BACI(GROUND

TO
BETRAYAL

The Tragedy OF' Vietnarn

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 CI(GROUND

TI{E TR,AGEDY OF \/IETNAM

HIIAIRE du BERRIBR

\r
Tl{E! AMERICANIST LIBRARY

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 INTRODUCTION
At the time this book is being published, the heated words
of dispute over what is really happening in Vietnam have
soared into a con-flagration. Everybody from Suzanne Labin
and Senator Dodd to Henry Cabot Lodge and Maxwell Taylor
has versions to give you of who is doing what to whom, and
why and for what puq)ose. And in some of these versions,
anyway, any resemblance to the truth is purely coincidental.
This book, however, is not concerned primarily with the
present tragedy iz Vietnam. Its subtitle is "the tragedy ot
Vietnam," which indicates a far longer perspective. The care-
fully stage-managed horror now being acted out in that un-
happy country is of great interest because of the undisclosed
purposes for which this fraud is being perpetrated and pro-
longed. But this volume is history, not conjecture. It was the
destruction and demoralization of anti-Communist groups and
leaders in South Vietnam, already carried out by the end of
the Eisenhower administration through the regime it had
imposed on the Vietnamese people, to which the current
confusion is but an epilogue. And regardless of whatever
whole new tragedy this confusion may be intended to serve
in turn as a prologue, the author of this book is simply attempt-
ing to make clear the background to the total betrayal.
It is apparent, to anybody who will study all of the antics
on this stage with prerequisite knowledge and objective vision,
that Communist influences are pulling strings and determining
actions on both sides, exactly as we now know to have been
the case in the Korean War. And it is entirely possible that a
repetition of that sham, on a far more extensive scale and
with far more serious aspects and results, might be in the
making.
A war between ourselves and the Chinese Communists, in
and supposedly over Vietnam, exactly as took place in Korea,
would enable leftwing influences in the present administration,
and their Soviet allies, to make even more effective use, than
has been achieved so far, of the highly publicized but wholly
fictitious feud between Red Russia and Red China. As in
World War II, the Soviets would again become our "noble
allies." Tloie rapprochement between our goverDment and the
Soviet government could be made visibly far greater, and in
d,etailed practical effect far more extensive than it is today.
And the regimentation that could be imposed on the American
people, by an administration which has already shown itself
to be hell-bent for tyranny, with this war against Red China
as the excuse, wotrld make the government controls of World
War II look like a study in free enterprise and personal liberty.
When Communist-led students and Communist front groups
parade and picket against 6ur' 1e[naining in Vietnan" right
while the actual results of our staying there continue to be so
damaging to any residue of real anti-Cornmunist strength in
that country, you can be sure that the plotters activating these
poor misguided puppets are seeking to support the belief, of
the even more misguided American peoplg that we teally ore
trying to save Vietnam from Communism-and are willing
to use lorce to do so. This psychological build-up of a willing-
ness on the part of the American people to accept a state of
war against the Red Chinese is just one of a great many straws
in the wind, indicating that such a phonily controlled' play-
acting, but horribly cruel wat, may be blowing towards us.
But this book is not written nor published because of, nor
is it in any way based on, any such hnrcthesis, or possibility.
Its purpose is merely to make available to the American people
a knowledge of what has gone before; a knowledge of the
situation that has gradually been created in Indoohina by
agencies of our government and the Communists working
together, ever since we put Ho Chi Minh in business with
onr money and equipmefi rn 1944. This is so that whatever
use is made of that situation in the future, the new develop-
memts can be well enough understood by enough of our fellow
citizens to keep those developments from being quite so
disastrous to our co'ntry'
Robert welch
 FOREWORD

At the end of the eighteenth century the Nguyen dynasty

reiped over Southern Amam, which lay to the South of
China. Tonkin, the province to the north of Annam and border'
ing on China proper (see maps in center section), had been
retaken from China and Nguyen power aPpeared supreme'
when a merciless revolt shook the land. The Nguyens were
swept away, and chaos succeeded them.
In France the first consul, Napoleon Bonaparte, was restor-
ing order to a tortured country and, in a great burst of energy'
Frinchmen sailed far and wide over the world. It was in 1801
that one of these leagued with a descendant of the Nguyens
and helped to bring Annam, the middle country' Tonkin to
the north, and Cochin China to the south, once more under
Nguyen rule. The Empire of Annam was born, and France
made her entry into the world that was to become known as
lo6sshina.
In 1858 a French naval force on its way home from a ioint
Franco-British expedition against China put in at a port about
half way up the east coast which the French commander,
Rigault de Genouilly, called Tourane and which the Americans
now know as Da Nang. From there the French sailed south
and occupied Saigon.
Four ylars later, in 1862, the Emperor Tu Dus gpanted
France a foothold on the east coast of his southern province'
Cochin China, and with it ceded the island of Poulo Condore,
noted today for its prison.
The following year, in 1863, King Norodom of Cambodia
placed himself under the protection of France. Then came
1866, the year of Francis Garnier's great exploration of the
Mekong River in search of a commercial route to the southern
provinces of China. In 1867 the west coast of Cochin China
was ceded to France. Six years later a minor incident led to
fighting and Francis Garnier occupied Hanoi to restore order.
Garnier was killed but the protectorate he established over the
northern province of Tonkin remained. Garnier's successor
was in turn killed in 1882. The following year war broke out
with China. French forces debarqued at Haiphong, defeated
vu
ry BACKGROLND TO BETRAYAL
the_C,hinese in a year of fighting and in 1885 signed the Tteaty
of Tientsin out of whicb two years later, France,s Indochina
Union came into being. On the east coast lay Vietnam, or the
Empire of Annam as it was also called. Landlocked l_aos
bordered Vietnam on the west. Soutl of Laos and wedged
between Siam and Vietnam was Cambodia.
Gradually Laos and the kingdom of Cambodia were added
to the protectorate which the French established. By l8g4 the
tlree lands were known as French Indochina
Tbree kingdoms had previously existed in Laos. The King-
dom of Luangprabang was an ally of Siam. Vientiane was-a
vessal of Annrm, and the kings of champassak were vassals of
the powerful rulers of Luangprabang untit Siam invaded the
country early in the ninetbenth centgry. Vientiane power wrls
desboyed by the Siamese, and thereafter the rulersbf Luang-
prabang reigned supreme. Under the French protectorate
France replaced Siam in the affairs of Laos, and the implanta-
tion of French culture continued unhindered in Indochinl until
1940, when Japan wrung permission from Admiral Decoux,
the lrench governor-general, to send in troops, supposedly to
see that material was not being transported tb Chinise foices
over the French railway to the north.
Admiral Decoux resisted as long as he could, but his position
was hopeless. He was cut off from France, his aviation was
non-existent, and his forces had ammunition for onlv a dav
and a half of fighting. Neither Britain nor America ** p*
pared to come to his aid.
Cordell Hull was America's secretary of state at the time.
French ambassador St. Quentin aske4 in Washington, ..Shall
we resist?"
*lf I were youI would yield," Mr. Hull replied.
According to Mr. Charles Bohlen's minutes of the Cairo-
Teheran papers, it was by a secret agreement between president
Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin on December !, !943, that
France's premature elimination from Southeast Asia and the
sowing of wars to come were effected. Franklin D. Roosevell
we are told qy, Mr. Bohlen, "was IOOVo in agreement [at
Teheranl with Marshal Stalin that France should not get back
Indochina."
The war that France fought to redain Indochina within the
French Community and free from communism terminated on
May 7, 1954, with the fall of the fortified position of Dien
Bien Phu, after five montls of heroic resistance.
Communist members of the French National Assemblv rose
 FOREWORD ix
to their feet and applauded when the assembly was informed
that Dien Bien Phu had fallen.
It was established that a one-hour strike by American planes
could have saved the beleaguered garrison and changed the
courle of history. On five separate occasions such a strike was
discussed, but each time reasons were found to rule out Ameri-
can rescue from the air.
The first such proposal came on March 25, 1954, when
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the ioint chiefs of
staff, and France's General Ely talked of a limiied tactical air
strike against the Vietminh, in view of the appearance of
Chinese heavy artillery and anti-aiicraft battbries at Dien
Bien Phu. Admfual Radford favored the strike. Chances of its
leading to massive Chinese intervention were considered nil.
Rather, it was believed that American determination would
discourage Peking from further adventures. Congress presum-
ably at the request of John Foster Dulles, the U. S. secretary
of state, vetoed the proPosal.
By April 2 the situation at Dien Bien Phu was becoming
desperate. Dulles' reaction was to call French Ambassador
Henri Bonnet for a one-hour talk and outline a nebulous, time-
consuming and probably unfeasible plan for joint action by
America, Australia, New Zealand and Britain. Paris saw it as a
prelude to internationalization of the conflict, without any
assurance that an anti-Communist victory was Mr. Dulles'
aim.
On April 23 Mr. Dulles was in Paris, preparing for the
forthcoming Geneva conference. Georges Bidault of France
showed him xtr urgent message from General Henri Navarre'
stating that only immediate, massive American air support
could save the garrison at Dien Bien Phu Mr. Dulles replied
that no such support was possible without a preliminary polit-
ical agreement with the other powers having vital interests n
Southeast Asia, particularly Great Britain. lais time Britatn
refused to co-operate.
Dien Bien Phu fell on May 7. Less than two weeks earlier
the conference had opened in Geneva. French Premier Laniel
asked U. S. Ambassador Dillon what the attitude of America
would be if an honorable peace could not be obtained or if'
before the end of the conference, the military situation should
deteriorate further. Ambassador Bonnet had instructions to put
the same question before the Department of State.
Principal points of the American reply, detvered on May 15,
were not encouraging. France must formally demand American
intervention. Britain, Thailand, the Philippin$, Australia and
X BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
New Zealand must receive the sarne request. Any iotervention
that might follow must be under the Unitea Nations. France
must openly declare the three states of Indochina independ-
enl even to permitting their secession from the French Com-
puqty, if they wished. Manifesfly \Mashington was playing
for time.
The fifth and last att'empt to enlist American support came
on _@l 24, when Foreign Minister Bidault appealea to Gen-
eral Walter Bedell Smith, then LI. S. undersecretary of state.
Smith held out some encouragement. Not only was eventual
air support possible, said he, but American marines could be
moved into Indochina without it constituting an act of war,
accordilg to the Constitution, or necessitating congressional
approval.
For several weeks the Laniel government clung to this final
hope. In the end even such support as Lebanon obtained in
tbree days in 1958 was refused. Allegedly a small group headed
by _Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson and the-generals
Ridgeway and TWining, and supported by the senators who had
consistently worked to block a French victory, was responsible
for Washington's final reply, a modified version of the con-
ditions specifed on May 15.
Dglrived of American support, the Laniel government fell
and Piene Mendes-France, the socialist, rose io conclude the
treaty by which Tonkin and that part of Annam above tle lTth
parallel were given to Ho chi ![inh, the Communist. Annam
below tle 17th parallel and all of Cochin China were to be
evacuated by the Communists until a referendum, set for 1956,
might decide under which ssqfisa-nerth or south-the coun-
try would be re-united.
Thus, by a circuitous route and at the cost of 120,000
casualties, French and native, the Roosevelt-Stalin accord of
December t, 1943, was fulfilled and the story of so-called
"free Vietnam" begrn,
Mr. Dulles, "A year will be enough for us to train the
- SaidVietnamese
South government and army to take oyer and be
on theil own."
Hilaire du Berrier

Note: Readers are urged to refer to the appendix section at

the rear of this volume. It is believed tnaf tne information
contained there will be an aid to understanding the story of
Vietnam.
 CONTENTS

Introduction v
Foreword vii
1 Vietnam 1

2 Bao Dai I3
3 Ngo dinh Diem 23
4 Ngo dinh Nhu and His In-Laws 34
5 The People Thwarted 42
6 The Binh Xuyen and the Cao Dai Sect 55
7 Nguyen Binh and the Hoa Hao 65
8 The Government American Supported 7t
9 The Beleaguered Man 80
10 The Battle of Saigon 9l
11 New Actors on the Stage 109
t2 A Victory for "Democracy" t2L
13 The Brai-nwashing Machine 130
14 The "Showcase for Democracy" at Work 147
15 The Blow Falls on South Vietnam's Chinese 155
16 The Downgrade Becomes Perceptible L64
17 The Police State .{merica Supported L75
18 Price Tag for Disaster t92
19 The Chain Reaction 203
20 Prelude to the End 214
2l The Scramble to Get Out from Under 226
22 Enter Cabot Lodge 235
23 The Explosion 251
Appendix 268
About the Author 278
Index 286
 Americans had no say in what was done in
their narne in South Vietnam.
,A small, firmly-knit group succeeded in
making South Vietnam the proving-ground
for their ideas, which millis$ s1 ViJdamese
will expiate in chains and for which alt
Americans rrill stand accused before History.

f
 CHAPTER ONE

VIETNAM

Vietnam is "the land to the south," which is to say the land

to tle south of China, where the center of the universe was
said to be. A rich patina of story hangs otsl lrigrnnm's stean-
ing jungles and spongy swamps. Strange tribes live in the high
central plateau to the north. In neighboring Cambodia existed
the ancient empire of the Khmers, builders of the sacred city
of Angkor Wat, around which, so the natives say, the forest
is traversed by phantom armies led by weeping queens on
shadowy elephants.
Above the 17th parallel is North Vietnam, the state of
Communist Ho chi Minh, whose followers call themselves
yie' inh, "ligbt of tle land." There are approximately 60,900
square miles to Ho chi Minh's couDtry with a pqlulation of
some 16,200,000.
South Vietnam, the land below the 17th parallel, has an area
of rougbly 66,350 square miles and a population between
15,000,000 and 15,500,000. The reunifcation of these two
Vietnams, under the East's concept or ouns, is the objective
that has made South Vietnam a battlefield. In this struggle, as
regards communism America's role was defensive, the role of
reaction, never initiative. Only in advancing the leader of our
choice were we aggressive. America staked her own prestige
and Southeast Asia's future on Ngo dinh Diem, an unknown
ascetic of sbange moods and violent rages. It was from a face-
less group in Washmgton with mternational ramifications, not
from his couDtrymen, that he received his mandate.
Our study of this struggle begins in the spring of 1954 in
Geneva, Switzerland. France had lost the cosfly battle of Dien
Bien Phu and the Laniel goyernment was groping for a way to
extricate itself from an unpopular war, though it meant the end
of a hundred years of occupation and the markets on which a
sector of the French economy existed.
Much drivel has been written about tle Communist victory
at Dien Bien Phu. For eight years Americans interest€d in
foisting Ngo dinh Diem on his countrymen and the American
I
 2 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
public, for reasons known only to themselves,
held up the
washington-im.posed_puppet as a miracle worker. -None
of the
e_xpe4s gave him a chance against the army
tn t n"n ait""t"J
the French," was ttre tine.parrottec,bt Aid* niJOfe-prrile,
who headed American n6"9s o1 VietnamT in" p"op"g_aj
$oot Tl up to circrrmvenj the,I,oreign aeents i"e"6ti""
I-aw. What experrs? Angier niAOb 6ukeT-poUfi"-r"f"tio*
lo:blrr Harold Oram? J6seph S"oi"g"irh"iustrian social-
it? Lieutenant General .,Iro; Mike;b;b;"L who left the
U._S. army to help sell Diem in AmericaiWerfiv
f.i.n"f, *[o
indockinated fteltudents itiiu"rrtq,
.of lVichiganlai"
the Diem hoax and called it eCucatiJni "tth
_,fhe real experts knew that the French debacle in Indo-
cnrna was no proof of Communist Vietminh invincibility.
American labor leaders through their connections
with-til;
french unions and French sociilists
Pierre Mendes-France's p.ersonal
t""* Gi Socialist leader
."pr".aot"tir" (who warf,;gi
commissioner in Indochina by'appointnent of premier
Laniel) was in contact
tF F: ir""i"g out
f9ry year and a hatf while "_-""-lr,
theirp;;;
Pt " Henri Navarre, the the Fiench-ffiy wus Agiti"l.
General French *.--e; knew that the
lattle of Dien Bien phu was l";tth, d"y ilbecarne known
6"_Laniel-government naa ae;Jio a'conference
*i!
L'eneva-r:rom that moment all the force Ho chi Minh coutd
in
muster was thrown into a frontal attack on
Dien Bien phu
a psychological;*;;;;pioit at the con-
f_::9:r-T.eain
terence table.
It was_ a Pyrrhic victory. Ho had no army with which to
ocjupl Laos, seize Cambodia and tbreaten'South Vietnam
when it was over. It would tave tarcn four
i""", to rebuild
4" ryy he had lost. But Fe Westwas-never i^rfa tm,i*Ei
left wished to justify surrender *iiinia-""i"*
9","+
*PnT to portray Diem, [\e labor leader's rcft
brother, as the
mir_acle man before whom
*.-*ir-
victorious
had lost confidence and halted.
on ttre march
The French regarded their sacrifices in Indochina
_,
standard-bearing strugqlg for Western civitization, as I
as did the
Americans in Korea. The Communist world
thizers depicted it as a rear-guard
and it ,lr_t":
to pi"rs;re cotgnietism
and nothing more. Naturally_ "ti*
tt" **6rence arranged in
w_as weighted tro.m Ae
9eneva $sl uguiosiiheirench. Britain,
France, Communist China and fiffi-;"[;d around the
table, with rhe United States lookin!;":
of China and Russia peerea
d; the shoulders
conm.nlst fro;hl-Ml"h,r_-il;is
MinisGr, Pham van -Dong.
Anthony Eden represented Britain's pivotal position,
bridg_
 VIBTNAM 3

ing East and West in the center of the see+aw. He alone had
a iepresentative in psking and his ,ountry traded on a large
scate with Russia. No one could accuse him of supporting
either Mao Tse-tung or Bao Dai, the Vietnamese ruler whose
country was on the operating table.
Moiotov spoke fol Russia, Chou En-lai for Red China'
Foreign Minister Georges Bidault for France, and Pham van
Dong for Ho chi Minh. Secretary of State Dulles flew in'
stayed for a few days and departed, leaving General Bedell
Smitt as his observer. Bao Dai the emperor of Vietnam and
chief of state, accompanied by his cousin, Prince Buu Loc, the
prime rninister, sat in the Verniaz Hotel in Evian, powerless
io a.ffect history in one way or the other while their affairs of
state were lsing settled.
As one by one the countries concerned took up their posi'
tions around the conference table in Geneva, the situation
looked sometfiing fifts rhis; Moloton when he bothered to be
civil, did so for reasons of propaganda. I{e wanted a peace that
would permit the infilfi'ation of soldiers without uniform,
politicai agents o1 1he \,rishinh, into areas still occupied by t\
Frencb, a peace that would permit a gradual dilution and
eventual elimination of everything representing the Occident
from Southeast Asia.
Chou En-lai waa not satisfied with a Communist triumph.
tlfu aim was the yellowing of the rest of Asia by comple0e
elimination of the white man. Time was working for him. He
and Ho chi Minh could afford to be patienL Unlike Eden and
Bidault and Bedell Smith, they did not have to reckon with
public opinion. Whether peace came or not was all the same
io them; they had only to await a more favorable ti*e and
reopeD hostilities.
Fham van Dong, the fieutenant and spokesman of Ho chi
114inh, was flanked by Molotov and Chou. The Chloese were
the theoreticians of the bloc, the most insulting' the most un-
yielding, but it was to the Russians that Dong was deferential.
Eden stoutly denied charges of neutralism but his thinking
was, nevertheless, along traditionat Bdtish mercantile lines'
na.mely that it was better to sacrifice half of Indochina ttran
risk any loss for England. He felt that communism should be
stopped, 6o1 lnds'china was neither the place nor the time.
Better to wait till Hong Kong or Malaya or Singapore were
tlreatened. In his pocket, as he negotia@4 was a telegram from
Nehru telling him to do anything as long as it meant peace.
No one knew where America stood. Monsieur Bidault com'
4 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
plained that lack of American support prevented his sowing
discord between the Chinese and the Russians.
Dien Bien Phu had fallen on May Z, 1954, after a heroic
resistance.
On May 11, at 10:30 a. m., Mr. Dulles held a Washington
press conference. He had just returned from Geneva. He-had
no statement to make, but he was ready to enswer questions.
Daniel Schorr of CBS asked if Southeist Asia could be de-
fended if Indoehina fell. Mr. Dulles replied, ..I believe so.,'
A murmur went tlrough the room. Another voice asked,
"Mr. Secretary, do you regard Laos and Cambodia us oeces-
sary for the defense of Southeast Asia?"
. 'oThey 41s important', replied Mr. Dulles, ,,but not essen-
tial."
To Monsieur Bidault, informed of the Dulles statements
while still at the conference table, they had the effect of a
knife between the shoulder blades. Notice had been served
that come what might, America would not intervene. Behind
piapU! {ne support of a war-weary France dropped alarm-
ingly. Britain knew, France knew, and the orgoiiutiog i"d,
knew that the game was over. Admiral Radford was moie ihan
disappointed; he had previously stated that if Indochina fell
the sole ls6aining line for the defense of the southeast Asia
peninsula would run from the Kra Isthmus across Malaya, a
continental line which the British had held for three days
against the Japanese and which president Eisenhower had
described as "barely defendable."
Mr. Dulles' statements before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations a few days later were equally conducive to
disaster for the West. He said, .,The United Stutei ca" intervene
in Indochina only tlrough the United Nations." It was the
Red bloc's green light.
. B-idaylt.wan!9d peace, but not at any price. His reproach
to the United States was not for having iefused interiention
!* fgl letting the belligerent Reds, a=wavering Eden, and
Bidaulfs political enemies in France, know that he-could expect
no support from America-and this at the moment whei he
was fighting with his back to the wall. A few days later the
Laniel government, in which Bidault was ministei of foreign
lff_airs, fell, to be followed by the government of pierre
Mendes-France, the socialist.
It was Premier Mendes-France who terminated the long
drawn out conference at Geneva giving Ho chi Minh the arei
of Vietnam north of the l7th parallel.-Bao Dai was given the
area to the south and a promise of a referendum in -1956 for
 VIETNAM 5
the reunification of the country. As tle
date for that referen-
lum approached, the American press, essentially pro-Mendes-
France but anti-French (see for example tne a.iicie by Joseph
Buttinger in the special issue of the New Leader Aaiea fuie
27, 1955), reproached France for having sold out Vietnam
at Geneva. Ignored was the fact that the finat terms of the
Geneva accord of. 1954 were the work of Mendes-France
and of him sle1e, and were terms that had much tb do with
Frlqce'g repudiation of Mendes-France eighteen months later.
toppling of the Laniel government on June
_ -Mendes-France's
f 8 was accomplished by a clnning combination of anti-Arner-
lganism and leftist demagoguery: He charged that Monsieur
Bidault had Aied to bring about an American intervention
that would have started another world war. On ass,ming
tle premicrship his frst act was to quash an indictment againsi
the heavily Communisl-infltratnd, dbservateur for teatin! mn-
itary information to the Vietminh. Outstanding on tlJ Or-
servateuls editorial staff was Daniel Guerin, who later or-
ganized the "anti-fascist" committees within the French army
for $e puq)ose sf ffting and pushing reports made by Com-
munist-trained draftees against their officers. (Guerin wrote
$e b_oo\ The Popular Fro,nr.) Such was pierre Mendes-France,
the Socialist whose lectures were to become the gospel on
European affairs at America,s Brandeis University. itden the
French Surete raided Guerin's paris apartment early one
morning in the winter of 1956, a Brandeis University pro-
fessor was there.
_Ame:ica's replacement of France in Southeast Asia dates
ofrcially from Mendes-Frrnce,s granting of complete inde.
pendense in 1954 to
lhe French Union, which is roughly
parallel to the British Commonwealth. It was no secret ihat
international forces described as ..liberal" bad worked cease-
Iessly toward the destruction of France,s empire since the
earlyyears of World War II. A significant par{graph in Gen-
eral Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe aeals with president
Roosevelt's- trip to Egypt prior to the invasion of europe. iie
complained tlat th: president showed no interest in thi prob,
1".-r pof- Iogting Ope_ration Overlord, the invasion of Er.iope,
his. mind teing entirely occupied with plans for France,s
cbl-
onies and his determination that they should not return to
their pre-war status. There were no few men around the
president, from State Department's information section to his
closest advisors, to feed constanfly that determination and
to advance to key positions Americans who would further
such a policy. Whether the policy favored the advancement
6 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
of communibm by chance or was designed to that end is
something no congressional committee is ever likely to make
clear.
Ow first Indochina policy was only a general one existing
in the minds of a few well-placed men. It lasted from 1940
to the end of World War II and aimed at the elimination of
French influence. There was no opposition to it, for the policy
was never opeDly declared' It was the period of great friend-
ship with [ussia and an almost childish dte'm of a Jean
Jadques Rousseau post-war world wherein, by simply driving
out the colonialists, the little people of Africa and Asia
would revert to "their original, good, and peaceful states."
The second American policy n Indochina lasted from
1945 to a date that is hard to establish because it did not
end abruptly; it embarrassedly tiptoed oy! We might set it
as 1951. It was a continuation and natural development of the
first and marked the period of our active support of Ho chi
Minh. Ho, educated in Moscow's Orient University, had been
sent to China in 1925 with Borodin, the agent charged with
the communization of China. Ho was arrested in Hong Kong
in 1931 and was later expelled as head of the bureau of the
third international, which was entn$ted with the preparation
of Communist revolutions in Southeast Asia.
AfterV-J Day French resistance goups whose members had
risked their lives to aid Americans and rescue downed pilots
in Indoshina (against the explicit orders of the British, under
whose command they were *) were pushed aside with a hasty
sowing of freedom medals, and overnigbt American political
and military support was thrown behind Ho chi Minh.
Any American who warned against the possible results of
such a policy, or who expressed forebodings based on long
Far East experience and knowledge of the personalities we
were using and supporting, was ruthlessly dropped if in Amer-
ican employ and blacklisted if he were not, on charges that
he was 'korking against America." As those attempting to
warn America saw it, the picture looked ssmsthing like
this:
Ho chi Minh had returned to Indochina after V-J Day
(August 15, 1945) with an elastic timetable but two inflexible
goals. First, he was to beguile us into helping him drive out
the French. \Mith Indochina in hi.s hands the communiza-
tion of Southeast Asia would be simple. In 1941 the Chinese
t BritFin, looking ahead to tho post-waf, period when France would
again be a commercial rival, wished to prevetrt Franco from having any
cleim to American gratitude. Franco-American cooperatioa in tho Far
East could bo an obstacle to British policies and commerce.
 VIETNAM 7
southern commander, Chang Fa-kwei, had recognized Ho chi
Minh as head of a "government in exile" in Luchow, on
Chinese soil, where Ho had taken refuge. Chang Fa-kwei had
his eyes on the rich provinces of Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kwang-
tung as possible fiefs for himself. He counted on Ho to drive
out the French after American arrns fiad sliminlfed the
Japanese; then he would suppress Ho and spread a sort of
war lord control southward over Tonkin. As we shall see later,
on behalf of the U. S., General George C. Marshall was will-
ing to agree to this if the Chinese nationalist government at
Nanking would accept Mao and Chou.
Within three years of its founding, I{o's shadow government
in Luchow was enjoying full diplomatic status and receiving
a streiun of American arms. In return for this, OSS agents
were being fed reports of prodigious feats against the Japanese.
Actually there was only one instance on record of any friction
between the Vietminh and the Japanes+an incident in an
isolated village where eight Japanese were killed. Af0er V-J
Day it was to Ho and his American-equipped forces that the
Japanese surrendered more arms, well aware of the trouble
it would cause Japan's enemies, the Americans and the
Chinese and the French.
Ho made good use of his Moscow training. Conscious of
the importanca of his first impression on the allied missions
entering Indochina, he held his troops in check. They were
well disciplined, spreading out in an orderly p4nns1 srhile
political agents worked on Vietnamese nationalists and Western
allieg aliks.
Vietnamese anti-Communists were assured by Ho that
everything would be all right. He had the Americans behind
him a1d would form a national government in which all
parties would be represented as soon as the French were
ousted.
"Bug" he insisted to the Vietnamese, "it is important that
you recognize me as the leader of the united nationalist front.
I have to play down your importance because the Americans
are not satisfied with the passive role you played in the war
against the Japanese. If you start assertingyourselves and chal-
lenging my authority, the Americans will support the Frencb-,'
__
It is hardly likely that all of the Ameri-ans taken in by
Ho's agents were loyal, qrsll-ms4ning dupes. Mr. Harold R.
Isaacs, the Newsweek correspondent whose articles of that
period glorified Ho as a native George \{6hing{on, could
not have been completely fooled. Mr. Isaacs had been a
journalist in Shanghai in 1931 and L932 at the time when
8 BACKGROI]ND TO BETRAYAL
Ho-waq elnglled from Hong Kong for his revolutionary work
as head of the Southeast Asia bureau of the Communist third
international. That was the Shanghai period of American
Communist Eugene Dennis and the master German Com-
rrunisf spy, Richard Sorge. Mr. George Sheldon, the OSS
ofrcer who returned to Saigon to continue his support of
Ho chi Minh from a desk is the U. S. embassy, mrist have
worked with his eyes open, both as an American vice-consul
then and later as an International Co-operatioa ddministra-
tion ofrcial in Saigon.
Le Xuan, the Vietnamese boy who worked as General phillip
^a
Q{aghe1 s interpreter and who, after V-J Day, hitchhiked
ri{e, to Sh-anghai in the general's plane to siir up a revolt
gf a"f*iF troops in tle French garrison, could iever deny
his culpability if confronted with the details of his machina-
tigns oJ that period. Down and out in paris in 1956, I-e Xuan
offered a report of his nine years in the employ of American
intelligence to both the Russians and the nritiSn. The French
already had it. 1a this detailed account, I-e Xuan named his
American
_contacts, particularly blaming Major Batty and
Professor Knapp, both OSS officers, for ..tricking. him into
being a spy for the Americans, then dropping him without
money 3ffs1 ning years of what Le Xuan iermed ..loval
services.!'
-This-
Le Xuan report has particular interest. He told how,
when it came time for the Americanq to leave Indochina
they took him to Bangkok with them ..because tle French
would kill him if he stayed behind.,, He stated that at ttre
r.equegt of the Americans he helped organize the Vietham-
American Friendship Association, Lenina wnicn Ho chi Minh's
supporters operated from Bangkok, Thailand. Le Xuan con_
tinued that work. In Bangkok he was supplied with a camera
and a press card from Siam Rath Newi-Agency as a blind,
and was then sent on missions to Hamburg, Ceneva and Spain.
This, it must be borne in mind was during the period when
American liberals were working to undeimine-the Franco
government. (In mid-1959 I_e Xuan was reporled to be em-
Ployd again by the American army, giving aptitude tests in
Paris.)
Whatever part I-€ Xuln played in organizing the friendship
association mentioned, there is evidenci of exiemely efficient
Communist direction behind the apparently guileleis natives
-were
?nd cause-hungry Americans who taten in by it. The
friendship association spread to America, and was-incorpo-
rated in the State of New York as a non-profit organizatisn
 VIETNAM 9
on June 28, 1946, with headquarters at 796 Ninth Avenue,
New York City, in an apartment rented by one Andr6 Pham.
Litfle investigation was done about Pham in our postwar
enthusiasm for "oppressed" peoples. In 1944 Paul de Wasch
of 256 West 52 Street posted a $500 bond for Mr. Pham and
Nathan Sinkmnp acted as his attorney. That was all that was
known. Pham's group published a propaganda organ known
as tbe Vietnamese Bulletin, which was printed by Fred Lurch
on West 52 Street. The line of communications between Pham
and his principals ran tbrough a Vietnam center at 543 Sylom
Road, Bangkok, a Vietnamese on Pacific Avenue in San
Francisco, and the Indian consul-general in Saigon.
Among the members and sympathizers of the association
we find such names as Robert Delson, editor of the Sociallst
Call and lawyer for the Worker's Defense League; Richard J.
Walsh, Harold R. Isaacs, Norman Thomas, Virginia T. Adloff,
Anthony Vangly, Clara Clayman, Pearl Buck, J. J. Singh,
Roger Baldwin of American Civil Liberties Union; and Mr.
George Sheldon, the OSS officer who returned to Saigon as
an American vice-consul and whose report on Indochina ap
peared in the Far Eostern Survey, of The Institute of Pacific
Relations, on Decembet 18, 1946. Miss Maud Russel, con-
nected with a group describing itself as For a Democratic
Far Eastern Policy, was on the subscription list of Pham's
bulletin. The full list of those connected with our 1946 med-
dling-which was as misguided as our 1954 meddling with
the internal politics of this region-would make an interesting
history, as would the list of sympathizers attending the Vietnam
friendship organization's dinner at New York's Hotel McAlpin
in 1948, and the speeches these sympathizers made.
The Korean War brought to the American in the streel
and at a painful price, sudden realization of where he was
being taken. Without a ripple the Vietnam-American Friend-
ship Association faded from sight, its activators sliding un-
obtrusively into other fronts, entrenching themselves in the
overlapping folds of our ponderous and intrigue-ridden aid
agencies, or in the overstaffed ranks of our foreign service
and intelligence agencies. Robert Delson was to turn up a
decade later as legal counsel for the American Committee on
Africa, the chaotic continent where the officials responsible
for our debacle in Indochina were, by coincidence or other-
wise, appearing as consuls and ambassadors.
Disillusionment with Ho chi Minh was never openly ad-
mitted. The Ho camp in America simply folded its tent like
the Arabs and silently stole away to another camping ground
10 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
when the North Koreans started rolling southward. Overnight
lndsshinl became a second front, potentially capable of
tying down Communist Chinese forcei who might otherwise
be deployed against United Nations troops in Korea. A fever-
ishly active third period of American policy was ushered in.
Military, diplomatic, and economic missions were rushed to
tle er.nbatfled French, who were being pressed by the enemy
America had armed in 7945 and supported ever since. But
our officials made no pretense of pointing out the Communist
menace to the young Vietnamese intellectuals they had told
to refuse all co-operation with the French until given complete
and immediate independence. MacArthur fought commuiism,
but colonialism was the enemy our State Department was
fighting. A firm, centralized French command was necessarv
to the prosecution of the war, but we merely went tbrougi
the motions of supporting it.
Policy number three was, superficially at least, a volte lace
from policies one and two, buiGenerai fHlip Gallagher'was
never reproached for having broadcast over Ho chi Minh's
radio in 1946. He was transferred to, of all places, Orleans,
France.
It must also be remembered that the Americans who had
been tbrown out of government service for opposing policy
number two, and whom time had proved right^, werl nevei
taken off the blacklist. They were never given another govern-
ment job. But the men who had supporied Ho chi Ir4inn ana
ousted every loyal American counsiling against it, remained
where they were. They were the oneJ charged with imple-
menting the new policy, which was in direct contradiction to
everything they had worked tirelessly and ruthlessly to achieve.
It.was to them that any military and pottical missions charged
wrtn co-operation with the French were sent for guidance and
"expert advice." How enthusiastically the old team followed
their new orders is open to question.
_
A parallel fact is worth noting. Loud and vociferous com-
plaints rose from the American left against this third policy
of support for the French against ffo ihi Minh. A eroup of
professors, an Austrian socialist leader and naturalized Amer-
ican, a State D€partment "specialist on Indochina" who had
never lived there, the political tacticians of labor, and mud-
dled-thinkers by the score opposed our official policy in speech
and print. None was accused of ,.working agiinst-Amelica,"
or otherwise ttueatened.
The extent to which official sabotage of policy number three
and protection of its detractors extended may Ue deduced from
 VIETNAM 11
a conversation Monsieur Jean Letourneau, the French minister
for overseas aftairs, had with an official high in our govern-
ment, on one of Monsieur Letourneau's trips to Washington.
Said the official, whose name Monsieur Letourneau would not
divulge in mid-1959 because the man was still in our govern-
ment, "I will not hide the fact from you that I and an-impor-
tant number of my colleagues desire to see a Ho chi Minfr
v_lctory in Indochina and we will do all in our power to achieve
that end."
Policy nrnber three continued until the end of the Korean
War. America was then no longer involved in Far East fight-
ing. The Korean settlement in 1953 removed all but theoretical
American interest in prolonging the war in Indochina or
maintaining the French. Slowly but inevitably, from the mo-
ment a diversionary war in the south ceased to be necessarv
to draw Red Chinese arms and manpower from the Korean
front, American interest in France-veisus-communism waned.
It had a last rally on its death-bed, inspired partly by the gal-
Iant defense of Dien Bien phu and partly Ly a sudden ind
gr.im public realization that a Recl v1ctory might set unpre-
dictable events into motion. But it was noi enough to lead us
beyond
lympathy, weapons and money. The Frlnch expedi-
tionary force_ did the dying. For many who survived, u fi.oe
was already feing prepared in Algeria by the same men and
groups who had advised and armed Ho chi Minh in Indo.
china.
, The fourth and final phase ol our policy in what had been
known as Indochina was a natural consequence of policies
one, two, and three, It can be described as America,s experi-
ment with the cult of the personality, the picking of a -man
ald the backing of that man against his country lather than
the country against communism. General O'Daniel mav be
legarded as the principal military exponent of this pdhcy.
Numerous senators and State Department officials advanced
it on the political level. Since the biother of the man on whom
America's hopes were placed and prestige risked was a labor
leader in Saigon, American labor and its allies of the inter-
national socialist left reached out to practice diplomacy and
a form of international politics of their own.
Under this fourth period of American policy in South Viet-
1nm, the same sotd front of support appeared that had pro_
tected Ho chi Minh in 1945 and 1946. A new propaginda
front organization, The American Friends of Vietnam,
#r*l
up yher-e the-old pro-Ho Vietnam-American Friendrnip -arsi
ciation had been. A loyal American could no longer write
12 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
an honest report on anything that our activists in Vietnam
were doirg without fear of retaliation. Reports rrnfavorable
to the man America was backing were not judged, statement
by statement, on a scale of truth or untruth. They were re-
jected outright and their authors threatened with trumped-up
charges and loss of passports for "working against Amerisa."
If they were government employees they were transferred.
Nowhere else in American society or politics did this or-
ganizsd, high-handed machine of retaliation function so ruth-
lessly against all criticism. The man it protected was Ngo
dinh Diem.
Our press and certain officials complained bitterly that
the accord of March 8, 1949, which gave Vietnam a relation-
ship to France similar to that Canada enjoys with Britain, did
not grant sufficient independence. It granted enough, however,
that between March and August of 1950 the personnel in the
American legation rose from seven to one hundred. One
hundred earnest liberals, each of whom, with the exception
of one able minister, Donald Heath, considered himself a
soldier in the war against colonialism. France that year spent
$614 million, or ten percent of the national budget to fight
Ho chi Minh, the enemy in front. No one told thinking Ameri-
cans about the sabotage in the rear.
Four years later the American in the street still knew nothing
of the long-range planning that was going on; but the New
Leader, the political organ of the AFL-CIO, on February 22,
1954, four months before Diem was eased into power, carried
an article oy David J. Dallin entitled "How to Win in Indo-
china." American labor, reaching out into diplomatic and mili.
tary spheres where tt had no business, was already dictating
policies that in ten short years were to bring America to the
brink of a disaster as grim as Dien Bien Phu.
 CHAPTER TWO

BAO DAI

Bao Dai, the former emperor, reigned again in South Viet-

nam under the title of chief of state when America replaced
the withdrawing French. American prestige was at an all-time
high, and South Vietnam was supposed to be America's show-
sase for democracy. Here was America's frst experiment at
replacing the discredited colonials of Europe and introducing
a government and life generally prefaced as "American way
sf-' 61d held to be the ideal for all the world.
Bao Dai, the son of Khai pinh, emperor of Annam (Bao
Dai means Guardian of Greatness) ascended the tlrone in
1925 at the age of twelve. Bao Dai was not a resolute ruler.
Neither was he as bad as the press-more determined to rid
the world of monarchs than to use constitutional monarchy
as an ideal against Communist totalitarianisr-has painted
him. General MacArthur had good reason for preserving the
tlrone in Japan. That Bao Dai was irresolute is incidental. He
would have passed in time. The monarchy, had it been strength-
ened, could have served the country in its civil wat and con-
tributed to stability.
Bao Dai was charged by his detractors with having col-
laborated with the Japanese. He had yielded to Japanese pres-
sure, subscribed to Japan's "greater East Asia" theme and
abolished the treaties with France. Those who tried to nego-
tiate with the Japanese military from a position of weakness
found it hard honestly to blame him.
The Japanese of the war period conducted themselves more
like savage beasts than either diplomats or soldiers. They were
drunk with a power that took the combined forces of Britain
and America four years to defeat. The helpless Bao Dai agreed
to anything, then resisted in the only way he knew, with
complete immobility. The same cannot be said for Sukarno
and other leaders we have supported since. Our press, in its
buildup for the kill, accused Bao Dai of having collaborated
with Ho chi Minh in the postwar period. Ihey overlooked the
fact that Ho chi Minh was armed and supported druing that
13
T4 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
period by us, the power to whom Bao Dai was expected to
look for leadership. Behind Bao Dai stretched a line of nine
kings, four of whom had died in exile, the others under more
or less natural circumstances. The main reason for the throne's
loss of power had been its inability to oppose the French
victoriously. Beneath Bao Dai, in a twisting, seiling mass that
the wife of an Americap charg6d'affaires was later to compare
with a basket of eels, writhed Vietnam. The political spectrum
ranged from communism to tle conservatism of old Asia's
mandarins, from patriotism to self-interest and from idealism
to plain love of intrigue. Bao Dai's life was not the sinecure
it has been painted.
Had much effort been directed to strengthening Bao Dai
as
as was employed in ruining him, and with him the monarchy,
a strong Vietnam directed by a premier heading a broad-based
popular government might have welded the disparate groups
into a solid front against the Reds. Bao Dai could have been
replaced by his son, Bao Long, under a regency headed by
Bao Dai's wife the empress, Nqm Phuong. Given independence
after the war with Ho chi Minh, and guidance not primarily
committed to the establishment of a socialist republic, the
dynasty might have survived and in time regained its force.
It was never given the chance.
America's first direct contact vrith Bao Dai at the Geneva
conference of. 1954 was also America's first indication of what
we intended to do, f-anything, in lndochina. Mr. Dulles had
flown back to \ryashington. The conference was deadlocked.
It was Sunday afternoon, the end of April.
General Bedell Smith entered a hired Cadillac bearing li-
cense plate VD 14 724.Withthe State Department eagle flying
from the radio antennae. he drove to the hotel in Evian where
Bao Dai and his cousin, Prince Buu Loc, the premier, were
staying. There the three men talked for an hour and fifteen
minutes.
The essence of what General Bedell Smith had to say wan
this: I do not believe that you and the French can get an
honorable armistice out of the Communists. They do not want
to share the country, and neither do you. You must continue
the war and, at the same time, continue to negotiate peace.
Eisenhower c?nnot intervene directly, as in Korea, for internal
political re,Nons. He was specifically elected on a platform of
G.I. return from Korea; he cannot turn around now and send
them to Indochina. But we can give you the strong Vietnamese
army you lack. We will train your army. You will have your
own generals and general staff. Put pressure on the French
 BAO DAI 15

to let us instruct your new divisions; that is the limit ol our

lntervention.
No fault can be found with the general's proposition. It
sounded straightforward and sensible. At the time a satis-
factory negotiated peace seemed unlikely. Continued resistance,
if it was backed by American support and encouragement, was
certainly advisable, coDsidering the state of Ho chi Minh's
army after Dien Bien Phu.
Yet for all of Bedell Smith's apparent sincerity, Bao Dai
must have had some second thoughts. The man is no fool.
At times, in a pinch, he has shown rare intelligence, and those
tight spots in which only good judgment saved his life gave
him svsry reason for being cynical. He showed no resentment
when General Bedell Smith told him that Mr. Dulles had
been called home suddenly; otherwise he would have come in
person. It is a safe guess, however, that a year later, when
told that Mr. Dulles had boasted that he had never con-
tacted Bao Dai or spoken to him in person, Bao Dai was not
surprised. He had a memory.
What of this emperor whom the entire American press tore
to shreds in the spring of 1955? Cartoonists sneered at him
and men supposed to be supplying news tore at him with a
savagery never applied to Stalin. No one attempted to tell the
story of the foreign-educated young Son of Heaven who re-
turned to his country at the age of eighteen thinking he was
going to reign, and who learned that his job was to sign papers
prepared by petty civil servants whom he despised. And to
whom could he explain his position?
Accordingly he drew more and more into himself. His
energy he released by hunting tigers. The young liberals who
knew nothing of his problems accused him of betraying nis
country, but did nothing to help him to strengthen it.
Then came the mereiless years under the Japanese, the con-
stant pressure to join Japan's "greater East Asia" movement
and declare war on the West. Bao Dai navigated the shoals
till the morning in March of 1945 when the Japanese decided
to exterminate the French. Bao Dai knew nothing about it.
He was in the jungle, tracking elephants, when a Japanese
regiment suddenly surrounded him. A Japanese general handed
him a paper which he was summarily told to sign if he wanted
to live.
The emperor did what he had done all his life. His policy
was to ride the tide and see wbat could be done later. So he
afrxed his seal to the paper, dispossessing the French and pro-
elniming independence.
16 BACKGROTIND TO BETRAYAL
He knew the Japs were about to collapse but what he did
not know was that what was to follow them would be worse.
The minute the Jap grip relaxed, Ho chi Minh sent him
potler papu to sign, accompanied by a tireat. It was regard-
ing Bao Dai's abdication. Bao Dai signed it. What ehe Jodd
he do? Bear in mind, Ho chi lv{inh, not Bao Dai, was the
post-war prot6g6 of Anerica's General philip E. Gallagher,
who represented the greatest power on earth; and Uo,s ptui
was to both use Bao Dai and destrov him.
So the title of emperor was replaced by supreme councillor
and the "Son of fleaven" was taken away frbm his wife and
family and carted off to Hanoi to be paraded at Communist
meetings under the name of citizen Vinh Tuy. His wife and
children were held as hostages back in Annam.
Someone once wrote, "A king who has fallen must see
strange sights, so bitter a thing is the heart of man.', Not one
of the smart American journalists axing Bao Dai ever bothered
to mention the period he spent in Ho chi Minh's hands as a
living dead man with his life hanging by a tlread. A false step,
a slip of the tongug the slightest error would fuays cosl hiil
h,rs head. Everything depended on his art of dissimulation, the
ability to keep smiling, to act contented, to go tlrough the farce
of auto<riticism and avowed repentance. Nothing-was spared
!im, eveq to- letting "Uncle IIoi, embrace him in public. nut
General Gallagher was sitting beside ,,Uncle flo,' in his box
in the opera house in Hanoi in those davs.
The Vietminh carefully calculated oe* w"ys of insulting
Bao Dai, even to inviting him to rtinner with his formei
chauffeur. And Bao Dai had to profess to like it. It was a
ryryr of living from one day to the next, but each day he
tn-e net closing tighter. A mistake, a gesture, anA he wbrild
felt
have been put to death.
TWo years later Bao Dai told his cousin, ..At night I used
to ask myself lnhy haven't they liquidated me?' ', yet he knew
the answer. They did not dare b-ecause of the anger of the
masses. The Reds knew that the man they were degrading was
still, for millions of little people, their emperor, . iivine -being
whose death the heavens would avenge by some frightful
calamity.
Therefore, while the masses were being reeducated, it was
the game of Ho and the Tong Bo, his Communist committee,
to,go on using Bao Dai even as they discredited him. The
political commissaires preached that he was nothing but a
traitor who must be destoyed with all the superstitions sur-
rounding him. Strangely enough, in almost identical words,
 BAO DAI t7
David Schoenbrun, of Columbia Broadeasting System, wrote
in Collief s magezine of September 30, 1955, ;Olem must not
oDly remove Rao Dai, but do it in such a way that he no longer
has any usefulness as a symbol of Vietnamese unity."
Mr. Schoenbrun, with never a word about thosi harrowing
months in the hands of the Reds-for to mention them would
have knocked his thesis into a cocked hat-used the argument
that if Bao Dai were not destroyed he might become a fossible
turncoat to the Reds. Actually there was no reason, witn tne
unpredictable dangers ahead, why any symbol of Viehamese
unity should be deliberately destroyed, much less one that
Ho chi Minh wished with all his heart to see exterminated, and
this was one who, havrng been bitten once, would never walk
into a VieFinh trap again if he could help it.
As 1945 drew to a close Bao Dai tnew he was living on
borrowed time. The moment the emperor image was destr6yed
there would be no reason for maintaining crlt:u:eo Vinh Trry.
Ho chi Minh and hrs committee were as obsessed with the
necessity of destroying their prisoner in 1945 as David Schoen-
brun wiul ten years later, but their immediate preoccupation
was to break him morally as well as politically. bao Dai,s life
depended on his being able to convin& his captors that he was
no longer gapable, mentally or morally, of-working against
e"T:lt th_e slightest manife5laliep oi inaepenOencJtney
would have had him shot.
. So dawned
rrom
t946. By this time Lu Han, the Chinese warlord
y'rnnan proyince, was lool:ng Indochina by
virtue of
the Potsdam agreement which authdrized Chiang kai_shek to
accept Japanese surrender in northern Indochina. Lu Han had
1l*lyt Tu."".9HTg trouble, so Chiang dangled tne oppor-
looting France's colony down- to rie l6rh pari,ltet
fryty :{
hts aJTogant warlord, get him yunnan.
9elgle to out of While
l-u-Hg1's personal troops strippid everything in their path in
Indochina like a horde of loiists, Chi'*C int anothi.r gen-
,"]4
b-*"gy Yunnan"_ for such was the iay of doing thTngs
ln the East. Ho chi Minh and his military commander beneral
Giap knew that if they kills6 Bao Dai, Lu Han would use it as
an excuse to wipe out their Red regime.
_ tuJqg $9 Tong Bo the debatJraged. Was it wiser to risk
Bao Dai's fafling into the hands of Lu Han, or would it be
to-
,b:ttgJ take the plungg execute him and have done with it?
yntl_e_ th-ey argued, a mob trooped into the town under
Lu Han's -protection, cVing, ..Llng
five Bao Dait,' The
Tong Bo, the dreaded Red counsil, dlcided that assassination
was too dangerous. They moved their prisoner to a village in
18 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAI.
the lonkin delta where he was held under house arrest in a
hut, wondering each day whether it would be a ball in the
head or poison in his food. A month passed, then Ho shi Minh
arrived, all smiles. In his pocket was an order for execution.
However, he embraced Bao Dai and said, "I want you to
become head of the government. t will be your assistant, your
Number TVo." Then the oriental game began.
Bao Dai protested that he was not worthy of the job. The
honor was too great. For hours the subterfuge, the insistence
on the part of Ho and the claims of abject incapacity oy
Bao Dai, went on. Had he yielded the suspicions of the Tong
Bo would have been substantiated: He still had ambition and
could, if opportunity presented, be tempted to head a move,
ment, in which case he should be shot on ttre spot.
By lr'lling Ho's suspicions, Bao Dai got back to Hanoi.
There Ho and Giap were having their troubles with the
Chinese. The insatiable Lu Han was demanding more and
more money. How was Lu Han to know that where he was
going his rapacrty was to avail him nothing? When the time
came, it was not to Yunnan that he was to return, loaded with
treasure. Chiang piled Lu Han and his army on boats and
shipped them to Manchuria, where Mao Tse.tung and Chou
En-lai exterminated all but Lu Han and his personal guard.
But that was yet to come. Wealth, not war against ssmmunism,
was Lu Han's prime consideration, in his ignorance of the fact
that communism would soon destroy him.
Ho chi Minh and his councillors were desperate and here
they made their big mistake. They sent Bao Dai to bargain with
Yunnan's insatiable warlord. It was the first chance that pre-
sented itself for a getaway and Bao Dai grabbed it. Lu Han
put him on an American plane bound for Nanking.
No sooner was Bao Dai installed in Nanking in 1946, than
General Marshall-there to talk Chiang Kai-shek into takiog
the Reds into his government-y/ent to see him. Marshall
ofiered Bao Dai big things, but his conditions were exorbitant
The final clause, in essence, was, "Do not have too many
ambitions. Vietnam is only an artificial countxy. Tonkin 15
really a meridional province of China and must go back to
her." Marshall was having trouble getting Chiang tb accept
Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai and their Communist hordei.
To make the pill easier to swallow he bad conceived the idea
of offering Chiang Tonkin as a sweetener, which in turn en-
tailed ofiering Bao Dai something in return for signing a paper
dismembering his country, while his signature wls still worth
something. This time Bao Dai refused. Certain Americans with
 BAO DAI 19
interests at stake in Marshall's game never forgave him.
That was when Bao Dai went to Hong Kong. Everyone
abandoned him. Had it not been for some of his friends in the
Bank of Indochina he would have had lsthing.
The year 1946 drew to a close. For Bao Dai the future
looked black. However, a reaction was setting in among the
humble toilers in the jungle villages and rice paddies. Not
content with levying taxes for the war against the French, the
Vietminh had set out to destroy everything that pertained to
their country's past civilization. Ho's class war and the terror
that accompanied it were spread to the smallest hamlet.
Notables and the rich were wiped out mercilessly, with the
dregs of the village doing the executing. All of the laws of
religion and tradition were profaned. The young insul&d the
old, sons turned against their fathers, youngsters denounced
their families. Who could doubt that these sacrileges were
the cause of all their calamities?
Annam's ansient hierarchy rose from village notable to
emperor, fu1 witftin each level all men observed with respect
the consideration due to their ancestors, to the old, to Heiven
and to ttre emperor. In this system it was the emperor who
served as intermediary between the deities and man. Each
year in his palace in Hue he traced the frst furrow, that the
harvest might !s bountiful in his land.
The villagers had had enough of murder and longed for the
old days. Monsieur Leon Pignon was French high commis-
sioner in lndsshina at the t:me. Pignon watched the fence-
straddling, the collaboration and profiteering of the Vietnamese
in the cities and looked for a way to bring Vietnam into the
war to save herself. fs him, the masses of the country were
!!e answer. He started, cautiously at firs! then insistently, on
his plan to bring back Bao Dai.
- The formcr
pnaken
emperor, who was then in Hong Kong and
by everybody, overnight became sought atter. He
found himself with a court. Yet, broke as he was, he was not
going to go back merely to sign papers. If there was a chance
of saving the country, it depended on his convincing his people
that he was not a puppet. And he bad no illusions; he knew
that the ever-increasing weight of Red China would eventually
burst tlrough like a flood. He also knew the Vietminh snd
their methods.
It was n 1947 that the first French emissary, Monsieur
Cousseau, was dispatched to Hong Kong to negotiate terms
-international
{or-Bao Dai's return, and with that trip the
intrigues began. Britain entered into the gaie, anti€ommunist
 2; BA.KGR'UND To BETRAYAL
in principle but still happy if they could torpedo anything
planned by the French. Vietnamese appeared tom nowhere
to surround the exile they had abandoned. Like flie.s attracted
to a bowl of sugar, they swarmed back and swore fidelity.
Among them was Bao Dai's archenemy, Ngo dinh Diem; but
since Diem was the son of Ngo dinh KhC Oe nine-button
mandarin who had served Bao Dafs father, Bao Dai took
him i11
It is the opinion of most Americans who consider them-
selves well-informed on Vietnamese affairs that Ngo dinh Diem
entered into our calculations with his arrival in America in
1951. And it is worth remarking that nowhere in the numerous
biographical sketches published by Time magazine is Diem,s
1947 peiod in Hong Kong with Bao Dai ever mentioned.
_Actualln lbroughout the long negotiations in Hong Koog,
D.req wa1 ttrrc agent of questionable Americans already en-
visagrng their own same in Indochina. Bao Dai hated biem
but he feared him. He knew that for twenty years Diem had
never concealed his hatrea of the tlrone. But the club Diem
held over Bao Dai in Hong Kong was his claim to bave an
. "in" with the Americans. Everything supported Diem's claims.
Each morning he went to the American consulate. That he was
received, truste4 even courted was evident from the state
Peltl, notes, and suggetions he brought back" With Bao Dai,s
"1dvice" originating in the American consulate on those
morning visits in conversations between agents who will prob-
ably remain faceless and a Diem who beca^me more anti-Frlnch
un$.gqphpassing day, Monsieur pipon's emissary was forced
to bid higher and higher.
__Eve_ntually Cousseau reported to his chief in Saigon that the
HongKongbrrnch of the team that inNew yor!fuashiqgton
an{ llnekot-sup_ported Ho chi Minh was aatotaging Oeir-(his
and Pipon's) plan to mobilize the country UeninA ru tridi-
tional emp€ror. For almosl two years thc fruitless dickering
with.Bao Dai dragggt on, blocked by Ngo dinh Di€m's;d
ments egainst Bao Dai,s return- ,.Don't accept their teris.
You'Il dishonoJ Voylself forever. Don't go 6ack until they
grie you complete independence,'was the tleme. Meanwhile
Ho chi Minh advanced
At last Bao Dai was told to make his shoice, with France
or wilh Ngo dinh Diem and his friends. Sao bai made his
decision. There was a terrible last scene between him and
Diem, and Bao Dai took off for paris to make f"t r*r"S*
m€nts.for-the dgsperate gamble. The agreement with Frai-ce
was signed on March 8, 1949. It granted immediafe tmited
 BAO DAI 2I
independence within the French Union with a pledge of in-
creasing independence ahead. Britain s relationship with her
former colonies within the commonwealth is a fair comparison.
Bao Dai would have his own cabinet and army and a free hand
in internal affairs. Foreign policy would coincide with that of
France. The French would maintain bases, special courts for
French citizens and special consideration for French advisors
and the Frensh language, in reality little more than America
enjoys in Korea.
Bao Dai's choice, however, was to cost him dearly. It meant
a few more years of grace for America's prestige throughout
the East but in the end Ngo dinh Diem and the foreign sup
porters, thwarted with him when the down-and-out emperor
opted for the French, were to have their revenge--a revenge
for which the American thxpayer and the growing boys
destined to die in the score-settling would ultimately pay.
It was to Dalat, the scene of so many tiger hunts as a bon
that Bao Dai returned in his chartered Dakota" on Aptil 27,
1949. His reason for refusing to go to Saigon was that the
French representative and military commander still occupied
Norodom Palace, which in the public mind was associated with
ttre retention of power. The beautiful Empress Nam Phuong
remained in France, where she had been 6anspor0ed by the
Frend with her two sons and three daughters, while her hus-
band even if he did not win the war, succeeded in restoring
their fortunes.
The war dragged on to its close. The French graves mounted
while potticians reasoned, after the manner of politicians
everywhere, that a tless drain would be accepted. Some
l77,O0O soldiers had been lost under the tri-color by the time
Pierre Mendes-France put over on his countrymen the vast
hoax that he had delivered an ultimatum to the Reds and that
their signature to the treaty by which he abandoned half of
Vietnam was a national triumph. Had Bao Dai yielded in 1946
to George Marshall, North Vietnam would have been com-
munized eight years earlier. The men who pressed for that
sipature triumphed in the end, and the French soldiers who
fought to thwart them died in vain.
It was Bao Dai's fate to be forever a pawn, if not in the
game of big power politics then the pawn of his ambitious
countrymen who sought to prove to the young revolutionaries
of the capital that they were not servile courtiers by vying
among themselves to see who could be most dissourteous to
their F.mFeror. A few days later they would return separately
to profess undying devotion and apologize privately for the
22 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
words they had spoken in public. A[ this Bao Dai bore
without a word.
He watched the French fade out and the team on whom
he had tumed his back in 1949 in Hong Kong close in, with
Ngo dinh Diem in the forefronL Their day had some. Wearily
Bao Dai signed another paper.
 CHAPTER THREE

NGO DINH DIEM

It was from an office in New York in 1954 that Monsieur

Pignon, the French delegate to the United Nations who had
been France's high commissioner to Indochina, watched the
drama unfold. He had no doubt as to the course it would take.
He knew too well the dramatis personae, the motivations, the
weaknesses and all the pressures at play to have any illusions.
With the failure of his Bao Dai experiment, an experiment
sabotaged as much by the French section of the international
socialist party as by America, Monsieur Pignon was relegated
to the French delegation to United Nations. Bao Dai had been
unyielding in his refusal to go to Saigon as long as the French
occupied Norodom Palace, and the various Vietnamese fac-
tions and factions within factions were in the end obstructionist
Some groups tried to advance their interests by flattering
Bao Dai; others courted the pro.Ho chi Minh and pro-Ameri-
can left by insulting him. French officials haggled over every
line in their agreement, and the mass of Vietnamese waited
to see which way ttings were going to turn.
Bao Dai's reaction, as always, was to draw into himself. He
was too weak to command, too proud to argue his case; and,
looking at the forces around him, he undoubtedly concluded
that there w:ul no one to whom it was worth bothering to
explain. In the end he went back to Cannes and bought a
twelve-room house, referred to for reasons of dignity as the
Chateau de Thorenc.
On the battlefield the French setbacks continue4 which
provided occasion for the crusaders against colonialism to fight
for their cure-all. Few Americans had ever seen a Vietnamese,
but all were convinced that, given independence, the fence-
sitters in Vietnam would flock en masse to the recruiting
offi.ce. Thousands of Vietnamese clamored for visas to Anerica"
Each had his reason: Some, who had transferred black market
and piastre exchange fortunes to Hong Kong, wanted to get out
while the getting was good; otlers saw political futures in
23
24 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
currying favor with the Americans. But without influence an
Anerican visa was hard to get.
Diem, the inside man of the :onsulate team in Hong Kong
in 1949, had no trouble. Thus in 1951 we fiad him living in
Maryknoll Junior Seminary in Lakewood, New Jersey, from
which address he became, as Raymond Cartier expressed it,
'"tle lion of the anti-colonialists in Washington and the Catholic
cardinal of the New York diosese," while his brother operated
tlrough his own labor union in Saigon and was slipping his
men into international labor organizations.
Every line of the sugary biography presented as news by
Time of. April 4, 1955, should be read and analyzed by those
who paid to get facts during the period of our infatuation
with Diem but instead were given propaganda on which to
form their opinions. Though Diem resided in the seminary in
Lakewood from 1951 to 1953, Time noted that he often went
"down to Washington to buttonhole State Department men
and Congressmen and urge them not to support French
colonialism. 'The French may be fighting communists,' Diem
argued, 'but they are also fighting the people.'n' A stupid line
when one stops to analyze it, and certainly not one to bear
weight with the parents and wives of American boys for whom
the honor of being killed by those same Communists was thus
reserved for ten years later. But Time neyer went into this,
and the men buttonholed in State Department apparenfly never
questioned susl lsassnin g.
According to Senator Mike Mansfield's own article in
Harpefs magazine of January 1956, he and Supreme Court
Justice William Douglas were taken in by Diem at a luncheon
in Washington and thereafter supported his game, the object
of which was Diem's establishment as ruler of Vietnam"
Senators, congressmen, labor leaders exercising political pres-
sure, and powerful news orgaut, were converted to the idea
that America must also fence-sit, like the abte-bodied Viet'
nemese, and not help the French. Because though they "may
be fighting the communists they are also fighting the people."
As a result enough pressure was created that no two-hour air
strike came from our VIIth Fleet to shatter the Vietminh
military machine after they had sacrificed first their elite and
then their reserves in frontal attacks against Dien Bien Phu
for a spectacular victory to exploit at the conference in
Geneva.
What was never spread out before the congressmen applying
rubber stamps to our policy, or before the idealistic public
 NGO DINH DIEM 25

approving it, was the sinuous route of oriental intrigue and

the use of ruse upon nrse by the Ngo dinh brother team. To
the mandarin believing power his due, nothing one does to
achieve this power is dishonest. For "honest" Diem to write
letters to senators and congressmen for no other re€rson than
to get a courteous reply for Nhu to display before hesitant
Vietnamese in Saigon as irrefutable proof of Diem popularity
and support in Washington, was only natural. The Vietnamese
capacity fep ggnning, dissimulation and outrigbt deception is
something the inexperienced American crn hardly conceive.
It is no monopoly of the Vietminh, or the Vietcong, as they
now call themselves-a contiaction of Viet Cong Sang, mean-
ing Vietnam Communists. Both sides consider it good politics.
While Nhu practiced his dupery in Saigon, Diem practiced
his in Washington. Al example: Monsieur Jean Letourneau
flew into the capital as French minister for overseas affairs to
seek help in the war against Ho chi Minh. Diem requested
an appointment. Monsieur Letourneau knew him; in facf knew
all his family. (He considered brother Kloi, the one killed by
the Communists, the most intelligent of the Ngo dinhs.) Diem
at the time was pushing his campaign against helping the
French, Nevertheless, he went to Letourneau's hotel, stayed
for an hour, discussed nothing of any importance, and left.
That evening the word was circulated by Diem's supporters,
"No important Frenchman comes to Washington without ask-
ing to see Diem. Monsieur ktourneau called him in to ask
his advice this afternoon.n' Thus the myth that "there is no
one else" was planted, nurtured and reared to mighty oak
proportions in the American mind.
Nhu's tactics were identical with Ho chi Minh's n 1946.
Nhu demanded temporary solidarity of the distrustful south-
erners, saying, "If the Americans are convinced that you all
want my brother they will put him in. And after we kick out
the French you can have elections. If you don't get behind my
brother," he threatened, "they [the Americans] will support
the French."
Nhu drew the correspondent for the biggest afternoon paper
in Paris into the Diem game by omitting the line about kicking
out the French and emphasizing the promise that with their
man as premier the Americans would shoulder the burden of
the war. (One of the first things Diem did on sssuming power
was to expel said journalist, Monsieur Lucien Bodard, from
the country.)
So it went. "I{onest Diem," he who never hesitated to use
26 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
every trick in the book to deceive or comrpt others when it
was, to
fi1 ldvantage, won his nomination to the premiership
of South Vietnam not in Vietnam but in America-.
When he
-came
up against newsmen during his Washington
campqgn his obtuseness was ascribed to lack of familiarity
with the language. The fluctuations between wooden silencs_
complete lack of articulateness when asked about his program
a toment of abuse-laying all his country's iti, aI tn"
-and
door of the colonialists-even these were turned to Diem's
advantage. If he had no answer to questions about his politioal
plans h9 lowered his eyes and protested that his onl| desire
was to be in the church; that he could never be a pblitician
because of his inability to compromise with evil.
he nor the journalists who quoted this drivel ever
-Nertler
referred to those years in America as other thnn .,exile.', The
inference was that he had fled for his life under tlreat of a
lummary trial at which no attorney would dare defend him;
in srn, the fate so many anti-Communist Vietnamese were to
suffer at a later date under him and his brother___sentenced
to dgath or long prison terms in absentia, and their prop"rty
confiscated.
Over and over it was repeated that Diem had refused to
ac:ept a ministerial post since 1932 because his country was
not free. No attemFt to help Bao Dai attain tlat freedom was
eyer pa$e byNgo dinh Diem. And no one, apparently, won-
lgred why this refusal should be such a gtoii-ous tri'bute to
Diem or shameful thing for Bao Dai. Fiom the start the
deception of the American people was inexcusable.
The truth of the matter was-that no competent psychiatrist
the gushing biography rn Time of April 4, 1-955, woulC
have cleared Diem for an executive job il any'organ-ization.
Touching on the atmosphere of austerity in de conservative
lYol"l38s of his boyhood, Time *.otu tn"t he *prayed a
day, got up at 5 a. m. to study, expbaing
f:pt:91hours.:v.ery
mto tantrums if intemrpted by his brothers or iisteis.,, Ai
of. a country, his- monumental rages and outbursts, if
$gtator
rffelrupt€d_ or crossed, were to bring forth more than in_
y9cuves.. "He may erupt into sudden violence,', the Time
Dlography continued. ..Considering someone he dislikes, he
will sometimelspit across the rooir and snari.Dirty typ;t,.
_ _From the office of the-French UN delegation in New"iork,
M9 i"* Pignon watched derrelopmenls *itl tn" lr*fr
resignation of a man frustrated ana aisgusted, but from
the
:9j-ry_lt,d,Ttlgt?"?Flosopher still iiterested in the story,
every inside detail of which he knew like a book. He regarAid
 NGO DINH DIEM 27

Diem as he was-a man who took refuge behind a blank

silence or a burst of indiscriminate accusations whenever he
was confronted by unpleasant facts. Pigrron watched as those
hawking this stubborn man with the narrow mandarin mind
reached further and further for superlatives with which to
describe him, even to the point of fabricating a heroic resist-
ance record against the Japanese.* Monsieur Pignon could
thumb back through files giving dates and details General
Navarre, in his book La Guerre d'Indo-Chine, told of Admiral
Decoux' issuing an order for Diem's arrest as a Japanese
collaborator, wlereupon Diem took refuge in the home of a
Japanese named Komatsu; a fact which permitted Komatsu
to return to Saigon two years after Diem's rise to power and
embark on a mission for Diem to negotiate with Ho chi Minh
in North Vietnam. Undoubtedly the American public would
have risen in indignation had they been told about these
negotiations.
Monsieur Pignon also noticed that when Diem left America
in 1953 it was not to go back to his country where he was
needed, but to go instead to Belgium, seat of the all-powerful
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in whose
councils his labor leader brother was so powerful. From
Belgium he went to Paris, and the road inevitably led to the
twelve-room "chateau" in Cannes. It was mid-June of 1954.
The strange little man without warmth, without humor, stood
before the former emperor who was still addressed as "Votre
Majest6" or "Sire," though officially then he was chief of
state.
Bao Dai knew the tempers, the strange moods, the quick
changes from timidity to aggressive fury, in the obstinate
ascetic turned inward upon himself by his years of isolation
from human feelings. Bao Dai knew of the aloof disregard
the man had for those who stood in his sectarian, revolutionary
path. If asked to choose a premier for those perilous times,
with the good of the country in mind, Diem was the last man
Bao Dai would have named; but he had no choice.
On bended knees Diem swore allegiance to his emperor.
Bao Dai, after all the vicissitudes through which he had passed,
r The "Madison Avenue" grmpaign working to keep its client inflated
to heroic proportions did not he:sitite to state that Diem -'spurned the
overtures 6f the Japanese occupation during World War !I"' (Geleral
O'Daniel, im Ameriian Mercury, March 1959.) General Navarre (pago
-stem of-Indo-China) his troubles
127 of his book,The Agony writes, "The francophobia
of Mr. Diem seems to above all from with Admiral
Decoux who ordered his arrest for collaboratiqg with the Japaneso
duriag the war of 194G1945,"
 28 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
took this one in his stride. He pretended to have forgotten the
stomy session in Hong Kong fve years before. He knew that
the man before him had never been known to forgive a grudga
Howwer, Bao Dai went tbrough with his part: he-namei DiJm
St !ti-" minister with full powen to iorm a goyernment.
His last injunction was "Integrate the sects intd a national
community; rrni0e the country that is left to us.,'
_'Ihe Empress Nam phuong, like Diem a Catholic, begged
Dign to_sqve and stren€then the dynasty for her son nao f-iig.
Bao Dai wrote a check for a million piastres, to pay for
the "sponthneous" demonstrations that dere to impiess the
Americans and instill enthusiasm among the Vietnamese.*
Diem thanked him as he pocketed it and la:ter penned a formal
1eqlf.. "Sire-,
if ever you find fault with my aitioos, yo" nuu"
but_to speak the word and I shall step down.',
. -One June 26, 1954, at the age of-54, Diem went home to
teke over, and America,s reslonsibility started. Ten years
!{"4 o" Jl.tne 22,1964, black hiadlines iroclaimed the degree
ot our success from the newsstands of Nlw york. ..Showd6wn
in Asiar" screamed the lournal-American...We Move Up a
Marine Division." And for nine of those ten years the lournal-
A. yt-e1ican, along with tle rest of the news
media of America,
told its readers we were winning.
Imagine Saigon as it was when Diem returned with a million
-
piashes with which to hire a claque. Forty-three year
old
ItoF"".llT was living in what Jo-hn Osborne, of. iile, was
to describe later as his fly-specked union headquarterr. Another
brother Ngo dinh Thuc, fifty-seve& was a
iriesr Ngo dinh
9ln, forty-one, and the youngest brother, thirty-nine fear old
|.[So
dinh Lufen, were unknowns. These were to provide the
base on which Diem intended to build his power. Biyond them
would-come the in-laws, and their in-laws, -spreading
downward
tbrough syel-widsning rings of cousins.
. A French-$ained general named Nguyen van Hinh, son of
rormer premier, Nguyen van Tam, was chief of sta.ff of the
armya Le van Vien, the ex-pirate known as Bai Vien when
he
ruled the impenetrable Binh Xuyen swamps where he was born,
}:aded_the Saigon police. A colorful cfraracter, this Le van
Yien. Time told its readers that he bought the police, from
Bao Dai, for a million dollars, a statemeniwhich was
no more
gifr,lf, i,'i;flr*rfffl"f ll,,*.ufl,if; oi*,#e[-,#,,p"""9#m
ruary 1956). O. trL Armstrong was.a member'o,fA F oi V,"tni ixin
Readef.s. o,g.esr, iotrowine-G-i"iri.ir,ii." -ot 'dhL -"rd;;
Pl9l.
Iaued -1n:
to answer critical letters.
 NGO DINH DIBM 29
true than most of tle reports given the American public.
The truth of the matter was that Bai Vien had proved hinself
able to beat the Communists at their own game; and the
Communist5 when he was appointed police chief' were the
capital's number one problem, all we shall see later. There is
no doubt that self-interest was behind his courting of Bao Dai
to the point of getting himself named chief of police, but he
rose almost to nobility when the big test came. Aside from the
police force, he maintained a private army, called the Binh
Xuyen after the swamp whrch had been his fief. Cholon' the
Chinese city beyond the "Y' bndge connecting it with Saigon,
was the capital's vice center and Le van Vien's monopoly. But
as Monsieur Litt6e, frst president of the Saigon court of
appeals, was to admit, '"Ihere was no law against gambling
opium and prostitution in his country. Cholon supported the
army of the Binh Xuyen" and the Binh Xuysn were the terror
of the Reds. And after Le van Vien took over the police, I
never had cause to reproach him."
Then there were the two sects. The Cao Dai, numbering
almost three million adepts, was ruled by Pope Pham cong Tac,
from his papal see in Tai Nmh. The Cao Dai also had an
army capable of mobilizing, in a pinch, some 25,000 men.
And after the Cao Dai came the Hoa Hao, with their claim
to two million followers, a private army, and tle passive sup-
port of some 400,000 Cambodians in the area between Can Tho
and Long Xuyen.
General Hinh would have to be removed and replaced by a
man loyal to the family if the power of the Ngo dinhs was to
be firmly established. As we shall see, brother Nhu con-
sidered himself the theoretician of the family, the driving force
responsible for his brother's accession to power, and as such
he went about solving the problem of consolidating their posi-
tion. Once frmly established they would take over the army.
Later they would crush Le van Vien, the police, the Binh
Xuyen and the sects, and after that there would be no pro-
tective force between the Ngo dinhs and the people.
Brotler Nhu had married into the Tran van family. While
the ascetic Diem remained isolated behind his presidential
palace doors, Nhu and his father-in-law, Tran van Chuong
(during the days of the Japanese occupation one of Bao Dai's
ministen), set to erecting something that would satisfy the
Americans by having the appearance of a government. But
the real director of the project was Madame Chuong, Nhu's
mother-in-law.
30 BACKGROUND IO BETRAYAL
The wife is often the true head of the family in Vietnam.
Whatever appearance of power she may leave her husband in
public, she is capable of terrifying him fi home. She may
ippear to be frail in her diaphanous robes, but inwardly she is
a human dynamo and her rapacity is boundless. If she climbs
upward beyond the family and into public affairs, out of her
mind emerges the thread from which the web is woven to
make fast each new gain. As the Ngo dinh'g, and in their wake
the Tran vah's, moved upward, Madame Chuong spread an
unbelievable web of palace intrigue that was later morally to
bankrupt America in the eyes of the world. From her hands
this web was to pass to her daughter. The one question no one
asked was: How did the man on whose coat-tails this family
rode upward ever get his appointment?
The Austrian socialist leader, naturalized American Mr'
Joseph Buttinger, of whom tlre reader will learn much more
in this history, wrote in the New Leader of June 27, L955,
"In the hour of military and political catastrophe, the French
remembered Ngo dinh Diem." The statement is misleading.
TVhat Mr. Buttinger means by "the French" is the French
socialists. No French leader to the right of Mendes-France's
extreme left position and France's American-i!fluenced labor
leaders had or would have approved Diem's appointment. Yet
it was the falling laniel government that as one of its last
offcial acts did the actual sponsoring. The pressure must have
been terrific.
By what authority, democratic process or pressure, walt
Diem rather than some recognized leader forced upon the
Emperor Bao Dai and the country?
Senator Mike Mansfield, until the title became embarrassing,
was proud of being referred to as "Diem's godfather." Colonel
Edward r.ansdale, in a paper written for Michigan State
University (which happily for the colonel the Pentagon refused
to permit to be published) wrote, "There has been much non-
sense and romance written about the appointment of Ngo dinh
Drem as President de Conseil in 1954. Allegedly, this appoint-
ment was engineered by U. S. officials. The truth is that none
of the Americans in position of decision, either in \{ashington
or Saigon, knew Diem." MSU submitted this r-ansdale paper
to this author for comment.
So who did know him?
Mr. Ngo kai Minh, a councillor of the French Union, told
this author, "Bill Gibson and David Bane were at the Vietnam
desk in t"ne American embassy in Paris in 1954. Gibson went
 NGO DINH DIEM 3I
to Cannes fwice to ask Bao Dai to appoint Diem premier'
Bao Dai did not want to do so. He stalled for time. Monsieur
Letourneau was by then minister ot the Associated States
(Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam). Lauiel was still p-remier- a-nd
Moosieur Bidault was foreign minister. Bao Dai called for
help and Monsieur Letourneau was sent down to see him. To
Lefourneau Bao Dai said, 'The Americans want Diem. What
shallI do?'
"'You are independent now; it is up to you,' Monsieur
Letourneau replied. Bao Dai then decided against Diem; but
the American-embassy put pressure on the French foreign
office, saying, You have lost half of Indochina. We have put
too muc[ money and arms in there to write off the other half.
If you cannot sive it, quit obstructing us and support 9i9m.'
So-Bidault told Letourneau to go back and tell Bao Dai to
sign the appointnent."
-The
foreign office informed the pubtsher of Paris' largest
afternoon piper, France,Soir, that 1ry35hington had requested
both France and Bao Dai to turn the Vietnamese government
over to Ngo dinh Diem at the beginning of the 1954 Geneva
conferense. Jean Larteguy, one of the leading French author-
ities on Southeast Asia, states that at America's request General
Ely, the French commander in Indochina, told Bao Dai he
should turn the government over to Ngo dinh Diem.
In lateApril 1956, French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau
in an after-dinner speech told his listeners that Ngo dinh Diem
was made premier of South Vietnam shortly after the Geneva
conference began in 1954. This appointment followed an agree-
ment between Paris and Washington in which Washington
demanded Diem's appointment as a prerequisite to the con'
tinuation of American aid. This led Mr. Nguyen th6 Truyen,
-a former municipal councillor from Hanoi, to send open letters
to President Eisenhower and Presrdent Coty in which he said'
'eT'hank you, Mr. Pineau, for your frankness which throws light
on the drama of South Vietnam. The world and our country
have wondered how we got Ngo dinh Diem as premier. We
now know that it was not, as his partisans say, because of his
integrity and popularity but because of the favor he was able
to solicit from France and America. Now that we have it from
an official source that these two occidental powers got together
outside of our country dne fine day in 1954 and imposed on
us a chief and government that suited them," Mr. Truyen con'
tinue4 '\rill the same two governments take him away and
32 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
refrain from meddling in Vietnnmese politics in the future."
Monsieur Marc Jacque! minister of the Associated States
under- the Laniel government, was approached by a friend of
Diem's named Ton that Can with a request ior support.
Monsieur Iacquet mentioned the meeting to Bao Dai,'who
snorted, "He [Diem] wouldn't last tlree weekst" At thai time
Bao Dai intended to appoint his chief of cabinel Nguyen De,
as premier to succeed his cousin, prince Buu Loc.
A short .:me later in the Spring of 1954 Monsieur Jacquet
met Diem at a dinner and asked what his program would be
if he.were to hlad a governm€nt. What fcrieifi poficy, what
soclal po.lrcy, what about the finances and the army? Diem did
not reply. "What would you do about the Viethamese who
are in the French Army?" Jacquet asked. Diem still did not
answer; but a friend with him spoke up and said, ..We would
tlrow them out and send them back to-the farms. Maybe later
we would take a few of them back."
"WhyT asked Jacquet. ,,Because they are suspect,', was the
enswer. Since the French-trained troops *ere
ihe bory oo",
capabQlf .making a stand against the Communists, jacquet
opposed Diem's appointment from that day on.
OnI. y Paul Devinat, the French secretarry of state for civil
aviation, and his secretary, Monsieur Varriy, were for Diem.
Devinat had once directed a parliamentary- investigation in
|ygoq -{ y* regarded as a learring authority on Indochina.
He refused the portfolio of minislsisf the Associated States
when Jacquet resrgned, and in 1956 was to write an article
toy loltleue EtrangDre, a publication put out by the ofrce
of
..ftj Fr-ench premier, in which peiinat justified Diem,s
anu-Flench attitude on grounds that France had always op-
posed his nomination. No disclaimer of French ,"rpooribitity
could be more official than tlus article written by a-pro_Diem
official.
So we come back to the conclusion that certain Americans,
3o9 they alone, were behrnd the selection which both Colonei
Edward Landsdale and Joseph Buttinger, the socialht, wished
p pake- appear the result oi spontanius popularity uoa nuo
Dai's submission to his countrf's popular will^.
_.Ptgq:.biographical sketchin-tne |SSZ edirion of Asids
wno's ..Returned
Who, presumably written by himsslf, reads,
June 26,1954 with full crvil and mili161y pe*",
:: Yl",ou- government; Irime Minister July 7, t934:, pro-
1?,t_gTt.i.
clalmed Vretnam a republic and became presiden! October
26, 1955.'And that G as much as tne american people are
"ff:" :'
Nc'o DnrH DIBM g3

lftety to learn from their press or any Senate Foreign Rela-

tions Committee headed by Senator Mike Mansfield.
Now for a look at the crew of this new ship of state on
whose launching Washington liberals broke the champagne
bottla
 C}IAPTER FOUR

NGO DINH NHU AND HIS IN-LAWS

Nhu was forty-three when the brother through whom he

and his wife were ultimately to rule a nation was made
premier. Those who studied with Nhu in France, where he
specialized in treaties, constitutions and charters, knew him
as an evasive, shy student from Indochina. Most 5ummsd him
up as having an inferiority complex. None imagined that the
weak schoolmate would one day become merciless, imposing
on a country the fear that in his mind was inextricably linked
with respect. He read Machiavelli and later explained his ap-
plication of Machiavellian principles by describing himself
as a Catholic of the left. To his followers he preached the
curative virtues of prisons and political internment camps-in
other words, the arms of the leader incapable of inspiring a
following.
When Ho chi Minh rose to power in post-war Indochina,
young Nhu's first reaction was to exclaim, "IIe needs us in-
tellectuals!" Unfortunately for Nhu, Ho felt that he was doing
well with the time-tried Communist team he had built up
over the years. He was wary of young Johnnys-come-lately
and preferred to surround himself with men whose loyaltiee
had been proved when the going was rough.
This threw Nhu back into the game of opportunism, draw-
ing what he could from French pressure on the Communists
and Ho chi Minh's pressure on the French, and leading each
to believe he had something to offer. The group he gathered
around him was called the Movement for Independence and
Peace. Only by acquiring a following would Nhu be in posi-
tion to demand of either side the consideration he feit he
ought to have; so what he built up was a following of fence-
sitters. The name Movement for Independence andpeace was
well chosen. It came out of the Communist handbook. Inde-
pendarce was a magic word with the Americans and peace
was the jingo of the Reds.
There were two ways of acquiring peace as the war raged
-between Ho chi l\',[inh aad the French. One was by helping
34
 NGO DINH NHU AND HIS IN.I-AWS 35

the French win; the other by making them lose. And as Tinte
magazine admitted, Nhu did all in his power to prevent the
peace part of his platform from coming about tbrough an
anti4ommunist victory. flis excuse for an obstructionist pol-
icy was that the country was not free-the same argrrment
lsing used so effectively by his brother in Virashington. It met
with the approval of the Americans. "Force them [the French]
to give independence to Indochina and they will form a cru-
sade for liberty," proclaimed Senator John F. Kennedy in
Washington, at the darkest moment of the struggle.
With some American help Nhu fastened his gip on the
labor movement in Vietnam and thereafter the international
labor organizations plugged fq1 him in Geneva, Brussels, New
York, Washington and the lesser capitals of their respective
members. Labor was the striking fist of Nhu's political action,
which he conductedunder another name, The Humanist Work-
er's Revolutionary party. It had e famitar ring.
When defeat ceme in 1954 and the country was divide4
Nhu charged the French with treason and betrayal. Armistice
was described as abandonment and used as an argument for
demanding the appointment of his brother, Diem. American
opini6a, which had been so easily maneuvered into defending
Nhu's refusal to lift a finger while the fighting was going on,
fell equally hard for his cry that the amistice was betrayal
when the fghting was lost. The dogood theorists claimed that
he represented a "third force," hostile to both communism
and the French, and that he was impeded by conviction from
helping either. This specious explanation made him acceptable
to America's government and press, despite his non-resistance
to the Communists.
In Nhu's case the whole theory was rot. Many Vietnamese
were in the "third force" category sincerely, torn by an inner
conflict But Ngo dinh Nhu was never one of them. He and
his "intellectuals of the left" remained in the middle from
opportunism, not scruples. They were waiting to see which
side would triumph. They made no attempt to conceal their
sympathy for Ho, the Communist, who was doing the figbting
againsl the French. In fact there was a strong bond between
Nhu and most, if not all, of the Americans in Vietnam at that
time in their desire to see the Communists and the French
fiIe themselves off against each other, thereby leaving the
feld for a solution which each visualized according to his
lights. In their game the "devout Diem" was never anything
but a front and Nhu played every angle to advance him. The
pattern employed has since become classic.
36 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
It was the policy of American labor to organize native unions
in the colonies of our allies, then to push the native union as
a revolutionary political force. When the European power
granted indqrendence under American governmental pressure
brought about by the other hand of the some unions, the rigbt
of tbe uaion leader to head the nation was claimed on the
assertion that he had won independence. Considering the
double role of American labor in these operations, the claim
was iustified. In former colonies where a monarchical form of
government existed, the next move was invariably against the
thtone, also in the name of democracy. Thus the labor leaders
supplanted the king.
Thnisia is an example of this operation. It was at an AFL
CIO congress in San Francisco in September 1951 that
Bourguiba was given his mandate and the support of the
American press and State Department to "liberate" and lead
Tunisia. The Moroccan dynasty temporarily escaped the same
fate through the popularity of Mohammed II, but the days of
the monarchy are numbered.
The hate campaip against the Emperor Bao Dai, which a
perusal of old newspapers and magazines discloses, merits study
now that the heat of the moment is past. The goal was simple:
to create a socialist world you create socialist nations. In Viet-
Dam we were at the stage of attack ageinst the tlrone. Next
would come establishment of the doctrine of the Humanist
Workers' Revolutionary party, which Nhu headed when the
political parties of Vietnam met for a congress in Saigon on
September 6, 1953. Nhu made a breast-beating spe€ch, dear to
the hearts of leftist demagogues everywhere. It sounded fine as
printed by the liberal press. He demanded "liberty, independ-
ence, a broad-based government representative of the people,
and a national assembly, honestly and freely elected, before
which the government would stand accountable."
It is interesting to reflect that a year later the speaker himself
was imprisoning Vietnamese for demanding the same liberties
that he had claimed in 1953 without fear of arrest by Bao Dai
and the French; and no Ameiican newsman or government
official protested Nhu's socialist program aimed at destroying
the throne and tightening the grip of himself and his family.
Rather, they encouraged it.
Peter Kalischer, the Far East comespondent for C.olumbia
Broadcasting System, wrote an illuminating piece for Collier's
magazine of July 6, 1956. "We are working towards a social-
istic state," he quoted Nhu as saying, '3-4 nsa-lvlarxist stat€
of free co-operatives where management and labor share con-
 NGO DINH NHU AND HIS IN.LAWS 37
trol of industry." Stripped of its flowery rhetoric and studied
with an eye on Sukarno, Mr. Nhu's non-Marxist personal
Marxism should never have been reassuring.
Continues Mr. Kalischer, "Diem's brother, Ngo dinh Nhu'
is the second most important personage in free Vietnam. S&nt,
cat-like on his feet, with a large head and brilliaot eyes, Nhu
is a political in-fghter, a sort of combination Jim Farley and
Harry Hopkins. Nhu s Humanist Revolutionary Workers'Party
(membership figures confidential) forms the left-wing sore of
Diem's broad National Revolutionary Movement." A clique
limited to the Ngo dinh family and its hangers-on Mr. Kali-
scher described as a "broad National Revolutionary Move-
ment."
No questions were asked by Senator Fulbrighfs ssmmitfes'
which investigated public relations men using American aid
to lobby for foreign governments or leaders, when that com-
mittee went through the motions of probing such matlers in
1963. Why was this piece written? How did this particular
ma" happen to write it and Colliels print it and how much
did it cost? These are questions that would give an irate public
a heyday.
The first person to play a part in Nhu's consolidation of
power w:N bis imperious mother-in-law, Madame Tran van
Chuong. The second was his beautiful wife, who married when
she was fifteen to get away from home because her mother had
slapped her, and who in turn edged out her mother. Next came
the head of Nhu's secret police, Albert Pham ngoc Thao'
whom the inspired pen of Joe Alsop converted into an anti-
Communist hero, tnough Thao's careir as intelligence chief fo1
Ho chi Minh a few years before was an open book and his
seventy-some thousand informers, reporting on their neighbors,
public servants and even ministers of government were the
terror of South Vietnam.
Each of the principal characters forming the foundation for
Mu's naked wielding of power deseryes a book, and even a
cursory study cannotbut cast some doubts on the leader whose
props rested on such a following. Let us take a look at the head
of the Tran van family.
History is ftrll of stories of indomitable women' some legend-
ary, some real. But if one is to look for examples of the native
tigress with all her energy, ruthlessness and rapacity, Vietnam
is a country in which the type is both indigenous and con-
temporary. Here we find By Ho Thi Hao (or MadameTee'Ben
as she was called), the Communist guerrilla leader, with her
band of foreign legion deserters and Jap mercenaries. Madame
38 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
tee-Bey made merciless robots out of her followers. She was
in her tlirties when her unit, Chidoi 12, of Ho chi Minh's
southern army-ravaged the Hoc-Mon area while France,s high
commissioner in Indochina,.Monsieur pipon, was workingio
bring back Bao Dai. With her assassinaEon squads, her iwn
prop_aganda corps, police force, ministy of-economy and
political burearl she built herself an empire founded on teror
and brainwashing. She dressed in a black uniform with a Colt
in her belt and a gun slung over her shoulder. Death was the
punlgbm- e1t_ for any infraction of the rules Madame Tee_Bey
applied with an iron hand.
Then there was Madame Le thi Ngam, the wife of the Hoa
Hao general, Tran van Sioai, who bliw up her husband's own
chief of staff with a hand grenade for holting out on her in a
business deal. There was a time when Bao Dail,s mother, secure
in the power she wielded in old Vietnam, was referred to as a
tigress also.
'tings_being as they were,
_ 1{l1 the chances were high that
[q yan Chuong, the son of the ricb mandarin (oi court
om{4) family who took his doctorate in law in paris, rn 1922,
would have a grasping, dominating shrew for a wife. It was
not a question of what percentage of Vietnamese women
pp:Ts tl-ese qualities; rather did it hinge on Chuong's chances
of rising high enough for his wife to reich the tnin a:mospneie
where a consciousness of power is ever prescnt Above i cer-
tain level a headiness sets in
"-ong the females of the species,
and the latentavidity for more of everything becomes a mania.
Chuong was doomed from the start, for hJwas related to the
tmperial familn therefore of the circle to which power and
opportunity for more power are natural.
Chuo:rg was cultured, his manners were charming, and for
generations bis ancestors had administered Annah for its
emperon. In 1938 he was vice president of the Grand Council
for Econmis Interests of Indochina. As the neme would
ingln the post's opportunities for profit were many. In 1940
he became a member of the federal council. Then ia 1945, just
before the Japanese collapse, Bao Dai a26e him ministei of
affairs-and vice president of the cabinet ef minisfsrs, 4n
Io*tgo
honor which Tran van Chuong the man did not forget wlen
the test came. It was Tran van Chuong the husband iho was
hammered into rejecting the obligationiof honor.
TI*g! tle ** years with the Vietbinh, Chuong did
9" very
notlilg-1;1 end, in 1953, when he accepted ,-co--
paratively rrnimportant post as judge of the Frenct'-Vietnamese
court of cassation, which was simitar to the Supreme Court in
 NGO DINH NHU AND IIIS IN-LAWS 39
America. During those years when Chuong remained in the
wings his authoritative wife was the active member of the
clan. She became a councillor of the French Union, the
legislative body that sat at Versailles, with all the perquisites
and privileges that appertained thereto. These included the
opportunities offered by the exchange office which we have
mentioned. For the Tran van Chuong fortune, like that of
Bao Dai himself and all the other leading families of Annam
and Coahin China, bad suffered by the war-first during the
stagnation period under the Japanese, then under the ruthless
despoiling by Ho chi Minh.
When Ngo dinh Diem returned in 1954 with his full powers,
military and civil, to form a government, command reposed,
literally, in the hands of his brother Nhu. But Nhu's mother-
in-law, the councillor of the French Union, was supreme boss
within the family. She was the one who made money while
Nhu tended his roses in Dalat or organized political labor
unions in Saigon. Hers was the spotlight, the trips to padia-
mentary meetings where she sat with those whose decisions
made front page news, while her frustrated daughter, married
to the indigent rose fancier and coffee-howe conspirator, suf-
fered from boredom. And even worse, anonymity!
Lucien Bodard, the French writer on the Far East, wrote
of Madame Nhu:
"All her powers of rage I saw when Bao Dai returned to
power and Diem refused to be Prime Minister. At the time
she was living in Dalat in a tawdry house. When she could
stand no more she would telephone Bao Dai and ask him to
come and get her. A sumptuous car would call for her while
her husband smelled his flowers. Later, trrings were worse. In
Saigon the life of the Nhus was almost clandestine. They lived
in modest rooms adjoining a religious clinic. The frit time
I went there I crossed a dusty yard where the washing was
hung- out to dry. Out of a passage covered with cornrgated
metal came a young woman in a white tunic and green pants.
She was shabbily dressed. Children clung to her. She was so
depressed by disappointment I did not recognize her. All she
had to do was wash clothes, cook meals and wipe ner
children."
With Diem's sudden projection into a position of power in
the last days of June 1954, the petulant daughtei of the
was swept upward as a member of the new ..ruling
-Cnugng; though her father was immediately made mini
f*ity.l'And,
ister of statg an indefinite post specifying no particular field
of responsibility but permitting everyihing, by- the unwritten
40 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
laws of protocol operating within families Madame Nhu
theoretically took precedence over her mother. Yet the mother
had experience and she was not to grve up without a figbt. The
palace intrigues started. It was both a power-struggle and a
score setfling.
Jean Larteguy, author of numerous books on Vietnam which
tle Pentagon would do well to study' described Nhu's wife,
who was destined to win in the end, as the "courageous, enter-
prising sister-in-law who, while Diem worked from within the
seminary in New Jersey, was the belle of the court at Dalat'
and thne. intimatb of Bao Dai." (Paris Match, Sept. 14' 1963.)
But Larteguy excused her frivolities and dalliances as weap-
re1fuis
ons of a woman who knew what she wanted. rsvishing
wornan with the cool head," he sontinued, "never forgot to
serve her clan in all her strayings. She is credited with a certain
number of affain. They were always to gain an end. They
served the cause of the Ngo dinhs. Madame Nhu played a
great part in the rallying of certaih young ofrcers at a time
when Diem could not have survived without gaining the
support of the army. Could it be that this is one reason for
the revenge that she is so determined to take on men?
"Diem never could stand the presence of a woman. He felt
ill at ease and immediately became obnoxious, except in the
case of his beautiful sister-in-law, who in her way, by her
ambition and her tenacity, is a man. She rendered immsasg
service to the family, and they knew they could depend on her.
If she sinned it was by fidelity to her own."
Aux Ecoutes, the French diplomatic weekly, of November
ll, 1963, all but mentioned by name the official in the Ameri-
can Embassy to whose winning over by Madame Nhu the
Vietnamese, inveterate gossips, credited the perpetuation of
the family's grip. Wrote Aux Ecoutes,'"The beautiful sister-
in-law of the president based all her power on the physical
attraction she exercised over military shiefs and also-why
not admit it?<n American counsellors and diplomats in
Saigon."
It took t''ne for beauty and wiles to dislodge the mother
who had been so long in the spotlight. Through the first year
of Ngo dinh ascendancy visualize Madame Chuong as en-
sconced in the center of a vast web. Her husband she sent
off to Washington to sit in an embassy. Pham duy Khiem,
whom Saigon gossip insisted was her lover, she presented with
an ambassadorship to France. Whether NgUyen huu Chau, the
husband of one of her daughters was, as rumor had it, a former
lover or not, one thing is certain: The daughter never wanted
 NGO DINH NHU AND HIS IN-LAWS 4I
to marry him xrrd so hated the union that eventuallv she
announced her intention of getting a divorce and marrying a
Frenchman; whereupon Madame Nhu arrested her own sisier
and the sister attempted suicide. But all this was yet to come.
Nguyen huu Chau, while Madame Chuong waj di.t ibut-g
sinecures, became secretary of state to the-presidency, a
that w.ould correspond to that of assistant to tle presiaenf1o6in
America (except that in Vietnam the new presideint accepted
advice only from his brother and later, out oi fear of her rages,
from his sister-in-law.)
- Chuongt-
f9-t"igo
brother, Tran van Do, was set up as minister of
affairs, and the Chuong son, Tran vao'Khie-, eventu_
ally became press chief, a post which he held until Nhu made
him nomin4l head of the Jecret police toward the end of the
regime.
__l *r accepted that should anything happen to Diem,
rran. van-chuong would remain io lryashington to maneuver
the Americans while Tran van Do, his broiher, would move
into Norodom Palace. At the top of the pylamid,
noiai"g
the strings, was Madame Chuong. fne tniri-trother ofthe "U
Tran vl3.family, Tran van phuoc,-Madame Chuong dispatched
to the hinterlands as mayor of Dalat and chief of il"rit
for.the high plateau reglon. There he reLGeO until a 40
T1tron plastre scandal involving slaughterhouse taxes back in
faig-on provided an excuse to niake n]- Suigo" police prefect
in the spring of 1959.
The,only real change in the power setup from 1954to 1956
yT M.193-"_ Nhu's gradual edging out o1 her mother. It was
sur wrt"hln the {amily circle, and its effect was to lock out
more securely than ever the political leaders who
the.brunt of the fight for indeplnd"o"".
had borne
tG-r"rult was poti."
state run by two mandarin families, one of which, "
the^Tran
vans, was still bound by a certain loyalty to hadition and
emperor. The personal ambitions of the other, tne
Ngo OinnJ
were boundless. Diem and Nhu and the latter,s gasi'ing
were determined to sweep the table clean and
wife
establish a new
dynasty-themselves.
_ O_ne heard lerhing in America of Diem,s sister, Madrme
!1!_6,
troueh alt thls; brt ;h; ;;r;"r"fr."en she occupied
no govemment post. she waxed rich on her
riie
Central Vietnam and advanced h;r-;;;_l'alw, monopofy in
Dung, Tran trung
as secretary of state for defense. Her Urotner_in_law,
|Su.V"" van Thoai, trom.1954-t Mt i955 she pushed into
the lucrative post of minisfel .f pl-a#rg
;dreconstruction.
 CHAPTER FIVE

TI{E PEOPLE TI{WARTED

From the first no voice of advice or criticism was permitted.

And as the stranglehold of the strange man and his power-
hungry family tightened, the suppression of southern demands
for a voice in their own govemment became more ruthless.
The new premier, no one forgot for a moment, was a north-
erner from Hue, and had been installed by America. Southem-
ers who had gone through with the farce of affecting enthusi-
asm wanted him to live up to his share of the bargain, i.e., an
election n which they could install a leader of their own. In-
stead they were hounded into exile or summarily arrested.
So witbin a matter of weeks after assumrng po*e. in 1954,
Diem became known as "the parachuted"-dropped from
above by a foreign power (America) and without roots in
the soil. Anyone repeating this in the United States was de-
ngunced by those who were working so hard to cram Ngo
dinh Diem down the tbroats of his countrymen.
Brother Nhu's insurance against criticism was to saturate
homes, offices and neighborhoods with informers whose job
it was to stop justified complaints by arrests, not reforms. One
exception existed, one opposing voice which Diem and Nhu
dared not silence. It was permitted to continue as a sort of
ineftectual resistance for six years, as proof that they were
democratic. Whenever Diem was asked why he did not Lnlarge
hisgovernment, the answer, duly repeated ind approved by t[e
eutire American press, was, .'They [the southerners] won't co-
operate with me." Probably never in the history of the world
was refusal to be a yes-man found to be an evit ty so many
theoretically idealistic Americans.
The q1e opposing voice permitted to live in liberty, if not
to actually campaign, served to make the Vietnamese in the
street more cynical of our whole policy. This man was phan
huy Dan, sometimes known as phan qn"og Day, and he is
worth more than a paragraph in any honest siuOy bf America's
big experiment. For not only would Dan, as he was called, be
the only "oppositron" leader at liberty to dispute power with
42
 THE PEOPLE THWARTED 43
M{1m. Nhu's family, the Trans, if something had happened
to Diem, but he provides an excellent slnmpli of the -s6fi of
Fan to whom our agents were invariably drawn. Dan had
been_all ihing f6 all people in his time, depending on who
yas dispensing_the perquisites. politically he LaO ranged from
feryent monarchist to popular democrat.
b 1946, when the Dai Viet party under Nguyen ton Hoan
atternFted a coup ditat against Ho chi Minh, Dan was in on
it-with- a_group calling themselves the Dai Churig (Great
Masses). The attelqpt failed because the French wie-trying
!9 Se! alory with Ho chi Minh at the time, and they,guia"i
Ho chi Minh as the lesser tbreat. In all justice it must*be r+,
membered that America was also granting Ho ..agrarian re-
fgrmet'' garb and considerable support. Those in tni pai Viet
plot-who were able to escape fled io China. Among tlem, leav-
inC.S.*if" g a.village some hundrea ana fift/mit"*'"*"y
and taking with him the daughter of a party member who hai
been doing his cooking, went Dan. fni Oai Viet accused him
of taking the party's funds.
In 1947 the nationalist leaders brought their scattered or-
ganizations together again and convergid on Hong fong io
oe-Tang a say ln the new agreement Bao Dai was negotiating
y1F3" Fregc!. They promised they would stick iog"tn"i
but Dan used the rest of the group as a bargaining pii"t t6
advance himself. In return foi a post as perJonal counsellor
to Bao Dai, he sold out his friendslnd helped f"rm wnaf tney
considered to be a puppet cabinet.
Ia 1952 the Americans, each trying to apply his own theories
to Southeast-Asian politics, atternpied t6'siU the idea of a
-rurc rorce," a movement_previously
mentioned_that would.
oust both Bao Dai and,the French and then oppose
the Reds.
ihe material to. Cian-am' breene,s book,
tS$^t".t:a,provided
ne Autet American. Gene Gregory, publisher of. the Timei
of Vietnam, was the American C.i["^ Cr"""" fictionalized
in this novel. A thread in Greene's ptot the involve-
ment of the hero with terrorist tomtings"o"c"-"
in *etnam. In real
life, an American named McKay *-iEt"a *ith the
OSS was
explosives for a rheater bombing in
::1q,"^1,At-rurnil|r1e
rv,)z and w.ap ex-peled from the country by the French. -The
urr5, was saict to be behind his return to Vietnam
after Diem,s
rise to power.)
_ The'third force" idea was not a new one. g,tr", oulisaatint
leaders had tried and rejected it wnen tney fo-unO
that activi-
ties against Bao Dai alwiys aided Ho Irfi"n indirectly, and
invariably only made more necessary"ni the continuation of the
4 BACKGROUND NO BETRAYAL
French rule. Bao Dai himself had tried an anti-French, anti-
Communist "third force. platform and failed for lack rf r"p
liberals, however, were more ardent in fghtiig
!9,1lpdan
colonialism th"y ever were.in the war against Co-mmul
msm. .lhey Fuq
backed a new Vietnamese party which they put
?* t: Itg":f+g in Thailand. He was give;prenty of m-only,
anc€very etort was made to attract recruits. BuiDan was-a
northerner. Old scores had not been forgotten and his move
ment collapsed.
F pt"p"tution for his next try, he dropped the glrl who had
- to_ Hong Kong with h;m i' S+e
fed a woman
"i'J-".i"a
rrom Cochin China, hoping it would make him a southerner
P_I^TarriaC:. (forthern Vietnam, it will be recalled, was
as Tonkin, Annam occupied the center, and iochin
P,o.*"
uruDa walr the land to the south.) Later Dan was to try
to
folm still another new party, wnich le catteO tne Democratis
I'roc, named to attract American support.
** tlis political adventurei^the only man permitted to
^^IFI
go urough the motions of opposition to ine premier whose
Py1ygI?sT had already Uecbme Ur" i"rro,6t m" yi
"o*tinto
properry confiscated, disappeared
Y_T_:T !94, $A .their
pflson, drew death sentences or simply disappearid; but phan
l"{ P* lived under a magtc-Ixotection. The explanatron: he
had dug in with oss durin! tt' .ro;r.Th;
fr-ei omce.s wtom
he convinced sf fois imFortance then baseO-their
reports on hig
information. To admit, or fi;,-tilfl;
!he1 huy Dan was
a pho-ny would be ro artmit tnat tnelnaJilL tootea. How
s-ound Dan's information had been
the war_and his superiors were promoted.
i"r'i--"t"riA. We won
When it was over,
those who wished to escape tn6 hazarOs
automatically became ..Ch-ina oi competitive life
specialists,; o, iSoutnea.t Asia
:ry:i,,Iirti'regardless of how
before. Many tansferr._e{ to bentrJ
tfiil;t tne-j had oeen a year
others returned to tne y.q.A. -lffig"""" Agency,
;;i""d;;'phan
kept in-touch with all of them.",Wherever huy Dan
he went an invisible
protected him; rt was the *nirp"i;i"ep
lPbt:ilq
hinB he is an American in good with
agent.,,
Whether he was or not ceased to matter.
sufficient-to p,revent Diem and Nhu The whisper was
from torr"Uiog him until,
in.their headiness-their convictionln"i
get along without them-they ai"ri.a could not
tnrew cautioJo the winds; but
that day was still far off. Thr;;sh
rh;;;;;rrppressions of
ftlgrty years, the ru"t tn"t-or-"-n;;";#;'Lericau
and had direct pipelines to WashinC; agents
huy Dan, placed him above persecution.
*"i"'iriends of phau
 THE PEOPLE THWARTED 45
As the centralization of power spread downward tlrough
Diem's immediate family, to thin out tbrough in-laws aod
widening circles of cousins, resentment of America as the
power respor$ible for the repressive and alien family keptpage
with the growing hatred of Diem. And as was only natural, the
fact and sourse of Dan's protection, which no other Vietnamese
enioyed, inevitably worked aginst him and us. The stigma ap'
plied to him as tool of the America's offset any advantages he
enjoyed through his limited freedom of movement.
A malaise grlpped the country-a realization that day by
day the family in power was tightening its gdp and that unless
something were done and done quickly, it would be too late.
The political parties were resfless, but they and their splinter
gxoups pulled against each other. Jealous leaders refused, even
temporarily, to unite in a common front. Thus Nhu was per-
mitted, through his secret police and agitators, to practice the
game of divide-and-rule. Antagonisms between northerners
and southerners, both anti-Communist, increased. The most
imFortant of the nationalist, anti{ommunist political parties
opposing Diem's growing power wrul the Dai Viet party we
have mentioned, the party that 'n 1946 came within a breath of
beating Ho chi Minh. The Dai Viet leader, Dr. Nguyen ton
Hoan, still convinced of the purity of all things American, a
delusion that was fostered tbrough his personal friendship with
and confidence in American Ambassador Donald Heath, pre
pared to fly to Washington in late 1954, with a visa provided
him !y Ambassador Heath. All that was necessary, Dr. Hoan
thought, was to explain to the Americans and they would rec-
tify their mistake of backing Diem.
The two religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao,
were alarmed, but not yet to the point of making a move. In
1953 they had formed a United National Front, as they called
it, with fte ginh Xuyen-the organization of Le van Vien
who was to become head of the police in 1954. The Binh
Xuyen was more than a gang of pirates; it had the organiza-
tional attributes of a secret society, one of those brotherhoods
to be found in the Orient and nowhere else. The eyes and the
ears of fts linh Xuyen were everywhere. They alone had
proved that they could beat the Communists at their own
game. Perhaps it was a feeling of security that kept the two
sects and the Binh Xuyen, with their three private armies, from
making a move while Diem and Nhu prepared to take over the
national army before their eyes. For in those months of July
and August 1954, the honeymoon with the new regime was
already over, and the army loomed as the bulwark between
46 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
the Ngo dinbs and the people. It was to the army that the
people tumed.
Like all crises, the mounting one in Saigon started with
countless conversations, carefully sheltered behind the con-
ditional. "If we were to do this," was the preface until that
step was past and "we must do this" opened a new phase.
Diem had appointed himself minister of the interior (i.e.,
head of the national police) and minister of national defense
(i.e., controller of the army). Tran van Do, the uncle of
Madame Nhu, was minister of foreign affairs. Tran van
Chuong was minister of state, but his role in the unsavory
Trang trong Kim government of 1945 under the Japanese had
not,been forgotten. Brother Nhu stayed out of the picture,
preferring to operate as "counsellor to the president,,, with
his 180,000 regimented labor union members acting as a sort
of iron guard for a personal fascism-of-the-left.
Cochin China's six millisn southerners had not I minister
in the government as the showdown approached between Diem
and young General Nguyen van Hinh, the chief of staff of the
army. Ilinh's father, Nguyen van fem, had been premier two
years before, and he passed the laws guaranteeing the rights
of labor unions which, in the summer of 1954, enabled frhu
to use his union to outdistance the leaders who had bona fide
political backing. As a consequence Nguyen van Tam was the
first to have his property con-fiscated and be driven from the
country.
Diem's brother, Thuc, the priest of ffte fsmily, was bishop
of Vinh Long to the south; so Cochin ehina, without repre
sentation at the time in the cabinet, became his personal hef.
The northern area, it must be remembered, was turned over
to the iron-fisted brother Can. Brother Luyen was packed off
to Burope as ambassador-at{arge. Wherever one looked there
were only Ngo dinhs and Tran vans, save for the incumbents
of two unimportant posts, agriculture and public health, both
held by nonentities.
Lieutenant General "fron Mike" O'Daniel, head of Ameri-
s4's mililary aid advisory group was an all-out partisan of the
Ngo dinhs. From the moment of Diem's arrival he forgot the
main pu4rose of his mission. Strengthening Vietnam ag"in t th"
Communist power to the north was the least of O'Daniel's
worries. Eventually he left the army and returned to America
as Diem's heavy artillery in the greatest public relations cam_
paign ever launched to sell America a liability. More will be
said later of General O'Daniel and Colonel Edward Lansdale,
 .fHE PEOPLE THWARTED 47
the political officer who was dispatched to help Diem strangle
his opposition.
Also there was Professor Wesley Fishel, Diem's old friend
from Michigan State University, who for seven years turned
the press and political science section of an American hall of
learning into indoctnnation organs to sell Vietnam,s outside-
imposed despot and his policies. On the side, Fishel served
as conzultant to the U. S. operations mission-the group sup'
plying money to keep Diem in the saddle. Fishel also w-ork6d
from the inside as a member of Ambassador J. Lawton Collins,
sta.ff.
It was the practice of this American team, as southern dis-
content mounted, to divert the storm from Diem's head bv
running .a lo9{ popularity contest against the French by
resurrecting o-l{ grydges and directing popular anger against
tne late colonialists! In Vietnam it meiwitfi tmited-succe-ss; in
America, far from the scene, there was no voice to contrad.ict
them.
An important adjunct to this team was the International
Rescue Committee, IRC, as it was called, of New york, which
worked on the American front. This olganization, rnto which
no spotlight ever probed, had both the fnances
-investigative
and, apparently, a reason for sending a ..mission,, to South
Vietnam. Whom did they send? The Austrian socialist leader
and naturalized American, Joseph Buttinger.
_ By September 1954 something had to !ive. Oiem knew that
the southerners were sti!!ng, but slow ietloos and negotia_
not his way. He proposed to break them. nf that
lions yere
time, however, the army was in revolt and wholeheartedly in
sympathy with the opposition.
_ The acc_ount given by General Hinh,s father, the former
Premier Nguyen van Tam, of the start of this affarr, which
Ame-rican press agencies and newspapers presented as an
ex_
aTFle of our brilliant diplomacy aria oiedt miracte_woikin!,
is herefor the record.
For all his courteous, old-school air, Nguyen van Tam is a
fghter. One of his sons was killed ty tn" Viit-i"n, ana wnen
he toof his premiership under Bao Oai L June 1952, it
was with-ov9r
the blunt declaratio!_ of policy, ,,We are going to
fght Communists.', Naturally Hinh turniO to ni, tatnir ihen
he was faced with the political decision. We might aAa
thai
Sinh an{ _!is foynS ginerals also thought- that ex_premier
lem would have better luck with French General Ely.
. .'lI y* up in Dalat when it started,,' former premier Tam
told the author. ..My son telegraphed
-" To down. I
"o-"
48 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
flew to Saigon and they [his son and the other military leaders]
told me they were going to oust Diem. The people didn't want
Diem, and Bao Dai was behind my son, so they were going to
throw him out if he refused to obey Bao Dai's order to step
down. I said, 'It is all right with me, but don't forget, the
French have charge of the gasoline and ammunition. You
can't do anything without them.'
"So they sent me to see the French. The first officers I
talked to said, 'It is all right with us, on our level, but you will
have to see General Ely.' I went to General Ely and told him
what we were going to do. And General Ely reptied that he
would not gtve us either gasoline or ammunition. He said,
'There are a thousand reasons for supporting Diem, chief of
which is America will cut off all aid if you don't.' Ely wouldn't
give us anything, so we were lost."
Such was the stand taken by the French general charged
with preserving order. Ihe propaganda given America then
or since never mentioned this. Rather, it :harged Ely with
openly agitating and oacking a revolt. He is accused of en-
couraging the whole plot as a means of restoring colonialism.
It was reported that he withheld ammunition from Diem, out
at no time is he given credit for trying to preserve peace by
keeping both sides from fighting, much less pteading Diem,s
case with Hinh's father.
Hinh was thirty-erght and with no political experience or
ambition, when he was confronted with the job of ousting
Diem or seeing Diem and Nhu take over the army, the only
protective shield between the Ngo dinhs and the people. He
had graduated from the Ecole Superieure de l'Air and was
a veteran of the Italian and German campaigns. He had thir-
teen decorations, including the Legion of ffonor, the Croix de
Guerre and the American Air Medal. During the war against
the Vietmihh he had commanded a squadron, and in 1951
ae left the French air force with the rank of lieutenant colonel
to enter Vietnam's new national army as a brigadier general.
In his battle dress covered with ribbons, he incarnated in his
person the young Vietnam who, with the 270,000 men avail-
able to his command, would, it was hoped, stop the Reds. He
was Vietnam's heroic soldier, the only general that would have
inspired a Vietnamese boy to join the army.
Suspicious of everyone but his brothers and in-laws, Diem
contemplated from Norodom Palace his dashing chief-of-staff
and did not like what he saw. In fact, Diem decided to get rid
of Hinh; it was one of the first official acts in the building he
 THE PEOPLE THWARTED 49
renamed "Independence Palace." His way of doing it was typi-
cal.
On Thursday morning, September 9, 1954, a telephone jan-
gled noisily in the Saigon office of Air France. A clerk picked
up the receiver. '"This is Norodom Palace," he was told.
"General HiDh will leave for Paris on the seven o'clock flight,
Sunday morning, September 12."
"Very well," replied the clerk. 'Who is speaking?" The
party had hung up.
The reservation clerk shrugged his shoulders. He knew his
Vietnam well enough to know the dividing line between what
was his concern and what was not. He obediently filled out a
reservation sheet to fs ssqnned by typists, errand boys, clerks
and ttre horde in general infesting all business offces in the
Orient. News of the impending trip crossed Saigon with the
speed of a national calamity. One of the last to hear about it
was General fiinh, when telephone calls started asking why
he was leaving.
Hinh refused to go. The army was b€hind fiim, and around
tle army a hard core of popular resistance had begun to form.
Hitherto Hinh had regarded the private armies of the Binh
Xuyen and the sects as threats to himself. But Diem's dismiss-
ing of Hinh and the weak-dictator manner in which he had
delivered it drew the four disparate forces together.
Since Hinh had refused to take the Sunday morning plane,
Diem sent him another order, Sunday evening, telling him to
leave on Tuesday. Hinh replied that he could not. The army
was in tle process of being transferred from French to Viei-
namese comnand and he could not leave on such short notice.
The truth of the matter was that Hinh knew the army repre-
the people in this a.ffair, and both army and people had
-sen_ted
had enougb. It is interesting to read the reflection of niymonO
Cldgt on the explosion developing. To Cartier, France,s great
mistake had been the basing of their confidnce, not on the
Vietnamese rnasses who were close to the soil, but on a limited,
upper-middle class who thought they knew how to govern be-
cause they had been given a varnish of western culture. The
result permitlsd a family to grasp all the levers of command
without having any real understanding of what should be done.
Penonal and family interests were placed above the country's.
The young intellectuals thought they were making politics; in
reality they delved in intrigue. When the sountrf needed a
leader with roots in its soil, able to feel its pulsations while
keeping an open mind toward Western ideasf it had no such
50 BACKGROTJND TO BETRAYAL
men. There was no lack of them among the Vietminh, Cartier
lamented.
It was a strange situation. Even as the storm clouds gatlered,
out of the American embassy came a torrent of publicity, in-
sulting the intelligence arrd damaging America in the eyes of
apia. A vast improvement was heralded. Tibar Mende, the
European journalist, wrote of our fervor at the time, *As usual,
the Americans go about their business in dead earnest. Having
decided to transplant their variety of democracy into this forl
gotten corner of Asia, they rejoice in every gesture of .ds.
mocracy' a1only a mother could rejoice in the progress of
her child. The greater majority of Americans in Vietnam
very sincerely believe that in transplanting their institutions
they will immrrnize South Vietnam against Communist propa-
gag{a.", (Tibar Mende, in Esprit, p. 933, faris, lune ie5i;
Mende was written off as a stupid and embittered colonialisi.
fapers told the Vietnamese that they had been badly treated
but democracy s,/as ssming in. Agrarian reforms, the thangng
of ulpopular taxes, and an end of misappropriation had coine-;
new industries would be introduced, recbnstruction pushed and
the army reorganized. Before it had started the new program
was hailed as a success. Right had conquered evil. And ndooe
heard the munnurs that were rising from the villages.
The ascetic Diem remained isolated in his pahcE, the doors
of which this longed-for new order never p-assed. All Diem
wanted for the moment was to get his hands on Hinh's army.
Removal of the causes of dissatisfaction were never given a
thought.
When Hinh arrived at his office on Monday morning, follow-
ing-the linalSunday afternoon orders to leave for piiis, gen-
erals and colonels were waiting for him. Telegrams
deAging
.sYpport were flowing in from all over the country. Diem, on
his part, had sent out a call to his partisans in Hue, wnere ne
was born,. and-beyond that was hoping to limrt the spread of
the__opposition by censoring all news dispatches.
jeep, escorted by hotorcycles, circulated
- Hinh's_ empty
through the streets, but no one knew w[s1s l{inh was or what
le.was doing. Instead of commanding, rnstead of taking over
Saigon while the country literally oneiia it to him on a p-latter,
Hinh waited for Do one knew what.
thut.iglt 9" _fiti"g started. Machine guns and hand gre_
nades shook the Buropean quarter. No one knew who ias
firing or why, for anyone could have fired and *"ryo* nuC
Leason to. It was impossible for the Westerner, who had never
lived such dramas, to understand this srtuation. rt was the
 TIIE PEOPLE THWARTBD 51

Orient, with its plots of warlords, its cupidity, its double-deal-

ings, all to the accompaniment of high-sounding speeches that
carried a noble and patriotic ring when read the next day in
the New York papers.
Diem ordered Hinh to hand over his command. Hinh re'
fused and told Diem to resign instead, whereupon Diem named
General Nguyen van Vy commander of the Saigon-Cholon
area, to replace Hinh. Vy went for a talk with Hinh and
prompfly joined him. The whole insubordination, American
newspaper readers were told, is due to "the hold still exercised
by the departing French over a small group of venal officers.
The French are determined to impede democracy."
While carefully sown rumonl, under-the-table dickering, and
plots and counterplots flourished, Diem stalled for time, to
give his American protectors time to saye him. He resurrected
a white-haired general named Nguyen van Xuan, the last head
of the governmenl sf Qsshin China before it became part of
a greater Vietnam. Xuan had been one of the founders of the
Vietnamese arrny, a fast with which, along with his age, made
him s, vellslxfle figure. Though two years before he had been
aa imFlacable enemy o\ the Ngo dinhs, Diem brought him
back politically, and for no one knows what price talked him
into accepting the post of minister of national defense, over
Hinh. And lIinh, with his years of training as a soldier, was
too bound by the habits of discipline to refuse to recognize
the appointment. He wired Bao Dai for advice. When Diem
heard of the telegram he branded Hinh a rebel.
It was Bao Dai's last chance to become a leader. A week
before he had been hated and detested for remaining in Cannes
while the dismemberment of the couDtry was going on. The
{ay Itinh turned to him for instructions, all that was forgotten.
Had he risen to the occasion at that moment he could have
saved his throne. Everything depended on Bao Dai's speak-
ing with a clear voice and issuing a command. Overnight the
country^forgot its past complaints and looked to him-again,
waiting for his word.
Despite the desertion of officers and soldiers who were
frighlened by threats from the American embassy that they
would receive no more pay if they stayed with fiihh, it was
clear that Hinh held thi situation in his hands. All he was
yliFg for was a wire from Bao Dai to make his orders legal.
Without that wire he lacked initiative to do anything oo*hi,
own. Everything was confusion as Hinh awaited a repty buq
once and for all, whatever happened, e great neave 6t tni
country seemed about to throw off tle fanatic and his family.
52 BACKGROIJND TO BETRAYAL
The minister of health disappeared. In a matter of hours nine
other minisfs$ handed in their resignations. The governmental
pllace was guarded only by a few green-bereted gendarmes,
Diem's family, and the few outsiders he had rusnea in from
Hue.
Le van Vien, the Binh Xuyen leader, had flown to Cannes
to make a report to Bao Dai before the crisis started. There
!e ald the emperor learned of the new turn of events together.
At the height of the confrontation Le van Vien returned with
instructions from Bao Dai that Hinh srand his ground. Some
4p0,_0gg Vietnamese, the people of the swampy delta where
the Mekong River fans out to the sea, were ieady to follow
k^u* Vien. His private army of some 11,000 armid and 25,-
000 rrnarmed m-en possessed the best morale in the country,
and they were loyal to Bao Dai, which in this case included
Hinh. The Hoa Hao sect, numbering approximately a miilion
and- a
\a!f 3nd having an army of bet*een 5000 ;rd 10,000
under old General Tran van Sioai, pledged its support. So did
the p_o99 of the Cai Dai sect with his iwo million adepts and
over 20,000 men under arms.
At that moment the reply to Hinh,s telegram came. What
prTsg-e had been applied to Bao Dai, and by whom, we shall
probably never know, for it was never Bao bai's way to seek
an out from his mistakes by making explanations. Suffice to
s?y, thg ageats of the greatest powei on -earth, America, were
grven rree hand to see that Diem triumphed. Still,
all that
was lacking was a word. And Bao Dai chbse that moment to
assure Hinh of his esteem and tell him he 1y6 thinking the
matter over.
, As.Geo-rge_Chafford points out in his book Indochine_Dix
!:s::_!'!nd?ee2day2e, Bao Dai was aware that his margin
tor maneuvering had been greatly reduced. Edgar Faure iad
succeeded Mendes-France as premier of France. Though
Faure's estimation of Diem *a', very low inCeeO,
his desie
was to wash his hands of Vietnam completely. tbere
were
favors he wished of the Americ"o,
ne was not
going to strain Franco-American ,"t"tio"s-
"ts"*fer",-anO
ty opposing any_
thing the Americans wanted to do in Soutteasi-esial evjn
$ough_ they were wrong. With the French aisassociating
thelnlelves, Bao Dai was at the mercy *-e-.ri"an teafr
no attempt to conceal the"tfact that they would
f^H:h_i:d:
napPY to have a pretext for running him out.
3e
rrencn the anti-
campaign was to pave the way for a demand
that
.France wrthdraw all troops and get out of the
country com-
pletely, this leaving Diem and niJ american-aivisors
and the
:-.1

THB PEOPLE THWARTED 53

scurrying progressives from Michigan State a free hand. AII
things considered, it is hard to criticize Bao Dai 1e1 ssting as
he did.
Madame Nhu is credited with having conceived the idea of
a demonstration in Diem's favor at that tense momenf on
Tuesday afternoon, September 21, 1954. Who was there to
demonstrate for him save his friends and the unhappy Catholic
refugees the French air force and the American navy had
brought down from the North? Out of their miserable toitgingg
the refugees were routed and told to assemble on Avenue-pai-
quier for a march o:r Diem's palace. At their head they calried
the national flag, along with banners proclaiming their loyalty
to President Ngo dinh Diem. Mosf wore crosses on their
breasts. There was a burst of fire and the marchers wavered.
A- few the group reached the place pipeaudeBehaing
-of
ryh9re FeV hrrng some signs on the gdfi surrounding the catle-
dtul. T'h" priSts took down the signs and begged tde marchers
to go home. The last thing they wanted was that their refugees
be dragged into Diem's political game.
_lt wT asking for trouble, in the over-heated atmosphere.
Diem, in his seclusion, alternately .'nrid or flaring witl rage,
ryas -already regarded as a foreign monk-dictator, trying-6
dominste the Soutl from within his cell. tle refugejs, ilrth
every gesture of solidarity with Diem, set themselves further
apart from the people with whom they were going to have to
live.
At that moment Diem and his family stood alone beforo
the sects, the army and the police. That he survived is the first
of the miracles he is credited with performing. Actually there
was no miracle about it. ffftits llinh sat in bis command poot
and lettime pass with good-natured tolerance, Diem's .Vi"to"y'
Y* !ei"g prepare{, Hinh, by procrastinating and waiting for
Bao Dai fe think things over, was sealing his own fate.
, Without waming the Cao Dai and Hoi ttao denounced their
{lies of the day before and marched over to Diem. American
lollars and pressure worked the miracle. A Vietnamese named
Pham xuan Thai had been with an American Adventist Mis-
sion in Indochina for years and claimed to have influence
with the Americans. For that reason the Cao Dai pope, phana
cong Tac, had raken him on as a political advisor. as ine torces
against Diem mounted, pham xuan Thai,s importance
to the
pro'Diem team in the American embassy incriased. The
.tis deal
that split solid front and threw the *"ignt in Diem,s favor
involved several rniilion dollars. The exact s,m is not knswn
54 BACKGROTJND TO BETRAYAI,
Perhapo it was more than the five to ten nillion estimated,
considering the number of leaders it bought. The American
taqlayer picked up the tab. Nine years later they were to pay
an equal amountto have their liability deposed.
 CHAPTER SD(

TTIE BINH XUTEN AND THE CAO DAI SECT

What were these Binh Xuyen, referred to in one breath as

pirates and in the next as policemen, who were to play !9ch -al
important role in the power struggle in Vietnam until' with
our help, Diem was able to destroy them?
Theii story and the story of Bai Vien, their leader, who
came to be known as General I* van Vien, surpasses anything
Hollywood bas ever produced. Interwoven with them is the
story of the two religious sects, the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai'
and cornrpt warlords fluctuating between patriotism and 1

piracy until in the end their own cupidity brought about the
aownfan of their spiritual leaders. When that day arrived' of
the three of them it was the leader of the Binh Xuyen who
rose nearsst to nobility. Why we should have rendered Ho chi
Minh the immeasurable service of destroying them is some'
Iting no one can explain, unless it was for the reason that
Le van Vien, when the cards were on the table, remained loyal
to his Emperor. And it is part of the phenomena of American
liberalism that any anti-western demagogue hard-pressed for
a victory to hold up to his people has only to attack a king to
enjoy American approval and recognition. Nasser's invasion
of Yemen is a ready example.
In his doctorate-in-law thesis Pierre Debezies wrote, "Bai
Vien is surely one of the most extraordinary figures of South
Vietnam. How did this highway robber, hunted by the author-
ities tlrough the swamps of Soi Rap ten years ago, raise
himself in such a short time to the position he has reached?'
"linh Xuygn" means "toward the peace." It was the name
applied to a village in the heart of the swamps that no outside
enemy could attack without sigpaling his presence so long in
advance an ambush would be waiting for him on the way. So
the village of Binh Xuyen, hidden in the impenetrable marshes
to the south of Cholon, was the home base of Bai Vien, and
the band which took the village's name.
In the beginning they lived by piracy and ransom. In all
fairness one must add that the region offered little opportunity
to live otherwise, and their incursions were supported by the
55
56 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
colonial economy as a form of risk natural to Asia. The
Binh Xrryen were in no sense a sect, and at first ttrey had no
interest in politics. For years some hundred small bands had
operated independently out of the swamps. They would make
sporadic raids and disappear, without higher organiza'tion.
Ex-convicts, escapees from justice, men who for one infraction
or a hundred had been banned from Sargon, made up most
of these saf,gs. The best known was led by Dong ba Duong
and his brother.
During the Japanese occupation the swamp pirates became
a sort of Robin Hood band. Their daring and the genius with
which they exploited their geographical position, and the
troubles caused oy the occupying Japanese, inspired &dmir4-
tion for fls linh Xuyen among the masses. Gradually they
emerged as nationalists. When the Japanese with&ew, the
Communists came, and in the eyes of the people, if not legally,
the rehabilitation of the pirates was compiete. Ouring the briif
period of Communist "legality" Bai Vien edged hiJmen into
the police as auxiliaries and acquired an amnJsty for everyone
as well as a complete education in Communist methods.
Ba Duong remained the big chief however, followed more
or less obediently by smaller leaders such as Muoi Tri and
B4 Vien. The agent sent by the Communists to be overlord
of the area was none other than the ferocious Nguyen ginh, the
most brutal of Ho chi Minh,s lieutenants; the man who, as
nJ"{ 9t Lh9 NaE Bo, the Communist revolutionary council for
9*hio China, was mastermind of South Vietnamese rerror_
ism and subvemion. Through ail that happened in this p;;i"d
runs the_name of Nguyen ginh, tle meri.iless, twistedkiller
wlro, wrthout ever becoming a Communist party member, rn
lis maniacal zeal became t[eir robot, destroyin! tis counLy,
his countrym_ en aD4 in the end, himself. O{g,t;" Binh trusted
-the
parricularry suspicious 6f
nauon4tis8 of19.**
l9-p""1.Td independent
the swamps. Clashes became more frequenl and
in February 1946Ba Duong was killed in a combat.
the
*_11eoreU{}y _command was to pass to his brother,
+olg van Ha. At that moment Bai Vien emerged from thi
shadows to stafr his meteoric rise. and inoUreryiig
this pirate
who was to come within a hair's breadth bi--
i:tf,^T.r+t ryweteader of his country *r", "i "rt$fr"nirg
ii i, ni, qrlfitio
:r.l:.adership are appraising, not "this morals. For-are we
lgnqnS communBm in South Vietnam, or axe we out to estab-
lish blue laws? If the moralist,uy. tl"f o* ui- i. totl, *o,la
it not have been still better to let tne t"" i"*o in question
destroy themselves against each other?
 THE BINH XT.IYEN AND THE CAO DAI SECT 57
The men composing the loosely-knit bands infesting the
Binh Xuyen swamps were without any cornmon direction when
Ba lhrong died. They were undisciplined outlaws, and the chief
who rose to lead them won the loyalty sf rhis army and sub'
jected it to his own iron discipline. He had come up through a
proving ground few generals could survive.
The period of Bai Vien's rise was also, as we have men-
tioned the period of Ho chi Minh's respectability, a shocking
period for America. In late 1945 end early t946 NewsweelCs
Harold R. Isaacs enthusiastically compared "IJncle Ho' to
George Washington, snd in 1945 American general Philip E
Gallagher made broadcasb over I{o's radio. American ofrcers
flew in and out of Hanoi, promising arms, money and political
support to Ho chi Minh, the Communist, and turned in reports
to Washington that Ilarold Isaacs might have dictated.
FromHo'sTongBo committee in the north to Nguyen Binh's
Nam Bo in the south flowed a constant stream of promisss,
directives and encouragement. Bai Vien, with his men installed
as police auxiliaries, became the tax collector for his fief; but
Nguyen Binh 1ryas distrustful sf him. Bai Vien was jedous of
his freedom. He was still the man of the marshes who had
never been subiected to anyone; so Binh decided to break him.
At first he tried to disperse Bai Vien's units. Then he tried to
infltrate them. In October 1946 Bai Vien made contact with
the Frencbo trying to insure his rear in the struggle that he
knew was shaping with Nguyen linh, but he was coolly
received.
In 1947 Huynh phu So, the mad monk who founded and
led the Hoa Hao sect (see chapter 7), was lured into a trap
and killed by Nguyen Binh; Muoi Tli, Bai Vien's companion
of a hundred raids, was sentenced to death at the time for
trying to save the Hoa Hao leader. In the end Muoi Tri was not
executed, but Binh's brutality drove Bai Vien to take his
distance. Several times Binh's agents tried to kill Bai Vien, but
each time he outwit0ed them. Then Binh decided on a vada-
tion of the ruse that permitted him to kill the Hoa Hao leader
tle year before.
On May 19, 1948, using Ho chi Minh's birthday as a pre.
text, Nguyen Binh ss1 his trap for Bai Vien- He rnvited
Bai Vien to come to his headquarters in the Plain of Junks
for a party. For days Binh's troops had been on the movg
quietly closing in, on the excuse &at the French were plnnning
an offensive. But there q/as asthing that Bai Vien did not
know. He accepted the invitation and took 200 of his fiercest
58 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
bodyguards piffi him, with orders to surge to his rescue and
kill Binh if Bai Vien gave the signal.
The Plain of Junks is a vast area. As far as the eye can see,
no distinguishing point marks tle place where low islands oi
reed-covered land end and reed-covered marsh begins. Junks
appeq to be floatiag on a field of reeds and from .qis appear-
ance the plain derives its name. On one of the islands of Als
treacherous no-man's-land Nguyen Binh had his headquarters.
Bai Vien walked into his tent. Binh said, ,,You have been
betraying us but I pardon you," and proceeded to put his armr
around Bai Vien and give him an aceolade. At that moment
the killers burst into the tenl Bai Vien cried, .,To met" and
the fight w€$ on.
- V-ien 1ltd h! guards fought their way out, and all the way
Pu"-k t" the-village in the heart of the swamp from which they
had come. Back to Binh )fut"o, the lah that gave them their
name. Over a thousand of their band had haa their tlroats cut
by Binh's raiders while Bai Vien was at the .,party.', Many
were disarmed in the frst onslaught and offered a thaoce to
rally to the Reds, and were then cut down in cold blood when
they refused to desert thpir chief, Vien.
Bai Vien's reaction was swift and decisive. He sent tle
lieutenant who wrote letters for him-a young man named
Lai huuJai, dignified with the rank of private secrerary_to
present-his complimsnts to the French-commander anA to
oler, tt gven alms and ammunition, to clear the Vietminh
out of his zone and maintain order. Furthermore, he agreed
to support the French central government and accepl the
French Union.
Ol hir own, and without waiting for the French reply, the
reprisals started. Not only did the-attack en himsslf ienana
an accounting, but there was that matter of a thousand loyal
friends with their tlroats cut. The reprisals were terrible, ior
the-bane conh tac, the intelligence ce]ts which were tle
iyes
and ears and the executionerJ of Bai Vien, spread like a net
ttrror4bout the area occupied by the Vietninh. Bai Vien,s
intelligence cells were i"t""! and-in one niglimey fiquiaateJ
the_entire network Nguyen Binh had,o pudl"ify
erected. Each
To-rllrng for weeks afterward the canaG and arroyos around
Sqgo:r were cluttered with drifting U-Gr. No-q""stions
were
Sq{-by the French authorities. fiom tnaf Oay,f,tay tt,- tSii,
Bai Vien was to remain an implacable toe oiin" Communists.
., Pi:ture.hiT: For years he irad Ue"" a Oo- in the side oi
:l:^{re?ch. Any Vietnamese arrested for nationalist activity
wno had no money for defense, sent a lettbr to Bai
Vien from
 THE BINH )('YEN A}ID THE CAO DAI SECT 59
hand to hand tbrough the underground as soon as he entered
prison. If money and a lawyer could not obtain his release,
Bai Vien, the pirate, the frsthand authority on prison de-
liveries, got him out With every outwitting of the French his
reputation had increased as a native Robin Hood. lr[sw this
same candid ex-pirate became the central pillar of the anti-
Communist fight in the Saigon area.
On June !3, 1948, his adherence to the government was
formally announced, and within two montls over eight hun-
dred guerrillas deserted the Vietuinh to join him. It was the
beeinning of ttre nationalist armed forces of the Binh Xuyen,
with a discipline and an esprit de corps such as has never been
equalled since by any anti-Communist force in Vietnam. The
possibilities s1 this 'tnderground,' forged and linked by the
memories of so many years of danger together, surpassed the
strictly military. A world of faceless agents, hideouts, arms
caches, friends and associates that no one knew or suspected;
infiltrators with their own lines lgnning through every level
and business; in sum, spies, collectors and executioners with
their secret signs and passwords came with the Binh Xuyen.
It was the age-old secret society of Asia, with all the attri-
butes of a modern arm and political party under a born leader.
The leader of such a secret society can do anything. Lost in
the immense ocean of Asian humanity, he enriches whom he
pleases and kills those with whom he is at war. Bai Vien was
at war with the Vietminh, and he conducted it more efficiently
than they did, as bis survival attests.
rnto the French fold, after Bai Viel, came the Hoa Hao and
the Cao Dai in turnr the tlvo sects Nguyen Binh had irrevo-
cably alienated by killing the leader of the former and trying
to subjugate the latter.
Saigoq for all its French venee& was a sprawling dirty,
oriental agglomeratioa sf fiumens. When this ant-hill was
turned over to Bai Vien and his auxiliary police it followed
that he would tax its rnhabitants in his fashion. He would
naturally fnow what the dishonest sttizens were up to and
whether or not the honest ones were tlreatened. Alll- rhis was
accepted with Onental fatalism. Those living in steaming rab.
brt-waJTen alleyways or passing their lives on junks had never
known anything else, and under the Vietminh rt had been
i'nfimtely worse. Since the money Bai Vien collected was used
to support the army that out-fought, out-schemed and out-
massilcrec the Communrsts, that anny was really self-support-
mg-the- only ono the American taxpayer was not re[uire{
to keep in luxury.
60 BACKGROUND NO BETRAYAL
Tbo years after Bai Vien's turning against the Nam Bo,
which il
to say in 1950, the Grand Monden the great gambling
center in Cholon, the Chinese city, became his monopoly; but
hereafter the name Bai Vien was to disappear. Bai Vien passed
wi6 the outlaw, to be replaced by Le van Vien, the respectable
general, who sultivated the friendship of the Bmperor Bao
Dai after Bao Dais return.
In April l954Lal huu Sang, brother of the private sesretary
whom Vien had sent as negotiator to the French, was named
chief of the sur€t€, so successfully did the Binh Xuyen operate
freir anti-Red clean-up; and overnight from auxiliaries the
Binh Xuyen became the police. Le van Vien's forces were not
ovet three thousand men at the time, but they were devoted
fs him. And though Vien's loyalty to Bao Dai was probably
based on self-interest when their strange friendship started, no
one can deny that in the crucial test it was sincere. Such was
the series of events that brought I-e van Vien, after 1953, to
leadership of a coalition including the Hoa Hao and the Cao
Dai, and his emergence as a political power.
/Ul rhis was made possible by the acquisition of the Grand
Monde; for who ruled the Grand Monde, nrled Saigon and
Cholon. Five hundred thousand piastres a day came out of
the Grand Monde's neon-lit gambling halls and taxi dance
floors for the French tax-collectors alone, to say norhing of
unofrcial graft that would carry the figure into millions. The
economic power of the m?n who ruled the Grand Monde and
with it Cholon and its some six hundred thousand Chinese,
holding in their hands the distribution system of Vietnam, was
considerable. It all accrued to Le van Vien, the square-headed,
powerful chief with fierce eyes, protruding jaw, and muscles
that reminded one of a panther-the man who lsysd enimals,
kept pet crocodiles and tigers, yet ordered Nguyen Binh's local
commitiee wiped out with the calmness of a chess player mov-
Ing a pawn.
Chinese merchants paid Le van Vien for every truck they
sent out of Saigon; but the money went to pay his personal
foops who patrolled the long road all the way to eape St.
Jacques over which their merchandise traveled.
Gradually Le van Vien's business interests expanded. \ilith
lhe caprta,l at his disposal he developed the lumber industry in
forest regions he had cleared of the Reds. Charcoal-proauiing
plants were set up as a by-product. He built slaughterhouses,
ran fleets of fishing and transport junks sri1tr one hand and
opened markets for the fishermen with the other. Soon he had
his own bw lines fanning ouf and no one attacked them. He
 THE BINH XIryEN AND TTIE CAO DAI SECT 6T
became a principal negotiator for the Bank of Indochina.
The flood of piastres permitted him to recruit more troops
and improve tne Uving conditions of the followert on whom
his powir was built. Iradership of the fa^mous "popular front"
with the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects which we have men-
tioned, provided a party to serve as a political arm. Through
it he was to become a national leader, moving into distant
provinces, forming branches, absorbing older groups and, with
the same genius for administration he had shown as an illiterate
leader of rufrans in the swamp, forming a political-military
-the of stabilizing Cochin
organization capable China.
And this is country to which America sent Colonel
Edward t-ansdale to teach guerrilla warfarel
First Communist reaction to Bai Vien's rallying to the
French and transition from outlaw to public serYant as Gen-
eral I* van Vien, wrs a peremptory sulnmons from the
Tong Bo, the dread committee surounding Ho chi 1ginh, for
General Nguyen Binh to present himself.
As for the Cao Dai, it was French General Latour who
approved bringrng into the war against Ho chi Minh the
private army of the Cao Dai pope. The Vierminh were like
water; they were everywhere and nowhere. The country was
their sponge, and Latour decided to wrest a cleared space from
the fluid enemy. Latour had informers by the thousands. The
intelligence service of the French army spent piastres by the
millions. Information was exchanged and traded on a regular
markel but most of it was false. The truth was too dangerous.
Leaks invariably led to the honest inforuer's getting his throat
cuL So in 1948 the same Cao Dai forces that had in 1945
embarked on a massacre of the French at the behest of the
Japanese, were brought into the fight as allies against the
Vietminh.
Ia 1945 the Japanese had armed the Cao Dai and moved
their flying columns into Saigon when defeat became inevita-
ble. Cao Dai leaders never doubted for a minute that if all the
foreip.ers in Cochin China had their tbroats cut, the country
would fall to them. The ssreams that punctuated that frightful
night in the spring of. 1945, in Saigon will never be forgotten
by the Ewopeans who survived it. Yet the Cao Dai pope
seemed such a gentle little man when one sipped tepid cham-
pagne with him 4f ten in the morningl He was known as His
Holiness, Pope Pham cong Tac. Beside him, in immense
diSnity with his flowing beard, sat the Bao Dao, defender of
the faith, the last time the author visited them in their place
of exile in Pnom Psnh, Cambodia.
62 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
- Incredible as it may seem, within thirty years the religion
that started wi-th expeiim*t" io ,piritu ldd;y a bored
civil
pTa"t nFmed Ngo van Chieu" whiling awat bi" dm" with
island post in the Gulf of Sia-,
flr^Tp-paC-,1g.isolated
oecame A national fg1ce.
The world of the little Vietnamese is inhabited by strange
spirits. Everywhere about him is a sense of mystery, una tetoi"
the mystery-his imprrlse is to band togethei wftfi'otner
n:unese to form a brotherhood bound by inner secrets
Vi"t-
ex_
pressef obscure-symbols. Because the ali_seeing ey;
onq
il symbols of the Cao
of the
b;ca;;
Dai secl stuAeits'of occuti
societies lave attem_pled to link Vietnam's powerful
sect with
older orders and ofishoots of the Illuminati. Actuallg to do
so is 0o accord it a genealogy it does not have. fne m6n
wno
sat qroung Ng9 van Chieu,s table in 1919 while ne com-
municated with the spirits by means of the ..corbeille i
bec," a-primitive, beak-shaped gadget holding a pencil which
in the hands of the adept-communicated tfe aily
were minor functionaries with at least rudimentary-uog",
Freich
{i:t"^. Hysg wgs the literary giant of tlieir clas;
so rt was-only natural that he should communicate with
them-
The sSmbol of the all-seeqg eye was familiar to tlem. tney
-lodge
1"1 td of $9 erand OriJnt
their French history.
of the iree Uasonry ii
_Long before tle master with whom they were in contact
identified himself on Christmas Eve of l9Z3 as.,Cao Dai, de
Pure A-ugust One, the Oldest of the Buddhas, S"Ly"--*i;J
Jesus Christ" Chieu had plundered the ganC Ciri"ot of its
symbo.-I, without any deep knowledge of 6at secret
lodge oi
any other.
When Chieu g9t back to Saigon his fust important convei
was a harddrinking wildly gambling reprobate named Le van
Tlung who overnight threw-himsef into Cao Daism with such
fervor that he seized its direction from Chieu. Trrnt bec"m;
pe.segfs frsl pope. Till his death, or ,,disincarnation' in Cao
S_ntraseo1ggy, in 1934, the sect never ceased to expand.
rnen-sarne Phan cong Tac, the former custonn ofrcial.-
Asia was in a state of trux. The nha-qug the toiling littte
man of Asia's human aqtlill*, was rejecting many of fiis old
superstitions._4"a-pqpq pham cong Tac w-as a glnius at ad_
p-.it"F.": Tis discipline_and leadership hardened the organ-
ization- Disjoinfed bands had protected the sect against- in_
:*iory-Y Vietminh guerrillas and the French- pf,am cong
Tac welded them into an army, the only army outside the Vietl
minh that possessed all the elements necessary for a crusade:
a
 THB BINH XIIYEN AND THE CAO DAI SBCT 63
mysticism, an ideal' alatge following; a cohesive organization
ila fighters' In sum, an instument of domination'
aoa Coo bai
"o*u'g"ous amUitions were boundless' To push ahgad' to
guin -ot" strength, to possess more followers, to control more
treachery, bru-
Fo""a, to ""qriit" more wealth, by duplicity,
or religion, was their aim.
-l6mi""t
tality
oiganizations were suppressed by the French police'
but police wlre powerless against a l+qo1 Under Pope
inuti Tac the Cao Dai followers bled the {apanese for
-a
"oog special auxiliary force. Prince Cong De, a cousin
-o*y ". fas brought back from Japan to s€rve as a puppgf
of Ba6 Dai,
;6 th" Cao Dai *"ti lireA to acclaim him. Without a qualm
Gy t*g over to Cong De as lgng--?s the money lastgd'
frdm,tne i"p*o" they swung to the Vietminh' till thrc !i9t-
minn tnreatened the Cab Dai pope; then they became the allies
of the French, and their holy see of Tay )rfinh, with its ge-at
C"i O"i temple, became a piilar in the anti'Vietminh struggle'
-bands,
Delirious imFervious to danger and fighting as
Oouin unaer a hypnotic spell, out-foughl-tbe chidois (sectors)
of td" Vi"t-i"n-iher"uei they found them' Soldiers of the
pop" nt"t" suicides from the moment they started' They killed'
i:ri ai"a as they killed, as though life were of no importanrce'
If the French sufiered an ambush, word was sent to the Cao
Dui pop" and a flying brigade cleared the area' What they did
with- tireir prisoneri the French never knew' Some were
herded bacf in columns, closely guarded lest the Vierminh
tty to tit"t"t" them. At the end bf each column marched
security officers. Between vehicles moved the shock troopg'
In the center came mortar bearers, accompanied by their
ammunilisn coolies. Pushed on by bayonets were the prts-on-
irs, assassination squads of the 'Vietm;"r'. The villages they
had terrorized henciforth belonged to the Cao Dai'
On either side of the route of march, phantoms moved
tbrough the brush, scouts by the hundreds armed only with a
hand-grenade to piotect 1fis-flanks and alert fts sslumn in the
event
-of attack. Along the road an efficient alarm system
operated.
It was mass mysticism, moving with modern arms' When a
French general cbdd nol fnd th; enemy he lad onl; to-call
on the Cao Dai pope. A flying brigade would be dispatched,
and in tbree months they wofud have a fort, the Vietminh
would be gone-wiped out to a man. The nha-ques, the.coun-
try peopd cooverfed to Cao Daism, would be working as
sid or toiling as Cao Dai slaves to feed and serve the new
oiganization. Each time a Vietminh drive tbreatened a pacified
64 BACKGROUND TO BBTRAYAL
area, Francens General Latour had only to give the Cao Dai
a bit more money, a few more psshine guns, and Vietminh
implantation was succeeded by that of the Cao Dai.
In the end the general realized that in areas where the
Vietminh had been, a new problem presented itself; Every
youngster play'rng beside a road, every workman in a field' the
woman selling produce or weaving a basket, the decrepit beg-
gar lying beside a trercver! human being, no matter how
young or old, how weak or humble-was a link not only in
the elaborate Cao Dai warning system against the Vietminh
but also against the French. When the general staff realized
this, the delicate game of balance and counterbalance started.
It was not by accident of geography that the Vietminh
claimed and were able to obtain the northern half of Vietnam
while the southern half remained free. Had Ho chi Minh suc-
ceeded in establishing Communist power in the south as
effectively as he had in the north, he could have claimed
tle whole country. That he failed was due as much to the
three forces (Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao) we
destroyed as it was to the French. Hoa Hao guerrillas were the
terror of the Comnunists in Western Cochin China and
tlroughout the whole Mekong Delta and its waterways fan-
ning out to the sea. Where the Hoa Hao did not operate and
where the French expeditionary force itself refrained from
venturing in Cochin Qhina, the Cao Dai sect ensured security.
And in the labyrinth of Saigon's putrid quarters, as Ray-
mond Cartier put i! "the Binh Xuyen waged a ceaseless,
bloodn ferocious war, killing the Vietrninh like a terrier exter-
minalfug rats, while Diem left his dear country at the frst
sound of a cannon and prepared to return with the superb dog-
matism and undentanding of politicehumao realities acquired
in exile.
"There is no doubt that I-e van Vien desired to rise above
his past and acguire respectability. Had he and his Binh Xrryen
not turned against the Viefuinh," Cartier reflected "no one
dares think of what we would have done to maintain order
in Saigon."
There were those who did dare pose that question, and
the alternative they saw was a Saigon terrorized by Nguyen
Binh.
 CIIAPTER SEVEN

NGI.ryEN BINH A}'ID TIIE HOA HAO

Ngrryen Binh was not his real name. It is doubtful that any-
ooe fnom what it was. He frst attracted attention as a young
incorrigible, distinguishing !!nset! by lawlessness and assum-
f"". U"fri"'&" cointless-p"ti"" who had cause to arrest him'
tG';"-" of the village io .tpp* Tonkin where he wasso-ciety'born'
a"a r" Ngtyen Binh he conducted his war against M11'
In his teenihe worked as a laundryman on a Messageries
th* 6;. At twenty he was sent to PouloCondore priso-n for
t""of"tio"rty activity; and this prison, the Alcatraz of Indo'
china, contained the-most cunning, rutlless Coonunists Rus-
sia ever trained to spread revolution. There Binh learned the
i""n"iq* of what fas to become his life work' In t934, for on
his reliase, he contacted the underground cell leaders
whom the'hardened veterans on the inside had given him
messages.
- fnJo"Outground dispatched him to a chief-in Canton who
in turn pattei him sn t6 comrades fiaining military and polit-
i"* t"ud"tt in the Whampo school of the Kuomintang'toWhen Mos-
the Kuomintang ceased io please him, Binh moved
cow ana therlthrough World War II, he worked with the
Russians. e p6int to bear in mind as one studies werything
this iron-wil6d murderer did thereafter is that in Binh we find
in" p"tt""t example of the tool of the Russiang able to say in
doo"tty that he was never a Communist. For Nguyen Binh'
to the end, never belonged to the party. It was always p -a
"U
nationalisg that shining overworked word, that he worked'
When the time was ripe, Moscow dispatched him ea s
mission to Ho chi Minh il Indochinq back to the country of
Ui. Uittl. It was in 1945, and Ho chi Minh sent him south to
a post near the river Binh had last sailed down as a laundry-
man, with full powers to organize and direct a war.
the murderous guerrilla tilti"gs in forests ani rice paddies
that took their toll on France for the next nine years, until
Pierre Mendes-France ceded the honor of protecting Inde'
china to the Americans, was the work of Nguyen Binb and the
65
66 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
machin€ he perfected. The real Communist overlords were in
the north with "Llncle IIo," the idol of Newsweek's Harold
Isaacs and the long line of OSS majors proudly bearing Uncle
Ho's autographed gold cigarette cases; but Ho and General
Giap with their Tong Bo council and their commissart, were
far-oft names to those in tle south. Nguyen Sinh, with his
sun helmef his dark glasses and a Colt revolver in a holster on
his hip, was the "nationalisf' designated to be communism,s
warlord in Cochin China.
Between 1945 and 1948, when he set his trap for Bai Vien
and commiJted the unpardonable sin-he set up a trap and
failed-Binh murdered _more people, with more brutality,
than any Oriental since Genghis Khan, and did it as America's
prot6gd as well as Ho chi Minh's and the Russian s. Hirs base,
from the start, was a constantly moving one, in the same plain
of Junks where he tried to kill Bai Vien, at the very gates of
Saigon. Fanatic, cruef generow when he wanted to be and
pitiless when tlere was Do political reason to be otherwise,
Binh drove hinself as mercilessly as his men-
Hib first move in Cochin China was to form an elite guard,
armed with the be,st automatic weapour Ho chi Minh had
received from the Americans in the frst days of our anti-
colonialist crusade. Radio eommunications equipment was
forthcoming from the same sourcs. And around him formed
the inevitable nucleus of Communist governmen! the Nam Bo,
which was the southern equivalent of the Tong Bo surrounding
Ho. Under Ngrryen Binh" until his work was accomplished and
the Tong Bo ready to liquidate him, the Nam ge exercised
almost complete autonomy fiom the Red council in the north.
Y€t only once, at the beginning of his career under Ho, did
Binh ever protest a Red order. It was in !944, atHanoi, while
Binh was being groomed for the southern corunand.. He and
Giap were systematically massacring the old anti-French ter-
rorists who had inspired Binh in his youth-men of the
YenJay uprising in 1930 and all the battles of the period of
Binh's apprenticeship in what the Roosevelti.ns weri to dig-
nify as nationalism"
"Listen " General Giap said 1s him, ,,you are an intelligent
Dationslisf. You must stand with us, even though we liquidate
the comrades of your youth. We have to dq rhis becausi they
are potential traitors. You knew these men when they wgi
heroes. Now they se lsrhing; they have feen outpateit By
history. Yef because they accomplished something yo"s agq
they want power. They are not worth it. So to get power thiri
 NGUYEN BINH AND THE HOA HAO 67

is only ess tting they can do: they will collaborate+ither

with the Kuomintang or the French. They have to go."
Once Binh was brought to accept ttis reasoning he was
fit for anything. His capital in the Plain of Junks became an
invisible city. Everything was mobile-his camp, printing
presses, arsenals for making crude rifles, bombs and grenades.
bamboo-built equipment for whole crafts and industries could
be dismantled, piled in jrtnks and transported tlrough a
labyrinth of canals and drainage passages to another reed-
hidden mound of earth at a momenfs notice. A constant
stream of messengers, spies, gssxgsins, political commissars
and tax collectors scurried between Saigon and wherever Binh's
-Binh's happened to be.
headquarters
In eyes, as iryith all revolutionaries basing their
power on terror whether in Algeria or Cochin-China, no man
laa a right to be neutral. If he is neutal, kill him. Suspicion,
whether or not supported by a sbred of proof, led to execution.
Each day Binh's underground transmitter Voice of the Nam
Bo, spread hate and terror in Saigon by reading the list of
Dames of those marked for assassination. His posters' pa^m-
phlets, sheets and whole newspapers circulated through Saigon
at nighf His administrative organization divided Cochin China
into tlree parts: In the eastern section were the rubber plan-
tations, the jute plantations and great producing 6q6ains in
the forest. Notling that would or could produce tax money
was destroyed. In the west he milked the rice producers. In
the center of his world lay Saigon, Cholon, and the Plain of
Junks, and here Binh's "minisfSr of finance," headed by him-
self, with a bookkeeping system as meticulous as any $ank's,
collected taxes and operated on the open market providing
the bulk of revenue necessary to keep Ho chi Minh happy in
the north and support six regular regiments in the Saigon area.
When one considers the gip of Binh's organization in the
very heart of what was French Indochina" then the dumping
of the whole problem of trying to cope \rith rhis force into the
lap of I-e van Vien and his ex-pirates becomes understandable.
And.in spite of the murders, the pitiless shake-downs and the
brutalities, the little people admired Nguyen 3inh, for the
Oriental worships strength even when it expresses itself in the
form of cruelty and its victim may be himself.
The early months of. 1947 were Binh's high s,pofl But in spite
of his authoritarianism tlree groups escape! control: the Hoa
Hao waged war on him, while the Cao Dai sect and the Binh
Xuyen, though cooperating as tax collectors, refused to yield
an inch of their independence. The idea of insubordination
68 BACKGROIJND TO BETRAYAL
and the possibility of treasotr became an obsession with Binh.
In his fanaticism he cut down the best of his lieutenants be-
cause of thoughB he fancied they were hiding in their minds.
This was when he decided to break the Hoa Hao by assassinat-
ing their leader, Huynh phu So.
A massive mountain raDge rears itself in lower Cochin
China, where for years convicts, rebels, hermits, philosophers
and anyone wishing safety or seclusion fled for refuge. This is
called the "Seven Mountains" area, and tle superstitious ac-
cord it a mystic power. In the early twenties Huynh phu So'
the son of a village notable, went there to cure himself of
epileptic fits. Living in a cave with a hermit he spent his days
in meditation, prayer and rqrentance. In 1926 the hermit died
andHuynh phu So, or Huynh, as we shall sall him, went down
from the mountain, sured of his epilepsy but completely mad.
He was emaciated and his unkempt hair hung to his shoulders.
IVandering from village to village he preached to the nha-ques,
as Indochina's teeming millions are called. Within the depths
of the nhagues, with their zuperstitions and their macabre
dreams of a continual dance of death, he struck a chord.
In his trances he preached of a renovated Buddhism but
talked of a devastating war in which the European would be
defeated. Whether or not he was in the pay of the Japanese
at this time is uns€rtain. Iater they were to advance him sad
use him. One night in 1939 he came out of one of the fitful
trances that inspired wonder and admiration in the ignorant
nha-ques who watshed hino, and proclaimed that a revelation
had come 1e him; He was tbe living God. Through Chauduc,
Cantho and the Long Xuyen areas his preachings spread.
Peasants, small land-owners and tradespeople prostrated them-
selves before him. Soon his power spread to Rach Gia and
Mytho and his followers numbered n million as he wandere4
performing miracles and healing the sick.
What they did not know was that the Japanese were giving
him the quinine he put in potions to reduce their feve.rs. As
his reputation grew his messagps became more terrible. In his
wake trailed a stream of monks he was training to spread his
word. As the Japanese star descended he began acquiring arms
for his followers and a new note appeared. The faithful must
wipe out their enenies. Anyone who killed ten Frencbnen
would go straight to heaven, but the Vietrinh, being infidels,
were enemies also. In the frenzy of their death cull Huynh's
oonverb ambushed French convoys to get more arms so tlat
they could kill Frencbmen on one hand and Communists on
the other. The Vieminh held the villages and the Hoa Hao
 NGTIYEN BINH AND THE HOA HAO 69
the rice paddies, and between tlem blood flowed like water.
In Cantho, tho great rice market on the Mekong River,
Nguyen Binh's tribmals sent thousands of Hoa Hao to death
with a bullet in the bapk of the head. Thousands more were
thrown into the river with their arms bound behind them.
Through it all, Hulmh escaped in seemingly miraculous ways,
which zupported his claim to being immortal. Any faithful
who killed ten Vietminh, he proclaimed, would mount directly
to a paradise superior to that reserved for killers of French-
men. Alienation of the Hoa Hao was the frst of Binh's great
mistakes.
For two yeanl trris butchery went on; then Binh decided to
rectify his error in the only way that was natural to him. In
Aprfl 1947 he sent the living god a message of friendehip,
saying "Come to me in the Plain of Junks. Let us embrace
and stop tris fratricidal struggle and unite against the French."
With the messagewas asafe conduct.
Huynh saw opening before him a golden opportunity to con-
vert the Vietminh. Some say that he was cut in two by a burst
of machine gun fire as he entered Binh's camp. Others claim
Binh dragged out his victory, then lopped off Huynh's head
with a scimitar, the military symbol of his sect. In the montls
that followed there was no attempt to avenge Huynh's death,
for his followers were convinced that he was immortal. His
generels, under the redoubtable Tran van Sioai, were enbar-
rassed. They knew there had been an ambush, but tley were
at a loss as to how to d€al with the religious side of the affair.
It was at that time that the French took stock of the situa-
tion. The Hoa Hao were capable of savagery, but in the man-
ner of children. Their ferocity was an uncomplicated, natural
thing. Better to treat them as naive children and forgive the
past. After all, as guerrilla warriors they were second to none.
What if their retgion had degenerated into an anarchy of
schisms and their military forces into feudal armies under gen-
erals who regarded them as personal prerogatives? The blunt
fact remained that Ttan van Sioai had cleared the Vietminh
from western Cochin Chi,oa-
A French ofrcer named Campadieu took his life in his
hands and walked into the Hoa Hao camp to open negotia-
tions. Overnight they became respectable and insatiable as
French allies, finance4 equipped and heaped with honors. One
of their fercest leaders was a frail esnsnmptive named Bacu!
who had hacked oft his index fnger in front of his troops to
show how he would cut off the heads of Frenchmen.
Back in Hanoi the Tong Bo was dissatisfied with the sense-
70 BACKGROUND TO BBTRAYAL
less alienation of such warriors. From that moment Nguyen
Binh was on thin ice. Perhaps it was to redeem himself thaf he
attempted the same ruse against Bai Vien e year later, but
this time he went too far, for along with the error of driving
an enemy of the French into forming an alliance with them,
he made the unforgivable mistake of failing. A committee
yg!_segt south by the Tong Bo to judge Binh in his own camp.
yith the frighfful coldness of Marxist lessening and precisioh
they charged him yift failing to analpe the situatiof, correct-
ly-,-yrtngftg in to egotism and by his own self-intoxication,
riskingthe ultimate victory of thepeopla
Binh !sm1 through the painful process of autocriticism. He
admitted his errors and begged forgiveness. And since his
work was not yet fnfuhed they spared him, but the next tlree
years of his life were a nightmare. I{e was as inextricablv
caught in the merciless machine as the humblest nha-que in
t1rs
ryok*. _One by oae his comrades were weeded oul liqui-
qgte4 q be replaced by a new man sent by the fong ito.
4*uyr it -was to inprove the efrciency of the machine, and
the executioner was always Nguyen Binh. At last, in 195i the
time came when he eould no longer satisfy his masters. They
him to sppear in Hanoi, before the Tong Bo. Foi
weBks he sta[ed. At last he started, only to be kilGd by the
French along the
nay_. There were those in the expediti5nary
corps who suspected that the tipoff which reached iheir hands
yas sgnt by Ho and Giap themselves. Having Binh intercepted
by a French column was a more satisfactory-method of execu-
tion, for the man was still an idol to mady in the south. He
hap-sptled so nuch French blood there; an6 thi*, to the Viet-
Ti"h of Cochin China, was the measure of his greatness.
 CHAPTER EIGHT
TTIE GOVERNMENT AMERICA SUPPORTED

October lO, 1954, was the date set for French withdrawal
fr-om-Hanoi, capital of North Vietnem. It brought a horde
of refugees to the south. First there were the Catholics, herded
in a mass 9xo{us by their pdests; then the Buddhists, and
after them in the ever increasing flood went hundreds more
who for one reasotr or another dreaded to face life under the
Reds. The American navy transported thousands to their new
fom-es-
in th_e soutb, ani the French air force plied back and
forth in a shuttle service, evacuating thousandj more.
years
- -Eight and later a French commandant who supported his
fricnds was charged with refusing to abandon- Moslems
who had served with them in Algeria, was still seared by the
memory of what he had seen in Indochina. ..As our boat
pulhd_awan t rlqg us out to the ship in the harbor,'he testi-
fied, "I watched Vietnamese women wade after us, hold their
babies up to soldiers in the boats and then, AenUeirtefy, sfiai
under the water and drown, and I swore that I wodd never
take part in such betrayal again.',
By lanuary of 1955 this human wave was at its heigbt, a
trek of misery which, though they had nothing to do dth'it,
the remote man in Independence'palace ana f,is f"riti *1i.i
exploit plopaganda-wise in America, and poHtically at none,
fo
tor years to come. Either because his unstable teirper hap,
p:"* to be lashing gut at the French at the time, of Uecauie
lis American apologists needed a whipping boy to blame for
tn9 efoyrng opposition against him, Diem chose the moment
when the plight of the fleeing refugees was most desperate to
go into one of his tirades and demand that the Fiencb
air
forcehalt its airlifl
was rife, but again A.merican agents on the rpot
,_.?_":9."rft
mterpreted each nsw warning sign of impending trouble ii a
way th3t w9ul9_-support whai tney were iut to sell. Freedom
was wnat the Viernamese wante4 but instead of freedom
in-
creasing-with independence, each passing week made the old
oays took better. yet the American team had a ready arBwers
It fanned the hate campaign against the departing c6tooiutists,
7l
72 BACKGROUND TO BBTRAYAL
and said everything would be aI right &s soon as the standard
of living was raised and the colonialists were gone. This meant
more American aid wrung out of patient Americans for a peo-
ple who were hitherto satisfied with what they had, since they
had never known anything better, but who were soon destined
to become bitter complainers at the sight of s favored few
6scsming rich while they remained poor.
From the first, each estimate given us of cause and efte.ct
was false, but the evil geniuses responsible seemed to thrive
on errofit. Under President Truman two "empires" outside of
but parallelling the Department of State became firmly rooted.
They were out Central Intelligence Agency and a burdensome
Foreigu Aid Administration. Then came Eisenhower, who
added the United States Information Agency. Each adniaistra-
tion felt itself duty bound to make government more top-
heavy by adding another "empire." Under Kennedy it was the
Peace Corps, touted as volunteers to teach backward peoples
to plant trees and thatch roofs, but by August 1964, openly
advertising itself in Readefs Digest as spreaders of the
"modern revolution."
In Vietnam each of the parallel organizations we installed
soon equaled, man for man, the personnel in our over-swollen
embassy. And every eager beaver in the ponderous, overlap-
ping services was out to play krngmaker on one hand and
on the other to assure America 1631 things were going well.
For the South Vietnamese things were not going well at all
For one thing, after taking over the army Diem and Nhu tight-
ened their grip too suddenly. Already the Cao Dai pope and
the leaders of the Hoa Hao regretted their venality and wished
they could backtrack to the days of General Hinh. But it was
too late. In February 1955, one of the military pillars on
which they depended, General f1fufu minh The of the Cao Dai,
was enticed, with some two million dollars for bait, to move
into Pien's gnmp with 2,500 of his personal followers. By
nid-March the night arrests and rumors of kidnappings and
assassrnations could no longer be ignored.
To the nation clamoring for freedom, wbile we promised
better living standards and proceeded to enrich tfose who
were important a{r yes-men, a truth became evident: under a
tyrant who uses an army as a political force, only armed op.
position is possible. So the Vietnamese turned bacl once moie
to the old national front of the Binh Xuyen and the sects-
the same coalition that could have saved them seven montbs
before when they had the army with them, had the sects not
cold out forAmerican money.
 THE GOVERI{MENT AMBRICA SUPPORTBD 73
Time magaztn€s account of this second crisis in its famous
Diem biography number of April 4, 1955, should be held up
to irate America when the grim reckoning comes. It is typical
of the managed news which magazine buyers were given when
the nation cried for information. The Binh Xuyen, erroneously
described as a sect, antl its two allies were denounced as noth-
ing more than "an exotic consortium of religious fanatics,
feudal warlords, uniformed hoodlums and racket bosses bound
loosely behind an ambitious general who keeps pet crocodiles.D
Time told, Americans that these groups, deprived of the sub
sidies and prerogatives accorded them by the French colonials,
had become dangerous. It was that simple. Time evoked. im-
dignation by adding tlat such a bunch had dared deliver an
ultimatum to the man we were backing. "Reorganize yout
government within five days. Replace it with one that is suit-
able," they had said. An honest reporter would have told what
sort of governmeDt the Vietnamese were rejecting, gnd a think-
ing public would have asked. Let us turn a spotlight on the
rubber-stamp minisfp6 Diem and his brother brought together
to form what CBS correspondent Peter Kalischer in nls Col-
liels rnagazine article of July 6, 1956, called ..Diem's broad
National Revolutionary Movement."
At the top of the pyramid, as premier and minister of tho
interior (national police) sat Diem himsslf. ,.He impressed
no one as a man of destiny," Peter Kalischer said of him. dg
a matter of fact he wasn't; but a chimFanzee with a million
and a half American dollars a day behind him sould not fail
to survive. Brother Nhu held no official posl He and his wife
exerted influence in their own ways from the wings on the
unstable ascelic who posted a sign saying ..Women leep oufl
on.his ofrce door. A psychiatrist once attributed Diem's -.irog
ynism to im-poj9ncy. Whatever the reason, he was uneasy in tf,e
presence of all women save the iron-willed sister-in-law who
alternately terrorized him q,/ith her tempers and cajoled him
as a mother would a small bon patting his face anO jtraigtten-
inghis tie.
The cabinet fanned out below the family was heavily
weighted with men of undeniable Communist sympathies and
connections. J[g ministers who did not have piebonomunist
backgrounds were generally inept nonentities.
There were fye ministsrs of itate. The posts were lucrative
withoul carrying any power. Tran van Sioii, the old Hoa Hao
general with the fierce mo,ustache, and Nguyen than phuong
q9- Ca9 D.ai general who had been boughi dn wift him, wefr
ctill enjoying the honor of being addrlssed as ,.exceliency''
74 BACKGROIJND TO BETRAYAL
when the ultimatum was delivered. When Diem had no fur-
ther need for them they were arrested and stripped of what
they had amassed by 'playing ball." There was a difference,
however: The money received when they betrayed their fel-
low nationalists had been paid by America; when it was con-
fscated, it was returned to Ngo dinh Nhu.
J[s minisfsl of foreign affairs was Tran van Do, Madame
Chuongis brother-in-law, but he resiped during the crisis and
was replaced by Vu van Mau, a northerner and former sup
port€r of fts Vistmin[ who returned from abroad to accept
a pos! in the cabinet. TVo meaningless posts of secretary of
state for the interior were created for Huynh van Nhiem, rep.
r-seqting the Hoa Hao, and Nguyen ngoc Cac, representing
the Cao Dai. Both were unknowns and a year later were undei
arrest.
The minister of national defense, Mr. Ho thong Minh, who
was soon to flee to Paris, was a former army supplier for Ho
chi Minh. Mr. Tran trung Dung, the son-in-lai of Diem,s
sister, occupied the defense ministly as the April 1955 crisis
approached. Dung's sister followed Madame Mu,s example
a.nd pade a good thing out of seiling export licenses and pirr-
chasng_properties from Europeans whom she had frightened
into- selling (at a fraction of the value of their property; Uy
having her brother sign an army requisition order-foi their
homes. When his sister had closed a deal, Dung released the
property.
The minister of national economy was replaced in mid-1956
by Nguyen ngoc Tho, whom Nguyen van Tam had arrested
on October 25,1945, as a Communist. Tho was ambassador to
Japan until Diem arbitrarily made him both vice-president of
the country and minister oi economy. His son, minacing stu-
dents as leader of the Vietminh Studints' Association in Faris,
was in cons.flnt communication with his father. .As minister oi
esonomy, Tho had hanging eysl him the problem of getting
re$.1caqh for a government that leaked file a sieve;
-a Ui
sjlutiog for doing tlis is generally conceded to have emanated
tr.om thesharp-brain of Madame Nhu. putting the ideas
Ng *g hisvife into practice was what minisfs6 were for. of
r_no srgned an order requiring
a heavy deposit from all firms
It^ptl"g.
fq gport-expori periirc. Suc[ p.i-i* went r]rough
_trends of Nhu and his wife. The a-ount demanded torceO
th-9
all..but_pe biggest firms out of business. When Diem's 1956
nauonalization decrees-forcing the Chinese to become Viet-
namese citizens or lose their the economy,
the importers in turn were wall and demanded
 THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA SUPPORTED 75
their deposits back. fhose deposits had already gone into
somebodt's account. Not a cent was repaid, and a wave of
suicides followed. The Saigon newspaper Dan Chung reported
in February 1958 that a cloth merchant, unable to meet his
bills because of Tho's eld decree, had poured gasoline over
himself and applied a match, burning himself alive in a place
known as Ia Pointe des Blaguers (Point of the Jokesters). No
American paper reported it; the bankrupt Chinese had no press.
Imports piled up in customs sheds. Merchants were unable
to bail it out, and business ground to a standstill. Rumon of
exchange speculation and wholesale graft in the government's
exchange of new banknotes for the old currency undemined
confidence in tle piastre. When the Chinese were barred from
rice distribution, rice prices soared. Asia's economy is based
on the rice standard, and a leader's popularity is based on the
price of rice.
With mixed emotions-sympathy for Tho bred of the man-
in-the-street's hatred of the president's brother, and contempt
for Tho for remaining in such a government-saigon citizens
repeated stories concerning his treatment by Diem's family.
Nhu was said to have slapped Tho's face for refusing to sign
an export permit at less than the customary kickback.
h_any government 11[s minister of public works disposes of
tle fnt requisite for acquiring a political following-i.e., he
disposes of jobs. And if his patronage provides his entourage
with a living, it also permits him 1e know how much each
henchman, down to the lowest pick-and-shovel worker, is mak-
ing and, accordingly, how muih he can be made to kick in.
The money for public works in South Vietnam, it goes without
saying, came from American aid, through the hands of an
American aid administrator named Vu van Thai, a high Com-
munist lieutenant until the Geneva accord of. 1954. -
__
Th9-q{lic works minister was Mr. Tran le euang, a former
Ho chi Minh collaborator who had served as fresiient of the
Association of Vietminh Students in France.
Qo-g replaced
Tran van Bach when Bach became imFlicated ina rice scandal.
General Le van Vien's intelligence irvice reported that tho
:poog _functioning of euang's works program was due to s
tro chi Minh order that there be no trouble lest attention be
drawn to the whole setup and a scrutiny launched which might
reveal that a Red cell was being supported by U.S. aid. Th6se
unable to get in on public woiks gmft, or iesentful over its
bemq_ mn by a former Ho chi Minh lieutenant,
were afraid
to talk-for rensoru which we will make clear.
The American std ldministrstol working hand_in_hand with
76 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Quang was, as we have mentioned, Mtr Yy van Thai'
Thai
aicodpaniea Diem to America in early L957.In mid-1957 he
made ?ranc exchange available to pay for a printing job in
Paris handled by Minh Tan Press, a Commuoist printin-g plant
at 7 rue Guenegaud. Minh Tan Press was run by Vu van
Thai's old comrade in arms, Nguyen ngoc Bich, the Com-
munist engineer who sabotaged bridges in Cochin China for
Ho chi fvfinh auring tnewar against the French.
Vu van Thai flew to America on October 3, 1958, to talk
to high State Department and foreign aid ofrcials in Wash-
ington. Other talks followed at Michigan State University cou-
ceining assistance (propaganda and advisors) being furnished
Vietnam by that institution. Main aim of the mission, however,
was more money, rn lump sums. No mention of rhis trip was
made in the American press. (Ofrcials controlling such infor-
mation were well acquainted with Vo van Thai's record.) In
1960 Thai became Harvard's "authority on Vietnam" and
Vietnamese observer at LIN, where he remained until sup
planted by Madame Chuong when Madame Chuong was
edged out of Saigon by her daughter.
The credit office chief in tle American aid section of the
national bank was immediately above Vu van Thai in Viet-
nam's hietarchial structure, for all that Thai was the minister.
The credit ofrce chief was Albert Pham ngoc Thao, whose
unsavory record was second only to that of Diem's minister
of information. Before the Geneva accord of. 1954, Thao was
Ho chi Minh's intelligence chief in Corchin China. In 1949
he married a militant Communist, sister of the well-known
Vietminh professor, Pham Thieu. Thao's father openly headed
the Vietminh league in Paris while Thdo's brother, Gaston,
worked as Ho chi Minh's righthand man in Hanoi. It was
tbrough Thao and his brother Gaston that Diem's brother
Nhu maintained contact with the Vietminh through the years
of Amer{ca's great delusion from 1954 to 1964.
Along with his credit office job, Thao also headed Nhu's
secret police, a position for which his years with Ho chi Minh
eminently fitted li-. Every business ofrce, every ministry,
every group, and practically every househotrd had within it
somewhere a Nhu agenf informing on his neighbors, his su-
periors and his fellow workmen. No man dared make a move
or breathe a word 1tra1 might be distorted by an informer
seeking to gBin "face" and advanoement.
Nationalists claimed that Thao, with his 194G1954 Com-
munist intelligence experience and contasts to draw on, was
able to track down, imprison and ruin any non-Communist
 THE GOVERNMENT AMERICA SUPPORTED 77
opposition to Diem. At the same time he fnrstrated their at-
lsmp$ !9 tully deserters from the Red camp. Those wishing
to quit Ho chi Minh and go home were discouraged from do-
ing-so-bf the lpectacle of thrcir friends being arrested by Thao
and other former Comnunists in Diem's government tie nin-
ute they returned for acts they had committed while under the
orders of those same men. (Through 1961 Joe Alsop was to
eulogize Albert Pham ngoc Thao in his columns. S6 for ex-
ampJe 4lsop's columns in fre European edition of the New
York HeraW Tribune for April ll,- lZ, 14 and 18 of 1961.
Not until the eve of Nhu's assassination did Alsop ey91 sdmif
ftuj4" bro6ers \C_o Ainn were in contact with lio chi Minh,
and then il was with rhe ex?lanation that Nhu had changed,
that bad treatmgnt by the Americans and knowledge thaiwJ
y,"I9.."9*t.Lo 9"_-p -t'ry ffrced him in desperatioi to try to
negotiate with the Reds behind our backs.)
It should now be clear why no Vietnamese dared expres
disapproval of the minister of public works.
post of secretary of state for the presidency was filled
-byT!"
Nuyen dinh Thuan, a northerner friend of Diem's
$ter Nguyen hrru Chau was forced to flee to Deauville, ""pn"rr,
fiao"e,
for trying to divorce Madame Nhu's sister on grounds of adul-
tery, a matier on which Madame Nhu forestaled repetition
in
the future by outlawing divorce as soon as she giioeO aO-
nittance to the national assembly.
.tnut.anyone knew of Lam le Trinh, the nss/ minisfsl
or"4tr
rne mtenor, whom Diem named to take pressure
oft hinself,
he had been in trbuble for misappioi
prlatrng t ]-{srstrate
:-T.P:t lunds. Traa chanl Thanh, the minister of propaganaa
and infornation who replaced pnam xuan fnai, tfr"
had administered "iusdc;" for the VietmLinh-in
iuibui
inces beJore 1954, and had Aone it-s, t*ililv
;tSbi;-p;;
that his name
was still used to friefueq children. fnann,sl,iti
her neck in business-d"uf, witl ffrua-dh,r. ** u-p to
The minister
of educ,ation, Than huu fne, connAea mai'ile woufa fike to
get out but was afraid to because
of Ngo Aiol Nn". Th;;;
grielance against ffa van-Vuong, the minislsl
}l^t11ti"{*
trnanoe, except that he was an unknslyl sl
a post which the southerners regarded
oo!tn"*", tofJiig
succeeded
p ritnUy tneirs. Vuo"E
an earlier, appointeJnamed Tran
Phuong. on the otner $ponular
naua^,_ q" ;A;ilil"?a asrarian
huu
re,
form minislry was occu.pied tV E-r""*O#g
southerner with no quatiiications t* ,n" who wec a
scandalous private iob Ld who had a
life against f,im.
lne mrnrster of teconstruction and planning came from
78 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
central Vietnam and was s ghining example of the cabinet
Time defended. He was Hoang Hung, a former Vieffiinh who
had studied to be an architect. Ngu.yen van Tam told rhis
author that, when he was director-general of national security'
he once raided Hungfs home and found the cellar used for
a \,ristminh arrns cache. After loading a truck with guns and
Communist tracts, Tam decided to investigate the house next
door, which Hung had built on his propqrty and rented to a
friena. The friend tumed out to be Le van Liem, a leading
Saigon terrorist for the Vietminh. Revolvers, cartridges and
knives were found in the wall. On opening a closet which was
filled with Comnunist pamphlets, Tam heard a faint rapping.
Behind a secret door in the back of the closet they found a
rich Chinese drug manufacturer' owner of the Nhi Thien
Duong (Second Paradise) pharmacy, who was being held for
ransom. So much for Hoang Hungis qualifications as a planner.
He replaced Nguyen van Thoai, the brother-in-law of Diem's
sister.
If the reader's head ig syimming as he peruses the desCrip
tions of these ministers of government with their strange na^mes,
let him pause for a monent before he puts the whole confusing
businesJ out of his mind as not worth the effort. For that is
just what the men to whom American conservatives looked for
information did for nine long years, while South Vietnam
rotted. One of the most respected columnists in Washington
refused to look into the Vietnam picture. "America isn't in'
terested in what is happening out there," he protested. It was
not true. America was devouring an ocean of oewsprint on
South Vietna"m-tripe put out by the United States Informa-
tion Servicg the State Department and the most despicable
high-pressure public relations campaip ever put over on I
civilized nation. But the men and publishers to whom think'
ing Americans looked for sound information would not make
the mental effort to familiarize themselves with the area and
its leaders so they could do an intelligent report.
A host of questions present themselves as we note the indig-
nation of Time, Aprtl 4, 1955, that anyone should dare deliver
an ultimatum to Diem, demanding he throw out his cabinet
For we have scrutinized the cabinet Diem's countrymen re
fused to accept. The first question that arises: Would Time
have cleared U. S. Communist leader Eugene Dennis and
the Rosenberg atom spies for comparable poots in America?
Then why drd Time campaign for Diem's crew in South Viet-
nam? Why drd Time and the rest of our press hold up Dieds
 .l
iA5t.. ? -

\,
' TIIE GOVERNMENT AMERICA SIJPPORTED 79
supposed piety and honesty as a sheet to cover the thoroupfilv
unhealthy structure beneath him, as though Ae cfains-ioF6
virtue.s were sufrcient arguments to accor-rr the worst or asso
ciates a blanket acceptance?
 CIIAPTER NINE

TIIE BELEAGUERED MAN

"The beleaguered man sat in Freedom Palace," the Time

issue of April 4, 1955, glibly told a public longing desperately
for assurance that somewhere we were winning. Pointedly
TlmCsFar East correspondentnoted that "a wooden crucifix, a
picture of the Virgin" a slide projector, a gaudy spittoon, books
entitled SocloJ lustlce aard Thoughts ol Ghandt' were arnong
the possessions alsuf him. On the desk lay the ultimatum from
the sects and the Binh Xuyen.
"An odd procession passed in and out of the palace doors
for hours on end to deal with the crisis-three of the man's
brothers, one in the cloth of a Roman Catholic bishop; his
beautiful, politics.minded sister-inlaw; U. S. diplomats and
U. S. military ofrsers in mufti; eye-rubbing ministers of state
summoned from their sleql for emergency consultations."
From the first" in a paragraph stacked to assure Diem the
sympathy of devout Cathotics, all shades of liberals and lovers
of the underdog, the reader was bound, tied and delivered. But
analyze it: These tbree brothers and the 'politics-minded
sister-in-lawr" there was the rub. One had to be in Saigon, or
a conservative in Washington under the reign of the Kennedys,
to appreciate the e:rtent to which Vietnam was a family affair.
The eye-rubbing minilv0cm of state were window-dressing, told
to get out of bed and come and nod before the 2{s.sfgnns.
Accompanying the Ttne report was a photograph showing
'Presidential Envoy Lawlon Co[ins, Assistant Secretary of State
Walter Robertson, Foster Dulles and Diem, grinning from
ear to ear.
Time said that leaders were hard to fnd. Of course they
were, wift Nhu's secret police driving them h1s hiding. "The
French, sfiving to maintain by fair means and by sly means
a remnant of influence and profit in the land they had ex-
ploit€d for seven d€cades, obstruct hin [Diem] with the wily
rear-guard maneuvers of colonialism,n' continued tho Ttme
story. Such lines, popular as they were in Americao are likely
to cost us dearly before our turn at.the receiving end in South
Vietnam is done.
80
 THE BBLEAGUBRED MAN 81
Time went on, "A quick survey of the hinterlands showed
tlatDiem's nationalist regime could count on the electoral
support of no more than a fourth of tle villages. The rest
leaned for communism, or at least leaned against the unknow&
unproved regime in Saigon."
If the Saigon regime was unknown, why go on with the
pretext that anyone but the new-social-revolution liberals in
IVashington had foisted it on the country? And in that case
yh-y call it nationalist? Anything, it seemed, was justified by
intimating tat a portion of the trvo-thirds of the iountry ad-
mittedly againsl "our" man were Communists. This madi our
abrogation of the right of self-determination democratic.
Tlro pages latsr Tlme's writer expressed Tran van Do's re-
sentment that tle Vietnamese (whom Diem had told not to
fight the Communists) were not consulted when the French
made peace the previous year. "Back in Saigon, Diem found
that he could not depend on a single Vietnamese battalion; he
had nothing in the treasury; he could not make contact with
aboat 85Vo of his villages," the paragraph continued.
"His advisers--including those from the U. S.<autioned
hig-to-goslowly. You are too weak to fight now, they coun-
seled. Invite negotiations; play for timi. tne advice was
accepted. While soldierg and fsnks moved through the tense
streets Saigon, the weanling governmeDt of the weanling
state of-ofSouth Vietnam dickered and maneuvered to whittle
down the warlords and the sects."
Let us glamine these recornmendations for which U. S.
advisors received praise. Put into plain language, what olu men
were saying was: With eighty-five per cent of the country
against you? you are too weak to nght. fate it easy, stall for
llme, proqlse reforms, tell your people anything tlat wilt tuU
them-into_beliwing you are goinf to-give tlem representationl
then knock them ofi one at a time.
Such advice was unnecessary. Diem had used ruses all his
-treachery,
life. It was America's advising and approving of it,
that Time readers never coniidered. le' van Viin *ri gi*o
tll soft*-oap treatment and told to forget the pasf as th-ough
all were f_orgiven. Diem piously proclaiired rn'the'same Tiile
reporl "Clever maneuvers only betran demoralize and divide
the peo-ple." But he did as his American advisors suggested.
- No honst, factual article has been published to-date on
those Americans Time lauded, and of their use sf ths rrnlimitsd
bribinq power of the American treasury to buy oft the lieuten-
ants of 191{en who represented a majority oi the nation and
who could have strangled the Viet inh in their areas had we
82 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
permitted them. Time said, "An Asian tradition has it that if
one saves a man's life, one is henceforth responsible for his
destiny. The U. S., in a sense, is lumping these two missions
into one simultaneous undertaking in South Vietnam. In addi-
tion to its millions and its prestige, Washington invested the
talents of 1,000 Americans in the country, with the ex- Army
chief of staff, General J. Law0on Qellins, as the top U. S. emis-
sary. Among them, for land reform, Wolf Ladejinsky, the
celebrated Agricultural Department expert who did the land
reform job in post-war Japan; for maneuvering against the
communists, Colonel Edward Lansdale, the officer who played
such a helpful role in the rise e1 philiFpines President Ramon
that Filipinos gave him a post-election title of
'General Landslide'.'
Time negel*tsA to mention that Russian-born Wolf lade
jinsky was booted out of his U. S. agricultural attach6 job in
Tokyo n 1954, I{e bougbt stock in a company the success of
which was assured by American aid. As for Colonel Lansdale,
the indignant snort '"Talk sensel" is long overdue. By August 4
1961, Time had made Lansdale "the Pentagon's guerrilla war-
fare expert who helped Magsaysay crush the Huks in the
Philippines and advised Ngo dinh Diem in his battle against
the Binh Xuyen gang." Joe Alsop, in his "Memo for Otto
Passman" (W.?A, 1962) cafled Lansdale one of the u$ung
heroes of the cold war. What does he 6ean, "unsunt''?
Glowing writers by the score had boasted that Colonel
Lansdale elected Magsaysay. What could be more insulting
to a free people than to infer that their president would never
have been elected without the aid of an American intruder?
And certainly Magsaysay was in a bad way if he could not
defeat the I{uks without Ed Lansdale.
Raymond Cartier wrote in the May 28, 1955, issue of Paris
Match that the success of any new tri-party co-operation in
South Vietnam would depend on Diem's desire for co-opera-
tion. "It demands also," Cartier continued, "the dropping of
t,he anti-French commando unit installed in the American
embassy. The men tlat compose it have been drawn by the
ardor of their game into excesses capable of cleaving a breach
in Franco-American relations that wilt pass beyond the frame-
work of Indoc,hina Here [in Saigon] they have provoked in
the [French] expeditionary corps and civilian population a
resenh ent that is all the more significant since it follows tle
period of harmony that marked the mission of Ambassador
Donald Heath."
By "anti-French commando trnit installed in the American
 THE BELEAGT'ERED MAN 83
embassy," Cartier was referring to Colonel Lansdale and
General ODaniel; and he added, "The America:l te'm has set
itself the task of building Vietnamese inner solidarity by
cultivating nationalism and exciting all the animosities created
by a century of unequal coexistence."
On his return to America Lsnsdals was photographed with
Allen Dulles, receiving the Distinguished S-ervice Medal. For
what? For doing for Russia in two years what mitlions of
dollars and a decade of propaganda had failed to accomplish:
pnking a hundred thousand bitterly anti-Communist Fiench
soldiers anti-American? Jean Larteguy, author of. The Centu-
riorrs, blasted Lansdale in Paris Match as late as Sqttember 14,
1963 as 'one of 1foegs kingmakers of the American secret
services." Cambodia credited its anti-American sentiment to
Edward Lansdale whq for his services in Asia, was duly made
deputy assistant secretary for defense.
Then a newdealer naval ofrcer named William r-ederer and
a liberal professor named Eugene Burdick wrote a book called
!\e aq$ American, which got new dealer l-ederer advisory
jobs with the Peace Corps and Reoderl Digest. Mr. Lederer
was asked d, as a naval officer, he was not afraid to write such
a book. "Not at all," he replied. ..We had clearance from the
psnlagont" And why shouldn't he, since a good portion of
the
book was dedicated to the praise of Colonel faward Lansdale,
transparently disguised as Colonel Edrsin Hillingsdale? In a
short time Lansdale was made a brigadier-geneialo and, fhe
Ugly Amertcan 'otsn1 tbr'errgh several editions- It was translated
into foreign languages, distributed abroad by the U. S. Infor-
mation Ssvice and displayed in Moscow as part of an Ameri-
can cultural exposition
Americans should go back and reread The UgIy Ameican,
with their minds as well as their eyes. They were told that of
all America's ofrcers in the East only one had the courage and
initiative to launch and win a one-m4n samFaign to show the
.,I{illingr
ltljpinos that Americans are not all rich and snobs.
dale" did it In full uniform as an American colonel and wear-
ing his ribbons, he rode into a Philippine village on & motor-
cycle bearing a,sign saying "The ragtime kid" then played a
harmonica in the gutter for a crowd of moutl-breathingloaf-
ers fron whom he proceeded to bum the price of a meal.
Mr. Iderer insulted Amerisa's intelligence. In the facecon-
scious Easl where respect is inextricably associated with dig-
nity, the mon€Nrt "Colonel Hillingsdale" descended to coolie
level he ceased to build up friendship or esteem for America.
Ou the co!trary he carded America donm with him.
84 BACKCROUND TO BETRAYAL
From the Philippines Mr. I:derer's hero went to Southeast
Asia, where he memorized files on politicians and even princes,
and then astounded them by pretending to read the lines of
their hands. All doors were opened fe him, x14 a king asked
to meet him. dpefea's "Fdwin Hillingsdale" singlehandedly
could have put over all the pet projeets of our inepts who were
using Southeast Asia as their playground had he not been
thwarted by a jealous ambassador.
Stop and think it over. Wbat Lederer is saying in this book,
in which the insult is compounded by our translating it into the
dupes' own languages, is that Southeast Asians are a bunch of
superstitious oafs whom Ed "Ilillingsdale" made fools of and
would have continued to play for suckers indefinitely if, to the
disapproval of Messrs. Lederer and Burdich our ambassador
had not stopped him.
Such were the acton in Diem's camp and ours as the battle
that was South Vietnam's last chance to shake off the unwanted
family took shape.
Americans were dependent on picture magazines for news
as the clouds gathered. Lile magazrne's editorial of March 14,
1955, was headed "Dulles in S. E. Asia" and everything was
fne. At that moment, if the truth had only been known, Diem's
friend, Nguyen phuoc Dang, was flying to Bangkok on a per-
seaal mission to Thailand's strong man, Pibul Songgram, to
arrange refuge and free passage for Diem's family, if things
went wrong. And Nhu had started shipping out cases of
money.
"What were you doing at this time?" the writer asked Gen-
Ir van Vien. "Did you know the clash was coming?'
eral
"We should have, Vien answered. "After Hinh was broken
thinp were quiet for three months, while Diem and Nhu
moved their henchmen into commands in the army, down to
non-com level."
He continue4 "Towald the end of December [1954J Gen-
eral O'Daniel started soming to see me. He begged me for a
week to desert the sects and let Diem wipe them out separately.
I told him to be patienl A civil war would kill oft men who
were needed against the Communists. Demilitarize tle sects
gradually, if you want to, I told him, but don't drive them into
a civil war. Red cadre,s are lying dormant in all the villages,
and if you eliminate the sests you will have no one to contain
them. Wors€, you will drive the remnants of the Hoa Hao and
the Cao Dai trnderground, where they will have to aocom-
modate themselves with the Reds to survive.
 THE BELEAGUERED MAN 85

'Tf you disband ttrem, overnigh! vithout eiving thgm-f3ir

i""otp6rutio" in the regular army,- they will take to fts hills
-A 6"*-u bandits to-make a living. F\rrthermore, you will
aienate their provinces, where the people know that the c€sts
Ao"u rt""O tit*""n thim and Ho cni tt{inn. But you couldn't
rclf-OU-i"t anSrlhing," Le van Vien lamented, with apalns'
up gesture of the hands.
"-H" *r" stubborn, and less intelligent than Diem' I thinlc
^

Diem woultl have been patient and followed the course I

if ODaniel had n6t pushed him" I had four talks with
"J"it"C*a more meetings witl O'Daniel before the end of
bi"-
iCS+. e""n time I urged O'Daniel to dissuade Diem ftom
a"irg *VOl"g foolish,-that it would only aid the Commuists'
At tfr€ si.e tihe I knew O'Daniel was going to the Hoa Hao
and Cao Dar generals, trying to line thrq yp against ma
--;euo* au,-r bedd iim-to restrain Diem from teking the
field against nacutllhe Hoa Hao gelerail. Bacut was in revolt
U""""i Oiem wanted to disband his forces without -akilS
any provision for t'hem- His demands were not unreasonable'
H;
-_;'iauH have been brought back.
*"ot up to Dalat to-do to-" hunting in January 1955'
and General-O'Daniel asked General Ely [Commander of the
niencn troops in Vietnaml to send a plqe-for me. He wanted
to see me. I had had enough of him and did not go. There waq
no point in trying to talk to a man who would not listen At tbe
sade time I iras under pressure from everyone around me to
take steps to protect thei against Diem" I led the coalition and
ev"ryod" tefit teUing me thit only it co-uld prevent Diem from
supprassing'all opposition. At last I went to General Ely
to^ist his-advice-frd he told me my fears were rmfounded'
He said he was responsible for preserving order and he would
see that there was no civil war. That is how we happened to
be caugbt off-guard."
Yet-there wis no lack of storm sipals. The Febnrary 1955
defection of General Tfinh minh The and his 2500 personal
Cao Dai followers left his spiritual leader, Pope Pham cong
Tac, dependent on General-Nguyen thanh Phuong an-i-lis
25,OOO ioops. Tfue, Tlinh minh The had never been reliable.
He was a saiistic butcher when the Cao Dai were flghting the
Frencb, but as the first of the coalition generals to be bought
out by biem s American team his defection was an indication
of wfiat was ahead. Trinh minh The, according to Raymond
Cartier, was paid two million dollars, more money than he
had ever hoped for in his wildest drea.ms.
86 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Even with the bribing of Trinh, which the American press
heralded as a "rallying," the scattered opposition leaders could
not bring themselves to unite under one man. With the sword
hanging over them, they continued to intrigue and undercut
each other. Each wanted to be a leader and every man with
enough friends to fll a cafe formed a party. By the end of
February 1955, tlirty-seven opposition political parties were
struggling for supremacy among themselves, instead of form-
ing a solid front.
Methodically, cunningly, Diem picked out the strongest of
the political parties and proceeded to cut it to pieces first. In
the provinces, government troops swooped down on villages
in a series of lightning raids against the Dai Viet party. There
were two immediate results from this: The Dai Viet moved
closer to Le van Vien's United Nationalist Front for protection.
While on the visa U. S. Ambassador Donald Heath had given
him, Dr. Nguyen ton Hoan, the leader of the Dai Viel traveled
to Washington to tell his story.
Hoan left his wife and children in Saigon and took off,
naively beteving that all he had to do was explain the situation
and our ofrcials would rectify their mistakes.
A strangp, honest hard-working idsalisf, was this Nguyen
ton Hoan. He was a Catholic, though born in Tay Ninh, the
seat of the Cao Dai sect, on May l, 1917. The Japanese
arrested him for a time in, 1943. The following year they
were after him again and he took shelter in the brush, in
Cambodia. ln 1946 came the attempted coup d'etat against
Ho chi Minh mentioned in a previous chapter, and Hoan's
flight to China Back in Saigon tn 1949 he founded the anti-
Communist league known as the "Quoc Gia Lien Hiep" and
sg minisfsl of youth affairs from 1949 to 1951 he organized
what he called disintoxication centers, to reeducate Commu-
nist youth.
Hoan had been told that Jeff Parsons was the architect of
America's policy in Southeast Asia, but that Kenneth Todd
Young, in the State Department, was the man to see-all of
which was true as far as it went. What Hoan did not know
was that Young's job was to open doors for pro-Diem emis-
saries and see that Vietnamese who anived with disturbing
reports on our men were given a runaround. Hoan was sent
to Joseph Buttinger, the Austrian socialist who was in New
Yor\ and from Buttinger to Milton Sacbs, of Brandeis
Univenity; in sum, from one Diem propagandist to another,
until, fed up with getting nowhere, he packed up and went to
 THE BELEAGUERED MAN 8T

France. Later, as the fight to shield senators and congressmen

from the truth oecame more desperate, no membet of the
Diem olposition could get a visa to Am-erica'-and inabili{-to
obtain i""ita *t" then presented as indisputable proof of tho
man's rmimportance.
all Hoan got out of Kenneth t'oung was an admission that
SurrHoi, a &usin of Bao Dai who had dropped his title of
iprince.owas being pushed as a possible Diem successor. And
-Buu
ii f""t Hoi undoubrcdly had an inside track in his close
relationship with American authoress Miss Ellen l{amnen,
whose anti-Diem writings on South Vietnam never failed to
plug the man whose rise to power might make Miss Hnmmer
Soith Vietnrm's first lady. (The struggle lor Indochttu Co*
tinues trrd Geneva to Bandoeng are among her books. She was
Press and The Pacifc Spectator of
-stanford by Princeton
published
UniversrtY.) 't migbt be added also that Buu Hoi was
Mendes.France's man.
From those in Washington who were advancing socialism
or trying to acquire personal power by dabbling in foreip
hti6,o, O" tesf ffoan got was assurance that if he could raise
fifty-thousand dollars they would get him some publicity. Ere-n
theh he never completely realized tle number of wheels within
wheels at work in America to keep our policy on the beam
ftom which he, one friendless Vietnamese, was trying to
sway it.
While his followers back in Saigon were being stripped of
their finances, arrested or hounded into flight or clandestine'
ness, I{oan rode back and forth on buses from one American
"southeast Asia authori{t''to another. Bvery word he said was
passed on to the Vietnamese embassy in Washington, -CI{
USIA ane ttre American aid administration, for tansmission
back to Diem and Nhu. When he had finished, Hoan dared
not return to Saigon. France lfas the only country open to
him, so to Paris he went. Thereafter anything he said was
discredited by Diem propagandists in the United States as
giping from a puppet of the embittered colonialists. His wife
and children were retained in Saigon as hostages.
Thuscivilian opposition to Diem in the purely political sense
was led to dissipate itself, in puerile splinterings at home while
in America it beat its head against a news blackout and the
stone wall of ofrcialdom. In the end, salvation' if it were to
come, could come only from the three armed bands, one of
which had already partially defected. The remaining leaders
went tlrough the proper motions and made the usual speeches
88 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
of solidarity. On March 3, 1955, the same United National
Front that American money had shattered the previous Sep-
tember was re-formed. But rhis tims to everyone's surprise
the native socialist party joined the lineup. The most respected
socialist in South Vietnam was Ho huu T\rong a novelist,
lexicographer and political leader who had fought the French
for twenty-fve years. Before Tuong clashed with the Ngo
dinhs he was referred to in Americ& as a great nationalist,
which he never w€ut. Ttrong was an internationalist, and an
important array of Americans were behind him. But to give
him his just due it must be admitted that he was ao enemy of
the Vietminh on grounds tlat they were Stalinist.
A photographer took a picture of the new alliance: Pope
Pham cong Tac in the center, old General Tran van Sioai of
the fierce calvary moustache at his right, I-e van Vien at his
lefL For over two weeks internal wrangling went on nmong
them, with no one knows what deals to ensure each leader's
jealously guarded prerogatives. Then on March 21, 1955, tbe
ultimatum that Time resented was served.
A week passed, a week in which each side watched the
other like two wary wrestlers, with General Ely assuring Le
van Vien there would be no fighting and Diem's intermediaries
dangling bribes of two and 1fu's€ millies dollars, as though it
were ice cream soda money, before the generals protecting
Le van Vien's flanks. While the bickering continued, Diem's
tanks and troops moved into position.
TWo other groups joined the Udited Front: the Vietnam
Quoc Dan Dung, outcome of a party formed by the Chinese
Nationalisb in the Red River valley after V-J Day, and a group
from Oentral Vietnnm salling itself the Movement for the
Protection of Popular Security. One needed no Gallup poll to
see at a glance that a majority of the country wanted nothing
to do with America's man and were out 1q eusf him.
By that time the ultimatum that Diem dissolve his cabinet
was a dead issue. Fourteen of the ministers tbreatened had
already resigned. Only the guardian of the seal remained on
the job, and he from a sense of duty. An imperative wire from
Bao Dai summoned Diem to appear before him ia Qaaasg, 6n
May 9, pending which General Nguyen van Vy, who had gone
to Dalat for safety after the flinh siffair, was named com-
mander of the army. All that remained to Diem was the radio
station, the censor's office and his two Americans, General
O'Daniel and Colonel Lansdale, the lot supported by four
battalions of personal troops which Diem had brought down
from the Nha-Trang region.
 THE BELEAGUERED MAN 89

Then the storm broke. Af midnight on Thursday, March 28'

Dieds 81 m. m. mortars started lslshing fire. Diem dirccted
his end of the battle from within the Independence Palace.
I,e van Vien's home and command post were in a villa at the
exit of the Y bridge whish crossed the stagnant aroyo !9pt
rating Saigon from the Chinese city. But overnight-Vien's
posidon h="d b"co-" precarious, if not hopeless. General
irh.tong in return for $3.6 millisa, plus monthly paymJnQ fPr
his to-ops and a sinecure command for himself (as Jobn
Osborndwas to admit tn Lile of May t3, t957), had gone
over to Diem with his 25,000 followers, bag and baggage. His
spiritual leader, the Cao Dai pope, was already weakened by
ti" UtiUiog of Trinh minh The, and Phuong's sellout lsff him
hieh and dry.
it"n van Sioai, the Hoa Hao general, was offered a million
dollars for himseif and another million for his troops' but hi!
brief period as an "exqellency" after he betrayed General
Hint'naa taught him his lesson. Ferocious old Sioai refused
to see DiedJ advisors again. Later he told General flinh's
father that an agreement could have been reached if any kint
of an honorabdproposition had been made. The account he
gave of events leading up to the fighting was as follows:
"General O'Danief came to me and demanded angrily, 'I
hear you are ag4inst Diem.' I said no, we Hoa Hao are not
as"inst Diem but he is making demands that we cannot accepL
{hen you are against him,' he shouted. I said no, we are not
against nim, Uut we cannot accept all his conditions'
"*cUy
'Then-yoi are against him,' repeated General- O'Daniel, 'and
if you don't zupport him you won't be able to live; we will cut
off all your American aid.'
" That won't make any difference to us Hoa Hao,' I told
hirn, 'because Diem has never let us have ady of it.' General
O'Daniel was angry and said, 'If you don't support Diem we'll
smash your faod.i' (The words used by Nguyen van Tam in
describing O'Daniel's threat were "On va casser Ia figwe"') -
Tran vin Sioai said, 'All right, then, if that is the way it is
going to ber" or words to that efiect. "General O'Daniel sent
saw him
i* ie tbrei times after that,' he added, "but I nevergonr'
again. If r had enjoyed seeing lum t ryo{9.have but
hE bhstered and shouted too much, and I didn't fike it."
Bacu! the wild Hoa Hao consumptive YiF hqr !*e"g 9
his shouiders, stusk with Sioai and Le van Vien; but Bacut 199
Sioai were oot in oo the figbting that night of April 28,1955'
The obiect of Diem's su4rrise attac! w-as to destroy his e-ne'
mies piecemeal. Until 4:00 a. m. the heavy mortars rocked
90 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Saigon and staccato bursts of machine gun fre could be
heard from the terraces on Boulevard Gallieni. When the lull
came 26 dead and 152 wounded were amid the debris of the
shattered streets, but Diem's battalions with their superior fire
power and American backing held the city.
 CHAPTER TBN

TTIE BATTLE OF SAIGON

All evidence suggests that Diem and his American advisors

waited until the oiiasion was ripe, then exploited the element
of surprise. J[s Sinh Xuyen, however, were blamed fo1 ope-n-
ing hostilities. Certainly no judge sifting the facts would take
thls claim seriously, foi as long as things were going well aad
victory seemed to justify the means, Diem's Americans them-
selves bragged of their complicity in urging Diem to open
hostilities.
Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota wrote appro-v'
iogly i" a booklet put out by Diem's American lobb-y in
Sepiember 1956 cafled "A Symposium on America's Stake in
Soirtl Vietnam," that while General Ely and General Collins
were home, wringing their hands over the impending demise
of the country, fortunately Diem went in and cleaned things
up. "Since they were gone they could not- stgq hiT",' Con;
giessman Judd observed, adding, "General- O'Daniel egged
biem on, as I understand all the way." General O'Daniel
must have approved of this statement, since he was chairman
of the organization that printed the booklet.
General Ely was still in Saigon as high commissioner of the
French Repu6fic on March 28, t955. His plone rang. On th9
other end of tne me he heard Diem's voice in a high pitch of
emotion. A shell had fallen; one man had been killed and
several others wounded. The government, Diem announced,
was about to order the national army into action against the
Binh Xuyen. Ely begged for patience, pleaded with Diem not
to throw the country into a civil war and promised that an
investigation would be opened immediately. There was no
answer. Diem had hung uP.
General Lawton Qqllins, as Congressman Judd said, was in
lf6hington, and every man in Ngo dinh Dieds entourage
was convinced that the trip was to advise Foster Dulles to
dump Diem and all his camp, and do it quickly. Whether true
or n6t, everything that transpired in the next three weeks could
Ue caUea a iomedy of errors had tle resulk not been so tragic.
9L
 92 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Never was there a betier example of the truth of Axel Oxen-
steirn's reflection that his son wbdd be surprised to learn with
what little intelligence countries are governid.
I-et us turn from the battle ragng in Saigoa" which was
lepewed slo:tly after dawn on Friday norning, April29, 1955,
Diem and the circle of friends whose heads-io.itO faf it nis
$d-srryd up the situation coldly and realistically. Back ;d
forth between Independence palace and the Afoerican em-
bassy, where Mr. Randolph Kidder had taken over as charge
d'affaires, went the trust€d go-betweens.
The_ politicgl picturg ceen from Saigon looked grim. Tran
van Ctuong in tle Vietnamerc embassy in Washington had
ceased-to telegranr. If Chuong were taking his-distance
it could -only mean tlal from where he was Jitting Diem
looked about to fall. Somehow the ground had to be iut trom
beneath Lawton Collins' feet
The post of ambaxrdi,r-at-large for Europe was rrnnecest
sary, since its ofrce at 47 bis Avenue Klebei in paris dupii-
cated when it war not pulling against, the nmbrssador to
Franpe. Ifowever, it will bc recaUia tlat it war created for
Pirp- r youngest brother, Luyen, Luyen was in Saigon for a
family council when the tension began to mount. -So while
General. Colli"r winged his way towara Washington" Luyen
was sen_t racing to Canneg to try to wheedle a new statement
of confidence out of Bno Dai before Collinr and Bao Dai's
digmisqal of Diem could:each the State Department together.
The gates to CAabau Thorenc were cloeei. Bao Dai rif,rsea
to see.him. I-9y9" then took oft for pauic. Tbroughout Wedn;-
{an April 20, he scurried back and forth betwien talks with
tle, French ssginlists, his French advisor and the American
emlassy. On Wednesday night he decided on a move that war
to become classic. He would send a deputy to Washington.
The "deputy amtassador,'would slip into iown, contast Diem's
supporters in the State_Departmenf and tle eenators regarded
ts in Diem's qocket. When he had obtained a promir'e that
tley would stick with their man, and if possible a promiee that
General Lawton Collins would be reciiled, ther the deputy
ambassador would descend on the Vietnamese embassy^ani
bulldoze Tlan van Chuong back into line.
Luyen looked arould his office. The only employee he
trusted sufrciently to dub ..deputy ambassador,', f* u
y.:"p.*T.1.chunky, square-faced artist named Vo"u"d
Lang in
Ir tgte thirties, whose brother, Vo Hai, was close to D-iim.
Vo Irang spoke no English and his judgnent was open to
question, but his integrity was neveiin doubt. ffe ieaaifi
 TIIE BATTLE OF SAIGON 93

admitted that his own cousin, Vu van Thai, Diem's minister

of public works, was a Communist and in his opinion ought to
be not tlrown out but shot.
On Thursday, April 21, Vo Lang presented himself at the
visa ofrce of the American embassy on Avenue Gabriel.
Trouble. Miss Dorothy Barker was polite but frm. Vo had no
diplomatic passport so, officially, he was no diplomat. And she
could not issue a visa at once' even a transient one, to an
unknown Vietnamese. A day was lost while Luyen pulled
strings through William Gibson in the American embassy. For,
suppos€ Luyen had requested a diplomatic visa for Vo, which
only Pha- duy Khiem, the ambassador and high commissioner
to France, could issue? Khiem would wire Madame Chuong
in Saigon; Madame Chuong would wire her husband in Wash-
ingto& and Vo Lang would be undercut instead of Chuong.
On Friday, AprJ722, all obstacles miraculously rolled away.
Vo got his visa. Ife was informed that Monsieur Paul Devinat
would fly from Tokyo and meet him in qra5hington at the
French Embassy with further instructions and advice. There
was a last meeting with a socialist councilor of the French
Union at a corner table in La Coupole in Montparnasse. More
advice and instructions. Then, with the mysteriousness and
secretiveness characteristic of his race, Vo slipped off without
a word to the "aide" who was being sent along to translate
and if necessary say what Vo was supposed to say. This author,
incidentally, was the aide, and the conversations related were
conversations in which the author served as interpreter.
Vo's disappearance, it developed latet, was to meet a blask'
market exchange dealer who sold him a thousand'dollar
banknote and two five hundred dollar bills, so he would have
some American money to grve the taxi driver when he reached
New York. At 11:30 that night Vo and his aide took off from
Orly.
The interesting part of these preparatory shenanigans is that
at that moment, as the Time article of April 4 discloses, the
bitter anti-French campaign being run by the American press
and the Diem government was at its height. All of Diem's
troubles were laid to "the wily, rear-guard maneuvers of colo'
nialism," msaning France. Ye! French socialists srsle fssking
Diem, advising his "deputy ambassador," and flying a man to
Washington to help save Diem. Obviously the loyalty of
France's socialists was to a Vietnamese francophobe half-way
around the world-never to tleir country. This is part of the
phenomena of the modern international left.
Vo Lang's frst preoccupatiou on leashing New York on
94 BACKGROIIND TO BETRAYAL
Saturday noon, April 23, 1955, was to telephone Dr. Wesley
Fishel, of Michigan State University, in Lansing' Michigan,
which introduced a new actor in the plot. Nothing had been
said about Dr. Fishel in Paris. It was not the first example, nor
was it to be the last, of the genius of the participants in this
web of intrigue for not letting the left hand know what the
right hand was doing.
On Sunday, Aprl 24, Vo's plane for Washington departed
while he was in an airport shop, adding a telescopic lens for
his camera to his expense account. At last, late that afternoon,
he was to arrive at Washingtons Dupont Plaza Hotel.
How does an inexperienced young man, picked at tandom,
sent to a country where he has never been before and where
he does not speak the language, go about saving a government?
For the honest senators and private citizens who would like
to know the answer to this question and will never obtain it
through any congressional investigation tleir government is
likely to hold, it was really very simple. But frst bear in mind
that, for all his frankness later, Vo Lang never divulged tle
details of why he was instructed to call REgent 7-560O exten-
sion 5287, in Washington, and ask for K.Y., as soon as
senatorial support for Diem was assured "for just a little
longer." Or of his half-hour conversation over the telephone
with Wesley Fishel. All we know is that on Monday morning,
April 25, instructions called for his seeing frst Senator Mike
Mansfield and then Senator Hubert Humphrey. After talking
with them, he was to give a bipartisan appearance to the drive
for Diem support by calling on Sen4tor Mundt of South
Dakota and Senator Knowland of California.
Vo had no trouble with Mansfield. He was in Diem's corner.
And to Vo Lang's credit be it admitted that, on a mission for
Luyen though he was, Vo told the senator that Diem must be
made to broaden the base of his government that southern
demands for a voice in their affairs must be given a hearing.
Mike Mansfield, the liberal history professor from Montana,
elected by the mine workers' union and his state's unionized
farmers, shifted Vo over to Frank Velio, secretary of the
Senate's Foreign Relations Committee. Tbrough Velio what
Vo Lang had to say would be passed on to the s6mmitt€s.
Velio, in pidgin French, conducted his own interrogation. And
every question he posed was loaded, its aim all but concealed
in a rambling 'You think we ought to ds this, don't you?"
preamble which, if Vo understood at all, oriental politeness
demanded that he answer in the affirmative.
Had an intelligent freshman in political science been sitting
 THE BATTLE OF SAIGON 95

in tho office of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

that April afternoon while America's p-restig-e and Southeast
Asia's iuture were at stake, he would have been appalled to
see how the secretary-interpreter on whom our law-makers
dipended operated. fiow miny fact-findingmissions to South
Vi]etnam sail situations tlrough the warped vision of Velio's
lnterpreting and came home to fPPlove policies described
-as
there^after American? America's they never were' They
were the policies of men who knewwhere they werg going' and
who, by foeir monopoly on key positions,-were able to impose
their interpreter on senators who might otherwise prove
troublesome.
Vo Lang was never expected to change their minds. He
was the "diputy ambassador" sent to provide statements
justi'
fying what iley alreaay intended to do. Vo was te s1V Ves
*n"i y"s was ihe answer his interrogator wanted' Each sen'
tence towhich be gave approval, impressed by marble
surroundings and his obligation as a favordemanding guest
was accredr;ted in its entirlty to him, with recommendations
that his observations be accepted.
Whatever happened tater, Velio canrct say that Vo Lang
did not warn hini. Again, as in Mansfield's ofrce, Vo plea{ed
that America stay behind Diem "just a litfle lolger," but thal
after the crisis be be made to widen the base of his government'
"IIow can we make him?" Velio asked. "Make himl" replied
Vo, and he leaned back in his chah.
How would one sum up those senators with whom Vo hng
talked that Monday of April 25,1955, while the crisis mounted
in Saigon and the entire American press unleashed itself in a
blind iorrent of rage against Bao Dai, the Binh Xuyen, thre
Cao Dai and Hoa Hao Gcts and last but not least the French?
Mansfield was the most dangerous, for each gesture, each
observation he made with with an air of false kindliness that
beguiled the listener into believing that this was a friend of
nunanity. Actually, behind the benign front lay !he- profas-
sional "progressivg' spply'ng to each degisign a single yar- d'
stick: is-this-the liberal thirig to do?-and feeling that no action
liberal solution was too brutal. The
which brought -if aboutisthe
bloodshe4 thete bloodshe4 be on "their" hands (the
enemies oi liberalism), for if they had not resisted, bloodshed
could have been avoided, seemed to be Mike Mansfield's
reasoning.
Hubei Humphrey must be regarded as a demagogue with a
mind second to none by those who compare his private con'
versations with his public pronouDcements. His conversation
96 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
with Vo Lang was short. Every question he asked was intelli-
gent direct to the core of the problem. The man was concen-
trating, not shooting off hot air. Once he had satisfied himself
on a point and mentally filed it away he went on to the next
Poinl One could see him putting the pieces together !r his
gind. When Vo Lang launched into his diatribe against the
Frenchn Humphrey silenced him with a gesture. ,,You have
your independence now; quit fighting the French. That is
over."
- Tl_9 ony conclusion one can reach is that Humpbrey is
intelligent, tbat every sacrifice of America's interests is niade
knowinglS to court the mob, to stay in ofrce. Whether he
weigbs the sacrifces and feels that America can stand the
selbq+ qs a price she must pay for Hubert Humphren or
whether he is acting with the long-range eye of a soiialisi-out
t9 male collapse of the existing system inevitable, is something
American voters and historians must decide for themselvei.
Humpbrey pledged his support to Diem. For nine years it was
always "just a little longer."
Senator Karl Mundt, the Republican from South Dakota,
moved slowln thought slowly, but left no doubt that he was
doing what he thought would be honorable and best. He
listeng$ !o Vo Lang's request, tlen reached for his telephone
to call Nixon's ofrce, that Vo might put his nessage before
the vice-president. Nixon was out, but never mind, |,a[un61
would tlrow his support behind Mansfield and Humpbrey on
matters pertaining to Ngo dinh Diem. It was the story of our
role in Southeast Asia in a nutshell. The liberal establishment
could not lose, for in "honest" Diem, the anti-colonialist who
had studied to be a priesf and in his brother who had been a
labor leader, American progressives had a team behind which
all the shades of the political spectrum could be herded under
threat of being called un-American if they balked.
In a staG of elation Vo Lang left Senator Mundt's office
and headed for Senator Knowland's. Knowland was an im-
portant figure on the Foreip Relations Committee. Enlisting
his support would tip the scale; and Knowland joined the
bi-partisan front for Diem wholeheartedly. From that moment
Vo I-ang felt that he alone had saved the Ngo dinh DiEm
regime, Iittle realizing that he had only provided tle quotes.
Itwas a strange interview that Vo Lang had with Knowland"
Of all the senators in that marble-floored building Knowland
portrayed best in his person the Roman idea of the lawmaker.
He was impressive; he looked intelligent and forceful, but he
did not ask a question on the background of the crisis, tte
 TTIE BATTLE OF SAIGON N
prospects for the future, how the people really felt in South
Vietnam. Instead, he told Vo Lang.
The socialist councillor of the French Union, in his last
briefing at the Montparnasse cafe before Vo Lang boar{ed t\
-not f6r
phne America, had said, "Tell 'le senators [in Washington]
to worry about k van Vien. All he wants is money. We
can buy him sff." Vo dutifully passed tle observation on to
Knowland, who replied, quite admirably, "The United States
will never pay ransom to a river piratel" In retrospect a dis-
turbing thought remains: Surely the councillor of the French
Union knew-when he made his $tatement that Vien was the
terror of the Communists, and was incorruptible. The logical
explanation then is that this was a final ruse to clinch Know'
land s support by making him adamant againgt Diem's enemy'
Vien, to-*hose former allies millious had already been paid
in bribes.
From the Senate Office Building Vo took a taxi to the
embassy of the nation being axed by both the Vietnamese
press and the American as villain of the piece, to meet Mon'
iieur Paul Devinat, the official who had flown all the way
from Tokyo to help put his mission across. It was a day of
triumph for Vo-triumph political and social, beyond anything
he had dreamed of during those lonely months in Hong Kong
when, as an exile, he made a living &awing pictures of Chinese
in the street. From the French embassy he doubled back to
the home of a woman prominent in Republican circles, on
Jefterson Place, for a cocktail. Here he made tle acquaintance
of Joseph Ballentine, a retired foreigp service ofrcial who had
spent years in the Orient. Ballentine's understanding of the
East, his judgment and personal acquaintance with leaders in
South China, impressed Vo. Here w.N a man to whom, in a
pinch, one could refer a senator with complete confdence in
the authority's integrity.
For the moment everything ran according to plan. Tran van
Chuong, still ignoring Diem's telegrams in his embassy, was
apparently still unaware that he was about to be whipped into
line. The last thing Vo did before going to bed the night of his
first day in Washington was call Wesley Fishel of Michigan
State University for further orders.
The next day, Tuesday the 26th, was hectic. The headlines
were bigger, the cartoons denigrating Bao Dai wilder. U. S.
News & World Report sent a man to interview Vo in the
Dupont Plaza. There was a long meeting in the Cambodian
embassy, the only development of which was a request by
Vo I-ang that his aide call a number in Alexandria, hang up if
98 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
a man answered, but if it was a woman,s voice say, .nThis is a
friend of Jacques in the Cambodian embassy. Can you come
to the Dupont Plaz-a at once?"
__
At fve-lbirg tlat afternoon Vo had an appointment with
Kenneth Young in the State Department, to wnicn he went
alone. What transpired between then and midnight, when Vo
returned to his hotel, is not known. Vo called Wesley Fishel
again as soon as he got to his room, then an airline tomake a
r-eseryatio:r for a quick round trip to Michigan, departing in
the morning. Not until 1961, when Vo's hair had turneA wnite
1nl nq was again shabbily dressed, painting pictures for a
living in the apartment he had bought near Oe tr'olies Begtsre
in his bdef period of access to the American aid till, aia ne
divulge any part of the long conversation he bad with the
behind-the+cenes Southeast Asia ace of the State Departmenl
Kenneth Todd Young.
Vo confded, 'He told me that they had been intercepting
Chuong's messages to Bao Dai for montls and they were tea
up with him. If I wanted to cooperate, Young said they would
make me ambassador 1s g,/xshington.,,
"Do you think 1fosy were able to decipher the code Chuong
used with Bao Dai, or was someone in Bao Dai's household
lsaking the message to Bill Gibson in Paris?"
"I don't know," the disillusioned Vo Lang replied.
The day after Vo's late return from Lansing, lylishiganr
political science professor Wesley Fishel himself arived in
Washington to take a hand. Short, swarthy, well built and
with the cat-like tread of a boxer, Fishel had all the worst
characteristics of the genus liberal currently grpping American
education. Where he came from, who he was, no one seemed
to know. Under his direction a Vietnam Project had been
instituted in Michigan State, and it was evident from Fishel's
steamroller tactics that any student not in agreement with
Michigan State's indoctrination on behalf of Ngo dinh Diem
would cause no serious trouble to the crusade, the reason being
tbat he would not get a diploma, without which ratiflcation of
knowledge no job of any importance would be open to him.
New Leader magazine of December 7, 1959, saJried a
biographical sketch on Fishel, accompanying an article in
which Communist subversion is pictured as fghting for its life
in South Vietnam before the advances made by land reform
(run by Fishel's friend, Wolfl,adejinsky), political education
(police state fashion), rural credit (restricted to Diem's par-
ticular friends) and community development. ('social pre$nrre
was usually sufficient to ensure the presence of the able.bodied
 THE BATTLE OF SAIGON 99

citizens,'wrote apologist Fishel of the forced labor aspect of

the community development.)
The biography gven was as follows: "Wesley R. Fishel,
[birthplace and source of his education uustated] has traveled,
studied and taught extensively in the Far East for the past 20
years." That would put Mr. Fishel in the Far East around
tS:S. ft would be interesting to know where he traveled and
studied at that time, how he happened to go to the Far EasL
who sent him.
'In 1953 he directed a classifed research project in Korea
and Japan for the Operations Research Office of Johns
Hopkins University [Milton Eisenhower's university]." Not
reassuring. How does it happen that no conservative is ever
selected for such jobs?
'"The following year," New Leader continued, "he seryed in
Indochina as consultant in governmental reorganization for
the U. S. Operations Mission and as staff member for General
J. Lawton Collins, special Presidential representative." Inter'
esting, this. The year 1954 was the period when American
leftists swarming over Indochina as operations missions agents
and in other capacities, worked to sabotage Washington's aid
to the French, then fghting Ho chi Minh. The Michigan State
professor's loyalty to his chief, General Lawton Colllns, on
whose staff he was, could not have been great, since one year
later Mr. Fishel was in Washington to help Vo Lang get Gen:
eral Collins fired from his job.
But now we are getting somewhere: 'In 1956-58 he headed
a Michigan State advisory group on public administration in
Vietnam," says the vague biography. Among other things'
Michigan State was at that time ftaining the South Vietnamese
police that ran Hitler's Gestapo a close second, all this as Part
of public administration.
New Leader terminated the only Fishel biography we have
at hand with the statement that "He is the author of. The End
of Extra-Territoriality in China and of many scholarly articles.
Readers will recall his article "Vietnam's Democratic One'Man
Rule" which ran in our November 2 tl959l issue."
A treatise on the psychology of wishful thinking among
American conservatives could be derived from the reaction of
the American public during the up period and down period of
our Diem intoxication. When the American left, of which
New Leader and Wesley Fishel are examples, turned against
Diem in 1961 to get out from under their responsibilify for
him, America's solid middle-of-the-roaders rose in arms in
Diem's defense. They knew lerhing of lhe reasons for the left's
lOO BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
disavowal They never reasoned that our mililsnl left having
accumulated an explosive force, might be putting itself on
record as being against it before it blew up. The fact that the
New York Times began cooling oft toward Diem was $ffcient
to make conservative citizens feel that he must be good. When
the same leftist journals and professors were on positive rather
than a negative line, our tranquillity-seeking public swallowed
it without a murmur, though the soft soap was tansparently
false. Then they were happy to leave South Vietnam to the
New Leader and men like Wesley Fishel.
Fishel's arrival in Washington that hot April 28, coinciding
as it did with Diem's decision to launch hostilities in Sai-
gon, added further complications. Vo and his aide-interpreter
appeared together on visits to congressmen, but said aide knew
nothing of what went oD in the side trips Vo made with Pro-
fessor Fishel or the six-hour talks when Vo was presumably
with Kenneth Young. ln fact, from the moment of Fishel's
arrival, a promise of support having been extracted from tle
four important senators on the Foreign Relations Qsmmittss,
the aide's duties consisted mainly of accompanying Vo Lang
to Corr's Hobby Shop for the purpose of buying a four-
hundreddollar model airplane with a six-foot wing spread and
a gasoline motor, or to cocktail parties or on searches for more
photographic equipment, for which the American taxpayer,
without a say in the matter, was Santa Claus.
An appointmeDt was set up for a courtesy call on Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy at 10:30 a.m. on Friday, April 29, the
idea being that Vo should meet as many of the senators on the
Foreign Relations Committee as possible, so that he would
know them in the event of another mission. At 9:45 a phone
call came for Vo in his room. "I have to go down to the lobby
to see Mr. Fishel," he explained. "I'll be right back.', Uterally,
he was kidnapped, simpty put in a car and taken away. He
returned that afternoon at 4:30, with no explanation as to
where he had been or why he had walked out on the McCarthy
appointment without the courtesy of making a cancellation or
an apology. One possible explanation is that certain Americans
pulling stdlgs in Vietnamese affairs did not want a naive and
sometimes too honest Vo Lang wandering into Joe McCarthy,s
office and waxing loquacious.
, ThatDornnight a speech by Congressmen William Jennings
lryan of South Carolina went over the air, demanding
the recall of Ambassador J. Lawton Qsllins. An hour later
Vo Lang descended on the Vietnamese embassy for tle battle
that was to last till midnight He was in a state of high elation
 TTIB BATTLE OF SAIGON 101
when he returned to the Dupont Plaza shorfly after twelve.
thirty, and Ambassador Chuong was once more pro-Diem.
Vo Lang's political future seemed assured. Before going to bed
he dispatched a telegram to Saigon in code, naming the con-
gressmen whose support he had obtained. Fow copies of
statements those congressmen had made, eulogizing Diem
before Vo had ever seen them, were clipped from the Wasb
ington Post and telegraphed to the four top figures in Saigon,
verbatim and at full rate, signed by Vo Lang's hapless "aide.'
The telegraph bill was slightly over four hundred dollars.
When thoqe telegrams arrived an immense cloud of black
smoke covered the sky to the east of Saigon. On April 29 the
battle recommenced, shortly after dawn. By nightfa[ the north
branch of the Y bridge had been blown up and the fight had
moved beyond the river, into Cholon, where it was ragrng
around [,e van Vien's great gambling center, b Grando
Monde. Thousands of huts had gone up in smokg pafr of
Saigon was a shambles, but the test of strength which the
opinionated mandarin in Independence Palace hadwanted, and
precipitated, was won-at least as far as the city was con-
cerned.
Outside Saigon it was another matter. k van Vien, aided by
the Hoa Hao, still held the rice fields and the waterways lead-
ing into the city. Trucks bearing loudspeakers roamed tle
streets, blamiag all the misery on the French and the Binh
Xuyen, despite the fact that French General Jacquot's mobile
detachments were blocking off as much of Saigon as they
could to save it from the fighting and provide a haven for
thousands of homeless refugees pouring in from the devastated
parts of Saigon and Cholon.
The family in Independence Palace was determined to
inflame the population. It was the most fearful incitement to
mob violence and anti-colonialist rabble rousing the city had
seen. Mimeographed tracts appeared, giving official sanction,
as it were, to an anti-French riot. Raymond Cartier reported
in Paris Match of May 14, 1955, "No Frenchman in Indochina
doubts that these tracts exciting the civilian population to
massacre them were drawn up in the office of Colonel l-ans.
dale, and lhg snglisis6s they contain, such as spit ia la lace
of the French rather than cracher d la figure [which anyono
familiar with the French language would have usedl do not
contradict that conviction."
The theme behind the violent anti-French campaign, covered
in full by American correspondents on the spot, was that
France was backing snd inflaming the sects for the dual pur-
102 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
pose of obetructing formation of a strong government and
installing a French grip on the couutry in spite of the inde'
pendence which she had recognized. "It- was a policy which
we might have been tempted to play, which we did not," said
Cartier. "If the Diem campaign had succeeded and a strong
popularly supported government had resulted it would have
laa Oe cynical justification of success. But it did not, as the
resultant state of South Vietnam was to attest. All that resulted
was the cruelty, the injustice and the distrust of France, and
grim forebodings of what might be expected t o6s1 similar
circumstances in the futute."
Of General O'Daniel and the colonel who, having "elected
Magsaysay in the Philippines," was about 1o- win new king-
makin! hurels in Vietnam, Cartier observed, "Without taking
into account past history or present problems, America, in
Indochina, dreamed only of ousting the French with a brusque
shove of the shoulder, to pursue a path that could but lead to
a labyrinth. The blood poured out, the-9acrifi9es borne, the
civilization sown in Indochina meant nothing before the brutal
and summary men who, beneath their masks of officialdom'
displayed the profiles of adventurers."
ilet" *"t tle start of the rancour which America's later
zupport of the Algerian rebellion was to increase and harden'
If-the splitting of NATO, the driving of a wedge between
America and the armed forces of the country that provides
NATO'g base, was the intention of those sowing Franco'
American animosity in Indochina, their plan succeeded.
To say that confusion reigned in Independence Palace as the
last dayi of April approached would be puttinC it mildly' A
message had co-me frbm Bao Dai, as we stated, ordering Diem
to prdent himself in Cannes on May 9. A parallel order from
gai nai named General Nguyen van Vy commander'in-chief
of the army, and since the country had no elected assembly or
eovereipty other than Bao Dai, the orders were legal. To dis-
pute thiir'legality would, in fact, put in question the legality of
Diem's own appointment as Premier.
But dispute-tlem Diem did. Whether he was "eg89d 9n" 9y
General O'Daniel, as Congressman Judd put it, or whether he
acted on his own, in the fanatical conviction that his appoint-
ment came from God and not from Bao Dai, we shall never
know. The consequences were the same. His harangues fol-
lowed the line of ail revolutionaries: He orated on the suffering
of the people and worked himself into rages over conditioris
-himself
which ie had created. Every opposition paper had
been suppessed, and French publications were barred from
 THE BATTLE OF SAIGON 103
the county, but Diem talked about the new librrtie.e which
had accrued with independence.
Over a thousand known anti-Communists had disappeared
into the night between the police ofrcers of Diem and Nlu.
There were no trials. Executions had taken place, but no one
knew for certain who was in prison or who had been executed,
and intimidation, tle tlreat of disappearing, silenced all ques-
tioners. The Americans who knew of these events could not
have cared less.
General Nguyen van Vy was up in Dalat when promotion
tcr command of the national army descended on him. It was
safer thele. Nevertheless, he boarded a plane for Saigon, where
he arived lat€ in the afternoon of April 29. About the time
news reached Independence Palace that Nguyen van Vy was
on his way it became known that General Hinh was also
flying home on a mission for Bao Dai.
General Vy moved into General Hinh's villa on the outskirts
of townr while Trinh minh J[s, the ambitious Cap Dai general
whom Diem had purchased along with his 2,500 personal
troops for some two million dollars (of Amercan aid moneyl)
the previous February, prepared to resist Vy's appointment
Rumors and counter-rumors crossed the capital like wildfire,
and in the end no one knew who was in command. Ambas-
sador Chuong in Washington was still not answering telegrams,
from Diem at least; tle results of Vo Lang's secondary in-
trigues in Washington under the wing of Professor Fishel had
not yet reached Saigon. Matters stood in ttris uncertain state
when April 30 broke over a sweltering capital and its two
million inhabitantl, securely in Diem's hands but with his
power extending no farther.
For ten lears this writer has tried to fix the exact role of
American initiative and money in the tangled developments of
tle next forty-eight hours. At this date it is untikely that the
true story will ever be unravelled, so many of the actors are
now where they cannot talk. Only those Vietnamese who
remained loyal to Diem to the end in order to retain their
place on the'gravy train" are still alive; and they are singu-
larly reserved on the subject of those events.
General Vy set off to brave the lion in his den, accompanied
by General TY, then in name at least his chief of staff. The two
generals got in a ieep that Saturday morning and with & Eotor-
cycle escort preceding them roared through the streets of
Saigon where 2,500 more northern refugees rmloaded ftom
the American ship Daniel Webster had just joined tbo horde of
104 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
humanity-men, wometr and children-and jumbled belong-
ings already littering the city.
At Independence Palace they ascended the marble stairway
leading to Diem's office. Before they had time to state their
business they found themselves facing Trinh minh The and a
circle of pistols. T! had one of his epaulettes torn oft and might
have suftered worse if at that moment Diem had not appeared
to tell them tbey were under arrest. With The's higger'happy
Iieutenants brandishing guns under their noses, Vy and Ty
heard Diem order them to sign a paper, swearing loyalty to
him and repudiation of Bao Dai.
Irt us leave the two generals where they are for a minute.
Diem had already started throwing together what he called
a National Revolutionary Committee. The members were
appointed by the "General Assembly of Revolutionary Forces
oi the Nation," a puppet assembly which Diem and Nhu had
named and then summoned to a meeting in the city hall that
Saturday afternoon. Thirty-thee names were signed to the
manifesto that resulted. These thirty-three men clained to
represent sixteen parties. In all, about two hundred Diem
henchmen attended the meeting, the purpose of which was not
long in doubt. A large portrait of Bao Dai hung on the wall.
It was torn down and trampled on, and Ngo dinh Diem.was
charged with the formation of a Provisional Government of
the Republic of Vietnam.
Lieutenants were dispatched in all directions to mobilize
students, tear down Bao Dai's portraits, burn him in effigy'
and by their exuberance impress the American embassy and
the American press with the strength of the National Revolu-
tionary Commi6ss. It is interesting to look back on this farce
and wonder why it was taken seriously, but taken seriously
and passed on to the American public as an advance of
"democracy," it was. Nguyen bao Toan, the fiery orator whose
speech whipped the assembly into tearing down Bao Dai's por-
trait, was made shairman of tle representative committee. A
man named Ho han Son, who formerly commanded Ho chi
Minh's dreaded Seventh zone, w&r vice chairmau. Nhi Lang,
whose picture may be found in Lile magaz.ine of April 18,
1955, was No. 3 of the group, in recognition of his services in
holding a gun over Nguyen van Vy that morning. Supporting
them with the considerable weigbt and experience at his com-
mand was the famous Dr. Tran, who not long before had been
president ef tfis sdministrative committee of the Nam Bo, Ho
16inh's government in the South.
"triHad any of these men possessed the power of clairvoyancg
 TIIE BATTLE OF SAIGON 105

had there been a brief lifting of the shutter, here is what they
would have seen: Less than a year later Nguyen bao Toan wag
to ffnd himself in flight. Fortunately he had a considerable
fortune by that rime, provided indirectly-by the American
top"y"t, ind when last-heard of he was living comfortably-in
ed"rica. Ho han Son was to disappear in January 1956. Nhu
and his police made no attempt to look f-or him. Thirleen
months later Son's skeleton was found. Nhi Lang was soon to
flee to Cambodia. The others were for the most part broken
one by one; or if alive, are now not talking.
i"iaotpn Kidder, ihen serving as America's charg6- d'
affaires and running the embassy during General Iawton Col-
lins' absence, is also unlikely to divulge any pertinent informa'
tion. Reports to the French government- accused him 6f sa-
rather than trying to restrain the effonts of General
"""i"gi
o;nuiial Colonel Laniaate and the increasinglyinflame -powerful
Urit"a Stat"t lofor-ation Service helping to tho
civilian population against the French. This did not p19y9nt
in" St"tioipartment from assigning the handsome Mr' Kidder
to the Paris embassY in 1959.
On the fateful Saturaay of April 30, 1955, another develop'
ment occurred to pose potentially embarrassing questions at
o* S*goo embass!. A French plane tear-rne navigation certi'
n"ate S] O. A. D. N., Type M- no. 3,681, and owned by the
F high commissioner to Vietnam, the very ofrcial ac-
"""nof 6tpiog Diem's enemies, made three passes -over k
.ur"a
Viuo" co-i'tand post. It appeared to be photographingthe
"*
outio""firt front's positioos and directing the mortar fire that
r"r Uicomiog incireasingly accurate. On !ts- fourth prys- it
d6ild a mE UomU and peeled off toward the earth wtthin
---fie of light weaPons.
range
UoaI of an hmerican named Dixie Reece was formd in
the- wreckage of the plane. Newspaper reqor-ts said he
was a
press photo;apher, killed while reporting the battle' Papers on
lir o-"itoo iientinea him as head of the photo-laboratory of the
Ad;;; embassy. A Vietnamese eatholic priect named
Father Cua was slnt on the dangerous mission of trying -to
f"""t" fvft. Reece before it was known that both Reece and the
;il"t ;;" dead. Five years later, afler Diem had sent Father
L\r" t" prison on a irumped'up charge of. receiving stolen
eoods (f,r[owing the prieit's indiscreet political prono.uncc
il-ttttl' tn" Amirican imbassy in Paris refused him a visa on
grounds that he wall an ex-convict.
- But let us leave our embassy and the problems of Mr' Kid'
106 BACKGROTJND TO BETRAYAL
der, who was destined to play a gFeater role in our experiment
in Vietnam than perhaps historians will accord him.
Back with the motorcycle escort outside Independence Pal-
ace the parachutist colonel Kao van Tri, whom Diem had iust
promoteh, was beginning to wonllervhy b]s !*" generals who
Lad gone into the august palace five hours before did not come
out. tri telephoned and was told they were under arest. Tri
informed the palace that his two chiefs had gone there in good
faith and thafif they were not released he would be back with
troops to free them. They were freed immediately.
Irieanwhile Trinh minh The, who arrested the generals inthe
first place, on May 4, had been sent back to his troops. He
started marching at the head of his men across a bridge and
fell, shot in the back. Anyone might have done il for he was
a man of ferocious cruelty. One of his own soldiers, resentful
of Trinh's betrayal of their spiritual leader, may have chosen
that moment to administer divine retribution as he saw it, or
it may have been an agent of I-e van Vien. Reasons for shoot-
ing fiinn minh The were so many, no one tried to sort them
out. Besides, in the wider picture he was unimportant.
Papers in America were rolling oft the- Prlss by that time'
beariig big headlines of Bao Dai's ouster by the revolutionary
co--ittee. As we have said, no questions were asked about
said committee: the Saigon riots,.the trampling of Bao Dai's
portrait under foot, and his burning in effigy were rqtresented
io oe*tp"p"t readers avidly buying extras as the mase uprising
of a nation marching toward democracy.
Yet, for a brief spell on Sunday morning in far away Saiggn"
General Vy had hG moment of glory. Ninety per cent 9f -the
army's generals had made known their willingness- to follow
him. GJneral Le van Ty, his chief of staft, insisted on going
back to the palace around mid-day and announcing tbeir deci-
sion to Diem's revolutionary committee, iust to ds ths thing
correctly. Vy permitted two generals to go along as an escort.
For the-information of senators who might someday be inter'
ested in peering into the caree$ of Vietnamese generals to
ascertain wheth-r they were the recipienb of favors by or sub
sequent generals and-ambassadors, the name of one of them
was Minh and the other was Don.
Around 3 p. m. General Don returned, alon9, with tle
$upefying news that Le van TV', ungo-nditioqalty loyal to Vy
tnri. horitt before, had moved back into Diem's camp, and
that Minh had gone Yft! him.
Trinh minh fie, Nguyen thanh Phuong with his 25'000 Cao
Dai toops. and now Le van Ty and Minh had, one after an-
othcr, crosnC the feld in this strange game of sell'out and
 THE BATTLE OF SAIGON IW
doubl+cnoes. No one appea$ to have considered that tho
leaders on whom we were staking our big experiment were
considerably ls6 rhan stable. In America our man's triumph
was hailed as a victory. That he was hated, and the victory
paid for by the Amcrican taxpayer' was never nentioned.
Time mzgaz.ine of August 9, t963, called it "Dieds Finest
Hour."
In America the wild exultation over Vietnam's "spon-
taneous" rejection of the monarchy lasted just one day; then'
as suddenly as it appeared, splashed across front pages' it
abruptly ended with a lame statement to the effect that a con-
stitutional monarchy was foreseen in South Vietnam. Nothing
more was said.
Professor Fishel burst into Vo Langis room in the Dupont
Plaza Hotel in a towering ragc. Throwing a crumpled news-
paper to the floor, he exclaimed, "Those imbecile$ they are
afraid of their shadowst I know who is behind rhist Ifs that
bunch in the embassy in Saigon!"
The paper contained not a line about the new 'tepublic."
The students demonstrations had miraculously disappeared
from prinl Someone, somewhere, had said, "Enough. Take it
easy," and the whole tele-commanded performange was halt€d.
Who, using America's prestige and funds, decided to abolish
the tlrone in South Vietnam and make America's man a pres.
ident while General Lawton Collins was out of the country,
and out to stay if they had any say in the matter? That is a
question the American public has a right to ask.
Sunday papers across America carried an International
News Service story under I V'/ashington dateline of April 30
signed by Don Dixon. "fhree senators have thrown their sup-
port behind the State Departmenfs lasking of South Viet-
nam's controversial Premier Ngo dinh Diem" Diem has be-
come the target of strong French criticism," wrote Mr. Dixon.
(Note: the criticism was always French. Vietnamese were pic-
tured as solidly behind their premier.) Then note the order
in which eenatorial support is listed. 'Senate GOP leader
Knowland (Calif.) expressed hope the French would 'stop
prrlling the rug out from under Premier Diem and give him a
chance to zuccee4"'began the opening four-inch paragraph
that made Knowland Diem's guarantor. "Knowland added that
if the French make any attempt to restore 'colonialism'to that
area they will fail He sai{ 'The age of colonialism in Asia is
dead."t
Next came Senator Humphrey's statement of position,
summed up in one inch of 8-point type. Diem, said Humphrey'
108 BACKGROLIND TO BETRAYAL
is 'the best hope we have in South Vietnam and any comments
about the leadership in the war-torn country shsuld be aimed
at Bao Dai, the Chief of State now living on the French
Riviera." Diem and Bao Dai, as Vo Lang had discovered,
were the only Vietnamese names Senator Humphrey knew.
Mike Mansfield's plug for Diem ran to an inch and three-
quarters, but, coming at the end of the column as it did, the
reader might suspect that Mansfield was going along in sup-
port of Knowland's and Hurnphrey's boy. "Senator Mansfield
(D. Mon.) dsmnndgd that the U. S. cut off all aid to South
Vietorm," wrote Mr. Dixon, "if the tacketeers'revolt' waged
by the rebel Binh Xuyen forces overthrows the Diem govern-
ment."
It was an old refrain. Never did American aid to Vietnam
bolster the country against the Communist enemy to the north;
always it strengthened the grip of a family against their coun-
trymen. And each year when foreign aid appropriations came
up in the American Congress, opponents of the tbrow-away
program inexorably ruining America, economically and in the
eyes of the world, were told that to cut the aid appropriation
would hinder American forergn policy.
 CHAPTER ELEVEN

NEW ACTORS ON THE STAGE

After the third of May, 1955, there was no tbreat, in Saigon

at least, to the government the United Nationalist Front had
rejected. True, as one moved from the capital the central
government's authority diminished, trailed ofi and gradually
ceased to exist, but firm censorship in Saigon and the news
blackout in America could prevent the American public from
hearing about this. The rest of the world did not matter.
Le van Vien could hold out indefinitely in his swamps. Tran
van Sioai and his embarrassing associate, Bacut, the wild man
of the Hoa lfao, were more vulnerable in their stronghold to
the west, so it was the Hoa Hao that Diem prepared to wipo
out first. In the meantime the reasons for the radio and press
violence against the French, and attempts to blame them for
the crisis which destroyed part of Saigon, were becoming clear.
The treaty of independence accorded France the right to main-
tain troops in South Vietnam as protection for the European
population and to protect the country against the Vietminh.
Diem and the Americans around him wanted those troops out.
No one considered for a moment that a time might come when
Americans would wish with all their hearts to have European
help back there again.
The Los Angeles Times of Wednesday, May 11, 1955,
headed its European bureau report, "Dulles Tells Faure to
Support Diem." The brutal, ultimatum-like headlines gave
many Americans a burst of pride, a feeling of '"Thafs telling
theml" Edgar Faure, premier of France at the time, feared
that weeks of radio incitement and Colonel Lansdale's mimeo-
graphed sheets, reports of whicf, were in his desk, might touch
off a massacre of French civilians in South Vietnam.
This Los Angeles Times accovnt of the exchange of notes
between Washington and Paris continued, "secretary of State
Dulles last night issued a virtual ultimatum to France that she
support the native South Vietnamese Government of Premier
Ngo dinh Diem and if necessary withdraw all or part of her
90,000 French Expeditionary Force. Dulles used stern lan-
109
110 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
guage shom of diplomafic euphemisms to enlist France's
Jarnest support of Diem as the West's only visible hope of
saving IndoChina from Communist envelopment."
Monsieur Faure knew that Ho chi Minh had no army left
after the Pyrrhic victory of Dien Bien Phu, that in reality the
French government had done nothing to oppose Diem save
protest against his anti-French radio diatribqs which made
Goebbels'pre-war blasts seem weak by comparison. The next
sentence made him shake his head: "He lDulles] also warned
that the new Vietnam native army is still so far from being
ready for combat after 18 months of training by the United
States Army that it could not defend the country if France
does withdraw her forces." Why then, Faure asked himself, do
they tell us to get out?
"Faure indicated France might accept Diem if he broadens
his government and agrees to Emperor Bao Dai's continuance
as titular chief of state and if Ngo dinh Diem abates his mili-
tant anti-French attitude. Faure asked Dulles who would pro'
tect French lives and property in Vietnam against Diem's anti-
French crusade if the French expeditionary force is withdrawn.
Dulles replied the United States would in any case use her full
influence to insure respect for French lives and property. He
said public opinion in the United States has reached the state
where it would be excessively difrcult for the United States
to participate in Diem's removal from power."
The Premier leaned back and reflected. The men who pro-
duced the inflammatory sheets in his file would use their full
influence to insure respect for French lives and property, he
was told. That was not good enough. And nothing could be
done about Diem because the organized press campaign had
whipped the public into a state where nothing but the policies
of the faceless clique doing the inciting would be acceptable.
'Why did you gtve me this particular paper?" Premier Faure
asked his aide.
*Reports from the European bureau of the Los Angeles
Times go into a special fiIe," he was told. "The bureau chief
is a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy Reserve; con-
sequently they are considered semi-official."
All of these seemingly unimFortant details, overlooked by
a preoccupied public, are taken into consideration in the
modern, airplane-spanning world of diplomacy. One Amencan
overseas press bureau out of tbree is on a list in the recesses
of interior ministries as a branch post of Central Intelligence.
Each dispatch is thereafter studied for mdications of biases
that will affect policy. At a time when American newspaper
 NEW ACTORS ON THE STAGE 111

readers were aghast at the refusal of the French air force to

accept American command in event of war, not one reader
in a-million took notice of the coincidence tlat the columns
of Marguerite Higgrns were sermons of praise for the Algerian
rebels, or that before the Algerian revolt they had been anti-
French in Vietnam. The French air ministy watching the
sinuous twistings of Egyptian, Russian and Chinese plots and
counterplots in the Algerian revolt noticed it, and in the minds
of officers assigned to study and tabulate the daily press, was
the conviction, true or false, that Marguerite Higgins' hus-
band, in his third floor office of the Pentagon, had read and
presumably approved her column the day before.
Certainly Franco-American relations were not helped by
the Los Angeles Times as Diem purged his army of officers
suspec'ted of being pro-French and heaped honors on the
friends and relatives promoted to command as he prepared
his offensive, against the Hoa Hao in the west. The battle was
to last from May 25 until the end of July 1955. While Diem's
fifty battalions were locked with the twenty battalions of regu-
lars, plus &n unknown number of guerrillas, under Tran van
Sioai and Bacut, Le van Vien's Binh Xuyen crept back to
the gates of Saigon and from fsn milss outside of town threat-
ened to cut the national army's supply lines.
While this battle was at its height a special Vietnam number
of the New Leader, published by the American Labor Con-
ference on International Affairs, appeared in America, dated
lvne 27,1955, written in its entirely by Mr. foseph Buttinger.
ll is rrnliksly that any American conservative deigned to read
the political iournal of American labor, but the American
left read it. Labor unionists read it. Reprints were sold by the
thousands at 15{ each or 100 copies for $9.50. And some
fhinking American, somewhere in our vast country, should
have torn himself away from a television set long enough to
read every word ih this sixteen-page magazine. If it is not
someday spread out on a table and thoroughly dissected by
a congressional committes delving into the whys and where.
fores of our pollcy in South Vietnam, it will be because Senator
Mansfield and Hubert Humpbrey brought the weight of the
Demoeratic pafty and Walter Reuther's unions into play to
prevent iL
What do we conclude from a study of this special number
ot New Leader headed *Are We Saving South Vietnam?,' in
which the answer was inferred to be yes but was actually no?
First that American labor was meddling in foreip poliey
and that its weight was behind Ngo dinh Diem.
II2 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
The next question is: who is Joseph Buttinger? What was bis
interest in Vietnam? New Leader described him ss vice chair-
man of the International Rescue Committee and added that
the International Rescue Committee sent him on a mission to
South Vietnam in the fall of 1954, after which he became "one
of the leading American champions of the free Vietnamese."
He is an Austrian socialist naturalized American, and "from
1935 to 1938 he was chairman of the Central Committee of
1[9 $scinlisf Underground Movement in Vienna"-in other
words, a socialist revolutionary. TVhen Hitler marched into
Austria, Mr. Buttinger went to America, and sometime within
his first few years there became active in the International
Rescue Qsmmittes, which sent him back to Europe as its
European director n t946 and 1947 , This was the period when
American labor delegate Irving Brown also was abroad, or-
ganizing the American-financed unions that were to serve
politically as striking fists for native socialist parties, African
revolutionary leaders, and eventually Europe's pro-Commu-
nist united socialist fronts. New Leader ended its biographical
notes with, "Since his IRC mission to South Vietnam, he has
begun a work on that nation." After one visitl
What else can we learn about this Mr. Buttinger who inter-
preted South Vietnam politics for America's tbirteen and a
half million unionized workmen and x number of white-collar
socialis&? The best way to find out is by analyzing his reporL
Somewhere it should erpress his credo.
For tbirteen pages Mr. Buttinger rambled through spccious
explanations of how Diem came to power, attacks on the sects,
the Binh Xuyen, the French, and Graham Greene for ques-
tioning America's wisdom. General Collins was praised for de-
fending Diem during the General Hinh crisis but charged with
turning against him in March, 1955. (It is hard to fix the
exact date when Buttinger himself turned against Diem, but
turn against him [s did in the end, just before the blowup
came, when to stay on the bandwagon any longer threatened
to become embarrassing.)
All the arguments of socialist dialectics are to be found in
this Nery Leader propaganda piece making anti-colonialism a
k9y-gote, and interference in Vietnam's internal politics the
9fficial foreign policy of American labor. On ..Anti-colonials
page thirteen,
however, we find the kernel we are seeking.
gmong the Left parties in France," wrote Mr. Buttinger, of
French gocialists and Communists without actually naming
them,.'have always supported the originally corrit solution
of giving independence to the Democratic Republic of Vietuam
 NEW ACTORS ON TIIB STAGE 113

headed by Ho chi Minh, after its establishment in 1945. Al-

though the government of Ho chi Minh, was dominated by
ssmmunisfs, this regime had a good chance of developing
along democratic lines if French colonial policies had not
driven the people of Vietnam into the communists' arms."
What New Leader and Joseph Buttinger are saying is that
in 1945 we should have supported the man we were to fight
in1964, Hochi ffiinh, the Moscow-trained revolutionary whose
aim was the Communization of all Asia. Buttinger, the Aus-
trian socialist, had seen government after government in which
Communists were & minority succumb to Communist domina-
tion in Central Europe, yet here he has the effrontery to write,
and New Leader the effrontery to print, the statement that,
although the t945 government of Vietnam was headed by an
admitted lifetime Communist terrorist and dominated by Com-
munists, it'had a good chance of developing along democratic
linss." Whxf an insult to our intelligencel So Ho chi Minh
dsminsfiep is what "anti-colonialists among the Left parties
in France" always wanted, and "French colonial policies" are
responsible for everything that went wrong, states the man
who headed the International Rescue Conmittee mission to
South Vietnam.
|rfqthing more need be said of Joseph Buttinger. The above
statement of principles should be borne in mind througb the
developments that follow. But what of the International Rescue
Commiftss, of which be is vice chairman?
The American public, even the segment that is suspicious of
anything remotely connected with Ford Foundation, ihe Coun-
Foreign Relations and other groups used as political
-cil-_on
bulldozers snd flsasmission belts toi tni intematioial left,
has never shown any curiosity about the IRC. That it was
presented as an organization helping refugees escape from
communism was enough, and on that favorable facet of IRC
the publicity spotlight was constantly focused. Whether ,.in_
ternational" meant that the Rescue Cbmmittee was part of an
international chain, or an American ssmmittss operating in
the s5t991 gapitals listed in its letterhead, was neier cle.irly
stated. All that was immsfialely discernible when Joseph Bui-
tin, ger drew attention to th€ II{C by his proDi"n
actinity in
1955 was that said commillss was-founded in 1936. a"giei
Duke_was its president at the time of the Suttio?er
?i.d{"
mission and Leo Cherne, executive director of the
Researlh
rnstitute of America, served as chairman. Mrs.
Kermit Roos€-
velt was listed as secretary and Eric M. Warburg as treasurer.
There were the usual joiners whose names are found on the
Lt4 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
rolls of liberal organizations in America. Cbristopher Emmet
was there, but with Emmet and the crowd of Americans auto'
matically associated with the Americans for Democratic Ac'
tion were the inevitable conservatives, roped in on the belief
that they were fighting communism, not just encaging in a
family power struggle between Communists and socialists.
Monfrgnot Bela Varga, the Hungarian priest who headed
Hungaryk last free government, was listed as a member of
the board of directors. 'Vhat can you tell us about this man
Buttinger?" Monsipor Varga was asked by this author. "He
alone wag responsible for breaking the anti-Communist front
in Hungary," was the arswer. 'oThen, Monsignor Varge' what
are you doing on that Rescue Qemmitts€f" The answer was
a cryptic smile.
Sometime in 1951, while the British were struggling to zuf
press the Mau Mau terrorists of the Kikuyu tribe in Keoyq
whose bloody orgies and revolting oath-taking are described
by Robert Ruark in his book (Jhuru, a Kikuyu named Mungai
Njoroge arrived in New York. An u named pen pal in Rye,
New Yorh had contacted Njoroge concerning a scholarship.
The International Rescue Committee saw tlat the Kikuyu got
through Stanford University Medical School and in 1958 sent
him [s6s with supplies and operating funds equalling $30'000
per year, plus a promise of $1fi),000 to build a hospital and
set up village clinics. The Mau Maus were badly mauled and
were in dire need of doctors at the time Njoroge was brought to
America. The possibility definitely exists that correspondence
between I pen pal in Rye, New York, and a member of the
tribe perpetrating the honible atrocities in Kenya, was not ae'
cidental. And a deep suspicion that the IRC's education of
'Dr. Mungai Njoroge" was part of a wider plan might sse6
"lunatis fringe" if the privaoe anti-colonialist war of the IRC
did not somehow, invariably, come to light in every area of
the world where America's allies were faced with revolts. The
'tefugees" for whom Angier Biddle Duke and Joseph Buttin-
ger beggpd donations and American visas could be bona fide
refugees from communism; or they could be murderers being
sought by the French in Algeria, the Portuguese in Angola,
or our allies fsced with a Communist-backed rebellion any-
place in the world. In 1965 Njoroge was the pro-Red defense
minfuterof Kenya
It is with the feeling that a corner of a curtain has been
lifted that a researcher must contemplate the importance of
foseph Buttinger's article in New Leader against the back-
ground of the profession of faith to be found in Buttinger's
 NEW ACTORS ON THE STAGE 115

eulogizing of Ho chi Minh. Tbinking Americans at the time

ignored the propaganda front's existence as they read papers
filled with accounts of Diem's victories.
In western Cochin China the fight against the Cao Dai and
the Hoa Hao continued. Tfinh minh The's 2,500 men, who
had been bought off in the spring before the showdown in
Saigon, prompfly deserted and were thereafter, until late 1963,
referred to as Communists. The one group from whom no one
exper'ted anything, then or eve& walr the Buddhists. Numer-
ically the biggest body in the country, they drifted. Buddhism
had slowly foundered into a mire of oriental somnolense. To
its followers it offered inertia and called it wisdom. Buddhism
did nothing, and graced it with such adorning words as "reflec-
tiod'and "lolerance.'Its branches were countless, but whether
it was family-type Buddhism or the ascetic with precious names
such as "the perfumed lotus of the Jade Fountain," Buddhism
presented no tlreat of force to come as Diem set out to break
the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai.
On July 27,1955, government troops in the west abandoned
the campaip, with notling settled, and moved back to break
Le van Vien's encirclement of Saigon. While the troop move-
ments were taking place, Joseph Buttinger was busy composing
a letter to Diem in his sumptuous apartment at 336 Cental
Park West in New York. This letter must remain one of the
most interesting epistles ever written by a private, naturalized
American citizen to the head of a foreign state; t)?ewritten,
it nrns to nine pages and it ranges from desultory rambling to
unctuousness. Its perusal is well worth the effort. The first
paragraph congratulated Diem on his victory over the sects
and expressed Mr. Buttinger's conviction that, from the frsl
neither the French nor the sects would be able to overthrow
Diem's government. (Always there is the assumption on the
part of Buttinger that the French were out to destroy his man.)
"Your ambassador in q/ashington, Mr. Chuong, has prob-
ably kept you informed about the activities that have developed
around my efiorts to work up support for your policies and
your government in the United States," continued this foreip-
born socialisl whose judgment and aims were already open
to question by his support of Ho chi Minh. Questions con-
tinually come to mind 6 one studies this letter. It was not
Buttinger's business to promise the head of a country to which
he had made one visit that he would keep American support
behind him. Could it be that Buttinger, more anti-colonialist
than anti-Communist, had been playing a political game in
South Vietnam before Diem went back there, to the point of
116 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
perhaps having a hand in the rise to power which has never
been satisfactorily explained? In sum: Is the Rescue Com-
mittee out and-out political?
'You may have seen or heard of the last piece I wrote en-
titled 'An Analysis of the Conflict Between the United States
and French Policies in Vietnam,"' Buttinger continued" "This
piece marks the end of a period in my work for Vietnam.
From now on I will hwe to work in a different mawwr (em-
phasis ours). Your decision to start a public relations program
in the United States is one reason 1s1 this. Much of what I
have been doing in the way of propaganda and information
will now be done by Mr. Oram and his associates. I will con-
tinue to support these efforts and advise and help Mr. Oram
in every possible way, but my main efforts will go into the
project of writing an understandable book on Vietnam for the
American public."
Thus it was that the American public, as taxltayen' paid for
the ponderous tome of socialist propaganda published by
Praeger in 1958, which said public would never have bougbt
over the counter. One or both of two American agencies must
have underwritten the publication of Buttinger's book, "The
Smaller Dragon," for no publishing house would have touched
it on a free enterprise basis. And it might be added that con-
servative books are rarely found in Praeger's catalogues.
There was other evidence of the "one big happy family'' in
the paragraph dealing with Mr. Buttinger's switch from direct
to indirect propaganda methods. In 1951, when the IRC was
taking up the Kikuyu from Kenya, a former Young Com-
munist Leaguer named Marvin Liebman was public retrations
man writing letters and newspaper artisles that men who were
set up to front for the committee would sign. New York ?inzes
of March 12, 1962, states that Liebman left the Communist
party in 1945. Ten years later, when the lucrative South
Vietnam public relations account could have been his for the
talcin& Liebman was running the Committee of One Million,
which opposes admission of Red China to UN. So the Vietnam
account was thrown to Liebman's friend and former asso-
ciate, Harold Oram, whose lack of knowledge of Vietnam was'
if anything an asset.
After giving Diem a dtimpse of what his friend Mr. But'
tinger would do for him in the future, tlere is a sudden change
of tack to the letter we are studying. "Before r retire to the
study, howeverr" Diem's gratuitous-+r was the taxpay€r pay-
ing him alsepropagandist went o&
*I should like to orpress
myself in a personal and confdential mannetr on how I see a
 NEW ACTORS ON THE STAGE tL7
few aspects of the Vietnamese problem in the context of
American foreign policy, and how I regard the chances of
American public support for this policy when the inevitable
international crisis over Vietnam will be upon us next year."
From the eight pages that followed an alert public could
have formed a blue-print of how said public was being worked'
"Korea is an almost froznn issue," Buttinger wrote. "It also
cannot be handled outside the United Nations." And Formosa
was static. But unless a drastic change were brought about,
Buttinger warned Diem, American leaders would come in for
little criticism if they diminished the danger of war at the ex-
pense of Vietnam. A vast propaganda campaign in which
Americ'an taxpayers would pay for the drive to condition them-
selves for more aid-until eternity if necessary-was the
answer.
There was an almost absurd childishness in Buttinger's
efforts to ingratiate himself in this rambling letter. "The French
are now very active in the United States," he told Diem. "They
even take the trouble to follow my activities, trying to influence
or silence me. The French ambassador and his information
service have both been after me for several weeks. They have
tried to get the International Rescue Committee to disavow
my activities publicly. They know of course that they cannot
influence me, but they try hard enough and sometimes succeed
in preventing me from influencing others."
All of the anti-colonialist dialectics with which socialists
insulate revolutionaries newly arrived to Power are in this let-
ter. Diem is particularly urged to give thought to what the
British might say in America, for "the democratic world has
a sentimental attachment to the mere word election," says
Buttinger, adding that the British "are regarded as the pos-
sessors of great wisdom in the international aftairs."
After each step forward in the Buttinger letter there is a
pause, an offering of profuse apologies for appearing to b€
telling Diem what to do. At the same time, before Diem's eyes
is a constant reminder of what Buttinger has done'for him,
that Buttinger is being persecuted by the French for his loyalty
to Diem but, barring any false step on Diem's part, that loyalty
will continue. (Surprise, and an amused, cynical smile were
the only reactions of French Ambassador Bonnet, on being
shown the letter by this author.)
Buttinger next warned Diem that American ignorance and
French intrigues were not his only problems in America. He
said, "Increasingly we have to contend with other oPponents,
namely personalities and political grouPs of South Vietnam
1I8 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
who are dissatisfied with your course." What follows is nothing
more nor less than an admission of dishonesty bv the man who
for the next six years operated behind two fioni organizations
to keep America persuaded that in all Vietnam there was no
alternativeto Diem.
"Up to now I felt completely justified in disregartling the
complaints, criticisms and demands of these circles," wrote
Buttinger, whose conscience did not bother him very much,
since said complaints were never admitted to Teddy Roosevelt's
granddaughter, married to a Columbia University professor,
nor to the host of other well-meaning women Buttinger was
mobilizing to sell America on Ngo dinh Diem. He went on:
"I had been exposed to much of this while still in Saigon, and
although I learned a great deal from some of your critics, all
my writings testify to the fact that they had no influence on my
positive views of your personality and your political course."
Though he had neither swerved in his support of Diem, nor
told anyone else what he had learned, Buttinger warned that
in the future criticisms should not be taken lightly, nor left
unanswered. For they would find willing ears, and "the people
who agitate against you and your government in the interna-
tional field will achieve at least one thing: they will create
doubts as to the character of the regime and the validity of
your democratic intentions."
Buttinger is smooth: "I hesitate to approach this difficult
subject. If I express doubts created by information critical
to your regime and if I ask you questions which seem to imply
criticism on my part, I do it in a spirit of respect and friendship
for your person and driven only by my concern for the cause
which you represent." After this paving of the way Buttinger
led'up to the "great deal of counter-propaganda" which he
was receiving. In the world of Marxist reasoning there are no
adverse reports, no unpleasant facts. These are always "coun-
ter-propaganda." Various persons and groups with a variety
of motives were trying to influence Buttinger against the man
to whom he was writing. Buttinger admits to Diem, and to him
only, that he knows nothing about Vietnamese politics, but-
and now read the following carefully:
"To give you an example. I am now receiving material from
Paris containing the complaints the Vietnamese Socialist Party
has against your government. [Not "the French" this time, but
French socialists acting as intermediaries, which made it an-
other matterll I have received such material from Paris directly
and also from the Socialist Bureau in London, which is a cen-
tral office of the socialist parties in the West. Through this
 NEW ACTORS ON THE STAGE 119

Sociatist Bureau all the socialist parties in the West have been
informed about the complaints of the Vietnamese Socialist
Party against your government. Some of the complaints have
alreadyiound-expression in the press of a number of socialist
f"tti"r in Europj. As you know, I lived in Paris for a number
'of
y""tt before the war and while there I became acquainted
wit'h many of the leading French socialists. I am therefore not
suiprised itt"t ttt.y wo.rld try to appeal to me at the urging of
their Vietnamese friends."
There is a complete absence of any sense of national barriers
of loyalties as Mi. Buttinger candidly and bluntly speaks for
Vietnamese socialists, French socialists, British socialists and
socialists of Western Europe. The reader suddenly finds himself
in a world void of national loyalty, where a Passport is a thing
of convenience to be changed when advantage will accrue to
the international brotherhood by a change of flag' The brief
glimpse into international ramificatiqn: -that this paragraph
a world
irouiO"r, with its veiled threat to Ngo dinh Diem that
Lrotherhood was likely to align itself against him if the com-
plaints did not cease, opens a new avenue of conjecture against
,rtti"tt to measure deveibpments in Asia, Africa and around the
world. In fact, one might add in every area covered by Mr'
Buttinger's International Rescue Committee activity. Analyzed
with tfre international socialist front in mind, which Buttinger
unequivocally held over the head of Diem, many of the things
that developid later in America's tragic experiment in South
Vietnam take on more the appearance of part of a plot than
a fact of circumstance.
The next two pages of Mr' Buttinger's wordy letter cushion
the delicate point to which America's new citizen was leading
while promiiing American support and speaking for an inter-'
national socialiit secret society. "During the last few weeks,"
wrote Mr. Buttinger, "I have heard more criticism through an
acquaintance I made in the course of my work in defending
your gou..nrnent. I have met Mr; Mitton Sachs, an old cham-
pion-lin spite of his youth----of the cause of free Vietnam and
a man whom you can justly count among your strongest sup-
porters and admirers in the U. S' Mr. Sachs told me he had
kno*n you already in the U. S. and saw you last in Paris at the
end of 1953." Gradually the pieces fall into place as we re-
construct what may be called the crime of Diem's installation
in power.
':Mr.Sachs, as you probably know, has been severely-
and think unjustly---ciiticized by American officials for his
I
anti-French poiition during the time when unconditional sup'
r20 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
port of the French in Indochina was still U. S. policy,', said
Buttinger in his warming-up of Diem toward Sachs, before in-
troducing the unpleasant matter at hand. The warming-up for
each new touchy subject, it will be noticed, was always pref-
aced by a claim that the writer, or the person he was lauding,
had been persecuted by the French for supporting Diem. In
Political Alignments ol Vietnamese Nationalisrs (published
by the Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Re-
search, as report number 3708, in 1949), this Milton Sachs
whom Buttinger praises, published an article extolling and
whitewashing the Vietminh, who were then killing Frenchmen
and a decade later were murdering post-college Americans in
Vietnam while Sachs indoctrinated students in Brandeis
University.
At last Buttinger reached the point: Among the friends of
Mr. Sachs was the Vietnamese socialist leader, Ho huu Tuong,
to whose extolling he devoted the next page and a half. Mr.
Buttinger saw no reason why Ho huu Tuong should not be free
to work for his opinions among the nationalists of South
Vietnam. Buttinger admitted that he had also talked to Dr.
Nguyen ton Hoan, the Dai Viet party leader, but Diem was
never left in doubt that the writer's ideas of democratic govern-
ment would be satisfied if Ho huu Tuong, the socialist, were
permitted to come above ground and indulge in politicking in
Diem's preserve. The suspicion grows that Mr. Buttinger was
interested in having a socialist prot6g€ on the spot and with
a following when the day came for the Ngo dinh family's suc-
cession, not knowing that in the mind of the Ngo dinhs there
ivas to be no succession.
The "or else" implied in Mr. Buttinger's letter was deli-
cately handled. While making it clear that he was dissatisfied
with the way things were being run, he ended with a promise
that, no matter what Diem's reaction to his criticizing might
be, he would "continue my eftorts to mobilize American sup-
port for your policy."
Thus, through the efforts of a foreign-born socialist com-
manding a Marxist audience around the world, and with the
buying power of America's almost unlimited aid to South
Vietnam at his disposal, U. S. public opinion, before which
Foster Dulles in his note to Premier Faure had claimed to be
powerless, was hardened to a point where any policy contrary
to that of Joseph Buttinger, Milton Sachs and Diem's public
relations man was out of the question.
 CHAPTER TWELVE

A VICTORY FOR "DEMOCRACY''

Back in the embassy-atJarge in Paris brother Luyen was not

taking it easy while the offensive in Western Vietnam was going
on. The credit be acquired at home the moment General
Collins was recalled was exploited to the utmost. Luyen was
soon in cloak-and-dagger work up to his neck, opening offices
in Geneva, Rome and Bonn, paying informers to report on
anti-Diem refugees in Paris, and buying cameras small enough
to hide in a match-box and pocket-size recorders for tapping
telephones.
Luyen was not the only one to profit by General Collins'
recall. With the change of American ambassadors in Saigon
our charg6 d'affaires acquired an advantage also. He had been
there through the crisis and was credited with having a direct
pipeline to the source of power and information, which there
is no denying he had. The Vietnamese are inveterate gossips'
Observations, scraps of conversation, every bit of information
picked up by a faceless world of servants, nha-ques and petty
functionaries happy to gain face by imparting something some-
one else has not heard-all these travel by word of mouth with
the rapidity of Asia's age-old "bamboo wireless." By mid-
summer of t 955 nowhere in Vietnam was the American
embassy's charg6 d'affaires referred to other than as "Madame
Nhu's man in the American embassy," a privileged position
that served Madame Nhu more than it did America.
Luyen, in his maneuvers to extract every advantage he could
from his share in the happy turn of events, fixed his sights on
His Excellency Pham duy Khiem, the ambassador to Paris'
Briefly, Khiem had the handling of the sixteen million francs
per month allotted for maintaining both his own embassy and
Luyen's establishments, and Luyen wanted to get his hands on
that money. As long as Madame Chuong held the strings in
Saigon, Khiem was secure, but this did not prevent Luyen
from probing.
Vo Lang, too, was riding high since the mission to Washing-
ton, so Luyen too sent him, along with advisors including this
author, secretaries to give him face, and a French former
t2l
 122 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
collaborator claiming high connections in Bonn, to see what
he could accomplish in Geneva at the Big-Four Conference
of July 1955. The reason for the Vietnam mission, aside from
an opportunity to put in a padded request for funds, was the
report that Harold Stassen was to join Eisenhower at the
conference. Stassen was handling America's foreign aid opera-
tions at the time, and Diem's team was hampered by the
American procedure of paying out aid money against bills and
vouchers, rather than turning the entire amount over to them
at the beginning of the year, to spend as they pleased.
Stassen did not show up at the conference, so Luyen's com-
plicated paper, showing why more money, allotted for several
years in advance, should be handed over in a lump sum for
the sake of efficiency, was never used. Luyen was ingenious,
however, and managed to get things done despite the obstacles
presented by American red tape. A slick-cover propaganda
magazine in French, to be published in Paris, was proposed
and immediately approved. The moment Luyen had an OK
on his cost-estimate for the first year he had a piece of collat-
eral backed by the U. S. government and was able to borrow
enough to buy a small printing shop outright. A couple of
issues of the magazine were put out, after which everyone
forgot about it and the whole project was swept under the rug,
leaving Luyen with a printing establishment.
When an appropriation was made to produce a propaganda
film, Luyen and Vo Lang bought the best German movie and
sound equipment available, instead of hiring an experienced
crew and filming a good documentary. The film that resulted
was worthless, but the equipment that remained represented a
sizeable asset, besides which Vo Lang was making an animated
film in his spare time as a hobby.
All of the ins and outs of the protracted negotiations that
went on between Luyen and the Bank of Indochina for the
purchase of certain bank property in Saigon will never be
known. The essential facts were as follows: Saigon had author-
ized Luyen to buy the propegy, but seven hundred million
francs was the maximum he was authorized to pay. The bank
took a look at the violent radio and press inciiement against
the French and thought it not impossible that Diem and Nhu
might use whipped-up emotions as justification for confiscating
the property and paying nothing. Whether the report from
Luyen's own advisor (a report that Luyen stalled until the bank
came down to 500 million francs-he then concluded the deal
on condition that they give him a receipt for 700 million to
present to the American aid office) is true or not, we are never
 A VICTORY FOR "DEMOCRACY'' 123

likely to know; and too many things were happening on the

Saigon scene for anyone to care.
It is not difficult to visualize the reaction of Diem and Nhu
as they waded through Joseph Buttinger's letter in the ugly
ochre and white palace in Saigon. Whatever Buttinger hoped
his list of complaints and his naming the native socialist leader
and the head of the Dai Viet party as sources of information
would accomplish, the only thing he really did achieve was to
impress on Diem and Nhu the importance of muzzling their
crilics. It was the beginning of a program that was self-
perpetuating. Nhu already had an estimated seventy thousand
secret police and informers operating within his personal party,
the Can Lao Nhan Vi, the Humanist Workers Revolutionary
party. A parallel network was set up with spies informing on
their neighbors, Nhu's informers, and each other. Buttinger
had, no doubt, wanted reforms, even though his idea of reform
was more liberty of action for Vietnam's socialists. Diem re-
plied with more suppression. His weapon was fear; but as fear
of the family at the top spread among the masses, fear of the
masses increased, in direct proportion, at the top. Soon con-
centiic rings of informers and security forces, having nothing
to do with the approaching struggle against communism, were
stretching out in ever-widening circles.
Michigan State University, with the Detroit police force
to draw upon as instructors, was training police for Diem as
part. of the University's Vietnam Project. Soon everyone
suspected everyone else, and the veritable hell in which Viet-
namese lived, whatever their class or grouP, contributed more
than the unending war in the hinterlands to the weariness that
eventually spread over the country.
Weariness, cynicism and discontent could be handled by
concentration camps and effrcient police, but continued and
blind American support was necessary to the establishment
of the concentration camps and police forces. "Madame Nhu's
man in the American embassy" was not to be permitted to
ent€rtain doubts. No word of the brewing storm must reach
him or his colleagues or successors. Nothing must ever dispel
the existing climate wherein any bearer of complaints or bad
reports to Americans was immediately turned over to one of
Diem's or Nhu's countless secret police. With such cooperation
at the source, Mr. Buttinger, "working in a difterent manner,"
as he put it, "to continue my efforts to mobilize American
support for your policy" would take care of the rest. But, as
the pressure bcneath the Saigon lid increased, Mr. Buttinger's
124 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
and Mr. Oram's machines, like the concentric rings of police in
Vietnam, had to expand also.
The lesson an astute political science student could have
learned in the years to follow was that the most ruthless of
dictators can oppress and imprison, not only with impunity
but with "liberal" support and approval, if he has the foiesighi
to employ a good public relations firm. What he does he must
always do as a "liberal" and he must take the precaution of
flattering professors, writers, politicians and journalists with
his personal acquaintance.
Thus John Osborn's account of what had transpired (Life,
May 13, 1957) was in the best style of renaissance admiration
9f Caa11 Borgia. "Diem in the period from March to Septem_
ber [955], moved against his other non-Communist enemies,
the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, with a masterly combination
of force, cajolery and bribery."
As a matter of fact, even as Diem and Nhu acted on the
advice of Mr. Buttinger as they interpreted it, a battle was
raging in the inundated mangrove forests around Rungsat,
where the Saigon River pours into the sea. Despite their
familiarity with the terrain Le van Vien's six battalions, which
could have held out for years as scattered guerrillas and in
fact have held out as such ever since, were helpless against
the gunboats, landing craft and other light navai units biem
was able to send up the waterways. The battle lasted from
September 20 to October 12, 1955, and when it ended Le van
Vien's son, Colonel Le Paul, was in Diem's hands. Two years
previously it was Le Paul who wrested the route between
Saigon and Cape St. Jacques from the Communists. After the
Cape St. Jacques route operation he was entrusted with the
defense of the strategic point of Phu My which he held against
a year of Communist attacks, though he was only twenty-four
years oldin 1953.
After October 12 the Binh Xuyen ceased to be a force
capable of threatening the government. Le van Vien left for
France on November 7, inspiring John Osborne to tell America
(Lile, May 13, 1957), "Since then the sects have disintegrated
as political and military factors." The same refrain was re-
peated in hundreds of other American news dispatches ancl
magazines, though, actually, the exact opposite was true. There
was no news of them in American papers, that was all; nor of
Le van Vien's son. One solution might have been to bring him
to trial, but that would only make him a hero. Another would
have been to put him on a plane and exile him, with his father,
but that was not Diem's way, nor Nhu's. In the end they stuck
 A VICTORY FOR "DEMOCRACY'' 125

Le Paul in Phu-Lam prison, in Cholon, with some of his men,

and amused themselves by making them as miserable as
possible.
With the Binh Xuyen broken and the sects dispersed the
table was still not swept clean. One other power, theoretically
over and above the Ngo dinhs, still existed. That was Bao Dai,
the emperor, and the machinery was in motion for removing
him. Carefully, minutely, the rigged plebiscite was set up.
Nothing was left undone. In America the propaganda barrage,
which had been interrupted at the time of the battle of Saigon
early in 1955, was resumed in full swing. The choice offered
was a republic under Diem or a monarchy under Bao Dai. It
was from the first a plebiscite without claim to legality, if we
agree that legality comes from below. For Bao Dai, whose
legitimacy was undisputed, had under pressure appointed Diem
to be his prime minister. From there Diem prepared to move
into the presidency by deposing the emperor who appointed
him, by not offering the people a choice of any candidate but
himself.
October 23, 1955, was the date set for the voting, and in
America the drums were beating for Diem's forthcoming gift
of "democracy" to his people. Considering the public relations
machine at work and the amount of American aid diverted
back to New York to keep it going, often over tables or under
tables in the Overseas Press Club, there are a number of ques-
tions that should have interested Senator Fulbright's committee
which was supposed to be investigating such. practices in mid-
1962. For on September 30, 1955, less than a month before
the much-publicized referendum, Collier's Magazine came out
with its David Schoenbrun hatchet job on Bao Dai.
Paul Smith was editor of Collier's and Diana Hirsch was its
foreign editor. Neither replied to the letters this writer sent
asking how Schoenbrun happened to write and Collier's pub-
lish such an article at that time, telling the Vietnamese that
"Diem must not only remove Bao Dai, but do it in such a way
that he no longer has any usefulness as a symbol of Vietnamese
unity."
Collier's foundered; and America's well-meaning, duped and
swindled citizens, being led up a blind alley that went downhill,
saw nothing suspicious about the venom with which Schoen-
brun went after the monarch whom Ho chi Minh also wanted
destroyed. The article that the European correspondent of
Columbia Broadcasting System just happened to write was
in Vietnam by the information ministry, run by
circulated
Ho chi Minh's former administrator of "justice." It proved
126 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
irrefutably that Bao Dai's ousting was what America wanted.
Dangled in front of Vietnamese eyes before every organized
march to the polls was the prospect that a resounding vote for
what America wanted might make some of that aid money
trickle down to the little man's level. Bao Dai was permitted
no news space or canrpaigning.
Police made pre-referendum house-to-house visits to tell the
citizens how to vote. The ballots, which met with Mike Mans-
field's approval, were green on one end and red on the other.
The red half, which is a lucky color, bore a picture of Diem.
The green half, an unlucky color, was reserved for a picture
of Bao Dai. The explanation was that many voters could not
read, so all they had to do was tear off the leader they re-
jected and throw his picture on the ground, after which they
would insert the other half of the ballot in a thin envelope
provided by the government and a policeman would escort
them to the urn.
Few Vietnamese escaped being routed out to swell the
"majority" which public relations man Harold Oram was to
exploit for months to come, and still fewer of the cowed public
were brave enough to drop transparent envelopes bearing green
ballots into urns watched by one of Tran chanh Thanh's police-
men. An old lady had her ears boxed for insisting that she had
a right to be loyal to her Emperor. Scattered incidents were
reported, but it was a victory for "democracy" all the way.
Diem received 5,721,735 votes, Bao Dai 63,017-a surpris-
ingly large figure, considering everything.
Thereafter, as Raymond Cartier was to observe, "the civil
war, religious passions, power struggles between groups, the
total lack of a national conscience, the corruption and the in-
competence, made South Vietnam ungovernable. But these
fatal consequences the Americans did not foresee when they
evicted Europeans from empires which were much less neces-
sary to their masters than to the subjected." (Paris Match,
Sept. 5, 1964)
What the liberal team directing American policy achieved
when they elinrinated Bao Dai was a free hand for themselves.
Thereafter there was no one who could tell their man to step
down. Never for a moment did they stop to think that in a few
years they might wish for a way to get the creature they had
conjured back in the vase again.
Chaos was inevitable. The process of destroying Bao Dai,
which Ho chi Minh had started, America finished with David
Schoenbrun for a spokesman. With respect for emperor de-
stroyed, respect for parents, law, tradition and everything that
 A VICTORY FOR "DEMOCRACY'' L27

made for stability began to crack. Diem and Nhu demonstrated

that unlimited wealth accrued to the occupant of Independ-
ence Palace. With hereditary rule discredited each Vietnamese
saw no reason why the man at the faucet should not be him-
self. Given money in sufficient quantities, a good public rela-
tions man could make anything look all right, and a family
might remain in.power forever.
Lile magazine's editorial of November 7, 1955, hailed the
results of the great referendum as "Figurehead's Fall." The
same magazine a month later (Dec. 5) spurred America to
greater triumphs with the editorial appeal, "Let's not quit
while winning!"
As Diem and his family surveyed the ledger at year's end
from their palace in Saigon, the balance, on the whole, was
satisfactory. Only one disappointment marred the record of
unbroken victories; and it, unfortunately, was a matter that
several million dollars of American aid money could not
arrange to their satisfaction. It was the beginning of Diem's
black file in the Vatican. Diem had not failed to notice that
the Holy See took three weeks before recognizing Diem's
victory over Bao Dai. The next annoyance started during his
anti-French campaign. As Paris Match reported on Aug. 31,
1963, Diem demanded that missionaries sent to South Vietnam
take an oath of allegiance to him. They refused, whereupon
Diem accused them of being pro-Communist and proceeded to
arrest Monsignor Sieltz, of the Society of Foreign Missions.
The monsignor faced a prison sentence for "threatening the
intbrnal security of the state" when the Vatican stepped in and
saved him.
Diem's next move was to request the robe of a cardinal for
his brother. The importance of Rome's reaction to that request
was highlighted by France-Soir of. October 26, two dayp after
the rigged plebiscite. "The only shadow on the scene for Mr.
Diem is paradoxically the attitude of the Vatican. The Vatican
has just named as Bishop of Saigon, not the candidate of
Mr. Diem, who is his own brother, Monsignor Thuc, but an
unknown priest named Hien. The blow for the President of
the Council is harder, since Mr. Hien is considered lukewarm
where he is concerned.
Diem protested. Monsignor Thuc boarded a plane for Rome.
France-Soir of December 29, 1955, told how, pending the out-
come of Thuc's direct appeal to the Vatican to annul the Hien
appointment, the papal order naming Hien apostolic vicar of
Saigon was held up by Diem's postal authorities, its seal
broken and the papal order photocopied. "The Vatican main-
128 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
tained its
decision," wrote France-Soir, "and Vietnamese
censors suppressed the announcement of Hien's elevation for
several weeks, until priests announced the news from their
pulpits and Hien himself used the word excommunication in
regard to Diem."
The French weekly, Aux Ecoutes, of December 15, 1955,
had carried a letter written from Saigon by a French Catholic
officer. It is prophetic when read nine years later: To fellow
Catholics in France the officer wrote: "Because he affirms his
catholicism at the top of his voice, he lDieml is supported by
a great part of his French co-religionists who are unaware of
the hypocrisy of his motives where they are concerned. His
attitude is a characteristic abuse of confidence. If we continue
to let ourselves be taken in by our good faith, the consequences
will be heavy for us and the awakening brutal. The Catholics
whom we wish to support will themselves tomorrow be the
victims of either total occupation of their country by the
Communists, or of an inevitable settling of counts in a double
civil war and war of religion."
The National Catholic Welfare Conference representative
in Saigon as 1955 drew to a close was Father Patrick O'Con-
nor, who showed himself capable of hitting Diem and his fam-
ily and hitting them where it hurt, that is, alnong their Cath-
olic supporters in America. In a radio report dated November
29, and, in a press release of December 5, the Irish Father
O'Connor lashed out at Diem's interference with church af-
fairs and the pressure he employed to get his older brother
(who was also head of the family) made head of the Saigon
diocese.
America, the Chicago Jesuit magazine, editorialized on
Father O'Connor's reports in its issue of December 10, 1955,
under the heading "Church-State in Vietnam," with the ob-
servation, "News that the government of South Vietnam is
resorting to press censorship is disturbing enough. That the
censorship should be coupled with interference in Church
administration is downright perplexing, particularly since the
free world has been given to understand that Pres. Ngo dinh
Diem and democratic government are practically synonymous
terms.
"According to an NC [National Catholic Welfare Confer-
encel report dated November 26, the Vietnamese government
has been indulging in some pretty childish antics in Saigon.
As NC correspondent Rev. Patrick O'Connor relates, Presi-
dent Diem, for some reason or other, is opposed to the ap-
pointment of Bishop-elect Simon Nguyen van Hien as Vicar
 A VICTORY FOR "DEMOCRACY'' 129

Apostolic of Saigon. Censoring all news of Msgr. Hien's im-

pending consecration, the Government has requested the Holy
See to change the appointment. While the authorities are not
expected to interfere with the consecration, the whispering
campaign against the Bishop-elect and the ill will it has caused
may continue to foment trouble.
"Moreover. Fr. O'Connor sees in the incident a reflection of
a growing tendency in Vietnam to interfere in Church affairs.
Priests' letters are opened in the post office. Rumors abound
that the Church, bishops, priests and Catholic organizations
may be in for government regimentation. The outcome may
even be indirect restrictions on preaching and pressure on
foreign missionaries to get out of Vietnam.
"This review has constantly supported Ngo dinh Diem, not
on the ground of his Catholicism, but because he seemed to
be the only available political figure capable of unifying Viet-
nam's variety of political-religious factions and ushering in
an era of truly representative government. We trust our con-
fidence is not about to be destroyed."
Few other American papers reported Diem's short struggle
with the church at all. In a few weeks it was forgotten and
Father O'Connor was once more solidly pro-Diem. Unfor-
tunately, he never put himself in the place of Vietnam's ma-
jority when it was tyrannized by the Ngo dinhs.
A prominent Catholic anti-Communist in Chicago dismissed
the America editorial with the remark that America's editor
was soft on Communists. There was always some reason for
avoiding looking any unpleasant report in the face. Father
O'Connor's authorship of the original report was ignored, and
the mass arrests, tortures and even executions of Vietnamese
with no church or personal claims to Father O'Connor's sym-
pathy were treated as of no concern.
A former French missionary, Father Jean Renou, who had
spent thirty-seven years in the Orient, exclaimed to this author:
"The man [Diem] is mad! He is undoing all we have accom-
plished in a hundred and fifty years! There was no ill-will be-
tween Catholics and Buddhists when he came into power. Now
unless we can get him out quickly, we Catholics will suffer
when he is gone, though we are not to blame for his actions."
But his words bore no weight among Americans because he
was French. There was always some reason for discrediting
every sincere voice of warning and for believing the New
York propagandists who, for an equal amount of money,
would have gladly proved the opposite.
 CHAPTER THIRTPEN

THE BRAINWASHING MACHINE

1956 was a great year for the brainwashers using a fake

anti-Communist campaign to clear the field for their men.
They had a heyday. America was as a nation intoxicated.
Never was a free people so mass-hypnotized and with such
ease. It would not have been possible had the American public
not wanted to believe, and believe they did. They swallowed
anything, while Lile magazine urged them on with thE stirring
appeal; "Let's not quit while winning." It was the period of
the "Bastion of the Free World" line. and elorification of
Anrerica's "showcase for Democracy."
Anyone who attempted to tell the truth became a target for
^
vicious, well-directed whisper and letter-writing campaigns,
which State Department boys breathlessly composing iwhite
Paper" hooey on the guerrilla war in South Vietnam made
raids on their passports and smeared them in government files.
Long after a Supreme Court decision refused officialdom the
right to deny passports to Communists, a loyal American writ-
ing a true report on conditions in South Vietnam could have
his wings clipped with no explanation required. Such an at-
tempt was made in 1959 on this author.
How was all this possible? It took a powerful machine, and
the money it swallowed was gladly, willingly poured into its
maw by the hoodwinked victims themselves. The 1962 Ful_
bright committee investigating the activity of public relations
men in the service of foreign governments and heads of state
carefully avoided swinging the spotlight too far into the work-
ings of the Vietnam machine in America. Had they done so
they would have found, floating on the body politic of Ameri-
ca,_ a brainwashing organization that, like an iceberg, projected
only its smaller part above the surface.
The visible part of the Diem propaganda machine in Ameri-
ca was Harold L. Oram's office at 8 West 40 Street, New york.
This was the part registered with the Department of Justice.
Whether Diem eventually turned against Oram and snarled
'Dirty type!" over his hapless huckster's inability to keep
favorable reports in print and unfavorable reports out when
130
 THE BRAINWASHING MACHINE 131

the tide began to turn is unknown. It may have been that Oram,
like many others, saw the writing on the wall and decided to
get out from under, for we find in Newsweek of July 30, 1962,
the statement that public relations firm Kastor, Hitton, Ches-
ley, Crawford and Atherton had picked up the account from
Oram in 196l and was letting it go. The year 1961 is one to
remember, for it was then that the scramble to disavow re-
sponsibility for Diem and his family started. Until then how
much the wheeler-dealers made, operating lor political reasons
or profit, is conjectural. The fee for the Vietnam account was
reported by Nev,sweel< to be $100,000. Vietnamese reported
that Oram's take was $24.000 per month plus expenses. (The
latter must have been staggering.)
The first must for a public relations agent campaigning for
a foreign president was associate membership in the Overseas
Press Club in New York. where nanre writers gather. Drinks,
dinners-bait for recognizecl writers willing to sign or write
articles-these were all legitimate expenses, as were red-carpet,
expense-paid. trips to Saigon, so that nanre writers could be
flattered by Diem's acquaintance and at the same time say they
had been there. Until the author of each glowing report pub-
lished during the intoxication years is questioned under oath,
we shall never know how many writers enjoyed a junket half-
way around the world at the expense of the taxpayer.
January 1956 started with Mike Mansfield's "Reprieve in
Vietnam" in Harper's magazine. It contained all the clichds
of anti-colonialist dialectics. The French were the villains, and
the generals bought out by American dollars were described
as having rallied to Diem. Mike was "Diem's godfather" and
the repetitious arguments he used would suggest that someone
in Harold Oram's office wrote the piece for the busy, liberal
senator to sign.
A nronth later O. K. Armstrong's "Biggest Little Man in
East Asia" toured the world via the February 1956 Reader's
Digest. How Armstrong happened to write it, no one asked.
All that mattered was that Armstrong was convinced. He had
seen one of Diem's "spontaneous" demonstrations at the air-
porI.
When on March 4, 1956, the elections were held in which
123 handpicked members were elected to Diem's national as-
sembly, the American press outdid itself . Tinte of March l9
insulted its readers' intelligence with the declaration, "De-
spite high-handed campaign regulations that hobbled any or-
ganized opposition to Diem, the election was no mere formali-
ty." The American public was never told that only Diem-
 \
t32 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
approved candidates were allowed to run, or that in spite of
Diem's precautions a Dai Viet party member was elected. He
disappeared shortly thereafter and was never heard of again.
Madame Nhu's election was hailed as a victory for our side;
unmentioned was the fact that her constituency was an arti-
ficial one, created by grouping together the northern refugees
who were being given land, homes and a dole. Even so, out
of a possible 25,000 votes she gleaned only some 5,000.
Bombarded as Americans were by a constant stream of
propaganda from official agencies and a slanted press, the con-
stitution which Diem's handpicked constituent assembly drew
up was associated in the American mind with that magic word
"democracy." To the Vietnamese it brought only disillusion-
ment. Instead of the right to speak freely and at given periods
elect a leader of their own choosing, the constitution gave a
stamp of legality to the abuses of the family in power. Diem's
picking of his assembly was glossed over by his apologists with
the explanation that "bandits" would have been elected olher-
wise. It followed naturally that the constitution drawn up by
such an assembly was Diem-elected. Nguyen kahc Oanh, the
Vietnamese attorney faced with a request to help write it or
face arrest for opposing it, chose exile.
Diem's first thought was to assure himself of eleven years in
power. Then, by a sort of hocus-pocus, he turned the con-
stituent assembly he had selected into a legislative body. With-
out more ado the legislative and judicial powers of the country,
as well as the executive, were in his hands. He could invite his
critics to come into the open and discuss participation in his
government, and, without a voice raised in protest from his
slave assembly, arrest and sentence them to prison or execu-
tion when they came. If they feared to come, he held them
up to the American public as proof of their unwillingness to
cooperate.
Nowhere did any American paper report the crime perpe-
trated by Diem's and Nhu's policy on April 14, 1956. Colonel
k Paul, the twenty-seven-year-old son of Le van Vien, was
at that time in Phu-lam prison and had been since his capture
in October 1955. No charges had been filed against him and
there had been no talk of a trial. For that matter, prisons and
concentration camps were springing up all over South Viet-
nam, filled with men who were in them for less. On April 14
I,e Paul was led out and put in a truck which set off in the
direction of Rach-Cat. He was told that he was being trans-
ferred. A short time later his body was lying beside the road
four miles from Phu-Lam with his arms tied behind his back.
 THE BRAINWASHING MACHINE t33
The government announced that the military escort had shot
him because he tried to escape. This event sent a tremor
through the country: There were to be many such cases before
the Dlem myth exploded, but this was the son of a man who
had followers, and not Communist ones, either.
The passing of each month swelled the ranks of those crying
for revenge. The American press couldn't have cared less, and
it is doubtful if the public would have been greatly concerned
had they been told. Anyone against our man deserved any-
thing that happened to him. When the pendulum swung back,
seven years later in 1963, righteous citizens who had never
heard of Le Paul's killing or of the thousands whose blood was
on our man's hands rose up in indignation against those who
were dumping the Ngo dinhs.
On July 6, 1956, it was Collier's turn once more to beat
the drum. Having used the CBS European corresPondent to
ax Bao Dai in 1955, they called upon the CBS Far East ace,
Peter Kalischer, to extol Nhu's "socialist state." Kalischer ob-
ligingly lauded Michigan State University's thirty-man team
teaching political science, public administration, and helping to
reorganize Diem's police force, while American officials as-
sisted the Diem government with newsreels and documentaries
and educational skits which touring Vietnamese actors pro'
duced from the backs of trucks. All of the hopes and conclus-
ions Kalischer offered were false, but by the time the blowup
came the publisher who printed his article had folded and the
t€am that encouraged Kalischer had swept Vietnam under
the rug.
What a year 1956 was! On August I Vital Speeches ol the
Day featured a flowery oration by Senator John F. Kennedy
praising Diem. On September 15 it was the Saturday Evening
Posr with Demaree Bess almost breathless in his pontificating
on our man. No letter to Demaree Bess, pointing out the gap
ing holes in the report he gave American readers in return for
a fat check from Saturday Evening Posf, was ever answered.
On September 2O, 1956, Darrel Berrigen added his contri-
bution to the campaign of deception, in the Reporter. Not a
single American appeared to question Berrigen's story on
grounds that if the Reporter printed it it must be false. People
who wanted to be fooled forgot that in 1944-1945 Darrel Ber-
rigen was undermining Chiang Kai-shek in the Saturday Eve'
ning Post and that, as editor of the Bangkok World he was
part of Arthur Larson's distrusted Information-Service in
Bangkok. Reporter editor Phil Horton, when visited by this
I34 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
writer on January 31,1957, refused even to consider the pos-
sibility that he had contributed to diffusion of the bie lie.
Critical 1961 seems to have been the year wheri someone
on the outside shouted "Jiggers!" and the scramble to get off
the Diem bandwagon started. As late as November Z, 1959,
and December 7, 1959, the New Leader was still carrying
Wesley Fishel's breathless paeans of praise for Diem. Wolf
I.adejinsky's glowing account of life under Diem appeared in
the Reporter of December 24, 1959. A year later Ladejinsky
got another propaganda piece in the New Leader. Then the lib-
erafs got the word Sol Levita.s did a volte lace in the New Lead-
er ancl described the South Vietnamese government as ,,an
autocratic, corrupt and ineffective regime." Labor's roving dele-
gate, Irving Brown, in a confidential report to the AFL-CIO
dated November 27, 196 I, advised labor to drop Diem and
support Saigon labor leader Tran quoc Buu.
Stan Karnow, who, as a.Tinte-Lif e man in paris, refused to
discuss Vietnam with Dr. Hoan in 1956, came out in the Re-
porter of January 19, 1961 , with the most brutal indictment
of Nhu's informers and Diem's government that America had
seen to date. "Diem defeats his own best troops," he called it,
but this time American conservatives rejected ihe story in toto
on the assumption that if the Reporter printed it it could not
be true.
It was as though Fate itself conspired to blind America by
^ saturating the country with
first lies which the public swai-
lowed from 1954 to l96l because they were palaiable. Then,
when the deceivers rushed to clear themselves of responsibility
for the disaster, America rejected the trurh becauie of who
was writing it.
On November 24, 1956, Freda Utley's clithyrambic ecsta_
sies on Diem and his family appeared in National Review,
William Buckley's voice of the conservatives. What Miss Utley
had done was assemble everything U. S. Information Service
and Diem's propagandists gave her and called the result ,.The
Amazing Mr. Diem." So louclly was USIS beating the drum
for Diem in that part of the world, they intoxicited them-
selves. The wife of the USIS chief in Laos dropped her house-
work to write a Diem biography.
Gushed Freda in her National Review article: USIS was not
denigrating Diem as the Office of War Information did Chiang.
She neglected to observe that the boys who denigrated Chiang
in 1944 were the same ones extolling Diem in tgSO. .,It t,us
also to be noted on the credit side of American policy that
U. S. Information Service expenditures in Vietnam, amount-
 THE BRAINWASHING MACHINE 135

ing to $750,000 a year, are used mainly to build up confidence

in President Diem's government," said Freda. She called it
"giving the government of South Vietnam the confidence en-
gendered by having a big strong friend behind it." Vietnamese
time-biders considered it a serving of notice that Diem was
there to stay, whether they wanted him or not. Nhu saw it as a
green light.
Freda told how USIS helped the government "get informa-
tion to the countryside by means of motion pictures carried
and displayed by trucks; or of placards and posters which are
read out to their neighbors by the literate people in every
area. USIS also helps the Vietnamese Ministry of Informa-
tion [run by the hated former Communist administrator of
"justice." Tran chanh Thanhl set up information halls in
towns and villages; and to maintain boat units operating along
the canals."
No one appeared to reflect that had a nation with customs
totally different from ours sent a team to America to meddle
in our internal affairs by forcing on us a president they had
selected, we would have been highly indignant. And had their
team been as numerous, by percentage of population, as the
scurrying propagandists we sent into South Vietnam, it would
have amounted to an invasion. The fact that Freda's thesis
found universal acceptance in America should have aroused
some doubts, but it did not. Liberals approved it because they
were for USIS, which was part of the underwater section of
the Diem machine iceberg. Conservatives swallowed it be-
cause it appeared in National Review.
So USIS, with conservative blessing, continued to act as a
news agency and to issue press releases to the glory of Diem.
Papers subsidized by USIS proceeded to print these releases
on grounds that they were "selling America." The egos of
natives in countries where such eftusions appeared were flat-
tered because Americans, for all their shiny cars and jet air-
planes, were obviously fools. The American public was told
that everything was going fine, and everyone was happy.
Sometime after Joseph Buttinger's International Rescue
Committee mission to South Vietnam in 1954, a subsidiary
organization called American Friends of Vietnam made its
appearance, thereby enabling Mr. Buttinger and Angier Biddle
Duke to publish reports under one front and use another to
substantiate and quote them. This AF of V, as we shall call
it, was formed in December 1955, probably the day the men
running the International Rescue Committee ordered the new
stationery from the printer. At the head of it was Angier Bid-
136 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
dle Duke. Joseph Buttinger was vice chairman. In sum, it
provided another identity for the men running the IRC. Leo
Cherne, who was on the IRC letterhead as chairman, was a
member of the executive committee of the AF of V and Gen-
eral John'W. (Iron Mike) O'Daniel appeared as chairman.
The post'war Vietnam-American Friendship Association,
set up as a front to support Ho chi Minh, disappeared, as we
have mentionetl, when American involvement in Korea drove
our Vietminh supporters to cover. But this AF of V, which
succeeded it in 1955, we find headed by the socialist Buttin-
ger, who openly pronounced himself in favor of Ho chi Minh
in his New Leader article of June 27. 1955.
Whether Mr. Buttinger's aim within the International Rescue
Committee was to help foreign revolutionaries to escape fiom
the police and rise to power, or to help recipientJ of his
sympathy to get into America, is a question we will not go
into here. Suffice it to say that wherever Communisfbackid
revolutionaries were in the field against our allies, the IRC was
known and kept in mind as the rich American friend who
could be counted upon for delivery in a pinch. Time magazine
of Dec. 20, 1963, told its readers that Lee Harvey Oswald had
written his mother from Russia, asking her to contact the Inter-
national Rescue Committee about getting him home.
What motivated the men who got together in the spring of
1955 and sent a congratulatory telegram to Diem and in
December organized the front that was to lull America while
Southeast Asia crumbled? Buttinger's actions are understand-
able; he was a socialist. But what was Angier Biddle Duke
doing in this galley? Duke had an inherited fortune. He was
socially impeccable; all doors were open to him. What led
him to become the front for an aggregaie of operators directed
by and for the international left? In Dukels case there is
unanimity of opinion, and the explanation for his action is the
least complimentary of the lot. To a man, everyone questioned
replies, "He is stupid."
One of the most prominent women financiers in America
defended him, saying, "I know him well. He dines at my
home; he couldn't do anything wrong. He is too stupid!" A
well-known estate consultant, with offices at Rociefeller
Center, said, "I've known him for years, but on anything but
the weather I wouldn't take his judgment for a minute.t' On
September 9, 1958, this writer asked Diem's public relations
agent, Harold Oram, in the Overseas press Club in New york,
"What's the matter with Duke? He knows better than to write
some of that tripe he pu6lishes under his name!" The propa-
 THE BRAINWASHING MACHINE 137

gandist replied with a gesture of contempt and impatience,

"Use your head. You know those fellows [in the AF of Vl
don't know what the score is; they are only set up there tb sign
papers!"
In Time magazine of February 10, 1951, we find Angier
Biddle Duke, Kennedy's chief of protocol (!) whose name is
on the invitation list of every hostess in Washington, presiding
as honorary chairman at the head table of a testimonial dinner
being given by the Committee of One Thousand for Congress-
man Adam Clayton Powell. What a commentary on American
society.
On June l,1956, it was at a Washington banquet given by
the American Friends of Vietnam that Duke presided. Presi-
dent Eisenhower was there. So were Assistant Secretary of
State Walter D. Robertson and Senator John F. Kennedy.
Morning papers in Saigon the next day carried their speeches,
promising continued American aid and support for Ngo dinh
Diem. It did not appear in any papers, but all over Saigon
men were discussing in furtive whispers the arrest of two Dai
Viet leaders, Nguyen van Ut and Nguyen tan Nua, pulled out
of their beds in the middle of the night by Nhu's police and
not heard of since. Nguyen ton Hoan wasted stamps on letters
to Eisenhower, Robertson and Kennedy, but received no reply.
Over 250 "representatives of government, the armed serv-
ices, the universities and national civic organizations" par-
ticipatedin the series of panel discussions sponsored by the
AF of V that June 1, in Washington. Senator Kennedy ex-
pressed his pride at being a member of the AF of V. Joseph
Buttinger heaped scorn on Diem's critics and assured his
listeners that the fight was already won. The sect leaders and
the French colonels who assisted them in their sabotage, he
said, are gone. Fred Bunting, Saigon chief of America's Inter-
national Co-operation Administration operations, waxed
enthusiastic. Said he, more than two-thirds of the ICA pro-
gram funds in Vietnam were expended on internal security.
The result: internal security was well on its way to solution.
He did not mean the Communist threat; he was referring to
Diem's anti-Communist personal enemies! "The country has
been pacified and security has been established virtually every-
where," he boasted. "A National Police Academy has been
established and intensive special training activities are under
way." The 110-page booklet on this symposium which the
AF of V put out in September of 1956 should be read for
the light it throws on the depth of America's deception. Milton
Sachs' speech is there. So is Leo Cherne's. General O'Daniel
138 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
promised victory in the field and showed his listeners a film.
Joseph Buttinger, listed as a "political scientist and writer,"
was panel chairman for the discussion of Vietnam's ,.inter-
national position," a subject on which he had shown himself
an authority as far as international socialist parties were con-
cerned. It should be noted here that the Milton Sachs men-
tioned is the same Milton Sachs who in 1949 wrote political
Alignments ol Vietnamese Nationalisrs, which appeared as
report number 3708 of the Department of State Office of
Intelligence and Research, and which was nothing more or
less than a whitewash of the Vietminh.
The membership list of the American Friends of Vietnam,
which Duke and Buttinger had drawn together, is also worth
noting. Huynh sanh Thong, in his article in the Nation of.
February 18, 1961, said of it, "The American Friends of
Vietnam was turned from the very beginning into a Diem
propaganda outfit dominated by a relatively small but efficient
group of activists on the executive committee." A study of the
members that committee dominated provides an insight into
the methods employed. The number of editors the committee
directing the AF of V was able to rope in as l'bad press in-
surance" was unbelievable. Malcolm Muir of. Newsweek,
Herbert Bayard Swope, Whitelaw Reid of the New york
Herald Triburu, Quincy Howe, the news analyst; Barry Bing-
ham of the Louisville Courier-Jounvl, Wrlliam Randolph
'Hearst, Jr. and Max Lerner were all on the roster. So was
socialist Norman Thomas, Representative Adam Clayton
Powell, Mrs. Averell Harriman and that joiner of liberal causes,
Christopher Emmet.
Anyone scrutinizing the membership of this organization,
separating the activists from the dupes brought in for their
narnes, and studying the methods employed to prevent warn-
ing reports from reaching the public, must come to the con-
clusion that there were men in the AF of V who knew their
business, How can one reconcile Norman Thomas' name on
the front set up to boost Diem in 1956, and his equally active
membership in 1948 on the front set up to boost Ho chi Minh?
If Diem was such a valid anti-Communist, what was Norman
Thomas, Ho's old partisan, doing on his side unless he was
there as a favor to his fellow socialist, Joseph Buttinger? And
if Thomas did not want to throw Vietnam to the Reds, what
ya! lr" doing demonstrating against American military support
in Vietnam, on morat and practical grounds, at a studenfrally
in Washington in October, 1963? Why did Norman Thomas
help thwart every Vietnamese attempt to get out from under
 THE BRAINWASHING MACHINE 139

Ngo dinh Diem when the situation was not desperate, and
thin beat his breast and tell Washington students that "our
support of Ngo dinh Diem's tyrannical and unpopular rule
trvhich he and Buttinger had supported!l mocks our interest in
freedom and our leadership of nations-"?
American Friends of Vietnam, powerful as it was with its
senator$ and publishers, socialists and prominent citizens, was
only a front body for the Diem cult. Let us take a look at how
the lobby operated. Suppose an honest article on conditions
in Vietnam were to get into print, such as Albert Colgrove's
or Richard Starnes' reports in the Scripps-Howard press. Out
of Harold Oram's public relations office would come a flow of
instructions to AF of V members, associates in Saigon, stooges
in America. The editor publishing the offending piece would
be inundated with letters, many of them pre-written for the
mailer to sign. Let the Providence lournal up in Rhode
Island publish a letter critical of Diem, and in the length of
time it would take a plane to reach Saigon and return, an angry
retort would come, blasting the French colonialists, whitewash-
ing Diem and ending, "I am not with any government agency,
but with a private organization supported by the Overseas
Chinese to combat Communist influence in the Pacific area."
(Signed) Joan Thompson, or some other name.
What overseas Chinese organization? No one ever asked.
Diem, you will remember had nationalized his country's
Chinese, and they hated him accordingly except for Bernie
Yoh, the Chinese employed by Diem to assure America that
the Chinese loved Diem like a father. Formosa's public rela-
tions man, Marvin Liebman, in September 1958 described
Diem's hatred of the Chinese as a bitter pathological thing.
It is unbelievable, the efficiency with which a handful of
well-financed. well-directed men were able to recruit letter
writers, letter signers, and acquiescent editors to undermine
anyone who told America the truth.
Suppose an unfavorable inquiry arrived at the Vietnamese
embassy in Washington, or on the side of Angier Biddle Dukels
desk reserved for American Friends of Vietnam correspond-
ence. It would be forwarded to Harold Oram. Oram would be
deeply concerned. "I cannot believe, Madam, that this report
is true. You may be assured that I shall look into it immedi-
ately.
"You asked 'just what is going on in South Vietnam' and
referred to 'persistent' stories which indicate a 'criticism of
the regime,'" runs a typical Oram reply. "I do believe your use
of the term 'persistent' is a vast exaggeration. We read the
 140 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
American and foreign press regularly and, aside from persist-
ently unfriendly French journalists who are fundamentally en-
gaged in licking their wounds, there is no sustained criticism
anywhere in the world that would justify your comment."
The Oram statement was a lie. At that moment 2500 Viet-
namese exiles were vainly watching the French press for a
word of encouragement.
After a delay long enough for a letter to reach Saigon
and the reply to get back to New York, Mr. Oram's expression
of relief would reach the anxious American. Father Raymond
de Jaegher in Saigon had assured him the story was false. A
letter from a priest would usually clinch the discussion. With
the copy of Father de Jaegher's letter Mr. Oram would enclose
a report (undated) from the Times ol Vietnam, praising Pres-
ident Diem for ofiering a home to Father de Jaegher when he
had to leave Red China. So Father de Jaegher was whitewash-
ing the man who supported him for just that purpose!
Each new name opens another trail for the researcher to
investigate. Who was Father de Jaegher? "An excellent Bel-
gian priest," comes the answer from his high Catholic sources.
"An honorable man. He would lay down his life for Diem
tomorrow." Another priest averred, "Father de Jaegher was
not fighting Communism. He was playing politics, fighting for
the right of his man to lead the anti-Communist fight. And he
would turn over to Nhu's police any Vietnamese who came to
him with information critical of his hero, or anyone who
warned that a growing number of Vietnamese saw Ho chi
Minh as a liberator from Diem and his brother."
What about the Times ol Vietnam, quoted by Harold Oram
and used to praise Father de Jaegher? The answer: a Diem
propaganda sheet published by American Gene Gregory and
his wife Anne. Gregory went to Saigon in 1955 on a Ford
Foundation grant to write a thesis on village life in South
Vietnam. Instead, he started publishing Times ol Vietnam.
The recurrent story that Gregory changed his ten-thousand-
dollar grant from Ford Foundation on the Saigon black mar-
ket to launch his paper may or may not be true; in either
case neither the rumor nor the paper helped America. It is
possible that Gregory may be the first American to have en-
riched himself in Vietnam at the expense of the American
taxpayer. A paper flattering the insatiable vanity of Diem
could not fail financially, with or without Vu van Thai, the
American aid administrator getting a share of the handout.
(According to Vietnam's 1957 budget debate, Thai's office paid
President Ngo dinh Diem and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
walk in false amiability. Their thoughts are anybody's guess. In
1953 and 1954 Diem's labor leader brother. Nhu. had eased his men
into the International Labor Organization to muster world wide
support for Diem's American-imposed rise to power. In the ILO
was George Lodge, the ambassador's son. At that time the elder
Lodge was American ambassador to the United Nations, close to
the ear of John Foster Dulles and Milton Eisenhower. What Diem
is probably asking himself is, "Did the Kennedy crowd say to this
man, 'You and your son helped get us into this mess; saddled with
this family; now you go out there and get us out'?"
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shelter in beleaguered Dien Bien Phu. The public in the West was
never told that the Communist army of Ho chi Minh was virtually
destroyed at Dien Bien Phu while winning its Pyrrhic victory'
 UPI Photo

With a pensive expression, Madame Ngo dinh Nhu faces an audi-

ence at Fordham University during her visit to New York City in
mid-October, 1963. The beautiful and avaricious sister-inlaw of
President Diem became the "first lady" of Vietnam. She controlled
business deals and secret funds with a women's para-military or-
ganization of her own, mobilized to provide accurate political in-
telligence for their leader.
 rt"rr;t ' "t
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Ngo dinh Nhu was 43 when his brother Diem rose to power. Nhu
had been a labor leader living in his fly-specked office in Saigon.
To him went control of the police and secret police. Known as
"advisor" to the president, Nhu actually held the reins of power
during the later days of the Diem regime.
Li-*.
UPI Photo

Former Ambassador to the U.S. Tran van Chuong, father of Ma-

dame Nhu, tells a press conference in Boston, November l, 1963,
that the overthrow of the Diem government came as no surprise
to him. A lawyer in private life, Chuong became in the Diem pe-
riod ambassador to Washington, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil
with control of embassy funds for these countries.
 UPI Photo

Bearing a striking resemblance to her mother, attractive Ngo dinh

Le Thuy, 18, daughter of Madame Nhu, wears the uniform of the
Republican Girls, her mother's para-military group.
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munist Ho chi Minh's intelligence service in Cochin China. Under
Diem he became head of Nhu's secret police and had his hand in
The American aid till. Diem made him goverlor of a province
and Joe Alsop made him a hero. All night on October 31, 1963,
he sat at a microphone broadcasting attacks against his former
masters, Diem and Nhu. Made press attach6 in the Vietnam em-
bassy in Washington, he flew home on December 26, 1964, surfaced
on February 19, 1965, in a desperate attempt to seize power, then
went underground to await a more propitious moment when the
attempt failed.
 aPI Photo

Ho chi Minh, last of the old time Qpmmunist revolutionaries and

president of the People's Republic of North Vietnam. As far back
as l9lE Ho chi Minh wrote an incendiary article on the plig[t
of thc American Negro in Harlem, in which he foresaw the possi-
bility of using the American Negro as a tool for revolution.
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the largest and best established nationalist, anti-Communist party
in South Vietnam. After Diem's fall Hoan was attacked by Com-
munist Hanoi as the man America would logically chose to replace
Diem, while misinformed conservatives and advocates of no-winism
attacked him in Washington. Hoan was the one leader the Com-
munists feared. After a brief period as vice-premier under General
Nguyen Khanh, Hoan was exiled by Khanh on September j, 1964.
His exile removed determined leadership and broJght a negotiated
surrender in Vietnam one step nearer.
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 UPI Pholo

Senator Mike Mansfield and President Lyndon B. Iohnson might

well have been discussing Vietnam when this photograph was taken.
Mansfietd was known as "Diem's godfather." The American left
led this country through a seven-year honeymoon with lhe Diem
regime until someone hollered "Jiggers."
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 THE BRAINWASHING MACHINE r4l
seventeen million piastres in that year, (a little less than half
a million dollars, to theTimes of Vietnam.)
The paper was not a giveaway sheet. It carried heavy ad-
vertising, and the only high-salaried person on it was Gregory.
For Diem and Nhu it provided a quotable English-language
press, bearing their account of their affairs for USIS to com-
municate to Bangkok, Vientiane, Pnom Penh, Washington and
elsewhere. Had an infiltrator been directing this operation for
the Communists, with the objective of making Americans look
foolish, or dishonest, or both, he could not have done a bet-
ter job.
As Diem's leading English-language sycophant in the coun-
try, Mr. Gregory's influence was considerable, whether or not
Vu van Thai was his partner, as rumored. Consequently there
was every possibility that he might be tempted to influence
deals for business men negotiating contracts. Eventually Mr.
Gregory opened his own import-export business, the Vietnam
Development Company, on the side. The only irregularity the
International Ce.operation Agency was ever induced to admit
and investigate in Saigon was the one in which Mr. Gregory
was the complainant. ICA chief Le'land Barrows acknowl-
edged receiving a note from Gregory dated August 14, 1958,
disclosing the "curious," as Mr. Barrows described it, fact that
Motorola Communications and Electronics, Inc. was awarded
a $47,0OO contract for police radios, though its bid was sixty
percent higher than Gregory's. Stepping on the toes of Gene
Gregory was a grave tactical error on the part of Motorola.
What a mess! Here we had Michigan State University, hired
by ICA to make a study and draw up specifications for a proj-
ect on which Motorola was going to make a bid. How did they
do it? By copying a Motorola catalogue. Naturally Motorola
got the contract. But had not Diem's own propagandist been
the bidder they were freezing out, this deal, like so many
others, could have gotten by with murder, as Jim G. Lucas
pointed out in his New York Vl/orld-Telegrarfl report of No-
vember 16. 1959.
How did Michigan State University happen to come into
the operations of Gene Gregory, the ntan Graham Greene is
said to have had in mind when he created his central character
in The Quiet American? What was Michigan State doing, wrif
ing specifications for the International Co-operation Agency
in South Vietnam? It would take volumes to provide the an-
swer. If all the so-called "scholarly" books published by Michi-
gan State during the honeymoon years with Ngo dinh Diem
were spread out before an investigating committee, and the
142 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
source of the money that produced them probed, it would
of Michigan if not all America.
shake the educational system
The pool of professors acting as propagandists while em-
ployed as educators, quoting each other as "authorities," ac-
cording diplomas to students who parrotted their theme, which
subsequent history has proved to be false, and flunking those
who dug for the truth, should be exposed. While Michigan
State's Vietnam Project was in operation, we find its president.
John Hanna, acting as advisor to President Eisenhower as
chairman of the Civil Rights Commission.
Not content with flooding universities with books glorify-
ing a man whom the authors and publishers of those books
were later to repudiate, Michigan State in July of 1959 turned
out a book for $1.25 on What to Read on South Vietnam to
recommend works written by the propaganda pool and rule
out anything written by anyone else. This book was distributed
by the Institute of Pacific Relations. Huynh sanh Thong, at
Yale, told this author in 1958 of hearing Diem's public rela-
tions man, Harold Oram, ask Milton Sachs to do a "scholarly
report" on Diem, adding, "I'll pay you for it."
Early one morning in the winter of 1956, French police
swooped down on the Quai aux Fleur apartment of a man
named Daniel Guerin who was implicated with a Communist
ring helping the Algerian rebels. Simultaneously they raided
Guerin's office in the Communist-infiltrated France Observa-
teur. In the apartment they found Guerin's friend Milton
Sachs. Nguyen ton Hoan, the exiled Dai Viet leader told this
author that while he was trying to contact Mr. Sachs in Paris
he walked in on the middle of the raid.
Certainly the actors chosen by the faceless casting director
forming America's South Vietnam troupe were perfect for their
roles. Angier Biddle Duke was the star who provided social
impeccability and name value at the head of press communi-
ques and letters. Leo Cherne, with his frequent appearances
on chatty New York radio programs and his Research Institute
of America identity and newsletter, had another following.
It was as executive director of the Research Institute of Amer-
ica that Leo Cherne advised American businessmen. on Feb-
ruary 28, 1958, to plunge into South Vietnam, for Diem
would back their investments. Labor leaders, the New Leader
and the socialist left were in Buttinger's pocket. Father de
Jaegher's word was final in the minds of many Catholics who
saw him as a Saigon priest rather than Diem's pensioner run-
ning a magazine and press bureau for his patron. The Na-
tional Catholic Welfare Conference reported on April 8, 1957,
 THE BRAINWASHING MACHINE t43
that the last Catholic paper in Vietnam had been closed and its
editor-priest, Father Vu minh Trac, sent to prison for nine
monthi for "defaming the state." He had prayed, editorially'
that "the Almighty keep the President always in good health
and enlightened to regain the confidence of the beginning."
This was not printed in America'
Bernie Yoh was the stooge to fly back and forth between
Washington and Saigon; to Saigon so he could say he had been
there, then back to America to tell editors, women's clubs and
congressmen, "Don't believe what you hear' I have just come
from Vietnam. I have been in the jungles with the guerrillas,
killing Communists, and we are winning. You are not going to
desert Vietnam as you did my country, are you?"
Psychologically the choosing of a Chinese to touch Amer-
ica's guilty conscience was brilliant. That Diem hated the
Chinese and they hated him was immaterial. Depending on
the gullibility of the listener, Yoh was Diem's advisor, a guer-
rilla expert, a Chinese intelligence officer, and on occasion a
Chinese Nationalist general.
Wesley Fishel and Milton Sachs provided the "scholarly
articles" and letters from professors to refute any unfavorable
reports. When Tran van Tung fled from Vietnam and or-
ganized an opposition party in exile, the New York Times
of Augrist 28, 1955, gave Christopher Emmet more than a col-
umn in which to axe him. An introductory paragraph in italics
introduced Mr. Emmet as a "member of the Executive Com-
mittee of the International Rescue Committee, which is assist-
ing intellectuals who have escaped from North to South Viet-
nam." How were they assisting these intellectuals, by helping
them into America to lobby for their man? And what was
Trung if not an intellectual refugee?
Diem's years of "politicking" in America were never criti-
cized by Emmet and the interlocking organizations working
America; but, with all the guilelessness in the world Emmet
observed that Mr. Tung did not explain why his letter in the
Times of. August 14 emanated from Paris and not from
Saigon. The answer was that one did not write such letters
from Saigon in 1955 with impunity.
There was no level of society or field of endeavor unworked
by Diem's American lobby. When the word of an "authority"
was needed to impress the person being duped, a letter signed
by Lieutenant General John W. O'Daniel appeared in the mail,
and a flood of letters would be mobilized if the offending editor
did not give it attention. "Permit an old soldier and Chief
of the U. S. Military Advisory Mission in Saigon during 1954
144 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
and 1955 to express his appreciation of one of the finest pieces
of fiction I have ever run across under the guise of so-called
political verity," was the typical opening of an O'Daniel of-
fensive against an honest report. By the time history proved
the troublesome writer right and O'Daniel wrong, it was too
late.
On occasion the propaganda drive took on the form of a
swindle. Americans clamored to know what was going on in
South Vietnam, so, in October 1956 we find the citizens of
Los Angeles and surrounding communities buying tickets to
hear an "authority" deliver a lecture in the Ebel Club. The
lecturer they were paying to hear was Diem's propagandist,
General O'Daniel.
General Navarre's book, The Agony ol Indo-Chinc, with its
lessons and indictment of General O'Daniel's sabotage of the
French war effort, should be required reading for Americans.
America's risk was limited to materiel, said Navarre; Navarre
was doing the fighting. O'Daniel made several trips to Indo-
china, charged with integrating American aid and French
strategic needs. This sufficed to make him the Pentagon's Indo-
china expert. His ideas on how a war should be fought were
limited to what he called the "lessons of Korea." Navarre said
they were unsound. The terrain, the form of warfare and the
men were difierent. There was no front in Indochina with its
jungles and marshes. In Korea the rear was more or less se-
cure and the entire nation was on a war footing. Vietnam could
not be put on a war footing with an American general con-
stantly repeating, "Do not lift a finger till they give you com-
plete independence."
When O'Daniel alone could not impose his views on Na-
varre, he started inflating the size of his American mission.
With its weight behind him he tried to dictate strategy and
policy by controlling the use of the American materiel fur-
nished, wrote General Navarre. When hope of victory de-
pended on Navarre's bringing the Vietnamese into their war,
O'Daniel continued to play politics in admonishing, "Do noth-
ing unless they [the French] give you complete independence.
There is no reason why you should not have the handling of
American aid yourselves." The last was particularly attractive.
That the South Koreans were never given independent com-
mand of their army till after their war was over was never
considered. Navarre lamented that with each increase of au-
tonomy he gave the Indochinese states to buy their co-opera-
tion, O'Daniel raised the price. With each grant of more free-
dom of command, the military quality which Navarre was
 THE BRAINWASHING MACHINE t45
trying to raise diminished. Each new liberty of action was
used by the people most concerned'in the outcome of the
struggle to elect to do nothinq. In the end Navarre reflected
that a firm Franco-American front could have inspired a
common offensive. O'Daniel's playing of the Vietnamese
against the French prevented him from achieving it.
Georges Chaftord, a recognized authority on Southeast
Asia, told in Le Monde, of January 5, 1957, how Ceneral
O'Daniel presided over training conferences for Vietnamese
omcers. When his views were opposed as impractical, "Iron
Mike" banged his fist on the table and shouted, "Who is paying
for this?" After a short recess the Vietnamese officers would
return to the meeting and announce their submission.
June 1958 saw the appearance of General O'Daniel's "Con-
fidential Intelligence Report on Vietnam" circulated by Diem's
humming lobby. Its theme: Don't believe anything bad you
hear against Diem; they are Conrmunist lies. It is the duty
of every patriotic American to encourage private investment
in South Vietnam and see that American aid is maintained
at the highest possible level.
Wherever reports appeared on Diem's police state, a regi-
mented cascade of letters demanded that General O'Daniel,
the Pentagon's authority, be permitted to write a reply. Ready
to do anything to get the hornets away from his head, the
harassed editor would comply as did the editor of Anterican
Mercury. General O'Daniel's "refutation," when it came,
ignored every offending statement he was supposed to correct
and repeated the threadbare Iitany, false from the start, of
Diem's pretended miracles: "Out of post-Geneva chaos he
lDiem] created public order and political stability. Out of an
inherited administrative chaos he created a governnlent func-
'tioning smoothly over the whole of South Vietnam. Out of a
post-Dien Bien Phu military chaos he has created from a
strife-torn and demoralized military nonentity a well-trainecl
and well-equipped national army. His administration has set-
tled almost a million refugees. His administration shored up
a tottering economy, overcame inflation and removed the
vicious forces of racketeering and vice. His administration
abolished a moribund and hated monarchy and replaced it with
a government that has successfully solved the short-range
problems with which the country has been beset."
Not a line of the theme was valid when it was written. A
surface appearance of public order had been created by terror
and secret police. There was no political stability nor smoothly
functioning government, as succeeding events were to attest,
t46 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
American dollars created the spit-and-polish army O'Daniel
vaunted, and threw out the despised French colonialist com-
mando school with its jungle warfare instruction' The million
refugees were told by their priests to go south, the American
navy and French air force transported them, and American
aid maintained them in attractive "Potemkin" villages there-
after for congressional junkets to admire as one of Diem's
miracles. With the entire Vienamese economy dependent on
American aid. to tetl us Diem shored it up is to insult our in-
telligence. As for Diem's government and the "moribund
monlrchy" it replaced, intelligent Americans will wish with all
their hearts someday that they had that "moribund monarchy"
back. Aside from it there was no unifying force or sense of
nationality in Vietnam.
How did O'Daniel and the rest of them put it over? The
answer is simple: Fear-inspiring police concealed the foment
in Saigon. Suppression of the truth and propagation of the
false picture blanketed America. Our State Department co-
operaied by hounding like a criminal any American who
bucked the artificially created tide. Like a heavy curtain' an
ocean of newsprint from the immense machine headed by a
socialite, directid by left-wing socialists, and financed by de-
ceived Americans, shut off every glimmer of what was really
happening.
 CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE 'SHOWCASE FOR DEMOCRACY"

AT WORK

White Harold Oram, Angier Biddle Duke, Joseph Buttinger

and Michigan State University spread a screen between Viet'
nam and the American people, a fake front which depicted our
new democracy-blessed prot6g6s as living in a Watteau gar-
den, things were far from pleasant for those not lucky enough
to be at the top.
Archbishop Thuc, the oldest brother of the Ngo dinh fam-
ily and hence by mandarin custom its chief, recovered from
his disappointment at not being given the Saigon diocese and
plunged into business with gusto, buying aPartment houses,
stores, rubber estates and timber concessions. When Thuc set
his eyes on a piece of real estate, other bidders prudently
dropped out. Importation of schoolbooks was in his hands,
which gave him the rights of a censor, and Michigan State
University a market.
Soldiers, instead of building defenses, were put to work
cutting wood for brother Thuc to sell. Army trucks and labor
were requisitioned to build buildings for him. A Saigon mer-
chant observed, "As a brother of Diem, his [Thuc's] requests
for donations read like tax notices." The Vatican was aware
of the harm Thuc was doing, and of the trouble that mobilizing
Catholic refugees could cause-mobilization that was done
on grounds that the Catholics "are more trustworthy, more
likely to be loyal to the regime."
In central Vietnam brother Ngo dinh Can lived like a feudal
warlord, spreading terror with mass arrests and summary ex-
ecutions, shaking down businessmen for his political party and
requesting officers, desirous of promotion to hold out monthly
"donations" from their men. When Can was about to face a
firing squad, Time of. May l, 1964, described him as a "rural
Rasputin in high-collar Mandarin robes who wenched and
swindled lustily." However, during the years when Central
Vietnam was groaning and Can was filling the dungeons and
mnss graves discovered after his brother's f.all, Time hewed
to the State Department-Joe Alsop line that any complaint was
147
148 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
only another venting of "the dog-in-the-manger" attitude of
the French.
Fancy slogans and holier-than-thou pronouncements intro-
duced Diem's campaign against black-marketing, making it a
crime punishable by death. One of the most flourishing black
markets was rice. Distribution had broken down, war had
disrupted the planting, and America was shipping rice to the
country that had been Southeast Asia's granary, trying to hold
down the price. An over-zealous official uncovered a large
scale traffic in rice smuggling into Communist North Vietnam.
There were arrests and a loud outcry in the press-then an
attempt to quash the whole campaign. The smuggling ring was
operating under orders of Diem's brother Can. The affair
could not be hushed up completely, so a court went through
the motions of a trial. One man was executed, to satisfy an
irate public, furious over having been forced to pay high prices
for rice when it was the diverting of the supply to the Reds
which caused the shortage. The rest of those arrested were
given stiff sentences, but Can was never touched.
While Can sold the opium in Hue that his brother's police
confiscated in Saigon, brother Luyen's preserve was in Europe.
Remenrber, a Vietnamese with access to dollars could buy
seventy-five piastres on the black market for one dollar, and if
he were on the inside he could buy dollars at thirty-five
piastres. Luyen went into a huddle with a group of men who
had incorporated themselves into a firm called COFRAMET.
COFRAMET was at 69 Boulevard Haussman, and with Luyen
as the Vietnamese partner they formed another corporation
called COVENTER, located at 163 Boulevard Ham Nghi, in
Saigon. The idea was to use the dormant funds, inside in-
formation, and exchange facilities Luyen had at his disposal
and make a clean-up. All of the men in Luyen's COVENTER
office in Saigon were relatives or henchmen of the Ngo dinhs,
who had other relatives and henchmen in the National Bank
of Vietnam and the bureau of exchange. It was a natural.
The COFRAMET crowd in Paris put up five million francs
as capital. Luyen listed his Saigon capitalization at one million
piastres and made an immediate profit on the exchange. Two
Frenchmen named Sauzun and Carsanti were dispatched to
Saigon to represent COFRAMET on the spot, and some of
the weirdest financial transactions that ever graced a swindle
novel were on their way.
William Hunt, an American operator who had made a for-
tune in China, was digging into the Southeast Asian field at the
time, and among Hunt's items were banknotes. The British
 ..SHOWCASE FOR.DEMOCRACY" AT WORK 149

firm of De La Rue had previously enjoyed a banknote monoP

oly in Thailand until Hunt's man' an American named Weber,
made ttre mistake of thinking he could squeeze out a firm of
De La Rue's importance without reckoning with British In-
telligence.
feber took the Thai finance minister and governor of the
Bank of Thailand, Nai Chote Gunakasem, and the finance
minister's secretary, Dr. Sudchit, in with him, and the three
proceeded to throw out De La Rue's banknotes and introduce
i{unt's. The inevitable happened: British Intelligence carefully
gathered evidence and De La Rue blew the combine sky-high
in 1959. There were many arrests, a suicide, and a crisis for the
Sarit Thanarat cabinet itself. Naturally, the American press
was discreet when the Thailand scandal broke.
Back in 1955 Weber and Hunt were still going strong in
Bangkok when they began eyeing the Saigon market. Weber
sugglsted to Sauzun and Carsanti that if they would let him
in on their operation they would all have a foot in Bangkok.
The time had come for Vietnam to have new banknotes' And
what an operation it was! How many times old notes were
exchanged for new ones at a bank window, and then carried
out the back door to circle the building and come in the
front (the American taxPayer being told all the while he was
"generating currency"), will never be known. A voucher ex-
plained the disappearance of one lot of $400 million in local
iurrency with the laconic statement, "Burned by fire'"
Weber and Hunt operations followed the customary freeze-
out pattern, and the next move was to eliminate the Frenchmen.
For months a hocus-pocus of bank deposits followed, as
COFRAMET maneuvered to get its five million francs back
and another deposit in Switzerland. In the end Luyen and
Weber held the field, but all was not rosey for long. Luyen,
trading on his position as Diem's brother, wanted too big a
cut. Weber and Hunt figured the lion's share rightfully be-
longed to them because the money was American, so they
proceeded to buy out a man named Linh, whom Luyen had set
up as COVENTER's director. When Luyen began to get tough
they leaked the whole deal to Madame Chuong, Madame
Nhu's mother.
An inter-family struggle was going on between Madame
Chuong and Luyen at the time. Luyen was trying to get his
hands on the sixteen million francs a month allotted Madame
Chuong's friend, Pham duy Khiem, for maintenance of Luy-
en's embassy and his own in Paris. With the details of his flyer
in international corporations in Madame Chuong's hands,
150 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Luyen knew he was beaten. Madame Nhu took over COV-
ENTER and Luyen had no doubts that his days as ambassa-
dor-at-large were numbered. He scurried to clean up all he
could before the axe fell. There were other irons in the fire,
and what a buying spree he had.
Since he did not trust his office force, orders went out to
buy three tape recorders and install them in the office of the
ambassador-at-large on a Saturday, while the office force was
away, and in such a manner that conversations in every room
and on every telephone could be recorded by manipulating
a series of controli under Luyen's desk. They were not cheal
recorders either. Everything purchased was of the best, with
an eye to providing the incumbent with as many valuable,
convertiblq assets as possible before he left.
Like youngsters enjoying a new gadget, Luyen and his
trusted lieutenant accumulated a pyramid of tapes bearing
every imaginable sort of recorded drivel within a week. Watch-
ing the pile of tapes mount, a tolerant confidant philosophized
on the way American-aid-supported embassies are run, with
the observation, "And so prosperity descended on the little
tape shop on Avenue Friedland, like golden sunset over the
turquoise dome of Samarkand's Shah-i-Zinda."
There was no big circulation paper or magazine in America
willing to report it, but the divergence of America's interests
and Diem's had already become evident. The Binh Xuyen and
the armies of the two sects that had been driven underground
formed a new coalition called the Cao-Tien-Hoa-Binh, under
General Bay Mon, Le van Vien's old chief of staff. America
was told nothing of this, but instead was led to believe that
only Communist opposition remained. Washington wanted
Diem to get on with his job of cleaning out the Communists,
so that we could cut our aid and bring home our advisors.
While this had priority in Washington, the top priority of the
Ngo dinhs was survival in power. American advisors were re-
garded as a necessary evil, to be borne in order to get the
money that went with them but not necessarily heeded. If the
money were cut off there would be no stick to hold over the
head of the army. In other words, a Communist threat must be
fostered, protected and preserved, to keep America in the
game, without which Diem and Nhu would be lost. The Ngo
dinhs intended to remain in power forever, and this meant a
series of moves executed with consummate generalship during
the spring and sunrmer of 1956, while the efficient lobby in
America spread the Watteau garden picture.
In the first place, old General Tran van Sioai of the Hoa Hao
 ..SHOWCASE FOR DEMOCRACY'' AT WORK I51
had to be removed. The dickering was long and tedious but in
the end he was bought out for a sum reported to run to a
couple of million dollars. On the pleading of his wife he
was coaxed back to Saigon where Diem could watch him, and
there he died. That left Bacut the only important Hoa Hao
guerrilla in the field-Bacut whose days were numbered as
Communists in his rear pushed him inexorably toward the
trap Diem and Nhu were baiting. The incredible thing about
this period of consolidation of power is that, aside from the
lack of integrity displayed by our people, not an official of
the overstaffed agencies we had operating in Vietnam found
fault with Diem's methods from the standpoint of common
sense. The same can be said of our press. For every move in
the crushing process taking place before their eyes left in its
wake a swelling reservoir of rancor that sooner or later musl
inevitably submerge Diem and react against us. That we nol
only condoned but approved and encouraged every flaunting
of justice in order to break the opposition, is inexcusable.
When the Cao Dai pope, who was in his late seventies but had
been charged by Diem with having seduced vestal maidens of
the Cao Dai sect, escaped from house arrest and fled to Pnom
Penh, Cambodia, Time magazine of March 5,1956, sneered at
him and his sect and chalked up another victory for our side.
As reported by Temps du Paris,May 24, 1956, on March 24
a Frenchman named Rene Rogat was given a prison sentence
for expressing opinions "touching on the dignity of President
Diem." Each Vietnamese who thought as Rogat did-and
there were millions-felt the long arm of Diem's police and
Diem's courts.
A general named Nguyen van Phuoc was sentenced to death
on August 9 for siding with the Binh Xuyen in April of 1955.
Aside from creating more enemies for Diem, Phuoc's death
sentence provided a moral lesson. Just twenty-four hours
earlier Diem's police had raided the home of General Nguyen
thanh Phuong and his brother. With much hullabaloo, two
heavy mortars, 42 machine guns, ten cases of grenades and
two tons of ammunition were seized. The UP report in the
N.Y. Herald Tribune, European edition, August 9, 1956, was
headed "Vietnam raid pays off."
Phuong, it will be remembered, was the Cao Dai general
who sold out to Diem for $3.6 million dollars for himself and
some more for his troops in the same month that Nguyen van
Phuoc defected to the Binh Xuyen. Phuong's brother, Danh,
had been paid a sizable sum to organize a puppet political
party called tbe Phuc Quoc Hoi, composed of Cao Dai de-
152 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
fectors enlisted to demonstrate in Diem's favor. The rai'l of
August 8 was the first of the moves that dragged Phuong and
hisirother in the mud until Nhu had milked them in fines and
outright confiscations of the money they had been paid for
saving Diem the year before. Vietnamese were to learn that
they could not win.
ih"s" *er" the minor matters; the big moves had been
going on.since early spring. Parallel lines of secret police and
Jecuiity forces were multiplying. Police organizations artd un-
limited dollars could insure the appearance of submission in
Saigon, but the Vietminh in the north, and Bacut, Iivirrg off
his grass-roots supporters in Can-Tho, required other treat-
ment. Of the two Bacut was the more urgent.
Diem's ambassador to Japan was Nguyen ngoc Th<1, the
finance minister discussed in an earlier chapter. Tho was happy
in Tokyo when left to do his job. Madame Nhu had turned
her vioient tongue on him on one of her visits. Tho took it
with bowed head, in front of his embassy staff. He exercised
the same self-control when the attractive secretary who shared
his meals was banished to the servants' table for the duration
of la Nhu's visit. He could console himself with the thought
that Diem, the celibate who feared women, with or without
tantrums, was as naggingly hen-pecked in his own palace, with'
out daring to lift his head either.
Tho was called to Saigon for consultation early in 1956. On
his way back to Tokyo he received orders in Hong Kong to
turn around and return to Saigon for an assignment from the
president.
Bacut, the dissiderrt Hoa Hao, as we have related, had taken
to the brush and sworn not to cut his hair until his country
was reunited and free. To seal his vow he had cut off a finger
and ground it into the dust with his heel. Being anti-Diem
and i seasoned guerrilla, he enjoyed the sympathy if not the
open support of millions of Vietnamese. Gradually, however,
with Communists at his back and Diem troops harassing his
front, Bacut felt the net closing in. To ease the pressure he
agreed to cease attacking the Reds if they would pull their
agents out of his territory and leave him alone. Comrvrunist-
like, they broke the promise. Bacut summarily seized twelve
Vietminh tErrorists and executed them. The wrath of thr-' Viet-
minh descended on his head. Instead of leaving Bacut in the
feld as a useful buffer defending the rice paddies, Diern and
Nhu decided to set a trap. Nguyen ngoc Tho was selected to
handle it.
Tho contacted Bacut's uncle, Huynh kim Hoan, and offered
 .SHOWCASE FOR DEMOCRACY''
AT WORJ( 153
safe conduct if Bacut would come in to discuss rallying to the
government. Bacut proceeded to the village designated and was
promptly seized under pretext that the truce had expired. He
was hurriedly brought to a rigged trial. An uncle of Madame
Nhu_w-as the judge, and only one witness dared to appear for
the defendant: He was Bacut's uncle, who had actid as go-
between in arranging the truce, and he disappeared immeiai-
ately after testifying. It was a farce from beginning to end in
which Bacut dominated the court. At one point tre lifted the
black shirt covering his emaciated figure and showed his body,
covered with scars received fighting Communists, and dared
any man present to show as many.
When he finished they led him out to a rusty guillotine left
behind by the French. A million and a half Hoa Hao members
y9*eg revenge. The American press sang Diem's praise. Diem,s
New York propagandists and a cooperaiing presJtold America
that the Hoa Hao sect had.been wiped-out. Senator Mike
Mansfield successfully imposed the same opinion on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
. In_reply to a letter from this author setting forth the situa_
!io-n -in Saigon and warning of the future aciounting he was
helping to make inevitable; Senator Mansfield replie-<l with a
condescending brush-oft. He wrote, ..I was very
-much
inter-
ested in what you had to say relative to the situation in free
Vietnam. Personally, I think the only hope lies in the continua_
tion of Mr. Ngo dinh Diem, and I was pleased to note that on
yesterday a constitution has finally been agreed on. I recognize
the fact that there are tiemendous difficulties still inherent in
the Vietnam situation, but when I think of the odds against
Mr. Diem two years agHven one year ago-and think of the
strides which have been made in the intervening period, I
cannot help but be impressed by the progress madi by this
remarkable man. It is true that he may be stubborn and
obdurate, that he may not listen to counsel; but it is a fact
that a free Vietnam exists at the present time and that in large
part this free entity is the result of the efforts of Mr. Diem.',
In reality, within two weeks of the writing of Mansfield's
letter, the Hoa Hao cost us and Vietnam millions of dollars.
Leagued together in a new nationalist lineup that had lost its
feudal,character, they were raiding plantations less than fifty
miles from Saigon in broad daylight. General Bay Mon, thl
former Binh Xuyen chief of staff, reported to his old leader that
some of his followers, pursued by Diem forces, had been
driven into North Vietnam, but that if Le van Vien would
 154 BACKCROUND TO BETRAYAL
return and lead them, all of them would come back, bringing
ten Vietminh deserters aPiece.
Not a day passed but a communal police chief or notable
was kidnapped or assassinated. Diem's army was constantly
under attaik. As a reward for his role in the triumph with
Bacut, Nguyen ngoc Tho was made vice-president. There was
no nonsense about it, no costly, time-consuming election' Diem
said, "You are vice-president," and he was.
What chants of victory went up from the American press!
, "As of now President Diem is in firm control of his country,"
wrote Bill,Henry in the Los Angeles Times. "He has the con-
fidence of the people. He has instituted land reform, currency
reform and administrative reform." In his enthusiasm to suP-
port Diem's principle that "stability must come first; democracy
can follow,"- Bill Henry wrotb, "He [Diem] smashed the rival
atmies, jailed the trouble-makers and, above all, established
the sori of government the Vietnamese understand and
appreciate."
- -Bob
Considine, in his glowing "Indochina Payoff," published
in the Los Angeles Examiner of October 17, 1956, went Bill
Henry one betler and polished off the Communists and the
empeior as well. "You never hear of Ho or Bao Dai any
mo're," Considine ended the column in which he pictured
Vietnam as "a strong barrier between Red China and Indo-
nesia."
Had Considine done his homework his readers would have
heard of Bao Dai, for Bao Dai a few weeks earlier had sent
a pathetic letter to the pious Diem, asking for news of his
mothet. Diem replied that he did not know where she was'
At the time Considine wrote his "Indochina Payoff," every
paragraph of which was unsound, the Chinese population of
Vietn"- was moving toward the Peking camp in a mass move-
ment that was to affict all Southeast Asia' and the Ngo dinhs
were trying to strike a deal with Ho chi Minh behind America's
back. NhJ was obsessed with the thought that the Americans
might cut off their aid some day, or that an opposition-leader
milht gain American support. Openly he admitted that he and
his-fariily would see the country go to the Vietminh before
they would ever step ^of
down' Privately he determined to insure
the family's tenure office by making a deal with the North
in advante, as even Nhu's most devoted apologist, Joseph
Alsop, was to admit in his New Yotk Herald Tribune column
of May 15, 1964.
 CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE BLOW FALLS ON SOUTH VIETNAM'S

CHINESE

With Bacut gone the only logical whipping boy left was the
Chinese. It was still too early to turn on the Americans. At
first glance Diem's decision in August 1956 to nationalize the
800,000 to 1,000,000 Chinese living in the country seems con-
tradictory to his attempt to come to terms with Communist
North Vietnam. The clampdown on the Chinese could only
drive them into the arms of Peking, which would theoretically
stiffen the Reds in North Vietnam. But western logic does not
necessarily apply in oriental politics. The August 1956 move
against the Chinese residing in Vietnam was for an immediate
gain. We have quoted the remark of Mr. Liebman, the Formosa
public relations agent, that Diem's hatred of the Chinese was
a pathological thing. For Nhu running the Chinese out of
eleven professions could be exceedingly profitable as a license
for expropriation. On the other hand the accord with North
Vietnam was a long-term project.
The greater part of the Americans fishing in Vietnam's
troubled waters cared nothing about the anti-Chinese measures
and closed their eyes to the fact that Nhu was putting out
feelers to the Vietminh. To assume that no one in the CIA, the
Saigon embassy or the State Department knew what was going
on is to underrate the enemy. Quite likely Mr. Randolph Kidder
accepted and passed on to his superiors Madame Nhu's denial
of such feelers, but those who knew what was afoot and hushed
it up must have been dedicated to the principle that every
negotiation between Communists and non-Communists, in an
attempt to reach a modus vivendi, was a step forward. As
regards the injustice done the Chinese, such people considered
only the matter of their loyalty to Diem.
Robert Alden, in the New York Times of October 9, 1956,
sugared his report by stating that Diem had "extended" citizen-
ship to his Chinese minority. The inference was that he was
doing them a favor. "By conferring citizenship on the great
bulk of the Chinese here, President Diem has given them
exactly the same status as t$e Vietnamese. As citizens the
r55
156 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Chinese must register and then will be free to carry on their
businesses as before," stated Mr. Alden. He erroneously wrote
that "Diem's first steps were directed against the Communists,"
for these had not been inconvenienced. The next move, con-
tinued Mr. Alden, was against "the religious-feudal gangster
sects of the Binh Xuyen, Hoa Hao and Cao Dai. Now that
these groups have largely been eliminated, President Diem,
according to those close to him, feels that the existence of a
separate Chinese community within the country must be
ended." Another way of saying it would have been that the
Chinese were the next scapegoats in line, when the Communist
threat was the one that should have been eliminated before
anything else. Instead Diem chose to multiply his enemies
before tackling the big one.
Robert Alden continued, "Orders have been issued making
it illegal for noncitizens to own businesses in eleven important
categories. These include transport and many retail trades,
which until now have been dominated mainly by Chinese
nationals." Alden admitted, "The new laws, which were issued
last month. came as a blow to the Chinese community of
approximately 1,000,0001 Persons living in South Vietnam.
There was a run on the banks as some Chinese withdrew their
money. Some Chinese left the country, crossing the border
into Cambodia."
Industrious Chinese provided the machinery on which the
economies of most of the nations of Southeast Asia operated.
An estimated sixt€en million of them were thriving in the
Philippines, Burma, Indonesia and Borneo. Copra trade was
almost entirely in their hands in the Philippines. In Malaysia
they made up half the population and possessed huge holdings
in rubber plantations and in mines. Two hundred and fifty
thousand Chinese were installed in Cambodia before refugees
from Vietnam doubled their number, and half the population
of Thailand was Chinese. Strong bonds existed between all
these Chinese communities, making them potential pillars or
cancers in any country where they were implanted.
Since Diem had no other whipping boy in September of
1956 to divert hate from himself, with a stroke of a pen he
started the landslide which made the Chinese communities of
all Southeast Asia potential fifth columns for Peking' The
Chinese, who had been in Indochina for generations, had long
been envied because of their prosperity. Diem and Nhu bor-
rowed a page from Hitler and made them the Jews of South
Vietnam.
David Hotham, soft-spoken correspondent in Saigon for the
 THE BLOW FALLS 157

London Times and the Economr'st, called the new moves

"Chinoiseries in South Vietnam," in his London Economist
report, September 29, 1956. "A bolt recently fell out of the
blue sky on the Chinese minority in South Vietnam," said
Hotham. "It was 'nationalized' by President Ngo dinh Diem,
much as President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. On
August 2l .|956'l a decree published by the South Vietnamese
government declared that all Chinese children born in Vietnam
were Vietnamese and must take Vietnamese names."
The full import of that edict is hard for the westerner to
appreciate. Many Americans are attached to their names by
pride of family, but to the Chinese it struck at the very roots
of their ancestor worship. ,
"One peculiarity of the decree-apart from the fact that it
concerned only the Chinese-was that it was retroactive, so
that not only all Chinese children born in Vietnam in the future
become Vietnamese, but also all children born there in the
past. Since some families have lived in the country for several
generations, octogenarian Chinese are finding a new nationality
thrust upon them without option in their declining years."
The point that Hotham recognized, and which our press
overlooked, was that Diem had chosen the moment when the
Vietminh were saturating the country by every means at their
disposal to hand over to them the community forming the very
heart and core of the nation's economy. Hotham wrot€, ..The
Chinese were attracted in large numbers from South China to
the fertile rice lands of the Mekong delta, where with com-
mercial acumen for which they are renowned they soon took
over the bulk of the rice trade, and indeed many other trades,
under their exclusive control . . . They had their own schools,
far-reaching economic rights, and a commercial and admin-
istrative autonomy which made them almost a self-sufficing
community. This state of affairs was always resented by the
Vietnamese. But the sifuation since Vietnam became inde-
pendent has been delicate. To dismantle the Chinese com-
mercial structure overnight, on top of the drastic modifications
already made to the French trading system, would demolish
an already shaky economy . . . In addition to the law which
'vietnamifies' all Chinese children ever born in Vietnam, a
second, more unusual edict, prohibits the practice by foreigners
of eleven professions. These involve most of the retail trade
and almost all the entire intermediary rice trade, both the
special province of the Chinese."
What Hotham said was true, but he neglected to add that
the edict against foreigners hit some half a million Cambodians
158 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
also, and could not help boomeranging against the Vietnamese
living in Cambodia.
"fh"t" is. nevertheless, some uneasiness in Saigon about this
apparent master-stroke-snd nqt merely among the Chinese,
w'hom it most closely concerns," Mr. Hotham continued' "The
300,000 Chinese not born in Vietnam will presumably have
to abandon their professions unless some way around the edict
(such as operating under the name of a Vietnamese member
of the family) can be found . . . The Chinese, who for about
-have
5000 years regarded themselves as superior to all the
other nations of thJearth, consider it a mortal affront to be
saddled with the nationality of a state which in the past they
have thought of as a dominion of the Chinese empire' Chinese
sentiment is not mollified by the official attitude of the Viet-
namese government that they are conferring a favour on the
-by
Chinese taking them into the bosom of the body politic'
Meanwhili Taipeh has registered 'deep concern' at the South
Vietnamese action and recalled its Saigon representative for
consultation. Peking-which under the Communist constitu-
tion regards all oveiseas Chinese as Chinese nationals-has so
far remained silent."
David Hotham's fears, expressed and unexpressed, were well
founded. Rice prices soared on the Saigon market; this com-
modity is of course Asia's political barometer' Distribution
broke down completely. Nhu's Can Lao Nhan Vi with its
seventy thousand or more informers scrambled over the carcass
of South Vietnam's trading system, Iooking for opportunities
to make a quick profit by cbnfiscation. It mt$t be remembered
that the Chinese-being told to take Vietnamese nationality or
get out could not take- their capital out of-thb country' Money
i"ing to transported or businesses run by Chinese who had not
founi a w"y to circumvent the law were fait' game for seizure
by the president's brother.
'True,
as Hotham said, Peking was remaining silent as far as
shouting from the housetops was concerned, for things were
going {'uite satisfactorily. The first reaction of the Chinese
Seini oespoiled was to ieason: Diem is America's man, and
Formosa ls America's protege. We'll ask Formosa to request
Washington to tell her man to go easy on us'
The bhinese of Cholon were soon to learn that the world
which America leads is not one big family. There are degrees
of relationship, and a priority system justified by what- the
comparatively small group in command-considers "America's
interests." Thut *" nnO fvtr. Hamilton Wright Sr.'s $15O'0OG
a-year public relations contract with Formosa contingent on
 THE BLOW FALTS 159
obtaining American editorial support for a mainland invasion
in Formosa's interest and the world,s. yet the $ate Departrnent
tells Mr. Wright "No go," because such an invasion would
not be in "the best interests of the United States.', (Testimony
before the Fulbright committee, July 1962)
- Ina August
for
1956 Washington answered Formosa's request
word in Diem's ear to go easy on his Chinese, w-hom
Formosa could not absorb, with orders not to rock the boat.
Keep out of it, Washington told Formosa. The blow to For-
mosa's prestige throughout Southeast Asia was fatal. pe-
k_ing stepped in and said, through its Vietminh underground,
"Now you see who your friends are." Chinese were told to
whom to give their money in Saigon. peking agents would hand
it back to them, minus a small fee, in Cambodia, Singapore,
Hong Kong, or anyplace they wanted to go. A clandeJtine
organization called the Patriotic and Democratic Chinese As_
socialion of Vietnam grew by leaps and bounds, and one of
the Chinese it helped get away from Saigon became financial
advisor to the queen of Cambodia. Ali along the board it
was a political bound ahead for peking and a setback for
Formosa.
Taipeh began ferrying Chinese to Formosa, but for every
one that opted to go to Chiang Kai-shek's free China scores
took the road to Peking. On August S, 1957, twelve Chinese
students who had been evacuated with a group of 245 told the
Form_osa press (in an interview set up ty if,. government)
that Chinese had been assassinated in -saigon and others sent
to_ forced labor camps for resisting the n-ationalization
edict.
Many, the students said, had elecGd to take Vietnamese na_
tionality but disappeared nevertheless. The Chinese commu_
nity believed their fellow countrymen had been assassinated
rather than permit them to thwart confiscation of their prop
erty by naturalization.
_ ,fho.:.know.n
to possess liquid assets were denied exit per-
mits, which relegated them to a life of terror in Vietnam, un_
able to do business yet constantly watched lest they try to
escape. The seventeen-year-old Miss Lee Shiu_fong, O"ujnt",
of a Chinese tumber merchant, told the Formosa press that her
fianc6 had requested Vietnamese nationality s6 his family
could retain its property. A short time later trij Uoay was founi
in the sea. The boy's father was then driven from iris property
because no member of the family was lietnamese.
, A report was sent to Dr. Marcel Junod, field man for the
International Red Cross in Geneva, stating that the use of the
river in carrying out assassinations had -become
a common
 160 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
practice. Chinese claimed that victims were first arrested on
iake'warrants or without warrants at all, which permitted the
' police to deny any knowledge of them. Then an injection was
administered to induce sleep. The sleeping prisoner was thrown
in the water, and a death by drowning report would follow,
explained as another Chinese suicide over the nationalization
decree.
The Taiwan press conference inflamed Formosa' UP filed
a short dispatch on it, dated August 5,1957. The Hong Kong
Tiger Standard printed it the following day, but no U. S. paper
carried the story. An American lady wrote a letter about it,
which ended up on Harold Oram's desk. Oram sent the letter
to Father de Jaegher in Saigon, and by September 20 had a
soothing reply: "The Chinese students repatriated to Free
China were-discontented, because they were repatriated with-
out being allowed any money-except 400 paistres ($5 in
American money)-and of course it is impossible to exchange
piastres in Taiwan; also at that time there was a lot of discon-
aent between the Chinese and Vietnamese' but I am glad to
report that the situation has been improved."
It was easy to lull the posers of embarrassing questions in
America. but in Formosa, Thailand, and wherever the Chinese
of Saigon had cousins the cancer spread. One might assume
that in view of Diem's tipPing of the scales in favor of Peking
throughout Southeast Asii's Chinese communities, Formosi's
public relations man in America would try to muster some
opposition. Not a bit of it! Mr. Liebman's first loyalty was to
nii Maaison Avenue associate. On Committee of One Million
stationery Formosa's own propagandist wrote a California lady
who had circulated the Formosa student complaint, question-
ing the motives of anyone who "attacked . one of our
strongest allies in Asia todaY."
Duped as America was by propaganda labelled as news'
Diem and Nhu never doubted for a moment that the lid might
someday blow sky high' Consequently their feelers went out
toward Hanoi. Not until May 15, 1964, in a column headed
"Hu-pty Dumpty," did the Ngo dinh family's most deter-
mined apologist, Joe Alsop, admit that Nhu had ever made
Qverturei to the North. By that time Nhu's doubledealing
could no longer be denied, so Alsop provided an out for him-
self by saying that Nhu "had succumbed to the combined pres'
sures of the unenOing war and his own egomania'" The infer-
ence was that Nhu had once been all that Joe claimed him to be
but that he had changed. "In brief," wrote Alsop, "the unbal-
anced Nhu had begun negotiating with the North Vietnamese
 THE BLOW FALLS 16I
Communists in the last months before his death. These negotia-
tions, strongly promoted by a secret French intrigue, had in
turn caused the Communists to slacken their military pressure
on Diem and Nhu." No matter how far he had to reach, Alsop
was determined to make the French responsible when his hero
went sour.
In early May of 1956 reports of negotiations between Nhu
and Ho chi Minh via Pnom Penh, Cambodia, were so precise
and so alarming that on May 4, 1956, Nguyen ton Hoan tried
to get an appointment with Francis Melloy, at the Vietnam
desk in the American embassy in Paris. Melloy, with the pom-
pous arrogance of youth and the then popular conception of
Diem as America's man, replied that if Hoan walked into his
office he would not kick him out but he certainly had no desire
to see the man. He added, "I don't believe we'll be bothered
by these fellows [Diem's opposition] much longer; they'll soon
be running out of money." Melloy knew whereof he spoke, for
our services were then cooperating with Diem's to separate
every opposition leader, no matter how anti-Communist, from
his source of funds, and to expose their contributors to Nhu so
that he could confiscate their property.
Throughout the hot summer of 1956 Tran buu Kiem (some-
times called Tran buu Taem) worked in Saigon with a Viet-
minh emissary named Pham van Bach, trying to smooth out
an agreement. American officials must have known these two
Hanoi agents were in town. Bach was an old-time Ho chi Minh
political commissar; during the war with the French he had
headed Ho's "South Vietnam Resistance Committee." Kiem
had been secretary-general of the native socialist party, the
Dan Chu Dang, which united with the Communists to form the
Vietminh. One of the first straws in the wind was Diem's an-
nouncement to the press on May 12, 1956, that he was opposed
to any foreign bases in South Vietnam, even American.
Nhu's right hand man and Joe Alsop's hero, Albert pham
ngoc Thao, kept a line open to Ho chi Minh's ear through his
brother, Gaston, who was a Ho chi Minh official. parailel ne-
gotiations continued in Paris, where Albert pham ngoc Thao's
father headed the Vietminh League and a Ho chi Minh repre-
sentative named Ho dac Di had installed himself in the Hotel
St. James as head of a health mission to France. There was no
doubt about it, as Premier Nguyen van Tam remarked, Diem
and Nhu felt that with America so committed behind them,
they could negotiate with the Communist North from a posi-
tion of strength.
As a link between French Reds and the Vietminh an or-
r62 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
ganization called Union Vietnamienne pour la Paix, l'Unite,
Et I'A-iti" avec la France was set up at 40 rue Pascal, where
Diem's agents and Ho's met regularly. Here, on May 13, 1956'
Ho dac Di g"ue a lecture in which he stated that Ho chi Minh
had ordered his followers to hide and bury their arms in South
Vietnam in 1954, with the idea of later unearthing them and
arming new divisions capable of creating a neutralist climate'
Gradual occupation of territory, rather than oPen attack, was
to be the order of the daY.
Early in this book we made passing mention of a Japanese
named Komatsu. General Navarre, on page 127 in his book
The Agony ol Indochina. hazards the conjecture that "the
francophobia of Mr. Diem seems to stem above all from his
troubles with Admiral Decoux who ordered his arrest for col'
laborating with the Japanese during the war 1940'1945."
Komatiu, Diem's Japanese friend, hid him when Admiral
Decoux ordered his arrest and in mid-1956 Komatsu returned
to Saigon as a Japanese trade agent' Politically Komatsu de-
scribed himself as a socialist. In practice he was often farther
to the left. After five months in Saigon he proceeded to Hanoi,
via Pnom Penh. It was no secret that he was on a personal
mission for Ngo dinh Diem. From Hanoi he returned to
Saigon.
In the months that followed Komatsu was to emerge as the
neutral party negotiating between Hanoi, Saigon and Paris. In
April l95Z he flew to France. While in Paris Komatsu confided
thit Diem was having increasing trouble controlling his brother
and sister-in-law.
Back in Pnom Penh a Vietnamese Red named Nguyen manh
Ha, son-inJaw of the French Communist deputy, Maranne,
started publishing his Tribune at No. 5 Vithei Preah Ang
MakhahVann. A British Labor member of Parliament and an
impressive list of British and French socialists were so closely
assbciated with Nguyen manh Ha that it was never clear who
was doing the speaking when Ha's Tribune of November 14,
1956, came out with its call for Diem to sit down with Ho's
representatives and work out a "just compromise." Nguyen
minh Ha assured Diem, "This manifesto has been elaborate'
ly discussed and edited by men close to you who nourish no
personal ambition and have no eye on power." It was botb
i hint that the Ngo dinhs could stay in power and an admis-
sion that infiltrators were in every level of the Saigon govern-
ment, all the way to the toP.
Throughout igse ana 1957 Ha's office in Pnom Penh had
been a relay and meeting place for Ngo dinh Nhu's emissaries
 THE BLOW FALLS r63
and Ho chi Minh's. While they talked, Ho's military-political
commissar, Le Duan, maintained an office in the wings from
which he dispatched messengers to agents of the Communist
Committee for South Vietnam Action, which a Vietnamese
named Nguyen van Tay was running from Dinh Bang, situated
in the area where Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam meet. From
Dinh Bang the network spread to Dr. Pham ngoc Thach in the
committee's Saigon office, and out of this tenuous line grew the
efficient chain that wiped out Diem's village notables and com-
mittee leaders until the countryside accepted what was to be
its way of life from 1956 on, rule by Diem's government by
day and Ho chi Minh's by nighr.
Lying dormant, scanning every American report for a sign
of_ encouragement, the non-Communist opposition to Diem ln
Vietnam awaited America's reaction to the overtures with the
North. Time magazine as usual was regarded as the official
voice and launcher of trial balloons for the State Department.
Consequently, when Tinte of. August 26, 1957, reproached
Diem for not mentioning the Communist threat on his visit to
Thailand, there was a surge of hope. The same issue of finre
stated that Nhu had been won over to ..a Nehru-stvle thesis
that North and South Vietnam can eventually be unified if
Red China can be talked into accepting the concept of neutral
bufier states in Southeast Asia. Tinte told its readers of the
existence of a "saigon theory that Communist Ho chi Minh
should get all he can from the Russians and Chinese while
Diem gets all he can from the U. S. in hope that in about five
years North and South may be reunified outside the world
power blocs."
Vietnamese nationalists were jubilant. Could it be that Titne,
State Department's spokesman, was preparing the public foi
a change of course? Through the Swediah diplomatic mission
in Saigon they got the aniwer, ..No, ?r,rne was only giving
a warning to Diem and Nhu. America will continue to ignori
the unrest in the country as long as no big explosion oJcur*.
As long as Diem can hold the lid on he wilt be backed."
The only big explosion possible would be a revolt in the
army, a feudal army of Ngo dinh Diem's which had replaced
the feudal armies of Le van Vien and the sects. ploti were
rife, but so efficient was Nhu's informer system and sO great
the distrust it fostered among fellow Vietnamese that no gioup
of plotters knew about the others.
 CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE DOWNGRADE BECOMES PERCEPTIBLE

The critical year was 1957, the year when men studying
developments in esia as doctors watch the temperature chart
of a patient, knew it was time for America to quit swimming
the current. Unfortunately everyone responsible for
Alnerica's policy in South Vietnam regarded any criticism
"guinit
as an attack against themselves.
Peter KaIsJher's declaration in Collier's of July 6, 1956'
that Diem was "Upsetting the Red Timetable" was arrant
nonsense. Nothing was more elastic than the Red timetable'
li was ttre Rled p-lan that was immutable, and that plan had
never ceased to move ahead. It is against the background of
io trri Minh's and General Giap's first rule for a war of sub-
version that every event in Soulh Vietnam must be studied'
That rule: Long war-short campaign. Through "long war"
the adversary rriins himself, is drawn deeper and deeper into
a mire of local actions. The wager of subversive war profits
Uy ttor" mobilization, arming himself first by arms taken
'- " ttre enemy, later with arms furnisMterrain;
from from without'
the wager of
The adversary is kept struggling for
subveisiue war'spreads his domination over people' When
;h; ;;;". of subversive war senses that the balance is in his
favor, ihe period of "long war" ends-and-the "short cam-
paign;' begins. His greatesi cards are the climate of general
i;til" in-the camp-of the enemy and controlwar" of the people
During the "long period. of
in i'he adversary's ierrain.
small actions af places and times of the adversary's cloosing'
ti'," ruii""" picture of government control is carefully main-
tained. Not till the su6lersive adversary himself is ready
to
come into the open and launch his final "short campaign" is
itt" tou"tnrn"nt'i delusion of power destroyed' The adversary
*fto'p.t-itt a subversive general to drag him through the
;i;;g';a;;' stage to the fina'i "short campa,ign" flurry and tfe
knoc"k-out ,""ri.. his money, his time and his men, and
in the
end his country.
---itt"
f."""h army learned to its sorrow the lessonDepart- of Ho
ctri trtintt's golden rule. The American press' State
t&
 THE DOWNGRADE BECOMBS PERCEPTIBLE 165
ment and Pentagon never gave them credit for having learned
it; thus, when assassination squads of the Tong Bo, Ho
chi Minh's northern council, murdered 472 vtllage notables
in South Vietnam in 1957 (over one a dayt) tlose American
ofrcials who knew of it interpreted it as a fight for lerrain
and concluded blithely, "We are still winning." The contrary
was the truth. By proving that the Tong Bo could strike where
it wfuhe4 and that the Saigon government was powerless to
prot€ct its ofrcials, Tong Bo administration first paralleled
then out-weighed government sdministration. Village beads
were pernitted to present the external aplrearanc€s of Saigon
administration by day in return for accepting Vietuinh ad-
minist'ation by night. The enemy's will was rutllessly inpooed"
In 1959 ttre number of village chiefs assassinat€d zoomed to
an admitted 1,600. On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy was
to admit tbat 4,000 heads of villages had been killed in 1960,
but the Vietnamese knew that 13,fi)O (in a country that had
only 12,00O to 14,(XX) villages) was nearer the true figrrre.
That the "long war" stage was being won by the Communists
was undeniable. Yet censorship in Saigon and collusion in
Washington were to suppre$ the fac.ts till late 1963. Every
study of fts dswn-hill progression inevitably brinp us back
to 1957 as the year when America should have struck at tle
real enemy and ceased to impose the maa and family whose
v€,!y presence drove people toward Ho chi Minh, while our
State Department and propagandists put pins in maps and
boasted of holding ground.
Diem and his brother Nhu, who with no official post in the
government remained in the wings like some Machiavelli
guiding a mtleless renaissance prince, reasoned that if one
could conceal the blight and repeat insistently that it did not
exist, somehow everyttring would be all dght. The fatal weak-
ness of Nhu and his wife lay in their delusion that they could
outsmart, delude and suppress-indefnitely.
In 1956 their advisors continually urged them to do some-
thing about Buu Hoi and his American companion Miss
Ellen Hammer. Diem was giving ttrem too much ammunition
negotiations with Hanoi, the arbitrary arrests, the
-the
despoiling of the Qhinese. Buu Hoi had means of knowing
what was going on. In Europe he had a press in the sosialist
weekly favorable to Mendes-France, L'Express. In America
Miss Hammer could publish their anti-Diem reports in the
Pacific Spectator (see vol. 9, no. 3, 1955), put out by Stanford
Press. Princeton Press, in the East, was in her pocket. And
these two could not be suppressed. *Make peace with themr"
Tffi BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Diem's propagandists and political advisors urged. So Buu
Hoi and-Miss Hammerwere invitedto Saigon as Dledsguests
in the fall of 1956 and overnight their attac'ks ceased- A series
of pro-Diem articles by Buu Hoi appeared in-L'Express; tfrLe
two nen a press conference in Saigon at which Diem was
showered with praise; and Prince Buu Hoi was made am-
bassador to Morocco.
The whirring machine working for Mendes-France in Paris
continued the Uula-up of Buu Hoi as a valuable interlocutor in
his new post in Rabit, linking Diem, Ho chi Minh and the
socialists-in France. Buu Hoi was considered to be the man
who would rise in Vietnam when Mendes-France refirrned to
power. The suppression of all information on this in America
i,oun onry signify that Americans in high positions approved.
In Vietnim maintenance of the picture of surface serenity
was by potce state methods.
In i report headed "Diem's Grip Tight in South Vietnam,"
as early as feUruary 15, 1956, Robert Alden reported in th-e
New York Times that "Many persons suspected of communist
subversion have been arrested [in Vietnaml recently. The figure
is usually given as 8,000. In some cases at least there are indi'
cations that the arrests were made on rrnsubstantial evidence.
. . . Arests are made in the middle of the night on flimsy
evidence; letters are steamed open and personal mail rc1d;
brutality toward prisoners is not unknown.- Communist tech-
niques of self-criticism in government ofrces and the indoctri-
nation of youth are also practiced."
If millions of Americans on reading anlthing in the New
York Tirnes that they do not want to believe assume auto-
matically that the opposite must be true, the blame must rest
with the New York Times. Not until it is too late does the
average reader have any way of knowing, when the odds are so
heavy against him, which Times story must by the law of per'
centages be right. So Robert Aldeds report was forgotten, and
by February 22, t957, when a young student took a shot at
Diem in Ban Me Thuot and missed him, no observations were
made on the relation between cause and efiect. Inslead of ask-
ing why the boy actsd, the event was used to engulf America
in anotber wave of Diem propaganda. Not a paper asked
what happened to the boy, whether he was tortured, whether
he was ever given a trial. He had attacked America's man;
that was enough. When Generalissimo Franco executed a
known terorist whose hands were red with the blood of hun-
dreds of innocent victims our press outdid itself: an avalanche
of letters descended on Madrid. No one was told or has ever
 THE DOWNGRADE BECOMES PBRCEPTIBLE T67
asked what became of the boy who shot at Diem or why he
did iL The pat answer was that he was a Communtst which
he was not.
Tlro days before the shooting in Ban Me Thuot the armored
car regiment stationed at Go-Vap, about six mil€s from Saigon,
stood poised to roll on the capital, when tle plot was disclosed
by a sergeant who preferred the certainty of enrishment and
to ttre hazards of a coup d'&at. Colonel Hai, com-
mander of the regiment' was Aapped. A commandant named
Chieu managed to reach Pnom Penh" All Southeast Asia knew
of tle plot, its indication of rot within the army and the aggra'
vation caused by the executions that followed, but not a word
reached America.
Witb Prince Buu floi and Miss llammet, the only anti-
Diemists with a press in America, bought off, the way was clear
for a junket, and what a carnival it was. The propaganda teaq
thought of everything. Repression of all opposition? Diem took
care of that with a stroke of a pen. The last thing he did be-
fore taking off for America was to announce the formation of a
"legal opposition," the newly-formed Demosratic Bloc, under
tha-t old fair-haired boy of America's wartime OSS' Phan
quang Dan, formerly known as Phan huy Dan. In Paris Dan
*as represented by a pockmarked dostor named Pham huy Co
who aspired to be ambassador to France under an evenfual
Dan government. Co was a great asset to Dan on any terms'
for Co's brother-in-law was none other than Tran chanh
Thanb" the former Communist whose long arm extended into
every security organization and informer ring in Vietnam.
Co and Dan's friends in CIA wete Dan'g insurance against
arrest; so if an opposition was necessary, even one handpicked
by the man in power' to kid the Americans into thinking
democratic government existed under their ptot6g€, Dan was
the man who would get the nod.
Pham huy Co held a pre$ conference followed by a cock-
tail party in the Hotel Lutetia in Pads. It was paid for by
American aid. Most of the journalists Present quipped about
the invitation catds, on which
*legal opposition" was empha-
size4 as though being handpicked by the man in power was
something in Dan's favor. America's capacity for being
conned was unlimited. Our press rmblushingly swallowed "the
legal opposition," rthich wan never allowed to campaign for
anything in reality. TWo years later when Dan was elected to
thd national assembly, he was forcibly thrown out of the
assembly by Diem's police.
168 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
- What a heyday the Diem lobby had, whether calling itself
American Friends of Vietnam or International RescuJCom-
mittee, from the beginning of Diem's 1957 visit to the U.S. until
he left; for Diem's triumph was their triumph. Ike personally
awaited his- distinguished guest at the airport in Washin$on as
the Columbine III, which had been seni to Honolulu to meet
him, neared home. The National Press Club turned out, Con-
gress (on the eve of a debate over foreign aid) listened to
Diem as he campaigned for more money, appropriated for
longer periods-a "crash program" for a leap ahead was what
exponents of aid called it.
'Diem fooled everybody," said a column (bearing all the
earmarks of Harold Orem's public relations handouts) in the
New York lournal-American of May 11. ..He eliminated
gangster national police, outlawed gambling and prostitution in
Saigon, won the loyalty of powerful religious iects, crushed
robellious and jealous foes." Only the ,,fooled everybody"
wa8 trus.
For tlree days (May 12, 13, 14, 1957) Marguerite Hig-
gias, not jet campaigning for a Communist-supported gang
of cutthroats in .Algeda, made her Herald Tribune column a
dithyrambic plea for Diem, whom the Trib's editorialist ad-
vanced on his page and newswriters on theirs. As Marguerite
Higgins saw if cutting oft the funds with which Diem was
supplied might slys $3,000,000 (as proposed by Senator
Bridges of New Hampshire) or 910,000,000 (as proposed by
the United States Chamber of Commerce), but it would bring
communism to the shores of Japan, all Asia and the Middle
East.
Said an editorial of the Herald Tribune on May 9, ..His
[Diem's] people began to listen to him and turned their backs
on communists." In the same issue Walter Briggs extolled the
'Miracle-Maker from Asia-Diem of South Vietnam." Senator
Mike Mansfield, Democratic whip, according to the pashing-
ton Port of that sane dan "said the speech [made by Diem be-
fore Congressl was 'excellent and right to the point.,', The
following morning the New York Times announced that in
reply to a journalist asking if he sought more American aid,
Diem replied, "We have accomplished a good deal. We have
been successful in rehabilitating 860,000 refugees from the
north and this problem is almost finished. We have maintained
an army which is an Army."
On SundaS May 11, 1957, America's folly took off for New
York in a cloud of glory. American conservatives, caught up
in the mass intoxication, swallowed anti-Communist headlines
 TI{E DOWNGRADB BECOMES PERCEPTIBI-B 169

and onrlted in the thought that somewhere we were coming out

on top. New York diguitaries awaited Diem (accompanied by
Vu van Thai and Tran le Quang, the former Vietminh officials)
at the arrport, rushed them to St. Pahick's Cathedral for a mass
and from there to Tarrytown, New York, for a luncheon with
John D. Rockefeller, III, and Mr. and Mrs. David Rockefeller.
Among the guest falling over themselves in praise of their guest
of honor were Dr. Henry T. Heald, president of Ford Founda-
tion, and his wife; Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie
Bndowment for International Peace; John J. McCloy' chair-
man of the board of Chase Manhattan Senk, and Mrs. Mc-
Cloy; Ogden R. Reid, president and editor of the New York
Herald Tribune (which gave Diem rave stories on pages 1, 13,
14 arrd 15 the following morning) and Mrs. Reid; James J.
Rorimer, president of the Mefiopolitan Museum of Art, and
Mrs. Rorimerl Dean Rusk, president ol the Rockelellet Fouw
dation and Mrs. Rusk; Paul J. Sherbert, executive director of
the Asia Society, and Mrg Sherbert; Howard C. Shepherd'
chairman of the board of the First National City Bank' and
Mrs. Shepherd; and Kennetl T. Young, Jr., director of the
ofrce of Southeastern Asian aftairs in the State Department,
and Mrs. Young.
On Monday, the 12th, Diem was given his ticker tape
parade, luncheon by the mayor at the Waldorf-Astoria, and an
afternoon reception by the Council on Foreign Relations. But
of all the honors heaped upon him, including the fawning
adoration of the Far Eastern Council on Commerce and In-
dustry, the most transparent was tle banquet at which Angier
Biddle Duke presided on the svsning of l[[ay 12 in New York's
Hotel Ambassador.
From the first a cwsory glance at the men and organiza-
tions playing tle Diem card should have awakened decent
Americans to the fact tlat they were being played like yokels
at a county fair, but the public's gullibility was boundless be-
cause they wanted to believe. When the awakening came, when
the forces feiling in Vietnam could be suppressed no longer
and Diem was pushed over, with the approval and encourage-
ment of the former president of the Rockefeller Foundation'
Dean Rusk, who had helped to lionize Diem at John D. Rocke-
feller III's on May ll, L957, each dupe found an out satis'
factory 1e himself. Joe Alsop assuaged his ego by claiming that
Diem and Nhu had changed. Thousands of American con-
servatives followed the course of most comfort and least
rhinking: they decided the forces represented at the Rocke.
feller luncheon had destroyed Diem and arranged his death
170 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
when they found they could not manage him, and from that
conclusion, which freed America's conservativeg from charges
of failing to think in 1957, they retused to budge.
Picture the International Rescue Committee banquet for
Diem, at the Ambassador. At the head table Angier Biddle
Duke and his clique, officially wearing their International
Rescue Committee identities that evening though everyone
knew that the same men, with another 5e1 sf salling cards and
letterheads, ran Diem's lobby, the American Friends of Viet-
nam.
With a straight face a United Press writer announced the
farce in the Herald Tribunc:, "Mr. Diem will receive the Inter-
national Rescue Committee's award for leadership among free
nations at a dinner next Monday. Mr. Diem will be the first
recipient of the annual award named for the late polar ex-
plorer, Admiral Richard E. Byrd. The Vietnamese governmelt
Lontributed $100,000 to the committee's Hungarian relief
work "
Translated literally, Angier Biddle Duke, as head of the
IRC, gave ffi man an award cooked up as a propaganda gim'
mick for iust that occasion. (No one else had ever received it.)
Atrd Diein paid off by writing out a chEck for $100,000
(American taxpayers'money) for his own propagandists, who
had honored him under the front organization and would wring
the award of its last drop of publicrty value under another.
Mr. Joseph Buttinger of the IRC is perhaps best known due to
widespread publicity (particularly from his best friend, Leo
Cherne) for having gone to Vienna "sf his owtl expense" as
representative of the IRC, to help Hungarian refugees after
the revolt of Ostober 1956. Mr. Richard Atens, director of the
House Un-American Activities Committee, stated in Washing-
ton on April 18, 1957, that since the Hungarian patriots were
in control from October 23, t956, until November 15, the
only ones who had reason to flee during that Period were the
Hungarian Communists. "On November 15," he added, "the
communists reasserted their control in Hungary. They took
over and sealed the borders. Those who came out fell into two
categories: frst the Freedom Fighters who were able to get
througb the machine-gun nests that were established anq
secondly, those whom the communists wanted to come out.
The security offcers have told us repeatedly that it is impossi-
ble to screen out the communists and subversives because
background information is not available."
This brings up a vital question about the types of refugees
Mr. Buttinger and Mr. Cherne expedited inlo the U.S. during
 THE DOWNGRADE BF-COMES PERCEPTIBLE I7I
the wave of sympathy in tlis country in late 1956 for Hun-
garian'tefugees.t' How many of these w^ere actual Freedom
Fichters and how many were Communists?
-gquallv important, how many were members of an inter-
medi'ary boop, the Socialist party of Europe, the efEciency of
which 6rganization was shown in the Buttinger letter to Pres-
ident Dieim? If Mr. Arens' committee had no way of checking
the backgrounds of the men in question, the same could hardly
be said of Ur. Buttinger after reading the outline of his sources
of information as Put to Diem.
The next man to receive the award on which Duke and
Joseph Buttinger had hung Admiral Byrd'1 name (Byrd was
dea<i and had-no say in the matter) was Germany's socialist
leader, Willi Brandt,'who used it to show Germans that he, not
Adenauer, was the man America preferred. By 1964 a new
front, the booley Foundation-named for Dr. Thomas Dooley
added to the keyboard, and the frst man to receive
-was
the Dooley Foundation's "splendid American Awatd" was
Henry Cabot Lodge, for his-achievemeqt in polisting off.in
-(which
ib?s"O" liability is to say the Diem regime) which
Duke, Buttinger, Leo Cherne-Dooley's friends, in sum-- were
sellini in 1957. P. T. Barnum walt never more cynic4 th?n
the "!ang'that sotd America on Ngo dinh Diem' Doolen the
iaealisf was shamefully exploited, both as a fund raiser and
for his publicity value, by Duke and his g3oup. The New York
Times Magazine of April 20, 1958, ran e story signed by
Dooley at the tife of his fund-raising tour for Medico, an
IRC front Dooley donated the proceeds from his best'seller,
Deliver tls from Evil, to Duke's organization. Louella Parsons
reported in the Hearst press on December 5,1959' that Buddy
Adler had just paid well over $100,000 for Dooley's movie
rights. Pharmaceutical companies were constantly reported
ss 6qLing gifts of instruments and drup running as higt 3g
$50,000 per aonation. Dooley so believed in what he was doing
that the day he appeared on Martha Deane's morning radio
program, where Leo Cherne regularly aired his views, he
i"*le Oe taxi driver who took him to the WOR studio
into donating his tips for the day to IRC.
A\e Tabtet of Feb. 15, 1958, quoted Angier Biddle Duke as
setting a $1,000,000 goal for the Dooley fund-raising drive'
Mike-Wallace, in his New York Posf column of March 1O
1958, lauded Dooley for taking nothing from his books, giv-
ing everything to IRC and Medico. Bven Dooley's death by
c,anser was vrung to the last donation check by Duke et al'
 172 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
How much of the flow of dollars fnanced potitical activity
rather than medical, no one has ever asked.
. On November 27,195'1., Dg,oley spoke in New york. A lady
in tle audience asked him if ne c6uld explain the National
Catholic Welfare Coof-erence report on April g, IgS7, ;;
Diem's sentencing a priest to prison and closing down a iath-
olic paper. So profoundly had the self-sacrificing young doctor
been drawn inJo the game of those making monef on ii- that
fe qeplied, "If Diem has imprisoned a prles! you may be sure
he had good reason."
Accompanied by Minislsl of Public Works and Communi-
cations Tran le Quang Ambassador and Mme. Tran van
Chyonq, and a planeload of State Departrnent ofr.cials, Diem
took oft for Detroit and Lansing, where he and his tiam at
l4ighigan State went through the same sort of performance
Duke had set up in Washington and New york.-The Detxoit
banquet q,/as important, for one must remember ttrat Amer-
ican labor had its own foreign policy and that policy was to
meddle in Vietnamese affairs to any extent and Uy any means
th_at would ensure tle perpetuation of Ngo dinh Diem,s power.
Vietnamese oirponents of Diem are still if State Iiepart-
ment's Kenneth T. Young, Jr., is related ^tiog
to the Kenneth y6ung
who is assistant public relations chief for Reuther's mehf
workerg'union.
From Michigan tle presidential party was scheduled to visit
Knoxville, Tennessee, then head for Los Angeles and a guided
tour as guests of R. L. Minckler, president of General petro-
leryn Compann to show Diem and euang how oil is produced.
I41 Angeles the big banquet was staged by the l,os Angeles
lfWorld Affairs Council in the California Club with executive
dircctol of thc council, Walter p. Coombs, presiding.
The boys hoodwinking America shook hands all around and
called it a job well-done when the sixteenday Diem circus
ended. Why not repeat it in Asia, they asked. Accordingly, in
mid-August, with U. S. Information Service issuing gtoi,i"g
communiques
like a press agency and USlS-subsidized papen
printing them, Diem descended on Bangko\ Thailand,'where
no protective censorship existed and where Diem himself was
so hated that Thai pressmen were frisked for revolvers before
being permitted into his press conferences. Thailand,s premier,
Pibnl Songgram, tried valiantly to go tlrough with it, but even
American Darrel Bcrrigen's Bangkok World was forced to
announce on August 19 that pibul had at the last minute
backed out of accompanying his embarraqing guest on a jaunt
 THB DOWNGRADE BECOMES PERCEPTIBLE 173
to Thailand's ancient capital. The premier was playing it cau-
tious and tnking his distance.
U dolars and adroit manipulation of mass communications
media could not sell Asiatics on America's man, Diem's Far
East junkets, costly as they were to tle American taxlrayer,
were still not a total loss. The Diem machine in America could
lsll Ansdsnns that Diem's every trip-Bangkok, Manila,
Formosa-was a triumph. An honest reporter who knew what
he was doing might not be able to get his story in print but a
Los Angeles writer named Polyzoides had no trouble in using
the powerful Los Angeles Tirnes to diffuse any fool thesis he
wished to circulate. "End of Civil War in Sight in Vietnam,'n
Polyzoides told his readers.
Meanwhile back in Saigon Nhu and his wife counted the
haul from confiscating Bao Dai's property and looked around
to see what else they could seize. And the Communists stuck
to their knifffug, plugging along in the villages and rice pad-
dies, grabbing a supply of arms here and taking over another
local administration there. As long as initiative remained with
them, time could not help but be on their side.
The tragic part of it was, as though Diem and Nhu and every
American agent who knew what was going on consciously
wished for a Communist victory, a monster police machine in
South Vietnam clapped a heavy hend over the mouth of every
man who would cry the alarm. On December 8, 1963, the New
York Times published a report by Hedrick Smith, stating that
Saigon was no longer cringng from a state of terror. "Arrests
have been publicized and the treatuent of political prisoners
is far more humane than under the Diem regime whic.h had 18
difierent security apparatuses seizing people at any hour of
day or night," vnote Hedrick Smith. The question is, why did
the New York Times lower a blackout e1 this state of affairs
for nine years when re,porting night have saved Souttreast
Asia? Having been lied to for nine years, is it any wonder that
the American public refused to believe the truth when the
New York Times could no longer avoid facing the facts?
Vo Lang the deputy ambassador whom Diem's brother
Luyen had rushed to Washington in April 1955, struggted
with his conscience for six years, then wrote letters to Senators
Mansfield and Humphrey and everyone else he had met when
on the Diem bandwagon, begging them to do a volte lace and
help save his country. Desperate, with tears in his eyes and
falking about suicide, he decided as a last resort to get in touch
with Joseph Ballentine, the retired foreign service man who
had so impressed him yyfuen they met in Washington. It was no
T74 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
nse: Mr. Ballentine's wife was the daughter of tle American
poet, Robert Frosf of whom Leo Cherne, an amateur sculptor
as well as Diem propagandist, had just made a bust.
Madame Lecomte de Nouy indignantly exclaimed, when
told of the use of torture on Diem's non-Communist opposi-
tion, "Ifs a liet The head of Diem's suret6 translated my hus-
band's books and I know he wouldn't do anything like thatt"
Mrs. Clochette P. . . , wife of a Columbia University pro-
fessor, cancelled a tea appointment on November 9, 1956, be-
cause she knew the subject of Ngo dinh Diem was coming up.
Her excuse, "I've worked hard for President Diem and it up.
sets me to hear bad things about him. Besides, this man [the
other guestl comes from France, so I distrust him."
Madame Suzanne Labin wrote in the Washinglon World
of July 24, 1962, (Karl Hess was then editor), "Nothing in-
deed could justify a revolt of the masses in South Vietnam.
Anyone wandering around the country, as I have done several
times, can testify to a miraculous improvement." What editore
and Senator Dodd overlooked was that in police states, when a
touring woman is preceded by a request from the top to show
her every courtesy, opponents of the team in power get the
message, "This is an apologist for the President. Be careful
what you say if you don't want to end up in a camp."
Madame Labin wrote exultantly in the Paris daily Combat,
of April 14, 1960, "During my passage through Saigon I found
the official address of tle leader of the Socialist Party in the
telqrhone book, and listed as such. I'd give a great deal to see
in the phone book of Hanoi Mr. X, listed as se$etary of the
Liberal Party, that one migbt telephone him 6d be invited to
lunch with him in a public place and thal over dessert, he
niSht fift his glass to the coming unseating of the president
in power, as did my comrade of the S. F. I. O. lFrench section
of the International Workers, which is the French Socalist
partyl in Saigon," What she ignored was that the socialist she
called comrade, though permitted to have his name in the
phone book and to arink to victory in 1[g seming elections
with a comrade from France, w:ls not permitted to run
against Diem in that election, nor was anyone else but the
two unknowns whom Diem himself chose as opponents. It is
also interesting to note that she was willing to condone a toast
to Diem's downfall provided her socialist cosuade were to do
the ousting
 CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

TI{E POLICE STATE AMERICA SUPPORTED

How astute it was of the American team, whether motivated

by devotion to liberatism or working purely and simply for
money, to take the precaution of discrediting in advance as an
embittered colonialist every French writer and statesman who
might have proved embarrassing. Jean LarteguY' author-of
Tie Centurions, and some half dozen books on South Viet-
nam, could have taught us much, but the language barrier and
the campaip of Diem defense through francophobia discour'
aged anyone whs might lsvs published his writinp.
In a short article in Pafis Match of September 14, 1963,
Larteguy recalled, "I remember Ngo dinh Diem as a small man
dressed in white, immobile of face, with eyes of anthracite'
holding himself on the edge of a sofa, his fat little hands
crossed over his stomach. He listened to only what he wanted
to hear, he did only what pleased him, he had confidence only
in his family and his god-a fanatical god of the Middle Ages,
cruel, respectful of the social hierarchy. When I tried to irri-
tate him he ceased to receive me. It was a period of crisis. I
ssftsd him for a statement and he gave me oner then denied
it on the advice of his brother."
Concerning the government of this man, Larteguy wtote,
"Lansdale, one of the king-makers of the American secret
service, went to work to try to give him [Diem] the appcarance
of a democratic Chief of State. He gritted his teeth. Diem
relused to understand; with bad grace he made a few dema-
gogic gestures and proceeded to eliminate by ruse all his oppo-
nents . . . Diem-but should we say Diem?-rather the Ngo
dinhs, for one never knew for sure who was in command and
doing the deciding in the clan-purged half the army, covered
the other with honors, and created a remarkable political police
which had nsrhing to envy &s \,/iefminh. A sort of tonton
macoute' militia [the political police of Duvalier in Haiti], a
little less unbridled but with methods more secret and more
effective. Recruitment was easy. Refugees from the North,
Christians, also, but from another age, whom their trials had
hardened and who felt that they had been betrayed by the
t75
 T76 BACKGROTJND TO BETRAYAL
F1e1ch.-Ambitiorn young bureaucrats, often xenophobes, pro.
tfg6s of the Ngo dinh family{isillusioned functionariei or
men acting tbrough fear, and some fervent nationalists, tlese
formed the framework of the country."
To the above add a hard core of converts, true or false"
froq the Vietminh, and we have the makings of a police
qachine that was to be the downfall of the Ngo ainhs and the
shame of America. There were many componentg To start
with, there were the followers of Madame Nhu.
'Behind each demonstration of police force," wrote the
polidcal_ editor of Paris Match,..risei the shadowed profile of
1fts smiling and implacable Madame Nhu."
-'t and my husband were the powers behind president Diem;
without us he was nothing," exclaimed this oriental passionaria
who described herself in the August 31, 1963, issue of paris
Match as an "unloved Joan of Arc," in the last days of the
Diem regime, as she and her husband openly coniemplated
seizing_power. If she rys1s rrnteygd, the powei of which she
boasted could only have been based on haie and force.
Tbo hundred thousand women were enrolled in Madame
Nhu's par_a-military organization. Her own party, The Viet-
nanese Women's Solidarity Movement claimid almost a mil-
lion members by the time biem fell. Its main purpose was to
PoPtze -women to provide accurate political intelligence for
tFeir Fader, and beyond her, her husband and broth-er-inlaw.
A natonwide paramilitary training program was set up for all
of Madame Nhu's follow-ers from age ii"t""n to torty. When
critics protested that two thousand p'iustr"s p"r mooth pay for
Madame Nhu's women,s militia orus when Viet-
l1gtese
"ror'bit"ot
soldiers-risking their lives daily in swamps received
Dau as much, Madame Nhu replied, ..My women ca&e mem-
bers are ofrcers.', Brand new' U.'S-a;ils went to the
y_otlt;l" pjfiti" (referred ro by Madame Nhu as .,my dar-
lq$") while local militia guarded exposed strategic hamlets
with 1917 rifles.
.. As_ide fr-om keeping the enthusiasm of Madame Nhu,s ,,dar-
|ln--
E" at tever pitch for infslp6g on their neighbors, what
gil theirftitling and parad^in_g Oo tn'"f -ilnt j*titj, tn" i oo"i,
1111l,_T{Sort.experrded? In the fight igainst Comnunisrij
nothrng. Itut their weight was there, scowling, armed and ever_
pres€nt, a constant weapon of fear againit
real or fancied
opponents. When hatred.of Dr. Tran ki-m Tlryen,
head of the
secret police apparatus, made him s liability
f:":,Ti:-t31_
ro Drs masters, he was sent off as ambassador to the
united
Arab Republic. Madame Xlu's Uiotler,-ii* lfti"q
"*
 TIIE POLICE STATE AMBRTCA SUPPORTED 177
replaced him snd Madame Nhu's power increased. A wave
of arrests of lawyers, former cabinet members and respected
citizens followed, for no other reason than to intensify the
fear of those still free.
Madame Nhu's personal female arrny wuul not tle only
women's force. Women were also recruited and given military
6aining and duties in her husband's blue-uniformed Cong-Hoa
(Republican Youth). These were Vietnam's "gun-girls," wear-
ing tight slaclts, tight blouses and Colt-45s, strapped to their
hips. Aside from providing a source of easily obtained Ameri-
can equipment for the Vietcong, the only service the Cong-Hoa
performed was to add the weight of one more oppressive
organization to the load the people of South Vietnam were
already bearing.
Nhu's force was not limited to his blue-uniformed Repub-
lican Youth either. After them came the secret police of the
Can-Lao-Nhan-Vi (Humanist Workers' Revolutionary Party),
then his own arrny, which included three armored car com-
panies armed with fifty-caliber machine guns. Nhu's "special
forses" battalions numbered 1,200 men in Saigon alone and
included two groups dressed in civilian clothes, armed with
knives, pistols and grenades for fighting in the streets.
What a pile of tiers of police upon police we supported in
the endt Madame Nhu's women's militia reporting every scrap
of unfavorable conversation, Nhu's Republican Youth and his
Can-Lao-Nhan-Vi party with swarming spies and informen
vying with each other to prove their loyalty by denouncing
someone else; Diem's army officered by men promoted not for
ability but for loyalty to Diem; a 50,000-man civil guard, and
an American-trained and equipped policel
Nhu told Joe Alsop (Alsop's column of September 20, 1963,
"In the Gia Long Palace"), "Even if you Americans pull out
I will still win the war here at the head of the great guerrilla
movement which I have prepared." That guerrilla force,
unhappily, was directed not against the Communist North but
against the non-Communist opposition. "No one in this coun-
try has any ideas except me," said Nhu, the man whom Alsop
had lauded, protected and sold to Ameilca for nine long years,
and who never became the megalomaniac overnight that Alsop
admitted him to be in September of 1963.
Nhu's method of operating was not admitted by our govern-
ment either until mid-1963, when the explosion was imminenl
Not until September 6, t963, did. Time tell its reade$, that
members of "Nhu's Republican Youth Organization made
door-to-door gnlls, warning against public criticism of the
I78 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
government on pain of arrest." The picture evoked in the
Vietnamese by the threat of arrest for even the mildest
criticism was never brought home in all its horror to the
American public. Saville R. Davis wrote a piece on it in the
Christian Science Monitor of January 10, 1956, but that was
one unfavorable report against the hundreds that were re
assuring. There was no American reaction when Davis gave
America the following account:
-Tbree weeks ago," said a personal friend, a Vietnamese
whom I had known elsewhere and whom I knew to be a man
of integrity, "my cousin was arrested.,' He is a newspaper-
man, a moderate nationalist and in no sense either a Com-
mnnlst or pro-Communisl His political views are fairly
widely known-

"It was a classic arrest. The police came at three o'clock

in the morning, two truckloads of them. Thev came into
my cousint house with riot guns pointed. They took his
radio and typewriter and said these were enough to in-
sriminate him.

Fu it suffering from an illness which would make prison

dangerous, so I went to thepolice.They said lorhing could
be done. went to an adviser of presidint Ngo dinh-Diem,
I
and he said this was not ss6srhing he could help with. I
wrote President Diem himself, whom I have known quite
well personally, and there has been no enswer.

Wile Rebufied Too

"My cousin's wife went to the police and pleaded because
of her husband's health. They laid to hei, ,If you cause
touble, we will arrest you, too.' Since she had four children
to take care of, she left.
*A lawyer was sent to him and denied admittance.
There
are courts, but none of ttrem will touch a political case like
tlis. There is no habeas corpus.
-fhere is complete censorship in the newspapers, so news
of a case like rhis cannot be spread around. Thire is no legal
opposition to the Diem governmen{ so no one can raise a
question, so to speak, in parliament."

I talked to another Vietnamese who also happened by co-

 THE POLICE STATE AI\,IERICA SUPPORTED I79
incidence to be a newspaperrnao.
At least he was trained
and wanted to be one.

'But I cannol' he said. "I have written articles but the

moment the slightest questioning of the government somes
in, the ocruor takes it out. We are in that fawning stage
now where adulation of President Diem is required in almost
every article. This is not journalism, so I have another job."

Security lob Difficul.t

"Sure there are political prisoners," said a knowledgeable
American. "You must remember that some of the national-
lsts are in open rebellion against the regime and the security
job is a difrcult one and the police in crude circumstances
like this cannot be expected to dissriminate."

A larger perspectivecame from a generally respected Viet-

namese opposition leader who is out of a job because there
is no provision for parties outside the ruling group.

"The most serious mistake of President Diem," he sai4 "is

to crack down so hard on those nationalist groups which are
not Communist and which are frustrated by his dictator-
ship. His stratery is pnshing them over into dhe other camp.
If we continue with a tight dictatorship like this, the word
will get around the country that things under Diem are not
much better than things under the French, and then Ho chi
Minh (President of Communist North Vietnam) and his
fifth column will have another real wave of popular dis.
conient to exploit."

So ended the Saville Davis report on Diem's police state.

Louis Kraar, in a lengthy 1961 report to the Wall StreA

Journal, when the truth began to come out, wrote that within
three weeks of an order directing all civil servants under 6irty-
five to join Nhu's Republican Youth, all one could see was
blue uniforms, though some villages had to do without other
things to buy them. Operators from Diem's new public rela-
tions firm (Kastor, Cheslen Clifford & Atherton, which
succeeded Harold Oram), gggslding to Kraar, "screen cor-
respondents before letting them see government officials, report
newsmen's private conversations to Vietnam's goventntenl
[emphasis ours] and badger reporters who suggest that the
country is not ideally adminisfsled." Everywhere the heavy
180 BACKGROI'ND TO BETRAYAL
hand of secret police and informers, no few of them American,
was presenL
In 1959, in search of a specialist to train ..combat police,"
Diem and Nhu recruited Deputy police Chief Frank fualton,
of Ios.Angeles. To quote the Los Angeles Times of. JulV 6,
1959, 'Valton will report to Washington rl,i. week for a
poiod of lndrctrhwion ln the Inentalonal Co-operation Ad_
ttdrdfiratbn progr@n, then he will So to Vletnam to serve os
prbltc mfety dviser to the chief otlhe nationat police brce.,,
(enphasir ours)
As early as December 5, 1956, Jim G. Lucas wrote of
lgtSon, in the New York World TeLegron & Sun,."This is a
city in which the secret police are aciiv*-worse than under
the French." As a trainer of said police, there was still another
American "rdviser', besides Frank walton, a police officer
named CoIe sent to Saigon by Michigan State Uiiversity; and
readers of the New york Tilnes of March 15, 1957,'could
have learned, if they had wishe4 that Mr. Cole's wife,'peggy,
was Saigon representative of the International ne.scue C66_
mittee. So in Saigon, where an anti.Communist was rotting in
p1i-son
for every antiComnunist incarcerated in Budapes!-the
wife of an American who was hired to help Diem irra iVn"
swell thcir prisons was employed as paid ripresentative of a
committee boasting of what it had done for ^anti-Communists
in Hugary. The fagt that American aid provided gl.5 miilion
lo.r.police radio equipment, and more riittions for Michigan
Slatet.police training program and advison to put teeth-in
the police apparatus of a country where Communists were
gaining
ryowerly the week and only Diem's personal enemies
appqgd to suffer, never gave pause to our editors or congress-
meo The fact that the "ex-pirites,'we boasted of ousting-from
the control of the Saigon irotice had really beaten ttre Com-
PTsS,**" iqnored as.blissfully as we did-anotler unpleasant
fact: When the Frenc,h were figbting Ho chi Minh,'Diem,s
pleas that we should not help theln bJcause, thoogn they w.e
qshtins the C,ommunists, they were also n*ti"f
tne peopfe,
nade sense to Time magazine. It never entJred ilenry^tuie,s
hoad that it was unwisJfor America to idelrtify heneff witn
Diem's police machine, which arrested Communists from time
to time but concerned itself mainly with fighting people who
did not want Diem.
Beyond tle obvious police machines were more sinister or-
ganizations. Atb€rt Colegrove, in his article, ,,We
aren,t build_
P,g **n Democracy in Viitnam," ..you told Washingon in the
washington News of July 25, 1959, don't, if you,re a
 THE POLICE STATE AMBRICA SUPPORTED 181
foreign touri$t or an American newsman here on a well-
escorted 48-holr visit, or a U. S. Government employee toiling
in a Saigon ofrce, see the prison and concentrafron
and, as a matGr of fact, neither did I. But I talk€d"r-fr
,""iiUy
witl Vietnanese who had. you dont see the .political Ri
education Centers' where the milder dissidents are given en-
forced-tutoring in the Free Vietnam brand of .democrty.'Ani
one of these f did see-_the only American who ever **g"A
that privilege. Information Uinister Tran chanh fUnn ino
defect€d from the communist Vierminh n lgl2 ir,
other things, the boss of these centers." The four "*oog
;.i*;;;
Colegrove selected to interview in the camp he visited llad bee;
thgre fro^m-eight months to two years, aloig with four-hundred
oF-9ry, including eighty women, some with Uabies and small
children
Colegrove estimated that at least sixteen-thousand people
were in Tran chanh Th-an's thirty-nine known ,teedricatilon
cent€.$." Diem's new law setting up military courts in tlree
Vietnamese cities to deal with ..xa6lgoverndenf' action" Mr.
Colegrore found included any exprJssion of criticism, down
-"shaking a ftt in the geneial direction of the
to presidential
Palace." The tlree courts .lhave absolute power to seize anAtry
suspects, hand down a verdic! and carry out the sentence i;
days. O-nlf
lhree. lbree yerdicts ar" provided: Not guilty, lif-
rmpnsonment or death," wrote Mr. Colegrove.
Department,s reaction was i vicious attempt to
,,fr".ft*.Colegrove.
discfedit And up to the time Diem himself fbund
the muzzle of a gun pointed at his head, anyone in America
who dared observe that there was not a family in Vietnam,
save perhaps those at tl,e trough, which did not fave good rea_
s9--n p null the trigger, broughl a stom down on
bis h-ead. Not
T e" li{ llew sky high was the American public given a
gumpse ot tJrc treatuent of what Colegrove called ,.tle untold
thousands in concentration camps."
Malcom W. Browne, in an Ap report in the Sbreveport
Times and other American papers on il{ovember 9, 1963, iold
of Vietnanege su'saming out or Diem's camps with stories of
tofrure on naked bodies, of blinding and hutilations. Miss
F,t*g..j$ Dong a tw_enty-nineyeai-old rypist employed in
rne urlusn-embassy, told Browne of fingers chopped off and
pruoners torced to drink soapy water
.tlt their intestines
streamed blood.
G_eorges Chaffard observed in Le Monde (paris, January
^
t957) d
that the discontent aroused in every layer of-the poputa-
tion served the propaganda interests of the Vietminh. Chriffard
182 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
reflected that anyone not in agreement with tem is, as far as
bie,m, anA the Americans are concerned, I
Communist' The
"int€rgroup" organizations, in which families informed on
Or.t-"tt"J and Each other, the heavy administrative Poltigal
*a JUo nets headed by men who had been themselves Viet-
a-sked hirnself if all these cnrshing
-iifi terrorists{haffard
not a machiavellian plan devised by Hanoi
oreanizatioDs'lwere
t"-ionttut" the South tlroug! playing on Diem's fears and
*.aUtl" For nowhere did tha enticing prospect of using
Co.-""itt methods to beat the enerry at his own game bring
the desired results."
Jobn Osborne conceded in 'The Tough Miraele Man of
Vietnam," nLile of May 13, !957, that "the whole machinery
of r""*ily has been used to discourage ac-tive oppositig o{ a. y
kind from, any source." Tr'an chanh Thanh, Ho chi Minh'g
forln; overfia' Osborne continued "directs the re+ducation
oot"rt where ilousands of dissenters get short enforced
*uis; in Thanh's version of democracy, and he estimated
fu.iyCu" that 15,000 to 20,00O people had been detained
for politicat reaso$l since 1954." Osborne added, "A p.rop-
u-nrJa" *J pottioal front catled the Movement for National
il"uoiotio" tftANR) has cells at various levels in every national
ministry aoa every provincial organization and is being ex-
tended to every tosm and village- Corollary organizations -of
*o-"o, youtb' peasants and workrnen strive to permeate the
-
easy-going Vietnamese. "
ffi c[toh Thuoh, whom Osborne described as the "black
beast of the Diem regimg" and of whom Osborne said, "All
ne knows are the methods that he saw work with the Viet-
-i"h,; ian Diem's political moYement' in conjunction with
Oi"#t brothers, Nc'du and Can. "Behind the facade of pho-
togaphs, nags a;a slogans, tlere is a grim structure of decrees'
oo-litii:al'prisons, concentration camps, milder te-education
'centers,' s^ecret police," John Osborne told' Ltle readers, May
tZ, tgSl. "Ord]nance No. 6, siped and issued by Diem in
January 1956, provides that "individuals considered dangerous
iJ de?6nse and common security" may be confn:d by
executive order in "a conce'lttration camp" or "obliged tb
""ti,""d
- -;"ft"under
reside police surveillance in a fxed pl'ace'"
natioiat army, the civil guard or national police, local
oolice and the SixthBureau-a formation of secrst military
'police+nforce tlris and similal measnres with strict and often
LUit o.v rigor. Only known or suspecrcd communists wfto
-violated
ion" thrrot-"*a ot public securiry since luly 1954
temphasis oursl are supposed to be arested and 're-educated'
 THE FOLICE STATE AMERICA SUPPORTED 183

rmder these decrees. But many non+ommunists have also been

detained-"
Time, of April 14, 1961, reported, "Some overly suspicious
army oosrmanders make recruits for the Viet Cong by in-
discriminately jaitng villagers. One colonel taking over a new
post found 1,50O people in jail and discovered that there was
not a shred of evidence against 1,200 of tlem." But what of the
special military courts that had been empowered to seize, try
and condemn suspects, with sentences carried out within three
days and only "not guilty, life tmprisonment and death ver-
dicts" permrtted? How many rnnocent men had been taken out
and shot in such camps with no one but ther friends and tam-
ilies knowing of theu fate?
Anerican liberals, who assail all parading swaggering pri-
vate armies and police as reminders of Hitler and Mussolini,
found nothrng wrong with the bands formed by Nhu and his
wife. Like Hitler's, these bands were composed of men and
women out for money, power and perquisites. In every crisis
their brutality rncreased out of fear of the score-settling by
those whom they nad terrorized were Diem and Nhu to fall.
rn his phobia about cnticsm and security, Diem was rnio€u-
vered into seerng his brother and sister-in-law as hrs mainstays.
"His lDiem's1 followers were killed oy Communists and our
followers snysd him," Madame Nhu explained to all who
wonld listen, as quoted by the New York Herald Tribune (Eu-
ropeao edition), August 27, 1963. "Without his family he
[Diem] stands alone. The women follow me and my husband
has his Youth Movement. The C-atholics take orders from
Archbishop Thuc."
Thuc and Diem pushed their projects for nobilizing groups
all such and playing them against each other to the point of
planning Catholic parish militias extending over all of Viet-
nam. Gerard Periot, the writer covering Catholis Aftairs for
Patrs Match, wrote on August 31, 1963, that notes had been
sent to all pries* requesting them to recruit and arm militias
in their parishes. Only three priests agreed, so great was the
apprehension that Diem's use of the nation's ten per cent
Catholic minsrity in his political game would make tlem the
ultimate of a civil war which could become a religious war
after Diem's fall. "Monsignor Thuc wished to hold an anti-
communist meeting in Saigor5" wrote Periot. "Monsip.or
linh, the archbishop of the capital, refused, saying, 'If you are
the masler of the Hue diocese, t am the master of the diocese
of Saigon and I am not going to let my cathedral become a
headquarters for political meetinp."
184 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Monsignor Binh was no weakling in his stant against com-
munism;-it was simply that in his eyes Monsignor Thuc was
not fighling sommlinism but using the Communist threat to
politick for his family.
^ Undaunted, Diem and Nhu then decided to rid them-
selves of the Loublesome Dai Viet party, the nationalists who
had never accepted them. At the same time they planned to
"Vietnamize" the mountain tribesmen of the High Plateau.
For d hundred years the French had protected the montag-
nards, as they were called, against the Vietnamese of tbe
lowlands. Diem decided to inundate them by forcibly trans-
porting those Dai Viet members whom he considered tlreats to
^tli-*efr
to the High Plateaq an area twice as large as Switzer-
land, extending fiom the frontier of North Vietnam to the
plains of Cochin China in the South.
^ It was a monster police operation, unjust and handled in
the worst maruler of the old mandarins. The 600'000 montag'
nards saw the 200,000 political being brought t9 9iem:s
^victims exiles
'Siberia" not as fellow but as the first wave of a horde
meant to take their lands and exterminate them. As potential
enemies of the regime were forcibly transplanted and other
sections of the HiEh Phteau were turned into model villages
for Catholis refugees, hate smouldered among the montag-
nards against the authors of the whole plan.
Wherever there was hatred of Diem the Vietcong swung
into action, discreetly at first, according to the Tong Bo's time-
tried "long war" me-thodt. Every abusl by Diem favored the
Vietcong. Appeals to revolt alternated with terrorism. The
nigbttinJe triliunafs of the Vietcong spread judging and
executing minor functionaries, village heads, government ad-
ministrators down to the smallest communities. The govern-
ment replied to Vietcong terrorism with secret- police-and
i'patriotic organizations" denouncing citizens whom
zealous
the government was powerless to Protect from the Vietcong
but ieady to imprisof if they made the slightest accommoda-
tion to save their skins.
Life in the villages became impossible' Slowly at first, then in
dtoves, whole families migrated to Saigon, preferring to die
of hunger rather than with a bullet in the head. In Saigon gov-
ernmeu:tal police proved as pitiless as the Reds. By Junrc of
1959 veritible oil spots, called "free regions" by the Com-
munists, cast their stain across the country and continued to
spread. Red flags, loud speakers, slogans and administrations
were openly installed.
Establislunent of these "liberated regions" was exceedingly
 TFIE POLICE STATE AMERICA SUPPORTED 185
simple. Fint a Vietcong unit would move into a village at
night set up a court and try and execute the local administra-
tor and all his aides, under the eyes of their fellow citizens.
A-utomatically the village become not only converted but
"loyal."'Ihe next move was to confscate identity cards issued
by the Diem government. Communist agents used then as
passes and tle poor nha-que of the countryside, deprived of his
card of {""gty, had no alternative but to become a Vietcong.
The national army with its American equipment was to-o
cumbersome for night chases through the rice paddies, even
if so inclined.
- So Nhu got his next brain wave: the aggrovilles, or strategic
hamlets, as we called them. "If he [Diem] bows to .American
pressures' and retrres from the scene even for a few months,',
Joe,Alsop quoted Nhu as saying in the famous Alsop column
ot-fep!9mber 20, 1963, "The whole strategic hambfprogram
will collapse, for I alone am the inspiration of the youig fight-
ers who defend the hamlets." A word is needed here on these
hamle8 which were at once villages fortified, presumably
against the Reds, and concentration camps encasing the pop-
ulation for tle Ngo rlinhs.
Overnight the propaganda machine took oft on its latest
kick. Before they were even tried, strategic hamlets were hailed
as a great $rccess, and anyone who
talked sense was denounced
as being "on the Qssprrnisf team." EVer since the beg:tnning
of America's "sink or swim with Diem,' experiment, as New
York Timel Homer Bigart caned i! our press, State Depart-
meNf, U$S and self-appointed authorities, such as Ixderer and
Burdick ot The UgIy American famg had never ceased to par-
rot the self-satisfying claim that the French lost because they
used World War II metlods in a subversive war. The truth of
the matter is, the ingenuity with which individual ofrcers met
and coped with Vietmrnh methods was astounding; and if the
Pentagon and USIS (Saigon headquarters of which was re-
ferred to as "the temple of self-exlollers',) would translate and
study Lucien Bodard's boole" La Guerre djlndoChina L' En-
lisement, as a manual, they would learn a lot.
The Saturdoy Evening Post of Novemoer 24, !962, carried
a story by Harold Martin which was typical. Martin sneered at
the French guard towers as hangovirs from a .,fortification
cgncegt'l that in eight years of bloody fiehting cost France
the whole of Indochina. .oThe .Old Stockade idea' Works,.
proclaimed Martin. Hamlets were ringed by fences of sharp-
ened bamuoo stakes, protected by a moat and barbed wiri.
186 BACKGROUND TO BBTRAYAL
tle Cong can't just walk in and take what they want."
"}.{ow
Maftin quoted an American as saying triumphantlya
In reaiity "strategic hamlef,' was the French fortification
concept on-a biggericale. Instead of locking a small force in a
suardltower at nieht, Nhu and his do-it-big assistants locked
ip whole villaees. When a guard tower fell it was usually
tf,rougn a traitor on the inside. By fortifying whole ha'mlets
Nnu inlargeA the "tower" and increased the. possibili-f -of
treachery; tlat was all. Villagers who resented doing work for
which they were not paid were harassed by Nhu's po-licaYiet-
cong spies and infiltrators found it easier to undermine a
stocladed village ttan a guard tower, and when a stockaded
village fell the arms naU was correspondingly bigger.
fie ttugi" stories were legion. A dying Vietnamese found
near the ammunition cases when Plei Mrong was attacked
murmured, "Me Vietcong No. 1." Charged with distributing
ammunition to the defenders, he had armed his own meIL
Nearly 175 Jarai tribesmen had been recruited to defend the
hant& Ebven elected to settle their scores with Saigon by
helping the Vietcong. The night of-the attgk an infiltrator
oufOJUmrcgs mortar out of commission while another cut a
i".r"g" through the barbed wire. The first attack was directed
lowur? the Jarai recruits, who took shelter in a trench' There
they were cut down one by one. A sack full of thc hands of
Jarai volunteers was later found near an eltry to the camp'
In another hamlet a message being sent from a woman on
the inside to her husband with the Vietcong was intercepted'
"Do not worry about us," she wrote. '"The cbildren and I are
being taken iare of." How many Vietconq tenorists were
relieied of family responsibilities by stockade'enthusiastic
Americans we shall never know. "South Vietnam rounds up
critics of the regime," announced the Indianapolis -Star -o{
September 4, tgdz, and from that belated admission of special
*ni"t-poti.e-ana-arUitrary arrests emerged another picture of
what we not only condoned but financed.
Oou of the frst honest reports to reach the Americanpublic
was David Hotham's article in ltre New Republlc of Novem-
ber 25, 1957; but hero again Americans who should have
heeded rejecteA the warning because it was unpleqsant-and
because the Neur Repubtlc had printed it. Hotham had been
in Saigon for tbree years as British correspondent for the
Londoi Times and the Economlsl. On his way home by boat
he summed up his observations; and carefully, in understate'
ment if anything, wrote that America was losing the-southern
half of tniochina just as France had lost the northern' "It
 THE POLICE STATE AMBRICA SUPPORTED T87
has been possible for Western propaganda to porfray it [South
Vietnaml as stable by drawing over the confused whirlpool
of its internal ferment a massive but discreet curtain of dollars
end mislssding publicity," Hotham warned. Diem's use of his
"police to squelch the anti{ommunist intellectual opposition,"
Hotham branded an imbecility. 'nWhat is extraordinary is that
these incredible mistakes of policy Flotham listed theml have
been represented by Western publicity services as successes of
the regime. In fact they have annihila&d the forces of anti-
Communist nationalism. "
Hotham's lucid portrayal of the ugliness of Diem's power
should have been carefully studied. Sixty,four per cent of the
$770 million (admitted) poured into the country since 1954
went to pay the wages of the "feudal" army of the Ngo dinhs,
which replaced, and inefrciently at tha! the ferocious anti-
Communist armies sf 1fos ginh Xuyen and the sects which we
reviled because thcy were "feudal." What security did Diem's
private forces provide? Against the Communistg none, said
Hotham. "Since the defeat of ttre sects in 1955, Diem's army
and police have been notorious for their activities in the vii,
Iages-widespread arrests and imprisonment without evidence
and withoW trial of perso$r suspected of being Communists
or 'enemies of the state.' According to reliable iources, about
14,000 persons were arrested in Annam alone at the time of
lhe March 1956, elections. Since then the process has, accord-
ing to atl reports, insreased rather than aiminishsd. Far from
giving security,, tlere is every reason to suppose that the army,
buttrcssed by the Civil Guard (a sort of rural police of 50,0dd
Fen), .E regqded by the southern peasant as a symbol of
and rqrression.',
This ardcle, one of the best the author has seen on our
South Vieham experimen! Hotham sent to an Anerican
lite^rary agent whoso name had been given him. Editor after
editor turned it down. At last, rather than write it off as a
!o4 b*: Hotham, who knew nothing of consenative rhinking
in America" accepted a check for sevlnty-five dollars from hi!
agenf who sold the piece to thc Nsw R ejablic.Then the public
yhigh ggve him no other choice condemned Hotham for being
tn the.Ne11 R1nulltc, This is the story of most attempts to teI
America the truth about South Vietiam.
leyond the obvious networlc with their overlapping layers
of informers were apparatuses Americans in Oeir'tlusiodces
ignore.d. When forced to face the spectre
of what they were
financing and protecting,-whole ag6ncies reac&d as a single
man. An ouflash of blind hate against tle monster ,\rork[g
188 BACKGROTJND TO BETRAYAL
against Anerica" followed" and a torrent of vicious reports
flew Washington-ward, to rqnse in government files which
only thoso out to block the offender's passport and destroy his
reputation would ever see. No one, therefore, would ever refute
them-
Beneath the visible police-state machinery was the Cong
Dan Vu, ostensibly formed to protect the country against
Communists, but often referred to as a '"Tlojan horse." Its
headquarters was at the airport from which Diem and his
family would presumably flee, if they ever had to leave the
country. No one else would be able to get near the airport in
the event of a crisis, bul for that matter, no one would have a
passport nor any Formosa to go to, so it would not matter.
No one believed the men of the Cong Dan Vu would have to
flee, but the CDV was as ideally situated to prevent a getaway
as to assure one. As early as September 1958 this author wrote
in an article published by Anoertcan Mercury that fte Cong
Dan Vu would never let Diem and his family escape.
A man namd Kieu cong Cung who had once been Ho chi
|,,linh's chief of state, headed the Cong Dan Vu. Ho chi Minh
sent him north in 1946. Then C\rng returned to the South to
get in touch with Ngo dinh Nhu one month before the Geneva
accord of 1954, bringing with him his own lieutenants, old
Communist comrades in arms from central Vietnam. Cung's
fellow Communist ofrcer, Albert Pham ngoc Thaq who had
been Ho chi Minh's intelligence chief in the sout\ was wonn-
ing his way into the family teams being organized by Nhu
and Thuc, wbile Diem waited in Europe for American sup-
porters to force him on Bao Dai and the French. Cung and
Thao adroitly denounced as Communists any southerners who
got in their way, so the next thing Saigon anti4ommunists
kneq their former implacable enemies, Albert Pham ngoc
Thao and Kieu cong Cung, were running Nhu's intelligence
setup and Diem's private gestapo, re.spectively. Cung was given
special powers, making him answerable only to the presidenf
and required to make no accounting to anybody. His budget,
provided by American ai4 was pass€d ea f6 him directly by
the secretary of state with no accounting to the finance min-
ister. No one knew how much Cung spent or where it went.
The organization of the CDV was divided into tlree ses-
tions: intelligence, information and special police. Head of the
intelligence section was Nguyen van Thuan, who had been
Ho chi Minh'g economic section chief after World War tr. It
was Thuan who built up tho efrcient black market and piastre
trafrc which made Ho's forces in the Saigon area self+upport-
 THE POLICE STATE AMERICA SUPPORTED 189
pB; Alrcng with intelligence, Thuan directed Diem's psycho-
logical warfare section which carried with it the right to i:rest
without warrant and hold without trial. The number of those
takeninto custody by Thuan and not seen again would seem
to indicate that the right to execute without circumlocution or
undue paper work was also included.
Since Tran chanh Thanh's information service and Thuans
dual networks overlapped, Vietnamese observing the close
cooperation between ffuqnh's agency and U. S. information
Service concluded that USIS also straddled information and
intelligence for America.
All of the men in Diem's speciat branches were handpicked,
which did not mean that they were not Communist infil-trators.
No matter llw many conce,trtric protective rings he drew
around him, Diem still felt inssgls's. As provocation for hatred
increased Diem's distrust of associates and subordinates and
the peop_le at lar_ge spread downward and outward. Suspicion,
qanifesline. itself by alternate rages and periods ot Ur.6oaini
silence, hesitance followed by ruthless repressioas, tormentei
his days._ Escape from haunting fear became a necessity, until,
pespite the great political and social gulf between th*i, pi""i
became no different from Ho sfui ]yfinh and Nguyen Binh and
Ho's^ other satraps who executed and imprisoned right and
left for thoughts they imagined those around them wJre con-
cealing in their minds. The man hawked from one end of
America to the other for his high morality became a facade
of simplicity and purity behind which worked all the forces
of evil.
-IVIore groups, more ever-widening rings, each more cor€-
fnlly selected (and sometimes better paid) than the last, were
grganqed and kept ignorant (so Diem thought) of each otler.
In reality- tley worked together in perfect teamwork to play
upol his fears, for at the head of each ring was an experieicei
revolutionary who, a few months or years before, hald worked
in the same capacity under Ho chi Minh.
. Clemeat Johnsfea, head of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce,
iu his 1957 special report to Congress on America's a"com-
plishme_nts
il Vietnam, said, ,,What has been accomplished
PV_
O." Michigan State University team with the polici force
19
being uni.ertaken in other Government departmelts by pub-
lic administration technisians from the same in tit"tion, witU
agreeable but less spectacular results.,'
How spectacular these results were the American people
were to learn_six years later. ,,Control of the army is a c6n-
venient and effective means of protecting political tdnure,,, Mr.
190 BACKGROTIND TO BETRAYAL
Johnston also told the committee. One year later State Depart-
ment testimony before Congress estimated that 38,000 political
prisoners
^before
were irr Vietnam's camps and- prisons. And this was
the fierce outbreak of guerrilla fighting provided a pre-
text for such measures. Mixed together in Diem's prison
camps were all the makings of the sort of Communist univer-
sity ihat trained Nguyen Binh and thousands of other subver-
sives in countries that have since fallen to the Reds.
Why so many estimates gave 30,000 to 38,000 as the number
languishing in the camps set up by Diem, Nhu and Can, is hard
to exptain,-untess the 5b0,000 often grventy-!!em s opposition
seemid too high and anything less than 30,000 was obviously
untue. On June 17, 1960, three and a half lines in Paris's
Figro announced that six hundred political prisoners had been
released from Vietnamese prison camps after promising to
break with the Communist party. Thus six hundred em-
bitlered graduates went out as "professofs" from the hardest
schools on earth, while non{ommunists by the thousands were
hauled in for indoctrination. What a heyday the Communists
had with the ammunition "our man" was giving them'
On January 20, 1959, General Vo nguyen Giap, the national
defense minister and vice-president of Communist North Viet-
narn, launched a press dtasft slaiming that Diem's police had
killed over a thouiand political prisoners fu1 2 gingls day in the
Phu-Ini concentration camp, about four miles ftom the prin-
cipal village in Thu-Dau-Mot province. As rqrcrted i2.L1
Monde of lanuary 21, L959, betweBn 5,000 and 6,000 political
prisoners, many of them non{ommunis! were in the Phu-Loi
camp. After their noon meal on December 1, 1958, they started
dying. Some say several hundred succumbed; others set the
figure at over a thousand. There was no way of knowing, under
the strict censorship in force. Next day the survivors staged
a riot. A fre, believed caused by guards firing on the panic-
stricken inmates, increased the number of victims.
Whether the poisoning was due to bad food purchased by
ofrciats trying to graf! or Diem ofrcers getting rid of trouble-
some charges, is hard to say. More important it provided
propaganda emmunition for the Reds and fanned the South's
apprehensions. A feeling that no one was safe existed on every
level, and the example of what happened at Dai-Loc was never
forgotlen. At Dai-Loc 360 "reformed" Communists were re-
leased in the nearby farming area on their oath that they had
tumed over a new leaf and would help clean up the country.
Within four months they denounced and sent to concentratiou
camps over a thousand farmers as "Communist agents." An-
 TI{E POLICB STATE AMERICA SUPPORTED 191

other 160 were either locked up or severely beaten. (Pacific

Affairs, vol. XXXI no. 3, September 1958)
This was the climate in whicb the hapless residents of
"America's Showcase for Democracy" lived. By the very ease
with which the enemy assassinated village heads who did not
cooperate, it should have been obvious to an intelligent Ameri-
can bureaucracy that village chiefs who lived were village
chiefs who were Ho chi ffiinh ad{ninistrators by night and who,
if they denounced anyone by day, denounced only enemies of
Ho chi Minh.
 CHAPTER EIGI{TEBN

PRICE TAG FOR DISASTER

How much did all this cost the American taxpayer? Un-
fortunately, we shall never know. What about the claim that
no matter what happens, eighty percent of all American aid
comes back to America in the form of purchases? The truth
is, the bookkeeping which presents eighty percent of foreign
aid as coming back to America in purchases is a swindle. Such
e4rorts are not sales abroad; they are forced purchases by
the American taxpayer of something he does not want and
does not get. The material he is forced to buy, though he
neve,r sees it, goes to some native with a place at the faucet
somewhere on the other side of the world- Tfue, the American
manufacturer makes a profit. His taxes are higher becawe of
it, but the cost is spread over the American taxpaying body
as a whole. The many manufacturers are willing to carry on,
on that basis, until eternity if they and their congressmen can
put it over. The question is, can America afiord it? And does
any country have a right to milk its citizens by making them
buy products for someone else?
The high-sounding term that the economic wizards in Wash-
ington gave tis swindle is "countetpart financing." We pre-
vent inflation in recipient countries, they proudly told the
tanpayer, by bringing eighty-five percent of our aid allotments
in the form of consumer foods and only fifteen percent in
funds. The consumer goods are purchased on the local foreign
market and the funds therefrom are used to meet the needs
of the foreign government receiving such "aid." The Inter-
national Cooperation Agency sallsd this "generating local
currensy." What it meant in a country where comrption is
considered a fine art and American agencies covered up the
comrption, is that the government could print bank notes as
fast as it wished, and American exports provided the backing.
The notes had no gold, silver, nor any other reserye behind
them; but since they could buy American tape recorders, hi-fi
radios, food, textiles, shiny new automobiles, and other luxury
items, the fiction was maintained that eigbty percent of foreign
l92
 PRICE TAG FOR DISASTER 193
aid returned to Americq and Vietnam's crxrency went on a
tape recorder, hi-fi radio, and luxurygadget standard.
Firms with an inside track grew 1u1 e11 ttis deal, and their
agents in Saigon made a killing. In Vietnam, as in all countries
on American-generated cuxrency, the native purchaser's will-
ingness to buy was unlimited. Ability to buy was another mat-
ter. The per capita income was estimated at around $130 per
year with most of the purchasing power in the hands of the
armn whose pay scale, Pacific Afiairs of September 1958,
admitted, was "among the highest in Asia and in some cases
higher than those paid to troops in NATO." These, and c.ivilian
administrators in position to reach the trough, constituted the
new, rich class tle Diem govcrnment and our aid created.
That their capacity to buy had a saturation point was soon
demonstrated by the amount of goods piling up on Saigon
shelves, priced lower than they cost in America.
Food and textile purchases in America ruined the native
Vietnam textile industry. Rice imports in the form of unpub
licized American aid were diverted in the native black market
and sometimes reshipped as a source of foreign currency-
this by the country that continued to export its rice tlroughout
the Indochina war. Congressman Otto Passman (D., Iruis-
iana) spearheaded an attack on waste and graft in Anerican
aid in June 1958, but tiny Laos, whose fleecing of the Aner-
ican contributor was piddling by comparison, was as close as
he ventured to our "sacred cow" in South Vietnam.
Leland Barrows, our International Cooperation Agenry
chief in Saigon, in an interview published by the Washington
Post of February 18, 1957, called Vietnam a "stable, peaceful
nation. (In the Department of State Bulletin of May ll, 1959,
Barrows again touted his program in an article covering Amer-
ican aid to South Vietnam since 1955.) Barrows, in 1957,
stated that we were pouring only $320 million a year into
South Vietnam. 3g1 this did not include the salaries and
expenses of the 130 to 150 men working for ICA nor the
sprawling United States Information Service spending most of
its $750,000 to let President Diem's non{ommunist oppo-
sition know that he had the weight of a gleat country, i" e., the
United States, le[fud him.
The effort to entrench Diem rather than bolster South Viet-
nam was iustified as a solid plan to preserve stability. It created
the illusion of a surface calm. Since the USIS expenditure was
to fnance a Diem propaganda campaign rather than sell
America" both it and its parallel operation to tell America that
all was well in South Vietnam must rightly be included in the
I94 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
balance of American aid to Diem. Copies of Time magazine
totaling 1.8 million were dishibuted free in ffty-six countries
by the USIS in 1958 as part of the American propaganda
efforl To the extent of Time's perpetuation of the false picture
in Sotdh Vietnam, the cost of that operation must be con-
sidered aid to the governnent of President Diem-
Lffe magaztne of May 13, 1957 (the lobn Osborne report),
put American aid in South Vietnam at $400 million yearly.
The New York Herald Tribunc of February 12, 1958, esti-
mated it at "about $2,000,000,000 a year." The truth is som+
where between the Leland Barrows figure and the Herald
Trtbunds.
EiShty percent of the Vietnamese national budget was
admittedy paid by the United States tbrough Fresident Diem's
New York public relations offlce, and American Friends of
Vietnam assured America tlat one of the miracles performed
by *our man" was the successful shoring up of his national
economy. By the above admission of eigbty percent depend-
ency on America, Vietnam sould be said to be twenty percent
independent but the term "American aid" did not take into
account the periodic "loans' abeorbed by the Saigon govern-
ment. On June 18, 1958, there was a $9,50Q0(X) loan "to
cseate an industrial development in the agricultural south."
(S/hether the government i. e., tle presidenfs familn or
private ownership, i. e., the president'e family, would control
tle development when fnished, was unstated.) On fdy 13,
1958, there was a six million dollar loan for a telecommrmi-
cation system
These are only examples. Ihe actual yearly figure is stag-
gering. The Vietnamese Petroleum Compann launched in
1957, was investigated for a swindle involving some 100
million piastres. By the agreement siped on November 5,
1957, the United States government guaranteed all American
loans and investuents in South Vietnam. Since not a cent of
such money will ever return to Amerisa, there is no reason
why the farce should be maintained that it is different from
American aid or that anyone but the ta4rayer will be the
ultinate victim.
The fact that the Communists have not taken over has
been touted as proof tbat America's sacrifices stopped the tide.
Tbey have, but not in the way we bave been tol4 No Com-
muni$t would be fool enough to kill the golden-egg-laying
goose that was financing all the improvements he wanted. The
U. S. Development Loan Fund was authorized on March 15,
1959, to advance $19,500,000 for the extension and moderni-
 PRICE TAG FOR DISASTER 195
zation of thetaigon-Cholon water sy$tem. Former Communist
leader Tran le Quang public works chief, inherited the projecl
It provided employment for his penonal following
British comeEnndent David Hotham declared in both the
London Tlmes and.tfu Economist that four-fifths of Anerica's
gigantic a1$ progam had failed to contribute in any direct way
to the wefl-being of the people, that the Americane who gave
that nnstinting aid were not liked and that the economio situa-
tion was rapidly deteriorating. That the Communists had done
norlring, hc insisted, was not because Diem was in power but
rather, Diem was in power because the Communists had done
nqthing.
According to ofrcial estimates, sixty-four percent of Amer-
ican aid to Vietnam was going for military expenditures in
1957. This included a 150,00G.man army in which the pres.
ident had so little confdence that he used it as an outer ring
of defense against his people. Within tle ring he relied on a
smaller circe of 45,0fi) civil guards, in which he had so little
confidence he added a st'll closer enveloping ring of 15,000
picked police. Former Red leaders ran the police.
The explanation for Vietnamese army pay scales being
among the highest in Asia and in some cases higher than tlose
paid to NATO troops is simple: As a leader becomes hated his
army's pay becomes not pay but bribery. $10,000 a day went to
Nhu's special forces alone. Considering the cost of training
equipping and maintaining an unsure army on a pay scale
necessa4f to keep tlem from deserting it is doubtful that
sixty-four percent of even $3 million a day could support the
210,000 men constanfly on a campaign footing that Diem
found necessary to prevent a nationalist revolt.
Meanwhile American aid fnanced the New York public
relations firm and other propaganda organizations campaigning
for continued American aia-in targei sums and toi tongei
periods. As the campaip. to condition the citizen for further
levies on himself met with increasing resistance, the switch
over to a cry for private investuents gained momentum. It
involved keeping another set of books but that was all. Lower
aid fgures were expected to cheer Americans at home. The
Development Loan Fund grants replacing them passed un-
mentioned.
American aid was administered througb the National Bank
of South Vietnnm by a former Q666rrnisl official named
Vu van Thaq it will b€ recalled. Working in conjunction with
him as credit chief for said aid was Mr. Albert Pham ngoc
Thao, who had been Communist leader Ho shi li,Iinh's intelli-
196 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
genoe chiefin Cochin China and whose brother was in Ho's
government in Hanoi and whose father was president of the
Vietminh (Communist) League in Paris. Why shordd Ho chi
Minh be in any hurry to take over?
There was another form of Amerisan aid no less involuntary
on the part of the contributor. Tfavelers passing through Sai-
gon by boat or plane had to declare the American dollars and
other gurrensies, and even the number of watches carried with
them. When the declaration was signed, they wete searched
to se€ if banknotes in their billfolds exceeded tle declaration.
Most passing Americans felt that how many dollars they car-
ried was their own aftair and were haphazard about diselosing
them. Not so the Vietnamese. Hauls of two and tbree thousand
dollars per ship were not unconlmon. Confiscation was based
on the absurdity that the passenger planned to buy piastres on
the black-market, or that he was sltpping a watch past the
customs to sell in the counEy. Where did this money go?
Personal graft perhaps, but one never knows, vdth former
Red officials running the police.
If. admined American handouts paid eigbty percent of the
expemes of the Diem governmenf contributions disguised as
lsans, foreiF investments, welfare work and customs seizures
could have equaled twenty percent of the admitted aid. This
left other revenue available for graft, and America might in
all honesty claim to have carried the country one hundred
percent. The United Nations poured money into the country
tlrough a technical assistance program' under its orvn natne'
with the UN rather than America getting the credit. America,
however, wa{l on paper as paying sixty percent of rhis expendi'
ttue and in reality probably paid around ninety-three Percent.
Diem's family deposits were so heavy in France at the time
Monsieur Pinay devaluated the franc in 1959 that negotiations
were opened for improved trade only on the conditlon that
the Frinch goveftEnent would tnake an adiustment on the
15Vo of Yletnarnese wealth lost by devahmtion.In other wotds,
brother Nhu, on the governnent level, was willing to restore
some of the trade taken by us from France if Monsieur Pinay
would fnd a way to pay him ss a private citizen a sum equalling
l|Vo of his holdings and dqrosits in France as a commission.
Foreip Affairs Minister Pineau of France gave Diem a
billion and a half francs when he visited Saigon in early
1958 and further French handouts. In November
1959 he followed with a ffteen-year loan of seven billion
francs. West Germany and Japan made sredits available, and
Japan's,war reparations ($39 million in reparations and $16
 PRICB TAG FOR DISASTER 197

million in loans) were expedited to afford a trade outlet in

Southeast Asia The Colombo Plan, through which British and
Australian cooperation was chaDneled, brought a constsnt
stream of money from the pound sterling nations as part of
their project for safeguarding Singapore 9d the Straits.
yei tnlre wall never enough. The cry for more money and
new forns under whish to disguise it was constant. Where did
it all go? Little if anything was done to industrialize the coun-
try. A-wstch assembly plant periodically opened-and shut down.
Tlere were model rifugee Camps, nurseries, schools and well-
stocked stores piled high with consumer goods that success-
fully screcned tle concentration camps and -the terror. And
thEie was the gaft It was everywhere. It made the president's
sister-in-lnw anC ofrciat hostess famous (or infamous) around
the world, except in America.
Mr. Clement Johnston, chairman of the board of the U. S.
Chamber of Commerce, reported to the Specid Committee to
Study the Foreign Aid Program, rn t957 , that the usual patte-rn
of gilvernment in Southeast Asia was a strong man and !!s
ass&iates buoyed by the indispensable Amerisan aid, with
liberal crumbc from the table for loyal followers.
'"The people of Vietnam," Mr. Jobnston stated, "now are
living by false standards under a 'phoney' inflated surrency.
Under igreement which Washington has yet to modify in the
face of repeateA recommendations, United States doilaf, aid is
extended on a basis of $1 for 35 piastres. The piastre, even otr
the semi-ofrcial market, is worth less tlan half the ofrcial
rate and is worth about one-third the value on the black
markel or at the fnancial center of Hong Kong. The United
States, therefore, is getting no more than 50/o of the mileage
we should expect on the aid dollar."
Mr. Johnson told the committee, "The figure is utterly un-
realistic. The added and unnecessary cost to the United States
taxpayer is approximately $20 millio! a month." This
am6ulted to $240 million a yearl How likely is it then that
the $320 million a year quoted by Mr. Leland Barrows to the
Washington pre$ was anywhere near the honeet figure?
*The $20 million a month loss entailed by our maintenance
of the fantastic artificial piastre rate," Mr. Jobnston stated
categorically, "ig not going into public treasuries' it is- going
into-private pockets," and hc put the result correctly when-he
amrneA that the faith of the people of the area is "being
shaten by the spectacle of the undeserved enrichment of a
favorcd group."
Unfortunately, by representing to Congress all aid as
 198 BACKGROIJND TO BETRAYAL
"defense{onnected," those favoring its maintenance or in-
crease carried the day.Ipored was Mr. Jobnston's conclusion
that Unit€d States funds were being used to ..build and equip
armed forces, some of whose officers and men s€ep 1s thini
of their mission only in terms of aneient hostilities and
rivalries. Communist aggression and communism obviously do
nlt constitute the primary menace, nor provide alone a jufr-
eient challenge to motivate current miUtary training pro-
gra^ms."
As American goods mounted on Saigon shelves and cus-
tgns 9!eds became packed to overflowing a corrupt officiat-
dom,- like an arrny of ants swarming over a decaying sarcass,
sought more ways of acquiring crurency and proiriding scape-
goats to blame for its lack. AIt that Amerisa-knew was wlat
corrld_ be gleaned from zuch vague reports as Ap's dispatch
of February 16, 1958, out of Washington: ,,The Internatonal
Cooperation Administration yesterday approved the orpendi-
ture of $9,141,800 to buy petroleumo textiles and othef com-
modities from worldwide sources for South Vietnam-,'
In- far-off Saigon the scramble for money and scapegoats
continue.d. The nationalization laws against the Chin6se and
Cambodians, and Vietnam,s confiscation moves were phases
of- that scramble by which shake-downs were legaliz& and
ltitqy encouraged It was obvious eight years before history,s
foreclosure tlat the dividends on our huge investment in fhis
country, the total of which will never be divulged, were going
to be_negative; yet, oD May 2O, 1957, Walter Lippmann
headed his column in the New York Herald Tribut;,,"I\e
Case for Foreign Aid.' One week later he wrote .,The presi-
dent's Plea for Foreign Aid." Half of our foreign aid for
1957 went to Formosa, South Korea and South Vietnam.
What happened to tle money we poured into South Vietnam
(besides,"generating currency" anA Uriting opposition gen-
erals with sums nrnning into the miltions to ially to Diem,
which we have already mentioned) could fill a booic. The Feb-
Jualf tf59 plot to finance a revolution in neighboring Cam-
bodia should not be omitted. While rural roads were torn up
by Red saboteurs, construction crews toiled to make a privarc
road and landscaped approach to a new rose-fringed mountain
leg-?! for $e Ngo dinhs in Dalat. (Louis Kraar report to
Wall Street Journal, previously mentioned.) The International
lipe anA Ceramics Company of East Orange, New Jeney,
landed a $5,600,000 contract for t4.7 miles of pipeline, and
Hydrotechnic Co4roration of New york raced-to put in a
$7,144,000 water-treating plant before the blo*-up. A
 PRTCB TAG FOR DISASTER 199

disposal grojgct.was-next on the board'

- efUdtt M.sowage
$9,207J00
Colegrovl of the Scripps-Howard chain dealt
Vietnam aid swindlers their hardest blow in mid-1959' In a
sedes of articles Colegrove stated, "We'Ye flooded the country
*iO tt""tott, trucks,leeps, factories. Thc people don't know
what to do with lihem." He added, "It's like gving yonr young
."r,-*U" l* never been behind the wheel of a car, a ndw
C"dUu", a hundreddollar bill, and an instruction book and
:
teUing trim to run along and have a good time'"
fn]u en aid boys at the top were sawy. Knowing the
"i""o might touch oft an explosion, I-eland Bar-
Colerrove report
to*rl m" aid chief responsible when everything from .atomic
i"""too to watch factories was being installed in South Viet-
tEoi"g Ho chi Minh tangible qnfeqce of the fruits to be
""-
;r-"ild bi b€ins patient), was quietly hauled out of Saigon
i"a nermiieA to-take cover in Falls Churcb' Vireinia' Then
tn" att"ct starte{ not on foreip aid waste but on Colegrove'
ICA as usual applying picket-line tactics, set out to destroy
the bost-rosk€r. Another Scripps-Howard man, Jim G' Lucas'
went to Saigon to see if his colleague had exaggerated,-and
Lucas're'poru we.re, if anything more devastating than Cole-
grove's. What happened? A Senate committee was set up
Io investigate the-charges. Who was in charge ot- it?-Milfe
Mansfield.- Needless to say Mike's "godson" and his family
came out unscathed, and Colegrove's excellent story on "Our
Hidden Scandal-Arrogant U. S. Bureaucrats Roil Viet-
nameser' which appeared in the New Yotk World'Telegram
of July 23, 1959, was buried and forgotten !V JulV 25 of the
samo inonth. The Washington Post in its editorial of January
5, 1960, called such rePorts "Picking on Vietnam." And Pres-
ident Eisenhower refused to let tle Senate investigating com-
mittee look at thc books on American aid to Soutb Vietnam.
There the matter rested'
American aid paid off in hate.
interview of Feb-
I-eland Barrows, in his Washington Port*43,000
ruary 18, 1957, boasted of having resettled refugees-in
six ilontbs in 8,000 new houses along more than 100 miles
of canals, newly dug by hand." Barrows was spieling propa-
ganda. What hi.proieci bougSt was hate. David Hotlam, the
i.ondon correipondent mentioned in the previous chap-
?rlnzes
ter, vrote, "If DiedJ army contributes little or nsthing to the
advancement of tle Southern people, neither does the rese&
tlement of the Northern refugees. . . . This was a great success-
ful human operation (though it was also of course a maneuver
in the ColilWar). But to settle nearly 900,000 Tonkinese
2OO BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
refugees, tw.o-thirdsof them Catholics, among the primarily
Buddhist population of Cochin-China was not calculated to
endear a Catholic Fr$ident and his Western supporters to
the people of the South. The latter have, besides, every reason
to be envious of the money spent on these undesirable visitants
frqm the North, and of the houses, work and land-all of
which are short in the South-with which they axe provided."
American aid paid off in hate in other instances as well.
fobn Osborne, h b article in Life, ltf:ay 13, t957, wamed,
"They [tle Vietnamese] remember that brother Nhu, riding
around in his palace Citroen today, was working and fiving
in his union's dirty, fly-pestered quarters not so long ago. They
note that Mme. Ngo dinh Nhn, a tiny and articulate beauty of
28, has emerged as her bachelor brother-inJads official hos-
tess, as leader of the nation's organized women, and as an
'Independent'member of the Assembly, to which her husband
was also elected."
Vietnanese exiles claimed that Paris' big movie theater, the
Re4 and the dance halt, Reve, attached to it, as well as apart-
ments and buildingr running into millions of dollars, were
"oversess investments" of the Ngo dinhs. The Paris daily
L'Aurore, March 18, 1958, mentioned only the Rex motion
picture chain
Hotham, the Britisher, told America in his New Republic
article of November 25, 1957:

The present writer qpent nearly tbree years in Saigon as the

correspondent of an English newspal,er. He has no axe to
grind other than f6 make what contribution he can to tbe
over-riding objective of saving the people sf fhis corner of
Asia from the deqrerate system of Communism. It is his
view that Western potcy in South Vietnam has gone com-
pletely oft the rails, and unless it is radically changed now,
or is again plunged into chaos, it will be a daagerous shock
for the Western world and a menace for the rest of Asia.
Such, however, is the danger today, and the Western nation
mainly concerned is the United States. Into this little country
of 11 million inhabitants thc U. S. pumped about $770
millioa of aid since the end of the Indochina war in 1954.
If has given the government of President Ngo dinh Diem
every kind of zupport that a great power can give to a small
-diplomatic, military, economic, moral. Yet, it has to be
admitted, and the Americans themselves do admit it that
those who bring rhis unstinting aid are nol liked in the
 PRICE TAG FOR DISASTER zot
country to which they bring it, and that the economic situa-
tion there, instead of improving as the result of it, is rapidly
deteriorating. Wbat is wrong?

On May 6, 1959, Admiral Felix Stump, vice president of

the Freedom Foundation of :America, conferred his founda-
tion's awafil on Diem for "Freedom Leadership"-in the
police state America was supporting.
- Unlesr everything Hotham prophesied n1957 was what ow
planners wanted, the billions we invested in a man-to the
detriment of his peopl*were worse than wasted" Southeast
Asia come to hate us, and the NATO allies against whom
Diem and his American backers played us became embittered.
Americans, the extortion victims forced to pay for all this, will
next be mulcrcd for armaments to protect their country from
the results.
One of the lessons that could have been learned was that
IC,\ tbe agency handling American funds in South Vietnam'
was a haven" not for political sgientists but for sociologists' and
the sociologist was able to use America's wealth and prestige
for his politicaf aims, which the State Department ably sup-
ported.
- When Southeast Asia was about to sink, our officials respon-
sible for it were picked up as by a grant magnet and dropped-
in Africa-to repeat the performance. Edmund Gullion, polit-
ical ofrcer in the American embassy in Saigon, was made
ambassador to the Congo, to help labor leader Adoula destroy
Katanga. William Gibson, formerly at the Vietnam desk in the
American embassy in Paris, was made U. S. consul in Angola,
where irate Portuguese tlrew his car in the river in July 196f .
CharlseYos! formerly U. S. charge d'affaires in Laos, became
ambassador to Morocco in time to turn America's great
(Frenchowned) air base there over to the Moroccans. From
Morocco Yost went home to become Adlai Stevenson's assist-
ant at United Nations.
Leland Batrows, our Saigon ICA chief through the crucial
yeant' was named ambassador to the Camerouns. And Mich-
igan State University, its Vietnam Projecl potce-training and
propaganda-producing for the Ngo dinhs suddenly terminated,
embarked on an African project, ushered in. by a mourning
parade for the Communist Lumumba' Angrer Biddle Duke be-
iame Kennedy's chief of protocol and as his first ofrcial
act swore in foreign aid-for-Africa chief, Hefii Labouisse'
(Mme. Labouisse, the former Eve Curie, told newsmen she
 '-

2O2 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL

was no longer interested in nuclear science but would make
her husband's work her work-aid for Africa-)
As investments, our hard-headed forebears might catl the
above guilt+dged. The dividends for first Russia and then
Peking have been immense.
 C}IAPTER NINETEEN

TIIE CHAIN REACTION

Thoughdul American lawmakers acted long ago to prelent

private citizens from entering into relations with heads of for-
-ign states and dabbling in diplomacy. The extent to which
crusading Americans, who should have been minding their
business within America, intruded in fields where theii quali'
fications were nil is illustrated by an incident that took place in
early 1957. The Hungarian tevolt, as we have stated' provided
an excellent opportunity for socialists of the Buttinger ilk to
circumvent existing immigtation laws. Largo batches of foreign
nationals who wero unlikely, according to Mr. Arclrs of the
House Committee on LJn-American Activities, ever to cast a
conservative vote were rammed through fts immigration bar-
riers \rhile the headlines were hot. As 1956 ended, This Week
magazine carried a number of articles signed by Mr. But-
tinger's friend, Leo Cherne, that were undeniably propaganda
for tho operation designed to flood America with refugees.
Following the article published December 30' 1956' Mr.
Cherne was asked, "IIow can one direct a rescue committee
and plead for funds to help men escape Communist tyranny
and at the same tine sit on the executive committee that fights,
with its ears closed to every unpleasant reporl to maintain a
family clique that call match every political prisoner in Buda-
pest with an anti4ommunist patriot languishing in concen-
tration samps in South Vietnam? . .
"Anerican people who have depended upon your association
for honest reporb and written letters to their senators advo-
cating support of policies your executivs committee has rec-
ommended cannot be put off forever with bland assurances
that the unpleasant rumblings emanating from South Vietnam
are due to 'French propaganda and FrancoBritish intrigue.'
a1 this instrnt President Diem is putting the final touches to
his new accord with France and, through Buu Hoi, negotiating
a simitar one with Ho chi [dinh, preparing, as his relations
with Washington deteriorate, to play France and Ho against
America.
"fhese things are going to prove embarrassing some day.
203
2O4 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Believe me, sir, when The American Friends of Vietnam, which
was organized to aid a people fighting with their backs to the
sea, becomes a propaganda Fachine for a man and his hated
family, there must be an inevitable shadow cast over every-
rhing done thereafter by that Association's directing committee
members. Short-memoried as the American public is, I can-
not help but believe that the Rescue Committee's bed-partner,
American Friends of Vietnam, will some day cause the Com-
mittee a loss of prestige at the time when some future revolt
will make its work needed most."
Cherne's reply of January 16, 1957, was arrogantly con-
descending. 'I doubt that anything I would tell you concern-
ing my admiration for President Diem and the efiective nature
of his government and his people's resistance to Communism
would alter your point of view," he wrote. What did Cherne
really know about Diem?-the answer is "Nothing." IIe was
off on a Diem kick which he termed "admiration."
Closing his eyes to every aspect of the Diem regime but the
refugee influx, in which Diem himself was passivg Cherne re-
peated the tlreadbare refrein, "If a President and a govern-
ment which have given sanctuary to a million who fled
from Communism can be called inq. then
by that logic I would expect you to say that Ho chi Minh
carries the torch of freedom."
Snide insolence or no reply at all was the answer every man
who knew what was going on received from the small clique
making Vietnam their business.
As head of the Research Institute of America, Mr. Cherne
delivered a lecture in Los Angeles in 1956, at whish time he
met Mrs. Doris Parks, wife of a prominent attorney. Mrs.
Parks drew the director of Diem's American lobby out on a
limb. In a letter to Mr. Cherne she asked if it were true that
President Diem was holding the wives and children of anti-
Communist nationalist leaders as hostages. Cherne hotly de-
nied the allegation. Whereupon Mrs. Parks expressed pleasure
and told him 1foxt in that case she was sure Madame Nguyen
ton Hoan and her children, currently being held as hostages,
would be given a passport and be permitted to join Dr. Hoan
in Paris.
Cherne stalled for time while he talked it over with the
lobby. On December 18, 1956, he wrote to Mrs. Parks, "Your
letter is far too imFortant for me to rush an uninfomed reply.
You can be sure tlat neither I nor any of us who are associated
with the International Rescue Committss or the American
Friends of Vietnam would in the slightest measure be indif-
 THE CIIAIN REACTION 205

ferent to any diminution of freedom in Vietnam or anywhere

else for that matter.
"I will seek to enlarge my information and will write to you
just as soon as I am able."
But Mrs. Parks was not to be put off. She stated that she
was not as charitable toward Mr. Buttinger, Mr. Cherne's
fellow member of the executive committee of the Diem lobby'
as Mr. Cherne was. She wanted Mme. Hoan and her children
liberated, and at once. She continued, on December 28, in
a letter to Mr. Cherne:

In personal contact with Dr. Hoan one thing shines like a

light. lte is completely honest in his dedication to his coun-
try and the cause of freedom. Contrast this with the smooth
rationalization Pres. Diem handed out to Freda Utley and
which she reported to the U. S. A. througb an article for
National Review, Nov. 24th, 1956, of the necessity for dic-
tatorship and political prisons that democratic institutions
in South Vietnam can be protected and saved. What.non-
sense if it were not such I tragedy. How can Mr. Buttinger
have spent hours with a man of Dr. Hoan's rare intelligence
and dedication, heard lus story, and then go right on di'
recting and participating in a delusion of the American
public about Ngo dinh Diem?

Friends of mine in the Philippines are quite positive that

Mr. Buttinger was one of the last visiting Americnns that
Dr. Hoan's Dai Viet Nationalists risked arrest for, by daring
'to pour out their story to him. What did he do about their
story? Where was it reported?

With passionate awareness of America's opportunity to assist

the cause of freedom in today's dark world with deeds, not
just a mountain of expressed lofty sentiment I am sure
you want substance back of your words I quoted at the
beginning of this letter.

Well, Dr. Ifoan's Cbristmas card from Paris stares back

at me. Mme. Hoan and his children are still being held in
South Vietnam sans passport."

Backed in a corner, the man whose heart bled for the Hun-
garians replied in an outburst of anger on January 2,1957,
when forced to look at reatties in Vietnam under the man
whose stranglehold on the country Mr. Cherne and his friends
had made their business.
206 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL

Dear Mrs. Parks,

Your second letter is so strikingty djfferent in attitude and

objectivity from your first that i cannot fail to comment
upon it. I said I would move to secure the facts. I also tried
t-o sta^te my own pottical and philosophical formulation be.
for_e fnding out whether or not you iould have any reason
to haye confidence in my judgment or reason to hive faith
in my democratic commitment.

You have now proceeded to lecture me. you also find vou
cannot accenJ py statement at face value. I wonder, t[en,
why you took the trouble to write to m+I certainly musi
have been equally suspect before.

l. !ryq no doubt you knew before that I was a member of

AMERICAN FRIENDS OF VIBTNAM. Though a mem_
ber of its Executive Committee, I have not parEcipated in
the deliberations of that semmittss except on'rare occasions
of my rather complete p."o""opitioo with tne prob_
,bTl*:
Iems ot the International Rescue Commillss.

Y9"jnq proceed to evaluate Mr. Buttinger for me. I know

Mr. Buttinger well. I have foruo-" y"*rii*o"C", whether
you have ever met him. I plaa to asf hi- this question
when
he returns from Vienna where he *""t oo bis ;;
exlgDle to function as European Director ""iirefy
of Hungarian
Relief for IRC.

There are few men in the world whose consistent,

demo.
cratic convictions, courage in political ;"fu;;; and
ded.ica-
Ion -to tree values, in my judgment, I respect more than Mr.
Buttinger. If you have
to gTpll" 1ot-git fvfr. nuttinger, it -ignt n"tp
!o you why Dr. Hoan, of wnom iori
so highly of him.
*ri*lrpJfr
pgiJe 9-agAialy, I have no further intention of turther de-
bating this matter of Vietnam with you"
fi;f,ave intention,
however, of ascertaining the facts'il grldlnl
my actions
accordingly. I am sorry f have naa re-ason
you in tle past. you might tuve w"itea
io disappoint
to nld'o.rt whether
reas9n
l*al _proved unjusti_0ed in this instance, or, provided
that you had, saved us both time.
Sincerely, Leo Cherne (signed)
 THE CHAIN REACTION 207

T\vo weeks later Ngo dinh Diem sent for Mme. Hoan in
Saigon and told her that she could leave the country when she
wisnea. All of this roundabout Pressure and exchange of letters
to force an act of common decencY.
When Leo Cherne's admiration for President Diem, which
he saw no point in trying to explain to iporant dolts who had
studied the Indochina scene for many years' abated, we do
not know. Joseph Buttinger must have begun to have doubts,
for when the 463-page Vietnam book he mentioned in his
famous 1955 letter fnally appeared, in early 1958' he disposed
of the whole Diem period with six innocuous pages' In a letter
written to Dr. Hoan on February 10, 1958, Buttinger fore
stalled unfavorable observations by Vietnamese able and likely
to expose him by encouraging them to hope that someday he
mighi mobilize American support for them. His failure to
make any criticism of the Diem regime, he told Dr. Hoan, was
"bec&uss I know too little about it.' This from the man who
had lobbied for said regime, silenced its critics, and as he
himself had promised Diem in the letter we have quoted'
worked to keep American opinion and policy behind iL
The book itsetf, entitled The Smaller Dragon and published
by Praeger, was a hodgepodge of material Mr. Buttinger had
collected on Vietnam's long-past rulers and gleaned of every-
thing favorable to the socialist, anti-colonialist thesis. What
emerged was a sort of Jean Jacques Rousseau glorification of
the unspoiled native. Kings, according to socialist dialects, one
gathered, were good if long dead and victims of European
superior armameDt, and only bad if alive and posing the prob
lems of legitimacy. The most glowing review and praise of
the author was Leo Cherne's full page in the New Leader of
May 12, 1958. This time Mr. Cherne wrote as the director of
the Research Institute of America, in no way connected with
Mr. Joseph Buttinger.
Just one year before the Buttinger book appeared, the Dai
Viet party had compiled a 'lnhite book" on the graft, cor-
ruption and police state methods current under Diem and his
brothers. Dr. Hoan, then without funds in Paris, scraped to-
gether enough money among his fellow party members in exile
to send copies to Joseph Buttinger, General O'Daniel, Angier
Biddle Duke, Leo Cherne and other "authorities" on South
Vietnam then sitting at the head tables of preDiem banquets.
So hungry were the msn who had made South Vietnam their
avocation for information on the subject that every one of
them refused to accept delivery of the book.
By 1957 it was no longer a matter sf gimFly changing presi-
 208 BACKGROUND TO BBTRAYAL
a*9. Fg family was riding a tiger. Opposition had been
too b"rutally, piessruei-had
for too long.
f$4
Dlsapproval
becn buitt up.
had given way to hatred. As the hatred increasdd
wittrin tX€ country, Father patrick O'Connor and Father de
Jaegher had to use the yeight of their great authority to in-
creas€-counter pressure from without. Their man simply must
pt lalln for the time was past when Diem's remofal- could
be eftected without violence.-The church, tle ctotl, tne *"rgn
of the words of Diem,s friends as pries'ts, were Uiought fito-
play to save him. ,'Guqgts,, of the i{go <tinhs, who g;
home_ agd n!e$ their cause, pourea inroueh 3"isro.",;rld
eff !&_
rotted the claim that no matter what ..tie fdf;; did,-;
must etick by them because they were fighting communism.
They werc not; instead-they weri ngbting-fo, 6"t no*p"ly
on_a country, with the Communist threat-as s rntking
I-o9enh_Nenb_onne,
pot. '
of the Los Angelee Times, told iis'readers
og.Y"y 5, l957,..Gradually DieuiwhittleA the strengfh
of his opponents, sorrnrlty "i,"V
-beating -orf p-"r.o"aiog
eo-me over to his side, byVinS off others and
,o.r-to
Uy delees win_
ning the admiration oi tli ml4orify;i;;pi"i"us
Vietnamese
pgn of the 17th parallel.. Thougn fte i,ioog war,, of the
rs€o: was pJoceecinq smoothly, with one vilage
after another
passrng.under
99-mplete Red control at niehfand, by agree_
ment with the Vietminh,-presenting the suiface
cutn'of iou-
Nerbonne wrore and the rns eng?res
;TjT_T:ggl!v.air,
t n es p:nnted tfie statement that ,,One of the
most impreisive
lof Dieml ri""" tuti"g--omJl the restoration
of security in a country qny.sigalffi"rcr-fy Japanese
occu_
p{9T_*j eight years- 91 6ivl ;*:;-i;;; as dishonest as
\raDor tl)dge's assertion in 1963 that ..Vietnam,s down ,pirut i.
ended."
,_-D,4y-^h:I91ably, rhe rotting at the base continued. On
anlsly 2, 1958, a band describid by me ..pira0es,,
f lress as
tacked a rubber plantation forty_seven mries at-
from Saigon and
1nlt_gg Tq a iayrol of .ii6;_;oG[an* .astres,
taking
8 represeDtative "
of the sgigon go""__";t dth ttefo.-rnE
'birat€s" were members ot tie-cio ilt,il Jni"u
-iia"f""o rl" Amer-
i3_qtf- dailr agsuled tneir reaoers
and were never heard of any more. destroyed

. f9" ",time, about a year after Mme. Hoan and her tfuee
-".Hd"-* had been permirtea to i"-u* ti" ;;;;y, ir looked as
F-"yt Aa _change oi attirude -{iliJlfi;irace in wasu-
lngtot. Vietnamese teen-ager wrote a letter'io'Afired Friend-
l5 editor of the TVashington-f^r, *ni"il Ui.lriendly put on
the Posfs front page of r"rruury
fi:di:'wh"o oo"
"oo-
 THE CHAIN REACTION 209
siders
-the
following letter, one can appreciate the encourage
ment it gave the Vietnamese opposition that the Washington
print it.
Po,rr should
Dear Mr. Friendly:

Iam a little Viefnarnese girl. I saw your name in I [€ws-

paper and decided to write to you because your name
sounded ttre nicest.

Here are some questions I would like to know about Amer-

ica, for now, Vietnamese people are living under the help
of your country.

I would also like to let you know what I think about

America. Thse questions are my doubts towards your
country. If you answer my questions, I am sure tbat ati the
other Vietnanese will appreciate it.

1. Does American Government help Vietnamese be-

cause of these principal reasons:
view: Vietnam will be a big market for the commerce and
h4yrtty of America. HStrategic point of view: Vietnam
will be used to stop communism.
2. Is it right that the poticy or American Government is
to assimilate all the countries living under its help?

3. Will Americans go home soon or will they stay in Viet-

nam fe1 a hundred years?

4. Do American people know that Ngo Dinh Diem is an

American puppet as some of the Vietnamsss thinkf

5. Do American people know thar 95Vo of Vietnamese

people don't like them?

M. FriendlR I found rhat although we live under the help

of Americans but we don t like Americans, we don't g6t
along witb Americans.

6. What do Americans tint about Vietnamese people? Do

they consider us as Negros in America?

7. Is President Eisenhower influenced by big capitalists such

as General Motors, General Electric, or other interests?
2ro BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL

8. Why are there still a lot of White Americans do not get

along with Black Americans? I}o they still have the impres-
sion that Blak (sic) Americans are their slaves?

I think America is a democratic and free country so such a

colored separation must be ended. The trouble at Little
Rock, do you think that was a big shame hung over
America?

9. What do Americans think about the Russian man-made

moon and 150 atomic sub-marines?

I think that's a big mortification for American Government.

10. Do you agree with me that Americans do not have

men-made moon because American spies could not work in
Russia?

(Russians control their country very rigid.)

11. How can Hollywood (sic) make James Deans more

popular than President Eisenhower in Vietnam?

If America is really a democratic country, I am sure that

your Government will let you answer all of my questions.

Sincerely yours, and Thanks,

Miss Le-My* (*A pseudonym)

What happen"6 to rhis "Miss Le-My" no one ever asked. An

avalanche of letters from anti-Diem Vietnamese descended on
Mr. Friendly till, over the grapevine, went the word, ',No
more letters to Friendly. They are being turned over to CIA."
Cherne, under his Research Institute of America identity,
addr$sed a New York conference on "Investmsnt Conditions
in Vietnam" and managed to work in a reply to Mi$s k-My,
which Mary Hornaday, staff correspondent of the Christiin
Sclence Monltor, repor0ed in the Monitor
of March 3, 1958.
_
On Octob€r 30, L958, a New York Times editorial pro-
claimed with dl the pompous dignity of the Ttrmeg.Ttree
years ago chances for success in rhis beleaguered country
seemed small . . . Strong leadership and wisely given help
tipped the scale. President Ngo dinh Diem ittacked thi
 THE CIIAIN RBACTION zLL

dissidents frontally and defeated them. He set up truly-repre-

r"otrti"" governnienq in itself no small gamble, and derived
his authoity, which is great, from the will of the people '-'- '
Out in the villages the Glovernment showed how it was possible
to beat the communists on their own ground"'
What of this "authoritJr" ,nd thqse victories the fiberal in
Times Square in New Y6rk thought F make a realill
"gS9
simply bf continuaff telling us they existed? Authority smugly
aesilbei as "coming from the people"? Through the suqmel
oi iSsg "approved-candidates" campaigned for the national
assembly ei"itions due to take place on August 30th' Phan
quang Dan and an independent named Nguyen Ttqn"*-
tionoi"O their candidacy. Press censorship prevented Saigon
papen ftom epeaking of them. Oi"{l- special-powers law
i"ii"a them the righfto address assemblies of more than five
-arrdsted.If
people. their supporters fied to put up posters they were
Every inch of wall and billboard spase was reserved
for Diem's nairApictea candidates. Because supporters 9f Dan
and Nguyen trao naa been arested for puttrng up election
posters (it was said, over posters of the opponents)' con-
demnations were filed against their chiefs.
Despite all these handicaps Dan, running under the banner
of his-Free Democrat party, got 10,000 votes more than the
next highest votegetter on the ticket. He and Nguyen Tran
were both elected. Diem them disqualified them under his
rubber-stamp law that men with condemnations against them
were ineligible for office. Dan entered the assembly €nyway
and demanded his seat, since he had received 33'166 votes
against the government candidate's 6,700. Two of Diem's
police came in and forcibly tlrew him out' No word of this,
Lowever, appeared in Time magazine's September t4, 1959,
report on South Vietnam's elections.
Through the long surnmer of 1960 a sullen resentment
gipped the country. The country's feelings had been expressed
in the August 30, 1959, elections. Diem's contempt for the
country's wishes was made clear when his policemen forcibly
hustled Phan quang Dan out of the assembly. The conclusions,
to the peoplg were obvious. Things might have dragged on
indefinitely, however, with no more than a latent, growing
feeling among the masses that life could not be much worse
under Ho chi Minh, had tlree crack battalions from General
Giap's elite 325th division, trained at Gia-Lam near Hanoi,
notbrupted on the scene in mid-October to show their strength.
It staried at 3:00 a. m. on October 2t, 1960, in the darkness
surrounding a guard post near Man Bac, about a hundred miles
 212 BACKGROT]ND TO BETRAYAL
north of Kontoum in thg plateau region of the montag-
nard tribes._ The polt had IIiCh
bgen s9t up to piotect a su1ryly baie
fg o_ne of the grandiose projects being puiheO under iioerican
aid.It was a new roali a protongaEoi of Route to join
f.rytryLwi$.gy"g Nam. ftso 6attalions surged 14
out of'the
nlgnt in flre initid sttack. They blew up part of the defeoses,
destroyed trucks, bulldozers ana otnei i"rn-Uuifaiog
ment estinated at around gJ.f miflisn Most of the iortmJn "qf1l.
were killed. Only one s.ma[ post defended by civil g"*A,
a small unit of tle national army held out.'
*J
- Knowing the ruses of the Vietrninh, rtranl later agreed that
po-tt may have been permittea to survive. Thjattackers
!h"
xnew iE defenders would radio frantically for suppor!
which
y dia. Tbo of the attacking battalions'instatb-a-tlenosetves
F plsi.$ons
f they had seized while a thira sei up an ambush
goTS qe roa{ to await the relief column. After-four o,clock
in rh:c af,temoon it came, weighted aown wiO-tructs anatant
,
reggring_gaboJaeed stretches of the road along the
*uy.'-'
__Thg.Vietminb (Viercong) batrations, foniing lr-got".
Ho chi Minh regimenL were superbty ir-J *iit "the ilost
m_9fgn, weanonsasunenor -to
if anyhing tt" oilil"
"q"ipruf
nauonar_arrny. The furious combat that ensired tasted for
yyeral daye, on terrain that was ideal for the Communists.
Diem-c_hear5r, impeccatle, spit-and-polish anny
was not pre-
pared for it
For the fust time Giap's real striling force was
tgl*d to ffght as an army.
It was his warniig that the
change from long-war to short+ampaign could and dight
come
at any time.
As morg national troops were flown north to counter the
Vietminh regiments appeared from nowhere. Not
three battalions but a Vietminh division" supported
by the local
population, had moved in witl aU its-equipment, flar;,
bazookas, heavy mortars. Captured materiet proved
French and American.
to be
When tbe batde was over the Reds leisurely withdrew to
lneir lases in Laos, takingwith them what they coU4 A*stroy-
ing wbat was IefL Wfth tjolt the VietnamJ'army took
stock
of its lossed. From the balance sheet a puiotrf truth stood
out: Thoy had been decimated because the people of the
contr5nside had acted as the eyes and ears of tle
*e-y.
Ofrcers faced the obvious lesson and react€d accordind!.
There was more to soldiering than supporting a man on
whose
teaurE in ofrce the army's pay aepended. dtnere were going
to be any more Kontoums because of hatred of the mon oi
 THE CIIATN RIIACTION 2T3
whom tbe Am€ricans made the army's pay contingent bet0er
to have a showdown over pay than be cut to pieces.
The Kontoum battle can be said to have touched off the
chain reaction that in three years ended in the crumbling of
everything Amenca had built up in nine years at the cost of
billions of dollars and more lives than American mothers
have even oeen told. The world did not know what had nap-
pened. The censorship lid n Washington as well as Sargon
was just as tigbt. But the Vietnamese army knew, and in less
than two weeks after the Kontoum oattle ended, the army
stirred.
In the heavy air of a tropical morning, just before davrn
broke over Saigon on November 11, 1960, parachutists in
rubber+oled shoes and camouflaged nylon combat uniforms
surrounded the palace where Diem slept. For tlirty+x hours
Diem's fate hung in the balance. Through duplicig blufrng
lying, and stalling for time he won, aod once more the lead
weight of an ever-present but rntangible menace hung over the
city. Men spoke in low voices again, looking carefully around
beforo expressing themselves. Over a hundred and fifty were
wounde4 some tlirty killed. Diem survived, but America had
her warning.
 CIIAPTBR TWENTY

PRELUDE TO TIIE END

'Ihe events of Fridan November 11, 1960, and the day that
followed wero to color everything that happened thereafter,
and ultimately t9 create an unbridgable gulf- of suspicion be-
tween ofrcers whose first aim should have remained the salva-
tion of their country.
__-Tho big oapo:tunity came when Diem, fearing a general
Vietcong- offensive, put the three battalions of parachutists
surrounding th9 capital as security forces under the operatioaal
comrnand of the army. Until then their every movement had
been watched and controlled from the palace. Colonel Nguyen
chanh ThL gsmmander of the troops in question, bad a hJali16y
respect for Nhu's secret police, but his adjutant, Lieutenan-jt
Colonel Vuolg van Don8, had been waitin! for iust such an
gpPortunity. Dong's uncle, the lawyer Hoang co ihun was a
friend of Phan quang Dan and deputy phan khac Sirir. ana
Phan khac Suu bad incurred Diems displeasure by accusing
the government of cornrption" oppression, undemoiratic ebd
tions, despotism, favoritisn in army appointments, gross inefr-
ciency fu1 qrtminisfration, and nepotlsm in business.
..Io 1 seven-plge manifesfs signed by fifteen deputies, phan
khac Suu and his Progress ana fiUerty party hai demanded
government reforms on May l, 1960. Diem ignored them. So
at 3:00 a. m. on November 11, carrying his colonel siffi him,
Lt. Col. Dong profited by their temporary freedom of move-
ment to occupy strategic points of the city. The barracks of
the prcsidential guard, near Diem's subterranean dungeons and
torture cells in the botanical gardens, were taken by assault
According to statements made later by Dong and liis fellow
ofrger1 they would have seized the preiiaentiil palace without
a shot if- at the last momen! tley had not beei betrayed by
an ambitious armored car offi.cer who, toking tbat road io surL
promotion, alerted the palace guard just bef6re the paratroop
ers arrived there.
Diem barely had time to take shelter in the bunker he had
prepared for just such an emergency. Outside the police had
214
 PRELUDE TO THE END 215
i_oimd the rebels. Dong wanted to storm the palace at once.
Others wanted to wait ior heavier armament. Colonel Thi was
for negotiating; and this was their downfall. nis extnemity
n
Diem remem.bered the time-tried co,nsel grven by ht, A-";
can- advisons in the spring of 1955 when -he tasea fte torces
ot tho Binh-X-uyen" the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, tle masses
:f ft: Dai
-Viet
parry and leyond them all tle couotry:
:l"yP.4,negotiations; play for t:me,,'he had been told,. (Tin;e,
April 1-?5,5) In other words, promise your countrymen any_
rhing rmtil their guad is down,-then knife them.
Gen€ral McGarr was American commander of the advisory
group at the time of the predawn revolt of November 1 1,
196d,
and McGarr was at a loss. He temporized. Wdhingtd;;i;
j"-t
the throes of an election and in th6 absence of ordErs to
one way or tho other General McGarr followed the oriental
maxrnwhich yary, ,,To make no mistake, do nothing.'; ti-
urged pnS ..try to-reach
1pd the- group opting for action to
aD und€rstanding with Diem.,'
. Accordingly, old General L€ van TY, the chief of stafi who
nad been Diem's tool since September 1954 when the arny was
tbreateoed with no American-aid and hence no pay if it did not
*lT Hin!, waq brought forward to fot-as emissary.
ry nad99".*t
been arrested when the paratroopers noved on the
palace. Colonel Thi and Lieuwnau-Jt-Colon"i Ooog
as neaas oi
the military and president ot Oe pioviiionaf govern-
r€speqyely,_e^mpowered General
Tglg ry- to promisi Oiem
their coqp€ration" Diem would not be forced frbm
lnwer; all
they-demanded was that Nhu and his wife be sent ilsewnere.
prete.nded to negotiate. He made
.,_D_bp
ume to consider certain points and promiiea "Ui""tio*,i"qooil
thai hii reply
would be detvered that evening. rvfe^anwtite trom his gho:ri
yave--post in the palace ounkei went a stream of calls for
troop to move on the caprtal. Above all, Diem and
-r-oyt"were trying to contact Diem's godson, Colonel Tban
lPll rrno was thien
l+en, with the 21st division in Mytho south of
$Soo. Th9 fress at the time referred to Colonel Khiem as
r-l'f-mqnepne% he was not a nephew but Diem had held him
baptismal fount ang on arfoval rn
3j.tho
Khiem ahead among his favorites. d*"
he had pm.a

.
rn t.ho city delirious crowds were pulling down Diem,s
Pftures fom public buildins and burning .lvtaaame Nhu in
e^mgy, Dyt a heavy ahosphere of indecision was discernible.
l wlTy.fqeboding
good
pervaded the city, a fseting tbat it was too
to bo tnre, that secret police were watching and that if, in
the end, the brotlers oesiegea in the palace ilr to come out
2t6 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
victors, it would go hard with anyone manifesffug too much
loy in the brief period of liberty.
A Vietnamese named Ha van Tran provided the Associated
Press with such on-the+pot news as AP passed on to the
American public. Ha, who had seen priests go to jail for doubt-
ing Diem's popularity, prudently stuck to a line that bad never
failed to please the Americans and which would not :ost him
bis neck if Diem and Nhu came out on top. Ha told America'
via AP on November 11, that "x militaty revolutionary com-
mittee said it had overtbrown the government of President
Ngo dinh Diem. Ihe fate of the Catholic, staunchly anti-
communist chief executive was not immediately known . . . At
least 15 paratroopers were reported killed in fighting around
tle presidendal palace in the heart of the capital where the
nrling Frcnch colonialists of Indochina once sat." The real
yillains, if one wanted to be on the safe side, were still the
French.
By mid-afternoon members of Nhu's Republican Youth
Movement were in the streets in quarters unoccupied by the
paratroopers, distributing hasfily printed tracts announcing that
officers leading the revolt had been "bought by the communists
and the colonialists."
"It is the babit of tle Diem government to baptize as Viet-
minh all opposen of the regime," Jean Larleguy wrote in Paris
Prcsse of November 15. No one accepted the story that Thi
and Dong, both noted for their patriotism and anti-Com-
mrrnisf sentments, had sold out to the enemy. Nhu then
changed the charge to incitement by the Americans with the
French colonialists perhaps having a hand in it. Saigon USIS
Chief Anspacher was the Anerican on whon Nhu and Diem's
secretary of state for the presidency were setting their sigbts.
All afternoon that Saturday of November 11 the desperate
radio calls from the bunker continued. To gain time Diem
agreed to a list of reforms<ivil liberties, free elections, a new
economic program, more effective measures against the Com-
munists and the eliminafion of the Nhus from any hand in
govertrment. It looked as though the colonels had won.
Phan quang Dan and the civilian opposition emerged from
their hideouts and gathered around a microphone to announce
their support of the revolt while Dong prepared to storm the
palace. Someone persuaded him to wait till the next day.
By Saturday morning Diem's personal troops of the 7th
division had reached Bien Hoa, less than twenty miles from
Saigon, and eleven tanks commanded by his godson, Khiem,
were rolling on the city. A unit of Vietnamese marines sensed
 PRELUDE TO TI{E END 2r7
that Thi and Dong had waited'too long and agreed to bring
the rescuing troops in by boat past the roadblocks and demol-
ished bridges.
Since eight tlat morning the crowd had been demonstrating
around the palace, bearing placards inscribed, "Down with
Ngo dinh Diem and Hig pamily." Still Dong did not move.
Around 1:0O p. m. Khiem arrived with his trnk.q, embraced
his fellow ofrcers, and swore tlat he was withthem. To Colonel
Thi he confided that a circle of tanks around the palace would
not only assure the success of their assault but guarantee the
safety of Diem, should a popular uprising get out of control.
Thi trusted him completely. But Khiem was only following
instructions he had received from the palace to stall for time
until the infantry could arrive from Bien Hoa. Then the gun
turrets of his tanks were slowly turned on bis comrades. From
the palace the presidential guard began fring into the crowd.
How many were killed is not known for sure; it was estimated
that as many as 400 paratroopers died before the affair was
over. Then the purge of the army and axrests of civilians
started.
Demonstrations were set up to convince the Americans that
the people were still behind Diem. A maqs was held in Saigon's
cathedral for "the recovery of peace." Demonstrators mobilized
from labor unions, the national assembln The National
levolutionary kague, and Nhu's youth groups went out with
their banners, and South Vietnam was almoit back where it
had been-but not quite.
- I!lesson
tle
Diem had emerged with his ego and obstinacy unscathed,
was still tlere for all to see. The army was no longei
sure. Of all the units caled upon by the despeiate brothen, in
tho palaco basemenl only Khiem had answered. The others
waited. Had the revolutionary semmitte€ stormed the palace
with determination the army and the nation would havd been
behind them-
_ A purgo commitiee was set up by the govemment to track
down civilians and military who, during the forty-eight nours
of suspense had shown little alacrity to come io the aid of
Diem" And when the work of the purge committee was finished
the backbone of Vietnam's military command had been
b-rokpn Some officers, feeling that they were suspect, fled to
the bnrsh. Only Diem's creatures remajned in commands.
A friend of Nhu's named Trong cong Cuu was appointed
to direct the score-setfling. Another Nhu lieutenant named
Nguyen dinh Jfiuan became a sort of superminister with the
functions of secretary of state to the presidin! defense, psycho-
218 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Iogical warfare and information. The secretary of state for
civic action, a sort of Vietnamese Arthur Larson named Ngo
trong Hieu" took over police operations; and henceforth this
trio, _accountab! 9ny to Diem and Nhu, directed the gestapo
which was to bring America's new presid.ent face io face
with reality. Neftr again were the solutions which Senator
Kenn:dy had supported, as a Diem partisan in the front organ-
ization led by his chief of protocol, to seem so simple.
Of the civilians involved in the attempted coup,lnly Hoang
co Thuy escaped. He fled to France. phan quang Dan and hii
friend Pham khac Suu were arrested" along with many of their
associates. Colonel Thi and Lieutenant4olonel Dong, accom-
panied by a handful of fellow officers, commandeered a DC3
at gunpoint and took refuge in Pnom Penh, Cambodia. Khiem
emerged a general of brigade and the Judas of the army. Real
victor of the fracas was the Commumst National Lib-eration
Frout. The number of adherents to it mounted with every day
ttrat Diem remained in power and Nhu,s vengeance committee
continued in operation.
Jean Larteguy proclaimed in neavy headlines in paris presse
of November 26, "Hurry, Mr. Kennedy, the communists are
about to win the Dien Bien Phu of the rotting war on the free
wotld's Asiatic front.' His report in retrospect see.ms written
with clairvoyance. "Ambassadors, military commanders and
special services, each draw their own conclusions, settling
gcoreq aqording to their personal sympathies or antipathies,
bgt lor the most part doing nstt'ing. They waited to see
whether Anerica would vote democrat or iepublican."
, la1t"got continued, "Yet this was the moment when great
decisions should have been taken in all tle fragile coun=trieg
that cling to life only tlrough perpetual injections of dollars, a
few administrative traditions inherited from tleir former
colonizers and the armies which they must pay, train and
ann.
"For t5re€ months there was a vacuum. The communists
jumped in to filI it. Act qurckly, Mr. Kennedy, if you do not
want to see tle red flag floating over Saigon, Vientiane,
Bangkok, Pnom Penh, Rangoon and Singipore, and the
Occident driven from tle Orient forever.
"Diem is committing suicide. rn South Vietnam the situation
is gravest. Farlure of the coup d'etat on November 11 per-
mitted s condemned regime to survive, but it is no longer
supported by the people and President Diem has shown him-
self incapable of fghting es6snuris6 effectively . . . His police
state system has alienated the people of the south to a point
 PRELUDE TO THE END 219
where they s1g slsl4iming, 'We may as well have the Viet-
minhtt tt
Willip Buckley's National Review of that same date,
_ _
Novem-ber 26, t960, unburdened by Mr. Larteguy's vast per-
sonal kuowledge of Southeast Asia, told iti readers -the
Russians were "hotting up the cold war." It was that simple.
"Last week they provoked and basked an atlempt to unseat
the authoritarian and strongly pro-American regime of Ngo
dinh Diem," wrote National Review. Diem was so proAmeii-
can that the "anti-rebel and anti-Communist committee', he
and Nhu had thrown together as a front was distributing
handbills from army trucks, telling Vietnamese who would nol
ac_ce{ Fu lio" that Communists had instigated the coup that
colonialists and British and American impiriatists naa iicitea
the paratroopers.
None of this reached the American public. Don Fifield of
the N. Y. Herald Tribune News Service reported that the
*Saigon
coup seemed inevitable', (Washington post, Novem-
bet 12,1960), but a frank disclosure of the facts would have
constituted an admission that everything told the public to
date tad been false, and such an ad*ission neither ihe press
no1 the State De,partment had any intentioo of making.
Lartegun author of a long listof books on Southeist Asia,
w-as_ no! quoted by a single American paper when he s.rote
of the denunciations, the mass arrests ana the posters demand-
in-g vengeance which left most Vietname.e oniy with
a feeling
of regret that the coup had failed. Larteguy Lad known Dr.
Dan f9r y-ears. While soldiers still wearLg army boots and
pants but hastily provided with shirts to make thim look like
civilians were applauding Diem and Nhu in the streets in
artificial demonstrations of popularity to impress the Ameri-
caDS.,.Dao_ from his place of hiding asked L-arteguy to come
see him. Said Dan:
. '"Ihe ey93ts of the past tbree days reveal profound cracks
in the political structure of the Ngo dinh Diem regime, the
armn the adminisfpstiqn and the people. This coup that failed
marks a turning point in the destiny of Soutn Vieinam. If the
government refuses to understand the severe 6eaning of this
yarning and- lets its passions over-ride its reason, if- it gives
ftry .:- to, its hunger for revenge and strengthens its t&at-
tarilllsm, the days to come will bi black and iny adventure is
possibla only beneficiary will be co-- rtti"m." (paris
-The
Presse, November 30, 1960)
The scramble for Washington support, as logic told Saigon
exiles and agents alike that Americi must sooner or later t-ake
220' BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
another look at her "showcase," was frantic. Wherever there
were Vietnamese the Vietnamese love of intrigue was evident.
Exiles honestly concerned with the fate of their country had
no entree to the American embassy in Paris, but informers,
because they were paid to do so or because of the feeling of
importance it gave them, came and went with exaggerated
reports on the doings of their compatriots. After each such
visit the informer, or gossiper, as the case may be, acquired
face by telling his friends what the embassy official had said
to him.
Somehow, out of the tell-tale visits, first to Bill Gibson and
then to Francis Melloy and his successors, word spread through
the Vietnamese colony in Paris that Dr. Claytor Williams,
pastor of the American Church on Quai d'Orsay, was a top
CIA agent and that his residence was a meeting place for high
echelon emissaries of Allen Dulles. Overnight devout Viet-
namese Catholics, Hoa Haos and Buddhists became ardent
members of Dr. Williams' congtegation. So two groups took
form, one Diem's supporters who carried tales to the embassy
and the other anti-Diem exiles who flattered themselves into
thinking that they had a pipeline to the center of power through
the pastor. Prominent among the latter was the former presi-
dent de conseil, or prime minister, Tran van Huu. With a
tenacity surprising in a man of his years, Tran van Huu never
ceased plotting for a return to power. First he dreamed of
making a comeback as an anti{ommunist protege of the
Americans. When it became evident that his friendship with
Foster Dulles' former pastor was not going to bring him
advancement, and the people of South Vietnam were cer-
tainly not going to call for him, Huu changed tack. He gained
the support of Ho chi Minh's followers wherever they were
by becoming the man of the neutralists. And as, tlrough
popular hatred of Diem and his family, the antiCommunist
cause rotted from within, Tran van Huu became the candidate
for transition leadership, the front for Nguyen manh Ha,
son-in-law of France's Communist deputy, Monsieur Maranne.
The one American to be concerned, and he because he was
so deeply compromised, was the man whom Amerisans had
elected only a few weeks before by the narrowest margin in
history. Jack Kennedy looked over the files that had never
reached the public. Considering the role the CIA and the
American aid administration had played in the whole idiotic
chapter of America's experiment in South Vietnam, the hon-
esty of the facts placed before the new president is doubtrul.
One rhing, however, was inescapable: Nowhere was the
 PRELIJDE TO THE END 221
situation encouraging. The incoming Anerican president was
"holding the bagf'which he in his demagoguery as senator had
helped only too wilingly to create. As the disintegration in
Vietnam gained momentum those responsible for it in our
government were tiptoeing oft the stage and turning their atten-
tion to Africa. So was the AFLCIO.
Ilowever, for Fresident Kennedy, newly installed in the
Whilp House, essape was not quite that simple. The old days
of irresponsible senatorial tirades were gon-, and the search
for an "out" from the pompous statements he had made as
Senator Kennedy, proud to be a member of Diem,s Amerisan
lobby, must have taxed the talents of the new president to the
utmost, higbly developed though tlose talents were. The con-
fidential reports the new president was studying, reports which
never reached the American people, left no doubt that he was
holding a hot potato. It was time to start looking for a way to
unload.
On March 8, 1960, eight months before Colonel Thi's para-
troopers blew the lid off and destroyed any illusion that ei&er
thrc Vietnamese army or people were behind Ngo dinh pis6,
America had bad her warning: American-trained Brigadier
General Duong van Duc, commander of the Nationat Oraer
and one of the young hopes of the Vietnamese army, took
advantage of a trip to Pads to write a declaration which he
thought would alert the world. Duc had been permanent secre.
tary-general of Vietnam's national defense. What he said was:

'Tn view of the fact:

That Mr. Ngo rlinh Diem did not hesitate to assume the
re_sponsibilities of power during the extremely grave period of
1954,
his promises made at the time of assuming power led
the-that
_
Tajority of the population to believe that he wai going to
lead Vietnam to a brilliant future,
his efforts in the course of the frst year were dedi-
-that
cated to ttre re-establishment of order and security and the
removal of the effects of war,
brothers in arms and myself ardently served in the
-my
reconstruction of tle country under the leadership of Mr. Ngo
dinh Diem.
"In viel of the fact that:
One year later the government was able to control tle
entire territory of the South by grace of the efiorts and
sacrifices of the army, the people, and the administration,
-<rder and security being established, instead of building
222 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
s democratic regime based on justice and liberty, Mr, Ngo dinh
Diem broke his promises, established a family dictatorship,
backward and feudal, camouflaged as a republic;
ao demoeratic country on earth does a government
-incomposed of five brothers of the same family and a pres-
erist
ident who has assumed the right to draw up a constitution and
transmit it afterwards to a National Assembly for their in-
formatiou
the Vietnamese citizen has lost the most sacred rights
of-that
liberty: liberty of life, liberty of belief and liberty of
thought;
Ngo dinh Diem has seen fit to increase his police
-Mr.to consolidate his family dictatorship instead of utilizing
forces
the aid of friendly powe$ to erect a healthy economy and
assure the vital minimum to the population, and trris without
considering that a large part of the national budget has been
diverted to their personal ends by his brothers and their closest
colhborators;
present regime is bringing the country back to the
-thedays of 1954. Again there is
dark€st exploitation,
and injustice; discontent has reached n high point among all the
levels of the population. The extension of communist bases,
spreading throughout the Soutb" eyen to the outskirts of
Saigoq constitutes a grave danger;
--South Vietnam must inevitably be absorbed by interna-
tional communism if this situation persists;
faith in the glorious future of a truly democratic
-I{aving
Vietnsm where eash citizen would enjoy inviolable rights of
freedom and liberty, I demand that Mr. Ngo dinh Diem prove
his patriotisn in fulfiling the aspirations of his people:
l. l3f him dissolve the puppet National Assembly.
2. Let him relinquish his functions as President of the
Republic, that the people may freely decide the future of
tho country.
If he will not do this, I have decided to return to the coun-
try and set in motion this struggle. My determination is
based on the will of the oppressed people slaiming their
rights to liberty.
Since the present regime survives by gface of a certain
number of foreipers who have been mislsd, I draw the
attention of these last to tle fact that the Vietnanese people
consider them accomplices to the oppression, the injustice
and the dictatorship.
In nine years of struggle against communism the Viet-
narnese people have maintained their position at tle price
 PRELUDE TO THE END 223
of sacrifices and heavy lossesin human lives. This is irrefu-
table proof of their determination to play a role in the
free world.
Before international opinion I accuse the Ngo dinh Diem
regime of perfidy and dictatorship.
At the same time I appeal to the countries friendly to
Vietnam to aid us in our struggle for justice and liberiy, a
struggle which, itself, will contribute to the maintenanci of
peace in Southeast Asia.
I shall personally present this declaration to the Ambassa-
dor of South Vietnam at his embassy, at 3 p.m. on March
10, 1960, with the request that he traDsmitit to Mr. Ngo
dinh Pi"*.
Paris, March 8, 1960
(Signed) Brigadier General Duong van Duc
Commander of the National Order"
True to his word, Duc stomped into the Vietnam embassy at
3:00 p.m. on March 10 and demanded to see the ambassador.
The ambassador called the police; the police hustled Duc out
and passed his declaration on to the ministry of the interior.
All that immediately resulted was a terse order from a French
official who was annoyed by Duc,s allusion to ,.oppression,
exploifation and injustice" in 1954, which was to say-under tle
French. Duc was told to keep still or he would bs sent home
to Diem and Nhrg the last rhing Duc wanted. He had been
captured by the Vietminh while fighting under the French.
Most men would rather die than So tbrortgh that experience.
lJnde1 lhe process which Ho chi Minh's specialists had per-
fected for reducing tough foreign legionnaires to human
.break-
lvrecks, Duc was given the works. The man doing the
ing" was none other than Joe Alsop's hero, Albert pham ngoc
Thao, tlen Ho chi Minh's iatelligence chief. When Duc deliv-
ered his declaration, Pham ngoc Thao was the right hand man
and secret police chief of Ngo dinh Nhu.
F9r six years Duc had served in Diem,s army, forced to
watch the Communist whom he had known as the man-breaker
gain power. And Duc needed no psychology book to lgll him
that men hate and distrust those whom they have broken. For
six years Pham ngoc Thao, applying for Ngo dinh |rffuu fts
same methods he had practiced for Ho chi Minh, had also
watched the officer who would get him some day if Thao did
not get him first. In the end Thao held the field; Duc delivered
his declaration and thereafter existed on handouts from Viet-
namese restanrrants,
Shortly after General Duc's startling declaration was deliv-
2VI BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
ered out of the blue, Jean-Marc Dufour, the French Far East
specialist who had been employed by TJSIS in Pnom Penh
tne ti-e of the February 1959 plot to depoae the Cambodian
a]t
monarchy, warned in La Nation Ftancaise: "Since the Chinese
New Year, in February, the Vietminh have never ceased to
gain ground. Murders succeed murders and ambushes suc-
ceea amtutnes. The most recent and the most striking assassi-
nations were those of the provincial governor of Vinh Long'
the recruituent commander of Tan Uyen and the sports and
youth leader of the same region. The number of assassinations
of ofrcialr and police average ten a day. The Vietminh
rebellion has become an organized military rebellion with a
supreme command in the field, able to maneuYef openly in
battalion strength."
Nexf on September 20, 1960, the European edition of the
New York Heiald Tribune broke the conspiracy of silence and
published a letter written by a Vietnamese who signed himself
General Thai-Son' Said he:

"Al1 newspapers around the world and particularly those

of the U.S. are aware of an unusual scandal-alme51 ttnique
in the history of modern times-the control of a supposedly
democ'ratic country by a single family.
"The true structure of this government by family' the
-most undemocratic and authoritarian in free Asia, is as
follows:
1. At the top is the President himself: Ngo dinh Diem.
2. Brother Ngo dinh Nhu, advisor of the President, con-
trols government, army, business, police, Assembly and
Revolutionary party (Can-Lao), whose 70'000 undergtound
membe,rs tlroughout the nation spend much of their time
giving police information about their neighbors.
3. Brother Ngo dinh Luyen is the Ambassador to Lon-
don, Tltnis, Brussels and Bonn, and controls the funds of
all these embassies.
5. Brother Ngo dinh Thuc is Roman Catholic bishop of
Vinh Long and controls all churches in Viet Nam.
6. Mrs. Ngo dinh Nhu, pretty wife of Nhu, "First Lady
of Diem's dynasty," controls ail big business and secret
funds.
7. The father of Mrs. Nhu, Mr. Tran van Chuong, is
ambassador to Washington, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, and
controls the funds of these embassies.
8. The mother of Mrs. Nhu is representative of Viet Nam
 PRELUDB TO THE END 225
in the UN and controls the licensing of commercial enter-
pdses.
Diem's regime is supported by the U.S. (a million Amer-
ican dollars a day). It rules not tlrough and for the people,
but tlrough his family and for said family.
And it is on this that the Communists mainly place their
hopes. Each month, from 250 to 300 government officials
and supporters are brutally murdered by Red guerillas.
Gen. TIIAI-SON
Saigon

Considering that Kennedy knew of all this, and much more

of which tle public was unaware, his appointment of Angier
Biddle Duke to the post of chief of protocol appears a graceful
way of collapsing American Friends of Vietna.m and getting
both the organization's head and its most prominent member
"out from under."
 CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

TIIE SCRAI\4BLE TO GET OUT FROM UNDER

It was labor that emerged as the master of America's destiny

and decider of foreign policy. Labor's decisions had been
delivered with the ring of authority in the AFLCIO's political
organ, Naw Leader, Sometimes labor leaders themselves did
the talking or again it might be their scholastic front, Mich-
igan State University. Polieies changed" but as one potcy
disastrous for America was dropped for another one doomed
to be worse, rlo note of doubt wru ever p€rmiffed to creep
into the New Leoder's line to America's unionized sheep.
On February 22, t954, tlre New Leqder published "How
to Win in Indo-China" by David J. Daflin. Obviously the frst
mo\re was to kick out tle French. Then came the specious
special issue of lvne 27, 1955, which we have mentioned, in
which Austrian socialist Joseph Buttinger said Ho chi Minh
wss ths man tle West should have supported but, since Ho had
been forced into the arms of the Communists by "French
coloniql policies," Diem was the man to bask The line was
always'oThis is tle way to win," but following a slowly chang-
ing sper{rum of nuances, the solutions changed The New
Leatler, which is to say American labor, and Michigan State
University, however, were always side by side. And the trend
was always downward.
As the bankruptcy of the policy of supporting a hated
family instead of a country became more evident the phmges
of the losing gamblers became more desperate. On November
2, 1959, and again on December 7 the New Leoder carried
pro-Diem articles by Michigan State's Professor Wesley Fishel.
Wolf Ladejinsky did his bit to perpetuats both Diem's reip
and his own job tbrough a New Lead.er article in 1960, while
Fo Eastern Sumey and Pacifrc Affoirs obediently printed the
flood of (scholar'Iy'' articles being turned out by Michigan
State, sti[ under contact to train Vietnam's public administra-
tors and polic€. Never did Fishel's group warn America of the
dangu on the horizon.
In mid-1959 agencies in Washington blocked the passport
rcnewal of the author o1 +his book for trying to do so. They
226
 TIfi SCRAMBLE TO GET OUT FROM UNDER 227
informed the French equivalent of FBI tlaf the opposition
in Vietnam had been formed and was being directed by Mr.
du Berier, and that said opposition's headquartert in Pnom
Penh occupied a house ren&d in Mr. du Berriet's name. Since
said oppostion was known to be without funds, American
agents having helped Diem and Nhu cut off their resouroes,
the American report went on to assert that Mr. du Berrier
was believed to have acquired funds for the Diem opposition
from an unnaned foreign power (Red China implied). Mr.
du Berrier's e:rpulsion from France, it was hint€4 would be
appreciated. A disgusted French ofrcial passed the report on
to the author with the laconis query, "Who is trying to get
you?' Tliirty minutes had sufrced to assure tle French DST'
the Direction de la Surveillance du Terriotoire (French
equivalent of the FBI), that the American plaint was false.
On November 11, 1960, came the revolt of thc paratroopers.
The drum-beating over Die,m's fefifrgeming elections scbed-
uled for April 9, 1961, showed no abatement of ofrcial Ameri'
can enthusiasm for our man, but the boys on the inside, the
small group of string-pulle'rs who had p11 things as they
please{ were washilg their hands of the results of the New
Lea.d.efs old'How to Win" formulae. Henceforth Sol If,vitas,
editor of the labor publioation in questio'n, descriH the Saigon
government as "a,n autoc.ratic, corrupt and ineffective rcgime."
American labot's wandering "ambassadorr" Irving Brovnr,
could not have failed to find the second page of Paris Pre't'te
of December 2, 1960, neatly folded on his desk f6ry filing, with
Alex Ralmaut's report, "On South Vietnarn Which Rots and
Decomposes." Said Raynaut "A woman, Madame Ngo dinh
Nhu, is the Luc,rezia Borgia of the regime. She concentrates the
hstred of all the opposition to the Diem party." Brown was no
fool; thougb the American public was not yet ready for such
blunt truths, he knew it was time to drop a hot potato.
Out of East l-ansing, Michigan, on February 18, 1961' came
a UPI dispatch announcing that "the establishnelrt of an
African I-anguage Center at Michigan State University has
made the institution one of the few places in tle U.S. where
Aftican languages can be learned under the teaching of expert
linguists.'The AP on the sane date reported a parade tbrough
porning rain at Michigan State-"to mourn the death of
Patrice Lumumba." Of the late but unlamented Vietnam
Project not a word. And the 6ansfer to Africa of ofrcial after
official responsible for our disastrous Southeast Asia policy
passed unnoticed.
To conceal from the duped American taxpayers the fact
2?3 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
that their much-touted experimeut was sinking, and that tle
boys in the know were deserting it, drums kept on beating for
the new "democrafiC' elections set for April. Again Diem
picked his oppnents, t 73-yetr-old Oriental faith healer
named Ho phut Tran and a rich planter, a former friend
of Ho chi Minh" named Nguyen dinh Quat.
"Communists lose a round to Col. Thao" was the way Joe
Alsop hailed Diem's "victory" in the New York Herald
Trlhutu of April 11, 1961. The Thao he was glorifying was
Albert, Ho chi Minh's erstwhile intelligence chief. In the same
April 11 issue Edgar E. Clark told Americans, "Pro-Western
President Ngo dinh Diem won a surprising landslide victory
in his bid for re-election for a five-year term. . . . All Mr.
Diem's critics, both here and abroad, cannot deny that the
election was demoqratic. . . . The voting and counting were as
straight as could be. There v3g nething wrong with either so
far as the beadiest-eyed observer could see."
On April 12 Joe Alsop gave the beast-become-hero Albert
Phan ngoc Thao another plug in a coluon headed "April Fool
for Col. Ifung." TWo days later, on April 14, a Herald.
Tfibunc editorial hailed the election outcome as a "Red Set-
back in South Vietnam." Joe Alsop was just warming up: Hh
column in the same issue was "CoL Thao's War."
Time was in on it aJso. Time of April 2L ta,ld followers of
the Luce line that Diem had responded to some sound advice
from "leon, ex-communist Colonel Pham ngoc Thao" by
handing Colonel Thao command of vital, rice-growing Kien-
hoa province. Thao got 83Vo of his voters to the polls." The
rqnrt continued, *'\Mc tried a little propaganda on our own,'
he flhaol admits. '\ile told the people that if they did not vote,
they would have trouble getting jobs gr help from the govern-
ment"'An oblique way of saying that American aid dangled
before a suffering countryside bought Diem a victory. How-
€ver, no letter pointing out rhis fact ever appeared in print in
Time Magaane. Nor were Europe's down-to-earth commeDts
ever pass€d on to the American public.
Paris Presse of April 4, screamed, "The communists have
taken the offensive in South Vietnam," adding, 'If the deterio-
ration of public institutions in South Vietnam is evident the
police system of the government is still solid enough to assure
President Diem a victory next Sunday."
Flgmo's Saigon correspondent Francois Nivolon, cabled on
April 6, "IJt's admit at once that tle victory of President Ngo
dinh Diem and his teammate Vice Fresident Nguyen ngoc
Tho is certain. The chances of their adversaries are non-
 THE SCRAMBLE TO GET OUT FROM UNDER 229

existent. We can only deplore the fagt that the opposition did
not tlrow candidates of any importance into the battle. Both
men atre anti+ommunist and anti-neutralist but tbey are not
supported by any of the known opposition movements."
liran-Lfarc Dufour wrote in La Nation Francoise, the Paris
weekly quoted by National Review on all subjects but South
Vietdm, that the formality of Diem's reelection proved noth-
ing but the perfect orgnnizalisa of his police. There was, how-
ever, Dufour admitted, something new in the recent campaign:
an American public relations man' which led the Washington
Post ta exclaim that Diem had undertaken a handshaking tour
"in the best American stYle"'
"After that can one reasonably doubt the popularity of
Ngo dinh Diem?'asked Mr. Dufour. The fly in the ointment'
a.-he saw i! was that despite "the efforts of Dr. Wesley Fishel
of Michigan State Universlty and public relatiorn man Harold
Oram, thi principaf problem remained unsolved: While Diem
was enjoying a promenade throug! the countryside and chat-
ting with the villagers, armed bands numbering as many as
3fi) men were attacking the regular army." Since Diem com-
manded neither the loyalty of the arrny nor tlat of the coun'
try, Dufour concluded, "everything seems impossible: The
opposition is reduced to exile by the police qd to impotelce
by-exile, which leaves only the communists in position to be-
come Diem's heirs."
"Scrutator," commentator in the London Sunday Times of'
May 14, 1961, told British readers tlat Presideot Ngo dinh
Diem had mellowed "to a point where his electors no longer
fnd it necessary to give him more votes than thcy can count
heads. His American backing is more lavish than ever . . .
yet his seat is becoming uncomfortable, th,e communists hav-
ing begun to seep into his territory and to slaughter his officials
at night.'Scrutitor added, "suppose the Americans had inter-
vened at the time of the Dien Bien Phu disaster, and had some'
how reconquered all of Indo-China . . . they would still have
saddled themselves with the indefensible Mr. Diem and his
family."
Wliy the Reporter decided to do a turnabout and publish
Stanley Karnos/s article, "Diem Defeats His Own Best
Troops' in tle issue of January t9, 196L, or how Karnow
happined to write it" has never been explained. When Darrel
Beilngen's sugarcoated propaganda for Ngo dinh Diem ap-
p""t"dio the-Reporter of September 20, 1956, editor Phil
ilorton fuad asthing but aloof disdain for anyone trying -to
talk sense to him on the subject. And Stan Karnow, then in the
230 BACKGROTJND TO BETRAYAL
Paris bureau of. Tilne-Life, was too busy setting up a ski bip
for the weekend to bother to talk to Dr. Nguyen ton Hoan
when Hoan went to his ofrce.
Victor I-asky, out of loyalty to his friend Harold Oram" or
because Oram was pay'lng him for every plug he cogld give the
foundering Ngo dinh Diem, reached far out to work a boost
for Diem into an article against Robert Welch and the John
Birch Society. Syndicated by the North American Newspaper
Alliance, Lasky's column, "Welch throws wild punches at
Reds," appeared in The Indianapolis Star of. April 11, 1961,
two days after Diem's "reelection."
"How much does Welch really know about Asian affairs?"
asked I-asky, whose own knowledge of Asia was derived from
evenings spent at the bar of the Overseas Press Club with
Diem's public relations huckster, fishing for a free trip to
Saigon. Lasky wrote that Welch, once a yeal, "devotes his
monthly American Opinian to a scoreboard of communist
influence in over 100 nations. For each country he presents
a per@ntage score on the degree of Red infiltration. What his
yardstick is he does not say."
Actually, Welch did some explaining, which Victor Lasky
omit0ed, and, studied in retrospect, without any distortions,
Webh comes out much better than Lasky. For what American
Oplniods yearly "Scoreboard" attempted to estimate was not
Communist infltration but the percentage of power Com-
munists would be able to throw into the streets in a given
country under favorable conditions using all the forces, Com-
munist or otherqdse, that might be brought into their game.
Considering that President Kennedy himself admitted the
Communist assassination of 4000 local ofrcials in Vietnam in
1960, and authorities such as Dr. Bernard Fall set the figure at
closer to 13,00fin a country that had only 12,000 to 14,fi)0
villagcs in all-the 70Vo to 9OVo estirnate of Red strength
which Lasky pooh-poohed was conservative. Buddhists, stu-
dents, tribesmen of the high plateau regions, the army and
the countryside awaited only an opportunity to end Diem's six
years of abuse of power. A:rd villages where offcials remained
alive were villages obedient to the Reds.
In March 1961 Vice-President Johnson took off for a
iunket to Soutl Vietnam-a trip fraught with significance.
\\rift him were all the usual hangers-on of government and
press, a sort of triumphant visit to a satrapy with dl eyes and
carnerl$ focused on America's vice-president, who had been
selected for the Kennedy ticket by a Russian-born labor leader
named Dave Dubinsky. In the rear of the plane bearing Vice.
 TIfi SCRAMBLE TO GET OUT FROM UNDER 231
President Johnson's entourage sat an unobtrusive little man
in gay narned Suftrage. He was president of the Retail Clerks'
Union of America, which is an AFI{IO afrliate.
Why should a labor union president accompany a vice-pres-
idential junket to Vietnam? The question was never asked. At
each stoir the spotlight was focused on Lyndon Johnson. Offi-
cials awaited him, cameras clicked, honor guards were drawn
up; no one noticed the little group tha! whiskcd Mr. Suffrage
away for a meeting elsewhere, behind closed doors-to discuss
wna-t? Was Suftrage regimenting native labor qrposition against
Diem? Was LSrndon taking attention away from Suftage while
Vietnam labor told its story and AFI-CIO strengthened its
hand to name Diem's successor? When the big plane turned its
nose toward America on the homeward journey, tle little labor
leader in gray was back in his seat, as colorless and expression-
less as ever, but back in Saigon word went out that a change
was in tle works.
Britain's liberal Observer Foreign News Service, provider
of many of the feature articles Arnericans read in the New
York Eerald Tribune, filed a report out of Saigon by Dennis
Bloodworth on June 7, t96l.It was the usual 'Ve are win-
ning" story, but its main objective was to swell the chorus
of the loe Alsop campaign to sell Albert Pham ngoc Thao.
"Bold Experiment Tried by South Viet Colonef' was the way
the European edition of the Herald Tribune headlined it' on
June 8. A column of priceless publicity in one of America's
largest papers followed, telling how, in his campaign to,win
confidence, Colonel Thao's first act on taking over Kien Hoa
province was to release from 1200 to 1500 "susp-ects" arrested
on suspicion of aiding Communist guerillas. Nothina rys sai,{
of Thio's record as torturer and intelligence chief for Ho chi
Minho nor his role as head of Nhu's secret police in filling
Diem's prison with the anti-Communist opposition. In facl the
Bloodworth article continued, "To the astonisbment and some-
timas fury of his superiors he [Pham ngoc Thao] also set free
some of the Viet Cong his men had captured, allowing tlem
to walk out of prison campv-with their weapons . . . Colonel
Thao ha-s trained his men not to return fire when the Viet Cong
open up on them, but quietly to note the position of the com-
munists and encircle them." The Vietcong could Dot caPture
arms fast enough, so Thao was letting prisonen, personal
friends perhaps, walk out with them. The order not to return
frewas explained as a move 'to ring tle enemy for a mass
capture"-which, alas, never took place.
While Lyndon Johnson provided a shelter for labor diplo'
232 BACKGROTJND TO BETRAYAL
macy and Albert Phom ngoc Thao liberated captured Viet-
cong-allowing them to take thet guns!-to prove that our
side was not afraid of them, the intentions of America's new
president were ambiguous. It is not easy to do a volte-tace
on a policy when one has been a vociferous member of the
lobby supporting it. Kennedy began sending missions to Viet-
nam while he stalled for time, goping for an out. Strangely
enougb, one of the best reports on this period, written by an
American in Saigon who signed himsslf "2," appeared in the
March 12, 1962, issue of the Nep Republic, but, like Stanley
Karnow's article in the Reporter of January 19, 1961, it was
rejected by conservative Americans out of distrust of the
organ in which it appeared.
"T' s?idi "Beginning with the mission of Vice President
Johnson in March, 1961, followed in rapid succession by the
Staley and [General] Taylor missions, \ly'ashington began to
learn in a few weeks and months what had been available for
it to know for the past six years: that a Commuoist-led and
directed guerrilla movement, feeding on large.scale popular dis-
content in the villages and aided by North Vietnam (but to a
far less extent than is said-this again is part of the new myth),
was about to take over South Vietnam directly from under the
feet of the Diem regime . . . In lfashington parlance, 'the
town really hit the panic button.' A round-the-clock unit was
set up on the seventh floor of the newest of the new State De-
partment buildings to co-ordinate all activities concerning Viet-
nam, end hotel space in Saigon became totally unavailable as
an unending stream of visitors from Washington and
ICINPAC], Commander-in-Chief Pacific Area Command, be-
gan to investigate the Vietnam situation for themselves.
"A brief flurry of hope followed departure from Saigon of
General Taylor's mission. Although Taylor had been carefully
screened from all Americans in Saigon whose views might have
clashed with the offcial myths . . . he had seen and learned
enough to come through with a report which in all likelihood
was to advocate some deep-seated political changes."
Obviously, the most important political change envisaged
was the dumping of Nhu and his wife. Without them the coun-
try could still, just possibly, be rallied behind Diem. But there
was not a hope. i\s '32" described the Saigon reaction, ..the
government-controlled press of South Vietnam let loose against
th9 U. S. a barrage of insults whose viciousness and inanity can
only be matched by Peking or Havana (on particularly bad
days). On November 24, t961, Saigon,s Thoi Bao (The Jour-
nal) printed an eight-column headtine readi'g ,Republic of
 THE SCRAMBLE TO GBT OUT FROM I]NDER 233
Vietnam Guinea Pig For Capitalistic Imperialism-Is it not
time to revise Vietnamese-American Collaborationf' d similar
tack was taken by the other newspapers' and for awhile it
looked as if the Moment of Truth had arrived on both sides
. . . But nothing of the sort occurred: !1'hshington simply and
purely capitulated . . . Having thus abandoned all hope of
istanding up' to the Diem regime, Washington topped off its
total surrender by sending the new foreign aid director' Fowler
Hnmillea, to Saigon in mid-January, 1962." And Hamilton'
according to the Associated Press, was impressed by the
strength, vigor and competence of the men he met.
Behind the scenes a more deadly power struggle than "T'
imagined was going on. Those in the know were aware that
Diem could not agree to reforms, for Diem had had no final
say as to what was going on for months, perhaps even the past
two years. Gradually power had passed to Nhu, who, on the
pretext of taking a burden oft his brother's shoulders, had made
the transition from advisor to ruler. Nhu was not going to
submit to his own ousting. Nor was he about to launch pleas
for Mike Mansfield to support the regime "for just a little long-
er," as he had in April of 1955. Secret negotiations with Ho chi
Minh for a "neutral, American-free South Vietnam" under
himself had reached a stage where Nhu was convinced that
America dared not cut loose and cared little if she did. Even
while Nhu's treasonable negotiations were going on, however,
the effects of Mr. Suffrage's road-paving under the shelter of
Lyndon Johnson were being felt.
The junket to Saigon by a Professor Staley in June of 1961
was not to affect the long-term deterioration in Vietnam one
iota, for, to put it in American beatnik terms, Staley was
off on a strategic hamlet "kick". It was the age of the egghead
in America, which Jacqueline Kennedy was later to com-
pare with the brief, shimmering age of Camelot. For the small
group of men who never under normal circumstances would
have approached the center of power and who, after Ken-
nedy, were never likely to do so again, the comparison was
valid. To Staley, strategic harrlets were the answer, and the
American taxpayer paid for Staley's folly in dollars while GI's
and Vietnamese paid with their lives.
Then, in September, to the loud ballyhooing of radio, TV
and press, came General Maxwell Taylor's plea for political
reforms. But tbere was no communicationJ media spotlight
thrown on the mission of Irving Brown.
Mr. Irving Brown, AFLCIO's roving ambassador who
boasted of having travelled half a million milss ,.in the cause
234 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
of anti-Communism" (mostly sowing revolts in colonies that
have since passed from allied rule to Communist), was dis-
patched on a Vietnam fact-finding trip for American labor.
His confidential report dated November 27, 1961, ran to nine
single-spaced filewritten pages and can be summed up in a
few lines: The new man to back in South Vietnam is the Con-
federation of Vietnam Labor leader, Tran quoc Buu, described
by Brown as "the most outstanding trade union leader and in-
dividual I met in Saigon." Brown added, "Buu still has the con-
fidence of Diem but Buu, himself, has lost much of his con-
fidence in Diem especially his entourage." Translated into
plain language, "Buu is still trusted by the palace, so he can
attack from the inside if we will get behind him."
The buildup of Buu started from that moment. The fall of
Diem gained momentum, but the boys who selected Diem in
the fust place were determined to name his successor. "IIow
to Win in Vietnam" would still be announced through New
Leader magazine.
In the months between Suffrage's trip and Brown's, Ho chi
Minh's "veterans of the Nam Bo" set up the scaffolding of their
National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. In December
196l a commando operation effected the liberation of left-wing
lawyer named Nguyen huu Tho whom Diem had interned;
and with Nguyen huu Tho as their president the new Red front
prepared to rally under a banner of fake nationalism all the
groups deprived of any other alternative by America's blind
support of the Ngo dinhs. Among them was a group called The
Patriotic and Believing Catholics.
lryashington, however, ipored all this and remained pre-
occupied only with "support for Diem." One reason may have
been, as Georges Chaffard explains in his book on that period,
that Ambassador Frederick Nolting had made some feeble
efforts to move Diem. but when he saw that he could not in-
fluence that stubborn chief of state he decided to become a
friend of the Nhu's, to try to convince them. Instead, he be-
came their tool.
 CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

ENTER CABOT LODGE

The year 1962 broke over the dying country that had once
been the rice bowl of Southeast Asia in another wave of Com-
munist onslaughts. The obstinate Mandarin from Hue had
moved from Gia Long Palace, the scene of his early struggles.
February found Diem, Nhu, Madame Nhu, and Thuc (who
was about to become archbishop of Hue, the Buddhist strong-
hold in the north), all living in Dinh Doc Lap Palace, which
Diem had chosen as his presidential residence.
How aware the people of the CIA, the USIS, American aid,
or the embassy were of the inroads the National Liberation
Front was making, as one village after another embraced the
Commrnists as liberators from the Ngo dinhs, is hard to say.
A frightened officialdom had hustled Miss Sandra Davies out
oi Saigon on a couple of days' notice in 1958 and transfered
her to the embassy in Manila on charges that "she was going
native," which was a way of saying that she had established
a rapport with Vietnamese and was beginning to learn what
was going on. The clique tolerated only those who closed their
eyes and parroted their myth.
Despite both Vietnamese and American censorship, the
news seeped through. All Southeast Asia knew of Vietnam's
jolting series of setbacks in the field in late February 1962.
First the civil guard was mauled in three lightning astions.
With the people of the countryside giving no waming to gov-
ernment troops, the Vietcong struck, inflicted heavy casual-
ties, and after each attack pulled out with a new haul of am-
munition and weapons. Then at 6:50 a. m. on Tuesday, Feb-
ruary 2'1 , two air force lieutenants, Pham phu Quoc and
Nguyen van Cu, instead of carying out the bombing mission
south of Saigon to which they had been assigned, attacked the
presidential palace. For fifty minutes they bombed and strafed
Dinh Doc Lap. Diem was mysteriously warned and managed
to get to his underground bunker just in time. Madame Nhu
fell through a hole in the floor but came out with minor
scratches and bruises.
Lieutenant Quoc was brought down by anti-aircraft fire,
235
 236 BACKGROTJND TO BETRAYAL
but Cu, a-brilli:lt young pilot who had received twenty_three
months of training in the U. S., escaped to Cambodia,'where
he announced that the airforce could no longer support Diem,s
dictatorship and that other revolts were in store. ,.The Viet-
namese people and elements of the army detest Diem,s regime
and family," said Cu.
Diells reply was to ground the air force and launch another
purge. Through the directorate general of information, a series
.,reactionaries
9f communiquss denounced thi as *eil the
Commrrnists" who wer-e responsible for the outrage.""With
"reactionaries" x hinf of new scapegoats came into thi picture
for the first time: There was mori than a suspicion tnai Oiim
a,nd Nhu, without coming out and saying so, were
aiming ai
the Americans. But what Americans? Thi old inteUigence,-in-
formation, aid and embassy combine of the past, or someone
new?
Prob-ably the best indication of who was trying to get
_- the
Kennedy administration "out from under" is io be foirnd in
James Reston's column which appeared in the New york
Times o2-Itrne 18, 1964, more tian two years later. Reston
wrote, "With the possible exception of iuba, Vietnam has
the. Attorney General,s ittention
l1_::t"d policy. problem. -ore ih"o u"y otU",
19.?Err. Under president Kennedy he was a
Ieader in the decision to mount a counter_insurgeniy policy
in
that country. He was involved in all the maneuvers that led
to the Administration's open opposition to the Diem regime
inSaigon . . ."
"Vietnam is the third of the momentous tests in the Cold
U. proved.in Korea that it could aeU witn
s;..T1"-war. S.
uT1".g It proved in the Cuban crisis that it codd"-ujo,
dlal
wtn the threat of a nuclear war, but the challenge of subver-
sive warfare has not yet been mit anO this is-the
test of Viet-
lam . . . More than almost anybody else in the Administra-
tion, he lRobert Kennedy] has ieen f*"i""t"a by the
tech-
oigu"r-
log_possibilities of counter-inilg;;;, has been in-
volved in Vietnam and its problems for ihe past
three years,
the prestige and authority to pull togeiler what is now
19.l+
a olvloed ancl rather confused team of State Department,
De-
fense
_Department and Central Intefligence oplrators on the
scgne."
.
In. other words, for years Jack Kennedy, as senator,
had
obedienfly read from sinate floor u"C G"t',rr" ptattorms
paper put in his hands by- Arthur Goldberg -r{ngier any
or Bidd6
Drket-humming Diem totUy. nut n.-r"""ned the White
"tt",
House his brother Bobby took over__described
ty paris presse
 ENTBR CABOT LODGE 237

as having
*all the sentimentality of a-panther" and having
;.n"J ni.-futt tear at the age of seven." Bobby's constant dread
.^ * i".*tection agaiist the Rostow-Weisner-Schlesinger
o.o** of his brothei. Counter-insurgency-how to quell an
-ios-rfrectioo
if in power or win one if on the outside-became
S"bby. p*.ion, ind South Vietnam his testing ground fo-r3x-
labor
p"t-i-""ti. Irving Brown's late 1961 recommendation thatjoined
6oss Sou be taken up as America's man had no doubt
td-"th;; papers in fobby's hands; with all.the realism of his
f.t" of tni jiungle mentaiity, he read th9 ,tt-ryu and, whether
the public was lrepared for it or not, told his brother it was
time to unload.
--io-S;bty, Lieutenant Cu's and Lieutenant Quoc's lomling
of the pahCe was no isolated incident. The "reactionaries"
*lot bi"- and Nhu denounced after the bombing were
io tn" White House. Whether Bobby and his brother still
iUouglt the war in South Vietnam could be won' or had any
iot"fiioot of trying to win it, is one of the secrets locked in the
breasts of men noted for their subterfuge.
Whatever Bobby thought privately, it was not yet tim€ to
tell America that the years of ballyhoo had been false and the
Uig was on the skids. That Diem's family knewlhe
*"t near became evident in the summer of 1962 when
"*p"ti-"nt
"oA
Diem's niece, the wife of Tran trung Dung, former secretary
of state for defense, visited Paris. Sitting in a restaurant in
Montparnasse, surrounded by her counJry- men avid for news
from'home, siie replied to their questioning, "How can I be
oprimisfis2 The pedple detest my family. One of these days we
*it att fe ryncGa.i am making plans to takg refuge in Paris
before it is tbo hte. I ask myself wlat the Ngo family is waiting
for that they do not get out of there before they a1e all mjs:a-
cred,." (Indochine .-. . Dix Ans de L'Independence-Indo-
china . . . Ten Years of Independence . . . by Georges
Chaffard. Calmann-Levy, 29 4 pages.)
I-ess informed than Madame Tran trung Dung, America's
U. S. Operations Mission beavers were still going full speed rJom
ahead, enjoying the heady experience of moving families
wherathey banteO to be and inutting them up in villages whirch
the Vietcong picked off at will. It was their show, and they
enjoyed every-minute of the spending and propaganda spree
accompanying Mr. Staley's "strategic hamlets." A new social
systen was created. Those showing most enthusiasm for the
hamlets formed a new' favored class at the top' rmmediately
after them came their families and relatives. At the bottom
were the nha-ques, the poor peasants for whom the social revo-
 238 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL

lYli"P .*": srLnn3gedlf being carried out. American military

chiefs in South Vietnam had nothing to say about the defense
of what was really America's do-irbig equivalent of the 1954
guard towers of the French, large enough to take in a
village.
These strategic hamlets were under thJ..economic and fina"n_
cial adviser to the Government of South Vietnam," i.e., the
man who allotted dollar aid. Diem's civil guard was also
under him.
Al! th9 ingredients of a first class explosion were in the
crucible but still, out of cynicism-deteinination to tell the
public what it wanted to Lear, reluctance to backtrack and
a{mit, eight.years. of guilt, or maybe a forlorn hope thai a
ruracre mlght yet appear and save them_Ameriia,s mass
communications media continued the hoax. The leaders were
Joe Also-p and Marguerite Higgins, whom Diem and
Nhu had
accorded preeninence through invitations to the palace
and
photograpbs taken with the
fresident. (Such photographs ie-
came tangible evidence of authority, and on piem's ind
-name-dropping Nhuis
:,"^19:l .t-portance hioryd eacf
clarm to stature. Madame Suzanne Labin wrote in tne
upofogi.i,,
dasn-
h.Po: JulV Z4,.tg_62,..Nothing, iot""a, could jus--
Y:rl4.9f
ry a revolt of the masses in South Vietnam. Anyone waudering
round.the gountry, as I have done several tiri.r, t"rtlti
to a miraculous improvement." "uo
- Thgughexacfly
all Vietnam was waiting for an upheaval without
how or when, reasirring state^ments continued
f"g*i"q
to flow from "travelers" of supposedfy i"?epe"Aent means
who
were.just wandering around,-but *"r" preceded by
warnings over Asia's age-old bamboo wireless "iway,
ihaf it woda be
them and suicidal to telt ttem anlthing
f:lTf}
rne |.l,p.ptol*
pouce might not like. If Americans were taken in by sucf,
statements, not so the Vietcong.
Tbrough the labor unions of Western Europe and
a London
S::l_ryig"d.by_a certain Labor membei of parliamenq
naDot was kept informed of rhe 11"oo"dy team,s groping
for a
:_%l* The _quesrion was whom thelwould b;rk- t"-;h";
jumped to rhe conclusion that it could-only
ll 3tjT.^-rl"oi
ton tloan, since he was the only opposition leadei
::.lryyq
with a party. Accordingly, on September Zi, tbiZ, the
Frencn
Communist daily Humanire turned it" n"""y urtiUrry
on Hoan
as the "war-monger,' and ..puppet of tle .{nlricans.,,
The de
Gaulle press stated that Hban'w^
because he
was for continuation of the war. epparentiy--both
""*".-ptuUle paris and
H_anoi feared rhat logic might triJriph
Wsshington. The fear ias unfiunded. '
lJ". newinism in
 ENTER CABOT LODGE 239

On Januarf2, !963, came the rude jolt when regiment after

regiment of the Vietcong, recruited and trained on the spof
suiged from nowhere out of the delta heart of Mytho province
to defeat a Vietnamese national army equipped with American
105 mm. artillery, amphibian craft, helicopters and an air
force. Placed before the Kennedy team in 14/65hington, the
debacle was called the Battle of Ap-Bac. Grim as it was' it did
not deter American advisors from arming Vietcong guerrillas,
on the theory that "infiltrators are among the best targets for
conversion to fighters against Communists." (Washington
Posf, January 25, L963). "The United States has armed some
Viet Cong sympathizers along with anti-Communist tribesmen
in a bold gamble to gain control of the higblands in South
Vietnam," gushed an AP dispatch out of Saigon on Janu-
ary 24,1963. The report added, however, that the experiment
had not always been successful, as in the case of Plei Mrong
where tbirty-nine defenders had been killsd. $q it was ad'
mitted that the defenders of the strategic hamlet of Plei Mrong
paid for an unpardonable stupidity no high school freshman
would have committed-and to the tune of a basketful of
severed hands, left behind as a thank-you.
"A highly informed source said that 50 Viet Cong sympa-
fhizsrs who aided the attack have been arrested," AP unblush-
ingly continued, "But many probably will be released after
stern reprimands and allowed to return to their villages."
While military men scruried between Washington and
for reestablishing a military balance, and
Saigon, with plans
the AFL{IO's policy formers pushed Irving Brown's recom-
mendations, the crisis that secret police and American dollars
had staved off for nine years was rapidly approaching. Its
scene:ffue, the feudal seat of the Ngo dinhs. Monsignor
Ngo dinh Thuc, archbishop of the diocese, doyen of the
epucopate in Vietnam, chancellor of the University of Dalat'
was preparing a sacerdotal jubilee to mark the twenty-fifth
anniversary of his accession in the church. May 5 was the date
set.Diem himself was to attend; therefore Thuc and his brother,
Can, planned to turn the celebration into a political manifesta-
tion for the family.
Businessmen complained that they were shaken down for
contributions. With each cash donation a message of con-
gratulation was expected. From all directions the non-spon-
taneous expressions of good will poured in. One, however,
which had been expiessly solicited failed to appear. Ngo dinh
Can demanded of the venerable Thich tinh Khiet what had
happened to his telegram. Khiet, president of the Association
 24O BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
of Vieharnese Buddhists, w_hose spiritual fief was also lfue,
rqilied that he was not sending one. (The refusal *u, troi u
T*k of hostilif_tg the Roman Catholic religion; under other
crcums&ncca Khiet would gladly have added his fraternal
felicitations to the othen, but he inew that his message
would
be usedpo_litic$V
ry groot of the Buddhist superior'S:satisfac-
tion wittr the Ngo dinhs.)
Georges Chafford observed (Indochine_Dix Ans de L,Inde_
y:y:y?) t"! Ng.o gttr c* was not in the natit or paraon_
rng. uthers claim that it was at Archbishop Thuc,s requist that
bgrya the display of Buddhist In any case,
H1T, "rrrUL-..
rnuc's r,evenge c4me next day in the form of an order-on the
eve of the celebration of Buddha's 2,005th birthday
tnat no
Buddhist flags or religious emblems should be aispliyed.
The
crowd_began to manifest its displeasure; still Thic6
tinh Khiet
urged his followers to remain cilm.
. .Ol lv-Iay 8, the date of Buddha's birthday, Dr. Eric Wulff, a
thirty-nine-year-old German from Fribouri'University
rt il"J
?mong the crowd milling around the H-ue raOio jtation ai
9:30 in t4e hot humid evening. accompanieA by one
students, Wulff enjoyed the festive air. Several,thous*d
of his
p";pl"
were massed in the streets to hear the speeches that
always h?d
been simultango'!"ly broadcast and fu""r-itt"a over
loud_
sPeaKqrs, Suddenly a monk's voice came over
the air, an-
nouncing that the ceremony had been banned ty'the
government. A wave of.su-ry1se nnd indignation
the crowd. "Remain calm,"-the voice of-G went through
monx continued.
'"Ibe provincial governor is coming to air""r, tn" matter.,,
A tew minutes later the governor, 6 Budr{hist, arrived. A
monk asked the crowd to applaud ni- *J p"rr-"gll
yF"! F:y obedienfly did. ,iutomaticativ -tension"f""i ",oUsiOJa.
Aoout ntteen minutes after the governor entered the
radio
building, Dr. Wulff heard the ,ooiO of anO turned to
see four armored cars ente-r_the garden. -otors
His siudent t"ld hi_,
'We |1d better get out of Otl.rr-"ppLntly had the
same idea. As thev aonroached-here.-.
one of tn. of the garden
Wulft heard tne iract or ""it people threw
;.-;p;;
themselves on the ground. _""tor""ii"
wulff ano trre siuaent ran for their
lrYes.
. A litge later, with another German doctor Wulff went
to the
lospital where fifteen wgun-de! people wlre'being treated.
A nurse suggested that he look in tl" hore"".-niehtaeaj;;;;
woman and seven children,
langrng from s6"en to-nfteen yearr,
repoled o_n the slabs, partially O""apit"tea Uy heavy machine-
gun fire. Later it was l"arn"d that bommani",
oi"g Sy,E"
 ENTER CABOT LODGE 24L

sovernor's Catholic assistant, under orders from Ngo ai"!

C1n
i;;;;;ibi;f"; th" *uttu"t" while his superior was in the
--A;;;tf,aa
radio building, supposedly negotiating'
naa its-sigb1 of blood' and from that dav'
witn it" t"*"los machine-gunning in the radio station
gard-eno

th; was no turning Uact. on May !2, Buddhist leaders

a petition t6 the government bearing five demands:
"Jat**.d
fiU"tty of t"Ulto* meetings ana activities; granting of $e-sape
.t"iuJto Ae Euaanist refton as that enjoyedty the.Catholics
LV nitt"" of Ordinance 10 of the constitution; immediate
cessa-
of the
til" of all persecution of the Buddhists; and sSrmbols; coo-
suppression law
i;iddi"g'th; showing of Buddhist flags
plete indemnity for vicrims of the May 8 massacre and Pulusn-
ment of those resPonsible.
- Oo t"tuy 15 Diem received a Buddhist delegation dispatched
t G;;tt-Ueg co*iA"tation of their petition' none o! the
aemaias of whiJh were unreasonable' But Diem ipored
them'
By Mt S0 had been done' Then started the hunger
proiest marches around Hue's Tu Dam pagoda'
"othiog
,t it", *a the
iiDil-h"d af,pearec conciliatory on May 15, it was ooryio
g"i" tit"", *a pernaps to placate th" *ote apprehensive of the
i-"ti""ti.. Iniealiti'ne fu"s convinced thatOnhe had won and
the Buddhist deman'ds would be forgotten' June 2 a per'
;;il;-t"t*y from the falace arrivia in Hue with orders for
n *"t -"pt"tsion. out oi tn" propaganda machine in Saigon
was all
flew the ofrcial version oi tn" rf"" -u"hine-gunning' It
Communist proPaganda.
Frederick Nolting, ile American ambassador' backed his
during
m""at it tntptoid""tiJ pdu"" with a statement thatpersecu-
nir r*o ana a'nalf ye.r ttay he had seen no religiols
tion. The Intenect- Committee for the Defense of Buddhism
replied with a ti"ii"g that^"Mr' Nolting should
il;G;i" "o.-""iq""
dntral vi"ilu* tn"tJpast five Years if he^w-anted
to see how frequent were the cases of persecutlon or wlucn of
the Buddhists *"t" uiJ*t, and these acts in the narne
l"gulity' almost uf*uyt ty-tiministrative.and military omtt4t
who were Catholic." Few press servlces transmitted the
Buddhist replY.
It was illegal, said the government, to fast as a sip of
ptoLtt. sut6?d'wire barriiades went up overnight around
J"o" went into the
titit ptr""tpJp"goa*. <i" 3 the stirdents
wire' The barricades
streets to prote$t ug.i"ti tn" barbed
stayed, and a fury of and placards
"otigon"tnment.slogans
resulted. Then the ttofi-*lot into action' Dr' Wulff noted
that the soldiers *"r" bottles ssafxining a dark brown
""iiyiog
 242 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
liquid, which they threw into the crowd. On breaking, they
gave off a cloud of toxic gas. Dr. Wulff countea
sixty_tr6
victims with second ana t!i1O degree burns accompaniid by
:tgmach-and larynx convulsions anO a fall in blooa press-urJ.
Jvlany of the victims were blinded. Thirty-six hours later those
burned ty
4e g:N were rounded up Uy tne police, so Wulff
wa' never able to ascertain how many of tne 6uros were fatal
or whether the effects were temporary or permanent. Who,
i{ pVbodf, treated the victims Wum never fo"., oo. was he
able to learn the source of the gas. Whether it was left over
t9ry Jhe]apanese occu-pation, a iounter-insurgency arm being
S"9 Ut Bobby Kennedy's experimenterr, o, u- gifi from fohi
Richardson's hated CIA team, no one ever knew.
Pgls qapep accorded a full page to Dr. Wulff's testimony,
notably Candide of August 21,1963.parispresseof August fi
gas-9tory half a page, while rle Washington poit gave
.g_lugjhe
Wulff a small eorner of in lnner page on Septeiber 24,;tith_
out mentioning tle gas victims ai ail. To inier that Wdn Oia
not mentioa the victims while he was in Washington is to insult
the American public's intelligence.
The next big question:.Who was responsible for ordering
a gas attack when by a simple gesture bf conciliation Dieri
could have avoided, temporarily at least, the tragic train of
events to follow? Americans in the vicinity of -Richmond,
Virginia, of which Ambassador Nolting is naiive, showed thai
-
regro.nal
-loyutty was stronger than d]stust of a fennedy_
lppointed ambassador: They accepted Nolting,s whitewash of
his friends.
D.r. Wulff testifed (Candide, August Zl, 1963) that officials,
T1rory to prove their loyalty to tIe ruling family, refused oi
delayed any authorization dimanded by tle monk". .,On the
other hand,' he wrote, ..I am able to state that the Catholic
e-nloyed exgeptional favors. I was able to buy in the
9jurch
tlue market such foodstuffs as oil, corn and cheese marked
.NOT
TO BE SOLD OR EXCHANGED . . . A GIFT OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.' Such foods, turned over to
Catholic orgianizations to b€ distributed gratis tlrough the
c9untry, were sold to swell the cash resewes of the organiza_
tions. From an official in the forestry department I learned
Sal w-9od cut.by rhe army was sold by tArchbishop thucsj
Catholic organizations. Examples abound. Thus, brotLer of the
President had exclusive control o1 16s ;-portatioo and sale
of school{ooks, which turned out to be-both a profitable
and an eftective means of censorship.
mon_o_poly
"Most striking, however, was the t""t 16u1-'his policy had
 ENTER CABOT LODGB 243

the opposite of the desired effect' With a bit of

good sense
il-";IiJ;;; been foreseen' Instead o; wsaksning the
iioaaUitt", such acts strengthened them' A re-awakening of
ffi;h#,"*"ft"A Rehtio-rs between mo'!s and thc pelde
;;;;; inrcnse. First the pagodas regained their ancient
;;i;;;;;t"ts of spiritual leadership, -theq thev began to
O.-t-"ft* to the transformation that had taken place
"a."t Nfdinh Diem. About a vear b9{ol".6" crisis thev
il;;
U"n* L:"tot" a student movement, which Diem accep-0ed
;ifi; bJ g"*. mi" autocrat regarded any force indgpendent
of ni.""tf^ a tbreat, which led him to crush and declare out-
i"w tn" t""e in the south and all political oppo-sttion ' '. '
-E;;;;t"
virulent than Diem was his sister-in-law' the
t"""Af"iftf"Aame Nhrl who exercises strong influence on the
Vietnamese got"tnm"ot. She publicly catled the 6enks
-assassins'
'l.ito.t *a when they were peaceful ' ' ' Thus
Europe
tn*" t*g"a forth in Asia a religious fanaticis:n which no
ffi f"tdtt"" since the Midd; Ages and which in time
- -f"tn"t
began to disturb the Vatican."
Vincent
-$p-iember S. Kearney, writing in America magazing
of 7, 1963, concerning the events that followed'
rt"t"A tn"t "in ail probability, direCt responsibility,f9r the Ifue
unuit be laid at tne aoot of Ngo dinh Can' This man has
"* status in the governmlnt. Yet he rules Central
om"iA
"o
Vietnam like a Chinese w:arlord. It is quite possible that he
gave orders for the crackdown on the demonstrations at Hue
iitlout realizing tie consequence . . The governmenJ's
-Buddhist
n""Oi"g of the crisis is merely a symptom of the
potiticat- mataise affecting the country' South Vietnam is an
iuory-to*"t dictatorship operating in total iso-lation from the
p""pf" it rules. It is aciualiy mole ulpo.PYlar than the colonial
i"gih" of the deposed Emp-eror Bao Dai. For it demands much
more of the people and gives them less."-
Father Fr^anc'is J. nuikley wrote in the same magazine that
"the major motive for the repressive acts of .the governgtent
towards the agitation of the General Association of Buddhists
is not hostility towards Buddhism but unwillinpess to accept
criticism from anY source."
C"o.g"t Menant (Paris Match, November 23, 1963) in his
6t tn" a"Uo"ation of power among th9 Ngo dinhs-ani
"*p*"
eaih member's role in the family monopoly that resulted'
places the responsibility on Diem and Th'te'- "To Diem went
ihe power," #ote Monsieur Menant, "to Nhu the police' to
nit *if" the comrption and the deals, to Luyen diplomlcl and
to Can the traffic in rice. Religion was the domain of Thuc'
 2M BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
the archbishop, with his vast landholdings and personal resi-
dence surrounded by a tower of anti-aircraft batteries. But the
sardinal'g hat was not the extent of Thuc's ambition Mon-
signor Thuc intended to become Pope. Nothing less.
"It is the custom of the Vatican," Menant continued, ,.to
choose the Supreme Pontiff from among the prelates of a coun-
try where the Catholic majority is absolute. This is why Diem
published official statistics pretending that Vietnam was TOVo
Catholic, ZOVo Buddhrst and l|Vo diverse sects. The claim
might have continued had an apostolic delegate not arrived on
the scene in the midst of a Buddhist celebration and had said
delegate not observed that, in his opinion, considering the
Buddhist oriflammes along his route, the TOVo figure should
apply to the faithful of the pagodas. Diem was furious. The
flying of Buddhist banners was forbidden and the immutable
mechanism of repression that led to monks burning tlemselves
in public was in motion."
The Voice of America gave only the official goyernment
explanation of events in Hue: It was all a Vietcong provo-
cation.
On June 11 the monk Tich quang Duc burned himself alive
in-tle center of Saigon. Other monks, including a woman adept
who was none other than the mother of Prince Buu Hoi, tie
friend of Miss Ellen Hammer who was then ambassador to
several African countries, threatened to do likewise. While Buu
Hoi was racing home to dissuade his mother, Diem and Nhu
set up one of their fake "spontaneous" demonstrations of sup-
port. This time army veterans, supplied with trucks and soudd
equipment by the government, had their way cleared by police
as they threatened to storm a pagoda. America was shocked.
Diem and Nhu were more annoyed than alarmed by the
whole thing. To placate America more than the Buddhists, they
sent Vice-President Nguyen ngoc Tho, himself a ludrthist, fo
try to soothe his coreligionists. Tho knew what a narrow
margrn of action he had, but he did his best. On June 15 he
llnounced that the government would respect the liberty of
the Buddhists, and release the monk-s and their followers who
had been arrested, but that it would not admit responsibility for
the massacre or the use of poison gas at Hue. The olhcial
version still blamed everything on the Vietcong.
If Diem still seemed to be conciliatory, it was only in ap-
pearance. The persecutions, instead of ceasing, were stepped
up. Pagodas were encircled, monks harassed and students
arrested. Dr. Wulff later testified that the police tortured one
of his students, Phan dinh Binh, to extract his sipature to a
 ENTER CABOT LODGE 245
paper accusing the Buddhist superior of working for the Com-
munists. l\,{gnks were tortured to extract similar confessious.
When a German colleague of Dr. Wulff was finally permitted
to see the tortured student, he was unrecognizable. Four Ger-
man doctors then officially protested the government actions
anf its refusal to permit the treatment of those burned by gas.
When they were still prevented from fulfilling their misJion
as doctors, they decided to leave the country.
Why Diem and Nhu persisted with their repressive measures
rather^than trying to ease the tension is hard to explain. Some
say Diem was convinced that he was winning and was deter-
mined not to lose face. Others claim that Nhu counted too
heavily on the support of his friend, CIA chief Jobn Richard_
son, who to date had never failed him. Ambassador Nolting,
living in his ambassadorial ivory tower, may also have hat
remsthing to do with it, for one must bear in mind that under
Nhu's effi.cient informer system, which pulled in any men ex-
cept Nhu's who tried to contact Americans, and with American
officials adlling to point out to tle police any bearer of anti_
Diem inlormation, Nolting's chances of knowing the true state
of aftairs were very poor indeed.
While Buddhists, students and opposition groups attacked
America besause of Nolting's blind support of the Ngo dinhs
1gd the Ngo dinhs charged America with inciting revolts, who
should suddenly come to the fore again in New york but
Joseph Buttinger, still meddling in Vietnam affairs. One would
tbink that the bitter experience with Diem would have taught
the ardent whitewasher of Ho chi Minh a lesson, but not at ill.
9-n Jgle 29, 1963, Mr. Buttinger presided over a meeting in
New York to decide "the policy that America should lollow in
South Vietnam."
5"$9{y, looking around for someone to replace Nolting
and rid him of the old policy, which was compl6te support oI
the Ngo dinhs, saw ffenry CiUot Lodge sitting io puri, as head
of a little-publicaed organnation called The Atlantic Institute:
A bright idea struck the president. He had no time to prepare
the public for a volte-face. Diem had lost two-thirdj of his
country, and the rest was about to disintegrate in a great burst
of spontaneous combustion. Something drastic had to be done
in a hurry. Better to send a Republican to do it, and Lodge
wa! tle only Republican who would have taken the job.
Lo.dee prepared to leave the sinecure where he had been
drawing up plans for an international currency in which the
American dollar would be submerged, for advancement of
socialist one-worldism through the destruction of colonies, anJ
U6 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
for American entry into a regional super-state. Suave, Englisb
sprsnkins General ie Soury, philosophically reflected, "At last
f," fl-oig"t is getting to fna-ocUina. When the war ended in
f*6p",-G *i *itn General Devers. Roosevelt and Stalin
nae id"ea at Teheran to run us [the French] out of the Far
f"tt. -W*niogton was already lxpking ,Ho chi Minh, and
I-odge asked to be parachuted into Indochina. There was neYer
any doubt which side he would be on."
h frenzied race with destiny seemed to seize all concerned
in Saigon as the date of Lodge's arrival approached' Like the
river ibove Niagara, the stream of events in Saigon S1q9d
momentum and lwept all before it as it approached the falls'
Already the inner pilace coup d'etat had taken place: Diem
no longer could have dumped his brother if he had wanted to,
for Nh:u had assumed command and in a wild drive to end
resistance before Lodge's arrival had stepped uP the massive
arrests of students and raids on pagodas by American-armed
special forces. A small dissident Buddhist group was haltily 9r-
ganized and accorded official recognition, to convince America
t=hut Di"m had Buddhist support. Likewise, a fake student
front was formed to issue protestations of fidelity for publica-
tion in Gene Gregotfs Times of Vietnam. When American
officials tried to exonerate the Vietnamese anny of responsi-
bility for shooting into the crowd, Nhu cunningly wrung a
statement of solidarity from the generals.
On August 5 a twenty-year-old monk soaked himself in
gasoline and burned himself at Phan Thiet, shortly after one
of the country's most respected authors had committed suicide
on the eve of arrest. On August 16 a7l'yeat-old monk burned
himself in Tu Dam pagoda in Hue. Then came the brutal raids
on the pagodas and Madame Nhu's arrogant exclamation that
if fifty monks barbecued fismselves she would clap her hands.
On August 25, troops drove trucks into the demonstrators in
Saigon, killing 6sd 64iming as they went' At the same time
Diem and Nhu multiplied the demonstrations intended to fool
the Americans. On August 31 a monster parade was organized
with some 10,000 marchers slowly filing tbrough Saigon to
counter, with their banners of loyalty and the impressiveness of
their number, the growing climate of hate. What stood out
throughout this force was the Hitlerism organization behind it.
Nhu's Republican Youth in their dark blue uniforms, Madame
Nhu s Wbmen's Solidarity Movement, the League of Civil
Servants-all paid by Diem and Nhu-and the lesser organiza-
tions which they controlled, made up the parade'
At this point a phenomenon of American shallow-pan
 ENTER CABOT LODGE 247
thinking appeared in all its fatuous might to provide an object_
lesson for political science professors for years to come, a
lesson that should throw much light on America's decline.
Madame Nhu was accused of throwing oil on the fue by
Gerard Marin of Paris' Figaro. London's bconomist (Septem_
b-er 14, 1963) agreed that "a continued policy of repression by
the regime could cause a disastrous daih rither than a drift
loryp1d_c-ommunism by the disillusioned populace," as indeed
it did. Madame Nhu, the pampered *omun who all her life,
by one means or another, had attained everything her heari
desired, or made a scene that shook high heavin, found herself
d.espised by the world. Her father turned against her and re_
signed_ from his post as ambassador in W-astrington, stating
that she was mad with power. Long-suffering Vice.presideni
Tho resigned from office and shaved his head. Word that
Madame Nhu's way of dealing with the monks would be to
beat them ten times as hard had traveled around the world
when Vietnam's .'First Lady" took of torlne International
Parliamentary Conference in Belgrade. There Senator Mar-
garet Chase Smith introduced her to Teddy Kennedy,
stating,
"She's quite a gal."
The_Bel.grade sojourn started on September 11. From Bel-
grade Madame Nhu went to paris, wheie she replied
to a query
about how the war was going at home, ,.It ii near its'end.
Only a handful of pirates are keeping it alive." As she threw
out anti-French and anti-Americin invectives in ner
conference at the Vietnamese embassy, French police'held fiess
several hundred hostile Vietnamese at bay in the streets,
On_October 5, two days before Madame Nhu's arrival in
-_
New York, the sixth suicide by fire in South Vietnam made
headlines. Before igniting himielf, the monk
euong H;;
Diem, "To you, Mr. president, who siig tn-e praisei
:".?f 1:
or rtoerty and democracy, I address these last words of I man
who is about to die that he might at least cry the truth.,,
Diem waslnperturbed; to thi end he refused to see or hear.
-.
Unconcerned, he opened the first session of the new national
assembly, elected by the same police state methods
as all the
others, and announced that the Buddhist movement had
been
orchestrated "by communist agents, with the complicity
of
foreip elements." And this was-the iefrain VtaOame Nhu bore
to America. The reversal of American opinion that followed
would have been called a miracle, had tiere been any truth
in the premise on which it was based. Overnignt, on notnin!
but the word of a woman whose statements Ricla.a Starnes
(New York World-Telegrarn, October tZ, tiASl
described as
248 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAI
a "charming torrent of half-truths, double-talk, Oriental Gold-
wynisms and an occasional out-and-out whopper,', the forces
in America dedicated to sound policy and -cornmon sense
swung, en masse, to the support of Madame Nhu.
_ !9g over eight years, while America's press and government
had lied blatantly in the extolling of this woman, her family
and the deteriorating war in South Vietnam, barely a handful
of the fringe resentful of being described as lunatic had ever
questioned the veracity of the news they were getting. When
the culprits did a twnabout to e$cape the consequenceJof their
fraud, Americans, who should have held them accountable,
set out in their infatuation with Madame Nhu to prove thai
the,_yery clique they were attacking had been righi
_
Well-meaning citizens who, if asked to put all they knew
about Vietnam on paper could not have filled a sheet, were
ready !o go down fighting for what they ,.felt," simply be_
cause, for entirely different reasons, Madame Nhu wasiitack-
ing the lrysshington adminl56alion which they as conserva-
tives distrusted. The spoiled brat of the Chuong famity became
their darling.
On her arrival in New York, accompanied by her daughter,
Madame Nhu went to the Barclay Hotel, at lll gasi+Stn
Street, the same hotel where Vo Lang and this author de-
scended tha.t
{nril day eight years before as bearers of ..fresh,
important information" to keep American support behind
Diem through "just this last crisis.', A host of such emissaries
had_ passed through New York on their way to Washingon
in the intervenTg years, but gradually this t6cbnique, liki all
ploys, suffered from the law of diminishing returns and at the
end of the road faced bankruptcy.
It was then that Diem and Nhu played their big card, the
woman who had charmed embassy officials and CIA operatorg
alike into underwriting the dying regime through all its vicis-
situdes. So deeply was Charg€ d,Affaires Randolph Kidder in-
volved, in the eyes of Soutleast Asia, that by-the time his
assignment to the American embassy in Saigon ended he was
never referred to by name but always as .,Madame Nhu,s man
in the American embassy." There is no IBM machine to cal_
culate the cost to America of what the paris diplomatic weekly
Aux Ecoutes (November 8, 1963) headlinid as Madaml
Nhu's use of "eroticism in the service of politics.,'
When Madame Nhu reached America lor her tour that was
to take her from coast to coast, through 12 cities for at least
17 local or national radio and TV appearances, 17 lectures
and 15 lunches or dinners, Randolph t<iCOer was not there to
 ENTER CABOT LODGE 249
greet her. He had been sent on a bip around the world, "in-
specting U. S. embassies." Angier Biddle Duke rented Mr.
Kidder's house on Foxhall Road, in Washington, for the time
he would have to be away.
Back in Vietnam thingg were going from bad to worse. On
October 19, 150 miles from Saigon, the national army had suf-
fered its most humiliating defeat since ApBac. rn the coune
of it tlirteen Americans were killed or wounded.
On October 26 Diem entertained the UN fact-finding mis.
sion, which he had isolated and whose movements Nhu's
secret police were shielding as though they were contagious.
The occasion was the eighth anniversary of the police.state
referendum so admired by Senator Mansfield which lad de-
pose4 Bao Dai and made Diem president. Next day another
monk burned himself near Saigon's Catholic cathedral. The
l8th,ot October brought another smashing military defeat in
the delta, but the heavy conspiracy of censorship,-both Viet-
lamge and American, prevented all this from ever reaching
the Anerican people.
_Bti"g this period Cabot Lodge was giving parties in honor
of Vietnamese o6cers. Colonels and generaG began gathering
on the ambassador's tennis court. When Diem wantia to see
him, Mr. Lodge was always too busy, ,.which was more and
more true," observed Georges Menant. (parb Match, Noyen-
ber 23,1963)
Segsing that a storm was approaching, that Washington's un-
questioning support was slipping Diem humblsd hr:ms6lf fs
o_ffering to go to the embassy himself. ,.Impossible,
9" pqiot ojle_President,,'
)lgnsieur replied Mr. Lodge on the rciephone.
"You know that would be contrary to prot6col.',
Nhu, the real master of the country, had already long been
negotiating with the Communists. Joe-Alsop, ni. g""to,i
ggt al{ sycophant, went so far as to aamii in tnJWasnin&on "p"i
lost-9t September 2l that Nhu had received .'overtures,, fiom
th9..Nort-h Vietnamese, from which Alsop exonerated him by
9dli"g them "French-sponso-red.,, When-it was all o*r, *i
9:d"t oo ionger possible, Atsop *roi" o"
May !5, -"t.Nlu's,perfidy
1964, that ..the unbalancedNnu h;d bedm oigod"-
tions for a deal with the North Vietnamese comnunists I the
last months before his death.', And again Alsop adroitly uo"A"a
lesponsibility for his nine. years of lawning iraise b! aAaing
that "a secret French intrigue,' *", ,"rpo*'lbi+and, besides]
Nhu had changed.
.. Sq actually. in the fall- of 1963, while Nhu negotiated with
the Reds behind our backs, his fiiry wire ins'tte-o the intelli-
25O BACKGROTJND TO BETRAYAL
gence of America's conservatives with wild statements about
the fight she and her husband were waging against com
munism. The war is being won, she said. Stay with us just a
little longert To please Americans who distrusted the Kennedy
adminis'tration, she added, "One does not need an enemy if one
has America for a friendt"
 CHAPTER TWENTY.THREE
THE EXPLOSION

South Vietnam's elegantly gowned first lady with the vicious

tongue paused in Chicago on Oetober 23, 1963, to telephone
her husband, whose special forces had just clubbed uid ur_
rested a few hundred more Vietnamese clamoring for his oust_
ing. (What lay in store for those arrested the Saigon public
knew only too well. Many had brothers and couJins in the
army and air force.)
"When are you coming back?', Nhu asked his wife.
"Around the29th.I'll come byway of Japan."
"I'll come to meet you."
"Be careful that they Con't inink you are running away.',
It was no facetious remark. paris presse had reporteA as tar
back as September 1 that the Ngo dinhs were
lacking their
treasure.
- Nhu
san
made no reply. Four days later he called his wife in
Francisco. They discussed her forthcoming operation for
a cyst on.the eye. (GossiF had it that she was naviog wrinkles
removed.) Nhu advised her to go back to Los Angeles for the
operation.
ljl_le--you ssming to meet me in Japan?" she asked.
ttNo.tt
"Why?"
"You yourself told me not to come."
"No. I said not to come if conditions were unfavorable. Are
they?"
l'I'- not.colrlg," wa9 all Nhu said. His wife, later, said that
-, sensed that his confidence
sne g nirysglt was slipping. Actually,
Nhu and Diem were still convinced that they iould come out
on lop, for was not American aid still porrriog into the coun_
t y? in
Dalat an Institute of Nuclear'Reseaich l"* Luugo_
-Up
rated on October 30. Heads of Internationat irpe
and Ceram-
i1s Co. of Ellt^orange, N9w Jersey, ;;tti"g th;t hana
gver a $5,600,000 order for a fifieen_mile pipedne from the
Rrver to. Saigon. fne HyCrotechnictorporation oi
R:__"C.)l{
New rort was racing to co*mp-lete a $7,144,OO0 waier_treating
plant for Saigon, whlle a Sgioi,ioi J"*"L" iirposal sysrem
251
252 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAI
was also under eonstruction. How generous was the nation
that, after World War II, denied its own citizens passports until
they could pay for food furnished them in Japanese prison
camps!
Joe Alsop insists that the Communist offensive was slowed
down during this period because of the negotiations going on
between them and Nhu; others have reasoned that Ho chi
Minh wanted to give America time to complete the fine roads
and installations we were preparing for him. Again, it may
have been that the offensive did not let up at all, that c€trsor-
ship alone was responsible for the illusion that our side was
holding firm.
On October 31 four companies of the American-paid spe-
cial forces with which Nhu had maintained his grip on the
capital were moved out of Saigon to go tlrough the motions
of opposing the Vietcong. This, Nhu had been assured by his
friends on the American team, would permit them to resume
payrnC the $300,000 a month he had been receiving for their
support. To oftset the temporary loss of the four companies,
Diem called in some 10,000 "loyal" troops and placed them
under the command of his military governor, General Ton that
pinh, for Diem and Nhu were convinced that such a show
of force would discourage any plotters.
Admiral Felt, U. S. commander in the Pacific, made his fare-
well call at the palace at 11:30 a. m., accompanied by
Ambassador Lodge, to say good-bye to the president before
returning to America. Lodge had been scheduled to leave the
same day, but at the last minute announced that his trip had
been postponed till the following Saturday.
"My services inform me," Diem told his visitors, "that tbere
are nrmonl of a movement being prepared against me. No
doubt they are only trial balloons being launched by irrespor
sible agents of your CIA."
Lodge and the admiral made no reply. While they were at
the palace, all of the generals in the area who were considered
"Diem men" were arriving at the headquarters of the general
for a very special luncheon. General Le van TY, the old
sta.ff
fox who had betrayed General Hinh in September 1954, and
served as emissary between the reoels and the palace in No-
vember 1960, had been smart enough to know long in advance
that something was afoot and to get out of the capital "for
reasors of health." This left in command forty-six-year-old
General Tran van Don, a corps commander who had had some
succe$s against the Communists but who had been removed
from field command by Nhu in December 1962 because he was
 THB BXPLOSION 253
suspected of being one of the officers who wanted reforms in
Saigon as a prime requisite to winning the war.
Don had suomoned Diem's generals for the luncheon and
conference, and at 1:30 he calmly told them that the army wan
seizing power and that they were under arrest.
Diem and Nhu were taking their siesta in the palace as this
was going on. The chief of the suret6 had phoned Nhu earlier,
when the troop movement! started that morning, but Nhu
-"Don't
reassured him. worfr," said he. "It's a plan of mine."
When tlree command battalions cut the road to the airport the
police chief began to have doubts. Then a detachment of
marine infantry took over the police headquarters and he knew
something was afoot. Again he called the palace; this time
Diem phoned his faithful military governor-general and was
told by an aide that the governor was not in. While they were
talking, rebel forces were occupying the arsenal and the radio
station.
At l:45 the heavy, humid air of Saigon was shaken by shots.
Supported by tanks, the insurgents started occupying all the
city. Colonel Nguyen ngoc Khoi, commanding the presidential
guard, prepared to hold off the attackers beginning to ring the
palace. Again Diem tried to contact his military governor and,
failing to reach him, concluded that he had been arrested, little
knowihg that the governor who the day after the brutal assault
on the pagodas had saved Diem's face by swearing that the
army was united to a man behind the president, had been flat-
tered into joining the plot. Shortly after 3:00 p. m. an an-
nouncement came over the radio that fourteen generals and
ten colonels had delivered an ultimatum to Diem and his
brother to surrender.
Within the palace the procedure that had worked so well
on November 11, 1960, was being repeated. Over the bunker
radio Diem and Nhu began calling regional commanders to
come to thet rescue. The generals replied that they would
obey the orders of the general staff. Then Nhu called for pro-
vincial governors to rush their civilian guards to his aid. Hour
after hour the appeals from the bunker continued, always
farther and farther afield, and Nhu waited in vain. He and his
brother had tried their game once too often and were to learno
to their sorrow, the cost of the wave of revenge they had un-
leashed the last time troops had saved them.
General Duong van MinF-"Big Minh,' they called him-
showed himself by mid-afternoon as leader of the putsch, the
s46s lvlinh who, as a colonel seven and a half years before
had acquired his star as general of brigade by destroying the
254 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Hoa Hao and the Binh Xuyen for Diem in the Battle of Rung-
Sat, thereby opening their vast areas to the Communists. An-
other coincidence was not overlooked as the war of religion
between Diem and the Buddhists seemed likely to rip the coun-
try asunder: It was Diem's American advisors, the meddlers
from Michigan State, "Iron Mike" O'Daniel and Colonel Ed-
ward Lansdale, the political officer with the poison-mimeo-
graph, who first introduced the religious factor into Vietnamese
politics with their playing of Diem and his Nung tribe mer-
cenaries against the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao.
_ SometiTe during the afternoon of October 31, Cabot Lodge
is reported to have telephoned the palace and offered Diem
safe conduct out of the country. ..I refuse,,' Diem is said to
have replied. "But know that I appreciate your great thought-
fuloess."
As night fell the two brothers, trapped in the bunker be-
neath the Gia Long Palace, were still appealing for help. Again
the insurgents called on them to surrinder. egain iney-re-
fused, and the order to charge was given. fen U-Z+ iants
opened a breach in the wall.
_ Albert Pham ngoc Thao, Joe Alsop's here-the man whom
Tiry,e mgea1,ne of April 12, 196t, glorified for getting Diem
reelected-had known when to jump. One might imagjie Thao
as-fighting for his own life and Diem's ihis stiggle was
"spolice, mi-o tnew
going on. Not at all. As head of Nhu's secret
when the game was up and saved his skin 6y slsnging sides.
rre spent the mght broadcasting diatribes against his late
master.
Madame Nhu, following the battle in Beverly Hills with her
ears glued to a radio, said nothing against her frusband,s right-
hand man, but stepped up her tiradis against the Americins.
It is true, the storming of the palace *us an affair that the
young hot-heads of USIS and CIA should have stayed out
of.
puropgaq papers told of American ..advisorsi, entering Gia
Long Palace with the first wave of troops: young Ameiicans
in civilian clotles, wearing baseball *A ti'ltiog ioc"r_
"ui.from one
santly into walkie-talkies as they moved unii to an_
other the attacking fories. Correspondents wrote of
-among
America_n *photographers', whom they hid never seen
be
rore and who did not use ther cameras, accompanying each
advancing wave.
At 3:00 a. m. Vietnamese marines massed for a final assault
some two hundred and forty feet from the palace. An
hour
Iater two T-28 planes made itrafing p*.", *f-"t 4:15 the
at-
tack was ordered. As each room wis^cleared a white sheet
was
 THE EXPLOSION 255
hung from the window so that artillery fire outside would
cease.
The last message from the radio in the bunker was moni-
tored about 4:00 a. m. All else had failed and Nhu, at the end
of his rope, played his last card. He called on his Republicin
Youth and the Women's militia, organized by his wife, to go
into the streets and save them. There was no reply, nothing
but silence. The last highly paid rats had left the ship.
The palace was empty when the search for the two brothers
began. Later it was learned that they had escaped through a
tunnel leading to the home of n Qhinsss who had long served
as a cover for Nhu and was in that spot for just such an oe'
casion. To the end the brothers never lost their cunning: As
Marvin Liebman, the friend of Diem's public relations hucks"
ter, had so truthfully put it, Diem's hatred of the Chinese was
a pathological thing, so a Chinese home would be the last
place where Diem's enemies would expect to find his tunnel.
And it was through the house of Mai Tuyen, the Chinese,
that they escaped in the early hours of November I to the
church of St. Francis of Xavier in Cholon, the Chinese city
van Vien's old center of vice and pleasure, the city from
-Le
whence Nhu had sent Le van Vien's son to his deatb seven
years before.
For about an hour the two brothers remained in prayer.
An armored car drew up outside. At 10:15 the Saigon radio
announced that they had committed suicide while being trans-
ferred to army headquarters. Fantastic versions of their death
began sweeping the town. A Vietnamese sergeant showed their
stained jackets and said that Diem had been killsd fy a bullet
in the back of the head but that Nhu had been stabbed in the
back. Another story had it that Nhu flew into a rage and was
shot when he lunged for a gun.
Georges Chafford (Indochine-Dix Ans de L'Independence)
gives a version according to which Nhu let himself be taken
because he was deprived of his opium. Street gossipers claimed
that the brothers knew too much about the USIS and CIA
boys who had worked with them, and that they were murdered
to seal their tongues. Among the shattered telephones on Nhu's
desk lay an open book, entitled., Shoot to Kill, which he had
been studying before he went to sleep.
The full story will eventually come out. To date, however,
ithas never been established who actually killed Diem and
Nhu. Much as it would please many Americans to read that
embassy officials, CIA inepts, and USIS liberals who had
bolstered this family since 1954 were also guilty of murdering
256 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
them, the author does not, in all honesty, believe that Amer-
ica's high-handed plotters ordered the murder.
Granted, had Diem and Nhu noJ been killed, a trial would
-have followed, and at the trial the real defendants in the wit-
ness box as the crimes of
$e Ngo dinhs against their people
were brought, to light would be the Ameri&ns wno iniposeO
them-labor leaders dictating policy, the Michigan State'Uni_
v.ersity revolutionaries,,Mi.ke Mansfield, foseih nuttin!"r,
4ngter Biddle Duke and the distinguished gues-* of fonn-O.
Rockefeller's May 11, 1957, lunchion. Bui no order to as_
sassinate th9 Ngo dinhs was necessary. There was not a family
in- Saigon that had not discussed in whispers the fate
of a
friend or a relative-and an anti-Commuoist one at that_
yho had disappeared into the dungeon in the botanicU !ar_
dens or some other of Nhu's prisons.
The.Am:rican public had never been told of these things,
3nA ylat
paper, after praises of the Ngo Oin-h;
lhgtog the..lte
for eight years, was likely io say, fied to you; hJre is the
So the sy-mpathy of America's consirvativ", ,*gJ
lT:,rtotyj':
to the. widow, but heaped anathema on the men who had
given her power and enriched her and, ,n"" tn" gum;;;""."
embanassing, g9nn".O her. journatisi Ority observed,
"Madame Ambition {. French
is now Madame ilevenge."
often tle case, and certainly it was-with Ambassador
-_It.is
Nottrng, that those outside of a beleagured capital know
more
9f whlt is qoing on than do those *itni". io Hr.r", brother
9:k^th: qptess grafter generally referred to as tne gangster
or rne tamily, knew long in advance that the end wis iear.
99n eased his fuon rule several weeks before his brothers were
killed. When General Do cao fri, commanG of the fourth
military region, went to his villa to'anesininqlna at the same
time save him from being massacr.O,-Cuo nua taken
refuge
i! the American consulate, which, i" vi"* of C"n,s conduct in
refuse to hand nim over.-i.or oo" Auy
5:::$g tardly
apoeared in
the American press, announcingihe
u
:_T-11_.c|t:!lTh
Trcov-ery_orgass graves and underground dungeons in Can,s
stronghold. Then silence. America-ns n.vei-neara
again.
of them
_ Qan was flown back
had _to Saigon, tried and executed,
-General but a
{e$ been concluded, it wai ,uiA, l"tor"""
f_allowers and the Americans: Td v*;;;;;iere
Minh,s
accorded
Ca_n's scalp* but charges against li-
mrnrmum. Just enoush
l"i" t"ld down to a
.to convict him wi1fisu1 embarrassin!
America. So little oiwhat c"" L"o ao";;;;,
days of un-
bridled power ever reached tn" a-..i"a*p"U-fi"],
a great storm
 THE EXPLOSION 257
of-nroles! rose from sbocked sentimentalists who, on the other
side of the world and dependent on Tirne magazine for in-
formation, could not see *hy he was being executed.
Americans who a short time before had-been outraged over
the brutality of the raids on Buddhist temples and the horror
of the suicides did a turnabout overnight anC tu*eC their ire
o-" F"T _own governm€nt for not perpetuating what had
shocked them. Using the fate of Diem and Nhu and Can,s
execution as ammunition agalllt the Kennedy feft, nowiver,
_"."t 1"d-
blanket acceptance of Madame Nhu,s statement that
.oe Suoohrst monks v,/g1g nqthing but communists in saffron
robes-so
lccep] h9r statement they did. It was surfacs ttink-
Tq. trag America's good conservatives devoted to events in
Ja.l-go-n,the s_garching study that a people anxious to avoid being
called "kooks" and lunatics should apply to every move
bd
lore lganing inJo it they coutd lave'tuit uj a much more
damntPg case. For the crime lay in s5..rin, ti* f".ifyi"
A"
first place, putting-it in power,'refusing toT"t tne Vietnamese
roDpre our prot€g€es while change was yet possible
and then
permitting our team to wash their hanOs'"t r*p"""itruty
when the.coming explosion threatened to comproiise
them.
lnere is no doubt ffiaf eenprrnist agitators were active
emoDg ffis sqnks and students, for the Vletcong
were as wily
f ft: \!p. If the police state rule of Oiem ana Nhu ani
me stupdrty or intent of the srall group of Americans
suP.
portingit created a climate ideal f6r io.-o"irt ugit"tioi,
they-not the Communists-should be blameA when the
Qsmm rnisls exploit iL
AII this was overlooked, however, by California,s young
Republicans, who flocked ro take
6 t[" leautrrur harridan
whom a French writer wlo knew hei once GcriUed
as .,one
9f God's lies." That her father had closed his i'oo" oo her was
brushed off. When she cried, ,fn, U"itJ-SLte,
wanted to
i#l}:t*l tgg*r e.lecteg by the vi"tname.se people,,,
p"l:r9o.d entrllce-d, as though she were Joan of aic. ffua
3:{-:y_T_I-"lt:
egarnst tlgllt! woutd have served their campaip
Kennedy anq his plannsrr so much better.
Leavmg between $11,000 and $14,000 in debts
behind her,
and swearing never to set foot in tni coun-try again,
Nhr.r, accompanied by her Oaughtei L"-i"="y,
Madaml
took oft for
--o--" i" a blaze of firy t9l"i"'n". #Jtn"ii"_r"*, the arch-
bishop. While her othei darighter *J ;;
Rome to- join ner, tnise wno-,1"
ins were being
Py",.a
trao qnlro-ssessed began streaming home from
her husband
""atheir places of
exile. Colonel Nguyen chanh fhi, wno led tne
NovemUei
258 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
1950 paratrooper revolt, returned from three years of in-
digence and boredom in Cambodia. Nguyen ton Hoan, the
Dai Viet leader, and General Duc, of the defiant proclamation,
flew back from Paris. Huynh sanh Thong, the Dai Viet party
member whom U. S, Information Agency had hounded out
of one job after another, including a job with a supposedly in-
dependent newsreel company, because of the letter he wrote
predicting what was to happen, left his job at Yale University
and headed for home. Saigon, in a delirium of joy reminiscent
of Paris on its delivery from the Germans, danced in the
stree$. Tran trung Dung, Nhu's nephew by marriage and
husband of that same Madame Dung who in a Paris restaurant
the year before had wondered why her family did not get out
while they could, quietly buried Diem and Nhu in the ceme
tery of Phu-Nhuan on the evening of November 3. For Ma-
ame Nhu the big adventure was over. The bitterness of un-
importance in a luxurious apartment on Avenue Charles
Floquet in Paris' most fashionable arrondissement lay ahead.
For Vietnam the "long war" period had definitely ended and
the "short campaign" was under way.
*Big Minh" set up a revolutionary commitlss to rule the
country pending new and honest elections. The American press
sang his praises and, surface-wise, all looked bright for the
moment. But what was to follow after the first days of exulta-
tion should have been expected. "The team," who had been
responsible for the shambles, were still anonymous because
of a servile press, and there was no reason why the debacle in
Saigon should drive them to shelter. Already they were at work
to thwart the Vietnamese who had earned a chance at power
and to ease into office one government after another of nonen-
tities, from whom Ho shi ffiinh would eventually seize control.
Plans for the buildup of Albert Pham ngoc Thao as eventual
heir to the Ngo dinh's were already discernible, despite the fact
that Thao was responsible for much of the country's hatred
of that family.
Still repeating the mistake they had made with Diem, the
team in 14/ashington rushed to Saigon a man named Nguyen
xuan Oanh, whom some unstated agency or private group
(CLA, or Angier Biddle Duke's International Rescue Com-
mitteee?) had wafted to America after World War II, when
America was glamorizing Ho chi Minh. Oanh had been out of
his country for fifteen years, studying at Harvard, teaching
economics at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticul and
even acquiring, soit was said, American nationality. The UN
employed him fs1 a while. It was evident that he never warned
 THB EXPLOSION 259
the entrenched elique leading Anerica downhill that their
Diem experiment was going to be disastrous, since he never
earned their enmity.
Unknown though he was in Vietnam" and certain to be
despised for having remained comfortably in America while
the going was rough, the high-handed little group in Washing
ton that had been running Vietnam as they pleased picked up
Nguyen xuan Oanh (nicknamed Jack Owens) and sent him
home. It may have been the same group that brought him to
America in the first place; a web of unfathomable inhigue
surrounds almost every phase of the meddling in South Viet-
nam.
When ioy at being liberated subsided, the honelmoon wasl
over, and the public turned 611 ]ylinh fe1 lstaining Diem's crea-
tures. 'Premier" Tho was the first to be sacrificed, since he had
never had_support from anyone but Diem. Thereupon Ngryen
xuan Oanh was dubbed premier by the American team" iitl
no more forrnalities or mandate than when Diem had made
Tho vicepresident. As a sop to the Dai Viet party, which had
been penecuted by both Diem and his American backers all
those .years,_ Nguyen ton Hoan was giveu the rank, mainly
honorific, of vice-premier. When Hoan saw that his handi
were tied, he resigned.
Completely unobserved by the general public as &ll this
Fanipulation was going on was Albert Pham ngoc Thao, who
had successfully made the switch from intelligence chief for the
Communists to commander of Nhu's secret police and, when
Nhu fell, to a top spot among Diem's and Nhu's assassins.
thao w3s, potentially, the most dangerous man in the country.
No! oaly was his record ef Qsmmrrnist atrocities shockiig
and his capacrty for treachery boundless, but the force at hii
disposal was an underground one. Since, no doubt at Thao's
orders, Nhu's seventy-thousand-member network of killers
and informers had ignored Nhu's appeal to go into the streets,
rhey were neither broken up nor exposed, and Thao was stili
their leader. Both he and they were bound together more
firmly than ever, if they were to save their own nicks. But of
all this Time and, the American press said nothing, and Wash-
ington was silent.
-Out
in the feld, units of the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai sects,
whom Diem and his American advisors had been fghting since
mid-1955 as Communists, came in to make their-peaci, and
offi.cials for the first time admitted that they hadbeen-anti-
Cjmmunist all along. For a day or so stories of Cai Dai and
Hoa Hao cooperation against the Reds appeared. Then silence.
260 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
"Big Minh," the man whom the sects were expected to ac-
cept as tleir new chief, was the same Minh who, with Ameri-
can "advisors" directing his artillery fire, had broken them in
1955. And there were the followers of Le van Vien, who had
been communism's ruthless enemies. "Big Minh" and the
Americans would not let Le van Vien come back at all.
If Vice President Tho was unacceptable as a civilian chief of
state, who would head the new Vietnam? Hanoi, Saigon, Wash-
ington and Paris simultaneously posed this question. Here we
have one of the most significant contradictions of the Vietnam
fasco; at least it is a contradiction if we are to assume that
the aim of Americans who made South Vietnam their private
affair was anything other than a Ho chi Minh victory.-
Hanoi assumed that America would get behind the one
Vietnamese with a party and a known determination to win the
war; accorlingly Hanoi launched a campaign against Nguyen
ton Hoan. That America should back anyone else seemed-in-
conceivable to Ho chi Minh's central committee. A 103-page
booklet entitled Saigon at the Hour of Coups dEtatwas ruinJA
Foreign Language Editions press to destroy Hoan
-out_by 4o's
by labelling him 1fis warmongering puppet of the Anericans.
In Washington, however, two recognized conservatives came
out with a column of "inside information', on November 9,
1963, just eight days after the Dieb and Nhu assassination,
which could only have been slipped to them by someone de-
termined to block Hoan. No better example exists of the way
in which the international left profits by the tack of communi-
cation amoag the world's disunited conselatives to play them
against each other, than the manner in which Allen and Scott
were led into using a line that would be effective in America
to knife the man wbom Humanite, the French Communist
daily,, h1d torpedoed as pro-American and a warmonger (.612-
tmanite, F ebruary 27, 1962) .
Wrote Allen and Scott, "Remember the name of Nguyen
ton Hoanl He is the man to keep an eye on in the seithing
South Vietnamese cauldron." (Hoan had just resigned as vicJ
premier and seemed likely to move in as president or premier
in a matter of weeks.)
_'They continued, "Ifoan is head of the Democratic League of
Jietnam, with headquarters in New Haven." Actually,-Hoan
|eaded the Dai Viet (Great Land or Great Viet) parry;Neither
it nor Dr. Hoan were headquartered in New Haven. Iloan'g
friend and party member Mr. Huynb sanh Thong had been
working at Yale University, it will be recalled, since his dis-
charge from a job with the State Deparhent in February
 THE EXPLOSION 26I
1956 for writing letters to the Christian Science Monitor al'd
16s rJyashington Posf, predicting what has since happened in
his country, and his discharge from News of the Day by
order of the fJ. S. rnformation Agency.
The next untruth: "A leftist-leaning politician, Iloan was
sent into exile by the late President Diem for 'anti-American'
activities. He is credited with favoring the establishment of a
so'called coalition government to seek 'unity' with communist-
ruled North Vietnam." The exact opposite was true. Of Hoan's
violent anti-communism and his coup d'etat attempt against
Ho chi Minh in 1946, Allen and Scott knew nothing. As re.
gards the "sent into exile" statement, it will be recalled that
U. S. Ambassador Donald Heath gave Hoan his visa and sent
him to lrysshington to tell his story, after which Hoan did not
dare go home.
The "coalition government" and "unity with communist-
ruled North Vietnam" were likewise part of the hatchet job.
The advocate of such a solution was floan's mortal enemy,
former Premier Tran van Huu, currently working with the
Vietnamese Communist, Nguyen manh Ha, son-in-law of a
French Communist deputy named Maranne.
"Several months ago the State Department gave Hoan a
visa to come to the U. S. from Paris," Allen and Scott con-
tinued. "He was there in the early days of the Buddhist pro-
tests. Two Saigon leaders of that stormy anti-Diem movement
are close associates of Hoan. They are Tam Chau and Tri
Quang." True, after refusing Hoan entry into America since
1956, the State Department issued him a visa when they de.
cided to get out from under Diem. Like all former cabinet
members and opposition leaders, Hoan had maintained con-
tact with the Buddhists who were also dissatisfied with "Amer-
ica's man", though Hoan himself is a Catholic, a fact which
the same American agents using Allen and Scott to torpedo
Hoan in \[rashington were holding up to Budrlhists in Saigon
as an argument against him.
The last Allen and Scott paragraph was meant to polish oft
the victin once and for all. "After leaving Hanoi University in
1940, Hoan was tied up with French Intelligence." The truth is,
Hoan left Hanoi University in 1945, delayed by the war. In
1939 he founded the first section of the Dai Viet party within
the univenity. In 1943 Communist killers made two attempts
to assassinate him because of his "disintoxication" project to
un-brainwash Communist students.
That same year, probably on a Qsmmrrnisf tipoft, since
they often used that way of getting an enemy, Hoan was ar-
262 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
rested.by_$9- Japanese. Released, he was hunted by the
Jaos
agan rn ry44 and went underground. In 1945 he was track6A
by the French because,his Oai Viet party, claimint i"ddft:
ense, was considered subversive
Tbree weeks after Allen and- Scott s gratuitous hatchet job
on the one man l{ansi wanted destroyedit was the turn
of ihi
Waslington World.. On_December 2,'1963, the World told
its
readers, iAlthough .ofrcialg they are hippy witn
government
the new
in South Vietnam, veteran U. S. aiptomats-are
ofg. the political vacuum created Uy'md overthrow
"|ry
9r r+e DleT r€gime. One- reason: Nguyen ton Hoan, a left_
lsaning politician who had bren livinf in exile in Newffavln,
Connecticul as head of the Democritic I.eague of Viet
may well be sucked into the
N;il
leadership vacium. tf so, thiri
g_o.44_!" much agitation to.unify, Soutfr Viet Nam with North
Viet Nam."
_.Any anti-Communist authority on Vietnam, piecing these
divers. moves together, can aqivg at odtffi; assumptions:
Am. erica3s in Washington and Saigon
who haa left n6 stone
unturned to ruin Hoan arnd destroy his party during
the years
oJ all-out support for Diem *"r" A"tJ..io"A tn"t the
man
regard as a pers-onal enemy was not going
::"I^i?9 ":l:.1"
Ot, b9-y were out to deliver the country to H6 cbl
:o.,9:,,-.
ytng by seeing tbat no one capable of fighting Fio chi
Minh
should rise to power.

- T,.L*-ury
suodhrst
30,
_1964,,.8ig Mintr. was overthrown and a
general, Nguyen Khanh, took over. Minh's
uonary committee
,"uol*
was^ replaced by Khanh,s revolutionary
counrcil, and overnight Ameiica took up thelraises
of Khanh.
Agaln, seriousr students of the situatioo trx4 m;sgivings.
Khanh,
prother of a Communist- *-J-Ngoi." Longi had
become Diem's 9fficial
fair-hairedtoy ouring the No"ulmbe, l1:i960-
!!y a'egt gtFmpt U.y m$1ng his way into the palace, taking
command of the presidential guard ana mtOing
out until Tran
thien Khiem coulid betray UJ"orrua",
adier-general) by bringing
i*a't""o-"
'--- - a brig-
up tis taofr.
lhereafter Khanh and Khiem could do anything. Khanh
sat
gq the general staft but as Diem's favorite n"ioot orders from
Diem.alo.ne, iporld the chain ot co-m"Jaia w"ot his own
leey_neelgg way. When hleplaced Minh it may have pleased
the Hoa Hao and the Cao Oai Uut in th;;e;aU
was
pi"t"rltt"re
-no.improvement. The paratroopers over wUom Khanh
aad Khiem walked to advat'cem"ot fi Non"-ber
1960 hated
the new teem as fiercely as the sects nateA
tne JO one. What a
 THB EXPLOSION 263
basket of eels was this nation, about which every hoodwinked
and lied-to Amerisan thougbt he knew everythingl
Chaos reigned. Buddhists, drunk with the headiness of pow-
er after ning yesxs on the receiving end, rapidly lost all the
sympathy their just grievances and suicides had brought them.
The climate for Communist agitation was perfect. On Feb
ruary 2 rioting students, as intoxicated with their own im-
portance as the Buddhists, made troubletill Khanh took *Big
Minh" back into his government. The truth of the law ol
physics tlat every swing of the pendulum is followed by an
equal and opposite reaction was never better illustrated. But,
watching this anarchy from across the ocean and applying an
explanation to fit their wishes, Anericans by the thousands
accepted the fallacious premise that 'tnti Diem and Nhu were
killsd sru'side was,ryinning." Great lawyers who would never
have taken a case without thorougbly studying the background
flocked to the defense of Madame Nhu. Catholics and Citholic
tg"ry41 took 1p the sause of the Ngo dinhs because they were
Catholic, and Protestant conservatives because, in the last two
minutes of the game, and then only, the most arrogant group
of planners that ever misdirected a nation had decided to tati
the! distance from the Ngo dinhs.
March 23, 1964, and for that day only, an Ap report
-On
a little over two inches long appeared in an insiae page of Ae
New York News. Most papers failed to print it aia[. Assets
illegally acquired by Diem and the Nhus had gone on display
ig Saigo-n the previous day. Included were photograpns of tn!
elegant batlroom in Madnme Nhu's sumptuous nomi in Oatat.
The loot exhibited was appraised at some $20 -iltie11, or over
$_2,300,000 for each year that Diem and Nhu had held power.
This, of course, represented only such assets as had nolt been
shipped- out of the country by the family that tr16 nsthing in
June 1954, when Bao Dai gave Diem a check for a mit'iion
piastres-to hire a claque. The assets of shipping companies,
construction enterprises, real estate and fishing frms,-sugar,
rice and cinnamon houses, etc., concealed through Nf,u,s
arrangements with business men fron.:ng for him, had already
been confiscated, tlree months before.
- Caught between the devil and the deep blue sea in this track-
qg doyo of accomplices was poor If,tai Tuyen, the Chinese
whose house sheltered the escape end of Dieds tunnel. Despite
everythigg the Ngo dinhs had done to his people, Mai Ttrfen,
F.stay in business, had had to put up witn anytning Nhu-and
Diem demanded, even to the Vietnamization oi his name. Had
he denounced them the morning of their €ssape, he could have
2& BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
saved his property,but who could be sure, even then, that
"the family" would not come out on top? In the end Mai
Tuyen's belongings were confiscated along with the property
he covered for "Honest Diem" and his brother.
Pandemonium was the best word for Saigon as 1964 un-
folded. On August 17 Khanh again drove out Minh and had a
junta name him chief of state. Out in the streets again came
rioting Buddhists and Vietnam's new beatnik student class.
On August 25 Khanh tore up the charter voted by his junta
and stepped down from the presidency, to prevent further dirs-
order. There was a pause. For a moment it appeared that the
day Nguyen ton Hoan and the Dai Viet had been awaiting for
twenty-five years was at hand. Then something happened.
That America had a hand in it would seem evident from the
viciousness of the campaign against Hoan's assuming the presi-
dency. Hoan was summarily driven out of the country to Hong
Kong, and on September 3 General Khanh returned to what
might, by a stretch of the term, be called power.
Actually it was anarchy. The first intimation of what was
afoot came in a dispatch out of Saigon by Warren Rogers,
Washington bureau chief of Hearst Headline Service, on Sep
tember 21, 1964. Who Washington-and Hanoi-were out to
destroy we already know. Hearsfs Washington bureau chief
furnished the first clue as to who was on the upgrade. It was
Albert Pham ngoc Thao.
Of all the far-out sorties of newsmen into the outer space
beyond common sense, no report liven the Americao pittic
since the Vietnam hoax began was ever so insulting to the
public's intelligence or less able to stand up under analysis
than Warren Rogers's September 21 effort to make a fine fellow
out of a Communist breaker of men. It will be remembered
that when Thao headed Ho chi Minh's intelligence the tough-
est legionnaires, with reason, regarded death as preferable to
capture. In September Major General Duong van Duc had led
his troops on Saigon in an abortive coup d'etat. He made three
demands on the government, the first of which was the elimina-
tion of Albert Pham ngoc Thao, whose ruthlessness for the
Communists, Duc had personally experienced as a prisoner.
Warren Rogers pooh-poohed it as the petty gxipe of a coward
against a fine officer who did his duty. No sentimental nonsense
about the underdog was permitted to interfere with the new
line. Those q/nfshing the writhing of the vietnam basket of
eels and the sinuous turnings of American policy with any
knowledge of the actors involved murmured ."Ihis is it," and
waited for the next development.
 TIIE E)(PLOSION 265
On October 1 it came. Colonel Albert Pham ngoc Thao was
appointed press attache to the Vietnamese embassy in Wash-
ington. With hin" as ambassador, went Lieulenant General
Tran thien Khiem, the godson of Diem, who had been Senator
Mike Mansfield's "godson" when the going was good.
By coincidence or logical train of events, depending on tle
realism of the viewer, shortly after Nhu's former secret police
chief and Diem godson reached Washington in tbeir new
capacities all the bills Madame Nhu left behind her in Amer-
ica, somewhere between $11,000 and $14,000, were quietly
paid.
There was another coincidence as the disastrous summer of
1964 drew to a close and the September maneuveringp in
Saigon to get Khiem and Thao appointed to Washington as
ambassador and press attache, respectively, unfolded. At that
very moment senators in far-ofi Washington were obediently
approving the Johnson-Rusk appointment of Randolph Kid-
der as United States ambassador to Cambodia.
Now it will be recalled that Diem's invasion of Cambodia in
June 1958 was responsible for Cambodia's swing toward Pe-
king, and Randolph Kidder, regarded in Southeast Asia as the
foremost of Madame Nhu favorites, was held responsible
for our continuing support of Diem. gs nrming Kidder ar
bassador to Cambodia was nothing more nor less than a last
push to shove vital Cambodia the rest of the way into Pekingis
ams, if that were necessary. How to estrange allies and win
friends-for our deadliest enemy-seerns our greatest talent.
Not an American paper expressed anything but surprise
when Cambodia refused to permit Randolph Kidder to enter
the country.
On Decembel 6, Thao's wife, Pham thi Nhiem, the long-
time Communist militant and sister of the Communist pro,
fessor, Pham ffuisu, joined her husband with her four Chil-
dren. The capital where the fanatic Red found herself, still
claimed to be the torch-bearer for liberty in Southeast Asia
and continued to sacrifice several young Americans a day to
convince America's patriotic citizens it was true. But a change
was in the air. Senator Mansfield, the stubborn Montanan moit
lespolslble for South Vietnam's defeat by despair, the mem-
ber of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations who would
not consider anyone but his man when a change could have
been made, oVernight began trlking about .,negotiations,,, I
euphemism for surrender.
When
-confronted
by the anarchy he, more than any other
senator, had made inevitable, by encouraging destnrction of
266 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
every man and erouo capable of assuring stability,
Senator
Mansfeld
-piously ob'served, 'The vieG-des'J sloua reariz,-,
that it is their countrv and their .u..,, ff"Jtt" good
senator
only realized it ten yean sooner, all might have
been so dif-
ferentt
The New york Times-tol_d- its readers on
l964,.that'jg p"i" of fol{ singers *n, n"".November
dil;;;
22,
college
llerjcag
soon be touring -campryes -by "o-ou"otiooA-t uosportation
will
the back villages of Vietnam bi n"fi"op-t ,I
Reporter Robert Shelton.-contiiuea to i"U
partmetrt was sendins Bill Crofut and
loi the State De-
Steve aOaiss alroai,
"oq their second sucf government-backed junk4
of two-man musical oiace corps." Vietnam, . . . as a sort
iaos, Indonesia,
M_alaysia, Thailand *io x""y"' *"r; ;;#'rh;ir desrinations.
l'_O--n.a.
lrevio]" Ep they sang for Burmese- s6i"nts in a com,
munist school and were.3ad9 honorary triUesmen in fenya,,
subject of-opp_osmon to commrrnism, ..All
9l th"
what we read in the Neq york Times,,, we know is
saidMr. Crofut. .q,re
don't want to get involved.in any p;;;; J;;gd
giv_e Asians a different picture
We are out to
oi am"ri"ai?.i, So American
defense of liberty had become a ,.power
struggle.,,
.- "\ilIhen two elephants figh! it lr^ tl" gr*-Tnat suffers,, was
the way Messrs. Crofut aoA eaAiss-,-o--;
Neutralism, up their line.
not encour-ag€ment
that vieto"mes" warn and
assist American ofrcers dqino td*b;J;;;of bases about
to be attacked, was the go$y eaair, iiof"t;;;;;;hg
Vietnam ana
-teric6pteiea-r-ilil"e.
-a
fl":"1." to village
The best_picture to be.found of America,s
. disastrous four-
tqcggy in South is pr""ioeJt/spreaoing four
:!19" Jietnan
rssues of Harpels maeazine out
on a table: In 1946 came the
Ho..g.hi Minh phase, w'ith Harola
[. i;;;;;"g
as "tle-George washington of soutn"art-erti'-tu"
Ho,s praises
kepr life in his frail body only bt man who
srngleness of purpose. Ooscemues
hir;ffi; of aim (!) and
were heaped on off-
French
cerc who opposed him.
In January 1956 Haroels accorded Senator
Mansfield space
_f:t $" -{audine of Ngo di"h Di;;: Ti_;"La cnangea, ana
the Ho line was out. Then came.Harpe/s of
September 1962:
!t w9s time to disclaim,rasponsiUilitf Jo. fji!il, so professor
Sta_nley Millet prwided-with-" pir* i."r"i-A, rpels
megoried readers-was short-
about "Terror i" vi"tou--a" American,s
Or$eal at the Hands of our Friends.',
_ In Harpef s of December l_16a,-eighteen years after Harold
R. rsaacs'passionate plea for H",'i;i;;;;;#fi
editors com.
 THE EXPLOSION 267
pleted the circle and published a call by Ioseph Kraft (ex-
propagandist for the Algerian FLN) to get out of Vietnam
and let North and South negotiate between themselves. If one
read the sierrs correctly, and they were many, America's post-
war protege, Ho chi Minh, was aboirt to win out in the end.
There was no resolute, last-hour girding for American victory.
Desperate American "advisors," watching protected guer-
rillas and unhindered raiders wipe out experienced officers and
young West Pointers with impunity, cried for unity-anything
that would provide a semblance of a rallying point. David
Schoenbrun, who on September 30, 1956 (in Colliers),
trumpeted for Diem to "not only remove Bao Dai, but do it in
such a way that he no longer has any usefulness as a symbol
of Vietnqmese unity," had by 1964 washed his hands of the
whole affair and was busy burrowing elsewhere.
"How did we ever get involved in South Vietnam?" a public
capable only of apathy or indignation oegan to sry. "Was it
for this that we people were bled white, our gold reserves
squandered and our dollar brought to the brink of collapse?"
The answer, blunfly is: Yes. A senseless, stupid crusade against
colonialism, agreed upon by Roosevelt and Stalin at leheran,
led us up to our waists in the quagmire of Indochina. Deter-
mihation to replace the allies we were ousting drew us in the
rest of the way.
A onehour, carrier-based airstrike could nave destroyed
Ho chi Minh's decimated army in March 1954, saved the be'
leaguered garrison at Dien Bien Phu and changed the course
of history. But there was a virus in the bloodstream of Ameri-
ca that desired a Vietminh triumph. The story of Indochina
is the story of the decline of the West. Only an informed pub-
lic, such as America did not have on November 3, 1964, will
bring the victory at the polls which alone will eradicate the
virus and prevent many more rndochinas to come. All of the
force of America's massed left, from the White flouse down,
are regimented to silence those who would rell America the
truth.
 ,^,,::i:fn*,
1925: Bao Dai, twelve years old, a student in France, becomes
emperor of Vietnam upon the death of his father.
1929: The Communist party of Indochina is founded.
1939: World War II begins. The Dai Viet party is founded by
Nguyen ton Hoan.
1940: France falls to Germany. French Indochina, loyal to
t_ne
lichy government in France, comes underJuianese
domination.
1945: March.. Japan ends French rule in Vietnam. Bao Dai
proclaims the independence of Vietnam.
August: Hiroshima. V-J day. Commrrnist Ho chi Minh
and his Vietminh effectively take over Vietnam. Ho chi
Minh forces Bao Dai to abdicate.
September: France begins to reestablish her rule in Viet-
nam.
1946: An eight-year war between France and the Communist
Vjetminh begins. Bao Dai escapes from Ho chi Minh;
flies to Nankilg.
1948: Bai Vien, the pirate, brings his band to the side of
France against the Communists.
1949: Bao Dai returns as chief of state of Vietnam.
1950.. commrrnisf ehin4 begins large_scale military aid to the
Vietminh. Bai Vien acquires the..Grande Monde," the
great gambling monopoly; builds up a private force that
is the terror of the Reds. The United States increases
aid to the French.
1952: lune: Nguyen van Tam (father of Nguyen van Hinh)
replaces Tran van Huu as premier.
1953: May: Henri Navarre becomes French military com-
mander in Vietnam.
November: The French occupy Dien Bien phu.
1954: Bu Vien becomes ,'General Li van Vien" and head of
the Saigon police.
April 26: In Geneva, the conference on Indochina
opens.
May 7: Dien Bien Phu falls to the Communists.
Irne,l!: Ngo dinh Diem takes office as premier of
South Vietnam.
268
 APPENDD( 269
Iuly 21: The Geneva agreement is signed giving North
Vietnam to the Communists.
"Ialy.. Refugees begin to stream from North to South
Vietnam.
September: Nguyen van Hinh, chief of staff of the
army, heads a moyement to remove Diem fiom power.
The attempt fails and Hinh is forced to leave the
country.
October /5..The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
receives a Vietnam report from Senator Mike Mans-
field. Based on a trip Senator Mansfield made to Viet-
nam, the report is strongly pro-Diem.
1955: Moch: The United Nationalist Front made up of the
Binh Xuyen, the Cao Dai sect, the Hoa Hao sict, and
others, forms a coalition against the Diem regime.
October 23: The official results of a national referen-
dum to decide whether the country should remain an
9qpfue or become a republic give Ngo dinh Diem
5,72L,735 votes, Bao Dai 63,Oli.
1956: March..A national assembly is elected in South Viet-
nam.
1957: February 22: A student attempts to assassinate Diem at
Ban Me Thout.
19,60: October.. Red forces erupt on the high plateau and
defeat the regular army.
November 11.. Paratroopers revolt against the govern-
ment of President Diem.
1962: March.. Two planes of the Vietnamese airforce strafe
Diem's palace.
1963: Ianuary 2.. Communist forces defeat the Vietnamese
army at Ap Bac.
May 8: Armored cars open fre on Buddhists in Hue.
A series of crises starts.
August: Henry Cabot Lodge becomes United States
ambassador to South Vietnam.
October: The United States cuts sharply its aid to South
Vietnam.
November 1..The final military revolt against the Diem
regime begins. Ngo dinh Diem and his brother Ngo
dinh |rffiu are forced to flee the palace.
November 2.. In the early morning the palace falls to
rebel forces. Later, Nhu and Diem are arrested and
then assassinated while being transported to army head-
quarters in Saigon.
 IMPORTANT VIETNAMESB NAMES

Boo Dai: Hereditary emperor of Vietnam, though after his

abdication n L945 and restoration in 1949 he was known
as "chief of state."
Buu Loc: Cousin of Bao Dai and premier of the last French-
Vietnam government. Buu Loc was premier at the time of
the battle of Dien Bien Phu.
Ngo dinh Diern: Son of Ngo dinh Kha, a mandarin (court offi-
cial) at the court of the Emperor Khai Dinh, Bao Dai's
father. In June 1954 Diem, at America's insistence, was
named premier by Emperor Bao Dai. Diem was then
fifty-four years old. The power setup of Ngo dinhs was
primarily x fsmily affair.
Ngo dinh Thuc: Diem's brother, three years older than Diem,
becrme bishop of Vinh Long. Thuc controlled the
churches in South Vietnam.
Ngo dinh Nftz.'Nhu was forty-tlree when Diem rose to power.
He had been a labor leader. To him went the police. He
was known as "advisor to the president."
Ngo dinh Can: Can was forty-one. To him went the traffic in
rice, and the northern part of Vietnam as his fief.
Ngo dinh Luyen: Luyen was thir$-nine. To him went diplo.
macy. He became ambassador to I;ondon, Tunis, Brussels
and Bonn, and handled all funds for these embassies.
Madame Ngo dinh Nfta.'Nhu's beautiful and avaricious wife.
She became the "first lady" of Vietnam and controlled
business deals and secret funds, with a women's para-
military organization of her own.
Tran van Chuong: Madame Nhu's father, a lawyer in private
life, became ambassador 1s lly'ashington, Canada, Argen-
tina, and Brazil, with control of embassy funds for those
countries.
Tran van Do.' Brother of Tran van Chuong. He became the
first minister of foreign affairs of the Diem regime.
Madarne Tran van Chuong: Madame Nhu's mother, formerly
a councilor of the French Union. In the early days of the
Diem regime Madame Chuong placed her favorites in
positions of power. When edged out by her daughter she
became Vietnam's observer in the UN. Licensing of com-
mercial enterprises had been her domain.
270
 APPENDD( 271

Madone Ca-L€: Sister of Ngo dinh Diem. She headed the

Company of Cereal Traders, controllers of the rice trafrc
in central Vietnam.
Tranvan Khiem: Brother of Madame Nhu. He was press secre-
tary at f''ne of the Binh Xuyen crisis; later became head
of police.
Tran trung Dzng.' Son-in-law of Madame Ca-I-€. He became
secretary of state for defense.
Nguyen van Thni: Brother-inJaw of Madame Ca-L€. From
1954 to May 1955 he was minister of planning and recon-
struction. He was followed by Hoang Hung, a former
Vietminh.
Huynh van Lang: Godson of Monsignor Thuc. He controlled
the foreign exchange office.
Nguyen van Don: Boyhood friend of Nhu. He was made secre-
tary of state for national education.
Ton that Thrach: A Diem godson. He became director-general
of customs.
Tran huu Phuong: He sheltered Diem in Paris in 1953 and
1954. Consequently he became secretary of state for
finances and later head of the national bank of Vietnam.
Tran chat*r Thanh: An old-time Vietrninh "administrator of
justice" for Ho chi Minh. He became secretary of state for
information under Diem, while his wife was a business
parther of Madame Nhu's in several projects. In May
1962 Thanh became ambassador to Tirnisia.
Nguyen van Hinh: Son of Nguyen van Tam. As chief of staff
of the army of South Vietnam, Hinh, a hero of the French
airforce in World War II, led the first challenge to the
Ngo dinhs in September 1954. At date of this writing he
is chief of staff of the French airforce.
Nguyen van Tam: A former premier of Vietnam and father of
General Nguyen van Hinh, chief of sta.ff of the army of
free and independent Vietnam.
Bai Vien: The early narhe of General Le van Vien, leader of
the private army of the Binh Xuyen.
Le van Vien:The former pirate who led the soalition of polit-
ical parties, religious sects and his own private army
against the Ngo dinhs in April 1955. See Bai Vien.
Pham cong Tac: Pope of the Cao Dai sect.
Albert Pham ngoc Thao: Head, of Ho chi l\{inh's intelligence
service during the war against the French. Brother of Ho
chi Minh ofrcial, Gaston, son of Pham ngoc Thual, head
of Vietminh League, in Paris. Under the Diem regime
Thao became head of the credit office of the American aid
N2 BACKGROI'ND TO BETRAYAL
section of the national bank and later intelligence chief for
Ngo dinh Nhu in the Nhu party, the Can Lao Nhan VI
(Worker's Humanist Revolutionary party). On October
31, L963, Thao deserted Nhu and Diem, worked for the
revolting generals. Became information chief, first under
General Minh, then under General Nguyen Khanh. He
was assigned to the Vietnamese embassy in Washington iu
late September L964. He disappeared from Washington
on December 26. On February 19, 1965, Thao surfaced
in Saigon in a coup d'etat attempt which held Saigon for
one day. IIis arrest was ordered but Thao, protected by
powerful but r nnamed forces, went underground. He
was still unapprehended at date of this writing.
Bacut: Commander of the military forces of the Hoa Hao sect.
Le Monde (Paris diplomatic daily) of g,pril lZ, 1956,
reported exesution of twelve Vietminh agents at Chauduc,
by Bacut. Communists launched a campaign in retaliation.
The Diem government, using Ambassador to Japan
Nguyen ngoc Tho as an intermediary, lured Bacut into a
trap under a truce agreement and executed him. Bacut
was also known as Le quang Vinh.
Nguyen ngoc Tho: Was appointed vice-president of South
Vietminh by Diem for his services in leading the Hoa Hao
leader Bacut into a trap under promise of a truce in the
summer of 1956. In the last days of the Diem regime he
quit the Diem government in protest over Diem treat-
ment of Buddhists.
Ho chi Minh: Last of the old time Communist revolutionaries
and president of the People's Republic of North Vietnam.
As far back as 1918 Ho chi Minh wrote an incendiary
article on the plight of the American Negro in Harlem,
in which Ho clearly foresaw the possibility of using the
American as a tool for revolution.
Vo nguyen Giap: Commander-in-chief of "the people's army"
of North Vietnam. He is author of the celebrated book on
guerrilla warfare, People's llu, Peoplds Army.
Pharn von Dong: Premier of the Ho chi Minh government of
North Vietnam and number-two man in the Ho chi Minh-
General Giap-Premier Pham van Dong triumvirate which
rules the country.
Nguyen ton Hoan: Catholic, veteran leader of the Dai Viet
party, the largest and best established nafionalist, anti-
Communist party in South Vietnam. After Diem's fall
Hoan was attacked by Hanoi as the man America would
logically choose to replace Diem and he was attacked by
 APPENDIX 273
Americans (the Washington World of Dec. 2, 1963; the
Allen & Scott column of Nov. 9, 1963, and Warren
Rogers' Hearst Headline Service report on September 21,
1964) for reasons that are not clear. None of the charges
against him would stand up under scrutiny and Hoan was
the one nationalist leader that Hanoi feared. After a brief
period as vice-premier uoder General Nguyen Khanb"
Hoan was exiled by Khanh on September 3, 19fl. His
exile created a total leadership vacuum and was another
step toward chaos in Saigon.
Pharn huy Quat: A doctor by profession, minister of national
defense rtnder Ngu.yen van Tem in L952 and personable as
a man but without sr'fficient base to become a national
leader. In L946 Quat was one of the wealthy, northern
mandarins to join the Dai Viet party as protection against
ffie \,tistminh. ln 1949 when France regained power in
Indochina, Quat left the Dai Viet nationalists and opted to
work with the French, thereby acquiring a "puppet"
label. Through 195I, 1952, and 1953, the Dai Viet party,
led by Nguyen ton Hoan, was ouflawed for expelling Quat
and other members who favored collaboration with the
French rather than a campaign for independence. After
Hoan's exile in September 1964, American agents in
Saigon backed Quat in his attempt to seize leadership of
the entire Dai Viet party. Quat was marked as America's
choice for the premiership but both his defection from
the leaders that saved him in 1946 and the fact that, like
Diem, he is a northerner, work against him.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books
Anonymous, Saigon alheure des coups detcts (This book was
published in March 1964 by the Communist government
in North Vietnam.)
Lucien Bodard, L' Indo-Chine, I' enlisement
Charles Boblen, Bohlen minutss, the Cairo-Teheran papers
Joseph Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon, A Political History ol
Vietnam
George Chaffard, Indochine, dix ans dindependence
Anthony Eden, memoires
Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy
274 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in U.S, Policy
Wesley Fishel, Problems of Freedom, South Yietnam since
Independence
J. Laniel, Le drarne de l'Indo4hine
Henri Navarre, L'agonie de I'Indo4hine
Oml E. Parks and Milan Jan Reber, Michigan State Univer-
sity bibliography on South Vietnam from 1955 to 1957
Robert G. Scigliano, South Vietram, Nation under Stress
Richard Tregaskis, Vietnarn Diary

Articles and Reprts

Joseph Alsop, New Yotk Herald Tribune, European edition,
April 11, 12, L4, 18, 1961
O. K. Armstrong "Biggest Little Man in East Asia," Readey's
Digest, February, 1956
American Friends of Vietnam, "America's Stake in Vietnam"
Anonymous, "The Beleaguered M"n," Time, Apri4.4,t955
"Chinoiseries in South Vietnam," Economist, Septem-
ber 29, t956
---, "Diem's Shaky Foundations," Economist, June 23,
-r 1956
"Divided Vietnam: Second Korea," Progressive,De-
--, cember 1955
'3fudsshina, The Unfinished Struggle," World Today,
January L2, 1956
"Should All-Vietnamese Elections be Held?" New
-, Leader, July 11, 1955
"South Vietnam-Problem of One Man," Time, July
. 11, 1960
--, "Vietnam Stability," Newsweek, February 17,1958
"Vietnam's First Lady," Time,Iawary 26, L959
"Vietnam's Point of No Return," Inform, Baltimore,
-t
--r Maryland, luly L9, L962
-t '"The Waning Power of France in Yietnam," V[/orld
--, Today, February 12, t956
"Will GI's Fight in Indochina?" U,S. News & World
Report, April 30, 1954
The"Z" report, New Republic, March L2, t962
--, New York Herald Tribune, article on Lawton Qsllins,
April2l, 1955
Time, article on Albert Pham ngoc Thao, April 21,
-, t96r
Leland "U$Vietnam Co-operation Program, The
-, ICABarrows,
Program since 1955," Department of State Bulletin,
May 11, 1959
 APPENDD( 275
Darrel Berrigen" "The Ordeal of South Vietnam," Reporter,
September 20, 1956
Dennis Bloodwort\ Observer Foreign News Service article on
Albert Pham ngoc Thao, New York HeraW Tribuns,
European edition, ApnlZl, l96L
V. L. Borin,'Vho Killed Diem and Why?" National Reyiew,
Jllrre 2, t9&
TValter Briggs, "Miracle Maker of South Vietnam," New York
Herqd Triburu, Buropean edition, May 13, L957
Joseph Buttinger, "An Eyewitness Report on South Vietnam,"
Reporter, January 27, 1955
'Are TVe Saving South Vietnam?" New Leader, Ilurre
27,1955
Bob Considing "fad6rshin6 Payoff," International News Service
-r column, October 17, 1956
Robert I. Crane, "Dilemma in Indochina," Christian Century,
n.d.
Brian Crozier, "Anatomy of Terrorism," Nation, March 21,
1959
"The Diem Regime in Southern Vietnam," Far East
ern Sumey, April 1955
--,
David J. Dallin, "IIow to Win in Indochina," New Leader,
February 22,1954
Hilaire du Berrier, "About South Vietnarn," American Opin-
loa February 1958
Bernard FaJt "Master of the Red Jab--Ho chi Minh is Waging
the Kind of War that He Knows Best," Saturdcy Evening
Post, November 2/+, 1962
Wesley Fishel, articles, New Leader, November 2, L959 and
December 7,1959
Ellen Hammer, "Progress Report on Southern Vietnam,"
Paclftc Afrairs, September 1957
William Henderson, 'Report on Vietnam," Foreign Affalrs,
January 1957
Bill I{enry, column, Los Angeles
Tim.es, May 16, 1957
Marguerite Higgins, "Our Country's Inglorious role in the
Final Days of the Diem Regime," Human Events, March
7,1964
David Hotbam, "Vietna.m-Shalry Bastion " New Republic,
November 25, 1957
William H. Hunter, "The War in Vietnam, Luce Version "
New Republlc, March 23, 1963
Clement Johnston, "Southeast Asiq Report on United States
Foreign Assistance Programs," committee report, 85th
Congress, lst session, survey number 7, Marcb 1957
N6 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
PeterKalischer, "IJpsetting the Red Timetable,,, Collief s,Jlly
6, 1956
Stanley Karnow, "Diem Defeats his own Best Troops,,,Re-
porteL January L9, l96t
"The Edge of Chaos," Saturdoy Evening posf, Sep-
tember 28, 1963
Iohn F. Kennedy, speech on Vietnam, Vital Speeches ot the
-, Day, August t,1956
Wolf Ladejinsky, "Vietnam's First Five Years," Reporter,
December 24, 1959
Claire Booth Luce, "The Lady is for Burning," Natiorwl Re-
view, November 5, 1963
Mike Mansfield, "Report by Senator Mike Mansfield on a
Study Mission to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos," Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, October 1954
"Reprieve in Vietnam," Hatper's, January 1956
Harold H. Martin, "Fighting an lJnseen Enemy," Saturday
-, Evening
Stanley
Posf, November 24, t962
Millet, 'oTerror in Vietnam-An American's Ordeal at
the Hand of our'Friends'," Harper's, September 1962
foseph Nerbonne, "President Diem Fools Vietnam's Pessi-
mists," Associated Press article, L,os Angeles Tirnes, May
5, L957
Ngo dinh Thuc, "'What's Really Going on in Vietnam," Nc-
tional Review, November 5, 1963
Milton Orshevsky, "Joan of Arc or Dragon Lady?" Life, Octo-
bet 26,1963
John Osborne, "The Tough Miracle Man of Yietnam,,, Life,
May 13, 1957
Jerry A. Rose, "Hot War on One Burner," Book Week, Decem-
ber 22, 1963
Milton Sachs, "Political Alignments of Vietnamese National-
ists," Department of State, Office of Intelligence and
Research, report number 3708, 1949
Robort Shaplen, "The Enigma of Ho chi Minh," Reporter, nd..
David Shoenbrun, "Bao Dai," Collier's, September 30, 1955
Robert Ttumbull, "'Mandarin' Who Rules South Vietnam,"
New York Times Magazine, January 7, 1962
Freda Utley, "The Amazing Mr. Diem," National Review,
November 24, 1956

Notes on the Bibliography

The article by Mr. Rose, listed above, is a review of six
books on Vietnem: Yietrnm Diary, by Richard Tregaskis; Tfte
 APPENDIX 277
Two Vietnatns, by Bernard FalJ.; Communistn in North Viet-
n4nt,by Patrick J. Honey; The Furtive War The Anited States
in Vietnam and Laos, by Wilfred G. Burchett; Southeast Asia:
Problems ol United States Policy, by William Henderson; and
Southeast Asia in U.S, Policy, by Russell H. Fifield. Burchett
is an Australi"tl lleslrrnist who has spent some tine living
with the Vietminh in North Vietnam.
The New York Times, February L2, 7965, gave a report on
another Burchett book that is nothing more nor less tlan anti-
American propaganda. The report is as follows: "Vietcong, by
a Friend-A book about the Vietcong forces that operate in
South Vietnam, written by Wilfred G. Burchett, the Moscow
correspondent of a number of communist newspapers, will be
published at the end of the month by International Publishers
Assosiates of New York. It is 'Vietnam: Dark Tunnel to Dis-
aster:The Story from the Inside.' The publishers explain that
Mr. Burchetfs book is 'an account of what he saw and learned
during six months with the Liberation forces in South Viet-
nam.' An article by Mr. Burchett telling of his sapslisnc€g
with the Vietcong appeared in a Soviet military weekly in
December, 1963."
The article by Mr. Sachs, listed above, is quite simply a
whitewash of the Communist Vietminh. At the date of this
writing Mr. Sachs is a professor at Brandeis University,
Waltham, Massachusetts.
 ABOUT TIIE AUTHOR

Hilaire du Berrier was tle first white child born in the littte
town his pioneer parents founded on the banks of a strerm
called Louse Creek in North Dakota. He studied in Minnesota"
went to Laylon School of Art in Milwaukee for a semester,
then to Northwestern University School of Journalism in
Chicago for a term. At the age of twenty he was barnstorming
with a flying circus. In 1931 he went to Paris to spend, he
thought, tbree montls with his uncle, a former South pakota
congressman then appointed commissioner to the United States
participation in the French Colonial Exposition. This was the
beeipning of a life of adventure that was to lead him inls ths
trouble spots of the world and was to prevent his return to
America until sixteen years later.
When it became obvious that Mussolini intended to invade
Ethiopia, du Berrier bought a ticket to Addis Ababa to offer
his services to Emperor Haile Selassie. The long awaited mate.
rial never arrived, and du Berrier ended up as a war corre-
spondent for Central News Agency of I-ondon. It was as a
prisoner of the Itallirns that he entered Addis Ababa on May 5,
1936, in the second automobile in the Italian advance guard's
gglrrmn.
French friends got him out of Addis Ababa and down to the
coastal port of Jibouti on a French train. There du Berrier
worked for a month with the disheartened Ethiopian consul,
Lij Andargue Messai, who later became the son-in-law of
Haile Selassie and viceroy of Brytria.
When the civil war began in Spain, du Berrier was in
Rumania trying unsuccessfully to sell airplanes for Koolhoven
Aircraft of Rotterdam. Viewing the Franco revolt as a step
toward restoration of the monarchy in Spain, du Berrier
dropped everything and boarded x flain for Cannes. There he
asked the advice of Colonel Clifford llarmon, a pro-Franco
American, donor of the Harmon Trophy and founder of the
International kague of Aviators.
Armed with a letter from Harmon to General Orgaz,
Franco's chief of staff in Tetuan, du Berrier set off for his
rendezvous ia fangiers with Franco agent Don Cezar AIba.
But he met only frustration. Italians were powerful in Franco'g
278
 ABOIIT THE AUTIIOR 279
air force, and du Berrier was on their blacklist for havlng
helped Haile Selassie in Ethiopia.
Back to Paris he went to knock on the door of Franco's
unofficial ambassador, the Marquis Quiniones de Leon, who, as
itturaed out, could do nothing for him, He then went to
England and with a friend from Ethiopia, RAF pilot Hugh
Olaf de Wet (later sentenced to death by the bermans),
pestered Franco's London representative, the Marquis de
Portago, with requests that they be sent to Franco'J front.
De Portago could do nothing for them either.
Deternined to see the Spnnigl crvil war from the inside,
d9 W9t went to the Spanish Loyalist embassy in London and
signed himse$ rp a pursuit pilot at $1,000 per month and
expenses, $15,000 ^
for each plane he shot down, and g10,000
payable ,,4o6,.
lo anygne he wished in the event he was kille6.
9{d-!!e Spanish official, "we'll give you twenty pounds sterling
[$100] for each recruit you canbring us."
_, ryq till a
year later did du Berrier learn that his pal had
"iold" him to the Loyalists for the equivalent of a fundred
do[ars.
On November 2, 7936, the two arrived in Madrid-where
Ftanco's troops were srtting in the suburbs. In the dead of the
night with tfuee other pilots, de Wet and du Berrier were
driven in a commandeered car through the closing pincers of
Ftanco's advance.
_ their frst stop was Albacete, but the planes they were to
fly had been destroyed on the ground; ,o the tir"d carload of
pilots pushed on to tle naval airbase at San Javier near the
army airforce base of Los Alcazares. After a check out at
Los Alcazares, du Berrier was assigned to a pursuit group in
Alicante and de Wet was sent to Barcelona.
When the one-month contract expired, the problem of
getting out presented itself. After a welk of stallin-g over safe
conduct papers and travel permits, du Berrier was sent to the
new air minrsuy in Valencia.
Meanwhile, Comm'nist reports from paris had informed
the Loyalist government that du Berrier was an anti-Commu-
nist. Accordingly, one of the Valencia groups that was making
arests on its own and executing prisoners without notifyinl
the central goverDment arrested du Berrier at g:30 a.m. on
November lO, 1936, and took him to an interrogation center.
No1 uliJ Senor Pliny, the interpreter from thJair ministry,
arrived that afternoon at 4:45 witn tne papers that savea him,
did du Berrier learn that those sharing tle bench with him
280 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
during that day had been taken out and shot when their names
were called.
Colonel Alberto Bayo (who later trained Castro's guerrillas)
was responsible for saving du Berrier's life. The reason:
Eleanor Roosevelt and other American liberals were doing a
great deal for r-oyalist Spain and Bayo was determined not to
iisk alienating them by having an American executed' Bayo
sheltered him in the air ministry that night and put him, under
military guard, on a train bound for France the following
morning.
In Paris du Berrier went at once to military attach6s Colonel
Fuller and Major Waite in the American embassy and gave
them an account of the situation in Spain-the Americans
serving there under assumed names and the Russian material
being used. Next, aided by Mr. Ralph Heintzen of United
Presi, du Berrier wrote a series of articles on Moscow's direc-
tion of the Spanish civil war. These articles were published in
part by the Hearst press in America and were syndicated
abroad by the French agency Opera-Mundi'
It was at the suggestion of Colonel Charles Sweeney'that
du Berrier sailed for the Orient in mid-April 1937. "There is
going to be a show out there," said Sweeney. "You go and see
if you can get all of us in." By a "show," Sweeney meant a
war. And by "all of us," he meant the little group of adven-
turous flyers who sat si1fo him in Paris bars and talked of past
wars around the world.
On the boat with du Berrier was Admiral le Bigot and his
staff, who were on their way to assume command of the
French Far East fleet. Rear-Admiral Petit was with them, as
were replacements for the military command in Indochina,
the French concession in Shanghai, and French forces in
points north.
By the time they tied up in Saigon three weeks later, du
Berrier had established such ties of friendship so that there-
after the fate of any French officer in Indochina was a matter
of personal concern to him.
During his short stby in Saigon-a visit that changed the
course of his life-he became close friends qrith Lieutenant de
Vaisseau Ponchardier, the aviator aboard the flagship Zc
Motte-Picquet. Ponchardier was later to live in the swamps of
lo6sshina in a deadly underground war against first the
Japanese and later the Vietminh.
Lieutenant de Vaisseau de Riencourt, pilot of the hydro
plane hoisted on the stern of the cruiser Le Primaguet was
another friend. De Riencourt's murder by a Vietminh sniper
 ABOUT THE AIJ'IHOR 281
in December 1945 brought du Berier still deeper into opposi-
tion to America's arming of Ho chi Minh-an opposition-that
wrn to cost du Berrier both his job with Newsweek magazine
and his position as a civilian Far East specialist witl SSU
(Strategic Services Unit, the organization that succeeded the
OSS, Office of Strategic Services).
In the years that followed there were other visits to Indo-
china and the little enclave of Quang-Chao-wan, where Mon-
sieur Ie Prevost represented France. Du Berrier flew out of
Hankow for a time when the capital was moved rnland. His
friend Colonel Vincent Schmidt came out from paris to join
him in late 1937 and it was this Vincent Schmidt who as com-
mander of the then Colonel Chennault's seventh volunteer
bombardment squadron raided Formosa in what was the first
attack on Japanese territory.
_ By April 1939 du Berrier was back in Shanghai playing a
dangerous game of hide and seek with the Japinese-. tiesting
in one apartment for a time, moving to anothei when it begai
to get hot, he and his Chinese team lived in constant danger
asthey ng-zagged back and forth between the Shanghai inier-
national settlement and the French concession, carrying witt
them the underground radio which maintained contaci belween
free_China and Chiang Kai-shek's agents in Shanghai.
The Deuxidme Bureau, as French military intelligence is
called, was headed in China by Captain Jean Valliy, who
later became supreme commander of NltO forces, Central
Europe. Assisting him were captains Dumuel and Mingant as
numbers two and tbree respectively. Captain Valluy was called
back to Francq for a stage at the war college, but captains
Dumuel and Mingant continued to protect and warn du
Bgrriel in his dangerous game. It was Mingant who, three days
after Pearl Harbor, went over the roofs of apartments in a
shabby quarter off Bubbling Well Road and removed from
du Berrier's apartment the transmitter and receiver, boxes of
stick cordite (for boiling down into gelatinous cordite), bottles
of distilled water, nitric acid, glycerine, and other material used
in^the assembling of time bombs to be used against Japanese
shipping.
Most of the Americans trapped in Shanghai were business-
men. Du Berrier alone had contacts with the French militarv.
Already he had started writing articles for America on the
Japanese invasion of Indochina and massacre of the French
9fficers who held up the Japanese advance at Dang Dong and
Lanson. Not content to sit in Shanghai and wait to be rescued,
du Berrier threw in with the network being formed by Captain
282 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
Mingant as a unit of the French resistance. "Reseau Mingant,"
as it was called, was later to operate between China and e
French base in Indochina. It rescued many a downed Ameri-
can flyer in what was often a neck-and-neck race with the
Jipanese. To Mingant it brought the American Freedom
Medal; to du Berrier, nothing but trouble.
He was arrested just before dawn in his Shanghai hideout
on November 5, 1942. As officers of the Imperial Japanese
Kampetai, the torture specialists of the Japanese service an-
swerable only to the Japanese emperor himself, led du Berrier
down the narrow stairs from his attic apartinent, a Chinese
furtively peered out of a doorway on the floor below. It was
Mr. B. J. Yoh, head of the telecommunications bureau for
Anwhei province, the man for whom the Japanese KamFetai
had been searching for three years.
Along with some two hundred other allied nationals charged
with espionage, du Berrier was taken to a prison camp on
Haiphong Road in Shanghai and lodged in what had been the
barracks of the U.S. fourth marines. Five months later, at 8:30
a.m. on April 5, 1943, Kampetai officers took him to the
torture center in the former British Union Jack Club. There
he was interrogated, clubbed, and given the dread "water
treatment." When he was not in the torture room he was kept
in a five by eight wooden cage with six other prisoners.
On learning that du Berrier was in the torture centbr on
Myburgh Road, Captain Mingant and his men figured the
game was up, and with each day that passed, their fears in-
creased that du Berrier would break and :onfess. But he did
not, and with the time thus gained, Mingant was able eventu-
move south into Indochina.
-allyDuto Berrier finally was moved to the makeshift hospital in
Haiphong road camp late on the night of April 23. Dr. T. B.
Dunn, the American doctor in the camp, prescribed a special
diet of milk and eggs, which had to be bought on the black
market, to build him up after the eighteen days in the torture
house. When the war was over, Mr. Louis Thompson, head
of the finance office of the Department of State, refused Mr.
du Berrier a passport until he could repay the State De-
partment $516 for food furnished him while a prisoner in
Haiphong road camp.
Du Berrier was one of five Americans who were held as
hDstages by the Japanese and refused a place on the exchange
list when Americans who had been trapped in the Orient were
exchanged for Japanese nationals held in America.
V-J Day found du Berrier with some 250 other prisoners
 . ABOI.]T TIIE AUTHOR 283
held as human shields in the largest Japanese ammunition
dump in China-at Feng Tai, eighieen miies out of peking_
ljit^1 lwaitiig.transportation to Japan. There an OSS pia-
chute team led by Major Ray Nichols of Mississippi and
Major Gustav Krause of pasadena, California, UUeraLa Ou
Berrier about the time one of their men named John Birch
was killed by the Communists only a few miles away.
Through
Pierre de Beaumont, a secretary in the French [o
"-U"rry,were
Berrier-got word to the American team that the Japanese
concealing four surviving members of the DoolitG raiders in
pits in Peking.
This was the beginning- ag Berrier,s period of employ
as a civilian with OSS and 9f.
his back-tothe-wall oppositioi-i6
the U.S.'s enthusiastic support of Ho chi fvfinh_anbpposition
tr1! *S ev€nrually to cost him his job.
.. Du-!enqe-r'1 ngxt job was wth Niwsweek magazine. At the
time, Harold R. Isaacs was head of Newsweeks Far East desk.
But he had referred to Chiang Kai-shek as an s.o.b. and conse-
nggntly was barred from China. Since he could not enter
Qhina, Isaacs was lauding Ho chi Minh and heaping invectives
on the French in Saigon,
_Hanoi and Haiphong tl,rougn nis
teggl1 reports to Newsweek and through his freilance fti"b.
for Harper's.
Meanwhile, du Berrier's old friend Valluy, by this time a
general and commander of French forces in Indochina,
was
greeted by gunfire from the Chinese warlord Lu Han
when
t-he transports bearing his toops neared Haiphong. Isaacs
was
for Ho chi Minh in the showdown that ioloied, and du
Berrier was for General Valluy. What happened next, there,
fore, was no surprise: du Berrier received a telegram from
Newsweek's home office stating that Mr. Robert Shallen would
arrive aboard the Marine phoenix to take over thi Shanghai
bureau.
It was at this time that du Berrier began amassing his files
on every actor on the Indochina scene to emerge from ano.
nymity. Most of his information he learned from the actors
themselves. He has estimated that with the same emount of
money, ':me
and effort applied in the field of medicine, he
could have become a surgeon.
. On January 7, 1947, du Berrier returned to his native
America after a sixteen-year absence. He had g200 when he
arrived in San Francisco. An army of young Americans was
being dumped on the employment martei, *d'n" could neither
get I job nor sell the articles that he wrote during
the next
284 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL
eix years. Also, his passport was still blocked until he could
pay for the food he ate in a Japanese prison cemp.
At last, early in 1954 du Berrier's passport was temporarily
unblocked on his promise that he would pay his "bill" when
he was able. Later the State Department threatened to with-
draw it again and in 1957 the bill was paid by Mr. Fred
Champion of Los Angeles, giving du Berrier mobility once
more.
War was raging in Indochina and du Berrier began making
plans to return there. Mingant, by then a colonel, was back in
Paris with a group that was planning to arm a Chinese force
and turn over a sector of the front to General Li Tsung-jen.
General Li was the warlord of Kwangtung province who for a
time had oeen president of Nationalist China. The French
would underwrite r-i, arm him, and back him as far as the
frontier of his old province, where his name was still magic.
If he could snowball his forces and reconquer the Chinese
mainla14, the French would wish him well. Du Berrier was the
intermediary between the army group in Paris and Li Tsung-
jen, who was in exile in New York.
Dien Bien Phu fell before du Berrier could reach Paris, but
his files on Indochina continued to swell. Premier Laniel fell
and Pierre Mendes-France concluded the long drawn out nego-
tiations in Geneva. Du Berrier was paid by the wealthy man in
Los Angeles for his letter-reports-reports which editort con-
stantly rejected but which time after time proved to be correct.
Ngo dinh Diem was named premier of South \,rlstnam and his
brother r-uyen became his agent in Europe. Meanwhile a
favorite of the powerful Madame Tran van Chuong became
ambassador to France and rival of Luyen in a deadly strug$e
for power and money.
In April 1955 a call came for du Berrier from Luyen's office.
"Will you be able to fly to lryashington tomght?" asked the
voice at the other end of the wue. Du Eerrier did not leave
that night, but he did leave the followrng night as "aide" to the
"deputy ambassador" who was oeing dispatched by Luyen on
a mission to undermine ambassador Lawton Collins. Two and
a half months later du Berrier accompanied the Vietnamese
mission to the big four conference in Geneva. As du Berrier's
personal files continued to swell, storage room in his friends'
homes began to diminish.
In January of 1956 du Berrier began to perceive hils mistaks
in helping thwart General Lawton Collins' recommendatio'ns
that America dump the Ngo dinhs. The rumor has been cir-
culated that du Berrier was dropped by Diem and consequently
 ABOUT TIIB AUTIIOR 285
lps out for revenge in his withdrawing of support for Diem.
Nothing could be firrther from the truth. It should be clear to
lgYme even vaguely familiar with the vanity of dic,tators and
tle metlods of public rclations hucksters tnit naA du Benier
been intcrested in high living he could have becone a rich man
feeling the insatiable Diem and his American press glowing
stories of *our man's" miracles in South Victnam.
Instead, because the market for honest reports was limiGd
to oqre or two small publications in Americq du Berrier and
lvIrs. Doris A. Parks, of Ips Angeles, launched their H. du B.
Report*a private intelligence letter for the American who
buys_ newspapers and newsmagazines and in them gets propa-
ganda in lieu of news.
One night say that this book began when Japanese ofrcers
confined du Berrier's French fricnds to their quarters in Dang
Dong and Lanson on ttre eve of World War II and tbrew
handgrenades in on them. It was spuned on when valiant
yorng de Riencourt was shot dowq in December 1945 by a
Victninh sniper as de Riencourt was bathing in a river. 'ite
day an O$S major tlrew aside a report from du Benier on
General Philip E. Gallagher's transporting of Ho chi Minh's
protegp to Shanghai-where this protege incited a revolt
amolg French troops from Indochina-this book was given
anothcr push. "The Frcnch are bitching again , was the mijot's
only comment. In his pocket was a gold cigarette c,ase en-
graved 'To my good friend" Major B.. ....., from Ho chi
IVfinh-"
fnt chapter of this book was actually draft€d the day
-The foreign
aftef f service employee in the American embassy iir
Paris boasted that he would'gef,' du Berrier's passport beciuse
of a du Berrier article published rn the Ecinomic Council
I*tter of. December L, 1957 (published by the National Eco-
nomic Council of New Yqk).
When du Berriet's passport renewal was blocked in the
spring of 1959 and he learned of the smear file compiled
against him, the necessity of making this book both complcb
and unassailable became a holy mission.
 INDEX
Addiss. Steve, 266 Bloodworth, Dennis, 231
Adonauer. Konrad, 171. Bodar4 Lucien,25, 39, 185
Adler. BuddY, 171 Bohlea. Charles, xiii
Adloft. Virsinia T., 9 Bonapirte, Napoleon, xii
Adoula- CVrillo. 201 BonneL Henri, ix, 117
Albert Pfuim ngoc Thao, sae Pham Borcia. Ca€sar. 124
nsoc Thao. Albert Bor-gja', brcrezia,227
AldEn- Robort 155. 156, 166 Borguiba, Habib, 36
Allen inowsman\, 261, 262' 27 3 Borodin.6
Alsop. Joseph. 3i:77 , 82, 147 , 160' Brandeii University, 5, 86, 120
16r: t69,-177 , 185,223,228, 23r Brandt. Willi 171
238.249.252.254 Bridges, Styles, 168
American Civil'Liberties Union' 9 Briess. Walter. 168
American Commiteo on Africa, 9 Bro*ri. Irving, ll2, 134, 227, 233
American Fodoration of Labor- 234, 237, 219
Congorc of Industrial Organiza- Browno. Malcotm W.. 181
tionr- (AFI-CIO), 12, 36, r34' Buck Pearl 9
?21,22j.,231,23t,23e Buckley. Francis J., 243
Americaos for Democratic Action, Buckley, William F., 134, 219
1t4 Buntinq. Fred. 137
Amorican Friends of Vietnam (AF BurdicE. Eueeno, 83, 84, 185
of V),2, 11, 135-139, 168, 170,
194.204,2fi6,2:2s " "r'**ftt-itt"t, ?: l;,|,' il? itl:
American Labor Conference oD 142., 110, 171,203, 205-207
147 ,
Intornational Affair, 111 226.U5.256
Anspachor (U.S. official), 216 Buu Hoi.87. 165-167. ?n3,U4
Ared. Richar4 170, l7l,2o3 Buu Loc, f,' 14, 32, 234, 237, 270
Arnstrotr& O. K-. 131 By Ho Tbi Hao, see Tee-BeY
Associstan Prsss (AP), 181, 198' Byrd, Richard 8., l7O, 171
216,2n,233,239,2,63
Atlantic lDstitute, 245 Ca-13.41.271
-Lao (French officer),
Campidieu 69
Bacut, 69, 85, 89, 109^ 111, 151- Can Nhan Vi. sss flrrmanisf
$,n2 Workorr RovolutionarY PartY
Bai Vie'n, .rea Lo van Vien Cao Dai 29. 45, 52, 53, 55, 5964,
BafdwnL Roger, 9 67. 72:1 4. 77, 84-86, 89, 95, 103,
Ballontino, Joseph, 97, 773,174 106, 115, l2A, l5l,
156, 208,
Bano, Davi4 30 215, 254, 259, 262, 269, 27 1
Bank of Indochina. 19 Cao-Tien_Hoa_f, inh, 1 50
Bao DaL 3, 4, 13-23,2G32, 36, 38- Carsanti (French businessman)'
40,4t,44,47, 48, 51-53, 60, 63, 148.149
87, 88, 9,95,97,98, 102-104, Cartier, Raymon4 U, 49, 50, 64,
106, 108, llo, 125-127, 133, ls4, 82,83,85, 101.102,126
173, 188, 24:3, 249, 263, 267 -27 0 Cetrtral Intolligpnco Agency (CIA),
Bao Dao.61 43, 44,72, 87, 155, 167, 210,
Bao Long; 14,28 220, 215, 236, 242, U.5, 248,
Barkor, Dorothy, 93 252,254,255
Barnum, P. T., 171 Chaffar4 Georgo, 52, 145, l8l
Barrowr, Lelan4 141. 193, 194, 182,234,237, ?r'}0,255
L97,199,?nl Chamber of Co'mmerce, 168, 189
Batty, Major, 8 197
Bay Mon, 150, 153 Chane Fa-kwei,7
du Borrior. IJIle.Jtr.e,227 Cherne, Leo, 113, 136, 137, 142
Berrigen, Darrel 133, 172,229 170, 111, 174,203-2M
Bess, Demares, 133 Chiane Kai-sheh 17, 18, ll3, 134
Bidsutt, GeorgBs, ix, x, 3-5, 31 159
Bigart, Homer, 185 Chieu (Vietnamese officer), 167
Singhan, Barry. 138 Chou En-lai, 3, 7, 18
Binh, Monsipor, 183, 184 Civil Riehts Commission, 142
Binh Xuyon, 28, 29, 45, 49, 52, Clarlr Bd;garB,.,?28
55-60, g,67, 72, 73, 80, 82, 91, Clayman, Clarq 9
95, 101, 108, 111, tr2,124, rzs, CoFRAMET, 148, 149
150, 151, 153, 156, 187, 215. Cole, Peg:gy, 180
254.269,271 Colo (polico ofrcer), 18C
286
 INDEX 287
Colgrovg Albert M., 139, 180, Dooley, Thomas. 171
l8l.199 Dorn, William 'Jennings Bryan"
Collins, J. Lawton, 47,80,82, gl,
92,99, 100,105, 107, ltz, r2l
Columbia Universiw. 174
Cofqqrlia Broadcii rng System
_ (cBs), 4, 17, 36,73,-125; n3
Com-mittee for Souttr Vietnam Ac-
tion, 163
Cornmittee of One Million, 116,
r60
Committee of One Thousand, 137
Cong De, 63
Cong Dan Vu. 188
Cong-Hoa, 177
Considine, Bob, 154
Coombs, Walter P.. 172
Coty, Ren6. 3l
Cou4cil on Foreign Relations, 113,
169
Qqqsqgau (French officid), 19, 20 EbeI Club. 144
covENTER,149, r50 Eden, Anthony, 2.4
Crofut, Bill. 266 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 4, 5, 14.
Cua, Father, 105 3r,-72, t22, 137, t42, 199,209,
Curie, Eve, see Mme. Henn La- 2to
bouisse Eisenhower. Milton. 99
Ely,_ General tx,3l', 47,48, 85, 88,
Dai Chung, 43 9l
Dai viet pafty, 43, 45,86,120, Emme! Christopher, ll4, 138, 143
123, 132, 137, 205, 215, 258:262,
264, 268,273 FaIl, Bernard. 230
Pallin, David 1., 12,226 Far Eastern Council m Commerce
Dan chu Dang, 161 and Industry, 169
Dang Sy, 240 farley, James, 37
Davies, Sandra, 235 Faure, Edgar, 52,1O9,110. 120
Davis, Saville R., 178, 179 Fedpry! Bureau of Investigation
Deane, Martha, 171 (FBr),227
Debezies, Pierre, 55 r.elt Admiral, 252
Decoux, Adnrira[, xut, 2'1, 162 Fifiel4 Doq 219
de Gaulle, Charles, 238 Fishel, Wesley, 2, 47, 94, 97-100,
de Jaeger, Raymond, 140, 142, 103, 107, tt4, 143, 226, 229
160. 208 FLN (Algerian national liberation
De La Rue. 149 front),267
Delson, Robert, 9 For a Democratic Far Eastern
Democratic Bloc, 44, 167 Policy,9
Dennis, Eugene, 8, 78 Ford Foundatio,n, 113, 1210
Department of Defense, U.S., 235 Foreip fiid {rlminis6a1is1, ]!
Department of State, U.S., ix, 5, Franco, Francisco, 8, 166
ro, tt, u, 36,72,76,78,86,92, Free Democrat party, 2ll
98, 105, 7O7, t2O,130, 138, 146, Freedom Foundation of America,
747, r55, 159, 163-165, 1'.t2, t8t, 201
185, 190, 193, 20r, 219, 232, Fribourg University, 240
236,260,26r, ?56 Friendly, Alfred, 208-210
de Souzy, General,246 Frost, Robert, 174
Devers, General, 246 Fulbrigbt, J. William, 37, 125, L3o,
Devinat, Paul, 32, 93, 97 159
Dillon, C. Douglas. ix
Direction de la Surveill:rnce du Gallagher, Philip E., 8, 10, 16, 57
Terriotoire (DST), 227 Gallup, George, 88
Dixon, Don, 107, 108 Garnier, Francis, xii
Do Cao Tn.256 General Association of Buddhists,
Dodd, Thomas, 174 )41
Don, General, 106 Goneral Electric. 2O9
Dong ba Duong, 56, 57 General Motors, 209
Dooley Foundation, 171 General Petroleum, 172
288 INDEX
Genghis Khan, 65 Howe, Quincy, 138
Genouilly, Rigault de, xii Hugo, Victor, 62
Gostspo,99 Huks. 82
Gibsoo. Willia.m, 30, 93, 98, 201, Hull, Cordell, xiii
220 flrrmanis[ Worken Revolutionary
Goebbels, Josepb, 110 parU, 35-17, 123, 158, 177 , 224,
Goldborg, Arthur,236 272
Grand Council for Economic In- Humphrey, HubeG 9+96, t07,
ter€8t! of Indochina, 38 108, 111. 173
Clreorro, Grahrm, 43, ll2, l4l Hunt, William, 148, 149
Gregory. Anno. 14O 11uynh tim Hoan, 152
Grogory, Geno, 43, t40, 741,246 Huynh phu So, 57, 68, 69
Guerin Daniol, 5, 142 Huynh sanh Thong, 138, 142,258,
Gullim. Edmund,201 260
Gunakasem, Nai Chote, 149 Huynh van Laltg,27l
Huynh van Nhiem, 74
HaL Colonel, 167 Hydrotechnic Corporation, 198,
!lnririt166, Fowler, 233 251
f[ammor. Ellen" 87, 165-167,244
Hanna, Jobn, 1,l2 Illuminati. 62
Hanoi University, 261 Institute of Nuclear Research,
Harrimao" Mrg. Averell, 138 Vietnam. 251
Harvard University, 76 Instituteof Pacific Relations, 9,
Ha van Tran 216 142
Ha van Vuolle; 77 International Confederation of
Heal( Harry T., 169 Free Trade Unims.27
International Cooperation Admin-
istration (IcA), 8, 137, l4l,
180, 192, 193, 198, 199, 201
International Nows Service, 10?
Intemational Pipe and Ceramics
Company, 198,251
International Red Cross. 159
International Rescue Committeo
(rRc), 47, llLll4, 116, lr7,
il9, 135, 136, 143, 168, 170,
171, 180, ?A4,2M,258
Intersect Committee for the De-
fenso of Buddhism. Z1
Isaacs, Harold R., 7, 9, 57, 66,266
Jacquet, Marc, 32
Jacquot, General,101
Jarai tribo. 186
Jesus Christ. 62
Joan of Arcl, l'76,251
John Birch Society, 230
Johns Hopkins University, 99
Johnson, Joseph E,, 169
Johnson, Lyndon 8., 230-233, 265
Johnston, Clement, 189, 190, 197'
198
Judd, Walter H., 91, 102
Junod, Marcel, 159
Ho han Sod, 104, 105
Ho huu Tirctrg, 88, 120 Kalischer, Peter, 36, 3'1,73, l!3,
Ho uhut TraD. ?28 164
Hoplins, IJariy,37 Kao van Tri. 106
Hornaday, Mary, 210 Karnow, Stanley, 134, 229, 232
Horton, PW 113,229 Kastor, Hilton, Chesley, Crawford
Hotham, Davi4 156-158, 186, 187, & Atherton, l3l,179
195, 199, 2,00 Keamey, Vincent S.,243
Ho thong Minh,74 Kennedy, Edward M.,247
Honrso Committee on Un-Ameri- Kennedy family, 80
can Activities, l7O, 203 Kennedy, Jacquelino, 233
 INDEX 289

Kennedv. John F., 35,72, ll3, Lnmumba. Patrics, 2Ol, 2Tl

131. 165. 201, 218,220, ??1, Lurch, Fred 9
11s. zzoi 232: 236: 238,239,
245.250.251 MacArthur, Douelas, 10' 13
Kennidv. notert F., 236, 237, 242 Machiavelli 34. 165
Khai Einh" 13.270
rcAaer. nirndolPh, 92, 105' 155'
i'a$*..lilf
u8.249.26s
Kieu bons'Cung, 188 i1f'jz?!.1?'?]:&t,
Kikuw tribe, 114, 116 ili. t9s, i}t, ?A!9, 256, 265'
Knapp. Professor, 8 266'269
Kn"rsilind" Wiiliam, 94, 96, 97'
107. 108 Ml,'"H3'H;"itf, ' lh"i"rr, rez,
Komatsu. 27, 162 220.261
Kraft. JosePh' 267 rnr2#rirff t*r"u c', 1, r8, re, 21
Martin. Harold. 185. 186
Krar.'Louis, 179, 198
Mffiol Juniir SeninarY' ?'4
Labin, Suzanne, 11 4, 238 Mary. tho Virgin, 80
Laboriisse. Henri, 201 Mau Mau. 114
Labouisse, Mmo. Henri' 201 McCarthv. JosePh, 100
r"aJruslii-wolt, 82, 98, 1!4,226 Mc€lov. J. J., 169
Lai huu Sang, 60 Mc€lov. Mrs. J. J., 169
Lai huu Tai, 58 Mccaff: General, 215
Lam lo Trinh, 77 McKay'(U.S. ofrciat)' 43
ra"iet. ioj"ph, ix, x, 1, 2' 4, 5, Medico. 171
30-32
ransdale. Edward. !O, 32, 46, 61,
- s2. 8li 88, 101; 105, 109' 17s'
M:*lht3ffik!\Ii3jo,,*
Msndo. Tibar, 50
254 i"tinaii-Fran&. Pierre, x,2, 4, 5,
Larson. Arthur, 133, 218
l-uilJg,iv, reorr, 31; 40' 83' 175'
216,218,2r9
Laskv. Victor, 230
"{,#i;Wvif#;gn
Latoiri. General,6l,64 -
tJisuC ot Civil Servants, 246
.
Milei Statrley,266
GdErer, William, 83, 84' 185 Minckler. R. L, 112
I-o Duan. 163 Minh. Genoral, 106
I-eo Shiu-fong, 159 Mohrimmed II. 36
Molotov, 3
*-F.la3i9*, es, 132, r33 M;il;i;- Communications and
I-erner, Max' 138 Electronics. l4l
fvfoviniint fo,r IndePendence and
*,Y*il:ffi;i
Le van Do,ng, 7?
, !,2s,31
rur3#ff#tnro, National Revolu-
H #l ffT*l', on, rou, qr-s., uoflll?r"'
2s.2 Protpction of Por
ular SecuritY, 88
G Vii" (f'rrmerlY Bai Y-le4)'
--28:2e. Muir. Malcolm, 138
"an si, ss-a\ 64,66,61,-70,
iil at'. e,i-so. 8i9. 89, 97, lql' Mundt. Karl, 94, 96
Muoi Tri
io3. tbo. 100, 111, rrs, \?!' 56. 57
iii. iso. 1s3; 163; zss, 260, Mussblini, Benito, 183
268.211
I-evitas, Sol,134,227 Nam Bo, 56, 51, 60,66, 67' 104'
Ir Xuan. 8 2t4
iieumattl Marvin, 116' 139' 155' Nffi'PH^ffi"k3h3',
rilfloi3,rti""*-an), 14e ",
Lioprrian. Walter, 198
Litt6€. Judse. 29 N;dAat iiuer'ation'Frodt' vieb
ioacd. t{e-nrv Cabot, 171' 208' ttt
2trs: 246. t49.2s2, 2s4,25e -
-Revolutiodary
Lucas. Jim'G., i41, 180' 199 ""T#"it*#h'"'o]
i.i;daal
t€s. 104
Commit-
Luce, Henry, 180
Lu Han, 17, 18 N;tidnal RevolutionarY lragPs'
211
290 INDEX
National RevolutionarY
ment. 37. 73
Navarrir, Henri, ix, 2,27, 144, 162'
268
Nehru. Jawaharlal, 3, 163
Nerbonne, Joseph, 208
New York Herald Tribune News
Servicc.2l9
-r8zdin[
Nso Can 28. 46, 147, 148'
190. 239-Ul, 243, 256, 25',1,
270
Ngo dinh Diem, passim
y[6 dinh femily, passim
Ngo rfinh IKh420,n0
NEo dinh Xhoi 25
Neo dinh Lr Thuv. 257 Nguyen van Xuan, 51
\!s rrinh Ltryen, 28, 46, 92-94, Nhi Lang, 105
Nivolon, Francois,228
121, 122, 148-1s0, r73, 224,243,
TIO Nixon, Richard, 96
Nso &nh Nhu passim Nioree. Munsai. 114
trt[e Nhu,-Mme., 39-41, 43, Nbltinri Freilerick, 234, 241, 242,
-6, dinh
5t,74,77', l2r-123, 132, 149, aA<
150. 152, 153, 155, 176, 717, Norodm, King, xii
183: 200, 215,224, 227, 23s, North Atlantic TteatY Organir4-
24!, U6, 248, 254, 257, 263, tion (NATO), |W, 193, 195,
265. U0.271 ?fr1
Neo dinh Thuc, 28, 46,127,147, Nouy, Mme. I-ecomte de, 174
183, 184, 224, 235, 239, 240, Nung tribe,254
?4%244,n0,27r
Ngo kai Minh, 30 Observer Foreign News Servico,
Ngo trona Hiett' 218 2tl
Neo van Chieu. 62 O'Connor. Patrick" 128, 129, 2O8
NEuven bao Toan. 104. 105 O'Daniel. John W. "Iron Mike,"
NEui'en Binh, 5G61, 65-70, 189, 2, tL, 46,83-85, 88, 89,91, ltz,
190 105. 135, 137, 143-146, ?r7, r54
Nguyen sfoanh Thi, 2l+218,221, Office of Strategic Services (OSS)'
257 "t-9.43. 44.66, 167
Nguyen De, 32 Officd of War Information 134
Ngrryen rlinh Quat, 228 am, Harold, 2, 116, 124, I126,
Oram.
Nguyon dinh T\uan, 71, 217 130. 131, 136, 139, 140,144, I142,
Nguyaa dynasty, xii r47, 1721?2,
147, 760, 168, 179, 230
229, ?3O
Nguyen huu Chau, 40, 41,77 Orient University. USS& 6
Nguyen huu Chau, Mme., 77 Osborne, lohq 28, 89, 124, 182"
Osborne. Johr,
Nguyon huu Tho,234 194,200
194.200
Ncuven kahc Oanh. 132 Oswald. Lee Harvey, 136
NEui'sn l(\anh, 262-264, 27 2, 27 3 Overseds Press Club, 125, L3l,
Ncuven Lonc..262 136,230
NEuien manl Hq 162,220,261 Oxensteirn, Axel,92
Nguye,n ngoc Bich, 76
Nguyen ngoc C^c,74 P . . ., Clochette, 174
Ncuven nqoc Khoi. 253 Parks, Doris,20+206
NEui'en n=soc Tho, 74, 15, 152, Parsons, Jeff, 86
154. 228, U4, 247, 260, 272 Parsons. Louella. l?1
Nguyen phuoc Dong; 84 Patrioti6 and Bdleving Catholics,
Nguyen tan Nua, 137 234
Nguyan than Phoung,73, 89, 106, Patriotic and Democratic Chineso
l5l, r52 Association o{ Vietnam, 159
Ncuven th€ Truven. 31 Peace Corps, 72
Nguven ton Hoin,'43, 45, 86, 87, Periot, Gerard, 183
120, 134, 137, 142, 16r, 204-207 , Pham. Andr6. 9
230'. 238. 258-262, 264, 268, 2't 2 Pham' cons Tac, 29, 53, 61-63, 85,
Nguydn tam Hoan, Mme., 204, 88, 271
205,207,208 Pharir duy Khiem, 40, 93, l2l, r49
Nguyen Tran,2ll Pham huy Co, 167
Nguyen van Cu, 235-237 Pham huy Dan,45
 INDEX 29t
Pham huy QuaL 273 Rorimer, James J.. 169
Pham khac Suu. 218 Rorimer. Mrs. Janes J.. 169
Plam ngoc, Gastnn, 76, l6t,271 $.osenberg; Ethel, 78
Pham ngoc Thach. 163' Rosetrbers. Julius. 78
Phlgn ngoc Thao,'Albert, 37, 76, Rostow, W. W..237
77, 161, 188, 195. 223. 228.'231. Rousseag Jean Jacques. 6. 207
-
,,2t2, 254, 259, 2&, 265, 27 t, 272 Ruark Robert 114
Ph"- ngoc Thuan 271 Ruqk, Dea4 169.265
Phem phu Quoc. 235. 237 Rusk, Mn. Dean.' 169
Pham Thieu. 76.265 Russel" Maud 9
Pham thi Nhiem. 265
Pham van Bach.'161 Sag!s^, |!ilto-n, 86, 119, 120,1!7,
Pham van Doni.2. 3.272 t38,142. t43
Pham xuan ThiLL 53.77 qt..Quenti{ (french official), xiii
P[aq .finh Binlr.2Azi Sakyamuni.62
Phen huy Dan, see Phau quang Santa Claus,- 100
Dan san?an (lusinessman).
5s,tran (businessman). 148.
14t 149
Phan khac Suu, 214 Schlesinger.
Schlesinger, Arthur Ji.. 232-
237
P!u.quang Ddn, 4244, 167,21t, Sclggnbrun" David. 17,125, 126,
12
2r4,216,2r8.219 267
Phan qu^rg Day, se Phan quang Schorr, Daniel" 4
Lran Scott (ngqsman ), 261, 262, 27 3
Phuc Quoc HoL 151 Scrip^ps-Howard iewslapefu, 139,
Pipon, 19, 20.23. 26.27.38 199
Pinay (French official). 196 Senato Foreip Relations Commit-
Pineau. Christiao- 31. 196 __tr9, q t3,94,9s, 100,26s, 269
Polyzoides (newsman). 173 QFI-Q (Frqnch socialist -iarry)', 174
Passman, Otto, 82. 193' Sheldon, Georse. 8. 9.
Powelt Adam Cldyton, 137, 138 Shelton, RoberL 266
Princeton University Press.'165 Sheppherd, Howard C.. 169
Shepher4 Mn. Howard C.. 169
Quong Huang, 247 Sherberl Paul J.. 169
Quoc Dan Duns. 88 Sherbert, Mrs. Pdul J.. 169
Quoc Gia Lien Eiiep, 86 Siam-Rath News Aeencv. -' 8
Sieltz, Monsignor, 127
Radford, Arthur W.. ix. 4 Shsh, J. J., 9
Raspu'in. 147 Sinkmar. Nathan.9
Raynaut, Nex,227 Smith. Hedrick i73
Reeco, Dixie. 105 Smith, Margaret Chase. 2{7
Rei4 Oeden R.. 169 Smith. PauL 125
Rei4 Mrs. Odeen R.. 169 Smilh, W4!er Bedell, x, l, 14, ls
Reid Whitelaw, 138 Society of Foreign Missions" i27
Renou, Jean" 129 Songgram" Pibul, 84. 172
Re-publican Youth, 177, 179, U6, Sorge, Richard. 8
255 South Vietnam Resistance Com-
Reggqrch Institute of America, mittee, 161
113, 142, 204. 207. 2r0 Staley, Professot, 232, 2!1, 237
Reston, James, 236 St"rin, Jo6eph, x, xiii.246. ?57
Retail Clerks Union of America. Stanford University, I 14
231 Stanford University Press. 165
Reuther. Walter. 111 Starnes, Richar4 139, U7
Richardion, J otin. 242. 245 Stass€.n, Harold,, 122
Ridgeway, Matthew. x Stevetrson, Adlai. 201
Robertson, Walter D.. 80. 13? Stump, Felix, 201
Robin Hoo4 56, 59 Sudchit, Dr., 149
Rockefeller, David. 169 Su$lago (union leader), 231,233,
Rockefeller, Mrs. David. 169 234
Rockefeller Foundation. 169 Sukarno, Achmed, 37
Rockefeller, John D. IIi, 169,256 Supremo Court, 130
Rogat, Rene, 151 Swope, Herbert Bayar4 138
Rogers,Wanen,264, 273
Rqoggvgl!, Franklin D., x, xiii, 5, Tam Chau,261
246.267 Tan Uyen,224
Roosevelt, Mrs. Kermit, 113 Taylor, Maxwel\ 212- 233
Roosevelt, Theodore, 118 Tee-Bey, 37
292 INDEX
Thai-Soo. 224,225 United Stater Information Ser-
Than huu T]n6,77 vice (USIS), ,ree United Stat€s
Thich tinh Khiet 239, ?40 Information Agency
Thomas. Norman, 9, 138 United States Operations Mission,
99.217
T'*,bHfAti' ?ffi', 66, 6e, ?0, University of Dalat, 239
Utley, Freda, t34, 135, 205
165.184
Ton that Can.32
Ton that Dinb"252
Ton that Thrach. 271 Vangly, Anthony, 9
Tran buu Kiem. 161 Varea. Bela. l14
Tian chanh 1ahnh, ?7, 126,135, Vanei (French official), 32
167 , L9l, 182, 189, 27 | Velio. Frank. 94. 95
Tran" Dr.. l(M \,ristr;inh lrague, 16l, 196, 27 |
Vietminh Students Association, 74,
TlffotiT'ffi;5,,,,,
ftss kim Tuyen, -176
75
Vietnam-American FriendshiP As.
Tran le Quang, 75, 76, 169,172, sociation, 8, 9, 11, 136
195 Vietnam Development ComPanY,
Tran quoc Buu. 134 r41
Tran ihien Khtem, 215-218, 262' Vietnamese Petroleum ComPanY'
265 L94
Tran trunc Dung, 41, 74,258,271 Yinh Long,224
Tran trung DunE, Mme., 237' 258 Vinh Tuy, .ree Bao Dai
Tran van Bach. 75 Voico of America. 2ul4
Tran van Chuoarg, 29,38,39,41, Vo Hai. 92
6. 92, 97, 98-, 101, 103, 115, Vo Lang, 92-101, 103' 107, 10E'
224.n0 l2l. 122. 173. U8
Tran van Chuong Mme', 29' 30' Vo niuyed Gidp, 17, 18, 66, r0,
37. &, 41,'.14,76, 93, 121, 149, 164. 190,2ll,2r2
172.270 \,/g minh Trac, 143
Tran van Do, 41, 46,14,81,252, Vuong van Dong 214'218
zfi. n0 Vu van Mau. 74
l4l,
'tra[ van family, 29, 30, 37, 4I, Vu van Thai: 75, 76,93,14o,
43.6 169, 195
Tra:rvan Huu, 220. 261,268
Tran van Khiom, 41, 176
Tran van Phuoc. 41
Tran van Sioai. 38, 52,69,73,88,
89. 109,111, 150
Tran van Pung" 143
Trinh minh fhe. 72, 85, 86, 89'
103. lM, 106, 115
Tri Ouane. 261
Trong cong Cuu,2l1
Truman, Harry S., 72
Tu Duc. xii
fwining Nathan' x Williams. Clayton,220
Women'si Solidarity Movemcnt'
l'16,246
United Nations (UN), x' 4' l0' Workers Defense League, 9
23.2,r.,76, 116, ll7, 796,20r, World Affairs Council, 172
225.U9,258,270 wrisht. Hamilton Sr., 158, 159
rjnion Vietnamienne, 162 1ryr't?, Eric ?A-Us
United Natiotal Front, 45, 86, 88'
109.269
United Press (UP or UPI), 151' Yale University, 142, 258, 260
1ffi, 170,2n Yoh, Bernie, 139,143
United States Development Loan YosL Charles. 201
Fund.194.195 Youic Comm:utrist kague, 115
United Stat€s Information AgencY YounE, Kenneth (union official),
(usn). 72. 18, 83, 87, 105' l'12
i34. 135. r4l, r72, 185, 193, Young, Kenaeth T, Jr.,86, 87' 98'
194, 216, 224, 235, 254,255, 100. 169. 172
258,261 founi, Mri. Kenneth T. Jr., 169