The Federalist No.

51
The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the
Different Departments
Independent Journal Wednesday, February 6, 1788
Publius [James Madison]
To the People of the State of New York

[1] To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in 1. What is the “necessary
practice the necessary partition of power among the several partitions”?
departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can The separation of powers.
be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be
inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior 2. Why is necessary to partition
structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by government?
their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their To establish checks and balances
proper places. which prevent abuse of power.

[2] In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct 3. What does Madison mean when
exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain he says each department should
extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of have a will of their own?
liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; Decision making process of its own.
and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each
should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the
members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it
would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, 4. What are the three departments
legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same Madison is referring to?
fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no The legislative, executive, and
communication whatever with one another...Some deviations, judiciary.
therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of
the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist
rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being
essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to
select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications;
secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are
held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on
the authority conferring them.

[3] It is equally evident, that the members of each department should be 5. Explain the suggested relationship
as little dependent as possible on those of the others… Were the between the departments:
executive magistrate, or the judges, not independent of the legislature in They should be independent of one
this particular, their independence in every other would be merely another.
nominal.
[4] But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several 6. What does the bolded phrase
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who mean.
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision It implies a competitive relationship
for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to among the three branches.
the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.
... It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government
itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men
7. What is Madison’s argument
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the
about human nature?
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary Madisons argument is that humans
control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the look out for themselves, or the
necessity of auxiliary precautions. branch they belong to, first.

[5] This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of 8. Paraphrase the bolded section:
better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human The goal is to establish a system of
affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the checks and balances.
subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide
and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a
check on the other -- that the private interest of every individual may be
a sentinel over the public rights...

[6] But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of 9. Which branch of government does
self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority the Federalists support as the one
necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to that will dominate?
divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by The legislative branch.
different modes of election and different principles of action, as little
connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and
their common dependence on the society will admit. It may even be 10. Opinion: Does this branch
necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further dominate national (federal) govt.
precautions... today?
I don’t believe so, as it has since been
separated into The House of
Representatives and the Senate
creating more checks and balances.

11. How was the legislative body

divided into different branches?
It was turned into congress which
was divided into the senate and
 house of representatives.

[9] First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is 12. Why is “separation of powers”
submitted to the administration of a single government; and the the Federalist answer to Anti-
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into Federalist charges of a too large,
distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of abusive government?
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between Since it prevents the consolidation of
two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each power, something similar to a tyrant
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double or monarchial form of government
security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments which removes the rights of the
will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by people, something that the anti
itself. federalists fear in a strong
government.

[10] Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the 13. How will a republic protect
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the minority rights?
society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests A republic will protect minority rights
necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by by it being extensive, hopefully
a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are causing mass number of interests,
but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will preventing an oppressive majority to
in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society form since people will form under a
itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate multitude of beliefs and economic
descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority statuses.
of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable...The second method
will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all
authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the
society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of
citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little
danger from interested combinations of the majority... Justice is the end
of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will
be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a
society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite
and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a
state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the
violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger
individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to
submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as
themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or
parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government
which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful...
It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary
 opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society,
provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be
of self- government. And happily for the republican cause, the
practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious
modification and mixture of the federal principle.

PUBLIUS