Subject: Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 38. Declaration Against Interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable
to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received
in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons
Case Title: DANILO L. PAREL, petitioner, vs. SIMEON B. PRUDENCIO, respondent
G.r. No./ Date: G.R. No. 146556. April 19, 2006
Facts:
1. On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of
a two-storey residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation near
Department of Public Service (DPS) compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed
solely from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax Declaration No. 47048; he
commenced the construction of said house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when
the second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed petitioner's parents,
Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and occupy the second floor while
the construction of the ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction and to
safeguard the materials; when the construction of the second floor was finished in 1975,
respondent allowed petitioner's parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat;
it was done out of sheer magnanimity as petitioner's parents have no house of their own and
since respondent's wife is the older sister of Florentino, petitioner's father; in November 1985,
respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the former was due
for retirement and he needed the place to which petitioner's parents heeded when they
migrated to U.S. in 1986; however, without respondent's knowledge, petitioner and his family
unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of respondent's house; petitioner's
refusal to vacate the house despite repeated demands prompted respondent to file the instant
action for recovery of possession. Respondent also asked petitioner for a monthly rental of
P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises
and surrender possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
cost of suit.
2. Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim alleging that: his parents are the co-owners of the
said residential house, i.e., the upper story belongs to respondent while the ground floor
pertains to petitioner's parents; he is occupying the ground floor upon the instruction of his
father, Florentino, with respondent's full knowledge; his parents spent their own resources in
improving and constructing the said two-storey house as co-owners thereof; the late Florentino
was an awardee of the land on which the house stands and as a co-owner of the house, he
occupied the ground floor thereof; the demand to vacate was respondent's attempt to deprive
petitioner's parents of their rights as co-owner of the said house; that respondent had filed
ejectment case as well as criminal cases against them involving the subject house which were all
dismissed. Petitioner asked for the dismissal of the complaint and prayed for damages and
attorney's fees
RTC: declares that the house erected at No. 61 DPS Compound, Baguio City is owned in common
by the late Florentino Parel and herein plaintiff Simeon Prudencio and as such the plaintiff
cannot evict the defendant as heirs of the deceased Florentino Parel from said property, nor to
recover said premises from herein defendant.
Likewise, the plaintiff is ordered to:
(a) pay the defendant in the total sum of P20,000.00 for moral and actual damages;
(b) pay the defendant P20,000.00 in Attorney's fees and P3,300.00 in appearance fees;
(c) pay the costs of this suit
CA: Reversed the trial court and declared respondent as the sole owner of the subject house and
ordered petitioner to surrender possession of the ground floor thereof to respondent
immediately. It also ordered petitioner to pay respondent a monthly rental of P2,000.00 for use
or occupancy thereof from April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same and the sum of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and cost of suit.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not the respondent was able to establish the sole ownership to the two-
story building
Ruling: YES
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 38. Declaration Against Interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-
interest and against third persons
We agree with the CA that respondent had shown sufficient evidence to support his complaint
for recovery of possession of the ground floor of the subject house as the exclusive owner
thereof. Respondent presented the affidavit dated September 24, 1973 executed by Florentino
and sworn to before the Assistant City Assessor of Baguio City, G.F. Lagasca, which reads:
I, FLORENTINO PAREL, 42 years of age, employee, and residing at Forbes Park,
Reservation No. 1, after having been sworn to according to law depose and say:
That he is the occupant of a residential building located at Forbes Park, Reservation No.
1, Baguio City which is the subject of an advicement addressed to him emanating from the
Office of the City Assessor, Baguio City, for assessment and declaration for taxation purposes;
That I am not the owner of the building in question;
That the building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B. Prudencio who is presently
residing at 55 Hyacinth, Roxas District, Quezon City.
Further, affiant say not. (Underscoring supplied)
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence notwithstanding
they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration asserts facts which are against his
own pecuniary or moral interest.
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner's father and had adequate knowledge
with respect to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically
declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building, he is not the owner of the
same as it is owned by respondent who is residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he
would not have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to
himself as well as to his children's interests as his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. Notably, during Florentino's
lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death, there is
no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a criminal complaint for trespass to
dwelling had been filed by respondent against him (Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding
the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that
petitioner entered the house against the latter's will and held that the remedy of respondent
was to file an action for ejectment; and even when a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed
against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground
that respondent's action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court.
Moreover, the building plan of the residential house dated January 16, 1973 was in the name of
respondent and his wife. It was established during petitioner's cross-examination that the
existing structure of the two-storey house was in accordance with said building plan.
Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house
declared under his name since 1974. In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted
that there was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the
house in their name.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not tax receipts and declarations are incontrovertible evidence
RULING: NO
Notably, respondent has been religiously paying the real estate property taxes on the house
declared under his name since 1974.In fact, petitioner during his cross-examination admitted
that there was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared any portion of the
house in their name.
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The house which petitioner claims to be co-owned by his late father had been
consistently declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent, and this fact, taken with
the other circumstances above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is
the sole owner of the house subject matter of the litigation.
BURDEN OF PROOF (apil nko)
Respondent having established his claim of exclusive ownership of the subject property,
it was incumbent upon petitioner to contravene respondent's claim. The burden of evidence
shifted to petitioner to prove that his father was a co-owner of the subject house.
We held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
. . . Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be
returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing,
that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
ISSUE 3: Whether or Not petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that his
father was a co-owner of the subject two-storey residential house
RULING: NO
In this case, the records show that although petitioner's counsel asked that he be allowed to
offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the same. Thus, the CA did
not consider the documentary evidence presented by petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court provides:
Section 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled
rule that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does
not mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule
that the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not
mean that it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.
Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally offered, the same
were marked during the presentation of the testimonial evidence, thus it can properly be taken
cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we allowed evidence on minority by admitting
the certified true copy of the birth certificate attached to a motion for bail even if it was not
formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that the birth certificate was properly filed
in support of a motion for bail to prove petitioner's minority which was never challenged by the
prosecution and it already formed part of the records of the case. The rule referred to in
the Bravo case was Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Evidence on motion. — When a motion is based on facts not appearing of
record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective
parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions
and not Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable to the present
case.
Even assuming arguendo that the documentary evidence of petitioner should be considered in
his favor, the evidence showing that respondent had filed civil and criminal cases against
petitioner which were dismissed as well as the alleged Special Power of Attorney of petitioner's
parents whereby they authorized petitioner to stay in the ground floor of the house, did not
establish co-ownership of Florentino and respondent of the subject house.
The testimonies of petitioner and his witnesses failed to show that the subject house is co-
owned by petitioner's father and respondent.
Candelario Regua merely testified that he was hired by petitioner's father, Florentino, to
construct the residential building in 1972; that he listed the materials to be used for the
construction which was purchased by Florentino; that he and his men received their salaries
every Saturday and Wednesday from Florentino or his wife, respectively; that he had not met
nor seen respondent during the whole time the construction was on-going. 27 On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he cannot tell where the money to buy the materials
used in the construction came from.
Corazon Garcia merely testified that Florentino started building the house when he was
allocated a lot at DPS compound, that she knew Florentino constructed the subject house and
never knew respondent. The bare allegation that Florentino was allocated a lot is not sufficient
to overcome Florentino's own affidavit naming respondent as the owner of the subject house.
Petitioner himself testified that it was his father who saw the progress of the construction and
purchased the materials to be used; and as a young boy he would follow-up some deliveries
upon order of his father and never saw respondent in the construction site. The fact that not
one of the witnesses saw respondent during the construction of the said house does not
establish that petitioner's father and respondent co-owned the house.
We also find that the CA did not err in ordering petitioner to pay respondent being the sole
owner of the subject house a monthly rental of P2,000.00 from April 1988, the date of the extra-
judicial demand, until petitioner actually vacates the subject house. Although the CA made no
ratiocination as to how it arrived at the amount of P2,000.00 for the monthly rental, we find the
same to be a reasonable compensation for the use of the ground floor of the subject house
which consists of a living room, a dining room, a kitchen and three bedrooms. The rental value
refers to the value as ascertained by proof of what the property would rent or by evidence of
other facts from which the fair rental value may be determined.
We likewise affirm the CA's award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent. Article 2208 of
the Civil Code allows the recovery of attorney's fees in cases when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his interest and in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered which are both shown in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2000 and its Resolution
dated November 28, 2000 are AFFIRMED.
