ERICH FRAUWALLNER

The Philosophy of Buddhism

 ERICH FRAUWALLNER
The Philosophy of Buddhism
Die Philosophie des Buddhismus

Translated by
GELONG LODRö SANGPO
with the assistance of
JIGME SHELDRöN

under the supervision of

Professor ERNST STEINKELLNER

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS

PRIVATE LIMITED “ DELHI

Rajesh\\D:Rajesh\Philosophy of Buddha\Philims Pages. pm.6.5

 First Edition : Delhi, 2010
Translated from Die Philosophie des Buddhismus
Berlin, Akademie-Verlag 1956,
third revised edition 1969, fourth edition 1994

© ERNST STEINKELLNER
All Rights Reserved

ISBN : 978-81-208-3481-1

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007
8 Mahalaxmi Chamber, 22 Bhulabhai Desai Road, Mumbai 400 026
203 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Chennai 600 004
236, 9th Main III Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore 560 011
Sanas Plaza, 1302 Baji Rao Road, Pune 411 002
8 Camac Street, Kolkata 700 017
Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004
Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

Printed in India
By Jainendra Prakash Jain at Shri Jainendra Press,
A-45, Naraina, Phase-I, New Delhi 110 028
and Published by Narendra Prakash Jain for
Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited,
Bungalow Road, Delhi 110 007

Rajesh\\D:Rajesh\Philosophy of Buddha\Philims Pages. pm.6.5

 DEDICATED
TO MY ESTEEMED FRIEND
ÉTIENNE LAMOTTE
 CONTENTS
(brief)

Preface by Ernst Steinkellner........................................................................viii

Contents (detailed)........................................................................................xxv
Introduction by Erich Frauwallner...................................................................1

A. The Teaching of the Buddha ..................................................................... 9

AA. The Buddha (ca. 560–480 b.c.e.) .................................................... 11
AB. The proclamation of the Buddha.................................................. 13
AC. Questions that the Buddha did not answer ............................... 21
AD. The tenet of dependent origination ............................................. 30

B. The Scholasticism (Abhidharma) of the Way of Hearers

(Śrāvakayāna)......................................................................................... 63
BA. The rise of the Buddhist schools................................................... 65
BB. The principal philosophical doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda .... 67

C. The Schools of the Great Way (Mahāyāna)........................................ 151

CA. Main elements in the development of the Mahāyāna............ 153
CB. The beginnings of the Mahāyāna ............................................... 156
CC. The oldest literary documentation of the Mahāyāna............. 157
CD. The Madhyamaka school ............................................................. 181
CE. The school of Sāramati.................................................................. 271
CF. The Yogācāra school...................................................................... 280

Sources and Literature & Supplementary Remarks

Sources and Literature............................................................................ 441
Supplementary Remarks (1969)............................................................ 458

Appendices
Appendix I: Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna. A Contribution
to the Epistemology of Buddhism. (1951) ................................ 469
Appendix II: Bibliography of Erich Frauwallner .............................. 496
Appendix III: Selected editions (E), translations (T),
resources (R), and literature after the third edition (1969) ... 503

Indices ................................................................................................................. 521

 PREFACE

THE PRESENT ENGLISH TRANSLATION of Die Philosophie

des Buddhismus by Erich Frauwallner opens up a classic intro-
duction to Buddhist thought to a broader English language
readership. First published in 1956, the main body of the book
has remained unchanged. Frauwallner added supplementary
remarks to the third edition, published in 1969. The edition
translated here is the fourth, published in 1994.
Frauwallner’s original idea was to publish a series of
anthologies with selected translations and introductory explana-
tions to accompany his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie
(History of Indian Philosophy), of which the first two volumes
were published in 1953 and 1956.1 Of this planned translation
series only the anthology of Buddhist philosophical texts
translated here and a small selection of Śivaitic texts2 were
published in his life-time. An anthology of translations of
Brahminical philosophical texts was published posthumously.3
Because of the exemplary selection of source texts translated
in Die Philosophie des Buddhismus and particularly because
of the clear and substantial introductions to these texts, this

1
New edition by Andreas Pohlus: Shaker Verlag, Aachen 2003. English
translation by V. M. Bedekar: History of Indian Philosophy, Motilal
Banarsidass, Delhi 1973.
2
Aus der Philosophie der śivaitischen Systeme, Berlin 1962.
3
Erich Frauwallner: Nachgelassene Werke II. Philosophische Texte des
Hinduismus. Gerhard Oberhammer / Chlodwig H. Werba (eds), Verlag
der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1992. These
translations from the Upaniṣads and the Mahābhārata to texts from
the Sāṃkhya-, Vaiśeṣika-, and Nyāya-systems, as well as Mādhava’s
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha are all that remained of the original plan.
 Preface ix

anthology is an excellent and profound narrative of the

unfolding of Buddhist thought, and it is still the only one
of its kind. At the same time, to be sure, this book is not
totally comprehensive. It covers the period of early canonical
literature, with examples of its philosophically relevant ideas,
followed by the principal philosophical concepts of mature
Śrāvakayāna-Buddhism and, in the main part of the book,
presents the first survey of the development of the philosophical
systems of Mahāyāna-Buddhism. It does not, however, include
such developments as the important post-systematic tradition
of Buddhist epistemology and logic. Although as early as
the 1930s Frauwallner was breaking new ground with articles,
first critical editions, and translations of texts on concept
formation and theory of language, as well as the proof of
momentariness, at the time of his writing Die Philosophie des
Buddhismus, research in general had not progressed sufficiently
to allow a clear and comprehensive presentation of the main
issues at stake in the epistemological tradition founded by
Dignāga. It is for this reason, I think, that Frauwallner decided
not to include a selection of major texts by either Dignāga or
Dharmakīrti. As is evident from his overall plan for the
continuation of the Geschichte der indischen Philosophie,1
the Buddhist epistemological tradition was, of course, in-
tended to be included, along with many other and much later
traditions.
His articles on the sequence of Dharmakīrti’s works (1954),
on Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhi (1957), or on the development of
Dignāga’s thought (1959) indicate that during these years
Frauwallner had begun to clarify the philological and historical

1
Cf. Erich Frauwallner: Nachgelassene Werke I. Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen. Ernst
Steinkellner (ed.), Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissen-
schaften, Wien 1984, Anhang C and D (= Erich Frauwallner’s Posthumous
Essays. Translated from the German by Jayendra Soni. Aditya Prakashan,
New Delhi 1994, Appendix C and D).
x The Philosophy of Buddhism

basis for the next volumes of his Geschichte. In 1956, however,

the year both the second volume of the Geschichte and the
present anthology were first published, he does not seem to
have been ready to include this philosophically creative
development. He thus decided to conclude this presentation
of Buddhist philosophy, which must have been written in
close temporal relation to the first volume of the Geschichte,
by introducing and providing translations from the last great
ontological and soteriological system, the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda.
A comparable case is the lack of a more detailed account of
the beginnings of Buddhist scholastic philosophy (Abhidharma),
on the subject of which he began to publish a long series
of Abhidharma-Studien only in 1963. Frauwallner was well
aware of these limitations in his presentation of only the
Buddhist philosophy of the “classical,” i.e., the systematic
period, as well as of the fact that from a vast literature he could
take into consideration no more than a small sampling.1 The
remaining volumes of his Geschichte were evidently on his
mind throughout these later years of his life. Nevertheless,
he always adapted his own research and writing interests to
the changing needs of his students, thus moving from Buddhist
epistemology to Mīmāṃsā, and on to Abhidharma and Navya
Nyāya. It was only after retirement, during his last years, that
he could again concentrate on the earliest Abhidharma,
publishing the last articles of the above-mentioned series.2
Unfortunately, however, he did not have sufficient time left to
realize his great plan for a comprehensive history of Indian
philosophy from its beginnings to modern times.

1
Cf. the last paragraph of his introduction to the present book.
2
The whole series of articles was translated by Sophie Francis Kidd and
published by SUNY Press: Erich Frauwallner, Studies in Abhidharma
Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems. Albany 1995.
 Preface xi

Before saying a few words about Frauwallner’s concept of

Buddhist philosophy and the present English translation of his
Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, it seems appropriate here to
briefly address Frauwallner’s life. Frauwallner’s life has been
portrayed and his scholarly progress delineated in a number of
more or less detailed contributions,1 but in brief:
Born December 28, 1898, he was drafted from the Academic
High School into the Austrian Imperial Army in May 1916. As
a combatant in the First World War, he took part in the
Rumanian offensive and the “Battle of Isonzo”. At the war’s
end he enrolled at Vienna University in the winter term of
1918/1919. Frauwallner studied Classical Philology and took
courses in Indology and Iranian Studies. His doctoral thesis,
De synonymorum quibus animi motus significantur, uso tragico,2
was approved in 1921. In 1922 he took the state examination and
started to teach Classical Greek and Latin at a secondary school
in Vienna. Although a Sanskrit grammar had been in his
possession since 1915, he had no academic mentor in Indology
and Indian philosophy. Instead he used his methodological

1
Gerhard Oberhammer: “Erich Frauwallner – 60 Jahre,” Religion,
Wissenschaft, Kultur 10. Jg., 1959. IV, pp. 397–99; id.: “Erich Frauwallner
(28.12.1898 – 5.7.1974),” WZKS 20, 1976, pp. 5–36; id.: “Nachgetragene
Gedanken zu E. Frauwallners ‘Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie’,” in
Erich Frauwallner, Nachgelassene Werke II. Philosophische Texte des
Hinduismus. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften:
Wien 1992, pp. 225–34; Robert Göbl: “Erich Frauwallner,” Österreichische
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Almanach für das Jahr 1974, 124. Jg., Wien
1975, pp. 476–81). The most detailed account of his life and work is
contained in the “Preface” by Karin Preisendanz and Eli Franco in
Die Philosophie des Buddhismus to be soon reprinted by the Akademie
Verlag, Berlin. I gratefully acknowledge having received an almost com-
pleted manuscript of this preface at the end of 2006 and I am indebted
to them for a number of facts and statements in my summary below.
2
“On the synonyms by which the modes of the soul are signified, in
tragic usage.”
xii The Philosophy of Buddhism

competence as a Classicist to guide himself.1 In 1925 he

published his first indological paper,2 and in 1928 he received
the venia legendi3 for Indology on the basis of his first studies
of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. In addition to teaching at the
secondary school he taught until 1938 as a sessional instructor at
Vienna University. During these years he also turned to Classical
Tibetan, which—just as he later did with Buddhist Chinese and
Modern Japanese—he taught himself, and was able to interpret,
for example, Dharmakīrti’s theory of concepts and language
from its Tibetan translation with such a degree of clarity and
accuracy that to this day, it remains a wonder of philology.
After Austria’s annexation by Nazi Germany, Frauwallner
was appointed professor extraordinarius4 of Indology and
Iranian Studies in August 1939. Drafted once again in April 1943,
he served in anti-aircraft units around Vienna until the end of
the second world war. On June 6, 1945, he was dismissed from
the University due to his political affiliations, and his venia
legendi was revoked. At the end of 1948 he was sent into early
retirement with a small secondary school teacher’s pension. The
difficult post-war years as private scholar with a wife, three
children, and almost no income, were devoted to the first
volume of his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. This was the
beginning of an exposition of Indian thought that in its
methodology and presentation can be considered to be the basis
of all further research in this field. His account of the history
of Indian thought as a history of ideas, based directly on the
original sources, is still unequalled. In analyzing the acceptance

1
Karl Reinhardt’s Poseidonios (Munich 1921) is probably the most recog-
nizable model for Frauwallner’s attitude in research.
2
“Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma. Die nichtsāṃkhyistischen Texte,”
Journal of the American Oriental Society 45, pp. 51–67.
3
Latin for “permission to lecture” after habilitation.
4
I.e., a professor without chair.
 Preface xiii

and rejection of concepts and theorems that constitute the core

of philosophical positions, he renders the content of new
thoughts and new theories intelligible and thus is able to explain
them as attempts to solve specific difficulties arising within
older views.
In 1952, Frauwallner once again received his venia legendi
at Vienna University and in 1955 he was again appointed
professor extraordinarius. In 1956 he established a committee
for the compilation of a “Handbuch der indischen Philosophie”
at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, of which he became a
full member in 1955, and in 1957 he founded the influential
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens. 1 Appointed
full professor at the newly founded Institute of Indology that
opened March 21, 1960, he retired in 1963. Greatly respected
throughout the international scholarly community, also known
as a fascinating and motivating teacher, Frauwallner drew a
number of gifted students to Vienna during his last years at
Vienna University. He was honored in 1972 with an honorary
membership in the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft and
1973 he became a corresponding member of the Academy of
Sciences at Göttingen. Erich Frauwallner died on July 5, 1974.

Long left uninvestigated has been Frauwallner’s relationship to

the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) and the extent to which
its racist ideology influenced his conception of the character
and development of Indian philosophies. It is only quite recently
that these aspects of Frauwallner’s life and work have been
focused upon more seriously.
While coming to terms with the National Socialist past
(“Vergangenheitsbewältigung”) was a process widely propa-
gated in Germany after the war, and subsequently also in
Austria, in less prominent fields of European scholarship, such

1
Renamed Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens in 1970, which cele-
brated its 50th volume in 2006.
xiv The Philosophy of Buddhism

as Indology, comparable necessary efforts concerning indi-

vidual scholars is still just beginning. The recent recovery of
Frauwallner’s entire correspondence up to 1966 and the accessi-
bility of various archives in Vienna, Berlin, and Munich, made
it possible to conceive the research project “Erich Frauwallner
und der Nationalsozialismus” that is presently being carried out
by Jakob Stuchlik with funding provided by the Presidency of
the Austrian Academy of Sciences.1
Jakob Stuchlik presented his PhD dissertation at the
Department of Philosophy of Vienna University in 2005. Its
second section contains2 an analysis of Frauwallner’s “Aryan
approach” (“arischer Ansatz”), which is also the principal
subject matter of the ongoing project. At the same time, although

1
In 1997, the Academy published a comprehensive survey of its own
fate and activities during the years of Austria’s annexation (Anschluß) to
the Third Reich: Herbert Matis, Zwischen Anpassung und Widerstand.
Die Akademie der Wissenschaften in den Jahren 1938 – 1945. Verlag der
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien. As for Frauwallner—
who had become a “corresponding member” of the Academy in 1940—in
1946 he was acquitted of his political past by a denazification panel, which
judged him to have been “less incriminated” (“minderbelastet”). However,
a more substantial examination of the involvement of Austrian scholars
with their political and ideological reality was not undertaken at that
time, and the matter was closed. It seems that a closer investigation had to
wait for a more distant generation of scholars. H. Matis dryly summarizes
this aspect of the Academy’s reorganization after 1945: “As the problem
of ‘denazification’ was treated in a purely judicial manner, a thorough dis-
cussion of the period of National Socialism with lasting effects did not even
come close to taking place.” (“Indem das Problem der ‘Entnazifizierung’
rein juristisch abgehandelt wurde, kam eine nachhaltige und innerliche
Auseinandersetzung mit der Ära des Nationalsozialismus gar nicht erst zu-
stande.” Ibid., p. 67).
2
Jakob Stuchlik: Erkenntnispraxis mit offenen Augen. Überlegungen am
Rande eines altindischen Übungsweges. Dissertation, Universität Wien,
2005, pp. 72–149. The results of the above mentioned project will be
published by the Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.
 Preface xv

independently of Stuchlik’s dissertation, Karin Preisendanz,

University of Vienna, and Eli Franco, University of Leipzig, also
wrote a lengthy preface, which addresses this issue, for the
present book’s new, fifth German edition by the Akademie
Verlag, Berlin.
Frauwallner evidently had strong political convictions, as did
many of those intellectuals who, after the catastrophes of the
First World War and the fall of the Hapsburg Empire, made up
a social stratum of German nationalists in Austria. Frauwallner
had already joined the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) in
1932, when it was still illegal. He clearly shared such ideas
as “the Aryan race”, “blood”, and other inherited propensi-
ties, which had long been used in Europe to account for the
perceived differences in peoples and cultures. It was these ideas
that formed a part of the theoretical basis of Frauwallner’s
understanding of historical differences in Indian philosophical
thought, and he applied them to a periodization of Indian
philosophical history. But these same ideas were then also
incorporated into the NSDAP’s ideology for their increasingly
aggressive core slogans, which then in the end helped to pave
the way for the holocaust.
In 1939, Frauwallner published the article “Der arische Anteil
an der indischen Philosophie” (“The Aryan Share in Indian
Philosophy”), which highlights in particular, as characteristic
of the ancient systems of Indian philosophy, the aspects of
atheism and of a purely scientific derivation of their teachings,
attributing these features to the “blood” common to Aryan
peoples. His promotion of these ideas seemed to have served
two purposes. On the one hand, Frauwallner was clearly
convinced that it was appropriate to use such ideas when
interpreting his subject matter. On the other hand, by using
them, he also sought to increase the academic value of his
specific subject, the study of Indian thought, in the eyes of those
holding power at the time. This shows that Frauwallner, in what
xvi The Philosophy of Buddhism

was actually his first attempt to define typological features of

a fundamental and pervading nature that would be convenient
for distinguishing the early period from later periods of Indian
philosophy, cannot be seen as merely a victim of Nazi ideology
in the sense that he “fell victim to the spirit of the times.”1
He was fully confident of the meaningfulness of his historical
hypothesis. Moreover, Stuchlik’s dissertation also points out that
the traditional notions of the Aryan race, blood, and other
inherited propensities, which Frauwallner had presented in his
article of 1939, were still on his mind in 1953, as seen in his
attempts to define categories that differentiated the periods
in the history of Indian thought in the first volume of his
Geschichte der indischen Philosophie.2
Besides the personal difficulty of understanding, on a human
level, Frauwallner’s relationship with the NSDAP and its
ideology, we are also faced with the difficulty of understand-
ing why a scholar of Frauwallner’s stature and range—whose
interpretations and methods of presenting the Indian sources
are impeccable models of philological and critical scholarship—
used such archaic categories, as “blood”, at all, and why,
furthermore, the influence of these categories is not to be sensed
in Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. The answer, to my mind, is
simple enough. While in the distinct individual results of his
philological and interpretational work Frauwallner produced
untainted presentations of the sources, it was when he ventured
into the wide-ranging comprehensive historical summary of the
cultural phenomenon of Indian philosophical thought and its
development that he fell back on such meta-conceptions from
his socio-political environment and his own convictions.

1
“Verfallenheit an den Zeitgeist,” G. Oberhammer in 1992 quoted in note 6
above, p. 225, note 1.
2
And also even later, as seen for example in the article “Indische
Philosophie,” in: Die Philosophie des XX. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart 1959,
(pp. 49–66) p. 50.
 Preface xvii

Leaving the human level aside and considering only the

scholarly perspective, it is in this area that we can say today
that he failed. On the one hand, he incorporated the notions
of Aryan race, blood, and body (“Volkskörper”) into his work
based on his own convictions; on the other hand, he selected
certain features that he identified in his subject, e.g.,
“rationality,” “scientific approach without presuppositions,” 1
or the presence or absence of the idea of God, and took such
features to be representative of typical characteristics of the
Aryan race. While no longer accepting such concepts because
they are either unfounded or unethically biased, scholars today
are still grappling with the problem of how—without relying
on racist theories—to otherwise explain the features high-
lighted by Frauwallner or dismiss them as being inadequately
chosen or defined.2 In short: when we read his Geschichte, it
is reasonable and legitimate to accept those of Frauwallner’s

1
For a discussion of these characteristics as appropriate or useful in
understanding the development of Indian philosophical traditions, in
particular of the Sāṃkhya, cf. Jan. E. M. Houben, “Why did rationality
thrive, but hardly survive in Kapila’s ‘system’? On the pramāṇas, rationality
and irrationality in Sāṃkhya (part I),” Asiatische Studien 53, 1999, pp. 491–512,
and “ ‘Verschriftlichung’ and the relation between the pramāṇas in the
history of Sāṃkhya,” Études de lettres 2001.3: La rationalité en Asie /
Rationality in Asia (ed. J. Bronkhorst, Lausanne), pp. 165–94, as well as
Johannes Bronkhorst, “Mysticism et rationalité en Inde: le cas du Vaiśesika,”
Asiatische Studien 47, 1993, pp. 559–69.
2
For a recent attempt at identifying other characteristics through which
to demarcate periods in Indian philosophy and an explanation of these
periods as being also based on changing intellectual or sociopolitical
conditions, cf. Johannes Bronkhorst, “La grammaire et les débuts de la
philosophie indienne,” Asiatische Studien 58, 2004, 791–865, and “Systematic
Philosophy between the Empires. Some Determining Features,” in: (Patrick
Olivelle ed.), Between the Empires. Society in India 300 BCE to 400 CE, Oxford
University Press: Oxford 2006, pp. 287–313, as well as Aux origines de la
philosophie Indienne. Collection Le Maître et le disciple. Infolio éditions:
Gollion 2008.
xviii The Philosophy of Buddhism

interpretations and insights that remain valid even from

our historically more informed perspective, while at the
same time we can discard all those of his ideas that originated
in a specific and discernible set of social and cultural
conditions that, hopefully at least in the majority, are no longer
ours.
The book translated here, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, is,
however, not tainted by any of these racist ideas, although
it was written at the same time as the Geschichte. So we must
ask: why? My answer may appear inexcusably flippant, but
I can see no better. For Frauwallner, from its beginnings up to
the development of its philosophical systems, Buddhism be-
longed to the early period of cultural phenomena that he had
determined in his Geschichte as dominated by the Aryan compo-
nent of Indian societies. Like Oldenberg 1 and de La Vallée
Poussin,2 both held in high esteem by Frauwallner,3 he had
no awareness, as we have today, of the multicultural melting
pot in the eastern Ganges Valley, with its minor kingdoms
and small stratum of immigrant Aryan tribal peoples.4 Since
in this anthology of Buddhist philosophy, Frauwallner focused
exclusively on Buddhist philosophy, there was no reason to

1
E.g., Hermann Oldenberg, Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde.
Stuttgart-Berlin 1881.
2
Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Indo-européens et Indo-iraniens. (Histoire du
monde III). Paris, 21936.
3
Cf. his Geschichte I, pp. 464–66.
4
Cf. Michael Witzel, Das alte Indien. Verlag C. H. Beck, München 2003,
pp. 50ff. Frauwallner considered the Buddha to be a member of this
group of immigrant Aryan tribes, which was a ruling class. However, today
even this has become highly uncertain (cf., e.g., Richard Gombrich,
Theravāda Buddhism. A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern
Colombo. London–New York 1988, pp. 49f. – Greg Bailey and Ian Mabbett,
The Sociology of Early Buddhism. Cambridge University Press 2003. –
Johannes Bronkhorst, Greater Magadha. Studies in the Culture of Early India.
Leiden-Boston: Brill 2007, pp. 1–72.)
 Preface xix

explain the appearance of this historical phenomenon as such, or

its relationship to other cultural phenomena of India. Here he
acted as an interpreter of a strictly defined phenomenon, the
development of systematic philosophy in Buddhism. It is for
this reason that the book is what it is: an impeccable scholarly
account of early and systematic Buddhist thought, reliable in
its translations and precise in its introductory explanations.
In this, being a product untainted by racist conceptions, it
provides corroboration for my hypothesis above, namely that
only when writing comprehensive history, which had to include
a determination of periods and an identification of their charac-
teristic aspects, did Frauwallner refer to his personal ideological
convictions. Although there probably will always remain
a certain blemish to Frauwallner’s reputation, based on his
political past and some of his personal views, since this book
is free from any ideas related to those and since it is still the best
of its kind, there should be sufficient benefit to warrant the
publication of this English translation.

At this point it seems worthwhile to remark on Frauwallner’s

concept of “Buddhist philosophy,” which he used as the title
of his book. “The Buddha himself . . . proclaimed exclusively
a doctrine of liberation,” Frauwallner says, and he avoided
“the philosophical questions of his time,” which had no rele-
vance for this doctrine. The development of philosophy within
Buddhism occurred when “in the course of the last centuries
before the Common Era the general development of Indian
philosophy had led to the formation of complete philosophical
systems.” 1 To my knowledge, however, Frauwallner does not
expressly state anywhere what actually constitutes “philosophy”

1
Cf. the Introduction in this book, p. 1, as well as Geschichte der indischen
Philosophie I, 1953, pp. 17ff. and 156–60 (= History of Indian Philosophy I,
1973, pp. 8ff. and 124–27).
xx The Philosophy of Buddhism

and in particular “Buddhist philosophy,” 1 or why he considered

his selections from the Buddhist literature as “philosophically
valuable.” Apparently the book itself is intended to provide an
answer to these questions. And here, in fact, we find philosophy
represented mainly in the form of metaphysics or ontology,
as well as soteriology: limitations of which, as stated above,
Frauwallner was well aware.
As a whole, within the religion2 of Buddhism in its various
forms, “Buddhist philosophy” can be roughly defined as encom-
passing all the theoretical traditions that developed over time
in the analysis, elaboration, and argumentative establishment
and defense of the so-called Four Noble Truths3 (catvāry
āryasatyāni), which serve all followers of the Buddha as a
succinct summary of the Buddha’s teaching and are thus the
theoretical framework of philosophy for Buddhists everywhere.
Of these Truths, the first, the Truth of Suffering, is the basis
of Buddhist ontology; the second, the Truth of the Origin of
Suffering, the basis of a Buddhist psychology or in other words,
of an ontology of the mental; the third, the Truth of the
Cessation of Suffering, is the basis of Buddhism as a religion,
since it teaches a goal to be pursued; and the fourth, the Truth
of the Way leading to the Cessation of Suffering, is the basis
of Buddhism as a moral and meditational practice. Following
the formation of the various philosophical systems, from the

1
For a recent straightforward, lucid and succinct lecture elucidating
the concepts of “philosophy” as well as of “Buddhism as religion” and “as
philosophy” cf. chapter 1 in Mark Siderits, Buddhism as philosophy. An
Introduction, Aldershot UK 2007.
2
“Religion” in the broader sense of a belief that liberation from a frustrat-
ing and painful existence or from eternally repeated existence is possible
and can be achieved through appropriate mental and moral practices.
3
Or “the Four Truths of the Noble One, i.e., the Buddha,” cf. K. R. Norman,
“Why Are the Four Noble Truths Called ‘Noble’?,” in: Ānanda: Essays in
Honour of Ananda W. P. Guruge, Colombo 1990, pp. 1–13.
 Preface xxi

fourth century c.e. on, discussions concerning epistemology

and logic began to develop in an effort to examine the sources
of correct and valuable knowledge that shapes every-day and
spiritual practice and is oriented towards liberation, as well
as the methods of acquiring such knowledge. The theories and
argumentations elaborated in the Buddhist tradition of episte-
mological thought are primarily related to the first two Noble
Truths and were ultimately created in order to strengthen the
authority of the Buddha, who had been the first to recognize and
proclaim them. While in many aspects, to be sure, many theories
and ideas of this philosophical tradition appear deceptively
emancipated from their religious origins, nevertheless they
cannot be separated from their Buddhist presuppositions and
purposes, just as medieval European logic cannot be separated
from Christianity.
Although the above mentioned four principal truths of the
Buddha remain as the core of Buddhism and all of its later
manifestations, it would be more appropriate to speak of
“Buddhist philosophies” in the place of the book title’s singular
philosophy. For—beyond the Buddha’s few and basic theoreti-
cal concepts, all intended as direct explanations of facts of
experience, none responding to metaphysical questions—there is
nothing resembling one comprehensive or unified “Buddhist
philosophy.” In fact, the present book describes a considerable
variety of theories and systems of Buddhist thought, all of which
are related to the same fundamental heritage, but which were
often developed in vivid inner-Buddhist polemics and result in
quite contradictory ultimate views.

As for Frauwallner’s approach to translation, it was straightfor-

ward: to remain as close as possible to the original text while
presenting it in a clear and readable way in order to mediate
an accurate impression of its meaning. For technical terms, he
maintained a single translation even when various meanings
xxii The Philosophy of Buddhism

were suggested. For clarity regarding such variations of meaning

he relied on the strengths of context and explanation. This
method had the added advantage of revealing the fact that these
literary documents were firmly embedded in strong termino-
logical traditions. 1
The same approach has also been taken by the translator
of the present book, Gelong Lodrö Sangpo. Born in Stuttgart,
Germany, Jürgen Balzer studied Educational Science and
became a teacher at an elementary school. In 1984 he underwent
his first ordination in the Karma Kagyü Sangha, in France, and
he then moved to Gampo Abbey, located in Canada. In 1987 he
received the Bhikshu ordination in the USA and afterwards he
completed the traditional three year retreat and a four year
study retreat. He became one of the co-founders, in 1996, of the
Nitartha Institute for the transmission of Buddhist learning and
practice, and is a senior teacher at the Vidyadhara Institute, the
monastic college (shedra) of Gampo Abbey. Over the years
he has specialized in the systematic traditions of Buddhist
Abhidharma, and has prepared an annotated English transla-
tion of Louis de La Vallée Poussin’s French translation of the
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that is now edited in preparation for its
upcoming publication. Since Lodrö Sangpo’s mother tongue is
not English, he was assisted in the initial stages of the present
translation by a Canadian, Bhikshuni Migme Chödrön, and in
its later stages particularly by the expertise of Jigme Sheldrön
(aka Donna Ross), a Canadian, who is also very familiar with the
intricacies of the German language.
My own task in this enterprise was limited to ensuring
that Frauwallner’s sometimes idiomatic Austrian German was
correctly represented; discussing ambiguous linguistic points
and terminological questions; and providing parts of the

1
Cf. Geschichte der indischen Philosophie I, pp. 5f. and the Introduction to
the present volume, pp. 4–5.
 Preface xxiii

bibliographical supplement with literature related to the book

published since 1969. I take this occasion to express my sincere
gratitude, not only for the enormous amount of work invested
by Lodrö Sangpo and his colleagues, all members of the Chökyi
Gyatso Translation Committee, but also for their thorough and
dedicated approach to this task, as well as for their patience,
over the years, with the intervening periods of silence on my
part due to time constraints. From start to finish, this coopera-
tion was a most pleasant experience and of great benefit to me
as well. In addition, I would like to gratefully acknowledge
the help received from Hisataka Ishida in checking the URLs—
newly added to the book—for most of the now freely and
easily available original Sanskrit, Tibetan, Pali, and Chinese
source-materials used by Frauwallner, and in compiling the
bibliographical supplement. For easy access to these URLs, go
to the webpage of the Chökyi Gyatso Translation Committee:

http://www.gampoabbey.org/translations2/index.html

My thanks go further to Stephanie Johnston, Lodrö Yarda, and

Lars Keffer for their tips and help with the layout and artwork in
the book.
While this translation attempts to be literally faithful to the
1994 edition of Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, in the process
of translating we thought it helpful, for the benefit of the reader,
to insert additional headings into the text and to enlarge the
index. All other additions by the translator are enclosed within
square brackets. Besides this we have created an Appendix,
which includes one of Frauwallner’s more important articles,
namely, “Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna. A Contribution to
the Epistemology of Buddhism” (1951), since it nicely comple-
ments the long Yogācāra section of the book; a bibliography of
Frauwallner’s work; and the selective bibliography of related
publications since 1969.
xxiv The Philosophy of Buddhism

It is my hope that, in spite of the author’s personal commit-

ments, this English translation of an anthology of pivotal
documents from the rich world of Indian Buddhist philosophy
together with introductory essays that are still unsurpassed
gems of intellectual history writing will be duly appreciated by
a new readership.

Vienna, December 2008 Ernst Steinkellner

 CONTENTS
(detailed)

Introduction……...............................................................................................1

A. The Teaching of the Buddha ..................................................................... 9

AA. The Buddha (ca. 560–480 b.c.e.) .................................................... 11
AB. The proclamation of the Buddha.................................................. 13
ABA. The sermon of Benares
(Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra) ............................................. 13
ABB. The Buddhist path of liberation ........................................ 16
ABB.1. From the Kandaraka Sutta
(Majjhima Nikāya 51)................................................. 17
AC. Questions that the Buddha did not answer ............................... 21
ACA. Ānanda
[Saṃyutta Nikāya 44, 10] ...................................................... 21
ACB. The Discourse of Vatsagotra and the Fire
(Aggivacchagottasuttanta) [Majjhima Nikāya 72] .............. 22
ACC. The Discourse of the Bearer of the Burden
(Bhārahārasūtra) ..................................................................... 28
AD. The tenet of dependent origination ............................................. 30
ADA. The Account of Enlightenment
(Bodhikathā; Mahāvagga I, 1) ................................................ 32
ADB. The Great Discourse of the Foundations of
Origination
(Mahānidānasuttanta; Dīgha Nikāya 15) ............................. 34
ADC. The Discourse of Dependent Origination
(Pratītyasamutpādasūtra) ...................................................... 42
ADD. From Vasubandhu’s “Commentary to the Discourse
of Dependent Origination”
(Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā) ................................................. 46
ADE. The Discourse of the Young Rice Plant
(Śālistambasūtra) .................................................................... 52
xxvi The Philosophy of Buddhism

B. The Scholasticism (Abhidharma) of the Way of Hearers

(Śrāvakayāna)......................................................................................... 63
BA. The rise of the Buddhist schools................................................... 65
BB. The principal philosophical doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda .... 67
BBA. The principal philosophical thoughts.............................. 68
BBA.1. The denial of a soul, of a self.................................. 68
BBA.1.1. From “The Questions of Menandros”
(Milindapañhā)................................................ 72
BBA.1.2. Vasubandhu the Younger
(ca. 400–480 c.e.) ............................................ 81
BBA.1.2.1. A soul does not exist
(Abhidharmakośa III, vv. 18–24) ....... 82
BBA.1.2.2. From “Refutation of the Person”
(Pudgalapratiṣedhaprakaraṇa) ............ 91
BBA.2. General views associated with the doctrine
of the denial of a soul............................................. 101
BBA.2.1. First general view: All entities lack a
solid, permanent core................................. 101
BBA.2.1.1. (A) Discussion of this first
general view in the field of
material elements ............................ 102
BBA.2.1.2. (B) Discussion of this first
general view in the field of
psychology........................................ 104
BBA.2.1.3. A substance does not exist
(Abhidharmakośa III, ad v. 100) ....... 106
BBA.2.2. Second general view: The momentari-
ness of all entities ........................................ 107
BBA.2.2.1. The momentariness of entities
(Abhidharmakośa IV, vv. 2–3) ......... 111
BBB. The fundamental concepts ............................................... 115
BBB.1. The scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda ............... 115
BBB.1.1. From the “Treatise on the Five
Aggregates”
(Pañcaskandhaka) .......................................... 118
 Contents xxvii

BBB.2. The scholasticism of the Sautrāntika.................. 126

BBB.2.1. The seemingly and the truly real
(Abhidharmakośa VI, v. 4)............................ 129
BBB.2.2. The nature of acquisition
(Abhidharmakośa II, v. 36) ........................... 131
BBC. The doctrine of liberation of the Śrāvakayāna............. 134
BBC.1. Suppression through knowledge
(Abhidharmakośa I, v. 6) .......................................... 138
BBC.2. Nirvāṇa as non-existence
(Abhidharmakośa II, v. 55)....................................... 140
BBC.3. From “Establishment of the Truth”
(Tattvasiddhi) ............................................................ 144

C. The Schools of the Great Way (Mahāyāna)........................................ 151

CA. Main elements in the development of the Mahāyāna............ 153
CAA. The new goal of liberation................................................ 153
CAB. The philosophical doctrine of an ultimate state of
being and of the unreality of the phenomenal
world .................................................................................... 154
CAC. The new buddhology ........................................................ 155
CB. The beginnings of the Mahāyāna ............................................... 156
CC. The oldest literary documentation of the Mahāyāna............. 157
CCA. The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its
philosophical doctrines..................................................... 158
CCA.1. Central philosophical thought: the idea of
an ultimate state of being...................................... 159
CCA.2. The unreality of the phenomenal world
and its relationship to the ultimate state of
being .......................................................................... 161
CCA.3. From the “Perfection of Insight in Eight
Thousand Lines”
(Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā)............................... 163
CCB. From the “Jewel Heap”
(Ratnakūṭa)............................................................................ 175
xxviii The Philosophy of Buddhism

CD. The Madhyamaka school ............................................................. 181

CDA. Nāgārjuna (ca. 200 c.e.) ..................................................... 181
CDA.1. The works of Nāgārjuna ....................................... 181
CDA.2. The philosophical system of Nāgārjuna ............ 182
CDA.2.1. The unreality of the external world ........ 182
CDA.2.1.1. The phenomenal world as
dependent origination.................... 183
CDA.2.1.2. The relativity of opposing terms
and the middle way........................ 183
CDA.2.1.3. Nāgārjuna’s concept of intrinsic
nature and the emptiness of the
phenomenal world.......................... 185
CDA.2.1.4. The highest and the restricted
truth.................................................... 186
CDA.2.1.5. The nature of the phenomenal
world is diversity (prapañca) ......... 186
CDA.2.2. The highest reality ...................................... 187
CDA.2.2.1. Distinction from the phenomenal
world: free from diversity,
extinction, peace, etc....................... 187
CDA.2.2.2. Identity in nature of the
phenomenal world and nirvāṇa ... 187
CDA.2.3. Doctrine of liberation ................................. 188
CDA.3. Introduction to sections of the
Madhyamakakārikā ................................................... 188
CDA.3.1. Chapter I: Examination of causes
(pratyayaparīkṣā)........................................... 188
CDA.3.1.1. From the “Mnemonic Verses of
the Middle Doctrine”
(Madhyamakakārikā).......................... 191
CDA.3.2. Chapter XV: Examination of intrinsic
nature (svabhāvaparīkṣā) ............................. 193
CDA.3.3. Chapter XVIII: Examination of the
self (ātmaparīkṣā) .......................................... 196
CDA.3.4. Chapter XXIV: Examination of the
noble truths (āryasatyaparīkṣā) .................. 200
CDA.3.5. Chapter XXV: Examination of
nirvāṇa (nirvāṇaparīkṣā) .............................. 206
 Contents xxix

CDA.4. Introduction to sections of the

Vigrahavyāvartanī .................................................... 211
CDA.5. From the “Averting of Quarrels”
(Vigrahavyāvartanī).................................................. 213
CDA.6. Introduction to the sections of the Ratnāvalī..... 216
CDA.7. From the “Garland of Jewels”
(Ratnāvalī) ................................................................. 221
CDB. Āryadeva (beginning of third century c.e.) .................. 230
CDB.1. Introduction to the sample from the
Catuḥśataka ............................................................... 230
CDB.2. From the “Treatise in Four Hundred Stanzas”
(Catuḥśataka)............................................................. 232
CDC. Buddhapālita (ca. fifth century c.e.) ............................... 234
CDC.1. Introduction to the sample from the
Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti ............................................. 234
CDC.2. From the “Commentary to the Mnemonic
Verses of the Middle Doctrine”
(Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti)........................................... 235
CDD. Bhāvaviveka (middle of sixth century c.e.) ................. 237
CDD.1. Introduction to the sample from the
Prajñāpradīpa ............................................................ 238
CDD.2. From the “Shining Light of Insight”
(Prajñāpradīpa) ......................................................... 240
CDD.3. From the “Jewel in the Hand”
(Tchang tchen)........................................................... 246
CDE. Candrakīrti (seventh century c.e.) .................................. 255
CDE.1. The works of Candrakīrti...................................... 255
CDE.2. Introduction to the sample from the
Prasannapadā ............................................................ 256
CDE.3. From the “Clearly Worded”
(Prasannapadā).......................................................... 257
CDE.4. Introduction to the sample from the
Madhyamakāvatāra................................................... 261
CDE.5. From the “Introduction to the Madhyamaka
Doctrine”
(Madhyamakāvatāra) ................................................ 264
xxx The Philosophy of Buddhism

CE. The school of Sāramati.................................................................. 271

CEA. Sāramati (ca. 250 c.e.)......................................................... 271
CEA.1. From the “Elucidation of the Germ of the
(Three) Jewels”
(Ratnagotravibhāga) ................................................. 274
CF. The Yogācāra school...................................................................... 280
CFA. The beginnings of the Yogācāra school: the
Yogācārabhūmiśāstra............................................................ 281
CFA.1. The divisions of reality {sections 1–8} ................ 282
CFA.2. The determination of the nature of reality:
non-duality & the middle way & the
constitution of the nature of reality
{sections 9–13} ......................................................... 283
CFA.3. The proof of the unreality of the
phenomenal world {section 14} ........................... 285
CFA.4. The two proofs of the unreality of the
designations {sections 15–16}............................... 286
CFA.5. The two errors & the false and correct view
of reality {sections 17–19}...................................... 287
CFA.6. From the “Stage of the Bodhisattva”
(Bodhisattvabhūmi)................................................... 288
CFB. The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra ................................................ 296
CFB.1. The doctrine of the threefold nature of
things in chapter VI................................................ 297
CFB.2. The doctrine of the threefold essencelessness
of things in chapter VII and its relation to
the doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā and of
the Mādhyamikas................................................... 299
CFB.3. From the “Elucidation of the Secret Meaning”
(Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra) .......................................... 302
CFC. Maitreyanātha (ca. 300 c.e.).............................................. 313
CFC.1. The works of Maitreyanātha................................ 314
CFC.2. The first philosophical system of the
Yogācāra: the doctrine of Maitreyanātha .......... 315
CFC.2.1. The ultimate state of being as the
center of the system .................................... 316
 Contents xxxi

CFC.2.2.
The ultimate state of being and the
phenomenal world ..................................... 316
CFC.2.3. The false conception and the deception
of the phenomenal world, etc. ................. 317
CFC.2.4. The doctrine of liberation.......................... 319
CFC.2.4.1. Nonconceptual knowledge and
liberation ........................................... 319
CFC.2.4.2. Buddhology and the ultimate
state of being .................................... 320
CFC.2.5. The doctrine of Maitreyanātha and the
Madhyamaka doctrine............................... 321
CFC.3. Introduction to the samples from the
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra ............................................ 322
CFC.3.1. From the “Ornament of the Discourses
of the Mahāyāna”
(Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra).............................. 328
CFC.4. Introduction to samples from the
Madhyāntavibhāga.................................................... 338
CFC.5. From the “Elucidation of the Middle and of
the Extremes” (Madhyāntavibhāga)...................... 343
CFD. Asaṅga (ca. 315–390 c.e.)................................................... 346
CFD.1. The works of Asaṅga ............................................. 347
CFD.2. The philosophical system of Asaṅga.................. 347
CFD.2.1. Adoption of old concepts and develop-
ment of new psychological concepts ...... 347
CFD.2.2. The appearance of the phenomenal
world: the doctrine of the three
characteristics .............................................. 349
CFD.2.2.1. The dependent characteristic........ 349
CFD.2.2.2. The imagined and the perfect
characteristic..................................... 351
CFD.2.3. The doctrine of liberation.......................... 352
CFD.2.4. Asaṅga’s buddhology ................................ 354
CFD.3. Introduction to the translated sections of the
Mahāyānasaṃgraha .................................................. 354
CFD.4. From the “Summary of the Mahāyāna”
(Mahāyānasaṃgraha) ............................................... 358
xxxii The Philosophy of Buddhism

CFE. Vasubandhu ........................................................................ 374

CFE.1. The works................................................................. 374
CFE.2. Synopsis of the doctrines of the
“Twenty Verses” and “Thirty Verses”............... 375
CFE.2.1. The mental complex as three
transformations of cognition .................... 376
CFE.2.2. The mental complex and the seeds of
permeation ................................................... 378
CFE.2.3. The mental complex in relation to
the phenomenal world, highest reality,
and other beings.......................................... 379
CFE.2.4. The doctrine of liberation.......................... 380
CFE.3. Introduction to the
Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi............................. 381
CFE.3.1. Chapter one: Doctrine of the
unreality of the external world and
answers to objections based on
reasoning (vv. 1–7)...................................... 381
CFE.3.2. Chapter two: Answers to objections
based on scripture (vv. 8–10).................... 383
CFE.3.3. Chapter three: Proof of the unreality
of the external world: impossibility
of the concept of an atom, etc.
(vv. 11–15)..................................................... 385
CFE.3.4. Chapter four: Refutation of various
objections (vv. 16–21) ................................. 388
CFE.4. “Proof that (Everything) is Mere Cognizance,
in Twenty Verses”
(Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi).......................... 392
CFE.5. Introduction to the
Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi............................... 411
CFE.6. “Proof that (Everything) is Mere Cognizance,
in Thirty Verses”
(Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi)............................ 414
 Contents xxxiii

CFF. Dignāga (ca. 480–540 c.e.)................................................. 419

CFF.1. From the “Compendium of the Means of
Valid Cognition”
(Pramāṇasamuccaya) ................................................ 421
CFG. Sthiramati and Dharmapāla (middle of sixth
century c.e.) ......................................................................... 424
CFG.1. From Hiuan-tsang’s “Proof that (Everything)
is Mere Cognizance”
(Tch’eng wei che louen) ............................................ 430

Sources and Literature & Supplementary Remarks

Sources and Literature............................................................................ 441
Supplementary Remarks (1969)............................................................ 458

Appendices
Appendix I: Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna. A Contribution
to the Epistemology of Buddhism. (1951) ................................ 469
Appendix II: Bibliography of Erich Frauwallner .............................. 496
Appendix III: Selected editions (E), translations (T),
resources (R), and literature after the third edition (1969) ... 503

Indices ................................................................................................................. 521

A. General index of terms ................................................................. 523
B. Sanskrit terms ................................................................................. 566
C. Names of texts ................................................................................ 571
D. Index of names ............................................................................... 574
 INTRODUCTION1

In Indian philosophy the systems of the Buddhists occupy a

leading position. The Buddha himself, it is true, proclaimed ex-
clusively a doctrine of liberation and scarcely ever expressed his
view on the philosophical questions of his time, but when, in the
course of the last centuries before the Common Era, the general
development of Indian philosophy had led to the formation of
complete philosophical systems, the Buddhists also began to
develop their old doctrine into a system. At that time they had
already developed specific noteworthy views, such as the
doctrine of the momentariness of all entities or the denial of the
existence of a soul. Most importantly, however, the schools of
the Mahāyāna raised the fundamental question of the reality of
the phenomenal world, tried to accurately prove its unreality,
and created a carefully thought-out epistemological idealism in
order to establish their view. At the same time, they contributed
decisively to the elaboration of the epistemology and logic that
reached their full flowering at the end of the classical period
of Indian philosophy and that belong to the most significant
contributions of Indian philosophy in general. In addition, the
philosophy of the Buddhists exerted a strong influence on the
following period, with above all the Vedānta having derived a
lasting stimulus therefrom.
In spite of its great importance, however, Buddhist philoso-
phy is still little <2> known in wider circles. A satisfactory
presentation is lacking and the sources themselves are scarcely

1
Angle brackets (< >) throughout the translation indicate the original page
numbers of Frauwallner’s Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (fourth German
edition). Square brackets ([ ]) indicate additions by the translator.
Frauwallner’s own cross references—as well as newly added cross refer-
ences—to German page numbers are indicated by: S. (= Seite = page).
2 The Philosophy of Buddhism

accessible to those unfamiliar with the original languages. Some

sources have in fact been translated, but as they make up only a
small part of an extensive literature, one could only with great
difficulty gain from them a general overview. In addition, the
study of these translations is so laborious that they are seldom
heard of beyond specialized circles. An opportunity for a wider
circle of readers to familiarize themselves with the world of
ideas of the Buddhist philosophers without great hardship still
does not exist.1
The present work is intended to provide this opportunity.
Through the use of selected texts, the intention is to provide
an initial introduction, which should subsequently facilitate
further more detailed study. There are, however, great dif-
ficulties associated with such an undertaking. In the Indian
philosophy of the older period, with which we are dealing
exclusively, there are very few texts that were intended to set
forth the doctrines of the different systems for outsiders. Doing
so was a matter of oral instruction, as, overall, the spoken word
always predominated in the philosophical and religious life
of India. What we are left with from this period, insofar as it
was meant for the intramural use of the schools, consists
essentially of originally orally transmitted mnemonic sayings
and verses, and, insofar as it was used in <3> discussions with
other schools, of polemic works. Neither are the kind of
presentations we might wish for.

1
Two works that contain a selection of Buddhist texts in translation have
recently [i.e., in the 50’s] appeared: Buddhist Texts through the Ages, edited
by E. Conze, in collaboration with I. B. Horner, D. Snellgrove, A. Waley,
Philosophical Library, New York 1954, and Buddhistische Geisteswelt, vom
historischen Buddha zum Lamaismus, Texte, ausgewählt und eingeleitet von
G. Mensching, Darmstadt 1955. Both provide well-selected samples from
all layers of Buddhist literature. The purely philosophical texts in both
works, however, take up only a modest space and the development of
philosophical thoughts is not pursued further.
 Introduction 3

The mnemonic texts provide key words for the memory in the
most concise form, which were meant to be handed down
together with oral explanations and which therefore are almost
incomprehensible without such explanations. They were, as
well, not so much intended to record the fundamental doctrines
but rather the systems in their totality, and in particular the
details and formulations of disputed points peculiar to each
school, which so easily vanish from memory.
The polemic texts, on the other hand, usually continue old
debates already in progress for generations, with which the
reader must be familiar if he wants to properly understand the
particular discussions. In this case the fundamental issues, the
broad strokes, become less important than the details to which
the dispute has turned its focus.
What is most important for us must, in both cases, first be
extracted from the texts through hard work and must all too
often be inferred from isolated comments and indications. In
addition, it must be said of Buddhist works that large parts
of them are philosophically without interest. In such cases
we are faced primarily with discussions of the practice-oriented
path of liberation in which technical details are presented and
elaborated upon in wearisome depth, in the midst of which
that which is philosophically valuable is almost completely
squashed. Finally, the study of all of these works is also
made more difficult for the reader because of the hitherto
unavailability of a sufficient presentation of the Buddhist phi-
losophy—one which could supply the prerequisites necessary to
put these texts into proper perspective and to comprehend
them. Instead, the reader must first gain most of the necessary
prerequisites through his own efforts. <4>
I have chosen to counter all these difficulties in the following
way. I will not render large sections of text in their entirety, but
have selected philosophically valuable sections and arranged
them according to pertinent viewpoints so that the reader may
4 The Philosophy of Buddhism

easily follow the development of the individual thoughts. I have,

however, placed particular emphasis on the explanation of the
texts. First, the reader is oriented by a brief synopsis about the
author and his teachings. The texts and their detailed elucidation
then follow.1 As for how exactly this is carried out, I would
like to note that I differentiate strictly between translation and
explanation. A translation must pass on the contents of the origi-
nal as accurately as possible to the reader who is not familiar
with its language. If the original is solemn and long-winded,
then the translation can only be solemn and longwinded. If the
original is difficult and obscure, then the translation should not
feign smoothness and clarity. Otherwise it is not a translation
but a reworking. The translator must reproduce unaltered even
logical mistakes made by the author. To point them out and
to explain them is a matter for the elucidation. The elucidations
themselves are rather extensive, especially those related to the
concise mnemonic texts. In such cases, I have preferred to give
a single uninterrupted explanation instead of disconnected sepa-
rate comments, and I have placed this explanation at the
beginning of the text. These elucidations are not intended to be
a thorough scholarly commentary, but it is my hope that they
contain everything necessary for an initial understanding of
the texts. <5>
As to the difficult issue of rendering the philosophical termi-
nology, I have proceeded in the following way. As we are
concerned here with a language that is, in contrast to that of
classical philosophy, familiar to only a very few readers, the
retention of the original terms was not a possibility. I have
therefore translated everything, as a matter of principle. Indian
terms are, however, included in parentheses in order to avoid

1
Translating Indian commentaries instead of presenting one’s own
explanations has the disadvantage that these commentaries themselves
often require an explanation and quite frequently read foreign thoughts
into these texts.
 Introduction 5

errors and ambiguities. In doing so, I have made an effort

to adhere to the same translation of a given term throughout
this book. Further, I have distinguished here as well between
translation and explanation. Indeed, even the Indian who
familiarizes himself with a philosophical system must first get
to know the terminological meaning of the different terms. As
far as possible, therefore, I have chosen translations that express
roughly the same as what the word in question means at
first glance for the Indian. The exact philosophical meaning will
become apparent from the comments. Above all, I have avoided
the use of terms from the European philosophical terminology
because, however convincing they often appear on first sight,
as a rule they mislead and arouse false ideas. First and foremost,
I have made an effort to adhere throughout to the Indian
characterization of the thoughts and to reproduce it as accu-
rately as possible, for only in this way is a correct understanding
of this foreign world of ideas possible. To give just one
example, the term fundamental cognition (ālayavijñāna) of
the Yogācāra school tempts one immediately to translate it
as subconsciousness [Unterbewußtsein], but Buddhist philoso-
phy is also cognizant of the term consciousness [Bewußtsein].
Historically, to be exact, it designates it earlier as saṃjñā
[Bewusstsein (ideation); see for example S. 21], and later as
saṃvit [Bewußtsein (awareness), as in svasaṃvitti, i.e., Selbst-
bewußtsein (self-awareness); S. 391]. If it now designates the
fundamental cognition as cognition (vijñāna) and <6> not as
consciousness, then it defines it deliberately as a mental phe-
nomenon to which very definite qualities belong and which
is essentially different from consciousness. In my opinion, the
translator must capture this distinction and should not blur it.
Additionally, in a field as little examined as that of Bud-
dhist philosophy, much remains a matter of personal view. I, of
course, express my own views. My Geschichte der indischen
6 The Philosophy of Buddhism

Philosophie1 [History of Indian Philosophy] and separately

published scholarly treatises detail the reasoning underlying
these views. In a work such as the present one, there is no
place for a discussion of differing views. I would, however, like
to briefly deal with two points.
Up to now, the great Madhyamaka teacher Nāgārjuna has
been considered to be a southern-Indian. É. Lamotte, by contrast,
basing himself on the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa,2 recently ad-
vocated the view that Nāgārjuna was active in the north-west of
India. This is correct insofar as this work must actually have
originated in the north-west. I do not, however, consider it to
be a work of the great Nāgārjuna, and hence I continue to
adhere to the old view.
A second point concerns the distinction between Asaṅga and
his teacher Maitreyanātha. P. Demiéville has, in this regard,
recently demonstrated in great detail that, according to Indian
tradition, the works attributed by some scholars to a teacher of
Asaṅga’s named Maitreyanātha were revealed to Asaṅga by the
Bodhisattva Maitreya; that <7> the belief in such revelations was
quite common in Buddhist circles at that time; and that nothing
entitles us to deduce from this tradition a historical teacher of
Asaṅga’s named Maitreyanātha.3 I, however, do not take the
legend as my starting-point in this case. I find rather, that the
most important scriptures handed down under the name of
Asaṅga fall into two groups that differ sharply4 from each other

1
E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. Salzburg, Otto Müller
Verlag, I. Band 1953, II. Band 1956.
2
Cf. É. Lamotte, Sur la formation du Mahāyāna, Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich
Weller, Leipzig 1954, pp. 377–90.
3
P. Demiéville, La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa, Bulletin de l’École
Française d’Extrême-Orient, tome XLIV, Hanoi 1954, p. 381, note 4.
4
Cf. also my essay Amalavijñānam und Ālayavijñānam, ein Beitrag zur
Erkenntnislehre des Buddhismus, Beiträge zur Indischen Philologie und
 Introduction 7

in their philosophical views and are unrelated in juxtaposition

to one another. It is possible in and of itself that a philosopher
may change his views in the course of his life. If, however, the
contrast is so stark and, at the same time, tradition traces the
works of the one group back to foreign inspiration, it seems
justifiable to me to assume actual foreign origin and a different
author. In addition, the personal name Maitreyanātha is entirely
plausible and has actually been attested to. It is likewise quite
possible and understandable that the later tradition saw this
Maitreyanātha or, in brief, Maitreya, as the Bodhisattva and that
the legend originated in this way.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that the present work
restricts itself exclusively to the Buddhist philosophy of India
in the classical period. Within that restriction, it is also only a
modest sampling of an extensive literature. I hope, however, that
it will prove its worth as an initial introduction and that it will
enable the reader <8> to gain an initial overview so that, should
his interest continue, it will provide him with the prerequisites
to delve into the works of the Buddhist philosophers themselves.

Erich Frauwallner

Altertumskunde, Walther Schubring zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht,

Hamburg 1951, pp. 148–59. [Cf. Appendix I.]
 THE TEACHING
OF
T THE BUDDHA
A. T HE T EACHING OF THE B UDDHA

AA. The Buddha (ca. 560–480 b.c.e.)1

Subsequent to the teachings of the Upaniṣads, tradition next
informs us about the teaching of the Buddha. The Buddha was
admittedly not a philosopher in the proper sense, but the
proclaimer of a doctrine of liberation. Philosophical matters
restrict themselves for him to a few trains of thought and
tenets that provide the theoretical foundation for his path of
liberation. The impetus that originated from him, however, was
so strong, and such important philosophers later joined their
systems with his proclamation, that his teaching deserves special
consideration.
From a temporal and spatial point of view, the Buddha is
not far removed from the most recent doctrines of the Upaniṣad
period. The country where he was born, lived, and was active
was not far from the country of Videha where [king] Janaka, the

1
[The date of the Buddha was the subject of a 1988 conference in
Hedemünden near Göttingen (cf. the proceedings: Heinz Bechert (ed.),
The Dating of the Historical Buddha. 3 vols., Göttingen 1991–1998). For
a summary of the editor’s opinion, cf. Heinz Bechert, “The Date of the
Buddha Reconsidered,” Indologica Taurinensia 10, 1982, pp. 29–36. It is
nowadays generally accepted that the Buddha’s dates as given here
by Frauwallner should be changed by approximately 100 years to
somewhere between 500 and 350 b.c.e. Contemporary Buddhists celebrated
the 2500 year commemoration of the Buddha’s Parinirvana in 1956, thus
following the seemingly incorrect chronology of the Singhalese histories,
which gives the dates of the Buddha as 624–544 b.c.e.]
12 The Teaching of the Buddha

legendary patron of [the great upaniṣadic sage] Yājñavalkya, had

ruled. The temporal separation is also likely not very great. And
yet, much had changed in the interval. The momentum and the
initial enthusiasm of the Upaniṣad period had evaporated. Large
numbers of teachers were traversing the country preaching
their different doctrines. The squabblings of rival schools had
replaced the enthusiastic proclamation of the ātman-doctrine. At
the same time, however, the period was imbued with a profound
striving for liberation, which had the widest circles in its grip
and most especially reached the nobility.
Both had a decisive effect on the personality of the Buddha.
Above all else, he is imbued with a passionate urge to find
liberation from the suffering of existence. The philosophical
teaching activities of his time, on the other hand, repelled him.
He saw in them a mistaken path leading away from the actual
goal of liberation and this determined his attitude toward
philosophy for the duration of his life. Thus, he proclaims the
path of liberation, which he himself discovered through personal
experience. <10> As far as possible, he rejects theoretical
discussions, providing only the reasons for entanglement in the
suffering of existence and the possibility of liberation in a few
formulaic sentences.
AB. The proclamation of the Buddha
At the forefront of the proclamation of the Buddha stands the
sermon of Benares in which, to use the Buddhist expression, he
set in motion the wheel of the teachings. Just as, according
to Indian mythology, a miraculous wheel rolls in front of a
universal king, showing the path of his victorious advance
toward the conquest of the earth, so, through this sermon, the
Buddha set in motion the wheel of the teachings, which rolled
victoriously over the earth from then on. This sermon is
addressed to the five disciples who had accompanied the
Buddha during the period of his striving but had then turned
away from him when he gave up excessive mortification as
useless, accusing him of having turned toward a life of ease. The
opening words of the sermon allude to this. The proclamation
of the four noble truths, which according to the early view
makes up the core of the liberating cognition, then follows. The
sermon has the following wording:

ABA. The sermon of Benares (Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra)

Thereupon the Exalted One addressed the group of five monks:
“Monks, one who has renounced the world should not adhere
to the following two extremes. Which two? On the one hand,
with regard to desires, to the devotion to the pleasure of desires,
which is low, vulgar, worldly, unworthy of a noble one and
which does not lead to the goal, and on the other hand, to the
devotion to self-mortification, which is painful, unworthy of a
noble one and which does not lead to the goal. Without
following either of these extremes, monks, the Perfected One
14 The Teaching of the Buddha

realized the middle way that brings about vision and brings
about knowledge and that leads to calming, to special
knowledge, to enlightenment, to extinction (nirvāṇa). What, <11>
monks, is this middle way, which the Perfected One has
realized, that brings about vision and brings about knowledge
and that leads to calming, to special knowledge, to enlighten-
ment, to extinction? It is the noble eightfold path, namely, right
view, right thought, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood,
right striving, right mindfulness, and right concentration. This,
monks, is the middle way, which the Perfected One has realized,
that brings about vision and brings about knowledge, and that
leads to calming, to special knowledge, to enlightenment, to
extinction.
Furthermore, monks, this is the noble truth of suffering. Birth
is suffering, old age is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is
suffering, to be united with what is unpleasant is suffering, to be
separated from what is pleasant is suffering, if one wants
something and does not get it, that also is suffering; in brief, the
five groups of grasping (upādānaskandha) 1 are suffering.
Furthermore, monks, this is the noble truth of the origin
of suffering. It is the thirst (tṛṣṇā) leading to rebirth, which,
accompanied by delight and passion, finds enjoyment here and
there, namely, thirst for desire, thirst for becoming, thirst
for annihilation.
Furthermore, monks, this is the noble truth of the cessation
of suffering. It is the cessation of thirst through complete
passionlessness, giving up, refusing, emancipation, and not
holding on to it.
Furthermore, monks, this is the noble truth of the way
leading to the cessation of suffering. It is the noble eightfold
path, namely, right view, right thought, right speech, right

1
The five groups that form the worldly personality (see S. 26) are so called
because the thirst for existence is directed toward them and clings to them.
 The proclamation of the Buddha 15

conduct, right livelihood, right striving, right mindfulness, and

right concentration. <12>
‘This is the noble truth of suffering, this is the noble truth
of the origin of suffering, this is the noble truth of the cessation
of suffering, this is the noble truth of the way leading to the
cessation of suffering’: thus, monks, in regard to things unheard
before, there arose in me the sight, there arose in me the
understanding, the insight, the knowledge, the seeing.
‘Suffering, this noble truth, must be recognized; the origin of
suffering, this noble truth, must be avoided; the cessation of
suffering, this noble truth, must be realized; the way leading to
the cessation of suffering, this noble truth, must be practiced’:
thus, monks, in regard to things unheard before, there arose in
me the sight, there arose in me the understanding, the insight,
the knowledge, the seeing.
As long, monks, as I did not possess in full clarity this
threefold knowledge and vision with its twelve aspects in regard
to these four noble truths, so long, monks, did I not claim to
have attained the highest perfect enlightenment in this world
with its heavenly gods, lords of death, and Brahma-gods, and
among these beings with its ascetics and brahmins, with its gods
and humans.
But, monks, since the time when I possessed in full clarity this
threefold knowledge and vision with its twelve aspects in regard
to these four noble truths, since that time, monks, do I claim that
I have attained the highest perfect enlightenment in this world
with its heavenly gods, lords of death, and Brahma-gods, and
among these beings with its ascetics and brahmins, with its gods
and humans. And there arose in me the knowledge and vision:
Unshakable is the liberation of my mind; this is my last birth;
from now on there is no rebirth.” <13>
Thus the Exalted One spoke. The group of five monks joyfully
hailed the discourse of the Exalted One.
 16 The Teaching of the Buddha

In view of the great importance tradition accords the four

noble truths, this proclamation’s lack of content is striking.
In it, not much more is said than that existence is full of
suffering, that the origin of suffering is desire, and that
the cessation of suffering occurs through the annihilation
of desire by means of the noble eightfold path. In particular,
the explanation of the noble eightfold path is scanty,
offering only unelaborated general concepts, nothing
clearly graspable. The sermon of Benares is therefore best
seen as a kind of programmatic announcement, a frame-
work to be completed and fleshed out through subsequent
more detailed teachings. And the Buddha did indeed richly
provide such additions in the course of his long teaching
activity. First and foremost, a detailed presentation of the
path of liberation exists, which is repeated in numerous
Buddhist canonical texts and which contains precise,
detailed instructions. According to this presentation, the
path of liberation appears to be roughly as follows:

ABB. The Buddhist path of liberation

To begin with, the disciple who renounces the world and goes
forth from home into homelessness, trusting in the word of
the Buddha, must observe a number of moral precepts. This
is followed next by the guarding of the senses, i.e., he should
not, through sense impressions, allow himself to become
excited and carried away by passion. Thirdly comes the practice
of mindfulness and awareness, according to which whatever
one does and refrains from doing must always occur with a
clear awareness of its meaning and consequences. These are
all preparations of a general nature. Only through them does
the disciple become able to enter the path of liberation in its
stricter sense. This path is—in the Indian tradition—a path of
yoga, i.e., through inner concentration, the mind is gradually
brought into a state of increased lucidity in which it is able
 The proclamation of the Buddha 17

to cognize every intended object through direct vision with

complete clarity and certainty. To this end, the disciple sits down
in a solitary place with crossed legs in the customary yoga-
position and <14> first makes an effort to overcome the five
mental hindrances. He then makes his way through the four
stages of meditation, through which the Buddha himself
originally discovered the liberating cognition, until, at the
fourth and last stage, he has gained the desired clear vision. This
he then directs first toward his own fate in earlier births, then
toward the law of the cycle of existences in general as it rules
the entire world. Finally, he directs it toward the four noble
truths themselves. He is now able, through his own vision, to
recognize them as true with complete certainty through his own
vision. As a result of this, passion and ignorance, which have
held him in the cycle of existences until now, vanish. Liberation
is won and he becomes aware that he is liberated. This most
important part of the path of liberation has the following
wording:

ABB.1. From the “Kandaraka Sutta” (Majjhima Nikāya 51)

Armed with this noble group of moral precepts, with this noble
guarding of the senses, and with this noble mindfulness and
awareness, (the disciple) seeks out a secluded dwelling, a forest,
the foot of a tree, a mountain, a ravine, a mountain cave, a
charnel ground, a wilderness, a place in the open air, or a heap
of straw. There, on returning from his alms round, he sits
down—after his meal—with crossed legs, holding his body
erect, while establishing mindfulness.
[1] After he has abandoned greed for this world, he abides
with a mind free from greed; he purifies his mind from greed.
[2] Having abandoned malice and anger, he abides with a mind
free from malice; concerned about the welfare of all living
beings, he purifies his mind of malice and anger. [3] Having
abandoned rigidity and languidness, he abides [with a mind]
18 The Teaching of the Buddha

free from rigidity and <15> languidness; with a clear conscious-

ness, mindful and aware, he purifies his mind of rigidity and
languidness. [4] Having abandoned agitation and remorse, he
remains without agitation; with a mind inwardly calmed, he
purifies his mind of agitation and remorse. [5] Having aban-
doned doubt, he remains free from doubt; not in the dark about
the wholesome factors, he purifies his mind of doubt.
After he has abandoned these five hindrances and has
recognized the weakening disturbances of the mind, through
separation from desires and separation from unwholesome
factors, amid contemplation and reflection, he attains the satis-
faction and ease born through this separation, and he remains
therein. This is the first stage of meditation.
After contemplation and reflection have come to rest, he
attains inner calm and one-pointedness of mind and in this
way—free from contemplation and reflection—the satisfaction
and ease born through this concentration, and he remains
therein. This is the second stage of meditation.
After turning away from satisfaction, he remains in equa-
nimity, mindful and aware, and experiences ease through his
body. This state is that of which the noble ones say: “He has
equanimity, is mindful, and remains at ease.” He attains [it] and
remains therein. This is the third stage of meditation.
Having abandoned ease and discomfort—contentedness and
discontentedness having already previously disappeared—he
attains, free from discomfort and ease, pure equanimity and
[pure] mindfulness, and he remains therein. This is the fourth
stage of meditation.
His mind having thus become collected, purified, cleansed,
unblemished, free from disturbances, supple, effective, firm, and
unshakable, <16> he directs it to the cognition of the recollection
of previous births. He recollects many former births, one birth,
two births, three births, four births, five births, ten births, twenty
births, thirty births, forty births, fifty births, a hundred births,
 The proclamation of the Buddha 19

a thousand births, a hundred thousand births, numerous periods

of cosmic destruction, numerous periods of cosmic creation,
numerous periods of cosmic destruction and creation. “Here I
had this name, belonged to such a lineage and such a caste, had
such sustenance, experienced such pleasure and suffering, lived
for so-and-so long; here I passed away and there I was reborn.
There I had this name, belonged to such a lineage and such a
caste, had such sustenance, experienced such pleasure and such
pain, lived for so-and-so long; there I passed away and there
I was reborn.” Thus he recollects many former births with all
their circumstances and particulars.
His mind having thus become collected, purified, cleansed,
unblemished, free from disturbances, supple, effective, firm, and
unshakable, he directs it to the cognition of the passing away
and reappearance of beings. He sees with the divine, purified,
superhuman eye how beings pass away and reappear, and he
recognizes beings that are low and high, beautiful and ugly, that
are on the good course and on the bad course, as they return
each according to their deeds: “These beings are endowed with
bad conduct of body, with bad conduct of speech, with bad
conduct of mind, they criticize the noble ones, maintain false
views, and perform deeds that are based on these false views.
<17> After the disintegration of the body, after death they
proceed on the wrong track, on the bad course, to their down-
fall, to hell. These beings, on the other hand, are endowed with
good conduct of body, with good conduct of speech, with good
conduct of mind, they do not criticize the noble ones, have right
views, and perform deeds based on these right views. After the
disintegration of the body, after death they proceed on a good
course, to a heavenly world.” Thus he sees with the divine,
purified, superhuman eye how beings pass away and reappear,
and he recognizes beings that are low and high, beautiful and
ugly, on the good course and on the bad course, as they return
each according to their deeds.
20 The Teaching of the Buddha

His mind having thus become collected, purified, cleansed,

unblemished, free from disturbances, supple, effective, firm, and
unshakable, he directs it to the cognition of the vanishing of the
negative influxes (āsrava). “This is suffering,” he knows in
accordance with truth. “This is the origin of suffering,” he knows
in accordance with truth. “This is the cessation of suffering,” he
knows in accordance with truth. “This is the way leading to the
cessation of suffering,” he knows in accordance with truth.
“These are the (negative) influxes,” he knows in accordance with
truth. “This is the origin of the (negative) influxes,” he knows in
accordance with truth. “This is the cessation of the (negative)
influxes,” he knows in accordance with truth. “This is the way
leading to the cessation of the (negative) influxes,” he knows in
accordance with truth. By knowing such, envisioning such, his
mind is liberated from the (negative) influxes of desire, from
the (negative) influxes of becoming, from the (negative) influxes
of ignorance. In the liberated one there arises the knowledge
of his liberation: “Rebirth is destroyed, <18> the holy life is
accomplished, the duty is fulfilled; there is no more returning
to this world.” Thus he knows.
AC. Questions that the Buddha did not answer
As we have already noted, the Buddha rejected philosophical
questions insofar as they do not immediately concern the path of
liberation. This is particularly true in the case of the questions
about the existence and nature of the soul, and about one’s fate
after death. He does not answer these questions in the negative.
He does not, for example, deny the existence of the soul and
he does not teach that nirvāṇa is annihilation. On the contrary,
much suggests that he tacitly presupposed views similar to those
developed in the final stage of the fire doctrine of the Upaniṣads.
He does not address these questions, however, remaining silent
about them because they “do not lead to turning away (from the
mundane), to passionlessness, to cessation (of the transient), to
calming, to special knowledge, to enlightenment, to extinction.”
In the rare cases where he is persuaded to speak, however, he
expresses himself to the effect that the nature of the soul and the
state of the liberated one are inconceivable and inexpressible.
The following two texts may convey some sense of the Buddha’s
behavior in this regard.

ACA. Ānanda [Saṃyutta Nikāya 44, 10]

(On one occasion the Exalted One was dwelling at Rājagṛha in
the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrel’s Feeding Place.) At that time
the wandering monk Vatsagotra betook himself to where the
Exalted One resided. Having gone there, he exchanged greetings
with the Exalted One and, after having exchanged greetings
and friendly words, he sat down to one side. Sitting to one side,
 22 The Teaching of the Buddha

the wandering monk Vatsagotra spoke to the Exalted One as

follows: “Is there, O Gautama, a self (ātmā)?”
When this was said, the Exalted One was silent.
“Then, is there, O Gautama, no self?”
Again, the Exalted One was silent. Then the wandering monk
Vatsagotra rose from his seat and departed. <19>
Then, not long after the wandering monk Vatsagotra had left,
the Venerable Ānanda said to the Exalted One the following:
“Why, O Lord, did the Exalted One not answer the question
addressed to him by the wandering monk Vatsagotra?”
“If, Ānanda, in regard to the question, whether there is a self,
I had answered the wandering monk Vatsagotra: ‘There is a
self,’ then, Ānanda, I would have sided with the ascetics and
brahmins who teach eternality. And if, Ānanda, in regard to the
question, whether there is no self, I had answered the wandering
monk Vatsagotra: ‘There is no self,’ then, Ānanda, I would have
sided with the ascetics and brahmins who teach annihilation.
If then, Ānanda, in regard to the question, whether there is a
self, I had answered the wandering monk Vatsagotra: ‘There is
a self,’ would it have helped me to bring forth [in Vatsagotra]
the knowledge that all entities are not the self?”
“No, O Lord.”
“And if, Ānanda, in regard to the question, whether there is
no self, I had answered the wandering monk Vatsagotra: ‘There
is no self,’ then, Ānanda, it would have caused (the wandering
monk) Vatsagotra, who is already bewildered, even more
bewilderment: ‘It seemed that my self existed formerly, but now,
does it no longer exist?’ “

ACB. The Discourse of Vatsagotra and the Fire

(Aggivacchagottasuttanta) [Majjhima Nikāya 72]
Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Exalted One was dwell-
ing at Śrāvastī in Jetavana, the Gardens of Anāthapiṇḍada.
At that time the wandering monk Vatsagotra betook himself
 Questions that the Buddha did not answer 23

to where the Exalted One resided. Having gone there, he

exchanged greetings with the Exalted One and, after having
exchanged greetings and friendly words, <20> he sat down to
one side. Sitting to one side, the wandering monk Vatsagotra
spoke to the Exalted One as follows:
“How is it, O Gautama? Does the Lord Gautama hold the
view that the world is eternal, that alone this is true and
everything else is erroneous?”
“No, Vatsa, I do not hold the view that the world is eternal,
that this alone is true and everything else is erroneous.”
“How is it then, O Gautama? Does the Lord Gautama hold
the view that the world will end, that this alone is true and
everything else is erroneous?”
“No, Vatsa, I do not hold the view that the world will end,
that this alone is true and everything else is erroneous.”
“How is it then, O Gautama? Does the Lord Gautama hold
the view that the world is limited, that this alone is true and
everything else is erroneous?”
“No, Vatsa, I do not hold the view that the world is limited,
that this alone is true and everything else is erroneous.”
“How is it then, O Gautama? Does the Lord Gautama hold
the view that the world is unlimited, that this alone is true and
everything else is erroneous?”
“No, Vatsa, I do not hold the view that the world is unlimited,
that this alone is true and everything else is erroneous.”

This is followed by questions about whether the soul and

the body are the same or whether they are different,
whether the Perfected One exists after death, whether he
does not exist, whether he both exists and does not exist,
whether he neither exists nor does not exist, and the
Buddha’s answer always remains the same. Then Vatsa-
gotra says:
24 The Teaching of the Buddha

“In regard to the question: ‘How is it, O Gautama? Does the

Lord Gautama hold the view, that the world is eternal, that this
alone is true and everything else is erroneous?’ you answer: ‘No,
Vatsa, I do not hold the view that the world is eternal, that this
alone is true and everything else is erroneous.’ In regard to the
question: ‘How is it then, O Gautama? Does the Lord Gautama
hold the view that the world will end, <21> that this alone is true
and everything else is erroneous?’ you answer: ‘No, Vatsa, I do
not hold the view that the world will end, that this alone is true
and everything else is erroneous.’ “

The same is repeated regarding all the other questions and

then Vatsagotra ends with the following words:

“What defect does the Lord Gautama see in these [speculative]

views that, altogether, he does not accept them?”
“ ‘The world is eternal,’ this [speculative] view, Vatsa, is a
thicket of a view, a wilderness of a view, a cramp of a view,
a shivering of a view, a fetter of a view, it is full of suffering, full
of distress, full of despair, full of torment and does not lead
to turning away, to passionlessness, to cessation (of all worldly
things), to calming, to special knowledge, to enlightenment,
to extinction.”

Again, the same is repeated regarding all the other [specula-

tive] views, and then the Buddha ends:

“This defect, Vatsa, do I see in these [speculative] views that,

altogether, I do not accept them.”
“Then does the Lord Gautama hold any [speculative] view?”
“Vatsa, a view is foreign to the Perfected One, for the
Perfected One, Vatsa, has understood the following: This is
corporeality (rūpa), this is the origin of corporeality, this is
the disappearance of corporeality; this is sensation, this is the
 Questions that the Buddha did not answer 25

origin of sensation, this is the disappearance of sensation; this

is ideation, this is the origin of ideation, this is the disappearance
of ideation; these are the formations, this is the origin of the
formations, this is the disappearance of the formations; this is
cognition, this is the origin of cognition, this is the disappear-
ance of cognition. Thus, I say, the Perfected One is completely
liberated through the vanishing, the refusal, the cessation, the
giving up, <22> and rejecting of all the opinions, all the worries,
and all the burdens caused by the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ “
“But where, O Gautama, does a monk whose mind is thus
liberated arise (again)?”
“Arising, Vatsa, does not apply.”
“But then, O Gautama, does he not arise (again)?”
“Not arising, Vatsa, does not apply.”
“But then, O Gautama, does he arise and not arise (again)?”
“Arising and not arising, Vatsa, does not apply.”
“But then, O Gautama, does he neither arise nor not
arise (again)?”
“Neither-arising-nor-not-arising, Vatsa, does not apply.”
“In regard to the question: ‘But where, O Gautama, does a
monk whose mind is thus liberated arise (again)?’ you answer:
‘Arising, Vatsa, does not apply.’ In regard to the question: ‘But
then, O Gautama, does he not arise (again)?’ you answer:
‘Not arising, Vatsa, does not apply.’ In regard to the question:
‘But then, O Gautama, does he arise and not arise (again)?’ you
answer: ‘Arising and not arising, Vatsa, does not apply.’ And
in regard to the question: ‘But then, does he neither arise nor
not arise (again)?’ you answer: ‘Neither-arising-nor-not-arising,
Vatsa, does not apply.’ Here, O Gautama, I have now fallen into
ignorance, here I have fallen into bewilderment, and the clarity
that I had gained through the previous conversation with Lord
Gautama has now been lost.”
“Enough with ignorance, Vatsa, enough with bewilderment!
This teaching, Vatsa, is profound, difficult to see, difficult to
26 The Teaching of the Buddha

understand, peaceful, sublime, inaccessible to reasoning, subtle,

comprehensible only to the wise; [this teaching] is difficult to
understand for you who holds other views, who indulges in
other [things] and delights in other [things], who follows another
rule and <23> another teaching. Therefore, Vatsa, I will now
address counter-questions to you; answer as you see fit. What do
you think, Vatsa, if a fire were burning here in front of you,
would you then know: ‘A fire is burning in front of me’?”
“If, O Gautama, a fire were burning in front of me, I would
know: ‘A fire is burning here in front of me.’ “
“If someone were to ask you now: ‘By what means is this fire
burning that is burning in front of you?’ How would you, Vatsa,
answer this question?”
“If, O Gautama, somebody would ask me: ‘By what means is
this fire burning that is burning in front of you?’ I, O Gautama,
would answer: ‘This fire that is burning in front of me is burning
by means of the fuel of grass and wood.’ “
“If now, Vatsa, the fire in front of you were to go out, would
you know: ‘This fire in front of me has gone out.’?”
“If, O Gautama, the fire in front of me were to go out, I would
know: ‘This fire in front of me has gone out.’ “
“If, Vatsa, someone were to ask you now: ‘In which direction
did the fire that went out in front of you go, to the east, to the
west, to the north, or to the south?,’ how would you, Vatsa,
answer this question?”
“This does not apply, O Gautama, for the fire has consumed
the fuel of grass and wood by means of which it was burning,
more [fuel] was not supplied and thus, without sustenance, it
is defined as having gone out.”
“Just so, Vatsa, corporeality, sensation, ideation, formations,
and cognition—by means of which one might describe the
Perfected One, if one wished to describe him—are given up,
uprooted, like a palm tree pulled out of the ground, annihilated,
and in future no longer subject to coming into existence. Free
 Questions that the Buddha did not answer 27

from any reckoning in terms of corporeality, sensation, ideation,

formations, and cognition, Vatsa, the Perfected One is profound,
immeasurable, <24> and difficult to fathom like the ocean.
‘Arising’ does not apply, ‘not arising’ does not apply, ‘arising
and not arising’ does not apply, ‘neither-arising-nor-not-arising’
does not apply.”
In answer to this speech, the wandering monk Vatsagotra
said the following to the Exalted One: “Just as if, O Gautama, a
great śāla tree stood near a village or market-town, and, due to
impermanence, the branches and the leaves fell off from it, the
bark and dry dead bark fell off, and the sapwood fell off, and
[the tree] then stood there pure as heartwood, without branches
and leaves, without bark and dry dead bark, and without
sapwood, just so the proclamation of the Lord Gautama stands
there pure as heartwood, without branches and leaves, without
bark and dry dead bark, and without sapwood. Wonderful,
O Gautama, wonderful, O Gautama! Just as if, O Gautama, one
were to set upright what is bent down or were to reveal what
has been hidden or were to show the path to one who is lost or
were to carry an oil-lamp in the dark so that all those who have
eyes can see the forms (of things), just so Lord Gautama has
proclaimed the teaching in manifold ways. I take refuge in Lord
Gautama, in the teaching, and in the community of monks. May
Lord Gautama consider me, from today onward and for the rest
of my life, as a lay follower who has taken his refuge in him.”

Lastly it should be briefly noted that although as a rule the

Buddha adhered strictly to the attitude discussed here and,
above all, avoided speaking of a self or a soul, nonetheless,
here and there one does also find texts that contradict this.
The dispute between the later schools is connected with
this. A well-known example of this is the following short
sutra, in which the Buddha, contrary to his usual habit,
speaks of a personality (pudgala). <25>
 28 The Teaching of the Buddha

ACC. The Discourse of the Bearer of the Burden (Bhārahārasūtra)

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Exalted One was dwell-
ing at Śrāvastī in Jetavana, the Gardens of Anāthapiṇḍada. There
the Exalted One spoke to the monks:
I will expound to you, monks, the burden, the taking up of
the burden, the laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the
burden. So listen and pay thorough and good attention. I will
speak to you.
What is the burden? The five groups of grasping (upādāna-
skandha). What five? Corporeality as a group of grasping, sensa-
tion as a group of grasping, ideation as a group of grasping,
formations as a group of grasping, and cognition as a group of
grasping.
What is the taking up of the burden? It is the thirst that leads to
rebirth, which, accompanied by delight and passion, finds
enjoyment here and there.
What is the laying down of the burden? It is the complete
abandoning, the rejecting, the shaking off, the vanishing, the
refusal, the cessation, the ceasing, the disappearing of the thirst
that leads to rebirth, which, accompanied by delight and
passion, finds enjoyment here and there.
Who is the bearer of the burden? This should be answered
in the following way: the person, i.e., that venerable one who
has such and such a name, who is of such and such a family,
is descended from such and such a lineage, eats such food,
experiences such pleasure and such suffering, whose life lasts
so-and-so long, who will live for so-and-so long, and whose
lifetime is so-and-so limited. This is what is called the burden,
the taking up of the burden, the laying down of the burden,
and the bearer of the burden.” <26>
Then the Exalted One added the following verse: “If one has
laid down the heavy burden, one should not newly take it up
again. The heavy burden brings great suffering, the laying down
of the burden brings great joy. One must annihilate all thirst,
 Questions that the Buddha did not answer 29

then all formations vanish. If one clearly cognizes the remaining

objects, then there is no further rebirth.”
Thus spoke the Exalted One. The monks joyfully hailed the
speech of the Exalted One.
AD. The tenet of dependent origination
We turn now to the actual philosophical tenets of Buddhism,
namely, the foundation of the path of liberation. In the sermon of
Benares, we have not discovered more in this regard than that
thirst is the cause of suffering. Later, however, this concept was
developed further. First and foremost, a distinction was made
between thirst aroused by sense-objects and thirst directed
toward one’s worldly existence. When, that is, the senses come
in contact with their objects, sensations arise and these awaken
desire. In this way, the so-called thirst for [objects of] desire
(kāmatṛṣṇā) arises. The second form of thirst comes into being as
follows. Taking the worldly personality to be the true self (ātmā)
is particularly fateful for one’s entanglement in existence.
The Buddha, on the other hand, has shown that the worldly
personality is in truth only a combination of different kinds
of factors (dharma), some material, some mental, all imper-
manent and all belonging to this world. He distinguished five
groups (skandha) of such factors, corporeality (rūpa), sensation
(vedanā), ideation (saṃjñā), formations (saṃskāra), and cognition
(vijñāna). One of the most important points of the Buddha’s
sermon, therefore, is to demonstrate that these five groups are
not the true self. Whoever—as is usual among ordinary human
beings—nonetheless takes them to be the self, comes to cling
to them. This attachment to the worldly personality is one of
the most important causes for constantly being reborn and this is
the second form of thirst, the <27> so-called thirst for becoming
(bhavatṛṣṇā). Occasionally, as a third form of thirst, the thirst for
annihilation (vibhavatṛṣṇā) was also placed beside these, since
striving for annihilation is just as much a mistaken path for one
 The tenet of dependent origination 31

seeking liberation as is striving for the continuation of life. This

third form never gained any great importance, however, and
was soon dropped.
The development of the concept of thirst demonstrates
some remarkable thinking. Far more important, however, was
that a second concept, i.e., that of ignorance, was drawn upon
in order to explain entanglement in the cycle of existences, and that
this [concept] was tied to the concept of thirst. Beginning
with the oldest teachings of the Upaniṣads, it was customary
to see the means of release, above all else, in knowledge, i.e.,
in a liberating cognition. What followed naturally from this
was to find the cause of entanglement in worldly existence
in the lack of this cognition, in ignorance. Since Buddhism
likewise made liberation dependent on the attainment of
a liberating cognition, it also could not avoid this conclusion.
Thus it came about that ignorance was placed next to thirst
as a cause of entanglement in the cycle of existences. The
two were united when a continuous chain of causes and
effects was devised to explain both the arising of entangle-
ment and the ever recurring rebirth. Thus emerged the most
important theoretical tenet that Buddhism in its oldest form
produced, the famous tenet of dependent origination (pratītya-
samutpāda). The examples that follow are intended to present
this tenet, its interpretation and its development.1 Here I have
chosen examples more generously, not only because of the
significance due this tenet itself, but also because it has been
dealt with quite often and explained in most diverse ways
in Europe. The following examples, on the other hand, are
intended, at least to a modest extent, to show how this tenet,
and its interpretation, are presented in the Buddhist tradition
itself.

1
[See Frauwallner’s further general explanations on his presentation of
dependent origination, pp. 50f.]
 32 The Teaching of the Buddha

Legend places the discovery of the tenet of dependent

origination as early as when the <28> Buddha had only just
attained enlightenment, and describes how he spent a long time
in contemplation, mulling it over again and again. In view of
this, it is said:

ADA. The Account of Enlightenment (Bodhikathā; Mahāvagga I, 1)

At that time the Buddha, the Exalted One, was dwelling at
Uruvilvā on the bank of the river Nairañjanā at the foot of the
tree of enlightenment just after he had attained enlightenment.
The Exalted One then sat cross-legged for seven days in one
and the same position at the foot of the tree of enlightenment
while experiencing the ease of liberation.
Then, in the . . . night, the Exalted One contemplated depend-
ent arising in the forward and in reverse order: Dependent on
ignorance, volitional formations (saṃskāra) come into being;
dependent on volitional formations, cognition; dependent on
cognition, name and form; dependent on name and form,
the sixfold sphere; dependent on the sixfold sphere, contact;
dependent on contact, sensation; dependent on sensation, thirst;
dependent on thirst, grasping; dependent on grasping, becoming;
dependent on becoming, birth; dependent on birth, old age and
death, sorrow and lamentation, pain, distress, and despair. Thus the
origin of this whole mass of suffering comes about.
Through the cessation of ignorance due to complete passion-
lessness, the volitional formations cease; through the cessation
of the volitional formations, cognition ceases; through the cessation
of cognition, name and form cease; through the cessation of name
and form, the sixfold sphere ceases; <29> through the cessation of
the sixfold sphere, contact ceases; through the cessation of contact,
sensation ceases; through the cessation of sensation, thirst ceases;
through the cessation of thirst, grasping ceases; through the
cessation of grasping, becoming ceases; through the cessation of
becoming, birth ceases; through the cessation of birth, old age and
 The tenet of dependent origination 33

death, sorrow and lamentation, pain, distress, and despair cease. Thus
the cessation of this whole mass of suffering comes about.
When the Exalted One had understood this matter, he spoke
the following words: “Truly, when the factors (dharma) come
into view for the striving and pondering brahmin, then all
his doubts disappear, since he understands the factors together
with their causes.”

This text presents the tenet of dependent origination in its

customary form. Here, the suffering of existence is traced
back through a twelve-membered chain of causes and
effects to ignorance as the last cause. Individually, the
members of this causal chain are to be understood
approximately as follows: The last cause of entanglement
in the cycle of existences is, as mentioned, ignorance, i.e.,
being unaware of the liberating cognition, the four noble
truths. In the person who does not possess this cognition,
volitional formations directed toward the sense-objects and
the worldly personality come into being. Cognition, which
like a subtle body is the bearer of rebirth, enters into a new
womb after death, driven by these volitional formations.
Subsequent to cognition, the body and the factors of the
psyche—as this is what is meant by name and form—
develop, and finally also the sixfold sphere, i.e., the sense-
organs of the new being which thus enters into existence.
If this new being is now born, then the <30> fateful contact
of the sense-organs with their objects occurs. Sensations
of various kinds come into being and rouse the passions,
foremost being the thirst that clings to sense-pleasures
and to the supposed self, or, as Buddhist texts say, that
grasps them, and thereby leads to renewed bondage and
new existence. Once again, birth and entanglement in the
suffering of existence come about, and so it goes, in an
endless chain, for as long as the liberating cognition and
 34 The Teaching of the Buddha

the annihilation of thirst do not put an end to the cycle

[of existence].
It cannot be denied that this tenet of dependent
origination shows some obscurities. Firstly, it is notice-
able that two causes of rebirth, ignorance and thirst, are
strung together quite superficially, and accordingly, two
descriptions of how worldly existence comes about are
given. This tenet has in fact always been considered to be
obscure and difficult. Together with the important position
that it holds within the proclamation of the Buddha, this
has led to the fact that people have occupied themselves
with it again and again and have repeatedly attempted to
interpret it anew. This [interpretation] has already begun
in the oldest parts of the Buddhist canon and continues
through the scholasticism of the later schools. Indeed, in
the course of time, considerably broader meaning was
ascribed to it and fundamental philosophical significance
attributed to it. In the following, therefore, at least a few
short examples of this development are presented. The
first of these comes from the old canon and comprises a
conversation between the Buddha and his favorite student
Ānanda, in which the Buddha explains the causal chain to
him. Noteworthy about this is that in this conversation the
causal chain ends with cognition.

ADB. The Great Discourse of the Foundations of Origination

(Mahānidānasuttanta; Dīgha Nikāya 15)
1
Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Exalted One was
dwelling in the land of the Kurus, where there is a market-town
of the Kurus <31> named Kalmāṣadamya. Then the venerable
Ānanda betook himself to where the Exalted One resided. After
arriving there and having greeted the Exalted One, he sat down
 The tenet of dependent origination 35

to one side. Sitting to one side, the venerable Ānanda spoke as

follows to the Exalted One:
“It is wonderful, O Lord, it is astonishing, O Lord, how
profound this dependent origination is and how profound it
appears. And yet it seems to me as if it were clearly right before
my eyes.”
“Do not say that, Ānanda! Do not say that, Ānanda! This
dependent origination, Ānanda, is profound and it appears
profound. And because they do not understand and do not
penetrate this doctrine, therefore, Ānanda, these beings—
tangled like a thread, covered with pustules, and like blades of
grass—are not able to pass beyond the wrong track, the bad
course, the down-fall, the cycle of existences.
2
If, Ānanda, it is asked: ‘Is old age and death dependent on
anything?’ then the answer should be: ‘Yes.’ And if the person
asking says: ‘On what is old age and death dependent?’ then the
answer should be: ‘Old age and death is dependent on birth.’
If, Ānanda, it is asked: ‘Is birth dependent on anything?’
then the answer should be: ‘Yes.’ And if the person asking says:
‘On what is birth dependent?’ then the answer should be: ‘Birth
is dependent on becoming.’
If, Ānanda, it is asked: ‘Is becoming dependent on anything?’
then the answer should be: ‘Yes.’ And if the person asking says:
‘On what is becoming dependent?’ then the answer should be:
‘Becoming is dependent on grasping.’ <32>
If, Ānanda, it is asked: ‘Is grasping dependent on anything?’
then the answer should be: ‘Yes.’ And if the person asking says:
‘On what is grasping dependent?’ then the answer should be:
‘Grasping is dependent on thirst.’
If, Ānanda, it is asked: ‘Is thirst dependent on anything?’
then the answer should be: ‘Yes.’ And if the person asking says:
‘On what is thirst dependent?’ then the answer should be: ‘Thirst
is dependent on sensation.’
36 The Teaching of the Buddha

If, Ānanda, it is asked: ‘Is sensation dependent on anything?’

then the answer should be: ‘Yes.’ And if the person asking says:
‘On what is sensation dependent?’ then the answer should be:
‘Sensation is dependent on contact.’
If, Ānanda, it is asked: ‘Is contact dependent on anything?’
then the answer should be: ‘Yes.’ And if the person asking says:
‘On what is contact dependent?’ then the answer should be:
‘Contact is dependent on name and form.’1
If, Ānanda, it is asked: ‘Is name and form dependent on
anything?’ then the answer should be: ‘Yes.’ And if the person
asking says: ‘On what is name and form dependent?’ then the
answer should be: ‘Name and form is dependent on cognition.’
If, Ānanda, it is asked: ‘Is cognition dependent on anything?’
then the answer should be: ‘Yes.’ And if the person asking says:
‘On what is cognition dependent?’ then the answer should be:
‘Cognition is dependent on name and form.’ <33>
3
Thus, Ānanda, cognition is dependent on name and form, and
name and form dependent on cognition; dependent on name
and form, contact comes into being; dependent on contact,
sensation comes into being; dependent on sensation, thirst;
dependent on thirst, grasping; dependent on grasping, becom-
ing; dependent on becoming, birth; dependent on birth, old age
and death; dependent on old age and death, sorrow and lamen-
tation, pain, distress, and despair. Thus the origin of this whole
mass of suffering comes about.
4
It has been said: ‘Dependent on birth, old age and death comes
into being.’ Now, how old age and death comes into being
dependent on birth should be understood in the following way.
If, Ānanda, birth did not exist, that is, not at all and in no way, of
anybody and anywhere, i.e., of gods as gods, of gandharvas as

1
The sixfold sphere is skipped here.
 The tenet of dependent origination 37

gandharvas, of yakṣas as yakṣas, of ghosts as ghosts, of humans

as humans, of quadrupeds as quadrupeds, of birds as birds, of
reptiles as reptiles, and if birth of such and such beings as this
and that did not exist, if, then, birth did not exist at all, would
one, after the cessation of birth, observe old age and death?” –
“No, O Lord.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this here is the ground, this the foun-
dation, this the origin, and this the cause of old age and death,
namely, birth.
5
Furthermore, it has been said: ‘Dependent on becoming, birth
comes into being.’ Now, how birth comes into being depend-
ent on <34> becoming should be understood in the following
way. If, Ānanda, becoming did not exist, that is, not at all and in
no way, of anybody and anywhere, namely, a becoming in the
sphere of desire, a becoming in the sphere of the material, and
a becoming in the sphere of the immaterial, if, then, becoming
did not exist at all, would one, after the cessation of becoming,
observe birth?” – “No, O Lord.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this here is the ground, this the foun-
dation, this the origin, and this the cause of birth, namely,
becoming.
6
Furthermore, it has been said: ‘Dependent on grasping, becoming
comes into being.’ Now, how becoming comes into being
dependent on grasping should be understood in the following
way. If, Ānanda, grasping did not exist, that is, not at all and
in no way, of anybody and anywhere, namely, grasping after
[objects of] desire, grasping after views, grasping after moral
behavior and after vows, grasping after the doctrine of a
personal self, if, then, grasping were not to exist at all, would
one, after the cessation of grasping, observe becoming?” – “No,
O Lord.”
38 The Teaching of the Buddha

“Therefore, Ānanda, this here is the ground, this the foun-

dation, this the origin and this the cause of becoming, namely,
grasping.
7
Furthermore, it has been said: ‘Dependent on thirst, grasping
comes into being.’ Now, how grasping comes into being
dependent on thirst should be understood in the following way.
If, Ānanda, thirst did not exist, <35> that is, not at all and in
no way, of anybody and anywhere, namely, thirst for forms,
thirst for sounds, thirst for odors, thirst for tastes, thirst for
tangibles, and thirst for things (dharma), if, then, thirst did not
exist at all, would one, after the cessation of thirst, observe
grasping?” – “No, O Lord.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this here is the ground, this the foun-
dation, this the origin, and this the cause of grasping, namely,
thirst.
8
Furthermore, it has been said: ‘Dependent on sensation, thirst
comes into being.’ Now, how thirst comes into being depend-
ent on sensation should be understood in the following way.
If, Ānanda, sensation did not exist, that is, not at all and in
no way, of anybody and anywhere, namely, sensation arisen
through contact of the eyes, sensation arisen through contact of
the (organ of) hearing, sensation arisen through the contact
of the (organ of) smell, sensation arisen through the contact of
the tongue, sensation arisen through the contact of the body,
sensation arisen through the contact of the mind, if, then,
sensation did not exist at all, would one, after the cessation of
sensation, observe thirst?” – “No, O Lord.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this here is the ground, this the foun-
dation, this the origin, and this the cause of thirst, namely,
sensation.
 The tenet of dependent origination 39

9
Thus, dependent on sensation, thirst comes into being;
dependent on thirst, seeking; dependent on seeking, finding;
dependent on <36> finding, judgment; dependent on judgment,
longing and delight; dependent on longing and delight, striving;
dependent on striving, acquiring; dependent on acquiring,
miserliness; dependent on miserliness, defending; due to defend-
ing, it comes to many evil, disastrous things, the taking up of
sticks, the taking up of weapons, quarrelling and fighting,
squabbling and discord, slander and lying.”

The listed terms are then explained in the same way as the
members of the causal chain. Then the text continues:

19
“Furthermore, it has been said: ‘Dependent on contact,
sensation comes into being.’ Now, how sensation comes into being
dependent on contact should be understood in the fol-
lowing way. If, Ānanda, contact did not exist, that is, not at
all and in no way, of anybody and anywhere, namely, contact
of the eye, contact of the (organ of) hearing, contact of the
(organ of) smell, contact of the tongue, contact of the body, and
contact of the mind, if, then, contact did not exist at all, would
one, after the cessation of contact, observe sensation?” – “No,
O Lord.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this here is the ground, this the
foundation, this the origin, and this the cause of sensation,
namely, contact.
20
Furthermore, it has been said: ‘Dependent on name and
form, contact comes into being.’ Now, how contact comes
into being dependent on name and form should be understood in
the following way: If, Ānanda, <37> appearances, signs,
marks, and indications through which the conglomerate of
40 The Teaching of the Buddha

names is expressed, if these appearances, signs, marks, and

indications did not exist, would one then, in regard to the
conglomerate of form, observe contact through designation1?” –
“No, O Lord.”
“And if, Ānanda, the appearances, signs, marks, and indica-
tions through which the conglomerate of form is expressed, if
these appearances, signs, marks, and indications did not exist,
would one then, in regard to the conglomerate of names, observe
contact through resistance?” – “No, O Lord.”
“And if, Ānanda, the appearances, signs, marks, and indica-
tions through which the conglomerate of name and the con-
glomerate of form is expressed, if these appearances, signs,
marks, and indications did not exist, would one then observe
contact through designation or contact through resistance?” –
“No, O Lord.”
“And if, Ānanda, the appearances, signs, marks, and indica-
tions through which name and form are expressed, if these
appearances, signs, marks, and indications did not exist, would
one then observe contact?” – “No, O Lord.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this here is the ground, this the founda-
tion, this the origin, and this the cause of contact, namely, name
and form. <38>
21
Furthermore, it has been said: ‘Dependent on cognition, name
and form come into being.’ Now, how name and form come
into being dependent on cognition should be understood in
the following way. If, Ānanda, cognition were not to enter into
the mother’s womb, would then name and form mass together
in the mother’s womb?” – “No, O Lord.”

1
In the ancient Buddhist scholasticism not only perception, but also the
designating and thinking of an object signifies a contact, which is merely
of a different kind than the contact of material objects that mutually resist
each other.
 The tenet of dependent origination 41

“And if, Ānanda, cognition, after it has entered into the

mother’s womb, should leave again, would then name and form
develop into this being?” – “No, O Lord.”
And if, Ānanda, cognition were annihilated in the boy or girl,
while they are still small, would then name and form grow,
flourish, and fully mature?” – “No, O Lord.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this here is the ground, this the foun-
dation, this the origin, and this the cause of name and form,
namely, cognition.
22
Furthermore, it has been said: ‘Dependent on name and form,
cognition comes into being.’ Now, how cognition comes into being
dependent on name and form should be understood in the
following way. If, Ānanda, cognition did not find any support
in name and form, would one then in future observe a coming
into being of the origin of the suffering of birth, old age, and
death?” – “No, O Lord.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this here is the ground, this the foun-
dation, this the origin, and this the cause of cognition, namely,
name and form.
This is, then, Ānanda, that through which one is reborn, ages
and dies, passes away and rearises; through which there is a
possibility of designation, a possibility <39> of explanation,
a possibility of delineation through which knowledge finds a
sphere; through which the course of the world proceeds, in
order to describe a being—namely, name and form together
with cognition.”

With that, the explanation of the causal chain concludes

and the text moves on to other subjects.
The next example we provide shows how the tenet
of dependent origination is treated in the most ancient
scholasticism. The text is presented as a discourse of the
Buddha, but by this point this has already become a mere
 42 The Teaching of the Buddha

formality. The presentation itself is broken into two parts,

the so-called beginning (ādi), which expresses the tenet
itself, and the explanation (vibhaṅga). The explanation is
short and dry in the style of the ancient scholasticism.
The text, however, was held in high regard and formed the
basis for the elucidation of this doctrine in the scholasticism
of the classical period.

ADC. The Discourse of Dependent Origination

(Pratītyasamutpādasūtra)1
Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Exalted One was dwell-
ing at Śrāvastī in Jetavana, the Gardens of Anāthapiṇḍada with
a great gathering of monks, with twelve hundred and fifty
monks. There the Exalted One spoke to the monks:
“I will set forth for you, monks, the beginning and the
explanation of dependent origination. So listen and attend
thoroughly and well to this. I will speak.
What is the beginning of dependent origination?
Specifically, when this exists, that comes to be; due to the
arising of this, that arises. Specifically, dependent on ignorance,
formations (saṃskāra) come into being; dependent on forma-
tions, cognition; dependent <40> on cognition, name and form;
dependent on name and form, the sixfold sphere; dependent on
the sixfold sphere, contact; dependent on contact, sensation;
dependent on sensation, thirst; dependent on thirst, grasping;
dependent on grasping, becoming; dependent on becoming,
birth; dependent on birth, old age and death, sorrow and
lamentation, pain, distress, and despair. Thus the origin of this
whole mass of suffering comes about. This is called the
beginning of dependent origination.

1
[The full title of this sutra is Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśasūtram.]
 The tenet of dependent origination 43

What is the explanation?

‘Dependent on ignorance, formations come into being.’
Of what type is ignorance? Not knowing the past, not knowing
the future, not knowing the past and future; not knowing what
is inner, not knowing what is outer, not knowing what is inner
and outer; not knowing deeds, not knowing their maturation,
not knowing deeds and their maturation; not knowing the
Buddha, not knowing the doctrine, not knowing the community;
not knowing suffering, not knowing the origin, not knowing
cessation, not knowing the path; not knowing the causes, not
knowing the factors arisen through the causes; not knowing
wholesome and unwholesome, blameworthy and blameless, to
be attended to and not to be attended to, low and high, black
and white dependently originated factors along with their
classification; or also [not knowing] the six spheres of contact
with regard to their understanding in accordance with truth.
Not knowing what is in accordance with truth with regard
to this and that, non-seeing, non-vision, darkness, delusion,
ignorance, obscurity, this is called ignorance. <41>
‘Dependent on ignorance, formations come into being.’
Of what type are the formations? There are three formations:
formations of body, formations of speech, and formations of
mind.
‘Dependent on formations, cognition comes into being.’ Of
what type is cognition? There are six groups (kāya) of cognitions:
cognition by means of the eye, cognition by means of the (organ
of) hearing, by means of the (organ of) smell, by means of the
tongue, by means of the body, and by means of the mind.
‘Dependent on cognition, name and form comes into being.’
What is name? The four non-material groups (skandha). Which
four? The group of sensation, the group of ideation, the group
of formations, and the group of cognition. What is form?
Everything that is matter, [i.e.,] the four great elements and
whatever is based on the four great elements. This form and the
44 The Teaching of the Buddha

previously mentioned name, bound together as a unit, are called

name and form.
‘Dependent on name and form, the sixfold sphere comes
into being.’ What is the sixfold sphere? The six inner spheres,
the inner sphere of the eye, the inner sphere of the (organ of)
hearing, of the (organ of) smell, of the tongue, of the body, and
of the mind.
‘Dependent on the sixfold sphere, contact comes into being.’ Of
what type is contact? There are six groups (kāya) of contact:
contact of the eye, contact of the (organ of) hearing, contact of
the (organ of) smell, of the tongue, of the body, and of the mind.
‘Dependent on contact, sensation comes into being.’ Of
what type is sensation? There are three sensations: pleasurable
sensation, painful sensation, and neither-painful-nor-pleasurable
sensation.
‘Dependent on sensation, thirst comes into being.’ Of what
type is thirst? There are three kinds of thirst: thirst <42> for
desires, thirst for the material, and thirst for the immaterial.
‘Dependent on thirst, grasping comes into being.’ Of what type
is grasping? There are four kinds of grasping: grasping of
desires, grasping of views, grasping of moral conduct and vows,
and grasping of the doctrine of a self.
‘Dependent on grasping, becoming comes into being.’ Of
what type is becoming? There are three types of becoming:
becoming in the sphere of desire, becoming in the sphere of the
material, and becoming in the sphere of the immaterial.
‘Dependent on becoming, birth comes into being.’ What is
birth? It is the birth of this and that being in this and that
group of beings, their being born, their embodiment, their
emerging, their becoming visible, the taking on of the groups
(skandha), the taking on of the elements (dhātu), the taking on of
the spheres (āyatana), the emerging of the groups, the becoming
visible of the life-organ.
 The tenet of dependent origination 45

‘Dependent on birth, old age and death come into being.’

Of what type is old age? Baldheadedness, grey hair, being
covered with wrinkles, frailty, being stooped, being hunched
like a gabled roof, having the limbs covered with black spots,
wheezing breath of the body, supporting oneself with a stick,
clumsiness, ponderousness, fading away, wasting away, wear-
ing out and decay of the sense-organs, aging and decline of
the formations, this is called old age. Of what type is death?
It is the passing away of this and that being from this and that
group of beings, their perishing, their disintegration, their dis-
appearance, the fading away of the lifespan, the fading away
of the life heat, the cessation of the life-organ, the casting away
of the <43> groups (skandha), death, the dying; this is called
death. This death and the previously mentioned old age, bound
together as a unit, are called old age and death.
This is called the explanation of dependent origination. What
I have said to you: ‘I will set forth for you the beginning and the
explanation of dependent origination,’ this is hereby answered.”
Thus spoke the Exalted One. The monks joyfully hailed the
Exalted One.

Now, one more short example to illustrate how this text,

[i.e., the Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśasūtram,] was ex-
plained in the classical period of the Buddhist systems. This
explanation comes from a commentary by the famous
ecclesiastical master Vasubandhu the Younger, to whom
we will later repeatedly refer.1 Here, I will render a section

1
[Even though Vasubandhu introduces the ālayavijñāna in his
Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa and his Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Muroji (1993, p. 19f.)
comments that Vasubandhu’s conception of the nature of pratītya-
samutpāda (without contradicting the doctrines of the Mahāyāna) is also
in the Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā fundamentally in accord with the tradi-
tional Buddhist view, according to which pratītyasamutpāda should explain
the arising of rebirth or the cycle of being reborn again and again (saṃsāra)
without recourse to a substantial self (ātman).]
 46 The Teaching of the Buddha

that comprises the explanation of thirst. Following a brief

elucidation of the concept of thirst, Vasubandhu goes on to
discuss various questions; whether sensations of pleasure
alone bring about thirst, and similar issues. The text gives
one a good idea of the commentarial literature of the
classical period in general. In particular, it also shows
how sacred texts were drawn on extensively for the
purpose of exposition, and how one noted and tried to
resolve their contradictions.

ADD. From Vasubandhu’s “Commentary to the Discourse of

Dependent Origination” (Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā)
“Dependent on sensation, thirst comes into being. Of what
type is thirst? There are three kinds of thirst, etc.” Here too,
the Exalted One taught the classification of thirst based on the
distinction between (the spheres) of desire, the material, and
the immaterial, but [he did not teach] <44> its nature, and
that, in consideration of the particular dispositions of those to
be instructed; this is as [explained] previously . . . (there follows
a brief linguistic-grammatical explanation). . . . Thirst oriented
toward the three spheres has been designated in this way. It
is a longing, adhering, and attachment, accompanied by the
defilements (kleśa), in people who are not free from passion
related to the sphere of desire, or, respectively, the sphere of the
material, or the sphere of the immaterial. Indeed, thirst belongs
to the same sphere as sensation on which it is dependent.
(Objection:) Why is it not said of the thirst related to
painful sensation, that it is exclusively thirst for that [painful
sensation]?1
[Answer:] Pleasurable sensation is the cause of thirst to be
connected with it and not to be separated from it; painful

1
The point is to show that painful sensation also brings about thirst for pleasure.
 The tenet of dependent origination 47

[sensation] is the cause of thirst not to be connected with it

and to be separated from it; neither-painful-nor-pleasurable
[sensation] is the cause of thirst that delights in this state, or, in
the case of a particular meditation, is the condition of thirst to be
connected with it and not to be separated from it. In addition,
the Exalted One has said: “Contacted by painful sensation, he
delights in the pleasure of desire.” Painful sensation is therefore
also the condition of thirst for pleasure.
Further, thirst for the existence of the self, which, accompa-
nied by the innate afflicted view of a self, indiscriminately
dominates the stream of the groups (skandha) filled with the
threefold sensation, is based on sensation. Indeed, this entire
stream of sensations is its dominant cause. Accordingly, it is
said in the Great Discourse of the Foundations <45> of Origination:
“Could one, Ānanda, say: ‘I am,’ where there is no sensation
and where one who senses is not observed? – No, O Lord.”
Dependent on this indiscriminately dominating thirst for the
existence of the self, some people then develop an afflicted
view of a self based on conceptions. And regarding this [af-
flicted view of a self], the Exalted One has said: “Dependent on
sensation, monks, which has arisen from ignorance and contact,
thirst arises and from that, the formations.” 1 This [afflicted view
of a self] is also equivalent to the grasping of the doctrine of
a self, since how, otherwise, could the grasping of the doctrine
of a self in dependence on thirst come about? (Cf. S. 41f.)
(Objection:) If therefore thirst depends on the threefold
sensation, why is it said then: “Passion attaches itself to pleasur-
able sensation?”
(Answer:) Because [passion] has [pleasurable sensation] as its
object-support and occurs in association with it. To be precise,

1
Here, the expression formations designates the view of a self based on
conceptions, which, immediately following, is equated with the grasping of
the doctrine of a self.
48 The Teaching of the Buddha

this applies to pleasurable sensation belonging to one’s own

personality-stream.
(Objection:) If thirst is dependent on sensation, then it would
follow that the saint is also tainted with thirst because every
person has sensations. Further, it would follow that the con-
tentedness that accompanies release from the mundane cannot
exist.
(Answer:) It is said: “Rain depends on clouds.” Yet, if there
is a cloud, must it necessarily rain? In the same way, if there
is sensation, then thirst does not necessarily have to appear.
(Question:) Why does it not appear?
(Answer:) <46> Because certain counteragents are there.
For instance, its seed is removed from its basis, or destroyed,
so that [thirst], in spite of the presence of the condition, does
not occur, precisely because the seed is absent or destroyed. Just
so, if its seed is absent or destroyed, a shoot does not appear
even if the conditions, such as the field, water, etc., are present.
Hence the Exalted One gave a more precise explanation in
another passage:

Dependent on sensation, which arises from ignorance

and contact, thirst arises.

Further:

Whoever experiences [the sensation of] pleasure and

does not properly discern the sensation, in him passion
entrenches itself, because he does not see the way out.

Thus, not every [sensation] is the cause of thirst but only that
which is not properly understood.
(Question:) Why then is a more precise explanation not also
given in the present case?
 The tenet of dependent origination 49

(Answer:) Because here in the treatment of the subject it is

presupposed that ignorance is the common condition of the
formations.
(Objection:) In some places the Exalted One has exclusively
pointed out ignorance as the cause of thirst:

Ignorance, monks, is the ground of thirst, ignorance is

the cause, ignorance is the foundation.

Further:

What, monks, is the nourishment of the thirst for

becoming? To that one should answer: “Ignorance.”

In some places, again exclusively, contact:

There are six groups (kāya) of thirst, the thirst arisen

through contact of the eye, etc.

Further:

Each group (skandha) of sensation, each group of

ideation, each group of corporeality is dependent on
contact.

Here, though, sensation is exclusively indicated as the cause.

How does this not contradict <47> the sacred texts?
(Answer:) Because of the difference in intentions. If, for
instance, ignorance is mentioned, then the general cause of
thirst is intended. The same applies to contact. With respect
to sensation, on the other hand, the special cause is intended.
[This is so] since in all three spheres of existence the thirst of
that stage to which the sensation belongs appears in the person
subject to delusion. Further, in one and the same stage and given
50 The Teaching of the Buddha

the same ignorance, a difference in thirst appears due to a differ-

ence in the sensation, its strength and its weakness. Finally, with
respect to the occurrence of thirst, the contacts to be experienced
as pleasurable, etc., are dependent on the difference in sensation.
Therefore, there is no contradiction.
(Objection:) If with the words: “Dependent on sensation,
thirst comes into being” the intention is to teach the exclusivity
of the cause,1 then the aforementioned faults would follow.
In addition, other causes of thirst, that is, the generative cause
and the similar and immediately preceding cause would not
be possible. If, on the contrary, the intention is to teach the
exclusivity of that which is caused, then sensation can be
neither the causal nor the similar and immediately preceding
cause, nor the object-support cause for other factors. In addition,
a contradiction of the following sacred texts would result:
“Repugnance attaches itself to painful sensation,” etc., and:
“In one who is filled with joy the mind collects itself, in one who
is filled with joy the factors calm themselves,” etc. If the
intention is to teach the exclusivity of both, then both faults
would follow. Finally, if one assumes no <48> exclusivity
whatsoever, then the instruction is meaningless.
(Answer:) Here, there is no such exclusivity. Nonetheless, the
instruction is not meaningless since the instruction is given in
this form—in accordance with our previous exposition—in order
to teach the specific cause of thirst; and also because sensation is
the main cause, given that thirst appears due to the connection,
etc., with pleasurable sensation, etc.,
This completes the explanation of thirst.

The examples rendered thus far have demonstrated the

detailed interpretation and scholastic explanation of the

1
I.e., if with it one wants to say that exclusively sensation causes thirst, or
that exclusively thirst is caused by sensation.
 The tenet of dependent origination 51

tenet of dependent origination. Philosophically much more

important, however, is the new meaning that was gradually
attributed to it in the course of time. This came about in the
following way: Because the tenet of dependent origination
follows a series of causes and effects over several births, it
came to appear as if it described the worldly personality
itself in the different stages of its existence. Thus when, in
the course of the development of the doctrine of the
impermanence of all entities, the whole worldly personality
was dissolved into a stream of perpetually changing
phenomena, one no longer saw in the tenet of dependent
origination the law according to which entanglement and
liberation from the cycle of existences take place. One
considered it rather to be the law that rules the entire
development of this personality-stream itself and gives
expression to its form of existence.
It was, however, not left at that. The impermanence
and perpetual change of entities applies not only to the
worldly personality but also to the external world, and thus
the law of dependent origination was transferred onto it as
well. Next to the previous causal chain, which was now
designated as the inner causal chain, a second, outer causal
chain was placed. In this way, the tenet of dependent
origination became the dominating law of the whole
phenomenal world and the philosophical expression of its
nature. Hence, when the school of the Mādhyamikas made
the first, boldly reasoned, attempt to prove the unreality of
the external world, <49> it proceeded from this doctrine
and deduced from it not only the impermanence, but also
the emptiness, of all worldly entities.
In the following, examples for this development as well
will be provided. The tenet of dependent origination as
the expression of the worldly personality will be discussed
in the section on the denial of the self (S. 77ff.). As an
 52 The Teaching of the Buddha

expression of the impermanence and emptiness of the

whole phenomenal world it will be dealt with in the section
on the Madhyamaka school (S. 171ff.). Here though, we will
present just one text that shows how the old causal chain
was expanded into a universal law of causality.
The text in question is the so-called Śālistambasūtra.
Tradition designates it as a Mahāyāna text and, in fact, it
is presented as spoken by Maitreya, the future Buddha. In
terms of content, however, the Mahāyānistic character of
the work is limited to details. The tenet of dependent
origination, in particular, does not carry any specific
Mahāyāna features. In order not to become too detailed,
I have not reproduced the text in its entirety but only the
section in which inner and outer dependent origination
are described and contrasted. An introductory general
section and an explanation of the old causal chain in the
presentation of the inner dependent origination have been
omitted, although these sections do also contain something
of interest.

ADE. The Discourse of the Young Rice Plant (Śālistambasūtra)

This dependent origination arises, moreover, because of two.
Because of which two? Because of the connection of causes and
because of the connection of conditions. Furthermore, it is to
be viewed as twofold: outer and inner. <50>
What then is the connection of causes with respect to outer
dependent origination? From the seed arises the sprout, from
the sprout the leaf, from the leaf the shoot, from the shoot the
stalk, from the stalk the node, from the node the bud, from the
bud the awn, from the awn the flower, from the flower the fruit.
If the seed is not present, the sprout cannot arise, . . . etc., up to1

1
Even the old Buddhist texts abbreviate the frequently occurring repeti-
tions in this way.
 The tenet of dependent origination 53

. . . if the flower is not present the fruit cannot arise. If, however,
the seed is present, the development of the sprout occurs, . . .
etc., up to . . . if the flower is present, the development of the
fruit occurs. In this the seed does not think:1 “I bring forth the
sprout”; and the sprout does not think: “I have been brought
forth by the seed,” . . . etc., up to . . . the flower does not think:
“I bring forth the fruit”; and the fruit does not think: “I have
been brought forth by the flower.” And yet the sprout develops
and manifests if the seed is present, . . . etc., up to . . . if the
flower is present, the fruit develops and manifests. The
connection of causes with respect to outer dependent origination is
to be viewed in this way.
How is the connection of conditions with respect to outer
dependent origination to be viewed? Through the coming
together of six elements. Through the coming together of which
six elements? Through the coming together of the elements
of earth, water, fire, wind, ether, and the season; so is the
connection of conditions with respect to outer dependent
origination to be viewed. <51>
In this, the earth element brings forth in the seed the effect of
cohesion; the water element brings forth in the seed the effect
of moistening; the fire element brings forth in the seed the
effect of maturing; the wind element brings forth in the seed
the effect of opening; the ether element brings forth in the
seed the effect of not obstructing, and the season element brings
forth in the seed the effect of transformation. If these conditions
are not present, the emergence of the sprout from the seed does
not take place; in other words, if the outer earth element is
absent and likewise if the elements of water, fire, wind, ether,
and the season are absent. Hence, through the coming together

1
With this it is emphasized that the entirety of worldly events occurs
without a thinking subject.
54 The Teaching of the Buddha

of all [of these], as the seed vanishes, the sprout’s emergence

from it takes place.
In this, the earth element does not think: “I bring forth
the effect of cohesion in the seed”; . . . etc., up to . . . and the
season element does not think: “I bring forth the effect of
transformation in the seed.” The seed also does not think:
“I bring forth the sprout”; and the sprout does not think: “I have
been brought forth by these conditions.” And yet when these
conditions are present, as the seed vanishes, the coming forth of
the sprout takes place, . . . etc., up to . . . as the flower vanishes,
the coming forth of the fruit takes place. Also, this sprout is
not created by itself, not created by another, not created by
both, not created by god, not transformed by time, not derived
from a primal matter, not dependent on a single origin, and
also is not arisen without a cause. Nonetheless, through the
coming together of the <52> elements of earth, water, fire, wind,
ether, and season, as the seed vanishes, the coming forth of the
sprout takes place.
The connection of conditions with respect to outer dependent
origination is to be viewed in this way.
In this, outer dependent origination is to be viewed in
five ways. Which five? Not as eternal, not as annihilation, not
as transition (saṃkrānti), [but] as the emergence of a great
effect from a small cause, and as the succession of something
homogeneous.
Why not as eternal? Because the sprout is something other
than the seed; for the sprout is not the same as the seed.
The sprout, that is, emerges neither from the annihilated
seed nor from the not-annihilated seed. Still, the seed vanishes
and, at the same time, the sprout arises. Therefore, not as
eternal.
Why not as annihilation? Because the sprout arises neither
from the previously annihilated nor from the not-annihilated
seed. Rather, the seed vanishes and, at the same time, the sprout
 The tenet of dependent origination 55

arises, just as the arms of a scale rise and fall at the same time.
Therefore, not as annihilation.
Why not as transition? Because the sprout is something other
than the seed; for the sprout is not that which the seed is.
Therefore, not as transition.
Why as the emergence of a great effect from a small cause?
Because a small seed is sown and brings forth a great fruit.
Therefore, as the emergence of a great effect from a small
cause.
Why as the succession of something homogeneous? As is the
seed that is sown, so is the fruit it brings forth. Therefore, as the
succession of something homogeneous. Thus is outer dependent
origination to be viewed in five ways. <53>
In the same way, inner dependent origination arises because
of two. Because of which two? Because of the connection of
causes and because of the connection of conditions.
What then is the connection of causes with respect to inner
dependent origination? Dependent on ignorance, volitional
formations come into being, . . . etc., up to . . . dependent on
birth, old age and death comes into being. If ignorance did
not exist, volitional formations would not be observed, . . . etc.,
up to . . . if birth did not exist, old age and death would not
be observed. As, however, ignorance is present, volitional
formations develop, . . . etc., up to . . . as birth is present, old age
and death develop. In this, ignorance does not think: “I bring
forth volitional formations”; and volitional formations do not
think: “We have been brought forth by ignorance,” . . . etc., up
to . . . and birth does not think: “I bring forth old age and death”;
and old age and death do not think: “We have been brought
forth by birth.” And yet if ignorance is present, volitional
formations develop and manifest, . . . etc., up to . . . if birth is
present, old age and death develop and manifest. The connection
of causes with respect to inner dependent origination is to be
viewed in this way.
56 The Teaching of the Buddha

How is the connection of conditions with respect to inner

dependent origination to be viewed? Through the coming
together of six elements. Through the coming together of
which six elements? Through the coming together of the
elements of earth, water, fire, wind, ether, and cognition; so is
the connection of conditions with respect to inner dependent
origination to be viewed. <54>
What is the earth element with respect to inner dependent
origination? That which, through the cohesion of the body,
brings about its solidity, is called the earth element. That, in
the body, which brings forth the effect of a closer consolidation,
is called the water element. That, in the body, which digests what
is eaten, drunk, chewed, and consumed, is called the
fire element. That, in the body, which brings forth the effect
of exhalation and inhalation, is called the wind element. That,
in the body, which brings about the inner hollowness, is called
the ether element. That, in the body, which brings forth the
sprout of name and form, being like (two) bundles of reeds1
(leaning against one another), [in other words,] the mental
cognition connected with the five groups (kāya) of cognition and
endowed with (negative) influxes (āsrava), that is called the
cognition element.
If these conditions are not present, the arising of the body
does not take place; just so when the inner earth element is
absent; likewise when the elements of water, of fire, of wind,
of ether, and of cognition are absent. Therefore, the arising of the
body takes place through the coming together of all [of these].
In this, the earth element does not think: “Through the
cohesion of the body, I bring forth its solidity”; the water
element does not think: “I bring forth in the body the effect of
a closer consolidation”; the fire element does not think: “I am

1
Name and form are compared to two bundles of reeds that mutually
support each other.
 The tenet of dependent origination 57

digesting what is eaten, drunk, chewed, and consumed”; the

wind element does not think: “I bring forth in the body the effect
of exhalation and inhalation”; the ether element does not think:
<55> “I bring about in the body the inner hollowness”; the
cognition element does not think: “I bring forth in the body
name and form”; and also the body does not think: “I have been
produced through these conditions.” And yet, when these
conditions are present, the arising of the body takes place.
In this, the earth element is not the self, not the being, not
the soul, not the living being, not the human, not the child, not
the woman, not the man, not the eunuch, not I, not mine, nor
anything else; likewise, the element of water, the element of
fire, the element of wind, the element of ether, the element
of cognition is not the self, not the being, not the soul, not the
living being, not the human, not the child, not the woman, not
the man, not the eunuch, not I, not mine, nor anything else.

There follows an explanation of the twelve members of the

causal chain. Then the text continues:

Thus, this twelve-membered dependent origination—mutually

caused and mutually conditioned, neither impermanent nor
permanent, neither created nor uncreated, neither without cause
nor without condition, not experiencing, not subject to vanish-
ing, not subject to annihilation, not subject to cessation—flows
like a river uninterrupted since beginningless time.
And even though this twelve-membered dependent origi-
nation—mutually caused and mutually conditioned, neither
impermanent nor permanent, neither created nor uncreated,
neither without cause nor without condition, not experiencing,
not subject to vanishing, not subject to annihilation, <56> not
subject to cessation—flows like a river uninterrupted since
beginningless time, still these four members of this twelve-
membered dependent origination function as cause for a
58 The Teaching of the Buddha

combined effect. Which four? Ignorance, thirst, deed [karman]

and cognition.
In this, cognition is cause, like a seed; the deed is cause, like a
field; ignorance and thirst are cause, like defilements (kleśa).
Thus, deeds and defilements generate the seed of cognition.
Thus, the deed brings forth the effect of the field in the seed of
cognition, thirst moistens the seed of cognition, and ignorance
sows the seed of cognition. If these causes are not present, the
development of the seed of cognition does not come about.
In this, the deed does not think: “I bring forth the effect of the
field in the seed of cognition”; thirst also does not think: “I am
moistening the seed of cognition”; ignorance also does not think:
“I am sowing the seed of cognition”; and the seed of cognition
also does not think: “I have been brought forth by these con-
ditions.” And yet the seed of cognition grows, resting in the
field of deeds, moistened by the wetness of thirst, and sown by
ignorance, and insofar as it enters here and there into the sphere
of arising, it brings forth the sprout of name and form in the
mother’s womb. Also, this sprout is not created by itself, not
created by another, not created by both, not created by god, not
transformed by time, not derived from a primal matter, not
dependent on a single origin, and also is not arisen without a
cause. Nonetheless, as a result of the union of father and <57>
mother at the time of readiness to conceive, and through the
coming together of the remaining conditions, the seed of cog-
nition, insofar as it—accompanied by lust—enters here and there
into the sphere of arising, brings forth the sprout of name and
form in the mother’s womb. This although the factors are
without a master and are not mine, are without attachment, are
like the ether, and are in their nature constituted like an illusion.
To be precise, because the causes and conditions are not absent.
 The tenet of dependent origination 59

Next follows the way in which the different kinds of cogni-

tion arise through the connection of different conditions.
Then the text continues:

Therein, no factor passes over from this world into that world.
Yet, deed and fruit are observed, because the causes and condi-
tions are not absent.
Just as when one sees the reflection of a face in the clear disk
of a mirror; the face does not thus pass into the disk of the
mirror. Still the face is observed because the causes and con-
ditions are not absent. Thus, no one passes away from this world
nor do they arise elsewhere, and yet deed and fruit are observed
because the causes and conditions are not absent.
Just as when the moon disk moves along four thousand miles
high yet one sees the reflection of the moon in a small vessel
of water; the moon disk has not thus descended from that
position, nor has it passed into the small vessel of water; still
the moon disk is observed because the causes and conditions
are not absent.
Just as a fire does not burn due to the absence of the causes
and conditions, yet with the completeness of the causes
and conditions it does burn, in the same way, the seed of
cognition generated through deeds and defilements, <58>
insofar as it enters here and there into the sphere of arising,
brings forth the sprout of name and form in the mother’s womb.
This although the factors are without a master and are not
mine, are without attachment, are like the ether, and are in their
nature constituted like an illusion. To be precise, because the
causes and conditions are not absent. The connection of
conditions with respect to inner dependent origination is to be
viewed in this way.
In this, inner dependent origination is to be viewed in five
ways. Which five? Not as eternal, not as annihilation, not
as transition (saṃkrānti), [but] as the emergence of a great
60 The Teaching of the Buddha

effect from a small cause, and as the succession of something

homogeneous.
Why not as eternal? Because the groups (skandha) ending with
dying are other groups than those involved with arising;
since the groups ending with dying are not the same as the
groups involved with arising. Rather, the groups ending with
dying vanish and the groups involved with arising appear.
Therefore, not as eternal.
Why not as annihilation? Because the groups involved with
arising appear neither after the previous annihilation of the
groups ending with dying nor without their annihilation. Rather,
the groups ending with dying vanish, and at the same time the
groups involved with arising appear, just as the arms of a scale
rise and fall at the same time. Therefore, not as annihilation.
Why not as transition? Since from a dissimilar class of
beings there come forth homogeneous groups in another birth.
Therefore, not as transition.
Why as the emergence of a great effect from a small cause?
Because a small deed is carried out and <59> the maturation of
a great retribution is experienced. Therefore, as the emergence of
a great effect from a small cause.
Why as the succession of something homogeneous? Just as
the deed that is done is to be experienced, so is the maturation
that is felt to be experienced. Therefore, as the succession of
something homogeneous.
Thus is inner dependent origination to be viewed in five
ways.
Whosoever, venerable Śāriputra, sees this dependent origina-
tion, correctly proclaimed by the Exalted One, in this way,
in accordance with reality, with right insight, incessantly
as without a soul and free from a soul, truthfully and without
error as unborn, unarisen, unfabricated, uncreated, without
obstruction, without obstacle, friendly, fearless, not to be
snatched away, imperishable, and by nature not coming to rest;
 The tenet of dependent origination 61

and views it as untrue, hollow, as deception, without a core, as

a sickness, as an abscess, as a tumor, as evil, as impermanent,
as painful, empty, and without self, that one does not reflect
upon the past: “Was I in the past, or was I not in the past?
Who was I in the past? How was I in the past?” He does not
reflect upon the future: “Will I be in the future, or will I not be
in the future? Who will I be in the future? How will I be in
the future?” And he does not reflect upon the present: “What is
this? How is this? Who are we? Who will we be? From whence
has this being come? Where will it end up when it passes away
from here?”
The views that some ascetics and brahmins will separately
maintain in the world—that are connected with the doctrine of a
self, that are connected with the doctrine of a being, that are
connected with the doctrine of a soul, <60> that are connected
with the doctrine of a personality, that are connected with
auspicious signs and sayings—: whatever is done and not done,
all of that is given up by him at that time, completely recognized,
entirely removed like the top of a palm tree, in its nature no
longer appearing, and in the future no longer subject to arising
and cessation.

This is followed by several concluding sentences. At the

same time, we conclude with this the series of texts
intended to elucidate the tenet of dependent origination.
In doing so we have already gone far beyond the doctrine
of the Buddha himself and have arrived in the midst
of the period of the later systems. It is therefore time to
break away and to move on to the presentation of those
systems. <61>
THE SCHOLASTICISM
(ABHIDHARMA)
OF
THE WAY OF HEARERS
(ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA)
B. T HE S CHOLASTICISM (A BHIDHARMA )
OF THE W AY OF H EARERS
(Ś RĀVAKAYĀNA ) 1
In the presentation of the doctrine of the Buddha, we have seen
that the Buddha himself refused to answer purely philosophical
questions. He occupied himself with theoretical questions only
to the extent necessary to establish and support his doctrine of
liberation. Anything beyond this he rejected as unnecessary and
misleading. He held fast to this attitude throughout his life and
certainly his stance with respect to these things continued to
have its effect for some time after his death.

BA. The rise of the Buddhist schools

Then, however, the natural need to penetrate the traditional
teaching as thoroughly as possible and to further expand it led to

1
[Frauwallner still used the older terminology of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna
(“Small and Great Vehicle”). The pejorative connotation of the former term
was the reason to replace it in more recent literature by the traditional term
Śrāvakayāna. But with the use of this term it seems also necessary to decide
on the translation of the term yāna, which means both “way” and “vehicle.”
Historically, “way” can be considered to be the meaning better fitting for the
period of ancient Buddhism. While in the Mahāyāna the meaning “vehicle”
became more prominent with the growing success of the movement,
originally the “way of the Bodhisattvas” seems to have been in focus. It is
for reasons of balance and terminological consistency that—later on in our
book—Māhāyāna is translated as “Great Way.”]
66 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

the broadening and transformation of the traditional doc-

trines. At first, a kind of scholasticism of liberation seems to have
evolved, which occupied itself in greater detail with the process
of liberation and, in Indian fashion, comprehensively listed and
classified the related terms. Once this development was under
way, however, the actual philosophical questions were also
not left untouched. In particular, the questions that the Buddha
himself had set aside—questions about the true self and about
the nature of liberation [S. 18ff.]—attracted interest and led to
serious philosophical discussions. Eventually, under the mani-
fold influences of the contemporary philosophical systems, the
doctrine was developed, beyond these first approaches, into
a complete system.
This development was immensely rich and diverse, since
by that time the Buddhist community had divided itself into
numerous schools, each of which, to a greater or lesser extent,
made a contribution. Even early on, in Magadha, the homeland
of Buddhism, a group by the name of the Great Community
(Mahāsāṃghika) had split off from the rest, the so-called Group
of the Elders (Sthavira). The Mahāsāṃghikas <62> were centered
in the east [of Central India] and they gradually spread along
the [eastern] coast far to the south, in the course of which they
divided into several, probably mostly local, schools. Far more
important was the formation of schools among the large western
group of the Sthaviras. In the outskirts, in the farthest north and
south, schools of a more conservative character formed. Among
them the school of the Tāmraparṇīyas of Ceylon occupies
a special position, not least because their literature has to a
large extent survived in the original language. Intellectually
prominent, however, were the schools of the center. The
important school of the Vātsīputrīya-Sāṃmatīyas was based
here in western Central India.
By far the most significant, though, was the school of the
Sarvāstivādins, also often called Vaibhāṣikas, which spread out
 The rise of the Buddhist schools 67

from Mathurā over the whole northwest and found strong

support in Kaśmīr in particular. It was this school that created
the most comprehensive and, in terms of content, the most
significant system. Characteristic of this school in particular is
a sober, realistic spirit that shoves all mystical aspects into
the background. This is evident, as we will see, for example, in
the assessment of the four stages of meditation as taught by
the Buddha, which here have become almost incidental to
[the process of] liberation. Next to this sobriety, on the other
hand, stands an incredible boldness of thinking which does
not shy away from the most daring assumptions in order to
satisfactorily answer the questions raised.
Finally, we must mention the school of the Sautrāntikas, the
development and history of which is, however, still largely
unclear. From the point of view of doctrine, this school follows
the system of the Sarvāstivādins, which it develops along more
advanced lines. The Sautrāntikas are above all nominalists, as
opposed to the realism of the Sarvāstivādins and also of
the Vaiśeṣikas.

BB. The principal philosophical doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda

It is quite impossible to present here even an approximate
picture of this rich development, which extended over nearly
a millennium. To a large extent research has also not yet pro-
vided the prerequisites for this. In addition we are dealing here
with exceptionally unyielding material. The philosophically
meaningful is embedded in a flood of dry scholasticism, <63>
which can hardly be of interest to a broader circle of readers.
In the following, therefore, I will restrict myself to picking
out the essentials. To this end I use the system of the
Sarvāstivāda as a basis, it being the most significant, and only
occasionally provide a glimpse of the doctrines of the other
schools. I begin with a discussion of the principal philosophical
thoughts: <S. 63–109>. This is followed by a presentation of
 68 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

the fundamental concepts on which the system of the school

is based: <S. 109–26>. A brief description of the doctrine of
liberation forms the conclusion: <S. 126–42>.

BBA. The principal philosophical thoughts

BBA.1. The denial of a soul, of a self

The most unique and momentous thought in the system of the
Sarvāstivādins is the denial of a soul, of a self. The impetus for
this was, after all, provided by the Buddha himself. Precisely,
this doctrine of the soul was one of the points on which he
persistently remained silent [S. 18f.]. In addition, one of the main
points of his sermons was to show that the worldly personality is
not the self. He never tires of emphasizing again and again that
none of the five groups (skandha) that constitute the worldly
personality can be held to be the self. It was certainly not his
intention though, to thereby completely deny the existence of
a soul. After his death, however, no longer faced with the master
himself but only the words handed down from him, the one-
sidedly negative formulation of his statements began to have an
effect, and in the end a denial of the soul was read into them.
This was not, however, a matter of a simple misunderstand-
ing of the master’s words. On the contrary, the cause of this
development was much deeper. The basic phenomenon from
which the proclamation of the Buddha proceeds is the fact of
suffering. Everything related to this world is full of suffering and
thus it is essential to search for a way out of this suffering, for
 The denial of a soul, of a self 69

liberation. Here, however, a very specific feature enters the

picture; one that in all probability goes back to the Buddha
himself. All earthly things are full of suffering because they are
impermanent, and it is from impermanence first and foremost
that the Buddha derives the fact of suffering. Of particular
significance is the way in which he establishes that the five
groups (skandha) are not the self. He asks: “What do you think, O
monks? Is form permanent or impermanent?” – “Imperma-
nent, <64> O Lord.” – “But that which is impermanent, is it
suffering or pleasure?” – “Suffering, O Lord.” – “So, of that
which is impermanent, full of suffering, and subject to change,
can one maintain the view: ‘This is mine, this is me, this is
my self’?” – “No, O Lord.” The same questions and answers are
asked and given regarding the four other groups. The knowl-
edge of the impermanence of all earthly things is thus the fun-
damental view from which the Buddha begins and which, after
all, provided the impetus for the proclamation of his doctrine.
This knowledge of impermanence, which originally arose
from a feeling and an immediate perception, has—as so often
happens in the course of development—now gradually been
elaborated into a systematic, strictly formulated doctrine. Later
[S. 102ff.] we shall have to return to the details of this doctrine.
The essential point is that no entity has an eternal existence,
rather every entity sooner or later vanishes, while another takes
its place. Indeed, the extreme schools of the Sarvāstivādins and
the Sautrāntikas go so far as to assert that everything exists for
only a moment and then ceases immediately, so that all entities
that seem to exist longer are, in reality, only a sequence of such
moments that follow one after the other as in a film and, through
their similarity, create the appearance of being one and the same
entity. The crucial point in this is that there is an actual arising
and ceasing and not merely a transformation. The Sarvāstivāda
does not accept any duration within change. There is no
enduring bearer in which all transformations take place but just
70 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

a continuous change of impermanent phenomena. The Buddha

himself had already strongly emphasized that there is no
enduring center to mental events, but only continuously chang-
ing processes. This view is now systematically and universally
followed through. According to the systems of Buddhism in
their heyday, there is no substance but only autonomous, imper-
manent properties. All entities that appear in our experience
have no solid core, but are only a loose conglomeration of such
changing phenomena. <65>
From this, according to the classical scholasticism of the
Śrāvakayāna, two essential characterizations ensue for all enti-
ties of the phenomenal world, namely, their impermanence
[S. 102ff.] and closely connected with that, their lack of a solid
core, of a substance [S. 96ff.]. This applies quite universally, but
also especially to all those factors that are the ultimate causes
from which the phenomenal world is constructed. As did all the
philosophical systems of the classical period, the scholasticism
of the Śrāvakayāna—when it elaborated the old doctrine into
a system—had brought these ultimate components of the
phenomenal world together, ordered them into groups, and
placed the list of them at the head of the system [S. 77ff.].
Specifically, all of these factors were named by the general
expression dharma, a term used since the early days of Bud-
dhism to indicate all objects of cognition, [and] which is
translated into English as factors [and into German usually as
Gegebenheiten or Daseinselemente]. According to what has been
said thus far, the impermanence of these factors and the fact that
they are empty appearances without a solid core, forms one of
their essential characteristics. This view of all factors constitutes
the so-called dharma-doctrine in which it is true we may not
see what is central to the classical scholasticism of Śrāvakayāna
Buddhism, but certainly one of its characteristic features.
Within this broad framework stands the doctrine of the
Sarvāstivādins that a soul or a self does not exist. Here,
 The denial of a soul, of a self 71

therefore, the Buddha’s teaching that the groups (skandha)

of the worldly personality are not the self is most strictly
followed through. It is philosophically established within the
framework of common views. And since a transworldly being,
about which the Buddha and his first disciples held a reverent
silence, is unknown to the sober realism of the school, in the end,
[this doctrine] developed into the consistent denial of any kind
of soul.
The oldest work to articulate the denial of the soul in detail
and in full clarity is the so-called Questions of Menandros
(Milindapañhā). The content of this work consists of a discussion
between the Greek king Menandros who, toward the end of the
second century b.c.e., starting from Śākala—today’s Siālkōt
in the Punjab—briefly created a powerful empire, and a
Buddhist monk by the name of Nāgasena. The work <66> obvi-
ously originates from a time when the memory of Menandros
was still vivid, presumably from the first century b.c.e. It was
written in a northwest Indian dialect, as were originally also
the canonical works of the Sarvāstivādins. All that remains,
however, are translations into Pāli, the ecclesiastical language
of the Ceylonese school, and into Chinese. With its lively
narrative and skillful and interesting treatment of the questions
raised, the work is among the best creations of the old Buddhist
literature.
Following a historical preamble, possibly a later addition,
the account begins with a description of the city of Śākala and
then turns to king Menandros (Milinda). Menandros is very
experienced in philosophical questions and skillful and clever
in disputation. One day, having inspected his army and seeing
that the day was still young, he expresses a desire to converse
with some monk or ascetic about philosophical questions.
His ministers bring him to a Buddhist monk named Yuvala
(Āyupāla). But Yuvala is unable to answer the king’s questions
and Menandros laments disappointedly: “Empty indeed is
 72 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

India! Empty talk indeed is India! The ascetic or brahman

does not exist who would be capable of conversing with me
and dispelling my doubts.” At this the minister Demetrios
(Devamantiya) brings it to the king’s attention that a respected
Buddhist teacher by the name of Nāgasena has recently arrived
in Śākala, and Menandros makes his way to him. Nāgasena is
able to address the questions of the king and immediately makes
a deep impression on him.

BBA.1.1. From “The Questions of Menandros” (Milindapañhā)

II, 1, 1; § 36
Then king Menandros betook himself to where the venerable
Nāgasena was residing. Having betaken himself there, he
greeted the venerable Nāgasena. And after having <67> ex-
changed friendly words of greeting, he sat down to one side
and also the venerable Nāgasena returned the greeting in a way
that put king Menandros in a friendly mood.
Then King Menandros spoke to the venerable Nāgasena as
follows: “By what name is the venerable one known? What name
does the master bear?”
“I am known by the name of Nāgasena, O great king; my
fellow-brethren address me as Nāgasena, O great king. But, even
though [one’s] father and mother give names such as Nāgasena,
Śūrasena, Vīrasena, or Siṃhasena, nevertheless, O great king,
if one speaks of Nāgasena, this is only an expression, a designa-
tion, an indication, a manner of speech, a mere name, since a
personality is not to be observed here.”
Then King Menandros spoke as follows: “Listen to me, you
five hundred Greeks and you eighty thousand monks! This
Nāgasena here speaks as follows: ‘A personality is not to be
observed here.’ Is it right to approve of that?”
Then king Menandros said the following to the venerable
Nāgasena: “If, O Nāgasena, a personality is not to be observed,
who gives you the necessary supplies, [i.e.,] monastic robes,
 The denial of a soul, of a self 73

almsfood, seat and bed, and medicines for caring for the sick?
Who uses them? Who holds the moral precepts? Who practices
contemplation? Who realizes the path, the fruit, and extinction
(nirvāṇa)? Who kills? Who steals? Who carries on unchastely?
Who lies? Who drinks intoxicating beverages? Who commits
the five sins that are immediately followed by retribution?
There is thus nothing good, there is nothing bad, there is no doer
or initiator of good and bad deeds, there <68> is no fruit or
maturation of good and bad deeds and if someone were to kill
you, O Nāgasena, then he would commit no murder thereby.
There would be among you, O Nāgasena, no teacher, no pre-
ceptor, and no admission into the monks’ order. And if you
say: ‘My fellow-brethren address me as Nāgasena, O great king,’
who in that case is Nāgasena? . . . Therefore, you speak falsely,
a lie, if you say: ‘There is no Nāgasena.’ “
Then the venerable Nāgasena said the following to king
Menandros: “You are, O great king, accustomed to royal luxury,
to extremely great luxury. If therefore, O great king, at midday
you walk about on the heated ground, on the hot sand, by
stepping on the rough gravel, pebbles, and sand, your feet hurt,
your body tires, your mind becomes sullen, and a bodily sen-
sation accompanied by pain stirs. So, did you come on foot or in
a vehicle?”
“I do not travel on foot, master; I came in a chariot.”
“So if, O great king, you came in a chariot, then explain
the chariot to me. Is, O great king, the pole the chariot?” – “No,
master.”
“Is the axle the chariot?” – “No, master.”
“Are the wheels the chariot?” – “No, master.”
“Is the chariot box the chariot?” – “No, master.”
“Is the flag-pole the chariot?” – “No, master.”
“Is the yoke the chariot?” – “No, master.”
“Are the reins the chariot?” – “No, master.”
“Is the goad the chariot?” – “No, master.”
74 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

“So, O great king, are pole, axle, wheels, chariot box, flag-
pole, yoke, reins, and goad the chariot?” – “No, master.”
“So, O great king, is the chariot apart from pole, axle, wheels,
chariot box, flag-pole, yoke, reins, and goad?” – “No, master.”
“So, however I may ask and ask, O great king, I do not see
<69> a chariot. What then is the chariot here? Therefore, you
speak falsely, a lie, O great king. As you are, O great king, the
foremost king in all of India, of whom are you afraid, that you
tell a lie? So listen to me, you five hundred Greeks and you
eighty thousand monks! This king Menandros here speaks as
follows: ‘I came in a chariot.’ And upon my request: ‘If, O great
king, you came in a chariot, then explain the chariot to me,’
he cannot come up with a chariot. Is it then right to approve
of that?”
At these words, the five hundred Greeks shouted their
applause to the venerable Nāgasena and said the following
to king Menandros: “Now talk, O great king, if you can!”
Then, king Menandros said the following to the venerable
Nāgasena: “I speak no lie, O Nāgasena. Based on pole, axle,
wheels, chariot box, and flag-pole the expression, the designa-
tion, the indication, the manner of speech, the name chariot
is used.”
“Splendidly, O great king, do you understand the chariot.
Just so, O great king, in my case, based on the hair of the
head, body hair, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones,
marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, pleura, spleen, lungs, entrails,
intestines, stomach, faeces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat,
fat, tears, lymph, saliva, nasal mucus, synovial fluid, urine,
the brain in the head, on corporeality, sensation, ideation,
formations (saṃskāra), and cognition the expression, the des-
ignation, the indication, the manner of speech, the mere name
“Nāgasena” is used. In reality, however, a personality is not
to be observed here. The nun Vajrā also expressed this in the
presence of the Exalted One with these words: ‘Just as the word
 The denial of a soul, of a self 75

chariot is used when the parts (of a <70> chariot) are put
together, so one speaks in everyday life of a being when the
groups (skandha) are present.’ “
“Wonderful it is, O Nāgasena! Astonishing it is, O Nāgasena!
Brilliant answers have you given to my questions. If the Buddha
were here, he would applaud you. Excellent, excellent,
Nāgasena. Brilliant answers have you given to my questions.”

The king then asks Nāgasena if he would be willing to have

a detailed discussion and, when Nāgasena agrees, he in-
vites him home to his palace. Nāgasena comes and a long
dialogue develops in the course of which the most diverse
points of Buddhist doctrine are discussed, among them
once again the question of the denial of a soul. Here, this
doctrine already takes its fully developed form. There is
no permanent soul. What appears as a worldly personality
is only name and form, i.e., the five groups (skandha),
which continuously cease and arise anew. From this follows
a series of questions, foremost of which is how it is possible
to regard the continuously changing groups as the same
personality and how, under these circumstances, the re-
sponsibility for good and bad deeds and their retribution is
possible. Nāgasena answers these questions by means of a
number of ingenious allegories. Finally, the stream of the
continuously changing groups is related to the tenet of
dependent origination, which is the law that governs this
unending change.

II, 2, 1; § 55
The king spoke: “Nāgasena, is he who is born (again) the same
or another?”
“The elder replied: “He is neither the same nor another.”
“Give an example.”
76 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

“What do you think, O great king, are you, now that you are
grown, the same as you were when you were a small tender boy,
foolish and lying on your back?”
“No, master, another was the small tender boy, <71> foolish
and lying on his back, and another am I now that I am grown.”
“If that is so, O great king, then [it would follow that] there
is no mother, no father, no teacher, no craftsman, no virtuous
one, and no sage. Or is not the mother of the little flake1 another
than the mother of the little bubble;1 this [one] another than the
mother of the little ball;1 this [one] another than the mother of
the little lump;1 this [one] another than the mother of the small
child; and this [one] another than the mother of the adult? Is not
he who is learning a craft another than he who has learned
it? And is not he who is committing a crime another than he
whose hands and feet are being cut off?”
“No, master. But what would you say, O master, if one would
ask you in this way?”
The elder spoke: “I, O great king, was the small, tender boy,
foolish and lying on my back, and now I am the adult. Based on
this same body all these (stages of development) are coalesced
into a unity.”
“Give an example.”
“If, for example, O great king, some man were to light a lamp,
would it burn all night?” – “Certainly, master, it would burn
all night.”
“Now, O great king, is the flame during the first watch of the
night the same as that during the middle watch of the night?” –
“No, master.”
“And is the flame during the middle watch of the night the
same as that during the last watch of the night?” – “No, master.”
“Was then, O great king, the lamp during the first watch of
the night another than during the middle watch of the night, and

1
Different stages of development of the embryo.
 The denial of a soul, of a self 77

this another than during the last watch of the night?” – “No,
master; since it burned all night based on the same support.”
“Just so, O great king, the stream of the factors <72>
continues. The one that arises is another than the one that ceases.
Without an earlier or a later, so to speak, [the stream] continues.
Thus, [the stream] is neither the same nor another that ends up
in the final coalescence of cognition.”
“Give another example.”
“If, for example, O great king, in the course of time, freshly
drawn milk were to transform itself into curdled milk, curdled
milk into fresh butter, and fresh butter into clarified butter, if
then, O great king, someone were to say: ‘The fresh milk is the
same as the curdled milk, the same as the fresh butter, and the
same as the clarified butter,’ would he speak rightly, O great
king, if he spoke thus?”
“No, master. Based on the same support, [the milk] turned
into them.”
“Just so, O great king, the stream of the factors continues.
The one that arises is another than the one that ceases. Without
an earlier or a later, so to speak, [the stream] continues. Thus,
[the stream] is neither the same nor another that ends up in the
final coalescence of cognition.”
“You are right, Nāgasena” . . .

II, 2, 6; § 60
The king spoke: “Nāgasena, who is reborn?”
The elder spoke: “Name and form, O great king, are reborn.”
“Is it the same name and the same form that are reborn?”
“No, O great king, it is not the same name and the same form
that are reborn. However, O great king, with this name and this
form, one accomplishes good or bad deeds and, through these
deeds, another name and another form is reborn.”
“If, O master, it is not the same name and the same form that
are reborn, then is one not relieved of the bad deeds?”
78 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

The elder replied: “If one were not reborn, then one would be
relieved of the <73> bad deeds. Since, however, O great king,
one is reborn, one is thus not relieved of the bad deeds.”
“Give an example.”
“If, for example, O great, king, some man were to steal
mangoes from another man, and the owner of the mangoes were
to seize him and bring him before the king: ‘Your majesty, this
man has stolen mangoes from me,’ and he were to speak as
follows: ‘Your majesty, I have not stolen this man’s mangoes; for
the mangoes that he planted are others than the mangoes I have
taken; therefore, I do not deserve punishment,’ would this man,
O great king, indeed deserve punishment?”
“Certainly, master, he would deserve punishment.”
“For what reason?”
“Even though he may speak so, the man would, O master,
regardless of the first mango, deserve punishment because of the
last mango.”
“Just so, O great king, with this name and this form, one
accomplishes good or bad deeds, and through these deeds
another name and another form is reborn. Thus, one is not
relieved from the bad deeds.” . . .
“Give another example.”
“If, for example, O great king, some man were to go up into
the attic with a lamp and were to eat there, and the burning
lamp were to set the straw on fire, the burning straw were to set
the house on fire, and the burning house were to set the village
on fire, and the villagers were to seize this man and speak to him
as follows: ‘Why, fellow, have you set the village on fire?’ and
he were to answer as follows: ‘I have not set the village on fire.
The fire of the lamp by whose light I was eating was another
than the fire that set the village on fire,’ and the quarrelling
parties were to come to you, in whose favor, O great king, would
you <74> decide the case?”
“The villagers, master.”
 The denial of a soul, of a self 79

“Why?”
“Even though he may speak thus, still this fire has indeed
arisen from that one.”
“Just so, O great king, even though the name and form that
end with death may be other than the name and form at birth,
yet these have arisen from those. And thus one is not relieved
from the bad deeds.” . . .
“You are right, Nāgasena.” . . .

II, 2, 8; § 62
The king spoke: “Nāgasena, you have spoken of name and form.
What therein is name and what is form?”
“The coarse material, O great king, is therein form, and the
subtle, mind and mental factors, is therein name.”
“For what reason, Nāgasena, is name alone, or form alone,
not reborn?”
“These factors, O great king, are supported by one another
and therefore arise only as a unity.”
“Give an example.”
“If, for example, O great king, the egg-yolk did not arise from
a hen, then the egg-shell would not arise, for both egg-yolk
and egg-shell are supported by one another and therefore their
arising takes place only as a unity. Just so, O great king, if name
did not arise, then also form would not arise, for both name and
form are supported by one another and therefore their arising
takes place only as a unity. This is how this has come about for
a long time.”
“You are right, Nāgasena.”

II, 2, 9; § 63
The king spoke: “Nāgasena, you have spoken of a long time.
What is it that is called time?”
“The past time, O great king, the future time and the present
time.” <75>
80 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

II, 3, 1; § 64
The king spoke: “Nāgasena, what is the root of the past time,
what is the root of the future time, and what is the root of the
present time?”
“The root of the past time, O great king, of the future time,
and of the present time is ignorance; dependent on ignorance,
volitional formations arise; dependent on volitional formations,
cognition; dependent on cognition, name and form; dependent
on name and form, the sixfold sphere; dependent on the sixfold
sphere, contact; dependent on contact, sensation; dependent on
sensation, thirst; dependent on thirst, grasping; dependent on
grasping, becoming; dependent on becoming, birth; dependent
on birth, old age and death, sorrow and lamentation, pain,
distress, and despair. Thus, an earlier starting point of all of this
time is not to be observed.”
“You are right, Nāgasena.”

II, 3, 2; § 65
The king spoke: “Nāgasena, you have said: ‘An earlier starting
point is not to be observed.’ Give an example of this.”
“If, for example, O great king, a man sows a small seed in
the earth, and a sprout arises from it, which in turn comes to
growth, flourishing, and maturity, and bears fruit, and then he
again takes the seed and sows it, and a sprout arises from it,
which in turn comes to growth, flourishing, and maturity, and
bears fruit, is there an end to this series?”
“No, master.”
“Just so, O great king, with respect to time, an earlier starting
point is also not to be observed.”
“Give another example.”
“If, for example, O great king, from the hen the egg, from the
egg <76> the hen and again from the hen the egg arises, is there
an end to this series?”
“No, master.”
 The denial of a soul, of a self 81

“Just so, O great king, with respect to time, an earlier starting

point is also not to be observed.”

Now we come to the presentation of the form that the

doctrine of the non-existence of a soul took on in the fully
developed system of the Sarvāstivādins. In so doing, we
skip over the older representatives of the school and turn
immediately to the man who gave the system its defini-
tive and final form. This is Vasubandhu whom I will call
Vasubandhu the Younger to distinguish him from the
Mahāyāna teacher Vasubandhu, the brother of Asaṅga [see
S. 350f.].

BBA.1.2. Vasubandhu the Younger1 (ca. 400–480 c.e.)

Vasubandhu the Younger was born about 400 c.e. We have
no information about his origins. His teacher was a certain—
relatively unimportant—Buddhamitra, but Vasubandhu him-
self soon gained great esteem. He enjoyed the favor of the
Gupta rulers, Skandagupta Vikramāditya (ca. 455–467), and
Narasiṃhagupta Bālāditya (ca. 467–473), who summoned him
to their court in Ayodhyā. In the end he died in Ayodhyā, at
the advanced age of eighty.
Vasubandhu first achieved fame through his successful
refutation of Vindhyavāsin, the most famous Sāṃkhya teacher of
his time. His greatest achievement, however, is the composition
of the Abhidharmakośa (The Treasury of Scholasticism) in which
he gave the scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda its final form.
In this work the entire system of the school is summarized
in just under 600 stanzas with unsurpassed precision and
clarity. However, despite the fact that Vasubandhu gave the
classical presentation of the scholasticism of the Sarvāstivādins,
he himself is not a strict adherent of the school. On the contrary,

1
[See footnote on page 374.]
 82 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

he leans strongly toward the Sautrāntikas, <77> as is clearly

expressed in his own commentary to the Abhidharmakośa.
Vasubandhu is the great systematizer of Buddhism. His
significance as a philosopher is difficult to judge as yet, since the
milieu in which he is found is still too little known. One thing
must also not be forgotten, if one wishes to judge him properly:
he belongs to the later period of the school. The foundations
of the doctrine that he presents are ancient. By contrast, his
formulation of it is recent; more recent in fact than those of
the great masters of the Mahāyāna, Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. To
lose sight of this will easily lead one to draw wrong con-
clusions.
The following section, which deals with the non-existence
of the soul, comes from the third book of the Abhidharmakośa
in which the structure of the cosmos and the fate of sentient
beings in the cycle of existences is presented. In this context, the
question of what it is that wanders in the cycle of existences
is raised. The answer is: Not a soul, but merely the five groups
(skandha). How these groups move from one existence to
another in an uninterrupted stream until liberation is achieved,
is set down in the tenet of dependent origination, which is then
discussed and explained in detail. The details of the section
reproduced here should be clear from what has been said up
to now, and calls for no further explanation.

BBA.1.2.1. A soul does not exist (Abhidharmakośa III, vv. 18–24)

About this the non-Buddhists, who believe in a self (ātman), say:
“If you accept a being (sattva) that wanders into the other world,
then the self that we assume is established.” In order to refute
that the author says:

v. 18
The self does not exist.
 The denial of a soul, of a self 83

What is the nature of the self that you accept? A person, an

internal agent, who abandons these groups <78> and assumes
other groups certainly does not exist, because it cannot be
observed like visible form, the eye, etc. Besides this, the Exalted
One has said: “Deeds exist and their maturation exists, but a
doer who abandons these groups and assumes other groups is
not observed apart from the law of factors (dharmasaṃketa).
However, this law of factors says: If this exists, then that comes
into existence; due to the arising of this, that arises; (the complete
causal chain follows).”
(Opponent:) Of what kind is the self that you do not reject?
(Answer:)

The mere groups . . .

If by the name self one designates the mere groups, then we do

not reject that.
(Opponent:) Should one assume that the groups wander from
this world into the other world?
(Answer:) The groups vanish every moment. They are there-
fore not capable of movement. (However,)

. . . influenced by deeds and defilements, (they) do

enter into the mother’s womb through the stream of
the intermediate existence (antarābhavasaṃtati); like
a light.1

Just as with a light, although it vanishes every moment, the

stream (of moments) is capable of moving to another place; the
same holds for the groups. Thus it is not an error if one speaks
of wandering. Hence it is established that, although a self does

1
The school of the Sarvāstivādins assumes an intermediate existence
between two births.
84 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

not exist, the stream of the groups enters into the mother’s
womb through the influence of the defilements and deeds.

v. 19
In accordance with their projecting cause, the stream
(of the groups) grows in sequence and, through the
influence <79> of the defilements and deeds, enters
again into the other world (i.e., into the next existence).

The streams of the groups induced (by the deeds) are not all
the same, in terms of their long or short duration, because the
deeds inducing the lifespan differ. In accordance with the great
or little strength of the inducing deeds they later then evolve
in sequence. What is meant by “in sequence”? As is stated in
the holy scripture: “At first the little flake arises, then the little
bubble, from this develops the little ball and from the little
ball the little lump. Then the limbs develop and after that, in
succession, the head- and body-hair, nails, the material sense-
organs, and their bearers.” That is to say, in the mother’s womb
there are five different stages of development: first, the little
flake; second, the little bubble; third, the little ball; fourth, the
little lump; fifth, the body with its limbs. Then the embryo
gradually evolves in the womb until the stage of development
in which the material sense-organs and their bearers are fully
developed. By means of the pressure of the winds that arise
through the maturation of the deeds, the embryo now turns in
the mother’s womb and faces the gate of birth.1 Sometimes the
embryo dies in the mother’s womb, either through the mother’s
inappropriate eating habits or through its own previous bad
deeds. Then experienced women insert their hands with small

1
The following sentences, in which the impurity of the womb and the
torment of birth are described in Buddhist fashion with painful vividness,
are abbreviated.
 The denial of a soul, of a self 85

sharp knives into the mother’s womb, cut off limb after limb
and pull them out. Or, the birth is without difficulty. Then
the mother and other women take [the new-born], wash and
<80> dry it. They put butter in its mouth, nurse it with mother’s
milk, and gradually it becomes accustomed to eating fine and
coarse, liquid and solid food. Then it evolves until the state of
maturity of its senses. Once again defilements arise and deeds
accumulate. Then the body decays. As before, the stream (of the
groups) of the intermediate existence arises once again and it
enters anew into the other world.
In this way the defilements and deeds are the cause of birth.
Birth is again the cause of the coming into being of the
defilements and deeds. And from these defilements and deeds
birth arises anew.

Thus the wheel of becoming is without a beginning.

If it is assumed that there is a beginning, then the beginning

must be without a cause. But if the beginning is without a
cause, then everything else must arise also from itself. One sees
through the relationship to place and time,1 however, that
sprouts, etc., arise from seeds, etc., as their cause. Just so, the
change through heat (pākaja), etc., arises through fire, etc. It
is thus certainly not the case that the factors come into being
without a cause. The doctrine of an eternal cause (god, etc.,) has,
moreover, already been previously repudiated.2 Consequently,
birth and death are certainly without a beginning. There is, on
the other hand, an end as a result of the disappearance of the
causes, since birth is based on causes. If therefore the causes fall
away, birth as an effect must by necessity come to an end. The
sentence stands as absolutely justified. <81> In the same way as

1
If they were without causes, they would arise everywhere and at all times.
2
[See Abhidharmakośa, ii. 64 d.]
86 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

when the seed perishes, the sprout also by necessity does not
arise.
The stream of the groups, of which we are speaking, is spread
over three births.

v. 20
This is the dependent origination, which consists of
twelve members and three sections, [i.e.,] two each at
the beginning and at the end, and eight in the middle,
and this with respect to the complete (person).

The twelve members are: 1. ignorance; 2. volitional formations;

3. cognition; 4. name and form; 5. the sixfold sphere; 6. contact;
7. sensation; 8. thirst; 9. grasping; 10. becoming; 11. birth;
12. old age and death. The three sections mentioned are: i. the
beginning, ii. the end, and iii. the middle; and these are three
births, namely, the past, the future, and the present. What does
it mean that the twelve members are spread over the three
sections? Two members each belong to the beginning and the
end, and eight to the middle; with that, there are twelve.
Ignorance and volitional formations belong to the beginning;
birth, old age and death to the end; and the remaining eight to the
middle.
(Question:) Are all eight members of the middle completely
present in each being in a single birth or not?
(Answer:) They are not all present. Why then was it said
that there are eight members? With regard to the complete
(person). By this is meant: If a person (pudgala) passes
through all the stages of development, then he is called
complete; not if, along the way, he dies prematurely; nor [if
he abides] in the sphere of the material or sphere of the
immaterial. For The Great Discourse of the Foundations of
Origination (above S. 30) teaches only with regard to the person
in the sphere of desire <82> that all (members) are present. There
 The denial of a soul, of a self 87

it states (S. 38): “The Buddha spoke to Ānanda: ‘If cognition

were not to enter into the mother’s womb, . . . etc., . . . would
then name and form grow, flourish, and fully mature, or not?’ –
‘No, O Lord.’ “
Occasionally, it is said that dependent origination consists of
only two sections. The first includes the beginning [i.e., members
1 and 2], the second, the end [i.e., members 11 and 12]. The
beginning involves the first seven members, namely, ignorance
through sensation. The end involves the last five members, from
thirst up to old age and death. That is to say, both sections then
include beginning and end, with their effect or, respectively, their
cause.1
What is the nature of these members; ignorance, etc.?

v. 21
2
Ignorance is the state of the previous defilements.

The state of all the defilements in the previous life up to the

maturation of the current fruit is summed up by the name
ignorance, because they constantly occur together with igno-
rance, since they appear through the influence of ignorance.
Just as when one speaks of the coming of the king, it is in no
way stated that his entourage is not coming. One says only,
summed up: “The king comes,” because the king has
precedence.

The volitional formations are the state of the previous

deeds. <83>

1
That is to say, to the beginning [i.e., members 1 and 2] are related those
members that represent its effect in the next birth [i.e., members 3 to 7], and
to the end [i.e., members 11 and 12], those that form its cause in the previous
birth [i.e., members 8 to 10].
2
The word state is added because it is always thought that the five groups
in this or that state make up the respective member of dependent origination.
88 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

The state of the good, etc., deeds in the previous life up to

the maturation of the current fruit is summed up by the name
volitional formations, . . .

The groups at the time of rebirth (pratisaṃdhi) are

cognition.

The five groups in the state of the single instant of rebirth in the
womb are called cognition.

(They are) name and form subsequent to that

v. 22
and before the arising of the sixfold sphere.

The states in the time after the rebirth of cognition and before the
arising of the six spheres are summed up by the name name
and form. Here it should actually be said “before the arising of
the four spheres,” 1 but in view of the fact that they now appear
to be in their complete state, six are spoken of.

This, before the coming together of the triad.

The state in which the eye, etc., has arisen but the sense-organ,
object, and cognition have not yet come together, is given the
name sixfold sphere.

Contact, before the ability to cognize the causes of

pleasure, suffering, etc., appears.

The state in which the coming together of the triad has oc-
curred, but in which the different causes of the threefold
sensation have not yet been cognized, is summed up by the
name contact.

1
Because thinking and the body, and thereby also the tactile sense-organ,
already exist from the instant of rebirth.
 The denial of a soul, of a self 89

v. 23
Sensation, before copulation.

The state in which the different causes of the threefold sensation

have been cognized, but in which <84> the passion for sexual
union has not yet arisen, this state is called sensation.

Thirst, in the one who desires sensual enjoyments and

copulation.

The state in which passion for sensual enjoyments, together with

the thirst for copulation, occurs, but in which one does not yet
strive for them, this state is called thirst.

Grasping, in the person who exerts himself to obtain

sensual enjoyment.

If one exerts oneself and runs all over in order to obtain the
various objects of sensual enjoyment, then this state is called
grasping.

v. 24
If one accomplishes deeds that bear their fruit in
a future birth, then this is becoming.

If, due to this exertion, one accumulates deeds that bring about
a fruit in a future birth, then this state is called becoming.

The new rebirth (pratisaṃdhi) is birth.

If, after the passing away from this life, due to the force of these
deeds one is reborn again in a new existence, then this state is
called birth. The future birth member therefore corresponds to
the current cognition [member].
90 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

Old age and death reach as far as sensation.

The state of gradual maturation after the moment of birth up to

the future sensation is summed up by the name old age and
death. Old age and death thus correspond to the four members,
name and form, the sixfold <85> sphere, contact, and sensation
in the present existence. This is the explanation of the nature of
the twelve members.

Further explanations of dependent origination follow, then

the text moves on to other topics.
In the school of the Sarvāstivāda the denial of a soul
has been given its starkest form. Of course, all of the
other Buddhist schools also occupied themselves with
this question and arrived at a variety of solutions. In sharp-
est contrast to the Sarvāstivādins stands the southern
neighboring school of the Vātsīputrīya-Sāṃmatīya, which
even went so far as to assert the existence of a person
(pudgala), based on texts such as The Discourse of the
Bearer of the Burden (Bhārahārasūtra), rendered above
(S. 25). According to the doctrine of the Sāṃmatīyas,
besides the three types of conditioned entities (saṃskṛta)
and the unconditioned entities (asaṃskṛta), there is—as
a fifth entity—the inexpressible (avaktavya), otherwise
known as the person. This person is neither the same as
the groups nor different from them; it is neither permanent
nor non-permanent, thus inexpressible.
We are informed about the doctrines of the Sāṃmatīyas
through a work of their own, preserved in a Chinese
translation, the Sāṃmatīyanikāyaśāstra (Treatise of the
Sāṃmatīya-school), which deals mainly with the doctrine of
the person. In addition, we have Vasubandhu’s polemic at
our disposal. Specifically, Vasubandhu composed a small
work, the Refutation of the Person (Pudgalapratiṣedha-
 The denial of a soul, of a self 91

prakaraṇa), which he appended to the Abhidharmakośa. It is

meant to serve as a refutation of the different doctrines
that accept a soul and is thus directed against the soul-
doctrine of the Sāṃkhya and of the Vaiśeṣika, but first and
foremost against the Sāṃmatīya-doctrine of the existence
of a person. A few brief sections from this work, which will
give some idea of the doctrine of the Sāṃmatīyas and at
the same time show how the Sarvāstivāda dealt with it, will
be translated next.
The first translated section, which is also the beginning
of the work, is directed against the definition of the <86>
person as inexpressible. Of course, this inexpressibility is
not the same as the inexpressibility of the ultimate state of
being, which remains inconceivable to all human ways of
thinking [S. 147f., 298]. Rather, it was customary at the time
to characterize any relationships that one was unable to
define clearly, as being neither this nor that and thus
as inexpressible. Thus, in the Sāṃkhya and in Kumārila’s
Mīmāṃsā, it was said that the universal (sāmānya) is
neither different nor not-different from the particulars.
Similarly, the Sāṃmatīyas declared the person to be neither
different nor not-different from the groups. In his refutation
Vasubandhu now tries to force his opponent to define
this relationship more clearly, and demonstrates that any
attempt to ascribe a clear meaning to the words is bound
to fail.

BBA.1.2.2. From “Refutation of the Person”

(Pudgalapratiṣedhaprakaraṇa)
Can there be no liberation on another path than this? Certainly
not. For what reason? Because the view is obscured by the
erroneous belief in a self. All those outside this doctrine (of
Buddhism) who assume a self, do not consider it as a desig-
nation for the stream of the groups (skandhasaṃtāna), but
92 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

assume that there is a real self that is distinct from the groups.
Through the belief in a self, however, all the defilements arise,
the cycle of threefold becoming rolls on, and liberation is not
possible.
(Question:) How can one recognize with certainty that the
designation self indicates only the stream of the groups and not
a self as an entity of its own?
(Answer:) Because there is no true [direct] perception or
inference with respect to this assumed self that is distinct from
the groups. If, namely, <87> the self were by nature a separate
real thing like the other factors, then, where no hindrance
appears, it would have to be apprehended either through
[direct] perception, like the six sense-objects1 and the mental
organ, or it would have to be apprehended through infer-
ence, like the five material sense-organs. As for the assertion
that the five material sense-organs are apprehended through
inference, in general the view prevails that, in spite of the
presence of the general causes, an effect does not arise if its
particular cause is absent, but that it does arise if the latter is
not absent as, for example, when a sprout arises from a
seed.2 Likewise, it is observed that in spite of the presence of
the causes light, object, attention, etc., perception does not occur
among the blind, the deaf, etc., but that it does occur among
the not-blind, the not-deaf, etc. From this it can be recognized
with certitude that there is a particular cause that is absent or
not absent. This particular cause is the sense-organ of the eye,
etc. In this sense then, one speaks of the inference of the material
sense-organs. But in the case of a self distinct from the groups,
both means of knowledge are completely absent. From this we

1
As Buddhism puts the mental organ on equal footing with the sense-
organs, it counts six sense-organs and six sense-objects.
2
Even if a field, water, etc., are present, the sprout arises only if its
particular cause, in this case the seed, is also present.
 The denial of a soul, of a self 93

can recognize with certainty that a self as a real entity does

not exist.
The school of the Vātsīputrīyas now assumes that a person
exists that is by nature neither one with the groups nor distinct
from them. Here, one must consider whether (this person)
is a thing (dravya) <88> or a mere designation (prajñapti).
“How is the mark of that which exists as a thing (dravyasat)
distinguished from the mark of that which exists as a
designation (prajñaptisat)?” If we are dealing with separate
things, then this is the mark of that which exists as a thing,
as in the case of visible form, sound, etc. If, on the other
hand, we are dealing only with an aggregation, then this is
the mark of that which exists as a designation, as in the case of
milk, etc.
(Opponent:) What errors ensue if one regards (the person) as
a thing or as a designation?
(Answer:) If it is by nature a thing, then it must be distinct
from the groups, because it has its own nature as do the
different groups themselves. In addition, if it has a real nature,
it must necessarily have a cause. Otherwise, it must be
something unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), which in turn coincides
with the view of the non-Buddhists. It would, moreover, be
purposeless.1 The assumption that [the person] is a thing is
therefore meaningless. If, on the other hand, it is by nature
(only) a designation, this in turn coincides with our assertion.
(Opponent:) The person of which I speak does not exist, as
you explain, either as a real thing or as a designation. Rather,
only based on the inner groups—belonging to the present and
appropriated (upātta)2—can one speak of a person.

1
Because, being eternally unchanging, it would be completely detached
from the course of the world.
2
To a Buddhist the [pellucid] organs along with the matter that goes with
them, which belong to a personality-stream, are termed appropriated.
94 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

(Answer:) This is the speech of one who is blind, for whom

the subject-matter has not yet become clear, for I still don’t
understand what you mean by the words “based on” (upādāya).
If “based on” means something like referring to (ālambya) the
groups, and the person thus comes about by referring to the
groups, then it is <89> established that the person exists only as
a designation, just as [the notion of] milk, etc., comes about by
referring to visible form, etc. If, on the other hand, “based on”
means something like [causally] dependent upon (pratītya) the
groups and one thus speaks of a person as being [causally]
dependent upon the groups, then the same error follows for
that person. 1
(Opponent:) This is not how we speak about this. “How
then?” Just as in everyday life one speaks of fire based on fuel.
“Why is it possible, if one is speaking of fire, to say that it is
based on fuel?” Because in the absence of fuel, one cannot speak
of the presence of fire. Here, the fuel is neither distinct from the
fire nor one with it, since if the fire were distinct from the fuel,
the fuel could not be hot. And if fire were one with fuel, then
that which is burned would also be that which does the burning.
In the same way, in the absence of groups, one cannot speak of
a person. The person is also neither distinct from the groups nor
one with them, since, if it were distinct from the groups, then it
would have to be eternal by nature. And, if [the person] were
one with the groups, then it would follow that the person is by
nature subject to annihilation.
(Answer:) In that case, you must first state clearly what fire is
and what fuel is, so that I can understand what it means that the
fire is based on fuel.
(Opponent:) What is there to say? If I must say something,
however, then that which is burned is the fuel and that which
does the burning is the fire.

1
In this case as well, the person exists only as a designation.
 The denial of a soul, of a self 95

(Answer:) But then you would have to explain in turn what

that which is burned and that which does the burning are, which are
called fuel and fire. <90>
(Opponent:) In everyday life everyone knows that the non-
blazing object that is consumed is called that which is burned, or
the fuel, and that the bright, extremely hot, blazing object that
consumes is called that which does the burning, or the fire. More
precisely, this [blazing object] burns or consumes that object
since it changes the later moments in its stream relative to the
earlier ones.1 And although both consist by nature of eight
things,2 fire arises in dependence upon fuel, just as sour milk and
vinegar arise in dependence upon sweet milk and wine. For this
reason, one says in everyday life that the fire is based on fuel.
(Answer:) If the fire is actually based on it, then it is distinct
from the fuel because the later fire and the earlier fuel each
belong to distinct times. If therefore the person assumed by you
is based on the groups as is the fire on the fuel, then it must
absolutely be said that it arises dependent upon the groups and
is therefore distinct from the groups. In addition, it follows that
it is not eternal.
(Opponent:) With regard to the blazing wood, etc., the
tangible (named) heat is called fire, the other things are called
fuel.3
(Answer:) In that case fire and fuel are indeed simultaneous,
but it must stand as established that they are different in nature,
and that this is due to <91> the difference in their marks. In
which case, what is meant by “based (on fuel)” would once
again need to be explained. How then, can you assert that one

1
Under the influence of fire the stream of moments of the wood gradually
turns into ashes.
2
Cf. S. 97 what has been said about the doctrine of the elements.
3
I.e., among the eight atoms that form the molecule of wood, the heat-atom
represents the fire, the other seven the fuel.
96 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

speaks of the fire based on fuel, since after all, both arise
simultaneously. In other words, the fuel cannot serve as cause
for the fire, since both arise, at the same time, from their own
causes. Neither can the fuel be designated as the cause of
the name “fire,” since after all, the tangible (named) heat is
designated as the cause of the name “fire.”
(Opponent:) The statement that the fire is based on fuel
means that both arise at the same time or that (the fuel) is the
bearer (of the fire).
(Answer:) Then you must assume that the person arises at
the same time as the groups, or that the groups are the bearer
(of the person). In addition, you apparently presuppose that it is
by nature distinct from the groups. Further, you must assume as
a result that, if the groups are absent, the person is by nature also
not present; just as when the fuel is not present, the fire is by
nature also absent. But, you do not allow these assumptions.
Therefore your explanation is also not correct.
With respect to your own assumption, you have, furthermore,
raised the objection that the fuel, if it were distinct from the fire,
could not be hot. Here, the nature of that which is hot must be
clearly stated. If you offer the explanation that that which is
hot is the tangible (named) heat, then the fuel is not hot because
its nature is of a different kind.1 If, on the other hand, you offer
the explanation that that which is hot is that which <92> is
connected with heat, then that which is different by nature, must
also be given the designation hot. Only the tangible (named)
heat then is designated as the actual fire. Everything else con-
nected with heat is given the designation hot. With that, how-
ever, it is obviously admitted that the fuel is called hot although
it is distinct from the fire, and this without resulting in an error.
How then, can one suggest that there is a problem here?

1
Since, according to the above assumption, the fuel consists of the other
seven atoms of the wood-molecule.
 The denial of a soul, of a self 97

(Opponent:) The wood, etc., when it blazes brightly, is called

fuel and, at the same time, fire.
(Answer:) In that case you must explain once again what is
meant by “based (on fuel).” Further, the person must [then]
necessarily be one with the groups of corporeality, etc.; this
cannot be refuted by any logic. The assertion that one speaks of
the person based on the groups, just as one speaks of the fire
based on the fuel, can therefore not be substantiated through
argument and counterargument.

The next section that we render is directed against the

doctrine of the perceptibility of the person. The Sāṃmatīyas
maintain namely that subsequent to the perception of the
sense objects the person is also perceived. Vasubandhu, on
the other hand, concludes from precisely this that the
person has no real existence but only a nominal existence,
and that it therefore—as is said in India—does not exist as a
real thing (dravyata) but only as a designation (prajñaptita).
He further shows that impossible consequences follow from
the opponent’s assumption.

Further, it must be stated which of the six types of cognition1

cognizes the person.
(Opponent:) All six types cognize it. “How so?” If, at a
particular time, the visual cognition <93> cognizes the visible
form, it then subsequently apprehends the presence of the
person. Therefore one says that (the person) is cognized by the
visual cognition. But one cannot say that [the person] is one with
the visible form or distinct from it, . . . etc., (through the other
types of cognition) up to: If, at a particular time, the mental
cognition cognizes the factors, it then subsequently apprehends

1
The five types of cognition via the senses and the mental cognition; cf.
below S. 117.
98 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

the presence of the person. Thus one says that (the person) is
cognized by the mental cognition. But one cannot say that
[the person] is one with the factors or distinct from them.
(Answer:) If that is so, then one can speak of the person
assumed (by you)—just as one does of milk, etc.—only as a
designation. If, in other words, the visual cognition, at the time
that it cognizes the visible form, subsequently apprehends the
presence of the milk, etc., then one says that the milk, etc., is
cognized by the visual cognition, but one cannot say that [the
milk] is one with the visible form or distinct from it, . . . etc. up
to: And if the tactile cognition, at the time that it cognizes the
tangible, subsequently apprehends the presence of the milk, etc.,
then one says that the milk, etc., is cognized by the tactile
cognition, but one cannot say that [the milk] is one with the
tangible or distinct from it. Otherwise it would follow that the
milk is nothing but the four (sense-objects), or that it is not
comprised of them. Thus it is established that one speaks of the
presence of the person as a designation based on the totality
of the groups, just as in everyday life, based on the totality of
visible form, etc., one speaks of milk, etc., as a designation, but
not as real.
Moreover, you have said: “If, at a particular time, the visual
cognition cognizes the visible form, it then <94> subse-
quently apprehends the presence of the person.” What does
this statement mean? Does it mean that the visible form is
the cause of the perception of the person, or that, at the time
that the visible form is perceived, the person can also be
perceived?
If it means that the visible form is the cause of the perception
of the (person), and if at the same time one cannot say that
[the person] is distinct from the visible form, then one also
cannot say that the visible form is distinct from the eye, etc.,
because the eye, just like light, attention, etc., is a cause of the
perception of the visible form.
 The denial of a soul, of a self 99

If, on the other hand, it means that, at the time when the
visible form is perceived, the person can also be perceived, is
then the perception of the visible form also the perception of
the (person), or is it a matter of a distinct perception?
If the perception of the visible form is also the perception of
the (person), then one is forced to accept that its nature is
precisely this visible form, or that the designation for it refers
only to the visible form. In that case, however, there can be
no such thoughts as: “Such is the visible form” and “Such is the
(person).” How then, can one ascertain the presence of the
visible form and of the person without these two sorts of
thoughts, since after all the ascertainment of their presence is
necessarily dependent upon the thoughts?
If, on the other hand, it is a matter of a distinct perception,
then (the person) must be distinct from the visible form because
the perception is chronologically separate, just as yellow is
distinct from blue, or the earlier from the later, etc.
The same objections can be raised (with respect to the other
sense-objects) up to the factors.
(The opponent) says, in order to counter this: Just as one
cannot state definitely that the (person) is one with the visible
form or distinct from it, the same holds for the <95> examination
of the two kinds of perceptions.
(Answer:) In that case, you cannot place perception among
the conditioned (saṃskṛta).1 If you do this, you contravene your
own system.

Finally, the third and last section that we present gives a

taste of how the two adversaries use the texts of the holy
scripture to support their assertions. The Sāṃmatīya quotes

1
If the [above-mentioned] perceptions are neither distinct nor indistinct
from each other, then they are inexpressible and belong to the same group
as the person, thus not among the conditioned factors.
100 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

The Discourse of the Bearer of the Burden (Bhārahārasūtra),

translated above (S. 29). Vasubandhu’s reply shows how—
since they could not deny the message itself of this widely
recognized text—the Sarvāstivādins tried to explain this
document away.

(Opponent:) If only the five groups of grasping are called person,

why then has the Exalted One spoken as follows: “I will explain
to you, monks, the burden, the taking up of the burden, the
laying down of the burden, and the bearer of the burden“?
(Answer:) For what reason should the Buddha not have
spoken in this way?
(Opponent:) Because the burden cannot be called the bearer
of the burden.1
(Answer:) Why not?
(Opponent:) Because such a thing has never been seen before.
(Answer:) In that case, you also cannot speak of any
inexpressible thing.
(Opponent:) Why not?
(Answer:) Because, similarly, such a thing has never been
seen. In addition, the taking up of the burden could then also not
be included in the groups, because it has never before been seen
that a burden takes itself up. It is said in the sutra, however, that
thirst is called the taking up of the burden. Hence it is included
<96> in the groups. And the same holds for the bearer of the
burden. It must thus be conceded that (the bearer) is to be found
in the groups. Besides, the Buddha himself, fearing that the
person might be regarded as inexpressible, eternal, and real,
explained a little later in the sutra that [the person] designates
only—according to the general custom—”that venerable one
who has such and such a name,” etc., . . . , specifically so that one

1
In the sutra itself, the burden is explained as the five groups of grasping.
These, therefore, cannot at the same time also be the bearer of the burden.
 The denial of a soul, of a self 101

might recognize that the person is by nature expressible, not

eternal, and not real. In addition, the five groups of grasping
are given the name burden because they mutually weigh upon
each other. And the earlier moments are called bearer of the
burden because they entail the later ones. There is therefore no
real person.

BBA.2. General views associated with the doctrine of the denial of a soul

BBA.2.1. First general view: All entities lack a solid, permanent core
We turn now to the general views that appear to be connected
with the doctrine of the denial of a soul and that constitute
its broader framework. The first of these is the view that all
entities lack a solid, permanent core. A tendency toward [this
view] is already apparent very early on and probably goes back
to the Buddha himself. It is expressed in the endeavor to
place fleeting individual phenomena in the foreground and is
apparently based on the effort to emphasize the impermanence
of all things. The endeavor to make individual phenomena
[more] autonomous was encouraged by the ancient method,
still prevalent at that time, of considering everything—even
properties, when it was a matter of trying to clarify their
nature—as real things. It was only later, however, that these
first attempts developed into a clearly defined philosophical
doctrine, in opposition, specifically, to the Vaiśeṣika system as it
created its doctrine of categories. When, that is, the Vaiśeṣika—
in a clear philosophical insight—differentiated things and their
 102 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

properties, i.e., substance and quality, from one another as

two different forms of existence, it became necessary to take a
stand on this new doctrine. At this point, opinions diverged.
With a few exceptions, the Buddhist schools decided to oppose
<97> the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of substances and their qualities
with the doctrine of the factors (dharma), which so to speak
lead an existence of their own, as autonomous attributes without
a bearer.
A rough idea of this doctrine is as follows.

BBA.2.1.1. (A) Discussion of this first general view in the field of material
elements
In the sphere of the elements, the primary concern was with
the five properties that, since ancient times, had been held to
be the objects of the sense-perceptions, namely: visible form;1
sound; odor; taste; and tangibility. In the doctrinal discourses
of the Buddha, these properties are usually mentioned alone,
without reference to the [invisible] elements, since to the Buddha
the external world was of interest only insofar as it affects
the person and arouses sensations and passions. Now, it was
explicitly taught that [visible form, etc.,] are not properties that
adhere to the elements, but they are rather autonomous entities.
And as the doctrine of atoms—which had been created and
propagated in the meantime—was adopted, it was taught that
these entities consist of atoms. The things of the external world
are therefore not composed of elements but are formed from
atoms of color, sound, odor, taste, and tangibility.
Of course, it was also necessary to deal with the old
conception of the elements, since elements—specifically the
commonly known four elements of earth, water, fire, and
wind—are often mentioned in the doctrinal discourses of the

1
Visible form (rūpa) includes color and shape.
 All entities lack a solid, permanent core 103

Buddha. What are these elements then? To explain this, one

reverted to the following idea. Since the ancient times, in
addition to the five properties that, as objects of the sense-
perceptions, correspond to the five sense-organs, a second set
of characteristic properties had been attributed to the elements.
These were: solidity to earth; wetness to water; heat to fire; and
motion to wind. Now it was said that the so-called four elements
were nothing other than these same properties. With that,
these four properties were classified within the tangible and
of course the theory of atoms was also applied to them. <98>
The four elements are therefore atoms of hardness, wetness,
heat, and motion. 1
At the same time, however, according to the commonly held
view, the properties of the elements never appear in isolation.
The Vaiśeṣika, for example, taught that each element unites
several qualities within itself, and all the other systems followed
the Vaiśeṣikas in this. Opinions differed only with regard to the
number and distribution of these qualities. Buddhism thus also
taught accordingly that the atom-like properties of the elements
never occur in isolation as single atoms, but always combined
into molecules. Each molecule, to be exact, contains one property
atom of each type [i.e., visible form, etc.], each of which are
joined as support, so to speak, by one atom of each of the four
elements. Since sound occurs only occasionally, the molecule
therefore consists of a minimum of eight [types of] atoms, which
may occasionally be joined by further atoms.2 The entire material
world is built from these atoms and the diversity of individual
materials derives from the predominance of this or that property
atom. In this way then, against the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the

1
But, as it was said, these are elements only in the philosophical sense.
That which in everyday life is called [element, i.e., earth, water, fire, wind,]
is a mixture of different atoms, whereby the name [element] adheres to the
color and shape atoms.
2
[See Abhidharmakośa ii. 22.]
 104 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

elements, Buddhism set its own doctrine, in which the concept of

a [permanent] substance was eliminated and a loose association
of autonomous property atoms took the place of [permanent]
substance atoms with their numerous qualities.

BBA.2.1.2. (B) Discussion of this first general view in the field of

psychology
The development of the doctrine in the field of psychology was
no different. Here the Vaiśeṣika taught that all mental processes
are qualities of the soul. Other schools, such as the Sāṃkhya,
which transferred all mental processes to the field of matter,
saw in them the properties of one or more mental organs. The
Buddhist view was initially close to that of these schools and
we still find clear signs that cognition (vijñāna) was originally
thought of as such a mental organ. But here as well, even the
discourses of the Buddha show the unmistakable tendency to
make the individual mental processes autonomous. Here as well,
the later scholasticism taught precisely and unambiguously that
all mental processes <99> are not properties of some kind of
mental organ, but rather separate autonomous factors that
assemble en masse into one overall mental process. Nothing
remains of the original characterization of cognition, other than
that it constitutes the center of this complex, to the extent that
cognition must be included in every mental process and that
the other factors associate themselves with it. In this case as
well, therefore, a loose association of autonomous factors takes
the place of the [permanent] mental substance with its numerous
qualities, whereby the concept of a substance is deliberately
eliminated.
This denial of a [permanent] substance is the most important
fundamental dictum of Buddhist scholasticism in this field. The
same point of view was, however, also extended to all similar
cases, wherever a solid core or a permanent nature seemed
to show itself in individual entities. This was especially so for
 All entities lack a solid, permanent core 105

the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the whole (avayavin). In this doc-

trine the Vaiśeṣika asserted that for all things constituted of
atoms—the ultimate components of matter—what exists is
not just an accumulation of atoms but that something new,
i.e., an undivided whole, arises from their conjunction. This
view is also rejected by Buddhism, according to which every
whole is a loose aggregation of different factors and nothing
more.
In the doctrine of the universal (sāmānya)—that general
entity that, according to Vaiśeṣika doctrine, is inherent in
individual entities and bestows on them their homogeneous
character—the Buddhists are influenced by the same attitude
[i.e., denial of a solid, permanent core]. Only to a very limited
extent did the old schools accept a kind of universal. In later
times though, it was categorically denied.
We cannot provide here a detailed sampling of texts for all
of these doctrines and their development. And in any case, by
Vasubandhu’s time this development was already long complete
and scholastically fixed. As is usual in India for such a stage
of development, the discussion is limited to a polemic in which
each party stubbornly holds on to their <100> adopted view
and seeks to defend it in every possible way. Although such
a polemic often contributed to a clearer view of things and
to a more accurate formulation of the doctrines, it makes
for difficult and laborious reading and is hardly of interest to
broader circles of readers. I thus restrict myself here to rendering
a short section of the Abhidharmakośa, in which Vasubandhu
discusses in a concise way the doctrine of the [permanent]
substance. I then immediately move on to the next point, the
doctrine of the momentariness of entities.
The section rendered comes from the Abhidharmakośa’s third
book, specifically from its last part, which gives an account of
the periodic destruction of the cosmos. For Buddhists this means
a complete destruction of the phenomenal world, whereas
 106 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

according to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine the cosmos merely dissolves

into its constituent components, the atoms, which continue
to exist as eternal substances. This provides Vasubandhu with
an opportunity to briefly discuss the concept of [permanent]
“substance.” The arguments he advances in doing so are essen-
tially the following:
Although, according to Vaiśeṣika doctrine, the substance can
be perceived through the eye sense-organ as well as through the
sense of touch, a substance does not exist, because while we
do perceive the properties of the elements, we do not perceive
a substance apart from them.
Further, when an object is burned, along with its qualities
the object itself disappears, which would be impossible if its
substance continued to exist unchanged.
Lastly, such a case does indeed seem to occur with the firing
of clay pots during which, according to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine,
the otherwise unchanging qualities [i.e., color] of the atoms
change, while in their substance the pots apparently stay the
same. In reality, however, this impression is based on the fact
that the appearance, i.e., the arrangement of the parts of the pots,
remains the same in the stream of moments. Similarly, for
example, given a trail of ants, we believe we are always seeing
one [and the same] row of ants, although nothing enduring
exists that could be given the name row. With this, Vasubandhu
breaks off the discussion and returns to his main topic. <101>

BBA.2.1.3. A substance does not exist (Abhidharmakośa III, ad v. 100)

Moreover, the name atom refers to visible form, etc. Therefore,
if visible form perishes, the atoms also perish [at the destruction
of the cosmos].
(Opponent:) The atoms are substance (dravya) and are dis-
tinct in nature from the qualities (guṇa), [i.e.,] visible form, etc.
Therefore, they must not necessarily vanish at the same time.
 All entities lack a solid, permanent core 107

(Answer:) The difference in nature between the two is by

no means to be considered as established, since if one observes
them, one does not find a separate [substance] earth, etc., apart
from the visible form, etc. Thus they are not distinct in their
nature. Further, in your own system it is accepted that the
earth, etc., is perceived through the eye and the body. How then
are visible form and the tangible distinct from it? Since,
furthermore—when wool, cotton, opium, etc., are burned—
the corresponding cognition no longer exists, the cognition
“wool,” etc., arises based only on the particular visible form,
etc. When the qualities that have been changed through heat
(pākaja) arise, the cognition “pot” or “bowl” occurs due to
the similarity in shape, just as with a row [of ants], since if
one does not see the shape, the cognition also does not appear.
But who would want to collect their ramblings, which are
senseless as those of a fool. So enough with the prolix polemic
against this system!

BBA.2.2. Second general view: The momentariness of all entities

The second important general view, which is closely connected
to the preceding one, [i.e., “All entities lack a solid, permanent
core,”] is the idea of the momentariness of all entities. As already
noted, the starting point for this was the impermanence of all
that is worldly, as emphasized already by the Buddha. As is
so often the case, however, the basic conceptions <102> referred
108 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

to [by the various traditions] were decisive in its development

and elaboration.
The Sāṃkhya, in its doctrine of the constant change of all
things, had in mind the image of a lump of clay, which becomes
a pot and finally breaks into shards. This gave the impression of
something that persists through all transformations while the
transformations themselves appeared as a mere change in the
state [of this something].
Buddhism thought differently. Here the basic conception was
the image of wood being consumed by fire. This brought with
it, however, the idea of complete annihilation, since the ashes
seemed to be something completely different from the wood.
The ashes arise while the wood vanishes. The impermanence
of all things was thus not perceived as a mere transformation,
but as a complete annihilation, in the course of which the
annihilated entity is replaced by something completely new.
The doctrine was then expressed accordingly. First of all, the
distinction was made between things that exist for some time
before they are annihilated, such as wood, and things that
cease and arise anew with every moment, such as the flame
of a lamp, the sound of a bell, and also all mental factors,
the impermanence of which had already been particularly
emphasized by the Buddha.
Many schools left the doctrine like this, particularly the
Vātsīputrīya-Sāṃmatīyas. Others, on the other hand, particularly
the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas who were the leaders in
this development [of the doctrine of impermanence], eventually
went so far as to assert the momentariness of all entities.
Characteristically enough, these are the same extreme schools
that had also formulated the denial of a soul in the starkest
terms. The connection is unmistakable, since the more clearly
one became aware of the lack of any solid core in things, the
more forcibly one was driven also to assert the momentariness
of all entities. To one who accepts a [permanent] substance, any
 The momentariness of all entities 109

change will easily appear as merely a transformation of the

state of this substance. The latter was thus the view of the
Sāṃkhya, who, despite their emphasis on the eternal flux of
all things, nevertheless taught that there was something endur-
ing within change. According to Sāṃkhya doctrine then, it is
only the qualities (dharma) of things <103> that vanish in all
transformations, whereas the bearer of these qualities (dharmin),
the eternal primal matter, 1 persists.
On the other hand, for those like the Buddhist schools, who
recognize only properties without any bearer as autonomous
factors, any transformation of these properties necessarily means
a complete ceasing and a new arising, and this must apply to
every kind of transformation. Indeed, even growth, aging, and
gradual decay must appear as such a succession of annihilation
and becoming. The explicit expression of the doctrine of the
momentariness of all entities thus signified only a final logical
step. With this the conception of the annihilation of things also
shifted, since, according to this doctrine, the wood is already
ceasing and arising in an uninterrupted sequence before it is
consumed by the fire. The fire merely ensures that the stream
of moments of the wood does not continue any further. The
constant arising and ceasing is therefore not brought about
by external causes but lies in the nature of things. The essence
of things themselves is impermanence. And the doctrine was
then expressed in this way.
This then is the stage of development that the doctrine had
reached by Vasubandhu’s time. The development itself was
essentially complete, with only details remaining in dispute
between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. Otherwise,
the discussion basically revolved around the establishment of
the momentariness of things in opposition to the Vātsīputrīyas

1
[See Gerald James Larson: Classical Sāṃkhya. An Interpretation of its
History and Meaning, pp. 7–14.]
110 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

and in opposition to the non-Buddhist schools, primarily the

Vaiśeṣika.
This state of affairs is thus also reflected in the sample
text that we will render in the following, taken from the
fourth book of the Abhidharmakośa. The occasion for the
discussion is provided by the question of movement, because
if things are in fact momentary, they cannot move, as every
movement takes time. The Sarvāstivāda thus adopts the view
that there is in reality no movement. What appears to us
as movement is, instead, just the stream of moments that,
like the frames of a film, arises in always changing form.
This provides the impetus to prove the momentariness of all
entities to an opponent who asserts the existence of movement.
<104> To this end, Vasubandhu puts forth three inferences,
to each of which he appends a refutation of the opposing
objections.
The first is as follows: The annihilation of entities cannot
be brought about by an external cause, because as a mere non-
existence, [annihilation] cannot be the effect of a cause. If,
however, impermanence lies in the very nature of entities, then
they must immediately vanish, as this nature is present from
the outset. To the opponent who appeals to the apparent fact
that fire annihilates wood, Vasubandhu responds that this
[latter cognition] is not direct perception but an inference, which
as such is not necessarily conclusive.
The second inference says: If the annihilation of entities is
indeed based on some sort of causes, then such causes would
have to be operative everywhere and thus also in the case of
mental factors, etc., the momentariness of which the opponent
himself accepts. [Vasubandhu] then rejects the causes assumed
in these cases by the opponent.
Finally, the third inference is based on the view that fire
brings about the gradual transformation of the objects exposed
to it. To the Buddhist way of thinking, this occurs in such a way
 The momentariness of all entities 111

that [fire] constantly brings about new and changed moments,

in the stream of moments of those objects. In this way, however,
fire is the cause of the arising of these moments and cannot, at
the same time, be the cause of their ceasing. This provides an
opportunity to clarify the role of fire in such cases. Vasubandhu
then closes with a brief summary of the results of his line
of argument.

BBA.2.2.1. The momentariness of entities (Abhidharmakośa IV, vv. 2–3)

What is a moment? That which ceases immediately after the
acquisition of its self (ātmalābha).1 A factor to which is attributed
such a moment is called <105> momentary . . . . All conditioned
factors must, after having acquired their self, immediately cease
and come to nothing. If they arise in a particular place, then
they also cease in this place. Thus, from this location they are
not able to arrive at another . . . .
(Opponent:) If the conditioned factors are momentary, then
the view that they cannot arrive at another location can
be justified.
(Answer:) The assertion that the conditioned factors are
momentary is established,

v. 2 d
because later they definitely cease.

In other words, the ceasing of the conditioned factors has no

cause. “Why?” That which has a cause is an effect, but ceasing
as a non-existence is not an effect and thus it also has no
cause. So since the ceasing has no cause, (the conditioned
factors) cease when they have just barely arisen, since if they
do not cease right at the beginning, then neither can this occur

1
In Buddhist philosophy of that time, the concept of arising is expressed
in this way.
112 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

later, since later they are still of the same nature as before.
If therefore they later come to an end, it can be seen from this
that they are already ceasing earlier.
(Opponent:) They change later and as a result they can
then cease.
(Answer:) They cannot be the same and be called changed.
Thus, it cannot possibly be correct that their nature changes.
(Opponent:) Can it not be observed in everyday life that
fire-wood, etc., is subject to annihilation through connection
with fire? And certainly there is no other means of valid
cognition superior to sensory perception. Therefore, it is not
correct that without exception the ceasing of the factors <106>
has no cause.
(Answer:) How is it recognized that fire-wood, etc., ceases
through the connection with fire?
(Opponent:) Because one no longer sees the fire-wood, etc.,
after the connection with fire.
(Answer:) In that case the following should be considered:
Is the fire-wood, etc., not seen because it ceases through the
connection with fire, or is it not seen because the previously
arisen fire-wood, etc., ceases by itself and does not arise again
later, and is thus no longer present, as is the case with the flame
of a lamp or the sound of a bell due to the connection with the
wind or with the hand?1 This matter must therefore be proven
by inference.
(Opponent:) How can this be inferred?
(Answer:) As we have said before: The ceasing has no cause
because, as non-existence, it is not an effect.
Furthermore, if the ceasing of the fire-wood has a cause,

1
The opponent himself assumes that the light of a lamp or the sound
of a bell are momentary and cease by themselves. The wind or the touch
of the hand therefore do not annihilate them; rather, a new arising simply
does not occur.
 The momentariness of all entities 113

v. 3 a
then no ceasing can be without a cause,

just as arising has a cause and is not without a cause. In

everyday life, however, it is observed that cognition, flame,
and sound cease on their own every moment without a separate
cause. Therefore the ceasing of fire-wood has also no cause.
Some (i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas) assume that the earlier cognition
and the earlier sound cease through the later cognition and
the later sound. This is not correct, <107> because the two
[cognitions] do not exist simultaneously. After all, one cannot
imagine doubt and certainty, suffering and pleasure, passion
and hatred, etc.—which are opposite to each other in their
characteristics—existing simultaneously. Or let us assume that,
after a clear cognition or a clear sound, an unclear cognition
or an unclear sound immediately arises. But how can an unclear
homogeneous factor annihilate a clear homogeneous factor? And
by what means, again, does a later strong cognition or a later
loud sound cease? . . .
If, furthermore, the connection with fire is the cause for
the ceasing of the fire-wood, etc., then with respect to the
changes brought about through heat (pākaja)—which are slight,
medium, or great—

v. 3 b
the cause of arising would also have to be the cause of
ceasing.1

Why? In the case of the changes in fire-wood, etc., caused

through the connection with fire and brought forth through

1
The changes brought about through heat gradually become ever greater.
The same fire, or if we take momentariness into account, a similar fire to
that which brought about the first changes, then also annihilates those
changes in order to bring about the next ones.
114 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

heat, that which brings about the medium and great changes
is also that which annihilates the slight and medium changes.
The same thing or something similar to that which is the
cause of the arising of the medium and great changes is there-
fore also capable of being the cause of the ceasing of the
slight and medium changes. Thus the cause of the arising would
also have to be the cause of the ceasing, or the causes of the
ceasing and of the arising could not differ from each other. It
is <108> not possible, however, that the existence, as well as
the non-existence of something, is based on the same or a
similar cause.
In addition, given the arising of the different flames of
a fire, one can conceive of a difference in the generating
and annihilating causes. How though, in the case of changes
in fire-wood, etc., induced by a connection with ashes, snow,
caustics, sun, earth, and water, and brought forth through
heat, could one conceive of a difference in the causes of arising
and ceasing?1
(Opponent:) Still, it is observed that boiling water decreases
in amount and disappears. What is, in this case, the effect of
the connection with fire?
(Answer:) Through the connection with fire, the power
of the fire element (present in water) increases. The increase
of the fire element makes it so that the mass of water arises
in an ever smaller quantity in each of its subsequent states
until, having become extremely small, it ceases to renew itself.
In this case, this is what is called the effect of the connection
with fire.

1
In the case of fire, which the opponent also considers to be momentary,
he can see the causes of arising and fading away in the different moments
of the fire. But as for the other causes of the changes—brought forth
through heat—which according to his view are not momentary, this is
not possible.
 The momentariness of all entities 115

Thus the ceasing of the factors does not have a cause. Rather,
the factors cease on their own because they are impermanent.
But since they cease on their own, they cease as soon as
they have arisen. Through their ceasing as soon as they have
arisen, the view of their momentary ceasing is established.
So, given that they are momentary, there can of course be no
movement. On the contrary, the erroneous idea of movement
arises when the factors arise in different places that immediately
succeed <109> one another, like the movement of the flames
in a prairie fire. Based on this line of proof, there is definitely
no movement.

BBB. The fundamental concepts

BBB.1. The scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda

In the previous section, we devoted ourselves to a presentation
of the principal philosophical thoughts that dominate the system
of the Sarvāstivāda. We now move on to give an overview
of the concepts on which the world view of the Sarvāstivāda
is based. These concepts are summarized in the list of factors
(dharma). As this list is, at its core, typical for all the schools, it
illustrates well the ideas with which the philosophical thinking
of those days was working. In addition, the factors summarized
in this list are repeatedly mentioned here and there [in our book]
and thus a brief rendering [of this list] will most certainly be
of benefit. The following should, however, be noted about the
origin and structure of this list.
116 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

The pursuit of systematics, so strongly pronounced among

the Indians, had led early on to the fact that different phi-
losophical schools attempted to summarize as lists the basic
elements out of which the world—according to their view—is
composed. This custom was taken over by the later systems, and
thus the Sāṃkhya put forward its series of twenty-five principles
(tattva), as did the Vaiśeṣika the list of its categories (padārtha).
Thus when the Buddhist schools set out to develop their doctrine
into complete systems, they also felt the need to put together
such lists, and this they did. In doing so the Sarvāstivādins chose
the following division: According to them, all factors are divided
into the impermanent and the permanent, for which—following
the established Buddhist forms of expression—the designations
saṃskṛta (the formed) and asaṃskṛta (the unformed), which we
translate as the conditioned and the unconditioned, were used. The
impermanent or conditioned was further divided into four
groups: matter (rūpa); cognition or, as one preferred to say in
this context, the mind (citta); <110> the factors associated with
the mind, also known as the mental factors (cittasaṃprayukta
dharma or caitta); and the factors dissociated from the mind
(cittaviprayukta dharma).
This division was, however, not used freely and indiscrimi-
nately as it was felt that one needed to somehow rely even here
on the words of the Buddha. But since the Buddha had no
interest in such things, there was no usable comprehensive
division in the canon. At first, the only divisions one could use
in a pinch were the five groups (skandha) into which the Buddha
had divided the worldly personality. Besides this, in speaking
of the contact of the sense-organs with their objects, the Buddha
had summarized the six sense-organs and their six objects as the
twelve spheres (āyatana). And finally, he occasionally placed
next to these twelve spheres the six forms of cognition arising
from them, and combined all of this into the group of the
so-called eighteen elements (dhātu). That was all that could
 The scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda 117

be found and so, in the absence of a better alternative, the list

of the factors was forced into the Procrustean bed of these
old divisions and in the process their original meaning was
broadened as far as necessary. Thus we regularly encounter
attempts to establish agreement with these old divisions in
works that contain the list of factors.
Our next presentation relies once again on a work of Vasu-
bandhu, the so-called Pañcaskandhaka, in particular because of
the exemplary clarity and conciseness that distinguish this work.
This is, however, a Mahāyāna work. In it Vasubandhu adheres
to the list of factors formulated by the famous Yogācāra teacher
Asaṅga. Asaṅga, for his part, follows the system of the
Śrāvakayāna school of the Mahīśāsakas in his list. Before his
conversion to the Mahāyāna, he had originally belonged to this
school, and as he later shaped the scholasticism of the Yogācāra
school, their system served him as a model. In the end, therefore,
the presentation in Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka harks back
to the scholasticism of the Mahīśāsakas, but the similarity to
the scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda <111> is so great that this
presents no problem. It will thus suffice for us to point out the
most important deviations.
In this work, as even its title indicates, Vasubandhu primarily
discusses the five groups (skandha). He then briefly mentions the
twelve spheres and the eighteen elements, and clarifies their
relationship to the five groups. The conclusion consists of the
enumeration of a series of definitions, similar to that in the first
book of the Abhidharmakośa, and the naming of the factors to
which they apply. The discussion of the individual factors is
broken into these divisions as follows: The material factors are
discussed with the group of corporeality; the mind with the
group of cognition; the mental factors and the factors dissoci-
ated from the mind—excepting sensation and ideation, which
comprise groups of their own—with the group of formations.
Lastly, the unconditioned factors are placed amongst the twelve
 118 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

spheres, specifically as part of the sphere of the factors. In the

following, I translate individual sections of the work and follow
them with the necessary explanations.

BBB.1.1. From the “Treatise on the Five Aggregates” (Pañcaskandhaka)

As the Exalted One has said in summarizing, there are five groups:
1. the group of matter (rūpa),
2. the group of sensation (vedanā),
3. the group of ideation (saṃjñā),
4. the group of formations (saṃskāra), and
5. the group of cognition (vijñāna).

What is the group of matter? The four great elements and the
matter dependent on the four great elements.
What are the four great elements? The earth element, the water
element, the fire element, and the wind element.
What is the earth element? Solidity. <112> What is the water
element? Liquidity. What is the fire element? Heat. What is the
wind element? Easy mobility.
What is the matter dependent on the four great elements?
The organ of the eye, the organ of the (sense of) hearing, the
organ of the (sense of) smell, the organ of the tongue, and the
organ of the body; visible form, sound, smell, taste, and one part
of the tangible;1 and the matter of non-information (avijñapti).
What is the organ of the eye? The subtle matter that has visible
form as its object.
What is the organ of the (sense of) hearing? The subtle matter
that has sound as its object.
What is the organ of the (sense of) smell? The subtle matter
that has smell as its object.
What is the organ of the tongue? The subtle matter that has
taste as its object.

1
The remaining tangibles are the four great elements.
 The scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda 119

What is the organ of the body? The subtle matter that has the
tangible as its object.
What is visible form? The object of the eye; it is divided into
visible form that is color, visible form that is shape, and visible
form that is information (vijñapti).
What is sound? The object of the (sense of) hearing; it is
divided into sound caused by the appropriated1 great elements,
sound caused by the non-appropriated great elements, and
sound caused by both (kinds of) great elements.
What is smell? The object of the organ of the (sense of) smell;
it is divided into pleasant smell, unpleasant smell, and neutral
(= indifferent) smell.
What is taste? The object of the tongue; it is divided into
sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and astringent taste.
What is the one part of the tangible? The object of the body;
it consists of the other dependent tangibles apart from the
four great elements <113> and is divided into that which is
soft, hard, heavy, light, cold, hunger, and thirst.
What is the matter of non-information (avijñapti)? The matter
that arises through information (vijñapti) or concentration
(samādhi) and is neither visible nor impenetrable.

This presentation of the material factors differs only

insignificantly from the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins and
after what we have already said about the doctrine of the
elements above (S. 100ff.), it generally needs no further
explanation. The ancientness of the list is noteworthy. Its
compilation dates back to a very early time and thus it
still considers the most diverse things, for example, hunger
and thirst, as distinct material entities. The concepts of
information and non-information belong to the doctrine of
deeds (karma). Information is any manifestation of one’s

1
Cf. p. 94, note 1,
120 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

will, through words or actions, that entails merit or demerit.

It is a case of non-information when someone accumu-
lates good or bad deeds without at the same time saying
corresponding words or performing corresponding actions.
In any case, these subtly elaborated ideas fall outside of
the scope of this presentation and will thus not be con-
sidered further.
The series of the non-material factors follows:

What is the group of sensation? The three feelings (anubhava):

1. pain, 2. pleasure, and 3. neither-pain-nor-pleasure. Pleasure is
that at whose fading away the wish to remain connected with it
exists. Pain is that at whose arising the wish to be separated from
it exists. Neither-pain-nor-pleasure is that in whose presence both
wishes are absent.
What is the group of ideation? The apprehending of the various
marks of objects. [ . . . ]
What is the group of formations? The remaining mental factors,
apart from sensation and ideation, and the formations dissociated
from the mind. <114>
What are the remaining mental factors? The factors associated
with the mind.
And which are these?
1. Contact, 2. attention, 3. sensation, 4. ideation, and 5. will;
1. desire-to-do, 2. conviction, 3. recollection, 4. concentration,
and 5. insight;
1. faith, 2. reserve, 3. shame, 4. the root of good, absence
of greed, 5. the root of good, absence of hatred, 6. the root of
good, absence of delusion, 7. diligence, 8. harmoniousness,
9. attentiveness, 10. equanimity, and 11. non-violence;
1. passion, 2. hate, 3. pride, 4. ignorance, 5. (erroneous) view,
and 6. doubt;
1. anger, 2. resentment, 3. hypocrisy, 4. spitefulness, 5. envy,
6. miserliness, 7. deceitfulness, 8. dissimulation, 9. wantonness,
 The scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda 121

10. malevolence, 11. unrestraint, 12. shamelessness, 13. rigidity,

14. agitation, 15. lack of faith, 16. laziness, 17. negligence,
18. forgetfulness, 19. distractedness, and 20. thoughtlessness;
1. regret, 2. languidness, 3. contemplation, and 4. reflection.
Of these mental factors, [in sequence,] five are all-pervasive,
five are bound to specific objects, eleven are good, six are
defilements, the next ones are secondary defilements and four
are unbound.

Definitions of these [fifty-one] individual mental factors

follow. These are of no great interest [in our context] and
can thus be omitted. In the section translated, Vasubandhu
attempts to give as complete a compilation of all mental
phenomena as possible. His list coincides almost completely
with that of the Sarvāstivādins; only the way it is divided
is different. Vasubandhu first gives the five factors that
accompany every mental process, then another five factors,
the occurrence of which is conditioned by the objects of the
process of cognition, and at the very end, another four that
are not bound to a specific moral character of the mental
processes, but that can occur alongside good as well as bad
or morally undetermined mental factors. <115> In between
there are three groups of factors that determine the moral
character of the mental processes, specifically, eleven good
factors, six defilements, and twenty secondary defilements.
By contrast, according to the Abhidharmakośa, the system of
the Sarvāstivādins distinguishes ten mental factors of the
extended domain (mahābhūmika) that accompany every
mental process and correspond to the first two groups of
the Pañcaskandhaka; as well as ten good factors of the
extended domain; six defilements of the extended domain;
two bad factors of the extended domain; a larger number of
factors from the sphere of the limited defilements; and
finally, as in the Pañcaskandhaka, the four unbound factors.
122 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

The division of the Pañcaskandhaka is distinctly clearer and

more advanced. That the prominence of the good factors
and of the defilements is common to both divisions is
easily understandable, since the whole psychology of these
schools is directed toward the goal of liberation and is
intended to facilitate the explanation of the process of
liberation.
The definitions of the individual mental factors are fol-
lowed by the discussion of the factors dissociated from the
mind. It begins as follows:

What are the formations dissociated from the mind? They are mere
designations (prajñapti) based on various states of matter,
of mind, and of the mental factors, and they cannot be clearly
determined as either distinct or not-distinct from them [i.e.,
matter, etc.].
And which are they? Acquisition (prāpti), the absorption of
non-ideation (asaṃjñisamāpatti), the absorption of suppression
(nirodhasamāpatti), the state of non-ideation (āsaṃjñika), the
life organ (jīvitendriya), homogeneity of beings (nikāyasabhāga),
birth, aging, duration, impermanence, the group of words,
the group of sentences, the group of phonemes, worldliness
(pṛthagjanatva) and so forth. <116>

Here, again, the definitions of the individual factors follow.

The listing itself agrees with that of the Abhidharmakośa
with the sole exception of worldliness, which the Sarvāsti-
vādins do not recognize but consider to be a type of non-
acquisition.
This specific group of factors is particularly characteristic
of the Sarvāstivādins’ way of thinking and of the antiquity
of their system. On the one hand, we see the serious effort
to trace all the concepts being dealt with back to their
factual basis. On the other hand, a primitive realism, which
 The scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda 123

assumes a corresponding reality in the external world for all

of these concepts, has not been transcended. I.e.:

• The arising and ceasing of things, their duration and

gradual aging are caused by specific factors that com-
bine with them and induce these processes, [i.e., birth,
impermanence, duration, and aging].
• The absorption of non-ideation and the absorption of
suppression refer to two stages of absorption and the
state of non-ideation to existence in a realm of gods
in which the mental processes are suspended. This,
too, is explained based on three special factors that
prevent the occurrence of the mental factors.
• Words, sentences, and phonemes are also considered to
be separate factors that trigger the corresponding
cognitive processes in connection with a specific sound.
• Acquisition and homogeneity of beings are reminis-
cent of the Vaiśeṣika concepts, specifically: acquisition
of the quality of connection; homogeneity of beings
of the category of the universal. In contrast to the
Vaiśeṣika, however, they are not forms of existence
of a different status; instead they are independent
factors, as are also the material or mental factors.
In addition, they are restricted only to sentient beings,
in relation to which their assumption proved to be
particularly necessary. To wit, acquisition serves to
explain the binding of certain factors to a particular
person and the homogeneity of beings was intended to
explain the fact of belonging to a certain group of
living beings.

As for worldliness, Buddhism distinguishes between noble

ones (ārya) who have entered into the path of liberation and
worldly individuals for whom <117> this is not the case.
124 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

Certain factors, the possession of which constitutes the

noble one, are absent in the worldly individual, and this
very absence is in turn caused by a specific factor, i.e.,
worldliness.
Vasubandhu does not share these Sarvāstivāda views,
however, and he expresses this in the first sentence of
this section. For him, in accordance with the view of the
Sautrāntikas and Yogācārins, the formations dissociated
from the mind are not real, autonomous factors; instead
they exist only as designations (prajñaptita). We will need
to discuss this in more detail in what follows [S. 119ff.].
The next section deals with the group of cognition. As a
start, it includes the six types of cognition that correspond
to the different sense-organs and that are thus designated
as visual cognition, auditory cognition, olfactory cognition,
gustatory cognition, tactile cognition, and mental cognition.
In accordance with the Yogācāra doctrine, Vasubandhu
also adds the mind accompanied by defilements (kliṣṭaṃ
manas) and the fundamental cognition (ālayavijñāna), and
indeed these two types of cognition are the only ones
that he treats in greater detail. But as these same two
will be brought up in the presentation of the Yogācāra
doctrine [S. 328, 358ff.], we can refrain from a discussion
of them here.
This concludes the presentation of the five groups. From
the discussion of the twelve spheres and the eighteen
elements, which comes next, we will select only the section
on the unconditioned factors, which alone is of greater
interest.

What is the unconditioned? Space (ākāśa), suppression without

knowledge (apratisaṃkhyānirodha), suppression through knowl-
edge (pratisaṃkhyānirodha), and suchness (tathatā).
What is space? That which provides space to matter.
 The scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda 125

What is suppression without knowledge? A suppression that

is not a separation (visaṃyoga). What does this mean? That the
groups do not arise at all, [although] a counteragent (pratipakṣa)
to the defilements is not present. <118>
What is suppression through knowledge? A suppression that
is separation. What does this mean? That the groups do not arise
at all because a counteragent to the defilements is present.
What is suchness? The nature of the factors (dharmatā), i.e.,
the essencelessness of the factors.

Of these four unconditioned factors, the Sarvāstivāda

recognizes only the first three.
With regard to space, we must bear in mind that
the Sarvāstivādins hold it to be a truly existing factor. The
Sautrāntika and Yogācāra were the first to view it as mere
emptiness.
As for the two suppressions, the following may be
said. [1] It may happen that certain factors do not arise in
a personality-stream because the causes for them are not
present. [2] Further, the knowledge of the noble truths—
as counteragent to ignorance and the rest of the defile-
ments—entails that these defilements no longer occur in
the personality-stream and that this stream is finally
completely interrupted. According to the doctrine of the
Sarvāstivādins, each of these [scenarios] is occasioned by
specific factors that, through their connection with the
personality-stream, prevent the arising of the mentioned
factors. These are called, respectively, suppression without
knowledge and suppression through knowledge. The latter
is particularly important, and we will need to discuss
it further [S. 130ff.] since it occasions liberation and is
therefore also referred to as extinction, as nirvāṇa.
And suchness, finally, signifies the true nature of things
and as we will later see, represents the ultimate state of
 126 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

being in the Mahāyāna [S. 148 and passim]. It is foreign

to the Sarvāstivāda. In his lists, Asaṅga still distinguishes
the suchness of the good [factors], the suchness of the
bad [factors], and the suchness of the indeterminate factors
in the manner of the Mahīśāsaka. Vasubandhu was the
first to replace them with suchness in general.
We have now had several occasions [S. 76, 114f., 117f.]
to note where Vasubandhu deviates from the orthodox doc-
trine of the Sarvāstivādins and follows the doctrine of the
Sautrāntika. It seems appropriate then, in view of the great
importance of this latter doctrine to the logico-epistemo-
logical school of <119> Buddhism, to say a few words here
about this school.

BBB.2. The scholasticism of the Sautrāntika

Different reports about the precursors of the Sautrāntika school
exist, and its first beginnings seem to reach back a rather long
way, however the details of its development remain unclear. The
school itself was founded by Kumāralāta who was active in
northwestern India in the second half of the third century c.e.
His disciple Śrīlāta gave the school its fundamental comprehen-
sive scholasticism and a second disciple, Harivarman, is also
worth mentioning as he is the only representative of the school
from whom a treatise, the Tattvasiddhi (Proof of the Truth), has
survived. In later times, it is most notably Vasubandhu the
Younger who tends strongly in the direction of the Sautrāntika.
 The scholasticism of the Sautrāntika 127

And even though he shows great independence at the level of

details, this tendency is so strongly expressed—especially in his
commentary to the Abhidharmakośa—that he was just called “the
Sautrāntika” by his opponents in the camp of the orthodox
Sarvāstivādins. At present we know nothing about a continua-
tion of this school, but it strongly influenced the logico-
epistemological school, and a number of its ideas persisted there.
The Sautrāntikas are often called nominalists, in contrast to
the realism of the Sarvāstivāda. This is justifiable in that they
state that many of the Sarvāstivādins’ factors exist only as
designations (prajñaptita). Of course they by no means deny any
real basis for these designations, they simply systematically
transcend the primitive realism of the Sarvāstivāda. Space, for
example, they see as mere emptiness and the suppressions
as mere annihilation. Often, however, they also find the
designations to be based in the nature of things, and, especially,
the potentials (śakti) of things [S. 126] play a role in this, which
idea the logical school then further expanded upon.
As a sample of these lines of thought, I will at first present
a text that illustrates what it means [from the general Śrāvaka-
yāna point of view] that something exists only as designation.
A discussion of acquisition (prāpti) then follows [S. 123ff.], as
an example of the <120> treatment of terms taught by the
scholastics of the Sarvāstivāda. Finally [S. 131–42], within the
presentation of the doctrine of liberation, we will discuss the
Sautrāntika view of nirvāṇa.
The first text is taken from the sixth book of the Abhi-
dharmakośa and deals with the question of the seemingly or
restricted real (saṃvṛtisat) and the truly real (paramārthasat). As
we will see [S. 173f., 230, 310], these two concepts are of great
importance in the Mahāyāna and they serve to characterize the
phenomenal world and true existence. The present text, on the
other hand, shows an attempt of the Śrāvakayāna to come to
terms with these concepts whereby, of course, one’s conception
128 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

of them differed markedly, depending on its, [i.e., the

Śrāvakayāna’s] doctrine. Here that is, they are used to make
a distinction within the phenomenal world itself; specifically
between things that exist only from a conventional stand point
and things that are, as such, real. The first of these concerns
things that exist as composites, in which case the words and
ideas do not have a precise correspondence to a [real] thing.
This is thus a case similar to that in the Vaiśeṣika and related
systems in which, when dealing with purely external com-
binations of things, such as a forest or an army, one shied away
from assuming a whole or a universal as the basis for the words
and ideas in question. Here [in the Śrāvakayāna], however,
[this point of view] was taken much further. The same view was
extended to all cases of a combination of parts in which the
words and ideas are attached to just this combination and its
form, and in which, in the event of the dissolution of this
combination and the disappearance of this form, the words and
ideas no longer apply. As, for example, once a pot is smashed,
one speaks only of shards and no longer of a pot. Indeed, this
was taken so far as to include all cases where a combination of
different things was presupposed, even if one was not able to
disassemble them in practice but only theoretically. Such a case
was seen, for example, in what are understood in everyday life
to be elements: water, fire, etc., <121> but which the Buddhist
schools saw as a mixture of various kinds of atoms. In all of
these cases then, it was assumed that no real things are present
that correspond to the words and ideas. Instead, these things
only seemingly exist; only from the point of view of everyday
life. Only their constituents are real. In this way, though, a break
had been made with the [kind of] fundamental realism that
demanded a real correlate for all words and ideas, and the
doctrine of things that exist only as designations (prajñaptisat)
rests on this view [that only the constituents of things are real].
 The scholasticism of the Sautrāntika 129

BBB.2.1. The seemingly and the truly real (Abhidharmakośa VI, v. 4)

The Exalted One has thus said that there are four truths. Then,
in another sutra, he has said that there are two kinds of
truths, the restricted truth (saṃvṛtisatya) and the highest truth
(paramārthasatya). What is the mark of these two truths? The
verse text says:

(v. 4) If the cognition of an object no longer occurs once

it is demolished or as soon as one has excluded what is
other by means of thought, then it is seemingly real
(saṃvṛtisat), just like a pot or water. The opposite of
this is truly real (paramārthasat).

If the cognition of an object no longer occurs as soon as it is

demolished, then this object is to be considered as seemingly
real, as with a pot in regard to which, if it is smashed and only
the shards are present, the cognition of the pot no longer occurs.
The same applies to a [piece of] cloth, etc. Further, in the case of
an object, if as soon as one has excluded what is other by means
of thought, its cognition <122> no longer occurs, then it is like-
wise seemingly real, as in the case of water of which the
cognition no longer occurs if one has excluded the form, etc., by
means of thought. The same applies to fire, etc. Now, as long as
the demolition or the exclusion of the object concerned has not
yet taken place, [the object] is designated as such and such,
following the usual ways of thinking and speaking, and because
it is thus designated, it is called seemingly real. If, moreover, in
accordance with common usage, one speaks of the presence of
a pot, etc., then this is true and not false; and thus one speaks of
seeming truth.
If an object is the opposite of that, then it is called truly real. In
other words, the cognition of the object does not vanish when it
is demolished and when what is other is excluded by means of
thought, the cognition of it continues to occur. This object is thus
130 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

to be considered as truly real. As in the case of form (rūpa), etc.,

the cognition of which continues to occur if one splits it down
to the atoms or if one excludes what is other—for example,
the taste, etc.—by means of thought. The same applies to
sensation, etc. So because the (object in question) is completely
real, it is called truly real. If, moreover, based on the truly real,
one speaks of the presence of form, etc., then this is true and not
false. And thus one speaks of the highest truth.
The ancient masters give the following explanation: Just as
the factors are apprehended by supramundane knowledge and
the subsequently acquired correct worldly knowledge, so they
are called truly true. And just as they are apprehended by any
other kinds of knowledge, they are called seemingly true. With
this, the discussion of the truths is finished. <123>

The next section shows how the concepts of the Sarvāsti-

vādins were given different meaning by the Sautrāntikas,
corresponding to their way of thinking. It is taken from
the second book of the Abhidharmakośa and deals with
acquisition (prāpti). According to the doctrine of the
Sarvāstivādins, this is a distinct entity that binds specific
factors—primarily defilements and good factors—to a
personality-stream. It thereby causes these factors to occur
in this personality-stream at the appropriate time, and at
other times—when these factors are not active—it also
determines the person’s character, so that the latter con-
sequently is considered to be either defiled or virtuous. In
contrast to this doctrine and in accordance with the
Sautrāntikas, Vasubandhu attempts to show that such
an entity, known as acquisition, does not exist. In his
view, the aforementioned facts rest instead on a specific
constitution of the personality-stream that makes up the
seed of that particular factor, so to speak, and that enables
the personality-stream to produce [this factor] at the
 The scholasticism of the Sautrāntika 131

appropriate time. Thus it is also this constitution that is

referred to when one speaks of acquisition, which therefore
exists only as designation and not really as a distinct entity.

BBB.2.2. The nature of acquisition (Abhidharmakośa II, v. 36)

How can one assert that a distinct thing (dravya) named
acquisition (prāpti) exists? . . . For since neither its intrinsic nature
is observed, as with visible form, sound, etc., or with
passion, hatred, etc., nor their effect, as with the eye, the
(sense of) hearing, etc., the qualities of a thing are not present
and [acquisition] therefore is not possible.1 <124>
(Opponent:) Acquisition is what the cause of the arising of the
factors is named.
(Answer:) Then there could be no [acquisition] of the un-
conditioned.2 And how then could factors arise that have not yet
been acquired or that have been abolished through a change of
the sphere [of existence] or through passionlessness?3
(Opponent:) The simultaneously arising acquisition is their
cause.
(Answer:) In that case, what does birth (jāti) or the birth of
birth (jātijāti) bring about?4 Further, with individuals who are
bound by all the fetters, the diversity of the weak, medium,

1
The means of valid cognition are [direct] perception and inference.
Acquisition, however, is neither perceived, as is visible form, etc., nor
inferred, as is the eye, etc.
2
According to the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins, the unconditioned factors,
suppression through knowledge and suppression without knowledge,
connect with the personality-stream by means of acquisition. However,
this would not be possible in the assumed case, as the unconditioned
cannot arise.
3
Since before their arising there also exists no acquisition that could cause it.
4
According to the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins, the factor birth (jāti) is
the cause of the arising of things (see S. 114f.), and its cause, in turn, is the
birth of birth.
132 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

or strong arising defilements would not be possible, since

indeed acquisition (i.e., their cause) does not differ. Or, [these
defilements] arise out of that from which this diversity is
derived, in which case acquisition is not the cause of arising.
(Opponent:) Who says that acquisition is the cause of arising?
(Answer:) Then what is it?
(Opponent:) It is the cause of the distinction [between states].
If, in fact, there were no acquisition, then, with noble ones who
entertain worldly thoughts and with worldly individuals, the
distinction: “These are noble ones and these are worldly indi-
viduals” would not be possible.
(Answer:) This (distinction) can also rest on the difference of
whether one has abandoned the defilements or not.
(Opponent:) But how is it possible to say that the former have
abandoned the defilements and that the latter <125> have not
abandoned the defilements? If, on the other hand, acquisition
exists, then [the distinction] results from its having disappeared
or not disappeared.
(Answer:) It results from the difference in the bearer (i.e., the
personality-stream). In the case of the noble ones, for instance,
the bearer has been transformed by the path of vision and of
contemplation1 such that the thus to be abandoned defilements
can no longer rearise. So if a bearer has in this way—like a grain
of rice burned by fire—become such that he can no longer be the
seed of defilements, or if, by the worldly path, his capability
to be a seed has been impaired, then one says that he has
abandoned the defilements; in the opposite case, it is said that
he has not abandoned them. Whoever has abandoned them, of
him it is said that he does not possess them; whoever has not
abandoned them, of him it is said that he possesses them.
Then, as far as the good factors are concerned, they are
twofold: arisen without effort and arisen through effort, i.e.,

1
Cf. the presentation of the doctrine of liberation, which follows below.
 The scholasticism of the Sautrāntika 133

those that one possesses from birth, and those that are obtained
through exertion. Here, one says that someone possesses the
factors arisen without effort if the capability of the bearer to be
their seed is not impaired; if it is impaired, one says that he does
not possess them. The roots of good are then cut through. One
should know specifically that this occurs through erroneous
view. Incidentally, the capability to be the seed of good factors is
never completely annihilated in the personality-stream. In the
case of the (factors) arisen through effort, on the other hand, one
says that someone possesses them once they have arisen and if
the capability of the <126> personality-stream to manifest them
at will is not subject to any obstruction.
So, the seed that is not completely removed, that is not
impaired, and is strong at the time that the capacity takes effect,
is that which receives the designation possession (= acquisition),
and not a distinct thing.
(Opponent:) What is this so-called seed?
(Answer:) Name and form, insofar as—due to a special
transformation of the stream of moments—they are capable
of directly or indirectly bringing forth a specific effect.
(Opponent:) What is this so-called transformation?
(Answer:) The alteration of the stream of moments.
(Opponent:) And what is this so-called stream of moments?
(Answer:) The formations belonging to the three stages of
time, insofar as they are related to one another as cause and
effect. . . . Therefore, acquisition and its negation, non-acquisition,
are certainly factors by designation only but not factors in the
manner of (real) things.
 134 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

BBC. The doctrine of liberation of the Śrāvakayāna

In conclusion [of our discussion of “The scholasticism
(Abhidharma) of the Way of Hearers (Śrāvakayāna)”], there re-
mains the task of at least briefly discussing the form that the
doctrine of liberation took in the Śrāvakayāna, since with the
central position of this doctrine in Buddhism, it is referred to
again and again. In addition, the search for the nature of libera-
tion touches upon the most crucial philosophical problems.
For the Sarvāstivādins, in the course of time and through
a course of development that we cannot pursue in detail here,
the doctrine of liberation assumed the following form: Since
beginningless time, living beings have been entangled in the
agonizing cycle of existences and they wander restlessly from
birth to birth, driven by the power of deeds (karma). Deeds,
however, exert their power only if they are morally determined.
Otherwise, they have no [maturation] effect. Their being morally
determined results from their connection with the good and bad
mental factors, above all with the defilements. Whoever strives
for liberation <127> from the pain of the cycle of existences must
therefore first remove the defilements. Then the deeds lose their
power and the cycle of existences comes to an end.
The cessation of defilements is reached by the path of
liberation, which culminates in the intuitive clear comprehension
of the four noble truths. After various preparatory practices,
among them, for example, attentive inhalation and exhala-
tion, one begins with the four awakenings of mindfulness
(smṛtyupasthāna), which play an important role in Buddhism
 The doctrine of liberation 135

even at its earliest. Next come the factors conducive to

penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya) wherein, in four stages, one con-
siders the revealed four noble truths ever more penetratingly.
These flow finally into one’s own direct clear comprehension
(abhisamaya) of these truths. With this the path of liberation in its
stricter sense—that which leads to the removal of defilements—
begins, commencing with the path of vision (darśanamārga).
According to the scholasticism [of the Sarvāstivādins], this
process of clear comprehension of the noble truths is divided
into sixteen moments. For each truth, that is, first all defilements
opposed to its cognition are removed in one moment; then, in
a second moment, one obtains the acquisition (prāpti), i.e., the
firm possession of this cognition. And since for each truth the
cognition relative to the lowest world sphere—the sphere of
desire—is distinguished from the cognition relative to the two
higher spheres—the sphere of the material and the sphere of
the immaterial—one comes to a total of sixteen moments in all
for all four truths. Noteworthy and characteristic of the sober
spirit of the school here is that the path of vision does not
necessarily require the practice of the stages of meditation
[dhyāna] as taught by the Buddha, and that the clear com-
prehension of the noble truths itself—in spite of its supra-
natural clear-sighted character—can occur at a preliminary
stage [sāmantaka] of these stages of meditation.
With the clear comprehension of the noble truths, the most
important part of the path of liberation has been traveled. The
disciple has now become a noble one (ārya), whereas before
he was a worldly individual (pṛthagjana). <128> With this,
however, [complete] liberation has not yet been gained as there
are in fact two types of defilements. The first are by nature
imperfect cognition, and the others are passions. This distinction
has its original equivalent in the doctrine of the Buddha in
which, in the twelve-membered causal chain, suffering is traced
back to two roots: ignorance and thirst. Of these two groups,
136 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

imperfect cognition can be eliminated by the clear comprehension

of the noble truths; the passions, on the other hand, cannot. In
other words, it had been recognized that cognition alone is
ineffective against the passions. They must rather be fought by
means of habitual constant influencing. Accordingly, within the
path of liberation, along with the path of vision, which eliminates
ignorance, a path of contemplation (bhāvanāmārga), which is sup-
posed to aid in the fight against the passions, was discerned.
This path of contemplation is itself also twofold. For the noble
one who has already envisioned the noble truths, it consists of
the repeated contemplation of the noble truths, which then also
gradually works on the passions and annihilates them. The fight
against the passions is not only possible for the noble one,
however. It is true that the removal of ignorance can only occur
through the cognition of the noble truths, but the worldly
individual can and should also fight against the passions. Aside
from the supramundane (lokottara) path [of contemplation] taught by
the Buddha, therefore, there is also a mundane (laukika) path of
contemplation on which, for example, [even] independent of
the proclamation of the Buddha, one contemplates the pain of
existence and turns away from the world. This mundane path of
contemplation can, however, also be entered before the path
of vision. Indeed, the Buddha himself is the most outstanding
example of this, since before his enlightenment he had already
completely eradicated all passions on the mundane path
of contemplation. Thus, at the moment of enlightenment, the
cognition of the noble truths brought him liberation as well.
On this twofold path, the path of vision and the path of
contemplation—whether mundane or supramundane—it is there-
fore possible to annihilate all <129> defilements. With the
annihilation of the defilements, deeds lose their effectiveness
and liberation comes about. Now the question arises, however:
What is liberation, or as the Buddha calls it, extinction, nirvāṇa?
It is precisely in the answer to this question that the sober
 The doctrine of liberation 137

realistic spirit that characterizes the scholasticism of the

Sarvāstivāda now shows itself more clearly than anywhere else.
At the same time, however, it also shows the unwavering
consistency with which a once-adopted path was adhered to
and followed to its end. An inconceivable ultimate state of being
[S. 147f., 298] remains foreign to the spirit of the school, which
turns away from all mysticism. Nirvāṇa, like any other object of
cognition, must therefore be a factor that exists as a thing, as
demanded by the logic of the system.
But how is this factor to be defined more precisely? Here, the
numerous scriptural passages characterizing nirvāṇa as the
cessation of suffering and the vanishing of desire, were once
again decisive. Nirvāṇa must then be something that eradicates
passion from the personality-stream and prevents the arising
of other painful factors. With this, however, reasoning could
already revert to familiar pathways. The factor acquisition
(prāpti), which causes the affiliation of specific factors with
the personality-stream, was known, and a second factor, non-
acquisition (aprāpti), was considered to be the cause of non-
affiliation. Thus nothing was more obvious than to assume that
nirvāṇa is a similar type of factor, whose connection with the
personality-stream leads to the defilements and all defiled
factors being eliminated from it and no longer being able to
arise within it. And this indeed was how nirvāṇa was then
defined. The only difference to come about was the fact that
it was classed with the unconditioned factors and not the
conditioned ones, but this was necessitated by the numerous
scriptural passages that describe nirvāṇa as eternal and
imperishable. Thus we arrive at the seemingly strange fact that,
according to the scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda, liberation—
nirvāṇa—is nothing other than a factor like all the others, which
connects with the personality-stream and so exerts its effect.
<130>
 138 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

We have already encountered this conception of nirvāṇa in

Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka [S. 119] where it appears among
the unconditioned factors under the name suppression through
knowledge (pratisaṃkhyānirodha). The same doctrine is also found
in the Abhidharmakośa. According to this doctrine, nirvāṇa is an
unconditioned factor, which bears the name suppression through
knowledge because it occasions the vanishing of the defilements
based on the cognition of the noble truths. It is defined as
separation (visaṃyoga) because it eliminates the defilements and
the defiled factors from the personality-stream. Finally, we must
note that there is not just one such suppression through knowledge,
but as many as there are defilements that are to be eliminated
from the personality-stream, since otherwise, with the
elimination of one defilement, all would be eliminated and
hence liberation would already be attained. The passage of the
Abhidharmakośa that includes the doctrine of suppression through
knowledge, has the following wording:

BBC.1. Suppression through knowledge (Abhidharmakośa I, v. 6)

Suppression through knowledge is separation (visaṃyoga).

Suppression through knowledge is the separation from the

contaminated (sāsrava) factors. Knowledge refers to the cog-
nition of the noble truths of suffering, etc., thus a form of insight
(prajñā). The suppression acquired thereby is suppression through
knowledge . . .
(Question:) Is suppression through knowledge one and the same
for all contaminated factors?
(Answer:) No.
(Question:) Then what is it?
(Answer:) (It is)

in each case different.

 The doctrine of liberation 139

There are as many separating things as there are connected

things, since otherwise the realization of the suppression of all
defilements would follow from the realization <131> of the
suppression of those defilements that are to be removed by the
vision of suffering. In which case, however, the practice of the
rest of the counteragents (pratipakṣa) 1 would be pointless.
(Objection:) But it is said: Suppression is non-homogeneous
(asabhāga). What does this mean?
(Answer:) This statement means that it does not have
a homogeneous cause (sabhāgahetu), and that it itself is not the
homogeneous cause of something else, but it does not (mean)
that nothing at all exists that is homogeneous to it. With this we
have discussed the suppression through knowledge.

This idiosyncratic Sarvāstivādin conception of the nature

of nirvāṇa was not, however, shared by the other schools.
It is true that—as with the Sarvāstivādin system as a
whole—its effects became apparent also outside the school,
but the other schools’ deviations in the conception [of
nirvāṇa] were manifold and in some cases considerable.
The Sautrāntikas also deviated from the doctrine of the
Sarvāstivādins in this point, as in so many other instances.
We will now examine their view a little more closely.
The Sautrāntika view of the nature of nirvāṇa is a logical
extension of their general point of view. They start, as so
often, from the Sarvāstivādin view, which they recast in
accordance with their own intentions. Thus for them as
well, nirvāṇa is suppression through knowledge. They do not,
however, content themselves with the primitive realism
of the Sarvāstivāda who sees in this suppression a dis-
tinct entity, instead they define it independently after their
own fashion. Suppression through knowledge thus exists

1
I.e., of the rest of the factors that counteract the defilements.
 140 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

in the fact that the defilements and the defiled factors

no longer arise in the future. A non-arising is, however, a
mere non-existence. Thus they concluded that nirvāṇa is a
non-existence, a mere nothing, and they did not shy away
from stating this matter-of-factly. <132>
This doctrine of the Sautrāntika is dealt with in a long
discussion in the second book of the Abhidharmakośa in
which Vasubandhu first briefly states the doctrine of the
Sautrāntikas and then defends it against the objections of
the Sarvāstivādins. We would like to offer a sampling of
this discussion here. As was customary, the opponents are
working partly with passages from the sacred scriptures.
They have particular difficulty with the problem of how
a non-existence can be an object of knowledge and how
statements about it are possible.

BBC.2. Nirvāṇa as non-existence (Abhidharmakośa II, v. 55)

The Sautrāntika teachers say: Everything unconditioned
(asaṃskṛta) does not really exist because it is not, like form,
sensation, etc., a separate real thing . . . If the already arisen
burden (anuśaya) and existence is annihilated and, through the
power of knowledge, a new one no longer arises, this then is
called suppression through knowledge . . .
(Objection:) If nirvāṇa is a mere non-arising, how can this
be reconciled with the wording of the sutra? For the sutra
says: “If one practices, maintains, and cultivates the five facul-
ties (indriya), they lead to the casting off of past, future, and
present suffering.” This casting off is nirvāṇa. Only in regard to
something in the future, however, can one think of a non-arising,
but not in regard to something of the past and present. How
then is there no contradiction?
(Answer:) Although this wording does exist, there is still no
contradiction in terms of meaning. The meaning the sutra is
intended to convey is that one casts off the defilements that are
 The doctrine of liberation 141

based on past and present suffering, <133> and for this reason it
is called the casting off of suffering. Accordingly, the Exalted One
has also said: “You should cast off the passion for form. If you cast
off passion, then this is called casting off form and [complete] under-
standing of form,” etc., in the same way up to cognition.1 Just so then
is the casting off of past and present suffering to be understood . . .
(Objection:) If by nature the unconditioned factors do not
exist at all, then why does the sutra say: “Of all the factors that
exist, whether conditioned or unconditioned, passionlessness2 is
by far the foremost“? How can one non-existent factor be put
forth as foremost among non-existent factors?
(Answer:) We are not indeed saying that by nature the
unconditioned factors do not exist at all. Rather, they must exist
as we state something (about them). It is said, for example, that
a previous non-existence and a later non-existence of sound
exists. By contrast, however, one cannot say that the non-
existence exists and that, therefore, the view of its existence is
established. If therefore one speaks of the existence of the
unconditioned, this is to be seen in the same way. One can
therefore also praise a non-existence. Passionlessness is in fact
called the complete non-existence of all that is harmful. And
this is the most excellent among every non-existence that there
is. It is therefore to be praised as foremost in order to bring
forth joy and delight in it in the disciples.
(Objection:) If the unconditioned factors represent a mere
non-existence, then nirvāṇa cannot be designated as the noble
truth of the cessation (of suffering), because it does not exist. <134>
(Answer:) What, first of all, does the expression noble truth3
mean? Does this expression not mean something non-erroneous?

1
I.e., the same is said of the other groups in the same wording.
2
I.e., nirvāṇa.
3
The scholasticism of the Sarvāstivāda usually equates the noble truths
with their concrete content.
142 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

The noble ones do not see existence and non-existence

erroneously. That is, the noble ones see in suffering only
suffering and they see in the non-existence of suffering only
non-existence. What then is objectionable in this conception of
the noble truths?
(Question:) How can this non-existence be put forth as the
third noble truth?
(Answer:) Because the noble ones see and teach it immediate-
ly after the second, it follows that it is the third.
(Objection:) If by nature the unconditioned factors do not
exist at all, then the knowledge of the ether or of nirvāṇa would
have to be based on a non-existence as object.
(Answer:) In the fact that it is based on a non-existence as
object, there is no fault. This will be examined later1 in the
discussion of the past and the future.2
(Opponent:) What disadvantage is there if we assume that the
unconditioned has its own real existence?
(Answer:) But what advantage does that have?
(Opponent:) If we assume it, then the doctrine of the
Vaibhāṣikas is upheld. This is the advantage.
(Answer:) May the gods know whether they wish to
uphold (this doctrine), if it can be upheld at all. But if you
assume that (the unconditioned) is real, then this is an
empty fantasy, and that is the disadvantage. “How so?”
Because it has neither a distinct nature that can be perceived,
as, [for example,] form, sensation, etc., nor does it produce
an effect that <135> can be perceived, like the eye, the ear,
etc.3 . . . . . .

1
[See Abhidharmakośa, chapter five, verse 25.]
2
The Sautrāntikas, in contrast to the Sarvāstivādins, consider the past and
the future not as real, but as mere non-existence.
3
I.e., it can neither be perceived through the senses nor deduced through
inference.
 The doctrine of liberation 143

(Objection:) As the sutra says, the monk acquires nirvāṇa in

this life. How [then] can one speak of an acquisition in reference
to a non-existence?
(Answer:) One speaks of an acquisition of nirvāṇa because
one attains the counteragent (pratipakṣa) 1 and thereby obtains a
bearer (= personality-stream) that is opposed to the defilements
and rebirth.
In addition, there is a passage of the sacred scripture that
shows that the nature of nirvāṇa consists only of a non-existence.
A sutra says:

The complete casting off of existing suffering, the

removing, the vanishing, the passionlessness, the
annihilation, the appeasement, the sinking; further,
the non-rearising of a new suffering, the non-grasping,
the non-appearing—that is the peaceful, that is the
exalted, the abandoning of all afflictions (upadhi) and
the complete vanishing of thirst, the passionlessness,
the annihilation, the nirvāṇa. . . .

From this, the sutra’s comparison is easily explained: “Like

the extinction (nirvāṇa) of a lamp, so was the liberation of the
mind.” 2 The meaning of this sutra is: Just as the extinction of
a lamp is only the fading away of the flame of the lamp, but
not a distinct entity, in the same way the mind of the Exalted
One attained liberation, i.e., only the groups were annihilated,
an existence was no longer present.

To conclude then, another Sautrāntika—this time Hari-

varman, the aforementioned student <136> of Kumāralāta
[S. 119]—will have his say. He is perhaps even clearer and
more precise than Vasubandhu in his statements.

1
I.e., the factors that constitute the noble path and that annihilate
the defilements.
2
The verse refers to the death of the Buddha.
 144 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

BBC.3. From “Establishment of the Truth” (Tattvasiddhi)

(Question:) Is it not the case that nirvāṇa really exists?
(Answer:) One speaks of nirvāṇa based on the total annihi-
lation of the groups. What is it here that is supposed to exist?
(Question:) (You ask) how one recognizes that nirvāṇa is real.
1. The (noble) truth of the cessation (of suffering) is what
is called nirvāṇa. The truth of suffering, etc., is real. Nirvāṇa must
therefore also be real.
2. Further, the knowledge of nirvāṇa is what is called
knowledge of annihilation. How can (nirvāṇa) bring forth
knowledge if it is not a (real) factor?
3. Further, in the sutra the Buddha says to the monks: “There
are factors that are born, arisen, brought-about, conditioned, and
there are factors that are unborn, unarisen, not-brought-about,
unconditioned.”
4. Further, the sutra states: “There are only two kinds of
factors, conditioned factors and unconditioned factors. The con-
ditioned factors are subject to becoming, passing away, and
transformation while they last. The unconditioned factors are
not subject to becoming, passing away, and transformation
while they last.”
5. Further, the sutra states: “Of all factors that exist—whether
conditioned or unconditioned—annihilation, vanishing, nirvāṇa
alone is the most excellent.”
6. Further, it states: “Form is not permanent because form
is annihilated. <137> Nirvāṇa is permanent,” etc., in the same
way up to cognition.
7. Further, the sutra states: “One should bring annihilation
to mind.” But if it is not a (real) factor, then what should one
bring to mind?
8. Further, the Buddha says in the Bahudhātukasūtra: “The
sage recognizes the conditioned and the unconditioned in
accordance with truth.” The unconditioned is nirvāṇa. How can
 The doctrine of liberation 145

one designate as non-existent, something that is recognized

through correct knowledge?
9. Further, there is no passage in the sutras that explicitly
states that nirvāṇa is not a (real) factor.
From this it can be seen that it is only a creation of your own
thoughts, (if you say) that nirvāṇa does not exist.
(Answer:) 1. If, independently of the groups, there is also a
specific factor with the name nirvāṇa, then one cannot designate
the vanishing and the annihilation of the groups as nirvāṇa.
2. Further, if there is a nirvāṇa, one would have to point out
its nature, what it is.
3. Further, the concentration that is focused on nirvāṇa is
called signless (ānimittasamādhi). If the signs of a factor exist, why
then is it called signless? As the sutra states: “The ascetic
observes the abandoning of the signs of visible form,” etc., up
to “he observes the abandoning of the signs of the factors.”
4. Further, the sutras state again and again: “All formations
are impermanent, all factors are without a self; annihilation,
nirvāṇa is peaceful.” Here self indicates the nature of the factors.
If one does not see a nature in the factors, then one says that
one sees that they have no self. So if nirvāṇa is a (real) factor,
then one cannot see that it is without nature, because this <138>
factor is not subject to annihilation.1 As long as a pot exists,
for example, there is no factor that embodies the vanishing of
the pot.2 Only once the pot vanishes can one speak of the
vanishing of the pot. The same applies to the felling of a tree,
etc. Just so, one cannot speak of nirvāṇa as long as the formations
still exist, since [it is] because the formations are annihilated
(in nirvāṇa), that it is called nirvāṇa.

1
For nirvāṇa is generally considered to be permanent and unchanging.
2
Nirvāṇa is by nature the annihilation of the factors, but according to the
doctrine of the opponent, it has existed eternally and thus before the factors
have yet been annihilated.
146 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

5. Further, the annihilation of suffering is not designated as

a further separate factor. The sutra states namely: “Monks, if
this suffering falls into annihilation and new suffering does not
arise, if a rebirth no longer occurs, then this is the highest abode,
the calm, the peaceful [abode], the casting off of afflictions
(upadhi), the disappearance of thirst, passionlessness, annihila-
tion, nirvāṇa.” Here, the annihilation of this suffering and the
non-arising of a new suffering is spoken of. What factor exists
beyond this that could be called nirvāṇa?
6. Further, a separate factor of vanishing does not exist. Only
if the already arisen thirst is annihilated and the not yet arisen
one does not arise does one then speak of vanishing. So what
factor exists beyond this that could be called vanishing? [This
factor] cannot be called real.
7. In addition, existence is only another name for factor.
The non-existence of the factors of the five groups is called
nirvāṇa. It is thus impossible to designate non-existence as
existence here. It is based on annihilation that one speaks
of nirvāṇa. If, for example, <139> a robe is annihilated, no
separate factor exists from then on, since otherwise, separate
factors of the annihilation of the robe, etc., would also have
to exist.
8. The knowledge of annihilation of which you speak pre-
sents no difficulties. In the case of the felling of a tree, for
example, knowledge (relating to that) arises, but this does
not imply a separate factor felling. Incidentally, the knowledge
arises in this case based on the formations. Thus, as soon as
the formations are no longer present, one speaks of nirvāṇa. Just
as when a specific object is no longer present, one recognizes
the absence of this object.
(Question:) Is there then no nirvāṇa?
(Answer:) It is not the case that there is no nirvāṇa. It is
just not a real factor. Because if there were no nirvāṇa, then birth
and death would last forever and there would be no liberation
 The doctrine of liberation 147

at all. In the same way, there is the breaking of a pot and the
felling of a tree. These are just not real separate factors. What
you have said in regard to the other (noble) truths, etc., has
already been answered. “How so?” Since, in fact, an annihilation
of suffering exists, one says thus that an unborn, unarisen,
not-brought-about, unconditioned factor, etc., exists. Therefore
there are no difficulties whatsoever.

So we have seen that according to the Sarvāstivādins

liberation—nirvāṇa—is suppression through knowledge,
i.e., a distinct real factor, which combines with the
personality-stream and prevents the arising of defilements
and thereby a new rebirth. According to the doctrine of the
Sautrāntikas, however, nirvāṇa is nothing other than this
nonarising of the defilements and of rebirth, hence a mere
non-existence. Both views are completely clear and under-
standable <140> from within the respective systems. But the
question of the nature of liberation and, in particular, of the
state of the liberated one has not really been answered yet,
since suppression through knowledge is only a factor that
leads to liberation, but not liberation itself.
The texts are silent about the state of the liberated
one though, whether because the attitude of the Buddha
himself on this point continued to have an effect, or be-
cause it was a departure from the usual lines of thought
to examine things from that perspective. Still a general
knowledge of the doctrine makes it possible for us to
answer even this question, and in the following way: As we
have seen, according to the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins
the worldly personality consists of a stream of factors that
constantly cease and arise anew, so long as the deeds
(karma), under the influence of the defilements, are active
and entanglement in the cycle of existences continues.
With the attainment of the liberating cognition, one obtains
148 Scholasticism of the Śrāvakayāna

suppression through knowledge, a distinct factor that combines

with the personality-stream and prevents any further
arising of the defilements. As soon as the defilements no
longer arise, however, the deeds lose the power to bring
forth new factors. Thus if the present life expires, the
personality-stream does not continue. No further rebirth
occurs and liberation is attained.
Does this mean then that, since the personality-stream
is interrupted, liberation brings annihilation? To answer
this, we must call on a doctrine considered to be one of the
most characteristic of the Sarvāstivādin school, and after
which it is named: the doctrine (vāda) that everything exists
(sarvam asti). According to this doctrine, not only do the
present factors exist, but all do, including those past and
future; they are merely at different stages of time. The
becoming and fading away of things is thus not a real
arising and ceasing, but just a movement of the already
existing factors from one stage of time to the other. The
seemingly newly arising factors <141> move from the time-
stage of the future to the time-stage of the present, and
when they cease they move on to the time-stage of the past,
just as one shifts a counting stone from the compartment
for ones into the compartment for tens and hundreds,
whereby its value changes but the stone itself always
remains the same. Thus, in the personality-stream as well,
the factors do not arise and cease. It is rather an actual
stream that flows from the future into the past. Now,
according to what has been said thus far, liberation signifies
that the personality-stream is interrupted and does not
continue any further. This means, given the above assump-
tions, that it passes once and for all into the past. It ends in a
death-like state. It is not annihilated but it is appeased.
The conclusions for the doctrine of the Sautrāntikas,
however, are different. Still their view of the nature of
 The doctrine of liberation 149

suppression through knowledge indicates no real fun-

damental difference, although it is true that for them
suppression through knowledge is not a factor in its own
right. Rather the personality-stream is transformed through
the liberating cognition in such a way that the defilements
can no longer arise in it, and only this non-arising is
regarded as suppression through knowledge. But the outcome,
the interruption of the personality-stream, is the same.
Something else, however, is crucial. In contrast to the
Sarvāstivādins, the Sautrāntikas deny the existence of what
is in the past and the future. For them only that which is
in the present is real. Thus for them, the becoming and
fading away of the factors is not a movement from time-
stage to time-stage but a real arising and a real annihilation.
It follows from this, however, that upon its interruption
the personality-stream ceases to exist. According to the
Sautrāntika then, liberation is complete annihilation.
Hence we are faced with the strange fact that a doc-
trine of liberation holds up a death-like state, indeed
complete annihilation, as its goal. Stranger still, is that this
doctrine was able to win a huge following and achieved
unparalleled success. We should not forget, however, that,
in the case of the schools of <142> the Sarvāstivādins and
Sautrāntikas, we are dealing only with particular trends in
Buddhism, and that is, with extreme schools of thought, of
which the Sautrāntikas in particular, in spite of their impor-
tant intellectual accomplishments, were not wide-spread
and before long merged with other schools. There were
other trends though, that differed strongly from the afore-
mentioned, in some cases even to the point of total direct
opposition. It is from these schools of thought then that the
movement arose that led Buddhism to its highest flowering
and to which we will now turn, the Mahāyāna. <143>
 THE SCHOOLS
OF
THE GREAT WAY
(MAHĀYĀNA)
C. T HE S CHOOLS OF THE G REAT W AY
(M AHĀYĀNA )

The trends of the Śrāvakayāna that we discussed in the last

section are characterized first and foremost by the fact that
they are ruled by sober, clear, but also cold reason. This is
most evident in the relegation of the practices of absorption to
the background and the denial of an ultimate state of being
(höchstes Sein) [S. 62, 118, 129]. The strong mystical element
that was always powerful in Buddhism and that ultimately
originates from the Buddha himself [S. 9f., 13ff.], however, could
not simply be eliminated. There were always many members
of the community for whom the experience of absorption was
the essential point and who were more or less indifferent
to dogmatic scholasticism. It is from these circles that the
Mahāyāna emerged.

CA. Main elements in the development of the Mahāyāna

CAA. The new goal of liberation
There were actually several currents that united into the great
movement of the Mahāyāna. The first of these concerns the doc-
trine of liberation, but we need only mention it briefly, since it
is philosophically unimportant. It was, however, all the more
important religiously and also gave the whole movement its
name. With his teaching the Buddha had shown the path on
 154 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

which one finds liberation from the cycle of existences for one-
self, but over time this was not enough for the enthusiastic
followers. They wished also to bring salvation to others and they
put forth as the highest goal to become a Buddha oneself, indeed
even to renounce, at first, one’s own liberation and to remain in
the cycle of existences in order to be able to save others. It had
already become customary to compare the doctrine with a raft
that carries the disciple across the dangerous stream of existence
to the safe shore of nirvāṇa, and thus the new doctrine, which
was intended to save many, was designated as the Great Way
(Mahāyāna). By contrast, the previous path of liberation was
named the Way of Hearers (Śrāvakayāna). This new goal of
liberation <144> naturally demanded a capacity for great en-
thusiasm and a willingness to make sacrifices, which, under-
standably, were more likely to be found in the circles of mystics
than among the sober scholastics. Thus it was primarily the
former who became the carriers of the new trend.

CAB. The philosophical doctrine of an ultimate state of being and of the

unreality of the phenomenal world
The same circles, however, also provided the ground for the
development of new philosophical thoughts. The impetus for
this was largely twofold. The mystics who practiced absorption
and experienced nirvāṇa even in this very body would not let
go of their belief in an ultimate state of being, which they
themselves had experienced in the state of absorption. And in
addition, as so readily among mystics, one could see a tendency
to consider this [highest] being as being the only true one and
to declare everyday life as trivial, by comparison, and as a
mere appearance. In this way came about the formation of
philosophical doctrines that were centered on the questions of
the ultimate state of being and of the reality of the external
world. Little attention was paid to the constitution of the
phenomenal world itself and with regard to it for the most part
 Main elements in the development of the Mahāyāna 155

the views of the Śrāvakayāna scholasticism were left unchanged

and adopted as needed.

CAC. The new buddhology

A third and final [element] was that, as a consequence of the
new goal of liberation, the view of the personage of the Buddha
also shifted. The historical personality became less impor-
tant than the scholastic concept. The Buddha now appeared
as a supranatural being whose activity reaches far beyond the
limits of a single worldly existence, as an embodiment of the
ultimate state of being. The multiplicity of the Buddhas gained
special importance. Thus a specific buddhology developed that
was anchored in the new philosophical doctrines.
These then are the three elements that were decisive in
determining and dominating the development of the Mahāyāna:

• the new goal of liberation,

• the philosophical doctrine of an ultimate state of being
and of the unreality of the phenomenal world and, lastly,
• the new buddhology.

Of these, the new goal of liberation led to the advancement of

a new path of liberation that was discussed in a hugely prolific
scholasticism of liberation and elaborated down to the smallest
detail. <145> The presentation of this new path forms the
topic of an entire literature. For the most part this literature
is philosophically insignificant and need only occasionally be
touched upon. All the more important then are the philosophical
doctrines that are among the most significant contributions
that Indian philosophy produced and with which we will
therefore have to be primarily concerned. The buddhology will
be discussed only insofar as it is closely tied to the philosophical
doctrines and suitable to complete their depiction.
 156 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CB. The beginnings of the Mahāyāna

The earliest beginnings of the Mahāyāna developed while still
within the framework of the old schools of the Śrāvakayāna,
since the new goal of liberation did not represent a fundamental
conflict. Any follower of the old schools could resolve to become
a Buddha himself without deviating from the doctrine of his
school. Only when the Mahāyāna developed complete doctrinal
systems that were in some cases in sharp contradiction to the
systems of the Śrāvakayāna, did the formation of independ-
ent schools of the Mahāyāna come about. Of course, not all
Śrāvakayāna schools provided equally favorable possibilities
of emergence for the Mahāyāna. Most unfavorable were likely
the schools that were the principal upholders of Śrāvakayāna
scholasticism, hence primarily the schools of the northwest. Far
better were the conditions in the circles of the Mahāsāṃghika
in the east. And it is, in fact, here that we find the various
rudiments of the new development. In particular, the southern
schools in the territory of the Āndhra empire and close to the
old capital Dhānyakaṭaka on the lower reaches of the Kṛṣṇā
proved to have tendencies toward the new movements. It is
this land that could most convincingly claim to be the birthplace
of the Mahāyāna.
 The beginnings of the Mahāyāna 157

CC. The oldest literary documentation of the Mahāyāna

The oldest literary documentation of the Mahāyāna are sutras.
These are discourses whose words are laid in the mouth of
the Buddha since, naturally, one sought to connect the new
doctrine with the authority of the Buddha. Inwardly and out-
wardly, however, these sutras differ starkly from the sutras of
the old canon. The often quite lively framework narratives have
been replaced by formulaic settings. The audience is largely
composed of supranatural beings and thousands and millions
<146> of future Buddhas, of Bodhisattvas. Instead of sermons
intended for a specific audience and circumstance, we find
a colorless, uniform lecture. In terms of content, completely
new doctrines are being taught, and everywhere the miraculous
and the measureless dominate.
As for the difficulties that arose from putting completely
different doctrines into the mouth of the Buddha, one then
sought to remove them in the following way. Since ancient times
the Buddha had been famed for his ability to adapt his teaching
to the powers of comprehension of his audience. In reference
to this it was now said that only some of the traditional sutras,
primarily of course the new sutras, proclaimed the complete
truth. The rest are intended for hearers who are not yet capable
of grasping the complete truth, and are meant to lead them
on the right path. They can therefore not be taken literally,
but must rather be interpreted accordingly. This possibility for
interpretation was then widely put to use and eventually a
 158 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

whole series of stages of various doctrinal proclamations came

to be distinguished.
The sutra literature of the Mahāyāna is exceedingly abundant.
From the beginning, new works were constantly created and
the old ones expanded and reworked. In this way a nearly
unfathomable number of such works was gradually accu-
mulated. It is therefore not possible here to give even an
approximate idea of this literature, besides, the present descrip-
tion is intended to primarily introduce the philosophers who are
known as actual persons. Consequently, I provide only a few
samples, [i.e., sections from the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā
and Ratnakūṭa,] from the oldest period, which are important
for the understanding of the origin of the Mahāyāna doctrines,
and then I turn right away [S. 170] to the historically known
representatives of the different doctrines.

CCA. The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines

I begin with a group of works that carry the common name
Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Insight). Occasionally, individual
titles also appear, but precisely the oldest and most important
works of this group carry just the general name and are distin-
guished only according to their length. Accordingly, <147> there
is first and foremost: a Perfection of Insight in Eight Thousand Lines
(Aṣṭasāhasrikā); a Perfection of Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Lines
(Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā); and a Perfection of Insight in a Hundred
Thousand Lines (Śatasāhasrikā). Anyone approaching these works
unprepared will initially be taken aback and perhaps
disappointed, since the doctrines expressed in them seem
strange and nearly unintelligible at first. Their historical
importance is, however, extremely great. In them the doctrine
of the unreality of the external world [S. 149f.] is expressed for
the first time. They had a decisive influence on the emergence
of the first important Mahāyāna school, the school of the
Mādhyamikas. Moreover, they have always belonged to the
 The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines 159

most sacred and most esteemed texts of the Mahāyāna. Thus at

least a few short samples from one of the oldest texts, from the
Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, will be presented.
The home of the Prajñāpāramitā literature may be the land
of Āndhra. Tradition, at least, reports that one of the southern
schools of the Mahāsāṃghika possessed a Prajñāpāramitā in the
vernacular. The founder of the Madhyamaka school, Nāgārjuna,
seems to have been of particular importance in the development
and propagation [of the Prajñāpāramitā literature]. Later as
well, much in the old texts was reworked and changed and
new texts were created. In terms of content, as with most of
the Mahāyāna sutras, the texts dealt primarily with the career
of a future Buddha, a Bodhisattva. The philosophical sections,
however, take up a relatively large amount of space and form
their actual core. Specifically, it is primarily the following
thoughts that are present in the oldest texts.

CCA.1. Central philosophical thought: the idea of an ultimate state of

being
The idea of an ultimate state of being is central. This is the
age-old idea alive in India since the time of the Upaniṣads. But
it is not simply adopted here; it has instead been uniquely
shaped through personal experience and couched in specific
forms of expression.
In accordance with the general state of development in the
context of Buddhism, the inconceivability and indeterminability
of the ultimate state of being is most strongly emphasized. Only
very rarely—in connection with an old view <148> that appears
here and there in the canon and that was later taken up by
the Mahāsaṃghikas—is it designated as stainless and luminous
mind (prabhāsvaraṃ cittam). In general, it is pointed out again
and again that no characterizations of any kind apply to it.
It is without arising and without ceasing, uncreated (akṛta) and
unchanging (avikāra), and has not come into existence at all
160 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

(anabhinirvṛtta). It is unthinkable, unweighable, unmeasurable,

uncountable, and unequalled. It is boundless, i.e., without start,
without center, and without end, and thus spatially unbounded.
It is, however, also without beginning, without present, and
without finish, and thus exists outside of the three periods of
time. In brief, it is by nature pure (viśuddha) and apart (vivikta)
from all characterizations. It is therefore also unimaginable
(avikalpa) and in it no processes of cognizance take place. Due
to its boundlessness and inconceivability it is readily compared
to empty space.
A further consequence of this is that it is also untouched
by all events within the phenomenal world. It is not bound and
not released, not stained and not purified, and also does not,
for its part, produce any effect. Whether it is recognized or not,
does not affect it. It does not flourish if it is taught, and does
not decline if it is not taught.
The expressions nature of factors (dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā),
element of the factors (dharmadhātu), and also pinnacle of the
real (bhūtakoṭi), often appear as designations for the ultimate
state of being. More characteristic and also very popular is the
designation suchness (tathatā), which first appears in canonical
scriptures, and which here seems to express the inconceivable
nature of the ultimate state of being equal only to itself and
which later was seen as an expression for its unchanging-
ness. Finally, the designations emptiness (śūnyatā), signless
(ānimitta), and the wishless (apraṇihita)—all already used in
the Śrāvakayāna, albeit in a different sense—although rarer,
are even more distinctive, since the indeterminability of the
ultimate state of being is most strongly emphasized in these
concepts. Their importance is accentuated <149> by the fact
that they and their contemplation are known as the gates to
liberation (vimokṣamukha).
 The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines 161

As the nature of all entities, this ultimate state of being is

also the nature of the Buddha (tathāgatatva). It is omniscience
(sarvajñatā) and the perfection of insight (prajñāpāramitā).

CCA.2. The unreality of the phenomenal world and its relationship to the
ultimate state of being
In contrast to this stands the phenomenal world, which is not
real. This is not further explained [S. 171] since this view
apparently rests on the sense—so alive among mystics—of the
vanity of everything worldly, as compared to the true state
of being that they have experienced in the state of absorption.
This non-reality of the phenomenal world is expressed quite
sharply and starkly. Things do not exist and cannot be
established, that is, not at all and in no way. They are namely
free (virahita) and apart (vivikta) from any intrinsic nature
(svabhāva), from the intrinsic nature of that which characterizes
(lakṣaṇa) and that which is characterized (lakṣya). They are
therefore nothing, and their nature (prakṛti) is a non-nature
(aprakṛti). That which we believe we have recognized is mere
words (nāmadheyamātra) and resembles a magical illusion (māyā),
a dream and a mere echo.
But as the things are unreal and apart from all signs, no
characterizations of any kind apply to them. They are unborn
and uncreated, without arising and ceasing. They are unthink-
able, unweighable, unmeasurable, uncountable, and unequalled.
And they are unlimited and without past, future, and present.
In this way the statements about the phenomenal world coincide
with those about the ultimate state of being, and the things seem
themselves to be the ultimate state of being, as it were. Thus
it is necessary to determine the relationship between the two,
but this presents difficulties. At every attempt it can only be said
that they are different and yet not different. The characteri-
zations attributed to the ultimate state of being such as, for
example, non-arising and non-ceasing, are not [the same as] the
162 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

five groups [that arise and fade away]. And yet [these
characterizations] and the five groups are not two. In the same
way, the ultimate state of being itself is not the same as the five
groups, but it is also not to be sought outside of them. <150>
Now since, as mentioned above, the phenomenal world is not
real and all characterizations related to it are invalid, there is also
no bondage and no liberation, and all concepts connected with
liberation are futile. For this reason there is no attainment and
beholding of the truth. Even the turning of the wheel of the
teachings by the Buddha does not apply.
How then under these circumstances does the phenomenal
world come about, and how are we supposed to deal with it?
The answer is: [The phenomenal world] is based on an illusion,
on the false ideas of worldly individuals. As already men-
tioned, it resembles a magical illusion, and when, for example, a
Bodhisattva liberates beings, this is the same as when a magician
allows his self-created illusions to disappear. In order to free
oneself from this illusion, one should not entertain it. One
should not cling to it, support oneself with it, and tarry within
it. Every grasping to words (nāman) and signs (nimitta), indeed
their mere usage, is, however, already clinging. Even the thought
that entities are natureless and empty, any attempt to capture
the ultimate state of being in concepts and words, entails
entanglement and should be abandoned. The only correct
conduct is to remain in complete apartness (viviktatā) and non-
perception (anupalambha), as it occurs in the state of absorption.
The enormously difficult task of a Bodhisattva consists in re-
maining in the phenomenal world in order to fulfill his task and
yet to maintain this apartness.
These are in essence the philosophical doctrines of the
older Prajñāpāramitā texts. These doctrines are, however, not
presented in a coherent manner; they appear as fragmentary
single thoughts and points of views, according to their relevance
to the conduct of a Bodhisattva, since this is and remains the
 The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines 163

principal subject of the texts. This naturally makes the thoughts

more difficult to comprehend. There is in addition a certain
archaic quality [to these texts]. There is still a sense of wrestling
with the thoughts and their expression. In the end, mysticism
always loves the mysterious. And here this finds expression in
the manner of lapsing into stark formulations that surprise the
hearer and <151> remain at first incomprehensible to him. This
explains the oddity and the difficulty of these texts. A good
example of this is provided by the very beginning of the
Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. The text is as follows:

CCA.3. From the “Perfection of Insight in Eight Thousand Lines”

(Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā)
From chapter I
Thus have I heard. Once the Exalted One was dwelling at
Rājagṛha on Gṛdhrakūṭa [Vulture Peak] Mountain together
with a great gathering of monks, with twelve hundred and
fifty monks, all saints (arhan), whose (negative) influxes had
vanished, who were free of defilements, masters of themselves,
with a liberated mind, liberated insight, like well-trained horses,
like great serpents, who had done what was to be done, who
had accomplished what was to be accomplished, who had
cast off the burden, who had attained their goal, in whom the
fetters [binding them] to existence had vanished, whose minds
were liberated through right knowledge, who had attained
the highest perfection of control of the entire mind, with
the exception of one single person, that is, the venerable
Ānanda.
Then the Exalted One spoke to the venerable elder Subhūti:
“Recall, Subhūti—regarding the perfection of insight of the
Bodhisattvas, the great beings—how the Bodhisattvas, the great
beings, arrive at the perfection of insight.” . . .
Then the venerable Subhūti, through the power of the
Buddha, spoke to the Exalted One as follows: “The Exalted One
164 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

<152> spoke in the following way: ‘Recall, Subhūti—regarding

the perfection of insight of the Bodhisattvas, the great beings—
how the Bodhisattvas, the great beings, arrive at the perfection
of insight.’ Here, O Exalted One, the expression Bodhisattva
is used. For what factor, O Exalted One, does the expression
Bodhisattva serve as designation? I do not see, O Exalted One,
any factor called Bodhisattva. I also do not see, O Exalted One,
any factor by the name perfection of insight. Therefore, since
I neither find, nor observe, nor see a Bodhisattva or a factor
called Bodhisattva, nor find, nor observe, nor see a perfection
of insight, to what kind of Bodhisattva should I instruct or teach
and about what kind of perfection of insight?
If, moreover, O Exalted One, with respect to such words,
teaching, and instruction, the mind of a Bodhisattva does not
founder, does not collapse, become alarmed, fall into dismay,
if the backbone of his thinking is not removed, not broken,
if he does not tremble, shake, and begin to quiver, then this
Bodhisattva, this great being, is to be taught the perfection of
insight. This is to be understood to be the perfection of insight
of this Bodhisattva, of this great being. This is the instruction
in the perfection of insight. If he abides in this way, then this
is his instruction and his teaching.
If, moreover, O Exalted One, a Bodhisattva, a great being,
engages in the perfection of insight and practices in the per-
fection of insight, then he should train himself in such a way
that, in the course of this training, he also does not entertain
an opinion with respect to the thought of enlightenment
(bodhicitta). For what <153> reason? Because this thought is
no thought;1 for the nature of mind (citta) is luminously pure
(prabhāsvara).”

1
The thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) is a moment of cognition (citta =
vijñāna). But since cognition in its apparent form is not real, it is no real
cognition, hence, non-cognition.
 The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines 165

Then the venerable Śāriputra spoke to the venerable Subhūti

as follows: “Does, venerable Subhūti, this thought of which (you
say) that it is no thought, exist at all?”
In answer to these words, the venerable Subhūti said the
following to the venerable Śāriputra: “Can one, venerable
Śāriputra, with respect to this being no thought (acittatā), find
or observe an existence or non-existence?”
Śāriputra spoke: “No, venerable Subhūti.”
Subhūti spoke: “But if, venerable Śāriputra, with respect
to this being no thought, an existence or non-existence cannot
be found or observed, then is your question justifiable, when
you ask: ‘Does this thought of which (you say) that it is no
thought, exist at all?’ “
In answer to these words the venerable Śāriputra said the
following to the venerable Subhūti: “Of what kind, venerable
Subhūti, is this being no thought?”
Subhūti spoke: “Unchanging, venerable Śāriputra, and un-
imaginable (avikalpa) is the being no thought.”
Then the venerable Śāriputra applauded the venerable
Subhūti: “Splendid, venerable Subhūti, you have demonstrated
this splendidly, you who have been designated by the Exalted
One as the most excellent among those who abide in the state
without quarrel.”

Now I will provide a few more examples of how the ideas

presented above [S. 147–50] are dealt with in the same text.
The first section [chap. II] discusses the perfection of
insight, and in particular its infinity, in the same terms as
the ultimate state of being, since the perfection <154> of
insight is identical in nature with the ultimate state of being.
After that, the concept of a being (sattva) is discussed in
addition and it is shown to be empty and vain.
166 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

From chapter II
In answer to these words, Śakra, the ruler among gods, spoke
to the venerable Subhūti as follows: “This perfection of insight,
noble Subhūti, is a great perfection. [This perfection of insight,
noble Subhūti, is an immeasurable perfection.] This perfection of
insight, noble Subhūti, is a limitless perfection. This perfection
of insight, noble Subhūti, is an infinite perfection.”
The elder, Subhūti, spoke: “Thus it is, Kauśika, thus it is.
This perfection of insight, Kauśika, is a great perfection. This
perfection of insight, Kauśika, is an immeasurable perfection.
This perfection of insight, Kauśika, is a limitless perfection. This
perfection of insight, Kauśika, is an infinite perfection. “For what
reason?” The perfection of insight, Kauśika, is a great perfection
due to the greatness of form. In the same way, the perfection
of insight, Kauśika, is a great perfection due to the greatness
of sensation, of ideation, of formations, and of cognition. The
perfection of insight, Kauśika, is an immeasurable perfection
due to the immeasurability of form. In the same, way, the
perfection of insight, Kauśika, is an immeasurable perfection due
to the immeasurability of sensation, of ideation, of formations,
and of cognition. The perfection of insight, Kauśika, is a limitless
perfection due to the limitlessness of form. In the same, way,
the perfection of insight, Kauśika, is a limitless perfection due to
the limitlessness of <155> sensation, of ideation, of formations,
and of cognition. The perfection of insight, Kauśika, is an infinite
perfection due to the infinity of form. In the same way, the
perfection of insight, Kauśika, is an infinite perfection due
to the infinity of sensation, of ideation, of formations, and
of cognition. At the same time, Kauśika, one does not entertain
the thought: ‘[The perfection of insight] is a great perfection.’
One does not entertain the thought: ‘It is an immeasurable
perfection,’ ‘It is a limitless perfection,’ and ‘It is an infinite
perfection.’ Therefore, Kauśika, the perfection of insight is a
 The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines 167

great perfection, an immeasurable perfection, a limitless perfec-

tion, and an infinite perfection.
The perfection of insight, Kauśika, is an infinite perfection
due to the infinity of the object-support (ārambaṇa). The
perfection of insight, Kauśika, is an infinite perfection due to
the infinity of beings (sattva). Why, Kauśika, is the perfection
of insight an infinite perfection due to the infinity of the object-
support? Since for all factors, Kauśika, no beginning, no middle,
and no end are to be observed, therefore, Kauśika, the perfection
of insight is an infinite perfection. The perfection of insight due
to the infinity of the object-support, Kauśika, is, in this way, an
infinite perfection. Further, since, Kauśika, all factors are infinite
and unlimited, and as a beginning, a middle, and an end are not
to be observed in them, therefore, Kauśika, the perfection of
insight <156> is an infinite perfection. For what reason? With
respect to form, Kauśika, a beginning, a middle, and an end are
not to be observed. Just so, Kauśika, with respect to sensation,
ideation, formations, and cognition, a beginning, a middle, and
an end are not to be observed. The perfection of insight due to
the infinity of the object-support, Kauśika, is, in this way, an
infinite perfection. Further, Kauśika, beings are infinite and
unlimited. For what reason? With respect to beings, a beginning,
a middle, and an end are namely not to be observed. Therefore,
Kauśika, the perfection of insight due to the infinity of beings
is an infinite perfection.”
Then Śakra, the ruler among gods, spoke to the venerable
Subhūti as follows: “In what respect, venerable Subhūti, is
the perfection of insight due to the infinity of beings an
infinite perfection?”
The elder, Subhūti, spoke: “Not because of the impossibility
of counting, Kauśika, nor because of the magnitude of counting
is the perfection of insight due to the infinity of beings an
infinite perfection.”
168 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Śakra spoke: “Then in what respect, noble Subhūti, is the

perfection of insight due to the infinity of beings an infinite
perfection?”
The elder, Subhūti, spoke: “What do you think, Kauśika, for
what factor does the term being serve as a designation?”
Śakra spoke: “For no factor, noble Subhūti, and for no
non-factor does the term being serve as a designation. The term
being is used as an adventitious designation, it is used as a
baseless designation, it is used as an essenceless designation, it
is used as a designation without an object-support.
The elder, Subhūti, spoke: “What do you think, Kauśika,
<157> did any kind of proclamation of beings take place here?”
Śakra spoke: “No, noble Subhūti.”
Subhūti spoke: “Where no proclamation of beings took place,
Kauśika, what kind of infinity of beings is there? If, Kauśika, the
Perfected One, the Saint, the perfectly Enlightened One should
utter the word being with the sound of infinite speech, with
a sonorous voice for as many cosmic aeons as the Ganges river
contains grains of sand, [then] has, because of that, any kind of
being arisen, will it arise, or is it arising, has it been annihilated,
will it be annihilated, or is it being annihilated?”
Śakra spoke: “No, noble Subhūti. For what reason? Because
beings are pure from the beginning and purified from the
beginning.”
Subhūti spoke: “In this way then, Kauśika, the perfection of
insight due to the infinity of beings is an infinite perfection. And
so, Kauśika, is the infinity of the perfection of insight due to
the infinity of beings to be understood.”

The next section (chap. XXII) deals with the question of the
coming about of the phenomenal world and tries to show
that it is based only on a fallacy.
 The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines 169

From chapter XXII

Subhūti spoke: “If all factors, O Exalted One, are apart [from
characterizations] and all factors are empty, how is it then,
O Exalted One, that the idea of the pollution of beings comes
about, how is it then, O Exalted One, that the idea of the
purification of beings comes about? For something that is apart,
O Exalted One, cannot be polluted, something that is apart, O
Exalted One, cannot be purified. Something that is empty,
O Exalted One, cannot be polluted, something that is empty, O
Exalted One, cannot be purified. Something that is apart <158>
or something that is empty does not attain the highest perfect
enlightenment. Except for [apartness and] emptiness, O Exalted
One, there is, however, no factor to be observed that has
attained, will attain, or is attaining the highest perfect enlight-
enment. Or how should we, O Exalted One, understand the
meaning of these words? Explain it, O Exalted One, explain it,
O Perfected One!”
In answer to these words, the Exalted One spoke to venerable
Subhūti as follows: “What do you think, Subhūti, do beings
walk for a long time in the belief in an ‘I’ and in the belief in
a ‘mine’?”
Subhūti spoke: “Thus it is, O Exalted One, thus it is,
O Perfected One. Beings walk for a long time in the belief in
an ‘I’ and in the belief in a ‘mine.’ “
The Exalted One spoke: “What do you think, Subhūti, is
the belief in an ‘I’ and the belief in a ‘mine’ empty?”
Subhūti spoke: “They are empty, O Exalted One, they are
empty, O Perfected One.”
The Exalted One spoke: “What do you think, Subhūti, do
beings travel in the cycle of existences due to the belief in an ‘I’
and due to the belief in a ‘mine’?”
Subhūti spoke: “Thus it is, O Exalted One, thus it is,
O Perfected One. Beings travel in the cycle of existences due
to the belief in an ‘I’ and due to the belief in a ‘mine.’ “
170 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

The Exalted One spoke: “Then the idea of the pollution of

beings comes about in this way. If one assumes beings and clings
to them, then the pollution takes place, and yet no one is defiled
by this. If, on the other hand, Subhūti, one assumes nothing and
clings to nothing, then the idea of a belief in an ‘I’ and a belief in
a ‘mine’ does not come about. The idea of the purification of
beings, Subhūti, comes about in this way. If one does not assume
beings and does not cling to them, then purification takes place,
and yet no one is purified by this. <159> A Bodhisattva, Subhūti,
a great being who walks in this way, walks in the perfection of
insight. The idea of the pollution and the purification of beings,
Subhūti, comes about in this way, even though all factors are
apart and all factors are empty.”

The following section (chap. I) presents the comparison of

the phenomenal world and also especially of the process
of liberation to a magical illusion.

From chapter I
Then the venerable Subhūti spoke to the Exalted One as follows:
“It is said, O Exalted One, ‘armed with a great armor, armed
with a great vehicle.’ In which manner, O Exalted One, is a
Bodhisattva, a great being, armed with a great armor?”
The Exalted One spoke: “A Bodhisattva, a great being,
Subhūti, has the thought: ‘Immeasurable beings are to be led
by me to liberation, innumerable beings are to be led by me
to liberation.’ And yet there is no one by whom they are to be
led to liberation, and no one who is to be led to liberation. Still
he leads these many beings to liberation. Nevertheless, there
is no being that is liberated, and no being by whom it is led to
liberation. For what reason? This nature of things (dharmatā
dharmāṇām), Subhūti, is based on the nature of a magical
illusion. Say, for example, Subhūti, a skilled magician or
magician’s apprentice at a great crossroad creates a great crowd
 The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines 171

of people, and after he has created them, he makes this crowd

of people disappear again. What do you think now, Subhūti?
Has anybody thereby been killed, died, <160> been destroyed,
or been made to disappear by anyone?”
Subhūti spoke: “No, O Exalted One.”
The Exalted One spoke: “Just so, Subhūti, does a Bodhisattva,
a great being, lead immeasurable and innumerable beings to
liberation. And yet there is no being that is liberated and no
being by whom it is led to liberation. If then, a Bodhisattva, a
great being, when he hears the exposition of this teaching, does
not tremble, shake, and begin to quiver, then, Subhūti, this
Bodhisattva, this great being, is to be regarded as armed with
a great armor.”

In conclusion, I will render a last section [chap. VIII], which

deals with clinging to objects of the phenomenal world and
which finishes with valuable remarks about the nature of
things and the ultimate state of being.

From chapter VIII

Then the venerable Śāriputra spoke to the venerable Subhūti
as follows: “Of what type, venerable Subhūti, is this clinging
[saṅga]?”
Subhūti spoke: “The thought, venerable Śāriputra, that form
is empty is clinging. In the same way, venerable Śāriputra, the
thought that sensation, ideation, formations, and cognition are
empty is clinging. If one thinks of past factors that they are past
factors, then this is clinging. If one thinks of future factors that
they are future factors, then this is clinging. If one thinks of
present factors that they are present factors, then this is clinging.
And if one thinks that an individual who is within the vehicle
of the Bodhisattvas earns such and such an amount of merit
due to the first arousing of the thought (of enlightenment), then
this is clinging. <161>
172 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Then Śakra, the ruler among gods, spoke to the venerable

Subhūti as follows: “How, noble Subhūti, is it clinging?”
Subhūti said: “If, Kauśika, one thinks about the thought of
enlightenment: ‘This is the first thought of enlightenment,’ then
it is directed (toward the highest perfect enlightenment) with the
thought: ‘I direct it toward the highest perfect enlightenment.’
But the nature of mind cannot be directed, be it by the noble
son, be it by the noble daughter, who are within the Great Way.
Therefore, Kauśika, if one teaches another about the highest
perfect enlightenment, tries to lead, rouse, and inspire him,
then one has to teach, lead, rouse, and inspire him in accordance
with the truth. For in this way, the noble son or noble daughter
does not harm him- or herself and leads others in the manner
approved by the Buddha (to the highest perfect enlighten-
ment). At the same time, he avoids all these millions of types
of clinging.”
Then the Exalted One applauded the venerable Subhūti:
“Splendid, splendid, Subhūti, you who teaches the Bodhisattvas,
the great beings, about these millions of types of clinging! I wish
therefore to proclaim to you yet other, more subtle types of
clinging. So listen and pay good and close attention! I will
speak to you.”
“Good, Exalted One,” the venerable Subhūti answered the
Exalted One.
The Exalted One spoke as follows: “Here, Subhūti, a faithful
noble son or noble daughter observes the Perfected One,
the Saint, the Perfectly Enlightened One based on a mark
(nimitta). But for as many marks as exist, Subhūti, there are
so many types of clinging. For what reason? Because clinging,
Subhūti, results from the mark. By thinking: ‘I rejoice <162> in
the uncontaminated qualities of the past, future, and present
exalted Buddhas,’ with the thought: ‘I will direct this root of
good toward the highest perfect enlightenment,’ he directs this
(root of good)—accompanied by rejoicing and by the object
 The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines 173

of rejoicing—(toward the highest perfect enlightenment). The

nature of the factors, Subhūti, is, however, neither past, future,
nor present. But that which is neither past, future, nor present,
is apart from the three time periods. And what is apart from
the three time periods cannot be directed, cannot serve as a
mark or as an object-support. And it is neither seen, nor heard,
nor thought of, nor cognized.
Subhūti spoke: “Profound, O Exalted One, is the nature of
the factors. “
The Exalted One spoke: “Because of their apartness, Subhūti.”
Subhūti spoke: “The perfection of insight, O Exalted One, is
profound by nature.”
The Exalted One spoke: “The perfection of insight, Subhūti,
is profound by nature, because it is pure by nature, because it
is apart by nature.”
Subhūti said: “The perfection of insight, O Exalted One, is
apart by nature. I pay my respect, O Exalted One, to the perfec-
tion of insight.”
The Exalted One spoke: “All factors, also, Subhūti, are apart
by nature. And this apartness by nature of all factors is the
perfection of insight. For what reason? Because all factors,
Subhūti, have been seen as uncreated by the Perfected One,
the Saint, the Perfectly Enlightened One.”
Subhūti spoke: “Therefore, O Exalted One, all factors have
not been seen by the Perfected One, the Saint, the Perfectly
Enlightened One.” <163>
The Exalted One spoke: “Because, Subhūti, the factors are
by nature nothing. [This is so] for their nature is a non-nature
and the non-nature is their nature, because all factors have
only one characteristic (lakṣaṇa), that is, characteristiclessness.
Therefore, Subhūti, all factors have not been seen by the
Perfected One, the Saint, the Perfectly Enlightened One. For
what reason? Because, Subhūti, there are not two natures of
factors, for the nature of all factors, Subhūti, is only one. And
174 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

this nature of all factors, Subhūti, is a non-nature, and this

non-nature is their nature. In this way, Subhūti, all of these
millions of types of clinging have been avoided.”

These examples will suffice to give at least a brief glimpse

of the rich literature of the Prajñāpāramitā texts. From the
wealth of the remaining old Mahāyāna sutras I select as
a sample only a single work, the Jewel Heap (Ratnakūṭa).1
This work owes its special significance to the fact that in
it, for the first time, an idea that was of decisive importance
to the appearance of the Madhyamaka system is developed
in detail, that is, the idea of the middle way. The Buddha
himself had called his doctrine the middle way, as it steers
the middle course between the extremes of a life of ease
and of excessive asceticism. This concept was also quickly
buttressed by philosophical ideas. Even early in the
canon we find a discourse, the Instruction of Kātyāyana
(Kātyāyanāvavāda), in which the Buddha rejects as ex-
tremes the views that everything exists and that nothing
exists, and confronts these with his doctrine as the middle
doctrine. Similar ideas also appear in the Prajñāpāramitā
works. In itself this is nothing new. The rejection of
opposites is widespread in the philosophical world of
thought in India <164> and especially since the time of the
Upaniṣads it is common, in attempts to define the ultimate
state of being, to reject all definitions based on opposed
concepts. In the Ratnakūṭa, however, this thought is
accorded its full significance and deliberately made the
central point. The right contemplation of the ultimate state
of being consists precisely of the fundamental negation

1
This is the name of the old sutra. In later times an entire group of sutras
was brought together under this name and within this group the old text
was given the title “Kāśyapa-section” (Kāśyapaparivarta).
 The Prajñāpāramitā literature and its philosophical doctrines 175

of all opposing characterizations, and this alone is the

right doctrine, the middle way. The idea of the middle
way therefore decisively determines the entire formation of
the doctrine here. In addition, next to this basic idea, the
non-involvement of the ultimate state of being in any
process of the phenomenal world is also emphasized in
the strongest terms. The stern exhortation is also spoken
not to adhere to conventional concepts, since exactly this
essencelessness of entities, when taken as a doctrine in the
conventional sense, brings about the most fateful bondage.
The Ratnakūṭa belongs to the oldest Mahāyāna sutras.
It was translated into Chinese as early as the second
century c.e. and therefore still falls within the period before
the creation of the Madhyamaka system by Nāgārjuna. In
comparison to the works of the Prajñāpāramitā literature,
however, it represents a fundamental advance. In contrast
to the disjointed and mysteriously abruptly expounded
teachings of the Prajñāpāramitā, we find here a train of
thought that is systematically followed through, and the
thoughts themselves are more deeply developed and better
elaborated. It should also be noted in passing that a large
part of the work deals with questions about the doctrine of
liberation, which are, however, of no import for us here.

CCB. From the “Jewel Heap” (Ratnakūṭa)

§ 52
“A Bodhisattva, Kāśyapa, who wishes to train himself in this
proclamation of the doctrine, the great Jewel Heap, must apply
right effort toward the doctrine. What, Kāśyapa, is right effort
toward the doctrine? <165> The regarding of all factors in
accordance with truth. What, Kāśyapa, is the regarding of all
factors in accordance with truth? If, Kāśyapa, they are not
regarded as a self, if they are not regarded as a being, nor as a
soul, nor as humans, nor as a person, nor as a man, nor as a
176 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

human being, then, Kāśyapa, this is called the middle way, the
regarding of factors in accordance with truth.
§ 53
This also, Kāśyapa, is the middle way, the regarding of factors
in accordance with truth. If form is not regarded as permanent
nor as non-permanent, if sensation, ideation, formations, and
cognition are not regarded as permanent nor as non-permanent,
then, Kāśyapa, this is called the middle way, the regarding of factors
in accordance with truth.
§ 54
If the element of earth is not regarded as permanent and not
as non-permanent, if the element of water, the element of fire,
and the element of wind are not regarded as permanent nor as
non-permanent, if the element of space and the element of cog-
nition are not regarded as permanent and not as non-permanent,
then this, Kāśyapa, is called the middle way, the regarding of factors
in accordance with truth.
[...]
§ 56
Permanent, Kāśyapa, that is one extreme. Non-permanent,
Kāśyapa, that is a second extreme. What lies in the middle
between these <166> two, the permanent and the non-
permanent, is formless, unshowable, without appearing image,
without cognizance, without support, and without sign. This,
Kāśyapa, is called the middle way, the regarding of factors in
accordance with truth.
§ 57
Self (ātman), Kāśyapa, that is one extreme. Non-self (nairātmya),
Kāśyapa, that is a second extreme. What lies in the middle
between these two, the self and the non-self, is formless,
unshowable, without appearing image, without cognizance,
without support, and without sign. This, Kāśyapa, is called the
middle way, the regarding of factors in accordance with truth.
 Jewel Heap (Ratnakūṭa) 177

§ 58
Correct cognition (bhūtacitta), Kāśyapa, that is one extreme.
Incorrect cognition, Kāśyapa, that is a second extreme. Where
there is, Kāśyapa, no mind [cetanā] and no thinking [manas] and
no cognition [vijñāna], that, Kāśyapa, is called the middle way,
the regarding of factors in accordance with truth.
§ 59
Likewise, Kāśyapa, with respect to all factors, [whether]
wholesome and unwholesome, mundane and supramundane,
blameworthy and blameless, contaminated and uncontaminated,
conditioned and unconditioned, pollution is one extreme,
purification a second extreme. Not-adopting, not-communicat-
ing, and not-expressing these two extremes, that, Kāśyapa, is
called the middle way, the regarding of factors in accordance with
truth. <167>
§ 60
Existence, Kāśyapa, that is one extreme. Non-existence, Kāśyapa,
that is a second extreme. What lies in the middle between these
two extremes is called, Kāśyapa, the middle way, the regarding of
factors in accordance with truth.
§§ 61–62
That which I have also told you, Kāśyapa—that dependent on
ignorance, volitional formations (saṃskāra) come into being;
dependent on volitional formations, cognition; dependent on
cognition, name and form; dependent on name and form, the
sixfold sphere; dependent on the sixfold sphere, contact;
dependent on contact, sensation; dependent on sensation,
thirst; dependent on thirst, grasping; dependent on grasping,
becoming; dependent on becoming, birth; dependent on birth,
old age and death, sorrow and lamentation, pain, distress, and
despair; and that thus the origin of this whole great mass of
suffering comes about; that, further, through the cessation of
ignorance the volitional formations cease; through the cessation
of the volitional formations, cognition; through the cessation of
178 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

cognition, name and form; through the cessation of name and

form, the sixfold sphere; through the cessation of the sixfold
sphere, contact; through the cessation of contact, sensation;
through the cessation of sensation, thirst; through the cessation
of thirst, grasping; through the cessation of grasping, becoming;
through the cessation of becoming, birth; through the cessation
of birth, old age and death, sorrow and lamentation, pain,
distress, and despair; and that thus the cessation of this whole
great mass of suffering <168> comes about—in this, Kāśyapa,
knowledge and ignorance are not two things and do not
constitute a duality. And this cognition, Kāśyapa, is called the
middle way, the regarding of factors in accordance with truth.
Likewise, formations and the non-formations (asaṃskṛta);
the cognition and the cessation of cognition; name and form and
the cessation of name and form; the sixfold sphere and the
cessation of the sixfold sphere; contact and the cessation of
contact; sensation and the cessation of sensation; thirst and the
cessation of thirst; grasping and the cessation of grasping;
becoming and the cessation of becoming; birth and the cessation
of birth; old age and the cessation of old age are not two things
and do not constitute a duality. And this cognition, Kāśyapa, is
called the middle way, the regarding of factors in accordance with
truth.
§ 63
This also, Kāśyapa, is the middle way, the regarding of factors in
accordance with truth: that one does not make the factors empty
through emptiness but, rather, the factors themselves are empty;
that one does not make the factors signless through the signless
but, rather, the factors themselves are signless; that one does not
make the factors wishless through the wishless, but, rather, the
factors themselves are wishless; that one does not make the
factors unformed through non-formation, but, rather, the factors
themselves are unformed; that one does not make the factors
unarisen through non-arising, but, rather, the factors themselves
 Jewel Heap (Ratnakūṭa) 179

are unarisen; that one does not make the factors unborn through
not being born, but, <169> rather, the factors themselves are
unborn; and that one does not make the factors essenceless
through essencelessness (asvabhāvatā), but, rather, the factors
themselves are essenceless. This regarding, Kāśyapa, is called the
middle way, the regarding of factors in accordance with truth.
§ 64
Further, Kāśyapa, emptiness does not lead to the destruction
of the person. Emptiness is, rather, itself empty. It is empty at
the beginning, empty at the end, and empty in the present.
Turn toward emptiness, Kāśyapa, and not toward the person
[pudgala]! Those, however, Kāśyapa, who turn toward empti-
ness by conceiving of emptiness, those, Kāśyapa, I call lost and
completely lost to this doctrine. The profession of the belief
(dṛṣṭi) in a person—may this [belief] be as large as Sumeru,
mountain of gods—is better than the belief in emptiness in a
person who entertains this afflicted view. For what reason? For
all types of beliefs, Kāśyapa, emptiness is indeed the way out.
Whosoever believes in emptiness, however, Kāśyapa, how will
he find the way out?
§ 65
If, for example, Kāśyapa, a man were sick and the physician
were to give him a medicine and this medicine were to drive out
the agents of disease yet itself remained in the stomach and did
not come out—what do you think, Kāśyapa, would this sick
person be freed from sickness?”
He said: “No, Exalted One. The sickness of this man in
whom the medicine drives out all agents of disease yet itself
remains in the stomach and does not come out would be even
more serious.”
The Exalted One spoke: “Just so, Kāśyapa, <170> emptiness
is the way out for all types of beliefs. Whoever believes in
emptiness, however, Kāśyapa, him I call incurable.”
180 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

These examples from the old sutra literature show how far
the philosophical development of thoughts in the Mahā-
yāna had already advanced by the beginning of the com-
mon era. The views about the unreality of the external
world and about the nature of the highest reality had
already taken shape and different fundamental lines of
thought were clearly and systematically followed through.
With this, however, no philosophical system has yet been
created. This task was first undertaken by a man who is one
of the most important figures in Buddhism and in Indian
philosophical history as a whole: Nāgārjuna.
CD. The Madhyamaka school

CDA. Nāgārjuna (ca. 200 c.e.)

The life of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the first philosophical
school of the Mahāyāna, the school of the Mādhyamika, is so
overgrown with legends that it is difficult to peel it down to
a historical core. It is not only that legend has made him into a
magician and alchemist, but reports about other persons of the
same name are also merged with the traditional accounts of him,
so that only by conjecture can we sift out the little that is
genuine. So if we are to trust tradition, his home was Vidarbha,
today’s Berār in Central India, but he seems to have spent the
greatest part of his life in South India, in the Āndhra empire,
where he enjoyed the favor and friendship of one of the last
kings of the Śātavāhana dynasty. He spent the last days of his
life on [mount] Śrī Parvata on the banks of the Kṛṣṇā (Kistna).

CDA.1. The works of Nāgārjuna

Just as uncertain as the reports about his life are those about his
literary activity. In the course of time an entire literature has
been put under his name, which includes not only works that
wrongly bear his name, but also works of other <171> authors
with the same name. The basic text of the Madhyamaka school,
the Madhyamakakārikā (Mnemonic Verses of the Middle Doctrine),
is generally considered to be his work. Next to it stand a
number of works whose genuineness is highly probable. Far
greater though is the number of works whose authorship
 182 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

remains questionable and must still be clarified. In the follow-

ing selection I will therefore present primarily sections from
the Madhyamakakārikā. In addition, I provide samples only
from two works, [the Vigrahavyāvartanī and the Ratnāvalī,]
whose genuineness seems assured to me. The following brief
presentation of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine is also based exclusively
on the Madhyamakakārikā.

CDA.2. The philosophical system of Nāgārjuna

As we have already noted, Nāgārjuna was the first to create
a Mahāyāna philosophical system, but this does not mean a
system in the later sense. It is not a systematically presented
complete edifice, as the time was not yet ripe for such system.
He did try, however, to give an exact proof of the unreality of
the external1 world, which had merely been asserted in the
Prajñāpāramitā [S. 149f.]. He also developed and defined the
decisive fundamental concepts of the Madhyamaka school.
Systematically arranged, the views that he maintained look
roughly like this:

CDA.2.1. The unreality of the external world

His main goal is the proof of the unreality of the external world.
To this end he replaces the mere assertions of the Prajñāpāramitā
with proper inferences by demonstrating with bold logic that the
most ordinary concepts of daily life are impossible, and that the
phenomenal world as it presents itself to us—precisely because
it rests on these concepts—is impossible. In his principal work,
the Madhyamakakārikā, he pours out a whole abundance of such

1
[Here, and occasionally also below, Frauwallner uses the term external
world in a more general way as referring to the entirety of the phenomenal
world. However, later when starting to discuss differences between the
Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, as for example on S. 248, he distinguishes more
clearly between external world and phenomenal world.]
 Nāgārjuna 183

inferences before the reader, such that their initial impact

is bewildering. Still, there is no lack of a core of solid views
underlying this bewildering abundance.

CDA.2.1.1. The phenomenal world as dependent origination

Before all else, Nāgārjuna laid down a definite fundamental
view of the nature of the phenomenal world. When the subject
of the phenomenal world came up, the Prajñāpāramitā had
usually spoken of the five groups. Nāgārjuna replaces this
with dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). <172> When
considering the external world, since the time of the Buddha
himself, its impermanence had stood in the foreground [S. 63ff.,
101ff.]. The nature of the world was seen above all in the con-
tinuous becoming and ceasing that is governed by the law of
dependent origination [S. 26–60]. For Nāgārjuna then, this very
law of dependent arising appeared to be the appropriate formula
through which to express the nature of the phenomenal world.
His inferences thus also address this dependent origination.

CDA.2.1.2. The relativity of opposing terms and the middle way

As for the concepts on which our conception of the phenome-
nal world is based and whose impossibility Nāgārjuna tried
to prove, the Prajñāpāramitā had selected such concepts rather
arbitrarily. Nāgārjuna, following the example of the Ratnakūṭa,
prefers to choose opposed pairs of concepts [S. 165ff.].
Dependent origination is unreal to him since neither of the
opposing possibilities of becoming and ceasing, of permanence
and impermanence, etc., applies. The true doctrine consists
rather in the rejection of both opposites, in the middle way.
With this, Nāgārjuna makes a link to the proclamation of the
Buddha who himself designated his doctrine as the middle way
[S. 10f.], and asserts that he is proclaiming the genuine doctrine
184 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

of the Buddha. For this reason then, his system is also called the
middle doctrine, Madhyamakadarśana.
The fundamental inference from which he begins is meant
to show that neither an arising nor a passing away is possible.
Then follows a long series of similar inferences that at first
bewilder and nearly stupefy. On closer inspection, however,
solid fundamental views appear here as well, being reiterated
again and again. One of the views with which Nāgārjuna prefers
to work is the relativity of opposed concepts. Such concepts are,
in other words, mutually dependent on one another since the
one is possible only if the other is also given. From this though,
Nāgārjuna draws the conclusion that the corresponding entities
cannot really exist, because the existence of the one always
presupposes the existence of the other. A cause, for example, is a
cause only with respect to an effect. A cause can therefore not
exist as long as the effect does not exist. Without a cause, <173>
however, an effect also cannot exist. Neither [Nāgārjuna] nor his
contemporaries were able to recognize the error underlying
this conclusion.1 [See S. 176, 221, 224, 247].

1
[Frauwallner actually never explained in writing what he thought was the
error underlying Nāgārjuna’s conclusion. It can only be assumed that he
considered this error to be along the lines of some classical sophistic
arguments (cf., in a similar vein, Richard Robinson: “Some Logical Aspects
of Nāgārjuna’s System.” Philosophy East and West 6, 1957, pp. 291–308;
Richard Hayes: “Nāgārjuna’s Appeal.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 22, 1994,
pp. 299–378). The present error is basically due only to an assumed
congruence between language and reality, which in Nāgārjuna’s time,
however, had still not been clearly understood as a silent presupposition
underlying such arguments (cf. Johannes Bronkhorst: “The Correspondence
Principle and its Impact on Indian Philosophy.” Indo-Shisōshi Kenkyū 8,
1996, pp. 1–19). Nāgārjuna’s arguments and their often surprising logic
and style have been subject to a great number of studies recently. Examples
of closer analyses of Nāgārjuna’s arguments can be found so far only in
some papers by Claus Oetke, a good one being his “On some non-formal
aspects of the proofs of the Madhyamakakārikās,” in: Earliest Buddhism
and Madhyamaka. Eds. David Seyfort Ruegg – Lambert Schmithausen,
 Nāgārjuna 185

CDA.2.1.3. Nāgārjuna’s concept of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and the

emptiness of the phenomenal world
Still more important is Nāgārjuna’s uniquely developed concept
of an intrinsic nature (svabhāva). For Nāgārjuna, in accor-
dance with the Indian meaning of the word, intrinsic nature
means a being in and of itself and conditioned by only itself,
independent of everything else. From this, however, it follows
that such an intrinsic nature has not arisen because it cannot
be caused, and that it is not subject to passing away because
its existence is not dependent on anything else. It is therefore
permanent and imperishable. And so Nāgārjuna draws the
conclusion that entities of the phenomenal world, because
they are subject to constant becoming and ceasing, cannot
possess an intrinsic nature. They are therefore without a nature,
i.e., unreal.
At the same time, this argument of the unreality of entities
enables him to bring the nature of the phenomenal world as
he sees it into sharper focus. The unreality of the phenomenal
world does not mean that it does not exist [at all]. It just does
not exist intrinsically. With this, a characterization comes to the
fore, which in the Prajñāpāramitā was still only one among
many, but which for Nāgārjuna became the decisive expression
for the nature of the phenomenal world: emptiness (śūnyatā).
The things of the phenomenal world are empty, are natureless.
We can therefore neither say that entities exist nor that they do
not exist. Both are mistaken. Both are opposites. The truth lies in
the middle, in the middle way, in emptiness.

Leiden 1990, pp. 91–109. A good survey and balanced summary is in

Tom J. F. Tillemans: Trying to be Fair to Mādhyamika Buddhism. (The
Numata Yehan Lecture in Buddhism, Winter 2001). Calgary, The University
of Calgary, 2001, pp. 1–29.]
 186 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CDA.2.1.4. The highest and the restricted truth

That it is so constituted, however, makes the phenomenal world
as we know it possible in the first place. If things possessed
an intrinsic nature, they could, as noted, neither arise nor cease.
Only because of their unreality can the entire course of the world
unfold in accordance with the law of dependent origination.
The phenomenal world therefore does exist and it exists in
accordance with its own fixed laws. Thus also a certain truth is
allowed to it. Not truth in terms of the highest reality, however,
but a restricted truth (saṃvṛtisatya). In terms of the restricted
truth then, the events of the world, and in particular the
Buddhist path of liberation <174> and the proclamation of
the Buddha, have validity. From the point of view of the
highest truth (paramārthasatya), which applies exclusively to
the highest reality, though, there is neither a Buddha, nor a
doctrine, nor a community, since these all belong to the
phenomenal world.

CDA.2.1.5. The nature of the phenomenal world is diversity (prapañca)

A second view of the nature of the phenomenal world is
worth mentioning. While it does not come fully into play with
Nāgārjuna, it appears as significant for the first time. The nature
of the phenomenal world is diversity (prapañca), a concept
not further analyzed by Nāgārjuna. The world of dependence
is based on manifoldness, which diversity provides. Most im-
portantly, however, all our conceptions, which feign the
phenomenal world for us, but which do not apply to the highest
reality since this is free of all diversity, rest on diversity. And
here lies one of the germs of the later doctrine that sees in
the phenomenal world a creation of cognition. 1

1
[Cf. 221, 229, 268, 282, 299f., 329ff., 354f.]
 Nāgārjuna 187

CDA.2.2. The highest reality

CDA.2.2.1. Distinction from the phenomenal world: free from diversity,

extinction, peace, etc.
When it came to the highest reality, Nāgārjuna had less that
was new and original to say than about the phenomenal world.
In particular, he avoids the positive expressions and designa-
tions that appear in the Prajñāpāramitā. He does not speak of
an element of the factors (dharmadhātu), of a suchness (tathatā),
but only of extinction (nirvāṇa). The latter is without arising
and passing away, without ending, and also is not permanent.
Most importantly, it is neither existent nor non-existent, since
existence and non-existence, as opposing concepts, belong to the
world of dependence. Furthermore, nirvāṇa is free from all
diversity and so offers no basis for our concepts and is thus
unimaginable and inexpressible. In it the manifoldness of ap-
pearances and the law of dependent origination are thus set
aside. It is by nature peaceful (śānta).

CDA.2.2.2. Identity in nature of the phenomenal world and nirvāṇa

In this way, however, the same statements ensue about nirvāṇa
as about the nature of the phenomenal world. And so it is that
Nāgārjuna, just as does the Prajñāpāramitā [S. 149], comes to
assert the unity of the phenomenal world and nirvāṇa. The same
characterizations that are <175> valid for the nature of things
(dharmatā) are also valid for nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa and phenomenal
world are, so to speak, just two forms of appearance of the
same nature. That which in conditionality and dependency
constitutes the phenomenal world is, free from conditionality
and dependency, nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna is also not afraid to em-
phasize this sameness of nature most emphatically and most
sharply. The phenomenal world and nirvāṇa are one and the
same. There is not the least difference between them. From this
 188 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

it follows, however, that nirvāṇa is nothing separate per se that

one attains by freeing oneself from the phenomenal world.
It consists rather only in the fact that the deception of the
phenomenal world is no longer perceived, as the diversity on
which it is founded is appeased.

CDA.2.3. Doctrine of liberation

At the same time, this tells us wherein liberation lies according
to Nāgārjuna’s doctrine. It remains only to briefly add how the
process of liberation presents itself within the phenomenal
world. Nāgārjuna solved this question very simply. According to
the old Śrāvakayāna doctrine, rebirth depends on deeds, and the
efficacy of the deeds on the defilements—in particular on the
mistaken belief in an ‘I’, in a soul. Nāgārjuna now says that with
the abolition of diversity, resulting from the emptiness of all
entities, the bottom falls out of all ideas concerned with the
entities of the phenomenal world. With this, however, the belief
in an ‘I’ is also invalidated, and with it the efficacy of deeds
vanishes and rebirth comes to an end. Thus, in the end, the
cognition of the emptiness of all entities is the cause of liberation
and provides the impetus for an unfolding of the process of
liberation as it has been conceived of thus far.
These are the essential features of Nāgārjuna’s views as they
appear in the presentation of the Madhyamakakārikā.

CDA.3. Introduction to sections of the Madhyamakakārikā

CDA.3.1. Chapter I: Examination of causes (pratyayaparīkṣā)

We turn now to Nāgārjuna’s works themselves, beginning with
his principal work, namely the Madhyamakakārikā. Here we begin
with the first chapter, which contains the basic proof of
the impossibility of any arising. The chapter is, at the same time,
<176> a good example of Nāgārjuna’s logic, which, it is true,
is based to a great extent on sophisms, but which, like the
 Nāgārjuna 189

sophisms of the Eleatic Zeno, made a deep impression because

of its surprising boldness.
As with most Buddhist works, this one is prefaced with a
stanza of homage to the Buddha which, however, at the same
time briefly presents what constitutes the essential content of the
work: namely, the true teaching of the Buddha, i.e., dependent
origination (pratītyasamutpāda) as the nature of the phenomenal
world as it is in truth, free from all opposing characterizations;
and therewith also the ending of the diversity of appearances
and hence, liberation.
The actual presentation begins [v. 1] with the fundamental
assertion that there is no arising, neither from itself, nor from
something other, nor from both, nor from neither.
The next verse [v. 2] provides a brief proof. Things cannot
arise from themselves because their own nature, as presupposed
for the moment, is not present in the causes. As long as their
own nature is not present, however, another nature cannot
exist, since any other nature is only possible in contrast to
one’s own nature. Consequently, things also cannot arise from
something other. Nāgārjuna thus bases himself here on the
relativity of opposing concepts, which makes the occurrence of
one dependent on the occurrence of the other.
Then [v. 3] he moves on, in order to prove the impossibility of
an arising, to refute the opponent’s doctrine of causes; here first
of all, the doctrine of the Śrāvakayāna scholasticism. According
to this doctrine there are four kinds of causes: The cause (hetu) or
generative cause; the object-support (ālambana) or the object of
knowledge; the immediately preceding cause (samanantara-
pratyaya). By this latter is to be understood—according to the
Buddhist doctrine of the momentariness of all entities—that
moment in the stream of moments of a thing, which immediately
precedes the moment considered to be the effect, and which
therefore is to be seen as its cause. Finally, the dominant cause
(adhipatipratyaya), to which belong all things that enable the
190 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

arising of an effect through their mere existence. <177> To begin,

Nāgārjuna presents general objections to this doctrine.
An effect, as he says [v. 4], can neither have causes nor can it
be without a cause, and vice versa: the causes can neither have an
effect nor be without an effect.
As proof of this statement, he again uses [v. 5] the relativity
of concepts. Cause is what one calls that on which an effect
depends. But as long as the effect does not exist, it also cannot
depend on anything. And thus before the arising of the effect
no cause can exist.
The cause, on the other hand [v. 6], can have neither
something existent nor something non-existent as its effect, since
as the cause of something non-existent, it would, as stated, not
be a cause. And as the cause of an already existing effect, it
would be useless.
Nāgārjuna then [vv. 7–10] turns briefly, in one verse each,
against the different kinds of causes accepted by the Śrāvaka-
yāna scholasticism. Against the cause or generative cause, he
notes [v. 7]—in connection with the aforementioned—that if
the effect, i.e., that which is produced, can be neither existent
nor non-existent, nor existent-and-non-existent, then of course
a generative cause is also impossible. With respect to the object-
support, he refers [v. 8] to a saying of the Buddha in the
Prajñāpāramitā texts, according to which the factors are without
object-support. As refutation of the immediately preceding
cause, he bases himself [v. 9] on the definition of the opponent
who designates the passing away of the preceding moment
as cause of the following one. The passing away, however,
cannot take place before the following moment has arisen. But
if it has arisen, then nothing exists any longer that could be a
cause. Finally [v. 10], concerning the dominant cause, he refers
to the essencelessness of all things (he substantiates this later
in more detail), which does not permit one to speak of their
 Nāgārjuna 191

existence, such that it is impossible to assert that the existence

of one thing depends on the existence of another.
The following verses (vv. 11–14) appear to be directed
against the doctrine of causality of the Sāṃkhya and the
Vaiśeṣika, who had primarily the material cause in view, and of
which the Sāṃkhya taught that <178> the effect already pre-
exists in the cause, whereas the Vaiśeṣika asserted the opposite.
Nāgārjuna now first [v. 11] adopts the point of view that the
effect exists neither in the combined nor in the individual
causes, and poses the question as to how something can arise
from causes in which it is not contained. And even if this should
take place, why does it then, he asks further [v. 12], arise only
from certain things as causes and not also from others. If [v. 13]
on the other hand, one assumes that the effect is contained in
the causes and thus has their nature, then the same applies
equally to these causes. They themselves thus have no intrinsic
nature of their own, so how then can one assert that the effect
has their nature? Nāgārjuna then concludes [v. 14]: If therefore
the effect is neither contained nor not contained in the causes,
then there is no effect at all. And if there is no effect, then there
is also no cause.

CDA.3.1.1. From the “Mnemonic Verses of the Middle Doctrine”

(Madhyamakakārikā)
Chapter I:
[Examination of causes]
To the Buddha who has proclaimed dependent origination as
being without annihilation and without arising, without cessa-
tion and not eternal, without unity and without manifoldness,
without coming and without going, as the peaceful appeasement
of diversity (prapañca), to Him, the most excellent of teachers,
I pay homage.
192 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

1
Neither from itself, nor from something other, nor from both,
nor without cause, have any things whatsoever ever arisen
anywhere.
21
For the intrinsic nature of entities is not present in the causes,
etc. If, however, no intrinsic nature is <179> present, then also
no extraneous nature is present.
3
There are four causes: the cause [or generative cause], the object-
support [cause], the immediately preceding [cause] and the
dominant cause. There is no fifth cause.
4
The effect has no cause. But the effect also does not exist without
a cause. The causes likewise are not without an effect, but they
also do not have an effect.
5
Whatever the arising of a (thing) depends upon, those are
considered to be its causes. But as long as [this thing] does not
arise, why, for so long, should these not be non-causes?
6
A cause is appropriate to neither an existent nor a non-existent
object. For of what is it the cause, if (the object) is non-existent?
If, however, (the object) does exist, of what use then is the cause?
7
If neither an existent [factor] nor a non-existent [factor], nor an
existent and non-existent factor arises, how then is a productive
cause possible?
8
About the existing factor, it is taught that it is without object-
support. But if it is without object-support, from whence should
an object-support then come? <180>

1
[Frauwallner switched stanzas 2 and 3.]
 Nāgārjuna 193

9
As long as the factors have not arisen, annihilation does not
come about. The immediately preceding cause is therefore not
possible. If, on the other hand, annihilation has taken place, then
what is supposed to be the cause?
10
Since for things without intrinsic nature there is no existence, it
is inadmissible to say: When this exists, that comes to be.
11
Neither in the individual [causes] nor in all the causes is the
effect contained. But how should that which is not contained in
the causes arise from the causes?
12
But if the effect, even without being present, arises from the
causes, why then does it not also arise from non-causes?
13
If the effect consists of the causes, then the causes do not consist
of themselves. How then can the effect, which originates from
the causes that do not consist of themselves, consist of the
causes?
14
There is therefore no effect that consists of causes, and none that
does not consist of causes. But if there is no effect, then how can
there be causes and non-causes?

CDA.3.2. Chapter XV: Examination of intrinsic nature (svabhāvaparīkṣā)

From the numerous following chapters, in which Nāgārjuna
tries to prove the most diverse concepts of common life to
be contradictory and impossible, <181> I select only one, the
fifteenth, because in it a particularly important concept comes
up for discussion: the concept of intrinsic nature (svabhāva).
For the Indian, in the concept of intrinsic nature or own-being
lies, as we have already stated, the idea that something exists
194 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

only in itself and through itself. This means that it is dependent

on and conditioned by nothing else. And, for Nāgārjuna, it
further follows from this that it can neither arise nor cease. From
this, however, it necessarily follows that in the phenomenal
world—the basic law of which is represented by dependent
origination—an intrinsic nature is impossible.
In the chapter before us, Nāgārjuna starts from the concept
of intrinsic nature and asserts, first of all [v. 1], that an intrinsic
nature cannot arise and hence cannot exist in the phenomenal
world. Then [v. 3], from the opposition of concepts, he draws
the further conclusion that without an intrinsic nature there also
cannot be an extraneous nature (parabhāva). But [v. 4] without
an intrinsic and extraneous nature, any existence (bhāva) at all
is impossible, and without existence, there is also no non-
existence. The rejection of existence as well as of non-existence
[v. 5] is, however, the core of the proclamation of the Buddha
with respect to the phenomenal world. And as confirmation of
this, Nāgārjuna cites [v. 7] a famous sutra from the old canon,
the so-called Instruction of Kātyāyana (Kātyāyanāvavāda).
This sutra mentions the two opposed statements: “It exists”
and “It does not exist,” and this occasions a few further com-
ments, since these two statements are keywords in the canon for
the two views that the Buddha branded as the worst heresies,
the doctrine of eternality (śāśvatadṛṣṭi) and the doctrine of
annihilation (ucchedadṛṣṭi), in particular, of the self. Nāgārjuna
therefore briefly examines these two doctrines.
First [v. 8], he notes that from the existence of an intrinsic
nature its eternality follows, because the intrinsic nature cannot
change. Indeed [v. 9], in the case of an existing intrinsic nature,
no transformation is at all possible because it is unchanging, and
in the absence of an intrinsic nature, because nothing is there
that could change. Then he concludes [v. 10]: Both, existence
and non-existence, must be <182> rejected because the heresies
of eternality and annihilation result from them. For [v. 11] if one
 Nāgārjuna 195

assumes that something exists by nature, then eternality follows

from that. If, on the other hand, one says that something was and
is no more, then the heresy of annihilation results.

Chapter XV:
[Examination of intrinsic nature]
1
An arising of intrinsic nature through causes and conditions is
not possible. For, if intrinsic nature were to arise from causes
and conditions, then it would be created.
2
But how could a created intrinsic nature exist? For intrinsic
nature is nothing created and is not dependent on something
other.
3
How could there be an extraneous nature if there is no intrinsic
nature? For the intrinsic nature of an extraneous nature is called
extraneous nature.
4
Further, how could there be an existence without an intrinsic
nature and extraneous nature? For only if an intrinsic or extra-
neous nature is present, does an existence come about.
5
But if there is no existence, then non-existence also cannot be.
For people call non-existence the being-different of an existence.
6
Those who see an intrinsic nature and an extraneous nature, an
existence and a non-existence, do not see the truth in accordance
with the teaching of the Buddha. <183>
7
In the Instruction of Kātyāyana, the Exalted One, who knows
existence and non-existence, has rejected both statements: “It
exists” and “It does not exist.”
 196 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

8
If existence exists by nature, then there is no non-existence of the
(thing in question). For a being-different of the nature (prakṛti =
svabhāva) can never come about.
9
If there is no nature, of what should the being-different then
come about? And if there is a nature, how then is a being-
different possible?
10
“It exists,” from this results the belief in eternality. “It does
not exist,” from this results the view of annihilation. A judicious
person should, therefore, affirm neither existence nor non-
existence.
11
Because what exists by its intrinsic nature cannot not exist;
consequently it is eternal. If on the other hand one says: “It
does not exist now, but existed previously,” annihilation follows
from this.

CDA.3.3. Chapter XVIII: Examination of the self (ātmaparīkṣā)

I now present a few more chapters in which, along with the
refutation of various concepts, other important topics come up
for discussion. The first of these is the eighteenth chapter, which
is devoted to the refutation of the concept of ātman and which
also contains valuable statements about the proclamation of
the Buddha and the true doctrine. The reasoning begins [v. 1]
in Nāgārjuna’s customary manner. There cannot be an ātman,
a self, because it can neither be identical with the groups
(skandha) nor <184> different from them.
But [v. 2] if there is no self, then there is also no mine, and
with this, the fateful belief in an ‘I’ and in a ‘mine’—the
principal cause for entanglement in the cycle of existences—is
invalidated.
 Nāgārjuna 197

Nāgārjuna quickly interjects [v. 3] that of course one must

also not believe in a person freed from a belief in an ‘I’ and in
a ‘mine.’
He then continues [vv. 4–5]: With the vanishing of the belief,
the defilements and deeds are abolished, birth no longer
comes about, and liberation takes place. This corresponds, as
far as the establishment of liberation is concerned, with the old
Śrāvakayāna doctrine. He [v. 5] now connects this with his own
view. The belief in an ‘I’ and in a ‘mine’ rests on conceptions.
The conceptions themselves rest on the deceptive diversity of
the phenomenal world (prapañca). The latter is abolished
through the knowledge of its emptiness. Thus the doctrine of
the emptiness of all things is the final cause of liberation. We
will encounter the same line of thinking—as hinted at here—in
more detail in the first chapter of the Ratnāvalī (Garland of
Jewels), to be rendered later [S. 208ff.]. This concludes the actual
line of reasoning within the eighteenth chapter.
Next [v. 6], Nāgārjuna makes a few comments on the
proclamation of the Buddha. The Buddha speaks in various
ways, here of a self, there that there is no self, there again that
a self neither exists nor does not exist. The statements are
intended for different hearers who, according to their power of
comprehension and the stage that they have attained, are to
be gradually led to true cognition of the nature of the self.
This true nature itself [v. 7] is, however, not expressible since
the actual nature of things, no different from nirvāṇa, lies
beyond the sphere of human cognition and can therefore also
not be captured in words.
Nāgārjuna then [v. 8] repeats the same thoughts in a general
form. With respect to the things of the phenomenal world,
the proclamation of the Buddha includes all four statements,
affirmation, negation, affirmation and negation, and neither
affirmation nor negation, and these are matched with the mental
capacity of the hearers.
198 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

The true nature of things is [v. 9], however, free from the
diversity that <185> characterizes the phenomenal world, and
is therefore unimaginable and cannot be communicated.
Then [v. 10] he summarizes the cognition of the nature of
the phenomenal world briefly once again in the only form in
which it can be expressed and in which it was already expressed
in the introductory verse of the entire work, that is, in the form
that presents the true teaching of the Buddha.
Then [v. 12] he concludes with the comment that this eternal
doctrine—even during times when no Buddha appears and
the tradition is extinct among the disciples—survives among
the Pratyekabuddhas, who have found enlightenment for them-
selves alone.

Chapter XVIII:
[Examination of the self]
1
If the self is the same as the groups, then it is subject to arising
and fading away. If it is distinct from the groups, then it does
not have the characteristics of the groups.
2
If there is no self, whence should there be a mine? As a result
of invalidation of self and mine one is freed from the belief in a
‘mine’ and the belief in an ‘I’.
3
There is, however, no one present who is free from the belief
in a ‘mine’ and the belief in an ‘I’. Whoever believes that they
see someone who is free from the belief in a ‘mine’ and an ‘I’,
sees falsely.
4
If the ideas of ‘mine’ and ‘I’ have vanished outwardly and
inwardly, then grasping is abolished, and with its disappear-
ance, birth disappears. <186>
 Nāgārjuna 199

5
Through the disappearance of deeds and of defilements,
liberation occurs. Deeds and defilements originate from concep-
tions. These [originate] from diversity. But diversity is abolished
through emptiness.
6
That there is an ‘I’ has been proclaimed. That there is no ‘I’ has
been taught. That there is neither an ‘I’ nor not an ‘I’ has been
taught by the Buddha.
7
Where the sphere of cognition ends, the nameable also ends. For
the nature of the factors (dharmatā) is, like nirvāṇa, without
arising and without annihilation.
8
That everything is true, not true, both true and not true, and
neither true nor not true, that is the teaching of the Buddha.
9
Not to be recognized through extraneous help, peaceful, not
diversified through diversity, unimaginable, and without mani-
foldness, that is the characteristic of reality (tattva).
10
What arises dependent on another is not the same as the other
and is also not distinct from it. Thus it is not annihilated, but it
is also not eternal.
11
No unity and no multiplicity, without annihilation and also
not eternal, that is the nectar of the teaching of the protector of
the world, the Buddha. <187>
12
If no Buddhas appear and the disciples have vanished, then
the cognition of the Pratyekabuddhas appears of its own
accord.
 200 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CDA.3.4. Chapter XXIV: Examination of the noble truths

(āryasatyaparīkṣā)
The following chapter contains Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the
twofold truth. It begins [v. 1] with an attack by the opponent
who raises the objection that the assertion of the emptiness
of all things undermines the foundation of the Buddhist
doctrine. This opponent says: If there is no arising and fading
away, then the four noble truths, that is, suffering, the origin
of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path leading
to the cessation of suffering, cannot exist. Of these four truths
[v. 2], suffering should be recognized, its origin should be
avoided, its cessation realized, and the path leading to it
practiced. All this is not possible if the four noble truths do not
exist. With this [v. 3], the fourfold reward promised to the
disciple also fails to appear, namely that he enters the stream
leading to liberation (srotaāpanna), that he returns only once
more to the cycle of existences (sakṛdāgāmin), that he no longer
returns (anāgāmin), and that he becomes a perfect saint (arhan).
As a result of that, however, there are also no disciples who are
striving for this reward or who have already attained it. And if
there are no such disciples [v. 4], then there is no Community.
In addition, without the four noble truths, there is no Doctrine.
And without a Community and a Doctrine [v. 5], there is no
Buddha. With this, the threefold foundation on which Buddhism
rests is destroyed.
Nāgārjuna answers [v. 7] that all this is based only on a
misunderstanding on the part of the opponent who understands
the doctrine of emptiness wrongly. Two types of truths [v. 8]
must be distinguished, the restricted truth and the real truth.
The path of liberation [v. 10] belongs to the sphere of the
restricted truth and has its validity therein. This provides the
occasion to point out [v. 11] the dangers that are entailed by a
wrong understanding of the doctrine, and that thus also made
the Buddha at first hesitant about the proclamation of his
 Nāgārjuna 201

doctrine. Next Nāgārjuna himself goes on the offensive [v. 13].

All of the opponent’s objections <188> are actually turned
back on him. Only if entities are empty, i.e., without an intrinsic
nature, is an arising and ceasing and, with it, everything
else possible [v. 14]. An intrinsic nature, on the other hand
[v. 15], can neither arise nor cease. Emptiness and dependent
origination are thus one and the same and are mutually
dependent [v. 18]. Nāgārjuna then shows [vv. 20–39] in detail
that everything set forth by the opponent, beginning with the
four noble truths, is possible only because of emptiness. After
what has been said already, these discussions are easily
understandable and do not require any further explanation.
Finally [v. 40], he concludes with the statement that only a
correct understanding of dependent origination makes the
understanding of the noble truths possible.

Chapter XXIV:
[Examination of the noble truths]
1
(Opponent): If all this is empty and there is no arising and
passing away, then the non-existence of the four noble truths
would ensue for you.
2
Due to the non-existence of the four noble truths, recognizing,
avoiding, practicing, and realizing are not possible.
3
Since this does not exist, the fourfold reward of the noble ones
does not exist. And if the reward is absent, then there are no
abiders in the reward and no strivers toward it.
4
If these eight kinds of persons do not exist, then there is no
Community. And resulting from the absence of the noble truths,
the noble Doctrine does also not exist. <189>
202 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

5
But if there is no Doctrine and no Community, then how shall
there be a Buddha? Therefore, if you assert emptiness, you deny
the three jewels (the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Community).
6
And you make impossible the presence of the reward, of right
and wrong, and, in general, everything that people do and do
not do.
7
(Answer:) To this we say: You do not know the purpose of
emptiness, emptiness, and the meaning of emptiness. Therefore
you object.
8
The doctrinal proclamation of the Buddha is based on two
truths: on the restricted truth of ordinary life and on the real truth.
9
A person who does not understand the difference between
these two truths does not understand the profound truth (tattva)
in the teaching of the Buddha.
10
If one does not base oneself on ordinary understanding
(vyavahāra), the real cannot be taught. And if one does not
apprehend the real, then nirvāṇa cannot be attained.
11
Wrongly understood, emptiness brings the fool to ruin, like a
snake unskillfully seized or a wrongly cast spell. <190>
12
Thus also the sage (the Buddha) shied away in his mind from
proclaiming the doctrine because he considered how difficult
this doctrine is for the foolish to understand.
13
Further, as for the criticisms you raise against emptiness, the
faults that ensue do not apply to us and they also do not appear
with respect to that which is empty.
 Nāgārjuna 203

14
For one who accepts emptiness, everything proves to be possible
for him. For one who does not accept emptiness, nothing proves
to be possible for him.
15
By transferring your own faults onto us, you are like someone
who, while sitting on a horse, has forgotten the horse.1
16
If you are of the opinion that things exist by their intrinsic
nature, then you view the things as being without causes and
without conditions;
17
you deny effect and cause; agent, action, and deed; arising,
ceasing, and reward.
18
It is dependent origination that we designate as emptiness.
[Emptiness] is a mere designation dependent on some founda-
tion (upādāya prajñapti) and it is the middle way. <191>
19
Because there is no factor that is not dependently arisen, there is
also no factor that is not empty.
20
If all of this is not empty and there is no arising and ceasing, then
the non-existence of the four noble truths results for you.

1
[“Here is the idea behind this image, a standard trope in classical Indian
rhetoric: A man with a herd of horses thinks that he is missing one and
accuses you of having stolen it. As he rides around and counts his horses,
he always comes up one short. But you point out to him that the one he is
accusing you of stealing is in fact the very one he is riding but has forgot-
ten to count.” The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Translation and commentary by Jay L. Garfield;
Oxford University Press, 1995.]
204 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

21
How can there be suffering that is not dependently arisen? For
suffering is what one calls the impermanent. But in the presence
of an intrinsic nature, [the impermanent] does not exist.
22
Further, how should something arise that is present by its
intrinsic nature? Thus for the person who denies emptiness,
there is also no origin (of suffering).
23
There is no cessation of suffering if it exists by its intrinsic
nature. Therefore, if you assert the intrinsic nature, you make
cessation (of suffering) impossible.
24
If there is an intrinsic nature of the path, then it is not possible to
practice it. But if the path is practiced, then for you there can be
no intrinsic nature.
25
If there is no suffering, no origin, and no cessation, to what
cessation of suffering should the path lead? <192>
26
If (suffering) is not recognized in its intrinsic nature, how can
it then later be recognized? Or does intrinsic nature perhaps
not remain?
27
In the same way as recognition, however, avoidance, realization,
and practice are also not possible, and likewise the fourfold
reward of the noble one.
28
After all, how is it possible for the person who assumes an
intrinsic nature to later attain a reward that by its intrinsic nature
is not attained.
 Nāgārjuna 205

29
But if there is no reward, then there are no abiders in the reward
and no strivers toward it. If these eight kinds of persons do not
exist, then there is no Community.
30
And due to the absence of the noble truths, the noble Doctrine
does also not exist. But if there is no Doctrine and no
Community, then how shall there then be a Buddha?
31
Further, it follows for you that the Buddha is independent of
enlightenment, and it follows for you that enlightenment is
independent of the Buddha.
32
For you, no one who is not enlightened by nature will attain
enlightenment on the path of the Bodhisattva, <193> even if he
strives for enlightenment.
33
Further, no one will ever do right or wrong. For how shall one
act on something non-empty? After all, an intrinsic nature
cannot be created.
34
In addition, for you there is a reward even without right and
wrong, and for you there is no reward that is induced by right
and wrong.
35
Or, if there is a reward for you that is induced by right and
wrong, then how is the reward that is arisen from right and
wrong not empty?
36
Further, you make everything that people do and do not
do impossible, if you deny the emptiness of dependent origi-
nation.
 206 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

37
For the person who denies emptiness, there is nothing to do,
there is action even without it having begun, and there is an
agent even without him doing anything.
38
In the presence of an intrinsic nature, the world would have to
be not arisen and not ceased, unmoved (kūṭastha) and free from
all varying states. <194>
39
If (everything) is not empty, then there is no acquisition of the
non-attained, no putting an end to suffering, and no abandon-
ment of all defilements.
40
Whoever sees dependent origination (correctly), sees suffering,
the origin, the cessation, and the path.

CDA.3.5. Chapter XXV: Examination of nirvāṇa (nirvāṇaparīkṣā)

Lastly, I will present the twenty-fifth chapter, which deals
with nirvāṇa, that is, with the highest reality. Similar to the
previous chapter, it begins [v. 1] with the objection that if
all entities are empty there is nothing through the cessation of
which one attains nirvāṇa. Nāgārjuna responds [v. 2] again that
this difficulty arises precisely in the instance that things are
not empty because precisely then a becoming and ceasing is
not possible. He [v. 3] then proceeds to determine the nature
of nirvāṇa.
After provisionally establishing what tradition says about
nirvāṇa, namely that it can neither be given up nor attained,
is neither impermanent nor permanent, and neither arises nor
ceases, he begins [v. 4] to investigate whether it is to be viewed
as existence, non-existence, both as existence and non-existence,
or as neither existence nor non-existence. The examination leads
to the result that none of the four possibilities applies. As
existence, nirvāṇa would be subject to old age and death, it
 Nāgārjuna 207

would arise from causes, and it would not be independent,

which contradicts tradition.
Nirvāṇa [v. 7] cannot be considered as non-existence because
non-existence presupposes existence, and because in that case it
would likewise not be independent.
Here, Nāgārjuna interjects [v. 9] the important comment that
nirvāṇa is simply the other aspect of the phenomenal world, in
which conditionality and dependency have been abolished.
Then he adds [v. 10] that nirvāṇa can neither be existence
nor non-existence because the Buddha taught that there is no
becoming and ceasing in nirvāṇa.
In similar fashion [v. 11], the refutation of the views that
nirvāṇa is both existence and non-existence and neither existence
nor non-existence follows. In the first case, liberation would
be, at one and the same time, existence and non-existence; <195>
nirvāṇa would not be independent [v. 12]; would arise from
causes [v. 13]; and finally [v. 14], two opposites such as existence
and non-existence cannot come together to form a unity.
Nirvāṇa [v. 15], however, cannot be considered neither as
existence nor as non-existence, if neither an existence nor a non-
existence that can be negated has been established. So [v. 16]
by what means shall a nirvāṇa that is neither existence nor
non-existence be established? Nāgārjuna then refers [v. 17] to
the proclamation of the Buddha in confirmation of his asser-
tion. In the texts of the old canon, it is already stated (cf. above
S. 19ff.) that it cannot be said of the Liberated One that he exists,
that he does not exist, that he at one and the same time exists
and does not exist, or that he neither exists nor does not exist,
and that, indeed [v. 18], these statements do not even apply
when he is still alive. This is thus established.
Next follows [vv. 19–20] the decisive statement about the
relationship of nirvāṇa to the phenomenal world: Both are one
and the same. Not the least difference exists between them.
208 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Nāgārjuna then [v. 21] quickly rejects the other heretical

doctrines that are dismissed in the canon, along with the views
about the existence and non-existence of the Liberated One. That
the world is limited or unlimited, permanent or impermanent,
all these views are wrong and meaningless given that all things
are empty, that is, unreal.
And now one last question [v. 22]: Of what does liberation
consist if there is no nirvāṇa that can be attained, but rather
nirvāṇa and the cycle of existences are one? Nāgārjuna answers
[v. 24]: In the mere vanishing of all perceptions and in the
ending of the deceptive diversity of the phenomenal world,
since the Buddha’s path of liberation is also not real. In reality,
a doctrine has never been proclaimed by the Buddha.

Chapter XXV:
[Examination of nirvāṇa]
1
(Opponent:) If all this is empty and there is no arising and
ceasing, then, in your opinion, through the abandonment or
annihilation of what, does nirvāṇa result? <196>
2
(Answer:) If all this is not empty and there is no arising and
ceasing, then, in your opinion, through the abandonment or
annihilation of what does nirvāṇa result?
3
Not abandoned and not attained, not interrupted and not
eternal, not annihilated and not arisen—this is called nirvāṇa.
4
Nirvāṇa is, first of all, no existence, because it would follow from
this that it bears the characteristics of old age and death. For
there is no existence without old age and death.
 Nāgārjuna 209

5
If nirvāṇa were an existence, then nirvāṇa would be something
conditioned (saṃskṛta). For nowhere is there an existence that is
not conditioned.
6
If nirvāṇa were an existence, then how would nirvāṇa be
independent? For there is no existence that is independent.
7
If nirvāṇa is not an existence, then how could it be a non-
existence? For where there is no existence, there also is no
non-existence.
8
If nirvāṇa were a non-existence, then how would nirvāṇa be
independent? For there is no non-existence that exists independ-
ently. <197>
9
Conditioned and dependent coming and going (in the cycle of
existences) is, insofar as it is unconditioned and independent,
designated as nirvāṇa.
10
For the master (the Buddha) has called it the abandonment of
becoming and ceasing. From this it results that nirvāṇa is neither an
existence nor a non-existence.
11
If nirvāṇa were both existence and non-existence, then liberation
would be existence and non-existence. And this is not possible.
12
If nirvāṇa were both existence and non-existence, then nirvāṇa
would not be independent. For those are both dependent.
13
How could nirvāṇa be both existence and non-existence? For
nirvāṇa is not conditioned, and existence and non-existence are
conditioned.
210 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

14
How could nirvāṇa be both existence and non-existence? For the
two cannot be united in one place, like light and darkness.
15
The assumption that nirvāṇa is neither an existence nor a non-
existence is possible if an existence and non-existence is estab-
lished. <198>
16
If there is a nirvāṇa that is neither existence nor non-existence,
then by what means does one recognize that it is neither exis-
tence nor non-existence?
17
It cannot be recognized that the Exalted One exists after death, it
cannot be recognized that he does not exist, that both are the
case, and that neither of the two is the case.
18
Even when he is still alive, it cannot be recognized that the
Exalted One exists, and it cannot be recognized that he does
not exist, that both are the case, and that neither of the two is
the case.
19
The cycle of existences is not different from nirvāṇa and nirvāṇa
is not different from the cycle of existences.
20
The limit of nirvāṇa is also the limit of the cycle of existences.
Not the slightest thing exists that separates the two from
each other.
21
The views about (the state) after death, the limit (of the world),
etc., and about its eternity, etc., are based on a nirvāṇa, a begin-
ning and an end.
 Nāgārjuna 211

22
If, however, all factors are empty, what is then limited, what is
unlimited, what is both limited and unlimited, and what is
neither limited nor unlimited? <199>
23
What is the same and what is different, what is eternal and what
is not eternal, what is both eternal and not eternal, and what is
neither of these two?
24
All perception ceases, the diversity is appeased, and peace
prevails. Nowhere has the Buddha proclaimed any doctrine to
anyone.

CDA.4. Introduction to sections of the Vigrahavyāvartanī

I now follow with two brief samples from two of Nāgārjuna’s
other works. His inexorable logic, which stops at nothing and
proves everything to be without intrinsic nature, has brought
on the criticism that he thereby cuts away the ground beneath
his own feet. After all, if everything is empty and without
intrinsic nature, then the proofs that he brings forward are also
empty and therefore prove nothing. Nāgārjuna opposes these
criticisms in a separate work, the Vigrahavyāvartanī (Averting of
Quarrels). It is one of his best works and shows him at his most
idiosyncratic, in particular in his unwavering logical consistency.
It consists of a verse-text with Nāgārjuna’s own commentary
and is divided into two parts, the first of which comprises
the attacks of the opponent, the second their refutation. The
following samples are taken only from the second part. There
was no need to render the corresponding sections of the first
part since, for every new point to which he turns, Nāgārjuna
briefly reviews the opponent’s objection. His fundamental
attitude toward the questions raised can be drawn from these
samples. All his lines of argument, so he says, conform only to
the world of illusion and serve to refute it alone. They do not
212 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

comprise any positive assertions of his own. All of the

opponent’s attacks are therefore invalidated because they could
only apply to such assertions.
The first objection [v. 1] of the opponent says that given
the absence of an intrinsic nature for all things, Nāgārjuna’s line
of arguments is also without intrinsic nature, and therefore
proves nothing.
Nāgārjuna replies [v. 21] that the absence of intrinsic nature
in his words only <200> confirms the absence of intrinsic
nature for all things. Then he accuses his opponent of not
correctly understanding the doctrine of the emptiness of things.
Emptiness is identical in nature with dependent origination
[v. 22]. Only through the emptiness of all things are dependent
origination, whatever we do and do not do, and thus any line
of argument at all possible. And as the entities of the phenome-
nal world, in spite of their emptiness, are able to bring forth
their various effects within the phenomenal world, so his line
of argument, in spite of its emptiness, is also effective. He
elucidates this [v. 23] through comparing it to a man created
by means of a magical illusion. who stops the action of a second
man likewise created through a magical illusion.
The opponent’s next objection [v. 4] anticipates a [pos-
sible] reply by Nāgārjuna, for to the [opponent’s] objection
that [Nāgārjuna’s] refutation of the intrinsic nature of all
things is empty and therefore not conclusive, Nāgārjuna might
answer that the same applies to the refutation of this refu-
tation through the opponent, [i.e., it is empty and therefore
not conclusive]. According to the opponent, however, this is
not correct, since the assertion that all entities are empty is
exclusively Nāgārjuna’s statement, and hence only abolishes
his refutation but not the refutation of the opponent, who does
not admit this thesis.
Nāgārjuna replies [v. 29] that he does not put forward any
positive thesis at all, including the thesis that all things are
 Nāgārjuna 213

empty. No statement can therefore be regarded as his thesis.

And neither can the faults arising therefrom apply to him.

CDA.5. From the “Averting of Quarrels” (Vigrahavyāvartanī)

You have said at first:

[v. 1]
If, for all entities everywhere, there is no intrinsic
nature, then your own words [vacana] are without
intrinsic nature and not capable of refuting an intrinsic
nature.

To this we reply: <201>

v. 21
If my words are not present in either the causes,
conditions, and their totality, nor in a separate state,
then the emptiness of things is indeed established
precisely because of its being without intrinsic nature.

If my words are not present in the causes, that is, in the great
elements, whether associated or dissociated; if they are not
present in the conditions, that is, in the chest, the throat,
lips, tongue, teeth, palate, nose, skull, and so forth, and in
the exertions (prayatna); if they are not present in the totality
of these two; and if they are also not present separately, that
is, distinct from the causes, conditions, and their totality, then
they are without intrinsic nature and due to their being without
intrinsic nature, empty. The emptiness of my words is thus
established by reason of their being without intrinsic nature. But
just as my words are empty by reason of their being without
intrinsic nature, so are all things empty by reason of their being
without intrinsic nature. If you therefore have said: By reason
214 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

of the emptiness of your words, the emptiness of all things does

not apply, then this is not correct. Further:

v. 22
To wit, the dependent origination of things is called
emptiness, for a thing that arises dependently is
without intrinsic nature.

Without understanding the emptiness of things and without

knowing the meaning of emptiness, you have undertaken
to present a criticism, (by saying): “By reason of the emptiness
of your words, your words are without intrinsic nature. But
a refutation [pratiṣedha] of the intrinsic nature of things is
not possible with your natureless words.” The dependent
origination of things is in fact their emptiness. How so? By
reason of their being without intrinsic nature. Things that
are dependently originated <202> are without an intrinsic
nature because they lack an intrinsic nature. How so? Because
they are dependent on causes and conditions. If entities were to
exist by their intrinsic nature, then they also would exist
regardless of causes and conditions. But this is not the case.
Therefore they are without intrinsic nature. And since they are
without intrinsic nature, they are called empty. Thus it is
established that my words also are without intrinsic nature,
because they are dependently originated, and because they are
without intrinsic nature, that they are empty. But just as a
cart, pots, clothes, etc., although they are dependently origi-
nated and therefore empty of an intrinsic nature, nevertheless
exert their different effects—that is, hauling wood, [grass,] and
earth; holding honey, water, and milk; protecting against
cold, wind, and heat, etc.—likewise these words of mine,
although they are dependently originated and are therefore
without intrinsic nature, nevertheless prove the lack of intrinsic
nature of things. Thus, if you have said: Your words are by
 Nāgārjuna 215

reason of their being without intrinsic nature empty, and by

reason of their emptiness it is not possible to refute the intrinsic
nature of all things by means of them, then this is not correct.
Further:

v. 23
Just as a person created through miraculous power
(nirmitaka) fends off [pratiṣedhayeta] a person cre-
ated through miraculous power, or as a magical
person [māyāpuruṣa] fends off a person brought
forth through his own magic, so it is with this refu-
tation.

Just as a person created through miraculous power fends off

another person created through miraculous power who comes
along for a particular purpose, or as a magical person brought
forth by a magician fends off another magical person [brought
forth through his own magic] who comes along for a particular
purpose—in all this, the person created through miraculous
power <203> who is fended off is empty, and the person who
fends him off is likewise empty; the magical person who is
fended off is empty, and the person who fends him off is like-
wise empty—just so it is possible to refute the intrinsic nature
of all things by means of my empty words. Thus if you have
said: By reason of the emptiness of your words, the refutation of
the intrinsic nature of all things is not possible, then this is not
correct.
...
You have also said:

[v. 4]
“One [i.e., Nāgārjuna] might think that the same
holds true for the refutation of [his] refutation. That
is not correct. In this way, based on the characteristic
 216 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

of the thesis, [your] objection applies to you but not

to me.” 1

To this we say:

v. 29
If I were to advocate any kind of thesis, then this fault
would result from it for me. But I do not advocate any
thesis. Therefore no fault applies to me.

If I were to advocate any kind of thesis, then the characteristic of

that thesis could apply to me, and the fault arising from it
would, as you have said, result for me. But I advocate no thesis.
How, if all entities are empty, completely appeased, and apart by
nature, can there be a thesis? How could the characteristic of the
thesis apply to it? And how could the fault produced by the
applicability <204> of the characteristic of the thesis ensue? Thus
if you have said: The fault applies only to you because (for you)
the characteristic of the thesis applies, then this is not correct.

CDA.6. Introduction to the sections of the Ratnāvalī

Lastly, I present a sample from a more easily understandable
work of Nāgārjuna. As we have already mentioned, tradition
informs us that Nāgārjuna was friends with a king from the
South-Indian ruling house of the Śātavāhana. And in fact,
among the works attributed to him we find two that constitute
admonitory letters to a king, composed in verse, the Suhṛllekhaḥ
(Letter to a Friend) and the Ratnāvalī (Garland of Jewels). The
following text sample is taken from the much more extensive
and more important of the two works, the Ratnāvalī.

1
Since the statement, that all things are empty, is, by definition, considered
to be your [i.e., Nāgārjuna’s] assertion.
 Nāgārjuna 217

The Ratnāvalī is not a systematic presentation of Nāgārjuna’s

doctrines. It proceeds from one topic to another without strict
organization of the subject matter, and in it, moral admonitions
in particular are given much attention. But also interspersed are
purely philosophical sections, which are highly significant
in terms of content and which form a valuable complement to
the portrayal of his other works. It is one such section from
the first chapter of the work that I render in the following.
To begin a few introductory words [vv. 1–3] are offered. Then
[v. 4] a twofold goal of the doctrine is established: well-being
through piety; and liberation. The means for this are faith and
insight [v. 5].
First [vv. 6–24], the ethical life of the believer, which brings
him happiness and well-being, is described.
The presentation then moves on to the doctrine that leads
to liberation, and with this the philosophical part of the chapter
begins. The opening consists of the observation (v. 25) that the
fool experiences fear if he hears that a self and a mine neither
exist nor will exist. And indeed [v. 27], the belief in an ‘I’ and
in a ‘mine’ is the principal cause of entanglement in the cycle
of existences. This is explained in more detail, for it is this
very belief that leads to the accomplishment of deeds and to
rebirth. On the other hand [v. 29], the belief itself <205> in turn
rests on the external world that one thinks one perceives, in
other words, on the five groups. For just as [v. 31], based on a
mirror, one believes that one sees one’s reflection—which is,
however, nothing real—in the same way, based on the groups,
one believes in a self. In this way [v. 35] the cycle in which
continuous rebirth occurs in mutual dependence, is closed.
Liberation takes place [v. 37] through recognition of the un-
reality of dependent origination, because with this the belief in
an ‘I’ vanishes, and deeds and birth come to an end. The
unreality of dependent origination and thus of the external
world results, however, from the fact that an arising of things
218 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

either from itself, or from something other, or from both is

not possible. This indicates the basic reasoning with which
Nāgārjuna introduces his principal work (see above S. 176ff.).
At the same time [v. 38], he takes this opportunity to point
out that unreality is not non-existence but signifies neither-
existence-nor-non-existence. Then he returns [v. 39] to his initial
remark that upon hearing the true doctrine, the fool experiences
fear. That [v. 40] a self and the groups do not exist for the
liberated one has already been acknowledged. Why then, he
asks, should one experience fear in the face of the fact that they
are also not really present in this world?
Next comes a new line of thinking (v. 42) in which the most
peculiar feature of this doctrine of liberation is discussed, i.e.,
that it teaches neither an existence nor a non-existence. It was
already indicated in the preceding verses that the unreality of
the external world does not signify a non-existence. Likewise,
nirvāṇa is to be considered as neither existence nor non-
existence. The true doctrine steers clear of these opposites.
Nāgārjuna now briefly points out the moral significance of the
different views. The doctrine of non-existence [v. 43] denies the
reality of good and bad deeds and leads to punishment in an
unfavorable rebirth. The doctrine of existence [v. 44] admits the
effectiveness of the deeds and leads to reward in a favorable
rebirth. The doctrine of neither-existence-nor-non-existence, on
the other hand [v. 45], avoids both and leads to liberation.
Then follows a more thorough discussion of the question of
how the phenomenal world is <206> to be regarded neither as
existent nor as non-existent. Since [v. 46] it arises from causes, its
non-existence cannot be asserted. And since, along with the
causes, it ceases, its existence cannot be asserted. At the same
time [v. 47], the arising from causes is not real because the cause
cannot be a cause, whether it exists prior to the effect or
simultaneous with it. Its prior existence contradicts the relativity
of the opposed concepts, while its simultaneity makes a bringing
 Nāgārjuna 219

forth impossible. The old sutras [v. 48] had expressed dependent
origination in the words: “When this exists, that comes to be;
due to the arising of this, that arises” (cf. above S. 39). Nāgārjuna
relates the first phrase to the relativity of the opposed concepts:
something short can only exist relative to something long. The
second phrase he relates to the arising of one thing from
something other, just as light arises due to a lamp. In the first
case, however, the long is also not possible without something
short because the two mutually condition each other. And
therefore, the cause cannot exist prior to the effect because the
concept of the cause also presupposes the effect (cf. above
S. 176f.). On the other hand, no light can arise as long as the
lamp is not there. Thus the simultaneity of cause and effect is
also impossible. Finally [v. 50], however, in the phenomenal
world as it appears to us, an arising is indeed present, and if
one takes this into consideration, then one will not believe
in non-existence. And [v. 51] as the arisen things within
this phenomenal world cease again, one will also not believe
in existence.
Following this (v. 52), Nāgārjuna uses an example to elucidate
how neither existence nor non-existence applies with respect
to the phenomenal world. The phenomenal world resembles a
mirage that appears to be water. Whereas something real is seen
more accurately on closer inspection, the water of the mirage
cannot be perceived from close up. Likewise [v. 53], on closer
inspection, the phenomenal world proves to be different than
it appears on first sight. Both [i.e., the water of the mirage and
the phenomenal world] [v. 54] are therefore an illusion and
unreal. But [v. 55] just as in the case of the mirage, although
there is no water there, one cannot speak of non-existence since
the deception of the mirage as <207> such is present, so likewise
[v. 56] in the case of the phenomenal world, one can no more
speak of non-existence than of existence. It is noted in passing
(v. 58) that from the denial of existence and non-existence one
220 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

should not deduce any type of negativism, since, if from the

denial of existence one were to derive a belief in non-existence,
one would likewise have to infer a belief in existence from the
denial of non-existence. Nāgārjuna then concludes [v. 62] this
section with the remark that this doctrine, which goes beyond
existence and non-existence and which alone leads to liberation,
belongs exclusively to the proclamation of the Buddha.
Next comes another new line of thinking (v. 63). Nāgārjuna
now offers new proofs of the unreality of the phenomenal world.
With respect to entities, the old Buddhism distinguishes three
characteristics (lakṣaṇa) or stages of time: arising, abiding, and
ceasing. These correspond to birth, old age, and death, and thus
abiding is also defined as becoming-different during abiding.
Nāgārjuna now asserts that these three stages of time are not
real, and that the phenomenal world also, because it lies outside
of the three stages of time, cannot be real and is, therefore, [v. 64]
identical in nature with nirvāṇa.
He proves this in the following way [v. 65]. Arising and
ceasing cannot be real because there is no abiding. However
[v. 66], abiding is excluded due to the momentariness of things
(cf. above S. 102f.), since all things are subject to continuous
change, because only in this way is the presupposed becoming-
different during abiding possible. On the other hand [v. 67],
however, momentary things also cannot be real, since they cease
either completely or partially in every moment. In the case of
a partial ceasing the contradiction arises that the same thing
ceases and does not cease at the same time. A complete ceasing,
on the other hand, cannot be observed. In addition [v. 68], in the
case of a complete ceasing there is no aging, just as in the case
of an unchanging abiding. Finally though [v. 69], the concept
of the moment itself presents difficulties as well, because the
ceasing of a moment presupposes a preceding arising and
abiding. In that case <208> the moment would split into three
parts and would no longer be a moment. And [v. 70] what is
 Nāgārjuna 221

more, the same deductions could be drawn for each of its parts.
In addition, beginning, middle, and end are relative concepts
and, as such, impossible. Further [v. 71], due to the multitude of
its parts, the moment would not be a unity. On the other hand,
nothing partless exists. Unity and multitude are themselves
again relative concepts, just like existence and non-existence. This
last remark allows Nāgārjuna to make the statement [v. 72]
that non-existence is possible only through the destruction of
an existence or in opposition to it. Existence and non-existence
are therefore relative concepts as well and thus not real.
Consequently [v. 73], also with respect to liberation, no real
destruction of worldly existence takes place. It is thus with good
reason and complete justification that the Buddha responded
only with silence to the question of whether the world has
an end, since this question proceeds from completely false
assumptions. With that, this discussion is finished and the
chapter concludes [v. 74] with a few general remarks about the
significance of this doctrine and about the danger of a false
understanding by fools.

CDA.7. From the “Garland of Jewels” (Ratnāvalī)

Chapter I
1
After I have paid homage to the sole friend of all beings (= the
Buddha), who is freed from all faults, adorned with all virtues,
omniscient,
2
so that your merit may increase I will present to you, O king,
the exclusively good doctrine, for the doctrine bears fruit in a
worthy recipient of the good doctrine. <209>
3
Where merit first flourishes, later, the highest good comes about,
for if flourishing has been attained, then one later arrives at the
highest good.
222 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

4
Well-being is considered as flourishing, liberation as the highest
good. The means for this are, briefly summarized, faith and
insight.
5
Through faith one obtains merit, through insight one cognizes in
accordance with truth. Insight is, however, the more important
of the two, although faith precedes it.

Next follows a brief description of the virtuous life that

should be lead based on faith. Then the text continues:

25
Of the doctrine that leads to the highest good and that is
subtle and profound to see, the Victorious Ones (= the Buddhas)
have said that it causes trembling in the fools who are unable to
hear it.
26
The thought: “I do not exist and will not exist, nothing is mine
and nothing will be mine,” means fear for the fool, the vanishing
of fear for the wise.
27
He who proclaims exclusively that which is wholesome for
the creatures has said that the creatures are brought about
through the belief in an ‘I’ and are accompanied by belief in
a ‘mine.’ <210>
28
“There is an ‘I’, there is a ‘mine’ “; this is erroneous from the
point of view of the highest truth, since, in terms of true
knowledge, both do not exist.
29
From the belief in an ‘I’ the groups arise. This belief in an ‘I’ is,
in truth, false. But how can something, the seed of which is
false, truly rise up?
 Nāgārjuna 223

30
If one has seen that the groups are untrue, the belief in an ‘I’
vanishes. But if the belief in an ‘I’ vanishes, then the groups no
longer come about.
31
Just as, based on a mirror, the reflection of one’s own face is
seen, and like this [reflection] is, in fact, nothing,
32
so, based on the groups, the belief in an ‘I’ is observed, but it
is, in fact, nothing, exactly as with the reflection of one’s own
face.
33
And just as without the help of the mirror, the reflection of one’s
own face is not seen, so without the help of the groups,
(the conception) of an ‘I’ is not observed.
34
After the noble Ānanda had attained the eye of the doctrine
through hearing this fact, he himself repeatedly proclaimed
this fact to the monks. <211>
35
As long as the belief in the groups exists, so long also does
(the conception) ‘I’ exist. But if the belief in an ‘I’ exists, deeds
and birth again arise from it.
36
This wheel of the cycle of existences, consisting of three
sections, having no beginning, no end, and no middle, circles
by mutually causing itself, like a firebrand whirled around in a
circle.
37
Since it (= the dependent becoming of the cycle of existences)
cannot come about from itself, from something other, and from
both, and this in all three time periods, the belief in an ‘I’
becomes invalid and thereby deeds and birth also.
224 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

38
In that one views the arising of causes and effects and likewise
their fading away in this way, one recognizes that the world, in
reality, neither exists nor does not exist.
39
If somebody who is thoughtless hears this doctrine, which leads
to the vanishing of all suffering, then he trembles in his
ignorance, being afraid of the state of fearlessness.
40
That this will all not exist in nirvāṇa, does not frighten you. Why
then does it cause you fear if one says that it does not exist here?
41
In the case of liberation there is no ‘I’ and no groups. If such
a liberation is welcome to you, why then is an elimination of
the ‘I’ or of the groups undesired by you? <212>
42
Nirvāṇa is, however, also not a non-existence, much less an
existence. The vanishing of the conceptions of existence and
non-existence is called nirvāṇa.
43
The view of non-existence says, in brief, that there is no reward
for deeds. [This view] is non-meritorious and leads along a
bad path (to an unfavorable rebirth), and is designated as a
false view.
44
The view of existence says, in brief, that there is a reward
for deeds. [This view] is meritorious and entails the good path
(i.e., a favorable rebirth), and is designated as a correct view.
45
Through knowledge one transcends sin and merit, since
existence and non-existence are appeased. And thus this is
called by the good ones liberation from the bad (path) and from
the good path.
 Nāgārjuna 225

46
If one sees the causally dependent arising, one transcends non-
existence. And if one sees the cessation together with its cause,
existence is not asserted.
47
The cause is, in fact, no cause, though it may have arisen earlier
or it may have arisen at the same time, <213> because neither
the designation nor a real arising is observed.
48
If this exists, that exists, just as the short [exists], if the long
exists. Due to the arising of this, there is the arising of that, just
as light [arises] due to the arising of the lamp.
49
But as long as the short does not exist, the long is by nature not
present. And if the lamp has not arisen, the light also does
not arise.
50
If one sees the arising of cause and effect in this way, non-
existence is not asserted in that one accepts the actuality
(yāthābhūtya) of this world sprung from diversity.
51
And in that one, in accordance with actuality, accepts its
ceasing, which results from diversity, one does not assert
existence. One is thus liberated since one no longer clings to
either.
52
A form glimpsed from a distance is seen clearly when it is
near. If the mirage were water, why is it not seen when it is
near?
53
The way this world is seen from far off, is not how it is seen
when it is near, because it is signless (animitta) like the
mirage. <214>
226 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

54
Just as the mirage resembles water but is not water and is not
real, so the groups resemble the ‘I’ but are not the ‘I’ and are
not real.
55
If someone thinks of the mirage: “This is water,” walks toward
it and then once he is there, holds that the water [as the mirage]
does not exist [at all], then he is a fool.
56
Likewise it is a delusion if one thinks of the world, which re-
sembles a mirage, that it exists or that it does not exist. So long
as the delusion exists, however, one is not liberated.
57
One who believes in non-existence walks the bad path. One who
believes in existence, walks the good path. One who does not
cling to either, because he recognizes how it really is, arrives
at liberation.
58
If someone who rejects existence and non-existence, because
he recognizes how things really are, succumbs to (the belief in)
non-existence due to delusion, why does he not succumb to
(the belief in) existence?
59
One might think that, from his dismissal of existence, non-
existence would implicitly ensue. But why does existence not
ensue from the dismissal of non-existence? <215>
60
If the belief in non-existence implicitly ensues for those who
know of no thesis, no engagement, and no thought in reliance
on enlightenment, then why are they not, (just as well,) des-
ignated as followers of the belief in existence?
 Nāgārjuna 227

61
Ask people, including the Sāṃkhyas, Vaiśeṣikas, and Jainas,
the followers of the doctrine of a person and [the followers] of
the groups, whether they teach such a transcendence of existence
and non-existence.
62
Know then that this elixir of deathlessness of the teaching of
the Buddha, which transcends existence and non-existence, is
designated as the gift of the doctrine and as profound.
63
The world does not cease, does not come, and does not remain
even for a moment. How then should it be real, since by nature
it is outside of the three time periods?
64
What difference is there in truth, therefore, between the world
and nirvāṇa, since in both there is, in fact, no coming, no going,
and no abiding?
65
As there is no abiding, there is, in fact, also no arising and no
annihilation. How should there in truth be something arisen,
remaining, and annihilated? <216>
66
How should there be a non-momentary thing, if a change is
continually occurring? If no change occurs, how in truth should
there be a being-different?
67
Something can be momentary because it ceases partially or
entirely. It is, however, impossible in both cases because it
contains a contradiction and is not to be observed (?).
68
If a thing is entirely momentary, then how is there an aging?
But if it is not momentary due to its constancy, then how is there
an aging?
228 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

69
If a moment has an end, so also a beginning and a middle must
be assumed. Since the moment consists therefore of three parts,
the world cannot last for just a single moment.
70
Further, beginning, middle, and end are to be considered in
the same way as the moment. Also, the being beginning,
middle, or end is not possible either through itself or through
something other.
71
Nothing can be single, if it contains several parts. But something
without parts does not exist. There also is no multitude
without singularity, just as there is no non-existence without
existence. <217>
72
A non-existence can only exist through the destruction of or in
opposition to an existence. But how is the destruction or the
opposite possible if there is no existence?
73
Consequently, with respect to extinction, a ceasing of the world
does not in truth apply. Thus the Victorious One (= the Buddha)
chose to remain silent on the question of whether the world has
an end.
74
The Omniscient One is recognized as truly omniscient by the
informed because he has not imparted this profound doctrine to
unsuitable people.
75
Of this doctrine that leads to the highest good, that is profound,
and does not hold onto anything, the enlightened ones who have
seen the truth, have said that it is free of anything to which one
could cling (anālaya).
 Nāgārjuna 229

76
Of this doctrine that is free from anything to which one could
cling, foolish people who gladly cling to something and who
have not transcended existence and non-existence, are afraid and
therefore come to ruin.
77
And since they come to ruin because they fear the state of
fearlessness, they also bring others to ruin. Therefore, O king, act
in such a way that you are not brought to ruin by those who
are lost. <218>
CDB. Āryadeva (beginning of third century c.e.)
Next to Nāgārjuna stands his great student Āryadeva, also called
Deva for short. According to tradition, Āryadeva came from
Ceylon. What is reported about his life is completely legendary.
[With Āryadeva] we have the rare case that a significant student
appears to be in complete agreement with his teacher and
complements him most successfully. He agrees with Nāgārjuna
in all essential views, but goes beyond him in his style of
presentation. Whereas, especially in his basic treatise, Nāgārjuna
works with generalized abstract inferences, Āryadeva examines
the disputed views very closely and deals with them in great
detail. For this reason he is an important source of the views of
the opposing schools of his time. But since in a philosophical
sense he presents nothing fundamentally new, and in considera-
tion of the limitations of space, a brief sample of his style should
suffice here. To this end I select a few verses from his most
extensive work, the Catuḥśataka (The Treatise in Four Hundred
Stanzas); specifically, the refutation of the doctrine of atoms.

CDB.1. Introduction to the sample from the Catuḥśataka

In this treatise Āryadeva opposes the Vaiśeṣika’s doctrine of
atoms according to which all material entities are composed of
atoms. At the same time, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, these
entities are not simply an aggregation of atoms. Instead the
atoms form a new whole that is different from them; specifically,
the substance and the qualities of the whole are formed from the
substance and the qualities of the atoms [cf. S. 360]. Āryadeva
now states [v. 13] that the atoms do not make up with their
 Āryadeva 231

entire nature the whole that represents their effect. In particular,

the minute sphericity (pārimāṇḍalya) that distinguishes the
atoms does not apply to the whole. But [v. 12] that which with
one part of its nature is a cause, and with another, on the
other hand, is not, is by nature combined. And that which
is combined, so he infers, cannot be eternal. With this the
eternality of atoms, assumed by the opponent, is refuted.
Incidentally [v. 14], that the atoms as cause and the whole
as effect cannot have the same extension <219> results from the
fact that one atom cannot occupy the same place as another
atom.
A further reason [v. 15] why the atoms themselves must
consist of particles is that with each attempt to conceive of an
atom, we must necessarily assume different sides of this atom
facing the different directions. But that which has several sides
also has several parts.
A further reason [v. 16] ensues from the Vaiśeṣika doctrine
of movement, according to which the movement of an entity
consists in the fact that with its anterior parts, it establishes
new spatial connections, while with its posterior parts, it dis-
solves earlier connections. This, however, again presupposes the
presence of parts.
In addition [v. 17], a perfect partlessness would render the
atom completely invisible, whereas according to the Vaiśeṣika
doctrine, at least to the supranatural perception of a yogin, it
is visible.
Finally [v. 18], Āryadeva—against the Vaiśeṣika conception
of atoms and of the whole that they form—also calls on the
Buddhist doctrine of causality according to which the arising
of an effect presupposes the annihilation of its cause (cf. above
S. 101ff.), which likewise contradicts the assumed eternality
of the atoms. In addition [v. 18b], cause and effect, atoms and
whole, could not, as the Vaiśeṣika doctrine assumes, occupy the
same place.
 232 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

He concludes [v. 19] therefore with the statement that eternal,

materially impenetrable atoms such as the opponent accepts,
cannot be proven and that consequently the doctrine of the
Buddha also speaks of no such atoms.

CDB.2. From the “Treatise in Four Hundred Stanzas” (Catuḥśataka)

Chapter IX:
[Refuting permanent entities]
12
That of which one part is a cause, while another part is not
a cause, is thus manifold, and something manifold cannot be
eternal. <220>
13
The sphericity of the cause is not present in the effect. Thus the
atoms cannot combine with their entire nature (into the whole).
14
It is not accepted that the place of one atom is also the place of
another. Thus it is also not accepted that both, cause and effect,
have the same extension.
15
That which has an eastern side has also an eastern part. Because
the atom thus has parts, therefore the atom is designated as
a non-atom.
16
Seizing what is in front and abandoning what is behind—one for
whom these two do not take place cannot be going (= moving).
17
That which has no beginning, that which has no middle, and
that which has no end, is invisible. Who can see it?
18
The cause is destroyed through the effect, thus the cause is not
eternal. Further, the effect is not there where the cause is to
be found.
 Āryadeva 233

19
An impenetrable eternal thing is nowhere to be observed. Thus
the Buddhas have never designated atoms as eternal. <221>

As far as the further development of the Madhyamaka

doctrine after Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, we find here no
development of the same type as with the other schools.
After all, unlike the other schools, the Madhyamaka system
did not present a complete world view that could be
amended and corrected. Instead, at its core it confined itself
rather to a few metaphysical fundamental views that re-
mained unchanged after Nāgārjuna’s time. If in spite of this,
a sort of development did take place within the school, it
was determined by external circumstances. There were, in
effect, two things that initiated this: The advances made
in the meantime in the field of logic, and the blossoming
of the second great Mahāyāna school, the school of the
Yogācāra.
The advances in the field of logic necessitated that in
lieu of Nāgārjuna’s deductions, which proved for the most
part to be disputable fallacies [see S. 173, 176], more tenable
proofs be put forth. The Yogācāra school had gone beyond
the Madhyamaka most notably in explaining the coming
about of the phenomenal world by means of a kind of
epistemological idealism and thereby answering the most
important question that the Madhyamaka had left open.
The great successes of the Yogācāra school forced the older
school to take a stand on this new doctrine.
Under these circumstances the later development of the
Madhyamaka school is best portrayed by showing how
their most important representatives related to these two
points: how they took into account the advances of logic;
and how they dealt with the Yogācāra doctrine.
CDC. Buddhapālita (ca. fifth century c.e.)
After Āryadeva, the first important personality of the
Madhyamaka school to break new ground, was Buddhapālita
who probably dates to about the fifth century c.e. It was
Buddhapālita who was the first to take into account the
advances in logic, in that he composed a commentary on
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakakārikā in which he tried to support
the latter’s assertions through more thorough and more
tenable <222> reasoning. In doing so he held himself on
principle to Nāgārjuna’s approach of advancing no assertions
of his own, and confined himself to proving the opponent’s
assumptions to be impossible. He did this by showing that
undesired conclusions follow (prasaṅga) from the assertions of
the opponent, hence, via deductio ad absurdum. A brief example
from his commentary will suffice to illustrate his method. I select
for this purpose the commentary to the first verse of the
[Madhyamaka]kārikā (see above S. 178), since the establishment
of the impossibility of any arising increasingly became the
foremost proof on which the refutation of the external world
by the Madhyamaka school was primarily rested.

CDC.1. Introduction to the sample from the Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti

The details of his presentation is clear and it requires no
extensive explanation. One after the other he discusses the four
possibilities of arising rejected by Nāgārjuna: from itself; from
something other; from both; and without cause. Things do
not arise from themselves, because it would be pointless for
something already existent to arise a second time, and because
 Buddhapālita 235

otherwise they would have to arise all the time since the cause—
i.e., their own selves—would indeed always be present. Things
do not arise from something other, because then everything
could arise from everything since one extraneous thing is just as
much something else as another. They do not arise from both,
because then the objections brought forth against the above
individual assumptions would apply to both. And they do not
arise without cause, because then everything could arise from
everything at any time, since indeed no cause whose occurrence
must be awaited is necessary; and because then all effort would
be pointless, since even without cause everything would still
come about.

CDC.2. From the “Commentary to the Mnemonic Verses of the Middle

Doctrine” (Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti)
Chapter I
(Opponent:) First, it needs to be shown how it is a mere
manner of speaking (vyavahāramātra) when one speaks of <223>
an arising.
(Answer:) To this, the first thing to be said is:

v. 1
Neither from itself, nor from something other, nor
from both, nor without cause, have any things
whatsoever ever arisen anywhere.

If namely, some thing arises, then the arising of this thing

takes place from itself, from something other, from itself and
something other, or without cause. If one now examines (these
four possibilities), it proves in all four cases to be impossible.
How so? From itself means the same as from one’s own self.
Now, first of all, things do not arise from their own selves
because their arising would be pointless, and because an endless
arising would result. That is, there is no need for things that
236 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

in themselves are already existent to arise again. If, however,

something already existent were nonetheless to arise, then it
would never not arise. And this [conclusion] is undesired. Thus,
first of all, things do not arise from themselves. But they also
do not arise from something other. How so? Because it would
follow from this that everything could arise from everything.
Further, they do not arise from themselves and something other
at the same time since both faults would ensue. And finally, they
also do not arise without cause since it would follow from this
that everything could always arise from everything, and since
the fault would ensue that all efforts would be pointless. Since
therefore the arising of entities is not possible in any way, they
do not arise. And hence if one speaks of their arising, it is a mere
manner of speaking. <224>
CDD. Bhāvaviveka (middle of sixth century c.e.)
The next Madhyamaka teacher of note is Bhāvaviveka or
Bhāviveka, the greatest innovator in the history of the school.
He lived in the middle of the sixth century c.e. and was a
contemporary and opponent of Dharmapāla [S. 394ff.], at that
time the most famous representative of the Yogācāra school
in Nālandā. Bhāvaviveka innovated both by considering the
logical advances of his time as well as by making use of
Yogācāra ideas. The decisive impetus for his logical innova-
tions came from the fact that Dignāga had shortly before led
Buddhist logic to its full height and had precisely laid down,
out of what members an inference must consist and what
conditions the individual members must fulfill. Bhāvaviveka
took advantage of this, and to be precise by proceeding as
follows. He sought to extract the members for such an inference
from Nāgārjuna’s words, and from this he put together a
formal inference that conformed to all of the required con-
ditions and that he defended against all possible objections.
Thus in contrast to Buddhapālita—who was content to lead the
opponent ad absurdum—he advanced autonomous (svatantra)
inferences, and this earned his school the name of the
Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas. The followers of Buddhapālita, on
the other hand, were designated as Prāsaṅgikas [Consequen-
tialist].
He also dealt with the doctrines and objections of other,
and by no means only Buddhist schools, thoroughly and in
detail. As an example of his methodology, I present a sample
from his principal work, his great commentary on Nāgārjuna’s
Madhyamakakārikā, Prajñāpradīpa (Shining Light of Insight);
 238 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

specifically, just as for Buddhapālita, the explanation of the

first verse of the [Madhyamaka]kārikā. I render only the first
section of this explanation though, i.e., the refutation of the
arising of entities from themselves, since Bhāvaviveka is
incomparably more detailed than Buddhapālita and since this
section sufficiently exemplifies his way.

CDD.1. Introduction to the sample from the Prajñāpradīpa

Like Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka first cites the verse of
Nāgārjuna that he will discuss, and adds <225> to it a few
explanatory details. Whereas Buddhapālita, however, then puts
forward his consequences in full independence, Bhāvaviveka
begins even here to prepare his inferences and to derive them
from Nāgārjuna’s words. In the statement that things do not
arise from themselves, he reads into the words from themselves
that they are already present beforehand, which he regards as
a reason. As he notes, any thing in which the quality that proves
and the quality to be proven—i.e., reason and consequence—
appear connected, can serve as an example. He then proceeds to
present the formal inference; he actually divides it properly into
thesis, reason, and example. Things—he names as an example
the inner spheres—do not in truth arise from themselves
because they are already present, like the cognitive capacity.
There follows, as the custom of the logicians demands, a
defense of the individual members of the inference against
possible objections. The most important condition that the
reason must fulfill is that it is absent from that which is
dissimilar (vipakṣa). This is self-evident in the case in question
since something dissimilar—i.e., something that is in truth
arisen—does not exist.
Bhāvaviveka then rejects an objection by the Sāṃkhya.
According to Sāṃkhya doctrine, the existent arises from the
existent, i.e., the effect is already present in the cause.
 Bhāvaviveka 239

The Sāṃkhya then says: No one is asserting that things,

insofar as they are an effect, arise from themselves. So if that
is what your proof is saying, that is like breaking down an
open door. If on the other hand you wish to prove that, insofar
as they are a cause, they do not arise from themselves, then you
entangle yourselves in a contradiction. This is namely actually
the case and this is also what our doctrine says.
Bhāvaviveka rejects this objection with the remark that his
inference is meant to be general and without the alternative put
forward by the opponent, and that besides, a refutation of an
arising from the nature of the cause—whether it has its own
or another nature—is yet to come (cf. vv. 2 and 3 of Nāgārjuna).
Finally, he also justifies the use of cognitive capacity as an
example, since in accordance with the Yogācāra doctrine he
has adopted, in the stream of cognition every cognition already
exists as a seed, i.e., as a latent impression, before its <226>
arising. If this is taken into consideration, cognition thus indeed
already exists before its arising. And since therefore the reason,
i.e., the already being existent, is present in [cognition], it can
serve as an example.
With this Bhāvaviveka’s own line of argumentation is
concluded and he proceeds to reject Buddhapālita’s line of
argumentation as being inadequate. His reasons are that
Buddhapālita does not present a formal three-membered infer-
ence; that he does not deal with the objections of the opponent;
and lastly that every deductio ad absurdum implies that the
opposite of what is proven to be impossible is true.
How Buddhapālita’s followers faced up to these criticisms we
will see in the discussion of Candrakīrti (see below S. 241f.). This
then, is the manner in which Bhāvaviveka explains Nāgārjuna,
and he also deals in the same way with all other assertions put
forward in Nāgārjuna’s verses.
 240 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CDD.2. From the “Shining Light of Insight” (Prajnāpradīpa)

Chapter I
Of those who assert an arising, some say that the entities arise
from themselves; others, from something other; some, from both;
others, without cause. However, if (these views) are examined in
accordance with logic and tradition, then it becomes clear that an
arising in each mode is impossible. In this sense, (Nāgārjuna) says:

v. 1
Neither from itself, nor from something other, nor
from both, nor without cause, have any things
whatsoever ever arisen anywhere.

With this, the general thesis is put forward.

(Opponent:) First of all, what does “neither from itself”
signify here?
(Answer:) <227> The words “have any things whatsoever
ever arisen anywhere” are to be related to the individual (parts
of the thesis). “From itself” means the same as from one’s own
self. Since the intended subject is not proven by a mere thesis, the
existence is to be considered as reason here, since with the
words “from itself” it is stated that one’s own self already exists.
The example is based on the quality to be proven and the quality
that proves. For a bearer of qualities, proven to possess the
quality to be proven and the quality that proves, is an example.
The negation “not from itself” is to be understood in the sense
of a simple [or non-affirming] negation (prasajyapratiṣedha),
because in this the negation is the essential point and the
intention there is to call forth—through the removal of the net
of all conceptions—the nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpaka
jñāna) that includes all objects. If, on the other hand, [the
negation] also implied an exclusion (paryudāsa), then the words
“things have not arisen” would teach non-arising in positive
form, since with this [negation] the affirmation is the essential
 Bhāvaviveka 241

point, and through this there would be a deviation from one’s

own system. For it follows from tradition that he who engages in
the non-arising of form (rūpa) does not engage in the perfection
of insight . . .
To that end the formal inference reads as follows: These
inner spheres (āyatana) do not arise, in truth, from themselves,
because they already exist, like cognitive capacity.
(Opponent:) The reason, i.e., the existence, is no reason,
because it is not proven that it is not present in the dissimilar
[cases] (vipakṣa).
(Answer:) The not-being-present needs not to be considered,
since (something dissimilar) does not exist. Thus here, and
<228> in all (like cases), there is no fault.
Against this some Sāṃkhyas object: “What is the sense of this
thesis? Does it mean that (things do not arise) from themselves
insofar as they have the nature of the effect, or insofar as they
have the nature of the cause? What follows from this? If it means
insofar as they have the nature of the effect, then only some-
thing already proven is proven. If on the other hand, it means
insofar as they have the nature of the cause, then this is a
contradiction with regard to content, since everything that arises
does so after it has already existed in the form of the cause.”
[Answer to the Sāṃkhyas:] This is not valid because we
oppose this very arising from itself, and because also as far
as the nature of the cause is concerned—whether this (cause)
now has its own or another nature—we reject an arising. The
existence of the cognitive capacity is incontestable because it
is also included here, insofar as it bears the characteristic of force
(i.e., in the potential state).
To this, others (= Buddhapālita) give the following explana-
tion: Things do not arise from their own selves because their
arising would be pointless and because an endless arising
would result.
242 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

[Answer:] This is off the mark, because no reason and no

example are stated and because the objections advanced by
the opponent are not rejected. Further, since [Buddhapālita’s
explanation] consists of an undesired consequence (prasaṅga),
there ensues—in contrast to the statement in question—a thesis
and a reason of opposing content, that is: Things arise from
something other, because their arising has a point and because
their arising comes to an end. And that would mean a
contradiction to one’s own system.

Philosophically far more important than Bhāvaviveka’s

logical innovations is his discussion <229> of the doctrine
of the Yogācāra. To understand this discussion the
following should be considered. In their fundamental
views the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra are—by nature—
not necessarily opposed. The idea of considering the
phenomena of the external world as conceptions can
already be found in Nāgārjuna. And since this idea was
systematically elaborated by the Yogācāra school and made
the fundamental idea of the edifice of their teachings, then
no clear break was thus made vis-à-vis the Mādhyamikas.
The same goes for the richly developed psychology and
the doctrine of liberation based on it, which were created
by the Yogācārins in compliance with this fundamental
idea. These were also conceivable for the Mādhyamika
and, given their greater advancement, they offered several
advantages, so that the thought of making use of these
advantages readily suggested itself. And this is just what
Bhāvaviveka did. He adopted the Yogācāra school’s
psychology and the doctrine of liberation based on it, albeit
with certain alterations. In this way he achieved a
considerable enrichment of his own doctrine with valuable
concepts, and he could do this without infringing on the
principles of his own doctrine.
 Bhāvaviveka 243

This did not, however, come about entirely without

difficulties, and there was one point in particular around
which these difficulties set in. For every doctrine that
considers the world to be a conception, the idea of ascribing
the character of cognition to the highest reality suggests
itself, and this is what the Yogācārins did. But it was
not easy to bring this into harmony with the sharply
emphasized ungraspable nature of the highest reality,
which stands above all worldly determinations. And as we
will see,1 there were a number of different opinions about
this within the Yogācāra school. In principle though,
the opinions were favorable. – The situation was differ-
ent for Bhāvaviveka. In the Madhyamaka system, since
Nāgārjuna’s time, the inconceivability and indetermin-
ability of the highest reality had been so strongly and
uncompromisingly developed and emphasized, that it was
impossible to reconcile with it the character of cognition.
Bhāvaviveka’s decision was thus made accordingly. For
him cognition belongs to the sphere <230> of the
phenomenal world. To express this in the terminology of
the schools, according to the Yogācāra school, cognition
belongs to the dependent characteristic (paratantralakṣaṇa)
and therefore a certain degree of reality accrues to it. For
Bhāvaviveka, on the other hand, cognition belongs to the
sphere of restricted truth (saṃvṛtisatya) and has nothing
to do with the highest reality. On this point, therefore,
Bhāvaviveka differed from the Yogācārins. A dispute arose
about this, and on this he was thus most vehemently
attacked by the representatives of the Yogācāra school.
On this question, however, he decided in favor of his
own doctrine and thereby remained a faithful follower
of Nāgārjuna.

1
[Cf. 396f., and also Frauwallner’s Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna.]
244 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

As an example of these views, I render in the following

a piece from an original work of Bhāvaviveka’s, i.e., from
the Jewel in the Hand (Tschang tschen). This work briefly
summarizes the doctrines of the Madhyamaka school as
understood by Bhāvaviveka. The main part consists of
the refutation of the reality of the external world in
two broadly discussed formal inferences, one of which
proves the unreality of the conditioned factors (saṃskṛta
[dharma]), the other the unreality of the unconditioned
factors (asaṃskṛta dharma). The conclusion consists of a
description of the path of liberation and of the highest
knowledge. I render the better part of this section, since it
offers an unusually good presentation of the principal phi-
losophical thoughts of the Mahāyāna path of liberation
from the point of view of the Madhyamaka doctrine, and
at the same time clearly shows the difference between the
views of Bhāvaviveka and the Yogācārins.
To understand it, the following should be noted. For
Bhāvaviveka, the starting point is the cognition of the
unreality of the external world, gained through instruc-
tion, but more importantly through the two preceding
inferences. According to the old view, however, such
cognition alone does not suffice for liberation. Contem-
plation (bhāvanā) must still be joined with it (cf. above
S. 128f.).
According to Yogācāra doctrine, this path of contempla-
tion has as its purpose the gradual removal of all the
conceptions that make up the content of <231> worldly
cognition. The same goes for Bhāvaviveka, only for him, the
path of contemplation with regard to the conceptions that
are to be removed is adapted to the Madhyamaka doctrine,
and likewise the sutras to which he refers are those that
were esteemed by the Madhyamaka school most of all.
 Bhāvaviveka 245

The first stage [part one, subsection 1 (S. 232)] of this

path of contemplation consists in that the practitioner
contemplates all phenomena of the phenomenal world as
unreal, i.e., as empty. Specifically, he must hold in this to
the definitions of emptiness as given in the Prajñāpāramitā
texts. The outcome of this contemplation is that finally all
coarse external phenomenal forms and the conceptions tied
to them disappear.
In the second stage [subsection 2] of the contemplation
the practitioner comes to the knowledge that knowledge of
the emptiness of all entities is also a conception that, as
such, impedes the highest liberating knowledge and must
therefore be removed. Consequently—again following the
Prajñāpāramitā texts—he also contemplates things no longer
as empty and he continues this contemplation until the
conception of emptiness vanishes as well. By thus
contemplating things neither as empty nor as not empty,
he enters the middle way (madhyamā pratipat) as described
in the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra [S. 163ff.].
This knowledge, however, that rejects both opposites,
emptiness and non-emptiness, existence and non-existence,
this knowledge, as a knowledge, is also a conception and
must be overcome. And so [subsection 3] the practitioner
arrives at the third stage of contemplation in which any
content of knowledge is eliminated. With this he attains
the last and highest stage, nonconceptual knowledge
(nirvikalpaka jñāna).
[In part two (S. 236)] the Yogācārins also speak of this
nonconceptual knowledge. But here opinions differ.
According to the Yogācāra doctrine, nonconceptual knowl-
edge also bears the character of knowledge, but according
to Bhāvaviveka, this is not the case. According to him,
nonconceptual knowledge has shed even the character of
knowledge and is, as he says elsewhere, designated as
 246 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

knowledge only in a figurative sense. Nonconceptual

knowledge is therefore no knowledge, even <232> though
one speaks of knowledge. Just as, with respect to the saint
on this stage, there is no movement (i.e., engagement) even
though one speaks of movement. As stated already in the
sacred texts, this final knowledge consists rather in the
absence of any knowledge, just as the engagement of the
saint consists in the absence of any engagement. And this is
the highest, the emancipation from any error, the silence of
the saints.

CDD.3. From the “Jewel in the Hand” (Tchang tchen) (T 1578,

pp. 276a3–377b11)
[Prajñā without movement]
[Part One: Contemplation (bhāvanā) of the emptiness of the
conditioned and unconditioned factors:]
After the practitioner has removed all objections in this way,
he apprehends, by means of correct inference, the emptiness of
the unconditioned (factors) assumed by himself and by others.
But although he may have apprehended emptiness on the ladder
of knowledge won through hearing, so long as the power of con-
templation (bhāvanā) is absent, he is still not capable of clearing
away the obstructions (āvaraṇa) that must be removed. Thus, he
now makes an effort to practice the power of contemplation.
1
In doing so, as long as a conditioned or unconditioned image
(nimitta) of any kind is present, which appears with interruption
or without interruption, he must remove this image through
truthful contemplation of its emptiness, so that it no longer
appears. (In doing so,) he apprehends all factors (in the fol-
lowing way): Since they are without an intrinsic nature, they
are by nature empty. Since they are empty, they possess no real
sign (nimitta). They are therefore signless. Since they are
signless, they are nothing <233> for which one yearns. Thus they
 Bhāvaviveka 247

are unwished for. Since they are free from contamination by a

sign, they are apart. Since they are apart, the defilements that
attach themselves to them do not arise at all. Thus they are
peaceful. Since their intrinsic nature does not arise, they are not
arisen. Since they are not arisen, they are not impermanent. They
are not painful. They are not without a self. Since they are not
arisen, they are, further, without a sign. Since they are without
a sign, the non-duality of all factors can be apprehended through
contemplation, the sole sign of which is signlessness.
In this form [the practitioner] endeavors to practice contem-
plation. In that the power of contemplation grows in this way, he
removes the coarse images so that they no longer appear. Thus
there is no longer any appearing form to occupy his mind. In
other words, he apprehends the conditioned and unconditioned
appearing forms as does someone with an eye disease (taimirika)
whose eyes have been freed and cleared of the coarse cloudi-
ness caused by the eye disease. That is, he no longer sees the
appearing images that he previously apprehended.
2
Although he has now come to the point of not abiding in these
(images), the stream of his mind—because the conceptions of
emptiness, etc., still appear—remains nevertheless connected
with a certain striving (ābhoga) and thus does not yet attain
immovability.1 Since he recognizes thus that the occurrence
of conceptions of emptiness, etc., prevents the supramundane,
nonconceptual insight, he wishes to remove them. He makes
a sincere effort, therefore, to consider the following [i.e., first
reasoning]: “From the standpoint <234> of the highest truth,
the conceptions of emptiness, etc., concerning objects that are by
nature empty are likewise not real since they arise from causes,

1
[La Vallée Poussin comments that this means that the practitioner has not
yet obtained the eighth stage (acalābhūmi) of the Bodhisattva. See Siddhi,
p. 616.]
248 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

like a conjuror’s illusion, etc.” In practicing contemplation in

this way, he is now able to remove the conceptions of emptiness,
etc. And by removing these, he avoids the two extremes of
emptiness and non-emptiness, etc. Thus, he no longer sees the
factors under the form of their emptiness.
Accordingly it is said in the Perfection of Insight (Prajñā-
pāramitā) [i.e., second reasoning]: “If he engages himself
correctly, he views corporeality neither as eternal nor as non-
eternal; he sees it neither as pleasurable nor as painful; he sees
it neither as self nor as non-self; he sees it neither as peaceful
nor as non-peaceful; he sees it neither as empty nor as non-
empty; he sees it neither as sign nor as non-sign; he sees it
neither as wished for nor as unwished for; and he sees it neither
as apart nor as non-apart. Likewise, he sees sensation, ideation,
formations, and cognition, all visible forms, sounds, odors,
tastes, all tangibles, and all factors, the eye, the ear, the nose, the
tongue, the body, and the mind, the perfections of generosity, of
moral conduct, of patience, of vigor, of absorption, and of
insight, the awakenings of mindfulness, the right efforts, the
constituents of miraculous power, the faculties, the powers,
the members of enlightenment, the members of the [noble]
path, the meditations, the absorptions of the formless sphere,
the supranatural knowledges, the ten powers, the certainties, the
unlimited knowledges, the qualities unique to the Buddha, the
concentrations, <235> the gates of retention, and omniscience,
neither as eternal nor as non-eternal, etc., etc.”
Since in this way the (practitioner) is capable of removing
both extremes, he is able to bring about and to further the
middle way. This middle way, free of both extremes, is called
formless [arūpin] because—due to the two reasonings above
rendered—the forms of the conditioned and the unconditioned
no longer appear. Because it is formless and because the
conceptions of existence, etc., are absent from it, there is no
factor at all whose characteristic could be demonstrated by
 Bhāvaviveka 249

saying: “This is so, thus that is likewise so.” [The middle way]
is therefore called undemonstrable [anidarśana]. Because it is
essenceless, there is nothing on which to base oneself, and
nothing that is based upon it. Therefore, because it knows of no
abiding, it is called without support [apratiṣṭha]. Whether it be the
image of the conditioned or the image of the unconditioned,
whether it be something conceived or non-conceived, conception
or non-conception—a knowledge that shows such an image
does not occur [in this path]. Hence it is called without image
[anābhāsa]. Since it is free of any image of existence or non-
existence, no knowledge arises that has this [image] as its object,
and therefore it is called without cognizance [avijñaptika].
Because it is formless and shapeless, and there is no determina-
tion or mark in it, it is called without mark [aniketa].
Accordingly, the Exalted One said to Kāśyapa (cf. above
S. 165f.): “Eternal, that is one extreme. Non-eternal, that is a
second. What lies in the middle between these two, that is
formless, undemonstrable, without support, without image,
without cognizance, and without mark. <236> That is called
the middle way, the truthful consideration of the nature of
all factors,” etc., up to “existence, that is one extreme. Non-
existence, that is a second,” etc.
Further, the Buddha said to Kāśyapa (above S. 167f.):
“Knowledge [vidyā] and ignorance [avidyā] are not two things
and do not constitute a duality. The correct understanding of
this is called the middle way.”
3
While the (practitioner) is able in this way to remove both
extremes, he abides in the conception that arises with regard
to the view of non-duality. Now he recognizes that this view
of non-duality is also an obstacle to peaceful abiding in the
supramundane, nonconceptual insight. He therefore quickly
removes the causes mentioned. Because he removes them, such
or such a conception no longer appears, the twofold speaking
250 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

[jalpa] of the voice and of the mind simultaneously comes to

a standstill, and he becomes aware of the true nature of the
factors: unmoving; without image; without sign; and free from
any diversity. Thus, based on that [awareness], he attains an
unmoving realization and he abides in the stream of the
knowledge of the intrinsic characteristic (svalakṣaṇa). Thus
although he makes an effort to practice the unmistaken view of
emptiness, nevertheless, he does not bring the nature of
emptiness into consciousness at all.

Another long citation from a sutra follows and then the

text continues:

[Part Two: Nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajñāna):]

[1. The Yogācāra doctrine:]
The Yogācārins hold the following view: “If all conceptions of
something grasped and a grasper are removed, then this is the
<237> supramundane, nonconceptual knowledge. A firm view
of reality arises in him [i.e., the practitioner] and he makes an
effort to practice the contemplation.”
Others, who examine this correctly, say: [1] If this knowledge
arises, then indeed, the above mentioned conceptions are not
present. It arises, however, in connection with the image of a
signless object, is accompanied by the conception according to
its intrinsic nature (svabhāvavikalpa),1 is caused, and therefore—
just like the other knowledges that are sensory perception
[pratyakṣabuddhi] and are accompanied by conceptions—
cannot be considered to be supramundane, nonconceptual
knowledge. [2] Likewise, the highest reality [paramārtha]

1
Buddhist scholasticism distinguishes several kinds of conceptions. Of
them, the conception according to its intrinsic nature (svabhāvavikalpa)
is the basic form that also appears in other processes of knowledge, which
are otherwise considered to be nonconceptual.
 Bhāvaviveka 251

assumed by them, the signless and designationless suchness

(tathatā), is the object-support (of knowledge) and, as such—
just like the other object-supports—cannot be considered to be
the highest reality. For these reasons both (assumptions) are
not incontestable.
Accordingly, it is said in the sutra: “What is in all of this the
truth in the highest sense? – To this, knowledge has no access.”
Further, in the Question of Mañjuśrī (Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā) it is
said: “What is it that the eye of insight (prajñācakṣu) regards?”
The answer states: “If something were present that it regards,
then it would no longer be the eye of insight. Since this eye
of insight is free from conceptions, it does not regard the
conditioned and also does not regard the unconditioned since
everything unconditioned does not fall into the sphere of this
eye of insight.” <238>
According to these reasons and these sacred texts, the above
mentioned view must be discarded.
Further, those who correctly examine, say: According to the
truth in the highest sense, such a supramundane, nonconceptual
knowledge is not real because it has arisen from causes, like a
person created by magic. All difficulties and faults, whatever
they may be, are to be removed due to correct contemplation.
But if it is a knowledge that removes such views, then just like
them, it is faulty. Thus one makes no further effort to examine
and to explain. With that, all such views are destroyed.

[2. Apprehension in accordance with truth:]

With respect to the signless nature of the objects, which is the
subject matter of knowledge [jñeya], there is no direct apprehen-
sion. And since the causes and conditions are absent, no other
types of knowledge arise either. Because there is, however, no
direct apprehension, one speaks of apprehension in accordance
with truth.
252 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Accordingly, the Exalted One has said: “What is called

apprehension in accordance with truth? – The complete non-
apprehending of all factors: that is called the apprehension in
accordance with truth.” Further, a sutra says: “The Exalted One
does not see enlightenment at all.” In addition, in the Question
of Mañjuśrī (Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā) it is said: “What does he see
who sees the (noble) truths?” – The answer states: “There is no
factor of any kind that can be seen. Why? Everything that is seen
is false. If there is nothing that is seen, then one speaks of seeing
the truths [satyadarśana].” Further, it is asked: “How does one
make an effort to practice clear comprehension [abhisamaya]?” –
The answer states: “If one knows that there is no factor of any
kind and thinks and reflects in this way, then one is making
the effort to practice clear comprehension.” Further, it is <239>
asked: “When has one realized clear comprehension?” – The
answer states: “If one contemplates the equality of all factors.”
Further, it is asked: “Is there someone who sees the equality
[samatā] of all factors?” – The answer states: “There is no one
who sees the equality. For if there is something that is seen,
then the result is that equality is not seen.” The expressions
“apprehension in accordance with truth,” “seeing the truth,” and
“clear comprehension” all have one and the same meaning.

[3. Absence of movement:]

In one who practices contemplation, neither mind [citta], nor
thinking [manas], nor cognition [vijñāna], nor knowledge [jñāna]
moves. This is called correct movement in nonconceptual
insight. If he is able to move without movement in this way,
then he attains the true prediction [bhūtavyākaraṇa] of the
Perfected Ones, the Perfectly Enlightened Ones.
Accordingly, a sutra says: “Exalted One, how should a
Bodhisattva practice so that he attains—about the highest,
perfect enlightenment—the true prediction of the Perfected
Ones, the Perfectly Enlightened Ones? – O brahman, if the
 Bhāvaviveka 253

Bodhisattva at that time moves, i.e., engages neither in the

arising nor in the ceasing; if he engages neither in the good nor
in the bad; if he engages neither in the mundane nor in the
supramundane; if he engages neither in the contaminated nor
in the uncontaminated; if he engages neither in the blameworthy
nor in the blameless; if he engages neither in the conditioned nor
in the unconditioned; if he engages neither in the connection
nor in the non-connection; if he engages neither in the apartness
nor in the non-apartness; if he engages neither in birth and death
[saṃsāra] nor in extinction [nirvāṇa]; if he engages neither in
what is seen nor in what is heard, what is thought, and what is
cognized; if he engages neither in generosity and renunciation
nor in moral <240> conduct and discipline; if he engages neither
in patience nor in vigor; if he engages neither in absorption
nor in concentration; if he engages neither in insight nor in
understanding; and if he engages neither in knowledge nor in
calling to mind; if the Bodhisattva engages, i.e., moves without
movement in this way, then he attains—about the highest
perfect enlightenment—the true prediction of the Perfected
Ones, the Perfectly Enlightened Ones.”

[4. Silence:]
Such an engagement in insight is called the silence of the
saints [ārya tūṣṇīmbhāva]. Accordingly, a sutra says: “The true
proclamation of the thirty-seven factors conducive to enlighten-
ment, just as the Buddha taught them is called the preaching
of the doctrine. If, further, (the practitioner) realizes these
factors with his body, then he does not regard them as
separate from the body, and he does not regard the body as
separate from the factors. Rather, he regards them in the
way that he sees them, neither as duality nor as non-duality.
And while he regards them in this way, he also does not,
subsequently, regard the knowledge and vision by way of
254 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

sensory perception. And because he does not regard them, this

is called the silence of the saints.
From these reasonings and sacred texts results—if one
examines them accurately—that it is impossible to make the
intrinsic nature of all that is conditioned and unconditioned into
the intrinsic nature of the objects of mind or of insight, be they
accompanied by conceptions or free from conceptions. If one
recognizes this, then the sunshine of clear insight chases away
all the darkness of delusion. <241>

With the innovations discussed here, Bhāvaviveka had

gone far beyond anything that had hitherto existed and
this led to a backlash. He was attacked more vehemently
by the Yogācāra teachers than any other representative
of his school. And within the [Madhyamaka] school itself
as well, a countercurrent arose, the principal representative
of which was Candrakīrti.
CDE. Candrakīrti (seventh century c.e.)
Candrakīrti is the most significant personality of the
Madhyamaka school in the seventh century. His principal
effort was directed at reestablishing Nāgārjuna’s doctrine in
its purity, free from all the more recent expansions and
distortions. He drew support therefore from Buddhapālita,
whom he saw as his role model, while he most vehemently
opposed Bhāvaviveka. From this fundamental approach,
however, ensues that we should not expect to find in him
something significant, new, and original. And it is characteristic
of him that, in contrast to most of the great Madhyamaka
teachers, his activity was confined almost exclusively to the
composition of commentaries. He did, however, represent the
school with all the know-how of his time and with great
success, and since he belongs among the best known and
most oft-mentioned representatives of the school, he is entitled
to a place here.

CDE.1. The works of Candrakīrti

The most important of Candrakīrti’s commentaries is his
great commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakakārikā, called
Prasannapadā (The Clearly Worded). Aside from this, an
original work, the Madhyamakāvatāra (Introduction to the
Madhyamaka Doctrine), is most worthy of mention. One
sample from each shall be presented, which will illuminate
Candrakīrti’s approach to logic and his relationship to the
Yogācāra school at the same time.
 256 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Firstly, as for his approach to the question of logic, he saw

in the formulation of formal inferences by Bhāvaviveka an
aberration and an offense against Nāgārjuna’s principle that
Mādhyamikas should not advance any thesis of their own.
<242> In his opinion, the correct method is that of Buddhapālita
who does indeed refute the opponent by means of deductio ad
absurdum, but in doing so avoids any assertion of his own.
He deals with this question in detail in his commentary to the
first verse of the Madhyamakakārikā [S. 179], in which he
defends Buddhapālita against Bhāvaviveka’s attack, and from
this broad discussion is taken the brief selection that I present
as an example.

CDE.2. Introduction to the sample from the Prasannapadā

The text does not offer any difficulties. Candrakīrti first makes
a few explanatory remarks about Nāgārjuna’s verse; and for
a detailed proof of the theses put forward therein, he refers to
his own Madhyamakāvatāra.
He then immediately cites Buddhapālita’s explanation
and defends it against Bhāvaviveka’s attacks. These attacks
encompass three points.
First, Bhāvaviveka criticizes Buddhapālita for not stating a
reason and an example, as is demanded by a proper inference.
Candrakīrti responds that the deductio ad absurdum is entirely
sufficient for the refutation of the opponent and thus a proper
inference is unnecessary.
In addition, according to the testimony of Āryadeva and
Nāgārjuna, a Mādhyamika should put forward no thesis of
his own. With this, Bhāvaviveka’s second criticism is also
invalidated, that is, that Buddhapālita does not refute the
opponent’s objections. Since Buddhapālita does not put forward
a thesis of his own, the opponent also cannot advance any
objections that would need to be refuted.
 Candrakīrti 257

Bhāvaviveka’s third criticism states that from a deductio ad

absurdum it follows that the opposite of the refuted thesis is
correct. Candrakīrti replies that, in such cases, the Mādhyamika
starts from the assumptions of the opponent and not from his
own views, and that therefore the resulting consequences also
apply only to the opponent and not to himself.
The answers clearly show Candrakīrti’s fundamental stance.
The further extensive discussions that he ties to this are without
general interest and are therefore not rendered. <243>

CDE.3. From the “Clearly Worded” (Prasannapadā)

Chapter I
The arising that the opponents assume could be conceived as
from itself, could be conceived as from something other, from
both, or without cause. But in no mode is it possible. With this
in mind, (Nāgārjuna) says:

v. 1
Neither from itself, nor from something other, nor
from both, nor without cause, have any things ever
arisen anywhere.

. . . (Opponent): If one states that they do not arise from

themselves, then the undesired consequence follows that they
arise from something other.
(Answer:) This does not follow since a simple [or non-
affirming] negation (prasajyapratiṣedha) is intended to be ex-
pressed, and since in addition, the arising from something other
has yet to be refuted. The line of argumentation according to
which an arising from itself is impossible is found in the Intro-
duction to the Madhyamaka Doctrine (Madhyamakāvatāra), etc.,
where it is said (chapter VI, v. 8):
258 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

With respect to the arising of same from same, there is

no advantage. In addition, a renewed arising of some-
thing already arisen, is nonsensical, etc.

The Master Buddhapālita says on the other hand (see above

S. 223): “Things do not arise from themselves because their
arising would be pointless, and because the error of conse-
quences that are too far reaching would result. That is, there is
no need for things, which in themselves are already existent, to
arise again. If, however, something already existent were
nonetheless to arise, then it would never not arise.” <244>
In opposition, some (= Bhāvaviveka) raise the following
objections (see above S. 228). This is off the mark, because no
reason and no example are stated and because the objections
advanced by the opponent are not rejected. Further, since it is
a matter of an undesired consequence (prasaṅga), there results in
contrast to the statement in question, a thesis and a reason of
opposing content. Specifically: things arise from something
other, because their arising has a point and because their arising
comes to an end. And that would mean a contradiction to
one’s system.
We regard all of these objections as unjustified. How so? If
you say, first of all: “Because no reason and no example are
stated,” then this is not appropriate. Why? Because we ask the
opponent who assumes an arising from itself, what point it
would serve if something already existent were to arise again.
Since after all, “from itself“ is given as a cause, this means
that the same arises. We see no point in the renewed arising
of something already existent, but rather see (that) an infi-
nite regress (anavasthā) results. But the renewed arising of
something already arisen also appears unwanted by you, and
likewise, an infinite regress is unwanted. Therefore, your
assertion is impossible and contradicts your own assumptions.
Is it not the case that the opponent now agrees, when he is
 Candrakīrti 259

challenged [in this way,] so that there is still reason to state

a cause and an example? If, however, the opponent does not
admit defeat even when shown that he contradicts his own
assumptions, then he in his shamelessness will also not admit
defeat when reason and example are given. But we will not
debate with a madman. <245>
The good master thus only shows his fondness for inferences
when he advances an inference even where it is not appropriate.
It is not fitting, however, for a Mādhyamika himself to formulate
an autonomous inference of his own since he does not admit
any thesis. Accordingly, Āryadeva says (Catuḥśataka XVI, v. 25):

Whoever holds no thesis, be it existence, non-existence,

or both existence and non-existence, to refute him is
not possible however long [one tries].

It is also said in Averting of Quarrels (Vigrahavyāvartanī) (see

above S. 203f.):

v. 29
If I were to advocate any kind of thesis, then this fault
would result from it for me. But I do not advocate any
thesis. Therefore no fault applies to me.
v. 30
If I were to apprehend anything, then I would put
forward and refute theses based on objects observed
through sensory perception, etc. Since this is not the
case, no reproach applies to me.

However, if the Mādhyamika does not put forward any

autonomous inference, then what has he to do with the
autonomous inference (see above S. 227f.): “The inner spheres do
not arise from themselves,” against which the Sāṃkhyas bring
forth their objections by saying: “What is the sense of this thesis?
260 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Does it mean that (things do not arise) from themselves insofar

as they have the nature of the effect, or insofar as they have the
nature of the cause? <246> What follows from this? If it means
insofar as they have the nature of the effect, then only something
already proven is proven. If on the other hand, it means insofar
as they have the nature of the cause, then this is a contradiction
with regard to content, since everything that arises does so after
it has already existed in the form of the cause.” What do we have
to do with the reason (see above S. 227): “Because they already
exist”? This [reason] only proves what is already proven, or it
contains a contradiction with regard to content, so that we then
have the work of invalidating this proving of what has been
proven or this contradiction with regard to content. So since
no objections brought forth by the opponent ensue for the
Master Buddhapālita, he also does not have to invalidate
them. . . .
The view opposed to the undesired consequence concerns
only the opponent, but not us, since we do not put forward any
thesis of our own, and thus no contradiction to our own doctrine
results. If on the other hand, the various objections apply to the
opponent because the opposite of the undesired consequence
holds true, then this is fine with us. Indeed, why should the
Master Buddhapālita, who follows the unmistaken doctrine of
the Master Nāgārjuna, make contestable statements so that the
opponent would be able to find an opportunity to attack? And
why should the view opposed to the undesired consequence
result for the proponent of the doctrine of the essencelessness
(of things), if he holds up un undesired consequence to the
follower of the doctrine of an intrinsic nature (of things)? After
all, words are not persecutors that rob the speaker of his
freedom. Rather, insofar as they have the appropriate capacity
for expression, they depend upon that which the speaker wishes
to express. Therefore, since bringing forward an <247>
undesired consequence has the sole purpose of refuting the
 Candrakīrti 261

thesis of the opponent, the view opposed to the undesired

consequence in no way necessarily results from it.

As for Candrakīrti’s relationship to the Yogācāra school, in

accord with his fundamental attitude his stance is one of
a fundamental rejection of any adoption of Yogācāra ideas.
In this respect then, he goes beyond Bhāvaviveka. On the
main question though, as to whether cognition is to be
regarded as real or whether it belongs to the unreal
phenomenal world, he agrees with him. As this question is
central to the dispute with the Yogācāra school, he sees
no need to take up a position against Bhāvaviveka. And
indeed in the section that disputes the Yogācāra doctrine,
there is no polemic against Bhāvaviveka.

CDE.4. Introduction to the sample from the Madhyamakāvatāra

The section that I render in the following comes from
Candrakīrti’s great original work, the Introduction to the
Madhyamaka Doctrine (Madhyamakāvatāra). This work dis-
cusses the career of a Bodhisattva with reference to the old
doctrine of the ten stages (bhūmi) that a Bodhisattva must
pass through. Philosophically most important is the sixth
chapter, which deals with the sixth of these stages, on which
the Bodhisattva gains the perfection of insight. As befits its
importance, this chapter makes up more than half of the
entire work. It is divided into three parts. The first contains
the proof of the unreality of the external world. The second
combats the false belief in a self. The third, finally, discusses
the sixteen kinds of emptiness, which are already enumerated
in the Prajñāpāramitā texts and also otherwise often dealt with.
The proof of the unreality of the external world shows the same
development that we could see in Bhāvaviveka’s Jewel in the
Hand. The bewildering wealth of in many ways questionable
inferences—as advanced by Nāgārjuna—is given up, and in
262 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

their place we find a single, but thoroughly elaborated line of

argument. Specifically, it is in Candrakīrti the <248> proof—
which also stands at the beginning of Nāgārjuna’s principal
work—that indeed any kind of arising is in reality impossible.
Various digressions are woven into this line of argument, among
them a broad refutation of the Yogācāra doctrine. It is from this
that the following brief sample is taken.
The selection is prefaced [vv. 45–47], according to general
custom, by a brief rendering of the tenets of the opponent
that are to be refuted. I have translated only the verses of
this part without Candrakīrti’s explanation, since they are easily
understandable on the basis of the later presentation of the
Yogācāra doctrine [in our book].
Next [v. 48], Candrakīrti’s polemic begins. In order to prove
the unreality of the external world, the Yogācārins could not use
Nāgārjuna’s line of argument, since it serves as proof that the
entire phenomenal world is unreal, whereas the Yogācāra school
asserts only the unreality of the external world while accepting
the processes of cognizance as real. This made it necessary for
them to find a different way. In doing so they used above all
various examples that were intended to show that cognition is
also possible without really existing external objects. Among
these examples the most popular was once again the dream.
They said: Just as cognition in a dream displays the most diverse
objects, which do not in reality exist, so also the objects that
we believe we see in the waking state are not real. At this
point Candrakīrti’s polemic begins and in accordance with the
aforementioned fundamental view of the Mādhyamikas, he
tries to show that not only the external world but the entire
phenomenal world is unreal. Hence he says: Your example
proves nothing because in a dream not only the seen objects but
cognition as well is unreal.
 Candrakīrti 263

The Yogācāra replies [v. 49]: Cognition in a dream is real

because we can remember it.
Candrakīrti answers: We can also remember the objects seen
in a dream.
Now [v. 50], the Yogācārin formulates his doctrine more
precisely: In a dream it is not a matter of [sensory] perception
but of mental cognition (manovijñāna), whereby the image is
erroneously projected as external; and the same applies for
cognition during <249> the waking state.
In contrast to this, Candrakīrti holds fast [v. 51] to the view
that in this case also, cognition is just as unreal as its object.
He elaborates this further as follows: According to the Buddha’s
doctrine—as it holds true for all Buddhist schools—perception
does not arise due to the fact that someone sees, but because
the perceived visible form and the eye jointly bring about a
visual cognition. Now, if the visible form and the eye are not
real, then of course the cognition cannot be real.
This is valid for all six types of cognitions, including the
mental cognition [v. 52]. And nothing changes in this regard
even if one points out that only as a constituent of the sphere
of the factors (dharmāyatana) is the visible form an object of
the mental cognition. For if one were to infer from this that, just
like the visible form and thinking [manas], the mental cognition
of the dream is also real, then the entire example loses its
meaning. The unreality of the objects of waking awareness can
namely no longer be proved by it, since the object [of the
example] itself is presupposed to be real.
Next Candrakīrti cites a few references from the sacred
scripture and then he concludes by interpreting and making
use [v. 53] of the opponent’s example from his own perspective:
Just as in a dream all three factors on which the processes of
cognizance are based appear as real, whereas upon waking
they are recognized as unreal, just so in the case of cognition
during the waking state, the same factors appear at first as real.
 264 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

One who wakes from the dream of ignorance, however, realizes

that these too are unreal. With that, this line of thinking comes
to an end and Candrakīrti moves on to the next arguments of his
opponent. These follow in a long series, from whose rendering
we must, however, refrain.

CDE.5. From the “Introduction to the Madhyamaka Doctrine”

(Madhyamakāvatāra)
[Chapter six]
45
The Bodhisattva abiding within insight, who has
reached the understanding that reality <250> is only
cognition, understands, since he does not see a grasper
without something grasped, that the threefold exis-
tence (= the triple world) is only cognition.
46
Just as waves arise out of the great ocean through
the impetus of the wind, in the same way, mere
cognition arises out of the so-called fundamental
cognition that contains all seeds through its own
power (śakti).
47
Hence, the dependent nature (paratantrarūpa), which
forms the foundation of all things that exist merely
as designation, exists. It arises without something ex-
ternal that is grasped, it exists, and it lies by nature
outside the sphere of all diversity (prapañca).

To this is to be said:

48 a
The mind exists without something external – as where?
 Candrakīrti 265

This is to be examined in detail.

(The opponent) says:

As in a dream. (48 b)

If one sleeps in a tiny room, one dreams—deceived by sleep—of

a herd of raging elephants within the house. But they are not
[actually] present in any way. Since therefore no external object
exists, this cognition [without the existence of an external object]
must of necessity be accepted.
In order to show that this is also not sound, the (author) says:

This is to be investigated. (48 b)

How so?
(In answer) he says:

Since according to our view the mind in a dream also

does not exist, your example is not valid. (48 c–d) <251>

According to our view, the cognition that bears the form of the
raging herd of elephants exists no more than the object, because
it is not arisen. But if this cognition does not exist, then there
is no example accepted by both parties, and it is therefore not
correct that cognition exists without an external (object).
Now, one might think that if there were no erroneous
cognition in the dream, then, upon waking, one could not
remember what was perceived in the dream. But this is also
not correct, since:

49 a–b
If mind exists because a dream is remembered in the
waking state, then it is the same for the external object.
266 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

How so?

Just as you remember: “I have seen,” just so there is

also the memory of the external object. (49 c–d)

As the mind exists due to the memory of the perception in

the dream, likewise, the object must necessarily exist due to the
existence of the memory of the perception of the object, or the
cognition also does not exist.
(Opponent:) If the visible form (rūpa) of the elephants, etc.,
existed in the dream, then, in order to apprehend it, the visual
cognition would also have to exist. But this is not the case since
within the bewilderment of sleep the groups of the five (sense-)
cognitions cannot come about.
In other words

50
if you [i.e., the Yogācāra] hold: Because a visual
cognition is not possible in sleep, no (object) exists.
<252> But the mental cognition exists. And just as its
appearing form in the dream is conceived as external,
so it is also the case here (in the waking state).

In a dream, a visual cognition does not exist in any way, and

because it does not exist, the form of the elephants, etc., which
could be apprehended as the visual sphere (āyatana), also does
not exist. But the mental cognition is there. Even if therefore an
external visible form (rūpa) does not exist, nevertheless, there can
be no objection to the appearing form of cognition being
conceived as external. Therefore, just as in a dream, only the
cognition arises without anything external existing, so it is also
the case here.
 Candrakīrti 267

(Answer:) It is not like this, because in a dream, a mental

cognition cannot arise. Since

51 a–b
just as for you [i.e., the Yogācāra] no external object
arises in the dream, so also no mind arises.

Thus

all three, the eye, the object of the eye, and the cog-
nition arising out of them, are untrue. (51 c–d)

Just as in the perception of a visible form the eye, the visible

form, and the cognition—these three—appear together, so also
in the apprehension of an object in a dream, these three are
perceived to occur together. And as here the eye and the visible
form do not exist, so also visual cognition does not exist.
And like these three, so

52 a
also the other groups of three, the ear, etc., do not arise.

With the words “ear, etc.,” are the sound, auditory cognition,
etc., up to thinking, the sphere of the <253> factors, and mental
cognition included. Thus in a dream, all these groups of three
are untrue. Therefore it is also impossible that mental cognition
exists in a dream.
(Opponent:) The visible form belonging to the sphere of the
factors is recognized by the mental cognition, and this does exist
in a dream. Therefore it is not at all correct that the cognition is
without an object.
(Answer:) This is also not correct because in sleep the three do
not exist in any case. If, however, we were to accept it in order to
refute the doctrine of the opponent, then the example of the
268 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

dream loses its meaning, since with an example whose subject-

matter is not established as untrue, a real subject-matter cannot
be established as untrue. Thus because in dreams these three
are altogether untrue, it follows from this—since through that
which is proved the non-proved is proved—that also in the
waking state all factors are without intrinsic nature. Hence, (the
author) says:

Just as in a dream, so also here in the waking state

things are untrue and the mind does not exist; and also
the sense faculties do not exist, since they do not have
an [existing] object. (52 b–d)

Just as in a dream the object, sense faculties, and cognition are

untrue, so are they also in the waking state. This is to be under-
stood in this way. Hence it is also rightly stated:

Just as living beings created through a magical illusion

appear to be perceived, but in truth are not real, so—as
the Perfected One has taught—are the factors, like a
magical illusion and like a dream.

Further:

The entire course of existence is like a dream. No one is

born and no one dies. No being, no soul, and no
individual are to be apprehended. <254> All of these
factors are like foam or a (hollow) bamboo reed.

And so forth.
Thus we have said that, with regard to the cognition in the
waking state, the entire triad is not arisen. In a dream then—
with regard to the cognition of the one dreaming the dream—
 Candrakīrti 269

53 a–b
just as here in the waking state, as long as he does not
awaken, the triad exists.

Just as for someone who is considered to be awake—although

he is submerged in the sleep of ignorance—because he is free
from the sleep that is different from that [sleep of ignorance],
this triad—although by its intrinsic nature not arisen—exists
since he observes it, because due to the sleep of ignorance he
dreams a dream; so for those who are not free from sleep and
who have not arisen from the dream state, the corresponding
triad exists.

Just as this triad does not exist upon waking, just so

it is the case when one awakens from the sleep of
delusion. (53 c–d)

Just as for one who has awakened from sleep the triad seen does
not exist, so for those who have completely shaken off the sleep
of ignorance and who have brought to mind the element of the
factors (dharmadhātu) in direct perception, the triad does not
exist. Thus, it is not correct that cognition (alone) exists without
external (objects).

With this we conclude our overview of the development

of the Madhyamaka school. Of their better-known represen-
tatives from the later period, Śāntideva (around 700 c.e.)
is more significant as a poet than as a philosopher. <255>
Tibet’s great apostle Śāntirakṣita (middle of the eighth
century) deserves particular mention along with his student
Kamalaśīla, who attempted, in the style of Bhāvaviveka, a
blending of the Madhyamaka- with the Yogācāra-doctrine.
After him the school produced no further significant
personalities and gradually became extinct on Indian soil.
270 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

It should still be mentioned, however, that the tantric

schools of Buddhism, with their mystical cults and magical
rites, are based to a great extent on the ideas of the
Madhyamaka school.
CE. The school of Sāramati
Before we proceed to the examination of the second great
Mahāyāna school, the school of the Yogācāra, we must at
least briefly mention a small school, which I call the school
of Sāramati, after its most important representative. It deserves
mentioning not just because it is itself noteworthy and demon-
strates the multiplicity of currents in the Mahāyāna, but most
importantly because it strongly influenced the actual founder
of the Yogācāra school, Maitreyanātha. Among the works of the
Sāramati school, the Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra (The Treatise on
the Development of the Mahāyāna Faith), attributed to an
Aśvaghoṣa, is the most well-known in Europe. But historically,
Sāramati is more significant. He had a long lasting effect
whereas—in India at least—the Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra soon
disappeared. Indeed, it is not impossible that this work actually
originated in China. Therefore only Sāramati will be briefly
taken into account here.

CEA. Sāramati (ca. 250 c.e.)

According to tradition, Sāramati came from Central India and
lived not long after Nāgārjuna. We are in possession of two
of his works. The more important is the Ratnagotravibhāga
(Elucidation of the Germ of the [Three] Jewels), <256> mostly
called Uttaratantra (The Ultimate Doctrine). The title of the
second, which is preserved only in Chinese translation, is
usually rendered as Dharmadhātvaviśeṣatāśāstra (Treatise on the
Non-difference of the Element of the Factors).
272 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

The doctrine that is set down in these works stands in

stark contrast to the Prajñāpāramitā and to Nāgārjuna. Whereas
in these latter, the unreality of the external world is the focus
of interest [S. 149, 171ff.] and the inconceivability of the ultimate
state of being is so strongly emphasized that it finally recedes
entirely into the background and disappears almost into
nothingness [S. 147f., 174], Sāramati deals primarily with the
ultimate state of being, which has for him a decidedly posi-
tive character and a strong similarity to the world soul of
the Vedānta. This ultimate state of being is stainless (amala) or
luminous mind (prabhāsvaraṃ cittam). It is also designated
as suchness (tathatā). But usually, it is called element (dhātu)
or, more precisely, true element (paramārthadhātu), element
of the factors (dharmadhātu), and element of the Buddhas
(buddhadhātu). It is not at all inconceivable, but is character-
ized by clearly distinctive qualities, that is, by stains (mala)
[or faults (doṣa)] as well as by virtues (guṇa). First and foremost,
the four perfections—purity, self, bliss, and permanence—are
attributed to it. But whereas the faults are adventitious
(āgantuka) and do not affect its nature, the virtues are
inseparably connected with its nature, like light rays with the
sun.
The ultimate state of being is the foundation of the entire
phenomenal world. Through incorrect thinking (ayoniśo-
manaskāra) the deeds and defilements (karmakleśa) arise and
through these the groups (skandha), spheres (āyatana), and
elements (dhātu) out of which the phenomenal world is com-
posed. Since the ultimate state of being is omnipresent, it is
also innate in all living beings and they all, therefore, possess
the germ (gotra) of buddhahood. In ordinary individuals,
though, it is impure, in noble ones, partly pure and partly
impure, and completely pure only in Buddhas. In its completely
pure form it is thus buddhahood (buddhatva), <257> the noble
truth (āryasatya), and extinction (nirvāṇa).
 Sāramati 273

The true nature of the Buddha, therefore, is the ultimate

state of being. This is [the Buddha’s] body of the doctrine
(dharmakāya), which alone is genuinely true (paramārthakāya).
His worldly body (rūpakāya), which appears in twofold form,
is on the other hand only seemingly (true) (samvṛtikāya) and
relates to the body of the doctrine as the [moon’s] reflection in
water does to the moon. The bodies of the Buddha possess
the various characteristics and virtues, which are ascribed to
it by scholasticism. Through them the Buddha brings about the
liberation of beings, but without striving (ābhoga) and without
the ultimate state of being—which makes up his body of the
doctrine—moving [in any way] or suffering any kind of change.
All of this is elaborated on in great length; yet this brief
indication must suffice here.
The translated samples that follow are taken from various
parts of the Ratnagotravibhāga and are meant to illustrate the
doctrines outlined above. A continuous translation of longer
sections is not advisable due to the affected and unmethodical
arrangement of the text. In terms of the details, few explanations
are necessary. The first series of verses (I, vv. 49–63) deals
with the arising of the phenomenal world out of the ultimate
state of being, which is compared with the creation of the world,
wherein, according to Buddhist doctrine, first the wind arises,
then the water and, finally the earth. The second series of
verses (I, vv. 40–47) deals with the ultimate state of being as
the germ of buddhahood, innate in all living beings; more
specifically, in worldly persons in impure [form], in the noble
ones in partly pure [form], and in the Buddhas in completely
pure form. In its pure form the ultimate state of being thus
also constitutes buddhahood as well as liberation, which two
are therefore identical in nature (I, vv. 84 and 87). The next series
of verses (II, vv. 3–7) describes buddhahood as the ultimate state
of being. The two obstructions mentioned here—obstruction
of defilements and obstruction to what is to be known—and
 274 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

the two forms of liberating knowledge [—nonconceptual

knowledge and subsequently attained knowledge—] recur in
the doctrine of the Yogācāra school and will be explained
there (S. 267 and 300f., etc.). Next comes a description of the
two bodies of the Buddha (III, vv. 1–4). The body of the doc-
trine is attained through the freeing of the ultimate state of
being—innate in beings—from all adventitious stains. <258>
Scholasticism attributes to it ten powers, four fearlessnesses,
and eighteen qualities unique to the Buddha. The worldly body
arises in the cycle of existences through the maturation of
deeds. It possesses the thirty-two marks that distinguish
a great man in Indian mythology. Lastly, the final series
of verses (IV, vv. 53–64) deal with the activity of the Buddha
whose uniqueness is elucidated through comparison with the
activity of the god Brahman and of the sun.

CEA.1. From the “Elucidation of the Germ of the (Three) Jewels”

(Ratnagotravibhāga)
Chapter I
49
Just as space, by nature free from conceptions, pervades every-
where, so the element, consisting of the natural stainlessness of
the mind, pervades everywhere.
[...]
51
Since it is connected in an adventitious way with faults and
endowed by nature with virtues, the constitution of unchanging-
ness accrues to it, before and after.
52
Just as, due to its subtlety, the omnipresent space does not
become soiled, so this (element) that exists everywhere in beings,
is not soiled.
 Sāramati 275

53
Just as worlds arise and vanish everywhere in space, so the
sense faculties vanish and arise in the unconditioned element.
<259>
54
Just as space has never yet been consumed by fires, so the fires
of death, sickness, and old age do not consume this [element].
55
Earth is based on water, water on wind, wind on space. Space,
however, is not based on the elements of wind, water, and earth.
56
Likewise, the groups, elements, and sense faculties are based on
deeds and defilements. Deeds and defilements are always based
on incorrect thinking.
57
Incorrect thinking is based on the purity of mind. The nature of
mind, however, is not based on all the factors.
58
Groups, spheres, and elements are to be seen as akin to the
element of earth. Deeds and defilements of embodied beings
are to be seen as akin to the element of water.
59
Incorrect thinking is to be seen as akin to the element of wind;
the nature (of mind), which is without root and without founda-
tion, is akin to the element of space.
60
Incorrect thinking adheres to the nature of mind. Defilements
and deeds originate from incorrect thinking. <260>
61
The groups, spheres, and elements originate from the “water”
of deeds and defilements. They arise and vanish, just as
this [“water” of deeds and defilements] is created and de-
stroyed.
276 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

62
The nature of mind, just like the element of space, knows no
cause, no condition, and no totality (of causes and conditions),
no arising, no vanishing, and no abiding.
63
This luminous nature of mind, just like the sky, never suffers
any change. Through the adventitious stain of passion, etc.,
which arises from false conceptions, it does, however, experience
pollution.
[... ...]
40
If the element of the Buddhas did not exist, then there would
be no weariness with suffering and there would be no wishing,
no desire, and no aspiration for extinction.
41
If the germ (gotra) exists, the faults and the suffering of existence
as well as the virtues and the bliss of extinction are seen. In
(those) in whom the germ is absent, this is not the case.
[...]
45
Since the suchness of worldly individuals, noble ones, and
enlightened ones is not different, the beholders of <261> truth
have proclaimed that this germ of the Buddhas (jinagarbha) is
present in (all) living beings.
46
Worldly individuals are trapped in error. For those who have
seen the truth (the noble ones), it is the other way around. Truly
free from error and free from diversity are the perfected ones.
47
The element of beings, of Bodhisattvas, and of the perfected ones
is designated, respectively, as impure, impure and pure, and
completely pure.
[...]
 Sāramati 277

84
Since this is the body of the doctrine, the perfected one, the noble
truth, and true extinction, there is no extinction apart from
buddhahood because its qualities are inseparable from it, like
the light rays from the sun.
[...]
87
Enlightenment, in all aspects, and the removal of stains along
with their permeation, [i.e.,] buddhahood and extinction, are
thus in truth one and the same.
[...]

Chapter II
3
Buddhahood—which, as is taught, is luminous in nature;
which, like the sun and space, is covered by the adventitious
obstructions of defilements and <262> to what is to be known,
as by the cloak of a dense veil of clouds; which, endowed with
all the stainless qualities of a Buddha, is permanent, steadfast
and eternal—is attained due to knowledge that consists of the
nonconceptual distinction of the factors.
4
Buddhahood is conditioned by inseparable bright factors and
is characterized, like the sun and space, by two [features:]
knowledge and abandonment.
5
It is endowed with all the luminous qualities of a Buddha, which
outnumber the [grains of] sand on the banks of the Ganges,
are uncreated, and are inseparably attached to him.
6
The obstructions of the defilements and to what is to be
known, because they are unreal by nature, all-pervading and
adventitious, are thus designated as being like clouds.
278 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

7
The two knowledges, the nonconceptual [knowledge] and the
subsequently attained knowledge, are considered to be the cause
of the removal of both obstructions.
[...]

Chapter III
1
The true body and the seemingly [real] body based on it serve
the benefit of oneself and the benefit of others. This fruit is
divided into sixty-four qualities, according to whether it is
based on separation or on the maturation (of deeds). <263>
2
The true body of the sage (= the Buddha) is the foundation of
one’s own fortune. The foundation of the fortune of others is
the body of the worldly truth (sāṃketika).
3
The first body is connected with the qualities based on
separation, the powers, etc., the second with the marks—based
on maturation—of a great man.
4
Through the possession of the powers, in relation to the
hindrances of ignorance, the sage is like a thunderbolt. Through
the possession of the fearlessnesses, in the assemblies he is
like a lion. Through the qualities unique to the Perfected One,
he is like the air; through his twofold appearing [as visible
bodies], [he is like] the moon in water.
[...]

Chapter IV
53
Just as Brahman—without departing his Brahman abode—
effortlessly shows his appearance in all the worlds of the gods,
 Sāramati 279

54
so the sage (= the Buddha)—without departing from the body of
the doctrine—is effortlessly visible in all realms to those worthy
of instruction by means of his created (appearances).
55
Just as Brahman does not depart his palace, yet still the gods
see him always in the sphere of desire and the sight of him
takes away their delight in sense objects, <264> so the Perfected
One does not depart from the body of the splendid doctrine, and
yet those worthy of instruction see him always in all worlds and
the sight of him removes all of their stains.
[...]
59
Just as the sun, free of conceptions, wakes the lotuses and ripens
other [crops] by means of its simultaneously radiated rays,
60
so the sun of the Perfected One, free of conceptions, affects
the lotuses of those worthy of instruction by means of the rays
of the splendid doctrine.
[...]
63
Since the sun of the Buddha always spans the entire vault of
the sky of the element of the factors, its (rays) fall on the
“mountains” of those worthy of instruction, according to what
they deserve.
64
Just as, in this world, the sun as it rises, illuminates the whole
world with the span of its thousand rays, and shines, in turn,
on the highest, the middle, and the lowest mountains, so the
sun of the Buddha shines in turn on the crowds of beings.
CF. The Yogācāra school

We turn now to the most important Mahāyāna school, the

school of the Yogācāra. It bears this name because the practice of
yoga played a special role in the circles from which it arose.
<265> Here yoga is understood in a general sense as the entire
striving, the practice, and activation of all virtues demanded
of a future Buddha, a Bodhisattva. Naturally, the description of
the path that a Bodhisattva has to travel was always the central
interest to all the Mahāyāna schools. In this case, however,
it was elaborated on and depicted in a wildly imaginative way
that surpasses anything else of its kind. But even early on,
various philosophical lines of thought emerge alongside this,
although at first to a modest extent. These were later fused
with and expanded through a wide variety of other ideas from
important teachers. In this way a great, all-encompassing system
finally arose.1

1
[For a brief overview of the development of the doctrines of the Yogācāra
(Mahāsaṃghikas, Sāramati, Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga), see Frauwallner’s dis-
cussion of the bearer of cognition and the relationship of highest reality
to phenomenal world in Buddhism in his Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna,
S. 151–59, in Appendix I.]
 The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra 281

CFA. The beginnings of the Yogācāra school: the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra

The most characteristic work produced by the older Yogācāra
school is the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra (Treatise of the Stages of
the Application of Yoga). It is one of the typical gigantic works
that Indian excessiveness so readily created. Tradition names
the heads of the school, Maitreya and Asaṅga, as its authors,
but it is probably a work (of the school), whose development
extended over several generations. The oldest part may be
the Bodhisattvabhūmi (The Stage of the Bodhisattva). In this
the career of the Bodhisattva is described with inexhaustible
imagination in all its details and with bewildering and nearly
stupefying elaborateness, wherein the philosophical completely
recedes behind the tropically proliferative scholasticism of
liberation. A few isolated sections that are also of philosophical
significance are, however, inserted. And since they give a good
idea of the lines of thought from which the development of
the Yogācāra system began, I will render a sample from them.1
In doing so, I abridge them and render only the philosophically
most important pieces, since in and of itself, the work is written
in a peculiar, complicated, and longwinded style. And since
on top of this it is also broadly elaborated what significance the
philosophical insights in question have for the career of the
Bodhisattva, such abbreviations seem to be called for. <266>

1
[Later, S. 306, in the context of introducing chapter VI of the Mahāyāna-
sūtrālaṃkāra, Frauwallner comments that this chapter corresponds to the
section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi that is partially translated here.]
 282 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CFA.1. The divisions of reality {sections 1–8}

The subject of the rendered segment is reality (tattvārtha or
tattva). In accordance with the overtly scholastic manner that
characterizes the entire work, it begins with various divisions
of reality.
The first is superficial and insignificant. It distinguishes the
[true] existence (bhūtatā) of the factors and their totality
(sarvatā), by which [distinction] apparently the extent of the
sphere of reality is meant.
More important, although still peripheral, is the second
division. According to this, there is a fourfold reality or truth,
respective to the mode of cognition of which it is the object.
Specifically, the first [reality] is the object of the view of all
ordinary individuals, thus of the opinio communis; the second is
the object of rational knowledge. This is simple and nothing
special.
Noteworthy, however, is the distinction between the third
and the fourth realities, for the third is the object of knowledge
through which the obstruction of defilements is removed, and
the fourth is the object of knowledge through which the obstruc-
tion to what is to be known is removed.
This distinction is based on an important further develop-
ment of the doctrine of liberation. In the Śrāvakayāna (cf. above
S. 126ff.), the process of liberation had been conceived in such
a way that the defilements are removed through the cognition
of the four noble truths, and that through this the deeds lose
their power and the chain of rebirths comes to an end. In other
words, one was strongly inclined to see the core of the liberating
cognition in the non-existence of a worldly personality. Now,
however, a new fundamental understanding had been reached,
to which much importance was attached: the understanding
of the essencelessness of the phenomenal world. Thus it was
only natural that a role in liberation was attributed also to this
understanding. Nāgārjuna had done this, as we have seen above
 The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra 283

(S. 175f.), in that he made the cognition of the non-existence of

a worldly personality dependent on the cognition of the essence-
lessness of the phenomenal world.
In the long run though this did not suffice. Both cognitions,
each of which seemed so important, had to be brought out
equally as causes of liberation, and this was done in the
following way. Two causes <267> of entanglement in the cycle
of existences were distinguished. The first, in accordance with
the views existing up until then, is the defilements, and so
one spoke of the obstruction of defilements (kleśāvaraṇa). In
addition to this, however, a second obstruction, which prevents
the correct cognition of that which is to be cognized, was now
adopted, and this was called the obstruction to what is to be
known (jñeyāvaraṇa). For its removal, however, this double
hindrance naturally demanded a twofold liberating cognition,
and so it was taught that the obstruction of defilements is
removed by recognizing the essencelessness of the worldly
personality (pudgalanairātmya), while on the other hand, the
obstruction to what is to be known is removed by becoming
aware of the essencelessness of the factors (dharmanairātmya).
This twofold establishment of the bondage and liberation gradu-
ally gained general acceptance, and it is this [establishment]
that forms the basis for the present distinction of the third and
fourth realities, which we thus encounter for the first time here.

CFA.2. The determination of the nature of reality: non-duality &

the middle way & the constitution of the nature of reality
{sections 9–13}
Next follows the actual determination of the nature of reality
and, with this, the philosophically most important part of
this section. It is explained that the nature of reality is based
on non-duality. With this an old idea is taken up, with which
we have already become acquainted in the Ratnakūṭa [S. 167f.]
284 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

and in Nāgārjuna [S. 174ff.]. But here [in the Bodhisattvabhūmi]

it is given a new meaning. The duality, of which reality is
free, is existence and non-existence, which is also Nāgārjuna’s
primary concern. – Nāgārjuna had stated that existence does
not apply because the diversity that is ruled by the law of
dependent origination is not real, but that non-existence also
does not apply because [this diversity] is not completely non-
existent [S. 171f., 174]. – Here [in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, however,]
the same fundamental thought, [i.e., that reality is free of
existence and non-existence,] is given a different form. Existence
does not apply [to reality] because our conceptions of things,
which we project onto them, are unreal. But non-existence,
likewise, does not apply, because the ungraspable thing in itself
(vastumātra), on which the conceptions are based, is real. –
According to Nāgārjuna, the things of the phenomenal world
are unreal because they do not conform to the demands of logic
[S. 171f., 175f.]. In addition, the thought appears that these
things are the objects of our conceptions, whereas the ultimate
state of being remains inaccessible to all conceptions. <268> –
Here [in the Bodhisattvabhūmi], it is now maintained that the
appearances themselves are conceptions and as such unreal.
The ultimate state of being, on the other hand, is that which
stands behind these conceptions and is their basis, but it is itself
free from all of the conceptions.
With this, an important shift has taken place. The deception
of a phenomenal world as taught by Nāgārjuna [S. 206f.] has
been replaced by the world as conception. The doctrine of non-
duality is now elaborated upon with this in mind. We should not
regard reality as existent, because our conceptions are unreal.
But we should also not declare it to be non-existent, because
the entity in itself on which the conceptions are based is real
and is not to be denied. This view, which avoids both
extremes of existence and non-existence, is the middle way
 The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra 285

and the correct doctrine, which helps Bodhisattvas to achieve

the highest enlightenment.

CFA.3. The proof of the unreality of the phenomenal world {section 14}
Next there follows an attempt to prove the supposed nature of
reality, specifically through the proof of the unreality of the
phenomenal world. This proof conforms to the new view and
proceeds quite differently than Nāgārjuna [S. 171ff.]. In order
to understand it, the following should be kept in mind.
In the discussion of Śrāvakayāna doctrines we have seen
(S. 119f.) that, at that time, one had come to understand that
not all objects of our cognition are real. The Sautrāntikas in
particular taught that we also speak of things that do not have
a corresponding entity in the real world, and they called such
things existent only by designation (prajñaptisat). We must
therefore assume that these lines of thought were already known
at the time [of the Bodhisattvabhūmi]. But to this we must
also add the following: In those days, in spite of a few note-
worthy attempts, one [the early Yogācārin]1 was not yet able
to distinguish between perception and conceptual thinking
as two [clearly] distinct forms of cognition. They were rather
considered as processes of cognition that belong together and
are similar. One then believed to observe that every process
of cognition is accompanied by “words,” in the sense of either
actual speaking or mental speech (manojalpa). From this it was
concluded that all cognition is not only necessarily connected
with “words,” but also conditioned by them. <269> And since

1
[See S. 330 for Asaṅga’s view that not every cognition is conception,
but only mental cognition. – See in this context also Frauwallner’s comment
in his Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñana, S. 155, that “it is one of the
most characteristic features of the earliest Mahāyāna that it is without a
philosophically clearly defined terminology and a systematics comparable
to the Śrāvakayāna Abhidharma.”]
 286 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

it is we who [falsely] attribute the designations in the form of

“words” [as actually belonging] to the things, it was concluded
that the appearing forms expressed through the designations
were also only [falsely] attributed to the things by us, but that
in reality they are our own conceptions.
Accordingly, and more clearly expressed, the nature of reality
being discussed here is depicted in the following way. Un-
derlying all appearances there is a thing in itself (vastumātra),
which is, however, completely ungraspable and inexpressible.
We impute onto it the various designations (prajñaptivāda) and
thereby the related appearing forms. This imputation (samāropa)
of designations is thus false. But it would be equally false to
deny (apavāda) everything, since the thing in itself, which
underlies the designations and makes the imputation possible
in the first place, is real.

CFA.4. The two proofs of the unreality of the designations

{sections 15–16}
That the designations are in fact not real and cannot be real is
established in two ways.
Firstly, we impute a whole variety of designations to each
thing and, with it, a whole variety of appearing forms. But they
cannot all belong to the nature of the thing, because a thing
cannot have all sorts of natures. But we have no grounds and
hence no justification for seeing the nature of the thing in only
one of these appearing forms. Therefore, we must regard all
of them as unreal.
The second reason is the following. If the designations and
appearing forms that we attribute to the things constituted their
nature, then before this imputation occurs the things would be
essenceless, hence non-existent. Thus also the imputation would
be impossible, since any basis for it is absent. If, on the other
hand, we were to assume that the things already possess the
appropriate nature before we make the imputation, then the
 The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra 287

conceptions connected with the appropriate designations would

have to already appear before we have yet imputed these desig-
nations to the things and have thereby connected them with
each other. But this is not the case.
Consequently, the designations and the appearing forms
connected with them cannot belong to the nature of the things
and are thus not real. <270>

CFA.5. The two errors & the false and correct view of reality
{sections 17–19}
Next comes another longer section, which, however, after what
has been said so far is easily understandable and needs no
further explanation.
This section also proceeds from thoughts already found
in the Ratnakūṭa and in Nāgārjuna (cf. above S. 169f. and 180ff.)
and merely reshapes them in accordance with the new views.
We are concerned here with the two errors that one may make
with respect to the view of reality if one misses the correct
middle way: the error of one-sided affirmation and the error
of one-sided negation. The first error, in which one believes
exclusively in existence, consists, according to the new view, in
the fact that the appearing forms imputed upon the thing in
itself are regarded as real. The second, in which one believes
exclusively in non-existence, consists in the fact that one also
regards the thing in itself as unreal. And just as in the Ratnakūṭa
and in Nāgārjuna, here too it is explained that the second error
is by far the more fatal, because it is impervious to correction.
Finally, the false and correct views of reality are discussed as
the false and correct views of emptiness. This idea as well is
elaborated according to the new way of thinking, but already the
very expressing of it by using the word emptiness shows the
connection with the old.
In conclusion an attempt is made to support the doctrine
presented by means of passages from the sacred scripture.
 288 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

This is not rendered here. The presentation then moves on to

other topics.

CFA.6. From the “Stage of the Bodhisattva” (Bodhisattvabhūmi)

[From] part 1, chapter IV
{1} What is reality? In brief, it is twofold. With respect to the manner
of existence of the factors, [it is] their [true] existence (bhūtatā).
With respect to the extent of their existence, [it is] the totality
(sarvatā) of the factors. In this way, [true] existence and totality
<271> are, in brief, to be considered as reality.
{2} Further, reality is—divided according to its varieties—
fourfold: that which is accepted in the [ordinary] world [loka];
that which is accepted based on rational arguments [yukti];
the sphere of knowledge [jñānagocara] purified of the obstruction
of defilements; and the sphere of knowledge purified of the
obstruction to what is to be known.
{3} [As for the first,] when all ordinary people, based on knowl-
edge that is in accordance with convention, custom, habit, or
tradition, have a shared view with respect to any given thing:
for example, with respect to the earth: “This is earth and not
fire“; and just as with earth, so with respect to fire, water, wind;
with respect to visible forms, sounds, odors, tastes, tangibles;
with respect to food and drink, vehicles, ornaments . . .; with
respect to pleasure and pain: “This is pain and not pleasure” and
“This is pleasure and not pain”; in brief: “This is this and not
something else; this is so and not some other way”; – this thing
then—which is the object of a very particular view, which is
accepted by all ordinary people by means of their own
conception as based on an opinion handed down by means of
a continuous tradition, and which is accepted without having
been pondered, weighed and investigated—that is called reality
accepted in the [ordinary] world.
{4} [As for the second,] what is the reality that is accepted based
on rational arguments? A recognizable thing that by sensible
 The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra 289

people who are skilled in what is reasonable, who are smart,

who know logic, are versed in methodical investigation, and
belong to a stage governed by logic on which their own flashes
of insights are valid and which is connected with the sphere
of worldly people and with methodical investigations, (thus
a thing that, by such people,) is proven and established—with
the help of <272> the means of valid cognition, that is, sensory
perception, inference, and authoritative tradition—as an object
of clearly determined knowledge through demonstrations,
proofs, and rational arguments, this is called reality accepted
based on rational arguments.
{5} [As for the third,] what is the reality that is the sphere of
knowledge purified of the obstruction of defilements? (That
reality) that is the sphere and object of uncontaminated
[anāsrava] knowledge,1 of the knowledge that brings about
uncontaminated knowledge, and of the worldly knowledge of
all Hearers (śrāvaka) and Solitary Buddhas (pratyekabuddha)
attained subsequent to the uncontaminated knowledge, that
is called reality that is the sphere of knowledge purified of the
obstruction of defilements. By means of this object-support,
knowledge is purified of the obstruction of defilements and
henceforth remains in this state of unobstructedness. Thus one
speaks of a reality that is the sphere of knowledge purified of the
obstruction of defilements.
{6} What, then, is this reality? The four noble truths: suffering,
the origin, the cessation, and the path. Whoever clearly dis-
tinguishes and comprehends these four noble truths, in him
arises this knowledge [purified of the obstruction of defile-
ments] as soon as he clearly comprehends them. This clear
comprehension of the truths in turn arises in Hearers and
Solitary Buddhas, when—through insight connected with the

1
The vision of the noble truths is designated as uncontaminated
knowledge.
 290 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

arising and ceasing of the dependently arisen formations, <273>

based on the constant consideration of the non-existence of a
person apart from the groups—they perceive only the groups
and do not perceive a self as an object distinct from the groups.
{7} [As for the fourth,] what is the reality that is the sphere of
knowledge purified of the obstruction to what is to be known?
A hindrance to knowledge with respect to what is to be
known is called obstruction. (That reality, then,) which is the
sphere and object of knowledge freed from the obstruction to
what is to be known, is to be regarded as the reality that is
the sphere of knowledge purified of the obstruction to what is to
be known.
{8} What, then, is this reality? (It is that reality) that is the sphere
and object of the knowledge of the Bodhisattvas and exalted
Buddhas, (that knowledge) that is aimed at penetrating into the
essencelessness of factors, that is completely pure, and that, in
view of the inexpressible nature of all factors, realizes the nature
of designations free of conceptions as completely the same (?).
That is that highest suchness (tathatā), the unsurpassable [such-
ness], which forms the limit of the knowable, in the face of which
the correct distinguishing of all factors retreats and to which it
does not extend.
{9} Further, with regard to the characteristic of reality, it should
be understood—in light of its determination—as being called
forth by non-duality. Existence and non-existence are designated
as duality [dvaya].
{10} Therein, existence [bhāva] is that which is determined as
the nature of designations (prajñaptivādasvabhāva), that which has
been conceived by people in this way for a long time, and that
which is, for the people, the root of the diversity of all
conceptions [sarvavikalpaprapañcamūla]: e.g., corporeality [i.e.,
visible form, etc.] or sensation, ideation, formations, and
cognition; the eye or the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind;
earth or water, fire and <274> wind; visible form or sound, odor,
 The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra 291

taste, and the tangible; the good, the bad, or the undetermined;
arising or ceasing; the dependently arisen; what is past, future,
or present; the conditioned or the unconditioned; this world
or that world; both, sun and moon; what is seen, heard,
thought of, and cognized; what is acquired and searched for,
or what is contemplated and reflected in the mind; up to,
finally, nirvāṇa. The nature of the factors that is constituted in
this way and that is—for the people—firmly attached to desig-
nations is called existence.
{11} Therein, non-existence [abhāva] is the thinglessness and sign-
lessness of the designation “corporeality,” etc., up to, finally, the
designation “nirvāṇa”; the entire and complete non-existence and
non-presence of a basis for the designations, based on which the
designations could be used. That is called non-existence.
{12} That thing [vastu] included within the characteristic of the
factors that is free from the above-mentioned existence and from
this non-existence, from both of these, from existence and non-
existence, that is the non-duality [advaya]. This non-duality is
the middle way, is free from both extremes and is designated as
the unsurpassable [niruttara]. The completely pure knowledge
of the exalted Buddhas is to be regarded as being aimed at
this reality. The knowledge of the Bodhisattvas, brought about
on the path of training, is [also] to be regarded as being aimed
at this reality.
{13} For the Bodhisattva, this insight is a precious means for the
attainment of the highest perfect enlightenment . . .
{14} Through what kind of rational arguments, then, can the
nature of all factors be recognized as inexpressible [nir-
abhilāpya]? Every designation of the intrinsic characteristic
(svalakṣaṇa) of the <275> factors, e.g., “corporeality” or “sensa-
tion,” etc., – as above, up to, finally – or “nirvāṇa,” is to be
regarded as a mere designation, [i.e.,] not as the intrinsic nature
[of the factors itself] and not as a sphere or object of speech that
is [completely] separate and distinct from [the intrinsic nature].
 292 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

That being the case, the nature of factors does not exist in the
way it is expressed. But it is also not completely absent. But how
does it exist if it does not exist in the way [it is expressed] and
yet is not completely absent? Free from the false view that
consists of the affirmation of something unreal, and free from
the false view that consists of the denial of something real, it
exists. This true nature of all factors is, further, to be regarded
exclusively as the sphere of nonconceptual knowledge.
{15} If, further, all factors [dharma] and each thing [vastu] were
so constituted as the expression used for these factors and that
thing, in this case a single factor and a single thing would have
many and different intrinsic natures. For what reason? Since
many and different designations are attributed (upācāra), by
means of many expressions, to a single factor and a single thing.
With respect to these many and different designations, however,
a fixed rule cannot be found according to which a particu-
lar single designation belongs to the nature, constitution, and
intrinsic nature of this factor and this thing, but not the other
remaining designations. Hence, all designations do not belong,
either as wholly or in part, to the nature, to the constitution,
and to the intrinsic nature of all factors and all things.
{16} If, further, the above-mentioned factors, corporeality, etc., had
the designation as their nature, in this case, at first the thing
would be present, and <276> then the designation would
be attributed to it at will. Thus before the attribution of the
designation and for as long as the attribution of the designation
has not yet taken place, this thing and this factor would be
without an intrinsic nature. But if the intrinsic nature is absent,
then the designation—for which (in this case) the thing is
lacking—would not be possible. And if no attribution of the
designation takes place, then it is also not possible that the
factor or the thing has the designation as its nature.
If, on the other hand, before the attribution of the designa-
tion, corporeality already had the nature of corporeality and
 The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra 293

subsequently this nature of corporeality were to be addition-

ally attributed to corporeality by means of the designation, in
this case even without this attribution of the designation
“corporeality” with respect to the factor designated as corpo-
reality and the thing designated as corporeality, the cognition
of corporeality would appear. But it does not appear.
Thus, for this reason and because of these rational arguments,
the nature of all factors is to be recognized as inexpressible. And
just as for corporeality, this also applies to the rest of the factors
mentioned: sensation, etc., up to, finally, nirvāṇa.
{17} About the two that follow, one should know that they have
fallen away from the rule of this doctrine [dharmavinaya]:
[1] he who—with respect to factors, such as visible form,
etc., and with respect to a thing, such as corporeality, etc.—
clings to their intrinsic characteristic, which is by nature only a
designation, by attributing something unreal to them, and [2] he
who invalidates the thing—which as the foundation is the occa-
sion for the designation, which as the support is the occasion for
the designation, and which in its inexpressible self is truly real—
by denying it and saying: “It does not exist at all.”
As for the errors, firstly, <277> that follow from attributing
something unreal, these have already been described, made
known, clarified, and explained previously: i.e., the errors due
to which one is to be regarded as having fallen away from the
rule of this doctrine, because one attributes something unreal to
a thing such as corporeality, etc. Why, on the other hand, he who
overturns everything by denying the thing in itself [vastumātra]
in factors such as visible form, etc., has fallen away from the
rule of this doctrine, this I will now state.
For him who, with respect to factors such as visible form, etc.,
denies the thing in itself, both are not possible, neither reality
[tattva] nor designation [prajñapti]. Because, namely, just as the
designation of person is possible if the groups, corporeality, etc.,
exist, but not if they do not exist, since then the designation
294 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

of person would be without a thing; in the same way, the

bestowing of the designation of factor, such as visible form,
etc., is possible if, with respect to the factors visible form, etc., the
thing in itself exists but not if it does not exist, since then the
bestowing of the designation would be without a thing. For
indeed when a thing does not exist for the designation, then
the designation also does not exist, since it has no foundation.
If therefore, after having heard the sutras belonging to
the Mahāyāna—which are difficult to understand, profound,
connected with emptiness, and intended with a specific mean-
ing—some people, because they do not correctly understand and
do not correctly ascertain the meaning of what is taught,
advocate—as a result of a mere unskillful attempt at reasoning—
the following view and the following doctrine: “All of this is
mere designation; that is the truth, and whoever sees thus, sees
correctly,” then for these (people), this designation too does not
exist at all since the thing in itself as the foundation of the <278>
designation is absent. How then is reality supposed to be mere
designation? In this way, they thus deny both reality and desig-
nation, and also both together. Hence, because (such a person)
denies designation and reality, he is to be regarded as an arch-
denier. And because he is such a denier, intelligent fellow
disciples should not talk to him and should not associate with
him, for he plunges himself into ruin, and those people who
approve of his views are also plunged into ruin. In this sense the
Exalted One has said: “Better that someone here believes in
a person than that someone wrongly comprehends emptiness.”
For what reason? If a person believes in a person, then he
merely deludes himself about that which is to be known, but he
will not deny all that is to be known. For this reason he will
therefore not be reborn in bad forms of existence. He will not
oppose and will not delude another who seeks the doctrine
and who seeks liberation from suffering, but he will help him
 The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra 295

toward the doctrine and the truth. And he will not be lax in the
observation of the precepts.
Through a wrong comprehension of emptiness, on the other
hand, one is deluded about the thing that is to be known.
Indeed, one even denies all that is to be known. For this reason
one is reborn in bad forms of existence. One plunges another,
who adheres to the doctrine and seeks liberation from suffering,
into ruin. And one is lax in the observation of the precepts. In
this way then, he who denies the real thing has fallen from the
rule of the doctrine.
{18} But in what way is emptiness wrongly comprehended
[durgṛhīta]?
If a particular ascetic or brahmin does not accept that of
which something is empty and also does not <279> accept that
which is empty, then this type of emptiness is called wrongly
comprehended. For what reason? If that of which something is
empty is not present, but on the other hand, that which is empty
is present, then emptiness is possible. If, on the other hand,
everything is absent, what is then supposed to be empty, where
and of what? Also, the emptiness of something [being empty]
of itself is not possible. In this way then is emptiness wrongly
comprehended.
{19} But, in what way is emptiness correctly comprehended
[sugṛhīta]?
If something is regarded as empty of that which is not present
in it, yet that which is then left over is truthfully recognized
as being present here, then this is called truthful, unerring
penetration of emptiness. For example, a factor that is by nature the
designation of visible form, etc., is not present in a thing
designated as visible form, etc., as we have called it above.
Therefore, this given thing designated as visible form, etc., is
empty of the nature of the designation of visible form, etc. So
then what is left of this thing designated as visible form, etc?
That which forms the basis of the designation of visible form, etc.
 296 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Now, if one truthfully recognizes these two, namely, the present

thing in itself and the mere designation of the thing in itself, if
the unreal is not attributed and the real is not denied, if nothing
is added and nothing taken away, nothing is inserted and
nothing eliminated, then true suchness, the inexpressible nature,
is truthfully understood. This is called correctly comprehended
emptiness, well-discerned through correct insight.

CFB. The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra

As with the Madhyamaka school [S. 145ff., 163f.], the sutra
literature also plays a great role in the Yogācāra school, parti-
cularly in the earlier period, and we find several important
thoughts first expressed in sutras. A sample of this should thus
also be given, and I choose for this purpose a work that was
especially esteemed <280> and that most strongly influenced
the development of the school, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra
(Elucidation of the Secret Meaning). With regard to this work,
it is also interesting that it still clearly shows traces of its
gradual formation and so, to a certain extent, reflects the course
of the general development of the school. Its oldest parts fully
adhere to the manner of the Prajñāpāramitā texts, while in
the more recent ones the new philosophical thoughts and the
scholasticism of liberation of the Yogācāra school find
expression.
 The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 297

CFB.1. The doctrine of the threefold nature of things in chapter VI

The section rendered in the following contains a doctrine that
was characteristic of the Yogācāra school throughout the entire
duration of its existence. This is the doctrine of the threefold
nature or the threefold characteristic of things, and connected
with that, the doctrine of their threefold essencelessness. With
the doctrine of the nature of reality, as we have come to know
it in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, one of the fundamental doctrines
of the system was created. It had, however, not yet assumed
the form in which it was to find lasting acceptance. This first
occurred with the doctrine of the threefold characteristic.
The Bodhisattvabhūmi had taught [S. 267ff.] that the phe-
nomenal world is mere conception, but that an ungraspable
and inexpressible thing in itself underlies it, and it had clothed
this view in the form of the old doctrine of the middle way.
The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra chose another form for this. It
distinguished first and foremost between things [insofar] as they
appear to us and things as they really are. This was important
from the point of view of the doctrine of liberation, since on the
view of things as they appear rests entanglement in the cycle
of existences; on the knowledge of how they really are,
liberation. Now, this twofold nature of things is caused by the
fact that in the first case, the appearing forms that actually
belong to conception are attributed to the things, whereas in the
second case, things are free from [the appearing forms]. The
appearing forms belonging to conception are thus the factor
whose presence or absence brings about the twofold nature
of things. Thus they were placed as a third [nature] next to
[this twofold nature], thereby distinguishing a threefold nature
<281> (svabhāva) or a threefold characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of things:
first, the appearing forms that we attribute to things; second,
the things insofar as they present themselves to us in these
appearing forms; and, third, the things insofar as they are free
from these appearing forms. The first nature was called the
298 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

imagined nature (parikalpita svabhāva) because these appearing

forms are mere conception; the second, the dependent nature
(paratantra svabhāva) because the phenomenal world presents
itself to us in this form and its most essential characteristic is
dependent origination; and finally the third, the perfect nature
(pariniṣpanna svabhāva) because it represents the ultimate state
of being in its pure form.
That is the doctrine of the threefold nature of things as the
Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra presents it. It superseded the doctrine
of the nature of reality from the Bodhisattvabhūmi and became
a firm tenet of the Yogācāra system. The threefold break-down
of reality it gives, however, is askew unbalanced and has pre-
sented difficulties time and again. The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra
itself does not completely succeed in clearly following the idea
through, but the systematic found therein conformed to the
Indian style of tending toward numerical categorization, parti-
cularly strongly pronounced in the Yogācāra school. And thus,
this doctrine quickly gained irrevocable acceptance [within the
Yogācāra school].
In the first part of the section of the Saṃdhinirmocana
(= chap. VI) translated below then, this doctrine of the threefold
nature of things is expounded. First the doctrine itself is briefly
formulated [vv. 1–6]. Then [vv. 7–10] it is explained using
examples. As its conclusion [vv. 11–12], the threefold nature is
finally considered from yet another point of view: with respect
to the doctrine of liberation. It is stated that—through correct
insight into the imagined nature—the factors are recognized
as being without characteristic or without a sign, since the
appearing forms belonging to conception are without essence;
that—through correct insight into the dependent nature—the
factors in the state of pollution (saṃkleśa) are recognized, since
the dependent nature represents the nature of the phenomenal
world and hence the cycle of existences; and that—through
correct insight into the <282> perfect nature—the factors in
 The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 299

the state of purification (vyavadāna) are recognized, since the

perfect nature corresponds to the ultimate state of being and
hence liberation. This threefold assumption [with respect to the
doctrine of liberation] did not survive for long. Only the view of
the phenomenal world as a state of pollution and of the ultimate
state of being as a state of purification were incorporated into
the lasting views of the [Yogācāra] system.

CFB.2. The doctrine of the threefold essencelessness of things in

chapter VII and its relation to the doctrine of the
Prajñāpāramitā and of the Mādhyamikas
The subsequent second part of the translation (= chap. VII) deals
with the counterpart to the doctrine of the threefold nature of
things, i.e., the doctrine of the threefold essencelessness, wherein
the threefold nature of things is considered from the viewpoint
of a threefold essencelessness. This doctrine as well has its
special significance and its deeper background. In spite of all
outward connections to and all reliance of the old Yogācāra
school on the doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā and of the
Mādhyamikas, inwardly there is a deep contrast.
Thus far we have only pointed out [S. 268] the difference
that lies in the fact that the Yogācārins replaced Nāgārjuna’s
doctrine of the deception of the phenomenal world with the
view of the world as conception.
Far more essential is, however, the difference in the view of
the highest reality. In Nāgārjuna [S. 174] this [highest reality] is
beyond all conceptions and determinations and indeed cannot
even be described as existent or non-existent. This position of
Nāgārjuna’s is then followed through and held onto with a
logical consistency never again achieved, so that, cloaked in
silence, the highest reality nearly disappears into nothingness.
In the school of the Yogācāra, however, despite all the emphasis
on its inexpressibility, [the highest reality] retains a decidedly
300 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

positive character. Nothing is more typical than the way [1] the
concept of emptiness (śūnyatā)—which dominates everything
in Nāgārjuna—is completely relegated into the background
here and [2] the highest reality is described using other terms
such as, first and foremost, suchness (tathatā). It is also explicitly
stated that only in the form in which it appears to us does the
highest reality not exist and that on the other hand, it does exist
as a thing in itself. Important consequences ensue from this
for the relationship of <283> the highest reality to the phenome-
nal world. No unbridgeable gap exists, and a firm, clearly
conceivable connection takes the place of the mystical unity
of the cycle of existences [saṃsāra] and nirvāṇa, as Nāgārjuna
had taught it [S. 174f.]. This separates the schools of the
Mādhyamikas and the Yogācārins more clearly than anything
else and also determines their very dissimilar development.
For the Yogācārins, however, this dissimilarity brought with
it a significant problem. The numerous sutras, particularly the
Prajñāpāramitā works, which were closely connected with the
Madhyamaka school, and which the Yogācārins also recognized
as the Buddha’s words, spoke explicitly of the emptiness and
essencelessness of all things. How then was this to be reconciled
with their own positive stance toward the phenomenal world
and its underlying reality? In order to circumvent this problem,
they resorted to the favorite assumption (cf. above S. 146) that
with these works one is dealing with texts that do not proclaim
the full truth, but that were rather revealed by the Buddha with
a particular purpose in mind, for a specific audience. It was
said that in this case the Buddha was thinking not of a complete
essencelessness, but only of an essencelessness from a par-
ticular perspective, namely, that of a threefold essencelessness,
corresponding to the threefold nature of things:
The first essencelessness is essencelessness in terms of a char-
acteristic or of a sign (lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā). This corresponds to
 The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 301

the imagined nature as this has no intrinsic characteristic

(svalakṣaṇa) and hence no essence.
The second is essencelessness in terms of arising (utpattiniḥ-
svabhāvatā). It relates to the dependent nature and is based—
apparently in reliance upon Madhyamaka thinking—on the fact
that things arise not from themselves but from other causes.
The third essencelessness, finally, is essencelessness in terms
of the highest truth (paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā). As the name
indicates, it is related to the ultimate state of being. And since
the ultimate state of being is connected with the dependent as
well as with the perfect nature—since these two represent
the ultimate state of being in the states of pollution and of
purification—essencelessness <284> in terms of the highest truth
is also connected with both. More precisely, in the case of the
dependent nature one can speak of an essencelessness in terms
of the highest truth since only the ultimate state of being in
the state of purification is to be regarded as the highest truth.
The perfect nature, in turn, can be considered as essencelessness
in terms of the highest truth since the highest truth consists
precisely in the selflessness or essencelessness of the factors
(dharmanairātmya).
By means of this doctrine of the threefold essencelessness, the
essencelessness of all things as expounded in the Prajñāpāramitā
[S. 149f.] was explained from the point of view of the Yogācāra.
While it is true that this doctrine did not prove fruitful for
the development of the ideas of the system, it was still, with
only a few alterations, continually preserved and remained
firmly connected with the doctrine of the threefold nature.
In the following translation [of chapter VII] the question is
first raised as to why the Buddha taught the doctrine of
the essencelessness of all things. Then the doctrine of the
threefold essencelessness is expounded and briefly explained,
and following that, how the Buddha leads beings to liberation
through this doctrine is elaborated upon in detail.
 302 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CFB.3. From the “Elucidation of the Secret Meaning”

(Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra)
Chapter VI
1
At this, the Bodhisattva Guṇākara asked the Exalted One:
“Exalted One, one speaks of Bodhisattvas who are experienced
in the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) of the factors. In what way, O
Exalted One, are the Bodhisattvas experienced in the character-
istic of the factors? And for what reason does the Perfected One
designate the Bodhisattvas as experienced in the characteristic of
the factors?” <285>
2
When he had said this, the Exalted One spoke as follows to the
Bodhisattva Guṇākara: “Guṇākara, you ask the Perfected One
about this matter for the welfare of many individuals, for the
well-being of many individuals, out of compassion for the
world, for the benefit, for the welfare, and for the well-being of
creatures, including gods and humans. Excellent, excellent! Then
listen, Guṇākara, I will explain experience in the characteristic of
the factors to you.
3
Guṇākara, there are three characteristics of factors. What are
these three? The imagined characteristic (parikalpitalakṣaṇa),
the dependent characteristic (paratantralakṣaṇa), and the perfect
characteristic (pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa).
4
In this, Guṇākara, what is the imagined characteristic of the
factors? It is any attribution of a name and a convention1 for the
factors in terms of their nature or distinction, in order to indicate
them in day to day language.

1
According to the Buddhist view, the connection between word and object
rests on human convention (saṃketa).
 The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 303

5
What, Guṇākara, is the dependent characteristic of factors? It
is the dependent origination of the factors, that is, when this
exists, that comes to be; due to the arising of this, that arises;
that is, dependent on ignorance, formations come into being,
etc., up to: thus the origin of this whole great mass of suffering
comes about. <286>
6
What, Guṇākara, is the perfect characteristic of factors? It is
the suchness of factors, the recognition of [this suchness] by the
Bodhisattvas as a result of their energy and correct observation
(yoniśomanasikāra), and finally, the establishment of the highest
perfect enlightenment through establishment of the practice of
this recognition.
7
Just as [the defect of] an eye disease, Guṇākara, in the eye of
a person who suffers from an eye disease, so is the imagined
characteristic to be seen.
Just as the images of strands of hair, bees, sesame seeds, of
blue, yellow, red, or white appear to such a (person) due to the
eye disease, so is the dependent characteristic to be seen.
And just as the natural sphere, [i.e.,] the errorless object of the
same eye when the eye of the same person has been cleared
and freed of the [defect of] the eye disease, so is the perfect
characteristic to be seen.
8
It is the same, Guṇākara, as with a transparent crystal. If this
[crystal] comes in contact with something blue, it appears like
a sapphire, and in that it is mistaken for a sapphire, it fools
beings. If it comes in contact with something red, it appears
like a ruby, and in that it is mistaken for a ruby, it fools beings.
If it comes in contact with something green, it appears like an
emerald, and in that is mistaken for an emerald, it fools beings.
304 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

If it comes in contact with something yellow, <287> it appears

like gold, and in that it is mistaken for gold, it fools beings.
9
Guṇākara, just as in the case of the transparent crystal, the
contact with the color [is to be seen,] so in the case of
the dependent characteristic, permeation1 through the use of
language—which belongs to the imagined characteristic—is to
be seen.
Just as in the case of the transparent crystal, the erroneous
apprehension of it as sapphire, ruby, emerald, or gold, so in the
case of the dependent characteristic, the [erroneous] apprehen-
sion of it as the imagined characteristic is to be seen.
Just as the transparent crystal itself, so the dependent charac-
teristic is to be seen.
Just as the transparent crystal, in terms of its characteristic
as sapphire, ruby, emerald, or gold, is not permanently and
perpetually given and is without essence, so the perfect char-
acteristic is to be seen, insofar as the dependent characteristic, in
terms of the imagined characteristic, is not permanently and
perpetually given and is without essence.
10
In this, Guṇākara, the imagined characteristic is recognized in
that one relies on the names connected with the images.
The dependent characteristic is recognized in that one relies
on taking the dependent characteristic as being the imagined
characteristic.
And the perfect characteristic is recognized in that one relies
on no longer taking the dependent characteristic as being the
imagined characteristic. <288>

1
The underlying view is that all conceptions and words leave imprints
in the cognition, from which, later, corresponding conceptions again arise.
These imprints, called permeation (vāsanā), take the place of words and
conceptions. Cf., in regard to this, below S. 328f.
 The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 305

11
Now, Guṇākara, in that the Bodhisattvas recognize the imagined
characteristic [attributed falsely to] the dependent characteristic
in accordance with truth, they recognize the factors without
characteristic in accordance with truth.
In that Bodhisattvas recognize the dependent characteristic
in accordance with truth, they recognize the factors in the
characteristic of pollution (saṃkleśa) in accordance with truth.
And in that Bodhisattvas recognize the perfect characteristic
in accordance with truth, they recognize the factors in the
characteristic of purification (vyavadāna) in accordance with truth.
In that Bodhisattvas recognize the factors without charac-
teristic in the dependent characteristic in accordance with truth,
they abandon the factors in the characteristic of pollution. And
in that they abandon the factors in the characteristic of pollution,
they attain the factors in the characteristic of purification.
Thus, Guṇākara, because the Bodhisattvas—by recognizing
the imagined characteristic, the dependent characteristic, and
the perfect characteristic in accordance with truth—recognize
the absence of the characteristic, the characteristic of pollution,
and the characteristic of purification in accordance with truth;
because they—by recognizing the factors without characteristic
in accordance with truth—abandon the factors in the char-
acteristic of pollution; and because they—by abandoning the
factors in the characteristic of pollution—attain the factors in
the characteristic of purification, therefore the Bodhisattvas are
experienced in the characteristic of the factors, and if the
Perfected One designates the Bodhisattvas as experienced in the
characteristic of factors, then he does so because of this. <289>
12
After that, the Exalted One at that time spoke the following stanzas:

If one recognizes the factors without characteristic,

then one abandons the factors in the characteristic of
306 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

pollution. If one abandons the factors in the character-

istic of pollution, [then] one attains the factors in the
characteristic of complete purity.
People who are lazy and overcome by heedlessness,
who do not appreciate the faults of the formations and
are lost in the unstable, by nature fluctuating factors,
are pitiable.

Chapter VII
1
Then the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata said the following
to the Exalted One: “Exalted One, once when I was dwell-
ing alone in solitude, the following reflection came to my
mind: The Exalted One has proclaimed the intrinsic charac-
teristic (svalakṣaṇa) of the [five] groups in many ways. He
has proclaimed the characteristic of arising, the characteristic
of perishing, the avoiding and the recognizing. Just as with
the groups, so he has proclaimed [the intrinsic characteristic,
etc., of] the spheres, dependent origination, and the sustenances
(āhāra).
The Exalted One has proclaimed the intrinsic characteristic
of the truths in many ways. He has proclaimed recognizing,
avoiding, realizing, and practicing.
The Exalted One has proclaimed the intrinsic characteristic
of the [sense-]elements in many ways. He has proclaimed the
variety of the [sense-]elements, the manifoldness of the [sense-]
elements, the avoiding, and the recognizing. . . .
And yet the Exalted One has proclaimed that all factors are
without essence, that all factors are unborn, unceasing, <290>
peaceful from the very beginning, and completely extinct
by nature. With what hidden intention has the Exalted One
proclaimed that all factors are without essence, that all factors
are unborn, unceasing, peaceful from the very beginning, and
completely extinct by nature? I ask the Exalted One about this
 The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 307

matter: ‘With what hidden intention has the Exalted One

proclaimed that all factors are without essence, that all factors
are unborn, unceasing, peaceful from the very beginning, and
completely extinct by nature?’ ”
2
When he had said this, the Exalted One said the following to
the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata: “Paramārthasamudgata,
your reflection is good and has come about correctly. Excellent,
excellent! Paramārthasamudgata, you ask the Perfected One
about this matter for the welfare of many individuals, for the
well-being of many individuals, out of compassion for the world,
for the benefit, for the welfare, and for the well-being of
creatures, including gods and humans. That also is excellent.
Listen then, Paramārthasamudgata, I will explain to you with
what hidden intention I have proclaimed that all factors are
without essence, that all factors are unborn, unceasing, peaceful
from the very beginning, and completely extinct by nature.
3
Paramārthasamudgata, with respect to the threefold essence-
lessness (niḥsvabhāvatā) of the factors, I have proclaimed
that all factors are without essence; that is, with respect
to the essencelessness in terms of characteristic (lakṣaṇa-
niḥsvabhāvatā), to the essencelessness <291> in terms of arising
(utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā), and to the essencelessness in terms of
the highest truth (paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā).
4
In all of this, Paramārthasamudgata, what is essencelessness
of the factors in terms of characteristic? It is the imagined charac-
teristic.
For what reason? – Because in terms of its characteristic, this
[imagined characteristic] is based on names and convention and
is not based on an intrinsic characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), thus it is
called essencelessness of the factors in terms of characteristic.
308 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

5
What, Paramārthasamudgata, is essencelessness of the factors
in terms of arising? It is the dependent characteristic of the
factors.
For what reason? – Because this [dependent characteristic]
arises through the power of extraneous conditions and not from
itself, for this reason it is called essencelessness of the factors in
terms of arising.
6
What, Paramārthasamudgata, is essencelessness in terms of
the highest truth? The dependently arisen factors, which are
without essence due to the essencelessness in terms of arising,
are also without essence due to the essencelessness in terms of
the highest truth.
For what reason? – That which, with regard to the factors,
is the object-support (ālambana) of purification,1 this I have
proclaimed as the highest truth. The dependent characteristic
is not the object-support of purification; therefore it is called
essencelessness of the highest truth.
Further, the perfect characteristic <292> of the factors is also
called essencelessness in terms of the highest truth.
For what reason? – With regard to the factors, the selfless-
ness of the factors (dharmanairātmya) is designated as their
essencelessness. And this [selflessness] is the highest truth. Thus
because the highest truth emerges from the essencelessness of
all factors, it is called the essencelessness in terms of the highest
truth.
7
Just as a skyflower,2 Paramārthasamudgata, so is the essenceless-
ness in terms of characteristic to be seen.

1
I.e., to which the process of purification of liberation applies.
2
The favorite Indian example of something completely unreal is the
skyflower, i.e., a flower that grows in empty space from nothing.
 The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 309

Just as a magical illusion, so is the essencelessness in terms of

arising to be seen and so is one part of the essencelessness in
terms of the highest truth to be seen.
And just as space, which emerges from the mere essenceless-
ness (= the non-existence) of matter and extends everywhere,
so is one part of the essencelessness in terms of the highest truth
to be seen, insofar as it emerges from the selflessness of the
factors and extends everywhere.
8
With respect to this threefold essencelessness, Paramārtha-
samudgata, I have proclaimed that all factors are without
essence.
In so doing, with respect to the essencelessness in terms of
characteristic, I have proclaimed that all factors are unborn,
unceasing, peaceful from the very beginning, and completely
extinct by nature.
For what reason? – Because that which in terms of an intrinsic
characteristic does not exist, has also not been born. But that
which has not been born has also not <293> ceased. That which
has not been born and has not ceased is peaceful from the very
beginning. That which is peaceful from the very beginning
is completely extinct by nature. In that which is by nature
completely extinct, there is nothing that must still be brought
to complete extinction. Thus, with respect to the essencelessness
in terms of characteristic, I have proclaimed that all factors are
unborn, unceasing, peaceful from the very beginning, and
completely extinct by nature.
9
Further, Paramārthasamudgata, with respect to the essenceless-
ness in terms of the highest truth, which emerges from the
selflessness of factors, I have proclaimed that all factors are
unborn, unceasing, peaceful from the very beginning, and com-
pletely extinct by nature.
310 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

For what reason? – Because the essencelessness in terms of

the highest truth—which emerges from the selflessness of fac-
tors—is permanently and perpetually given. As the nature of
the factors (dharmadharmatā), it is, in addition, unconditioned
and completely free from the defilements. But that which is
permanently and perpetually given as the nature of the
factors and is unconditioned, that, because it is unconditioned, is
also unborn and unceasing. And because it is free from all
defilements, it is also peaceful from the very beginning and
completely extinct by nature. Thus with respect to the essence-
lessness in terms of the highest truth, which emerges from
the selflessness of factors, I have proclaimed that all factors
are unborn, unceasing, peaceful from the very beginning, and
completely extinct by nature. <294>
10
I have not, Paramārthasamudgata, proclaimed the threefold
essencelessness because the beings in the realm of beings see
the imagined nature, in terms of its nature, as something distinct
[from the dependent and perfect nature] and because they
see the dependent nature and the perfect nature, in terms of
their nature, as something distinct [from the imagined nature].
On the contrary, beings attribute the imagined nature onto
the dependent and the perfect nature, and thus designate—
according to linguistic usage (vyavahāra)—the dependent and the
perfect nature according to the characteristic of the imagined
nature.
As they now designate [the dependent and the perfect nature]
according to linguistic usage, their mind becomes permeated
by these designations according to linguistic usage. And through
the connection with the designations according to linguistic
usage and through the imprints (anuśaya) of the designations
according to linguistic usage, they cling—with respect to
the dependent and perfect nature—to the characteristic of the
imagined nature. As they now cling to this [characteristic of
 The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra 311

the imagined nature], then due to this cause and this condition—
i.e., that they cling to the imagined nature with respect to the
dependent and perfect nature—a dependent nature is produced
(again) in the future.
And this forms the foundation so that they become polluted
by the pollution [saṃkleśa] of the defilements [kleśa], that they
become polluted by the pollution of deeds and by the pollu-
tion of birth, and that they roam around for a long time in
the cycle of existences, wandering either among hell beings,
among animals, among ghosts, among gods, among demons, or
among humans, since they have not succeeded in leaving the
cycle of existences.

A long description of how beings reach liberation through

the doctrine of the threefold essencelessness of the <295>
factors follows. It ends with the words:

24
Then at that time the Exalted One spoke the following stanzas:

The factors are without essence, the factors are unborn,

the factors are unceasing, the factors are peaceful
from the very beginning, all factors are extinct by
nature: What sensible person would speak in such a
way without a hidden intention?
Essencelessness in terms of characteristic, essence-
lessness in terms of arising, and essencelessness in
terms of the highest truth, this I have proclaimed. The
sensible person who recognizes the hidden intention in
this does not travel the path to ruin.
This is the one path of purification. There is only
one purification, there is no second. For this reason
I proclaim this one vehicle. Yet this is not to say that
there are not beings of various lineages (gotra).
312 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

The beings who, in this realm of beings, attain

nirvāṇa for themselves alone, are innumerable.
However, those who—although they are extinct—
steadfastly and compassionately do not abandon
beings are difficult to find.
The uncontaminated realm of the liberated ones
is subtle, inconceivable to thought, equal, and undif-
ferentiated. It is the fulfillment of all wishes, the
casting away of suffering and defilements. It is without
duality, inexpressible, the lasting treasure.

Then in conclusion the Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata

speaks up and once more summarizes the doctrine as he
has understood it. <296>
CFC. Maitreyanātha (ca. 300 c.e.)
Thus far we have discussed the beginnings of the Yogācāra
school and in doing so, we have pointed out the lavishly
developed scholasticism of liberation. In addition, however, we
have become acquainted with valuable philosophical lines of
thought. These did show several points of contact with the
beginnings of the Madhyamaka school, but above and beyond
that, they contained much that was new and significant. Never-
theless, we are dealing here only with the initial stages of a
development of philosophical thoughts that completely recede
behind the theory and practice of liberation. By no means can we
speak in this connection of a philosophical system. As was the
case with the Madhyamaka school, this was first created through
the activity of a significant personage. Here this personage
appears to have been Maitreyanātha.
Tradition records that the head of the Yogācāra school,
Asaṅga, received teachings from the Bodhisattva Maitreya in
Tuṣita heaven and that Maitreya also revealed various works
to him. Similar traditions are quite common. In the present case,
however, it is striking that the works attributed to Maitreya are
not sutras, as one would expect, but philosophical works like
any others. Asaṅga cannot, however, be the author of these
works since the doctrines expounded in them show a clearly
pronounced originality and distinguish themselves noticeably
from Asaṅga’s own works. We are therefore justified in seeing
in their author a historical personage other than Asaṅga, who
was probably known by the oft handed down name of
Maitreyanātha, and who was only later seen as the well-known
Bodhisattva.
 314 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CFC.1. The works of Maitreyanātha

Maitreyanātha’s most frequently mentioned works are:

• the Abhisamayālaṃkāra
(The Ornament of Clear Comprehension)
• the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra
(The Ornament of the Discourses of the Mahāyāna)
• the Madhyāntavibhāga
(Elucidation of the Middle and of the Extremes)

Buddhists designated as alaṃkāra (“ornament”) works that,

written for the most part in verse and loosely connected with
authoritative texts, provided explanations and augmentations
to these. <297> The first two above-mentioned works are
such alaṃkāras. Specifically, the Abhisamayālaṃkāra seeks to
systematically and lucidly summarize the path of liberation
as described in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (The
Perfection of Insight in Twenty-five Thousand Lines; see above
S. 146f.), whereas the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, while closely
following the structure of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (The Stage of
the Bodhisattva; see above S. 265), yet otherwise with great
latitude, discusses the subjects treated therein. Both works
thus represent an attempt to bring order to the jumble of
the older scholasticism of liberation, but this attempt met with
only limited success. Maitreyanātha has only partially forged
the immense and in many ways reluctant mass of material
into a unity. For the most part, he simply arranged them
according to an external division and thereby gave the thoughts
a clearer form.
The third work, the Madhyāntavibhāga, is of a similar type,
even though it does not rely externally on an older text, as do
the two alaṃkāras. Here as well, important subjects of the
doctrine are treated in such a way that the traditional views
 Maitreyanātha 315

are arranged into the schema of an external division, without

achieving a real unity.
In addition to these incomplete attempts to master the
recorded mass of the scholasticism of liberation, Maitreyanātha,
however, also developed clear philosophical views; a real phi-
losophical system, in fact. Even though in his works—which
indeed deal essentially with the scholasticism of liberation—
philosophical views are only raised occasionally and in a few
disconnected sections, it still becomes apparent that the same
underlying views are always present, which are readily con-
nected to each other and joined together to form one great
whole. And this whole we can then see as the doctrine of
Maitreyanātha and as the first philosophical system of the
Yogācāra school.

CFC.2. The first philosophical system of the Yogācāra: the doctrine of

Maitreyanātha
Seen on a large scale, Maitreyanātha’s doctrine is an ingenious
edifice in which all sorts of older doctrines along with valuable
thoughts of his own have been forged into a unity. <298>
Sāramati’s doctrine [S. 256f.] of the ultimate state of being,
together with his buddhology, forms one essential constituent.
To this are added the philosophical views of the older Yogācāra
school, in particular the doctrine of the three characteris-
tics, augmented and enriched through Maitreyanātha’s own
thoughts. Lastly, all kinds of ideas have also been taken from
the Madhyamaka school. In particular, Maitreyanātha again
and again makes an effort to give his statements the form of
the middle doctrine and, in this way, to establish his doctrine,
instead of the Madhyamaka doctrine, as the true middle way.
 316 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CFC.2.1. The ultimate state of being as the center of the system

In the center of his system stands the ultimate state of being,
which he most often calls the element of the factors (dharma-
dhātu) and less frequently, suchness (tathatā). He speaks of
emptiness (śūnyatā) only in connection with the Madhyamaka
doctrine. This ultimate state of being is the only thing in the
world that really exists, and it is also the basis of the deception
of the phenomenal world. It is itself inexpressible (anabhilāpya)
and without diversity (aprapañcātmaka). To these views, which
are also common to the Madhyamaka school, are added the
fundamental doctrines of Sāramati; primarily the doctrine of the
pure mind. As for Sāramati, so also for Maitreyanātha the
ultimate state of being is mind (citta) and is brightly luminous
(prabhāsvara). First and foremost, however, it is pure by nature
(prakṛtiviśuddha), like water, gold, or space. All pollution, which
the deception of the phenomenal world entails, is merely
adventitious (āgantuka) and cannot touch its essence. And thus
[the ultimate state of being] is also not changed in its nature
through the purification of pollution. Nevertheless, its pollution
and purification are of fundamental importance, since on these
are based bondage and liberation, and the entire deception of the
phenomenal world in general.

CFC.2.2. The ultimate state of being and the phenomenal world

The phenomenal world encompasses all of the factors (dharma).
According to Maitreyanātha, these are based on the ultimate
state of being and cannot exist separately. Rather, the ultimate
state of being constitutes the nature of the factors (dharmatā).
Specifically, their relationship is such that they are neither
distinct nor not distinct. The character of the phenomenal
world itself is best elucidated, in Madhyamaka <299> style,
through comparison to a magical illusion (māyā). Just as, on
some sort of basis, such [an illusion] simulates something that
 Maitreyanātha 317

does not exist in reality, so it is also with the phenomenal

world. The latter is thus unreal with respect to what it simulates,
but it is real as semblance. Consequently, it can be designated
neither as existent nor as non-existent, instead it is at once
existence and non-existence. Other comparisons that elucidate
its nature are the illusion that a good painting produces, or
a dream.

CFC.2.3. The false conception and the deception of the phenomenal

world, etc.
In order to explain the deception of the phenomenal world,
Maitreyanātha says, as did the older Yogācāra school, that it
is conception, i.e., a creation of our cognition. He is not content
with this, however, but goes significantly further, and here he
develops his most valuable original thoughts. Up to this point,
the questions of who the bearer of the conception is and how
it comes about had not been asked. Maitreyanātha asked this.
In doing so he focused on the idea of false conception1 (abhūta-
parikalpa), i.e., of a cognition that conceives of something that
is not real. For Maitreyanātha this false conception is the
foundation of the entire phenomenal world and comes about
in the following way. As already stated, the ultimate state of
being is itself mind and is inherent in all beings as a seed
or element (dhātu). From this element, the false conception
emerges. In this it displays the image of the various things of
the phenomenal world. Among Buddhist schools, it is namely
widely held that the cognition of a thing comes about through
the mind taking on its form. Thus the false conception also
reflects the various things of the phenomenal world. No real

1
[Obviously, unreal conception would be the literal translation of “unwirk-
liche Vorstellung,” but even though Frauwallner qualifies this term at once
and in the next paragraph, the “unreal” in this literal translation could be
read as a statement about the status of the conception itself.]
318 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

things correspond to these reflections in the conception,

however. On the contrary, all factors are just such reflections.
Real things outside of cognition do not exist at all.
The false conception not only reflects the objects of the
seeming external world, however, it also reflects the subject.
It displays, as Maitreyanātha expresses it, the apprehended
[grāhya] as well as the apprehending (grāhaka). It is thus one
of its characteristic marks that <300> it continually simulates
a duality (dvaya). Occasionally, Maitreyanātha makes the attempt
to further structure this duality. Hence he says that conception
reflects, on the one hand, objects and beings; on the other
hand, the self and cognition. In other passages it is stated,
however, that it appears on the one hand, as words, objects, and
bodies; on the other hand, as thinking (manas), view (udgraha),
and conception (vikalpa). He does not seem to have formed firm
views in this respect.
His views concerning the constitution of the mental organism
are also fragmentary. While he usually speaks only of the false
conception, he occasionally distinguishes—as do most Bud-
dhist schools—between mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta).
But he does not elaborate on this any further. It is noteworthy,
however, that he occasionally states explicitly that the defile-
ments (kleśa), which are usually counted as mental factors, are
mere appearing forms of the mind.
Maitreyanātha also clothes all of these views of the phe-
nomenal world and the ultimate state of being in the form
of the doctrine of the three characteristics, as we have encoun-
tered it in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra [S. 280f.]. Accordingly,
the images that are reflected as duality in the conception are
the imagined characteristic. The false conception itself, which
displays these images, is the dependent characteristic. And
lastly, the absence of duality, in other words the ultimate state
of being underlying the false conception in its pure form, is the
perfect characteristic. At the same time, it is clearly noticeable
 Maitreyanātha 319

that for Maitreyanātha the adoption of this doctrine of the three

characteristics is only a concession to the tradition of the school
without in any way fruitfully influencing his own lines of
thought.

CFC.2.4. The doctrine of liberation

CFC.2.4.1. Nonconceptual knowledge and liberation

As far as the doctrine of liberation is concerned, Maitreyanātha
dealt with the traditional scholasticism of liberation of the
Yogācāra school in great detail. In addition, however, he also
developed his own clear views about the decisive mental
processes pertaining to liberation, and <301> these views are
also philosophically significant. According to these views,
liberation occurs in the state of absorption by means of
nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakaṃ jñānam) once the
Bodhisattva has obtained the necessary merit and knowledge
and, in particular, has heard and correctly comprehended
the Mahāyāna doctrine. Here the Bodhisattva first recognizes
that all objects of cognition are accompanied by words and
conditioned by words, and can therefore not be real. From this,
the knowledge next results that cognition [itself] also cannot
be real, because without an object, there can be no cognition.
And once the unreality of object and subject has thus been
recognized, the mind gathers itself in the element of the ultimate
state of being that is its basis (cittasya svadhātau sthānam), all
duality of conception vanishes, and the element of the factors
itself is seen. This is the so-called nonconceptual knowledge.
What is important here most especially, is that thereby
also the sameness (samatā) of the element of the factors in
all beings is recognized. This nonconceptual knowledge—
gained in the state of absorption—is further followed, as a
result, by another knowledge (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), which remains
in the ordinary state of consciousness as well. And while the
 320 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

first brings about one’s own liberation, the second makes

possible the teaching and thereby the liberation of other
beings.
Liberation itself consists in the fact that, through non-
conceptual knowledge, the pollution that occasions entangle-
ment in cyclic existence is removed so that the element of
the factors, which is inherent in all beings, attains its own natu-
ral purity. This process is called transformation of the basis
(āśrayaparāvṛtti). It is not an all at once process but one that
takes place in stages over long periods of time. Maitreyanātha
ties it, as indeed he does all the processes leading to liberation,
to the numerous stages of the path of liberation as elaborated
by the old scholasticism of liberation. This complicated schema
is, however, philosophically insignificant and need not be taken
into consideration here.

CFC.2.4.2. Buddhology and the ultimate state of being

With the last and final transformation of the basis, liberation is
gained and at the same time—corresponding to the goal <302>
of the Mahāyāna—omniscience and buddhahood. Thus for
Maitreyanātha, the doctrine of the state of the Liberated One
is connected with buddhology. Since liberation consists of the
purification of the element of the factors, which is inherent
in all beings, of the adventitious pollution of worldly existence,
the Liberated One belongs to the pure ultimate state of being.
Our presentation thus returns to the point from which it started.
From the point of view of buddhology, however, features other
than those we have first discussed [S. 298ff.] emerge with respect
to the ultimate state of being. As buddhahood, it does not appear
as brightly luminous mind but rather as similar to a world
soul, which pervades everything in its activity. It is eternal and
omnipresent. Its activity is uninterrupted and all-encompassing.
If it does not manifest everywhere in its activity, this is due
to the corruptness of beings. Further, its activity is manifold
 Maitreyanātha 321

and inexhaustible, like a light that shines without becoming

exhausted. What is noteworthy here, is that its activity occurs
without striving (yatna), without effort (ābhoga), and without
egotism, in other words, without anything that could signify
a bondage.
A special question arises as to how the personage and the
multiplicity of the Buddhas is to be reconciled with the
buddhahood that is based only on the ultimate state of being.
Here on the one hand, Maitreyanātha professes the logically
consistent view that, with respect to the unity of the stainless
element of the factors, no multiplicity is possible, and that a
multiplicity can be spoken of only in consideration of a previous
embodiment. He does, on the other hand, actually reckon—in
practice—with the multiplicity of Buddhas and explains their
combined activity using the analogy of the combined activity
of sunbeams. Likewise, he explains the significance of this
combined activity using the analogy of rivers, whose value
as dwelling-places for beings first fully comes into being when
their waters unite in the ocean.
Maitreyanātha also refers several times to the good or white
qualities, which according to the old doctrine, are the marks of
the Buddha and are unique to him.
Finally, it must be noted that Maitreyanātha is also ac-
quainted with the doctrine of the three bodies of the Buddha,
so widespread in the Mahāyāna, <303> but this is more
theologically than philosophically interesting and hence need
not be considered here.

CFC.2.5. The doctrine of Maitreyanātha and the Madhyamaka doctrine

In broad strokes, this is the doctrine of Maitreyanātha. A final
essential feature is the fact that he tried as far as possible to fuse
the views of the Madhyamaka school with his doctrine and in
this way sought to replace and supersede the Madhyamaka
 322 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

doctrine. This he does by adopting and incorporating—wherever

an opportunity presents itself—the concepts of the Madhyamaka
system; for example, by equating his ultimate state of being
with emptiness (śūnyatā), in spite of all the differences in these
views. First and foremost, however, he does so by seeking to
give his doctrine the form of the middle way. In this, unlike the
Madhyamaka school originally, he does not deny the respective
extremes on the principle that both are not in any way
applicable. Instead, he denies their one-sided affirmation, since
in a certain sense their opposite is also applicable, i.e., with a
view of their relativity. Such a middle view through the nega-
tion of the two extremes is applied—in his doctrine—at every
possible opportunity and with respect to the most varied of
concepts. The most systematic attempt of this application of the
middle way is found, however, in chapter I of the Madhyānta-
vibhāga, translated below. This chapter can serve as a good
example of this entire way of looking at things and so it seems
good to make particular reference to it.

CFC.3. Introduction to the samples from the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra

The first of the following translated samples is taken from
the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. Here I have selected verses from
different chapters of the work and arranged them in a meaning-
ful order in order to elucidate the most significant tenets. A
translation of continuous sections was out of the question, since
Maitreyanātha himself does not give a continuous presentation
and too much that is philosophically insignificant is woven in.
I have refrained from a more thorough sequential explanation
and elucidate [in the following] only a few points where it seems
necessary, since after the preceding presentation, most of this
should be readily understandable.
The first series of verses (XIII, vv. 16–19) deals with the
nature of the phenomenal world and the highest reality. The
phenomenal world is perceived, although in reality it does not
 Maitreyanātha 323

exist. This is elucidated using the examples of a magical illusion

[māyā] <304> and of the illusion produced by a good painting.
The highest reality is purified, although in reality it is not
polluted. Space and clear, merely outwardly cloudy water serve
as examples.
The second series of verses (XI, vv. 13–23) begins with a
short description of the nature of the highest reality. Here, the
statement that it must be recognized, abandoned, and purified,
refers to the doctrine of the threefold characteristic and is easily
understandable from the previously translated sections from the
Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (VI, 11, above S. 288). Next [vv. 14–18],
the emergence of the deception of the phenomenal world is
elucidated using the example of a magical illusion. The last two
of these verses (vv. 17–18) allude to the supranatural power
gained by the ascetic subsequent to the liberating cognition
about the phenomenal world, as soon as—with the purification
of the element of the factors—the so-called transformation of
the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) takes place. By way of explanation it
is pointed out that even those people who have been deceived
by a magical illusion are, after the illusion has vanished, able to
deal with its origins just as they please. The magician, after all,
does not bring forth the illusion out of nothing. Instead he takes
some real object, e.g., a piece of wood, as a support and simply
causes it to appear in a different shape, perhaps as an elephant.
Following that [vv. 19–21], Maitreyanātha applies the middle
doctrine’s way of seeing things to this view of the phenomenal
world. A magical illusion exists as an appearance, it is true, but
not as a real thing. Hence one should neither state one-sidedly
that it exists, nor that it does not exist. And the same applies
to the phenomenal world.
The next series of verses (XI, vv. 31–35) deals with conception
and how it comes about. First, the entire sphere of the phe-
nomenal world, which is indeed nothing but conception, is
classified as follows: [1] false conception, by which is meant
324 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

the ordinary processes of cognition; [2] neither true or false

conception, by which is understood the processes of cognition
that prepare for the liberating cognition; [3] non-conception, i.e.,
the nonconceptual <305> knowledge (nirvikalpaka jñāna) that
brings liberation; and finally, [4] the resulting knowledge
belonging to the ordinary state of consciousness, which is to be
seen neither as conception nor as non-conception. Ordinary
conceptions emerge from their element, i.e., from the element of
the factors, which is inherent—as a germ—in all beings. They
display the appearance of duality without containing an actual
duality. If they are turned toward the highest object accessible
to them, by directing them toward their element, then the
appearance of duality vanishes, i.e., they lose the character of
a conception. This is illustrated through the example of leather,
which, given appropriate treatment, loses its hardness and
becomes soft; or through the example of a bent rod, which
becomes straight under the influence of heat. In addition, the
good and bad mental factors are mentioned, in particular, the
defilements of which it is said that they are not independent
factors but only appearing forms of the mind.
The subject of the next three verses (XI, vv. 39–41) is the
doctrine of the threefold nature of things; specifically, they
give a brief definition of this threefold nature according to
Maitreyanātha’s view.
Hence the imagined characteristic is the conceived image
in which object-referent [artha] and name [nāma] mutually
condition each other.
The dependent characteristic is the false conception, which
displays the twofold appearance of object and subject, whereby
each of these appears to be triply divided: the object into
word [pada], object-referent [artha], and body [deha]; the subject
into mind [mana], taking notice [udgraha], and conception
[vikalpa].
 Maitreyanātha 325

The perfect characteristic, finally, the nature of which con-

sists in the absence of the duality of object and subject, is
defined here according to the middle doctrine (cf. the section
from the Madhyāntavibhāga translated below, S. 324ff.). It is
non-existence, since this duality does not exist, and it is exis-
tence, since this non-existence exists. Thus, it unites in itself
existence and non-existence. Further, it is not peaceful, since it
is polluted through adventitious stains, and it is peaceful, since
it is pure by nature. Lastly, in spite of its nature as mind, it
lacks the nature of conception. <306>
The next series of verses [vv. 1–10] forms the VIth chapter
of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. I present this brief chapter in full
because it corresponds to the section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi
partially translated above, and shows how Maitreyanātha fol-
lows this work only superficially and very freely expresses his
own thoughts in the comments related to it. Furthermore, the
chapter presents in concise terms a good summary of the
essential features of the processes of liberation according to
Maitreyanātha’s view.
The first five verses lean heavily on lines of thought from
the Madhyamaka. First [v. 1], a definition of the highest reality
is given, which retains the style of the Prajñāpāramitā texts.
Only the statement that the highest reality is not purified and
yet does become purified, refers once again to the fact that it
is pure by nature and merely adventitiously stained. Next [v. 2],
the belief in a self, as the cause of entanglement in the cycle
of existences, is discussed in nearly as broad a manner as in
Nāgārjuna. This belief is merely an error, since neither it nor the
five groups are the self, and something else that could be the
self does not exist. Nevertheless [vv. 3–4], under the influence
of this belief, people are unable to recognize that things are full
of suffering and thus cannot be the self, and that all things,
including the factors of the psyche, are called forth by each other
only in accordance with the law of dependent origination,
326 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

without an active self being behind them. These are old lines
of thought that reach all the way back to the canonical texts.
In between are interspersed comments from the perspective of
the middle way. People experience suffering because they feel
it, and they do not experience it because they do not understand
it. They are tormented by it but also not tormented because,
indeed, there is no self, since they consist only of factors. Yet
even that is not the case since the factors are also not real. To
the thought that the belief in a self is merely an error, and
that liberation thus consists simply of the extinction of this
error,[v. 5] is then also joined the doctrine that liberation and
the cycle of existences are in reality one and the same, even
though the attainment of liberation by means of the path
shown by the Buddha is taught. <307> This too corresponds
to the doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā and the Madhyamaka
school.
This is followed (v. 6) by the presentation of the process of
liberation itself and here Maitreyanātha begins once again to
expound his own views. First, he mentions the preparatory
stages, which consist of the Bodhisattva obtaining the necessary
accumulation of good deeds and knowledge, and also his
hearing and correctly comprehending the Mahāyāna doctrine.
The decisive process of cognition begins with his becoming
aware that all conceived images—hence, all objects of cogni-
tion—are accompanied by “words” [S. 268f.] and are condi-
tioned by “words” and are thus unreal. Through this he comes
to the insight [v. 7] that nothing exists but the cognition that
displays the appearance of the objects, and subsequently, by
freeing himself from the duality of subject and object, he arrives
at a direct seeing of the highest reality. Explained in detail
[v. 8], this last step takes place in such a way that, with the
disappearance of the object, the subject as well is rendered
invalid. With this, insight into the unreality of duality is gained
and the highest cognition, which consists of the direct clear
 Maitreyanātha 327

comprehension of the nondual highest reality, appears. This

highest cognition brings with it [v. 9] the recognition of the
sameness of the element of the factors, which is one and
the same in all beings, and in removing all of the stains that
cause entanglement in the cycle of existences, this same
cognition leads to liberation. As a kind of addendum, the last
verse [v. 10] mentions, that at this stage the Bodhisattva also
recognizes the doctrine of the Buddha as mere conception,
which is based on the element of the factors, and that he hence-
forth rapidly acquires the countless virtues that make him
a Buddha.
As a last sample from the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, several
groups of verses from chapter IX, which deals with buddha-
hood, follow. First (vv. 11–12), buddhahood is praised as the
refuge for all beings and its attainment is briefly described.
Thereby the following [three] points are emphasized: [i] The
prerequisite is the removal of both of the obstructions, the
obstruction of defilements and the obstruction to what is to
be known. This occurs gradually through numerous <308>
processes of elimination. [ii] Buddhahood itself is based on
the transformation of the basis, which brings about the puri-
fication of the element of the factors, and it is distinguished
through the qualities unique to the Buddhas, which, in
accordance with their moral character, are called white factors.
[iii] The path to this is, finally, nonconceptual knowledge
unafflicted by stains, which brings with it omniscience.
The remaining groups of verses are easily understood and
need no detailed explanation. They deal with (vv. 15–17) the
omnipresence of buddhahood, and explain through examples
why buddhahood does not become apparent everywhere.
Then it is mentioned that the activities of the Buddhas are
without effort (ābhoga), in other words, without inner bondage
(vv. 18–19), and that they occur uninterruptedly (vv. 20–21).
Following this, (v. 26) the reason why one can speak neither
 328 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

exclusively of a unity nor of a multiplicity of the Buddhas, and

hence why in a certain sense both apply, is established. Further,
using the analogy of sunbeams, there is an explanation of
the uniformity of the activity of the Buddhas (vv. 29–31), which
is without any selfishness (v. 32) and which extends to every-
thing, so long as the wickedness of beings does not stand in
its way (vv. 33–34). One verse (v. 37) shows that buddhahood, as
the pure form of the element of the factors, is inherent—as a
germ—in all beings. A further series of verses deals once more
with the activity of a Buddha. It describes (v. 51) how the one
Buddha displays a thousandfold activity in numberless world
spheres and yet by his actual nature remains immovable. It
emphasizes again (vv. 52–53) how the activity of the Buddha
takes place without inner involvement and effort. Using the
example of a lamp, it illustrates (v. 54) how the nature of the
Buddha, in spite of all that it radiates, does not exhaust itself.
Finally, using the analogy of the ocean, it explains (v. 55) how
the element of the factors, as the sphere of the Buddha, does
not become full and does not increase, in spite of the influx
that results from the continual purification and liberation of
so many beings. The last series of verses, finally (vv. 82–85),
and again by means of an example, shows how the activity of
the Buddha comes into full effect only through <309> its unity
in buddhahood.

CFC.3.1. From the “Ornament of the Discourses of the Mahāyāna”

(Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra)
Chapter XIII:
[The nature of the phenomenal world and the highest reality.]
16
Perception, without existing factors, and purification, without
existing pollution, are to be regarded like a magical illusion,
etc., and like space, [respectively].
 Maitreyanātha 329

17
Just as in a properly painted picture, there exists no height and
depth and yet they are seen, so in false conception, there is
never and in no way a duality, and yet it is seen.
18
Just as with water that has been churned up and then calmed
again, the clarity does not arise from elsewhere, but rather a
separation of the dirt takes place; this same principle applies
also to the purification of one’s own mind.
19
The opinion is accepted that the mind is by nature continually
clear [luminous (prabhāsvara)] and becomes clouded only
through adventitious faults. Apart from the mind that is based
on the nature of the factors (dharmatācitta), there is no other
mind whose natural clarity [luminosity] is taught.

Chapter XI:
[The nature of the highest reality]
13
Reality is continually free from duality; it is, however, the
foundation of error. It cannot be <310> expressed in any way
and is by nature without diversity. It must be recognized,
abandoned, and purified; is considered to be stainless by
nature; and its purification from defilements is considered to
be similar to space, to gold, and to water.
14
There is nothing in the world [of beings] that could be other
than it, and still the entire world [of beings] is deluded about
it. Why does this peculiar kind of delusion of people, which
clings to the non-existent and completely disregards the exis-
tent, occur?
330 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

15
Like a magical illusion [as cause], so the false conception
(abhūtaparikalpa) is explained. Like the effect of the magical
illusion, so the deception [error] of duality is explained.
16
Like the non-existence of the one [i.e., the effect of the magical
illusion] in the other [i.e., magical illusion as cause], so the
highest truth is accepted. Just as with the perception of this
[effect of the magical illusion], however, so (it is with) the
restricted truth.
17
Just as with the vanishing of the ([effect of the] magical illu-
sion) the (true) state of its cause (nimitta) is apprehended, so
with the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) (the true
constitution) of the false conception is apprehended.
18
And just as people, when they are freed from error, deal with
this cause just as they please, so, if the error has vanished due
to the transformation, <311> it is in the power of the ascetic to
proceed just as he pleases.
19
The corresponding shape [e.g., elephant] is there, yet [real]
existence is not present. Thus, with respect to a magical illusion,
etc., one speaks of existence and non-existence.
20
In this, existence is not non-existence and non-existence is
not existence. However, with regard to a magical illusion,
etc., one asserts the non-difference of existence and non-
existence.
21
Likewise the appearance of duality is there, yet [real] existence
is not present. Thus, with respect to visible form, etc., one
speaks of existence and non-existence.
 Maitreyanātha 331

22
In this, existence is not non-existence and non-existence is not
existence. However, with respect to visible form, etc., one
asserts the non-difference of existence and non-existence.
23
This [non-difference] is assumed in order to reject the two
extremes of affirmation and negation and in order to reject the
way of the small vehicle (Hīnayāna).
[...]

[Conception and how it emerges]

31
The entirety of the knowable is explained as false conception, as
neither-true-nor-false[-conception], as non-conception, and as
neither-conception-nor-non-conception.
32
From their element (dhātu) emerge the conceptions, which
show the appearance of duality, are accompanied—in their
working—by ignorance and defilements, <312> and are free
from a real duality (dvayadravya).
33
They, [i.e., those conceptions,] attain their most excellent object-
support if one practices directing them toward their element,
since they then appear without the appearance of duality, like
a piece of leather or a rod.
34
It is maintained that the mind that displays the appearance of
duality also displays the appearance of passion, etc., and the
appearance of faith, etc. A defiled or good factor distinct from
this does not exist.
35
The mind thus becomes apparent in that it displays manifold
appearances and manifold appearing forms. Existence and non-
existence thus concerns the image, and not the factors.
[...]
332 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

[The doctrine of the threefold nature of things]

39
The appearance of the object-referent and of the name
corresponding to the name and object-referent, which is the
object (nimitta) of the false conception, that is the imagined
characteristic.
40
The false conception, which is characterized by the
apprehended and the apprehending, and displays respectively
a threefold appearance, that is the dependent characteristic.
41
Non-existence and existence, the equality of existence and non-
existence, not peaceful and peaceful, and non-conception, that
is the perfect characteristic. <313>

Chapter VI:
[Bondage and essential features of the processes of liberation]
1
It is not existent and not non-existent, it is not so and not
otherwise, it does not arise and does not pass away, it does
not decrease and does not increase, it is not purified and yet
is purified, that is the mark of the highest truth.
2
The belief in a self does not itself have the mark of the self; just
as little as does the world of suffering (duḥsaṃsthitatā), since
[the latter] is of another type [than the self]. Something other
than these two does not exist, however. Thus, [the belief
in a self] is an error. Consequently, liberation is the mere
extinction of this error.
3
Why do people who are merely in error, not recognize the
eternally painful nature (of things)? They experience it and
they do not experience it. They are tormented and not
tormented by suffering. They consist of the factors and they do
not consist of them.
 Maitreyanātha 333

4
Why do people, even though they have the dependently
originated before their eyes, believe that it has arisen through
something else? What peculiar kind of blindness is this, that
they do not see that which exists and see that which does not
exist?
5
In reality, there is also no difference here at all between peace
(i.e., nirvāṇa) and birth [saṃsāra]. And yet, for those who
perform good deeds, the attainment of peace through the
extinction of birth is taught. <314>
6
After he has collected an unlimited accumulation of knowledge
and merit, the Bodhisattva, having attained full clarity through
reflection on the doctrinal texts, recognizes that the apprehen-
sion of the object-referents is dependent on speech.1
7
After he has recognized the object-referents as mere speech, he
abides in the mere mind that displays their appearance, and the
element of the factors becomes apparent to him. Through this,
he is liberated from the characteristic of duality.
8
For in that, through his intellect, he recognizes that something
other than the mind does not exist, he thereby also recognizes
the non-existence of the mind. And having recognized the non-
existence of duality, the intelligent person abides in the element
of the factors, which is not affected by [duality].
9
Through the power of nonconceptual knowledge—which
everywhere and always accompanies sameness (sama)—the
dense heap of faults that has collected in the intelligent person
is removed; as is poison by a strong antidote.

1
[On speech, see Frauwallner’s comments, S. 268, on the parallel section in
the Bodhisattvabhūmi.]
334 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

10
After he has gained full clarity about the good doctrine
proclaimed by the sage (the Buddha), the steadfast one directs
his mind to the underlying element of the factors. He recog-
nizes, then, that the <315> (entire) tradition (smṛtigati) is mere
conception, and in this way he quickly reaches the other shore
of the ocean of virtues.

Chapter IX:
[The nature of buddhahood]
11
As long as the world exists, buddhahood is accepted as the
great refuge of all beings so that they turn away from all mis-
fortune and so that all good fortune is bestowed upon them.
12
This buddhahood, in which the seed of the obstructions of
defilements and to what is to be known, which has constantly
adhered (to beings) since beginningless time, has vanished as
a result of extremely abundant abandonments of all kinds,
consists of a transformation of the basis, which is associated
with the most excellent virtues consisting of white factors.
Specifically, [buddhahood] is attained on the path of knowl-
edge, which is free from conceptions, has an extremely broad
scope, and is completely pure.
13
Dwelling therein, the Perfected One surveys the world as if
he were standing on a high mountain. He feels compassion for
people, who take pleasure in peace (i.e., nirvāṇa), how much
more so for other people, who take pleasure in becoming
[saṃsāra].
[...]
15
Just as it is thought about space that it is constantly all-perva-
sive, so it is thought about (buddhahood) that it is constantly
 Maitreyanātha 335

all-pervasive. And just as space is everywhere present in the

crowds of visible forms (rūpa), so [buddhahood] is everywhere
present in the crowds of beings. <316>
16
Just as the image of the moon cannot be seen if the vessel of
water is broken, so the image of the Buddha cannot be seen in
corrupt beings.
17
Just as fire flares up in one place, but goes out in another, so
should it be understood about the Buddhas, that now they can
be seen and now they can not be seen.
18
Just as sound emanates from (celestial) musical instruments
without their being struck, so the doctrine emanates from the
Buddha without any effort on his part.
19
And just as a precious gem displays its luster without exerting
itself, so the Buddhas display their activities without any effort
on their part.
20
Just as, uninterruptedly, in space the activities of people can be
seen, so uninterruptedly, in the uncontaminated element the
activities of the Victorious Ones (the Buddhas) [can be seen].
21
And just as, in space a disappearing and arising of the activities
(of people) constantly takes place, so, in the uncontaminated
element an arising and ceasing of the activities of the Buddhas
takes place.
[...]
26
In the unstained element of the Buddhas, there is no unity and
no multiplicity, because of bodilessness, <317> like space, and
in connection with an earlier body.
[...]
336 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

29
Just as innumerable rays, united in the disc of the sun, con-
stantly bring forth one and the same effect and illuminate the
world,
30
so, in the unstained element, an innumerable number of
Buddhas is assumed who, united in their activities, bring forth
one and the same effect and call forth the light of knowledge.
31
Just as with the radiating of one single sunbeam, all of the sun-
beams radiate, so is the radiating of the knowledge of the
Buddhas to be understood.
32
Just as, in the activity of the sunbeam, there is no selfishness,
so, in the activity of the Buddhas’ knowledge, there is no
selfishness.
33
Just as the world is illuminated by the sunbeams whose glow
the sun emits all at once, so all that is knowable is illuminated
all at once by the knowledge of the Buddhas.
34
And just as it is thought that sunbeams are hindered by clouds,
etc., so the wickedness of beings constitutes a hindrance to
[illumination by] the knowledge of the Buddhas. <318>
[...]
37
Suchness, which is no different in all (beings), if it has become
pure, represents buddhahood. Therefore, all embodied (beings)
carry the germ of it within them (tadgarbha = tathāgatagarbha).
[...]
51
Here (the Buddha) shows the wheel of the doctrine in many
hundreds of ways, there the disappearance of birth, there
manifold courses through births, here perfect enlightenment,
 Maitreyanātha 337

there nirvāṇa; and that again and again. In doing so, he does not
move from his place and yet he accomplishes everything.
52
In doing so, the Buddhas [do not] think: “This one is ripe
for me. This one I must ripen. This one will now be ripened.”
Without an act of will (saṃskāra = abhisaṃskāra), everywhere
in all parts of the world, people reach ripening through the
three gates (of the three vehicles), by virtue of the white factors
(i.e., the virtues of the Buddha).
53
Just as, through the emission of its extensive bright rays,
the sun is active without effort in the ripening of seeds
everywhere in all parts of the world, so, through the emission
of the rays of the doctrine, the sun of the (Buddhas’) doctrine
that preaches peace (i.e., nirvāṇa) is active in the ripening of
beings everywhere in all parts of the world.
54
Just as from one light an extremely great, boundless, and
immeasurable abundance of light emanates without <319> it
thereby exhausting itself, so, from a Buddha, an extremely
great, boundless, and immeasurable abundance of ripening
emanates without him thereby exhausting himself.
55
And just as the great ocean does not become saturated by the
waters and is not increased by the influx of the extensive
clear waters, so the element of the Buddhas is not saturated
and is not increased by the constantly arriving influx of purity.
This is the greatest marvel.
[...]
82
As long as they have not sunk underground, rivers that each
have a distinct bed and distinct water, that each carry only
a little water and accomplish their effect separately, are of use
to only a few beings that live in the water.
 338 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

83
If, however, they have reached the ocean and all now have one
bed and one great body of water, and together accomplish one
effect, then they are constantly of great use to the great mass
of beings that live in the water.
84
Likewise, as long as they have not reached buddhahood, the
sages, who have each their own distinct abode and distinct
opinion, who possess little insight, and who each pursue
separately their own activity, are constantly of use to only
a limited number of beings.
85
If, however, they have reached buddhahood and all have the
same abode, possess the same great insight, <320> and together
perform the same activity, then they are constantly of use to
a great crowd of beings.

CFC.4. Introduction to samples from the Madhyāntavibhāga

The second translated sample presents the philosophically most
important parts of the first chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāga.
This chapter contains Maitreyanātha’s discussion of the
Madhyamaka doctrine. He proceeds in this by shaping his
doctrine in the form of the middle way, as he understands
it, and thereby trying to correct and to complement the
Madhyamaka doctrine. Accordingly, he also chooses a new
name for his doctrine and does not speak of the middle way,
but calls it the doctrine of the middle and the extremes. Essen-
tial in this is that in which he believes to have found the middle
way between the extremes and his incorporation of the concept
of emptiness (śūnyatā).
In the first two verses Maitreyanātha’s view of the middle
way is already presented. Nāgārjuna had seen the middle way in
the fact that both extremes, existence and non-existence, do not
apply to the phenomenal world because both are, in and of
 Maitreyanātha 339

themselves, not possible (cf. e.g., the translation of the fifteenth

chapter of the Madhyamakakārikā, above S. 180ff.). In addition
to this, however, in Nāgārjuna we already find the tendency to
establish the denial of the two extremes by stating that neither
of them applies exclusively since, in a certain sense, the other is
also valid (cf. e.g., Ratnāvalī I, vv. 42 ff., above S. 212).
The Yogācāra school decided in favor of this view. Thus in
the above translated section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (S. 283f.), we
have found the middle way explained in such a way that one
cannot speak of an existence of the phenomenal world because
it is mere conception and therefore unreal, but that one can just
as little speak of a non-existence since the ultimate state of being,
which is the basis [of the phenomenal world], is real.
And the same view holds for Maitreyanātha, except that in
his case [this view] appears in a somewhat more complicated
form since he does not—as does the Bodhisattvabhūmi—have
only the phenomenal world and the ultimate state of being in
view, but also takes into account the three characteristics that
the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra had taught [S. 280ff., 284ff.]. <321>
Of these three characteristics, the imagined characteristic is pure
conception; the dependent and perfect characteristic are the
ultimate state of being in its polluted and its purified forms.
Accordingly, the doctrine of the middle way takes the following
shape for Maitreyanātha: He sees the imagined characteristic in
the duality of subject and object, which conception displays to
us. The dependent characteristic is, for him, the false conception,
which is indeed afflicted with the deception of duality. The
perfect characteristic, finally, is the ultimate state of being,
insofar as it is free from this deception. Maitreyanātha thus
speaks of non-existence or emptiness, but he later equates this
(vv. 13–14) explicitly with the ultimate state of being, i.e., with
the element of the factors. Of these then, the duality of subject
and object does not exist, since it is mere conception. On the
other hand, the non-existence [of this duality], i.e., the highest
340 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

reality, and the false conception that is based on this, do exist.

With respect to the phenomenal world, therefore, one should
not speak of existence since duality does not exist, and one
should not speak of non-existence since emptiness and the false
conception do exist. And this is the true middle way.
Next (vv. 3–4) Maitreyanātha elucidates the central concept
of the false conception (abhūtaparikalpa), and starting from this
concept he explains the entire phenomenal world; following
which (v. 5), he briefly presents the relationship to the doctrine
of the three characteristics. The false conception consists in the
fact that cognition arises by displaying the appearance of object
and subject. But a real object does not exist. And, without an
object, no subject can exist either. This is the same inference that
recurs in the description of the liberating cognition, and that
we have thus already encountered above [S. 301]. It follows
from this, however, that all cognition is merely a conception of
something unreal. This unreality is then also concisely defined
in terms of the middle way. The conceived does not exist in the
way it appears, because in reality it does not exist. But it is also
not completely non-existent, because it exists as a conception.
However—just as Nāgārjuna teaches [S. 174f.]—bondage and
liberation, and hence <322> the entire course of the world, are
based on this deception of the conception, since liberation
consists only in the extinction of this deception. This false
conception is, in terms of the doctrine of the three characteristics,
the dependent characteristic; its object, that is, the duality of
subject and object, is the imagined characteristic; and the non-
existence of this duality, as it ensues from liberation, is the
perfect characteristic.
The next two verses (vv. 6–7) elaborate in greater detail on the
briefly mentioned establishment of the unreality of conception.
From the insight that only the cognition, which has the
[appearing] form of the objects, is perceived, there arises the
knowledge that no object-referents are perceived. But from
 Maitreyanātha 341

the fact that no object-referents are apprehended, there arises the

further consequence that also no cognition can be perceived,
since without object-referents there is no cognition. The seeming
perception is thus in reality a non-perception. But because both
exist—the non-perception in accordance with the actual facts,
and the perception, since, indeed, the unreal conceptual image is
perceived—perception and non-perception are the same. And
with that, the relative view in terms of the middle way is once
again woven in.
A few remarks on the psychological foundation of the false
conception follow in the next two verses (vv. 8–9). Correspond-
ing to the general Buddhist view, this psychological foundation
consists of the mind or cognition and the mental factors be-
longing to it, both of which are classified in terms of the three
world spheres. Of these, the mind recognizes the given object
in general, whereas the mental factors grasp its distinctive fea-
tures. The interpretation of the second verse is difficult since
Maitreyanātha hints at his views rather than expressing them
and later interpreters have read Asaṅga’s psychology into his
words. A number of things point to the fact that Maitreyanātha
distinguishes two forms of cognition, of which the first merely
conveys the appearance of the object, whereas the second allows
for the awareness of [the object’s] perception. The first would
thus correspond to the object part, the second to the subject
part of the false conception. <323>
In the original, two verses then follow that enumerate the
forms of pollution that condition entanglement in the cycle of
existences, using the superficial systematic often found in
Maitreyanātha. With this, the first half of the chapter is finished.
The second half, which now follows, deals with emptiness
(śūnyatā) or the ultimate state of being. After a brief account
of the outline of this section, Maitreyanātha first (v. 13) gives
a definition of emptiness. Here he repeats the definition of the
perfect characteristic given at the beginning of the chapter [v. 1],
342 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

which, as we know, corresponds to the ultimate state of being,

and he simply formulates it somewhat more pointedly in terms
of the middle way. According to [this definition], emptiness is
the non-existence of duality and the existence of this non-
existence, i.e., it has a positive character. It is not a mere absence
but an essence characterized by the absence of duality. As a
result, in terms of a relative way of looking at things, it can be
designated neither as existent nor as non-existent, and with this
the middle way is once again preserved. Important, but not
further elaborated upon, is the definition contained in the last
part of this verse. It refers to the relationship of the ultimate state
of being to the phenomenal world, in other words, of the nature
of the factors (dharmatā) to the factors (dharma). According to
Maitreyanātha, this relationship is such that the two are neither
distinct nor one.
The next two verses (vv. 14–15) enumerate the different
names by which emptiness is also designated, and explains
them. It is called suchness (tathatā), because it never changes.
It is called pinnacle of the real (bhūtakoṭi), because it is free
from any error. It is called the signless (ānimitta), because it is
without any sign. It is called the highest truth (paramārthatā),
because it is the object of the knowledge of the Noble Ones. And
it is called element of the factors (dharmadhātu), because the
qualities (dharma) of the Noble Ones are based on it.
Subsequently, Maitreyanātha discusses emptiness from the
point of view of bondage and liberation (v. 16), that is, in exactly
the same way as otherwise in his works, where he uses the
designation element of the factors. <324> [Emptiness] is, accord-
ingly, either stained or unstained. It is stained if it is polluted
through connection with the defilements. It is unstained if it is
purified through the removal of the defilements. This pollution
and purification, however, does not affect the nature [of empti-
ness] and does not cause any change in it since it is pure by
nature, and all stains are only adventitious, as is the case with
 Maitreyanātha 343

water, gold, or space (cf. above Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XI, v. 13).

The verses that now follow in the original (vv. 17–20) are an
insertion, in which Maitreyanātha enumerates the sixteen types
of emptiness that are taught in the Prajñāpāramitā. Then he
continues (vv. 21–22): The polluted form of emptiness must exist,
because otherwise there would be no entanglement in the cycle
of existences. The purified form must exist, because otherwise no
liberation would be possible. Relatively seen, [emptiness] is thus
neither polluted nor unpolluted, neither pure nor impure. So
here as well the principle of the middle way holds.

CFC.5. From the “Elucidation of the Middle and of the Extremes”

(Madhyāntavibhāga)
Chapter I
1
False conception exists. There is no duality therein. There is,
however, emptiness therein. And in the latter, there is also that
(false conception).
2
Hence, everything is taught neither as empty nor as not-
empty, due to the existence [of the false conception], to the
non-existence [of duality], and to the existence [of that non-
existence]. And this is the middle way.
3
Cognition arises in that it reflects object-referents, beings, the
self, and perception. It has no object-referent, however, and
because this [object-referent] is absent, [cognition] itself is non-
existent. <325>
4
Hence, the character [of the four appearances of cognition] as
false conception is established because it is not so, but is also
not completely not. It is maintained that liberation (occurs) due
to its vanishing.
344 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

5
The imagined, dependent, and perfect characteristic have been
taught on the basis of the object-referent, the false conception,
and the non-existence of duality.
6
Based on perception, non-perception arises. Based on non-
perception, non-perception arises.
7
Hence, it is established that the nature of perception is non-
perception. Because of that, it should be known that non-
perception and perception are the same.
8
The false conception is the mind and the mental factors that
belong to the three realms. In this, cognition is the seeing of
the object-referent. The mental factors are directed toward its
distinctive features.
9
[There are two forms of cognition:]
One is the cognition that takes note [of an object]
(pratyayavijñāna), [i.e., the object part,] the other is the cognition
that experiences (aupabhogika), [i.e., the subject part]. In this,
the mental factors promote (preraka) determination (pariccheda)
and experience (upabhoga).
[ . . . ] <326>
13
The non-existence of duality and the existence of [this] non-
existence is the characteristic of that which is empty. (It is thus)
neither existence nor non-existence, characterized neither by
distinctness nor by unity.
14
Suchness, the pinnacle of the real, the signless, the highest truth,
and the element of the factors, these are, in brief, the synonyms
of emptiness.
 Maitreyanātha 345

15
The meaning of these synonyms results respectively from
the fact [that emptiness] is not different, is without error, is
the suppression of (signs), is the sphere of the Noble Ones, and
is the cause of the qualities of the Noble Ones.
16
[Emptiness] is polluted and pure, or stained and unstained. It is
assumed that its purity is similar to the purity of the element of
water, of gold, and of space.
[...]
21
If this [emptiness] were not polluted, all beings would be
liberated. If this [emptiness] were not pure, every effort would
be fruitless.
22
It is (therefore) neither polluted nor unpolluted, neither pure
nor impure.
CFD. Asaṅga (ca. 315–390 c.e.)
The most important personality of the Yogācāra school is
Asaṅga, the great student of Maitreyanātha. Asaṅga <327> was
born toward the beginning of the fourth century c.e. as the son
of a distinguished brahmin in Puruṣapura ([modern] Peshāwar).
Initially, he belonged to the Śrāvakayāna school of the
Mahīśāsaka, but turned later toward the Mahāyāna. The
influence of his teacher Maitreyanātha was decisive for him.
Maitreyanātha imparted his works to Asaṅga, who partly
commented on them himself and partly passed them on to
his brother Vasubandhu so that he could write the commen-
taries to them. The later legend then made out of this—once
the personality of Maitreyanātha was forgotten—that Asaṅga
received these works from the future Buddha Maitreya in
Tuṣita heaven. Important to the development of the school
was, further, that Asaṅga succeeded in winning over to his
doctrine his younger brother Vasubandhu, whose activity in
the service of his new convictions then became extremely
extensive and successful. According to a later tradition, Asaṅga
died at the age of seventy-five years.
In spite of his being a student of Maitreyanātha and in spite
of the latter’s strong influence on him, Asaṅga did produce
significant achievements of his own: to be precise, two things
in particular. Through his adoption and incorporation of the
Śrāvakayāna scholasticism, he developed the Yogācāra system
in such a way that it could place itself in every respect on equal
terms with the great Śrāvakayāna schools of that time. Further,
he surehandedly incorporated the mass of the old scholasticism
of liberation into his system, which Maitreyanātha had not
 Asaṅga 347

succeeded in doing. In this way, he established a unified edifice

of doctrines that has, in its essential aspects, remained endur-
ingly valid.

CFD.1. The works of Asaṅga

Of Asaṅga’s numerous treatises the following are particularly
important:

• The Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Scholasticism), in

which, in reliance on the Abhidharma of the Mahīśāsaka,
he gave the Yogācāra school its fundamental scholasticism.
• The Hien yang cheng kiao louen (Proclamation of the
Noble Doctrine; as a makeshift, since the original title is
not known, most often called Āryadeśanāvikhyāpana or,
briefly, Vikhyāpana), which has been preserved only in
Chinese, a systematic <328> summary of the doctrines of
the gigantic Yogācārabhūmiśāstra (see above S. 265f.).
• The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Summary of the Mahāyāna), the
philosophically most significant work, in which he gives a
systematic presentation of the fundamental doctrines of
his system.

CFD.2. The philosophical system of Asaṅga

CFD.2.1. Adoption of old concepts and development of new psychological

concepts
Most characteristic of Asaṅga’s system is, as already mentioned,
the adoption of the concepts of Śrāvakayāna scholasticism.
This is especially evident in the psychology. Maitreyanātha’s
pure cognition, from which mistaken conceptions originate
[S. 298f.], is replaced in Asaṅga by the complex of the factors
of the psyche as taught by the Śrāvakayāna school, that is,
the mind, i.e., the six kinds of cognition already found in the
348 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

canon, and the mental factors associated with it. To this is

added thinking (manas), as the bearer of self-consciousness,
and, what is especially important, the fundamental cognition
(ālayavijñāna).
The latter has the following origin. Since, according to gen-
eral Buddhist doctrine, the factors of the psyche have only
a moment’s duration and immediately after their arising
pass away again, the question soon arose as to how, in cases
where an interruption of consciousness takes place, the stream
of cognition can continue again later. For this reason, several
schools of the Śrāvakayāna, among them the Mahīśāsaka, had
assumed a form of cognition that underlies the conscious forms
of cognition and remains uninterrupted for the entire cycle of
existences or, at least, from birth until death.
In Asaṅga, the place of this cognition is now occupied by
the fundamental cognition. And indeed, this assumption was
all the more necessary for him, since the Yogācāra school
recognized nothing outside of cognition that could have served
[the conscious form of cognition] as its bearer or could have
called it forth. Asaṅga thus connects with this yet another
doctrine, which perhaps also had a predecessor in the
Mahīśāsaka school, namely, the doctrine of the seeds (bīja)
or of the permeation (vāsanā) of the fundamental cognition.
According to this doctrine, every process of cognition leaves
behind an imprint in the fundamental cognition. It permeates
it, as it were, like an odor does a piece of cloth, and these
imprints—without the stimulus of an external object—are
capable of later bringing about a <329> cognition of the same
kind, so that, in a beginningless uninterrupted succession of
cognition and imprints, the appearance of the phenomenal
world arises without any real entities existing outside of
cognition. Asaṅga also explains the operation of deeds (karma)
through similar imprints.
 Asaṅga 349

CFD.2.2. The appearance of the phenomenal world: the doctrine of the

three characteristics
Out of these factors of the psyche, the appearance of the phe-
nomenal world is constituted in the following way: The concept
of the false conception, so fundamental for Maitreyanātha, is
insignificant for Asaṅga, and is only very superficially incor-
porated into his doctrine. In contrast to Maitreyanātha, on the
other hand, the doctrine of the three characteristics provides
him with the firm foundational framework.

CFD.2.2.1. The dependent characteristic

Of these three characteristics, the dependent characteristic, being
fundamental, is central. It consists of the different types of cogni-
zance (vijñapti) that emerge from the fundamental cognition; and
to be exact, Asaṅga recognizes eleven such types:

1–3. cognizance of the body, of the embodied, and of the one

who enjoys, [i.e., the six sense-organs];
4. cognizance of that which is enjoyed by the preceding
[cognizances], [i.e., the six objects];
5. cognizance of the enjoyer, [i.e., the six cognitions];
6. cognizance of time;
7. cognizance of number;
8. cognizance of place;
9. cognizance of manners of expression [vyavahāra; S. 341];
10. cognizance of difference between oneself and others;
11. cognizance of the good and bad destinies, of passing
away and arising.

These eleven types of cognizance encompass all the forms in

which the phenomenal world presents itself; and in that they
emerge in this form from the fundamental cognition, the image
of the phenomenal world arises.
350 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

The distinction of object and subject, so strongly emphasized

by Maitreyanātha [S. 299f.], is accomplished by Asaṅga in the
following way. He does not speak of the apprehended and
the apprehending (grāhyagrāhaka), but rather, with respect to
cognition, distinguishes between an image part (nimittabhāga)
and a seeing part (darśanabhāga), which correspond to the
object and subject. Both, the image part and the seeing part,
are included in the types of cognizance enumerated above,
specifically, as follows: According to old Buddhist doctrine,
three factors must be present in every process of cognizance:
the object, the sense-organ, and the corresponding cognition, and
thus the canon taught a group of <330> eighteen so-called
elements (dhātu) that encompasses the six sense-organs with
the corresponding six objects and six types of cognition. But
for Asaṅga, who does not recognize an external world, all of
these eighteen elements are just types of cognizance and are, as
such, contained in the above enumerated eleven types. More
precisely, they constitute their actual core, whereas all others
are only variations (prabheda) of them. Here, the cognizance
of the body, of the embodied, and of the one who enjoys
encompass the six sense-organs; the cognizance of that which
is enjoyed, the six objects; and the cognizance of the enjoyer, the
six types of cognition.
Hence—for Asaṅga—for every process of cognizance, three
types of cognizance always arise at the same time, the first
of which displays the image of the sense-organ, the second, the
image of the object, and the third, the image of the correspond-
ing cognition. In this, the cognizance that displays the image of
the sense-organ forms the foundation, as it were; the cognizance
that displays the image of the object represents the image part
and hence the object of the process of cognizance; and the
cognizance that displays the image of the corresponding cogni-
tion represents the seeing part and hence the subject.
So much for the dependent characteristic.
 Asaṅga 351

CFD.2.2.2. The imagined and the perfect characteristic

Of the imagined and of the perfect characteristic, Asaṅga, like
Maitreyanātha [S. 300, 305, 312], can only say that the imagined
characteristic consists of object-referents that, without really
existing, are reflected in the cognizance; the perfect characteris-
tic, on the other hand, consists in the complete absence of these
object-referents.
What is important and new is only his view of conception,
since for him not every cognition is conception, but only mental
cognition (manovijñāna). Here he again follows a widespread
view of the Śrāvakayāna schools that, indeed, every cognition
is accompanied by conception1 (vikalpa) but that the actual
conceiving character belongs to mental cognition alone. With
respect to mental cognition, again, as everywhere, three types
of cognizance appear connected with one another. The cogni-
zance of thinking (manovijñapti) forms the foundation here.
The cognizance of mental cognition itself (manovijñānavijñapti)
constitutes the seeing part. The image part, finally, consists of
all six external <331> elements or spheres, from the cognizance
of visual form (rūpavijñapti) up to the cognizance of the
factors (dharmavijñapti). These types of cognizance together
make up conception and it is on them that the imagined char-
acteristic is based.

1
[See Frauwallner’s footnote (S. 237) on conception according to its
intrinsic nature (svabhāvavikalpa) and also Vasubandhu’s discussion of the
three types of conception in his Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, i. 33 a–b. On the
other hand, see S. 268, where Frauwallner briefly speaks of the days of the
early Yogācāra where one was not yet able to distinguish between
perception and conceptual thinking as two distinct forms of cognition. In
this context see also Vasubandhu’s view, S. 355.]
 352 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CFD.2.3. The doctrine of liberation

The peculiarity of Asaṅga’s view finds especially clear expres-
sion in the doctrine of liberation. Admittedly, the situation is
more difficult, since the endeavor to incorporate the entirety of
the traditional material into his system and to treat it as a whole,
has resulted here in old and new ideas mixing freely with each
other. In this, a number of things have remained uneven and
there are also some contradictions. But if we pick out the sections
in which Asaṅga expresses his own thoughts, then the objections
vanish and everything merges easily and consistently with the
views rendered thus far to form a unified picture.
In Asaṅga the essential aspects of the path of liberation are
in accord with Maitreyanātha [S. 300f.]. He begins [S. 342] with
the preparation, which consists primarily of the accumulation
of merit and knowledge. Especially important therein is the
hearing and correct view of the Mahāyāna doctrine. The deci-
sive step, however, is nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpaka-
jñāna). This knowledge first recognizes the unreality of the
object-referents of cognizance, becomes conscious that without
object-referents mere cognition also becomes invalid, and finally,
directly beholds the ultimate state of being. Nonconceptual
knowledge is followed by the subsequent knowledge (pṛṣṭha-
labdhajñāna) that maintains the acquired insight even in the
ordinary state of consciousness. The first acquisition of non-
conceptual knowledge represents the path of vision (darśana-
mārga). On this path, the removal of the obstructions begins, and
with this, the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti)
is initiated. The continuation of this process occurs on the path
of contemplation (bhāvanāmārga), which extends over a long
period of time. The path of completion (niṣṭhāmārga), which
brings the transformation of the basis <332> to completion after
the last obstructions have been destroyed in the diamond-like
concentration (vajropamasamādhi), finally leads to the goal and
with this liberation is achieved.
 Asaṅga 353

Typical here is the way Asaṅga, in contrast to Maitreyanātha

[S. 300f.], explains these processes psychologically. Whereas, for
Maitreyanātha, they take place within the ultimate state of
being, which is indeed the stainless mind [S. 298], for Asaṅga,
their bearer is the mental complex, as taught by him. The process
is then as follows [S. 348ff.]. First, through the hearing and
correct view of the Mahāyāna doctrine, a permeation (vāsanā)
arises that is an outflow of the ultimate state of being. This
permeation does not belong to the fundamental cognition,
since the latter is polluted, while [the permeation] itself is
uncontaminated (anāsrava) and supramundane (lokottara). It
does, however, lean on the fundamental cognition. From this
permeation, nonconceptual knowledge emerges that is likewise
supramundane, and it is also joined by all of the uncontami-
nated factors that the Bodhisattva acquires in the course of
his striving. In this way, in addition to the polluted funda-
mental cognition and everything belonging to it, a second,
purer component develops in the dependent characteristic.
The further development in the course of the path of liberation
now proceeds in such a way that the polluted part becomes
increasingly weaker, whereas this permeation, and with it
the entire pure part, gains more and more strength. This is
the above-mentioned transformation of the basis. It ends
finally in such a way that the fundamental cognition and with
it the entire polluted part completely vanish and only the
pure part remains [see S. 346f.].1 And with this, liberation is
attained.

1
[See also in regard to this Frauwallner’s discussion in his Amalavijñāna
and Ālayavijñāna, S. 156–59.]
 354 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CFD.2.4. Asaṅga’s buddhology

Asaṅga’s buddhology also corresponds to this view of the
process of liberation. Accordingly, the body of the doctrine
(dharmakāya) of the Buddha consists of the pure factors,
which remain after the transformation of the basis, together with
the qualities characteristic of the Buddha, which he gains with
the attainment of enlightenment [see S. 347].1 Thus, here as well
it is not the [inherent] ultimate state of being on which Asaṅga
bases his thinking, but the [acquired pure part of the] complex
of the mental factors. At the same time, this corresponds to the
old Śrāvakayāna view that had seen the body of the doctrine in
[acquisition of] the pure factors, the possession of which makes
the Buddha a Buddha. Seen in detail, the ten perfections <333>
of power (vaśitā) play a kind of central role. They are joined by
the remaining pure factors. The latter are extremely numerous
as here too Asaṅga integrates all that the old tradition had to
offer. Likewise, he elaborates in detail on the doctrine of the
three bodies of the Buddha. But all this has little philosophical
significance and can—like the scholastic embellishment of the
path of liberation—be left aside.

CFD.3. Introduction to the translated sections of the

Mahāyānasaṃgraha
In the case of Asaṅga, longer continuous sections from his trea-
tises are not suitable as translated samples, since his writing
is long-winded and complicated, and he constantly weaves
in material from the old scholasticism of liberation, which
offers nothing to the philosophically interested reader. Thus
I present a selection of single sections in which are expressed
those of his views that have been portrayed above. In this,

1
[See also Frauwallner’s comment about difference in opinion regarding
the dharmakāya, in his Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna, S. 159.]
 Asaṅga 355

I do not consider the doctrine of the fundamental cogni-

tion and of the permeations, since it shows up again in
the works of Vasubandhu, which will be rendered later
[S. 352ff.].
After what has been said, the translated sections will be in
general easily understandable so that a few comments will
suffice:
The parts of chapter II translated here deal with the doc-
trine of the three characteristics and especially the way the
phenomenal world assembles itself from the eleven types of
cognizance. In this regard, the distinguishing of the three types
of permeation in § 2 should be highlighted as characteristic for
Asaṅga. Of these, [1] the permeation of speech belongs to the
bulk of the cognizances, which as we have seen are—according
to the old Yogācāra doctrine—necessarily connected with
“words” (see above S. 268f.). [2] The permeation of the belief
in a self appears separately, as befits the significance attributed
to the self-conception and since it is linked with its own form
of cognition, i.e., the so-called defiled mind (kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ).
[3] The permeation of the members of existence, finally, cor-
responds to the form of knowledge in which the maturation of
deeds in particular finds its expression. § 13 teaches an image
part and a seeing part of the fundamental cognition, based
on the consideration that, as cognition, it must also possess
these two parts. <334>
The sections rendered from chapter III deal with the path
of liberation, although with the focus on nonconceptual knowl-
edge. § 1 begins with a precise definition of the permeation
through hearing the Mahāyāna doctrine and of the correspond-
ing cognizance from a psychological point of view. According
to this definition, this cognizance is mental speech and, as
a cognition, consists of an image part and a seeing part.
More precisely, the image part consists of word and object-
referent, hence here, of the Mahāyāna texts and their content.
356 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

§§ 7–9, which describe by what means and how the non-

conceptual knowledge actually comes about, provide a good
example of the way in which Asaṅga weaves together the
varied traditional material and joins it with his own ideas to
form a whole. In the essential aspects, he follows the doctrine
of Maitreyanātha (cf. above S. 300f.). In order to establish the
unreality of the object-referents of cognizance, he uses the
old Yogācāra doctrine of mental speech and of the necessary
connection of the object-referents with words. With this he
connects the doctrine of the four examinations and of the
four comprehensions in accordance with truth, taken from the
scholasticism of liberation, and he adds his own reasons as
well (§ 8 beginning = chapter II, § 11). Finally, one should
note how he tries to harmonize the course of the processes
with the doctrine of the three characteristics.
Chapter VIII deals exclusively with nonconceptual knowl-
edge. The attempt in § 7 to establish the inexpressibility of the
true nature of things is noteworthy. Here again Asaṅga bases
himself on the old Yogācāra doctrine of the dependence of the
conceived object-referents on the connection of phonemes in
words. The true nature of things, however, cannot be tied to
words because they do not coincide with each other, since,
for example, several words can be used for one and the same
thing and thus [the nature of this one thing] is inexpressible
through words.
There is nothing in particular to note about chapters IX
and X, which deal with the transformation of the basis and
with the body of the doctrine of the Buddha. One should just
bear in mind, that in the buddhology, the old doctrine of the
ultimate state of being resounds again and again.
I have also tacked on a few additional paragraphs from
chapter I, which <335> elucidate more precisely the doctrine
of the transformation of the basis. The supramundane mind
is, in this regard, nonconceptual knowledge. As for the
 Asaṅga 357

comparison to milk and water, finally, it is to be noted that

milk and water are seen as a typical image of a harmonious
combination and that, according to Indian belief, the flamingo
has the ability to separate the milk from this mixture while
drinking.1

1
[In the introduction (prastāvanā, § 2–3) to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Asaṅga
briefly outlines its ten chapters:
I: the basis of the knowable (jñeyāśraya), i.e., the foundational conscious-
ness (ālayavijñāna);
II: the characteristic of this knowable (jñeyalakṣaṇa), i.e., the three natures
(svabhāva);
III: entry into this characteristic of the knowable (jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa),
i.e., mere cognizance (vijñaptimātratā);
IV: cause and effect of this entry (praveśahetuphala), i.e., the six per-
fections (pāramitā);
V: various contemplations of this cause and effect (hetuphalabhāvanā-
prabheda), i.e., the ten stages of the Bodhisattva (bodhisattvabhūmi);
VI: training in the highest morality (adhiśīlaṃ śikṣā), i.e., the discipline
(saṃvara) of the Bodhisattvas, that is contained in these various
contemplations;
VII: training in the highest mind (adhicittaṃ śiksā), i.e., the concentrations
(samādhi) called hero’s walk, etc., that is contained in these various
contemplations;
VIII: training in the highest insight (adhiprajñaṃ śikṣā), i.e., nonconceptual
knowledge (nirvikalpakajñāna), that is contained in these various
contemplations;
IX: abandonment, fruit (of these three trainings) (phalaprahāṇa), i.e., the
non-abiding nirvāṇa (apratiṣṭitanirvāṇa);
X: the knowledge of the fruit (of these three trainings) (phalajñāna), i.e.,
the threefold body of the Buddha (buddhakāya): the essence/nature
body (svabhāvikakāya), the enjoyment body (saṃbhogakāya), and the
emanation body (nirmāṇakāya).]
 358 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CFD.4. From the “Summary of the Mahāyāna” (Mahāyānasaṃgraha)

Chapter II
[The characteristic of the knowable (jñeyalakṣaṇa)]
§1
How should the characteristic of the knowable be seen?
It is, in summary, threefold: 1. the dependent characteristic,
2. the imagined characteristic, and 3. the perfect characteristic.
§2
In this regard, what is the dependent characteristic? The
cognizance that has the fundamental cognition as its seed and
that belongs to the false conception (abhūtaparikalpa). What is
this [cognizance]?

1–3. Cognizance of the body, of the embodied, and of the one

who enjoys, [i.e., the six sense-organs];
4. cognizance of that which is enjoyed by the preceding
[cognizances], [i.e., the six objects];
5. cognizance of the enjoyer, [i.e., the six cognitions];
6. cognizance of time;
7. cognizance of number;
8. cognizance of place;
9. cognizance of manners of expression;
10. cognizance of difference between oneself and others;
11. cognizance of the good and bad destinies, of passing
away and arising.

In this regard, cognizance of the body, of the embodied, and

of the one who enjoys, the cognizance of that which is enjoyed
by the preceding [cognizances], <336> the cognizance of the
enjoyer, the cognizance of time, the cognizance of number, the
cognizance of place, the cognizance of manners of expression
are arisen from the seed of the permeation of speech
(abhilāpavāsanā).
 Asaṅga 359

Cognizance of the difference between oneself and others is

arisen from the seed of the permeation of the belief in a self
(ātmadṛṣṭivāsanā).
Cognizance of the good and bad destinies, of passing away
and arising, is arisen from the seed of the permeation of the
members of existence (bhavāṅgavāsanā).
All the realms [of the world], courses (gataya), wombs
(yonaya),1 and pollutions, which are contained in these types of
cognizance, are denoted as false conception of the dependent
characteristic. (On the other hand), these types of cognizance
(themselves)—insofar as, being mere cognizance, they belong
to the false conception and are the basis of the non-existent,
erroneously appearing things—are the dependent characteristic.
§3
In this regard [i.e., § 1], what is the imagined characteristic? The
appearance of this mere cognizance as an object-referent, even
though no object-referent exists.
§4
In this regard [i.e., § 1], what is the perfect characteristic? The
complete non-existence of the mark of an object-referent in the
dependent characteristic. <337>
§5
In this regard [i.e., § 2], by the cognizance of the body, of the
embodied, and of the one who enjoys are to be understood
the six inner elements, [i.e.,] of the eye, etc.
By the cognizance of that which is enjoyed by the preceding
[cognizances] is to be understood the six outer elements, [i.e.,] of
visible form, etc.
By the cognizance of the enjoyer is to be understood the six
elements, [i.e.,] of visual cognition, etc.

1
As types of existence, a Buddhist distinguishes five courses, i.e., existence
as a god, a human, a ghost, an animal, or a hell being; and four wombs,
corresponding to birth from an egg, from the embryonic membrane, from
sweat, or through miraculous sudden appearance.
360 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

The other types of cognizances are to be regarded as varia-

tions of these types of cognizance.
§6
(Opponent:) What example do you have for the assertion that
these types of cognizance are mere cognizance, because no
object-referent exists?
(Answer:) A dream, etc., can be regarded as an example. In
a dream, e.g., even though no object-referent is present and only
cognition exists, the image of various object-referents appears:
of a visible form, a sound, an odor, a taste, a tangible, a house,
a forest, a land, a mountain, etc., and yet, at the same time,
no object-referent exists. Based on this example, it can be recog-
nized that, in all instances, only cognizance exists. The term
“etc.” (above) is to be understood such that a magical illusion, a
mirage, and an optical illusion can also be regarded as examples.
(Opponent:) If, as in a dream, etc., also in the waking state
in all instances only cognizance exists, why then does here, as
in the case of a dream, not also the insight arise that it is nothing
but cognizance?
(Answer:) It does arise for those who are awakened through
the knowledge of the truth. Just as this insight does not arise in
a dream, but does rather in the waking state, so <338> it does not
occur in those who are not awakened through the knowledge
of the truth, but rather so in those who are awakened through
the knowledge of the truth.
[...]
§ 10
(Question:) Why do the cognizance of the body, of the em-
bodied, and of the one who enjoys, the cognizance of that which
is enjoyed by the preceding [cognizances], and the cognizance
of the enjoyer arise in unison and simultaneously in every body
[= existence]?
(Answer:) So that birth and the experience (of the deeds) can
be completely accomplished.
 Asaṅga 361

(Question:) Why do the various types, [i.e.,] the cognizance

of time, etc. [6–11], arise?
(Answer:) [6] Because the chain of the cycle of births that
has existed since beginningless time knows no interruption.
[7] Because the sphere of living beings is immeasurable.
[8] Because the sphere of the surrounding world (bhājanaloka)
is immeasurable. [9] Because the expressions that communicate
the mutual activities are immeasurable. [10] Because the varieties
of the grasped experience are immeasurable. [11] Because the
varieties of the experience of the desired and undesired matu-
ration of the fruit of deeds are immeasurable, and because
the varieties of birth, old age and death that one suffers are
immeasurable.
§ 11
(Question:) How can it be established that these [latter six] types
of cognizance are mere cognizance?
(Answer:) In brief, in three ways:

1. because only they exist, since there is no object-referent,

2. because a duality is given, since they are endowed with an
image (nimitta) [part] and a seeing (darśana) [part], and
3. because a multitude arises at the same time, since they
arise in various forms.

These types of cognizance are in fact all, since there is no object-

referent, <339> just this, (i.e., cognizance). The cognizance of
the eye, etc., is endowed with image and seeing, since visible
form, etc., are its image and the cognition of these is its seeing,
. . . etc., up to . . . since the tactile cognition is its seeing. The
cognizance of thinking has—from the cognizance of the eye up
to the cognizance of factors—everything as image and the
cognizance of mental cognition as seeing, because the mental
cognition is conception and arises in the form of all types of
cognizance.
362 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

About this, a verse states:

Just this, the duality and the multitude, do the yogis

wish to understand. For one who has entered into the
mere mind, is freed from these.

[...]
§ 13
If the cognizance of the fundamental cognition is understood as
cognizance of an object-referent, then all other types of cogni-
zance form the cognizance of its image, [while] the cognizance of
mental cognition along with its basis should be regarded as its
seeing [part]. Since the types of cognizance that form the image
are the occasion for the arising of the seeing, they function as the
basis when this [seeing] arises in the form of the object-referent.
In this way, it is certain that only cognizance exists.
[...]
§ 15
(Question:) If the dependent nature is the mere cognizance,
which forms the basis for the appearance of object-referents,
why then is it dependent and why is it called dependent?
(Answer:) Because it arises from the seed of its own per-
meation, thus it is dependent on conditions. And because once
<340> it has arisen it is itself unable to exist for longer than a
moment, thus it is called dependent.
(Question:) If the imagined nature is the appearance that
is based on [the dependent nature] of the object-referents,
which do not exist as object-referents, then why is it imagined,
and why is it called imagined?
(Answer:) Because it is the occasion for the arising of the
errors that consist of the conceptual imaginations of the mental
cognition with their innumerable forms of appearing, thus it is
imagined. And because it relies only on conceptual imagination,
 Asaṅga 363

since an intrinsic characteristic [of the imagined nature] does not

exist, thus it is called imagined.
(Question:) If the perfect nature is characterized by the total
non-existence of the (imagined nature) [in the dependent
nature], why then is it perfect, and why is it called perfect?
(Answer:) Because it does not change, thus it is perfect. And
because it is the object-support of purity [i.e., of a purified mind]
and represents the culmination of all good factors, thus it is
called perfect, in the sense of culmination.
§ 16
(Question:) If conceptual imagination exists, then the imagined
and an imagined nature also exist. What, then, is the conceptual
imagination, what is that which is imagined, and what is the
imagined nature?
(Answer:) The mental cognition is the conceptual imagination
(parikalpa) since it is accompanied by conceptions (vikalpa).
[Mental cognition] arises from the seed of its own permeation
of speech (abhilāpavāsanā) and it arises from the seed of the
permeation of speech of all types of cognizance. Hence it arises
with the conceptions of innumerable forms of appearing, and
because it conceives in that it forms in every way, it is called
conceptual imagination.
The <341> dependent nature is that which is imagined.
And finally, the aspect in which the dependent nature is
imagined is the imagined nature . . .
(Question:) How does conceptual imagination conceive?
[1] What is the object-support, [2] what is the grasping of the
marks, [3] what is the clinging to [the marks], [4] what is the
expression of speech [vāksamutthāna], [5] what are the manners
of expression (vyavahāra), and [6] what is the imputation
(samāropa) by which [the conceptual imagination] conceives?
(Answer:) [Conceptual imagination] conceives in that it
[1] finds its object-support in a name, [2] grasps the marks in the
dependent nature, [3] clings to [the marks] by means of views,
364 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

[4] expresses itself in speech through reflection, [5] expresses

itself through the four manners of expression: of the seen, etc.,
(the heard, the thought of, and the cognized), and [6] imputes
existence to a non-existent object-referent.
§ 17
(Question:) Is this threefold nature of distinct or of non-
distinct kind?
(Answer:) It is to be designated neither as distinct nor
as non-distinct. In a certain sense, the dependent nature is
dependent, in a certain sense it is imagined, and in a certain
sense it is perfect.
(Question:) In what sense is the dependent nature called
dependent?
(Answer:) Because it is dependent insofar as it arises from
the dependent seed of permeation.
(Question:) In what sense is [the dependent nature] called
imagined?
(Answer:) Because it is the occasion for the conception and is
conceived through it.
(Question:) In what sense is [the dependent nature] called
perfect?
(Answer:) Because it does not exist at all in the way as it
is imagined. <342>
[...]

Chapter III
[Entry into the characteristic of the knowable (jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa)]
§1
With this [i.e., chapter II], the characteristic of the knowable
[jñeyalakṣaṇa] has been discussed. How, then, is the entry into
the characteristic of the knowable to be seen? It consists of
mental speech [i.e., mental cognition] the foundation of which
is permeation through extensive hearing [of the doctrine of the
 Asaṅga 365

Great Way], does not form part of the fundamental cognition1

but like the fundamental cognition is a seed; it [i.e., mental
speech] belongs to right attention, displays upon its arising the
form of doctrinal texts and their content, corresponding to the
apprehended thing, and is “connected” with vision [sadarśana].
§2
Who is it who enters into the characteristic of the knowable?
A Bodhisattva, whose mind stream is permeated through
extensive hearing of the doctrine of the Great Way, who has
won the favor of innumerable embodiments of the Buddha, and
who has fostered the roots of good through extraordinary
devotion and has in this way accumulated a rich store of merit
and knowledge.
§3
Where does he enter? With the aid of this mental speech that
is “connected” with vision, that displays the image of doctrinal
texts and their content, and that arises from the doctrine of
the Great Way, he enters [1] into the stage of the engagement
of devotion, [2] into the path of vision, [3] into the path of
contemplation, and [4] into the path of completion, [1] because,
he devotes himself to the instruction that all factors are mere
cognizance, [2] because he recognizes this [instruction] in ac-
cordance with truth, [3] because he practices the antidote to all
obstructions, and [4] because he is free from obstructions. <343>
[...]
§7
By what means and how does he enter?
He enters 1. due to mental speech that arises from the per-
meation through hearing, that belongs to right attention, that
displays the image of doctrinal texts and their content, and

1
[Because this kind of mental speech ensues from the very pure element
of the factors (dharmadhātu) and counteracts the fundamental cognition.
See Lamotte, S. 65ff., 153.]
366 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

that is “connected” with vision; 2. due to the four examinations

(paryeṣaṇā), that is, the examination of the name, of the object-
referent, of the designation of the nature, and of the designation
of the particularities; and 3. due to the four comprehensions
in accordance with truth (yathābhūtaparijñāna), that is, the com-
prehension in accordance with truth of the name, of the thing,
of the designation of the nature, and of the designation of the
particularities, since all of these cannot be perceived.
That is to say, in that the Bodhisattva makes an effort to enter
into mere cognizance, he recognizes in mental speech, which
appears in the form of phonemes and object-referents, that
the names consisting of phonemes are mere mental speech.
He recognizes that the object-referents based on the phonemes
are likewise mere mental speech. And he recognizes that the
nature and the particularities of the names and the object-
referents are mere designations, . . . . In this way, on the basis
of the four examinations and the four comprehensions in
accordance with truth within mental speech, which displays the
image of phonemes and object-referents, he enters into mere
cognizance.
§8
How does this entry into mere cognizance take place and
what does it resemble to? He enters [1] into mere (cognizance),
[2] into the duality endowed with image and seeing, and [3] into
the multiformity, [1] because the six object-referents: name,
object-referent, designation of the nature, designation of the
particularities, the nature, and the particularities, <344> are not
object-referents, [2] because they present themselves as the
apprehended and apprehending things, and [3] because they
arise in that they simultaneously display the image of multiform
object-referents.
He enters as in the case of a rope that in the dark appears as
a snake. In the case of the rope, the snake is a deception because
it does not exist. Those who have recognized the object-referent
 Asaṅga 367

thus discard the apprehension of the snake that does not exist
and remain with the apprehension of the rope. But the latter
also is a deception if one traces it back to its subtle appearing
form, since it has color, odor, taste, and the tangible as its mark.
With regard to mental speech then, which displays the six
appearing forms of phoneme and object-referent, as with the
apprehension of the snake, the reality of the six appearing forms
is dismissed. And just as, based on the apprehension of color,
etc., the apprehension of the rope is also dismissed, so, based
on the apprehension of the perfect nature, the apprehension of
mere cognizance is also made to disappear.
§9
In that the Bodhisattva thus enters into the mental speech
characterized by the appearing object, he enters into the
imagined nature. And in that he enters into mere cognizance,
he enters into the dependent nature. But how does he enter
into the perfect nature?
He enters in that he eliminates the comprehension of mere
cognizance. Once the Bodhisattva has caused the comprehension
of an [existing] object-referent to disappear, then the mental
speech originating from the permeation of the doctrinal texts
that have been heard, has no possibility of arising in the form
of all the object-referents. <345> Consequently, it also does
not arise in the form of mere cognizance. If then with regard
to all object-referents, he remains in the mere nonconceptual
name and remains in such a way that he directly perceives
the element of the factors, then, due to the sameness of the
perceived and the perceiver, there arises within this Bodhisattva
the nonconceptual knowledge of sameness. In this way, the
Bodhisattva enters into the perfect nature.
[...]
368 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Chapter VIII
[Training in highest insight (adhiprajñaṃ śikṣā)]
§1
With this [i.e., chapter VII], the excellence of the highest mind
[adhicittaṃ] has been discussed. How, then, is the excellence
of the highest insight to be seen?
Nonconceptual knowledge is to be seen as the excellence of
the highest insight.
[...]
§3
The bearer of the nonconceptual knowledge of the Bodhisattvas
is [1] not mind and [2] yet mind, because [the bearer]
[1] recognizes no object-referent and [2] yet has emerged from
it (i.e., from mind).
§4
The basis of the nonconceptual knowledge of the Bodhisattvas
is [1] the permeation through hearing connected with speech
[about the Great Way] and [2] the right attention.
§5
The object-support of the nonconceptual knowledge of the
Bodhisattvas is the inexpressible nature of things and the
suchness constituted by selflessness (nairātmya). <346>
§6
The appearing aspect of the nonconceptual knowledge of the
Bodhisattvas is the signlessness of the knowable, which serves
as object-support.
§7
The conceived is the nature resulting from the connection
[of the phonemes], and nothing else. The object-referent that
results from the connection of the phonemes with one another,
is the (object-referent) resulting from the connection.
If then a designation does not exist, knowledge is not engaged
in the designated.
 Asaṅga 369

A designation does not exist (in the factors), however,

because an opposition exists [between designation and desig-
nated entity]. Thus, everything is inexpressible.
[...]
§ 13
The final stage of the nonconceptual knowledge of the
Bodhisattvas consists of the attainment of the pure three bodies
[of a Buddha] and in the attainment of the perfected powers.
[...]

Chapter IX
[Abandonment, fruit of the three trainings (phalaprahāṇa)]
§1
With this [i.e., chapter VIII], the excellence of the highest insight
has been discussed. How, then, is the excellence of abandonment
to be seen?
The abandonment of the Bodhisattvas consists of the non-
abiding nirvāṇa (apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa).1 Its mark is the transfor-
mation of the basis, which consists of the fact that while
pollution has been abandoned, one still remains, without giving
up the cycle of existences.
Here,

• the cycle of existences [saṃsāra] is the dependent <347>

nature insofar as [the dependent nature] constitutes the
polluted part;
• the nirvāṇa is [the dependent nature] insofar as [the
dependent nature] constitutes the pure part;
• the basis is this dependent nature insofar as [the depend-
ent nature] encompasses both parts;
• the transformation consists in the fact that this depend-
ent nature, when its counteragent [i.e., nonconceptual

1
The nirvāṇa that does not exclude further activity in the cycle of
existences for the benefit of beings.
370 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

knowledge] arises, abandons its polluted part and becomes

its pure part.

[...]

Chapter X
[The knowledge of the fruit (phalajñāna)]
§3
What is the characteristic of the body of the doctrine (dharma-
kāya) of the Buddhas? One should know that, briefly sum-
marized, its characteristic is fivefold:
1. Its characteristic is the transformation of the basis, because
it has cast off the polluted-part-forming dependent character-
istic that contains all of the obstructions, and has become the
pure-part-forming dependent characteristic that has gained
mastery over all factors through becoming free from all
obstructions.
2. Its characteristic is that its nature consists of white fac-
tors, because it has obtained the ten perfected powers (vaśitā)
through the completion of the six perfections (pāramitā) . . .
3. Its characteristic is non-duality (i.e., being free from the
duality of existence and non-existence, of the conditioned and
the unconditioned, and of multiplicity and unity) . . .
4. Its characteristic is eternality, because it is characterized
by pure suchness, because it is the effect of a previous vow, and
because its activity is never completed.
5. Its characteristic is inconceivability through thinking,
because pure suchness must be experienced by oneself
(pratyātmavedya), because it is unequalled in the world, and
because it does not fall into the realm of logical thinking. <348>
§4
How, further, is this body of the doctrine first obtained through
contact? By the nonconceptual [knowledge] and the knowl-
edge subsequent to this, which are directed at the summarized
 Asaṅga 371

doctrine of the Great Way [i.e., suchness (tathatā)]; by the

fivefold energetic contemplation;1 by the energetic accumulation
of the stores (of knowledge and merit) on all of the stages
(bhūmi); and by the diamond-like concentration (vajropama-
samādhi), which serves to destroy the subtle, difficult to destroy
obstructions. Immediately following that concentration, one is
freed of all obstructions and thus obtains thereby the transfor-
mation of the basis.
[...]
§8
(Question:) Is the body of the doctrine of the exalted Buddhas
distinct or is it not distinct?
(Answer:) Since basis, goal, and activity are not distinct,
[the body of the doctrine] is not distinct. But since innumerable
bodies do reach perfect enlightenment, it is distinct. . . .

Chapter I
[The basis of the knowable (jñeyāśraya)]
§ 45
(Opponent:) If the maturation-cognition (i.e., the fundamental
cognition as the result of the maturation of deeds), which con-
tains all the seeds, is the cause of pollution, how can it then be
the seed of its counteragent, that is, of the supramundane mind
(lokottara citta)? The supramundane mind is, namely, something
unusual [anucita]. Hence a permeation by it does not [yet] exist.
But if no permeation exists, then it must be stated from which
seed [the supramundane mind] arises.
(Answer:) <349> It arises from the seed of the permeation
through hearing, which is an outflow of the completely pure
element of the factors.

1
[Contemplation that all factors are (1) without arising (anutpāda);
(2) without cessation (anirodha); (3) calm from the very beginning (ādiśānti);
(4) nirvāṇa by nature (prakṛtiparinirvṛti); (5) essencelessness (niḥsvabhāva).]
372 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

§ 46
(Opponent:) Does this permeation through hearing belong to
the fundamental cognition by nature or not? If it belongs to the
fundamental cognition by nature, how can it then be the seed
of the counteragent of this [fundamental cognition]? If, on the
other hand, it does not belong to it by nature, what should
then be regarded as the bearer of this seed of the permeation
through hearing?
(Answer:) Until the enlightenment of the Buddhas, to
whatever bearer it may adhere, the permeation through hearing
adheres to the maturation-cognition insofar as it arises simul-
taneously together with it, just as milk and water. It does not,
however, belong to the fundamental cognition, since it is the
seed of the counteragent of this [fundamental cognition].
§ 47
Based on a weak permeation, a moderate permeation arises;
based upon a moderate permeation, a strong permeation arises,
since hearing, reflecting, and cultivating entail a strengthening.
§ 48
In this, the seed of the permeation through hearing, whether
weak, mediate, or strong, should be regarded as the seed of
the body of the doctrine. Since it is the counteragent of the
fundamental cognition, it does not belong to the fundamental
cognition by nature. And since, even though it is mundane, it
is an outflow of the supramundane, completely pure element
of the factors, it constitutes the seed of <350> the supramun-
dane mind. Even if this supramundane mind has not yet arisen,
it is the counteragent to the outbreak of the defilements, the
counteragent to the bad course (in the cycle of existences), and
the counteragent that makes all bad activity disappear. It fosters
the connection with the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Even though
it is mundane, it belongs to the body of the doctrine of the
prospective Bodhisattvas and it belongs to the body of liberation
of the disciples and solitary Buddhas. Thus it does not belong
 Asaṅga 373

to the fundamental cognition; instead it belongs to the body of

the doctrine and to the body of liberation. As it then develops
as weak, moderate, and strong in turn, to the same extent the
maturation-cognition diminishes and the basis is transformed.
Once the basis is completely transformed, then the maturation-
cognition, which contains all the seeds, has become seedless and
is completely eliminated.
§ 49
(Opponent:) If the fundamental cognition and that which is
not fundamental cognition [i.e., the permeation through hear-
ing] coexist like milk and water, how can the one [i.e., the
fundamental cognition] completely disappear, [whereas the
(permeation through hearing), which is not fundamental
cognition, completely develops]?
(Answer:) Just as the milk is extracted from water by a
drinking flamingo . . .
CFE. Vasubandhu1
Next to Asaṅga, the most famous personage of the Yogācāra
school is his younger brother Vasubandhu [the Elder, ca. 320–80
c.e.]. He originally belonged to the Śrāvakayāna school of the
Sarvāstivādins and had already made a name for himself
through the composition of numerous treatises when he was
won over to the Mahāyāna by Asaṅga. He then with great
enthusiasm puts his talents to work in the <351> service of his
new faith, for which he wrote so many works that he received
the name “master of a thousand doctrinal treatises.” According
to legend, he is said to have died before Asaṅga.

CFE.1. The works

Vasubandhu’s writings include numerous commentaries on
the works of Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga, but his fame is based
first and foremost on his commentaries on some of the most
important Mahāyāna sutras. In addition, two smaller works

1
[With the original section title “Vasubandhu der Ältere (ca. 320–80 c.e.),”
Frauwallner follows the traditional account that reckons with one
Vasubandhu as the author of all works attributed to this name. In the
introduction to the two works selected here, he presents these works,
however, as being authored by Vasubandhu the Younger in accordance
with his theory of two Vasubandhus. Cf. his book On the Date of the Buddhist
Master of the Law Vasubandhu of 1951, the note to the revised edition of the
present book, S. 425, and for a recent survey of the issue of two
Vasubandhus cf. Florin Deleanu: The Chapter on the Mundane Path
(Laukikamārga) in the Śrāvakabhūmi. A Trilingual Edition, 2 Vols. Tokyo:
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies 2006: 186–94 (with notes
206, 207 in particular).]
 Vasubandhu 375

are preserved under the name Vasubandhu, both of which go

by the title Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Proof that [Everything] is
Mere Cognizance), one of which is in twenty verses (Viṃśatikā),
the other in thirty (Triṃśikā). The external tradition does
not permit a decision as to whether these two works come
from Vasubandhu, the brother of Asaṅga, or from Vasubandhu
the Younger [ca. 400–80 c.e.], the author of the Abhidharmakośa.
In my opinion, Vasubandhu the Younger is their author, yet
this difficult question cannot be discussed further here. Of these
two works, the first, in twenty verses, also includes an auto-
commentary by Vasubandhu himself. Its content is the proof
of the unreality of the external world. The second work, in
thirty verses, consists only of the verse-text. It is considered
to be the last work of Vasubandhu, who is thought to have
died before it was possible for him to write the intended
commentary. It contains a scholasticism of the Yogācāra doctrine
in a most concise form. These two works are considered to be
the best summaries of the most important philosophical tenets
of the school. As such, they have always enjoyed great esteem,
and numerous commentaries on them have been written.
Corresponding to their importance, I render them in full in
what follows. I preface them with just a brief synopsis of the
most important views they contain.

CFE.2. Synopsis of the doctrines of the “Twenty Verses” and “Thirty

Verses”
In general, the following features are characteristic of these
works. The philosophical interest is decidedly predominant.
The old scholasticism of liberation has completely disappeared.
Further, a greater deviation from Asaṅga [S. 354f.] and a reliance
on the views of Maitreyanātha [S. 356] are noticeable. In the
psychology, first created by Asaṅga [S. 328f.], we do find agree-
ment in the essential points. All the <352> greater, on the other
 376 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

hand, are the deviations with respect to the doctrine of the

phenomenal world [S. 329ff.]. To this are added unique new
thoughts that pointed the way for later development, while
quite often closer contact with Sautrāntika views is apparent. In
terms of the shaping [of the material], finally, a precision and a
taut conciseness are reached that the Śrāvakayāna scholasticism
knew only in its greatest heyday.

CFE.2.1. The mental complex as three transformations of cognition

The details of the doctrine contained in both of these works
amounts to the following. The mental complex, on which the
entire phenomenal world rests, consists of three appearing forms
or, as Vasubandhu expresses it, transformations (pariṇāma) of
cognition. These are the [i] fundamental cognition, [ii] thinking,
and [iii] cognizance of objects. Vasubandhu discusses each of
these systematically; specifically, he deals with their nature,
their support, and their object, the mental factors that accom-
pany them, their moral character, and, finally, the exact time,
and duration of their arising.
[i] The fundamental cognition (ālayavijñāna), as foundation
of the entire mental complex and the essential bearer of the
mundane personality, is, in its constitution, conditioned by the
deeds that have brought about the existence in question and
that in this way determine the manner of being of this existence.
It is thus maturation (vipāka) or retribution. Its essential task is
to function as the bearer of all of the seeds of the diverse
permeations, in other words those imprints from which the
diverse forms of cognition emerge. It is in this regard, however,
a true cognition and has as such its object, namely the entire
surrounding world (bhājanaloka) in addition to one’s own body.
Yet, this object is not brought into consciousness through
the fundamental cognition. Vasubandhu thus advocates—as
by the way Asaṅga already did before him—the bold thought
that the entire phenomenal world is already the creation of
 Vasubandhu 377

the subconsciousness and that, through the remaining processes

of cognition, only secondarily parts of it are raised into
consciousness. Further, as cognition, the fundamental cognition
is also accompanied by mental factors (caitta), but, since it
remains non-conscious, only by those that accompany every
cognition and are called all-pervasive (sarvatraga). <353> In
addition, being itself the result of previous deeds and non-
conscious, it is morally undetermined. Thus it is not afflicted
with defilements and is neither good nor bad. As for its
occurrence, finally, it exists from beginningless time as the
essential bearer of mundane existence in the uninterrupted
stream of cognizance, [and will continue to do] so long as
the cycle of existences endures. Only in the state of sainthood,
when the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) has taken
place, is it extinguished.
[ii] Thinking (manas) is by nature mentation or imagining
(mananā). For it is the bearer of the fateful mistaken concep-
tion of a self, for which—in accordance with its importance—
a continuously active form of cognition of its own is assumed.
It is supported by the fundamental cognition from which it
originates, and, at the same, has it as its object. The fundamen-
tal cognition is therefore the foundation of this conception of
a self. Thinking is accompanied by the five all-pervasive mental
factors, but especially by four defilements related to the
mistaken conception of the self and that lend it its unique,
disastrous character. Morally, it is undetermined since the good
and bad mental factors that entail good or bad retribution are
absent from it, but it is defiled. It exists throughout the entire
cycle of existences and is extinguished once and for all only—
as is the fundamental cognition—through the transformation
of the basis in the state of sainthood. It can, however, be
temporarily interrupted even earlier, specifically, in the state of
the absorption of suppression (nirodhasamāpatti) and in the
supramundane nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajñāna).
 378 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

[iii] Cognizance of the objects (viṣayavijñapti), finally, en-

compasses all the remaining processes of cognizance, in other
words, the six types of cognition that, in accordance with the
old doctrine, are named after the six sense-organs. Its support
is to be seen in the seed of the permeation, from which it has
emerged. The different object-referents, which seem to belong
to the external world and are reflected in it, are its object. It can
be accompanied by any of the mental factors known to the
scholasticism of the Yogācāra (cf. above S. 113ff. the rendering of
Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka): <354> the all-pervasive ones;
those bound to specific objects; the good ones; the defilements;
the secondary defilements; and the unbound mental factors.
In [this cognizance], the volitional processes take place that
constitute the deeds and determine the further course of the
cycle of existences. It is thus good as well as bad, but can also
be undetermined. Finally, with regard to the occurrence of the
different types of cognizance of the objects, the different types
of sensory cognizance arise each time that the conditions for
their arising are present, that is, at times singly, at times con-
currently. Mental cognition is always present except in the state
of unconsciousness, thus while being anaesthetized, in the case
of fainting, in the absorption of non-ideation (asaṃjñisamāpatti),
in the absorption of suppression (nirodhasamāpatti), and finally,
in the state of non-ideation (āsaṃjñika) that Buddhism ascribes to
a certain realm of gods.

CFE.2.2. The mental complex and the seeds of permeation

The mental complex on which the entire phenomenal world
rests is composed of these three transformations of cognition.
The seeds of permeation stored in the fundamental cognition are
crucial to its activity. Vasubandhu does not divide [these seeds
of permeation] into three groups in the manner of Asaṅga (see
above S. 333), but gives instead a simpler, better fitting divi-
sion into two groups. Specifically, he distinguishes between
 Vasubandhu 379

the permeation of the twofold apprehension (grāhadvayavāsanā) and

the permeation of the deeds (karmavāsanā). The permeation of
the twofold apprehension is brought about through the sepa-
rate processes of cognizance, which seem to recognize an
apprehended and an apprehending, and it is itself, in turn, able
to bring forth similar cognitions. The permeation of deeds is, as its
name says, conditioned by deeds, and determines the general
development of the mental complex, and with this, the destiny
in the cycle of existences. Above all else, it is also the principal
cause—when a fundamental cognition that has, in a specific
form, been the bearer of a specific existence comes to an end—
for a new fundamental cognition of a different kind to arise as
the bearer of a new existence.

CFE.2.3. The mental complex in relation to the phenomenal world, highest

reality, and other beings
According to Vasubandhu, with this activity of the mental
complex, the appearance of the phenomenal world comes about
as follows. <355> By nature, every cognition is a conception
(vikalpa) that conceives something unreal. This “unreal” is
the duality of the apprehended and the apprehending
(grāhyagrāhaka). In this, the apprehended and the apprehending
are not, as Asaṅga assumed, embodied by two distinct
cognizances to which, as bearer, corresponding to the sense-
organ, a third is added [S. 329f.]. Instead, everything is united
in one cognition. In other words, this cognition itself displays
the image of an object that is held to exist externally. With
this, the apprehended and the apprehending is established.
Further, with regard to the sense-organ, which, according to
the old canonical doctrine, must be given along with an object
and cognition so that a process of cognition can come about,
Vasubandhu takes it to be the seed of permeation from which
the corresponding cognition originates. Since every cognition is,
in this way, in itself a conception, the special role that Asaṅga
 380 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

ascribes [S. 330] to the mental cognition is abandoned. For

Vasubandhu, the latter is rather of the same type as the sensory
cognition that it follows. It displays the same image as this
[sensory cognition], and is thus by nature a recollection. It is
differentiated from [sensory cognition] only through the fact that
it consciously apprehends the corresponding object-referent.
Also important is Vasubandhu’s insight that every cognition,
as soon as it itself becomes an object, appears in conceived
form. What is then cognized is thus not its true nature, but rather
a conception like any other. With this, the relationship to the
highest reality is clarified. The doctrine that everything is mere
cognizance thus does not mean that the sole real entity is cogni-
zance as it appears to us [in conceived form]. It is, rather, the
true nature of [cognizance] that remains forever inaccessible
to our mundane cognizance. And precisely this is the highest
reality.
In addition, it is noteworthy that Vasubandhu raises the
question of the multiplicity of living beings, that is, the multi-
plicity of cognizing subjects and their relationship to one
another. In his view, the relation of different living beings to
one another rests upon the fact that the distinct streams of
cognition, all of which are real, are able to causally influence
one another in their course. <356>

CFE.2.4. The doctrine of liberation

With respect to the doctrine of liberation, Vasubandhu starts,
according to old custom, from the twofold bondage, which
consists of the false belief in a self and in factors, while he
attempts in a new and unique way to define the nature of this
belief as the attribution of an extraneous essence (upacāra). As
for the process of liberation itself, he is concerned only with
the fundamental philosophical idea, which he takes over essen-
tially just as Maitreyanātha created it and Asaṅga retained it (see
above S 300f. and 331f.). In the establishment of the unreality
 Vasubandhu 381

of the external world, however, he takes a very different route.

The dependence of entities on words, with which Asaṅga had
worked [S. 333f.], is completely dropped and he attempts to
prove the impossibility of matter through examining the concept
of the atom. From the impossibility of the knowable, he infers
in the customary way the invalidity of cognition, while returning
to the idea that cognition, as it appears to us, is [in reality]
only conception. Once the disciple has turned away from the
object and cognition, that is, from the apprehended and the
apprehending, he then abides in mere cognizance, i.e., in its true
nature, the highest reality. In this way, he has attained the
supramundane, nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajñāna),
which is, at the same time, the non-perception (anupalambha)
of any object in the ordinary sense. With this, the transformation
of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) takes place, the twofold bondage
through the false belief in a self and in factors is destroyed,
and the mental complex dissolves. Through this, liberation is
attained; the union with the highest reality, the undefiled
element (anāsrava dhātu), as Maitreyanātha called it, which
at the same time is the body of the doctrine (dharmakāya) of
the Buddha.

CFE.3. Introduction to the Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi

CFE.3.1. Chapter one: Doctrine of the unreality of the external world and
answers to objections based on reasoning (vv. 1–7)
I now move on to the discussion of the Viṃśatikā Vijñapti-
mātratāsiddhi. The doctrine of the unreality of the external
world originally emerged directly from the experience of medi-
tation. As proof, one was content to point to dreams, sensory
illusions, mirages, and so forth. Accordingly, Vasubandhu
begins [v. 1] by stating the tenet with a reference to the sacred
scripture and by referring to these examples. <357>
382 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

In the meantime, however, the opposing side had brought

forth various objections that needed to be addressed; specifically,
above all, four points were of concern [v. 2]. It was asked:

[1–2] If the entities that we see are indeed only a creation of

our own conception, why do we then see them only at
a specific place and at a specific time?
[3] Why do we all see them and not just some of us?
[4] And how are they able to bring forth certain effects?

Vasubandhu answers with counter-examples [vv. 3–4] wherein

he also makes use of views that are valid only for Buddhists,
since after all, his line of argument is directed primarily against
the followers of the Śrāvakayāna.
He first [v. 3] points out that dream images also appear at
a specific place and a specific time and that they are capable of
bringing forth an effect [v. 4], for example, nocturnal emission.
As for the fact that everyone sees the same things [v. 3], he
gives the example of the spirits of the dead, since among the
diverse types of rebirth Buddhists also recognize existence
as spirits of the dead or ghosts (preta). These roam about on earth
and are tormented, above all, by hunger and thirst. This
is based on the fact that, as a result of their deeds, they believe
they see pus and filth in rivers that for humans carry clear water,
and thus they are unable to quench their thirst. And in fact,
all spirits of the dead who are subject to the effect of the same
deeds are subject to this illusion, not just a few of them.
Finally [v. 4b], Vasubandhu gives another example in which
all four points apply, namely, the guardians of hell who guard
and torment the damned. According to Sautrāntika doctrine,
with which Vasubandhu commences, these guardians of hell
are, in fact, not real, but only the conceptions of the damned.
Nevertheless, they appear at a specific place and at a specific
time, are seen by all and not just by some, and the damned feel
 Vasubandhu 383

the torment that they cause them. This doctrine of the guardians
of hell was, however, quite controversial among the Buddhist
schools and different opposing views existed. Vasubandhu thus
felt compelled to answer to various objections. <358>
Specifically, [v. 5], he first opposes the doctrine of the
Mahāsāṃghikas and Sāṃmatīyas, who saw in the guardians of
hell real living beings, and then [vv. 5–7], the doctrine of the
Sarvāstivādins, who see the guardians of hell as formations of
the inanimate elements, which appear in this guise through the
deeds of the damned. Against this second view he remarks that
the effect of the deeds is based on the permeation (vāsanā)
or the imprints that they leave behind in cognition; it would
therefore be better to assume that their effect—in the guise of
a conception—also appears in cognition and not in the external
world. Here he relies on the principle, generally accepted in
Indian philosophy, that, of several possible theories, the simpler
one is always preferable.

CFE.3.2. Chapter two: Answers to objections based on scripture

(vv. 8–10)
With the opponent’s reference to sacred scripture, the discussion
moves on to a new question: Why did the Buddha speak of the
six outer spheres (āyatana) if an external world does not exist? To
this Vasubandhu gives the answer [v. 8] that had already long
been customary in the Mahāyāna: The doctrine of the six outer
and six inner spheres was proclaimed by the Buddha with the
specific purpose of first leading a specific audience not yet
capable of apprehending the complete truth one step further.
As a similar example [v. 8], he points to the doctrine of the
spontaneously appearing beings (upapāduka sattva). Buddhist
scholasticism namely recognizes living beings that are not born,
but rather appear independently and spontaneously. To these
belong, among others, the hell beings, some of the gods, and
the beings of the intermediate existence (antarābhava) between
384 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

the end of one life and the beginning of a new re-embodiment, of

which Vasubandhu is thinking here in particular. With this
doctrine of the spontaneously appearing beings, the Buddha
did not at all intend to affirm the existence of living beings—
a concept that Buddhism equates with the concept of a soul and
discards on principle—but rather he had in mind the continuous
existence of the stream of cognizance and he wanted to prevent
his audience from believing that at death an interruption of
existence, and with it an annihilation, occurs.
Likewise [v. 9], with the <359> doctrine of the six outer and
six inner spheres, he did not intend to affirm the existence of an
external world, but rather he had in mind the appearing image
in cognizance and the seed from which it arises, and intended
with this to bring those hearers who are not yet mature enough
for the doctrine of the essencelessness of all factors (dharma-
nairātmya) [v. 10], first to the realization of the essencelessness of
the personality (pudgalanairātmya) (cf. to this S. 267). For,
by means of this doctrine that the individual processes of
cognizance come about through the combined activity of object
and sense-organ and are not the work of a uniform cognizer, the
hearers come to the insight that there is no self and no soul.
If this has taken place [v. 10], then through the doctrine that
everything is mere cognizance, they can be led to the complete
truth of the essencelessness of all factors.
Now [v. 10], the opponent raises another objection: If all
factors are without essence, then so is mere cognizance;
therefore, it cannot exist and it is meaningless to teach it.
Vasubandhu answers [v. 10] that essencelessness of the factors
does not mean that they do not exist at all. They just do not
exist in the form in which ordinary people conceive them;
however, they do indeed exist by this inexpressible nature,
which only the Buddhas can totally recognize. This also applies
to mere cognizance. This too does not by any means not exist
at all, it does not, however, exist in the form in which ordinary
 Vasubandhu 385

people conceive it. This assumption is, in fact, absolutely

necessary, since if cognizance as we conceive it were real, then
one cognizance, if it recognized another [cognizance] (cf. v. 21),
would have a real object and the doctrine that cognizance
exists only on its own, i.e., without an [external] object, would
be invalid.

CFE.3.3. Chapter three: Proof of the unreality of the external world:

impossibility of the concept of an atom, etc. (vv. 11–15)
Next (v. 11ff.), the actual center-piece of the presentation follows,
Vasubandhu’s own proof of the unreality of the external world.
The old idea from the Bodhisattvabhūmi, with which Asaṅga
had still worked [S. 268f., 333f.], of deriving the unreality of
things from their necessary connection with words, had been
rendered impossible by the advances in epistemology that had
taken place in the meantime. <360> Vasubandhu thus takes
a completely different route. Specifically, he bases his argument
first and foremost on the impossibility of the concept of the
atom. Some features here are reminiscent of older lines of
thinking as we have seen them, for example, in Āryadeva
(see above S. 218f.). On the whole, however, his presentation
is new and unique. His principal idea is that spatially extended
things cannot be a unity, but must instead be divided into parts.
This continues until only atoms remain, which are partless
and therefore indivisible. Such partless atoms are, however,
impossible, as he explains further. And therefore, matter, and
with that an external world, cannot exist.
The presentation begins [v. 11] with Vasubandhu stating
three possibilities for things of an external world. They are either:

[1] a whole (avayavin) consisting of atoms but being distinct

from the atoms, as the Vaiśeṣikas taught [see S. 218], or
[2] a multiplicity of individual atoms, or
[3] a combination of atoms.
386 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

He quickly passes over the view of the Vaiśeṣikas, since it was

unanimously rejected by all of the Buddhist schools.
A multiplicity is out of the question since single atoms cannot
be perceived.
Finally, the assumption of a combination [v. 12] fails due to
difficulties with the concept of the atom. If, namely, six atoms
approach an atom from all six sides so as to combine with it, and
if they touch it at six different places, then the atom has parts
and is no longer an atom.
If, on the other hand [v. 12], they all touch it at one and the
same place, then they all collapse into a single atom.
And this is also not affected [v. 13] by the assumption of
the Kashmirean school of the Sarvāstivādins that it is not the
single atoms, but rather conglomerates that combine with each
other, for the conglomerates are nothing other than the atoms,
whose combination is quite impossible. And, Vasubandhu adds,
if the conglomerates do not combine, then even less so do the
individual atoms.
It is [v. 14], however, not at all necessary to consider a com-
bination. As soon as the atom has different sides, it has parts
and is no longer an atom.
Furthermore [v. 14], any shadow is impossible because
partless atoms cannot be illuminated and not illuminated at
the same time. Further, other atoms do not encounter anything,
beyond the single <361> point, that would offer resistance
and prevent their collapsing into the first atom, and thus a
combination of however many atoms would never be any larger
than a single atom.
And here as well the subterfuge that it is not the individual
atoms but rather their conglomerates that produce shadow and
resistance is of no use since, as stated, the opponent himself
admits that his conglomerates are nothing other than the com-
bined atoms.
 Vasubandhu 387

The opponent then also advances the objection that this

entire line of argument, which should prove the unreality of the
external world, does not strike at the heart of the matter, since
it starts only from the external form of matter and not from
its characteristic (lakṣaṇa), i.e., from that which constitutes its
nature. Of what, Vasubandhu asks, does this characteristic then
consist? The opponent answers: Of the fact that [matter] is—
in accordance with its respective affiliation with the six outer
spheres—the object of the eye or of another sense and is
characterized as color, etc.1 To this, Vasubandhu replies: But it
is exactly this color, which is the object of the eye, that we
investigate to see if it occurs in atomic form or as a unitary
whole, and hence it is itself refuted thereby.
That [matter] is not possible as an atom has already been
shown. [Then] in order to prove the impossibility of a unitary
whole, Vasubandhu starts [v. 15]—as does the Buddhist refuta-
tion of the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the whole (avayavin)—from
the principle that that to which different determinations apply
cannot be a unit, in the context of which he, however, also
draws on determinations of a rather superficial type: He states
that the earth cannot be a unit because—when gradually being
traversed—it is partly traversed and partly not traversed. [Also,]
in the case of a truly unitary thing, we could not—at one and
the same time—apprehend its front and not apprehend its back.
Further, several separate objects cannot—at the same time—
be found on a unitary surface, for they either would have to
collapse into one, or the surface would have to be—at one
and the same time—covered and not-covered by them. He
concludes, finally, with a remark opposing the <362> opinion of
the opponent that only the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) determines the
nature of things. In that case, he says, the invisible subtle

1
With regard to the view that the characteristic qualities alone make up
matter, cf. above S. 96ff.
 388 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

water beings—which, by the way, not only Buddhism recog-

nizes—would have to be just as visible as the coarse ones, since,
according to the above-mentioned characteristic, the matter of
which they consist is of the same type.
With this, the actual line of argument ends.

CFE.3.4. Chapter four: Refutation of various objections (vv. 16–21)

There then follows, in conclusion, the refutation of a series of
objections by opponents [vv. 16–21].
The first of these (v. 16) refers to sensory perception, which
is accepted by all schools as the most authoritative means
of valid cognition (pramāṇa). How can we, asks the oppo-
nent [v. 16], become conscious of perceiving an object-referent
through the senses if in reality it does not exist?
In his answer [v. 16]—following Śrāvakayāna views, and in
particular the Sautrāntika doctrine—Vasubandhu distinguishes
between the actual perception and the subsequent mental cog-
nition. Only through this mental cognition—which displays
the same image as the perception, and thus has the char-
acter of a recollection, and which, like any mental cognition is
accompanied by conception—does one become conscious of
perceiving the object-referent. As a result of the momentariness
of all cognition, however, at the time of this mental cognition,
the perception itself is already past, and according to the
doctrine of the momentariness of all entities, the same applies
to the perceived object-referent itself. How, then, could this
consciousness of the perception establish the existence of an
object-referent that is at the same time neither perceived nor,
itself, existent.
If [v. 17], however, the opponent refers to the fact that
this mental cognition must be based on a perception, which
itself again presupposes the existence of the object-referent, the
answer is [vv. 16 and 17] that it can just as easily be based on
 Vasubandhu 389

a perception that, as in a dream, shows the image of the object-

referent, without the latter really existing.
Secondly [v. 17], there follows an objection that we have
already encountered in Asaṅga (see above S. 337f.). It is directed
against the comparison with the dream and asks how, with
respect to the dream, we automatically recognize that the seen
object-referents are not real, whereas this is not the case in the
waking state. <363>
Vasubandhu answers in the same way as Asaṅga, that we
also only recognize the unreality of the object-referents seen in
a dream once we have awakened from sleep. Likewise, we
recognize the unreality of the object-referents seen in the waking
state only once we have awakened, through the supramundane
nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpaka jñāna), from the sleep of
delusion that keeps ordinary people biased.
The third objection (v. 18) raises the question of how people
can influence each other if an external world does not exist and,
hence, interaction and verbal communication with each other is
not possible.
Vasubandhu answers that the individual streams of cogni-
zance that represent the various persons are able to influence
each other as a dominant cause [adhipatipratyaya; S. 176f.] and
that in this way they determine each other’s development.
The next objection [v. 18] is again dependent on the compari-
son with the dream and refers to the Indian doctrine of the
efficacy of deeds (karma). Why, it says, do good and bad actions
in a dream not entail the same retribution as good and bad
deeds performed in the waking state, if, in both cases, it is
indeed merely a matter of processes that take place in one’s own
cognizance.
The answer is that an action in a dream is weakened by the
dullness of sleep and for this reason, it does not have the same
consequences.
390 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

An objection (v. 19) follows that again has to do with the

influence of living beings on one another; to be specific, it
concerns the question of how, supposing that only cognizance
exists, it is possible for one living being to kill another.
In his answer, Vasubandhu again bases himself on the view
of the influence of distinct streams of cognizance on one another;
to be exact, he teaches that a specific process of cognizance in
the stream of cognizance of the killer influences the stream
of cognizance of the killed individual in such a way that it
counteracts the life-sustaining forces and thus brings about
the interruption of the stream of cognizance, which we call
death. As proof of this influence of one stream of cognizance
on another, he refers back to the <364> general Indian belief
that demonic beings (piśāca) and individuals endowed with
miraculous power are able, through their mere thinking, to
influence the mind of another in the most diverse ways. To
support this, he brings in examples from legend and myth;
specifically, [1] the legend of Mahākātyāyana and Sāraṇa, and
[2] the myth of the defeat of the king of giants Vemacitra.
The first tells how the prince Sāraṇa becomes an ascetic and
a student of the great monk Mahākātyāyana, how he is mis-
treated by King Pradyota of Ujjayinī and then thinks about
leaving the order to find revenge at the head of an army. But
Mahākātyāyana dissuades him by allowing him to foresee the
failure of the enterprise in a dream.
The myth of the king of giants Vemacitra recounts how he
impolitely treats saintly seers living in the forest when visiting
them and bluntly refuses their request for his protection, while
the king of gods, Indra, meets them in the most courteous way.
For this reason, their anger strikes Vemacitra, and when it comes
again to a battle between the gods and giants (asura), he is
defeated by Indra.
At this point [v. 20] it has yet to be proved that the men-
tal influence under discussion can go so far as to be able to
 Vasubandhu 391

bring about the death of another living being. To this end,

Vasubandhu quotes a saying of the Buddha, taken from an old
canonical text, the so-called Upālisūtra. This [sūtra] recounts
a conversation of the Buddha with the householder Upāli, a
follower of the Jaina doctrine, about the question of what
deeds—or, as it is stated here following the Jaina way of
speaking, what acts of violence (daṇḍa) 1—entail the greater
offences, those through thoughts, through words, or through
deeds. While the Jainas consider the act of violence through
deeds to be the most serious, the Buddha decides in favor of
the act of violence through thoughts. Among the examples that
he gives in order to show that much more serious damage can
be caused through thoughts than through deeds, we find various
myths that recount how kings insult or kill ascetics who are
capable of miracles, and how as punishment <365> a rain of
stones and fire strikes their country and destroys all life. Here
Vasubandhu makes reference to this and to the authority of
the Buddha in order to show that mere thoughts can bring
about the deaths of even numerous living beings.
In this connection [v. 20], he rejects a further objection to the
effect that it was not the anger of the seer that directly brought
about the death of all these living beings, but rather that it was
caused by supramundane beings who were kindly disposed
toward the seers and executed their will. In this case, he says,
the Buddha could not have cited this event as an example of
the fateful effect of mere thoughts.
Lastly comes a final objection (v. 21), which takes up once
more a thought that has already been touched upon in another
context (above S. 359). Among the supranatural capabilities that
the disciple gains in the course of his practices of absorption,
Buddhism also acknowledges the ability to recognize processes
in the mind of another. The stream of cognizance of another

1
The Jaina tradition uses the expression yoga.
 392 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

is, however, real. Hence, such a cognizance would have a real

object, and this contradicts the assertion that only mere cogni-
zance exists, without any object.
Vasubandhu answers that in this case also, no real object
exists, since whether we recognize our own mental processes
or those of another, what we recognize here, as with all fac-
tors, is only the conceived appearing form, which belongs to
the illusion of the phenomenal world. The true nature of
things remains—here as everywhere—inaccessible to our cogni-
zance and is exclusively the sphere of knowledge of the
Buddhas.
With this, the work ends and picking up on the last ideas,
Vasubandhu concludes [v. 22] by saying that he has presented
the doctrine of mere cognizance to the best of his abilities. Its
nature, however, he would neither be able to fully recognize
nor fully present, because its true nature is not graspable in
the forms of our cognizance and is accessible only to the
supranatural knowledge of the Buddhas. <366>

CFE.4. “Proof that (Everything) is Mere Cognizance, in Twenty

Verses”
(Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi)
Chapter I
In the Mahāyāna it is taught that the world consisting of the
three realms is mere cognizance, because in the sutra it says:
“Truly, sons of the Victorious One, this world consisting of
the three realms is mere mind.” Mind (citta), thinking (manas),
cognition (vijñāna), and cognizance (vijñapti) are synonyms.
“Mind” signifies here the mind along with its associates.1 The
word “mere“ serves to exclude external object-referents.

1
It is therefore not only the mind that is real, but also the mental factors
(caitta) accompanying the mind.
 Vasubandhu 393

v. 1
All this is mere cognizance, because the non-existing
object-referents are reflected (in it), just as somebody
suffering from an eye disease sees non-existing hairs,
[moon,] etc.

Against this, an objection is made:

v. 2
If the cognizance is not brought about through an
object-referent, then (1–2) restriction with regard to
place and time, (3) non-restriction with regard to a
specific stream of cognizance, and (4) the production
of an effect are unfounded.

What does this mean?

If there is no object-referent such as visible form, etc., and
the cognizance of visible form, etc., arises without being brought
about by an object-referent such as visible form, etc., why does
it then arise in a specific place and not everywhere? Why does
it arise in this [specific] place at a specific time and <367>
not always?
Why does it arise without a definite restriction in the mind of
all those who are present at this time in this [specific] place, and
not only in some, just as hairs, etc., appear only in the mind of
someone suffering from an eye disease, and not in other people?
Why do the hairs, bees, etc., seen by those suffering from an
eye disease not bring about the effect of [actual] hairs, etc., while
other [hairs, etc.,] do bring it about? Why do food, drink, clothes,
poison, weapons, etc., as seen in a dream, not bring about the
effect of [actual] food and drink, etc., while other [food, drink,
etc.,] do bring it about? Why does a city of Gandharvas (fata
morgana), which does not exist, not bring about the effect of
an [actual] city, while other [cities] do bring it about?
394 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

If therefore the object-referent of such a cognizance does not

exist, then—just as with non-existing (things)—the being re-
stricted with regard to place and time, the not being restricted
with regard to a specific mind, and the bringing about of an
effect would be unfounded.
(Answer:) It is not correct that they are unfounded, since:

v. 3
The being restricted with regard to place and time is
established as in the case of a dream.

How so? In a dream, certain things such as bees, gardens,

women, men, etc., even without an existing object-referent, are
seen in a specific place and not everywhere. And they are seen
in this specific place at a specific time and not always. With
this, the restriction with regard to place and time is established
even without an object-referent.

v. 3
Further, the not being restricted with regard to a
specific stream of cognizance as in the case of spirits
of the dead.

“Is established“ continuous to apply. How is it established?

<368>

v. 3
Since rivers of pus, etc., are seen by all of them
simultaneously.

The spirits of the dead who are in the same state of the
maturation of their deeds, all of them see a river filled with
pus, and not just one of them. And in the same way as they see
a river filled with pus, they also see [rivers] that are filled with
 Vasubandhu 395

urine, excrement, etc., and are guarded by men with sticks and
swords; this is what is indicated by the word “etc.” With this,
it is established that even when no object-referent exists, cogni-
zance need not be restricted with regard to a specific stream
of cognizance.

v. 4
The bringing about of an effect [is established] as in the
case of nocturnal emission.

“Is established” should be understood. Just as in sleep, a

nocturnal emission, marked by the outflow of semen, takes place
even without sexual union. Hence, the stated [four] facts, the
restriction with regard to place and time, etc., are established
through different examples respectively.

v. 4
Once again, everything [is established] as in the case of
the hells.

“Is established” should be understood. How is it established?

v. 4
Since one sees the guardians of hell, etc., and is
tormented by them.

[Position of the Sautrāntikas:] Just as it is established that in the

hells the hell beings see the guardians of hell, etc., in a specific
place and at a specific time—the word “etc.” indicates that they
also see dogs and crows, as well as iron mountains, etc., that
come and go—and that means all [of the hell beings] and not
just one; and as it is further established that they are tormented
by the guardians of hell, although there are no guardians of
hell, merely through the influence of the similar maturation of
396 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

their deeds, likewise <369> in other cases also, all four of the
mentioned facts, the restriction with regard to place and time,
etc., are to be regarded as established.
(Objection [by the Mahāsaṃghikas and Sāṃmatīyas]:) For
what reason do you not assume that the guardians of hell and
these dogs and crows are living beings?
(Answer:) Because it is impossible. They cannot in fact be hell
beings because they no not, like them, experience the torments
of hell. Also, if they all tormented each other, it would be
impossible to distinguish between hell beings and guardians
of hell. Further, if they were of the same shape, stature, and
strength, and tormented each other, they would not experience
fear in the same way. And if they themselves could not bear
the torment of fire on the burning iron ground, how could
they torment others in this situation? But if they are not hell
beings, how then can they be reborn in hell?
(Objection:) How then can animals be reborn in heaven?
In that case, animals and certain types of spirits of the dead
could just as well be reborn as guardians of hell, etc., in the
hells.
(Answer from the point of view of the Sarvāstivādins:)

v. 5
A rebirth of animals in hell, as happens in heaven,
is not possible, and just as little that of the spirits of
the dead [as guardians of hell], because they do not
experience the pain that arises there.

Animals that are reborn in heaven are born there as a result of

deeds that lead to the pleasure of the environment there, and
they enjoy the pleasure that arises there. The guardians of hell,
etc., on the other hand, do not experience the torments of hell.
Therefore, neither the rebirth of animals nor of spirits of the
dead is <370> possible (in the hells). Rather, due to the deeds of
 Vasubandhu 397

the hell beings, there arise from the elements certain formations,
which show a certain color, shape, stature, and strength, and
which receive the name guardians of hell, etc. And they change in
such a way that they seem to perform various movements, like
swinging their arms, etc., to bring about fear, or that one sees
mountains, in the shape of rams, come and go, and that
the thorns in the iron Śālmalī forest seem to turn up and down.
They are, however, in no way non-existent.
(Vasubandhu’s answer [to the Sarvāstivādins]:)

v. 6
If you accept that, through the deeds of the (hell
beings), elements arise there and change in such a
way, then why do you not accept the same for
cognition?

Why do you not accept that their cognition changes in this way
through their deeds? Why do you conceive of elements?

v. 7
You conceive of the permeation of the deeds in one
place and the fruit in another. For what reason do you
not accept (the fruit) there where the permeation
(resides)?

You conceive that—through the deeds of the hell beings—

elements in (hell) arise and change in such a way. But the
permeation of these deeds adheres to the stream of cognizance
and nowhere else, so why then do you not accept that there
where the permeation resides, its fruit also appears, i.e., a
corresponding change of the cognition? For what reason do you
conceive of the fruit there where the permeation is not? <371>
398 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Chapter II
(Opponent:) The reason is sacred tradition. If only the cognition
that displays the image of the visible form, etc., existed and not
the object-referent of visible form, etc., then the Exalted One
would not have taught the existence of the sphere of visible
form, etc.
(Answer:) That is no reason, since:

v. 8
The existence of the sphere of visible form, etc., was
taught with a specific intention, that is, out of con-
sideration for the people to be cultivated by it, just
like (the existence) of the spontaneously appearing
beings.

Just as the Exalted One taught with a specific intention that

spontaneously appearing beings exist—specifically in view of
the fact that the mind stream will not be interrupted in the
future, in accordance with the saying: “A living being and a
self do not exist; what we see are only causally conditioned
factors”—likewise, the Exalted One has taught the existence
of the sphere of visible form, etc., namely out of consider-
ation for the people to be cultivated by this doctrine. It is thus
a matter of a statement with a specific intention. What then is
this intention?

v. 9
Its own seed, from which a cognizance emerges, and
the image that it (thereby) displays, these two the
sage has designated as its double sphere.

What does this mean? Cognizance, which displays the image

of visible form, arises from its seed as soon as the latter has
 Vasubandhu 399

reached a specific state of transformation (pariṇāmaviśeṣa).1

<372> This seed, then, and the image that [the cognizance]
(thereby) displays, the Exalted One has designated these two
as the sphere of the eye and of visible form, respectively,
belonging to this cognizance. The same applies for all types
of cognizance up to the cognizance of the tangible. In other
words, a cognizance that displays the image of the tangible
arises from its seed as soon as the latter has reached a specific
state of transformation. This seed, then, and the image that
[the cognizance] (thereby) displays, the Exalted One has
designated these two as the sphere of the body and of the
tangible, respectively, belonging to this cognizance. This then
is the intention in question here.
What is the advantage of expounding the doctrine on the
basis of this intention in this way?

v. 10
In this way one attains the understanding of the
essencelessness of the personality.

If the doctrine is expounded in this way, one in fact attains

the understanding of the essencelessness of the personality.
If one recognizes that the six types of cognition each arise
from two (spheres), but that a uniform seer, hearer, etc., up
to thinker does not exist, then those who should be culti-
vated by the doctrine of the essencelessness of the personality,
attain the understanding of the essencelessness of the
personality.

1
The seed or impression in the subconsciousness, from which every
cognition arises, matures gradually through continuous transformation
until it, finally, has gained the capacity to bring forth the respective
cognition in the next moment.
400 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

v. 10
If, on the other hand, the doctrine is expounded in
the other way, then one attains the understanding of
the essencelessness of the factors. <373>

“In the other way“ means, if it is taught that (everything) is

mere cognizance. How does one then come to the understand-
ing of the essencelessness of the factors? By recognizing that
everything that we see is mere cognizance, which arises in that
it displays the image of the factors, visible form, etc., but that,
on the other hand, a factor characterized as visible form, etc.,
does not exist.
(Objection:) If a factor does not exist at all, then mere cogni-
zance also does not exist. How can you then assert it?
(Answer:) One does not attain the understanding of the
essencelessness of the factors in that one thinks that a factor
does not exist at all, but rather only

v. 10
according to the conceived nature.

The essencelessness of the factors exists according to the

conceived nature, i.e., according to the nature that fools
conceive as the apprehended and the apprehending, etc., but
not according to the inexpressible nature that is the object of
the Buddhas. Likewise, it is according to the nature conceived
by another cognizance that one attains the understanding of
the essencelessness of mere cognizance; and in that one asserts
(in this sense) that (everything) is mere cognizance, one comes
to the understanding of the essencelessness of all factors, not
in that one completely denies the existence [of cognizance]. For
otherwise, one cognizance would have another cognizance as
its object-referent and it would therefore not be proven that
(everything) is mere cognizance, because the cognizances would
have an object-referent.
 Vasubandhu 401

Chapter III
(Opponent:) But how can it be known that the Exalted One
taught the existence of the spheres of visible form, etc., <374>
with this intention, yet that these (spheres) that are individually
the object of the cognizance of visible form, etc., do not (in
reality) exist?
(Answer:) Because

v. 11
[the sphere of visible form, etc.,] is an object neither
as a unit, nor as a multitude of atoms, nor as the
latter in a state of agglomeration [saṃhata], since the
individual atom is not proven.

What does this mean? The sphere of visible form, etc., which
is individually the object of the cognizance of visible form, etc.,
is either a unit—like the whole that the Vaiśeṣika conceive—or
a multitude of atoms, or these same atoms in a state of ag-
glomeration.
Firstly, a unit cannot be an object because a whole that is
different from the parts can nowhere be grasped.
Just as little can a multitude, because the atoms cannot be
grasped individually.
And just as little can the (atoms) in a state of agglomera-
tion be an object, because the atom as an individual thing is
not proven.
How is it not proven? Because

v. 12
in the case of a simultaneous connection with a group
of six, a six-partedness of the atom (results).

In the case of a simultaneous connection from (all) six sides with

six atoms, a six-partedness of the atoms results, because in the
position of one (atom) no other can be.
402 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

v. 12
If, on the other hand, all six are located in the same
position, then the conglomeration [piṇḍa] would only
be the size of one atom.

If the position of one atom were, at the same time, the (position)
of all six, then all would be located in the same position and the
whole conglomeration would thus be only <375> the size of one
single atom, because one atom would not extend beyond the
other. Consequently, no conglomeration would be visible.
(Opponent:) The individual atoms do not combine with one
another because they are partless. Thus, this mistake need not
result. When aggregated, they do, however, combine with one
another; so say the Vaibhāṣikas of Kaśmīr.
(Answer:) But the amassment of atoms is nothing other than
they themselves.

v. 13
If the atom thus does not combine, then what is
combined in the amassment [saṅghāta]? But then it is
also not due to partlessness that the combination
[saṃyoga] of the atoms does not come about.

If therefore amassment also do not combine with each other,

then you cannot say that the combination of the atoms does
not come about due to partlessness, since, in the case of
amassment, which does have parts, you also do not admit a
combination. Thus the atom as an individual thing is not
proven.
Whether, furthermore, a combination of atoms is assumed
or not:

v. 14
That which is divided into spatial parts, can not
possibly be a unit.
 Vasubandhu 403

The eastern spatial part of the atom is namely different . . . etc.,

up to . . . the downward situated spatial part is different. How
then, if a division according to spatial parts exists, can the atom,
which indeed consists of these (parts), form a unit?

v. 14
Or how could there be shadow and obstruction?

If, in the case of the individual atom, there were no division

according to spatial parts, how then at sunrise <376> does a
shadow appear on one side and light on the other side? For
there is after all no other part that the light is not able to reach.
And how does the obstruction of one atom by another take
place if a division according to spatial parts is not assumed.
For the atom then has no other part where, if one [atom] were
to move there, it would encounter the resistance of another.
But if it does not encounter resistance, then—as we already
have said—all (atoms) would occupy the same position and
every accumulation would therefore be the size of just one
atom.
(Opponent:) Why do you not assume that shadow and
obstruction belong to the conglomeration and not to the
atom?
(Answer:) Do you perhaps assume that the conglomeration to
which they supposedly belong is something other than the
atoms? No. Thus it is said:

v. 14
If the conglomeration is nothing other, then [the
atoms] do not belong to it.

If you assume that the conglomeration is nothing other than

the atoms, then it is proved that they do not belong to it.
404 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

(Opponent:) The question as to whether atom or accumula-

tion, considers only the difference in shape. But what is the point
of this reflection, as long as the characteristic of visible form, etc.,
is not refuted?
(Answer:) What is the characteristic then?
(Opponent:) The being-the-object for the eye, etc., and the
blueness, etc.
(Answer:) But this is exactly what our reflection is dealing
with. It is investigating, namely, whether just this blue, yellow,
etc., that is regarded as the object of the eye, etc., is a unitary
thing or a multitude.
(Opponent:) And what follows from that?
(Answer:) The faults in the case of the multitude have already
been discussed. <377>

v. 15
In the case of the unit, a gradual movement, a
simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension,
the existence of several separate (things), and the
non-perception of the subtle would not take place.

If it is assumed that the object of the eye, blue, yellow, etc.,

insofar as it is not broken up [avicchinnaṃ nānekaṃ], repre-
sents one individual thing, then there would be no gradual
movement on earth, i.e., no walking, because everything would
be traversed in a single step.
There would be no simultaneous apprehension of the
front part and non-apprehension of the back part. For an
apprehension and non-apprehension of the same (thing) at the
same time is not possible.
Further, in one (thing), several separate (things), such as
elephants, horses, etc., could not be found. For where the
one is, the other would also have to be. How then can one
see the two as separate? And how, on the other hand, can that
 Vasubandhu 405

which is both connected and unconnected with both of them be

a unit, since after all in the gap (between the two), something
is apprehended that is free from them.
Finally, if a difference of things is assumed solely due to the
difference in characteristic and for no other reason, then there
would be no non-perception of the subtle water beings, since
they have the same constitution as the coarse ones. Therefore,
a division according to atoms must certainly be assumed, and
this [division] is not established as a unit. If it is not established,
however, then it is also not established that visible form, etc., is
the object of the eye, etc., and with that it is established that
(everything) is mere cognizance. <378>

Chapter IV
(Opponent:) Existence or non-existence is determined based on
the means of valid cognition. But of all means of valid cognition,
sensory perception is the most important. Hence, if no object-
referent exists, how does this cognizance come about: “I have
perceived this through the senses”?
(Answer:)

v. 16
The cognizance of sensory perception (pratyakṣa-
buddhi) comes about as in sleep.

Even without an object-referent, as has already been shown

previously [i.e., in verse 3].

v. 16
Further, the object-referent is not seen at the time
that [the cognizance of sensory perception] appears.
So how can it be regarded as being perceived through
the senses?
406 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

At the time that the cognizance of sensory perception: “This

I have perceived through the senses,” occurs, the object-referent
is not seen because this ascertainment is brought about by
mental cognition and the visual cognition is, in the meantime,
past. How then can the (corresponding object-referent) be
regarded as being perceived through the senses, especially by
a follower of the doctrine of the momentariness of all entities,
for whom, at this time, the corresponding visible form or the
corresponding taste, etc., is past?
(Opponent:) Something that was not perceived before is not
recollected by the mental cognition. Thus there must definitely
be a perception of the object-referent and that is vision. For this
reason, the visible form, etc., that represents the object [of vision]
is regarded as being perceived through the senses.
(Answer:) It is not established that a perceived object-referent
is recollected, for: <379>

v. 17
We have discussed [v. 9] how a cognizance that
displays its image (arises).

We have discussed how, even without an object-referent, a

cognizance that displays its image—a visual cognition, etc.—
arises.

v. 17
From this (originates) recollection.

From this cognizance, a mental cognizance—which is connected

with recollection, displays the same image, and conceives the
visible form, etc.—originates. Thus the perception of the
object-referent is not established through the arising of the rec-
ollection.
 Vasubandhu 407

(Opponent:) If, just as in sleep, cognizance in the waking state

likewise did not have a real object-referent as object, then people
would likewise recognize its non-existence on their own. But this
is not the case. Thus it is not correct that every perception of an
object-referent, just as in sleep, does not have an object-referent.
(Answer:) This is not conclusive, since:

v. 17
As long as one has not awakened, one does not
recognize the non-existence of the objects seen in sleep.

Likewise, people who are sunk in the sleep of the permeations

arisen from the habit of false conceptions, and who see, as in
sleep, an unreal object-referent, are not able—as long as they
have not awakened—to recognize the non-existence of [an
object-referent] in accordance with truth. However, as soon as
they have awakened through the acquisition of the counter-
agent to [this vision of an unreal object-referent]—that is, the
supramundane, nonconceptual knowledge—they recognize the
non-existence of the object in accordance with truth through
realizing <380> the pure mundane knowledge that follows.
Hence, the situation is the same.
(Opponent:) If, with respect to beings, the cognizance that
displays the image of the object-referent arises based on a
specific transformation of their stream of cognizance, and not
based on a specific object-referent, then how is it possible that
the connection with bad and good friends and the hearing
of good and bad teachings determine the cognizance of beings,
if in fact this connection and this doctrine do not exist?
(Answer:)

v. 18
The mutual determination of cognizance takes place
through mutual influence.
408 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

The respective mutual determination of cognizance takes place

in all beings due to the fact that their cognizances influence
one another. Thus through a specific cognizance in one stream
of cognizance, a specific cognizance in another stream of cogni-
zance arises, and not through a specific object-referent.
(Opponent:) If, just as in a dream, the cognizance in the
waking state has no object-referent, then why does good and
bad conduct in the sleeping and not sleeping person not, in
the future, result in the same desired or undesired fruit?
(Answer:) Because

v. 18
the mind in sleep is obstructed by dullness, hence the
fruit is not the same.

This is the cause of it, and not the existence of an object-referent.

(Opponent:) If all of this is mere cognizance and no one
has a body or a voice, then how does <381> the death of sheep,
etc., which are slaughtered by shepherds, take place? Or if
their death is not caused by the shepherds, then why are they
affected by the sin of the destruction of life?
(Answer:)

v. 19
Death is a change based on a specific cognizance of
another, just as through the power of thought of a
Piśāca, etc., (a change such as) loss of memory, etc.,
(takes place) in others.

Just as through the power of thought of a Piśāca, etc., changes

occur in others, such as loss of memory, the seeing of dreams,
or possession by ghosts and demons, or (just as such changes)
occur through the power of thought of persons endowed
with miraculous powers, such as the seeing of dreams by
 Vasubandhu 409

Sāraṇa under the influence of the noble Mahākātyāyana, or

the defeat of Vemacitra through the embitterment of the
thoughts of the forest-dwelling seers, in the same way, through
the influence of a specific cognizance of a particular person, a
change occurs in others, which counteracts the life organ, and
it is through this that the interruption of the homogeneous
stream of cognizance takes place, which we call death. So is this
to be understood.

v. 20
How, otherwise, could the emptiness of the Daṇḍaka
forest have occurred through the anger of the seers.

If, however, you do not accept that the death of beings takes
place under the influence of a specific cognizance of another,
(then we refer to the fact that) the <382> Exalted One—in order
to prove the great sinfulness of the act of violence through
thoughts—asked the householder Upāli: “Did you hear, house-
holder, how the Daṇḍaka forests, the Mātaṅga forests, and the
Kaliṅga forests became empty and cleansed?” and that Upāli
answered: “I have heard, Gautama, [that it occurred] through
the embitterment of the thoughts of the seers.”

v. 20
How else would the great sinfulness of the act of
violence through thoughts be proven thereby?

If one assumes that the beings living there were eradicated

by superhuman beings who were friendly toward the (seers),
and that they were not killed through the embitterment of
the thoughts of the seers, how is it in this case proven that the
act of violence through thought is far more sinful than the act
of violence through body and speech? Through the death of
410 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

so many beings as a result of the mere embitterment of their

thinking, on the other hand, it is proven.
(Opponent:) If this is all mere cognizance, do the knowers
of another mind then know the other mind or do they not know
it? What follows from that? If they do not know it, how are they
then knowers of another mind? If, on the other hand, they do
know it, (then how do you assert that only cognition without
an object-referent exists?)
(Answer:)

v. 21
The knowledge of the knowers of another mind does
not correspond to reality. How so? As with the knowl-
edge of one’s own mind.

How does this too not correspond to reality?

v. 21
Because [the knowledge of one’s own mind] does not
know (one’s mind), in the manner in which it is the
domain of the Buddha. <383>

Because [the knowledge of one’s own mind] does not know

[this mind], in the manner in which it is in its inexpressible
nature the domain of the Buddha. Both [knowledges, i.e., of
another mind and of one’s own mind], therefore, do not cor-
respond to reality because they have not given up the conception
of an apprehended and an apprehending, since they display
false appearing images.
Regarding this (doctrine) of the mere existence of cogni-
zance, which, with its innumerable particular statements, is un-
fathomably profound,
 Vasubandhu 411

v. 22
I have composed this “Proof that (Everything) is
Mere Cognizance” according to my abilities. [Mere
cognizance] cannot, however, be completely grasped
by thoughts.

In any form, it cannot be grasped by people like me by means

of thoughts, because it is not the object of logical thinking.
Whose domain is it then, in its entirety?

v. 22
It is the domain of the Buddha.

In any form, it is indeed the domain of the exalted Buddhas,

since their knowledge, which encompasses everything knowable
in every shape, knows no bounds.

CFE.5. Introduction to the Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi

The Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, the translation of which
I now present, consists of only thirty verses since Vasubandhu
did not leave behind a commentary to it. Nevertheless, a more
thorough explanation is unnecessary, since nearly everything
needed for its understanding can be drawn from the brief
introductory overview of Vasubandhu’s views.
Vasubandhu begins [v. 1] with a brief reference to the two-
fold cause of entanglement in the cycle of existences: the belief
in a self and the belief in factors. The only thing new here is that
he determines the nature of this error more precisely as an
attribution (upacāra), i.e., through it a nature is <384> attributed
to a thing that in reality does not befit it. In the present case,
the attributed nature is the self and the factors. It is attributed
to the different appearing forms of cognition.
412 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Vasubandhu then describes these three appearing forms of

cognition one after the other.
[1] In the description of the fundamental cognition, (vv. 2–5)
the expression site indicates the environment (bhājanaloka). By
appropriation, the body and sense-organs are to be under-
stood, since these appear to be incorporated into and, in a
way, appropriated by the personality-stream. Equanimity as a
sensation is neither pleasure nor suffering and befits the
fundamental cognition, since this remains unconscious.
[2] The description of thinking (vv. 5–8) includes, besides
the other determinations, an additional brief comment on the
domain to which the defilements that accompany thinking be-
long. This question was discussed a great deal by Buddhist
scholasticism with regard to all of the factors, but is without
philosophical interest. Nonconceptual knowledge is designated
as the supramundane path (v. 7), because this [knowledge] con-
stitutes the supramundane part of the path of liberation.
[3] In the description of the cognizance of objects (vv. 8–16),
the four unbound mental factors are enumerated as two pairs
(v. 14) and are designated as twofold, i.e., they can be defiled
and undefiled.
After a few verses about the character of cognition as being
conception and on the operation of permeation, a brief
account of the doctrine of the threefold nature of things
and their threefold essencelessness (vv. 20–25) is given. Here
Vasubandhu follows the old doctrine as it was presented in
the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (see above S. 279ff.), without adding
anything essentially new. With respect to the doctrine of the
threefold nature, the only items of note are the comment
(v. 22) that the perfect nature is neither distinct nor non-distinct
from the dependent nature—which is reminiscent of how
Maitreyanātha defined the relationship between the nature of
the factors (dharmatā) and the factors (cf. above S. 323)—and
the further comment that the dependent nature cannot be
 Vasubandhu 413

correctly understood if one has not first recognized the perfect

nature. As for the threefold essencelessness, the imagined <385>
nature is natureless because no intrinsic characteristic befits
it; the dependent nature, because it does not exist in itself but
is dependent on other things. Finally, the essencelessness of
the perfect nature rests on the fact that it is the highest reality
and that the latter consists of the essencelessness of the factors
(cf. above S. 283f.).
The doctrine of liberation (vv. 26–30) follows in conclusion.
The false conceptions of the belief in an ‘I’ and in factors and
the permeations caused thereby—on which the entanglement
in the cycle of existences rests—disappear only through the
direct clear comprehension of mere cognizance by virtue of non-
conceptual knowledge. To this end, all conceptions of objects
must be removed. It is thus also not sufficient to think, in the
ordinary forms of our cognition, that everything is mere
cognizance because, with this, an object still remains. Only if
every object, and with the object also the cognition, has
disappeared, does one become directly aware of mere cogni-
zance in its true inexpressible form. This is the supramun-
dane nonconceptual knowledge—a non-perception, according to
ordinary cognition—in which the factors of the psyche have
also disappeared. This leads to the transformation of the basis
and the disappearance of the twofold bondage by the belief
in an ‘I’ and in the factors, which Vasubandhu—with an old
expression already used by Maitreyanātha—designates here
as badness (dauṣṭhulya). With this, liberation and the entrance
into the ultimate state of being occurs, which for the ordinary
disciple is the body of liberation (vimuktikāya); for the Buddha,
the body of the doctrine (dharmakāya).
 414 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

CFE.6. “Proof that (Everything) is Mere Cognizance, in Thirty Verses”

(Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi)
1
The attribution of an ‘I’ and of factors, which takes place in
a variety of ways, concerns the transformation of cognition. And
this transformation is threefold: <386>
2
[it is] called [1] maturation, [2] thinking, and [3] cognizance of
objects.
Of these, maturation is the so-called fundamental cognition.
The latter contains all of the seeds
3
and recognizes, in an unconscious form, the appropriation
[i.e., the seeds and the body endowed with the five sense-organs]
and the site [i.e., the environment]. It is constantly associated
with contact, attention, sensation, ideation, and will.
4
Sensation therein is equanimity. – Further, it is uncontaminated
and indeterminate. Likewise contact, etc. It propagates itself in
an uninterrupted flow, like a river.
5
Its disappearance occurs in the state of sainthood.
Based on it and taking it as its object-support, the cognition
called thinking develops, which has the act of mentation as its
nature,
6
is constantly accompanied by the four defilements—which
are contaminated and indeterminate, are designated as belief
in a self, delusion about an ‘I’, pride in the ‘I’, and love for
the ‘I’,
7
and belong to the (domain) in which one is born—and by the
other (mental factors), contact, etc. [Thinking] does not exist in
 Vasubandhu 415

a saint, in the absorption of suppression, and on the supramun-

dane path.
8
This is the second transformation.
The third is the perception of the sixfold object. This is good,
bad, and neither of the two. <387>
9
[Perception] is accompanied by the all-pervasive mental factors,
by those bound to specific objects, by good [mental factors],
by defilements, and by secondary defilements, and has three
sensations.
10
The first are contact, etc. Those bound to specific objects are
inclination, conviction, and recollection, along with concentra-
tion and insight. Faith, modesty, shame,
11
the triad of absence of greed, etc., diligence, harmoniousness,
equanimity along with heedfulness, and non-violence, are the
good [mental factors]. The defilements are passion, hate,
delusion,
12
pride, (false) view, and doubt. And again, anger and grudge,
hypocrisy, spitefulness, envy, and further, miserliness, along
with deceitfulness,
13
dissimulation, wantonness, malevolence, unrestraint, shame-
lessness, rigidity, agitation, lack of faith, and further, laziness,
negligence, forgetfulness,
14
distractedness, and thoughtlessness; remorse and languid-
ness, contemplation and reflection. These are the secondary
defilements and the (last) two pairs are each twofold, [i.e., good
and bad].
416 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

15
Depending on the presence of the conditions, five types of cogni-
tion arise—at the same time or not—from the root-cognition,
just like the waves on the water. <388>
16
The mental cognition always arises, except in the state of non-
ideation, the two absorptions, languidness (= anaesthetization)
and that fainting in which the mind is suspended.
17
This [threefold] transformation of cognition is conception. That
which is conceived by it, that does not exist. Thus, all of this
is mere cognizance.
18
Cognition, in fact, contains all of the seeds. Through mutual
influence, the transformation develops now this way, now that
way, so that now this, now that conception arises.
19
When the previous maturation is exhausted, the permeation
of the deeds, along with the permeation of the twofold appre-
hension [i.e., the object-aspect and the subject-aspect], brings
forth the (fundamental cognition) as a new maturation.
20
All things that are conceived through any kind of conception
form the imagined nature. The latter does not exist.
21
The dependent nature, on the other hand, is the conception
arisen from conditions. The perfect (nature) is [the dependent
nature’s] constant freedom from the former [i.e., the imagined
nature].
22
Thus, [the perfect nature] is to be designated neither as distinct
nor as non-distinct from the dependent nature, like imperma-
nence, etc. As long as the former is not seen, the latter is not
seen. <389>
 Vasubandhu 417

23
With a view toward the threefold essencelessness of this
threefold nature, the essencelessness of all factors has been
taught.
24
The first [nature] is essenceless according to its characteristic.
The second, because it has no independent existence. A further
essencelessness results from the fact
25
that it (= the third, i.e., the perfect nature) is the highest reality
(paramārtha) of the factors. This [reality] is also suchness, because
it is such at all times. And it is, in addition, mere cognizance.
26
For as long as cognition does not abide in mere cognizance,
so long does the burden (anuśaya) of duality [in apprehension]
not disappear.
27
Also through the perception that (all) of this is mere cognizance,
one does not abide in mere (cognizance) since one holds some-
thing before oneself.
28
If, on the other hand, knowledge does not perceive an object-
support, then it stands firm in mere cognition, since, due to
the absence of that which is apprehended, it also does not
apprehend the (cognition).
29
This is that non-perception in which the mind has disappeared
(acitta), it is the supramundane knowledge, <390> the transfor-
mation of the basis through the removal of the twofold badness
(dauṣṭhulya).
30
It is the uncontaminated element, the unthinkable, salutary,
imperishable, blissful [element]. This is the body of liberation.
This is the so-called (body of) the doctrine of the great sage.
418 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

With Vasubandhu, the Yogācāra school reached its apex.

We do not have space here to pursue its further
development in detail. It continued to flourish for a long
time and in particular the sixth century is rich in renowned
representatives of the school and significant works.
Further, of special importance is that the logico-
epistemological school of Buddhism, which constitutes
one of the high points of the entire Indian philosophy,
arose from a combination of Yogācāra- and Sautrāntika-
thoughts. Its classics are Dignāga (sixth century) and
Dharmakīrti1 (seventh century). This school produced a rich
literature and maintained a leading position up to the
beginning of the second millennium. We must leave all
of this aside here, but using just a brief example, we
will offer a taste of how Vasubandhu’s epistemology was
further developed after his time.

1
[See: Erich Frauwallner: “Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke
Dharmakīrti’s.” In Kleine Schriften: pp. 677–89.]
CFF. Dignāga (ca. 480–540 c.e.)1
Dignāga came from South India, from the region of Kāñcī, and
initially belonged to the sect of the Vātsīputrīyas. Later, he
turned toward the north and converted to the Yogācāra school.
He spent some time in Nālandā, the center of Buddhist learn-
ing. The rest of his life, he spent in Orissa. Dignāga was an
extremely prolific author. He wrote, among others, a concise
commentary on the Abhidharmakośa <391> of Vasubandhu
the Younger and a brief summary of the doctrine of the
Prajñāpāramitā. Most significant, however, were his logical
writings, through which he became the founder of the logico-
epistemological school of Buddhism. After he had written
numerous smaller treatises, he finally summarized his doctrines
in the extensive Pramāṇasamuccaya (Compendium of the Means
of Valid Cognition), which became the fundamental work of
the new school. His logical doctrines cannot be touched upon
here. In the epistemological field, his distinction between
perception and conception is particularly important; also the
doctrine of the different parts of cognition, which is the subject
of the following translated sample.
As we have seen (above S. 329f.), Asaṅga had in fact
distinguished within cognition an image part and a seeing
part, which were allotted to two distinct knowledges.
Vasubandhu had abandoned this idea [S. 355]. In Sautrāntika
style, he taught only that cognition reflects the object, without

1
[See: Erich Frauwallner: “Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung.”
In Kleine Schriften: pp. 759–841.]
420 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

explicitly distinguishing between two parts of cognition.

Nevertheless, in Vasubandhu also the thought appears that
cognition itself becomes the object of another cognition.
Following upon this, Dignāga distinguishes between two
appearing forms of cognition. The appearing form of the object,
which reflects itself in cognition, and cognition’s own appearing
form. Over and above that, however, he also acknowledges a
third appearing form: the awareness. Even early on in the
schools of the Śrāvakayāna, the question of how one becomes
aware of a cognition had been raised. Different doctrines had
been put forward, and, among others, the Mahāsāṃghika had
held the view that cognition becomes aware of itself, in the
way that a lamp illuminates not only objects, but also itself.
Dignāga adopted this view and taught the self-awareness
(svasaṃvitti) of cognition as its third appearing form. Hence, in
his view, three appearing forms are combined in a cognition: the
appearing form of the recognized object, the cognition’s own
appearing form, and, thirdly, the awareness. <392>
The following section from the Pramāṇasamuccaya then
contains Dignāga’s arguments for this doctrine. Here he starts
from the case that—among the cognitions that succeed one
another uninterruptedly in the stream of cognition and of which
each has only the duration of a moment—upon one cognition
that recognizes an object a second cognition follows that has
this cognition itself as an object. Now, if the cognition of the
object, as he says, displays only the appearing form of the object,
then the cognition that recognizes [this cognition] itself can,
likewise, display only this appearing form. Hence [this second
cognition] would also just be a cognition of the object and
no different from the first. Were, on the other hand, the first
cognition to bear only its own appearing form, then the fol-
lowing cognitions also would not display the object’s form and
could therefore not recognize it as a cognition of the correspond-
ing object. Thus, the first cognition must contain both appearing
 Dignāga 421

forms, that of the object and its own. The same thing also
follows from the fact that one later recollects the perception of
an object. For this is only possible if one can recollect both the
object as well as its perception, which again presupposes both
appearing forms of the corresponding knowledge.
The self-awareness of cognition can also be inferred from
recollection, since just as one can only recollect an object if one
has perceived it, so one can also only recollect a cognition if
one has perceived it, i.e., if one has become aware of it. This
becoming aware, however, can only proceed through the
corresponding cognition itself. For if one has become aware of
it through another cognition, then for this other cognition the
same would have to apply, and hence a regressus in infinitum
would result. In addition, one could never move on to the
cognition of another object, since one cognition always recog-
nizes only the previous one, in an infinite series. Thus the
assumption that each cognition becomes aware of itself is
established as absolutely necessary. <393>

CFF.1. From the “Compendium of the Means of Valid Cognition”

(Pramāṇasamuccaya)
Chapter I
(Opponent:) How can it be recognized that cognition has two
forms? (Answer:)

v. 11ab
From the distinctness of the cognition of the object and
of the cognition of this (cognition), the twofoldness of
cognition results.

The cognition of an object, a visible form, etc., displays the

object’s image and its own. The cognition of the cognition of
this object, on the other hand, displays the image of this
cognition resembling the object and its own image. Otherwise,
422 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

if the cognition of the object were to display only the form of

the object or its own form, then the cognition of the cognition of
the object would be no different, and each following cognition
would not display the image of the object of the preceding
cognition, because it would not have this as its object. Therefore,
the twofoldness of cognition is established.

v. 11c
And from the recollection afterwards,

“the twofoldness results,” is to be added. Also because with

respect to the cognition, as well as with respect to the object, a
recollection of the perception arises afterwards, the twofoldness
of cognition is established.
Also the self-awareness.
Why? <394>

v. 11d
Since in the case of something not perceived, this
[recollection] does not occur.

Without perception, the recollection of the seeing of an object

does not occur, just like the recollection of a visible form,
etc.
(Opponent:) Just like visible form, etc., the cognition is also
perceived through another cognition.
(Answer:) That is not correct, since:

v. 12ab1
In the case of perception through a separate cognition,
an infinite series would result.

If the cognition is perceived through another cognition. How?

 Dignāga 423

v. 12b2
Since in the case of this cognition as well, recollection
occurs.

Since if the cognition is perceived through another cognition,

then, later, a recollection of the latter must also be observed.
And if this [cognition] is thus also perceived through another
cognition, [then] an infinite series would result. In addition,

v. 12cd
under these circumstances, no moving on to another
object would take place. The latter is, however, ob-
served.

Thus, a self-awareness of cognition must certainly be assumed.

CFG. Sthiramati and Dharmapāla (middle of sixth century c.e.)
To conclude, I present another translated sample from Vasu-
bandhu’s school. As we already have stated, the Yogācāra
school enjoyed a great flowering most particularly in the sixth
century. Numerous significant representatives <395> created an
abundance of works. Commentaries were written on the works
of Asaṅga and Maitreyanātha. But in particular Vasubandhu’s
Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi constituted the
starting point for numerous explanatory writings in which
Vasubandhu’s system was further elaborated and augmented.
The center of this lively literary activity was the famous
Buddhist university of Nālandā, in Northern India, the home-
land of Buddhism. Dharmapāla, the son of a minister from Kāñcī
in South India, stands out as a representative of the Nālandā
school. He spent his youth in the South, but later made his
way to Nālandā, where he brilliantly advocated the Yogācāra
doctrine in teaching and in writing. He died very early, however,
at the age of thirty-two.
Alongside the Nālandā school stands the school of Valabhī
in Kāthiāvār. It was founded by Guṇamati, a Southern Indian,
who in the first half of the sixth century moved from Nālandā
to Valabhī. Its most renowned representative is Sthiramati—
a student of Guṇamati—who in his time was considered the
most significant representative of the Yogācāra school, next to
Dharmapāla.
Our principal source for this time and, in particular, for the
two schools of Nālandā and Valabhī, is the famous Chinese
pilgrim Hiuan-tsang (602 to 664 c.e.), since of the once so rich
 Sthiramati and Dharmapāla 425

literature only a few works have been preserved. After his return
from India, Hiuan-tsang wrote an extensive commentary on
Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā, using the commentaries of ten Indian
authors. In it he generally follows the doctrine of Dharmapāla,
but besides that he also considers again and again the different
deviating views; in particular, he also mentions Sthiramati’s
opinion quite regularly. The following translated sample then
is taken from this work. It should be noted in this regard,
however, that that which Hiuan-tsang cites as Sthiramati’s
opinion often does not agree with what we find expressed
in Sthiramati’s own works. Hiuan-tsang thus seems to base
himself less on Shiramati’s own works than on what he
has learned in India as the doctrine of the latter’s school. It
would therefore be wise for us to see in the doctrines that
he attributes to Dharmapāla <396> and Sthiramati, not so
much the personal views of these men as the doctrines of
their schools.
Similar to the translated sample from Dignāga, the follow-
ing sample deals with the doctrine of the parts of cognition.
According to the reports of Hiuan-tsang, the most diverse views
on this subject prevailed.
Some held to Vasubandhu’s view [S. 355], according to which
the image of the object appears in cognition, without [any] parts
having been explicitly distinguished.
For the most part though—following Dignāga’s method—
three parts were assumed. This was also Sthiramati’s view.
Dharmapāla, finally, added yet a fourth part.
But the contrast between Sthiramati and Dharmapāla in this
field rests less on the number of the assumed parts than on
the following: [1] According to Sthiramati, only the awareness
part is real; the image and seeing parts are mere cognizance.
[2] According to Dharmapāla, all of the parts are real.
426 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

This difference of opinion has its deeper reasons:

Sthiramati, namely, follows the view of Maitreyanātha
[S. 299f.] and Vasubandhu [S. 355], according to which every
cognition is conception. Consequently, the image part and
seeing part of every cognition belong to the imagined nature
(parikalpita svabhāva) and are not real. Only the awareness
part falls in the domain of the dependent nature (paratantra
svabhāva) and is real.
Dharmapāla, on the other hand, takes up Asaṅga’s idea
[S. 330] that conception befits only thinking, and elaborates
further on this, perhaps following Dignāga. For Dharmapāla,
therefore, the imagined nature includes only the characteristic
that is attributed to the objects of the other forms of cognition by
the mental cognition (manovijñāna) and by thinking (manas).
The image part and seeing part of all of these forms of knowl-
edge belong to the dependent nature and are real.
Hence, for Sthiramati the entire phenomenal world is mere
conception. For Dharmapāla, reality befits [the phenomenal
world]; it is just, according to his doctrine, not a matter of an
external world, but instead merely a matter of appearing forms
of cognition.
This difference of opinion also has its effect with respect to
the doctrine of liberation, where the connection to Maitreyanātha
[S. 300f.] and Asaṅga [S. 331f.] is once again apparent:1
For <397> Sthiramati, in the case of liberation—in connection
with the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti)—all cog-
nition disappears since [cognition] is mere conception, and only
suchness remains.
According to Dharmapāla, all forms of cognition undergo
a transformation, but they continue to exist even in the liberated
one.

1
[See in this context also Erich Frauwallner’s Amalavijñāna and Ālaya-
vijñāna, S. 154–59.]
 Sthiramati and Dharmapāla 427

The first section of the translated sample comes from the

commentary to the third verse of the Triṃśikā and deals with
the words “(the fundamental cognition) recognizes, in an
unconscious form, the appropriation [i.e., the seeds and the body
endowed with the five sense-organs] and the site [i.e., the
environment].” – First a brief explanation of the individual
words is given. Then Hiuan-tsang moves on to the question of
the appearing form (ākāra) of cognition and, in doing so,
discusses the doctrine of its parts. For this he uses material
of the most diverse origins, which he attempts as much as
possible to unify in that he starts from the simplest view and
advances to the most difficult and tries in conclusion to show
that all of these views have the same meaning.
Without speaking of any parts, § 1 describes according
to Vasubandhu’s own doctrine, how the image of the object,
which provides the object of the process of cognizance,
appears in cognition. The last sentence, which designates this
process of cognizance as the seeing part, is Hiuan-tsang’s
addition.
In § 2, two parts of cognition are distinguished, the appre-
hended (ālambya) and the apprehending (ālambaka), and their
existence is established. The establishment of the existence of
the image of the apprehended is the same as that which was
already current in the Śrāvakayāna school of the Sautrāntikas.
Without this image, in other words, no reason would exist for
the corresponding cognizance to recognize exactly this object
and no other. The characteristic of the apprehender must be
given in order for cognition to take place at all.
Next [§ 3], follow two scholastic discussions:
The first deals with the question of what the object-support
(ālambana), the appearing form (ākāra), and the substance
(dravya) of cognition are, thus, its object, its activity, and its
actual nature.
428 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

The second deals with the question of how mind and mental
factors relate to each other with respect to their support, their
object-support, their <398> appearing form, and their substance.
In both cases, Hiuan-tsang starts from the Śrāvakayāna view
of the reality of the external world, since in both we are
dealing with discussions that date from even the Śrāvakayāna
scholasticism. Now according to [Śrāvakayāna scholasticism],
for each cognition, the outer object is to be regarded as the
object-support, the image part as the appearing form, and
the seeing part as the nature. The support of a cognition and
of the mental factors belonging to it are one and the same,
namely, the sense-organ. Likewise, the object-support, namely,
the outer object; and the appearing form, namely, the image
of the object in cognition. On the other hand, while cognition
and the mental factors, themselves, are indeed the same in
terms of number—since they all show up individually—in terms
of their character, cognition, sensation, etc., are of course
different.
All of this shifts as soon as one denies the existence of
external objects, and at the same time it becomes necessary
to assume an additional third part of cognition, namely, the
awareness part. For in this case, the image part is to be regarded
as the object-support for each cognition; the seeing part as the
appearing form; and the awareness part as the nature. The
support, namely, the sense-organ, is the same for the mind and
the mental factors. Likewise, the object-support, i.e., in this case
the image of the object in the cognition. On the other hand, the
appearing form, namely, the activity of cognition, of sensation,
etc., is different, and, likewise, the character of cognition, of
sensation, etc., itself. The proof of the existence of the awareness
part, which is briefly outlined at this opportunity, is the same
as in Dignāga, i.e., that without it no recollection of mental
processes would be possible.
 Sthiramati and Dharmapāla 429

Since Dignāga was the one who decisively shaped the

doctrine of the three parts of cognition, Hiuan-tsang also
offers, as a kind of supplement, the form in which the doc-
trine of the object-support, appearing form, and substance of
cognition appears in Dignāga. For in the circles of logicians
and epistemologists to which Dignāga belonged, the question
was formulated differently:
Firstly, one did not speak of cognition in general, but <399>
of the means of valid cognition, since one tried to determine
these first and foremost. And one inquired about the object
of the means of valid cognition (prameya), about these means
themselves (pramāṇa), and about their result (pramāṇaphala).
According to the verse cited from Dignāga (Pramāṇasamuccaya I,
v. 10), these three are then apportioned to the three parts of
cognition in the following way: The image part is the object,
the seeing part the means of valid cognition, and the awareness
part is the result.
§ 4 offers Dharmapāla’s view. He teaches a fourth part of
cognition, that is, the awareness of the awareness. The reasons
that lead him to this are: that the awareness part, as with every
part of cognition, would have to be recognized by another
part; in addition, [the awareness part] as awareness is sensory
perception [pratyakṣa], hence a means of valid cognition, and like
any such, must have a result. This leads to the assumption of a
fourth part of cognition that recognizes the awareness part.
[The fourth part of cognition] itself is in turn recognized by the
awareness part, and so the circle is closed and an infinite series—
as Dignāga had feared it (cf. S. 393)—is avoided. The fourth part,
by the way, recognizes only the third part and not the second
part, because this latter part is already recognized by the third
and thus there remains nothing more to recognize. Besides
this, it should also be noted that, with respect to sensory
cognition, the second part is sensory perception, hence a means
of valid cognition. With respect to mental cognition, [the second
 430 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

part] can, as inference, likewise be a means of valid cognition.

As recollection, on the other hand, it is not. Everything else is
easily understandable.
The last paragraph [§ 5] tries, finally, to show how the
different views of the number of the parts of cognition can be
harmonized with each other:
The last two parts can be regarded as a unit, since they are
both awareness. In this way, only three parts remain.
One can, however, also view the last three parts as a unit,
since they can all, as apprehending, be classed as the seeing
part. This results in only two parts.
And, finally, all of the parts can be regarded as a unit,
since their nature as cognizance [vijñapti] is the same. <400>

CFG.1. From Hiuan-tsang’s “Proof that (Everything) is Mere

Cognizance” (Tch’eng wei che louen)
What is the appearing form and the object-support of this
cognition [i.e., the fundamental cognition]? The answer reads:

v. 3
It recognizes, in an unconscious form, the appropria-
tion and the site.

Cognizance (vijñapti) is its appearing form, because cognition

has its appearing form in cognizance.
“Site” means location, i.e., the environment, because it is the
location of all beings.
“Appropriation” is twofold: [1] the seeds and [2] the body en-
dowed with the sense-organs.
By “seeds,” the permeation by mark, name, and conception is
to be understood.
By “body endowed with the organs,” the material organs and
the bearer of the sense-organs is to be understood.
 Sthiramati and Dharmapāla 431

These two are appropriated by cognition, i.e., integrated into

its nature, because they share its fate.
Appropriations and site are the object-support (of cognition).
§1
At the time that, through the power of the causes and condi-
tions, the fundamental cognition arises according to its nature,
there occurs its inner transformation into the seeds and the
body endowed with the sense-organs, [and] its outer trans-
formation into the environment. [The fundamental cognition]
has its object-support in this transformation, because with [the
transformation’s] help its appearing form (= the cognizance)
comes into existence. Here cognizance is to be understood
as the cognitive activity—of the maturation-cognition—that
is directed to its object-support. This activity of cognizance
belongs to the seeing part. <401>
§2
At the time that it arises according to its nature, every defiled
cognition displays the image of the characteristic of the
apprehended (ālambya) and of the apprehending (ālambaka).
The same is true of the (mental) factors connected with it. The
image of the characteristic of the apprehended is called the
image part. The image of the characteristic of the apprehending is
called the seeing part.
For if the mind and the mental factors did not display
the characteristic of the apprehended, then either they could
not apprehend the object that is their object-support, or they
would each have to apprehend all of the (objects), since
their own object would [then] become the same as the other
[objects] and the other [objects] would become the same as
their own.
And if the mind and the mental factors did not display
the characteristic of the apprehending, then they could not
apprehend, like the ether, etc., or the ether, etc., would likewise
apprehend.
432 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Thus mind and mental factors must necessarily possess this

double characteristic. And accordingly it says in the sutra:

Everything is mere perception, perceived objects do

not exist. The perceiving and the perceived part appear
separately on their own.

§3
Those who assume that there are objects as object-support
outside of cognition, say that the external object is the object-
support (of cognition), the image part the appearing form, and
the seeing part the substance, because [the seeing part] is the
characteristic of the nature of the mind and of the mental factors.
Here the mind and the mental factors have the same support,
the same object-support, and the same appearing form, namely,
the same appearing image. The <402> substance, although the
same in terms of number, differs in terms of characteristic, since
the characteristic of cognition, of sensation, of becoming aware,
etc., differs.
Those, on the other hand, who admit that outside of cognition
there are no objects as object-support, say that the image part
is the object-support (of cognition), the seeing part the appear-
ing form, and the nature—which forms the foundation of the
image [part] and the seeing part—the substance. This [nature]
is the awareness part. If this [part] did not exist, one could not
recollect the mind and the mental factors, just as objects not
previously seen can of course not be recollected. Here the mind
and the mental factors have the same support, namely, the same
sense-organ, the same object-support, that is, the same appear-
ing image. The appearing form differs, because the activity of
cognition, of sensation, etc., differs. Likewise, the substance,
although the same in terms of number, differs in terms of
characteristic, since the nature of cognition, of sensation, etc., is
a different one.
 Sthiramati and Dharmapāla 433

Thus the mind and mental factors, if correctly examined, each

have three parts at the time of their arising, since [1] the object
of the means of valid cognition, [2] the means of valid cognition,
and [3] the result of the means of valid cognition are to be
distinguished, and because the image part and the seeing part
must necessarily have one nature as foundation. Accordingly,
it is stated in a verse of the Compendium of the Means of Valid
Cognition (Pramāṇasamuccaya; chap. I, v. 10):

The appearing image, which displays itself, is the

object of the means of valid cognition. The means of
valid cognition and its results are to be found in the
appearing forms of the apprehender, and in aware-
ness. These three are therefore nothing separate from
each other. <403>

§4
But if the mind and mental factors are considered in detail, then
they must have four parts, three parts as above and, as the
fourth, the awareness-awareness part. For who would, if the
latter would not exist, bring the third part to awareness? For
since it is a part of the mind, it must, like all others, be brought
to awareness. Further, the awareness part would have to have
no result, whereas all means of valid cognition necessarily have
a result. Also, the seeing part cannot be the result of the third,
since the seeing part sometimes does not belong to the means
of valid cognition. Consequently, the seeing part cannot bring
the third to awareness, because the nature of awareness is
necessarily sensory perception.
Of these four parts, the first two are outer, the last two
inner (parts).
The first is only an object-support.
The last three are both simultaneously (the apprehended and
the apprehending):
434 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

In this, the second part apprehends only the first. It is a means

of valid cognition, or else, it is not. It can be perception, or also
inference.
The third part apprehends the second and the fourth.
The awareness-awareness part apprehends merely the third,
but not the second, because [the awareness-awareness part] has
nothing more to do.
The third and the fourth parts both are sensory perception.
The mind and the mental factors are composed of four
parts. They are at once the apprehended and the apprehending.
Therefore, the flaw of an infinite series does not apply. And
they are neither one nor separate. Thus, it is valid that
everything is mere cognizance. Consequently, it is stated in a
verse of a sutra:

The mind of beings is of two types. All parts, inner and

outer, are entangled in the apprehended and <404> the
apprehending. Seeing has manifold variations.

This verse means: The mind of beings is composed of two

types of parts. All of these, be they inner or outer, are entangled
in the apprehended and the apprehending. Seeing has many
manifold variations: means of valid cognition, non-means of
valid cognition, sensory perception, or inference. In this, seeing
is namely the seeing part.
§5
These four parts can also be summarized as three, since the
fourth is contained in the awareness part.
They also can be summarized as two, since the last three
are all contained in the seeing part, as they are, by nature,
the apprehending. Indeed the expression “seeing” means the
apprehending.
Finally, they can also be summarized as one, because their
nature is not different. Accordingly, it is stated in a verse of
the Laṅkāvatāra:
 Sthiramati and Dharmapāla 435

While it is attached to its own mind, the mind devel-

ops in that it displays an outer object. But that which
is seen does not exist. Therefore, it is stated that there
is merely mind.

Likewise, it is stated in numerous passages that there is only the

mind. For with the expression “only mind,” the mental factors
are included.
Thus the appearing form of cognition is cognizance. And
cognizance is the seeing part of cognition.

I follow with a few more sentences from the commentary

to verse 20 that illuminate the difference in view with
respect to the reality of the parts of cognition. Of the views
presented, the first belongs to the school of Sthiramati,
the second to the school of Dharmapāla. It is noteworthy
here that in Sthiramati the adduced references to scripture
lead back to Maitreyanātha (Madhyāntavibhāga I, see above
S. 324f.), <405> and in Dharmapāla to Asaṅga (Mahāyāna-
saṃgraha II, § 11 and § 2, see above S. 338f. and 335).

What is the characteristic of the imagined nature, and how does

it differ from the dependent nature? Some hold that—due to
beginningless false permeation—the mind and mental factors
that belong to the three spheres, although by nature a unity,
appear as a duality when they arise as duality, namely, as
a seeing part and an image part, i.e., as the apprehended and
the apprehending. As an assumption, these two parts exist, but
not as established. [In the Madhyāntavibhāga] this characteris-
tic is called imagined. However, the nature on which these two
(parts) rest, actually arises based on conditions. This nature is
thus in no way non-existent and is called dependent.
Others hold that the two parts into which every mind and
its mental factors transform themselves through the power of
permeation arise from causes and are thus likewise dependent.
436 The Schools of the Mahāyāna

Based on these [causes], conception erroneously assumes a real

existence and non-existence; unity and difference; both at once
and neither of the two; etc. These twofold opposites are called
imagined. Scripture states, in fact, that the mere means of valid
cognition, the mere duality, and the mere multitude are desig-
nated as dependent. Also the treatise says that . . . the eleven
types of cognizance belong to the dependent (nature).

In conclusion, I render one paragraph from the very end of

the treatise, which shows how the doctrine of the unreality
of the phenomenal world presents itself according to the
views of the two schools [of Sthiramati and Dharmapāla].
First [§ 1], the doctrine of Sthiramati is formulated.
According to this, only cognition itself exists. The entire
phenomenal world is mere appearance.
Then [§ 2] follows <406> Dharmapāla’s view. According
to him, cognition develops into the phenomenal world. This
world is therefore real, only it is not external, but rather
within cognition.
Then [§ 3], an opponent brings forth the objection that in
this case it would not be justifiable to state that merely
cognizance exists, since the objects are also real.
This objection is first countered from Dharmapāla’s point
of view, and then the author concludes by once again
returning to Sthiramati’s view, which offers no point of
attack for such an objection.

1
The image part, etc., which develops based on cognition, does
not belong, as does the nature of cognition, to the dependent
(characteristic) and is not real. For otherwise, it would not be
proven that everything is mere cognizance, since it would be
assumed that both cognition and the inner objects are real.
 Sthiramati and Dharmapāla 437

2
Or, the image part and the seeing part of cognition are arisen
from causes. They are thus both dependent, and unreal or real
like the cognition itself. The expression “mere (cognizance)“
only refutes outer objects, but does not deny the inner objects.
Otherwise, suchness would also have to be unreal, (since it is
not cognition).
3
(Opponent:) If therefore, as well as cognition, the inner objects
are also not unreal, why then do you only state that merely
cognizance exists, and not the objects too?
(Answer:) Cognition is only inside, but the objects are, at the
same time, also outside. Because one could possibly fall victim
to the mistake that they are outside, it has just been taught that
merely <407> cognizance exists. Or, because fools mistakenly
believe in objects, then through this bring about defilements
and deeds, sink into the cycle of existences, and do not attempt
to get out through contemplation of the mind, for this reason,
out of compassion for them, it has been proclaimed that merely
cognizance exists, so that they find liberation from the cycle
of existences through contemplation of the mind—but not by
assuming that the inner objects, just like the outer, do not exist
at all. Or, the image part, etc., is by nature cognition. Only
through the power of permeation does the image of several parts
arise. The true nature of cognition is, however, suchness. Thus,
separate from the nature of cognition, there are no factors of
their own. Here the mental factors are [thus] also indicated
by the expression “cognition,” because the mind is necessarily
associated with the mental factors. <408>
 SOURCES AND
LITERATURE
&
SUPPLEMENTARY
REMARKS
SOURCES AND LITERATURE
(S = source material, E = editions, T = translations)

GENERAL
H. Oldenberg. Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde, Stuttgart und
Berlin 1923.
H. v. Glasenapp. Der Buddhismus in Indien und im fernen Osten, Berlin-Zürich
1936.
L. de La Vallée Poussin. Bouddhisme. Opinions sur l’histoire de la dogmatique,
Paris 1925.
———. Le dogme et la philosophie du Bouddhisme, Paris 1930.
E. Conze. Buddhism its Essence and Development, Oxford 1951.
Regamey. Buddhistische Philosophie (Bibliographische Einführungen in das
Studium der Philosophie, No. 20/21), Bern 1950.

A. THE TEACHING OF THE BUDDHA

Canonical texts (Tripiṭaka):
S: The canon of the Ceylonese branch of the school of the Sthavira (Pāli
canon) [Pali Canon: Online Database: http://www.bodhgayanews.net/
pali.htm], and also numerous fragments of the canons of other schools,
are preserved in the original; in addition, the most important texts
exist in Chinese translations, which go back to different schools; in
the Tibetan bka’ ‘gyur (Kanjur), only a few texts of the old canon were
included.
E: The authoritative edition of the Pāli canon was undertaken by the
<409> Pali Text Society, London 1882ff.; more recently, a new edition
with translation is being published in Paris. The best edition of the
Chinese translations is found in the Taishō edition of the Chinese
Tripiṭaka, ed. by J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe, Tokyo 1924–29. [Chinese
Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CBETA): http://www.cbeta.org/
index.htm]. For the Tibetan translations one is generally dependent
442 The Philosophy of Buddhism

on the Tibetan blockprints.1 [ACIP: http://www.asianclassics.org/

research_site/index.html].
T: The most important texts are translated in the Sacred Books of the
Buddhists and in the Translation Series of the Pali Text Society,
London; besides this, numerous partial translations exist in diverse
languages. The rendered sections are taken from the following texts:
• The sermon of Benares = Mahāvagga I, 6, 17–29
[http://www.bodhgayanews.net/tipitaka.php?record=10];
• The Buddhist path of liberation = Majjhimanikāya 51 (Vol. I,
pp. 346ff.)
[http://www.bodhgayanews.net/tipitaka.php?record=3345];
• Ānanda = Saṃyuttanikāya XLIV, 10 (Vol. IV, pp. 400f.)
[http://www.bodhgayanews.net/tipitaka.php?record=5099];
• The Discourse of Vatsagotra and the Fire = Majjhimanikāya 72
(Vol. I, pp. 483ff.)
[http://www.bodhgayanews.net/tipitaka.php?record=3466];
• The Account of Enlightenment = Mahāvagga I, 1, 1–3
[http://www.bodhgayanews.net/tipitaka.php?record=1];
• The Great Discourse of the Foundations of Origination = Dīghanikāya
XV, 1–9
[http://www.bodhgayanews.net/tipitaka.php?record=2430]
Dīghanikāya XV, 19–22
[http://www.bodhgayanews.net/tipitaka.php?record=2435];
• The Discourse of the Bearer of the Burden is translated according to
the Chinese of Tsa a-han (T. 99, k. 3, p. 19a15–b1)
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T02/0099_003.htm].

Pratītyasamutpādasūtra:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=409d327524b16c86df]

1
In the following, I cite the Pāli texts according to the Pali Text Society,
the Chinese translations according to the Taishō edition of the Tripiṭaka, the
Tibetan translations according to the Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan
Buddhist Canons, ed. by H. Ui and others, Sendai 1934.
 Sources and literature 443

Chin. translation, T. 124

[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T02/0124_001.htm];
Tib. translation, Nr. 211.
My translation follows the inscriptively preserved Sanskrit text, see
N. P. Chakravarti, “Two Brick Inscriptions from Nālandā” (Epigraphia
Indica, XXl/1931–1932, pp. 193–99).

Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā:
S: Fragments of the Sanskrit original; Tib. translation, Nr. 3995.
E: G. Tucci. A Fragment from the Pratītyasamutpāda of Vasubandhu
(Journal of the <410> Royal Asiatic Society, 1930, pp. 611–23). – The
translation corresponds to Tucci, pp. 616–19.

Śālistambasūtra:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=a2d3127542217a7eb6];
five Chin. translations, T. 708–712
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T16/0708_001.htm;
…T16/0709_001.htm; …T16/0710_001.htm; …T16/0711_001.htm;
…T16/0712_001.htm];
Tib. translation, Nr. 210.
E: In L. de La Vallée Poussin. Théorie des douze causes, Gand 1913,
pp. 68ff. (Contains the Tibetan text and a reconstruction of the Sanskrit
original on the basis of the numerous fragments). The newly found
Sanskrit original was not available to me.

B. THE SCHOLASTICISM (ABHIDHARMA) OF THE

WAY OF HEARERS (ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA)
Milindapañhā:
S: Pāli Text
[http://www.bodhgayanews.net/tipitaka.php?record=14822;
next sections begin: …14836; …14843; …14846; …14847];
Chin. translation, T. 1670 a and b
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T32/1670a001.htm;
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T32/1670b001.htm].
444 The Philosophy of Buddhism

E: The Milindapañho, being Dialogues between King Milinda and the Buddhist
Sage Nāgasena, ed. by V. Trenckner, London 1928.
T: T. W. Rhys Davids. The Questions of King Milinda (Sacred Books of the
East, vol. 35–36), Oxford 1890 and 1894.
F. O. Schrader. Die Fragen des Königs Menandros, Berlin 1907.
L. Finot. Les questions de Milinda (Collection des Classiques de l’Orient,
vol. 8), Paris 1923.
P. Demiéville. Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha (Bulletin de l’École
Française d’Extrême-Orient, tome 24/1925, pp. 1–258).

Vasubandhu the Younger:

Abhidharmakośa:
S: Sanskrit original;
two Chin. translations, T. 1558–1560
[Hsüan-tsang:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1558_001.htm;
Paramārtha:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1559_001.htm;
Kārikās (Hsüan-tsang):
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1560_001.htm];
Tib. translation, No. 4089–4090
[Kārikās:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD4089N.html;
Bhāṣya Part 1:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD4090I1.html;
Bhāṣya Part 2:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD4090I2.html].
Of the newly found Sanskrit original, so far only the verse text has
been published by V. V. Gokhale, The Text of the Abhidharmakośakārikā
of Vasubandhu (Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society, New Series, Vol. 22/1946, pp. 73–102).
 Sources and literature 445

T: L. de La Vallée Poussin. L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu; traduit et

annoté, 6 vols., Paris-Louvain 1923–1931 (according to the Chinese
translation of Hiuan-tsang). – The translated parts correspond to the
following sections: <411>

• A soul does not exist = T. 1558, k. 9, pp. 47b24–48c8 (in La Vallée

Poussin III, pp. 56–65)
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1558_009.htm];
• From “Refutation of the Person” (in La Vallée Poussin IX, pp. 230ff.,
238ff., 256f.) =
T. 1558, k. 29, pp. 152b24–153b2; 153b12–c12
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1558_029.htm];
T. 1558, k. 30, p. 155a23–b9
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1558_030.htm];
• A substance does not exist = T. 1558, k. 12, p. 66c15–23 (in La Vallée
Poussin III, pp. 213f.)
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1558_012.htm];
• The momentariness of things = T. 1558, k. 13, pp. 67c11–68b1 (in
La Vallée Poussin IV, pp. 4–8)
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1558_013.htm];
• The seemingly and the truly real = T. 1558, k. 22, p. 116b10–29 (in
La Vallée Poussin VI, pp. 139ff.)
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1558_022.htm];
• The nature of acquisition = translated according to the incom-
plete edition of the Tibetan text in the Bibliotheca Buddhica XX,
pp. 158,15–161,20 (in La Vallée Poussin II, pp. 181ff.);
• Suppression through knowledge = Bibl. Buddh. XX, pp. 9,8–10,11
(in La Vallée Poussin I, pp. 8f.);
• Nirvāṇa as non-existence = T. 1558, k. 6, pp. 34a12–35a3 (in
La Vallée Poussin II, pp. 278–86)
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1558_006.htm].

Pañcaskandhaka:
S: Chin. translation, T. 1612
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1612_001.htm];
Tib. translation, No. 4059.
My translation follows the Chinese version.
446 The Philosophy of Buddhism

Harivarman,
Tattvasiddhi:
S: Chin. translation, T. 1646
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T32/1646_001.htm].
The rendered section (k. 16, pp. 368c13–369a27) was also translated by
L. de La Vallée Poussin in Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, V/1936–1937,
pp. 208–10.

C. THE SCHOOLS OF THE GREAT WAY

(MAHĀYĀNA)
The oldest literary documentation of the Great Way
Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=ff1588e3e4301c794e];
six Chin. translations, the oldest from the years 172 and 179 c.e.,
T. 220, k. 538–555
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T07/0220_538.htm
up to:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T07/0220_555.htm] and
T. 224–228
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T08/0224_001.htm
up to:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T08/0228_001.htm];
Tib. translation, Nr. 12
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/KD0012I.html].
E: Rájendralála Mitra. Ashṭasáhasriká; a Collection of Discourses on the
Metaphysics of the Maháyána School of the Buddhists (Bibliotheca
Indica 110), Calcutta 1888; reprinted, with some <412> improvements,
in Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka of Haribhadra, ed. by Unrai Wogihara,
Tokyo 1932–1935.
 Sources and literature 447

T: M. Walleser. Prajñā Pāramitā, die Vollkommenheit der Erkenntnis

(Quellen der Religionsgeschichte, Bd. 6, Gruppe 8), Göttingen 1914
(partial translation).
The following sections were translated according to the edition of
Rājendralāla Mitra (all of which are also included in the Chin. trans-
lation from 179 c.e., although with deviations in wording):
chap. 1, pp. 3,12–6,10 (T. 224, k. 1, pp. 425c4–426a4
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T08/0224_001.htm]);
chap. 2, pp. 45,1–47,20 (T. 224, k. 1, p. 430b23–c22
[same URL as before]);
chap. 22, pp. 399,12–400,17 (T. 224, k. 7, p. 462a23–b14
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T08/0224_007.htm]);
chap. 1, pp. 20,13–21,12 (T. 224, k. 1, p. 427c2–13
[same URL as before]);
chap. 8, pp. 190,8–192,20 (T. 224, k. 3, p. 442b26–c20
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T08/0224_003.htm]).

Ratnakūṭa (Kāśyapaparivarta):
S: Sanskrit original, in an incomplete Central Asian manuscript
[http://folk.uio.no/braarvig/getskt_kpv.php (Sanskrit; Chinese;
Tibetan);
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=0d5b0251cf911162ac];
four Chin. translations, the oldest from the years 178–84 c.e.,
T. 310, No. 43, k. 112
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T11/0310_112.htm], and
T. 350–352
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T12/0350_001.htm
up to:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T12/0352_001.htm];
Tib. translation No. 87.
E: A. von Staël-Holstein. The Kāçyapaparivarta; a Mahāyānasūtra of the
Ratnakūṭa Class; edited in the original Sanskrit, in Tibetan and in
Chinese, Shanghai 1926.
448 The Philosophy of Buddhism

The Madhyamaka school

Nāgārjuna:
Madhyamakakārikā:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=4673a1cbc57363b8294];
Chin. translation (with the commentary by Ts’ing mou), T. 1564
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T30/1564_001.htm];
Tib. translation, Nr. 3824
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD3824N.html].
E. L. de La Vallée Poussin. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec
la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti (Bibliotheca Buddhica IV),
St.-Petersbourg 1913.
T: M. Walleser. Die buddhistische Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen
Entwicklung. – 2. Teil: Die Mittlere Lehre (Mādhyamakaśāstra) des Nāgārjuna,
rendered according to the Tibetan version, Heidelberg 1911. – 3. Teil:
Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna, rendered according to the Chinese
version, Heidelberg 1912. See also under Candrakīrti.

Vigrahavyāvartanī:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://folk.uio.no/braarvig/getskt_vgv.php (Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan,
English; entire text);
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=1eed29b9ed10fcdd4 (kārikās only)];
Chin. <413> translation, T. 1631
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T32/1631_001.htm];
Tib. translation,
No. 3828
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD3828M.html] and
No. 3832
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD3832M.html].
 Sources and literature 449

E: K. P. Jayaswal and Rāhula Sāṅkṛityāyana. Vigrahavyāvarttanī by

Āchārya Nāgārjuna; with the Author’s own Commentary (Appendix
to the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Vol. XXIII,
Part III), Patna 1937.
T: Susumu Yamaguchi. Traité de Nāgārjuna pour écarter les vaines
discussions; traduit et annoté (Journal Asiatique, tome 215/1929,
pp. 1–86).
G. Tucci. Vigrahavyāvartanī by Nāgārjuna; Translation from the
Chinese and Tibetan Text (In Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic
from Chinese Sources, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, No. XLIX),
Baroda 1929.
Johnston, E.H. and A. Kunst. Vigrahavyāvartanī, as reproduced with
tr. in K. Bhaṭṭacharya: The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna, Motilal
Banarsidass, Delhi 1978

Ratnāvalī:
S: Fragments of the Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=2660279af4e11b01b];
Chin. translation, T. 1656
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T32/1656_001.htm];
Tib. translation, Nr. 4158 [spring yig, ge 107a1–126a4:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_sie/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD10171/TD10171-9.html].
E: G. Tucci. The Ratnāvalī of Nāgārjuna (Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society, 1934, pp. 307–25, and 1936, pp. 237–52) (k. 1, 2 [beginning]
and 4; Sanskrit text with English translation).

Āryadeva:
Catuḥśataka:
S: Fragments of the Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=ef30048c74d5c1f7e];
partial Chinese translation, T. 1570
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T30/1570_001.htm];
450 The Philosophy of Buddhism

Tib. translation, No. 3846

[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD3846M.html].
E: Haraprasād Shāstri. Catuḥśatikā by Ārya Deva (Memoires of the
Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. III/1914, No. 8, pp. 449–514).
Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. The Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva; Sanskrit
and Tibetan Texts, with copious extracts from the commentary of
Candrakirtti, reconstructed and edited, Part II (Visva-Bharati Series,
No. 2), Calcutta 1931.
T: G. Tucci. Studi Mahāyānici I; La versione cinese del Catuḥçataka di
Āryadeva confrontata col testo sanscrito e la traduzione tibetana
(Rivista degli Studi Orientali, X/1923–1925, pp. 521–90).

Buddhapālita:
Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti:
S: Tib. translation, No. 3842
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD3842M.html].
E: M. Walleser. Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti; tibetische Übersetzung (Biblio-
theca Buddhica XVI), S.-Petersburg 1913–14 (incomplete).

Bhāvaviveka:
Prajñāpradīpa:
S: Chin. translation <414> T. 1566
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T30/1566_001.htm];
Tib. translation, No. 3853
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD3853M.html].
E: M. Walleser. Prajñā-Pradīpaḥ; a Commentary on the Madhyamaka
Sūtra (Bibliotheca Indica 226), Calcutta 1914 (incomplete).

Tchang tchen (Hastaratna ?):

S: Chin. translation, T. 1578
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T30/1578_001.htm].
 Sources and literature 451

T: L. de la Vallée Poussin. Madhyamaka. – II. L’auteur du Joyau dans la

main. – III. Le Joyau dans la main (Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques,
II/1932–1933, pp. 60–138).

Candrakīrti:
Prasannapadā:
S: Sanskrit original;
Tib. translation, No. 3860
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD3860M.html].
E: See Nāgārjuna.
T: Th. Stcherbatsky. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, Leningrad 1927
(contains a translation of the first and twenty-fifth chapters).
St. Schayer. Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā (V, XII bis
XVI), Einleitung, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen (Polska Akademja
Umiejetności, Prace komisji orientalistyczny No. 14), Krakow 1931.
[———. German translation of chapter X of the Prasannapadā in
Rocznik Orientalistyczny 7, 1929–1930, pp. 26–52.]

Madhyamakāvatāra:
S: Tib. translation, No. 3861–62
[dbu ba la ‘jug pa:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD3861N.html;
dbu ma la ‘jug pa’i bshad pa zhes bya:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD3862M.html].
E: L. de la Vallée Poussin. Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti; traduction
tibétaine (Bibliotheca Buddhica IX), St. Pétersbourg 1912.
T: L. de la Vallée Poussin. Madhyamakāvatāra; introduction au traité du
milieu de l’Ācārya Candrakīrti, avec le commentaire de l’auteur, traduit
d’après la version tibétaine (Muséon VIII/1907, pp. 249–317; XI/1910,
pp. 271–358; XII/1911, pp. 235–328) (incomplete).
452 The Philosophy of Buddhism

The school of Sāramati

Sāramati:
Ratnagotravibhāga:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=d8ee716b28e3399ee16];
Chin. translation, T. 1611
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1611_001.htm];
Tib. translation, No. 4024
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD4024N.html].
E: E. H. Johnston. The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra (The
Journal of the Bihar Research Society, Vol. XXXVI, Part I), Patna 1950.
T: E. Obermiller. The Sublime Science of the Great Vehicle to Salvation,
being a Manual of Buddhist Monism. The Work <415> of Ārya Maitreya
with a Commentary by Āryāsaṅga, translated from the Tibetan with
introduction and notes (Acta Orientalia, IX/1931, pp. 81–306).

The Yogācāra school

Bodhisattvabhūmi:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=2c8271d89f1460a1d9a];
three Chin. translations,
T. 1579, k. 35–50
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T30/1579_035.htm
up to:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T30/1579_050.htm],
T. 1581
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T30/1581_001.htm]
T. 1582
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T30/1582_001.htm];
 Sources and literature 453

Tib. translation, No. 4037

[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD4037M.html].
E: Unrai Wogihara. Bodhisattvabhūmi; a statement of the whole course
of the Bodhisattva (being fifteenth section of Yogācārabhūmi), Tokyo
1930–1936. – pp. 37,1 and 43,24–48,6 were translated.

Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra:
S: five Chin. translations, T. 675–679
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T16/0675_001.htm
up to:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T16/0679_001.htm];
Tib. translation, No. 106
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/KD0106M.html].
E: É. Lamotte. Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. L’explication des mystères. Texte
tibétain; édité et traduit (Univ. de Louvain, recueil de travaux publiés
par les membres des Conférences d’Histoire et de Philologie, 2e série,
34e fasc.), Louvain-Paris 1935. – My translation follows the Tibetan.

Maitreyanātha:
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=f005e1a32cc417568fb (kārikās only)];
Chin. translation, T. 1604
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1604_001.htm];
Tib. translation, No. 4020 [sems tsam, phi 1a1-39a4:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD10122.html].
E: Sylvain Lévi. Asaṅga, Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra; exposé de la doctrine
du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra; édité et traduit
(Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études, sciences historiques et
philologiques, fasc. 159 & 190), Paris 1907–1911.
454 The Philosophy of Buddhism

Madhyāntavibhāga:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=9687e18555923109];
two Chin. translations, T. 1599–1600
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1599_001.htm;
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1600_001.htm];
Tib. translation, No. 4021 [sems tsam, phi 40b1–45a6:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD10122/TD10122-3.html].
E: Susumu Yamaguchi. Pien tchong pien louen, Nagoya 1934 (contains
the Tibetan and the Chinese translations with the commentary by
Vasubandhu). Fragments of the unpublished Sanskrit original in:
Susumu Yamaguchi. Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā; exposition
systematique du Yogācāravijñaptivāda, <416> Nagoya 1934, and:
Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya and G. Tucci. Madhyāntavibhāgasūtra-
bhāṣyaṭīkā of Sthiramati, Part I (Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 24), London
1932.
T: Th. Stcherbatsky. Madhyāntavibhaṅga. Discourse on Discrimination
between Middle and Extremes, ascribed to Maitreya and commented
by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. Translated from the Sanskrit (Biblio-
theca Buddhica XXX), Leningrad 1936 (was not available to me).

Asaṅga:
Mahāyānasaṃgraha:
S: four Chin. translations,
T. 1592–1594
[Buddhaśānta:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1592_001.htm;
Paramārtha:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1593_001.htm;
Hiuan-tsang:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1594_001.htm]
T. 1596
[Dharmagupta:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1596_001.htm];
 Sources and literature 455

Tib. translation, No. 4048 [sems tsam, ri 1a1–43a7:

http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD10133.html].
E: É. Lamotte. La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asaṅga (Mahāyāna-
saṃgraha), Tome I, Versions tibétaine et chinoise (Hiuan-tsang),
Tome II, traduction et commentaire (Bibliothèque du Muséon 7),
Louvain 1938.

Vasubandhu
Viṃśatikā:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=6906a9ddb861e622e];
three Chin. translations, T. 1588–1590
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1588_001.htm
up to:
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1590_001.htm];
Tib. translation,
No. 4056 [sems tsam, shi 3a4–4a2:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD10135.html]
up to:
No. 4057 [sems tsam, shi 4a3–10a2:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD10135.html].
E: Sylvain Lévi. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi; deux traités de Vasubandhu,
Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā (Bibliothèque de l’École des Hautes Études,
fasc. 245), Paris 1925.
L. de la Vallée Poussin. Vasubandhu, Viṃśatikākārikāprakaraṇa; traité
des vingt ślokas avec le commentaire de l’auteur (Muséon XIII/1912,
pp. 53–90) (Tibetan text with translation).
T: Sylvain Lévi. Matériaux pour I’étude du système Vijñaptimātra
(Bibliothèque de I’École des Hautes Études, fasc. 260), Paris 1932
(contains a translation of the Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā).
Junyu Kitayama. Metaphysik des Buddhismus (Veröffentlichungen des
Orientalischen Seminars der Universität Tübingen, 7. Heft), Stuttgart
1934 (contains, pp. 234–68, a translation of the Viṃśatikā).
456 The Philosophy of Buddhism

Triṃśikā:
S: Sanskrit original
[http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=3ea808e159e43f226];
two Chin. translations, T. 1586–1587
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1586_001.htm;
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1587_001.htm];
Tib. translation, No. 4055 [sems tsam, shi 1a1–3a3:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD10135.html].
E: See Viṃśatikā.
T: See Viṃśatikā.
H. Jakobi. Triṃśikāvijñapti des Vasubandhu mit Bhāṣya des Ācārya
Sthiramati <417> (Beiträge zur indischen Sprachwissenschaft und
Religionsgeschichte, 7. Heft), Stuttgart 1932.

Dignāga:
Pramāṇasamuccaya:
S: Tib. translation, No. 4203–4204
[http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD4203M.html;
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD4204M.html].
E: H.-R. Rangaswamy Iyengar. Diṅnāga’s Pramana Samuccaya (Chapter 1),
with Vṛitti, Ṭīka and Notes edited and restored into Sanskrit, Mysore
1930 (completely unusable).

Hiuan-tsang:
Tch’eng wei che louen:
S: Chin. original, T. 1585
[http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T31/1585_001.htm].
T: L. de la Vallée Poussin. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, la Siddhi de Hiuan-
tsang, traduite et annotée (Buddhica, Premiere Série: Mémoires –
Tome I & V), Paris 1928–1929. <418>
 Sources and literature 457

ADDITIONAL HELPFUL URLs

Source materials
• Access to Insight:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/index.html.
• Digital Library & Museum of Buddhist Studies:
http://buddhism.lib.ntu.edu.tw/BDLM/en/index.htm
• Digital Sanskrit Buddhist Canon:
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/33
• GRETIL – Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages:
http://www.sub.uni-goettingen.de/ebene_1/fiindolo/gretil. htm#Tipit
• The Online Tibetan to English Dictionary and Translation Tool:
http://www.thdl.org/tibetan/servlet/org.thdl.tib.scanner.
OnLineScannerFilter?thdlBanner=on
• The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English dictionary:
http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/pali/index.html
• Peking Tripitaka Online Search: The ShinBuddhist Comprehensive
Research Institute: Otani University:
http://web.otani.ac.jp/cri/twrp/tibdate/Peking_online_search.html
• Sanskrit, Tamil and Pahlavi Dictionaries:
http://webapps.uni-koeln.de/tamil/
• Thesaurus Literaturae Buddhicae:
http://folk.uio.no/braarvig/tlb.html
SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS
More than fifteen years have passed since the present book was
written. During this time numerous specialized works have
appeared, so that it seems advisable to point out at least the most
important thereof.
First, the large text editions should be mentioned:
In the years 1956–1961, a complete edition of the Pāli canon
was published in Nālandā, in the Nālandā-Devanāgarī-Pāli-
Series under the supervision of Bhikkhu J. Kashyap. The
previous editions served as the basis, first and foremost the
Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition. A corresponding edition of
the Pāli commentaries is planned. – Further, a new edition of
the Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka is currently in
publication. – The edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka published
in 1957 by the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute in Tokyo,
under the supervision of Daisetz T. Suzuki, is particularly
valuable and welcome. It contains a reduced photographic
reproduction of the Peking blockprint of 1737 c.e., taken from
the copy at the Otani University in Kyoto. A detailed catalogue
and index to the latter was published in 1962. With this the
Tibetan canon is no longer available only in rare original block
prints. – The series of Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, published in
Darbhanga by the Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and
Research in Sanskrit Learning, is also very commendable. It
contains, among others, works that had been out of print for
centuries and that <419> are now once again available. Finally,
particular importance is also to be attributed to the Tibetan
Sanskrit Works Series, published by the Kashi Prasad Jayaswal
Research Institute, in Patna. In it Buddhist works appear, the
manuscripts of which were obtained or photographed in Tibet
by Rāhula Sānkrityāyana, and which were thus saved for
research. Unfortunately, their publication is proceeding only
very slowly.
 Supplementary remarks (1969) 459

GENERAL
With respect to presentations of a general nature, I would like
to note the following: a thirteenth edition of Oldenberg’s book
was published in 1959, with an afterword by H. v. Glasenapp
that contains supplements and additions, as well as an appraisal
of Oldenberg’s achievements. E. Conze’s book, Buddhism, its
Essence and Development, is also available in a German
translation under the title Der Buddhismus, Wesen und Ent-
wicklung, Stuttgart 1953 (Urban-Bücher 5). In the meantime,
another work of a general nature by E. Conze has also been
published: Buddhist Thought in India, London 1962. Further,
a good general presentation is offered by A. Bareau, Der indische
Buddhismus, Stuttgart 1964 (in Religionen der Menschheit,
Bd. 13: Die Religionen Indiens III). Although it deals only briefly
with Buddhist doctrine within the larger framework, I would
also like to mention the extensive work of Ét. Lamotte, Histoire
du Bouddhisme Indien, des origins à l’ère Śaka, Louvain 1958
(Bibliothèque du Muséon, vol. 43).

THE TEACHING OF THE BUDDHA

For the canonical texts translated in this section, I would like to
limit myself to referring to the <420> above mentioned collective
editions of the canons. – An edition of the Śālistambasūtra, by
N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar, was published in 1950 (The Adyar
Library Series, No. 76). However, it contains only a retranslation
from the Tibetan.

THE SCHOLASTICISM (ABHIDHARMA) OF THE

ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA
André Bareau has published a series of works—which should be
considered as fundamental—on the doctrines of the different
schools of the Śrāvakayāna. In particular, Les sects bouddhiques
460 The Philosophy of Buddhism

du Petit Véhicule, Saigon 1955 (Publications de l’École Française

d’Extrême-Orient, vol. 38) should be mentioned.
As far as the Abhidharma works of the older period are
concerned, the manuscript findings in Tibet did not produce
anything worth mentioning. The editions that have appeared
lately in India are retranslations from the Chinese and are
not very reliable. In addition, as I have previously mentioned in
this book, in terms of content and form, these works are
extremely unyielding and scarcely of any interest to wider
circles. As to what they do offer that is of philosophical
importance, I refer the reader to my presentation in the third
volume of my History of Indian Philosophy, which I hope to
finish before too long, and until then, to my “Abhidharma-
Studien” (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens,
Bd. 7/1963 and 8/1964).1
The Sanskrit text of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa was
finally published just recently; Abhidharm-Koshabhāṣya of
Vasubandhu, ed. by P. Pradhan, Patna 1967 (Tibetan Sanskrit
Works Series, Vol. 8). Also of importance is that among the
manuscripts in Tibet, parts of a work from the school of
Saṃghabhadra—who in contrast to Vasubandhu’s tendency
toward the Sautrāntika holds the <421> orthodox doctrine of the
Sarvāstivādins—were also found; this work was published by
Padmanabh S. Jaini, Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti;
critically edited with notes and introduction, Patna 1959 (Tibetan
Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 4).

1
[Frauwallner’s third volume was never written. For an edition of some
remaining essays and a survey of the complete plan of Fr.’s “History”
cf. Erich Frauwallner’s Posthumous Essays. Translated from the German
by Jayandra Soni, Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi 1994. – Frauwallner’s
“Abhidharma-Studien” were continued until 1973 and subsequently
collected and published in English: Studies in the Abhidharma Literature
and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems. Translated by Sophie
Francis Kidd. SUNY Press, Albany 1995.]
 Supplementary remarks (1969) 461

THE SCHOOLS OF THE MAHĀYĀNA

The oldest literary documentation of the Mahāyāna
As for the Prajñāpāramitā literature, one must point out the
works of E. Conze in particular. Among others, we have also
from him a translation of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā,
which was published in Calcutta 1958 as Nr. 284 of the
Bibliotheca Indica. A collection of his most important essays
was recently published under the title Thirty Years of Buddhist
Studies: Selected Essays by E. Conze, Oxford 1967. A new edition
of the text of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, as well as the
commentary by Haribhadra, was brought out by P. L. Vaidya
as nr. 4 of the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga 1960.

The Madhyamaka school

A new edition of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamakakārikā, together with
the commentary by Candrakīrti, was published by P. L. Vaidya
as nr. 10 of the Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga 1960. It
also includes in the appendix, the Vigrahavyāvartanī as well as
the Ratnāvalī. Moreover, after the first edition of the Vigrahavya-
avartanī by K. P. Jayaswal and R. Sāṅkrityāyana, a far better
critical edition by E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst was published
(in: Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, vol. 9/1951, pp. 99–152).
Further, we must mention R. Gnoli, Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka-
kārikā, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Catuḥstava, introduzione, traduzione
e note, Torino 1961.
The first chapter of Buddhapālita’s Vṛttiḥ <422> was dealt
with in the meantime by I. Datar in a separate study (“A study
of the first chapter of Buddhapālita’s Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti,”
Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Asiatic Society,
Vol. 26/1951, pp. 129–39). The first chapter of Bhāvaviveka’s
Prajñāpradīpa was translated by Y. Kajiyama (Wiener Zeitschrift
für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, Bd. 7/1963, pp. 37–62 and
Bd. 8/1964, pp. 100–30).
462 The Philosophy of Buddhism

From Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā—only individual chap-

ters of which had earlier been translated, specifically, in addi-
tion to the works by Th. Stcherbatsky [chapters 1 and 25] and
St. Schayer [chapters 5, 10, 12–16] already noted, the seventeenth
chapter by Ét. Lamotte (in Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques,
vol. 4/1936, pp. 265–88)—we now also have translations of the
other chapters. Specifically, of chapters 18–22 by J. W. de Jong
(Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapadā. Buddhica, documents et
travaux, 1re série, t. 9, Paris 1950); of chapters 2–4, 6–9, 11, 23–24,
and 26–27 by J. May (Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamaka-
vṛtti; douze chapitres traduits du sanskrit et du tibétain;
accompagnés d’une introduction, de notes et d’une édition de la
version tibétaine, Collection Jean Przyluski, t. 2, Paris 1959).

The school of Sāramati

With respect to the Ratnagotravibhāga, an extensive study by
J. Takasaki has been published, which is of the utmost
importance for the assessment of the text: A Study on the
Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra), being a Treatise on the
Tathāgatagarbha Theory of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, Roma
1966 (Serie Orientale Roma 33). – A detailed presentation on
the Tathāgatagarbha- and Gotra-theory, which is so important
for this school, will soon appear in a book by D. Seyfort Ruegg.
<423>

The Yogācāra school

A new edition of the Bodhisattvabhūmi by N. Dutt (Tibetan
Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 7) appeared in Patna 1966. In
addition, large parts of the other sections of the Yogācārabhūmi
have been found among the Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts
photographed by Rāhula Sānkrityāyana in Tibet. Of these, so far
The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga, ed. by Vidhushekhara
Bhattacharya, Part I, Calcutta 1957, has been published. This
contains the first five sections of the work. The thirteenth section,
 Supplementary remarks (1969) 463

the Śrāvakabhūmi, was taken on for publication by A. Wayman.

So far only the Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript by
A. Wayman, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1961 (University of
California Publications in Classical Philology, vol. 17), and the
text of the short sections 8, 9, and 14, which happened to be
included in the manuscript of the Śrāvakabhūmi, under the title
“The Sacittikā and Acittikā Bhūmi and the Pratyekabuddha-
bhūmi (Sanskrit texts)” by A. Wayman (Journal of Indian and
Buddhist Studies, Vol. 8/1960, pp. 375–79) have appeared.
Contrary to A. Wayman’s opinion, I am holding to my own
view that the Yogācārabhūmi is a gradually developed work of
the school, and refer for this to L. Schmithausen’s Zur Literatur-
geschichte der älteren Yogācāra-Schule (Zeitschrift der Deutschen
Morgenländischen Gesellschaft. Supplementa I: Vorträge des
XVII. Deutschen Orientalistentages in Würzburg, Wiesbaden
1969, pp. 811–23).
Likewise, I am holding to the view that in Maitreyanātha we
must see a historical personality to whom a number of works are
to be ascribed, which are connected by the same characteristic
views and therefore allow the conclusion of identical authorship.
With respect to these works, important new publications should
be mentioned. The text of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, <424> with
the Tibetan translation, was already published in 1929 by
Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller as nr. 23 of the Bibliotheca
Buddhica. An edition with the commentary by Haribhadra was
brought out by G. Tucci (Gaekwad’s Oriental Series, Vol. 62,
Baroda 1932) and by U. Wogihara (Tokyo 1932–1935). In
addition, E. Obermiller had given a presentation of the doctrine
in Acta Orientalia, Vol. 11/1932–1933. In the meantime, a
translation of the text by E. Conze has appeared: Abhisamaya-
alaṃkāra, Introduction and translation from the original text,
Roma 1954 (Serie Orientale Roma 6). C. Pensa published an older
commentary than Haribhadra’s with L’Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti
di Ārya-Vimuktisena, primo abhisamaya, Roma 1967 (Serie
464 The Philosophy of Buddhism

Orientale Roma 37). Haribhadra’s own commentary has been

reprinted in the edition of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā
by P. L. Vaidya (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 4, Darbhanga
1960).
An edition of the Sanskrit text of the Madhyāntavibhāga
together with the commentary by Vasubandhu appeared in
G. M. Nagao Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya: a Buddhist philo-
sophical treatise edited for the first time from a Sanskrit
manuscript, Tokyo 1964. J. Nozawa published the Tibetan
translation, together with a fragment of the Sanskrit text,
of another work by Maitreyanātha—the Dharmadharmatā-
vibhaṅga, along with the corresponding commentary by
Vasubandhu—under the title “The Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga
and the Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga-vṛtti” in the felicitation
volume for S. Yamaguchi (Studies in Indology and Buddhology,
Kyoto 1955).
Of Asaṅga’s works mentioned in this book, the Abhidharma
Samuccaya of Asanga, ed. by Pralhad Pradhan, <425>
Santiniketan 1950 (Visva-Bharati Studies 12) has been published
in the meantime. This edition is based on an incomplete
manuscript of the Sanskrit text. That which is missing in the
manuscript has been retranslated from the Chinese and Tibetan,
although not always satisfactorily. Sthiramati’s commentary,
which was also found in its Sanskrit original by Rāhula
Sānkrityāyana, served as valuable aid in this. This commentary
itself has, however, not been published so far.
With respect to Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratā-
siddhi and Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, further examinations
seem to confirm my assignment of these to the younger
Vasubandhu; cf. L. Schmithausen, “Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen
in Viṃśatikā und Triṃśikā” (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde
Süd- und Ostasiens, Bd. 11/1967, pp. 109–36). In any case, the
Abhidharmakośa, Karmasiddhi, Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā clearly
belong to one and the same sequence of development.
 Supplementary remarks (1969) 465

Of Dignāga’s principal work, the Pramāṇasamuccaya, the

first part has, in the meantime, appeared under the title
Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of
Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya; from the Sanskrit fragments
and the Tibetan versions. Translated and annotated by Masaki
Hattori, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1968 (Harvard Oriental
Series, Vol. 47). Dignāga’s smaller works are printed at the
end of my essay “Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung”
(Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens,
Bd. 3/1959, pp. 83–164). <426>
APPENDICES
A PPENDIX I:
A MALAVIJÑĀNA AND Ā LAYAVIJÑĀNA .
A C ONTRIBUTION TO THE
E PISTEMOLOGY OF B UDDHISM . 1
[A. Introduction
AA. The dispute as to whether amalavijñāna or ālayavijñāna is the
foundation of cognition and of the entire phenomenal world
AB. The purpose of the essay
B. The investigation
BA. The facts about the dispute in China
BB. The facts about the dispute in India
BBA. The doctrine of the world soul, brahman or ātman, as the
standard or model for later Indian philosophy
BBB. The bearer of cognition and the relationship of highest
reality to phenomenal world in the Sāṃkhya system
BBC. The bearer of cognition and the relationship of highest
reality to phenomenal world in Buddhism
BBC.1. Sarvāstivāda, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra
BBC.2. The development of the doctrines of the Yogācāra:
Sāramati, Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga
BBC.3. The Mahāsāṃghikas’ doctrine of pure cognition
BBC.4. Sāramati’s system
BBC.5. Maitreyanātha’s system
BBC.6. Asaṅga’s system
C. The result of the investigation]

1
First published in: Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 7, Hamburg 1951,
pp. 148–59; also published in Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden 192, pp. 637–48.
 470 Appendix I

A. INTRODUCTION
AA. The dispute as to whether amalavijñāna or ālayavijñāna is
the foundation of cognition and of the entire phenomenal
world
In his brilliant article on the authenticity of the Mahāyāna-
śraddhotpādaśāstra,1 P. Demiéville has pointed out an interesting
dispute that occupied the Buddhist schools of China in
a lively way in the sixth and seventh centuries c.e. At issue
was the question of whether stainless cognition (amalavijñāna)
or fundamental cognition (ālayavijñāna) is to be seen as the
foundation of cognition and the entire phenomenal world.
Demiéville has outlined the essential aspects of the different
opinions of the schools and the course of the discussion with
wonderful clarity. In one thing he was mistaken, however, since
he concludes his description with the words (p. 46):

La querelle était vraiment bien vaine, car en fait, qu’on

classe le vijñāna pur comme une section de l’ālaya ou
qu’on en fasse un neuvième vijñāna sous le nom
d’amala, cela importe assez peu au fond de la doctrine.
Mais les Chinois se sont toujours montrés friands de
classifications verbales, et il n’y a pas lieu de s’étonner
qu’ils aient pu tant discuter sur une question en
somme si superficielle.

The dispute was truly quite in vain, since whether in

fact one classifies pure cognition (vijñāna) as part of
the ālaya or makes of it a ninth cognition (vijñāna)
under the name of amala, makes very little difference to
the heart of the doctrine. But the Chinese have

1
P. Demiéville, Sur l’authenticité du Ta tch’eng k’i sin louen, Bulletin de la
Maison Franco-Japonaise, série française, tome II, No. 2/1929.
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 471

persistently shown themselves to be fond of verbal

classifications, so it is no surprise that they were able
to create so much discussion about a question that is
in fact so superficial.

AB. The purpose of the essay

In this entire discussion he has thus seen nothing but a
subordinate dispute among the schools. This, however, is not
right. In reality, this is one of the most fundamental and most
difficult questions in the whole of Buddhist and of Indian
epistemology. To demonstrate this and to place the problem in
its proper context within the historical development [of Indian
philosophy] is the purpose of the following essay.

B. THE INVESTIGATION
BA. The facts about the dispute in China
The facts, as Demiéville has demonstrated them, are the
following:1
In the year 508 c.e., two Buddhist missionaries, Bodhiruci and
Ratnamati, came from India to China. Both belonged to the
idealistic Yogācāra school and both relied first and foremost
on Vasubandhu the Elder’s2 commentaries on various Mahāyāna
sutras. It was Vasubandhu’s Daśabhūmikaśāstra in particular
that both of them considered to be the fundamental text and
that they both translated into Chinese. Nonetheless, their
followers formed two separate schools of thought. The crux of
the dispute that lead to this split can be clearly recognized in

1
pp. 30ff.
2
[For a recent survey of the issue of two Vasubandhus cf. Florin Deleanu:
The Chapter on the Mundane Path (Laukikamārga) in the Śrāvakabhūmi.
A Trilingual Edition, 2 Vols. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist
Studies 2006: 186–94 (with notes 206, 207 in particular).]
472 Appendix I

the surviving reports. It had to do with the foundation of all

cognition. According to Bodhiruci, the foundation of all cogni-
tion is the ālayavijñāna (fundamental cognition), according to
Ratnamati, it is the tathatā (suchness). Ratnamati’s view was
later supported by the great Indian missionary Paramārtha, who
came to China in 546 c.e. He too belonged to the <149> Yogācāra
school, though for him the fundamental text was Asaṅga’s
Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Paramārtha taught that the foundation
of all cognition is not the ālayavijñāna, but rather a further
cognition, the amalavijñāna (stainless cognition). The dispute
soon subsided, however. The final word rested, in the seventh
century, on the authority of Hiuan-tsang, who, in contrast to
Paramārtha, sided with the ālayavijñāna.
In order to understand this entire discussion, we must first
grasp two things:
Firstly, as can clearly be drawn from traditional reports,1 the
issue at hand is a dispute about the interpretation of the ancient
texts. Both camps, Bodhiruci just like Ratnamati and Paramārtha
just like Hiuan-tsang, base themselves on the same texts, from
which they extrapolate their own view. Thus while the starting
points of their different views were present in the ancient texts,
the elaboration of the problem and the differing of the schools
based thereon are more recent.
Secondly, it is important that tradition traces the origin of the
dispute back to India.2 This of course suggests itself, since the
leading personalities of the aforementioned schools were either
themselves Indian or, as in the case of Hiuan-tsang, directly
dependent on the Indian tradition. So, the doctrine of amala-
vijñāna is traced back to the school of Sthiramati, and the
doctrine of ālayavijñāna to Dharmapāla. The picture we have of
the Yogācāra school in India during the sixth century is indeed

1
Demiéville, pp. 38ff.
2
Demiéville, p. 43.
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 473

dominated by the comprehensive activity of commentators

concerned with the works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, in
particular Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. The
center of this [activity] was the great Buddhist university at
Nālandā. At the beginning of the sixth century, however,
a respected teacher from Nālandā, Guṇamati, had moved to
Valabhī in Kāṭhiāvār and there founded his own school, which
reached the height of its success under his pupil Sthiramati.
At the same time, Nālandā came into full flower under the
great teacher Dharmapāla. In connection with this we hear
often of an opposition between the two schools, specifically
that Shiramati followed the old masters (pūrvācarya), while
Dharmapāla advocated a more progressive direction. The dif-
ferent views about the amalavijñāna and the ālayavijñāna thus also
hark back to the opposition between these two schools.
The doctrine of the amalavijñāna comes from the school of
Valabhī. And in fact, its principal representative, Paramārtha,
lived in neighboring Mālava. The doctrine of the ālayavijñāna,
on the other hand, originates in Nālandā. And it is well
known that Hiuan-tsang found his ultimate authority in
Dharmapāla.

BB. The facts about the dispute in India

With this we come to the question of what lead to this difference
of opinion in India and what underlies it. But in order to answer
this question, we have to go a ways further back.

BBA. The doctrine of the world soul, brahman or ātman, as the

standard or model for later Indian philosophy
The most important, though not the only stream of development
of the older Indian philosophy originated in the Upaniṣads. It
was here that the doctrine of the world soul, the brahman or
ātman, was created, which then remained largely authoritative
474 Appendix I

and exemplary. <150> Even in the most ancient times, we can

already see the tendency to place the brahman far above
everything worldly; to proclaim it to be inconceivable and free
from all worldly definitions. In the end only three definitions
remained in the most important doctrine; specifically that
handed down under Yājñavalkya’s name, which the later
Vedānta brought together in the term saccidānanda: it [i.e.,
brahman] is being, it is consciousness, and it is bliss. The same
tendency, however, also continued in the schools that arose later
from the same stream of development, in particular in the
relevant doctrines of the Epic, in Buddhism, and in Sāṃkhya.
Here as well one sought to elevate the highest reality beyond
everything worldly, indeed, even more emphatically. [Thus:]
[1] Its definition as bliss, particularly characteristic of
Yājñavalkya’s doctrine, was generally dropped.
[2] Yet also in its definition as being, one often saw a worldly
concept that does not apply to the highest reality. Thus as early
as in the doctrines of the Epic we find the highest reality de-
scribed as neither being nor non-being.1 And this occurs most
pointedly in the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism.
[3] But the greatest difficulties were presented by its third
definition as consciousness. To simply let this go was not an
easy decision to make since to see in the soul the bearer of cogni-
tion too readily suggested itself. To retain it, on the other hand,
entailed very undesirable consequences. Special importance
was attributed to the eternal untouchedness and immutability
of the highest reality, since that is all that places it beyond the
becoming and ceasing and the pain thereof, which belongs
intrinsically to the earthly world. But from this it follows that the
highest reality can also not be active, since any activity means
a change and thus a ceasing and arising. This [argument] was
particularly used against the proponents of the belief in a highest

1
Mahābhārata XII, 201, v. 27.
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 475

creator-god. The same also applies, however, to cognition. This

is also a process and as such, a change. And thus one arrived
at the conclusion that cognition cannot belong to the highest
reality. One could not, on the other hand, simply deny cognition
to the highest reality, since in that case, one had to ask oneself:
what kind of connection, if any at all, would there be between
the highest reality and the earthly world? Who then experiences
existence and entanglement and release?

BBB. The bearer of cognition and the relationship of highest

reality to phenomenal world in the Sāṃkhya system
The Sāṃkhya system tried to resolve these difficulties as follows.
It was held that cognition and mental processes in general do
not belong to the soul (puruṣa), which here corresponds to the
ātman or the highest reality, but rather to the mental organism.
They are qualities of the mental organ, the buddhi. This latter,
however, is not itself capable of cognition, since consciousness
itself merely adheres to the soul. Thus one thought to preserve
the soul’s character as the bearer of cognition, and on the
other hand, to relieve it of all events and the changes related
to them. Its opponents inexorably pointed out, however, that
any occurrence of awareness, as it must be ascribed to the soul
as the highest subject, by necessity has the soul’s changeability
and thus its impermanence as a consequence. To this context
<151> belongs the oft-quoted verse, which I presume is derived
from Vasubandhu’s Paramārthasaptatikā:1

varṣātapābhyāṃ kiṃ vyomnaś carmaṇy asti tayoḥ

phalam /
carmopamaś cet so ‘nityaḥ khatulyaś ced asatphalaḥ //

1
Yaśomitra, Sphuṭārthā, p. 699, 25; Yuktidīpikā (Calcutta S. S.), p. 105, 4;
Nyāyavārttika (Kashi S. S.), p. 355, 4, etc.
476 Appendix I

How can rain and sunshine affect space! Yet they affect
the skin.
Now if (the soul) is akin to skin, then it is imperma-
nent. Yet if it is akin to space, then it is impervious
to being affected.

Finally, after several vain attempts,1 the following theory was

arrived at. It was held that the buddhi resembles a two-sided
mirror. On one side, the perceived objects are reflected, on the
other side, the consciousness of the soul, which thus passes over
to the buddhi, so to speak, and enables it to cognize the objects.
Thus it was thought possible to attribute all events in the process
of cognition exclusively to the buddhi and yet at the same time to
hold on to the soul as the principle of cognition. In doing so,
this co-operation of soul and buddhi was carefully formulated in
the following way:2

apariṇāminī hi bhoktṛśaktir apratisaṃkramā ca

pariṇāminy arthe pratisaṃkrānteva tadvṛttim anupatati,
tasyāś ca prāptacaitanyopagraharūpāyā buddhivṛtter
anukāramātratayā buddhivṛttyaviśiṣṭā hi jñānavṛttir ity
ākhyāyate.

Although the soul’s capability to cognize is unchang-

ing and cannot pass over to any (other entity), it
nevertheless passes over to the changeable buddhi, so to
speak, and follows its activity. And only because it
follows the activity of the buddhi, which has thus
adopted the form of consciousness, it is said that the
activity of the soul is not different from the activity of
the buddhi.

1
Cf. here the presentation in the first volume of my History of Indian
Philosophy.
2
Vyāsa, Yogabhāṣya (Ānandāśrama S. S.), pp. 89, 2 and 197, 4.
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 477

But this theory was too forced for it to succeed in broader circles.
Indeed, it was unanimously rejected by all the schools other than
the Sāṃkhya.

BBC. The bearer of cognition and the relationship of highest

reality to phenomenal world in Buddhism

BBC.1. Sarvāstivāda, Madhyamaka, Yogācāra

Buddhism followed very different paths to the resolution of
the question of the relationship of the highest reality to the
phenomenal world and the question of the bearer of cognition.
Here, from the beginning, all mental processes were attributed
exclusively to the mental factors, without recourse to a soul or
an ultimate state of being. In this way the difficulties discussed
above were avoided. A soul had thus also become superfluous,
however, and the fully developed scholasticism (Abhidharma),
of the Sarvāstivāda in particular, also did not shy away from
completely denying a soul.
But for the schools that did not go so far, the original problem
continued to exist to its full extent, and this was particularly true
for the schools of the Mahāyāna. The latter had emerged from
the circles of mystics who could not be talked out of their belief
in the ultimate state of being, which they had experienced in the
state of meditation. This, however, left them still faced with the
same old difficulties.
It is true that the most extreme school, the Madhyamaka, was
little affected by all of this—although it was they in particular
who emphasized the inconceivability of the highest reality the
most pointedly and thus took the contrast to the phenomenal
world <152> to its extreme—but this was only so because they
did not ask the decisive questions.
For the Yogācāra school, on the other hand, the difficulties
were all the greater, and all the more so since they viewed
the phenomenal world as conception. For them, therefore, the
 478 Appendix I

question of the bearer of cognition must by necessity have been

of central importance. And with this we are already approaching
the circles from which our investigation began.

BBC.2. The development of the doctrines of the Yogācāra:

Sāramati, Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga
In discussing the doctrines of the Yogācāras, we will follow
the course of development that proceeded essentially in the
following way.
The Yogācāra school was originally, as even the name
suggests, a school that concerned itself above all else with
questions relating to liberation and that had developed an
extensive scholasticism on this subject. As with most of the
Mahāyāna schools, [the early Yogācāra school] was closely
connected with the circles of the Mahāsaṃghikas, but did not
possess a philosophical system of its own. While it did also
address metaphysical questions, this did not go beyond a few
isolated attempts and there was no actual system to speak of.
The creation of such a system was the achievement of
Maitreyanātha who melded the existing attempts with the
doctrine of an ultimate state of being and with the buddhology
of Sāramati’s school to form a unit, and thus strove at the same
time for a synthesis with the tenets of the Mādhyamikas.
What was still missing though, was a fully developed scholas-
ticism of the type the Śrāvakayāna schools had developed,
a scholasticism that systematically arranged all factors, and
especially those of the phenomenal world, and discussed them
in philosophically clearly defined terms. [The Yogācāra] school
first achieved this thanks to Asaṅga. Asaṅga, who came from
the Śrāvakayāna school of the Mahīśāsakas, developed and
expanded the Yogācāras’ Abhidharma based on the doctrines
of his former school. He built a monumental system of doctrines
atop the foundation laid by Maitreyanātha, while also making
use of the old scholasticism of liberation. In all its essential
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 479

features this system of doctrines has continued to be authorita-

tive for this school.

BBC.3. The Mahāsāṃghikas’ doctrine of pure cognition

For the issues that concern us here, we must now first draw
upon a theorem of the Mahāsāṃghikas—the influence of which
can still be detected in various places in the Mahāyāna trea-
tises1—specifically, their doctrine of pure cognition. As early as
the Pāli canon, we occasionally find the sentence:

pabhassaraṃ idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ taṃ ca kho

āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ. 2

This mind, o monks, is brightly luminous. It is polluted

through adventitious pollutions.

Here then, a form of mind is spoken of, which is by nature

pure and to which all contaminations attach themselves in only
an adventitious manner, without affecting it in its essence.
The Mahāsāṃghika school adopted this view and developed it
into a firm theorem that is rendered in the following way in
Vasumitra’s well-known treatise on the Buddhist schools and
their tenets (T 2031, p. 15c27; theorem 42 [35]3):

The nature of the mind is pure in its original state

(prakṛtiviśuddha). However, when it is polluted by
adventitious (āgantuka) pollutions (upakleśa), it is
called impure. <153>

1
Compare La Vallée Poussin’s references and citations in Abhidharmakośa
VI, p. 299, footnote 1 and Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, pp. 109f.
2
Anguttaranikāya I, 10ff.
3
The Chinese texts are cited according to the Taishō edition of the Tripiṭaka.
 480 Appendix I

What is not certain is what place this pure mind occupied

within the Mahāsāṃghikas’ system. According to the Tibetan
tradition,1 it was counted as one of the nine unconditioned
factors (asaṃskṛtā dharmāḥ). What is certain, on the other hand, is
that it served as the foundation of all mental processes2 and
that a lasting essence was attributed to it.3

BBC.4. Sāramati’s system

The same views of the pure mind were taken over by Sāramati
and were transferred to the ultimate state of being. For Sāramati,
the ultimate state of being holds the central position in his
doctrine, while everything else becomes less important. More
specifically, his version of the ultimate state of being has fea-
tures quite similar to the ātman of the Upaniṣads. It is true
that its inconceivability and ineffability are occasionally em-
phasized, but he does not avoid any statement at all—as is
consistently done in the Madhyamaka system. A description
such as the following is quite reminiscent of the tone of the
Upaniṣads (Uttaratantra,4 T 1611, p. 835a18–25; Ob. I, vv. 77–79;
[J. vv. 80–82]):

1
Cf. M. Walleser, Die Sekten des alten Buddhismus, Heidelberg 1927, p. 27.
2
Cf. the doctrine of the mūlavijñāna (root cognition), La Vallée Poussin,
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, pp. 178f.; E. Lamotte, “Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa,”
Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques IV/1936, p. 250; E. Lamotte, La Somme
du Grand Véhicule, Tome II, Louvain 1938, p. 27 and 7*.
3
This we can see from the polemic in the Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra and in
Saṅghabhadra’s Nyāyānusāra; cf. La Vallée Poussin, Abhidharmakośa VI,
p. 299, footnote 1.
4
Translated from the Tibetan by E. Obermiller, The Sublime Science of the
Great Vehicle to Salvation, being a Manual of Buddhist Monism, the Work
of Ārya Maitreya with a Commentary by Āryāsaṅga, in Acta Orientalia
IX/1931, pp. 81–306. The [Tibetan] text is not appended, the translation
therefore not verifiable. Since, as far as I know, the fragments of the original
Sanskrit texts are not yet published and I do not at the moment have access
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 481

It is not born and it does not die, it does not sicken and
it does not age, because it is eternal, lasting, pure, and
immutable.
Because it is eternal, it is not born, since it is without
even a mental (manomaya) body.
Because it is lasting, it does not die, since it is also
without imperceptible transformation.
Because it is pure, it does not sicken, since it is not
permeated by defilements (kleśa).
And because it is immutable, it does not age, since it
is also not adhered to by uncontaminated formations
(anāsrava saṃskāra).

Beyond this, quite specific qualities are actually attributed to the

ultimate state of being, such as, for example, the four qualities

to a Tanjur, I quote according to Ratnamati’s Chinese translation, but add

the verse numbers according to Obermiller.
Supplementary note by Erich Frauwallner:
Since the composition of this essay, the Sanskrit original of the Uttaratantra
(Ratnagotravibhāga) by E. H. Johnston (J) has been published in the Journal of
the Bihar Research Society XXXVI/1950. The passages from the Chinese
translation reproduced above deviate from the original Sanskrit in some
details. In terms of the ideas put forward, nothing has changed. Since the
division of the verses in Obermiller is often flawed, his numbering of the
verses differs from that of the Sanskrit text. The above-mentioned verses
correspond in the following way: v. 30 = 30; v. 34 = 35; v. 46 = 47; v. 48 = 49;
vv. 51f. and 61f. = 52f. and 62f.; vv. 58ff. = 59ff.; vv. 77–79 = 80–82.
[J. vv. 80–82:
na jāyate na mriyate bādhyate no na jīryate /
sa nityatvād dhruvatvāc ca śivatvāc chāśvatatvataḥ //80//
na jāyate sa nityatvād ātmabhāvair mano-mayaiḥ /
acintya-pariṇāmena dhruvatvān mriyate na saḥ //81//
vāsanā-vyādhibhiḥ sūkṣmair bādhyate na śivatvataḥ /
anāsravābhisaṃskāraiḥ śāśvatatvān na jīryate //82//]
482 Appendix I

of purity, self, bliss, and eternity.1 This ultimate state of being

is the dharmakāya of the Buddha and is inherent as an element
(dhātu) or germ (gotra) in all sentient beings.
This same ultimate state of being now also shows the
characteristic features of the viśuddha citta [pure mind]. It
is consciousness in its intrinsic nature 2 and it is designated as
vimala citta3 [stainless mind] or viśuddha citta.4 Above all, it
is pure in its original state.5 All of the contaminations that
the entanglement in cyclic existence entails <154> are merely
adventitious. More precisely, in ordinary people [the ultimate
state of being] is completely contaminated, in Bodhisattvas
partially contaminated and partially pure, and in Buddhas
completely pure.6 This is elaborated upon through numerous
analogies, among which the image of space is the most popular.
Of these many examples, one will suffice (T 1611, p. 814a18–21 =
832c4–7 [cf. T 1626, p. 893b1f.] and 814b7–10 = 832c22–25; Ob. I,
vv. 51f. and 61f.; [J. vv. 52f. and 62f.]):

Just as space pervades everything and, because of its

subtlety, is not soiled by dust, similarly Buddha-nature
pervades all sentient beings and is not soiled by defile-
ments (kleśa).7

1
T 1611, p. 814a8f. = 829b9f.; Ob. I, v. 34; [J. v. 35].
2
Ob. p. 187, A 6 sems kyi rang bzhin don dam pa’i bden pa = cittasvabhāva
paramārthasatyam; T 1611, p. 814a29 = 832c15 tseu sing ts’ing tsing sin.
3
For example T 1611, p. 814a17 = 832b8; Ob. I, v. 48; [J. v. 49].
4
For example T 1611, p. 814b2ff. = 832c17ff.; Ob. I, vv. 58ff.; [J. vv. 59ff].
5
tseu sing chang pou jan, T 1611, p. 814a6 = 828b21; Ob. I, v. 30; [J. v. 30];
cf. T 1626 (Dharmadhātvaviśeṣatā-śāstram), p. 892b27.
6
T 1611, p. 814a14f. = 832a11f.; Ob. I, v. 46; cf. T 1626, p. 893a5f.
[J. v. 47:
aśuddho ‘śuddha-śuddho ‘tha suviśuddho yathā-kramam /
sattva-dhātur iti prokto bodhisattvas tathāgataḥ //47//]
7
[J. v. 52:
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 483

Just as the entire world arises and ceases supported

by space, similarly all vital energies arise and cease
supported by this uncontaminated element (anāsrava
dhātu).1

[...]

The pure mind, like space, is without cause, without

condition, and without the totality (of causes and con-
ditions) (sāmagrī), it knows no arising, abiding, and
ceasing.2
Just like space, the pure mind is constantly bright
and unchanging. Due to false conception, it becomes
polluted by the adventitious stains of defilements. 3

BBC.5. Maitreyanātha’s system

These views of Sāramati’s constitute one of the most important
components out of which Maitreyanātha constructed his system.
In [Maitreyanātha] as well, the ultimate state of being, which he
most often calls the element of the factors (dharmadhātu) or also
suchness (tathatā), occupies the center of the system. It is true

yathā sarva-gataṃ saukṣmyād ākāśaṃ nopalipyate /

sarvatrāvasthitaḥ sattve tathāyaṃ nopalipyate //52//]
1
[J. v. 53:
yathā sarvatra lokānām ākāśa udaya-vyayaḥ /
tathaivāsaṃskṛte dhātav indriyāṇāṃ vyayodayaḥ //53//]
2
[J. v. 62:
na hetuḥ pratyayo nāpi na sāmagrī na codayaḥ /
na vayayo na sthitaś citta-prakṛter vyoma-dhātuvat //62//]
3
[J. v. 63:
cittasya yāsau prakṛtiḥ prabhāsvarā
na jātu sā dyaur iva yāti vikriyām /
āgantukai rāgamalādibhis tv asāv upaiti
samkleśam abhūtakalpajaiḥ //63//]
484 Appendix I

that here, due to the strong Madhyamaka influence, it is treated

more abstractly, but the essential features are the same.1 It is all-
pervasive like space, undivided and unvarying. As an element
(dhātu) or seed (bīja), it is inherent in all sentient beings,2 and in
its pure form, it constitutes the nature of the Buddha.3 First and
foremost, however, it again bears the characteristic features of
the viśuddha citta [pure mind]. It is mental, pure by nature,
and only adventitiously polluted. This is shown very clearly,
for example, by the following verses from the fifth chapter
of the Madhyāntavibhāga.4 Maitreyanātha enumerates here the
various kinds of errorlessness (aviparyāsa) and in doing so says
(vv. 19b–23a):

/ chos kyi dbyings ni ma gtogs par // ‘di ltar chos yod

ma yin te // 19b
/ de’i phyir spyi’i mtshan nyid der // de ni phyin ci ma
log pa’o / 20a

1
Cf. to this in particular the ninth chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,
ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris 1907–1911.
2
For example, IX, v. 15.
3
For example IX, v. 59.
4
Ed. Susumu Yamaguchi, Nagoya 1935 (Tibetan and Chinese text);
the Sanskrit original has to my knowledge not yet been published. [Cf.
now: Gadjin M. Nagao: Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya: Buddhist Philosophical
Treatise Edited for the First Time from a Sanskrit Manuscript. Suzuki
Research Foundation: Tokyo 1964:
dharmadhātuvinirmukto yasmād dharmo na vidyate // 19b
sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ tasmāt sa ca tatrāviparyayaḥ / 20a
viparyastamanaskārāvihāniparihāṇitaḥ // 20b
tadaśuddhir viśuddhiś ca sa ca tatrāviparyayaḥ / 21a
dharmadhātor viśuddhatvāt prakṛtyā vyomavat punaḥ // 21b
dvayasyāgantukatvaṃ hi sa ca tatrāviparyayaḥ / 22a
saṃkleśaś ca viśuddhiś ca dharmapudgalayor na hi // 22b
asattvāt trāsatāmānau nātaḥ so ‘trāviparyayaḥ // 23a
Verses 5.19b–23a are numbered 19–22 in Nagao’s edition.]
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 485

Since there is no factor that would be separated from

the element of the factors (dharmadhātuvinirmukto
yasmād dharmo na vidyate), therefore that is errorless-
ness with respect to the common characteristic.

/ phyin ci log gi yid la byed // ma spangs pa dang

spangs pa las // 20b
/ de ni ma dag rnam dag ste // de yang de la ma log
pa’o / 21a

The impurity and purity of the (element of the factors)

through the not-vanishing or vanishing of erroneous
thinking (viparyastamanaskāra), that is errorlessness
with respect to them, [i.e., impurity and purity].

/ chos kyi dbyings ni rang bzhin gyis // rnam par dag

phyir nam mkha bzhin // 21b
/ gnyis ni glo bur gyung ba ste // de yang de la ma log
pa’o / 22a

That these two (impurity and purity) are adventitious,

since the element of the factors is pure by nature,
like space (dharmadhātor viśuddhatvāt prakṛtyā
vyomavat), that is errorlessness in regard to it, [i.e.,
their being adventitious].

/ chos rnams dang ni gang zag gi // kun nas nyon

mongs rnam dag med // 22b
/ med phyir de bas skrag dang dngang // med de de ‘dir
ma log pa’o / 23a. <155>

For pollution and purification do not apply to the

factors and the person (pudgala), since these do not
exist. Therefore neither fear nor pride is appropriate
here. That is errorlessness with respect to it, [i.e.,
absence of fear and pride].
486 Appendix I

Maitreyanāthā is, furthermore, also acquainted with the three-

fold division of sentient beings, according to whether they are
impure, impure and pure, or completely pure.1 And he elu-
cidates the pollution and purification of the ultimate state
of being, in a way very similar to Sāramati’s, namely through
analogies. In particular, he compares them to the purely adventi-
tious cloudiness, to which water, gold, or space are subject, and
following which the original purity reasserts itself.2
From all of this we can see that Maitreyanātha teaches an
ultimate state of being that, similar to the ātman of the
Upaniṣads, is inherent in all living beings, and also that thus,
for him, this ultimate state of being is the bearer of existence and
of cognition. With this though, we come to the question of where
Maitreyanātha stands regarding the problems discussed above
and how he resolves the difficulty of attributing the processes
of cognition to the ultimate state of being.
Regarding this, it must be said that this difficulty does not,
in fact, exist for him. Like Sāramati’s, his doctrine has undergone
its own development from its own presuppositions and hence
has not inherited these problems. We have seen that Sāramati
unhesitatingly attributed positive qualities to the ultimate state
of being, and so, like Maitreyanātha, he does not find anything
objectionable in thinking the ultimate state of being capable of
action. Indeed, for the buddhology of both of them it is even
required, since for them—since the ultimate state of being also
constitutes the essence of the Buddha—the entire activity of the
Buddha must by necessity also emanate from [the ultimate state
of being]. Maitreyanātha most clearly explains this in the ninth
chapter of his Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, in which for example,
he compares the activity of the Buddha, which occurs without

1
Madhyāntavibhāga IV, vv. 15b–16a.
2
Cf. Madhyāntavibhāga I, v. 16, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra XI, v. 13, and the
final remarks of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga.
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 487

striving (ābhoga), to the shining of a jewel or to the sound of

celestial instruments that resound without being struck (v. 18f.);
or in which he presents the example of the sun, which without
effort, without selfishness, and without moving, illuminates
everything (vv. 29ff. and 51ff.).
This leaves only the question then, of how Maitreyanātha
conceives of the interplay between the ultimate state of being
and the factors of the psyche with respect to cognition, and how
he envisions the details of the mental processes at all.
Here, however, we encounter a gap in his system. Over all,
it is one of the most characteristic features of the earliest
Mahāyāna that it is without a philosophically clearly defined
terminology and a systematics comparable to the Śrāvakayāna
Abhidharma. The one-sided interest in the scholasticism of
liberation and in the metaphysical questions related to the
ultimate state of being prevented their development. The old
canonical terms <156> were generally considered to be suffi-
cient, and when necessary, particular ideas were borrowed
from the Śrāvakayāna scholasticism. Such is also the case with
Maitreyanātha. In vain we search in him for a fully developed
psychology, comparable for example, to that of the Sarvāstivāda.
While it is true that he is the first to attempt to change
this, particularly in the first chapter of his Madhyāntavibhāga,
he does not progress beyond mere beginnings. A systematics
is still missing. The terms and expressions are idiosyncratic
and strange. And it is typical that, for example, the name
ālayavijñāna, the most characteristic term of the later Yogācāra
school, does not appear [in Maitreyanātha’s writings]. The credit
for having brought about a fundamental change in all of this
goes to his great disciple Asaṅga, to whom we must now turn
our attention.
 488 Appendix I

BBC.6. Asaṅga’s system

As already mentioned, Asaṅga systematically introduced the
philosophical conceptions of the Śrāvakayāna into the Yogācāra
system and adapted them to its needs. In his work, therefore,
we also find a fully developed psychology:1 the long familiar
six kinds of cognition, to which is added the manas [thinking]
as the bearer of the I-awareness, and finally the ālayavijñāna
[fundamental cognition], which forms the foundation of the
whole of the mental processes and of which—incidentally—
prototypes could already be found in the Śrāvakayāna. Similar
to the Śrāvakayāna schools, he also provides a detailed list of
all of the factors of the psyche that are associated with cognition
(caitta). He bases his psychology on these factors and with them
he explains all of the mental processes. In this, surprisingly, we
can then see the strongest contrast to Maitreyanātha, since for
Asaṅga, as for the schools of the Śrāvakayāna, not only are
the aforementioned factors of the psyche independently acting
factors, but all of the processes of entanglement in cyclic
existence and of liberation also take place within them. Next
to them, the ultimate state of being—positioned centrally in
Maitreyanātha—recedes completely into the background; but
as surprising as this may appear on first sight, it is in fact
quite natural.
In its scholasticism the Śrāvakayāna had created a highly
developed philosophical system with very specific ways of
thinking. Given this superior system, it is little wonder that
in attempting to make it one’s own, anyone approaching it
without a firm philosophical foundation of their own would
be compelled to follow its lead, and forced to think in these
ways. Otherwise, one would have first had to develop one’s own
new manner of thinking, and this was not in Asaṅga’s interest,

1
A systematic synopsis of this is found at the beginning of the
Abhidharmasamuccaya (T 1605) as well as that of the Vikhyāpana (T 1602).
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 489

who after all had his origins in the Śrāvakayāna. However,

this Śrāvakayāna scholasticism understood mental processes
only as the play of independently acting mental factors. There
was no place in this system for an ultimate state of being in
Sāramati’s sense. And it is typical that the ultimate state of being,
where it was incorporated into a Śrāvakayāna-style list of
factors, is in no way an entity of a completely different type
relative to the other [conditioned and unconditioned] factors,
but rather—as a factor just like any other—it was listed among
the unconditioned factors (asaṃskṛta dharma). 1 <157>
Hence, in Asaṅga, the process of liberation—wherein the
uniqueness of his view shows itself especially clearly—proceeds
in the following way. Similarly to the Śrāvakayāna scholasti-
cism,2 he begins by distinguishing between polluted (sāṃkleśika)
and pure (vaiyavadānika) factors. The fundamental cognition, the
ālayavijñāna, along with all of the polluted factors that attach
themselves to it, constitutes the foundation of cyclic existence.
The preparation for liberation occurs in that—through hearing
the Mahāyāna teachings and through their correct comprehen-
sion—pure factors are called forth that, along with their seeds,
attach themselves to the mental complex of the ālayavijñāna.
These pure factors are strengthened and increased in the
course of the continued path of liberation. Finally, liberation

1
Cf. the suchness (tathatā) of the good, bad, and indeterminate factors in
the list of the unconditioned factors of the Mahīśāsaka (in Vasumitra,
T 2031, p. 17a8f.), and subsequently in Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya
(T 1605, p. 666a21ff.) and Vikhyāpana (T 1602, p. 484b29ff.); see also
Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānaśatadharmaśāstra (T 1614, p. 855c19) and Pañca-
skandhaka (T 1612, p. 850a19ff.); regarding the development of the term
[i.e., asaṃskṛta] in the Yogācāra school, cf. further Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi,
T 1585, p. 6b15ff. (La Vallée Poussin, pp. 72ff.).
2
Cf. the fundamental division between sāsrava (impure; contaminated)
and anāsravā (pure; uncontaminated) dharmas, with which Vasubandhu
opens his Abhidharmakośa.
490 Appendix I

occurs by means of the liberating nonconceptual knowledge

(nirvikalpaka jñāna), which reaches its peak at the end of
the path of liberation. This [knowledge] namely brings forth
a transformation (parāvṛtti) of the mental complex through
which the polluted factors vanish and the pure factors alone
remain. With this, liberation is attained. The complex of pure
factors that alone now continues to exist is the dharmakāya
of the Buddha. To express this in Asaṅga’s own words
(Mahāyānasaṃgraha IX, 1):1

a. de la ‘khor ba ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de

kun nas nyon mongs pa’i char gtogs pa’o //

The cycle of existences is the dependent nature

(paratantra svabhāva)2 insofar as [the dependent nature]
constitutes the polluted part.

b. mya ngan las ‘das pa ni de nyid rnam par byang ba’i

char gtogs pa’o //

The nirvāṇa is [the dependent nature] insofar as [the

dependent nature] constitutes the pure part.

c. gnas ni de nyid gnyi ga’i char gtogs pa ste / gzhan

gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid do //

This dependent nature, which encompasses both parts,

is called the basis (āśraya).

1
I quote according to the paragraph divisions in the edition of E. Lamotte,
La Somme du Grand Véhicule (Bibliothèque du Muséon 7), Louvain, 1938.
2
This is how the Yogācāra school refers to the entire complex of the factor
of the psyche, on which the deception of the phenomenal world is based.
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 491

d. gzhan gyur pa ni gang gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo

nyid de nyid kyi gnyen po skyes na gang kun nas nyon
mongs pa’i cha ldog cing rnam par byang ba’i char gyur
pa’o //

The transformation of the basis consists in the fact

that this dependent nature, when its counteragent
(pratipakṣa) arises, abandons its polluted part and
becomes its pure part.

Of the dharmakāya he says further (X, 3):

gnas gyur pa’i mtshan nyid ni sgrib pa thams cad pa

kun nas nyon mongs pa’i char gtogs pa’i gzhan gyi
dbang gi ngo bo nyid rnam par log na sgrib pa thams
cad las rnam par grol zhing chos thams cad la dbang
sgyur ba nye bar gnas pa rnam par byang ba’i char
gtogs pa’i gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid gyur pa’i
phyir ro //

Its characteristic is the transformation of the basis,

because it has cast off the dependent nature that
forms the polluted part and contains all obstructions
(āvaraṇa), and it has become the dependent nature
that forms the pure part <158> and has gained mastery
over all factors through becoming free from all
obstructions.
 492 Appendix I

C. THE RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION1

We thus come to the conclusion that on the question of the
bearer of all mental processes a sharp difference of opinion
exists between the two leaders of the Yogācāra school. Whereas
Maitreyanātha locates it in the element of the factors (dharma-
dhātu), that is to say, in the ultimate state of being, Asaṅga
sees it in the complex of the factors of the psyche that group
themselves around the ālayavijñāna.
Asaṅga did not completely supplant Maitreyanātha’s doc-
trine, however, since the treatises of both were handed down
alongside each other as the fundamental texts of the [Yogācāra]

1
Editorial addition: The result of this investigation may be summarized by
the following chart:

Maitreyanātha Asaṅga
unique: dharmadhātu unique: ālayavijñāna
CHINA Ratnamati Bodhiruci
508 arrives in China 508 arrives in China
unique: tathatā unique: ālayavijñāna
both follow:
the commentaries of Vasubandhu [the Elder], in particular the
Daśabhūmikaśāstra
Paramārtha Hiuan-tsang
546 arrives in China 602–664
unique: amalavijñāna unique: ālayavijñāna
follows: Mahāyānasaṃgraha
INDIA school in Valabhī school in Nālandā
Guṇamati
≈ first half of the 6th cent.
Sthiramati Dharmapāla
th
≈ middle of 6 cent. ≈ middle of 6th cent.; ca. 510–70
unique: amalavijñāna unique: ālayavijñāna
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 493

school. It is thus only natural that this difference of opinion

exerted its influence on the later school. Hence there arouse
within the school various movements that decided in favor of
one view or the other, and that then sought, in accordance with
Indian custom, to interpret the entire tradition from their own
point of view. And a last reverberation of this difference of
opinion within the school is what we encounter in the Chinese
reports discussed at the beginning of this [essay]. Ratnamati
does advocate Maitreyanātha’s line of thought, and Bodhiruci
that of Asaṅga. Paramārtha attempts to reinterpret Asaṅga’s
principal work from Maitreyanātha’s point of view, whereas
Hiuan-tsang turns back again to Asaṅga’s original view.1
How this dispute among the schools otherwise unfolded,
especially in India itself, must be shown by further research,
provided that it manages to piece together a realistic depiction
of the history of the Yogācāra school from the rubble that
confronts us. Nevertheless, a few things can already be said here.
The Chinese tradition connects the dispute with the difference
of opinion between the schools of Nālandā and Valabhī, and this
may be correct. However, whether Dharmapāla and Sthiramati
were the principal representatives of the two views remains
open to question. Their names have likely been invoked because
they were well known as the most significant representatives
of the two schools,2 but by no means can they be the originators

1
In his Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Hiuan-tsang mentions both views, i.e., the
one that suchness (tathatā) is the basis of the transformation of the mental
complex and that the ālayavijñāna completely vanishes [in this process], and
the other that the ālayavijñāna is the basis and that cognition continues to
exist and only undergoes a change in its character (cf. T 1585, k. 9, p. 51a3ff.
and k. 10, p. 55a10ff.; in La Vallée Poussin pp. 610f. and 665). He himself
leans toward the second view.
2
Hiuan-tsang especially, when he refers to the doctrines of Sthiramati and
Dharmapāla, seems to have their own treatises less in mind than the
doctrines of their schools, as he had become acquainted with them in India.
494 Appendix I

of the difference of opinion on this issue, since when Bodhiruci

and Ratnamati came to China [in 508], Dharmapāla had not
yet been born and Sthiramati was no more than a boy. In
addition, the most extensive treatise of Sthiramati’s that has
been found and published thus far,1 the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā,
does not express any explicit support of Maitreyanātha’s view by
Sthiramati. Signs of the dispute can, however, also be detected
here. Sthiramati was in fact not the first commentator on the
Madhyāntavibhāga but had several predecessors, of which we
can name at least one: Candrapāla. Thus, when it comes to
important questions, [Sthiramati] <159> again and again pre-
sents several attempts at an explanation, and thereby the old
difference of opinion between the doctrines of Maitreyanātha
and Asaṅga becomes apparent. To give but one example: In the
course of explaining the fourth chapter, Sthiramati comes to
speak of the dharmakāya and says in this context: 2

sarvāvaraṇaprahāṇat tatpratipakṣānāsravadharmabīja-
pracayāc cāśrayaparāvṛttyātmakaḥ sarvadharmavaśa-
vartī anālaya iti buddhānām dharmakāyaḥ . . . anye tu
niḥśeṣāgantuka-malāpagamāt suviśuddho dharma-
dhātur eva dharmatākāyo dharmakāya iti varṇayanti.

The dharmakāya of the Buddhas consists of the trans-

formation of the basis, in that all obstructions are
removed and the seeds of the uncontaminated factors
that form their counteragent are accumulated; it has
power over all factors and is without the fundamental
cognition.3 . . .

1
Unfortunately, the Tibetan translations of these treatises are not available
to me [at the moment].
2
Sthiramati, Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, exposition systématique du Yogācāra-
vijñaptivāda, éd. par Susumu Yamaguchi, Nagoya 1934, p. 191, 4ff.
3
Since this [fundamental cognition] vanishes with the polluted factors.
 Amalavijñāna and Ālayavijñāna (1951) 495

Others, on the other hand, say that the element of

the factors, completely purified through the removal
of all adventitious stains, is called the dharmakāya,
since the nature of the factors (dharmatā), in this case,
is the body (kāya).1

The first opinion corresponds to Asaṅga’s view, the second to

Maitreyanātha’s.
With this, the questions raised at the beginning [of this essay]
have found their answer and our investigation comes to an
end. We have succeeded in tracing the dispute between the
different representatives of the Yogācāra school, as documented
in Chinese [sources], back to its origins. In doing so it has
become evident that underlying it is one of the most interest-
ing and controversial problems of the more ancient Indian
Philosophy. And I hope that at the same time, new light has
also been shed on the history of the Yogācāra school; a school
of such great importance, yet one whose understanding is still
obstructed by great difficulties.

1
This is an attempt to explain the expression dharmakāya. According to
this explanation, it derives from dharmatākāya, by dropping the suffix tā.
A PPENDIX II:
B IBLIOGRAPHY OF
E RICH F RAUWALLNER 1
Abbreviations:
JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society
WZKM Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlands
WZKS Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens
ZDMG Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft
ZII Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik

1921
• De synonymorum, quibus animi motus significantur, usu tragico.
Dissertation, Wien (unpublished).
1925
• Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma. Die nicht-sāṃkhyistischen
Texte. JAOS 45, pp. 51–67.
• Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma. Die sāṃkhyistischen Texte.
WZKM 32, pp. 179–206.
1926
• Untersuchungen zum Mokṣadharma. Das Verhältnis zum Buddhis-
mus. WZKM 33, pp. 57–68.
• Untersuchungen zu den älteren Upaniṣaden. ZII 4, pp. 1–45.
1927
• Zur Elementenlehre des Sāṃkhya. WZKM 34, pp. 1–5.
1929
• Bemerkungen zu den Fragmenten Dignāgas. WZKM 36, pp. 136–39.

1
[This bibliography is based on the one by Franco-Preisendanz—in the
new reprint of Frauwallner’s Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (Akademie
Verlag, Berlin)—that excludes book reviews, for an alphabetical list of
which see: WZKS 1978.]
 Bibliography of Erich Frauwallner 497

1930
• Dignāgas Ālambanaparīkṣā. Text, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen.
WZKM 37, pp. 174–94.
• Beiträge zur Apohalehre. – I. Dharmakīrti. WZKM 37, pp. 259–83.
1932
• Jñānaśrī. WZKM 38, pp. 229–34.
• Beiträge zur Apohalehre. – I. Dharmakīrti. Übersetzung. WZKM 39,
pp. 247–85.
1933
• Beiträge zur Apohalehre. – I. Dharmakīrti. Übersetzung. (Fort-
setzung). WZKM 40, pp. 51–94.
• Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam.
WZKM 40, pp. 281–304.
• Dignāga und Anderes. Festschrift für Moriz Winternitz. Leipzig,
pp. 237–42.
1934
• Dharmakīrtis Sambandhaparīkṣā. Text und Übersetzung. WZKM
41, pp. 261–300.
1935
• Beiträge zur Apohalehre. – I. Dharmakīrti. Zusammenfassung.
WZKM 42, pp. 93–102.
• Dharmottaras Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ. Text und Übersetzung. WZKM
42, pp. 217–58.
1936
• Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nyāya. – I. Jayanta und seine Quellen.
WZKM 43, pp. 263–78.
1937
• Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Autoren in Haribhadras
Anekāntajayapatākā. WZKM 44, pp. 65–74.
• Beiträge zur Apohalehre. – II. Dharmottara. WZKM 44, pp. 233–87.
1938
• Bhāvanā und Vidhiḥ bei Maṇḍanamiśra. – I. Bhāvanā. WZKM 45,
pp. 212–52.
• Der arische Anteil an der indischen Philosophie. (Kurzfassung)
ZDMG 92/Heft 2/3, pp. *9*–*10*.
498 Appendix II

1939
• Der arische Anteil an der indischen Philosophie. WZKM 46,
pp. 267–91.
1942
• Die Bedeutung der indischen Philosophie. (Kurzfassung) ZDMG
96/Heft 3, pp. *40–42*.
1944
• Die Bedeutung der indischen Philosophie. Der Orient in deutscher
Forschung, Vorträge der Berliner Orientalistentagung, hrsg. H. H.
Schaeder, Leipzig, pp. 158–69.
1951
• On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu. Serie
Orientale Roma Vol. III, Roma.
• Amalavijñānam und Ālayavijñānam. Beiträge zur indischen Philo-
logie und Altertumskunde, Walther Schubring zum 70. Geburts-
tag dargebracht, (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 7), Hamburg,
pp. 148–59.
1952
• Die buddhistischen Konzile. ZDMG 102, pp. 240–61.
• Die ceylonesischen Chroniken und die erste buddhistische Mis-
sion nach Hinterindien. Actes du IVe Congrès International des
Sciences Anthropologiques et Ethnologiques, Vienne 1952, Tome 2,
pp. 192–97.
1953
• Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. 1. Band. Die Philosophie des
Veda und des Epos, der Buddha und der Jina, das Sāṃkhya und
das klassische Yoga-System. Salzburg. (Second newly composed
edition by Andreas Pholus, Aachen 2003).
1954
• Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti’s.
Asiatica, Festschrift Friedrich Weller zum 65. Geburtstag, Leipzig,
pp. 142–54.
 Bibliography of Erich Frauwallner 499

1955
• Der Stand der Erforschung der indischen Philosophie. ZDMG 105
(1955): Bericht über die Mitglieder-Versammlung der D. M. Gesell-
schaft am 31. Juli 1955 in Hamburg, pp. 55–56.
• Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram. Studia Indologica,
Festschrift für Willibald Kirfel, (Bonner Orientalistische Studien, 3),
Bonn, pp. 65–85.
• Die Anthropologie des Buddhismus. Anthropologie Religieuse,
Supplements to Numen, Vol. 2, Leiden, pp. 120–32.
1956
• Die Anfänge der indischen Logik (Auszug aus dem Vortrag).
Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Klasse der Österr. Akad. d. Wiss., Jg. 1956,
Nr. 6, pp. 97–98.
• Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. 2. Band. Die naturphilo-
sophischen Schulen und das Vaiśeṣika-System, das System der
Jaina, der Materialismus. Salzburg. (Second newly composed
edition by Andreas Pohlus, Aachen 2003).
• The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature.
Serie Orientale Roma VIII, Roma.
• Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. Philosophische Studientexte.
Texte der indischen Philosophie. Bd. 2, Berlin. (2. unveränd. Auf-
lage, Berlin 1958; 3. durchges. Auflage, Berlin 1969; 4. gegenüber der
3. durchges. unveränd. Auflage, Berlin 1994).
1957
• The historical data we possess on the Person and the Doctrine of the
Buddha. East and West 7, pp. 309–12.
• Zu den buddhistischen Texten in der Zeit Khri-Sroṅ-Lde-Btsan’s.
WZKS 1, pp. 95–103.
• Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhiḥ. WZKS 1, pp. 104–46.
• The Editions of Mallavādī’s Dvādaśāranayacakram. WZKS 1,
pp. 147–51.
1958
• Zur Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems. WZKS 2,
pp. 84–139.
500 Appendix II

1959
• Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung. WZKS 3, pp. 83–164.
• Indische Philosophie. Die Philosophie im XX. Jahrhundert, Stutt-
gart, pp. 49–67.
1960
• Das Eindringen der Sprachtheorie in die indischen philoso-
phischen Systeme. Indologen-Tagung 1959. Verhandlungen der
Indologischen Arbeitstagung in Essen-Bredeney, Villa Hügel,
13.–15. Juli 1959. Göttingen, pp. 239–43.
• Sprachtheorie und Philosophie im Mahābhāṣyam des Patañjali.
WZKS 4, pp. 92–118.
• Devendrabuddhi. WZKS 4, pp. 119–23.
1961
• Mīmāṃsāsūtram I, 1, 6–23. WZKS 5, pp. 113–24.
• Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic. WZKS 5, pp. 125–48.
• Geschichte und Aufgaben der Wiener Indologie. Anzeiger der
phil.-hist. Klasse der Österr. Akad. d. Wiss., Jg. 1961, Nr. 10, Wien,
pp. 77–95.
• Dignāga, die Entwicklung eines indischen Philosophen. Wissen-
schaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Witten-
berg, Jahrgang 10 (1961), pp. 1410–12.
1962
• Aus der Philosophie der śivaitischen Systeme. Deutsche Akad. d.
Wiss. zu Berlin, Vorträge und Schriften, Heft 78, Berlin.
• Kumārila’s Bṛhaṭṭīkā. WZKS 6, pp. 78–90.
1963
• Abhidharma-Studien. – I. Pañcaskandhakam und Pañcavastukam.
WZKS 7, pp. 20–36.
1964
• Abhidharma-Studien. – II. Die kanonischen Abhidharma-Werke.
WZKS 8, pp. 59–99.
• Mahatma Gandhi. Die geistig-politischen Profile der Gegenwart
in Asien. Eine Auswahl von Vorträgen der Seminare der Österrei-
chischen Unesco-Kommission, Wien, pp. 21–31.
 Bibliography of Erich Frauwallner 501

1965
• Prabhākara Upādhyāya. WZKS 9, pp. 198–226.
1966
• Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. WZKS 10, pp. 86–207.
1967
• Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1. Fortsetzung). WZKS 11, pp. 140–208
1968
• Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā.
Österr. Ak. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl., Sitzungsber., 259. Band, 2. Abh.,
Wien. (Veröffentl. d. Komm. f. Sprachen u. Kulturen Süd- und
Ostasiens, Heft 6).
1970
• Die Lehre von der zusätzlichen Bestimmung (upādhiḥ) in
Gaṅgeśa’s Tattvacintāmaniḥ. Österr. Ak. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Kl.,
Sitzungsber., 266. Band, 2. Abh., Wien. (Veröffentl. d. Komm.
f. Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens, Heft 9).
• Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (2. Fortsetzung). WZKS 14, pp. 161–208.
• Der ursprüngliche Anfang der Vaiśeṣika-Sūtren. Seminar on
Aspects of Religion in South Asia. School of Oriental and African
Studies, London (hectographic reproduction).
• Preface to a reprint of H. Jacobi, Das Rāmāyaṇa. Darmstadt,
pp. V–VIII.
1971
• Die Entstehung der Buddhistischen Systeme. Nachrichten der
Akademie der Wiss. in Göttingen, I. Phil.-hist. Klasse. Jg. 1971
Nr. 6, pp. 115–27 [3]–[15].
• Abhidharma-Studien. – III. Der Abhisamayavādaḥ. – IV. Der Abhi-
dharma der anderen Schulen. WZKS 15, pp. 69–121.
1972
• Abhidharma-Studien. – IV. Der Abhidharma der anderen Schulen
(Fortsetzung). WZKS 16, pp. 95–152.
• Zum Vṛttikāragranthaḥ. WZKS 16, pp. 165–67.
502 Appendix II

1973
• Abhidharma-Studien. – V. Der Sarvāstivādaḥ. Eine entwicklungs-
geschichtliche Studie. WZKS 17, pp. 97–121.
• History of Indian Philosophy. Vols. I and II. Tr. V.M. Bedekar.
Delhi. (Reprints 1984, 1993, 1997, 1999).
1982
• Kleine Schriften. Ed. Gerhard Oberhammer and Ernst Steinkellner.
Glasenapp-Stiftung Vol. 22. Wiesbaden.
1984
• Nachgelassene Werke. Vol. I: Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen. Ed. Ernst
Steinkellner. Österr. Akad. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungs-
berichte Band 438 = Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Spra-
chen und Kulturen Südasiens Heft 19. Wien.
• Historia filozofii indyjskiej. Tom I–II. Tr. Przełożył Leon Żylicz.
Warszawa.
1992
• Nachgelassene Werke. Vol. II: Philosophische Texte des Hinduis-
mus. Ed. Gerhard Oberhammer and Chlodwig H. Werba. Österr.
Akad. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte Band 588 =
Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen
Südasiens Heft 26. Wien.
1994
• Erich Frauwallner’s Posthumous Essays. Transl. Jayendra Soni.
Delhi. (Transl. of Nachgelassene Werke I, 1984).
1995
• Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist
Philosophical Systems. Tr. Sophie Francis Kidd under the super-
vision of Ernst Steinkellner. SUNY Series in Indian Thought: Texts
and Studies. New York.
2003
• New edition of Geschichte der indischen Philosophie by Andreas
Pohlus. Geisteskultur Indiens. Klassiker der Indologie 4.1–2. Aachen.
A PPENDIX III:
S ELECT ED E D IT ION S (E), T RANSLAT ION S (T),
R ESO U RC ES (R), AND L IT ER AT UR E AFT ER TH E
T HIRD E DITIO N (1969)

With specific regard to the sources adduced and English translations and
interpretations.

GENERAL:
Bechert, Heinz and others. 2000. Der Buddhismus I. Der indische
Buddhismus und seine Verzweigungen, (Die Religionen der
Menschheit 24,1). Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln: Verlag W. Kohlhammer.
R: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. I. Bibliography. Compiled by
Karl H. Potter. 1970. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
(http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter/)
R: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VII. Abhidharma Buddhism
to 150 A.D. Ed. Karl H. Potter and others. 1996. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
R: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. VIII. Buddhist Philosophy from 100
to 350 A.D. Ed. Karl H. Potter and others. 1999. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
R: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. IX. Buddhist Philosophy
from 350 to 600 A.D. Ed. Karl H. Potter and others. 2003. Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass.
Frauwallner, Erich. 1982. Kleine Schriften. Herausgegeben von Gerhard
Oberhammer und Ernst Steinkellner. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner
Verlag GmbH.
Gethin, Rupert. 1998. The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Harvey, Peter. 1990. An Introduction to Buddhism. Teachings, History and
Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Herman, A. L. 1983. An Introduction to Buddhist Thought. A Philosophic
History of Indian Buddhism. Lanham: University Press of America.
504 Appendix III

Kajiyama, Yuichi. 1989. Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (Selected

Papers). Edited by Katsumi Mimaki et al. Kyoto: Rinsen Book.
Kalupahana, David J. 1976. Buddhist Philosophy. A Historical Analysis.
Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii.
Keown, Damien. 1996. Buddhism. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
La rivelazione del Buddha. Vol. I: I testi antichi, a cura e con un saggio
introduttivo di Raniero Gnoli. Traduzioni e commento di Claudio
Cicuzza, Raniero Gnoli e Francesco Sferra. 2001. (I Meridiani.
Classici dello Spirito). Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore.
La rivelazione del Buddha. Vol. II: Il Grande veicolo, a cura e con un
saggio introduttivo di Raniero Gnoli. Introduzione ai testi tradotti
di Claudio Cicuzza e Francesco Sferra con contributi di Mauro
Maggi e Cristina Pecchia. 2004. (I Meridiani. Classici dello Spirito).
Milano: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore.
Lamotte, Étienne. 1988. History of Indian Buddhism from the Origins
to the Śaka Era, translated from the French by Sara Webb-Boin
under the supervision of Jean Dantinne. (Publications de l’Institut
Orientalist de Louvain 36). Louvain-La-Neuve.
R: Nakamura, Hajime. 2007 (19801). Indian Buddhism. A Survey with
Bibliographical Notes, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Schmithausen, Lambert. 1973. “Spirituelle Praxis und philosophische
Theorie im Buddhismus.” In Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft
und Religionswissenschaft 57: pp. 161–86.
———. 1978. “Zur Struktur der erlösenden Erfahrung im indischen
Buddhismus.” In Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils.
Edited by Gerhard Oberhammer. Wien: De Nobili Research
Library; pp. 97–119.
Siderits, Mark. 2007. Buddhism as Philosophy. An Introduction.
Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Takasaki, Jikido. 1987. An Introduction to Buddhism. Translated by
Rolf W. Giebel. Tokyo: Tōhō Gakkai.
Vetter, Tilmann. 1988. The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early
Buddhism. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
 Selected editions, etc., after 1969 505

Warder, A. K. 1996 (19701). (Revised Edition). Indian Buddhism. Delhi:

Motilal Banarsidass.
Williams, Paul with Anthony Tribe. 2000. Buddhist Thought. A Com-
plete Introduction to the Indian Tradition. London: Routledge.
The World of Buddhism. Buddhist Monks and Nuns in Society and Culture.
Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich (eds). 1984. London:
Thames and Hudson.

A. THE TEACHING OF THE BUDDHA

Canonical texts (Tripiṭaka):
Saṃyuttanikāya:
T: The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. A Translation of the
Saṃyutta Nikāya. Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi. 2000. Boston:
Wisdom Publications.

Majjhimanikāya:
T: The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. A New Translation
of the Majjhima Nikāya. Original translation by Bhikkhu Ñāṇa-
moli. 1995. Translation edited and revised by Bhikkhu Bodhi.
Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Dīghanikāya:
T: Dīgha Nikāya. Thus have I heard: The Long Discourses of the
Buddha. Translated from the Pali by Maurice Walshe. 19952 (19871).
Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Non-canonical texts:
Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā:
E: Muroji, Yoshihito. 1991. “Vedanā- und Tṛṣṇāvibhaṅga in der
Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā. Tibetischer Text mit Entsprechungen
im Sanskrit.” In Mikkyō Bunka 173, 98–74.
———. 1993. Vasubandhu’s Interpretation des Pratītyasamutpāda.
Eine kritische Bearbeitung der Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā
(Saṃskāra- und Vijñānavibhaṅga), (Alt- und Neu-Indische Stu-
dien 43). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
506 Appendix III

Śālistambhasūtra:
E: Schoening, Jeffrey D. 1995. The Śālistambha Sūtra and its Indian
Commentaries. Vol. I: Translation with Annotation; Vol. II: Tibetan
Editions, (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismus-
kunde 35,1,2). Wien: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische
Studien Universität Wien.
E&T: Reat, N. Ross. 1993. The Śālistambasūtra: Tibetan Original, San-
skrit Reconstruction, English Translation, Critical Notes (including
Pāli parallels, Chinese version and ancient Tibetan fragments).
Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
T: Cooper, J. M. 1992. “The Śālistambhasūtra.” In Buddhist Studies
Review 8,1–2; pp. 21–57.

B. THE SCHOLASTICISM (ABHIDHARMA) OF THE WAY OF

THE HEARERS (ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA)
General:
T: Broeck, José van den. 1977. La saveur de l’immortel (A-p’i-t’an Kan
Lu Wei Lun). La version chinoise de l’Amṛtarasa de Ghosaka.
Publications de l’Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 15. Louvain-la-
neuve: Institut Orientaliste. – Chinese Text URL (T 1553):
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T28/1553_001.htm
Cox, Collett. 1995. Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Exist-
ence. (Studia Philologica Buddhica: Monograph Series XI). Tokyo:
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. – Chinese Text
URL (T 1562):
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T29/1562_012.htm
Dhammajoti, Kuala Lumpur. 1998. Entrance into the Supreme Doctrine
(Skandhila’s Abhidharmāvatāra). Colombo, Postgraduate Institute
of Pali and Buddhist Studies. – Chinese Text URL (T 1554):
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T28/1554_001.htm
———. 2007a. Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Third Edition. Centre of
Buddhist Studies. The University of Hong Kong.
 Selected editions, etc., after 1969 507

———. 2007b. Abhidharma Doctrines and Controversies on Perception.

Third Revised Edition. Centre of Buddhist Studies. The University
of Hong Kong.
T: Dessein, Bart. 1999. Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. Heart of Scholasticism
with Miscellaneous Additions. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. – Chi-
nese Text URL (T 1552):
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T28/1552_001.htm
Frauwallner, Erich. 1995. Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the
Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems. Translated from the
German by Sophie Francis Kidd under the supervision of Ernst
Steinkellner. (SUNY Series in Indian Thought: Text and Studies).
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Griffith, Paul. 1986. On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the
Mind-Body Problem. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
Jaini, Padmanabh S. 1977. Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti.
Critically edited with notes and introduction (pp. 1–144). Patna:
Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.
———. 2001. Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass. – Sanskrit root text:
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=ff0da13b8c3349909ad
JIABS. 2003. The Sautrāntikas. Journal of the International Association of
Buddhist Studies. Volume 26, Number 2: General Introduction, by
Robert Kritzer, 201–24; On the School Affiliation of Aśvaghoṣa:
‘Sautrāntika’ or ‘Yogācāra’? by Nobuyoshi Yamabe, 225–54; Bhadanta
Rāma: A Sautrāntika before Vasubandhu, by Takumi Fukuda,
255–86; Sautrāntika and the Hṛdaya Treatises, by Bart Dessein,
287–321; Sautrāntika, by Yoshifumi Honjo, 321–30; Sautrāntika in
the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, by Robert Kritzer, 331–84.
Rospatt, Alexander von. 1995. The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness.
A Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of this Doctrine up to
Vasubandhu. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 47). Stuttgart: Franz
Steiner Verlag.
508 Appendix III

Sadakata, Akira. 1999. Buddhist Cosmology. Philosophy and Origins.

Tokyo: Kosei Publishing.
Schmithausen, Lambert. 1967. “Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃśatikā
und Triṃśikā.” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ost-
asiens 11: pp. 109–36.
Willemen, Charles and Bart Dessein, Collett Cox. 1998. Sarvāstivāda
Buddhist Scholasticism. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
T: Willemen, Charles. 2006. The Essence of Scholasticism. Abhidharma-
hṛdaya. T 1550. Revised edition with a completely new introduc-
tion. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. – Chinese Text URL (T 1550):
http://www.cbeta.org/result/normal/T28/1550_001.htm

Specific texts and authors:

Milindapañhā:
T: Milinda’s Questions, Vol. I. Translated from the Pali by I. B.
Horner. 19692 (19631). (Sacred Books of the Buddhists vol. XXII).
London: Luzac & Company Ltd.
T: Milinda’s Questions, Vol. II. Translated from the Pali by I. B.
Horner. 19692 (19641). (Sacred Books of the Buddhists vol. XXIII).
London: Luzac & Company Ltd.
T: Milindapañha. Ein historisches Gipfeltreffen im religiösen Welt-
gespräch. Aus dem Pāli von Nyanatiloka. Herausgegeben und
bearbeitet von Nyayaponika. 1998. O. W. Barth Verlag.
T: Entretiens de Milinda et Nāgasena. Traduit par Édith Nolot. 1995.
Paris: Gallimard.

Vasubandhu,
Abhidharmakośa:
E: Abhidharm-koshabhāṣya of Vasubandhu. Edited by P. Pradhan.
1967. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute. (Revised Second
Edition with Introduction and Indices, Etc., by Aruna Haldar 1975).
E: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, Chapter I: Dhātunirdeśa.
Edited by Yasunori Ejima. 1989. (Bibliotheca Indologica et
Buddhologica 1). Tokyo: Sankibo Press.
 Selected editions, etc., after 1969 509

E: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, Chapter IX: Ātmavāda-

pratiṣedha. (Bibliotheca Indologica et Buddhologica 11). Edited by
Jong Cheol Lee. 2005. Tokyo: Sankibo Press.
T: Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam [translated into French] by Louis de La
Vallée Poussin. English translation by Leo M. Pruden. 1988–1990.
Vols. 1–4. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press.
T: Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons: Vasubandhu’s “Refutation
of the Theory of a Self.” Translated by James Duerlinger. 2003.
London: Routledge Curzon (Chapter 9).
T: Hall, Bruce Cameron. 1983. Vasubandhu on ‘Aggregates, Spheres,
and Components’: Being Chapter One of the ‘Abhidharmakośa’.
Ph.D. diss., Harvard University.
R: Index to the Abhidharmkośabhāsya (P. Pradhan Edition). – 1973.
Part 1: Sanskrit–Tibetan–Chinese. – 1977. Part 2: Chinese–Sanskrit.
– 1978. Part 3: Tibetan–Sanskrit. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan.

Pañcaskandhaka:
E: Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka. Critically edited by Li Xuezhu
and Ernst Steinkellner, with a contribution by Toru Tomabechi.
2008. (Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 4).
Beijing-Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House – Austrian
Academy of Sciences Press.
T: Seven works of Vasubandhu: the Buddhist psychological doctor.
Translated and edited by Stefan Anacker. 1984. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass; pp. 49–82.
T: Le traité des cinq agrégats (Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa de Vasu-
bandhu). Traduit et annoté par Jean Dantinne. 1980. Bruxelles:
Institut Belge des Hautes Études Bouddhiques.
T: The Inner Science of Buddhist Practice. Vasubandhu’s Summary of the
Five Heaps with Commentary by Sthiramati. 2009. Ithaca: Snow Lion
Publications.
510 Appendix III

C. THE SCHOOLS OF THE GREAT WAY (MAHĀYĀNA)

General:
Brunnhölzl, Karl. 2003. The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the
Kagyü Tradition. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.
Buescher, Hartmut. 2008. The Inception of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda.
Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 62. Wien:
Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Harris, Ian Charles. 1991. The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra
in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
Kritzer, Robert. 1999. Rebirth and Causation in the Yogācāra Abhi-
dharma. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde,
Heft 44. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische
Studien Universität Wien.
T: Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. 1996. Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten von
ihrem wahren Wesen (Dharmadharmatāvibhāga). Eine Lehr-
schrift der Yogācāra-Schule in tibetischer Überlieferung. Swisttal-
Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag. – Tibetan text of Vasu-
bandhu’s Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti:
http://www.asianclassics.org/research_site/webdata/monastic/
open/html/TD4028I.html
Nagao, Gadjin M. 1991. Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. A Study of Mahā-
yāna Philosophies. Collected Papers of G. M. Nagao, Edited,
Collated, and Translated by L. S. Kawamura in Collaboration with
G. M. Nagao. Albany: State University of New York Press.
R: Powers, John. 1991. The Yogācāra School of Buddhism: A Bibliography.
Metuchen, N. J.: Scarecrow Press.
T: Abhidharmasamuccaya. The Compendium of the Higher Teaching
(Philosophy) by Asaṅga. Originally translated into French and
annotated by Walpola Rahula. 1971. English version from the
French by Sara Boin-Webb. 2001. Fremont: Asian Humanities
Press. – Sanskrit text:
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=644091f3a5b359f4dfd
 Selected editions, etc., after 1969 511

Ruegg, David Seyfort. 1969. La Théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra.

Études sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme. Paris:
École Française d’Extrême-Orient.
———. 1981. The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy
in India. (A History of Indian Literature VII,1). Wiesbaden: Otto
Harrassowitz.
Schmithausen, Lambert. 2007 (19871). Ālayavijñāna. On the Origin and
the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philo-
sophy. Part I: Text; Part II: Notes, Bibliography and Indices. Tokyo:
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
Tachikawa, Musashi. 1997. An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Nāgārjuna. Translated by Rolf W. Giebel, Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
T: Tola, Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti. 2004. Being as Consciousness:
Yogācāra Philosophy of Buddhism. Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass. –
Sanskrit text URLs:
Ālambanaparīkṣā:
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=
node/35&textID=ac7935c4b5d4306c4
Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛttiḥ:
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=
node/35&textID=423ef50ce1b5ac8ff
Trisvabhāvakārika:
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=
node/35&textID=7b25c8832fd7727e1
Viṃśatikākārikā:
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=
node/35&textID=6906a9ddb861e622e
Waldron, William S. 1994–1995. “How Innovative is the Ālayavijñāna?”
In Journal of Indian Philosophy. – Part I: 22 (1994): pp. 199–258;
Part II: 23 (1995): pp. 9–51.
———. 2003. The Buddhist Unconscious. The Ālaya-vijñāna in the
Context of Indian Buddhist Thought. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
512 Appendix III

Williams, Paul. 1989. Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Doctrinal Foundations.

London: Routledge.

1. The Madhyamaka school

Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā:
Schmithausen, Lambert. 1977. “Textgeschichtliche Beobachtungen zum
1. Kapitel der Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā.” In Prajñāpāramitā
and Related Systems (Studies in honor of Edward Conze). Ed. by
Lewis Lancaster. (Berkeley Buddhist Series 1); pp. 35–80.

Ratnakūṭa (Kāśyapaparivarta):
T: A Treasury of Māhāyāna sūtras: Selections from the Mahāratnakūta
sūtra. Translated from the Chinese by the Buddhist Association of
the United States (ed. by Garma C. C. Chang). 1983. University
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Nāgārjuna,
Madhyamakakārikā:
E: Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ. Edited by J. W. de Jong. 1977. Madras:
Adyar Library and Research Centre.
E&T: Kalupahana, David K. 1986. Nāgārjuna. The Philosophy of the
Middle Way, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Albany: State University of
New York Press.
T: The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Nāgārjuna’s
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Translation and Commentary by Jay
Garfield. 1995. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vigrahavyāvartanī:
E&T: Bhattacharya, Kamaleshwar. 1971. “The dialectical method of
Nāgārjuna, translation of the ‘Vigrahavyāvartanī’ from the original
Sanskrit with introduction and notes.” In JIP 1, pp. 217–61.
(Reprinted in Delhi 1978: The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna:
Vigrahavyāvartanī. Translated from the original Sanskrit with
introduction and notes by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, text critically
edited by E.H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst. 19862. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass).
 Selected editions, etc., after 1969 513

E&T: Edited in Sanskrit and Tibetan in Christian Lindtner. In

Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of
Nāgārjuna. By Christian Lindtner. 1982. (Indiske Studier 4).
Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag; pp. 70–86.
E: Yonezawa, Yoshiyasu. 2008. “Vigrahavyāvartanī. Sanskrit Translit-
eration and Tibetan Translation.” In Journal of Naritasan Institute
for Buddhist Studies 31, pp. 209–33.

Ratnāvalī:
E: Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī, Vol. I, the Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan,
Chinese). By Michael Hahn. 1982. (Indica et Tibetica 1). Bonn:
Indica et Tibetica Verlag.
T: The Precious Garland and The Song of the Four Mindfulnesses.
Translated and edited by Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche with
Anne Klein. 1975. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Āryadeva, Catuḥśataka:
E&T: Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka. On the Bodhisattva’s Cultivation of Merit
and Knowledge. By Karen Lang.1986. (Indiske Studier 7). Copen-
hagen: Akademisk Forlag.
E&T: Tillemans, Tom J. F. 1990. Materials for the study of Āryadeva,
Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti: the Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva,
chapters XII and XIII, with the commentaries of Dharmapāla and
Candrakīrti: introduction, translation, Sanskrit, Tibetan and
Chinese texts, notes. (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und
Buddhismuskunde Heft 24). Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und
Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien (2 vols) (Chapters 12–13).
T: Āryadeva’s Four Hundred Stanzas on the Middle Way. With
Commentary by Gyel-tsap. Translated by Ruth Sonam Rinchen
with additional Commentary by Geshe Sonam Rinchen. Ithaca,
N. Y.: Snow Lion Publication.
514 Appendix III

Buddhapālita, Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti:
T: Feher, Judit. 1984. “Buddhapālita’s Mūlamadhyamakavŗtti: Arrival
and Spread of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamika Literature in Tibet.” In:
Ligeti, Louis (ed.), Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating
the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Körös,
Vol. 1. (Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica 29,1). Budapest: Akadémiai
Kiadó; pp. 211–40 (Chapter One).
E&T: Lindtner, Christian. 1981. “Buddhapālita on Emptiness.” In Indo-
Iranian Journal 23; pp.187–217 (Chapter Eighteen).

Bhāvaviveka, Prajñāpradīpa:
E: Lindtner, Christian. 1984. “Bhavya’s Controversy with Yogācāra in
the Appendix to Prajñāpradīpa, Chapter XXV.” In: Ligeti, Louis
(ed.), Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th
Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Körös, Vol. 1.
(Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica 29,1). Budapest: Akadémiai
Kiadó; pp. 77–97.
T: Kajiyama, Yuichi. 1963–1964. “Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñāpradīpaḥ
(1. Kapitel).” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens,
Bd. 7, 8. (Reprinted in Studies in Buddhist Philosophy, Kyoto;
pp. 417–74). (Chapter 1, translated into German).
T: Ames, William L. 1993–1995, 1999–2000. “Bhāvaviveka’s Prajñā-
pradīpa, A translation of Chapter One: ‘Examination of causal
conditions’ (pratyaya).” In Journal of Indian Philosophy, 21, 1993,
pp. 209–60; 22, 1994, pp. 93–116. (Chapter Two. In Journal of Indian
Philosophy, 23, 1995, pp. 295–365; Chapters Three, Four, Five.
In Buddhist Literature 1, 1999, pp. 1–119. Chapters Six, Seven. In
Buddhist Literature 2, 2000, pp. 1–91).
T: Eckel, M. David. “Bhāvaviveka’s Critique of Yogācāra Philosophy
in Chapter XXV of the Prajñāpradīpa.” In: Lindtner, Christian (ed.),
Miscellanea Buddhica. (Indiske Studier 5). Copenhagen: Akademisk
Forlag 1985; pp. 25–75.
 Selected editions, etc., after 1969 515

Candrakīrti,
Prasannapadā:
E&T: MacDonald, Anne. 2003. The Prasannapadā’s Chapter One:
Editions and Translations. PhD dissertation, University of Vienna
(publication forthcoming).
E&T: Timme Kragh, Ulrich. 2006. Early Buddhist Theories of Action
and Result. A Study of Karmaphalasambandha. Candrakīrti’s
Prasannapadā, Verses 17.1–20. (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie
und Buddhismuskunde 64). Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische
und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.
T: Ruegg, David Seyfort. 2002. Two Prolegomena to Madhyamaka
Philosophy. Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā Madhyamakavŗttiḥ on
Madhyamakakārikā I.1 and Tsoṅ kha pa Blo bzaṅ grags pa/rGyal
tshab dar ma rin chen’s dKa’ gnad/gnas brgyad hyi zin bris.
Annotated Translations. (Studies in Indian and Tibetan
Madhyamaka Thought Part 2). (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie
und Buddhismuskunde 54). Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und
Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien; pp. 1–135.

Madhyamakāvatāra:
E Sanskrit text of chapters one to five:
http://www.uwest.edu/sanskritcanon/dp/index.php?q=node/
35&textID=dd79e10fef63096b02d
T: Madhyamakāvatāraḥ und Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyam (Kapitel VI,
Vers 166–226). Übersetzt und kommentiert von Helmut Tauscher.
1981. (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 5).
Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien
Universität Wien.
T: The Moon of Wisdom: Chapter Six of Chandrakirti’s Entering the
Middle Way. With commentary from the Eighth Karmapa Mikyö
Dorje’s Chariot of the Dagpo Kagyü Siddhas. Translated under the
guidance of Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rimpoche by Ari Goldfield,
Jules Levinson, Jim Scott & Birgit Scott. 2005. Ithaca: Snow Lion
Publications.
516 Appendix III

T: Introduction to the Middle Way. Chandrakirti’s Madhyamaka-

avatara; with commentary by Jamgön Mipham. Translated by
the Padmakara Translation Group. 2002. Boston: Shambhala
Publications.

2. The school of Sāramati

Sāramati, Ratnagotravibhāga:
E: Cf. Schmithausen, Lambert. 1971. “Philologische Bemerkungen
zum Ratnagotravibhāga.” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde
Südasiens 15; pp. 123–77.
T: Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. 2008. A Direct Path to the Buddha Within.
Gö Lotsāwa’s Mahāmudrā Interpretation of the Ratnagotra-
vibhāga. Somerville: Wisdom Publications.
T: Buddha Nature. The Mahayana Uttaratantra Shastra by Arya
Maitreya; written down by Arya Asanga; commentary by Jamgön
Kongtrül Lodrö Thayé “The Unassailable Lion’s Roar.”
Explanations by Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rimpoche. Translated
by Rosemarie Fuchs. 2000. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.

3. The school of the Yogācāra

Bodhisattvabhūmi:
T: Tatz, Mark. 1986. Asanga’s Chapter on Ethics with the Commen-
tary of Tsong-kha-pa, The Basic Path to Awakening, The Complete
Bodhisattva. Lewiston, N.Y: The Edwin Mellen Press (Part I,
Chapter 10).
T: Deleanu, Florin. 1986. The Chapter on the Mundane Path (Laukika-
mārga) in the Śrāvakabhūmi. A Trilingual Edition (Sanskrit,
Tibetan, Chinese), Annoted Translation and Intoductory Study.
2 Vols. Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series XX.
Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
 Selected editions, etc., after 1969 517

Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra:
T: Wisdom of Buddha: the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Translated by
John Powers. 1994. (Tibetan Translation Series 16). Berkeley:
Dharma Publishing.

Maitreyanātha,
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra:
E: Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra of Asaṅga. Edited by S. Bagchi. 1970.
(Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 13) Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of
Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning.
T: The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (Mahāyāna-
sūtrālaṃkāra) by Maitreyanātha/Āryāsaṅga, together with its
Commentary (Bhāṣya) by Vasubandhu. Translated from Sanskrit,
Tibetan, and Chinese by L. Jamspal, R. Clark, J. Wilson,
L. Zwilling, M. Sweet, R. Thurman. 2004. (Tanjur Translation
Initiative Treasury of the Buddhist Science series). New York:
American Institute of Buddhist Studies at Columbia University.

Madhyāntavibhāga:
T: Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor.
Translated and edited by Stefan Anacker. 1984. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass; pp. 191–286.
T: Kochumutton, Thomas A. 1982. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experi-
ence. (A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasu-
bandhu the Yogācarin). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers;
pp. 27–89; 235–246.

Asaṅga, Mahāyānasaṃgraha:
E&T: The Realm of Awakening. A Translation and Study of the Tenth
Chapter of Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṅgraha. Introduction by John P.
Keenan. Translation and Notes by Paul J. Griffiths, Noriaki
Hakamaya, John P. Keenan, and Paul L. Swanson (with the
assistance of Alex Naughton, John Newman, and Heng-ching
Shih). Texts by Paul J. Griffiths and Noriaki Hakamaya. 1989.
New York: Oxford University Press.
518 Appendix III

T: Chapter Eight translated, with Gadjin Nagao’s commentary, by

Leslie Kawamura, “Nirvikalpaka-jñāna: awareness freed from
discrimination.” In From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism
and Chinese Religion (ed. Koichi Shinohara and Gregory Schopen).
1991. Oakville, Ontario, pp. 41–68.
T: The Summary of the Great Vehicle by Bodhisattva Asaṅga. Trans-
lated from the Chinese of Paramārtha (Taishō, vol. 31, no. 1593)
by John P. Keenan. 1992. Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist
Translation and Research 1992.

Vasubandhu,
Viṃśatikā:
T: Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor.
Translated and edited by Stefan Anacker. 1984. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass; pp. 157–79.
T: Kochumutton, Thomas A. 1982. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experi-
ence. (A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasu-
bandhu the Yogācarin). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass; pp. 165–96;
260–75.
T: Tola, Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti. 2004. Being as Conscious-
ness: Yogācāra Philosophy of Buddhism. Delhi, Motilal Banarsi-
dass; pp. 53–186.

Triṃśikā:
E: Buescher, Hartmut. 2007. Sthiramati’s Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya.
Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation.
Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
T: Seven Works of Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor.
Translated and edited by Stefan Anacker. 1984. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass; pp. 181–90.
T: Kochumutton, Thomas A. 1982. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experi-
ence. (A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasu-
bandhu the Yogācarin). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass; pp. 127–163;
254–259.
 Selected editions, etc., after 1969 519

Dignāga, Pramāṇasamuccaya:
E: Steinkellner, Ernst. 2005. Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1.
A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help
of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known
Sanskrit fragments.
http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf
INDICES
 I NDICES
A. General index of terms1
of the buddhi, 476
A of the soul (jñānavṛtti*), 476
abandonment (prahāṇa*), 206, 369 actuality (yāthābhūtva), 225
abiding (sthiti*), 227, 276 advantage (guṇa), 272, 274, 276,
absence of 399
delusion (amoha*), 120 adventitious (āgantuka), 168,
greed (alobha*), 120, 415 272, 274, 276–77, 316, 320, 325,
hatred (adveṣa*), 120 329, 343, 479, 482–83, 485, 495
absorption (samāpatti*), 416 flaws (āgantukadoṣa*), 329
absorption, 122–23, 153–54, 248, adventitious cloudiness of
253, 319, 378, 392, 414 water, gold, or space
of non-consciousness (comparison), 486
(asaṃjñisamāpatti*), 122, 378 affirmation (samāropa*), 292,
of suppression (nirodha- 331
samāpatti), 122–23, 378, 414 affliction (upadhi), 143, 146
of the formless sphere (ārupya aggregation (samudāya*), 93
samāpatti*), 248 aggregation, state of (saṃhata*),
without marks 401
(ānimittasamādhi*), 145 aging (jarā*), 122
absorption, state of, 154, 161–62, agitation (auddhatya*), 18, 121
319 all-pervading (vyāptitva*), 277
accumulation of merit and all-pervasive (sarvatraga), 121,
knowledge, 352 335, 377–78, 415, 484
acquisition (prāpti), 111, 122–23, anger (krodha*), 120, 415,
127, 130–33, 135, 137, 143, 206, (pradoṣa*), 17
352, 354, 407 anger of the seers (ṛṣikopa*), 409
non-acquisition (aprāpti), 122, annihilation (nirodha*), 143, 193,
133, 137 227, (uccheda*), 54, 59, 196,
acquisition (lābha*), 407 (vibhava), 30, (vināśa*), 112
of the self (ātmalābha), 111 doctrine of (ucchedadṛṣṭi), 194
activity (karman*), 371, (kriyā*), thirst for (vibhavatṛṣṇā), 30
370, 432, (kṛtya*), 335, 338, antidote (pratipakṣa*), 365
(vṛtti*), 476 apart (vivikta), 160–62, 169
of cognizance (vijñaptikriyā*), by nature (prakṛtivivikta*),
431 173, 216

1
The technical terms marked by an asterix are based on the source materials
and added by the translator. The page numbers listed refer to samples of
these terms that do not cover all the occurrences of the terms in the book.
524 General index of terms

appearing form, 247, 266, 286–87, arisen

297–98, 318, 324, 331, 367, 376, through effort (yatnabhāvin*),
392, 412, 420, 426–28, 430–33, 132
435 through the causes (hetu-
appearance (ābhāsa*), 359, (ākāra*), samutpanna*), 43
39, (pratibhāsa*), 278 without effort (ayatnabhāvin*),
of duality (dvayābhāsa*), 331 132
appearing aspect (ākāra*), 368 arising (utpāda*), 113, 188, 203,
appearing image (ābhāsa*), 433 224, 291, (utpatti*), 225,
appearing form (ākāra), 247, 266, (udaya*), 198, 203, 208, 227,
286–87, 297–98, 318, 324, 331, 276, 335
367, 376, 392, 412, 420, 426–28, characteristic of (utpāda-
430–33, 435 lakṣaṇa*), 306
of that which apprehends ascetic (śramaṇa*), 295, (yati*),
(grāhākāra*), 433 330
appeasement (vyupaśama*), 143 aspect (ākāra*), 277, 363
apprehended and the aspiration (praṇidhi*), 276
apprehending (grāhya-grāhaka), ātman-doctrine, 12
350, 366, 379, 400 atom (paramāṇu*), 95–96, 102–3,
apprehended, the (grāhya - 105–6, 128, 130, 230–33, 381,
ālambya), 318, 332, 350, 365–66, 385–87, 401–5
379, 381, 400, 427, 431, 433–35 combination of atoms, 386
apprehending, the (grāhaka - doctrine of atoms, 102, 230
ālambaka), 318, 332, 350, 379, impossibility of a unitary
381, 400, 427, 431, 433–35 whole, 387
apprehension impossibility of partless
and non-apprehension atoms, 385
(grahāgraha*), 404 minimum of eight types, 103
of mere cognizance (vijñapti- multiplicity of individual
mātratābuddhi*), 367 atoms, 386
of the object-referents (artha- partless and indivisible, 385
gati*), 333 shadow, 386
of the perfect nature (pari- the whole and the atom, 386
niṣpannasvabhāvabuddhi*), attention (manaskāra*), 92, 98,
367 120, 414
of the rope (rajjubuddhi*), 367 attentiveness (apramāda*), 120
of the snake (sarpabuddhi*), attribution (upacāra), 292, 302,
366 380, 411, 414
apprehension, erroneous auditory cognition (śrotra-
(mithyāgrāha*), 304 vijñāna*), 124, 267
appropriated (upātta*), 93, 119, autonomous inference (svatantra
430 anumāna*), 259
appropriation (upādi*), 412, 414, authoritative tradition
430 (āptāgama*), 289
 General index of terms 525

awakening of mindfulness 109, 144, 148–49, 177–78, 183,

(smṛtyupasthāna*), 135, 248 185, 206–7, 209, 223, 283, 321,
awareness (saṃvitti*), 433 326, 334, 370, 421, 432, 474,
awareness part (svasaṃvitti- 491
bhāga*), 425, 428–29, 432–34 definition, 44, 89
awareness-awareness part thirst for becoming (bhava-
(svasaṃvittisaṃvitti- tṛṣṇā), 14, 30, 49
bhāga*), 429, 433–34 beginning (ādi*), 85, 223, 227
definition, 42
B beginningless time (anādi-
bad (akuśala*), 291, 415 kālika*), 361, (utkṛṣtakāla*),
two bad factors of the extended 334
domain (akuśalamahā- being (sattva), 82, 165, 167, 232,
bhūmika*), 121 335, 343, 407–8
bad course (apāyagati*), 35, 372 spontaneously appearing
badness (dauṣṭhulya), 413, 417 (upapāduka sattva), 384,
removal (hāni*) of the twofold 398
badness, 417 being anaesthetized
bamboo reed, hollow (example), and mental cognition, 378
268 being-different (anyathābhāva*),
based on (upādāya*), 94, 203 196, (ayathātvā*), 227
basis (āśraya*), 132, 143, 368, 372, beings living in the water
490 (jalāśritaprāṇi*), 337
for the appearance of object- beings of the intermediate
referents (arthābhāsāśraya*), existence (antarābhava), 384
362 belief (drṣṭi*), 179
of the knowable (jñeyāśraya), belief in
357, 371 a highest being, 154
transformation of the (āśraya- a ‘mine’ (mamakāra*), 169, 222
parāvṛtti), 320, 323, 327, 330, a person (pudgaladṛṣṭi*), 179
334, 352–54, 356, 370–71, 377, a self (ātmadṛṣṭi*), 332, 411,
381, 413, 417, 426, 491, 494 414, (ātmagrāha*), 92
bearer of cognition, 477 an ‘I’ (ahaṃkāra*), 169, 222
bearer of qualities or properties emptiness (śūnyatādṛṣṭi*), 179
(dharmin), 109, 240 eternality (śāśvatagraha*), 196
bearer (adhisṭhāna*) of the sense- factors, 411
organs, 430 the groups (skandhagrāha*),
bearer of the burden 223
(bhārahāra*), 100 benefit (artha*), 302
definition, 28 of oneself (svārtha*), 278
becoming (bhava*). See also of others (parārtha*), 278
dependent origination bewilderment (saṃmoha*), 22
(pratītyasamutpāda). 20, 32, of sleep (T. gnyid kyis dkrugs
35–38, 42, 44, 80, 85–86, 89, 92, ba*), 266
526 General index of terms

birth (jāti), 131 boundless (aprameya*), 337

birth of birth (jātijāti), 131 brightly luminous (prabhāsvara),
birth (jāti*). See also dependent 316, 320, 479
origination (pratītya- Buddha (jina*), 335
samutpāda). 15, 18, 32–33, Buddha, vii, xviii–xxi, 1, 9,
35–37, 41–42, 44–45, 55, 60, 11–13, 16, 21, 23–24, 27, 30, 32,
79–80, 84–90, 122–23, 131, 34, 41, 43, 52, 65–71, 75, 87,
133–34, 147, 177–78, 197–98, 100–4, 107–8, 116, 135–37,
217, 220, 223, 253, 311, 333, 143–45, 148, 153, 155–57, 159,
336, 348, 359–61 162–63, 172, 174, 183–84, 186,
definition, 44 189–91, 194–202, 205–9, 211,
birth, old age and death 221, 227–28, 248–49, 253, 263,
(jātijarāmaraṇa*), 361 273–74, 277–80, 300–1, 321,
blameless (anavadya*), 43, 177 326–28, 334–37, 346, 354,
blameworthy (sāvadya*), 43, 177 356–57, 365, 369, 381, 383–84,
bliss (ānanda*), 272, 276, 474, 482, 391, 410–13, 460, 482, 486, 490
(sukha*), 272, 276 historical personality and
Bodhisattva, 6, 65, 157, 159, supranatural being, 155
162–64, 170–72, 175, 205, 247, proclamation of the Buddha,
252, 261, 264, 276, 280–81, 285, vii, 13, 34, 68, 136, 183, 186,
290–91, 302–3, 305–7, 312–13, 194, 197, 202, 207, 220
319, 326, 333, 353, 357, 365–69, solitary Buddhas (pratyeka-
372, 453, 482 buddha), 289–90
body (kāya*), 408, 495, (śarīra*), buddhahood (buddhatva),
23, (vapu*), 278 272–73, 277, 320–21, 327, 334,
endowed with the sense-organs 336, 338, (tathāgatatva*), 336
(sendriyakakāya*), 430 Buddhism, vi–vii, xviii–xxiii,
of liberation (vimuktikāya), xxxiii, 30–31, 65–66, 70, 82,
373, 413, 417 91–92, 103, 105, 108, 123, 126,
of the doctrine (dharmakāya), 134–35, 150, 153, 159, 180, 185,
273–74, 277, 279, 354, 356, 200, 220, 270, 280, 378, 384,
370–72, 381, 413, 482, 490–91, 388, 392, 418–19, 424, 460, 463,
494–95 469, 474, 477
of the sage (śarīra*), 278 Buddhist philosophy, x–xi,
of the splendid doctrine xviii–xxi, xxiii, 1, 7, 111
(saddharmakāya*), 279 buddhology, 155, 315, 320, 354,
worldly (rūpakāya), 273–74 356, 478, 486
bondage, 33, 162, 175, 283, 316, burden (anuśaya), 140, 417
321, 327, 340, 342, 380, 413 burden (bhāra*), 100
and liberation, 283, 316, 340, definition, 28
342
twofold, 380, 413 C
both (ubhaya*), 54 category (padārtha*), 116
parts (ubhayabhāga*), 369 causality, 52
 General index of terms 527

[causally] dependent upon characteristic (lakṣaṇa), 173, 198,

(pratītya*), 94 220, 290, 297, 302, 344, 370,
cause 387–88, 404, 417, 431–32, 435,
material, 191 491
cause (hetu*), 43, 87, 133, 189, 195, dependent (paratantra-
213, 276, 310 lakṣaṇa), 243, 302–5, 308,
homogeneous (sabhāgahetu), 318, 324, 332, 339–40,
139 349–50, 353, 358–59, 370
of the arising (utpattihetu*), 131 entry into the characteristic
cause (kāraṇa*), 92–93, 111, 203, of the knowable (jñeya-
408 lakṣaṇapraveśa), 357, 364
projecting (ākṣepakāraṇa*), 84 intrinsic (svalakṣaṇa), 250, 291,
cause (nimitta), 330 293, 301, 306–7, 309, 363,
cause (pratyaya*), 37 413
dominant (adhipatipratyaya), of duality (dvayalakṣaṇa*),
47, 189–90, 192, 389 333
generative (hetupratyaya*), of perishing (vināśalakṣaṇa*),
192 306
immediately preceding of the factors (dharma-
(samanantarapratyaya*), 50, lakṣaṇa*), 291
189–90, 193 of the knowable (jñeya-
object-support (cause), 192 lakṣaṇa), 357–58, 364–65
causes and effects (hetuphala*), perfect (pariniṣpanna-
224 lakṣaṇa*), 302–5, 308, 318,
ceasing (nirodha*), 203, (vināśa*), 325, 332, 339–40, 342, 344,
111–12, (vyaya*), 203, 208, 335 351, 358–59
cessation (nirodha*). See also three, 220, 302, 319, 339–40,
dependent origination 349, 355
(pratītyasamutpāda). 14–16, threefold, 297, 323
20–21, 24–25, 28, 32, 37–39, 43, characterized, that which is
45, 57, 61, 134, 137, 142, 144, (lakṣya*), 161
177–78, 200, 204–6, 225, 289, characterizes, that which
371 (lakṣaṇa*), 161
of suffering (duḥkhanirodha*), chariot (example) (ratha*), 73–74
14 axle (akṣa*), 73
of this whole mass of suffering chariot box (rathapañjara*),
(P. kevalassa dukkha- 73
kkhandhassa nirodha*), 33 flag-pole (rathadaṇḍaka*), 73
change (pariṇāma*), 227, 397, goad (pratodayasṭi*), 73
(vikāra*), 409, (vikriyā*), 276, pole (īṣā*), 73
409 reins (ratharasmi*), 73
change through heat (pākaja), 85, wheels (cakra*), 73
107, 113 yoke (yuga*), 73
528 General index of terms

clear comprehension 350–53, 355, 360–61, 363, 365,

(abhisamaya), 134–35, 252, 289, 372–73, 376–81, 383, 388, 392,
464 397–99, 410, 412–14, 417,
sixteen moments of, 135 419–23, 425–33, 435–37,
clear water (example), 323 469–70, 472, 474–78, 480,
cognition 486–88, 493
four parts of (Dharmapāla), 425 auditory (śrotravijñāna*), 124,
three appearing forms of, 420 267
three parts of, 429 definition, 43, 88
three parts of (Dignāga), 425 fundamental (ālayavijñāna), 5,
two appearing forms of, 420 124, 264, 348–49, 353, 355,
cognition (buddhi*), 107, 113, 129, 358, 362, 365, 371–73,
405, (citta* = vijñāna*), 164, 376–78, 412, 414, 416, 427,
(parijñāna*), 107 430–31, 470, 472, 488–89,
cognition (jñāna*), 421 494
of the cognition of the object gustatory (jihvāvijñāna*), 124
(viṣayajñānajñāna*), 422 mental (manovijñāna), 56, 97,
of the object (viṣayajñāna*), 421 124, 263, 266–67, 285, 351,
of the passing away and 361–64, 380, 388–89, 406,
reappearance of beings 416, 426, 429
(cyutyupapādajñāna*), 19 mere (vijñānamātratva*), 417
of the pot (ghaṭabuddhi*), 129 olfactory (ghrāṇavijñāna*),
of the recollection of previous 124
births (pūrvanivāsānusmṛti- stainless (amalavijñāna), 470
jñāna*), 18 tactile (kāyavijñāna*), 98, 124,
of the vanishing of the negative 361
influxes (āsravakṣayajñāna*), three appearing forms of, 412
20 transformations (pariṇāma*)
of this (cognition) (tajjñāna*), of, 376, 378, 414, 416
421 twofold liberating, 283
two forms (dvirūpa*), 421 visual (cakṣurvijñāna*),
cognition (vijñāna). See also 97–98, 124, 263, 266–67, 359,
group (skandha) and 406
dependent origination cognition element (vijñāna-
(pratītyasamutpāda). 5, 18–20, dhātu*)
25–26, 28, 30–34, 36, 40–43, definition, 56
56–59, 70, 74, 77, 80, 86–89, cognitive activity (vijñaptikriyā*),
97–98, 104, 107, 110, 113, 431
116–18, 121, 124, 129, 135–38, cognizance (vijñapti), 160, 176,
141, 145, 164, 166–67, 171, 249, 262–63, 349–52, 355,
176–78, 186, 188, 197–99, 239, 357–62, 365–67, 376–81, 384,
243–44, 248, 252, 261–69, 280, 389–90, 392–95, 397–401,
282–83, 285, 293, 304, 317–19, 405–14, 416–17, 425, 427,
324, 326, 340–44, 347–48, 430–31, 434–37
 General index of terms 529

eleven types, 349–51, 355, cognized, the (vijñāta*), 364

359–63, 378, 436 cold (śīta*), 119
inexpressible form of mere, 413 color (raṅga* - varṇa* - rūpa*),
of an object-referent (artha- 102–3, 106, 111, 119, 304, 367,
vijñapti*), 362 387, 397
of difference between oneself combination (saṃyoga*), 402
and others (svaparaviśeṣa- common characteristic
vijñapti*), 358 (sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), 485
of manners of expression Community (saṃgha*), 43, 200
(vyavahāravijñapti*), 358 comparison (dṛṣṭānta*), 143
of mental cognition (mano- compassion (karūṇa*), 334
vijñānavijñapti*), 351, 361 compassion for the world
of number (saṃkhyāvijñapti*), (lokānukaṃpā*), 302
358 comprehension of mere
of objects (vijñaptiviṣaya*), 412, cognizance
414 (vijñaptimātrasaṃjñā*), 367
of place (deśavijñapti*), 358 conceived (parikalpita*), 364,
of visual form (rūpavijñapti), (vikalpita*), 368
351 concentration (samādhi), 14–16,
of the body (dehavijñapti*), 358 18, 119–20, 145, 248, 253, 357,
of the embodied (dehivijñapti*), 371, 415
358 concept
of the enjoyer (tadupabhoktṛ- relativity of opposed concepts,
vijñapti*), 358 184
of the eye (caksurvijñapti*), 361 conception (vikalpa), 197, 199,
of the factors (dharmavijñapti*), 318, 325, 331, 351, 361, 363,
351 379, 412, 416, 430, 435
of the fundamental cognition according to its intrinsic
(ālayavijñānavijñapti*), 362 nature (svabhāvavikalpa*),
of the good and bad destinies, 250, 351
of passing away and arising by nature free from
(sugatidurgaticyutyupapatti- conceptions
vijñapti*), 358 (nirvikalpātmaka*), 274
of the objects (viṣayavijñapti*), false (abhūtaparikalpa), 276,
378 317–18, 324, 329–32, 339–44,
of the one who enjoys (bhoktṛ- 349, 358–59, 407, 413, 483
vijñapti*), 358 of an apprehended and an
of thinking (manovijñapti*), apprehending (grāhya-
351, 361 grāhakavikalpa*), 410
of time (kālavijñapti*), 349, 358 of innumerable forms of
of what is enjoyed by the appearing (anantākara-
preceding [cognizances] vikalpa*), 363
(tadupabhuktavijñapti*), 358 own conception (svavikalpa*),
specific (vijñaptiviśeṣa*), 408 288
530 General index of terms

conception (parikalpa*), 364 88–90, 116, 120, 177–78, 303–4,

concepts, opposed, 174, 184, 218 313, 370, 376, 414–15
conceptual imagination definition, 44
(parikalpa), 362, 363 through designation
condition (pratyaya*), 195, 213, (P. adhivacanasamphassa*),
276, 310, 416, 435 40
causal (hetupratyaya*), 50 through resistance (P. paṭigha-
similar and immediately samphassa*), 40
preceding (samanantara- contaminated (sāsrava), 138, 177,
pratyaya*), 50 253, 414, 482, 489
conditioned (pratītya*), 209 and indeterminate
conditioned (saṃskṛta), 99, 111, (nivṛtāvyākṛta*), 414
116, 137, 145, 177, 209, 246–48, contemplation (bhāvanā), 244,
251, 253, 291, 370 246
and unconditioned fivefold (pañcavidha-
(saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta*), 370 bhāvanā*), 371
conditioned entity (saṃskṛta*), 90 path of (bhāvanāmārga), 136,
conditioned factor (saṃskṛta 244, 352, 365
dharma*), 111, 144, 244, 398 contemplation (darśana*), 290,
conduct, good and bad (vitarka*), 18, 121, 415
(kuśalākuśalasamudācāra*), 408 contentedness (saumanasya*), 18
conglomerate of names convention, 288, 302, 307
(nāmakāya*), 39 human (sāṃketa), 302
conglomeration (piṇḍa*), 402–3 conviction (adhimokṣa*), 120,
connection (anubandha*), 310, 415
(samparka*), 407, co-operation of soul and buddhi,
connection (saṃyoga*), 372 476
of the phonemes, 368 corporeality (rūpa). See also
with one another (paraṃpara- group (skandha). 24, 26, 30, 49,
saṃyoga*), 368 74, 97, 117, 248, 290–93
connection correct cognition (bhūtacitta*),
of causes (hetūpanibandha*, 52, 177
55 correct distinction of all factors
of conditions (pratyayopani- (samyagdharmapravicaya*),
bandha*), 52, 55 290
consciousness (cit*), 474, (saṃvit), correct observation
5 (yoniśomanasikāra), 303
consequence (prasaṅga), 155, 160, correct view (samyagdṛṣṭi*), 224
234, 238, 240, 257, 260, 341, 475 counteragent (pratipakṣa), 48,
undesired, 242, 257–58, 260 125, 139, 143, 370–72, 407, 491,
contact (sparśa*). See also 494
dependent origination counting (gaṇana*)
(pratītyasamutpāda). 30, 32–33, impossibility of counting
36, 38–40, 42–44, 47–49, 80, 86, (gaṇanāyoga*), 167
 General index of terms 531

magnitude of counting deeds and defilements

(gaṇanābahutva*), 167 (karmakleśa), 58–59, 83,
created appearances (nirmāṇa*), 272, 275
279 deed (kriyā*), 203
creation of the world, 273 defect (doṣa*), 274, (mala*), 24,
creatures (sattva*), 302 272, 303
crystal, transparent (example) defiled (kliṣṭa*), 331,
(svacchasphaṭika*), 303 (sāṃkleśika*), 489
cultivating (bhāvanā*), 372 by adventitious (āgantuka)
cycle of existences (saṃsāra), 17, defilements (upakleśa), 479
31, 33, 35, 46, 51, 82, 134, 154, mind (kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ), 124,
169, 200, 208–10, 223, 253, 274, 355
298, 300, 311, 326, 333–34, 348, part (saṃkleśabhāga*), 369,
369, 372, 377–79, 413, 437, 490 490–91
defilement (kleśa - saṃkleśa -
D upakleśa), 46, 58, 83–85, 87, 92,
dark, the (andhakāra*), 366 121, 125, 130, 132, 134–41, 143,
darkness (tamas*), 43, 210 147–49, 163, 188, 197, 199, 206,
death (maraṇa*), 14, 408–9 247, 275, 277, 282–83, 289, 298,
definition, 45 305, 310–12, 318, 324, 328–29,
death (mṛtyu*), 275, (nirodha*), 331, 334, 342, 372, 377–78, 412,
210 414–15, 437, 479, 481–83
deceitfulness (māyā*), 120, 415 deeds and (karmakleśa),
deception (bhrānti*), 366 58–59, 83, 272, 275
of duality (dvayabhrānti), 330, four, 377
339 obstruction of (kleśāvaraṇa*),
deception 273, 282–83, 288–89, 327
of the conception, 340 of birth (utpattisaṃkleśa*), 311
of the phenomenal world, 188, of deeds (karmasaṃkleśa*),
284, 316–17, 323, 490 311
produced by a good painting of the defilements (kleśa-
(example), 323 samkleśa*), 311
deceptive diversity of the secondary defilements
phenomenal world (prapañca*), (upakleśa*), 121, 378, 415
197 defilements of the extended
deductio ad absurdum, 234, 239, domain (kleśamahābhūmika*)
256–57 six (AKB), 121
deed (karma), 19, 43, 58–60, 73, 75, delight in sense objects
77–79, 83–85, 87–89, 119–20, (viṣayarati*), 279
134, 137, 148, 188, 197, 199, 203, delusion (moha*), 226, (mūḍhī*),
217–18, 223–24, 272, 274–75, 415, (saṃmoha*), 43
278, 282, 311, 326, 333, 348, 355, about an ‘I’ (ātmamoha*), 414
360–61, 371, 376–79, 382–83, of people (lokamoha*), 329
389, 391, 395–97, 416, 437 demerit (apuṇya*), 120
532 General index of terms

demonic being (piśāca), 390 according to the use of

denial (apavāda*), 292 language (vyavahāra-
denial of the soul, 1, 68, 71, 75, 90, prajñapti*), 310
108 dependent on some
denier (nāstika*), 294 foundation (upādāya
dependence of entities on words, prajñapti*), 203
381 existent only by (prajñaptisat),
dependent (paratantra*), 364, 285
435–36, (upādāya*), 209 nature of designations
dependent characteristic (prajñaptivādasvabhāva),
(paratantralakṣaṇa), 243, 290
302–5, 308, 318, 324, 332, desire (chandarāga*), 141,
339–40, 344, 349–50, 353, (P. kāma*), 13, (prārthanā*),
358–59, 370, 490 276
dependent nature (paratantra* - desirelessness (virāga*), 141, 143
paratantra svabhāva), 264, 298, desire-to-do (chanda*), 120
301, 310–11, 362–64, 367, despair (upāyāsa*), 32, 36, 42
369–70, 412, 416, 426, 435, destruction (vināśa*), 228
490–91 of the person (pudgala-
dependent origination bhāvavināśa*), 179
(pratītyasamutpāda), 31, 35, destruction of life (prāṇātipata*),
41–42, 45, 51–57, 59–60, 86–87, 408
90, 183, 189, 191, 194, 201, 203, determination (pariccheda*), 344
205–6, 212, 214, 217, 219, 298, determination of cognizance
303, 306 (vijñaptiniyama*), 408
law of, 51, 183, 186–87, 284, diamond-like concentration
326 (vajropamsamādhi), 353, 371
tenet of, vii, 30–34, 51–52, 61, difference in
75, 82 characteristic (lakṣaṇabheda*),
dependently arisen 405
(pratītyasamutpanna*), 291 the bearer (āśrayaviśeṣa*), 132
designation (abhidhāna*), 368 their marks (lakṣaṇabheda*),
designation (adhivacana*), 164, 95
168 difference of things
adventitious (āgantuka*), 168 (dravyāntaratva*), 405
baseless (avastuka*), 168 diligence (vīrya*), 120, 415
essenceless (anātmiya*), 168 direct clear comprehension
without an object-support (abhisamaya*), 135, 327, 413
(anārambaṇa*), 168 disc of the sun (example)
designation (prajñapti), 40–41, 72, (bhānumaṇḍala*), 336
74, 91–94, 96–99, 116, 122, 124, disciple (śrāvaka*), 199, 373,
127–28, 131, 133, 160, 164, 168, (vineya*), 141
187, 203, 225, 264, 286–87, discontentedness
291–95, 310, 342, 366, 368–69 (daurmanasya*), 18
 General index of terms 533

dissimilar (vipakṣa), 238, 241 deeds (karma), 119

dissimulation (śāṭhya*), 120, 415 emptiness, 200
distinct (anya*), 198, 416, (bhinna*), eternality (śāśvatadṛṣṭi), 194,
310, 364, 371 (śāśvatavāda*), 22
distinction (viśeṣa*), 302, existence, 218
(vyavasthā*), 132 liberation, xix, 1, 11, 65, 68, 127,
distinction between 132, 134, 149, 175, 218, 242,
perception and conception, 419 282, 297–98, 319, 352, 380,
perception and conceptual 413, 426
thinking, 285, 351 neither-existence-nor-non-
distinctness (pṛthaktva*), 344, existence, 218
(viśeṣa*), 421 non-duality, 284
distractedness (vikṣepa*), 121, 415 non-existence, 218
distress (daurmanasya*), 32, 36, pure cognition, 469, 479
42 suppression through
disturbance (upakleśa*), 18 knowledge, 138
diversity (prapañca), 103, 131, doctrine of the
186–89, 191, 197–99, 208, 211, Buddha, 61, 65, 135, 184, 232,
225, 250, 264, 276, 284, 290, 329 327
division (bheda*), 405 deception of the phenomenal
according to spatial parts world, 299
(digbhāgabheda*), 403 denial of a soul, 101
doctrinal proclamation general views:
(dharmadeśanā*), 202 all entities lack a solid,
doctrinal texts and their content permanent core, 101
(dharmārtha*), 365 momentariness of all
Doctrine (dharma*), 200 entities, 107
doctrine (deśanā*), 335, 398–99, dependence of the conceived
(dharma*), 35, 43, 295, (pakṣa*), objects on the connection of
142, (vāda*), 148, 294 phonemes in words, 356
body of the (dharmakāya), different parts of cognition,
273–74, 277, 279, 354, 356, 419
370–72, 381, 413, 482, 490–91, efficacy of deeds, 389
494–95 emptiness of all things, 197
doctrine of emptiness of things, 212
a being (sattvavāda*), 61 essencelessness of all factors,
a personality (pudgalavāda*), 61 384
a self (ātmavāda*), 61 four examinations, 356
a soul (jīvavāda*), 61 four points of objection, 381
an eternal cause (nitya- four truthful cognizances, 356
kāraṇāstitvavāda*), 85 Great Way
annihilation (ucchedadṛṣṭi), 194, (mahāyānadharma*), 365
(ucchedavāda*), 22 middle and the extremes, 338
causality, 191, 231 middle way, 297, 339
534 General index of terms

momentariness of all entities, 1, dream (example) (svapna*), 161,

105, 109, 189, 388, 406 262–63, 265–69, 317, 360, 382,
nature of reality, 297 389–90, 394, 408
necessary connection of the dream of ignorance, 264
objects with words, 356 duality (dvaya), 290, 318, 329,
permeation (vāsanā) of the 343, 361–62
fundamental cognition, endowed with image and
348 seeing (nimittadarśana-
phenomenal world, 376 dvaya*), 366
seeds (bīja) of the fundamental in apprehension
cognition, 348 (grāhadvaya*), 417
soul, 68 non-duality (advaya*), 247,
spontaneosly appearing beings 249, 253, 283–84, 290–91,
(upapāduka sattva), 383 370
three appearing forms of of subject and object, 326,
cognition, 420 339–40
three bodies of the Buddha, 321, real (dvayadravya*), 331
354 dullness (middha*), 408
three characteristics, 318, 340, duration (sthiti*), 122
349, 356
three parts of cognition, 428 E
threefold characteristic of earth (pṛthivī*), 107, 275, 288,
things, 297 404
threefold essencelessness of earth element (pṛthivīdhātu*),
things, 297, 299 53, 118
threefold nature of things, definition, 56
297–99, 301, 324, 332, 412 effect (kārya*), 92, 111, 203, 337,
unreality of the external world, (kriyā*), 192, (phala*), 87, 133,
158, 381 193
unreality of the phenomenal effect of the magical illusion
world, 436 (māyākṛta*), 330
world soul, the brahman or effort (ābhoga), 327, (vyāyāma*),
ātman, 473 345
doctrine that everything exists effortlessly (anābhoga*), 279,
(sarvam asti), 148 (aprayatna*), 278
doctrine, Madhyamaka, 233, 244, egotism, 321
315–16, 321–22, 338 Elders (sthavira), 66
doer (kāraka*), 83 element (bhūta*), 397
domain (gocara*), 410–11 element (dhātu), 44, 116, 272,
dominant cause (adhipati- 274, 306, 317, 331, 350, 482,
pratyaya), 47, 189–90, 192, 484
389 eighteen, 116–17, 124, 350
doubt (vicikitsā*), 18, 120, 415, of earth (prthivīdhātu*), 275
(samśaya*), 113 of space (vyomadhātu*), 275
 General index of terms 535

of the buddhas (buddha- dhātu*), entanglement in the cycle of

272, 276, 337 existences, 31, 148, 196, 217,
of the factors (dharmadhātu), 283, 327, 341, 343, 411
160, 187, 269, 272, 279, 316, twofold cause of, 411
319–21, 323–24, 327–28, entities
333–34, 339, 342, 344, 367, momentariness of all, 1, 22, 51,
372, 483, 485, 492, 495 69, 90, 101–2, 105, 107–11,
of water (abdhātu*), 275, 345 119, 161–62, 175, 184–85,
of wind (vāyudhātu*), 275 188–89, 192, 201, 206,
true (paramārthadhātu), 272 212–14, 216, 220, 230, 232,
uncontaminated (anāsrava 236, 238, 240, 245, 348,
dhātu), 335, 417, 483 381–82, 388, 406
element (dhātu* - mahābhūta*), entry into the characteristic of
four, 102 the knowable (jñeyalakṣaṇa-
elephants, 265–66, 405 praveśa*), 364
elixir of deathlessness (amṛta*), environment (bhājanaloka*), 396,
227 412, 430
emancipation (P. nirodha*), 14 envy (īrṣyā*), 120, 415
embitterment of the thoughts epistemological idealism, 1,
(manaḥpradoṣa*), 409 233
embryo (garbha*), 84 epistemology, ix–x, xx, 1, 385,
emptiness (śūnyatā), 51–52, 125, 418, 471
127, 160, 169, 178–79, 185, 188, equality (samānatā*), 332
197, 199–206, 212–15, 245–47, equanimity (upekṣā*), 18, 120,
250, 261, 287, 294–95, 300, 316, 412, 414–15
322, 338–39, 341–45, 409 erroneous (mithyā*), 222
defiled form of, 343 erroneous
definition, 214, 341 belief in a self (vitathātma-
meaning of (śūnyatārtha*), 202 dṛṣṭi*), 91
purified form of, 343 cognition (T. rnam par shes pa
sixteen types of, 343 rnor ba*), 265
empty (śūnya*), 169, 178, 343, 409 idea (abhimāna*), 115
end (anta*), 223, 227, (aparānta*), thinking (viparyasta-
86, 210, (avasāna*), 228 manaskāra*), 485
endless series (anavasthā*), 434, view (dṛṣṭi*), 120
(aniṣṭhā*), 422 view (mithyādṛṣṭi*), 133
engagement (carita*), 226 error (bhrama*), 332, (bhrānti*),
energy (vīrya*), 303 329, (doṣa*), 293, (viparyāsa*),
Enlightened One (saṃbuddha*), 362
228, 276 of one-sided affirmation,
enlightenment (bodhi* - 287
sambodhi*), 205, 226, 372 of one-sided negation, 287
thought of enlightenment errorlessness (aviparyāsa*),
(bodhicitta), 164, 172 484–85, (asvabhāvatā*), 179
536 General index of terms

essencelessness (nairātmya - examination (paryeṣaṇā*), 366

asvabhāvatā - niḥsvabhāvatā). of causes (pratyayaparīkṣā),
See also selflessness. 125, 175, 188
179, 190, 260, 283, 290, 299–301, of the designation of the
307–11, 371, 384, 399–400, 413, nature (nāmārthasvabhāva-
416–17 prajñaptiparyeṣaṇā*), 366
in terms of a characteristic or in of the designation of the
terms of a sign (lakṣaṇa- particularities (nāmārtha-
niḥsvabhāvatā*), 300, 307 viśeṣaprajñaptiparyeṣaṇā*),
in terms of arising (utpatti- 366
niḥsvabhāvatā), 301, 307–9, of the name (nāma-paryeṣaṇā*),
311 366
in terms of the highest truth of the object-referent (artha-
(paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā), paryeṣaṇā*), 366
301, 307–11 example (dṛṣṭānta*), 238, 240,
of all factors (sarvadharma*), 242, 258, 360, 395
416 excellence
of the factors (dharma- of abandonment (prahāṇa-
nairātmya), 125, 283, 290, viśeṣa*), 369
301, 307–8, 384, 400, 413 of the highest insight
of the personality (pudgala- (adhiprajñāviśeṣa*), 368–69
nairātmya), 283, 384, 399 of the highest mind (adhicitta-
threefold, 297, 299–301, 309–11, viśeṣa*), 368
412, 416 excluding what is other
established (siddha*), 394 (anyāpoha*), 129
establishment (samudāgama*), exclusion (paryudāsa*), 240
303 exertion (prayatna*), 213
eternal (nitya*), 100, 277, (śāśvata*), existence (asti*), 177, (astitā*),
23, 54, 59, 196, 211 165, (astitva*), 196, 330, 405,
eternality (śāśvata), 370 (janman*), 140, (sattva*),
doctrine of (śāśvatadṛṣṭi), 194 343
eternity (śāśvata*), 210 existence (bhava*)
ether (ākāśa*), 53–54, 56–59, 142, intermediate (antarābhava),
351, 431 83, 85
ether element (ākāśadhātu*), 53 existence (bhāva), 141, 194–95,
definition, 56 209, 224, 290, 330
everything exists (sarvam asti*), definition, 291
148 existence and non-existence
everywhere (samanta*), 333, 337, (bhāvābhāva*), 370
(sarvatra*), 274, 393 extraneous nature (parabhāva),
everywhere present (sarvaga*), 192, 194–95
335 existent as a designation
exalted (bhagavat*), 411, (prajñaptisat*), 93, 128, 264,
(praṇīta*), 143 285
 General index of terms 537

existent as a thing (dravyasat*), 93

experience (upabhoga*), 344, 360, F
(vedaka*), 332 factor (dharma)
experienced by oneself conditioned (saṃskṛta
(pratyātmavedya*), 370 dharma*), 111, 144, 398
explanation (vibhaṅga*), unconditioned (asaṃskṛta
definition, 42 dharma), 125, 138, 144, 147,
expression (abhilāpa*), 292 246, 480
expression of speech factors (dharma), 18, 30, 33, 38,
(vāksamutthāna*), 363 43, 50, 58–59, 70, 77, 79, 83, 85,
expressions (vyavahāra*), 361 92, 97, 99, 102, 104–5, 108–12,
extending everywhere 115–17, 119–27, 130–35,
(sarvatraga*), 309 137–49, 167, 169–71, 173,
external object (T. phyi rol gyi 175–78, 190, 193, 211, 244, 246,
yul*), 265 248–49, 252–53, 263, 267–68,
external world, 51, 102, 123, 154, 272, 275, 277, 282, 288, 290–94,
182–83, 217, 234, 242, 244, 298, 302–3, 305–11, 316,
261–62, 318, 350, 378, 381, 318–20, 324, 326–28, 331–32,
383–85, 389, 426, 428 334, 337, 341–42, 344, 347–51,
three possibilities for things 353–54, 361, 363, 365, 369–72,
of an, 385 376–78, 380, 384, 392, 400,
unreality of the, 51, 180, 182, 411–17, 427–28, 431–35, 437,
218, 244, 261–62, 272, 375, 477–78, 485, 487–89, 491–92,
381, 385 494
extinction (nirvāṇa), 14, 21, 73, associated with the mind
125, 127, 137–47, 154, 187, 197, (cittasaṃprayukta dharma -
199, 202, 206–10, 218, 220, 224, caitta), 116, 120
227, 253, 272, 276, 291, 293, 300, by designation (prajñapti-
311, 333–34, 337, 357, 369, 371, dharma*), 133
490 conducive to penetration
non-abiding (apratiṣṭhita- (nirvedhabhāgīya), 135
nirvāṇa*), 369 dissociated from the mind
extinction (saṃkṣaya*), 332 (cittaviprayukta dharma),
extraneous nature (parabhāva), 116, 122
192, 194–95 element of (dharmadhātu),
extremes (anta*), 176 160, 187, 269, 272, 279, 316,
two extremes, 13, 177, 248, 322, 319–21, 323–24, 327–28,
331, 339 333–34, 339, 342, 344, 365,
eye disease (taimirika), 247, 303, 367, 372, 483, 485, 492, 495
393–94 essencelessness of (dharma-
eye (cakṣu*), nairātmya), 125, 283, 301,
of the doctrine (dharma- 307–8, 384, 400, 413
cakṣu*), 223 highest reality (paramārtha*)
of insight (prajñācakṣu), 251 of, 417
538 General index of terms

in the manner of (real) things firebrand (firebrand) (alāta*), 223

(dravyadharma*), 133 fire-wood (kāṣtha*), 112
list of, 115, 117, 489 five groups of grasping
nature of (dharmatā; (upādānaskandha*), 28
dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā), 125, fixed rule (niyama*), 292
145, 160, 173, 199, 250, foam, 268
291–92, 316, 329, 342, 413, follower of the doctrine of
495 a person (pudgalaskandha-
unwholesome (akuśala*), 18 vādin*), 226
white, 327 an intrinsic nature (of things)
faculty (indriya), 140, 248, 268, 275 (T. rang bzhin dang bcas par
fading away (kṣaya*), 224, smra ba*), 260
(vyaya*), 198 the essencelessness (of things)
fainting (mūrchana*), 416 (T. rang bzhin med par
and mental cognition, 378 smra ba*), 260
faith (śraddhā*), 120, 222, 331, 415 the momentariness of all
false conception entities (kṣaṇika*), 406
(abhūtaparikalpa), 276, 317–18, food (bhojana*), 288, (āhāra*), 28,
324, 329–32, 339–41, 343–44, (bāla*), 222, 400
349, 358–59, 407, 413, 483 fool (mandhamedhas*), 202,
false conception (asatkalpa*), 330, (mūḍha*), 226
(vitathavikalpa*), 407 forest (āraṇya* - vana*)
false view (mithyādṛṣṭi*), 224 Daṇḍaka forest, 409
fantasy (parikalpita*), 143 forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛtitā*),
fault (doṣa*), 202, 216, 221, 259 121, 415
of the formations (saṃskāra- form (rūpa). See also group
doṣa*), 306 (skandha) - visible form (rūpa) -
fear (bhaya*), 222, 397, (trāsa*), corporeality (rūpa) -
485 dependent origination
fearlessness (vaiśāradya*), 224, (pratītyasamutpāda). 3, 14,
229 30–33, 36, 39–43, 50–51, 56, 58,
four, 274 69, 75, 77–81, 87, 90, 95, 97–99,
feeling (anubhava), 120 102, 106–7, 110, 119, 128–30,
fetter (bandhana*), 131 133–34, 138, 140–41, 143, 145,
fire (agni*), 21, 26, 53–54, 56–57, 159, 164, 166–67, 171, 176–78,
59, 78–79, 85, 94–97, 102–3, 197–98, 207, 217, 225, 230–31,
108–10, 112–15, 118, 128–29, 241, 247–48, 250, 260, 263,
132, 176, 275, 288, 290, 335, 391, 265–67, 272–73, 284, 286, 290,
396 294–95, 297, 300, 314–15,
definition, 95 317–18, 322, 328, 338–40, 343,
fire doctrine of the Upaniṣads, 21 348–49, 352, 355–56, 361–62,
fire element (tejodhātu*), 53, 114, 365–67, 375, 377, 379–80, 384,
118 387, 393, 398–401, 403, 411,
definition, 56 413–14, 416, 420, 422, 427–28,
 General index of terms 539

430, 432, 461, 476, 478–79, 484, free from

494 both extremes (antadvaya-
definition, 43 varjita*), 291
of the object (arthākāra*), 422 conceptions (nirvikalpa*),
visible, 83, 93–94, 97–99, 102–3, 334
106–7, 118–19, 131, 145, 248, diversity (niṣprapañca*), 276
263, 266–67, 288, 290, 293, error (aviparyasta*), 276,
295, 330–31, 335, 359–61, 393, (abhrānta*), 330
398, 400–1, 404–7, 421–22 the belief in a ‘mine’
form, its own (svākāra*), 422 (nirmama*), 198
formations (saṃskāra). See also the belief in an ‘I’
group (skandha) - dependent (nirahaṃkāra*), 198
origination (pratītya- free of
samutpāda). 25–26, 28–30, conceptions (nirvikalpa*), 279,
32–33, 42–43, 45, 47, 49, 55, 74, 290
80, 86, 117–18, 120, 122, 124, defilements (niḥkleśa*), 163
133, 145, 147, 166–67, 171, fruit (phala*), 278, 397, 408
176–78, 248, 290, 303, 306, 337, desired or undesired
383, 397 (phalamiṣṭhāniṣṭa*), 408
definition, 43 knowledge of the fruit
dissociated from the mind (phalajñāna), 357, 370
(cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*), of deeds (karmaphala*), 361
120, 122, 124 fuel (indhana*), 26, 94–97
uncontaminated (anāsrava definition, 95
saṃskāra), 481 fulfillment of all wishes
volitional (saṃskāra). See also (sarvārthasiddhi*), 312
dependent origination full clarity (suviniścita*), 333,
(pratītyasamutpāda). 32–33, (suvyavasthā*), 334
55, 80, 86–88, 177 fundamental cognition (ālaya-
fortune vijñāna), 5, 45, 124, 264,
of others (parasaṃpatti*), 278 348–49, 353, 355, 357–78, 362,
one’s own (ātmasaṃpatti*), 365, 371–73, 376–78, 412, 414,
278 416, 427, 430–31, 469–70, 472,
foundation (adhiṣṭhāna*), 278, 487–89, 492–94
(āśraya*), 432, (nidāna*), 37, future (anāgata*), 140, 291,
311, (pratiṣṭhāna*), 275, (aparānta*), 43
(saṃniśraya*), 329
foundation of all cognition, 472 G
four elements (dhātu*), 102 gates (mukha*)
four great elements (mahābhūta*), of the power of recollection,
118 248
four possibilities (catuṣkoṭi*), to liberation (vimokṣa-
206, 234–35 mukha*), 160
free (virahita*), 161 three, 337
540 General index of terms

generative cause (hetupratyaya*), of the doctrine of a self

192 (ātmavādopādāna*), 44
generosity (dāna*) of views (dṛṣṭyupādāna*), 44
perfection of, 248 great (mahā)
genuinely true body being (mahāsattva*), 163
(paramārthakāya*), 273 body of water (mahājala*), 338
germ (garbha*), 272–73, 276, 324, element (mahābhūta*), 43
328, 336, 482 mass (gaṇa*), 338
of the Buddha (tathāgata- ocean (mahāsāgara* -
garbha), 336 comparison), 264, 337
germ (gotra), 272–73, 276, 311, 324, perfection (mahāpāramitā*),
328, 336, 482 166
of the Buddhas (jinagarbha*), sage (mahāmuni*), 417
276 sinfulness (mahāvadya*), 409
ghost (preta), 37, 311, 382, 409 great way (mahāyāna), vii, 1, 45,
god (deva*), 302, 311, (īśvara*), 52, 65, 81–82, 117, 126–27,
54 150–51, 153, 155–59, 174–75,
gold (kanaka* - suvarṇa*), 304, 181–82, 233, 244, 271, 280, 285,
316, 329, 343, 345, 486 294, 319–21, 326, 346, 352–53,
good 355, 374–75, 383, 392, 462–63,
deeds (śubhakarma*), 333 471, 477–79, 487, 489
doctrine (saddharma*), 221, greatness (mahat*), 166
(sudharma*), 334 greed (abhidhyā*), 17, (rāga*),
fortune (saṃpatti*), 334 331
path (sugati*), 224 ground (hetu*), 37
good (kuśala*), 291, 331, 415 group (skandha - kāya), 14, 28,
good factors of the extended 30, 56, 68–69, 75, 82, 87–88,
domain (kuśala- 100–1, 116–18, 124, 146, 162,
mahābhūmika*) 183, 217, 325
ten, 121 group (kāya*), 43–44, 49, 56, 495
gradual movement (krameṇa*), of phonemes (vyañjanakāya*),
404 122
grasper without something of sentences (padakāya*), 122
grasped (T. gzung ba med pas of words (nāmakāya*), 122
‘dzin pa*), 264 group (skandha), 30, 43–45, 47,
grasping (upādāna*). See also 49, 60, 68–69, 71, 75, 82–83,
dependent origination 100, 116–17, 196, 198, 224, 272,
(pratītyasamutpāda). 14, 28, 32, 290
35–38, 42, 44, 47, 80, 86, 89, of cognition
100–1, 157, 162, 177–78, 198, 363 (vijñānaskandha*), 118, 124
definition, 44, 89 of ideation (saṃjñāskandha*),
of desires (kāmopādāna*), 44 118, 120
of moral conduct and vows of formations (saṃskāra-
(śīlavratopādāna*), 44 skandha*), 118, 120
 General index of terms 541

of grasping (upādāna- hidden intention (saṃdhi* -

skandha*), 14, 100 abhipreta*), 306, 311
of matter (rūpaskandha*), 118 highest (anuttara*), 291
of sensation (vedanāskandha*), highest being, 477
118, 120 and ātman, 480, 486
stream of groups (skandha- and capability of action, 486
saṃtāna), 91 and processes of cognition,
grudge (upanaha*), 415 486
guardians of hell (narakapāla*), bearer of existence and of
382, 395 cognition, 486
gustatory cognition four qualities (purity, self,
(jihvāvijñāna*), 124 bliss, and eternity), 481
in ordinary people,
H Bodhisattvas, Buddhas, 482
habit (saṃstava*), 288 inconceivability and
harmoniousness (praśrabdhi*), indeterminability, 159
120, 415 inconceivability and
hate (pratigha*), 120, 415 ineffability, 480
hatred (dveṣa*), 113, 131 positive qualities of, 486
he who unconditioned factors, 489
enters the stream leading to highest perfect enlightenment
liberation (srotaāpanna*), (anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi*),
200 303
no longer returns (anāgāmin*), highest reality (paramārtha),
200 180, 186–87, 206, 243, 250, 280,
returns only once more to the 299, 323, 325–26, 328–29, 340,
cycle of existences (sakṛd- 379–81, 413, 417, 469, 474–75,
āgāmin*), 200 477
heard (śruta*), 291 and the earthly world, 475
Hearers (śrāvaka*), 289 immutability of, 474
Way of Hearers (śrāvakayāna), inconceivability of, 477
ix, 65, 70, 117, 127–28, 134, relationship to the
153–56, 160, 188–89, 197, phenomenal world, 477
282, 285, 346–48, 351, 354, untouchedness of, 474
374–75, 382, 388, 420, highest truth (paramārthasatya -
427–28 paramārthatā*), 129–30, 186,
hearing (śruta*), 372 222, 247, 301, 307–10, 330, 332,
heat (uṣman*), 95, (uṣṇatā*), 103 342, 344
heaven (svarga*), 396 essencelessness in terms of the
heedfulness (sāpramādika*), 415 (paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā),
heedlessness (pramāda*), 306 301, 308–11
hell beings (naraka*), 311, 384, hindrance (āvṛti*), 336,
395–97 (pratighāta*), 290
hells (naraka*), 395 of ignorance (ajñānāvṛti*), 278
542 General index of terms

hindrances (nivaraṇa*) of the object-referent (artha-

five mental, 17–18 pratibhāsa*), 407
homogeneity of beings of this cognition
(nikāyasabhāga), 122–23 (jñānābhāsa*), 421
homogeneous (sabhāga*), 54–55, image of the Buddha (buddha-
60, 105, 113, 139, 409 bimba*), 335
non-homogeneous (asabhāga*), image of the moon (candra-
139 bimba* - comparison), 335
cause (sabhāgahetu), 139 image part (nimittabhāga),
stream of cognizance 350–51, 355, 419, 425–26,
(sabhāgasaṃtāti*), 409 428–429, 431–33, 435–37
horse (example) (aśva*), 203, 405 image, its own (svabhāsa*), 421
householder (gṛhapati*), 409 imagination, conceptual
human convention (saṃketa), (parikalpa), 362–63
302 imagined (parikalpita*), 364,
hypocrisy (mrakṣa*), 120, 415 435–36
imagined characteristic
I (parikalpitalakṣaṇa*), 302, 332,
‘I’ (ahaṃ*), 222, (ātmā*), 224 358
idealism, epistemological, 1, 233 imagined nature (parikalpita
ideation (saṃjñā*), 30, 118, 120, svabhāva), 298, 301, 310,
414 362–63, 367, 413, 416, 426, 435
ignorance (aparijñāna*), 224 immeasurable (aprameya*), 170,
ignorance (avidyā*), 17, 20, 25, 361, (asaṃkhyeya*), 337,
31–34, 42–43, 47–49, 55, 58, 80, (apramāṇa*), 166
86–87, 120–25, 136, 177, 224, immediatley preceding cause
249, 269, 278, 303, 331 (samanantarapratyaya*), 50,
definition, 43, 87 189–90, 193
illusion, 58–59, 162, 211–12, 219, impermanence (anityatā*). See
248, 268, 316, 323, 330, 360, 382, also momentariness of entities.
392 27, 51–52, 69–70, 101, 107–10,
magical illusion (example) 122–23, 183, 416, 475
(māyā), 161–62, 170, 212, 268, impermanent (anitya*), 204
309, 316, 323, 328, 330, 360 imprints (anuśaya*), 310
image (ābhāsa*), 331, 398, 406, impure (aśuddha*, 276, 345
(nimitta*), 246, 303–4, 361, and pure (aśuddhaśuddha*),
(pratibhāsa*), 398, 407 276
of doctrinal texts and their impurity (aśuddhi*), 485
content (dharmārthābhāsa*), imputation (samāropa*), 286, 363
365 inclination (chanda*), 415
of multiform object-referents inconceivability (acintya*), 159,
(nānāvidhārthābhāsa*), 366 243, 272, 370, 477, 480
of the object (viṣayābhāsa*), inconceivable to thought
422 (acintya*), 312
 General index of terms 543

incorrect embodiments (apramāṇa-

appearing images (vitatha- prādurbhāva*), 365
pratibhāsa*), 410 forms of appearing
cognition (abhūtacitta*), 177 (aprameyākāra*), 362
thinking (ayoniśomanaskāra*), particular statements (ananta-
272, 275 viniścayaprabheda*), 411
indeterminability, 159–60, 243 inseparable (avinirbhāga*), 277
Indian philosophy, x–xi, xv, xvii, insight (prajñā), 15, 60, 101, 120,
xix, 1–2, 155, 383, 418, 469, 471, 138, 163–68, 173, 217, 222,
473 247–49, 251–54, 264, 290–91,
inexpressible (avaktavya* - 296, 298, 326, 338, 340, 352,
anabhilāpya - nirabhilāpya*), 357, 360, 368–69, 380, 384, 415
21, 90–91, 99–100, 187, 286, eye of (prajñācakṣu), 251
290–91, 293, 296–97, 312, 316, perfection of (prajñāpāramitā),
356, 368–69, 384, 400, 410, 413 161, 163–68, 170, 173, 241,
inference (anumāna*), 92, 110, 248, 261
112, 131, 143, 182–84, 230, instruction (avavāda*), 164,
237–39, 241, 244, 246, 256, 259, (upadiśya*), 164
261, 289, 340, 429, 433–34 instruction, those worthy of
autonomous (svatantra*), 237 (bhavya*), 279
infinite (ananta*), 167 intelligence (buddhi*), 333
perfection (anantapāramitā*), intelligent person (dhīman*),
166 333
infinite regress (anavasthā*), 258 intended with a specific
infinity (ananta*), 167 meaning (abhiprāyikārtha-
influence (adhipati*), 409, nirūpita*), 294
(adhiṣṭhāna*), 409 intention (abhiprāya*), 398–99,
of a specific cognizance of 401
another (paravijñapti- intermediate existence
viśeṣādhipati*), 409 (antarābhava), 83, 85, 384
of living beings on one another, intrinsic characteristic
390 (svalakṣaṇa), 250, 291, 293,
influx, negative (āsrava), 20, 56 301, 306–7, 309, 363, 413
information (vijñapti), 119 intrinsic nature (svabhāva), 131,
inner (adhyātma*), 43, 161, 185, 186, 191–96, 201,
(ādhyātmika*), 52, 93 203–6, 211–15, 246, 250, 253,
calm (adhyātmasaṃprasāda*), 260, 268–69, 291–92, 297, 357,
18 482
sphere (adhyātmikam- conception according to its
āyatana*), 44, 241 intrinsic nature (svabhāva-
innumerable (asaṃkhyeya*), vikalpa), 250, 351
170 definition, 185
innumerable examination of (svabhāva-
bodies (apramāṇakāya*), 371 parīkṣā), 193
544 General index of terms

lamp (dīpa*), 225, (pradyota*),

J 143
jewels, three (ratna*), 202 lamp (example), 328
judicious person (vicakṣaṇa*), 196 language, day to day
(anuvyavahāra*), 302
K languidness (middha*), 17, 121,
knowable (jñeya). See also what is 415–16
to be known (jñeya). 290, 331, law of dependent origination,
336, 357, 368, 381, 411 51, 183, 186–87, 284, 326
basis of the (jñeyāśraya), 357, law of factors (dharmasaṃketa),
371 83
characteristic of the (jñeya- laying down of the burden
lakṣaṇa), 357–58, 364–65 (bhāranikṣepaṇa*), 28, 100
entry into the characteristic of definition, 28
the (jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa), laziness (kausīdya*), 121, 415
364 leather (example) (carman*), 324,
knowers of another mind 331
(paracittavid*), 410 liberated (mukta*), 345
knowledge (buddhi*), 288 insight (suvimuktaprajñā*),
knowledge (jñāna*), 14, 224, 163
277–78, 289, 368, 410–11, 417 mind (suvimuktacitta*), 163
nonconceptual (nirvikalpaka liberating cognition, 13, 17, 31,
jñāna), 240, 245, 250–51, 274, 33, 148–49, 282–83, 323–24,
292, 319, 327, 333, 352–53, 340
355–57, 368–70, 378, 381, 389, liberation (mokṣa* - vimokṣa*),
407, 413, 490 xx–xxi, 12, 15–17, 20, 31–32, 51,
of one’s own mind (svacitta- 66–67, 69, 82, 91, 122, 125,
jñāna*), 410 134–38, 143, 147–49, 153,
of the Buddhas (buddha- 155–56, 160, 162, 170–71,
jñāna*), 336 188–89, 197, 199–200, 207–9,
of the fruit (phalajñāna), 357, 217–18, 220–22, 224, 226, 242,
370 244, 273, 282–83, 294–95, 297,
of the truth (tattvajñāna*), 299, 301, 308, 311, 313, 315,
360 319–20, 324–26, 328, 332, 340,
subsequent (pṛṣṭhalabdha- 343, 347, 353–55, 373, 381, 413,
jñāna), 319, 352 426, 437, 478, 488–89
subsequent to this (tatpṛṣṭha- bondage and, 283, 316, 340,
labdhajñāna*), 371 342
from suffering (duḥkha-
L vimokṣa*), 294
lack of faith (āśraddhya*), 121, life organ (jīvitendriya*), 45, 122,
415 409
lamentation (parideva*), 32, 36, 42 lifespan, lifetime (āyus*), 28, 45,
84
 General index of terms 545

light (ābhāsa, 92, (āloka*), 98, magical being (māyāpuruṣa*),

(dīpa*), 337, (prabhā*), 225, 215
(pradīpa*), 83, (prakāśa*), 210 magical illusion (example)
of knowledge (jñānāloka*), 336 (māyā), 161–62, 170, 212, 268,
limit (anta*), 210, (koṭi*), 210, 309, 316, 323, 328, 330, 360
(paryanta*), 290 magician (māyākāra*), 162, 170,
limitless perfection 181, 215, 323
(aparimāṇapāramitā*), 166 malevolence (vihiṃsā*), 121,
lineage (gotra*), 28, 311 415
little malice (vyāpāda*), 17
ball (peśin*), 84 manners of expression
bubble (arbuda*), 84 (vyavahāra*), 363–64
flake (kalala*), 84 mark (lakṣaṇa*), 367, 369,
lump (ghana*), 84 (nimitta*), 39, 172, 430
living being (sattva*), 276, 398 of an object-referent (artha-
created through a magical lakṣaṇa*), 359
illusion (T. sgyu ma’i sems of the highest truth
can*), 268 (paramārthalakṣaṇa*), 332
multiplicity of living beings, of the self (ātmalakṣaṇa*), 332
380 of a great man (mahāpuruṣa-
logic, ix, xx, 1, 97, 137, 182, 184, lakṣaṇa*), 278
188, 211, 233–34, 237, 240, thirty-two marks, 274
255–56, 284, 289 mastery (vibhutva*), 370
logical innovations, 237, 242 of all factors (sarvadharma-
logical thinking (tarka*), 411 vibhutva*), 491
logico-epistemological school, material cause, 191
127, 418–19 material organs (rūpīndriya*),
longing and delight (chanda- 430
rāga*), 39 matter (rūpa), 116, 118
loss of memory (smṛtilopa*), 408 dependent on the four great
lotus (kamala*), 279, (padma*), elements (upādāyarūpa*),
279 118
love for the ‘I’ (ātmasneha*), 414 means of valid cognition
luminous (prabhāsvara*), (prameya), 429
276–77 medicine (bhaiṣaja*), 179
mind (prabhāsvaraṃ cittam*), meditation (dhyāna), 18, 248
159, 272 stages of, 17–18, 67, 135
luminously pure member (aṅga*), 33
(prabhāsvara*), 164 of enlightenment
luster (prabhāva*), 335 (bodhyaṅga*), 248
of the noble path (mārgāṅga*),
M 248
Madhyamaka doctrine, 233, 244, memory, 3, 71, 266, 408–9
315–16, 321–22, 338 men (puruṣa*), 394
546 General index of terms

mental cognition (manovijñāna), designation (prajñaptimātra*),

56, 97, 124, 263, 266–67, 285, 291, 294
351, 361–64, 380, 388–89, 406, duality (dvayamātra*), 436
416, 426, 429 essencelessness of matter
mental cognizance (rūpaniḥsvabhāvatāmātra*),
(manovijñapti*), 407 309
mental complex groups (skandhamātra*), 83
and seeds of permeation, 378 manner of speaking
and the phenomenal world, (vyavahāramātra*), 235
highest reality, and other means of valid cognition
beings, 379 (pramāṇamātra*), 436
three appearing forms or mind (cittamātra*), 333, 362,
transformations of cognition, 392, 435
376 non-existence (abhāvamātra*),
mental factors (caitasika dharma* - 142
caitta), 116, 122, 318, 344, objects (arthamātra*), 437
377–78, 393, 431, 435, 437, 488 merit (puṇya*), 120, 171, 221–22,
associated with cognition 224, 319, 333, 352, 365, 371
(cittasaṃprayukta dharma), middle (madhya*), 86, 223, 227,
116, 488 279
eleven good (kuśala*), 378, 415 middle doctrine (madhyamaka-
five all-pervasive (sarvatraga*), darśana), 174, 184, 315, 323,
121, 378, 415 325
five bound to specific objects middle way (madhyamā
(pratiniyataviṣaya* - pratipad*), 14, 174, 176–78,
viniyata*), 378, 415 183, 185, 203, 245, 248–49, 283,
four unbound (anyathā*), 378 285, 287, 291, 315, 322, 326,
six defilements (kleśa*), 121, 338–43
378 definition, 249
ten of the extended domain milk (kṣīra*), 93, 95, 98
(mahābhūmika), 121 milk and water (comparison),
twenty secondary defilements 372
(upakleśa*), 121, 378 mind (cetanā*), 177, (cetas*), 143,
mental organ (manas* - buddhi*), 163, (mati*), 334, (saṃtāna*),
92, 104, 318, 475–76 394
mental speech (manojalpa*), 285 mind (citta), 17, 116, 122, 164,
mental organism, 475 252, 274, 316, 318, 329, 344,
mentation as its nature 368, 392, 434, 437, 479, 482
(mananātmaka*), 414 luminous (prabhāsvaraṃ
mere (mātra*), 393 cittam), 159, 272
cognizance (vijñaptimātra*), mind being suspended
359–60, 362, 392–93, 400, 408, (acittaka*), 416
410, 416–17, 437 mind having disappeared
conception, 334, 426 (acitta*), 417
 General index of terms 547

mind stream (cittasaṃtāna*), multiplicity and unity

365, (cittasantati*), 398 (nānātvaikatva*), 370
other (paracitta*), 410 multiplicity of cognizing
stainless (vimala citta), 353, 482 subjects
mind, defiled (kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ), and their relationship to one
124, 355 another, 380
mindfulness (smṛti*), 14–18, 134, multitude (aneka*), 401, 404,
248 (nānātva*), 361–62
mine (ātmīya*), 198, (mama*), 222 mundane (laukika*), 136, 177,
minute sphericity 372
(pārimāṇḍalya*), 231 mundane knowledge that
miraculous powers (ṛddhi*), 409 follows (pṛṣṭhalabdha-
constituents of (ṛddhipāda*), laukikajñāna*)
248 pure (śuddha*), 407
mirage (marīci*), 225, 360 mutual influence
mirror (darśa*), 223 (anyonādhipatitva*), 408,
two-sided, 476 (anyonyavaśa*), 416
miserliness (mātsarya*), 39, 120, mutually causing
415 (anyonyahetuka*), 223
misfortune (vyasana*), 334 mystical, 67, 153, 270, 300
mistake (doṣa*), 402 mystics, 154, 161, 477
modesty (hṛī*), 415
molecule, 95, 103 N
moment (kṣaṇa*), 111, 227 name (nāma*), 28, 302, 304, 307,
momentariness 332, 363, 430
of all entities, 107–8, 110 definition, 43
momentary (kṣaṇika*), 111, 227 name and form (nāmarūpa*). See
momentary ceasing also dependent origination
(kṣaṇabhaṅga*), 115 (pratītyasamutpāda). 32–33,
moon (candra*), 59, 273, 278, 291, 36, 39–44, 56–59, 75, 79–80,
335, 393 86–90, 177–78
in water (ambucandra*), 278 definition, 88
moral conduct (śīla*) names consisting of phonemes
perfection of, 248 (akṣaranāman*), 366
moral precepts (śīla*) nature (prakṛti), 161, 196
group of (śīlaskandha*), 16 apart by nature
mortification, 13 (prakṛtivivikta*), 173, 216
motion (īranā*), 103 non-nature (aprakṛti), 161, 173
mountain (parvata*), 360, 397, profound by nature (prakṛti-
(śaila*), 279 gambhīra*), 173
movement (gati*), 115 pure by nature (prakṛti-
multiformity (nānātva*), 366 viśuddha), 173, 316, 325,
multiplicity (bahutā*), 335 343, 479, 484–85
548 General index of terms

nature (svabhāva), 297, 302, 366, negative influx (āsrava), 20, 56.
368, 431–32, 435, 437 163
dependent (paratantra of becoming (bhavāsrava*), 20
svabhāva), 264, 298, 301, of desire (kāmāsrava*), 20
310–11, 362–64, 367, 369–70, of ignorance (avidyāsrava*), 20
412, 416, 426, 435, 490–91 ninth cognition (vijñāna), 470
imagined (parikalpita negligence (pramāda*), 121, 415
svabhāva), 298, 301, 310, neither-conception-nor-non-
362–63, 367, 416, 426, 435 conception (na kalpa nāpi
intrinsic (svabhāva), 131, 161, cākalpa*), 331
185–86, 191–96, 201, 203–6, neither-pain-nor-pleasure
211–15, 246, 250, 253, 260, (aduḥkhāsukha*), 120
268–69, 291–92, 482 neither-right-nor-false-
of designations [conception] (na bhūta
(prajñaptivādasvabhāva*), nābhuta*), 331
290 nirvāṇa, 14, 21, 73, 125, 127,
of the cause (T. rgyu’i bdag 137–47, 154, 187, 197, 199, 202,
nyid*), 241, 260 206–10, 218, 220, 224, 227, 253,
of the effect (T. ‘bras bu’i bdag 272, 291, 293, 300, 311, 333–34,
nyid*), 241, 260 337, 357, 369, 371, 490
perfect (pariniṣpanna definition, 137, 224
svabhāva), 298, 301, 310, 363, phenomenal world and, 187
367, 412, 416–17 no thought (acitta*), 164
threefold, 297–300, 324, 364, noble Doctrine (saddharma*),
412, 416 201
nature of reality, 283, 285–86, 298 noble eightfold path, 14, 16
nature of the Buddha noble one (ārya), 13, 18–19, 123,
(tathāgatatva), 161, 273, 328, 132, 135–36, 142, 201, 204, 253,
484 272–73, 276
nature of the factors (dharmatā), noble truth (āryasatya), 14–15,
125, 145, 173, 199, 250, 291, 316, 125, 135–36, 138, 142, 200–1,
329, 342, 413, 495 205, 272, 277, 289
relationship to the factors of suffering (P. dukkhaṃ
(dharma), 342 ariyasaccaṃ*), 14
nature of the factors of the cessation of suffering
(dharmadharmatā*), 310 (P. dukkhanirodhaṃ
nature of things (dharmatā), ariyasaccaṃ*), 14, 142
287 of the origin of suffering
nectar of the teaching (P. dukkhasamudayaṃ
(śāsanāmṛta*), 199 ariyasaccaṃ*), 14
negation (apavāda*), 331, of the way leading to the
(pratiṣedha*), 133, 240 cessation of suffering
negation, simple (prasajya- (P. dukkhanirodhagāminī
pratiṣedha), 240, 257 paṭipadā*), 14
 General index of terms 549

nocturnal emission non-meritorious (apuṇya*), 224

(svapnopaghāta*), 382, 395 non-nature (aprakṛti), 161, 173
nominalists, 67, 127 non-perception (anupalambha),
non-abiding nirvāṇa 162, 341, 344, 381, 404–5, 413,
(apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*), 369 417
non-acquisition (aprāpti - non-perception of the subtle
asamanvāgama*), 122, 133, 137 (sūkṣmānīksa*), 404
non-arising (anutpāda*), 140 non-self (nairātmya*), 176
non-Buddhists (tīrthika*), 93 non-violence (ahiṃsā*), 415,
non-conception (akalpa*), 331–32 (avihiṃsa*), 120
nonconceptual distinction non-visible (anidarśana*), 119
(akalpanapravicaya*), 277 not arisen (ajāta*), 206,
nonconceptual knowledge (anutpanna*), 208
(nirvikalpaka jñāna), 240, 245, not different (ananyathā*), 345
250–51, 274, 292, 319, 324, 327, not distinct (abhinna*), 371
333, 352–53, 355–57, 367–70, not eternal (aśāśvata*), 23, 191,
378, 381, 389, 407, 412–13, 490 199, 208, 211
non-difference (aviśeṣa*), 330
non-distinct (abhinna*), 364 O
non-dual (advaya*), 291 object (artha*), 432, 437,
non-duality (advaya*), 247, 249, (nimitta), 332, (viṣaya*), 92,
253, 283–84, 290–291, 370 118, 289, 400, 404–7, 411, 421
non-erroneous (aviparīta*), 142 object and subject, 319, 324–25,
non-existence (abhāva*), 111, 340, 350
141, 143, 195, 224, 330, 407, object of speech (vāgviṣaya*),
(anastitva*), 196, (asattva*), 291
343, (nāsti*), 177, (nāstikatā*), object of the eye (T. mig gi yul*),
291, (nāstitā*), 165, (nāstitva*), 267
330, 405 object of the means of valid
non-existence as object cognition (prameya*), 432–33,
(asadālambana*), 142 429
non-existence of duality object part, 341
(dvayābhāva*), 344 object, errorless (abhrānta-
non-existence of a worldly viṣaya*), 303
personality, 282 object-referent (artha*),
non-existence, total 324–25, 332–33, 343–44, 355,
(ātyantikābhāva*), 363 359–62, 364, 366–68, 380,
non-existent (asat*), 343, 359 388–89, 393–95, 398, 400,
non-formations (asaṃskṛta*), 405–8, 410
178 specific (arthaviśeṣa*), 407–8
non-homogeneous (asabhāga), unreal (abhūtam artham*),
139 407
non-information (avijñapti*), non-existing (asadartha*),
118–19 393
550 General index of terms

object-support (ālambana - omniscient (sarvajña*), 221

ārambaṇa*), 167, 189, 289, 308, one-pointedness of mind (cetasa
331, 363, 368, 417, 427, 430–432 ekotībhāva*), 18
of purification only conceptual imagination
(viśuddhālambana*), 308 (parikalpamātra*), 362
of purity (viśuddhālambana*), only the size of one atom
363 (aṇumātraka*), 402
object-support condition opinion (mata*), 329, (saṃjñā*),
(ālambanapratyaya*), 192 288
obscurity (andhakāra*), 43 opposition (pratipakṣa*), 228.
obstruction (āvaraṇa), 60, 133, (virodha*), 369
246, 273, 278, 282–83, 288–90, optical illusion (timira*), 360
327, 365, 370, 403, 491, 494 ordinary understanding
definition, 290 (vyavahāra*), 202
of defilements (kleśāvaraṇa*), organ of the
273, 282–83, 288–89, 327 body (kāyendriya*), 119
of what is to be known eye (cakṣurindriya*), 118
(jñeyāvaraṇa), 273, 283, 288, (sense of) hearing
290 (śrotendriya*), 118
obstruction (āvṛti*), 277, 403, (sense of) smell
(vṛti*), 334 (ghrāṇendriya*), 118
occasion (nimitta*), 364 tongue (jihvendriya*), 118
for the arising (utpādanimitta*), origin (samudaya*), 37, 43, 204
362 of suffering (duḥkha-
ocean (arṇava* - samudra*), 27, samudaya*), 14
264, 321, 328, 334, 337–38 of this whole mass of suffering
ocean (comparison), 328 (kevalasya mahato
odor (gandha*), 38, 102, 248, 288, duḥkhaskandhasya
290, 348, 360, 367 samudayo bhavati*), 36, 42
old age (jarā*), 14, 275 origination, dependent
definition, 45 (pratītyasamutpāda), 31, 35,
old age and death (jarāmaraṇa*). 41–42, 45, 51–57, 59–60,
See also dependent origination 86–87, 90, 183, 189, 191, 194,
(pratītyasamutpāda). 32–33, 201, 203, 205–6, 212, 214,
35–37, 42, 45, 55, 80, 86–87, 90, 217, 219, 298, 303, 306
177, 207–8, 361 ornament (alaṃkāra*), 288, 314
definition, 90 other shore (pāra*), 334
old masters (pūrvācārya*), 473 other world (lokāntara*), 82,
olfactory cognition (ghrāṇa- (paraloka*), 84
vijñāna*), 124 outburst of the defilements
omnipresence, 327 (kleśaparyavasthāna*), 372
omnipresent (sarvagata*), 272, 274 outer (bahirdhā*), 43, (bāhya*), 52
omniscience (sarvajñatā), 161, outer object (bahirdhā*), 434
248, 320, 327 outflow (niṣyanda*), 372
 General index of terms 551

of vision (darśanamārga), 132,

P 135–36, 352, 365
pain (duḥkha*), 32, 36, 42, 120, of yoga, 16
288, 396 supramundane (lokottara*),
part (bhāga*), 433, (deśa*), 228 412
awareness-awareness part to ruin (praṇāśamārga*), 311
(svasaṃvittisaṃvitti- path of liberation (vimokṣa-
bhāga*), 429, 433–34 mārga*), 3, 11–12, 16, 21, 30,
awareness part (svasaṃvitti- 123, 134–35, 154–55, 186, 200,
bhāga*), 425, 428–29, 208, 244, 314, 320, 352–54, 412,
432–34 442, 490
image part (nimittabhāga), four stages of meditation
350–51, 355, 419, 425–26, (dhyāna*), 17
428–29, 431–33, 435–37 overcoming the five mental
pure (vyavadānabhāga*), 369, hindrances (nivaraṇa*), 17
490–91 preparation
seeing part (darśanabhāga), guarding of the senses
350–51, 355, 419, 425–29, (indriyasaṃvara*),
431–35, 437 16–17
particularities (viśeṣa*), 366 observation of moral
partless (niravayavatva*), 402 precepts (śīlaskandha*),
partlessness (anavayavatva*), 16
402 practice of mindfulness
parts (avayava*), 401 (smṛti*) and awareness
passing away (vyaya*), 291 (saṃprajāna*), 16–17
passion (rāga*), 14, 120, 131, 276, recognizing the four noble
415 truths, 17
for sexual union (maithuna- steps of the Buddhist path of
rāga*), 89 liberation, 16
passionlessness (vairāgya* - path (mārga*), noble eightfold,
virāga*), 14, 21, 24, 131, 141, 14, 16
143, 146 patience (kṣānti*)
past (atīta*), 140, 291 perfection of, 248
path (mārga*) peace (praśama*), 337, (śama*),
of completion (niṣṭhāmārga), 333, (śiva*), 211
352, 365 taking pleasure in
of contemplation (bhāvanā- (śamābhirāma*), 334
mārga), 132, 136, 244, 352, peaceful (śānta*), 143, 187, 199,
365 from the very beginning
of purification (viśuddhi- (adiśānta*), 306
mārga*), 311 people (jana*), 332, 334, 398,
of training (śikṣāmārga*), (janatā*), 337, (loka*), 330, 335,
291 407
552 General index of terms

perception (anubhava*), 406, 422, of cosmic destruction

(pratyakṣa*), 92, 269, 433, (saṃvartakalpa*), 19
(upalabdhi*), 328, 330, 344, 415, of cosmic destruction and
(upalambha*), 211, (vijñapti*), creation (saṃvartavivarta-
343 kalpa*), 19
of an object-referent permanence (nitya*), 272
(arthopalabdhi*), 407, permanent (nitya*), 176
(arthānubhava*), 407 permeated (bhāvanā*), 365
perfect characteristic permeation (vāsanā), 277, 304,
(parniṣpannalakṣaṇa*), 302–5, 348, 353, 355, 358–59, 363–64,
308, 318, 325, 332, 339–40, 342, 367–68, 371–73, 378, 380, 383,
344, 351, 358–59 397, 412, 416, 430, 435, 437
perfect enlightenment moderate (madhya*), 372
(samyaksaṃbodhi*), 169, of speech (abhilāpavāsanā*),
291 355, 358, 363
perfect nature (pariniṣpanna of the deeds (karmavāsanā*),
svabhāva), 298, 301, 310, 363, 379
367, 412, 416–17 of the doctrinal texts that have
perfect saint (arhan*), 200 been heard (śrutadharma-
Perfected One (sugata*), 279, vāsanā*), 367
(tathāgata*), 14, 23–24, 26, of the twofold apprehension
168–69, 172–73, 252, 268, 276, (grāhadvayavāsanā*), 379,
278–79, 302, 305, 307, 334 416
perfected powers (agravaśitā*), strong (adhimātra*), 372
369–70 two groups, 379
perfection (pāramitā*), 357, 370 unreal (abhūtavāsanā*), 435
four, 272 weak (mṛdu*), 372
great (mahāpāramitā*), 166 permeation of the belief in a
immeasurable (apramāṇa- self (ātmadṛṣṭivāsanā), 359
pāramitā*), 166 permeation through extensive
infinite (anantapāramitā*), hearing (bahuśrutabhāvita*),
166 364
limitless (aparimāṇapāramitā*), permeation through hearing
166 (śrutavāsanā*), 365, 372
perfection of insight (prajñā- person (pudgala), 86, 90, 93, 97,
pāramitā), 161, 163–68, 170, 173, 100, 290, 294, 485, (puruṣa*),
241, 261 83, (puruṣapudgala*), 201
instruction (avavāda*) in the, person created through
164 miraculous power
teaching (anuśāsana*) of the, (nirmitaka*), 215
164 personality (pudgala), 27
periods essencelessness of the
of cosmic creation (vivarta- personality (pudgala-
kalpa*), 19 nairātmya), 283, 384, 399
 General index of terms 553

personality-stream, 48, 51, 93, 125, pot (ghaṭa*), xviii, 107–8, 128–29,
130–33, 137–38, 143, 147–49, 412 146–47
phenomenal world, 1, 51–52, 70, power (bala - prabhāva* - śakti -
105, 127, 155, 160–62, 168, vaśitā*), 127, 248, 264, 278, 333,
170–71, 175, 182–83, 185–89, 354, 370
194, 197–98, 207–8, 212, 218–20, of extraneous conditions
233, 243, 245, 261–62, 272–73, (parapratyayabala*), 308
280, 283–84, 297–98, 300, of knowledge (pratisaṃkhyā-
316–17, 323–24, 328, 339–40, bala*), 140
342, 348–49, 355, 376–79, 392, of the Buddha
426, 436, 469–70, 475, 477–78 (buddhānubhāva*), 163
and nirvāṇa, 187 of thought (manovaśa*), 408
as conception, 477 possession of (balatva*), 278
unreality of the, 154–55, 161, ten powers (bala*), 248, 274
185, 220, 285 practice (bhāvanā*), 139, 303
philosophical system, ix, xviii–xx, precepts
1, 5, 66, 70, 180, 182, 313, 315, observation of (śikṣāpada*),
347, 478, 488 295
philosophy precious gem (maṇi* -
Buddhist, x–xi, xviii–xxi, xxiii, comparison), 335
1, 7, 111 precious means (mahānupāya*),
Indian, x–xi, xv, xvii, xix, 1–2, 291
155, 383, 418, 469, 471, 473 present (pratyutpanna*), 140,
phonemes (akṣara*), 366, 368 291, (vartamāna*), 93
physician (vaidya*), 179 pride (māna*), 120, 415, 485
pinnacle of the real (bhūtakoṭi*), in the ‘I’ (ātmamāna*), 414
160, 342, 344 primal matter (prakṛti*), 54
pitiable (anukampanīya*), 306 principle (tattva)
place (deśa*), 393, (sthāna*), 337 twenty-five principles
place and at a specific time, in a (Sāṃkhya), 116
specific (deśakālaniyamena*), proclamation of the doctrine
395 (dharmaparyāya*), 175
pleasure (sukha*), 113, 120, 288, production of an effect
396, 412 (kṛtyakriyā*), 393
point of support (āśraya*), 432 profession (āśrita*), 179
pointless (vaiyarthya*), 139, 235, profound (gambhīra*), 35, 173,
241, 258 202, 222, 227, 294
poison (viṣa*), 333, 394 by nature (prakṛtigambhīra*),
possession (samanvāgama*), 173
133 projecting cause (ākṣepa-
possession by ghosts and kāraṇa*), 84
demons (bhūtagrahāveśa, 409 proof (sādhana*), 289
possibilities (koṭi*) proof of the unreality of the
four, 206, 234–35 external world, 375
554 General index of terms

protector of the world questions that the Buddha did

(lokanātha*), 199 not answer, 21, 66
pure (vaiyavadānika* - viśuddha),
160, 345, 482, 484, 489 R
by nature (prakṛtiviśuddha), raft, 154
173, 316, 325, 343, 484–85 rain (varṣa*), 476
cognition (vijñāna), 470 rational argument (yukti*), 289,
from the beginning 291
(adiśuddhatva*), 168 rays (raśmi*), 279
in its original state (prakṛti- innumerable (ameya*)
viśuddha*), 479 (comparison), 336
mind (viśuddha citta), 316, 480, from the sun (arkaraśmi*), 277
482–84 rays of the doctrine
part (vyavadānabhāga*), 369, (dharmāṃśu*), 337
490–91 rays of the splendid doctrine
suchness (tathatāviśuddhi*), (saddharmakiraṇa*), 279
370 real
three bodies (śuddhatrikāya*), seemingly (saṃvṛtisat), 127–29
369 truly (paramārthasat), 127,
purification (vyavadāna), 169–70, 129, 293, 445
177, 299, 301, 305, 308, 311, 316, real existence, real thing
320, 323, 328–29, 342, 485–86 (dravya*), 93, 142
purification (viśuddha*), 308. real truth (paramārthasatya*),
(viśuddhi*), 328, 485 202
from defilements (kleśa- realism, 67, 71, 122, 127–28, 140
viśuddhi*), 329 reality (tattva), 199, 282, 288,
of one’s own mind (svacitta- 293–94, 329, (bhūtārtha*), 367
śuddha*), 329 accepted based on rational
purified from the beginning arguments (yukti-
(ādipariśuddhatva*), 168 prasiddhaṃ tattvam*), 289
purity (śubha*), 272, (śuddhi*), accepted in the [ordinary]
345, (viśuddhi*), 485 world (lokaprasiddha-
of mind (cittaśuddhi*), 275 tattvam*), 288
that is the sphere of
Q knowledge purified of the
qualities (dharma - guṇa), 106, obstruction of defilements
109, 272, 277, 342 (kleśāvaraṇaviśuddhi-
of the Noble Ones (ārya- jñānagocarastattvam*), 289
dharma*), 345 that is the sphere of
sixty-four, 278 knowledge purified of the
unique to the Buddha (āveṇika- obstruction to what is to be
dharma*): eighteen, 248, 274 known (jñeyāvaraṇa-
question of the bearer of viśuddhijñānagocaras-
cognition, 477–78 tattvam*), 290
 General index of terms 555

reality of the external world, 154 rendering the philosophical

reality, highest (paramārtha), 180, terminology, 4
186–87, 206, 243, 250, 280, 299, reproach (upālambha*), 259
323, 325–26, 328–29, 340, resentment (upanāha*), 120
379–81, 413, 417, 469, 474–75, reserve (hrī*), 120
477 resistance (pratighāta*), 403
realm (dhātu), 359 restricted real (saṃvṛtisat*), 127,
consisting of the three realms 129
(traidhātuka*), 392 restricted truth (saṃvṛtisatya),
of beings (sattvadhātu*), 129, 186, 200, 202, 243, 330
310–11 of ordinary life (lokasaṃvṛti-
three realms (tridhātu), 344 satya*), 202
realm of logical thinking restriction (niyama*), 393
(tārkikagocara*), 370 result (phala*)
reason (hetu*), 238, 294, (nidāna*), of the means of valid
294, (pakṣadharma*), 240 cognition (pramāṇa-
rebirth (pratisaṃdhi), 88–89, phala*), 433
(punarbhava*), 143, of valid cognition (pramāṇa-
(sambhava*), 396 phala*), 429
recollection (smaraṇa*), 406, reward (phala*), 201, 203
(smṛti*), 120, 415, 422, 429 right attention
referring to (ālambya*), 94 (yoniśomanasikāra*), 365, 368
reflecting (cintā*), 333, 372 right
reflection (cittaparikalpa*), 307, concentration (samyak-
(vicāra*), 18, 121, 415, samādhi*), 14
(pratibimba*), 223, (vitarka*), conduct (samyakkarmānta*),
364 14
refuge (śaraṇa*), 334 effort (samyakpradhāna*),
refutation (pratiṣedha*), 215 248
regret (kaukṛtya*), 121 knowledge (samyagājñā*),
rejection (hāni*), 334 163
rejoicing (anumoda*), 172 livelihood (samyagājiva*), 14
remaining (sthita*), 227 mindfulness (samyaksmṛti*),
relativity of opposed concepts, 14
184, 218 speech (samyakvāk*), 14
releasing knowledge striving (samyagvyāyāma*),
two forms of, 274 14
remorse (kaukṛtya*), 18, 415 thought (samyaksaṃkalpa*),
removal 14
of all adventitious stains (niḥ- view (samyakdṛṣṭi*), 14
śeṣāgantukamalāpagama*), right effort toward the doctrine
495 (yoniśadharmaprayoga*),
of the twofold badness (dvidhā 175
dauṣṭhulyahāni*), 417 rigidity (styāna*), 17, 121, 415
556 General index of terms

ripening (pāka*), 337, (prapāka*), 281, 285, 296, 313–15, 319–20,

337, (vipāka*), 43, 83, 278, 376, 346–47, 354, 356, 375, 378, 383,
414 412, 428, 460–61, 465, 477–78,
of their deeds (karmavipaka*), 487–88
396 of liberation, 66, 155, 281, 296,
ripening-cognition (vipāka- 313–15, 319–20, 347, 354,
vijñāna*), 371–72, 431 356, 375, 479, 487
river (augha*), 414, (nadī*), 337 scholastics (ābhidhārmika*), 127,
of pus (pūyanadī*), 394 154
rod (kāṇḍa* - comparison), 331 scope (viṣaya*), 334
bent rod (example), 324 season element (ṛtudhātu*), 53
root (mūla*), 275 secondary defilements
of good (kuśalamūla*), 120, 172 (upakleśa), 121, 378, 415
of the diversity of all sections (kāṇḍa*, vartman*)
conceptions (sarvavikalpa- three, 86, 223
prapañcamūla*), 290 seed (bīja), 48, 52–55, 58–59, 80,
of good (kuśalamūla*), 133, 365 85–86, 92, 130, 132–33, 222,
root cognition (mūlavijñāna*, 239, 264, 317, 334, 358–59,
480 362–65, 371–72, 378, 380, 384,
row [of ants] (paṅkti*), 107 398–99, 414, 416, 430, 484
rule of this doctrine (dharma- definition, 133
vinaya*), 293 of the body of the doctrine
ruler among gods (devānāṃ- (dharmakāya*), 372
indra*), 166 of the permeation (vāsanā-
bīja*), 362, 364
S of the permeation through
sacred scripture (āgama*), 143 hearing (śrutavāsanābīja*),
sacred tradition (āgama*), 398 372
sage (dhīra*), 338, (muni*), 202, of the uncontaminated factors
279, 334, 398 (anāsravadharmabīja*), 494
saint (arhan, arhat*), 163, 200, 246, seeing (darśana*), 361, 365–66,
253, 414 434
salutary (kuśala*), 417 seeing of the truths
sameness (sama* - samatā), 252, (satyābhisamaya*), 289
319, 333, 367 seeing part (darśanabhāga),
sand (rajas*), 277 350–51, 355, 419, 425–29,
Sarvāstivādin, 139, 148 431–35, 437
everything exists (sarvam asti), seeming truth (saṃvṛtisatya*),
69, 174 129
satisfaction (prīti*), 18 seemingly (true/real) body
scholasticism (abhidharma), x, 34, (saṃvṛtikāya*), 273, 278
40–41, 63, 65–67, 70, 81, 104, seemingly real (saṃvṛtisat), 127,
115, 117, 126, 134–35, 137, 142, 129
153, 155–56, 189–90, 250, 273, seen (dṛṣṭa*), 291, 364
 General index of terms 557

seer (ṛṣi*), 409 separation (visaṃyoga*), 125,

self (ātman* - ātmā), 22, 27, 30, 44, 138, 278
46–47, 61, 68, 70, 82–83, 91–92, sermon of Benares, 13, 16, 30,
145, 175–76, 196–98, 217–18, 442
247, 261, 290, 298, 301, 308–10, sesame seed (tilakaṇa*), 303
325, 332, 343, 355, 368, 377, 380, several (aneka*), 228
411, 414, 423, 469, 473, 475, 480, sexual union (dvaya-
486 samāpatti*), 395
permeation of the belief in a shadow (chāyā*), 403
self (ātmadṛṣṭivāsanā), 359 shame (apatrapā*), 415,
self-awareness (svasaṃvitti), 5, (apatrāpya*), 120
420, (svasaṃvedyatā*), 422 shamelessness (atrapā*), 415,
selfishness (mamāyita*), 336 (anapatrāpya*), 121
selflessness (nairātmya). See also shape (ākāra*), 411, (ākṛti*), 330,
essencelessness. 301, 308–10, 396, 397, (saṃniveśa*), 404,
368 (saṃsthāna*), 119
of the factors (dharma- shining of a jewel (example),
nairātmya*), 308 487
self-mortification sickness (vyādhi*), 14, 275
(P. attakilamatha*), 13 sign (lakṣaṇa*), 173, (liṅga*), 39,
sensation (vedanā). See also (nimitta), 246
group (skandha) and signless (animitta*), 160, 178,
dependent origination 225, 342, 344
(pratītyasamutpāda). 24, 26, 28, signlessness (alakṣaṇatva*), 173,
30, 32, 36, 38–39, 42–44, 46–50, (animitta*), 368, (nirmittatā*),
74, 80, 86–90, 117–18, 120, 130, 291
140, 143, 166–67, 171, 176–78, similarity in shape
248, 290, 293, 414–15, 428, 432 (saṃsthānasāmānya*), 107
definition, 44, 89 simple/non-affirming negation
sensation (vit*), 414 (prasajyapratiṣedha*), 257
sense-elements (dhātu*) simultaneous (yugapad*), 404
inner (ādhyātmikadhātu*), 359 simultaneous connection
outer (bāhyadhātu*), 359 (yugapadyoga*), 401
sense faculty (indriya*), 268, 275 simultaneously arising (sahaja*),
sense-organ (indriya*), 88, 92, 106, 131
350, 379, 384, 428, 432 sin (pāpa*), 224
sensible person (T. mkhas pa* - single (eka*), 228
S. paṇḍita*), 311 site (sthāna*), 412, 414, 430
sensory cognition, 380, 429 sixfold object, 415
sensory perception (pratyakṣa*), sixfold sphere (ṣaḍāyatana*). See
259, 289, 405, 429, 434 also dependent origination
sensual enjoyments (bhoga*), 89 (pratītyasamutpāda). 32–33,
sentient beings 36, 42, 44, 80, 86, 88, 177–78
threefold division, 486 definition, 44, 88
558 General index of terms

sleep, 265–67, 269, 389–90, 395, speech, mental (manojalpa*), 285

405, 407–8 spell (vidyā*), 202
dullness of, 390 sphere (āyatana), 44, 116, 241,
of delusion, 269, 389 266, 272, 383
of ignorance, 269 of contact (sparśāyatana*), 43
of the permeations (vāsanā- of the factors
nidrā*), 407 (dharmāyatana*), 263, 267
small vehicle (hīnayāna), 65, 331 sixfold (ṣaḍāyatana*). See also
smell (gandha*) dependent origination
neutral (= indifferent) (pratītyasamutpāda). 32–33,
(tadanya*), 119 36, 42, 44, 80, 86, 88, 177–78
pleasant (sugandha*), 119 twelve, 116–17, 124
unpleasant (durgandha*), 119 sphere (dhātu*)
snake (sarpa*), 202, 366 of desire (kāmadhātu* -
solidity (khara*), 103 kāmāvacara*), 37, 44, 46, 86,
Solitary Buddhas (pratyeka- 135, 279
buddha), 289–90, 373 of living beings (sattva-
sons of the Victorious One dhātu*), 361
(jinaputra*), 392 of the immaterial (ārūpya-
sorrow (śoka*), 32, 36, 42 dhātu* - ārūpyāvacara*), 37,
soul, 477 44, 46, 86
denial of the, 68, 71 of the material (rūpadhātu* -
soul (puruṣa*), 475 rūpāvacara*), 37, 44, 46, 86,
soul as bearer of cognition, 135
474–75 sphere (gocara*), 289
sound (śabda*), 38, 93, 102–3, 108, of cognition (cittagocara*),
112–13, 118–19, 123, 131, 141, 199
168, 248, 265, 267, 288, 290, 335, of knowledge (jñānagocara*),
360, 487 288
sound of celestial instruments of speech (vāggocara*), 291
(example), 487 of the Noble Ones (ārya-
sour milk (example) (dadhi*), 95 gocara*), 345
space (ākāśa* - ambara* - nabha* - real (svabhāvagocara*), 303
vyoman*), 2, 124–25, 159–60, sphere of the limited
176, 230, 274–77, 308–9, 316, defilements (parīttakleśa-
323, 328–29, 334–35, 343, 345, bhūmika*)
417, 476, 482–86 large number/ten, 121
space (example), 323, 128–29, 335 sphericity (T. zlum po*), 232
spatial parts (digbhāga*), 403 spirits of the dead (preta), 382,
special transformation of the 394–97
stream of moments (saṃtati- spitefulness (pradāśa*), 120, 415
pariṇāmaviśeṣa*), 133 spontaneously appearing being
specific state of transformation (upapādukasattva), 383–84,
(pariṇāmaviśeṣa*), 399 398
 General index of terms 559

sprout (aṅkura*), 52–56, 58–59, 80, of the groups (skandha-

85–86, 92 saṃtāna*), 91
squabbling (P. vivāda*), 39 of the intermediate existence
stage (bhūmi*), 261, 371 (antarābhavasaṃtati*), 83
of the engagement of devotion streams of cognition
(adhimukticāryabhūmi*), ability to causally influence
365 one another, 380
stain (mala*), 279 strength (bala*), 396–97
stained (samalā*), 342, 345 striving (ābhoga - yatna*), 247,
stainless (amala), 272, 275 273, 321, 487
cognition (amalavijñāna), subject part, 341
469–70, 472–73, 492 subsequent knowledge
stainless mind (vimala citta), 353, (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), 319, 352
482 subsequently attained
stainlessness (vaimalya*), 274 knowledge (tatpṛṣṭalabdha-
stains along with their jñāna*), 278
permeation (savāsanāmala*), substance (dravya), 106, 427, 432
277 subtle (sūkṣma*), 222, 312, 405
state (avasthā*), 112, 206 appearing form (sūkṣmākāra*),
of the ripening (vipākāvasthā*), 367
395 obstruction (sūksmāvaraṇa*),
state of 371
defilement (saṃkleśa*), 298 subtle matter (rūpaprasāda*),
fearlessness (abhayasthāna*), 118
224, 229 subtlety (saukṣmya*), 274
non-ideation (āsaṃjñika), 122, succession of something
378, 416 homogeneous
purification (vyavadāna*), 299 (tatsadṛśānuprabandha*), 54,
sainthood (arhattva*), 414 60
statement (vacana*), 398 suchness (tathatā), 124–25, 160,
stature (pramāṇa*), 396–97 187, 251, 272, 276, 290, 296,
steadfast (dhīra*), 312, 334 300, 303, 316, 336, 342, 344,
store of merit and knowledge 368, 370–71, 417, 426, 437, 472,
(puṇyajñānasaṃbhāra*), 365 483, 489, 492–93
strands of hair (keśoṇḍuka*), constituted by selflessness
303 (nairātmyadharmatā*),
stream (saṃtāna* - santati*), 393 368
definition, 133 of the bad factors (akuśala-
of cognizance (vijñāna- dharmatathatā*), 126
santāna*), 397 of the good factors (kuśala-
of cognizance, another dharmatathatā*), 126
(saṃtānāntara*), 408 of the indeterminate factors
of moments (santati*), 106, (avyākṛtadharmatathatā*),
110–111, 133, 189 126
560 General index of terms

suffering (duḥkha*), 14, 43, 113, tantric schools, 269

204, 276, 412 taste (rasa*), 38, 99, 102, 118–19,
suffering, whole mass of 130, 248, 288, 291, 360, 367,
(duḥkhaskandha*), 32 406, 418
sun (āditya* - bhānu* - divākara* - teaching (anuśāsana*), 164,
ravi* - saptasapti* - sūrya*) 114, (deśya*), 164, (śāsana*), 195,
272, 274, 277, 279, 291, 336–37, 199
487 of the Buddha (buddha-
sun of the (buddhas’) doctrine śāsana*), 202
(dharmārka*), 337 teaching (dharma*)
sun of the Buddha (jinasūrya*), hearing of good and bad
279 teachings (sadasatdharma-
sunbeams (comparison), 328 śravaṇa*), 407
sunrise (ādityodaya*), 403, tenet of dependent origination
(ātapa*), 403 (pratītyasamutpāda), vii,
sunshine (ātapa*), 476 30–34, 51–52, 61, 75, 82
superhuman beings (amānuṣa*), thesis (pratijñā*), 216, 226, 238,
409 259
suppression (nirodha*), 138, 345 thing (bhāva*), 214, (dharma*),
through knowledge 38, (dravya*), 93, 131, 133,
(pratisamkhyānirodha), (vastu*), 291, 366, 416
124–25, 131, 138–40, 147–49 thing in itself (vastumātra),
without knowledge 284, 286–87, 293–94, 296–97,
(apratisamkhyānirodha), 300
124–25, 131 thinglessness (nirvastukatā*),
supramundane (lokottara*), 136, 291
177, 353, 372 things
knowledge (lokottarajñāna*), nature of (dharmatā), 287
130 threefold characteristic
mind (lokottara citta*), (lakṣaṇa) of, 297
371–72 threefold nature (svabhāva) of,
path (mārge lokottare*), 412, 299–300
414 thinking (manas), 177, 252, 263,
supranatural knowledge 318, 348, 377, 392, 412, 414,
(abhijñā*), 248 426, 488
thinking, erroneous (viparyasta-
T manaskāra*), 485
tactile cognition (kāyavijñāna*), thirst (pipāsā*), 119
98, 124, 361 thirst (tṛṣṇā). See also dependent
taking up of the burden origination (pratītya-
(bhāradāna*), 28, 100 samutpāda). 14, 28–36, 38–39,
tangible (spraṣṭavya*), 38, 95–96, 42, 44, 46–50, 58, 80, 86–87, 89,
98, 103, 107, 118–19, 248, 288, 100, 119, 136, 143, 146, 177–78,
291, 360, 367, 399 382
 General index of terms 561

definition, 44, 89 transformation (parāvṛtti*), 370,

for annihilation (vibhava-tṛṣṇā), 490, (pariṇāma*), 53, 414, 431,
30 490
for becoming (bhavatṛṣṇā*), 14, definition, 133
30, 49 of cognition (vijñāna-
for [objects of] desire (kāma- pariṇāma*), 376, 378, 414,
tṛṣṇā*), 30 416
thirty-seven factors conducive to of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti),
enlightenment (bodhipākṣika*), 320, 323, 327, 330, 334,
253 352–54, 356, 369–71, 377,
thorns (kaṇṭaka*), 397 381, 413, 417, 426, 491, 494
those that are obtained through of their stream of cognizance
exertion (prāyogika*), 133 (svasaṃtānapariṇāma-
those that one possesses from viśeṣa*), 407
birth (upapattiprati- specific state of (pariṇāma-
lambhika*), 133 viśeṣa), 399
those worthy of instruction transition (saṃkrānti*), 54, 59
(vineyajana*), 279 translation and explanation, 4–5
thought (citta*), 226 trapped in error (viparyasta*),
thought of enlightenment 276
(bodhicitta), 164, 172 true
thoughtlessness (asamprajanya*), body (paramārthakāya*), 278
121, 415 element (paramārthadhātu*),
thoughts (cintya*), 411 272
three time periods (traikālya*), existence (bhūtatā*), 282, 288
223 extinction (paramārtha-
threefold nirvṛti*), 277
appearance (trividhābhāsa*), 332 knowledge (parijñā*), 222
characteristic (lakṣaṇa), 297, 323 suchness, 296
essencelessness truly real (paramārthasat), 127,
(niḥsvabhāvatā), 297, 129, 293, 445
299–301, 309–11, 412, 416 truth (satya), 295, 306
existence (T. srid gsum*), 264 four, 129, 135, 200
nature (svabhāva), 297–300, four noble, 13, 15–17, 33, 134,
324, 364, 412 200–1, 203, 282, 289
thunderbolt (vajra*), 278 highest (paramārthasatya),
time (kāla*), 54, 393 129–30, 186, 222, 247, 301,
torments (duḥkha*), 396–97 307–10, 330, 332, 342, 344
totality (sāmagrī - sarvatā*), 213, noble (āryasatya), 125, 135–36,
276, 282, 288, 483 138, 142, 200–1, 205, 289
(of causes and conditions) restricted (saṃvṛtisatya), 129,
(sāmagrī*), 483 186, 200, 202, 243, 330
tradition (āgama*), 288, two, 129, 202
(smṛtigati*), 334 truth (tattva*), 202, 222, 228, 294
562 General index of terms

truth, in accordance with undemonstrable

(yathābhūta*), 43, 305, 365 definition*, 249
twofoldness (dvirūpatā*), 421 undesired consequence
of cognition (dvirūpatā (prasaṅga*), 242, 258, 260
jñānasya*), 422 undetermined (avyākṛta*), 291
undifferentiated (nirviśeṣa*), 312
U unequalled (anupama*), 370
unarisen (anutpāda*), 178 unfathomably profound
unborn (ajāti*), 179, (anutpanna*), (agādhagāmbhīrya*), 411
306 uniform thing (eka dravya*), 404
unbound factors (anyathā/aniyata unimaginable (avikalpa*), 160,
dharma*) 165, (nirvikalpa*), 199
four (PSk)/four although really unison (sahajāta*), 360
eight (AKB), 121 unit (ekatva*), 403–4
unceasing (aniruddha*), 306 united (miśra*), 336
unchangeable (avikāra*), 363 unity (eka*), 344, (ekatā*), 335
unchanging (avikāra), 159, 165 unity of the phenomenal world
unchangingness (avikaritva*), and nirvāṇa, 187
274 universal (sāmānya*), 91, 105,
unclear cognition (apaṭu- (Vaiśeṣika), 123
buddhi*), 113 unlimited (ananta*), 211, 333,
unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), 90, (aparyanta*), 167
93, 116–17, 124, 131, 137–38, unmoved (kūṭastha*), 206
140–43, 145, 177–78, 244, 246, unobstructedness
248, 251, 253, 275, 291, 310, 370, (anāvaraṇatva*), 289
489 unreal (apariniṣpatti*), 277,
unconditioned factor (asaṃskṛta (asadbhūta*), 293
dharma), 125, 138, 144, 147, 244, unreality of conception, 340
246, 480, 489 unreality of the
nine, 480 conditioned factors, 244
unconscious form (asaṃvidita*), designations, 286
414, 430 external world, 51, 180, 182,
uncontaminated (anāsrava), 177, 218, 244, 261–62, 272, 375,
289, 353, 381, 481, 483 381, 385
and indeterminate phenomenal world, 154–55,
(anivṛtāvyākṛta*), 414 161, 185, 220, 285
element (anāsrava dhātu), 335, unconditioned factors, 244
381, 417, 483 unrestrained/unbound mental
formations (anāsrava saṃskāra), (anyathā*/aniyata*) factors,
481 412
realm (anāsravadhātu*), 312 unrestraint (ahrīkya*), 121, (hrī*),
uncreated (akṛta*), 159, 173, 277 415
undefiled (akliṣṭa*), 345 unshowable (nidarśana*), 176
element (anāsravo dhātu*), 381 unstable (adhruva*), 306
 General index of terms 563

unstained (nirmala*), 342, 345 view of annihilation

unstained element (amala- (ucchedadarśana*), 196
dhātu*), 335 view of reality
unstained knowledge false and correct, 287
(anāsravajñāna*), 289 two errors, 287
unsurpassable (niruttara*), 290, vigor (vīrya*)
291 perfection of, 248
unthinkable (acintya*), 417 vinegar (example), 95
unwholesome (kuśala*), 18, 43, virtue (guṇa*), 221, 334
177 visible form (rūpa), 83, 93–94,
use of language (vyavahāra), 304, 97–99, 102–3, 106–7, 118–19,
310 131, 145, 248, 263, 266–67, 288,
290, 293, 295, 330–31, 335,
V 359–61, 393, 398, 400–1, 404–7,
valid cognition (pramāṇa), 421–422
388–89, 405, 429, 432–33 vision (darśana*), 406
means of (prameya), 112, 131, visual cognition
289, 388, 405, 429, 432–34, (cakṣurvijñāna*), 97–98, 124,
436 263, 266–67, 359, 406
result of (pramāṇaphala), 429 voice (vāk*), 408
vanishing (kṣaya*), 143, 343, volitional formations
(vyaya*), 276 (saṃskāra), 32–33, 55, 80,
vanishing every moment 86–88, 177
(kṣaṇika*), 83 definition, 88
variation (prabheda), xxi, 350, 360,
434 W
varieties of the experience waking state (jāgrat* -
(upabhogaviśeṣa*), 361 prabodha*), 262–63, 265–66,
varying (vicitra*), 206 268–69, 360, 389, 407–8
vault of the sky (nabhastala*), 279 walking (gamana*), 404
vehicle; way (yāna*), 288 wantonness (mada*), 120, 415
one vehicle (ekayāna*), 311 water (ambu* - ap* - jala* - toya* -
verse (kārikā), 234, 238 vāri*), 48, 53–54, 56–57, 59,
versed in methodical 92, 102–3, 114, 118, 128–29,
investigation (mīmāṃsaka*), 176, 214, 219, 225–26, 273, 275,
289 278, 288, 290, 316, 323, 329,
Victorious One (jina*), 222, 335 335, 337–38, 343, 345, 357,
view (dṛṣṭi*), 363 372–73, 382, 388, 405, 415, 486
erroneous, 120 water being (audakajantu*), 405
of existence (astitādṛṣṭi*), 224 invisible subtle, 388
of non-existence (nāstitādṛṣti*), water element (abdhātu*), 53,
224 118
view (udgraha), 318, 325 definition, 56
564 General index of terms

waves (example) (taraṅga*), 264, wind element (vāyudhātu*), 53,

415 118
way definition, 56
Great Way (mahāyāna), vii, 1, wine (madhu*), 95
45, 52, 65, 81–82, 117, 126–27, wishing (icchā*), 276
150–51, 153, 155–59, 170, wishless (apraṇihita*), 160, 178
174–75, 181–82, 233, 244, 271, without
280, 285, 294, 319–21, 326, a cause (ahetu*), 54, 113
346, 352–53, 355, 374–75, 383, annihilation (anirodha*),
392, 462–63, 471, 477–79, 487, 191, (aniruddha*), 199,
489 (anuccheda*), 199
of knowledge (jñānamārga*), any effort (vinābhoga*), 335
334 appearing image (anābhāsa*),
small vehicle (hīnayāna), 331 176
Way of Hearers (śrāvakayāna), arising (anutpāda*), 191,
ix, 65, 70, 117, 127–28, 134, (anutpanna*), 199
153–56, 160, 188–89, 197, 282, cessation (anuccheda*), 191
285, 346–48, 351, 354, 374–75, cognition, 249
382, 388, 420, 427–28 coming (anāgama*), 191
way out (niḥsaraṇa*), 179 departing (avicala*), 278
weapons (āyuddha*), 394 diversity (aprapañca*), 329
weariness (nirvid*), 276 duality (advaya*), 312
welfare (hita*), 302 effort (ābhoga), 327, (ayatna*),
well-being (sukha*), 222, 302 337
wetness (sneha*), 103 error (aviparyāsa*), 345
what is to be known (jñeya), 251 essence (niḥsvabhāva*), 304,
obstruction of (jñeyāvaraṇa), 306
273, 277, 283, 288, 290 exerting (vināyatna*), 335
wheel of becoming (bhava- going (anirgama*), 191
cakra*), 85 image, 249
wheel of the cycle of existences intrinsic nature (T. rang bzhin
(saṃsāramaṇḍala*), 223 med pa*), 268
wheel of the doctrine (dharmyaṃ manifoldness (anānārtha*),
cakraṃ*), 336 191, 199
wheel of the teachings multiplicity (anānārtha*), 199
(dharmacakra*), 13, 162 parts (apradeśa*), 228
white factor (śukladharma*), 334, quarrel (araṇā*), 165
337, 370 sign, 249
whole (avayavin*), 105, 230, sign (aniketa*), 176
386–87, 401 striving (ābhoga*), 273
wholesome (kuśala*), 18, 43, 177, support (apratiṣṭha*), 176
222 unity (anekārtha*), 191
will (cetanā*), 120, 414 womb, mother’s (mātuḥ kukṣi*),
wind (vāyu*), 84, 112, 275, 288 84
 General index of terms 565

wombs (yoni*), 359

wood (kāṣṭha*), 97
wool (ūrṇā*), 107
word (nāman*), 162
words (bhāṣya*), (vaca*), 213,
(vacana*), 213
world (jagan*), 334, (jagat*), 206,
329, 336, (loka*), 224, 275, 288,
336
surrounding world (bhājana-
loka*), 361, 376
world as conception, 284, 299
world of suffering
(duḥsaṃsthitatā*), 332
world soul, 272, 469, 473
world, external, 51, 102, 123, 154,
182–83, 217, 234, 242, 244,
261–62, 318, 350, 378, 381,
383–85, 389, 426, 428
world, phenomenal, xviii, 1,
51–52, 70, 105, 127, 155, 160–
62, 168, 170–71, 175, 182–83,
185–89, 194, 197–98, 207–8, 212,
218–20, 233, 243, 245, 261–62,
272–73, 280, 283–84, 291, 297–
98, 300, 316–17, 323–24, 328,
339–40, 342, 348–49, 355, 376–
79, 392, 426, 436, 469–70, 475,
477–78
world, surrounding (bhājanaloka*),
361, 376
worldliness (pṛthagjanatva),
122–23
worldly body (rūpakāya), 273–74
worldly individual (pṛthagjana),
123, 132, 135–36, 162, 276
worldly knowledge
(laukikajñāna*), 130, 289
worldly path (laukikamārga*), 132
worldly truth (sāṃketika*), 278
worlds of the gods (deva-
bhavana*), 278
B. Sanskrit terms1
abhidharma, x, xxii, 63, 65, 134, apavāda, 286
285, 347, 460–61, 465, 477–78, aprakṛti, 161
487 aprāpti, 137
abhilāpavāsanā, 358, 363 apratisamkhyānirodha, 124
abhisamaya, 135, 252, 464 arhan, 163, 200
abhisaṃskāra, 337 ārya, 123, 135, 253
ābhoga, 321, 327, 487 āryasatya, 272
abhūtaparikalpa, 330, 340, 358 āsaṃjñika, 122, 378
acittatā, 165 asaṃjñisamāpatti, 122, 378
adhipatipratyaya, 190, 389 asaṃskṛta, 90, 93, 116, 140, 178,
āgantuka, 272, 316, 479 244, 489
āhāra, 306 asaṃskṛta dharma, 244, 489
ākāra, 427 asaṃskṛtaḥ dharmāḥ, 480
ākāśa, 124, 483 āsrava, 20, 56
ālambaka, 427, 431 āśrayaparāvṛtti, 320, 323, 330,
ālambya, 94, 427, 431 352, 377, 381, 426
alaṃkāra, 314–15 asura, 391
ālaya, 470 asvabhāvatā, 179
ālayavijñāna, 5, 45, 124, 348, ātmā, 22
357, 376, 469–70, 472, 487–89, ātmadṛṣṭivāsanā, 359
492–93 ātmalābha, 111
amala, 470 ātman, 82, 176, 196, 469, 473,
amalavijñāna, 469–70, 472–73, 475, 480, 486
492 aupabhogika, 344
anabhilāpya, 316 āvaraṇa, 246, 491
anabhinirvṛtta, 160 āyatana, 116, 241, 266
anāgāmin, 200
anālaya, 228, 494 bhāva, 290
anāsrava, 289, 381, 481, 483 bhāvanā, 244, 246
anāsrava dhātu, 381, 483 bhāvanāmārga, 136, 352
anāsrava saṃskāra, 481 bhūmi, 261, 371
anavasthā, 258 bhūtacitta, 177
ānimittasamādhi, 145 bhūtatā, 282, 288
antarābhava, 384 bīja, 348, 484
antarābhavasaṃtati, 83 bodhicitta, 164
anubhava, 120 bodhisattva, 6, 65, 157, 159,
anupalambha, 162, 381 162–64, 170–72, 175, 205, 247,
anuśaya, 310 252, 261, 264, 276, 280–81, 285,

1
To ease the search for the general reader, ordered according to the Roman
alphabet.
 Sanskrit terms 567

290–91, 302–3, 305–7, 312–13, dharmatā, 329

319, 326, 333, 353, 357, 365–69, dharmatācitta, 125, 170, 187, 199,
372, 482 316, 342, 413, 495
brahman, 71, 252, 274, 278–79, dharmatākāya, 495
469, 473–74 dharmavijñapti, 351
brahmin, 33, 295, 346 dharmāyatana, 263
buddha, vii, xviii–xxi, 1, 9, 11–13, dharmin, 109
16, 21, 23–24, 27, 30, 32, 34, 41, dhātu, 116
43, 52, 65–71, 75, 87, 100–4, dravya, 93, 131
107–8, 116, 135–37, 143–45, dravyasat, 93
148, 153, 155–57, 159, 162–63, dravyata, 97
172, 174, 183–84, 186, 189–91, dvaya, 290
194–202, 205, 207–9, 211, 221,
227–28, 248–49, 253, 263, gataya, 359
273–74, 277–80, 300–1, 321, gotra, 272, 276, 311, 482
326–28, 334–37, 346, 354, grāhadvayavāsanā, 379
356–57, 365, 369, 381, 383–84, grāhaka, 318
391, 410–11, 413, 460, 482, grāhyagrāhaka, 350, 379
486, 490 guṇa, 272
buddhatva, 272
buddhi, 475–76 hīnayāna, 65, 331

caitta, 116, 488 indriya, 140

citta, 164, 252, 392, 482
cittasamprayukta dharma, 116 jātijāti, 131
cittasya svadhātau sthānam, jinagarbha, 276
319 jīvitendriya, 122
cittaviprayukta dharma, 116 jñeya, 251
jñeyalakṣaṇa, 357–58, 364
daṇḍa, 391 jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa, 357, 364
darśanabhāga, 350 jñeyāśraya, 357, 371
darśanamārga, 135 jñeyāvaraṇa, 283
dauṣṭhulya, 413, 417
dharma, 30, 33, 38, 70, 102, 115, kāmatṛṣṇā, 30
244, 292, 316, 342 kārikā, 234, 238
dharmadharmatā, 310 karma, 119, 134, 148, 348, 389
dharmadhātu, 160, 187, 269, 272, karmakleśa, 272
342, 365, 483, 492 karmavāsanā, 379
dharmakāya, 273, 354, 381, 413, kāya, 43–44, 49, 56, 495
482, 490–91, 494–95 kleśa, 46, 58, 311, 318,
dharmanairātmya, 283, 301, 481–82
308 kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ, 355
dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā, 160 kliṣṭaṃ manas, 124
dharmasaṃketa, 83
568 Sanskrit terms

lakṣaṇa, 161, 220, 297 paramārthadhātu, 272

lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā, 300 paramārthakāya, 273
lakṣya, 161 paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā, 301,
307
madhyamā pratipat, 245 paramārthasat, 127, 129
madhyamakadarśana, 184 paramārthasatya, 129, 186
mahābhūmika, 121 pāramitā, 357, 370
mahāyāna, vii, 1, 45, 52, 65, 81–82, paratantra svabhāva, 298, 426,
117, 126–27, 150–51, 153, 490
155–59, 174–75, 181–82, 233, paratantralakṣaṇa, 243, 302
244, 271, 280, 285, 294, 319–21, parikalpa, 363
326, 346, 352–53, 355, 374–75, parikalpita svabhāva, 298, 426
383, 392, 462–63, 471, 477–79, pariṇāmaviśeṣa, 399
487, 489 pariniṣpanna svabhāva, 298
mala, 272 phalajñāna, 357, 370
manas, 177, 252, 263, 377, 488 piśāca, 390
manomaya, 481 prabhāsvara, 164, 316, 329
manovijñāna, 263, 351, 426 prabhāsvaraṃ cittam, 159, 272
manovijñānavijñapti, 351 prabheda, 350
manovijñapti, 351 prajñā, 138
māyā, 161, 316, 323 prajñācakṣu, 251
prajñāpāramitā, 161
nairātmya, 176, 368, 384 prajñaptisat, 93, 128, 285
nāmadheyamātra, 161 prajñaptita, 97, 124, 127
niḥsvabhāvatā, 307 prajñaptivāda, 286
nikāyasabhāga, 122 prajñaptivādasvabhāva, 290
nimitta, 162 prakṛti, 196
nimittabhāga, 350 prakṛtiviśuddha, 316, 479
nirodhasamāpatti, 122, 378 pramāṇa, 388, 429
nirvāṇa, 14, 21, 73, 125, 127, pramāṇaphala, 429
137–47, 154, 187, 197, 199, 202, prameya, 429
206–10, 218, 220, 224, 227, 253, prapañca, 186, 191, 197, 264
272, 291, 293, 300, 311, 333–34, prāpti, 122, 127, 130–31, 135,
337, 357, 369, 371, 490 137
nirvāṇaparīkṣā, 206 prasajyapratiṣedha, 240, 257
nirvedhabhāgīya, 135 prasaṅga, 234, 242, 258
nirvikalpaka jñāna, 240, 245, 324, pratipakṣa, 125, 139, 143, 491
389, 490 pratisaṃdhi, 88–89
nirvikalpakaṃ jñānam, 319 pratisaṃkhyānirodha, 124, 138
niṣṭhāmārga, 352 pratītya, 94
pratītyasamutpāda, 31, 45, 183,
pākaja, 85, 107, 113 189
parabhāva, 194 pratyayaparīkṣā, 188
paramārtha, 250, 417 pratyayavijñāna, 344
 Sanskrit terms 569

pratyekabuddha, 289 śrāvaka, 289

prayatna, 213 śrāvakayāna, ix, 30, 65, 70, 117,
preraka, 344 127–28, 134, 153–56, 160,
preta, 382 188–89, 197, 282, 285, 346–48,
pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna, 319 351, 354, 374–75, 382, 388, 420,
pṛthagjana, 135 427–28
pṛthagjanatva, 122 srotaāpanna, 200
pudgala, 179 sthavira, 66
pudgalanairātmya, 283, 384 śūnyatā, 160, 185, 300, 316, 322,
338, 341
rūpa, 24, 30, 102, 118, 130, 241, svabhāva, 161, 185, 193, 196, 297,
266, 335 357
rūpakāya, 273 svabhāvaparīkṣā, 193
rūpavijñapti, 351 svabhāvavikalpa, 250, 351
svalakṣaṇa, 250, 291, 301, 306–7
sabhāgahetu, 139 svasaṃvitti, 5
saccidānanda, 474
sakṛdāgāmin, 200 tadgarbha, 336
śakti, 127, 264 taimirika, 247
samādhi, 119, 357 tathāgatagarbha, 336
sāmagrī, 483 tathāgatatva, 161
samatā, 252 tathatā, 124, 160, 187, 251, 272,
saṃjñā, 5, 30, 118 290, 300, 316, 342, 371, 472,
saṃketa, 302 483, 489, 492–93
sāṃketika, 278 tattva, 202, 293
saṃkleśa, 298, 305, 311 tṛṣṇā, 14
saṃsāra, 46, 253, 300, 333–34,
369 ucchedadṛṣṭi, 194
saṃskāra, 30, 32, 42, 74, 118, 177, udgraha, 325
337 upacāra, 380, 411
saṃskṛta, 90, 99, 116, 209, 244 upādānaskandha, 14
saṃvit, 5 upādāya, 94, 203
saṃvṛtisat, 127, 129 upādāya prajñapti, 203
saṃvṛtisatya, 129, 186, 243 upadhi, 143, 146
sarvajñatā, 161 upakleśa, 479
sarvam asti, 148 upapāduka sattva, 383
sarvatraga, 377 upātta, 93
sāsrava, 138, 489 utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā, 307
śāśvatadṛṣṭi, 194
sattva, 167 vajropamasamādhi, 353, 371
skandha, 30, 68–69, 75, 82, vāsanā, 304, 348, 353, 383
116–17 vaśitā, 370
skandhasaṃtāna, 91 vastumātra, 284, 286, 293
smṛtyupasthāna, 135 vedanā, 30, 118
570 Sanskrit terms

vibhavatṛṣṇā, 30
vijñāna, 5, 30, 104, 118, 164, 177,
252, 392, 470
vijñapti, 119, 349, 392, 430
vikalpa, 325, 351
vimala citta, 482
vimokṣamukha, 160
vimuktikāya, 413
vipāka, 376
vipakṣa, 241
viṣayavijñapti, 378
viśuddha, 160, 482, 484
viśuddha citta, 482, 484
vyavadāna, 299, 305
vyavahāra, 202, 310, 349, 363
vyavahāramātra, 235

yonaya, 359
yoniśomanasikāra, 303
C. Names of texts1
Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of Dīghanikāya (Collection of Long
Scholasticism), 81–82, 85, 91, [Discourses]), 34, 442
103, 105–6, 110–11, 117, 121–22, Hien yang cheng kiao louen
127, 129–31, 138, 140, 142, 375, (Proclamation of the Noble
419, 461, 465, 479–80, 489, Doctrine - Āryadeśanā-
Abhidharmasamuccaya vikhyāpana - Vikhyāpana),
(Compendium of 347
Scholasticism), 347, 489 Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa (Treatise
Abhisamayālamkāra (Ornament on the Establishment of
of Clear Comprehension), 314, Karma), 45, 480
464 Kāśyapaparivarta (The Book of
Aggivacchagottasuttanta Kāśyapa), 174
(Discourse of Vatsagotra and Kātyāyanāvavāda (Instruction
the Fire), 22 of Kātyāyana), 174, 194
Anguttaranikāya (Collection [of Laṅkāvatāra (Descent to Laṅkā),
Discourses] by Numerical 434
Progression), 479 Madhyamakakārikā (Mnemonic
Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Verses on the Middle
(Perfection of Insight in Eight Doctrine), 181, 183, 188, 191,
Thousand Lines), 158–59, 163, 234, 237, 255–56, 339, 462
462, 465 Madhyāntavibhāga (Elucidation
Bhārahārasūtra (Discourse of the of the Middle and of the
Bearer of the Burden), 28, 90, 99 Extremes), 314–15, 325, 338,
Bodhikathā (Account of the 343, 435, 465, 484, 486–87, 494
Enlightenment), 32 Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā
Bodhisattvabhūmi (The Stage of (Subcommentary on the
the Bodhisattva), 281, 284–85, Elucidation of the Middle and
288, 297–98, 314, 325, 333, 339, of the Extremes), 494
385, 463 Mahābhārata, viii, 474
Catuḥśataka (Treatise in Four Mahānidānasuttanta (Great
Hundred Stanzas), 230, 232, 259 Discourse of the Foundations
Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra of Origination), 34
(Discourse Setting the Wheel of Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa
the Dharma Rolling), 13 (Instruction on the Great
Dharmadharmatāvibhāga Perfection of Insight), 6
(Elucidation of the Factors and Mahāvagga (The Great Group),
their True Nature), 486 32

1
To ease the search for the general reader, ordered according to the Roman
alphabet.
572 Names of texts

Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra (Treatise of Prajñāpradipa (Shining Light of

the Great Commentary [on the Insight), 237–38, 462
Jñānaprasthānaśāstra]), 480 Pramānasamuccaya
Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Summary of (Compendium of the Means of
the Mahāyāna), 347, 354, Valid Cognition), 419–21, 429,
357–58, 472, 490, 492 433, 465
Mahāyānaśatadharmaśāstra Prasannapadā (The Clearly
(Treatise on the Hundred Worded), 255–57, 463
Factors of the Mahāyāna) 489 Pratītyasamutpādasūtra
Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra (Discourse of Dependent
(Treatise on the Development Origination), 42
of Mahāyāna Faith), 271 Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Commentary to the Discourse
(Ornament of the Discourses of of Dependent Origination),
the Mahāyāna), 314, 322, 325, 45–46
327–28, 343, 484, 486 Pudgalapratiṣedhaprakaraṇa
Majjhima Nikāya (Collection of (Refutation of the Person), 91
Middle Length [Discourses]), Ratnagotravibhāga (Elucidation
17, 505 of the Germ of the Three
Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā (Question of Jewels), 271, 273–74, 452, 463,
Mañjuśrī), 251–52 481
Milindapañhā (Questions of Ratnakūṭa (Jewel Heap), 158,
Menandros), 71–72 174–75, 183, 245, 284, 287
Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti Ratnāvalī (Garland of Jewels),
(Commentary to the Mnemonic 182, 197, 216–17, 221, 339, 449,
Verses of the Middle Doctrine), 462
234–35, 462 Śālistambasūtra (Discourse of
Nyāyavārttika (Commentary on the Young Rice Plant), 52, 460
the Nyāya[sūtra]), 475 Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra
Pañcaskandhaka (Treatise on the (Elucidation of the Secret
Five Aggregates), 117–18, 121, Meaning), 296–98, 302, 318,
138, 378, 489 323, 339, 412
Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Sāṃmatīyanikāyaśāstra
Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of (Treatise of the Sāṃmatīya-
Insight in Twenty-five school), 90
Thousand Lines), 158, 314 Saṃyutta Nikāya (Collection of
Paramārthasaptatikā (Seventy Connected [Discourses]), 21,
[Stanzas] on True Reality) 475 Śatasāhasrikā ([Perfection of
Prajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Insight] in Hundred Thousand
Insight), 158–59, 162, 174–75, Lines), 158
182–83, 185, 187, 190, 245, 261, Sphuṭārthā (The Intelligible), 475
272, 296, 299–301, 325, 343, 419, Suhṛllekhaḥ (Letter to a Friend),
462 216
 Names of texts 573

Tattvasiddhi (Proof of the Truth),

126, 144
Triṃśikā ([Proof that Everything
is Mere Cognizance] in Thirty
Verses), 375, 411, 414, 424–26,
465, 473
Tripiṭaka (The Three Baskets), 479
Tchang tchen (Jewel in the Hand),
244
Upālisūtra (Discourse with
Upāli), 391
Upaniṣad, viii, 11, 21, 31, 159, 174,
473, 480, 486
Uttaratantra (The Ultimate
Doctrine), 271, 463, 480–81
Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Proof that
[Everything] is Mere
Cognizance), 375, 381, 392, 411,
414, 465, 473, 479–80, 489, 493
Vikhyāpana (Hien yang cheng
kiao louen - Proclamation [of
the Noble Doctrine]), 347,
488–89
Viṃśatikā ([Proof that Everything
is Mere Cognizance] in Twenty
Verses), 375, 381, 392, 424, 465
Yogabhāṣya (Commentary on the
Yoga[sūtra]), 476
Yogācārabhūmiśāstra (Treatise of
the Stages of the Application of
Yoga), 281, 347
Yuktidīpikā (Illuminating the
Arguments), 475
D. Index of names
Aiyaswami Sastri, N., 460 Candrakīrti (seventh century
Ānanda, xx, 21–22, 34–41, 47, 87, c.e.), 239, 254–57, 261–63,
163, 223 462–63
Āryadeva (beginning of third Central India, 66, 181, 271
century c.e.), 230–31, 233–34, Ceylon, 66, 230
256, 259, 385 China, 271, 469–71, 492, 494
Asaṅga (ca. 315–390 c.e.), 6, 81–82, Consequentialist (Prāsaṅgika),
117, 126, 280–81, 285, 313, 341, 237
346–57, 374–76, 379, 381, 385, Conze, E., 2, 460, 462, 464
389, 419, 424, 426, 435, 463, 465,
469, 472–73, 478, 487–89, 492, Daṇḍaka forests, 409
494–95 Datar, I., 462
Aśvaghoṣa (first century c.e.), 271 Deleanu, F., 374, 471
Ayodhyā, 81 Demetrios, minister, 72
Āyupāla, 71 Demiéville, P., 6, 470–72
Devamantiya, 72
Bamboo Grove, 21 Dhānyakaṭaka, 156
Bhattacharya, V., 463 Dharmakīrti (seventh century),
Bhāvaviveka (middle of sixth ix, xii, 418, 497–98
century c.e.), 237–39, 242–45, Dharmapāla (middle of sixth
254–58, 261, 269, 462 century c.e.; ca. 530–561), 237,
Bhāviveka (middle of sixth 424–26, 429, 435–36, 472,
century c.e.), 237 492–93
Bodhiruci (arrives 508 c.e. in Dignāga (ca. 480–540 c.e.), ix, xii,
China), 471–72, 492–94 237, 418–20, 425–26, 428–29,
Bronkhorst, J., xvii, 184 465
Buddha Śākyamuni (624–544 Dutt, N., 463
b.c.e. or ca. 560–480 b.c.e. or
between 500 and 350 b.c.e.), vii, Europe, xv, 31, 271
xviii, xix–xx, xxi, 1, 9, 11–13, 16, Exalted One (bhagavat*), 13,
21, 23–24, 27, 30, 32, 34, 41, 43, 15, 21–22, 27–29, 32–34, 42,
52, 65–71, 75, 87, 100–4, 107–8, 45–49, 60, 74, 83, 100, 118, 129,
116, 135–37, 143–45, 148, 153, 141, 144, 163–65, 169–73, 179,
155–57, 159, 162–63, 172, 174, 195, 210, 249, 251–52, 294, 302,
183–84, 186, 189–91, 194–202, 305–7, 311, 398–99, 401, 409
205, 207–9, 211, 221, 227–28,
248–49, 253, 263, 273–74, Franco, E., xi, xv
277–80, 300–1, 321, 326–28, Frauwallner, E., vi–xix, xxi–xxiii,
334–37, 346, 354, 356–57, 365, 1, 6–7, 11, 31, 65, 182, 184, 192,
369, 381, 383–84, 391, 410–11, 243, 280–81, 285, 317, 333, 351,
413, 460, 482, 486, 490, 498–99 353–54, 374, 418–19, 426, 461,
Buddhamitra, 81 481
 Index of names 575

Gardens of Anāthapiṇḍada, 22, Kitayama, J., 455

28, 42 Kṛṣṇā (Kistna), 181
Garfield, J. L., 203 Kumāralāta (second half of the
Gautama, 22–27, 409 third century), 126, 144
Glasenapp, H. v., 460 Kumārila, 91
Gnoli, R., 462 Kunst, A., 462
Gṛdhrakūṭa, 163 Kurus, 34
Greeks, 72, 74
Guṇamati (first half of sixth La Vallée Poussin, L. de, xviii,
century), 424, 473, 492 xxii, 247, 479–80, 489, 493
Gupta rulers, 81 Lamotte, É., 6, 365, 460, 463, 480,
490
Haribhadra (ninth century c.e.), Larson, G. J., 109
462, 464 Lévi, S., 484
Harivarman (fourth century c.e.),
126, 144 Madhyamaka, vii, 6, 52, 159,
Hattori, M., 466 174–75, 181–82, 233–34,
Hīnayāna, 65, 331 237–38, 243–44, 254–55, 257,
Hiuan-tsang (602–664 c.e.), 269, 296, 300–1, 313, 315–16,
424–25, 427–28, 430, 472, 492–93 321, 325, 338, 462, 469, 474,
Horner, I. B., 2 477, 480, 483
Madhyamakadarśana (middle
India, xvii, xviii, 2, 6–7, 66, 71, 74, doctrine), 184
97, 105, 126, 159, 174, 271, Mādhyamika, 51, 158, 181, 242,
424–25, 460–61, 469, 471–73, 256–57, 259, 262, 299–300, 478
493 Magadha, 66
Mahākātyāyana, 390, 409
Jainas (nirgrantha), 226, 391 Mahāyāna, vii, 1, 45, 52, 65,
Jaini, P. S., 461 81–82, 117, 126–27, 150–51,
Janaka, 11 153, 155–59, 174–75, 181–82,
Jayaswal, K. P., 459, 462 233, 244, 271, 280, 285, 294,
Jetavana, 22, 28, 42 319–21, 326, 346, 352–53, 355,
Johnston, E. H., xxiii, 462, 481 374–75, 383, 392, 462–63, 471,
Jong, J. W. de, 463 477–79, 487, 489
Mahīśāsaka, 117, 126, 346–48,
Kajiyama, J., 462 478, 489
Kaliṅga forests, 409 Maitreya, Bodhisattva, 6, 52, 281,
Kalmāṣadamya, 34 313, 346, 480
Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795 c.e.), 269 Maitreyanātha (ca. 300 c.e.), 6,
Kāñcī, 419, 424 271, 280, 313–26, 338–42,
Kashyap, Bhikkhu J., 459 346–47, 349–53, 356, 374–75,
Kaśmīr, 67, 402 381, 412–13, 424–26, 435,
Kāśyapa, 175–79, 249 464–65, 469, 478, 483, 486–88,
Kathiāvār, 424 492, 494–95
576 Index of names.

Mālava, 473 Przyluski, J., 463

Mātaṅga forests, 409 Punjab, 71
Mathurā, 67 Puruṣapura, 346
May, J., xi, 27, 142, 463
Menandros, king, 71–74 Rājagṛha, 21, 163
Mensching, G., 2 Ratnamati (arrives 508 c.e. in
Milinda (Menandros), 71 China), 471–72, 481, 492–94
Mīmāṃsā, x, 91 Robinson, R., 184
Ruegg, D. S., 185, 463
Nagao, G. M., 465, 484
Nāgārjuna (ca. 200 c.e.), 6, 82, Śākala, 71
159, 175, 180–91, 193–94, Śakra, 166–68, 172
196–97, 200, 206–8, 211–12, Samghabhadra, 461
215–21, 230, 233–34, 237–40, Sāṃkhya, viii, xvii, 81, 91, 104,
242–43, 255–57, 260–62, 271–72, 108–9, 116, 191, 238–39, 469,
283–85, 287, 299, 325, 338, 340, 474–75, 477, 496, 498
462 Sāṃmatīya, 90–91, 97, 99, 383,
Nāgasena, 71–75, 77, 79–80 396
Nairañjanā, 32 Saṅghabhadra, 480
Nālandā, 237, 419, 424, 459, 473, Sāṅkṛityāyana, R., 449
492–93 Śāntideva (around 700 c.e.), 269
Nozawa, J., 465 Śāntirakṣita (725–788 c.e.), 269
Sāramati (third century c.e.), vii,
Obermiller, E., 464, 480–81 271–72, 280, 315–16, 463, 469,
Oetke, C., 184 478, 480, 483, 486, 489
Oldenberg, H., xviii, 460 Sāraṇa, 390, 409
Omniscient One, 228 Śāriputra, 60, 165, 171
Sarvāstivāda, vii, 67, 69, 81,
Paramārtha (arrives 546 c.e. in 90–91, 110, 115, 117, 124–27,
China), 472–73, 492–93 137, 140, 142, 469, 477, 487
Paramārthasamudgata, denial of the soul, 68, 71
Bodhisattva, 306–10, 312 fundamental concepts, 68, 115,
Perfected One (tathāgata), 14, 182
23–24, 26, 168–69, 172–73, 252, principal philosophical
268, 278–79, 302, 305, 307, doctrines, vii, 67
334 principal philosophical
Perfectly Enlightened One, thoughts, 67–68, 115
172–73, 252 Sarvāstivādin, 66–71, 81, 83,
Peshāwar, 346 90, 100, 108–9, 116, 119,
Pradhan, P., 461, 465 121–22, 125–27, 130–31,
Pradyota, king, 390 134–35, 139–40, 142,
Prāsaṅgika (Consequentialist), 147–50, 374, 383, 386,
237 396–97, 461
Preisendanz, K., xi, xv Śātavāhana dynasty, 181
 Index of names 577

Sautrāntikas, 67, 69, 82, 108–9, Vaibhāṣikas, 66, 142, 402

124–27, 130, 139–40, 142, 144, Vaidya, P. L., 462, 465
147, 149–50, 285, 376, 382, 388, Vaiśeṣika, viii, 67, 91, 101,
395, 419, 427, 461 103–6, 110, 113, 116, 123,
Schayer, St., 463 128, 191, 226, 230–31, 386–87,
Schmithausen, L., 185, 464–65 401
Scholasticism, 34, 40–41, 63, Valabhī, 424, 473, 492–93
65–67, 70, 81, 104, 115, 117, 126, Vasubandhu
134–35, 137, 142, 153, 155–56, the Elder (Fr.: ca. 320–380 c.e.),
189–90, 250, 273–74, 281, 296, 471
313–15, 319–20, 346–47, 354, the Younger (Fr.: ca. 400–480
356, 375, 378, 383, 412, 428, 460, c.e.), 45, 81, 127, 374–75
477–78, 487–88 Vasubandhu (ca. 350–430 c.e.
Siālkōt, 71 [Deleanu]), ix, 45–46, 81–82,
Skandagupta Vikramāditya 90–91, 97, 100, 105–6, 109–11,
(ca. 455–467 c.e.), 81 117, 121, 124, 126, 130, 138,
South India, 181, 419, 424 140, 144, 346, 351, 355, 374,
Śrāvastī, 22, 28, 42 376, 378–80, 382–92, 397,
Śrī Parvata (mountain), 181 411–13, 417–19, 424–25, 427,
Śrīlāta (fourth century c.e.), 126 461, 465, 471, 473, 475, 489,
Stcherbatsky, Th., 463–64 492, 498–99
Sthavira (Group of the Elders), Vasumitra, 479, 489
66 Vatsa, 23–26
Sthiramati (middle of sixth Vatsagotra, 21–24, 27
century c.e.; ca. 520–570), Vātsīputrīya, 93, 109, 419
424–26, 435–36, 465, 472, Vātsīputrīya-Sāṃmatīya, 66, 90,
492–94 108
Subhūti, 163, 165–73 Vedānta, 1, 272, 474
Śūrasena, 72 Vemacitra, king of giants, 390,
Suzuki, D. T., 459, 484 409
Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, 237 Victorious One, 222, 228, 335,
392
Takakusu, J., 441 Vidarbha, 181
Takasaki, J., 463 Videha, 11
Tāmraparṇīyas, 66 Vindhyavāsin, 81
Tillemans, T. J. F., 185 Vīrasena, 72
Trenckner, V., 444 Vulture Peak, 163
Tucci, G., 464 Vyāsa, 476
Tuṣita, 313, 346
Waley, A., 2
Ujjayinī, 390 Walleser, M., 480
Upāli, 391, 409 Wayman, A., 463
Uruvilvā, 32
578 Index of names.

Yājñavalkya, 12, 474

Yamaguchi, S., 465, 484, 494
Yaśomitra, 475
Yogācāra, vii, xxiii, 5, 117, 124–25,
182, 233, 237, 239, 242–45, 250,
254–55, 261–63, 266–67, 271,
274, 280–81, 296–99, 301, 313,
315, 317, 319, 339, 346–48, 351,
355–56, 374–75, 378, 417–19,
424, 463, 469, 471–72, 477–78,
487–90, 492–93, 495
Yogācāra school, vii, 5, 117, 233,
237, 242–43, 255, 261–62, 271,
274, 280–81, 296–99, 313, 315,
317, 319, 339, 346–48, 374, 417,
419, 424, 463, 471–72, 477–78,
487, 489–90, 492–93, 495
Yuvala, 71

Zeno, 189
 About the Author
P ROF . E RICH F RAUWALLNER , born
December 28, 1898, took part in WWI
from 1916 to 1918, and after the war
studied Classical Philology at Vienna
University for which his doctoral thesis
was approved in 1921. In 1922 he took the
state examination and began teaching
Classical Greek and Latin in Vienna. He
had no academic mentor in Indology and
Indian philosophy; instead he used his
methodological competence as a Classicist to guide himself.
In 1925 he published his first indological paper. In 1928
he received permission to teach Indology at Vienna University.
After Austriaís annexation by Nazi Germany, Frauwallner
was appointed extraordinary professor of Indology and
Iranian Studies in August 1939. Drafted again in April 1943,
he served close to Vienna to the end of the WWII. In
June 1945, he was dismissed from the University for his
party membership, and in 1948 sent into early retirement.
In 1952 Frauwallner received the permission to teach again
and in 1955 was appointed extraordinary professor and
became full member of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.
Appointed full professor in 1960 at the newly opened
Institute of Indology, he retired in 1963.
Frauwallner founded, in 1957, the Wiener Zeitschrift für die
Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens. He was widely acknowledged
throughout the international scholarly community for his
numerous path-breaking studies and the History of Indian
Philosophy (1953, 1956), an exposition of Indian thought that
in its methodology and presentation can be considered as the
basis of all further research. Frauwallner was also a fascinating
and motivating teacher and drew a number of gifted students
to Vienna during his last years at Vienna University. He was
honored in 1972 by the honorary membership of the Deutsche
Morgenländische Gesellschaft and in 1973 became
corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences at
Göttingen. Frauwallner died on July 5, 1974.
 LODRö SANGPO (J
ürgen Balzer) ó the
translator ó is a Gelong in the Karma
Kagyü Order. Born in Stuttgart,
Germany, in 1952, he studied Educati-
onal Science and became an elementary
school teacher. A student of the late
Ven. Trungpa Rinpoche, he received
his first ordination in the Karma Kagyü
Sangha in 1984, in France, and then
moved to Gampo Abbey, Canada. In
1987, he received the Bhikshu ordination in the USA and
afterwards completed the traditional three-year retreat
and a four-year study retreat. He served for a few years as
Acting Director of Gampo Abbey and was one of the co-
founders of the Nitartha Institute for Higher Buddhist
Studies. Now he is a senior teacher at the Vidyadhara
Institute, the monastic college of Gampo Abbey. His focus
of study is on the systematic traditions of Buddhist
Abhidharma. He has prepared a new annotated English
translation of Louis de La Vallée Poussinís French
translation of Vasubandhuís Abhidharmako‹abhµ a ¶ya,
soon to be published.
E RNST S TEINKELLNER óthe supervisor of the translation
ó obtained his Ph.D. in Indology under Erich Frauwallner in
1963. He received permission to teach at Vienna University
in 1967. In 1971 he was appointed guest lecturer and in 1972
associate professor at the University of Pennsylvania (USA).
In 1973 he was called to Vienna University where he founded
the Department for Tibetology and Buddhist Studies, which
he headed until 2000. In 1977 he founded the Wiener Studien
zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde. From 1998 to 2006
he served as director of the Institute for the Cultural and
Intellectual History of Asia of the Austrian Academy of
Sciences. In 2008 he received the Ludwig Wittgenstein Prize
of the Austrian research community.
Thanks to an agreement between the Austrian Academy
of Sciences and the Chinese Tibetology Research Center in
Beijing, Ernst Steinkellner gained access to the treasure of the
Sanskrit manuscripts in Tibet. The study of these manuscripts
ushers in a new era in the research on Indian Buddhism.