Buddhism and the God-

Idea

Selected Texts

Edited and introduced by

Nyanaponika Thera

Buddhist Publication Society

Kandy • Sri Lanka

The Wheel Publication No. 47

First Edition 1962
Second Edition 1970
Third Printing 1981
BPS Online Edition © (2008)
Digital Transcription Source: BPS Transcription Project

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For free distribution. This work may be republished,
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However, any such republication and redistribution is to be
made available to the public on a free and unrestricted
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clearly marked as such.

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 Buddhism and the God-Idea

Quite contradictory views have been expressed in Western

literature on the attitude of Buddhism toward the concept of
God and gods. From a study of the discourses of the
Buddha preserved in the Pali Canon, it will be seen that the
idea of a personal deity, a creator god conceived to be eternal
and omnipotent, is incompatible with the Buddha’s
teachings. On the other hand, conceptions of an impersonal
godhead of any description, such as world-soul, etc., are
excluded by the Buddha’s teaching on anattā, non-self or
unsubstantiality.
In Buddhist literature, the belief in a creator god (issara-
nimmāna-vāda) is frequently mentioned and rejected, along
with other causes wrongly adduced to explain the origin of
the world, as, for instance, world-soul, time, nature, etc.
God-belief, however, is not placed in the same category as
those morally destructive wrong views which deny the
kammic results of action, assume a fortuitous origin of man
and nature, or teach absolute determinism. These views are
said to be altogether pernicious, having definite bad results
due to their effect on ethical conduct.
Theism, however, is regarded as a kind of kamma-teaching
in so far as it upholds the moral efficacy of actions. Hence a

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theist who leads a moral life may, like anyone else doing so,
expect a favourable rebirth. He may possibly even be reborn
in a heavenly world that resembles his own conception of it,
though it will not be of eternal duration as he may have
expected. If, however, fanaticism induces him to persecute
those who do not share his beliefs, this will have grave
consequences for his future destiny. For fanatical attitudes,
intolerance, and violence against others, create
unwholesome kamma leading to moral degeneration and an
unhappy rebirth.
Although belief in God does not exclude a favourable
rebirth, it is a variety of eternalism, a false affirmation of
permanence rooted in the craving for existence, and as such
an obstacle to final deliverance.
Among the fetters (saṃyojana) that bind to existence, theism
is particularly subject to those of personality-belief,
attachment to rites and rituals, and desire for fine-material
existence or for a “heaven of the sense sphere,” as the case
may be.
As an attempt at explaining the universe, its origin, and
man’s situation in his world, the God-idea was found
entirely unconvincing by the Buddhist thinkers of old.
Through the centuries, Buddhist philosophers have
formulated detailed arguments refuting the doctrine of a
creator god. It should be of interest to compare these with
the ways in which Western philosophers have refuted the
theological proofs of the existence of God.

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But for an earnest believer, the God-idea is more than a
mere device for explaining external facts like the origin of
the world. For him it is an object of faith that can bestow a
strong feeling of certainty, not only as to God’s existence
“somewhere out there,” but as to God’s consoling presence
and closeness to himself. This feeling of certainty requires
close scrutiny. Such scrutiny will reveal that in most cases
the God-idea is only the devotee’s projection of his ideal—
generally a noble one—and of his fervent wish and deeply
felt need to believe. These projections are largely
conditioned by external influences, such as childhood
impressions, education, tradition and social environment.
Charged with a strong emotional emphasis, brought to life
by man’s powerful capacity for image-formation,
visualization and the creation of myth, they then come to be
identified with the images and concepts of whatever
religion the devotee follows. In the case of many of the most
sincere believers, a searching analysis would show that their
“God-experience” has no more specific content than this.
Yet the range and significance of God-belief and God-
experience are not fully exhausted by the preceding
remarks. The lives and writings of the mystics of all great
religions bear witness to religious experiences of great
intensity, in which considerable changes are effected in the
quality of consciousness. Profound absorption in prayer or
meditation can bring about a deepening and widening, a
brightening and intensifying, of consciousness,
accompanied by a transporting feeling of rapture and bliss.

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The contrast between these states and normal conscious
awareness is so great that the mystic believes his
experiences to be manifestations of the divine; and given the
contrast, this assumption is quite understandable. Mystical
experiences are also characterized by a marked reduction or
temporary exclusion of the multiplicity of sense-perceptions
and restless thoughts. This relative unification of mind is
then interpreted as a union or communion with the One
God. All these deeply moving impressions, and the first
spontaneous interpretations of them, the mystic
subsequently identifies with his particular theology. It is
interesting to note, however, that the attempts of most great
Western mystics to relate their mystical experiences to the
official dogmas of their respective churches often resulted in
teachings which were looked upon askance by the orthodox,
if not considered downright heretical.
The psychological facts underlying those religious
experiences are accepted by the Buddhist and are well-
known to him; but he carefully distinguishes the
experiences themselves from the theological interpretations
imposed upon them. After rising from deep meditative
absorption (jhāna), the Buddhist meditator is advised to
view the physical and mental factors constituting his
experience in the light of the three characteristics of all
conditioned existence: impermanence, liability to suffering,
and absence of an abiding ego or eternal substance. This is
done primarily in order to utilize the meditative purity and
strength of consciousness for the highest purpose: liberating

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insight. But this procedure also has a very important side
effect which concerns us here: the meditator will not be
overwhelmed by any uncontrolled emotions and thoughts
evoked by his singular experience, and will thus be able to
avoid interpretations of that experience not warranted by
the facts.
Hence a Buddhist meditator, while benefiting from the
refinement of consciousness he has achieved, will be able to
see these meditative experiences for what they are; and he
will further know that they are without any abiding
substance that could be attributed to a deity manifesting
itself to his mind. Therefore, the Buddhist’s conclusion must
be that the highest mystical states do not provide evidence
for the existence of a personal God or an impersonal
godhead.
Buddhism has sometimes been called an atheistic teaching,
either in an approving sense by freethinkers and
rationalists, or in a derogatory sense by people of theistic
persuasion. Only in one way can Buddhism be described as
atheistic, namely, in so far as it denies the existence of an
eternal, omnipotent, God or godhead who is the creator and
ordainer of the world. The word “atheism,” however, like
the word “godless,” frequently carries a number of
disparaging overtones or implications, which in no way
apply to the Buddha’s teaching.
Those who use the word “atheism” often associate it with a
materialistic doctrine that knows nothing higher than this

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world of the senses and the slight happiness it can bestow.
Buddhism is nothing of that sort. In this respect it agrees
with the teachings of other religions: true lasting happiness
cannot be found in this world, nor, the Buddha adds, can it
be found on any higher plane of existence, conceived as a
heavenly or divine world, since all planes of existence are
impermanent and thus incapable of giving lasting bliss. The
spiritual values advocated by Buddhism are directed not
towards a new life in some higher world, but towards a
state utterly transcending the world, namely, Nibbāna. In
making this statement, however, we must point out that
Buddhist spiritual values do not draw an absolute
separation between the beyond and the here-and-now. They
have firm roots in the world itself for they aim at the highest
realization in this present existence. Along with such
spiritual aspirations, Buddhism encourages earnest
endeavour to make this world a better place to live in.
The materialistic philosophy of annihilationism
(ucchedavāda) is emphatically rejected by the Buddha as a
false doctrine. The doctrine of kamma is sufficient to prove
that Buddhism does not teach annihilation after death. It
accepts survival, not of an eternal soul, but of a mental
process subject to renewed becoming; thus it teaches rebirth
without transmigration. Again, the Buddha’s teaching is not
a nihilism that gives suffering humanity no better hope than
a final cold nothingness. On the contrary, it is a teaching of
salvation (niyyānika-dhamma) or deliverance (vimutti) which
attributes to man the faculty to realize by his own efforts the

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highest goal, Nibbāna: the ultimate cessation of suffering
and the final eradication of greed, hate and delusion.
Nibbāna is far from being the blank zero of annihilation; yet
it also cannot be identified with any form of God-idea, as it
is neither the origin nor the immanent ground or essence of
the world.
Buddhism is not an enemy of religion as atheism is believed
to be. Buddhism, indeed, is the enemy of none. A Buddhist
will recognize and appreciate whatever ethical, spiritual
and cultural values have been created by God-belief in its
long and chequered history. We cannot, however, close our
eyes to the fact that the God-concept has served too often as
a cloak for man’s desire for power, and the reckless and
cruel use of that power, thus adding considerably to the
ample measure of misery in this world supposed to be an
all-loving God’s creation. For centuries free thought, free
research and the expression of dissident views were
obstructed and stifled in the name of service to God. And
alas, these and other negative consequences are not yet
entirely things of the past.
The word “atheism” also carries the innuendo of an attitude
countenancing moral laxity, or a belief that man-made
ethics, having no divine sanction, rest on shaky foundations.
For Buddhism, however, the basic moral law is inherent in
life itself. It is a special case of the law of cause and effect,
needing neither a divine law-giver nor depending upon the
fluctuating human conceptions of socially-conditioned
minor moralities and conventions. For an increasing section

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of humanity, the belief in God is breaking down rapidly, as
well as the accustomed motivations for moral conduct. This
shows the risk of basing moral postulates on divine
commandments when their alleged source rapidly loses
credence and authority. There is a need for an autonomous
foundation for ethics, one that has deeper roots than a social
contract and is capable of protecting the security of the
individual and of human institutions. Buddhism offers such
a foundation for ethics.
Buddhism does not deny that there are in the universe
planes of existence and levels of consciousness which in
some ways may be superior to our terrestrial world and to
average human consciousness. To deny this would indeed
be provincial in this age of space travel. Bertrand Russell
rightly says: “It is improbable that the universe contains
nothing better than ourselves.”
Yet, according to Buddhist teachings, such higher planes of
existence, like our familiar world, are subject to the law of
impermanence and change. The inhabitants of such worlds
may well be, in different degrees, more powerful than
human beings, happier and longer-lived. Whether we call
those superior beings gods, deities, devas or angels is of
little importance, since it is improbable that they call
themselves by any of those names. They are inhabitants of
this universe, fellow-wanderers in this round of existence;
and though more powerful, they need not be wiser than
man. Further, it need not be denied that such worlds and
such beings may have their lord and ruler. In all probability

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they do. But like any human ruler, a divine ruler too might
be inclined to misjudge his own status and power, until a
greater one comes along and points out to him his error, as
our texts report of the Buddha.
These, however, are largely matters beyond the range and
concern of average human experience. They have been
mentioned here chiefly for the purpose of defining the
Buddhist position, and not to serve as a topic of speculation
and argument. Such involvements can only divert attention
and effort from what ought to be our principal object: the
overcoming of greed, hatred and delusion where they are
found in the here and now.
An ancient verse ascribed to the Buddha in the Questions of
King Milinda says:
Not far from here do you need to look!
Highest existence—what can it avail?
Here in this present aggregate,
In your own body overcome the world!

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 The Texts

Origin of the Belief in a Creator God

Now, there comes a time, monks, when, sooner or later,
after the lapse of a long period, this world-system passes
away. And when this happens, beings have mostly been
reborn in the World of Radiance, and there they dwell made
of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light from themselves,
traversing the air, continuing in glory; and thus they remain
for a long period of time.
Now, there comes a time, monks, when, sooner or later, this
world-system begins to re-evolve. When this happens the
Palace of Brahmā appears, but it is empty. And some being
or other, either because his span of years has passed or his
merit is exhausted, falls from the World of Radiance, and
comes to life in the Palace of Brahmā. And there also he
lives made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light from
himself, traversing the air, continuing in glory; and thus
does he remain for a long, long period of time.
Now there arises in him, from his dwelling there so long
alone, a dissatisfaction and a longing: ”O! would that other
beings might come to join me in this place!”, And, just then,
either because their span of years had passed or their merit

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was exhausted, other beings fall from the World of
Radiance, and appear in the Palace of Brahmā as
companions to him, and in all respects like him.
On this, monks, the one who was first reborn thinks thus to
himself: “I am Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, the Supreme One,
the Mighty, the All-Seeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the
Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his
place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are
to be. These other beings are of my creation. And why is
that so? A while ago I thought, ’Would that they might
come!’ And on my mental aspiration, behold the beings
came.”
And those beings themselves too think thus: “This must be
Brahmā, the Supreme, the Mighty, the All-Seeing, the Ruler,
the Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all,
appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father
of all that are and are to be. And we must have been created
by him. And why? Because, as we see, it was he who was
here first, and we came after that.”
On this, monks, the one who first came into existence there
is of longer life and more glorious, and more powerful than
those who appeared after him. And it might well be, monks,
that some being on his falling from that state, should come
hither. And having come hither he might go forth from the
household life into the homeless state. And having thus
become a recluse he, by reason of ardour, of exertion, of
application, of earnestness, of careful thought, reaches such

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rapture of heart that, rapt in heart, he calls to mind his last
dwelling-place, but not the previous ones. He says to
himself: “That illustrious Brahmā, the Great Brahmā, the
Supreme One, the Mighty, the All-Seeing, the Ruler, the
Lord of all, the Maker, the Creator, the Chief of all,
appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father
of all that are and are to be, he by whom we were created,
he is steadfast, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows
no change, and he will remain so for ever and ever. But we
who were created by him have come hither as being
impermanent, mutable, limited in duration of life.”
This, monks, is the first state of things on account of which,
starting out from which, some recluses and brahmans, being
eternalists as to some things, and non-eternalists as to
others, maintain that the soul and the world are partly
eternal and partly not.
From Dīgha Nikāya No. 1: Brahmajāla Sutta.
Translated by Prof. Rhys Davids.

The Inexplicable God

“Well then, Udāyi what is your own teacher’s doctrine?”
“Our own teacher’s doctrine, venerable sir, says thus: ’This
is the highest splendour! This is the highest splendour!’” [1]
“But what is that highest splendour, Udāyi, of which your
teacher’s doctrine speaks?”
“It is, venerable sir, a splendour, greater and loftier than

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which there is none. That is the highest splendour.”
“But, Udāyi what is that splendour, greater and loftier than
which there is none?”
“It is, venerable sir, that highest splendour, greater and
loftier than which there is none.”
“For a long time, Udāyi, you can continue in this way,
saying, ’A splendour greater and loftier than which there is
none; that is the highest splendour.’ But still you will not
have explained that splendour.
“Suppose a man were to say: ’I love and desire the most
beautiful woman in this land.’ and then he is asked: ’Good
man, that most beautiful woman whom you love and desire,
do you know whether she is a lady from the nobility or
from a brahman family or from the trader class or sudra?’
and he replies: ’No’—’Then, good man, do you know her
name and that of her clan? Or whether she is tall, short, or
of middle height, whether she is dark, brunette or golden
skinned, or in what village or town or city she dwells?’ and
he replies, ’No’. And then he is asked: ’Hence, good man,
you love and desire what you neither know nor see?’ and he
answers, ’Yes’—What do you think, Udāyi; that being so,
would not that man’s talk amount to nonsense?”
“Certainly, venerable sir, that being so, that man’s talk
would amount to nonsense.”
“But in the same way, you, Udāyi, say, ’A splendour,
greater and loftier than which there is none. That is the

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highest splendour’, and yet you have not explained that
splendour.”
From Majjhima Nikāya No. 79: Cūla-Sakuludāyi
Sutta.

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Blind Faith
“Is there, Vāseṭṭha, a single one of the brahmans versed in
the three Vedas who has ever seen Brahmā face to face?”
“No, indeed, Gotama.”
“Or is there, then, Vāseṭṭha, a single one of the teachers of
the brahmans versed in the three Vedas, who has seen
brahma face to face?”
“No, indeed, Gotama.”
“Or is there, then, Vāseṭṭha, a single one of the pupils of the
teachers of the brahmans versed in the three Vedas who has
seen Brahmā face to face?”
“No, indeed, Gotama.”
“Or is there then, Vāseṭṭha, a single one of the brahmans up
to the seventh generation who has seen Brahmā face to
face?”
“No, indeed, Gotama.”
“Well then, Vāseṭṭha, those ancient rishis of the brahmans
versed in the three Vedas, the authors of the verses, the
utterers of the verses, whose ancient form of words so
chanted, uttered or composed, the brahmans of today chant
over again and repeat, intoning or reciting exactly as has
been intoned or recited—to wit, Aṭṭhaka … and Bhāgu, did
even they speak thus, saying: ’We know it. We have seen it:
where Brahmā is, whence Brahmā is, whither Brahmā is?’”

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“Not so, Gotama.”
“Then you say, Vāseṭṭha, that none of the brahmans, nor of
their teachers, nor of their pupils, even up to the seventh
generation, has ever seen Brahmā face to face. And that
even the rishis of old, the authors and utterers of the verses,
of the ancient form of words which the brahmans of today
so carefully intone and recite precisely as they have been
handed down—even they did not pretend to know or to
have seen where or whence or whither Brahmā is. So the
brahmans versed in the three Vedas have in fact said thus:
’What we know not, what we have not seen, to a state of
union with that we can show the way, and can say: “This is
the straight path, this the direct way that makes for
salvation, and leads him who acts according to it into a state
of union with Brahmā.”’
“Now what think you, Vāseṭṭha? Does it not follow, this
being so, that the talk of the brahmans versed in the three
Vedas, turns out to be foolish talk?”
“Certainly, Gotama, that being so, it follows that the talk of
the brahmans versed in the three Vedas is foolish talk.”
The String of Blind Men
“Verily, Vāseṭṭha, that brahmans versed in the three Vedas
should be able to show the way to a state of union with that
which they do not know, nor have seen—such a condition
of things can in no wise be!
“Just, Vāseṭṭha, as when a string of blind men are clinging

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one to the other, neither can the foremost see, nor can the
middle one see, nor can the hindmost see—even so, I think,
Vāseṭṭha, is the talk of the brahmans versed in the three
Vedas but blind talk: the first sees not, the middle one sees
not, nor can the last see. The talk, then, of these brahmans
versed in the three Vedas turns out to be ridiculous, mere
words, a vain and empty thing!”
The Staircase to Nowhere
“Just, Vāseṭṭha, as if a man should make a staircase in the
place where four roads cross, to mount up into a mansion.
And people should say to him, ’Well, good friend, this
mansion, to mount up into which you are making this
staircase, do you know whether it is in the east, or in the
south, or in the west, or in the north? Whether it is high or
low or of middle size?’
“And when so asked he should answer, ’No’. And people
should say to him, ’But then, good friend, you are making a
staircase to mount up into something—taking it for a
mansion—which, all the while, you knew not, neither have
seen.’”
Praying for the Beyond
“Again, Vāseṭṭha, if this river Aciravatī were full of water
even to the brim, and overflowing. And a man with
business on the other side, bound for the other side, making
for the other side, should come up, and want to cross over.
And he, standing on this bank, should invoke the further

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bank, and say, ’Come hither, further bank! Come over to
this side!’
“Now what think you, Vāseṭṭha? Would the further bank of
the river Aciravatī by reason of the man’s invoking and
praying, and hoping and praising, come over to this side?”
“Certainly not, Gotama.”
“In just the same way, Vāseṭṭha, do the brahmans versed in
the three Vedas—omitting the practice of those qualities
which really make a man a brahman, and adopting the
practice of those qualities which really make men non-
brahmans—say thus: ’Indra we call upon, Soma we call
upon, Varuṇa, Isāna, Pajāpati, Brahmā, Mahiddhi, Yama we
call upon.’
“Verily, Vāseṭṭha, that those brahmans versed in the three
Vedas—omitting the practice of those qualities which really
make man a brahman, adopting the practice of those
qualities which really make men non-brahmans—may, by
reason of their invoking and praying, and hoping and
praising, after the breaking up of the body after death, attain
to union with Brahmā; such a condition of things can in no
wise be.”
From Dīgha Nikāya No. 13: Tevijjā Sutta.
Translated by Prof. Rhys Davids.

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Revealed Religion
“Again, Sandaka, here some teacher depends on hearsay,
takes hearsay for truth, he teaches his doctrine [relying on]
legendary lore and scripture. But when, Sandaka, a teacher
depends on hearsay, takes hearsay for truth, this he will
have heard well and that he will have heard badly, this will
be thus and that will be otherwise.
“Herein a wise man will consider: ’This teacher depends on
hearsay, takes hearsay for truth, he teaches his doctrine
[relying on] legendary lore and scripture. But when a
teacher depends on hearsay, takes hearsay for truth, this he
will have heard well, and that he will have heard badly this,
will be thus, and that will be otherwise.’
“So when he finds that this kind of religious life is
unsatisfactory, he becomes disappointed and leaves it. This,
Sandaka, is the second unsatisfactory religious life declared
by the Blessed One who knows and sees, who is the Arahat,
fully enlightened, wherein a wise man certainly would not
lead the religious life, or, when leading it, would miss the
true path-teaching that is profitable.”
From Majjhima Nikāya No. 76: Sandaka Sutta.

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The Buddhist Saint (Arahat) and the God-
Idea
Also a monk who is a saint [arahat], canker-free, who has
lived the life, accomplished his task, laid down the burden,
reached the true goal, who has destroyed the fetters to
existence, and is liberated through right final knowledge—
he too has full knowledge of the gods as gods; and knowing
them as such, he does not imagine [anything] about the
gods, [2] he does not imagine himself among the gods, [3] he
does not imagine himself as [originating] from a god, [4] he
does not imagine, “Mine are the gods”, [5] and he does not
find delight in the gods. And why not? Because this has
been comprehended by him; and because he is freed from
greed through greed’s extinction, freed from hate through
hate’s extinction, freed from delusion through delusion’s
extinction.
Also a monk who is a saint, canker-free, who has lived the
life, accomplished his task, laid down the burden, reached
the true goal, who has destroyed the fetters to existence, and
is liberated through right final knowledge— he, too, has full
knowledge of the lord of creatures as lord of creatures; and
knowing him as such, he does not imagine [anything] about
the lord of creatures, [6] he does not imagine [the qualities]
in the lord of creatures, [7] he does not imagine himself as
[originated] from the lord of creatures, [8] he does not
imagine, “Mine is the lord of creature,” [9] and he does not

23
find delight in the lord of creatures. And why not? Because
this has been comprehended by him; and because he is
freed from greed through greed’s extinction, freed from hate
through hate’s extinction, freed from delusion through
delusion’s extinction.
Also a monk who is a saint, canker-free, who has lived the
life, accomplished his task, laid down the burden, reached
the true goal, who has destroyed the fetters to existence, and
is liberated through right final knowledge—he, too, has full
knowledge of Brahmā as Brahmā; and knowing him as
such, he does not imagine [anything] about Brahmā, he does
not imagine [the qualities] in Brahmā, [10] he does not
imagine himself as [originated] from Brahmā, [11] he does
not imagine, “Mine is Brahmā,” and he does not find delight
in Brahmā. [12] And why not? Because this has been
comprehended by him; and because he is freed from greed
through greed’s extinction, freed from hate through hate’s
extinction, freed from delusion through delusion’s
extinction.
From Majjhima Nikāya, No. 1: Mūlapariyāya Sutta.

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God Belief and Fatalism
There are ascetics and brahmans who maintain and believe
that whatever a man experiences, be it pleasant, unpleasant
or neutral, all that is caused by God’s act of creation. I went
to them and questioned them [whether they held such a
view], and when they affirmed it, I said:
“If that is so, venerable sirs, then people commit murder
theft and unchaste deeds due to God’s act of creation; they
indulge in lying, slanderous, harsh and idle talk due to
God’s act of creation; they are covetous, full of hate and
hold wrong views due to God’s act of creation.”
Those who fall back on God’s act of creation, as the decisive
factor, will lack the impulse and effort for doing this and not
doing that. Since for them, in truth and fact, [a necessity for]
action or inaction does not obtain the designation “ascetic,”
does not fit them who live without mindfulness and self-
control.
From Aṅguttara Nikāya, Book of the Threes, No. 62.

If God is the cause of all that happens, what is the use of

man’s striving?
From Aśvaghoṣa, Buddhacarita 9.53.

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The Transient Deity
As far as suns and moons revolve and the sky’s directions
brilliantly shine, so far reaches a thousand fold world-
system. In that thousand-fold world-system, there are a
thousand moons, a thousand suns, a thousand Sinerus, a
thousand kings of the mountains, a thousand of the four
continents, a thousand of the four oceans, a thousand of the
heavenly worlds of the sense plane, and a thousand
Brahmā-worlds. As far as this thousand-fold world-system
reaches, so far is the great Brahmā deemed the highest there.
But even in that great Brahmā, monks, there is
transformation, there is change. Seeing this, monks, a well-
instructed disciple feels disgust even with that. Being
disgusted with it, his attachment even to the highest fades
away; how much more to what is low!
From Aṅguttara Nikāya, Book of the Tens, No. 29.

26
The Disillusionment of the Gods
Now there arises in the world the Blessed One, who is holy,
fully enlightened, endowed with knowledge and pure
conduct, sublime, the knower of worlds, the incomparable
leader of men in need of guidance, the teacher of gods and
men, enlightened and blessed.
He thus teaches Dhamma: “This is personality; this the
origination of personality; this the cessation of personality;
this is the way leading to the cessation of personality.”
And those gods who are long-lived, resplendent in beauty,
who dwell full of happiness and for a long time in lofty
heavenly mansions, even they, having heard the Perfect One
teaching Dhamma, are mostly beset by fear, agitation and
trembling:
“Alas, we who, in fact, are impermanent, believed that we
were permanent! We who, in fact, are evanescent, believed
that we were ever lasting! We who, in fact, are non-eternal,
believed that we were eternal! But, truly, we are
impermanent, evanescent, non-eternal, engrossed in
personality!”
From Aṅguttara Nikāya, Book of the Fours, No. 33.

27
Brahmā Admits His Transiency
One there is [13] who thought of posing
The Divinity [14] this question
In Sudhamma Hall in Heaven:
“Is there still in you existing,
Friend, the view that once existed?
Is the radiance of heaven
Clearly seen by you as passing?”
The Divinity gave answer
Truly to my question’s order:
“There exists in me no longer,
Sir, the view that once existed;
All the radiance of heaven
I now clearly see as passing;
I condemn my erstwhile claiming
To be permanent, eternal.”
From Majjhima Nikāya, No. 50

28
God’s Responsibility
If there exists some lord all-powerful to fulfil, in every
creature, bliss or woe, and action good or ill, that lord is
stained with sin. Man does but work his will.
From the Mahābodhi Jātaka, Jātaka No. 528 (J-a V
238).

He who has eyes can see the sickening sight;

Why does not Brahmā set his creatures right?
If his wide power no limit can restrain,
Why is his hand so rarely spread to bless?
Why are his creatures all condemned to pain?
Why does he not to all give happiness?
Why do fraud, lies, and ignorance prevail?
Why triumphs falsehood—truth and justice fail?
I count your Brahmā one th’unjust among
Who made a world in which to shelter wrong. [15]
From the Bhūridatta Jātaka, Jātaka No. 543 (J-a VI
208).

29
Creation and Cause
The assumption that a God [īśvara] is the cause, etc. [of the
world] rests upon the false belief in an eternal self; but that
belief has to be abandoned if one has clearly understood
that everything is [impermanent, and therefore] subject to
suffering.
From Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakoṣa, 5.8 (vol. IV p.
19); Sphuṭārtha p. 445, 26.

30
Refutation of the Absolute Creator
A certain school holds that there is a Maheśvara God who is
absolute, omnipresent, and eternal; and that he is the creator
of all dharmas [i. e. phenomena].
This theory is illogical. And why?
(a) That which creates is not eternally present, is not eternal,
is not omnipresent; that which is not omnipresent is not
absolute.
(b) If he is eternal and omnipresent, and complete with all
kinds of capacities, he should, in all times and at all places,
produce all of a sudden all dharmas [phenomena].
(c) [If they say] that his creation depends upon desire and
conditions, then they contradict their own doctrine of
“unique cause.” Alternatively, we may say that desire and
conditions should also all arise of a sudden, since the cause
[which produces them] is there always.
From Vijñaptimātratā Siddhi Śāstra. [16]

31
Śāntideva
The creative nature of one who is incomprehensible must
likewise be incomprehensible. Why then talk about it?
From Bodhicaryāvatāra 9, 121.

If the cause [God] has no beginning, how can the effect

[God’s creation] have a beginning?
Ibid. 9, 123

Why did [God] not produce always? [17] There is no other

person or thing he need consider. For there is no other
person or thing he has not created. Why then, should he
thus consider?
Ibid. 9, 124.

If he has to consider the completeness of conditions, then

God is not the cause [of the world]. For he is then not
free [18] to refrain from creating when that completeness of
conditions is present; nor is he free to create when it is
absent.
Ibid. 9, 125.

If God acts without wishing it, he creates in dependence

upon something else; but if he has the wish, then he will be
dependent upon that wish. Hence where is the creator’s

32
sovereignty? [19]
Ibid. 9, 126.

33
Śāntarakṣita
Extracts from the Tattvasaṃgraha, The Compendium of Truth,
with the commentary of Kāmalasīla. Translated by
Gaṅganath Jha, Gaekwads Oriental Series, Oriental Institute,
Baroda.
From Chapter II—Doctrine of God
1. The One and the Many (Paley’s “Watchmaker”
Argument)
The existence of a being who is eternal, one, and the
substratum of eternal all-embracing consciousness—can
never be proven …. (Text 72)
… for the simple reason that any corroborative instance that
might be cited in the form of a jar and such things, would be
lacking in the element of similarity that is essential [the
maker of the jar not having all the character that is
predicated of God]. (Commentary to Text 72)
For instance, all such products as houses, steps, gateways,
towers and the like definitely known to have been fashioned
by makers who have been many, and with fleeting ideas.
(Text 73)
2. The Eternal Cannot be Productive
Eternal things cannot produce any effects, because
“consecutive” action and “concurrent” action are mutually
contradictory; and if objects are consecutive, there must be

34
the same consecutiveness in their cognitions also. (Text 76.)
Only non-eternal things can be productive causes, as it is
these alone which go on unceasingly changing their
sequential character—of being present now and past at the
next moment. Thus it is proven that an intelligent maker
must be evanescent and many. (Commentary to Text 76.)
God’s cognitions must be consecutive, because they are
related to consecutive cognizable things …. (Text 77.)
If God’s cognition manifesting itself is produced by objects
which are consecutive, then it becomes proven that it must
be consecutive; if it is not so produced, then, as there would
be no proximate contact [with the object and the cognition],
God could not cognize the object at all …. (Commentary to
Text 77.)
3. An Unobstructed Divine Cause Requires
Simultaneous Creation
God cannot be the cause of born things, because he is
himself devoid of birth, like the sky-lotus. Otherwise all
things would come into existence simultaneously. (Text 81.)
If the cause were one whose efficiency is never obstructed,
then all things would come into existence simultaneously
….
The absurdity [involved in the theist’s position] is to be
shown in this manner: When the cause is present in its
complete form, then the effect must appear as a matter of
course; just as it is found in the case of the sprout which

35
appears as soon as the final stage has been reached by the
causal conditions conducive to it. Now under the doctrine
of the theist, as God, the cause of all things, would always
be there and free from defects, all things, the whole world,
should come into existence at once.
The following argument might be urged: “God is not the
only cause [of all things]; in fact, what he does he does
through the help of such auxiliary causes as merit and the
rest, God himself being only the efficient [controlling] cause.
So that so long as merit and the rest are not there, the cause
of things cannot be said to be present there in its efficient
form.”
This is not valid. If there is help that has got to be rendered
to God by the auxiliary causes, then he must be regarded as
dependent upon their aid. As a matter of fact, however, God
is [said to be] eternal, and as nothing can introduce into him
any efficiency that is not there already, there can be no help
that he should receive from the auxiliary causes. Why then,
should he need such auxiliaries as are of no use to him?
Uddyotakara has argued as follows: “Though the cause of
things, named God, is eternal and perfect and always
present, yet the producing of things is not simultaneous
because God always acts intelligently and purposely. If God
has produced things by his mere presence, without
intelligence [and purpose], then the objection urged would
have applied to our doctrine. As a matter of fact, however,
God acts intelligently; hence the objection is not applicable,

36
as God operates towards products solely by his own wish.
Thus our reason is not ’inconclusive.’”
This is not valid. The activity and inactivity of things are not
dependent upon the wish of the cause; only if it were so, the
appearance of all effects would not be possible, even in the
constant presence of the untrammelled cause in the shape of
God, simply on account of his wish being absent. The fact of
the matter is that the appearance and non-appearance of
things are dependent upon the presence and absence of due
efficiency in the cause. For instance, even though a man may
have the wish, things do not appear if he has not the
efficiency or power to produce them; and when the cause in
the form of seed has the efficiency or faculty to produce the
sprout, the sprout does appear, even though the seed has no
wish at all. If then the cause called God is always there, fully
endowed with the due untrammelled efficiency (as he is at
the time of the producing of a particular thing), then why
should things stand in need of his wish, which can serve no
purpose at all? And the result of this should be that all
things should appear simultaneously, at the same time as
the appearance of any one thing. Thus alone could the
untrammelled causal efficiency of God be shown, if things
were produced simultaneously. Nor can God, who cannot
be helped by other things, stand in need of anything, for
which he would need his wish.
Further, in the absence of intelligence, there can be no desire
for anything else, and the intelligence of God is held to be
eternally uniform; so that, even if God acted intelligently,

37
why should there not be a simultaneous production of
things? Because like God himself, his intelligence is always
there. If then, his intelligence be regarded as evanescent,
even so it must co-exist with God, and its presence must be
as constant as God himself; so that the objection on that
score remains in force.
And yet the production of things is not found to be
simultaneous; hence the conclusion must be contrary to that
desired by the theist.
The argument may be formulated as follows: “When a
certain thing is not found to be produced at a certain time, it
must be taken to be one whose cause at that time is not
untrammelled in its efficiency as it is found in the case of
the sprout not appearing while the seed is still in the
granary; it is found that at the appearance of one thing the
whole world is not produced. Hence what has been stated
[by the opponent] as a universal proposition is not found to
be true. (Commentary to Text 87.)
From Chapter 6
Doctrine of the Puruṣa (Spirit, Personality)
as Cause of the World
Others, however, postulate the puruṣa [spirit], similar in
character to God, as the cause of the world …. The
refutation of this also is to be set forth in the same manner
as that of God: for what purpose does this spirit perform
such an act [as the creating, of the world]? (Text 155.)

38
If he does it because he is prompted by another being, then
he cannot be self-sufficient [independent]. If he does it
through compassion, then he should make the world
absolutely happy. When he is found to have created people
beset with misery, poverty, sorrow and other troubles,
where can his compassion be perceived? (Texts 156–157.)
Further, inasmuch as, prior to creation, the objects of
compassion would not be there, there could not be even that
compassion through the presence of which the ordainer is
assumed. (Text 158)
Nor should he bring about the dissolution of those beings
who would always be prosperous. If in so doing he be
regarded as dependent upon the unseen force [of destiny],
then his self-sufficiency ceases. (Text 159.)
It might be argued that “He makes people happy or
unhappy in accordance with their destiny, in the shape of
merit and demerit.” That cannot be right, as in that case his
self-sufficiency, which has been postulated, would cease.
One who is himself endowed with power does not depend
upon anything else; if he is wanting in power, then the
creation of the world itself might be attributed to that on
which he is dependent; and in that case he would cease to
be the cause. (Commentary to Text 159.)
Then again, why should he make himself dependent upon
that destiny, which is conducive to suffering and pain? In
fact, full of mercy as he is, the right course for him would be
to ignore that destiny. (Text 160)

39
Merciful persons do not seek for such causes as bring about
suffering, because the sole motive behind their actions
consists in the desire to remove the suffering of others.
(Commentary to Text 160.)

40
 Notes

1. Deve devato abhijānāti. In earlier sections of this discourse,

a similar formulation occurs, referring to other terms. In
this context, the commentary to our discourse explains
(and this applies also to our passage): “Without ignoring
[the respective term; here, it is gods, lord of creatures,
etc.], he knows it distinctly [abhijānāti] as impermanent,
liable to suffering, void of self and substance.”
2. deve na maññati. According to the commentary, the
“imagination” (maññanā) which he avoids appears in
three forms, as craving, conceit and wrong views. These
three pertain also to most of the other types of imaginings
in this paragraph and in the following ones, with
exceptions mentioned in the Commentary (where only
one or two apply, which space does not permit us to
specify here).
3. devesu na maññati.
4. devato na maññati.
5. Here we may think, for instance, of tribal deities, of the
possessiveness exhibited by fetish worshippers, but also
by devotees of higher religions.

41
6. In the Commentary, the lord of creatures (pajāpati) is
identified with Māra who, in Buddhist cosmology, is the
ruler over the Paranimmitavasavatti Gods, “those who
wield power over the creations of others.”
7. Namely his permanence, immutability, that in him there
is no evil, etc. (Commentary)
8. By creation or emanation. (Commentary)
9. “Thinking, ‘He is my Lord and Master.’” (Commentary)
The statement of the text may also be applied to the belief
that a God-concept adhered to individually, or by one’s
own religion, can claim exclusive validity or superiority.
10. Brahmasmiṃ maññati. The Commentary restricts its
explanation to imaginings about the qualities or attributes
found in Brahmā (See Note #5). But it appears possible to
render the locative case of the Pali term Brahmasmiṃ as
literally as the commentary does with other terms of the
discourse, and to translate by “he imagines himself in
Brahmā.” This, then, would refer to a mystic union with
the deity.
11. Brahmato maññati. Here, too, the Commentary explains
the ablative case only in the sense of originating from
Brahmā by way of creation or emanation (see Note 6). But
when explaining the parallel phrase applied to other
terms, the Commentary mentions an alternative
interpretation of the ablative case, as signifying “different
from.” The rendering here would then be: “He imagines
himself different from Brahmā.” This would refer to a

42
 strict dualism of God and man. One will also be reminded
here of those Christian theologians who emphasize the
deep gulf between the creator and creature.
12. The Commentary says that he delights (in Brahmā) by
way of craving (taṇhā) and wrong views (diṭṭhi), which
may be exemplified by the “yearnings for the delights of
divine love,” and by indulging in theological
speculations.
13.Mahā-Moggallāna Thera, a chief disciple of the
Buddha.
14. Brahmā.
15. The above is a poetic and rather free rendering. An
alternative, more literal translation is:
If indeed he is the master in the whole world,
Brahmā, the lord of many beings, his offspring,
Then why did he create the world in such a miserable
way,
why didn't he make the world happy?
If indeed he is the master of the whole world,
Brahmā, the lord of many beings, his offspring,
Then why did he make the world with unrighteous
means,
involving deceit, false speech, and madness.
If indeed he is the master of the whole world,
Brahmā, the lord of many beings, his offspring,
An unjust lord of beings he is, who, although justness

43
 exists,
created in an unjust manner.

16. A standard work of the Buddhist idealistic school.

Translated from the Chinese version by Wong Mow Lam,
The Chinese Buddhist, Vol. 11, No. 2. Shanghai, 1932.
17. That is, produce the whole creation all at once.
18. Literally, the master, the Lord (īsā).
19. These arguments and those in the preceding section
from the Viiñapṭimātratā are elaborated in the following
extracts from the Tattvasaṃgraha.

44
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Founded in 1958, the BPS has published a wide variety of
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Its publications include accurate annotated translations of
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46
Table of Contents
Title page 2
Buddhism and the God-Idea 4
The Texts 13
Origin of the Belief in a Creator God 13
The Inexplicable God 15
Blind Faith 18
The String of Blind Men 19
The Staircase to Nowhere 20
Praying for the Beyond 20
Revealed Religion 22
The Buddhist Saint (Arahat) and the God-Idea 23
God Belief and Fatalism 25
The Transient Deity 26
The Disillusionment of the Gods 27
Brahmā Admits His Transiency 28
God’s Responsibility 29
Creation and Cause 30
Refutation of the Absolute Creator 31
Śāntideva 32
Śāntarakṣita 34
From Chapter II—Doctrine of God 34
1. The One and the Many (Paley’s
34
“Watchmaker” Argument)
2. The Eternal Cannot be Productive 34
3. An Unobstructed Divine Cause Requires

47
 Simultaneous Creation
From Chapter 6 Doctrine of the Puruṣa (Spirit,
38
Personality) as Cause of the World
Notes 41

48