“Ethics and Aesthetics Are One”

KHALED FURANI

Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/3/3/464/1542678/464furani.pdf by guest on 28 January 2024

Let us sup­pose that for a long time now, in the mod­ern West, re­li­gion has been
the name of a cer­tain wound. I am spe­cif­i­cally re­fer­ring to Latin Chris­tian­ity as a
wound, due to its his­toric excesses, its ev­er-deep­en­ing ir­rel­e­vance, and our in­vet­
er­ate sense of its ex­ter­nal­i­ty.1 This inherited—per­haps even de­bil­i­tat­ing—wound
has in time be­come uni­ver­sal: Europe’s his­to­r y, and wound, have be­come the rest
of the world’s. Europe’s pains have be­come the pain of oth­ers the world over, as
that con­ti­nent, un­der its ban­ner of mo­der­ni­ty, has be­come a com­pass for orient-
ing “uni­ver­sal” modes of life. If Europe laughs, so does the world, and if Europe
aches, an ob­se­qui­ous world aches as well. Indeed, to the ex­tent that pain en­gen­ders
a Eu­ro­pean con­fu­sion, such a con­fu­sion be­comes the world’s.
Malcolm X summed up the con­di­tion of men­tal slav­ery, whereby the dom­i­
nated as­sim­i­lates the dom­i­nant’s pain, with the ques­tion, “What’s the mat­ter boss,
we sick?”2 Malcolm X’s ques­tion in­vites a re­cov­ery of dis­cern­ment. Most im­me­di­
ate­ly, there is the re­cov­ery from a mas­ter’s inflicted pain. But ul­ti­mate­ly, question-
ing this ques­tion en­tails clar­i­fy­ing at­ten­dant con­fu­sions about a pain’s owner and
by ex­ten­sion its very ex­is­tence. In his es­say, Talal Asad seeks such dis­cern­ment,
such healing from pain and con­fu­sion, as he “thinks” about re­li­gion. He sum­mons
Wittgenstein, who broadly seeks to “heal” from con­fu­sions, in­clud­ing through
ef­forts to step “out­side” think­ing.3
I am here us­ing heal and pain in a very spe­cific sense: to heal through thaw-
ing out our think­ing about re­li­gion and re­cov­er­ing it from the pain­ful deep freeze
to which it has been subjected. Here healing means to let the blood of life run its
course again where a hy­po­ther­mia of con­cep­tual hab­its has blocked its flow; it is a
healing in which the first sen­sa­tion is an­other kind of pain.
The kind of cure which Wittgenstein and Asad en­treat us to em­brace in­volves
avoiding the temp­ta­tion to de­fi­ne.4 Indeed, de­fin­ing can un­der­mine our in­ves­ti­ga­

CRITICAL TIMES | 3:3 | DECEMBER 2020

DOI 10 . 1215/26410478-8662336 | © 2020 Khaled Furani
This is an open ac­cess ar­ti­cle dis­trib­uted un­der the terms of a Creative Commons license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). 464
tive aim, for de­fin­ing can con­fi­ne. Rather, our task is to in­ves­ti­gate re­li­gion’s one­

SPECIAL SECTION
ness with life. Summoning the cour­age to sim­ply em­bark on de­scrib­ing, or dare I
say, “ob­serv­ing,” is what I hear Asad and Wittgenstein im­plor­ing us to do. Let “re­li­
gion” re­main an open ques­tion and an ac­tive quest.5 I even won­der if this re­straint
from de­fin­ing (that is, from os­ten­si­bly de­fin­ing) is what gives Asad’s es­say its shape
and pow­er. Instead of a more stan­dard, lin­ear treat­ment, Asad’s “main ar­gu­ment”

|
takes the form of a two-tiered ro­tun­da.6

Grammars of Religion: Talal Asad on Wittgenstein

The first tier as­sem­bles di­verse “equip­ment” from Wittgenstein, as well as
a se­ries of as­so­ci­ated themes, largely shel­tered un­der the um­brella of “per­sua­
sion.” Asad then moves us to the sec­ond tier where he “applies” Wittgenstein’s

Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/3/3/464/1542678/464furani.pdf by guest on 28 January 2024

“equip­ment” to ex­am­ine ways in which the Mus­lim tra­di­tion has availed var­i­ous
re­sources—“na­tive rem­e­dies”—for re­solv­ing pos­si­bly pain­ful con­tra­dic­tions
ap­par­ent in the re­ve­la­tory lan­guage of the Qurʾan.
I was ­able to count six­teen themes in the ro­tun­da’s first tier un­der the um­brella
theme of per­sua­sion: cri­tique, tra­di­tion, be­lief in di­vine at­tri­butes, con­ver­sion,
Enlightenment, un­cer­tainty and con­trol, sci­ence ideology, rule-fol­low­ing, money
and la­bor ex­change, mo­der­ni­ty, state and cor­po­rate pow­er, the soul, phi­los­o­phy-
sci­ence ten­sion, mod­ern civ­i­li­za­tion, and plan­e­tary fu­ture. Other read­ers may
lo­cate more or few­er, but I sus­pect that this pleth­ora and its in­de­ter­mi­nacy might
be the very ar­gu­ment (dem­on­stra­tion) of this es­say. Its shape embodies (or should
I say, “en­souls”) Wittgenstein’s ex­hor­ta­tions to re­sist the se­duc­tion of con­cep­tu­al­
iz­ing by insisting on the one­ness of in­ves­ti­gat­ing and liv­ing.7
Wittgenstein’s sense of “grave mis­takes” he made in the Tractatus not­with­
stand­ing, he pref­aces it with a state­ment that I be­lieve guides us into his sub­
se­quent rec­ti­fy­ing work, which Asad fol­lows when it comes to “think­ing” about
re­li­gion: “It shows how lit­tle has been done when these prob­lems have been
solved.”8 Solving a prob­lem by for­mu­lat­ing a con­cept, erad­i­cat­ing in­fin­i­ty, or dis-
solving aporias is not an ac­com­plish­ment for Wittgenstein. Keeping prob­lems
alive is.9 And no­ta­ble among them stands the prob­lem of draw­ing lines be­tween
“sense” and “non­sense.” The on­go­ing life of this prob­lem furnishes healing for
“think­ing.”
I sus­pect that Wittgenstein’s foun­da­tional re­fusal to, in a cer­tain sense, “phi­los­
o­phize,” which res­o­nates with a tra­di­tional Mus­lim mis­trust (as in Ibn Taymiyya’s
mis­trust of phi­los­o­phy and the­ol­ogy in­so­far as they are the­o­ret­i­cal dis­courses), is
here ex­tended to Asad’s re­fusal to os­ten­si­bly de­fi­ne, con­cep­tu­al­ize, or the­o­rize re­li­
gion, lead­ing him to broach a strik­ing abun­dance of top­ics in “think­ing” about it.
Wittgenstein’s cu­ra­tive tech­nique in guarding against “be­witch­ment” by phi­los­o­
phy be­comes Asad’s in assigning no uni­ver­sal es­sence to re­li­gion.10 The point is to
rec­og­nize in­fin­i­ty, not sim­ply mul­ti­plic­i­ty, as Asad re­minds us: “Of course words
sig­nify but they do in­fi­nitely more” (406).

FURANI | “ETHICS AND AESTHETICS ARE ONE” | 465

 Recognizing this in­fin­ity stands at the cen­ter of Asad’s dis­cus­sion of the op­po­
si­tional ways in which dif­fer­ent schol­ars went about re­solv­ing ap­par­ent con­tra­
dic­tions within the Mus­lim tra­di­tion. Asad re­fuses a sca­lar read­ing that pos­its
greater ra­tio­nal­ists (“phi­los­o­phers” or “theo­lo­gians”) and lesser ra­tio­nal­ists (“tra­
di­tion­al­ists”) in the de­bate over approaching rather than re­ceiv­ing the words of the
Qurʾan. This is be­cause re­ceiv­ing the Qurʾan is liv­ing it. And liv­ing it faith­fully is
a prac­ti­cal task, not merely a con­cep­tual one, as Asad came to rec­og­nize through
his own moth­er’s mode of re­li­gi­os­i­ty: a prac­ti­cal abil­ity she lived in.11 Living the
Qurʾan makes con­tra­dic­tions ap­par­ent rather than re­al. For ex­am­ple, God’s be­ing
be­yond hu­man grasp and si­mul­ta­neously hav­ing hands are not dis­crep­ant the­o­

Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/3/3/464/1542678/464furani.pdf by guest on 28 January 2024

ret­i­cal state­ments to be her­me­neu­ti­cally re­solved by ex­e­getes, but dif­fer­ent (not
nec­es­sar­ily con­tra­dic­to­r y) in­vi­ta­tions for di­vinely ori­ented forms of life.
Clearly, there is more at stake here than think­ing about Is­lam, or re­li­gion for
that mat­ter. Asad’s “think­ing” is an oc­ca­sion to think about the re­la­tion be­tween
re­li­gion and life, and by ex­ten­sion, about the re­la­tion be­tween “think­ing” and
“liv­ing,” spe­cif­i­cally their one­ness (al­though Asad would likely say they are “inter-
twined”). I take from his “think­ing” about re­li­gion that “dis­solves lan­guage into
ev­ery­day be­hav­ior,” and words into forms of life, that con­cepts are also dissolving
into prac­tice, rules into ap­pli­ca­tions, in­ter­pre­ta­tion into ac­tion, de­scrip­tion into
crit­i­cism, and be­liev­ing into be­ing in the world.
In un­do­ing these dualities, fol­low­ing Goethe if not Plotinus,12 Wittgenstein in
a sense im­plores us to su­ture re­li­gion with life, to su­ture our think­ing with our
liv­ing, and to cease from in­su­lat­ing our think­ing and liv­ing from stand­ing be­fore
and as part of the infinite and its rid­dles.13 And for some­one like Wittgenstein
who wanted to exit the Car­te­sian meth­od, the infinite ex­ceeds our grasp, lead­ing
us to mys­tery, which will in­ev­i­ta­bly de­mand cour­age for reaching un­der­stand­ing
through “si­lence.” Wittgenstein seems to have con­sis­tently lived by the eth­i­cal rule,
“the sim­ple de­mand”: “We should at all­times and in all­places say no more than we
re­ally know.”14
Considering Wittgenstein’s ex­hor­ta­tions for si­lence and dissolving the du­al­
ity of liv­ing and think­ing, I find it ironic that Asad de­scribes what he is do­ing as
“think­ing” about re­li­gion. He does it through a man (Wittgenstein), who long
looked across the riv­ers of “think­ing,” seek­ing to step be­yond “think­ing.” To rec­
og­nize how Wittgenstein lo­cates the pri­mal home of “think­ing” in “do­ing,” re­call
him quot­ing Faust: “In the be­gin­ning was the deed.”15 In what ways there­fore, does
Asad, through Wittgensteinian eyes, not merely “think” but also do: de­scribe, clar­
i­fy, and in­deed at­test to “re­li­gion” as made up of or­di­nary deeds in­ex­haust­ible by
any sin­gle and ter­mi­na­ble “lan­guage-game?”
The in­ex­haust­ibil­ity of “re­li­gion” as a way of life, its ground­less­ness, per­haps
even the mir­a­cle that it ex­ists, and that the world ex­ists in the first place, means

CRITICAL TIMES 3:3 | DECEMBER 2020 | 466

that it takes fall­ing prey to a be­witch­ment to gen­er­ate def­i­ni­tions of it. If we start

SPECIAL SECTION
to de­fine it (or any­thing) in or­der to un­der­stand it, then we might even be right to
sus­pect a cer­tain death has vis­ited it. We could sus­pect this kind of death vis­ited
Pascal, who needed to es­tab­lish the­o­ret­i­cal ar­gu­ments for God’s ex­is­tence. Perhaps
Pascal’s very ef­fort was in a way in­dic­a­tive of God’s “ex­it” from the fab­ric of prac­ti­cal
life, an exit cul­mi­nat­ing in Nietzsche’s an­nounce­ment of God’s de­mise in mod­ern

|
Western forms of life. Perhaps this kind of death has left us with the “pro­found

Grammars of Religion: Talal Asad on Wittgenstein

con­se­quences” to which Asad re­fers. In agree­ment with Asad, I take the way we
have come to live (and not live) re­li­gion as one such con­se­quence.
The intertwining of life and lan­guage are such that a vi­brant tra­di­tion’s ends

Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/3/3/464/1542678/464furani.pdf by guest on 28 January 2024

and be­gin­nings can­not be per­ma­nently fixed; rather the distinction between its
“inside” and “outside” “has to do with what is taken for granted only in and for
a particular time” (415). If—and to the ex­tent that—this claim holds true, we are
poised to for­mu­late the fol­low­ing ques­tion: What con­di­tions have been en­abling us
to take for granted the no­tions that faith starts where rea­son and doubt end, that
aes­thet­ics is one thing and the re­li­gious an­oth­er, that wor­ship be­longs to one world
and schol­ar­ship to an­oth­er, and that pol­i­tics is not a way to found a pi­ous life?
Inquiring into the re­la­tion of each thing to ev­ery­thing else and re­fus­ing to set­tle
for il­lu­sory se­cu­ri­ties of ground­ing—fab­ri­cated by the quick­sand of meta­phys­ics16
that Wittgenstein sought to leave be­hind—takes cour­age. Instead of succumbing to
the mod­ern crav­ing for gen­er­al­ity and gen­er­al­iz­ing about “re­li­gion,” let us as­sume
that we can­not know the es­sence of re­li­gion, as Asad has been exhorting an­thro­pol­
o­gists to rec­og­nize since his Genealogies of Religion (1993). Asad and Wittgenstein’s
ap­pre­hen­sion about a world mov­ing to­ward an “in­creas­ingly con­trolled fu­ture”
ought to be a warn­ing that seek­ing to con­trol (de­fi­ne, the­o­rize, con­cep­tu­al­ize) what
re­li­gion or in­deed any­thing is—rather than keep­ing our­selves open to the “mir­a­cle
that it ex­ists,” that is, nur­tur­ing a cu­ri­os­ity about infinite and per­haps in­ex­press­ible
life forms—rel­e­gates us to remaining, af­ter cen­tu­ries of re­ly­ing on the Car­te­sian
meth­od, barely ­able to con­ceive of a way of know­ing that is not about con­trol­ling.
A ver­i­ta­ble ca­coph­ony of ac­a­demic and non-ac­a­demic the­o­riz­ing of “re­li­gion”
in our con­tem­po­rary world be­speaks this crav­ing for con­trol. For any sal­u­tary hush
that Asad’s think­ing may bring to this din, beck­on­ing us to “si­lence”—so dear to
Wittgenstein in fac­ing mys­tery and in­fin­ity in the quick of the or­di­nary (not be­yond
it)—we can be par­tic­u­larly grate­ful, and would do well to re­call be­fore open­ing our
mouths about “re­li­gion” next time.
I want to con­clude with a pro­voc­a­tive sug­ges­tion with the aim of disabus-
ing Is­lam from “re­li­gion” as caged by post-Reformation def­i­ni­tions: In what ways
might it be sen­si­ble to sug­gest that Wittgenstein was Mus­lim? With this ques­tion,
I wish to en­ter the “healing” that Wittgenstein’s phi­los­o­phy sought, when he in­ves­
ti­gated the line be­tween “sense” and “non­sense” in ef­forts to seek knowl­edge with­

FURANI | “ETHICS AND AESTHETICS ARE ONE” | 467

out con­trol, and to live out­side of fears that force us to pain­ful­ly, even fa­tal­ly, de­fine
and do­mes­ti­cate in­fin­ity and its puz­zles. That Wittgenstein could not help but see
“ev­ery prob­lem from a re­li­gious point of view” is what leads me to make this sug­
ges­tion, as does his fo­cus on prac­tice and rejecting idols, his em­brace of He­braic
thought,17 and, crucially, his vi­sion of a fu­ture “re­li­gion” with­out a priest­hood.18
Two places in Asad’s es­say es­pe­cially lead me to en­ter­tain the no­tion that Witt-
genstein was Mus­lim by dis­po­si­tion or aes­thet­i­cal­ly, or “gram­mat­i­cal­ly,” as Wittgen-
stein him­self might say. First, Asad aligns Wittgenstein and Ibn Taymiyya for their
com­mon view about the one­ness of mind and be­hav­ior and re­fusal to ac­cord “be­lief ”
the sta­tus of an “in­ner state” that sub­se­quently in­duces prac­tice. Second, he con­

Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/3/3/464/1542678/464furani.pdf by guest on 28 January 2024

cludes that Wittgenstein senses mo­der­ni­ty ’s greatest fail­ure as “the con­tin­u­ous de­sire
to move the world to­ward an in­creas­ingly con­trolled fu­ture” (430). Wittgenstein’s life-
long quest to re­frain from con­trol­ling feels to me rhyth­mi­cally close to “let­ting go,” to
adopting “sur­ren­der­ing” (islam), as a dis­po­si­tion for know­ing and liv­ing.
Recognizing Wittgenstein as rhyth­mi­cally Mus­lim does not mark a so­lu­tion to
a prob­lem; it opens an in­vi­ta­tion to one. It in­vites a ques­tion: How might we rec­og­
nize Is­lam, or any re­li­gious tra­di­tion for that mat­ter, as es­sen­tially un­de­fin­able by
“the re­li­gious”? To keep this ques­tion alive is one way to keep the clar­ity to which
Asad as­pires in “healing” from our mod­ern con­fu­sions about re­li­gion and in “heal-
ing,” as Wittgenstein had wanted, from our con­fused draw­ing of lines be­tween
life’s “sense” and “non­sense.”

KHALED FURANI is as­so­ci­ate pro­fes­sor of an­thro­pol­ogy at Tel Aviv University. His

re­cent book is Redeeming Anthropology: A Theological Critique of a Modern Science (2019).

Notes
The title is drawn from Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §6.421.
1. This sense of Christianity as an “externality” to Europe, as a colonizing power arriving from
elsewhere, I find manifest in Nietzsche’s writings, especially in “Anti-Christ” and “Human
all too Human” (Portable Nietzche), where he refuses to acknowledge “the Galilean religion”
as having its “native soil” (589) in Europe and blasts Christianity for doing “everything to
orientalize the Occident” (63).
2. Malcolm X, “Race Problem.”
3. Wittgenstein holds, “My whole tendency . . . ​and [anyone’s] who tried to write or talk
Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language” (Klug, “Wittgenstein
and the Divine,” 7). My referring to healing relates to late Wittgenstein’s approach to
philosophical labor as therapeutic. Hadot says about Philosophical Investigations (PI),
“Philosophy is an illness of language . . . t​ he true philosophy will therefore consist of
curing itself of philosophy. . . . [​ PI] wishes to act little by little on our spirit, like a medical
treatment” (citing two essays in Critique in 1959, in Hadot, Philosophy, 17–18).

CRITICAL TIMES 3:3 | DECEMBER 2020 | 468

4. One place to witness Wittgenstein’s aversion to “ostensible definitions” is among his

SPECIAL SECTION
remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough: “Whoever is gripped by the [idea of the] majesty of death
can express this through just such a life” (“Remarks,” 36).
5. Wittgenstein holds, “If you want to stay within the religious sphere, you must struggle”
(Culture and Value, 98e).
6. Interestingly and tellingly, in interpreting Ibn Taymiyya, Asad provides a meaning for the
word din at the end of his essay, noting that it is “a complex word for which ‘religion’ will

|
[only] sometimes do,” suggesting that readers turn to Lane’s lexicon for a “fuller account”

Grammars of Religion: Talal Asad on Wittgenstein

(425). If it is true that the form of PI is inseparable from Wittgenstein’s conception of
philosophy, I am proposing that the form of Asad’s essay is inseparable from his “argument”
about religion.

Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/3/3/464/1542678/464furani.pdf by guest on 28 January 2024

7. Wittgenstein holds, “In reality one gives only a few examples & explanations . . . n ​ o more
than this is necessary” (Culture and Value, 94e).
8. Wittgenstein, preface, 24.
9. Klug, “Wittgenstein and the Divine,” 3.
10. When I speak of “bewitchment,” I have in mind Wittgenstein’s student Wasfi Hijab, who
holds, “I came to recognize that Wittgenstein never intended to suppress concepts or
replace them by their respective language games. . . . ​The replacement was merely a
tactical move in his technique to in order to exorcise the demon that bewitched him into
the quicksand of metaphysics [in the Tractatus]” (“Wittgenstein’s Secret,” 22).
11. Furani, Redeeming Anthropology, 108–9.
12. And Plotinus in turn followed his teacher, Ammonious of Alexandria in a “pilgrimage to the
source” (Hadot, Plotinus, 78).
13. In the face of ethics, Wittgenstein held the following “picture” of words: “Our words will
only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water [even] if I were to pour a
gallon of water over it” (in Klug, “Wittgenstein and the Divine,” 7). And words so “pictured”
as a “vessel” seems also implicit in al-Niffari’s adage, “The more a vision expands the more
an expression stifles (Kullamā tasaʾat ar-ruʾyah ḍāqat al-ʿibārah).”
14. Wittgenstein’s widely cited sentence from the Tractatus comes to mind: “Whereof one
cannot speak thereof one must remain silent” (§7). And so does another from that book:
“There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical” (§6.522), quoted in
Kerr, Theology, 37.
15. “Im Anfang war die Tat” (Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 51e; §402).
16. See note 10.
17. Wittgenstein once reported to his friend and student Maurice O’Connor Drury: “Your
religious thoughts have always seemed to me more Greek than biblical. Whereas my
thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic” (quoted in Klug, “Wittgenstein and the
Divine”). Brian Klug bases his comments on Wittgenstein’s “religious point of view” on
this quote, saying, “To see the world as a miracle is to see it in the light of the opening
verse of Genesis. To read Wittgenstein from this point of view is to understand his work
as bearing witness. Drawing the limits of language, his work, from early to late, testifies to
the Hebraic vision that does not and does make sense: created bespeaking creator” (Klug,
“Wittgenstein and the Divine,” 12).
18. Wittgenstein declares, “All philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not
making new ones” (Big Typescript, 305e). Elsewhere he remarks that “the religion of the
future” will perhaps be “without any priests or ministers” (in Plant, “Wretchedness,” 466).

FURANI | “ETHICS AND AESTHETICS ARE ONE” | 469

Works Cited
Furani, Khaled. Redeeming Anthropology: A Theological Critique of a Modern Science. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2019.
Hadot, Pierre. Philosophy as a Way of Life. Edited and with an in­tro­duc­tion by Arnold I. Davidson.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.
Hadot, Pierre. Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision. Translated by Mi­chael Chase with an in­tro­duc­
tion by Arnold I. Davidson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Hijab, Wasfi. “Wittgenstein’s Secret.” Unpublished manuscipt. Private ar­chive of Nadia Hijab.
Kerr, Fergus. Theology af­ter Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Klug, Brian. “Wittgenstein and the Divine: Can Nonsense Make Sense?” In Spielarten diskursiver
Repräsentierung des Absoluten, edited by Knut Wenzel, 1–12. Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany:

Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/critical-times/article-pdf/3/3/464/1542678/464furani.pdf by guest on 28 January 2024

Herder, forth­com­ing (in Ger­man trans­la­tion).
Malcolm X. “The Race Problem.” Address to the Af­ri­can Students Association and NAACP Cam-
pus Chapter, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, Jan­u­ary 23, 1963.
Nietzche, Friedrich. The Portable Nietzche. New York: Vi­king, 1968.
Plant, R. C. “The Wretchedness of Belief.” Journal of Religious Ethics 32, no. 3 (2004): 449–76.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value. Edited by G. H. von Wright. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. On Certainty. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright. New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Preface to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans­lated by C. K. Ogden. 1918.
Project Gutenberg. www​­.gutenberg​­.org​­/ebooks​­/5740.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” trans­lated by Stephan Palmié. In The
Mythology in Our Language: Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, edited by Giovanni da Col and
Stephan Palmié, 29–76. Chicago: HAU Books, 2018.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Big Typescript: TS 213. 1922. Reprint, Oxford: Blackwell, 2013.

CRITICAL TIMES 3:3 | DECEMBER 2020 | 470