Entrepreneurship in G18 Countries
Entrepreneurship in G18 Countries
By
Abstract: The World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey measures entrepreneurial activity
around the world. The database includes cross-country, time-series data on the number of total
and newly registered businesses for 84 countries. This paper finds significant relationships
between entrepreneurial activity and indicators of economic and financial development and
growth, the quality of the legal and regulatory environment, and governance. The analysis
shows the importance of electronic registration procedures to encourage greater business
registration. These results can guide effective policymaking and deliver new capabilities for
identifying the impact of reforms.
February 2008
* Corresponding author: Leora Klapper, ph: 1-202-473-8738, e-mail: [email protected]. Amit and Guillén
are at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. and Klapper is at the World Bank. We are grateful for
the financial support of the SME department at the IFC, the Development Research Group at the World Bank, the
Robert B. Goergen Chair at the Wharton School, the Wharton-SMU Research Center, and the Penn Lauder CIBER
Grant No P220A60017. Thanks to Zoltan Acs, Maxwell Aitken, Laurence Carter, Tim Davis, Asli Demirguc-Kunt,
Michael Ingram, Aart Kraay, Josh Lerner,, Andrei Mikhnev, Antoinette Schoar, and participants at the NBER
conference on International Differences in Entrepreneurship for valuable comments and special thanks to Sagit
Stern, Sharika Jain, Dennis Bogusz and Aaron Imperiale for their outstanding research assistance. This paper’s
findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views
of the Wharton School or the World Bank Group.
1
1. Introduction
Entrepreneurship is essential for the continued dynamism of the modern market economy
and a greater entry rate of new businesses can foster competition and economic growth (Klapper,
Laeven and Rajan, 2007; Djankov, La Porta , Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer, 2002). In this
regard, a comprehensive longitudinal study of entrepreneurial activity can assess time-varying
and time-invariant determinants of firm-creation, and its relationship to economic growth and
poverty reduction. Furthermore, from an evolutionary economics perspective, new research
suggests that disparities in economic growth between advanced and less developed countries can
narrow owing precisely to the growth of entrepreneurial activity (Galor and Michalopoulos,
2006). Empirical data can also help us better understand how entrepreneurs interact within their
respective networks, wherein new business ideas are generated and businesses are created (Stuart
and Sorenson, 2005). Additionally, there is a strong need to develop data sets to study how
economic and political factors affect entrepreneurship. For instance, Brander, Hendricks, Amit,
and Whistler (1998) used a longitudinal data set on the evolution of firm formation in Canada to
document that economic growth is driven by new entry rather than by the growth of existing
firms.
This study offers a methodology for collecting data on new business creation, serving as
a first step in enabling research on the dynamic of entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, the data
can be used as a benchmark for changes in the composition of the private sector, and further
advance the study of the impact of regulatory, political, macroeconomic, and institutional
changes on entrepreneurship and growth.
We find that business entry and density rates are significantly related to country-level
indicators of economic development and growth, the quality of the legal and regulatory
environment, ease of access to finance, and prevalence of informality. In the multivariate panel
analyses, we find that the business environment, specifically the ease of starting a business and
political corruption, remain significant indicators of total firm registrations, even after
controlling for the level of economic development. These results are thus consistent with prior
work on the efficient allocation of inputs and other resources to entrepreneurial activities
(Jovanovic, 1982). We also find significantly higher entry rates in countries with better
governance. Case studies show the impact of political, institutional, and tax reform on new
business creation. These results can guide effective policymaking and deliver new capabilities
for identifying the impact of reforms.
2
2. Methodology: How Do we Define Entrepreneurship?
Notably, this definition excludes informal sector initiatives. This exclusion is based on
the difficulties of quantifying the number of firms in the informal sector, rather than on its
relevance for developing economies (Nielsen and Plovsing, 1997). The only way to measure the
informal sector is through economic censuses, which due to their high costs are infrequently
collected.
After defining our measure of entrepreneurship, we need to create a standard unit of
measurement. Generally, entrepreneurial activities are carried out in the form of a “business.”
Statistical agencies around the world define “business” in many different ways based on the
sources of available administrative data (Vale, 2005). Due to the lack of a universally-agreed-
upon definition of what constitutes a business, agencies have formulated either an economic,
1
See Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, and Venkataraman, 1997 for a discussion of alternative definitions.
3
statistical or legal definition.2 For instance, the U.S. bases its business statistics on
establishments, Canada reports Average Labor Units (ALU),3 while countries reporting to
Eurostat4 and UNECE5 use various measures including legal (enterprises), geographical (local
unit), and activity-based (kind of activity unit) approaches for their business statistics. As a
result, the data are not easily comparable across countries: the proposed unit of measurement
must take into consideration the availability of the data, consistency across countries, relevance
to entrepreneurship, and focus on the formal sector.
Hence, our definition of the unit of measurement of entrepreneurship is:
Any economic unit of the formal sector incorporated as a legal entity and
registered in a public registry, which is capable, in its own right, of incurring
liabilities and of engaging in economic activities and transactions with other
entities.
2
At the international level, Eurostat and the OECD have attempted to define the concept of business. Other
countries like the United States, choose the establishment as the main unit for business statistical purposes.
3
US Census Bureau: http://www.census.gov/econ/www. Also see Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program
(LEAP) of Statistics Canada: http://strategis.gc.ca/epic/site/sbrp-rppe.nsf/en/rd00827e.html.
4
Council Regulation (EEC) No 696/93 of 15 March 1993 on the statistical units for the observation and analysis of
the production system in the Community, Official Journal L 076 , 30/03/1993 P. 0001 – 0011.
5
Terminology on Statistical Metadata, United Nations Statistical Commission, available at:
http://www.unece.org/stats/publications/53metadaterminology.pdf
6
The benefits of formal sector registration might vary by industry. This is discussed in Section 5.3.
4
many firms might find it optimal to evade regulations and operate in the informal sector. Firms
that choose to stay small and informal might be unable to realize their full growth potential. Our
dataset allows us to examine the growth of the formal private sector, relative to the informal
sector, and identify factors that encourage firms to begin operations in or transition to the formal
sector.
For instance, a large cross-country study finds that increases in product market and labor
regulations have been linked to increases in the size of the informal sector (Loayza et al., 2006).
Furthermore, a study in the United States finds that increases in the top marginal income tax rate
and decreases in tax audit probabilities and penalties might increase the size of the shadow
economy (Cebula, 1997). Another cross-country analysis finds that entrepreneurs are most likely
to operate informally to avoid the burdens of bureaucracy and corruption and that increases in
regulation – and, importantly, the enforcement of regulations – is associated with larger informal
sectors (Johnson et al., 1998a, Johnson et al., 1998b, Friedman et al., 1999). This suggests that
regulations can affect the creation of new firms, the average size of firms, and the dynamism of
incumbent firms.7 Our empirical analysis examines the relationship between growth in the
formal sector and improvements in the tax, regulatory, and governance environment.
Evidence on the relationship between the informal sector and economic growth is mixed.
On the one hand, a larger shadow economy is related to less tax revenue, which might lead to
less investment in public infrastructure and economic growth, particularly in developing
countries (i.e. Loayza, 1996). On the other hand, evidence in OECD countries finds that the
informal economy has a strongly positive effect on consumer purchases of both durable and
nondurable expenditures, and an indirectly positive effect on tax revenue and economic growth
(Schneider, 1998; Bhattacharyya, 1999). In our longitudinal analysis we find no significant
relationship between economic growth and new firm creation, but this might be due to our short
panel series.
7
However, informal microenterprises might not lag behind formal microenterprises in terms of growth or dynamism
– for instance, studies of Latin America suggests that in developing counties, with low levels of formal sector labor
productivity, entrepreneurs with low levels of human capital might optimally choose to operate in the informal
sector (Maloney, 2004).
5
3. Business Registries
The information presented in this study was collected from business registries and other
government sources in 84 countries. The data were collected via a survey and follow-up phone
calls.8 These other sources include statistical agencies, tax and labor agencies, chambers of
commerce, and private vendors (such as D&B), which were used only when business registry
data were unavailable or non-existent.9 While this analysis reasserts the great heterogeneity that
characterizes these public entities in terms of inter alia, prevailing regulations, methodologies,
and implantation of digital administration, a number of common challenges and achievements
have been identified and are described in this section.
8
The complete survey data are available at: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sme.nsf/Content/Entrepreneurship+Database.
9
A complete list of sources is provided in Annex 1.
10
Also called Incorporation Offices (US), Companies Registration Offices (IR), Companies House (UK), Business
Register (AU), Mercantile Registries (SP), Public Registries of Property and Commerce (MEX), Registry of
Commerce (FR), etc.
11
The registration of businesses without legal entity (e.g. professional associations, individual merchants, etc.) can
be voluntary, not compulsory, in some countries (e.g. Spain).
6
Within this context, most countries fall into one of the following legal system groupings:
(i) Civil Law systems: Every business constitutes a separate legal entity; therefore every
business is required to register.12
(ii) Common Law systems: Only corporations and similar entities constitute autonomous
legal entities, therefore mandatory registration is limited to the same.
Some examples of the distinctions between the two legal systems include:
In Common Law countries, while every corporation constitutes a business, not every
business constitutes a corporation.
In Civil Law countries, every business is a corporation.
Partnerships do not have a defined legal equivalent in Civil Law countries. Since
partnerships and sole proprietorships can be considered businesses from an economic
point of view; they do not represent a separate legal entity and are therefore not obligated
to register.13
The great majority of the countries surveyed fall into one of these two categories.
Nevertheless, there is a significant group that uses variations of the two systems. For instance,
some have voluntary registration for business without legal entities, or the registration is
business-activity based.
7
• Facts concerning the contractual and legal capacity of bodies authorized to represent
the business enterprise
• Changes in:
o the name of the company
o legal address of the company
o type of activity
o legal form
o the articles of incorporation
o share capital, value of the share, amount of shares;
• Mergers, transformations, and divestitures
• Branch openings and closures
• Exclusion of personal liability in special cases
• Facts concerning insolvency proceedings
• Liquidations
• Re-registration requirements14
However, many countries requiring businesses to file certain data lack the ability to
enforce compliance. A key case in point is the fact that whereas 65% of the countries surveyed
require businesses to record their financial statements, a significantly lower percentage actually
manage to collect the data. The same applies to the reporting of closures: over 80% of the
countries surveyed require notification of firm closures – either through liquidation, bankruptcy,
merger, or acquisition – but a large number of countries lack the proper mechanisms to enforce
this requirement. In sum, although information requirements do not vary markedly across
countries, many registries lack enforcement mechanisms regarding business filing and reporting
laws. This further contributes to the significant differences in the quality of the registration
information across countries.
8
made such a transition, the client must generally go to the registry bureau (which is often
decentralized) in person, and conduct “manual” research on site. To complement official
channels, private vendors also distribute registry information in many countries (see Box 1).
Many private sector initiatives have developed in response to businesses’ demand for
information. In countries that have neither a central business registry nor electronic
information available to the public, the private sector has attempted to fill the gap by
creating databases containing the information that would normally be found in the
business registry, such as contact information, a description of business activity, and the
names of owners and managers. Some private vendors have specialized in building
databases to evaluate the financial risk of businesses. Using financial statements,
bankruptcy and insolvency notifications, and other court records, they produce reports
that measure the credit and financial risk of businesses. The sources used for gathering
this information vary greatly across countries and businesses, but commonly include
public data at chambers of commerce, business registries, professional associations, and
in some cases, telephone listings. Nevertheless, these databases, while widely used in
some countries, may also be heavily monitored because of the possible conflicts with
privacy rights. Some examples are D&B (www.dnb.com) and Bureau Van Dijk
(www.bvdep.com).
9
creditors and potential business partners make proper financial judgments.16 For instance, in
many countries commercial banks rely on the information found in the business registry to
perform a risk analysis of the business before approaching the company to offer their financial
products.
b) Legal watchdog:
The business registry is at the front line in the effort to assure that a business operates
transparently and within the bounds of the law. It acts as a guarantor of a solid, legal business
environment by fostering transparency thereby aiding in preventing and exposing illegal
activities such as money laundering and other financial crimes.
16
For cross-country evidence see Berger, Klapper and Udell, 2001.
17
The decision to require mandatory public disclosure of financial statements for non-listed companies should be
made independent of the potential use of the data for monitoring and benchmarking. For further discussion, see
Gielen, et al. (2006).
10
INPUT COMPONENT TARGET GOAL
With the goal of establishing a dynamic business ecosystem, the European Union, in conjunction
with the European Business Registry, has launched the “Business Register Interoperability
Throughout Europe” (BRITE) project in 2006. BRITE aims to address the cross border
registration problem in the EU by creating a common and unified European Business Registry.
The main challenge is the interoperability of all EU registries through the implementation of a
common electronic platform in 18 different countries. The objective of BRITE is to harmonize
the collection and distribution of business registry data, in order to facilitate greater private and
public sector access to corporate data. The goal is also to promote registry data as part of greater
e-government initiatives.
11
Nevertheless, many countries continue to record their business information in paper
format causing considerable difficulties as regards recording and accessing the data. The “paper
version” makes the registrar susceptible to physical damage (i.e. humidity, weather, insects, etc.)
and subject to possible misappropriation, i.e. tracking difficulties, lost records (De la Rosa
Guzman, 2003). In such instances, conducting research also becomes a formidable task. This is
particularly the case if there is no central registry – given that each local registry tends to gather
and classify the information according to its own methodology. Moreover, it has been observed
that registry employees tend to use their own notation and indexing methods, eschewing standard
methods, thereby creating a confusing mixture of notation and coding systems resulting in
frequent errors and even fraud; furthermore, corruption and bribes can be commonplace, as
clients may be asked to pay “a fee” for quicker service (Labariega Villanueva, 2006). This
highlights the importance – and difficulties – of modernization in decentralized, developing
countries.
b) Centralization:
When a country lacks an electronic centralized registry, access to information becomes
problematic. In these cases – especially when the information is only available in paper format –
the client must necessarily revert directly to the region/state where the business had been
incorporated in order to retrieve the information. Furthermore, many countries have laws
governing registries at the federal level, but delegate the registration process and regulatory
oversight to the regions/states. In this case, confusion arises when each register follows its own
separate methodology, making the registration process as varied as there are regions/states within
the country.
It is also common in strongly decentralized countries, especially those with a federal
system, that companies be required to register in the state or region where they regularly conduct
their business. This means that they must register in every state where they would like to open a
subsidiary, which subsequently slows business transactions and acquisitions across regions.
12
4.1. Data Availability
As previously stated, several countries do not compile data on newly-created businesses
or on firms that went out of business, much less on re-registered businesses (i.e. businesses that
register existing businesses because of changes to firm names, ownership, sector, etc.) A second
challenge refers to some countries, excluded from this survey, which have in fact collected data
on enterprise creation, but simply do not have the tools or resources to process them. In some
cases, decentralized business registries make aggregation to the national level extremely
difficult. In other cases, the data are archived only in paper format.
Figure 1: Legal Reforms that Affect Business Statistics, the Algerian Case
20000
Law n° 97 -42 of 1 -18-1997 . Obligated all businesses to “re--register”
18000
16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003
13
number of closed businesses. The reasons differ from country to country, but are mainly due to
the fact that the registrars generally have no enforcement mechanisms to obligate businesses to
report closures. In other cases, the number of closed businesses was reported, but might be
imprecise because only a low percentage of businesses actually report their closure. Although
the number of closed companies is essential to paint a clear picture of the economic and
entrepreneurial activities of a country, it is not yet feasible to obtain comparable data (Nucci,
1999).
Information on “active” companies – excluding closed or inoperative businesses – should
be available from national tax agencies and labor ministries, although these agencies generally
do not make their data public. A few countries, such as Denmark, maintain active registries that
annually confirm that registered firms are still operating. This type of mechanism improves the
accuracy of the data and their usefulness to creditors and business partners.
4.4 Shell Corporations
Shell companies are defined as companies that are registered for tax purposes, but are not
active businesses. These corporations do not fit into the methodology of our study, since they do
not correspond to the category of “entrepreneurship” or to that of “business” (see Box 4).
Therefore, we also exclude some countries that are internationally recognized tax havens (i.e.
Jersey).
Shell companies are also known in Common Law countries as International Business
Corporations, Personal Investment Companies, Inactive Corporations, Front Companies or Mail
Box Companies. Generally incorporated in free zones or tax haven countries, the main
characteristic is that they have no significant assets or operations, and usually have no
employees. The purpose for their creation can vary:
Legal purposes: To protect business names or as an alternative venture financing mechanism (to
obtain financing prior to starting operations)
Fraudulent purposes: Money laundering, tax evasion, etc.
In Civil Law countries, the incorporation of “inactive companies” is common in order to create
“legal equivalents” of legal forms from the common law that have no direct equivalent in civil
law systems. These “inactive corporations” are legally incorporated, but do not perform any
significant economic activity. A clear example is the family that incorporates a business in order
to unify the entirety of their real estate assets under a common name. If one of the members of
the family dies, their shares are redistributed to the other shareholders at a significantly lower tax
rate compared to that of an ordinary inheritance.
14
4.5 Regional Data Limitations
When comparing data across regions, it is important to note the relative difficulty in
collecting information from developing countries. For the purpose of this study, we group
countries in five different regions: (i) Asia, (ii) Africa and the Middle East, (iii) Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, (iv) Latin America and the Caribbean, and (v) industrialized countries.
Although the number of represented countries varies by region, we decided to include regional
averages because the countries that did answer the questionnaire were considered representative
enough of the region to give an approximate picture.
5. Summary Statistics
15
80
64.23
60
38.22
40 29.12 29.29
20 13.32
1.57
0
Africa and Asia Eastern Europe Latin America Industrialized Total
Middle East and Central Asia and the Countries
Caribbean
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database, 2007.
5.2 Entry Rates
Entry rates are calculated as new registrations of companies as a percentage of total lagged
(previous year) registered businesses. The data for 82 countries, summarized by region, are
shown in Figure 3. On a regional level, industrialized countries had the highest entry rates in the
three years period. Interestingly, we find that mean entry rates are consistently around 7-9%
across emerging markets.
12%
10.24%
10%
8.44% 8.55% 8.35%
7.84%
8%
6.70%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Africa and Middle Asia Eastern Europe and Latin America and Industrialized Total
East Central Asia the Caribbean Countries
16
Wholesale and retail trade, Financial and real state, Industry, and Services. In addition to sectoral
differences across levels of economic development, we expect variation across regulatory and
governance regimes. For instance, we might expect that capital- and labor-intensive industries
would be under-represented in countries with weak financial development and burdensome labor
regulations (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). We should also find that sectors that have greater needs
for formal sector registration documents are over-represented in countries with challenging
business environments.
40.77%
40%
30%
25.05% 24.43%
19.05%
20% 16.79% 17.01%
9.74%
10%
0%
Wholesale & Retail Trade Finance Insurance & Real Industry Services
Estate
Indeed, an initial analysis of the data shows an almost perfect asymmetry in the business
distribution in developing and industrialized countries (Figure 4). While in developing countries
the retail and finance sectors are twice as big as in the industrialized countries, the industry and
services sectors are half their size. Approximately the same distribution was found among new
business created in 2005 (not shown). An in-depth study would be necessary to better
understand why entrepreneurs focus so disproportionably on certain sectors in developing
countries. Nevertheless, a preliminary analysis might suggest the relative lower requirements of
investment, human resources, knowledge, and capital as among the reasons that entrepreneurs in
developing countries focus on the retail sector. In addition, in developing countries with costly
and timely barriers to starting a business, only firms in wholesale and retail trade might have the
17
greatest incentive to formally register, for instance, in order to receive a Value Added Tax
(VAT) number, which might be required for domestic and international sales.18
6. Empirical Analysis
In this section we examine various macroeconomic, financial, political, and regulatory
indicators that might be related to business density and entry rates. Although we find significant
relationships with these measures – i.e. more dynamic economies in countries with better
business environments – we cannot postulate on the direction of causality. We plan to continue
to collect this data over time and construct time-series of private sector entry and growth that will
allow us to study the country characteristics that determine entrepreneurship and the effect of
regulatory and institutional reforms.
18
We are unable to control for sectoral distribution in our empirical analysis, since the data are only available for a
small sub-sample of countries and was not collected over time. However, we expect changes in the distribution to
be related to economic development and improvements in the business environments, which are measured by our
explanatory variables.
18
Figure 5: Entry and Density Rates versus Ease of Doing Business Rankings,
by Country, Average 2003-2005
15
15%
10
10%
5
5%
0
0%
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Ease of Doing Business Ranking Ease of Doing Business Raking
15%
10
10%
5
5%
0% 0
0 3 6 9 12 15 18 0 3 6 9 12 15 18
Procedures to start a business Procedures to start a business
19
Countries with entry costs greater than 40 percent of GNI per capita are excluded.
19
6.2 Economic and Financial Development
The data also show a positive and significant relationship between economic and
financial development and entrepreneurship. The log of GDP per capita and domestic credit to
the private sector (as a percentage of GDP) are both positively and significantly correlated with
entry rates (Figure 7) and business density (not shown). This suggests that greater business
opportunities and better access to finance are related to a more robust private sector.
Disentangling the direction of causality – whether positive economic growth is a
determinant for the creation (i.e. registration) of new businesses or whether greater
entrepreneurship leads to economic growth and innovation – in an important area of future
research.
Figure 7: Entry Rates and GDP Per Capita and Private Credit to GDP,
by country, Average 2003-2005
15% 15
10% 10
5% 5
0% 0
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 0 50 100 150 200 250 300
GDP per capita Private credit /GDP
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database (2007) and World Bank (2005).
20
Figure 8: Business Creation and the Informal Sector, by Country, Average 2003-2005
15%
10
10%
5
5%
0% 0
0 20 40 60 0 20 40 60
Informal Economy (percentage of GNP) Informal economy (percentage of GNP)
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database and World Bank (2006).
16 20
12 15
8 10
4 5
0 0
-2 -1 0 1 2 -2 -1 0 1 2
Governance (Kraay indicators average) Governance (Kraay indicators average)
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database and World Bank (2006).
This result suggests that a stable business environment should be expected to foster
private sector development and growth. The case of Peru shows the sensitivity of new firm
registrations to political changes (Figure 10).
21
Figure 10: Entrepreneurship and Political Stability – The Peruvian Case
Presidential Elections
30%
25% New
Government
20% Transition
Political Government
15% Crisis Political
Crisis
10%
5%
0%
1995 1997 1998 2000 2001
-5%
-10% 1999
Case-based evidence also suggests that government policy in the areas of taxation and
enforcement can have a large impact on business registrations. For instance, in the post-
transitional period (1992-1996), the Ukraine imposed high marginal tax rates, tax legislation was
vague and non-specific (i.e. included complex exemptions and deductions), regulators did not
enforce compliance, and the system was perceived as unfair and corrupt (Kravchuk, 2002).
However, in July 1996 the government enacted a simplified procedure for patenting many types
of entrepreneurial activities, and in September 1998 enacted a simplified (unified) system of
taxation, accounting, and reporting for small business entities (with less than 50 employees and
less than 1 million UAH in revenue).20 These reforms have contributed to the increase in new
small business registrations (Figure 11). Interestingly, the increase in registrations of new small
enterprises happened mostly due to the establishment of newly operating enterprises – 91.7% in
2004 – rather than the splitting of larger enterprises (1.12% in 2004), established to take
advantage of the small business tax exemptions.
20
“Law of Ukraine, ‘On Patenting Certain Kinds of Entrepreneurial Activity;”, July 1, 1996; “Decree of the
President of Ukraine, ‘On the Simplified System of Taxation, Accounting and Reporting for Small Business
Entities’”, September 9, 1998.
22
Figure 11: Number of Small Businesses in Ukraine (1,000’s)
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Taxation levels have also been found to be related to new firm formation in developed
countries. For instance, a study of manufacturing firm registrations in Spain’s 50 provinces
between 1981 and 1995 found a correlation of -15.3% (marginally significant at the 10% level)
between the number of new registrations per capita and production taxes. The correlation with
provincial per capita income, by contrast, was +47.3% (Sánchez Moral, 2005, pp114-127).
21
We exclude from this analysis six countries that are not included in the Doing Business database.
23
Our explanatory variables include three indicators of the business environment, which
vary over time. First, we proxy the barriers to entry by the number of procedures to start a
business and the rigidity of employment index, and by an indicator of governance. We control
in all analyses for policy stability, the ratio of domestic credit to GDP, and GDP per capita.
ENTY PROCEDURES 197 Log of number of entry procedures (Doing Business) 2.07 0.49
RIGIDITY OF EMPLOYMENT 197 Rigidity of employment index (Doing Business) 36.97 16.85
DOMESTIC CREDIT (% GDP) 197 Domestic credit divided by GDP (WB statistics) 62.01 53.69
GDP PER CAPITA 197 Log of GDP per capita, PPPs, 2000 int’l dollars (WB) 9.01 1.13
Source: World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Database and World Bank (2007).
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix, with asterisks identifying statistical significance.
These univariate tests show that business density (Column 3) is significantly related to all
country characteristics; however, entry rates are more sensitive to the business environment and
governance. We also find large and significant correlations among our dependent variables.
24
Table 2: Correlation Matrix, Panel of 76 Countries, 2003-2005
22
We also added the corporate tax rate and the GDP growth rate to assess the impact of taxation and the business
cycle, respectively. These two variables were not significant in any of the models. We also added to the models in
Table 3 the interaction between GDP per capita and governance. This term reached significance, with a positive
sign, only in model (5). However, the main effect of governance continued to be insignificant. This evidence seems
to indicate that good governance is especially conducive to higher density in high-income countries.
25
Table 3: Regressions Predicting Entry Rates and Density,
Panel of 76 Countries, 2003-2005
Many governments have taken action to make it easier for entrepreneurs to start a new
firm, such as deregulating and automating the registration process, which can reduce time and
cost for entrepreneurs.23 A larger number of formally registered firms is associated with a
smaller informal sector, which is associated with slower growth and employment and lower tax
23
Cross-country data on the cost, time, and number of procedures required to register a business is available in the
Doing Business Report: www.doingbusiness.org.
26
revenue.24 Furthermore, formal sector registration provides firms access to a VAT sales ID,
which offers greater domestic and international sales opportunities. Legislative reforms to the
registration process have been shown in countries around the world to increase entry and small
business employment (i.e. Mexico and Russia).25 An example of legislative reform to encourage
formal entrepreneurship and the growth of new and small firms is to introduce on-line electronic
registration systems. Automating the registration process also helps provide lenders, suppliers,
and customers greater access to information on the financial health, management, and ownership
of registered firms, which encourages greater access to financing and growth.
In order to have a better understanding of the business registration process and the impact
of different typologies of registries in the ease of doing business, the 2007 World Bank Group
Entrepreneurship Survey added a special section related to the business registries. Seventy-five
countries participated in this section, providing valuable information about the registration
processes, information requirements, and the availability of e-registries and e-distribution,
among other issues.
27
Figure 12: Electronic Business Registration, by Region
100% 14/16
16/20 13/16
80% 53/75
10/17 7/11
6/11
60%
32/75
6/17 4/11
40% 6/20
3/11
20%
0%
Africa and Middle Asia Eastern Europe Latin America Industrialized Total
East and Central Asia and the countries
Caribbean
Moreover, the registries were questioned on the information businesses were required to
file, as well as if they registered any other information besides business incorporations. We find
deep disparities among regions (not shown). When it comes to the information the companies
are required to register, the majority of them oblige businesses to report closures and annual
financial statements. Nevertheless, not all countries have the mechanisms to enforce these
requirements. In addition, while business registries in industrialized countries tend to stand
alone, and only in some cases register internet domains, developing countries tend to have
registries where businesses, real state, internet domains and patent registrations coexist.
28
Figure 13: E-Registration and the Investment Climate
7.4 The Impact of Electronic Registration: Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Jordan.
The modernization of business registries is an important step in a successful private
sector development strategy. If appropriate political and economical reforms take place, the
country will require an efficient registry that can satisfy new businesses demands. Otherwise,
the registry will become a bottleneck for entrepreneurs, not only encumbering the business
creation process, but also discouraging the transition between the informal and formal sectors.
Our data suggest that the modernization process of business registries is usually a long
process framed inside a larger national private sector development strategy. On average,
countries draft five-year plans and the goal is to implement electronic registration and
distribution. Figure 14 shows the timeline of new business registrations for three countries –
Guatemala, Sri Lanka, and Jordan – that have successfully implemented a business registry
modernization strategy.
29
The data suggest a strong relationship between the implementation of a modern business
registry and a significant increase in the number of new business registered. All three countries
witnessed an increase larger than 20% in the number of new business registration after the full
implementation of their modernization plans. It is also noteworthy that in Jordan and Guatemala,
the growth of new firms begins before the implementation of the reform, usually about 4 years
earlier when the modernization plan was announced and initiated.
40000 9000
35000 8000
30000 7000
6000
25000
5000
20000
4000
15000
3000
10000 2000
5000 1000
0 0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
For example, Guatemala began its modernization plan in 1996, achieving e-registration
and e-distribution in 1999 (see Box 5). Jordan, following a 1997 law, created a new entity in
charge of business registration and entrepreneurship promotion that fully implemented the
electronic registration in 2002. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, partially implemented its electronic
business registration in 2001, in order to prepare for the new Companies Act of 2007.
In addition, in several countries the business registry has played a central role in private
sector development strategies. Instead of being a passive actor, the registries have in many cases
been entrusted with the task of fostering entrepreneurship through a variety of activities. Among
others tasks, they provide an advisory role training potential entrepreneurs, are in charge of the
dissemination of information, promote foreign investment, reduce bureaucratic barriers, etc.
30
Box 5: The case of Guatemala
Since the creation of the business registry of Guatemala in 1971, its structure remained almost
unchanged for two decades. An average of seven employees and a couple of mechanical
typewriters composed its organizational structure until 1995. In 1996, under a new
administration, the Business Registry undertook an ambitious modernization plan. The initial
program, divided into four phases, would be accomplished with the implementation of e-registry
and e-distribution in 1999 (Figure 15).
30000
25000
20000
Active Modernization plan
15000
Inactive Modernization plan
10000
5000
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
The plan included not only the modernization of the business registry, but also the entrustment of
the registry as the central actor for the new private sector development strategy. The registry
would gain an active role in the promotion of entrepreneurship through activities such as training
of entrepreneurs, investment promotion, dissemination, etc. As shown in Figure 2, the
modernization of the business registry and the new economic policies had a direct impact in the
number of new business registered, with an increase of 40% on new registrations. In
comparison, the three years period (2000-2003) during which the modernization strategy was
paralyzed due to a change in the administration, resulted in a sharp 11% decline in the number of
new business registered.
In 2003, the new administration reactivated the second modernization plan for the business
registry. A number of new and ambitious goals were defined, such as increasing the number of
registration locations, the reduction of necessary steps for business incorporation, and the
promotion of foreign investment. This second stage had a remarkable impact in the number of
new business incorporated, and increased the number of new business registered per year by
almost 25%. Moreover, the number of monthly electronic transactions – including
incorporations, closures, re registrations and consultations - has climbed over 3400, representing
more than 50% of the total number of monthly transactions.
31
8. Conclusion
The World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey 2007 provides a new set of indicators to
study the relationship between business creation, the investment climate, and economic
development. Preliminary findings suggest that a higher level of entrepreneurship significantly
relates to greater economic development, formal sector participation, and better governance. For
instance, countries with lower barriers to entry and less corruption generally see higher
percentages of firm registrations and entry. Consistent with the findings of Brander et al. (1998)
for the Canadian economy, we find that in the 84 countries included in our analysis,
entrepreneurship, measured both in terms of new registrations and entry rates, is also positively
correlated with economic growth. This might suggest that countries that facilitate
entrepreneurship see commensurate increases in overall economic growth and an expansion of
the formal sector. Alternatively, it might be the case that periods of economic expansion
encourage optimism and entrepreneurship; for instance, individuals might be willing to leave
their job security to start a business if they are more confident they could find another job if their
business fails. We hope to continue collecting data on firm creation over time, which will allow
us to better understand how the private sector behaves over business and financial cycles. The
current data limitations prevent us from observing the evolution of new entrants over time in
order to asses their longevity and their growth. Furthermore, entrepreneurship indicators can be
used to complement other World Bank group indicators – such as the Doing Business indicators
– in the development of policy recommendations to promote private sector development and
growth.
In addition, the data collected could become the base for further studies in business
ecology. For instance, the distribution of businesses per sector could be used for a deeper
research paper aimed to answer questions such as which kind of businesses are easier to
incorporate in challenging business environments, which sectors are interdependent on one
another, and which ones contribute more to the countries economic development.
Moreover, the process of collecting data has become a valuable tool for the diagnosis of
the business environments. For instance, direct contact with business registries in more than a
125 countries helps us to better understand the difficulties that entrepreneurs face when
incorporating a business, as well as the impact of the institutional and technological framework
of registries in the ease of starting a business.
32
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35
Annex 1: Sources, by Country
Country Source
Albania Boga & Associates Attorneys at Law
Algeria Centre National du Registre du Commerce
Argentina INDEC
Armenia National Statistical Service
Australia Business Demographics Section
Austria Bundesministerium für Justiz
Azerbaijan Ministry of Justice
Bangladesh Registrar of Joint Stock Companies & Firms (RJSC)
Belgium Business Register
Bolivia Fundación para el Desarollo Empresarial
Bosnia & Herzegovina IFC
Botswana Registrar of Companies
Canada Statistics Canada
Chile Servicio de Impuestos Internos
China Ministry of Commerce. State Administration for Industry and Commerce
Colombia Confecamaras
Congo, Dem. Rep. Djunga and Risasi, Attorneys at Law
Costa Rica Registro Nacional
Croatia Financial Agency (FINA)
Curacao Curaçao Chamber of Commerce
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism.
Cyprus
Department of Registrar of Companies and Official Receiver
Czech Republic Ministry of Justice. Czech Statistical Office
Denmark Danmarks Statistik
Egypt Commercial Registry Authority
El Salvador Dirección del Registro de Comercio
Estonia Centre of Registers, Ministry of Justice of Estonia
Finland Business Register
France Institut National de le Statistique et des Etudes Economiques
Georgia Ministry of Economic Development
Germany Statistisches Bundesamt
Ghana Registrar-General's Department. Ministry of Justice
Greece Athens Chamber of Commerce – ACCI
Guatemala Registro Mercantil
Haiti Direction Général des Impôts (DGI)
Hong Kong, China Companies Registry. Inland Revenue Department
Hungary Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Business Register Unit
Iceland Statistics Iceland
India Dun & Bradstreet Information Services India Private Limited
Indonesia Ministry of Trade
Ireland Companies Registration Office
Israel Registry of Companies
36
Country Source
Italy InfoCamere
Jamaica Registry of Companies
Japan Ministry of Justice
Jordan Companies Control Department
Kazakhstan Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Kenya Iseme, Kamau & Maena Advocates
Latvia Ministry of Justice
Lebanon Etude Badri et Salim El Meouchi
Lithuania State Enterprise Center of Registers. Department of Register of Legal Entities
Luxembourg Répertoire des Entreprises
Macedonia FYR Macedonia Statistics Office
Madagascar Direction Générale Statistique. Ministère de l'économie, des finances et du budget
Malawi Registry General
Malta Registrar of Companies
Mexico Mexican Statistical Agency and Labor Ministry
Moldova State Registration Chamber
Morocco Office Marocain de la Propriété
Mozambique National Director of the Registry and Notary Offices. Central Investment Center
Netherlands Dutch Association of Chambers of Commerce
New Zealand New Zealand Companies Office
Nigeria Corporate Affairs Commission
Norway Brønnøysundregistrene
Oman Company Registrar’s Office, Department of Industry
Pakistan The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Panama Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
Peru Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas
Poland World Bank
Portugal Centro de Formação dos Registos e do Notariado. Ministry of Justice
Romania Registrar of Corporations. Office of the Attorney General
Russia Russian SME Resource Center
Senegal Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie (ANSD)
Serbia & Montenegro Department for Statistical Registers and Standards
Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA)
Singapore
Business Statistics Division, Singapore Department of Statistics
Slovak Republic Analyses and Information Service Unit, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic
Slovenia AJPES
South Africa Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office
Spain Registro Mercantil Central de Madrid
Sri Lanka Board of Investment of Sri Lanka. Registrar of Companies
Sweden Swedish Companies Registration Office
Switzerland Eidg. Amt für das Handelsregister
Syria Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce
Tanzania Business Registration and Licensing Authority (BRELA)
Thailand World Bank
Togo Direction Générale de la Statistique et de la Comptabilité Nationale du Togo
37
Country Source
Tunisia Répertoire National d’entreprises
Turkey Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT)
Uganda Registrar General’s Department
Ukraine State Statistics Committee of Ukraine
United Kingdom International Relations Manager at the Companies House
United States D&B
Yemen Deputy Minister for Trade Affairs
Zambia World Bank
Zimbabwe Office of the Chief Registry of Deeds and Companies, Ministry of Justice
38