an n a ls of c o mmuni sm

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project editor of the annals of communism series
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 Stalin and the Lubianka
A Documentary History of the Political
Police and Security Organs in the
Soviet Union, 1922–1953

David R. Shearer and Vladimir Khaustov

New Haven and London

Published with assistance from the foundation established in memory of Amasa Stone
Mather of the Class of 1907, Yale College.

Copyright © 2015 by Yale University.

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Shearer, David R., 1952–. Stalin and the Lubianka : a documentary history of the
political police and security organs in the Soviet Union, 1922–1953 / David R. Shearer
and Vladimir Khaustov.
pages cm.—(Annals of communism)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-300-17189-1 (hardback : alkaline paper) 1. Police—Soviet Union—History.
2. Police—Soviet Union—History—Sources. 3. Internal security—Soviet Union—History.
4. Lubianka (Prison : Moscow, Russia)—History. 5. Political prisoners—Soviet Union—
History. 6. Stalin, Joseph, 1879–1953—Influence. 7. Power (Social sciences)—Soviet
Union—History. 8. Social control—Soviet Union—History. 9. Soviet Union—Politics and
government—1917–1936. 10. Soviet Union—Politics and government—1936–1953.
I. Khaustov, V. N. (Vladimir Nikolaevich). II. Title.
HV8224.S3757 2015
363.20947'09041—dc23
2014012361

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Yale University Press gratefully acknowledges the financial
support given for this publication by the John M. Olin
Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the
Historical Research Foundation, Roger Milliken, the Rosentiel
Foundation, Lloyd H. Smith, Keith Young, the William H.
Donner Foundation, Joseph W. Donner, Jeremiah Milbank, the
David Woods Kemper Memorial Foundation, and the Smith
Richardson Foundation.
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents

Preface ix
Note on Translation, Document Presentation,
Transliteration, and Abbreviations xii
List of Abbreviations and Glossary of Frequently
Used Terms xiv

introduction. Stalin and the Lubianka 1

chapter 1. Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State,
1922–1927 17
chapter 2. Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the
Economy, 1927–1930 56
chapter 3. Subduing the Countryside, 1928–1933 89
chapter 4. Ordering Society, 1933–1937 122
chapter 5. The Great Purges, 1935–1939 170
chapter 6. Social and Ethnic Cleansing: The Mass
Operations, 1937–1938 193
chapter 7. The Security Organs at War, 1939–1944 228
chapter 8. Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania,
1945–1953 269
viii Contents

Conclusion 309
Biographical Sketches 315
List of Documents 333
Notes 345
Index 363
 Preface

V
adim Staklo, of Yale University Press, first suggested a history
of the Soviet political and security police. He was right to do
so. Much has been written about particular aspects of the
Soviet political police, but no single account existed of the Soviet
political and security organs for the first thirty years of their existence.
This volume is an attempt to provide such a history, at least for the
first and formative decades of the Soviet state, from the early 1920s to
the mid–1950s. It is both a narrative history and a document collec-
tion, combining interpretive text with translations of important as
well as indicative documents from the period. Most of the documents,
though not all, are taken from the four-volume series Lubianka,
Stalin, published in Russia during the early and mid–2000s. Lubian-
ka, of course, refers to the large nineteenth-century buildings on
Lubianka Square, in downtown Moscow. That complex served as
headquarters for the Soviet political and security organs throughout
the twentieth century, and still serves as the headquarters of the Rus-
sian Federation security service, the FSB.
The documents in the Lubianka, Stalin series, and in this volume,
come from a number of archives, but many are from collections in
the still highly restricted archives of the security organs, and the
Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation. Other major archival
sources include the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the
Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, the Russian
State Archive of Contemporary History, and the State Archive of the
Novosibirsk Oblast. Some of the documents in this volume were

ix
x Preface

already published prior to the appearance of the Lubianka, Stalin

series. Several have appeared in English translation, and these are
noted. The great majority of the documents, however, appear here for
the first time in English. Together, with the text, they tell a story previ-
ously untold, of the growth of the Soviet political and security organs,
and the various and evolving functions of those organs in the realm of
domestic and foreign spying, state security, and political and social
repression.
This is more than a story of repression, however. During the first
decades of the Soviet state, the history of the political police was in-
extricably tied to the rule of Joseph Stalin, the general secretary of the
ruling Communist Party. Stalin became secretary in 1922, a position
that became known as “general” secretary during the final illness of
the founder of the Soviet state, Vladimir Lenin, and after the tumultu-
ous years of revolution and civil war from 1917 to 1921. Stalin was
not one of the early charismatic leaders of the Bolshevik Party, but he
quietly asserted himself, and he did so largely through an alliance with
key individuals in the political police. By the early and mid–1930s,
Stalin rose to be the undisputed and ruthless leader of the country
and, as this book shows, he did so largely through his ability to use
the political police. He dominated the country, and the political po-
lice, until his death in early March of 1953. His rule became synony-
mous with the power of the political police, and in turn, the extent of
power wielded by the police and security organs would have been
impossible without Stalin. This power was never secure, however. Sta-
lin manipulated the balance between the police and the ruling Com-
munist Party, using each in turn to purge and maintain control over
the other. The documents herein reveal this dynamic of Stalin’s power,
as well as the expanding, shrinking, and often changing functions of
police activities over the decades of Stalin’s rule.
Contrary to many perceptions, the Soviet political and security
organs did much more than hunt and persecute Stalin’s political
rivals and supposed enemies of the regime. In a state plagued by weak
civil institutions, the political police stepped into, and at times were
pushed into, areas of social governance not usually associated with
a political and state security agency. The documents here reveal the
degree to which the police under Stalin fundamentally shaped the
social, economic, and even geographical makeup of Stalin’s peculiar
brand of militarized socialism. Thus, this book is not just a history of
police and repression, it is also a history of Stalinism, and of Soviet
socialism.
 Preface xi

We are grateful for the support of Yale University Press in making

this book possible. We are also grateful to Marina Dobronovskaya for
her invaluable help in translating both the words and the sense of the
documents contained herein. Finally, our thanks go to Gavin Lewis,
whose astute editing made a manuscript into a book.
David R. Shearer
Vladimir Khaustov
Note on Translation, Document Presentation,
Transliteration, and Abbreviations

T
he great majority of documents in this collection are of an of-
ficial nature. The language is highly bureaucratized, it is often
stilted or convoluted, and almost all the documents were writ-
ten in the passive voice. At times, the language in the documents is
grammatically nonsensical. We have made no attempt to “clean up”
the language into clear, readable English. On the contrary, we have
made a conscious effort to retain the sense and tone of the language
that strikes the reader in the original Russian. In a number of instanc-
es, this has required some judgment about what might sound normal
or not normal to a Russian ear, and then to translate that into analo-
gous English. In no case, however, have we allowed ourselves literary
license. We have tried to stay as close as possible to the literal sense,
phrasing, and word order of the Russian text. We have tried to retain
in the English text some of the historical immediacy of the original
language.
We have followed standard practice in using brackets and dots, […],
to indicate original text that we have excluded. The use of parentheses
and dots, (…), indicates a break in the text of the original document.
Text underlined by hand in the originals appears also underlined here,
and wording crossed out by hand appears scored through; occasional
typewritten underlining of headings appears here in italic; handwrit-
ten insertions, marginal annotations, and the like are interpolated in
brackets at points corresponding to their positions in the originals.
In transliterating names, we have followed the standard Library of
Congress system, with the following exceptions. In cases where a cus-

xii
 Note on Translation xiii

tomary English-language spelling already exists, that version is used:

Yagoda and Yezhov, for instance, are written as such, instead of as
Iagoda and Ezhov, although Evdokimov remains as Evdokimov.
In addition, for simplicity’s sake personal names of both well-known
and lesser-known personages are throughout spelled with “ya,” “yu,”
and “-sky” rather than “ia,” “iu,” and “-skii”: Karpovskaya, Trotsky,
Yurovsky.
Abbreviations are a special problem in the highly bureaucratized
language of Soviet documents. For the most part, and for the sake of
accuracy, we have left them in transliterated form with translations in
brackets. A list of abbreviations with glossary appears below.

Marina Dobronovskaya
David R. Shearer
 Abbreviations and Glossary of Frequently
Used Terms

AP RF Presidential Archive, Russian Federation

ASSR Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
BSSR Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
c., cc. comrade(s)
Cheka acronym for the Extraordinary Commission to
Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage, the
political police during the revolutionary war years
1917–22
Chekist political police officer
c-r, c.r. counterrevolutionary
DVK Far East Territory
d. delo (file) (in archive cites)
EKO (EKU) Economic Crimes Department (Administration) of
the political police
f. fond (“collection”) (in archive cites): archive
designation, approximate equivalent of U.S.
“record group”
GANO State Archive of Novosibirsk Oblast
GARF State Archive of Russian Federation
GKO (GOKO) State Committee of Defense
GPU State Political Administration, under the Russian
Republic Commissariat of the Interior, 1922–23:
preceded the OGPU
guberniia a province of the Russian empire, still a govern-
ment unit in the first years of Bolshevik rule

xiv
 Abbreviations and Glossary xv

GUGB Chief Administration for State Security: political

police administration, 1934–41, under the Com-
missariat for Internal Affairs
GULAG Chief Administration of Camps
INO Foreign intelligence and espionage department,
successively of the GPU, OGPU, and GUGB
Kadets Constitutional Democrats: prerevolutionary
political party
Kharbintsy “Harbin people”: Soviet reimmigrants who
worked for the Chinese Eastern Railway, which
ended at Harbin, Manchuria
kolkhoz collective farm
Komsomol Communist Youth League
KP(b)U Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine
KPSS Communist Party of the Soviet Union
krai administrative territory, usually larger than an
oblast, and associated with frontier status; also
appears here in the plural as “krai”
kraikom Communist Party krai committee
KRO Department of Counterintelligence, State Political
Administration
OO Special Department
kulak “rich” peasant
l., ll. list, listy (folio[s]) (in archive cites)
LVO Leningrad Military District
MGB Ministry of State Security, March 1946–March
1953
militsiia “militia”: civil police
m-ks Mensheviks
MTS machine tractor station
MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs, renamed successor to
the Commissariat for Internal Affairs, from March
1946
Narkomiust People’s Commissariat of Justice
Narkomvnudel People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (see
NKVD)
NEP New Economic Policy, 1921–29: mixed state-
market economic system, introduced by Lenin
NKGB People’s Commissariat of State Security, February
1941–March 1946
NKID (NKIDel) Commissariat of Foreign Affairs
xvi Abbreviations and Glossary

NKIu, NKIust People’s Commissariat of Justice

NKPS People’s Commissariat of Transportation
NKVD People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the
Russian Republic, 1918–30, and All-Union Com-
missariat for Internal Affairs 1934–46
ob. oborot (reverse) (in archive cites): reverse side of a
folio
obkom Communist Party oblast committee
oblast government administrative unit, larger than a region
(raion), smaller than a district or territory (krai)
oblispolkom oblast soviet executive committee
OGPU United (Combined) State Political Administration:
political police, 1922–34
okrug district, usually referring to a military administra-
tive district
op. opis’ (“inventory”) (in archive cites): division of
archive holdings below fond
osadnik Polish farmer along the Polish eastern frontier,
given land for military service
Osoboe Special Board: highest sentencing board of the
soveshchanie political police
OUN Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
Politburo Politicheskoe Biuro (Political Bureau): executive
body of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party
politotdel political department: used for political police
administrations in machine tractor stations and on
rail lines
PP OGPU political police plenipotentiaries
privod police detention
Procuracy State prosecutorial agency
Procurator Prosecutor
raion government administrative unit, similar to a
county
RGAE Russian State Economic Archive
RGANI Russian State Archive of Contemporary History
RGASPI Russian State Archive of Social and Political
History
RKKA Red Army
RKP(b) Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
RO OGPU Region (county level) office of the political police
 Abbreviations and Glossary xvii

RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic

s/ch secret section (archive cite)
SKK Northern Caucasus Territory
SMERSH “Death to Spies”: Counterintelligence directorate
under the Commissariat of Defense
SNK Sovnarkom
soviet local governing council
sovkhoz State farm, in which farmers were paid salaries as
workers
Sovmin Council of Ministers: replaced Council of
People’s Commissars from March 1946
Sovnarkom Council of People’s Commissars: highest govern-
ment ruling body
spetspereselentsy “special settlers”: deportees
spetsy “specialists” (professionals)
SPO Secret Political Department, OGPU and GUGB
SR, s-r Socialist Revolutionary
SSSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
STO Council of Labor and Defense
TO Transport Department, GPU, OGPU, GUGB
Troika Nonjudicial police sentencing board
TsA FSB RF Central Archive of the Federal Security Service,
Russian Federation
TsChO Central Black Earth Oblast
TsIK Central Executive Committee: highest executive
organ of the Soviet government
TsK Central Committee of the Communist Party
TsKK Central Control Commission of the Communist
Party
UkSSR (USSR) Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
UNKVD district- or oblast-level NKVD administrations
VKP(b) All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
VMN “the highest measure of punishment” (capital
punishment)
VSNKh Supreme Economic Council
VTsIK All-Russian Central Executive Committee:
highest government executive body of the Rus-
sian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
VTsSPS All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
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Stalin and the Lubianka
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 Introduction: Stalin and the Lubianka

O
n 20 December 1917, the revolutionary Bolshevik govern-
ment of Russia created the Extraordinary Commission to
Combat Counterrevolution and Sabotage. This political
police became known by its Russian initials, ChK, or Cheka. It was
created as a temporary agency in the exigencies of a brutal revolution-
ary war, but it grew into one of the most enduring and powerful insti-
tutions of the Soviet state. Originally subordinated to the executive
council of the government, its power grew as its functions expanded.
At its height, the political and security police was responsible for the
protection of the country’s leaders and the fight against political
opposition and deviation, as well as against foreign and domestic
spying. Chekists, as officials of the political police were called, were
also responsible for border protection, internal population control
and migration, residence registration of citizens, all prisons and labor
camps, and a sprawling economic empire that included extractive
industries, agriculture, and construction. The labor force for that
empire consisted of hundreds of thousands of convicts, all under con-
trol of the political police. The agency commanded its own militarized
fighting divisions, as well as the country’s border forces. At times,
organized as an independent All-Union ministry, it even threatened
the power of the country’s ruling Communist Party. This book
explores the various incarnations and functions of the Soviet political
and security forces from their beginnings to the 1950s, when their role
and trajectory of development changed dramatically, and they entered
a new era in their history.

1
2 Introduction

The power of the Soviet political police was not a foregone con-
clusion.1 Its rise to power was neither uncontested, nor the result of
an inexorable process of expansion. The power of the political police
waxed and waned as its functions expanded and shrank. Accordingly,
its organizational structure also changed, numerous times—so many
times, in fact, that its various acronyms make for awkward and
lengthy book titles.2 In the early 1920s, critics nearly succeeded in
disbanding it. The political police rebounded, reaching its zenith
during the 1930s and World War II. Its power was severely curtailed,
once again, in the postwar era, especially in its domestic surveillance,
carceral, and economic functions.3
We often think of the Soviet political police as an agency that
existed to combat real and perceived enemies, and to protect Soviet
leaders and the security of the state, and in part it did so. From its
inception, the political police was officially subordinated to the
executive organs of the Soviet government, which meant the Central
Executive Committee (TsIK), the highest executive organ of the Soviet
government, and the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom).
At the same time, the government could take no action that involved
the political police without it first being discussed by the Politburo
(Political Bureau) of the ruling Communist Party. In effect, then, the
political police functioned as more than a government security agency.
It was the “fighting arm of the Party,” as Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the
founder of the Cheka, declared. Iosif Stalin, the general secretary of
the Communist Party from 1922 until his death in 1953, used the
political police very much in this capacity. And, to the extent that he
perceived his own power as identical to the interests of the Party, he
used the political police to strengthen his position within the ruling
elite, and to implement the kinds of policies, both domestically and
internationally, that he believed would further the goals of the Soviet
state.
As chapter 1 shows, Stalin, as general secretary, took quiet control
early on of operational direction, information flow, and strategic
leadership of the political police. If the Soviet political police became
a state within the state, it was surely Stalin’s state. If the waxing and
waning power of the political police depended on its changing func-
tions, it was primarily Stalin who defined those functions. The history
of the Soviet political police and the history of Stalin are inseparable.
The growth of police authority and prestige depended on Stalin’s pa-
tronage and his use of it to achieve his goal of personal dictatorship,
and to implement policies that he believed furthered the interests of
 Introduction 3

Soviet power. Conversely, Stalin relied on the political police, first and
foremost, to secure his undisputed power. In other words, Stalin’s rise
to power, and his dictatorship, cannot be understood apart from the
history of the Soviet political police, and the development and power
of the political police cannot be understood apart from Stalin’s rise to
power.
To say that Stalin’s personal involvement had a profound effect on
the way the police operated is not to say that the various heads of the
police were passive. Each head placed his mark on the agency, espe-
cially in personnel choices, each bringing in his own “clan,” adminis-
trative organization, and operational culture. Feliks Dzerzhinsky was
a powerful Party leader in his own right. He fought relentlessly to
maintain and expand the authority of the police throughout the
period of budget and personnel cuts of the early 1920s. He fully sup-
ported and helped Stalin in strengthening the authority and scope of
practice of the police, and he died before coming into serious conflict
with Stalin. V. R. Menzhinsky, chosen by Dzerzhinsky as a deputy,
was a cultured, even an effete man, often sickly, but still ruthless.
Despite his debilitating bouts of angina, Menzhinsky masterminded
some of the most successful Soviet espionage campaigns of the 1920s,
and he scripted and stage-managed the first major show trials under
Stalin in the late 1920s and 1930s.4 Increasingly ill, Menzhinsky ced-
ed many of his duties in the late 1920s and early 1930s to his deputy,
Genrikh Yagoda. Yagoda, then Nikolai Yezhov, were competent
administrators, but they were Stalin’s creatures, even though Yagoda
had originally been promoted by Dzerzhinsky. Yagoda and Yezhov
did Stalin’s bidding, and when they outlived their usefulness, or
became a perceived threat, Stalin rid himself of them. In 1951, Stalin
also executed A. S. Abakumov, whom he had appointed in 1946 to
head the Ministry of State Security. As with Yagoda and Yezhov, Stalin
concocted a conspiracy that implicated Abakumov and led to his
arrest and death. Lavrentii Beria, the last of the state security heads
under Stalin, proved a wary survivor of Stalin’s machinations. He
managed to outlive Stalin, as did his protégé, V. N. Merkulov, also
head of state security during several years in World War II. Both Beria
and Merkulov, however, were arrested and executed in 1953 as part
of the power struggle among Stalin’s successors in the ruling group of
the Communist Party.5
During the late 1920s and the 1930s, as documents in chapters
2 and 3 reveal, the power of the political police in the Soviet Union
grew rapidly during Stalin’s dictatorial regime. Most histories explain
4 Introduction

this power of the police during the 1930s as the consequence of Sta-
lin’s intensifying policies of political repression and of his personal
penchant to see enemies everywhere. Certainly, political repression
intensified under Stalin’s style of personal despotism, but historians’
fixation on political forms of repression misses much of what the
political police actually did during the 1930s. As the documents in the
following chapters show, it expanded its jurisdiction and functions
during the 1920s and 1930s in a number of different areas. These
included revolutionary transformation of the countryside, social
order in urban areas, ethnic cleansing and border protection, resi-
dence and migration control, and forced labor policing.
The scope and scale of police activities expanded dramatically in the
very first years of the 1930s, during the collectivization drives. These
campaigns were designed to end private farming, and to bring arable
farm lands under state control. Farms and villages were gathered
together into large administrative units under Party and police control
as collective or state farms. Official propaganda described this process
as one of socialist reconstruction of rural life, and resistance was attrib-
uted to capitalist class hostility. Peasants who resisted were called kulaks
and, as part of the process of collectivization, they were “dekulakized.”
Peasants’ property was confiscated, and those identified as kulaks
were arrested and deported, or shot. As Lynne Viola and others have
described, resistance was widespread, and state violence brutal and sys-
tematic in response. Official propaganda described the violence of the
collectivization campaigns in terms of class war, but collectivization, as
chapter 3 shows, amounted to a broad social war to bring the country-
side under the regime’s control. During that war, the political police, the
OGPU, engaged in large-scale operations of mass suppression, arrest,
and deportation, aimed against the country’s rural inhabitants.6
These campaigns of mass repression were part of a process designed
to extend state power into the countryside, and to eradicate, either
by shooting or by deportation, social opposition to Soviet power
among the country’s peasantry. Once inaugurated, however, this revo-
lutionary war mutated into a protracted and insidious social war on
a broad scale. Stalin’s industrial revolution and class war in the coun-
tryside created social dislocation on an apocalyptic scale. Widespread
dispossession of property, wholesale deportations, and forced popula-
tion migration characterized the early years of the 1930s. Dispos-
sessed and often starving, hundreds of thousands of peasants and
other rural inhabitants, as well as those in former professional classes,
took to the rail lines and roads and streamed into and through the
 Introduction 5

cities and industrial sites. Famine conditions in the early 1930s and
severe shortages of all goods, due to Stalin’s industrial priorities, ex-
acerbated the movement of masses of people—to escape famine-
stricken areas, to find food and other necessities, to avoid political
discrimination, to seek a better life, even just to survive. This unorga-
nized movement of people drained economic resources and threat-
ened to overwhelm the underdeveloped infrastructure of the cities and
the social stability of the country. Large numbers of indigents and
itinerants, criminals, unemployed youth, gypsies, the disenfranchised,
and a range of other groups added to these mass migrations. Social
displacement on such a scale heightened criminality and social disor-
der, and posed an imminent danger to the state and the goals of
socialist construction.
The regime’s policies created widespread social disorder, but the
Soviet state possessed inadequate resources to deal with it. Social
agencies were weak and quickly overwhelmed, and the state’s civil
policing agencies also experienced difficulty coping with the problems
that suddenly confronted them. As a result, the country’s leaders
turned to the political police to bring order to the country. Under the
command of Stalin’s police chief Genrikh Yagoda, and with Stalin’s
backing, the political police expanded operational and administrative
authority to take over institutions and problems of social governance,
one after another—migration and trade, indigence, the unemployed,
civil and residence registration and census taking, orphan children
and related problems of juvenile delinquency, and a massive wave of
petty criminality. Chapter 4 documents this political police involve-
ment in social governance.
As political police were drawn deeper into upholding social order,
they incorporated and subordinated the civil police in an attempt to
create an integrated system of surveillance and control of the popula-
tion. Encroachment of political police into areas of civil governance
was not entirely new in the 1930s, but the scale of intervention during
the 1930s was unprecedented for a peacetime period. This conflation
of public order with state security was unique to the Stalinist era and
fundamentally reshaped the repressive policies of the Soviet regime.7
More than that, the forced removal, redistribution, or elimination of
suspect populations reached a level of mass social engineering that
was also unique to the Stalinist era. Neither in the 1920s, nor after
Stalin’s death in 1953, did the Soviet regime employ methods of mass
police repression to try to maintain social order, or to restructure the
social, ethnic, and territorial boundaries of the country.
6 Introduction

There was an incremental logic to the escalating use of police and

repression. Once Stalin used force, Stalin needed force. He began the
decade with a state-sponsored revolutionary war in the countryside,
but he then needed increasingly ubiquitous force to deal with the mas-
sive social dislocation and crises that resulted from the industrial and
agrarian chaos of the early 1930s. Reading the successive documents
in this collection gives a sense of a regime not so much building social-
ism by plan, but lurching from one crisis to another, each caused by
official policies, but each unanticipated by the country’s leaders.
Given the concomitant breakdown of civil governance, it is under-
standable how police authority flowed in to fill the vacuum left by an
undergoverned state and a fragmented and increasingly ungovernable
society.8
Incrementalism notwithstanding, the merging of political and civil
police and the conflation of state security and social order were not
just the result of cumulative circumstances. There was an ideological
basis for the politicization of social order, and it came about with
Stalin’s 1933 declaration of victory in the struggle to win the class war
against socialism and Soviet power. In the plenary meetings of the
Party’s Central Committee of that year, Stalin declared that with the
successful completion of his industrialization and agrarian policies,
the socialist offensive had succeeded, the remnants of capitalism had
been routed, and the victory of socialism had been assured. With that
pronouncement, definitions of deviancy, criminality, or other unac-
ceptable forms of behavior changed. If crime and deviancy could be
accepted and even tolerated as part of the compromise with capitalism
of the 1920s, such tolerance was no longer possible after Stalin’s an-
nouncement of socialist victory. As the documents in chapter 4 show,
social disorder could be explained as nothing else but class hostility
toward the new Soviet order, and as sabotage of Stalin’s grand project
to build socialism. And in Stalin’s famous dictum, the forces of disor-
der would intensify the further the country moved along the road to
socialism, which, in turn, justified and required the increasing use of
force and police authority. As the reproduction of Stalin’s speech
shows, the merging of political and civil policing functions resulted
from more than the logic of historical circumstances. The ideology of
socialist victory made social order a major priority of state security,
and a part of the operational sphere of the political police during the
1930s.9
In 1934, in accordance with the broadened scope of OGPU activities,
the political police was reorganized into a different organization, a
 Introduction 7

Chief Administration for State Security (Glavnoe Upravlenie Gosu-

darstvennoi Bezopasnosti), or GUGB. In turn, the GUGB was incorpo-
rated as the main administration into a new central state Commissariat
for Internal Affairs, the NKVD (Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennykh
Del). The civil police, the militsiia (Glavnoe Upravlenie Raboche-
krest’ianskoi Militsii, GURKM) was subordinated to the GUGB within
the NKVD. Documents in chapter 4 follow this reorganization.
It is tempting to call what Stalin created a police state, but this is
not an entirely accurate characterization. Although powerful, police
and policing policies remained under the control of Stalin and the
small group of ruling elite of the Communist Party. What evolved
during the 1930s might be more appropriately called martial law
socialism, or, literally, militarized socialism. “Militarization” (voen-
nizatsiia) was the term that Yagoda and others used to describe the
integration of the civil and political police, and it is an appropriate
description. The merging of the two did, indeed, “militarize” the civ-
il police, as well as bring the political police into the arena of social
governance.10 Specifically, this merging created a kind of militarized
social gendarmerie, similar, in some ways, to the kinds of gendarme
forces that existed in Russia prior to the Revolution, and which
operated in European states during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. As documents in chapter 4 show, the task of Stalin’s politi-
cal and civil police was to maintain political and, more broadly, social
order in the country.11
As the functions of the political police expanded, so did its num-
bers. Beginning with collectivization, the police never again under Sta-
lin worried about cuts in budget or personnel. Both expanded, though
never fast enough to keep pace with the increasing operational bur-
dens. Systematic increases in numbers are difficult to document, and
even more difficult to analyze for what they include and exclude, but
documents give some idea of the expansion in police numbers and
budgets, and in what areas, during the early and mid-1930s. As these
documents show, high police officials put significant effort into reduc-
ing the top-heavy character of central police administration and
strengthening the operational effectiveness of local police networks.
Documents also show that police spent much time and effort attempt-
ing to perfect secret techniques of broad social surveillance. Although
civil police administered the internal passport system, inaugurated in
1933, the political police utilized it to gather and catalog information
about broad segments of the population. Similarly, they attempted
to integrate material gathered from informant networks to augment
8 Introduction

surveillance, with the information compiled into registry catalogs

(kartoteki). Neither the passport nor the informant system worked as
effectively as police heads hoped. The informant system, in particular,
proved ineffective, and state control surveys of police catalogs re-
vealed many gaps and inadequacies. Still, as the documents in chapter
4 reveal, police during the 1930s moved from being an agency that
targeted real or potential political opponents to an agency that
attempted to develop surveillance systems to track and account for the
whole of the population.
Developing technologies of mass surveillance went hand in hand
with active shaping of the population through mass actions, such as
deportations, the creation of restrictive settlements and regions, and
the control of geographic space through restrictions on migration,
residence registration, and work. Police enforced such restrictions
mainly through the passport system, but political and civil police also
engaged in specially approved campaigns of mass deportation of
suspect populations in border zones and other strategic areas such as
industrial and major urban centers, and even in resort areas of the
political elite. In this way, the police came to play a significant role in
forming the geographic as well as social and ethnic construction of
Soviet socialism during the 1930s.
As documents in chapter 4 show, much of the activity of the police
during the middle years of the 1930s revolved around forms of mass
social and ethnic repression—the struggle against so-called social aliens
and anti-Soviet elements—and in developing techniques of mass sur-
veillance. The assassination of Sergei Kirov, the Leningrad party chief,
in December 1934 altered police operational priorities. Police did not
abandon social order forms of policing or mass forms of repression
and surveillance, but, pressured by political leaders, Stalin in particu-
lar, police became increasingly consumed by, and then obsessed with,
a frenzied hunt for spies, saboteurs, agents of hostile foreign powers,
and conspiratorial organizations plotting to overthrow the Soviet re-
gime. All these “enemies of the people” were supposedly linked to
Stalin’s former rivals, Leon Trotsky, Nikolai Bukharin, Grigorii Zino-
viev, and others. Shaken by Kirov’s assassination, Stalin unleashed and
drove forward a relentless hunt for hidden enemies and conspirators.
His focus became so obsessive that it overwhelmed and subsumed
other state priorities, and led the Politburo to codify his fears in a new
set of statutes for the political police. The new statutes, approved in
April 1935, focused the chief task of the police on the struggle against
“treason, spying, counterrevolution, terror, wrecking, subversive acts,
 Introduction 9

and other antistate crimes …”12 This new directive did not entirely
supplant Stalin’s 1933 emphasis on socially alien and anti-Soviet social
elements, but linked the social order campaigns to ever more urgent
and ever more deadly political priorities.
As documents in chapter 5 reveal, through 1935 and into 1936 and
1937, political police investigations of supposedly conspiratorial
organizations gained momentum and affected every branch of the
state, the economy, the military, and cultural and social institutions.
Purges, arrests, and interrogations followed by the hundreds and then
the thousands as each purge, each arrest, each interrogation revealed
an ever widening network of conspirators and secret oppositionists.
Communist Party organizations were not immune from this spiral of
suspicion and violence, as the police engaged in a systematic review of
all card-holding members and all former members. The Politburo was
careful to remind police not to act arbitrarily against Party members,
and to work closely with local leaders, but this was a formality. Stalin
was convinced that the Party was riddled with secret oppositionists,
and directed police purges to investigate particular Party heads and
whole organizations. No Party member was immune. Moreover, by
decree of 27 July 1936, police no longer needed Party sanction or re-
view to appoint investigators to local posts. Although some state pros-
ecutors (prokurory) still challenged the legality of police methods,
they too were subject to accusation and investigation if they interfered
too much. By the end of 1936, the political police was nearing its ze-
nith of power as an institution answerable to no one but Stalin.
With the political police protected by and working under Stalin’s
direct supervision, its power was unassailable, but that was not true
of individual police officials. By the end of 1936, Stalin had grown
suspicious of his own political police chief, Yagoda. Documents in
chapters 5 and 6 depict Yagoda’s fall from grace and power, the purge
of his entourage, and his replacement by Nikolai Yezhov and a new
cadre of officials. Despite the partial opening of archives, the reasons
for Yagoda’s purge are still unclear, although Yezhov’s intrigues no
doubt contributed to Stalin’s suspicions. In the end, we can only
accept at face value that Stalin, for his own reasons, truly believed that
Yagoda had failed in his duties, and that he was connected with
oppositionists, agents of foreign powers, and other anti-Soviet plots.13
The year 1936 brought not only an escalation in police activity and
violence, but also the first of the three great Moscow show trials. More
trials followed in 1937, both public and secret, and the final major
trial of old Party leaders, and of Yagoda, in 1938. Yezhov headed the
10 Introduction

police apparatus from December 1936 until his own fall from power
in late 1938, but during his two short years of tenure, Yezhov oversaw
some of the bloodiest purges of the entire Stalinist era. These included
not only arrests of so-called enemies, but widespread mass purges of
certain categories of the population, among them various ethnic
groups that the regime regarded as potentially hostile because of cross-
border ties—what Terry Martin has called enemy nations within
Soviet borders.14
Explaining the mass purges of the late 1930s is a problem, of
course, since there is little documentation about their origins, and they
directly contradicted the line put forward by Stalin’s new head of
police, Nikolai Yezhov, beginning in late 1936, to move the NKVD
away from social policing functions.15 There are many explanations
that have recently been put forward, but the one that still makes the
most sense is that put forward by Oleg Khlevniuk, namely that Stalin
was increasingly convinced of a coming invasion. In that event, the
Soviet leader feared an insurgency uprising among disaffected popula-
tions in the Soviet Union, which would repeat the success of insur-
gency movements in Spain that helped bring about the military defeat
of the Loyalist forces. This is the well-known fifth column argument,
and it is the only argument that makes sense of both the timing and
the level of violence of the mass purges.16
Each of these supposed threats—class opposition, social disorder,
underground political subversion, and national contamination—had
generated separate political responses and operational policies
throughout the 1930s. These concerns and policy lines converged in
the great purges. By 1937, leaders were convinced that oppositionists,
working with foreign agents, were actively organizing socially dis-
affected populations into an insurgency movement. Leaders worried
that invasion, which seemed increasingly likely in the late 1930s,
would be the signal for armed uprisings by these groups, as well as by
purportedly disaffected ethnic minorities. Indeed, the threat of war
was the final and key element, and it gave the mass purges their
particular political urgency and virulence.
Domestic as well as international factors contributed to the organi-
zation of mass purges, and the documents in chapter 6 show the grow-
ing concern of leaders, especially at local levels, about renewed asser-
tions of rights by groups regarded as potentially troublesome. Key
here were returning kulaks, freed en masse in 1935 and 1936, after
serving sentences in penal colonies. Officially banned from leaving
their regions of exile, kulak peasants nonetheless found their way
 Introduction 11

back to their home districts in large numbers, and demanded restitu-

tion of property and rights. Emboldened also were other marginal
groups, especially clerical and religious ones, who believed, and
rightly so, that the new constitution, promulgated in 1936, gave them
protection from persecution. A new census process was begun in late
1936 and 1937, and the results shocked both local and national lead-
ers by the impoverished and primitive conditions in which much of
the population lived. Speeches at the Party’s February and March
1937 plenum reveal a sense close to that of being besieged, and this
sense gained urgency, not only in conditions of prewar tension, but
also because of upcoming elections to a new national ruling body, the
Supreme Soviet. There is no doubt that Stalin was secure in his politi-
cal power, but for a number of reasons, leaders became convinced that
a mass purge of the population was necessary and urgent.
The documents in chapter 6 lay bare the mechanisms and the phas-
es of both the social and the nationality operations. They also show
the haste that characterized the operations’ preparation and execu-
tion. Only several weeks separated the first announcement of a gen-
eral social purge, on 2 July 1937, and the onset of the purge process
in late July and early August. During that time, and throughout the
operations, central and local officials negotiated up and down the
numbers to be purged, and in which category they were to be placed—
the most dangerous to be shot, others to be sent to camps or exile. In
the hectic weeks of July, meetings were arranged, briefings held,
operational groups assembled, and sentencing boards, troikas, were
named. As the documents show, these operations were monitored and
controlled from the center, primarily by Stalin, but also by Yezhov.
Nonetheless, purging was a chaotic as well as a bloody business, and
the haste with which operations were implemented intensified the in-
herent chaos. Central authorities spent much time reprimanding and
even removing and arresting local leaders either for lack of diligence
or for overstepping their purge limits.17
The nationality operations overlapped and followed on from the
mass social operations.18 The latter peaked in December 1937 and
early 1938, while the former intensified throughout 1938. Using a
Politburo order, Stalin brought the mass operations to a halt on 17
November 1938, and soon after, the Politburo nullified the various
operational orders that covered the purges. By this time, Stalin had
already removed Yezhov and appointed a new political police head,
Lavrentii Beria, who in turn oversaw the purge of Yezhov’s command,
and most of the major officers who had carried out the previous
12 Introduction

operations. This purge was carried out under the pretext of the illegal-
ity of the entire process and, unbelievably, on the basis of charges that
Yezhov, and those around him, had operated as foreign agents dedi-
cated to the subversion of the Soviet regime. In other words, Yezhov’s
command was purged for exactly the same reasons as Yagoda and his
staff.
Beginning in 1939, Stalin and the Politburo reasserted the primacy
of the Party and Procuracy organs in supervising the work of the
NKVD, and in reviewing appointments at all levels. Procuracy offi-
cials, in turn, began to conduct mass reviews of sentencing and inves-
tigative practices from 1937 and 1938, but Stalin did not go from one
extreme to another. Although Beria conducted a significant purge of
the political police leaders, he also defended local organs against what
he regarded as excessive interference by Procuracy officials, and from
retribution by Party organs. Similarly, Stalin had to strike a delicate
balance of relations between the military and the security police, and
the police and the Party, since animosity ran high against the NKVD.
Documents in chapter 7 reveal Stalin’s attempt to reestablish a work-
ing governmental system after the great purges.
Mass repression by political police did not end with the great
purges, of course, but campaigns targeted different populations after
1938, as documents in chapters 7 and 8 show. Categorical forms of
mass deportations, for example, continued to hit ethnic communities
hard inside the pre–1939 borders of the country, as they did in the
new territories annexed in 1939 and reoccupied after 1945. Mass
administrative repression of “socially dangerous populations” also
continued in the new territories. In the occupied Baltic republics and
in the post–1939 western border regions of Ukraine and Belorussia,
security forces and civil police carried out the same kinds of mass
social and political repression that had been characteristic of the mid–
1930s.19 Inside the country’s pre–1939 borders, however, the role of
the security forces shifted during and after the war years. Instead of
mass social repression of “anti-Soviet elements,” the NKVD returned
to more traditional tasks of spying (abroad as well as domestically),
seeking out supposed political enemies of the regime, and on expand-
ed tasks of monitoring economic sectors and enterprises, especially in
those supplying defense needs. Dealing with criminals, social margin-
als, and other supposedly “anti-Soviet elements” became, as it had
been in the 1920s, the domain of the civil police, the militsiia, and fell
under civil law jurisdiction rather than under the extrajudicial politi-
cal powers of the state’s security organs.
 Introduction 13

By the beginning of 1941, the NKVD was an unwieldy commissari-

at. It functioned as a state security organization, a major economic
administration, an investigative organization, a social policing force,
and a domestic surveillance organization. It protected borders, admin-
istered the civil police, oversaw a massive labor camp and colony sys-
tem, and operated as an international espionage agency. The NKVD
had indeed become Stalin’s state within the state. Despite its size and
power, however, the NKVD had suffered from the great purges in an
analogous manner to the institutions that it had purged. The arrest of
Yezhov and the purge of the command and operational structures had
left the agency in disarray. This was especially true of its espionage
systems abroad. Stories of individual spies, such as Viktor Sorge, oper-
ating in Japan, are well known, even legendary, but the regular net-
works in countries such as France, Germany, Britain, Canada, and the
United States lacked staff and agents. Soviet spy networks had col-
lapsed, and this left Moscow without a workable intelligence system.
Counterespionage activities of foreign governments could not have
disrupted Soviet intelligence gathering any more successfully than
Stalin’s purges. In order to streamline administration, and to rebuild an
effective system, Beria recommended to Stalin a major overhaul, to
separate operational sectors into a separate administration. Creation
of a Commissariat of State Security (NKGB), separate from the Com-
missariat of Internal Affairs, the NKVD, occurred in February 1941.
The newly proposed NKGB encompassed the state security organs,
while the civil police remained within the NKVD.
Reorganization of the security agencies occurred almost on the eve
of war. And while Stalin received reports of German intentions to
invade the Soviet Union, he dismissed these as part of a British disin-
formation campaign designed to goad the USSR into a war with
Germany. Stalin expected war, and he continued to build the country’s
military readiness at an intensive pace, but he knew none of the specif-
ics of Hitler’s Barbarossa plan of invasion, which came about on
22 June 1941. In October 1941, Stalin and the Politburo leaders re-
united the internal and security commissariats, and postponed reorga-
nization until 1943. In that year, the security organs were once again
separated into a separate commissariat, the NKGB, while the civil
police remained in the NKVD.
Many of the activities of the security police during the war are
documented in chapter 7, especially the mass deportations of different
nationalities and the infamous slaughter of Polish military personnel
and other prisoners in 1940.20 Stalin also relied on the security forces
14 Introduction

to purge territories in front of advancing or retreating German troops,

and to round up and imprison or execute deserters from the Soviet
military forces. Beria, as head of the NKVD and the Politburo mem-
ber most concerned with security forces, kept Stalin informed about
all the activities of the police and paramilitary security units. As the
tide of the war turned, and as Soviet forces moved across Soviet bor-
ders, militarized security units followed, purging territories freed from
German occupation. In the reoccupied Baltic and western border re-
gions, as documents in chapters 7 and 8 show, Soviet security forces
encountered serious armed opposition, which continued in these areas
well into the postwar years. Opposition was so strong that special
internal forces of the civil police and the NKVD were reintegrated
under command of the state security agency, the NKGB. In 1946, this
commissariat, like all commissariats, was renamed as a ministry, the
Ministry of State Security (MGB), while the NKVD was renamed the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Suppressing resistance, purging,
and sovietizing the new republics and the western border areas of
Ukraine and Belorussia became a major preoccupation of both Soviet
leaders and the state’s security forces.21
As documents in chapter 8 show, much of the purging of new ter-
ritories was carried out in the same way as the mass social operations
of 1937 and 1938, but inside the 1939 borders of the Soviet Union,
state security forces did not generally engage in the kind of politicized
social policing and repression that characterized the prewar years.
This is not to say that mass repression ended. On the contrary, it
shifted focus and purpose. Millions of people found themselves under
arrest and then convicted for infractions of labor discipline, antitheft,
and other harsh laws associated with Stalin’s extractive policies of
economic reconstruction. However, these people were convicted by
judicial courts rather than by police administrative boards, and for
specific violations of laws rather than for potential disloyalty based on
a suspect social or ethnic background. In the realm of social politics,
people were repressed for what they did rather than who they were.
After the war, Stalin and other leaders employed political police
methods—the kind of secret, extrajudicial policing that dominated
the 1930s—primarily in the country’s new territories, as well as in
some regions of the Caucasus. In these areas, leaders perceived that
the security of the state was at risk, as local authorities faced serious
insurgency movements against Soviet rule all along the country’s new
borders. Inside the pre–1939 territories, in contrast, leaders depoliti-
cized social order policing and the fight against criminality, even as
 Introduction 15

they increased the role of civil police and courts in the effort to exert
a kind of social and economic discipline over the population.
This shift in policies of repression reflected reforms designed to
separate civil from political policing. In the postwar years, a series of
bureaucratic reorganizations hived off the civil police from the state
security organs and placed the former under the Ministry of the Inte-
rior, the MVD, which also operated most of the regime’s labor camps.
The state security ministry, MGB, operated only a new series of spe-
cial regime camps for political prisoners. To those sentenced to pris-
ons, camps, colonies, or penal settlements, the difference maybe mat-
tered little between being arrested by political or civil police. But there
was a difference, and a significant one. Social policing during the post-
war years was not nearly as deadly as it was in the 1930s, and this
change reflected a general demilitarization of the social sphere, if not
a reduction in the numbers of people who experienced the coercive
power of the state. So, the goal, and therefore the methods, of policing
changed from the 1930s to the postwar years. No longer was social
policing aimed at isolating or eliminating enemies of the state. Instead,
leaders employed mass coercion to discipline a society in the service
of the goals of state economic reconstruction.
Documents in the final chapter highlight the mechanisms of these
changes, as well as the ongoing tensions between military intelligence
organs and the state security departments assigned to monitor the mili-
tary. As well, this chapter reveals the role played by the security police
in Stalin’s last major purge campaigns, especially that against Leningrad
Party leaders, and the role of the MGB in the intensifying anti-Zionist
and anti-Semitic policies and purges under Stalin. These policies culmi-
nated in the infamous Doctors’ Plot, a fictitious plot by Kremlin physi-
cians, most of whom were Jewish, supposedly to murder Stalin.
It is not clear how Stalin intended to use the last conspiracies that
he concocted. The dictator died in the first week of March 1953, and
his successors quickly dropped the fiction of the Doctors’ Plot. Within
weeks, they also acted, once again, to purge the security police, this
time ridding themselves of Beria and dismantling the security organ’s
empire, subordinating it once and for all to the collective leadership
of the Party and the government.
As the documents in this book attest, the history of Soviet state
political and security organs is incontrovertibly tied to the history of
Iosif Stalin and his rule. As such, this book is not just a story about
police and repression; it is also a history of Stalinism, and a history of
the Soviet Union in the first half of the twentieth century.
This page intentionally left blank
 chapter one

Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

1922–1927

L
ate in the evening of 24 October 1917, detachments of armed
revolutionaries seized key points in Russia’s capital city, Petro-
grad. The detachments operated under the authority of the So-
cialist Revolutionary Council of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants. In
fact, these revolutionary guards took orders from leaders of the major
faction in the Council, the Bolshevik faction, especially Vladimir Len-
in and Leon Trotsky. The actions of the guards on that October night
deposed the weak provisional government, and Lenin and the Bolshe-
viks moved quickly to consolidate governmental power in their hands.
The next day, Lenin announced the formation of an almost exclu-
sively Bolshevik government, the beginning of a dictatorship. Lenin’s
actions precipitated a revolutionary war that the Bolsheviks managed
not only to survive, but to win against considerable odds. They were
able to hold and extend their power for a number of reasons, one of
which was the formation and ruthless actions of the Cheka, the Ex-
traordinary Commission to Combat Counterrevolution and Sabo-
tage. Under Lenin’s orders, the Cheka carried out systematic policies
of “Red terror,” that is, summary executions, against suspected ene-
mies of the regime. The agency grew in size and number and became
the “fighting arm” of the Bolshevik Party and government.
By spring 1921, the Bolshevik regime had defeated organized mili-
tary opposition, but faced a range of difficult problems. After years of
war, famine was killing millions of people, mass migration was empty-
ing cities, and a militarized economy could not produce goods for
civilian life. While the Bolsheviks had maintained political power
primarily through military force, they ruled over a chaotic, nearly

17
18 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

nonexistent state; the government had no constitutional form. Faced

with these problems, Lenin and the Bolshevik Central Committee now
had to manage the transition from a wartime to a peacetime govern-
ment, economy, and society. This transition, begun in spring 1921,
came to be known as the New Economic Policy, or NEP. It involved a
dismantling of the nationalized and militarized war economy of the
Civil War era, and creation of a mixed market and state-run economy.
As a “partial retreat” from War Communism, the NEP also required
the reintroduction of a money economy instead of state rationing, and
this transition not only impoverished many people, it also placed eco-
nomic and even state institutions in dire financial straits.

The Cheka Reborn

Among other issues, the transition to NEP required the demobiliza-
tion of millions of fighting soldiers. The transition from a revolution-
ary government also raised the question of the Cheka. It had been
created as an extraordinary institution in a time of revolutionary war.
By contrast, NEP involved a partial relaxation of repression, and an
attempt to create a legal structure appropriate for a socialist society at
peace. What role would an extraordinary organ of revolutionary jus-
tice play in this new era? Was it needed, still? Should it take a different
form? The defeat of the revolution’s enemies left the agency with no
further function, according to critics, especially under a government
that had fought to overthrow a tyrannical police state. Those critics
were no minor figures, but important Bolshevik leaders such as Niko-
lai Bukharin, one of the original revolutionary leaders, and one of the
strong supporters of NEP. Other critics included the finance commis-
sar, Georgii Sokol’nikov, and the justice commissar, Dmitrii Kursky.1
In 1922, these three, along with strong supporters of the Cheka in-
cluding Iosif Unshlikht, its deputy head, and Iosif Stalin, the newly ap-
pointed general secretary of the Communist Party, were enjoined by the
Politburo to form a commission that would eliminate the Cheka and
reorganize it as a “political administration” under control of the gov-
erning state body, the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom). At
the local administrative level of the raion, this new political police was
to be subordinated to the local Soviet government councils and, at
the center, both to Sovnarkom and to VTsIK, the Central Executive
Committee of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet. These latter organs
formed the main branch of the government. VTsIK was the chief
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 19

governmental council of the Russian Soviet state and, formally at least,

separate from the Communist Party.
The charter statutes of this new political administration redefined
the name, image, and function of the Cheka. As the following
documents show, the new State Political Administration (GPU) also
retained broad powers, including the right to establish, or continue,
extra-judicial sentencing boards.

d o c u m en t
· 1 ·
Note from I. S. Unshlikht to V. M. Molotov on delivery to the Politburo of
statutes of the GPU, its province-level and transport departments, and its
district-level plenipotentiaries. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 49–62.
6 March 1922

Herewith are attached 3 copies, confirmed by the commission, for the

Politburo session: 1st, Statute of the Gospolitupravlenie (GPU); 2nd, Stat-
ute of province-level departments of the GPU; 3rd, Statute of transport
departments of the GPU; 4th, Statute of district [uezdnykh] plenipoten-
tiaries of province-level departments of the GPU. Statute of special de-
partments of the GPU, sent to comrade Skliansky for agreement.
[…]
Deputy chairman of the GPU Unshlikht
Confirmed by the commission
22.1.22.
In addition, and for further development of VTsIK decision from 6
February 1922, the following was confirmed:
Statute of the State Political Administration (GPU)

I. General provisions
1. The State Political Administration (in abbreviated form, GPU) is sub-
ordinated to the NKVD [People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs].
2. The chairman of the GPU is the people’s commissar of internal affairs
or his deputy, appointed by SNK [Sovnarkom].
3. A Collegium under the chairman of the GPU, members of which are
to be appointed by SNK, will resolve major issues and determine di-
rections of work, as well as questions that require coordination be-
tween departments.
4. In order to accomplish goals assigned to the GPU, it will organize
local offices:
20 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

a) Province-level departments of the GPU subordinated to the GIKs

[executive committees of provincial soviets];
b) Oblast departments of the GPU subordinated to TsIKs of
autonomous republics and oblasts;
c) Special departments of the GPU for military fronts, military dis-
tricts, and armies; special departments for border protection units;
d) Transport departments of the GPU for railroads and waterways;
e) Plenipotentiary representatives of the GPU for unifying, leading,
and coordinating work of local offices of outlying territories, and
in autonomous republics and oblasts.
5. The GPU is an institution with strictly centralized management. It has
the same rights as operating units of the Red Army in terms of using
railroads and waterways, and state communication facilities (tele-
graph, telephone and radio communication); receiving supplies of
rations and uniforms for its employees; and other advantages con-
nected to this Statute (according to the decision of the STO [Council
of Labor and Defense] from 17 September 1920).
6. All permanent employees of the GPU and its local organs are
considered on active military duty and carry all the rights, duties, and
advantages connected with that status.
7. Budget estimates of the GPU are to be affirmed by SNK; all
estimates of local organs are to be included and affirmed within the
general estimate of the GPU.
8. The GPU has at its disposal special forces, which are organized into
a free-standing Army of the State Political Administration, and which
are fully subordinated to the chairman of the State Political Admin-
istration. The strength of the army is to be determined by the STO.
[…]

II. Goals of the State Political Administration

10. Goals of the GPU are:
a) Prevention and suppression of open counterrevolutionary actions
(both political and economic);
b) Struggle against any kind of banditry and armed revolts;
c) Struggle against obviously criminal relations of employees
toward their duties, as well as uncovering counterrevolutionary
organizations and persons whose activities are directed toward
undermining economic organs of the Republic;
d) Protection of state secrets and struggle against espionage in all of its
forms (surveillance, wrecking, political, military, and economic);
e) Protection of railroads and waterways, struggle against theft of
cargoes and against crimes that have goals of destroying transpor-
tation facilities or reducing the carrying capacity of transportation;
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 21

f) Political protection of borders of the RSFSR, struggle against

both economic and political contraband, and illegal border
crossing;
g) Implementation of special tasks, assigned by VTsIK and SNK, to
protect revolutionary order.

III. Means to accomplish assigned tasks

11. In order to accomplish its tasks, the GPU is authorized to engage in
the following activities: Use of informants, search and seizure,
surveillance, arrest, confiscation, interrogation, preliminary investi-
gative activities, and [surveillance] registration of individuals:
a) Collection and communication of any information, political or
economic, to appropriate state organizations, which may be
relevant to the task of fighting counterrevolution.
b) Agent surveillance of criminal or suspicious individuals, groups,
or organizations within the territory of the RSFSR, and outside
its borders.
c) Issuing of exit and entrance permits to the RSFSR to foreign and
Russian citizens;
d) Deportation of unreliable foreign citizens from the RSFSR;
e) Reading correspondence, both internal and foreign;
[…]
h) Registration of persons apprehended or suspected of criminal
activity and their affairs; registration of unreliable administrative
and supervising personnel of state institutions, industrial enter-
prises, and command and administrative structures of the Red
Army.
Statistical and political development of [surveillance] registry data.
Registration and summarizing of abnormal phenomena of life in the
RSFSR, in order to understand the reasons for, and consequences of, such
phenomena.
12. The People’s Commissariat of Justice is responsible for general over-
sight of the legality of actions of the GPU and its local bodies.
“Confirmed” 24.II.–22 Enukidze, Krylenko, Unshlikht
“Confirmed” 5.II.–22 Stalin, Kamenev, Kursky, Unshlikht
As the GPU charter noted, the new political administration came
under control of Sovnarkom, as well as of VTsIK, which bodies ap-
pointed, or confirmed the appointment, of the agency’s personnel. At
the same time, the Party did not lose control over the GPU, the Polit-
buro passing a secret rider that ensured its primacy over matters of the
political police:
22 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

d o c u m ent
· 2 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b) [Political Bureau of
the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)].
On coordination of decisions of the Presidium of VtsIK, related to
the State Political Administration, with the Politburo. RGASPI, f. 17,
op. 3, d. 266, l. 5.
15 February 1922

Strictly confidential
No. 97, point 15-s—On coordination of the decisions of the Presidium
of VtsIK, related to the State Political Administration, with the Politburo.
(cc. [comrades] Enukidze, Unshlikht).
To charge c. Enukidze with personal responsibility to ensure that no
questions related to the State Political Administration be resolved by the
Presidium of VTsIK without preliminary approval by the Politburo.
Feliks Dzerzhinsky remained head of the GPU, and Unshlikht stayed
on as his active and energetic deputy. In several further riders, the
Politburo gave the GPU expanded authority to deal with banditry and
to strengthen civil police, drawing the latter under the influence if not
the administration of the political administration. From the begin-
ning, then, political police became increasingly drawn into the sphere
of civil governance, due to the underdevelopment of Soviet institu-
tions. This was to become a common pattern. Given the weakness of
civil police and the burden on the judicial system, leaders turned in-
creasingly to the political police.

d o c u m ent
· 3 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On extraordinary powers of the
GPU for struggle against banditry. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 290. l. 4.
27 April 1922

On granting the GPU the right of immediate execution of bandit

elements at the place of a crime (c. Unshlikht’s proposal) […]
a) To authorize the GPU to execute bandit elements (i.e. partici-
pants of armed robberies) captured at the moment of their crim-
inal action, at the place of the crime.
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 23

b) To entrust the commission consisting of cc. Kursky, Krylenko,

Kalinin, and Unshlikht with the juridical formulation of this de-
cision on behalf of the Presidium of VTsIK.
c) To entrust the same commission with the juridical formulation of
a decision to grant the GPU the right to exile criminal elements.
[… .]

d o c u m en t
· 4 ·
Note from I. S. Unshlikht to I. V. Stalin on additions to Statutes of
the State Political Administration. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, l. 92.
10 May 1922

Considering the impossibility of resolving a whole variety of cases through

legal procedures, and, at the same time, the necessity to rid ourselves of
brazen and harmful elements, the State Political Administration suggests
the following additions to our Statutes:
“In addition to and for further development of the Statute of the State
Political Administration of the Republic, from 6 February 1922, to em-
power the State Political Administration with the following rights:
a) administrative exile to certain provinces for a term of up to two
years for anti-Soviet activity, participation in espionage, banditry,
and counterrevolution;
b) administrative deportation, outside the RSFSR borders, of ill-
intentioned Russian and foreign citizens for a term of up to two
years.”
This decision should be published by the Presidium of VTsIK, so that
deportation abroad would guarantee us from unwarranted return of the
deportee. Simultaneously with the VTsIK decision, NKIu [the People’s
Commissariat of Justice] should add to the criminal code a statute on
punishment for entering Russia without proper cause. I would think, up
to two years in prison for illegal entrance, but if the purpose of entering is
clearly counterrevolutionary—then all the way up to capital punishment.
Deputy chairman of the GPU Unshlikht

Early Struggles
The Cheka had been a feared and powerful agency during the Civil
War era, but with the cessation of active military and revolutionary
activities, and with the transition to NEP, its fortunes faded quickly.
24 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

As the following document shows, the new GPU was not immune to
the same misfortunes as other parts of the new Soviet society, and al-
though material conditions improved quickly, at the beginning, at
least, GPU officials worried about the collapse of the organization.

d o c u m ent
· 5 ·
Letter of F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin on the difficult conditions
of GPU personnel, with letter from V. N. Mantsev appended. RGASPI,
f. 76, op. 3, d. 245, ll. 4–5.
6 July 1922

(To all members of the Polit and Orgbiuro [Politburo and Organization-
al Bureau] of TsK RKP)
Yesterday, 3.VII, at the Orgbiuro session, Secretary of the Donetsk
[Communist Party provincial committee’s] Orgbiuro reported on the im-
possibly difficult conditions of personnel in the provincial GPU adminis-
tration, on flight of communists from the GPU, of renouncing even their
Party membership, etc. (Orgbiuro heard similar reports from impartial
comrades.) The Kiev GPU administration, for example, survived from
February until May on only the 1.4 billion [sic] allocated them each
month. The [appended] memorandum from c. Mantsev pictures the situ-
ation in Ukraine, which is no worse than in the RSFSR. It is necessary to
turn serious attention to this. GPU organs are still necessary for the secu-
rity of the state.
At present, I have one request—to instruct Narkomfin [Commissariat of
Finance], Narkomprod [Commissariat of Food Supply], and Narkomvoen
[Commissariat of Military Affairs] to ensure that state allocations of food
and materials to us, as well as financial [allocations], not be fictional, but
be given to us in full, according to planned estimates. Only under these
conditions can we fight with an iron fist against corruption and reduce staff
to the maximum limit, selecting the best, and fulfilling our tasks.
With communist greetings, F. Dzherzhinsky
6 July 1922

[Letter from V. N. Mantsev]

20 June 1922
Respected comrade Dzherzhinsky
I am sending you this letter, in which I want to bring to your attention
the difficult conditions of GPU organs and personnel in Ukraine. I think
that this is a general issue, and in Russia the situation is hardly better. The
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 25

financial allocation that is paid to personnel is miserly, as is the food ra-

tion. An official, especially one with a family, can survive only by selling
everything he has on the open market. And he has very little. Because of
this, an official’s general work capability is lowered, his morale weakens,
his discipline falls, and extraordinary conditions are necessary in order to
force him to work even at half his previous [ability]. Moreover, there
have been several instances of suicide as a result of hunger and extreme
exhaustion. I personally have received letters from female personnel, in
which they write that they are forced into prostitution in order not to die
from hunger.
Tens, if not hundreds [of GPU personnel], are arrested and shot for
assault and robbery, and in all cases, it is established that they turn to
robbery because of systematic starvation. There is mass flight from the
Cheka. The decline in numbers of communist personnel is especially dan-
gerous. If, before, we had 60 percent communists, now we can barely
count 15 percent. Very often, if not daily, there are instances of [person-
nel] leaving the Party because of hunger and lack of material support.
And, those who are leaving are not the worst, the majority are of the
proletariat.
I do not think it necessary for me to draw conclusions from what is
written above. They are obvious. So, I must say the following. We have
tried all measures, along both Party and Soviet lines. We have gotten
some results. But it is just crumbs [groshi]. By the way, most help is
local. The Cheka lives mostly from its own means, rather than through
allocations from the center. The latter is so miserly, it cannot be taken
seriously.
Let me turn to the last [point]. The situation of the Cheka led the South-
ern Bureau of the VTsSPS [the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]
[…]to raise the question about [the Cheka] in one of its recent meetings,
which I attended. At the meeting, a mixed commission was chosen, from
us and from the Southern Bureau, to study the issue [of the Cheka]. And
this commission came to the following conclusion: the state cannot support
the Cheka apparatus to the full extent and, as a result, it is necessary to
reduce the [GPU] staff to the [minimum] limit and reduce the functions of
the GPU accordingly. But we already have reduced staff by 75 percent.
What else to cut? Do we have the authority to do that? Because the work
of the Cheka becomes more difficult and strained, and fulfilling it, even
with the current minimal number of personnel, has become more and more
difficult. There is only one way out—state power must understand, finally,
what kind of an institution the Cheka is, it [the Cheka] must be satisfied
fully [udovletvoriat’ polnost’iu], allocations must come [in the form of]
fully satisfactory credits. And state power should do this.
I ask that you raise this issue, for the danger is close of a final dissolu-
tion of the Cheka. And if the Cheka is not needed, then that needs to be
26 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

said directly and firmly. And then, we will act accordingly. Let me know
if you need material about the Cheka and its personnel.
With communist greetings
V. Mantsev
5.VII–22
Work conditions for GPU officials were, in fact, desperate, but no
more so than for many officials, especially for those in militarized sec-
tors of the state, such as in the police and the military. Apart from
Bukharin, Sokol’nikov, and Kursky, other leading Bolsheviks criti-
cized the GPU, and sought to cut it back. One of those critics was
Leon Trotsky. In a 23 November 1923 memorandum to Stalin as gen-
eral secretary, Trotsky criticized the appearance of GPU troops at a
parade on Red Square celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Octo-
ber Revolution. He wrote that “During the parade, a glaring abnor-
mality unfolded before the whole world,” referring to the review of
GPU forces—three infantry brigades, a unit of special forces, a mount-
ed unit, and artillery. Trotsky noted that if the foreign correspondents
at the parade understood that these were GPU forces, that fact alone
could be used against the Soviet state. In his opinion, the very exis-
tence of a GPU military force was uncalled for and unjustifiable. The
existence of a whole army with every kind of weapon belonging ex-
clusively to the GPU compromised the country in front of its friends
as well as enemies. Trotsky proposed severely cutting the GPU to no
more than 20,000 persons, and border forces to no more than 25,000.2
Overall numbers of personnel were rarely discussed openly, and it
is difficult to know how much of a cut Trotsky’s proposals constitut-
ed, or to what extent they were implemented. The power of the Fi-
nance Commissariat carried more significant weight, as Sokol’nikov
unilaterally cut the OGPU budget. As a result, the projected budget
for the GPU for 1923 dropped from 72 million rubles in December
1922 to an actual allocation of 58 million. Dzerzhinsky complained
that such cuts would lead to the complete disorganization of the orga-
nization, but the Politburo supported the cuts.3

The Intelligentsia, Mensheviks, and SRs: The First

Large-Scale Operations
That year, 1923, was the low point for the OGPU. In the coming
years, the situation improved, in part through rising wages and mate-
rial support, and through a reduction in personnel, as Mantsev’s letter
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 27

reflected. It is interesting to note, however, the indication, as expressed

by the Southern Trade Union Council, of at least some kind of popu-
lar sense in favor of eliminating the political police as no longer neces-
sary. At the same time, the Politburo concurred with Dzerzhinsky’s
counterclaim that the GPU was still necessary for state security; in-
deed, even as Mantsev was warning of the GPU’s dissolution, the Po-
litburo was gearing up to use it in its largest operations since the
Civil War. Those operations resulted from Lenin’s concern about anti-
Soviet attitudes among the professional and cultural elite, the intelli-
gentsia. Lenin’s directive about this, noted on the back of a letter of
spring 1922 from N. A. Semashko (Document 6), set in motion a
complex, but typical, process of responses by Politburo members—
Lenin himself, Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, Unshlikht, and others—leading
ultimately to a major operation by the GPU to infiltrate, monitor, and
regulate the formation of key social and professional institutions. The
process also reveals the continuing siege mentality of the Bolsheviks
as they attempted to maintain their power within a semisocialist econ-
omy and society. The letter from N. A. Semashko, active in Soviet
health and other social welfare issues, gives a flavor of Bolshevik wari-
ness. The letter offers, as well, an example of the often stilted language
of the Bolshevik revolutionaries:

d o c u m en t
· 6 ·
V. I. Lenin’s proposal for a Politburo directive in connection
with N. A. Semashko’s letter appraising the congress of medical
doctors. With a TsK cover letter. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 3–4.
23 May 1922

To all the Politburo members

For voting
On c. Stalin’s recommendation, c. Lenin’s proposal about a Politburo
directive on the All-Russian Congress of Medical Doctors is forwarded to
you for voting (see the attached letter by c. Semashko).
C. Lenin’s proposal is on the other side of c. Semashko’s letter.

Rather secret
[Semashko’s letter]
To c. Lenin and members of the Politburo:
28 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

Dear comrades. The recent All-Russian Congress of Medical Doctors

has revealed such important and dangerous tendencies in our life that I
consider it necessary not to leave members of the Politburo in ignorance
about these trends, which are used successfully by Kadets [Constitutional
Democrats], m-ks [Mensheviks, moderate anti-Bolshevik socialist party],
and s-rs [Socialist Revolutionaries]; the more so, as far as I know, these
tendencies are widespread not only among medical doctors, but also
among other spetsy [specialists] (agriculturists, engineers, technicians,
and lawyers), and even more so, many even high-ranking comrades not
only do not understand this danger, but thoughtlessly lend their ear to the
whisperings of such spetsy.
In the most general terms, the essence of the tendencies revealed at the
congress may be reduced to: 1. A campaign against Soviet medicine and
praise for the Zemstvo [pre–1917 local councils] and insurance types of
medicine; 2. “further development [of medicine] to be based on “freely”
elected independent organizations of the population, organized from the
bottom up” (the exact resolution of the congress); on those patterns,
which orators—Kadets, m-ks, s-rs—were drawing on this canvas. 3.
Strong aspiration to stay out of general-professional worker movements
and 4. Aspiration to strengthen their own organization by creating their
own press publication.
For struggling against these trends, it seems to me, it is practically neces-
sary: 1) to be extremely careful about the reorganization of our Soviet sys-
tem. In this respect, the NEP has generated some kind of bygone nostalgic
attitude [likvidatorstvo] when [we] with deeply thoughtful expression and
irony begin … [text missing] … to spetsy about the basics of our Soviet way
of life [stroitel’stvo]. Any idea of “Zemshchina” [local council movements]
must be burned out with a red-hot iron.4 No attempts should be [tolerated]
to restore (“town councils”) (c. Voreikis’s idea). From this point of view, I
personally consider that Narkomvnudel [the People’s Commissariat of In-
ternal Affairs], in my opinion, should be ordered to approve any reforms in
the area of Soviet [administration] in town councils only after approval by
the Politburo. 2) In particular, any attempts to replace Soviet (class) medi-
cine with local (“popular”) medicine and insurance (“not Soviet”) should
be considered politically inadmissible. 3. Gosizdat [State Publishing House]
must not allow publication of any newspapers and journals of social-
political (unscientific) character by spetsy and their societies. Otherwise,
journals that are permitted now, such as [that of the] “Pirogov Society,” will
objectively degenerate into organs of anti-Soviet propaganda; permission
for any periodical publication must be approved by the corresponding
agency and the GPU. 4. VTsSPS should be extremely circumspect in the
establishment of autonomy of [professional organizations] of specialists’
sections (doctors, engineers) in general-professional unions, [and] in no
event allow [creation of] separate independent specialists’ unions. As to
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 29

removal of the “top” m-k and s-r doctors who spoke at the congress (Drs.
Granovsky, Magul, Vigdorchik, Levin), this question needs to be coordi-
nated with the GPU (on what bases—administrative or judicial-investigative,
[so as] not to give their tricks popular play, having in mind, that no more
congresses should be held?).
Semashko.
[Annotations on the reverse:]
To c. Stalin. I think it necessary to show this as strictly secret (without
making copies) to Dzerzhinsky, as well as to all members of the Politburo,
and to issue a “directive.” Dzerzhinsky (GPU) with the help of Semashko
is entrusted to elaborate a plan of measures and to report to P/buro (2 week
(?) deadline). 22. V. Lenin
In favor—Stalin
In favor—Trotsky
In favor—Kamenev
In favor—Rykov
In favor—Molotov
Tomsky—I abstain, since the question of the Congress of Medical Doc-
tors requires a different approach. We ourselves, and c. Semashko, above
all, are in many respects guilty.

d o c u m en t
· 7 ·
Note from F. E. Dzerzhinsky to the Politburo of TsK RKP(b), with
attachment of the GPU report about anti-Soviet groupings among the
intelligentsia. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 175, ll. 7–12.
3 June 1922

Herewith is forwarded the report about anti-Soviet groupings among the

intelligentsia, with the GPU draft of a Politburo decision.
Chairman of the GPU, Dzerzhinsky
Absolutely secret

1. Introduction: The New Economic Policies of Soviet power have cre-

ated a danger in favor of the unification and consolidation of power of
bourgeois and petty bourgeois groups, based on the strengthening condi-
tions of NEP development. The anti-Soviet intelligentsia widely utilizes the
possibilities open to it for organization and strengthening its forces, which
have been created by the peaceful course of Soviet power and the weaken-
ing of activities of the repressive organs. In the near future, the spontane-
ous renaissance of a significant number of private social unions (scientific,
30 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

economic, religious, etc.), which will draw anti-Soviet elements, will be the
most disturbing symptom of a growing counterrevolutionary front. The
might of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia, and the groups that rally around it,
is strengthened still further by the widespread sense in Communist Party
circles of a “peaceful” relaxed attitude, due to the liquidation of [military-
political] fronts and the conditions of NEP. The weakening of repression
has given wings to the hopes of the anti-Soviet intelligentsia and, in differ-
ent forms, to the different strata of that intelligentsia to work in a deter-
mined way against Soviet power. The main arenas of struggle against So-
viet power by the anti-Soviet intelligentsia are occurring in the following:
higher educational institutions, various societies, press, various profes-
sional conferences, theater, cooperatives, trusts [industrial administra-
tions], trade organizations, and, more recently, religion, and other areas.
2. […] Both students and the anti-Soviet professorate in higher educa-
tion institutions conduct counterrevolutionary work in two main direc-
tions: a) struggle for “autonomous” higher education, and b) for im-
provement of the material conditions of the professorate and students,
and the struggle for “autonomy,” both circles of active anti-Soviet stu-
dents and professors have an essentially political goal, which is directed
against any influence in higher education of the Communist Party and the
class principle.
[…]
4. The permission granted by Soviet power to allow private publica-
tions and periodical press has put a powerful weapon into the hands of
the anti-Soviet intelligentsia, which it has not hesitated to utilize.
[…]
7. Removal of religious valuables and divisions among orthodox
church groups is being used mainly by the Black Hundreds [a prerevolu-
tionary anti-Semitic movement] intelligentsia.5 Apart from the usual agi-
tation against confiscation of valuables, and in addition to direct opposi-
tion, the elite Black Hundreds intelligentsia, including priests and a num-
ber of lay believers, have become energized and are preparing the ground
for a united religious front for struggle against the atheism of Soviet
power.
All of the above shows that, in the process of development of NEP,
there is a definite crystalization and a rallying of anti-Soviet groups and
organizations, which are informed by the political aspirations of a re-
vived bourgeoisie. Given the current tempo of development, there is a
possibility that these groups may come together into a dangerous force
against Soviet power. The general situation in the Republic calls forth the
necessity for decisive promulgation of a series of measures to prevent
these possible political complications.
Special plenipotentiary GPU, Agranov
Moscow 1 June 1922.
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 31

d o c u m en t
· 8 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On anti-Soviet groupings
among the intelligentsia. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 296, ll. 2–3.
8 June 1922

No. 10. Item 8. […] (c. Unshlikht)

a) to accept (with amendments) the following proposal by c. Unshlikht:
1. In order to maintain order in higher educational institutions, to form a
commission consisting of representatives of Glavprofobr [the Chief Ad-
ministration of Professional Education] with the OGPU6 (Yakovlev and
Unshlikht), and of representatives of the Orgburo of the TsK to elabo-
rate measures on the following questions:
a) vetting of students by the beginning of the next academic year;
b) establishing severe restriction on enrolment of students of non-
proletarian origin;
c) establishing certificates of political reliability for those students
who were not sent by professional and Party organizations, and
whose payments were not waived. C. Unshlikht has responsibility
for calling the commission, deadline is one week.
2. The same commission (see point 1) is to elaborate rules for meetings
and unions of students and the professorate.
Recommend to the Political Department of Gosizdat to work jointly
with the GPU to thoroughly check all publications published by pri-
vate societies, by sections of spetsy of the trade unions, and by some
narkomats [People’s Commissariats]: (Narkomzem [People’s Com-
missariat of Agriculture], Narkompros [People’s Commissariat of
Education], and so forth).
[… .]
e) To create a commission consisting of cc. Unshlikht, Kursky, and
Kamenev, to confirm a list of top leaders of hostile intellectual
groupings to be deported [out of the country or to distant parts
of Russia].
f) To authorize the same commission in point 1 to address the issue
of closing publications and press organs that do not fit the direc-
tion of Soviet policy (journal of the Pirogovsky Society, etc.)
Secretary of TsK

Appendix to the protocol of the meeting of the Politburo of the TsK

RKP from 8.V1.22
32 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

[…]
3. To ensure that none of the congresses or the All-Russian meetings of
spetsy (doctors, agriculturists, engineers, lawyers, and so forth) be
called without the permission of the NKVD. Local congresses or
meetings of spetsy are permitted by gubispolkoms [Soviet govern-
ment executive committees of provinces], after preliminary approval
by local organs of the GPU.
4. To assign the GPU the task to reregister all societies and unions
(scientific, religious, academic, and so forth) […], and to allow no
new societies and unions without GPU permissions. To declare ille-
gal, and subject to immediate liquidation, societies and unions that
were not registered.
5. VTsSPS is not to allow formation and functioning of unions of spetsy
outside the all-professional associations. To take into special account
and special supervision the existing spetsy sections of trade unions.
Charters of the spetsy sections must be revised with the assistance of
the GPU. VTsSPS may give permission for formation of the spetsy
sections at the professional associations only with GPU consent.

The documents above were part of an anti-intelligentsia campaign,

spearheaded by the OGPU but initiated by Lenin and the Party leader-
ship. This campaign to “sovietize” public intellectual life reached its
greatest intensity in 1922 and 1923.7 The most dramatic event of the
campaign came in late 1922 with the expulsion from the country of some
217 professional intellectuals—teachers, scientists, writers—an event that
resulted directly from the documents above.8 The 8 June decision by the
Politburo established the police’s authority, for the first time, over censor-
ship and control of all of Soviet public intellectual life. As the documents
also show, much of the Party’s concern about politically unregulated or-
ganizations involved the continuing and even reviving influence of rival
socialist parties, particularly the Mensheviks, and the agrarian socialist
party, the Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs).9 One of the early and major
preoccupations of the GPU was to ferret out Menshevik and SR sympa-
thizers in workplaces and organizations, and this operation was tied to
the Bolsheviks’ decision to arrest and try key Menshevik leaders. As the
following series of documents shows, it was primarily through their use
of the political police, rather than through political means, that Bolshevik
leaders hoped to destroy the organizational infrastructure and influence
of these parties.
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 33

d o c u m en t
· 9 ·
Appendix to Politburo session No. 59, 29.III.23. Protocol of meeting,
23.III.23, on the question of measures to struggle against Mensheviks,
in accordance with instructions from the chairman of the GPU, c. Dzerzhinsky.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 59, d. 3, ll. 78–80.

Present: cc. Menzhinsky, Messing, Samsonov

Notes of the Chairman of the GPU on measures in the struggle against
Mensheviks:

1. Measures of the struggle along Party lines:

1) To conduct a special campaign against Mensheviks in the press, spe-
cifically in places of vigorous Menshevik activity (plants, factories,
workshops, etc.), and, in particular, in the Far East, Piter [Petrograd],
and Moscow.
2) To select special comrades in gubkoms [province-level Party commit-
tees], who are newspaper workers, and to charge them with conduct-
ing the campaign against Mensheviks in the press.
3) Party organs are to pay particular attention to the struggle against
Mensheviks’ influence on the Komsomol [Communist Youth League].

Measures of struggle along GPU lines:

1) To receive sanction from the TsK RKP(b) for mass operations against
Mensheviks, Bund [United Jewish Labor Movement], and Poalei
Zion [Jewish Communist Labor Party] organizations.
2) As a rule, adult Mensheviks should be exiled to the Narym Krai
[north-central Siberia], the Pechorsky Krai [in the Komi Republic] for
youth under the age of 25, and Turkestan along the Kashgar border
for the especially sick.
3) To coordinate removal of Mensheviks from offices and enterprises,
with agreement of enterprise heads.
4) Recognize as necessary to expel Mensheviks, particularly, from all
cooperative organizations.
[… .]
6) Recognize as necessary to organize filtering commissions with repre-
sentation of the GPU at VUZs [higher educational institutions] for
students … at the beginning of each academic year.
7) Remove active students-Mensheviks before the end of the current
academic year.
8) Conduct extremely thorough expulsion of Mensheviks from NKPost
[People’s Commissariat of Post], NKPS [People’s Commissariat of
Transportation], Narkomvneshtorg [People’s Commissariat of External
34 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

Trade], NKID [People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs], VTsSPS, and

Profintern [International Trade Union Organization] in order to sever
Mensheviks’ connections abroad.
9) Strengthen work of INO [the Foreign Department] of the GPU abroad
to disrupt connections of Mensheviks with Russia. Komintern [Com-
munist International] and Profintern must do the same.
10) Instruct localities about strengthening the TsK RKP(b), VTsSPS, and
GPU struggle against Mensheviks.
11) Encourage Party comrades to give any reliable information and as-
sistance to GPU organs in the struggle against Mensheviks.
12) Communists who cooperate with or render assistance to Mensheviks
to be subject to severe Party sanctions

Secretary Samsonov
23 March 1923

Speculation, Banditry, and Institutional Conflicts

The anti-Menshevik campaigns were successful, at least as regards the
leaders, although historians have noted that despite political repres-
sion, Menshevik influence remained strong in some economic sectors
and trade union organizations.10 In any case, the anti-Menshevik op-
erations reinforced a reliance on the police, and this was true of mea-
sures to solve not only political problems, but problems of social dis-
order, as well. During the course of the early and mid–1920s, the
political police pressed for and received broader authority to deal with
two phenomena especially—“speculation” (profiteering) and bandit-
ry. The former threatened the state’s control over the economy, and
leaders perceived the latter as both a criminal activity and a potential
base for anti-Soviet armed resistance. Expansion of political police
jurisdiction in the area of criminality also resulted from the underde-
veloped state of civil policing, at least according to political police
officials. The civil police hardly existed during the 1920s, and local
officers did not have the capability or manpower to fight widespread
illegal trading and gang theft. In rural areas, especially, where bandit
activity was most intense, local officials were often outnumbered and
outgunned by bandit gangs operating in their territories.
Leaders usually granted extra powers to the political police, but this
was not a foregone conclusion. Generally, resistance came from sev-
eral important people and state institutions. As the following docu-
ments show, Nikolai Krylenko, chief prosecutor for the Russian Re-
public, clashed with the OGPU as early as 1922 over police authority.
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 35

The instance below, in which Krylenko and then deputy OGPU head
Genrikh Yagoda came into conflict, was one of the first of many in-
stances over the course of the 1920s and 1930s. As the documents
below show, Krylenko objected to the right of the OGPU to investi-
gate any crime other than those political crimes that fell strictly under
its jurisdiction. He also objected to the exclusive right of the OGPU to
investigate and try its own personnel. This, he believed, would turn
the political police into a caste essentially outside the law.11

d o c u m en t
· 10 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK RKP(b). On the authority of
the GPU. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 99–100.
28 September 1922

Appendix to Politburo protocol No. 28, 28.IX.22. point 2

Draft decision by TsIK, supported by the Politburo 28.9.22, on
additions to the authority of the Gospolitupravlenie [GPU]
[…]:
1. Grant the GPU authority a) to take extrajudicial action, even shoot-
ing, in relation to persons caught in the act of armed assault with the
intent to rob; b) to give authority to exile and imprison in a kont-
slager [concentration camp] to the Board of Exile of the NKVD, [the
latter] formed in accordance with the decree on expulsion, with a
precise definition of categories of persons who are subject to expul-
sion, and for a limited period of time of confinement at the place of
exile, up to three years.
2. Conduct investigations of cases of occupational crimes committed by
GPU personnel, with the obligatory participation of a Procuracy
oversight official, and to enact extrajudicial sentencing by the GPU
Collegium, informing NKiust of the sentence.
3. Recognize the right of the GPU independently to decide whether to
initiate or quash an investigation of those cases under its jurisdiction.
4. a) Establish, as a rule, that any Procuracy officials assigned to over-
sight of GPU activities be special deputies to either the republic-level
or provincial-level Procuracy administrations, and that such officials
be Party members for at least three years;
[… .]

Chairman VTsIK
Secretary VTsIK
36 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

d o c u m ent
· 11 ·
Memorandum of N. V. Krylenko to I. V. Stalin on authority of the GPU to
impose extrajudicial sentences. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, l. 112.

Secret.
9 October 1922
This is to inform you that c. Yagoda and I can find no mutual agree-
ment in connection with the Politburo decision of 28.IX on GPU author-
ity to impose extrajudicial sentences on GPU personnel. I insist on a
clause that 1) allows the GPU this authority only in exceptional instanc-
es, and not “as a general rule,” and 2) [that the GPU be required] to
seek the “sanction” of NKIu, and not simply inform NKIu [of such a
practice.]
At the same time, I emphasize that a cardinal question needs to be re-
solved whether the GPU can investigate any crime or exclusively those
within its legal jurisdiction, i.e. counterrevolutionary crimes, spying, ban-
ditry, or in connection with border defense.
I request that both questions be placed on the Politburo agenda, and
that I and c. Kursky be present for the discussion.
With comradely greetings, Krylenko
In his exchange with Dzerzhinsky, Krylenko objected to the im-
plicit and explicit criticisms that civil police and courts were weak and
not doing enough to fight economic crimes and banditry. In making
his request to the Politburo for expanded police powers, Dzerzhinsky
used this argument as justification for expanded authority. Foreign
Minister Chicherin also cautioned against expanded GPU powers, as
did RSFSR Justice Minister Kursky. All three saw expansion of police
powers as a threat to their own agencies and jurisdictions, as uncon-
stitutional, or as excessive and unnecessary given current laws. In a
letter objecting to expanded police powers, Krylenko succinctly sum-
marized political police methods to act first and then seek a general
sanction from the Central Committee.
In the meantime, Dzerzhinsky and the OGPU continued to seek
special sanctions from the Politburo to conduct campaigns against
both profiteering, or speculation as it was called, and banditry.
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 37

d o c u m en t
· 12 ·
Letter from F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin on measures against
malicious speculators. TsA FSB RF, f. 2. op 1, d. 56, l. 99.
22 October 1923

One of the important factors inflating prices of products is malicious

speculators who chose as their profession inflating prices (especially of
foreign currencies) and entangling trusts and cooperatives, and their
workers, in their frauds. Moscow, in particular, attracts them, since the
major trusts, Tsentrosoiuz [the All-Russian Central Union of Consumer
Societies] and banks are located here. [They] gather here from every cor-
ner of the USSR.
They take over markets and black currency markets. Their methods—
payoffs and depravity. If one asks on what they live, they cannot tell you,
but they live in full chic. While Moscow has a housing hunger, plenty of
the most luxurious apartments are available to them. They are parasites,
seducers, bloodsuckers, malicious speculators, they corrupt and gradually
and imperceptibly draw in our enterprise executives …
My suggestion is to broaden the authority of the Commission on Exile
to include the right to exile these malicious speculators, […] in conjunc-
tion with reports from me, i.e. the Chairman of the OGPU.
I am convinced that within a month, we will cleanse Moscow of these
elements, and that will certainly have an effect on the whole of our eco-
nomic life.12

d o c u m en t
· 13 ·
Memorandum from F. E. Dzerzhinsky to the Politburo of TsK RKP(b)
on the necessity to strengthen the struggle against banditry. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 197, l. 78
29 January 1924

In the recent past, there has been an active increase in both criminal and
political [forms of] banditry, both in cities and in the countryside, [involv-
ing] assaults, and robbery, and wrecking trains.
We have already received a number of memos from c. Chicherin about
this, in connection with robberies of representatives of missions and dip-
lomatic couriers: Polish, Italian, British, Persian.
38 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

It needs to be said directly that one of the reasons for lack of success in
the struggle against banditry is the formalism and red tape in our courts,
and the lack of coordination of efforts by courts, criminal investigation
organs of the militsiia [civil police], and GPU organs.
Therefore I make the following recommendations:
1. To assign the OGPU and its local organs leadership in the struggle
against banditry, both political and criminal, both in cities and in the
countryside.
2. For this purpose, to subordinate criminal investigation organs and
militsiia operationally to the OGPU.13
3. To give the OGPU authority of extrajudicial resolution of cases of
banditry not only of persons captured with weapons, but in general,
of those taking part in bandit attacks.
4. To entrust the OGPU to elaborate and, urgently, to put into practice
a plan to free the peasant population from bandits, including horse
thieves.

F. Dzerzhinsky
And again, attempts to limit the growing OGPU authority came
from the foreign affairs commissariat as well as from Krylenko, who
attempted to refute the implied accusation that civil police and courts
were incapable of effective action.

d o c u m ent
· 14 ·
G. V. Chicherin’s memorandum to the Politburo of the TsK RKP(b)
concerning c. Dzerzhinsky’s recommendations concerning the struggle
against banditry. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 197, l. 80.
30 January 1924

Extremely secret
Concerning c. Dzerzhinsky’s letter to the Politburo from 29 January No.
194/t, the Collegium of NKID considers it possible to implement the recom-
mendations by c. Dzerzhinsky, granting the OGPU special powers for strug-
gling against banditry, in the form he specified, but only in those areas where
banditry is out of control [svirepstvuet], specifying precisely the boundaries
[of those areas]. Granting the OGPU extrajudicial authority to resolve cases
is, in the view of the NKID, possible only for bandits captured with weapons
in their hands. The NKID Collegium would consider dangerous any further
expansion of OGPU authority for extrajudicial resolution of cases.
Narkomindel [People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs] Chicherin
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 39

d o c u m en t
· 15 ·
Memorandum of N. V. Krylenko to the Politburo of the TsK RKP(b)
concerning F. E. Dzerzhinsky’s recommendations on the struggle against
banditry. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 197, ll. 79–79ob.
1 February 1924

Secret
Concerning c. Dzerzhinsky’s recommendation on methods for the
struggle against criminal and political banditry, I consider it necessary to
communicate the following:
During ten months of the previous year, courts sentenced to execution
971 [people], and tribunals–296, for a total of 1,267 persons, which in-
cludes 721 persons, or 57 percent, for robberies and participation in
gangs. Sentences for 497 persons were upheld [by higher courts], which
is 39 percent of the total number.
During the same period, the GPU convicted 121 persons, including 16
for robberies and banditry. The total number of convicted people whose
sentences were carried out was 604. This means two persons a day, on
average. This percentage cannot be considered low. On the contrary, it
should be considered excessively high. If all sentences were carried out it
would increase twice and would reach four persons a day. Thus, one can-
not complain that repression in relation to the struggle against banditry
is weak.
In the main, c. Dzerzhinsky’s explanation is incorrect that the growth in
banditry is the result of formalism and red tape in our courts.
The general practice is that all cases of banditry are investigated by the
GPU. A case goes to the court only after it has been marinated in the GPU.
Cases are heard usually in military tribunals or at criminal courts at the
provincial level. They do not sit long [since] investigations are always rela-
tively simple and do not require any special additional actions.
After the recent decision of the Politburo about reduction of judicial
red tape, issued on Dzerzhinsky’s recommendation, instructions were
sent to all courts not to let cases sit for more than three months. Also,
provincial Procuracy and court officials are obliged to report the number
of cases every two weeks.
For this reason c. Dzerzhinsky’s recommendation to apply the right of
extrajudicial reprisal [rasprava] in general to people involved in banditry
leads in practice to extrajudicial reprisal against everybody who may be-
come suspected, in accordance with “agent information.” These may in-
clude anybody related to a banditry gang, such as bandits’ informants,
those who hide bandits, accomplices, etc.
40 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

Taking into consideration that, of late, the OGPU has been broadening
its jurisdiction by appealing to the Presidium of TsIK for permission to
resolve this or that case in an extrajudicial manner, and moreover, even
resolves the case and passes the sentence first, and only then asks VTsIK
to confirm this sentence—it becomes absolutely clear that even within the
current legislation and practice, the GPU has sufficient space and enough
possibilities for taking emergency measures in the struggle against
banditry.
I consider it necessary to speak strongly against point three of c. Dzer-
zhinsky’s proposal [to authorize GPU extrajudicial action against anyone
associated with bandit gangs]. Points one and two, on operational sub-
mission of criminal investigation and militsiia organs to the OGPU, meet
formal obstacles because of formal subordination of these organs to Nar-
komvnudel, and hence, they can be subordinated to the OGPU only by
secret order. C. Dzerzhinsky’s arguments, which are in principle correct,
should be implemented in a general reform of Narkomvnudel, according
to which the militsiia and criminal investigation organs would be includ-
ed in the GPU system.
Finally, point 4, in the way it was formulated by c. Dzerzhinsky, can be
accepted only under condition that this “plan for freeing the peasant
population from bandits’ abuse, including horse thieves” […] must be
discussed at the corresponding Party and Soviet levels for preliminary
implementation.
With comradely greetings, Krylenko
As the following decision shows, the Politburo sided, for the most
part, with Dzerzhinsky on the issue of OGPU authority over banditry.

d o c u m ent
· 16 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On the struggle against
banditry. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 418, l. 3.
14 February 1924

No. 70, point 7 (Dzerzhinsky, Krylenko, Beloborodov, Chicherin).

To recognize as necessary strengthening the struggle against banditry,
both political and criminal, both in cities and in the countryside, enjoin-
ing the OGPU and its local organs to carry out this decision: To subordi-
nate criminal investigation and militsiia organs to [OGPU] operationally,
and to recognize as necessary the temporary expansion of authority of the
OGPU in the use of extrajudicial repressions; Also, to assign cc. Dzerzhin-
sky, Krylenko, and Beloborodov with presenting to the Presidium of the
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 41

TsIk of the USSR a concrete plan for the expansion of OGPU authority
to enact extrajudicial repressions, and to free the peasant population
from bandits, so that this plan would specify areas, terms, and methods
of the struggle.
As the following document shows, the Politburo ceded other “tem-
porary” measures to the OGPU, encroaching still further, in Krylenko’s
view, on the jurisdiction of the civil police and courts.

d o c u m en t
· 17 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On struggle against thefts
in Moscow. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 2, l. 6.
27 June 1924

8. a) To accept c. Dzerzhinsky’s proposal authorizing the OGPU to

take urgent measures for the elimination of thefts.
b) To coordinate work of the OGPU with the same work of the
militsiia.
In at least one instance, resistance from Kursky and Krylenko was
so categorical that the OGPU backed away from a request to be grant-
ed jurisdiction. This instance involved a request to grant political po-
lice authority to make arrests and adjudicate cases of forgery of mon-
etary instruments such as bills of exchange. In addition to Kursky,
Finance Commissar G. Ia. Sokol’nikov also objected, arguing that
forgery of such issues was relatively easy to detect and stop, compared
to traffic in forged currency. Despite Stalin’s support, the OGPU with-
drew the request from Politburo consideration.
The simmering conflicts between state agencies and the OGPU contin-
ued throughout the 1920s, and even though Krylenko did not often win
these conflicts, he did not give up. His arguments usually concentrated
on the unconstitutionality of the OGPU’s extrajudicial powers, but on at
least one occasion, he focused on the damaging image abroad created by
the OGPU’s activities. In the memorandum below, Krylenko focused on
the uproar caused by the Soviet government’s execution of twenty indi-
viduals for alleged counterrevolutionary terrorist activities. The execu-
tions, ordered by the OGPU Collegium, the administrative sentencing
board of the political police, resulted in a sharp negative reaction, inter-
nationally, especially among leaders of social democratic movements in
42 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

several countries.14 Arguing that the OGPU’s administrative sentencing

system only fueled anti-Soviet propaganda abroad, Krylenko advocated
its abolition, and creation of a special court within the judiciary system.

d o c u m ent
· 18 ·
Note from N. V. Krylenko to the Politburo TsK RKP(b) about creating
extraordinary courts within the OGPU of the USSR. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 3, l. 113.
1 July 1927

Events of the last days, and, in particular, the outcry of hypocritical in-
dignation that the “execution of the 20” caused in all strata of the bour-
geoisie, up to and including correspondence on this matter between c.
Rykov and figures of the English Labour Party, make us raise the question
again, to what extent it is expedient for Soviet power to give occasion for
this hypocritical indignation, [to give] its class enemies propaganda mate-
rial in the struggle against us, if it is possible to achieve the same pur-
poses by punishing rigidly and severely class enemies of the revolution
without giving unnecessary “arguments” against us to our opponents.
I believe that the proper organization of extraordinary courts provides
a full possibility for the struggle against both spies and latent counter-
revolution, without recourse to acts of extrajudicial reprisal, carried out
by the OGPU, which, no matter how much one may wish, cannot be
equated to judicial measures, if only because they lack a major compo-
nent of any judicial action—that is, a personal deposition of the defen-
dant in court, and his right to offer explanations personally.
At one time, C. Dzerzhinsky, now deceased,15 had this point of
view, when, in 1919, he established the Special Extraordinary Tribunal,
under Cheka authority, for processing cases of the largest-scale specula-
tors, swindlers of economic counterrevolution, unscrupulous suppliers of
military uniforms, etc. This tribunal was abolished in 1920, in connection
with an ongoing reform of all tribunals. His main principles, however,
seem to me quite possible to restore now.
In other words, I recommend:
1. To create extraordinary courts within the All-Union OGPU and the
GPUs of the republics for resolving cases of espionage, banditry, and
counterrevolution, and the largest-scale cases that the Presidium of
VTsIK considers necessary to resolve in a special order. The extraor-
dinary courts will consist of 3 members: two from the OGPU Colle-
gium, and one from the corresponding provincial court;
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 43

2. Sentences given by the extraordinary court are not subject to appeal,

and must be carried out immediately;
3. Extraordinary courts are not restricted by any judicial procedures,
and have the right to allow or not to allow depositions or redeposi-
tion of witnesses, at discretion. Each case must be completed within
24 hours after its arrival in this court;
4. There is no prosecution and no defense.
5. Supervision over the extraordinary courts is possible only through
the current form of supervision of extrajudicial sentencing by the
OGPU, that is, the prosecutor of the republic supervising the OGPU
has the right to suspend a sentence, after which the question of re-
trial is to be transferred to VTsIK or TsIK, respectively.

As for public attendance, although the special tribunals of the Cheka

created by c. Dzerzhinsky acted publicly I personally believe that sessions
of the extraordinary courts may be either open or closed, at the discretion
of the OGPU, depending on the character of the case.
I think that such a form of punishment fully provides the necessary
harshness of repression and swiftness of procedure, and gives the possi-
bility of taking away from the hands of the counterrevolution the tool
that it uses now, in the form of slanders about the “injustice” [navety na
“bessudnost”] of the government of the working class.
In case of basic approval of this project, I would consider it expedient
to create a special commission consisting of cc. Menzhinsky or Yagoda
myself, and a third member chosen by the Politburo (say, c. Ordzhoni-
kidze) for further elaborating.
With communist greetings, Krylenko
Despite Krylenko’s efforts, the Politburo did not accept his recom-
mendations.

Foreign Activity and Foreign Policy

Early on, the GPU became involved in foreign intelligence gathering,
which was not inherently part of its activities, but was, nonetheless,
an extension of its mission to protect the political interests of the So-
viet state. GPU expansion into foreign affairs followed a step-by-step
process similar to its extension into other spheres of state activity, and
resulted in analogous kinds of institutional conflicts, in this case with
the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs(Narkomindel). I. S. Unshlikht’s
memorandum to Stalin and Trotsky (document 19) began this process
by recommending that the GPU organize systematic disinformation
campaigns in foreign countries. Surprisingly, the Politburo accepted
his recommendation apparently without the consultation of NKID
44 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

officials. Maksim Litvinov, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign

Affairs, protested vigorously, and the division of responsibilities be-
tween the two agencies remained tense and unresolved. In a follow-up
letter, Unshlikht recommended that full responsibility for information
deployed abroad be concentrated in the OGPU. Using the same
strategy that he employed successfully against the civil police, Unsh-
likht cited confusion over jurisdictions and working at cross-
purposes—problems arising from GPU intervention in the first place—
which Unshlikht now recommended resolving by giving full authority
to the political police. He also, of course, attributed incompetency to
the diplomatic corps as an excuse to expand OGPU jurisdiction in
creating the kind of information that was to be disseminated to for-
eign governments. In effect, the OGPU would be creating foreign
policy.

d o c u m ent
· 19 ·
Memorandum from I. S. Unshlikht to I. V. Stalin and L. D. Trotsky
on disinformation. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 131–32.
22 December 1922

Department of Counterespionage
Absolutely secret
With the transition of our republic to a state of peace, and with open-
ing of borders to foreigners, intelligence services of the bourgeois states
have intensified their activities using these new possibilities. Since, during
the military period, enemy intelligence services were mainly interested in
the location and conditions of our Red Army, now they redirect their at-
tention mainly toward the conditions of our industry, gathering informa-
tion about political work of our Party and Soviet organs, work of the
NKID, etc.
It is extremely important for the republic, during this current period of
respite and diplomatic negotiations with the capitalist states, to disorient
opponents, to mislead them.
A skillful, regular encircling of our opponents with a network of disin-
formation will allow us somewhat to influence their policies in ways de-
sirable for us, will allow us to force them to construct their practical
conclusions on miscalculations. Besides, disinformation helps our direct
struggle against foreign intelligence services, and [eases] the insertion of
our agents into intelligence organs of bourgeois states, etc.
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 45

For the purpose of establishing systematic disinformation work, the

GPU suggests to create a special bureau, consisting of representatives of
the institutions that are most interested in this work—Razvedupr [Intel-
ligence Administration], NKID, and the GPU.
Goals of the bureau must include: 1) Analysis of information
arriving in the GPU and Razvedupr, and other institutions, about the
level of awareness of foreign intelligence services about Russia. 2) Assess-
ing the character of the information that interests our opponents.
3) Assessing the level of awareness of the opponent about us.
4) Creating and producing a variety of false information and documents
that would give to opponents a misleading sense of the domestic situation
in Russia, of organization and conditions in the Red Army, of political
work of leading Party and Soviet organs, of work of the NKID, etc.
5) Supplying opponents with the above-stated materials and docu-
ments through corresponding organs of the GPU and Razvedupr.
6) Elaborating a number of articles and notes for the periodical press
in order to prepare the background for release of different sorts of ficti-
tious materials.
The GPU asks the Politburo of TsK RKP(b) to give its consent in prin-
ciple for conducting disinformation work and for creation of the afore-
mentioned bureau.
Deputy chairman of the GPU Unshlikht
Deputy Head of KRO [Department of Counterintelligence] Pilliar
On 11 January 1923, the Politburo issued a decision to enact Unsh-
lihkt’s recommendation and, in response, Litvinov sent the following
memorandum to Stalin and other Politburo members.

d o c u m en t
· 20 ·
Statement from M. M. Litvinov to I. V. Stalin regarding the bureau
of disinformation, with cover letter from the TsK RKP(b). AP RF,
f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 135–136.
15 January 1923

On c. Stalin’s instruction, the following statement from c. Litvinov from

11.1.23 […] is forwarded to you all for your urgent consideration. You
are requested to return the conclusion along with the material.
Deputy secretary of TsK, Nazaretian

Secret
11 January 1923
46 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

I have received the Politburo decision from January 11, No. 43 “On
disinformation,” along with c. Unshlikht’s proposal. I consider it neces-
sary to point out that NKID knows nothing about c. Unshlikht’s pro-
posal, and it is not clear from the decision itself what bureau is being
considered, and who will be put in charge of this bureau. One may only
guess that this is about active disinformation of foreign governments, and
that the suggested bureau will be created within the GPU.
NKID realizes the necessity in some cases of circulating disinforma-
tion, and uses this frequently. However, NKID does not consider the GPU
at all competent to decide when and how to spread [disinformation] data.
In particular, I just recently ordered all the plenipotentiaries to refute
regularly all false and doubtful information about Russia published in the
foreign press. It might easily happen that our plenipotentiaries will refute
immediately the information spread by this newly created bureau. How-
ever, since the Politburo already issued its decision, NKID is asking to add
to this decision a point that will oblige the GPU to take no steps and to
release no information without preliminary coordination with one of the
members of the Collegium of NKID.
Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Litvinov
In return, Unshlikht sent the following notes to Stalin, first to an-
swer Litvinov’s complaint, and then to push for GPU control over all
foreign intelligence activities.

d o c u m ent
· 21 ·
Letter from I. S. Unshlikht and R. A. Pilliar to I. S. Stalin
concerning M. M. Litvinov’s letter regarding the disinformation
bureau. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, l. 133.
17 January 1923

Absolutely secret
It is clear from c. Litvinov’s letter that NKID agrees with our point of
view about the necessity for regular disorientation of opponents, and that
NKID has been engaged in this kind of disorientation. As to c. Litvinov’s
suggestion about coordinating disinformation with one of the members
of the Collegium of NKID—apparently this was prompted by c. Lit-
vinov’s lack of information that, according to the GPU suggestion, ac-
cepted by the Politburo of the TsK RKP(b), the Disinformation Bureau
must include a competent representative of NKID.
Deputy chairman of the GPU Unshlikht
Deputy head of KRO of the GPU Pilliar
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 47

d o c u m en t
· 22 ·
Memorandum from I. S. Unshlikht to I. V. Stalin to concentrate all lines of
intelligence activity in the GPU. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, l. 140.
28 March 1923

Recently, there has been an increase in the number of suggestions of a

secret political character made to NKID representatives (for example,
suggestions made to c. Chicherin, and by the delegate Petrushevich),16
which coincide with the specialized activities of the GPU apparatus, and
result in parallelism and, inevitably, in both absolutely unnecessary cur-
rency expenditures and negative consequences of a political character for
the NKID organs.
For reasons of economic necessity, saving hard currency, and eliminat-
ing undesirable political consequences, the GPU asks the Politburo to
approve:
1. To concentrate exclusively in GPU organs all lines of intelligence
work (diplomatic, political), in which NKID engages only occasion-
ally.
2. In some instances, when NKID representatives take one or another
promising initiative in the field of intelligence work, the NKID repre-
sentative must first coordinate his steps with the GPU, or with its
local organs.

Deputy chairman of the GPU Unshlikht

The Politburo approved the OGPU recommendation, consolidating
all foreign intelligence in the OGPU, and giving the political police
significant influence over diplomatic information to be given to other
governments.
Such Politburo decisions increased OGPU influence in foreign af-
fairs, but did little to regulate relations between the foreign affairs
commissariat and the political police. Tensions continued between
diplomatic personnel and OGPU residents abroad, and this created
confusion and, at times, outright contradictions in Soviet foreign pol-
icy. In a 1925 memorandum, Litvinov, writing to Dzerzhinsky, enu-
merated Narkomindel’s main grievances against the OGPU. In turn,
Dzerzhinsky passed on this list to his deputy, M. Trilisser. As Dzer-
zhinsky explained, Litvinov’s main complaints were as follows:
48 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

d o c u m ent
· 23 ·
Memorandum of M. Litvinov to the TsK RKP(b). Late January or early
February 1925. RGASPI, f. 76, op. 3, d. 349, l. 2–2ob.17

[… .] 1) Arrest of foreigners occurs without forewarning NKIDel. 2) Un-

justified search and arrest of foreigners. 3) Inquiries by NKIDel remain
unanswered or are answered with inaccurate information, such that the
result discredits not only NKIDel, but also the USSR. This is the most
serious grievance. This is like a knife at our throat [Vse ostrie ego protiv
nas]. V. Ilich [Lenin] would berate us for this. And, as a result, we orga-
nize everyone against us, and give grounds for foreigners to start a cam-
paign that, in the USSR, the GPU runs everything. Politically, this is the
most dangerous consequence. It allows enemies of the USSR to make of
the OGPU the main excuse for intervention and counterrevolution. 4)
Illegal refusal of visas to foreigners to enter the country. 5) Not to bring
criminal cases against foreigners through the GPU. 6) A more precise
definition of the term “economic espionage.” 7) To regulate issues con-
cerning material of the INO—to send by special courier.
In order to monitor ongoing concrete issues connected with NKIDel—
have with us a [specially appointed] plenipotentiary, who is fully respon-
sible for this, but not like it is now, when it is unclear who is responsible
and who answers […].
In his turn, Dzerzhinsky also attempted to regulate relations be-
tween the NKID and the OGPU, but in favor of the police. In Febru-
ary 1925, he requested his deputy, Trilisser, to work up a plan to
regulate relations with the foreign affairs commissariat, but, as the
excerpt shows, to do so by increasing OGPU influence.

d o c u m ent
· 24 ·
Memorandum, F. Dzerzhinsky to M. Trilisser. February 1925. RGASPI, f. 76,
op. 3, d. 349, ll. 2–2ob.18

In view of current relations, the P/Buro [Politburo] needs to issue a deci-

sion to regulate our relations with NKID, and then to strictly enforce
those regulations. I cannot agree with our mutual relations in their pres-
ent form, since, as a result of them, the interests of our state suffer in some
ways. NKIDel leads and carries out the foreign policy of the USSR and is
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 49

the only representative of the USSR for other countries. Therefore, our
constant hostile relations with the NKIDel disorganize the prestige of
Soviet power […] abroad, and doom [us—the OGPU] to complete pow-
erlessness. Our work and materials, therefore, are underutilized—with
consequent damage to the state. And I demand that our mutual relations
be put in order, by which I mean a necessary strengthening of our influ-
ence, and the significant [increased or more] use of the results of work by
the INO and KRO. I ask that you brief c. Menzhinsky about this. […] and
I ask that you give me a draft of regulations based on decisions of the
commission of c. Kuibyshev, the Politburo, and others.
To ensure further coordination of OGPU activity and foreign policy,
Dzerzhinsky recommended, in 1925, that his deputy, V. R. Menzhinsky,
be named an ex officio member of the collegium of the foreign affairs
commissariat. This had a certain bureaucratic logic, and had been sug-
gested by Litvinov, but the appointment also furthered political police
intrusion into the highest levels of diplomatic policymaking.

d o c u m en t
· 25 ·
Note from F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin with the suggestion to include
V. R. Menzhinsky on the Board of NKID. RGASPI, f. 76, op. 3, d. 349, l. 3.
23 May 1925

In connection with the information on foreign affairs organized by the

OGPU, as well as with our struggle against espionage and counterrevolu-
tion organized by the capitalist countries, in the interests of the affairs of
the country and its defense, closer contact of our work with NKID would
be very desirable. For this purpose I suggest to include c. Menzhinsky on
the NKID Collegium.
F. Dzerzhinsky

Stalin, the OGPU, and Trotsky

The authority of the OGPU as a punitive organ and an active counter-
espionage agency continued to be a source of tension with other parts
of the Soviet government, and the balance shifted back and forth de-
pending on circumstances, personal power, and personalities, and on
the policies and perceptions of the Politburo and Stalin. As the docu-
ments above show, Stalin worked closely, especially with Unshlikht,
and to some extent with Dzerzhinsky, to extend GPU authority step
50 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

by step into key areas of government and foreign policy. However, he

was not always successful. In the early 1920s, Stalin was not the pow-
erful dictator that he later became, and he was especially wary of Leon
Trotsky, the charismatic and brilliant commander of the Red Army.
Trotsky, who became Stalin’s archenemy, had been second only to
Lenin as a revolutionary figure, and after Lenin’s incapacitating stroke
in 1922 he was feared by the other leaders as a potential usurper of
power, a Bonaparte of the Russian revolution. In the early 1920s,
Stalin did not have the power to confront Trotsky in an open fight, but
he found a willing ally in Dzerzhinsky, who, in the early 1920s, shared
his dislike of Trotsky.19 As the following documents show, the general
secretary was ready to intrigue against Trotsky with the help of the
GPU, but also quick to back down.
The following exchanges concern police investigation of anti-Soviet
sentiment within the Baltic Fleet in the early 1920s. According to GPU
statutes, the agency was required to inform and work with Party lead-
ers of any government institution it was investigating. As the exchang-
es below imply, however, Stalin connived with Genrykh Yagoda, still
a deputy head of the GPU, to conduct the investigation in secret. At
the time, Trotsky was still the charismatic Commissar of Military and
Naval Affairs, and he was not informed. Neither was his deputy V. I.
Zof, commissar of the Russian Republic naval forces and member of
the Baltic Fleet Revolutionary Military Council. Nor were other high-
ranking Party and military officials consulted. When Trotsky got wind
of this, he requested a report from Zof and, on the same day, accused
the GPU of violating procedures in order to spring a “surprise.” He
addressed his complaints to Dzerzhinsky, as head of the GPU, but
Dzerzhinsky referred him to Stalin, as the one who knew the most
about the operation. The personal and political implications were all
sub rosa, but the incident smacked of Stalinist intrigue to undermine
Trotsky, using the GPU as a front. The series begins with Zof’s report
to Trotsky.
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 51

d o c u m en t
· 26 ·
Memorandum from V. I. Zof to L. D. Trotsky. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 2, l. 117.
15 October 1922.

[…]
In accordance with your order from 15 October of this year, I report:
Neither I, nor the Revvoensovet Baltflot [Revolutionary Military
Council of the Baltic Fleet], nor the Naval Department, PUR [Political
Administration of the Red Army], nor any other supervising political
organs of the fleet—knew anything about materials on the fleet collected
by the GPU, or [anything] about any investigation conducted by GPU
organs of supposedly counterrevolutionary tendencies at Baltflot. [Type-
written note: “to c. Dzerzhinsky, Copy to c. Stalin—for members of the
Politburo of TsK (for their information).”]
The OGPU brought this question to the Politburo at the very time of
your absence from Moscow, and without informing Morved [the People’s
Commissariat of Naval Affairs of the RSFSR]. Already, after the first
decision of the Politburo on this question, I personally (27.IX–22) tried
to find out the essence of the issue from c. Yagoda. However c. Yagoda
did not give me a direct answer, alleging that Antonov-Ovseenko’s com-
mission is dealing with this question.20
When Antonov-Ovseenko’s commission was working in Petrograd, c.
Naumov [chief of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Baltic Fleet],
in his turn, tried to receive an explanation from c. Messing [GPU official].
However, again, he did not receive a clear and direct answer.
I confirm, again, that, despite all my attempts in Moscow, and attempts
of experienced, leading officials of Baltflot in Petrograd, to establish nor-
mal permanent working relations between Morved and the GPU organs,
the latter, apparently, has had a prejudiced attitude toward the Navy.
Processing the information collected by the GPU organs, as well as all its
operations concerning the Navy, have been conducted without Morved’s
knowledge. This has resulted in many errors and blunders.
Commissar of Naval Forces of the Republic, Zof
In turn, Trotsky wrote to Dzerzhinsky, sending a copy of his letter to
Stalin, as general secretary, for distribution to all Politburo members.
52 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

d o c u m ent
· 27 ·
Memorandum from L. D. Trotsky to F. Dzerzhinsky. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 114–15.

Absolutely secret
To c. Dzerzhinsky
Copies to Politburo members (for informational purposes)
15 October 1922
The work of the GPU organs is completely abnormal and full of errors
in connection with the case of the Petrograd sailors, for which Antonov-
Ovseenko’s commission was sent. These errors consist in the fact that
preliminary investigation, collection of evidence, surveillance, reporting to
higher authorities, and other [activities] are conducted completely without
participation of the most authoritative Party officials of Morved. For ex-
ample, in Petrograd, all this was hidden from c. Naumov, a member of the
RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] of Baltflot, and in Moscow, c. Zof.
In the specific case of Baltflot, there have already been, in the
past, enormous mistakes, for which the Politburo issued specific deci-
sions. And so, now, one receives the impression that GPU officials con-
sider it a matter of honor for themselves to present a “surprise,” rather
than to work together with those officials who are closest to the case.
15.X.22
Trotsky
Two days later, Dzerzhinsky replied to Trotsky by referring him to
Stalin.

d o c u m ent
· 28 ·
Memorandum from F. Dzerzhinsky to L. D. Trotsky. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 121–22.

Copy to c. Stalin
The GPU coordinated the processing of the case about the mood of the
Kronstadt sailors with the secretary of the TsK, c. Stalin, who can best
say why the case was directed in one way as opposed to another.
17.10.1922
On the same day, 17 October, Trotsky forwarded Dzerzhinsky’s
reply to the Central Committee Secretariat, demanding that the issue
be placed on the Politburo agenda for discussion.
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 53

d o c u m en t
· 29 ·
Note from L. D. Trotsky to the Secretariat of TsK related to the
Morved case, in connection with F. E. Dzerzhinsky’s answer. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 121–22.
17 October 1922

Secret
I am forwarding, herewith, c. Dzerzhinsky’s answer, and am asking to
schedule the question of the GPU work for the next possible session of
the Politburo.
[Appendix, Dzerzhinsky’s letter, attached]
No stenographic record exists of that meeting, but Trotsky suc-
ceeded in his request that the Politburo censure the GPU for its viola-
tion of procedures and, at least temporarily, stopped a police cam-
paign against the Party-military command structure.

d o c u m en t
· 30 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On work of the GPU.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 17, l. 4.
26 October 1922

No. 33. Point 14. On Work of the OGPU. (Politburo No. 22 from 19.X).
(cc. Unshlikht, Messing, Naumov, Zof also in attendance).
To acknowledge the mistake of the GPU in not informing the political
leader of the fleet, Naumov, about new evidence concerning the fleet.
To request that, within a week, and on the basis of existing procedures,
the GPU develop, with the corresponding organs of the military and
military-naval administration, more concrete and precise forms of mu-
tual communication and cooperative work, which will serve the full in-
terests of the case. To request that c. Unshlikht provide a written affidavit
about arrests within the fleet to which c. Zof referred in this [Politburo]
session.
Dzerzhinsky’s reply to Trotsky (document 28) is revealing. Possibly,
Dzerzhinsky was trying to deflect blame onto Stalin, not wanting a
direct confrontation with Trotsky, but this seems unlikely, since
such a tactic would have been too transparent to be effective. More
likely, Stalin was working closely with Yagoda against Trotsky,
54 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State

not informing even Dzerzhinsky. In any case, the document shows

how deeply Stalin was involved in operational activities of the GPU,
even at an early stage—even more so than the head of the agency,
Dzerzhinsky.
Stalin’s supervision of the political police was logical, since he was
the Party’s general secretary and, although the political police was
directly subordinate to the Party’s Central Committee and to Sovnar-
kom, it was the Politburo, as the documents above show, that really
determined policy and operational lines of political police activity.
However, Stalin’s involvement with the agency went much deeper
than mere supervision. He monitored and, when he could, manipu-
lated agency policy from the beginning. Though not as much revered
or feared as Dzerzhinsky in the early and middle 1920s, Stalin was not
afraid, even early on, to chide the head of the Cheka. The following
document, dating from July 1922, shows Dzerzhinsky’s formal rela-
tionship to Stalin, who had been elected to the new position of gen-
eral secretary only in April. Like other senior revolutionaries, Dzer-
zhinsky saw Stalin at this time as subordinate within the Bolshevik
hierarchy, and the position of general secretary as basically an admin-
istrative position. As a result, Dzerzhinsky did not address Stalin per-
sonally so much as institutionally. Still, the letter shows not only Sta-
lin’s close monitoring of GPU affairs, but the power he could wield
simply by virtue of his position. Despite his revolutionary stature,
Dzerzhinsky was subject to Party discipline, and therefore to the gen-
eral secretary.

d o c u m ent
· 31 ·
Memorandum of F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin on the reasons
for not sending a report on GPU activities for May 1922. RGASPI,
f. 76, op. 3, d. 253, l. 1.
6 July 1922

The GPU informs you that, according to the agreement with the Secre-
tariat of the TsK RKP, our report is presented to the TsK before the 7th
of each month. Dispatch of a report is usually precipitated by a reminder
from the TsK Secretariat.
Not receiving this reminder at the beginning of June of this year, the
GPU sent an inquiry to the TsK, [and the latter] explained that, as an
 Expanding Power, Infiltrating the State 55

exception, preparing a report for May was not necessary. As a result, the
May survey was, naturally, not sent.
At present, the Information Department is compiling a report for May–
June. The layout of the report is significantly improved and broader [than
in previous reports]. Despite that, however, the survey will be sent to you
earlier than the specified deadline (20th of July), and will arrive at the TsK
no later than July 15.
Chairman OGPU Dzerzhinsky
During the early 1920s, the political police survived near elimina-
tion, reorganization, and severe financial and staff reductions.
Through the aggressive leadership of Feliks Dzerzhinsky and his dep-
uty Unshlikht, the reorganized OGPU transformed itself from a revo-
lutionary fighting organization into a political police, and made itself
useful to the leaders of the Communist Party. As general secretary of
the Party, Stalin supported the OGPU, and attempted to use it to bol-
ster his own authority, as well as the authority of the Bolsheviks
against their perceived enemies. At the same time, he did not yet have
the kind of control over the political police that would come later.
 chapter two

Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating

the Economy
1927–1930

I
n the early and mid–1920s, Stalin played a moderating role within
the Politburo among other and sometimes more senior members.
His position as general secretary gave him influence, and he cer-
tainly saw potential in using the GPU, but he did not try to overstep
the limits of his power. By the late 1920s, however, Stalin had maneu-
vered himself into a position of clear leadership of the Communist
Party and the Soviet state. Lenin had died in 1924 and, as general
secretary, Stalin used his position in an alliance with other Politburo
members to isolate and then exile Trotsky. Dzerzhinsky died in 1926,
and this gave Stalin a freer hand to work with Dzerzhinsky’s deputy
and the new OGPU head, Menzhinsky, as the most dynamic leader of
that agency. Through the OGPU, Stalin kept track of Trotsky’s associ-
ates still in the country, and he helped maintain adherence to the Party
majority’s commitment to NEP policies of state capitalism. By 1927
and 1928, however, Stalin began to fear that NEP policies were leaving
the country vulnerable to hostile intervention, and defenseless in case
of war.
War seemed an increasingly likely possibility in the mid- and late
1920s, as the international situation worsened for the Soviet Union.
In April 1926, Dzerzhinsky, in one of his last reports to Stalin as head
of the OGPU, warned of imminent invasion by Poland, especially af-
ter the coup of May 1926 brought Marshal Józef Piłsudski to power.
Piłsudski had been responsible for Soviet defeats in Poland in 1920,
and had long advocated a union of Baltic states against the Bolshe-
viks, including an independent Ukraine. Dzerzhinsky feared that, now
that Piłsudski was installed as virtual dictator, nothing could stop him

56
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 57

making an attempt to recruit Romania and even Italy into a scheme,

backed by Britain, of military intervention to separate Belorussia and
western Ukraine from the USSR. During the same period, Stalin
received reports from Yagoda about increased Polish military intelli-
gence activity against the USSR, also backed by the British, and
carried on in collusion with intelligence services of other Versailles-
created states along the Soviet border. In the same vein, Yagoda
informed Stalin of increased British diplomatic and press efforts to
isolate and do serious damage to Soviet international efforts.1
Such fears came at a time of, and reflected, deteriorating relations
between Britain and the Soviet Union. British hostility toward the
Soviet Union intensified for several reasons: the increasing political
influence of the Conservative Party under Stanley Baldwin; percep-
tions of persistent revolutionary agitation by Soviet agents in Britain;
and Soviet support of the Communists in China and India, which
threatened British interests in the area.2 British concerns were not
unfounded, despite Soviet denial of the infamous 1924 “Zinoviev”
letter, the forged missive that had supposedly been sent by Grigorii
Zinoviev, encouraging the British Communists to incite an uprising.
Both Communist International and OGPU disinformation campaigns
had been carried out under cover of the Soviet diplomatic mission in
Britain, and this led the British to take the extraordinary step of raid-
ing the London headquarters of the Soviet trade organization, Arcos,
in May 1927. The raid was one of a series of steps that led to the
rupture of Soviet-British relations in 1927, and reignited fears among
Soviet leaders of capitalist encirclement and war.
The break with Britain occurred just at the time that Soviet leaders
faced major decisions about how to fund expanded industrialization,
and gave impetus to Stalin’s increasingly determined intention to bring
about forced industrialization, based on autarkic policies of internal
resource extraction. As if this were not enough, the British rupture
came on top of the near annihilation of the Chinese Communists by
Nationalist paramilitary organizations, and the collapse of Soviet
intelligence activities in China.3
In all, then, 1927 marked a turning point for Stalin, as well as for
others in the Soviet leadership, toward more aggressive plans for
industrial development, and expansion of socialist sectors in agricul-
ture. While all agreed on the necessity for a five year plan for rapid
growth, questions arose about the pace of expansion, the mix of
state and private growth, and whether or not to invite foreign invest-
ment. Bukharin and other moderates in the leadership argued for a
58 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

continuation of policies to encourage peasants to produce for the state

within the framework of a mixed private and state market, to encour-
age foreign involvement, and for industrial expansion within the ex-
isting framework of NEP state capitalism. On the other hand, Stalin
began to move increasingly toward a more radical and isolationist
interpretation of building socialism in one country. He regarded pri-
vate agriculture and private trade as a dangerous threat to the Soviet
state, controlled by kulaks, and market-trading middlemen, the infa-
mous Nepmen. Stalin favored an all-out campaign to bring socialism
to the countryside: to eliminate the kulak hold on rural parts of the
country, and, if necessary, to bring about collectivization and state
control over agriculture by force. As early as 1928, he received confir-
mation of his concerns in reports from the political police about the
growth of kulak influence in the country, and of supposedly conscious
and coordinated efforts to sabotage the state’s agricultural goals.4
Stalin also became convinced of widespread conspiracies, involving
domestic and foreign agent networks, to sabotage industrial expan-
sion efforts. Significant increases in industrial accidents, an appalling
number of train wrecks, corruption, poor construction, and delayed
schedules convinced Stalin and the political police that such incidents
resulted not from the reckless haste of planners, managers, and po-
litical leaders, but from the coordinated efforts of hostile govern-
ments, anti-Soviet émigré groups, and internal enemies. Some leaders,
such as Sergo Ordzhonikidze, later Commissar of Heavy Industry,
and Maksim Litvinov, in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, were
not as inclined as Stalin to see the pervasive hand of conspiracy, but
police reports reinforced Stalin’s ingrained paranoia.
As Stalin pushed for more forceful measures of collectivization and
a more intensive pace of industrial construction, moderate leaders
resisted, arguing that his policies would drive the country to ruin and
even civil war. Many economic and technical specialists, working in
planning or administrative positions, agreed. Stalin saw conspiracy in
their resistance, especially among the older technical and economic
intelligentsia, trained and in prominent positions already before the
revolution. He had a populist hatred of the “intellectual” intelligen-
tsia, and believed that to question his vision of socialist construction
was tantamount to questioning the revolution. Stalin saw (and creat-
ed) conspiracy everywhere around him. He successfully marginalized
moderate leaders by branding them as part of a “Right Deviation”
within the Party, and he discredited moderate approaches to modern-
ization by connecting them to efforts, domestically and abroad, to
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 59

destroy the Soviet Union. In the late 1920s, Stalin did not attempt to
arrest moderate Party leaders such as Bukharin, Mikhail Tomsky,
Aleksei Rykov, Lev Kamenev, and Grigorii Zinoviev, among others.
That came later, in the 1930s, but he managed to remove many long-
time Bolsheviks from their positions in the Politburo, and to demote
them to lesser positions within the Central Committee and state
apparatus. By 1929 and 1930, Stalin and his close entourage domi-
nated the Politburo and Party policy.

Infiltrating the Economy

The later years of the 1920s also saw an expanded role for the politi-
cal police. Police reports and investigations reinforced Stalin’s fears of
conspiracies, and furthered his political vendetta against Party moder-
ates. In turn, the OGPU benefited by Stalin’s increasing use of it to find
or create conspiracies and intrigues against him. Beginning in 1927,
the role of the political police in the economy began to expand dra-
matically, especially in connection with Stalin’s campaign to prove
widespread and conscious “wrecking” (vreditel’stvo) among moder-
ate specialists and economic managers, and to tie that conspiracy to
the so-called Right Deviation within the Party. This was easy enough
to do, since the regime’s policies of forcing the pace of production and
industrial construction led to an inevitable increase in accidents, mate-
rial shortages, breakdowns, and worker discontent. Stalin, as well as
others in the leadership, ascribed these dysfunctional aspects of indus-
trialization to the work of saboteurs and spies. The campaign to root
out these counterrevolutionary elements centered on the network
of specialists, as well as the growing number of foreign workers in
Soviet enterprises. By the late 1920s, several tens of thousands of for-
eigners were employed in key sectors, even in defense enterprises.
Stalin called on the political police to combat these “subversive forc-
es.” Inevitably, this brought the OGPU into the direct management
of the economy since, in order to root out saboteurs, agents had to
become involved in overseeing actual work and management prac-
tices. Their involvement in economic affairs also led to a physical and
permanent presence in work places, on trains, and on other forms of
transport. As the following documents reveal, political police officials
soon found themselves deeply involved in the forced mobilization of
the populace to achieve the regime’s economic goals.
60 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

d o c u m ent
· 32 ·
From the decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b)5 on security of factories
of the military industry. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 4, l. 70.
3 March 1927

No. 89. Point 3—OGPU report.

[…]
3. In view of the lack of security in major factories of the military in-
dustry, as well as the largest factories that are directly or indirectly impor-
tant for defense of the country, to create a commission consisting of cc.
Menzhinsky (c. Yagoda as substitute), Kuibyshev […] and Rudzutak […].
To charge said commission with the task of assessing the security situa-
tion of factories in terms of possible explosions, arson, etc. and also to
investigate reasons preventing normal work of factories. To present a
draft of practical actions for improvement of factories’ security to the
Politburo.
By the end of March, Menzhinsky’s commission proposed a num-
ber of measures, adopted by the Politburo, that militarized many
factories under OGPU control, and essentially criminalized accidents
as subversive counterrevolutionary activity. As the following docu-
ment shows, the commission also gave broad powers to the political
police to punish individuals administratively, outside of the judicial
system.

d o c u m ent
· 33 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On measures of struggle against
subversive actions. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 4, ll. 89, 94–96.
31 March 1927

No. 93. Point 3—Question of the OGPU. (PB [Politburo] from 24.III.27,
protocol No. 92, Point 27). (c. Yagoda).
To confirm suggestions of the meeting of the board of the OGPU,
plenipotentiaries and heads of [OGPU] administrations, about measures
of struggle against subversive actions, fires, explosions, and other acts of
wrecking.
[…]
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 61

Section 1
1) To enact measures of firefighting, and struggle against explosions and
other subversive activities, that are the result of either sabotage or
administrative negligence, and also for continuing supervision and
control over security, fire prevention equipment, and safety installa-
tions in warehouses, factories, and enterprises of state significance,
create a permanent Commission within the OGPU: [to consist of]
representatives from Voenved [Military Affairs Commissariat], the
OGPU, VSNKh [Supreme Economic Council], NKPS [People’s Com-
missariat of Transportation], and the VTsSPS [All-Union Central
Council of Trade Unions], under the chairmanship of the OGPU rep-
resentative, and in localities to establish corresponding commissions
under the PP OGPU [local GPU plenipotentiaries].
2) To recommend that the Central Committee of the VKP(b), by special
circular letter to Party organizations and by mounting a press cam-
paign to explain to workers the dangers threatening socialist con-
struction from fires, explosions, and damage of machine installations
as a result of both sabotage by foreign states and negligent attitudes
of workers and administration to the business of protecting the
enterprise, and to require workers themselves to attend to the protec-
tion of their enterprise.
3) In all enterprises of state significance, to hold the director personally
responsible for introducing measures to protect the enterprise and its
parts, and to require the same of authoritative personnel in different
parts of the enterprise (shops, etc.).
4) To consider it necessary to abolish civilian protection at enterprises
of state significance, and toward this end, to recommend that the
OGPU and VSNKh once again consider the list of factories and
enterprises, separating those of state significance, in order to establish
militarized security in the latter […].
To recognize as necessary the transfer of protection of military-
industrial enterprises, strategically important points, and railroad
infrastructure, as well as especially important state objects and enter-
prises—to Voenved or OGPU forces.
[…]
6) To issue, through Soviet institutions, a decree to expel all extraneous
residents [not associated with enterprises] from premises of enter-
prises of state significance.
[…]

Section 2
1) To strengthen repression, through both OGPU and Party measures,
for negligence, for nonimplementation of fire protection measures.
62 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

2) To raise [such] negligence […] in enterprises of state significance to

the level of a state crime.
3) To give authority to the OGPU to adjudicate extra judicially, even up
to the application of VMN [capital punishment], and to publicize in
the press cases of subversive activity, fires, explosions, damage to ma-
chine installations, and any other cases specified in sections 1 and 2.

Section 3
1) To prohibit employment of political refugees [perebezhchiki] in fac-
tories of the defense industry, in military warehouses, and on rail-
roads […]
2) To establish exclusion zones in which political refugees are prohib-
ited from living, including in this, Ukraine, ZVO [Western Military
District], LVO [Leningrad Military District] (not including the north-
ern provinces [severnykh gubernii]), MVO [Moscow Military Dis-
trict], SKK [Northern Caucasus Territory], Transcaucasia, railroad
lines, and industrial centers in other areas. Exceptions to this [order]
are allowed only with OGPU permission.
3) To close borders to refugees, and to accept them only in exceptional
cases, through organs of the OGPU.
4) To charge NKPS to complete within 6 months cleansing of the unreli-
able element [neblagonadezhnogo elementa] from border area rail
lines in Belorussia, Ukraine, and LVO, in accordance with lists drawn
up by the special railway commissions (DOK, TsOK).6

Foreign Spies, Industrial Wrecking, and the

Antimonarchist Campaign
The murder of a Soviet special envoy, Petr Voikov, in Warsaw on
7 June 1927, gave Stalin further grounds to suspect foreign intrigues,
and to expand political police activity. The Soviet foreign minister,
Georgii Chicherin, regarded the murder as a personal act of revenge,
with no wider implications, and the British, French, and German gov-
ernments “went out of their way” to dissociate themselves from it.
Still, Stalin decided that it had been initiated by the British to provoke
war between Poland and the Soviet Union, and was part of an overall
strategy to isolate the USSR internationally and disrupt Soviet devel-
opment.7 Whether Stalin really believed this, or found the murder a
convenient excuse, is difficult to know, but the following documents
show that he decided to use the murder to enact a campaign of “mass
repression” against “monarchists” and “White Guardists,” the name
applied to those who had fought or sympathized with anti-Bolshevik
military forces during the Civil War. Stalin orchestrated this campaign
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 63

while on vacation in Sochi, on the Black Sea, and communicated with

others through coded telegrams. In his wire to Molotov on the matter
one day after the murder (document 34), as well as to Menzhinsky,
Stalin hinted at but provided no firm evidence of British involvement.
Nonetheless, his missives laid out a detailed and multipronged plan of
police operations combined with public and international propagan-
da. Stalin enumerated the number of “enemies” to be tried and exe-
cuted, and based on his recommendations, the campaigns also led to
an unspecified increase in police personnel, and to an “improvement”
in the “material conditions” of police officials. Stalin’s injunction to
use extrajudicial forms of sentencing led, as well, to a systematization
of police administrative sentencing boards.
Significantly, the police campaigns were the first after the Civil War
in which Stalin orchestrated the use of mass repression. In this case,
police were given the authority to search, detain, or arrest any number
of people suspected of being or having been sympathetic to monar-
chist or anti-Soviet political groupings. Those subject to police atten-
tion need not have committed any specific crime. Stalin initiated the
campaigns and gave specific instructions when they should end. The
highly publicized execution of twenty individuals precipitated strong
negative reaction outside the Soviet Union, even from social demo-
cratic and communist workers’ organizations, but the police cam-
paigns and executions served the purpose that Stalin intended—to
heighten domestic fears of hostile capitalist encirclement, of enemies
diligently at work, and of an imminent war. These campaigns also
gave the political police a sense of prestige, as well as of Stalin’s public
support for methods of mass repression.

d o c u m en t
· 34 ·
Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to V. M. Molotov on hardening
punitive measures in relation to the murder of the plenipotentiary of
the USSR to Poland P. L. Voikov. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 71, ll. 2–3.
8 June 1927

I have received [information] about Voikov’s murder by an [émigré] mon-

archist. One senses England’s hand [here]. They want to provoke a con-
flict with Poland. They want to repeat Sarajevo or, at least, the Switzer-
land incident related to the murder of Vorovsky.8
64 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

This requires maximum circumspection on our part. We cannot demand

control over the Polish court during the trial. Poland will not agree. Poland
must express regret and must issue an official statement that it will take the
strictest measures to protect our people and to punish those guilty of the
murder. It is necessary to publish an official notice or to make a statement
to the population from an appropriate organ or person, indicating that
public opinion in the USSR considers the English Conservative Party to
have inspired the murder, and that it is trying to create a new Sarajevo.
We must immediately declare as hostages all known monarchists who
are sitting in our prisons and concentration camps. It is necessary, now,
to shoot five or ten monarchists, declaring that new groups of monar-
chists will be shot for each attempted murder. It is necessary to give the
OGPU a directive to make mass searches and arrests of monarchists and
of all kinds of White Guardists all over the USSR for the purpose of their
complete liquidation by all measures.
Voikov’s murder gives us the grounds for the complete destruction of
monarchist and White Guard cells in all parts of the USSR by all revolu-
tionary means. The goal of strengthening our [defensive] rear requires
this from us.
The same day, the Politburo codified Stalin’s suggestions to Molo-
tov, point by point, but increased the number of people to be shot
to twenty from the five or ten suggested by Stalin. Those executed
became known as “The Twenty,” and as documents below reveal,
their execution became a focal point for a number of events.

d o c u m ent
· 35 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On measures in connection
with White Guardist actions. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 5, l. 35.
8 June 1927

1) To publish a government statement about the recent facts of White

Guard actions, with an appeal to workers, and all laboring people, to
maintain intense vigilance, and to commission the OGPU to take
decisive measures in relation to White Guardists.
2) Also, to publish a special appeal by TsK VKP(b) on this issue.
3) To commission the OGPU to carry out mass searches and arrests of
White Guardists.
4) After publishing the government statement, to publish an OGPU
communiqué about the execution of 20 well-known White Guard-
ists, who were guilty of crimes against Soviet power.
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 65

5) To agree that the OGPU can, by itself, decide to authorize PP to pass

extrajudicial sentences on White Guardists guilty of a crime, up to
execution by shooting.
6) To recognize as necessary strengthening the OGPU both by [an in-
crease in] staff and by material means.
[…]
8) To organize a commission consisting of cc. Voroshilov, Menzhinsky,
and Yagoda for strengthening measures of security of central [state]
institutions as well as for some leaders. C. Voroshilov is charged to
call the commission.
9) To create a commission consisting of cc. Rykov, Bukharin, and
Molotov for working out additional political and economic actions
in connection with the intensification of White Guardist activities,
and the role that foreign governments play [in those activities]. To
charge the commissions to present proposals at tomorrow’s session
of the Politburo. To assign the same commission to edit the govern-
ment statement and the TsK statement. C. Rykov is charged with
convoking the commission.

Two weeks later, Stalin elaborated on his suspicions about foreign

intervention, sabotage, and spying to Menzhinsky. The latter had
written to Stalin to inquire about the operations, which precipitated
the following telegram. The document highlights Stalin’s attention to
OGPU activities abroad and to counterespionage matters inside the
country, since these were intertwined with foreign policy. His direc-
tion of these activities reveals the extent to which Stalin immersed
himself in the details of foreign policy and the political police, and his
micromanagement of information to be made public. These docu-
ments also reveal his deep-seated suspicion of constant conspiracy and
danger. In the following telegram, Stalin refers to Sidney Reilly, the
famous British adventurer and spy, who was caught, interrogated,
and executed by the OGPU in 1925.9

d o c u m en t
· 36 ·
Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to V. R. Menzhinsky on tasks of the
OGPU. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 71, l. 29.10
23 June 1927

Thank your for your communication. Contact the TsK for instructions.
My personal opinion: 1) London’s agents are deeper among us than it
66 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

seems, and their safe houses will remain. 2) We should use mass arrests
to destroy English spy networks [and] for recruitment among those
arrested through Artuzov’s department and to develop a system of volun-
tarism among the youth in favor of OGPU and its organs.11 3) One or two
show trials of English spies would be good in order to have official mate-
rial to use in England and Europe. 4) Publication of El’vengren’s inter-
rogation loses its persuasiveness in light of the anonymity of the author
of the article.12 5) Publication of such interrogations have a huge signifi-
cance, if it can be arranged skillfully, and the authors of such articles
should be well known judicial officials, lawyers, professors. 6) Pay special
attention to spying in military commands, aviation, and in the fleet.
When do you think you can publish Reilly’s interrogation? That must
be arranged skilfully.13
Greetings, Stalin
It is unclear from Stalin’s telegram whether he was justifying to
Menzhinsky the value of mass arrests already completed, or making
an argument for their continuation. A week after Stalin’s telegram to
Menzhinsky, however, the Politburo decided to end the mass opera-
tion, and issued the following decision.

d o c u m ent
· 37 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b) following c. M[enzhinsky]’s
information. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 5, l. 55.
30 June 1927

1) To issue a communiqué to newspapers about the liquidation of Oper-

put and his followers.14
[…]
3) Not to continue mass operations, but to concentrate attention of the
OGPU on the fastest processing of mass operations already conclud-
ed.
4) To assign the OGPU to present, within a fortnight, written informa-
tion, with as exact as possible data, concerning results of operations
already concluded.
5) To authorize the OGPU to exile families of the executed.
6) As an exception, to allow mass operations in Georgia [to continue].
To understand that the figures presented are significantly exaggerat-
ed. To recognize as necessary to limit arrests to the most active ele-
ments and, in particular, to take into consideration areas where gru-
zmeks [Georgian Mensheviks] have the greatest influence.
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 67

7) To place c. Chicherin in charge of publishing information about

actions of English counterespionage in the USSR.

The Politburo decision is interesting for several reasons, first for

what it indicates about political control of the judicial system. The
Politburo showed no hesitation about dictating the outcome of judi-
cial trials, a practice that was and continued to be commonplace.
Second, the decision shows to what extent OGPU operations, espe-
cially mass operations, were dictated by the Party leadership, and not
the state. On Stalin’s recommendation, the campaign commenced in
early June and, by Politburo decision, ceased abruptly at the end of
the month. The decision also reveals how closely the Party leaders
dictated the numbers of those to be repressed, and the intensity of
repression campaigns in different regions.
Stalin’s key role in the origin of the campaign is clear, although
initiatives for ending it are less clear. The Politburo decision merely a
week after Stalin’s telegram to Menzhinsky might indicate that he fa-
vored a continuation, while the majority of the Politburo decided to
end it. There was, in fact, a strong negative reaction, from both the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the judiciary organs, to the adminis-
trative execution of “The Twenty.” On several occasions, Chicherin in
particular warned of strained relations with Germany, Poland, France,
and Britain over the issue. International reaction was strongly nega-
tive, including letters of protest from communist, labor union, and
social democratic organizations in different countries. The operation
was creating bad press for the Soviet Union, and that must have been
one factor in the decision to stop it. Stalin, as well as other Politburo
members, was sensitive to these considerations. Stalin may have con-
cluded that, while the mass operations had been useful to make a
point, they had lost that utility and were becoming a liability.

The Trest Affair

There is a certain logic to the latter explanation given the context of the
decision, which was closely connected to the roll-up of the OGPU op-
eration Trest, or “Trust.”15 Begun in 1922, Trest ran for a number of
years as one of the most successful of Soviet counterespionage opera-
tions. Controlled by the OGPU, Trest was a front organization that
posed as an anti-Soviet monarchist underground “center.” OGPU
agents, working under cover, developed contacts with and infiltrated
a widening network of émigré groups actively working toward
68 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. By 1924 and 1925, the OGPU con-
trolled nearly all information supplied to, and domestic contacts with,
émigré organizations. It was through Trest that the Soviets lured a
number of prominent figures to sneak into or back into the Soviet
Union, either to be fed false information or to be captured. The capture
and execution of Sidney Reilly was orchestrated by Trest agents, as was
the capture of the notorious Socialist Revolutionary terrorist and anti-
Bolshevik agent, Boris Savinkov, in 1924.16 By 1927, however, the web
of double, triple, and even quadruple agents was moving beyond the
control of the OGPU. In June, the highly publicized defection of sev-
eral leading Trest agents to Finland, including Eduard Operput,
embarrassed the Soviet Union and compromised Trest operations.
These events occurred as the mass operations against monarchists were
just beginning, and the OGPU decided to terminate the Trest operation.
Stalin paid close attention to international politics and foreign policy,
and especially to the image of the Soviet Union abroad. It is likely that
he concurred in, and perhaps initiated, the ending of mass operations,
since they were beginning to impinge on foreign policy goals.
The mass operation against White Guardists concluded with some
twenty thousand searches and nine thousand arrests, as well as with
the execution of “The Twenty” and the indignant international re-
sponse. The day following the Politburo’s decision to stop the mass
operation, Krylenko, the Russian justice commissar, wrote his memo-
randum (chapter 1, document 18), proposing that administrative sen-
tencing boards be closed, and cases of espionage and counterrevolu-
tion be tried within special courts of the judicial system. The Polit-
buro rejected this proposal, but Stalin kept a copy in his safe, and in
1934, on his initiative, the Politburo created just these courts in a
decision that copied much of Krylenko’s proposal word for word.17
Reaction to the administrative execution of “The Twenty” was
strong enough that the Bolshevik leaders felt it necessary to make
a public defense of such methods, and of the OGPU in general. In
part, this took the form of a meeting with delegates of foreign
workers’ organizations. Stalin’s statements, while not surprising, are
nonetheless interesting, especially his comparison of the Russian
Revolution to the French Revolution, and his reference to the failure
of the Paris Commune of 1870–71. Stalin articulated, as well, the
essential argument of the doctrine of Socialism in One Country, which
stressed the internal strength of the Revolution, but the encirclement
by hostile powers. Hence, the need for a “naked sword” (namely the
OGPU) to protect the proletariat.
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 69

d o c u m en t
· 38 ·
Answer of I. V. Stalin to foreign worker delegates on the role
and place of the GPU in the Soviet state.18
5 November 1927

Question 7:
Judicial authority of the GPU [includes] trials without witnesses, with-
out defenders, secret organs. Since the French public opinion finds it hard
to accept these measures, it would be interesting to know their basis. Can
this authority be expected to change or be withdrawn?
Answer:
The GPU or Cheka is a punitive organ of Soviet power. This organ is
more or less similar to the Committee of Public Safety created during the
Great French Revolution. It punishes mainly spies, conspirators, terror-
ists, bandits, speculators, counterfeiters. It represents something like the
Military-political Tribunal created for the protection of revolutionary
interests against the counterrevolutionary bourge[oisie] and their agents.
This organ was created the very next day after the October revolution,
after all sorts of conspiratorial, terrorist, and espionage organizations
were uncovered, financed by Russian and foreign capitalists. This organ
has developed and become stronger […] and has been […] the vigilant
guard of the revolution, a naked sword of the proletariat.
[…]
I understand the hatred and mistrust of the bourgeoisie for the GPU. I
understand different bourgeois travelers, who come to the USSR, and
their first question is whether the GPU is still alive, and whether it is time
to liquidate the GPU. All this is understandable and not surprising.
But I refuse to understand some workers’ delegates, who come to the
USSR, and ask with concern: whether there have been many counterrevo-
lutionaries punished by the GPU, whether the various kinds of terrorists
and conspirators against proletarian power will still be punished, wheth-
er it is not time to end the existence of the GPU? Where do some workers’
delegates get this concern for enemies of the proletarian revolution? In
what way can this be explained? How to justify it? They preach for max-
imum softness, and advise to eliminate the GPU … But, is it possible to
guarantee that, after eliminating the GPU, capitalists of all countries will
stop organizing and financing counterrevolutionary groups, conspirators,
terrorists, instigators, bombers! Well, is this not foolishness, is it not a
crime against the working class to disarm the revolution, without having
any guarantees that enemies of the revolution would be disarmed! No,
comrades, we don’t want to repeat errors of the Parisian Communards.
70 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

The Parisian Communards were too soft towards the Versaillers, for
which Marx criticized them, with full justification.19 And they paid for
their softness, when Tier [Adolphe Thiers] entered Paris, and tens of
thousands of workers were shot by the Versaillers.20 Do the comrades
think that the Russian bourgeoisie and landowners are less bloodthirsty
than the Versaillers in France? We know how, anyway, they dealt with
workers when they occupied Siberia, Ukraine, the North Caucasus, in
alliance with French, English, Japanese, and American interventionists.21
By this I do not want to say at all that the domestic situation in the
country obliges us to have punitive organs of the revolution. The internal
situation of the revolution is so strong and unshakable that it would be
possible to live without the GPU. But the fact is that internal enemies are
not isolated units. The fact is that they are connected by a thousand
threads to the capitalists of all countries, who support them with all their
forces, with all their means.
We are a country surrounded by capitalist states. Internal enemies of
our revolution are the agents of the capitalists of all countries. Capitalist
states serve as a base, and a rear area for internal enemies of our revolu-
tion. Being at war with the internal enemies, we, at the same time,
conduct the struggle against the counterrevolutionary elements of all
countries. You decide now, whether in these conditions, it is possible to
manage without such punitive organs as the GPU.
No, comrades, we do not want to repeat errors of the Parisian Com-
munards. The revolution needs the GPU, and the GPU will live with us to
put fear into the enemies of the proletariat (stormy applause).

The Ever-Widening Conspiracy: The Shakhty Affair

The atmosphere of paranoia and danger created by the antimonar-
chist campaigns of 1927 did not abate, but intensified, setting the
stage for the famous Shakhty trial of the following year. The prosecu-
tion of fifty-five engineers for sabotage in the town of Shakhty, in the
Donetsk mining region, is well known, and marked the first significant
show trial since that of the Mensheviks and SRs in 1922. The engi-
neers were accused of working with former mine owners living abroad,
and foreign intelligence agencies. Along with them, British engineers
from the Vickers company were also implicated, as were several
Germans from AEG (Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft), the
German electrical conglomerate, employed as consultants.22 Five of
the accused were sentenced to death, while forty-three were given
prison sentences, but Stalin cautioned that the OGPU should deal
carefully with the foreign engineers. Both Litvinov and Chicherin
warned against arrest of German specialists, given the delicate
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 71

negotiations with German industrialists over aid. The following Polit-

buro decision reflected that caution.

d o c u m en t
· 39 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b) on the Shakhty case.
On arrests of Germans. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 6, ll. 37–38.
8 March 1928

Strictly secret
No. 14. Point 18—cc. Molotov’s and Stalin’s proposal. (PB from
2.III.28, Protocol No. 14, Point 12).

1) To arrest those Germans involved, with statement to A.E.G., that this

concerns not [the firm], but some of [the firm’s] agents, co-coordinating
this with NKID.
2) Not to touch the Englishmen without the commission’s approval; to
interrogate and to release the arrested Englishman; to conduct strong
surveillance of Vickers’s representative, etc. in the USSR.
3) To publish a statement of the USSR public prosecutor on Saturday,
having c. Rykov to give a speech about this case at the session of the
Mossovet [Moscow City Council] on Friday.
4) To put in charge a commission consisting of cc. Rykov, Ordzhoni-
kidze, Tomsky, Stalin (with replacement by Molotov), Kuibyshev, c.
Menzhinsky (with replacement by Yagoda), and Yanson for manag-
ing the OGPU and judicial organs in connection with the Shakhty
case, and conducting practical work along Party, trade union,
VSNKh, Rabkrin, and GPU lines.23
5) To distribute a document, with a TsK introduction, to all TsK and
TsKK [Central Control Commission of the Communist Party] mem-
bers, to the narkoms [people’s commissars], to the main communist
economic officials, to the best elements of the vuzovtsy-communists
[higher education students].

Much of the investigation of the Shakhty affair was conducted by

Yagoda rather than by Menzhinsky, and a week after the Politburo
decision, Yagoda sent a memorandum to Stalin outlining a conspiracy
that went beyond just the Shakhty events. Yagoda warned that the
tentacles of counterrevolutionary activity required a consequent ex-
pansion of police investigation, stretching from the Don region to
western Ukraine, and even to Moscow.
72 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

d o c u m ent
· 40 ·
Special communication from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on the
counterrevolutionary organization in the Donugol system [The Don
Basin Coal Administration]. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 328, ll. 20–25.
12 March 1928

The OGPU’s SKK plenipotentiary [special agent in charge of the North

Caucasus Krai]24 has discovered a powerful organization, which has been
operating for many years in the Donugol. In view of the fact that this
case has gone beyond the framework of the given raion, and its further
development rests in the necessity to conduct investigations in Kharkov
(Donugol Administration) and in Moscow (VSNKh USSR), instructions
were given by us to concentrate investigation of the present case in
Moscow, since it is absolutely clear, following from the case, that this
organization has its center in Moscow, [that] it leads wrecking [activity]
not only in [the] coal [industry], but in other branches of the [national]
economy.
[…]
The activity of this organization is directed from Poland (Dvorzhan-
chik, former chief shareholder of DGRU [Donetsk Ore Mining Associa-
tion]), and from Germany (Shkaf, former Chairman of the DGRU Share-
holders Society, […] through Moscow (VSNKh USSR) and Kharkov
(Donugol administration). Tasks from Germany are received by Donugol
engineers when they are on business abroad, as well as by specialists of
German firms who arrive in the USSR. […] Work is carried out with sup-
port from abroad […], sent from Poland and Germany. The organization
has set for itself a wide array of tasks, depending on the development of
the organization. In 1919–1920, the goal was to maintain the value of the
assets and mining equipment in [expectation of the] retreat of the Reds,
but subsequently the organization’s program broadened. “(…) Already
in 1925–26, the goal changed, to inflict direct damage on Soviet power
by buying and obtaining unnecessary equipment abroad, by irrational
capital investment, by delaying capital investment and its turnover, by
lowering quality, increasing production costs, increasing [the amount of]
impurities in the coal, and through this, most of all, to harm transport,
decrease the ability to compete abroad, etc. All of this was done to disrupt
the economy of not only Donugol, but the rest of the industry of the
USSR. Talk within the organization is already not about preserving the
value for the old owners, but about direct wrecking of the Soviet econo-
my” (interrogation of engineer Berezovsky).
[…]
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 73

Engineer Berezovsky characterized the third stage of the organization’s

work as follows: “(…) The third stage of our work began, I think in 1927,
in that all our work was tied to intervention in the USSR. […] We all had
to think, each of us in our workplace, in what way to destroy the enter-
prise’s activity […] [in case of intervention].”
[…]
From evidence of several of those arrested, though not yet sufficiently
proven, [it seems that] apart from transfer abroad of heavy machinery,
[there were plans to] smuggle weapons into the USSR from abroad, […]
and money for organizing insurgent units in Cossack regions.
The stimulus for recruiting specialists to fulfill the orders and instruc-
tions of their former owners was both ideological and material. Engineers
and technicians in the organization received almost regular monthly bo-
nuses, usually equivalent to a month’s salary, and, in addition, were paid
a monthly sum from 100 to 500 rubles for completing particular tasks.
Engineer Berezovsky, according to his personal evidence, distributed [to
other engineers] around 200,000 rubles. Of this, Berezovsky kept 20,000
for himself.
[…]
In order fully to acquaint you with case material, we will distribute an
overview of the case “Wreckers,” compiled by the SKK OGPU plenipo-
tentiary.
Deputy Head OGPU (Yagoda)
The Shakhty conspiracy was not an isolated incident, in Stalin’s
view, and he received confirmation of this through numerous reports
and memorandums. The memorandum below from Lazar Kaganov-
ich, one of Stalin’s closest associates and in 1928 general party secre-
tary in Ukraine, is an example. In April of that year, Kaganovich
warned Stalin of the discovery of an ever-widening conspiracy.

d o c u m en t
· 41 ·
Memorandum from L. M. Kaganovich to I. V. Stalin on investigation
of economic counterrevolution in the Donbass. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58,
d. 329, ll. 28–31.
26 April 1928

Dear c. Stalin!
OGPU [Handwritten above the line] investigation of economic coun-
terrevolution in the Donbass is completed. The investigation went deep
74 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

enough and [was] successful. [“and … successful”: Handwritten above

the line] […]. Investigative evidence showed that counterrevolution went
beyond the Shakhty case, and goes far beyond the boundaries of Donu-
gol, that the counterrevolutionary organization encompassed a number
of the biggest trusts of Ukraine—Iugostal [The Southern Steel Trust],
Khimugol [Chemical-Coal Trust], IuRT [Southern Ore Trust]. The inves-
tigation has established that this kind of organization existed on an all-
union scale in Moscow. The Moscow center was headed by Rabinovich,
the chairman of the Scientific-Technical Council of VSNKh, and others
who came into this were the Chairman of the All-Union Association of
Engineers, Pal’chinsky, as well as others […].
We have specific evidence saying that the all-union center has its cells,
and has spread its influence, to Siberia (Kuznetsk basin), the Caucasus
(Tkvibulsk coal basin and oil fields), and the Moscow Central Raion
(machine-building factories).
Of course, this latter requires further study and investigation. So far,
the investigation is complete only for the Donugol organization.
[…]
[The investigation] has established precisely that the Donugol counter-
revolutionary organization had ties to the Polish and French embassies in
Moscow. [Also] to the Polish consul general in Kharkov, the French war
ministry, the bureau of political police in Berlin, and several government
circles in Germany.
The Poles played the most immediate part in the very creation of the
organization, generously subsidizing it and using it broadly for spying
and subversive work. Head of the Ukrainian organization, engineer Ma-
tov, says with absolute openness: “The organization was a subversive
group for the Polish embassy.”
[…]
The organization prepared actively for intervention and, in practice,
took completely real measures for subverting the homeland from inside.
All these materials wholly and fully support your analysis at the TsK
plenary session about new forms of counterrevolutionary work, and
about preparations for interventions on the part of world imperialism.
It seems to me, comrade Stalin, that [we] must not be limited just to the
resolution that was taken at the TsK plenary session. That resolution was
completely and absolutely correct, but now, it is necessary to study more
deeply and concretely all the conditions of work of our trusts and eco-
nomic organizations, and carry out […] reorganization not only of the
structure, but of the very work of economic enterprises, which would
secure us from a repeat of similar histories.
In particular, it seems to me that it is necessary to strengthen the role of
the GPU, for example, in a way that there would be senior officials, GPU
plenipotentiaries, in the biggest trusts, something like the GPU transport
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 75

organs. [“something … organs”: Handwritten in ink above the line] This

reorganization needs to be conducted under supervision and direct leader-
ship of leading officials of the TsK and TsKK [Central Control Commis-
sion, Communist Party Inspectorate], otherwise, I am afraid that, in the
sense of structures and methods of work, everything will stay the same.
With communist greetings
Your,
L. Kaganovich
As the following document shows, even the normally cautious
Krylenko succumbed, at least officially, to the theory that the Shakhty
group was only one part of a widespread conspiracy that involved
anti-Soviet business and political interests in Poland and other coun-
tries, and that had spread from western Ukraine to the Donbass, and
still further. The document, a recommendation from a Politburo-
appointed commission, also highlights the relative caution expressed
in official statements about the extent of conspiracy and sabotage.
The statements in the document may seem unrealistic, but they are
moderate compared to allegations of foreign and domestic sabotage
made during the mass purges of the late 1930s.

d o c u m en t
· 42 ·
Decision of the Politburo commission of TsK VKP(b). On the Shakhty
case. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 329, ll. 10–12.
11 April 1928

Strictly secret
[…] Appendix to the protocol of the meeting of the commission on the
Shakhty case from 11.IV.28,
I suggest:

1) Since there is a direct connection of the Donugol case (Kharkov) with

the Shakhty case, and the latter is only an episode in relation to the
Donugol case;
Since the connection with the Polish [consular] mission and former
shareholders can be proven clearly and concretely only for the Donu-
gol case, while in the Shakhty case, this kind of connection might be
proven, but not without knowledge of exactly who, when, and where;
And, finally, since only in the Donugol case is it possible to establish
facts that compromise Moscow (Rabinovich etc.)— to change the
76 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

previous decision of combining both cases in one trial, and to limit

[the case] to the top management of Donugol and Shcherbinka
Rudoupravlenie [Shcherbinka Ore Mining Administration].
2) In connection with the previous decision: to delay the trial for two
weeks, i.e. until 15 May, instead of 21 April, which was decided pre-
viously by the Politburo, considering the 10 days that the accused
must have to become familiar with the [case] materials, after they
receive the indictment on 5 May.
3) To recommend, in this regard, that the OGPU transfer to Moscow
the arrested persons and Donugol materials by April 20th.
4) In connection with completion of the investigation of the Shakhty
case, to allow the Procuracy to release those arrested persons whose
cases will be sent to the court, and to send cases of some for further
investigation, or for deportation, etc., in an extrajudicial manner,
after OGPU approval.
5) To discuss whether it is expedient to include in the case two more
German engineers, Vagener and Zeebald, information about whose
wrecking is available. I personally believe that they should not be
involved, in order not to complicate the trial, to limit their punish-
ment to deportation from the USSR, despite direct evidence against
them given by the accused Bashkin and others.

G. Yagoda N. Krylenko
The Shakhty “affair” opened a period of at least two years in which
leaders’ attention, and Stalin’s attention in particular, focused increas-
ingly on the danger posed by widespread conspiracies of specialists,
allied with foreign agencies and governments, and with former own-
ers and White Guardists living abroad. The growing hysteria about
wrecking in industry seemed to give the OGPU a green light to engage
in anti-spetsy campaigns, as they came to be called. Likewise, many
local Party officials, police, factory cell communists, and workers
joined in. Such was the case in Moscow, as the document below
shows, and the reaction by leaders reveals their concern that the purge
campaign not get out of hand. In the document, Politburo member Ya.
Rudzutak requests fellow Politburo members to suspend the decision
made by the Moscow Party Committee to include workers in anti-
spetsy activities.
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 77

d o c u m en t
· 43 ·
Memorandum from Ya. Rudzutak25 to the Politburo of the TsK
(VKP(b) on purging specialists working in Moscow factories.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 332, l. 27.
1 June 1928

Absolutely secret
Urgent
As is apparent from the attached communication from c. Rukhimov-
ich,26 it was decided at a meeting of managers and GPU and Procuracy of-
ficials, sponsored by the MK VKP(b) [the Moscow Committee of the Party],
to carry out a purge of specialists, working in Moscow factories. I request
that this decision be tabled until the issue can be discussed in the PB.
Deputy Chairman, Council of Labor and Defense, c. Rudzutak

[Rukhimovich statement]
1.VI–28
[…]
Yesterday, at a gathering sponsored by the MK of managers and Pro-
curacy and OGPU officials, it was decided to carry out a purge of special-
ists in Moscow factories, no matter whether they are local, republic, or
all-union enterprises.
It was decided, as well, to conduct the purge openly, informing the work-
ers. This was communicated to me by c. Tortoriisky, a representative of
[…] VSNKh. I regard it as necessary that this issue be discussed in the PB.
Rukhimovich
In order to control the purge process, not to let it get out of hand,
Stalin and the Politburo were also careful to restrain the political
police from overzealousness.

d o c u m en t
· 44 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On specialists.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 6, l. 118.
2 August 1928

No. 36 Point 2—On specialists (c. Molotov)

a) To give to the GPU the following directive: while conducting work on
[…] counterrevolutionary-harmful elements in economic institutions,
78 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

which must be conducted systematically and strenuously, especially

concerning the major industrial and transportation organs, to require
the GPU to use repression and arrests of renowned specialists, in
particular, with maximal care, more than is the case now, and to al-
low arrests of only truly malicious counterrevolutionaries, wreckers,
and spies.

Reports about wrecking in the defense industries, transport, and

other economic sectors became increasingly detailed and lengthy. The
following memorandum from Stalin, concerning a report on the
defense industries, reflected his sense of danger and urgency. The re-
port to which Stalin referred was not attached to the memorandum.

d o c u m ent
· 45 ·
Memorandum from I. V. Stalin to members and candidate members of the
Politburo of the TsK VKP(b) on the case of the group of specialists in military
industries. AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 170, l. 40.
12 May 1928

Absolutely secret
I request that members and candidate members of the Politburo give
serious attention to the document being distributed from the RKI, as well
as the memorandum from Yagoda on activities of one group of specialists
in the military industries. This affair is very serious and urgent, and prob-
ably should be examined at the next Politburo session.
I. Stalin
The following memorandum and report detail problems in the
country’s railroad system. The report presents what is probably a
fairly accurate picture of the chaotic state of the rail lines, but the
question is still debated, was it the result of wrecking, as Stalin and
the OGPU assumed? Was it, instead, a combination of mismanage-
ment, ordinary corruption, and hasty political decisions taken by Sta-
lin and the Politburo, that overburdened and pushed the rail system
into collapse? Many have argued that Stalin created, or at least en-
couraged, the sabotage interpretation in order to deflect blame for
poor decisions of the leadership, but it is also very likely that, given
the state of the lines, and the discrepancy between managers’ assess-
ments and those of the OGPU, Stalin and those around him believed
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 79

in their conspiracy theories. The report, presented by Stalin, exempli-

fies the often convoluted language of official communications.

d o c u m en t
· 46 ·
Memorandum from I. V. Stalin to members and candidate members of the
Politburo, TsK secretaries, and members of the TsKK Presidium, with appended
report by the OGPU on wrecking in railroad transport. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d.
372, ll. 25–41.
16 June 1928

About two months ago, the first OGPU memorandum was distributed
about wrecking in railroad transport. The second memorandum […], dis-
tributed now, is supplemented by new materials, depositions by special-
ists, and technical data. Given the extreme importance of the issue, from
the point of view of both our economic development and especially de-
fense of the country, [you] are requested to review the memorandum
personally, and regard it as a strictly secret document.
I. Stalin

Absolutely secret
Report No. 2
On the system of wrecking activity by a counterrevolutionary organi-
zation in railroad transport, and its consequences.
Part 1
In furtherance of the previously submitted preliminary report, on the
basis of supplemental investigative evidence and conclusions of technical
expertise compiled by major engineers and specialists, the activity of a
counterrevolutionary organization directed toward the destruction of the
locomotive stock is characterized extremely clearly, and exceeds, by far,
our first suppositions built on preliminary investigative evidence and
agents’ materials about the extent of wrecking and its consequences.
The OGPU organized a network of spot inspections on all lines, of the
factual condition of the permanent (mobilized) stock of locomotives (the
so-called hard, cold NKPS stock). According to current orders and in-
structions, the mobilized locomotive stock should be maintained in the
most exemplary condition and should be ready at any minute to attach to
a train. The inspection showed that 25 percent of the permanent (mobi-
lized) stock is in damaged condition, and a part of these locomotives
could not even be placed in a military convoy.
80 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

This fact alone is enough to disrupt any mobilization [of stock]. Ex-
tremely indicative, as well, is the fact that the Moscow–White Sea–Baltic
railroad, the most important for moving forces according to the Military
Affairs Department, showed the worst condition of its cold stock, spe-
cifically, of 65 locomotives in its mobilized stock, only 2 were operable.
It is necessary, as well, to note that a week prior to our inspection, an
inspector from [the department of] locomotives, NKPS, visited, and his
survey of the mobilized stock showed nothing catastrophic. The situation
in relation to that line is made worse by the fact that, thanks to orders
from the locomotive department NKPS, a huge majority of locomotives
working on that line have absolutely no spare parts, so that in case
of damage to these parts, a locomotive has to be taken off line. […] Data
[of an all-union technical census of rail lines] showed that the number of
malfunctioning locomotives exceeds the official statistic of the NKPS
locomotive department by 1,300 units. It is apparent, as well, that with
this false data, it is completely impossible to manage transport, to imple-
ment correct repair policies, to conduct proper movement of trains in an
emergency. […]
Having surveyed the condition of operational (active) stock, the OGPU
went on to a survey of the reserve stock, and discovered that the reserve
stock is almost completely destroyed. (In 1925, there were 6,924 [loco-
motives] and, as of 1 May 1928, 2,200, of these nearly 1,000 have been
scheduled to be scrapped.) Also uncovered was a mass transfer of opera-
tional locomotives for scrap. […]
[…] Remarks of the deputy head of the transport planning department,
Shukov, one of the most qualified engineers in NKPS, who provided much
service to the OGPU, [highlighted] the characteristic attitude of NKPS
specialists. In answer to the question posed by c. Blagonravov: “What is
the percent of malfunctioning locomotives on the lines at the present
moment”—engineer Shukov answered “Close to 30 percent.” To the
question “How can it be that he gave such an answer, which coincides
with OGPU data (from its factual inspection), being that the answer
sharply contradicts NKPS statistical data, which showed only 18 per-
cent”—engineer Shukov said: “The number of malfunctioning locomo-
tives is not difficult to establish for any engineer who sorts through this.”
However, not one of these literate engineers went to the NKPS
Collegium and declared that the locomotive stock is near catastrophe.
[…]
[A table with 76 surnames is inserted here—those who had so far been
interrogated—with a note that 728 others had been interrogated and had
also acknowledged wrecking activity.]
Engineer-wreckers made their goal the destruction of the locomotive
stock, as already noted in the pervious report. For the successful realiza-
tion of their criminal goals they created a precisely calculated system of
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 81

wrecking, and covered the results of wrecking with fraudulent statistics,

which reflected complete well-being, when in fact the reality was collapse.
[…]
The consequence of the c[ounter]-revolutionary system is revealed with
special clarity when we compare the fraudulent statistics with the reality.
According to the false numbers, there is, on the face of it, an upward
curve, but the reality is a downward curve. According to official statistics,
the percent of malfunctioning locomotives in [19]28 was lower than in
[19]25. In reality, the percent of malfunctioning locomotives was 7.6
percent higher than in [19]25.
Capital investment in the locomotive department for the last 3 years
has not had any effect. […] Official statistics show that healthy locomo-
tives number 12,042, when in fact there are only 11,003. Official
accounts for fuel show that matters are rather good, that fuel expenditure
is equal to [19]13, when in fact expenditures continue to increase and
significantly exceed 1913 levels.
[…]
The consequences of [wrecking] cannot yet be calculated, although an
approximate financial estimation would comprise several hundreds of
millions of rubles, but the most important consequence consists in the
fact that the locomotive economy of NKPS has been brought to such a
situation that it could not cope with the tasks put on it in the case of
mobilization and war.
[…]
The OGPU is keeping transport commissar Rudzutak, informed of its
investigation, who has agreed to the prosecution of arrests and, on the
other side, has carried out personnel changes in both the communist and
the noncommunist sections of the NKPS department of locomotives. […].
[The investigation] will stretch out another several months.
Assist. Head OGPU (Yagoda)
Chief, TO OGPU [OGPU Transport Department] (Blagonravov).

Spying Abroad
As in other wrecking cases, the railroad engineers were supposed to
have been funded by, and to be working in close collaboration with,
foreign military, private, and government spying agencies. The Polit-
buro singled out Poland, Britain, France, and Germany as the coun-
tries most involved in plans to wreck Soviet industrialization and to
prepare for intervention, and instructed the foreign department of the
OGPU to concentrate its attention on these countries. This involved,
of course, an increase of funds and personnel to carry out the required
tasks.
82 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

d o c u m ent
· 47 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On the work of
INO OGPU [Foreign Department of the OGPU]. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 50, d. 32, l. 115.
5 February 1930

Strictly secret
No. 116. Point 38—About the INO (cc. Kaganovich, Yagoda, Mess-
ing). To approve a proposal of the commission of the Politburo, with
amendments.

1. Regions of intelligence work of INO OGPU.

Since it is necessary to concentrate all our intelligence forces and means
on certain main territorial areas, INO OGPU [will concentrate] its intel-
ligence activities on the following basic regions:
1. England
2. France
3. Germany (Center)
4. Poland
5. Romania
6. Japan
7. Limitrophes [Recently created border states or areas: Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Estonia, and parts of Poland and Finland, separated from the
Russian empire after World War I]

2. Goals of INO OGPU.

1. Elucidation of and penetration into émigré wrecking centers, no mat-
ter their locations.
2. Detecting terrorist organizations in all the places where they are con-
centrated.
3. Penetration of interventionist plans made by the leadership circles of
England, Germany, France, Poland, Romania, and Japan, and clari-
fication when they are supposed to be implemented.
4. Elucidation and exposure of plans for financial and economic block-
ade by the leadership circles of the mentioned countries.
5. Extraction of documents of confidential military-political agreements
and contracts between the above mentioned countries.
6. Struggle against foreign espionage in our organizations.
7. Organization of the destruction of traitors, deserters, and leaders of
White Guard terrorist organizations.
8. Extraction of inventions, technical-industrial drawings, and secrets for
our industry that are impossible to receive in a normal manner, and
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 83

9. Surveillance over Soviet institutions abroad, and exposure of latent

traitors.

3. Staff and means.

1. To appoint to the positions of foreign work of the OGPU the five
most responsible Party members who may become organizers and
political leaders in the major areas of the INO activities abroad. To
select these comrades in accordance with OGPU requests.
2. Within a year, to appoint to the positions of foreign work of the
OGPU no fewer than fifty especially vetted and reliable Party mem-
bers in order to train them theoretically and practically, according to
the OGPU program.
3. To recognize as essentially necessary to transfer work of INO organs
from Soviet organs to an extralegal status. To carry this out gradu-
ally within a year. Orgraspred TsK [Organization and Personnel
Department of the TsK], together with the OGPU, must develop a
procedure for inserting INO employees in Soviet institutions abroad,
[and] how to serve these institutions while maintaining the secrecy
[of their INO work].
4. To increase funding of work abroad up to 300 thousand gold rubles
for accomplishing the goals of the OGPU.

The Industrial Party Trial

The spiral of suspicion and repression came to a head with the Indus-
trial Party trial (25 November–7 December 1930). In this trial, a
number of prominent engineers and economists were accused of col-
laboration with foreign groups, especially in France, to cripple Soviet
economic and industrial planning efforts in conjunction with armed
intervention to overthrow the Soviet government. The eight engineers
who were tried included L. K. Ramzin, supposedly the leader, an in-
ternationally renowned technical expert, and director of the Moscow
Thermal Engineering Institute. The group, labeled the Trade-Industrial
Committee, Torgprom, included other prominent engineers such as
Professor V. A. Larichev. The group supposedly had ties to a number
of other anti-Soviet conspiratorial organizations, as the documents
below show. Stalin paid close attention to the process of arrest and
interrogation. He made specific recommendations for how the OGPU
should conduct interrogations, and how to describe the plans and
activities of the main defendants.27
84 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

d o c u m ent
· 48 ·
Letter from I. V. Stalin to V. R. Menzhinsky on future directions of testimony
of the leaders of the TKP [Labor-Peasant Party] and of the Promparty [Indus-
trial Party]. October 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d. 388, ll. 270–71.28

C. Menzhinsky!
Letter of 2.X and material received. Ramzin’s interrogation is very
interesting. In my opinion, the most interesting in his testimony—the issue
of intervention in general and especially the issue about the timing of in-
tervention. It turns out that intervention was suggested for 1930, but was
postponed to 1931, and even to 1932. This is very probable, and impor-
tant. It is all the more important given that [this information also] came
from initial sources, i.e. from the group Ryabushinsky, Gukasov, Den-
isov, Nobel, which seems the most powerful, both because of finances and
because of ties to the French and English governments. It may seem that
the TKP or the “Promparty” or Miliukov’s “party” are the most power-
ful. But this is not correct. The main power—[is] the group Ryabushin-
sky—Denisov—Nobel, and so forth, i.e. “Torgprom” [Trade-Industrial
Committee].29 The TKP, “Promparty,” Miliukov’s “Party” are merely
lackeys running after “Torgprom.” Even more interesting is the timing of
intervention, according to “Torgprom.” The question of intervention, in
general, and the timing, especially, is, as we know, our primary interest.
Given this, my suggestions:

a) For new (future) testimony of top leaders of TKP, “Promparty,” and

especially Ramzin, make one of the most important central points the
issue of intervention and the timing of intervention. 1) Why postpone
intervention from 1930? 2) Is it because Poland is not ready? 3) May-
be because Romania is not ready? 4) Maybe because the limitrophes
are not yet joined with Poland? 5) Why postpone intervention until
1931? 6) [What does it mean to say] intervention “can” be postponed
to 1932? And so forth and so on.
b) Bring into the case Larichev and other members of the Promparty
TsK [central committee] and interrogate them rigorously about this,
letting them see Ramzin’s interrogation.
c) Rigorously interrogate Groman,30 who, according to Ramzin’s [inter-
rogation], pleaded with the “Unified Center” that “intervention be
postponed until 1932.”
d) Run Messrs. Kondrat’ev, Yurovsky, Chayanov,31 and so forth through
the gauntlet [propustit’ skvoz’ stroi], who cleverly shirk away from a
“tendency toward intervention,” but who are (without argument!)
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 85

interventionists, and rigorously interrogate them about the timing of

intervention. (Kondrat’ev, Iurovsky, and Chayanov should know
about that, as well, as does Miliukov,32 to whom they went running
for consultation.)

If it turns out that Ramzin’s testimony is confirmed and concretized by

the testimony of others of the accused (Groman, Larichev, Kondrat’ev
and company, and so forth), then that will be a serious success for the
OGPU, because we will give the material gained in this form to the TsK
sections, and to the workers of every country, and [we will] conduct the
widest campaign against the interventionists, and get to the point where
we will paralyze, undermine attempts at intervention for the next year or
two, which is not unimportant for us.
Understood?
Greetings. I. Stalin
The Politburo established a special commission to manage the trial,
which included Stalin, Krylenko, and Menzhinsky. Stalin carefully
managed the course of interrogations, publicity surrounding the trial,
and the trial itself. He also gave specific orders to shoot “two or three
dozen wreckers,” including the economists N. D. Kondrat’ev and V.
G. Groman.33

d o c u m en t
· 49 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On use of the wreckers’
depositions about intervention. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 53.
25 October 1930

No. 13 Point 17—About use of the wreckers’ depositions in the matter of

intervention (c. Stalin).

a) To recognize as necessary to prosecute immediately the united coun-

terrevolutionary center, having wreckers’ depositions about prepar-
ing intervention as the central point during the trial.
b) To create a commission consisting of cc. Litvinov, Voroshilov, Stalin,
Menzhinsky, and Krylenko for reviewing quickly the wreckers’ depo-
sitions about intervention for publication.

C. Litvinov is charged to call the commission.

86 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

d o c u m ent
· 50 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On the trial of the
Promparty. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 81.
25 November 1930

No. 16 Point 48/48—To create a commission consisting of cc. Litvinov

(with replacement by Krestinsky), Molotov, Stalin, Voroshilov, Menzhin-
sky, Yanson, and Krylenko to direct the case of the Promparty
C. Molotov is charged to call [the commission].
As the trial commenced on 25 November, the Politburo approved
suggestions presented by Stalin’s committee to organize public re-
sponses to the trial and accusations, and to publicize the results as
widely as possible.

d o c u m ent
· 51 ·
Proposal of the commission on the case of the Promparty.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, ll. 81–82.
25 November 1930

No. 16, Point 53/53—

To accept the suggestion of the commission to send the following direc-
tives to TsKs of the national Communist Parties, kraikoms (obkoms) of
VKP(b) [Communist Party krai and oblast committees]:
“In connection with the trial of wreckers and agents of foreign inter-
vention, which will begin 25.XI, TsK VKP(b) suggests to engage in ex-
planatory work among the broad working masses and in the Red Army,
revealing the interventionist plans of imperialists, and France, in particu-
lar, of White Guardist émigrés, and of their bourgeois-wrecking agents in
the USSR. A major goal of this must be mobilization of the masses against
military intervention, and for strengthening defense of the country. Dur-
ing this explanatory work, the counterrevolutionary-wrecking activities
of some top elements that belong to the old bourgeois engineers’ and
proprietors’ [society] should be revealed. However, persecution and
sweeping charges against engineers in general should be avoided.
In this connection TsK VKP(b) directs:
a) To start extended coverage of the trial and of the goals of the Party
and working class in their struggle against wreckers and intervention-
ists, and for strengthening the defense of the country.
 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy 87

b) To organize widespread demonstrations in all cities and factory set-

tlements, and of collective farmers, if possible, during the first day of
the trial.
c) Main slogans must be the following:
1. Our response to the sorties of our class enemies, foreign interven-
tionists, White émigrés, wreckers, and kulaks will be merciless pun-
ishment of agents of military intervention, and a broad offensive of
socialism on all fronts of our economic construction.
2. Our response to the threat of intervention will be to strengthen
the defense of the country.
3. Broaden development of military training of the broad masses, to
strengthen the defense of the USSR, to strengthen the Red Army.
4. Our response to the class enemy is in creating millions of shock
workers [udarniki] among the working class, and a fighting uni-
ty of workers around the Bolshevik Party.
5. The proletarian dictatorship of the USSR, together with the in-
ternational revolutionary proletariat, will smash all and any
attempts of interventionists and their internal counterrevolution-
ary agents.
6. Down with warmongers! Long live the Red Army, a bulwark of
peace and the true sentry of the Soviet state!”
As a result of the trial, five of the eight defendants were sentenced to
be shot, including Ramzin, and three others to prison terms. The exe-
cutions were commuted to prison sentences of ten years. In specialists’
“prisons,” Ramzin and many others continued to work in their areas
of expertise, and he and others were pardoned and released in the
early 1930s. The OGPU staged related trials in many other economic
sectors, arresting in all some eight thousand specialists. Most of these
were from the liberal or conservative prerevolutionary technical elite.34
Historians have long wondered about Stalin’s motives for setting
such a campaign in motion. Most explanations center on his attempt to
create an atmosphere of crisis to gain support for his increasingly radi-
cal and reckless industrial plans, to silence moderate critics in the Party
and state apparatus, and to displace blame for problems in the econo-
my caused by the regime’s policies. The documents above lend weight
to this view, although they do not shed light on what Stalin may or
may not have really believed. At the same time, a genuine sense of para-
noia comes through in these documents. Whatever other reasons
motivated Stalin, he very likely believed the prophecies of doom that
his fears generated. Whatever the case, these campaigns solidified the
prestige and authority of the political police as Stalin’s main means to
88 Threats from Abroad, Infiltrating the Economy

accomplish his political and economic objectives. By the end of the

1920s, Stalin’s position as undisputed leader and the power and pres-
tige of the OGPU were intertwined. Stalin needed the political police to
enforce his power and his version of reality, and the political police had
a willing patron. As the following chapters show, however, although
Stalin needed the political police, he also remained its master.
 chapter three

Subduing the Countryside

1928–1933

B
y the end of 1930, Stalin’s group was fully in power, having
defeated, with the help of the OGPU, Trotsky and the so-called
Left Opposition, and then the Party moderates of the so-called
Right Deviation. Having silenced potential opposition, Stalin’s group
pushed industrialization and collectivization plans still further. In a
period of a few short years, during the era of the first Five Year Plan,
begun in 1928, Stalin’s revolution from above destroyed the remnants
of NEP’s state capitalism, and collectivized the great majority of the
country’s agrarian lands. Leaders forced the pace of industrial con-
struction at the expense of wages, housing, and other basic amenities,
creating widespread scarcities and deplorable work and living condi-
tions. For several years at the beginning of the 1930s, all nonstate
trade was made illegal, which worsened conditions of scarcity and
fueled a large black market. In the countryside, local Party and police
officials dispossessed millions of peasants, confiscating land, livestock,
equipment, even homes, for the sake of collectivization. Over two mil-
lion peasants were deported to penal colonies for actively resisting
collectivization or for refusing to join collective farms.
Forced industrialization and collectivization on such a scale
required a commensurate amount of coercion, opening up a new era
of mass repressions. And this was especially true in rural areas of the
country. There, the regime waged nothing less than a war to bring
agrarian lands under control of the state. The movement of police,
Party officials, and political troops into the countryside, and the re-
sistance that that provoked, led to the first of several mass waves of
repression of the 1930s. This chapter explores the expansion of the

89
90 Subduing the Countryside

political police and its authority in the late 1920s and early 1930s as
a revolutionary arm of the state, violently reshaping social and eco-
nomic relations.

Turning to the Countryside

The early 1930s saw a change in direction for the political police. Dur-
ing the years 1927 to 1930, the OGPU focused its primary activities
on the problems associated with Stalin’s industrialization drive: the
supposed sabotage of industrial enterprises, whole economic sectors,
and defense industries. The Politburo even charged the OGPU abroad
with orienting their intelligence activities toward uncovering foreign
intentions and attempts to wreck Soviet modernization efforts. In
1929 and 1930 this began to change, as the police’s attention turned
increasingly to the rural areas of the country. There, Stalin’s socialist
offensive was not going well. Policies of forced collectivization and
grain confiscation, begun in 1929, were meeting strong resistance, and
the spiral of state violence and popular reaction was escalating into a
full-out social war. Stalin did not trust the army to bring order and
control to the countryside, since many soldiers were from the villages,
and in some cases, even officers participated in resistance efforts
against the regime’s policies. Given the situation, Stalin and the Polit-
buro turned to the political police to break the hold of the “kulaks”
in rural areas and carry out the destruction of the “kulak class.”
OGPU numbers and funding rose substantially in the first years of the
1930s, and most of those increases went to expand local GPU offices
and operational centers. In addition, over five thousand officers were
assigned to political departments in farm equipment centers, the ma-
chine tractor stations that serviced the new collective farms. This was
in many ways a brilliant solution to the problem of rural control, a
network of police spies and informants that added yet another layer
of contact and surveillance in the countryside.
The escalation of state violence in rural areas led the political police
to engage in large-scale operations of mass purging and deportation
for the first time since the Civil War years. While the OGPU worked
against purported political opposition during the 1920s, the rural
dekulakization campaigns of the early 1930s returned the agency to its
Civil War origins as a revolutionary arm of the Bolshevik state—alter-
ing social and economic relations through administrative violence.
The dekulakization campaigns gave a new lease on life to the
political police, but that was not all. In addition to expansion in
 Subduing the Countryside 91

the countryside, police authority also expanded in other ways. In

1930, carceral institutions and labor camps were removed from juris-
diction of the justice commissariat, and the labor camp administra-
tion, the GULAG, was founded and placed under sole authority of the
OGPU.1 In the same year, secret reorganization of the civil police
brought the civil police, the militsiia, under operational control of the
OGPU. By the end of 1932, the militsiia was fully integrated, admin-
istratively, as well as operationally, into the political police.
The turning point toward mass violence in the countryside came in
September and early October 1930, when the Politburo demanded
that the OGPU and justice officials in the Russian and Ukrainian re-
publics “take decisive and rapid measures of repression, up to and
including execution by shooting, against kulaks who organize terror-
istic attacks against Soviet and Party officials, and who engage in
other counterrevolutionary activities.”2 In some instances, as in the
case in Nizhnee Povol’zhie, below, resistance included army officers,
and was described as an insurgency.

d o c u m en t
· 52 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On kulak terror.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 7, l. 158.
26 September 1929

Strictly secret
No. 99 Point 8—For cc. Sheboldaev’s and Trilisser’s information
a) In light of uncovering an SR [Socialist Revolutionary]-kulak insur-
gent organization in the Nizhnee Povol’zhie region, to charge the
OGPU to take decisive measures to liquidate it, shooting up to 50
leaders of the organization, especially prominent kulaks, military of-
ficers, and repatriatees.
To publish information in the press about execution of the most
prominent group of nobility-kulak-SR leaders of the organization.
b) To establish that, as a rule, cases of anti-Soviet actions in the country-
side must be resolved in a judicial order, except for cases of individual
acts of terrorism against representatives of local Soviet and Commu-
nist Party organizations and against active supporters of Soviet power.

Uprisings in the Povol’zhie (the Volga region) were not an isolated

event. Reports and telegrams from the western republics, Western
92 Subduing the Countryside

Siberia, the Black Earth region, the Caucasus, and the Central Asian
republics painted a picture of widespread and open resistance. On 10
March 1930, the Politburo attempted to deflect blame by declaring,
in a decision circulated to Party officials, that resistance resulted, in
large part, from excesses and abuses by local authorities in their zeal
to implement collectivization.3 For a brief period, the collectivization
drive was relaxed, but this led to still more mass departures from
farms, and an intensification of protest. As the reports below show,
local authorities and police were caught off guard and unable, ini-
tially, to quell disturbances. These reports show the kind of vacillation
between repression and conciliation that was endemic in rural areas.
They also show some of the first instances when mass purges were
directed not just against supposed class enemies, but also against spe-
cific national groups.

d o c u m ent
· 53 ·
Note telegraphed from Tiflis, from S. F. Redens to G. G. Yagoda,
with TsK cover letter to members and candidate members of the
Politburo of TsK VKP(b) and of the Presidium of TsKK. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 30, d. 146, ll. 74–77.
11 March 1930

Strictly secret
On c. Stalin’s instruction, herewith c. Redens’s note, telegraphed
11.III.30 from Tiflis, for your information

Deputy secretary of TsK

Absolutely secret
As a result of insufficient protection of a huge number of newly created
collective farms, of […] excesses, of errors inside the kolkhozes, and be-
cause of general activation of anti-Soviet and kulak’ forces, [Handwritten
annotations by Yagoda: “to c. Stalin. G. Yagoda. 11.III.30.” “The OGPU
has given an order to transfer 630 bayonets and to give 500 rifles and 500
grenades, and cartridges. G. Yagoda.”] mass anti–collective farm actions,
which have a political tinge, have been increasing. In Kakhetiia, and in a
number of areas of the Tiflis Okrug [district], some settlements of Sevan
Okrug, and all Turkic areas of Armenia have been in ferment. In the
listed areas, a steady disintegration of collective farms is occurring, which
in some cases has been accompanied by destruction of village soviets,
 Subduing the Countryside 93

beating and exiling of partkomsomoltsy [members of the Communist

Party and Communist Youth League], and village activists. Riots that
have taken place so far were liquidated by peaceful means and negotia-
tion and, only in rare instances, by using demonstrations and a small
number of army forces; initiators and participants of violence were not
arrested, except in a small number of exceptions; on occasion, attempts
to arrest people encountered general resistance of a whole village; as a
result the planned arrests were canceled, which the population interpret-
ed as a sign of weakness of power, and which encouraged even further
impudence of the insurgents, acting under the influence of anti-Soviet
forces. The following demands were made:
1) to release all arrested people. 2) to remove Party members and mem-
bers of the Komsomol. 3) to fire and remove a number of local Soviet
officials. 4) to allow free trade. 5) to allow delivery of goods from abroad.
6) to reduce prices of goods. 7) to cancel [forced] insurance and state
bond purchases. 8) to hand over all informers and 9) to return exiled
people and to return property to those who were dekulakized. An espe-
cially tense situation was created in Turkic areas. In Vedibasar Raion of
the Yerivan Okrug, up to 250 persons, together with families, have gone
into the mountains, up to 150 of them were armed. The remaining people
started widespread agitation in neighboring villages for recruitment of
supporters. For liquidation of the uprising, which gained a widespread
character, an army unit of up to 30 bayonets had to be sent. The subse-
quent negotiations have not yielded results, therefore operational actions
will begin on 11 March. In other Turkic regions of Armenia, as well as in
some Turkish border villages in Georgia, there is a strong resettlement
movement, escaping to Turkey. Across Georgia and Armenia, and espe-
cially in Azerbaijan, a group of kulaks have gone underground and are
hiding with weapons, and make up the core of existing gangs. In connec-
tion with the general situation in the countryside, gangs in Azerbaijan
have started actions, because of which army units had to be sent to Gan-
dzhin Okrug, Karabakh, and Nakhkrai [Nakhichevan Krai] for military
operations. The situation is serious. If drastic measures are not taken, by
spring we may have serious complications, which may turn into armed
uprisings. We have been taking all possible measures along GPU lines:
1) The local GPU apparatus in all okrugs has been strengthened;
representatives have been chosen and sent, all reserve Chekists have
been used. 2) Operational groups have been organized by the okrug GPU
department. 3) In the most affected areas, groups of Communards
were created. 4) The militsiia was subordinated to the GPU organs, and
has been used entirely for operational work. 5) Demobilization of Red
Army troops was postponed, and all they have been used for is strength-
ening border protection. 6) Operational groups were formed out of
GPU regiments 3 through 8 and 24, 130 personnel in Azerbaijan, and
94 Subduing the Countryside

100 personnel in Georgia. 300 bayonets out of the frontier units were
allotted to Armenia.
We consider absolutely necessary: 1) to remove the initiators of dem-
onstrations, the instigators and participants of kolkhoz closings and beat-
ings, of propagandists and malicious kulaks, not hesitating in the resolute
suppression of resistance. 2) In order to maintain planned operations to
liquidate active bandit groups and anti-Soviet demonstrations, to transfer
1,000 bayonets, with corresponding number of commanding officers,
equipment, and technical means to GPU command. 3) To allot 30 light
machine guns, 500 rifles, 500 grenades, and 300,000 cartridges to supply
the [newly] created operational groups and Communard units. We are
asking for urgent instructions. Acquaint Stalin and Sergo [Ordzhonikid-
ze] with this note.
Deputy chairman GPU, Redens
Head of SOU [Secret-Operational Department] Beria

d o c u m ent
· 54 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On Ukraine and
Belorussia. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 193, l. 154?.

Strictly secret
15 March 1930
According to available information, there are grounds to suggest that,
in case of serious kulak-peasant actions in Right Bank Ukraine [western
Ukraine, on the right bank of the Dnieper river] and Belorussia, especially
in connection with the forthcoming eviction of Polish-kulak counterrevo-
lutionary and espionage elements from frontier districts, the Polish gov-
ernment may decide on intervention. In order to avoid this, TsK considers
it necessary to send the following instructions to the TsK of KP(b)U [Com-
munist Party of Ukraine] and the TsK of Belorussia, as well as to the re-
spective OGPU organs:
1) to implement decisively the TsK directive from 10 March [the deci-
sion to relax collectivization] on struggling against distortions of the
Party line regarding the countryside, especially in frontier raions of
Ukraine and Belorussia;
2) to concentrate attention in the direction of both political work and
military-Cheka preparations, in order not to allow any actions of an
anti-Soviet character in frontier raions of Ukraine and Belorussia;
3) to relocate sufficient numbers of skilled Party workers to frontier
raions within one week to support local organizations;
 Subduing the Countryside 95

4) to strengthen the quantity and quality of the operative staff and mo-
bile OGPU units in frontier raions within one week, by drawing on
other OGPU reserves;
5) to prepare with all possible thoroughness, and to conduct with max-
imum speed, operations to arrest and exile kulak-Polish counterrevo-
lutionary elements;
6) to conduct the exile operation of kulak-Polish elements with maxi-
mum orderliness and minimum disruption;
7) to [understand] the major task: to prevent any kind of mass actions
in frontier raions;
8) since this directive is especially secret, to share it only with members
of the Politburo of TsK KP(b)U and the Bureau of TsK of Belorussia,
and PP of the OGPU Balitsky and Rappoport.

d o c u m en t
· 55 ·
Note from G. G. Yagoda and G. E. Evdokimov to I. V. Stalin on
political moods in Siberia in connection with collectivization and
dekulakization. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 147, ll. 117–23.
20 March 1930

Absolutely secret
According to recently received material from the Siberian PP OGPU,
we consider it necessary to draw attention to the following basic events:
Negative events in the course of collectivization and dekulakization:
Mass excesses and distortions in the course of collectivization and
dekulakization in many Siberian okrugs have reached threatening dimen-
sions. Continuing distortions evoke serious vacillation in the attitudes of
the middle-poor mass [of peasants], which creates a favorable ground for
development of kulak c.r. [counterrevolutionary] agitation, and for the
spread of kulak influence among parts of the middle and even the poor
[peasants]. As a result, in Siberia, the trend toward demonstrations does
not diminish but grows, led by kulak counterrevolutionaries and turning
into a movement of bandit gangs.
[…]
Flight from kolkhozes is increasing […]. For the period 10–15.III
in Siberia, over 2,000 households resigned from kolkhozes, and this is
according to [still] incomplete data. Altogether, data from the first 2 five-
day periods of March [show that] flight from kolkhozes equals 9,394.
Anti-Soviet manifestation:
96 Subduing the Countryside

Despite widespread OGPU operational work to remove c.r. elements

from the countryside (as of 13.III, 8,117 c.r. activists have been arrested
in the Krai as a whole, 14 c.r. organizations with 470 members, and 350
groups with 2,779 members have been liquidated), continuing excesses
and distortions in the work of low-level Soviet and Party organs, the lack
of more or less satisfactory political work, tied to measures of collectiv-
ization and dekulakization, has created a favorable ground for develop-
ment of kulak activism, and for the spread of kulak influence among part
of the middle [peasantry], and even among the poor.
Growth in the number of mass demonstrations, which started in mid-
February, deserves serious attention. […] The recent increase in demon-
strations is connected with kulak strengthening […] and, in March, mass
demonstrations have taken on the character of rebellion, along with the
formation of active bandit gangs.
[…]
As of 1.III, 21 bandit gangs were active, comprising in total 473 per-
sons. As of 15.III, 28 gangs were active (3 have been liquidated) with a
total number of 2,992 persons (of those, 1,442 persons have been liqui-
dated). As this shows, there has been an increase of 7 gangs with 2,519
members in the course of 15 days.
There has been an intensification of the political aspect of active bandit
kulak formation, transforming from individual acts of assault and rob-
bery to open gang activity, such as capturing population centers and de-
stroying Soviet power in them, organization of peasant assemblies, with
an appeal to join a broad movement of rebellion under a kulak banner.
Kulak exile:
Exile of category 2 kulaks4 in the Krai proceeds very weakly. As of
15.III, 10,302 households have been exiled out of 30,000 registered [ku-
lak] households, which comprises 34.3 percent. […] As such, the plan for
exile will be significantly underfulfilled by the time spring makes the
roads impassable.
[…]
Given the delay in exiling, and the presence of up to 8,000 kulaks es-
caped from their place of [exile], banditry in the Krai will inevitably be
strengthened, and cannot help but have an effect on the spring planting
campaign.
Everything above speaks to the necessity of taking a series of measures
by Krai organizations to overcome decisively and quickly the serious in-
adequacies of the work of local organizations.
Deputy Head OGPU (Yagoda)
Head SOU (Evdokimov)
 Subduing the Countryside 97

d o c u m en t
· 56 ·
Telegram from M. O. Razumov, first secretary of Tatar obkom
[oblast committee] of VKP(b) to the Secretariat of TsK VKP(b)
regarding peasant riots. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 146, ll. 124–25.
22 March 1930

Secret
During the last days, in a number of both Russian and Tatar volosts
[districts] of Arsk, and in Mamadyshsk, Chistopolsk, and Buinsk can-
tons, an extraordinarily high kulak activism has been noticed. They are
trying to use the recent Party directives about the struggle against distor-
tions, and Party work related to this, in a provocative way in order to
destroy collective farming. Kulaks’ propaganda results in abolishing col-
lective farms in a number of cases, and in poor and middle-level peasants
leaving collective farms. In these villages, preparation for spring sowing
has stopped. In twelve volosts of Arsk canton, anti–collective farm move-
ments encompass one hundred collectivized settlements, [and] put for-
ward demands that are obviously counterrevolutionary:
To disband collective farms […], to stop dekulakization and exile of
kulaks, to restore rights of all lishentsy [those deprived of civil rights],
[…] to remove poor peasants from kulaks’ houses, to close Soviet schools,
to arrest teachers, to open religious schools. In some instances, addition-
al demands are to reopen churches and mosques.
[…]

d o c u m en t
· 57 ·
Report from G. G. Yagoda and E. G. Evdokimov on counterrevolutionary
activity in the Didoevsk Sector of Andiisk Okrug, Dagestan. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30,
d. 147, ll. 15–17.

4 April 1930 [Handwritten note: “For c. Stalin from c. Yagoda”]

The Didoevsk Sector [uchastok] of Andiisky Okrug is a most inacces-
sible and a most backward area, with an enclosed natural economy. In
the past, this area was a base of revolts of Said Bek Shamil and Gotsin-
sky.5
As a result of the worst possible distortions, naked administrative mea-
sures, forced collectivization and tractorization, etc. […], mass revolts
98 Subduing the Countryside

started in this area on 11 March. These were inspired and led by c-r
[counterrevolutionary] Sharia elements. The organized unit that appeared
dispersed local Soviet organs, and created a “Sharia council” and a
“Shariat court.” The leader of this revolt is a former commander of Red
partisans, Vali Doigaev [also Dolgaev]. The initial number of armed
people [in Dolgaev’s revolt] was about 100; according to the latest infor-
mation, the number of the armed people reached, ostensibly, about 500.
This movement encompassed almost all settlements of the Didoevsk
Sector.
The leader of the movement, Vali Doigaev, on behalf of insurgents, has
made the following demands to the Okrispolkom [Executive committee
of the okrug soviet]:

1) To cancel collectivization.
2) To return waqf land [endowed religious lands].
3) To stop prosecution of clergy.

Essentially, Doigaev’s complaint is about the outrages committed by

local authorities, and demands their replacement. Vali Doigaev’s answer
to the demand that he disband his force was: “I took the leadership inten-
tionally, because angry, uneducated, and silly didoevtsy [Didoev resi-
dents] may make a lot of trouble.”
[…]
The area of the revolt has been surrounded by military troops and
partisan units. They have occupied all mountain passes and roads to
Georgia and the northeast part of Dagestan.
[…]
We consider that the Didoevsk problem must be resolved without in-
tervention of armed force [Sentence up to here marked with double line
in margin.] if Didoevsk residents follow the conditions of their surrender.
It is absolutely clear that, given the didoevtsy’s attitude towards the
Dagestan government, the latter won’t be able to resolve the question in
a peaceful way (by sending a delegation to Georgia).
We consider it necessary to send urgently either a [special] Soviet com-
mission from the center or some official from the Rostov SKK [North
Caucasus Krai]
Deputy chairman of the OGPU (Yagoda)
Head of SOU OGPU (Evdokimov)
 Subduing the Countryside 99

d o c u m en t
· 58 ·
Coded telegram from M. M. Malinov to I. V. Stalin regarding mass peasant
demonstrations. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 200, l. 132.
1 March 1931

In the village of Zmeintsy of the Shchigrovsk Raion, expropriation for

meat procurement of two cows from two prosperous middle peasants
resulted in a mass demonstration. A trial and a prosecutor arrived, and
were driven from the village. The nearby villages of Chizhovka and Ko-
noplianka have joined Zmeintsy. Local officials sent for mass [propa-
ganda] work were beaten. The crowd forcibly took back the instigators
[of the demonstrations]. Yesterday, an operational group of the GPU
faced gunshots in the villages of Chizhovka and Konoplianka. The op-
erational group has retreated. Today a commission of the oblispolkom
[oblast soviet executive committee] and a group of officials was sent for
mass [agitational] work. Depending on results of their work, further mea-
sures will be taken and the demonstrations will be liquidated.
Secretary of TsChO [Central Chernozem Oblast] Malinov.
[Note written in text: “to members of the PB. I. Stalin.”]
Responding to this wave of protest and resistance, the Politburo
substantially increased the number of operational staff for the OGPU
internal and border forces. In turn, funding for the OGPU, which had
remained relatively unchanged from the mid-1920s, rose dramatical-
ly, from 56.5 million rubles in 1925 to 57.5 million in 1930 and
88.014 million in 1931:

d o c u m en t
· 59 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On increasing the number of OGPU
employees. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, ll. 16, 20.
10 August 1930

[…]
QUESTION concerning the OGPU:
1. To increase the scheduled number of employees of the OGPU by
3,165 employees starting on 1 October 1930.
2. To increase the number of internal troops of the OGPU by 3,500
employees, of the troops of the frontier protection force of the
100 Subduing the Countryside

OGPU by 2,500 employees and 3,000 horses starting 1 October

1930.
3. To confirm the 88,014,000 ruble estimate for the OGPU organs for
[19]30/31.
4. In case of insufficient funding for prisoner foodstuffs and supplies for
the administratively exiled, to recommend that the OGPU apply for
additional funding from the reserve fund of SNK [Sovnarkom] of the
USSR, after submitting a report for the 2nd half-year of 30/31.
[…]
6. To create a 250-person reserve for the struggle against kulaks.

Dekulakization and Mass Deportations

Putting new resources into the countryside, the political police and
internal border forces returned to a campaign of mass deportations of
peasants identified as kulaks. From 1930 through 1932, over two mil-
lion peasants were forcibly relocated to penal settlements, mostly in
the Ural, Western Siberia, and Kazakh areas of the country. Most of
these colonies were designed to be agricultural or forestry settlements,
and police referred to the inhabitants as “special settlers,” or spetspere-
selentsy. The special settlements (spetsposelki) were to be adminis-
tered by the OGPU, but local authorities were supposed to prepare
areas to receive settlers. In order to conduct these large-scale opera-
tions, the Politburo established a Kulak Commission, chaired by Cen-
tral Committee member A. A. Andreev, which included Yagoda and P.
P. Postyshev, a Central Committee secretary and deputy head of the
Ukrainian Communist Party. As the following two documents show,
the commission worked up overall plans for the eviction of kulaks,
their transportation to resettlement colonies, and the construction of
housing; allocation of equipment, food, and medical care; and provi-
sion for educational and recreational needs and sectors of work for
kulak colonies. Kulaks were to be rounded up and deported in “con-
tingents,” or “echelons,” in an orderly fashion.6
 Subduing the Countryside 101

d o c u m en t
· 60 ·
Regarding kulaks. (PB from 11.III.31, protocol No. 29, point 2/6-c). (cc.
Andreev, Yagoda, Postyshev). RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, ll. 174, 176–78.
25 March 1931

Accept c. Andreev commission’s proposal (see appendix).

Present: committee members cc. Andreev, Yagoda.
Present: cc. Evdokimov, Zakovsky, Zaporozhets, Olshansky
Appendix

I. Heard:
About resettlement of kulak households in Western Siberia (c.
Zakovsky spoke).
Decided:
1. To accept c. Zakovsky’s proposal concerning resettlement of 40,000
kulak households to northern areas of the Western Siberian Krai dur-
ing May–June–July 1931.
2. To move the kulak households to the following raions of the Western
Siberian Krai: Kargask, Parabel, Kalpashchevo [Kolpashevo], Chainsk,
Krivosheino, Baksinsky, Novo-Kuskovo, Zyrianskoe, etc.
3. To suggest to the Siberian Kraikom to begin immediate preparations
for eviction of the kulaks [from current residences]. To charge c.
Zakovsky, the plenipotentiary of the OGPU to the Western Siberian
Krai, with managing the removal, and with the responsibility for car-
rying out the operation.
4. Resettled kulak households are to be used in agriculture in the black
earth massif of the raions mentioned in point 2, and as a workforce
for the forestry industry[…].
5. To allow kulak households to take with them a minimum of agricul-
tural tools, haulage livestock, and other productive tools (axes, pitch-
forks, shovels, etc.).
6. To require exiled kulak households to take with them a necessary
food reserve for travel. The size to be decided in localities.
7. To require the Western Siberian Kraikom and c. Zakovsky to create
a minimum reserve of food supplies for kulaks employed in forestry
work.
[…]
9. To charge SNK USSR to release to the OGPU 3,000,000 rubles for
resettling kulak households in the Sibkrai.
[…]
102 Subduing the Countryside

II. Heard:
Resettlement of kulak households in Eastern Siberia.
Decided:
Request c. Yagoda to present a plan for commission review in [15] days
on resettlement of kulak households to Eastern Siberia, analogous to the
plan for Western Siberia.

III. Heard:
Resettlement of kulak households to the former Akmolinsk and
Karkaralinsk provinces of Kazakh ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic] (c. Evdokimov spoke).
1. To confirm the general contingent of kulak households to be resettled
to Kazakhstan in 1931 at a level of 150,000 households, distributing
them in the areas of the former Akmolinsk and Karkaralinsk prov-
inces, and on lands along the river Tokrau (south of lake Balkhash).
2. Resettled kulak households must be used in the following principal
ways: a) coal mining; b) copper production; c) iron ore mining; d)
building railways; and e) agriculture.
3. To charge the OGPU with sending to the resettlement areas no less
than 10,000 persons (heads of families), no later than 15 April, in
order to use them for preparations (house building and other prep-
aration works)—for receiving the rest of the contingent.
4. To send to the areas of future settlements (Akmolinsk-Karaganda) a
commission consisting of c. Olshansky (chairman) and members cc.
Berman and Gorshkov, along with representatives of VSNKh [Su-
preme Council of the Economy] of the USSR, of NKZ [Commissariat
of Agriculture] of the USSR, and of the Kaz[akh] kraikom of VKP(b)
to make all preparations for places of resettlement, and to determine
places for resetting kulak households. Work of the commission to be
completed in 40 days [4 dekady].
5. To recommend to the OGPU to submit for the commission’s
consideration within one and a half months a plan for financing the
resettlement operation, and development of 150,000 kulak house-
holds in Kazakhstan.

IV. Heard:
Ongoing operations for resettlement of 25,000 kulak households (cc.
Yagoda and Evdokimov spoke).
Decided:
1. To confirm the OGPU plan to resettle 25,000 kulak households.
2. To recommend that SNK USSR expedite release of 6,000,000 rubles
from its reserve fund for expenditures connected with resettlement.
 Subduing the Countryside 103

V.
[…]
To note receipt of c. Evdokimov’s communication about ongoing op-
erations to resettle kulak households in the North Caucasus Krai, Lenin-
grad Oblast, Western Siberia, Eastern Siberian Krai, Transcaucasia, DVK
[Far East Krai] and Nizhkrai [Nizhnii Novgorod Krai]. To recommend
that the OGPU require local OGPU organs to resettle future kulak house-
holds only after sanction of the TsK commission. […]

d o c u m en t
· 61 ·
Special report from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on completion of kulak exile
operation. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 195, l. 163.
15 October 1931

Absolutely secret
Exile of kulaks from areas of full collectivization, which took place
from 20 March to 25 April of this year, and from 10 May to 13 Septem-
ber, is finished.
During this time 162,962 households (787,341 persons) were trans-
ported.
Among them: Men–242,776
Women–223,834
Children–320,731
In 1930 in total 77,795 households (371,645 persons) were transport-
ed, among them:
Men–123,807
Women–113,653
Children–134,185
Thus, in all 240,757 households have been transported (1,158,986
persons).
During the same period there were transported:
Horses–15,355
Carts–7,488
Plows–8,958
Harrows–9,528
All transportations were done in 715 echelons, using 37,897 train cars.
In fact, the campaign was plagued from the beginning by a combi-
nation of bureaucratic mismanagement and malicious indifference.
Conditions in the colonies were horrific, especially in the early years
of the 1930s, and above all in the alternately swampy and densely
104 Subduing the Countryside

forested tracts of the Narym region in Western Siberia. In the early

1930s, hundreds of thousands of kulak families were exiled there, and
the following documents reveal, in their banal language, the tragedy
that was dekulakization.

d o c u m ent
· 62 ·
7
Report of V. M. Burmistrov to Commissar of Justice, Siberian Krai,
Yanson. GANO, f. 47, op. 5, d. 104, l. 10.
7 January 1930

Absolutely secret
The issue of exile and deportation procedures still has not been re-
solved, despite your communication from 30 October [19]29, No.
17p120, on measures to take, according to the resolution of the Presidi-
um of the Siberian Krai Executive Committee from 12 September 1929,
on the struggle against criminal banditry. Siberia continues, as before, to
receive parties of exiles, sent by Moscow, with the krai-level administra-
tion learning of them only when they arrive, often a large portion of them
literally naked and barefoot.
Thus, on 3 January, a completely unexpected party of 160 exiles ar-
rived in Novosibirsk from Leningrad literally without clothes, and the
receiving detention administration was forced to transport them using
cars, and a part of the [exiles] had frostbite. Such an instance is not
unique. The same has happened in Omsk, where 455 exiles have accumu-
lated, in Tomsk, 825 exiles, Novosibirsk, 200, and in other provinces of
the Krai. Transporting people to their place of exile in such a manner
during the Siberian frost must be out of the question, and to clothe them
and give them shoes costs a colossal sum of money. As well, [winter]
conditions require us to maintain them in local jails until spring, so that
jails are significantly overcrowded, which, as of 1 January, this year, hold
2,774 exiles, the overwhelming majority of whom are without clothing,
and who cannot be sent to places of exile until spring, and, further, can-
not be released, since all are from the socially dangerous element.
[…]
All of this together requires a complete cessation of transports to Sibe-
ria of exiles until 30 May 1930. Please keep me informed of your deci-
sion.
Krai Procurator, Siberia
Burmistrov
 Subduing the Countryside 105

As the above report shows, poor exile conditions were not always
the fault of local authorities, but of miscommunication and callous-
ness of officials and police in charge of transporting the exiles. A Pro-
curacy report from 1931 blamed the OGPU for many of the problems.

d o c u m en t
· 63 ·
Extract of report of the USSR Procuracy to the Presidium of TsIK
[Central Executive Committee] USSR on supervision of the OGPU
for 1931. 20 December 1931. GARF, f. 8131, op. 37, d. 20, ll. 50–51.

Absolutely secret
[…]
Supervision over exiles and deportees:
Survey of exiles in the Narym Krai, conducted in 1931, has established
a number of abnormal phenomena in the organization of the exiles. The
most fundamental abnormality is the lack of responsibility for the proper
settling of the exiles, and the lack of their use for economic work.
Exiles were settled in such remote locations, that it was impossible to
organize their work, and impossible to maintain a minimum of food and
clothing. As a result, exiles resorted to theft and robbery, provoking sharp
dissatisfaction among the local population, which found expression in
vigilante murders of exiles by locals, including participation by local vil-
lage council authorities.
Administration and organization of work of kulaks, exiled with their
families from raions of full collectivization (spetspereselenie), is the re-
sponsibility of the Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps of
the OGPU.
In 1931, by order of the OGPU Procurator [the Procuracy official in
charge of judicial oversight over the OGPU], the Chief Procurator of the
Western Siberian Krai conducted a survey of conditions of special settler
villages in the Narym Okrug. The survey revealed the following:
Nearly 50,000 kulak families, about 200,000 individuals, were sent to
the Narym Krai from regions of full collectivization, primarily in Western
Siberia; this number (50,000) also included approximately 15 percent
Ukrainians and Belorussions, and up to 300 families from Oiratsk Oblast
[near the Russian-Mongolian border].
[…]
As a consequence of the improper distribution of the workforce (using
all available hands for grain harvesting and threshing), the late arrival
of exiles in the krai, and the extreme lack of building tools—housing
106 Subduing the Countryside

construction had not started. In several villages, as a result of this, hous-

ing conditions were extremely dire, and exiles were in mud huts and
sheds, with no protection from the cold and rain. This situation was made
worse by the lack of warm clothing and boots for most of the population.
Almost all villages, standing at a distance from waterways, had no
stores of foodstuffs, after the end of navigation and the shoaling of rivers,
even though a ten-day reserve of food stores is required.
The catastrophic situation with food stores in these raions, and the lack
of transport, forced the Western Siberian Krai administration to mobilize
horse transport of food stores to northern raions, which required 1,000
horses and took one month.
[…]
Due to the serious situation regarding supply of medical aid, there is a
high death rate among the elderly and the young, especially the latter.
Thus, in the Parabel’sk penal reserve, 1,375 individuals died in the
course of 1 year, [from January] to September, of whom 1,106 were
children.
In the Sredne-Vasiugansk penal reserve 2,158 individuals have died
since the arrival of the settlers on 1 September, that is, 10.3 percent of the
entire population, of which 275 were adult men, 324 women, and 1,559
children. The elderly accounted for 75 percent of the adult deaths.
[…]
Procurator of the Supreme Court of the USSR P. Krasikov
Chief Deputy to the Procurator of the Supreme Court of the USSR,
Procurator of the OGPU, Katanyan
Special settlements were remote and isolated, as this document not-
ed, and they were often cut off for months at a time from supply
routes. Colonists died of starvation from lack of supplies, from expo-
sure in the winter, and from dysentery and malaria in the summer.
Penal colonies were not intended to be death camps, but they often
were, for the NKVD officers as well as the colonists. In the first years
of the 1930s, the colonies lost about 10 percent of their populations
yearly to death.8 In the remote Aleksandrovsk penal reserve, however,
one-third of the 6,114 spetspereselentsy died in the first three months
of their arrival in April 1933. Through lack of police planning, the
colonists and their escorts reached their island encampment on the
Nazino River in late April, only to discover that nothing had been
prepared for their arrival. Numerous settlers had already died on the
arduous trip north by river barge from Tomsk. Armed bandit gangs
had attacked the barge encampments, killed settlers, and stolen much
of their supplies. Upon arrival at their “settlement,” a spring snow-
storm isolated the settlers further from supplies and help. After two
 Subduing the Countryside 107

days, the heavy snow turned to freezing rain. Without food, shelter,
or adequate clothing, the settlers died at a rate of thirty-five to forty
a day.9

Resettlement Colonies
Despite such incidents, the Politburo decided to remedy problems by
placing full responsibility for the camps, for selection, and for trans-
portation with the political police, extending its domain still further.

d o c u m en t
· 64 ·
Protocol of the Andreev Commission from 15 May 1931, on
organization of a Spetspereselenie Administration, and on productive
use of special settlers. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, ll. 46, 51–54.

(cc. Andreev, Postyshev, Yagoda)

I […] In light of the outrageous use of the special settler workforce, and
the disorganized way in which they are maintained by economic
organs, to transfer the whole to OGPU economic, administrative,
and organizational management for special settlers, as well as all
material stocks and financial funds for special settlers. To recom-
mend that the OGPU organize a special administrative apparatus
under the OGPU and at the krai level (Siberia, the Urals, the North-
ern Krai, and Kazakhstan).
2. For the productive use of special settlers this administration will con-
clude contracts, both through agreements with individual economic
organization, and directly by creating various economic enterprises.
[…]
4. To obligate economic organizations to pay special settlers wages no
lower than seasonal labor.
[…]

II. Plan for resettling kulak families in 1931.

1. In view of the technical impossibility of resettling 150,000 kulak
families in raions in Kazakhstan, to acknowledge the possibility of
distributing kulak families this year, first of all, 56,000 to raions in
Kazakhstan and 55,000 families to the Urals.
108 Subduing the Countryside

2. To allow internal resettlement in Eastern Siberia of 12,000 kulak

families northward from the southern border raions, and 12,000
families from the Urals, 7,000 of which have already been settled.
[…]
4. To ensure the primary needs of industry and housing construction,
transfer special settlers to the northeast areas of Kazakhstan in the
following order:
May–June, 20–25,000 individuals, with transfer of families to fol-
low.
July–August, the remaining 35,000 households.
5. Require all economic organs of VSNKh, NKPS [Commissariat of
Transportation], and Narkomsnab [Commissariat of Supply] to re-
lease funds immediately to the OGPU designated for housing con-
struction for the special settlers workforce.
[Points 5 through 17 enumerated requirements for fifteen commissari-
ats to ensure necessary equipment or supplies to the OGPU settler colo-
nies. These ranged from the agricultural commissariat to the fish indus-
try, health, forestry, and education and culture commissariats. In sec-
tion III, similar arrangements were articulated for settling or resettling
55,000 kulak families in the Urals Oblast, and the same in Bashkiria.]

[III–V]

VI. Special Consideration.

If any given special settler fulfills all decisions of Soviet power, conducts
himself as an honest worker, then after a 5-year period, from the moment
of resettlement, he can receive voting rights and all other civil rights.
[… And finally]

VIII. On careful monitoring of the rules for exiling kulaks

1. In view of existing evidence of instances of a mechanical [purely bu-
reaucratic] approach to the issue of exiling kulaks, given that exile is
restricted at times only to a rescinding of voting rights, which can
lead to crude mistakes, recommend to the OGPU […] to ensure a
serious and careful monitoring, and to take measures to guarantee
that such mistakes do not occur.
Plan for settlement of kulaks:
1) To the Urals Oblast 55,000 families, of which:
1. From Ukrainian SSR 30,000 families
2. From SKK [Northern Caucasus] 15,000 families
3. From IPO [Ivanovo Industrial Oblast] 5,000 families
4. From BSSR [Belorussia] 5,000 families
Total 55,000 families
 Subduing the Countryside 109

2) To Kazakhstan 56,000 families, of which:

1. From NVK [Lower Volga Krai ] 10,000 families
2. From SVK [Middle Volga Krai] 10,000 ″
3. From TsChO [Central Black Earth region] 10,000 ″
4. From MO [Moscow Oblast] 6,000 ″
5. From LVO [Leningrad Military District] 4,000 ″
6. From Nizh[nii Novgorod] Krai 5,000 ″
7. From Bashkiria 6,000 ″
8. From Tataria 5,000 ″
Total 56,000 families
The recommendations of the Andreev commission were accepted
by the Politburo on 20 May.

New Enemies in the Countryside

Despite mass deportations, police and local Soviet officials continued
to meet popular resistance to collectivization and the state’s high grain
quotas. The situation was particularly bad in Ukraine, where Stalin
believed, or at least claimed, that peasant intransigence was being
provoked by Polish spies and insurgents. Stalin regarded the situation
in Ukraine as extremely dangerous, fearing that the USSR might even
“lose” the republic. One of the police’s most ruthless officials, S. F.
Redens, was already stationed in the republic as head of the OGPU
and in November 1932, the Politburo, on Stalin’s recommendation,
dispatched another top-level and equally ruthless official, V. A.
Balitsky, to bring Ukraine under control. In Stalin’s view, it was the
OGPU, in the fight against counterrevolution, that would “trans-
form” Ukraine into a “real fortress of the USSR, a genuinely exem-
plary republic.”10 As the documents below show, Balitsky and Redens
were given complete authority to bring what amounted to a reign of
terror to the republic. In turn, the Politburo required a constant stream
of reports from the OGPU in Ukraine.
110 Subduing the Countryside

d o c u m ent
· 65 ·
Regarding a special plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU
in Ukraine. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 907, l. 20.
25 November 1932

In view of the special state importance for improving work of the OGPU
organs in Ukraine, and because of the extensive experience in Ukrainian
work by c. Balitsky, TsK VKP(b) decides:
To recommend that the OGPU send a deputy head of the OGPU, c.
Balitsky, as a special plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU to
Ukraine, for a period of 6 months. To subordinate to him the PP OGPU
in Ukraine, c. Redens, and the whole apparatus of the OGPU of Ukraine.
To charge c. Balitsky with the task of presenting a short report on work
of the OGPU organs of Ukraine to TsK VKP(b) every 20 days.
As the following document shows, Balitsky and Redens fulfilled their
obligation, providing reports of counterrevolutionary activities, lengthy
interrogations, and measures taken to overcome resistance to fulfilling
the state’s grain collection quotas. Resistance came from collective farm-
ers, but, as the document below shows, also from local officials. This was
a new twist. By late 1932, kulaks had been supposedly removed from
Ukraine, and from the countryside in general, and no longer posed a
widespread threat to Soviet agriculture. Even so, the regime still met
large-scale resistance to fulfilling its grain collection plans. A new enemy
had to be found, and this appeared in the form of local Soviet officials,
masking their sabotage behind the façade of being good Party members.
The lengthy report reproduced in part below became a model that Stalin
distributed to officials countrywide on how to deal with intransigent ar-
eas. The report concerns events in the Dnepropetrovsk area, which Stalin
had singled out even in 1932 as one of about sixty raion-level centers
where local officials had protested high grain collection quotas. His pre-
amble made clear his attitude toward local officials who protested against,
or tried to mitigate demands from, the center. Stalin’s preamble comes
first, then a note from Redens, who introduced the investigative materi-
als. Finally comes the original report.
 Subduing the Countryside 111

d o c u m en t
· 66 ·
Sabotage of grain collection in Orekhovo Raion of Ukraine.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 380, ll. 94–97.
7 December 1932

Secret
To all members and candidate members of the TsK and TsKK, to all
obkom, kraikom, and raikom [raion-level] secretaries, and to all Party
members of Narkomzem [People’s Commissariat of Agriculture] USSR:
Herewith is circulated for [your] information investigative materials on
sabotage of grain collection in Orekhovo Raion of Ukraine, sent to the
TsK VKP(b) by GPU representative c. Redens. Since these materials are
characteristic of a significant number of regions of the Soviet Union, it is,
in my opinion, worth it to give them special attention. These materials
show, yet again, that the organizers of sabotage are, in the main, “com-
munists,” people who carry Party cards in their pockets, but who long
ago were torn from the practices of the Party, and were regenerated [into
a new form].
[…]
Since the enemy with a Party card in his pocket should be more rigor-
ously punished than one without it, it follows that people such as Golovin
(former secretary of the Orekhovo raikom), Palamarchuk (former secre-
tary of the RIK [raion-level soviet executive committee]), Lutsenko,
Ordel’ian, Prigoda, and others should be arrested immediately and hon-
ored according to their service, i.e. from 5 to 10 years in prison for each.
[This was Stalin’s judgment on individuals who, for the most part, had
not yet been charged or arrested.]
Secretary TsK VKP(b) Stalin.

Herewith, I am sending a copy of investigative materials in the case of

resistance to grain collection in the Orekhovo Raion.
In this case, the former chairman of the raikolkhozsoiuz [raion-level
collective farm union], Prigoda, was arrested.
[Signed] Redens

To the General Secretary of the TsK KP(b)U, c. Kosior

In Orekhovo Raion and Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, the GPU is conduct-
ing an investigation of opposition to grain collection by the administra-
tion of several collective farms.
The investigation has established that the raion-level leadership, i.e.
secretary of the RPK [raion Party committee] Golovin; chairman of the
112 Subduing the Countryside

RIK Palamarchuk; chairman of the RKS [worker-peasant council], Pri-

goda; head of the raizu [raion-level administration of land use] Lutsenko;
chairman of the control commission, Ordel’ian; and others, gave instruc-
tions to village Party organizations and collective farms not to fulfill the
raion-level grain procurement plan.
To characterize this, I am sending a copy of the protocols of deposi-
tions given by Party members Masliuk, chairman of the commune “Avan-
gard,”11 Party member Kostenko, chairman of the “Svoboda” commune,
Party member Dikyi, head of the MTS [machine tractor station], Moro-
zov, manager of the raion-level office of the swine collective farm union,
and Budyak, planner in the RIK.
Although the raion-level leadership of the Dnepropetrovsk obkom was
removed, I regard it as necessary to prosecute the guilty.
Chairman, GPU, Ukrainian SSR S. Redens.

27.XI.32
Deposition protocol:
1932, November 21, was deposed as a witness, citizen Masliuk, Gavri-
il Amvrosievich, born 1889, native of the village Basan’, Chubarevka
Raion, from poor peasant [background], citizen of Ukrainian SSR, with
elementary education, Ukrainian, married, registered on military list as
middle political staff, grain farmer by profession, chairman of the “Avan-
gard” commune, Novo-Karlovka village soviet, Orekhovo Raion, never
under investigation or tried, Party member since 1925, Party card No.
0787758, living in the “Avangard” commune, Novo-Karlovka village so-
viet, Orekhovo Raion—reported the following:
“… In the ‘Avangard’ commune in mid-August this year, the raion-level
commission gave a plan [grain procurement quota] in the amount of
10,981 quintals [1,098,100 kg]. On receiving the plan, the Party bureau
passed a resolution that, while the plan was large for the commune, it had
to be fulfilled. After several days, the then raion-level Party secretary Go-
lovin arrived in the commune […] and raised the issue of the grain quota
plan, taking the position: ‘You must realize your mistake in declaring the
plan unrealistic, the plan should be accepted, in whatever amount, and
then fulfill it 30 percent. We [the raion-level leaders] will protest the plan
as unrealistic. We raion-level officials know that the plan is unrealistic,
but right now, we have to state that the plan has to be accepted.’ With
that, the meeting ended. In my opinion, the RPK Secretary could have
taken such a position only with the idea of informing the oblast Party
committee that the plan was unanimously adopted, and that all is well in
the Raion. After a while, the head of the RIK, Palamarchuk, arrived in the
commune. I addressed a request to him to reduce the plan, to which he
suggested the following:
 Subduing the Countryside 113

‘ “… To take out as much as possible for the sowing material for col-
lective farms of the Orekhovo Raion, so that that same amount can be
counted as if the commune fulfilled the grain collections plan, rather than
to count the same amount of set-aside grain twice: once by counting the
grain taken out as sowing material, and the second time as a shortfall in
plan fulfillment by the same quantity.’
“I rejected this statement since I considered it wrong.
“At the end of October of this year, when I was with Kostenko, the
head of the commune ‘Svoboda’—at the office of the head of the raikolk-
hozsoiuz, Prigoda, we got to talking about grain collections. I expressed
an opinion that the plan is high and difficult to fulfill, to which Prigoda
gave both me and Kostenko the following statement:
‘ “It is necessary for you to supply yourselves in full—to secure all
[reserve] stocks, for sowing as well as for backup, and for a number of
other [needs]. If you do not supply yourselves, we will prosecute you.
Fulfilling the plan may wait, because Golovin, Palamarchuk, and Lut-
senko (former head of the raizu) went to the oblast committee with a
petition from the Raion to decrease the plan, and probably it will be de-
creased.” ’
Such situations deenergized and discouraged communes and artels [an
early name for kolkhoz] from implementing the plan of grain procure-
ment …
Deposition protocol:
1932, November 23, deposed as witness, citizen Kostenko, Semen
Gur’evich, 37 years old, reported the following:
[This and other depositions follow]
For reference:
Golovin—(former secretary RPK) awaiting assignment from the
Dnepropetrovsk obkom (still in Orekhovo)
Ordel’ian—(former chairman KK) works now as an inspector [kon-
troler] in a state farm in Sinel’nikovo
Palamarchuk—(former chairman of the KK) now director of the MTS
in V. Lepetikha
Prigoda—(former chairman of a collective farm) now deputy director
of a state farm in Krivorozh’e
I have communicated this information to the head of the Party cadre
sector, Dnepropetrovsk Obkom, c. Vaisberg.

Dekulakization and Border Cleansing

Using police to put pressure on local officials proved but one tactic
that the Politburo used to enforce its demands, and to apportion
blame for failure to fulfill plans. At the same time, police also began a
114 Subduing the Countryside

second wave of mass roundups, following the initial waves of deku-

lakization in 1929–30 and 1931–32. These new mass arrests targeted
similar peasant communities in border regions, and especially Soviet
citizens with transnational ties or ethnic connections. These ties sup-
posedly provided proof of sabotage organized by foreign powers—
Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states.

d o c u m ent
· 67 ·
Special communication from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on
operations to cleanse areas along the western border of the USSR.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 201, ll. 75–87.
26 March 1933

Absolutely secret
Beginning on 16 March this year, operations to cleanse border areas
along parts of the Polish border with Ukraine and Belorussia, along the
Polish and Latvian borders in the Western Oblast, and along parts of the
Latvian and Finnish borders with the LVO [Leningrad Military District],
revealed, according to information from 20 March this year, the existence
along the whole length of the borders of c-r insurgent and subversive
organizations, created and led directly by the Polish and Finnish Military
General Staffs, or that became connected to them as they gained strength.
These organizations were planted in the most strategic directions
around railroad junctions, fortified raions, and defense installations.
Almost all of the organizations that were uncovered had established
one and the same date for an uprising, sometime in the spring of this year.
Along with the rout of the insurgent organizations and centers, also
liquidated were residents [local controlling agents], border crossing
points, and numerous spy networks of the PGSh [Polish General Staff]
and Finnish Intelligence, which, in some cases, managed to penetrate into
elite units of the RKKA [Red Army], the militsiia, and military schools
and installations.
In addition to building themselves up, and preparing and coordinating
an insurgency underground, these organizations also carried out system-
atic work to destroy collective farms, disrupt the spring sowing cam-
paign, make the food difficulties worse (through arson, theft, and
spoilage of fodder and foodstuffs), and create dissatisfaction and tense
conditions all along the border areas.
In Ukrainian SSR
 Subduing the Countryside 115

Liquidated a major c-r Petliuraite organization12 in several populated

areas […], tied to Polish-Petliuraite intelligence organs, preparing for an
uprising in spring of this year, and led by the Polish spy Soroka, Anastasii
(arrested).
The organization was designated to carry out mass terror against
Soviet-Party and collective farm activists. Participants of the organization
have been identified in the Kharkov tractor factory and the Moscow fac-
tory “Elektrostal,” where they were sent for subversive work by their
leaders.
Liquidated an insurgent spying organization in […] raions of Vinnitsa
and Kiev oblasts, created by the Polish-Petliuraite agent, Kuchera, sent
from across the border, and who headed a bandit gang in 1930. A cell of
the organization has been identified in the Staro-Konstantinovka military
installation.
[…]
In the Slavutsk border forces unit, an insurgent c-r organization was
uncovered, working toward an uprising in the spring of this year, and led
by agents of the Polish-Petliuraite spies Khomich and Melenchuk. The
organization distributed a proclamation of the “Ukrainian Revolutionary
Committee,” and conducted work to disrupt the spring planting cam-
paign and the work of collective farms.
Liquidated a c-r Petliuraite insurgency organization in the Potievka
and Malin raions of Kiev Oblast, working toward an uprising in the
spring of this year. Their assignment was to seize an armory in Radomysl,
and then move on the town of Zhitomir.
[…]
Uncovered an insurgency organization in Korsun’ Raion, Kiev Oblast,
made up mainly of teachers and students. It has been established that this
organization had ties to Kiev higher educational institutions.
[…]
Of insurgents formed from national minorities, special mention needs
to be made of the c-r organization of German colonists in the Zel’ts Raion
of Odessa Oblast, created by the SR Roteker, and building their insur-
gency plans on the hope of Hitler’s arrival in Ukraine. A major insurgent
organization of Germans, in Karllibknekht Raion of Odessa Oblast, is
tied to Romania. The organization’s timing for uprising was scheduled
for spring of this year. The German colonist Shtekler (arrested) led the
organization. Ties of the organization to Kiev and the Donbass have been
identified.
[…]
Overall, 9,514 persons have been detained to date, of whom 2,311 are
spies or connected with spying, 6,074 belong to insurgency organizations
and groups, 1,119 acknowledged ties to those who fled across the border,
116 Subduing the Countryside

have been repressed, etc. Seized 2,011 weapons, of which 1,780 are rifles,
and 213 smoothbores.
In BSSR
A fundamental blow has been delivered to the subversive-insurgent
organizations, planted by the second department of the Polish General
Staff, in strategic directions along roads, railroad junctions, around forti-
fied raions, and military installations.
In the Polotsk fortified raion
[report follows]
In the 110th Rifle Regiment, liquidated c-r group of officers, headed by
brigade commander Slizkovsky, who attempted to manipulate others in
the command staff to fulfill tasks that coincided with those [given by] the
kulak-insurgent organization operating in the Krichev Raion. Slizkovsky
supplied leaders of Shmatkov’s organization [presumably the same kulak-
insurgent organization] with cartridges and ammunition, and informed
the organization about storage locations of the regiment’s weapons. Ar-
rests have been made of members of the officers’ organization.
At the same time, a number of Polish resident agents and couriers have
been uncovered and crushed in areas [under jurisdiction] of the 12th and
17th border guard units, and in the towns of Bobruisk, Gomel, and Bor-
isov.
[…]
Overall, 3,492 arrests have been made to date, of which there are 445
individuals in 13 c-r organizations, 203 individuals in 16 resident agent
networks, and 2,844 as spies and insurgents.
In LVO
Liquidated a widely developed network of insurgent cells, created by
the Finnish General Staff and encompassing Karelia, the Karelian Isth-
mus, and separate national raions of LVO. Investigation has revealed in-
formation about the presence of a secret store of weapons in Karelia,
created by White-Karelian insurgent gangs. An operational unit has been
dispatched to discover its whereabouts.
[…]
It has been determined that wrecking work on collective farms and in
the forest industry, and organization of the insurgency, has been carried
out on direct orders from Finnish intelligence.
A resident agent has been uncovered, and various connections of Finn-
ish intelligence to a skirmish-reconnaissance brigade [of the Soviet border
or army forces] and Osoviakhim [voluntary association for assistance to
defense, aviation, and chemical construction].
It has been established that Finnish intelligence introduced its agents
into the Leningrad International Military School, and conducted c-r na-
tionalist work there. Command staff in the overwhelming majority of
brigades are comprised of those educated at the intermilitary school.
 Subduing the Countryside 117

[…]
As it turns out, a significant part of the intelligence work of the 4th
Department of the LVO headquarters is controlled by the Finnish defense-
intelligence [ministry].
[…]
In all, 2,074 arrests [Handwritten note by Stalin: “And what fate for
the arrested?”] have been made. Weapons seized: 875 rifles, 875 sawed-
off [shot guns], and 2,425 revolvers.
Deputy Head OGPU G. Yagoda

OGPU Expansion
As political police functions broadened, so did police numbers. The
following document shows an increase in political police and state
security personnel of 8,275, from 17,298 to 25,573, during the first
half of the 1930s, or 47 percent in a matter of four years. Most of the
personnel growth occurred at local levels, particularly in rural areas,
where some 5,000 officers took up positions as deputy directors in
political departments of rural machine tractor stations. This surveil-
lance network provided a system of monitoring rural areas through
direct contact in villages, and was a crucial part of the regime’s at-
tempts to control the rural population. Police expansion also occurred
in strategic border regions (especially in the Far East Krai), in the de-
partments responsible for economic and industrial construction and,
to a lesser extent, in military surveillance departments. At the same
time, and despite these increases, Yagoda noted a continuing deficit in
numbers of operational staff needed to support the expanding number
of tasks given the political police. This was especially true, he noted,
in local and border regions. Yagoda’s report included valuable infor-
mation on Party composition, purging within the political police,
sources of recruitment, especially from demobilized army soldiers,
and social origins, with a special emphasis on those of “working-
class” background. Released in 1935, the report refers to the NKVD
and the GUGB as well as to the OGPU, since the political police un-
derwent reorganization in 1934. This reorganization had important
consequences, and will be discussed in the following chapter.
118 Subduing the Countryside

d o c u m ent
· 68 ·
Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda on cadre conditions of the
GUGB NKVD and cadre dynamics for the period 1.VII.31 to 1.I.35.
GARF, f. 9401, op. 8, d. 41, ll. 11–37.

Absolutely secret
1. Overall numbers.
As a result of:
—strengthening the rural apparatus;
—strengthening of the Chekist apparatus in the Far East;
—introduction of the position ZNPO [Deputy heads, political depart-
ment] for NKVD work;
—creation of a Chekist apparatus in new construction areas;
—creation of an NKVD apparatus in new krai, oblasts, provinces, and
raions,
numbers in organs of the GUGB NKVD for the period 1/VII–31 to
1/1–35 increased by 8,275 individuals, or 47.3 percent:

On 1/VII–31 On 1/1–33 On 1/1–35

17,298 20,898 25,573

In some krai and oblasts, this growth was uneven. Growth was espe-
cially intense in border raions, the strengthening of which deserves special
attention:

As of As of As of
krai or oblast 1.7–31 percent 1.1–33 percent 1.1–35 percent

M.O. 699 100 835 120.9 1,020 145.9

Belorussia 460 100 559 121.5 803 174.5
Z.S.K. 669 100 755 112.8 1,097 163.9
D.V.K. 406 100 745 183.5 1,185 286.9
Kazakhstan 403 100 637 158.1 889 220.6

[M.O. = Moscow Oblast; Z.S.K. = Western Siberia Territory; D.V.K. = Far East Territory]

Changes in numbers of the organs SPO [Secret Political Departments],

EKO, OO [Special Departments charged with military oversight], and
TO GUGB [Transport Departments] are characterized by the following
dynamics:
 Subduing the Countryside 119

As of 1.1–31 As of 1.1–33 As of 1.1–35

Number percent Number percent Number percent

SPO 4,252 100 5,601 131.7 4.831 113.6

EKO 1,387 100 2,471 178.2 2,388 172.2
OO 2,680 100 3,645 136.0 3,769 140.6
TO 4,598 100 5,152 112.1 5,383 117.1
Total 12,917 100 16,869 130.5 16,371 126.7

[SPO = Secret Political Departments; EKO = Economic [Crimes] Departments; OO = Special

Departments [military oversight]; TO = Transport Department]

The slight decline in numbers for the SPO GUGB for 1/1–35 is ex-
plained by the transfer, from 1.1–33 to 1.1–35, of 2,900 individuals to
serve as deputy heads of the political departments of MTS, most of whom
were drawn from SPO.
The significant increase in numbers for the EKO to 1/1–33 resulted
from the development in that period of the largest industrial complexes,
and from the formation of a whole series of powerful economic centers
(Magnitogorsk, Kuzbas, Berezniki, etc.).
At the same time, staffing in the last two years of 1,662 state farm
political departments, which was done mainly by transfer of EKO offi-
cers, somewhat lowered the overal number for the EKO by 1/1–35.
Systematic growth in the numbers of special departments is explained
by strengthening of the special apparatus in connection with the strained
situation in the Far East, and the necessity to service new formations of
the RKKA.
With growth of overal numbers in the last 3.5 years at 47.3 percent,
numbers in the organs of SPO, EKO, OO, and TO GUGB increased on
average only 26.7 percent.
This testifies to the fact that basic growth in numbers of the GUGB
organs occurred as a result of strengthening the lower raion-level chain
of NKVD organs.
[…]
Conclusions:
1. For the period 1.VII–31 to 1.1–35, in connection with various orga-
nizational measures, numbers in the organs of the GUGB increased
by 8,275 individuals, or 47.3 percent, most of the increase occurring
as a result of strengthening the lower raion-level chain and the NKVD
special organs.
2. On the basis of Party and government decisions, up to 4,500 posi-
tions were staffed by deputy heads of political departments of MTS
and state farms, as a result of cadre regrouping, training of new cad-
re, and increasing the qualifications of existing [cadre].
120 Subduing the Countryside

3. The Party-Komsomol stratum among operational staff was increased

up to 92.4 percent (an increase of 3.9 percent). Independent of the
steady increase in Party membership in OGPU/NKVD organs, at the
present time, exclusionary measures are being taken to transfer all
non-Party [employees] to work outside the GUGB.
4. The workers’ stratum in krai-level special departments has increased
to 43.5 percent (an increase of 8.3 percent). In some border raions,
as a result of special work to strengthen them, the workers’ stratum
has risen significantly higher (DVK–51.9 percent, Belorussia–46.1
percent). Even so, it cannot be claimed that the proportion of work-
ers in GUGB organs is satisfactory, and this requires us [to take] de-
cisive measures, which will secure a still more intense growth of the
workers’ stratum, and to do this through organizational recruitment
of new cadres, primarily through the instructional network of the
NKVD.
5. Leadership staff of the Chekist apparatus consists, to a person, of Party
members having a long Party tenure and rich experience in operational-
Chekist work. Thus, among UNKVD heads [political police heads be-
low the republic or krai-level], GUGB NKVD administrative heads,
heads of republic and oblast NKVD administrations, and heads of krai
and oblast NKVD administrations, as well as their deputies, only 6.2
percent have Party tenure of less than 8 years, and only 1.8 percent of
officials working in the OGPU/NKVD have less than 6 years.
6. With the goal of increasing qualifications of operational staff of GUGB
organs, during the period 1.VII–31 to 1.1–35 a large [amount] of work
was carried out in training new cadres, and in supplemental training of
the existing operational staff of GUGB organs. In all, during this period,
in the whole of the instructional network of GUGB NKVD organs,
3,913 operatives were trained, and 4,724 officials were sent through
qualification improvement courses.
7. As a result of a great [amount] of work in training and requalification
of operational staff and, as well, a deepening of study of the profes-
sional and moral qualities of all active operational staff of GUGB
organs and their effective use, [there has been] obviously a vigorous
and widespread promotion of officials in service. In just 1934 and
1935, 7,453 were promoted, or 29.1 percent of the whole staff, and
among leadership staff there was even more widespread promotion.
8. With the goal of cleansing GUGB NKVD organs of alien, ideologi-
cally unworthy, and morally bankrupt people, a large [amount] of
work was carried out in the last 3.5 years, and especially in 1934, to
study and review the operational staff. As a result of this, in 1934,
among GUGB NKVD organs, 454 people were fired for drunkeness
and discrediting the organs, and 236 as a result of special review. In
addition to this, as a result of a series of measures for improving the
 Subduing the Countryside 121

material-daily situation of officials, we have a significant reduction in

turnover due to health conditions or personal decisions.
9. As of 1.1–35, the number of vacant staff positions in GUGB NKVD
organs amounts to 1,826, or 6.8 percent of the staff roster. The lack
of staff is especially high in newly organized krai and oblasts (Oren-
burg obl.–17.7 percent, Omsk obl.–13.6 percent), and somewhat less
so in the most important border areas (DVK–5.7 percent, Belorus-
sia–5.0 percent, Ukraine–3.9 percent). In addition to the usual re-
cruitment to vacant positions through local Party organizations of
trusted, active, and literate Party members, a number of students of
technicums and VUZs [higher educational institutions] are sent to
NKVD [schools] to cover the lack of staff. Besides this, a number of
staff vacancies will be covered by: a return to work in the NKVD of
operational reserve Chekists, the best elements of demobilized Red
Army soldiers, border forces, and NKVD guard units, and trusted
officials promoted to operational work from administrative and tech-
nical workers of NKVD organs.

In general, the operational-Chekist core of the GUGB NKVD organs,

in their professional and moral character, is healthy, and should success-
fully cope with and fulfill the tasks put before them by organs of the
Party and government.
10 July 1935
During the era of the first Five Year Plan, from 1928 through 1932,
the political police played a crucial role in pushing through and en-
forcing Stalin’s policies of rapid industrialization and subordinating
the countryside. By 1933, the political police were well ensconced in
rural areas of the country, in border regions, and in economic and
industrial enterprises. The police controlled a sizable and growing
population of forced labor, which was employed in the OGPU’s ex-
panding economic empire in agriculture, timber, construction, and
mining. Budgets were expanding, as were personnel rolls. OGPU of-
ficers regarded themselves and their organization as the fighting revo-
lutionary arm of the Communist Party and the socialist state.
As the regime’s policies led increasingly to social disaster and disloca-
tion, however, the role of the political police evolved yet again. Starting
in 1933, and throughout the 1930s, the Politburo turned increasingly to
the police, not as a revolutionary organ, but to protect the state’s inter-
ests and to enforce the Stalinist version of socialism. Social order polic-
ing and surveillance characterized police activities, in the main, through-
out the 1930s. Merged with the civil police, this newly formed organi-
zation became a kind of social policing force, a Soviet gendarmerie.
 chapter four

Ordering Society
1933–1937

C
onsolidation of Soviet power in the countryside, and the end
of the first Five Year Plan, marked the high point of Stalin’s
revolution, which the dictator noted in his famous declara-
tion, in January 1933, about the final victory of socialism. Addressing
the plenary session, or plenum, of the Party’s Central Committee,
Stalin declared to the jubilant attendees that despite hardships and
skepticism from many, the Party and the Soviet people had accom-
plished the “historic” tasks of the plan. Great factories had been erect-
ed and vast socialist farms had been organized. Soviet power ruled
indisputably across the Soviet Union. Organized class resistance had
been routed, and in that lay a powerful victory. The first Five Year
Plan, Stalin pronounced, was a triumph for socialism and the Party.1
In spite of Stalin’s declaration of victory, the social cost was devas-
tating. The regime’s agrarian and industrial revolution created near
universal social crisis, uprooting millions of people, either through
forced deportation or out of sheer necessity for survival. The dra-
matic shift in resources to build up industry precipitated a scarcity of
basic goods, food, services, and even shelter during this period, and
these scarcities led, in turn, to an appalling degradation in living stan-
dards. To make a bad situation worse, the initial years of the collective
farm system proved a disaster. By the end of 1932, famine conditions
were beginning to spread. A series of factors—the regime’s brutally
extractive policies in the countryside, the administrative chaos of the
new collective farm system, peasant resistance to collectivization, and
poor weather—combined to create one of the great tragedies of the
twentieth century, the great Soviet famine of 1933 and 1934. In large

122
 Ordering Society 123

areas of Ukraine, Western Siberia, central Russia, and the North

Caucasus, famine during these years killed some five million people,
and forced millions of others to try to migrate out of stricken areas.2
Widespread confiscation of property, wholesale deportations, and
forced population migration characterized the early years of the
1930s. Dispossessed and often starving, hundreds of thousands of
peasants and other rural inhabitants, as well as people from former
professional classes, streamed into and through the cities and indus-
trial sites. They took to the rail lines and roads—to escape hunger, to
find goods, to seek a better life, even just to survive. This unorganized
movement of people drained economic resources and threatened to
overwhelm the underdeveloped infrastructure of the cities and the
social stability of the country. Large numbers of indigents and itiner-
ants, criminals, unemployed youth, gypsies, the disenfranchised, and
a range of other groups added to these mass migrations.3
Local authorities could not cope with the influx of masses of people
and the shantytowns that sprang up in cities and industrial sites.4
Social agencies could not cope with the growing numbers of homeless,
and the hundreds of thousands of orphaned and unsupervised chil-
dren that filled the streets and traveled the roads and rail lines. Civil
police could not cope with the rising waves of criminality, whether the
illegal trade in scarce goods or the mass pilfering and theft of state
resources such as coal, bread, and grain.
Social displacement on such a scale not only heightened criminality
and social disorder, but posed an imminent danger to the state and
to the regime’s ability to carry out its economic plans. The latter,
especially, incensed Soviet leaders. Stalin, of course, cast the problem
of social breakdown in the language of class war. He and other
leaders equated even petty criminality with anti-Soviet intentions. He
declared that with the victory of socialism, the only possible explana-
tion for criminality could be counterrevolutionary sabotage. Social
disorder could be explained as nothing else but class hostility toward
the new Soviet order, and as sabotage of the grand project to build
socialism.
In his remarks to the January 1933 Party plenum, Stalin identified
the struggle against criminality and social disorder as the newest phase
of class war, after the defeat of organized class resistance. While he
lauded the feats of socialist construction, he also warned that this new
type of class war would be even more difficult to overcome than open
class resistance, since the enemy would be hidden, merging with and
incorporating the “criminal element” in a subtle kind of underground
124 Ordering Society

war. Stalin laid out the dangers and made it clear that at the current
stage of socialist construction, criminality and social disorder posed
greater dangers to the state than direct political opposition.5
Stalin’s remarks placed the problem of criminality and social disor-
der at the center of his address on building socialism in the country
after the revolutionary upheaval of the previous three years. More
than that, by linking class war and criminality, Stalin defined the latter
not only as the central problem of social order, but social order as the
central problem of state security. The conflation of social order with
state security was new, and turned the fight against crime and social
deviancy—indeed, any kind of social disorder—from a matter of
social control into a political priority in defense of the state. Stalin’s
remarks politicized or, more accurately, statized, criminality and so-
cial disorder, and deeply influenced political police policies in the mid-
1930s. In the conditions of social breakdown and weak civil govern-
ment, Stalin turned to the political police, not just to repress resistance
to the regime’s policies, but to reimpose order in the country, and to
defend the assets and infrastructure of the state. This chapter traces
the transformation of the political police during the 1930s from a
revolutionary fighting organization into a kind of social gendarmerie.

Hooligans and Railroads

One of the most significant aspects of that transformation involved the
merging of the political and civil police. In December 1930, the Polit-
buro gave sanction to this process. On the fifteenth, the Politburo and
Sovnarkom officially abolished the republic-level commissariats of the
interior that had administered the civil police, the militsiia. According to
the reorganization, the militsiia now came under jurisdiction of local
government councils, or soviets. In fact, a secret protocol of the reorga-
nization placed the militsiia under operational control of the OGPU and
its local organs, the GPU administrations. The militsiia operated this
way for two years, and the secret nature of its subordination indicated
some concern by leaders that an open relationship would look bad to
the public. Whatever the case, leaders already understood that the social
dislocation caused by collectivization and dekulakization, and by the
negative effects of forced industrialization, would require the use of
social force on a scale beyond the capabilities of the political police or
the civil police separately. The idea behind the merger, then, was to cre-
ate a civil police that could act as an auxiliary arm of the political police.6
 Ordering Society 125

One of the first social order operations of the combined OGPU and
militsiia came in 1932, to keep order on passenger trains and to stop
thefts and intimidation by gangs on the country’s railroads. Incensed
by the mounting numbers of incidents, Stalin wrote in August 1932 to
Lazar Kaganovich, a Politburo member and one of Stalin’s close sub-
ordinates, demanding that the political police take action.

d o c u m en t
· 69 ·
Letter of I. V. Stalin to L. Kaganovich. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 896, l. 260.7
4 August 1932

[…]
5. Outrages are happening on the railroads. State employees on the
routes are raped and terrorized by hooligans and homeless children. Or-
gans of the TO GPU [transport police of the OGPU] are asleep. (That’s a
fact!) This outrage can no longer be tolerated. Call the TO GPU to order.
Force them to keep order on the lines. Issue a directive to the TO GPU to
place armed personnel on the lines and to shoot hooligans on the spot.
Where is the TO GPU? What is it doing? How can c. Blagonravov [chief
of the TO GPU and deputy head of the Commissariat of Transport] toler-
ate such anarchy and outrage?
Regards, Stalin
As a result of Stalin’s outburst, political police embarked on a cam-
paign of regular sweeps of train yards, stations, and trains, even to the
extent of checking freight manifests and passenger tickets. As the
documents below portray, guarding the country’s railroads became a
routine duty for the political police, and the head of the OGPU, Men-
zhinsky, made a point to send regular reports to Stalin and to the
Politburo.
126 Ordering Society

d o c u m ent
· 70 ·
V. R. Menzhinsky’s report to I. V. Stalin on the struggle against
hooliganism, homeless children, and theft on transportation.
TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 10, d. 145, ll. 3–7.
31 August 1932

I. Concerning the struggle against hooliganism and homeless children on

transportation, the OGPU has done the following:
1. On the railways and waterways, mobile and stationary brigades were
organized, consisting of riflemen-guards, workers, and employees
who are Party and Komsomol members. These are operating under
the direction of OGPU officers at a number of stations, in trains, on
bridge spans, piers; 873 brigades of 3–5 people each.
2. At points contaminated the most with hooliganism, permanent out-
posts were created—243 [in number].
3. Armed units of NKPS [transportation commissariat] and OGPU rifle-
men accompany passenger, courier, and express trains in areas con-
taminated the most with hooliganism.
4. In the process of fighting against hooliganism, there were detained,
of the hooligan element, on transportation—during the period
April–August—49,045 persons, i.e.: April—10,047, May—7,287,
June—7,565, July—9,379, August—14,777.
5. Homeless children detained—13,122 persons.
Of these: April—1,303,
May—1,271,
June—1,771,
July—1,092,
August—7,685
6. Investigations initiated—2,573, i.e.:
April—444,
May—449,
June—418,
July—466,
August—796
7. Hooligans detained at a crime scene and charged—3,558 people.
Of them:
April—567,
May—620,
June—498,
July—618,
August—1,255
 Ordering Society 127

These numbers include: 640 persons arrested in August, of whom:

67 persons for breaking windows and throwing stones at trains, 11
persons for setting up obstacles on railways, 16 persons for using the
emergency brake and stopping running trains, 181 persons for as-
saulting train crews, 340 persons for disturbing the peace at stations,
640 people for other forms of malfeasance.
8. Concluded and transferred to courts were 2,184 investigations, with
a total number of 3,111 persons indicted. Of these, 407 cases were
finished in August, with 706 indicted. Of those cases transferred to
courts in August, only 115 cases went to trial. The rest are still under
court review. Sentences were passed for cases that went to trial (main-
ly hard labor from three months to one year and internment in a
concentration camp up to three years).
9. Fined for violation of the NKPS standing regulations (minor hooli-
ganism offenses)—118,085 persons. Of these:
April—10,972 persons in the amount of 59,039 rub.
May—15,652 persons for 78,291 rub.
June—18,078 persons for 117,862 rub.
July—20,957 persons for 84,756 rub.
August—52,426 persons for 128,318 rub.
10. Fined for stowaway journeys on railways and waterways—129,054
persons. Of these:
April—17,860 persons in the amount of 109,365 rub.
May—29,274 persons for 250,269 rub.
June—23,541 persons for 142,362 rub.
July—26,147 persons for 225,091 rub.
August—32,232 persons for 289,712 rub.

A characteristic result of the whole complex of actions by the OGPU

in the struggle against hooliganism and the criminal element on transpor-
tation is the sharp decrease in the number of cases of theft of
passengers’ luggage, and pickpocket thefts in August. Thus, in April
1,096 cases of theft from passengers were registered, in May—998, in
June—1.014, in July—1.073, in August—548.
[…]
In the last months, organs of the OGPU uncovered and liquidated a
network of large theft organizations on the [rail]roads, which were sys-
tematically engaged in theft of luggage and freight from train cars, station
warehouses, and freight yards.
Arrested for theft:

May 2,438 persons

June 1,950
July 1,792
128 Ordering Society

August 2,108
Total 8,288
Cases investigated:
May 1,130
June 1,241
July 1,357
August 892
Total 4,620
Convictions:
May 671
June 963
July 765
August 433
Total 2,832

In August, of the number of convicted, 43 persons were sentenced to the

highest measure of social protection—to execution, 86 persons to 10
years, 17—to 8 years, 61—to 5 years, the others to 3 years and less.
Theft on transport in August in comparison to the previous months
was reduced. If in May there were 3,596 cases of theft registered, in June
3,688, and in July 4,202, in 29 days of August, 2,469 cases were regis-
tered, which is only 58 percent of those [registered] in July.
In August, also, the percentage of solved cases of theft also improved,
which reached 44.4 percent, whereas during the period of May–June it
was on the average 29 percent.
In conclusion, it is necessary to note that punitive actions by the OGPU
will not give definitive results in terms of eliminating thefts on transport,
unless NKPS and railroad administrations accomplish completely all the
necessary preventive actions developed by the OGPU and included in the
above orders and circulars. To the same degree, there needs to be a real and
broad mobilization of the transport workers in the struggle against theft. At
the same time, there has even been some backsliding in cases where trade
union organizations decline active participation in the struggle against theft.
Head of the OGPU (Menzhinsky)

Protecting Socialist Property

The problem of petty theft became so widespread that single opera-
tions by police were not enough to stem the rising tide of criminality
against the state. As early as July 1932, Stalin outlined in a letter to
Kaganovich from the leader’s dacha in the Crimea a special law that
would allow systematic police action and would entail harsh penal-
ties. Stalin envisioned the law as having three major aspects—theft on
 Ordering Society 129

transport, in farms and cooperatives, and “antisocial elements” in

general. He emphasized to Kaganovich that such a law was needed
not just to stop crime, but to enable the political police.

d o c u m en t
· 71 ·
Extract of letter from I. V. Stalin to L Kaganovich, 15 July 1932.8

[…]
I think that on all three of these points, we must act on the basis of a
law (“the peasant loves legality”), and not just on the basis of OGPU
practice, although it is clear that the role of the OGPU here will not only
not be reduced, but, on the contrary, will become stronger and “enno-
bled” (“on a legal basis” and not just by “high handedness”).
The government enacted the law on 7 August 1932, and in Septem-
ber the Politburo approved and sent explicit instructions to prosecu-
torial and judicial commissariat officials, and to the political police,
on how to implement the new law.

d o c u m en t
· 72 ·
Instructions on implementing the law on protection of socialist
property (PB from 8.IX.32, pr[otocol]. No. 115, p[oint]. 5). AP RF,
f. 3, op. 57, d. 60, ll. 13–19.
16 September 1932

Strictly secret
Section I […]:
The law of August 7 is to be applied to the theft of state and public
property:
a) in industry (theft of factory or enterprise property)
b) in sovkhozes [state farms]
c) in state trade organizations
d) in kolkhozes [collective farms]
e) Goods on railroad, water, and local transport
130 Ordering Society

Section II:
Categories of thieves, and measures of social defense to be applied to
them:
1. In cases of organizations and groupings that systematically destroy
state, public, and cooperative property by arson, explosives, and
mass spoilage—apply the highest measure of social defense—shoot-
ing, without mitigation.
2. In relation to kulaks, former traders, and other socially dangerous
elements working in state (industrial and agricultural—sovkhozes)
enterprises or offices, caught in theft of property or embezzlement of
large sums of money of these enterprises, and likewise in state institu-
tions and enterprises, apply the highest measure of punishment, [and]
given mitigating circumstances of guilt (in cases of single action or
small thefts) reduce the highest measure of punishment to 10 years’
loss of freedom.
[…]
3. In relation to kulaks, former traders, and other socially dangerous
elements, who have infiltrated organs of supply, trade, and coopera-
tives, as well as officials of the trade network caught in theft of goods
or selling them privately and in embezzling large sums of money—
apply the highest measure of punishment, and only under mitigating
circumstances, in cases of insignificant amounts, change the highest
measure of punishment to 10 years’ loss of freedom.
Apply the same measure to profiteers, who, although they do not en-
gage directly in theft, [engage in] speculation of goods and products
they know to have been stolen from state enterprises and cooperatives.
4. In relation to persons caught in theft of goods on transport, apply the
highest measure of punishment, or, in cases of mitigating circum-
stances (theft of a single item or a small theft), a 10-year loss of free-
dom may be applied.
[…]
5. In relation to kulaks who have infiltrated into kolkhozes, as well as
those who remain outside kolkhozes, who organize or participate in
theft of kolkhoz property or grain, apply the highest measure of pun-
ishment, without mitigation.
6. In relation to independent farmers and collective farmers caught in
theft of kolkhoz property and grain, 10 years’ loss of freedom should
be applied.
In aggravated criminal circumstances, in particular: systematic theft
of kolkhoz grain, beets, and other agricultural products, and live-
stock, stolen in large numbers, by organized groups, theft aggravated
by violence, terrorist acts, by arson, etc., and in relation to collective
and independent farmers—apply the highest measure of punishment.
 Ordering Society 131

7. In relation to collective farm chairmen and members of the farm

management who participate in theft of state and public property, it
is necessary to apply the highest measure of punishment, and only
under mitigating circumstances—apply a 10-year loss of freedom.

[…]
Chairman of the Supreme Court—A. Vinokurov
Deputy head, OGPU—I. Akulov
Police acted on the law quickly. By March 1933, they had arrested
127,318 persons under the August 1932 law, and had executed 2,052.
The following report detailed for the Politburo the measures that
police took to implement the law. As the note at the end makes clear,
Stalin kept this report for his personal archive.

d o c u m en t
· 73 ·
Memorandum of G. E. Prokof’ev and L. G. Mironov to I. V. Stalin on the
number of those prosecuted by the OGPU for theft of public property. AP RF,
f. 45, op. 1, d. 171, ll. 87–89.

[Handwritten note by Stalin on the first page: “My archive”]

20 March 1933
The total number prosecuted by the OGPU for theft of state and pub-
lic property up to 15 March of this year is 127,318 persons. 55,166 per-
sons were prosecuted for thefts from shops and from warehouses of
goods-manufacturing networks and from industrial enterprises, and
72,152 persons—for thefts from sovkhozes and kolkhozes [collective
farms].
From the total number of those prosecuted for theft, courts and OGPU
organs (OGPU Collegium [administrative sentencing board] and
OGPU troikas under PP OGPU [nonjudicial sentencing boards
under OGPU plenipotentiaries]) convicted 73,743 persons.
OGPU organs convicted 14,056 persons (for the largest cases of orga-
nized thefts). According to measures of punishment, the number of the
convicted may be subdivided by type of punishment, as follows:
VMN [capital punishment] 2,052 persons
5–10 years of camp 7,661 persons
Less than 5 years 4,343
Total 14,056 persons
132 Ordering Society

According to social composition, the number of those convicted by the

OGPU organs is as follows:

Former traders, speculators, kulaks 4,467 persons

Employees, collective farmers, edinolichniki
[independent farmers], and other workers 8,209
Others 1,080
Total 14,056 persons

From cases of thefts being investigated by the OGPU during the re-
ported two weeks, large thefts of grain that took place in Rostov-on-Don
drew attention. Thefts embraced the whole system of the Rostprokhlebo-
kombinat [Rostov bread production combine]: the bread-baking factory,
two mills, two bakeries, and 33 shops, from which bread has been sold
to the population. Over six thousand puds [96,000 kg; 1 pud = 16.38 kg]
of bread were plundered, along with one thousand puds of sugar, 500
puds of bran, and other products. Thefts were made possible because of
the absence of a clearly established system of reporting and control, and
also because of criminal nepotism and the solidarity of employees. The
Public Workers Inspectorate, which was supervising the grain distribu-
tion network, failed to live up to its purpose. In all cases of proven thefts,
the inspectors were accomplices who signed the obviously fictitious
papers on underdelivery of bread, on write-off of shrinkage, and on
spillage, etc. 54 persons involved in this case were arrested, five of whom
are members of the VKP(b).
Large thefts were uncovered in the peat section of MOSPO [Moscow
Oblast Union of Consumers’ Societies], which was responsible for sup-
plying peat to workers. The head of the department of trade of the peat
section, Nikitin, a former officer, led the group of thieves. He selected
former [prerevolutionary] traders, landowners, and others of the alien
element, who had already been prosecuted, as employees for the ware-
houses.
The organization had its agents in local torfrabkops [peat workers’
cooperatives], in particular in Orekhovo-Zuyevo and Shaturstroi.
The organization did not limit itself to direct thefts. Using money of the
peat section, it bought train cars of food supply and marketed them on
the side, misappropriating the obtained money. 10 persons involved in
this case were arrested. The investigation continues.
[…]
In total during the period from 1 March to 15 March of this year, the
OGPU organs arrested 2,829 persons for theft.
Deputy head of the OGPU, Prokof’ev
Head of EKO OGPU, Mironov
 Ordering Society 133

Famine and the OGPU

Along with harsh enforcement of the 7 August law, the regime’s lead-
ers continued to apply relentless pressure on the peasantry for extrac-
tion of grain, especially to meet export quotas to pay for industrializa-
tion. Largely as a result of harsh extraction policies, many of the
country’s grain growing areas plunged into deep and prolonged fam-
ine in the winter of 1932–33. By spring and summer 1934, when grain
reserves were finally stabilized, an estimated five to seven million
people were dead from the hunger. Ukraine was hit especially hard,
and the famine there came to be known as the Holodomor (the Killing
by Hunger). The regime’s leaders were slow to react to the famine,
believing that peasants were simply hoarding grain and refusing to
work, prompted by foreign agents and anti-Soviet “elements.” By late
1932 and January 1933, tens of thousands of people were attempting
to flee stricken areas, and the Politburo ordered political and civil
police to coordinate efforts to stop the out migration. The following
pages document the response of the country’s leaders to this mass
movement and the actions by police to patrol roads, trains, and other
forms of transport and to return illegally fleeing peasants to their
home villages and regions. The matter-of-factness of the documents
belies the implications of police actions, which, by rounding up and
returning peasants to their home villages, surely condemned many of
them to certain death.

d o c u m en t
· 74 ·
TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR directive on prevention of mass departure of
starving peasants. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 45, ll. 109–109ob.9
22 January 1933

TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR have been receiving information that in
Kuban and Ukraine, mass departure of peasants “for bread” has started
in the direction of TsChO [Central Black Earth Oblast], to the Volga,
Moscow Oblast, the Western Oblast, to Belorussia. TsK VKP(b) and SNK
USSR have no doubt that this departure of peasants, as well as departure
from Ukraine last year, was organized by enemies of Soviet power, SRs,
and agents of Poland, for the purpose of propaganda agitation “through
peasants” in the northern regions of the USSR against collective farms
134 Ordering Society

and, in general, against Soviet power. Last year, Party, Soviet, and Cheka
organs of Ukraine missed this counterrevolutionary ploy by enemies of
Soviet power. This year, a repetition of last year’s mistake cannot be al-
lowed.
First. TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR order the kraikom, kraiispolkom
[executive committee of the krai soviet], and the PP OGPU of the North
Caucasus not to allow mass departure of peasants from the North Cauca-
sus to other regions, nor their entry into the Krai from Ukraine.
Second. TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR order the TsK KP(b)U, Ukrsovnar-
kom [SNK of Ukraine], Balitsky, and Redens not to allow mass departure
of peasants from Ukraine to other krai, nor their entry into Ukraine from
the North Caucasus.
Third. TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR order the PP OGPU of Moscow
Oblast, TsChO, the Western Oblast, Belorussia, the Lower Volga, and the
Middle Volga to arrest “peasants” who have made their way to the north
of Ukraine and the North Caucasus and, after sorting out counterrevolu-
tionary elements, to return others to their places of residence.
Fourth. TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR order [head of] TO GPU Prokhorov
to send the corresponding order through the TO GPU system.
Chairman of SNK USSR V. M. Molotov
Secretary of TsK VKP(b) I. Stalin

d o c u m ent
· 75 ·
Report of G. E. Prokof’ev to I. V. Stalin on measures taken in the
struggle against mass departures from Ukraine and SKK
[North Caucasus], with attached notes by V. A. Balitsky and
E. G. Evdokimov. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 189, ll. 3–10.

[Handwritten note on the first page: “To Molotov, Kaganovich, Posty-

shev. I. Stalin”]
23 January 1933
Absolutely secret.
Herewith are attached the first reports of cc. Balitsky, Evdokimov on
struggle against mass departures from Ukraine and SKK. […]
Deputy head of the OGPU, Prokof’ev

Appendix: Memorandum of cc. Balitsky and Evdokimov [telegraphed]

on a direct line.
Absolutely secret
Memorandum on a direct line from Rostov:
 Ordering Society 135

No. 141256
The issue of struggle against flight [of peasants] was raised as soon as
[my] arrival in SKK, based on materials from a number of raions, which
showed intense flight, which, in some places, was taking on a mass char-
acter. At the end of November and later, categorical orders were given
repeatedly by me to opersektors [operational sectors], to oblast adminis-
trations, to gorraiotdelenie [raion-level departments in cities and towns],
to DTO [GPU road transport departments], to the militsiia of the Krai,
on taking diverse and decisive measures for blocking flight. Generally, at
this time, actions in localities are being carried out along the following
lines: 1) agent networks have been mobilized for struggle against mass
flight, especially against the fugitive kulak–White Guardist element, espe-
cially for the identification of organizers and propagandists provoking
flight. Explanatory work has been carried out: explanatory campaigns,
summons [to interviews or interrogations], etc. 2) In localities, measures
were taken and attention has been brought continuously to the issue of
strengthening mass explanatory work for the purpose of organizing pub-
lic counteraction to the flight. This issue was raised in the kraikom, which
has given special instructions to localities. 3) Along the line of DTO, be-
sides agitation-operational work on transportation, mobile groups were
created, operational road blocks were set up at points—raions of the
greatest congestion of movement of fugitives, especially in the direction
of Ukraine, Transcaucasia, even checking travelers and ticket buyers. 4)
Militsiia forces, with the assistance of partsovaktiv [Party and soviet ac-
tivists], have organized check points along the main paths of movement
of runaways [bezhashchie], especially in the direction of the Black Sea
area, Transcaucasia, the Black Sea coast, along the border with Abkhazia,
and also to Dagestan at the border with Azerbaijan, in the main passes
to Transcaucasia. Detained kulaks, c-r [counterrevolutionary] elements
were arrested, the others were filtered, some after processing were
returned to their place [of residence] for explanatory work. Departures
without the permission of soviets, collective farm boards, are forbidden,
however these actions do not have any effect, [peasants] flee without
permission.
5) In cities, agent networks have been mobilized for identification of
runaways, and for suppression of possible c-r active subversive work of
runaways settled in cities, in enterprises, at new contracting sites. Mea-
sures were taken along agent line[s] of work and physical protection of
the most important strategic points, state constructions, and large enter-
prises, the first priority given to those of military importance. A number
of operations were conducted [against] runaways in cities.
6) Major efforts were directed toward organized insurgent c-r[s], and
their agitational, organizing role in the flight[s]. As you know, in the
Kuban a large insurgent organization was uncovered in Kurganensk
136 Ordering Society

and other raions of SKK—the affair of colonel Popov and others. In

this case, work on organizing flight for the purpose of sabotage was
uncovered, forming insurgent groups from the runaways (in the areas
of the Black Sea coast). Along with this, from other liquidated cases,
counterrevolutionary work was found, of concentrating runaways in
deep wooded mountain areas, and also in cities. As a result of the actions
undertaken in the Krai (and also the operations carried out in Shakhty,
Taganrog, Rostov, and elsewhere), our organs detained 7,534 people
of the runaway element. Of them: in the Black Sea opersektor up to
5,000 escapees from the Kuban raions, from which 1,216 people of c-r
elements. In the Shakhty opersektor, 349 people were removed of the
kulak–White Guardist element in the coal industry; among them, 104
White Guardists, 18 repatriatees. By transport organs along lines of the
sevkavkazsky [North Caucusus] [rail] roads, 11,774 runaways were
detained, among them 659 kulaks. In Dagestan 1,074 people. It is neces-
sary to consider that in connection with the lack of forces, concentration
of our main forces in the countryside [and] the rapid spread of sabotage,
purging work in cities, naturally, has not yet been completed. For Novem-
ber–December, flight in some places, in some stanitsas [Kazakh villages],
showed an increase. In particular, in villages where the strongest pressure
in connection with grain collections took place. As of now: 1) in January,
flight showed a decrease, in comparison with November–December.
However in some areas, stanitsas, flight continues. We found a concentra-
tion of runaways in the Azov Sea reed beds. We are preparing an opera-
tion. We are preparing an operation in Rostov. At the same time, in a
number of places, the fact of returning runaways has been noticed. 2)
Now, in connection with the completion of grain collections in the major-
ity of raions of the Krai, [we are conducting] preparatory work for the
spring sowing, together with expanding our measures, along with mass
explanatory work. Certainly, flight may show a further decrease. It is
necessary to point out: mass explanatory work in localities is weak. 3) I
repeatedly send orders to localities to organize a review of [measures] to
strengthen actions along all lines. I am asking to take into consideration
that, given the real conditions in raions, stanitsas, given the number of
our workers, of army and militsiia resources, naturally, there is no physi-
cal possibility to organize total, guaranteed interdiction, covering all
roads. 4) According to our information, questions of flight were continu-
ously elucidated since my first telegram from Kuban, and also in reports
along the line of SPO, in information on black villages [designated] for
exile.
0170064 Evdokimov
 Ordering Society 137

[Telegram 2]
To the Secretary, SPO OGPU10
22 January 1933.
Secret
Mass departure of peasants from villages, which began at the end of
December 1932, mainly in Kharkov, Odessa, Kiev, and partially in
Chernigov oblasts, is expressed in the following form:
In Kharkov oblast, departure was registered in 19 raions, 39 villages.
In all, 20,129 individuals left; of these 20,129 were collective farmers,
12,698 were independent farmers, 8 activists.
[…]
In total, in these oblasts, departure was registered in 74 raions, 721
villages, 228 collective farms, totally 31,693 individuals departed, 2,789
families, among them collective farmers—10,539 and families—1,262.
Single independent farmers—19,203, families 1,131, tverdosdatchiki 823
[individual farmers with fixed grain quota paid to the state], families 396,
activists 126.
[…]
In most cases, those leaving villages go to the Donbass and large
industrial centers. Flight of collective farmers [occurs] on a significantly
smaller scale than flight of independent farmers. Also, unwarranted
departure of heads of soviets and collective farms, including “communists,”
takes place. The latter flee from villages because they are afraid of
repressions for sabotage of grain collections and failure to fulfill Party
assignments. A check of the junction stations of Lozovaia and Sumy in
Kharkov Oblast, where flight from villages is especially widespread,
shows a large sale of train tickets for long-distance trains in January of
this year. Thus, in January at the station of Lozovaia, 16,500 tickets
were sold, and at the station of Sumy, 15,000. The increase in sale of
tickets has been noted also at the junction station of Pomoshchnaya in
the Odessa Oblast. Thus, if in the month of November 879 tickets were
sold for long-distance trains, in December 3,614, and in the first half of
January—1,617. The rest of the junction stations in other oblasts do not
show a sharp increase of ticket sales for long distance. For the purpose
of a decisive suppression of flight from the countryside, in the beginning
of January, the GPU of Ukraine started to remove organizers and
instigators of flight, and to strength agent-informant work in the places
contaminated with mass departure. Over 500 malicious instigators of
departures were arrested.
The GPU of Ukraine gave information to the KP[b]U and SPO OGPU
on mass departures since 25 December, 1932. I am giving additional
directives based on your instructions.—V. Balitsky
138 Ordering Society

d o c u m ent
· 76 ·
Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on results of
operational measures to curb mass flight of peasants. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 30, d. 189, ll. 36–37.

[Note on the first page: “To Molotov. I. Stalin”]

17 February 1933
Absolutely secret
As an addendum to the memorandum from 13.II of this year on the
results of operational measures by local OGPU organs to curb mass flight
of peasants from SSR Ukraine, CKK, and others, I report:
In Ukraine SSR—for the period from 11–13 February, this year, 2,377
of the fleeing element were arrested and filtered; of these 2,354 were
returned to their place of residence, and 23 were arrested.
In TsChO for the period 10 to 12 February, this year, 118 individuals
were detained. Together with those already detained, 297 were returned
to their place of residence, and 96 are scheduled to be returned to Ukraine.
In NVK [Lower Volga Krai] for the period 7–14 February this year, 227
individuals were detained. Together with those already detained, 1,209
individuals were returned to their place of residence.
For the period 11–14 February this year, in railroad stations, 2,450
individuals were detained, of whom 2,392 were returned, 9 have been
arrested, and the rest are still undergoing filtration.
In the past days, there has been a significant reduction in the flow of
those in transit along railroads.
Here is a table of data as of 14 February:
Numbers detained of the fleeing element from the beginning of the
operation to 14.II.33.

From Total Returned To be Sent to Exiled to

detained to residence indicted concentration Kazakhstan
camp

UkSSR 31,783 28,351 3,434 — 579

TsChO 27,368 26,578 694 — —
SKK 29,116 8,663 10,528 192 —
NVK 2,261 1,653 — — 99
ZSFSR 7,302 2,037 1,148 2,490 —
Western 5,115 4,087 432 — —
Oblast
SVK 27 29 — — —
 Ordering Society 139

ODTO 47,417 43,411 2,825 11 —

Total 150,391 114,759 19,059 2,693 678

[UkSSR: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; TsChO: Central Black Earth Oblast; SKK: North-
ern Caucasus District; NVK: Lower Volga District; ZSFSR: Trans-Caucasus Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic; SVK: Middle Volga District; ODTO: OGPU Transport Department.]

Secretary SPO
One of the last reports sent to Stalin about the above operations, from
March 1933, listed a total of 219,460 people picked up since the start
of the operations, and 185,588 returned to their place of residence.11

Yagoda’s Proposal for New Settlements

In anticipation of further policing activities, Yagoda and his deputy M.
D. Berman proposed a significant expansion of the system of special
settlements. In the following memorandum to Stalin, from February
1933, the two police officials estimated an additional two million peo-
ple to be deported and settled in areas of Kazakhstan and Western
Siberia. These would not be kulaks, primarily, but other “anti-Soviet
elements,” largely from cities and industrial areas. If approved, the
population of special settlements would reach some four million peo-
ple by 1934. As the memorandum shows, the plan was ambitious,
representing an attempt at social engineering on a large scale. As such,
real people were rarely mentioned, but were categorized into “ele-
ments”—socially harmful, socially dangerous, anti-Soviet, etc. Social
“elements” were to be moved about in “contingents” and “echelons,”
and assigned privileges or, more often, restrictions, accordingly. Based
on the number and types of restriction, it is clear that Yagoda regarded
those of the socially harmful element as more of a threat to the state
than those of the kulak element.

d o c u m en t
· 77 ·
Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda and M. D. Berman to I. V. Stalin
on the organization of special settlements. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30,
d. 196, ll. 127–38.

[Notes on the first page: “To archive. I. Stalin. Besides everything

else, need to tie this business to the population reduction in prisons.”
140 Ordering Society

“Expenditures (1,394 m. rub.) grossly exaggerated. Costs need to be

covered by exiles themselves. Molotov”]
13 February 1933
In connection with instruction from the TsK VKP(b) the OGPU is
developing a resettlement plan for 1933 and 1934 for anti-Soviet ele-
ments exiled from rural and urban areas, and for organizing them into
labor settlements.
A preliminary idea for resettlement of 2,000,000 persons in raions of
Western Siberia and Kazakhstan is laid out below.
Kazakhstan:
In Kazakhstan, resettlement is to be carried out mainly in the following
raions: Naurzumsky, Akhmolinsky, Atbasarsky, Evropeisky, Leninsky,
Revoliutsionny, Sotsialistichesky, Kurgol’dzhimsky, Aryk-Balyksky,
Uritsky, and Ubagansky.
According to Narkomzem [Commissariat of Agriculture], the total
area of open land comprises 2,244,000 hectares, of which 1,100,000
hectares is arable land. Distance from the railroad of these land funds is
280 klm at the maximum. (Naurzumsky Raion) and 35–40 klm at the
minimum (Akhmolinsk and Evropeisky raions).
A significant number of these raions are located in Central Kazakhstan,
thinly populated and underdeveloped. The soil in these raions is mostly
loamy, interspersed partially with black earth and saline soil. Several re-
gions are distinguished by periodic aridity (Atbasarsky and Sotsialis-
tichesky). Water supply comes from existing rivers and lakes and ground
water lying at a depth of 8 to 10 meters.
These tracts [fondy] are good for agriculture, with grain crops being
cultivated by natural irrigation (bagara), and gardens and […] potatoes
by watering.
Based on a calculation of one family per 3.5–4 hectares of land, it is
possible to settle up to a million people on 1,100,000 hectares of land.
Western Siberia:
In Western Siberia, resettlement will be carried out in the open lands of
the following northern raions: Narymsky, Krivosheinsky, Biriliussky,
Narabel’sky, Kargassky, Rybinsky, Kozhevnikovsky, Ishimsky, Tarsky,
Suslovsky, and Novokuskovsky, as well as in the southern [raions]: Kur-
gansky, Ongudaisky, Ust’-Abakansky (see map).
These regions are located at a distance of 50 to 500 klm from railroad
stations. There are 1,600,000 hectares of land in these areas, of which
418,000 are arable, 237,000 are for haying, 407,000 for pasture. Water
saturation of these areas is fully adequate, the soil is good for agriculture.
At the present time, through the PP OGPU in Western Siberia, we are
calculating more precisely the amount of land and the possibilities for
exploiting it.
[…]
 Ordering Society 141

[The report goes on at length, detailing the kinds of economic activities

to be carried out by settlements: agriculture, commercial grain crops,
animal husbandry, fishing, forest work, and even the kinds of artisan
industries that could be established for “second and third members of
families, those not fully capable of work, or invalids.” Yagoda and
Berman estimated the number of special settlers to be roughly equal to the
number exiled in the three years 1930–32, about two million, but these
new settlers would be of slightly different social makeup.]
The following contingents should be sent to the special settlements:
a) Kulaks exiled from raions of total collectivization, b) Those exiled for
disrupting and sabotaging grain collection and other campaigns, c) The
urban element, unwilling to leave cities as a result of passportization
[the system of residence registration designed to limit urban in migration
[See below.], d) Kulaks who have fled the countryside and who are [found
in and] removed from industrial production sites, e) Exiles removed in the
course of border cleansing (Western [Oblast] and Ukraine), f) Exiles sen-
tenced by OGPU organs and courts for periods up to 5 years, except for
the socially dangerous.
[The exiles are to have the same legal status as current special settlers,
that is, loss of voting rights and the right of free movement for 5 years,
with the possibility for restoration of rights,] if they prove their devotion
to Soviet power through hard work. [This part of sentence marked with
two bold lines in margin next to Stalin’s handwritten note: “Resettled for
how long? 10 years”]
[…]
The new special settlements will be organized from a calculated dis-
tribution in each of 500 to 1,000 [Written in pencil above this figure:
“300 to 500”] households. […] The special settlements will be headed by
commandant-Chekists. Groups of villages numbering 7,500 families will
be united into raion-level police reservations [kommandatury], headed by
a raion-level commandant. Protection of villages will be carried out by
civil police, subordinated in all matters to the raion-level and village
commandants.
[Yagoda and Berman further detail plans for preparing settlement areas
before the arrival of exiles, and the amounts of money and supplies that
would be necessary to transfer administration from other commissariats
to the OGPU. These include everything from tons of nails (6,929) to
amounts of boarding, numbers of tractors and horses (2,640 and 90,000
respectively), to numbers of train cars needed, to tons of tea (fourteen)
and other food staples, to medical, educational, propaganda, and other
support personnel. Given the amount of preparation time required,
Yagoda estimated that the OGPU could start moving exiles in April of the
year, 1933. In a last section, Yagoda notes the especially dangerous
category of the anticipated exiles, and what that would entail.]
142 Ordering Society

[…]
The composition of those being resettled is more serious in its social
danger than the special settlers of 1930–31. In [the former] contingent is the
declassed urban element and so the command and guard staff of entire re-
settlement will have to be administratively strengthened for a short period.
According to preliminary estimates, there will be needed:
Commandants and deputies: 3,250 individuals
Policemen 5,700
[…]
Rough calculations show that the cost of development for a 2 million
contingent is as follows:
1. Agricultural development, including agricultural construction and or-
ganization of 66 MTS. 325,593 t. r. [thousand rubles, i.e. 325,593,000
rubles]
2. Housing and cultural—sanitary structures. 571,396 t. r.
3. Food commodities for one year. 218,000 t. r.
4. Economic appliances and commercial goods. 63,000 t. r.
5. Livestock fodder. 10,000 t. r.
6. Instruments. 8,000 t. r.
7. Medical services. 34,000 t. r.
8. Transfer from rail stations: to place of resettlement. 165,000 t. r.

Total. 1,394,989 t. r.
[…] in the course of [the first] year, the settlers will have to be supplied
with foodstuffs free of charge.
As a result of the general expenditure to develop the new contingent,
657,000 t. r. will not be returned, and 737,153 t. r. will be reimbursed.
[…]
Deputy head OGPU (Yagoda)
Head of GULAG (Berman)
Yagoda’s proposal was based on the assumption that mass social
cleansing would continue at the pace of the previous two years, but Sta-
lin’s comment on the first page, that such a proposal had to be tied to the
problem of prison overcrowding, referred to a decision already taken to
curtail mass repression operations, reduce the prison population due to
overcrowding, and regulate arrest procedures under judicial supervision.

Depopulating Prisons and the 8 May 1933 Reform

By the spring of 1933, the problem of overcrowded prisons was seri-
ous. Nearly twice as many people were incarcerated than the facilities
were supposed to accommodate. At the same time, as Stalin’s July
 Ordering Society 143

1932 letter to Kaganovich indicated (document 71 above), the

Soviet leader was concerned about the appearance of arbitrary actions
by the political police, and he made it clear to their leaders that they
had to start acting within judicial procedures. By this time, as well,
and as his note on the February 1933 memorandum from Yagoda and
Berman shows (document 77), Stalin was disinclined to increase the
number of special settlements by the number they suggested.
On 8 May 1933, the Politburo issued a decision that tied these con-
cerns together. The directive was a curious document. Its main point
emphasized the need to depopulate the country’s overburdened pris-
ons. In order to alleviate this overcrowding, some prisoners, convicted
of minor violations, were to be released. Most, however, close to half
a million, were to be transferred to a scaled-down version of Yagoda’s
proposed special settlements and penal colonies. Restrictions on and
regulation of OGPU activities seemed almost an afterthought, moti-
vated by concern not for legality, but for reducing the number of peo-
ple in confinement. Moreover, the document called for an end to mass
administrative deportation, but then called for at least 12,000 “house-
holds” to be evicted and exiled.

d o c u m en t
· 78 ·
Directive-instructions of the TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR on cessation
of mass exile of peasants, regulating arrests, and reducing prison
populations. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 196, ll. 163–163ob.12
8 May 1933*

Strictly secret
[…]
Not for publication
To all Party and Soviet workers and all organs of the OGPU, courts,
and Procuracy
The desperate resistance of the kulak class to the collective farm
movement of the working peasants, which developed at the end of 1929,
and took the form of arson and acts of terrorism against collective farm
figures, has created the need for Soviet power to carry out mass arrests
and extreme kinds of repression in the form of mass exile of kulaks and
kulak spongers to northern and remote areas. Further resistance by kulak
elements, wrecking on collective and state farms, uncovered in 1932,
and widely spread mass thefts of collective and state farm property have
144 Ordering Society

demanded the further strengthening of repressive measures against kulak

elements, thieves, and any saboteurs.
Thus, the three last years of our work in the countryside were years of
struggle for the liquidation of the kulak class and for the victory of col-
lective farms.
In this way, these three years of struggle led to the defeat of forces of
our class enemies in the countryside, to the final strengthening of our
Soviet socialist positions in the countryside.
Summing up, we may now say that the position of the independent
farmers economy has already been overcome in all main regions of the
USSR, collective farms have become the universal and dominating form
of economy in the countryside, the collective farm movement has been
strengthened firmly, the full victory of the collective farm system in the
countryside is ensured.
Now the goal is no longer to defend the collective farm form of econ-
omy in its struggle against private forms of economy, for this task was
already resolved successfully. Now the task is to meet the growing thirst
of individual working peasants for collective farms, and to help them to
enter collective farms, the only place where they can save themselves from
the threat of impoverishment and hunger.
TsK and SNK USSR consider that all these circumstances create a new
favorable situation in the countryside, which gives the chance to stop, as
a rule, the application of mass exile and extreme forms of repressions in
the countryside.
[…]
However, demands for mass exile from the countryside and for appli-
cation of extreme forms of repressions continue to arrive from a number
of oblasts. TsK and SNK have received demands from oblasts and krai for
immediate exile of about one hundred thousand families.
TsK and SNK have information showing clearly that our officials con-
tinue the practice of mass chaotic arrests in the countryside. Heads of
collective farms and members of boards of collective farms arrest. Heads
of village soviets and secretaries of [Communist Party] cells arrest. Raion-
level and krai-level plenipotentiaries arrest. Anybody who is not too lazy,
and who, as a matter of fact, has no right to arrest, arrests. It is not sur-
prising that in such a rampage of arrests, the organs having the right to
arrest, including the OGPU organs, and especially the militsiia, lose their
sense of proportion, and often make arrests without any reason, operat-
ing by the rule: arrest first, and then think.
So, what does all this mean?
All this says that in oblasts and krai there are more than a few com-
rades who do not understand the new situation, and who continue to live
in the past.
 Ordering Society 145

All this means that despite the existence of new conditions, which re-
quire a shift in the center of gravity to mass political and organizing
work, these comrades cling to increasingly obsolete forms of work, which
no longer fit the new situation, and create a threat of weakening the
authority of Soviet power in the countryside.
[…]
It would be wrong to think that the existence of new conditions and
the necessity to move to new methods of work means liquidating or even
easing the class struggle in the countryside. On the contrary, class struggle
in the countryside will inevitably become aggravated, since the class
enemy sees that collective farms have won; he sees that the last days of his
existence have come, and in his despair, he cannot but engage in the most
extreme forms of struggle against Soviet power. Therefore, there must be
no talk about easing our struggle against the class enemy. On the con-
trary, our struggle must be in every possible way strengthened; our vigi-
lance must be in every possible way sharpened. So, we are talking of
strengthening our struggle against the class enemy.
But the problem is that it is impossible in the current new conditions to
strengthen the struggle against the class enemy and to liquidate it using
the old methods of work for they, these methods, have become obsolete.
So, we are talking of improving the old ways of struggle, of rationalizing
them and of making our strike more targeted and organized. So, we are
saying, finally, that each of our strikes must be prepared politically in
advance, that each of our strikes must be supported by actions of the
broad masses of peasantry. For only using these ways of improved meth-
ods of our work will we be able to liquidate completely the class enemy
in the countryside.
TsK and SNK do not doubt that all our Party-Soviet and Cheka-judicial
organizations will take into consideration the new situation resulting
from our victories, and respectively, will reconstruct their work accord-
ing to the new conditions of struggle.
TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR decide:
I. Regarding termination of mass deportation of peasants:
To stop immediately any mass deportations of peasants. To allow
deportation only individually and on a small-scale order, and only in relation
to those households the heads of which conduct active struggle against
collective farms and organize nonparticipation in sowing and grain collecting.
To allow exile only from the following oblasts and in the following
limited numbers:

Ukraine 2,000 households

North Caucasus 1,000 households
Lower Volga 1,000 households
Middle Volga 1,000 households
146 Ordering Society

TsChO 1,000 households

Urals 1,000 households
Gorky Krai 500 households
Western Siberia 1,000 households
Eastern Siberia 1,000 households
Belorussia 500 households
Western oblast 500 households
Bashkiria 500 households
Transcaucasia 500 households
Central Asia 500 households
Total 12,000 households
II. Regarding regulation of arrests:

1) To prohibit making arrests by persons who are not given this power
by law: heads of RIKs, plenipotentiaries of raions and krai, heads of
soviets of villages, heads of collective farms and of collective farm
associations, secretaries of cells, and so forth. Arrests may be made
only by organs of the Procuracy, the OGPU, or heads of the militsiia.
Investigators may make arrests only after preliminary sanction of a
prosecutor has been given. Arrests made by heads of militsiia must be
confirmed or canceled by OGPU plenipotentiaries or by the Procu-
racy […] no later than 48 hours after the arrest.
2) To forbid Procuracy, OGPU, and militsiia organs to use imprisonment
before trial [“before trial” written in by Stalin] as a measure of
restraint, for unimportant crimes. Taking into custody before trial
[again written in by Stalin] as a measure of restraint may be used only
in relation to people who are accused of: counterrevolution, acts of
terrorism, wrecking, banditry and robbery, espionage, crossing bor-
ders and smuggling, murder and infliction of severe wounds [“murder
… wounds” written in by Stalin], large-scale theft, professional specu-
lation, speculation in foreign currency, counterfeiters, malicious hoo-
liganism, and professional recidivists.
3) To establish preliminary consent of a prosecutor for making arrests
by the OGPU organs for all cases, except for cases involving acts of
terrorism, explosions, arsons, espionage and deserters, political ban-
ditry, and counterrevolutionary antiparty groupings.

[…]
III. Regarding reduction in the prison population:

1) To establish that the maximum number of people to be held in cus-

tody in jails of NKIust [Commissariat of Justice], OGPU, and the
militsiia, except for camps and colonies, should not exceed 400 thou-
sand people for the entire USSR. To oblige the Procurator of the
 Ordering Society 147

USSR and the OGPU to define limits on numbers of prisoners in in-

dividual republics and oblasts (krai), based on the total number spec-
ified above [“based … above” written in by Stalin], within twenty
days.
To oblige the OGPU, NKIust of republics, and the Procuracy of the
USSR to start immediately reducing prison numbers and to decrease
the total number of those deprived of freedom from 800,000 impris-
oned now, to 400,000 within a two-month [“within … two-month”
written in by Stalin] term.
To give the Procuracy of the USSR responsibility for fulfillment of
this decision.
2) To establish for each jail a maximum number of people to be held,
based on the figure of 400,000 established above.

[…]
[5]b) To transfer those convicted for a term from 3 to 5 years to labor
settlements of the OGPU;
c) To transfer those convicted for a term over 5 years to the camps of
the OGPU.
[…]
To oblige NKIust of republics and Narkomzdravs [Commissariats of
Health] of republics to liquidate completely typhus diseases in jails with-
in a one-month term.
Head of the Council of National Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov
(Skryabin)13
Secretary TsK VKP(b) I. Stalin
Decision accepted by poll of members of the PB 7.V.33.
The 8 May directive supposedly curtailed all activities of the OGPU
administrative sentencing boards, the so-called troikas. This directive,
however, did not end the activities of these boards. Typical of the
Stalinist regime was to enact laws, and then immediately to make
exceptions and, in this case, exceptions that covered most of the coun-
try. As the following directives show, the Politburo no sooner prohib-
ited troikas than it gave permission to these same troikas to operate
in crucial grain areas of the country, or in areas where many deportees
had been relocated. The first of these permissions, granted in March
1933, continued in force even after the 8 May directive.
148 Ordering Society

d o c u m ent
· 79 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). RGASPI,
f. 17, op. 162, d. 14, l. 96.
20 March 1933

To give authority to review cases of insurgency and counterrevolution in

Ukraine, with application of the highest measure of social defense, to the
troika consisting of cc. [B. A.] Balitsky, [K. M.] Karlson, and [I. M.]
Leplevsky.
Analogous permissions were given for Belorussia and, in July, for
the whole of Western and Eastern Siberia. There, the krai-level troikas
were given authority to apply the death sentence extrajudicially in
cases of banditry, especially of gangs “terrorizing” farms and popu-
lated areas.14 The regime did not publicize these kinds of exceptions,
but they gave leaders flexibility to act within legal procedures or to
take extraordinary measures. Such a system also gave Stalin flexibility
to manipulate the tension between the judicial and police organs,
so that neither gained too much power. In the spring of 1933, for
example, deputy OGPU head Agranov issued operational orders to
arrest grain “saboteurs” and send them through the OGPU adminis-
trative sentencing boards. This order elicited a sharp response from
Nikolai Krylenko, then head of the Russian Federation Justice Com-
missariat. As the memo below shows, Krylenko chastised Agranov for
overstepping the legal authority of the OGPU in prosecuting cases. In
his note, Krylenko referred to violations of the recently enacted 8 May
1933 directive from the Politburo. As Krylenko’s memorandum dem-
onstrates, Yagoda paid little attention to the directive.

d o c u m ent
· 80 ·
Memorandum from N. I. Krylenko to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, D. E.
Sulimov, G. G. Yagoda, and A. Ya. Vyshinsky on the illegality of OGPU
instructions. AP RF, f. 3, op. 57, d. 60, l. 55.
14 July 1933

The OGPU, over the signature of c. Agranov, issued an order, No. 00237,
9 July, about cases of grain theft under the 7 August law, as well as under
statutes of the UK [criminal code].
 Ordering Society 149

The text of point 10 reads as follows:

“All cases of grain theft should be processed in a two-week period by
review in judicial troikas under the PP OGPU. Cases demanding the high-
est measure of social defense should be sent for confirmation to the OGPU
Collegium.”

1. Apart from the formal illegality of this decision, given that the OGPU
has no authority to determine the jurisdiction of cases […] the order,
issued without any consultation from the Procuracy or the Commis-
sar of Justice, is completely unrealizable in practice.
The general number of cases under the 7 August law that pass through
courts is counted in the tens of thousands. The number of cases in-
volving the highest measure, which pass only through the RSFSR
Supreme Court, is in the thousands. Given this situation, a more or
less careful hearing is physically impossible in troikas of the PP. And
if it is necessary to struggle against judicial excesses in [the sense of]
simply rubberstamping cases, then we have a complete lack of guar-
antees not to make mistakes in hearings of the extrajudicial troikas.
The same goes for cases involving the highest measure. If 25 members
of the Supreme Court have trouble coping with cases of this category,
then, given the concentration of cases in the OGPU Collegium from
all over the Union, we have an even greater burden and even less of
an ability for review and control.
2. This order completely violates the TsK decision of 8 May on sanc-
tioning arrests by the Procuracy. […] In this redaction, the order
leaves out any possibility for control on the part of the Procuracy,
since any raion-level OGPU representative can answer the demand of
a procurator to sanction an arrest: “I don’t need any [Procuracy]
sanction, I have an OGPU order and for me it is obligatory,” and
from his point of view, he will be correct.
[…]
3. Even more unintelligible is p. 4 which recommends: “Collective
farmers indicted for grain theft, in those cases where they do not or-
ganize thefts, or if the theft they commit is of an insignificant charac-
ter, are not subject to arrest, instead the cases should be transferred
to comrades’ collective farm courts.”15

It is completely unclear: first, who decides the question of sending cas-

es to comrades’ courts—the raiupolnomochennyi OGPU [raion-level
OPGU plenipotentiary]? the head of the militsiia? the [judicial] court? or
the procurator?
Second, these comrades’ courts, far and away, do not exist everywhere,
[and] there is no law governing them. As much as I have tried to push through
a law about them, TsIK USSR has tabled it as “premature,” although these
courts now number 25,000.
150 Ordering Society

[…]
On these grounds, I suggest it as expedient to: 1) Rework the order, 2)
Recommend that the OGPU together with the USSR Procurator deter-
mine a more precise designation, which cases to send through extrajudi-
cial channels.
[…]
(N. Krylenko)
In this instance, Krylenko won his point. The issues he raised
reached the level of Politburo discussion, and on 14 July, Yagoda is-
sued an emendation of the original order, in accordance with the new
statutes regarding jurisdiction and police authority. Still, this was but
one case in a constant struggle over jurisdiction between police and
judicial review agencies. It was a tension that Stalin adjudicated many
times, but never resolved, and most likely did not wish to resolve.

To Count and to Cleanse

Yagoda’s plan from February for new settlements was ambitious, but
in April, the Politburo limited the number of deportees to a target
figure of slightly less than 500,000 by the end of 1933, and much of
this target was to be fulfilled by the transfer of hundreds of thousands
of people from prisons to special settlements.16 Still, such a reduction
did not idle the police, and neither did the 8 May directive. While
mass police operations tapered off in rural areas, police turned their
attention to the growing problems of urban in migration. Concerned
about the influx of “antisocial” and “anti-Soviet” migrants to cities
from the countryside, the Politburo and then Sovnarkom inaugurated
a system of residence registration and identity cards, or internal
passports. These were to be issued to citizens in key cities at first, and
then eventually to residents in all urban, border, and other strategic
areas, in sovkhozes (farms in which farmers were salaried workers),
and in some collective farm areas close to cities. The passport system
was to be administered mainly by the civil police, but under supervi-
sion of the OGPU. To this end, in December 1932, a national police
administration was formed, the Chief Administration of Worker’s
and Peasants’ Police, the GURKM, and placed both operationally and
administratively under control of the OGPU. In accordance with the
distribution of the new passport, the combined police mounted op-
erations to clear cities of “socially harmful elements,” that is, people
who did not have official residence, or engage in “productive” work,
in the cities. Socially harmful elements were either sent to special
 Ordering Society 151

settlements, or allowed to settle in cities and areas of lesser impor-

tance than those designated as strategic or privileged “regime areas.”
Regime areas included the major centers of the country, special in-
dustrial zones, and places close to borders or government and Party
resort areas. In major cities, such as Moscow and Leningrad, initial
social cleansing operations were undertaken by the political police,
and were conducted by both civil and political police on a periodic
basis throughout the middle years of the 1930s. Instituted, originally,
as a means to cleanse cities (the urban equivalent of dekulakization),
passport checks and sweep operations soon became a major instru-
ment in the struggle against petty criminals, unwanted or undocu-
mented populations such as gypsies, suspect ethnic populations, espe-
cially those near the country’s western borders, and those committing
economic crimes, especially “speculators” and thieves. As the police
geared up to issue passports, they began to make lists to pinpoint and
monitor anti-Soviet and socially dangerous “elements,” and rid cities
of these groups.

d o c u m en t
· 81 ·
OGPU circular on organizational and operational measures in
connection with passportization. GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 137,
document 46 (l. 200).
21 May 1933

Absolutely secret
Moscow
To all PP OGPU and head of GPU Yakutsk ASSR
By the decision of SNK from 28/IV this year, no. 861, the RK militsiia
has responsibility to carry out passportization. To ensure successful com-
pletion of this task, you are requested:

1. To provide aid and supervision [to the militsiia] in developing

organizational-political preparations for the [passportization] cam-
paign through information from leading Party, Soviet, and profes-
sional organizations.
2. To provide assistance to your police assistants in setting up the pass-
port department apparatus (of the central offices) using Chekist cadres
and special accounting staff, and in mobilizing Party forces for work at
passport [distribution] points.
152 Ordering Society

3. To prepare and process registration material for the PP of the

socially alien and parasite element.
4. To provide agent and open monitoring of the work of passport
points, not permitting deviations, and eliminating organizational
defects.
5. If, during passportization, there is mass saturation in some enter-
prises and institutions by socially alien and parasite elements, to sug-
gest to local Party and Soviet leaders to fire the socially alien elements
from the enterprises and institutions (not rescinding passports and
the right of residence in that population center).
6. During passportization within the 100 km strip along the western
European border of the Union (according to the special regime estab-
lished for Moscow and other cities) to involve the operational staff
of the UPO [border forces].

Deputy head OPGU, Prokof’ev.

As early as January, OGPU offices in major cities such as Moscow
and Leningrad already began plans, in conjunction with passportiza-
tion, to “cleanse” (ochistit’) the streets and districts of undesirable
“elements.”

d o c u m ent
· 82 ·
OGPU Order No. 009. On Chekist measures to introduce the
passport system. GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 137, doc.1.
5 January 1933

In accordance with the decision of the government, 27.XII.32, “On intro-

duction of the passport system,” and with the goal to cleanse the city of
Moscow of counterrevolutionary, kulak, criminal, and other anti-Soviet
elements, I order:
All Moscow Oblast OGPU departments, administrations, and special
plenipotentiaries to pay special attention to conducting operations for
cleansing the city of Moscow of [the above] indicated elements.
Operational departments of the OGPU and PP OGPU of Moscow
Oblast are to develop, verify, and centralize material on all persons subject
to expulsion from Moscow. All administrations and departments of the
OGPU, PP OGPU MO [Moscow Oblast], and the Moscow RKM [milit-
siia] administration are to present, in the suggested form, lists of counter-
revolutionary, kulak, criminal, and other anti-Soviet elements that have
been processed through operational materials (narrative reports, official
 Ordering Society 153

forms, agent notes, and catalog information) by 8.1.33 to the OGPU and
PP MO administrations and departments, and by 13.1.33 to RKM admin-
istration.
By the same date, present to the Operational department of OGPU and
PP OGPU MO special lists of persons, enumerated in p. 3 above, who are
to be allowed to remain in Moscow for operational reasons (agents, per-
sons under current operational observation, etc.). In the lists include only
persons who are actually necessary for ongoing operational work, mak-
ing your task the maximum liberation (and expulsion from Moscow) of
[those of] little [operational] value, those who are incapable of [opera-
tional] work, and those unqualified for agent exploitation.
[…]
Realizing that, as a result of introducing passports, a number of people,
who are on OGPU secret surveillance lists (former White officers, police,
Party members, etc.) will leave Moscow, it is necessary to obtain their
surveillance information and relay to [OGPU organs in] their new place
of residence.
G. Prokof’ev, deputy head, OGPU

Kartoteki
Point three of document 81, above, is especially interesting, for it
marked the first systematic attempt on a national scale to create card
catalog lists, the infamous kartoteki, of socially and ethnically suspect
populations. The passport system in general, and passport catalogs
specifically, though at first inaccurate and poorly maintained, none-
theless gave police an increasingly precise source of information, a
social-geographic map of the population. These catalogs told police
who lived where, the social makeup of the population, where socially
suspect groups were concentrated, and they provided information
about migration trends, work, and other demographic patterns. The
passport system, more than any other form of surveillance, trans-
formed the OGPU from a political and revolutionary fighting
organ into the state’s primary organ of mass social surveillance and
control.
Control over the passport system, and measures of repression as-
sociated with it, also changed the relationship of the OGPU to Soviet
citizens. The task of identifying citizens and aliens was new to the
police. During the 1920s, identification of aliens fell under the juris-
diction of local soviet officials, derived from the control these officials
exercised over election and disenfranchisement laws.17 During the
1920s, civil and political police enforced laws of inclusion and exclu-
154 Ordering Society

sion, but police did not decide who was a loyal citizen and who a
social alien. Those decisions were made by local communities and
local Party and government officials. In Stalin’s militarized state, and
under the 1933 passport laws, identification and adjudication of
aliens and suspect populations was transferred from the jurisdiction
of local civic government to the purview of the police. It was the police
who wrote identities into passports, based on whatever documents
people presented, and whatever information police had at hand. As a
result, the assignment of citizenship and social place passed from civ-
ic into police hands. Social engineering that had involved whole com-
munities and was centered in civil government was replaced by a bu-
reaucratized system of police repression, administered largely under
secret orders, and with little possibility of citizen interaction and re-
dress.
The police’s catalog system expanded rapidly, which also meant an
exponential increase in information available to them about the pop-
ulation. By August of 1934, about one year after the start of passpor-
tization, over 27 million people had been registered for passports in
the Russian republic alone. And police not only gathered information,
they acted on it, using passportization as a mechanism to clear cities,
industrial areas, and border zones of undesirables. During the two
months of initial passportization, the population of Moscow, approx-
imately 3.6 million, declined by 65,000. The population of the Mag-
nitogorsk metallurgical complex and city dropped from 250,000 to
less than 215,000. Population along the Eastern Siberian border
dropped by 10 percent, and by 1–2 percent along the western border
zones.18
In the Russian republic, about 390,000 people were refused pass-
ports, about 3.3 percent of the population that was eligible to receive
them. The problem of what to do with all these people prompted
Yagoda to issue the following guidelines about whom and how to
punish.
 Ordering Society 155

d o c u m en t
· 83 ·
OGPU circular on the use of measures of extrajudicial repression in
relation to citizens violating the law on passportization of the population.
GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 137, ll. 202–4.
13 August 1933

Absolutely secret
Moscow
To PP and prosecutors supervising the PP OGPU

1. In conformity with the Statute of the Special Sentencing Board

[Osoboe Soveshchanie] to establish measures of extrajudicial repres-
sion in relation to the following categories of people:
a) Those who refused to move voluntarily out of the areas where
they are prohibited to live, because they were refused a passport;
Those who returned, after being ejected, to the areas where they
were prohibited to live, and
b) Those, who, after they were refused a passport, arrived for resi-
dence in areas in which passportization of the population was
carried out according to the instruction of the SNK USSR from
14/1-33 (regime areas) […]
2. To organize for this purpose special troikas of the PP OGPU consist-
ing of: chairman—deputy PP OGPU for militsiia, and members—
chief of the passport department, and chief of Operod [Operational
department] PP OGPU.

[…]
7. Troikas will consider cases according to lists submitted by the
departments of the RK militsiia. These lists are to be submitted through
passport offices of departments of the RK militsiia of the autonomous
republics or of krai and oblasts.
Lists are to be made according to the following form: a) number; b) last
name, first name, middle name; c) age; d) social status; e) brief character-
istic of a person; f) (when necessary)—[number of the paragraph] of
the SNK [passport] directive, according to which a person was refused a
passport.
[…]
In relation to the persons mentioned in point 1, troikas are to choose
measures of extrajudicial repression according to the exemplary table
below, with variations depending on one or several conditions.
156 Ordering Society

Categories of people Measures of repression

Persons not employed in institutions Minus 30 [km]—prohibition to live in

and enterprises, “rolling stones,” and areas where passportization was carried
disorganizers of production out according to the instruction of SNK
USSR from 14/1-33 [regime areas]. In
case of a second violation—up to three
years in trudpos [special labor settle-
ments].
Lishentsy Transfer to special settlements for up to
[deprived of civil rights], kulaks, and three years.
dekulakized
Served some term of imprisonment, Transfer to special settlements for up to
exile, or deportation three years; in cases of previous
detentions—up to three years in camps,
except for those who support family
members—labor settlements for up to
three years.
Criminal and other antisocial element Transfer to camps for up to three years.
[Minus 30 = prohibition on living within 30 kilometers of a regime area]

[…]
Deputy Head of the OGPU G. Yagoda
OGPU Prosecutor Katanyan

More Social Cleansing

Despite passportization and associated operations, officials still
regarded levels of criminality as unacceptably high, especially in such
cities as Moscow. As a result, the regime’s leaders issued even harsher
measures of repression, first in the capital, and then in other selected
cities. Such campaigns were also motivated by leaders’ concerns, Sta-
lin in particular, that continued illegal economic activity threatened
the ability of collective farms to establish themselves against private
competition. Still sensitive to the 8 May directive, however, leaders
urged police not to engage in mass sweeps, but as in the case of Khar-
kov (document 86), to conduct operations in more discreet ways. The
first order, against speculators, was initiated by Stalin.
 Ordering Society 157

d o c u m en t
· 84 ·
Memorandum from G. E. Prokof’ev and L. G. Mironov to I. V. Stalin on the
number of those “detained” [privod] for speculation, as of 1 April, by OGPU
organs. AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 171, l. 90.

[Note in text: “My archive. I. Stalin”]

2 April 1933
Secret
The total number of those brought in for speculation, as of 1 April, by
OGPU organs comprises 54,370 persons.
Of the total number brought in for theft, 32,340 persons were con-
victed by courts and OGPU organs (OGPU Collegium and PP OGPU
troikas).
16,636 individuals were convicted by OGPU organs. These are subdi-
vided according to type of punishment:
5–10 years in camps 7,124
Less than 5 years 9,512
Total 16,636
By social composition, those convicted by OGPU organs are subdi-
vided as follows:
Former traders, speculators, kulaks 13,364
Administrative employees, collective farmers,
independent farmers, and other workers 2,655
Others 617
Total 16,636
In all, from 15 March to 1 April, 1,350 individuals have been arrested
by OGPU organs.
Deputy head OGPU, Prokof’ev
Head EKO, Mironov

d o c u m en t
· 85 ·
Decision of the Politburo TsK VKP(b). On the struggle against criminal and
déclassé elements in the city of Moscow. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 15, l. 161.
20 January 1934

1. For all participants in armed robbery, apply the highest measure of

punishment.
158 Ordering Society

2. For all persons who have two or more convictions in the last year for
theft, as well as for those who have been detained19 two or more
times for hooliganism, exile from Moscow and [Moscow] oblast to a
distant place, according to instructions by the OGPU Collegium.
3. In relation to the begging and declassed element, apply expulsion to
the place of residence, to special settlements, or to a kontslager [con-
centration camp].

d o c u m ent
· 86 ·
Decision of the Politburo TsK VKB(b). On deportation from
Kharkov Oblast of the déclassé element. RGASPI, f. 17,
op. 162, d. 15, l. 164.
20 January 1934

a) To allow the Kharkov Obkom to deport from Kharkov Oblast to

labor colonies and camps 2,000 people of the déclassé element.
B) To carry out the deportation through the OGPU, gradually, in small
parties of 80–100 people, during the months of January, February,
and March.

Political police also continued social order policing on the country’s

railroads.

d o c u m ent
· 87 ·
Decision of the Politburo TsK VKP(b). On measures of struggle
against hooliganism and train wrecks on railroads. RGASPI,
f. 17, op. 3, d. 946, l. 65.
9 June 1934

Due to the increasing number of train crashes, provoked by subversive

acts and hooliganism on railroads […], SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) have
decided:

1. To require the TO OGPU, on the basis of existing agent material, and

in the course of ten days, to remove professional hooligans, crimi-
 Ordering Society 159

nals, and orphan children from all railroad lands and zones of exclu-
sion along railroads.
2. To grant authority to the OGPU to imprison in concentration camps
for a period of 6 months to 3 years malicious hooligans who interfere
with orderly movement on railroads, who damage railroad property,
who terrorize railroad personnel and passengers, and to imprison
orphan children who hooliganize on railroads in special camps.
3. To require NKPS railroad guards to strengthen the struggle against
the hooligan element and against orphan children, to establish or-
derly boarding of trains, not to allow riding on the train cattle guards,
car platforms, and car roofs.
4. To require OGPU organs to arrest and imprison in concentration
camps for a period of 6 months all persons riding on freight trains
without special permission of station heads.

[…]
7. To require TO OGPU organs to organize stringent adherence to
rules for living in railroad exclusion zones.

Reorganization
As police activities expanded, and as jurisdictional issues became more
complicated, the Politburo initiated a discussion about the reorganiza-
tion of the OGPU. In February and then March 1934, as part of that
discussion, USSR Chief Prosecutor A. I. Akulov and Justice Commissar
Krylenko urged an end to the administrative sentencing boards of the
OGPU, especially since they dealt with cases much beyond the OGPU’s
jurisdiction. Krylenko recommended that this jurisdiction be returned
to what it was in 1922, limited only to cases of espionage and direct
political opposition. Yagoda sought to maintain as broad a jurisdiction
as possible, but the Politburo, and even Stalin, intervened to limit the
administrative sentencing authority of the political police to the Oso-
boe soveshchanie, the OGPU special sentencing board, as outlined in
the 8 May 1933 directive. Still, the outcome of reorganization was not
a disappointment for Yagoda and the police. Formation of an all-union
commissariat of internal affairs, the Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutren-
nykh Del, or NKVD, in July 1934 consolidated political police power
as the chief agency in a federal-level organ that encompassed all polic-
ing and carceral functions. The militsiia, the labor camps and special
settlements administration, and even the firefighting administration
were subordinated to Yagoda and to the political police.
160 Ordering Society

Along with reorganization came a new name for the political police,
the Glavnoe upravlenie gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, the Chief Ad-
ministration of State Security, or GUGB. The change of name denoted
a subtle but important shift in function, from a political administra-
tion to a state security organization. The GUGB was, from 1934, no
longer a policing force for struggle against political opposition, but an
organ formally charged with the protection of the state and its inter-
ests. From this moment, the task of the security force was to preserve
and protect the revolutionary gains of the state rather than to spear-
head further revolutionary changes. Struggle against political opposi-
tion was still one of the main tasks of the GUGB, but that agency now
defined itself not only as the “fighting arm of the Party,” but as the
guarantor of the Soviet state and Soviet order, at least the Stalinist
version of it. The basic tasks of the new commissariat reflected this
shift and were outlined in a draft statement from August 1934. The
first task was the protection of revolutionary order.

d o c u m ent
· 88 ·
Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin requesting confirmation
of the statute of the NKVD USSR and the Special Board. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 4, ll. 60–77.
24 August 1934

Herewith, I am distributing a draft of the statute for an All Union Com-

missariat of the Interior.
Peoples Commissar of Internal Affairs USSR, Yagoda.
Draft […]
The basic tasks of the Peoples Commissariat of the Interior are:

a). Securing revolutionary order and state security in all territories of the
Union of SSR;
b). Protection of personal and property security of citizens;
c). Protection of the state borders of the Union of SSR;
d). Protection of social (socialist) property;
e). Registration of civil acts;
f). Fulfillment of special tasks of the government of the Union of SSR.20

[…]
 Ordering Society 161

Cleansing Borders, Again

As the guarantor of Soviet order, the OGPU and then the NKVD con-
tinued to engage in civil policing tasks. Indeed, the next two years,
1935 and 1936, brought new campaigns of social order policing. As in
1933 and 1934, many of these campaigns were associated with pass-
portization and public order, especially with the renewal and exchange
of passports originally issued in 1933. During the two middle years of
the decade, police campaigns against social marginals intensified as the
newly formed NKVD widened and systematized campaigns of “social
defense” against indigents, displaced peasants, and illegal urban resi-
dents. The country’s political leaders also applied campaigns of mass
police repression against suspect ethnic populations. Leaders and po-
lice gave special attention to the western border regions, particularly
the Polish-Ukrainian border. As the following documents show, Polit-
buro leaders gave the political police full authority to cleanse these
border regions of what were described as “Polish” and “German” in-
habitants, and to replace them with “loyal” Ukrainian populations.
One raion, Markhlevsk, proved so “saturated” with anti-Soviet ele-
ments that local authorities requested police to cleanse it twice in the
course of a year.

d o c u m en t
· 89 ·
Report from St. Kosior to I. V. Stalin on strengthening border zones. AP RF, f.
3, op. 58, d. 130, ll. 162–66.
23 December 1934

In response to the directive of the TsK VKP(b) concerning Kamenets-

Podolsk and strengthening all border areas of Ukraine, in the first place
11 specially selected border regions [polosy],—TsK KP(b)U has taken the
following major measures:
[…]
2. Work has been carried out reviewing and strengthening staffs of the
heads of the raion-level NKVD departments [and] inspectors. […]
Only four raion-level heads were retained, and 7 raion-level heads
were replaced by stronger workers.
[…]
162 Ordering Society

4. Measures have been outlined for the cleansing of border regions of

the unreliable and anti-Soviet element, in the first place, in all raions
and villages with Polish and German populations, namely:
a) Cleansing by the NKVD of border regions of anti-Soviet ele-
ments, and deporting them to the North (approximately, 2,000
households).
b) Resettling unreliable elements of independent farmers, and also
some collective farmers from border regions, to the eastern dis-
tricts of Ukraine, in total about 8–9 thousand households. Areas
and villages will be cleansed especially carefully that are occu-
pied by Poles and Germans, in the first place, all the villages lo-
cated close to [military] points in fortified raions, and other
structures of strategic importance (railroad hubs, bridges etc.).
5. Recruitment is planned of 4,000 households from among the best col-
lective farmers and activists of the Kiev and Chernigov oblasts (where
conditions are most similar to a border area) for the strengthening of
the border area and for replacing those deported deeper into Ukraine.
As well, we have [submitted] a request to the TsK VKP(b) to move to
the frontier areas 2,000 demobilized soldiers of the Red Army in 1935.
6. For practical implementation of points 4 and 5, we have planned:
a) to send 11 troikas, led by members of the TsK KP(b)U, consisting
of representatives of the NKVD and military commanders, to 24
border raions. On the one hand, these troikas should work up
numbers and lists of people to be exiled by the NKVD to the North,
and, on the other hand, should draw up lists of villages and num-
bers of households to be resettled from border raions. Plans are to
send troikas to each of the three most complicated raions:
Markhlevsk and Novograd-Volynsk raions—with a dense Polish
population, and to Pulin—with German and Polish populations.
b) 20 high-ranking officers were sent to the raions of Staroselshchina
and Dnepropetrovsk, to Kharkov Oblast, and to the eastern part
of Odesshchina [the Odessa area], to determine the number of
households that can be moved to these areas, and what measures
are required in preparation for this resettlement.
Along with these main actions, we have been carrying out the follow-
ing measures:

7. Since, in the past, Polish soviets were created in a number of villages

where the majority of the population is non-Polish, now 18 such Pol-
ish village soviets in Vinnytsa Oblast have been reorganized into
Ukrainian [soviets], and in the Kiev raion—7 Polish village soviets.
Review continues for the purpose of further reorganization. Since a
 Ordering Society 163

number of Polish schools were artificially created in a number of

villages whose native language is Ukrainian, we now have been reor-
ganizing these schools. Across Vinnytsa Oblast, 135 out of 291 Polish
schools were completely reorganized or merged with existing
Ukrainian schools.

[…]

d o c u m en t
· 90 ·
Report from P. P. Postyshev to I. V. Stalin on the need to resettle
counterrevolutionary elements. AP RF f. 3, op. 58, d. 131, ll. 106–7.
31 July 1935

The Markhlevsk (border) Raion of Kiev Oblast, which has been consid-
ered a national Polish area, has been an area most saturated by anti-
Soviet and counterrevolutionary elements.
In the spring of 1935, according to the decision of TsK VKP(b) 1,188
households of anti-Soviet and unreliable elements were exiled to remote
places in the Union, and moved to raions of Ukraine remote from the
border; 745 households, made up of reliable Ukrainian collective farm-
ers, shock workers selected from the southern districts of Kiev Oblast,
were moved into the Markhlevsk Raion, for the purpose of border
strengthening.
These actions yielded considerable results for the strengthening of
Markhlevsk Raion. However, spring resettlement and deportations out-
side the borders of Ukraine did not give a complete result, since the num-
ber of households [slated] for deportation and resettlement out of
Markhlevsk Raion for spring was limited. In eleven village soviets of the
Markhlevsk Raion, resettlement and deportation was not done at all. In
the Markhlevsk Raion, there still is a large number of former members of
gangs, White armies, Polish Legionnaries, former smugglers, persons hav-
ing connections with previously uncovered espionage organizations, for-
mer kulaks, and dekulakized Polish nationalist elements.
Additional study of 20 settlements by the NKVD revealed 350 house-
holds, of which 300 households must be resettled to other oblasts of
Ukraine, and 50 households to be deported to the North. Among these
350 households are those with the following social and political back-
grounds: former kulaks and dekulakized—129, former noblemen—14,
bandits and participants of White armies and Polish Legionaries—75,
former smugglers—45, suspected of espionage—37.
164 Ordering Society

The Obkom and Oblispolkom are asking the TsK VKP(b):

In addition to those already resettled in the spring of this year, to allow
resettlement of 300 households of hostile and unreliable elements outside
of Markhlevsk Raion to other areas of Ukraine, and to deport outside the
borders of Ukraine to the North 50 households of the most dangerous
anti-Soviet elements.
To allow resettlement and deportation in the same order as last spring,
which was established by the decision of TsK VKP(b)U from 23.1.1935,
and also to allow deportation from Markhlevsk Raion, family members
to [join] their heads, who earlier were convicted and exiled for active anti-
Soviet and harmful activities.
Head of Kiev Oblispolkom [Executive Committee of the Kiev Oblast
soviet]
Vasilenko
Secretary of Kiev Obkom KPU [Communist Party of Ukraine]
Postyshev

Order 00192
Policing agencies were not weakened by reforms and reorganization in
1934. To the contrary, through colonization of social policies, the com-
bined police organs in the NKVD continued to grow in power and
jurisdictional authority. Even the ban against use of troikas, instituted
in summer 1934, lasted only a few months. As in spring and summer
of 1933, the Politburo sanctioned the renewed formation of political
police troikas in large areas of the country. In August 1934, despite
continued debate over the activities and authority of the NKVD,
Yagoda urged approval of the activities of the Osoboe soveshchanie,
since, as he wrote, “operations to cleanse cities and transport of so-
cially harmful elements are causing a large backlog of people who have
been arrested, and of cases that need to be reviewed.”21 In early Janu-
ary 1935, Yagoda and Andrei Vyshinsky, by then the procurator gen-
eral of the USSR, gave instructions to reestablish special troikas to
handle cases of passport violations by “criminal and déclassé ele-
ments.” In 1935, as in 1933, during initial passport campaigns and
operations against social harmfuls, the country’s underdeveloped court
system could not handle the crush of cases that passed through it. The
attempt to pass from administrative to judicial repression broke down.
Troikas were once again necessary to handle the overwhelming num-
ber of passport violations associated with passport exchange and
the continuing purge of urban areas. The January special order from
Yagoda and Vyshinsky sanctioned special “police boards” (militseiskie
 Ordering Society 165

troiki) similar in makeup and function to the recently disbanded OGPU

passport troikas. In the letter, below, to Stalin from 20 April, Vyshin-
sky explained that the formation of these troikas had been necessary
due to the significantly large number of passport cases of socially
harmful elements. These cases had clogged the judicial system and the
NKVD special sentencing board, the Osoboe soveshchanie. They had
led to overcrowding of preliminary holding cells and the consequent
violation of Soviet law for holding individuals without indictment.
Vyshinsky was writing to Stalin for approval of a draft Central Com-
mittee directive that would give approval to the continuation of these
troikas, as well as permission for operations that would “achieve the
quickest cleansing (bystreishaia ochistka) of cities of criminal and
déclassé elements.” As the letter shows, Stalin approved the use of the
troikas, but with a handwritten note not to engage in social cleansing
operations with “excessive administrative enthusiasm.”

d o c u m en t
· 91 ·
Note from G. G. Yagoda and A. Ya. Vyshinsky to Stalin. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d.
158, l. 150.22
20 April 1935

Absolutely secret
To the Secretary of the TsK VKP(b) c. Stalin I. V.
To the Head of SNK USSR c. Molotov V. M.
For the purpose of the most rapid purging of cities that fall
under p[aragraph] 10 of the passportization law23 from criminal and
déclassé elements, and from malicious violators of the Passport Statute,
on 10 December Narkomvnudel [NKVD] and the Procuracy of the USSR
issued a directive about creation of special troikas in localities for resolv-
ing cases of this category.
This decision was dictated by the very significant number of those de-
tained under these kinds of cases, and reviewing these cases in Moscow,
at the Special Board [Osoboe Soveshchanie], resulted in extreme delays
in reviewing these cases, and in overcrowding of preliminary detention
centers.
Considering it expedient to organize such troikas in localities for pre-
liminary review of cases of the above mentioned categories, with final
confirmation by the Special Board, we request approval of the attached
draft of the decision.
166 Ordering Society

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR G. Yagoda

Prosecutor of the USSR A. Vyshinsky
20 April 1935
Stalin approved the recommendation, but with a handwritten note
across text: “A ‘most rapid’ purging is dangerous. Need to purge
gradually and fundamentally, without shocks and excessive adminis-
trative enthusiasm. It would be good to define a year-long period to
complete the purge. With the rest—I agree.”
Having Stalin’s approval, Yagoda issued NKVD Operational Order
00192 on 9 May 1935.

d o c u m ent
· 92 ·
NKVD Order 00192. Instructions to NKVD troikas for reviewing cases of
criminals and déclassé elements, and on malicious violations of passport laws.
GARF, f. 8131, op. 38, d. 6, ll. 62–64.
9 May 1935

Secret
1. Troikas are to be organized for preliminary review of cases involving
criminal and déclassé elements, and also persons maliciously violat-
ing passport laws, consisting of the chairman or head of
the NKVD or his deputy, and members: head of the RKM and head
of the corresponding department that enforces passport laws.
2. Cases to be reviewed:
a. Individuals convicted or who have been detained [privod] for
statutory crimes, and those who have not yet severed ties with
the criminal world;
b. Individuals who have no previous judicial convictions, but en-
gage in no socially useful work, having no defined residence, and
with ties to the criminal world;
c. Professional beggars;
d. Malicious violators of the passport regime, specifically: individu-
als who refuse willingly to leave a locality, individuals who re-
turn to localities in which they are forbidden to live […].
3. In cases where troikas review passport violations, [said] troikas are
required to confirm the correctness and basis for depriving a citizen
of the right to live in a given regime locality. For this purpose, police
are required to secure the following information:
 Ordering Society 167

a. When, by whom, and on what basis was the violator forbidden

to live in a given regime locality.
b. Who obtained the signed affidavit of the violator to leave the
regime zone, when [was the affidavit obtained], and an explana-
tion of why the violator did not then leave.
4. In forwarding to troikas cases of persons under §2 above, police are
to provide the following material:
a. Statement about the reason for apprehension.
b. Certificate of conviction or police registry.
c. Investigative material, i.e. protocols of interrogations, witnesses,
and material evidence, if available.
d. Short statement of indictment.
5. The accused must be present at any hearing. In each case, write a
protocol of who is in attendance, a short explanation of when and
where apprehended, and where held. In the indictment, instruct what
kind of administrative measures are recommended and for how long.
6. Troika are required to review cases within 10 days of arrest. If a
longer [period is needed], [this] must be granted by the corresponding
UNKVD head.
7. Decisions of troikas, if there are no protests, are to be carried out
immediately. A protocol is to go to the NKVD Special Board for
approval.
8. Removal of the criminal and déclassé element, and passport regime
violators, should be carried out without excessive haste, so as to
avoid mass operations and campaigns. In reviewing cases, troikas are
to study attentively all conditions and circumstances of each case, in
light of instructions of SNK and TsK from 8 May 1933.

Signed Yagoda and Vyshinsky

There was no clearer example of how the political police conflated
social order policing with state security than a speech by Yagoda
to civil police heads in 1935, in which he claimed that “For us, the
highest honor is in the struggle against counterrevolution. But in the
current situation—a hooligan, a robber, a bandit—is he not the real
counterrevolutionary? In our country … where the construction of
socialism has been victorious … any criminal act, by its nature, is
nothing other than an expression of class struggle.”24 In one of his first
directives as head of the newly reorganized political police, in August
of 1934, Yagoda emphasized similar priorities, especially protection
of state property, as the foremost concern for operational and territo-
rial organs in the struggle against counterrevolution.25
168 Ordering Society

Homeless Children
Yagoda maintained this emphasis in his operational administration of
the political police. Throughout the mid-1930s, as the documents
above show, the OGPU and then the GUGB usurped control over a
number of functions that normally belonged to the state’s agencies of
social welfare and civil administration, and this was especially true of
the system of orphan children’s homes and detention centers. The
sheer numbers of homeless children (besprizorniki) and unsupervised
children (beznadzorniki) during the early and mid-1930s created
problems of social stability, as did the threat to order that resulted
from the connections between homelessness and crime. Because of the
social upheavals of the early 1930s, the population of homeless and
unsupervised children in the Russian republic alone jumped dramati-
cally from a low of 129,000 in 1929 to a peak of 400,000 in the late
months of 1933, and these were only the children who were counted
as they passed through children’s homes or temporary gathering
centers. These figures excluded Kazakhstan, for example, which had
a population of around 43,000 homeless children in 1933 and 68,000
in 1934, and Ukraine, where, according to a Sovnarkom report, chil-
dren’s homes counted about 228,000 inmates in 1933.26 In the whole
of the USSR there existed well over half a million homeless children
during the middle years of the 1930s.
Originally, care for homeless children in special centers, or
children’s homes, fell under jurisdiction of Narkompros and Nar-
komzdrav (the health and education commissariats). By spring 1935,
however, harsh new laws gave the NKVD control over most of
the homeless centers in the country, and also the authority to round
up orphaned children and send them either to special colonies or to
detention centers or even to camps or special settlements, or to re-
mand them for prosecution. Yagoda reported that territorial and
railroad police detained nearly 160,000 homeless or unsupervised
children in the second half of 1935 as a result of sweep campaigns. Of
these, 62,000 were sent to NKVD colonies, while another 74,000
were returned to parents or relatives. Narkompros or Narkomzdrav
homes received 13,700 children, and according to Yagoda, the rest—
about 10,000—were arrested, charged with crimes, and given over to
courts for trial.27
As with passport and other campaign operations, NKVD assess-
ments of results differed considerably from figures given by other
agencies. Yet, despite discrepancies, there was no doubt about the
 Ordering Society 169

dramatically increased role played by the NKVD in dealing with the

problem of street children. Various reports noted the large shift in
administration of placement centers from Narkompros to the NKVD.
In addition to increased police involvement in rounding up and dis-
posing of children, Yagoda reported that by June 1935, 260 children’s
centers had changed hands from Health and Education administra-
tion to NKVD control. This meant that a population of 23,000 chil-
dren living in these centers suddenly found themselves under police
jurisdiction instead of under the administration of social welfare agen-
cies.28 This was in addition to 22,000 children in centers or colonies
already run by the NKVD. In all, some 325,000 children were taken
off the streets in the two years between spring 1935 and August
1937.29 Given this kind of numbers, there is no doubt that social order
policing was one of the major priorities of the state’s security police
during the mid-1930s, whether as the OGPU or as the GUGB.
Despite similarities, however, the Soviet state security organ, the
GUGB, looked very different from its predecessor, the OGPU. In
1925, the OGPU operated on a shoestring budget of 45 to 50 million
rubles. By 1936, the GUGB dominated an entire state commissariat,
the NKVD, and ruled over an empire worth hundreds of millions of
rubles. During the 1920s, the OGPU functioned as a political police,
to protect the ruling Bolshevik Party from its perceived enemies. By
the mid-1930s, the GUGB had expanded its jurisdiction to encompass
even issues and problems that normally fell to other state social agen-
cies. Through the passport system and its various catalog registries,
the GUGB could monitor nearly the entire Soviet population, not just
criminals and supposed oppositionists. The political police did not
create the social identities that were written into passports, but it was
the agency, along with the civil police, responsible for ascribing, or
allocating, those identities to each citizen. Those identities determined
where citizens could live and work, and as a result, the GUGB, more
than any other single institution except the Politburo, determined the
social-geographic makeup of Soviet socialism. By the mid-1930s, the
OGPU had grown from being the “fighting arm of the Party” to being
the oft-remarked-on state within the state.
 chapter five

The Great Purges

1935–1939

I
n December 1934, Leonid Nikolaev, a disgruntled former Party
member, shot and killed Sergei Kirov, the head of the Leningrad
Party organization. Nikolaev shot Kirov inside the Party head-
quarters building. Remarkably, he entered the building without chal-
lenge, carrying a concealed gun. The breach in security was bad
enough, and the assassination shocked Stalin and other leaders—that
a Party official so high up, in fact, a close confidant of Stalin, could
be so vulnerable, shot dead by a single individual inside one of the
country’s centers of power.
What Stalin may or may not have thought about Nikolaev’s motives
is unclear, but officially, he left no doubt from the beginning that the
murder could only have happened as the result of a carefully orches-
trated plot to exterminate the Party’s leaders. As a result, and at Stalin’s
insistence, Kirov’s murder set in motion an ever-widening cycle of in-
vestigations, accusations, trials, and executions that eventually terror-
ized every institution and touched every corner of Soviet society. No
one was immune: not the police who conducted the investigations, not
the Party, not the military high command, not even symphony orches-
tras, educators, scientists, economic managers, not even peasants or
workers, or any of their families or acquaintances or distant relatives.
In the end, the mounting number of investigations of plots, secret orga-
nizations, and conspiracies caused leaders, and police, to see the omni-
present hand of Leon Trotsky, Stalin’s exiled nemesis, numerous foreign
agents and governments, and the Old Bolshevik, and anti-Stalinist
Party leaders, Grigorii Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev. These, and their
agents and spies, supposedly had amassed and coordinated, over the

170
 The Great Purges 171

years, a series of organizational networks inside the Soviet Union dedi-

cated to the elimination of the Stalinist leadership group, the dismem-
berment of the country, and the return of capitalism. Revelation of this
ever-widening conspiracy culminated in massive purges of all Soviet
institutions, the Party, and even the police, and then to the great show
trials and the secret military tribunals of the late 1930s.
In addition to instigating the purge process and trials, Stalin’s para-
noia extended as well to the masses of ordinary citizens who, he be-
lieved, would rise up against Soviet power in the increasingly likely
event of invasion and war. Beginning in the summer of 1937, and
through the late autumn of 1938, the combined political and civil
police set in motion a series of “mass operations” approved and coor-
dinated by the Politburo. These operations targeted former kulaks
and their families, criminals, other marginal groups, and then foreign
nationals living in the Soviet Union, and domestic ethnic groups
deemed suspicious by leaders. By 1939, over the course of two years,
over two million people were affected by purges and mass operations.
Close to 800,000 were murdered outright, and hundreds of thousands
more were sent to harsh labor camps, where many died.
Much has now been written about this episode in Soviet history,
and while there are still debates outstanding about causes and dynam-
ics, this is not the place to try to untangle and analyze these issues.1
This chapter traces the role of the security police during this period,
and the way that the Kirov murder shifted the fundamental direction
of police activities. Yagoda continued to follow Stalin’s policy direc-
tives from 1933 on the importance of social order policing, but docu-
ments show the increasing burden that political conspiracy investiga-
tions placed on police resources and time. By late 1936, Stalin had
become impatient with Yagoda for not exposing and bringing to light
the full extent of anti-Soviet conspiracies. Replacing him with Nikolai
Yezhov, a Central Committee member and an ambitious seeker of
Yagoda’s position, Stalin pushed the pace of political repression faster,
a process that delivered even the hapless Yagoda into the maw of
the Stalinist killing machine. That process plunged the country into
the two years, 1937 and 1938, that came to be known, first as the
Yezhovshchina, and then as the “Great Terror.”

Spinning the Kirov Murder

Within two weeks of Kirov’s assassination, a circular letter set the
framework in which political police officials were to understand the
172 The Great Purges

event. The tone, accusations, and implications of the following docu-

ment set the direction of police work for the next years.

d o c u m ent
· 93 ·
From a circular letter of the NKVD USSR to all local organs of the
Commissariat. January 1935. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 51, ll. 15, 18, 19.

Strictly secret
Draft
Investigation of the case of the villainous murder of c. Kirov committed
by Leonid Nikolaev has revealed that he was a member of “the Leningrad
terrorist center,” a counterrevolutionary Zinovievist organization, which
has existed with impunity for a long time, and which prepared and car-
ried out this act of terrorism according to a carefully worked out plan.
How could it happen that our organs in Leningrad overlooked, in a
criminal way, a multibranched Zinoviev organization an existing terrorist
group of Zinovievites, and could not manage to save the life of comrade
Kirov, one of the strongest leaders, and one of the best people of our Party?
How could it happen that, at one of the most important sites in the
fight against counterrevolution in Leningrad, where the revolutionary
Chekist vigilance of our organs should have been especially sharp, the
enemy dropped out of the view of Chekists, and managed thoroughly to
prepare and to strike the hardest blow against the Party and the working
class?
The reasons lie in the following:

a) Despite the obvious intensification of terrorist inclinations among the

remnants of the enemy, not yet completely beaten, a number of lead-
ing foreign terrorist centers [attempt] to penetrate the borders of our
territory to commit terrorist acts against leaders of the Party and
Soviet government.

And all this at a time when Leningrad and the oblast are saturated with
a large number of the remnants of the former aristocracy, imperial offi-
cials and court servants, Guard officers, and escaped kulaks who have
penetrated into manufacturing, etc.
And all this at a time when, in Leningrad, in fact, there remained un-
touched a considerable number of former participants of the Zinoviev-
Trotsky c-r [counterrevolutionary] block.
 The Great Purges 173

Ranking officials in the UNKVD [the local police headquarters] in the

Leningrad Oblast have criminally ignored the directive of the TsK VKP(b)
and SNK USSR from 8/V-1933, which reads:
“The class enemy sees … that the last days of his existence have ar-
rived,—and, in despair, he cannot help but grasp at the sharpest forms
of struggle against Soviet power. Therefore, there can be no discussion
about weakening our fight against the class enemy. On the contrary,
our fight must be in every possible way strengthened, our vigilance—in
every possible way must be sharpened. Thus, discussion must be about
strengthening our fight against the class enemy.”
But the leadership of the NKVD in Leningrad laid down arms and fell
asleep at the most crucial fighting revolutionary post, which was entrust-
ed to them by the Party.
Ranking officials of the Leningrad oblast UNKVD forgot the instruc-
tions of the leader of our Party, c. Stalin, at the XVII congress of the
VKP(b):
“It is clear that a classless society cannot come about on its own. It must
be won and constructed by efforts of all workers, by strengthening organs
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, by expansion of the class struggle, by
destruction of classes, by liquidation of the remnants of capitalist classes,
in struggle with enemies both internal, and external.
The matter, it seems, is clear. But, meanwhile, who doesn’t know that
the declaration of this clear and elementary thesis of Leninism generated
considerable confusion in [people’s] heads, and unhealthy moods among
a segment of Party members. The thesis about our movement toward the
classless society, given as slogan, they understood as a spontaneous pro-
cess. And they calculated, if [there will be] a classless society, then it is
possible to weaken the class struggle, it is possible to weaken the dictator-
ship of the proletariat and, in general, to be done with the state, which all
the same must die off soon. And they began to frolic like calves in antici-
pation that soon there will be no classes—which means it is possible to
lay down arms and go to bed—to sleep in anticipation of the coming
classless society.”
But where was the Party organization of the UNKVD of the Leningrad
Oblast?
Why did the Party organization not see […] the complacency, the crim-
inal smugness, the obstruction of class intuition and of revolutionary
vigilance, bordering on opportunism, that gripped a number of commu-
nists?
Why did the Party organization not notice the moral decay in some
links of the apparatus, did not notice that such unvetted people, obvi-
ously raising doubts, such as Baltsevich, were appointed to the most im-
portant positions in the struggle against terror and espionage?
174 The Great Purges

Tea Gossip, Librarians, and Plots to Kill Stalin

Following Kirov’s murder, Stalin insisted that the GUGB conduct a
thorough review of government and Party officials. Investigators were
to focus on issues of social background; any past involvement in op-
position groups, or in non-Bolshevik factions or political parties; and
anything else that might compromise loyalty to the Party and the
state. Police understood, of course, that it was their duty to find con-
spiracies and plots. That was a foregone conclusion. So began the
period of absurd investigations that led to fantastic charges of sabo-
tage and intrigue by the most unlikely people. In January 1935, for
example, Yagoda informed Stalin in a memorandum that the NKVD
had uncovered an anti-Soviet group working inside the Kremlin. As
the following documents show, this conspiratorial group amounted to
two janitorial staff and a telephone operator complaining about life
over a cup of tea. By March, however, the investigation had widened,
now extending to plots by a “terrorist group” against Stalin and oth-
er leaders, in conjunction with the Czechoslovakian intelligence ser-
vice. The conspiracy supposedly reached into the staff of the Central
Executive Committee of the government (TsIK), members of which
were former Mensheviks or members of other non-Bolshevik parties,
and who included even Nikolai Rozenfel’d, the brother of the Bolshe-
vik leader Lev Kamenev.

d o c u m ent
· 94 ·
Special report from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin regarding a counterrevolutionary
group in the Kremlin. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 231, ll. 1, 14.
20 January 1935

Absolutely secret
I am sending to you protocols of interrogations of:

1. Zhalybina-Bykova M. S., from 20.1. of this year 2) Mishakova E. S.,

from 20.1. of this year 3) Avdeeva A. E. from 20.1. of this year and
4) protocol of the confrontation between Avdeeva A. E. and Misha-
kova E. S. from 20.1. of this year. From materials of the preliminary
investigation it has been established that, besides Avdeeva A. E.,
whom we arrested for distribution of provocations and malicious
anti-Soviet [propaganda], Konstantinova A., Katynskaya, and others
 The Great Purges 175

also engage in anti-Soviet expression and distribution of provoca-

tions, who will be arrested today.
People’s commissar of internal affairs of the USSR, Yagoda.

Protocol of confrontation between Avdeeva, Anna Efimovna, and

Mishakova, Efrosiniia Semenovna, from 20 January 1935:
Question to Mishakova: You just discussed one conversation, in which
Avdeeva expressed anti-Soviet statements, lies, and provocations con-
cerning comrade Stalin. Repeat your testimony.
Mishakova’s answer: We were sitting—myself, Avdeeva, and Zhalybina-
Bykova—on the 1st floor of the government building, in a small room,
and were having tea. Avdeeva began to say that our life is bad, our boss-
es drink, eat well, and we eat very badly. And I told her that I now live
better than I lived before. Then Avdeeva began to say that Stalin is not
Russian, left his first wife, and, he is said to have shot the second one. I
said that it is not true, we don’t know. The conversation ended, and we
all went to work.
Question to Avdeeva: What can you say to the interrogation on this
matter?
Avdeeva’s answer: I testify that I didn’t say anything that Mishakova
said. All this was said by Zhalybina.
Recorded from our words correctly and read to us. Mishakova, Avdeeva.
Interrogated: Molchanov
Pauker

d o c u m en t
· 95 ·
Note from Ya. S. Agranov to I. V. Stalin regarding more arrests among
personnel in the Kremlin. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 231, ll. 15–17.
2 February 1935

Absolutely secret
In addition to No. 55173 from 20.1.1935, I am informing that, so far,
the investigation uncovered involvement of the following persons in the
spread of provocations in the Kremlin:

1. Avdeeva, A. E., 22 years old, non-Party, cleaning woman in the

Kremlin; 2. Kochetova, M. D., 20 years, old member of VLKSM [All-
Union Leninist Communist Youth League (Komsomol)], Kremlin
telephone operator; 3. Konstantinova, A. M., 35 years old, non-
Party, cleaning woman in the Kremlin; 4. Katynskaia, B. Ia., 50 years
176 The Great Purges

old, non-Party, cleaning woman in the Kremlin; 5. Orlova, A. A., 22

years old, member of VLKSM, courier in the Kremlin post office; 6.
Rozenfel’d, N. A., 49 years old, non-Party, from the princely family
Be[i]butov, librarian of the government library; 7. Raevskaia, E. Iu.,
31 years old, non-Party, born princess Urusova, librarian of the gov-
ernment library; 8. Sinelobova, K. I., 29 years old, non-Party, librar-
ian of the government library.

All these persons were arrested.

Avdeeva, A. E., who at the beginning denied her participation in
spreading provocations, testified that she had been passing provocative
hearsay to the cleaning women Zhalybina, M. S., and Mishakova, which
she had learned from the telephone operator of the Kremlin, Kochetova
M. D.
Kochetova, M. D., admitted her counterrevolutionary conversations
with Avdeeva, but has not given frank testimony yet.
Konstantinova, A. M., testified that Katynskaia, B. Ia., had anti-Soviet
conversations with her. She still denies her participation in spreading
provocations, but she has been proven guilty by testimony of Zhalybina,
M. S.
Katynskaia, B. Ia., so far admitted only her participation in counter-
revolutionary conversations with Konstantinova, A. M., but she has been
proven guilty by testimony of Zhalybina, M. S.
Orlova, A. A., admitted that she spread provocations, which she had
passed to the cleaning woman Zhalybina, M.
Rozenfel’d, N. A., still denies her guilt, but she is proved guilty by tes-
timony of Sinelobova, K. I.
Raevskaia, E. Iu., still denies her guilt, admits her participation in con-
versations of anti-Soviet character. She has been proved guilty by testi-
mony of Sinelobova, K. I.
Sinelobova, K. I., admitted spreading provocative hearsay among the
staff of the government library and Kremlin janitors, and testified that she
passed provocative gossip to the following persons:
Konnova, A. I., Burkova, L. E., Simak, E. O., Raevskaia, E. Iu., Gor-
deeva, P. I., Mukhanova, E., and to the Kremlin cleaning woman
Korchagina, who were working in the library.
Sinelobova, K. I., also names a senior librarian, Rozenfel’d, N. A., as a
participant in counterrevolutionary conversations.
Thus it was established that one of the sources for spreading provoca-
tions among staff of the government library and janitors was Sinelobova,
K. I.
Sinelobova, K. I., in turn, received provocative hearsay from her
brother Sinelobov, A. I., age 35 years, member of VKP(b) since 1930, an
assistant to the commandant of the Kremlin.
 The Great Purges 177

Arrested Sinelobov, A. I., [who] testified that he was connected with a

Trotskyist, Doroshin, V. G., age 40 years, member of VKP(b), an assistant
to the commandant of the Kremlin, who had conversations with him of
a counterrevolutionary character directed against the Party leadership.
I am attaching the protocol of interrogation of Sinelobova, A. I., from
31 January 1935. I consider it necessary to arrest Doroshin, V. G.
Deputy Head of the OGPU Agranov
The mention of N. A. Rozenfel’d, above, was significant. Nina
Rozenfel’d was the former wife of Nikolai B. Rozenfel’d, who was the
brother of Lev Kamenev. Kamenev, one of the original Politburo mem-
bers with Lenin, had long been an opponent of Stalin. He was twice
expelled from the Party under Stalin, and then allowed to return. He
had close ties to Grigorii Zinoviev, along with Trotsky the supposed
arch conspirator against Stalin. Kamenev was most likely the ultimate
target of the Kremlin investigation, and it was typical of Stalin to get at
his enemies in such a roundabout way. The first mention of N. A.
Rozenfel’d, though seemingly part of the normal progress of investiga-
tion, was likely intended. She was arrested, which implicated her former
husband, Nikolai, which then led to Lev Kamenev. Before the police got
to Kamenev, however, there were at least a couple of more steps.

d o c u m en t
· 96 ·
Report from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on the course of investigation
of the Kremlin case. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 231, ll. 22–26.
5 February 1935

Absolutely secret
In addition to No. 55173 from 20/1 and 55270 from 2/P-1935, I am
informing that, in addition, we arrested:

1. Doroshin, Vasily Grigor’evich, age 40, assistant to the commandant

of the Kremlin, member of VKP(b) since 1918;
2. Gavrikov, Ivan Demianovich, age 35 years, head of chemical service
of the 2nd Regiment of the Moscow Proletarian Infantry Division,
member of VKP(b) since 1919.

Doroshin, V. G., remains very stubborn. In the first interrogation he

admitted only systematic spreading of slander concerning Party leaders,
and testified that, for purposes of slander, he distorted Lenin’s so-called
testament2 in a Trotskyist way.
178 The Great Purges

I am attaching Doroshin’s testimony.

Gavrikov has not confessed so far.
Lukianov, Ivan Petrovich, age 37 years, manager of the Grand Kremlin
palace, member of VKP(b) since 1920, and
Kozyrev, Vasily Ivanovich, age 36 years, 4th-year student of the
Military-Chemical Academy, member of VKP(b) since 1919—we are ar-
resting [these individuals].
[interrogation protocol follows]
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs
(G. Yagoda)

d o c u m ent
· 97 ·
Letter of Ya. S. Agranov to I. V. Stalin with appended protocol of
interrogation of L. B. Kamenev (Kremlin case). AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 234, l. 1.
21 March 1935

Absolutely secret
I am sending you protocols of interrogations of:

1. Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, from 20/III-1935,

2. Burkova, Liudmila Emelianovna, from 20/III-1935,
3. Kochetova, Maria Dmitrievna, from 20/III-1935,
4. Mukhanov, Konstantin Konstantinovich, from 20/III-1935,
5. Sosinatrov, Aleksei Maksimovich, from 19/III-1935,
6. Gusev, Avram Makarovich, from 20/III-1935.

On March 20 of this year we arrested Ignatiev, Vladimir Ivanovich, born

1887, originally from Leningrad, former member of the TsK of the “Labor-
ing People’s Socialist Party”; was a member of Tchaikovsky’s government
in Arkhangelsk;3 former active participant of the counterrevolutionary
movement in Siberia in 1918–1920, former consultant to the Secretariat of
the Presidium of TsIK USSR, now—member of the Bar of Advocates.
We have been investigating and will arrest Gogua, Irina Kalistratovna,
born 1904, daughter of the well-known Menshevik Gogua, who works
as a technical secretary of the Budgetary Commission of TsIK USSR.
Named in Kochetova, M. D.’s testimony, Smoltsova has been located
and will be arrested.
Named in Kochetova, M. D.’s testimony, the kulaks, Diachkovs and
the Kasatkins, hiding in Moscow, have been located and will be arrested.
Deputy people’s commissar of internal affairs of the Union of SSR
 The Great Purges 179

(Agranov)
The implication of Nikolai Rozenfel’d in the plot led, consequently,
to the interrogation of his brother, Lev Kamenev.

d o c u m en t
· 98 ·
Protocol of interrogation of Kamenev, Lev Borisovich,
from 20 March 1935. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 234, ll. 1–6.

[Handwritten note by Stalin on the first page: “A stupid interrogation of

Kamenev.” Typewritten note: “Send to: c. Molotov, c. Kaganovich, c.
Voroshilov, c. Yezhov.”]
Question: What do you know about the political attitudes of your
brother, N. B. Rozenfel’d?
Answer: I have not considered him as a person having principled views
about political issues. On his part, I saw only personal sympathy for me,
which I explained not as any kind of considered political opinion, but as
ordinary familial feelings.
Question: Your brother testified that he shared your political views,
which you have defended in the fight against the Party.
Answer: I was not interested in his political views specifically, but I
assume that my personal authority could have influenced the formation
of his political views similar to mine.
Question: What do you know about the counterrevolutionary activity
in which your brother N. B. Rozenfel’d engaged?
Answer: I know only that during the era of our open fight against the
Party, he drew several drawings—lampoons of the Party leadership, and,
in particular, of Stalin.
Question: Do you know that he was spreading these lampoon draw-
ings around the city, and to whom?
Answer: From his words in 1934, I know that he gave these lampoon
drawings to his acquaintance, an artist, Etinger. He also gave me these
drawings. Whether he gave these to someone else I do not know.
Question: We arrested your brother N. B. Rozenfel’d for terrorist activ-
ity. During the interrogation he admitted that he participated in prepara-
tion for the murder of comrade Stalin, and testified that his terrorist
intentions were formed under your influence. What can you say about
this matter?
Answer: I was not aware that N. B. Rozenfel’d participated in prepa-
rations for the murder of Stalin. Rozenfel’d visited me from time to
time, I was helping him financially. When visiting, he was present at
180 The Great Purges

conversations, which were conducted in my apartment and in the dacha

in Il’inskoe. These conversations, mainly, were conducted with Zinoviev.
In these conversations with Zinoviev we criticized activities of the Party,
of the Central Committee, and allowed attacks against Stalin. At different
times, with more or less sharpness, we talked with Zinoviev about our
situation. We expressed the belief that we would not be allowed to con-
duct an active political life. At times, we reacted to the hopelessness of
our situation by spiteful attacks against Stalin.
Counterrevolutionary conversations, which we conducted with Zino-
viev in N. B. Rozenfel’d’s presence, influenced him as an enemy of Soviet
power and the Party, and kindled in him animosity in relation to Stalin. I
imagine that N. B. Rozenfel’d, who was embittered by my exile to Minus-
insk, and reacted to it extremely painfully, was fed up with the counter-
revolutionary conversations that I conducted with Zinoviev later, about
Stalin in particular, and [that this could have] driven him to terrorist
intentions.
Question: What kind of conversations have you conducted with
Zinoviev in connection to the counterrevolutionary documents issued by
Trotsky abroad?
Answer: Zinoviev became acquainted with the so-called opposition
bulletins at the Lenin Institute. He kept me informed about the contents
of Trotsky’s counterrevolutionary documents, stating his positive attitude
toward some of Trotsky’s assessment of the situation in the Party and in
the USSR. I didn’t object to Zinoviev, and before my arrest did not report
to anybody higher about his counterrevolutionary views on this matter.
Question: Meaning, you agreed with his counterrevolutionary views?
Answer: I have not read these documents myself, I did not offer him my
assessments, but I did not object to his counterrevolutionary views.
Question: what kind of conversations did you conduct with Zinoviev
in connection with the arrests made after the murder of comrade Kirov?
Answer: After the arrests of Bakaev and Evdokimov, Zinoviev came to
me, extremely nervous, and told me about these arrests. I calmed him in
every possible way. He nevertheless was extremely agitated, and tossed
out the phrase that he was afraid that the case of Kirov’s murder may turn
into the same picture as in Germany on 30 June, when Röhm was elimi-
nated, and Schleicher was destroyed along with him.4
This parallel had an inadmissible counterrevolutionary character. I
attributed it exclusively to Zinoviev’s nervous condition, and was calming
him down.
This protocol was transcribed from my words correctly and was read
to me.
L. Kamenev
Head of the Secret Political department GUGB (G. Molchanov)
Interrogated:
 The Great Purges 181

Deputy head of the SPO GUGB (Liushkov)

Head of Department 2 of the SPO GUGB (Kagan)
As Stalin’s comments show, he was unsatisfied with the interrogation
of Kamenev, but it was enough to seek the removal of A. Enukidze, a
high Party member and the longtime secretary of TsIK. Enukidze had
supposedly turned a blind eye to the background of the employees un-
der him, and had thereby allowed this dangerous organization to grow
inside the Kremlin walls. The nerve center of this terror organization
was located in the Kremlin library, and had ties to another counterrevo-
lutionary group within the Kremlin guard. As the following censure
shows, no blame as yet fell on Enukidze though he was removed
from his position. But, as with many others, he was revisited within a
couple of years by the police and eventually “shown” to be a Trotskyist
conspirator. Like so many others, he was eventually executed.

d o c u m en t
· 99 ·
Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On the apparatus of
TsIK USSR and c. Enukidze. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 234, ll. 47–53.
(Cyrillic alphabetical listing of items is retained.)
3 April 1935

To approve the draft of the information of the Politburo TsK elaborated

by cc. Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Yezhov On the apparatus of TsIK
USSR and c. Enukidze.
Secret
[…]
Information of the Politburo TsK VKP(b) to members and candidates
of the TsK VKP(b) and of commissions of Party and Soviet control.
C. Enukidze, A. S. was removed from the position of secretary of the
TsIK USSR, to which he was appointed for many years, and was trans-
ferred to a lesser position as one of the deputy chairmen of the TsIk of
Transcaucasia [Transcaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic]. C.
Musabekov, also a deputy chairman [from Transcaucasia] will retain his
position as representative of the Transcaucasian Federation to the TsIK
USSR.
The real motives for this transfer cannot be disclosed officially in
the press as their publication might discredit the supreme organ of Soviet
power—the Central Executive Committee of the Union of the SSR. How-
ever, TsK VKP(b) considers it necessary to communicate all the facts that
182 The Great Purges

served as the reason for removal of c. Enukidze from the position of secre-
tary of TsIK USSR, and of his transfer to a lesser position.
At the beginning of the current year, it became known that among
employees of the government library and the staff of the commandant’s
office, there was a systematic counterrevolutionary hounding of the lead-
ership of the Party and the government, particularly of c. Stalin, that
occurred for the purpose of discrediting them. A close investigation by
NKVD organs of the sources of this hounding revealed several connected
counterrevolutionary groups, whose purpose was the organization of acts
of terrorism concerning leaders of Soviet power and Party, first of all
concerning comrade Stalin.
The NKVD organs uncovered: a) a terrorist group in the government
library. Employees of the government library, N. A. Rosenfel’d—born
princess Beibutova, former wife of L. B. Kamenev’s brother; and active
White Guardist Mukhanova—former noblewoman, daughter of an offi-
cer under Kolchak, who served in the Czech counterintelligence, created
a terrorist group, worming their way into the Kremlin library, along with
former noblewomen Davydova, Burago, Raevskaia, and others.
According to the testimony of Kamenev’s brother, N. B. Rosenfel’d,
and his former wife N. A. Rosenfel’d, their terrorist attitudes were inspired
by L. B. Kamenev, who declared to them multiple times that elimination
from the leadership and destruction of comrade Stalin is the only means
to change Party policy and to bring to power the Kamenev-Zinoviev
group.
Nina Rosenfel’d and Nikolai Rosenfel’d took L. B. Kamenev’s instruc-
tions as a direct order to commit an act of terrorism against comrade
Stalin.
For the purpose of a more successful organization of the attempt upon
comrade Stalin, the Rosenfel’d-Mukhanova group involved a former
Kremlin librarian, Barut, who created a terrorist group inside the Armory
Museum of the Kremlin.
As a member of this terrorist group, Mukhanova was connected
with a female employee of a foreign embassy in Moscow, from whom
she, in turn, received instructions for preparing the murder of comrade
Stalin.
б) The terrorist Trotskyist group in the commandant’s office of the
Kremlin.
This group was organized by, and consisted of, employees of the Krem-
lin commandant’s office: assistants to the commandant Doroshin, Polia-
kov, Lavrov, and officers Sinelobov, Lukianov, and others. The leader of
the group, Doroshin, was organizationally connected with the Trotskyist
terrorist group outside the Kremlin, consisting of several commanders of
the RKKA [Red Army], and led by a student of the Military-chemical
Academy—Kozyrev.
 The Great Purges 183

The investigation established that Trotskyist groups of military officers

set as their purpose the organization of an act of terrorism against com-
rade Stalin. The terrorist group of Rosenfel’d-Mukhanova was connected
with Doroshin’s terrorist group through Sinelobov, who was one of the
persons directly responsible for security of the room where the Politburo
usually meets.
B) Terrorist group of Trotskyist youth.
Acting on instructions from N. A. Rosenfel’d, her son, B. Rozenfel’d, a
Trotskyist, created an independent counterrevolutionary group of Trotsky-
ist youth outside the Kremlin, which the Trotskyists Nekhamkin, Sedov
(Trotsky’s son), Asbel, Belov, and others joined. This group conducted
preparations for the murder of comrade Stalin outside the Kremlin.
All counterrevolutionary groups were trying to achieve their objective
in different ways, considering, however, the most convenient plan to get
inside comrade Stalin’s apartment.
Toward this end, Mukhanova and Rosenfel’d tried to get into comrade
Stalin’s apartment as librarians, using Minervina, comrade Enukidze’s
secretary. Only because comrade Stalin refused categorically the services
of librarians whom the Kameneva-Rozenfel’d-Mukhanova group tried to
send through Minervina was it possible to prevent terrorists from imple-
menting their villainous plan.
All these groups apparently represented the counterrevolutionary block
of Zinovievists, Trotskyists, agents of foreign states, united by the overall
objective of terror against leaders of the Party and the government.
Penetration and settling of these counterrevolutionary elements in TsIK
USSR (secretariat of TsIK USSR, commandant’s office of the Kremlin,
Government library, the Armory Museum) was facilitated by a peculiar
system of selecting workers in the secretariat of TsIK USSR, having noth-
ing to do with the principles of Soviet power. Male and female employees
of TsIK USSR were hired not because of their administrative qualifica-
tions, but by acquaintance, personal connections, and often because of
the readiness of female employees to cohabit with this or that ranking
official of the secretariat of the TsIK.
The direct result of such a system of selection of workers was that the
apparatus of TsIK USSR became extremely saturated with elements alien
and hostile to the Soviet state, who conducted their subversive work un-
der cover as employees of the secretariat of TsIK USSR. Along with low
qualifications, picked up arbitrarily, and because of personal connections,
declassed elements, remnants of the nobility—former princesses, noble-
women, etc.—infiltrated into the secretariat of TsIK USSR.
The degree of contamination of this apparatus is confirmed by the fact
that during the vetting of employees of the secretariat of TsIK USSR by
the commission especially appointed by TsK VKP(b), it turned out that it
was possible to keep at work in the Kremlin only 9 people out of 107;
184 The Great Purges

the rest were either subject to firing or transferred to work outside the
Kremlin.
It is necessary to say that many members and, in particular, female
participants of the Kremlin terrorist groups (Nina Rosenfel’d, Nikitins-
kaia, Raevskaia, etc.) had the direct support and high protection of com-
rade Enukidze. Comrade Enukidze personally employed many of these
female assistants, with some of whom he cohabited.
Needless to say, comrade Enukidze knew nothing about preparations
for an attempt on comrade Stalin, but he was used by the class enemy, a
person who lost political vigilance and who has shown an unnatural at-
traction, for a communist, to former people [members of dispossessed
middle and upper classes].
However, c. Enukidze bears political responsibility for all this, since,
when selecting workers, he was guided by reasons not connected to the
interests of business, thereby he promoted infiltration by terrorist ele-
ments hostile to Soviet power into the Kremlin. C. Enukidze’s guilt is
aggravated by the trust he placed in his personal secretary, Minervina,
non-Party, and now arrested, to send female employees of the govern-
ment library, among whom happened to be terrorists, to the apartments
of Politburo members, to their private libraries.
In discussing the question of transferring c. Enukidze, information
about the activity of the terrorist groups provided here was still unknown,
thus a comparatively mild decision concerning c. Enukidze was made by
TsK VKP(b). Since these new materials were revealed, TsK VKP(b) con-
siders it necessary to discuss at the next Plenum of the TsK the question
whether to retain c. Enukidze as member of the TsK VKP(b).
As a result of his deposition, Lev Kamenev was sentenced to ten
years, and in August was tried in the first major Moscow show trial.
He, along with Zinoviev, were the key defendants in what became
known as the Trial of Sixteen. He and Zinoviev were convicted, and
became the first of the well-known revolutionary Bolshevik leaders to
be executed.

The NKVD Goes After the Party

The investigations and interrogations continued, as did the review of
Party members in general. As a result, tens of thousands of people were
expelled from the Party, and these came to be of special concern to
Stalin and other leaders. As the following memorandum shows, police
kept the Politburo informed of the numbers of former Party members,
where they were located, and the reasons for their expulsion.
 The Great Purges 185

d o c u m en t
· 100 ·
Report of L. G. Mironov to I. V. Stalin and N. I. Yezhov about results
of operational actions of the Tatar Republic UNKVD in connection
with verification of Party documents [membership cards].
TsA FSB RF, f. 3, op. 3, d. 62, ll. 144–76.
15 February 1936

Absolutely secret
I am sending you a copy of the report of the Tatar Republic NKVD
administration about results of operational actions in connection with
verification of Party documents.
Head of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB
PP [Plenipotentiary] Commissar of State Security of 2nd Rank
(G. Molchanov)
Absolutely secret
To the Head of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB
PP Commissar of State Security of 2nd Rank c. Molchanov
[…]
Verification of Party documents of members and candidates of the
Party in the Tatar Party organization is generally finished.
As a result, in the course of verification, 4,875 persons, or 19.2 percent
of a total number of 25,395 communists, were expelled from the Party.
Of 4,875 people expelled from the Party, expelled:
1. For c-r propaganda and activity ...... 91 persons, or 1.92 percent
2. Spies and those suspected of espionage ................... 6, or 0.12
percent
3. Trotskyist-Zinovievists .......................................... 42, or 0.9
percent
4. White Guardists who served in the White Army and gendarmes
.................. 252, or 4.2 percent
5. Kulaks, traders, speculators ................................ 150, or 3.1 percent
6. Great power chauvinists and local nationalists ..................... 28, or
0.5 percent
7. Hiding their social background ................................. 702, or 14.4
percent
8. For communication with class-alien and hostile elements ......... 470,
or 9.4 percent
9. Swindlers and criminals ...................................... 269, or 5.5 percent
10. Deserters from the Red Army ................................ 29, or 0.6 percent
11. For moral behavior decay .............................. 1,029, or 21.1 percent
12. Other offenses ............................................. 1,807, or 38.26 percent
186 The Great Purges

In addition to close ties to Party organs regarding realization of materials,

which the UGB organs [local departments of state security] possessed con-
cerning certain communists; along with review of a number of communists
according to the special assignments of the Communist Party organization,
the counterrevolutionary kulak–White Guard element that was revealed in
the course of the review was placed immediately under active agent-
operational study by us. As a result, as of today, we have placed 451 persons
expelled from the Party under operational investigative surveillance, which
makes 9.2 percent in relation to the total number of [those] expelled during
the overall course of verification of Party documents.
[…]
From the 451 expelled, 93 persons are subject to operational investiga-
tive processing by the Transport Department of UGB UNKVD TASSR
[Tatar Autonomous Republic]. A major contingent from among this num-
ber consists of those accused of damaging railway and water transport, of
embezzlement, theft, and professional malfeasance.
[…]
In addition, in the city of Kazan and raions of the Tatar ASSR, persons
who have evaded Party document review and disappeared from work-
places consist of 45 people.
Concerning these persons, we took and have been taking search mea-
sures.
Of the 1,997 persons working in the Party apparatus, expelled from
the Party, 16 persons were brought to trial, 32 persons are the objects of
agent investigations.
1. Group counterrevolutionary activity of people exposed and expelled
during the Party document review.
The prevailing form of group counterrevolutionary activity of the hos-
tile element that infiltrated into the Party is identified as theft [of socialist
property], embezzlement, economic mismanagement, and professional
malfeasance. Revealed, as well, was the bloc-making activity of this ele-
ment with other c-r cadres: White Guardists, bandits, and others of the
c-r element.
[…]

Yagoda’s Replacement
Despite the efforts of Yagoda and the police under his command,
Stalin grew dissatisfied, believing that Yagoda was drawing out im-
portant investigations and not getting at the real enemies of the
regime, the so-called United Trotsky-Zinoviev Bloc. A final “break”
in this investigation came only in June 1936, when a key defendant,
E. A. Dreitser, admitted, under torture, that he was a key figure in the
 The Great Purges 187

central organizing group of the bloc, and that he had received direct
instructions from Trotsky. Still, it took Yagoda another two months
to prepare the evidence and witnesses necessary to stage the trial of
the supposed leaders of the bloc, which took place in August. During
that period, Yagoda sent Stalin sixty-four memorandums with accom-
panying protocols of witness interrogations.5
It was not just Yagoda’s slowness that turned Stalin against him, but
also intrigues by another Central Committee secretary, N. I. Yezhov.
Stalin began to rely on Yezhov for outside evaluations of the NKVD
as early as 1934 and 1935. In early 1935, following Kirov’s murder,
and acting on Stalin’s instructions, Yezhov delivered to Stalin a damn-
ing report on the overall dysfunctional state of the GUGB. In Yezhov’s
telling, the state security service was not just incompetent, but was a
major vehicle for spies, saboteurs, and anti-Soviet agents to infiltrate
to the very heart of the regime.6 In September 1936, Stalin was ready
to replace Yagoda, and he wrote to other Politburo members from his
dacha in Sochi.

d o c u m en t
· 101 ·
Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to members of the Politburo of TsK of VKP(b)
on appointment of N. Yezhov as Commissar of Internal Affairs.7
25 September 1936

First. We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent to appoint comrade

Yezhov to the position of Narkomvnudel [People’s Commissar of Internal
Affairs]. Yagoda clearly is not keeping on top of the task of uncovering
the Trotsky-Zinoviev Bloc. The OGPU was four years late in this busi-
ness. All partrabotniki [Party workers] and the majority of oblast repre-
sentatives of Narkomvnudel talk about this. It is possible to keep Agranov
as Yezhov’s deputy at Nakorkomvnudel.
[…]

The Show Trials, and Yezhov’s Purge of the NKVD

On 11 October 1936, the Politburo officially relieved Yagoda of his
duties as head of the NKVD, replacing him with Yezhov. Yagoda was
given a position as head of the communications commissariat. Yezhov
moved quickly to push investigations and trials to a conclusion. In
188 The Great Purges

January 1937, already, the second major show trial took place, against
the so-called Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Bloc. This trial exposed the sup-
posed second, or reserve, Trotskyist center, and included the promi-
nent revolutionary figures Karl Radek, Yurii Pyatakov, and Grigorii
Sokol’nikov among the seventeen defendents. Based on confessions
extracted from these individuals, especially from Radek, further trials
followed. One of the most infamous of these involved the trial and
execution of major military commanders, including General Mikhail
Tukhachevsky. This trial, in June 1937, was closed to the public, the
results being made known only after the execution of the major defen-
dants. It set off a major purge of the military high command that re-
moved three of five marshals, thirteen of fifteen army commanders,
eight of nine admirals, and somewhere between 5 and 8 percent of the
general officer corps.8
The final major show trial took place in March 1938, for which the
NKVD collected evidence to condemn the remaining major revolu-
tionary figures who had opposed Stalin. These included Nikolai
Bukharin, Aleksei Rykov, Christian Rakovsky, and Mikhail Tomsky,
who committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest. In this third trial,
Yagoda also found himself in the dock, accused as a co-conspirator
with the very “enemies” he had been charged to expose. Neither was
Yagoda the only one of the political police to be purged. As the
following document shows, Yezhov made a clean sweep of the
commanding group that had surrounded Yagoda. Those removed for
treason and counterrevolutionary activities were, of course, stripped
of their many medals and honors.

d o c u m ent
· 102 ·
Decision of the Politburo of Tsk VKP(b). On deprivation of decorations of
former executives of the Narkomat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. RGASPI, f.
17, op. 3, d. 987, ll. 100–101.
1 June 1937

No. 49, p. 406—To approve the following draft of the decision of TsIK
of the USSR:
For treachery and counterrevolutionary activity to deprive of decora-
tions of the USSR:
1. Molchanov G. A.—-Order of the Red Banner
 The Great Purges 189

2. Volovich Z. I.—-″ ″ ″ Red Star

3. Loganovsky M. A.—-″ ″ ″ Red Banner
4. Margolin S. L.—-″ ″ ″ Red Banner, Lenin, and the Red Star
5. Ukhanov K. V.—-the Order of Lenin
6. Yagoda G. G.—-″ ″ ″ Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red Banner
7. Pivovarov I. N.—-the Order of Lenin
8. Kabakov I. D.—-″ ″ ″ Lenin
9. Gvakhariya G. V.—-″ ″ ″ Lenin
10. Prokof’ev G. E.—-″ ″ ″ the Red Banner
11. Pauker K. V.—-2 Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star
12. Enukidze A. S.—-[Order of] Lenin
13. Gorbachev B. S.—-3 Orders of the Red Banner
14. Peterson R. A.—-Orders of the Red Banner and Lenin
15. Garkavy I. N.—-[Order of] the Red Banner
16. Kork A. I.—-2 Orders of the Red Banner, Honorary Revolutionary
Weapon
17. Eydeman R. P.—-2 Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star
18. Pogrebinsky M. S.—-Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star
19. Gai M. I.—-Order of the Red Banner
20. Bokiya G. I.—-″ ″ ″ the Red Banner
21. Bulanov P. P.—-Order of Lenin
22. Golov G. V.—-″ ″ the Red Banner
23. Puzitsky S. V.—-2 Orders of the Red Banner
24. Firin-Pupko S. G.—-Order of the Red Banner and the Lenin order
25. Chertok L. I.—-the Token of Honor
26. Rykov A. I.—-Order of the Red Banner

One of the most senior police officials from Yagoda’s circle to be

arrested was V. A. Balitsky, the ruthless operational officer and head
of the political police in Ukraine throughout the 1930s, also a member
of the Party’s Central Committee. Balitsky oversaw some of the most
brutal operations of the dekulakization campaigns of the early 1930s.
He had headed the OGPU/GUGB in Ukraine during the great famine
of 1933 and 1934, and had overseen the mass purge of Ukrainian
social and intellectual leaders during the middle part of the decade. In
July 1937, Balitsky was arrested in the course of Yezhov’s purge of
Yagoda’s police, as a pivotal figure supposedly linking the anti-Soviet
conspiracy inside the Ukrainian security service with the alleged anti-
Soviet military conspiracy, the so-called Trotskyist Anti-Soviet Mili-
tary Organization. Initially, of course, Balitsky protested his innocence
as a spy and counterrevolutionary. But, he, too, fell into the same
ritual dance of confession and denunciation, as did so many others.
His appeal to Stalin, below, was typical.
190 The Great Purges

d o c u m ent
· 103 ·
Memorandum of M. P. Frinovsky to I. V. Stalin on V. A.
Balitsky’s statement. AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 316, ll. 8–12.

[On the first page, handwritten note by Stalin: “To discuss with Yezhov”]
21 July 1937
To the secretary of the TsK VKP(b) c. Stalin
I am sending you the statement of the arrested, Balitsky V. from
17 July of this year.
Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Frinovsky
To People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, General Com-
missar of State Security N. I. Yezhov
From arrested Balitsky V. A.
Statement
On 14 July 1937, I submitted a statement to you. Now, I must retract
completely this statement, not of course because I took too much guilt
upon myself, but because, in this statement, I basely deceived you. In this
note, I maliciously, and in a double-dealing way, tried to present myself
to you as a person who is guilty only in an objective sense, in that I un-
consciously facilitated the anti-Soviet activity of enemies of the people.
After much thought, I came to the conclusion that, in any case, I will
be inevitably exposed by interrogation and, therefore, I decided to tell
how I deceived in the most base way the Party and the government, which
entrusted to me a high state position.
My crimes before the country are huge. After long-term honest work,
I fell into the camp of the worst enemies of the Party and the people.
I will testify in detail to the interrogation the kind of hostile work I
carried out.
In this note I will try to outline the main elements of my criminal ac-
tivities.
1. First of all I directly declare—I am a participant in the anti-Soviet
Trotskyist-fascist military conspiracy. I was recruited into this plot by
Yakir,9 after the well-known operations at the end of 1935.
2. The Ukrainian center of the military plot consisted of the following
persons: Yakir, Popov, N. N., Shelekhes, Veger, Demchenko, and my-
self, Balitsky.
We joined our maturing Ukrainian plot to the all-Union anti-Soviet
military conspiracy, which was directed by Gamarnik and Tukh-
achevsky, and the leading role in the all-Union military-fascist plot
belonged not to Tukhachevsky, but to Gamarnik.10
 The Great Purges 191

Gamarnik was in turn connected with leading centers of Trotskyists

and of the rightists.
Within the rank-and-file apparatus in all oblasts of Ukraine there were
participants in the conspiracy among leading Party and Soviet work-
ers, mainly from people who were former Trotskyists and rightists.
3. Speaking of the political orientation of the conspiracy, given those
tasks that we set for ourselves, I should declare that the political
direction and organizational communications of our conspiracy were
right-Trotskyist-fascist. Our conspiracy was military in the sense that
the leadership in the center and in Ukraine was military (Gamarnik–
Yakir). In essence, however, it was connected to a number of civilian
Trotskyists and rightists.
4. Parallel to our plot and in close coordination with it, an anti-Soviet
Ukrainian nationalist organization was active, led by Khvylya, Tril-
issky, and Lisovik [all three names circled in pencil].
The Ukrainian nationalist organization was connected with the
Ukrainian anti-Soviet centers in Germany and Poland.
5. The main objectives of the conspiracy were: overthrow of the central
leadership of the Party and the country by armed force. If it would
not be possible to accomplish this prior to the beginning of war, the
task of the conspiracy was to create all necessary conditions for de-
feat of the Soviet Union in a war with Germany, Japan, and Poland.
Toward these ends, a broad harmful work was conducted for
weakening the power of the Red Army along the main strategic lines
(Novograd–Volynsk–Zhitomir), the Korosten’ line, the Letichev mil-
itarized Raion.
The main operative lines of the People’s Commissariat of Internal
Affairs of UkSSR, directed by myself, were also placed in the service
of these tasks of the conspiracy.
6. Participants in the conspiracy:
a) military: head of the headquarters [staff] of the KVO [Kiev Military
District] Division Commander Butyrsky, deputy commander of the
KhVO [Kharkov Military District] Corps Commander Turovsky,
head of the Political Administration of the KVO—Amelin, his dep-
uty Orlov, Division Commander Grigoriev, Division Commander
Demichev, Corps Commander Germonius, Brigadier Commander
Ziukaa, Corps Commander Sablin;
b) Chekists: my former deputy Ivanov Vasily, my former deputy for
the militsiia Bachinsky, former head of the Special Department
Aleksandrovsky, head of the transportation department Pismen-
ny, head of the Kharkov Oblast Administrations Mazo, head of
the Odessa Oblast Administration Rozanov [All personal names
in this paragraph circled in pencil].
192 The Great Purges

According to my instruction, Bachinsky was supposed to engage in

conversation and enlist in the conspiracy the head of the Kiev Oblast
Administration Sharov [Circled in pencil]. Whether Bachinsky enlisted
Sharov or not, I did not have time to ask Bachinsky.
In this statement I only briefly touched on the main elements of crimi-
nal activity and the conspiracy.
I undoubtedly do not remember, and therefore also did not name, all
the participants I know in the conspiracy.
During the investigation, I will put all my diligence toward the task of
uncovering all our criminal activity and all conspirators.
17 July 1937 V. Balitsky
Balitsky was executed in November 1937, neither the first nor the
last to fall victim to the system that he helped create.
 chapter six

Social and Ethnic Cleansing:

The Mass Operations, 1937–1938

T
he show trials were the most famous and most publicized
of the purges conducted by the security police, but they were
not the only purges to take place and, as important as they
were, they did not match the “mass operations” of 1937 and 1938 for
scale and social impact. These differed considerably from the political
purges of Party, military, and state institutions, inasmuch as they did
not target individuals so much as whole social and ethnic categories
of the population. Leaders suspected these groups of potential disloy-
alty, and as a basis for insurgency in case of war and invasion. People
swept up in the mass operations were generally arrested not on the
basis of individual case files, but because their names were listed in
police catalogs or rosters as part of criminal or otherwise suspect
groups. In many cases, arrests were simply arbitrary. People were
arrested not for specific acts of political opposition, but because of
their ethnic or social background. They were generally not interro-
gated or tortured for information. They did not undergo lengthy court
trials. Most victims were convicted en masse, by administrative sen-
tencing boards, and shot or imprisoned fairly soon afterward.
Politburo resolutions initiated these mass purges of the population,
but each was carried out under specific police operational orders.
Arrest quotas were established for the different provinces and territo-
ries of the country, and time limits were specified, although these usu-
ally were extended, with Politburo approval. According to Opera-
tional Order 00439 of 25 July 1937, for example, Soviet citizens of
German background, and German immigrants and refugees, were to
be rounded up. Some 42,000 were shot, while another 13,000 were

193
194 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

deported to guarded colonies in Western Siberia. Similarly, 140,000

Poles or those of Polish background were swept up under Order
00485 from 11 August 1937. Some 111,000 were shot. Latvian, Finn-
ish and Karelian, Romanian, and Greek populations also suffered.
Some 174,000 Koreans living in Eastern Siberian border regions were
also deported from their homes and resettled in Kazakhstan and Uz-
bekistan. While the Koreans were not regarded as an “enemy nation,”
they were nonetheless relocated from the coastal regions and Japanese-
occupied Chinese border areas.1
An interesting feature of the so-called nationality operations was
that neither the police nor the Politburo seemed too interested in dis-
tinguishing the ethnicity of individuals arrested. Many people of Rus-
sian and other ethnic backgrounds, for example, were arrested as part
of the “German” and “Polish” operations. Although called “national-
ity” operations, these purges targeted people not so much because of
their ethnic origins, but because they supposedly had connections to
counterrevolutionary organizations, or anti-Soviet activities, associ-
ated with foreign governments related to the national minorities con-
cerned. The largest German-speaking population in the country, along
the Volga river, was not targeted in these operations, but was targeted
several years later, when mass operations were carried out specifically
against ethnic groups. During the 1937 and 1938 period, a total of
about 335,000 people were arrested and shot or imprisoned in the
course of the nationality operations.

Social Conspiracies and NKVD Order 00447

The largest single mass operation lasted from late summer 1937 until
November 1938 under the infamous order 00447 of 30 July 1937.
This operation, in fact, involved a number of ongoing efforts by both
political and civil police over the course of sixteen months either to
exterminate or to place in penal colonies all those who fell under the
category of “anti-Soviet elements.” These elements included those
who had been branded as kulaks, even and especially former kulaks,
and other socially marginal groups, especially petty criminals and
those with records of hooliganism. As the order indicates (document
109), leaders feared that these groups formed a large base for anti-
Soviet insurgency movements, to be organized by foreign agents and
Trotskyist sympathizers. As Yezhov described in his instructions, these
groups had infiltrated back into Soviet society throughout the 1930s,
in rural as well as industrial and urban areas, and now stood poised
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 195

to wreak havoc once the signal was given for uprising. The threat
from these groups needed to be resolved “once and for all time,” as
Yezhov wrote. Through a series of operational meetings, telegrammed
instructions, and correspondence, quotas were set and sentencing
boards were named. Over the course of the operation, close to 800,000
people were executed in this Soviet version of a final solution. Several
hundred thousand others were imprisoned in labor camps or sent to
special settlements or colonies.
The specific motivations behind this social cleansing operation re-
main obscure, but the first official indication of such a massive social
purge came on 2 July 1937, with the following Politburo resolution.

d o c u m en t
· 104 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On anti-Soviet
elements. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 32.
2 July 1937

To send the following telegram to all obkom, kraikom secretaries, and all
TsK of national parties.
“It has been noticed that a large proportion of former kulaks and crim-
inals exiled at one time from various oblasts to the northern and Siberian
raions—but then returned to their former oblasts after their exile term
ended—are the main instigators of all sorts of anti-Soviet and subversive
crimes, in both state and collective farms, and in transport and various
branches of industry.
The TsK VKP(b) recommends that all secretaries of oblast and krai
organizations and oblast, krai, and republic NKVD representatives regis-
ter all kulaks and criminals who have returned to their homes, so that the
most dangerous of them can be arrested and shot, through administrative
processing of their cases by troikas, and the remainder, less active but still
hostile elements, can be listed and exiled to raions designated by the
NKVD.
The TsK VKP(b) recommends that the makeup of troikas be transmit-
ted to the TsK, as well as the number to be shot, and the number subject
to exile.”
After this initial political resolution, the machinery of repression
moved rapidly. Already, within days, the Politburo began approving
lists of sentencing boards and numbers to be shot or imprisoned.
196 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

d o c u m ent
· 105 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On anti-Soviet
elements. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 33.
5 July 1937

Confirm troikas for processing anti-Soviet elements:

a) For the Crimea: cc. Pavlov—NKVD (Chairman) and members

Monatov—Procurator, Crimea ASSR, and Trupcha—Obkom Second
Secretary.
b) For Udmurtia ASSR: cc. Baryshnikov, Shlenov—NKVD; Shevel’kov—
Deputy Procurator Republic.
c) For Tatar ASSR: cc. Lep, Mukhametzianov and El’shin (Deputy NKVD).

Permit Tatar ASSR to provide information about numbers to be shot

in a month instead of in five days.

d o c u m ent
· 106 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On anti-Soviet
elements. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 34.
9 July 1937

Confirm troikas for processing anti-Soviet elements:

1) For North Ossetia ASSR: cc. Maurer, Togoev, and Ivanov. Confirm
169 individuals designated for shooting and 200 for exile.
2) For Bashkir ASSR: cc. Isanchurin, Bak, and Tsipnyatov.
3) For Omsk Oblast: cc. Salyn’, Nelip, and Fomin. Confirm 479
individuals designated for shooting and 1,959 for exile.
4) For Chernigov Oblast: cc. Markitan, Samovsky, and Sklyavsky.
Confirm 244 individuals designated for shooting and 1,379 for exile.
5) For Chuvash ASSR: cc. Petrov, Rozanov, and Elifanov. Confirm 86
kulaks and 57 criminals for shooting, and 676 kulaks and 201 crim-
inals for exile.
6) For Western Siberia: cc. Mironov (Chairman), Eikhe, and Barkov.
Confirm 6,600 kulaks and 4,200 criminals for shooting.
7) For Krasnoyarsk Krai: cc. Leoniuk (Chairman), Gorchaev, and Rabi-
novich. Permit northern raions of Krasnoyarsk Krai to provide infor-
mation about numbers to be shot and exiled by 1 August.
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 197

8) For Turkmen SSR: Mukhamedov, Zverev, and Tashli-Anna-Muradov.

Confirm 400 kulaks and 100 criminals for shooting, and 1,200
kulaks and 275 criminals for exile. Agree with recommendation by
the TsK Turkmenistan to include for repression and exile members of
the nationalist c-r organization “Turkmen-Azatlygi,” Muslim clergy,
and others who have been released from prison; recommend that the
NKVD determine the number subject to arrest and exile.

As justification for such operations, police organizations suddenly

reported the presence of “insurgency” groups in their regions. The
following reports were typical, from Western Siberia and Yaroslavl.

d o c u m en t
· 107 ·
Report of S. N. Mironov, Head of the UNKVD [local NKVD
administration] of the West Siberian Krai to the kraikom VKP(b),
On the case of an S-R [Socialist-Revolutionary]-monarchist plot
in Western Siberia. GANO, f. R-4, op. 34, d. 26, ll. 1–3.2
17 June 1937

UGB [local Department of State Security] of the UNKVD uncovered a

Kadet [Constitutional Democrat]-monarchist, and an S-R organization in
the Krai of West Siberia. They were preparing an armed overthrow and
seizure of power on orders of the Japanese intelligence service, and of the
“Russian All-Military Union” [ROVS]. A Kadet-monarchist organization
calling itself “Union for the Rescue of Russia” was created by former
princes Volkonsky and Dolgorukov, former White generals—Mikhaylov,
Eskin, Sheremetev, and Efanov, on orders from active figures of ROVS
abroad—Obolensky, Golitsyn, and Avralov. The counterrevolutionary
organization created large branches in the cities: Novosibirsk, Tomsk,
Biisk, and in Narym. White officers and Kadet-monarchist elements from
among the former people, and from a reactionary part of the professorate
and scientists, joined them.
The counterrevolutionary organization was guided by instructions of
the ROVS branches in Harbin and Prague, and by official Japanese rep-
resentatives to the USSR. The counterrevolutionary organization con-
ducted communication with those abroad by illegal border crossings.
The S-R organization was headed by the so-called “Sibbiuro PSR”
[Siberian Bureau of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries], which consisted
of Petelin, Osipov, Zanozin, Yevstigneyev, and Gorokh. On orders of the
“Central Bureau of the PSR” and of the Japanese intelligence service, the
198 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

organization spread its recruiting work widely, and also created a number
of terrorist and espionage-subversive formations in Novosibirsk, Tomsk,
Barnaul, Toguchin, Oyashino, and other raions. The S-R organization,
as well as the organization “Union for the Rescue of Russia,” was prepar-
ing insurgent staffing for the armed struggle against Soviet power. On this
basis, in 1935 a bloc was created between “Sibbiuro PSR” and the
headquarters of the “Union for the Rescue of Russia.” Eskin, under the
agreement with Petelin, took leadership of the whole of the struggle and
insurgency work of the S-Rs. Kulaks—special resettlers located in the
Narym Krai and in towns of the Kuzbass—served as a basis for formation
of the insurgent staff for the headquarters of the “Union for the Rescue of
Russia” and “Sibbiuro PSR.” Commanders for the insurgent formations
were appointed from among White officers. If [one] considers that 208,400
ex-kulaks, 5,350 former White officers, active bandits, and convicts in
administrative exile are located in the Narym Krai and the Kuzbass, it
becomes clear how broad a social basis there is on which to build an insur-
gent rebellion.
Insurgent formations were created on the principle of military units
(divisions, regiments, battalions). As a result of testimonies of Captain
Eskin, Dolgorukov, and a former Staff Captain Pirotsky, 26 such military
units that they created in the raions of the Narym Krai and the Kuzbass
were already unmasked. The headquarters developed a plan of revolt
scheduled for the beginning of war. Commanders from among the par-
ticipants—former White officers—were appointed for all these insurgent
formations. The headquarters planned to arm the insurgent formations
by capturing military depots of SibVO [the Siberian Military District].
One of the accused in the case, Berzin, a former head of the department
of military communications of the SibVO headquarters, a longtime Japa-
nese agent and an active participant in the S-R organization, testified
about measures he took, and about the plan for taking over the military
depots of the SibVO.
In the case of the “Union for Rescue of Russia” and “Sibbiuro PSR,”
382 people were arrested. 1,317 members of the organization were un-
masked by agent-investigative measures.
Head of the UNKVD of the West Siberian Krai, Mironov
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 199

d o c u m en t
· 108 ·
Coded telegram from A. S. Zimin to I. V. Stalin on “insurgency” groups
in Yaroslavl Oblast. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 65, l. 53.
16 July 1937

Yaroslavl
Investigation of a counterrevolutionary organization of rightists in
Yaroslavl Oblast has established that rightists, together with SRs, in a
whole number of raions of the oblast and in particular factories, have
organized insurgency groups. In these insurgency groups, rightists, SRs,
monarchists, and criminal elements have united. Leadership of these
organizations has been achieved by Zheltov, [Notes: “C. Yezhov. Zheltov
absolutely need to arrest. St[alin].” “Done. P[oskrebyshev].”] head of
the oblast administration of communications, who received instructions
directly from Rykov,3 and the former chairman of the Oblispolkom, Zar-
zhitsky. We are conducting [operations to] remove these groups.
Secretary Yaroslavl Obkom VKP(b)
Zimin
On 30 July, Yezhov’s deputy, M. N. Frinovsky, sent NKVD Opera-
tional Order 00447 for approval to the Politburo. It presented a
detailed, dispassionate, and calculated account of state planning for
the killing of hundreds of thousands of its citizens. Order 00447 is one
of the most remarkable documents to survive the twentieth century. It
came to light only in 1992.4

d o c u m en t
· 109 ·
Memorandum from M. I. Frinovsky to the Politburo TsK VKP(b)
with appended Operational Order NKVD USSR No. 00447. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, ll, 55, 59–78.
30 July 1937

To C. Poskrebyshev
I am sending Operational Order No. 00447 on repression of former
kulaks, criminals, and anti-Soviet elements, and a [draft of Politburo]
decision. I request to send the decision to members of the Politburo for
voting, and send an extract to c. Yezhov.
200 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

Operational Order of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the

Union of SSR
No. 00447
On operations to repress former kulaks, criminals, and other anti-
Soviet elements.
30 July 1937
Moscow
Investigative materials in cases of anti-Soviet formations have estab-
lished that a significant number of former kulaks have settled in the coun-
tryside who were earlier repressed, who have evaded repression, who
have escaped from camps, exile, and labor settlements. Settled [also] are
many church officials and sectarians, previously repressed, former active
participants of anti-Soviet armed campaigns. Significant cadres of anti-
Soviet political parties (SRs, Georgian Mensheviks, Dashnaks, Mussava-
tists, Ittihadists,5 etc.), as well as cadres of former active members of
bandit uprisings, Whites, members of punitive expeditions, repatriatees,
and so on, remain nearly untouched in the countryside.
Some of the above-mentioned elements, leaving the countryside for the
cities, have infiltrated enterprises of industry, transport, and construction.
Besides this, significant cadres of criminals are still nested in both
countryside and city. These include horse and cattle thieves, recidivist
thieves, robbers, and others who were serving sentences and escaped, and
are now in hiding. Inadequate struggle against these criminal contingents
has created conditions of impunity for them, promoting their criminal
activities.
As has been established, all of these anti-Soviet elements constitute the
chief instigators of every sort of anti-Soviet crime and subversion in kolk-
hozes and sovkhozes, as well as in transport and in certain branches of
industry.
Before the organs of state security stands the task—of crushing in the
most merciless way this entire gang of anti-Soviet elements, of defending
the laboring Soviet people from their counterrevolutionary intrigues, and,
finally, of putting an end, once and for all, to their vile undermining of the
foundations of the Soviet state.
Accordingly, I order that, as of 5 August 1937, all republics, krai, and
oblasts launch a repressive campaign against former kulaks, active anti-
Soviet elements, and criminals.
[…]
The organization and execution of this campaign should be guided by
the following:
I. Contingents subject to repression.

1. Former kulaks who have returned home after having served their
sentences and who continue to carry out active anti-Soviet sabotage.
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 201

2. Former kulaks who have escaped from camps or from labor settle-
ments, as well as kulaks who have been in hiding from dekulakiza-
tion, who carry out anti-Soviet activities.
3. Former kulaks and socially dangerous elements who were members
of insurgent, fascist, terrorist, and bandit formations, who have
served their sentences, who have been in hiding from repression, or
who have escaped from places of confinement and renewed their
anti-Soviet criminal activities.
4. Members of anti-Soviet parties (SRs, Georgian Mensheviks, Mussa-
vatists, Ittihadists, and Dashnaks), former Whites, gendarmes, bu-
reaucrats, members of punitive expeditions, bandits, gang abettors,
émigré abettors, reemigrants, who are in hiding from repression, who
have escaped from places of confinement, and who continue to carry
out active anti-Soviet activities.
5. [Persons] unmasked by investigators, against whom evidence is veri-
fied by materials obtained by investigative agents, and who are the
most hostile and active members of Cossack–White Guard insurgen-
cy organizations slated for liquidation, and fascist, terrorist, and
espionage-saboteur counterrevolutionary formations. Elements of
this category who are at present kept under guard, whose cases have
been fully investigated but not yet considered by the judicial organs,
are subject to repression, as well.
6. The most active anti-Soviet elements from former kulaks, members
of punitive expeditions, bandits, Whites, sectarian activists, church
officials, and others, who are presently held in prisons, camps, labor
settlements, and colonies and who continue to carry out in those
places their active anti-Soviet sabotage.
7. Criminals (bandits, robbers, recidivist thieves, professional contra-
band smugglers, recidivist swindlers, cattle and horse thieves) who
are carrying out criminal activities and who are associated with the
criminal underworld. In addition, repressive measures are to be taken
against elements of this category who are kept at the present under
guard, whose cases have been fully investigated but not yet consid-
ered by the judicial organs.
8. Criminal elements in camps and labor settlements who are carrying
out criminal activities in them.
9. All of the groups enumerated above, to be found at present in the
countryside—i.e., in kolkhozes, sovkhozes, in agricultural enterpris-
es—as well as in the city—i.e., in industrial and trade enterprises, in
transport, in Soviet institutions, and in construction—are subject to
repression.

II. Measures of punishment and numbers of those subject to repression.

202 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

1. All repressed kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet elements are

broken down into two categories:
a) To the first category belong all the most active of the above-
mentioned elements. They are subject to immediate arrest and,
after consideration of their case by the troikas, to be shot.
b) To the second category belong all the remaining, less active but
nonetheless hostile, elements. They are subject to arrest and to
confinement in concentration camps for a term ranging from 8 to
10 years, while the most vicious and socially dangerous among
them are subject to confinement for similar terms in prisons, as
determined by the troikas.
2. In accordance with the registration data presented by the people’s
commissars of the republic NKVDs and by the heads of krai and
oblast administrations of the NKVD, the following numbers of per-
sons are subject to repression:
[Chart of quotas, by category, and by republic and oblast or krai]
3. The approved figures are for orientation. However, republic NKVD
commissars and heads of krai and oblast NKVD administrations do
not have the authority independently to raise them. No independent
increase in figures is permitted.
In cases where the situation warrants an increase in approved figures,
republic NKVD commissars and heads of krai and oblast NKVD
administrations are required to present me with a corresponding peti-
tion of justification.
Reducing figures, and equally, transferring persons slated for first cat-
egory repression to the second category, and vice versa, is permitted.
4. The families of those sentenced in accordance with the first or second
category are not, as a rule, to be repressed. Exceptions to this include:
a) Families, members of which are capable of active anti-Soviet
actions. By special decision of the troikas, members of such fam-
ilies are subject to transfer to camps or labor settlements.
b) The families of persons repressed in accordance with the first
category who live in border areas are subject to expulsion
beyond the border area within the republics, krai, or oblasts.
c) The families of those repressed in accordance with the first cat-
egory who live in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Baku,
Rostov-on-the-Don, Taganrog, and in the raions of Sochi, Gagry,
and Sukhumi, are subject to expulsion from these centers to oth-
er oblasts of their choice, except for border raions.
5. All families of persons repressed in accordance with the first and
second categories are to be registered and placed under systematic
observation.
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 203

III. Order of the operation.

1. The operation is to begin 5 August 1937 and end in a four-month
period.
In the Turkmen, Tadzhik, Uzbek, and Kirgiz SSR to begin operation
10 August this year, and in the Eastern Siberian Oblast, and Kras-
noyarsk and Far East krai—15 August this year.
2. Contingents assigned to the first category are subject to repression,
first of all.
Contingents assigned to the second category will not be subject to
repression until special instructions [are given].
In cases where the republic NKVD commissar or the NKVD admin-
istrative head or head of the oblast department, having completed
the operation against contingents of the first category, deems it
possible to begin the operation against contingents of the second
category, he is obligated to request my sanction before beginning the
actual operation, and only after receiving [my sanction] to begin
the operation.
In relation to those arrested and sentenced to confinement in camps
or prisons for various periods […] advise me how many persons, for
what time period to be sentenced to prison or camp. After receiving
this information, I will give instructions about the order in which to
send the convicts and to which camps.
3. Divide republic, krai, and oblast territories into operational sectors,
in accordance with the situation and local conditions.
For organizing and conducting the operation, form an operational
group for each sector, headed by a ranking official of the republic-,
krai-, or oblast-level NKVD administration who is capable of coping
successfully with the serious operational tasks to be laid upon him.
In some cases, highly experienced and capable heads of raion or city
offices may be appointed heads of operational groups.
4. Staff operational groups with the necessary number of operational of-
ficers and provide them with means of transport and communication.
In accordance with operational requirements, supplement groups
with militarized or civil police units.
5. Heads of operational groups have responsibility for registering and
identifying those subject to repression, for leading the investigation,
for formulating indictments, and for carrying out sentences of the
troikas.
The head of the operational groups is responsible for the organiza-
tion and conduct of the operation in his operational sector.
6. For each person repressed, collect detailed information and compro-
mising material. On the basis of the latter, make up arrest lists, signed
by the head of the operational group, with two copies to be sent for
review and confirmation to the commissar of internal affairs, or to
204 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

the head of the [NKVD] administration, or the NKVD oblast admin-

istration.
The commissar of internal affairs, or the head of the NKVD admin-
istration, or the NKVD oblast administration will review the list and
give sanction for arrest […].
7. On the basis of the approved list, the operational group head will
carry out the arrest. Each arrest is to be formulated as an order. Dur-
ing arrest, conduct a thorough search. Confiscate: weapons, ammuni-
tion, military equipment, explosive materials, poisonous materials,
counterrevolutionary literature, precious metals in the form of mon-
ey, bullion, jewelry, foreign currency, print reproduction equipment,
and correspondence.
Everything confiscated is to be registered in the search protocol.
8. Those arrested are to be collected at points designated by the com-
missar of internal affairs, or the head of the NKVD administration or
oblast department. Collection points for arrestees are to have struc-
tures suitable for holding those arrested.
9. Arrestees are to be closely guarded. All measures must be organized
to prevent escapes or any kind of excesses.

IV. Order for conducting the investigation.

1. Investigation shall be conducted into the case of each person or group
of persons arrested. The investigation shall be carried out in a swift
and simplified manner. During the course of the investigation, all crim-
inal connections of persons arrested are to be exposed.
2. At the conclusion of the investigation, the case is to be submitted for
consideration to the troika.

[…]
VI. Order for carrying out sentences.
1. Sentences are to be carried out by persons in accordance with instruc-
tions by chairmen of the troikas—i.e., by commissars of the republic
NKVDs, heads of [NKVD] administrations, or by the raion-level
departments of the NKVD.
Implementation of the sentence shall be based on the certified extract
from the minutes of the troika session containing an account of the
sentence regarding each convicted person and a special directive
bearing the signature of the chairman of the troika, which are to be
handed to the person who executes the sentence.
2. Sentences included under the first category are to be carried out in
places and in the order as instructed by the commissars of internal
affairs, by the heads of [NKVD] administrations, or by the raion-
level departments of the NKVD, under complete secrecy of time and
place […].
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 205

Documents concerning the implementation of the sentence are

attached in a separate envelope to the investigative dossier of each
convicted person.
3. Assignment to camps of persons convicted under the second category
is to be carried out on the basis of warrants communicated by the
GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR.

VII. Organizing the operational leadership and maintenance of records.

1. I place [responsibility for] general direction of the operations on my
deputy, comrade Frinovsky, Corps Commander, head of the Chief
Administration of State Security. A special group is to be formed
under him in order to implement the tasks associated with the direc-
tion of these operations.
[…]
3. Reports on the conduct and results of the operation are to be sent
every 5 days, on the 1st, 5th, 10th, 15th, and 25th of each month by
telegram and in detail by post.
4. Inform immediately by telegram of any counterrevolutionary forma-
tions newly uncovered in the process of the operation, any excesses
that arise, escapes across the border, formation of groups of bandits
and thieves, and other emergencies.

Thoroughgoing measures are to be taken during the organization and

implementation of the operations in order to prevent persons subject to
repression from going underground, in order to prevent their escape from
their places of residence and especially beyond the border, in order to
prevent their forming groups of bandits and thieves, and to prevent any
excesses. Any attempts to commit some counterrevolutionary actions are
to be exposed promptly, and quickly stopped.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and General Com-
missar of State Security,
[N. Yezhov]
Confirmed: M. Frinovsky
The following day, the Politburo approved the order, and issued
instructions about how to deal with the huge influx of new prisoners,
those who were lucky enough not to be executed outright. The docu-
ment below gives specific meaning to the oft-used description of the
NKVD as a state within the state. Repression was a huge enterprise in
the Soviet Union, and the demands of the state’s security organization
extended into nearly every other state institution, and cost tens of
millions of rubles.
206 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

d o c u m ent
· 110 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK (VKPb). On the question
of the NKVD. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, ll. 52–54.
31 July 1937

1. To confirm the draft presented by the NKVD of an operational order

concerning repression of former kulaks, criminals, and other anti-
Soviet elements.
2. To commence operations in all oblasts of the USSR on 5 August
1937; in the Far East Krai, in the Eastern Siberia Oblast, and in Kras-
noyarsk Krai as of 15 August 1937; in the Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadzhik,
and Kirghiz republics as of 10 August 1937. The entire operation is
to be completed within a period of 4 months.
[…]
5. To issue to the NKVD 75 million rubles from the reserve fund of the
SNK [Council of People’s Commissars] to cover operational expenses
associated with the implementation of the operation, of which 25
million rubles is for payment of rail transport fees.
6. To require the NKPS [Commissariat of Transport and Communica-
tions] to grant the NKVD rolling stock in accordance with its de-
mands for the purpose of transporting the convicted within oblasts
and to camps.
7. To utilize, as follows, all kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet ele-
ments convicted under the second category to confinement in camps
for periods of time:
a) on construction projects currently under way in the GULAG of
the NKVD of the USSR;
b) on constructing new camps in the remote areas of Kazakhstan;
c) on the construction of new camps especially organized for
timber works undertaken by convict labor.
8. To propose to the People’s Commissariat of Forestry that it forthwith
transfer to the GULAG of the NKVD the following forest tracts for the
purpose of organizing camps for forest works. [List follows.]
9. To propose to the People’s Commissariat of Forestry and to the
GULAG of the NKVD of the USSR to determine within a period of
ten days which additional forest tracts, other than those listed above,
should be transferred to the GULAG for the purpose of organizing
new camps.
10. To commission the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) of the
USSR, the GULAG of the NKVD, and the People’s Commissariat of
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 207

Forestry to work out within a period of 20 days and to present for

confirmation to SNK USSR:
a) plans for the organization of timber cuttings, the labor force
needed for this purpose, the necessary material resources, the
funds, and the cadres of specialists;
b) to define the program of timber cuttings of these camps for the
year 1938.
11. To issue to the GULAG NKVD a 10 million ruble advance from the
reserve fund of SNK to organize camps and to conduct preparatory
work.
[…]
12. To propose to the oblast and krai committees of the VKP(b) and of
the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League (VLKSM) [Komso-
mol] in oblasts where camps are being organized, to assign to the
NKVD the necessary number of communists and Komsomol mem-
bers in order to bring the administrative and camp security apparatus
to full strength (as demanded by the NKVD).
13. To require the People’s Commissariat of Defense to call up from the
RKKA [Red Army] reserves 210 commanding officers and political
workers in order to bring to full strength the cadres of supervisory
personnel of the military security forces of newly organized camps.
14. To require the People’s Commissariat of Health to assign to the
GULAG of the NKVD 150 physicians and 400 medical attendants
for service in the newly organized camps.
15. To require the People’s Commissariat of Forestry to assign to the
GULAG 10 eminent specialists in forestry and to transfer 50 gradu-
ates of the Leningrad Academy of Forest Technology to the GULAG.

Other Mass Operations

As operations got under way, arrest quotas began to rise. Some of the
pressure for this came from local officials, either out of a desire to
show the requisite zeal, or as a way to settle accounts with a number
of troubling populations in their regions. On the other hand, Stalin
and Yezhov used a coterie of selected killers whom they sent to spe-
cific regions to step up the pace of repression. One of Stalin’s most
ruthless killers during the mass operations was G. F. Gorbach, a career
NKVD officer who was assigned and reassigned several times, before
his own arrest, to push sluggish fulfillment of mass operations. As
soon as he arrived in a new oblast, such as Omsk, he immediately
requested, and always received, permission to raise arrest quotas.
208 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

d o c u m ent
· 111 ·
Coded telegram from G. F. Gorbach to N. I. Yezhov on increasing the limit for
the “kulak” operation in Omsk Oblast. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 87b.
15 August 1937

As of 13 August 5,444 individuals of the first category have been arrested

in Omsk Oblast, 1,000 weapons confiscated. I request instructions
regarding my letter, No. 365, concerning a limit for first category up to
8,000 individuals.
13.VIII. No. 1962 Gorbach
Stalin’s handwritten note on the telegram approved the increase to
eight thousand.
Even as the political police were conducting arrests according to
the various national and anti-Soviet operational orders, the Politburo
approved yet another mass operation, the so-called Harbin operation.
This involved the arrest of some twenty-five thousand people who had
worked in China along the rail line owned by the Soviet Union from
the Soviet border to the Chinese city of Harbin. As with the “national-
ity” operations, leaders feared that all individuals who had been
abroad or worked for the rail line, or who had fled as refugees from
China, were potential or actual traitors, working for the Japanese,
whose troops occupied Manchuria, where Harbin was located. As a
result, the Politburo approved the following instructions.

d o c u m ent
· 112 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On the NKVD, with appended
draft for Operational Order No. 00593. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 254, ll. 223–28.
19 September 1937

To confirm the closed letter [for limited circulation] of the NKVD USSR
and the order for measures in connection with terrorist, subversive, and
spying activities of Japanese agents among the so-called Kharbintsy
[Harbin people].
Operational order of the USSR Commissar of Internal Affairs.
NKVD organs have registered up to 25,000 so-called Kharbintsy (for-
mer employees of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and reimmigrants from
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 209

Manchukuo [Japanese occupied Manchuria]) [who] have settled into the

railroad transport and industries of the [Soviet] Union.
Reliable agent-operational materials show that the great majority of the
Kharbintsy entering the USSR consist of former White officers, policemen,
gendarmes, members of various immigrant spy-fascist organizations, and
so forth. For the most part, they are agents of Japanese intelligence, which
has sent [these agents] into the Soviet Union for terrorist, subversive, and
spying activities.
Investigative materials serve, as well, to prove this. For example, in the
railroad and industries, up to 4,500 Kharbintsy have been repressed in
the last year for active terrorist and subversive intelligence activities.
Investigation of their cases reveals carefully prepared and executed work
by Japanese intelligence [organs] to organize subversive spy bases among
the Kharbintsy on the territory of the Soviet Union.
[…] with the goal of crushing the cadres of spies among the Khar-
bintsy planted in the transport and in industries of the USSR
I order:
1. Beginning 1 October 1937, launch a broad operation of liquidation
of subversive spying and terrorist cadre of Kharbintsy in transport
and in industries.
2. All Kharbintsy are subject to arrest:
a) Those who have already been discovered and [those] suspected
of terrorist, subversive, spying, and wrecking activities;
b) Former Whites, reimmigrants, those who either emigrated during
the Civil War, or military personnel of various White formations;
c) Former members of anti-Soviet political parties (SRs, Mensheviks);
d) Members of Trotskyist and right formations, as well as Khar-
bintsy having connections with the activities of these anti-Soviet
formations;
e) Members of various immigrant fascist organizations (“Russian
United Military Union,” “Union of Cossack Villages,” “Union of
Musketeers,” “Yellow Union,” “Black Ring,” “Christian Union
of Young People,” “Russian Student Society,” “Brotherhood of
Russian Truth,” “Working Peasants Party,” and so forth);
f) Employees of the Chinese police and army, both from before
Japanese occupation of Manchuria, and after the formation of
Manchukuo;
g) Employees of foreign firms, Japanese, first of all, but White
Guardist as well (the Churin firm, and others);
h) Graduates of known Harbin courses “Internationale,” “Slavia,”
“Prague”;
i) Owners and co-owners of various enterprises in Harbin (restau-
rants, hotels, garages, etc.);
210 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

j) Illegal arrivals in the USSR without legal Soviet documents;

k) Those who took Chinese citizenship, and then Soviet citizenship
again;
l) Former smugglers, criminals, opium and morphine traffickers, etc.;
m) Members of counterrevolutionary sectarian groups.
[…]
5. Investigation of cases of arrested Kharbintsy should be developed in
such a way as to expose, in the shortest possible time, all members of
subversive-spying and terrorist organizations and groups.
Arrest immediately any new networks of spies, wreckers, and subver-
sives that are uncovered in the process of investigating the Khar-
bintsy.
[…]
7. Every ten days make an album of arrested Kharbintsy […] with con-
crete depiction of investigative and agent materials, which determines
the degree of guilt of the arrested. Send the album to the NKVD
USSR for confirmation.
[…]
11. Complete the operation by 25 December 1937.
[…]
13. Inform me about the progress of the operation every five days by
telegram […].

Commissar of Internal Affairs, USSR, General Commissar of State Se-

curity,
Yezhov
According to data collected by the Russian organization Memorial,
46,317 Kharbintsy were repressed, of whom 30,992 were shot.

The Messiness of Mass Repression

As the documents above show, operational orders were specific about
arrest and processing procedures, especially about documenting in-
vestigative materials, confessions, convictions, and sentences. In prac-
tice, however, local police officials came under such pressure to fulfill
arrest quotas that they were forced to streamline the process of repres-
sion, dispensing with any kind of procedure and creating a kind of
conveyor system of terror. In January 1938, a special procurator on
the Kirov railroad line described in a report how this mass-production
system worked. In the context of this report, “conveyor” refers not to
the oft-cited practice of continuous interrogations, but to the bureau-
cratic assembly-line character of the purge machine. The procurator,
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 211

a certain Vorob’ev, submitted his report in the form of a rare com-

plaint to his superiors about investigative methods used by local po-
litical police officials and operational groups.

d o c u m en t
· 113 ·
Report of 26 January 1938 from Procuracy transport investigator of the 5th
Kirov railroad, Vorob’ev, to Deputy Procurator of the Kirov railroad, Shapiro.
GARF, f. 8131, op. 37, d. 69, ll 8–10.

In January of 1938, a plenipotentiary of the Petrozavodsk DTO GUGB

[transport department, GUGB], Pukhov, M. V., was assigned to us to
conduct several case investigations (arrests, interrogations, witnesses,
etc.). Since we had no special room for him, I gave him my office. During
our conversation, he told me he had much work, serious work, and a
fixed deadline, and that, alone, he could not do it. He asked me to give
him help. I didn’t have any pressing cases (only 1) and so I said yes. I
agreed to give him five people.
What did our work consist of? It consisted of gathering eyewitness
accounts. They were very easy to gather.
Pukhov invited several of his acquaintances, [list follows of eight
names, including two railroad dispatchers and a local medical clinic ad-
ministrator] and others, and before briefing them, said to each, “I need
eyewitness accounts for such and such, and such and such people (he had
a list), they have been shot, you will not be called into court, evidence is
needed only to formulate the case. We will write the protocol, then you
stop by and sign it.” I repeat, he said this to each of the “witnesses.”
After such conversations, Pukov and I got down to business. He made
up a rough draft of an [arrest and indictment] protocol and said: “(…)
Write the protocol for these people.” He gave me 3–4 names, first and last,
and the last place they worked, so that I could answer the first question,
“Do you know so and so?” There were three questions: “Do you know
this person?” “What do you know about anti-Soviet activities of this per-
son?” and “Tell about your connections to this person.” That was all.
I took a blank form, filled out the biographical data, answered that
I understood the penalty for giving false evidence, according to statute 95
of the criminal code, and began my conversation with the absent wit-
ness—gave them the required questions and answered them myself. [Ex-
cept for the biographical information], the rest all depended on my own
fantasy. And, I won’t be modest, since I don’t lack imagination, the result
came out smoothly.
212 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

Pukhov said that such and such a machinist conducted c-r agitation,
sabotaged all measures of the Party and government, slandered the great
leaders, carried out wrecking activities in production. He invited me to fill
in the protocol in such a fashion. And I wrote it just so. I wrote that the
machinist, his name was Iul’, I think, is dangerously disposed against the
Party and Soviet power in his counterrevolutionary soul; that he system-
atically slandered all measures of the Party and government; called social-
ist competition [production competition campaigns] as exploitative of
workers as in any capitalist country; that the right to vacation is given
only to Party and government leaders; that in the resorts and sanatoriums
communists lay about and don’t do a stroke of work, and only squander
the money of workers; that the Stalinist constitution is a fiction, a deceit,
blatant cheating on the part of communists, who systematically betray
the working class in their own interests; that the elections to the Supreme
Soviet were also a fiction; that only those whom the communists wanted
became deputies, and the workers were pushed aside. Etc. I wrote a lot.
Protocols for the others I changed somewhat, so as not simply to repeat
myself. And the “work” went on, without interruption.
During the day we scribbled away, completing eight such protocols. In
the evening, the “witnesses.” Several were completely indifferent, signing
my creation without even reading it; others gave a surprised look, read
with trepidation, and adamantly refused to sign. But Pukhov calmed
them, said that these citizens had been shot, that you will not be called
into court, etc. Their resistance was broken and they signed the protocol.
Clearly, the witnesses did not know the people whose protocols they
signed […] had never looked them in the face.
[…]
In one of the conversations I had with Pukhov afterward, he said, “I
will send you 200 rubles to settle accounts,” and this surprised me. Some-
thing else he said, “I had to give a bit to Lashmanovoi, because not every-
body would agree to sign this kind of a protocol or a blank form.” I
understood from this that Pukhov had paid Lashmanovoi to give an eye-
witness account.
This was our work. Pukhov signed all the protocols. Certainly, our
actions were illegal and criminally liable. In plain Russian, they were falsi-
fications, deceits. Given such investigative methods and actions, personal
freedom in our country cannot be guaranteed. Such methods are alien to
our Soviet intelligence service, alien to the work of our glorious Chekists.
From my work with Pukhov I learned nothing except that, in the end, I was
fed up with creating fantasies and such disgusting fictions. Was Pukhov
correct? Do we allow such investigative methods? I ask you to clarify this.
By the way, I ask you, Comrade Shapiro, to answer the following: We
now have people working here from the NKVD opergruppa [operational
group]. Two operatives. They have arrested a number of people. They
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 213

can’t interrogate them all themselves. So, they have mobilized others from
Party-Komsomol activists such as Borshov, deputy head of the political
department, […], and Kudriatseva, another Komsomol member, head of
a fire brigade. Is this proper? I don’t think so.
In perusing the above document, the reader wonders if Vorob’ev ex-
perienced a certain vicarious thrill in being able to enumerate with im-
punity such a long list of unmentionable truths about the Soviet system.
Vorob’ev certainly did not attempt to abbreviate the list of “slanderous
lies” that he put into the mouths of the condemned victims.

The Wizard Behind the Curtain

By early 1938, political police cadres were working under tremendous
pressure, attempting to fulfill quotas for a number of mass operations,
as well as for the ongoing purges of regional Party organizations, the
military, and state institutions. Despite the burden of work, Stalin
continued to press Yezhov for results. There are not many documents
to show Stalin’s close control of events, since much was communi-
cated through oral instruction, but the following memorandum and
resolution shows the extent to which the general secretary followed
and directed various purging operations closely.

d o c u m en t
· 114 ·
Memorandum from I. V. Stalin to N. I. Yezhov concerning SRs. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 24, d. 330, l. 18.
17 January 1938

C. Yezhov,
1. The line on SRs (left and right together) has not been completely
unraveled. Fishman and Paskutsky are leading the NKVD by the
nose. If Belov himself had not unraveled the line on the SRs, the
NKVD would be sitting in the dark. Belov said some things, but did
not say everything. Paskutsky, Uritsky, and Fishman must supple-
ment Belov. It must be kept in mind that there are not a few SRs in
our army and outside the army. Does the NKVD have a registry of
SRs (“former”) in the army? I would like to have it, and soon. Does
the NKVD have a registry of SRs outside the army (in civilian institu-
tions)? I would like to have this, as well, within 2–3 weeks.
214 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

2. What has been done to identify the SRs on the basis of the known
evidence from Ryskulov?
3. What has been done to identify and arrest all Iranians in Baku and
Azerbaijan?
4. I can tell you from my own experience that at that time SRs were very
strong in Saratov, in Tambov, in Ukraine, in the army (command
staff), in Tashkent, and in general, in Central Asia, in the Bakinsk
power-generating stations where they still sit and still engage in
wrecking in the oil industry. You must act livelier and push harder.
5. A very important task: strengthen the oblasts of the DVK [Far East
Krai] with new Chekists, from outside. This is far more important
than strengthening the Kazakhstan oblasts, which may be given a
lower priority.

Still Higher Limits

The original order 00447 placed a time limit on operations of the end
of 1937, but in January, the Politburo approved an extension of the
operations in a number of areas with even higher quotas.

d o c u m ent
· 115 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On anti-Soviet elements.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, ll. 155–56.
31 January 1938

[…]
a) Adopt the recommendation by the NKVD USSR to confirm addition-
al numbers subject to repression of former kulaks, criminals, and ac-
tive anti-Soviet elements, in the following krai, oblasts, and republics:
1. Armenia SSR: 1000 in cat[egory] 1 and 1,000 in cat. 2
2. Belorussia SSR: 1,500 -″-
3. Ukraine SSR: 6,000 -″-
4. Georgia SSR: 1,500 -″-
5. Azerbaijan SSR: 2,000 -″-
6. Turkmenistan SSR: 1,000 -″-
7. Kirgiz SSR: 500 -″-
8. Tadzhik SSR: 1,000 -″- and 500 -″-
9. Uzbek SSR: 2,000 -″- and 500 -″-
10. LVK: 8,000 -″- and 2,000 -″-
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 215

11. Chita Oblast: 1,500 -″- and 500 -″-

12. Buryat-Mongolia: 500 -″-
13. Irkutsk Oblast: 3,000 -″- and 500 -″-
14. Krasnoyarsk Krai: 1,500 -″- and 500 -″-
15. Novosibirsk Oblast: 1,000 -″-
16. Omsk Oblast: 3,000 -″- and 2,000 -″-
17. Altai Krai: 2,000 -″- and 1,000 -”-
18. Leningrad Obl.: 3,000 -″-
19. Karelia SSR: 500 -″- and 200 -″-
20. Kalinin Oblast: 1,500 -″- and 500 -″-
21. Moscow Oblast: 4,000 -″-
22. Sverdlovsk Oblast: 2,000 -″-
b) Recommend that the NKVD USSR complete all operations in the
above-designated oblasts, krai, and republics no later than 15 March
1938, and in DVK no later than 1 April 1938.
c) In accordance with this decision, extend the work of troikas for re-
viewing cases of former kulaks, criminals, and anti-Soviet elements in
the oblasts, krai, and republics listed under point “a.”

In all other oblasts, krai, and republics, complete troikas’ work no

later than 15 February 1938, so that, by that date, all cases will be fin-
ished and reviewed within the given limits [quotas] established for those
krai, oblasts, and republics.
The Politburo also extended the nationality operations, and in
1938, NKVD officials began to insist that local officials arrest people
according to genuinely ethnic rather than associational criteria.

d o c u m en t
· 116 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On continuing repression among
populations according to their nationality. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 254a, l. 90.
31 January 1938

1. To allow Narkomvnudel [the NKVD] to continue until 15 April

1938 the operation to crush spying-subversive contingents of Poles,
Latvians, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Kharbintsy,
Chinese, and Romanians, either foreign or Soviet citizens, under ex-
isting NKVD orders.
2. Continue until 15 April the existing extrajudicial review of cases of
those arrested under this operation, regardless of their citizenship.
216 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

3. Recommend that the NKVD conduct an analogous operation until

15 April to crush cadres of Bulgarians and Macedonians, both for-
eign and Soviet citizens.

In addition to purging potentially hostile ethnic minority popula-

tions, leaders also attempted to seal the borders of the country against
“contamination.” The following document attests to the level of para-
noia of leaders who instructed the police to arrest and either shoot or
imprison all refugees coming into the country, and to strengthen
police control of border regions in eastern Siberia. What is interesting
is that refugees were to be “punished” by imprisonment even if police
interrogation determined that their motives for seeking asylum were
genuine, and that they had no intention of conducting anti-Soviet
activities. Such an instruction shows how much the repressive nature
of the purges, especially the mass operations, was intended as prophy-
lactic, regardless of a person’s actions or intentions.

d o c u m ent
· 117 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On refugees. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 6, l. 53.
31 January 1938

It has been established that foreign intelligence services insert into the
USSR their massive network of spies and subversive intelligence agents
mainly in the guise of refugees: those purportedly seeking political asylum
in the USSR; better material conditions, as a result of unemployment;
deserters from military units and border guards; reimmigrants; and
immigrants.
The TsK VKP(b) decides:

1) To recommend that the NKVD USSR apprehend, immediately arrest,

and carefully interrogate all refugees at the border, regardless of their
motives for crossing into the territory of the USSR.
2) All refugees—if it is established directly or indirectly that they crossed
into the territory of the USSR with spying, subversive, or other anti-
Soviet intentions—remand to the military tribunal court with a man-
datory application of shooting.
3) Cases of all refugees, for whom it is established that they crossed into
territory of the USSR without malicious intent, remand for review by
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 217

the Special Board [Osoboe soveshchanie] of the NKVD USSR, with

application of punishment measures of 10 years of prison confinement.

[…].
And, still, the requests for higher and higher limits continued.

d o c u m en t
· 118 ·
Coded telegram from Ia. A. Popok to I. V. Stalin regarding an additional
limit for review of cases of anti-Soviet elements. RGASPI, f. 558,
op. 11, d. 65, l. 108.
2 February 1938

From Engels
Strictly secret
To: Moscow, TsK VKP(b) c. Stalin
The troika reviewing cases of former kulaks, criminals, anti-Soviet ele-
ments has reached its limit, and not succeeded yet in completing its work
to crush active elements.
I request an additional limit of one thousand persons by February 15.
Secretary of Nemobkom [German Oblast Party committee] VKP(b),
Popok

d o c u m en t
· 119 ·
Coded telegram from Iu. M. Kaganovich to I. V. Stalin and N. I. Yezhov on
increasing the limit for Gorky Oblast. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 158.
4 February 1938

Gorky
Absolutely secret
Work of the troikas is finished. In accordance with the oblast limit
9,600 kulak, SR, insurgent and other anti-Soviet elements have been re-
pressed. Additionally, kulak–White Guardist elements conducting sub-
versive work have been discovered. In all up to 9,000 of the anti-Soviet
element are calculated.
218 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

The Obkom requests establishment of an additional limit of 3 thou-

sand in the first category and two thousand in the second. Continue the
period of operation until 20 March.
Secretary of the Obkom VKP(b),
Iu. Kaganovich

d o c u m ent
· 120 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On the question of the NKVD. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 161.
17 February 1938

To allow the NKVD Ukraine to conduct additional arrests of kulak

and others of the anti-Soviet element and review cases in troikas, increas-
ing the limit for the NKVD SSR Ukraine by 30,000.
As Stalin pressed Yezhov, so Yezhov pressed his subordinates, who
were required to provide regular reports on the progress of opera-
tions. This meant, of course, that local police officials had to keep all
the various operations straight, and to make sure that they were com-
plying with the varying deadlines for different operations. As a result,
the lists of those arrested, shot, imprisoned, or deported became
meaningless; they became bureaucratic numbers to be manipulated to
satisfy bureaucratic demands. Nonetheless, numbers were important,
all important. Yezhov passed on the numbers to Stalin that local com-
manders passed to him and, as the following document shows, Stalin
read numbers carefully.

d o c u m ent
· 121 ·
Special communication from N. I. Yezhov to I. V. Stalin with appended copy of
telegram by S. I. Lebedev on progress of the foreign nationalities operations. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 254, ll. 200–205.

[On the first page, handwritten note by Stalin: “Important”]

24 March 1938
Absolutely secret
To the Secretary of the TsK VKP(b) c. Stalin
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 219

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 3/1909 by the Head of the NKVD

administration of Tula Oblast, c. Lebedev, on the progress of operations
against Germans, Estonians, and others.
Commissar of Internal Affairs USSR
General Commissar of State Security (Yezhov)
Absolutely secret
To the Commissar of Internal Affairs USSR
General Commissar of state security, c. Yezhov, N. I.
Post-telegram
On progress of operations under NKVD orders 00485, 00439, and
00593
In accordance with your directive No. 233, from 1 October 1937
through 20 March 1938, 1,646 persons were arrested by us, of which:
824 along the Polish line [of operation], 299 along the German line, 230
along the Latvian line, 21 along the Estonian line, 13 along the Romanian
line, 7 along the Finnish line, 136 along the Kharbin line, 35 along the
Chinese line, 48 along the Iranian line, 33 along the Greek line.
These include 127 persons arrested by us in the five-day period from
15 through 20 March, this year, of which: 91 along the Polish line, 12
along the German line, 17 along the Latvian line, 1 along the Kharbin
line, 5 along the Chinese line, 1 along the Romanian line.
During the same five-day period the following counterrevolutionary
formations were uncovered and liquidated:
[…]
The operation continues, according to your directive.
Head of UNKVD for the Tula Oblast
Major of state security,
Lebedev
In May 1938, not satisfied with the pace of the nationality opera-
tions, the Politburo once again extended the deadline for their com-
pletion.

d o c u m en t
· 122 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On the question of the NKVD. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 177.
26 May 1938

To continue until 1 August 1938 the simplified procedure for reviewing

cases of persons of Polish, German, Latvian, Estonian, Finnish, Bulgarian,
Macedonian, Greek, Romanian, Iranian, Afghan, Chinese Nationalists,
220 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

and Kharbintsy discovered in spying, terrorist, and other anti-Soviet

activities.

Ending the Operations and Ending Yezhov

The mass operations under order 00447 also extended into the sum-
mer of 1938, although the peak of arrests passed already in February
and March. Individual areas continued to request higher quotas, and
there was a last spasm of violent repression in Eastern Siberia, spurred
by the flight, in June, into China and then to Japan, of the NKVD chief
for the krai, G. S. Liushkov. By late summer, all the mass operations
were beginning to wind down, and Stalin began to maneuver in order
to bring the purges to a close and to reassert Party control over the
NKVD. To what extent Liushkov’s betrayal contributed to Stalin’s
decision to get rid of Yezhov is not clear, although Yezhov believed
that the defection to the enemy of one of the highest-ranking security
officers would be blamed on him. In any case, a clear sign came in
August with the reassignment of Yezhov’s deputy, M. P. Frinovsky, to
head the navy. Frinovsky was not only a deputy head of the NKVD,
but Yezhov’s top aide in perpetrating the mass operations. At the same
time, the Politburo endorsed the appointment of Lavrentii Beria to
replace Frinovsky. Although Beria had worked previously in the
OGPU, from 1931, he had been Party head in the Caucasus Krai. His
appointment as first deputy was essentially a first step in isolating
Yezhov and in bringing Party control back to the security organs.
Throughout the early autumn, other of Yezhov’s deputies were reas-
signed and replaced with people recommended by Beria.
As Stalin and Beria maneuvered to weaken Yezhov, the Politburo
began to move toward ending the mass operations. In early October,
the Politburo established a commission to review arrest procedures
and Procuracy supervision of the NKVD. Yezhov was appointed as a
nominal head, but the commission included Beria as well as Andrei
Vyshinsky, the USSR chief procurator and a longtime rival of the
NKVD. On 17 November, the Politburo issued a decision that effec-
tively brought the mass operation purges to a close, reestablished dor-
mant legal procedures for arrest and investigation, and reasserted
Procuracy supervision of investigations and arrests. The document
described accurately the way in which the purges were conducted,
only now it condemned them as illegal and anti-Soviet.
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 221

d o c u m en t
· 123 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On arrests, procuratorial supervi-
sion, and the conduct of investigations. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1003, ll.
85–87.6
17 November 1938

[…]
Absolutely secret
To the people’s commissars of internal affairs of the Union and au-
tonomous republics, to the heads of krai and oblast administrations of the
NKVD, to the heads of the military district, city, and raion-level depart-
ments of the NKVD;
To procurators of the Union and autonomous republics, to procurators
of krai and oblasts, military districts, cities, and raions;
To secretaries of the TsK of national communist parties, krai committees,
oblast committees, the military district, city, and raion-level committees of
the VKP(b)
On arrests, supervision by the Procuracy, and the conduct of investiga-
tions.
Decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the
Central Committee of the VKP(b).
SNK USSR and the TsK of the VKP(b) recognize that the NKVD
organs, under the leadership of the Party, have accomplished much dur-
ing 1937–38 in inflicting a crushing defeat on enemies of the people and
in purging the USSR of numerous espionage, terrorist, subversive, and
wrecking cadres consisting of Trotskyists, Bukharinists, SRs, Menshe-
viks, bourgeois nationalists, White Guardists, fugitive kulaks, and crimi-
nal elements—all providing crucial support to foreign intelligence agen-
cies in the USSR and, in particular, to the intelligence agencies of Japan,
Germany, Poland, England, and France.
At the same time, the NKVD has also accomplished much in inflicting
a crushing defeat on espionage-subversive agents of foreign intelligence
services transferred to the USSR in great numbers from abroad under the
guise of so-called political émigrés and deserters: Poles, Romanians,
Finns, Germans, Latvians, Estonians, Kharbintsy, and others.
The purging of the country of subversive, insurrectionary, and espio-
nage cadres has played a positive role in securing the further success of
socialist construction.
Nonetheless, one cannot think that the purging of the USSR of spies,
wreckers, terrorists, and saboteurs is at an end.
222 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

In continuing to wage a merciless campaign against all enemies of the

USSR, our task now consists of organizing this campaign by making use
of more precise and reliable methods.
This is all the more necessary insofar as the mass operations engaged
in crushing and eradicating hostile elements, carried out by organs of the
NKVD during 1937–38 and involving a simplified procedure of conduct-
ing investigations and trials, could not help but lead to a number of major
deficiencies and distortions in the work of the NKVD and the Procuracy.
Moreover, enemies of the people and spies employed by foreign intelli-
gence agencies, having wormed their way into both the central and local
organs of the NKVD and continuing their subversive activities, sought in
every way possible to confuse investigative and agent work. They sought
consciously to violate Soviet laws by carrying out mass, unjustified arrests
while at the same time saving their confederates (especially those who had
joined the NKVD) from destruction.
The chief deficiencies, recently revealed in the work of the NKVD and
the Procuracy, are as follows:
First of all, officials of the NKVD completely abandoned work with
agents and informers in favor of the much simpler method of making
mass arrests without concerning themselves with the completeness or
high quality of the investigation.
Officials of the NKVD became so much unaccustomed to meticulous,
systematic work with agents and informers and so much developed a
taste for a simplified method of conducting the investigation of cases, to
such an extent that up until very recently they were raising questions
concerning the so-called limits imposed on the conduct of mass arrests.
This has led to a situation where work with agents, weak as it was, has
regressed even further, and worst of all, many officials of the NKVD have
lost the taste for agent procedures that plays an exceptionally important
role in the work of a Chekist.
This has finally led to a situation where, in the absence of properly or-
ganized work, the investigative [organs] have, as a rule, been unsuccessful
in fully unmasking the spies and saboteurs under arrest who were in the
employ of foreign intelligence agencies, and in fully exposing all of their
criminal ties.
[…]
Second, a major deficiency in the work of the NKVD organs has been
the deeply entrenched simplified procedures of investigation, during
which, as a rule, the investigator is satisfied with obtaining from the ac-
cused a confession of guilt and totally fails to concern himself with cor-
roborating this confession with the necessary documents (testimonies of
witnesses, the testimony of experts, material evidence, etc.).
[…]
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 223

Investigative documents are formulated carelessly; drafts of testimo-

nies being written in pencil, and corrected and crossed out by who knows
whom, are entered into the record; protocols of testimonies, unsigned by
the person under interrogation and uncertified by the investigator, are
entered into the record, along with unsigned and unconfirmed indict-
ments by the prosecution, etc.
The Procuracy organs, for their part, have not taken the measures nec-
essary for the removal of these deficiencies, as a rule, reducing their par-
ticipation in the investigation to a simple registration and stamping of
investigative materials. The organs of the Procuracy not only have not
removed these violations of revolutionary legality but have in fact legiti-
mized them.
Such an irresponsible and arbitrary attitude to investigative work, and
such a crude violation of procedural rules established by law, have not
infrequently been cleverly utilized by enemies of the people, who have
wormed their way into the organs of the NKVD and Procuracy, both in
the center and in localities. They have consciously subverted Soviet laws,
committed forgeries, falsified investigatory documents, instituted criminal
proceedings, and subjected people to arrest on trivial grounds and even
without any grounds whatsoever, instituted “cases” against innocent
people, while at the same time taking every possible measure to conceal
and save their confederates—involved with them in criminal anti-Soviet
activities—from destruction. Such instances took place both in the central
and in the local apparatus of the NKVD.
All of these intolerable deficiencies observed in the work of the organs
of the NKVD and Procuracy were possible only because enemies of the
people, who had penetrated into the organs of the NKVD and Procuracy,
attempted with every means possible to cut off the work of the organs of
the NKVD and Procuracy from Party organs, to evade the Party’s control
and leadership, and thereby to make it easier for themselves and their
confederates to continue their anti-Soviet, subversive activities.
With the aim of decisively eliminating the deficiencies listed above, and
of organizing properly the investigative work of the organs of the NKVD
and of the Procuracy, the SNK USSR and the TsK of the VKP(b) hereby
decide:
1. To prohibit the NKVD and Procuracy organs from carrying out any
mass arrests or mass deportations.
In accordance with Article 127 of the Constitution of the USSR,
arrests are to be carried out only by court order or with the sanction
of the procurator.
[…]
2. To abolish the judicial troikas created by the special decrees of the
NKVD USSR, along with the judicial troikas attached to raion, krai,
and republic boards of the RK militsiia [civil police].
224 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

From now on, all cases must be directed for review by courts or the
Special Board of the NKVD USSR, in strict accordance with existing
laws on judicial competence.
3. In making arrests, the NKVD and Procuracy organs are to be guided
by the following:
[…]
4. In conducting investigations, the organs of the NKVD are obligated to
observe precisely all the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Code.
[…]
5. The Procuracy organs are obligated to observe precisely the demands
of the Criminal Procedure Code in their supervision over investiga-
tions conducted by the NKVD organs.
[…]
8. The NKVD USSR and the Procurator of the USSR are obligated to
give their local organs instructions for the precise implementation of
the present decision.

The SNK USSR and the TsK of the VKP(b) call the attention of all of-
ficials of the NKVD and the Procuracy to the need for a resolute elimina-
tion of the aforementioned deficiencies in the work of the organs of the
NKVD and the Procuracy, and to the extraordinary significance attached
to the organization of investigative and procuratorial work in a new way.
The SNK USSR and the TsK of the VKP(b) warn all officials of the
NKVD and the Procuracy that the slightest infraction of Soviet laws and
of the directives of the Party and the government by any official of the
NKVD and the Procuracy, regardless of who the person is, shall be met
with severe judicial penalties.
V. Molotov,
Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars
I. Stalin,
Secretary of the Central Committee of the VKP(b)
17 November 1938
In the meantime, Beria intrigued against Yezhov in the same man-
ner that Yezhov had connived against his predecessor Yagoda. As
a TsK member, Beria was part of a commission to oversee NKVD
affairs, even as he was Yezhov’s deputy. Beria accused Yezhov of con-
cealing compromising materials about his deputies who, it was al-
leged, had ties to Trotskyite, counterrevolutionary groups. In his
23 November letter of resignation, below, Yezhov admitted to this
charge, and to negligence resulting in the defection of Liushkov, and
the disappearance of another official, A. I. Uspensky, the NKVD chief
in Ukraine (later captured).
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 225

d o c u m en t
· 124 ·
Letter from N. I. Yezhov to the Politburo TsK VKP(b) [and to] I. V. Stalin.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1003, ll. 82–84.7
23 November 1938

Absolutely secret
I request that the TsK VKP(b) relieve me of work as Commissar of
Internal Affairs USSR for the following reasons:
1. Discussion in the Politburo, 19 November 1938, of the statement by
the head of the Ivanovo Oblast UNKVD, c. Zhuravlev, fully con-
firmed the facts contained in the statement. Primarily, I accept re-
sponsibility—that c. Zhuravlev, as apparent from his statement, sig-
naled me about the suspicious behavior of Litvin, Radzivilovsky, and
other ranking NKVD officials, who attempted to hush up cases of
various enemies of the people, being themselves linked to them in
conspiratorial anti-Soviet activities. In particular, especially serious
was the note from c. Zhuravlev about the suspicious behavior of
Litvin, who tried everything to hinder the discovery of Postyshev,
with whom he himself was linked in conspiratorial work. Clearly, if
I had given the required Bolshevik attention to the seriousness of
Zhuravlev’s signals, that enemy of the people, Litvin, and other
scoundrels, would have been uncovered long ago, and would not
have been appointed to responsible positions in the NKVD.

[…]
Fifthly, my fault lies in that, doubting the political honesty of such
people as the former UNKVD DVK traitor, Liushkov, and more recently,
the Narkomvnudel Ukrainian SSR traitor, Uspensky, I did not take suffi-
cient Chekist precautionary measures, and thereby allowed the possibility
for Liushkov to escape to Japan, and for Uspensky to hide somewhere still
unknown, while they still look for him. All of this together makes it im-
possible for me to continue work in the NKVD.
I request, again, to be relieved of work as Commissar of Internal Af-
fairs of the USSR. Despite all these great drawbacks and lapses in my
work, I may still say that under the constant leadership of the TsK, the
NKVD has given the enemy a real beating. I give my Bolshevik word, and
I pledge before the TsK VKP(b), and before c. Stalin, to learn all these
lessons in my future work, to learn from my mistakes, correct them, and
in whatever capacity the TsK deems necessary to use me—to justify the
trust of the TsK.
Yezhov
226 Social and Ethnic Cleansing

Change of Command
On 25 November, the Politburo approved the appointment of Beria
to head the NKVD. Simultaneously, Stalin issued a telegram to Party
organs laying the blame for “excesses” of the mass operations on
the “criminal band” that had infiltrated the NKVD under Yezhov,
immediately following the defeat of the “criminal band” that had sup-
posedly controlled the police under Yezhov’s predecessor, Yagoda.
The telegram, reproduced below, referred to a declaration from a cer-
tain V. P. Zhuravlev, head of the Ivanovo NKVD, alerting leaders to
untoward and suspicious activities among senior NKVD officials.
Certainly, Zhuravlev was prompted to write such a letter, since the
activities to which he referred were well known. Still, the letter pro-
vided Stalin with the pretext he needed to establish a “script” for
ending the purges setting in motion the machinery of recrimination,
but without affecting the stability of the regime or his own personal
power and responsibility.8

d o c u m ent
· 125 ·
Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to Party organ leaders on the unsatisfactory
situation in the NKVD. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 58, l. 61.
25 November 1938

In mid-November of this year, the TsK received a statement from Ivanovo

Oblast, from c. Zhuravlev (head of the UNKVD) about shortcomings in
the NKVD apparatus, about mistakes in the work of the NKVD, about
inattention to local signals, about warnings of the treachery of Litvin,
Kamensky, Radzivilovsky, Tsesarsky, Shapiro, and other ranking officials
of the NKVD, about the fact that Commissar c. Yezhov did not respond
to these warnings, etc.
Simultaneously, information has been received by the TsK that after the
crushing defeat of the Yagoda gang in the NKVD organs, a different gang
of traitors appeared in the persons of Nikolaev, Zhukovsky, Liushkov,
Uspensky, Passov, Fedorov, who consciously distort investigative cases,
shield notorious enemies of the people, all the while these people not
meeting sufficient counteractions on the part of c. Yezhov.
Placing the situation of the NKVD under discussion, the TsK VKP(b)
demanded an explanation from c. Yezhov. C. Yezhov submitted a decla-
ration in which he acknowledged the above-mentioned mistakes,
 Social and Ethnic Cleansing 227

acknowledged in addition that he carries responsibility for not taking

measures to stop Liushkov’s defection (UNKVD of the Far East), the
flight of Uspensky (commissar of the Ukraine NKVD), acknowledged
that he was far from able to cope with his duties in the NKVD, and re-
quested to be relieved of his duties as NKVD commissar, retaining the
post of water transport commissar and continuing his work in organs of
the TsK VKP(b).
The TsK VKP(b) fulfilled c. Yezhov’s request, relieving him of his work
in the NKVD, and confirmed c. Beria, L. P., as commissar of the NKVD,
by unanimous consent of the TsK members.
You will receive the text of c. Yezhov’s declaration by post.
[Handwritten note by Stalin:] Immediately acquaint with this commu-
nication all NKVD commissars and heads of NKVD administrations.
The day after his appointment, Beria issued an internal order annul-
ling all the operational orders connected with the mass operations.
The order reproduced much of the procedural detail contained in the
17 November Sovnarkom and Central Committee decision. One inter-
esting difference, however, was the section that focused on cessation of
mass operations of arrest and deportation. In one of the few docu-
ments of the 1930s to spell out what, exactly was meant by “mass
operation,” he defined it as “group arrests or deportations without a
differentiated approach to each of those arrested or deported, and
[without] a thorough review of all incriminating materials for each
person.” He reiterated that “all arrests must be made on a strictly
individual basis …” Beria also listed all of the special NKVD mass
repression orders that were to be annulled, eighteen of them in all.9
Beria wasted little time in purging the top ranks of the NKVD. Even
before the end of the year, nearly all of the heads of administrations
and their deputies had been replaced, many of them arrested, and
nearly all of the republic-, krai-, and oblast-level leadership had been
swept away. In all, 332 officials were arrested, 140 from the central
apparatus and 192 from peripheral organs. Beria also arrested and
replaced 18 republic and autonomous krai commissars.10 Purging and
arrests continued into 1939, but Beria, supported by Stalin and the
Politburo, acted quickly to lay blame on and silence Yezhov and the
leading cadres of the mass purges. As the following chapter shows,
Beria spent the next several years attempting to consolidate a new
cadre of Chekists, and to fulfill the new tasks given to the political
police by the Politburo.
 chapter seven

The Security Organs at War

1939–1944

Back to “Normalcy”: A Delicate Balancing Act

T
he Politburo decision of 17 November 1938 and the NKVD
order that followed stopped the various mass operations.
Beria’s purge of Yezhov’s leadership circle also went a long way
to send the signal that the cycle of violence was to change. To repair
the damage to the Party, state, and military institutions took longer
and was more complicated. Stalin had to bring the political police
once again under Party control, and this was difficult, given the pow-
er of the police during the previous two years, and the culture of fear
that pervaded the political apparatus. The Politburo also had to find
a way to normalize relations within state institutions, with the mili-
tary, and with enterprises, factories, and other workplaces. Stalin and
those around him had to convince officials that they could fulfill their
responsibilities without constant fear of arrest. These were difficult
tasks and required some adroit maneuvering.
One key problem for Stalin was to decide how to place blame on
the NKVD for what were clearly policies initiated and approved by
him. Blaming and eliminating Yezhov and his command, of course,
was an obvious answer, but many police officials had been arrested,
and Vyshinsky pressed Stalin about whether to try NKVD officials in
open courts. At first, Stalin approved, as the following terse memoran-
dum shows.

228
 The Security Organs at War 229

d o c u m en t
· 126 ·
I. V. Stalin’s note to A. Ya. Vyshinsky on organizing public trials of
NKVD officials. AP RF, f. 3, op. 57, d. 96, l. 110.
3 January 1939

To c. Vyshinsky
Public trials of the guilty are necessary. I. Stalin
In the end, however, most officials were tried in closed courts of the
state’s military tribunal, to which the police were legally subject as a
militarized force.
As part of the Politburo’s attempt to place controls on the police
and to reinvigorate regional Party structures, the 17 November 1938
order specifically instructed local Party officials to take a leading role
in vetting and approving NKVD heads. Regional leaders, however,
were reluctant to take such an initiative, and as a result, the Politburo
made an example of several Party organizations in order to get the
message across. The next document also shows how the Politburo
attempted to deflect blame onto local Party organs both for excesses
of the security organs, and for the consequent damage to the eco-
nomic functioning of the country.

d o c u m en t
· 127 ·
From the decision of Politburo TsK VKP(b) on the work of the Bashkir Obkom
[Oblast Committee] of the VKP(b). RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1005, ll. 12–13.
9 January 1939

Having heard the report of the first secretary of the Bashkir Obkom of
the VKP(b) c. Zalikin, the Tsk VKP(b) considers work of the Bashkir
Obkom of the Party unsatisfactory.
Knowing about the unsatisfactory work of the NKVD of the Bashkir
Republic, about contamination of the NKVD organs with obviously
doubtful elements, c. Zalikin not only did not take any measures for
checking and eliminating shortcomings in work of the NKVD, and for
purging its apparatus of these doubtful people, which was the clear duty
of the Obkom of VKP(b), but also hid signals and facts he received from
the Obkom; by doing so, he covered up significant problems and out-
rages at the NKVD organs.
230 The Security Organs at War

Weak leadership of industry by the Bashkir Obkom of VKP(b) resulted

in the failure of the largest enterprises (The Ufa motor plant, Beloretsky
plants, the enterprises of “Bashzoloto” [Bashkir Gold] trust, etc.) to fulfill
their production program.
[…]
Regional leaders in Dagestan, the Altai, Irkutsk, and other areas
received similar reprimands.
Stalin had to walk a fine line when it came to the issue of torture,
which had been used freely during the great purges. Use of physical
coercion was illegal, but had been sanctioned officially by the Polit-
buro during the purges. Stalin now had to justify its use while not
seeming to violate the law. In January 1939, he sent the following
memorandum to regional Party heads.

d o c u m ent
· 128 ·
Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to secretaries of obkoms, kraikoms, and to the
leadership of the NKVD-UNKVD [local NKVD administrations] on using
measures of physical coercion in relation to “enemies of the people.” AP RF, f.
3, op. 58, d. 6, ll. 145–46.
10 January 1939

Coded from TsK VKP(b) […]

It has become known to TsK VKP(b) that secretaries of obkoms–
kraikoms, when reviewing UNKVD officials, blame them for using phys-
ical coercion against arrested persons as something criminal. The TsK
VKP(b) clarifies that using physical coercion in the practice of the NKVD
was permitted in and after 1937 with the sanction of the TsK VKP(b). It
was specified that physical coercion is allowed as an exception, and only
in relation to obvious enemies of the people who, by undergoing a hu-
mane method of interrogation, impudently refuse to name conspirators,
refuse for months to testify, try to prevent exposure of the conspirators
remaining at liberty—in this way, they continue in prison their struggle
against Soviet power. Experience has shown that this method yielded re-
sults, considerably accelerating the business of exposing enemies of the
people. It is true that later, in practice, the method of physical coercion
was dirtied by such scoundrels as Zakovsky, Litvin, Uspensky, and others,
for they turned it from an exception into a rule and began to use it for
randomly arrested, honest people. For this they incurred a deserved pen-
alty. But this does not discredit the method itself at all, since it has been
correctly put into practice. It is known that all bourgeois investigations
 The Security Organs at War 231

use physical coercion in relation to representatives of the socialist prole-

tariat and, besides, they use it in its ugliest forms. It may be asked, why
should socialist investigation be more humane in relation to the inveterate
agents of the bourgeoisie, sworn [“inveterate” and “sworn” handwritten
by Stalin] enemies of the working class and collective farmers. The TsK
VKP(b) considers the method of physical coercion an absolutely correct
and expedient method to be used compulsorily from now on, as an excep-
tion, in relation to obvious and diehard enemies of the people. The TsK
VKP(b) requires secretaries of obkoms, kraikoms, the TsKs of national
Communist Parties to be guided by this clarification when they review
NKVD officials.
Secretary of TsK VKP(b) I. Stalin
At Vyshinsky’s request, the Politburo instructed local Party heads to
distribute the memorandum both to prosecutorial and to judicial
officials.
In early 1939, Vyshinsky also returned to a recommendation that
he had made in the mid-1930s, to no avail then, to remove the convic-
tion records and thereby lift the residence restrictions on individuals
who had been sentenced by troikas and who had served their sen-
tences. With the backing of Beria, he presented the following draft
proposal, which was finally approved in April. The most interesting
aspect of this proposal is the figure given at the beginning of over two
million people sentenced extrajudicially since 1927. It is not clear
which categories Beria had in mind, since over two million peasants
had been deported as kulaks already by 1933. Either Beria’s figure did
not count them, or he had other kinds of “contingents” in mind.

d o c u m en t
· 129 ·
Special communication from L. P. Beria and A. Ya. Vyshinsky to I. V. Stalin on
removal of criminal records of those people who had been convicted by
extrajudicial organs of the NKVD USSR, with appended draft of the decree of
the Supreme Council of the USSR. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, ll. 207–9.
5 February 1939

Absolutely secret
TsK VKP(b), to c. Stalin
During the period from 1927, the Special Board of the NKVD, former
OGPU Collegium, and local troikas convicted with various measures of
232 The Security Organs at War

punishment (up to and including imprisonment in camps, expulsion, and

exile)—2,100,000 people.
Organs of the OGPU and NKVD have not been removing criminal re-
cords in relation to cases in which punishment was set for no more than
three years of imprisonment, in particular, since, according to article 55 of
the RSFSR Criminal Code, these criminal records must be removed auto-
matically after a certain period, and judicial offices are required to provide
papers confirming this to the formerly convicted. Likewise, the Special [Sen-
tencing] Board [of the NKVD] never once reviewed the issue of criminal
record review in any other manner. All these people are considered con-
victed, and according to the passport regime law (Decree of the Sovnarkom
of the USSR No. 1441 from 8 August 1936) the majority of them, even after
serving their punishment, cannot live in a number of cities of the country.
Narkomvnudel [the Commissariat of Internal Affairs] and the Procu-
racy of the USSR consider it expedient to clarify this issue, and present
the following suggestions for your consideration.

1. To remove criminal records and related restrictions from all those—

the socially dangerous, as well as those convicted under all statutes
of the criminal code (except for 58-1-14)1—convicted by the former
OGPU Collegium, the Special Board of the NKVD, and troikas of the
OGPU-NKVD, after three years following the end of their term of
punishment, if these persons do not commit new crimes.
2. To grant authority to the Special Board of the NKVD USSR to re-
move criminal records of those convicted by the former OGPU
Collegium, the Special Board of the NKVD USSR, and by the OGPU-
NKVD troikas under all subsections of article 58 of the Criminal
Code of the RSFSR (and corresponding articles of Criminal Codes of
federal republics), in accordance with appeals [of the convicted], if
these persons did not commit new crimes during a period of no less
than three years after their release from punishment, and if, during
this whole period, they were engaged in socially useful work.

Formulation of this decision should be carried out under point “3” of

Article 49 of the Constitution of the USSR, by a decree of the Presidium
of the Supreme Council of the USSR.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)
Procurator of the Union of SSR (A. Vyshinsky)
[…]
The institutional culture of the NKVD proved difficult to change,
despite Politburo orders, operational instructions from Beria, and even
purges of those who had been part of Yezhov’s police machinery. As
the following report shows, old habits died hard within the security
 The Security Organs at War 233

forces. The report also shows the extent to which the purges deci-
mated and made dysfunctional the judicial and prosecutorial system.

d o c u m en t
· 130 ·
Special communication from L. P. Beria, A. Ya. Vyshinsky, and N. M. Rychkov
[Commissar of Justice] to I. V. Stalin, with a draft order appended about
implementation of the decision of SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) of 17 November
1938 on arrests, procuratorial supervision, and conducting investigations. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 6, ll. 172–75.
21 February 1939

TsK VKP(b), to comrade Stalin

For the purpose of verifying fulfillment of the Decision of SNK USSR
and TsK VKP(b) of 17 November 1938 “About arrests, procuratorial su-
pervision, and conducting investigations” by the organs of the NKVD and
the Procuracy, in the organization of investigative work and implementa-
tion of the procurator’s supervision of investigation, on 19 February of
this year a meeting was called, in which 26 heads of oblasts, krai UNKVD
heads, and commissars of internal affairs of union and autonomous re-
publics, and a number of high officials from both the center and the
periphery participated.
At the meeting it was established that at present there are large num-
bers of incomplete investigative cases in the NKVD organs, which nega-
tively influences the quality of investigative work, which still lags behind
the requirements of the Decision of SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) of 17
November 1938.
The meeting revealed a very weak exercise of the public procurator’s
supervision over investigations, both at the center, and, especially, in the
periphery.
The weakness of public procurators’ supervision is explained by the in-
appropriateness of a number of the public prosecution officials from both
the political and the professional aspect, and also by a large gap between
the required number of workers and the actual staff available.
The SNK of the USSR and TsK VKP(b)’s decision has not been fulfilled
in the aspect concerning verification and presenting for approval of the
TsK VKP(b) the candidates for all procurators who are to carry out su-
pervision of investigations by the NKVD organs, although the deadline
for this has passed.
In particular, it is necessary to emphasize the weak participation of
procurators in the investigative work carried out by NKVD organs, the
234 The Security Organs at War

inadmissible delay of case reviews arriving from the NKVD organs, and
red tape in transferring cases according their jurisdiction, which is in di-
rect relationship to the lack of staff, and to the self-protection that has
been practiced by a number of procurators.
The TsK VKP(b) and SNK of the USSR’s Decision from 17 November
1938, in connection with elimination of the judicial troikas that were cre-
ated under special orders of the NKVD USSR, and also of troikas of oblast,
krai, and republic [NKVD] administrations, required the Narkomiust
[Commissariat of Justice] and judicial authorities (military tribunals, oblast
and supreme courts, railway and water transportation courts) to prepare
for reception of these cases, in order to provide a correct and timely hearing
of cases arriving from the NKVD organs. For this purpose it was necessary
to reconsider and to strengthen judicial authorities with verified and quali-
fied personnel; such preparations were not made on the part of Narkomiust.
In many judicial instances, court examinations are carried out extreme-
ly slowly, examination of cases backs up for months, examination itself
is unsatisfactory, there are many cases of unreasonable return of cases for
supplementary examination.
For the purpose of ensuring implementation of the TsK VKP(b) and
SNK USSR Decision of 17 November 1938, we are asking TsK VKP(b):

1. To increase the number of procurators who carry out the supervision

of the NKVD organs by 1,100 people.
2. To assign comrade Vyshinsky, together with obkoms, kraikoms, and
TsKs of national communist parties to check the staff of procurators
carrying out supervision of investigations, and to remove doubtful and
bad workers. To report to TsK VKP(b) on the results in one month.
3. To require obkoms, kraikoms, and TsKs of national communist par-
ties to render full assistance to c. Vyshinsky in reviewing the staff of
procurators.
4. To oblige obkoms, kraikoms, and TsKs of national Communist Par-
ties, under personal responsibility of the first secretaries, to fill out the
staff of the local Procuracy organs supervising investigations by the
NKVD organs with vetted and qualified workers within one month.
To present a report of accomplished work to TsK VKP(b).
5. To require c. Malenkov and c. Vyshinsky to select 100 people for the
Procuracy of the USSR, mainly from among graduates of higher edu-
cational institutions.
6. To require Narkomiust USSR, c. Rychkov, and the head of the
Supreme Court of the USSR, c. Golyakov, to take measures for court
examination of backlogged cases transferred from the organs of the
NKVD and the Procuracy, and to establish a process that would
guarantee, in the future, timely and correct examination of cases
transferred to courts.
 The Security Organs at War 235

7. To assign c. Rychkov, together with the relevant Party organizations,

to verify and complete staffing of the judicial organs of Leningrad,
Saratov, Ukraine (Sumy, Kirovograd, and Zaporozhye oblasts), Ros-
tov, Chelyabinsk, Perm, and others, and to report the results to TsK
VKP(b).

We are attaching a copy of the order of the NKVD USSR and of the
Procurator of the USSR regarding actions for ensuring implementation of
the SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) Decision of 17 November 1938.
Narkomvnudel USSR (Beria)
Procurator of the USSR (Vyshinsky)
Narkomiust of the USSR (Rychkov)

Enemies Still Abound

The attempt to return to some kind of legal normalcy was hindered
not just by the previous years of purging and violence, but also by the
continuation of purges. Although Soviet leaders stopped mass repres-
sion operations, the Politburo pursued the “struggle” against counter-
revolutionary sabotage and Trotskyist plots. As a result, officials in
the security organs received mixed signals. They were now told to
adhere to legal norms, and were well aware of the fate of those who
had participated in the purges by falsifying evidence and fabricating
cases. At the same time, they were under pressure to “root out” ene-
mies in the very same manner. In the course of 1939, more than
forty-four thousand people were arrested as counterrevolutionary
Trotskyist saboteurs. This was a number some fifteen times lower
than the number arrested in 1938, but it showed that Stalin was not
done purging.2

d o c u m en t
· 131 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On bringing to trial members of
the Right-Trotskyist organization. AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 373, l. 1.
16 February 1939

Absolutely secret
To bring to trial before the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the
USSR cases of the most active enemies of the Party and Soviet power—
236 The Security Organs at War

those in the leadership of the counterrevolutionary Right-Trotskyist

conspiratorial espionage organization—in number 469 people, under the
law of 1 December 1934.3

d o c u m ent
· 132 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On conviction of counterrevolu-
tionary elements. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 25, l. 7.
8 April 1939

Strictly secret
To transfer cases of active participants of the counterrevolutionary
Right-Trotskyist conspiratorial and espionage organizations, in number
931 persons, to the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR for
trial under the law of 1 December 1934. And for 198 leading participants
of these organizations—to apply the highest measure of criminal punish-
ment—execution, and to sentence the other 733 accused to imprisonment
in camps for a term not less than 15 years each.
In the early months of 1939, both Yezhov and his deputy M. P.
Frinovsky were arrested as part of the same circus that they had helped
create—as spies and saboteurs. They were interrogated in the same
manner that they had helped perfect. And, as the following fragments
show, they played their appropriate roles in the familiar ritual of
required self-destruction.

d o c u m ent
· 133 ·
Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin with appended statement by
L. S. Frinovsky. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1009, l. 34.
13 April 1939

TsK VKP(b) to comrade I. V. Stalin

With this I am sending the statement of the arrested Frinovsky from
11.III.39.
[…]
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria
 The Security Organs at War 237

To the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics—Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank:
Beria L. P.
From arrested Frinovsky L. S.
Statement
The investigation charged me with anti-Soviet conspiratorial work.
During the period when I was free, I struggled long inside myself with the
thought that I must confess my criminal activity, but the wretched condi-
tion of the coward got the better of me. I had the possibility to tell you
honestly about everything, as well as the leaders of the Party of which I
was an unworthy member for the last years, even as I was deceiving the
Party, but I did not do it. Only after arrest, after the accusation was
brought, and after the conversation with you personally, I stepped on the
path of repentance, and I promise to tell the investigation the whole truth
to the end, both about my criminal-enemy work, and about persons who
have been accomplices and leaders of this criminal-enemy work […].

d o c u m en t
· 134 ·
Memorandum from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin regarding N. I. Yezhov, with
appended protocol of interrogation. AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 375, ll. 122–64.
27 April 1939

Absolutely secret
Comrade Stalin
With this I send you the protocol of Yezhov’s interrogation from
26 April 1939.
Interrogation continues.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. Beria

Protocol of the interrogation of arrested Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich,
from 26 April 1939
Yezhov N. I., born 1895,
Native of city of Leningrad, former member of the VKP(b) from 1917.
Before arrest—People’s Commissar of Water Transport.
Question: In the previous interrogation, you testified that you con-
ducted espionage work in favor of Poland for ten years. However, you
have hidden a number of your espionage connections. The interrogation
demands from you a truthful and full testimony on this matter.
238 The Security Organs at War

Answer: I must admit that, while giving truthful evidence about my

espionage work in favor of Poland, I, in fact, hid from the investigation
my espionage connections to the Germans.
Question: For what purposes did you try to lead the investigation away
from your espionage connections with the Germans?
Answer: I did not want to testify to the investigation about my direct
espionage connection with the Germans, since my cooperation with the
German intelligence service was not limited just to espionage work as-
signed to me by the German intelligence service; I organized an anti-
Soviet plot and was preparing a revolt by way of terrorist acts against
leaders of the Party and government.
Question: Talk about all the espionage connections that you tried to
hide from the investigation, and the circumstances of your recruitment.
Answer: I was recruited as an agent of German intelligence in 1934,
under the following circumstances: in summer of 1934 I was sent for
treatment abroad to Vienna to Professor Norden […].
Throughout 1939, Vyshinsky attempted to press his advantage
against the NKVD, as the following complaints show, to limit the
arrest and sentencing jurisdiction of the NKVD, and to strengthen the
authority of the Procuracy.

d o c u m ent
· 135 ·
Note from A. Ya. Vyshinsky to I. V. Stalin on violations of arrest procedures.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 6, l. 185.
31 May 1939

To comrade Stalin
To comrade Molotov
According to the SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) Decision of 17 November
1938, organs of the NKVD are forbidden to make arrests without pre-
liminary sanction from the Procuracy.
This Decision fully meets the requirements of article 127 of the Consti-
tution of the USSR.
Meanwhile, instances continue to take place in the practice of the
NKVD of making arrests without obtaining preliminary sanction of the
Procuracy of the Union. So, for example, Frinovsky, M., Belen’ky, Z.,
Kedrov, and others were arrested without obtaining preliminary sanction
of the Procuracy USSR.
Reporting this, I ask that the NKVD USSR be given instructions to fol-
low strictly the procedure of making arrests established by article 127 of
 The Security Organs at War 239

the Constitution of the USSR and by the Decision of TsK VKP(b) of 17

November 1937.
Vyshinsky

d o c u m en t
· 136 ·
Note of A. Ya. Vyshinsky to I. V. Stalin regarding the Special Board of the
NKVD USSR. RGANI, f. 89, op. 18, d. 2, l. 1.
31 May 1939

Absolutely secret
To TsK VKP(b)—to comrade Stalin
To SNK USSR—to comrade Molotov
Recently, large numbers of cases have passed through the Special Board
of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and at each ses-
sion of the Special Board, from 200 to 300 cases are reviewed.
In such a situation, the possibility of making erroneous decisions can-
not be excluded.
I presented my thoughts about this to c. Beria, along with a suggestion
to establish an operating procedure of work of the Special Board in which
its meetings are scheduled more often, and with fewer numbers of cases
to be reviewed at each session.
I would consider it expedient if the Commissariat of Internal Affairs
received special instructions from the TsK VKP(b) and the SNK USSR
about this matter.
A. Vyshinsky
Beria, for his part, held his own against Vyshinsky, and was able to
protect the interests of the security organs to the extent that Stalin and
the Politburo allowed. The latter, for example, agreed with the NKVD
to end the Procuracy’s practice of permitting early release of prisoners
for good behavior. Beria insisted, and the Politburo agreed, that pris-
oners should serve their full term, or be released early only under
extraordinary circumstances, and that the decision should be made by
the NKVD, not the Procuracy. Further, and most important, Beria
secured the right of the NKVD to have exclusive use of prison labor
for economic activities, not having to share with other commissariats.
240 The Security Organs at War

d o c u m ent
· 137 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On camps of the NKVD USSR.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 25, ll. 54–55.
10 June 1939

Strictly secret […]

To approve the proposal of the NKVD on carrying out the following
measures:

1. To reject the system of conditional early release of camp contingents.

A convict must serve the full term in a camp established by the court.
To instruct the Procuracy of the USSR and courts to cease hearing
cases of conditional early release from camps, and Narkomvnudel to
cease the practice of offsetting one working day for two days of a
term of punishment.
2. To establish as the main incentive for increase of labor productivity in
camps—improved supply and food rations for good workers who have
high rates of labor productivity, a monetary award for this category of
prisoners, and a lighter camp regime, with a general improvement in
their living conditions.

In relation to certain individual prisoners—excellent workers, who

show consistently high rates of work productivity—to allow their condi-
tional early release through a decision made by the Collegium of the NKVD
or the Special Board of the NKVD, supported by a special petition of the
camp commander and the chief of the Political Department of the camp.
[…]

d o c u m ent
· 138 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On securing a labor
force for work carried out by the NKVD USSR in 1939. RGASPI,
f. 17, op. 3, d. 1011, l. 4.
16 June 1939

To approve the following decision of the SNK USSR:

In order to ensure fulfillment of the capital construction plan at
the major construction sites of the GULAG [camp administration]
 The Security Organs at War 241

of the NKVD USSR in 1939, the Council of People’s Commissars of the

USSR decides:

1. To allow the NKVD USSR to cease the allocation of GULAG labor

to other commissariats and administrations.
2. In order to provide labor for construction undertaken by the Nar-
komvnudel USSR in the Far East, to allow the Narkomvnudel USSR
to transfer to the Far East 120 thousand people during June and July
1939 by means of:
a) removal of 60 thousand persons-prisoners from work in the
other commissariats […];
b) transferring convicts for a term of up to two years from correc-
tional labor colonies to camps.
3. To suggest that the NKPS [Commissariat of Transport] provide
transportation of 120 thousand people to the Far East according to
requirements of the Narkomvnudel USSR, under authority of p. 2 of
this decision.
4. In order to carry out the recommended measures, to suggest to Nar-
komfin [Commissariat of Finance] USSR, together with Narkomvnu-
del USSR, to revise the plan for financing the GULAG of the NKVD
USSR for 1939, and to submit it for approval of Ekonomsovet
[Council of the Economy] of SNK USSR within a 10-day period.
5. To allow Narkomvnudel USSR to remove all labor of the GULAG
NKVD USSR from other commissariats, administrations, and orga-
nizations, starting 1 January 1940.

Despite repeated attempts to regularize investigative and arrest pro-

cedures, jurisdictional conflicts continued and, more important, tens of
thousands of people were being arrested yearly, subjected to harsh treat-
ment by police, their lives often ruined, and still half of them being re-
leased for lack of evidence or improper procedures of investigation. The
following circular letter, from July 1939, gives remarkable figures for
the number of people arrested and then released. The letter also reflects
the attempt by the security and justice commissariats, along with the
Procuracy, now headed by M. I. Pankrat’ev, to define more precisely
arrest and investigation jurisdictions. As the letter shows, the three of-
ficials involved, Beria, Pankrat’ev, and N. M. Rychkov, then the justice
commissar, came to something of a truce, each willing to take criticism
and to make tradeoffs. At first glance, the document appears to be over-
ly critical of the NKVD, but it also lays blame for the high number of
quashed cases on the inactivity of the Procuracy during investigations,
leaving that to the security organs, and then complaining about illegal
242 The Security Organs at War

procedures. The following excerpt summarizes the problems. It was

followed by an order, which is not included here since it reiterates pro-
cedures codified in the 17 November 1938 Sovnarkom decision.

d o c u m ent
· 139 ·
Circular of NKVD USSR, the Procuracy of the USSR, and Narkomiust USSR on
investigative work. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 7, ll. 18–19.
25 July 1939

Absolutely secret
To people’s commissars of internal affairs of union and autonomous
republics, heads of krai and oblast administrations of the NKVD, procu-
rators of union and autonomous republics, krai, and oblasts, heads of
supreme courts of union and autonomous republics, heads of courts of
krai and oblasts, heads of military tribunals.
Despite a number of instructions and directives of the NKVD USSR,
the USSR procurator, and Narkomiust about procedures for fulfilling the
decision of the SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) of 17 November 1938, there
are serious shortcomings in the investigative work of organs of the
NKVD, in supervisory work of the Procuracy of the USSR, and in the
work of supreme, krai, oblast, okrug courts, and military tribunals in
hearing cases of counterrevolutionary crimes. Some NKVD and UNKVD
still have not completed investigations of old backlogged investigation
cases. In the course of investigations, organs of the NKVD do not always
take all necessary measures to complete full investigations of cases, which
results, not infrequently, in having them returned by the Procuracy and
courts for supplementary investigation. In turn, Procuracy and court or-
gans return cases for supplementary investigation to the organs of the
NKVD, either without sufficient reason or for unimportant reasons, at
times making impracticable demands (interrogation of persons sentenced
to capital punishment, or who have left the USSR, or who are under ac-
tive surveillance, etc.). From 1 January until 15 June 1939, the Procuracy
and courts returned to the organs of the NKVD for supplementary inves-
tigation over 50 percent of cases. In some krai and oblasts, the percentage
of returned cases is even higher. So, in Chelyabinsk Oblast, out of 1,559
cases transferred to the organs of the court and the Procuracy during the
same period of time, 1,599 cases were returned. The UNKVD of the Altai
Krai sent to the court and Procuracy cases of 661 persons, but received
returned cases of 787 people (the surplus of the returned cases is those
sent to the Procuracy and judicial authorities before 1 January 1939).
 The Security Organs at War 243

A similar pattern of returning cases for supplementary investigation

occurs in the Ordzhonikidze Krai, Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, and other
oblasts.
Organs of the Procuracy would be able to considerably decrease the
return of cases for supplementary investigation if they took active part in
the investigations, and if they pointed out, in time, the circumstances that
may be a subject of supplementary investigation to those conducting an
investigation.
Courts often return cases for supplementary investigation for reasons
that might be resolved during an actual court hearing.
Along with all this, long delays occur in examination of investigative
cases by Procuracy and court organs, which results in a significant back-
log of those under arrest.
[…]
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria
USSR Procurator Pankrat’ev
People’s Commissar of Justice Rychkov
Stalin was careful to manipulate the balance between the legal and
security organs of the dictatorship. If orders such as the one above
seemed to give too much authority to the Procuracy, Stalin redressed
that balance by sanctioning the appointment, in August 1940, of V. M.
Bochkov to be the Chief Procurator of the Soviet Union. Bochkov was
a career NKVD military officer. During the 1930s, he had been head
of the NKVD prison administration, head of the border forces training
school, and immediately prior to his appointment as chief procurator,
he had served as head of the NKVD Special Department, the depart-
ment with political and security oversight over the military.

Purging New Territories

Institutional infighting was the least of the NKVD’s activities during
1939 and 1940. The advent of war brought new problems and tasks.
After the German annexation of the Sudeten areas of Czechoslovakia
in late 1938, Stalin abandoned hope of drawing the French and British
democracies into a “United Front” alliance against Germany under
Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists. Convinced that war was in-
evitable, Stalin decided to strike a deal with the German dictator di-
rectly. As the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, continued allied
negotiations, Molotov, Stalin’s trusted associate and chairman of
Sovnarkom, began the secret talks with German Foreign Minister
Joachim von Ribbentrop, that led to the Soviet-German agreement of
August 1939. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as it became known,
244 The Security Organs at War

was publicly a nonaggression agreement, but it included secret proto-

cols that carved up eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet
Union. When German troops invaded Poland on 1 September 1939,
the Soviets “responded” by annexing the three Baltic states and parts
of the border areas in eastern Poland and Romania.4 At the same time,
the Soviets pressured Finland to concede territory in Karelia that was
close to Leningrad. When the Finnish government refused, the Soviets
invaded Finland, precipitating the short and inglorious “Winter War”
from November 1939 until March 1940. The Soviets failed to secure
a complete victory, but did force the annexation of about 10 percent
of Finnish territory along the two countries’ mutual border.5
Assimilation of these new territories presented the Soviet govern-
ment, and the security organs in particular, with serious challenges,
and at first, Soviet leaders refrained from large-scale purges and re-
pressions. This policy did not last, however, as local resistance per-
sisted. Soon, Party, state, and security forces launched large-scale pro-
grams of sovietization: arrests, confiscation of property, deportation.
Along with other policies, Sovietization included social purging of
“anti-Soviet elements,” similar to policies carried out during the mid-
1930s.6 As the following documents show, these purges received high
priority, especially cleansing border areas of Polish settlers called
osadniki, who had been granted land by the Polish government for
military or other valuable service during World War I and the conflicts
that followed. Beria reported to Stalin in early December 1939 on
how many osadniki there were, and in the following document, on the
operation to deport them. The document is particularly revealing of
the enormous scale such mass removals had reached already in 1939.

d o c u m ent
· 140 ·
Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on results of the opera-
tion to remove osadniki and forest guards from the western oblasts of Ukraine
and Belorussia. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 199, ll. 50–51.
12 February 1940

TsK VKP(b) to comrade Stalin

I am informing you about preliminary data on results of the operation
to remove osadniki and forest guards from the western oblasts of Ukraine
and Belorussia conducted by the NKVD SSSR.
 The Security Organs at War 245

Preparatory work was performed with the intention to complete the

operation within the course of one day, in order to exclude the possibility
of escapes and concealment of persons who were subject to eviction.
Fifty-two thousand NKVD and militsiia officers, NKVD troops, and
raion and village activists participated in the operation.
The operation started at sunrise on 10 February. By the beginning of
11 February the eviction of osadniki, forest guards, and their families was
completed.
According to statistics:

In total: UkSSR: BSSR:

27,356 families 17,753 9,603
Subject to removal:
146,375 people 95,065 51,310
Evicted by noon:
26,776 families 17,227 9,549
By 11 February:
137,501 people 88,262 49,239
Loaded in echelons:
24,133 families 16,388 7,745
By 11 February:
124,247 people 85,362 38,885

Withdrawal continues of people who escaped from the eviction or were

unavailable at their permanent residences.
No incidents worthy of attention occurred during the conduct of the
operation. In some villages there were attempts by osadniki to flee or re-
sist the eviction. In the village of Kovynichi, Dragobych Oblast, a group
of locals tried to stop eviction of osadniki. However, the NKVD opera-
tional group took measures and evicted 27 families subject to eviction. In
the village of Kuklintsy of Tarnopol Oblast, a group of women, in num-
ber 60, appealed not to remove an osadnik. After corresponding explana-
tions, the group dispersed.
On 10 February, at night, in the station of Voropaevo, Vileika Oblast,
the corpse of the chief of the station, c. Kiselev E. I., was found. After
examination of the corpse it was established that Kiselev’s death was
caused by a blow to the back of the neck with a blunt instrument. An
investigation is being conducted.
In the Belorussian SSR, in connection with hard frosts, reaching
–30° C, some cases of light finger frostbite were noted among Red Army
soldiers participating in the operation.
The population of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR and Belo-
russian SSR have reacted positively to the eviction of osadniki and forest
246 The Security Organs at War

guards. In some cases, locals assisted operational groups of the NKVD to

capture escaped osadniki.
Echelons of the evicted osadniki and forest guards are on the way to
their places of resettlement.
As the security organs cleansed new territories, the Politburo also
became worried about the number of foreigners slipping into and
settling in areas of the country adjacent to the territories. Murmansk,
on the White Sea and close to Finland, was a favored destination for
refugees and others fleeing the new border areas. In 1940, the Polit-
buro ordered the NKVD to purge the city of “foreigners,” and other
“suspicious” or anti-Soviet populations, but to do so without “overly
disturbing” the local population.

d o c u m ent
· 141 ·
From the decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b) on resettlement of citizens of
foreign nationalities from the city of Murmansk and the Murmansk Oblast.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 27, ll. 166–67.
23 June 1940

[…]
To approve the following draft of a decree of the SNK USSR:
The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR decides:
To approve the following proposals of the People’s Commissariat of
Internal Affairs of the USSR:

1. To charge the NKVD USSR with carrying out resettlement of all citi-
zens of foreign nationalities, in the number of 3,215 families—8,617
persons, from the city of Murmansk and Murmansk Oblast.
2. To place the resettled:
a) 2,540 families, consisting of 6,973 persons: Finns, Estonians,
Latvians, Norwegians, Lithuanians, and Swedes in the Karelian-
Finnish SSR, in the following raions:
Zaonezhsky Raion —600 households,
Pudozhsky -″- —700 -″-
Medvezh’egorsky -″ —340 -″-
Sheltozersky -″- —900 -″-
b) to the Altai Krai—675 families, consisting of 1,743 persons:
Germans, Poles, Chinese, Greeks, and Koreans, in the following
areas:
 The Security Organs at War 247

[…],
6. To suggest to Narkomzdrav USSR [Commissariat of Health] to pro-
vide those resettled with medical care, necessary medicines, and san-
itary supplies for their trip, per request of the NKVD USSR. The re-
quests must be submitted to Narkomzdrav USSR no later than three
days prior to the departure of echelons.
7. To require Narkomtorg USSR [Commissariat of Trade] to organize
food supplies for the resettlers on their way at points to be deter-
mined by the NKVD USSR.
8. To set the deadline of completion of resettlement as 10.7.1940.

Katyn
The NKVD conducted cleansing operations in all of the new territo-
ries, affecting over 400,000 people in western Ukraine and Belorussia
alone between 1939 and 1941.7 Most of these operations involved
deportation and exile, but some, especially in the Baltic areas, and in
the new western regions of Ukraine, also involved purging similar to
the deadly mass operations of 1937 and 1938. The most infamous of
these operations involved the murder of some twenty-two thousand
Polish military officers and other Poles who had been captured and
interned in the Soviet Union as a result of the annexation of Polish
territory. In trying to decide what to do with them, NKVD officials
interviewed many of the internees. Based on these interviews, Beria
concluded that the Polish “contingents” were predisposed against
Soviet power and represented the core of an army of resistance. As the
documents below show, he recommended to Stalin that all of the
groups listed be executed. On 3 March, the Politburo agreed and is-
sued the order. Nearly all the executions took place over the course of
April 1940, and the bodies were buried in mass graves in several loca-
tions near the various internment camps in Belorussia and western
Ukraine. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler’s gov-
ernment publicized the discovery of grave sites in the forest of Katyn.
The Soviets blamed the executions on the Germans, and the issue re-
mained officially contested until the late 1980s, when the Soviet gov-
ernment finally released the following documents.8
248 The Security Organs at War

d o c u m ent
· 142 ·
Report of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on imprisoned Polish military and police
personnel. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 166, d. 621, ll. 130–33.

TsK VKPB(b), to c. Stalin

5 March 1940
Absolutely secret
[Handwritten above the text: “C. Stalin, K. Voroshilov, V. Molotov, A.
Mikoyan,” and in the margins: “c. Kalinin—in favor, c. Kaganovich—in
favor”]
At the present time, in NKVD prisoner of war camps, and in prisons of
the western oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia, there are being held a large
number of former Polish army officers, former officials of Polish police
and intelligence organs, members of Polish nationalist c-r [counterrevolu-
tionary] parties, members of exposed insurgent organizations, deserters
from the enemy, and others. They all are sworn enemies of Soviet power,
full of hatred toward the Soviet System.
Prisoners of war—officers and policemen—are trying to continue
counterrevolutionary work in camps, conduct anti-Soviet propaganda.
Each of them is just waiting for the moment of his release in order to have
a chance to become actively involved in the struggle against Soviet power.
NKVD organs in the western oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia have
uncovered a number of counterrevolutionary insurgent organizations.
Former officers of the former Polish army, former policemen, and gen-
darmes played active leading roles in all these c-r organizations.
A considerable number of people who are members of c-r espionage
and insurgent organizations were exposed among the detained deserters
and border violators.
In all (and not counting soldiers and noncommissioned officers), 14,736
former officers, officials, landowners, policemen, gendarmes, prison guards,
osadniki, and intelligence officers are being held in camps for prisoners of
war. Over 97 percent of them are Polish.
Of these:

Generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels 295

Majors and captains 2,080
Poruchiki, podporuchiki, and khorungie [low-ranking
officers] 6,049
Officers and junior commanders of police, border security,
and gendarmes 1,030
Policemen, gendarmes, prison guards, and intelligence officials 5,138
Officials, landowners, priests, and osadniki 144
 The Security Organs at War 249

In prisons of the western oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia, 18,632

arrestees (10,685 of them are Polish) are being held. These include:
Former officers 1,207
Former police agents and gendarmes 5,141
Spies and subversives 347
Former landowners, factory owners, and officials 165
Members of different c-r and insurgent organizations and
various c-r elements 5,345
Deserters from the enemy 6,127
[Handwritten in margin: “O.P. Re: NKVD USSR.” O.P. stands for
Osobaia papka, “Special Folder,” the name given to materials involving
especially sensitive state secrets, and controlled by Stalin.] Since they all
are inveterate and incorrigible enemies of Soviet power, the NKVD USSR
considers it necessary:
I. To suggest to the NKVD USSR: to consider under special order, with
implementation of the highest measure of punishment—shooting—in:

1) cases of those held in prisoner of war camps—14,700 people, being

former Polish officers, officials, landowners, policemen, intelligence
agents, gendarmes, osadniki, and prison guards,
2) and also cases of arrestees held in prisons in the western oblasts of
Ukraine and Belorussia, in number 11,000, members of various
c-r espionage and subversive organizations, former landowners, fac-
tory owners, former Polish officers, officials, and deserters from the
enemy.

II. To conduct hearings of the cases without calling the arrestees to

court, without bringing charges, and without issuing court decisions and
sentences—in the following order:
persons held in prisoner of war camps—according to indictments issued
by the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the NKVD USSR.
Persons under arrest—according to indictments in cases of the NKVD
UkSSR and NKVD BSSR [Belorussia].
III. To assign a troika consisting of Kobulov [This name handwritten
above a crossed-out word], Merkulov, and Bashtakov (head of the 1st
Special Department of the NKVD USSR) for examination and making
decisions on cases.9
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union SSR L. Beria
The Katyn massacre remains the most notorious of the mass mur-
ders conducted by the NKVD, but it was by no means unusual, given
the background of the mass repression operations of 1937 and 1938,
and the purge of the new territories in general after 1939. Indeed, the
250 The Security Organs at War

NKVD had conducted a similar purge of urban, political, and rural

elites in Ukraine in 1934 and 1935.10
The Politburo and the NKVD paid special attention to exterminat-
ing armed resistance groups in the new territories of western Ukraine,
which were coordinated under the name of OUN, the Organization of
Ukrainian Nationalists. The document below is a typical example of
the orders that were given to deal with the OUN. This document also
refers to the organizational division, briefly implemented in 1941, that
separated the NKVD into two commissariats, with the state security
organ, the GUGB, forming its own Commissariat of State Security, or
NKGB.

d o c u m ent
· 143 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On removal of counterrevolution-
ary organizations in the western oblasts of the UkSSR. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162,
d. 34, l. 156.
14 May 1941

Strictly secret
[…] Decision of the TsK VKP(b) and the SNK USSR
Due to the strengthening of the activities of the counterrevolutionary
“Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)” in western oblasts of the
UkSSR, which has been expressed in armed raids of the ounovtsy [members
of the OUN] on village soviets, collective farms, in murders of village activ-
ists, and for the purpose of a resolute suppression of criminal activities of the
ounovtsy, who destroy the peaceful work of collective farmers in the west-
ern oblasts of the UkSSR, TsK VKP(b), and the SNK USSR USSR decide:

1. To require organs of the NKGB and NKVD of Ukraine to continue

removal of participants of the counterrevolutionary OUN organiza-
tions.
2. To arrest and send to exile in settlements in the remote areas of the
Soviet Union for a period of 20 years, with confiscation of properties:
a) members of families of participants of counterrevolutionary Uk-
rainian and Polish nationalist organizations, the heads of which
went into underground and into hiding from authorities;
b) members of families of mentioned participants of counterrevolu-
tionary nationalist organizations, heads of which were sentenced
to VMN [capital punishment].
 The Security Organs at War 251

3. Organs of the NKGB and NKVD [must] strengthen their agent-

operational work, securing good organization and execution of op-
erational measures.
4. The NKGB and NKVD of Ukraine must send operational officials to
help local organs in the western oblasts, for rapid identification, pur-
suit, and removal of members of bandit groups. To station several
troop units of the NKVD Ukraine in the raions of the western oblasts
of the UkSSR most contaminated by banditry, for use in the struggle
against bandit groups.
5. TsK KP(b)U [Communist Party of Ukraine] and SNK UkSSR [must]
strengthen the Party and Soviet staff in raions of the western oblasts
contaminated by banditry.
6. To apply with all severity the order of the NKVD USSR on prohibi-
tion of possessing and carrying firearms without special permission;
to arrest and bring to criminal justice persons who are found having
weapons without permission.
7. To designate the deputy NKGB USSR, c. Serov, to organize the strug-
gle against bandit groups in the western oblasts of Ukraine, based on
this decision.
8. To charge the NKVD and NKGB USSR and the secretary of TsK of
Belorussia c. Ponomarenko to discuss the possibility of carrying out
similar measures in western Belorussia.

The security police conducted similar operations throughout May

1941, and right up to the day of the German invasion, 22 June 1941.

d o c u m en t
· 144 ·
Special communication from V. N. Merkulov (then head of the NKGB)
to I. V. Stalin regarding the results of the operation to arrest and remove
“anti-Soviet” elements from the western oblasts of Belorussia. RGANI,
f. 89, op. 18, d. 7, ll. 1–3.
21 June 1941

TsK VKP(b)—to comrade Stalin

Total results of the operation to arrest and remove anti-Soviet and the
socially alien element from the western oblasts of the Belorussian SSR are
summarized.
I. In Belostok Oblast:
252 The Security Organs at War

arrested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 persons

removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,405 persons
repressed in all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,905 persons
In Brest Oblast:
arrested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 persons
removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,039 persons
repressed in all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,339 persons
In Baranovichi Oblast:
arrested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476 persons
removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,723 persons
repressed in all. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,199 persons
In Pinsk Oblast:
arrested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363 persons
removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,299 persons
repressed in all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,662 persons
In Vileika Oblast:
arrested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 persons
removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,887 persons
repressed in all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,307 persons
II. In all western oblasts of Belorussian SSR:
arrested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,059 persons
removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22,363 persons
repressed in all . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,412 persons
This includes:
a) Leaders and active members of various Polish, Belorussian,
Ukrainian, Russian, and Jewish c-r nationalist organizations,
officials of the former Polish state, and other c-r element,
arrested. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,059 persons,
Their family members removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,655 persons,
b) Family members removed of those sentenced to
VMN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,293 persons,
c) Family members removed of those who have gone
underground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,652 persons,
d) Family members removed of those escaped
abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,105 persons,
e) Family members removed of those previously arrested,
who are currently under investigation as leaders and
active members of various c-r organizations . . . . . . 2,093 persons,
f) Family members removed of previously repressed
landowners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 persons,
g) Family members removed of previously repressed
gendarmes and policemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 persons,
 The Security Organs at War 253

h) Merchants, manufacturers, dealers, and their family

members removed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708 persons,
i) Family members removed of previously high-ranking
officials and officers of the former Polish army . . . . . . . 469 persons.

People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR V. Merkulov

As the documents above show, Beria was no longer Commissar of
State Security by the time of the German invasion. In January 1941,
Beria sent to Stalin an outline for reorganization of the NKVD, writing
that he was acting in accordance with Stalin’s instructions. In fact,
Beria had been pressing for reorganization, and for good reason. By
1941, the Commissariat of the Interior had become unwieldy, respon-
sible for an increasing number of disparate functions. The organiza-
tion was responsible for both foreign intelligence work and domestic
order and counterintelligence. It ran a huge economic-industrial em-
pire, administering a prisoner labor force of hundreds of thousands of
people. It was responsible for the security of state and Party leaders,
and for guarding the country’s borders and strategic points and enter-
prises. It controlled the civil police and firefighting administration, as
well as passport and all civil registration processes.
Beria proposed a separation of operational sectors involved in espio-
nage and counterespionage into a separate Commissariat of State
Security (Narodnyi Kommissariat Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti,
NKGB), and in February, the Politburo approved the reorganization.
V. N. Merkulov became head of the NKGB, while Beria remained head
of the NKVD.

d o c u m en t
· 145 ·
Draft of a decision of TsK VKP(b) on reorganization of the Commissariat of
Internal Affairs of the USSR. January 1941. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163,
d. 1295, ll. 103–6, 109.

Draft
Absolutely secret
Decision of TsK VKP(b)
January “ ” 1941 Moscow
Due to the need for maximum improvement of agent-operational work
of the organs of state security, and the increased volume of work carried
out by the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and its
254 The Security Organs at War

disparate functions (protection of state security, protection of public order,

protection of state borders, militarized security of especially important
industrial enterprises and railway buildings, management of places of con-
finement, fire prevention/protection, local antiaircraft defense, manage-
ment of highways, guarding camps and organizing use of convict labor,
carrying out very large-scale economic activity, development of new areas
in the remote northern areas of the USSR, the management of archives and
civil registration, etc.), TsK VKP (b) decides:
1. To divide the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR
into two narkomats [People’s Commissariats]:
a) People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD);
b) People’s Commissariat of State Security of the USSR (NKGB).
2. To assign to the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the
USSR the following tasks:
a) protection of public (socialist) property, protection of citizens’
personal security and property, and protection of public order;
b) protection of state borders of the USSR;
c) organizing local antiaircraft defense;
d) guarding convicts in prisons, correctional labor camps, correction-
al labor colonies, labor and special settlements, and organizing use
of their labor and reeducation;
e) struggle against children’s homelessness and neglect;
f) reception, convoying, guarding, and maintenance and use of
labor of prisoners of war and of those interned;
g) state supervision of fire prevention and management of fire pre-
vention actions;
h) registration of reservists;
i) construction, repair, and maintenance of roads of federal impor-
tance;
j) registration, protection, scientific and operative development of
the state archival holdings of the USSR;
k) civil registration.
3. To approve the following structure of the People’s Commissariat of
Internal Affairs of the USSR (see appendix No. 1).
4. To assign to the People’s Commissariat of State Security of the USSR
the tasks of ensuring state security of the USSR:
a) conducting intelligence work abroad;
b) struggle against subversive, espionage, diversionary, terrorist
activities of foreign intelligence services in the USSR;
c) operational development and elimination of the remnants of any
anti-Soviet parties and counterrevolutionary formations among
 The Security Organs at War 255

various segments of the population of the USSR, in the system of

industry, transportation, communication, agriculture, and so on;
d) guarding leaders of the Party and the government.
5. To affirm that the NKGB is released from carrying out any other
work that is not connected directly with the tasks listed in point 4 of
the present decision.
6. To approve the following structure of the People’s Commissariat of
State Security of the USSR (see appendix No. 2).
7. To organize republic People’s Commissariats of State Security and In-
ternal Affairs in the Union and autonomous republics, and administra-
tions of the NKGB and of the NKVD in krai and oblasts respectively.
To conduct the organizing of republic, krai, oblast, and raion-level
organs of the NKGB and of the NKVD on the basis of dividing exist-
ing offices of the NKVD, having them structured in accordance with
the structures of the NKGB and of the NKVD USSR, approved by
this decision.
8. To accomplish division of the NKVD USSR into two narkomats
within one month.
To submit for approval of TsK VKP and SNK USSR the provision on
People’s Commissariats of State Security and Internal Affairs in one
month.
9. To approve a draft of the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme
Council of the USSR about division of the People’s Commissariat of
Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Transition to War
The German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 delayed any
further moves, and in July the Politburo approved a reunification of
the two organs. Throughout the first years of war, the NKVD remained
one organization, but it was divided again in April 1943, when the
security organs were once again separated from the NKVD and orga-
nized as a separate commissariat, the NKGB. Beria remained head of
the NKVD and V. N. Merkulov once again became the head of the
NKGB, a position he retained until 1946. In a further reorganization,
in February 1941 the NKVD special departments in charge of military
control were transferred from the NKVD and subordinated to the
Commissariat of Defense. In April 1943 the special departments were
reorganized again, forming a counterespionage organization within
the military. This organization came to be known as Smersh, “Death
to Spies,” and was responsible not only for counterespionage, but also
for monitoring anti-Soviet activity and sentiment in the military.
256 The Security Organs at War

d o c u m ent
· 146 ·
Resolution of the GKO [State Committee of Defense] approving the
operational and administrative charter of the GUKR [Main Administration
of Counterintelligence] “Smersh” of the NKO [People’s Commissariat
of Defense] USSR.11
21 April 1943

Absolutely secret
Of special importance
To approve the provisions of the Main Administration of Counterintel-
ligence “SMERSH”—(Death to Spies) and its local organs (see appendix).
Head of the State Committee of Defense, I. Stalin
Appendix to the resolution of the GKO
[…] from 21.04.43.
“Approve”
Head of the State Committee of Defense I. Stalin
I. General provisions
1. The Main Administration of Counterintelligence, “Smersh,” created
on the basis of the former Administration of Special Departments of the
NKVD USSR, is a part of the People’s Commissariat of Defense.
The chief of the Main Administration of Counterintelligence of the NKO
(“Smersh”) is a Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense, subordinated
directly to the People’s Commissar of Defense, and obeys only his orders.
Organs of “Smersh” are a centralized organization: organs of “Smersh”
at the front and in military districts […] obey only their higher organs […]
II. Tasks of the organs of “Smersh”
1. The following tasks are assigned to the organs of “Smersh”:
a) struggle against espionage, sabotage, terrorist, and other subver-
sive activities of foreign intelligence services directed against
units and offices of the Red Army;
b) struggle against anti-Soviet elements who have infiltrated into
units and offices of the Red Army;
c) taking necessary agent-operational and other measures (through
headquarters) to create conditions at the fronts that exclude the
possibility of undetected enemy agents infiltrating through the
front line, with the goal of making the front line secure against
espionage and anti-Soviet elements;
d) struggle against treachery and betrayal of the Motherland in
units and offices of the Red Army (deserting to the enemy’s side,
concealment of spies, and in general, assistance to the latter);
 The Security Organs at War 257

e) struggle against desertion and self-inflicted wounding at

the fronts;
f) verification of military personnel and other persons who have
been in captivity and encircled by the enemy;
g) accomplishing special tasks of the People’s Commissar of
Defense.
2. Organs of “Smersh” are released from carrying out any other work
that is not connected directly to the tasks listed in the above section
[…].

As this document suggests, Smersh became a new and important

center for espionage work and thereby also a potential rival of espio-
nage and counterespionage organs of the NKGB.
The document also reflects another significant change brought
about by the war. When war broke out, Stalin and the Politburo reor-
ganized the Party and government structure to deal with the crisis.
They did not dismantle existing structures, but created an emergency
war cabinet called the State Committee of Defense (Gosudarstvennyi
Komitet Oborony, GKO, or sometimes GOKO). Stalin, of course,
headed this body of several dozen people, which included the highest-
ranking members of the Politburo, key members of Sovnarkom, and
members of the General Staff. With creation of the GKO, power, both
political and governmental, shifted from the Central Committee and
from Sovnarkom to the GKO. All important decisions were issued by
the GKO rather than by the Central Committee. This situation lasted
throughout the war, until Stalin dissolved the GKO in 1946.
With the onset of war, the state security organs focused increasingly
on espionage and operations connected with the war, but they contin-
ued to engage in mass forms of repression. These operations were ei-
ther punitive in nature or directed against populations that leaders
considered potentially dangerous. In October 1941, for example,
NKVD commander M. S. Mil’shtein reported to Beria on security po-
lice operations to arrest and shoot “military personnel separated from
their units or who deserted” from the front. As the report below de-
scribes, this included over 600,000 individuals who were labeled as
deserters or who refused to serve at the front. Some 10,200 were shot,
and of these, over 3,000 were executed in front of their units.
258 The Security Organs at War

d o c u m ent
· 147 ·
Report of S. R. Mil’shtein to L. P. Beria on the number of arrested and
executed military personnel who were separated from their units and fled
from the front. October 1941. RGANI, f. 89, op. 18, d. 8, ll. 1–3.

Absolutely secret
To the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
To the General Commissar of State Security
Comrade Beria
Report
From the beginning of the war until 10 October of this year, 657,364
military personnel who deserted their units and escaped from the front
were detained by special departments of the NKVD, NKVD guard units,
and NKVD guard units for protection of the rear.
Operative guard units of the special departments detained 249,969
persons, and NKVD guard units for protection of the rear [detained]
407,395 military personnel.
From among detainees, special departments arrested 25,878 people,
another 632,486 people were formed into units and were sent to the front
again.
Among those arrested by special departments:
spies—1,505
subversives—308
traitors—2,621
cowards and alarmists—2,643
deserters—8,772
spreaders of provocative rumors—3,987
those committing self-inflicted wounds—1,671
others—4,371
In total—25,878
By decisions of special departments and sentences of military tribunals
10,201 persons were shot. Of them, 3,321 persons were shot in front of
military formations. […]
Deputy head of the Administration of the OO [special departments] of
the NKVD USSR
Commissar of state security of the 3d rank (Mil’shtein)
“ ” October, 1941.
 The Security Organs at War 259

Ethnic Deportations
In late summer of 1941, the NKVD launched the first of a series of
ethnic deportations that marked the war years. In August, Beria re-
ported to Stalin on preparations for the deportation of German popu-
lations from the Volga region and nearby oblasts. As the document
below shows, these deportations targeted the whole of the popula-
tion, as with the Koreans in 1939. Beria’s terse and neutral language
shows careful calculation. He did not refer to the Germans in negative
terms as proven enemies, or even as potential collaborationists with
the invading German army, although the fear of collaboration was
what prompted the Politburo decision. Beria was also careful to state
that he was fulfilling Stalin’s orders. Also of interest to note, is the
specific reference to Communist Party members who were also to be
removed.

d o c u m en t
· 148 ·
Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin with appended draft of a
decision of the SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) about procedures for resettlement
of Germans from the Volga German Republic and from Saratov Oblast and
Stalingrad Oblast. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 178, ll. 6–9.
25 August 1941

TsK VKP(b)—to comrade Stalin

With this, and according to your instructions, I am submitting the draft
of a decision of SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) on procedures for resettling
[of Germans] from the Volga German Republic, and from Saratov and
Stalingrad Oblasts.
In all, 479,841 people must be removed from the specified areas, in-
cluding 401,746 people from the Volga German Republic, 54,389 people
from the Saratov Oblast, and 23,756 people from the Stalingrad Oblast.
It is planned to resettle them in the northeastern oblasts of the Kazakh
SSR, Krasnoyarsk and Altai krai, and the Omsk and Novosibirsk oblasts.
First secretaries of the obkoms of VKP(b), c. Vlasov (Saratov), c. Chuy-
anov (Stalingrad), c. Malov, (Volga Germans), are acquainted with the
draft of the decision.
I request your instructions.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR L. Beria
260 The Security Organs at War

Copy
Absolutely secret
Decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Union of SSR
“ ” August 1941
Moscow, Kremlin
The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and TsK VKP(b) decide:
1. To move all Germans from the Volga German Republic and from the
Saratov and Stalingrad oblasts, in total number 479,841 persons, to the
following krai and oblasts:
Krasnoyarsk Krai—75,000 people
Altai Krai—95,000 ″
Omsk Oblast—84,000 ″
Novosibirsk Oblast—100,000 ″
Kazakh SSR—125,000 ″
including:
Semipalatinsk Oblast—18,000 ″
Akmolinsk Oblast—25,000 ″
North Kazakhstan Oblast—25,000 ″
Kustanai Oblast—20,000 ″
Pavlodar Oblast—20,000 ″
East Kazakhstan Oblast—17,000 ″
All Germans without exception, both urban and rural residents, are
subject to resettlement, including members of VKP(b) and VLKSM [All-
Union Leninist Communist Youth League (Komsomol)].
In 1944, similar operations were conducted to deport Kalmyk,
Chechen, and Ingush populations. These operations followed in the
wake of the Soviet reconquest of the Caucasus area, and were likely
intended as punishment for what the GKO and Politburo considered
collaboration with the enemy.

d o c u m ent
· 149 ·
Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov on
conducting the resettlement operation of people of the Kalmyk nationality.
GARF, f. 9401 s/ch [secret section], op. 2, d. 64, l. 1.
3 January 1944

Absolutely secret
State Committee of Defense
to comrade Stalin I. V.
 The Security Organs at War 261

to comrade Molotov V. M.
According to the instruction of the Presidium of the Supreme Council
and the decision of SNK USSR from 28 December 1943, the NKVD
USSR carried out the operation of resettlement of people of the Kalmyk
nationality to eastern areas.
To ensure completion of the operation and prevention of cases of
resistance or escape, the NKVD took prior and necessary operational-
military actions, organized protection [encirclement] of settlements, col-
lected those being resettled, escorted them to the places where they were
loaded in echelons [on trains].
At the beginning of the operation, 750 Kalmyks—bandit gang mem-
bers, gang helpers, collaborators of the German occupiers, and others of
the anti-Soviet element—were arrested.
In all, in 46 echelons there were loaded 26,359 families, or 93,139
people, resettlers who were sent to resettlement places in the Altai and
Krasnoyarsk krai, Omsk and Novosibirsk oblasts.
During the conduct of the operation there were no incidents or
excesses.
Echelons of those moved were accompanied by NKVD officers.
The NKVD USSR together with the local organizations took necessary
measures for reception, providing shelter and employment for those be-
ing resettled in the place of their resettlement.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR, L. Beria
In the case of the Chechen deportations, Beria described in some
detail measures taken by the NKVD to isolate mountain villages and
to prepare for expected resistance.

d o c u m en t
· 150 ·
Telegram of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin regarding preparations for the eviction of
Chechens and Ingush. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 64, l. 167.
17 February 1944

Absolutely secret
17. II-44
To comrade Stalin
Preparations for the operation of eviction of Chechens and Ingush are
coming to an end. After verification, 459,486 people were registered who
are subject to resettlement, including those living in the raions of Dages-
tan bordering on Checheno-Ingushetia, and in the city of Vladikavkaz. I
262 The Security Organs at War

have reviewed conditions and preparations in the localities of resettle-

ment, and the necessary measures have been taken.
Considering the scale of the operation and peculiarities of the moun-
tain areas, it was decided to carry out the removal (including boarding
people in echelons) within 8 days. Within [this period], the operation in
all lowland and foothill areas and in some mountain settlements will be
completed during the first three days, encompassing more than 300 thou-
sand people. During the next four days, removal in all mountain areas
will be carried out, encompassing the remaining 150 thousand people.
During the conduct of the operation in lowland areas, i.e. during the
first three days, all settlements of mountain areas where removal will start
three days later will be blockaded by military forces under the command
of Chekists, which will be stationed there beforehand.
Among Chechens and Ingush, there has been much said, in particular
in connection with the appearance of troops. Part of the population reacts
to the appearance of troops in accordance with the official version, ac-
cording to which Red Army units are allegedly conducting training ma-
neuvers in mountain conditions. Another part of the population assumes
[that the troops are there for the] deportation of the Chechens and In-
gush. Some think that bandits, German collaborators, and other anti-
Soviet elements will be removed.
There was much talk about the need to put up resistance to the removal.
We considered all this when planning our operational-Chekist actions.
All necessary measures are being taken in order to conduct the re-
moval in an orderly manner, within the planned period, and without seri-
ous incidents. In particular, involved in the removal will be 6–7 thousand
Dagestanis and 3 thousand Ossetians from collective farm and rural re-
gions of Dagestan and North Ossetia, adjacent to Checheno-Ingushetia,
and also rural activists from among Russians, in those areas where there
is a Russian population. Russians, Dagestanis, and Ossetians also will be
used in part for protection of cattle, housing, and the households of those
who will be moved. Within the next few days, preparations for carrying
out the operation will be completely finished, and the removal is planned
to begin on 22 or 23 February.
Considering the importance of the operation, I request permission to
stay in place until completion of the operation, at least in general, i.e.
until 26 or 27 February.
NKVD USSR Beria
The reality of the Chechen deportations belied the confident bureau-
cratic orderliness reflected in Beria’s memorandum. In fact, the reloca-
tion of the Chechen population in 1944 constituted one of the greatest
tragedies of social cleansing of the twentieth century. In all, some-
where between 350,000 and 400,000 Chechens were deported from
 The Security Organs at War 263

their mountain villages to arid areas of Kazakhstan. Thousands died

resisting the deportation; invalids and others unable to travel were
murdered, often brutally, in their villages. An unknown number of
deportees died in transit due to poor conditions, lack of food and wa-
ter, and diseases such as typhus. Somewhere between 14 and 23 per-
cent died in the hard first years of resettlement, 1944 to 1948. In all,
researchers estimate that as much as 30 percent of the Chechen popu-
lation died between 1944 and 1952. Demographic estimates suggest
that the deficit of births in the same period may have raised the popu-
lation loss to over 50 percent. The difference between the horror of
such an event and the banal hubris of its planning and execution has
been much discussed in the literature, but even in direct confrontation
with the documents, this kind of event remains almost unfathomable.
As well, the cost in time, money, effort, and people required to carry
out such an operation is staggering in and of itself. Somewhere be-
tween 50,000 and 100,000 people and military personnel participated
in the roundups and deportations. Yet the Chechen deportation was
neither the first nor the last such operation by Stalin’s security police.12
In May 1944, deportation of Tatar and Muslim populations from
the Crimea was connected with operations to “secure” the area from
anti-Soviet, pro-German, and pro-Turkish “elements,” collaborators,
and spies. Though the operation did not target ethnic or religious
populations specifically, Tatars and Muslims suffered inordinately.

d o c u m en t
· 151 ·
Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, and
G. M. Malenkov regarding work of operational-Chekist groups in cleansing
the Crimean ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. GARF,
f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 64, ll. 385–89.
1 May 1944

Absolutely secret
State Committee of Defense—
to comrade Stalin I. V.
to comrade Molotov V. M.
TsK VKP(b) to comrade Malenkov G. M.
In addition to our communication of 25 April of this year, the NKVD
USSR reports on the work of operational-Chekist groups in cleansing the
Crimean ASSR from the anti-Soviet element.
264 The Security Organs at War

Organs of the NKVD-NKGB and “Smersh” NKO arrested 4,206 peo-

ple of the anti-Soviet element, out of whom 430 spies were discovered.
In addition, from 10 to 27 April, NKVD troops for protection of the
rear detained 5,115 persons. Among them were arrested 55 agents of
German intelligence and counterintelligence organs, 266 turncoats and
traitors to the Motherland, 363 collaborators [posobnikov] and hench-
men [stavlennikov] of the enemy, and also participants of punishment
units.
Arrested were 49 members of Muslim committees, including Izmailov
Apas, head of the Karasubazar raion-level Muslim committee; Batalov
Batal, head of the Muslim committee of the Balaklava Raion; Ableizov
Beliai, head of the Muslim committee of the Simeiz raion; Aliev Musa, head
of the Muslim committee of the Zuya Raion.
Muslim committees carried out recruitment of Tatar youth into volun-
tary units to fight against partisans and the Red Army, selected appropri-
ate personnel to penetrate to the rear of the Red Army, and conducted
active profascist propaganda among the Tatar population in Crimea on
the instructions of German intelligence organs.
Members of Muslim committees were subsidized by Germans and, in
addition, had an extensive network of “trading” and “cultural enlighten-
ment” organizations, which they used simultaneously for espionage
work.
After the defeat of Paulus’s 6th German army at Stalingrad,13 the Feo-
dosia Muslim committee collected from Tatars one million rubles for aid
to the German army.
Members of Muslim committees in their work were guided by the slo-
gan “Crimea for Tatars only,” and were spreading rumors about joining
Crimea to Turkey.
In 1943, Turkish emissary Amil Pasha came to Feodosia. He called on
the Tatar population to support actions of the German command.
In Berlin, the Germans created a Tatar national center, whose represen-
tatives came to Crimea in June 1943 to learn about the work of the Mus-
lim committees.
A significant number of people from the enemy’s agents, henchmen,
and collaborators with German-fascist occupiers were discovered and ar-
rested.
According to our agent’s information, an organization, the NTSNP
[People’s Labor Union of Russian Solidarism], created in 1943 in Simfero-
pol by the German intelligence service, was engaged in anti-Soviet propa-
ganda among the Russian population of the Crimea, in the recruitment of
anti-Soviet intellectuals for these purposes, and also in the recruitment of
espionage personnel for the enemy’s intelligence service among Soviet
prisoners of war.
 The Security Organs at War 265

Our agent communicated a large amount of valuable data on the ac-

tivities of this organization, the authenticity of which has been verified.
A Russian fascist organization, “The Party of Truly Russian people,”
created by the German command in the Crimea, was headed by count
Keller, chief of Romanian counterintelligence in the Crimea, who lived in
Sevastopol before the occupation of the Crimea. Participants of the
Crimean center of this organization were Fedov, also Gavrilidi, A. P., an
employee of the military department of the Gestapo, arriving in the
Crimea from Bulgaria, and Buldeev, an activist traitor, the editor of a
fascist newspaper “Voice of the Crimea.”
[…]
The organization also engaged in recruiting youth between the ages
of 15 and 19 for sabotage work against the USSR, by organizing them
under cover of all sorts of sport teams, theatrical and musical, and other
societies.
Measures were taken for identification of participants of this organiza-
tion. In winter 1942, the German intelligence service created in the Crimea
the “Ukrainian National Committee,” headed by a certain Shopar. A trade
enterprise, Konsum, was the headquarters of the “Ukrainian National
Committee.” All Konsum’s personnel were Committee members.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)
Still plagued by fears of anti-Soviet activities, Beria proposed further
deportations from the Crimea of Greek, Armenian, and Bulgarian
populations. As the recommendation below describes, Beria justified
the deportations on the ground that these populations had been pre-
disposed to cooperate with German occupation forces.

d o c u m en t
· 152 ·
Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on the expediency of
removing Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians from the territory of Crimea.
GARF, f. 9401s, op. 2, d. 65, ll. 161–63.
29 May 1944

Absolutely secret
State Committee of Defense
to comrade Stalin I. V.
After removal of Crimean Tatars, work continues in the Crimea by or-
gans of the NKVD-NKGB to identify and remove the anti-Soviet element,
checking and combing through settlements and forest areas to capture
266 The Security Organs at War

Crimean Tatars who might have hidden from the expulsion, and deserters
and the bandit element.
Now living in the Crimean Krai are 12,075 persons, registered
Bulgarians, 1,300 Greeks, and 9,919 Armenians.
The Bulgarian population lives mostly in settlements between Simferopol
and Feodosia, and also near Dzhankoi. There are up to 10 village soviets
with a population from 80 to 100 Bulgarian inhabitants in each. Also, Bul-
garians live in small groups in Russian and Ukrainian villages.
During the German occupation, a considerable part of the Bulgarian
population actively participated in actions carried out by the Germans:
stockpiling bread and food for the German army, assisting German mili-
tary authorities to identify and detain military personnel of the Red Army
and Soviet partisans.
For their help rendered to German occupiers, Bulgarians received
so-called “protection licenses” that specified that the German command
[would] protect both the persons and properties of such Bulgarians, and
threatened execution for violation of the protection licenses.
Germans organized police units from among Bulgarians, and also
recruited Bulgarians for work in Germany, and for military service in the
German army.
The Greek population is scattered throughout the majority of Crimean
raions. A considerable proportion of the Greeks, especially in the seaside
cities, became engaged in trade and small-scale production after the arrival
of the occupiers. German authorities assisted Greeks in trade, transporta-
tion of goods, etc.
The Armenian population is scattered throughout the majority of Crime-
an raions. There are no large settlements with an Armenian population.
The “Armenian Committee,” organized by the Germans, actively as-
sisted the Germans and carried out large-scale anti-Soviet work.
The German intelligence organization, “Dromedar,” existed in the city
of Simferopol, headed by the former Dashnak [member of the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun] general Dro, who directed
intelligence work against the Red Army, and for this purpose created sev-
eral Armenian committees for espionage and guerrilla operations in the
rear of the Red Army, and for assistance in organizing Armenian volun-
tary legions.
Armenian national committees, with the active participation of immi-
grants arrived from Berlin and Istanbul, conducted propaganda work for
“Independent Armenia.”
So-called “Armenian religious communities” engaged in organizing
trade and small-scale production among Armenians, in addition to their
religious and political affairs. These organizations helped Germans, espe-
cially by fund raising for the military needs of Germany.
 The Security Organs at War 267

Armenian organizations created the so-called “Armenian Legion,”

which existed through support of Armenian communities.
The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR considers it
expedient to remove all Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians from the ter-
ritory of the Crimea.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)
In July 1944, Beria reported to Stalin the results of the Crimean
operations.

d o c u m en t
· 153 ·
Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on removal of
spetspereselentsy [special resettlers] from the Crimea. GARF, f. 9401s,
op. 2, d. 65, l. 275.
4 July 1944

Absolutely secret
State Committee of Defense to comrade Stalin I. V.
The NKVD USSR reports that removal of special resettlers—Tatars,
Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians from Crimea—is completed.
In all, 225,009 people were removed, including:
Tatars 183,155 persons
Bulgarians 12,422 ″
Greeks 15,040 ″
Armenian 9,621 ″
Germans 1,119 ″
Also foreign citizens 3,652 ″
All Tatars arrived in their places of resettlement and were resettled:
In oblasts of the Uzbek SSR—151,604 people.
In oblasts of the RSFSR, in accordance with the resolution of the GKO
from 21 May 1944—31,551 people.
Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, and Germans, in number 38,202 per-
sons, are on their way to the Bashkir ASSR, Mari ASSR, to the Kemerovo,
Molotov, Sverdlovsk, Kirov oblasts of the RSFSR, and to the Guryev
Oblast, Kazakh SSR.
3,652 foreign citizens were sent for resettlement in the Fergana Oblast,
Uzbek SSR.
All special resettlers were placed in satisfactory living conditions.
A considerable proportion of the able-bodied Tatar special resettlers
were put to agricultural work—in collective farms and state farms, at
timber cuttings, at enterprises and construction sites.
268 The Security Organs at War

There were no incidents during the conduct of the removal operation,

neither in the localities nor in transit.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)
Deportation of national groups from the Crimea was one of the last
of the ethnic operations during the war, but these operations did not
achieve the goal of securing Soviet borders. As the next chapter shows,
Soviet security and political chiefs faced serious insurgency move-
ments along the length of the country’s borders as the war drew to an
end. The history of these insurgencies is still little known, but, to-
gether, they amounted to a war within the war, one that continued
even after the fall of Berlin.
 chapter eight

Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

1945–1953

A
s Soviet armies pushed west, driving German forces out of
the USSR, Stalin’s regime faced new challenges. These, in turn,
created new tasks for the security organs. One of the most
dangerous threats arose from a new kind of war that erupted in re-
cently liberated or reoccupied territories, especially in the areas incor-
porated into the Soviet Union after 1939. In many of these areas,
armed resistance groups formed to fight Soviet occupation, from the
Baltic states through Belorussia into Ukraine, and as far south as the
former Bessarabian territories that had belonged to Romania. The ef-
fort to subdue and “sovietize” the “rear” of the advancing Soviet
armies involved more than disarming a few scattered bands of fighters.
The Soviet regime found itself engaged in borderland wars that in-
volved significant numbers of organized resistance groups, and that
resulted in large numbers of casualties on all sides. At the same time,
Stalin employed the security apparatus in an ongoing round of cam-
paigns to root out internal enemies, supposedly associated with the
country’s new international opponents. The victory in the war routed
the fascist threat but presented the Soviet Union with a new and even
more menacing danger from its wartime ally, the United States, and the
coalition of western European countries that came to make up the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Stalin relied heavily on the secu-
rity organs, and on increasingly sophisticated techniques, to provide
information about, and to carry out operations against, the NATO
alliance, but he continued to employ the security organs to root out
perceived enemies and conspiracies inside the USSR. These functions—
sovietizing new territories, international spying, and traditional

269
270 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

domestic purging—dominated the work of the postwar “Cheka” until

Stalin’s death in March 1953.
These functions were carried out by a reorganized security appara-
tus. In 1946, the Politburo reconfirmed the separation of the NKVD
and NKGB, which had occurred in 1943, and renamed all commis-
sariats as ministries. As a result, the Commissariat of the Interior, the
NKVD, became the Ministry of Interior, the MVD. Analogously,
the Commissariat of State Security, the NKGB, became the MGB.
S. N. Kruglov, Beria’s deputy in the NKVD, replaced him as interior
minister, a post Kruglov held until Stalin’s death in March 1953. V. S.
Abakumov, the head of the counterintelligence organization Smersh,
moved to head the newly formed MGB. The labor camp system
remained under control of the MVD, except camps for especially
dangerous political criminals under the MGB. Although Beria was
head of neither the MVD nor the MGB, he retained an important
oversight role as part of his brief as a Politburo member.

The Borderland Wars

The campaigns to subdue border areas and border states engaged
Soviet security forces in one of their largest and most costly operations
since the Civil War era. On the Soviet side, this war was waged by the
combined forces of the state security apparatus, the NKGB, and forc-
es of the NKVD, especially the border forces and the Chief Adminis-
tration for the Struggle against Banditry (Glavnoe upravlenie bor’by
s banditizma, GUBB), an administration that had been created in
1938. Together, these organs fielded units, spies, and informants to
destroy centers of resistance to Soviet authority. As the following doc-
uments show, much of the activity of the security organs focused on
Ukraine, against the so-called Organization of Ukrainian National-
ists, the OUN, whose collective members were called ounovtsy, and
against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the UPA. Soviet leaders
regarded these kinds of resistance organizations as fascist remnants.
Others, especially many locals, saw them as nationalist heroes fighting
against foreign domination. Either way, the newly occupied territories
became zones of ruthless fighting.
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 271

d o c u m en t
· 154 ·
Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, and G. M.
Malenkov on the conduct of Chekist-military operations to liquidate armed
groups of the OUN. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 66, ll. 130–31.
5 August 1944

Absolutely secret
GOKO—to comrade Stalin I. V.
SNK USSR—to comrade Molotov V. M.
TsK VKP(b)—to comrade Malenkov G. M.
According to information of the NKVD-NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR,
the OUN underground, and gangs of the UPA have become active again
recently, in connection with the advance of the Red Army to the west, and
with the departure of several units of NKVD troops, relocated in raions
from the Rovno Oblast.
OUN gangs from Poland and Lvov Oblast were noticed moving to
raions of the Volynsk, Tarnopol, and Rovno oblasts.
Several gangs crossed the Western Bug River to raions of Volynsk
Oblast, a number up to 1,000 persons.
During the last two weeks, cases of murders have increased of Soviet
and Party activists, family members of Red Army soldiers, and of former
bandits, who gave themselves up to the organs of the NKVD. Cases of
violent capture by OUN gangs have occurred of persons called up for
military service, at the call-up stations, and on the way [to their points of
service].
On 28–30 July, gangs of the UPA operating in raions of the Volynskaya
Oblast captured and took into the forest several teams of recruits, total-
ing 1,130 persons.
Deputy commissar of internal affairs of the USSR comrade Kruglov
was sent to the area to take measures to suppress actions of the OUN
gangs.
NKVD troops have been transferred to the contaminated raions.
For suppression of infiltration of the OUN gangs from Polish territory
to raions of Lvov, Volynsk, and Rovno oblasts, measures have been taken
for establishment of frontier groups along the border line between the
USSR and Poland.
During Chekist-military operations to liquidate OUN gangs (February–
July) 17,550 were killed, and 17,480 bandits captured alive.
3,795 persons surrendered to NKVD organs.
4,743 active members of the OUN and the UPA were arrested.
272 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

Weapons and ammunition captured: guns—14, mortars—85, large-caliber

and tripod and submachine guns—600, revolvers—436, grenades—6,567,
cartridges—600,000, mines—6,060, shells—6,110; 20 radio stations were
removed. 158 food supply depots were captured.
As a result of the detention of persons evading draft and mobilization
in the Red Army, 270,600 persons were sent to raivoenkomats [raion-
level military draft boards].
During operations, 700 operational workers, officers, and soldiers of
the NKVD and Red Army troops were killed, and 562 were wounded.
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)

d o c u m ent
· 155 ·
Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, and
G. M. Malenkov on the struggle against the anti-Soviet underground in the
Belorussian SSR. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 68, ll. 103–7.
12 December 1944

Absolutely secret
GOKO—to comrade Stalin I. V.
SNK USSR—to comrade Molotov V. M.
TsK VKP(b)—to comrade Malenkov G. M.
Comrade Kobulov, who was sent to the western oblasts of
Belorussia, together with the NKVD and the NKGB of Belorussia c.c.
Belchenko and Tsanava, reports on the work done by the NKVD-NKGB
of the Belorussian SSR in the struggle against the anti-Soviet underground
and armed gangs in the western oblasts of Belorussia, and on further
actions of cleansing these oblasts of the anti-Soviet element.
As of 1 December of this year, 288 anti-Soviet Polish and Belorussian
organizations were uncovered and liquidated. 5,069 participants of these
organizations and 700 agents of the organs of the intelligence service
were arrested. Thirteen spy residencies of the German intelligence service
were liquidated.
There were 22 removed and 11 killed who were emissaries of the Polish
government in exile in London, and also of the Warsaw and Vil’na centers
of the “Armiia Kraiova” [Home Army], who were sent to the western
oblasts of the BSSR to organize the armed struggle of Poles against Soviet
power.
During the Chekist-military operations of liquidation of bandit groups,
800 bandits were killed; 1,543 deserters and 48,900 draft evaders were
detained.
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 273

As well, in the Brest, Pinsk, and Polesie oblasts adjoining Ukraine, 11

OUN bandit groups were liquidated, which had moved from the Rovno
and Volynsk oblasts of the UkSSR. During liquidation of these gangs, 385
were killed, and 160 OUN bandits were captured alive.
Eight operating radio stations of the Polish nationalist underground
and 6 illegal printing houses issuing anti-Soviet literature were discovered
and removed.
We provide brief data on the most characteristic insurgent organiza-
tions liquidated in the territory of the western oblasts of the BSSR.
[…]
In July 1943, German counterintelligence organs created “Ragner,” a
large bandit-insurgent organization, which was called “Forces South”
[Soedinenie Iug]. The organization was receiving arms and ammunition
from German counterintelligence and conducted active struggle against
Soviet partisans in the territory of the Baranovichi and Grodno oblasts.
After leaving the western oblasts of the BSSR, the Ragner organization,
consisting of 120 persons, joined the “Armiia Kraiova” and conducted
armed struggle against Soviet power, carried out subversive and terrorist
acts, spread anti-Soviet flyers, incited the Polish population to engage in
sabotage actions against Soviet power. The organization was headed by a
lieutenant of the Polish army, Zainchkovsky, Cheslav, under the code-
name “Ragner,” who was directly connected with the Polish government
in exile in London and received instruction for subversive activities from
the latter on a handheld transceiver.
As a result of Chekist-military operations over a period of time, 80
members of the “Ragner” gang were killed or arrested.
On 3 December, as a result of another operation in pursuit of this
gang, the latter was crushed—“Ragner” was killed, and his headquarters
liquidated.
In the Baranovichi Oblast a multibranched White Polish insurgent
organization “Polish Union Underground” was liquidated.
[…]
Despite NKVD-NKGB measures to liquidate the anti-Soviet under-
ground, active enemy operations of the Polish anti-Soviet organizations
and gangs continue in the western oblasts of the BSSR, in particular in the
Grodno, Baranovichi, and Molodechno oblasts where the Polish popula-
tion prevails.
According to available intelligence and investigation materials, and also
from captured documents, it was established that the Polish nationalist
underground in the western oblasts of Belorussia is a part of the “Armiia
Kraiova,” and receives instructions for its anti-Soviet work from the Polish
government in exile in London, through the Warsaw and Vil’na centers.
A number of the organizations of the anti-Soviet Polish and Belorus-
sian underground were created by the German intelligence organs during
274 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

the occupation of Belorussia, and were left for subversive work against
the USSR.
With a view to liquidation of White Polish and other anti-Soviet orga-
nizations and armed gangs in the western oblasts of the BSSR, and to
cleansing these areas of anti-Soviet elements, the NKVD-NKGB of the
BSSR is conducting [further operations].
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)
The Polish-Ukrainian borders were not the only contested areas. In
March 1945, Beria reported to Stalin on efforts to subdue “bandit”
activity in Central Asia. To what extent this activity was simple law-
lessness or organized political activity is not clear, but to the Soviet
state security forces there was no distinction.

d o c u m ent
· 156 ·
Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, and
G. M. Malenkov on results of work to liquidate bandit formations in 1944.
GARF, f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 39–40.
14 March 1945

Absolutely secret
GOKO—to comrade Stalin I. V.
SNK USSR—to comrade Molotov, V. M.
TsK VKP(b)—to comrade Malenkov, G. M.
[…] In 1944 in the RSFSR, the republics of Central Asia, the Northern
Caucasus, and Transcaucasia 2,709 gangs were uncovered and liquidat-
ed, with a total number of 16,469 bandits and their helpers.
In 1943, in the same republics and oblasts, 3,790 gangs were uncov-
ered and liquidated, with a total number of 29,913 bandits and their
collaborators.

1943 1944

Liquidated

Bandit Bandits and Bandit Bandits and

groups helpers groups helpers

Areas of the RSFSR freed from

German occupation 1,117 9,242 902 4,511
Central areas of the RSFSR 834 5,265 885 4,330
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 275

Central Asia and Kazakhstan 772 5,193 328 1,818

North Caucasus 255 4,889 95 2,910
Transcaucasia 324 2,016 80 703
Siberia and the Urals 358 2,250 304 1,702
Far East 130 1,058 115 495

In addition, in the course of work to liquidate banditry in the territories

of the above-noted republics, removed were: deserters and draft evad-
ers—206,118 persons; parachutists dropped in by Germans for subversive
and bandit work—264 persons; German agents—242 persons; traitors,
betrayers, German henchmen and collaborators—7,001 persons.
In 1944, 4,356 bandit strikes occurred, including: attacks on officers
and soldiers of the Red Army and of troops and organs of the NKVD-
NKGB—264 persons; attacks on Soviet officials—165; attacks on state
and collective farm offices—885; robberies of citizens—3,402.
NKVD organs solved 4,233 cases of banditry, or 97.2 percent. Confis-
cated from bandits, deserters, enemy agents, and the population: machine
guns 411, automatic rifles 2,223, PTR [antitank rifles] 58, mortars 345,
rifles 25,498, revolvers and other handguns 7,993, grenades 7,793, car-
tridges 1,960,000, mines 16,310, other weapons 11,668, explosives about
1,000 kilos.
According to information of the NKVD USSR, by 1 January of this year,
in the territories of the specified republics and oblasts, 204 bandit groups
numbering 745 persons, and 320 single bandits, remained at large.
[…]
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)
As the Red Army moved into Germany, the NKVD continued opera-
tions to cleanse the areas behind the Soviet lines. At the same time, officers
set up special “filtration” points to vet Soviet citizens repatriated from
prisoner of war camps or otherwise the returning to the Soviet Union. The
following documents give an idea of the activities of the filtration units.

d o c u m en t
· 157 ·
Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on cleansing the rear area
of Red Army operations. RGANI, f. 89, op. 75, d. 5, ll. 1–3.
17 April 1945

Absolutely secret
State Committee of Defense
To comrade Stalin, I. V.
276 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

In response to your instruction, from January to April 15 of this year,

the NKVD USSR removed 215,540 persons—enemy elements—from the
rear areas of Red Army operations.
These include:
agents and official staff of the intelligence and counterintelligence
organs of the enemy, terrorists and subversives—8,470 persons,
participants of fascist organizations—123,166 persons,
command and regular staff of armies fighting against the USSR—
31,190 persons,
command and operational staff of police organs, prisons, concentra-
tion camps, employees of the public prosecutor’s office, and judicial
authorities—3,319 persons,
heads of large economic and administrative organizations, and work-
ers of journals and newspapers—2,272 persons,
traitors to the Motherland, betrayers, henchmen, and collaborators,
who escaped along with the fascist troops—17,495 persons,
others of the enemy element—29,628 persons.

Out of the total number of those removed, Germans make up

138,200 persons, Poles—38,660 persons, Hungarians—3,200 persons,
Slovaks—1,130 persons, Italians—390 persons, and citizens of the So-
viet Union (Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians,
Kazakhs, etc.)—27,880 persons.
Out of the total number of those removed, 215,540 persons: 148,540
persons were sent to NKVD camps; 62,000 persons are in front line
NKVD prison camps; 5,000 persons died on their way to the camps.
NKVD USSR investigative and verifying work established that among
those arrested, there is a significant proportion of ordinary members of
various fascist organizations (professional, labor, youth).
Removal of persons in these categories was dictated by the need for the
fastest cleansing of enemy elements from behind the front lines.
It is necessary to note that from among those arrested and sent to
NKVD camps, no more than half may be used for physical work, while
the rest consist of old men and persons unsuitable for physical work.
At present, only up to 25,000 persons are used for work in coal, light
metal industry, in peat production for power plants, and in construction.
The NKVD USSR considers it necessary to instruct plenipotentiaries of
the NKVD at the fronts:
1. From now on, in the course of the advance of the Red Army into the
territory of Germany, when cleansing rear operational areas of the
Red Army, to limit removal of persons to the following categories:
a) espionage and subversive, and terrorist agents of German intel-
ligence organs;
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 277

b) members of all organizations and groups left by the German

command and by the intelligence organs of the enemy for sabo-
tage work in the rear of the Red Army;
c) holders of illegal radio stations, armories, underground printing
houses, and to confiscate material equipment intended for enemy
work;
d) active members of the National Socialist Party;
e) oblast, city, and raion-level heads of fascist youth organizations;
f) employees of the Gestapo, “SD” [security service], and other
German retaliatory organs;
g) heads of oblast, city, and raion-level administrative organs, as
well as editors of newspapers, journals, and authors of anti-
Soviet publications.
2. To cease removal to the USSR of persons arrested during cleansing
operations behind operating units of the Red Army, organizing on the
spot the necessary number of prisons and camps. To transfer to the
USSR only those arrested who present some operational interest.
3. To review materials of all those arrested in all categories specified
above, and to release and to return to their places of residence, in an
organized manner, as far as possible, those people not suitable for
physical work, about whom there is no evidence of working for the
enemy. I request your approval of this draft of the order of NKVD.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)

On the first page there is a note by Beria: “Personal report approved by
comrade Stalin. 17/IV-45. L. Beria.”

d o c u m en t
· 158 ·
Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, and
G. M. Malenkov on the work of filtration points for Soviet citizens. GARF,
f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 92, ll. 6–8.
2 January 1945

Absolutely secret
GOKO—to comrade Stalin
SNK USSR—to comrade Molotov
TsK VKP(b)—to comrade Malenkov
The NKVD USSR reports that during the period of work in filtration
points for processing of Soviet citizens returning to the Motherland, as of
30 December 1944, 96,956 persons were received and vetted.
278 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

This includes points in:

Ukrainian SSR—13,960
Belorussian SSR—7,228
Moldavian SSR—9,688
Estonian SSR—18,459
Leningrad Oblast—45,011
Murmansk Oblast—2,610
From this number, 38,428 persons were given permission documents
and sent to places of permanent residence; 5,827 persons of draft age
were transferred to the voenkomats [military draft boards]; 43,693 per-
sons were sent to NKVD special camps for further vetting.
From those vetted, 153 persons—collaborators, betrayers, and traitors
to the Motherland—were discovered and arrested.
[…]
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)
As the war with Germany came to a close in May 1945, the war
along the Soviet Union’s western borders intensified. Stalin, along
with other Politburo members, followed events in these areas closely
and, as the following documents show, received monthly reports from
Beria and other security officials.

d o c u m ent
· 159 ·
Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, and
G. M. Malenkov on the course of struggle against an armed underground in the
western oblasts of Belorussia. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 99, ll. 167–69.
17 September 1945

Absolutely secret
SNK USSR—to comrade Stalin, I. V.
SNK USSR—to comrade Molotov, V. M.
TsK VKP(b)—to comrade Malenkov, G. M.
[…]
From 1 August to 1 September of this year, as a result of agent-
operational actions and Chekist-military operations, 6,146 people were
arrested and detained, including:
bandits .................................................................................... —219
bandit helpers ............................................................................ —60
members of anti-Soviet organizations ........................................ —57
German henchmen, collaborators, and other
anti-Soviet elements........................................................................ —69
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 279

deserters and draft evaders ..................................................... —5,741

Also:
bandits killed .............................................................................. —79
voluntarily surrendering to the NKVD organs .......................... —243
In all, during the operations from July 1944 to 1 September 1945, the
Belorussian SSR NKVD arrested and detained 97,094 persons, including:
bandits ................................................................................. —6,514
bandit helpers ....................................................................... —1,036
members of anti-Soviet organizations ....................................... —651
German henchmen, collaborators, and others of the
anti-Soviet element ..................................................................... —6,141
deserters and draft evaders ................................................... —82,752
3,282 bandits, deserters, and others of the anti-Soviet element were
killed.
Also, 698 bandits, 44 members of anti-Soviet organizations, and 8,188
deserters and draft evaders gave themselves up.
Confiscated, as a result of the operations: mortars 62, PTR 30, ma-
chine guns 657, automatic rifles 1,359, rifles 10,485, revolvers 771, gre-
nades 1,435, mines 1,164, cartridges 94,845, explosives 893, handheld
transceivers 12, radio receivers 51.
On 4 August a gang headed by “Grechko” in the Logishchin Raion of
Pinsk Oblast was liquidated. Killed were 3 bandits, and 7 were detained.
Confiscated: automatic rifles 2, rifles 7, cartridges 390.
On 12 August, “Shumsky’s” gang was liquidated in the Domachevo
Raion of the Brest Oblast. Killed were 29 bandits, and captured 16. Con-
fiscated from the bandits: machine guns 2, automatic rifles 4, rifles 16,
guns 2, grenades 50, cartridges 3,000.
On 24 August, in the Oshmyiany Raion, Molodechno Oblast, “Mat-
sulevich’s” gang was liquidated. […]
During the reporting period the following most characteristic bandit
instances took place:
On 13 August 1945, in the Mironychi village of the Radoshkovichi
Raion, Molodechno Oblast, an armed gang of 8 people murdered
Dvornikov, head of the planning department of the Radoshkovichi raion-
al [soviet] executive committee, and robbed a shop.
[…]
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR (L. Beria)
The following summary report gives an idea of the scale of the bor-
derland wars in the several years following the cessation of military
activities against Germany and its allied powers.
280 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

d o c u m ent
· 160 ·
Liquidation of anti-Soviet nationalist organizations and gangs linked
to them, as well as of others of the anti-Soviet element, on the territory
of the Western Oblast of Ukraine SSR, 1944–47. February or March
1947. GARF, f. 9478, op. 1, d. 764, ll. 1–15.

Anti-Soviet and nationalist bands liquidated:

1944 ................. 0.
1945 ................. 928.
1946 ................. 415.
1947, January ......... 19.
Liquidated bands linked to anti-Soviet underground:
1944 ............ 0.
1945 ............ 890.
1946 ............ 337.
Jan 1947 ......... 21.
During the same period, the numbers of people killed or arrested:
1944 1945 1946 Jan 1947
Members of anti-
Soviet organizations: 6,233 246
Members of gangs
tied to above: 124,366 115,784 710
Totals 130,008 129,016 29,503 1,189
Of 130,008 people above, 57,414 were killed, 56,655 arrested.
Victims of bandit activities, Western Ukraine. Killed:
1944 1945 1946 Jan 1947
MVD MGB officials 142 279 46-
Police officials - 144 5
MVD internal forces officers 40 14 -
Other ranks of the internal
forces 752 313 77-
Red Army officers - 21 1
Other ranks, Red Army 65 1
Fighers in istreb.1 and
other local formations 113 344 6
Party activists 901 785 335 35
Other citizens 2,953 4,249 1,677 132
Totals 4,748 5,779 2,723 180
[…]
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 281

The document above also gave information for Belorussia and

Lithuania. In the former, close to 10,000 people were either captured,
arrested, or killed in 1944, 8,237 in 1945, and 1,507 in 1946. In
Lithuania, for the period covering 1944 through January 1947, some
14,000 people were killed by MVD, NKGB, and military forces, or by
local extermination units. Some 43,276 were arrested or detained in
some manner. As other documents show, this underground war con-
tinued sporadically even into the early 1950s.
Security organs paid special attention to illegal religious groupings,
which they monitored carefully, regardless of denomination. These
included Uniate, Roman Catholic, Greek and Russian Orthodox, and
Jewish groups, as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses.

d o c u m en t
· 161 ·
From a special communication of V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin
on the work of state security organs of the UkSSR to liquidate
anti-Soviet church-sectarian groups. TsA FSB RF, f. 4os
(especially secret), op. 8, d. 11, ll. 354–62.
30 November 1950

Absolutely secret
To comrade Stalin, I. V.
I report that according to information from the minister of state secu-
rity of the Ukrainian SSR, c. Kovalchuk, in 1950, organs of the MGB
uncovered and liquidated 85 anti-Soviet church and sectarian groups in
the territory of Ukraine; 809 persons from among the leadership and
activists of the church-sectarian underground were arrested.
During the same time, 5 illegal centers of clergy and sectarians were
liquidated.
Investigation of the cases of the arrested established that they were giv-
ing sermons at illegal gatherings, in which they urged sectarians to sabo-
tage actions of the Party and government, not to participate in public and
political life, to refuse service in the Soviet Army.
Along with this, active participants of the church-sectarian formations
carried out anti-Soviet propaganda among the population, slandered the
leadership of the Party and government, spread provocative rumors about
Soviet reality, predicting the death in the near future of the Soviet system.
Heads of the church-sectarian underground also tried to arrange a uni-
fication of separate groups, to subordinate them to a centralized leadership,
282 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

and discussed actions of strengthening the underground for struggle against

Soviet power.
Along with this, I present comrade Kovalchuk’s report with more de-
tailed data on this specific question.
Abakumov
[…]

The Security Organs Abroad

The Soviet security organs also became involved in the internal affairs
of the newly formed Soviet bloc countries in Eastern Europe. In
Poland, security organs engaged in the same kind of purging opera-
tions as across the border in the newly occupied territories of the So-
viet Union. In Poland and other countries including China, the NKGB
also lent its expertise to the new governments.

d o c u m ent
· 162 ·
Decision of Politburo TsK VKP(b). On organizing trials of American
and English agents. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 44, l. 132.
23 October 1950

[…].
1. To accept a proposal by the MGB USSR (c. Abakumov) and the
Soviet Control Commission in Germany (c. Chuikov) about organiz-
ing three trials of American and English agents who were carrying
out espionage and subversive work against Soviet occupation troops
in Germany and the German Democratic Republic.
2. To try cases of the American and English spies at closed court ses-
sions of the military tribunal of Soviet occupation troops in Germany.
To try the first case at the beginning of November, the second at the
end of November, and the third—in the first half of December of this
year.
3. To oblige the Soviet Control Commission in Germany (c. Chuikov)
to publish short press releases about sentences of the convicted
Anglo-American spies in the German press.
4. To assign preparation of cases to the MGB USSR.
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 283

d o c u m en t
· 163 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On assistance to organs
of state security of the People’s Republic of China. RGASPI, f. 17,
op. 162, d. 44, l. 138.
6 November 1950

1. To oblige the Ministry of State Security of the USSR (comrade Aba-

kumov) to send c.c. Kuleshov V. I. and Evdokimov A. I., experts on
identification of enemy underground radio stations, with necessary
technical equipment; c. Arefyev D. A., specialist on border security;
and c. Fatyanov Z. A., [specialist] on work of militsiia organs, to the
People’s Republic of China for assistance to the [Chinese] organs of
state security.
2. To approve the following draft of a telegram from comrade Filippov
to comrade Mao Zedong:

To comrade Mao Zedong.

In connection with your request to send to China experts on organizing
the struggle against enemy underground radio stations, and officials of
border troops and the militsiia, two experts on radio stations, with the
necessary technical equipment, and also one specialist in border security,
and another, a militsiia specialist, will go. They will arrive in Beijing with-
in the next several days.
Filippov

d o c u m en t
· 164 ·
Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On sending MGB advisers
to Czechoslovakia. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 45, l. 16.
21 December 1950

Politburo TsK VKP(b) decides:

1. In response to comrade Slánský’s2 request regarding sending addi-
tional advisers of the MGB USSR to Czechoslovakia, to oblige the
Ministry of State Security of the USSR (c. Abakumov) to send to
Czechoslovakia four advisers on questions of organizing counterintel-
ligence in the army, on the struggle against espionage, subversions and
sabotage in industry, and also on militsiia work, and on organizing
284 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

operational record keeping in the Ministry of State Security of Czecho-

slovakia.
2. To charge MID USSR [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR] (c.
Gromyko) to inform c. Slánský through c. Silin, ambassador of the
USSR to Czechoslovakia, that advisers of the MGB USSR on these
specific questions will be sent to Czechoslovakia soon.

The very next year, The MGB sent more agents to Czechoslovakia to
advise in the interrogation and trial of Slánský, then accused, along with
other leaders, in a Stalinist-initiated purge of the Czech leadership.3

Stalin Cleans House, Again

As the war drew to a close, Stalin, now an aging dictator, distanced
himself from many of the daily affairs of government, leaving these to
his deputies. At the same time, he retained control over foreign policy,
and over the security organs. He continued to use the latter as he had
since the 1920s, to neutralize, and even to destroy physically, those he
regarded as political threats. In the postwar years, such purges did not
reach the level of the mid- and late 1930s, but Stalin, through the
MGB, used the same tactics as before—falsified conspiracies by groups
supposedly working against the Party. The so-called Leningrad Affair
in 1949 and the early 1950s was the largest of these purges, involving
the arrest or removal of a couple of thousand Party and Soviet officials
from Leningrad, or officials elsewhere closely associated with the Len-
ingrad apparatus. Stalin feared the prestige and esprit of the Lenin-
grad Party organization, which had organized the successful nine-
hundred-day defense of the city during the war, and he feared what he
perceived as the growing independence of the organization, possibly
as a rival power center in the country.4
According to later depositions by V. Abakumov, who was still MGB
chief in 1949 and 1950, he received specific instructions from the
highest “directive level” (presumably, Stalin, or Molotov or Georgii
Malenkov, acting for Stalin), about whom to arrest and what lines to
pursue in interrogations of those arrested.5 In secret trials in October
of 1950, six high-ranking officials were convicted of embezzlement of
government funds, and of creating an anti-Party group. They were all
executed. Among these were two of the most powerful younger lead-
ers in the Party: Nikolai Voznesensky, chairman of the state planning
agency, Gosplan, and Mikhail Rodionov, chairman of the Russian
Republic Council of Ministers.
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 285

Stalin did not limit the purge to top leaders, but “cleansed” Leningrad
in a deep purge. As the following documents show, the purge affected
public figures in all walks of life, branding them as unreliable or hostile,
as foreign agents, and even as Trotskyists. Some five hundred were ar-
rested and fifteen hundred were exiled from the city with their families.

d o c u m en t
· 165 ·
Special communication from V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin on arrests
in the city of Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast. TsA FSB RF,
f. 4os, op. 8, d. 1, l. 124.
14 January 1950

Council of Ministers of the USSR

To comrade Stalin, I. V. […]
I report that, during 1949, in the city of Leningrad and in the oblast,
1,145 persons in all were arrested as a result of Chekist actions carried
out by the administration of the Leningrad Oblast of the MGB.
Among those arrested:
agents of foreign intelligence services ............................ 164
Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rightists, SRs [Socialist Revolutionaries],
Mensheviks, and anarchists ...................................................... 279
members of anti-Soviet organizations and groups ....... 194
other persons conducting hostile activity ... 508
Abakumov

d o c u m en t
· 166 ·
Special communication from V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin on the
need for expulsion of the unreliable element from the city of Leningrad
and the Leningrad Oblast. TsA FSB RF, f. 4os, op. 8, d. 1. 125–27.
14 January 1950

TsK VKP(b)
To comrade Stalin, I. V.
Regarding the need for expulsion of 1,500 persons from the city of
Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast who compromised themselves
by their links to Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rightists, Mensheviks, SRs,
Germans, and Finns.
286 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

The MGB USSR considered necessary to report to you, again, that dur-
ing investigation and arrests of Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rightists, and
other criminals in the city of Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast, the
MGB Leningrad Oblast administration uncovered 400 people, compro-
mised to some extent by their links with Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Right-
ists, Mensheviks, SRs, and members of other anti-Soviet organizations
and groups, as well as with “former” people of bourgeois class origins
and privileged estates.
In addition, in Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast, 1,100 people were
compromised by links to Germans and Finns during the Patriotic War.
Considering that there is insufficient evidence to arrest such people,
[and] with a view to purging Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast from
the politically unreliable element, the MGB USSR considers it necessary
to expel 1,500 persons of the above-mentioned categories together with
their family members from the city and the oblast for permanent residence
in raions of Kazakhstan, the Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Novosibirsk Oblast.
If a positive decision is made, it is expedient to conduct the deportation
in small groups, according to the decisions of the Special Board of the
MGB USSR.
Work on identification of Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Rightists, and oth-
er enemy elements continues, and arrests of this category of criminals
occur regularly.
With this, I present a draft of a decision of the TsK VKP(b) on this
specific question.
I request your decision.
Abakumov
The purge even affected the security organs in the city.

d o c u m ent
· 167 ·
From special communication from V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin
on replacement of UMGB officials of the Leningrad Oblast.
TsA FSB RF, f. 4os, op. 8, d. 1, ll. 61–62.
10 January 1950

TsK VKP(b)
To comrade Stalin I. V.
We report that during the last 8 months, in total 102 persons—ranking
and operational officials—were either fired or transferred from the Len-
ingrad Oblast MGB administration to the organs of the MGB of other
oblasts. Out of these, 38 people were transferred on account of working
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 287

at the UMGB, Leningrad Oblast, for a long time, and 64 people were
fired in connection with the existence of compromising materials affect-
ing their work reliability.
[…]
Now, following your instructions, we are preparing a second group of
50 leading and operational officials to be sent to work in the Leningrad
Oblast MGB administration.
First, we are planning to replace ranking officials (heads of depart-
ments, deputy heads of departments) and operational workers who al-
ready have been working at the UMGB of the Leningrad Oblast for a long
time, and also those who had lived in Leningrad before they started work-
ing at the MGB.
We will be reporting on the course of this work.
Abakumov Ogol’tsov
Historians have speculated that Both Beria and Malenkov intrigued
against the Leningraders—Beria, in particular, fearing that the newly
promoted elites were a threat to him and his patronage networks. If
so, the purge of the Leningrad organization did not secure his position
for long. In late 1951, the MGB “uncovered” an anti-Party group
within the Georgian Party organization, specifically of Mingrelian
Party functionaries under the former second secretary of the Georgian
Party, M. I. Baramiia, a protégé of Beria. Baramiia was charged with
taking bribes and, more seriously, with creating an underground sepa-
ratist movement with ties to Iran, Turkey, and Georgian émigré circles
in Paris. As a result of the following police investigation and purge,
over six thousand people, connected in some way with Baramiia, were
deported permanently to Kazakhstan and other areas. Beria retained
his position in the Politburo. Stalin, for whatever reason, did not feel
the need to kill or remove him, but Beria’s power base in the Georgian
Party, and in the central Party apparatus, was seriously weakened by
the so-called Mingrelian Affair.

d o c u m en t
· 168 ·
Special communication from S. D. Ignat’ev6 to I. V. Stalin on preparations
for the operation of removing hostile elements from Georgia. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 58, d. 179, ll. 93–97.
27 November 1951
288 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

To the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b)

According to the instructions of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b), the
Ministry of State Security presents herewith the drafts of decisions by the
Politburo and Council of Ministers USSR on removal of hostile elements
from territory of the Georgian SSR.
Drafts of the decisions have been coordinated with the secretary of TsK
KP(b) of Georgia, c. Charkviani.
The MGB USSR is planning to carry out the removal of hostile ele-
ments in the second half of December of this year, using the time until
then for preparations.
At the same time, in coordination with TsK KP(b) of Georgia, organs
of the local MGB will take measures to arrest persons about whom there
are sufficient materials concerning their espionage and other hostile ac-
tivities.
During preparations for the removal operation, the Georgian SSR
MGB will file a brief for removal of each family […]. Agent materials
available in the Georgian SSR MGB, testimonies of the arrested, back-
ground information of the First Chief Directorate7 of the MGB USSR,
and other documents confirming hostile activities of persons whose
families are subject to removal, along with certificates by local authorities
about the family structure and relationships, will be collected in the
briefs.
A confirmation of removal will be written and approved by the
Minister of State Security and the Procurator of the Georgian SSR for
each case.
On the basis of these decisions, and on the day established by the MGB
USSR, the removal will take place simultaneously all over the republic.
Removal will be carried out by the organs of the MGB of the Georgian
SSR under the direction of one of the deputy ministers of state security of
the USSR, who will be present [in Georgia].
Operational officials of other organs of the MGB, and MGB troops,
will be transferred to the MGB of the Georgian SSR for assistance in car-
rying out the removal operation, at the ratio of one operational official
and two soldiers for each family being removed.
At the moment of removal, all those being removed will be told that
according to the decision of authorities, they will be moved to
residences in the Kazakh SSR. After this, families to be removed, along
with their belongings, will be taken to the railroads by automobile and
cartage transportation for boarding in echelons. Railroad [collection]
points will be determined in advance. Loading will be carried out under
protection of convoy troops of the MVD […].
Cases of the families removed will be considered by the Special Board
of the MGB USSR. Extracts from decisions of the latter will be read to the
persons being removed, over their signatures.
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 289

During the period of time before removal measures are taken, local
authorities of the South Kazakhstan and Dzhambul oblasts of Kazakh
SSR are to prepare accommodation and employment for those to
be removed. For this, special commandants’ offices of the MGB will be
organized to supervise them.
S. Ignat’ev

The Zionist Plots

Stalin worried constantly about the growth of national separatist
groups, especially those with potential ties outside Soviet borders, and
this was the background for his suspicions, after the war, of Zionist
underground organizations. As an ideology, Zionism was not new,
but had gained force and widespread support during and after the
war, and coalesced, in large part, around creation of an independent
Jewish state in Palestine. These trends, combined with traditional
anti-Semitism, made Stalin and other leaders suspicious of any orga-
nized Jewish groups, especially if they supported creation of a new
state. Such suspicion was enhanced by the close ties that bound the
United States to the Zionist cause, since Stalin saw the United States
increasingly as a primary enemy. Throughout the postwar period, Sta-
lin received regular reports from the MGB about “anti-Soviet” Jewish
activities. In some cases, Stalin decided to act on this information, as
in the case of the Soviet based Jewish Antifascist Committee. The JAC
was established in 1942, with the full support of the regime, to pro-
mote world support for the Soviet war effort. Committee members
toured the United States and developed close ties to American and
other Allied Jewish organizations. During the war, this kind of activ-
ity was encouraged, but afterward, such contacts were grounds for
suspicion. In early 1948, the MGB arranged the murder of the JAC
head, Solomon Mikhoels, the prominent director of the Moscow State
Jewish Theater. Security police staged the murder to look like a car
accident. Mikhoels was branded officially as a “nationalist” and, as
the following document shows, this led to further “investigation,”
and eventually to the purge and dismantling of the committee and its
activities.8
290 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

d o c u m ent
· 169 ·
Decision of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on dissolution
of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 183, l. 51.
21 November 1948

To: Deviatka [Ninth Directorate of the MGB—personal security of

Party and government leaders]—for approval.
The Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR charges the MGB
USSR with disbanding immediately the Jewish Antifascist Committee
since, as the facts show, this committee has been a center of anti-Soviet
propaganda, and regularly supplies organs of foreign intelligence services
with anti-Soviet information.
Because of this, close press organs of this committee and confiscate
committee files. Do not arrest anybody, yet.
Stalin, Molotov
At Stalin’s behest, further investigation led to the arrest of a number
of committee members and sympathizers. One such person was P. S.
Zhemchuzhina, Molotov’s wife. Zhemchuzhina worked as an official
in the Ministry of Food Industry and, as the document below suggests,
police arrested and interrogated her at Stalin’s specific order. Enduring
physical torture, Zhemchuzhina admitted her “role” in anti-Soviet,
Jewish nationalist activities associated with Mikhoels. That Stalin was
playing with Molotov is clear, intimidating him and striking at his
wife in order to test his subordinate’s loyalty. Molotov remained qui-
et, while his wife went into exile, to be released only after Stalin’s
death in March 1953.

d o c u m ent
· 170 ·
Note from M. F. Shkiryatov and V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin regarding
P. S. Zhemchuzhina. RGASPI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 6188, ll. 25–31.
27 December 1948

To comrade Stalin, I. V.
Fulfilling your assignment, we reviewed available materials about
c. Zhemchuzhina, P. S. As the result of a number of interrogations, and
also from Zhemchuzhina’s explanations, the following facts of her po-
litically untrustworthy behavior were established.
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 291

After the decisions of the Politburo TsK VKP(b) from 10 August and
24 October 1939, in which she was punished and warned for showing
imprudence and unscrupulousness concerning her communications with
persons not inspiring political trust, Zhemchuzhina did not fulfill this
decision and continued conducting further acquaintance with persons not
deserving political trust.
During an extended period of time, Jewish nationalists grouped around
her, and she, using her patronage, protected them. According to their state-
ments, she has been their adviser and defender. Some of these persons, who
happened to be enemies of the people, both in confronting Zhemchuzhina,
and in separate depositions, reported her close relationship with the na-
tionalist, Mikhoels, who was hostile to Soviet power.
At a confrontation with Zhemchuzhina on 26 December of this year, a
former secretary of the Jewish Antifascist Committee, Feffer, I. S., said:
“Zhemchuzhina was interested in the work of the Jewish Antifascist Com-
mittee and the Jewish theater … Mikhoels told me that ‘we have a great
friend,’ and named Zhemchuzhina. … Zhemchuzhina, in general, is very
much interested in our affairs: about the life of Jews in the Soviet Union
and about affairs of the Jewish Ant-fascist Committee; she asked whether
we are persecuted. Characterizing Zhemchuzhina’s relations to Jews, and
also his opinion about her, Mikhoels said: ‘She is a good Jewish daughter’
… Mikhoels talked about Zhemchuzhina enthusiastically, declaring that
she is a charming person, she helps, and it is possible to seek her advice
about the Committee and about the Theater.”
A former art director of the Moscow Jewish Theater, Zuskin, V. L.,
made a similar statement in confrontation with Zhemchuzhina: “Mik-
hoels was saying that he had great friendly relations with Polina Se-
menovna. I know that when Mikhoels had some problems, he asked
Zhemchuzhina for help … Mikhoels often met with Zhemchuzhina,
called her on the phone, met at receptions.”
A former member of the Jewish Antifascist Committee, Grinberg,
Z. G., arrested by the MGB USSR, gave similar testimony: “As Mikhoels
told those among his inner circle, whenever he turned to the Government
with some questions, he discussed these questions with Zhemchuzhina,
and received her helpful advice and precepts. … As a result of all this,
the connection between Mikhoels and Zhemchuzhina was important to
those of us who surrounded Mikhoels, as we saw in Zhemchuzhina our
defender and patron.”
[…]
After verifying all these facts, and at the confrontations, Zhemchuzhi-
na conducted herself in a non-Party way, extremely insincere, and, despite
Feffer’s and Zuskin’s statements convicting her, she tried hard to refute
factual explanations. At the same time, Zhemchuzhina admitted her
connection with Mikhoels, obtaining a letter from him to transfer to
292 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

government organs, organizing Mikhoels’s talk on America in a club, and

participating in his funeral.
As a result of a thorough check, and confirmation of all the facts, by a
number of persons, we are coming to the conclusion that there is a solid
basis to affirm that the accusations brought against her correspond to the
facts.
On the basis of all the given materials, we recommend to expel Zhem-
chuzhina, P. S., from the Party. Protocols of confrontations with Feffer,
Zuskin, and Slutsky are attached to this.
M. Shkiryatov
V. Abakumov
Sent to: cc. Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Beria, Voznesen-
sky, Mikoyan, Bulganin, Kosygin
Investigations and arrests in the “affair” of the JAC led to mass
media campaigns against “rootless cosmopolitans,” a code for Jews,
and to the trials and executions of at least thirteen prominent Jewish
figures, prison terms for several dozen others, and widespread dis-
crimination against Jews in state and public institutions.

Spies
Stalin’s security organs were well practiced at concocting and then
uncovering conspiracies and espionage rings against the regime and its
leaders. Dealing with real espionage was another matter, and in the
early years of the Cold War, there was plenty of that. In the several
years after the war, the United States and its allies inserted dozens of
spies, if not more, into the Soviet Union, recruited in Western Europe
from Soviet refugees and former prisoners of war. They crossed the
still weakly protected land frontiers, and were dropped by parachute
along the western borders, and from China into eastern regions. Some
of these agents took radios with them in order to send information as
agents in place. Many, however, were charged with specific assign-
ments, and instructed then to try to leave the country. The report
below is about one such agent.
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 293

d o c u m en t
· 171 ·
Special communication from S. D. Ignat’ev to I. V. Stalin on an
agent-parachutist, F. K. Sarantsev. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 263, ll. 62–63.
11 September 1951

Absolutely secret
To comrade Stalin
As already reported to you, on the night of 14 to 15 August of this year,
the American intelligence service air-dropped spies with parachutes over
the territory of the Moldavian SSR.
One of them, Osmanov, was detained on 15 August of this year at the
station of Bendery. Osmanov testified that one more spy was dropped
from the same plane.
As a result of follow-up measures, the second spy, Sarantsev, Feodor
Kuzmich, was detained on 5 September of this year in the city of Alma-
Ata, while he was trying to arrange an overnight stay in a house with a
collective farmer. Sarantsev, Feodor Kuzmich, born 1926, native of the
village Blagodatnoye of Akmolinsk Oblast, Russian, was mobilized into
the Soviet Army in 1943, and in December of the same year was captured
by Germans, after the war refused repatriation to the Soviet Union, and
remained in the American zone of occupation of Germany.
After he was brought to Moscow, at the interrogation, Sarantsev testi-
fied that in June 1951 he was recruited by the American intelligence ser-
vice, and for a month he prepared for his drop in the Soviet Union. On
the instructions of the Americans, he was to go to Semipalatinsk to pin-
point the exact site and configuration of a nuclear plant, which, according
to the American intelligence service, is located in the area of Semipala-
tinsk and Zhana Semey.
As he was told by the Americans, this plant manufactures nuclear
bombs or something else connected with atomic energy. Sarantsev was to
fix the location of the plant and whatever constructions are next to it, in
order to be able to draw a plan for the Americans upon his return.
Also, Sarantsev was to find out how strict is the security of the plant,
and what organization is responsible for it.
In addition, the Americans assigned Sarantsev to discover, through
local residents, whether there were any explosions or similar phenomena
in the area of Semipalatinsk.
After accomplishing this task, Sarantsev was to leave through Arme-
nia, crossing the Soviet-Turkish border illegally. In Turkey, as he was told
by Americans, there would be representatives of the American intelli-
gence service, with whom he would be put in contact by local authorities.
294 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

The arrested Osmanov testified the following about the character of

the espionage assignment he received: he was to make his way to the cit-
ies of Kyshtym and Verkhneivinsk, where, according to Americans, nu-
clear plants are located, and he was to collect data on the precise location
of the plants, their exterior, and, in particular, the number of smoke-
stacks, about railroads and other access roads to the plants, the existence
of high-voltage lines, whether there are airfields around the plants, and
whether there are planes at them.
In addition, Osmanov had the task to cut samples of grass, to cut
branches and leaves from trees, and to collect samples of dirt. As Osmanov
has testified, the Americans intended to analyze all this in order to define
whether, in these areas, work really has been conducted on atomic energy.
After accomplishing his assignment, Osmanov was to return to the Amer-
icans by illegally crossing the Soviet-Turkish border.
We will be reporting to you on the course of the investigation, and on
the results of identification of possible sources of knowledge of Ameri-
cans about the location of buildings of the 1st Chief Administration of
the Council of Ministers of the USSR.9
S. Ignat’ev
On the first page, in the top left corner there is a crossed-out note by
Stalin: “What is Osmanov’s nationality?”
Although many of these spies were caught, the relative ease with
which they were able to breach Soviet borders led to the following
sharp memorandum on protecting the country’s frontiers.

d o c u m ent
· 172 ·
Decision of Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On search for and detention
of agents-parachutists. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 47, ll. 18, 118–19.
11 November 1951

To approve the enclosed draft of a telegram.

Absolutely secret
To the Head of the Administration of Border Troops along the Pacific
Ocean, Major General Zyryanov
To temporary head of the Administration of Primorie [Maritime] Krai
of the MGB, c. Metlenko,
To commander of troops of the Primorie Military District, Colonel
General Biryuzov
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 295

To commander of troops of the Primorie Frontier Air Defense Raion,

Major General Davydov
It became known from our ambassador to China, c. Roschin, that on 2
November an American plane dropped in a violator near the Daduch-
zhuan village in the Raion Tszinsintsyuy, not far from Hunchun, near the
Soviet-Chinese border, that he crossed our border on the same day, and
that, on the same day in the same area, ten more American planes were
noted that also might have dropped in parachutists.
These facts could have happened only as a result of the extremely un-
satisfactory organization of both our border security on our overland
border with Manchuria, and of our aviation security there.
It has been more than a week since these disgraceful incidents, but we
still have no reports from you about how these incidents took place, or
whether the border violators were detained, and what measures you have
taken in order to prevent violations of our borders from now on.
We bring this to your attention, and we obligate you:
1. To take serious measures for search and detention of border violators
immediately, and to report to us on results.
2. To take measures, and to do all that is necessary, for strengthening
our overland and air borders in order to eliminate completely the
possibility of their being breached both on the ground and in the air,
and to report about the measures you have taken.
3. To give an explanation why you have still not informed about these
specific incidents, why the parachutists dropped by the Americans
were not found yet, and why you do not show initiative in drawing
conclusions on your own from the specific incidents of violation of
overland and air borders, without waiting for instructions from above.

Confirm receiving.
Ignat’ev
Vasilevsky
11.11.51
As the document above exemplifies, the Chinese border became a
major entering point for spies coming into the Soviet Union, and Sta-
lin and the security police attempted to choke off this channel.
296 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

d o c u m ent
· 173 ·
Special communication from V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin on arrests of
Russian emigrants in China. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 285, l. 90.
16 November 1950

Absolutely secret
To comrade Stalin, I. V.
I am reporting that, at present, over 40 thousand White Russian émi-
grés live in the territory of the People’s Republic of China, mainly in
Shanghai and the cities of Manchuria, a majority of whom were natural-
ized in 1945–47. As a result of processing Japanese archives captured in
1945 in Manchuria by Soviet troops, and also, based on agent materials
and depositions of arrested spies arriving in the USSR from China after
the end of the war under the cover of reemigrants, organs of the MGB
USSR uncovered 470 agents of foreign intelligence services from among
the Russian White emigrants living in China. These agents conducted ac-
tive subversion against the Soviet Union during the war, on assignment
from the Japanese intelligence service. After the war, a considerable pro-
portion of these were enlisted by American and English intelligence or-
gans, and these days they continue to conduct espionage activity against
the USSR and People’s democratic [sic] China. The MGB USSR considers
it necessary gradually to arrest the agents of foreign intelligence services
from among Russian White emigrants through the organs of the Ministry
of Public Safety of China, and to extradite them to the territory of the
USSR to conduct detailed investigation.
With this, I present a draft of the resolution of the Politburo TsK
VKP(b) on this question.
I request your decision.
V. Abakumov

The Final Conspiracies

Throughout his life, Stalin obsessed about plots and intrigues against
him, and this tendency continued into the postwar years and became
even more pronounced as he became increasingly ill. In the first half-
decade after the war, Stalin used the security organs to purge key parts
of the Party apparatus, the Leningraders and Georgians, for example,
as a way to maintain his own unassailable power. By 1951, however,
he began to swing the other way, becoming increasingly suspicious of
the security organs’ growing power. In classic style, his suspicions
focused on the security minister, Abakumov, appointed in 1946, who
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 297

oversaw the Party purges of the postwar years. Stalin set in motion the
familiar machinations to set up Abakumov: collecting false reports
and allegations of political conspiracy, cover-ups, egregious lapses in
duty, and self-aggrandizement.10 The most incriminating piece of evi-
dence against Abakumov came from M. D. Riumin, a special investi-
gator, whose letter of 2 July 1951 was very likely solicited either by
Stalin or by Malenkov. The latter was Abakumov’s adversary within
the leadership circle and a patron of Riumin, acting for Stalin. Inter-
esting to note, the cut-and-paste repetition of ritualized phrasing, first
used in Riumin’s letter, that substituted for, and became proof in and
of itself, of Abakumov’s guilt.

d o c u m en t
· 174 ·
Statement of a senior inspector of the MGB USSR, M. D. Riumin,
to I. V. Stalin. AP RF, f. 3, op, 58, d. 216, ll. 8–11.
2 July 1951

Absolutely secret
To comrade Stalin, I. V. […]
In November 1950, I was entrusted with conducting an investigation
of the case of the arrested professor Etinger,11 doctor of medical sciences.
At the interrogations, Etinger admitted that he was a confirmed Jewish
nationalist, and therefore he had harbored hatred toward the VKP(b) and
the Soviet government.
Further, having talked in detail about his hostile activity, Etinger admit-
ted, as well, that in 1945 he used the opportunity of being entrusted to
treat comrade Shcherbakov,12 and did everything to shorten his life.
I reported Etinger’s deposition on this matter to comrade Likhachev, a
deputy chief of the Investigative Division. Soon after that, myself and
comrade Likhachev, together with the arrested Etinger, were called to
c. Abakumov’s office.
During the “interrogation,” or, more precisely, conversation with Et-
inger, c. Abakumov hinted to him several times that he should retract his
testimony about c. Shcherbakov’s villainous murder. Then, when Etinger
was taken from the office, comrade Abakumov forbade me to interrogate
Etinger in the direction of uncovering his practical activities and his plans
for terror, explaining this by saying that Etinger “will lead us into a
maze.” Etinger understood c. Abakumov’s hint and, at the next interroga-
tion, he retracted all his confessed testimony, although his hostile attitude
298 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

to the VKP(b) was incontestably proved by materials of a confidential

interception, and by testimonies of his accomplice, the arrested Erozolim-
sky, who, by the way, told the investigation that Etinger told him about
his hostile attitude toward c. Shcherbakov.
Using these and other evidentiary materials, I continued to interrogate
Etinger, and gradually he began to return to his previous testimony, about
which I was writing daily notes for the report to my supervisors.
About 28–29 January 1951, I was called to the office of c. Leonov,
chief of the Investigative Division of Especially Important Cases. He, hav-
ing referred to comrade Abakumov’s instructions, told me to stop work-
ing with Etinger and, as comrade Leonov expressed it, “to put his case on
a shelf.”
In addition to this, I must specify that after the arrested Etinger was called
to comrade Abakumov’s office, a more severe regime was set up for him,
and he was transferred to the Lefortovo prison, into the coldest and damp-
est cell. Etinger was of an elderly age—64 years old, and he began to have
episodes of angina pectoris, about which the Investigative Division received
an official medical report on 20 January 1951. It read that “in future each
subsequent episode of angina pectoris could lead to [heart] failure.”
Considering this circumstance, I several times brought to the attention
of the leadership of the Investigative Division the question of allowing me
to continue further serious interrogations of the arrested Etinger, but I
was turned down. All this came to an end when Etinger suddenly died in
early March, and his terrorist activity remained uninvestigated.
However, Etinger had extensive connections, including among his ad-
herents, prominent expert-physicians, and it cannot be excluded that
some of them were linked to Etinger’s terrorist activity.
I consider it my duty to inform you that according to my observations,
comrade Abakumov is inclined to deceive governmental organs by con-
cealing serious defects in the work of the organs of the MGB.
For example, I am at present in charge of an investigative case on a charge
against Salimanov, the former deputy director general of a joint-stock com-
pany in Germany, “Vismut,” who escaped to the Americans in May 1950
and then came back to the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany 3 months
later, where he was detained and arrested.
Salimanov testified that in May 1950 he was dismissed from his posi-
tion, and was ordered back to the USSR, however he did not do this and,
using the absence of surveillance from the organs of the MGB, defected
to the Americans.
Then Salimanov said that after betraying the Motherland, he fell into
the hands of American intelligence officers, and, while communicating
with them, he realized that the American intelligence service has detailed
data about activities of the Vismut joint-stock company, which is engaged
in the production of uranium ore.
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 299

Salimanov’s deposition proves that organs of the MGB organized their

counterintelligence work in Germany badly.
Instead of informing governmental[ly appropriate] levels about this,
and using Salimanov’s testimonies for elimination of serious shortcom-
ings in the work of MGB organs in Germany, c. Abakumov forbade the
signing of Salimanov’s interrogations protocols.
[…]
In summary I dare to express my opinion that comrade Abakumov has
been strengthening his position in the government, not always in honest
ways, and he is a person dangerous to the state, especially in such a sensi-
tive place as the Ministry of State Security.
He is also dangerous because he put “reliable” people, from his vantage
point, in the most key positions in the Ministry, and, in particular, in the
Investigative Division. Having secured their careers through his hands,
they have been gradually losing their partiinost’ [party spirit], and have
been turning into bootlickers, and obsequiously do everything that com-
rade Abakumov wants.
(Riumin)
On the basis of Riumin’s accusations, a Politburo commission, which
included Abakumov’s rivals Malenkov and Beria, reviewed and ques-
tioned a number of his subordinates. On the basis of their recommenda-
tions, the Politburo issued a decision that described chaotic, illegal, and
anti-Soviet tendencies within the MGB. Reproduced in part below, the
decision enumerated four cases that Abakumov had either quashed or
derailed, including those of Etinger and Salimanov. The decision recom-
mended the removal of Abakumov and a number of subordinates.

d o c u m en t
· 175 ·
Decision of TsK VKP(b). On shortcomings in the Ministry of State
Security of the USSR. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 216, ll. 2–7.
11 July 1951

Strictly secret […]

On 2 July 1951, TsK VKP(b) received a statement by c. Riumin, a se-
nior inspector of the Investigative Division of Especially Important Cases
of the MGB USSR, in which he gave a signal about shortcomings in the
MGB in investigations of a number of very important cases of prominent
state criminals. He accuses the Minister of State Security c. Abakumov [of
creating these shortcomings]. (The statement is included.)
300 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

After receiving c. Riumin’s statement, TsK VKP(b) created a commis-

sion of the Politburo, consisting of c.c. Malenkov, Beria, Shkiryatov, and
Ignat’ev, and assigned it to verify the facts reported by c. Riumin.
In the course of the review, the commission interrogated the chief of the
Investigative Division of Especially Important Cases of the MGB, c. Les-
nov, his deputies—c.c. Likhachev and Komarov, chief of the 2nd Chief
Directorate of the MGB, c. Shubnyakov, deputy chief of a subdepartment
of the 2nd Chief Directorate, c. Tangiyev, deputy to the chief of the Inves-
tigative Division, c. Putintsev, deputy ministers of state security c.c.
Ogol’tsov and Pitovranov, and also listened to Abakumov’s explanations.
Since the facts stated in c. Riumin’s statement were verified during the
review, TsK VKP(b) decided to discharge c. Abakumov immediately from
his duties as Minister of State Security, and appointed the First Deputy
Minister, c. Ogol’tsov, to fulfill duties of the Minister of State Security
temporarily. This was on 4 July of this year.
On the basis of the results of the review, the commission of the Polit-
buro TsK VKP(b) established the following indisputable facts.
1. In November 1950, doctor Etinger, a Jewish nationalist exhibiting
an extremely hostile attitude to Soviet power, was arrested. At the inter-
rogation by the senior inspector of the MGB, c. Riumin, the arrested
Etinger, without any pressure, admitted that when treating c. Shcherba-
kov, A. S., he had terrorist intentions concerning him, and took all practi-
cal measures to shorten his life.
TsK VKP(b) considers Etinger’s testimony deserving of close attention.
Undoubtedly, among doctors, there is a conspiratorial group of persons
who aspire to shorten the lives of Party and government leaders while
treating them. It is impossible to forget the crimes of such famous doctors
as doctor Pletnev and doctor Levin, who poisoned V. V. Kuibyshev and
Maxim Gorky in the recent past, on the instructions of a foreign intelli-
gence service. These villains admitted their crimes in open court, and
Levin was shot, while Pletnev was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment.
However, Minister of State Security c. Abakumov, after receiving Et-
inger’s deposition about his terrorist activity, declared, in the presence of
inspector Riumin, the deputy chief of the Investigative Division Likh-
achev, and also in the presence of the criminal Etinger, that Etinger’s tes-
timony was far-fetched, and declared that this case was not worthy, that
it would lead the MGB into a maze, and stopped further investigation of
the case. Neglecting the MGB doctors’ warning, c. Abakumov placed the
arrested Etinger, who was seriously ill, in conditions obviously dangerous
to his health (in a damp and cold cell), which resulted in Etinger’s death
in prison on 2 March 1951.
Thus, by extinguishing Etinger’s case, c. Abakumov prevented TsK
from unmasking what is certainly a conspiratorial group of doctors, who
are fulfilling assignments of foreign agents for terrorist activity against the
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 301

leadership of the Party and the government. Also, it must be noted that
c. Abakumov did not consider it necessary to report Etinger’s testimony
to TsK VKP(b) and thus hid this important case from the Party and the
government.
[…]
5. TsK considers it necessary to note that when c. Abakumov was
called first to the Politburo, and then to the Tsk VKP(b) commission, he
took the path of naked denial of the established facts revealing shortcom-
ings in the work of the MGB. At [his] interrogation, he tried to deceive
the Party again, did not exhibit an understanding of his crimes, and did
not show any signs of readiness to repent of his crimes.
On the basis of the above, TsK VKP(b) decides:
1. To dismiss c. Abakumov, V. S., from the position of Minister of State
Security of the USSR, as a person who has committed crimes against
the Party and the Soviet state, to expel him from the VKP(b), and to
transfer his case to court.
2. To dismiss c. Leonov from the position of chief of the Investigative
Division of Especially Important Cases of the MGB USSR, and c.
Likhachev from the position as deputy chief of the Investigative Divi-
sion, for assisting Abakumov to deceive the Party, and to expel them
from the Party.
3. To issue a reprimand to the first deputy minister c. Ogol’tsov, and to
deputy minister c. Pitovranov, for not showing the necessary Party
spirit, and for not signaling the problems of MGB work to the TsK
VKP(b).
4. To obligate the MGB USSR to reopen an investigation of the case of
Etinger’s terrorist activity, and of the Jewish anti-Soviet youth orga-
nization.
5. To appoint Ignat’ev, S. D., member of the Politburo commission to
review the work of the MGB, as head of the department of TsK
VKP(b) of Party and Komsomol organs, and as a representative of
the TsK VKP(b) in the Ministry of State Security.

TsK VKP(b)
As the last point above stipulated, Ignat’ev was appointed as a Cen-
tral Committee “representative in the MGB.” Deputy Minister
Ogol’tsov remained acting minister for another month until 9 August
1951, when Ignat’ev’s appointment as minister was confirmed. The
appointment of Ignat’ev helped shift the balance of power in the MGB
back toward Party control, as was (once again) signaled in a decision
of December 1952.
302 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

d o c u m ent
· 176 ·
From the decision of the TsK KPSS [Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, replacing VKP(b)] on the situation in the MGB.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 22, d. 12, ll. 6–7.
4 December 1952

Absolutely secret
4 December 1952
1. On the situation in the MGB and on wrecking in medical care
(c. Goglidze):
a) To approve a draft of the decision “On the situation in the
MGB,” presented by the Commission of the Presidium13 of TsK,
with amendments accepted at the meeting of the Presidium TsK
KPSS
From the appendix
On the situation in the MGB
TsK KPSS decides:
[…]
2. To obligate the Ministry of State Security of the USSR:
[…]
d) In the line of counterintelligence, to organize work of identifica-
tion and timely elimination of agents of foreign intelligence ser-
vices and centers of anti-Soviet emigration inside the country.
e) Raise the quality of investigative work. Unravel to the end crimes
of participants of the terrorist group of doctors of the Lechsa-
nupr [the Kremlin sanatorium administration], find the culprits
and organizers of their malicious deeds. In the shortest time, con-
clude investigation of the case of wrecking work by Abakumov-
Shvartsman.14 […]
3. To regard control over organs of the Ministry of State Security as the
most important and urgent task of the Party, of the leadership of the
Party organs, of all Party organizations. It is necessary to end, reso-
lutely, the absence of control over activity of organs of the Ministry
of State Security, and to put their work both in the center and in lo-
calities under systematic and permanent control of the Party, leading
Party organs, and Party organizations.

[…]
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 303

After the removal of Abakumov, Stalin pressed Ignat’ev to reopen

and expand the investigation of Ya. G. Etinger, the prominent doctor
arrested in 1950 as a Jewish nationalist, who had died in prison.
Abakumov’s downfall had been tied, in part, to his refusal to pursue
the Etinger case, and his supposed cover-up of a nationalist conspiracy
among a number of prominent Jewish doctors to kill Soviet leaders.
Etinger was supposedly a member of this circle, but had died before
providing any evidence of conspiracy. This group of “doctor-terrorists”
supposedly worked in connection with British and especially American
intelligence agencies, and Jewish organizations. According to a num-
ber of historians, Stalin threatened Ignat’ev with the same fate as Aba-
kumov—removal and arrest—if he did not produce evidence of a Jew-
ish nationalist–American conspiracy.15 In early 1952, the case of the
“doctor-wreckers” was handed over to the investigator Riumin, whose
letter of 2 July 1951 had instigated Abakumov’s removal, and who
was also charged with bringing to trial the case against the Jewish
Antifascist Committee. While the trial against the JAC led to the exe-
cution of a number of its leaders, the investigation into the Doctors’
Plot dragged on inconclusively to the end of the year. Riumin was re-
lieved of his duties, though not arrested, and a large number of agents
continued to pursue leads. Stalin followed the interrogations assidu-
ously, making comments and pushing investigators to follow certain
lines. According to historians’ accounts, he was obsessed with linking
the MGB cover-up with the supposed conspiracy among top Kremlin
physicians and other doctors. In Stalin’s view, Abakumov and a num-
ber of leading security officials had aided and abetted this conspiracy
by quashing any investigation of it.
In January 1953, nine prominent physicians were arrested as part
of the supposed plot against Soviet leaders. The arrested included Sta-
lin’s personal physician P. I. Egorov. In February, Ignat’ev finally pro-
vided Stalin what he wanted. The following draft indictment of Aba-
kumov and other MGB officials accused them of a long list of crimes,
but of the main crime of covering up the alleged murder of Leningrad
Party chief Andrei Zhdanov in 1948. Zhdanov, who had been a prom-
inent Party critic of “rootless cosmopolitanism,” had died of heart
failure. By 1953, however, MGB investigators, under Stalin’s insistent
prodding, concluded that Zhdanov’s death was not just the result of
poor health. It was the result of malicious negligence on the part of
Kremlin-assigned doctors, the same Jewish doctors who were arrested
as members of the Doctors’ Plot. Abakumov had become an accom-
plice to Zhdanov’s murder by deliberately failing to follow up on
304 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

complaints about Zhdanov’s treatment. In Stalin’s mind, Zhdanov

had been killed both by Jewish doctors and by Abakumov. Stalin then
accused Abakumov of killing Etinger in order to hinder further inves-
tigation of the Jewish doctors’ conspiracy.

d o c u m ent
· 177 ·
Special communication from S. Ignat’ev to I. V. Stalin, with appended
draft of the indictment in the case of Abakumov-Shvartsman.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 222, ll. 203–43.
17 February 1953

To comrade Stalin
I am presenting to you a draft of the indictment in the case of the dan-
gerous group, Abakumov-Shvartsman.
In addition to Abakumov and Shvartsman, eight more accused will be
brought to justice:
Raikhman, L. F.—former deputy chief of the 2nd Chief Directorate of
the MGB USSR;
Leonov, A. G.—former chief of the Investigative Division of Investiga-
tion of Especially Important Cases of the MGB USSR;
Likhachev, M. T.—former deputy chief of the Investigative Division of
Especially Important Cases of the MGB USSR;
Komarov, V. I.—former deputy chief of the Investigative Division of
Especially Important Cases of the MGB USSR;
Chernov, I. A.—former chief of the Secretariat of the MGB USSR;
Broverman Ya. M.—former deputy chief of the Secretariat of the MGB
USSR;
Sverdlov A. Ya.—former deputy chief of Department “K” of the MGB
USSR;
Palkin A. M.—former head of Department “D” of the MGB USSR.
The MGB USSR considers it necessary to try the case of the above
criminals by the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR with-
out defense or prosecution personnel, [Note in margin: “Need to say:
“closed court”] and with a sentence on all arrested of capital punish-
ment—shooting.
A draft proposal on judicial consideration of others arrested [Note in
margin: “Others who?”] will follow later.
[…]
Minister of state security of the USSR S. Ignat’ev
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 305

I. It was established from confessions of the accused, from witnesses’

testimonies, and from other evidence collected in this case, that a hostile
group around Abakumov-Shvartsman operated for a long time in the
MGB USSR with the purpose of undermining the state security of the
Soviet Union.
The most serious damage inflicted by Abakumov and his accomplices
on the safety of the Soviet state was that they purposely wiped out [Note
in margin: “What is that?” Literally, the wording here is “greased” or
“oiled out,” smazyvali.] signals arriving in the MGB USSR about terrorist
activity by enemies of the Soviet people against Party and government
leaders.
In 1948, the MGB USSR received the statement of a doctor Timashuk,
L. F., in which she reported about the deliberate application of incorrect
treatment methods to a secretary of TsK KPSS, A. A. Zhdanov, which led
to fatal consequences for the life of the patient.
As established by the investigation, Abakumov did not take any mea-
sures for a Chekist review of this all-important signal about a direct threat
to the life of comrade Zhdanov.
Vlasik, the arrested former chief of the MGB USSR Chief Directorate
for Protection, testified at the interrogation:
“I had doctor Timashuk’s statement from 29 August 1948 by 30 or 31
August of 1948. I didn’t read the statement myself. On the same day
that I received it, I took it to Abakumov. He also did not read it, but
kept it without giving any instructions to verify the statement.”
[…]
Further investigation established that Abakumov and Vlasik con-
sciously were doing nothing to check Timashuk’s statement, and took all
measures in order to present this statement as untrustworthy, not worthy
of attention, and gave up doctor Timashuk, as it were, to be slaughtered
by the foreign spy–terrorists Egorov, Vinogradov, Vasilenko, Mayorov,
whom she had accused of harmful treatment of comrade Zhdanov, and
who are now exposed. Egorov, a member of the espionage and terrorist
doctors group, former chief of Lechsanupr [the Kremlin sanatorium ad-
ministration], arrested by the MGB USSR, testified: “There is no doubt
that if Abakumov and Vlasik had conducted a sufficient check of Ti-
mashuk’s statement right after they received it, we, the doctors guilty of
the death of A. A. Zhdanov, would have been exposed in 1948. Acting in
our interests, to the advantage of the doctors-wreckers, Abakumov and
Vlasik passed over Timashuk’s signal indifferently, did not try to verify
her statement, and thus helped us to suppress the fact of killing A. A.
Zhdanov, and to get rid of Timashuk.”
Another participant of the terrorist group of doctors, the English spy
Vinogradov, testified on this matter:
306 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

“When doctor Timashuk, L. F., tried to expose our criminal treatment

of A. A. Zhdanov, I myself, with Egorov, Vasilenko, and Mayorov,
took all measures to cover up traces of our crimes. We collectively
accused Timashuk of incompetence and finished her career.”
Later, Abakumov and his accomplices also prevented, in every possible
way, exposure of the group of doctor-poisoners acting in Lechsanupr, by
maliciously erasing an investigation of Timashuk’s statement.
By the beginning of 1949, as now revealed in materials and terrorist
statements by Etinger himself, [Handwritten in ink above the text: “to the
murderer of c. Shcherbakov.” Marginal note: “Not enough. Need more
detail.”] who was by then already a member of the gang of doctor-
murderers, Abakumov for a long time interfered with the arrest of this
declared enemy of Soviet power. When Etinger was arrested and started
to give evidence about the harmful treatment of A. S. Shcherbakov, Aba-
kumov, with the help of his accomplices—the accused Likhachev and
Leonov—hid these indications from the TsK KPSS, declared them far-
fetched, wiped out and extinguished the investigation of Etinger, declaring
that it was not trustworthy, and would lead the MGB USSR into a maze.
The accused Likhachev, explaining the circumstances that allowed
quashing of the case against the terrorist Etinger, declared:
I aided Abakumov to wipe out and to hide the case against the terrorist
Etinger from the Central Committee.
[…]
Abakumov asked Etinger directly: “You concocted all this in prison,
didn’t you?” Etinger could do nothing else but confirm the answer im-
plied in the question: “Yes, I thought it all up in prison,” Etinger declared,
understanding that this was an opportunity to retract his testimony ad-
mitting to terror.” [Marginal note to this crossed-out paragraph: “All this
[he has] hidden from Pr-vo” (the government).]
“And [Marginal correction: “Likhachev shows”] further: “When Et-
inger was taken away, Abakumov told me and Riumin that Etinger was
talking nonsense, and that there was not even any need to justify what he
said by signing the interrogation protocol, that his deposition would lead
us only into a maze.
[…]
In the end, Etinger died [Marginal note in Stalin’s hand: “did not sim-
ply ‘die,’ was murdered by Abakumov.”] in prison and his criminal activ-
ity and contacts … remained unexposed.”
[…]
III. All the materials collected in this case prove that the hostile group
of Abakumov-Shvartsman, existing in the MGB, has been attempting for
a number of years to tear the Chekist apparatus away from the Party, has
conducted subversive work through malicious wrecking in the state secu-
rity agencies, has been deliberately deceiving the Central Committee of
 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania 307

the KPSS, [Marginal note: “To Party and Prav-vo (government)] ignoring
[Overwritten by hand: “systematic violations”] decisions of the Party and
the government on strengthening of state security, deliberately covering
up cases against spies, terrorists, Jewish nationalists, and other especially
dangerous state criminals.
All the accused in the present case, except for Abakumov, acknowledge
their guilt in committing these crimes. The hostile activities of all the ac-
cused have been exposed by witness testimonies, face-to-face confronta-
tions, and documented evidence.
[…]
Deputy head, Special Investigative Division of Especially Important
Cases, Zaichikov
Deputy head, Special Investigative Division of Especially Important
Cases, Grishaev
In agreement:
Deputy minister of state security USSR (Goglidze)
As the document above shows, Abakumov never admitted his guilt
and refused to acknowledge the existence of a Doctors’ Plot.
It has never been clear to what ends Stalin intended to use the Doc-
tors’ Plot. In its early stages, the plot bore a striking similarity to the
way Stalin had used the death of the young and popular Leningrad
Party head Sergei Kirov in December 1934, an assassination by an
individual acting alone, as a pretext to begin a purge that culminated
in the 1937–38 mass terror. In the early 1950s, Stalin built a con-
spiracy around the death of another popular Leningrad figure, also
popular, Andrei Zhdanov. At the time, rumor had it that Stalin was
planning to use the concocted Doctors’ Plot as a pretext for mass
roundups and exile of Jews and their exile to Siberia, although there
is no archival evidence to suggest that Stalin was contemplating such
a move. The aging leader probably had more limited goals in mind in
1953, and he certainly used the Zionist plot scenario as a roundabout
means to purge and maintain control over the state’s security organs.
Whatever plans Stalin had were cut short by the brain hemorrhage
that incapacitated him on 1 March 1953. He lingered until the evening
of 5 March, when he died. There was probably not a lot that could
have been done to save Stalin’s life as he lay dying. Still, and ironically,
the doctors who knew him best, who could have done whatever was
possible, were languishing in prison at the time of Stalin’s stroke for
supposedly conspiring to kill him. Within days after his death, the
other Politburo members quickly and quietly buried the Doctors’ Plot
and released the arrested physicians. Ignat’ev was dismissed, and Beria
308 Border Wars, Plots, and Spy Mania

presided once again, but only briefly, over a combined MGB and
NKVD. His power, and that of the combined ministries, was too
threatening for other members of the Politburo, however, and they ar-
rested him in June of 1953. He remained under guard, interrogated
and tortured, until December when he was executed for his “crimes”
against the Party and the state.
Abakumov remained in prison as well. Although cleared of any
connection to the falsified Jewish nationalist conspiracy, he was none-
theless indicted again, in this case for his role in concocting the
Leningrad purge of 1949, and for being supposedly a part of the
“Beria gang.” Abakumov was executed in December 1954. Fearful of
the power of the MGB, the new leaders dismantled much of the state
security leadership and organizational structure. The MGB was sepa-
rated from the MVD, and the former was abolished. The Ministry of
State Security was reorganized into a Committee of State Security, the
KGB, and placed in administrative subordination to the Council of
Ministers. The new statutes, drawn up in 1954, remained relatively
unchanged until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.
 Conclusion

After Stalin’s death and the reorganization of the MGB, the state’s
security apparatus remained powerful, but never again reached the
zenith that it had under Stalin. On the other hand, neither was it
wracked by the convulsive purges and reorganizations to which Stalin
had subjected it, nor did it ever again serve so completely the power
fantasies of a single despotic leader. Stalin could not have ruled as he
did without the police and security forces that he did so much to cre-
ate. Certainly, different leaders of the “organs,” as they were called,
influenced the institutional culture of the OGPU and its successive in-
carnations, but the police and security agencies were mainly the prod-
uct of Stalin’s constant manipulations and machinations. He approved
or appointed every leader, with the exception of the first, Dzerzhinsky,
to their positions. He used these people and agencies for his purposes
and, if he felt it necessary, he removed them and reorganized and
purged the organs. Stalin was directly or indirectly responsible for kill-
ing four of the eight security heads who served under him, along with
a significant number of their entourages. As an aging dictator, he let
many institutions slide away from his scrutiny, but not the internal
security organs. Stalin controlled the affairs of these agencies with the
kind of assiduous attention that he devoted only to two other institu-
tions, the Party and the military.
The OGPU, NKVD, NKGB, and MGB were the key to Stalin’s
power, but not the only one. The secret to Stalin’s undisputed author-
ity lay in his ability to manipulate the balance between the Party ap-
paratus and the political police. He played one against the other, at

309
310 Conclusion

times using the police to purge perceived rivals or groups in the Party,
and then using the Party to subdue and purge the police. This swing
back and forth was the pattern throughout the dictator’s rule.
The function of the police and security organs evolved in different
directions from the 1920s to the 1950s. During the 1920s, the OGPU
functioned much as we traditionally understand, as a political police
that harassed and persecuted Stalin’s rivals and perceived enemies. In
the early 1930s, the OGPU returned to the role of its predecessor, the
Cheka, as a revolutionary arm of the Bolshevik Party. Stalin and the
Politburo used the agency to bring revolutionary communist rule to a
largely anti-Bolshevik countryside. During the collectivization and
dekulakization campaigns, the OGPU returned to the methods of bru-
tal repression and deportation on a mass scale that had characterized
Cheka activities during the civil war. After the dekulakization and
collectivization campaigns ended, the OGPU and then the GUGB,
evolved, again, from a revolutionary force to a state security agency.
During the middle years of the 1930s, the NKVD continued to func-
tion as Stalin’s political police, but it also moved into areas of mass
surveillance and repression to protect the social, economic, and po-
litical order that Stalin had created. Following Stalin’s lead, leaders of
the NKVD and the GUGB, specifically, saw the protection of socialist
property and the maintenance of social order as primary tasks of state
security. Civil policing, enforcement of passport and residence laws,
removal and isolation of “socially harmful” populations all fell with-
in the purview of the NKVD. Even the policing of street children and
hooliganism became a main responsibility of the state’s security or-
gans.
During the 1930s, the organs gained the authority to define social
status and citizenship rights through control of the passport system. It
was the police, and then the security organs, that ascribed the social
status written into passports. That status determined, in turn, where
a person could live, work, and travel. And the security organs played
a significant role in both determining and enforcing what areas of the
country were safe for socialism, what areas would be open to margin-
alized populations, and where suspect populations would be forced to
live out their lives. The regime’s leaders related to the Soviet people
largely through the police and state security organs during these years.
Given nearly unlimited license, political and civil police, in turn,
shaped the Soviet body politic in blunt and brutal ways, and in ac-
cordance with the ideology of the regime’s political leaders and their
changing perceptions of danger and state security. The social function
 Conclusion 311

of the security forces became brutally clear during the mass operation
purges of the late 1930s, and in the continuing deportations of whole
ethnic populations during and after the war years.
After the war, Stalin and other leaders employed political police
methods—the kind of secret, extrajudicial policing that dominated
the 1930s—primarily in the country’s new territories, as well as in
some regions of the Caucasus. In these areas, leaders perceived that
the security of the state was at risk, as local authorities faced serious
insurgency movements against Soviet rule all along the country’s new
borders. Much of the attention of the security and internal police
forces focused on these borderland wars, and on the cleansing and
“sovietization” of the newly incorporated populations. At the same
time, the security organs expanded their expertise to neighboring
Soviet-occupied countries, and entered a new era of increasingly pro-
fessionalized intelligence gathering and spying operations on an inter-
national scale. Still, not everything changed. Stalin continued to use
the MGB for the same kind of discrediting and purging of potential
rivals that had occupied Chekists since the 1920s. The Leningrad and
Mingrelian affairs and the final plots against the Kremlin doctors
engaged a great deal of the attention of the MGB.
While Stalin employed mass violence in newly acquired territories,
this was no longer the case inside the pre-1939 territories. In these
areas, the security forces of the Soviet Union got out of the business
of social order policing after the war, although they still played a
significant role in domestic spying and monitoring of what was
considered anti-Soviet behavior. After Stalin’s death, the role of the
state’s security apparatus diminished still further. More stable, more
secure, more professionalized, Soviet security service officials contin-
ued to serve the Soviet state until its collapse in 1991.
And what of the documents themselves? Can their language and
form tell anything more than the content? Certainly, use of the word
“element” dominated the language of the political police during the
1930s. That word belonged to the era of mass social cleansing, and
reflected the way police and leaders thought about the population.
“Element” simplified the business of categorizing the population in
order to act on it. Police used the word uniformly as a negative attri-
bute, dehumanizing those who were to be removed, whether geo-
graphically or physically.
The language in many of the documents, especially those dealing
with repression, is often formulaic, and appears often to have been
written in haste. Catchwords and clichéd phrases are thrown together
312 Conclusion

in strings, often without much editorial thought about clarity or preci-

sion of meaning. Strings of phrases are separated only by commas or
dashes, and there is much repetition of the same clichéd wording.
While the documents in this collection do not show it, local officials
often had to write to superiors for clarification of orders, especially
about whom, exactly, to repress. At the same time, the use of formu-
laic language allowed local officials great leeway in deciding who
fit any particular category to be purged. Documents of Procuracy of-
ficials often reflected greater precision than those of the police and
security organs. This is understandable, given the concern of these
officials to follow and use legal procedure in their various conflicts
with the police. The language of documents from Yagoda and Yezhov
is the worst, grammatically and stylistically. In many of their orders,
and in their correspondence, the language is brutalized, with little
regard for grammar and sentence structure. The reader cannot help
but feel that the unreflective brutalization of language, expressed in
their communications, reflected the same crude and simplistic brutal-
ization that these two brought to their work as Stalin’s social engi-
neers. The communications of both of these leaders, especially those
dealing with repression, were often written in the passive voice (this
action was taken, so-and-so many of the anti-Soviet element were
removed or liquidated), as if to distance themselves from what they
were doing to real people and their lives.
Feliks Dzerzhinsky, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, and Lavrentii Beria
were the most articulate of the leaders of the political police, judging
by the language of their communications. Dzerzhinsky was an Old
Bolshevik leader, with education and experience outside the Soviet
Union. He was not Stalin’s creature, as were Yagoda and Yezhov.
Dzerzhinsky’s communications were literate and to the point. Lavren-
tii Beria, perhaps of all the police heads, was the most careful in writ-
ing memorandums. With only a few exceptions, he attempted to cov-
er himself with specific and careful language. He wrote in straightfor-
ward sentences, free of jargon for the most part. He almost never
editorialized, and he almost always justified his activities by reference
to Stalin’s instructions.1 Beria’s wiliness, in general, may have helped
him to survive Stalin, but it did not save him from execution by his
compatriots who followed Stalin.
By the postwar period, the language of security and policing docu-
ments was beginning to lose the shrill rawness and hypertrophied po-
lemical character of the 1930s. Reports of the security and internal
forces on the cleansing of new territories were written in a straightfor-
 Conclusion 313

ward and descriptive manner. Some of the prewar scripted language

can still be seen in the documents about purging in the Party and the
security forces from the late 1940s and early 1950s—in the charges
used to justify the Leningrad and Georgian purges, as well as in the
indictments against Abakumov and the Kremlin doctors. In these cas-
es, officials fell back on the same tried and true formulas of the 1930s.
At the same time, this language did not fit with the new era of a pro-
fessionalizing and internationally experienced cadre of operatives.
Stalin retained sole control over the security and internal affairs min-
istries until his death, but he, like the language in which he thought,
was becoming anachronistic in the very system that he created. Sta-
lin’s despotic, martial law version of socialism was giving way quickly
to a new kind of socialism and a new kind of state, an oligarchic
dictatorship and an authoritarian-bureaucratic kind of socialism. This
transition did not occur universally or quickly. Many aspects of Stalin-
ism remained to shape social and state development. Still, Stalin’s
death in March 1953 hastened the evolution to a new era in the So-
viet Union and to a new phase of Soviet socialism.
This page intentionally left blank
 Biographical Sketches

Abakumov, Viktor Semenovich (1908–54). Finished elementary school; Member

of VKP(b) from 1930; 1938–41, head of UNKVD, Rostov Oblast; from
1941, Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs, USSR, head of Administration
of Special Departments; 1943–46, head of counterintelligence administration,
SMERSH, under the Commissariat of Defense, and Deputy Commissar of
Defense; 1946–51, Minister of State Security, USSR. Arrested 1951 under
orders from Stalin for supposed anti-Soviet activities; in 1954, after Stalin’s
death, tried and executed for his part in the purge of Leningrad Party leaders
in 1948. Not rehabilitated.
Agranov (Sorinzon), Yakov Saulovich (1893–1938). 1912–15, member of
Socialist Revolutionary Party; 1915, member of Russian Social Democratic
Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; 1919, joined the Cheka; 1919–21, head of
Special Department; 1922–23 head of Special Bureau for exile of anti-Soviet
elements; 1923–31, head of Secret Department, GPU-OGPU SSSR; 1931–33,
OGPU plenipotentiary for Moscow Oblast, and head of Special Department
for Moscow Military District; 1934–37, First Deputy People’s Commissar
for Internal Affairs, USSR; 1937–38. NKVD chief, Saratov Oblast. Arrested
and executed, August 1938. Not rehabilitated.
Akulov, Ivan Alekseevich (1888–1937). From 1907, member of Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party; during the revolution and Civil War, worked in St.
Petersburg, Ukrainian, and other oblast Party committees; 1922–29, Chair-
man of All-Ukrainian Council of Trade Unions; 1930–31, Deputy Chairman,
Workers and Peasants Inspectorate; 1931–32, Deputy Chairman, OGPU;
1933–35, Chief Procurator, USSR; 1935–37, Secretary, Central Executive
Committee, (TsIK) USSR. Arrested July 1937. Executed. Rehabilitated.
Alekseev, Nikolai Nikolaievich (1893–1937). 1910–18, member of Social
Revolutionary Party; 1919 joined VKP(b); 1920, began work in Cheka;
1920–22, plenipotentiary in Foreign Department of Cheka; 1922–25, deputy
head of Special Bureau for exile of anti-Soviet elements; 1925–35, OGPU

315
316 Biographical Sketches

plenipotentiary in Western Siberian Krai; 1935–37, deputy head of GULAG;

1937, arrested and executed. Rehabilitated.
Andreev, Andrei Andreevich (1895–1971). From 1914, Party member; 1920–
22, Secretary, Central Council of Trade Union (VTsSPS); 1922–27, Secretary
of Railway Union Central Committee; 1927–30, Secretary, North Caucasus
Party Committee; from 1930, Chairman Central Control Commission of the
TsK VKP(b), and Chairman, Workers and Peasants Inspectorate; 1931–35,
Commissar of Transport, USSR; 1935–46, Party Central Committee
Secretary; 1943–46, Commissar of Agriculture; 1946–53, Deputy Chairman,
Council of Ministers, USSR; 1939–52, Chairman of Party Control Commis-
sion of the TsK VKP(b).
Antonov-Ovseenko, Vladimir Aleksandrovich (1884–1939). Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction, member since 1917; from
1924, diplomatic work; from 1930, Soviet plenipotentiary in Poland;
1934–37, Russian Republic Chief Procurator; from 1936, General Consul in
Barcelona; 1937, recalled to Moscow, arrested, and executed. Rehabilitated.
Artuzov (Frauchi), Artur Khristianovich (1891–1937). From 1917, Bolshevik
faction/Party member; 1918, joined Cheka; 1918–22, Special Plenipotentiary
and deputy head, Special Department Cheka/GPU; 1922–27, head, counter-
intelligence department, OGPU, and one of the organizers of the counterin-
telligence front organization, Trest; 1927–31, deputy head, Secret Opera-
tional Administration, OGPU, and deputy head of Foreign [Operations]
Department, OGPU; 1931–35, head, INO OGPU-GUGB-NKVD USSR;
1935–37, deputy head of 4th Directorate of the General Staff. May 1937,
arrested. Executed. Rehabilitated.
Balitsky, Vsevolod Apolonovich (1892–1937). 1915, joined Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party; 1918, member of All-Ukrainian Cheka; 1923–
31, OGPU Plenipotentiary in Ukraine; 1924–30, Commissar of Internal
Affairs, Ukrainian SSR; 1931–34, Deputy Chairman, OGPU; 1932–34,
special plenipotentiary and then head of GPU, Ukrainian SSR; from 1934,
Commissar of Internal Affairs, Ukrainian SSR; from 1934, member TsK
VKP(b); 1937, transferred to head Far East UNKVD; July 1937, arrested.
Executed. Not rehabilitated.
Belen’ky, Abram Yakovlevich (1882–1941). Worked in Cheka from 1917;
1921–28, member Collegium Cheka-GPU-OGPU, and head of personal
guard of V. I. Lenin (1921–24); 1930–38, special plenipotentiary; 1938,
arrested. Executed. Rehabilitated.
Beloborodov, Aleksandr Grigor’evich (1891–1938). 1907, joined Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; 1917 and the Civil War,
worked in regional Party positions; 1912–23 and 1923–27, worked as
Deputy Commissar and then as Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Russian
Republic; 1927, expelled from the Party as an ally of Trotsky; 1930,
reinstated; 1930s, worked in state administrative positions; 1936, arrested.
Executed 1938. Rehabilitated.
Bel’sky, Lev Nikolaevich (Abram Mikhailovich Levin) (1889–1941). 1917,
joined Russian Social Democratic Workers Party; from 1918, member
 Biographical Sketches 317

Cheka; 1918–20, Chairman, Simbirsk Cheka, and head, Special Department,

Eighth Army; 1921–30, Special Plenipotentiary, Tambov Province, Far East,
and Central Asia; 1930–31, Special Plenipotentiary, Moscow Oblast;
1931–33, in economic work (Commissariat of Supply); 1933–37, head of
militsiia; 1936–38, Deputy Commissar, NKVD; 1938, head of NKVD
transport department; 1938, arrested. Executed 1941. Not rehabilitated.
Beria, Lavrentii Pavlovich (1899–1953). Born into a peasant family in Tiflis
Province, Georgia; finished secondary schooling; from 1917, member of
Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; 1920s, worked
for the Cheka-GPU-OGPU in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Transcaucasus;
from 1932, First Secretary of Transcaucasus Party organization; simultane-
ously, 1931–38, First Secretary, Georgian Party organization; from 1938,
First Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs, USSR, and head of the Main
Administration of State Security; 1938–45 and 1953, Commissar and then
Minister of Internal Affairs, USSR; 1941–53, Deputy Chairman of Council
of People’s Commissars and Council of Ministers after 1946; 1953, arrested
after Stalin’s death. Executed. Not rehabilitated.
Berman, Matvei Davidovich (1898–1939). 1917, joined Russian Social Demo-
cratic Workers Party; 1918, joined Cheka; 1920–30, headed Cheka-GPU-
OGPU in Ekaterinburg, Tomsk, Buryat-Mongolia, and Central Asia prov-
inces; 1929–32, deputy head, ULAG-GULAG; 1932–37, Deputy Commissar,
OGPU-NKVD; 1937–38, Commissar of Transport; 1938, arrested. Executed
1939. Rehabilitated.
Blagonravov, Georgii Ivanovich (1895–1938). 1917, joined Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Red Guard unit commander, member Petrograd
Revolutionary Military Committee, commander Petropavlovsk Fortress;
1918, member, railroad subdepartment, Cheka; 1919–21, head, Cheka trans-
port department Petrograd; 1921–31, head transport department, Cheka-
GPU-OGPU; 1929–32, Deputy Commissar of Transport, USSR; 1932–35,
First Deputy Commissar of Transport, USSR; 1934, Candidate member, TsK
VKP(b); from 1936, head of road construction administration, NKVD USSR;
1937, arrested. Executed. Rehabilitated.
Bliukher, Vasilii Konstantinovich (1890–1938). 1916, joined Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party; 1917, member, Military Revolutionary Commit-
tee, Samara; 1917–18, head of Red Guards, Chelyabinsk, commander,
Eastern Brigade, and commander, Urals Partisan Army; 1921–22, Minister of
War and commander, People’s Revolutionary Army, Far East Republic;
1924–27, chief military adviser to the Chinese revolutionary government;
1927–29, commander, Ukrainian Military District; 1929–38, commander of
special and regular Red Army forces, Far East; from 1934, member, TsK
VKP(b); 1938, arrested. Died during interrogation. Rehabilitated.
Bliumkin, Yakov Grigor’evich (1898–1929). 1917, member, Left Socialist
Revolutionary Party faction; 1918, head of Cheka Department for Struggle
against International Espionage; 6 July 1918, assassinated German ambas-
sador to Russian Republic, sentenced to 3 years prison, escaped; May 1919,
amnestied and became member of RKP(b); thereafter worked as Cheka-
GPU-OGPU agent in Mongolia, Palestine, Georgia, finally as OGPU resident
318 Biographical Sketches

in Turkey; 1929, met in secret with Trotsky, and arrested for conspiracy on
return to USSR. Executed.
Bukharin, Nikolai Ivanovich (1888–1938). From 1906, member of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party; 1911, expelled from Economic Division of
Moscow University Juridical Faculty; 1917–34, member of TsK of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction–RKP(b)-VKP(b); “Left”
Bolshevik during the Civil War, he opposed the Brest-Litovsk treaty and
supported the policies of War Communism, then turned and became a major
supporter of and theorist for NEP; from 1924, member of the Politburo of
the TsK VKP(b), editor of Party newspaper, Pravda, and 1926–29, head of
the Communist International organization, Komintern; 1928–29, one of
leaders of the so-called Right Deviation, for opposing forced collectivization
and grain confiscation; 1929, removed from Politburo and from Pravda
board; 1934–37, editor Izvestiia TsIK SSSR; February 1937, expelled from
the Party and arrested. Tried as leading member of so-called Anti-Soviet
Right Trotskyist Bloc. Convicted and executed. Rehabilitated.
Bulganin, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (1895–1975). State, Party, and military
official; after the Great Patriotic War, worked as Deputy Minister of Defense
and Minister of Armed Forces, USSR, Deputy Chairman of Council of
Ministers, and from 1955 as Chairman of Council of Ministers; 1958,
demoted as part of Khrushchev’s rise to power; 1960, forced into retirement.
Chicherin, Georgii Vasil’evich (1872–1936). 1896, finished Historical-
Philosophical Faculty, Petersburg University; from 1897, worked in the
archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 1904, emigrated to Germany,
where he lived off money inherited from his mother and helped finance the
Russian Social Democratic Workers Party; from 1905, member of that
party’s Menshevik wing; 1908, expelled from Germany for suspicious
activity, lived in France; 1914, moved to London and worked with British
Socialist Party and newspaper Golos; 1917–18, arrested and imprisoned in
Britain, then released to Russia where joined the Russian Social Democratic
Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; 1918, led Bolshevik delegation at Brest-
Litovsk treaty negotiations with Germany, ending Russia’s involvement in
World War I; 1918, replaced Trotsky as Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Republic; 1922–23, led Russian delegation to conferences in Genoa
and Lausanne, and negotiated German-Russian Treaty of Rapallo; 1923,
First Commissar of Foreign Affairs, USSR; from 1925, member of TsK
VKP(b); 1930, replaced as Foreign Affairs Commissar by M. M. Litvinov,
retired due to illness.
Denikin, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1947). 1918–20, main anti-Bolshevik army
commander in southern Russia, head of southern Russian government; 1920,
emigrated, lived in Britain, Belgium, France, and United States.
Deribas, Terentii Dmitrevich (1883–1938). 1903, joined Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party; 1917–18, one of Bolshevik leaders in Orenburg
Province, engaged in Party work; 1918–20, political commissar in Red Army,
became well known for mass shootings of “enemies” in Siberia; 1920–21,
worked in Secret Department, Cheka; 1921–22, head of Secret Department,
took leading role in suppression of Kronstadt uprising of anti-Bolshevik
 Biographical Sketches 319

sailors, and of peasant uprisings in Tambov Province; from May 1923, head
of Secret Department, OGPU; from 1927, first deputy head of Secret
Operational Administration, OGPU; 1931–37, member of OGPU-NKVD
Collegium; 1929, OGPU Plenipotentiary for Far East; from 1934, head of
Far East UNKVD, 1937, arrested. Executed. Rehabilitated.
Dzerzhinsky, Feliks (1877–1926). Born into Polish noble family; expelled from
gymnasium for revolutionary activity; helped organize the Social Democratic
Party of Poland and Lithuania; arrested, exiled, and emigrated several times
in the first decade of the 1900s, Dzerzhinsky lived and conducted revolution-
ary activity from Berlin and Capri, and in his native Poland; 1912–17,
captured and imprisoned; 1917, joined the Bolsheviks, and worked in the
Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet; elected to the Bolshevik Central
Committee, Dzerzhinsky moved to Petrograd, and played an active role in
the October seizure of power; 1918, chosen to head the newly founded
Cheka; after the Civil War, helped to establish the GPU-OGPU, and worked
as Commissar of the Interior and as Chairman of the Supreme Economic
Council.
Eikhe, Robert Indrikovich (1890–1940). 1905, joined Russian Social Demo-
cratic Workers Party; from 1919, Commissar of Food Supply, Latvia;
1919–24, worked in Commissariat of Food Supply, RSFSR; from 1924, and
then 1925–37, deputy head and then First Secretary of Krai Party Committee
in Western Siberia, and of the city of Novosibirsk; 1937–38, Commissar of
Agriculture, USSR; 1937, deputy for Supreme Soviet USSR; 1938, arrested.
Executed 1940. Rehabilitated.
Enukidze, Avel’ Safronovich (1877–1937). From 1896, member of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party; 1917, member of Petrograd Military
Revolutionary Committee; 1918–22, member of Russian Central Executive
Committee (of Soviets); 1922–35, Secretary, Presidium of All Union Central
Executive Committee of Soviets; 1935, accused of dereliction of duty in the
so-called Kremlin Conspiracy, and excluded from the Party; from 1936,
Director of the Kharkov Oblast Transport Trust; 1937, arrested. Executed.
Rehabilitated.
Evdokimov, Efim Georgievich (1891–1940). From 1918, member RKP(b); from
1918–19, member, Red Army and Cheka, Special Department for Moscow;
1920–21, deputy head of Cheka Special Department for Southwestern and
Southern fronts; 1921–23, head of Special Department for Ukraine; from
1923, OGPU Plenipotentiary for southeastern Russia; 1924–26, OGPU
Plenipotentiary for the North Caucasus Krai; 1929, appointed head of
OGPU Secret Operational Administration and OGPU Collegium member;
1931–34, OGPU plenipotentiary in Central Asia; 1934, member of TsK
VKP(b); 1934–37, First Secretary of VKP(b) in the North Caucasus Krai;
from 1937, First Party Secretary Azov–Black Sea and Rostov oblast commit-
tees; 1937, elected deputy to Supreme Soviet USSR and Commissar of Water
Transport, USSR; 1938, arrested. Executed 1940. Rehabilitated.
Frinovsky, Mikhail Petrovich (1898–1940). From 1918, member of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction, and worked in Cheka;
during Civil War and early 1920s, worked as political commissar in various
320 Biographical Sketches

military administrations; 1922–23, headed GPU in Kiev; 1925–27, OGPU

deputy plenipotentiary in Northern Caucasus and head of Northern Cauca-
sus Special Department administration; 1930–33, OGPU Chairman, Azerbai-
jan SSR; from 1933, head of border forces, OGPU USSR, and from 1934,
head of border and internal security, NKVD USSR; 1936–38, Deputy
Commissar of Internal Affairs. USSR, and second only to Yezhov in organiz-
ing and carrying out the great purges; 1938, arrested as part of the purge of
Yezhov’s leadership group. Executed 1940. Not rehabilitated.
Gamarnik, Yan Borisovich (1894–1937). From 1916, member of Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party; from 1929, head of the Red Army Political
Administration, member of the Revolutionary Military Council, USSR, and
chief editor of the military newspaper, Red Star; from 1930, Deputy Com-
missar of Naval Affairs, USSR; from 1934, Deputy Commissar of Defense,
USSR; 1937, committed suicide in anticipation of arrest in the case of the
so-called military conspiracy. Rehabilitated.
Ignat’ev, Semen Denisovich (1904–83). Born into a peasant family; from 1926,
member of VKP(b); 1935, finished Technical Academy of Industry; through-
out the 1930s, worked in various Party positions, including the Industrial
Department of the Central Committee; 1937–46, First Secretary of the
Buryat-Mongolian Party organization and then the Bashkir Party organiza-
tion; 1946–51, secretary of Belorussian Party organization and then headed
Party organizations in Central Asia; 1951–53, Minister of Internal Affairs,
USSR, and a TsK secretary; after 1953, headed the Bashkir and Tatar oblast
Party organizations; 1960, retired.
Kaganovich, Lazar’ Moiseevich (1893–1991). From 1911, member of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party; 1917, member, Saratov Committee of
Bolsheviks; 1918, Commissar, All-Russian Collegium for Red Army
Organization; 1918–19, Chairman, Nizhnii Novgorod Province; from 1920,
member of the Turkestan Bureau of the TsK RKP(b); 1924–25 and 1928–39,
TsK secretary; 1925–28, general secretary of Ukrainian Communist Party;
1930–35, First Secretary, Moscow City Party Committee; 1930–57, member
of Politburo of the TsK VKP(b)/KPSS; 1934–35, Chairman, Party Control
Commission; 1935–37, 1938–42, 1943–44, Commissar of Transport, USSR;
1937–38, Commissar of Heavy Industry, USSR; 1939–40, Commissar of
Petroleum Industry, USSR; 1940–47, Deputy Chairman of Sovnarkom/
Sovmin USSR; 1953–57, Chairman, Council of Ministers, USSR; 1957,
removed from Presidium (Politburo) and Central Committee of the KPSS;
1962, expelled from Communist Party.
Kamenev (Rozenfel’d), Lev Borisovich (1883–1936). From 1901, member of
Russian Social Democratic Workers Party; participated in 1905 revolution;
1908–17, in emigration; 1917, member of All-Russian Central Executive
Committee of Soviets; one of the editors of Pravda; 1919, special plenipoten-
tiary on the Southern Front; 1922–26, Chairman of the Moscow City
Council; 1922–26, Deputy, then First Deputy, Sovnarkom RSFSR, USSR;
Chairman of Defense Council; 1923–27, director of Lenin Institute; 1919–
25, member of TsK Politburo; implicated in the so-called new opposition
bloc; from 1926, ambassador to Italy, Chairman of Scientific-Technical
 Biographical Sketches 321

Administration of the Supreme Economic Council; 1927, expelled from

VKP(b); 1928, reinstated; 1932–33, in exile in Minusinsk; 1934, director of
the Gorky Institute of World Literature; 1935, sentenced to prison as part of
the so-called Moscow Center conspiracy; 1936, sentenced as part of the
“United Trotskyist-Zinovievist Center.” Executed. Rehabilitated.
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich (1894–1971). From peasant family; since 1918,
member of Bolshevik faction; 1920s, worked in local Party organizations,
and then the TsK of the Ukrainian Communist Party; 1932–34, Second
Secretary, Moscow city Party organization; from 1934, member of TsK
VKP(b); 1935–38, First Secretary, Moscow city Party organization, and
oversaw the great purges in Moscow; 1938–49, First Secretary, Ukrainian
Communist Party; 1949–53, Secretary in TsK KPSS; 1953–64, First Secre-
tary, Tsk KPSS; from 1958, also Chairman of Council of Ministers; 1964,
removed from office by Central Committee vote, and compelled to retire.
Kobulov, Bogdan Zakharovich (1904–53). Born in Tiflis, Georgia; 1921–25,
served in the Red Army; 1922, started work in the Georgian Cheka-GPU;
1925, joined the Communist Party; from 1931, as a protégé of Beria, worked
in leadership positions in the Secret Political Department of the Georgian
OGPU; from 1936, head of the Georgian UNKVD; from 1938, deputy head
of the GUGB NKVD USSR, and head of the investigative section of the
NKVD USSR; from 1939, candidate then full member of the TsK VKP(b);
from February 1941, Deputy Commissar of the Interior, USSR; from 1943,
Deputy Commissar of State Security, USSR; from 1946, deputy head of the
Administration of Soviet Property Abroad (under the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, and then the Council of Ministers, USSR), and deputy head of the
Soviet military administration in Germany; early 1950s, continued to work
in positions related to Soviet administration in Germany; 1953, First Deputy
Minister of the Interior, USSR; arrested June 1953 in connection with the
purge of Beria’s entourage in the state security system. Executed. Not
rehabilitated.
Kosior, Stanislav Vikent’evich (1889–1939). From 1907, member of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party, active in revolutionary work in Petrograd,
Ukraine; 1917, Commissar of Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee;
one of organizers of the Ukrainian Communist Party of Bolsheviks; from
1918, Finance Commissar, Ukraine; from 1922, Secretary of the Siberian
Bureau of the TsK RKP(b); 1926–28, Secretary, TsK VKP(b); from 1928,
First Secretary, Ukrainian Communist Party; 1938, Deputy Chairman,
Council of Commissars, USSR, and Chairman, Soviet Control Commission;
from 1924, member of TsK VKP(b); 1927–30 candidate member, Politburo;
from 1930, full member, Politburo, and member of Presidium of the
Central Executive Committee of Soviets; 1938, arrested. Executed 1939.
Rehabilitated.
Kruglov, Sergei Nikiforovich (1907–77). Educated at Moscow Institute of Asian
Studies and Institute of Red Professors; from 1928, member of VKP(b);
1929, began military service; from 1938, worked in the TsK VK(b)
apparatus; 1939, began work as a Special Plenipotentiary in the OGPU;
from 1939, Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs, USSR, and head of
322 Biographical Sketches

NKVD Department of Cadres; 1945–53, Commissar, then Minister, of

Internal Affairs, USSR; 1953, First Deputy, then again Minister of
Internal Affairs, until 1956.
Krylenko, Nikolai Vasil’evich (1885–1938). From 1904, member of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party; 1917, member, Petrograd Military
Revolutionary Committee; from 1918, member of Commissariat of Justice
Presidium, Chairman of Revolutionary Tribunal under the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee, and Procurator of the Russian Republic;
1927–34, member of Central Control Commission of the TsK VKP(b);
1931–36, Commissar of Justice, RSFSR; 1936–37, Commissar of Justice,
USSR; member of All-Russian and All-Union executive committees; 1937,
arrested. Executed 1938. Rehabilitated.
Kuibyshev, Valerian Vladimirovich (1888–1935). From 1904, member of
Russian Social Democratic Workers Party; 1918–19, Commissar and
member of Revolutionary Council of the Eastern Front, then Deputy
Chairman of Commission of All-Russian (then USSR) Central Executive
Committee, on Turkestan; from 1920, member of Central Executive Council,
Presidium of Trade Unions; from 1921, Presidium member of Supreme
Economic Council, and head of USSR Electrical Administration; from 1926,
head of Supreme Economic Council; from 1930, head of Gosplan; from
1934, Chairman of Soviet Control Commission.
Kursky, Dmitrii Ivanovich (1874–1932). From 1904, member of Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party; attended higher education institutions; 1919–21,
member of Revolutionary Military Council of RSFSR; 1918–28, Commissar
of Justice, RSFSR and First Procurator, USSR; 1927–30, member of Central
Party Control Commission, head of Institute of Justice; ambassador to Italy.
Litvinov, Maksim Maksimovich (Vallakh, Meer-Genokh Moishevich) (1876–
1951). From 1898, member of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party;
1918–21, member of Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, RSFSR; 1921–23,
Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, USSR; from 1923, member of
Collegium of Workers and Peasants Inspectorate, USSR; 1930–139,
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, USSR; 1934–41, member of TsK VKP(b), and
member of VTsIK and TsIK USSR; 1941–46, Deputy Commissar of Foreign
Affairs; 1941–43, ambassador to the United States and Soviet representative
in Cuba; 1946, retired.
Malenkov, Georgii Maksimilianovich (1901–88). From 1920, member of
VKP(b); 1930–34, head of Moscow Party organization; 1934–39, head of
Department of Party Organs of the TsK VKP(b); 1939–46, 1948–53, TsK
Secretary, and head of Party Cadre Department, 1939–46; 1946–53,
1955–57, Deputy Chairman of Council of Ministers USSR; 1957, expelled
from TsK, and in 1961 from KPSS, as part of Khrushchev’s rise to power.
Medved’, Filipp Dem’yanovich (1889–1937). From 1907, member of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party; before 1917, revolutionary activist,
arrested four times, imprisoned for two years; 1917, worked in factory,
member of Sokol regional Military Revolutionary Committee, Moscow;
from 1918, member of Cheka; 1918–20, member of Collegium of Cheka,
 Biographical Sketches 323

Chairman of Tula Province Cheka, Chairman of Petrograd Cheka, head of

NKVD RSFSR concentration camps, Cheka Plenipotentiary to Western
Front; 1920–21, head of Cheka Special Department for Western Krai;
1921–23, Deputy Chairman, Moscow city Cheka, head of Moscow Province
Cheka, head of Moscow Military District Special Department; 1924–25,
worked in OGPU in Western Territory and Belorussia, and as OGPU
plenipotentiary and head of Special Department in the Far East; 1930–34,
OGPU Plenipotentiary and then head of OGPU administration for Lenin-
grad; December 1934, arrested and convicted in 1935 for lax administration,
and sentenced to three years in prison. Arrested again and executed in 1937.
Rehabilitated.
Menzhinsky, Vyacheslav Rudol’fovich (1874–1934). Born in Poland; from
1904, member of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party; 1914–17,
military service in the Caucasus; 1917, Commissar, Petrograd Military
Revolutionary Committee; 1917–18, Deputy Commissar of Finance; 1918,
member, Presidium of Petrograd Council, Consul General in Berlin,
Collegium member, Commissariat of Foreign Affairs; 1919, member,
Presidium of Cheka, and Special Plenipotentiary of the Cheka Special
Department; from 1920, head of Special Department Administration, Cheka;
from 1922, head of Secret Operational Administration; from 1923, Deputy
Chairman and from 1926, Chairman, OGPU. Died 1934.
Merkulov, Vsevolod Nikolaevich (1895–1953). Son of a tsarist army officer;
1916–18, served in army; 1921–31, served in Transcaucasus and Georgian
Cheka-GPU-OGPU; during 1930s, worked in Party apparatus; from 1938,
head of GUGB USSR, and Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs, USSR;
1943–46, Commissar, then Minister, of Internal Affairs, USSR; 1946–53, did
not work in security organs; 1953, arrested and executed as part of post-
Stalin purge. Not rehabilitated.
Messing, Stanislav Adamovich (1889–1937). 1917, head of Cheka, Sokol’niki
Raion, Moscow; 1918, Collegium member and head of Secret Operational
Department, Moscow Cheka; 1920–21, deputy head and then head of
Moscow Cheka; from 1921, Chairman, Petrograd Cheka; from 1922,
commander, GPU forces in Petrograd Military District; from 1923, Colle-
gium member, OGPU; from 1927, head of Foreign Department, OGPU, and
second deputy head, OGPU; 1931, removed from OGPU and transferred to
work in various positions in Commissariat of Trade, USSR; 1937, arrested.
Executed. Rehabilitated.
Mezhlauk, Valerii Ivanovich (1893–1938). Attended Historical-Philological and
Juridical Faculties, Kharkov University; 1917, Menshevik “Internationalist,”
then Bolshevik faction member; 1918–20, Deputy Commissar, Finance
Commissariat, Ukraine, member, Revolutionary Military Committee,
Southern Front, Deputy Commissar of Defense, Ukraine; 1920–24, head of
various railroad administrations, and Deputy Commissar of Transport,
RSFSR-USSR; from 1924, head of Main Metallurgical Administration,
Commissariat of Heavy Industry, USSR, and member of Supreme Economic
Council Presidium; from 1931, Deputy Chairman and then Chairman of
Gosplan); 1937, Commissar of Heavy Industry, USSR, member Central
324 Biographical Sketches

Executive Committee of Soviets, USSR; 1937, arrested. Executed 1938.

Rehabilitated.
Mironov, Lev Grigor’evich (1895–1938). Finished gymnasium and attended
three years at Kiev University; from 1918, member of Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party; 1918–19, entered Cheka work; 1921–24,
conducted political work in Red Army and was Chairman of the Revolution-
ary Military Tribunal of the Samarkand-Bukhara Forces Group, also Deputy
Commissar of Justice for Turkestan; from 1924, entered work in OGPU;
1924–29, department head, then deputy head of Economic Administration,
OGPU USSR; 1930–31, OGPU Plenipotentiary in Central Asia; 1931–37,
deputy head of Economic Administration, OGPU USSR, then head of
Economic Department, GUGB, head of GUGB Counterintelligence
Department; 1937, arrested. Executed 1938. Rehabilitated.
Mironov, Sergei Naumovich (1894–1940). Served in the army during World
War I, and in the Red Army during the Civil War; worked in the Cheka
Special Department and then headed the Foreign Department, GPU, for
south-eastern Russia; 1920s, headed OGPU offices in the Black Sea–Azov
area, Chechnya, and Vladikavkaz; early 1930s, OGPU deputy plenipoten-
tiary, Kazakhstan; 1933–36, headed OGPU apparatus in Dnepropetrovsk
Oblast; 1936–37, head of NKVD in Western Siberian Krai; 1938–39, Soviet
envoy to Mongolia; 1939, arrested. Executed 1940. Not rehabilitated.
Molchanov, Georgii Andreevich (1897–1937). Member of Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; 1917–18, served in Red Army,
then in various military staff positions; 1919–21, Chairman, Grozny
Province Cheka; 1921–23, deputy head of Secret Operational Administra-
tion, Cheka and GPU, and of various provincial GPU administrations;
1923–25, head of Secret Operational Administration, OGPU; 1925–31, head
of Ivanovo-Voznesensk Province GPU; 1931–36, head of Secret Political
Department, OGPU; 1936–37, Commissar of Internal Affairs, Belorussian
SSR, and head, Special Department Administration, Belorussian Military
District; 1937, arrested and executed. Not rehabilitated.
Molotov (Skryabin), Vyacheslav Mikhailovich (1890–1986). Studied at Peters-
burg Polytechnic Institute; from 1906, member of Russian Social Democratic
Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; 1917, member of Petrograd Soviet
Executive Council and Petrograd Committee of Russian Social Democratic
Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; from 1918, member of Sovnarkom, and
from 1920 of TsK RKP(b) and then VKP(b); from 1921, candidate then full
member of Politburo of the TsK RKP(b) and VKP(b); 1930–41, Chairman,
Council of People’s Commissars; 1937–58, deputy, Supreme Soviet, USSR;
1939–49, Commissar then Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR; 1941–45,
Deputy Chairman, State Defense Committee; 1946–56, held various
positions as Chairman or Deputy Chairman of Foreign Ministry, USSR, and
Council of Ministers, USSR; 1956, Minister of State Control; 1957, as part
of Khrushchev’s purge of “Stalinists,” removed from post as Deputy
Chairman, Council of Ministers, and appointed ambassador to Mongolia;
1962, expelled from KPSS, and retired from politics; 1984, reinstated as
member of KPSS.
 Biographical Sketches 325

Ogol’tsov, Sergei Ivanovich (1900–1976). Joined the Cheka at age seventeen,

and worked in various positions throughout the 1920s; 1930s and early
1940s, served in various leadership positions in the OGPU border forces, and
in the Leningrad and Kuibyshev oblast UNKVD; 1943–45, headed the
Kazakhstan UNKGB; 1945–51, First Deputy Minister of State Security,
USSR; 1948, given the task of arranging the murder of Solomon Mikhoels,
well-known actor and founder of the USSR Jewish Antifascist Committee;
1951, briefly served as temporary Minister of State Security between the
removal of V. S. Abakumov and the appointment of S. D. Ignat’ev. After
Stalin’s death, and on the recommendation of L. Beria, briefly arrested for
the murder of Mikhoels, but was released after the arrest of Beria; 1958,
expelled from the Party and then stripped of his security rank and forced
into retirement.
Ordzhonikidze, Sergo (Grigorii Konstantinovich) (1886–1937). From 1903,
member of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction;
1917, member of Petrograd Soviet; 1918–19, Chairman, Council of Defense
of North Caucasus; during Civil War served in various Bolshevik military
positions on different fronts, one of leading Bolsheviks to help establish
Party power in the Caucasus and North Caucasus; 1922–26, First Secretary,
Transcaucasus and North Caucasus krai Party committees; 1926–30,
Commissar of Central Control Commission and Workers and Peasants
Inspectorate; 1930–32, Chairman of Supreme Economic Council; 1932–37,
Commissar of Heavy Industry, USSR; 1937, committed suicide.
Pauker, Karl Viktorovich (1893–1937). Born in Austria-Hungary; 1906–14,
worked as a barber and a pastry chef apprentice; 1914–15, served in
Austro-Hungarian army, captured and interned in Turkestan; 1918–19,
Deputy Commandant of Cheka in Samarkand; 1919–20, studied at Sverdlov
Communist Academy; 1920–22, worked for Special Department Administra-
tion, Cheka-GPU; 1922–37, deputy head and then head of Operational
Department, Cheka-GPU-OGPU-NKVD USSR; 1937, arrested and executed
1937. Not rehabilitated.
Pillar, Romual’d Liudwig Pillar von Pil’khau (Pilliar, Roman Aleksandrovich)
(1894–1937). Born into Baltic German family; studied in gymnasium in
Vil’na, Switzerland, and Russia; 1914, became involved in revolutionary
activities; from 1917–19, worked in the Lithuanian and Polish underground
revolutionary movements, then transferred to Russia as part of a prisoner
exchange; until 1921, Red Army political commissar; after 1921, worked in
the counterintelligence and foreign espionage departments, Cheka-GPU-
OGPU, including as one of organizers and managers, along with A. Kh.
Artuzov, of the counterespionage operation “Trust”; 1925–29, worked in the
Belorussian GPU; 1930s, supervised GPU operations in Central Asia, Saratov
Krai, and other regions; 1937, arrested and executed as an alleged Polish
agent. Rehabilitated.
Piłsudski, Józef (1867–1935). Polish military leader, Chief of State 1918–22,
and then de facto military head of the Polish state from 1926 until his death;
originally, a socialist and a nationalist, Piłsudski was convinced that Poland
would gain independence only through force of arms; 1914–1917, fought
326 Biographical Sketches

under the Austrians against Russia, and then against occupation; 1919–21,
commanded Polish forces against Bolshevik domination, attempting,
unsuccessfully, to gain control of eastern Ukraine and then defeating
Bolshevik armies in 1920 at the siege of Warsaw. As head of state, he
attempted to organize a Baltic alliance against the Bolsheviks, and to foster
anti-Bolshevik nationalist sentiment among non-Russian populations in
western Russia and Ukraine. According to Feliks Dzerzhinsky, a fellow
Pole and head of the Russian-Soviet political police, Piłsudski presented
the greatest threat to the Soviet Union. 1932, signed the Soviet-Polish
Nonaggression Pact.
Poskrebyshev, Aleksandr Nikolaevich (1891–1965). From 1917, member of
Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; from 1922,
worked in the Central Committee apparatus as deputy head of administra-
tion, and as Stalin’s deputy; 1929–34, deputy head, then head of the Secret
Department of the TsK; 1934–52, head of the Special Sector of the TsK
(responsible for all secret communications); from 1931, Stalin’s personal
secretary and confidant; 1939–56, TsK member; 1953, removed with
pension.
Postyshev, Pavel Petrovich (1887–1937). From 1904, member of Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; participated in revolutions of
1905–7 and 1917; one of organizers of Red Army; 1918–19, worked in
Irkutsk and Far East Republic; member of revolutionary tribunals and army
political commissar; from 1923, engaged in Party work; 1927–38, member
of TsK VKP(b) and Organizational Bureau; 1930–34, one of the TsK
secretaries; 1933–37, Second Secretary of Ukrainian Communist Party and
First Secretary of Kharkov and Kiev oblast Party Committees; Presidium
member of Central Executive Committee USSR; Deputy of Supreme Soviet;
1938, arrested. Executed 1939. Rehabilitated.
Prokof’ev, Georgii Evgen’evich (1895–1937). From 1919, member of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; engaged in revolution-
ary activity in Kiev, then Red Army volunteer; during Civil War, engaged in
political work in cavalry units, and on railroad transport; 1921–24, deputy
head of Cheka-GPU Foreign Department; 1924–26, head of OGPU Informa-
tion Department; 1926–31, head of OGPU Economic Department; 1931–32,
member of Supreme Economic Council, deputy head of Workers and
Peasants Inspectorate, and head of White Sea Canal construction; 1932–34,
third deputy head, OGPU, and head of the USSR militsiia administration;
1934–36, Deputy Commissar, NKVD USSR; 1936–37, demoted to Deputy
Commissar of Communications, USSR, as part of the purge of Yagoda’s
leadership circle; 1937, arrested and executed. Not rehabilitated.
Pyatakov, Georgii (Yurii) Leonidovich (1890–1937). Son of a factory manager;
studied in Economics Faculty, Petersburg University, expelled 1910; from
1910 member of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik
faction; 1914–17, in emigration in Switzerland; 1918, leading “Left Commu-
nist” opposed to treaty with Germany; from 1920, Chairman of Gosplan
RSFSR, and worked in Don basin industrial management, close ally of Leon
Trotsky; 1923–early 1930s, worked as Deputy Chairman, Supreme
 Biographical Sketches 327

Economic Council, on various trade missions abroad, and in the State Bank
administration; from 1932, Deputy Commissar of Heavy Industry; 1923–25
and 1930–36, member of TsK VKP(b); 1937, tried as member of so-called
Parallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center. Convicted and executed.
Rehabilitated.
Radek (Sobel’son), Karl Bernardovich (1895–1939). Studied in the History
Faculty, University of Cracow; 1902, joined the Polish Social Democratic
Party, and the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party in 1904. Worked as
a journalist and in the socialist press in Poland, Switzerland, and Germany;
expelled from the German Social Democratic Party; after the 1917 February
revolution, worked as a representative for the Russian Social Democratic
Workers Party in Stockholm; helped negotiate the return of Bolshevik
leaders, including Lenin, to Russia through Germany; 1918, member of
Bolshevik delegation at Brest-Litovsk negotiations, but also a “Left
Communist,” opposed to a separate peace with Germany; 1919, one of
founders of German Communist Party, and participant in failed communist
uprising; 1920, arrested and returned to Russia; 1919–24, member of TsK
RKP(b), active in the Communist International organization, and a close ally
of Leon Trotsky; 1927, expelled from the Party as a Trotskyist, and sen-
tenced to three years in exile; 1929, freed from exile and reinstated in Party
in 1930. Early 1930s, worked abroad, especially in Poland, for Stalin; 1937,
arrested and sentenced to ten years in a labor camp. Murdered in prison.
Rehabilitated.
Rakovsky, Khristian Georgievich (1873–1941). Born in Bulgaria; doctor by
profession; worked in social democratic movements in Bulgaria, Romania,
and France. 1917, joined Russian Social Democratic Workers Party,
Bolshevik faction, worked in communist revolutionary movement in
Romania and Ukraine; 1919–23, Chairman of Council of Commissars,
Ukraine; 1923–27, Soviet ambassador in Britain and then France, Deputy
Commissar of Foreign Affairs, member of TsK RKP(b); 1919–27, close ally
of Trotsky; 1927, expelled from Party as Trotskyist and exiled to Central
Asia; 1934, returned from exile; 1935–37, Chairman of Red Cross Society;
1938, tried as member of “Right-Trotskyist Bloc,” and sentenced to twenty
years in labor camp. Died in 1941. Rehabilitated.
Redens, Stanislav Frantsevich (1892–1939). From 1914, member of Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; from 1918, worked for
the Cheka during the Civil War, and then in the Crimea and Transcaucasus
during the 1920s; from 1931, OGPU Plenipotentiary in Belorussia; 1932–33,
Chairman, OGPU in Ukraine, oversaw collectivization and dekulakization;
1933–38, OGPU Plenipotentiary in Moscow, member of purge troika in
1937–38; 1938–39, Commissar of Internal Affairs, Kazakhstan SSR; 1938,
arrested 1938. Executed 1939. Rehabilitated.
Rudzutak, Yan Ernestovich (1887–1938). 1904, joined Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; from 1917, engaged in Party,
government, trade union, and diplomatic work; in early 1920s, worked in
trade union movements, member of TsK RKP(b); throughout the 1920s,
engaged in high-level Party work, in Secretariat, in Central Asia, as Soviet
328 Biographical Sketches

delegate to the 1922 Genoa Conference; early and mid-1930s, Deputy

Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, member of the Council of
Labor and Defense, and Commissar of the Workers and Peasants Inspector-
ate; May 1937, arrested for supposedly spying for Germany and being a
Trotskyist. Executed 1938. Rehabilitated 1956.
Rykov, Aleksei Ivanovich (1881–1938). Studied in Juridical Faculty, Kazan
University; 1908, joined Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik
faction; participated actively in revolutions of 1905–7 and 1917; throughout
the 1920s, held high-level government and Party positions, most importantly
as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars; 1931–36, Commissar
of Communications and member of Central Executive Committee of Soviets,
USSR; 1937, expelled from Party as member of so-called Right Deviation;
1938, tried and executed. Rehabilitated.
Ryutin, Martem’yan Nikitich (1890–1937). Born in Irkutsk Province; 1914,
joined Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; fought in
World War I and helped establish Bolshevik power in Siberia; 1920s,
engaged in Party work in a number of provinces; 1927–30, candidate then
full member of TsK, RKP(b); member of Presidium of Supreme Economic
Council; early 1930s, organized the Union of Marxists-Leninists and agitated
for removal of Stalin as general secretary; author of programmatic letter
critical of Stalin, and distributed among Party leaders; 1932, arrested and
imprisoned; 1937, arrested again and executed. Rehabilitated.
Semashko, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (1874–1949). 1901, finished Medical
Faculty, Kazan University; participated in 1905–7 revolution, arrested, freed
on bond, fled abroad, and lived in Switzerland and France; 1917, returned to
Russia; from 1918, Commissar of Health, RSFSR; from 1930, Chairman of
Children’s Commission, RSFSR.
Shcherbakov, Aleksandr Sergeevich (1901–45). Party functionary and founding
member of Soviet Writers Union; 1934–38, deputy to Andrei Zhdanov in
the Leningrad Party organization, then transferred to head the Moscow
Oblast Party organization; during the war, served as head of the Political
Administration of the Soviet army; 1945, died of a heart attack, later
claimed as a murder by anti-Soviet Zionist agents.
Sokol’nikov, Grigorii Yakovlevich (Brilliant, Girsh Yankevich) (1888–1939).
Son of a doctor’s family; finished Juridical Faculty, University of Paris; 1905,
joined Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; 1917,
active in revolutionary affairs; member of TsK, VKP(b); 1918, member of
Bolshevik delegation to Brest-Litovsk negotiations, and signed treaty for the
Bolsheviks; during 1920s, worked in high-level positions in Soviet banking;
1923–26, First Commissar of Finances, USSR; 1926, demoted to work in
other positions; 1930s, member of Collegium of Commissariat of Foreign
Affairs; 1936, expelled from Party and arrested; 1937, convicted and
sentenced to ten years in labor camp as member of “Parallel Anti-Soviet
Trotskyist Center.” Murdered in prison.
Sol’tz, Aron Aleksandrovich (1872–1945). Born into prosperous merchant
family; 1898, joined Russian Social Democratic Workers Party 1898; 1917,
 Biographical Sketches 329

worked in Moscow Committee of the party’s Bolshevik faction; 1920s and

1930s, worked in various positions in the Russian Republic and USSR
judicial system and the USSR and RSFSR Procuracy, including the RSFSR
Supreme Court; 1923–38, member of Central Control Commission of Party.
Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich (Ioseb Besarionis Dze Jugashvili) (1878–1953).
From the 1890s, active in revolutionary politics in Georgia, and then with
the Leninist Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Workers
Party; member of the Bolshevik Central Committee during the 1917 revolu-
tionary year; from 1922 until his death in 1953, general secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union; from the late 1920s, undisputed
dictator of the Soviet Union.
Tomsky (Efremov), Mikhail Pavlovich (1880–1936). 1904, joined Russian
Social Democratic Workers Party; engaged in revolutionary activity in
Russian Estonia, arrested and exiled to France, returned to Russia, arrested
again, and freed from prison in 1917 by the Provisional Government; 1917,
member of Petrograd Executive Committee of Bolsheviks; 1920s, head of the
Central Council of Trade Unions, RSFSR and then USSR; from 1927,
member of Politburo; one of leaders of so-called Right Deviation, supporting
NEP and opposed to the Stalinist policies of forced collectivization and
industrialization; 1930, expelled from Politburo and headed the State
Publishing House; 1936, committed suicide when implicated in supposed
anti-Soviet terrorist activities.
Trilisser, Meer Abramovich (1883–1940). 1901, joined Russian Social Demo-
cratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; participated in revolutionary under-
ground in Finland, arrested numerous times; 1917 and in Civil War, worked
in Siberia and the Far Eastern Republic as a Bolshevik Party functionary, and
in the Cheka, actively engaging in the “Red Terror” in Siberia; from 1921,
deputy head and then head of Foreign Department, Cheka, as one of key
organizers of foreign spy work in Russia and the early Soviet Union; 1926,
Deputy Chairman, OGPU; 1930–34, deputy head of the Workers and
Peasants Inspectorate; 1935, work in the Komintern Executive Committee
under the name Mikhail Aleksandrovich Moskvin, responsible for the Spanish
Communist Party; 1938, arrested. Executed 1940. Rehabilitated.
Trotsky (Bronshtein), Lev Davidovich (1879–1940). Since 1908, involved in the
Russian Social Democratic movement; first associated with the Mensheviks,
headed the Petersburg Soviet in 1905; 1907–17, lived in emigration; 1917,
returned to Russia, changed to Bolshevik faction, Chairman of Petrograd
Soviet; one of the founders of the Soviet state, commander of Red Army
forces during the Civil War, Commissar of War and, briefly, of Foreign
Relations; Politburo member; after Lenin’s death in 1924, a major rival for
political power against Bukharin, Kamenev, and Stalin; 1927, expelled from
the Party and exiled to Alma-Ata; 1929, deported from the USSR, lived in
emigration in Turkey, France, Norway, and finally Mexico; 1938, founded
the Fourth International; 1940, murdered in his home in Coyoacán by an
NKVD hired assassin, Ramón Mercader.
Tukhachevsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1893–1937). During the Civil War,
commander in the Red Army; helped defeat Kolchak’s forces in Siberia and
330 Biographical Sketches

Admiral Denikin in the Crimea; 1920, defeated by at the siege of Warsaw,

and came into conflict with Stalin over the defeat, each blaming the other;
Tukhachevsky went on to become a prominent military strategist and, in
1935, Marshal of the Soviet Union; 1937, long distrusted by Stalin, Tukh-
achevsky was arrested, tried, and executed along with other leading military
officers as supposed German agents working to overthrow the Soviet
government. Rehabilitated.
Uglanov, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (1886–1937). 1907, joined Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; from 1917, worked in trade
union movement and administration, and in provincial Party administra-
tions; 1924–29, Secretary, TsK RKP(b), and Moscow Party Committee;
1928–30, Commissar of Labor USSR; 1933, arrested for supposed
anti-Party activities; 1936, arrested again. Tried and executed 1937.
Rehabilitated.
Unshlikht, Iosef Stanislavovich (1879–1938). 1900, joined Polish and Lithu-
anian Social Democratic Party; 1906, member, Russian Social Democratic
Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; Deputy Chairman, Cheka-GPU; early and
mid-1920s, as deputy to Feliks Dzerzhinsky, Unshlikht was aggressive and a
crucial player in preserving and then expanding GPU-OGPU authority and
activities, especially in organizing foreign disinformation apparatus; from
1925, TsK member RKP(b); 1925–30, Deputy Commissar for Military and
Naval Affairs, USSR; 1933–35, head of civilian shipping administration;
1935, Secretary of Central Executive Committee of Soviets; 1937, arrested.
Tried and executed 1938. Rehabilitated.
Voroshilov, Kliment Efremovich (1881–1969). From 1903, member Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; 1921–60, member TsK and then
Politburo RKP(b); 1925–34, Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs;
1934–40, Commissar of Defense, USSR, close ally of Stalin; 1940–53, Deputy
Chairman, Sovnarkom-Sovmin, and Chairman of Defense Committee of
Sovnarkom-Sovmin; 1953–60, Chairman of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
Voznesensky, Nikolai Alekseevich (1903–50). 1920s, worked in the Communist
Youth League; 1924, entered Party work; 1931–34, taught in the Economic
Institute of Red Professors, and simultaneously in Party Control Commis-
sion; from 1934, also worked in the Soviet Control Commission; from 1935,
worked in the Leningrad Party administration, and from 1937, as Deputy
Chairman of the People’s Council of Commissars, USSR, in Moscow; from
1939, member of Party TsK, and from 1941, member of the Politburo;
1942–45, member of State Defense Committee; 1942–48, Chairman,
Gosplan; from 1943, member of USSR Academy of Sciences; 1949, removed
from Gosplan, Politburo, and TsK; arrested for supposed anti-Party activi-
ties. Executed 1950. Rehabilitated.
Vrangel’, Petr Nikolaevich (1878–1928). Born into a Baltic German noble
family; during the Civil War, one of main military and political opponents of
the Bolsheviks as commander of White armies in southern Russia; 1920,
after evacuation from the Crimea, lived abroad; 1924–28, organizer and
leader of the Russian All-Military Union. Died in Brussels.
 Biographical Sketches 331

Vyshinsky, Andrei Yanuar’evich (1883–1954). From 1903, member of Russian

Social Democratic Workers Party, Menshevik faction; 1913, finished
Juridical Faculty, University of Saint Vladimir, Kiev; from 1920, Bolshevik
Party member and made his career within the Soviet judicial and then
Procuracy administration; 1925–28, Rector of Moscow University; 1928,
chief prosecutor in Shakhty trial; 1930, chief prosecutor in the Industrial
Party trial; from 1931, Procurator of the Russian Republic and Deputy
Commissar of Justice; 1935–39, Deputy and then Chief Procurator, USSR;
1939–40, Chairman of Council of People’s Commissars; from 1940, Deputy
Commissar of Foreign Affairs; after World War II, worked in diplomatic
apparatus.
Yagoda, Genrikh Grigor’evich (Yenokh Gershenovich) (1891–1938). From
1917, member of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik
faction; 1917, participated in revolutionary events in Moscow; from 1920,
worked in the Cheka, as deputy head then head of Special Department
administration, and as head of the Secret Operational Department; 1923–29,
Second Deputy Chairman, OGPU; 1929–34, First Deputy Chairman, OGPU;
1934–36, Commissar of Internal Affairs, USSR; 1936–37, Commissar of
Communications, USSR; 1937, arrested. Convicted as member of supposed
“Right Trotskyist Bloc” and executed 1938. Not rehabilitated.
Yakovlev (Epshtein), Yakov Arkad’evich (1896–1938). Born in Poland; from
1913, member of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party; from 1926,
Deputy Commissar, Workers and Peasants Inspectorate; 1929–34, Commis-
sar of Agriculture, USSR, and member of Council of Labor and Defense;
1937, First Secretary of Belorussian Communist Party TsK. Repressed.
Rehabilitated.
Yezhov, Nikolai Ivanovich (1895–1940). From 1917, member of Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; 1920s, worked in provincial
Party apparatus, and from 1927, in the Party TsK administration; 1929–30,
Deputy Commissar of Agriculture; 1933, designated as head of commission
to purge the Party; from 1934, member of TsK; from 1935, TsK Secretary
and Chairman of Party Control Commission; 1936–38, Commissar of
Internal Affairs, USSR; 1938, Commissar of Water Transport, USSR; 1939,
arrested. Executed 1940. Not rehabilitated.
Zakovsky, Leonid Mikhailovich (Shtubis, Genrikh Ernestovich) (1894–1938).
From 1913, member of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party; during
Civil War, worked as a spy for the Cheka and as a political commissar and
head of several Special Department administrations; 1920s, headed GPU-
OGPU organizations in Siberia and Odessa, and headed the Special Depart-
ment of the Siberian Military District; 1932, OGPU plenipotentiary in
Belorussia, then head of Belorussian SSR OGPU; 1934–38, headed the
Leningrad UNKVD, and oversaw the purges of Leningrad in 1935 and in
1937–38; 1938, designated Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs USSR, and
head of State Security Main Administration for Moscow Oblast. Arrested
and executed 1938. Not rehabilitated.
Zhdanov, Andrei (1896–1948). From 1934, First Secretary of Leningrad Party
organization, after the assassination of Sergei Kirov; 1940, in charge of
332 Biographical Sketches

establishing Soviet government in newly annexed Estonia; during the Great

Patriotic War, in charge of the defense of Leningrad; 1938–47, Chairman of
RSFSR Supreme Soviet; after the war, led the official campaign against
“cosmopolitanism,” which signaled a return to cultural isolation, a form of
Russianized Bolshevism, anti-Semitism, and a rejection of modernism in its
various forms. Died of heart failure in 1948.
Zhemchuzhina, Polina Semenovna (Karpovskaya, Peri Semenovna) (1897–
1960). From 1918, member of Bolshevik faction; attended Moscow Univer-
sity and Moscow Economics Institute; worked as regional Party functionary;
1921, married V. Molotov; during 1920s and 1930s, worked in various
enterprise administrations; from 1939, Commissar of Fisheries, USSR, and
candidate member TsK; from 1942 worked in the Jewish Antifascist Com-
mittee, USSR; 1949, arrested for her association with the committee, and
especially with Solomon Mikhoels, committee founder and supposedly an
anti-Soviet Zionist-nationalist and American spy; exiled to Kustanaisk
Oblast; 1953, after Stalin’s death, released and rehabilitated.
Zinoviev, Grigorii Evseevich (Radomysl’sky, Ovsei-Gersh Aronovich) (1883–
1936). From 1901, member of Russian Social Democratic Workers Party,
Bolshevik faction; 1908–17, lived in emigration; participated in revolution-
ary events in Petrograd; 1912–27, member of Party TsK; 1921–26, member
of Politburo; during the 1920s, one of leaders of the “New Opposition” and
the “Trotsky-Zinoviev Bloc” against Stalin; 1927 and 1932, expelled from
Party for factional activity, then reinstated, and finally expelled in 1934; in
the 1930s, worked as an editor of the journal Bolshevik; 1935, sentenced to
prison as member of supposed “Moscow Center” group; 1936, convicted
and executed as organizer of supposed “Anti-Soviet United Trotskyist-
Zinovievist Center.” Rehabilitated.
Zof, Vyacheslav Ivanovich (1889–1937). From 1913, member of Russian Social
Democratic Workers Party, Bolshevik faction; during Civil War and early
1920s, worked in military administration of the Baltic fleet; deputy com-
mander of naval forces of the Russian Republic; in the late 1920s, Deputy
Commissar of Water Transport, USSR, and Commissariat of Communica-
tions, USSR; 1937, arrested and executed. Rehabilitated.
 Documents

1. Note from I. S. Unshlikht to V. M. Molotov on delivery to the Politburo of

statutes of the GPU, its province-level and transport departments, and its
district-level plenipotentiaries. 6 March 1922. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll.
49–62.
2. Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b) [Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)]. On coordina-
tion of decisions of the Presidium of VtsIK, related to the State Political
Administration, with the Politburo. 15 February 1922. RGASPI, f. 17, op.
3, d. 266, l. 5.
3. Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On extraordinary powers of the
GPU for struggle against banditry. 27 April 1922. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d.
290. l. 4.
4. Note from I. S. Unshlikht to I. V. Stalin on additions to Statutes of the
State Political Administration. 10 May 1922. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, l.
92.
5. Letter of F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin on the difficult conditions of GPU
personnel, with letter from V. N. Mantsev appended. 6 July 1922.
RGASPI, f. 76, op. 3, d. 245, ll. 4–5.
6. V. I. Lenin’s proposal for a Politburo directive in connection with N. A.
Semashko’s letter appraising the congress of medical doctors. With a TsK
cover letter. 23 May 1922. AP RF, f. 3. Op. 58. d. 2, ll. 3–4.
7. Note from F. E. Dzerzhinsky to the Politburo of TsK RKP(b), with
attachment of the GPU report about anti-Soviet groupings among the
intelligentsia. 3 June 1922. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 175, ll. 7–12.
8. Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On anti-Soviet groupings among
the intelligentsia. 8 June 1922. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 296, ll. 2–3.
9. Appendix to Politburo session No. 59, 29.III.23. Protocol of meeting,
22.III.23, on the question of measures to struggle against Mensheviks, in
accordance with instructions from the Chair of the GPU, c. Dzerzhinsky.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 59, d. 3, ll. 78–80.

333
334 Documents

10. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK RKP(b) on authority of the GPU. 28
September 1922. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 99–100.
11. Memorandum of N. V. Krylenko to I. V. Stalin on authority of the GPU to
impose extrajudicial sentences. 9 October 1922. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2,
l. 112.
12. Letter from F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin on measures against malicious
speculators. 22 October 1923. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op 1, d. 56, l. 99.
13. Memorandum from F. E. Dzerzhinsky to the Politburo of TsK RKP(b) on
the necessity to strengthen the struggle against banditry. 29 January 1924.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 197, l. 78.
14. G. V. Chicherin’s memorandum to the Politburo of the TsK RKP(b)
concerning c. Dzerzhinsky’s recommendations concerning the struggle
against banditry. 30 January 1924. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 197, l. 80.
15. Memorandum of N. V. Krylenko to the Politburo of the TsK RKP(b)
concerning F. E. Dzerzhinsky’s recommendations on the struggle against
banditry. 1 February 1924. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 197, ll. 79–79ob.
16. Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On the struggle against banditry.
14 February 1924. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 418, l. 3.
17. Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On struggle against thefts in
Moscow. 27 June 1924. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 2, l. 6.
18. Note from N. V. Krylenko to the Politburo TsK RKP(b) about creating
extraordinary courts within the OGPU of the USSR. 1 July 1927. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 58, d. 3, l. 113.
19. Memorandum from I. S. Unshlikht to I. V. Stalin and L. D. Trotsky on
disinformation. 22 December 1922. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 131–32.
20. Statement from M. M. Litvinov to I. V. Stalin regarding the bureau of
disinformation, with cover letter from the TsK RKP(b). 15 January 1923.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 135–36.
21. Letter from I. S. Unshlikht and R. A. Pilliar to I. S. Stalin concerning M. M.
Litvinov’s letter regarding the disinformation bureau. 17 January 1923. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, l. 133.
22. Memorandum from I. S. Unshlikht to I. V. Stalin to concentrate all lines of
intelligence activity in the GPU. 28 March 1923. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2,
l. 140.
23. Memorandum of M. Litvinov to the TsK RKP(b). Late January or early
February 1925. RGASPI, f. 76, op. 3, d. 349, l. 2–2ob.
24. Memorandum, F. Dzerzhinsky to M. Trilisser. February 1925. RGASPI,
f. 76, op. 3, d. 349, ll. 2–2ob.
25. Note from F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin with the suggestion to include
V. R. Menzhinsky on the Board of NKID. 23 May 1925. RGASPI, f. 76,
op. 3, d. 349, l. 3.
26. Memorandum from V. I. Zof to L. D. Trotsky. 15 October 1922. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, l. 117.
27. Memorandum from L. D. Trotsky to F. Dzerzhinsky. 15 October 1922. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 114–15.
28. Memorandum from F. Dzerzhinsky to L. D. Trotsky. 17 October 1922. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 121–22.
 Documents 335

29. Note from L. D. Trotsky to the Secretariat of TsK related to the Morved
case, in connection with F. E. Dzerzhinsky’s answer. 17 October 1922. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 2, ll. 121–22.
30. Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On work of the GPU. 26 October
1922. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 17, l. 4.
31. Memorandum of F. E. Dzerzhinsky to I. V. Stalin on the reasons for not
sending a report on GPU activities for May 1922. 6 July 1922. RGASPI, f.
76, op. 3, d. 253, l. 1.
32. From the decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b) on security of factories
of the military industry. 3 March 1927. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 4 l. 70.
33. Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b) on measures of struggle against
subversive actions. 31 March 1927. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 4, ll. 89,
94–96.
34. Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to V. M. Molotov on hardening punitive
measures in relation to the murder of the plenipotentiary of the USSR to
Poland P. L. Voikov. 8 June 1927. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 71, ll. 2–3.
35. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On measures in connection
with White Guardist actions. 8 June 1927. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 5,
l. 35.
36. Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to V. P. Menzhinsky on tasks of the
OGPU. 23 June 1927. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 71, l. 29.
37. Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b) following c. M[enzhinsky ]’s
information. 30 June 1927. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 5, l. 55.
38. Answer of I. V. Stalin to foreign worker delegates on the role and place of
the GPU in the Soviet state. 5 November 1927.
39. Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b) on the Shakhty case. On arrests of
Germans. 8 March 1928. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 6, ll. 37–38.
40. Special communication from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on the counter-
revolutionary organization in the Donugol system [The Don Basin Coal
Administration]. 12 March 1928. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 328, ll. 20–25.
41. Memorandum from L. M. Kaganovich to I. V. Stalin on investigation of
economic counterrevolution in the Donbass. 26 April 1928. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 329, ll. 28–31.
42. Decision of the Politburo commission of TsK VKP(b). On the Shakhty case.
11 April 1928. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 329, ll. 10–12.
43. Memorandum from Ya. Rudzutak to the Politburo of the TsK (VKP(b) on
purging specialists working in Moscow factories. 1 June 1928. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 332, l. 27.
44. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On specialists. 2 August
1928. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 6, l. 118.
45. Memorandum from I. V. Stalin to members and candidate members of the
Politburo of the TsK VKP(b) on the case of the group of specialists in
military industries. 12 May 1928. AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 170, l. 40.
46. Memorandum from I. V. Stalin to members and candidate members of the
Politburo, TsK secretaries, and members of the TsKK Presidium, with
appended report by the OGPU on wrecking in railroad transport. 16 June
1928. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 372, ll. 25–41.
336 Documents

47. Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On the work of INO OGPU
[Foreign Department of the OGPU]. 5 February 1930. AP RF, f. 3, op. 50,
d. 32, l. 115.
48. Letter from I. V. Stalin to V. R. Menzhinsky on future directions of
testimony of the leaders of the TKP [Labor-Peasant Party] and of the
Promparty [Industrial Party]. October 1930. TsA FSB RF, f. 2, op. 9, d.
388, ll. 270–71.
49. Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On use of the wreckers’ deposi-
tions about intervention. 25 October 1930. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9,
l. 53.
50. Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On the trial of the Promparty. 25
November 1930. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, l. 81.
51. Proposal of the commission on the case of the Promparty. 25 November
1930. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, ll. 81–82.
52. Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On kulak terror. 26 September
1929. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 7, l. 158.
53. Note telegraphed from Tiflis, from S. F. Redens to G. G. Yagoda, with TsK
cover letter to members and candidate members of the Politburo of TsK
VKP(b) and of the Presidium of TsKK. 11 March 1930. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 30, d. 146, ll. 74–77.
54. Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On Ukraine and Belorussia. 15
March 1930. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 193, l. 154a.
55. Note from G. G. Yagoda and G. E. Evdokimov to I. V. Stalin on political
moods in Siberia in connection with collectivization and dekulakization. 20
March 1930. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 147, ll. 117–23.
56. Telegram from M. O. Razumov, first secretary of Tatar Obkom [oblast
committee] of VKP(b) to the Secretariat of TsK VKP(b) regarding peasant
riots. 22 March 1930. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 146, ll. 124–25.
57. Report from G. G. Yagoda and E. G. Evdokimov on counterrevolutionary
activity in the Didoevsk District of Andiisk Okrug, Dagestan. 4 April 1930.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 147, ll. 15–17.
58. Coded telegram from M. M. Malinov to I. V. Stalin regarding mass peasant
demonstrations. 1 March 1931. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 200, l. 132.
59. Decision of the Politburo of TsK RKP(b). On increasing the number of
OGPU employees. 10 August 1930. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 9, ll. 16, 20.
60. Regarding kulaks. (PB from 11. III.31, protocol No. 29, point 2/6-c). (cc.
Andreev, Yagoda, Postyshev.) 25 March 1931. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d.
9, l. 174, 176–78.
61. Special report from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on completion of kulak
exile operation. 15 October 1931. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 195, l. 163.
62. Report of V. M. Burmistrov to Commissar of Justice, Siberian Territory,
Yanson. 7 January 1930. GANO, f. 47, op. 5, d. 104, l. 10.
63. Extract of report of the USSR Procuracy to the Presidium of TsIK [Central
Executive Committee] USSR on supervision of the OGPU for 1931. 20
December 1931. GARF, f. 8131, op. 37, d. 20, ll. 50–51.
64. Protocol of the Andreev Commission from 15 May 1931, on organization
of a Spetspereselenie Administration, and on productive use of special
settlers. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 10, ll. 46, 51–54.
 Documents 337

65. Regarding a special plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in Ukraine.

25 November 1932. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 907, l. 20.
66. Sabotage of grain collection in Orekhovo region of Ukraine. 7 December
1932. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 380, ll. 94–97.
67. Special communication from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on operations to
cleanse areas along the western border of the USSR. 26 March 1933. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 201, ll. 75–87.
68. Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda on cadre conditions of the GUGB
NKVD and cadre dynamics for the period 1.VII.31 to 1.I.35. GARF, f.
9401, op. 8, d. 41, ll. 11–37.
69. Letter of I. V. Stalin to L. Kaganovich. 4 August 1932. RGASPI, f. 17, op.
3, d. 896, l. 260.
70. V. R. Menzhinsky’s report to I. V. Stalin on the struggle against hooligan-
ism, homeless children, and theft on transportation. 31 August 1932. TsA
FSB RF, f. 2, op. 10, d. 145, ll. 3–7.
71. Extract of letter from I. V. Stalin to L Kaganovich, 15 July 1932.
72. Instructions on implementing the law on protection of socialist property
(PB from 8.IX.32, pr[otocol]. No. 115, p[oint]. 5). 16 September 1932. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 57, d. 60, ll. 13–.
73. Memorandum of G. E. Prokof’ev and L. G. Mironov to I. V. Stalin on the
number of those prosecuted by the OGPU for theft of public property. 20
March 1933. AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 171, ll. 87–89.
74. TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR directive on prevention of mass departure of
starving peasants. 22 January 1933. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 45, ll.
109–109ob.
75. Report of G. E. Prokof’ev to I. V. Stalin on measures taken in the struggle
against mass departures from Ukraine and SKK [North Caucasus], with
attached notes by V. A. Balitsky and E. G. Evdokimov. 23 January 1933.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 189, ll. 3–10.
76. Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on results of operational
measures to curb mass flight of peasants. 17 February 1933. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 30, d. 189, ll. 36–37.
77. Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda and M. D. Berman to I. V. Stalin on the
organization of special settlements. 13 February 1933. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30,
d. 196, ll. 127–38.
78. Directive-instructions of the TsK VKP(b) and SNK USSR on cessation of
mass exile of peasants, regulating arrests, and reducing prison populations.
8 May 1933. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 196, ll. 163–163ob.
79. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). 20 March 1933. RGASPI,
f. 17, op. 162, d. 14, l. 96.
80. Memorandum from N. I. Krylenko to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, D. E.
Sulimov, G. G. Yagoda, and A. Ya. Vyshinsky on the illegality of OGPU
instructions. 14 July 1933. AP RF, f. 3, op. 57, d. 60, l. 55.
81. OGPU circular on organizational and operational measures in connection
with passportization. 21 May 1933. GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 137,
document 46 (l. 200).
82. OGPU Order No. 009. On Chekist measures to introduce the passport
system. 5 January 1933. GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 137, doc. 1.
338 Documents

83. OGPU circular on the use of measures of extrajudicial repression in

relation to citizens violating the law on passportization of the population.
13 August 1933. GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 137, ll. 202–4.
84. Memorandum from G. E. Prokof’ev and L. G. Mironov to I. V. Stalin on
the number of those “brought in” [subjected to privod] for speculation, as
of 1 April, by OGPU organs. 2 April 1933. AP RF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 171, l.
90.
85. Decision of the Politburo TsK VKP(b). On the struggle against criminal and
déclassé elements in the city of Moscow. 20 January 1934. RGASPI, f. 17,
op. 162, d. 15, l. 161.
86. Decision of the Politburo TsK VKB(b). On deportation from Kharkov
Oblast of the déclassé element. 20 January 1934. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162,
d. 15, l. 164.
87. Decision of the Politburo TsK VKP(b). On measures of struggle against
hooliganism and train wrecks on railroads. 9 June 1934. RGASPI, f. 17,
op. 3, d. 946, l. 65.
88. Memorandum from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin requesting confirmation of
the statute of the NKVD USSR and the Special Board. 24 August 1934. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 4, ll. 60–77.
89. Report from St. Kosior to I. V. Stalin on strengthening border zones. 23
December 1934. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 130, ll. 162–66.
90. Report from P. P. Postyshev to I. V. Stalin on the need to resettle counter-
revolutionary elements. 31 July 1935. AP RF f. 3, op. 58, d. 131,
ll. 106–7.
91. Note from G. G. Yagoda and A. Ya. Vyshinsky to Stalin. 20 April 1935.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 158, l. 150. Published in Istochnik 6/1997, p. 109.
92. NKVD Order 00192: Instructions to NKVD troikas for reviewing cases of
criminals and déclassé elements, and on malicious violations of passport
laws. 9 May 1935. GARF, f. 8131, op. 38, d. 6, ll. 62–64.
93. From a circular letter of the NKVD USSR to all local organs of the
Commissariat. January 1935. AP RF f. 3, op. 58, d. 51, ll. 15, 18, 19.
94. Special report from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin regarding a counterrevolu-
tionary group in the Kremlin. 20 January 1935. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 231,
ll. 1, 14.
95. Note from Ya. S. Agranov to I. V. Stalin regarding more arrests among
personnel in the Kremlin. 2 February 1935. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 231, ll.
15–17.
96. Report from G. G. Yagoda to I. V. Stalin on the course of investigation of
the Kremlin case. 5 February 1935. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 231, ll. 22–26.
97. Letter of Ya. S. Agranov to I. V. Stalin with appended protocol of interro-
gation of L. B. Kamenev (Kremlin case). 21 March 1935. AP RF, f. 3, op.
58, d. 234, l. 1.
98. Protocol of interrogation of Kamenev, Lev Borisovich, from 20 March
1935. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 234, ll. 1–6.
99. Decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b). On the apparatus of TsIK USSR
and c. Enukidze. 3 April 1935. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 234, ll. 47–53.
100. Report of L. G. Mironov to I. V. Stalin and N. I. Yezhov about results of
operational actions of the Tatar Republic UNKVD in connection with
 Documents 339

verification of Party documents [membership cards]. 15 February 1936.

TsA FSB RF, f. 3, op. 3, d. 62, ll. 144–76.
101. Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to members of the Politburo of TsK of
VKP(b) on appointment of N. Yezhov as Commissar of Internal Affairs.
25 September 1936.
102. Decision of the Politburo of Tsk VKP(b). On deprivation of decorations of
former executives of the Narkomat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. 1 June
1937. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 987, ll. 100–101.
103. Memorandum of M. P. Frinovsky to I. V. Stalin on V. A. Balitsky’s
statement. 21 July 1937. AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 316, ll. 8–12.
104. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On anti-Soviet elements.
2 July 1937. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 32.
105. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On anti-Soviet elements.
5 July 1937. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 33.
106. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On anti-Soviet elements.
9 July 1937. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 34.
107. Report of S. N. Mironov, Head of the UNKVD [local NKVD administra-
tion] of the West-Siberian Territory to the kraikom VKP(b). On the case of
a S-R [Socialist-Revolutionary]-monarchist conspiracy in Western Siberia.
17 June 1937. GANO, f. R-4, op. 34, d. 26, ll. 1–3.
108. Coded telegram from A. S. Zimin to I. V. Stalin on “insurgency” groups in
Yaroslavl Oblast. 16 July 1937. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 65, l. 53.
109. Memorandum from M. I. Frinovsky to the Politburo TsK VKP(b) with
appended Operational Order NKVD USSR No. 00447. 30 July 1937. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, ll. 55, 59–78.
110. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK (VKPb). On the question of the
NKVD. 31 July 1937. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, ll. 52–54.
111. Coded telegram from G. F. Gorbach to N. I. Yezhov on increasing the
limit for the “kulak” operation in Omsk Oblast. 15 August 1937. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 87b.
112. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On the NKVD, with
appended draft for Operational Order No. 00593. 19 September 1937.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 254, ll. 223–28.
113. Report of January 26 1938 from Procuracy transport investigator of the
5th Kirov railroad, Vorob’ev, to Deputy Procurator of the Kirov railroad,
Shapiro. GARF, f. 8131, op. 37, d. 69, ll. 8–10, 114.
114. Memorandum from I. V. Stalin to N. I. Yezhov concerning SRs. 17
January 1938. AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 330, l. 18.
115. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On anti-Soviet elements. 31
January 1938. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, ll. 155–56.
116. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On continuing repression
among populations according to their nationality. 31 January 1938. AP
RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 254a, l. 90.
117. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On refugees. 31 January
1938. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 6, l. 53.
118. Coded telegram from Ia. A. Popok to I. V. Stalin regarding an additional
limit for review of cases of anti-Soviet elements. 2 February 1938.
RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 65, l. 108.
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119. Coded telegram from Iu. M. Kaganovich to I. V. Stalin and N. I. Yezhov

on increasing the limit for Gorky Oblast. 4 February 1938. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 212, l. 158.
120. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On the question of the
NKVD. 17 February 1938. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 161.
121. Special communication from N. I. Yezhov to I. V. Stalin with appended
copy of telegram by S. I. Lebedev on progress of the foreign nationalities
operations. 24 March 1938. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 254, ll. 200–205.
122. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On the question of the
NKVD. 26 May 1938. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, l. 177.
123. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On arrests, procuratorial
supervision, and the conduct of investigations. 17 November 1938.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1003, ll. 85–87.
124. Letter from N. I. Yezhov to the Politburo TsK VKP(b) [and to] I. V.
Stalin. 23 November 1938. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1003, ll. 82–84.
125. Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to Party organ leaders on the unsatisfac-
tory situation in the NKVD. 25 November 1938. RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11,
d. 58, l. 61.
126. I. V. Stalin’s note to A. Ya. Vyshinsky on organizing public trials of
NKVD officials. 3 January 1939. AP RF, f. 3, op. 57, d. 96, l. 110.
127. From the decision of Politburo TsK VKP(b) on the work of the Bashkir
Obkom [Oblast Committee] of the VKP(b). 9 January 1939. RGASPI, f.
17, op. 3, d. 1005, ll. 12–13.
128. Coded telegram from I. V. Stalin to secretaries of obkoms, kraikoms and
to the leadership of the NKVD-UNKVD [local NKVD administrations] on
using measures of physical coercion in relation to “enemies of the people.”
10 January 1939. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 6, ll. 145–46.
129. Special communication from L. P. Beria and A. Ya. Vyshinsky to I. V.
Stalin on removal of criminal records of those people who had been
convicted by extrajudicial organs of the NKVD USSR, with appended
draft of the decree of the Supreme Council of the USSR. 5 February 1939.
AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 212, ll. 207–9.
130. Special communication from L. P. Beria, A. Ya. Vyshinsky and N. M.
Rychkov [Commissar of Justice] to I. V. Stalin, with a draft order
appended about implementation of the decision of SNK USSR and TsK
VKP(b) of 17 November 1938, on arrests, procuratorial supervision, and
conducting investigations. 21 February 1939. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 6, ll.
172–75.
131. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On bringing to trial
members of the Right-Trotskyist organization. 16 February 1939. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 24, d. 373, l. 1.
132. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On conviction of counter-
revolutionary elements. 8 April 1939. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 25, l. 7.
133. Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin with appended
statement by L. S. Frinovsky. 13 April 1939. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d.
1009, l. 34.
134. Memorandum from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin regarding N. I. Yezhov, with
appended protocol of interrogation. 27 April 1939. AP RF, f. 3, op. 24,
d. 375, ll. 122–64.
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135. Note from A. Ya. Vyshinsky to I. V. Stalin on violations of arrest proce-

dures. 31 May 1939. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 6, l. 185.
136. Note of A. Ya. Vyshinsky to I. V. Stalin regarding the Special Board of the
NKVD USSR. 31 May 1939. RGANI, f. 89, op. 18, d. 2, l. 1.
137. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On camps of the NKVD
USSR. 10 June 1939. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 25, ll. 54–55.
138. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On securing a labor force for
work carried out by the NKVD USSR in 1939. 16 June 1939.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1011, l. 4.
139. Circular of NKVD USSR, the Procuracy of the USSR, and Narkomiust
USSR on investigative work. 25 July 1939. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 7,
ll. 18–.
140. Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on results of the
operation to remove osadniki and forest guards from the western oblasts
of Ukraine and Belorussia. 12 February 1940. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 199,
ll. 50–51.
141. From the decision of the Politburo of TsK VKP(b) on resettlement of citizens
of foreign nationalities from the city of Murmansk and the Murmansk
Oblast. 23 June 1940. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 27, ll. 166–67.
142. Report of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on imprisoned Polish military and police
personnel. 5 March 1940. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 166, d. 621, ll. 130–33.
143. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On removal of counterrevo-
lutionary organizations in the western oblasts of the UkSSR. 14 May
1941. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 34, l. 156.
144. Special communication from V. N. Merkulov [then head of the NKGB] to
I. V. Stalin regarding the results of the operation to arrest and remove
“anti-Soviet” elements from the western oblasts of Belorussia. 21 June
1941. RGANI, f. 89, op. 18, d. 7, ll. 1–3.
145. Draft of a decision of TsK VKP(b) on reorganization of the Commissariat
of Internal Affairs of the USSR. January 1941. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 163,
d. 1295, ll. 103–6, 109.
146. Resolution of the GKO [State Committee of Defense] approving the
operational and administrative charter of the GUKR [Main Administra-
tion of Counterintelligence] “Smersh” of the NKO [People’s Commissariat
of Defense] USSR. 21 April 1943.
147. Report of S. R. Milshtein to L. P. Beria on the number of arrested and
executed military personnel who were separated from their units and fled
from the front. October 1941. RGANI, f. 89, op. 18, d. 8, ll. 1–3.
148. Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin with appended draft of
a decision of the SNK USSR and TsK VKP(b) about procedures for
resettling Germans from the Republic of Germans of the Volga Region,
Saratov Oblast, and Stalingrad Oblast. 25 August 1941. AP RF, f. 3,
op. 58, d. 178, ll. 6–9.
149. Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov on
conducting the resettlement operation of people of the Kalmyk national-
ity. 3 January 1944. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch [secret section], op. 2, d. 64, l. 1.
150. Telegram of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin regarding preparations for the
eviction of Chechens and Ingush. 17 February 1944. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch,
op. 2, d. 64, l. 167.
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151. Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, and

G. M. Malenkov regarding work of operational-Chekist groups in
cleansing the Crimean ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]. 1
May 1944. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 64, ll. 385–89.
152. Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on the expediency
of removing Bulgarians, Greeks, and Armenians from the territory of
Crimea. 29 May 1944. GARF, f. 9401s, op. 2, d. 65, ll. 161–63.
153. Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on removal of
spetspereselentsy [special resettlers] from the Crimea. 4 July 1944. GARF,
f. 9401s, op. 2, d. 65, l. 275.
154. Special communication of L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, and
G. M. Malenkov on the conduct of Chekist-military operations to
liquidate armed groups of the OUN. 5 August 1944. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch,
op. 2, d. 66, ll. 130–31.
155. Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, and
G. M. Malenkov on the struggle against the “anti-Soviet” underground in
the Belorussian SSR. 12 December 1944. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 68,
ll. 103–7.
156. Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov,
and G. M. Malenkov on results of work to liquidate bandit formations in
1944. 14 March 1945. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 94, ll. 39–40.
157. Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on cleansing the
rear area of Red Army operations. 17 April 1945. RGANI, f. 89, op. 75,
d. 5, ll. 1–3.
158. Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov,
and G. M. Malenkov on the work of filtration points for Soviet citizens.
2 January 1945. GARF, f. 9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 92, ll. 6–8.
159. Special communication from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov,
and G. M. Malenkov on the course of struggle against an armed under-
ground in the western oblasts of Belorussia. 17 September 1945. GARF, f.
9401 s/ch, op. 2, d. 99, ll. 167–69.
160. Liquidation of anti-Soviet nationalist organizations and gangs linked to
them, as well as of others of the anti-Soviet element, on the territory of the
Western Oblast of Ukraine SSR, 1944–47. GARF, f. 9478, op. 1, d. 764
ll. 1–15.
161. From a special communication of V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin on the
work of state security organs of the UkSSR to liquidate anti-Soviet church-
sectarian groups. 30 November 1950. TsA FSB RF, f. 4os, op. 8,
d. 11, ll. 354–62.
162. Decision of Politburo TsK VKP(b). On organizing trials of American
and English agents. 23 October 1950. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 44,
l. 132.
163. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On assistance to organs of
state security of the People’s Republic of China. 6 November 1950.
RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 44, l. 138.
164. Decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On sending MGB advisers
to Czechoslovakia. 21 December 1950. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 45,
l. 16.
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165. Special communication from V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin on arrests in

the city of Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast. 14 January 1950. TsA
FSB RF, f. 4os, op. 8, d. 1, l. 124.
166. Special communication from V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin on the need
for expulsion of the unreliable element from the city of Leningrad and the
Leningrad Oblast. 14 January 1950. TsA FSB RF, f. 4os, op. 8, d. 1.
125–27.
167. From special communication from V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin on
replacement of UMGB officials of the Leningrad Oblast. 10 January 1950.
TsA FSB RF, f. 4os, op. 8, d. 1, ll. 61–62.
168. Special communication from S. D. Ignat’ev to I. V. Stalin on preparations
for the operation of removing hostile elements from Georgia. 27 Novem-
ber 1951. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 179, ll. 93–97.
169. Decision of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on
dissolution of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. 21 November 1948.
RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 183, l. 51.
170. Note from M. F. Shkiryatov and V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin regarding
P. S. Zhemchuzhina. 27 December 1948. RGASPI, f. 589, op. 3, d. 6188,
ll. 25–31.
171. Special communication from S. D. Ignat’ev to I. V. Stalin on an agent-
parachutist, F. K. Sarantsev. 11 September 1951. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58,
d. 263, ll. 62–63.
172. Decision of Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). On search for and detention of
agents-parachutists. 11 November 1951. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 47,
ll. 18, 118–.
173. Special communication from V. S. Abakumov to I. V. Stalin on arrests of
Russian emigrants in China. 16 November 1950. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58,
d. 285, l. 90.
174. Statement of a senior inspector of the MGB USSR, M. D. Riumin, to
I. V. Stalin. 2 July 1951. AP RF, f. 3, op, 58, d. 216, ll. 8–11.
175. Decision of TsK VKP(b). On shortcomings in the Ministry of State
Security of the USSR. 11 July 1951. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 216, ll. 2–7.
176. From the decision of the TsK KPSS [Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
replacing VKP(b)] on the situation in the MGB. 4 December 1952. AP RF,
f. 3, op. 22, d. 12, ll. 6–7.
177. Special communication from S. Ignat’ev to I. V. Stalin, with appended
draft of the indictment in the case of Abakumov-Shvartsman. 17 February
1953. AP RF f 3, op. 58, d. 222, ll. 203–43.
This page intentionally left blank
 Notes

introduction
1. Stuart Finkel, “An Intensification of Vigilance: Recent Perspectives on the Insti-
tutional History of the Soviet Security Apparatus in the 1920s,” Kritika: Explo-
rations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 299–320.
2. For example, V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, Lubianka:
Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, ianvar’ 1932–dekabr’ 1936 (Moscow,
2004).
3. There is a limited but rich literature on the history of the Cheka and the So-
viet political and security police. On the Cheka, see: O. I. Kapchinskii,
“VChK: Organizatsionnaia struktura i kadrovyi sostav, 1917–1922” (Candi-
date diss., Moscow State Pedagogical University, 2005); George Leggett, The
Cheka: Lenin’s Political Police (New York, 1986); S. P. Mel’gunov, Krasnyi
terror v Rossii, 1918–1923 (Moscow, 1990), translated as The Red Terror in
Russia (London, 1995); A. A. Plekhanov and A. M. Plekhanov, Vserossiiskaia
chrezvychainaia komissiia SNK (7 (20) dekabria 1917–6 fevralia 1922): Krat-
kii spravochnik (Moscow, 2011); Igor Simbirtsev, VChK v leninskoi Rossii,
1917–1922 (Moscow, 2008); V. Vinogradov and N. Peremyshlennikova, eds.,
Arkhiv VChK: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 2007); M. A. Iakovlev, MChK:
Moskovskaia chrezvychainaia komissiia (Moscow, 2011). For the most com-
prehensive history of the Soviet political police, see V. M. Chebrikov, Istoriia
Sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti: Uchebnik (Moscow,
1977); O. I. Cherdakov, Formirovanie pravookhranitel’noi sistemy Sovetsk-
ogo gosudarstva v 1917–1936 gg.: Istoriko-pravovoe issledovanie (Saratov,
2001); Paul Gregory, Terror by Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin (an
Archival Study) (New Haven, 2009); V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N.
S. Plotnikova, Lubianka, Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, ianvar’ 1922–
dekabr’ 1936 (Moscow, 2003); V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S.
Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i Glavnoe upravlenie gosbezopastnosti NKVD.
Arkhiv Stalina. Dokumenty vysshikh organov partiinoi i gosudarstvennoi

345
346 Notes to Pages 3–4

vlasti, 1937–1938 (Moscow, 2004); V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S.

Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i NKVD-NKGB-GUKR “Smersh,” 1939–mart
1946 (Moscow, 2006); V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova,
Lubianka: Stalin i MGB SSSR, mart 1946–mart 1953. Dokumenty (Moscow,
2007); V. S. Izmozik, Glaza i ushi rezhima: Gosudarstvennyi politicheskii
kontrol za naseleniem Sovetskoi Rossii v 1918–1928 godakh (Moscow,
1995); O. B. Mozokhin, Pravo na repressii: Vnesudebnie polnomochiia or-
ganov gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti. Statisticheskie svedeniia o deiatel’nosti
VChK-OGPU-NKVD-MGB SSSR, 1918–1953 (Moscow, 2011); Michael
Parrish, The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939–1953 (Westport,
1996); L. P. Rasskazov, Karatel’nye organy v protsesse formirovaniia
administrativno-komandnoi sistemy v Sovetskom gosudarstve, 1917–1941
gg. (Ufa, 1994); Nicolas Werth and Alexis Berelowitch, L’État soviétique con-
tre les paysans: Rapports secrets de la police politique. Tcheka, GPU, NKVD,
1918–1939 (Paris, 2011). For a major collection in Ukrainian, see Iurii
Shapoval, Volodymyr Prystaiko, and Vadym Zolotar’ov, ChK—HPU—
NKVD v Ukraïni: Osoby, fakty, dokumenty (Kiev, 1997).
4. Donald Rayfield, “The Exquisite Inquisitor: Viacheslav Menzhinsky as Poet
and Hangman,” Slavonic Journeys Across Two Hemispheres: Festschrift in
Honour of Arnold McMillin, special issue of New Zealand Slavonic Journal
37 (2003): 91–109.
5. For biographies of the various heads of the political police and state security
forces see: Donald Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those
Who Killed for Him (New York, 2005); Nikita Petrov and Marc Jansen,
Stalin’s Loyal Executioner: People’s Commissar Nikolai Ezhov, 1895–1940
(Stanford, 2002); Michael Parrish, The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security,
1939–1953 (New York, 1996); J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, Yezhov:
The Rise of Stalin’s “Iron Fist” (New Haven, 2008); Amy Knight, Beria:
Stalin’s First Lieutenant (New Brunswick, 1993); A. N. Iakovlev, ed., Lavren-
tii Beriia: 1953 g. Stenogramma iul’skogo plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie doku-
menty (Moscow, 1999); B. V. Sokolov, Beriia: Sud’ba vsesil’nogo narkoma
(Moscow, 2011); N. V. Petrov and K. V. Skorkin, Kto rukovodil NKVD,
1934–1941: Spravochnik (Moscow, 1999).
6. OGPU was the name of the political police until late 1934, when it was in-
corporated into the Commissariat of the Interior, the NKVD. On collectiviza-
tion, see the monumental document collection V. Danilov, R. Manning, and
L. Viola, eds., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizatsiia i razkulachivanie.
Dokumenty i materialy v 5 tomakh, 1927–1939, 5 vols. in 6 (Moscow, 1999–
2004). In English, the most comprehensive account of collectivization is in
Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin: Collectivization and the Culture of
Resistance (New York, 1996), and Lynne Viola, V. P. Danilov, et al., The War
Against the Peasantry, 1927–1930 (New Haven, 2005). See also R. W. Da-
vies, The Socialist Offensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture,
1929–1930 (Cambridge, 1980); R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft,
The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933 (London, 2004); Moshe
Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the History of Interwar
Russia, especially pt. 2, “Collectivization—Or Something Else?” (New York,
1985), 91–190. For the role of the OGPU during collectivization, see also
 Notes to Pages 5–7 347

Lynne Viola, “The Role of the OGPU in Dekulakization, Mass Deportations,

and Special Settlements in 1930,” The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East
European Studies, No. 1406 (Pittsburgh, 2000).
7. Histories of repression and political police under Stalin usually overlook the
social order policing campaigns of the 1930s, perhaps because these cam-
paigns were not overtly political, Robert Conquest, for example, leaves out
social order policing in his two studies of Stalinist repression. The Great Ter-
ror: A Reassessment (New York, 1990). More recent studies by J. Arch Getty
and Oleg Naumov also pass over such repression. J. Arch Getty and Oleg
Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolshe-
viks, 1932–1939 (New Haven, 1999), and J. Arch Getty, “ ‘Excesses Are Not
Permitted’: Mass Terror and Stalinist Governance in the Late 1930s,” Rus-
sian Review 61 (January 2002): 113–38. For exceptions, see the brief discus-
sions of repression of social marginals in V. N. Zemskov, Spetsposelentsy v
SSSR, 1930–1960 (Moscow, 2003), 45–46, and N. Vert and S. V. Mironenko,
eds., Istoriia stalinskogo Gulaga: Konets 1920-kh–pervaia polovina 1950-kh
godov: Sobranie dokumentov v 7-mi tomakh, vol. 1: Massovye repressii v
SSSR (Moscow, 2004), 68–69. For more extensive coverage, see Paul Hagen-
loh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926–
1941 (Washington, DC, 2009), “ ‘Socially Harmful Elements’ and the Great
Terror,” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (London, 2000),
286–308, and “ ‘Chekist in Essence, Chekist in Spirit’: Regular and Political
Police in the 1930s,” Cahiers du Monde russe 42, nos. 2–4 (April–December
2001): 447–76; Gabor Rittersporn, “Vrednye elementy, ‘opasnye men’shinstva’
i bol’shevistskie trevogi,” in V sem’e edinoi: Natsional’naia politika partii
bol’shevikov i ee osushchestvlenie na Severo-Zapade Rossii v 1920–1950-e
gody. Sbornik statei, ed. Timo Vihavainen and Irina Takala (Petrozavodsk,
1998), 101–19; David Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Social Order and
Mass Repression in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953. (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2009), “Social Disorder, Mass Repression, and the NKVD
during the 1930s,” Cahiers du Monde russe 42, nos. 2–4 (April–December
2001): 505–34, and “Crime and Social Disorder in Stalin’s Russia: A Reas-
sessment of the Great Retreat and the Origins of Mass Repression,” Cahiers
du Monde russe 39/1–2 (1998): 119–48.
8. Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police; Gabor Rittersporn, Stalinist Simplifications and
Soviet Complications: Social Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR,
1933–1953 (New York, 1991); Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism.
9. On the role of ideology and the change in views of deviance from the 1920s to
the 1930s, see, especially, David L. Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural
Norms of Stalinist Modernity, 1917–1941 (Ithaca, 2003), 177–78; David
Priestland, Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power, and
Terror in Inter-war Russia (Oxford, 2007). For an overview of Stalin’s social-
ist offensive, see, especially, R. W. Davies, The Socialist Offensive: The
Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930 (Cambridge, 1980), and
Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, 1998).
10. On militarization of police forces in general in European states after World
War I, see Gerald Blaney Jr., ed., Policing Interwar Europe: Continuity,
Changing, and Crisis, 1918–1940 (Basingstoke, 2007), 3–7.
348 Notes to Pages 7–11

11. Neither the civil nor the political police under Stalin were subordinated to the
military, as were most gendarme forces during the nineteenth century, and the
civil police, at least, did not live in barracks. Many units of the Soviet political
police, and especially the units of the internal forces, did live in barracks, and
were organized by military rank. Both the civil and the political police under
Stalin were subordinated to military law and discipline. On Western Euro-
pean gendarme forces, see Clive Emsley, Gendarmes and the State in
Nineteenth-Century Europe (Oxford, 1999); Herbert Reinke, “ ‘Armed as if
for War’: The State, the Military, and the Professionalisation of the Prussian
Police in Imperial Germany” in Policing Western Europe: Politics, Profes-
sionalism, and Public Order, 1850–1940, ed. Clive Emsley and Barbara
Weinberger (New York, 1991), 55–73; David H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing:
A Comparative International Analysis (New Brunswick, 1985); Howard C.
Payne, The Police State of Napoleon Bonaparte, 1851–1860 (Seattle, 1966).
On the Russian gendarmerie, see V. S. Izmozik, Zhandarmy Rossii (St. Peters-
burg, 2002); Z. I. Peregudova, Politicheskii sysk Rossii, 1880–1917 (Mos-
cow, 2000); E. I. Shcherbakova, Politicheskaia politsiia i politicheskii terror-
izm v Rossii (vtoraia polovina XIX–nachalo XX vv) (Moscow, 2001); M. I.
Siznikov, A. V. Borisov, and A. E. Skripilev, Istoriia politsii Rossii (1718–
1917) (Moscow, 1992); E. P. Sichinskii, ed., Istoriia pravokhranitel’nykh
organov Rossii: Sbornik nauchnykh trudov (Cheliabinsk, 2000).
12. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, 821 n. 159.
13. Leonid Naumov, Bor’ba v rukovodstve NKVD v 1936–1938 gg.: Oprichnyi
dvor Iosifa Groznogo (Moscow, 2006); Rayfield, Stalin’s Hangmen, 281–89.
14. Terry Martin, An Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the
Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca, 2001).
15. Shearer, “Social Disorder.” See also Hiroaki Kuromiya, “Accounting for the
‘Great Terror,’ ” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 53, no. 1 (January
2005): 86–101, and Getty, “ ‘Excesses Are Not Permitted.’ ”
16. Oleg Khlevniuk, “Prichiny ‘Bol’shogo Terrora’: Vneshnepoliticheskii aspekt”
(unpublished manuscript), and “The Reasons for the ‘Great Terror’: The
Foreign-Political Aspect,” in Russia in the Age of Wars, 1914–1945, ed.
S. Pons and A. Romano (Milan, 2000), 159–69. Based on his review of cur-
rent literature, Kuromiya agrees with this assessment, “Accounting for the
‘Great Terror,’ ” 87.
17. For works focused primarily on the mass purges of 1937 and 1938, see:
Andrei Artizov et al., Reabilitatsiia: Kak eto bylo. Dokumenty prezidiuma
TsK KPSS i drugie materialy, 3 vols. (Moscow, 2000); E. A. Bakirov et al.,
Butovskii poligon, 1937–1938: Kniga pamiati zhertv politicheskikh represii,
8 vols. (Moscow, 1997–2003); Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reas-
sessment (New York, 2007); Mark Iunge and Rol’f Binner, Kak terror stal
‘bol’shim’: Sekretnyi prikaz No. 00447 i tekhnologiia ego ispolneniia (Mos-
cow, 2003); Mark Iunge, Gennadii Bordiugov, and Rol’f Binner, Vertikal’
bol’shogo terror (Moscow, 2008): Mark Iunge, Cherez trupy vraga na blago
naroda: “Kulatskaia operatsiia” v Ukrainskoi SSR, 1937–1941, 2 vols. (Mos-
cow, 2010); Mark Iunge, G. Zhdanov, V. Razgon, and Rol’f Binner, Massovye
repressii v Altaiskom krae, 1937–1938 gg: Prikaz 00447 (Moscow, 2010);
V. A. Ivanov, “Mekhanizm massovykh represii v sovetskoi Rossii v kontse
 Notes to Pages 11–13 349

20-kh–40kh gg.” (Doctoral diss., Sankt-Peterburgskaia Akademiia MVD,

Rossii, St. Petersburg, 1998); V. N. Khaustov and Lennart Samuel’son, Stalin,
NKVD, i repressii, 1936–1938 gg (Moscow, 2009); Leonid Naumov, Stalin i
NKVD (Moscow, 2010); Hiroaki Kuromiya, The Voices of the Dead: Stalin’s
Great Terror in the 1930s (New Haven, 2007); Barry McLoughlin and Kevin
McDermott, eds., Stalin’s Terror: High Politics and Mass Repression in the
Soviet Union (London, 2003); Vadim Z. Rogovin, Stalin’s Terror of 1937–
1938: Political Genocide in the USSR (Oak Park, 2009); Karl Schlögel, Ter-
ror und Traum: Moskau 1937 (Munich, 2008), translated as Moscow 1937
(Cambridge, 2012); Sergei Tepliakov, Mashina terrora: OGPU-NKVD Sibiri
v 1929–1941 gg. (Moscow, 2008); Aleksandr Vatlin, Terror raionnogo
masshtaba: Massovye operatsii NKVD v Kuntsevskom raione Moskovskoi
oblasti 1937–1938 gg. (Moscow, 2004); Vert and Mironenko, Istoriia stalin-
skogo gulaga, vol. 1; Nicolas Werth, “Les ‘opérations de masse’ de la ‘Grande
Terreur’ en URSS, 1937–1938,” Bulletin de l’Institut d’histoire du temps
présent 86 (2006): 6–167; V. N. Khaustov, N. V. Naumov, and N. S. Plot-
nikova, Lubianka: Stalin i Glavnoe upravlenie gosbezopasnosti NKVD,
1937–1938 (Moscow, 2004).
18. I. I. Alekseenko, Repressii na Kubani i na Severnom Kavkaze v 30-e gg. XX
veka (Krasnodar, 1993); K. Chomaev, Nakazannyi narod (Cherkessk, 1993);
A. E. Gur’ianov, ed., Repressii protiv poliakov i pol’skikh grazhdan (Moscow,
1997); V. N. Nikol’skii, A. N. But, et al., Kniga pamiati grekov Ukrainy (Do-
netsk, 2005); Pavel Polian, Ne po svoei vole: Istoriia i geografiia prinuditel’nykh
migratsii v SSSR (Moscow, 2001); J. Critchlow, Repressirovannye narody
Sovetskogo Soiuza: Nasledie stalinskikh deportatsii. Otchet Khel’sinkskoi
gruppoi po pravam cheloveka, Sentiabr’ 1991 (Moscow, 1991); I. L.
Shcherbakova, ed., Nakazannyi narod: Repressii protiv rossiiskikh nemtsev
(Moscow, 1999).
19. For general works, see Andres Küng, Communism and Crimes against Hu-
manity in the Baltic States (Stockholm, 1999); Elena Zubkova, Pribaltika i
kreml’ (Moscow, 2008).
20. On Soviet nationality deportations, see: N. F. Bugai, Deportatsiia narodov
Kryma (Moscow, 2002), and Deportatsiia narodov Rossii: Chechentsy i in-
gushi (Moscow, 1994); Materialy k serii “Narody i kultury,” no. 12: Depor-
tatsiia narodov v SSSR, 1930–1950-e gody (Moscow, 1992); N. F. Bugai,
Ssylka kalmykov: Kak eto bylo (Moscow, 1993), and L. Beriia–I. Stalinu:
“Soglasno vashemy ukazaniiu” (Moscow, 1995); N. F. Bugai, T. M. Broev,
and R. M. Broev, Sovetskie kurdy: Vremia peremen (Moscow, 1993); A. M.
Gonov, Kavkaz: Narody v eshelonakh: 20–60-e gody (Moscow, 1998); A. N.
Iakovlev, Stalinskie deportatsii 1928–1953 (Moscow, 2005). On the Katyn
massacres, see: Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Ma-
terski, eds., Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment (New Haven, 2007); Stan-
islaw Swianiewicz, In the Shadow of Katyn, trans. and annotated by Witold
Swianiewicz (Pender Island, BC, 2002), originally published as W cieniu
Katynia (Paris, 1976); Polish Cultural Foundation, The Crime of Katyn: Facts
and Documents (London, 1989); Natalia S. Lebedeva, Katyn: Prestuplenie
protiv chelovechstva (Moscow, 1994); Rudolf G. Pikhoia, Natalia S. Lebede-
va, Aleksander Gieysztor, Wojciech Materski, et al., eds., Katyn: Plenniki
350 Notes to Pages 14–18

nieob’iavlennoi voiny (Moscow, 1997); Allen Paul, Katyn: Stalin’s Massacre

and the Triumph of Truth (Chicago, 2010); George Sanford, Katyn and the
Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory (London, 2005); J. K.
Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre (Notre
Dame, 1962). For the original German investigation of the Katyn site, see
Deutsche Informationsstelle, Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von
Katyn (Berlin, 1943).
21. On the borderland wars, see A. N. Artizov et al, eds., Ukrainskie natsional-
isticheskie organizatsii v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny, 1939–1945, 2 vols.
(Moscow, 2012); Aleksandr E. Gur’ianov, ed., Repressii protiv Poliakov i
pol’skikh grazhdan (Moscow, 1997); A. Kentii et al., Borot’ba proty UPA i
natsionalistichnoho pidpillia: Dyrektivni dokumenty CK KP(b)U, obkomiv
partii, NKVS-MVS, MDB-KDB 1943–1959 (Kiev, 2002–3); Volodimir Ko-
syk, Spetsoperatsiï NKVD-KHB proty OUN: Borot’ba Moskvy proty
ukraïns’koho natsionalizmu 1933–1943: Doslidzhenniametodiv borot’by
(L’viv, 2009); S. M. Mechnyk, Sluzhba bezpeky revoliutsiï noï OUN u
borot’bi z NKVD-NKHB-MHB-KHB (Ternopil’, 1994); I. E. Nadol’skii, De-
portaciïna politika stalins’kogo totalitarnogo rezhimu v zahidnih oblastiah
Ukraïni, 1939–1953 rr. (Luts’k, 2008); Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe
between Hitler and Stalin (New York, 2010); N. I. Vladimirtsev and A. I.
Kokurin, NKVD-MVD v bor’be s banditizmom i vooruzhennym natsionalis-
ticheskim podpol’em na zapadnoi Ukraine, v zapadnoi Belorussii i pribaltike
(1939–1956): Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 2008); Amir Weiner, “The
Empires Pay a Visit: Gulag Returnees, East European Rebellions, and Soviet
Frontier Politics,” Journal of Modern History 78, no. 2 (2006): 333–76.

chapter 1. expanding power, infiltrating the state

1. On these conflicts, see especially Stuart Finkel, “An Intensification of Vigi-
lance: Recent Perspectives on the Institutional History of the Soviet Security
Apparatus in the 1920s,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian His-
tory 5, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 309; George Lin, “Fighting in Vain: The NKVD
RSFSR in the 1920s” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1997); Nicholas
Werth, “L’OGPU en 1924: Radiographie d’une institution à son niveau
d’étiage,” Cahiers du Monde russe 42, nos. 2–4 (April–December 2001):
397–422; Vladimir N. Haustov, “Razvitie sovetskikh organov gosudarstven-
noi bezopasnosti, 1917–1953 gg,” ibid., 357–74; A. M. Plekhanov, VChK-
OGPU v gody novoi ekonomicheskoi politiki, 1921–1928 (Moscow, 2006),
esp. 99–115; Paul Hagenloh, “Police, Crime, and Public Order,” 21–32, and
“ ‘Chekist in Essence, Chekist in Spirit’: Regular and Political Police in the
1930s,” Cahiers du Monde russe 42, nos. 2–4 (April–December 2001): 451–
53; S. A. Krasil’nikov, “Vysylka i ssylka intelligentsii kak element Sovetskoi
karatel’noi politiki 20-kh–nachala 30-kh gg.,” in Diskriminizatsiia intelligen-
tsii v poslerevoliutsionnoi Sibirii (1920–1930-e gg): Sbornik nauchnykh tru-
dov, ed. S. A. Krasil’nikov and L. I. Pystina, Minuvshee, no. 21 (1997): 179–
239. Hagenloh, Werth, and Lin stress the intensity of these conflicts, while
other authors downplay the seriousness of the threat to the OGPU. See
also A. Ia. Malygin, “Organy vnutrennikh del v periode provedeniiia novoi
 Notes to Pages 26–42 351

ekonomicheskoi politiki (1921–1929)” in Borisov et al., Politsiia i militsiia

Rossii, 114–39 and Rasskazov, Karatel’nie organy v protsesse formirovaniia
administrativno-komandnoi sistemy v Sovetskom gosudarstve, 1917–1941
gg. (Ufa, 1994), 162–230.
2. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 52.
3. RGASPI, f. 76, op. 3, d. 305, l. 64.
4. Semashko refers here to a perceived return to polite etiquette and social defer-
ence to the educated upper classes, a lessening of revolutionary sensibilities as
a result of the partial retreat to capitalism, and a revival of old ways under
the NEP. He opposed this tendency, believing this kind of deference was mis-
placed and should be eradicated as dangerous.
5. Many in the Black Hundreds and similar groups viewed Bolshevism as a front
for a worldwide Jewish conspiracy.
6. In 1922, the various Soviet republics united under Moscow’s control and
became known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. With republic uni-
fication came organizational unification of the various republic police organs.
Control over the various republic GPU organs came under a new “Unified
[centralized] State Political Administration,” (Ob”edinennoe gosudarstven-
noe politicheskoe upravlenie, OGPU). The designation GPU remained for
republic-level political police.
7. On Bolshevik-intelligentsia relations, see Michael David-Fox, Revolution of
the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks, 1918–1929 (Ithaca, 1997);
Stuart Finkel, On the Ideological Front: The Russian Intelligentsia and the
Making of the Soviet Public Sphere (New Haven, 2007).
8. Stuart Finkel, “Purging the Public Intellectual: The 1922 Expulsion from
Soviet Russia,” Russian Review 62 (October 2003): 589–613.
9. For a classic study, see Leopold H. Haimson, The Mensheviks: From the
Revolution of 1917 to the Second World War (Chicago, 1975). On the
anti-Menshevik campaigns, see Vladimir N. Brovkin, The Mensheviks after
October: Socialist Opposition and the Rise of the Bolshevik Dictatorship
(Ithaca, 1991).
10. Diane Koenker, Republic of Labor: Russian Printers and Soviet Socialism,
1918–1930 (Ithaca, 2005).
11. On the early Soviet legal system, see Peter H. Solomon Jr., Soviet Criminal
Justice under Stalin (Cambridge, 1996), esp. chap. 2, “Criminal Justice under
NEP.”
12. This was a bold statement, made numerous times throughout the 1920s and
the 1930s, to justify the frequent and usually ineffective campaigns against
“speculators.”
13. During the 1920s, the criminal investigations organs and the civil police were
separate agencies.
14. Krylenko referred to “numerous” letters and telegrams, for example, from
British socialist individuals and organizations, criticizing the Soviet Union for
engaging in punishment without trial. AP RF, f. 3, op. 58, d. 281, l. 105. The
executions resulted from the mass arrests of supposed monarchists and other
counterrevolutionaries in 1927. For further discussion and references, see
chapter 3.
15. Dzerzhinsky died of a heart attack on 20 July 1926.
352 Notes to Pages 47–57

16. Ievhen Petrushevych (1863–1940). Ukrainian lawyer and national activist,

President of the Western Ukrainian National Republic, 1918–1919, and a
diplomat in Austrian and German exile throughout the 1920s. Initially anti-
Bolshevik, Petrushevych sought Soviet support for Western Ukrainian inde-
pendence when, in 1923, the Entente governments officially recognized the
1919 annexation of eastern areas of Galicia by Poland. The Soviets, initially
suspicious of Petrushevych as a British agent, financed his organization in
exile. Christopher Gilley, “A Simple Question of ‘Pragmatism’? Sovietophi-
lism in West Ukrainian Emigration in the 1920s,” Kozsalin Institute of Com-
parative European Studies, Working Paper No. 4 (March 2006), 18–21. For
GPU claims that Petrushevych was working in collusion with the British, see
V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-
GPU-OGPU-NKVD, ianvar’ 1922–dekabr’ 1936 (Moscow, 2003), 75.
17. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, p. 792 n. 42.
18. Ibid.
19. Donald Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those Who Killed
for Him (New York, 2005), 140. Rayfield notes that Dzerzhinsky later
became wary of Stalin, and began to move back toward Trotsky.
20. V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, an ally of Trotsky, headed the Political Administra-
tion of the Revolutionary Military Council, and had been dispatched to
Petrograd to investigate tensions between the military and the political police.

chapter 2. threats from abroad, infiltrating

the economy
1. V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, Lubianka, Stalin i
VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, ianvar’ 1922–dekabr’ 1936 (Moscow, 2003),
111–13, 117–18.
2. In 1924, Baldwin’s Conservatives unseated the Labour government of Ram-
say MacDonald, and took a harder line against the Soviets than had the La-
bourites.
3. For good accounts of these events, see the following: Keith Neilson, Britain,
Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919–1939 (Cam-
bridge, 2006), 54–55 on the Arcos raid; also, Harriette Flory, “The Arcos
Raid and the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1927,” Journal of Contem-
porary History 12, no. 4 (October 1977): 707–23. On Soviet international
relations and the war scare of the late 1920s, see Alastair Kocho-Williams,
Russia’s International Relations in the Twentieth Century (New York, 2013),
esp. chap. 3, “Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1920s”; Gabriel Gorodetsky, The
Precarious Truce: Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1924–1927 (1977; Cambridge,
2008); Edward Hallett Carr, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926–
1929, vol. 3, pt. 1 (New York, 1976), 18–26; Kocho-Williams focuses on
Comintern policy versus Soviet diplomatic policies. For a discussion of OGPU
activities, see Christopher Andrew, “The British Secret Service and Anglo-
Soviet Relations in the 1920s, Part 1: From the Trade Negotiations to the
Zinoviev Letter,” Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (1977): 673–706; Leonid Ne-
zhinskii, ed., Sovetskaia vneshniaia politika, 1917–1945 gg: Poiski novykh
podkhodov (Moscow, 1992).
 Notes to Pages 58–66 353

4. There are many studies of Party politics and debates during this period. One
of the most succinct and accessible, still, is that of the Czechoslovak Michal
Reiman, The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the “Second Revolu-
tion” (Bloomington, 1987), originally in German, Die Geburt des Stalinis-
mus: Die UdSSR am Vorabend der “zweiten Revolution” (Frankfurt/Main,
1979). See also the classic account by Edward Hallett Carr, Foundations of a
Planned Economy, 1926–1929, vol. 2 (New York, 1971), 3–147.
5. In 1922, with the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Russian Communist Party was dissolved into a new structure incorporating
the parties of all the republics. The new, united, organization became the All-
Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, or VKP(b).
6. The lists of undesirable populations were compiled, essentially by political
police, and those entered in them were to be removed by special transport
police under OGPU command.
7. Voikov was murdered by an anti-Soviet political émigré. For Chicherin’s
response, see Gorodetsky, The Precarious Truce, 236.
8. Sarajevo is a reference to the assassination of the Austrian Archduke and his
wife, July 1914, which precipitated World War I. Vorovsky was a Soviet del-
egate to the Lausanne international conference of 1923, murdered by a self-
proclaimed White Guardist.
9. Born as either Georgii or Salomon Rosenblum, in Odessa or elsewhere in
Ukraine in 1873, Reilly left imperial Russia sometime in the early 1890s. By
various unclear and most likely unscrupulous means, he ended up in Britain,
where he began working for the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), spy-
ing on radical émigré groups. It was in Britain that Rosenblum took the
pseudonym Sidney George Reilly. After a number of intelligence exploits, he
was smuggled into Russia as a British agent at the time of the revolution in
order to work against the Bolsheviks. Andrew Cook, Ace of Spies: The True
Story of Sidney Reilly (London, 2004); Michael Smith, MI6: The Real James
Bonds, 1919–1939 (London, 2011); Richard B. Spence, Trust No One: The
Secret World of Sidney Reilly (Port Townsend, 2003).
10. Published also in Donald Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen: The Tyrant and
Those Who Killed for Him (New York, 2004), 145.
11. A. Kh. Artuzov headed the OGPU’s counterespionage unit.
12. Georgii El’vengren was a Russian military officer of Karelian origin who
emigrated to Finland after the Civil War. An anti-Soviet White Guardist, he
worked with Reilly, and entered the Soviet Union in 1925 with a false Roma-
nian passport, in connection with activities of the Trust, a supposedly anti-
Bolshevik underground organization that was, in fact, an OGPU front orga-
nization. He was discovered and arrested in Tver, and executed as one of “the
20” prominent monarchists/White Guardists in retaliation for the murder of
Voikov.
13. At the time of his capture, Reilly was no longer working actively for the Brit-
ish secret service, having officially retired from SIS in 1921. Reilly was con-
tacted informally to sneak into Russia to assess the Trust’s legitimacy. OGPU
agents, working undercover as part of the Trust, organized Reilly’s entrance
into the Soviet Union through Finland, and then arrested him. Known as a
British agent, and already sentenced in absentia in Russia in 1918, Reilly was
354 Notes to Pages 66–70

executed in 1925. Reilly’s capture, interrogation, and execution no doubt

confirmed Stalin’s suspicions about British malevolent intentions.
14. Eduard Operput, a leading OGPU counterespionage agent, had defected to
Finland early in 1927, and had secretly returned to the USSR in the summer
to conduct sabotage against the Soviet government. He and several others
were killed as they attempted to flee capture.
15. Trest was the designation used for a merging of several economic or indus-
trial entities, like the English word “trust.” Unlike “trust,” however, the word
trest does not signify confidence or belief.
16. On Savinkov, see Boris Savinkov v Lubianke: Dokumenty (Moscow, 2000),
and Richard B. Spence, Boris Savinkov: Renegade on the Left (New York,
1991). Donald Rayfield attributes organization of the Trust to Vladimir
Dzunkovsky, the head of the tsarist political police, the Okhrana, who worked
for the Soviets in the 1920s, and who supposedly modeled the Trust on the
Okhrana’s successful infiltration organizations that operated during the pre-
revolutionary period. Rayfield, Stalin and His Hangmen, 142. Pamela K.
Simpkins and K. Leigh Dyer trace the origins to an earlier successful GPU
operation from 1920 called Maiak (Beacon), also designed to penetrate émi-
gré anti-Bolshevik circles. Prepared originally for the CIA, Simpkins and
Dyer’s work, published under the Freedom of Information Act, contains the
best discussion of the leading figures involved in the Trust operations, includ-
ing and especially information on real names and backgrounds. Pamela K.
Simpkins and K. Leigh Dyer, The Trust, The Security and Intelligence Foun-
dation Reprint Series (Alexandria, VA, 1989). See also John Costello and
Oleg Tsarev, Deadly Illusions: The KGB Orlov Dossier Reveals Stalin’s Mas-
ter Spy (New York, 1993).
17. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, p. 796 n. 60.
18. From I. Stalin, Interview with Foreign Workers’ Delegations (Moscow, 1927),
44–48.
19. “Versaillers” refers to the official French government and its sympathizers,
based at the Palace of Versailles so long as the revolutionary Commune con-
trolled Paris.
20. Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe Thiers, president of France 1871–73, came to
power after the defeat of France by Prussia and the collapse of the Second
Empire under Napoleon III. Thiers oversaw the bloody suppression of the
Paris Commune in 1871.
21. Reference to military intervention by Allied armed forces during the Russian
Civil War.
22. On the Shakhty trial and issues surrounding it, see Edward Hallett Carr and
R. W. Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926–1929 vol. 1, pt. 2
(New York, 1969), 574–604; Sabine Dullin, “Rol’ mezhdunarodnogo vo-
prosa v politicheskikh protsessakh v SSSR: Shakhtinskoe delo i sovetskaia
vneshniaia politika,” in Sudebnie politicheskie protsessy v SSSR i kommunis-
ticheskikh stranakh Evropy: Sravitel’nyi analiz mekhanizmov i prakhtik pro-
vedeniia. Sbornik materialov rossiiskogo-frantsuskogo seminara, Moskva,
11–12 sentiabria, 2009, ed. S. A. Krasilnikov and Alan Blum (Novosibirsk,
2010), 66–74. See also Gordon W. Morrell, Britain Confronts the Stalin Rev-
olution: Anglo-Soviet Relations and the Metro-Vickers Crisis (Ontario, 1995).
 Notes to Pages 71–87 355

23. The Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate (RKI) was the government inspec-
torate agency, as opposed to the Central Control Commission (TsKK), which
was the Party’s internal inspectorate. E. A. Rees, State Control in Soviet Rus-
sia: The Rise and Fall of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, 1920–34
(London, 1987).
24. In fact, Efim Georgievich Evdokimov, one of the most ruthless of the high
OGPU officials.
25. Politburo member, USSR transport commissar, and assistant head of the
Council of Labor and Defense.
26. M. L. Rukhimovich, assistant head of the VSNKh USSR, the Supreme Eco-
nomic Council.
27. For further reading on the Industrial Party trial, see Kendall E. Bailes, Tech-
nology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical
Intelligentsia, 1917–1941 (Princeton, 1978), esp. pt. 2, “The Old Specialists
and the Power Structure, 1928–1931.”
28. Also published in Kommunist, no. 11 (1990): 99–100, and in English in Ray-
field, Stalin and His Hangmen, 166–67.
29. One of the first indications that the conspiracy was concocted by Stalin, and
the OGPU was the connection that was supposed to exist between the con-
spirators in the USSR and P. P. Ryabushinsky, a former industrialist, who had
immigrated to France after the Bolshevik seizure of power. Ryabushinsky was
supposedly a key link connecting Ramzin et al. to French government circles.
According to OGPU materials, he was supposed to become the interior min-
ister in a new Russian government after supposed intervention and destruc-
tion of the Soviet regime. Apparently unknown to the OGPU, Ryabushinsky
died in 1925, before the conspiracy supposedly coalesced.
30. V. G. Groman, an internationally known economist of balanced planning,
opposed to the accelerated tempos of Stalinist industrialization. Groman was
held and tried as part of the Menshevik trial of 1931. See Naum Jasny, Soviet
Economists of the Twenties: Names to Be Remembered (Cambridge, 1972),
esp. chap. 6, “Vladimir Gustavovich Groman,” 89–124, and pt. 2, “The
Trial,” 60–88, on the Menshevik trial.
31. N. D. Kondrat’ev, economist, founder of the analysis of long cycles, also op-
posed to forced industrialization. For a biographical sketch, see Jasny, Soviet
Economists, 158–78. A. V. Chayanov was known for his studies of agrarian
subsistence economy and rural households. He leaned toward the moderate
Socialist Revolutionaries’ idea of rural cooperative development.
32. Pavel Miliukov, lawyer, prominent Constitutional Democrat, and foreign
minister under the Provisional Government of 1917, emigrated and lived
abroad after 1917.
33. Lars Lih, Oleg Naumov, and Oleg Khlevniuk, eds., Stalin’s Letters to Molo-
tov, 1925–1936 (New Haven, 1995), 200.
34. In addition to Jasny’s work on economists, see also Bailes, Technology and
Society; Loren R. Graham, The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology
and the Fall of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, 1993).
356 Notes to Pages 91–100

chapter 3. subduing the countryside

1. For recent histories of the Gulag, see Iu. N. Afanas’ev et al., eds., Istoriia sta-
linskogo gulaga: Konets 1920-kh–pervaia polovina 1950-kh godov. Sobranie
dokumentov, 7 vols. (Moscow, 2004–5); Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History
(New York, 2004); Steven Barnes, Death and Redemption: The Gulag and the
Shaping of Soviet Society (Princeton, 2011); Oleg Khlevniuk, The History of
the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror, trans. Vadim Staklo
(New Haven, 2004); Fyodor Vasilevich Mochulsky, Gulag Boss: A Soviet
Memoir, trans. Deborah Kaple (New York, 2012). See also the classic works:
Evgeniia Ginzburg, Journey into the Whirlwind (New York, 1967); and Alek-
sandr Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956: An Experiment in
Literary Investigation (New York, 1997), originally published as Arkhipelag
GULAG: Khudozhestvenno-istoricheskoe proizvedenie (Paris, 1973).
2. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 761, l. 17.
3. V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i
VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, ianvar’ 1922–dekabr’ 1936 (Moscow, 2003),
226–29.
4. Category 2 kulaks were subject to exile to penal work colonies, as opposed
to category 1 kulaks, who were slated for execution or imprisoned in labor
camps.
5. Said Bek Shamil: One of the founders and leaders of the Mountain Republic
of the Northern Caucasus (MRNC), which existed briefly from 1917 to 1920,
when MRNC forces were defeated by the Bolsheviks. Shamil escaped, settled
in Berlin, and there led the émigré organization Committee of Independence
of the Caucasus. Shamil was the grandson of Imam Shamil, the Dagestani
sheikh who rallied the population to resist Russian occupation in the 1850s.
Nazhmutdin Gotsinsky: Anti-Bolshevik Islamic revolutionary leader who led
uprisings in the Caucasus during the period 1917 to the early 1920s. Gotsin-
sky was caught and executed in 1925. On the Caucasus region during the
revolutionary period, see Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution,
1917–1923, vol. 1 (New York, 1951), 339–50; S. Mural, “The Jihad of Said
Shamil and Sultan Murad for the Liberation of the Caucasus,” Central Asian
Survey 10, nos. 1–2 (1991): 181–87; Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Em-
pires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–
1918 (Cambridge, 2011); Ronald J. Suny, The Baku Commune: Class and
Nationality in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 1972), Armenia in the
Twentieth Century (1983), and The Making of the Georgian Nation (Bloom-
ington, 1994); Ronald Suny, ed., Transcaucasia, Nationalism, and Social
Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Ann
Arbor, 1996). See also Ronald Suny and Terry Martin, eds., A State of Na-
tions: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (New York,
2001); Vera Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental
Studies in the Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods (London, 2011).
6. On the special settlements, see, among others, S. A. Krasil’nikov, Serp i
molokh: Krest’ianskaia ssylka v Zapadnoi Siberii v 1930-e gody (Moscow,
2003); Lynne Viola, The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin’s Special
Settlements (New York, 2007); V. N. Zemskov, Spetsposelentsy v SSSR,
 Notes to Pages 104–23 357

1930–1960 (Moscow, 2005). See also the document collection V. P. Danilov

and S. A. Krasil’nikov, eds., Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Siberii: Vesna
1931-nachalo 1933 (Novosibirsk, 1993), and their edited volume of essays,
Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri, 1933–1938 (Novosibirsk, 1994).
7. V. M. Burmistrov, Procuracy official in Western Siberia and then deputy chief
procurator of the Russian republic chief, arrested in 1938.
8. The other major cause of attrition was escape.
9. See the remarkable account of conditions, written by the propaganda instruc-
tor Belichko, in Danilov and Krasil’nikov, Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri,
1933–1938, 89–100. See also Nicolas Werth, Cannibal Island: Death in a
Siberian Gulag. trans. Steven Rendall (Princeton, 2007).
10. R. W. Davies et al., eds., The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence 1931–1936
(New Haven, 2003), 179–81.
11. In communes, all property and produce was held in common, whereas kolk-
hozes were cooperatives in which some private property was permitted. Most
farms were organized as kolkhozes.
12. Symon Petliura (1879–1926) headed the anti-Bolshevik government of the
Ukrainian National Republic, 1919–20. He made an alliance with Poland in
1920 during the Polish-Soviet War, and was assassinated in Paris in 1926.

chapter 4. ordering society

1. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 514, ll. 14–17.
2. There is a large literature on the famine, especially on the famine in Ukraine.
In English, see especially the journal Holodomor Studies. More generally, see
Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the
Terror-Famine (New York, 1986); R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft,
The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933 (London, 2004). See
also the memoir account by Miron Dolot, Execution by Hunger: The Hidden
Holocaust (New York, 1987). Articles in several languages are included in V.
Vasil’ev and Y. Shapoval, Komandiri velikogo golodu: Poizdki V. Molotova i
L. Kaganovicha v Ukrainu ta na Pivnichnii Kavkaz, 1932–1933 rr. (Kiev,
2001). See also exchanges about causes, issues of genocide, and demographic
discussions: Mark B. Tauger, “Natural Disasters and Human Actions in the
Soviet Famine of 1931–1933,” The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East Eu-
ropean Studies, No. 1506 (Pittsburgh, 2001); Jacques Vallin, France Meslé,
Serguei Adamets, and Serhii Pyrozhkov, “A New Estimate of Ukrainian Pop-
ulation Losses During the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s,” Population Studies
56, no. 3 (2002): 249–64; and exchanges in Europe Asia Studies vols. 51, no.
8 (1999); 57, no. 6 (2005); 58, no. 4 (2006); 59, no. 4 (2009).
3. For migration figures and patterns, see S. N. Golotik and V. V. Minaev, Nas-
elenie i vlast’: Ocherki demograficheskoi istorii SSSR 1930-kh godov (Mos-
cow, 2004); V. B. Zhiromskaia, Demograficheskaia istoriia Rossii v 1930-e
gody: Vzgliad v neizvestnoe (Moscow, 2001). On marginals, see S. A.
Krasil’nikov, Na izlomakh sotsial’noi strukture: Marginaly v poslerevoliutsi-
onnom obshchestve (1917–konets 1930-kh gg) (Novosibirsk, 1998); S. A.
Krasil’nikov, ed., Marginaly v Sovetskom obshchestve 1920–1930-godov:
Istoriografiia, istochniki. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov (Novosibirsk, 2001).
358 Notes to Pages 123–68

4. David Hoffmann, Peasant Metropolis: Social Identities in Moscow, 1929–

1941 (Ithaca, 1994); Gijs Kessler, “The Peasant and the Town: Rural-Urban
Migration in the Soviet Union, 1929–40” (Ph.D. diss., European University,
Florence, 2000).
5. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 514, l. 17.
6. Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the
USSR, 1926–1941 (Washington, DC, 2009); George Lin, “Fighting in Vain:
The NKVD RSFSR in the 1920s” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1997);
David Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Social Order and Mass Repression
in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953 (New Haven, 2009).
7. Published in O. V. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich: Perepiska, 1931–
1936 (Moscow, 2001), 260. For an English-language version of this docu-
ment, see R. W. Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, et al., eds., The Stalin-Kaganovich
Correspondence, 1931–1936 (New Haven, 1003), 175.
8. Published in V. P. Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: Kollektivizat-
siia i raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materially, 1927–1939, vol. 3: Konets
1930–1933 (Moscow, 2001), 419.
9. First published in Danilov et al., Tragediia Sovetskoi derevni, 3:634–35.
10. SPO, Secret Political Department.
11. AP RF, f. 3, op. 30, d. 189, l. 43.
12. Published in Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni, 3:746–52.
13. Molotov’s real name.
14. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 15, l. 2.
15. Informal courts made up of citizens and local officials who could censure and
fine an individual, and impose community sanctions, but could not impose
criminal responsibility or prison penalties.
16. V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i
VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, ianvar’ 1922–dekabr’ 1936 (Moscow, 2003),
811 n. 117.
17. Golfo Alexopoulos, Stalin’s Outcasts: Aliens, Citizens, and the Soviet State,
1926–1936 (Ithaca, 2003).
18. GA RF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1650, ll. 30–32.
19. Registration in police precinct for disorderly conduct, but without arrest.
20. The final charter of the NKVD was approved 5 November 1934.
21. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, #467.
22. Published in Istochnik 6 (1997): 109.
23. The paragraph that defined “regime” areas.
24. GA RF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 135, doc. 119. We are grateful to Paul Hagenloh
for help in reconstructing Yagoda’s speech. For a more complete description
of this speech, see Paul Hagenloh, “ ‘Socially Harmful Elements’ and the
Great Terror,” in Stalinism: New Directions, ed. Sheila Fitzpatrick (New
York, 2000), 299.
25. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 598, ll. 12, 41–43. See also Yagoda’s directive to
operational departments of the GUGB, as well as the civil police, in March
1936, to free themselves from unnecessary tasks and to “focus on priorities
of aggravated robbery, murder, and theft of socialist property.” GA RF, f.
9401, op. 12, d. 135, doc. 31, l. 4.
26. GA RF, f. 5446, op. 26, d. 18, l. 195, and d. 50, l. 5.
 Notes to Pages 168–99 359

27. GA RF, f. 5446, op. 18a, d. 904, l. 6.

28. GA RF, f. 5446, op. 16a, d. 591, l. 21.
29. GA RF, f. 1235, op. 2, d. 2032, l. 26.

chapter 5. the great purges

1. See the introduction.
2. Lenin’s testament: a statement drawn up by Lenin, in failing health, intended
to guide the Party after his death, included critical statements about the other
Party leaders. Lenin recommended, allegedly, that Stalin be removed as gen-
eral secretary, but there is controversy surrounding this aspect of the testa-
ment. The Russian historian V. A. Sakharov has argued that the anti-Stalinist
parts of the testament were forged, largely by Trotsky and Krupskaia, Lenin’s
wife. See Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin (Harlow, UK, 2005), 60–61.
3. Anti-Bolshevik government during the civil war.
4. Ernst Röhm, head of the National Socialist Storm Troopers (SA), murdered
30 June 1934 as part of the mass purge of the SA. Kurt von Schleicher, last
chancellor of Germany before Adolph Hitler, also assassinated at the time of
the SA purge.
5. V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i
VChK-GPU-OGPU-NKVD, ianvar’ 1922–dekabr’ 1936 (Moscow, 2003),
824 n. 175.
6. RGASPI, f. 671, op. 1, d. 118, ll. 1–33.
7. Published in O. V. Khlevniuk et al., Stalin i Kaganovich: Perepiska, 1931–
1936 gg. (Moscow, 2005), 682–83.
8. Still serviceable is John Erickson, The Soviet High Command: A Military-
Political History 1918–41 (London, 1962); see also Harold Shukman, Stalin’s
Generals (New York, 1993).
9. I. V. Iakir (1893–1937), Commander of the Kiev Military District during the
1930s, Central Committee and Politburo member of the Ukrainian Commu-
nist Party, arrested as a supposed member of the Tukhachevsky plot.
10. Ian Gamarnik (1894–1937), birth name Iakiv Borysovych Pudykovych,
a political activist and senior military and defense official, supported Tukh-
achevsky’s innocence and committed suicide after Tukhachevsky’s execution.
Implicated in the Anti-Soviet Military Organization plot.

chapter 6. social and ethnic cleansing

1. Li U Khe (Vladimir Fedorovich Li) and Kim Yen Un, Belaia kniga o deportat-
sii koreiskogo naseleniia Rossii v 30–40-kh godakh (Moscow, 1992).
2. Published in V. Danilov et al., Tragediia sovetskoi derevni: Kollekivizatsiia i
raskulachivanie. Dokumenty i materialy, vol. 5, bk. 1: 1937–1938 (Moscow,
2004), 256–57.
3. Aleksei Rykov, (1881–1938), an early Party leader, former head of Sovnar-
kom, arrested and executed as “right deviationist” in 1937–38.
4. First published, in fragmentary form, in Trud, no. 88, June 4, 1992, 1, 4. For
the full text in English, see J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to
360 Notes to Pages 200–244

Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939 (New

Haven, 1999), 473–79.
5. Dashnak (Dashnaksutyun, Armenian Revolutionary Federation): an anti-
Soviet socialist organization, founded in the 1890s, dedicated to an indepen-
dent and socialist Armenia. Mussavatists: members of the Azerbaijani nation-
alist political party Mussavat, the majority party in the short-lived Azerbaijan
Democratic Republic, 1918–20. Ittihadists: members of the radical Islamic
party Ittihad, formed in response to the more secular Mussavat party.
6. Published in Istoricheskii arkhiv 1 (1992): 125–28.
7. Published ibid., 129–30, and in English in Getty and Naumov, The Road to
Terror, 538–40.
8. For discussion of the purges as a changing series of Party “scripts” and “tran-
scripts,” see ibid.
9. V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i
glavnoe upravlenie gosbezopastnosti NKVD, 1937–1938 (Moscow, 2004),
612–15.
10. Ibid., 663.

chapter 7. the security organs at war

1. The statute used to convict people of counterrevolutionary and anti-Soviet
crimes.
2. V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i NKVD-
NKGB-GUKR “Smersh,” 1939–mart 1946 (Moscow, 2006), 564 n. 11.
3. The antiterrorist law, cases under which were tried in camera, without right
of appeal, and carried a mandatory death penalty.
4. On the United Front and the German-Soviet agreement, see Mieczyslaw B.
Biskupski and Piotr Stefan Wandycz, Ideology, Politics, and Diplomacy in East
Central Europe (Woodbridge, UK, 2003); Robert Boyce and Joseph A. Maio-
lo, The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues (London, 2003);
Edward Hallett Carr, German-Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars,
1919–1939 (1951; New York, 1979); Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and
the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–1939 (London, 1984);
Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Rus-
sia (New Haven, 1999); Igor Lukes and Erik Goldstein, eds., The Munich
Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II (London, 1999); Werner Maser, Der
Wortbruch: Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Munich, 1994); Alek-
sandr Nekrich, Adam Ulam, and Gregory L. Freeze, Pariahs, Partners, Preda-
tors: German—Soviet Relations, 1922–1941 (New York, 1997); Frank Mc-
Donough, ed. The Origins of the Second World War: An International Per-
spective (London, 2011); Alfred. J. Rieber, “Stalin as Foreign Policy–Maker:
Avoiding War, 1927–1953,” in Stalin: A New History, ed. S. W. Davies and
J. R. Harris (Cambridge, 2005), 140–58; Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union
and the Origins of the Second World War (London, 1995), and Stalin’s Wars:
From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven, 2006); Izidors Vizu-
lis, The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939: The Baltic Case (New York, 1999).
5. Alexander Chubaryan and Harold Shukman, eds., Stalin and the Soviet-
Finnish War, 1939–1940 (New Haven, 2002); Robert Edwards, White Death:
 Notes to Pages 244–84 361

Russia’s War on Finland 1939–40 (London, 2006); Eloise Engle and Lauri
Paananen, The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939–1940 (1973;
Boulder, 1985); David Glanz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve
of World War (Lawrence, 1998); Philip Jowett and Brent Snodgrass, Finland
at War 1939–45 (Oxford, 2006); William R. Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The
Russo—Finnish Winter War of 1939–40 (1991; London, 2006); Carl Van
Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939–40 (Frank Cass, 1997).
6. On policies of sovietization, see Jan Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The
Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (1988;
Princeton, 2002); Alfred J. Rieber, ed., Forced Migration in Central and East-
ern Europe, 1939–1950 (London, 2000); Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Eu-
rope between Hitler and Stalin (New York, 2010).
7. Khaustov et al., Lubianka: Stalin i NKVD-NKGB-GUKR “Smersh,” 568 n. 28.
8. For histories of the Katyn massacre, see above, Introduction, note 20.
9. B. Z. Kobulov (1904–53), Beria’s protégé, candidate member of the Central
Committee, and head of the NKVD Investigative Department. V. N. Merku-
lov (1895–1953) at this time was deputy head of the GUGB. Both Kobulov
and Merkulov were arrested and executed when Beria fell from power in
1953. L. F. Bashtakov, one of the officers responsible for the Katyn executions
of Polish military officers, survived until his natural death in 1970. On Kobu-
lov, Merkulov, and Bashtakov, see Michael Parrish, The Lesser Terror: Soviet
State Security, 1939–1953 (Westport, 1996).
10. Terry Martin, An Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the
Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca, 2001), 362–72.
11. Published in A. I. Kokurin and N. V. Petrov, Lubianka: Organy VChK-
OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-MVD-KGB, 1917–1991: Spravochnik (Mos-
cow, 2003), 623–26.
12. In addition to the works cited above (introduction, note 21), see V. A. Berdin-
skikh, Spetsposelentsy: Politicheskaia ssylka narodov Sovetskoi Rossii (Mos-
cow, 2005); N. Bugai, Iosif Stalin–Lavrentiu Berii, “Ikh nado deportirovat”:
Dokumenty, fakty, kommentarii (Moscow, 1992); Diakhat Ediev, “Demogra-
ficheskie poteri deportirovannykh narodov SSSR,” Naselenie i obshchestvo
79 (2004); Terry Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” Journal
of Modern History 70, no. 4 (1998): 813–61; Norman Naimark, Stalin’s
Genocides (New York, 2011); O. J. Pohl, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR,
1937–1949 (Westport, 1999), and The Stalinist Penal System: A Statistical
History of Soviet Repression and Terror, 1930–1953 (Jefferson, NC, 1997).
13. Friedrich Paulus (1890–1957), German field marshal, commander of the Ger-
man Sixth Army, encircled and surrendered at the battle of Stalingrad, 1943.

chapter 8. border wars, plots, and spy mania

1. Istrebitel’nie otriady: locally recruited “extermination” units.
2. Rudolf Slánský, general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
3. Slánský was purged as a part of a sweep of East European communist leaders
out of favor with Stalin. He was accused of trying to infiltrate Trotskyist and
“Zionist” sympathizers into the Czechoslovak Communist Party and govern-
ment. Karel Kaplan, Report on the Murder of the General Secretary (Columbus,
362 Notes to Pages 284–312

1990); Igor Lukes, “The Rudolf Slánský Affair: New Evidence,” Slavic Review
58, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 160–87.
4. For background information on the postwar period, we rely on two works:
Yoram Gorlitsky and Oleg Khlevniuk, Cold Peace: Stalin and His Ruling
Circle, 1945–1953 (Oxford, 2004); and Oleg Khlevniuk, Master of the House:
Stalin and His Inner Circle (New Haven, 2009). For foreign policy, see Jona-
than Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of
the Wall (New Haven, 2010); Vladimir Pechatnov, Stalin, Ruzvelt, Trumen:
SSSR i SShA v 1940-kh godakh. Dokumental’nye ocherki (Moscow, 2006);
Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953
(New Haven, 2006); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the
Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA, 1996).
5. V. N. Khaustov, V. P. Naumov, and N. S. Plotnikova, Lubianka: Stalin i MGB
SSSR, mart 1946–mart 1953 (Moscow, 2007), 599.
6. S. D. Ignat’ev, then Minister of State Security, replacing Abakumov, arrested
in July 1951. See further discussion of Abakumov’s arrest, below.
7. In keeping with convention, Glavnoe upravlenie is translated as Chief Direc-
torate, when referring to the organizational structure of the MGB. Otherwise
upravlenie is translated as “administration.”
8. See Arno Lustiger, Stalin and the Jews: The Red Book. The Tragedy of the
Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the Soviet Jews (New York, 2003); G. V.
Kostyrchenko, Tainaia politika Stalina: Vlast’ i antisemitizm (Moscow,
2000); Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, eds., Stalin’s Secret Po-
grom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, trans.
Laura Esther Wolfson (New Haven, 2001); Yehoshua A Gilboa, The Black
Years of Soviet Jewry, 1939–1953 (Boston, 1971).
9. The administration responsible for nuclear energy development.
10. For greater detail, see Gorlitsky and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 113–20.
11. Ya. G. Etinger, prominent cardiologist, medical professor, and consultant for
the Kremlin’s rest sanatorium, often referred to as the first victim of the so-
called Doctors’ Plot.
12. A. S. Shcherbakov, Oblast Party Secretary, Party Central Committee member,
and head of the Red Army Chief Political Administration; died of a heart at-
tack on the night of 9–10 May 1945.
13. Alternative name for the Politburo after the war.
14. L. L. Shvartsman, a career Chekist, deputy director of the Investigative Divi-
sion of Especially Important Cases, implicated in the supposed plot with Aba-
kumov.
15. Gorlitsky and Khlevniuk, Cold Peace, 155.

conclusion
1. We are grateful to Stephen Kotkin for first making this observation.
 Index

Abakumov, V. S., 3, 270, 281–85, 287, 231–33, 235–37, 239–41, 243–44, 253,
290, 292, 296–301, 303–8, 313, 315 255, 257–58, 270; and Katyn, 244,
Agranov, Ya. S., 30, 148, 175, 177–79, 248–49; and postwar years, 287, 292,
187, 315 299–300
Akulov, I. A., 131, 159, 315 Berman, M. D., 102, 139, 141–43, 317
Andreev, A. A., 100–101, 107, 109, 316 Blagonravov, G. I., 80–81, 125, 137
Antonov-Ovseenko, V. A., 51–52, 316 Bukharin, N. A., 8, 18, 26, 57, 59, 65,
Arcos, 57, 352 188, 318
Armenia, 92–94, 214, 265–67 Bukharinists, 221
Artuzov, A. Kh., 66, 316, 325, 353 Bulganin, N. A., 292, 318
Bulgarians, 216, 219, 265–67
Balitsky, V. A., 95, 109–10, 134, 137,
148, 189–90, 192, 316, 325, 339 Caucasus, 14, 74, 92, 220, 260, 311
banditry: criminal forms, 104, 106, 146, Central Asia, 92, 146, 214, 274–75
201; expansion of political police power Central Committee. See TsK plenary
to include, 20, 22–23, 34–42; and sessions
GUBB, 270–72, 274–75, 278–80; and Chayanov, A. V., 84–85, 355
order 00447, 201, 205; political forms, Cheka, 1–2, 17–19, 23–26, 42–43, 54,
146, 167, 186, 200–201; struggle 69, 94, 134, 154, 270, 310
against, 94–96, 115, 148, 163, 251, Chicherin, G. V., 36–38, 40, 47, 62, 67,
261–62, 266 70, 318
Belen’ky, A. Ya., 238, 316 China, 57, 208, 220, 282–83, 292,
Beloborodov, A. G., 40, 316 295–96; and Chinese, 194, 209–10,
Belorussia: and anti-Soviet resistance, 14, 215, 219, 246, 283, 295. See also
251–52, 269, 272–76, 278–80; and Manchuria
collectivization, 94–95, 108, 133–34, civil police. See Militsiia
146; and OGPU in 118, 120–21; social Communist Party: and authority of police
cleansing in, 12, 62, 114, 116, 148, and security organs, 21–22, 35, 40,
214, 244–48 50–53, 67, 154; and composition of
Beria, L. P., 3, 11–15, 94, 317; and arrest, OGPU/NKVD, 120–21, 144–45; and
307–8, 312; and border wars, 271–72, Leningrad affair, 284–87; and
274–75, 277–79; and ethnic Mingrelian affair, 287–89; against
deportations, 259–63, 265, 267–68; as police and security organs, 12, 220–26,
head of NKVD, 220, 224, 226–28, 228–29, 297–308; purges of, 9, 15, 50,

363
364 Index

Communist Party (Continued) Germans: as immigrants, 246, 193; as

170–74, 184–91, 213, 296; and ruling Soviet citizens, 115, 161–62, 193–94,
elite of, 3, 7, 15, 58–59, 89; and Stalin, 215, 217–19, 259–61, 267
2, 18, 54–56, 309–10 Germany: and Nazis, 180; and 1939 pact,
concentration camps, 35–36, 127, 131, 243–44; occupation of, 282, 293; and
138, 158 Shakhty, 70–72, 74–76; spying in, 13,
Czechoslovak, 174, 243, 283–84 81–82, 298–99; strained relations with,
62, 67; and subversion, 191, 221, 238,
Dagestan, 97–98, 135–36, 230, 261–62 264–66, 272–79, 282; war with, 13,
doctors’ plot, 15, 299–300, 303–7 247, 255, 269, 275–76, 278–79. See
Donbass, 73, 75, 115, 137 also Katyn massacre
Dzerzhinsky, Feliks, 2–3, 22, 24, 26–29, GKO (GOKO), 256–58, 260, 267, 271,
33, 36–43, 47–49, 50–56, 309, 312, 274, 277
319 Great Britain: and Metro Vickers affair,
84, 70; and 1927 crisis, 42, 57, 64–66;
Egorov, P. I., 303, 305–6 and spying, 57, 66–67, 81–82, 221,
Eikhe, R. I., 196, 319 282, 296, 303, 305; and subversion, 13,
“elements,” 8–9, 311–12; alien, 132, 183, 57, 62–65
185, 251; anti-Soviet, 8–9, 12, 30, 133, great famine, 5, 122–23, 133, 189, 357.
139–42, 161–64, 194–96, 199–202, See also Holodomor
206, 214–18, 244, 249, 251, 256, great purges, 10, 12–13, 170, 230,
261–66, 274, 278–80; bandit, 22, 166, 320–21
186; counterrevolutionary, 59, 66, 70, Great Terror, 171, 347–48, 356, 358
77, 86, 94–95, 98, 134–36, 139, 163, Greeks, 194, 215, 246, 265–67
183, 186, 236, 252; criminal, 23, 37, Groman, V. G., 84–85, 355
123, 127, 164, 199, 201, 221; déclassé, GUBB, 270–71
157–58, 164–67, 183; disloyal GUGB: criticism of, 187–88; formation,
(unreliable), 62, 164, 285–86; hooligan, 7, 160; and juvenile policing, 168–69;
126, 159; kulak, 143–44, 201, 221; and order 00447, 194, 197–207;
loyal, 71, 121; socially harmful purview, 169, 310; reorganization, 250;
(antisocial), 9, 104, 129, 130, 139, staffing, 118–21. See also NKVD
150–52, 156, 164–65, 191; terrorist, GULAG, 91, 142, 205–7, 240–41
184; white guardist, 135, 186, 197, GURKM, 7, 150
201, 221
England. See Great Britain Holodomor, 133, 357. See also great
Enukidze, A. S., 21–22, 181–84, famine
189, 319 hooliganism, 124–27, 146, 158–59, 167,
Estonia, 82, 215, 219, 221, 246, 278 194, 310
Etinger, Ya. G., 297–301, 303–4, 306,
362 Ignat’ev, S. D., 287, 289, 293–95,
Evdokimov, E. G., 95–98, 101–3, 134, 300–301, 303–4, 307, 320
136, 180, 283, 319 Industrial Party trial, 83–84, 331. See also
Promparty trial
famine of 1921, 17. See also great famine; Ingush, 260–62
Holodomor intelligentsia, 26–33, 58
Finland, 68, 82, 114, 116–17, 194, 219, Iranians, 214–15, 219
244, 246
France, 13, 16, 81–83, 86, 221; and Japan, 13, 82, 191, 220–21, 225;
French, 62, 68–70, 70, 74, 84, 243 intelligence services, 194, 197–98,
Frinovsky, M. P., 190, 199, 205, 220, 208–9, 296
236–38, 319 Jewish Antifascist Committee, 289–92,
301–2
Gamarnik, Yan B., 190–91, 320 juveniles: delinquents, 5; politicized, 66,
Georgia, 66, 93–98, 214, 287–88, 183, 264–65, 276–81, 301; unemployed
296, 313 youth, 5, 123
 Index 365

Kaganovich, L. M., 73–75, 82, 125, Manchuria, 208–9, 295–96

128–29, 134, 143, 179, 181, 217–18, mass ethnic deportations, 161–62, 194,
248, 292, 320 246, 259–67
Kalmyks, 260–61 mass repressions, 11, 167; and Katyn,
Kamenev, L. B., 21, 29, 31, 59, 170, 174, 247; against Mensheviks and
177–84, 320 monarchists, 33, 66–68; 1937–1939,
Karelia, 116, 194, 215, 244, 246 171, 193–94, 207, 213, 216, 220, 222,
kartoteki, 8, 69, 153–54, 193 226–28
Katyn massacre, 247–50, 349–50 May 8, 1933 reforms, 142–47, 149–50
Kazakhstan, 102, 107–9, 118, 138–41, Mensheviks: campaigns against, 26, 28,
168, 194, 206, 214, 260, 262, 275, 32–34, 66, 70, 200–201
286–89 Menzhinsky, V. R., 3, 33, 49, 56, 63–66,
Kharbintsy, 208–10, 215, 220–21 71, 85–86, 125–26, 128, 312, 323
Khrushchev, N. S., 320, 324 Merkulov, V. N., 3, 249–51, 253–56, 323
Kobulov, B. Z., 249, 272, 321 MGB: borderlands wars, 270, 280–81;
Komsomol, 33, 93, 120, 126, 175, 207, and counter espionage, 294–95, 302;
213, 260 and deportation, 287–88; and doctors’
Kondrat’ev, N. D., 84–85, 355 plot, 303, 307–8; and foreign
Koreans, 194, 246, 259 operations, 282–84, 296, 299;
Kosior, S. V., 111, 161, 321 formation of, 4, 15, 270; and Leningrad
Kremlin conspiracy, 174–75, 177–78 affair, 285–87; and purges, 15, 285;
Kruglov, S. N., 270–71, 321 purge of, 299–301, 304–7; and Zionist
Krylenko, N. V., 21–23, 34–36, 38–43, plots, 289–91, 297–99
68, 75, 85–86, 48–50, 159, 322 Mikhoels, Solomon, 289–92, 325, 332
Kuibyshev, V. V., 49, 60, 71, 300, 322 Militarized socialism, x, 7, 15, 17, 60–61,
kulaks: and border cleansing, 113–14, 154, 229, 254, 347
116; campaigns against, 10, 58, 90–97, militsiia (civil police), 11, 15, 144, 146,
100, 143–44, 163, 310; defined, 4; 149, 245, 310; and banditry, 38–41;
deportation of, 100–104, 107–9, 141, and mass repression, 171, 194, 203;
231; in exile, 104–7; and order 00447, and passportization, 150–52, 155, 223,
194–202, 206–8, 214–15, 218–19, 221; 161, 169; and social order, 8, 12,
restrictions on, 10–11; and socially 124–25, 133–36, 141; subordinate to
harmful elements, 130, 132, 139, 152, political police, 5–7, 14, 22, 38–41, 91,
156–57 114, 124, 159, 253; weakness of,
Kursky, D. I., 18, 21–23, 26, 31, 36, 34–36, 38, 123
41, 322 Miliukov, Pavel, 84–85, 355
Mironov, L. G., 131–32, 157, 185, 324
labor camps: administration of, 1, 13, 15, Mironov, S. N., 196–98, 324
91, 207, 240, 270; internment in, 203, Molchanov, G. A., 175, 180, 185,
240. See also GULAG 188, 324
Latvia, 82, 114, 194, 215, 219, 221, 246, Molotov, V. M., 19, 29, 179, 181, 243,
276 248, 324; and anti-Menshevik
Lenin, V. I., 17–18, 27, 32, 48, 50, 56, campaign, 63–65; and border wars,
177 271–74, 277–78; and ethnic
Leningrad, 8, 15, 151–52, 170, 172–73, resettlement, 260–63, 267; and exiles,
202–3, 284–87, 307 140, 147–48, 165; and famine, 134,
Leningrad Military District, 62, 109, 138; and Jewish Anti-fascist
114–17, 271 Committee, 284, 290, 292; and legality,
Leningrad oblast, 103, 173, 278, 285–87 224, 238–39; and specialists, 71, 77, 86
Lithuania, 82, 246, 276, 281 Moscow: crime in, 37, 41, 157–58; Jewish
Litvinov, M. M., 44–49, 58, 70, 85–86, Theater, 289, 291; as opposition center,
243, 318, 322 72–74, 77; repression in, 33, 76,
200–202; and social cleansing, 62,
Malenkov, G. M., 274, 278, 284, 292, 151–58, 165
300, 322 MVD, 14–15, 270, 280–81, 288, 308
366 Index

Narkomfin, 24, 241 operational orders: 00192, 164–67;

Narkomiust, 21, 36, 68, 91, 148–49, 159, 00439, 193–94, 215, 219; 00447,
233–34, 241–42 194–95, 199–205, 208, 214–15,
Narkompros, 31, 168–69 218–20; 00485, 194, 219; 00593,
Narkomzdrav, 147, 168, 247 208–10, 218–19
Narym, 33, 104–5, 140, 197–98 Operput, Eduard, 66, 68, 354
NKGB, 13–14, 250–51, 253–55, 257, Ordzhonikidze, Sergo, 43, 58, 71,
264–65, 270–75, 281–82 243, 325
NKVD, 7, 14, 106, 118–21, 159–61; and osadniki, 244–46, 248–49
banditry, 274–75, 278–81; and Osoboe soveshchanie, 155, 159–61
borderland wars, 270–74, 278–81; 164–65, 217, 239–40
culture of, 232–35; and ethnic OUN, 250, 270–71, 273
deportations, 259–98; and new
territories, 243–47, 250–53; and order passportization, 7–8, 141, 151–56, 161,
00192, 164–67; and order 00447, 164–69, 253, 310
194–99, 202–7, 212, 214–15, 218–19; Pauker, K. V., 175, 189, 325
and order 00593, 208–10, 215–16, Petliura, Symon (Petliuraite), 115, 357
219; purge of, 187–88, 220, 224–27, Piłsudski, Józef, 56, 325
229; purview of, 10–13, 220–24, Poland: under Soviet control, 282; spying
227–29, 238–39, 241–43; and in, 82; strained relations with, 67; and
reorganization, 250, 253–55, 270; and subversion, 72, 75, 81, 84, 114, 133,
torture, 230–31; in World War II, 191, 221, 237–38, 271; war with, 56,
256–59, 274–78. See also GUGB 62; and World War II, 244
NKVD RSFSR, 19, 32, 35 Poles: deportation of, 162, 246; purges of,
North Caucasus, 62, 70, 72, 98; and 194, 276; and subversion, 74, 215, 221,
collectivization, 103, 108; and famine, 272–73. See also Katyn massacre
123, 134, 139; policing in, 145, 274–75 Politburo: and border wars, 250, 278; and
Novosibirsk, 104, 197–98 collectivization, 90–92, 94–95, 100,
Novosibirsk oblast, 215, 259–61, 286 109; and famine, 133; and foreign
spying, 43–47, 90, 283; and formation
Ogol’tsov, S. I., 287, 300–301, 325 GPU/OGPU, 18–19, 21–22, 26–27; and
OGPU: and Baltflot affair, 50–53; and formation NKGB/MGB, 13, 253, 255,
banditry and speculation, 36–38, 270; and formation NKVD, 159–60;
40–41, 156–58; criticism of, 26, 34–36, and intelligentsia, 29, 32; and Katyn,
38–43, 50–53, 68–69, 105–6, 148–50, 247; and mass deportations, 259–60;
159; and dekulakization, 4, 90–91, and mass operations, 193–96, 199,
93–96, 99–103, 110–13; and émigrés, 205–6, 208, 214–15, 219, 220–21,
67–69; and foreign spying, 43–46, 57, 226–28; and Mensheviks, 33; and
82–83, 90, 330; formation, 26, 34–36; passportization, 169; and policing
and industry, 59–62, 72–76, 78–81, 90; authority, 2, 8–9, 11–12, 22, 32, 35–37,
and intelligentsia, 26, 31–32, 34; and 40–41, 53–54, 66–67, 77, 90–91, 99,
juvenile policing, 125–28, 158–59, 168; 107, 121, 143, 147, 150, 226–29, 239;
and law of 7 August, 1932, 131–32, and purges, 85–86, 184, 224–26,
156; and militsiia, 22, 91, 121, 124, 235–36, 299–301; and social cleansing,
150–53; and monarchists, arrest of, 125, 157–58, 161, 164, 171, 246;
62–65, 67–68; and NKID, 38, 43–49, and Stalin, 49, 56, 59, 67; and World
62, 67, 71; and passportization, War II, 257
151–56, 161, 165, 310; purge of Poskrebyshev, A. N., 199, 326
Mensheviks and SRs, 26, 66; purview Postyshev, P. P., 100–101, 107, 134,
of, 4–6, 23, 34–37, 40, 56, 89–90, 310; 163–64, 225, 326
and railroad campaigns, 125–28, Procuracy: conflicts with OGPU/NKVD,
158–59; reorganization, 6, 124, 105, 149, 232–34, 238–40, 312; and
159–60, 169–70; as social gendarmerie, great purges, 211, 220–24; supervision
7, 121, 124, 248; staffing, 26, 90, of OGPU/NKVD, 12, 35, 76, 143–47,
99–100, 117–21, 169 220–24, 241–43
 Index 367

Prokof’ev, G. E., 131–32, 134, 152–53, speculation (profiteering), 34–36, 130,

157, 189, 326 146, 157
Promparty trial, 84–86, 336. See also SRs (Socialist Revolutionaries), 26–28,
Industrial Party trial 32, 70, 91, 197, 199–201, 213–14
Pyatakov, Yu. L., 188, 326 Stalin, I. V.: and class war, 122–24; and
intelligentsia, 27–29; and Katyn,
Radek, K. B., 188, 327 244–48; and Kirov murder, 170–71,
Rakovsky, K. G., 188, 327 173; and law of 7 August 1932,
Ramzin, L. K., 83–85, 87, 355 128–31; and mass operations, 171, 206,
Red army (RKKA), 20–21, 44–45, 50, 208, 213–14, 217–18, 220, 251; and
86–88, 93, 114, 119–21, 162, 182, 185, nationality operations, 244–45,
191, 207, 245, 256, 262–66, 272, 259–61, 267; and purges, 9–11, 15, 59,
275–77 62–67, 110–12, 170–71, 184–86,
Redens, S. F., 92–94, 109–12, 134, 327 188–89, 284–87, 290, 303; and purges
Reilly, Sidney, 65–66, 68, 353–54 of police, 187–92, 220, 225–27,
religion, 11; as anti-Soviet, 30, 32, 97–98, 235–38, 297, 304, 306–7; and
264, 266, 281; repression of, 197, 263 relationship with police, 2–5, 9, 18, 41,
Riumin, M. D., 297, 299–301, 303, 306 43–49, 54–56, 88, 139, 143, 148–50,
Romania, 57, 82, 84, 115, 244, 269 159–60, 171, 225–30, 239, 243, 253,
Romanian, 197, 215, 219, 221, 265 284, 296–97, 309–12; and social order,
Rudzutak, Y. E., 60, 76–77, 81, 327 123–25; and specialists, 58–59, 70–76,
Rukhimovich, M. L, 77, 355 83–84, 87; and war, 13, 56, 243, 257
Rykov, A. I., 29, 42, 59, 65, 71, 188–89, surveillance: over foreigners, 71; mass
199, 328 domestic surveillance, 2, 5, 7–8, 13,
20–21, 91, 121, 153, 310; of Soviet
Savinkov, Boris, 68, 354 institutions, 52, 81, 83, 117, 186
Semashko, N. A., 27–29, 328
Shakhty, 70–72, 73–76, 331 Tatar, 97, 109, 185–86, 196, 263–67
Shcherbakov, A. S., 297–98, 300, 306, 328 Tomsky, M. P., 29, 59, 71, 188, 329
Shvartsman, L. L., 302, 304–6 Trilisser, M. A., 47–48, 49, 320
Siberia, 33, 70, 74, 154, 178, 275; and troiki, 11, 131, 141, 147–49, 157, 162,
collectivization, 92, 95, 100–108; and 231–34, 249; passport troiki, 155,
exiles, 139–40, 146, 307; and famine, 162–67, 223; and special operational
123; and mass repression, 195–98, 203, orders, 195–96, 202–4, 215–18, 223
208, 216, 220; police in, 118, 148 Trotsky, L. D., 8, 17, 26, 29, 43–44,
SMERSH, 255–57, 264, 270, 315 49–53, 56, 89, 170, 172, 177–81, 183,
socialism, 6–8, 58, 68, 87, 121–24, 167, 186–87, 316, 318, 326–27, 329
169, 310, 313 Trotskyist, 177, 181–83, 185, 188–91,
Socially harmful element. See “elements” 194, 209, 221, 235–36, 285–86, 318,
social order: breakdown of, 4, 121–23; 321, 327–28, 331–32
and policing, 4–5, 8–9, 14, 124–28, TsIK: and Kremlin affair, 174, 178,
150–53, 155–58, 161, 164–67, 171; 181–83; and political police, 20, 35,
and state security, 6–7, 123–25, 40–43, 105
167–69 TsK plenary sessions, 6, 11, 122–23
social order policing, 4–9, 14, 121, 124, Tukhachevsky, M. N., 188, 190, 329
158, 161, 167–69, 171, 310–11
Sokol’nikov, G. Ya., 18, 26, 41, 328 Ukraine: and anti-Soviet resistance, 14,
Sotsvredelement. See “elements” 56–57, 109, 115, 148, 191, 214, 245,
Sovnarkom: and political police, 2, 18–19, 250–51, 269–70, 273–74, 280–81; and
21, 54, 124, 227 collectivization, 94–95, 111–12; famine
specialists (spetsy), 28, 31–33, 58–59, 70, in, 123, 133–39, 189; and foreign
76–80, 87 conspiracy, 57, 71, 73–74, 191; OGPU
special settlements/settlers (spetsposelki/ control of, 109–10, 121, 161–62; social
spetspereselentsy), 100, 105–7, 139–43, cleansing in, 12, 114–15, 141, 145–46,
150, 156–59, 168, 195, 254, 267 163–64, 214, 218, 244, 247
368 Index

Unshlikht, I. S., 18–19, 21–23, 27, 31, passportization, 154, 156; and
43–47, 49, 53, 55, 330 reorganization, 159–60; and Shakhty,
71–73, 76; and Stalin against Trotsky,
Voikov, Petr, 62–64 50–53
Voroshilov, K. E., 85–86, 179, 248, 330 Yakovlev, Ya. A., 31, 331
Voznesensky, N. A., 284, 292, 330 Yezhov, N. I., 3, 9–10, 179, 181, 185,
vreditel’stvo. See wrecking 232, 312, 320, 331; and “Great
VTsIK, 18–19, 21–23, 35, 40, 43 Terror,” 11, 19, 171, 213; and mass
Vyshinzky, A. Ya., 148, 164–67, 220, operations, 194–95, 199, 205, 207–8,
228–29, 231–35, 238–39, 331 210, 217–19; and purge of NKVD,
187–88, 190; rise and downfall, 9,
wrecking (vreditel’stvo), 59, 73, 78–80, 11–13, 171, 187, 220, 224–28,
85–87, 210, 221, 303–5 236–37
Yezhovshchina, 171
Yagoda, G. G., 3, 5, 7, 312, 326, 331; and Youth. See juveniles
border cleansing, 114, 117; and
collectivization, 92, 95–98, 100–103, Zakovsky, L. M., 101, 230, 331
107; downfall, 9, 12, 186–89, 224, Zhdanov, Andrei, 101, 230, 303–7, 328,
226; and economy, 60, 78, 81; and 331
foreign intelligence, 57, 65, 82; and Zhemchuzhina, P. S., 290–92, 332
juvenile policing, 168–69; and Kirov Zinoviev, G. E., 8, 57, 59, 170, 172, 177,
murder, 171; and Kremlin conspiracy, 180, 182–84, 186–87, 332
174–75, 177–78; and mass repression, Zinovievists, 172, 183, 185, 285–86, 321,
138–39, 141–43, 164–67; and OGPU, 332
35–36, 43, 117–18, 148, 150; and Zof, V. I., 50–53, 332
 b ook s in t h e a nna l s of c o mm u n i s m s e ri e s

The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949, introduced and edited by Ivo Banac
Dimitrov and Stalin, 1934–1943: Letters from the Soviet Archives, edited by
Alexander Dallin and Fridrikh I. Firsov
Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934–
1939, by William J. Chase
The Fall of the Romanovs: Political Dreams and Personal Struggles in a Time of
Revolution, by Mark D. Steinberg and Vladimir M. Khrustalëv
Gulag Voices: An Anthology, edited by Anne Applebaum
The History of the Gulag: From Collectivization to the Great Terror, by Oleg V.
Khlevniuk
Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment, edited by Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S.
Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski
The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, edited by Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander
Gribanov
The Kirov Murder and Soviet History, by Matthew E. Lenoe
The Last Diary of Tsaritsa Alexandra, introduction by Robert K. Massie; edited
by Vladimir A. Kozlov and Vladimir M. Khrustalëv
The Leningrad Blockade, 1941–1944: A New Documentary History from the
Soviet Archives, by Richard Bidlack and Nikita Lomagin
The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–
1939, by J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov
Secret Cables of the Comintern, 1933–1943, by Fridrikh I. Firsov, Harvey Klehr,
and John Earl Haynes
The Secret World of American Communism, by Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes,
and Fridrikh I. Firsov
Sedition: Everyday Resistance in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev,
edited by Vladimir A. Kozlov, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Sergei V. Mironenko
Soviet Culture and Power, by Katerina Clark and Evgeny Dobrenko with Andrei
Artizov and Oleg Naumov
The Soviet World of American Communism, by Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes,
and Kyrill M. Anderson
Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War, edited by Ronald
Radosh, Mary R. Habeck, and G. N. Sevostianov
Stalin and the Lubianka: A Documentary History of the Political Police and Se-
curity Organs in the Soviet Union, 1922–1953, by David R. Shearer and Vlad-
imir Khaustov
Stalinism as a Way of Life: A Narrative in Documents, edited by Lewis Siegel-
baum and Andrei K. Sokolov
The Stalin-Kaganovich Correspondence, 1931–36, compiled and edited by R. W.
Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk, E. A. Rees, Liudmila P. Kosheleva, and Larisa A.
Rogovaya
Stalin’s Letters to Molotov, 1925–1936, edited by Lars T. Lih, Oleg V.
Naumov, and Oleg V. Khlevniuk
Stalin’s Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Soviet Jewish Anti-Fascist
Committee, edited by Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov
The Unknown Lenin: From the Secret Archive, edited by Richard Pipes
The Voice of the People: Letters from the Soviet Village, 1918–1932, by C. J.
Storella and A. K. Sokolov
Voices of Revolution, 1917, by Mark D. Steinberg
The War Against the Peasantry, 1927–1930, edited by Lynne Viola, V. P. Danilov,
N. A. Ivnitskii, and Denis Kozlov