International Journal of Cultural Policy

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Cultural politics in the South Korean cultural

industries: confrontations between state-
developmentalism and neoliberalism

Woongjae Ryoo & Dal Yong Jin

To cite this article: Woongjae Ryoo & Dal Yong Jin (2018): Cultural politics in the South Korean
cultural industries: confrontations between state-developmentalism and neoliberalism, International
Journal of Cultural Policy, DOI: 10.1080/10286632.2018.1429422

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2018.1429422

Published online: 07 Feb 2018.

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InternatIonal Journal of Cultural PolICy, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1080/10286632.2018.1429422

Cultural politics in the South Korean cultural industries:

confrontations between state-developmentalism and
neoliberalism
Woongjae Ryooa and Dal Yong Jinb
a
Department of Media and Communication, Hanyang university, Seoul, Korea; bSchool of Communication,
Simon fraser university, Vancouver, Canada

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This paper examines Korea’s cultural policy in tandem with the Korean received 23 July 2017
Wave. It maps out the vital role of the Korean government in the Korean accepted 10 January 2018
Wave phenomenon in the midst of the confrontations between neoliberal
KEYWORDS
globalization and developmentalism. It investigates the ways in which neoliberal policy; state-
Korea has developed the Korean Wave by analysing whether or not led developmentalism;
neoliberal ideologies have completely altered state developmentalism. the Korean Wave; cultural
More specifically, it studies the major characteristics of each administration industries
between 1993 and 2016 in cultural policy, leading to the theorization of
the nation-state in the context of the Korean Wave. Since studies of cultural
policy assume that a wide range of policy tools are available to a government
in promoting its cultural industries, it examines not only major cultural
policy directions driven by each president, but also governmental practices
executed at the level of the executive branch, in particular, the Ministry of
Culture, Sports, and Tourism.

Introduction
Since the late 1990s, South Korea (hereafter Korea) has rapidly developed its cultural industries and
emerged as one of the major hubs of transnational popular culture. The Korean cultural industries have
developed several cultural products, such as television programmes, music and films, as well as digital
technologies and culture, and Korea has substantially expanded the export of these products to Asia,
later to the Western markets. These local cultural products have made global sensations as both Western
fans and Asian audiences are enjoying Korean cultural products. Consequently, the Korean Wave (Hallyu
in Korean), which is the rise of Korea’s cultural industries and the parallel growth of Korean popular
culture in the global markets, has become a symbol of local-based transnational cultural industries
and popular culture (Jin, 2016).
More recently, with the rapid growth of social media, such as YouTube and Facebook, as well as
smartphones, K-pop has become one of the most important cultural forms.1 Meanwhile, Korean game
industries have continued to be the leader in the global trade as the largest exporter among local
cultural industries. The contemporary Korean Wave has greatly expanded its influences as several new
cultural forms, including animation, characters, and mobile games in addition to television dramas, films,
and music, have rapidly penetrated the global cultural markets. With the increasing popularity of these
local cultures, Korea has rapidly advanced its export of cultural products, from $188.9 million in 1998
to $4,679.3 million in 2015 (Korean Creative Content Agency 2016; MCST 2016). As the Korean Wave

CONTACT Dal yong Jin [email protected]

© 2018 Informa uK limited, trading as taylor & francis Group
2 W. RYOO AND D. Y. JIN

has continued to grow in terms of foreign export, the Korean government attempts to utilize Hallyu to
enhance national images. For example, several recent presidents, including Lee Myung-bak and Park
Geun-hye sought to connect the Korean Wave and soft power referring to ‘the ability to get what you
want through attraction rather than coercion or payments’ via culture, values and foreign policies (Nye
2004, 256). Therefore, these presidents continued to emphasize the significance of traditional popular
culture, including television programmes, films, and music for expanding cultural export and enhancing
the country’s brand power (Lee 2013, 191) as they represent the Korean Wave, although video games
are bigger than these cultural areas in foreign trade.
There have been several dimensions that have played primary roles for the growth of Korean culture
in the global markets, such as the 1997 economic crisis,2 the emergence of East Asian economy, the surge
of cultural industries corporations, and competition among them. In this process, the diverse images,
texts and styles circulating within Asia and beyond were providing new opportunities to construct
an alternative consciousness and identity formation through the sharing of culture, as exemplified in
the case of Korean television dramas and K-pop (Ryoo 2009, 144). Most of all, the role of the Korean
government as a provider of legal, policy, and financial resources to the cultural industries has become
one of the major elements.
This essay is to investigate the state cultural policy, focusing on the shifting role of the Korean govern-
ment in the local cultural industries by analysing key confrontations between neoliberal globalization
and developmentalism. It exemplifies the major characteristics of each administration between 1993
and 2016 in cultural policy, leading to the theorization of the role of the government in the realm of
culture. Since studies of cultural policy assume that a wide range of policy tools are available to a govern-
ment in promoting its cultural industries (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 2005; Kwon and Kim 2014), it maps
out not only major cultural policy directions driven by each president, but also governmental practices
executed at the level of the executive branch, in particular, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism.
This essay employs the political economy approach, in particular a historical analysis because it is
useful to find out the causes behind the shifting process of the Korean cultural industries. It formulates
three major time periods to clarify the relationship between developmentalism and neoliberalism based
on the major characteristics of the cultural politics of the Korean administrations: (1) the neoliberal
developmentalism era between 1993 and 1998, (2) the neoliberal cultural reform era between 1998
and 2008, and (3) the developmental neoliberal era between 2008 and present. It utilizes several major
source materials, such as presidential addresses on the cultural industries and the Korean Wave, secre-
tarial addresses and documents from the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and other pertinent
cultural agencies, including the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) and the Korean Film Council
(KOFIC). The value in these documents lays in the detailed information and data they provide on the
cultural industries and corporate activities.

The shifting roles of the nation-state amid neoliberal globalization

The Korean cultural industries have grown in the midst of the conflicts between state-led developmen-
talism and neoliberal globalization, which parallel with the major arguments in the national economy.
To begin with, starting in the 1960s, Korea has developed one of the strongest state-led developmental
models, which pursue a top-down and export-led economy. In Korea, ‘developmentalism’ entails gov-
ernment intervention to promote economic development in partnership with chaebol – a family owned
conglomerate. Therefore, developmentalism in the Korean context has been ‘a state-driven political
doctrine coined by the state to combat harsh domestic economic conditions’ (Lee and Kim 2010, 315).
In particular, Korea’s developmentalism was rooted in a ‘compressed development model’ that Park
Chung-hee formulated. In order to expedite the growth of national economy within a short period
of time, the Park regime developed several Five-Year Economic Plan starting in 1962, and these plans
focused on the shift of Korean economy from war-torn agricultural industries to heavy and chemical
industries, and later to information and communication technologies-driven industries.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL POLICY 3

In the realm of the Korean cultural industries, the practice of developmentalism had been actualized
mostly in the form of regulation. The cultural industries were marginal in terms of their contribution to
global trade,3 therefore, the Korean government mainly focused on the role of culture in nation-build-
ing,4 while regulating cultural content through heavy censorship. The consecutive military governments
until 1988 had also blocked foreign popular culture through both the screen quota system in the field
of film and the programme quota system in the realm of broadcasting. In other words, during the
developmental era until the late 1980s, the Korean government controlled the cultural industries with
several measures, such as the public ownership of broadcasting, protection of the domestic cultural
market from foreign penetration, and strong censorship on cultural content, with some promotional
cultural policies.
The situation surrounding the cultural industries significantly changed as the Korean government
starting in the late 1980s, and continuing through the mid-1990s, adopted neoliberal economic reforms,
and consequently neoliberal cultural policies, emphasizing the minimal role of the government. The
ideals of neoliberalism, which emphasize the supremacy of market forces, the need for deregulation
and liberalization, and the necessity of limiting government intervention in economic activity, contrast
sharply with the emphasis on the potential benefits of state intervention in economic activity (Cherry
2005, 329). As is well documented (Friedman 1982; Harvey 2005), the notion of neoliberalism originated
in the 1930s, and it is especially associated with the primacy of the market, the privatization of state
enterprises, maximized competition through liberalization and deregulation of the economy towards
monetary policies favouring businesses and corporations. As such, neoliberalism is grounded in the
assumption that ‘governments cannot create economic growth or provide social welfare. Instead, private
companies, and, most importantly, unhindered markets are best able to generate economic growth
and social welfare’ (Bockman 2013, 14). Some scholars (Pang 2000; Lim and Jang 2006; Kang 2012)
contended that the Korean economy had made a transition towards a neoliberal market economic
system, in particular in tandem with the 1997 economic crisis, and the government is no longer capable
of carrying out the same developmental policies as in the 1980s.
Some shifts in local cultural policies are embedded in changing scenes and politics of a series of
global finance and economic development. For instance, in the realm of culture, as the most powerful
force, the U.S. government, alongside several transnational media corporations, has forced other gov-
ernments to take on neoliberal reforms, including the liberalization of the cultural market. As these
demands took root, many countries have been compelled to adopt neoliberal globalization to survive
and nurture their own cultural industries as part of globalizing cultural markets. Therefore, several
scholars (Strange 1996; Sinclair 2007) argue that the nation-state as a meaningful unit in the global
culture is in decline, as diverse globalizing processes, in particular the liberalization of the local cul-
tural markets, undermine it. Castells (2009) also argues that globalization, in its different dimensions,
destabilizes the autonomy and decision-making power of the government. In cultural trade, Harvey
(2006) especially points out that the nation-state has been challenged, although the pivotal role of the
nation-state is worthy of careful attention. Meanwhile, Hjarvard (2003) emphasizes that the weakening
role of the nation-state has subsequently resulted in the decreasing role of local culture and cultural
identity in many non-Western countries.
Within this context, many globalization theorists forecast the end of national boundaries, national
corporations, national industries, and the end of national economies, including the media and cultural
industries sectors, where all will merge into corresponding transnational organizations outside the
reach of national regulations and actions. These views rest on the shared assumption that economics
increasingly controls politics, where economic globalization transforms the political and the social affairs
of interconnected human communities throughout the world (Kim 2000). Contrary to these continuing
predicates of globalization theory, our central claim is to argue against the normative body of works
that see globalization as an enduring and inevitable process that offers the promise of widespread and
potentially unparalleled prosperity for the planet (Ryoo 2008, 873, 874).
Instead, our contention is that globalization is a historically contingent and complex dialec-
tical process that exists in tension and in oscillation with the different path of modernization and
4 W. RYOO AND D. Y. JIN

developmentalism. The movement between these two orientations toward cultural policies corresponds
with the South Korean case. We argue that neither neoliberalism nor developmentalism is a stabilized
ideology of state involvement (or disinvolvement) with its cultural, as well as economic policies, but a
specific mode of state involvement in the guise of laissez-faire. Although cultural policies may still not
be at the top of policy-makers’ agendas, the importance of their influence on international and national
politics is undeniable. Two broad forces, one rooted in political economy of globalization and the other
in the latter’s cultural politics may be identified (Singh 2010, 9).
As the global cultural industries since the early 1990s have become some of the major sectors in the
global economy (Herman and McChesney 1997), the role of nation-states on cultural industries policies
and cultural flows has been more complicated and nuanced because nation-states still play a major
role in the growth of domestic cultural industries (Fulcher 2000; Liow 2011; Hundt 2015). In fact, several
scholars (Wong 2004; Cherry 2005; Hundt 2005; Kim, Han, and Jang 2008; Suh and Kwon 2014) argued
that government intervention has persisted in many countries, including Korea ‘despite market-oriented
reforms and neoliberal globalization’ (Suh and Kwon 2014, 680), and the Korean government has indeed
retained its strong control as a developmental state in the national economy and the cultural sector.
In the cultural industries, several media critics also argued for the consistent and even intensifying
role of the government. Pieterse (2004, 46) claims, while ‘neoliberal ideology pleads for small govern-
ment,’ some nation-states are still strong and regulate by deregulating. Some critical media scholars
(Fulcher 2000; Sánchez Ruiz 2001; Stuart 2001; Wu and Chan 2007) also argue that the role of the gov-
ernment and cultural trade is more complex than many globalists who claim the decreasing role of the
government, because many countries have continued to protect their own popular culture, effectively
staging confrontations with globalization. Taking the Canadian cultural market as an example, Stuart
(2001, 431) argued that ‘the mass culture often originating in, but no longer wholly associated with the
United States, has not produced the death of Canada as a nation-state, nor is it likely to do so.’
As such, over the past two decades, the national cultural industries and consequently the Korean
Wave have grown amid the conflicts between state-developmentalism and neoliberal globalization.
In particular, ‘with the popularity of Korean popular culture in many parts of the world, Korea, which
was once a representative Asian developmental state, has been a pivotal subject of research in the
debates over the characteristics of post-developmental states,’ as it has rapidly adopted neoliberal
reforms (Heo 2015, 351). The Korean government since the mid-1980s has deregulated and liberalized
the cultural industries based on its neoliberal tendencies; however, the Korean state has developed its
unique cultural policy to support and/or initiate the growth of the cultural sector.5
More specifically, while the Korean government has executed neoliberal reform in other fields, many
administrations have adopted a state-led development approach in the realm of popular culture, while
some administrations took neoliberal cultural tendencies. Therefore, the development of the Korean
cultural industries has been a showcase and the remarkable growth cannot be understood without
considering the role of the government in supporting the advancement of the industries with both
legal and financial arms. As Lee (2013, 186) aptly puts it, ‘the cultural policy’s full embrace of the phe-
nomenon to the degree where the Korean Wave itself becomes a policy paradigm will be reflected in
the historical transformation of the relationship between the state and the popular culture.’
Within the Korean administrations, neoliberal cultural policies between liberal and conservative
governments have substantially changed according to their political agendas. Therefore, the execu-
tion of developmental paradigm of nation-state against neoliberal globalization for the Korean Wave
cultural policies and tradition needs to be fully analysed. The nuanced analysis of the conflicts between
liberal administrations emphasizing neoliberal developmentalism – primarily utilizing neoliberalism to
develop cultural industries – and conservative administrations mainly appropriating developmentalism
will shed light on the current debates on the role of the government in the Korean Wave phenomenon
in the global markets.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL POLICY 5

The emergence of neoliberal developmentalism in the pre-Hallyu era

While there are several sociocultural elements in developing the local cultural industries, one of the most
significant characteristics is cultural policy that has greatly influenced the Korean Wave. The acceptance
of Korean cultural products in the global markets has markedly shifted as cultural policy has evolved.
Historicizing Korea’s cultural policy until the early 1980s, two major approaches had been developed
by the government. One is the emphasis on cultural identity through culture and art. Back then, the
essential cultural policy objective focused on arts, such as national music, painting and calligraphy, and
tried to establish cultural identity while promoting the vitalization of the arts, which implies that cultural
policy under the military regime was primarily synonymous with arts policy (Yim 2003, 99–101). For
the military regimes, cultural policy was not for the cultural industries, because they did not consider
culture as part of the industries that they supported. Therefore, cultural policy was limited to traditional
music and arts, instead of popular culture. The other is cultural policy as control of the cultural indus-
tries through censorship. The ultimate goal of the Park Chung-hee (1962–1980) regime was to achieve
a high level of economic development to provide legitimacy for their military government. All other
social, political and cultural domains of the nation were mobilized by the Park regime to achieve the
political and economic goals (Kwon and Kim 2014). The cultural industries were heavily censored and
controlled by the governments, so they were very underdeveloped.
Starting in the early 1990s, changes in the political, economic and social environment led to a shift
in the government’s perception of the cultural industries, which means that the governments after
1993 came to acknowledge the economic importance of culture, not as an art but as a commodity (Jin
2011a; Kwon and Kim 2014). After the 1990s, when the neoliberal vision became a global norm, the
Korean government put abundant stress on unlimited competition with other countries on a global
scale. The Kim Young-sam government (1993–1998) designated 1994 as the year for enhancing national
competitiveness and pushed to make Korea a member country of the OECD (Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development).
The Kim government consequently brought the concept of the cultural industries to cultural policy,
shifted the focus of cultural policy from arts to commercial cultural industries, and intensified the com-
modification of local popular culture. This means that the Korean government has allowed the cultural
sector to operate in accordance with the logic of neoliberalism (Jin 2016). As Adorno and Horkheimer
(1972) argued, cultural goods and services began to be commercially produced, reproduced and dis-
tributed as a part of a strategy directed towards economic growth in Korea.
However, the Kim government continued state-led developmentalism in that it ‘set up the Cultural
Industries Directorate in 1994 within the cultural ministry whose policy priorities included the industri-
alization of culture and the internationalization of Korean culture’ (Lee 2013, 189). The Kim government
understood the significance of export – the internationalization of Korean culture – for the Korean
economy as the country has achieved its economic growth based on an ‘export-led economic model’
(Amsden 1989). The Kim government started to support the audio-visual sector, which became a basis
for the growth of the Korean Wave afterwards. The government, for example, initiated the growth of the
film industry by enacting the Motion Picture Promotion Law in 1995 (Shin 2005). The new law included
diverse incentives, including tax breaks for film studios to welcome chaebol (family-owned conglom-
erates, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG) capital into the film industry (Paquet 2005). The Korean
government back then, therefore, advanced neoliberal developmentalism, which means that it started
to adopt neoliberal globalization strategies while continuously utilizing governmental intervention in
the realm of culture. As such, the conflicts between neoliberal reform and developmentalism starting
in the Kim Young Sam government has become a unique nature of Korea’s cultural policy, which has
eventually advanced the growth of domestic cultural industries.
6 W. RYOO AND D. Y. JIN

Neoliberal cultural industries policy in the liberal governments

Since the late 1990s, the Korean government has taken significantly different positions towards the
cultural industries and the Korean Wave in terms of political ideologies and the nature of government
intervention. Both the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations were liberal and initiated sev-
eral supports to the cultural industries; however, they mainly pursued neoliberal reforms, characterizing
a small government. For example, the major neoliberal cultural policies that the liberal governments
pursued came in the form of changes in the screen quota system and indirect promotion policies for
the Korean Wave phenomenon (Jin 2016).
Most of all, the Kim Dae-jung government (1998–2003) emphasized neoliberal globalization, stress-
ing the need to understand the rules for unfettered competition on a global scale. After the 1997 finan-
cial crisis, which was the worst economic crisis in Korea’s modern history, resulting in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout programme, the Kim Dae-jung government had no choice but to develop
neoliberal reforms under the IMF programme. The Kim government tried not to hinder Korean cultural
penetration just started in many Asian countries by employing indirect promotion policies, avoiding
the appearance of initiating Korea’s cultural invasion into other Asian countries (Jin 2011b). For exam-
ple, the Kim government has relatively less supportive broadcasting policies for local media industries
than the previous administrations. In 2001, three major networks, such as KBS, MBC, and SBS domi-
nated television programme production and accounted for 90.6% of television programme exports
(Korea Press Foundation 2003, 302). However, the Broadcasting Act Enforcement Ordinance under the
Kim government demanded network broadcasters must air up to 40% of programmes produced by
independent producers to develop domestic audiovisual industries; therefore, the number of small
producers increased (Jin 2011a). The Kim government’s plan to develop domestic audiovisual indus-
tries by increasing television programmes produced by independent producers certainly showed the
decreasing role in major networks, representing the broadcasting industry, which can be considered
as one of the major neoliberal cultural policies.
In fact, as clearly indicated in the New Culture and Tourism Policy announced in 1998, the Kim
government pursued a small but efficient government under the IMF bailout programme. The cul-
tural sector was not exceptional. Although the Kim government developed several financial and legal
measures, including the expansion of culture within the government budget to 1%, to funding cultural
industries, its supports to the cultural industries, again, aimed to avoid any direct intervention (Ministry
of Culture and Tourism 2001, 28). The Kim government strategically pursued indirect, instead of direct
and active, policies. During the process, the Kim government executed to break up the government
and big corporations, in this case, major networks, which was neoliberal in nature.
The indirect and inactive cultural policy continued to the end of the Roh Moo-hyun government,
although the degrees were different, primarily because of Roh’s political decision to get a Korea-U.S.
FTA (free trade agreement). During his initial stage of presidency, Roh, as the most liberal politician,
clearly expressed his intention to support the cultural industries and created several supporting mech-
anisms; however, President Roh changed his economic and cultural policy directions. In other words,
President Roh originally emphasized creativity, diversity, and dynamism in the cultural sector of the
inaugural stage of the government; however, Roh suddenly pursued growth of the national economy
by working with large conglomerates and foreign forces, which greatly influenced his cultural policy
(Choi 2013; Jin 2016).
During his inauguration speech, indeed Roh (2003) talked about his intention to support the cultural
industries by saying, ‘I will promote culture and extend active support for the progress of culture indus-
tries.’ Just before starting the FTA drive, during his congressional speech in October 2004, he stated that
cultural creativity and diversity are great assets to open Korea’s possibility and future. In recent years, Korean
movies had received several awards in global film festivals, and drams embedded in local mentalities and cultures
generated the Korean Wave boom in several Asian countries. I will actively develop the cultural industries as a
future driving force.
Ultimately, he kept his promise, at least for a while.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL POLICY 7

The Ministry of Culture and Tourism also developed its supportive policy measures. One of the
most significant directions could be found in C-Korea 2010 Vision. The Ministry of Culture and Tourism
developed the C-Korea 2010 blueprint designed to meet three policy objectives to turn Korea into a
top five culture industry country in the globe;
The ministry’s blueprint initiatives are based on three C’s: content, creativity and culture. In order to spread the
word about Hallyu around the world, the blueprint envisions Korean Plazas in 15 cities in Asia, Central and South
America and Western and Eastern Europe. These tourism and commodity-related pavilions are expected to attract
widespread interest in Korea and its culture and to create demand for Korean cultural industry exports. C-Korea
2010 puts private sector creativity in the driver’s seat with the goal of becoming a key supporter of the nation’s
drive to achieve a US$30,000 per capita gross national income (GNI). In this respect, it envisions culture industry
incubators with a focus on a market-friendly structure, the establishment of a special fund and the encouragement
of build-transfer-lease (BTL) projects. (C-Korea 2010)
However, once Roh desired to advance national economy, Korea’s cultural policy dramatically shifted.
President Roh’s primary economic objective was reaching a per capita income level of U.S. $20,000.
According to The Proposed South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) (2007), Roh made an
FTA the top economic priority during his tenure. Soon after his election in 2002, Roh committed himself
to raising Korea’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to $20,000 by the end of the decade and to
transforming Korea into a major economic hub in Northeast Asia by expanding the economic reforms.
President Roh’s political direction, again, fundamentally changed before and after his drive towards
the Korea-U.S. FTA. In his speech on The Export Day in October 2006, he stated that ‘I continue to try
to enhance national images in conjunction with the diffusion of Hallyu.’ However, he dedicated much
time to support his new policy priority, which is the FTA by saying,
The Korea-U.S. FTA is a new opportunity for Korea to jump to developed economy. The FTA will intensify Korea’s
stance in the largest global market and positively influence foreign direct investments …. I will do my best to settle
by all means the Korea-U.S. FTA. (Roh 2006)
Once Roh shifted his political economic agenda, the government, including the Ministry of Culture and
Tourism, had to change its policy priorities. Chang-dong Lee – the Minister of Culture and Tourism – for
example, changed his stance. Lee was himself a movie director who fiercely opposed the reduction of
the screen quota yet had to change his position when President Roh strongly pursed the Korea-U.S.
FTA (Kim 2011).
Consequently, the Korean government scapegoated the screen quota system, which had contributed
to the growth of Korean cinema since its introduction in 1967. In 2006 the Roh government deregulated
this pivotal policy for Korean cinema under pressure from the U.S. as a precondition for starting talks
for the Korea-U.S. FTA, which means that the role of the government in the film sector substantially
decreased (Kim 2011). The government has reduced the screen quota, from 146 days per year to 73 days
a year, from July 2006 onwards, which has severely influenced Korean cinema for several years.6 The
Roh government also significantly changed foreign ownership within the broadcasting sector. Korea
has made the commitment to phase in 100% foreign ownership of programme providers (channel
operators), other than those offering multi-genre, news or home-shopping programming, for firms
that establish a local subsidiary. It also allowed U.S. investment in IPTV, which opened substantial new
opportunities for U.S. interests in the Korean broadcasting marketplace (The United States-Korea Free
Trade Agreement 2007). The Roh government also cut the budget for the cultural industries. In particular,
the Roh government abrogated the Cultural Industry Promotion Fund in 2007, which was established
in 1999 to support corporations operating in the cultural industries, resulting in the plummeting of
financial support to the cultural industries (Park 2012; MCST 2013, 41).
Meanwhile, in 2007 the Ministry of Culture and Tourism changed the fundamental notion of C-Korea
2010; emphasizing contents, culture and creativity, to culture, competitiveness, and creativity. During
his speech at the Global Culture Forum 2007 Seoul, Myung Gon Kim (2007) – the Minister of Culture
and Tourism – stated that
8 W. RYOO AND D. Y. JIN

we need to enhance competitiveness. In a culture where competitiveness is considered to be the most important
value, only those cultures that survived in competition will most likely be regarded as strong and good ones. This
will severely damage cultural diversity.
In this respect, he continued to state that ‘we need to abandon the attitude of giving our priority only
to the economy and see creativity, diversity, and identity as a whole to judge competitiveness.’ However,
he also mentioned that ‘there is a strong demand for appropriate policies to sharpen the competitive
edge of our culture-related industries, including the cultural industry, which can yield high added
value.’ While emphasizing the significance of cultural diversity and creativity, he addressed the notion
of competitiveness as one of the most significant agendas for the cultural industry, which clearly proves
the nuanced and sophisticated government policy in the Roh government. It implies that, although
the Roh government’s cultural policies sought to appropriate the logics of neoliberal reforms, we also
need to understand that this might be a more of strategic manoeuvring of cultural policies in a flexible
fashion to fit to local conditions and context, in the midst of globalization. In other words, indicating its
overall sociocultural concerns for cultural policy, the Roh Moo-hyun government (2003–2008) expected
the Korean Wave to serve as a potential catalyst for transnational cultural dialogue, the development
of Northeast Asian culture and increased cultural collaboration within the Asian region (Ministry of
Culture and Tourism 2004; Lee 2013, 191).
As proved in many other countries, including the U.S., popular culture is a distinctive area that the
government supports in terms of planning and infrastructure (Lee 2007), not only because of its poten-
tial as cultural industries creating economic values, but because of its crucial role of nation-building.
As such, the growth of local popular culture and its export to the global markets deeply influence both
people’s cultural activities and national images, which justify the active role of the government. However,
the liberal governments in Korea were primarily negligent because these governments weighed the
country’s economic growth over the cultural industries in responding to both global and local politi-
cal-economic milieu surrounding their administrations.

Developmental neoliberal cultural industries policy in the conservative governments

Cultural industries policy has changed once again since 2008. The conservative governments, both the
Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations developed new policy measures to advance the
export of cultural products. Favourable cultural policy for the cultural industries by the conservative
governments has been well articulated in presidential speeches. The two previous liberal governments
focused on the national economy by sacrificing the cultural industries in terms of the government fund-
ing and legal measures, moves which were triggered by the 1997 economic crisis and the subsequent
IMF bail-out package. However, the two conservative administrations considered the cultural industries
as one of the most significant areas that the government must support to foster growth. During his
inauguration speech, Lee (2008) stated;
The Korean Wave that is now well placed around the globe testifies to the advantage of skillful replications of such
a long tradition. Modernization of traditional culture is useful for facilitating arts and culture and such attempts
surely dignify the country’s economic prosperity. Now, culture has become an industry. We must develop our
competitiveness in our content industries, thereby laying the foundation to become a nation strong in cultural
activities. The new Administration will do its best to bring the power of our culture into a full blossom in this glo-
balized setting of the 21st century.
The policy changes from hands-off, which is indirect and passive, to hands-on, which is direct and active,
approaches in the cultural industries were faithfully executed by the executive branch, in particular the
Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
On the one hand, the Lee government newly established the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism
(MCST) in 2008 by converging the existing Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) and the Ministry of
Information and Communication (MIC). The MCST developed the notion of the content industries in the
Lee government and creative industries in the Park Geun-hye government and placed their importance
as primary driving forces within the wider national economy. This means that both the Lee and Park
governments intended to develop popular culture as cultural commodities for the Korean economy.
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL POLICY 9

Instead of developing new creative mechanisms to advance cultural identity and sovereignty in the
cultural industries, by furthermore commercializing and marketizing cultural content, they jumped on
the band wagon that was already operating at increasing speed and scope.
On the other hand, the Lee government supported the cultural industries with both financial and
legal arms. In 2011, the Korean government established the Contents Industries Promotion Committee,
chaired by Prime Minister. The Committee developed on annual action plans consisting of several
strategies to strengthen the competiveness of Korea’s creative industries. For example, based on the
discussions and actions plans decided by the Committee, the Korean government decided to spend a
total of 452.2 billion won in 2015. The government therefore supported Korean film festivals and helped
broadcast Korean TV soap operas abroad in a bid to promote cultural exchange and to improve Korea’s
national images (Contents Industry Promotion Committee 2011; Limb 2014).
While several reasons explain why the Lee government pursued these cultural policies, the Lee gov-
ernment, followed by the Park Geun-hye government, especially sought to connect the Korean Wave
and soft power. Again, as Nye (2004, 256) argued, soft power means ‘the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or payments’ via culture, values and foreign policies. The Lee
government continuously emphasized that the government planned to build up national power with
culture. During the first year of Lee’s administration, the government highlighted culture as a criterion of
national competitiveness and a sine qua non for improving the national brand, thereby strengthening
the ability of public diplomacy and giving positive impressions to foreign people, and improving enter-
prises’ images overseas (MCST 2009, Kim and Jin 2016). In this regard, the Lee government expanded
the scope of the Korean Wave to food, sports, and tourism. It is certain that
the Lee government fundamentally developed the cultural industries with the name of contents industries, empha-
sizing the production and the export of cultural contents; as if he is the CEO of a corporation, the Lee government
was known as corporate state. (Choi 2013, 257)
The Lee government was
the most neoliberal of all Korean governments. It sought to promote the growth of the economy through pro-busi-
ness policies such as low corporate taxes and low interest rates. Even under Lee, however, the government retained
its capacity to intervene in the economy
as well as in the cultural industries (Suh and Kwon 2014, 689). In this regard, the Lee government’s
cultural industries policies can be identified as developmental neoliberalism, because it mainly devel-
oped the nexus of the government and big corporations, including mega media and cultural firms. The
priority of the Lee government in the cultural sector was the growth of cultural contents developed
by major cultural industries corporations, including CJ and Lotte, and it continued to deregulate and
liberalize the cultural markets.
Meanwhile, as one of the key presidential election promises was continued support for Korea’s cre-
ative economy and its cultural industries, the Park Geun-hye government (2013–2017)7 pursued and
even intensified its supportive cultural policy in the cultural industries (Kwon and Kim 2014; Jin 2016).
Park planned to implement more funds and policies for the culture sector when she stepped into power
in February 2013 (Lee 2012). During her inaugural speech on 25 February 2013, Park emphasized the
significance of the Korean Wave and her intention to support it:
In the 21st century, culture is power. It is an era where an individual’s imagination becomes creative contents. Across
the world, the Korean Wave is welcomed with great affection that not only triggers happiness and joy but one
that instills abiding pride in all Koreans …. The new administration will elevate the sanctity of our spiritual ethos
so that they can permeate every facet of society and in so doing, enable all of our citizens to enjoy life enriched by
culture. Creative activities across wide-ranging genres will be supported, while the contents industry which merges
culture with advanced technology will be nurtured. In so doing, we will ignite the engine of a creative economy
and create new jobs. (Park 2013)
As President Park planned, the MCST (2013) immediately announced that it would substantially
improve its supporting mechanism to the cultural industries. During the annual report to the president
in March 2013, the ministry stated that it especially fosters five major contents areas which are globally
competitive, consisting of digital games, K-pop, animation/character, music, and musical. For example, it
10 W. RYOO AND D. Y. JIN

planned to construct a K-pop performance centre near Seoul, while expanding its financial subsidies to
the animation/character sector, from 92 million Korean won in 2013 to 200 million won in 2017. Unlike
previous governments, the conservative governments also announced that they planned to develop
fashion and webtoon as new areas of the Korean Wave (MCST 2013, 20, 21).
The government budget also demonstrates the increasing role of the conservative government in the
cultural industries. Unlike the liberal governments, in particular, the Roh Moo-hyun government which
decreased the budget towards the cultural industries of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism,
from 12.7% in 2003 to 9% in 2007, the conservative governments have increased the same budget, from
9.9% in 2008 to 15.6% in 2015 (MCST 2013, 41, 2015; Jin 2016). The Park government’s main agenda
indeed was to increase the allotted budget for the culture ministry to 2% by the end of her term in 2017.
As of 2012, it was 1.14% as being far from the average of 1.9% for other OECD countries (Lee 2012).
Of course, as in the Lee government, the Park administration’s cultural politics was complicated as
her administration made several negative political decisions in the realm of the cultural sector, includ-
ing its budget cut to the Pusan Film Festival and the creations of the blacklist of artists encompassing
more than 1000 anti-government cultural producers, media scholars, and practitioners. Officially, Park
has made promoting movies and other cultural products one of her key priorities. But secretly, her
government has blackballed artists, reviving a practice of past military dictators like her father, Park
Chung-hee, and in so doing has “seriously undermined the freedom of thought and expression” (Hun
2017). The Park administration certainly executes its role as a developmental state, either supporting
the cultural sector through government budgets or severely regulating the cultural sector through
budget cuts and/or censorship.
In the Korean context, the developmental state is still running strong although the major charac-
teristic is being changed as sociopolitical milieus are played out. Neoliberal globalization enforces
certain restrictions on particular levels of cultural policy; however, the character of the Korean state
has continued supporting cultural industries. As the cultural industries have become one of the most
significant parts of the national economy in terms of exports, the Korean governments, in particular, the
conservative governments have prioritized the cultural sector. The government sometimes emphasized
its role as the regulator through financial and legal mechanism.
As such, cultural industries policy in the conservative governments emphasizes the commercial
role of Korean popular culture in the global cultural markets and develops mechanisms to support
cultural exportation. For the Lee and Park governments, the cultural flows of local popular culture
were essential because, again, the Korean Wave has played a major role for both the national economy
and soft power. Although transnational flows of culture have increased and made it far more difficult
for the nation-state to control, there are great variations in the capacity of states to control (Holton
1998, cited in Fulcher 2000). The Korean government has reconstructed its authority in the middle of
the confrontation between neoliberal reforms and state-developmentalism. The Korean government
since 2008 has advanced a developmental neoliberal cultural policy, which means that the govern-
ment, instead of only adopting neoliberal reforms, has acted as a key supporter of the Korean Wave
in the tradition of its state-led interventionism. Given that the nature of the support, emphasizing
competitiveness and global flows of local popular culture, is neoliberal, it is certain that neoliberalism
has been embedded in the process; however, neoliberalism cannot eradicate the significance of the
nation-state in the Korean context.

Discussion and conclusion

This essay has analysed the role of the nation-state with the case of the cultural industries. During the
growth of the local cultural industries and consequently the Korean Wave over the past twenty years,
cultural policy has been considered one of the most significant driving forces. What is interesting is that
the Korean government has fundamentally changed its cultural policy toward the cultural industries
amid conflicts between neoliberal and developmental perspectives. In other words, the local cultural
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL POLICY 11

industries have been advanced sometimes by emphasizing developmentalism and at other times focus-
ing on neoliberal cultural policies.
The Korean Wave phenomenon has begun with some television programmes mainly since 1997,
therefore, it started to analyse the increasing role of the Kim Young-sam government, which paved the
road for the growth of cultural industries. The Kim government extensively adopted neoliberal reforms;
however, unlike other countries, such as Mexico, Brazil and Chile, it strategically emphasized the signif-
icance of the cultural industries and the export of cultural products. As his concept of globalization did
not only open the domestic market to foreign forces, but also ask domestic corporations to penetrate
the global markets, the government pursed several supportive cultural policies to enhance the national
economy. In this context, the Kim government can be characterized by ‘neoliberal developmentalism,’
by which neoliberalism is utilized as a tool to fulfil government’s developmental purposes (Yoon 2009).
The two following liberal governments – Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun – continued developing
neoliberal economic policy. It was indispensable for the Kim Dae-jung government primarily because
of the 1997 economic crisis. The Kim Dae-jung government had no choice but to develop neoliberal
reforms in return for the IMF bailout programmes. In the case of the Roh Moo-hyun government, Roh
championed neoliberal globalization as evidenced in the case of the U.S.-Korea FTA. During the process,
although the government offered limited support to the cultural industries, these areas were not a main
concern for liberal administrations. The liberal governments had continued to adopt an increasingly
neoliberal approach that is less supportive of government intervention in the cultural industry.
The role of the Korean government in tandem with the cultural industries much changed when
Lee Myung-bak took political power in 2008. The conservative governments until the Park Geun-hye
administration have developed their cultural policies, renamed the cultural contents and the creative
industries. As expected, they have taken the core of a neo-liberalized regime; however, they undertake
active and direct cultural policy measures. While the relationship between the nation-state and the
cultural industries has undergone a vibrant transformation since the early 1990s, the conservative
governments have acted as the supporters of the growth of the Korean cultural industries.
Neoliberal and consumerist orientation in cultural policy did not outdate its long-standing development approach:
governmental planning and investment have intensified in order to address the policy goal of helping Korean
cultural industries fit in the increasingly globalized economy and expanding their overseas markets. (Lee 2013, 186)
The conservative governments had taken developmental neoliberal policy, which emphasized the role
of the nation-state in the cultural sector, while continuing their expansion of neoliberal reforms. As
Pieterse (2004) points out, one of the fundamental contradictions of neoliberal globalization concerns
the role of government which arguably opened up in the Korean cultural industries and the Korean
Wave.
In general, under neoliberal reform, the primary role of the Korean government has been somewhat
decreased; however, the nation-state remains and unexpectedly intensifies its role in popular culture.
‘The nation-state changes, as does the context within which it operates, but there is no sign of its
demise or withering away’ (Fulcher 2000, 541), and in countries like Korea, it is not likely to witness the
decreasing role of the nation-state with some exception. While implementing its commercial identities,
the government plays a significant role. It illustrates that neoliberalism does not necessarily weaken
nation-states in the realm of popular culture. Instead, in some circumstances, the government has rein-
forced and even intensified its centrality to cultural life. The Korean cultural industries and the Korean
Wave have grown in the middle of a coexistence of neoliberalism and developmentalism. Neoliberalism
has not completely altered the Korean state-interventionism in the cultural industries, while state-led
developmentalism only cannot be a sole mechanism in the growth of the local cultural industries.
In this respect, it is not dangerous or controversial to argue that the Korean governments have
advanced the logic of neoliberal agendas, while structurally developing state-led developmental prin-
ciples, which make the Korean cultural industries and the Korean Wave unique in terms of the role
of the nation-state. In the realm of popular culture, the Korean government has developed a style of
neoliberalism with Korean individualities rooted in developmental paradigm. There is no doubt that
12 W. RYOO AND D. Y. JIN

Korea began the transition to a neoliberal state in the late 1980s, but the fundamental stance of the
government remained that of a developmental state throughout, and that the capacity of government
to exercise strong intervention in the cultural industries has been retained in a different degree and
attitude according to each administration’s agenda and ideology. In other words, this coexistence of
cultural policies was a deliberate choice of the government, which deployed a flexible policy mix in
responding to changes in the environment and hence contributed to continuing growth and devel-
opment over the past two decades (Suh and Kwon 2014).
Of course, it is certain that the Korean government, whether they execute neoliberal developmen-
tal, neoliberal, or developmental neoliberal mechanisms, commonly develops cultural policy empha-
sizing market-based aspects of the creative industries. In other words, all successive governments
have developed their cultural policies in the name of economic imperatives. Since the Kim Young-sam
administration introduced globalization, the Korean state has emphasized the market and supported
cultural industries corporations, many of them being mega corporations. Korea’s cultural policy has
not been purely formed by the notion of cultural identity, and these administrations have not been
actively initiated in developing national culture, but cultural economy embedded in the Korean Wave.
To conclude, both liberal and conservative administrations have promoted the competitiveness of
Korean national economy and image through the growth of cultural industries and the Korean Wave;
however, the scale and scope of each administration toward their cultural policies were not identical
in their emphasis on developmentalism and/or neoliberalism. This kind of difference in its agenda and
ideology of each administration has resulted in considerable structural transformations in national
mediascape, as well as global cultural scene.

Notes
1. K-pop was relatively unknown to the global music markets until early 2001 when SM Entertainment began to
promote a teenage-girl singer named BoA who precisely targeted the Japanese market (Jung 2013). In the music
industry, the foreign export includes recorded music (sales of music CDs), digital music (online sales), and music
events, including music concerts. However, given rampant illegal downloads of music, the popularity of K-pop in
the 2010s could be much bigger than the money value mentioned above (MCST 2012).
2. For example, the Korean cultural industries, such as broadcasting and film, had to develop their own local cultural
products because many cable program providers had not enough budget to import foreign programs in the post
1997 economic crisis and also they were mandated to do so according to their government-issued licences and
programing guidelines.
3. Then, the cultural industries were not the main part of the national economy and popular culture was not a tangible
commodity for the governments who pursued export-led economic policies.
4. Admitting diverse approaches and interpretations, this essay mainly interprets the nation-building process from a
political economy approach because the Korean government mainly utilized the notion of nation-building for the
development of the national economy. As Mosco (1996, 200) argued, ‘processes of nation-building are viewed as
occupying a political space either supporting or resisting the economic imperative,’ and therefore nation-building
is a political economy process. Of course,
nation building is more than a political or a cultural question led by governments, because it is also ‘an
economic strategy for determining the most appropriate way of consolidating an economic system based
on industry, commercial relations and professional know-how.’ This means that we must accept that ‘national
identity, as a collective identity, is defined not only by the producers’ proposal.
At the same time, “it must be known how the production process works, how television programs and films define
the nation, ‘on which terms cultural policy is involved in the process, and which economic and political factors
must be taken into account“ (Enric 2007, 50).
5. In the realm of culture, the direct distribution rights of Hollywood studios started in 1988, which was forced by
the U.S. government and Hollywood studios cleared indicated that the Korean government started to develop
neoliberal reforms by deregulating and liberalizing the cultural markets.
6. The exports of domestic films plummeted, from $76 million in 2004 to only $13.6 million in 2010, with a slight
recovery in recent years (e.g. $29.3 million in 2015) (Korean Film Council 2016).
7. President Park Geun-hye was removed from office on 10 March 2017, as the Korean Constitutional Court
unanimously upheld a parliamentary vote to impeach her for her role in a corruption and influence-peddling
scandal. The impeachment marks a historic moment in Korea that adopted democracy only 30 years ago. In sharp
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CULTURAL POLICY 13

contrast with Korea’s history of military coups, peaceful protests this time led to the removal of an elected leader
(Fifield 2017). President Park became Korea’s first president to be impeached, and this resulted in quick elections
for a new president to be held within 60 days, that was held in 9 May 2017.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors
Woongjae Ryoo is an associate professor in the Department of Media and Communication at Hanyang University in Seoul,
Korea. His major research and teaching interests are in the areas of global media and communication, communication and
social change, cultural studies, creative industries, critical social theory, discourse and rhetorical studies, and qualitative
research methodology. He has published his work in Asian Journal of Communication, Media, Culture, and Society, Journal of
Contemporary Asia, Journal of International and Area Studies, International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, and Popular
Music and Society, and is the author of multiple books.
Dal Yong Jin is a professor in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University. He finished his PhD degree from the
Institute of Communications Research at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. His major research and teaching
interests are on social media and platform technologies, mobile technologies and game studies, media (de-)convergence,
globalization and media, transnational cultural studies, and the political economy of media. He is the author of several
books, such as Understanding the Business of Global Media in the Digital Age (2017, Routledge), Smartland Korea: mobile
communication, culture and society (University of Michigan Press, 2017), New Korean Wave: transnational cultural power
in the age of social media (University of Illinois Press, 2016), Digital Platforms, Imperialism and Political Culture (Routledge,
2015), De-convergence of Global Media Industries (Routledge, 2013), and Korea’s Online Gaming Empire (MIT Press, 2010).

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