Human Rights as a Common Concern

Author(s): Charles R. Beitz

Source: The American Political Science Review , Jun., 2001, Vol. 95, No. 2 (Jun., 2001),
pp. 269-282
Published by: American Political Science Association

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American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 2 June 2001

Human Rights as a Common Concern

CHARLES R. BEITZ Bowdoin College
he doctrine of human rights has come to play a distinctive role in
the role of a moral touchstone--a standard of assessment and cr
standard of aspiration for their reform, and increasingly a stand
practices of international economic and political institutions. In
controlling documents of international law in taking a broad view o
political theorists argue, however, that this view is excessively broad
are to be regarded as a truly common concern of world society, mu
against that perspective and in favor of the view implicit in contemp
right to democratic institutions as an example.

ore than fifty years have passed since

the machinery the typically
of coercion U.N. associated with
General Assembly adopted thewithin
adjudication Universal
the state).1
The public
Declaration of Human Rights, role in
and of human
thatrights also has been
important-more
time the doctrine of human rights has come so perhaps
to than
playgenerally
a recognized
in an
distinctive and in some respects the United States-beyond
unexpected the sphere
role in of intergov-
international life. This is primarily ernmental
the rolerelations.
of Human
a moralrights have served as
touchstone-a standard of assessment and criticism for bases for standard setting, monitoring, reporting, and
domestic institutions, a standard of aspiration for their advocacy by nongovernmental organizations at both
the domestic and the international levels of world
reform, and increasingly a standard of evaluation for
the policies and practices of international economic politics (Best 1995; Korey 1998). To whatever extent
and political organizations. This role is carried out in a contemporary international political life can be said to
variety of ways. Perhaps the most visible is the increas- have a "sense of justice," its language is the language of
human rights.
ing willingness to regard concern about human rights
I do not mean to overstate the case. Notwithstanding
violations as an acceptable justification for various
the hopes of its authors, the Universal Declaration
kinds of international intervention, ranging from dip-
does not function today as an "international bill of
lomatic and economic sanctions to military action, in
the domestic affairs of states. rights." The international capacity to enforce the re-
quirements of human rights law on states is at best
But coercive intervention in any form is exceptional,
embryonic. Outside Europe, most individual victims of
and the political functions of human rights usually are
human rights abuses have no effective appeal beyond
considerably less dramatic. For example, a govern- their domestic courts, if there. And even in countries
ment's human rights record may determine eligibility within the global "human rights culture" there is great
for development assistance programs, or human rightsvariation in the degree to which internationally recog-
conditions may be attached to internationally spon- nized human rights are embedded in domestic legal
sored financial adjustment measures. The likely effect systems.2 The juridical role of human rights is both
on satisfaction of human rights may function as a limited and uneven. But none of this shows that the
standard of evaluation for the policies of international national foreign policy measures, international institu-
financial and trade institutions. In the United States, tions, and nongovernmental organizations dedicated to
legislation requires periodic reporting by the govern- the advancement of human rights are politically incon-
ment regarding human rights practices in other coun- sequential. In fact, the global human rights regime is
tries and makes eligibility for certain forms of prefer- almost certainly more influential today than at any time
ential treatment in U.S. foreign policy dependent on since World War II.3
satisfaction of minimum human rights standards. In This fact recalls a longstanding worry about the
various parts of the world, most notably in Europe, doctrine of international human rights, expressed var-
regional codes have been adopted, and there is a iously in terms of its alleged partiality or parochialism.
developing capacity for adjudication and something
like enforcement (even the European Court of Human 1 Notwithstanding, governments seem to acknowledge the court's
Rights' capacity to hold governments accountable lacksauthority, as the decision by the British government regarding the
treatment of homosexuals in the military illustrates (Financial Times
1999). On the variety of roles played by human rights in intergov-
ernmental relations, see, e.g., Forsythe 2000, pt. II; Vincent 1986,
Charles R. Beitz is Professor of Government, Bowdoin College, esp. chaps. 4-6; and the case studies in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink
Brunswick, ME 04011. 1999.
For questions and comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to 2 The idea of a human rights culture derives from the Argentinean
Brian Barry, Amy Gutmann, Kristen Hessler, Jamie Mayerfield, jurist Eduardo Rabossi (Rorty 1993, 115).
Thomas Pogge, Thomas Scanlon, Lawrence Simon, and Dennis 3 Precisely why this should be true is an interesting question. There
Thompson, as well as to audiences at Columbia University and is a provocative discussion that focuses on the growth of the
Princeton University. European human rights regime in Moravcsik 2000.

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 Human Rights as a Common Concern June 2001

In practice, the worry arises asthat

an isobjection
missing from to
the external
liberal view. But there is
measures that are intended tosomething
induce paradoxical about this thought.
a government to Once we
begin to describe evaluative
comply with the doctrine's requirements. Suchstandards
mea- for social and
sures by another governmentpolitical
or an external
institutions, organiza-
it is hard to explain why we should
stop short of
tion are sometimes said to constitute thea full description of these
imposition ofrequirements as
foreign values upon a culturewewhose
see them. history
Of course, any such standards
and con- should be
appropriate
ventional moral beliefs do not support for thethem-in
empirical circumstances
the in which
they are supposed
extreme case, a kind of postcolonial to apply, and it is important to add
imperialism.
that this will
There is a reflection of this worry atleave
the some room for variation. But the
theoretical
level in a tension between two intent would still be to state
conceptions ofconditions
human for the legiti-
rights that can be found in macy of institutions. If thought.
philosophical this is the intent, then why
According to one conception, should
human we stop short of a represent
rights full, liberal conception of
the common element in a range humanof rights? And what
views aboutwould be the principle of
social
justice or political legitimacy distinction
found betweenamong the full
theand the restricted concep-
world's
tions?
cultures. A variant of this position, which is more
permissive as to what might be My purpose
counted here is to
asexplore
a human the thinking that
might lead
right but is motivated by a similar idea,someone to advocate
regards humana nonpartisan or
restricted
rights as political standards that would view be
of human rights. More precisely,
reasonable to I shall
take up one aspect
accept regardless of one's (culturally of this subject: views
influenced) Does the nonparti-
sanship,
about social justice or political nonparochialism,
legitimacy. Thisor neutrality
notion of a set of
rights, in
might be expressed by saying that itself, provide
human a reason to
rights treat these rights, as
strive
opposed to or
to be nonpartisan, nonparochial, a more extensive setamong
neutral like that found in
international
conflicting political cultures and doctrine, Ias shall
ideologies.4 having acall
special status in
international
this the nonpartisan or restricted affairs? In putting
conception the question this way, I
of human
rights. mean to distinguish considerations of ideological and
The other conception regards human rights as dis- cultural pluralism from various other kinds of reasons
tinctive of a particular view or family of views about for giving some political aims priority over others-for
social justice or political legitimacy. Although a list of example, reasons of urgency, efficiency, and institu-
human rights might not be a complete description of tional competence. These other reasons are obviously
the requirements of social justice for a society, on this important and may often prove decisive in establishing
conception it would be more than the common element priorities for political action, but they are also more
found among, or acceptable to, otherwise divergent easily understood, so for now I lay them aside. I will
views of social justice. That is, human rights identify conclude-tentatively, because I cannot give the view
conditions that society's institutions should meet if we an affirmative defense here-that considerations of
are to consider them legitimate. But because there is ideological and cultural pluralism need not, in them-
no general reason to believe that these conditions are selves, limit the scope of a plausible doctrine of inter-
included in all the views about social justice or political national human rights, although they may have impor-
legitimacy that exist in the world-or even among tant bearing on reasoning about the connection
those that have achieved widespread acceptance in between human rights and political action.
individual societies-there is no claim that human
rights are nonpartisan. On this view, in contrast to the
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AS
first, the advocate of human rights takes a stand PARTISAN
on STANDARDS
controverted questions of political theory. I call this the
liberal or full conception of human rights.5 To place the theoretical question in its political con-
Many people will think that the restricted conceptiontext, I begin with some summary remarks about the
is the more plausible because it seems to embodyhistory a and content of the doctrine of human rights as
tolerance of culturally embedded moral differences we find it in international law and practice.
Although the contemporary international doctrine
of human rights has many antecedents, both philosoph-
4 In an article whose title ("Human Rights as a Neutral Concern")
ical and political, it is principally a legacy of World War
inspired the title of this paper, Scanlon (1979, 83) describes human
II. It arose, on the one hand, from the statement of
rights as "a ground for action that is neutral with respect to the main
political and economic divisions in the world" and as standards allied
that war aims in the Atlantic Charter (1941) and, on
the other, from persistent pressure brought by individ-
"are not controversial in the way that other political and economic
issues are." He does not suggest, as do some of the writers uals
consid-
and groups outside government for a declaration
ered below, that human rights aspire to be neutral among all
of political principles for the postwar world. The
conceptions of justice or legitimacy. Rawls (1999a, 65, n. 4 and
Preamble to the United Nations Charter (adopted in
accompanying text) cites the Scanlon article as a source for the
conception of human rights in The Law of Peoples. 1946) affirms "faith in fundamental human rights," and
Article 1 commits the organization to encourage re-
s Donnelly (1999, 81) characterizes human rights as "a distinctive,
historically unusual set of social values and practices." Others whofor "human rights and for fundamental freedoms
spect
have espoused a liberal view of human rights include Waldron (1993,
for all." (By contrast, there was no mention of human
10-24), Nino (1991, passim), and Rorty (1993). Needless to say,
rights
agreement about the scope of human rights can coexist with dis- or any analogous idea in the Covenant of the
agreement in other dimensions. League of Nations [Lauren 1998, chaps. 5-6].) The

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 2

charter does not give content to the

cultural idea of human
differences in a way
rights and fundamental freedoms,
contenthowever. For that
of a person's human
one must refer to the Universal Declaration
features (1948) and
of that person's cultur
two international covenants, one on conference
national civil and political
on human
rights and the other on economic,
Vienna in social,
1993, and cultural the
considered
rights (both 1966). It bears remembering
final that the
act of the conference de
declaration is just that, a declaration of the General
among categories, holding that
Assembly without the force of law, whereas
universal, the and
indivisible cove-inter
nants are treaties to which lated."
national governments
Although have
it recognized th
acceded. Together these documents,
national and which oftenparticula
regional are
referred to collectively (and, as I suggested
in mind," earlier,
it declared that "it
misleadingly) as the International Bill of
regardless of their
Rights, con-
political, e
stitute an authoritative catalog of internationally
systems, to promote and rec-prote
ognized human rights. fundamental freedoms" (Uni
There are various ways to classify
1.5). the rights enumer-
ated in these documents. For our purposes
Human rights are it
sometimes thought to set ais
mini-useful
to think of internationally recognized
mal standard, but it is nothuman
obvious what this rights
can mean. as
falling roughly into five categories, although
The rights of the declaration it is less
and the two covenants,
important to agree about categories than
taken in their entirety, include to that
requirements appreciate
bear
the scope and detail of the on
enumerated rights.
nearly every significant dimension of a society's
1. Rights of the person referbasic institutional
to structure,
life,ranging from protections
liberty, and
security of the person; against
privacy the misuse of and state power to requirements
freedom of
movement; ownership of concerning the political process, welfare
property; policy, and the
freedom of
thought, conscience, and organization
religion, of the economy. In scope and detail,
including free-
international
dom of religious teaching and practice human rights are not more"in
minimal public
than,
say, the
and private"; and prohibition of requirements
slavery, of Rawls's torture,
principles of social and
justice. And those principles are not minimal in any
cruel or degrading punishment.
very interesting
2. Rights associated with the rulesense. of law include equal
recognition before the lawStill,
and one canequal
acknowledge the scope and detail of
protection of
internationally
the law; effective legal remedy forrecognized human rights without
violation of giving
legal
rights; impartial hearing up the idea that
and they are orpresumption
trial; should aspire to be neutral of
innocence; and prohibitionor of
nonparochial standards. So it may
arbitrary be useful to
arrest.
recall, briefly
3. Political rights encompass freedom and without critical
ofcomment, some
expression,
assembly, and association; recent
the instances
right in which
toit has
take been said that human
part in
rights are not neutral
government; and periodic and genuine elections because they conflict with by
prac-
tices endorsed by one or another of the world's major
universal and equal suffrage.
conventional
4. Economic and social rights moralities. All
refer to of these
anareadequate
familiar in the
human rights
standard of living; free choice literature.
of employment; pro-
tection against unemployment;One example is the dispute
"just andabout "Asian values." In
favorable
remuneration"; the right to join
the last decadetrade unions;
some East Asian "rea-
political leaders (e.g.,
Lee Kwan hours";
sonable limitation of working Yew of Singapore and Mahathir
free elemen- Mohamad
tary education; social security; and
of Malaysia) argued the
that some "highest
of the political and civil
attainable standard of physical
rights found and mental
in the international health."
doctrine-mainly free-
5. Rights of communities include
dom of expressionself-determination
and political participation-are
and protection of minorityincompatible
cultures. with traditional Asian political beliefs,
which value social harmony over public dispute and the
I note, but shall not discuss, that other international
collective pursuit of shared interests over the individual
agreements have elaborated and enlarged the scope of
pursuit of private interest. The civil and political rights
human rights in the areas of genocide, slavery and
of the declaration were distinctively "Western" values.
forced labor, racial discrimination, apartheid, discrim-
For this reason, it was said, international pressure for
ination against women, and the rights of children.6
domestic political reform (exerted, e.g., by means of
There has been a long-standing dispute in official
the attachment of political conditions to international
international discourse about human rights doctrine on
financial arrangements) was inappropriate (Kausikan
two major points: whether the international community
1993).
should recognize any priorities, either moral or prag-
Or consider the question of the subordination of
matic, among categories of rights (particularly between
women in traditional Islamic doctrine, elements of
civil and political as against economic and social rights)
which are carried over into some authoritative modern
and whether human rights doctrine should take note of
interpretations. There is, for example, no presumption
of equal treatment or equal protection of law, no
6 These agreements, as well as the Universal Declaration and the two protection against forced marriage, and either required
covenants, are conveniently collected in Brownlie 1992. or permitted forms of gender discrimination (e.g.,

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 Human Rights as a Common Concern June 2001

mandatory veiling and sexualNEUTRALITY AND PATERNALISM

seclusion and segrega-
tion). To the extent that these elements are embodied
The evident partisanship of international human rights
in the public law and legally sanctioned practices of
doctrine has led some philosophers to suggest that we
Islamic states, such as Iran and Pakistan (or for that
should distinguish between the full set of values recog-
matter Saudi Arabia), there is a clear conflict with the
nized as human rights in international law and a
requirements of international human rights doctrine,
restricted subset variously referred to as "basic rights"
and pressure to conform to these requirements will be
(Shue 1996)10 or "human rights proper" (Rawls 1999a,
regarded as partisan.7
80, n. 23). For expository purposes I shall call the
Finally, there is the much discussed matter
restricted subset-whatever of female
its contents turn out to
genital mutilation (FGM), still practiced ritualistically
be-"genuine" human rights. The fact that the rights in
in Sahelian African on as many as two million girls, at
the subset could be regarded as nonpartisan, or ideo-
or before puberty, each year. FGM, which can take
logically or culturally neutral, might be seen as quali-
several forms, is sustained by cultural acceptance
fying them to play a special role in foreign policy for
rather than the force of law, so it does not obviously
which international human rights generally are not
represent a case of a human rights violation by the
suited.
state. Yet, where it occurs, FGM is not an aberration;
Among those who believe there are grounds for
it is entrenched in local cultures and permitted or
restricting genuine human rights to some sort of
required by local moral codes. And it is subject to
nonparochial or neutral core, it is not always clear what
intervention, if not by the state, then by nongovern-
these grounds are or why we should care about them.
mental agencies that claim to be acting to defend the
In this section and the next, I discuss these questions in
human rights of the women affected. There is contro-
connection with each of two distinct interpretations of
versy about the seriousness of the harms brought about
neutrality or nonparochialism.
by FGM in comparison with various practices found in
Consider first an approach suggested by some re-
Western cultures, but whatever one's view about that, it
marks of Michael Walzer (although he does not make
would be hard to argue that interference to curtail
the connection with human rights explicit), who distin-
FGM constitutes the application of a culturally neutral
guishes between "thin" and "thick" moralities. Walzer
standard.8
In each of these cases it has been said that the local (1994, 9-10) speculates that a comparison of the moral
codes found in various societies might produce "a set
moralities that permit or require practices inconsistentof standards to which all societies can be held-
with international human rights are sufficiently com-
negative injunctions, most likely, rules against murde
plex to allow for an internal critique of the offending
deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny." These st
practices.9 This is true and important, but it does not dards would constitute "the moral minimum," not
diminish the impression that human rights operate in
complete moral code but, rather, "reiterated featu
all three settings in a nonneutral way. Indeed, the
of particular thick or maximal moralities." Someo
existence of disagreements internal to a culture, com-
influenced by such a distinction might regard hum
bined with the fact that the weight of human rights
rights as part of the "minimum" or "thin" morali
seems usually to favor the modernizing, cosmopolitan
nonparochial in that they are part of a core of requir
side of the disagreement, only strengthens the view of
ments shared by all conventional or "thick" mora
international human rights as a partisan rather than a
ties-the common elements in a global moral plura
neutral concern. Jack Donnelly (1999, 84) has written
ism. Thus, for example, R. J. Vincent (1986, 48
that internationally recognized human rights "set out
writes of a "core of basic rights that is common to
as a hegemonic political model something very much
like the liberal democratic welfare state of western cultures despite their apparently divergent theorie
which he describes as a "lowest common denomina-
Europe." No doubt this overstates the case, at least
tor."11
insofar as it suggests there is an unambiguous "liberal"
As Walzer's speculation suggests, this conception of
position about the full range of the subject matter of
nonparochialism, if treated as a constraint on what we
international human rights (there is, e.g., no single
should count as genuine human rights, would yield a
liberal view about self-determination or the rights of
relatively short list. Among others, rights requiring
minority cultures). But Donnelly is correct that the
democratic political forms, religious toleration, legal
declaration and covenants cannot really be regarded as
equality for women, and free choice of a marriage
setting forth a culturally or politically ecumenical or
partner would certainly be excluded. Other rights
syncretistic doctrine.
might be excluded if they were understood to generate
7 See the analysis of contemporary sources of Islamic human rights
certain kinds of duties; if, for example, the right to a
law, including the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human high standard of physical and mental health were
Rights, in Mayer 1995, 95-6 and 117-8. On the extent of officially
sanctioned human rights violations in the countries mentioned, see
U.S. Department of State 1999. 10 Compare Miller 1995, 74-5. There is an interestingly different
8 Welch 1995, 87-97. For the criticism that concern about FGM is view in Buchanan 1999, 52-6 and 59-60.
ethnocentric, see the discussion by Tamir (1996) and the response by 11 Similarly, Martin (1993, 75) believes human rights are principles
Kamm (1996). that "would be regarded as reasonable by persons at different times
9 See Sen 1999, 231-46, on Asian values, and An-Na'im 1990, chap. or in different cultures. And such principles, again cross-culturally,
7, esp. pp. 175-7, on gender in Islamic law. In general, compare Perry would be thought to have connection ... with a fairly wide range of
1998, 76-8. differing conventional moralities."

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 2

thought to imply that society has

I believe an many
the reason obligation
people aspire toto
a nonpa-
ensure the accessibility of health
rochial orcare for
culturally all,
neutral then
doctrine the
of human rights is
existence of disagreement about
connected distributive responsi-
to this interference-justifying role. Those
bilities outside of families or local communities would
who object to interference to protect human rights may
presumably exclude this right as well.12 claim that the interference is unjustifiably paternalistic.
The narrowness of the resulting conception might It would be paternalistic in that it limits liberty on the
encourage us to think that this interpretation of neu- grounds that those whose liberty is limited (the "sub-
trality relies excessively on the metaphor of a "core" of jects") will be better off as a result of the interference,
rights common to the world's main conventional mo- and it would be unjustified either because the subjects
ralities. Perhaps this is too restrictive; after all, the idea are capable of making choices for themselves or be-
of a right is itself culturally specific. So one might shift cause the intervenor judges "better off" by standards
to a more elaborate conception that sees human rights the subjects have no reason to accept. A doctrine of
as falling within an "overlapping consensus" of political human rights that satisfies a neutrality constraint might
moralities.13 On such a view, nonparochial human seem to offer the best prospect of meeting the antipa-
rights would not necessarily be part of a common core ternalism objection because, if the human rights at
in the sense of being recognized by all conventional stake are neutral in an appropriate way, then it can be
moralities; instead, they would be rights that could be replied that the aims of interference are ones that its
accepted by a reasonable person consistently with subjects themselves would accept if they were in a
acceptance of any of the main conceptions of political position to bring their own moral beliefs to bear on the
and economic justice in the world. The idea here is that matter at hand.
human rights should be the objects of a possible The antipaternalism objection, as interpreted above,
agreement among the world's political cultures; they faces the following problem. When we are concerned
are norms for the conduct of governments and inter- about a violation of human rights in another society, we
national organizations that anyone who belongs to one are usually not confronted with a situation in which
of these cultures can accept without renouncing other people are unanimous in endorsing standards of con-
important political principles.14 Such a view would be duct that justify the behavior of concern to us.15 The
narrow in comparison with the present international picture of a "we" who believe in human rights and a
doctrine, but presumably it would be broader than the "they" who do not is badly misleading. Among the
"common core": A value could count as a genuine "they" are oppressors and victims, and usually there is
human right even if it were not explicitly present in little reason to believe that the victims all share the
every culture, just in case members of each culture values that the oppressors think justify their conduct.
could reasonably accept it as consistent with theirWhat this shows is that the perception of interference
culture's moral conventions. to defend human rights as a form of paternalism can be
There are other forms of this basic idea, but rathera misapprehension. Paternalism is an intervention in a
than proliferate interpretations I shall turn instead to
person's self-regarding choices on the grounds that the
the question why we should care about a doctrine of intervention is good for that person. The individual
human rights limited to either a common core or an whose liberty is interfered with is the same person as
overlapping consensus. In answering this question, we the one whose good the interference is intended to
should remember that one function of human rights inadvance. In typical cases of interference based on
international politics is to justify external interferencehuman rights, however, some people's liberties are
in a society aimed at changing some aspect of the
infringed in order to protect the human rights of
society's internal life. Such interference might aim, forothers. The justification appropriately appeals not to
example, to stop genocide or forceful political repres-
paternalistic considerations but to the desirability of
sion, to protect the innocent against civil violence whenpreventing a harm or securing a benefit for someone
local authorities are unwilling or unable to do so, to threatened by another agent's wrongful actions or
restore a democratic government removed by force of omissions. (Although not always: Interference to per-
arms, or to deliver humanitarian assistance to thosesuade a young girl not to undergo an FGM procedure
imperiled by natural disaster or political collapse. is genuinely paternalistic, but noncoercive interfer-
ence-such as providing information and so respecting
the girl's capacity for choice-affords a different de-
12 In Walzer's (1994, 28-31) view, distributive justice generally is part
of thick but not thin morality; see his suggestive and interesting fense.) That this should not be immediately obvious is
remarks on "the cure of souls and the cure of bodies in the medieval evidence of the continuing grip of the analogy of
and modern West."
person and state, which tempts us to treat the state as
13 The idea of an overlapping consensus is due to Rawls, but he does
if it had the moral attributes of an individual rather
not use it in the analysis of human rights. See Nussbaum 1997, 286,
than as an aggregate of separate persons with wills and
and 1999, 37-9 and passim, for the application of this idea to human
rights.
interests of their own.
14 I think this is consistent with Scanlon 1979, but it does not seem to In most cases, then, what I have called the antipat-
be consistent with his view in What We Owe to Each Other (1998, ernalism objection, if it pertains at all, must be inter-
348). The position taken there allows judgments about the (un)rea-
sonableness of culturally influenced beliefs about value to enter into
preted elliptically. It must hold that, for purposes of
bottom-line judgments about right and wrong; there is no guarantee
that these judgments would satisfy the condition in the text. The 15 The point has often been noted. See, e.g., Nussbaum 1999, 10-2;
latter seems to me to be closer to the truth. Scanlon 1979, 88.

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 Human Rights as a Common Concern June 2001

DECENCY
justifying external interference in a AND MINIMAL LEGITIMACY
society, we should
base our judgment of what constitutes harm or benefit
I shall turn now to a different reason for limitin
to a member of that society on standards of value that
genuine human rights to a nonparochial core (
belong to the conventional morality of the society, even
therefore a different idea of the way the core can
if we have reason to believe that those on whose behalf
nonparochial). The basic idea is that we can distingu
the interference occurs would reject these values in
between minimal and full legitimacy, with human rig
their own cases. We might call this the principle of
cultural deference.
serving as necessary conditions of minimal legitimacy
A minimally legitimate regime is one that me
In itself this is not necessarily a form of moral
respect as a cooperating member of internatio
relativism, since it does not deny that sound cross-
society, even if it falls short of being (what we wo
cultural moral judgments are possible. Nevertheless,
recognize as) fully legitimate or reasonably just.
taken as a general principle of practical reasoning, it is
Something like this distinction lies behind the co
a strange, even a bizarre, view, for it allows the content
ception of human rights found in Rawls's The Law
of the doctrine of genuine human rights to be deter-
Peoples (1999a). It can be seen as an attempt t
mined by the array of political moralities or concep-describe a view that is significantly nonparochial wit
tions of justice to be found in the world. Suppose a out being neutral in either of the senses I distinguish
society with a racist political culture approves of thein the last section. As Rawls conceives of human righ
forced sterilization of a despised minority race as a they are normative standards that would be satisfied
means of population control. If we accept the principle any "decent" regime, whether a liberal democracy or
of deference, we are forced to delete the right against
(nonliberal, nondemocratic) "decent hierarchical so
genocide from the catalog of genuine human rights, ety." For Rawls, "decency" is a term of art that ser
because it is neither part of nor consistent with the to demarcate the boundaries of acceptable pluralism
racist conception. But surely we would resist doing so.international relations. Decent societies are those that
Someone might think that cases like that of aliberal societies have reason to recognize as "equal
genocidal society are only theoretical possibilities, that participating members in good standing" of interna-
no society would for long support such a horribletional society (the "Society of Peoples") (p. 59). Being
morality. Perhaps, over time, one expects a "normalso recognized, decent societies are entitled to a pre-
distribution" of conventional moralities, each with a
sumption against interference in their internal affairs; it
distinctive structure and content, but all converging on would be wrong for foreign governments to intervene
a substantial common core. This seems to me demon-
militarily, to attach political conditions to bilateral
strably too optimistic, but even if one regards the relationships and transactions, or to criticize. Rawls
genocide case simply as a thought experiment, reflec- distinguishes decency from liberal justice: All liberal
tion about it suggests that the ground of our belief that,societies are decent, but not all decent societies are
for example, genocide is a great wrong has to do notliberal. Human rights are common to all decent soci-
with the fact that other people agree it is so, but with eties, whether they satisfy the requirements of liberal
the nature and consequences of genocide itself (com-justice or not. So conceived, human rights "cannot be
pare Scanlon 1998, 337-8).16 rejected as peculiarly liberal or special to the Western
Whether a standard should be accepted as a groundtradition. They are not parochial" (p. 65).
of action, and a fortiori as a ground of international What should count as genuine human rights? Rawls
action, does not turn on whether the standard is a part believes that all decent societies would respect the
of, or implied by, existing conventional moralities.rights of the person, the rights associated with the rule
Actual agreement is too strong a condition to imposeof law, freedom of religious belief and thought, free-
on any critical standard, and I believe it misrepresentsdom of expression (although perhaps not as extensive
the motivating idea of human rights. To say that humanas justice requires in liberal societies), and certain
rights are "universal" is not to claim that they are economic (mainly subsistence) rights. Decent societies
necessarily either accepted by or acceptable to every-might, however, diverge beyond this area of overlap;
one, given their other political and ethical beliefs. specifically, they are not required to provide for equal
Human rights are supposed to be universal in the sense freedom of public religious practice (but there must be
that they apply to or may be claimed by everyone. To
sufficient liberty to allow the practice of minority
hold, also, that a substantive doctrine of human rights religions "in peace and without fear" [Rawls 1999a,
should be consistent with the moral beliefs and values
74]), equal access to public office, or a right to demo-
found among the world's conventional moralities is to cratic political participation. Therefore, the corre-
say something both more and different, and potentially sponding rights of the declaration-equal freedom of
subversive, of the doctrine's critical aims. public religious practice as opposed to freedom of
conscience and private religious practice, the right to
vote in free and fair elections--do not count as "hu-
16 Brown (1999, 119) claims to the contrary that "there are no
man rights proper"; they "seem more aptly described
general moral standards that apply" to "Bosnian Serbs who kill
Bosnian Muslims" or "Muslim extremists who think that the death as stating liberal aspirations" or "appear to presuppose
penalty is an appropriate response to apostasy" because in each case specific kinds of institutions" (p. 80, n. 23).17
the agents do not believe the conduct in question is wrong. This
cannot be right. The Bosnian Serbs who killed innocent civilians were
wrong to do so, whether they accept this or not. 17 Freedom of religion can be considered a human right "proper," in

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 2

Rawls's view has been criticized

a population that for
shares being too
a decent political toler-
morality is
differentBuchanan
ant of illiberal regimes (e.g., from the earlier example 2000; of a T6son
genocidal
1994). This may turn out government
to be in correct,
a racist society. but thereofis a
But the possibility
danger of overstatement: The
variation doesscope
not affect the ofbasicinternational
point that a doctrine
toleration in Rawls's theory depends
such as Rawls's might justifyon thein idea
interference nondecentof
societies that could not
"decency," which as he understands it easily
is morebe defended against
restric-
tive than it may seem. Acomplaints
decent that it imposes alien renounces
regime values. Something
aggressive war as an instrument
more needs to be said ofto policy;
respond to suchfollows
a complaint. a
"common good conception The ofresponse
justice,"might havein to dowhich
with the normative
every-
one's interests are taken idea
into account
of decency (although
itself, which serves to characterize the per-
haps not on an equal basis); and
minimum respects
requirements certain
of legitimacy. Where does basic
the
force of this
rights, including subsistence idea come from?for
rights, The answerall is not
(so clear that,
among other things, official
to me. The discrimination
underlying thought is that a society against
should
women is not permitted) not
(Rawls 1999a,
have to satisfy 64-7).
liberal principles Itin is
of justice ordertrue
that decency is compatible with
to be regarded a state
by other societies asreligion
legitimate; a society and
with undemocratic, but notmay be nonparticipatory,
deficient by liberal standards yet still political
embody
institutions: decency is, and is intended
elements that distinguish it to
from be, a thieves
a band of weaker who
requirement than liberalhave achieved a modus vivendi.
justice.18 Even These
so,elements
the in- con-
clude the
straints of decency are hardly rule of law, an acceptance
undemanding that all
and, persons
taken
seriously, probably would haveexclude
legal personalitymany ofto the
and the capacity non-
participate in
democratic regimes in the publicworld today
life, and a "common goodand possibly
idea of justice" that is
some ostensibly democraticshared,
ones as well.
at least, by judges In thepublic
and other end this
officials.
Such the
may not be enough to meet a society might be said to but
criticism, embodyit
a form of
helps
avoid a distorted picture of the theory.
reciprocity even if, from a liberal perspective, it is not
It is important to see that, unlike
the preferred the
form.19 common
Unlike liberal societies,core
such a
or overlapping consensus society
views, Rawls's
might embody view
and promote does
a single, not
compre-
require the content of the hensive
human view ofrights
the good life;doctrine to
but it would do so be
under
restricted by the array of conditions
political-moral
(including respect conceptions
for "human rights prop- in
the world. The content is er")
determined
that render the society fromtolerablethe begin-
as a cooperating
ning by the normative idea of
partner fordecency;
liberal societies inhuman rights
the international order.
are said to be nonparochial The in relation
question, however, is notto alla society
whether decent that
societies, not all societies simpliciter.
satisfies these criteria of decency isThis is why
to be preferred to
Rawls's view is not open to
one that the
does objection
not; so much that
is clear. At issue is whether, it
deprives the human rights doctrine
and if ofnot
so why, decent but its capacity
just societies should beto
serve as a basis of social criticism. But
regarded as legitimate and, there is
therefore, as a price
qualified for
to be paid. As Rawls (1999a,
treatment 80-1)
as "members observes, human
in good standing" of the inter-
rights must be considered as order.
national "binding
Why-for the on all purposes
(limited) peoples of
and societies, including international
outlaw political
states" that
life-should violate
decency be re-
these rights. But because garded
human rights
as on a par with liberalare conceived
justice?20
so that they are necessarilyAt one point Rawls (1999a,
common only 67) writes that the
to decent
societies, it cannot be argued that
definition of decency interference
is simply stipulated for the pur- to
protect human rights in other societies
poses of the would
theory, and the reader mustalways be
judge "whether
consistent with the conventional moralities of those a decent people.., .is to be tolerated and accepted."
societies. But it is a serious question whether we have enough to
Of course, much depends on the facts of the case, go on intuitively to make such a judgment. Do we have
particularly on the relationship between the nature of a a clear enough common-sense idea of decency, as a
government and the content of its society's conven-standard for institutions distinct from that of social
tional morality. The case of a rogue tyranny oppressing justice, to judge other than arbitrarily? At another
point he suggests that the content of the idea of
decency is related to the function this idea plays in the
Rawls's sense, only if its scope is interpreted more narrowly than
what some believe to be the intent of Article 18 of the Universal conduct of liberal foreign policy. Liberal states should
tolerate decent nonliberal states (which respect "hu-
Declaration. The human right to freedom of religion, as Rawls
understands it, forbids the persecution of minority religions, but it man rights proper") because they are so structured and
allows for a state religion that enjoys various political privileges, such
governed as to be peaceful, cooperating members of
as public offices open only to its members (1999a, 65, n. 2), and the
state religion may, "on some questions, be the ultimate authority
international society and therefore do not threaten
international
within society and may control government policy on certain impor- stability, whereas interference is permis-
tant matters" (p. 74). sible in "outlaw" states (which do not respect these
18 In the political sphere, for example, a decent regime need not be
democratic, but it must provide regular opportunities for all citizens
to communicate their views and preferences to those authorized to 19 I am grateful to Amy Gutmann for help in clarifying this thought.
make political decisions. Rawls (1999a, 64) calls such an arrange- 20 The restriction to international political life is important. Rawls
ment a "decent consultation hierarchy." The details are complex, and need not (and does not) claim that decency and justice are "on a par"
I pass over them here. for any other purpose.

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 Human Rights as a Common Concern June 2001

rights) because their internal features

minimally legitimate,cause them
in the sense tofor pur-
of being,
threaten international orderposes of(p. 81). As relations,
its international a practical
morally on a par
matter this may be true, butwith
it a cannot
liberally justgive
society,athen it would be possible to
plausible
understand
account of the basis of human rights, "human rights proper"
because as necessary condi-
it would
tionswrong
locate the justification in the of minimalplace,
legitimacy. Therein
not would
thebe a clear
significance of human rightssense
for in the
which rights
these human rights, as against
holders but the full
catalogfor
in the beneficial consequences of internationally
international recognizedorder
human rights,
could be defended
of reducing the number of regimes that doas nonparochial.
not respect If the ethical
them.21 significance of decency derives from that of liberal
Rawls's most perspicuous justice,
argumenthowever-for example,
for if its normative force
tolerating
decent but illiberal regimes
dependsappeals to that
on the hypothesis the conse-
decent societies, left to
quences of toleration for these their ownsocieties
devices, are likely to develop into liberal
themselves.
Decent societies, by definition, ones-thenare
the hypothesis
open to might yield a reason not to
internal,
nonviolent change, and Rawls interfere in decent 61-2)
(1999a, societies, believes
but there would be no
that the evolution of their institutions in a liberal deep distinction between "human rights proper" and
direction is more likely if they are treated "with other
due human rights that are part of liberal justice but
respect" as equal members of international society. not of decency. Indeed, it is hard to see any distinction
This is an empirical hypothesis about political develop-
of principle at all.
ment, and I suspect that some version of it is true in a
significant range of cases (although I am not sure what
would count as evidence for it). Yet, althoughPURPOSES
the AND LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
political development hypothesis bears clearly on the
question of how we should act toward a society, it does
Notwithstanding these doubts about Rawls's interpre-
not bear so obviously on the question of the ethical tation of human rights, reflection about his view sug-
significance of a society's political decency or, deriva-
gests two related precepts for any plausible conception.
tively, of the proper scope of a doctrine of human I shall try to formulate these precepts in a general way
rights. Perhaps the connection, in Rawls's view, is that
and then explain why they seem plausible.22
human rights should be understood as a class of moral
First, a satisfactory philosophical conception of hu-
consideration whose only role in political discourse is to rights should be suited to the public role that we
man
justify coercive intervention in a society's affairs. Ifneed
that human rights to play in international affairs. The
is correct, then the fact that a value is not sufficient to
doctrine of human rights is a political construction
justify coercive intervention counts against identifyingintended for certain political purposes and is to be
the value as a human right. understood against the background of a range of
But whether Rawls holds this view or not, there are general assumptions about the character of the con-
two reasons not to accept it. First, it is not true thattemporary
the international environment.23
only role of human rights in international discourse is Second, the conception should interpret human
to justify coercive intervention. As I observed atrights
the as "common" in a special sense, not as the area
beginning, human rights are also, for example, invoked
of agreement among all existing political doctrines or
to justify noncoercive interference by outsiders comprehensive
(gov- views, but as principles for interna-
ernments, international agencies, nongovernmental tional
or- affairs that could be accepted by reasonable
ganizations) and to justify programs of reformpersons
by who hold conflicting reasonable conceptions of
compatriots. We should conceptualize human rights the in
good life.
a way that is adequate to this larger role. Second,Here
as are some points of clarification. First, to say
before, the argument against interference doesthat not international human rights compose a doctrine
easily extend to an argument for limiting the scopeadopted
of for certain political purposes is to reject some
human rights. Granting the political development hy-
traditional views about the character of human rights,
pothesis grants nothing about the moral standing of the as those that interpret human rights as a contem-
such
values expressed as human rights; the hypothesis is
porary restatement of the (or a) theory of natural law
about the best means of realizing these values, ornotnatural rights, or as a statement of a single compre-
about their standing as values. Indeed, the best argu-
hensive view about political justice or the political good
ment against reform intervention in a decent society,
that is supposed to apply to all human societies at all
assuming that the hypothesis is correct, is that inter-
times and places.24 Human rights are standards in-
vention is more likely to retard than encouragetended the to play a regulative role for a range of actors in
society's movement from decency to (liberal) justice.
But such an argument depends on rather than repudi-
22 Thomas Pogge's comments on an earlier draft helped me formu-
ates the claim that the liberal conception is an appro-
late these precepts.
priate standard for the society in question. 23 Jones (1996, 183-204) emphasizes the political character of
What is the upshot for human rights? I believeRawls's
it isinterpretation of human rights. Note, however, that Rawls
(1999a, 81, n. 25) has reservations about this interpretation.
this. If it were possible to regard a decent society as
24 For example, Finnis (1980, 198) believes human rights are "a
contemporary idiom" for natural rights (see pp. 210-30 for his view
of theof
21 I do not mean to say that Rawls himself gives such an account content and limits of the doctrine of international human
human rights. rights).

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 2

the political circumstances tices,

of arises
the contemporary
from the developing international world.
capacity
Yet, to describe human rights doctrine
and disposition as in
to intervene coercively a the
"political
affairs of
construction" is not to states
say that
to protect the human rights
interests of their own people. are
Standards
unrelated to these other kinds ofare needed
views: to guide
Intheadhering
use of this coercive
to
power.it,
the doctrine or in criticizing As I have
one been urging, however,
might human rights by
be moved
doctrine
beliefs about natural law or serves other purposes
natural as well. The
rights or most
by a
comprehensive conceptiongeneral, of the good.
albeit awkward, Butofit
statement thesewould
purposes be
an error to identify these mightmore
be this. The fundamental
global political structure contains moral
an
beliefs with a political doctrine of human
array of institutions and practices, rights.
including the foreign
Second, according to these policiesprecepts,
of states, with thethe capacityparticulars
to influence the
of the public political role expected conditions of life for of individuals
human in their domestic
rights are
essential to a comprehension societies.and
In some defense
cases this influence of comes
the about doc-
trine. I shall say more about throughthis intentionalrole action,below.
such as militaryFor now
interven-
the essential point is that tion human rights
or the attachment are
of political meant
conditions to devel-for
certain political purposes,opment andaid. we cannot
In other think
cases it occurs through the intelli-
normal
gently about their content and
operation of anreach
institution, without
such as structural taking
assistance
account of these purposes. I do
provided not mean
by international financial to say
bodies. that
Moreover,
one should accept uncritically as I have been the conception
emphasizing, of the
transnational action that
political role of human rights affects human prevailing
rights is not limitedin interna-
to the operations of
tional affairs any more than governments one and should
international acceptorganizations;the it may
details of prevailing views alsoof their
be carried out by content.
nongovernmental But criti-
organizations,
cism must begin with some actingconception
in international fora ofor within
the the internal
practice
being examined, and the contours political processesof of individual
this societies. The
practice aredoctrine
to
be found in the doctrine of of human
human rights is rights
a statementas we have
of standards to guideit the
in contemporary international structureslife.and conduct of global political life insofar as
Third, the second precept these states
bear on the conditions
thatof human life for individuals in
rights
should be acceptable to reasonable their societies. persons, not peo-
ples. This is possibly in contrast To be more to Rawls,
specific, a doctrinewho of humanwritesrights of
peoples as corporate wholes suitedwith more
for contemporary or less
international practicewidely
should
shared conventional moralities. I have
be capable of playing discussed
at least three kinds of roles. First, my
doubts about this elsewhere (Beitz
it constrains the 2000)of and
domestic constitutions states and here
simply call attention to the possible
the fundamental rules of contrast and note
international organizations
its importance in thinking about
and regimes. the
(Whether content
this constraint of the
should operate
human rights doctrine. In by my
means of view,
the embodiment human
of these norms rights
in consti- are
ultimately justified by considerations about
tutions, organizational charters, the
and so forth,reason-
I take to
able interests of individuals, not question,
be another those oneof whole
not settled societ-
by theoretical
ies conceived as corporateconsiderations.) entities. Second, it describes goals for social
A view of this kind is at odds with some traditional development applicable to all contemporary societies,
conceptions in distinguishing between human rights as to the extent that they are or can be influenced by such
a political doctrine and various underlying views about external forces as the foreign policies of other states
social justice. Why should we accept the revisionist and the practices of international institutions. (The
view? Part of the answer is that, as a historical matter, degree and kinds of influence appropriate in particular
international human rights doctrine is not accurately cases is again another question, involving both norma-
interpreted as an effort to fill the same conceptual tive and pragmatic considerations.) Third (and deriva-
space as was filled by natural law or natural rights in tively), the doctrine furnishes grounds of political
the Western political tradition. Those ideas aimed to criticism to which it would be appropriate to appeal in
supply something different-a comprehensive concep- the setting of global politics by a range of international
tion of the good or just society, perhaps, or an account and transnational actors-not only governments but
of the constraints a government should observe in the also officials of international institutions and nongov-
use of its monopoly of political power. By contrast, the ernmental organizations acting in their capacity as
international doctrine is a negotiated agreement (or set citizens of global society.
of agreements) that describes "a common standard of On this view the doctrine of human rights is signifi-
achievement for all peoples and all nations" (Universal cantly teleological. It is a statement of aspiration
Declaration, Preamble), and it is meant to provide applicable to all contemporary societies, but all of its
guidance in the conduct of international political life by requirements may not be capable of being satisfied
actors such as international organizations and their simultaneously or in the short run. Human rights may
member states, nongovernmental organizations, and not bear on political choice as straightforwardly as they
individuals. would if conceived in more traditional terms as side
But the argument need not rest on a historical constraints or prohibitions. The actions required to
observation. Contemporary international society needs satisfy a human right will depend on the case. This is
a doctrine of the kind imagined by the framers of the not only because achieving a given end may require
Universal Declaration. One reason, which Rawls no- different strategies in different settings, but also be-

277
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 Human Rights as a Common Concern June 2001

cause priorities will have to bepoint

specific set and
of tension compromises
between the restricted concep-
reached when, in the short term, theprevalent
tion of human rights effort to thought
in philosophical secure
one right threatens to block efforts and the development toof secure
international law
another.
and practice.
Joel Feinberg (1973, 95) observed long ago
Consider a hypothetical that
case. Imagine some
an authoritar-
rights of the declarations seem ian regimeto in a society
be more in which historically
accuratelythe pre-
conceived as rights "in andominant unusual new
political beliefs are not'manifesto
democratic. Citing
sense"' than on the model of the legal
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a modern-
claim-rights.25 The
view I sketch here is compatible with
izing insurgency this
fighting observation.
for democratic reforms calls
upon the international community for military and
A CASE STUDY: POLITICAL RIGHTS financial help. Given the society's cultural history,
international interference, if successful, would produce
According to the formula I suggest, the doctrine a result
of that would be regarded as a change for the
human rights is "common" in the sense that, consid- worse by a significant portion, perhaps even a majority,
ered in light of the political purposes it is expected of thetosociety. The question is whether this fact argues
serve, reasonable persons could accept it despite dif-interference to help the reformers and, if so, for
against
ferences in their reasonable conceptions of the what good. reason.
Because this formulation depends from the outset on possible reply returns to the issue of paternal-
One
judgments about which conceptions to count as reason- ism. Interference in this kind of case, perhaps in
able, its effect is to frame the question of the justifica- contrast to most interferences to defend human rights,
tion of human rights as a substantive problem would ofbe genuinely paternalistic: It involves coercive
political theory, comparable to problems such as interference
the in some people's liberty on the grounds
justification of principles of social justice for domestic that the results would be in their own interests. But it
society. What distinguishes the problem about human would not be justified paternalism. Normally, the jus-
rights from the others is the special character of tification
the of a paternalistic choice has at least three
international political environment in which these elements: stan- (1) a claim that the subject is unable to
dards must operate. Concerns regarding cultural choose paro- rationally for himself owing to a failure of
chialism or political bias would arise, if at all, within reason
the or will; (2) evidence that the choice is guided by
substantive argument for each of its elements. knowledge of the subject's own interests, to the extent
To illustrate, let me consider whether the doctrine they of can be known, or by a reasonable conception of
human rights should recognize a right to democratic the interests it would be rational for the subject to
institutions. The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have; and (3) a reasonable expectation that the subject
is unequivocal. It holds that there are human rights will come
to to agree that the agent's choices on his behalf
political institutions that afford every citizen an oppor- are the best that could be made under the circum-
tunity to participate in public affairs either directly stances.26
or In my example, because a significant portion
through "freely chosen representatives"; to compete or even a majority of the population does not share
for public office and to vote in "genuine periodic democratic political values, for this portion of the
elections"; and to assemble peaceably without restric- population the second element (and possibly the third)
tions "other than those.., .which are necessary of in the
a justification would fail. The interference does
democratic society in the interests of national security not appear to take seriously the moral beliefs of those
or public safety" (Arts. 21, 25). As a purely descriptive whom it coerces.
matter, there is no question that these requirements This reply seems to me to yield the most plausible
are nonneutral in the sense that they are not endorsed account of the ethical significance of the fact that many
by all the major political moralities in the world. What in our hypothetical society hold moral beliefs inconsis-
is the ethical significance of this fact? Does it mean tent
thatwith democracy. Yet, it is open to certain doubts.
we should not regard democratic rights as genuine First, it may be questioned whether what I describe as
human rights, or that we should not accept the defense people's "moral beliefs" accurately identify their polit-
or promotion of democratic rights as a justification ical
forinterests. This is primarily an empirical issue, and I
interference in a nondemocratic society's domestic have not worked out the case in enough detail to
life? resolve it one way or the other. One would want to
These questions are worth special attention because know, for example, about the nature of the evidence
the element of international human rights doctrine that many people reject democratic values, whether the
most often said to be objectionably parochial is that society has any past experience with democratic forms,
concerned with democratic rights. At the same time, and whether there have been occasions for public
there is a discernible trend in international law toward political deliberation about forms of government.
recognition of a universal right to democratic institu- On one set of assumptions, the very fact that political
tions (Franck 1995, chap. 4). So these questions mark a institutions lack the features characteristic of democ-
racy-such as free expression, political competition,
25 Feinberg's use of "manifesto sense" is not, as some writers havevoting-would suggest that preferences about political
thought, derisory; he endorses and expresses sympathy for this usage.forms are not either fully informed or freely arrived at.
It is also worth noting that one can accept the idea that some human
rights are "manifesto rights" without also accepting Feinberg's view
that it is not possible to assign corresponding duties to them. That, I 26 I rely here on the discussion in A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1999b,
believe, is a mistake. 218-20).

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 2

In that case the justification of

ceded that paternalistic
there interfer-
is no universal (and hence no human)
right to democracy?
ence must fall back on a judgment aboutThe answer
what is thatit
we have
wouldnot.
The question
be rational for people to want trades on were
if they the idea that
inthere can be no
possession
right
of full information and able towithout a remedy,
reason or no right without
freely, and heresome
we have no choice but feasible
to engage
strategy for itsthe substantive
realization. But the fact that
question of the value of democracy.
intervention is unlikely Telescoping a long
to succeed in establishing dem-
argument, suppose there is
ocratic reason
institutions to political
in a divided believe that
culture does
democratic institutions are instrumental
not imply to the
that nothing ever will; institutional enjoy-
change is
a complexhuman
ment of certain (nonpolitical) historical process, usually accompanied
rights, including by
the rights of the person and subsistence
changes in political belief as well.rights. Then,
Moreover, a human
assuming these other rights are
right not may
to democracy themselves
have practical forcecultur-
otherwise
ally controversial, there is than
anbyargument that it
licensing coercive intervention. For would
example, it be
rational to want democratic might call for efforts
rights as meansat persuasion
of and ensuring
education or
the satisfaction of urgent human
support interests,
for the development whatever
of elements of a demo-
the present political values cratic
in social infrastructure (associations,
a culture.27 (There labor
isunions,
also
the counterargument that and some so on). other
Of course, to accept this as a reply to theof
configurations
political institutions, like objection,
Rawls's one must"decent consultation
accept a conception of a human
hierarchy," would be equally right aseffective
something different in securing
from a legal right orhu-
man rights. Which is correct certain moraldepends on although
rights; for example, a historical
it may
and political judgment, not generate
anduties for various
ethical agents, a human right
one.)
Second, the reply considers only
cannot always the for
be a ground perspective
insisting on immediateof
the nondemocratic portion of But
compliance. the population.
if human rights are regarded as What
polit-
about the democratic insurgents who
ical constructions in the asked for outside
way I have described, this is
unremarkable.
help? Again, one needs more information, but presum-
ably the insurgency has local causes and responds to
local grievances and aspirations. From the perspective
of this group, interferenceCONCLUSION is not a matter of paternal-
ism at all but of avoiding or reducing harm or protect-
ing against injustice. It is hard to see
The discourse how this
on international issue
human rightscan
suffers
be addressed other than by fromexamining the
a strange juxtaposition. urgency
In major of
arenas of inter-
the interests at stake in relation to the costs of inter- national politics concerns about human rights are more
ference and its probability of success. Once again, it prominently expressed than ever before, and there is
seems that the justifiability of interference to support some reason to believe that these concerns increasingly
the democratic reformers should be faced as a free- motivate action. Yet, within contemporary political
standing issue in political ethics in which the values that
thought human rights are often regarded with suspi-
interference may achieve are compared with the costs cion. These suspicions are diverse. Some people think
and risks of making the attempt. There is no categor-there is no such thing as universal human rights (i.e.,
ical conclusion possible about the sufficiency of demo-
rights that may be claimed by anyone). Some think
cratic reform as a justification of intervention in a casethere is no such thing as universal human rights
like this. (possessed by human beings independently of their
These reflections suggest an alternative explanation relationships with others and their institutional mem-
of the ethical significance of local disagreement over berships). Some think that "internationally recognized
political values. It may be that this bears on the human rights" are not rights (at least not in any sense
feasibility of constructive interference, or on its pros- that would be familiar to someone influenced by Hoh-
pects of success in the long run, rather than on the feld). Some think the international doctrine of human
nature or scope of human rights themselves. If rights
a is a good idea corrupted by overextension:
significant portion of the population lacks democratic Although there may be such a thing as a universal
sympathies, then it is not likely that democratic insti- human right, some (perhaps many) of the rights spe-
tutions will be sustained even if a democratic insur- cifically enumerated in the international instruments
gency attains its immediate objectives. In that case it fail to qualify. And some believe the doctrine of human
could be true both that there is a human right torights is a cloak for liberal political values, an instance
democratic institutions and that interference in sup- of partisanship rather than a neutral basis for global
port of a prodemocratic insurgency would be wrong. agreement.
Why, then, should we say there is a right at all? If the I have only addressed the last of these suspicions
acceptability of interference to promote democratic directly, although I have adverted to some of the
institutions effectively depends on the extent of demo- others. I have observed that the doctrine of human
cratic commitment within a culture, have we not con-rights, regarded for the moment as part of the positive
law of international society, cannot plausibly be con-
sidered culturally or politically nonpartisan. And I have
27 The argument is made in Shue 1996, 74-8, and Sen 1999, 178-86.
I made a similar argument about the value of democracy, concen- argued that this fact, in itself, does not count against
the doctrine. What is distinctive about human rights as
trating on the circumstances of developing societies, in Beitz 1981,
177-208.
a category of normative standard is not their suppos-

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 Human Rights as a Common Concern June 2001

but this hardly

edly symmetrical relationship to means
thethatconceptions
the account would exclude of
political justice or legitimacy moral
to considerations;
be found in fact,
in it would
the depend upon
world's
cultures but, rather, the role them.
they play in international
relations. Human rights state conditions
Second, for
in some ways a contrasting political
objection is that
and social institutions, the systematic
a partisan conception violation of which
of human rights is insufficiently
may justify efforts to bring about
realistic. Accordingreform bya doctrine
to this objection, unless agents
external to the society in which the
of human rights violation
is culturally neutral it cannot occurs.
possibly
This interference-justifying role may
play the role that we limit the
need a doctrine content
of human rights to
of the doctrine, but there is playno reason
in international to
affairs. The suppose
reason is that if a the
limitations will yield a neutral
violation ofor
humannonpartisan view.
rights is not regarded as a shared
Indeed, it is hard to see how things could
basis for political be
action, then theotherwise.
capacity to enlist
In the words of the Vienna international
Declaration, support whenhumanit is most needed rights
will
specify conditions that institutions
deteriorate, and the doctrine of human rights will in
should satisfy
order to respect "the dignity become
andlittle worth
more than ainherent
sectarian hope. Thein latterthe
human person" (Preamble); but the concept
proposition seems true enough, but the point about of a
person with inherent dignityneutrality
and does worth is follow
not obviously a substantive
from it. It is an
moral idea and will almost certainly be amore
empirical question whether congenial
political doctrine must be
to some than to other conceptions of
neutral in order justice
to enlist or political
enough international support
good. to be influential, a claim that not only has not been
Is this kind of partisanship problematic for the proved but also is most likely false. The growth of the
doctrine? I believe not, provided that each of its global human rights regime itself may be evidence to
elements can be defended by an appropriately general the contrary.
argument, as I suggest is possible for the right to Third, there is a residual worry that an expansive
democratic institutions. Such a defense would hold that
doctrine of human rights can too easily be used as an
human rights are "common" in a morally significant instrument of neocolonial domination, as a way to
way without being, so to speak, empirically nonparo- rationalize the use of coercion by a hegemonic power
chial. This, of course, is not to say that cultural and to advance its own interests. Of course, there is one
political differences do not come into deliberation sense in which this is a legitimate worry if not almost a
about how to act. These differences may enter in a
necessary truth. If an expansive doctrine of human
variety of ways-for example, as factors determining
rights embraces liberal political values, and if the
the feasibility and cost of a contemplated interference
hegemonic power identifies its interests with the ad-
or the risks of collateral harm. They may also enter at
vance of these values, then coercion that is soundly
a more basic level, as factors influencing a judgment
justified by human rights considerations also will ad-
about the rightness of using coercive means of inter-
vance the interests of the hegemonic power. What
ference, particularly when the purpose of the interfer-
troubles people, however, seems to be not this kind of
ence is genuinely paternalistic.
case but one in which human rights considerations are
This conception of human rights faces a variety of abused or distorted in order to make self-interested
objections. Here I note three of the most prominent
political action seem to be justified by other-regarding
and simply gesture at the kind of reply that might be
considerations. The fear is that an expansive doctrine
offered to each. First, it may seem excessively prag-
will be more open to this sort of abuse than a minimal-
matic to regard human rights as a "political concep-
ist one.
tion." Whatever else they are, human rights are surely
moral standards, standards whose authority rests on This is not an abstract fear. The history of interven-
recognizably moral considerations. To suggest other- tion (e.g., by the United States in Central America)
wise, the objection holds, fails to take seriously both includes many instances of what plausibly can be seen
the character and the history of the idea of human as analogous abuses of the values of self-government
rights. I believe, however, that the objection starts from and individual liberty as rationales for self-interested
a faulty premise. To say that the doctrine of human interference. Let us therefore concede the hypothesis
rights is a political conception is not to deny that its that an expansive doctrine is more open to abuse by a
authority rests on moral considerations; human rights hegemonic power than a more narrowly drawn concep-
are political, not in the source of their authority, but in tion. What follows? Since we are conceiving of human
their role in public ethical life. As I have described rights as a public, political doctrine, it cannot be replied
them, human rights are standards to which it is reason- that the possibility of abuse is irrelevant to the content
able to hold political institutions accountable in the of the doctrine. If this possibility were significant, and
processes of contemporary world politics. They operate if unilateral intervention were the only mechanism
as prima facie justifications of transnational (although realistically available to promote human rights, then a
not only transnational) political action aimed at narrowing of the doctrine's content might be appropri-
bringing about change in the structure and operation ate. But there is an alternative: It is to establish
of domestic (and international) institutions. Any multilateral institutions to protect human rights doc-
account of the authority of human rights must take trine from unilateral abuse. This is one source of the
note of the political contexts in which they operate, argument for a world human rights court, and it may

280
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 American Political Science Review Vol. 95, No. 2

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