12/28/23, 2:27 AM [ G.R. No. 221097.

September 29, 2021 ]

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 221097. September 29,
2021 ]
AUGUSTO M. AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS.
MA. ALA F. DOMINGO AND MA.
MARGARITA IRENE F. DOMINGO,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

LOPEZ, J., J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[2] dated January 9, 2015 and the Resolution[3]
dated October 16, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94760, which declared as void, the
Orders dated April 13, 2009[4] and September 15, 2009[5]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33, Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, acting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC) in
AGR. Case No. 1221-G, insofar as they granted attorney's
fees to Atty. Augusto M. Aquino (petitioner) equivalent to
30% of the increased just compensation awarded to the late
father of respondents Ma. Ala F. Domingo and Ma.
Margarita Irene F. Domingo (respondents).

The Antecedents

Angel T. Domingo (Angel), the late father of the

respondents, was the owner of a 262.2346-hectare rice land
in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, which was covered by the
agrarian reform program and distributed to 193 farmer
beneficiaries pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27,
[6] as implemented by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228.[7]
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) initially valued
the land at P2,086,735.09, but Angel disagreed.[8]
Consequently, he verbally contracted the legal services of
petitioner who, on July 31, 2002, filed before the SAC, a
petition for determination and payment of just
compensation alleging that his land should have been
valued at P39,335, 190.00.

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On April 12, 2004, the SAC rendered its Decision fixing

the just compensation of the property at P15,223,050.91.
The ruling was affirmed by the CA, which in turn, was
upheld by this Court in its Decision dated February 4, 2008
in G.R. No. 168533. Meanwhile, Angel died and was
substituted by respondents. In the G.R. No. 168533, this
Court held that the final valuation of the land should be
computed in accordance with Lubrica, et al. v. Land Bank
of the Philippines,[9] and that the partial payment of
P1,845,999.71 already received by Angel should be
deducted from the computation. This Court then directed
the SAC to proceed with deliberate dispatch.[10]

In an Order dated October 28, 2008, the SAC directed the

LBP to compute the final valuation of Angel's land in
accordance with the ruling of this Court. According to the
LBP, the final just compensation is P15,269,313.66 but
since Angel previously received the initial valuation of
P2,086,735.09, the balance is now P13,182,578.57, which
will be paid partly, in cash and partly, in bonds.[11]

On February 2, 2009, petitioner filed a Manifestation with

Motion to Approve Memorandum of Agreement
(Manifestation) alleging that in a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) dated December 12, 2005, Angel and
his brother, Benjamin, engaged the services of Elmer San
Vicente (San Vicente) and Josefina Gajitos (Gajitos) to
obtain a higher valuation than the original amount of
P2,086,735.09 determined by the DAR and LBP. The
MOA provided, among others, that Angel and Benjamin
would shoulder the filing fees while San Vicente and
Gajitos would shoulder all other expenses, including
attorney's fees. In the event of a higher valuation, the latter
would be entitled to a 35% of the increase thereof. Thus,
petitioner sought to collect, on behalf of San Vicente and
Gajitos, the said 35% commission, which is equivalent to
P4,613,902.49.[12] Incidentally, petitioner attached to his
Manifestation, a Contract for Legal Services purportedly
executed by him and Benjamin, wherein they agreed on a
contingent attorney's fees of 30% of any increase above the
original valuation.[13]

Respondents opposed the Manifestation and assailed the

authenticity of the MOA. They claimed that the MOA was
falsified and that Angel already paid attorney's and
commissioner's fees before his death. Moreover, the case
was only for the application of the Comprehensive

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Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and thus, petitioner's

monetary claim should be filed with the settlement of
Angel's estate and not with the SAC.[14]

In an Order[15] dated April 13, 2009, however, the SAC

adopted the computation of the LBP, granted petitioner's
Manifestation, and directed the segregation of 35% of
P13,182,578.57 or P4,613,902.49 in his favor. The agrarian
court ruled that the MOA partakes the nature of a contract
for payment of attorney's fees of petitioner and the persons
who collaborated with him in accomplishing his tasks.

In another Order[16] dated September 15, 2009, the SAC

modified its ruling and instead, granted contingent
attorney's fees in favor of petitioner at 30% of
P13,182,578.57 or P3,954,773.57. According to said court,
even in the absence of a written contract between the
parties, petitioner should be reasonably compensated for
his services in the prosecution of the case. It also
maintained jurisdiction to act on the Manifestation since
there was still no judicial proceeding for the settlement of
Angel's estate. Thus, the trial court disposed of the case as
follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, order is

hereby issued as follows:

1. Denying the motion for reconsideration;

2. Denying the Motion to Approve the

Memorandum of Agreement dated
December 12, 2005;

3. Deleting the portion of the order dated April

13, 2009 directing Land Bank to release the
amount of P4,613,902.49 to Atty. Augusto
Aquino, Elmer San Vicente and Josefina L.
Gajitos in cash and in bonds in the manner
provided by law;

4. Fixing the contingent attorney's fees of Atty.

Augusto Aquino at 30% based on the
increase in the compensation for petitioners'
lands in the amount of P13,182,578.57 or
the amount of P3,954,773.57 for the services
he has rendered to the deceased petitioner.

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5. Directing Land Bank to release the amount

of P3,954,773.57 to Atty. Augusto Aquino.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Disagreeing with the SAC Orders, respondents filed their

Notice of Appeal. They maintained that the agrarian court
erred in granting the 30% attorney's fees in favor of
petitioner. Instead, they moved to execute the April 12,
2004 SAC Decision, which this Court had affirmed, with
the directive to compute and pay just compensation with
deliberate dispatch. Subsequently, the SAC gave due
course to the Notice of Appeal.[18]

On January 14, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for

Execution Pending Appeal (Motion for Execution). He
claimed that since his right to attorney's fees would be
prejudiced by the execution of the April 12, 2004 SAC
Decision, it should also enforce the September 15, 2009
SAC Order, which awarded him 30% attorney's fees
despite the pendency of the appeal.

On February 16, 2010, the SAC granted petitioner's Motion

for Execution and issued writs ordering the release of his
30% contingent attorney's fees.[19] The LBP complied with
said order.

Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion to Reverse and Set

Aside Order of Execution Pending Appeal and to Order
Respondent LBP to Indemnify Petitioners-Appellants for
the Sum of P4,497,977.95 Belonging to Petitioners-
Appellants Unlawfully/Unduly Delivered by it to Atty.
Aquino as and for Attorney's Fees (Motion to Reverse).[20]

In a Resolution[21] dated August 9, 2010, the CA denied

respondents' Motion to Reverse. It rejected their contention
that the RTC/SAC already lost jurisdiction when petitioner
moved for execution pending appeal. The CA held that the
SAC still had authority to grant petitioner's motion for
execution since he filed the same before the records were
transmitted to the appellate court.[22]

In a Resolution[23] dated March 2, 2012, the CA further

denied respondents' motion for reconsideration.

Thereafter, in its Decision[24] dated January 9, 2015, the

CA, declared as void, the April 13, 2009 SAC Order
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insofar as it treated the Manifestation as a motion to charge

attorney's fees as lien, and the September 15, 2009 SAC
Order insofar as it granted the 30% contingent attorney's
fees to petitioner, but without prejudice to the filing of a
proper action before the regular courts, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby

GRANTED. Accordingly, the April 13, 2009
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,
Guimba, Nueva Ecija in AGR. Case. No. 1221-
G is hereby declared VOID insofar as it treated
the Manifestation with Motion to Approve
Memorandum of Agreement as a motion to
charge attorney's fees as lien. Similarly, the
September 15, 2009 Order in the said case is
declared VOID with respect only to the grant of
P3,954,773.57 contingent attorney's fees to
Atty. Augusto M. Aquino, equivalent to 30% of
the increased just compensation awarded to
Angel T. Domingo. Atty. Augusto M. Aquino is
hereby ORDERED to return the P3,954,773.57
adjudged as his attorney's fees without
prejudice to the filing of a proper action before
the regular courts.

SO ORDERED.[25]

According to the CA, while a claim for attorney's fees may

be asserted either in the action where the services of the
lawyer had been rendered, or in a separate action, the
special circumstances of the case dictates that the claim be
resolved in a separate action. The appellate court found that
the SAC could not have awarded attorney's fees because
petitioner's Manifestation pertains not to the payment of his
attorney's fees, but to the approval of a MOA purportedly
between Angel and Benjamin, on the one hand, and San
Vicente and Gajitos, on the other. Besides, the jurisdiction
of the SAC under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, while
original and exclusive, is limited only to petitions for the
determination of just compensation and all offenses under
the Act.[26]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present petition on

December 8, 2015. He harps on the idea that the issues
discussed by the January 9, 2015 CA Decision were
already passed upon by the August 9, 2010 and March 2,
2012 CA Resolutions, which became final and executory.
This is due to the fact that respondents did not file a

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petition before this Court to question said Resolutions and

instead, allowed them to attain finality. Thus, even if the
Resolutions turned out to be erroneous, they may no longer
be altered.

Petitioner added that the issue of whether the SAC can rule
on his entitlement to attorney's fees was not raised by the
respondents and, thus, the CA should not have dealt with
the matter.

Issues

I.

Whether the CA was precluded by its

Resolutions dated August 9, 2010 and March 2,
2012 to rule upon the matter of petitioner's
attorney's fees in its subsequent January 9, 2015
Decision; and

II.

Whether the CA, in its January 9, 2015

Decision, correctly invalidated the award of
30% contingent attorney's fees in petitioner's
favor without prejudice to the filing of a
separate action before the courts.

Our Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Prefatorily, this Court deems it necessary to shed light on

the seeming confusion of petitioner, insofar as the
procedural antecedents is concerned. The fact that
respondents did not question the August 9, 2010 and March
2, 2012 Resolutions of the CA, does not render the case, in
its entirety, final and executory.

To recall, when this Court directed the SAC to compute the

final amount of just compensation due to the respondents
for their land, petitioner sought to collect attorney's fee by
filing his Manifestation. In its September 15, 2009 Order,
the SAC granted attorney's fees in favor of petitioner at
30% of the increase in the value of the land. Aggrieved,
respondents appealed this Order by filing their Notice of
Appeal, which was given due course by the said agrarian
court.[27]

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In the meantime, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution

seeking to enforce the September 15, 2009 SAC Order and
collect the 30% attorney's fees awarded therein pending
appeal.[28] The SAC granted the same and ordered the
release of funds. Respondents opposed this and filed their
motion to reverse. In its Resolution dated August 9, 2010,
however, the CA denied respondents' motion to reverse
finding that the SAC had authority to grant the award
pending appeal.[29] When respondents moved for a
reconsideration, the CA further denied their motion in its
Resolution dated March 2, 2012.[30]

According to petitioner, these CA Resolutions dated

August 9, 2010 and March 2, 2012 have the effect of
finally disposing with the issue of petitioner's attorney's
fees, which may only be reviewed by this Court. Since
respondents did not file a petition before this Court for said
purpose, the Resolutions, and the entire case for that
matter, already attained finality. Hence, the CA, erred in
resolving the issue anew in its Decision dated January 9,
2015, nullifying the grant of 30% attorney's fees in
petitioner's favor.

The argument fails to persuade.

It must be remembered that respondents timely appealed

the September 15, 2009 SAC Order before the CA. As
stated in the January 9, 2015 CA Decision, for review
therein, was the appeal of the respondents' subject of their
Notice of Appeal that was aptly given due course by the
SAC.[31] This January 9, 2015 CA Decision, therefore,
addresses the appeal itself that was pursued by the
respondents when the SAC awarded 30% attorney's fees in
its September 15, 2009 Order.

As such, contrary to the claims of petitioner, the issue

resolved by the CA in its August 9, 2010 and March 2,
2012 Resolutions are not identical to the issue it resolved
in its January 9, 2015 Decision. On one hand, the
Resolutions resolved the question of whether it was proper
to execute the September 15, 2009 SAC Order pending
appeal, and consequently release the amount of attorney's
fees prior to final judgement. On the other hand, the
Decision involved the propriety of the actual award of
attorney's fees in the September 15, 2009 SAC Order.

Thus, it cannot be said that the CA Resolutions dated

August 9, 2010 and March 2, 2012 can no longer be altered
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or annulled by the CA Decision dated January 9, 2015. To

put things in perspective, the CA Decision nullified the
September 15, 2009 SAC Order and not the CA
Resolutions. This SAC Order was timely appealed by the
respondents before the CA. Hence, the CA was not
precluded by the CA Resolutions from ruling on the
appeal.

Indeed, until the case in its entirety is definitely closed, the

grant of attorney's fees remains subject to review. In
Gatmaytan v. Court of Appeals,[32] for instance, Atty.
Gatmaytan similarly sought to compel, by mandamus, the
execution of a probate court's order granting him 30%
attorney's fees on account of his services as counsel in an
estate proceeding. We dismissed his action in view of the
fact that the probate court adjudged a new amount of
attorney's fees of P10 million in lieu of the original rate of
30% of the inheritance. This Court acknowledged that:

It is settled that an order of a probate court

fixing the amount of fees is regarded as
interlocutory in nature, subject to
modification or setting aside until the estate
proceeding is terminated and the case
definitely closed, after which the order
becomes final. In other words, an order fixing
the fees continues to be under the control of
the probate court until the proceeding is
closed and until then it may increase or
decrease the fees as facts and circumstances
develop and unfold which may justify
modification of the order even if the fees
have already been partially or fully paid, as
they may be ordered returned or reimbursed to
the estate or a bond required to be filed to
guarantee their return or reimbursement.[33]

On the merits of the subject CA Decision, We take

cognizance of Our pronouncement in Aquino v. Judge
Casabar,[34] a case between the same parties involving the
same issue albeit a different piece of property. In Casabar,
petitioner similarly sought payment of attorney's fees for
the services he rendered in the heirs' just compensation
case. In that case, We held that the SAC had authority to
pass upon the issue in the main case rather than a separate
action, and despite finality of the SAC decision.
Nevertheless, We found that since petitioner failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that the late Angel
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expressly agreed to a 30% contingent attorney's fees, the

principle of quantum meruit is controlling. Hence, the rate
of 15% is deemed more appropriate, thus:

Ordinarily, We would have left it to the trial

court the determination of attorney's fees based
on quantum meruit, however, following the
several pronouncements of the Court that it will
be just and equitable to now assess and fix the
attorney's fees in order that the resolution
thereof would not be needlessly prolonged, this
Court, which holds and exercises the power to
fix attorney’s fees on quantum meruit basis in
the absence of an express written agreement
between the attorney and the client, deems it
fair to fix petitioner's attorney's fees at fifteen
percent (15%) of the increase in the just
compensation awarded to private respondents.
[35]

In the same vein, the central issue in the present case is

whether the SAC, in its September 15, 2009 Order,
correctly granted the 30% contingent attorney's fees in
favor of petitioner.

As in Casabar, the heirs of Angel in this case also alleged

that the SAC had lost jurisdiction over the claim of
attorney's fees of petitioner upon finality of the just
compensation case. Again, We "see no valid reason why
respondents cannot pass upon a proper petition to
determine attorney's fees considering that it is already
familiar with the nature and the extent of petitioner's legal
services."[36] The case of Traders Royal Bank Employees
Union-Independent v. NLRC[37] is instructive, thus:

. . . It is well settled that a claim for

attorney's fees may be asserted either in the
very action in which the services of a lawyer
had been rendered or in a separate action.

With respect to the first situation, the remedy

for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of
the main action may be availed of only when
something is due to the client. Attorney's fees
cannot be determined until after the main
litigation has been decided and the subject of
the recovery is at the disposition of the court.
The issue over attorney's fees only arises when

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something has been recovered from which the

fee is to be paid.

While a claim for attorney's fees may be filed

before the judgment is rendered, the
determination as to the propriety of the fees
or as to the amount thereof will have to be
held in abeyance until the main case from
which the lawyer's claim for attorney's fees
may arise has become final. Otherwise, the
determination to be made by the courts will be
premature. Of course, a petition for attorney's
fees may be filed before the judgment in favor
of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof
delivered to the client.

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion

that a lawyer has two options as to when to
file his claim for professional fees. Hence,
private respondent was well within his rights
when he made his claim and waited for the
finality of the judgment for holiday pay
differential, instead of filing it ahead of the
award's complete resolution. To declare that a
lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same
action only before the judgment is reviewed by
a higher tribunal would deprive him of his
aforestated options and render ineffective the
foregoing pronouncements of this Court.[38]

Accordingly, it is of no moment that petitioner filed his

claim after the finality of the main case and as an incident
thereof. As long as the claim is filed within the period
allowed under the law, he is permitted to recover
reasonable compensation for the legal services he rendered.
[39] Under Article 1145[40] of the Civil Code, an action to
enforce an oral contract, as in the present case, may be
commenced within a period of six (6) years. Considering
the absence of a written contract between the parties,
petitioner seasonably filed his action on February 2, 2009,
which is well within six (6) years from the February 4,
2008 Decision of this Court.

Indeed, against the CA's directive for petitioner to file yet

another action to enforce his claim for attorney's fees, this
Court is aware of the fact that this case has dragged on
long enough. A review of the records, further reveals that
the parties are no longer interested in enforcing the MOA

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since neither petitioner nor respondents bothered to

question the SAC's rejection thereof. As such, instead of
allowing the case to find its way back to the trial court to
address the same issue of determining attorney's fees, this
Court deems it to be more in line with prudence to simply
resolve the matter once and for all.[41]

To support his claim for attorney's fees, petitioner filed his

Manifestation seeking to enforce the MOA whereby Angel
and his brother purportedly agreed to pay San Vicente and
Gajitos 35% of the increase in just compensation, while the
latter agreed to pay attorney's fees. Petitioner also attached
a Contract for Legal Services allegedly executed by
Angel's brother wherein they agreed to pay the former,
30% contingent attorney's fees.[42] In its September 15,
2009 Order, however, the SAC disapproved the MOA and
its attachment. Despite this, We find that the SAC correctly
found that even if petitioner's documentary evidence are
disregarded, he should still be reasonably compensated for
the professional services he rendered in the prosecution of
respondents' case.

As to the proper amount of attorney's fees, We resolve to

modify the 30% rate awarded by the SAC in accordance
with Casabar. There, We ruled that in the absence of an
express contract, the only way to determine his right to
appropriate attorney's fees is to apply the principle of
quantum meruit, to wit:

Quantum meruit — literally meaning as much

as he deserves – is used as basis for determining
an attorney's professional fees in the absence of
an express agreement. The recovery of
attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit
us a device that prevents an unscrupulous client
from running away with the fruits of the legal
services of counsel without paying for it and
also avoids unjust enrichment on the part of the
attorney himself. An attorney must show that he
is entitled to reasonable compensation for the
effort in pursuing the client's cause, taking into
account certain factors in fixing the amount of
legal fees.[43]

As in Casabar, the fact that petitioner rendered

professional services was never denied by respondents.
From the filing of the petition for just compensation on
July 31, 2002 up, until the time when the respondents
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terminated his services on March 3, 2009, petitioner

exerted efforts in obtaining a favorable judgment from the
agrarian court, which the respondents undoubtedly
benefited from. Thus, consistent with the previous award to
petitioner in Casabar,[44] We deem it fair to fix the award
of attorney's fees in favor of petitioner at 15% of the
increase in the just compensation awarded to the
respondents. Indeed, while the practice of law is not a
business, that an attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice, underscores the need to secure
him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve
the decorum and respectability of the legal profession.[45]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition

is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 9,
2015 and the Resolution dated October 16, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 94760, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Atty. Augusto
M. Aquino is hereby granted attorney's fees at the rate of
fifteen percent (15%) of the amount of the increase in
valuation of just compensation awarded to the respondents
Ma. Ala F. Domingo and Ma. Margarita Irene F. Domingo.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier,

and M. Lopez, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 8-23.

[2]
Rollo, pp. 24-36. Penned by Associate Justice Pedro B.
Corales and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P.
Punzalan Castillo and Florito S. Macalino.

[3] Id. at 38-39.

[4] Id. at 12.

[5] Id. at 95-98. Penned by Judge Ismael P. Casabar.

[6] Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the

Bondage of the Soil, transferring to them the Ownership of
the Land they till and Providing the Instruments and
Mechanism Therefor, October 21, 1972.

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[7] Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Farmer

Beneficiaries Covered by Presidential Decree No. 27;
Determining the Value of Remaining Unvalued Rice and
Corn Lands Subject to P.D. No. 27; And Providing for the
Manner of Payment by the Farmer Beneficiary and Mode
of Compensation to the Landowner, July 17, 1987.

[8] Rollo, p. 15.

[9] 537 Phil. 571 (2006).

[10] Rollo, p. 26.

[11] Id. at 26-27.

[12] Id. at 27.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at 27-28.

[15] Id. at 28.

[16] Id. at 95-98.

[17] Id. at 98.

[18] Id. at 29.

[19] Id.

[20] Id. at 45-57.

[21]Id. at 58-63. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A.

Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Michael P.
Elbinias and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring.

[22] Id. at 62.

[23]Id. at 110-112. Penned by Associate Justice Angelita A.

Gacutan, with Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon
and Francisco P. Acosta, concurring.

[24] Id. at 24-36.

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[25] Id. at 35.

[26] Id. at 31-33.

[27] Rollo, pp. 28-29.

[28] Id. at 29.

[29] Id. at 58-63.

[30] Id. at 110-117.

[31] Id. at 31-33.

[32] 531 Phil. 253-264 (2006).

[33] Id. at 262-263.

[34] 752 Phil. 1-14 (2015).

[35] Id. at 13-14.

[36] Id. at 9.

[37]336 Phil. 705-724 (1997), cited in Aquino v. Judge

Casabar, supra note 34.

[38]
Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v.
NLRC, id. at 713-714.

[39] Supra note 34.

[40] ART. 1145. The following actions must be commenced

within six years.

(1) Upon an oral-contract

(2) Upon a quasi-contract

[41]Rosario, Jr. v. De Guzman, et al., 713 Phil. 678, 689

(2013).

[42] Rollo, p. 27.

[43] Supra note 34 at 12.

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[44] Id. at 13-14.

[45] Id. at 14.

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