1. G.R. No. 160384.

April 29, 2005

CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and
PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ALLAN T. SALVADOR, Respondents.

HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and VIRGINIA

SALVADOR-LIM, respondents-intervenors.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

1
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision

2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its Resolution denying the

motion for the reconsideration of the said decision.

The Antecedents

On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed Hilario,
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 71, against
private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows:

2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a parcel of
land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon, Romblon, which property
was [adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was
still single, and which adjudication was known by the plaintiffs[’] father’s co-heirs;

3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the
property of the plaintiffs’ father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their
predecessors-in-interest;

4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter manifested
that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador;
5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the Lupon of
Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as
ANNEX B;

6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the plaintiffs to
suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;

7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a
3
lawyer.

The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issued for
the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property and that
defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:

a. actual damages, as follows:

a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case amounting to
₱1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the hearing of this case at ₱1,500.00 each schedule;

a.2. attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱20,000.00 and ₱500.00 for every court appearance;

b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to
determine; and

4
c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.

The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by
5
Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. He averred that –

(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;

(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the
subject-matter of this action;
both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is
filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the
allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which can be picked-up for
determining the Court’s jurisdiction as provided by law.

In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the lines, that the
assessed value of the land in question cannot exceed ₱20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court
6
rather than before the RTC. …

7
The petitioners opposed the motion. They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action

since the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in question, which was
₱200.00 per square meter and considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less,
the total value thereof is ₱3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss
was premature and "the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence
that the land is of such value."

8
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss, holding that the

action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the RTC as provided in
Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.

After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with
9
counterclaim. Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the

petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal
property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.

10
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention making

common cause with the private respondent. On her own motion, however, Virginia Salvador was
11
dropped as intervenor.
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991
12
the property had an assessed value of ₱5,950.00.

On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:

Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied property;
and

Dismissing defendant’s counterclaim.

13
SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed the
decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of the RTC and
dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case DISMISSED,
without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.

14
SO ORDERED.

The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership and
possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the
property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the action, conformably to
15
Section 33 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate court
16
denied. Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following assignment of errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN THE
EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON,
AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF DECIDING
THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID
APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
17
COURT.

The Ruling of the Court

The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the
petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant therein.

The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reinvindicatoria,
an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject
property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in
their opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss, they made mention of the increase in the
assessed value of the land in question in the amount of ₱3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners
maintain that their action is also one for damages exceeding ₱20,000.00, over which the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.

The petition has no merit.

It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed
for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs
18
are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. The caption of the complaint is not

determinative of the nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the
answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the
petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that the action of the
petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property subject
matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession
over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said
ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right
to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the
19
occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.

The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over
the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and
that the private respondent, who was the defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without
their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed
that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.

When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect.
Section 33(3) of the law provides:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed
value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.

Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
 …

(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined
by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of real
property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied by the assessment level. It is
20
synonymous to taxable value. The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold

by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.

Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation stating the
21
assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial notice of

22
the assessed or market value of lands. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed

value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action.

We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A,
showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was ₱5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did
not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property
when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in
1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the
petitioners since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of
23
less than ₱20,000.00.

We quote with approval, in this connection, the CA’s disquisition:

The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691 discloses, the
assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction
if the assessed value exceeds ₱20,000, and the MTC, if the value is ₱20,000 or below. An assessed
value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and
is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and
presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property
was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant
in the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that
should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is ₱5,950. The
case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of
Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a
24
quo.

It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the
25
presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.

Unavailing also is the petitioners’ argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the
recovery of damages exceeding ₱20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions.
Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination
of the jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs." This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the
guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that –

2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However,
in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
which states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

…
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00).

The said provision is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving title to, or
possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the
court’s jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause
26
of action for recovery of possession of real property.

Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings therein,
27
including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

2. G.R. No. 165177 August 25, 2005

LILIA V. PERALTA-LABRADOR, Petitioners,

vs.
1
SILVERIO BUGARIN, substituted by his widow, CONSOLACION BUGARIN, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

2
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the March 12, 2004 decision of the Court of

3
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57475, which affirmed with modification the January 26, 2000 judgment

of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. RTC-1590-I, which
4
in turn affirmed the decision dated May 16, 1999 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Felipe,

5
Zambales, in Civil Case No. 328, and its September 6, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration

thereof.

On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for "Recovery of Possession and
Ownership," docketed as Civil Case No. 328, with the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales. She alleged that
she is the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at Sitio Caarosipan,
Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales, having purchased the same in 1976 from spouses
Artemio and Angela Pronto. In 1977, she was issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid the taxes
6
due thereon.

In 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways constructed a road which traversed
Cadastral Lot No. 2650 thereby separating 108 sq. m. from the rest of petitioner’s lot, for which she
7
was issued Tax Declaration No. 02-2460R in 1991.
Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot and
refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, on January 18, 1996, she instituted
a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against respondent.

8
In his Answer with Counterclaims, respondent contended that the area claimed by petitioner is

included in the 4,473 square meter lot, covered by the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011;
and that he has been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955. In his Amended
9
Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to allege that the questioned lot is covered

by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he planted fruit bearing trees in the property.
Respondent further pleaded the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription.

On May 16, 1999, the court a quo ruled in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the
controverted lot on the basis of the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was dismissed for failure of
petitioner to prove prior physical possession and ownership thereof. The dispositive portion thereof,
reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered and for failure on the part of the plaintiff to
establish the preponderance of evidence of prior actual physical possession and present title over the
lot in her favor, let the instant case be ordered DISMISSED, and the defendant be awarded the
rightful possession and ownership of the same and the plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay FIFTEEN
THOUSAND (P15,000.00) PESOS as reasonable Attorney’s fee and FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS as appearance fee plus costs.

10
SO ORDERED.

11
The RTC affirmed the assailed decision, hence petitioner filed a petition for review before the

Court of Appeals which was however denied for insufficiency of evidence to prove ownership or
prior actual physical possession. The appellate court deleted the monetary awards in favor of
respondent as well as the declaration of the MTC that respondent is the owner of the questioned lot
on the ground that the OCT No. P-13011, relied upon by said court was not formally offered in
evidence, hence, cannot be considered by the court. The decretal portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing discussion, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated January 26, 2000, in Civil Case No. RTC 1590 I of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, and Decision dated May 16, 1999, in Civil
Case No. 328 of the Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe, Zambales are MODIFIED by deleting the
declaration of ownership as to the disputed 108 square meters and the monetary award in favor of
respondent Silverio Bugarin. However, the dismissal of the complaint is AFFIRMED.

12
SO ORDERED.

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied. Hence the instant petition.

Pertinent portion of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – … a person deprived of the possession of any
land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, … may at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with the damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied)

13
In Lopez v. David Jr., it was held that an action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one

year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Thus, we have
nullified proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had exceeded one year. After the lapse of the one
year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of the
right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty
independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted before the same court as an accion
14
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.
Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Thus, in
ascertaining whether or not the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the
15
averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined.

In the instant case, petitioner’s complaint alleges that:

2. That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land denominated as Cadastral lot No. 2650, San Felipe
Cadastre, situated at sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe, Zambales which she
bought in 1976 from Spouses Artemio Pronto and Angela Merano when she was still a widow, with
the following boundaries: North, Alipio Abad, East, Antonio Cueva, South, Juan Borja, and West,
Old Provincial Road, containing an area of 108 square meters, declared under Tax Declaration No.
002-1860R and assessed at P1,120.00;

3. That plaintiff has been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse as well as notorious
possession of the said lot and in the concept of an owner since she [acquired] it in 1976 until the
time when defendant took possession forcibly, two years ago;

4. That in or before 1990 the land was traversed by a new National Highway and the land was
segregated from a bigger portion of the land, the western portion is now the land in question and
since the new provincial road which traversed the whole land of the plaintiff, the old highway which
is west of Lot 2650 shall belong to the plaintiff in compensation of the portion of her lot traversed by
16
the new highway, said old highway is also taken by defendant unlawfully;

It is clear that petitioner’s averment make out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior
physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by respondent.
17
Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred two years prior to

the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996, the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed
and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case. Petitioner’s complaint therefore should have
been filed with the proper RTC.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their
18
silence, acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the
defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with
Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case.

19
On this point, the Court held in Bongato v. Malvar that:

It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is
prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the one-year period within
which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the
land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the
time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a
parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of
possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible entry filed by
respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992.
Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested
through a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one
(1) year. Respondents should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an
accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry. Their cause of
action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.

...

Further, a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or
cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of
the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can
take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has
been belatedly filed we likewise held in Bayog v. Natino[.]

Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complaint should still be
dismissed because petitioner failed to prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastral
Lot No. 2650. Petitioner admitted that she has never seen the Cadastral Map of San Felipe, Zambales,
20 21
and relied only on the Survey Notification Card from the Bureau of Lands, with a sketch of
Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Said card, however, does not reflect the 108 sq. m. lot subject of this case.
Neither did petitioner cause the survey of Cadastral Lot No. 2650 after the construction of a new
road to prove that the segregated portion on the western side is part thereof. Ei incumbit probotio qui
22
dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. Failing to discharge this

burden, the dismissal of the complaint is proper.

In the same vein, ownership of the lot in question cannot be awarded to respondent considering that
23 24
OCT No. P-13011, and the Survey Plan were not formally offered in evidence. While the issue

of ownership may be passed upon in ejectment cases for the sole purpose of determining the nature
25
of possession, no evidence conclusively show that the lot in question is covered by said OCT No.

P-13011 or any other title of respondent.

WHEREFORE, the May 16, 1999 decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe, Zambales, the
January 26, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Iba, Zambales, and the March 12,
2004 decision of the Court of Appeals, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. The
complaint in Civil Case No. 328 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
3. G.R. No.171555 April 17, 2013

EVANGELINE RIVERA-CALINGASAN and E. RICAL ENTERPRISES, Petitioners,

vs.
WILFREDO RIVERA, substituted by MA. LYDIA S. RlVERA, FREIDA LEAH S. RIVERA and
WILFREDO S. RIVERA, .JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

1
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, filed by petitioners Evangeline Rivera-Calingasan

2 3
and E. Rical Enterprises, assailing the February 10, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals ( CA) in

4
CA-G.R. SP No. 90717. The CA decision affirmed with modification the April 6, 2005 Decision and

5
the July 8, 2005 order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No.

2003-0982.

The Factual Antecedents

During their lifetime, respondent Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired several
parcels of land in Lipa City, Batangas, two of which were covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
6
(TCT) Nos. T-22290 and T-30557. On July 29, 1982, Loreto died, leaving Wilfredo and their two

7
daughters, Evangeline and Brigida Liza, as her surviving heirs.

About eleven (11) years later, or on March 29, 1993, Loreto’s heirs executed an extrajudicial
settlement of her one-half share of the conjugal estate, adjudicating all the properties in favor of
Evangeline and Brigida Liza; Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties, with a reservation of his
8
usufructuary rights during his lifetime. On September 23, 1993, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City,

Batangas cancelled TCT Nos. T-22290 and T-30557 and issued TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495 in the
9
names of Evangeline and Brigida Liza, with an annotation of Wilfredo’s usufructuary rights.
 10
Almost a decade later, or on March 13, 2003, Wilfredo filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

(MTCC) of Lipa City a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc.,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0019-03.

Wilfredo claimed that he lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of land located along
C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas, covered by TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495, with a building
used for his furniture business. Taking advantage of his absence due to his hospital confinement in
September 2002, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. took possession and caused the renovation of
the building on the property. In December 2002, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., with the aid of
11
armed men, barred him from entering the property.

Both the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo voluntarily renounced his
12
usufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights dated March 4, 1996, and

that another action between the same parties is pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13 (an
action for the annulment of the petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by Wilfredo),
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-0773.

The MTCC Ruling

13
In its December 2, 2003 decision, the MTCC dismissed the complaint. It found no evidence of

Wilfredo’s prior possession and subsequent dispossession of the property. It noted that Wilfredo
admitted that both E. Rical Enterprises and Star Honda, Inc. occupied the property through lease
contracts from Evangeline and her husband Ferdinand.

Wilfredo appealed to the RTC.

The RTC Ruling

14
In its November 30, 2004 decision, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s findings. It held that Wilfredo

lacked a cause of action to evict the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. since Evangeline is the
registered owner of the property and Wilfredo had voluntarily renounced his usufructuary rights.

Wilfredo sought reconsideration of the RTC’s decision and, in due course, attained this objective; the
RTC set aside its original decision and entered another, which ordered the eviction of the petitioners
and Star Honda, Inc.
 15
In its April 6, 2005 decision, the RTC held that Wilfredo’s renunciation of his usufructuary rights

could not be the basis of the complaint’s dismissal since it is the subject of litigation pending with
the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13. The RTC found that the MTCC overlooked the evidence proving
Wilfredo’s prior possession and subsequent dispossession of the property, namely: (a) Evangeline’s
judicial admission of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence since May 2002; (b) the Lipa
City Prosecutor’s findings, in a criminal case for qualified trespass to dwelling, that the petitioners
are not residents of the property; (c) the affidavit of Ricky Briones, Barangay Captain of Barangay 9,
Lipa City where the property is located, attesting to Wilfredo’s prior possession and the petitioners’
entry to the property during Wilfredo’s hospital confinement; and (d) the petitioners, with the aid of
armed men, destroyed the padlock of the building on the property. The RTC ordered the petitioners
and Star Honda, Inc. to pay ₱620,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the property, and ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

The petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. filed separate motions for reconsideration.

16
In its July 8, 2005 order, the RTC modified its April 6, 2005 decision by absolving Star Honda, Inc.

from any liability. It found no evidence that Star Honda, Inc. participated in the dispossession.

The petitioners then filed a Rule 42 petition for review with the CA.

The CA Ruling

17
In its February 10, 2006 decision, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s findings, noting

that: (a) Evangeline’s admission of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence (a place
different and distinct from the property) rendered improbable her claim of possession and
occupation; and (b) Evangeline’s entry to the property (on the pretext of repairing the building)
during Wilfredo’s hospital confinement had been done without Wilfredo’s prior consent and was
done through strategy and stealth. The CA, however, deleted the award of ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees since the RTC decision did not contain any discussion or justification for the award.

The petitioners then filed the present petition.

Wilfredo died on December 27, 2006 and has been substituted by his second wife, Ma. Lydia S.
18
Rivera, and their children, Freida Leah S. Rivera and Wilfredo S. Rivera, Jr. (respondents).
 The Petition

The petitioners submit that the CA erred in equating possession with residence since possession in
forcible entry cases means physical possession without qualification as to the nature of possession,
i.e., whether residing or not in a particular place. They contend that the pronouncements of the RTC
19
of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773, in the March 11, 2003 order, that they have been

20
"occupying the premises since 1997" and Wilfredo’s own admission that he padlocked the doors of

the building contradict Wilfredo’s claim of prior possession.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondents counter that the petitioners mistakenly relied on the statements of the RTC of Lipa
City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773 on the petitioners’ occupation since 1997; such statements
had been rendered in an interlocutory order, and should not prevail over Evangeline’s admission in
21
her answer of "Poblacion, Rosario, Batangas" as her residence, compared to Wilfredo’s admission

in his complaint of "C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas" as his residence, the exact address of
22
the disputed property.

The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of who, between the petitioners and Wilfredo, had been in prior
physical possession of the property.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Ejectment cases involve only physical possession or possession de facto.

"Ejectment cases - forcible entry and unlawful detainer - are summary proceedings designed to
provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property
involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de
23
jure. It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable." Thus, "an ejectment
case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the
24
subject property."

Indeed, possession in ejectment cases "means nothing more than actual physical possession, not
25
legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law." In a forcible entry case, "prior physical

26
possession is the primary consideration." "A party who can prove prior possession can recover

such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if
he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the
27
property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him." "The party in peaceable, quiet

28
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence, or terror."

The respondents have proven prior physical possession of the property.

In this case, we are convinced that Wilfredo had been in prior possession of the property and that the
petitioners deprived him of such possession by means of force, strategy and stealth.

The CA did not err in equating residence with physical possession since residence is a manifestation
of possession and occupation. Wilfredo had consistently alleged that he resided on "C.M. Recto
Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas," the location of the property, whereas Evangeline has always admitted
that she has been a resident of "J. Belen Street, Rosario, Batangas." The petitioners failed to prove that
they have occupied the property through some other person, even if they have declared their
residence in another area.

We note that in another proceeding, a criminal complaint for qualified trespass to dwelling, the Lipa
City Prosecutor also observed that the petitioners did not reside on or occupy the property on
29
December 16, 2002, about three (3) months before Wilfredo filed the complaint for forcible entry on

March 13, 2003. The petitioners also alleged therein that they are residents of "J. Belen St., Rosario,
30
Batangas" and not "No. 30 C.M. Recto Ave., Lipa City."

Furthermore, the petitioners failed to rebut the affidavit of Barangay Captain Briones attesting to
Wilfredo’s prior possession and the petitioners’ unlawful entry to the property during Wilfredo’s
31
hospital confinement.
 32
The petitioners’ claim of physical possession cannot find support in the March 11, 2003 order of the

RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13, in Civil Case No. 99-0773 stating that the petitioners "have been
occupying the premises since 1997." We note that the order was a mere interlocutory order on
Wilfredo’s motion for the issuance of a cease and desist order. An interlocutory order does not end
the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and
33
liabilities against each other. "It is basically provisional in its application." It is the nature of an

interlocutory order that it is subject to modification or reversal that the result of further proceedings
may warrant. Thus, the RTC’s pronouncement on the petitioners’ occupation "since 1997" is not res
judicata on the issue of actual physical possession.

In sum, we find no reversible error in the decision appealed from and, therefore, affirm it.

Wilfredo’s death did not render moot the forcible entry case.

The death of Wilfredo introduces a seeming complication into the case and on the disposition we
shall make. To go back to basics, the petition before us involves the recovery of possession of real
property and is a real action that is not extinguished by the death of a party. The judgment in an
ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action; hence, it is enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased. 1âwphi1

This judgment entitles the winning party to: (a) the restitution of the premises, (b) the sum justly due
as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, and (c)
attorney’s fees and costs.

The complicating factor in the case is the nature and basis of Wilfredo’s possession; he was holding
the property as usufructuary, although this right to de jure possession was also disputed before his
death, hand in hand with the de facto possession that is subject of the present case. Without need,
however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the usufruct is now rendered moot by the
death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This
development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right to retain or to reacquire possession of
the property even if the ejectment judgment directs its restitution.

Thus, what actually survives under the circumstances is the award of damages, by way of
compensation, that the RTC originally awarded and which the CA and this Court affirmed. This
award was computed as of the time of the RTC decision (or roughly about a year before Wilfredo’s
death) but will now have to take into account the compensation due for the period between the RTC
decision and Wilfredo’s death. The computation is a matter of execution that is for the RTC, as court
of origin, to undertake. The heirs of Wilfredo shall succeed to the computed total award under the
rules of succession, a matter that is not within the authority of this Court to determine at this point.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal and accordingly AFFIRM the February 10, 2006 decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90717 with the MODIFICATION that, with the
termination, upon his death, of respondent Wilfredo Rivera’s usufructory over the disputed
property, the issue of restitution of possession has been rendered moot and academic; on the other
hand, the monetary award of ₱620,000.00, as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the property up to the time of the Regional Trial Court decision on April 6, 2005, survives and
accrues to the estate of the deceased respondent Wilfredo Rivera, to be distributed to his heirs
pursuant to the applicable law on succession. Additional compensation accrues and shall be added
to the compensation from the time of the Regional Trial Court decision up to respondent Wilfredo
Rivera’s death. For purposes of the computation of this additional amount and for the execution of
the total amount due under this Decision, we hereby remand the case to the Regional Trial Court, as
court of origin, for appropriate action. Costs against petitioners Evangeline Rivera-Calingasan and E.
Rical Enterprises.

SO ORDERED.
4. G.R. No. 137013 May 6, 2005

RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY AYON, respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1
For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of

2
Appeals dated October 5, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 4735 and its Resolution dated December 11, 1998

denying the motion for reconsideration.

The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City a complaint for illegal detainer against spouses
Tony and Mercy Ayon, respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3506-B-96.

In his complaint, petitioner averred that he is the registered owner of three lots situated at Lanzona
Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 108174, 108175,
and 108176. Respondent spouses are the registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-247792. The previous occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the
lots of the herein parties. Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse.

Petitioner further alleged in his complaint that in 1985, when he bought the three lots, he informed
respondents that the building occupies a portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue
using the building. But in 1996, he needed the entire portion of his lot, hence, he demanded that
respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over
to him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion
and even made improvements on the building. The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon,
but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification
to file action was issued.

In their answer, respondents sought a dismissal of this case on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over it since there is no lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Respondents
denied they were occupying petitioner's property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the
contested portion and have been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985.

On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering
the latter, their successors-in-interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the portion of
the subject properties and peacefully surrender possession thereof to plaintiff as well as
dismantle/remove the structures found thereon.

Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the use and occupation of the encroached
area in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the
subsequent months thereafter until premises are vacated; to pay attorney's fees of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit.

3
SO ORDERED."

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated February 12,
4
1998 in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment. The RTC upheld the finding

of the MTCC that respondents' occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence,
when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through court action.

Respondents then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review. In its
Decision dated October 5, 1988 now being challenged by petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner's proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for
unlawful detainer, thus:

"In this case, petitioners were already in possession of the premises in question at the time private
respondent bought three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is occupied
by a building being used by the former as a bodega. Apart from private respondent's bare claim, no
evidence was alluded to show that petitioners' possession was tolerated by (his)
predecessor-in-interest. The fact that respondent might have tolerated petitioners' possession is not
decisive. What matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of
petitioners' possession from its inception. And in this regard, the Court notes that the complaint
itself merely alleges that defendants-petitioners have been 'occupying a portion of the above
properties of the plaintiff for the past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff.'
Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise tolerated petitioners' possession of the premises.
x x x.

Consequently, x x x, respondent should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion
publiciana and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
5
complaint for unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED."

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution
dated December 11, 1998.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following
errors:

"I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING THE

INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER SHOULD PRESENT HIS CLAIM BEFORE
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA.

II

THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH

EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE."

The sole issue here is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law in holding
that petitioner's complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC.

Petitioner contends that it is not necessary that he has prior physical possession of the questioned
property before he could file an action for unlawful detainer. He stresses that he tolerated
respondents' occupancy of the portion in controversy until he needed it. After his demand that they
vacate, their continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the
MTCC is proper.

Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the disputed property
even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he cannot claim that they were
occupying the property by mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical possession.
We sustain the petition.

It is an elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer
6
or pleadings filed by the defendant. This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or

7
unlawful detainer. All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper

Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, which
actions shall include not only the plea for restoration of possession but also all claims for damages
8
and costs arising therefrom. The said courts are not divested of jurisdiction over such cases even if

the defendants therein raises the question of ownership over the litigated property in his pleadings
9
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership.

Section 1, Rule 70 on forcible entry and unlawful detainer of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, reads:

"Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person may, at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs."

Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a
case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant
whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for
recovery of possession from defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively lawful by
virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his
10
possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
Petitioner's complaint for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96 is properly within the
competence of the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read:

"4. That defendants (spouses) have constructed an extension of their residential house as well as
other structures and have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the
past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff since at the time he has no need of the
property;

5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made demands to the
defendants to vacate and turn over the premises as well as the removal (of) their structures found
inside the PROPERTIES of plaintiff; that without any justifiable reasons, defendants refused to
vacate the portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the
plaintiff.

6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Matina Crossing 74-A,
Davao City for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996. The barangay case
reached the Pangkat but no settlement was had. Thereafter, a 'Certification To File Action' dated
March 27, 1996 was issued x x x;

11
x x x." (underscoring ours)

Verily, petitioner's allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find
no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. A complaint for unlawful
detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is
12
unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Here, there is an allegation in

petitioner's complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his
tolerance. Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents' failure to
vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom,
or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.

It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when
the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas
13
vs. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case: "A person who occupies the land of another at the

latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is
the proper remedy against him."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47435 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
February 12, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97,
affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao
City in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

5. G.R. No. 132197 August 16, 2005

ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG, Respondent.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

1
In a Decision dated 6 January 1998, the Former First Division of the Court of Appeals overturned

the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue
City, ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful
detainer. This petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of Appeals’ Decision.

The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2376, before the MTC of Mandaue City, Branch I. In the complaint,
petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged
respondent Elizabeth Ong’s ownership of the lots previous to theirs. On 26 January 1995, Atty.
Joseph M. Baduel, representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing them of
its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter.
But respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so
petitioners alleged.

Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. and Juanito King and Sons, Inc. (petitioners) had acquired the lands from
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale made on 23 March 1995. In turn, it appears that
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 14 July 1994. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title
consequential thereto were subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint filed
2
on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. Per record,

this case is still pending resolution.

Meanwhile, the MYC resolved the ejectment case on 24 April 1996, with the decision ordering
respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession thereof to
petitioners.

On appeal, the RTC rendered on 1 March 1997 a judgment affirming the MTC’s decision in its
entirety.

On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal. However, on the following day, they filed a
motion for reconsideration.

On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently gave due course to respondents’
3
notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997; denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997,

and granted petitioners’ motion for immediate execution pending appeal.

In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a Petition for
Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as there was no
contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for unlawful
detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.

Petitioners then took this recourse via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has already become final
and executory at the time the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the
complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC; and, (iii) whether
petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of the subject premises.

We resolve the first argument to be without merit.

The following sequence of events is undisputed:

(1) On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the judgment of the MTC.

(2) On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned decision.

(3) On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.

(4) On 9 May 1997, respondents filed likewise with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision.
(5) On 23 June 1997, the RTC of Mandaue issued an Order denying respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration.

(6) On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order.

(7) On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional
period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review.

(8) On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review.

Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period for appeal.
They theorize that the period started running on 28 April 1995, the date of receipt of the RTC
decision, and ended on 13 May 1997. According to them, this reglementary period could not have
been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for Reconsideration because of the filing
one day earlier of the Notice of Appeal. This Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997, albeit the wrong mode
of appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a petition for review to either the Court of
4
Appeals or the Supreme Court.

Petitioners further argue that respondents, after having filed the Notice of Appeal which was given
due course by the RTC, cannot take an inconsistent stand such as filing a Motion for Reconsideration.
Such filing, therefore, did not toll the fifteen (15)-day period which started running from the date of
receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997.

5
Respondents, in their Comment, submit that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated 8 May 1997 was

improper, and as such did not produce any legal effect. Therefore, the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration immediately on the following day cured this defect. The RTC refused to subscribe
respondents’ position. It justified the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the
respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated:

On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997.

Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration.

Considering the Notice of Appeal filed earlier which the court hereby approves, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED.
 6
The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is GRANTED. (Emphasis

in the original.)

Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it took cognizance
of respondents’ position and reversed the RTC. But does this necessarily mean that the RTC was
correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of
Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was?

Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides:

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and
other lawful fees, depositing the amount of ₱500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court
and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and
the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before
the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners
should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal
of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief. Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of
the defective Notice of Appeal.

Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again
from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to
File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is
clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.
 7
Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot

be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the
two cases are different.

De la Cruz is a criminal case, governed by criminal procedure. Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and
an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal.

In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal
from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if
no appeal was interposed.

Now on the second and more important issue raised by petitioners: whether the Complaint satisfies
the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC.

The MTC considered itself as having jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint and disposed of the
same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the
lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds,
namely: that the allegations fail to show that petitioners were deprived of possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the
parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals.

The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations:

....

3. That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register of
Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City, all situated in the City of Mandaue. Copies of said Transfer Certificate of Titles are
hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and made an integral part hereof;

4. That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots;
5. That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband and
co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots;

6. That on May 6, 1995, plaintiffs, through the undersigned counsel, wrote defendants a letter
informing them or their intent to use said lots and demanded of them to vacate said lots within 30
days from receipt of said letter. Copy of said letter is hereto attached as Annex "D" and made an
integral part thereof;

7. That despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots,
thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the
use of their lots;

8. That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have
suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of ₱10,000.00 a month

8
....

Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
9
jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

Respondents contend that the complaint did not allege that petitioners’ possession was originally
lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express
or implied contract.

The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify
the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter.

10
In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was

unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is
equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, without necessarily employing the
11
terminology of the law.
Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of
defendant, which was legal in the beginning, having no other source than a contract, express or
12
implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B.

13
Barba v. Court of Appeals, we held that a simple allegation

that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient.

Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that:

. . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus,
unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of
14
their lots;

is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case.

In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered
by TCT Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. By their implied tolerance, they have allowed respondents, the
former owners of the properties, to remain therein. Nonetheless, they eventually sent a letter to
respondents asking that the latter vacate the said lots. Respondents refused, thereby depriving
petitioners of possession of the lots. Clearly, the complaint establishes the basic elements of an
unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC.

Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v.
15 16
Panis. But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The case

doesid not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co
17
Tiamco v. Diaz justifies a more liberal approach, thus:

. . . The principle underlying the brevity and simplicity of pleadings in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases rests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are
summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as
promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully
18
avoided.

Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the
annulment of deed of sale and title over said property. Petitioners know better than to question this
in an ejectment proceeding, which brings us to the nature of the action in this case.

Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being an accion
reivindicatoria according to them, on the ground that petitioners were constantly claiming ownership
19
over the lands in the guise of filing an action for ejectment. In their Comment, respondents

maintain that they occupy the subject lots as the legal owners. Petitioners, on the other hand, are
seeking recovery of possession under a claim of ownership which is tantamount to recovery of
possession based on alleged title to the lands, and therefore is within the original jurisdiction of the
RTC, so respondents conclude.

This contention is not tenable.

The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs
from accion publiciana where the issue is the better right of possession or possession de jure, and accion
interdictal where the issue is material possession or possession de facto. In an action for unlawful
detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally
20
unessential.

Neither the allegation in petitioners’ complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by
respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province
of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming
or obtaining ownership of the properties. The acknowledgment in their pleadings of the fact of prior
ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of respondents’ present ownership. This
is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically
the unlawful withholding of possession. Petitioners, in all their pleadings, only sought to recover
physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels
of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case.
Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion
would be the same for mere assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not
21
therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. This Court in Ganadin

22
v. Ramos stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter

if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of
deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will
not abate the ejectment case.

23
In Drilon v. Gaurana, this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the

same property or for annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the MTC of its
jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while
there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for
annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the
24
same.

25
In Oronce v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a

separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or
equitable mortgage in the same

Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedy of ejectment afforded
by law to the plaintiff. Consequently, an adjudication made in an ejectment proceeding regarding the
issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a
necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only
issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de
facto and not possession de jure.

26
The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez when it ruled:
We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the lot in
dispute, for the purpose of settling the issue of possession, although the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment
case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action
is brought seasonably before the proper forum.

The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.

27
In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, this Court had the occasion to clarify this:

. . . Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding for that
purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the respondents can only be
assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the
right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an
28
action for unlawful detainer.

With the conclusion of the second issue in favor of petitioners, there is no need to discuss the third
assignment of error which is related to the second issue.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 6 January 1998
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated 24

April 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaue City REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs
against respondents.

SO ORDERED.