Soriano v. Dizon , A.C. No.
6792, January 25, 2006
Facts of the case:
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, which
involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment. The facts leading to respondent's conviction
were summarized in this wise:
". . . . The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook
the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone,
but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.
Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and
Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop
the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi
driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused
who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged,
stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the
chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but
the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could
be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he
noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the
accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the
accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter
pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."
Issue:
Whether respondent's crime involves moral turpitude and warrants disbarment.
Held:
YES. The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, a labor case concerning an employee who was
dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer's contention and held that
homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude.
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the
moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the
aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression
shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by
complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
lawyer's assault.
We also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent
wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed
his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime. The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the
earmarks of moral turpitude. The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable;
they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the
penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable — lawyers in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior
disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances — not the mere
fact of their conviction — would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present
case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his
unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
