Modi on Twitter

NAVODITA PANDE

INDI A SINGAPORE M A L AY S I A
 Copyright © Dr. Navodita Pande 2023
All Rights Reserved.

ISBN 979-8-89066-894-3

This book has been published with all efforts taken to make the material
error-free after the consent of the author. However, the author and the
publisher do not assume and hereby disclaim any liability to any party for
any loss, damage, or disruption caused by errors or omissions, whether such
errors or omissions result from negligence, accident, or any other cause.

While every effort has been made to avoid any mistake or omission, this
publication is being sold on the condition and understanding that neither
the author nor the publishers or printers would be liable in any manner to
any person by reason of any mistake or omission in this publication or for
any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice rendered or accepted on
the basis of this work. For any defect in printing or binding the publishers
will be liable only to replace the defective copy by another copy of this work
then available.
 Dedication
For ‘Image’, the Allahabad University Film Society magazine where I wrote
my first editorial
For Bennett, Coleman & Company Limited where I began my first
published writings
For my deceased colleagues- Ashrita Shukla & Niran Srivastava
Contents

Foreword7
Preface11
Acknowledgments13

Social Media Technocrat 15

Social-Media-Literate Leadership 25
Campaign Strategy 33
Party Organization 41
Citizen Mobilization 49
Identity Formation 57
Personality Traits, Politics and Media 65
Public Sphere 75
Opinion Leaders 83
Hybridization and Globalization 89
Tweet Bibliography 95
Visual Representation 107
6 Contents
Foreword

By
Professor Subhash Dhuliya
Former Vice-Chancellor, Uttarakhand Open University
Former Professor of Journalism, Indira Gandhi National Open University,
Indian Institute of Mass Communication (IIMC), Central University of
Rajasthan
Distinguished Professor of Dean, School of Creative Art, Design and
Media Studies, Sharda University
Founder-Director, newswriters.in

I ndia has 23.6 millions Twitter users. Third in the world after US and
Japan. India embraced the internet with open arms, and its digital
population has been growing rapidly in the past decade with crossing 600
million active internet users .Growing digitalization efforts combined with
low data prices enabled a significant number of people to use the internet
actively across India. Of these, about 467 million were active social media
users in the third quarter of 2022. (https://www.statista.com/)
According to the Digital 2023 data report, India has over 692.0 million
internet users, when internet penetration stood at 48.7% with an active
1.10 billion cellular mobile connections in the country.
Social media, specifically, Twitter has become major platform of
political discourse and mass mobilization. Twitter-driven politics has
acquired new dimensions in recent times. Most of the major players in
political and public life are increasingly using twitter to propagate and
promote their ideas and goals. Its social media where public figures make
statements and reporters announce their breaking news.
Social media has dramatically changed the way elections campaigns
are conducted. It has virtually taken over the conventional mode of
8 Foreword

campaigning. It allows politicians to communicate directly to voters

without spending much. Many politicians and news organizations
engage on the platform regularly. Twitter users only are relatively small
portion of the voting public but through multi-step communication and
amplification of messages, its reach and impact is much wider with the
amplifying power of Twitter. The tweets are a major source of news for
news organisations this facilitate wider dissemination of the messages.
Twitter has given rise to forces that are completely reshaping the
course of political discourse and mass mobilization. Social media played
crucial role in coloured revolutions the Middle-East -Iran, Egypt, Tunisia,
Bahrain, and many other countries- the Arab Spring, the Occupy
Movement in late 2011 in US relied on Twitter for coordination of direct
action and amplification of messages, and Black Lives Matter perfected the
same strategy a few years later. And many more.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, with more than 24 million followers
on Twitter and 37 million “likes” on Facebook. The overwhelming
majority of Modi’s messages on Facebook are “liked” more than 50,000
times apiece, and the median number of retweets of his Twitter messages
is more than 2,000. As of November 2016, Modi had more than twice the
number of followers on either Twitter or Facebook as any mainstream
news media channel or journalist in India indicating his reach and
influence of an individual. This reflects the efficacy and reach of Modi’s
election campaign through twitter. He has made best use of this platform.
He is one of the few world leaders who have such a huge presence on
social media sphere.
Navodita Pande’s book is based on the study of legislative assembly
elections held in five states (Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Manipur, Goa,
and Punjab) during the months of February and March in 2022 and the
role Modi’s tweets played in the campaign. She monitored and tracked the
large number of tweets by Modi during this time.
The author states that “a crucial part of the ‘‘Modi wave’’ was his
omnipresence throughout the election campaign. Online, Modi’s
presence was undeniable. Within the span of five months, his name
became the most tweeted election-related term or phrase, with
approximately 11.1 million tweets mentioning him.”
 Foreword 9

Modi’s Tweets were tailored to specific states that Modi was visiting
and could relate to his target audience more effectively. The author
observes “in India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh (UP), which also
happens to be a key battleground during elections, economic growth
was de-emphasized while the issue of political corruption was brought
to the forefront. Modi sent out focused and targeted tweets about UP.
Critiquing the BJP’s primary electoral rivals in the state, Modi tweeted, SP
(Samajwadi Party), BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party) and Congress can’t do any
good for people of UP. They are immersed in corruption and vote bank
politics.” The central theme fo Modi’s election campaign in UP.
The study observes that “through much of his campaigning in Gujarat,
Modi has used technology to recraft himself as a man who appeals
beyond his Hindutva roots to a leader who represents the needs of a “neo-
middle class,” using a range of media including and initiating a television
channel called “NaMo,” mobile-based outreach, an Internet campaign,
and a number of public appearances. Modi’s investment in social media
is necessarily more than just the value of head count outreach to voting
citizens. The symbolic value of social media emerges on two fronts—
being active on social media itself suggests an embracing of modernity,
but second, the tone and content of the messages on social media are also
representational objects used to re-mind listeners of the leader’s political
message.” “Modi on Twitter” analyses all these trends and captures the
core of political campaigning in the country.
The social media is playing important in setting the political
agenda and shaping of Indian democracy. Navodita Pande’s work is a
contribution in analyzing and understanding the political process and
discourse in the wake of social media explosion.
Preface

T his book is written as part of a SEED Grant sanctioned by Research

Department of Bennett University. I feel very proud to be part of this
esteemed organization and the Department of Times School of Media
where I received this opportunity to work on research on social media
platforms and its use during elections.
Elections are held from time to time- once in five years to the
parliament and to state legislative assemblies. This study is based
on legislative assembly elections held in five states (Uttar Pradesh,
Uttarakhand, Manipur, Goa, Punjab) during the months of February and
March in 2022. I monitored and tracked the tweets by Prime Minister
Narendra Modi during this time to see if there is any special trend being
followed by his tweets- greater emphasis on those five states addressing
people living in those states.
Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Manipur, Goa, Punjab were the states
that went to elections where lot of citizens were tweeting about politicians
and chief ministers of these states. It took me three months to collect the
data on Twitter and another two months to take a subscription of Tractor-
Graphext- a software used to analyse tweets, some diagrams which have
been showcased in the text.
I was particularly motivated to write about it as elections have been of
immense interest to me. Elections are a crucial part of Indian democracy.
We choose our leaders and our nation-builders through this mammoth
exercise. It thus becomes important to know, understand, analyse and
investigate this exercise and how this fares for the nation and the citizens.
While writing this book, Twitter platform got its new CEO, Mr. Elon
Musk but that has not changed the nature of tweets which were noted
down much earlier while voting was on in the months of February-March,
2022.
12 Preface

While writing this book, I realized that it is the journey which is

important, rather than the destination. I started out by formatting the
writing in a certain academic style. But I realized that in order to keep the
book more intelligible, I will directly analyse the tweets made by Modiji as
that will simply keep it more engaging.
Acknowledgments

T he author owes much to the funds granted by research department

of Bennett University for funding this publication. I am particularly
grateful to members of Research wing of Bennett University- Dr. Rajendra
Chauhan, then Head of Department of Research; Dr. Prabhu Agarwal,
Vice-Chancellor, Bennett University; Dr. Rama Komaragiri, Dr. Veena
Dutta, Mr. Sunil Saxena, Head of Department, Times School of Media and
my colleagues for their unflinching support.
I am also grateful to Tractor-Graphext and Paul Suddon and
Allyssa Marie Arocha of Graphext for all the assistance in analysing
and understanding the software. They guided me and trained me to
understand the software and work on it to analyse data on Twitter.
I am also directly and indirectly grateful to some of the professors on
Twitter- Professor Claes de Vreese, Professor Rasmus Kleis Nielsen and
Professor Cristian Vaccari whose valuable tweets helped me understand
and download books on political communication, involving Twitter and
social media.
I am grateful to my colleague Dr. Rahul Dass, Mr. Jatin Gandhi, Dr.
Shilpi Jha, Dr. Nithin Kalorth and Mr. Bhavneet Aurora for guiding me
and helping me understand where to find resources and substantial study
material for the research conducted from time to time. I also thank Ms.
Anitha Pannir Selvam and Dr. Rama Komaragiri for their constant
counselling and support to accomplish my tasks on time.
I also owe a lot to my mother for guiding me and motivating me to
study and work on my aims and goals that I set out to achieve.I am also
grateful to my students for asking questions related to social media which
further made me investigate the matter and find more fruitful results and
findings related to the research. Sometimes and most often, questions can
make your work shine like nothing else can.
14 Acknowledgments

I also thank my publisher, Notion Press, for being patient as I took

time to complete my writing.
While I thank each and everyone for the success of my work, I am
alone responsible for any omissions and errors one might find in this
work.
SOCIAL MEDIA TECHNOCRAT
 Dr. Navodita Pande 17

S ocial media such as Facebook and Twitter have created a “digitally

enhanced public sphere” that has become a space for political actors
and citizens to exercise agency and outreach (Dutton, 2009). Elections
in almost all democracies increasingly feature social media campaigns
of key candidates in what has come to be a new normal for parts of the
Global South (Lufkens, 2016). Prime Minister Narendra Modi, with more
than 24 million followers on Twitter and 37 million “likes” on Facebook,
is second only to Barack Obama among elected officials worldwide with
social media followers (Pal, 2019). The overwhelming majority of Modi’s
messages on Facebook are “liked” more than 50,000 times apiece, and the
median number of retweets of his Twitter messages is more than 2,000. As
of November 2016, Modi had more than twice the number of followers
on either Twitter or Facebook as any mainstream news media channel or
journalist in India.
Through much of his campaigning in Gujarat, Modi has used
technology to recraft himself as a man who appeals beyond his Hindutva
roots to a leader who represents the needs of a “neo-middle class,” using
a range of media including and initiating a television channel called
“NaMo,” mobile-based outreach, an Internet campaign, and a number
of public appearances through holographic shows during elections
(Jaffrelot 2015).
The choice of social media is, in and of itself, not surprising. Unlike
earlier means of technology-enabled outreach such as a website with
downloadable wallpapers, or opt-in subscriptions for SMS messages,
social media allow an unobtrusive way of connecting with the electorate
and building a community (Kapoor and Dwivedi 2015). The nature of
social media, in its perception as a technology of young people, came
to the forefront significantly after Barack Obama’s successful online
campaign for his 2008 election. Modi’s investment in social media is
necessarily more than just the value of head count outreach to voting
citizens. The symbolic value of social media emerges on two fronts—
being active on social media itself suggests an embracing of modernity,
but second, the tone and content of the messages on social media are also
representational objects used to re-mind listeners of the leader’s political
message. The construction of social media as a means of political outreach
18 Modi On Twitter

that spoke out against entrenched political institutions gained purchase

in the aftermath of the Iranian elections of 2008 and the Egyptian
prodemocracy movement (Sabadello 2011).

The popular press, in particular, played an important role in

promoting the politicized social media participant as representing
youthful revolution and a voice of change and decentralized
empowerment (Grossman 2009). The use of short-form social media
messaging was individualized yet informal, and distinct from the
traditional banality of political polemic, and consequently seen as
attractive to a younger tech- savvy ethic (Lenhart et al. 2010; Sago 2010).
The election of a “giant-killer” Barack Obama, who defeated establishment
candidates within his party to emerge on a platform of change, helped
further the idea not just of a different kind of modern political leader
but also of a campaign strategy that could canvas a young and idealistic
population into political action. Several studies showed that politicians on
social media were either younger themselves (Larsson and Kalsnes 2014),
trying to reach the young (Leng 2012), or looking awkward trying to act
young (Baxter and Marcella 2012).

Modi’s presence on social media must be framed within the history

of his political genesis from a grassroots proselytizer and organizer for
the right-wing Hindu social organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS) to a leading member of its political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP), and eventually to chief minister for the western Indian state of
Gujarat in 2001. Modi led the BJP to three election wins in Gujarat and
became the longest- serving chief minister in the state’s history. The early
years of his Gujarat tenure were marred by the 2002 riots, which some
news media alleged were a pogrom against Muslims. Modi was acquitted
of charges, though some of his key aides were convicted and jailed for
their involvement. This led to Modi’s marginalization in the international
community: the United States banned Modi from entry and the European
Union denied him diplomatic access for several years. Modi’s association
with the RSS also put him at odds with the relatively liberal English-
language media in India, a channel to both Indian elites and nonresident
expatriates. In the years following the riots, Modi’s negative coverage
persisted, including interviews with antagonistic television commentators.
 Dr. Navodita Pande 19

Although even before 2002 Modi had been known to talk about
or be seen using a computer in media interviews (Shukla 2000), his
investment in an aggressive public relations effort to build an image as
a development icon expanded significantly after the riots (Kaur 2015;
Price 2015). The “Vikas Purush” campaign featured a series of photos
of him in sylvan settings, in thoughtful poses, surrounded by artifacts
like an Obama biography, a financial newspaper, using technological
devices like an Apple laptop and an SLR camera— proposing an image
of a thoughtful, well-read, technology- embracing leader (Pal 2017). The
regime highlighted industrial growth and the investment climate, avoiding
mention of the riots in public fora. Modi’s positive-tone messaging on
Twitter that we see later has roots in the espousal of the terms asmita
(common pride) as a central part of his speeches while he was chief
minister, suggesting that people invest in pratiksha (aspiration) rather
than ninda (condemnation) (Suhrud 2012). The use of asmita presented
a turn-the- other- cheek style of forward-looking leadership that by
encouraging its own movement to disavow ninda undercut the political
opposition’s attempts to bring up the riots.
Modi is not the first major politician to highlight digital technology as
central to his political branding. Since the mid-1990s, several politicians
have crafted political images as tech-savvy leaders. Key among them was
Andhra Pradesh’s chief minister N. Chandrababu Naidu, who claimed the
moniker of Cyber-Naidu, signaling his vision for a tech industry-inspired
polity by referring to himself as the state’s CEO (Rudolph and Rudolph,
2001). In subsequent years, several politicians came to embrace both
a macro- vision of technology-enabled industrial growth by explicitly
promoting the tech sector or special economic zones as part of their
political platforms (Banerjee- Guha 2008; Kamat 2011), or through a
visible interaction with digital artifacts such as posing with computers
for the media or incorporating technology into their public programs
such as laptop give-aways around election times (Mudliar and Pal 2015).
This political investment in the symbolic value of technology occurred
alongside the broader expansion of the discourse of ICT4D (information
and communications technology for development), which saw a role for
digital technology and the tech industry in a symbiotic relationship with
the idea of global development (Kleine and Unwin 2009), often drawing
20 Modi On Twitter

on the work of management theories premised on a value that “Bottom

of the Pyramid” markets offered growth possibilities to corporations
and vice versa (Schwittay 2009). Building on Arjun Appadurai’s work
on the “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai, 2004), several works looked at
the projection or enactment of aspiration as an interim indicator of
development (Ray and Kuriyan 2010; Rangaswamy and Cutrell 2012).
Hence digital technology as a tool for branding has been used by
many.
 Dr. Navodita Pande 21

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Appadurai, A. 2004. “The Capacity to Aspire.” In Culture and Public
Action, ed. V. Rao and M. Walton, 59–84. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Banerjee-Guha, S. 2008. “Space Relations of Capital and Significance of
New Economic Enclaves: SEZs in India.” Economic and Political Weekly
43 (47): 51–59.
Baxter, G., and R. Marcella. 2012. “Does Scotland ‘Like’ This? Social
Media Use by Political Parties and Candidates in Scotland during the 2010
UK General Election Campaign.” Libri 62 (2): 109–24.
Dutton, W. H. 2009. “The Fifth Estate Emerging through the Network of
Networks.” Prometheus 27 (1): 1–15.
Grossman, L. 2009. “Iran’s Protests: Why Twitter is the Medium of the
Movement.” Time, June 17. Accessed March 30, 2023. http://content.time.com
Jaffrelot, C. 2015. “Narendra Modi and the Power of Television in Gujarat.”
Television & New Media 16 (4).
Kamat, S. 2011. “Neoliberalism, Urbanism and the Education Economy:
Producing Hyderabad as a ‘Global City’.” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural
Politics of Education 32 (2): 187–202.
Kapoor, K. K., and Y. K. Dwivedi. 2015. “Metamorphosis of Indian
Electoral Campaigns: Modi’s Social Media Experiment.” International
Journal of Indian Culture
and Business Management 11 (4): 496–516.
Kaur, R. 2015. “Good Times, Brought to You by Brand Modi.” Television &
New Media 16 (4): 323–30.
Kleine, D., and T. Unwin. 2009. “Technological Revolution, Evolution and
New Dependencies: What’s New about ict4d?” Third World Quarterly 30
(5): 1045–67.
Larsson, A. O., and B. Kalsnes. 2014. “‘Of Course We Are on Facebook’:
Use and Non-Use of Social Media among Swedish and Norwegian
22 Modi On Twitter

Politicians.” European Journal of Communication (May 16): https://doi.

org/10.1177/0267323114531383
Leng, H. K. 2012. “Marketing Politicians on Facebook: An Examination of
the Singapore General Election 2011.” Studies in Business and Economics
7 (1): 101–9.
Lenhart, A., K. Purcell, A. Smith, and K. Zickuhr. 2010. Social Media
and Mobile Internet Use among Teens and Young Adults. Millennials.
Washington, DC: Pew Internet and American Life Project.
Lufkens, M. 2016. Twiplomacy Study 2016. Geneva: Burson-Marsteller.
Mudliar, P., and J. Pal. 2015. “ICTD in the Popular Press: Media Discourse
around Aakash, the ‘World’s Cheapest Tablet.’” Information Technologies
& International Development 11 (1): 41–55.
Pal, J. 2017. “The Technological Self in India: From Tech-Savvy Farmers to
a Selfie-Tweeting Prime Minister.” Proceedings of the Ninth International
Conference on Information and Communication Technologies and
Development. Article no 11. New York: ACM.
Pal, J. (2019). The Making of a Technocrat. Global Digital Cultures:
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Price, L. 2015. The Modi Effect: Inside Narendra Modi’s Campaign to
Transform India. New York: Quercus.
Rangaswamy, N., and E. Cutrell. 2012. “Anthropology, Development
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 Dr. Navodita Pande 23

Sabadello, M. 2011. “The Role of New Media for the Democratization

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SOCIAL-MEDIA-LITERATE
LEADERSHIP
 Dr. Navodita Pande 27

T ransformational leadership continues to be an immensely popular

model of leadership for both its practical value and theoretic richness
(Lowe & Gardner, 2000). While transformational leadership was initially
developed to explain outstanding political leadership, it is now being
applied routinely to describe outstanding leadership in various contexts
most notably the for-profit organizations. “Transformational leadership
is the process whereby a person engages with others and connects which
raises the level of motivation and morality in both the leader and the
follower” (Burns 1978). The goal of the transformational leadership
model, according to the creator of the concept MacGregor Burns, is for
“leaders and followers to help each other to advance to a higher level of
morale and motivation” (Burns 1978).
Twitter as a communication platform gives leaders the means to
disarm crisis skillfully (Gruber, Smerek, Thomas-Hunt & James, 2015),
create positive brand loyalty with customers, and forge meaningful
relationships with members (Korzynski, 2015). However, what is
surprising is that many leaders don’t tweet or don’t view social media
platforms as valuable to their leadership effectiveness (Korzynski,2015).
Two of the pioneers in transformational leaders were Bass and
Avolio (1987). They argue that transformational leaders are charismatic
individuals who can motivate their followers to get on board with their
cause (Bass, 1995) and are able to create an emotional bond with their
followers (Men 2014). Transformational leadership is also seen as more
positive leadership style than most other forms of leadership because of
its social support component (Rowold and Rohmann 2009; Men 2014). In
their study on transactional and transformational styles of leadership, Men
and Stacks (2013) found that transformational leadership had a significant
positive effect on organizational reputation both directly and indirectly
through the empowerment of the employees. Transformational leadership
is also both a product and a process. Considerable research has discovered
the foundational dimensions of transformation leadership including
charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individualized
consideration (Bass 1990). However, transformational leadership is also
a communicative process that can be developed through training (Bass
1981). How can managers and supervisors develop from transactional
28 Modi On Twitter

to transformational leaders? One explanation may very well be Twitter.

Leaders today face a radically different leadership context. More needs to
be known about how leaders can develop their transformational qualities
by taking advantage of the digital age and constructing an active presence
with members on Twitter.
According to a survey conducted by the Pew research group (Barthel
and Shearer 2015), two-thirds of U.S. adults get their news from Twitter.
This makes Twitter one of the most accessed daily news sources. In
their study on the relationship between broadcasters and their followers
on Twitter, Xu and Feng (2014) proposed that journalists function as
gatekeepers of information on social media platforms like Twitter. They
found journalists who were featured on television were reached out to
more by their followers than those who wrote for newspapers. They also
found that twenty-one percent of those who reached out and reached out
more than once was because of an interpersonal greeting given by the
journalists. There is a significant relationship between followers wanting
engagement from their preferred journalists on Twitter.
In his study on the use of Twitter to manage public relations,
Castronovo & Huang (2012) looked at the use of Twitter by CEOs and
the CEOs use of transformational leadership via a survey of students.
Hwang found that participants were fond of CEOs and their use of
Twitter, and they responded encouragingly to the use of transformational
leadership. Here the use of social media is directly correlated to the
positive perception of the leader of the organization, and his or her
leadership structure. Subordinate fulfillment (Ross and Offermann, 1997)
and commitment to the organization (Basu and Green 1997) were also
positivity influenced by transformational leaders. Leadership at its core
is a negotiated relationship. This give and take between members and
leaders can also be seen in interactions on Twitter just as they occur in the
actual workplace.
Ahlquist (2014) used the social change model to advocate the need
for both digital leadership and digital literacy in our contemporary
leaders. She created ten competencies of a digital leader, with the majority
of these competencies following under a category of connectedness
with their followers. These include awareness of emerging technology,
 Dr. Navodita Pande 29

sorting accurate information, self-awareness, establishing boundaries,

self-branding, building a learning network, online encounter resolution,
and “using social media for social good” (Ahlquist 2014 pg. 59). Preece
and Shneiderman (2009) presented a framework of “Reader-to-Leader”
which focuses on leaders in the digital world. They view leadership as a
higher calling. Leaders are called to make those around them better, stop
individuals from being mistreated, and to make sure new members feel
welcomed.
Leadership at its core is a negotiated relationship. This give and
take between members and leaders can also be seen in interactions on
Twitter just as they occur in the actual workplace. Much like athletes and
journalists bring themselves down to a personal level with their followers,
a leader may benefit from Twitter as well by constructing meaningful
relationships with their followers on Twitter.
Sheer and Chen (2003) investigated Intranet use and tried to find a
correlation between transformational leadership and their Intranet use.
Intranet is the internal application of the Internet within an organization.
Twitter gives individuals the opportunity to stand up and become
leaders in a world outside the one they previously lived in their
organizations. Twitter can increase their credibility and transformational
qualities as leaders in the eyes of their followers. It can possibly increase
transformational leadership opportunities by constructing an employee-
centered system of communication, which develops the leader-member
relationship and heightens levels of communication satisfaction members
have with their organizations.
Hence we find that social-media-literate leadership or leadership
initiated and promoted through social media or digital platforms can
go a long way in impacting citizens, employees or followers thereby
determining the nature of outcomes in an organization or a country as the
case may be.
30 Modi On Twitter

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(2015). The real-time power of Twitter: Crisis management and
leadership in an age of social media. Business Horizons, 58(2), 163-172.
Hwang, S. (2012). The strategic use of Twitter to manage personal
public relations. Public Relations Review, 38(1), 159-161.
Korzynski, P. (2015) Online networking and employee engagement: what
current leaders do? Journal of Managerial Psychology, 30(5), pp.582 – 596
 Dr. Navodita Pande 31

Lowe, K., Gardner, W. (2000) Ten years of the leadership quarterly:

contributions and
challenges for the future. The Leadership Quarterly, 11(4). 459-514.
Men, L. R., & Stacks, D.W. (2013). The impact of leadership style and
employee empowerment on perceived organizational reputation, Journal
of Communication Management, 17(2), 171-192.
Men, L. R. (2014). Why leadership matters to internal communication:
Linking transformational leadership, symmetrical communication, and
employee outcomes. Journal of public relations research, 26(3), 256-279.
Preece, J., & Shneiderman, B. (2009). The reader-to-leader framework:
Motivating technology-mediated social participation. AIS transactions
on human-computer interaction, 1(1), 13-32.
Rowold, J., & Rohmann, A. (2009). Transformational and transactional
leadership styles, followers’ positive and negative emotions, and
performance in German nonprofit orchestras. Nonprofit management
and leadership, 20(1), 41-59.
Ross, S. M., & Offermann, L. R. (1997). Transformational leaders:
Measurement of personality attributes and work group performance.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(10), 1078-1086.
Sheer, V. C., & Chen, L. (2003). Do superiors’ intranet use predict their
transformational leadership?. Asian Journal of Communication, 13(1),
120-136.
Xu, W. W., & Feng, M. (2014). Talking to the broadcasters on Twitter:
Networked gatekeeping in Twitter conversations with journalists.
Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 58(3), 420-437.
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
 Dr. Navodita Pande 35

S tudies on the use of social media in Canadian federal politics, as well as

on the political discussion taking place on the popular #cdnpoli Twitter
hashtag, have proliferated in recent years (Small 2011, Chen and Smith
2011). However, within this new field of study, elections have been given
minimal attention.
Social media may contribute to political success because of the
opportunity provided to candidates to have continued interaction with
voters in a scale and intensity not possible through more traditional
campaign methods (i.e. door-to-door campaigning, leafleting, print or
television coverage). In addition, there are no direct costs associated with
using Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube and the platforms are user-friendly
for individuals with minimal computer skills. However, within research
on social media use during elections (e.g. Goodman 2010; Raynauld and
Greenberg 2014).
Raynauld and Greenberg (2014, 8) argue that social media, including
Twitter, have “helped lower the threshold to political participation,
thus giving resource-poor political players previously on the edges of
the political system more opportunities to participate actively without
institutional restraints in public political processes.”
Since using Twitter and other social media only require an Internet
connection and a computer, smartphone or tablet, political actors can
easily develop and share content with large audiences (Vergeer, Hermans
et al 2013). Research on the use of social media by candidates contributing
to electoral success has produced mixed findings. Through an analysis of
the use of social media in the 2008 Canadian federal election, Chen and
Smith (2011) identify that structural and financial factors are the main
determinants of political success. Although optimal use of social media
has some impact on individual candidate electoral success, they claim
that this benefit can “not be separated from the electoral advantages of
established political parties and incumbent candidates such as greater
resources and higher levels of access to ‘free media’ [exposure and
journalistic coverage]” (2011, 400).
Analysis of the BJP’s 2014 (Sridharan, 2014) electoral victory tends
to fall into one of three categories: (1) the impact a Modi-led government
36 Modi On Twitter

would have on communal relations and secularism in India, focusing

on whether the ‘‘electoral imperative’’ will temper the pro-Hindu
agenda of the BJP; (2) the extent and scope of the BJP’s electoral victory
geographically and among key social groups; and (3) the importance of
campaign strategy, organization, mobilization, and leadership (Sridharan,
2020). Although this paper is most interested in explanations falling
under the last category, there is often a great deal of overlap between
these categories of research. E. Sridharan explains the ‘‘pro-BJP’’ swing
by the party’s successful mobilization of voters across state lines, social
categories, and the urban–rural divide. The combination of Modi’s
leadership, the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance coalition’s poor
economic performance in the lead-up to the election, the corruption
scandals that plagued the ruling coalition, and the BJP’s aspirational
message of ‘‘better days,’’ as well as the party’s superior funding and
organization, helped mobilize support in the BJP’s favor.
A crucial part of the ‘‘Modi wave’’ was his omnipresence throughout
the election campaign. Online, Modi’s presence was undeniable.
Within the span of five months, his name became the most tweeted
election-related term or phrase, with approximately 11.1 million tweets
mentioning him. Yet, his online presence needed to be supplemented by
more-conventional forms of campaigning. By the end of the campaign,
Modi had held over 400 political rallies, been beamed into remote areas
as a hologram approximately 1,000 times, held interactive discussions
broadcast online and via satellite during his popular chai pe charcha
(discussion over tea) segments, and successfully rolled out an aggressive
television and print media advertising campaign.
The ‘‘saturation of the public sphere’’ was therefore essential to the
effectiveness of the ‘‘Modi-centric, populist’’ election campaign.12 The
BJP’s hypermedia campaign also reflected the need to reach out to and
mobilize a wide spectrum of the Indian electorate, ranging from the rural
poor to the more plugged-in, younger, middle class—a group that played a
critical role in this election and who were expected to turn out in droves.
The party’s strategy served to enhance its perceived ‘‘winnability,’’ which in
turn may have allowed the BJP to attract more vote mobilizers, or, to put
it differently, ‘‘boots on the ground’’ to mobilize support for the party, or
more accurately, for Modi (ibid).
 Dr. Navodita Pande 37

During the 2014 election campaign, the overwhelming majority of

election-and-campaign-related tweets from Modi’s Twitter handle were of
the information-control type (Table 3). Information-control tweets ‘‘direct
users to the preferred flow of information and analysis’’ and are the type
of tweets that positively affect election outcomes. As with all forms of
political communication, how these tweets were framed is critical.
Under the second Congress-led United Progressive Alliance coalition
government (2009–14), economic growth had stalled, unemployment
continued to rise, and inflation was persistent. The Congress Party’s
image was also tainted by multiple corruption scandals at both national
and state levels. Prior to the 2014 elections, it was clear that issues relating
to economic development, economic growth, and governance would
dominate the election. As survey data indicates (Kumar et al, 2016), voter
preferences also crystallized around these issue dimensions prior to the
election (Table 1):

Table 1: Issues important to voters during the 2014 Indian election

Option/issue Percentage of respondents

Price increases/inflation 18.3
Corruption/scandals 11.8
Employment/unemployment/jobs 7.4
Development 14.8
Economy/economic growth 1.8
Infrastructure and services (Bijli, sadak, pani) 7.6

Source: National Election Study, Pre-Poll Survey Findings, 2014 (Kumar et al, 2016)

The mobilization of the middle class and upper and forward castes
was critical to the BJP’s growth in the 1990s. It is widely held that what
motivates these disparate social groups with different interests to cast their
ballot for the party is not the BJP’s pro-Hindu religious agenda but its
stance on economic issues. In the 2004 and 2009 elections the BJP had lost
support among this core base, and in the lead-up to the 2014 elections,
it was imperative to regain this backing. Given the broader political
and economic climate and the overall dissatisfaction with the United
38 Modi On Twitter

Progressive Alliance II government, the BJP’s focus on issues relating to

development and governance seemed to dovetail with the concerns of this
‘‘aspirational’’ middle-class voting bloc.
In order to present Modi as the strong, effective leader who would
usher in a new era of development and good governance, the party
sought to distance him from the 2002 communal violence that occurred
in Gujarat State under his tenure as chief minister. In other words,
the party created an alternative narrative by opting to emphasize the
rapid economic growth, industrial development, and infrastructural
advancement of that time. The emphasis on economic and developmental
advancement in the state fit neatly within the party’s development-and-
governance election frame. As Jaffrelot (2021) has pointed out,
Modi toured India to contrast the ‘‘Gujarat model’’ with the situation
of other states of India, making the Nehru/Gandhi family and non-
BJP Chief Minis-ters responsible for socioeconomic backwardness.
Never before had a Chief Minister showcased his achievements in this
manner in order to rule at the Center.
Tweets were also tailored to specific states that Modi was visiting. For
example, in India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh (UP), which also
happens to be a key battleground during elections, economic growth
was de-emphasized while the issue of political corruption was brought
to the forefront. Modi sent out focused and targeted tweets about UP.
Critiquing the BJP’s primary electoral rivals in the state, Modi tweeted,
‘‘SP [Samajwadi Party], BSP [Bahujan Samaj Party] & Congress can’t do
good for people of UP. They are immersed in corruption & votebank
politics’’; and later, ‘‘Congress’ appetite for corruption is legendary! From
the earth, seas till the skies they spared nothing! UP will not accept this
any longer.’’26 The BJP presented an alternative narrative: that at the helm
of the party and at the national level, Modi himself would reproduce the
‘‘Gujarat model’’ of economic development and growth.
 Dr. Navodita Pande 39

References
Chen, P., and P. Smith (2011). Digital media in the 2008 Canadian
election. Journal of Information Technology & Politics 8 (4): 399-417.
Goodman, W. (2010). Cyber deterrence: Tougher in theory than in
practice?. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 4(3), 102-135.
Jaffrelot, C. (2021). Modi’s India: Hindu nationalism and the rise of ethnic
democracy. Princeton University Press.
Kumar, S., Rai, P., & Gupta, P. (2016, August). Do surveys influence
results?. In The Seminar Magazine issue on ‘Measuring Democracy (Vol.
684, pp. 61-63).
Raynauld, V., & Greenberg, J. (2014). Tweet, click, vote: Twitter and the
2010 Ottawa municipal election. Journal of Information Technology &
Politics, 11(4), 412-434.
Small, T. A. (2011). What the hashtag? A content analysis of Canadian
politics on Twitter. Information, communication & society, 14(6), 872-895.
Sridharan, E. (2014). Behind Modi’s victory. J. Democracy, 25, 20.
Sridharan, E. (2020). India in 2019: A New One-Party Hegemony?. Asian
Survey, 60(1), 165-176.
Vergeer, M., Hermans, L., & Sams, S. (2013). Online social networks
and micro-blogging in political campaigning: The exploration of a new
campaign tool and a new campaign style. Party politics, 19(3), 477-501.
PARTY ORGANIZATION
 Dr. Navodita Pande 43

P arty organization can be easily carried out through social media

where platforms can be used as efficient tools to build organizational
communication.
In the six countries examined (United Kingdom, Germany, France,
Australia and New Zeeland), Gauja (2016) showed that ‘parties’
perceptions of the social trends in which they operate shape reform
agendas’. Among the reform initiatives observed by the author were the
introduction of primaries, the changing meaning of party membership,
issues-based online policy development and community organizing
campaigns. Her cases however were old established democracies which
also happened to have the highest level of plebiscitary IPD (Poguntke et al
2016).
Party organization is important for party change (Harmel and Janda
1994; Schumacher et al (2013), party electoral success (Greene and
Haber 2016; Ishiyama 2001; Janda and Coleman 1998; Masket 2011),
party system change (Janda 1990), political participation (Kernell
2013), political decentralization (Meguid 2015; Meguid 2018; Toubeau
& Wagner, 2015; Spina 2013; Massetti & Schakel, 2016) or party
nationalization (Borz and De Miguel 2019; Chhibber et al 2014).
More attention should be paid to the party as unit of analysis and
not to countries. Differences among parties within countries are equally
important as differences across countries. In their recent study, Poguntke
et al. (2016) discussed two types of IPD: assembly (i.e. inclusiveness of
party decision-making via discussions, exchange of arguments within
party organs and assemblies of all members) and plebiscitary (i.e. member
ballots for programme writing and personnel selection). Even if the two
concepts are associated, they found more evidence of the former than of
the latter across the 19 countries in their sample.
The literature on party organization has tended to emphasize
candidate selection within a party by studying the distribution of power,
formal rules and institutional arrangements governing the selection
process (Katz & Mair 1992; Ware, 1996). Katz (2001: 278) goes so far as to
suggest that candidate selection is ‘one of the central defining functions of
a political party in a democracy’. Still others, such as Norris & Lovenduski
44 Modi On Twitter

(1993), have focused on the degree of institutionalization of the selection

process, i.e. whether it is formal, through the use of standardized rules that
are observable by all, or informal, through less explicit forms of decision-
making that are personalized and non-bureaucratic.
Organizational theory has long suggested that the structural factors
underlying career development and advancement in an organization have
a bearing on an individual’s decision to stay within or quit an organization
(Thompson 2003). Career advancement in any organization brings with
it both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, such as pay, access to power,
autonomy, prestige and the opportunity to do more interesting work
(Kanter, 1977). Greater opportunities to access these rewards are likely to
discourage members of an organization from quitting (Lefkowitz, 1977).
The level of party organization, which determines the distribution of these
career advancement incentives, therefore becomes critical to the retention
of members of a political party. Party members are more likely to remain
loyal to a party in which career advancement is more predictable.
The Indian government election, social media tool has been used in
a number of campaigns. It is found in a study (Lesotho) (Southall, 2022)
that the idea of marketing the political party or particular candidate for
constituencies on social media is there, but it is presented in a rough and
ready manner, inspired more by enthusiasm and zeal, rather than by skill
and professionalism and therefore there is lack of finesse. More can be
done by politicians to harness social media for political organizations and
candidates in Lesotho to reach out to their supporters fully.
Although even before 2002 Modi had been known to talk about or
be seen using a computer in media interviews (Shukla & Shukla 2020),
his investment in an aggressive public relations effort to build an image
as a development icon expanded significantly after the riots (Kaur 2015;
Price 2015). The “Vikas Purush” campaign featured a series of photos
of him in sylvan settings, in thoughtful poses, surrounded by artifacts
like an Obama biography, a financial newspaper, using technological
devices like an Apple laptop and an SLR camera— proposing an image
of a thoughtful, well-read, technology- embracing leader (Pal 2017). The
regime highlighted industrial growth and the investment climate, avoiding
mention of the riots in public fora. Modi’s positive-tone messaging on
 Dr. Navodita Pande 45

Twitter that we see later has roots in the espousal of the terms asmita
(common pride) as a central part of his speeches while he was chief
minister, suggesting that people invest in pratiksha (aspiration) rather
than ninda (condemnation) (Suhrud 2008). The use of asmita presented
a turn-the- other- cheek style of forward-looking leadership that by
encouraging its own movement to disavow ninda undercut the political
opposition’s attempts to bring up the riots.
The social media affordances of having followers who engage with
one’s content offers the semblance of interactive direct communication—
in Modi’s case, his voice on social media is not just his flow of direct
content, but also the resonance of his image and message through
retweets, likes, and forwards through an active population of Indian social
media users. This population is largely an aspirational and tech-savvy
middle and upper class, an educated and often successful professional
class whose support matters by virtue of its publicness, particularly
because of its apparent distinction from his traditional base of social
conservative voters. Here, communicating through Facebook or Twitter
provides instrumental benefits, but doing so simultaneously dovetails
a larger discourse of aspiration at a particular moment in India’s history,
where the political actor’s embrace of the social media artifact in and of
itself represents a normative positioning.
46 Modi On Twitter

References
Borz, G., & De Miguel, C. (2019). Organizational and Ideological
strategies for nationalization: evidence from European parties. British
Journal of Political Science, 49(4), 1499-1526.
Chhibber, P., Jensenius, F. R., & Suryanarayan, P. (2014). Party organization
and party proliferation in India. Party Politics, 20(4), 489-505.
Gauja, A. (2016). Party reform: The causes, challenges, and consequences of
organizational change. Oxford University Press.
Greene, Z., & Haber, M. (2016). Leadership competition and disagreement
at party national congresses. British Journal of Political Science, 46(3),
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Harmel, R., & Janda, K. (1994). An integrated theory of party goals and
party change. Journal of theoretical politics, 6(3), 259-287.
Ishiyama, J. T. (2001). Party organization and the political success of the
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Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1992). Party organizations: a data handbook on
party organizations in western democracies, 1960-90. (No Title).
Katz, R. S. (2001). The problem of candidate selection and models of party
democracy. Party politics, 7(3), 277-296.
Kaur, R. (2015). Good times, brought to you by brand Modi. Television &
New Media, 16(4), 323-330.
 Dr. Navodita Pande 47

Kernell, G. (2013). Political party organizations, civic representation, and

participation. Representation: Elections and beyond, 114-37.
Lefkowitz, J. (1977). Industrial-organizational psychology and the police.
American Psychologist, 32(5), 346.Masket, S. (2011). No middle ground:
How informal party organizations control nominations and polarize
legislatures. University of Michigan Press.
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Decentralization and regionalist party ideological radicalism. Party
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electoral impact of decentralization in Western Europe. Comparative
Politics, 47(4), 379-398.
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Norris, P., & Lovenduski, J. (1993). ‘If only more candidates came
forward’: Supply-side explanations of candidate selection in Britain.
British Journal of Political Science, 23(3), 373-408.
Pal, J. (2017). Studying political communication on Twitter: the case for
small data. Current opinion in behavioral sciences, 18, 97-102.
Price, L. (2015). The Modi Effect: Inside Narendra Modi’s Campaign to
Transform India. Hachette UK.
Schumacher, G., De Vries, C. E., & Vis, B. (2013). Why do parties change
position? Party organization and environmental incentives. The Journal of
politics, 75(2), 464-477.
Shukla, S., & Shukla, R. (2020). The pragmatics of Indian political
apologies: Sorry, but not sorry. Discourse & Society, 31(6), 648-669.
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48 Modi On Twitter

Suhrud, T. (2008). Modi and Gujarati’Asmita’. Economic and Political

Weekly, 11-13.
Thompson, J. D. (2003). Organizations in action: Social science bases of
administrative theory. Transaction publishers.
Toubeau, S., & Wagner, M. (2015). Explaining party positions on
decentralization. British Journal of Political Science, 45(1), 97-119.
Poguntke, T., Scarrow, S. E., Webb, P. D., Allern, E. H., Aylott, N., Van
Biezen, I., ... & Verge, T. (2016). Party rules, party resources and the
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century. Party politics, 22(6), 661-678.
Ware, A. (1996). Political parties and party systems. (No Title).
CITIZEN MOBILIZATION
 Dr. Navodita Pande 51

C itizen journalism, participatory journalism or user-generated content it

is defined as “the act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active
role in the process of collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating
news and information” (Bowman and Willis 2003:9). So, could Twitter be a
tool for citizen journalism and also a tool for social mobilization and citizen
mobilization?
First step is to define stages in the news production process (Domingo, et
al. 2008):
Access/Observation: The initial information-gathering stage at which
source material for a story is generated, such as eyewitness accounts and
audio-visual contributions.
Selection/Filtering: The “gatekeeping” stage when decisions are made
about what should be reported or published.
Processing/Editing: The stage at which a story is created, including the
writing and editing of an item for publication.
Distribution: The stage at which a story is disseminated or made available
for reading and, potentially, discussion.
Interpretation: The stage at which a story that has been produced and
published is opened up to comment and discussion.
Traditional network theory examines the impact of networks created
through interpersonal and organizational ties. Larger social pattern
emerge through social networks and interactions between individuals
(Granovetter 1990). Networks play integral roles in behavior change,
such as smoking cessation (Christakis and Fowler 2013). Social networks
are also important to emotion dispersion, such as happiness (Fowler and
Christakis 2008).
Similar results are found the in social movement mobilization
literature, demonstrating the influence of personal and organizational
connections on engaging in activism (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson
1980, McAdam 1986, McAdam and Paulsen 1993, Kitts 2000, Passy and
Giugni 2000). Interpersonal ties or informal networks have been identified
as primary motivators for individuals to join movements. People are much
more likely to participate in movement activity if they have a connection
52 Modi On Twitter

to someone already in the movement (Snow et. al. 1980). In addition,

people’s interests in certain topics increase when they engage with
individuals who have interests similar to their own (Kitts 2000). Research
looking at ties across movements demonstrates how, in certain cases,
those ties can lead to common viewpoints, shared identities, and collective
action (Carroll and Ratner 1996).
On the topic of organization and recruiting strategies, Juris (2004)
argues contemporary social movements share the following principles:
“1) forging horizontal ties and connections among diverse, autonomous
elements; 2) the free and open circulation of information; 3) collaboration
through decentralized coordination and consensus decision-making; and
4) self-directed networking.” These principles are adopted by activists
and ultimately end up influencing networking practices. Embracing these
principles changes the goal of movements from recruiting activists to
their particular movement to, “horizontal expansion through articulating
diverse movements within flexible structures that facilitate maximal
coordination and communication” (Juris 2005).
Researchers identify the Internet as playing a key role in shaping
political and cultural life (Kahn and Kellner 2004). Castells (1996) asserts
that CMC and other mediated social networks have transformed society
into a networked society where information exchange is instantaneous
and global. The Internet society is less constrained by geographic location
than previous societies (Hugill 1999). Wellman et al (2001) argues
that, in part from the introduction of the Internet, the nature of social
relationships have shifted toward networked individualism. With this
shift, he theorizes, individuals have multiple and shifting work partners
and partial involvement with shifting set of workgroups that are not
based on location, but rather based on the network ties of the individual.
In addition, many contacts initiated through online social networks
transition to offline meetings. Research suggests most Internet users make
use of the Internet to extend their offline participation in various activities
(Wellman, Haase, Witte, and Hampton 2001).
Della Porta and Mosca (2005) identify three contributions the Internet
brings to collective action: (1) organization, logistics, and networking
between groups, (2) a way of expressing dissent and protest, and (3)
 Dr. Navodita Pande 53

information dissemination. Similarly, research on the impact of the

Internet on collective action overall reveals the Internet influences social
movement mobilizing structures, opportunity structures, and framing
processes (Kelly Garrett 2006).
In addition, the Internet offers social movements the speed and range
of communication that technologies, such as printing, the postal system,
the telephone, and fax did in the past (Della Porta and Mosca 2005). Use
of the Internet may also increase the accuracy of messaging and interaction
between organizations and activists (Diani 2000). Social movement
participants can use the Internet to spread uncensored messages and
impact the mass media (Della Porta and Mosca 2005). The Internet
provides hyperlinked communication networks that enable individuals
to find multiple points of entry into varieties of political action and offers
independence from the mass media and other conventional institution
organizations (Bennett 2003, Castells et al 2004, Bennett et al. 2008).
Furthermore, use of the Internet facilitates permanent social movement
campaigns, the growth of broad social movement networks, and the
transformation of individual member social movement organizations and
growth patterns of whole social movement networks (Bennett 2003).
One of the most well documented areas of research concerning
the Internet and collective action is the relationship between online
and offline collective action (Brunsting and Postmes 2002a, Brunsting
and Postmes 2002b, Kahn and Kellner 2004, Reid and Chen 2007,
Wojcieszak 2009). Offline and online protests are strongly related and
tend to reinforce each other (Della Porta and Mosca 2005). The Internet
is a place where otherwise isolated, distant individuals and networks can
come together and work toward forms of collective action (ibid). Most
recently, Fisher and Boekkooi (2010) find the Internet plays a major role
in mobilizing participants for global days of action.
Citizen journalism and Twitter creates a very interesting ecosystem
at this stage, the discussion can be generated out of the media, at Twitter
or any other social network. Journalists in this stage are forced to look
outside of the conversation, losing control over comments and any
external content.
54 Modi On Twitter

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 Dr. Navodita Pande 55

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‘Battle of Seattle’to blogging. New media & society, 6(1), 87-95.
Kelly Garrett, R. (2006). Protest in an information society: A review of
literature on social movements and new ICTs. Information, communication
& society, 9(02), 202-224.
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freedom summer. American journal of sociology, 92(1), 64-90.
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social ties and activism. American journal of sociology, 99(3), 640-667.
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sustained participation in social movements: A phenomenological
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56 Modi On Twitter

Postmes, T., & Brunsting, S. (2002a and b). Collective action in the age of
the Internet: Mass communication and online mobilization. Social science
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IDENTITY FORMATION
 Dr. Navodita Pande 59

M odi’s self-representation as a technocrat at once uses the

discourse of technology in communicated output (such as talk
of the technology industry and e-governance) and the integration of
technological artifacts into his persona (such as posing with computers
and mobiles, appearing in 3-D holograms, or regularly posting to social
media in a first-person voice). In this, Modi goes beyond Jawaharlal
Nehru or Rajiv Gandhi, in whose national political visions technology
played a significant part. Modi’s brand cachet as a modern, technologically
oriented political actor was even greater than that of his immediate
predecessor, Manmohan Singh, who was arguably the Indian political
establishment’s most accomplished technocrat—a widely published
economics professor and former governor of the Reserve Bank of India.
Modi’s use of technology in his political branding raises the
importance of the embodied technological actor in electoral politics, a
subject that has largely been missing (Subramanian 2006), particularly
given the long-standing perception that technocracy and populist politics
have traditionally been at odds with each other (Howse 2002).
Identities are multifaceted and entail individual, interpersonal, and
social processes embedded within social structures. Social identity theory
encompasses multiple subtheories. One subtheory is collective identity,
which focuses on identity as it relates to social movements (Brewer 2001;
Polletta and Jasper 2001). Key works from both sociology and psychology
point to collective identity as a potential bridge between identity theory
and social identity theory, but one that has not yet been fully realized
(Burke and Stryker 2016; Miller, Taylor, and Rupp 2016; Stets and Serpe
2013; Stryker, Owens, and White 2000; White-Johnson et al, 2010).
Identity theory situates identities into three overlapping bases: person,
role, and group/social (Burke and Stets, 2014; Stets et al 2020; Stets and
Serpe 2013).
From an identity theory (IT) perspective, identities are internalized
meanings attached to the self as a unique person, an occupant of a role,
and/or as a member of a group (Burke and Stets 2022; Stets and Burke
2014; Stets and Serpe, 2013). Person, role, and group/social constitute
three bases of identity. Group and social represent two parts of the same
base, broadly conceived as categorical membership. While group identity
60 Modi On Twitter

refers to membership in a community of specific others (e.g., family,

school, political organization), social identity refers to status categories
that denote one’s position within the broader social structure (e.g., race,
gender, age). Because of their imbrication, group and social are presented
as a single unit (i.e., group/social; Stets 2018). The three bases of identity
overlap and inform each other such that individuals enact role and
group/social identities in ways that correspond with each other and are
guided through person identity meanings. Identities are organized into
hierarchies of prominence, and persons are apt to enact more prominent
identities when the situation allows (Brenner, Serpe, and Stryker 2014;
Owens, Robinson, and Smith-Lovin 2010).
Individuals seek to verify identity meanings through interaction. The
identity verification process has four main components that operate in a
cybernetic feedback loop (Burke 1991): the identity standard, perceptual
inputs, a comparator, and behavioral outputs (Burke and Stets, 2009). The
identity standard is the set of meanings attached to an identity. Individuals
generally perform in ways that support the identity standard and interpret
feedback on their performance using cues from the interaction setting
(perceptual inputs), including reflected appraisals.
Reflected appraisals are a person’s perception of how others view
the self within a situation. The comparator contrasts reflected appraisals
against the identity standard. When reflected appraisals align with
the identity standard, identity verification is achieved. When there is
significant distance between reflected appraisals and the identity standard,
persons experience nonverification. Identity verification elicits positive
emotion. Identity nonverification elicits distress. The emotional effects of
nonverification motivate behavioral outputs to bring situational meanings
more closely in line with the identity standard (Stets 2006; Stets and
Burke, 2014; Stets and Trettevik 2014).
Collective identity is a subtheory that operates under the larger
umbrella of SIT (Brewer 2001). that addresses inter and intragroup
relations with attention to stereotyping, conflict, conformity, cohesion,
leadership, and organizational behavior (Abrams and Hogg 2004;
Turner and Oakes 1986). Rooted in social movement studies, collective
identity is the set of identity meanings established and shared by activist
 Dr. Navodita Pande 61

collectives (Gamson 1992; Mattoni 2016; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Taylor
& Whittier 1992).
Calls for theoretical and empirical synthesis point out that both
identity theory and collective identity theory recognize social structures,
social situations, and social networks as integral to identity processes
(Stets and Serpe 2013; White-Johnson et al, 2010). Identity theory posits
that identities are made salient and prominent through commitment
to networks and relationships (Brenner et al. 2014; Owens et al. 2010;
Serpe and Stryker 2011). In turn, collective identity centralizes group
cohesion, emotional attachment, and solidarity as critical to activist
identity formation and maintenance (Polletta and Jasper 2001) even when
networks are heterogeneous, loosely connected, and dispersed (Brewer
and Silver 2000; Melucci 1988, 1995). In this vein, social movements have
been shown to play a powerful role in identity verification, providing
‘‘self-verifying opportunity structures’’ through participation and network
formation (Cruess et al. 2016; Pinel and Swann 2000). Similarly, identity
and related emotional attachments can be a motivating force for social
movement participation, driving individuals to contribute to collectivities
(Melucci 1995; Simpson and Macy 2004; Stryker, Owens, and White 2000;
White-Johnson, 2010). Connections between IT and collective identity are
‘‘ripe for empirical testing’’ (Stets and Serpe, 2013:53).
Group identity pertains to membership in a network of specific others,
social identity pertains to identification with others who share general
status markers (Stets et al, 2018; Stets and Serpe 2013), and collective
identity pertains to identification with a social movement (Polletta and
Jasper 2001). Both collective identity and group/social identity address
identity processes as they relate to a larger categorical label. Collective
identity is simply the special case in which that larger categorical label is
derived from a social movement.
Thus we see that as an online tool, Twitter is often used by citizens and
politicians and leaders to generate a certain kind of ‘online identity’ which
is nationalistic, and one of social cohesion.
62 Modi On Twitter

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 Dr. Navodita Pande 63

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64 Modi On Twitter

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PERSONALITY TRAITS, POLITICS
AND MEDIA
 Dr. Navodita Pande 67

P ersonality traits come to influence and shape political orientation?

That is, why are open individuals more likely to be politically liberal
and conscientious individuals more likely to be conservative? Thus far,
this question remains understudied and less well understood. Given the
evidence for substantive genetic influence on personality traits (e.g., Jang,
Livesley, & Vemon, 1996), it would be of importance to understand how
these more “innate” traits help to shape differences in political orientation,
which not only develop much later on in life, but are also supposed to be
based more on logic and reasoning.
As such, better understanding of these mechanisms would not only
contribute to the personality and political psychology literatures, but
may also improve people’s understanding of each other’s fundamental
motivations or predispositions towards certain sides of the political
spectrum. Consequently, this could potentially lead to means of
facilitating discourse and communication between different political
groups. Personality traits affect many aspects of perception, value,
and behavior, including the manner in which people interact with the
broader social world (e.g., Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005; Ozer & Benet-
Martinez, 2006). One potential way in which personality can influence
political orientation may be via its impact on people’s exposure to and
consumption of media products. Given that information about political
events and values are primarily communicated through mass media, it is
possible that personality’s effect on media preferences might influence the
development of different political viewpoints, perhaps as a consequence
of increased exposure, préexistent bias, or postexposure emotional
and cognitive reactions. The media types and content that individuals
choose to expose themselves to might further influence their beliefs,
attitudes, and behaviors towards various issues and topics, exaggerating
or modifying their already existing individual differences and ideological
beliefs.
68 Modi On Twitter

Figure 1: Personality, Media and Political Orientation

Source: Self

This is a theoretical model in which differences in media preference

mediate the association between trait personality (i.e. that is openness to
experience and conscientiousness) and political orientation.
It is clear that exposure to media information changes the way people
view the world and act.
Consumption of print and narrative fiction, for example, is associated
with wider vocabulary and increased world knowledge, as well as
improved social abilities (Cunningham & Stanovich, 1998; Mar, Oatley,
Hirsh, dela Paz, & Peterson, 2006; Mar, Oatley, & Peterson, 2009; Mol
& Bus, 2011; Stanovich & Cunningham, 1993). Exposure to films can
influence people’s decision-making toward health-related behaviors, such
as smoking (Dal Cin, Gibson, Zanna, Shumate, & Fong, 2007) or risky
sexual behaviors (O’Hara, Gibbons, Gerrard, Li, & Sargent, 2012). People’s
music preference also plays an integral and multidimensional part in
helping people to reveal information about themselves (e.g., personality,
attitudes, social behaviors), and to accurately gather information and
 Dr. Navodita Pande 69

form impressions about others (North and Hargreaves, 1999; Rentfrow &
Gosling, 2006, 2007; Rentfrow, McDonald, & Oldmeadow, 2009).
More germane to our present question, an abundance of work found
that media exposure and preferences have important influences on people’s
political orientation. Different forms of media have varying effects on
how people process and remember political and ideological information.
Entertainment media (e.g., late night talk shows), for example, appears
to influence affective or emotional impression formation (Kim & Vishak,
2008), as well as increasing attentiveness towards political issues for less
political individuals (Cao, 2010). By contrast, news media is more effective
and accurate in helping people acquire factual information about political
issues (Kim & Vishak, 2008). Mass media can also more broadly alter how
people interpret and form judgments about political issues and events (e.g.,
Adkins & Castle, 2014; Butler, Koopman, & Zimbardo, 1995). One study
showed, for example, that participants were significantly more likely to
believe conspiratorial accounts of the John F. Kennedy assassination (e.g.,
the involvement of the CIA) and reported decreased intention to engage
in political activities after viewing Oliver Stone’s film JFK (Butler et al.,
1995). Similarly, participants who viewed Fahrenheit 9/11 were less likely
to endorse the Bush administration’s rationale for the war in Iraq and
indicated decreased intention to vote for Bush (Koopman et al., 2006).
Finally, there is evidence pertinent to our model suggesting that the
type of media people expose themselves to can further shape their existing
political views. For example, devoted listeners of the Rush Limbaugh
radio program appear to become even more politically conservative over
time, compared to casual or nonlisteners of the show (Jones, 2012). These
results, in particular, seem supportive of the selective exposure theory, as
devoted listeners of the show were more likely to be conservative to begin
with, and prolonged exposure to this specific form of media served to
further polarize their political beliefs. Such effects appear characteristic
of both liberals and conservatives, such that liberals (or conservatives)
who consume more liberal (or conservative) media become increasingly
polarized in their attitudes and beliefs (Stroud, 2010).
Given the important and diverse roles that media play in people’s
lives, researchers have begun to examine individual differences factors
70 Modi On Twitter

that might contribute to media preferences and consumption. Trait

personality, for example, consistently appears to predict differences in
media preference and engagement. With regards to the two traits most
commonly associated with political orientation, openness to experience
and conscientiousness - researchers have found that individuals high
in the former preferred media genres highlighting complexity, culture,
intensity, and aesthetics (e.g., arts, foreign), while disliking conventional
and communal genres (e.g., pop, romance; Rentffow, Goldberg, & Zilca,
2011). Specifically, Openness appears positively related to preference for
reflective, complex music (e.g., classical, blues), as well as rebellious music
(e.g., rock, heavy metal), and negatively related to preference for upbeat
and conventional music (e.g., pop; Rentfrow & Gosling, 2003). Open
individuals are also more likely to enjoy reading books about literature,
culture, and science and are prone to dislike romantic or people-oriented
books or magazines, such as news about celebrities (Kraaykamp & van
Eijck, 2005; Schutte et al, 1998).
Individuals higher on Conscientiousness, on the other hand, tend to
prefer conventional, fact-oriented media (e.g., reality television, news;
Rentfrow et al., 2011; Schutte et al, 1998). Conscientious people enjoy
music that is upbeat and books related to science, romance, and current
events.
However, they dislike intense, edgy media (such as punk music, cult,
and horror films) (Kraaykamp & van Eijck, 2005; Rentfrow & Gosling,
2003; Schutte et al, 1998).
A recent set of studies, more relevant to our current research question,
demonstrated that expo-sure to cultural or media products (e.g., books
and films) mediated the relationships between political orientation and
the traits Openness to Experience and Conscientiousness (Xu et al., 2013).
Specifically, higher Openness to Experience and lower Conscientiousness
were both associated with increased exposure to cultural and media
products (such as reading more books and viewing more films). This
increased cultural exposure then predicted higher political liberalism.
These findings provide some evidence for the notion that media may
indeed be an important mechanism through which personality traits
shape political orientation.
 Dr. Navodita Pande 71

References
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of cinematic influence on political attitudes. Social Science Quarterly,
95(5), 1230-1244.
Butler, L. D., Koopman, C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1995). The psychological
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Quarterly, 54(3), 823-854.
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mind. American educator, 22, 8-17.
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72 Modi On Twitter

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 Dr. Navodita Pande 73

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PUBLIC SPHERE
 Dr. Navodita Pande 77

T he media is conceived as the most important institutional

communicative infrastructure of the public sphere. The media in
complex differentiated societies may be conceived as ‘a negotiator of public
consent’ (Hjarvard, 2013, p. 55) via continuous discursive negotiation
in the public sphere both when it comes to motivating the need for
political action and to legitimizing political decisions. For Hjarvard,
the media serves the three functions of constituting ‘a realm of shared
experiences’, ‘an interface in the relations within and between institutions’
and of institutionalizing a political public sphere (2013, p. 37). From this
viewpoint, the media contributes to the cohesion of society by linking its
differentiated parts together on a symbolic level.
The media may be considered to produce ‘the symbolic patterns that
create the invisible tissue of society on the cultural level’ (Alexander,
1990). While these roles have traditionally been assigned to mass media,
there is a need to explore whether, how and on what premises new digital
media fulfil the same or other functions. The traditional Norwegian
media model is often described in terms of the Northern European
democratic corporatist model (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Based on a
development of this scheme, Syvertsen et al. (2014) have coined the
term the ‘Nordic media welfare states’, which share four commonalities:
universal services; editorial freedom; distinct cultural policies for the
media and political solutions that enjoy a high degree of legitimacy
among public and private actors (2014, p. 2). The Norwegian media
has effectively been characterized by high levels of public legitimacy
and comparatively high readership levels (Larsen & Ihlebæk, 2014).
In later years, however, the business model of Norwegian traditional
media has been challenged by the impact of digitalization, and cut-backs
and processes of restructuration have been common among national,
regional and local media organizations. Concurrently, the use of social
media for social, entertainment and political purposes has soared, and
Norway is ranked high in terms of Internet and social media penetration
(Enjolras et al., 2013).
The public sphere can be defined as comprising the institutional
communicative spaces that facilitate public discussion and the formation
of public opinion. The public sphere is not unitary but consists of a
78 Modi On Twitter

manifold of communicative spaces. These spheres are not equal in terms

of political impact, and it is usual to distinguish between mainstream vs.
counterpublic spheres. In addition, if ideally access to the public sphere
is universal, many exclusionary mechanisms inhibit equal access to and
participation in the public sphere, such as mechanisms based on class,
ethnicity or gender.
A sociological perspective of the public sphere needs to differentiate
its cultural, institutional and structural layers. The public sphere is a
cultural phenomenon; it is not only discursive but is shaped by and filled
with institutions, organizations of communication and regulation. In such
a conceptual scheme, ‘public opinion, which is the sea inside of which civil
society swims’ is ‘the middle ground between the generalities of high-flow
discourse and the ongoing, concrete events of everyday life’ (Alexander,
2006, p. 4). Following Alexander (2006), we consider the communicative
institutions of civil society as being composed of the communication
media, public opinion polls and civic associations. Media institutions not
only respond to opinion but also structure and change it. Institutional
and structural changes affecting the media also transform the types of
interaction and discourse taking place in the public sphere. In complex
and differentiated democratic societies, civil society and the public
sphere have to be conceived analytically, as functionally separated spheres
independent from the other social spheres (economic, political, religious,
family).
At the same time, in a concrete sense, the public sphere is deeply
interpenetrated with the rest of society and connected to activities in
other spheres (Alexander, 2006, pp. 193–194). Viewed from such a
perspective, ‘politics is a discursive struggle’ (Alexander, 2006, p. 233).
The stakes of the communicative interactions taking place in the public
sphere – through the media, in public forums and civic associations –
are different conceptions of justice, of the ‘good life’, of the promises of
universalizing solidarity. The public sphere is the space where struggles for
realizing the promises of universalizing freedom, equality and solidarity
– entailing redistribution, recognition and incorporation or inclusion –
take place. But the public sphere is not only an institutional realm. It is
also a cultural realm constituted of networks of meaning that are built
 Dr. Navodita Pande 79

upon distinctive symbolic codes. This symbolic dimension is critical in

constituting the sense of belonging to and participating in a democratic
society (Alexander, 2006). In what follows, we will point out core features
of digital media that might lead to changes in how the public sphere
functions as an institutional and cultural realm.
The rise of a ‘networked information economy’ (Benkler &
Nissenbaum 2006; Benkler, 2013) has revolutionized the media
political economy. The emergence of digital interactive media has been
enabled by the rise of the networked and computer-mediated mode of
communication that has radically transformed the ways information is
produced and consumed.
Whereas mass media communication required centralized means
of information production and large investments in physical capital,
networked media are based on decentralized and relatively cheap
personal computers interconnected through the Internet. In contrast
to mass media production of information, which required high levels
of capital concentration, networked media are synonymous with the
decentralization and democratization of the means of production and
distribution of information, knowledge and culture. The networked
information economy improves the capacities of individuals to produce
information, to cooperate with others in loose non-hierarchical networked
communities and to cooperate in formal organizations outside the market
sphere. Decentralization and network connections have also opened
possibilities for nonmarket production and consumption of information
and large-scale cooperative efforts exemplified by initiatives such as
Wikipedia.
In modern democracies, edited news media have played a crucial role
as gatekeepers of the public sphere and have to a large extent regulated
access by different groups, actors and institutions. With digitalization
comes a transformation of the role of the media that has been
characterized in terms of an evolution from ‘gatekeeping’ to ‘gatewatching’
(Bruns, 2009). Whereas gatekeeping designates the control exercised by
media professionals (journalists, editors, owners) over the production
process of information and consequently over what is published and
made available to the public, gatewatching implies a weakening in the
80 Modi On Twitter

importance of such moderation and an increasing reliance on the public

as selectors and filters of content. The emergence of gatewatching is visible
in the emergence of arenas of expression outside of edited media where
individuals may freely express themselves either with some moderation,
such as on collaborative sites (e.g. Wikipedia), or without any moderation,
such as on SNSs (e.g. Twitter). Classical journalism has traditionally had
a normative self-understanding where impartial renderings of reality
and information as service to the public were considered as basic values.
Digital media challenges this traditional conception of journalism because
journalism’s position within people’s ensemble of information sources
loses its importance. At the same time, the features of digital media
open the possibility for everybody to act as a journalist. The audiences
of journalism are becoming more fragmented as people have the ability
to choose and customize their media consumption. Audiences are more
mobile, able to make individual choices and possess capacities enabling
them to actively produce or transform information.
 Dr. Navodita Pande 81

References
Alexander, J. C. (Ed.). (1990). Durkheimian sociology: cultural studies.
Cambridge University Press.
Alexander, J. C. (2006). The civil sphere. Oxford University Press.
Benkler, Y., & Nissenbaum, H. (2006). Commons-based peer production
and virtue. Journal of political philosophy, 14(4).
Benkler, Y. (2013). WikiLeaks and the networked fourth estate. In Beyond
WikiLeaks: Implications for the future of communications, journalism and
society (pp. 11-34). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Bruns, A. (2009). Vom Gatekeeping zum Gatewatching: Modelle der
journalistischen Vermittlung im Internet. Journalismus im Internet:
Profession–Partizipation–Technisierung, 107-128.
Enjolras, B., Steen-Johnsen, K., & Wollebaek, D. (2013). Social media
and mobilization to offline demonstrations: Transcending participatory
divides?. New media & society, 15(6), 890-908.
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three
models of media and politics. Cambridge university press.
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Americanization, globalization and
secularization. Comparing political communication, 25-44.
Hjarvard, S. (2013). The mediatization of culture and society. Routledge.
Larsen, A.G. & Ihlebæk, K.A. (2014). Journalistikk i en digital tidsalder.
In Enjolras, B., Rasmussen, T. & Steen-Johnsen, K. (Eds.). Status for
ytringsfriheten i Norge. Hovedrapport fra prosjektet. Oslo: Fritt Ord, ISF,
IMK, FAFO.
Syvertsen, T., Mjøs, O., Moe, H., & Enli, G. (2014). The media welfare state:
Nordic media in the digital era (p. 165). University of Michigan Press.
OPINION LEADERS
 Dr. Navodita Pande 85

2 016 was the year that public opinion turned against social media and
big tech companies. In 2011, Facebook was hailed as a platform that
would bring democracy to the world. We were grateful to Google. The
protests in Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and many other countries were
spurred in part by bloggers and social media commentators who used
social media to galvanize people and encourage them to take to the streets.
By 2017, we had learned that although the Internet had transformed
protest, it has not much improved democracy. Moreover, we learned again
a lesson that the post-Cold War democracies had apparently forgotten:
that misinformation and propaganda are powerful and that repeating
“big lies” can persuade susceptible people of all kinds of nonsensical and
dangerous ideas. This should not have been a surprise, but critic Norah
Ephron once said that “people have a shocking capacity to be surprised
by the same things over and over again.” The question now is what to do.
Regulation of social media platforms comes up repeatedly, but of what
kind is less clear.
Propaganda, lies, and “truthiness” have been around for hundreds
of years and used by many political candidates, corporations, and
religions to persuade and mislead. What is different today is the speed
and volume of disinformation. We simply do not know what it means
for the electorate when millions of Russian propaganda messages are
targeted at swing states. We can guess, but the research has not yet been
done, and the information is not available for us to know with absolute
certainty. In their comprehensive report on “Information Disorder” for
the Council of Europe, Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan (2017)
discuss the need to create cultures of truth and provide recommendations
for governments, journalists, technology companies, and other parties.18
While many of the fixes being proposed, including media literacy
education and changes in ownership models, are long term, changing
norms and culture will be part of getting back to a culture of truth and
evidence. The topic is too important to leave to tech companies to handle
alone and without disclosure. Government, academia, and civil society
need to lead the conversation on how to address the problem of the
millions of lies and propaganda mentions that can spread so quickly on
social media.
86 Modi On Twitter

The implications of these developments for democracy are enormous.

Is the Internet killing our democracy and paving the way for uninformed
mob rule? Democracy rests upon the assumption of an educated populace;
this is part of why public education is so important. Understanding
the important issues of the day, as well as government representatives’
positions on these issues, is necessary for citizens to participate actively in
a democracy. Without this knowledge, voting decisions may be arbitrary,
and government can be based on capturing voters or pandering, and can
cease to be a truly functioning democracy.
The problem of misinformation on the Internet has come at a
dangerous time, when growing resentment over inequality and the
worsening state of the American middle class have stoked a deep mistrust
in institutions of education, science, and media that have traditionally
served to keep “false facts” and demagoguery at bay. Citizens are
increasingly turning to the Internet, a forum for distributing information
that does not adhere to typical standards of truth, scientific inquiry, and
evidence-based news and information. At the same time, the institutions
that have typically distributed information to citizens are being usurped.
Consequently, for the average American citizen, distinguishing between
true and false information has only become more difficult.
Polling data suggests that we live in a country where a large part of
the populace is either unable or unwilling to accurately educate themselves
on the reality of their country and leaders. An uninformed citizenry of
this type is unable to act in its own best interest when electing leaders
and representatives. If misinformation and fake news campaigns truly do
frustrate citizens’ attempts to educate themselves—or, even worse, actively
manipulate citizens into believing false information—then the very
foundations of democracy are at risk.
Although many celebrities attach themselves to a charity or a cause,
‘political celebrities’ more specifically endorse a particular issue position,
a political party or an electoral mandate. For these political celebrities,
social media has become a particularly useful platform. Due to its unique
‘Retweet’ and ‘follow’ features, social media Twitter has not only become
a social networking tool, but it also possesses broadcaster-like network
features, allowing it to function as a conveyor of news (Marwick & boyd,
 Dr. Navodita Pande 87

2011; Kwak et al, 2010). The reach of political celebrities becomes more
than that of a broadcaster. So do these ‘political celebrities’ function like
‘opinion leaders’ on the social networking sites?
Digital media enable a new era of collaborative democracy that is not
limited to the confrontation of different viewpoints but seeks to impact
decision making. In this sense, mobilization through digital media may
function as a new form of opinion poll, which serves to make the opinions
of citizens visible to the political system. Collaborative democracy may
have a democratizing effect by giving ordinary citizens – collaborating
online and affecting political decision making – an influence that
traditionally has been reserved for organized lobbies, interest groups
and civil society organizations. The combination of affordances and
effects giving way to modular, flexible, mobile and decentralized forms
of communication and interaction allows people to coordinate their
actions that cohere and aggregate via the play of information cascades
across digital networks into mass mobilization or protest that manifest
both online and in the real world. Many examples of such cascades and
mobilizations have been observed locally, nationally and even globally in
recent years.
88 Modi On Twitter

References
Kwak, H., Lee, C., Park, H., & Moon, S. (2010, April). What is Twitter, a
social network or a news media?. In Proceedings of the 19th international
conference on World wide web (pp. 591-600).
Marwick, A. E., & Boyd, D. (2011). I tweet honestly, I tweet passionately:
Twitter users, context collapse, and the imagined audience. New media &
society, 13(1), 114-133.
Wardle, C., & Derakhshan, H. (2017). Information disorder: Toward an
interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking (Vol. 27, pp.
1-107). Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
HYBRIDIZATION AND
GLOBALIZATION
 Dr. Navodita Pande 91

M edia, and digital media are an autonomous subsystem, a

transmission belt between citizens and elites in the political
process. ‘Citizens’ provide aggregate inputs into this process, but it would
be equally appropriate to use the labels ‘people’, ‘civil society’ or ‘publics’
(indeed, these labels will be used interchangeably). The term ‘public
arena’ is used, in order to avoid Habermas’ (1996) normatively laden
‘public sphere’ (see chapter 1), and this also points to the contestedness
within this common but limited attention space. To understand the media
and politics, the public (or publics) can be counterposed to political elites
(which include civic activists, and also economic elites insofar as they are
politically relevant actors). Media elites translate the agenda of political
elites, plus ‘people’, into the media agenda. These political elites consist
not just of powerful leaders, as Schudson (2011) has pointed out, for the
vast bulk of sources of news are government officials. But elites that rule
must also set and be responsive to the agendas of the public. And apart
from this responsiveness on which the legitimacy of ruling elites is based,
there are counterpublics (Fraser 1990), publics that challenge the status
quo via media.
The measure of political change is the responsiveness of the political
apparatus to citizens, mainly via the media as a transmission belt. For
politics, only politically relevant communication and information
should be considered, and the yardstick for this is whether they provide
a representative and plural set of inputs into the political apparatus. In
a democratic society, these inputs should not, as much as possible, be
skewed towards powerful elites or towards particularly powerful groups
since they should be representative (Dahl 1998). Note, however, that
the yardstick of responsiveness can also be applied to non-democratic
China, though in this case there is a single, all-powerful elite (the party),
which exercises strong control over the media agenda, and publics or
counterpublics are kept within bounds.
At this stage we can briefly define ‘communication’ as comprising two-
way one-to-one or one- to-many messages, whereas ‘information’ means
the one-way obtaining of knowledge or data that makes a difference –
in this case to how citizens cope with the political environment. ‘Media’
encompass both information and communication. In focusing on how
92 Modi On Twitter

media constitute the transmission belt of political responsiveness and

politically relevant inputs then, an implicit premise – that the political
system can be separated from the economic and cultural systems (or
political power separated from economic and cultural power). This
separation is not controversial in mainstream political and social theory
(Schroeder 2013; Mann 2013, especially 154–66), and makes sense of the
idea (as Hallin and Mancini 2004 have argued) that media systems have
become autonomous from market forces and from the political system.
However, even if much of political communication and information
is moving online, it is worth bearing in mind that the vast bulk of
political responsiveness and inputs still take place via traditional media,
newspapers and television, rather than through new digital media.
Chadwick argues that politics and the media (in the United States and the
United Kingdom) are currently in a ‘hybrid’ transition from old to new:
he says there is a ‘hybrid media system’ that ‘exhibits a balance between
the older logics of transmission and reception and the newer logics of
circulation, recirculation, and negotiation’ (2011), with the balance still
skewed towards the older logics (ibid). But this argument fails to pinpoint
how the newer logics depart from the older logics in terms of their effects
and workings. Chadwick concludes (for the United States) that ‘political
communication... is more polycentric than during the period of mass
communication that dominated the twentieth century... the opportunities
for ordinary citizens... are on balance greater than they were... [though it
is primarily political activists and the politically interested who are able to
make a difference with newer media’(2011). This overlooks, first, the way
in which political and media elites (not just ‘ordinary citizens’) are also
able to make more powerful uses of new media to monitor and respond
to the public, and second that new media change not just those who are
active and interested in politics, but can also shift attention and the agenda
to new political forces, including political ‘outsiders’, who can use new
media to circumvent traditional ones.
In China, the lid is kept on by the state, whereas in India, small
burgeoning civil society forces are outweighed by elites. In both countries,
major examples of online activism include protest and pressures for less
corrupt and more responsive government. There are wider lessons here
 Dr. Navodita Pande 93

for the double-edged nature of the political implications of digital media.

The internet is changing politics, but it extends inputs from civil society
only within the confines of the workings of different media systems, and
includes forces that demand more responsiveness from government in the
direction of greater pluralism and accountability – but also, as we shall see,
calls for a stronger, less tolerant state and a more exclusive nationalism. In
any event, the role of online forces is a – perhaps the – central question
for Chinese and Indian political development. That is because, unlike in
established democracies, with their autonomous media systems and well-
established competition for visibility among many inputs, in China and
India the online realm will continue to provide the main alternative to
entrenched political power and its hold over traditional media.
Thus platforms like Twitter give rise to a new culture of hybridization
and globalization where followers of leaders like Modi get united under a
common thread of nationality, culture and political identity.
94 Modi On Twitter

References
Chadwick, A. (2011). The political information cycle in a hybrid news
system: The British prime minister and the “Bullygate” affair. The
International Journal of Press/Politics, 16(1), 3-29.
Dahl, R. A. (1998). Justifying democracy. Society, 35(2), 386-392.
Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the
critique of actually existing democracy. Social text, (25/26), 56-80.
Habermas, J. (1996). The public sphere. Media studies: A reader, 2, 92-97.
Hallin, D. C., & Mancini, P. (2004). Comparing media systems: Three
models of media and politics. Cambridge university press.
Mann, S. A. (2013). Third wave feminism’s unhappy marriage of
poststructuralism and intersectionality theory. Journal of feminist
scholarship, 4(4), 54-73.
Schroeder, R. (2013). An age of limits: Social theory for the 21st century.
Springer.
Schudson, M. (2011). TOCQUEVILLE’S INTERESTING ERROR. The
Oxford handbook of American public opinion and the media, 61.
TWEET BIBLIOGRAPHY
96 Modi On Twitter
 Dr. Navodita Pande 97

Tweet Date: February 10, 2022

Tweet 1: उत्तर प्रदे श विधानसभा चुनाव में आज पहले चरण की वोटिं ग है । सभी
मतदाताओं से मेरा आग्रह है कि वे कोविड नियमों का पालन करते हुए लोकतंत्र के इस
पावन पर्व में बढ़-चढ़कर हिस्सा लें। याद रखना है - पहले मतदान, फिर जलपान!

Today is the first phase of voting in the Uttar Pradesh assembly elections.
I request all the voters to participate enthusiastically in this holy festival of
democracy by following the rules of Covid. Remember - Vote first, then
refreshments!
Theme: UP Election
Tweet 2: On the holy occasion of Madhwa Navami, I pay my respectful
obeisances to Sri Madhwacharya.
His noble message of spiritual and social upliftment will keep inspiring
generations. Here is a speech I had given on Sri Madhwacharya.
Theme: Religious
Tweet 3: उत्तराखंड के स्वर्णिम भविष्य के लिए राज्य के लोगों और भाजपा ने मिलकर
सपने दे खे हैं …

For the bright future of Uttarakhand, people of Uttarakhand and the BJP
have woven dreams together…
Theme: Uttarakhand Election
Tweet 4: यूपी में कुछ लोग आज इसलिए नाराज हैं , क्योंक�ि योगी जी की सरकार ने
दं गावादियों और अपराधियों के खिलाफ कार्रवाई की, उन्हें जेल भेजा।

In UP some people are angry today because Yogi government took action
against rioters and criminals, sent them to jail.
Theme: UP Crime
Tweet 5: विकास में बेटियों की सहभागिता भाजपा की सबसे बड़ी प्राथमिकता है ।
मुस्लिम बहनें-बेटियां भी हमारी इस साफ नीयत को भलीभां ति समझती हैं ।

In development the role of daughters is BJP’s top priority. Our Muslim

sisters-daughters understand this clear intention of ours.
Theme: Muslim Women
98 Modi On Twitter

Tweet Date: February 11, 2022

Tweet 1: Thankful to the people of UP, Uttarakhand and Goa for their
affection today. Will be addressing rallies in Almora and Kasganj
tomorrow, 11th February.
Goa for us is about:
Governance.
Opportunities.
Aspirations.
Tweet 2: My gratitude to the hardworking BJP Karyakartas of Goa.
The NDA Government has made innovative efforts to improve tourism
and this has benefitted Goa.
Tweet 3: My association with Goa is special.
Goa has played a central role in key events of my life.
The bond between BJP and Goa is very strong. Watch from Mapusa.
Theme: Goa Election
Tweet 4: पंडित दीनदयाल उपाध्याय जी का संपूर्ण जीवन सर्वजन हिताय-सर्वजन
सुखाय के सिद्धां त पर आधारित रहा। उनका एकात्म मानववाद का दर्शन भारत ही नहीं,
बल्कि दु निया की कई समस्याओं का समाधान दे ने में सक्षम है । उनकी पुण्यतिथि पर
आदरपूर्ण श्रद्धां जलि।

Pandit Deen Dayal Upadhyaya’s entire life has been based on welfare for
all-bliss for all. His philosophy is capable of providing solutions to not
only the problems of India but of the whole world. Condolences on his
death anniversary.
Theme: National Leader

Tweet Date: February 12, 2022

Tweet 1: Shri Rahul Bajaj Ji will be remembered for his noteworthy
contributions to the world of commerce and industry. Beyond
business, he was passionate about community service and was a great
 Dr. Navodita Pande 99

conversationalist. Pained by his demise. Condolences to his family and

friends. Om Shanti.
Theme: Business Leader
Tweet 2: Delighted to receive my friend H.E. Raila Amolo Odinga, former
Prime Minister of Kenya. I fondly recollect my past interactions with him
in India and Kenya.
India and Kenya enjoy strong bilateral relations and we welcome further
strengthening of our ties.
Theme: Foreign Relations

Tweet Date: February 13, 2022

Tweet 1: World Radio Day greetings to all radio listeners and those who
enrich this outstanding medium with their talent as well as creativity.
Be it at home, during journeys and otherwise, the radio remains an
integral part of people’s lives. It is an amazing medium to connect
people.
Due to #MannKiBaat, I repeatedly see how the radio can be a great
medium to share positivity as well as recognise those who are at the
forefront of bringing a qualitative change in the lives of others. I would
also like to thank all those who contribute to this programme.
Theme: Media
Tweet 2: महान योद्धा और जन-जन के लिए अपना जीवन समर्पित करने वाले महाराजा
सूरजमल जी को उनकी जयंती पर मेरा शत-शत नमन।

I pay my regards to a great warrior who contributed his life to the society,
Maharaja Soorajmal, on his birth anniversary.
Theme: National Leader

Tweet Date: February 14, 2022

Tweet 1: दे श में आज जहां -जहां डबल इं जन की सरकार है , वहां गरीबों और किसानों
की छोटी-छोटी जरूरतों का भी पूरा ध्यान रखा जा रहा है । पंजाब में डबल इं जन की
सरकार आने पर राज्य में विकास के कार्यों में तेजी आएगी।
100 Modi On Twitter

In the country wherever there will be a Double-Engine government (BJP

in Centre and state), needs of the poor and the farmers will be kept in
mind. In Punjab, if there is a double-engine government, developmental
tasks will speed up.
Tweet 2: हमारे दिल में पंजाब का उज्ज्वल भविष्य है । पंजाब का भला हो, पंजाबियों का
भला हो, पंजाबियत अमर रहे , इसके लिए हमने अपने राजनीतिक हकों को भी दरकिनार
करके पंजाब की चिंता की है ।

We have a bright future of Punjab in our hearts. May Punjab and Punjabi
culture stay alive, we have worked hard for this by putting our political
interests aside.
Tweet 3: A video addressing a rally in Jalandhar, Punjab.
Theme: Punjab Election
Tweet 4: Kanpur Dehat and the surrounding areas are going to bless BJP
yet again! Watch. (Video)
Theme: UP Election
Tweet 5: Congratulations to our space scientists on the successful launch
of PSLV C52 mission. EOS-04 satellite will provide high resolution images
under all weather conditions for agriculture, forestry and plantations, soil
moisture and hydrology as well as flood mapping.
Theme: National Interests
Tweet 6: I pay homage to all those martyred in Pulwama on this day in
2019 and recall their outstanding service to our nation. Their bravery and
supreme sacrifice motivates every Indian to work towards a strong and
prosperous country.
Theme: Defence and National Security
Tweet 7: Polling will be held across Uttarakhand, Goa and in parts of Uttar
Pradesh. I call upon all those whose are eligible to vote today to do so in
record numbers and strengthen the festival of democracy.
Theme: Assembly Election
 Dr. Navodita Pande 101

Tweet Date: February 15, 2022

Tweet 1: The passing away of Gitashree Sandhya Mukhopadhyay Ji
leaves us all extremely saddened. Our cultural world is a lot poorer. Her
melodious renditions will continue to enthral the coming generations.
My thoughts are with her family and admirers in this sad hour. Om
Shanti.
Theme: Indian Culture
Tweet 2: मुझे यह बताते हुए गर्व का अनुभव हो रहा है कि हमने अपनी सरकार के हर
कदम और हर योजना में पूज्‍य श्री गुरु रविदास जी की भावना को समाहित किया है ।
यही नहीं, काशी में उनकी स्मृति में निर्माण कार्य पूरी भव्यता और दिव्यता के साथ आगे
बढ़ रहा है ।

It takes me immense pleasure and pride to share that in every step and
planning we have incorporated the feelings of Shri guru Ravidasji. Not
only this, in Banaras/Kashi the construction site in his memory is moving
ahead with a lot of enthusiasm and excitement.
Theme: National Leader
Tweet 3: Birthday greetings to my dynamic Cabinet colleague Shri @
HardeepSPuri Ji. He is vigorously working in the critical spheres of
achieving energy security and ensuring better urban amenities. May he
lead a long and healthy life.
Theme: Cabinet Minister

Tweet Date: February 16, 2022

Tweet 1: Shri Chennaveera Kanavi’s sublime poetry and writings have
enriched Kannada literature for decades. Saddened by his demise.
Condolences to his family and admirers. Om Shanti.
Theme: Indian Literature
Tweet 2: My remarks at the TERI World Sustainable Development
Summit. (Video)
Theme: Environment
102 Modi On Twitter

Tweet Date: February 17, 2022

Tweet 1: Birthday wishes to Telangana CM Shri KCR. Praying for his long
and healthy life. @TelanganaCMO
Theme: Popular Leaders

Tweet Date: February 18, 2022

Tweet 1: A very special interaction with the Sant Samaj and distinguished
members of the Sikh community.
Tweet 2: I was humbled by the kind words from the distinguished members
of the Sikh community on various efforts of the Central Government. I
consider it my honour that the respected Sikh Gurus have taken Seva from
me and their blessings have enabled me to work for society.
Tweet 3: This morning, I met a wide range of people from the Sant Samaj
and Sikh community. These are distinguished individuals who are at the
forefront of popularising Sikh culture and serving society.
Theme: Sikh Community

Tweet Date: February 19, 2022

Tweet 1: I bow to Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj on his Jayanti. His
outstanding leadership and emphasis on social welfare has been inspiring
people for generations. He was uncompromising when it came to standing
up for values of truth and justice. We are committed to fulfilling his vision.
Tweet 2: I salute Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj on his birthday. His best
leadership and insistence on social welfare has been a source of inspiration
for many generations. He did not compromise on the values of truth and
justice. We are committed to fulfilling their dreams.
Theme: National Leaders
Tweet 3: Remembering ‘Tamil Thatha’ U. Ve. Swaminatha Iyer on his birth
anniversary. Admired for his contribution to Tamil culture and language,
he popularised works from the Sangam era and helped conserve precious
heritage. Urging more youngsters to read his rich works.
Theme: Indian Culture
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Tweet Date: February 20, 2022

Tweet 1: The Punjab elections and the third phase of the UP elections
are being held today. I call upon all those voting today to do so in large
numbers, particularly the youth as well as first time voters.
Tweet 2: Make this special day of democracy forever memorable by
exercising your right to vote. Be sure to vote, do your duty as a responsible
citizen.
Theme: Assembly Election
Tweet 3: Greetings to the people of Mizoram on their Statehood Day.
India takes great pride in the vibrant Mizo culture and the contributions
of Mizoram to national progress. I pray for the good health and well-being
of the people of Mizoram.
Tweet 4: Best wishes to the people of Arunachal Pradesh on their
Statehood Day. The people of the state are known for their stupendous
talent and hardworking nature. May the state scale new heights of
development in the times to come.
Tweet 5: My message on the Statehood Day of Arunachal Pradesh.
Theme: Northeastern States

Tweet Date: February 22, 2022

Tweet 1: मणिपुर के जिन बेटे-बेटियों को पहली बार वोट दे ने का सौभाग्य मिल रहा है ,
उनसे मेरी एक अपील…(Video)

All those getting an opportunity to vote for the first time in Manipur, here
is an appeal (video)
Tweet 2: भाजपा सरकार मणिपुर में क्या बदलाव लेकर आई है , इसका एक बड़ा
उदाहरण…(video)

BJP government has brought a huge change, here is an example

(video)
Tweet 3: बीजेपी सरकार मणिपुर सहित पूरे नॉर्थ ईस्ट में Sports Talent को प्रोत्साहित
करने के साथ Sports Infrastructure पर Invest कर रही है । ओलंपिक्स में भारत के
ऐतिहासिक प्रदर्शन के पीछे यह एक बड़ी वजह है ।
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BJP government has encouraged sports talent and infrastructure in the

northeast, including Manipur. This is a major reason for India’s historic
performance in Olympics.
Theme: Manipur Election
Tweet 4: This year’s Budget places great importance to rural
development and ensuring proper infra in the villages. At 10 AM, will
be speaking on how India’s villages will grow faster due to the provisions
in the Budget.
Theme: Budget and Economy

Tweet Date: February 23

Tweet 1: उत्तर प्रदे श विधानसभा चुनाव में आज वोटिं ग का चौथा दौर है । सभी
मतदाताओं से मेरा आग्रह है कि वे अपने बहुमूल्य वोट का प्रयोग कर लोकतंत्र को
मजबूत करने में अपना योगदान करें ।

In UP election, today is the fourth phase of voting. It is my earnest request

to all voters to cast their invaluable vote; and strengthening democracy.
Theme: UP Election
Tweet 2: This year’s Budget places great importance to rural development
and ensuring proper infra in the villages. At 10 AM, will be speaking on
how India’s villages will grow faster due to the provisions in the Budget.
Tweet 3: Here is how this year’s Budget augurs well for rural development.
(video)
Theme: Budget and Economy

Tweet Date: February 26, 2022

Tweet 1: Addressing a webinar on how this year’s Budget supports
building a robust healthcare system. (video)
Tweet 2: It is our Government’s endeavour to ensure that the people
of India have access to top quality and affordable healthcare. This year’s
Budget has many provisions aimed at augmenting health infra. Will be
speaking on them at 10 AM today. Do watch.
Theme: Budget and Economy
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Tweet 3: Urging all those voting today in the first phase of the Manipur
Assembly elections to turnout in record numbers and cast their vote. I
particularly call upon the young and first time voters to exercise their franchise.
Theme: Manipur Election

Tweet Date: February 27, 2022

Tweet 1: It is always special to be in Varanasi. Addressing Booth Vijay
Sammelan. Watch. (video)
Tweet 2: Grateful to the people of Deoria for their affection. Addressing a
rally. Watch.
Tweet 3: Tremendous enthusiasm across Uttar Pradesh. Addressing a
massive rally in Basti.
Theme: UP Development

Tweet Date: March 2, 2022

Tweet 1: महाशिवरात्रि के पावन-पुनीत अवसर पर आप सभी को मंगलकामनाएं । दे वों
के दे व महादे व सबका कल्याण करें । ओम नम: शिवाय।

Best wishes to everyone on the auspicious occasion of Maha Shivratri. Om

Namah Shivay!
Theme: Religious

Tweet Date: March 4, 2022

Tweet 1: Anguished by the passing away of General S F Rodrigues.
The nation will remain indebted to him for his exceptional service and
contribution towards making India stronger. He was respected for his deep
strategic knowledge. My thoughts are with his family and friends. RIP.
Theme: National Leaders

Tweet Date: March 5, 2022

Tweet 1: Today is the second phase of the Manipur Assembly elections.
Calling upon all those whose constituencies are polling today to vote in
large numbers and mark the festival of democracy.
Theme: Manipur Election
106 Modi On Twitter

Tweet Date: March 6, 2022

Tweet 1: Congratulations to Symbiosis International on marking their
Golden Jubilee. They have made a mark with their academic research, and
national as well as International diversity on campus. My best wishes to
the staff, students and alumni for their future endeavours.
Theme: Education

Tweet Date: March 7, 2022

Tweet 1: उत्तर प्रदे श में आज लोकतंत्र के महायज्ञ की पूर्णा हुति का दिन है । सभी
मतदाताओं से मेरा आग्रह है कि वे विधानसभा चुनाव के सातवें और आखिरी चरण के
मतदान में पूरे जोश-खरोश से भाग लें और वोटिं ग का नया रिकॉर्ड बनाएं ।
Today is the final phase of voting in Uttar Pradesh. I request all voters to
cast their vote and participate in election enthusiastically by creating a
new record in voting.
Theme: UP Election

Tweet Date: March 8, 2022

Tweet 1: Addressing a seminar recognising the contributions of women
saints in our society.
Tweet 2: An exemplary effort which will ensure more girls get the joys of
education! Let us all, as a nation, come together and make this movement
a success.
Tweet 3: On the occasion of #IWD2022, @MinistryWCD in partnership
with @EduMinOfIndia has undertaken ‘Kanya Shiksha Pravesh Utsav’ -
a mission to integrate out of school adolescent girls back into the school
system as a part of Beti Bachao, Beti Badhao program.
Theme: Women and Education

Tweet Date: March 10, 2022

Tweet 1: In all the five states that went to the polls, our Party Karyakartas
worked tirelessly among the people. They spoke about our good
governance agenda and highlighted our pro-people efforts. I salute each
and every Party Karyakarta for their exceptional efforts.
Theme: Assembly Election
VISUAL REPRESENTATION
108 Modi On Twitter

T ractor-Graphext Software was used for the analysis of PM Narendra

Modi’s tweets from the polling dates- February 10 to March 10,
2022. Here are a few graphical findings of the search done with the name
‘Narendra Modi’:
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