Economic History Review, XLV, I(I992), pp.

24-50

Rehabilitating the industrial

revolution’
B y MAXINE BERG and PAT HUDSON

he historiography of the industrial revolution in England has moved

T away from viewing the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as
a unique turning point in economic and social development.2 The notion of
radical change in industry and society occurring over a specific period was
effectively challenged in the 1920s and 1930s by Clapham and others who
stressed the long taproots of development and the incomplete nature of
economic and social transf~rmation.~ After this it was no longer possible to
claim that industrial society emerged de ~ O P Oat any time between c. 1750
and 1850, but the idea of industrial revolution survived into the 1960s and
1970s. In 1968 Hobsbawm could state unequivocally that the British
industrial revolution was the most fundamental transformation in the history
of the world recorded in written d o c u m e n t ~Rostow’s
.~ work was still widely
influential and the social history of what was seen as a new type of class
society was only starting to be written. The idea that the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries witnessed a significant socio-economic
discontinuity remained well entrenched.
In the last decade the gradualist perspective has appeared to triumph. In
economic history it has done so largely because of a preoccupation with
growth accounting at the expense of more broadly based conceptualizations
of economic change. New statistics have been produced which illustrate the
slow growth of industrial output and gross domestic product. Productivity
grew slowly; fixed capital proportions, savings, and investment changed only
gradually; workers’ living standards and their personal consumption remained

Some of the arguments in this article appear in Berg, ‘Revisions and revolutions’; and in Hudson,
ed., Regions and industries. We are very grateful to N. F. R. Crafts for detailed discussion of the substance
of an earlier version, and to seminar groups at the Institute of Historical Research, London, the Northern
Economic Historians Group, University of Manchester, the University of Glasgow, the University of
Paris VIII at St Denis, and the Universities of Oslo and Bergen. Although many of the arguments in the
paper apply as much to Scotland and Wales as to England, we confine discussion in this paper to the
industrial revolution in England in order to avoid confusion where the existing literature is discussed.
For a broad survey of this and other trends in the historiography of the industrial revolution see
Cannadine, ‘The past and the present’.
Clapham is most often associated with initiating the trend away from more cataclysmic interpretations
in Economic history of modern Britain, but the shift in emphasis is obvious in other works of the interwar
period and earlier, e.g. Mantoux, The industrial revolution; Heaton, ‘Industrial revolution’; Redford,
Economic history of England; Knowles, Industrial and commercial revolutions; George, England in transition.
Hobsbawm, Industry and empire, p. 13.
Thompson in his Making of the English working class identified the industrial revolution period as
the great turning point in class formation. Rostow’s Stages of economic growth, though challenged over
the precise fit between the model and British experience, was a powerful voice in favour of significant
and unprecedented economic discontinuity. Landes in Unbound Prometheus drew a convincing picture
of the transformations initiated by technical innovation.
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REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 25
largely unaffected before 1830 and were certainly not squeezed. The
macroeconomic indicators of industrial and social transformation were not
present and so the notion of industrial revolution has been dethroned almost
entirely leaving instead only a long process of structural change in employment
from agrarian to non-agrarian occupations.
At the same time, and often taking a strong lead from the gradualism of
economic history interpretations, the social history of the period has shifted
away from analysis of new class formations and consciousness.’ The post-
Marxian perspective stresses the continuity between eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century social protest and radicalism. Chartism, for example, is seen
as a chronological extension of the eighteenth-century constitutional attack
on Old Corruption.8 Late eighteenth-century depressions and the Napoleonic
Wars are seen as the major precipitators of social tensions which are viewed
as arising from temporary and selective economic hardship rather than from
any new radical critique or alternative political e c o n ~ m y‘The
. ~ ancien regime
of the confessional state’ survived the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
substantially unchanged. lo In demography, the dominant explanation of
the late eighteenth-century population explosion stresses its continuity with
a much earlier-established demographic regime which remained intact until
at least the 1 8 4 0 s . ~And
~ an influential tendency in the socio-cultural
historiography of the last few years has argued that the English industrial
revolution was very incomplete (if it existed at all) because the industrial
bourgeoisie failed to gain political and economic ascendancy. l2 Thus England
never experienced a period of commitment to industrial growth: the industrial
revolution was a brief interruption in a great arch of continuity whose
economic and political base remained firmly in the hands of the landed
aristocracy and its offshoots in metropolitan finance. Gentlemanly capitalism
prevailed and the power and influence of industry and industrialists in the
English economy and society were ephemeral and limited. l 3
Crafts, British economic growth. See also Harley, ‘British industrialisation’; McCloskey, ‘Industrial
revolution’; Feinstein, ‘Capital formation in Great Britain’; Lindert and Williamson, ‘English workers’
living standards’. More radical social and cultural change is implied in some of the recent literature
discussing increases in internal consumption. See Brewer, McKendrick, and Plumb, Birth of consumer
sociery. But we concentrate here on the gradualism of supply side approaches in economic history because
supply side changes are vital in underpinning any change in aggregate demand. The so-called consumer
revolution of these years can only be understood as part of a dynamic interplay between changing
consumption patterns and the transformation of employment and production.
’Characterized by Thompson, Making of the English working class, and emphasized by Foster, Class
snuggle.
Stedman Jones, ‘Rethinking Chartism’.
Williams, ‘Morals’; Stevenson, Popular disturbances, pp. 1 1 8 , 152; Thomis, Luddites, ch. 2 . For
critiques of this literature see Charlesworth and Randall, ‘Comment’; Randall, ‘Philosophy of Luddism’.
For a balanced survey of the debate on the ‘moral economy’, see Stevenson, ‘Moral economy’.
l o The phrase is from Clark, English society which is heavily critical of the social history of the 1970s
and 1980s. For a critique of his position, see Innes, ‘Jonathan Clark’.
l 1 Wrigley and Schofield, Population history. The argument is summarized in Wrigley, ‘Growth of
population’ and in Smith, ‘Fertility and economy’.
Iz See Wiener, English culture; Anderson, ‘Figures of descent’; Cain and Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly
capitalism’; Ingham, Capitalism divided?; Leys, ‘Formation of British capital’. For the argument that the
landed aristocracy was an elite closed to new wealth see Stone and Stone, Open elite?; Rubinstein, ‘New
men’.
l 3 Ibid. The term ‘great arch’ is from Corrigan and Sayer, The great arch although this work itself
does not place exclusive stress on continuity.
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26 MAXINE BERG and PAT HUDSON

Though current consensus strongly favours continuity and gradualism,

contemporaries appear to have had little doubt about the magnitude and
importance of change in the period, particularly industrial change. In 1814
Patrick Colquhoun wrote:
It is impossible to contemplate the progress of manufactures in Great Britain
within the last thirty years without wonder and astonishment. Its rapidity,
particularly since the commencement of the French revolutionary war, exceeds
all credibility. The improvement of steam engines, but above all the facilities
afforded to the great branches of the woollen and cotton manufactories by
ingenious machinery, invigorated by capital and skill, are beyond all calculation
. . . these machines are rendered applicable to silk, linen, hosiery and various
other branches. l 4
Robert Owen in 1820 identified a key turning point:
It is well known that, during the last half century in particular, Great Britain,
beyond any other nation, has progressively increased its powers of production,
by rapid advancement in scientific improvements and arrangements, introduced
more or less, into all the departments of productive industry throughout the
empire.
And in 1833 Peter Gaskell wrote of the social and political repercussions of
economic change, seeing working-class organizations forming an ‘ “imperium
in imperio” of the most obnoxious description’. l6 In I 85 I the Owenite James
Hole wrote that:
Class stands opposed to class, and so accustomed have men become to pursue
their own isolated interests apart from and regardless of that of others, that it
has become an acknowledged maxim, that when a man pursues his own interest
alone he is most benefitting society-a maxim . . . which would justify every
crime and folly. . . . The principle of supply and demand has been extended
from commodities to men. These have obtained thereby more liberty, but less
bread. They find that in parting with the thraldom of Feudalism they have taken
on that of Capital; that slavery has ceased in name but survived in fact.”
Radical change was obvious to contemporaries but it has been obscured
in recent historiography, and industrial performance in particular has been
viewed as an extension of a pre-industrial traditional past. We argue here
that the industrial revolution should be rehabilitated. The national accounts
approach to economic growth and productivity change is not a good
starting point for the analysis of fundamental economic discontinuity. The
measurement of growth using this approach is prone to significant errors of
estimation which arise from the restricted definition of economic activity,
from the incomplete nature of the available data, and from assumptions
embodied in the analysis. We argue that growth and productivity change in
the period are currently underestimated. But, much more importantly, we
stress that growth rates on their own are inadequate to the task of identifying
and comprehending the industrial revolution. The current orthodoxy

l4 Colquhoun, Treatise on wealth, p. 68.

Is Owen, Report to the county of Lanark, pp. 246-7.
l6 Gaskell, Manufacturing population of England, pp. 6-7.
” Hole, J., Lectures on social science, quoted in Briggs, Victorian cities, p. 140.
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REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 27
underplays economic and social transformation because such development is
not amenable to study within the frame of reference of national accounts
and aggregate statistics. We examine four areas in which fundamental and
unique change occurred during the industrial revolution: technical and
organizational innovation outside the factory sector, the deployment of female
and child labour, regional specialization, and demographic development. For
each area we identify both problems of underestimation and of the
measurement of fundamental change. We conclude by considering the
importance for social and political history of our reassessment of the extent
and nature of transformation in these years.

I
Unlike the earlier national accounts estimates of Deane and Cole, recent
calculations show very slow growth rates before the 1830s and particularly
in the last four decades of the eighteenth century. Explanations for this slow
growth vary considerably but the work of Crafts has been the most widely
influential in current assumptions about the industrial revolution. l 8 Crafts
calculated that change in investment proportions was very gradual until the
early nineteenth century and that total factor productivity growth in
manufacturing was only around 0.2 per cent per annum between 1760 and
1801 and 0.4 per cent between 1801 and 1831. Even total factor productivity
growth across the entire economy, inflated in Crafts’s opinion by the
performance of agriculture, grew very slowly: 0.2 per cent per annum 1760-
1801, 0.7 per cent 1801-31, reaching 1.0 per cent only in the period 1831-
1860.’~
Several points about these growth rates could be made. Perhaps the most
important is that, although productivity growth appears gradual, it was high
enough to sustain a much increased population which under earlier economic
circumstances would have perished. Crafts, however, chooses to emphasize
the poor showing of manufacturing, arguing that one small and atypical
sector, cotton, in which growth accelerated sharply, accounted for as much
as half of all productivity gains in manufacturing. It was a modern sector
floating in a sea of tradition, too small to have a significant overall impact.
For most of industry, he concluded, ‘not only was the triumph of ingenuity
slow to come to fruition but it does not seem appropriate to regard
innovativeness as pervasive’.*’ We believe that this opinion rests on two
false assumptions. First, it is assumed that the innovative factory sector
functioned independently of, and owed little to, changes in the rest of the
manufacturing and service economy. Secondly, innovation is assumed to

Deane and Cole, British economic growth; Crafts, British economic growth; Williamson, ’Why was
British economic growth so slow?’; McCloskey, ‘The industrial revolution’. Whereas Crafts stresses the
low productivity of the economy because of a shortage of high return investment opportunities, Williamson
argues that the industrial revolution was crowded out by the effect of war debts on civilian accumulation.
For recent debate between these two views see Crafts, ‘British economic growth’; Williamson, ‘Debating’;
Mokyr, ‘Has the industrial revolution been crowded out?’. See also Williamson, ‘English factor markets’;
Heim and Morowski, ‘Interest rates’.
l 9 Crafts, British economic growth, pp. 3 1 , 81, 84.
zo Ibid., p. 87.
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28 MAXINE BERG and P A T HUDSON

concern only the introduction of capital-intensive plant and equipment which

has an immediate measurable impact on productivity. We return to these
important points about economic dualism and productivity below but first
briefly deal with measurement problems of the national accounts approach
during the industrial revolution period which alone are sufficient to undermine
confidence in the current gradualist orthodoxy.

I1
Industrial output and GDP are aggregate estimates derived from the
weighted averages of their components which, as Crafts himself admits,
involves ‘a classic index number problem’.21 The difficulties of assigning
weights to industrial and other sectors of the economy, allowing for changes
in weights over time and for the effects of differential price changes and
value-added changes in the final product, are insurmountable and will always
involve wide margins of potential error. Errors in turn become magnified in
residual calculations like that of productivity growth.22
At the root of problems concerning the composition of the economy by
sector in the national accounting framework are the new social and
occupational tables of Lindert and Williamson upon which Crafts and others
rely.23 These give a higher profile to the industrial sector than the earlier
social structure estimates of King, Massie, and Colquhoun and fit well with
current work on the importance of proto-industrialization. But the latitude
for potential error in these tables is great. Lindert himself has cautioned
that for the large occupational groupings of industry, agriculture, and
commerce error margins could be as high as 60 per cent while estimates for
shoemakers, carpenters, and others are ‘little more than guesses’.24 Lindert
and Williamson rely on the burial records of adult males as their main source
of occupational information. Yet women and children were a vital and
growing pillar of the manufacturing workforce during the proto-industrial
and early industrial periods. The further difficulties of allowing for dual and
triple occupations, and of dealing with descriptions like ‘labourer’, which
give no indication of sector, suggest that no reliable sectoral breakdown for
labour inputs can be made. Before the 1831 census, and without the benefit
of much more research, not only are sectoral distributions likely to be
erroneous, but they are particularly likely to underestimate the role of
growing sections of the labour force and of the vitally important, often
innovative, overlaps between agrarian and industrial occupations.
Nor are the industrial macrodata particularly robust. Many of Crafts’s
estimates of sector outputs and inputs rely on using multipliers derived from
a handful of examples and only a sample of industries is used. This omits

21 Ibid., p. 17.
22 Jackson, ‘Government expenditure’; Mokyr, ‘Has the industrial revolution been crowded out?’,
p. 306.
23 Lindert and Williamson, ‘Revising England’s social tables’; Lindert, ‘English occupations’.
24 Ibid., p. 701; Wrigley also uses these estimates, and distinguishes rural non-agricultural from rural

agricultural population. Note, however, that he emphasizes the fallibility of estimates for agricultural
population before 1800. See Wrigley, ‘Urban growth and agricultural change’, p. 169.
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REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 29
potentially vital sources of output and productivity increase in the economy:
for example, food processing, metal wares, distilling, lead, furniture,
coachmaking, and new industries like chemicals and engineering.25 The
sectors which are included should be representative of industry as a whole
but in fact the sample is heavily biased in favour of finished rather than
intermediate goods. Change in the nature and uses of raw and semi-processed
material inputs probably results in bias because major sources of innovation
in the economy are neglected.26
In attempting to measure the size and nature of the service sector the
macro accounting framework encounters a virtually impossible task. Crafts
is forced to rely on the assumption that productivity in the service sector
increased no more than in industry. Behind this lies the even more
problematic assumption that the service sector expanded at the same rate as
population before 1801 and thereafter in line with what little we know about
rents, (central) government expenditure, and the growth of the legal
profession. Crafts’s treatment of the service sector excludes direct evidence
of what was happening in transport, financial services, retail and wholesale
trades, professions other than the law (in other words, what was happening
to transactions costs), to say nothing of personal and leisure service^.^' And
further controversy surrounds Crafts’s estimates of agricultural output
because he relies on inferences from questionable estimates of population
growth, agricultural incomes, prices, and income elasticities.28
Large areas of economic activity have of course left no available source of
quantitative data at all. Even in the twentieth century national income
accounting, when used as an indicator of national economic activity, involves
major problems of underestimation, but these are magnified in earlier
applications because so much economic activity was embedded in unquantifi-
able and unrecorded non-market relationship^.^^ The problems of the national
accounting approach are further compounded for periods of fundamental
economic change because the proportion of total industrial and commercial
activity showing up in the estimates is likely to change radically over time.
If, as seems likely, entry thresholds in most industries were low, industrial
expansion might take place first and foremost among a myriad small firms
which have left few records and whose contribution is lost to historians who
confine themselves to easily available indices. Finally, price data for the

25 Crafts, British economic growth, pp. 17-27; Hoppit, ‘Counting’, p. 182.

26 Hudson, Genesis, ch. 6; Berg, Age of manufactures, chs. 1 1 , 12; Rowlands, Masters and men;
Sigsworth, Black Dyke Mills, ch. I .
27 Hoppit, ‘Counting’, pp. 182-3; Price, ‘What do merchants do?; Jackson, ‘Government expenditure’;
idem, ‘Structure of pay’.
Crafts, British economic growth, pp. 38-44; Mokyr, ‘Has the industrial revolution been crowded
out?’, pp. 305-12; Jackson, ‘Growth and deceleration’; Hoppit, ‘Counting’, p. 183. Crafts, however, was
certain enough of these and of his other estimates to write in 1989 ‘The dimensions of economic change
in Britain during the Industrial Revolution are now reliably measured. A number of features . . . are
likely to be subject to only minor revision as a result of further research’; Crafts, ‘British industrialisation
in an international context’, p. 416.
29 For discussions of the problems of national income accounting see Hawke, Economics, pp. 27-36;
Usher, Measurement of growth, passim. For discussion of the embeddedness of economic acuvity see
Polanyi, ed., Trade and market, pp. 239-306; Douglas and Isherwood, World of goods; Beneria,
‘Conceptualising the labour force’.
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30 M A X I N E BERG a n d P A T HUDSON

eighteenth century are sparse and highly partial. This creates a problem
because the national accounts framework requires price information across
the board to calculate value added in each sector.
These considerations together preclude drawing firm conclusions from the
estimates currently available and suggest that the bias they contain is likely
to result in underestimation of production and productivity in the secondary
and tertiary sectors of the economy.
In this connection it is worth noting that Crafts’s recent statistical analysis
of industrial output series for Britain, Italy, Hungary, Germany, France,
Russia, and Austria shows that Britain and Hungary were the only countries
to exhibit a prolonged period of increase of trend rate of growth in industrial
production during the process of industriali~ation.~~ In the light of the
qualitative evidence of the extent and speed of change in Germany and
Russia in particular, this finding suggests either that the macro estimates
are far from accurate and/or that paying undue attention to changes in the
trend rates of growth at the national level is not a helpful starting point for
identifying or understanding economic transformation.

111
Aggregative studies are dogged by an inbuilt problem of identification in
posing questions about the existence of an industrial revolution. As Mokyr
has pointed out in the English case:
Some industries which grew slowly were mechanising and switching to factories
(e.g. paper after 1801,wool and chemicals like soap and candles) while construction
and coal mining in which manual techniques ruled supreme with few exceptions
until deep in the nineteenth century, grew at respectable rates.3’
Clearly technical progress is not growth and rapid growth does not everywhere
imply the revolutionizing of production functions. Can we justify using
high aggregate investment ratios, high factor productivity manufacturing
techniques, and their immediate influence on the formal GDP indicators as
our yardstick of industrial innovation and transformation? In answering this
question, we need to look more closely at the model of industrialization
which underpins much current analysis.
The new interpretations of the industrial revolution rely on an analytical
divide between the traditional and modern sectors: mechanized factory
industry with high productivity on the one hand, and a widespread traditional
industrial and service sector backwater on the other. It is argued that the
large size of the traditional sector, combined with primitive technology,
made it a drag on productivity growth in the economy as a whole.32 But it
is not clear how helpful this divide is in understanding the economic structure

30 This analysis employs the Kalman filter to eliminate the problem of false periodization and to
distinguish between trend changes and the effect of cycles of activity. See Crafts, Leybourne, and Mills,
‘Britain’; idem, ‘Trends and cycles’.
3 1 Mokyr, ‘Has the industrial revolution been crowded out?’, p. 314.
32 Crafts, British economic growth, ch. 2 ; Mokyr, Economics of the industrial revolution, pp. 5-6; Crafts,
‘British industrialisation’.
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REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 31
or the dynamism of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century England. 33 In
reality, it is impossible to make clear-cut divisions between the traditional
and the modern as there were rarely separate organizational forms,
technologies, locations, or firms to be ascribed to either. Eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century cotton manufacturers, serving domestic as well as foreign
markets, typically combined steam-powered spinning in factories with large-
scale employment of domestic handloom weavers and often kept a mix of
powered and domestic hand weaving long after the powered technology
became available. This pattern was a function of risk spreading, the problems
of early technology, and the cheap labour supply of women and children in
particular. 34 Thus for decades the ‘modern’ sector was actually bolstered by,
and derived from the ‘traditional’ sector, and not the reverse.
Artisans in the metal-working sectors of Birmingham and Sheffield
frequently combined occupations or changed them over their life cycle in
such a way that they too could be classified in both the traditional and
modern sectors.35 Artisan woollen workers in West Y orkshire clubbed
together to build mills for certain processes and thus had a foot in both the
modern and traditional camps. These so-called ‘company mills’ underpinned
the success of the artisan Thus the traditional and the modern
were most often inseparable and mutually reinforcing. Firms primarily
concerned with metalworking diversified into metal processing ventures as
a way of generating steady raw material supplies. This and other cases of
vertical integration provide more examples of the tail of ‘tradition’ wagging
the dog of ‘modernity’.37
The non-factory, supposedly stagnant sector, often working primarily for
domestic markets, pioneered extensive and radical technical and organizational
change not recognized by the revisionists. The classic textile innovations
were all developed within a rural and artisan industry; the artisan metal
trades developed skill-intensive hand processes, hand tools, and new malleable
alloys. The wool textile sector moved to new products which reduced
finishing times and revolutionized marketing. New forms of putting-out,
wholesaling, retailing, credit and debt, and artisan co-operation were devised
as ways of retaining the essentials of older structures in the face of the new
more competitive and innovative environment. Customary practices evolved
to match the needs of dynamic and market-orientated production. The result
33 The use of a two-sector traditionaUmodern model of industrial change is reminiscent of development
economics during the 1950s and 1960s which looked to a policy of accelerated and large-scale
industrialization through promotion of the modern sector as a spearhead for the rest of the economy.
This division was abandoned in the 1970s with recognition of the diverse and dependent linkages between
the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ and between the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ sectors, yet it has gained renewed
prominence in economic history. See Moser, ‘Informal sector’, p. 1052;Toye, Dilemmas in development.
For fuller discussion of parallel ideas in development economics, see Berg, ‘Revisions and revolutions’,
pp. 51-6. For a particular interpretation of the dynamism of the small firm sector see Sabel and Zeitlin,
‘Historical alternatives’, pp. 142-56; also Berg, ‘On the origins’.
34 See, for example, Lyons, ‘Lancashire cotton industry’.
35 Berg, ‘Revisions and revolutions’, pp. 56, 59; idem, Age of manufactures, chs. 11, 12; Sabel and
Zeitlin, ‘Historical alternatives’, pp. 146-50; Lyons, ‘Vertical integration’; Berg, ‘Commerce and
creativity’, pp. 190-5.
36 Hudson, Genests of industrial capital, pp. 70-80; idem, ‘From manor to mill’.
37 Heaton, Yorkshire woollen and worsted industry; Wadsworth and Mann, Cotton trade; Hamilton,
English brass and copper industries; John, Industrial development of south Wales.
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32 MAXINE B E R G and PAT HUDSON

was considerable transformation even within the framework of the so-called

traditional sector.
The revisionists argue that most industrial labour was to be found in those
occupations which experienced little change.38 But the food and drink
trades, shoemaking, tailoring, blacksmithing, and trades catering for luxury
consumption successfully expanded and adapted to provide the essential
urban services on which town life, and hence much of centralized industry,
was dependent. Furthermore, early industrial capital formation and enterprise
typically combined activity in the food and drink or agricultural processing
trades with more obviously industrial activities, creating innumerable external
This was true in metal manufacture in Birmingham and
Sheffield where innkeepers and victuallers were commonly mortgagees and
joint owners of metal working enterprise^.^' In the south Lancashire tool
trades Peter Stubs was not untypical when he first appeared in 1788 as a
tenant of the White Bear Inn in Warrington. Here he combined the activity
of innkeeper, maltster, and brewer with that of filemaker using the carbon
in barm bottoms (barrel dregs) to strengthen the files.41 There are many
examples of this kind of overlap between services, agriculture, and industry.
These were the norm in business practice at a time when entrepreneurs’
risks were difficult to spread through diversification of portfolios and where
so much could be gained from the external economies created by these
overlaps.
We do not suggest here that productivity growth at the rate experienced
in cotton textiles was achieved elsewhere, but that the success of cotton and
other major exports was intimately related to and dependent upon innovations
and radical transformations in other branches of the primary, secondary,
and tertiary sectors. Dividing off the modern from the traditional sectors is
an analytical device which hides more than it reveals in attempting to
understand the dynamics of change in the industrial revolution.

IV
More questionable than their assumption of the separateness and depen-
dence of the traditional sector is the revisionists’ evaluation of productivity
change in the economy at this time. Throughout the historiography of the
industrial revolution productivity measures have seldom been clearly defined,
the limitations of measures have rarely been explained, and figures of limited
meaningfulness have been produced and widely accepted on trust. Total
factor productivity (TFP) is the measure most used by Crafts and others
and its use has led them to conclude that productivity was slow to grow in
the period. TFP is usually calculated as a residual after the rate of growth
of factor inputs has been subtracted from the rate of growth of GDP.

38 Crafts, British economic growth, p. 69; Wrigley, People, cities and wealth, pp. 133-57; idem, Continuity,
chance and change, p. 84.
39 Jones, ‘Environment’; Burley, ‘Essex clothier’; Chapman, ‘Industrial capital’; Mathias, ‘Agriculture
and brewing’.
40 Berg, ‘Commerce and creativity’, p. 183.
4 1 Ashton, Eighteenth century industrialist, pp. 4-5.
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REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 33
There are several major problems with the TFP measure. First, TFP as
a residual calculation is heavily affected by any mistakes in the estimation
of sectoral outputs and factor inputs. If the original sector weightings were
wrong, TFP estimates may be highly distorted. Big differences in TFP may
also arise from variations in the estimated growth of GDP. Secondly, if
factor reallocation from sectors with low marginal productivities to those
with high ones was an important feature of the period, it will not be possible
to derive reliable economy-wide rates of TFP growth simply by taking a
weighted average across sectors. The effects of factor reallocation must be
i n ~ o r p o r a t e dThirdly,
.~~ TFP embodies a number of restrictive assumptions
rarely acknowledged by those who use the measure. These are perfect
mobility of factors, perfect competition, neutral technical progress, constant
returns to scale, and parametric prices.43The eighteenth-century economy
did not match these assumptions. For example, the assumption of neutral
technical progress is suspect in view of the evidence of long-term labour-
saving technical change. So too are assumptions of constant returns to scale
when set against evidence of increasing returns; TFP calculations should
allow for imperfect competition and changing elasticities of product demand
and factor inputs4 Assumptions of full employment of labour and capital
and of perfect mobility are also inappropriate. Movement of population was
often not a response to shortages of labour in industry; indeed many
industrial sectors came to be characterized by flooded labour markets,
particularly for the less skilled tasks. These were paralleled by massive
immobile pools of agricultural labour in many southern and midland counties.
Structural unemployment was endemic and chronic under-utilization of both
labour and capital was aggravated by seasonal and cyclical swings.4s
Furthermore, TFP takes no account of innovation in the nature of outputs
or of change in the quality of inputs, yet we know that both were marked
features of the period. On the input side, labour needs to be adjusted in
TFP calculations for changes in age, sex, education, skill, and intensity of
work. Output per worker is also affected by changes in the relative power
of employers to extract work effort and in the power of employees to
withhold it.& Similarly, material inputs were changing constantly as product
innovation affected the nature of raw materials and intermediate goods as
well as final products. The small metal trades were a case in point: innovation
entailed not powered mechanization but the introduction of new products
and the substitution of cheap alloys for precious metals as raw material.47

42 Williamson, ‘Debating’, p. 270; Mokyr, ‘Has the industrial revolution been crowded out?’, pp. 305-
12.
43 Link, Technological change, pp. 15-20.
44 Eichengreen, ‘What have we learned?’, pp. 29-30;Link, Technological change, p. 14.For discussion
of evidence of labour-saving technical change, see Rosenberg, Perspectives on technology, ch. 6; David,
Technical choice, ch. I; Field, ‘Land abundance, interesdprofit rates’, p. 41 I; Stonernan, Economic analysis
of technological change, pp. I 56-67. For evidence and discussion of increasing returns, see David, Technical
choice, chs. 2, 6 .
4s Eichengreen, ‘Causes of British business cycles’; Allen, Enclosure, ch. 12; Hunt, ‘Industrialisation
and regional inequality’.
46 Link, Technological change, p. 24; Eichengreen, ‘What have we learned?’, pp. 29-30; Elbaum and
Lazonick, Decline of the British economy, pp. 1-17;Lazonick, ‘Social organisation’, p. 74.
47 Berg, Age of manufactures, chs. 1 1 , 12;Rowlands, Masters and men.
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34 M A X I N E B E R G and PAT HUDSON

Product innovation fuelled a revolution in consumption patterns and habits.48

But because the national accounts framework measures the replication of
goods and services, it cannot easily incorporate either the appearance of
entirely new goods not present at the start of a time series or improvements
over time in the quality of goods or services. New products further frustrate
efforts at productivity estimation because the initial prices of new goods
were usually very high but declined rapidly as innovation proceeded, making
the calculation of both weights and value-added a major
Finally, the national accounts framework and productivity calculations
cannot measure that qualitative improvement in the means of production
which can yield shorter working hours or less arduous or monotonous work
Clearly, a broader concept of technological change and of
innovation is required than can be accommodated by national income
accounting. If the most sensible way to view the course of economic change
is through the timing and impact of innovation, it is arguable that the use
of national accounting has frustrated progress. Emphasis has been placed on
saving and capital formation at the expense of science, economic organization,
new products and processes, market creativity, skills, dexterity, the knacks
and work practices of manufacture, and other aspects of economic life which
may be innovative but have no place in the accounting categories.’l
The problems involved in measuring economy-wide productivity growth,
and in regarding it as a reflection of the extent of fundamental economic
change, are compounded when one considers the nature both of industrial
capital and of industrial labour in the period. Redeployment of labour
from agrarian-based and domestic sectors to urban and more centralized
manufacturing activity may well have been accompanied by diminishing
labour productivity in the short run. Green labour had to learn industrial
skills as well as new forms of discipline while, within sectors, labour often
shifted into processes which were more rather than less labour-intensive.
The same tendency to low returns in the short term can be seen in capital
investment in the period. Early steam engines and machinery were imperfect
and subject to breakdowns and rapid obsolescence. Gross capital investment
figures (which include funds spent on renewals and replacements), when fed
into productivity measures, are not a good reflection of the importance and
potential of technological change in the period. Rapid technological change
is capital hungry as new equipment soon becomes obsolescent and is replaced.
Shifts in the aggregate measures of productivity growth are thus actually
less likely to show up as significant during periods of rapid and fundamental
economic transition than in periods of slower and more piecemeal adjustment.
This point was stressed by Hicks who noted that the long gestation period
of technological innovation might yield Ricardo’s machinery effect: the
returns from major shifts in technology would not be apparent for several
decades and, in the short term, innovation would only increase unemployment

48 Brewer, McKendrick, and Plumb, Birth of a consumer sociery; Breen, ‘Baubles of Britain’.
49 Usher, Measurement, pp. 8-10.
Ibid., p. 9.
5 1 Ibid., p. 10.
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REHABILITATING T H E INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 35
and put downward pressure on wages.52 There was such a disjuncture
between the wave of innovations surrounding the electric dynamo in the late
nineteenth century and an acceleration in the growth of GNP. And the
current computer revolution which is transforming production, services, and
working lives across a broad front is not accompanied by rapidly rising
income, output, or productivity within national economies. Resolving this
apparent ‘productivity paradox’ involves recognizing the limited nature of
TFP as a measure of economic performance and the long time-frame needed
to connect fundamental technological change with productivity growth.53
Thus, just as it is possible to have growth with little change, it is possible
to have radical change with limited growth. In fact the more revolutionary
the change technologically, socially, and culturally, the longer this may take
to work out in terms of conventional measures of economic performance.

v
Another striking feature of the new orthodoxy is its restricted definition
of the workforce; this in turn has implications for the analysis of productivity
change as well as the standard of living debate. Wrigley assessed key
productivity growth only through the 10 per cent of adult male labour
which, in 1831, worked in industries serving distant markets. Williamson’s
documentation of inequality and Lindert and Williamson’s survey of the
standard of living considered only adult male incomes while Lindert’s
estimates for industrial occupations relied on adult burial records which are
almost exclusively male. But the role of women and children in both
capital and labour intensive market-orientated manufacturing (in both the
‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ sectors) probably reached a peak in the
industrial revolution, making it a unique period in this respect. 54
It is extremely difficult to quantify the extent of female and child labour
as both were largely excluded from official statistics and even from wage
books. But analyses based only on adult male labour forces are clearly
inadequate and peculiarly distorting for this period. On the supply side the
labour of women and children was a vital pillar of household incomes, made
more so by the population growth and hence the age structure of the later
eighteenth century which substantially reduced the proportion of males of

5 2 Hicks, Theory of economic history, p. 153; Berg, Machinery question, ch. 4. If patenting can be taken
as a rough indication of inventiveness, then we have some evidence that growth of TF P in nineteenth-
century England took place some 40 years after the acceleration of inventive patentable activity. See
Sullivan, ‘England’s “age of invention” ’, p. 444; Macleod, Inventing the industrial revolution.
53 David, ‘The computer and the dynamo’.
54 Wrigley, Catinuity, chance and change, pp. 83-7; Williamson, Did British capitalism?, passim;
Lindert and Williamson, ‘English workers’ living standards’; Crafts, British economic growth, pp. 4-5. In
the woollen industry women’s and children’s labour accounted for 75 per cent of the workforce, and
child labour exceeded that of women and of men. Women and children also predominated in the cotton
industry; children under 13 made up 30 per cent of the cotton factory workforce in 1816;those under
18, 51.2 per cent. The silk, lace making, and knitting industries were also predominantly female, and
there were even higher proportions of women and children in metal manufactures such as the Birmingham
trades. See Randall, Before the Luddites, p. 60; Nardinelli, ‘Child labour’; Berg, ‘Women’s work’, pp.
70-3; Pinchbeck, Women workers, passim; Saito, ‘Other faces’, p. 183; idem, ‘Labour supply behaviour’,
pp. 636 and 646. For a recent critical discussion of child labour and unemployment see Cunningham,
‘Employment and unemployment’, passim.
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36 M A X I N E B E R G and PAT HUDSON

working age in the p o p ~ l a t i o n The. ~ ~ impact of the high dependency ratio

was cushioned by children earning their way at an early age, particularly in
domestic m a n u f a c t ~ r i n gOn
. ~ ~ the demand side the need for hand skills,
dexterity, and work discipline encouraged the absorption of more and more
female and juvenile labour into commercial production. This was further
encouraged by sex differentials in wages which may have been increasing
under the impact of demographic pressure in these years.57Employers were
much attracted by low wages and long hours at a time when no attention
was yet paid to the incentive effects of payment by results or shorter hours.58
Thus factors both on the supply and on the demand side of the labour
market resulted in a labour force structure with high proportions of child
and female workers. They were the key elements in the labour intensity,
economic differentiation, and low production costs found in late eighteenth-
century industries. And this in turn influenced and was influenced by
innovation. New work disciplines, new forms of subcontracting and putting-
out networks, new factory organization, and even new technologies were
tried out initially on women and children. 59
The peculiar importance of youth labour in the industrial revolution is
highlighted in several instances of textile and other machinery being designed
and built to suit the childworker. The spinning jenny was a celebrated case;
the original country jenny had a horizontal wheel requiring a posture most
comfortable for children aged nine to twelve. Indeed, for a time, in the very
early phases of mechanization and factory organization in the woollen and
silk industries as well as in cotton, it was generally believed that child labour
was integral to textile machine design.60 This association between child
labour and machinery was confined to a fairly brief period of technological
change. In the north-eastern United States it appears to have lasted from
c. 1812 until the 1 8 3 0 s , during which time the proportion of women and
children in the entire manufacturing labour force rose from 10 to 40 per
cent. This was associated with new large-scale technologies and divisions of
labour specifically designed to dispense with more expensive and restrictive
skilled adult male labour.61 Similarly, the employment of an increasing
proportion of female labour in English industries was also encouraged by
the ready reserves of cheap and skilled female labour which had long been
a feature of domestic and workshop production. In addition, in England,
many agricultural regions shed female workers first during the process of

5 5 Children aged 5-14 probably accounted for between 23 and 25 per cent of the total population in
the early nineteenth century, compared with 6 per cent in 1951. Wrigley and Schofield, Population
history, tab. A3.1, pp. 528-9.
56 Berg, Age of manufactures, ch. 6; Medick, ‘Proto-industrialfamily economy’; Levine, ‘Industrialisation
and the proletarian family’, p. 177.
57 Saito, ‘Other faces’, p. 183; idem, ‘Labour supply behaviour’, p. 634.
58 Hobsbawm, ‘Custom, wages and workload’, pp. 353, 355.
59 Berg, ‘Women’s work’, pp. 76-88; Pinchbeck, Women workers. For modern Third World parallels
see Elson and Pearson, ‘Nimble fingers and foreign investments’, pp. 2-3; Pearson, ‘Female workers’.
6o Report . . . on the state of children (P.P. 1816, 111), pp. 279, 343; Report from the Committee on the
bill to regulate the labour of children in the mills and factories (P.P. 1831-2, XV), p. 254. The issue is
explored in greater depth in Berg, ‘Women’s work‘.
61 Goldin and Sokoloff, ‘Women, children and industrialisation’, p. 747; Goldin, ‘Economic status of

women’.
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REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 37
agricultural change, and much migration within rural areas and from rural
to urban areas consisted of young women in search of work.62
By mid century female and child labour was declining in importance
through a mixture of legislation, the activities of male trade unionists, and
the increasingly pervasive ideology of the male breadwinner and of fit and
proper female a c t i v i t i e ~ .A~ ~patriarchal stance was by this time also
compatible with the economic aims of a broad spectrum of employers.
According to Hobsbawm, larger scale employers (as well as male labour)
were learning the ‘rules of the game’ in which higher payments (by results),
shorter working hours, and a negotiated terrain of common interests could
be substituted for extensive low-wage exploitation with beneficial effects on
productivity.64
The use of low-cost child and female labour was not, of course, new: it
had always been vital in the primary sector and had been integral to the
spread of manufacture in the early modern period. What was new in the
period of the classic industrial revolution was the extent of its incorporation
into rapidly expanding factory and workshop manufacturing and its
association with low wages, increased intensification of work, and labour
d i s ~ i p l i n eThe
. ~ ~ female and juvenile workforce undoubtedly had an impact
on the output figures per unit of input costs in many industries, but this
would not necessarily be reflected in aggregate productivity because some
female labour was a substitute for male: it increased at times and in sectors
where male wages were low or male unemployment high.66The social costs
of underutilized male labour (felt in high transfer payments through poor
relief) as well as the difficulties of allowing for male unemployment in
sectoral weightings are likely to offset gains in the measurable economic
indicators of the period. The potential economic performance of the economy
as a whole was further limited by the lack of incentive to substitute capital
for labour when the labour of women and children was so abundant, cheap,
and disciplined through family work groups and in the absence of traditions
of ~olidarity.~’
The full effects of this expanded role of female and juvenile labour can

Pollard, ‘Labour’, p. 133; Bythell, Sweated trades; Berg, ‘Women’s work’; Allen, Enclosure, ch. 12;
Snell, Annuls, chs. I and 4; Souden, ‘East, west-home’s best?’, p. 307; cf. Williamson, Coping with
cizy growth.
63 Lown, Women and industrialisation, ch. 6; Seccombe, ‘Emergence of male breadwinner’; Rose,
‘Gender antagonism’; Davidoff and Hall, Family fortunes; Harrison, ‘Class and gender’, pp. 122-38, 145;
Roberts, Women’s work.
64 Hobsbawm, ‘Custom, wages and workload‘, p. 361.
6s Levine, ‘Industrialisation and the proletarian family’, pp. I 75-9; Levine, Reproducing families,
pp. 112-5.The low wage character of the export-orientated economies of the industrializing regions is
highlighted by Lee, The British economy, pp. 131, 136-41.See also Hunt, ‘Industrialisation’, pp. 937-45.
Mokyr, echoing Marx, suggests that low wages may have been a key factor behind the growth of modern
industry: ‘Has the industrial revolution been crowded out?’, p. 318. See also Bienefeld, Working hours,
p. 41. For parallels with the Third World see Pearson, ‘Female workers’.
Saito, ‘Labour supply behaviour’, pp. 645-6; Goldin and Sokoloff, ‘Relativeproductivity hypothesis’.
For a standard theoretical and empirical treatment of this see Mincer, ‘Labour force participation’, and
Greenhalgh, ‘A labour supply function’. The male occupational statistics upon which productivity
estimates rely, necessarily take no account of unemployment.
67 Lewis, ‘Economic development’, p. 404; Allen, Enclosure, ch. 12; Boyer, ‘Old poor law’; Lyons,
‘The Lancashire cotton industry’; Berg, ‘Women’s work’.
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38 M A X I N E BERG and PAT HUDSON

only be completely understood at a disaggregated level by analysing its

impact upon sectors and in regions where it was crucially important. A
regional perspective is also uniquely valuable in assessing the extent and
nature of economic and social change in the period.

VI
The industrial revolution was a period of great disparity in regional rates
of change and economic fortunes. Expanding industrializing regions were
matched by regions of declining industry, and chronic underutilization of
labour and capital. The story of commercializing agriculture was similarly
patchy. Slow-moving aggregate indicators fail to capture these developments,
yet the interactions and self-reinforcing drive created by the development of
industry in marked regional concentrations gave rise to major innovations.
For example, an increase in the output of the British wool textile sector by
150 per cent during the entire eighteenth century seems very modest but
this conceals the dramatic relocation taking place in favour of Yorkshire,
whose share in national production rose from around 20 per cent to around
60 per cent in the course of the century. If the increase had been uniform
in all regions, it could have been achieved simply by the gradual extension
of traditional commercial methods and production functions. But Y orkshire’s
intensive growth necessarily embodied a revolution in organizational patterns,
commercial links, credit relationships, the sorts of cloths produced, and
production techniques. The external economies achieved when one region
took over more than half of the production of an entire sector were also of
key importance.68
All the expanding industrial regions of the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries were, like the West Riding, dominated by particular
sectors in a way never experienced before nor to be experienced again after
the growth of intra-sectoral spatial hierarchies during the twentieth century.
Furthermore, sectoral specialization and regional integrity together help to
explain the emergence of regionally distinctive social and class relations
which set a pattern in English political life for over a century. These
considerations prompt the view that regional studies may be of more value
in understanding the process of industrialization than studies of the national
economy as a whole.69
The main justification which Crafts uses for employing an aggregative
approach to identify the nature, causes, and corollaries of industrialization
in Britain is that the national economy represented, for many products, a
well integrated national goods market by the early nineteenth century.
Although the spread of fashionable consumer goods was increasing and
national markets for much bulk agricultural produce were established before
the mid eighteenth century, it cannot be shown before the second quarter
of the nineteenth century that the economy had a ‘fairly well integrated set

The argument here and throughout this section is much influenced by Pollard, Peaceful conquest,
ch. I.
49 Fuller discussion of this can be found in Hudson, Regions, ch. I . For another example of this
approach see Levine and Wrightson, The making, on the earlier transformation of Tyneside.
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REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 39
of factor markets’.70 The really important spatial unit for production factors,
especially capital and labour, and for information flow, commercial contacts,
and credit networks in the pre-railway period was the economic region,
which was often clearly identifiable.71 Construction of the improved river
and canal systems on which economic growth depended did much to endorse
the existence of regional economies, for a time increasing their insularity (in
relation to the national economy).72 Nor were the railways quick to destroy
regionally orientated transport systems. Most companies found it in their
best interests to structure freight rates so as to encourage the trade of the
regions they served, to favour short hauls, and thus to cement regional
resource groupings. 7 3
Industrialization accentuated the differences between regions by making
them more functionally distinct and specialized. Economic and commercial
circumstances were thus increasingly experienced regionally and social protest
movements with their regional fragmentation can only be understood at that
level and in relation to regional employment and social structures. Issues of
national political reform also came to be identified with particular regions,
for example factory reform with Yorkshire, the anti-poor law campaign with
Lancashire and Manchester, or currency reform with Birmingham. Regional
identity was encouraged by the links created around the great provincial
cities, by the intra-regional nature of the bulk of migration, by the formation
of regionally based clubs and societies, trade unions, employers’ associations,
and newspaper^.^^
In short, dynamic industrial regions generated a social and economic
interaction which would have been absent if their component industries had
not been spatially concentrated and specialized. Intensive local competition
combined with regional intelligence and information networks helped to
stimulate region-wide advances in industrial technology and commercial
organization. And the growth of specialized financial and mercantile services
within the dominant regions served to increase the external economies and
reduced both intra-regional and extra-regional transactions costs signifi-
cantly. 75 Macroeconomic indicators fail to pick up this regional specialization
and dynamism which was unique to the period and revolutionary in its
impact.

70 Crafts, British economic growth, p. 3 .

” Hunt, ‘Industrialisation and regional inequality’; idem, ‘Wages’, pp. 60-8; Allen, Enclosure, ch. 12;
Williamson, ‘English factor markets’; Clark and Souden, eds., Migration and society, chs. 7 , 10. On
capital and credit markets see Hudson, Genesis. See also Pollard, Peaceful conquest, p. 37; Presnell,
County banking, pp. 284-343; Anderson, ‘Attorney and the early capital market’; Hoppit, Risk and
failure, ch. I S .
7 2 Freeman, ‘Transport’, p. 86; Langton, ‘Industrial revolution and regional geography’, p. 162;
Turnbull, ‘Canals’, pp. 537-60.
7 3 Freeman, ‘Transport’, p. 92; see also Hawke, Railways.
Langton provides a stimulating survey of the regional fragmentation of trade unions, of Chartism
and other movements, and of regional differences in work practices and work customs, in ‘Industrial
revolution’, pp. 150-5. See also Read, English provinces; and Southall, ‘Towards a geography’ which
concentrates on the artisan trades.
7 5 See Pollard, Peaceful conquest, pp. 19, 28-9.
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40 M A X I N E BERG and PAT HUDSON

VII
The work of Wrigley and Schofield rightly dominates the population
history of this period but their original causal analysis illustrates some of
the difficulties of aggregative studies of economic and social transformation.
They argue that, despite considerable growth in numbers and the disappear-
ance of major crises of mortality, there was no significant discontinuity in
demographic behaviour in England between the sixteenth and the mid
nineteenth centuries. 76 There was no sexual, social, medical, or nutritional
revolution. The population regime was and remained marriage driven:
nuptiality and hence fertility throughout the three centuries varied as a
delayed response to changes in living standards as indicated by real wage
trends.77 But the danger in using national demographic variables to analyse
patterns of individual motivation is that national estimates may conflate
opposing tendencies in different regions, sectors of industry, and social
groups. Accurate identification of the mainsprings of aggregate demographic
trends will only come with regional, sectoral, and class breakdowns because
different sorts of workers or social groups within different regional cultures
probably experienced different stimuli or reacted differently to the same
economic trends, thus creating a range of demographic regimes. 7 8
The fact that demographic variables such as illegitimacy rates and age of
marriage exhibit enduring spatial patterns in the face of changing economic
fortunes is s~ggestive.’~ Parish reconstitution studies indicate that local
behaviour did not parallel the movement of the aggregate series. Such
diversity casts doubt upon the use of the national vital rates for causal
analysis of demographic behaviour. The most important causal variables in
local reconstitution studies appear to range well outside the movement of
real wages. The local economic and social setting, broadly defined, was
crucial. It included such things as proletarianization, price movements,
economic insecurity, and the nature of parish administration, particularly of
the poor laws8’ Despite this, a national cultural norm continues to be
stressed, with the assumption that regions and localities tended towards it.
The result, as with the macroeconomic work of Crafts and others, is an
excessive preoccupation with national comparisons (‘the French versus the
English pattern’) and with the idea that lower classes and backward regions
lag behind their superiors, but eventually follow them on the national road
to modernity and progress.81

76 Wrigley and Schofield, Population history, chs. 10, 1 1 . For summaries of their causal analysis see
Smith, ‘Fertility, economy and household formation’; Wrigley, ‘Growth of population’.
” There has been considerable debate over this view and the statistical method underlying the analysis.
See Gaunt, Levine, and Moodie, ‘Population history’; Anderson, ‘Historical demography’; Mokyr, ‘Three
centuries of population change’; Olney, ‘Fertility’; Lindert, ‘English living standards’; Lee, ‘Inverse
projection’; idem, ‘Population homeostatis’.
See Levine, in Gaunt, Levine, and Moodie, ‘Population history’, p. 155.
79 See for example, Levine and Wrightson, ‘Social context of illegitimacy’, pp. 160-1; Wilson,
‘Proximate determinants’.
Wrightson and Levine, Poverty and piety. For the importance of the local economic setting see
Levine, Family formation; Levine and Wrightson, The making, ch. 3; Sharpe, ‘Literally spinsters’. For
family reconstitution results see Wrigley and Schofield, ‘English population history’.
Seccombe, ‘Marxism and demography’, p. 35.
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REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 41
Recently, the effects of proto-industrialization, proletarianization, and the
changing composition of the workforce have received attention in relation
to demographic change.82This opens the door for a more radical interpretation
of the structural causes of fertility change. The need to look more closely
at those structural and institutional changes which resulted in the marked
decline in age of marriage in the second half of the eighteenth century has
been emphasized, as has the importance of a growing group of ‘young
marriers’ in the population whose actions appear unaffected by the general
pressures on real wages. 83 Evidence of radical discontinuity is reappearing
at all levels of analysis.84
The influence of the Wrigley/Schofield approach may also have unjustifiably
diverted attention away from mortality and its significant discontinuities.
The Cambridge Group aggregate data suggest that rising fertility was two-
and-a-half times more important than falling mortality in producing the
acceleration in population growth in the eighteenth century.85 But the
marked increase in the proportion of the population living in towns together
with the substantial urban mortality penalty makes diachronic studies of the
national aggregate population particularly likely to underestimate the
importance of mortality changes in relation to fertility. A central role for
improvements in urban life expectancy in fuelling population growth during
the industrial revolution is perfectly compatible with significant contemporary
shifts in fertility and even with such shifts being apparently more significant
at the national
The significance of radical structural shifts in the composition and location
of the population, as well as of improvement in mortality rates, tends to be
overlooked if causal explanations based on aggregate data are used. This has
resulted in the current literature being dominated by discussion of fertility
rather than of mortality and of continuity rather than of discontinuity.

VIII
The evolution of social class and of class consciousness has long been
integral to popular understanding of what was new in the industrial
revolution. Growing occupational concentration, proletarianization, loss of
independence, exploitation, deskilling, and urbanization have been central
to most analyses of the formation of working-class culture and consciousness,
while the ascendancy of Whig laissez-faire political economy has been
associated with the new importance of industrialists as a class.87But recent

82 See Levine, Reproducing families, chs. 2 , 3; idem, ‘Proletarian family’, pp. 181-8.
83 Schofield, ‘English marriage patterns’. This study finds that, in the eighteenth century, age of
marriage became more important than variation in celibacy in accounting for changes in fertility, and
that age of marriage was relatively unresponsive to real wage indices after 1700. On young marriers see
Goldstone, ‘Demographic revolution’.
84 For a recent example see Jackson, ‘Population change in Somerset-Wiltshire’.
8 5 Wrigley, ‘Growth of population in the eighteenth century’, pp. 126-33.
86 Woods, ‘Population redistribution’. This point is made in Kearns, ‘Urban penalty’; cf. Thompson,
The making, pp. 356-66; Perkin, Origins.
87 See, for example, Foster, Class struggle; Prothero, Artisans and politics; Morris, Class and class
consciousness; Seed, ‘Unitarianism’.
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42 M A X I N E B E R G a n d PAT HUDSON

economic history has rightly emphasized the complexity of combined and

uneven development. Putting-out, workshops, and sweating existed alongside
and were complementary to a diverse factory sector. It is no longer possible
to speak of a unilinear process of deskilling and loss of workplace control.
The diversity of organizational forms of industry, of work experience
according to gender and ethnicity, of composite and irregular incomes, and
of shifts of employment over the life cycle and through the seasons meant
that workers’ perceptions of work and of an employing class were varied
and contradictory.” Nor can one speak of a homogeneous group of industrial
employers. There were marked differences between the attitude and outlook
of small workshop masters and factory employers. And within these groups
there were variations of response to competitive conditions ranging from
outright exploitation to paternalism, with many mixtures of the two. There
was also a wide range of intermediaries from agents down to foremen and
leaders of family work groups to deflect opposition and tension in the
w~rkplace.’~ And we now have a much more sophisticated understanding
of the complex interplay of customary and market relationships. Any simple
notion of the latter replacing the former is to be discarded.” In addition,
recent writing, including post-structuralist approaches, has questioned any
suggestion of deterministic relationships between socio-economic position
and political consciousness.91
Despite the significance of this work, these interpretations should not be
allowed to edge out all idea that the industrial revolution period witnessed
radical shifts in social relations and in social consciousness. Much recent
social history has been based on an unquestioning acceptance of the new
gradualist view of the economic history of the period which, we have argued,
severely underplays the extent of radical economic change and of parallel
developments affecting the mass of the population. Balanced analyses of the
combined and uneven nature of development within industrial capitalism
should not obscure the fact that the industrial world of 1850 was vastly
different for most workers from that of 1750. There were more large
workplaces, more powered machines, and along with these there was more
direct managerial involvement in the organization and planning of work. A
clearer notion of the separation of work and non-work time was evolving
partly out of the decline of family work units and of production in the home.
Proletarianization had accelerated and the life chances of a much larger
proportion of the population were determined by the market and affected
by urban mortality and disease. Capitalist wage labour and the working class

xx Joyce, ‘Work’; idem, ‘Introduction’ in idem, Historical meanings; Samuel, ’Workshop’; Sabel and
Zeitlin, ‘Historical alternatives’; Reid, ‘Politics and economics’; Hobsbawm, ‘Marx and history’.
89 Davidoff and Hall, Family fortunes; Behagg, Production and politics; Rodger, ‘Mid Victorian
employers’; Joyce, ‘Work’; Huberman, ‘Economic origins of paternalism’; Rose, Taylor, and Winstanley,
‘Economic origins . . . objections’; Huberman, ‘Reply’.
90 Williams, ‘Custom’; Bushaway, By rite; Randall, ‘Industrial moral economy’; Berg, ed., Markets
and manufacture.
y 1 Stedman Jones, ‘Rethinking Chartism’; Sewell, Work and revoZution; Sonenscher, Work in France;

Foster, ‘Declassing of language’; Gray, ‘Deconstruction of the English working class’; idem, ‘Language
of factory reform’; Reddy, Money and liberty; Scott, Gender and history, chs. 1-3; Patterson, ‘Post-
structuralism’.
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REHABILITATING T H E INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 43
developed irregularly and incompletely but with greater speed than in earlier
centuries. And the regional concentration of similarities of work experience
and of the trade cycle advanced class formation sufficiently to produce social
protest and conflict on an unprecedented scale, involving an array of anti-
capitalist critiques.92
While the factory never dominated production or employment nationally,
it did so sufficiently in certain regions to create widespread identities of
interest and political cohesion. And where it did not exist it exercised
enormous influence not only in spawning dispersed production, sub-
contracting, and sweating, but also as a major feature of the imagery of the
age. The factory and the machine as hallmarks of the period may have been
myth but they were symbolic of many other changes attendant on the
emergence of a more competitive market environment and the greater
disciplining and alienation of labour. This symbol provided a focus of protest
and opposition and was a powerful element in the formation of social
consciousness.93
Finally, we must consider the prominence recently given to the economic
power and political influence of the landed aristocracy, rentiers, and
merchants in the nineteenth century.94 This prominence is, in part, a
response to the new gradualist interpretations of industrial change and
industrial accumulation. The major division in the social and political life
of nineteenth-century England is argued to have been that between the
dominant gentlemanly capitalism of the aristocratic and rentier classes and
a subordinate industrial capitalism. But how valid is this? Is it yet another
aspect of the current historiography which (while alerting us to the complexity
of industrialization) diverts attention unduly from the impact of changes in
industry and industrial power in the period?
The gentlemanly capitalism thesis has been shown to have overestimated
the dominance of rentier and mercantile capital in elite wealthholding
patterns, and to have overemphasized the separation of interests and cultures
between these groups and industrialists. The thesis also exaggerates the
internal homogeneity and cohesion of gentleman-capitalists on the one hand
and industrial capitalists on the other.95Before 1830, or even perhaps before
1850, the economic role of industry and industrialists should not be
minimized. The dynamism of industrializing regions, the pattern and finance
of their overseas trading, their power in political lobbying, and changes in
their local government suggest otherwise. The metropolitan economy may
well have become the major locus of service sector growth and of wealth
accumulation by the third quarter of the nineteenth century, but in the

92 Randall, ‘Industrial moral economy’; idem, ‘Philosophy of Luddism’; Behagg, ‘Democracy of work’;

Gray, ‘Languages of factory reform’; Hilton, Age of atonement. For similar views among small
manufacturers see Davidoff and Hall, Family fortunes; Behagg, Politics and production; Kirk, ‘Defence
of class’; Foster, ‘Declassing of language’.
93 Berg, Machinery question; idem, ‘Progress and providence’; Behagg, Politics and produczion; Randall,
‘Industrial moral economy’; idem, ‘New languages’.
94 This interpretation is seen in varying forms in the following works: Cain and Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly

capitalism’; Anderson, ‘Figures of descent’; Wiener, English culture; Ingham, Capitalism divided.
95 Daunton, ‘Gentlemanly capitalism’; Gunn, ‘Failure of middle class’; Barratt Brown, ‘Away with

great arches’.
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44 M A X I N E B E R G and PAT HUDSON

industrial revolution period itself it is more likely that regional industrial

revolutions dictated the course of structural change and colonial expansion.96
In short, although industrial transformation gave rise to a complicated
mass of differing experiences and social relations, many innovations in the
organization and use of labour if not in technology were common to all
industries and sectors. Furthermore, changes in markets and in the
competitive climate had an impact on all English capitalists whether they
were metropolitan or provincial and whether financiers, farmers, small
masters, factory employers, or involved in the service sector.

IX
The industrial revolution was an economic and social process which added
up to much more than the sum of its measurable parts. The period saw the
sectoral specialization of regions and the growth of regionally integrated
economies some of which were clearly experiencing an industrial and social
revolution, no matter how this term is defined, while others deindustrialized.
The movement of aggregate quantitative indicators ignores this and, as
presently calculated, fails to give an accurate account of the structural shift
in the nature and deployment of the workforce because the calculations rely
on adult male labour. The nature of innovation and of industrial and social
transformation is also currently misrepresented and underestimated. Landes
has warned of masking the significance of discontinuities by concentrating
on the absence of shifts in quantitative indicators: to him these were the
historians’ ‘butterfly under glass or frog in formaldehyde-without the virtue
of wholeness to compensate for their lifelessness’:
numbers merely describe the surface o f . . . society and even then in terms that
define away change by using categories of unchanging nomenclature. Beneath
this surface, the vital organs were transformed and . . . it was they that determined
the metabolism of the entire ~ y s t e m . ~ ’
It is time to move on from the macro accounting framework and to rebuild
the national picture of economic and social change from new research at
regional and local level. We need to adopt a broader concept of innovation,
to insist on a greater awareness of female and child labour, and to recognize
that the economic, social, and cultural foundations of an industrial capitalist
order rest on much more than conventional measures of industrial or
economic performance. If this is done it should not be long before the notion
of an industrial revolution, occurring in England in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, is fully rehabilitated.

University of Warwick
University of Liverpool

96 Porter, ‘Capitalism and empire’; Allen, Enclosure, ch. 12; Hudson, Regions, ch. I; Saville, ‘Notes
on Perry Anderson’; Barratt Brown, ‘Away with great arches’.
97 Landes, Unbound Prometheus, p. IZZ.
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REHABILITATING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 45
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