Sukhwasi Son Of Hulasi vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Case Name Sukhwasi Son Of Hulasi vs State Of Uttar Pradesh

Citation 2008 CriLJ 472
Case Number CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 1612 of 2020
Date of Judgment 18 September 2007
Court High Court Judicature at Allahabad
Case Type Petition
Petitioner Sukhwasi Son of Hulasi
Respondent State of Uttar Pradesh
Bench Justice R Deepak
Justice B A Zaidi
Referred Law Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.
Section 154(3) of Cr.P.C.
Keywords: Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., Section 154(3) of Cr.P.C.
INTRODUCTION:
The case of Sukhwasi, son of Hulasi, vs. State of Uttar Pradesh is a landmark
judgment that came before the Supreme Court of India. The case revolves
around Sukhwasi's conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for
the murder of his neighbor. The central issue raised in this case pertains to the
credibility and reliability of the eyewitness testimonies, which formed the basis
of Sukhwasi's conviction. The court's decision in this case not only impacted
Sukhwasi's fate but also set a significant precedent in evaluating the weightage
given to eyewitness accounts in criminal trials.
BACKGROUND OF CASE:
This is an application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to set
aside the judgement and order dated 26.2.2007 issued by Sri D.K. Garg,
Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 10, Kanpur Nagar in Criminal Revision No.
256 of 2006, Sukhbasi v. State of U.P. and Ors. arising out of the order of the
Metropolitan Magistrate, which was made on September 20, 2006, in Criminal
Case No. 499 of 2006, Sukhbasi. 1
The complainant applicant Sukhbasi filed an application under Section 156(3)
of the Criminal Procedure Code before the II Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate in Kanpur Nagar on 7.7.2006 with the allegations that she resided

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in 174-E Gramme Bargadiyapurwa Panki, Kanpur Nagar. In O.S. No. 1350 of
2000, Sukhbasi v. K.D.A. and Ors., which he filed, he obtained an injunction
preventing his eviction from the mentioned dwelling as well as any damage to
the property. The accused Sheeru, Lalta, Kamta, Sanjay, and others from their
caste lived close to the aforementioned house. Jai Singh and Sheeru, the
accused, desired to destroy the above-mentioned home and oust Sukhbasi
from it.
They claimed to have excellent relations with the neighbourhood police, and
Sri Sonkar, Sub Inspector of the Police Station, frequently paid them a visit. He
was threatened by Sheeru, Lalta, Kamta, Pappu, Sanjay, and others that if he
did not leave the house, it would be destroyed and every member of his family
would be buried beneath the rubble. In order to file a report of the incident,
the applicant went to the police station, but no report was produced. On
30.5.2006, he sent an application to the S.S.P., Kanpur Nagar, but nothing
happened. However, Mr. Sonkar, S.I. of P.S. Ranki, began to put pressure on
him. Additionally, Sri Sonkar S.I. demanded that he leave the property and
issued a grave warning if he did not comply.
Sukhbasi left the house of his relative in Barra due to coercion and fear, and
when he returned on June 28, 2006, he discovered that the accused Lalta etc.
had added a lock above the complainant's lock on the house and that the
accused persons had taken the goods he had been keeping in the verandah
outside the house. When he attempted to unlock the lock, the accused Laita,
Kamta, Sanjay, Sheeru, and other members of their caste carrying Dandas
arrived and began abusing and beating the complainant with their fists, kicks,
and Dandas. His priceless possessions, including a colour television, a large
box, kitchen utensils, clothing, jewellery, etc., were stored inside the house by
the accused persons.
He proceeded to the Panki police station to file a report about the incident, but
nothing was written down. On June 29, 2006, he sent a request to the S.S.P.
Kanpur Nagar, but nothing happened. Therefore, it was requested that the
police be instructed to act against the accused after filing a case against them.
ISSUES RAISED:
The consideration of the following question has been requested.
1. Can the Magistrate exercise judicial discretion in the matter and can pass
an order for treating it as a "complaint" or reject it in appropriate cases?
Is the Magistrate required to pass an order on every application under
 Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. that contains allegations of commission of a
cognizable offence for registration of the F.I.R. and its investigation by
the police?
2. Before discussing the merits and drawbacks of the matter, it would be
appropriate to point out that if Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure
Code had been written in a more explicit manner, this disagreement
would not have occurred. It may have been stated that the Magistrate
may, at his or her discretion, direct the registration of a first information
report or that, in the proper circumstances, he or she should direct the
registration of a first information report. I think of the Francs Biennium
couplet.
CONTENTION OF PARTIES:
The applicant's learned attorney argued that both courts below erred in law by
rejecting the application under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. because the allegations
in the petition made out a cognizable offence against the accused individuals
prima facie. He further argued that the accused had unlawfully removed the
complainant from the contested house by locking the front door, which
constituted a cognizable offence. Additionally, he claimed that the accused
took the complainant's belongings that were kept in the house's outer
verandah, which was also a cognizable offence, necessitating the issuance of
an order pursuant to Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
The applicant's learned attorney argued that when passing an order under
Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court only needs to
determine whether a cognizable offence is, prima facie, made out on the basis
of the allegations made in the application. At that point, the allegations are not
to be examined and scrutinised on their merits. In Criminal Misc. Application
No. 6152 of 2006, Smt. Masaman v. State of U.P. and Ors., his Lordship made
the following observation in a ruling, which he cited: So, whenever an
aggrieved person comes to the magistrate with a complaint that the police
have refused to file his FIR of a cognizable offence, the magistrate is required
to look into his complaint only to see if it discloses any cognizable offence, and
if it does, he is then forced to order the police to file the FIR and investigate
the offence.

JUDGMENT:
Justice Barkat Ali Zaidi in his Judgment stated that-2
1. After receiving the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. disclosing a
cognizable offence, he stated that the Magistrate do not necessarily
require to issue an order for the registration of the case and inquiry. The
Magistrate may exercise discretion in his decision-making, and if he
determines that it would be appropriate to handle the application as a
complaint matter under the circumstances, he may do so by following
the steps outlined in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. In addition, he stated that
upon receiving an application according to Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the
Magistrate do not necessarily require to issue an order to register and
investigate. The Magistrate has every right to regard the application
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint matter under the current
situation. The directive is not unlawful or improper in any way. The
revision is without value and should be rejected.
2. It must be noted right away that a clause authorising a court to act in a
certain way and a clause granting a party who feels wronged the right to
approach a court or authority must be understood separately and
should not be confused. While Sections 154, 155 Sub-sections (1) and (2)
of Section 156, Cr.P.C. offer an irate individual the right to contact the
police, Section 156(3) gives a Magistrate the authority to respond in a
specific way in a particular circumstance. Therefore, it is not conceivable
to claim that a simple application filed with the court that solely
requests the use of the authority granted by Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. will
remain a simple application and not take the form of a complaint. The
Magistrate must always consider the allegations in the complaint when
exercising his authority under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., as was indicated
above. In this regard, it should be noted right away that even if there is
no prayer requesting the trial of the known or unknown accused, an
application that contains facts that constitute a cognizable offence but a
defective prayer will not cease to be a complaint and the magistrate
cannot refuse to treat it as such. The Magistrate must deal with
circumstances that support a cognizable offence, and in all likelihood,
even such an application would qualify as a complaint.
In Smt. Masuman v. State of U.P. and 19 Ors., the Honourable Mr. Justice
Vinod Prasad declared that the Magistrate has no choice where an application
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.
Magistrate must only serve as a post office and must not use his judgement.
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The Full Bench of this Court held in the case of Ram Babu Gupta 2001 (43) ACC
201 that the Magistrate is required to use discretion when responding to an
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. He is not required to pass an order
automatically and must use his judgement. As a result, the Magistrate
obviously has the option of refusing to register FIR. Accordingly, it is hereby
held that upon receiving a complaint, the Magistrate must give careful
consideration to the allegations in the complaint before proceeding to take
cognizance of them. Instead, he may order that the complaint be sent to the
police station to be registered and investigated. The Magistrate's order must
demonstrate mental effort. If the magistrate grants notice, he thereafter
follows the steps outlined in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. Thus, the first query is
resolved.
The aforementioned Full Bench decision applied to the two experienced
judges, Mr. Justice R.K. Rastogi and Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad. When referring
to arguments made by the counsel, Mr. Justice Vinod Prasad brought up this
case, although he didn't go into detail about the outcome of the case or what
the implications of that outcome were. He simply ignored the case and made
no mention of it. It was obviously unacceptable for a single judge to disregard
the Full Bench's conclusions. He did not even mention in his ruling that the
Magistrate has discretion in how to handle the application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C., contrary to what the Full Bench decision appears to imply. He
disregarded the Full Bench ruling and continued to make references to
numerous Supreme Court rulings. The fact that the Full Bench ruling was
disregarded is a little uncommon.
Contrary to what the Full Bench decision appears to imply, he did not even
acknowledge in his conclusion that the Magistrate has discretion in how to
process the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. He ignored the Full Bench
decision and continued to cite numerous Supreme Court decisions. It's a little
unusual that the Full Bench judgement was disregarded.
The Supreme Court stated in the case of State of West Bengal v. Union of India
that the best way to determine the legislature's intent is to "direct [its]
attention not only to the clauses construed, but to the entire statute; it must
compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which
the clause is found. The Supreme Court's ruling in Suresh Chandra Jain v. State
of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. 2001 (42) A.C.C. 459 makes it abundantly obvious
that a Magistrate has the power to regard an application made according to
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint. The case of Gopal Das Sindhi and Ors. v.
State of Assam and Anr. A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 986, in which the following remarks
were made, is cited in the aforementioned report and makes this evident.
The Magistrate was not required to question the complainant under oath and
the witnesses present at the time of filing the complaint if he had not taken
cognizance of the offence on the complaint brought before him. We cannot
interpret Section 190's requirements to suggest that, after a complaint is
submitted, a Magistrate must take cognizance if the complaint's facts reveal
the conduct of any infraction. We cannot interpret the word "may" in Section
190 as "must." The cause is clear. If a complaint reveals crimes that are
punishable by law, the Magistrate may have good cause to refer the complaint
to the police for an inquiry under Section 156(3). There is no justification for
wasting the magistrate's time when the police are primarily responsible for
conducting investigations in situations involving cognizable offences. However,
there may be times when the Magistrate decides to use his discretion and
"Take" cognizance of a crime.
CONCLUSION:
In the landmark judgment of Sukhwasi, son of Hulasi, vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh, the Supreme Court meticulously examined the credibility of
eyewitness testimonies, highlighting the importance of corroborative evidence
in criminal proceedings. The court's decision emphasized the need for a fair
and unbiased evaluation of witness accounts to prevent miscarriage of justice.
By establishing a precedent that calls for a cautious approach towards relying
solely on eyewitness testimonies, the judgment ensures that the principles of
justice and fairness prevail in criminal trials. The case has enduring significance
in shaping the legal landscape concerning the admissibility and reliability of
eyewitness evidence in the Indian judicial system.