FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2022-2194
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BOOKERTEE HARTFIELD,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County.
C. Kevin Wells, Judge.
February 28, 2024
WINOKUR, J.
Bookertee Hartfield pleaded no contest to selling
methamphetamine and using a two-way communications device to
sell methamphetamine. He was sentenced to five years in prison
for each count, to run concurrently. On appeal, Hartfield argues
that the trial court erred in denying his Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct a sentencing error and that
certain costs imposed, as part of his sentence, should be stricken.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
Hartfield first challenges the imposition of a $100 fee under
section 938.27(8), Florida Statutes. He argues the State must have
requested the cost for it to be imposed. We disagree.
In Parks v. State, 371 So. 3d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), we held
that a cost imposed under section 938.27(8) is mandatory and is
not “an ‘investigative’ cost incurred by an agency as described in
section 938.27(1), which can only be imposed ‘if requested’ by the
agency.” Parks, 371 So. 3d at 392–93. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s imposition of the $100 cost under section 938.27(8).
II.
Next, Hartfield challenges the imposition of a $100 cost under
section 938.05(1)(b), Florida Statutes, because he was not
convicted of a misdemeanor. The State concedes, and we agree,
that the misdemeanor cost was improperly imposed. Accordingly,
we reverse the imposition of the $100 cost under section
938.05(1)(b). *
III.
Third, Hartfield challenges the imposition of a $300 public
defender fee under section 938.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes, arguing
the cost was excessive without the requisite findings by the trial
court. Here, too, the State concedes error. We agree.
Section 938.29(1)(a) provides that
* At the time of Hartfield’s offenses, a person was required to
pay as a cost $225 for felonies and $60 for misdemeanors.
§ 938.05(1), Fla. Stat. (2020). Hartfield was required to pay $100
for a misdemeanor—which was improper, in addition to higher
than the statutorily mandated $60—but only $200 for the felonies,
which he did commit. It is unclear why the trial court only imposed
$200 when he was convicted of a felony.
2
[a] defendant who is convicted of a criminal act . . . and
who has received the assistance of the public defender’s
office . . . or a private conflict attorney . . . shall be liable
for payment of the assessed application fee under
[section] 27.52 and attorney’s fees and costs. Attorney’s
fees and costs shall be set in all cases at no less than $50
per case when a misdemeanor . . . and no less than $100
per case when a felony offense is charged . . . The court
may set a higher amount upon a showing of sufficient
proof of higher fees or costs incurred.
§ 938.29(1)(a), Fla. Stat. During the proceedings below, Hartfield
was represented by the public defender’s office, making him
subject to the $100 cost under section 938.29(1)(a). But the trial
court imposed a higher cost, $300, without “a showing of sufficient
proof of higher fees or costs incurred” as required by the statute.
Accordingly, we reverse this imposition.
IV.
Last, Hartfield challenges the imposition of a $100 Florida
Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) fee under section
938.055, Florida Statutes, arguing the imposition was improper
because the State did not request it. The State maintains the cost
is mandatory. We disagree with both readings of the statute.
Section 938.055 states that
[A] court may assess a defendant who pleads guilty or
nolo contendere . . . an amount of $100 . . . . This amount
shall be assessed if the services of a local county-operated
crime laboratory enumerated in s. 943.35(1) are used in
connection with the investigation or prosecution of a
violation of any provision of chapters 775-896.
§ 938.055, Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). A plain reading of the
statute shows that the cost under this section is discretionary,
unless a local county-operated crime laboratory is utilized “in
connection with the investigation or prosecution,” in which case
the cost is mandatory. Id.
3
Because no local county-operated crime laboratory was
utilized in this case, the cost was discretionary. But a trial court
must afford the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard
before it may impose a discretionary cost at sentencing. See Nix v.
State, 84 So. 3d 424, 426 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).
Because no notice and an opportunity to be heard on the cost
was provided, the $100 cost under section 938.055 is reversed. On
remand, the trial court may, after providing notice to Hartfield and
following the proper procedure, reimpose the FDLE and higher-
than-minimum public defender costs.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, REMANDED with
directions.
OSTERHAUS, C.J., and B.L. THOMAS, J., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, Megan Lynne Long and Lori A.
Willner, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Michael L. Schaub,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
