FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200233. July 15, 2015.]

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J : p

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner

Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566. 1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of
bigamy.
THE FACTS
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997,
3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an Information 4 for
bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped
the criminal suit. 5
The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married
to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked petitioner to marry him.
Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July
1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she
wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without
responsibility." 7
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be
included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because she had been under
the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also
averred that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to
her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued
that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife,
Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met
petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the former
introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this
allegation and averred that she met Galang only in August and September
1997, or after she had already married Santos.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married
Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang. Based on the more
credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the
legal wife of Santos in March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the
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 affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first
marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like
petitioner to be easily duped by a person like Santos. 8
The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her
marriage was celebrated without a need for a marriage license in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that
she cohabited with Santos long before the celebration of their marriage." 9
Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the
accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Pe nal Code and imposes against her the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
maximum. SDHTEC

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage
to Santos was void ab initio for having been celebrated without complying
with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the
requirement of a marriage license if the parties have actually lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the celebration of their
marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived
together as husband and wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence,
she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered their
marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.
The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11
Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-
accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a valid
marriage license . . . . In advancing that theory, accused wants this
court to pass judgment on the validity of her marriage to accused
Santos, something this court can not do. The best support to her
argument would have been the submission of a judicial decree of
annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot
declare their marriage null and void in these proceedings.
THE CA RULING
On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was
not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She attacked the credibility of
Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage
of Santos.
Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution
witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony of Santos. Anent
the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the
claim was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos in
question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12
THE ISSUES
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 Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused
in the instant case, because she was not aware of Santos's previous
marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt.
Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is
void because of the absence of a marriage license. She elaborates that their
marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage
license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it is extant in the
records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met
him in 1993. Without completing the five-year requirement, she posits that
their marriage without a license is void.
In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
respondent advances the argument that the instant Rule 45 petition should
be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent
marriage. As regards petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos's first
marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence supports
the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting
marriage.
The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
I n Montañez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of
bigamy as follows:
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has
been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved
. . .; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d)
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were
it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)
AScHCD

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime,

People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should have had knowledge
of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that
the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior
marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of
bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.
THE RULING OF THE COURT
The penalty for bigamy and
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 petitioner's knowledge of Santos's
first marriage
The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two
persons who marry each other while the previous marriage of one of them is
valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the
offended parties depending on the circumstances, as when the
second spouse married the accused without being aware of his
previous marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of
the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she
be included in the information as a co-accused. (Emphasis
supplied)
Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's
knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts consistently found
that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following
circumstances: 19 (1) when Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the
house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it was
incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil
status; and (3) Galang, who was the more credible witness compared with
petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly
testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the
former was the legal wife of Santos.
After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or
modify the factual findings of the RTC, less so in the present case in which
its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of
the credibility of witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the
important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and demeanor of
the witnesses during the trial. 20
Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with
the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy. However, we
disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty
on her. To recall, the RTC, which the CA affirmed, meted out to her the
penalty within the range of prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor
as maximum.
Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds
that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of bigamy, is liable only as an
accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority
in criminal law, writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who
knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound in
lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22
Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an accomplice to the crime.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty
for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration
of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of
petitioner is that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correccional, which has a duration of
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 six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its medium period
consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two
months of imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24
petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and
one day to six months imprisonment.
The criminal liability of petitioner
resulting from her marriage to
Santos
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of
bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the
marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation
of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner
has consistently 27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos
on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a
marriage license are void ab initio. 28
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The
RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the validity of the marriage.
The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos
was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain
issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a criminal case throws the
whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of
the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between
petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage license. The absence of
this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage,
which reveals that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family
Code. The provision reads as follows:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal
impediment to the marriage. AcICHD

Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been

exempted from a marriage license had they cohabited exclusively as
husband and wife for at least five years before their marriage. 31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more
or less in February 1996 32 and that after six months of courtship, 33 she
married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution,
petitioner testified that Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano,
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 Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her,
as she was residing in the house of her in-laws, 34 and her children from her
previous marriage disliked him. 35 On cross-examination, respondent did not
question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos
as an agent who sold her piglets. 36
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had
only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it follows that the
two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their
marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this
demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show that they submitted an
affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it
appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years
before they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the
issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which the solemnizing officer
stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
The legal effects in a criminal case
of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the
marriage
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained
the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that they were eligible to
contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation
wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal
actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing
that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and
(2) falsely making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a
bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our
penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate
disregard of the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond
between spouses. 38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals , 39 we had the occasion
to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered
nugatory by allowing individuals "to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women
with the promise of futurity and commitment."
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal
acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of
the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of
marriage. 40
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its
aid to . . . one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an
illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of
action appears to arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression
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 of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a result,
litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the
controversy in issue. 43
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative
defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her marriage with Santos was
void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated
earlier, they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement
based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law
against illegal marriages, 44 petitioner married Santos while knowing fully
well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation
requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the
height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to
escape criminal conviction.
The applicability of People v. De
Lara
Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an
acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second marriage lacked the
requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo
de Lara married his second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the
local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19 August
1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance
of the marriage license, the Court acquitted him of bigamy.
Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public
documents in order to contract a second marriage. In contrast, petitioner
and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner
later used this blatantly illicit act as basis for seeking her exculpation.
Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot
regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime. TAIaHE

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an

inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and
caprices of the contracting parties. 46 In keeping therefore with this
fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for
bigamy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As
modified, petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four years of prision correccional as maximum plus accessory
penalties provided by law.
SO ORDERED.
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 Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 56-70, 72-73; the CA Decision dated 21 September 2011 and
Resolution dated 5 January 2012 were penned by Associate Justice
Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias
and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring.
2. Id, at 75-83, 85-86; the RTC Decision dated 21 May 2010 and Order dated 24
June 2010 were penned by Judge Celso O. Baguio of RTC Branch 34,
Gapan City, Nueva Ecija.

3. Id. at 88; Certificate of Marriage issued by the Civil Registry of Nueva Ecija.
4. Records, p. 1.
5. Id. at 117; his Certificate of Death showed that he died during the pendency of
the case on 28 November 2001.
6. Rollo , p. 87; Marriage Contract between Nicanor Santos and Estela Galang.
7. Id. at 57-58; CA Decision, pp. 2-3.
8. Id. at 80; RTC Decision, p. 6. See also records, pp. 269-270, 117; the
appointment papers of petitioner showed that she worked as a faculty
member of Divina Pastora College, and the Death Certificate of Nicanor
Santos indicated that he was a laborer.
9. Id. at 83; RTC Decision, p. 9.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 86; RTC Order, p. 2.
12. Id. at 70, 73; CA Decision, p. 15, CA Resolution, p. 2.

13. No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079.

14. Id. at 152-169; Comment filed on 23 August 2012 by the Office of the Solicitor
General.
15. G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012, 684 SCRA 315.
16. 159-A Phil. 771 (1975).
17. 111 Phil. 291 (1961).
18. Supra note 16, at 775.

19. Rollo , pp. 64-68, CA Decision dated 21 September 2011, pp. 9-13; rollo, pp.
80-81; RTC Decision dated 21 May 2010, pp. 6-7.

20. People v. Arcilla, 326 Phil. 774 (1996).

21. Supra note 17, at 293.
22. Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Criminal Law, Book Two, p. 979,
Volume II (2012) citing Viada, 3 Cod. Pen. 274.
23. Revised Penal Code, Art. 52.
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 24. Act No. 4103 (1965).
25. De la Cruz v. Ejercito, 160-A Phil. 669 (1975), Zapanta v. Montesa , 114 Phil.
1227 (1962), Merced v. Diez , 109 Phil. 155 (1960), and People v. Dumpo ,
62 Phil. 246 (1935).
26. Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis , 391 Phil. 648 (2000).
27. Rollo , p. 77, RTC Decision, p. 3; records, pp. 311-312, Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Santiago before the RTC, pp. 2-3.
28. Family Code, Art. 3.
29. Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan, 242 Phil. 519 (1988).
30. People v. Flores, 442 Phil. 561 (2002).

31. Republic v. Dayot , 573 Phil. 553 (2008).

32. The TSN dated 13 June 2002, p. 3 reflected that petitioner met Santos in
1996; but according to the TSN dated 10 August 2004, she clarified in her
additional direct testimony that she met Santos in 1993. In both cases,
she only knew Santos for less than five years prior their marriage on 29
July 1997.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 7-8.
35. TSN, 24 October 2002, p. 14.

36. Id. at 2.
37. Records, p. 88. Certified True Copy of the Certificate of Marriage between
Nicanor F. Santos and Leonila G. Santiago.
38. Tenebro v. CA, 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
39. Id. at 744.
40. Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, 16 October 2013.
41. Manuel v. People , 512 Phil 818, 851 (2005).

42. Acabal v. Acabal, 494 Phil. 528 (2005).

43. Muller v. Muller, 531 Phil. 460 (2006).
44. REVISED PENAL CODE, Arts. 349-352. Art. 350 punishes the crime of illegal
marriages as follows:
Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. — The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceeding article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage
is in disregard of a legal impediment.
If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means
of violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty provided in the next preceding paragraph.
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 45. CONSTITUTION, Article XV, Sec. 2.
46. Supra note 40.

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