THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 193038. March 11, 2015.]

JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA , petitioner, vs. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA,

respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J : p

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 dated May

14, 2010 and the Resolution 2 dated July 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70235, which affirmed with modification the assailed
Decision 3 dated February 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina City, Branch 273, in Civil Case No. 96-274-MK.
The following facts are found by the trial court and affirmed by the
appellate court:
Respondent Shirley B. Nuega (Shirley) was married to Rogelio A. Nuega
(Rogelio) on September 1, 1990. 4 Sometime in 1988 when the parties were
still engaged, Shirley was working as a domestic helper in Israel. Upon the
request of Rogelio, Shirley sent him money 5 for the purchase of a residential
lot in Marikina where they had planned to eventually build their home.
Rogelio was then also working abroad as a seaman. The following year, or
on September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the subject house and lot for One
Hundred Two Thousand Pesos (P102,000.00) 6 from Rodeanna Realty
Corporation. The subject property has an aggregate area of one hundred
eleven square meters (111 sq. m.) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. N-133844. 7 Shirley claims that upon her arrival in the Philippines
sometime in 1989, she settled the balance for the equity over the subject
property with the developer through SSS 8 financing. She likewise paid for
the succeeding monthly amortizations. On October 19, 1989, TCT No.
171963 9 over the subject property was issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Marikina, Rizal solely under the name of Rogelio.
On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the
subject property. The following year, Shirley returned to Israel for work.
While overseas, she received information that Rogelio had brought home
another woman, Monica Escobar, into the family home. She also learned, and
was able to confirm upon her return to the Philippines in May 1992, that
Rogelio had been introducing Escobar as his wife.
In June 1992, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for
Concubinage before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal, and another
for Legal Separation and Liquidation of Property before the RTC of Pasig City.
Shirley later withdrew the complaint for legal separation and liquidation of
property, but re-filed 10 the same on January 29, 1993. In between the filing
of these cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of selling the
subject property. Shirley then advised the interested buyers — one of whom
was their neighbor and petitioner Josefina V. Nobleza (petitioner) — of the
existence of the cases that she had filed against Rogelio and cautioned them
against buying the subject property until the cases are closed and
terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale 11 dated December
29, 1992, Rogelio sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley's
consent in the amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P380,000.00), including petitioner's undertaking to assume the existing
mortgage on the property with the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation and to pay the real property taxes due thereon.
Meanwhile, in a Decision 12 dated May 16, 1994, the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 70, granted the petition for legal separation and ordered the
dissolution and liquidation of the regime of absolute community of property
between Shirley and Rogelio, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby grants
the instant petition for legal separation between the subject spouses
with all its legal effects as provided for in Art. 63 of the Family Code.
Their community property is consequently dissolved and must be
liquidated in accordance with Art. 102 of the New Family Code. The
respondent is thus hereby enjoined from selling, encumbering or in
any way disposing or alienating any of their community property
including the subject house and lot before the required liquidation.
Moreover, he, being the guilty spouse, must forfeit the net profits of
the community property in favor of the petitioner who is the innocent
spouse pursuant to Art. 43 of the aforesaid law. Finally, in the light of
the claim of ownership by the present occupants who have not been
impleaded in the instant case, a separate action must be instituted by
the petitioner against the alleged buyer or buyers thereof to
determine their respective rights thereon.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar
of Manila, the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila and the
National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 13

Rogelio appealed the above-quoted ruling before the CA which denied

due course and dismissed the petition. It became final and executory and a
writ of execution was issued in August 1995. 14
On August 27, 1996, Shirley instituted a Complaint 15 for Rescission of
Sale and Recovery of Property against petitioner and Rogelio before the RTC
of Marikina City, Branch 273. After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered its decision on February 14, 2001, viz.:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Shirley Nuega and against
defendant Josefina Nobleza, as follows:
1) the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 insofar as
the 55.05 square meters representing the one half (1/2)
portion of plaintiff Shirley Nuega is concerned, is hereby
ordered rescinded, the same being null and void;
 2) defendant Josefina Nobleza is ordered to reconvey said 55.05
square meters to plaintiff Shirley Nuega, or in the
alternative to pay plaintiff Shirley Nuega the present
market value of said 55.05 square meters; and
3) to pay plaintiff Shirley Nuega attorney's fees in the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
For lack of merit, defendant's counterclaim is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 16

Petitioner sought recourse with the CA, while Rogelio did not appeal
the ruling of the trial court. In its assailed Decision promulgated on May 14,
2010, the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial court's ruling,
viz.:
WHEREFORE, subject to the foregoing disquisition, the appeal
is DENIED. The Decision dated 14 February 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Marikina City, Branch 273 in Civil Case No. 96-274-MK is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 29 December 1992 is hereby declared null and void in its
entirety, and defendant-appellant Josefina V. Nobleza is ordered to
reconvey the entire subject property to plaintiff-appellee Shirley B.
Nuega and defendant Rogelio Nuega, without prejudice to said
defendant-appellant's right to recover from defendant Rogelio
whatever amount she paid for the subject property. Costs against
defendant-appellant Nobleza.
SO ORDERED. 17

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated July 21,

2010, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, this
petition raising the following assignment of errors:
[I.] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY SUSTAINING
THE FINDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT A PURCHASER IN
GOOD FAITH.
[II.] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT MODIFIED
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BY DECLARING
AS NULL AND VOID THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 29
DECEMBER 1992 IN ITS ENTIRETY. 18
We deny the petition.
Petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of
another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in
the property, for which a full and fair price is paid by the buyer at the time of
the purchase or before receipt of any notice of claims or interest of some
other person in the property. 19 It is the party who claims to be an innocent
purchaser for value who has the burden of proving such assertion, and it is
not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith. 20 To
successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith, the
presumption is that first and foremost, the "buyer in good faith" must have
shown prudence and due diligence in the exercise of his/her rights. It
presupposes that the buyer did everything that an ordinary person would do
for the protection and defense of his/her rights and interests against
prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in such a situation. The
prudence required of a buyer in good faith is "not that of a person with
training in law, but rather that of an average man who 'weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibration of our technical rules of
evidence of which his knowledge is nil.'" 21 A buyer in good faith does his
homework and verifies that the particulars are in order — such as the title,
the parties, the mode of transfer and the provisions in the deed/contract of
sale, to name a few. To be more specific, such prudence can be shown by
making an ocular inspection of the property, checking the title/ownership
with the proper Register of Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor,
or inquiring into the minutiae such as the parameters or lot area, the type of
ownership, and the capacity of the seller to dispose of the property, which
capacity necessarily includes an inquiry into the civil status of the seller to
ensure that if married, marital consent is secured when necessary. In fine,
for a purchaser of a property in the possession of another to be in good faith,
he must exercise due diligence, conduct an investigation, and weigh the
surrounding facts and circumstances like what any prudent man in a similar
situation would do. 22
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that she is a buyer in good faith of
the subject property which is titled under the name of the seller Rogelio A.
Nuega alone as evidenced by TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-
012-04723 and D-012-04724. 23 Petitioner argues, among others, that since
she has examined the TCT over the subject property and found the property
to have been registered under the name of seller Rogelio alone, she is an
innocent purchaser for value and "she is not required to go beyond the face
of the title in verifying the status of the subject property at the time of the
consummation of the sale and at the date of the sale." 24
We disagree with petitioner.
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely
relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding
circumstances relevant to the sale.
In the case of Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses Bandong, 25 petitioners
therein — as does petitioner herein — were also harping that due to the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there was nothing in the TCT of the property
in litigation that should have aroused the buyer's suspicion as to put her on
guard that there was a defect in the title of therein seller. The Court held in
the Spouses Raymundo case that the buyer therein could not hide behind
the cloak of being an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the
TCT which showed that the registered owner of the land purchased is the
seller. The Court ruled in this case that the buyer was not an innocent
purchaser for value due to the following attendant circumstances, viz.:
In the present case, we are not convinced by the petitioners'
incessant assertion that Jocelyn is an innocent purchaser for value. To
begin with, she is a grandniece of Eulalia and resides in the same
 locality where the latter lives and conducts her principal business. It
is therefore impossible for her not to acquire knowledge of her grand
aunt's business practice of requiring her biyaheros to surrender the
titles to their properties and to sign the corresponding deeds of sale
over said properties in her favor, as security. This alone should have
put Jocelyn on guard for any possible abuses that Eulalia may commit
with the titles and the deeds of sale in her possession. 26
Similarly, in the case of Arrofo v. Quiño, 27 the Court held that while
"the law does not require a person dealing with registered land to inquire
further than what the Torrens Title on its face indicates," the rule is not
absolute. 28 Thus, finding that the buyer therein failed to take the necessary
precaution required of a prudent man, the Court held that Arrofo was not an
innocent purchaser for value, viz.:
In the present case, the records show that Arrofo failed to act as
a prudent buyer. True, she asked her daughter to verify from the
Register of Deeds if the title to the Property is free from
encumbrances. However, Arrofo admitted that the Property is within
the neighborhood and that she conducted an ocular inspection of the
Property. She saw the house constructed on the Property. Yet, Arro fo
did not even bother to inquire about the occupants of the house.
Arrofo also admitted that at the time of the sale, Myrna was
occupying a room in her house as her lessee. The fact that Myrna
was renting a room from Arrofo yet selling a land with a house should
have put Arrofo on her guard. She knew that Myrna was not
occupying the house. Hence, someone else must have been
occupying the house.
Thus, Arrofo should have inquired who occupied the house, and
if a lessee, who received the rentals from such lessee. Such inquiry
would have led Arrofo to discover that the lessee was paying rentals
to Quiño, not to Renato and Myrna, who claimed to own the Property.
29

An analogous situation obtains in the case at bar.

The TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner is the seller
Rogelio himself who was therein also described as "single". However, as in
the cases of Spouses Raymundo and Arrofo, there are circumstances critical
to the case at bar which convince us to affirm the ruling of both the appellate
and lower courts that herein petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.
First, petitioner's sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the sale, was
residing near Rogelio and Shirley's house — the subject property — in
Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina City. Had petitioner been more prudent as a
buyer, she could have easily checked if Rogelio had the capacity to dispose
of the subject property. Had petitioner been more vigilant, she could have
inquired with such facility — considering that her sister lived in the same
Ladislao Diwa Village where the property is located — if there was any
person other than Rogelio who had any right or interest in the subject
property.
To be sure, respondent even testified that she had warned their
neighbors at Ladislao Diwa Village — including petitioner's sister — not to
engage in any deal with Rogelio relative to the purchase of the subject
property because of the cases she had filed against Rogelio. Petitioner
denies that respondent had given such warning to her neighbors, which
includes her sister, therefore arguing that such warning could not be
construed as "notice" on her part that there is a person other than the seller
himself who has any right or interest in the subject property. Nonetheless,
despite petitioner's adamant denial, both courts a quo gave probative value
to the testimony of respondent, and the instant petition failed to present any
convincing evidence for this Court to reverse such factual finding. To be
sure, it is not within our province to second-guess the courts a quo, and the
re-determination of this factual issue is beyond the reach of a petition for
review on certiorari where only questions of law may be reviewed. 30
Second, issues surrounding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale
also pose question on the claim of petitioner that she is a buyer in good
faith. As correctly observed by both courts a quo, the Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed and dated on December 29, 1992. However, the Community
Tax Certificates of the witnesses therein were dated January 2 and 20, 1993.
31 While this irregularity is not a direct proof of the intent of the parties to

the sale to make it appear that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on
December 29, 1992 — or before Shirley filed the petition for legal separation
on January 29, 1993 — it is circumstantial and relevant to the claim of herein
petitioner as an innocent purchaser for value.
That is not all.
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, the civil status
of Rogelio as seller was not stated, while petitioner as buyer was indicated
as "single," viz.:
ROGELIO A. NUEGA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and with postal
address at 2-A-2 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro
Manila, hereinafter referred to as the VENDOR
And
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single and with
postal address at No. L-2-A-3 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina,
Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the VENDEE. 32
It puzzles the Court that while petitioner has repeatedly claimed that
Rogelio is "single" under TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-
04723 and D-012-04724, his civil status as seller was not stated in the Deed
of Absolute Sale — further creating a cloud on the claim of petitioner that
she is an innocent purchaser for value.
As to the second issue, we rule that the appellate court did not err
when it modified the decision of the trial court and declared that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 is void in its entirety.
The trial court held that while the TCT shows that the owner of the
subject property is Rogelio alone, respondent was able to prove at the trial
court that she contributed in the payment of the purchase price of the
subject property. This fact was also settled with finality by the RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 70, and affirmed by the CA, in the case for legal separation and
liquidation of property docketed as JDRC Case No. 2510. The pertinent
portion of the decision reads:
. . . Clearly, the house and lot jointly acquired by the parties
prior to their marriage forms part of their community property
regime. . . .
From the foregoing, Shirley sufficiently proved her financial
contribution for the purchase of the house and lot covered by TCT
171963. Thus, the present lot which forms part of their community
property should be divided equally between them upon the grant of
the instant petition for legal separation. Having established by
preponderance of evidence the fact of her husband's guilt in
contracting a subsequent marriage . . ., Shirley alone should be
entitled to the net profits earned by the absolute community
property. 33
However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on
proof of respondent's financial contribution in the purchase of the subject
property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether a piece
of property is community property for the law itself defines what constitutes
community property.
Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:
Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the
property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from
the absolute community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the
marriage settlement.
Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the
Family Code, which states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community
property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by
either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any,
unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that
they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse;
however, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who
has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as
well as the income, if any, of such property.
As held in Quiao v. Quiao: 34

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the

husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of
the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those
 excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass
of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or
community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the
spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the
parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have
originally owned.
Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions
provided in Article 92, it therefore forms part of the absolute community
property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to
its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's
name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the
spouses Shirley and Rogelio.
Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio,
on his own and without the consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold
the subject property via a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992
— or during the subsistence of a valid contract of marriage. Under Article 96
of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the
Philippines, the said disposition of a communal property is void, viz.:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the common properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on
the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors. 35
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that Rogelio
could not sell the subject property without the written consent of respondent
or the authority of the court. Without such consent or authority, the entire
sale is void. As correctly explained by the appellate court:
In the instant case, defendant Rogelio sold the entire subject
property to defendant-appellant Josefina on 29 December 1992 or
during the existence of Rogelio's marriage to plaintiff-appellee
Shirley, without the consent of the latter. The subject property forms
part of Rogelio and Shirley's absolute community of property. Thus,
the trial court erred in declaring the deed of sale null and void only
insofar as the 55.05 square meters representing the one-half (1/2)
portion of plaintiff-appellee Shirley. In absolute community of
property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife,
 sells (their) property, such sale is void. The consent of both the
husband Rogelio and the wife Shirley is required and the absence of
the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void including the
portion of the subject property pertaining to defendant Rogelio who
contracted the sale with defendant-appellant Josefina. Since the Deed
of Absolute Sale . . . entered into by and between defendant-
appellant Josefina and defendant Rogelio dated 29 December 1992,
during the subsisting marriage between plaintiff-appellee Shirley and
Rogelio, was without the written consent of Shirley, the said Deed of
Absolute Sale is void in its entirety. Hence, the trial court erred in
declaring the said Deed of Absolute Sale as void only insofar as the
1/2 portion pertaining to the share of Shirley is concerned. 36
Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the
contract of sale with petitioner and acknowledged receiving the entire
consideration of the contract under the Deed of Absolute Sale, Shirley could
not be held accountable to petitioner for the reimbursement of her payment
for the purchase of the subject property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code,
the absolute community of property shall only be "liable for . . . [d]ebts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to
the extent that the family may have been benefited . . . ." As correctly stated
by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record that the amount
received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family, respondent
cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner. 37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2010
and July 21, 2010, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70235 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 30-52. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with

Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Michael P. Elbinias
concurring.

2. Id. at 54-55. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with

Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
concurring.

3. Id. at 95-103. Penned by Judge Olga Palanca Enriquez.

4. Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.

5. Respondent initially sent US$3,500.00 and added P50,000.00 or a total of

P150,000.00, rollo, pp. 33, 96.

6. TSN, December 9, 1997, pp. 29 & 34.

7. Deed of Absolute Sale, records, pp. 309 & 363.

8. Social Security System.

9. Records, p. 303.

10. Docketed as JDRC Case No. 2510, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 18-20.

11. Rollo , pp. 79-81.

12. Rendered in JDRC Case No. 2510, Folder of Exhibits, pp. 21-24.

13. Id. at 24.

14. Rollo , p. 32.

15. Entitled "Shirley B. Nuega v. Josefina V. Nobleza and Rogelio Nuega" and
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-274-MK, rollo, pp. 84-87; records, pp. 24-27.

16. Rollo , p. 102.

17. Id. at 49.

18. Id. at 14.

19. Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses Bandong, 553 Phil. 480, 495 (2007), citing
Eastworld Motor Industries Corporation v. Skunac Corporation, 514 Phil.
605, 613 (2005). Emphasis supplied.

20. Id., citing Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 410 (2003).

21. Sia Tio, et al. v. Abayata, et al., 578 Phil. 731, 747 (2008).

22. PNB v. Heirs of Estanislao and Deogracias Militar, 526 Phil. 788, 796-797
(2006).

23. Records, p. 49.

24. Id. at 51.

25. Supra note 19.

26. Id. at 496.

27. 490 Phil. 179 (2005).

28. Id. at 191.

29. Id. at 191-192.

30. Palon v. Nino, 405 Phil. 670, 682 (2001).

31. Rollo , pp. 79-81.

32. Id. at 79.

33. Folder of Exhibits, p. 24.

34. G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012, 675 SCRA 642, 667. Emphasis and
 underscoring omitted.

35. Emphasis supplied.

36. Rollo , pp. 45-46. Citations omitted. Underscoring in the original.

37. Id. at 48-49.