Airbnb and Hotel Performance 1 18
Airbnb and Hotel Performance 1 18
Hotel Performance
An analysis of proprietary data in 13 global markets
Analyzed by:
Jessica Haywood
Patrick Mayock
Jan Freitag
Kwabena Akuffo Owoo
Blase Fiorilla
Table of Contents
Executive Summary.............................................................................................. 3
Market Overviews................................................................................................. 16
In Closing............................................................................................................. 34
Contact Information.............................................................................................. 35
Credits
Performance data through July 2016 indicated hotels were following their normal
cyclical trajectory, hovering at or just below the peak at a time when Airbnb
listings outnumbered the world’s largest hotel company by nearly three units to
one. As of July, the U.S. hotel industry had recorded its 77th consecutive month
of revenue-per-available-room growth. During that same month, hoteliers sold
more roomnights (117 million) than ever before.
Those same dynamics largely held true in the following 13 global markets
analyzed in this report: Barcelona, Boston, London, Los Angeles, Mexico
City, Miami, New Orleans, Paris, San Francisco, Seattle, Sydney, Tokyo and
Washington, D.C. Airbnb provided more than two-and-a-half years of daily data
for each market, which STR analyzed and then compared to its hotel performance
data.
• Airbnb occupancy generally was the highest in markets where hotels had
high occupancy.
• Hotel occupancy was significantly higher than Airbnb occupancy.
• While Airbnb’s share of total accommodation supply (i.e. Airbnb units and
hotel rooms) was growing, its share of market demand and revenues still was
generally below 4% and 3%, respectively.
• Airbnb guests typically stayed longer than the average hotel guest, with
roughly half of Airbnb roomnights coming from trips of seven days or longer.
• Airbnb’s share of business travel was substantially smaller than its share of
leisure travel.
• Hotel average daily rates generally were higher than Airbnb rates (e.g. $16
higher on average in our seven U.S. markets).
• Hotel ADR increased in all but one market (Paris) in the year ending July
2016. Airbnb rates decreased in eight markets and increased in five.
Supply might have been a contributing factor in that latter point, as the majority
of the markets analyzed in this report saw available Airbnb units increase by
more than 40%—and in some cases north of 100% . When analyzing growth
rates, however, it’s important to acknowledge the baseline. Airbnb is a relatively
new presence in many markets, and growth rates often are commensurate
with untapped potential. In other words, Airbnb has more room to grow in most
markets, whereas hotels have carved out an established presence over decades.
Figure 1
Compression Nights for 7 US Markets 75 76
71
July YTD
61
43
27
15 16 17 15
13
4
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
That said, one can still glean meaningful insight and information from the data.
A review of compression nights, for instance, showed no noticeable impact
of Airbnb within the seven U.S. markets included in this report (Figure 1). The
number of nights in which occupancy exceeded 95% had increased steadily since
the Great Recession, reaching its peak of 76 during year-to-date July 2015. That
number dipped slightly to 71 through July 2016, which followed a softening of
several other macroeconomic indicators. Also at play was the 1.6% uptick in hotel
supply in those seven markets, which should not be underestimated. This looks to
be a small percentage increase on the surface given the high base of hotel supply
(92,871,685), but the total number of new supply added (1,487,458) to these
markets was actually substantial.
With this analysis, it is our intent to provide the most comprehensive comparison
of Airbnb and hotel performance data ever reported to better inform the
conversations in this “street corner” business. It is not our intent to draw
correlation or causation. We will share more findings as we continue to examine
the available information and as new data becomes available.
While Airbnb provided a complete set of data for these 13 markets, STR excluded
data we deemed incomparable to hotels to provide a more relevant analysis for
our stakeholders. STR excluded shared and private rooms, limiting its analysis to
entire homes/apartments/etc. We also excluded listings that hold more than seven
people because groups of this size are the least likely to stay in hotel rooms.
Some charts and tables do not include every market due to the fact that either the
Airbnb or hotel data in those segments was insufficient for analysis.
STR was not remunerated in any way for its analysis, and its participation in this
analysis was not contingent upon developing or reporting predetermined results.
1. We removed Airbnb listings that aren’t actually available for rent. (Some
hosts create listings but never actually make them available).
2. We removed shared bedrooms and private rooms with shared living space,
because it is unlikely a typical hotel guest would view such a space as a
viable alternative to a hotel room.
3. We removed large Airbnb listings that hold more than seven people, because
groups of this size are unlikely to stay in hotel rooms.
Within the remaining listings, there was still the “Airbnb experience” factor, which
might include kitchens and other apartment-style amenities, meeting the host,
and other factors unique to the accommodation. For example, a small percentage
of Airbnb listings are eclectic accommodation types such as treehouses, camper
vans, yurts, castles and so forth that were not identifiable in our dataset.
Most reports about Airbnb rely on scraped data. Pulled directly from advertised
listings on the company’s website, scraped data can prove a useful indicator—but
one subject to numerous assumptions, which in turn can lead to unsupported
conclusions. This is why STR prefers to use data directly from Airbnb.
Figure 2
Scrape Listings, Scrape Reviews Scrape Base Price Apply Average Stay
Calendars
Source: Airbnb
To see just how different scraped data is from real Airbnb data, we compared real
Airbnb data from a previous STR analysis on New York City to scraped data. For
the 12 months ending August 2015, the scraped data substantially overestimated
both demand and revenue. This suggests that estimates of demand and revenue
market share that are based on scraped data may indeed be overestimates as
well.
STR has used scraped data in the past, and we believe it can be a useful,
directional indicator of Airbnb’s growth and prices. But just as when
benchmarking hotel performance, source data is far more reliable.
Despite this elusive quality, Airbnb is not beyond measure. Data provided from
Airbnb on 13 global markets revealed new insights on the platform’s size and
makeup.
Figure 3
Largest Lodging Companies by Rooms/Listings
Airbnb 3M
AccorHotels 519K
But recall that only a portion of Airbnb’s listings are actually comparable to hotel
rooms. To estimate the fraction of hotel-comparable rooms within Airbnb’s global
inventory, we extrapolated based on data provided by Airbnb for 13 markets.
Figure 4
Largest Lodging Companies by Rooms/Listings
Less Unavailable, Shared Rooms, Private Rooms and Large Listings
Airbnb 1.0M
AccorHotels 519K
While STR does not track business travel, an analysis of weekday (traditionally
business-focused) versus weekend (traditionally leisure-focused) travel provides
a good proxy.
Hotel occupancy typically was highest mid-week for the 13 markets, while
Airbnb’s occupancy was highest on the weekend (Figure 5). This supports the
logic that Airbnb is more leisure-focused than hotels. The only exception is San
Francisco, where Airbnb occupancy was the highest on Wednesday and Thursday.
Figure 5
67%
52%
48% 49%
43% 42% 45%
42%
Hotel Airbnb
$188 $187
$183
$178
$171 $171 $170 $166
$166
$158 $154 $153 $154 $156
Hotels Airbnb
In both hotels and Airbnb, average daily rate was the highest on the days with
the highest occupancy (Figure 6). The largest variance in ADR between hotels
and Airbnb occurred on Tuesday and Wednesday, which makes sense given these
were the most occupied days for hotels and least for Airbnb. The pricing premium
was reduced to $5 on the weekend, when competition for leisure travelers is
arguably most intense. Recall that for the Airbnb data, we included listings that
can accommodate up to six people, which skewed Airbnb rates higher than if we
only considered listings accommodating one or two guests.
Airbnb’s share of weekday demand grew steadily over the past three years and
was highest in Los Angeles, but was still less than 5% of total weekday demand in
every U.S. market we examined (Figure 7). Most cities hovered in the 1-3% range.
4.7%
3.8%
3.3%
3.1%
2.6% 2.6%
1.8%
1.6% 1.6%
0.7% 0.7%
0.5% 0.6%
0.4%
Boston MA Los Angeles/ Miami/ New Orleans LA San Francisco/ Seattle WA Washington DC
Long Beach CA Hialeah FL San Mateo CA MD-VA
While Airbnb’s share of weekday demand was growing, hotels in most markets
still saw weekday demand growth. Boston and New Orleans were the only markets
that saw a slight decline in hotel weekday demand year-over-year.
Additionally, weekday ADR was up in all markets except Miami. Four markets
(Barcelona, Tokyo, Los Angeles and San Francisco) saw hotel weekday ADR
growth of 5-10%.
17.3%
53.5%
29.2%
Please note: This chart does not show the percentage of total trips booked. Rather, it’s the
percentage of total roomnights sold. Of all Airbnb roomnights sold, 29.2% were part of a trip that
lasted between seven and 29 days, while 17.3% were part of a trip that lasted a month or longer.
Combined, 46.5% of all Airbnb roomnights sold were part of a “long-term stay.”
STR currently does not track length of stay. However, we do have an extended-
stay indicator that applies to approximately 30 brands in the U.S. that focus on
attracting hotel guests for an extended amount of time. In the seven U.S. markets
included in this report, 9% of all roomnights sold were attributed to extended-stay
brands. This figure does not account for guests that stay for an extended period in
non-extended stay hotels, but it is a good directional indicator.
Thus, the data suggests that travelers who use Airbnb typically have longer
lengths of stay on average than do typical hotel guests.
In Los Angeles, Mexico City and Sydney, more than half of all Airbnb roomnights
sold were part of trips that lasted a week or longer (Figure 9). New Orleans
had the smallest percentage (20%) of roomnights for trips of a week or longer.
Interestingly, hotel occupancy growth in extended-stay properties in New Orleans
was down 8%, which indicates the demand for extended-stay nights declined in
that market.
Figure 9
Percent of Airbnb Demand for 7+ Days
Tokyo 35.9%
Sydney 56.9%
Paris 41.8%
London 48.3%
Barcelona 39.5%
Seattle WA 37.4%
Miami FL 49.7%
Boston MA 43.0%
The only market that saw the number of Airbnb extended-stay nights grow was
San Francisco. Notably, only 4% of all hotel supply in San Francisco was classified
as extended stay, which is the smallest of any U.S. market studied.
While Airbnb does have a large percentage of extended-stay demand, these hotels
in the U.S. still saw healthy growth. July 2016 year-to-date demand was up 5%,
which was above the U.S. average of 1%. ADR growth for extended-stay hotels
also was higher than the U.S. average at 4%.
But first, a mathematical word of caution: Growth rates of many key performance
indicators for Airbnb are much larger than those of hotels. There is a simple
reason for this: Since Airbnb represents a tiny fraction of the inventory of hotels,
Airbnb data starts at a low base—hence, high growth rates.
Tokyo serves as a good example. The market’s Airbnb supply footprint roughly
tripled in the 12 months ending July 2016, a rate that dwarfed hotel supply
growth of 3.2% in the comparable period. Those percentages belie the actual
market dynamics, however. Tokyo’s baseline of 951,459 Airbnb rental nights
listed in the 12 months to July 2015 is much less than the hotel baseline of 38
million available roomnights.
In other words, Airbnb had considerably more room to grow, and each additional
unit listed represented a higher percentage increase than did each additional
hotel room.
Airbnb growth rates were muted in its more “mature” markets, such as its home
base San Francisco and also Paris. The larger baseline of units in these markets
softened the supply growth rates.
All markets, with the exception of Barcelona, reported supply growth of more than
30% in the 12 months ending July 2016. All markets reported demand growth of
more than 20%.
Figure 10
13.1%
Greater Barcelona 36.2%%
62.1%
Greater London 67.9%
107.0%
Mexico City 119.2%
39.6%
Paris
33.0%
53.1%
Sydney 81.3%
252.4%
Tokyo 241.3%
62.7%
Boston MA 70.5%
41.3%
Los Angeles/Long Beach CA 61.5%
52.0%
Miami/Hialeah FL 60.6%
76.3%
New Orleans LA
79.3%
31.9%
San Francisco/San Mateo CA 25.1%
77.9%
Seattle WA 84.8%
53.7%
Washington DC-MD-VA 65.5%
Because hotel supply and demand started at such a high base, year-over-year growth
rates for the 12 months ending July 2016 were much smaller compared to those
recorded for Airbnb.
While Tokyo’s Airbnb growth rates were the largest among the markets we examined,
the city’s hotel growth numbers were not. Miami reported the largest hotel supply
increase (4.1%), and Mexico City reported the largest hotel demand increase (5.5%).
Given that hotel demand decreased and Airbnb demand increased in those two
markets, Airbnb likely did affect hotel demand. However, there are also other
market-level factors at play such as the recent terrorist activity in Paris and large
event shifts in New Orleans that also negatively impacted hotel demand. In all
other markets, both Airbnb and hotel demand increased at the same time, so
there seemed to be no universal relationship at work.
Figure 11
4.1%
3.3%
3.2%
3.2%
3.3%
2.4%
2.5%
2.4%
2.3%
2.3%
2.4%
2.0%
1.8%
1.6%
0.7%
0.7%
0.9%
0.9%
0.5%
0.5%
-9.0%
0.2%
-0.4%
0.0%
0.0%
Greater Greater Mexico Paris Sydney Tokyo Boston Los Angeles/ Miami/ New Orleans San Francisco/ Seattle WA Washington DC-
Barcelona London City MA Long Beach Hialeah LA San Mateo MD-VA
CA FL CA
In San Francisco, for instance, hoteliers sold more than eight out of every 10
hotel rooms available (84.6%), which was third highest among our 13 markets.
Airbnb hosts in that market, meanwhile, sold more than five out of every 10 units
available (51.8%), which also was third highest.
The above example underscores another trend: Airbnb occupancy was highest
in markets in which hotel occupancy was highest, which might suggest Airbnb is
accommodating incremental demand (Figure 12).