Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 381

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration

of petitioner United Planters Sugar Milling Company, Inc., SET
ASIDE the Resolution dated 2 April 2009, and REINSTATE
the Decision dated 28 November 2006 as modified by the
Resolution dated 11 July 2007.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 142549. March 9, 2010]

FIDELA R. ANGELES, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY

OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO
T. GUINGONA, JR., respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS;

DEFINED AND CONSTRUED.— It is settled that mandamus
is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt
exists. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action,
when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion,
but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already
taken in the exercise of either.
2. CIVIL LAW; LAND REGISTRATION; RESOLUTION OF THE
CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE MAYSILO
ESTATE AND THE QUESTIONED EXISTENCE OF
ANOTHER O.C.T. NO. 994 WAS FINALLY LAID TO REST
 Supreme Court E-Library

382 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

AND ALL OTHER CASES INVOLVING SAID ESTATE ARE

BOUND BY THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
SETFORTH IN THE CASE OF MANOTOK REALTY, INC.
VS. CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
SUSTAINED.— It is important to emphasize at this point that
in the recent case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007,
entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the
succeeding resolution in the same case dated March 31, 2009
(the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the
Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another
OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to rest. All other cases
involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar,
are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said
resolutions. As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on
previous cases decided by this Court which have held that there
are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one
from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424)
derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior
title. Regrettably, petitioner’s claim no longer has a leg to
stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case: The
determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of
this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not
the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles
are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April
1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be
recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate
concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such
OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga
decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus officio
except on the basis of the “law of the case” doctrine, and can
no longer be relied upon as precedents. Specifically, petitioner
cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on
April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following
conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the
record, that mother title was received for transcription
by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should
be the date which should be reckoned as the date of
registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as
appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance
of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 383

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date

when the title took effect. Second. Any title that traces its
source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for
such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson
and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994
dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles
since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x. Third. The
decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at
bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT
No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now
acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions
in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated
19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the
factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Orosa Blanco Dime Law Office and Nelson A. Clemente for

petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The property involved in this case is covered by Original

Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One
Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the
Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En Banc as
a “vast tract of land [that] stretches over three cities, comprising
an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the
Vatican.”1 What we have before us now is touted as “one of
the biggest and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent
history.”2
1
Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 123346, December 14, 2007, 540 SCRA 304, 319.
2
Rollo, p. 500.
 Supreme Court E-Library

384 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

The existence of several cases already decided by this Court

dealing with this infamous estate has made the job of deciding
this particular petition easy, on one hand, as there are cases
squarely on point and at the outset, applicable; but complicated,
on the other hand, as such applicability must be determined
with thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just, equitable,
and fair conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for
almost forty-five (45) years.
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking
respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to comply with the Order3 dated January 8, 1998
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in
Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v.
Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued
a Certificate of Finality on March 12, 1998.
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals,
all of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit
her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon
City and in the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province
of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and
accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate
covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19,
1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan
City, Branch 120.
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate.
They also had led this Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was
registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals,4 reiterated in Heirs of
Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court held that OCT
3
Id. at 15-33.
4
G.R. No. 103558, 17 November 1992, 215 SCRA 783.
5
330 Phil. 8 (1996).
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 385

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the
valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime
D. Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed for
by plaintiffs in that case; directed the respective Registers of
Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer
certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners, including
petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate
area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-
Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered
that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of
the Court, and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in
proportion to their respective interests in the property.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the
Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners’ Report dated
October 21, 1997 and Supplemental Commissioners’ Report dated
December 30, 1997 that the following lots with transfer certificates
of title to be issued by the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City in
the names of all co-owners be sold and the proceeds thereof divided
among themselves in proportion to their respective interest in the
property, is approved.
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are
hereby directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the names
of all the co-owners for the following lots, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation
by this Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure . 6
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of
Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with the
RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the
LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for petitioner
then requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers
6
Rollo, pp. 22-33.
 Supreme Court E-Library

386 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

of Deeds to comply with the Order.

The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel
for petitioner a letter-reply 7 dated March 27, 2000, with two
attachments: 1) the 1 st Indorsement8 dated September 22, 1997
(the 1st Indorsement) issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ)
Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona),
and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-119 issued to all Registers of Deeds.
The letter-reply reads in part:
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in
view of the directive of the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement
dated 22 September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry
conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under
DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only one
OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds
on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to Decree
No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this
DOJ directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all
Registers of Deeds, copy attached, stating the following:
xxx xxx xxx
In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1 st
Indorsement dated 27 March 1998, x x x had recommended to the
Office of the Solicitor General the filing of an appropriate pleading
relative to the said Order dated 8 January 1998.
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by
the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban
Planning in its Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May
1998 x x x. 10 (Emphasis ours.)
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee
Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees
on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with
the following findings:
7
Id. at 9-11.
8
Id. at 12-13.
9
Id. at 14.
10
Id. at 9-10.
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 387

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994

and this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.]
ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It
was a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former
Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true
and legal heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as
government findings showed the physical and genetic impossibility
of such relationship[.]
iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds
of Caloocan City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith,
by issuing “certifications” and/or written statements to the effect
that OCT No. 994 was issued or registered on April 19, 1917 when
in truth and in fact it was issued or registered on May 3, 1917.
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan
City, likewise acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith,
when she signed the TCTs issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera
which bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT No. 994. Malice
was evident because she had previously issued certificates of title
in the names of other individuals which were derived from OCT
No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact questioned the
falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the registration of
OCT No. 994. 11 (Underscoring in the original.)

The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact
and was being kept in the LRA “to prevent its alteration and
tampering.” We quote the last portion of said letter-reply:
As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former
Register of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear
that OCT No. 994 was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong
impression that there were two (2) OCT No. 994, resulted in the double,
if not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title covering the
subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land
mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our Authority,
as the protector of the integrity of the Torrens title is mandated to prevent
anomalous titling of real properties and put a stop to further erode the
confidence of the public in the Torrens system of land registration.

11
Id. at 10.
 Supreme Court E-Library

388 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs
the issuance of transfer certificates of title as direct transfer from
OCT No. 994, suffers from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994
had long been cancelled totally by the issuance of various certificates
of title in the names of different persons; and that the plan and
descriptions of the lands were not based on a subdivision plan duly
approved by the proper government agency but merely sketch plans,
in violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with
the Order will result to duplication of certificates of title covering
land previously registered in the names of other persons. Besides,
in MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court did not declare the nullity of
the certificates of title which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued
on 3 May 1917. It merely invalidates the title of MWSS and recognizes
as valid the title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such declaration
as to the various transfer certificates of title emanating from OCT
No. 994. Under the law, there must be a separate action in court for
the declaration of nullity of certificates of title pursuant to the due
process clause of the Constitution.
As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of
Appeals (94 SCRA 874), “there are too many fake titles being
peddled around and it behooves every official of the government
whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it
that this plague that has made a mockery of the Torrens system
is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion, honesty
and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large.” 12
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st
Indorsement,13 made a substantive modification of the ruling
made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of
12
Id. at 10-11.
13
The 1 st Indorsement reads:
Respectfully transmitted x x x the attached report of the fact-finding
committee constituted pursuant to Department Order No. 137, to conduct
inquiry relative to the irregularly issued transfer certificates of title affecting
the Maysilo Estate, calling attention to the committee’s recommendations
insofar as our office is concerned. In pursuance thereof, you are hereby
directed:
1. Consistent with the rationale of Opinion No. 239, s. 1982 to immediately
issue a directive instructing the Registry officials concerned, to annotate on
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 389

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that “[n]ot

even the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set
aside or alter an established ruling made by the highest Court
of the land.” According to petitioner, respondent Guingona claimed
to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994
which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3,
1917, and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal
of the decisions of this Court on “what is the valid OCT No. 994.”
Petitioner contends that “[t]he rule is well settled that once a
decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify,
much less set aside the same” and that respondent Guingona
usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered
the Order of no effect. 14
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who
caused the issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular
No. 97-11 dated October 3, 1997, which had the same legal
effect on other cases similarly situated without hearing or notice
to the parties-in-interest, and that this was contemptuous and
contumacious and calls for “condemnation and reproof of the
highest degree.” 15

the originals of the questioned titles a memorandum to the effect that the
Report dated August 28, 1997 of the Composite Fact-Finding Committee created
under Department of Justice DO 137, questioning the regularity of the titles
has been forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General for evaluation,
xxx xxx xxx
3. To promulgate the following issuances:
xxx xxx xxx
e. An Administrative Order requiring the Registrars of Deeds to elevate
en consulta to the Administrator, for possible referral to the Office of the
Solicitor General for judicial action, court orders directing the issuance of
titles even after the court’s attention has been called by the Registrar to an
overlapping with an existing one or to any other irregularity in the title ordered
to be issued. (Rollo, pp. 12-13.)
14
Rollo, pp. 4-5.
15
Id. at 5.
 Supreme Court E-Library

390 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order

is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. C-424 cannot avail of the benefits granted to
them by the Order, and that she has no “plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this
action.”
In his Comment,16 respondent Guingona raises the following
grounds for denial of the petition:
1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona
in that the latter is no longer the Secretary of Justice.
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22,
1997 was pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997 made
by the committee created by Department Order No. 137
dated April 23, 1997 after conducting an independent fact-
finding investigation. It did not in any way alter or modify
any judgment of this Honorable Court.
3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any,
under the Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in
existence at the time the 1st Indorsement was issued.
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims
of damages. 17

Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the

Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the
mandatory duties being compelled to be performed in this case
by way of a writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting
from the said position and could not perform an act that pertained
to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not have
the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore
not a real party-in-interest in this case.
Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue
DOJ Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating
a committee due to several complaints received by the Office
16
Id. at 39-49.
17
Id. at 41-42.
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 391

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others,

the complaints prayed for the investigation of certain actions
taken by the LRA officials and personnel in connection with
transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him,
the committee was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-
finding inquiry:
“(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of
original Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing
Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon City as well as the issuance
and regularity of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived
therefrom; (2) in the event of a finding of the irregular issuance of
any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the involvement of and to
recommend the actions to be taken against person(s) and/or officials
and employees of this Department or its agencies who may appear
to have participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative
and/or judicial actions, if any, that may directly be undertaken by
this Department, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land
Registration Authority, and other units and attached agencies of this
Department, with respect to such irregularly issued Transfer
Certificates of Title, taking into account the final decisions of the
courts affecting the Maysilo Estate.” 18

Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from

the purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding
investigation was merely administrative to formulate and
recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which
the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other
agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of
the proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate
to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committee’s
report dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement
which spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action
which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow not
only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering
the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates
of title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely
18
Id. at 54.
 Supreme Court E-Library

392 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

an administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be

said that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court.
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement
dated September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order
dated January 18, 1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner
was denied due process as her rights and interests were non-
existent at that time. Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges
that petitioner was accorded due process when the LRA
Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioner’s counsel to
present petitioner’s case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent
Guingona claims that such opportunity to be heard satisfies the
requirements of due process, as the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard. 19
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona
argues that it is a factual issue which the petitioner must prove
in the course of a trial where petitioner’s claim for damages
can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court, however, is not a
trier of facts. Such being the case, it is inappropriate for petitioner
to include in her petition for mandamus a claim for damages
the amount of which she did not even specify. As it is, such
claim should be denied by this Honorable Court. There is also
no showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees for her
claims for damages. On this score alone, such a claim should
be outrightly dismissed.20
In her Reply,21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary
Guingona has to be named as private respondent because he
was the cause of public respondents’ failure to comply with
their ministerial duty. A private respondent is “the person interested
in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the
duty of such private respondent to appear and defend, both in
his own behalf and in behalf of the public respondents affected
19
Id. at 45-46, citing Conti v. National Labor Relations Commission,
337 Phil. 560, 566 (1997); Philippine National Construction Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 691, 704 (1997).
20
Rollo, p. 47.
21
Id. at 122-132.
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 393

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

by the proceedings x x x.” He is not charged with any improper

act, but he is a necessary party as the grant of relief prayed for
by petitioner shall require private respondent’s active participation.22
Anent private respondent’s argument that the 1st Indorsement
did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable
Court, petitioner counters that the 1st Indorsement and “pertinent
acts of private respondent x x x resulted in the altering or
supplanting of a judgment of this Court.” The complaints praying
that an investigation be conducted on the irregular issuance of
titles in the Maysilo Estate were made to the private respondent
by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3,
1917, after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in
MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondent’s claim,
she is entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and her
co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from
damages and losses incapable of quantification, because of the
wrongful act of the respondents. Petitioner cites the following
provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her argument:
RULE 65
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. —
A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the
last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned
in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto
shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any
damages or costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39
SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. —
Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment
or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration
of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
22
Id. at 123-124.
 Supreme Court E-Library

394 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the
execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on
motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true
copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought
to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse
party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the
interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue
the writ of execution.

Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a

function that did not belong to the Executive Department, because
he had caused the issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade
compliance with a court order that had already become final
and executory. Petitioner likewise avers that the doctrine of
separation of powers called for each branch of government to
be left alone to discharge its functions within its jurisdiction, as
it saw fit. 23
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator
of the Land Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City filed their Comment 24 on November 16, 2000.
Public respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs
are not the rightful owners of the property subject of said complaint
for partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are the
heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994,
and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share, ownership,
and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI
to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent
to deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report
of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which are
the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper,
the Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the

23
Id. at 128-129.
24
Id. at 144-165.
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 395

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled

to the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their names.25
Public respondents claim the following as facts:
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation.
On May 25, 1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of
the Republic of the Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner
and her co-plaintiffs are not and cannot be true heirs of the late
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). x x x.
As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already
been partitioned and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo
Tuason y Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion
Vidal y Tuason, Pedro Baños, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad
Jurado, Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel
Tuason Chua, Juan Jose Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de
la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason
y de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana
Tuason y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda
y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y Tuason, Emilia
Tuason y Patiño, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia O’Farrell y Patiño,
German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo
Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y
Tuason, Josefa Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon
in proportion to their respective shares, as evidenced by the document
entitled PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE
MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO)
consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex “D”,
and its faithful translation into English consisting of forty-nine (49)
pages attached as Annex “E”, and both made integral parts hereof.
As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering
the same subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names
of above-enumerated true owners.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through
the undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for
Reconsideration of the questioned Order of the lower court.
The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases
pending before the lower court has been held in abeyance to await
25
Id. at 148.
 Supreme Court E-Library

396 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

the resolution by higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo

Estate . 26

We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents

unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal
to issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner
and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully
excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever
claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a writ of
mandamus against said public respondents.
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence
related to this controversy as will be discussed below, we find
that it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance
with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not
their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the
petition must be dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified
by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights
of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus
will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute
or to which a substantial doubt exists.27 It is nonetheless likewise
26
Id. at 149-150.
27
Go v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 613, 616 (1996).
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 397

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving

judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of
an action already taken in the exercise of either. 28
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner
and see if compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by
mandamus; or, in the alternative, find out if substantial doubt
exists to justify public respondents’ refusal to comply with said
Order. Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to
refuse to grant petitioner’s request?
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land
Registration Authority29 instructive, to wit:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in
the performance of its duty, the LRA’s reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over
the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy
and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens
system of registration.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when
the petitioners’ legal right to the performance of the particular act
which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which
is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the
right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought
to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case,
mandamus cannot issue. 30 (Emphasis ours.)

As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance

by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely
28
Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 335 Phil. 766, 771-772 (1997); citing
Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, Volume III (4th Ed.), p. 233.
29
350 Phil. 779, 789-793 (1998).
30
Id. at 792-794.
 Supreme Court E-Library

398 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result
to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same
vein, we find that in this case, which involves the issuance of
transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be
compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since
there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject
parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of
those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could
respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require
the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit
in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-
reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona,
LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No.
1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioner’s request.31
There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to
refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained
in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917,
on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly
anchored their rights, did not exist.
It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent
case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok
Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation32 (the
2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding resolution33 in
the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case),
the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question
of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid
to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994,
such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions
set forth in said resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous
cases decided by this Court 34 which have held that there are
31
Rollo, pp. 9-11.
32
Supra note 1.
33
582 SCRA 583.
34
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 4; Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, supra note 5.
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 399

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from
which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived
their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title.
Regrettably, petitioner’s claim no longer has a leg to stand on.
As we held in the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of
this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the
titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced
from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such
titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court.
Since the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which
is that there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in
the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually
functus officio except on the basis of the “law of the case” doctrine,
and can no longer be relied upon as precedents. 35

Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994

allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists,
given the following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007
Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record,
that mother title was received for transcription by the Register
of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should
be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also
be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted
from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917,
although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or
the date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated
[19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The
fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an
OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of
such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals
and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at
bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994
35
Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, supra
note 1 at 341.
 Supreme Court E-Library

400 PHILIPPINE REPORTS

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as

inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga
with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any
other case operating under the factual setting the same as or
similar to that at bar.36 (Emphases supplied.)

To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and
Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok
case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of
Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to
adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider
whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions
may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of
the parties. x x x The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn
judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account
as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted
by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the
Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without
inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still
undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will
have the discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties
that could only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals.
x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence,
conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its
findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from
finality of this Resolution . 37

Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the

evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the
latter’s conclusions as to the status of the original title and its
subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding
that “there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of
36
Id. at 348-349.
37
Id. at 353-355.
 Supreme Court E-Library

VOL. 628, MARCH 9, 2010 401

Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al.

which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and

not 19 April 1917” and categorically concluded that “OCT
No. 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its
registration date is null and void.”
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff
in Civil Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The
records bear several attempts of different individuals to represent
her as counsel, a matter that could be attributed to her advanced
age and potential access to a vast sum of money, should she
get a favorable decision from this case. It appears, however,
that the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo
Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer
prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted above that
the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered,
OCT No. 994, does not exist.
The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ
of mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we
dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J. (Chairperson), Carpio Morales, Bersamin, and
Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.