504128

research-article2013
ARP44110.1177/0275074013504128American Review of Public AdministrationAberbach and Christensen

Invited Essay
American Review of Public Administration
2014, Vol 44(1) 3­–16
Why Reforms So © The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0275074013504128
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Joel D. Aberbach1 and Tom Christensen2

Abstract
This article examines why major reforms so often disappoint. It starts with an explication and
analysis of perspectives for understanding why reforms often do not work out as hoped—
rational comprehensive decision making and garbage can decision making, the latter in a
“pure” version and in a modified version of the garbage can widely identified with the work
of John Kingdon. We present these perspectives in a general way and then discuss how we
can understand features of two central aspects of reforms based on these perspectives—the
processes leading up to decisions on reforms and reform implementation processes. Some
brief case studies are presented to illustrate some of the problems laid out in the theoretical
part of the article. We conclude that nonincremental reform is vulnerable at every stage from
conception to implementation and that although reforms are certainly not always doomed to
failure, they are not often great candidates for success either.

Keywords
comprehensive-rational perspective, garbage can perspective, implementation, modified garbage
can perspective, public reforms

Prologue
The last few decades have seen an explosion of major reform proposals and significant modifica-
tion in government norms, structures, and behavior (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Public adminis-
tration scholars have been especially busy analyzing, evaluating, and even proposing reforms.
But the results have not been especially pleasing. Arguments range from opposition to the defini-
tion of problems, to skepticism about proposed solutions, and to disillusionment with implemen-
tation. Yet the process goes on. In this article, we synthesize some major literature on problem
and solution definition and on problems of implementation. We then look at a few cases to illus-
trate what we have discussed. The cases are brief, but illustrate the applicability of our analysis
to policy-level as well as what we would ordinarily categorize as administrative reforms. We
conclude with a discussion of why the situation looks the way it does, and why public administra-
tion scholars continue their love affair with reforms and reform evaluation.
We usually think of reforms as addressed to problems that require solutions. Something is
wrong and we want to fix it. Or something might be functional, but after careful examination we
know that it could be much better designed or implemented. We want as much information as we

1University of California, Los Angeles, USA

2University of Oslo, Norway

Corresponding Author:
Joel D. Aberbach, University of California, 4289 Bunche Hall, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472, USA.
Email: [email protected]

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4 American Review of Public Administration 44(1)

can get and we want to be confident that, after careful analysis, that is, what Dahl and Lindblom
(1953) label “rational calculation,” we can actually solve the problem, or successfully redesign a
system, or implement our policies more successfully (and that we have good criteria for telling
us whether or not we have succeeded).
We examine two basic perspectives to understand why reforms so often disappoint—first, a
rational comprehensive decision mode (outlined in the last paragraph), and then two closely
related versions of the garbage can mode of decision making, one the original and the other modi-
fied by later work (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001; Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Kingdon,
1984; March & Olsen, 1983).1 We will first present these perspectives in a general way, then
discuss how we can understand features of two central aspects of the reforms based on these
perspectives—the processes leading up to decisions on reform and the reform implementation
processes—and then use the perspectives for analyzing a few reform cases from the United
States and Norway. The cases are illustrative, meant to convey some of the flavor and texture of
attempts to make major reforms. For the reasons laid out in the next section (three perspectives),
we believe the cases are more typical than atypical, but the article is meant more to tackle a dif-
ficult and important set of theoretical problems related to reform than to provide definitive evi-
dence for our argument.

The Two Perspectives

Rational-Comprehensive Mode of Decision Making
The rational-comprehensive approach is the one that we all think of intuitively when we consider
problem solving. The problem is clear and the goal is clear (our preferences are clear, and we
know that we want to solve the problem). We then examine the alternative ways to get where we
want to go and select the most rational, that is, the most efficient, alternative for reaching the
goal.
This perspective comes in two main varieties. One is the “economic man” version of full
rationality, that is, actors have full information about alternatives and effects and make optimal
decisions (March, 1994; Self, 2000). Boston, Martin, Pallot, and Walsh (1996) show, for exam-
ple, that the extreme New Public Management (NPM) reforms in New Zealand in the early 1980s
were inspired by what they label “neo-institutional economic theory” which draws from theories
such as rational/public choice, principal-agent theory, and transaction cost theory. The other vari-
ety, the “administrative man” type of theory, is inspired by the works of Simon (1957) on bounded
rationality. We will focus more on the latter version, which puts greater emphasis on the influence
of formal structure and the organization of decision-making processes in public organizations,
not to mention the constraints that political and administrative actors have when handling
reforms.
The basic take on public decision making and reforms from this perspective is that leaders,
whether political or administrative, are the most important actors (March & Olsen, 1983).
They are supposed to have relatively unambiguous goals, intentions, and problem/solutions
definitions; they know how to organize and control the reform and implementation processes;
and they basically get the effects that they expect. Formulated in the classical concepts of
Dahl and Lindblom (1953), they score relatively high on social/political control and rational
calculation. Accordingly, one can then understand why reforms fail based on analysis of devi-
ations from this ideal.
This perspective has two distinct but often interacting features—hierarchical features and
negotiation-related features (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness, & Røvik, 2007. The hierarchical fea-
tures stress that the leaders who decide or have influence are few, and that there are closed and
“exclusive” processes and tight control (March & Olsen, 1983), whereas the negotiation features

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Aberbach and Christensen 5

focus on heterogeneity among leaders, control problems and tensions, and the legitimacy of
wider participation (Cyert & March, 1963; Mosher, 1967).

The Garbage Can Modes of Decision Making

The garbage can perspective, as used here, comes in two versions—one “pure” and one modified.
In what might be called the “pure” or “classic” garbage can, goals are not precisely defined (they
are discovered through action), technology is unclear (trial and error is the way actors proceed),
and there is fluid participation in decision making (participants drift in and out). The final product
is an unpredictable coupling of problems looking for solutions and solutions looking for prob-
lems, problems and solutions that are added and removed from the agenda, and actors are
described as “coming and going” to decision situations that also are fluid. All this yields deci-
sions that are therefore difficult to understand and explain (Cohen et al., 1972).
Some basic factors lead to such features. One is that actors, like political and administrative
leaders, have capacity or attention problems, leading them to be part-time participants (March,
1994). Another factor is that decision situations may imply ambiguous stimuli, that is, it is not
entirely clear what they are all about (March & Olsen, 1976). Decision situations are also situa-
tions where broader social roles are enacted, and therefore where the formal decisions to be made
are only part of the picture. This means that garbage can processes are often characterized by the
use of symbols to increase the legitimacy of leaders (March & Olsen, 1989; Weick, 1995).
John Kingdon’s (1984) excellent book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies presents a
modified version of the garbage can and applies it to agenda setting and decision making in a
variety of areas. Kingdon retains the framework of problems looking for solutions and solutions
looking for problems, but adds the role of policy entrepreneurs and windows of opportunity. This
gives more structure and instrumentality to the conception of the process and increases one’s
ability to predict outcomes (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001).
It is important to point out two aspects related to this perspective. First is its temporal or con-
textual nature, that is, there are many preconditions or contexts that have to be combined in a
dynamic way to open a “window of opportunity” and eventually to keep it open for some time.
Second, Kingdon’s argument adds a more culturally inspired element where traditions and his-
torical trajectories may be punctuated through critical junctures and shocks (Baumgartner &
Jones, 1993; Selznick, 1957), leading to a new path, something that, for example, was quite typi-
cal of the reforms in New Zealand (Gregory, 2003).
A more elaborate version of this, where rational and cultural thinking are combined, is found
in the works of Kathleen Thelen. Streeck and Thelen (2005) make a distinction between the
change process, which can be both incremental and abrupt, and the result of the change process,
which can represent either continuity or discontinuity. This yields four possible combinations of
process and result: “reproduction by adaptation,” which is a combination of incremental process
and continuity in result; “breakdown and replacement,” which is a combination of abrupt change
and discontinuity of result; “survival and return,” which combines abrupt change and continuity,
that is, after a period of conflict and upheaval the system reverts to its roots; and finally, “gradual
transformation,” which couples incremental change and discontinuity, meaning that major trans-
formations may result from many small and seemingly insignificant changes, whether as the
result of a cumulative process or of partly parallel processes.

Features of Reform Processes

Some reforms, often the more narrow ones, will succeed of course (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011).
Here, however, we will focus on the potential factors—based in the perspectives outlined—that
help explain why major reforms so often fail or disappoint. We will focus on two parts of the

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6 American Review of Public Administration 44(1)

reform processes, the process leading up to a decision on a reform and the implementation pro-
cess related to reforms.

The Process Leading Up to a Decision About a Reform—Rational Calculation and

Control
Rational calculation. It is not always that significant reforms are meant to answer a pressing soci-
etal or political question. Reforms may come about because of imitation, stylishness, or a desire
to undermine an existing interest or opponent, or to benefit one’s own group or supporters
(Brunsson & Olsen, 1993). These are more typically compatible with garbage can logic, where
the process often features solutions before problems as well as symbols and social motives only
loosely coupled to the nominal problem being solved. The same holds true for a modified gar-
bage can perspective, where the same feature of solutions before problems often holds and imita-
tion and the use of symbols are frequently necessary to take advantage of a window of
opportunity.
What are the criteria for saying something is a real problem as a basis for major public
reforms? Should the problem involve a lot of resources/money, influence a lot of people, be felt
as a problem by many, or perhaps be defined in a special unambiguous way? If a problem is col-
lectively oriented, it is per definition probably complex, significant and far-reaching, and can be
seen in different ways (March & Olsen, 1989). If it is selective, the probability of having actors
who do not agree that there is a real problem will increase and so will the level of conflict, and
with it also an increase in the probability that some actors, using mainly symbols, will try to
formulate it in a more collective way. Seen from a rational-comprehensive perspective, the top
political-administrative leadership has a main obligation of focusing on collective problems, but
those are often modified by processes of negotiation and compromise, something that can also
result in garbage can features. It is commonly said by garbage can theorists that too much of an
individual (or group) rationality focus will lead to organizational or collective irrationality (see,
for example, March & Olsen, 1976).
Another take on this is to ask what kind of problem one is addressing, which influences how
clearly it may be defined. Problems may be related to process, content/policy, structure, demog-
raphy, or competence. The more complex and hybrid the problems are, or the more “wicked” the
issues are, the more potential there is for difficulties with rational calculation, partly because
issues are multisectoral and multilevel (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). This again may lead to
greater use of symbols as a substitute for rational calculation.
As Cohen et al. (1972) emphasize in their garbage can theory, solutions may come first and
actors may try to connect one or more problems to the solution(s) already there. This deviates
from a main premise in the rational-comprehensive perspective. It does, however, potentially
save resources because less effort is used in problem analysis and planning. It can also be argued
that imitation of a reform or reform element that has been a success in another country or organi-
zation is perfectly rational. This, however, presupposes de-contextualizing argument, which is,
that a successful solution will likely fit everywhere (Røvik, 2011).
Is there a real solution to a problem in a reform process? Analyzing a problem correctly, hav-
ing an adequate theory to comprehend the problem, and designing a realistic and effective solu-
tion to the problem, are all potential features of a rational-comprehensive model. A problem may
be analyzed in different ways. A single, “objective” way to solve a problem is more difficult to
believe in when problems are complex. A more plausible view is that there are many possible
solutions, but that leaders, generally after a bargaining process within the elite, will have to
decide on one or a limited set of solutions. A third, related, way would be to try to increase legiti-
macy by bringing a broad set of actors into the process of defining a solution to a problem so that
deciding on a solution is a result of negotiations and compromise (Mosher, 1967). A fourth way

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Aberbach and Christensen 7

would be to keep more than one solution in the process so as to be flexible concerning changing
constraints and preconditions. An adequate theory to comprehend the problems could be based
not only in the rational-comprehensive perspective outlined but also in the learning process that
political and administrative leaders experience—learning from solutions recently used, said to be
a success or failure, or learning from others (Cyert & March, 1963; Sahlin-Andersson, 2001).
To design a realistic and effective solution to a problem usually entails a political and admin-
istrative process where there may be a lot of disagreements and negotiations, not to mention
symbolic and temporal features. If one thinks in two dimensions and two values—a limited or
wide problem on one dimension and a limited or wide solution on a second dimension solution—
one can argue that the least challenge would be to design a limited solution to a limited problem,
whereas a wide and comprehensive problem would usually imply a complex solution. But it is
also possible to have a limited problem and a wide-ranging solution, as was the case with the
Norwegian welfare administrative reform analyzed below, or a limited solution to a wide set of
problems because of limits on resources, for example.
It is of course possible, at least in theory, that the quality of analysis is so good in public
reform processes that it is quite effortless to define a problem, formulate a goal, and find a solu-
tion. Normally, however, such decision-making processes take time, and in the ideal process, at
least according to the rational-comprehensive mode, there are deep processes of defining the
problem and goals, and several solutions are discussed before a solution connected to the prob-
lem is decided on. But in real situations, the problems will vary in scope and in the number of
actors or institutions they influence and involve.

Political and administrative control. We now turn to elements of political and administrative control
(Dahl & Lindblom, 1953). The process leading up to a decision on reform may be characterized
by strong hierarchical control, as represented by the rational-comprehensive perspective, and,
continuing with this perspective, deviations from bureaucratic control can then be used to explain
the success or failure of a reform. Are the political and/or administrative leaders central actors in
the control process? What is the significance of attention and capacity problems in leaders’ con-
trol of the process? What is the significance of the scope of the reform—is it so, as often sug-
gested, that broad reforms are more difficult to control than more narrow ones (Wright, 1994)?
Overall, many reform studies suggest that leaders more often control hierarchically reform
processes due to their exclusive formal participation rights rather than because they score high on
rational calculation (Christensen & Lægreid, 2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). But many poten-
tial factors may undermine their influence. For example, March and Olsen (1983) show in their
study of American presidents and reforms that the presidents often initiate reforms, whether
structural or policy-oriented, but that after some time they lose political interest in them or have
their attention diverted by more pressing political questions, resulting in either the processes los-
ing momentum or other types of actors becoming more central in the processes.
A second important question about control of reform processes is whether negotiations
between political and administrative actors are typical features of the process. Are suggestions
primarily about the reform process or the content of the reforms, and do they engage both internal
and external stakeholders? Olsen (1988) states that negotiations in public decision making may
lead to at least three ways of deciding: one is that the winning coalition takes all (or most), a
second is compromise, and the third is “quasi-solution of conflict and the sequential attention to
goals” (Cyert & March, 1963). The dilemma for leaders, as indicated above, is to balance the
need for hierarchical control, clear goals and direction with broad participation and compro-
mises, a neat combination that potentially increases the legitimacy of solutions (Mosher, 1967).
But control can also be understood in accord with the two versions of the garbage can perspec-
tive. One potentially important factor here is cultural compatibility (cf. Brunsson & Olsen, 1993).
Do leaders try to further reforms that build on traditional cultural norms and values to increase

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8 American Review of Public Administration 44(1)

the support of the reform, or do they try to break with the past (Boin & Christensen, 2008)? If
there is cultural resistance to the reform, is this based primarily on the way the reform process
was organized or the content and culture that the new reform represents? What is the significance
of the scope of the reforms for cultural resistance (Wright, 1994)? If cultural resistance is strong,
this may be a sign that a classic garbage can process will be dominant because a lot of influence
is likely wielded by actors and factors that have the potential to undermine the process. Or, quite
the contrary, according to the modified garbage can mode, leaders may use symbols connected to
the culture to help take advantage of a window of opportunity (cf. Kingdon, 1984). The key here
is timing, because it is important to argue that the open window presents an opportunity to act
that might not come again soon.

Implementing Reforms
General features. The starting point for reform implementation is of course important for what
happens in the implementation process (Wright, 1994). If there have been both problems of con-
trol and rational calculation in the decision-making processes in the past, this can be adjusted or
modified in the implementation process, but more likely will influence implementation in a nega-
tive way. Conflicts over how to organize implementation might erupt, the sense of direction for
the reform may be lost, and emerging legitimacy problems may be evident. This is likely to be
magnified if reforms are broad and sweeping.
Assuming there is a real problem that is well understood, and a realistic and potentially effec-
tive solution, a reform may still fail in implementation because it has been compromised in
design through the political process, or existing interests may undermine it through a war of attri-
tion. The secret, according to Patashnik (2008), is to reorient the playing field so that new inter-
ests get a foothold and a stake in the reformed status quo, which partly reflects the fact that there
may be new actors implementing the reforms after the initial decision to make a change.

Rational calculation. Looking first at rational calculation in the implementation phase, there are
some central questions to discuss. Are the problems, goals, and solutions stable during imple-
mentation? If they change, why is that? Do preconditions for the problems, goals and solutions
change during implementation? Are there activities related to the problems or solutions that
cause the process to open up to additional actors and interests?
From a rational-comprehensive perspective, one can argue that a successful decision process,
scoring high on control and rational calculation, is best followed up with stability in particular
solutions in the implementation phase. But with changing conditions, it will also be rational to
adjust the solution chosen in the implementation process. According to a “pure” version of the
garbage can perspective, an implementation phase might be used by the participants in the deci-
sions to introduce new problems and solutions, which may create conflicts and ambiguity. And
according to a modified garbage can version, there may easily be other factors that are dominant
in the implementation process than in the decision phase. The reforms in New Zealand in the
early 1980s are an example of the latter. Roger Douglas (Minister of Finance) managed to com-
bine political entrepreneurship with distrust toward the civil service and a ready-made economic
model to take advantage of a window of opportunity (Aberbach & Christensen, 2001). After the
Labor Party won the election, a radical reform package was unexpectedly revealed and imple-
mented, something that in the short run paved the way for reforms, but later created conflicts,
distrust, and a new election system that fragmented the party system and made reforms more
difficult to implement (Vowles, 1995).

Political and administrative control. Another major aspect in the implementation phase is the control
and influence pattern. Does the pattern of influence among actors change in the implementation

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Aberbach and Christensen 9

process? Is there quite a different set of actors implementing than deciding? Following a model
where a rational-comprehensive perspective would be dominant, one would expect continuous
strong control in the implementation phase. But political leaders may eventually lose interest in
the reform, either because they see that it does not have that much potential for political success,
or because they see more interesting processes to attend to, or they may have capacity problems,
to list just a few possible reasons (March & Olsen, 1983).
It may also be a simple fact that as a result of division of work or functions, the implementa-
tion of reforms is loosely connected to top leaders because the reform involves institutions on
lower levels or a complex set of organizations, or the implementation project consists of repre-
sentatives from different public organizations, making it less likely that the deciding and imple-
menting actors overlap.
If one takes a version of a rational-comprehensive perspective one can ask whether a hierar-
chically driven decision-making reform process, combined with a more open implementation
process, makes a reform easier to implement? Or is it the other way round, meaning that a broad
and inclusive decision process combined with a strict hierarchical implementation will be better?
How easy is it to reorient the playing field, to make the basis for implementation better, without
losing the support of the original strong actors (Patashnik, 2008)?
Some of these mechanisms can also be understood based on a modified version of the garbage
can perspective. Indeed, according to a modified garbage can perspective, the implementation
phase is an opportunity to further new problems or solutions that may create conflicts or ambigu-
ity and for contextual factors to have an effect because of external processes and events that
interfere with the implementation, making a reform more difficult to fulfill.
What about the significance of cultural factors in the implementation phase (cf. Selznick,
1957)? Are cultural factors of more significance in the implementation process than in the deci-
sion-making phase because implementation is done on a lower level and dependent on how
organizational units and members react? In other words, what is the effect of the fact that imple-
mentation takes place where subcultures, either connected to organizational units and/or profes-
sions, have added importance? Is the reform well prepared to deal with potential cultural
resistance? Is the reform sensitive in a cultural way (Brunsson & Olsen, 1993)? How much lee-
way is there in the implementation process for discretionary behavior in regard to traditional
norms and values? Do political and administrative leaders build in “cultural safeguards” in antic-
ipation of possible cultural critiques?

Effects. The last questions to be discussed concern the criteria for defining a reform after its
implementation as a success or failure. How do different actors (including us as observers) define
success? Is the definition of success or failure dependent on their positions in the decision-making
and implementation process, or on the starting point of reforms, or on how broad the reforms
were (Wright, 1994)? Is there any agreement about when to do studies of effects? How about the
problem of attribution, that is, how does one differentiate the effects of the reforms one is study-
ing from the effects of other factors (Christensen et al., 2007)? Is the process of evaluating the
effects dominated by central actors who oversell its impact or adjust the target to fit the result, or
by opponents who come up with negative evaluations and views (cf. March & Olsen, 1976)? Is
there any actual effect of a given reform on the political or administrative process, on policy
content, on patterns of influence or on society?
These effects are seen in different ways in the different analytical perspectives. According to
the rational-comprehensive perspective, success or failure will depend on an unambiguous link
from motivation/goals/problems/solution to the fulfilling of these through implementation. It is
more difficult to define success or failure from the two garbage can perspectives because they
emphasize more individualistic/partial interests, the use of symbols and social effects, and an
expected outcome that cannot be defined in terms of some optimum result, at least as

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10 American Review of Public Administration 44(1)

conventionally understood. Because of the complexity and ambiguity in “classic” garbage can
and modified garbage can processes, most of those involved are likely to have some expectation
unfulfilled and there is the very strong likelihood of a gap between what has been promised and
what eventually results.

Applying the Perspectives to Some Reforms in the United States

and Norway
The brief cases we are about to outline are merely suggestive of the myriad reasons that major
reforms often run into trouble. They are examples of policy and administrative reforms (and, in
one case, a proposed reform), but they are just that—examples. They invite more detailed cases
using similar concepts to further illustrate and refine what we present here.

Tax Cuts by the Bush Administration

Context and process. When George W. Bush ran for President in the year 2000, he saw a big
problem. There was a budget surplus in the United States, one carefully constructed by President
Bill Clinton’s Secretary of the Treasury (Robert Rubin) and made possible in part by a tax
increase that many believe cost the elder Bush dearly in the 1992 elections. “W” argued that the
surplus belonged to the people and not the government (and that politicians would inevitably
waste it), so that a tax cut was the solution to an emerging problem (“See, I don’t think the sur-
plus is the government’s money. I think it’s the people’s money.” From the third presidential
debate, quoted in Mucciaroni and Quirk, 2004, p. 164). When economic conditions deteriorated
after the election, Bush argued that a tax cut was the means to an effective economic stimulus:

Then, when Senate Democrats proposed a small, temporary tax cut for that purpose, he shifted, once
more, to the supply-side argument that a permanent tax cut was necessary for long-term economic health
. . . . When energy prices increased sharply in the spring of 2001, he added yet another rationale: tax cuts
could provide relief to hard-pressed consumers (Mucciaroni & Quirk, 2004, p. 164).

And when the country went to war in the wake of 9/11, he argued that the tax cuts should con-
tinue (be made permanent) to keep the economy buoyant after the economic shock that accom-
panied the attack.

Analysis. In short, Bush had a robust solution to every economic situation—a tax cut, a further tax
cut, and the maintenance of the tax cuts, meaning that the problems, goals, or motives were added
to the solution. Bush and his aides played a major role in mobilizing congressional support for
the cuts, demonstrating a strong degree of hierarchical control and entrepreneurial activity. He
pushed the first set through after his election, a classic “window of opportunity” in the Kingdon
(1984) model. And he was vehement in defending the cuts. The notion of a solution that attaches
itself to almost any feasible problem that comes along seems to fit this policy reform quite well.
Unlike at least some aspects of the New Zealand case referenced earlier, however, the results
seem to have been mainly negative. The United States developed a huge budget deficit that
threatened to grow steadily unless something was done about it. One argument put forth by sup-
porters (and by the Bush Council of Economic Advisers) was that “deficits don’t matter,” that
they don’t “significantly affect long-term interest rates or economic growth” (Kingdon, 1984,
p. 165). Another was that the problem is on the expenditure and not the revenue side. The answer
was to cut expenditures. However, the administration mainly resorted to a variety of practices
that gave little confidence that it would cut expenditures (not including war costs in the budget,
for example), and the tax cuts ultimately contributed to a growing budget deficit.

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Aberbach and Christensen 11

One can read this case as that of a cherished and enthusiastically embraced “solution” that was
effectively joined by a well-positioned policy entrepreneur to every feasible “problem” that came
along. The solution had strong ideological-symbolic connotations, including a firm belief in it as
an “all-purpose” solution, something, in short, that has definite garbage can features.
The long-term consequences in this instance, however, may be dire, and expose the huge risks
that can accompany a major reform where a modified garbage can process produces a “solution”
that cannot possibly fit all of the problems with which it was said to be compatible. The case, as
just noted, also shows the impact of cultural factors—where a dominant narrative that the money
belongs to the people and not to the government and that low taxes are symbol of American
freedom—can make a tax cut solution seductively attractive as an answer to any economic prob-
lem. And, once enacted, it can be quite difficult to undo a reform like tax cuts because strong
interest groups coalesce around the maintenance of lower rates.

Reforming Social Security in the United States—The Bush Approach

Context and process. There is a long-term problem for the Social Security system in the United
States. With a growing number of retirees (swelled by the wave of retirements of the so-called
“baby boomers”) and a decrease in the ratio of workers to retirees, the system (now financed by
payroll taxes paid by employers and employees) will pay out more money than it takes in starting
in 2018 and will exhaust its “trust fund” (government bonds purchased each year with the surplus
of taxes over disbursements) in about 2042 (according to the system’s trustees; and now, accord-
ing to the latest estimate by 2033; Pear, 2012). At that point, without any changes in current law,
it will still be capable of paying about 70% of its projected obligations, but not its full obligations
(Lowenstein, 2005).
President Bush and many like-minded conservatives had long advocated private accounts for
social security (funds invested in instruments of the future beneficiary’s choice and held in the
beneficiary’s name). Bush made “reform” of the system his first major domestic priority for his
second term. And he announced a “crisis” in the social security system to which private accounts
were the solution.
Bush’s proposals met with resistance. One major problem was the claim of a problem. The
administration had trouble convincing large segments of the population that there was a problem.
As a Washington Post article on the visit by Bush to the constituency of a skeptical New
Hampshire member of Congress (Jed Bradley, a Republican) put it, “the White House has said
the aim now is to sell Americans on the idea there is a problem, in hopes that they will, in turn,
put pressure on their representatives in Washington to enact the president’s plan” (Loven, 2005).
Other problems were that there is a huge transition cost estimated for going from the current
system to a privatized system (the administration preferred to call the accounts “personal
accounts” because of the negative reaction focus groups give to the idea of “privatizing” social
security), and the administration’s insistence that there could be no increase in taxes to fund any
change made in the system. In the end, the proposed reform died in Congress.

Analysis. In brief, this was a case of a solution politically attractive to a few, a problem definition
unacceptable to the many, and a failed attempt to define a window of opportunity (a crisis) so that
the solution could be adopted. Bush tried to define a situation as a crisis by using a “worst case”
scenario common in garbage can–like processes, and he attempted to build support by making
the TINA (“there is no alternative”) argument that can work if one can sell people on the immi-
nence of a disaster, but he did not succeed in frightening enough people to move the political
process forward.
Had the “reform” been enacted, the increased insecurity brought on by private accounts would
likely have created additional short- and long-term problems (greater feelings of insecurity)

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12 American Review of Public Administration 44(1)

when markets crashed in 2008. But it is important to understand that an approach to reform of the
type described by Kingdon and other modified garbage can analysts is widely used in political
processes and often, as in the case of the Bush tax cuts, succeeds in enacting the policy change
advocated. Furthermore, if appealing to important constituencies, the reform can be very difficult
to undo, especially in a system with multiple veto points and strong interest groups that benefit
from the changes.

Welfare Administration Reform in Norway

Context and process. In Norway, all the parties in Parliament in 2001 demanded that the govern-
ment should reform the welfare administration because of problems of fragmentation and that it
should create a unified welfare service (one door policy). The government said that there was no
actual need for reform, but the Storting (Parliament) asked again for a proposal for a real unifica-
tion of the services. This time the government established a public committee consisting of aca-
demic experts in the field. It concluded that there were few needs for change, a position that was
politically impossible for the government (Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2007).
The incoming minister, now heading a unified Ministry of Social Affairs (employment, pen-
sions, and social services), proposed a reform compromise that was accepted in the Storting in
2005. The reform decision, the largest public reform ever in Norway, consisted of merging the
employment and pension services into a new central government welfare agency and of estab-
lishing local one-stop shops in every municipality. These local administrative welfare offices—
one-stop shops—were to be a collaboration between the new central agency and the social
services based in the municipalities. The main goals behind the new reform were three: get more
people from benefits into the workforce, secure a more coordinated and user-friendly service,
and create a more efficient welfare service.
In the implementation period, from 2006-2010, two major features were typical. First, all
new local welfare offices were gradually “rolled out” in 430 municipalities. Second, a major
reorganization of the reform was decided on in 2008. This reorganization, headed by the top
leadership in the new central agency, and accepted by the central political leadership, meant
that a lot of resources were moved from the local offices and up to the regional level. The
reorganization established five to six regional pension offices, something that happened at the
same time as a new pension system with a new information technology system was established
(Askim, Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2010). It also established several decision-produc-
ing county-administrative offices. In this way, it was thought, efficiency through economy-of-
scale would be better, professional quality would also be better, and the judicial rights of the
clients improved.
What are the arguments that this reform was a relative success? First, the three former services
have managed a more unified means of service delivery that, at least for the multiservice users,
seems to have yielded some positive effects. Second, the new welfare administrative system has
managed, through the establishment of a new pension system and the reorganization in 2008, to
learn from the problematic features of the 2005 reform and established a new organization with
better professional quality.
On the negative side, there are more signs of this reform being a failure, or at least disappoint-
ing in many respects. First, the fact that the reform had to be reorganized during the implementa-
tion phase suggests that the original reform was not well founded. Second, if we look into the
fulfillment of the major goals behind the reform, the results are very mixed, especially for more
efficiency. Third, there has been much criticism of the system, both after the initial reform and
after the reorganization, from the Auditor General’s Office, the national organization for the
municipalities, and the clients’ organizations. In addition, the affected unions have also become
increasingly negative, as has the media (Askim et al., 2010). Client satisfaction had not improved;

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Aberbach and Christensen 13

quite the contrary. Overall, it is fair to conclude that this has been a reform that has disappointed
in major ways.

Analysis. How can we understand the reform and its effects based on the three perspectives
outlined? Based on the rational-comprehensive perspective, rational calculation has problem-
atic features. First, a combination of an unwilling ministerial leadership and an initiative that
was ambiguous—what really was a unified service?—led to a rather low quality of organiza-
tional thinking in the initial process. Second, when the final compromise was proposed and
decided on in 2005, it produced a very complex model that was difficult to understand. Third,
the process leading up to the revision of the reform in 2008 scored higher on rational calcula-
tion because the internal processes of preparation and planning were more thorough. But it
was still not easy to grasp how the reorganization would greatly improve the chances of ful-
filling major goals.
With regard to political and administrative control, the picture is also rather mixed. The politi-
cal and administrative leadership had rather little control in the initial phase of the process
because the Parliament was driving the process. Political control was, however, taken back in
2004 when the incoming minister worked out a compromise that was accepted in the Parliament.
What happened in the phase leading up to the reorganization of the reform in 2008 was, first of
all, “arena-shifting,” that is, moving from one set of leaders and decision-making arenas to
another (Richards & Smith, 2006). The top leadership in the central welfare agency dominated
this phase. According to Patashnik (2008), one can say that the administrative leadership in the
ministry accepted this development because it led to modification of a reform they had originally
been against. The new political leadership saw the problems of the original reform and also
accepted the reorganization.
In accord with the garbage can perspective, the process showed loose coupling and the use of
symbols, both features that undermine rational calculation. The Parliament’s initiative was basi-
cally ambiguous. “One welfare service” became a strong symbol, but left unresolved the balance
between a strong central state and local self-rule. The main symbol in the compromise proposed
in 2005 was “local partnership.” That sounded good, but actually covered an organizational con-
struction that had the potential to produce strong central dominance. The initial reform process
definitely had features of solutions coming before problems. The reorganization also had features
of a preferred solution—vertical centralization to the regional level—looking for problems. The
reform was in many ways oversold by the administrative leadership in the welfare agency and
later on the leadership struggled to sell the new solution as a major improvement.
Do we also see features of the modified garbage can perspective in the reform and reorganiza-
tion processes? At two important points in time, entrepreneurs clearly used arguments, partly
symbolic, to take advantage of a “window of opportunity.” In 2004, the incoming minister
showed evidence of significant political entrepreneurship when he proposed a compromise that
was accepted in the Parliament. This entrepreneur took advantage of the open window left by the
ambiguous initiative by the Parliament, something that was politically necessary, but a major
negative factor was that the solution decided on was quite far away from what the political and
administrative leadership originally wanted.
This eventually led to a second window of opportunity in 2008. This time it was the director
of the new central welfare agency who was the entrepreneur and he argued that it was both
natural and imperative to develop the reform further. The window opened partly because of the
reemergence of old resistance toward the reform and partly because there was a great deal of
criticism of the effects of the reform. So this was a little like “the empire strikes back,” or
according to Streeck and Thelen (2005) a change from “breakdown and replacement” (a major
reform) toward “survival and return” (a reorganization that went back toward the original
arrangements).

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14 American Review of Public Administration 44(1)

Last, how do cultural factors play into the picture we have painted? First, when the reform was
decided on, the Storting and the pension services had their interests mostly fulfilled, while the
reorganization of the reform brought forward new winners, primarily the administrative leader-
ship and actors from the former employment service, who were originally against the reform. The
second reorganization partly turned the clock back toward reinstating some elements from the
old organization.

Conclusion
Our article uses basic theoretical perspectives for understanding why reforms often do not work
out as hoped—rational-comprehensive decision making and garbage can decision making, in a
“pure” and a modified version widely identified with the work of John Kingdon (1984). We first
presented these perspectives in a general way and then discussed how we can understand features
of two central aspects of reforms based on these perspectives.
The modified version of the garbage can perspective yields important insights for understand-
ing both the process leading to major reforms and the reasons they are so often disappointing.
Because the process often entails solutions in search of problems, rather than problems in search
of solutions, the match of the two is likely to be quite imperfect, even under the best of circum-
stances. The addition of political entrepreneurs and windows of opportunity to the explanation
provide an important role for the usual political factors that are often used to explain the process
and the reasons that imperfect solutions come out of the political process. They are important
factors, to be sure, but it is possible that they may be less important than the sometimes odd cou-
plings that are inherent in the garbage can process. Add to this the huge difficulties that often
present in implementing and, especially, in sustaining a reform, and the big question for us to
answer may not be why major political and policy reforms so often fail to achieve what is prom-
ised (or, in the case of the Bush tax cuts, achieve what is promised and then contribute to new and
more intractable problems); the big question may be why (beyond sheer luck), given the process
that seems to dominate, some major reforms succeed.
Although the three cases in the analysis are by no means fully representative of the reform
process—no three cases could be—they do suggest that structural reforms may be even more
difficult to design and implement than policy reforms, and that policy reforms attractive to many,
such as the Bush tax cuts, while perhaps relatively easy to get enacted, often contribute to big
problems down the road. Furthermore, and not surprisingly, all of the cases exhibit strong evi-
dence of garbage can features, and they show how useful the “window of opportunity” concept
explicated by Kingdon (1984) is, both in understanding the adoption of reforms and their later
problems in implementation.
The bottom line is that the road to effective reform is filled with obstacles. Reform, especially of
the non-incremental type, is vulnerable at every stage from conception through to implementation.
An old saying in American football is that three things can happen when one throws a forward pass,
and two of them are bad. In the world of reform, the stages are often numerous and almost always
complex, and things that happen in all of them are potential sources of problems. That does not mean
that reforms are always doomed to failure, but they are not often great candidates for success either.
They do, however, provide steady business for consulting firms and academic evaluators.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Aberbach and Christensen 15

Note
1. We are fully aware that there are many perspectives available on reforms, but we have chosen these as
fundamental approaches that cover a lot of ground.

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Author Biographies
Joel D. Aberbach is Distinguished Professor of political science and public policy and director of the
Center for American Politics and Public Policy at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is
the author or coauthor of Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight (Brookings,
1990), In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive (Brookings 2000), Bureaucrats
and Politicians in Western Democracies (Harvard, 1981), and Race in the City (Little, Brown, 1973). His
latest book, edited with Gillian Peele, is Crisis of Conservatism?: The Republican Party, the Conservative
Movement and American Politics After Bush (Oxford University Press, 2011).
Tom Christensen is professor in public administration and policy at the Department of Political Science,
University of Oslo, and also adjunct professor at the University of Bergen and at City University of Hong
Kong. His research focuses on comparative public-sector reform from an organization theory perspective.
He has published extensively in the major journals in the field. His latest book, coedited with Per Lægreid,
is The Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management (2011).

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