iLab

DNS and DNSSEC

Dominik Scholz
Slides by Benjamin Hof
[email protected]

Chair of Network Architectures and Services

Department of Informatics
Technical University of Munich

Lab 5 – 18ss

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Outline

Domain Name System

Authoritative name server

Resolver

Security

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Outline

Domain Name System

Authoritative name server

Resolver

Security

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The quest for memorable names

I IP addresses hard to remember for humans

I symbolic names mapped to addresses

address resolution
1. host files
I file with mappings
I copy between all machines
I /etc/hosts
2. protocol: Domain Name System
I by Paul Mockapetris in 1983
I wide deployment in 1988

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Domain Name System

I application layer protocol on UDP, TCP

I glibc call getaddrinfo(3)
I distributed name database
I deployed globally
I hierarchical structure
I extensible
I e.g. DNSSEC: security extensions inside the protocol itself

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Distributed hierarchical name space

net edu org

lwn tum gnu debian

cs ma ei

mail
Fully qualified domain name (FQDN) by label concatenation:
mail.cs.tum.edu.

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Distributed hierarchical name space

root zone (empty label) .

top level domain net edu org

second level domain lwn tum gnu debian

cs ma ei

mail
Fully qualified domain name (FQDN) by label concatenation:
mail.cs.tum.edu.

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Name server

Name servers can fulfill different functions:

1. authoritative name servers
I operated by a site on the Internet
2. resolver
I asked to resolve names
I contacts authoritative name servers

Example
Knot and unbound

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Outline

Domain Name System

Authoritative name server

Resolver

Security

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Zone

I subtree of the global name space

I delegated by parent
I managed by one organization
I hosted on an authoritative name server

Example
tum.edu. delegated by edu., containing www.tum.edu. and
mail.in.tum.edu.

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Authoritative name server

I only knows about its own part of the name space

I responsible, “authoritative”, for its zone
I may serve multiple zones
I usually primary and secondary servers exist for a zone
I synchronized with zone transfer
I avoid disappearance of the zone in case of outage
I load balancing

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Zones: example

net edu org

lwn tum gnu debian

cs ma ei

mail

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Resource record

I zone contains resource records (RR)

example.net. 3600 IN A 198.51.100.5

owner TTL class type RDATA

domain name where RR is found

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Resource record

I zone contains resource records (RR)

example.net. 3600 IN A 198.51.100.5

owner TTL class type RDATA

validity period in seconds when cached

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Resource record

I zone contains resource records (RR)

example.net. 3600 IN A 198.51.100.5

owner TTL class type RDATA

only Internet is relevant for us

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Resource record

I zone contains resource records (RR)

example.net. 3600 IN A 198.51.100.5

owner TTL class type RDATA

record type, e.g. IPv4 address

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Resource record

I zone contains resource records (RR)

example.net. 3600 IN A 198.51.100.5

owner TTL class type RDATA

resource data: e.g. 32 bit IPv4 address

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Resource records

owner TTL class type RDATA

i.example.net. 3600 IN AAAA 2001:db8::1
like.example.net. 3600 IN AAAA 2001:db8:af23::eb2
dns.example.net. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.25
i.example.net. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.205

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Resource records

owner type RDATA

i.example.net. AAAA 2001:db8::1
like.example.net. AAAA 2001:db8:af23::eb2
dns.example.net. A 192.0.2.25
i.example.net. A 192.0.2.205
i.example.net. AAAA 2001:db8::2

I RRset for i.example.net. type AAAA with more than one record!
I note: TTL and class usually omitted

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Zone file and record types

$ORIGIN example.net. ; everything will be relative to this

$TTL 1h ; default TTL could be overwritten later

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Zone file and record types

$ORIGIN example.net. ; everything will be relative to this

$TTL 1h ; default TTL could be overwritten later

example.net. IN SOA ns1 hostmaster [. . . ]

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Zone file and record types

$ORIGIN example.net. ; everything will be relative to this

$TTL 1h ; default TTL could be overwritten later

example.net. IN SOA ns1 hostmaster [. . . ]

; RRset with two records: NS
example.net. NS ns1 ; primary authoritative NS
example.net. NS ns2.registrar.example. ; secondary

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Zone file and record types

$ORIGIN example.net. ; everything will be relative to this

$TTL 1h ; default TTL could be overwritten later

example.net. IN SOA ns1 hostmaster [. . . ]

; RRset with two records: NS
example.net. NS ns1 ; primary authoritative NS
example.net. NS ns2.registrar.example. ; secondary
ns1 A 198.51.100.1

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Zone file and record types

$ORIGIN example.net. ; everything will be relative to this

$TTL 1h ; default TTL could be overwritten later

example.net. IN SOA ns1 hostmaster [. . . ]

; RRset with two records: NS
example.net. NS ns1 ; primary authoritative NS
example.net. NS ns2.registrar.example. ; secondary
ns1 A 198.51.100.1
example.net. MX 10 mail
; priority to order multiple MX RRs

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Zone file and record types

$ORIGIN example.net. ; everything will be relative to this

$TTL 1h ; default TTL could be overwritten later

example.net. IN SOA ns1 hostmaster [. . . ]

; RRset with two records: NS
example.net. NS ns1 ; primary authoritative NS
example.net. NS ns2.registrar.example. ; secondary
ns1 A 198.51.100.1
example.net. MX 10 mail
; priority to order multiple MX RRs
mail AAAA 2001:db8::1
A 198.51.100.2

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Zone file and record types

$ORIGIN example.net. ; everything will be relative to this

$TTL 1h ; default TTL could be overwritten later

example.net. IN SOA ns1 hostmaster [. . . ]

; RRset with two records: NS
example.net. NS ns1 ; primary authoritative NS
example.net. NS ns2.registrar.example. ; secondary
ns1 A 198.51.100.1
example.net. MX 10 mail
; priority to order multiple MX RRs
mail AAAA 2001:db8::1
A 198.51.100.2
webmail CNAME mail ; alias for a canonical name

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Delegation

sub.example.net. NS ns.sub.example.net.
ns.sub.example.net. A 198.51.100.3

I make ns.sub.example.net. responsible for the sub.example.net.

zone
I glue record to make the new name server findable
I possible misconfigurations
1. missing glue records
2. delegation loops

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Outline

Domain Name System

Authoritative name server

Resolver

Security

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Resolving name server tasks

I query: owner, class, type

I resolve a query from the root downwards
I cache responses based on TTL
I changes might only be visible after days
Allow access only from your network, never open for everybody

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DNS packet layout

IP UDP DNS header query answer authoritative additional

ID, flags,
number of RRs records

header
c,s QR query or response
s AA authoritative answer
s TC truncation (TCP as fallback)
c RD recursion desired
s RA recursion available
s 4 bit response code: no error, name error, server failure, refused
I number of resource records in each section

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DNS packet layout

IP UDP DNS header query answer authoritative additional

ID, flags,
number of RRs records

record sections
I query: only one record with owner, type, class
I answer: answer RRs
I authoritative section: name server delegation
I additional section: glue records, EDNS pseudo record

packet size limited to 512 octets

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Lookup

stub forwarder recursor

IP?

in.tum.de.

I recursive queries

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Lookup
k.root-servers.net.
2001:7fd::1
in.tum.de. A

de. NS a.nic.de.
a.nic.de. A 194.0.0.53
stub forwarder recursor

in.tum.de.

I recursive queries
I iterative queries
I glue
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Lookup
k.root-servers.net.

in.tum.de. A a.nic.de.

stub forwarder recursor tum.de. NS dns1.lrz.de.

dns1.lrz.de A 129.187.19.183

in.tum.de.

I recursive queries
I iterative queries
I glue
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Lookup
k.root-servers.net.

a.nic.de.

in.tum.de. A
stub forwarder recursor

in.tum.de. A 131.159.0.35 dns1.lrz.de.

in.tum.de.

I recursive queries
I iterative queries
I glue
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Lookup
k.root-servers.net.

a.nic.de.

stub forwarder recursor

dns1.lrz.de.

in.tum.de.

I recursive queries
I iterative queries
I glue
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Lookup
k.root-servers.net.

a.nic.de.

stub forwarder recursor

dns1.lrz.de.
131.159.0.35

in.tum.de.

I recursive queries
I iterative queries
I glue
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Reverse lookup

IPv4
I PTR record type
I special domain in-addr.arpa.
I 198.51.100.5 → 5.100.51.198.in-addr.arpa.
I small subnets require lots of CNAMEs

IPv6
I ip6.arpa.
I can be delegated per nibble
I 2001:db8::1 is:

1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.

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Outline

Domain Name System

Authoritative name server

Resolver

Security

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Common attacks using DNS

Cache poisoning
I send many packets with fake responses to a resolver
I spoofed source IP: address of an authoritative name server
I try to answer a query before the legitimate server does
Counter: randomize as much as possible: source port, query id

Distributed denial of service

I send queries with spoofed source address to open resolvers
I spoofed source address is attack target
I queries with high amplification factor
Counter: no open resolvers, ingress filtering (BCP 38)

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Security extensions in DNS: DNSSEC

I data origin authentication

I data integrity
I no confidentiality
I inside the protocol, no *S layer
I no flag day

Basic idea
I signatures with public key cryptography
I zone owner signs RRsets offline using private key
I full resolvers verify signatures using public key

How do we know that the signing key really belongs to the zone
owner?

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Changes

New RR types
I RRSIG: signature over RRset
I signature validity introduces absolute time into DNS
I DS (delegation signer): hash of public key
I DNSKEY: public key
I NSEC, NSEC3: for nonexisting domains

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Changes (cont’d)

header bits
c CD checking disabled: request delivery of DNSSEC records
s AD answer authenticated: DNSSEC successfully verified

EDNS extension
I uses pseudo record
I larger UDP payload size
c DO bit: DNSSEC OK: include RRSIGs, DS

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Zone signing
parent zone

signed child zone

RRset

child zone
RRset public key RRset

RRset private key

Note: root key comes with resolver software

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Zone signing
parent zone

signed child zone

RRset

RRSIG
child zone
RRset public key RRset

RRset private key RRSIG

Note: root key comes with resolver software

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Zone signing
parent zone

signed child zone

RRset

RRSIG
child zone
RRset public key RRset

RRset private key RRSIG

DNSKEY

RRSIG

Note: root key comes with resolver software

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Zone signing
parent zone
DS
signed child zone
RRSIG RRset

RRSIG
child zone
RRset public key RRset

RRset private key RRSIG

DNSKEY

RRSIG

Note: root key comes with resolver software

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Record collection

g.root-servers.net.

torproject.org. AAAA

org. NS a0.org.afilias-nst.info.
org. DS
resolver org. RRSIG DS
+ glue

torproject.org.?

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Record collection

g.root-servers.net.

torproject.org. AAAA

resolver a0.org.afilias-nst.info.

torproject.org. NS ns1.torproject.org.
torproject.org. DS
torproject.org. RRSIG DS
+ glue

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Record collection

g.root-servers.net.

resolver a0.org.afilias-nst.info.
torproject.org. AAAA

torproject.org. AAAA
torproject.org. RRSIG AAAA
ns1.torproject.org.

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Record collection

g.root-servers.net.

. DNSKEY

. DNSKEY
. RRSIG DNSKEY
resolver a0.org.afilias-nst.info.

ns1.torproject.org.

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Record collection

g.root-servers.net.

org. DNSKEY

resolver a0.org.afilias-nst.info.

org. DNSKEY
org. RRSIG DNSKEY

ns1.torproject.org.

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Record collection

g.root-servers.net.

resolver a0.org.afilias-nst.info.
torproject.org. DNSKEY

torproject.org. DNSKEY
torproject.org. RRSIG DNSKEY
ns1.torproject.org.

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Discussion
We have for each zone:
I DS
I RRSIG DS
I DNSKEY
I RRSIG DNSKEY
as well as the RRSIG AAAA.

Verify from the top:

1. org. DS, RRSIG using root DNSKEY/stored key
2. org. DS, org. DNSKEY
3. torproject.org. DS, RRSIG using org. DNSKEY
4. torproject.org. DS, torproject.org. DNSKEY
5. torproject.org. AAAA, RRSIG using torproject.org. DNSKEY

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Alternative signing scheme
child zone
parent zone
DNSKEY: KSK
DS (KSK)
DNSKEY: ZSK
RRSIG
RRSIG

RRset

RRSIG

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Deal with nonexisting domains

NSEC
sign the hole between two domains:
alice.example.net. NSEC charlie.example.net. A RRSIG NSEC
I + RRSIG
I no domains between alice and charlie
I alice only has A, RRSIG and NSEC records
I zone walking

NSEC3
I hash all domains
I order by hash value

0him. . . lfhr.example.net. NSEC3 0lver. . . oj3l A RRSIG

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Operational considerations

I offline signing
I small key sizes recommended for speed
I many parameter choices
I limited key lifetime, frequent rollover required
I best practice: key signing key, zone signing key
⇒ operational complexity
Example
Software like OpenDNSSEC or Knot automates a lot of this.

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Security gaps

I TLD/root key operators cannot be removed or replaced!

I last mile
I confidentiality
I actual connection content
I DDoS

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