Digital Democracy

and the Digital

Public Sphere

This sixth volume in Christian Fuchs’ Media, Communication and Society series draws on radical Humanist
theory to address questions around the digital public sphere and the challenges and opportunities for
digital democracy today.
The book discusses topics such as digital democracy, the digital public sphere, digital alienation,
sustainability in digital democracy, journalism and democracy, public service media, the public service
Internet, and democratic communications. Fuchs argues for the creation of a public service Internet run
by public service media that consists of platforms such as a public service YouTube and Club 2.0, a re-
newed digital democracy and digital public sphere version of the legendary debate programme formats
Club 2 and After Dark.
Overall, the book presents foundations and analyses of digital democracy that are interesting for
both students and researchers in media studies, cultural studies, communication studies, political sci-
ence, sociology, Internet research, information science, as well as related disciplines.

Christian Fuchs is a critical theorist of communication and society. He is Chair Professor of Media Sys-
tems and Media Organisation at Paderborn University’s Department of Media Studies. He is ­co-​­editor of
the journal tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. He is the author of many publications, includ-
ing the books Digital Capitalism (­2022), Foundations of Critical Theory (­2022), Communicating ­COVID-​­19:
Everyday Life, Digital Capitalism, and Conspiracy Theories in Pandemic Times (­2021), Marxist Humanism
and Communication Theory (­2021), Social Media: A Critical Introduction (­3rd edition, 2021), Communi-
cation and Capitalism: A Critical Theory (­2020), Marxism: Karl Marx’s Fifteen Key Concepts for Cultural
and Communication Studies (­2020), Nationalism on the Internet: Critical Theory and Ideology in the Age
of Social Media and Fake News (­2020), Rereading Marx in the Age of Digital Capitalism (­2019), Digital
Demagogue: Authoritarian Capitalism in the Age of Trump and Twitter (­2016), Digital Labour and Karl Marx
(­2014), and Internet and Society (­2008).
Digital Democracy
and the Digital
Public Sphere
Media, Communication and Society
Volume Six
Christian Fuchs
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Contents

List of Figures vii

List of Tables ix
Acknowledgements xi

PART I
Introduction 1

1 Democracy, Communicative Democracy, Digital Democracy 3

PART II
Foundations of Digital Democracy 19

2 The Dialectic: Not Just the Absolute Recoil, but the World’s Living Fire
that Extinguishes and Kindles Itself. Reflections on Slavoj Žižek’s Version
of Dialectical Philosophy in Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of
Dialectical Materialism 21
3 The Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication 69
4 Power in the Age of Social Media 91
5 The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism and Mihailo Marković’s Theory of
Communication 123
6 Sustainability and Community Networks 149
7 Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 177
8 Towards a Critical Theory of Communication as Renewal and Update of
Marxist Humanism in the Age of Digital Capitalism 199
9 Digital Democracy, Public Service Media, and the Public Service Internet 229

PART III
Conclusion 269

10 The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation:

Challenges and Opportunities for the Advancement of Digital Democracy 271

Index 301
Figures

4.1 Power as dynamic process 98

4.2 Two logics of the relationship between media technology and society 116
7.1 An example of ideology on Twitter 195
8.1 Communication as the mediation and production of human sociality
and social relations in society 208
8.2 Society as dialectical river 210
8.3 The polluted river as metaphor for alienation in class and
capitalist societies 210
8.4 The development of various types of advertising 216
8.5 Donald Trump’s use of Twitter 217
8.6 The antagonism between instrumental and co-operative in society in
general and the realm of communication 223
9.1 The media system as the public sphere’s communication system 233
9.2 Three models of digital democracy (based on van Dijk 2000, 49) 237
9.3 Digital democracy’s information processes 239
9.4 Concept of Club 2.0 257
10.1 The media system as part of the public sphere. Further development
on the basis of Habermas (­2008), Diagram 1 and 2 273
10.2 A model of the public sphere 275
10.3 The digital transformation of the public sphere 277
10.4 Concept of Club 2.0 292
Tables

3.1 Average annual number of mentions of categories critical of

capitalism in the titles of social science journal articles in specific
time periods 71
4.1 Three concepts of power 93
4.2 Three forms of power structures 97
4.3 John B. Thompson’s four forms of power (based on Thompson 1995, 12–18) 108
4.4 Power and counter-power in the media (based on: Curran 2002, Chapter 5) 110
5.1 Markovic´’s (­­1984, 72) typology of objects 130
6.1 Share of energy sources in world energy generation, year 2012 153
6.2 Checklist for sustainability issues in community networks 168
7.1 Four political economies of the media (­see Fuchs 2020a,­
Chapters 8 & 12 & 14) 186
7.2 A typology of cultural goods in the culture industry 189
7.3 The evolution of global newspaper sales, 2­ 015–​­2021 191
7.4 The development of the share of certain forms of advertising in
global advertising sales, in percent (%) 191
8.1 Society’s three realms of production 209
8.2 Alienation as the antagonism between instrumental and co-operative
reason in society 212
8.3 Capitalist society 214
8.4 Communication in the context of instrumental and co-operative reason 215
9.1 Two levels and four types of media organisations 234
9.2 Forms of digital democracy 241
9.3 Practices of digital representative democracy in the EU in 2016 and 2020 242
9.4 Digital plebiscites and digital deliberation in the EU in 2015 and 2019 243
10.1 Antagonisms in three types of alienation 280
10.2 The main actors in alienated society and in Humanist society. Based
on Fuchs (­2020a, 103: T­ able 4.4) 281
10.3 Three forms of digital alienation 284
10.4 Antagonisms in three forms of digital alienation 284
10.5 The most watched YouTube videos of all times 285
Acknowledgements

C­ hapter 2 was first published as a journal article. Reprinted with permission of the
journal tripleC: Christian Fuchs. 2014. The Dialectic: Not Just the Absolute Recoil, but
the World’s Living Fire that Extinguishes and Kindles Itself. Reflections on Slavoj Žižek’s
­Version of Dialectical Philosophy in “Absolute Recoil. Towards a New Foundation of Di-
alectical Materialism”. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique 12 (2): 848–875.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31269/triplec.v12i2.640

Chapter 3 was first published in German as a journal article using a Creative Commons
CC-BY licence that allows the creation and publication of derivatives, which includes
translations: Christian Fuchs. 2017. Die Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie der Medien/
Kommunikation: ein hochaktueller Ansatz. Publizistik 62 (3): 255–272. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1007/ s11616-017-0341-9

C­ hapter 4 was first published as a journal article. The author has retained the cop-
yright, which allows republication. Christian Fuchs. 2015. Power in the Age of Social
Media. Heathwood Journal of Critical Theory 1 (­1): ­1–​­29.

Chapter 5 was first published as a journal article. Reprinted with permission of

­Taylor & Francis: Fuchs, Christian. 2017. The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism and Mi-
hailo Markovic´’s Theory of Communication. Critique 45 (1–2): 159–182. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1080/ 03017605.2016.1268456

­Chapter 6 was first published as a journal article. Reprinted based on the author
agreement between the author and Elsevier that allows reprint of the accepted manu-
script and the published journal article in a compilation of the author’s works. Christian
Fuchs. 2017. Sustainability and Community Networks. Telematics and Informatics 34 (­2):
­628–​­639. DOI: https://­doi.org/­10.1016/­j.tele.2016.10.003

Chapter 8 was first published as a journal article using a Creative Commons CC-BY
licence that allows reproduction: Fuchs, Christian Fuchs. 2020. Towards a Critical Theory
of Communication as Renewal and Update of Marxist Humanism in the Age of Digital
Capitalism. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 50 (3): 335–356. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1111/jtsb.12247
Part I

Introduction
Chapter One
Democracy, Communicative Democracy,
Digital Democracy

1.1 Foundations of Digital Democracy

1.2 What Is Democracy? What Is Communicative Democracy? What Is Digital
Democracy?
1.3 The Chapters in This Book
References

1.1 Foundations of Digital Democracy

The book Digital Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere asks: What is digital democ-
racy? What are the democratic dimensions of communications and digital communica-
tions? What is the digital public sphere?

The book at hand is the sixth volume of a series of books titled Media, Communication &
Society. The overall aim of Media, Communication & Society is to outline the foundations
of a critical theory of communication and digital communication in society. It is a m
­ ulti-​
­volume book series situated on the intersection of communication theory, sociology, and
philosophy. The overall questions that Media, Communication & Society deals with are:
What is the role of communication in society? What is the role of communication in
capitalism? What is the role of communication in digital capitalism?

This book presents theoretical and philosophical foundations of digital democracy and
the digital public sphere. It engages with the dialectic as philosophical foundation of
digital democracy, the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication
as analytical foundation of digital democracy the concepts of alienation, power, praxis
communication, the public sphere, and sustainability as dimensions and aspects of the
analysis of digital democracy; journalism and democracy; public service media and the
public service Internet as important aspects of democracy, democratic communications,
digital democracy, and the digital public sphere.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-2
4 Introduction

Digital Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere is organised in three parts. Part I
(­­Chapter 1) is an introduction to digital democracy. Part II (­­Chapters ­2–​­9) discuss various
dimensions of the foundations of digital democracy and the digital public sphere. Part III
(­­Chapter 10) draws conclusions. Each chapter is focused on specific questions:

• ­Chapter 1: What is democracy? What is digital democracy?

• ­Chapter 2: What is the dialectic?
• Chapter 3: What is the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and
Communication?
• C­ hapter 4: What is power? How does power look like in the age of digital and
social media?
• C­ hapter 5: How can we make sense of the notion of praxis as part of a critical
theory of communication? How did the Yugoslav philosopher Mihailo Markovic´, a
leading member of the Praxis School, conceive of communication?
• C­ hapter 6: What do sustainability and unsustainability mean in the context of
community networks? What advantages do such networks have over conventional
forms of Internet access and infrastructure provided by large telecommunications
corporations? In addition, what disadvantages do they face at the same time?
• C­ hapter 7: How did Karl Marx see the role of journalism in the public sphere and
democracy?
• C­ hapter 8: What is the role of communication in a ­Marxist-​­Humanist theory of
communication that aims at advancing participatory democracy?
• C­ hapter 9: What are digital democracy and the digital public sphere? What are the
main trends in the development of digital media today, what are digital media’s
democratic possibilities and deficits, and what role can public service media play
in strengthening digital democracy and digital public sphere? What legal frame-
work is needed so that public service media can strengthen digital democracy?
• C­ hapter 10: How can Marx’ theory of alienation and Habermas’ theory of the struc-
tural transformation of the public sphere be combined for advancing the under-
standing of democracy today?

1.2 What Is Democracy? What Is

Communicative Democracy? What Is Digital
Democracy?
In order to understand what digital democracy is all about, we need an understanding of
what democracy is.
 Chapter One | Democracy, Communicative Democracy, Digital Democracy 5

1.2.1 Definitions of Democracy

Let us have a look at some definitions of democracy from academic works.

­a) “­While the word ‘­democracy’ came into English in the sixteenth century from the
French démocratie, its origins are Greek. ‘­Democracy’ is derived from demokra-
tia, the root meanings of which are demos (­people) and kratos (­rule). Democracy
means a form of government in which, in contradistinction to monarchies and aris-
tocracies, the people rule. Democracy entails a political community in which there

What Is Democracy? What Is Communicative Democracy? What Is Digital Democracy?

is some form of political equality among the people. ‘­Rule by the people’ may
appear an unambiguous concept, but appearances are deceptive. The history of
the idea of democracy is complex and is marked by conflicting conceptions. There
is plenty of scope for disagreement” (­Held 2006, 1).
­b) Democracy “­is better thought of as a means of managing power relations so as
to minimize domination […] a central task for democracy is to enable people to
manage power relations so as to minimize domination […] democracy is about
structuring power relations so as to limit domination” (­Shapiro 2003, 3, 52).
­c) “­democracy understood as s­ elf-​­government in a social setting is not a terminus
for individually held rights and values; it is their starting place. Autonomy is not
the condition of democracy, democracy is the condition of autonomy. Without
participating in the common life that defines them and in the ­decision-​­making
that shapes their social habitat, women and men cannot become individuals.
Freedom, justice, equality, and autonomy are all products of common thinking
and common living; democracy creates them. […] The key to politics as its own
epistemology is, then, the idea of public seeing and public doing. Action in com-
mon is the unique province of citizens. Democracy is neither government by
the majority nor representative rule: it is citizen s­ elf-​­government” (­Barber 2003,
xxxv, 211).
­d) “­for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory society to exist,
i.e. a society where all political systems have been democratised and socialisa-
tion through participation can take place in all areas. The most important area
is industry; most individuals spend a great deal of their lifetime at work and the
business of the workplace provides an education in the management of collective
affairs that it is difficult to parallel elsewhere. The second aspect of the theory
of participatory democracy is that spheres such as industry should be seen as
political systems in their own right, offering areas of participation additional to the
national level. If individuals are to exercise the maximum amount of control over
6 Introduction

their own lives and environment then authority structures in these areas must be
so organised that they can participate in decision making” (­Pateman 1970, 43).
­e) “­What is essential in a modern democratic theory? As soon as democracy is seen
as a kind of society, not merely a mechanism of choosing and authorising govern-
ments, the egalitarian principle inherent in democracy requites not only ‘­one man,
one vote’ but also ‘­one man, one equal effective right to live as fully humanly as he
may wish’. Democracy is now seen, by those who want it and by those who have it
(­or are said to have it) and want more of it, as a kind of ­society – ​­a whole complex
of relations between i­ndividuals – rather
​­ than simply a system of government. So
any theory which is to explicate, justify, or prescribe for the maintenance or im-
provement of, democracy in our time must take the basic criterion of democracy to
be that equal effective right of individuals to live as fully as they may wish. This is
simply the principle that everyone ought to be able to make the most of himself, or
make the best of himself […] democracy as a claim to maximize men’s powers in
the sense of power as ability to use and develop human capacities” (­Macpherson
1973, ­51–​­52).
­f) “­In monarchy the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its particular modes
of being, the political constitution. In democracy the constitution itself appears only
as one determination, that is, the s­ elf-​­determination of the people. In monarchy
we have the people of the constitution; in democracy the constitution of the peo-
ple. Democracy is the solved riddle of all constitutions. Here, not merely implicitly
and in essence but existing in reality, the constitution is constantly brought back to
its actual basis, the actual human being, the actual people, and established as the
people’s own work. The constitution appears as what it is, a free product of man.
[…] Just as it is not religion which creates man but man who creates religion, so
it is not the constitution which creates the people but the people which creates
the constitution. […] Man does not exist for the law but the law for ­man – ​­it is
a human manifestation; whereas in the other forms of state man is a legal man-
ifestation. That is the fundamental distinction of democracy. […] In democracy
the constitution, the law, the state itself, insofar as it is a political constitution, is
only the s­ elf-​­determination of the people, and a particular content of the people.
Incidentally, it goes without saying that all forms of state have democracy for their
truth and that they are therefore untrue insofar as they are not democracy” (­Marx
1843, 29, 30, 31).
­g) “(­a) Processes of [democratic] deliberation take place in argumentative form, that
is, through the regulated exchange of information and reasons among parties who
 Chapter One | Democracy, Communicative Democracy, Digital Democracy 7

introduce and critically test proposals. (­b) Deliberations are inclusive and public.
No one may be excluded in principle; all of those who are possibly affected by the
decisions have equal chances to enter and take part. (­c) Deliberations are free of
any external coercion. The participants are sovereign insofar as they are bound
only by the presuppositions of communication and rules of argumentation. (­d) De-
liberations are free of any internal coercion that could detract from the equality of
the participants. Each has an equal opportunity to be heard, to introduce topics, to
make contributions, to suggest and criticise proposals. The taking of yes/­no posi-

What Is Democracy? What Is Communicative Democracy? What Is Digital Democracy?

tions is motivated solely by the unforced force of the better argument. […] (­e) De-
liberations aim in general at rationally motivated agreement and can in principle be
indefinitely continued or resumed at any time. […] (­f) Political deliberations extend
to any matter that can be regulated in the equal interest of all. This does not imply,
however, that topics and subject matters traditionally considered to be ‘­private’ in
nature could be a fortiori withdrawn from discussion. In particular, those questions
are publicly relevant that concern the unequal distribution of resources on which
the actual exercise of rights of communication and participation depends. (­g) Po-
litical deliberations also include the interpretation of needs and wants and the
change of prepolitical attitudes and preferences. Here the ­consensus-​­generating
force of arguments is by no means based only on a value consensus previously
developed in shared traditions and forms of life” (­Habermas 1996, ­305–​­306).
­h) “­At the heart of strong democracy is talk. […] strong democratic talk entails lis-
tening no less than speaking; […] The participatory process of s­ elf-​­legislation that
characterizes strong democracy attempts to balance adversary politics by nourish-
ing the mutualistic art of listening. […] talk appears as a mediator of affection and
affiliation as well as of interest and identity […] It can build community as well
as maintain rights and seek consensus as well as resolve conflict. It offers, along
with meanings and significations, silences, rituals, symbols, myths, expressions
and solicitations, and a hundred other quiet and noisy manifestations of our com-
mon humanity. Strong democracy seeks institutions that can give these things a
­voice – ​­and an ear. […] The functions of talk in the democratic process fall into at
least nine major categories. […]

1) The articulation of interests; bargaining and exchange

2) Persuasion
3) ­Agenda-​­setting
4) Exploring mutuality
8 Introduction

5) Affiliation and affection

6) Maintaining autonomy
7) Witness and ­self-​­expression
8) Reformulation and reconceptualisation
9) ­Community-​­building as the creation of public interests, common goods, and
active citizens”

(­Barber 2003, 173–​­179)

1.2.2 Democracy in General

Understandings of democracy have in common that they conceive of democracy as the

­self-​­government of human beings. Democracy is opposed to monarchies (­rule of one em-
peror), oligopolies and aristocracies (­rule of the few), and to dictatorships and tyrannies
(­rule by violence and terror). Democracy is not just a means for minimising domination
but also the attempt of minimising the rule by violence.

There is no general agreement on what ­self-​­government means and what form it should
best take, which is why there is a variety of models of democracy. David Held (­2006)
discusses nine models of democracy (­see also ­Chapter 9 in this book): classical Athenian
democracy, liberal democracy, direct democracy or plebiscitary democracy, competitive
elitist democracy, pluralist democracy, legal democracy, participatory democracy, delib-
erative democracy, democratic autonomy. Democratic autonomy involves constitutional
guarantees of fundamental rights, parliamentary election of representatives combined
with direct democratic elements, citizens’ forums and other deliberative mechanisms,
extension of democracy to municipal services and s­ elf-​­managed companies, and trans-
national democratic institutions (­cosmopolitan democracy).

1.2.3 Participatory Democracy

Liberal, pluralist, and competitive models of democracy often limit the very notion of
democracy to the process of elections and the political system in a narrow sense. It is
much more desirable that decisions in society are enforced by elections than by vio-
lence and terror. But democracy does not end at the voting booth. Liberal democracy is
a still too limited concept of democracy. My own understanding of democracy combines
participatory democracy (­see definitions [c], [d], [e], [f]) and deliberative democracy (­see
definitions [g], [h]). Participatory democracy means that democracy is expanded beyond
voting and beyond the narrow understanding of the political system into other realms of
 Chapter One | Democracy, Communicative Democracy, Digital Democracy 9

society such as the economy. One of liberal capitalist society’s antagonisms is that as
citizens humans live in a democracy, but as workers they live in a dictatorship. Participa-
tory democracy argues and struggles for a society where the economy is democratically
organised, i.e. ­worker-​­controlled, which means democratic management of economic
organisations (­worker ­self-​­management). Participatory democracy also means that there
are economic foundations of democracy. Democracy requires space, time, and skills. In
a society, where resources are unequally distributed and many lack time and opportuni-
ties to engage in politics, an impoverished form of politics where the few rule over the

What Is Democracy? What Is Communicative Democracy? What Is Digital Democracy?

many is the likely outcome. A participatory democracy is a ­post-​­scarcity society where
necessary labour is minimised by the use of highly productive technology so that all
humans have the time and opportunities needed for practicing politics, political debate,
and political ­decision-​­making.

One implication of a participatory understanding of democracy is that if we want to

understand democracy, we need to look at political economy, i.e. the interaction of pol-
itics and economy. If we therefore want to understand the communicative and digital
dimensions of democracy, we need to understand the Political Economy of Communica-
tion and digital technologies. This is the reason why we in this book also have a look at
foundational political economy aspects of communicative and digital democracy such
as the dialectic (Chapter 2) and the Critique of the Political Economy of Communication
(Chapter 3).

1.2.4 Karl Marx: The Paris Commune as

Participatory Democracy
For Marx (­see definition [f]), democracy is opposed to the monarchy. For him, the first is
the ­self-​­government and ­self-​­determination of humans and the latter a dictatorship that
alienates humans politically. For Marx, democracy is the essence and truth of politics.
For Marx, only a polity that is democratic is a true state. And socialism, the workers’
collective ownership and s­ elf-​­managed governance of the means of production is the
essence and truth of the economy. Given that politics and economy are interrelated,
socialist democracy and democratic socialism are for Marx society’s and political econ-
omy’s essence and truth.

Marx’s understanding of the Paris Commune (which existed from March until May 1871)
as the “­reabsorption of the State power by society, as its own living forces instead of
as forces controlling and subduing it, by the popular masses themselves, forming their
own force instead of the organized force of their suppression” (­Marx 1871b, 487) is a
10 Introduction

reflection of the insight formulated in definition [b] that democracy as such works against
and is opposed to violence, tyranny, and terror as means of governance.

What form of democracy did Marx favour? This question is answered in his analysis of
the Paris Commune that he analyses in The Civil War in France (­Marx 1871a, 1871b,
1871c). The Paris Commune was the democratic governance of Paris in the period from 18
March to 28 May 1871 after the end of the F­ ranco-​­Prussian War. For Marx, the Paris Com-
mune was both ­self-​­determination of workers who abolished the private property of the
means of production and the democratic governance of the political system via elections.

In line with his earlier writings on democracy and politics, Marx stresses the opposition
of the Paris Commune to the monarchy and oligarchy. “­It [the Paris Commune] is not
political ­self-​­government of the country through the means of an oligarchic club and the
reading of The Times newspaper. It is the people acting for itself by itself” (­1871b, 464).
Political councillors were elected and politicians and officials were no longer serving a
central force such as the emperor, “[p]ublic functions ceased to be the private property
of the tools of the Central Government” (­1871a, 331). They were appointed by the Com-
mune to which they were responsible and by which they could be recalled (­1871a, 331).

In its most simple conception the Commune meant the preliminary destruction
of the old governmental machinery at its central seats, Paris and the other
great cities of France, and its superseding by real s­ elf-​­government which, in
Paris and the great cities, the social strongholds of the working class, was the
government of the working class.
(­1871c, 536)

The Commune consisted of elected councillors who together formed an assembly and
took political decisions:

The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal

suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short
terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men, of acknowl-
edged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a work-
ing, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time. […]
Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the Central
Government. Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hith-
erto exercised by the State was laid into the hands of the Commune
(­Marx 1871a, 331)
 Chapter One | Democracy, Communicative Democracy, Digital Democracy 11

The idea was to create many local communes that have their local democratic assem-
blies that are federated in a translocal assembly where decisions are taken on matters
of general concern that go beyond the local community and are guided by a constitution:

The rural communes of every district were to administer their common affairs
by an assembly of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies
were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate
to be at any time revocable and bound by the mandat impératif (­formal instruc-
tions) of his constituents.

What Is Democracy? What Is Communicative Democracy? What Is Digital Democracy?

(­Marx 1871a, 332)

The Commune was a ­working-​­class government that served workers’ interests and real-
ised democratic ownership and control of the economy:

Its true secret was this. It was essentially a ­working-​­class government the pro-
duce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political
form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation
of Labour. […] It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the
means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and
exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour.
(­Marx 1871a, 334, 335)

For Marx, the Commune was a socialist democracy and democratic socialism. The monar-
chy was abolished and replaced by a democracy with universal franchise, a constitution,
elected and translocal assemblies. The Commune was a socialist democracy because
the Commune democratically enforced workers‘ interests. It was democracy in the in-
terest of socialism. It combined elements of representative, participatory, and delibera-
tive democracy. And the Commune was a democratic socialism because it abolished the
private ownership of the means of production, extended democracy to the workplace,
and put workers in collective control of the means of production. The Paris Commune’s
element of democratic socialism was a manifestation of participatory democracy, the
extension of democracy from politics to the economy.

1.2.5 Deliberative Democracy: Democracy’s

Communicative Dimension
I am interested in deliberative democracy because deliberation inevitably is a commu-
nicative process where humans come together publicly to debate issues that concern
12 Introduction

them together and to try to reach a collective decision in a communicative manner. With-
out discussing the issues that matter and what solutions there might be, democracy
cannot exist. This is why the existence of a public sphere is key to any democracy.

Deliberative democracy involves, as we can learn from Barber (­definition [h]) and Haber-
mas (­definition [g]), everyone’s right to speak and to be listened to, rational arguments,
the equal access to resources that enable participation in deliberation, the power of
speaking and listening. Deliberative democracy requires institutions such as ­high-​­quality
journalism, public service media, and a public service Internet. These are institutions of
the public sphere that support democratic information, democratic communication, and
democratic ­decision-​­making by publishing information about matters of general concern
in society, enabling debate of key political topics, and fostering learning, understanding
by participation, social production, community, and creativity (­see especially ­Chapter 9 in
this book). Digital Democracy gives attention to institutions of the public sphere, espe-
cially in C­ hapters 7, 9, and 10. The public sphere is an important communicative aspect
of democracy.

Communicative democracy has to do with communication in the public sphere that ad-
vances democracy and the democratic organisation of communication(­s). Communicative
democracy involves both democratic communication and democratic communications.
Digital democracy has to do with digital communication in the public sphere that ad-
vances democracy and the democratic organisation of digital communication(­s). Democ-
racy requires both democratic processes and democratic institutions. Communication
operates both at the level of democratic processes and democratic institutions. Democ-
racy is organised as processes of communication where humans inform themselves, de-
bate, and take collectively binding decisions. And democracy requires institutions of the
public sphere that advance democratic information, communication, and ­co-​­operation.
Digital democracy means on the one hand the practices and processes of democracy
that are mediated by digital technologies. And on the other hand, it means a democratic
society where democratic information, communication, and participation are supported
by digital technologies. The theories of the public sphere, participatory democracy, and
deliberative democracy help us to understand democracy, communicative democracy,
and digital democracy. The approach taken by the present author is informed by critical
theories of society and the ­Marxist-​­Humanist approach, which means to stress the po-
litical economy of the communicative and digital dimensions of democracy. The political
economy of democracy, communicative democracy, and digital democracy requires us
to think about and analyse how ownership, class, power, domination, capitalism, social
 Chapter One | Democracy, Communicative Democracy, Digital Democracy 13

struggles, and normative questions frame and shape democracy and its digital and com-
municative aspects. The political and moral quest of Marxist Humanism is the insight
that socialist democracy and democratic socialism constitute a society that is adequate
to the human being and realises Humanism. Democracy is socialist when it advances
the common economic, political and cultural good of all humans. And socialism is dem-
ocratic when the economy is together with society organised in a democratic manner.
The implication for the realm of (­digital) communication(­s) is that communication as a
public process should be organised in manners that advance socialism and democracy
and that systems of (­digital) communication should not be organised as dictatorships
that are controlled and owned by the few but as democratic public systems that are
publicly owned and governed by communications workers and citizens in a participatory
manner. The public sphere, ­high-​­quality journalism, true public service media (­that are
autonomous from capital and the state), and a public service Internet are important as-
pects of democracy.

1.3 The Chapters in This Book

­Chapter 1: Democracy, Communicative Democracy, Digital Democracy

This chapter gives an overview of the book Digital Democracy and the Digital Public
Sphere. It also deals with the questions: What is democracy? What is communicative
democracy? What is digital democracy?

The chapter stresses the importance of the notions and theories of the public sphere, The Chapters in This Book
participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy for a critical and Humanist under-
standing of democracy, communicative democracy, and digital democracy. The chap-
ter stresses that advancing and understanding democracy requires the connection of
politics/­economy (­political economy), democracy/­socialism (­socialist democracy, demo-
cratic socialism), democracy/­communication (­democratic communication(­s), communica-
tive democracy).

C­ hapter 2: The Dialectic: Not Just the Absolute Recoil, but the World’s Living Fire that
Extinguishes and Kindles Itself. Reflections on Slavoj Žižek’s Version of Dialectical Phi-
losophy in “­Absolute Recoil. Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism”.

Slavoj Žižek shows in Absolute Recoil (­and previous Hegelian works such as Less than
Nothing) the importance of repeating Hegel’s dialectical philosophy in contemporary
capitalism. Žižek contributes especially to a reconceptualisation of dialectical logic and
14 Introduction

based on it the dialectic of history. The reflections in this chapter stress that the dialectic
is only the absolute recoil, a sublation that posits its own presuppositions, by working
as a living fire that extinguishes and kindles itself. I point out that a new foundation of
dialectical materialism needs a proper Heraclitusian foundation. I discuss Žižek’s version
of the dialectic that stresses the absolute recoil and the logic of retroactivity and point
out its implications for the concept of history as well as Žižek’s own theoretical ambigu-
ities that oscillate between postmodern relativism and mechanical materialism. I argue
that Žižek’s version of the dialectic should be brought into a dialogue with the dialectical
philosophies of the German Marxists Hans Heinz Holz and Herbert Hörz and that Žižek’s
achievement is that he helps keeping alive the fire of dialectical materialism in the 21st
century that is needed for a proper revolutionary theory.

­Chapter 3: The Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication

This chapter asks: What is the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and
Communication? It discusses how topical the approach of the Critique of the Politi-
cal Economy of Media/­Communication is today. It analyses the status of this field. At
the international level, there is a longer tradition in the Critical Political Economy of
Media/­Communication, especially in the United Kingdom and North America. Since the
start of the new crisis of capitalism in 2008, the interest in Marx’s works has generally in-
creased. At the same time, communicative and ideological features of societal changes’
unpredictable turbulences have become evident. This contribution introduces some spe-
cific approaches. It also discusses aspects of why the complex, multidimensional, open,
and dynamic research approach of the critique of capitalism and society that goes back
Marx’s theory remains relevant today. It stresses that there are many elements in Marx’s
works that can help us to critically understand communication: critical journalism, limits
on the freedom of the press, the analysis of the commodity form, the analysis of labour,
exploitation, class, ­surplus-​­value, globalisation, crisis, modern technology, the General
Intellect, communication, the means of communication, the contradiction between the
productive forces and the relations of production, dialectics, ideologies, social struggles,
and democratic alternatives.

­Chapter 4: Power in the Age of Social Media

There are a lot of claims about social and other media’s power today: Some say that
we have experienced Twitter and Facebook revolutions. Others claim that social media
democratise the economy or bring about a participatory culture. Other observers are
more sceptical and stress social media’s realities as tools of control. Understanding
 Chapter One | Democracy, Communicative Democracy, Digital Democracy 15

social media requires a critical theory of society that uses a dialectical concept of power.
A critical theory of society can then act as framework for understanding power in the age
of social media. This chapter is a contribution to critically theorising media power in the
age of social media. It categorises different notions of power, introduces a dialectical
notion of media power discusses the dialectics of social media power, and draws some
conclusions about the need for a dialectical and critical theory of the media and society.

C­ hapter 5: The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism and Mihailo Markovic´’s Theory of
Communication

Mihailo Markovic´ (­­1923–​­2010) was one of the leading members of the Yugoslav Praxis
Group. Among other topics, he worked on the theory of communication and dialectical
meaning, which makes his approach relevant for a contemporary critical theory of com-
munication. This chapter asks: How can we make sense of the notion of praxis as part of
a critical theory of communication? How did the Yugoslav philosopher Mihailo Markovic´,
a leading member of the Praxis School, conceive of communication?

Markovic´ turned towards Serbian nationalism and became the ­Vice-​­President of the
Serbian Socialist Party. Given that nationalism is a particular form of ideological com-
munication, an ideological a­ nti-​­praxis that communicates the principle of nationhood,
a critical theory of communication also needs to engage with aspects of ideology and
nationalism. This chapter therefore also asks whether there is a nationalist potential in
Markovic´’s theory in particular or even in Marxist Humanism in general.

For providing answers to these questions, the chapter revisits Yugoslav praxis philos- The Chapters in This Book
ophy, the concepts of praxis, communication, ideology, and nationalism. It shows the
importance of a full Humanism and the pitfalls of truncated Humanism in critical theory
in general and the critical theory of communication in particular. Taking into account
complete Humanism, the chapter introduces the concept of praxis communication.

­Chapter 6: Sustainability and Community Networks

Community networks are ­IP-​­based computer networks that are operated by a community
as a common good. In Europe, the most w ­ ell-​­known community networks are Guifi in
Catalonia, Freifunk in Berlin, Ninux in Italy, Funkfeuer in Vienna, and the Athens Wire-
less Metropolitan Network in Greece. This chapter deals with community networks as
alternative forms of Internet access and alternative infrastructures and asks: What do
sustainability and unsustainability mean in the context of community networks? What
advantages do such networks have over conventional forms of Internet access and
16 Introduction

infrastructure provided by large telecommunications corporations? In addition, what

disadvantages do they face at the same time? This chapter provides a framework for
thinking dialectically about the un/­sustainability of community networks. It provides a
framework of practical questions that can be asked when assessing power structures in
the context of Internet infrastructures and access. It presents an overview of environmen-
tal, economic, political, and cultural contradictions that community networks may face as
well as a typology of questions that can be asked in order to identify such contradictions.

­Chapter 7: Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy

This chapter asks: How did Karl Marx see the role of journalism in the public sphere and
democracy? It examines Marx’s significance for the theory of journalism. Marx was not
only a critical journalist himself but also a defender of freedom of the press, which he jus-
tified theoretically. Marx anticipated Jürgen Habermas’ critical theory of the public sphere.
Marx’s theoretical concepts of the critique of political economy are still of central impor-
tance for a critical theory of journalism today. The applicability of Marx’s concepts of the
commodity form, labour, and ideology to journalism theory are examined in this chapter.

C­ hapter 8: Towards a Critical Theory of Communication as Renewal and Update of Marx-

ist Humanism in the Age of Digital Capitalism

This chapter asks: What is the role of communication in a ­Marxist-​­Humanist theory of

communication that aims at advancing participatory democracy? The chapter’s task is to
outline some foundations of a critical, ­Marxist-​­Humanist theory of communication in the
age of digital capitalism. It theorises the role of communication in society, communica-
tion and alienation, communication in social struggles, social struggles for democratic
communication, the contradictions of digital capitalism, and struggles for Digital Social-
ist Humanism.

Marxist Humanism is a ­counter-​­narrative, ­counter-​­theory, and ­counter-​­politics to neolib-

eralism, new authoritarianism, and postmodernism. A critical theory of communication
can draw on this intellectual tradition. Communication and work stand in a dialectical
relationship. Communication mediates, organises, and is the process of the production
of sociality and therefore of the reproduction of society. Society and communication are
in class and capitalist societies shaped by the antagonism between instrumental and
­co-​­operative reason. Authoritarianism and Humanism are two basic, antagonistic modes
of organisation of society and communication. Instrumental reason creates and univer-
salises alienation.
 Chapter One | Democracy, Communicative Democracy, Digital Democracy 17

Digital capitalism is a dimension of contemporary society where digital technologies such

as the computer, the Internet, the mobile phone, tablets, robots, and ­AI-​­driven (“­smart”)
technologies mediate the accumulation of capital, influence, and reputation. A ­Marxist-​
­Humanist theory of communication aims to inform struggles for a good, ­commons-​­based,
public Internet in a good, ­commons-​­based society that has a vivid, democratic public
sphere.

­Chapter 9: Digital Democracy, Public Service Media, and the Public Service Internet

This chapter deals with the relationship between digital democracy and public service
media. It addresses three questions: What are digital democracy and the digital public
sphere? What are the main trends in the development of digital media today, what are
digital media’s democratic possibilities and deficits, and what role can public service
media play in strengthening digital democracy and digital public sphere? What legal
framework is needed so that public service media can strengthen digital democracy?

C­ hapter 10: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities for the Advancement of Digital Democracy

This chapter asks: How can Marx’ theory of alienation and Habermas’ theory of the struc-
tural transformation of the public sphere be combined for advancing the understanding
of democracy today?

The chapter builds on Habermas’ concept of the public sphere. It relates Habermas’ con-
cept to Marx’ notion of alienation. A fusion of these two concepts is used for showing The Chapters in This Book
that digital capitalism and capitalist social media do not form a public sphere but rather
constitute a danger to democracy. In contrast, a public service Internet is a manifestation
of the digital public sphere and digital democracy.

Internet platforms such as Facebook and Google, which dominate the social media sector,
are among the largest corporations in the world. At the same time, social media have be-
come an integral part of politics and public communication. World politicians like Donald
Trump have a total of more than 100 million followers on various Internet platforms and
spread propaganda and false reports about these media. The Arab Spring and the various
Occupy movements have shown that social media like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube
are important in social movements. No politician, no party, no NGO, and no social move-
ment can do without profiles on social media today. This raises the question of the con-
nection between social media and the public. This article sheds light on this question.
18 Introduction

Section 2 presents a concept of the public sphere as a concept of critique. Section 3 uses
the concept of the public sphere to criticise capitalist Internet platforms. Section 4 deals
with the potentials of a public service Internet.

References
Barber, Benjamin. 2003. Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press. Twentieth Anniversary Edition.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1996. Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Held, David. 2006. Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity.
Macpherson, Crawford B. 1973. Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Marx, Karl. 1871a. The Civil War in France. In Marx & Engels Collected Works (­MECW), Volume
22, ­307–​­359. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Marx, Karl. 1871b. First Draft of “­The Civil War in France”. In Marx & Engels Collected Works
(­MECW), Volume 22, ­437–​­514. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Marx, Karl. 1871c. Second Draft of “­The Civil War in France”. In Marx & Engels Collected Works
(­MECW), Volume 22, ­515–​­551. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Marx, Karl. 1843. Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. In Marx & Engels
Collected Works (­MECW), Volume 3, ­3–​­129. London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Pateman, Carole. 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Shapiro, Ian. 2003. The State of Democratic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Part II

Foundations of Digital
Democracy
Chapter Two
The Dialectic
Not Just the Absolute Recoil, but the World’s Living Fire that Extinguishes
and Kindles Itself. Reflections on Slavoj Žižek’s Version of Dialectical
Philosophy in Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical
Materialism

2.1 Introduction
2.2 Žižek on Retroactivity as Dialectical Logic
2.3 Žižek and the Dialectic of History
2.4 The Dialectical Logic
2.5 The Dialectic of History
2.6 Auschwitz
2.7 Conclusion
References

2.1 Introduction
Hegel’s dialectical philosophy has in the course of the 20th century lost influence in
Marxist theory. Too many theorists repeated the bourgeois and postmodern reflex to dis-
miss Hegel as having a deterministic, closed, and totalitarian system of philosophy. The
merit of Žižek’s recent work, including Absolute Recoil (­Žižek 2014), is that he has mas-
sively strived to bring back Hegel to the attention of critical theory. Recent discussions
about how to use Hegel’s Logic for reading Marx’s Capital and critically understanding
capitalism (­for an overview, see: Moseley and Smith 2014) show how important Hegel’s
dialectic remains in ­21st-​­century capitalism.

In this chapter, I reflect on Žižek’s version of Hegelian dialectics and ask the question
what kind of Hegelian dialectic is most appropriate today. This chapter consists of seven
sections. Following the introduction, Section 2.2 discusses Žižek’s logic of the dialectic
as retroactivity (­Section 2.2). Section 2.3 moves from Žižek’s dialectical materialism to
the discussion of his version of historical materialism. In Section 2.4, I suggest amend-
ments to Žižek’s dialectical logic and engages with the question of how dialectic works.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-4
22 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Sections 2.5 and 2.6 analyse the implications of Žižek’s historical dialectic, first in gen-
eral (­Section 2.5) and second by asking how we should interpret Auschwitz and what the
implications of Žižek’s h­ istorical-​­dialectical materialism are in this respect (­Section 2.6).
Section 2.7 presents some conclusions.

2.2 Žižek on Retroactivity as Dialectical Logic

The title of Žižek’s 2014 theory monograph Absolute Recoil refers to two passages in
Hegel’s Science of Logic that describe “­the speculative coincidence of opposites in the
movement by which a thing emerges out of its own loss” (­Žižek 2014, 1).

When positedness is s­ elf-​­sublated, an essence is no longer directly determined

by an external Other, by its complex set of relations to its otherness, to the en-
vironment into which it emerged. Rather, it determines itself, it is ‘­within itself
the absolute recoil upon itself’ – ​­the gap, or discord, that introduces dynamism
into it is absolutely immanent.
(­Žižek 2014, 2)

The “­action appears as its own c­ ounter-​­action, or, more precisely, […] the negative move
(­loss, withdrawal) itself generates what it ‘­negates’” (­Žižek 2014, 148). There is “­a with-
drawal that creates what it withdraws from”, an “­action appears as its own c­ ounter-​
­action” (­Žižek 2014, 148).

The proper dialectical process is for Žižek (­2014, 149) that there is a starting point (­positing
reflection) that becomes negated so that the original situation is lost and the origin is
experienced as inaccessible (­external reflection) and the new situation is “­transposed
back into the Origin itself” (­absolute reflection) (­Žižek 2014, 149). Žižek conceptualises
dialectical materialism as retroactive dialectic: The “­event is prior to the unfolding of its
consequences, but this can be asserted only once these consequences are here” (­Žižek
2014, 73). The

meaning of our acts is not an expression of our inner intention, it emerges alter,
from their social impact, which means that there is a moment of contingency
in every emergence of meaning. But there is another more subtle retroactivity
involved here: an act is abyssal not in the sense that it is not grounded in
reasons, but in the circular sense that it retroactively posits its reasons. A truly
autonomous symbolic act or intervention never occurs as the result of strategic
calculation, as I go through all possible reasons and then choose the most
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 23

appropriate course of action. An act is autonomous not when it applies a ­pre-​

­existing norm but when it creates a norm in the very act of applying it.
(­Žižek 2014, 21)

“­An act proper is not just a strategic intervention into a situation, bound by its ­conditions –​
­it retroactively creates its conditions” (­Žižek 2008, 311).

Žižek discusses as an example that for Marx, capital is a s­ elf-​­moving automatic subject
that acts on itself in the accumulation process, where invested monetary capital M is
turned into an increased amount of money M’ that forms the starting point M for a fur-
ther cycle of accumulation. In “­its ­self-​­movement, capital retroactively ‘­sublates’ its own
material conditions, turning them into subordinate moments of its own ‘­spontaneous ex-
pansion’ – ​­in pure Hegelese, it posits its own presuppositions” (­Žižek 2014, 31; see also
Žižek 2012, 250). Žižek concedes that capital is not really a ­subject-​­substance because it
depends on “­workers’ exploitation” (­Žižek 2012, 251).

One “­should look for a ­non-​­dialecticizable moment of the dialectical process” that is the
dialectic’s “­very motor” (­Žižek 2014, 89). Žižek speaks of this n­ on-​­dialecticisable moment
also as “­excessive element” (­Žižek 2014, 363), the “­chimneysweep element” (­Žižek 2014,
363), an “­intruder” (­Žižek 2014, 363), “­excesses which do not fit” (­Žižek 2012, 455), subla-

Žižek on Retroactivity as Dialectical Logic

tion’s “­constitutive exception” (­Žižek 2012, 471), or with Lacan as the objet a (­Žižek 2014,
361, 392). For Žižek, retroactivity is a key concept in order to interpret “­Hegel’s thought”
as harbouring “­openness towards the future” (­Žižek 2014, 221). “­Den” is Democritus’
term for less than nothing (­see also Žižek 2012, ­Chapter 1). Žižek (­2014, 396) says that the
negation of one is zero and the negation of zero is den. For Žižek (­2012, 38), the dialectic
proceeds “­from Nothing through Nothing to Nothing” so that there “­is only Nothing”. In
his book Less than Nothing, Žižek (­2012, 4) bases his analysis on the assumption that
“­reality is less than nothing”.

Žižek (­2014, 154) questions conceptions of the dialectical process as something, negation
of the something, negation of the negation so that the origin of something is restored
with new qualities at a higher level. He conceives the dialectic as beginning “­with noth-
ing”, a “­­self-​­negation of nothing”, so “­that something appears” (­Žižek 2014, 154). While
“­the negation of Something gives Nothing, the negated Nothing does not bring us back
to Something but rather engenders a ‘­less than nothing’” (­Žižek 2014, 331). Žižek distin-
guishes in this context between the standard Hegelian u­ pward-​­Aufhebung (­sublation)
and a d­ ownward-​­Aufhebung (­Žižek 2014, 332).1 The latter results in less than nothing,
it creates something without substance that cannot be sublated or negated, is undead,
24 Foundations of Digital Democracy

a ghost, and the lowest level (­Žižek 2014, 3­ 31–​­333). In the d­ ownward-​­Aufhebung, there
is “­no positive synthetic result” (­Žižek 2014, 336). First, “­something is negated, we get
nothing; then, in a second negation, we get less than nothing, not even n­ othing – ​­not a
Something mediated by nothing but a kind of ­pre-​­ontological inconsistency which lacks
the principled purity of the Void” (­Žižek 2014, 343). The dialectical triad for Žižek is: den
(­less than nothing) – ­​­­nothing – ​­something (­Žižek 2014, 391).

2.3 Žižek and the Dialectic of History

For Žižek, retroactivity is one of the temporal dimensions of the dialectical logic. After
a negation of the negation, the result becomes the starting point of a new dialectical
process so that the dialectic is infinite, it is posited as a new precondition of another
dialectical relation. The process of the positing of results as preconditions is a logical
constituent of the dialectic that at the same time also enables the historical development
of systems. “­Something becomes an other; this other is itself somewhat; therefore it
likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum” (­Hegel 1830, §93). Žižek however
uses the notion of retroactivity for grounding an understanding of human history as de-
veloping in a specific sequence.

For Žižek, retroactivity means that the future is “­a priori unpredictable” (­Žižek 2012, 221).
According to him, one can only look backwards in history to the past in order to make
sense of what actually happened, what went wrong, etc. He argues that there is “­the
paradox of a contingent actual emergency which retroactively creates its own possibility:
only when the thing takes place can we ‘­see’ how it was possible” (­Žižek 2008, 180).

Žižek says that the “­future is open” (­Žižek 2014, 36). He argues that although the con-
crete future is open, retroactively seen for Hegel history “­will always go wrong, and the
intended goal will turn into its opposite (­as confirmed by the reversal of revolutionary
emancipation into Stalinist nightmare)” (­Žižek 2014, 36). A

revolution also has to be repeated: for immanent conceptual reasons, its first
strike has to end in fiasco, the outcome must turn out to be the opposite of
what was intended, but this fiasco is necessary since it creates the conditions
of its overcoming.
(­Žižek 2014, 37)

First, “­a negation is enforced, but it fails, and the negation of negation draws the conse-
quences of that failure, giving it, as it were, [in a second attempt] a positive spin” (­Žižek
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 25

2014, 330). For Hegel, there are “­unexpected reversals” (­Žižek 2014, 23) in history: the
October Revolution turned into Stalinism, consumerism into religious fundamentalism,
etc. Only “­the experience of catastrophe can make the revolutionary agent aware of the
fateful limitation of the first attempt” (­Žižek 2014, 38). Today we “­find ourselves in a
strictly homologous Hegelian moment: how to actualize the communist project after the
failure of its first attempt at realization in the twentieth century” (­Žižek 2014, 37). Žižek
(­2009a, 28) in Living in the End Times argues that the modern state would not have been
possible “­without having to pass through the ‘­superfluous’ detour of the Terror”.

Žižek refers to one of the messages of Richard Wagner’s opera Parsifal: Die Wunde schließt
der Speer nur der sie s­ chlug – “­​­ The wound can be healed only by the spear that smote it”
(­Žižek 2014, 136). The “­very disintegration of traditional forms opens up the space of liber-
ation” (­Žižek 2014, 136). Žižek gives the example that the proper answer to English coloni-
alism in India is not a return to an alleged Indian origin that completely refuses everything
that comes from the West as evil, but to appropriate English language and culture, to im-
purify them, turning them into something different in a specific Indian context so that the
Indians “­become more European than the Europeans themselves” (­Žižek 2014, 150). Žižek
sees history not as a process, in which domination negates and alienates society from an
origin or e­ ssence – “­
​­ there was nothing prior to the loss” (­Žižek 2014, 136) – to
​­ which one
has to return, something good may rather “­come out of Evil” as “­a contingent ­by-​­product”
(­Žižek 2014, 131). For Žižek, the solution to the problem can be found in the problem itself.
The “­wound as such is ­liberating – ​­or rather, contains liberatory potential. […] we should
also fully endorse the liberating aspect of the wound” (­Žižek 2014, 138). In “­the course of
the dialectical process, a shift of perspective occurs which makes the wound itself appear The Dialectical Logic

as its ­opposite – ​­the wound itself is its own healing when seen from another standpoint”
(­Žižek 2014, 141). There “­is no original unity preceding loss, what is lost is retroactively
constituted through its loss, and the properly dialectical reconciliation resides in fully as-
suming the consequences of this retroactivity” (­Žižek 2014, 347). The absolute recoil is “­a
thing emerging through its very loss” so that “­the truth of every substantial thing is that it
is the retroactive effect of its own loss” (­Žižek 2014, 150).

2.4 The Dialectical Logic

In the Science of Logic, Hegel first mentions the absolute recoil in the discussion of
reflection. Essence differentiates itself from something unessential; it shines into forms
of being and is therefore also shine and reflection. Reflection is a threefold dialectic of
positing reflection, external reflection, and determining reflection.
26 Foundations of Digital Democracy

The positing reflection is an identity, “­the movement of the nothing to the nothing”, “­­self-​
­referring negativity”, “­the negating of itself” (­Hegel 2010, 346). It is the precondition of
development, what Hegel calls “­Voraussetzen” (­Hegel 1813/­1816, 26) – ​­“­presupposing”
(­Hegel 2010, 347). It is in this section on positing reflection, where the passage on the
absolute recoil that Žižek (­2014) refers to in the title of his book Absolute Recoil occurs:

Die Reflexion also findet ein Unmittelbares vor, über das sie hinausgeht und
aus dem sie die Rückkehr ist. Aber diese Rückkehr ist erst das Voraussetzen
des Vorgefundenen. Dies Vorgefundene wird nur darin, dass es verlassen wird;
seine Unmittelarkeit ist die aufgehobene Unmittelbarkeit. – Die ​­ aufgehobene
Unmittelbarkeit umgekehrt ist die Rückkehr in sich, das Ankommen des Wesens
bei sich, das einfache sich selbst gleiche Sein. Damit ist dieses Ankommen bei
suchd as Aufheben seiner und die [sich] von sich selsbt abstoßende, vorausset-
zende Reflexion, und ihr Abstoßen von sich ist das Ankommen bei sich selbst.
Die reflektierende Bewegung ist somit nach dem Betrachteten als absoluter
Gegenstoß in sich selbst zu nehmen. Denn die Voraussetzung der Rückkehr in
­sich – ​­das, woraus das Wessen herkommt und erst als dieses Zurückkommen
ist –​­, ist nur in der Rückkehr selbst.
(­Hegel 1813/­1816, 27)

Reflection thus finds an immediate before it which it transcends and from

which it is the turning back. But this turning back is only the presupposing of
what was antecedently found. This antecedent comes to be only by being left
behind; its immediacy is sublated immediacy. – ​­The sublated immediacy is,
contrariwise, the turning back into itself, essence that arrives at itself, simple
being equal to itself. This arriving at itself is thus the sublating of itself and
­self-​­repelling, ­pre-​­supposing reflection, and its repelling of itself from itself is
the arriving at itself.

It follows from these considerations that the movement of reflection is to be

taken as an absolute internal ­counter-​­repelling. For the presupposition of the
turning back into i­ tself – t​­ hat from which essence arises, essence being only as
this coming ­back – ​­is only in the turning back itself.
(­Hegel 2010, 348)

“­Absoluter Gegenstoß” has in the Cambridge translation of Wissenschaft der Logik

been translated as absolute ­counter-​­repelling, whereas in the Humanities Press edition
that Žižek the absolute recoil is used. Hegel argues that the posited reflection is the
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 27

presupposition of the dialectic, but it always has a before, it is already the result of a
previous sublation that has left something behind. Hegel here points out the cyclic form
of the dialectic, where the e­ nd-​­point of a dialectical sublation is the starting point of a
new contradiction.

Hegel brings up the notion of absolute ­counter-​­repelling or absolute recoil a second time
in the Science of Logic, when he discusses the ground:

Der Grund ist daher selbst eine der Reflexionsbestimmungen des Wesens, aber
die letzte, vielmehr nur die Bestimmung, daß sie aufgehobene Bestimmung
ist. Die Reflexionsbestimmung, indem sie zugrunde geht, erhält ihre wahrhafte
Bedeutung, der absolute Gegenstoß ihrer in sich selbst zu sein, nämlich daß
das Gesetztsein, das dem Wesen zukommt, nur als aufgehobenes Gesetztsein
ist, und umgekehrt, daß nur das sich aufhebende Gesetztsein das Gesetztsein
des Wesens ist. Das Wesen, indem es sich als Grund bestimmt, bestimmt sich
als das Nichtbestimmte, und nur das Aufheben seines Bestimmtseins ist sein
Bestimmen. – ​­In diesem Bestimmtsein als dem sich selbst aufhebenden ist
es nicht aus anderem herkommendes, sondern in seiner Negativität mit sich
identisches Wesen.
(­Hegel 1813/­1816, ­80–​­81)

Consequently, ground is itself one of the reflected determinations of essence,

but it is the last, or rather, it is determination determined as sublated determi-
nation. In foundering to the ground, the determination of reflection receives
its true m­ eaning – that
​­ it is the absolute repelling of itself within itself; or
The Dialectical Logic

again, that the positedness that accrues to essence is such only as sublated,
and conversely that only the ­self-​­sublating positedness is the positedness of
essence. In determining itself as ground, essence determines itself as the ­not-​
­determined, and only the sublating of its being determined is its determining. – ​
­Essence, in thus being determined as ­self-​­sublating, does not proceed from an
other but is, in its negativity, identical with itself.
(­Hegel 2010, 386)

The ground is not posited by something else, it is an essence that sublates any de-
termination and positing and is “­das Nichtbestimmte”, “­the ­not-​­determined”, as Hegel
says. We can say that the ground is the absolute recoil of the absolute recoil that posits
essence. It is a kind of ultimate and therefore also first and substantial essence, a recoil
of any recoil, a ­super-​­recoil, a substantial essence.
28 Foundations of Digital Democracy

But the positing reflection that is an absolute recoil is only the starting point (­that is at
the same time an end point that forms a new starting point) of a dialectical process: The
­reflection-­​­­in-​­itself externalises itself into a negative other so that there is what Hegel
calls external reflection: Reflection

[a]t one time it is as what is presupposed, or the reflection into itself which is
the immediate. At another time, it is as the reflection negatively referring to
itself; it refers itself to itself as to that its n­ on-​­being.
(­Hegel 2010, ­348–​­349)

In external reflection, an immediate “­becomes the negative or the determined”. It is the

negative of something other. This other is however also an immediate that is a negative
and the determined of the external other. The external reflection connects two things
that are both immediate beings and therefore also negatives that mutually negate each
other’s immediacy.

The determining reflection is “­the unity of positing and external reflection” (­Hegel 2010,
351). The sublation of the contradiction between one thing and another thing determines
the emergence of what Hegel terms “­Gesetzsein” (­Hegel 1813/­1816, 32) – ​­the “­posited”
(­Hegel 2010, 351).

Existence is only positedness; this is the principle of the essence of existence.

Positedness stands on the one side over against existence, and over against
essence on the other: it is to be regarded as the means which conjoins exist-
ence with essence and essence with existence. – If​­ it is said, a determination
is only a positedness, the claim can thus have a twofold meaning, according to
whether the determination is such in opposition to existence or in opposition to
essence. […] In fact, however, positedness is the superior, because, as posited,
existence is what it is in i­tself – ­​­­some-​­thing negative, something that refers
simply and solely to the turning back into itself. For this reason positedness is
only a positedness with respect to essence: it is the negation of this turning
back as achieved return into itself.
(­Hegel 2010, 347)

Positedness is a ­reflection-­​­­in-­​­­and-­​­­for-​­itself:

It is positedness – negation
​­ which has however deflected the reference to an-
other into itself, and negation which, equal to itself, is the unity of itself and
its other, and only through this is an essentiality. It is, therefore, positedness,
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 29

negation, but as reflection into itself it is at the same time the sublatedness of
this positedness, infinite reference to itself.
(­Hegel 2010, 353)

Herbert Marcuse argues in his Hegel book Reason and Revolution that the “­laws of
reflection that Hegel elaborates are the fundamental laws of the dialectic” (­Marcuse
1941/­1955, 146):

Essence denotes the unity of being, its identity throughout change. Precisely what
is this unity or identity? It is not a permanent and fixed substratum, but a process
wherein everything copes with its inherent contradictions and unfolds itself as a
result. Conceived in this way, identity contains its opposite, difference, and in-
volves ­self-​­differentiation and an ensuing unification. Every existence precipitates
itself into negativity and remains what it is only by negating this negativity. It
splits up into a diversity of states and relations to other things, which are originally
foreign to it, but which become part of its proper self when they are brought under
the working influence of its essence. Identity is thus the same as the ‘­negative to-
tality’, which was shown to be the structure of reality; it is ‘­the same as Essence.’
(­Marcuse 1941/­1955, 146)

The German Marxist philosopher Hans Heinz Holz analyses as part of his five volume his-
tory of dialectical philosophy (­Dialektik. Problemgeschichte von der Antike bis zur Gegen-
wart) Hegel’s works in detail. He also mentions Hegel’s concept of the absolute recoil
and argues that the absolute recoil connects the ­reflection-­​­­in-​­itself and the ­reflection-­​­­in-​
­another: “­In the positing of the other my ­reflection-­​­­in-​­myself becomes at the same time
The Dialectical Logic

a ­reflection-­​­­of-­​­­myself-­​­­into-​­another (‘­external reflection’)” (­Holz 2011b, 158, translation

from German2).

Holz also points out that determining reflection as the unity of posited reflection and ex-
ternal reflection is ­being-­​­­in-­​­­and-­​­­for-​­itself (­Holz 2011b, 159). “[B]­eing-­​­­in-­​­­and-­​­­for-​­itself only
is by being equally reflection or positedness, and positedness only is by being equally
­in-­​­­and-­​­­for-​­itself” (­Hegel 2010, 509). Holz from Hegel’s dialectic of reflection draws the
conclusion that “­every substance is the (­passive, posited) result of all substances’ inter-
action and every substance is at the same time active (­actively, positing) moment of this
interaction” (­Holz 2011b, 161, translation from German3).

Holz (­2011b, 158) discusses the ­re-​­formulation of the Science of Logic’s section on re-
flection in the Encyclopaedia Logic’s section on the pure determinations of reflection
30 Foundations of Digital Democracy

(­Hegel 1830, §§­115–​­122), where Hegel describes essence as a dialectic of the moments
identity, difference, and ground, that are negatively opposed to existence (§§­123–​­124),
which constitutes a contradiction that is sublated in the thing (§§­125–​­130). The notions
of positing reflection and external reflection are in the Encyclopaedia Logic manifest in
the dialectic of identity and distinction:

Distinction in its own self is the essential [distinction], the positive and the
negative: the positive is the identical relation to self in such a way that it is not
the negative, while the negative is what is distinct on its own account in such
a way that it is not the positive. Since each of them is on its own account only
in virtue of not being the other one, each shines within the other, and is only
insofar as the other is. Hence, the distinction of essence is opposition through
which what is distinct does not have an other in general, but its own other fac-
ing it; that is to say, each has its own determination only in its relation to the
other: it is only inwardly reflected insofar as it is reflected into the other, and
the other likewise; thus each is the other’s own other.
(­Hegel 1830, §119)

This contradiction of the one and the other also means that r­ eflection-­​­­in-​­itself is “­just as
much ­reflection-­​­­into-​­another and vice versa” (­Hegel 1830, §121). Something that exists
is a unity of contradictory moments, a unity of one and another:
Existence is the immediate unity of inward reflection and ­reflection-​­into­-another.
Therefore, it is the indeterminate multitude of existents as inwardly reflected,
which are at the same time, and just as much, shining­­into-​­another, or rela-
tional; and they form a world of interdependence and of an infinite connected-
ness of grounds with what is grounded.
(­Hegel 1830, §123)

It should at this point be mentioned that the development of Hegel’s works was dialecti-
cal itself. He posited a certain philosophical system and then negated it so that his own
system ­re-​­posited, questioned, and r­e-​­constituted in a sublating manner its own precon-
ditions. Hegel aimed at systematising his own philosophical system. The ultimate ap-
proach for this task was his Encyclopaedia. But the Encyclopaedia was itself a dialectical
development constituted in a dialectical process in three steps: first, the 1808 Nürnberg
version that was in a second step sublated by the 1817 Heidelberg version, which resulted
in a negation of the negation by the 1827 and 1830 versions elaborated in Hegel’s Berlin
lectures. The 1830 edition, published one year before Hegel’s death, is the ultimate and
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 31

most systematic version of Hegel’s dialectic. The Encyclopaedia is a “­grounded system-

atic of knowledge as totality” (­Holz 2011b, 176, translation from German). The Science of
Logic is not the grand dialectical logic and the Encyclopaedia Logic is not the small logic.
Saying the latter is small or short belittles its status, importance, and systematicity. The
Encyclopaedia Logic’s third edition/­version is rather Hegel’s systematic dialectical logic.

Both Hans Heinz Holz and Herbert Marcuse in their discussion of Hegel point out that the
part of reflection (­positing reflection, including the absolute recoil) that Žižek makes the
key foundation of his Hegel interpretation is only one moment of the whole dialectical
process, namely identity or ­reflection-­​­­in-​­itself that is the starting point and simultaneous
end point that becomes a new starting point of the dialectical process. And Žižek (­2012,
200) indeed focuses predominantly on what he terms the “­primacy of ‘­­self-​­contradiction’
over the external obstacle”. If one looks at Hegel’s system as a whole, as worked out in
the Encyclopaedia Logic in systematic form, then it becomes evident that the dialectic
does not need a n­ on-​­dialectisisable moment, an excessive element, or intruder that is
the motor of the dialectic and enables the retroactive positing of the dialectic’s own pre-
conditions so that something emerges out of nothing (­or nothing from less than nothing).

In the dialectical process, there is always something emerging from something and
at the same time something immersing into nothing. This is the precise threefold
meaning of the German term “­Aufhebung” (­sublation) as (­a) preservation, (­b) elimi-
nation, and (­c) uplifting. There is no pure nothing; otherwise, a spiritual being (­God)
would have had to create something out of nothing (­creatio ex nihilo). In a ­dialectical-​
­materialist worldview, there is a dynamic material substance of the world that is
endless and has always existed. It is however a process substance that continuously
The Dialectical Logic

develops from something into nothing and something new by negating negations that
sublate (­aufheben) parts of the world. In a dialectical process, something is sublated
(­aufgehoben): parts of it are eliminated, other parts preserved, and new parts emerge
out of it. So something emerges from something, but this something is something dif-
ferent. But given that it is again something, the world and the something remain some
thing, and is therefore one that returns into itself. But this return or what Hegel and
Žižek call the absolute recoil is a sublating return that splits something off something
and at the same time adds something to something so that a new something emerges.
Sublation at the same time preserves, cancels out, and creates new qualities. That
something emerges from something is one aspect of the dialectical process. But it is
not the only one: The newly emerging something also has new qualities, so also noth-
ing emerges out of something. Some older qualities may cease to exist so that parts
32 Foundations of Digital Democracy

of something turn into nothing, but the old continues to exist and shape the new. And
finally, given that there are mere potentialities that have not been realised and consti-
tute ­non-​­being (­or ­not-​­yet being) in the old and the new, also and old nothing turns in a
sublation into a new nothing: A new field of possibilities, of ­non-​­existing realities that
are pure potentialities, emerges.

In the Encyclopaedia’s section on the logic of being, Hegel points out the double pro-
cess of sublation (­Aufhebung) as the creation of something out of something and turning
something into nothing:

Es ist hierbei an die gedoppelte Bedeutung unseres deutschen Ausdrucks aufhe-

ben zu erinnern. Unter aufheben verstehen wir einmal soviel als hinwegräumen,
negieren, und sagen demgemäß z. B., ein Gesetz, eine Einrichtung usw. seien
aufgehoben. Weiter heißt dann aber auch aufheben soviel als aufbewahren,
und wir sprechen in diesem Sinn davon, daß etwas wohl aufgehoben sei.
(­Hegel 1830 [German], §96)

At this point we should remember the double meaning of the German expression
‘­aufheben’. On the one hand, we understand it to mean ‘­clear away’ or ‘­cancel’,
and in that sense we say that a law or regulation is cancelled (­aufgehoben). But
the word also means ‘­to preserve’, and we say in this sense that something is
well taken care of (­wohl aufgehoben)
(­Hegel 1830, §96)

Hegel explicates the relationship of being and nothingness:

In becoming, being, as one with nothing, and nothing as one with being, are only
vanishing [terms]; because of its contradiction becoming collapses inwardly, into
the unity within which both are sublated; in this way its result is b­ eing-​­there.
(§89)

The result of the dialectic is

a determinate result, which here is not a pure nothing but a nothing which
includes being within itself, and equally a being, which includes nothing. It
follows that (­1) ­being-​­there is the unity of being and nothing, in which the
immediacy of these determinations, and therewith their contradiction, has dis-
appeared in their ­relation – ​­a unity in which they are only moments.
(­Hegel 1830, §89)
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 33

That is to say, becoming contains being and nothing within itself and it does this
in such a way that they simply overturn into one another and reciprocally sublate
one another as well as themselves. In that way becoming proves itself to be what
is thoroughly restless, but unable to maintain itself in this abstract restlessness;
for, insofar as being and nothing vanish in ­becoming – ​­and just this is its ­concept – ​
­becoming is thereby itself something that vanishes, like a fire, that dies out within
itself by consuming its material. But the result of this process is not empty noth-
ing; instead it is being that is identical with negation, which we call ­being-­​­­there-​
­and its significance proves to be, first of all, this: that it is what has become.
(­Hegel 1830, addition to §89)

It is just one moment of the dialectic that becoming is “­the movement from nothing to
nothing and thereby back to itself” (­Hegel 2010, 346). It is at the same time the intercon-
nected movement from something to something, something to nothing, and nothing to
something. The dialectic is a dialectic of ­coming-­​­­to-​­be and ­ceasing-­​­­to-​­be. It is a fire that
dies out within itself by consuming its material that results in the moment of dying out in
a new material that can and will itself catch fire or instigate a new fire. The dialectic is
a fire that in the moment of dying out is born again.

Hegel’s Logic was much influenced by Heraclitus’ (­­535–​­475 BC) philosophy, in which
the dialectic constitutes the world’s objectivity, its being, and becoming. “­There is no
proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic” (­Hegel 1892, 279). For
Heraclitus, being is nothing and nothing is being because they are two different and at
the same time identical moments of the dialectic of becoming. The Dialectical Logic

Heraclitus says: ‘­Everything is in a state of flux; nothing subsists nor does it

ever remain the same’. […] This universal principle is better characterized as
Be coming, the truth of Being; since everything is and is not, Heraclitus ex-
presses that everything is becoming. Not merely does origination belong to it,
but passing away as well; both are not independent, but identical.
(­Hegel 1892, 283)

Heraclitus

determined the real process in its abstract moments by separating two sides in ­it – ​
­‘­the way upwards and the way downwards’ – t​­ he one being division, in that it is the
existence of opposites, and the other the unification of these existent opposites.
(­Hegel 1892, 288)
34 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Heraclitus draws from the dialectic the materialist conclusion that there is no God and
the world has the capacity of a productive dialectic, i.e. to create itself like a living fire:

With this in view, we find Heraclitus, according to Clement of Alexandria, say-

ing: ‘­The universe was made neither by God nor man, but it ever was and is,
and will be, a living fire, that which, in accordance with its laws, kindles and
goes out’.
(­Hegel 1892, 289)

In a new translation of Heraclitus, this passage reads the following way: “­That which al-
ways was, and is, and will be, everliving fire, the same for all, the cosmos, made neither
by god nor man, replenishes in measure as it burns away” (­Heraclitus 2001, §20). “­As all
things change to fire, […] fire exhausted falls back into things” (­Heraclitus 2001, §22).

The philosopher Hans Heinz Holz argues that Heraclitus “­connected ­coming-­​­­to-​­be and
­ceasing-­​­­to-​­be in the cosmos […] to the nature of the fire” (­Holz 2011a, 212, translation
from German). According to Holz, Heraclitus sees transition as the world’s logos: The
logos “­retracts the many into the one and disassembles the one into the many” (­Holz
2011a, 218, translation from German). Holz considers Heraclitus as a representative of
a dialectic of the real understood as “­the unity of the world and the manifoldness of
things” (­Holz 2011a, 222, translation from German). The fire would be a metaphor for
the world’s real dialectic (­Holz 2011a, 222). Holz sees Heraclitus as the dialectic’s “­prime
father in the Occident” (­Holz 2011a, 223, translation from German). The German Marxist
philosopher Herbert Hörz argues in his book Materialistische Dialektik (­Materialist Dia-
lectic) that Heraclitus formulated a “­decisive foundational notion of the dialectic” when
seeing “­movement as matter’s mode of existence. Nature, society and humans consist
of contradictions, that are the driving forces of events” (­Hörz 2009, 28, translation from
German).

Matter is a causa sui, it has the capacity to organise itself and produce new forms and
levels of organisation of matter. The s­ elf-​­organisation of matter is the ultimate absolute
recoil: In every transition from one form of the organisation of matter to another (­e.g.
from inanimate to animate nature, from the animal to the human, from capitalism to
communism, etc.), matter posits its own presuppositions as the ultimate absolute recoil,
namely the capacity to produce forms of matter and to thereby reproduce itself. A spe-
cific quality of human matter is that it is matter that is conscious of its creation of active
relationships: humans constitute the social world through their social work and social
interconnection with others. Humans as a specific form of the organisation of matter, ask
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 35

themselves: “­What’s the matter of matter in society?” They have the capacity to actively
reflect on what society they want to live in and bring about. Such conscious planning
capacity does not mean that human social actions are always successful (­results cor-
responding to the original aims) or that plans do not fail, but rather that humans and
society have the capacity for bringing about their own freedom and to create a society
with freedom from scarcity. Matter as the ultimate absolute recoil is this recoil only in
and through dialectical production, as the fire that extinguishes and kindles itself.

Marx describes the accumulation of capital and therefore the capitalist system as a dia-
lectical process, in which first money turns into commodities and commodities turn back
into money: ­M – ​­C.. P.. C’ – ​­M’. The capitalist with a sum of capital M buys commodities
C: labour power and means of production. In the first metamorphosis of capital, money
turns into commodities. Labour uses the means of production to create a new product
C’ that has emergent qualities: C’ contains ­surplus-​­value and a ­surplus-​­product. Labour
transforms the commodity into something new that has a higher value than the sum of
the value of the invested capital and labour power. This new commodity C’ is offered
for sale on the market and if the sale is successfully completed, the commodity C’ is in
another metamorphosis turned into an increased sum of money capital M’ = M + ΔM.
The two basic transitions in the realm of circulation are M ­ – ​­C and C’ – ​­M’. An additional
transition is C.. P.. C’ in the realm of production. Marx (­1867, 200) says: “­The process of
exchange is therefore accomplished through two metamorphoses of opposite yet mutu-
ally complementary ­character – ​­the conversion of the commodity into money, and the
­re-​­conversion of the money into a commodity”.

After this passage, Marx in a footnote cites a quote of Heraclitus that he took from
The Dialectical Logic

Ferdinand Lassalle’s book Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunkeln von Ephesos (­The
Philosophy of Heraclitus the Dark Philosopher of Ephesus): “­all things exchange for fire,
and fire for all things, just as gold does for goods and goods for gold” (­Marx 1867, 200,
footnote 16). Marx here uses Heraclitus’ metaphor of the dialectic as s­ elf-​­transforming
fire for analysing the metamorphoses of capital. The dialectic is a fire that extinguishes
and kindles itself: Money capital is a substance that in the accumulation process is first
immersing into commodities (­the fire of money goes out through exchange, but in the
going out of money in the hands of the capitalist a new fire kindles itself because labour
power and means of production come into the capitalist’s ownership as commodities).
Labour then transforms commodities into a surplus product so that labour is a fire that
extinguishes the physical and value form of the invested capital, but kindles at the same
time a transition into a new commodity that has higher value and new qualities. This new
36 Foundations of Digital Democracy

commodity C’ is thrown onto the market, where exchange extinguishes the fire of the
commodity in the hands of capitalists, but in doing so kindles a new f­ ire – an
​­ increased
sum of money M’ – ​­that the capitalist controls. Already Heraclitus, as Marx and Lassalle
show, understood the dialectic of the transition of money into goods and goods into
money. Marx points out the importance of this Heraclitusian dialectic as a substance of
the capital accumulation process in modern society.

Also in the Grundrisse, Marx uses the metaphor of fire for characterising transitions
in the capital accumulation cycle. Capital and commodities are transformed like a
­self-​­transforming fire: The circulation of capital is a “­revolution which capital must
go through to fire itself up for new production, as a series of exchanges” (­Marx 1857/­
1858, 663). “­Commodities constantly have to be thrown into it anew from the outside,
like fuel into a fire” (­Marx 1857/­1858, 255). Labour is a fire that gives form to com-
modities, it transforms purchased goods into ­surplus-​­value and a surplus product:
“­Labour is the living, f­orm-​­giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things, their tempo-
rality, as their formation by living time” (­Marx 1857/­1858, 361). Fire is a metaphor
for transition and change. Capital changes its form in the accumulation process like
Heraclitus’ ­self-​­transforming fire that constantly extinguishes and kindles itself. In
this process, the crucial ­form-​­giving fire is labour that in its exploitation is compelled
to produce value and surplus value and thereby drives the ­self-​­transformation of cap-
ital from M into M’.

The absolute recoil that Žižek stresses means in the case of capital accumulation that
the ­end-​­point of accumulation M1’ turns into a starting point M2 of a further cycle
of accumulation. Accumulation has however not only a start and an end, but also a
­dialectical dynamic in ­between – ​­the fire that extinguishes and kindles itself. The
­dialectical recoil and the dialectical fire are interconnected dialectical moments of
the dialectical process.

Theodor W. Adorno was sceptical of Hegel’s notion of the determinate negation, i.e. the
idea that the dialectic always produces a “­positive” result: The “­thesis that the negation
of the negation is positive, an affirmation, cannot be sustained” (­Adorno 2008, 17). The
problem would be that the positive has the linguistic meaning of both “­something that
exists” and “­the good, the higher, the approvable” (­Adorno 2008, 18), which could lead
to the assumption that the result of the negation of the negation is “­intrinsically positive
in itself” (­Adorno 2008, 18). Negative dialectics in contrast dissociates itself from the
“­fetishization of the positive” (­Adorno 2008, 18). Adorno argues that Hegel’s assumption
that the “­actual is the rational” is after Auschwitz no longer be tenable (­Adorno 2008,
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 37

19). “­After Auschwitz, our feelings resist any claim of the positivity of existence as sanc-
timonious, as wronging the victims” (­Adorno 1973, 361). Žižek to a certain extent shares
Adorno’s concern about the dialectic’s positivity and therefore turns negative dialectics
into ­less-­​­­than-​­negativity dialectics. Negation

is the negation of the determined fact which is resolved, and is therefore de-
terminate negation; that in the result there is therefore contained in essence
that from which the result ­derives – a​­ tautology indeed, since the result would
otherwise be something immediate and not a result. Because the result, the
negation, is a determinate negation, it has a content.
(­Hegel 2010, 33)

The determinate negation is the result and content of the negation of the negation. The
dialectic of the positive and the negative enables the repetition of development, but says
nothing about the moral quality of development: “­Something becomes an other; this
other is itself somewhat; therefore it likewise becomes an other, and so on ad infinitum”
(­Hegel 1830, §93).

Sublation is a general process that creates a new positive, a something, out of an old
something, which means emergence and disappearance at the same time: c­ oming-­​­­to-​­be
as the positive and c­ easing-­​­­to-​­be as the negative pole of a positive/­negative dialectic
constitute the new. But the new can have very different forms and qualities. New forms
can be very unlike each other. Roy Bhaskar (­1993), in his book Dialectic: The Pulse of
Freedom, in my opinion, has correctly stressed that there are different kinds of sublations
and negations of the negation. He distinguishes three kinds of negation of the nega-
The Dialectical Logic

tion (­Bhaskar 1993, ­5–​­6): Real negation characterises absence, ­non-​­being, ­non-​­identity,
being other, and n­ on-­​­­existence – ​­it is distanciation without transformation (­Bhaskar
1993, 5, 401). Transformative negation is the “­transformation of some thing, property
or state of affairs” (­Bhaskar 1993, 5). It “­may be essential or inessential, total or par-
tial, endogenously and/­or exogenously effected” (­Bhaskar 1993, ­5–​­6). Radical negation
means “­­auto-​­subversion, transformation or overcoming of a being or condition” (­Bhaskar
1993, 6). Bhaskar argues that confusions about Hegel emerge when one assumes the
three forms of negation are the same. Not all negations would be transformative or rad-
ical, frequently negations would only be connecting or separating. Real negation is for
Bhaskar the most general concept, a subset of real negations is also a form transforma-
tive negation, and a subset of transformative negations is also a form of radical negation:

real negation ≥ transformative negation ≥ radical negation (­Bhaskar 1993, 6, 402).

38 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Sublation as “­species of determinate transformative negations, may be totally, es-

sentially or partially preservative” (­Bhaskar 1993, 12). Other dialectical results include
“­­stand-​­offs, the mutual undoing of the contending parties, the preservation of the status
quo ante, retrogression and many other outcomes besides sublation” (­Bhaskar 1993, 1­ 2–​
­13). Bhaskar has tried to differentiate dialectics so that it can account for various forms
of transformations and invariability. Transformative negations result in the change of
form and/­or content of a system, parts, and relations between parts of a system change.
Given a radical negation, a system changes fundamentally, its root parts, structures, and
its condition are ­re-​­constituted, old systems vanish and new ones emerge. In society,
radical negation is a revolutionary transformation.

So there are real negations, transformative negations, and radical negations (­real nega-
tions ≥ transformative negations ≥ radical negations). All of these negations are forms
of negating the negative and sublating contradictions. There are different kinds of subla-
tions that produce different kinds of results. This means that in sublation there are vary-
ing degrees of preservation and elimination of qualities of the two poles of a dialectical
relation. Not all negations of the negation produce radical novelty, only some of them
are revolutionary sublations of the status quo. Other negations of the negation are only
transformative, they do not create novelty at a fundamental level of social systems or so-
ciety, but at a more superficial level (­at a smaller level of granularity of social or societal
reality) so that the overall existing system can reproduce itself.

Žižek distinguishes between ­upward-​­and ­downward-​­sublation, which is a differentia-

tion of the concept of sublation into different forms. Bhaskar’s differentiation is more
differentiated. It is a surprise that Žižek in his two big Hegel books Absolute Recoil and
Less than Nothing does not mention Bhaskar a single time and does not discuss this
specific version of the dialectic (­see Fuchs 2011, C­ hapter 2, for a detailed discussion of
various form of the dialectic, including the ones by Bhaskar, Žižek, and others).

Think of claims that we live in a completely new society, a network, information, post-
modern, risk, or X society. These claims are ideological because they assert a radical
sublation of society, although capitalism and its inherent features such as exploitation,
crisis, and inequality continue to exist. The same kinds of claims have been made about
the WWW that is said to have become radically new, a web 2.0 or a form of social
medium that was n­ on-​­social before. Or about media studies that, according to the same
claims, in the digital age radically turned into something completely different called me-
dia studies 2.0. Some critics point out that such claims are ideologies and that there is
nothing new under the sun, but that rather the only thing we find is the continuity of
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 39

capitalism. But wait a minute: Capitalism is dialectical in that it maintains exploitation

and domination by its own contradictory dynamic, by changing its appearance it repro-
duces its basic structures and social forms. So we still have capitalism, but a capitalism
that has entered a new stage, in which digital media play indeed an important role in the
organisation of exploitation and domination, lift existing contradictions to a new level
so that existing class relations are deepened, but at the same time the productive forces
are further socialised so that potentials of a c­ ommons-​­based economy are advanced,
etc. Capitalism in its own transformation undergoes sublations that in Bhaskar’s termi-
nology are not radical, but transformative at different levels so that a digital capitalism,
a capitalist information society, a capitalist web 2.0, etc. emerge that to a certain degree
have new qualities, but preserve and transform previous structures so that the most
fundamental structures of class, exploitation, and domination can continue to exist and
to reproduce themselves by continuity (­of capitalism) and discontinuity (­in technology,
communications, etc.). The point is to transform the contradictions that these changes
bring about in a political direction so that society and communications can be turned into
a democratic-socialist society and democratic-socialist communications.

Žižek argues that the “­refusal of a moment to become caught in a [dialectical] movement”
is the rule (­Žižek 2012, 294). There is no necessity or automatism of a negation of the
negation. In society, crises and antagonisms condition radical changes, but do not call
them forth. It depends on subjective factors such as ideology, collective action and or-
ganisation, contact networks, resource mobilisation, etc. if the oppressed and exploited
attempt to overthrow the system or not. If they refuse to do so, then they do not stand
outside the dialectic because there is no outside: They remain caught in social contra- The Dialectical Logic

dictions (­such as class and domination) and embedded into these relations. There is no
­outside – ​­something ­undialectical – ​­of the dialectic because the world and its moment
are not isolated, but relational. Everything exists in a negative relation to something else.
If and when change occurs and the negative turns via a negation of the negation into
something new depends on many factors and is not determined.

The assumption that the dialectic has a ­non-​­dialectisisable excessive element can also
be found in Žižek’s (­2006) book The Parallax View. He defines the parallax view based on
Kojin Karatani’s work as a “­constantly shifting perspective between two points between
which no synthesis or mediation is possible” (­Žižek 2006, 4). There is an “­irreducible gap
between the positions itself” (­Žižek 2006, 20). Žižek sees the parallax view as the “­first
step in the rehabilitation of the philosophy of dialectical materialism” (­Žižek 2006, 4),
but also points out the proximity of this concept to Derrida’s différance (­Žižek 2006, 11).
40 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Jacques Derrida, Kojin Karatani, Slavoj Žižek, and Alain Badiou not only share the
criticism of Hegel’s dialectic, of ­Hegelian-​­Marxist dialectics, and of the concept of
the determinate negation, but they also have tried to overcome these perceived
limits by introducing elements into the concept of the dialectical relationship that
constitutes a difference gap between the two poles. This difference gap is for them
irreducible, ­non-​­dialectisiable, and not integratable. Derrida, Karatani, Žižek, and
Badiou’s philosophies converge in what Frederic Jameson (­2009) has characterised
as postmodern “­multiple dialectics” (­Jameson 2009, 15) that stress incommensura-
ble elements.

But what if the antagonism between exploiters and the exploited is overcome and a
classless society emerges? Classes will vanish (­destruction), ­non-​­owners will become
collective owners (­new quality), and the existing wealth and instruments of produc-
tion will remain important material foundations of a society that take on new forms
(­preservation). In this Hegelian Aufhebung (­sublation), difference does not vanish be-
cause in the dialectical process new qualities emerge. Incommensurability is built into
the concept of the Hegelian dialectic itself. What is the irreducible, incommensurable,
­non-​­dialecticisable, n­ on-​­overcomeable, subtractable parallax gap of the dialectical rela-
tion between exploiters and the exploited? There is none. The relationship all resolves
around private property, the control, and n­ on-​­control of private property. This relation can
be overcome, private property is dialecticisable and does not constitute an “­irreducible
gap” (­Žižek) that cannot be synthesised or mediated. The overcoming of the gap between
control and n­ on-​­control of private property is the process of revolutionary politics. To
assume that there is a ­non-​­overcomeable gap between exploiters and the exploited so
that we can only shift between the different positions of these two groups limits the
revolutionary potential of dialectical philosophy.

By employing the logic of concepts such as différance, the parallax view, and subtraction,
even a radical thinker such as Slavoj Žižek ends up with philosophical concepts that are
close to postmodern theory. Žižek’s works are in this respect inconsistent because he
is also a radical critic of postmodernist opposition “­to all foundationalism, […] grand
solutions and […] global emancipatory projects” (­Žižek 2008, 1). Against such relativ-
ism, Žižek brings back a focus on the totality that questions capitalism as such, tries to
bring back the lost cause of communism and thereby big ideas. Given this laudable and
important project, it is inconsistent that Žižek contends in his concept of the dialectic
to the postmodernists that there is something n­ on-​­dialectisisable, an assumption that
philosophically questions the focus on the totality.
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 41

The alternative to postmodern dialectics is to assume that the determinate negation is

not a deterministic, but a revolutionary concept, to assume with Bhaskar that there are
different forms of negation (­real negation ≥ transformative negation ≥ radical negation),
and to see determinate negation not as a systemic or natural law, but as something
that must be created by humans in social struggles against capitalism and other forms
of domination. Determinate negation is a possibility, not an automatic necessity, it is
transformed from possibility into actuality only by revolutionary politics. The parallax
view might be able to explain that two elements in a dialectic cannot be reduced to each
other (­such as the economy and politics), but it cannot truly renew dialectical materialism
and dialectical philosophy because it misses the elements of the determinate negation
and the negation of the negation, which constitute the possibilities for change and rad-
ical change. If you apply the notion of the parallax gap as “­new dialectical materialism”
to the situation of the relation between exploiters and the exploited, then you end up
oscillating between the positions of the two groups without being able to in a theoret-
ically consistent manner consider the revolutionary sublation of this relation as a real
possibility in the categorical universe.

For Žižek, the dialectic is not a triad of three steps, but a quadruple with four steps: There
are

four rather than only three stages of a dialectical process. […] to these three
steps another is added: the highest level which paradoxically coincides with
the ­lowest – ​­at this highest level, people do exactly the same as at the previous
level, but with a subjective attitude which is the same as the attitude of those
at the lowest level.
The Dialectical Logic

(­Žižek 2012, ­314–​­315; see also 294, 501)

It “­is negativity which can be counted two times, as a direct negation and as a s­ elf-​
­relating negation” (­Žižek 2012, 501).

Hegel’s formulation at the end of the Science of Logic that Žižek refers to is that

the term counted as third can also be counted as fourth, and instead of a tri-
plicity, the abstract form may also be taken to be a quadruplicity; in this way
the negative or the difference is counted as a duality. – ​­The third or the fourth
is in general the unity of the first and the second moment, of the immediate
and the mediated.
(­Hegel 2010, 746, in German: Hegel 1813/­1816, 564)
42 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Identifying four steps in the dialectic is somewhat redundant and tautological because
an identity at some level can never remain isolated, it automatically posits a new neg-
ativity and is so not just s­ elf-​­related, but also o­ ther-​­related. The negated negative is
immediately negated in a dialectical relationship to an other. Given that sublation al-
ways means not just repetition, but repetition with a difference, the negation that is
the second step following identity is repeated at a different level after the sublation so
that we just need three steps in the dialectic. The fourth, fifth, and sixth steps emerge
from the principle of the dialectic to repeat itself with a difference; the seventh, eighth,
and ninth steps occur as the difference of a difference, as repetition with a difference
of the fourth, fifth, and sixth step and as a repetition with a difference of the repetition
with a difference (­a double difference) of the first, second, and third step, etc. Heraclitus
(­2001, §59) expresses the dialectic of unity and diversity in the following way: “­Two
made one are never one. […] We choose each other to be one, and from the one both
soon diverge”. A negation of the negation produces a new one, but this one repeats
the divergence into two and thereby constitutes a difference that makes a difference to
previous negations of unity.

The rectangle structure of the dialectical logic is ­over-​­specified because a rectangle

can be dissolved into triangles. It is therefore no accident that Hegel’s Encyclopaedia,
his most systematic and consistent work, is made up of three books (­the Logic, Nature,
the Phenomenology) that consist each of three sections with three subsections, etc.
In his conceptual system, this triangle structure necessarily reaches a ­top – ​­the ab-
solute spirit (­the triple of ­art – ­​­­religion – ​­philosophy) – ​­because books are necessarily
finite, but the basic logic of the Encyclopaedia that Hegel repeats with a difference
throughout all its three parts reflects the structure of the material world that is in itself
endless: The world develops through sublations and the emerging new posits itself as
­self-​­related and at the same time ­other-​­related and thereby constitutes new potentials
for sublations. The

third is the immediate, but the immediate through sublation of mediation, the
simple through the sublating of difference, the positive through the sublating
of the negative; it is the concept that has realized itself through its otherness,
and through the sublating of this reality has rejoined itself and has restored its
absolute reality, its simple ­self-​­reference.
(­Hegel 2010, 747, in German: Hegel 1813/­1816, 565)

Dialectical logic operates for Hegel (­2010, 751; in German: Hegel 1813/­1816, 571) as a
“­circle that winds around itself”, “­a circle of circles”.
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 43

2.5 The Dialectic of History

In 2009, Žižek (­2009b) named an entire book after a formulation that Marx made when
commenting on a passage from Hegel, namely that “­Hegel remarks somewhere that all
facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He
forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce” (­Marx 1869, 10). In the book
First as Tragedy, then as Farce, Žižek (­2009b) argues that the history of the first decade of
the 21st century started with a tragedy and ended with a farce: “­the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 and the financial meltdown of 2008” (­Žižek 2009b, 1). Žižek calls for a r­e-​
­invention of communism as the proper political response. “­Today, our message should be
the same: it is permitted to know and to dully engage in communism, to again act in full
fidelity to the communist Idea” (­Žižek 2009b, 7). Žižek here also points out the “­series of
reversals that characterize modern revolutions” (­Žižek 2009b, 125): from Mao’s cultural
revolution to Chinese capitalism, from the October revolution to Stalin, etc. But Žižek in
his 2009 book trusts the potential of revolutionary agency: the repetition of catastrophes
in capitalism can be broken by the new proletariat’s communist revolution.

In Absolute Recoil, Žižek (­2014) says that history “­will always [first] go wrong” (­36), first
it ends “­in fiasco” (­37), the opposite of what was intended, and only the second time can
the wound that is thereby created be healed by the logic of the wound itself. A commu-
nist revolution, according to this logic, has to go wrong the first time, but the solution
emerges through the experience of catastrophe, loss, and suffering. If one compares
Absolute Recoil to First as Tragedy, then as Farce, then the logic of Žižek’s argument is
not consistent: If history developed in such a way that first there is a wound created by The Dialectic of History
the smote, which then creates the conditions for the smote healing the wound, capital-
ism’s history would also have to be s­ elf-​­healing. Capitalism and class societies can how-
ever develop from one catastrophe to the next, as Marx remarked. The economic crisis of
1929 did not result in a ­self-​­healing capacity of the ­socio-​­economic wounds created by
it, but rather capitalism ­re-​­organised itself, created a new level of its own contradictions
that exploded in the 1­ 973–​­1975 crisis and recession that instigated the phase of neolib-
eral and ­post-​­Fordist capitalism that created its own set of contradictions that exploded
in a series of crises, including the 2000 ­dot-​­com crisis and the 2008 financial crisis that
developed into a new world economic crisis. Clearly, the wound that is healed by the
smote that created it is not a universal pattern of history. In capitalism, one wound is
rather created after another and the question is what the time lag is between one s­ pear-​
­wound and another. The point is that class societies are grounded in contradictions that
have catastrophic potentials that can and eventually will erupt. The only potential that
44 Foundations of Digital Democracy

can overcome this immanent catastrophic potential of class societies is the working
class’ revolutionary potential actualised in collective action.

Žižek in Absolute Recoil grounds an ethics of suffering and a dialectic of failure and ca-
tastrophe: History and revolution have to go wrong and result in catastrophes, otherwise
there never can be a free society. So although he says the “­future is open” (­Žižek 2014,
36) and that Hegel saw history as “­open and contingent process” (­Žižek 2012, 227), he
does not draw the conclusion that this enables people to act as revolutionaries who
have the potential to bring about a free society already at the first attempt, but rather
says they can only do so if they have first gone through a revolution that failed, created
suffering, catastrophes, inverted its own goals, etc. Such a logic is politically disabling,
defeatist (­if you fight a battle in the first instance, why should you fight it, if you are
bound to fail?), and introduces a new theory of functionalist historical determinism that
does not trust in humans’ agency and power to bring about a free society without having
first through the same logic created barbarism. Barbaric figures of history, such as Stalin,
Pol Pot, Mao, Kim Il Sung, are then necessary figures of history, proofs that history goes
wrong as the foundation for in a turn making history right. The point is that the people do
not need despotic masters and have the power to make themselves a better history with-
out any masters. We do not have to go through Stalin or any of his historical or contextual
equivalents in order to create a truly free socialist society. The October Revolution did
not with necessity have to end in the Gulag. It is the tragedy of history that it did, but this
development was not a necessity, but rather one of several possibilities.

Žižek argues for materialist ­miracles – ​­“­the emergence of a phenomenon ex nihilo, not
fully covered by the sufficient chain of reasons”, “­something radically new, outside the
scope of the possibilities” (­Žižek 2012, 230) – ​­that are at work in history. Every “­dialectical
passage or reversal is a passage in which the new figure emerges ex nihilo and retro-
actively posits or creates its necessity” (­Žižek 2012, 230). Every “­dialectical passage or
reversal is a passage in which the new figure emerges ex nihilo and retroactively posits
or creates its necessity” (­Žižek 2012, 231).

If something is not possible in a specific instance because of previously given structures,

then it cannot emerge. Something new can only emerge out of previously existing con-
ditions. “­There are no structural miracles. Every structure is coagulated development”
(­Hörz 2009, 86, translation from German). It is not determined that something new will/­
can emerge and what exactly the form and content of the new is, but not everything
imaginable is possible. A tortoise cannot lay eggs out of which humans hatch. We can
imagine a human/­­turtle-​­hybrid as the subject of a bad science fiction novel or of bad
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 45

s­ cience-­​­­fiction-​­like science (­the kind of popular academic books written by the likes of
Hans Moravec and Raymond Kurzweil; it may indeed just be a matter of time until they
move from the cyborg to the human turtle and argue that science and technology will turn
us all into Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles), but the very idea is nonetheless nonsensical
because it is materially impossible. ­Human-​­hatching turtles will not exist at any time
because they are structurally impossible (­not even genetic engineering will help in this
case). Hegel (­1830, addition to §143) argues that “­the most absurd and nonsensical sup-
positions” can be thought as being possible, but are just “­empty possibilities”. A proper
materialist sees these empty possibilities not as truly possible, but as ideologies.

Given that there is a specific space of possibilities for the emergence of novelty, some-
thing new does not emerge ex nihilo without precondition, but from specific conditions.
That actuality conditions possibility for the future does not mean that the future is de-
termined, but rather that in a specific historical situation there is a number of possi-
bilities for the future. Collective practices in complex causal networks of reality shape
possibilities and add to or limit the space of possibilities. Practices and praxis can create
new possibilities that did not exist before, but not everything is possible all of the time
because existing structures of economic production, technology, politics, and culture en-
able and constrain possibilities and future possibilities. If agency opens up these levels
for more freedom, then the space of possibilities is enhanced, which does however not
mean that everything goes at any time in history.

For Žižek, history seems on the one hand in a way to be governed completely by chance so
that reversals of history appear like miracles. Pure chance can however also be limiting for The Dialectic of History
political agency because if we cannot do anything to increase the possibility of the realisa-
tion of certain possibilities, then we better not act at all politically. On the other hand, Žižek
does not dismiss agency. He believes in the power of revolutionary action in the very mo-
ment we live in. But in this respect, his stress is not on revolutionary action in general (­at any
time), but the very moment we live in. It would be the second time that communism gets a
chance, so now it could go right, whereas in the first instance it according to Žižek had to fail.

Immanuel Wallerstein has a different concept of history. He takes from the sciences of
complexity the insight that complex systems have no certainty. Society as a historical sys-
tem is therefore in the moment of structural crisis confronted with the uncertainty of the
future. The system enters bifurcation points with multiple options for future development.
“­The system has at that point what we may think of as choice between possibilities”
(­Wallerstein 2011, 156). The only thing that is certain in such a point of change is that the
future will be different from the present, but not how it will look like. History is shaped by
46 Foundations of Digital Democracy

a dialectic of chance and necessity. Wallerstein argues that capitalism’s antagonisms are
today culminating in a bifurcation point, a chaos that could last for up to 50 years. It is de-
termined that some order will emerge out of this noise and chaos created by capitalism’s
contradiction, but it is uncertain and contingent how this order will look like and if it will
be for the better or the worse. Some of the possible future development that Wallerstein
(­2011, ­162–​­163) identifies are: n­ eo-​­feudalism, democratic fascism (­democracy within 20
per cent of the world that exerts fascist power over the rest), and a “­highly egalitarian
world order” (­Wallerstein 2011, 163). The “­choice will depend on our collective world
behaviour over the next fifty years” (­Wallerstein 2011, 163).

In a structural crisis, not only is the system unpredictable, but fluctuations can quickly
intensify (­the butterfly effect) so that a revolution’s effects can be immense (­Wallerstein
2013, 33). The point is that the world’s uncertainty in the moment of crisis should not be
seen as an occasion for despair (“­It can all get worse! We may all die!”), but as possi-
bilities for true socialism (“­It may go wrong! But if not, then we may have democratic
communism in the end!”).

History is on nobody’s side. We all may misjudge how we should act. Since the out-
come is inherently, and not extrinsically, unpredictable, we have at best a 5­ 0–​­50
chance of getting the kind of w
­ orld-​­system we prefer. But 5­ 0-​­50 is a lot, not a little.
(­Wallerstein 2013, 35)

The German Marxist philosopher Herbert Hörz speaks of dialectical determinism and dia-
lectical determination as principles that govern the relationship of chance and necessity.

A certain causal relation impacts a system as the cause that through the given
complex of conditions results in a field of possibilities, from which possibilities
are realised. […] A possibility that does not necessarily occur is random just
like the individual scope that exists in the necessary event of a totality.
(­Hörz 2009, 69, translation from German)

The space of possibilities constitutes a space for different behaviours and futures. A
dialectical negation of a negation that constitutes a contradiction results in “­qualitative
transitions” that lead “­to new fields of possibilities” (­Hörz 2009, 69, translation from Ger-
man). An existing field of possibilities results in a specific new reality that creates a new
phase and conditioned field of possibilities. Not every moment of a totality is connected
to every other moment and not to the same degree. In a class society, some people for
example have more power than others. As a result, possibilities are not equally likely, but
have different likelihoods (­Hörz 2009, 70).
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 47

It should be noted here that Hegel argued in this context that “­possibility is mere chance
itself” (­Hegel 1830, §144). “­The contingent is generally what has the ground of its being
not within itself but elsewhere” (­Hegel 1830, addition to §145). The chance present
in the field of possibilities that Herbert Hörz talks about has its own necessity in the
­pre-​­conditions that constitute this field and the previous sublations that manifest them-
selves in this very field. For Hegel, the contingent dimension of the dialectic poses the
possibility that actuality can be turned into something different: “­Being actuality in its
immediacy, the contingent is at the same time the possibility of an other. […] But, in fact,
any such immediate actuality contains within it the germ of something else altogether”
(­Hegel 1830, addition to §146).

A specific quality of the society is that humans can actively intervene in the objective
dialectic through their subjective collective actions. They can act based on specific goals.
There is no guarantee that their goals will become realised in actual changes in society,
but collective action can increase or decrease the likelihood of specific possibilities. Dia-
lectical determinism in society means that our future is always and necessarily conditioned
and open at the same time. How the future looks like is not determined and depends on
many complex interrelated contradictions and dialectics of dialectics, but it is also not
completely accidental. If there were mere chance, then we would be just like under mere
determination/­necessity be left helpless, which would make the conscious g­ oal-​­oriented
shaping of society impossible. We cannot determine or steer the future because there is
no finality and mechanical determination of history, but we can dialectically determine the
existing fields of possibilities for the future, i.e. humans have the freedom to collectively
act and struggle for changing what is possible and somewhat influence the likelihoods The Dialectic of History

of possibilities. Given a specific field of possibilities, fluctuations, intensification, n­ on-​

­linearity, complexity, chaos, critical values, and bifurcations are aspects of chance (­Fuchs
2003, 2008, ­Chapter 2). But chance can be somewhat organised, it is not completely un-
determined (­Hörz 2009, 187). Emergence of order from noise is a dialectic of chance and
necessity, i.e. determined chance and open necessity. “­Humans shape actuality and their
social environment by active practice with specific objectives. They thereby change the
fields of possibilities and the stochastic distribution of statistical laws” (­Hörz 2009, 71).

Hegel in this context stresses the role of activity when discussing the dialectic of chance
and necessity that constitutes actuality:

The activity is (­α) likewise existent on its own account, independently (­a man, a
character); and at the same time it has its possibility only in the conditions and
in the matter [itself]; (­β) it is the movement of translating the conditions into the
48 Foundations of Digital Democracy

matter, and the latter into the former as the side of existence; more precisely
[it is the movement] to make the matter [itself] go forth from the conditions, in
which it is implicitly present, and to give existence to the matter by sublating
the existence that the conditions have.
(­Hegel 1830, §148)

Hans Heinz Holz argues in his book Weltentwurf und Reflexion (­2005) that a dialectical
concept of history needs to take into account that a new status of the world after a
negation of the negation not simply eliminates the old status, but that this old status
affects and overgrasps into the new one: The “­disappeared” is “­irrevocably present and
operates in the f­ uture – in
​­ whatever transformed and transported way” (­Holz 2005, 484,
translation from German).

Progress does not proceed in history along a time line of successive real condi-
tions. It is mediated by the continuation of past contents and purposes’ essence
in the comprehension of the ­having-​­been and therefore it is progress of the
consciousness of freedom.
(­Holz 2005, ­486–​­487, translation from German)

Historical progress in the consciousness of freedom is not necessarily and automatically

a progress towards or of freedom itself. Humans look into past experiences and this
past itself constitutes a new field of possibilities. Reflection about the past can allow
doing something differently in the future. It is however open if catastrophes are repeated
through human action or if humans do everything in order to avoid their repetition by
acting as to make alternatives more likely. The point is that the historical dialectic works
backwards in time when we reflect on how we have come to where we are. In the
backward dialectic, we try to make sense of the past by reconstructing and causally
interpreting what has happened. In the forward dialectic, we project the past and the
present into the future in order to imagine how a different state of affairs could look
like. So the dialectic is a collision and unity of a backward and a forward dialectic. The
past and the presence do however not determine, but just condition the outcome of the
forward dialectic.

Humans reflect the dialectical reflections (­i.e. contradictions that drive development) of
the world in objects that they produce. They produce their own thoughts, each other as
social beings through communication and therefore society, as well as physical and n­ on-​
­physical ­use-​­values. They are active, conscious, social, producing beings that can reflect
about how a desirable world should look like. What
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 49

distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect
builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every
labour process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the
worker at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects
a change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [verwirklicht] his
own purpose in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it
determines the mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must
subordinate his will to it.
(­Marx 1867, 284)

The architect has a specific taste and there are particular requirements for the build-
ing s/­he designs, which are considerations that let him/­her make specific choices and
construct models before the actual construction begins. A writer anticipates what s/­he
wants to write about before starting, s/­he for example decides if it is a novel, an art
book, or a social science book, where the novel is set, what kind of art the book covers,
or what part of society the social science study shall cover. A bee in contrast acts much
more driven by instincts and immediate needs. Creativity, ­self-​­consciousness, empathy,
and morality are crucial forms of the human constitution that also shape the work pro-
cess. The conscious social shaping of the world is the activity that allows humans to
increase the likelihood of specific alternatives in existing fields of possibilities. History
can go wrong, but it can also go right.

History is not necessarily first a catastrophe, then as a result of a revolution a different

catastrophe, and finally a better society emerging out of the same logic as the second The Dialectic of History
catastrophe. It is also not with necessity a repetition of catastrophes, first as tragedy
and then as farce. All of these (­and other) developments are paths that history can take,
but they are not determined. Moments of structural crisis are culmination points of a
system’s antagonism. The big crisis that started in 2008 is just like the one that started
in 1929 (­and that led to the Second World War) a point of bifurcation, in which we find
a dialectic of chance and necessity: It is certain that there will be change, but how
this change will look like is not determined, which should give us hope to attempt the
communist revolution now and in every crisis. Fascism and the Second World War were
the outcomes of the crisis in 1929. According to Žižek’s logic of history, history in the
1929 moment that eventually led to modernity’s biggest barbarity and catastrophe thus
far, had to go wrong, socialism was no option, and the catastrophes of Auschwitz, Hiro-
shima, Nagasaki, etc. had to be the result and at the same time the precondition that
another ­time – ​­this ­time – ​­history could work differently.
50 Foundations of Digital Democracy

The point about history that Wallerstein, Hörz, and Holz make is in contrast that in 1929
just like in 2008 the capitalist system entered deep crises and that the outcomes are in
such situations never determined. There can be a catastrophe just like there can be lib-
eration. Barbarism, socialism, or something different are possibilities in such situations.
And this is why people should collectively act in a revolutionary manner. The outcome of
their action is uncertain, but if they don’t act the likelihood that fascism or another form
of barbarity is the outcome increases, whereas democratic-socialist action is no guar-
antee for freedom, but increases the likelihood of freedom. Revolution can go wrong,
not just the first time, but any time. Capitalism or another class society can reconstitute
itself, which will result in a new set or contradictions that result in crisis, catastrophes,
etc. But revolution can also go right, which is why it is worth to fight. Intelligent revo-
lutionary strategy learns from the history of revolution, from failures, successes, and
their contradictions. Moishe Postone stresses that in today’s deep crisis, just like in any
deep crisis, “­the old slogan of ‘­socialism or barbarism’ acquires new urgency, even if our
understanding of both terms has been fundamentally transformed” (­Postone 2012, 249).

Tariq Ali argues that the transition from feudalism to capitalism that resulted in the pres-
ent form of democracy took 500 years and was “­the result of violent clashes” (­Ali 2009,
112) and dictatorships by Cromwell, Robespierre, Napoleon, etc. The “­second transition”
from capitalism to socialism would also have

produced a period of dictatorship: Lenin, Stalin and Mao. Why should the col-
lapse of the old social dictatorships in Russia and China, and their replacement
by capitalism, not be seen as part of a long transition whose ultimate destina-
tion is presently invisible?
(­Ali 2009, 113)

The point of history is that there is no ultimate destination or finality, just dialectical
development resulting from the interaction of objective structural contradictions and the
subjective contradictions created and acted out in human agency. That the idea of com-
munism went through Stalin and Mao is in no way a guarantee that the second time
it will and must go right. It could go wrong again. Or it could never happen. Or it could
happen differently. I am not saying history is relative, but rather that humans certainly
can learn from previous mistakes and try to avoid them, but history can eventually also
repeat itself as the repetition of mistakes just like it can contain breaks that make a dif-
ference. Collective action based on the democratic communist idea is not a saviour, but
can increase the likelihood that history takes a humane direction.
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 51

Žižek is sceptical of the idea that sublation is a return, r­ e-​­appropriation, or d­ e-​­alienation

of a lost essence or origin because such assumptions imply that an origin or foundation
must have already existed or unfolds automatically in history. Žižek rather assumes that
the emergence of essence constitutes retroactively this very essence: “­The Essence ret-
roactively constitutes itself through its process of externalization” (­Žižek 2012, 235). For
Žižek (­2012, 259), communism is not “­the subjective (­re)­appropriation of the alienated
substantial content”. The problem would be to assume that the negation of the negation
is “­a magical mechanism which guarantees that the final outcome of a process will
always be happy” (­Žižek 2012, 300).

The Hegelian sublation of the antagonism between essence and existence need however
not be understood as a reconciliation with or return to the origin, the reconstitution of
a primordial state, and a historical foundation that once existed, but can be seen as the
struggle for and establishment of the e­ thico-​­logical foundation of society. For Hegel,
truth is the correspondence of essence and existence. The notion of essence is an inher-
ently ­ethico-​­political one. It immediately brings up ­ethico-​­political questions like: What
is a good society? What are the possibilities inherent in society itself? Does current
society realise the best possible life for all or not? Any political project just like any form
of ethics needs foundational principles for discerning what to struggle for respectively
what to consider as appropriate status of society. But what is the foundation of society?
What principles are constitutive for all societies?

Humans have in all societies to relate to each other positively in order to survive.
They have to communicate, work collaboratively together, and form and maintain com- The Dialectic of History
munities. There can be no society without c­ o-​­operation and the social, but certainly
a society without competition and egotism. C­ o-​­operation is more foundational and
substantial than competition. It is part of the essence of all societies. C­ o-​­operation can
certainly be used for negative means, such as warfare so that it becomes a principle
alienated from itself that serves an alien purpose. Warfare just like class is no essen-
tial principle, but a historical form of domination. If a true society is one, in which the
basic structures correspond to their own essence, then this means that a class society
(­a society grounded in exploitation and domination) violates the essence of all socie-
ties and is a false society. A democratic socialist society, a society where humans are
in common control of their conditions of existence, in contrast fully realises human es-
sence and is a fully social and societal human existence that overcomes class societies’
­crippling of society and the social. The ­ethico-​­political imperative can therefore only
be: Act so as to increase the likelihood, degree, and reality of socialism. Socialist el-
52 Foundations of Digital Democracy

ements and seeds exist in most societies. The point is to make these elements grow
ever more and to find possibilities to maximise socialism in order to reduce class and
capital.

The disappearance of capitalism and a creation of a socialist society is neither a return

to an origin that once existed in a primeval society nor a creatio ex nihilo (socialist po-
tentials, degrees of reality and elements have exited before), but rather a realisation of
the ­ethico-​­logical and ­ethico-​­political essence of society, the creation of a society that
corresponds to the essence of humans and society. There is no historical necessity or
determination that leads from that which exists to the realisation of society’s substantial
essence. Such a realisation is rather a potential and question of the complexities of
class struggles. In class societies, the realisation of society’s essence is a ­not-​­yet. The
transformation of the ­not-​­yet into the now and yet is however possible through social
struggles that are conditioned by that which exists. The essence constitutes potential-
ities and with the development of society that which is possible in terms of a good life
and with it the maximum qualities of the essence can expand (­or shrink). “­The fact is,
before it exists concretely; it is, first, as essence or as unconditioned; second, it has
immediate existence or is determined” (­Hegel 2010, 416). The transition from the un-
conditioned essence to the immediate existence is brought about by collective action.
There is no guarantee that it happens. Essences are also somewhat relative because
everything has its own essence. The essence of society is a foundational ground of
humanity, whereas the essence of capitalism is not because capitalism is a specific
existential manifestation of a society that has historical character as a particular form
of class society.

Concrete history is an undetermined path of approximations and distantiations from the

realisation of society’s essence that takes place through social struggles. And even if
the essence is once realised, history does not stop, but continues to develop and to bear
potentials for regression from or for further extension of the realised essence’s qualities.

The negativity and its negation are two different phases of the same historical
process, straddled by man’s historical action. The ‘­new’ state is the truth of the
old, but that truth does not steadily and automatically grow out of the earlier
state; it can be set free only by an autonomous act on the part of men, that will
cancel the whole of the existing negative state
(­Marcuse 1941/­1955, 315)

Essence in society is connected with what humans could be (­Marcuse 1937):

 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 53

Here the concept of what could be, of inherent possibilities, acquires a precise
meaning. What man can be in a given historical situation is determinable with
regard to the following factors: the measure of control of natural and social
productive factors, the level of the organization of labor, the development of
needs in relation to possibilities for their fulfilment (­especially the relation of
what is necessary for the reproduction of life to the ‘­free’ needs for gratification
and happiness, for the ‘­good and the beautiful’), the availability, as material to
be appropriated, of a wealth of cultural values in all areas of life.
(­Marcuse 1937, 71)

The ­ethico-​­political is connected to questions of what can and should be because soci-
ety can based on the existing preconditions reduce pain, misery, and injustice (­Marcuse
1964, 106), use existing resources and capacities in ways that satisfy human needs in
the best possible way, and minimise hard labour (­Marcuse 1964, 112). The conditions
and tendencies of the present are in class societies structured by objective antagonisms
(­such as in capitalism the ones between ­use-​­value/­­exchange-​­value, labour/­capital, pro-
ductive forces/­relations of production, necessary labour/­­surplus-​­labour, social needs/­
capitalist production, social production/­private appropriation, real/­virtual, etc.). These
antagonisms form the space of conditions for action and social struggles. History is
shaped by a ­meta-​­dialectic of objective dialectics and the subjective dialectic of collec-
tive action, between conditioning necessity and the possibility for freedom from neces-
sity (­or enslavement by it) through societal praxis.

Axel Honneth (­2008, 32) argues that “­reified social relations merely represent a false The Dialectic of History
framework for interpretation, an ontological veil concealing the fact of an underlying
genuine form of human existence”. Honneth in contrast to other contemporary critical
theorists does not give up the connection of the notions of alienation and ­de-​­alienation
to human essence, but rather argues that there is an “­elementary structure of the hu-
man form of life characterised by care and existential interestedness” that are “­always
already there” (­Honneth 2008, 32).

Honneth takes up insights from Michael Tomasello’s (­1999, 2008) development psychol-
ogy and socialisation research: Recognition precedes cognition because children learn
to take over the perspective of another person, which enables thinking and interaction/­
communication. Tomasello (­2008, 1999) stresses in this respect the “­9 month revolution”:
The child in its development starts after about nine months of perceiving an attachment
figure whose perspective it takes over. It develops an emotional relation to this person.
The child starts relating to the world and objects by observing how the attachment figure
54 Foundations of Digital Democracy

relates to objects. Developmental psychology confirms for Honneth that recognition

by and of others and empathetic engagement precedes cognition: “­The acknowledge-
ment of the other constitutes a n­ on-​­epistemic prerequisite for linguistic understanding”
(­Honneth 2008, 50). Honneth shows that human essence lies in the social foundation of
society, that human social relations constitute this essence, and that essence manifests
itself in human subjectivity. Honneth asserts that the essence is not a historical primor-
dial state of society that once existed and was lost, but that rather it is a foundational
structure of human social relations.

Reification that occurs in instrumental reason, exploitation, and domination is for

Honneth “­forgetfulness of recognition” (­Honneth 2008, 56): They can make us forget
that our knowledge, being, and cognition are based on recognition and empathetic
engagement. Judith Butler comments on Honneth’s concept of reification that he has
“­an Arcadian myth” of a “’before’” (­Butler, in: Honneth 2008, 108) and that both “­love
and aggression” would be coextensive with human being” (­Butler, in: Honneth 2008,
109). Such relativism that assumes two human substances has problematic logical
implications: Applying this form of argument to child development and recognition
means that parents have to treat their kid both with love and aggression in order
that the child develops. If thought to the end, then Judith Butler with her relativist
­anti-​­essentialism indirectly justifies violence against children. That there is an ­ethico-­​
­­logical-​­political essence of society and the human is a crucial political foundation for
a just world.

2.6 Auschwitz
Auschwitz is the negative symbol of the catastrophe of modernity, the absolute negativ-
ity of history. It is therefore well suited as a case for reflections on the dialectic of history.
In one of his studies on Hegel, Adorno (­1993) uses the dictum from Parsifal that “­the
wound can be healed only by the spear that smote it” that also Žižek employs:

Using the language of epistemology and the language of speculative metaphys-

ics extrapolated from it, Hegel expressed the idea that the reified and ration-
alized society of the bourgeois era, the society in which a n­ ature-​­dominating
reason had come to fruition, could become a society worthy of human b­ eings – ​
­not by regressing to older, irrational stages prior to the division of labor but
only by applying its rationality to itself, in other words, only through a healing
awareness of the marks of unreason in its own reason, and the traces of the ra-
tional in the irrational as well. Since then the element of unreason has become
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 55

evident in the consequences of modern rationality, which threaten universal

catastrophe. In Parsifal Richard Wagner, the Schopenhauerian, put Hegel’s ex-
perience in terms of the ancient topos: only the spear that inflicted the wound
can heal it. Hegel’s philosophical consciousness suffered more from the es-
trangement between subject and object, between consciousness and reality,
than had any previous philosophical consciousness. But his philosophy had the
strength not to flee from this suffering back into the chimera of a world and
a subject of pure immediacy. It did not let itself be distracted from its aware-
ness that only through the realized truth of the whole would the unreason of a
merely particular reason, that is, a reason that merely serves particular inter-
ests, disintegrate.
(­Adorno 1993, 74)

Adorno expresses the same idea as Žižek, namely that change is mostly then progressive
when it is not a return to a previous state of society, but a sublation of that which exists
so that the best elements are taken from it, the bad ones shaken off, and new ones are
developed based on that which exists. But we should here bear in mind Roy Bhaskar’s
insights that there are different forms of sublation. And each situation and contradiction
may depend on the context and require a different, more or less substantial and radical
form of the negation of the negation.

Marx’s classical example of a constitutive negation that needs to be negated is the cap-
italist contradiction between productive forces and relations of production. Capitalist
technology creates technological potentials that socialise labour and the means of pro-
duction, but at the same time deepen the class antagonism. This means that a com-
munism that emerges from capitalism should further develop preconditions that already
exist in the capitalist means of production and communication. How such sublations of
Auschwitz

these means however look like depends very much on their specific forms.

There are ­use-​­values and technologies that are predominantly means of destruction.
The atom bomb cannot be put to a positive use. Sublation of the atom bomb in a com-
munist society must therefore mean a radical, substantial negation that gets rid of this
technology of war. The same can be said of nuclear power plants: They are technologies
of production, what Marx termed motor mechanisms that produce energy, but have de-
structive effects. So although in a socialist society, nuclear power plant workers may be
paid well, a socialist nuclear power plant is just like a capitalist one not a good power
plant because it threatens to extinct human life on Earth and destroys nature to a mas-
sive degree. It is not a common cause, but a common enemy of humanity. Given that
56 Foundations of Digital Democracy

not just h­ uman-​­produced ­use-​­values that we need in order to survive are commons, but
also nature is a commons that all humans require in order to survive, we can infer that
technologies that destroy nature cannot be socialist technologies at all because they do
not foster common causes.

What about the Internet? It is certainly not a principal enemy of the people. In its current
capitalist and ­state-​­controlled forms, it however is a means of domination and control.
This becomes evident in corporate social media’s exploitation of digital labour, the mass
monitoring of online communication operated by the s­urveillance-​­industrial complex
whose existence Edward Snowden revealed, etc. (­Fuchs 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2015).
Domination has been designed into a lot of online platforms. At the same time, the
Internet fosters the knowledge commons that have socialist potentials. So a socialist
transformation will not abolish the Internet in a radical sublation, but undertake subla-
tions that abolish capitalist ownership of platforms, online commerce, state surveillance
of users, etc. as well as the design patterns domination brings about, whereas it will
further develop the online commons so that a c­ ommons-​­based and public service Inter-
net can take full effect.

“­The wound can be healed only by the spear that smote it”. It is not the spear that
smites, not the knife that kills, and not the gas chamber that causes mass extinction.
Technologies are tools operated by human beings. It is humans and groups of humans
having specific ideologies and installing specific systems who smite, kill, and attempt
to extinct others. Wagner’s theme is rather functionalist and reads agency in a t­echno-​
­deterministic manner into technologies. If it is not the spear that creates the wound, but
the human who with the help of the spear does so, then it is also not the Internet that
does something (­exploits us, monitors us, etc.), but there are human beings with specific
interests shaping and designing the Internet in such ways that it is a means of control,
exploitation, etc. Given that the Internet has no agency, it therefore will also not save
us. Not technology will save us, only humans can. An alternatively designed and shaped
Internet can however be a tool applied for the better in a free society.

According to Moishe Postone, the logic of capitalism resulted in Auschwitz. It was the
specific agency of the Nazis that created and operated Auschwitz, but the Nazis oper-
ated in the context of capitalist modernity. Modern ­anti-​­Semitism emerged from the fet-
ishistic structure of capitalism, it is “­a particularly pernicious fetish form” (­Postone 2003,
95). “­The Jews were held responsible for economic crises and identified with the range
of social restructuring and dislocation resulting from rapid capitalist industrialization”
(­Postone 2003, 89). The “­specific characteristics of the power attributed to the Jews
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 57

by modern ­anti-­​­­Semitism – ​­abstractness, intangibility, universality, ­mobility – ​­are all

characteristics of the value dimension of the social forms fundamentally characterizing
capitalism” (­Postone 2003, 91).

Using Deleuze and Latour, Žižek writes:

We can think of Auschwitz as an a­ ssemblage – in ​­ which the agents were not

just the Nazi executioners but also the Jews, the complex network of trans, the
gas ovens, the logistics of feeding the prisoners, separating and distributing
clothes, extracting the gold teeth, collecting the hair and ashes and so on.
(­Žižek 2014, 8, footnote 8)

Applying Actor Network Theory (­ANT) to Auschwitz not just bestows agency to inan-
imate things, but also creates the impression that all “­actants”, including the Jews,
had the same influence and power in the very situation and event of Auschwitz. When
asking the question of responsibility, such a relativist approach therefore implies that all
involved human and n­ on-​­human actants had the same kind of responsibility. It is then no
longer possible to name and shame the ­beast – ​­the Nazis, the SS, those who supported
the Nazis, etc. – that
​­ actively planned and executed the Shoah. In the specific footnote
just quoted, it is not clear if Žižek only outlines the application of ANT to Auschwitz or if
he in this specific case shares this analysis.

Auschwitz was not an assemblage of humans and n­ on-​­humans, but a negative factory:

Auschwitz was a factory to ‘­destroy value’, that is, to destroy the personifica-
tions of the abstract. Its organization was that of a fiendishly inverted industrial
process, the aim of which was to ‘­liberate’ the concrete from the abstract.
The first step was to dehumanize and reveal the Jews for what they ‘­really
Auschwitz

are’ – ​­ciphers, numbered abstractions. The second step was to then eradicate
that abstractness, trying in the process to wrest away the last remnants of the
concrete material ‘­­use-​­value’: clothes, gold, hair.
(­Postone 2003, 95)

Adorno writes that after Auschwitz there is a new categorical imperative: “­A new cat-
egorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to arrange their
thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar
will happen” (­Adorno 1973, 365). He argued that after 1945, there was a “­continuing
potential” for Auschwitz’s “­recurrence” because “­barbarism continues as long as the
fundamental conditions that favoured that relapse continue largely unchanged” (­Adorno
58 Foundations of Digital Democracy

2003, 19). Forces enabling a repetition would be authoritarian culture that creates and
authoritarian personality and the “­revival of nationalism” (­Adorno 2003, 32). The one
thing that could be done in order to reduce the danger of repeating Auschwitz would be
­anti-​­fascist education.

Adorno gave a lot of attention to how education in p­ ost-​­1945 Germany could be used for
fostering ­anti-​­fascist engagement with the past in order to prevent a second Auschwitz
from happening. He was not convinced that the danger of such a repetition was banned.
Auschwitz haunts Germany like a ghost, a living dead that can r­e-​­awake its livelihood
at any time:

National Socialism lives on, and to this day we don’t know whether it is only
the ghost of what was so monstrous that it didn’t even die off with its own
death, or whether it never died in the first ­place – ​­whether the readiness for
unspeakable actions survives in people, as in the social conditions that hem
them in.
(­Adorno 1986, 115)

Adorno does not assume that the catastrophe of modern history results in learning from
the past, a conjuncture of barbarism and p­ ost-​­barbaric learning that avoids repetition. He
is much more sceptical and argues that ­de-​­barbarising politics and education need to be
fostered and attempted, but are no guarantee against the repetition of barbarism as long
as the root causes that enable the possibility of barbarism continue to exist: “­We will not
have come to terms with the past until the causes of what happened then are no longer
active. Only because these causes live on does the spell of the past remain, to this very
day, unbroken” (­Adorno 1986, 129).

If there is always a “­liberating aspect of the wound” (­Žižek 2014, 138) and the “­wound
itself is its own healing” (­Žižek 2014, 141), then this can imply that there are liberating
aspects of ­Auschwitz – ​­the deepest wound of ­capitalism – ​­and that Auschwitz is itself
the solution that guarantees its own n­ on-​­reoccurrence. This would mean that Auschwitz
first has to occur in order to not occur a second time. If the Allied Forces had rela-
tively quickly defeated Hitler and the Nazis, then Auschwitz, which started operating as
a negative factory in late 1940, would not have happened at that time. So there could
have been another solution that would have avoided going through Auschwitz in the first
instance. One could then however argue: If it had not happened then, it would have hap-
pened at another place and at another time. This could certainly have been the case, but
if we believe Adorno, then Auschwitz as a wound cannot heal itself and after 1945, the
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 59

threat of repetition has remained. Authoritarian personalities implicated by authoritarian

structures in society, ­anti-​­Semitism, and fascist potentials have not vanished.

Since the 2008 crisis started, f­ar-​­right and fascist movements and parties have gained
strength in many European countries. One can certainly learn from history, but this does
not mean that all humans do or want to learn in such a way. Auschwitz does not guaran-
tee its ­non-​­repetition. The only force that can guarantee Adorno’s categorical imperative
is ­anti-​­fascist agency and the political attempt to overcome the very causes of fascist
potentials in society. Such agency can however not be idealistic and voluntaristic, but
must be concretely related to the fascist potentials and dangers that exist at specific
times in specific contexts in society. Auschwitz was no liberation, but hell on Earth. ­Non-​
­repetition is not a l­ogical-​­historical consequence of Auschwitz itself, but rather requires
structural changes and agency that can break the continuity and ­re-​­creation of the condi-
tions that created and can continue to create Auschwitz.

Žižek again and again analyses Nazi ideology and society, for example when writing
that “­Nazism displaces class struggle onto racial struggle” (­Žižek 2008, 261). His own
analysis makes sense in respect to the assumption that humans can learn from history:

We can say that one result of Nazi Germany and its defeat was the institution
of much higher ethical standards of human rights and international justice; but
to claim that this result in any sense ‘­justifies’ Nazism would be an obscenity.
(­Žižek 2014, 131)

There is, however, as Adorno stresses, no necessity and determination that humans learn
from history and do not repeat the same catastrophes.

With formulations like the ones that the “­wound itself is its own healing” (­Žižek 2014,
Auschwitz

141) and that history “­will always [first] go wrong” (­Žižek 2014, 36), Žižek contradicts
parts of his own analysis and the assumption that history is a contingent process. There
is a strange and unresolved ambivalence between absolute freedom and absolute neces-
sity in Žižek’s concept of history.

Žižek argues that Heidegger was neither “­a fully fledged Nazi” nor “­politically naïve”,
that there is neither a “­direct link” nor a divisive gap between Heidegger’s thought and
Nazi ideology, but that “­the space for Nazi engagement was opened up by the immanent
failure or inconsistency of his thought” (­Žižek 2012, 882). Žižek interprets Heidegger’s
thought as being constituted by a “­missed potential” (­Žižek 2012, 903) – ​­the turn towards
communism. Where “­Heidegger erred most (­his Nazi engagement), he came closest to
60 Foundations of Digital Democracy

the truth” (­Žižek 2008, 148, see also 139). Heidegger was looking at Nazism for “­a revo-
lutionary Event” (­Žižek 2008, 142), but it was, Žižek argues, the wrong revolutionary force
that did not bring about a revolution at all, but a brutalisation of capitalism.

Žižek judges Heidegger based on a retroactive logic: looking backwards in history, he

argues that Heidegger’s theory had to make a choice if it sides with the Nazis or others,
such as the socialists or communists. We do not know if Heidegger ever considered join-
ing a left political movement, probably not. I don’t see why we should judge intellectual
thought and a theory based on what it could have (­according to Žižek’ assumptions) been.
The point is that thought should rather be judged by how it actually developed.

That young radical thinkers such as Herbert Marcuse and Günther Anders saw a left
potential in Heidegger does not imply that it was something that Heidegger himself
ever considered as feasible. And even if so, then it is more important how his thought
actually developed. Marcuse (­1934) himself considered Heidegger after his turn against
him as part of the ­anti-​­Hegelian Nazi philosophy. As Nazi philosopher, Heidegger’s works
engaged in “‘­existential’ opportunism” (­Marcuse 1934, 29) that justified Hitler’s regime
and tried to give a death blow to Hegel so that it envisaged a Fall of the Titans of German
philosophy” (­Marcuse 1934, 30). Hans Heinz Holz (­2011b, 554) characterises Heidegger’s
work as a form of “­romantic ­anti-​­Hegelianism”.

The question how deeply influenced Heidegger’s thought was by National Socialism re-
mained disputed for a long time. On the one hand, there were apologists such as Hannah
Arendt, ­Jean-​­Paul Sartre, Jacques Derrida, or Richard Rorty who felt inspired by Heideg-
ger and defended and took up the content of his philosophical works. The impression that
Heidegger’s work made on their own thoughts blinded them for his politics. On the other
hand, critical theorists, especially Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas, argued that
Heidegger was a fascist and that National Socialism also shaped his philosophy.

This controversy remains topical until today. New insights were gained by the 2014 pub-
lication of Heidegger’s (­2014a, 2014b, 2014c) Black Notebooks. Not just did he stay a
member of the Nazi Party until the liberation from National Socialism in 1945, but the
Notebooks show that Heidegger’s thought was in these years also deeply entrenched in
­anti-​­Semitism, the ideological core of Nazism.

In these notebooks, Heidegger wrote that Jews are calculating profiteers, would have
lived based on the principle of race, but resist that the Nazis apply this principle to them.
He writes that the Nazis would only practice in an unlimited manner what the Jews
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 61

would have practiced long before them. World Judaism would be uprooted and abstract
and would not want to sacrifice the blood of Jews in wars, whereas the Germans would
only have the choice to sacrifice what Heidegger describes as the best blood of ­all –​
­German ­blood – ​­in warfare. “­The Jews have ‘­lived’ the longest with their pronounced
calculating aptitude according to the ‘­racial principle’, which is why they most heavily
contest its full application” (­Heidegger 1936c, 56, translation from German4). Heidegger
here basically blames the Jews for Auschwitz and says that they themselves have deeply
advanced the instrumental logic on which it was based. Heidegger makes the typical
Nazi move to blame the Jews for capitalism. He argues that they have an inherently cal-
culating, instrumental reason and thereby identifies them with capitalism. He identifies
the Jews “­with the range of social restructuring and dislocation resulting from rapid
capitalist industrialization” (­Postone 2003, 89) and typically for “­Nazism displaces class
struggle onto racial struggle” (­Žižek 2008, 261).

Many commentators have argued that the Black Notebooks show once and for all that
Heidegger was a convinced Nazi, an a­ nti-​­Semite, and a ­Nazi-​­apologiser. They criticise
that Heidegger argues that the Jews are themselves to blame for the Shoah. Given Hei-
degger’s ­anti-​­Semitism, it seems almost cynical that Žižek argues to see Heidegger not
just in a negative light, but to consider retroactively that it could have been different. Hei-
degger did in the years 1­ 934–​­1941 that are covered in the Notebooks not retroactively
reflect on the ideological foundation of Nazism in order to make an ideological turn. He
did not learn from his own history and stayed the same Nazi he was during his time as
Rector at the University of Freiburg.

In a truly retroactive manner, the Black Notebooks allow us to posit Heidegger’s thoughts
own preconditions. The Notebooks give insights into the past that were thus far con-
tested and not entirely clear because Heidegger tended to be silent on Auschwitz and
Conclusion

the Nazis after 1945 (­which is in itself problematic). Retroactively the Notebooks show
and allow the judgement that Heidegger was a Nazi, that his thought was, is and re-
mains deeply reactionary and fascist, and that critical theory can only be critical without
Heidegger.

2.7 Conclusion
Žižek shows in Absolute Recoil (­and previous Hegelian works such as Less than Nothing)
the importance of repeating Hegel’s dialectical philosophy in contemporary capitalism.
In order to adequately and critically understand the world today, we need a materialist
62 Foundations of Digital Democracy

and dialectical theory that grasps society as a dialectical totality. Žižek keeps up the dia-
lectical fire and gives the idea that Hegelian dialectics matters a broader publicity. Such
Hegelian works are of high relevance for a critical theory of 21st century society and its
constitution within the world in general.

Within a proper dialectical debate it is inevitable that questions about the dialectic of
the dialectic arise: How shall the dialectic adequately be conceived today? Žižek con-
tributes especially to reconceptualising the dialectical logic and based on it the dialectic
of history. He uses both versions of the dialectic for critical interventions into specific
questions of contemporary culture, politics, ideology, theory, and ethics.

The key aspects of Žižek’s dialectical materialism are the Hegelian concept of the abso-
lute recoil and the notion of retroactivity: In dialectical development, a sublation posits
its own preconditions. It returns to itself and thereby constitutes itself. Žižek has in his
books again and again stressed the importance of the logic of retroactivity and has in
Absolute Recoil conceptualised the dialectic’s positing of its own preconditions as retro-
activity. This retroactivity is of logical nature, but at the same time the logical is historical
and so retroactivity is for Žižek also an important principle of the dialectic of history.

I have argued in this chapter that the absolute recoil that in a retroactive manner con-
stitutes its own preconditions and thereby makes a thing constitute itself, is an impor-
tant, but incomplete dialectical principle. Marx uses this notion of the absolute recoil
implicitly for describing the logic of the accumulation of capital: A specific capital M1
must in order to survive increase itself into M1’ that again becomes the starting point of
a new accumulation process M2. But there is a dynamic in between that Žižek is aware
of and that constitutes the starting and end point: the exploitation of labour and labour’s
production of commodities. Žižek is not unaware of the dialectical process, but the book
title Absolute Recoil stresses as the main principle of the dialectic how the result of the
dialectic turns into preconditions. This stress is incomplete because the dynamic in be-
tween starting and end point that becomes a new starting point is of crucial importance.

I have argued that we need to make a Heraclitusian move for properly conceptualising
2­ 1st-​­century dialectics: Yes, the dialectic is the absolute recoil that posits its own pre-
conditions. But for this ­self-​­referencing and ­self-​­constitution, in which something returns
into itself as something different that constitutes a new positive difference that makes a
difference, to occur, the dialectic needs to burn: The dialectical fire extinguishes a con-
tradiction and thereby itself, but this extinguishment is at the same time a ­self-​­kindling
of the dialectic and the kindle of a new fire, in which the old is sublated as the new and
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 63

constitutes a new contradiction. The dialectic is the absolute recoil in and through being
a fire that continuously extinguishes and kindles itself.

For Žižek, the dialectic is a development from nothing to nothing and from less than noth-
ing to nothing. This assumption is a specific Žižekian version of the negative dialectic. I
have argued in this chapter that the dialectic develops from nothing to nothing and at the
same time from something to something, nothing to something, something to nothing.
It is this complex unity of dialectics of something and nothing that constitutes the world
and its development potentialities.

In his conceptualisation of the dialectic of history, Žižek on the one hand uses the notions
of the parallax, the absolute recoil, and retroactivity for stressing that there is a n­ on-​
­dialecticisable intruder/­excess that keeps the dialectic open. I have argued that Žižek
with this assumption gives too much into postmodern thought that he at the same time
paradoxically detests as an enemy that does not want to question the capitalist totality.
A proper dialectic of the totality sees the source of differentiation inside the dialectic
itself as the dialectic is constituted within a complex field of possibilities that is based
on a dialectic of chance and necessity. I have argued that whereas Žižek on the one
hand concedes too much to postmodernism, he on the other hand also falls back into
a version of a mechanical dialectic that sees the catastrophe as the absolute necessity
for liberation so that history and revolutions have to fail the first time and through this
failure can succeed later.

For conceptualising a dialectic for the 21st-​­century world and the world’s society, I have
not just invoked Heraclitus, but also the works of the two German dialectical Marxist
philosophers Herbert Hörz (­born in 1933) and Hans Heinz Holz (­­1927–​­2011). Their major
works, especially Weltentwurf und Reflexion (­Holz 2005) and Materialistische Dialektik
(­Hörz 2009), are rather unknown internationally because they have thus far not been
Conclusion

translated into English. I have stressed the importance of Hörz’s concept of dialectical de-
terminism for a proper dialectic of chance and necessity, openness and determinateness,
freedom and constraint. Herbert Hörz grounds his dialectical heuristics in contemporary
advances in science, such as the theories of complexity and ­self-​­organisation, and at the
same time has worked out the specificity of the dialectic and the application of new the-
ories to a society based on dialectical philosophy. Hans Heinz Holz is probably one of the
most important dialectical philosophers of the totality of the 20th century. He shows how
the totality is dialectical and thereby neither mechanically determined nor relativistic.
And he grounded these insights in a detailed and profound study of the history of dialec-
tical philosophy: His posthumous work Dialektik: Problemgeschichte von der Antike bis
64 Foundations of Digital Democracy

zur Gegenwart presents in five volumes and almost 3,000 pages the history of dialectical
philosophy. Also this major work is thus far not available in English. Holz’s own dialectic
connects Leibniz, Hegel, and Marx and takes a historical approach to the dialectical de-
velopment of dialectical philosophy itself. Readers of this book who are in the structural
position to bring about the publication of book translations, are well advised to have a
look at the works of Hans Heinz Holz and Herbert Hörz if they care about the dialectic.

Wallerstein, Hörz, and Holz together allow us to see that history is constituted in a spe-
cific period as field of possibilities, in which humans can by collective praxis increase
the possibility of certain alternatives. The future is contingent because society is inher-
ently contradictory in complex manners. History is a dialectic of chance and necessity:
The possible futures are constituted through the presence and the past, but the exact
outcome is not determined and therefore open, which gives us hope that we can make a
difference and that the future does not have to be catastrophic. The past lives on in the
present, but it is not determined if humans adequately learn from it and can make a differ-
ence the next time. The next catastrophe always looms just democratic socialism looms.

Hans Heinz Holz has shown in impressive manner that the dialectic is itself subject to a
historical dialectic. Slavoj Žižek’s Absolute Recoil helps us keep the fire of the dialectic
alive. The point is how to conceptualise the dialectic today so that it can be a proper
revolutionary theory. The aspect I want to stress is twofold: (­a) It is important that we
further develop dialectical materialism by enabling engagement with major contributions
(­such as the ones by Holz and Hörz). (­b) The dialectic manifests itself in specific realms of
being. In the 21st century, one important (­but of course not the only) dimension of society
has to do with media, communication, culture, and the digital. This realm continues to
be devalued in Marxist theory and belittled as a superstructure (­not necessarily in Žižek’s
works itself). So we need to repeat Hegel’s dialectic in general, but this repetition should
at the same time be one that manifests itself in a critical dialectical theory of media,
communication, culture, the digital, and the Internet (­Fuchs 2008, 2011, 2014a, 2014c,
2015, Fuchs and Mosco 2012, Fuchs and Sandoval 2014, Sandoval et al. 2014).

Notes
1 In Less than Nothing, Žižek (­2012, 315) distinguishes between total and partial sublations.
2 “­Im Setzen des Anderen wird meine ­Reflexion-­​­­in-​­mich zugleich ­Reflexion-­​­­meiner-­​­­in-­​­­ein-​
­Anderes (‘­äußere Reflexion’)”.
 Chapter Two | The Dialectic 65

3 “­Jede Substanz ist das (­passive, gesetzte) Resultat der Wechselwirkung aller Substanzen und
jede ist zugleich aktiv (­aktives, setzendes) Moment dieser Wechselwirkung”.
4 “­Die Juden ‘­leben’ bei ihrer betont rechnerischen Begabung am längsten schon nach dem
Rasseprinzip, weshalb sie sich auch am heftigsten gegen die uneingeschränkte Anwendung
zur Wehr setzen”.

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Chapter Three
The Critique of the Political Economy of the Media
and Communication

3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Research Field of the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and
Communication
3.3 Karl Marx as a Critic of Capitalism and Communication Theorist
3.4 An Example Application of the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media
and Communication: Social Movements and Alternative Media in Capitalism
3.5 Conclusions
References

3.1 Introduction
The Critique of the Political Economy of Media and Communication is an approach that
applies theory, philosophy, and empirical research to analyse and critically reflect on
the interrelation of communication, capitalism, domination, and power, thereby gener-
ating knowledge that can play a significant role in social praxis aimed at changing the
world.

The basic questions of media economics in communication studies as a critique

of the political economy of the media include the analysis of the relationship
between the media and capitalist society, i.e. the role of the media in all mate-
rial, economic, social, political and cultural human life.1
(­­Knoche 2002, 105)

The Critique of the Political Economy is one of the approaches within the Political Econ-
omy of the Media and Communication. Other forms of the Political Economy of the Media
and Communication go back to neoclassical economics, ­­neo-​­​­​­Keynesianism, institution-
alism, feminist political economy, political ecology, and other approaches (­­see Hardy
2014, Mosco 2009, Winseck 2011). These approaches are partly overlapping and cannot
be clearly distinguished from each other. Nevertheless, one can certainly distinguish

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-5
70 Foundations of Digital Democracy

in general between orthodox approaches, which are neoclassical, neoliberal, and ­­neo-​­​­​
­conservative, and heterodox approaches.

This discussion piece deals with the relevance of the Critique of the Political Economy of
the Media and Communication in today’s society. Section 3.2 provides a brief introduc-
tion to the field of the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communica-
tion. Section 3.3 explores the relevance of Marx’s theory for media and communication
studies. Section 3.4 presents an example of the application of the Critique of the Political
economy of the Media and Communication, namely the analysis of the political economy
of alternative media and social movements.

3.2 The Research Field of the Critique of

the Political Economy of the Media and
Communication
The approaches to the critique of capitalism, which go back to Marx and are summarised
by the terms “­­critique of the political economy” and “­­critical political economy”, have a
long tradition and a relatively large number of manifestations (­­cf. Bidet and Kouvelakis
2008). These approaches differ in terms of their subject matter, the way in which theory
is formed and oriented, the role of empirical and theoretical research, the relationship
between structure and agency, and the relationship between economy and society. How-
ever, they also have in common that they always see the analysed subject area in the
context of capitalist rule, power structures, classes, class struggles, forms of production
and reproduction, and alternative societal formations. To speak of Marx therefore does
not mean fixating on one person or one book, but orienting oneself towards a complex,
­­multi-​­​­​­layered, open, and dynamically developing tradition of theory and research. If one
wants to rediscover Marx, there are many starting points, possibilities, and theoretical
versions.

The expression of interest in the ­­Marx-​­​­​­inspired critique of capitalism and critical social
analysis is related in a complex way to societal development and the results of social
struggles and class struggles. In the wake and immediate aftermath of the 1968 stu-
dent movement, this interest was relatively strong. With the rise of neoliberal capitalism
combined with the collapse of “­­actually existing socialism” and the rise of postmodern
approaches that have rejected ­­Marx-​­​­​­influenced critical social analysis as a totalitarian
“­­grand narrative”, have devoted themselves to microanalysis and micropolitics, and
have believed in an end to history, the interest in the critical political economy declined
 Chapter Three | The Critique of the Political Economy 71

T­ ABLE 3.1 Average annual number of mentions of categories critical of capitalism in the titles of social science
journal articles in specific time periods

Time period Number of average mentions per year

­­1970–​­​­​­1979 535
­­1980–​­​­​­1989 821
­­1990–​­​­​­1999 506
­­2000–​­​­​­2009 434

The Research Field of the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication
­­2010–​­​­​­2019 799

Data source: Social Sciences Citation Index (­­accessed 13 April 2021; keyword search: Marx* OR capitalis* OR
commodi*).

significantly. The new global economic crisis that started in 2008, the crises of national
and transnational state power (­­including the European Union) as a result of austerity
measures and short-​­​­​­
­­ sighted reactions to refugees and war, the political and ideological
crisis of the neoliberal model of regulation, and the social crisis characterised by precar-
ious living and working conditions that affect young people in particular in many parts of
the world, have together led to a crisis of legitimacy of capitalism. In the course of this
crisis, interest in the critique of capitalism and society influenced by Marx has increased
significantly.

This theoretical analysis can be empirically substantiated for the social sciences.
­Table 3.1 shows the number of mentions of keywords critical of capitalism in the
titles of social science journal articles indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index
for different time periods. In the 1970s and 1980s, the number was significantly
higher than in the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium. Since 2010, the
annual average number has increased significantly again, almost to the level of the
1980s. The turbulent social times in which we live have obviously led to an increase
in interest in and engagement with the critique of political economy in the social
sciences.

The Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication has become in-
stitutionalised to a certain degree, especially internationally and in Great Britain, the
United States, Canada, and Latin America (see Mosco 2009, Wasko 2014). In the In-
ternational Association for Media and Communication Research, there has been a very
active Political Economy Section since 1978. Dedicated to the Political Economy of Com-
munication are a number of academic journals such as tripleC: Communication, Capital-
ism & Critique or The Political Economy of Communication; conferences, textbooks and
72 Foundations of Digital Democracy

courses, anthologies, handbooks, research projects, young researchers in the form of

doctoral students, etc.

Vincent Mosco (­­2009, 2) defines the approach of the Political Economy of the Media and
Communication as “­­the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations,
that mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of resources, in-
cluding communication resources”. According to Mosco, an analysis of communication
phenomena using the approach of the critique of the political economy is about relating
the object of study to processes of commodification (­­of content, labour, and audience),
globalisation and internationalisation, privatisation, liberalisation, commercialisation,
concentration processes (­­horizontal and vertical integration, strategic alliances, joint
ventures), structuration processes (­­class relations, racism, gender relations, etc.) and
social praxis (­­social movements, social change, protest, etc.).

Graham Murdock and Peter Golding emphasise that capitalist media sell information as
a commodity and/­­or are integrated into the overall economy as advertising platforms (­­
see Murdock and Golding 1974). The specificity of the media system, they argue, is that it
publicly communicates ideas about the economy and politics, making ideology critique a
central task of the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication, in
addition to analysing the role of the media in capitalism. Murdock and Golding (2005, 61)
argue that the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication differs
from mainstream approaches in four ways:

Firstly, it is holistic. Secondly, it is historical. Thirdly, it is centrally concerned

with balance between capitalist enterprise and public intervention. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly of all, it goes beyond technical issues of efficiency
to engage with basic moral questions of justice, equity and the public good.

One can say that the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication
is materialistic in that it avoids ­­technology-​­​­​­ and ­­media-​­​­​­centricity, and has “­­sought to
decenter the media of communication” (­­Mosco 2009, 66), which means to always view
and analyse the media and communication in the context of society as a whole.

In the debate between Cultural Studies and Critical Political Economy, the q­ uestion was what
role structure/­­agency, macro/­­micro, social science/­­humanities, domination/­­resistance,
production/­­consumption, economy/­­culture, exploitation/­­power, class/­­identity play in the
analysis of communication phenomena and how the relationship between these catego-
ries is to be grasped. Today, the approach that both sides of these contradictions are to
 Chapter Three | The Critique of the Political Economy 73

be treated dialectically and integratively has become more internationally accepted. This
fact becomes clear, for example, in the last interview Stuart Hall gave before his death, in
which he said:

They would have to go back to the political function of cultural studies, the
political dimension of cultural studies, and they would have to ask themselves,
‘­­If the economy does not determine everything in the last instance, then what is

The Research Field of the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication
the role of the economic in the reproduction of the material and symbolic life?’
They would have to ask themselves economic questions. […] There’s a kind of
return. […] But as Gramsci always said, the economy can never be forgotten.
It has to be taken into account. [...] You won’t be surprised to know I think it’s
more like a return to what cultural studies should have been about and was
during the early stages. It sort of lost its way.
(­­Jhally 2016, ­­337–​­​­​­338)

Hall argues for Cultural Studies to be more concerned with the “­­Marxist tradition of
critical thinking” (­­Jhally 2016, 338).

Horst Holzer (1994, 185, 2017) spoke of the fact that the Critique of the Political Economy
of the Media and Communication is a “­­forgotten theory” in the German-​­​­​­
­­ speaking world.
There have been representatives with excellent approaches throughout, such as Horst
Holzer, Manfred Knoche, Dieter Prokop, Jörg Becker, Wulf Hund, Bärbel ­­Kirchhoff-​­​­​­Hund,
Franz Dröge, Jörg Aufermann, Rudi Schmiede, Lothar Bisky, Jürgen Alberts, etc. With
exceptions, however, such as Manfred Knoche’s professorship in Salzburg (­­­­1994–​­​­​­2009),
the approach of the critique of the political economy has not become institutionalised in
media and communication studies in the ­­German-​­​­​­speaking world.

Horst Holzer combined critical social theory and empirical social research to analyse the
media and communication. He thus advocated the approach of a Critique of the Political
Economy of the Media and Communication based on a dialectic of theory and empiri-
cism. For example, Holzer used the method of content analysis, the secondary analysis
of empirical studies, and the analysis of macroeconomic data to analyse the connection
between communication, economy, and democracy (­­see Holzer 1971). Like Habermas,
Holzer emphasised that advertising, media concentration, the commercial orientation
of the media, “­­the personalisation of societal facts” and the “­­emphasised mixing of
individual life problems and public affairs”2 (­­Holzer 1971, 151) undermine the democratic
character of the public sphere. The difference between Habermas and Holzer is that the
74 Foundations of Digital Democracy

latter does not argue purely in terms of social theory, but interprets empirical results in a
critical way and on the basis of a critical theory of communication and society.

Holzer’s dialectical theory of society and communication emerged as a critique of action

theory and systems theory. He criticised systems theory, which was decisively influenced
by Talcott Parsons, for conceiving of social systems as subjects (­­cf. Holzer 1971, 255)
and for “­­hypostatising an actual status quo of society as societal order as such”3 (­­Holzer
1971, 250). According to Holzer, Luhmann’s systems theory of communication is not ca-
pable of illuminating the connection between communication, body and psyche, and
the “­­entanglement of mass communication’s genesis, quality structure and functions”4
(­­Holzer 1994, 182) with media production, media organisations, media content, media
use, media reception, and human consciousness.

Holzer criticises that Habermas’ theory does not conceive of the relation between work
and interaction as a dialectic, but rather as a dualism (­­see Holzer 1987). Habermas is
“­­not capable to discern the essential quality of societal production: In the process of pro-
duction, we not just develop the productive forces, but also societal relations, including
communication and interaction, that humans enter in this production process”5 (­­Holzer
1987, 27).

In contrast to Habermas, Georg Lukács in his book Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen
Seins (­­The Ontology of Society’s Being) characterised the social production process,
which is based on a dialectic of work and communication (­­see Fuchs 2016a, ­Chapter 2).

Holzer worked on a materialist theory of communication based on Marx’s theory of

society (­­see Holzer 2017, 2018). There is a dialectic of work and communication. Hol-
zer argues that “­­cognition and communication […] are two sides of the process” that
“­­regulates the societally organised metabolism with nature and society’s internal social
conflicts”6 (­­Holzer 1973, 57).

What is decisive for such a theory is that it is a Critique of the Political Economy of the
Media and Communication. Holzer analysed communication and the media in capitalism
at the level of individual capitals and total capital (­­see Holzer 1973, ­­129–​­​­​­137, 1994, ­­202–​­​­​
­204, 2017, ­­715–​­​­​­718). At the level of individual capital, the media and communication
system has a capital economy in which information is directly a form of capital valori-
sation and surplus value production, and plays a role in the circulation of commodities
as the creator of “­­a climate fostering consumption and the advertisement of specific
products and services” (­­Holzer 2017, 715).
 Chapter Three | The Critique of the Political Economy 75

At the level of capitalism as a whole, the communication system has an ideological role
“­­to secure and legitimise the rule of capital”7 (­­Holzer 1973, 131) and “­­of society’s organ-
isational principle” (­­Holzer 2017, 715) as well as a reproductive role as Information and
entertainment source that is used to “­­produce, preserve and reproduce”8 (­­Holzer 1973,
131) labour power.

The Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication has so far failed

The Research Field of the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication
and has been institutionally prevented in the German-speaking world. The view that
Critical Political Economy is an important theoretical and empirical contribution and ap-
proach to the study of media and communication has not prevailed. Although the Critique
of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication is highly relevant today, it is
forgotten and little established in the German-​­​­​­
­­ speaking world. One of the influencing
factors is illustrated by the example of Horst Holzer, who was banned from holding a
professorship in Bremen in 1971 because of his membership in the German Communist
Party, which also prevented his tenure at Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich in
1974 and led to the end of his academic career (­­see Bönkost 2011, Scheu 2012).

More than 45 years after Holzer faced an occupational ban, the political hunt against
Marxists has not yet come to an end. Media and communication studies scholars are still
affected today: In autumn 2012, the Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution
initiated an investigation when Kerem Schamberger was offered a funded doctoral po-
sition in the field of media and communication studies at Ludwig Maximilian University
of Munich. Schamberger is known in Bavaria as a ­­left-​­​­​­wing activist. He describes what
happened as follows:

In July 2016, I applied to a position as research assistant supervised by Professor

Meyen. When I got the job offer I had to complete the ‘­­Questionnaire for Assess-
ing Constitutional Loyalty’ (­­Bogen zur Prüfung der Verfassungstreue) that lists
organisations that are, according to the opinion of the Bavarian Office for the Pro-
tection of the Constitution, ­­anti-​­​­​­constitutional. All applicants applying to public
service positions in Bavaria have to complete this Orwellian questionnaire. It is a
scandal that the list contains ­­anti-​­​­​­fascist organisations such as the Union of Per-
secutees of the Nazi Regime (­­Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes) right
next to Nazi organisations such as National Democratic Party of Germany (­­NPD)
or militant, fascist fraternities. The list also contains left-​­​­​­
­­ wing organisations crit-
ical of capitalism such as the DKP or Red Aid (­­Rote Hilfe). So if you check that
you are the member of such an organisation, then the Office for the Protection of
76 Foundations of Digital Democracy

the Constitution is asked for information on the background of the applicant. That
is also what happened in my case. […] I checked association with the German
Communist Party (­­Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, DKP), the Union of Persecu-
tees of the Nazi R­ egime – ​­​­​­Association of Antifascists (­­Vereinigung der Verfolgten
des ­Naziregimes – Bund
​­​­​­ der AntifaschistInnen, VVN), Red Help (­­Rote Hilfe), and
the Socialist German Workers Youth (­­Sozialistische deutsche Arbeiterjugend,
SDAJ), where I was a member until 2013.
(­­Schamberger 2017, 84 & 85)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich eventually hired Schamberger despite the

Office for the Protection of the Constitution’s negative review, as the university had no
doubts about his loyalty to the constitution and his advocacy of the democratic form of
socialism.

3.3 Karl Marx as a Critic of Capitalism and

Communication Theorist
Marx was a historical and dialectical thinker. Since society changes, the categories with
which it is analysed must therefore also change. Therefore, in terms of social theory,
however, two extremes should be avoided. Namely, on the one hand, the assumption
that we now live in a radically new postmodern, digital, or information society. And on
the other hand, the premise is that society has not changed at all since the 19th century.
Both approaches can be avoided through the dialectical approach to social analysis,
which assumes a dialectic of continuity and discontinuity in society’s development. A
new phase of societal and capitalist development sublates older phases, i.e. to a certain
degree, the existing is preserved, eliminated, and supplemented by new emergent qual-
ities. This degree is determined by a dialectic of chance and necessity, structures and
action, crises, and social struggles.

We live today in a capitalism that is based on the exploitation of labour, as it was in the
19th century. However, capitalist change has at the same time led to changes within cap-
italism, which is now organised as a multiplicity of interlocking capitalisms, for example,
financial market capitalism, digital capitalism, knowledge and information capitalism,
neoliberal capitalism, authoritarian capitalism, mobility capitalism, hyperindustrial cap-
italism, etc.

The study of the critique of political economy is in many ways relevant to the critical
analysis of media and communication today (­­cf. Fuchs 2008, 2011, 2014a, 2015, 2016a,
 Chapter Three | The Critique of the Political Economy 77

2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2020, 2021, Fuchs and Mosco 2012, 2017a, 2017b). It goes back to
Marx’s analysis of capitalism and society.

A first interesting aspect about the Critique of Political Economy is the fact that Marx
was a critical journalist and intellectual who was comprehensively critical of the political
developments of his time. In times of erosion of investigative journalism, Marx’s jour-
nalistic practice reminds us of a time when the commercialisation and capitalisation of
the media and thus the colonisation of the public sphere was less advanced. For Marx,
journalism was a means of social critique.

Marx was an ardent advocate of democracy, freedom of the press, and freedom of ex-
pression. He saw the danger of restricting this freedom through state censorship and
pointed to the danger of the restriction of freedom through capitalisation and media
concentration: “­­The primary freedom of the press lies in not being a trade” (­­Marx 1842,
175). Today we live not only in a world where there is a strong concentration of capital

Karl Marx as a Critic of Capitalism and Communication Theorist

in the traditional media sector, but also in the new digital media sector. Google has mo-
nopolised capital in the search engine sector, Facebook in the social networking sector,
Amazon in online commerce, Microsoft in operating systems, etc. The mechanisms by
which capital concentration and commodification operate and the forms in which they
are expressed have changed with the shift to digital capitalism, but the phenomena of
media concentration and media monopolies remain fundamental structural principles of
capitalism. Google has a dominant position in the online advertising market. This is a
global market because the Internet is a global means of information and communication.
In October 2020, Google controlled 69.30 per cent of all desktop search engine queries,
92.9 per cent of all mobile search engine queries, and 88.3 per cent of search queries
conducted on tablets.9 Google search and Google advertising are algorithmic. They are
based on constant surveillance, storage, and analysis of (­­almost) all online activities of
all users, generating and commodifying Big Data. The online concentration of capital
operates in a global market based on algorithms and Big Data.

The analysis of the commodity form as the elementary form of capitalism is a second
interesting aspect of the critique of capitalism. Marx begins the first chapter in the first
volume of Das Kapital with the words: “­­The wealth of societies in which the capitalist
mode of production prevails appears as an ‘­­immense collection of commodities’; the
individual commodity appears as its elementary form” (­­Marx 1867, 125).

The ­­political-​­​­​­economic strategy of capitalism is to subsume more and more realms of so-
ciety under the commodity form. In the last few decades, this has not stopped at realms
78 Foundations of Digital Democracy

that were traditionally protected or spared from commodification, such as public services
(­­including public media, education, health, and universities), the human body, the human
mind, communication, nature, etc. In the field of digital media, commodification has af-
fected labour (­­digital labour), digital content, digital technologies, access to platforms,
online audiences, online prosumers (­­producing consumers), and Big Data.

The categories of the exploitation of labour, surplus value and class relations are a third
current aspect of Critical Political Economy. In capitalism, the workers are considered as
“­­merely a machine for the production of surplus-​­​­​­
­­ value” and capitalists as “­­a machine for
the transformation of this surplus-​­​­​­
­­ value into surplus capital” (­­Marx 1867, 742). The his-
torical differentiation of capitalism has made the class structure more complex (­­see Dalla
Costa and James 1973, Federici 2012, Negri 1982/­­1988, 2017, Smythe 1977, Wright
1997). This can be seen in the emergence of managers, unpaid interns, the precariat,
freelancers, knowledge workers, digital labour, etc. The relations of production of digital
capitalism are based on an international division of digital labour in which different forms
of exploitation (­­such as slave labour, digital housework, Taylorist industrial labour, precar-
ious digital labour, the work of highly paid and overworked software engineers, unpaid
digital shadow labour, low paid digital labour in developing countries) interact.

The globalisation of capital represents a fourth current aspect of the critique of politi-
cal economy. Marx emphasised that capitalism has a fundamental tendency to expand
spatially in order to create markets, spheres of production and consumption for commod-
ities, labour, and capital. “­­The need of a constantly expanding market for its products
chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere,
settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere” (­­Marx and Engels 1848, 487). In
recent decades, capitalism has transnationalised the production of goods and surplus
value and strongly promoted the export of capital, similar to the beginning of the 20th
century. One consequence of this has been that since the 1990s there has been a lot of
talk about globalisation in public discussions and the social sciences.

This terminology is not wrong, but the social critique based on Marx has the advantage
of having captured the specific form of capitalist globalisation as imperialism. In more
recent discussions, David Harvey, for example, has coined the notion of the new imperi-
alism (­­see Harvey 2005) to highlight the combination of financialisation and neoliberal-
ism as a characteristic of contemporary capitalist globalisation. The economic sector of
media, information, communication, culture, and digital capital is subject to such a cap-
italist globalisation tendency. In 2020, the world’s 30 largest transnational corporations
 Chapter Three | The Critique of the Political Economy 79

included 9 such companies: Apple (#9), AT&T (­­11), Alphabet/­­Google (#13), Microsoft
(#13), Samsung Electronics (#16), Verizon Communications (#20), Amazon (#22), Comcast
(#27), and China Mobile (#28).10 Among these 30 companies were 11 financial corpora-
tions (­­banks, insurance companies) and five energy and mobility corporations (­­oil, gas,
energy supply, car production). This fact indicates that capitalism today is a combination
of financial capitalism, mobility capitalism, hyperindustrial capitalism, and information/­­
digital capitalism.

And these dimensions of capitalism are intertwined and overlapping. Digital companies
are a good example of this: many of these corporations are financed by venture capital
companies, which makes the Internet economy vulnerable to crises of financial markets,
as these financial investments are often very risky. Digital media cannot exist without
energy supply. The global Internet consumes about 10 per cent of the energy consumed
globally (­­cf. De Decker 2015). In times of Big Data and server farms, this share is increas-

Karl Marx as a Critic of Capitalism and Communication Theorist

ing. Digitalisation has supported and mediated a flexibilisation and global mobilisation
of goods, people, and information.

The ­­crisis-​­​­​­proneness of capitalism is a fifth important aspect of the critique of political

economy. Capitalism is an inherently ­­crisis-​­​­​­prone system.

The fact that the movement of capitalist society is full of contradictions im-
presses itself most strikingly on the practical bourgeois in the changes of the
periodic cycle through which modern industry passes, the summit of which is
the general crisis.
(­­Marx 1867, 103)

The new world economic crisis and its consequences highlight the importance of the
objective dialectics of capitalism, i.e. its susceptibility to crisis. A complex combina-
tion of wage stagnation, class struggle from above, financialisation, precarisation, and
the increase in the technical and organic composition of capital through computeri-
sation, informatisation, and automation had ripened contradictions over the decades
that were then sublated in the crisis. Due to its financialisation, the capitalist Inter-
net economy is a highly ­­crisis-​­​­​­prone realm of capitalism. The ­­dot-​­​­​­com crisis in 2000
made this clear. The social media economy is also subject to similar financialisation
tendencies.

The dialectic of technology and society is a sixth significant aspect of the critique of po-
litical economy. Marx presented this dimension in the ­­so-​­​­​­called “­­Fragment of Machines”
80 Foundations of Digital Democracy

in the Grundrisse as well as in the fifteenth chapter of the first volume of Capital
(“­­Machinery and ­­Large-​­​­​­Scale Industry”). For example, he argues:

machinery in itself shortens the hours of labour, but when employed by capi-
tal it lengthens them; since in itself it lightens labour, but when employed by
capital it heightens its intensity; since in itself it is a victory of man over the
forces of nature but in the hands of capital it makes man the slave of those
forces; since in itself it increases the wealth of the producers, but in the hands
of capital it makes them into paupers.
(­­Marx 1867, ­­568–​­​­​­569)

The dialectic of technology is understood to mean that technology develops contradicto-

rily in a class society under the influence of existing and developing social contradictions.
At the same time, technology is not only socially produced, but also has unpredictable
internal contradictions and development dynamics. This applies especially to highly com-
plex systems that involve a risk of catastrophe. Communication technologies and other
technologies do not develop in a certain way by necessity, nor is their development
completely random. Rather, a dialectic of chance and necessity plays a role. Raymond
Williams, who was a Marx-​­​­​­ ­­ influenced theorist throughout his life, has emphasised in
his critique of Marshall McLuhan’s technological determinism that technology is not a
“­­­­self-​­​­​­acting force which provides materials for new ways of life” (­­Williams 2003/­­1974,
6). Rather, human intentions and actions influenced by certain societal conditions play a
significant role.

The seventh important aspect of the critique of political economy is the examination
of the ­­knowledge-​­​­​­based nature of society and capitalism. Marx introduced the concept
of the General Intellect in the Grundrisse, a draft of Das Kapital, in a section also known
as the “­­Fragment of Machines”. Marx (­­1857/­­1858, 706) describes a condition where
“­­general social knowledge has become a direct force of production” and “­­the conditions
of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect
and been transformed in accordance with it”. On the one hand, Marx emphasised with
the concept of the general intellect that knowledge, technology, and science represent
general conditions of the modern economy, which flow into many production processes
at the same time and are created and used cooperatively by many people. On the other
hand, with this category, he anticipated the computerisation of the economy.

Related to the general intellect is also the fact that Marx was concerned with the new
media of his time (­­especially the telegraph) and their role in society. The eighth aspect
 Chapter Three | The Critique of the Political Economy 81

is therefore that the study of Marx offers historical, theoretical, and methodological
insights for the sociology of technology and media and the analysis of the means of
communication and human communication. For example, Marx described information
and communication systems “­­whereby the individual can acquire information about the
activity of all others and attempt to adjust his own accordingly” and whereby “­­relations
and connections are introduced” (­­Marx 1857/­­1858, 161). This formulation bears a strik-
ing resemblance to the communicative properties of the Internet, but was written in the
1850s, more than 100 years before the technical creation of the Internet.

The ninth aspect of the critique of political economy that is relevant today is the contra-
diction between productive forces and relations of production (­­see Marx 1894, ­­373–​­​­​­374).

Capitalist development gives rise to new forms of cooperation and cooperative tech-
nologies that are the foundations for new commons, but at the same time, as capitalist
private property, are means of exercising domination. This contradiction is clearly visible

Karl Marx as a Critic of Capitalism and Communication Theorist

today in networked digital technologies, which at the same time produce new ways of
commodification and exploitation and can resist commodification and create spheres of
­­non-​­​­​­capitalist communication. The contradiction of productive forces and class relations
is expressed in digital capitalism as a contradiction between digital commons and digital
commodities. In this context, Toni Negri (­­2017, 25) writes that digitalisation is shaped by
an “­­antagonism between the social cooperation of the proletariat and the (­­economic and
political) command of capital”.

The tenth important aspect of the critique of political economy is the contribution to com-
munication theory. “­­Peter only relates to himself as a man through his relation to another
man, Paul, in whom he recognizes his likeness” (­­Marx 1867, 144, footnote 19). Through
the process of communication, people mutually relate their mental reflections to each
other in a complex way, which leads to cognitive changes and produces and reproduces
human sociality and societality. Important contributions to communication theory have
been made in the Marx-​­​­​­
­­ based tradition by Georg Lukács’ Ontology of Society’s Being
and the works of Raymond Williams, Ferruccio Rossi-​­​­​­
­­ Landi, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert
Marcuse, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Vološinov, among others (­­see Fuchs 2016a). If these
theoretical approaches are thought together, this results in a communicative materialism
that is an alternative to the dualistic critical communication theory of Jürgen Habermas
and Niklas Luhmann’s instrumental systems theory of communication.

The 11th topical aspect has to do with the fact that in the base/­­superstructure problem
Marx poses the question of the connection between economy and society, labour activity
82 Foundations of Digital Democracy

and communication, labour and ideology, body and mind, physical and mental labour,
production and reproduction, nature, and society. Raymond Williams, in his approach of
cultural materialism, emphasises Marx’s insight that society is a context of social pro-
duction of human sociality (­­see Williams 1977). Social production mediated by communi-
cation is an identical moment of all realms of society. Social production is the economic
moment of the social. At the same time, however, all social systems and realms have
emergent qualities that distinguish and set them apart from other systems and spheres
and the purely economic aspect.

The 12th reason why the critique of political economy has relevance today is the role that ide-
ologies and the fetish character of commodities play in contemporary society. By commodity
fetishism, Marx understands that “­­the definite social relation” between humans assumes
“­­the fantastic form of a relation between things” (­­Marx 1867, 165). Ideology naturalises and
normalises naturalisation. Characteristic of ideology in capitalism today is the spread of new
nationalisms combined with new racism and xenophobia, directed mainly against migrant
workers and refugees. Nationalism is an ideology that constructs a fictitve ethnicity (­­see Bali-
bar and Wallerstein 1991) and proclaims a fictitious unity of the interest of capital and labour
in a national interest. This proclaimed national interest distracts from the complex causes
and interrelations of social problems. Nationalism is a political form of fetishism in which the
nation and a national and völkisch collective are fetishised. Nationalism “­­professed to unite
all classes by reviving for all the chimera of national glory” (­­Marx 1871, 330).

The thirteenth aspect of the critique of political economy that is important today is the
role of social struggles and class struggles in societal and social change. Marx sees here
a historical dialectic of chance and necessity, praxis and structural conditions. When he
writes that humans “­­make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please;
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances
directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (­­Marx 1852, 103), this insight
has practical relevance today. Today, in the context of discussing social change, there
are discussions about the role social media play in rebellions, protests, revolutions, and
social movements. This raises the question of whether people, crises, or media tech-
nologies make history. To answer this question, one needs a theoretical model of social
change that takes into account the dialectic of structures and practice and the influence
of communication technologies. The orientation of the critique of the political economy
towards social struggles is based on a practical humanism that questions relations in
which the human being is “­­a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being” (­­Marx
1844, 182).
 Chapter Three | The Critique of the Political Economy 83

The 14th aspect emphasised by the Marx-​­​­​­

­­ based critique of capitalism is the necessity
and importance of democratic alternatives to capitalism and capital accumulation. Marx
focuses on the extension of democracy from politics to the economy. In the field of the
media, this refers to ­­non-​­​­​­commercial, ­­non-​­​­​­profit alternative media that are oriented to-
wards the communicative commons. In the field of academic publishing, for example,
­­non-​­​­​­profit open access journals and books have gained greater importance, challenging

An Example Application of the Critique of the Political Economy of the Media and Communication
the capital accumulation strategies of commercial publishers (­­see Fuchs and Sandoval
2013, Knoche 2014).

The discussion of the relevance of the critique of political economy could go on for a
long time, as the number of its representatives with important ideas in this theoretical
tradition is very large.

3.4 An Example Application of the Critique

of the Political Economy of the Media and
Communication: Social Movements and
Alternative Media in Capitalism
The critique of political economy has a humanities tradition in the form of dialectical
social philosophy and a social sciences tradition in the form of critical social analysis.
Practically speaking, these two dimensions cannot be strictly separated; they often ap-
pear in combined form as ­­theory-​­​­​­led empirical critiques of capitalism and society.

The field of social movement communication studies has established itself internation-
ally as a sub-​­​­​­
­­ aspect of media and communication studies. In the context of the Arab
Spring and the Occupy movements, there has been much discussion about the role of
social media in protests and revolutions (­­cf. Fuchs 2014b, 2017b, 2021). Most of the
work published on such questions deals purely ­­micro-​­​­​­sociologically with the question
of how social movements communicate, without taking into account the broader macro-​­​­​
­­
­sociological context in which these movements operate, namely the capitalist world sys-
tem. The study OccupyMedia! The Occupy Movement and Social Media in Crisis Capital-
ism (­­see Fuchs 2014b), on the other hand, was designed as a work that used the critique
of political economy as an empirical approach. Methodologically, an online survey was
conducted in which 418 Occupy activists participated.

One of the findings was that neither online communication nor ­­face-­​­­­​­­​­­­to-​­​­​­face communica-
tion alone is the decisive form of communication for activists occupying public spaces,
but that there is a dialectic: the more active an activist is in the movement, the larger their
84 Foundations of Digital Democracy

social protest network is and the more they tend to use online and offline communication,
which are mutually reinforcing, for internal movement communication and external, pub-
lic mobilisation communication. However, internal and external movement communica-
tion are now in the context of capitalist and state power, which such movements usually
oppose. This raises the question of how capitalist and state control of communication
influences social movements. The survey highlighted a contradiction between public
communication and communication control on capitalist social media: activists see it as
a great advantage that these online platforms have large user numbers, as this enables
them to reach a wide public. Since the companies (­­such as Facebook and Twitter) that run
these platforms are part of “­­the 1%” and some of them, as Edward Snowden’s revelations
have shown, are involved in the surveillance industrial Internet complex, the problem for
protest movements is that the use of these platforms can be associated with deliberate
or algorithmic censorship as well as state surveillance of their communications.

A contradiction also emerged with regard to the use of alternative, ­­non-​­​­​­commercial so-
cial media: on the one hand, they offer more autonomy and protection from the state and
capital, but on the other hand, they are relatively unknown to the public and activists,
thus reaching few people, and are additionally confronted with the resource inequality
typical of capitalism, which means that alternative media often have little visibility,
money, staff, reputation, influence, etc., are based on voluntary ­­self-​­​­​­exploitation and
precarious work, or disappear or become capitalist due to a lack of resources.

When asked how the contradiction of alternative media in capitalism should be dealt
with, 54.7 per cent supported the model of voluntary donations, 9.4 per cent user fees on
a ­­non-​­​­​­profit basis, 8.0 per cent personalised advertising and 7.0 per cent state subsidies
(­­see Fuchs 2014b). However, the donation and crowdfunding models popular among ac-
tivists are again confronted with the contradiction that the donations for alternative pro-
jects largely come from activists who are usually not millionaires but often precariously
employed, which can easily make such models financially unstable. The fundamental
capitalist contradiction in this context is between digital corporations like Google and
Facebook, which make billions and pay hardly any taxes, and the permanent crisis of
critical alternative media. This contradiction cannot be resolved under capitalism. What
is needed are radical reforms that tax capital, profit, and advertising and use the reve-
nues thus generated (­­e.g. in the form of a basic income, participatory budgeting for non-​­​­​
­­
­commercial alternative media and non-​­​­​­ ­­ commercial projects, etc.) for public and critical
purposes. The basic problem is the structural restriction and limitation of communicative
democracy in capitalism.
 Chapter Three | The Critique of the Political Economy 85

Currently, the greatest challenge for the study of political communication is the massive
rise in nationalism and right-​­​­​­
­­ wing populism. In this context, social media, reality TV,
and other popular media play an important role. Traditions of political economy criti-
cism, such as the theory of the authoritarian personality of the Frankfurt School (­­Franz
L. Neumann, Erich Fromm, Theodor W. Adorno, Leo Löwenthal, Herbert Marcuse, etc.),
represent an important starting point in this context.

3.5 Conclusions
The critique of political economy is a fruitful approach to the empirical and theoretical anal-
ysis of and elucidation of contemporary communication that has a true practical relevance.

In this chapter, I have tried to show that in media and communication studies, scholars’
“­­fear of Marx […] is unjustified”11 (­­Knoche 2005, 411). On the contrary, today we are in a
social situation in which the crisis of capitalism is linked to a general crisis of legitimacy and
authoritarian movements and authoritarian capitalism are attacking the foundations of de-
mocracy. Neoliberal capitalism today tends to turn into authoritarian capitalism in a negative
dialectic. Communication platforms, strategies, and ideologies play an important role in this
turbulent social situation. The intellectual legacy of Karl Marx, Max Horkheimer, Theodor W.
Adorno, Georg Lukács, Raymond Williams, and other scholars in this critical tradition enables
a truly ­­practice-​­​­​­relevant, socially critical communication science that offers theoretical and
analytical research approaches to better understand crises and authoritarianism in today’s
situation, as well as starting points for a critical, public social science (­­see Aulenbacher et al.
2017, Buraway 2005) that is truly relevant to practice and intervenes in public discourses.

The case of Schamberger illustrates that representatives of the Critique of the Political
Economy of the Media and Communication in the ­­German-​­​­​­speaking world still have to
Conclusions

have a “­­justified fear”12 of “­­being considered Marxist”13 (­­Knoche 2005, 411).

Theories of capitalism, the authoritarian personality, crises, ideology, critical ­communication,

etc., as found in the critique of political economy, are now central to the study of society and com-
munication studies. The founding of the Critical Communication Studies Network (­­KriKoWi:
Netzwerke Kritische Kommunikationswissenschaft) in spring 2017 (­­see https://­­dimbb.
de/­­­­w p-​­​­​­ c ontent/­­u ploads/­­2 017/­­0 3/­­­­N etzwerk-­​­­­​­­​­­­ K riKoWi_Aufruf-­​­­­​­­​­­­ z ur-​­​­​­ G r%C3%
BCndung.pdf) and the establishment of an associated mailing list (­­https://­­lists.riseup.
net/­­www/­­info/­­krikowi) is a welcome development in this context. To what extent it will
or will not make a real difference remains to be seen.
86 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Notes
1 Übersetzung aus dem Deutschen:

Zu den Grundfragen einer kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Medienökonomie als Kritik

der Politischen Ökonomie der Medien gehört die Analyse des Verhältnisses von Medien
und kapitalistischer Gesellschaft, also die Rolle der Medien für das gesamte materielle,
wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche, soziale, politische und kulturelle menschliche Leben.

2 Translation from German: “­­die Personalisierung gesellschaftlicher Tatbestände”; “­­betonte

Vermischung von individuellen Lebensproblemen und öffentlichen Angelegenheiten” (­­Holzer
1971, 151).
3 Translation from German: “­­die Hypostasierung eines realgesellschaftlichen Status quo zur
Ordnung von Gesellschaft schlechthin”.
4 Translation from German: “­­die Verschränkung von Genese, Beschaffenheit und Funktion der
Massenkommunikation”.
5 Translation from German: Habermas ist “­­nicht imstande, die wesentliche Bestimmung der
gesellschaftlichen Produktion zu erkennen: daß im Prozeß der Produktion eben nicht nur
die Produktivkräfte entwickelt werden, sondern auch die gesellschaftlichen B­ eziehungen –​­​
­​­eingeschlossen: ‚Kommunikation’, ‚Interaktion’ –​­​­​­, die die Menschen in diesem Produktion-
sprozeß miteinander eingehen”.
6 Translation from German: “­­Erkenntnis und Kommunikation […] zwei Seiten des Prozesses”
sind, “­­der den gesellschaftlich organisierten Stoffwechsel mit der Natur und die innerge-
sellschaftlichen Auseinandersetzungen regelt”.
7 Translation from German: “­­zur Sicherung und Legitimation der Kapitalherrschaft”.
8 Translation from German: “­­Herstellung, Erhaltung und Wiederherstellung”.
9 http://­­www.netmarketshare.com, accessed on 13 April 2021.
10 Data source: Forbes 2000 List for the Year 2020, https://­­www.forbes.com/­­global2000/­­list/,
accessed on 13 April 2021.
11 Translation from German: “­­Angst der WissenschaftlerInnen vor Marx […] unberechtigt”.
12 Translation from German: “­­berechtigte Angst”.
13 Translation from German: “­­als Marxist zu gelten”.

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Chapter Four
Power in the Age of Social Media

4.1 Introduction
4.2 Three Theoretical Concepts of Power
4.3 Media, Communication, and Power
4.4 Social Media and Power
4.5 Conclusion: The Need for a Dialectic and Critical Theory of Media and Society
References

4.1 Introduction
2011 was also the year, in which various Occupy movements emerged in North America,
Greece, Spain, the United Kingdom, and other countries. One of their protest tactics is to
build protest camps on public squares that are centres of gravity for discussions, events,
and protest activities. Being asked about the advantages of Occupy’s use of social media,
respondents in the OccupyMedia! Survey1 said that they allow them to reach a broad
public and to protect themselves from the police:

• “As much as I wish that occupy would keep away from a media such as Facebook
it got the advantage that it can reach out to lots of people that […] [are] otherwise
hard to reach out to” (#20).
• “All of these social media […] Facebook, Twitter etc. helps spread the word but I
think the biggest achievement is Livestream: those of us who watch or participate
in change can inform other streamers of actions, police or protest moving from
one place […] to another. That saved many streamers from getting hurt or less
arrests” (#36).

At the same time, the respondents identified risks of the use of commercial social media:

• “Facebook is generally exploitative, and controls the output of Facebook posts, the
frequency they are seen by other people. It’s a disaster and we shouldn’t use it at
all. But we still do” (#28).

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-6
92 Foundations of Digital Democracy

• “There have been occasions where the police seemed to have knowledge that
was only shared in a private group and/or text messages and face-to-face” (#55).
• “Events for protests that were created on Facebook, but not organised IRL [in real
life]. Many ‘participants’ in calls for protests on Facebook, but at least 70% of
them [don’t] […] show up at the actual demonstration” (#74).
• “Twitter has been willing to turn over protestors tweets to authorities which is a
big concern” (#84)
• “Censorship of content by YouTube and email deletions on Gmail” (#103)
• “Yes, my Twitter account was subpoena’d, for tweeting a hashtag. The supboena
was dropped in court” (#238)
• “Facebook = Tracebook” (#203)

This example indicates that social media seems to be embedded into asymmetric power
structures (for a detailed discussion see also Fuchs 2014a, 2014b): It has the potential to
support protest mobilisation and protest communication. At the same time using social
media generates data traces of activists’ communications and movements, which makes
it easier for corporate Internet platforms and the police to monitor, control, censor, and
infiltrate political movements. This contradictory character of media power can only be
understood by using critical theory for conceptualising and analysing power relations, its
realities, asymmetries, potentials, and struggles.

This chapter is a contribution to critically theorising media power in the age of social
media. It first categorises different notions of power (Section 4.2), introduces a dialecti-
cal notion of media power (Section 4.3), discusses the dialectics of social media power
(Section 4.4), and draws some conclusions about the need for a dialectical and critical
theory of the media and society (Section 4.5).

4.2 Three Theoretical Concepts of Power

There are objective, subjective, and dialectical concepts of power and consider the latter
approaches as integrating and synthesising the former two (Table 4.1).

4.2.1 Objective Concepts of Power

The power to take and influence collective decisions is a central aspect of politics.
There are on the one hand objective concepts of power that consider it as being lo-
calised in institutions and structures such as nation states, parliaments, ministries,
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 93

TABLE 4.1 T hree concepts of power

Human subjects Objects

Objectivism Power is located in coercive
institutions that realise the
particular will of a group by
commanding and sanctioning other
groups and individuals.
Subjectivism Power is a productive, transformative
human capacity that is immanent
in the human body and all social
relationships.
Subject-Object-Dialectic Power is a dialectical process, in which human actors enter social
relationships that are to certain degrees competitive and co-operative in
order to reach decisions so that decision-oriented structures emerge and
are reproduced that enable and constrain further decision-oriented social
practices. Power is conceived as a dynamic process that connects power
structures and power practices, objects, and subjects of power.

public administration bodies, coercive state apparatuses such as police, military, law,
the judicial system, the prison system, and secret services that coercively assert the
will of certain groups against the will of others. A classical definition of power that
stands in this objectivist tradition is the one of Max Weber who sees it as the “chance
of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the

Three Theoretical Concepts of Power

resistance of others who are participating in the action” (Weber 1978, 926). He defines
domination as “probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be
obeyed by a given group of people” (Weber 1978, 212). Weber’s definition implies that
power is something that is necessarily coercively defended by one group against other
groups. This also means an unbridgeable gap and relationship of domination between
the powerful and the powerless. The difference between power and domination in
Weber’s theory is vague; both seem to be related to sanctions, struggle, disciplines,
commands, and coercion. For Weber power is something that is exerted on someone
against his own will.

Jürgen Habermas (1986)2 has given a definition of power that is similar to the one of We-
ber. For Habermas power has to do with the realisation of collective goals, means of co-
ercion, symbols of power and status, decision-making authorities, disadvantages, power
of definition, counter-power, organisation, and legitimation (Habermas 1987, 267–272).

For Niklas, Luhmann power is a symbolically generalised medium of communication

that regulates and overcomes contingency and increases the possibility of selections
in communication processes (Luhmann 1975, 2000). In a first general sense, Luhmann’s
94 Foundations of Digital Democracy

definition of power as the ability to act effectively reminds one of Gidden’s definition
and as an action that affects other actions it seems close to Foucault (Luhmann 2000,
39). But Luhmann continues that such a definition is too broad because it would imply
that all simple activities like brushing one’s teeth would have to do with power. Hence
in a narrower definition, he sees power as the achievement of inducing someone to act
in a certain way that he wouldn’t act normally and only does so due to the announce-
ment of possible sanctions (ibid.). Power would always be connected to influence that
is generated by communicating possible (positive or negative) sanctions. Political power
would be based on negative sanctions, threats, and coercion. Physical violence would be
the best means of threatening someone and for generating power; it would be closely
connected to the state system (55). Power would never include consensus, the life-world
wouldn’t as assumed by Habermas be a pool of consensus (53–54, 76). Consensus would
make the use of power superfluous.

Luhmann analyses power as something necessarily coercive and hence his concept is
closer to Weber than to Foucault and Giddens. His assumptions imply that organisations
that are largely based on consensus and co-operation are powerless organisations. Col-
lective modes of organisation are an expression of a certain degree of power that can
be employed in order to achieve goals. If there is a low level of conflict in an organisa-
tion and all actors can achieve their goals by co-operating and achieving consensus by
dialogue, neither they nor their organisation are powerless, but can be considered as
an expression of co-operative modes of power. Tooth brushing and other activities don’t
have much to do with power not because conflict and coercion are missing, but because
they are simple individual activities, whereas power occurs only in social relationships
and situations that require collective decisions.

4.2.2 Subjective Concepts of Power

Opposed to such objective concepts of power that stress repressive institutions, Foucault
has asked: “If power were never anything but repressive if it never did anything but say
no, do you really think we should manage to obey it?” (Foucault 1980, 119). He stressed
a productive, creative aspect of power: Power

runs through, and it produces things, it induces pleasure, it forms knowledge,

it produces discourse; it must be considered as a productive network which
runs through the entire social body much more than a negative instance whose
function is repression.
(Foucault 1980, 119)
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 95

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative
terms: it ‘excludes,’ it ‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘con-
ceals.’ In fact, power produces, it produces reality, it produces domains of ob-
jects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained
of him belong to this production.
(Foucault 1977, 250)

Foucault (1977, 1980, 1982) pointed out that power is not an abstract entity “out there”,
it is not something that one cannot know or pinpoint. His work made clear that power
doesn’t exist outside of the human being, but operates in and through the human body
and within daily routines and actions. Foucault opposed the idea that power is only lo-
cated in dominating classes and the state and that it is something that others don’t have
and is withheld from them. Power would have a networked character that affects all
social relationships. Foucault never gave a definition of power, only one of the power
relations:

The exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual

or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others. […] Power
exists only when it is put into action, even if, of course, it is integrated into
a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon permanent structures.

Three Theoretical Concepts of Power

What defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does
not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions:
an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in
the present or future.
(Foucault 1982, 219–220)

For Foucault power is productive and produces knowledge. The exercise of power may
need violence, but violence for Foucault is not inherent in a power relation.3 A power
relation would be an action that influences another action and determines a field of pos-
sibility for it. In this field, ways of resistance and counteraction would always be present
– “there are no relations of power without resistance” (Foucault 1980, 142).

With Foucault the concept of power took a subjective turn, he pointed out that power is
related to people’s bodies, sexuality, consciousness, and everyday life. Foucault in no way
was optimistic that oppressed individuals and groups can produce counter-power and re-
sistance. He thought that modern society is so oppressive that it even reaches the drives
and sentiments of humans. But one can interpret Foucault’s assumptions that power is
productive and that it is immanent in all social relationships in a way that means that all
96 Foundations of Digital Democracy

oppressed groups and individuals have power potentials as social groups that they can
make use of in order to change their situation in society. Power doesn’t exist outside of
social relationships and isn’t a thing that is simply controlled by some groups that try to
withhold it from others; it is produced and reproduced in and through agency.

Also Anthony Giddens has elaborated a rather subjective concept related to the notion
of human agency. Giddens defines power as “‘transformative capacity’, the capability
to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them” (Giddens 1985,
7), as the “capability to effectively decide about courses of events, even where others
might contest such decisions” (Giddens 1985, 9). For Giddens power is related to (alloc-
ative and authoritative) resources, to material facilities and means of control. Power is
characteristic for all social relationships, it “is routinely involved in the instantiation of
social practices” and is “operating in and through human action” (Giddens 1981, 49–50).
For Giddens power is related to the command over economic resources and humans: “Al-
locative resources refer to capabilities – or, more accurately, to forms of transformative
capacity – generating command over objects, goods or material phenomena. Authorities
resources refer to types of transformative capacity generating command over persons or
actors” (Giddens 1984, 33).

Foucault argues that power is not necessarily something repressive and coercive. Both
Foucault and Giddens point out that it operates in and through social relationships and
on the foundation of daily routines. Power stems from the creative political relationships
of human beings. They are both subjects and objects of power. The problem of Foucault’s
work is that his concept of power is very diffuse. He doesn’t give a clear definition. Gid-
dens defines power in a more concrete way in relationship to collective decisions and
resources. For him, the political realm of society has to do with the “capability of mar-
shalling authoritative resources or what I shall call administrative power” (Giddens 1985,
19). This would always include control, surveillance, domination, sanctions, physical vi-
olence, and threats of the use of violence. Giddens thereby naturalises relationships of
domination, coercion, and heteronomy as fundamental aspects of all social systems and
societies. But historical and archaeological studies show that there were cultures such
as the Minoan one that was remarkably peaceful. One can imagine social systems and
societies that are largely based on co-operation instead of domination, violence, and
coercion. It is therefore an unrealistically defeatist position when Giddens (1984) argues
that the end of domination is an unrealistic goal and vision. Suggesting that political
power is always repressive and dominative results in an unclear differentiation between
power and domination (as it also can be found in the works of Max Weber).
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 97

4.2.3 A Dialectical Concept of Power

Synthesising objective and subjective approaches allows conceiving power as a dynamic

process that includes power practices and power structures. Power is the disposition
over means required to influence processes and decisions in one’s own interest. Domi-
nation refers to the disposition over means of coercion that are employed for influenc-
ing others, processes, and decisions. Means of power are economic resources (money,
means of production, commodities), social relationships, human activities, capabilities,
and knowledge. This means that what Pierre Bourdieu (1986a, 1986b) has termed eco-
nomic, political, and cultural capital are structures that allow those individuals and
groups who control a certain share of these capital types to influence decisions to certain
degrees (see Fuchs 2003a).

Power structures are not confined to politics, there are economic, political, and cultural
power: property, collective decision-making power, and definition power. Economic power
is a disposition over property, political power the capacity to influence decisions that are
binding for all, and cultural power the capacity to shape definitions, meanings, interpre-
tations, norms, and values. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the three dimensions of
power structures. Power is relational. It is a social relation, in which individuals or groups
control specific shares of a specific structure.

Three Theoretical Concepts of Power

Objective power structures enable and constrain further (actual or potential) power strug-
gles and practices that aim at changing the distribution of power in social systems and so-
ciety. Power has both a subjective and an objective level that produces each other mutually.
It is a permanent dynamic production process in which actors enter relations, conflicts, and

TABLE 4.2 T hree forms of power structures

Dimension of society Definition of power Structures of power in modern society

Economy Control of use-values and Control of money and capital.
resources that are produced,
distributed, and consumed.
Politics Influence on collective decisions Control of governments, bureaucratic state
that determine aspects of institutions, parliament, military, police,
the lives of humans in certain parties, lobby groups, civil society groups, etc.
communities and social
systems.
Culture Definition of moral values and Control of structures that define meaning and
meaning that shape what moral values in society (e.g. universities,
is considered as important, religious groups, intellectual circles, opinion-
reputable and worthy in society. making groups, etc).
98 Foundations of Digital Democracy

FIGURE 4.1 Power as dynamic process

discourse in order to constitute, change, and reproduce collective structures that enable
and constrain further social practices, etc. Power structures emerge or are reproduced dy-
namically from social power practices that influence further practices and relations so that
existing power structures are reproduced, there is the potential for the emergence of new
ones emerge, etc. (cf. Figure 4.1, for a more detailed discussion cf. Fuchs 2003b). There are
different enabling and constraining degrees of power structures ranging from very open
structures that allow a maximum of freedom and rights (including the right to welfare and
social security, the right to participation, leisure, and self-expression, the guarantee of the
realisation of human rights for all, freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and
belief, etc.) to very closed coercive structures that minimise freedom and rights.

Power structures take on a specific form in modern society – the capital form. Modern
society is a capitalist society. For Marx, capital is self-expanding value and accumulation
is its inherent feature. Capital needs to permanently increase; otherwise companies,
branches, industries, or entire economies enter phases of crisis. Capitalism is therefore
a dynamic and inherently expansive system, which has implications for the exploitation
of nature, centralisation, concentration, uneven development, imperialism, military con-
flicts, the creation of milieus of unpaid and highly exploited labour, the destruction of
nature and the depletion of natural resources, etc. “The employment of surplus-value as
capital, or its reconversion into capital, is called accumulation of capital” (Marx 1867,
725). The capitalist

shares with the miser an absolute drive towards self-enrichment. But what ap-
pears in the miser as the mania of an individual is in the capitalist the effect of a
social mechanism in which he is merely a cog. Moreover, the development of cap-
italist production makes it necessary constantly to increase the amount of capital
laid out in a given industrial undertaking, and competition subordinates every
individual capitalist to the immanent laws of capitalist production, as external
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 99

and coercive laws. It compels him to keep extending his capital, so as to preserve
it, and he can only extend it by means of progressive accumulation.
(Marx 1867, 739)

Capitalism is a society that is grounded in and driven by the accumulation of capital.

The drive to accumulate is in contemporary society not limited to money capital. We also
find the accumulation imperative in the accumulation of political decision power and
the accumulation of cultural distinction, reputation, and definition power. Capitalism is
not a purely economic system, but rather a society, in which the subsystems are driven
by the accumulation imperative. Accumulation logic is multidimensional and shapes the
modern economy, politics, culture, private life, everyday life, and the modern humans’
relationship to nature. The subsystems of modern society have their own specific forms
of the accumulation logic, which means that they all have their own specific economies
of production, circulation, and distribution of power. Power takes on economic, political,
and cultural forms. Pierre Bourdieu (1986a, 1986b) has generalised the concepts of cap-
ital and accumulation and describes capitalism as a class system based on the accumu-
lation of economic, political, and cultural capital.

Human actors and groups in modern society have a certain share of the total available
capital. These structures are in modern society organised in such a way that humans

Three Theoretical Concepts of Power

compete for accumulating capital shares at the expense of others. This results in social
and symbolic power struggles that are an expression of asymmetrical distributions of
power. Power struggles organised in the form of, e.g. elections, wars, industrial conflict,
or everyday disputes produce and reproduce objective power structures and institutions
such as laws, decision-making bodies, the state system, nation states, parliaments, min-
istries, bureaucracies, courts, public offices, departments, public administration bodies,
coercive state apparatuses such as police, military, law, the judicial system, the prison
system, secret services, etc. These structures are influenced and controlled by different
social groups to certain degrees according to the outcome of power struggles.

Power and politics do not necessarily involve leadership as suggested by Max Weber.4
Power can be distributed in different forms in social systems. Domination always in-
cludes sanctions, repression, threats of violence, and an asymmetric distribution of
power. In political relationships, it is determined how power is constituted, distributed,
allocated, and disposed. Highly co-operative and inclusive social systems that are char-
acterised by solidarity and altruism are not systems without power, but systems with a
rather symmetrical distribution of power and a minimisation of domination. Power can be
100 Foundations of Digital Democracy

distributed in different manners: In more symmetrical distributions actors can influence

the decisions which affect them to a large degree, in an asymmetrical distribution of
power certain actors control resources in such a way that they can influence decisions
in their own sense and circumvent the possibility that others can also influence these
decisions. Domination is based on asymmetrical distributions of power, but it means
more than that, it also includes means of coercion that are employed in order to influ-
ence others, processes, and decisions in one’s own sense. Domination always includes
sanctions, repression, threats of violence, and an asymmetric distribution of power. It is a
coercive, institutionalised social relationship of power. Domination cannot be distributed
in a symmetrical manner. It always involves an asymmetrical distribution of resources
and possibilities. It necessarily is exerted on someone against his will. Coercive means
are an expression of the possibility of disciplines, sanctions, and repression. Domination
means that these coercive means exist along with the threat of being used against some-
one or certain groups. Domination can also be found where these means are not directly
employed, but only exist as a means of threat.

Power does not necessarily imply violence, whereas domination often is violent and
repressive. Power is potentially a violent social relation, but not necessarily. Domina-
tion in contrast implies the existence of an asymmetrical power relation and the use of
repression or even violence in this relation. But what is violence? Johan Galtung (1990,
292) defines violence as “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally
to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible”
(Galtung 1990, 292). Violence can according to Galtung (1990) be divided into three prin-
cipal forms: direct violence (through physical intervention; an event), structural violence
(through state or organisational mandate; a process), and cultural violence (dehumanis-
ing or otherwise exclusionary representations; an invariance). According to Galtung, in
exerting violence one can physically coerce somebody (physical violence), exclude him/
her from access to vital resources (structural violence) or manipulate his/her mind or ruin
his/her reputation (ideological violence). Violence not only exists if it is actually exerted,
but also if it is only a threat: “Threats of violence are also violence” (Galtung 1990,
292). The three forms of Galtung’s understanding of violence are forms of how people or
groups try to accumulate different forms of power.

Sylvia Walby argues against broad forms of violence. She argues that physical assault is
more dangerous and often a more severe and more direct threat to life than what Galtung
terms cultural/ideological violence. Violence is the intentionally caused physical harm
to a human being (Walby 2022). Violence is turning of the human being “into a thing in
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 101

the most literal sense: it makes a corpse out of him” (Weil 2005, 183). Violence is not
the same as power. It is a dimension of coercive societies and a social relation, where
humans try to intentionally cause physical harms to other humans who don’t agree to
the cause of that harm (see Walby 2022 for a detailed discussion). The harm caused
is usually “a physical injury” (Walby et al. 2017, 33), but can also in addition involve
mental or psychological harm. Physically injuring others can take on a variety of forms
such as assault, torture, rape, killing, murder, war, genocide, enslavement, etc. Violence
is a means towards an end such as gaining control of resources (e.g. land, humans),
exterminating certain humans, i.e. the absolute exclusion from society through death,
gaining pleasure or reputation, etc. Violence is a means for creating alienation, but it is
not in itself an alienated system or condition. Repression is a more general category than
violence. Violence is a specific form of repression.

Different forms of repression can be exerted in order to accumulate different forms of

power. In modern society, economic, political, and cultural power can be accumulated
and tend to be asymmetrically distributed. The logic of accumulation (getting more
and more of something) is vital for modern society. It has its origins in the capitalist
economy. But it also shapes the logic of modern politics and culture that are focused
on the accumulation of political and cultural power. Capitalism is therefore not just an
economic system, but also a form of society. Physical, structural, and ideological re-

Three Theoretical Concepts of Power

pression can be used in any of the three dimensions/fields of modern society for trying
to accumulate power at the expense of others. Many structures of modern society are
based on specific forms of repression that help accumulating power. For example, a
corporation makes use of the structural repression of the market and private property
in order to accumulate capital. Or the state uses of the monopoly of physical violence
and the institutional power of government institutions in order to make collective
decisions.

Power exists in all situations where humans enter social relationships and have to act
in order to transform structures by taking decisions of how to act. In this sense, it can
be considered as decision-oriented capacity to act that produces structures that in a
recursive and self-referential loop enable and constrain further practices. For transform-
ing structures and taking decisions humans depend on each other and on resources,
depending on how these relationships are organised (symmetrically vs. asymmetrically,
i.e. all control resources and humans together in self-managed processes or an elite con-
trols resources and humans) different distributions of power are possible. Asymmetrical
distributions of power are characteristic of coercive systems, but coercive power is not
102 Foundations of Digital Democracy

something fixed. Oppressed groups can challenge coercion by realising the power poten-
tial that they as collective actor comprised of human capacities possess.

Counter-action and counter-power are not always realistic and achievable, but it is
at least always a possibility of action that under certain circumstances can result in
liberation from domination. Anthony Giddens speaks in this context of the dialectic of
control:

All strategies of control employed by superordinate individuals or groups call

forth counter-strategies on the part of the subordinates. […] To be an agent is
to be able to make a difference to the world, and to be able to make a differ-
ence is to have power (where power means transformative capacity).
(Giddens 1985, 10–11)

For Giddens, counter-power is however not a potential, but an automatism (“calls forth”).
He does not see that specific interests, violence, and ideology can forestall change and
cement the existence of domination. There is no guarantee that humans who are op-
pressed see the need for change and engage in building counter-power. Counter-power
is always a potential, but never a necessity. Counter-power does not automatically result
from domination. It is a potential for changing the social world.

Power is institutionalised and objectified in structures. At the same time, structures need
to be reproduced in order to exist continuously. Any system of power, be it a fascist
state, a slave system, a company that highly exploits its workers or a patriarchal family
structure, is upheld by the practices that are organised within it. Those oppressed by
asymmetric power structures must engage in practices that reproduce these structures
in order for them to continue to exist: the citizens obey the laws of the fascist state, the
slave and the worker in the company produce profits for the slave-master and the capi-
talist day-in day-out, the wife continues to have sex with the husband who beats her up,
etc. These practices are what Gramsci calls hegemony. Hegemony means “an active and
voluntary (free) consent” (Gramsci 1971, 271). But why do oppressed people not always
resist their oppressor? It is partly out of fear of violence or getting killed, fear that others
may be harmed to, or the ideological belief that the system is good the way it is, that it
could be worse, or that there is no alternative. Even if there is hegemony, there is always
the potential for people to resist, build counter-power and try to overthrow the dominant
structures of power. Often this is however difficult and they are confronted with a lack of
resources, motivation, courage, and organisation. Resistance is therefore a structurally
difficult, but morally important form of work.
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 103

Marx stresses the object-subject dialectic of power in his analyses of French politics.
He stresses on the one hand the objective power dimension of dominative systems: He
Marx points out how the French bourgeoisie ruled over the working class with the help
of violence, censorship, surveillance, military rule, and ideological education. Marx says
that the bourgeoisie rules by the sword:

It apotheosised the sword; the sword rules it. It destroyed the revolutionary
press; its own press has been destroyed. It placed popular meetings under
police supervision; its salons are under the super- vision of the police. It dis-
banded the democratic National Guards; its own National Guard is disbanded.
It imposed a state of siege; a state of siege is imposed upon it. It sup- planted
the juries by military commissions; its juries are supplanted by military com-
missions. It subjected public education to the sway of the priests; the priests
subject it to their own education. It transported people without trial; it is being
transported without trial.
(Marx 1852, 101–102)

So power has for Marx an objective-structural dimension. Those in power “repressed

every stirring in society by means of the state power; every stirring in its society is sup-
pressed by means of the state power” (Marx 1852, 102).

Three Theoretical Concepts of Power

A revolutionary or protest movement challenges existing power structures. Its constitu-
tion and practices are a form of power of the people in itself. Therefore Marx describes
social struggles as “struggle between the two powers” (Marx 1852, 62) and a “[w]ar be-
tween the two powers” (Marx 1852, 75). Power for Marx is something that is exerted by
ruling groups, individuals, and classes, but is not merely located in institutions, but also
something that can be built and conquered in social struggles. Marx (1852, 81) therefore
also speaks of oppressed people conquering the control of power. Power is distributed in
different ways and this distribution can be changed by social struggles. Marx described
that in France under Louis Philippe (French King from 1830–1848) the “commercial bour-
geoisie” held “the lion’s share of power” (Marx 1852, 88). This formulation implies that
power is distributed and redistributable.

In his analysis of the Paris Commune (1871), Marx argues that a revolutionary move-
ment that takes over state power has to transform this power. He sees revolution as a
transformation of power structures and a change in the distribution of power: “But the
working class cannot simply lay hold on the ready-made state machinery and wield it
for their own purpose. The political instrument of their enslavement cannot serve as the
104 Foundations of Digital Democracy

political instrument of their emancipation” (Marx 1871, 533). In the Paris Commune, the
revolutionaries’ appropriation of power – its “break[s] with the modern state power”
(Marx 1871, 333) – resulted in the transformation of administrative, educational, judicial,
repressive and other state institutions:

Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hitherto exercised
by the state was laid into the hands of the Commune. Having once got rid
of the standing army and the police – the physical force elements of the
old government – the Commune was anxious to break the spiritual force
of repression, the ‘parson-power’, by the disestablishment and disendow-
ment of all churches as proprietary bodies. The priests were sent back to
the recesses of private life, there to feed upon the alms of the faithful in
imitation of their predecessors, the apostles. The whole of the educational
institutions were opened to the people gratuitously, and at the same time
cleared of all interference of church and state. Thus, not only was education
made accessible to all, but science itself freed from the fetters which class
prejudice and governmental force had imposed upon it. The judicial function-
aries were to be divested of that sham independence which had but served
to mask their abject subserviency to all succeeding governments to which,
in turn, they had taken, and broken, the oaths of allegiance. Like the rest of
public servants, magistrates and judges were to be elective, responsible,
and revocable.
(Marx 1871, 331–332)

Marx describes that a revolutionary movement not just has the power to transform polit-
ical structures, but also economic ones:

Yes, gentlemen, the Commune intended to abolish that class property which
makes the labor of the many the wealth of the few. It aimed at the expropri-
ation of the expropriators. It wanted to make individual property a truth by
transforming the means of production, land, and capital, now chiefly the means
of enslaving and exploiting labor, into mere instruments of free and associated
labor. But this is communism, “impossible” communism!
(Marx 1871, 335)

Marx describes power as a dialectic of structures and practices: The French regime used
state power to oppress citizens and workers economically and politically. The revolution-
ary movement broke in 1871 with the hegemonic reproduction of these power structures
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 105

and seized power. It then started to transform the existing power structures by making
them democratic.

In modern society, the two most important dimensions of institutionalised power are
capital and the state. Framed more generally, this is the question of how the economy
and the state are related. Marx says in this context that “state power assumed more and
more the character of the national power of capital over labor, of a public force organized
for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism” (Marx 1871, 329). And: “And yet
the state power is not suspended in midair. Bonaparte represents a class, and the most
numerous class of French society at that, the small-holding peasants” (Marx 1852, 105).
The question is what it means that state power represents class. It does not mean that
capitalists directly rule, run, and control the state. But how can we best think about this
relationship of capital and the state?

The state is not a homogenous apparatus or machine of the ruling class for dominating
the ruled class, but a field of power forces. First, there are factions of the capitalist
class (e.g. transnational corporations, small and medium enterprises, finance capital,
commercial capital, manufacturing capital, cultural capital, etc.) that compete for shares
of capital and power and therefore have to a certain degree conflicting interests. Sec-
ond, although there are overlaps of the capitalist class and the political elite (e.g. when
managers become politicians or bureaucrats become consultants for companies or when

Three Theoretical Concepts of Power

private–public partnerships are established as part of neoliberal governance systems),
their activities, personnel, and interests are not co-extensive. The differentiation of the
state and the capitalist economy in modern society has also brought about a division of
labour between capitalists and politicians.

Third, the state’s class power can be challenged by left-wing political movements that
want to establish a transitory state that drives back capitalist interests and advances
welfare and social benefits for all. It is of course doubtful in this context that a socialist
state can exist in a capitalist society and that state power is necessary in all forms of
society, but at the same time, progressive movements’ goal to conquer state power is not
necessarily a social democratic-reformist strategy, but can be based on politics of radical
reformism that are politically immanent and transcendental at the same time. The state
is however not just challenged and reproduced by political parties, but also by social
movements organised in civil society.

Given these complexities and contradictions of the state, it can only be conceived as
a contradictory force field with temporal unity – a power bloc – between conflicting
106 Foundations of Digital Democracy

interests that form political alliances. The state is an “institutional crystallization”, “the
material condensation of a relationship of forces”, “a strategic field and process of
intersecting power networks, which both articulate and exhibit mutual contradictions
and displacements” (Poulantzas 1980, 136). The state does not directly map or mirror
the interests of the capitalist class, but rather crystallises the complexities of the class
structure in contradictory ways. It is precisely by the articulation of complex factions
and oppositions through which dominant interests are transposed from economic power
into state power and in a dialectical reversal back from state power to economic power.
The

state crystallizes the relations of production and class relations. The modern
political state does not translate the ‘interests’ of the dominant classes at the
political level, but the relationship between those interests and the interests of
the dominated classes – which means that it precisely constitutes the ‘politi-
cal’ expression of the interests of the dominant classes.
(Poulantzas 2008, 80)

4.3 Media, Communication, and Power

When discussing media and communication power, Manuel Castells’ approach has in
recent years received the most attention.

The task that Manuel Castells has set himself for his book Communication Power is to
suggest answers to the question: “where does power lie in the global network society?”
(Castells 2009, 42). Castells defines communication power as a fourfold form of power
characteristic for the network society: networking power, network power, networked
power, network-making power (Castells 2009, 42–47, 418–420). Network-making power
is for Castells the “paramount form of power in the network society” (Castells 2009, 47).
It is held and exercised by programmers and switchers. Programmers have the power “to
constitute network(s), and to program/reprogram the network(s) in terms of the goals
assigned to the network”. Switchers have the power “to connect and ensure the coop-
eration of different networks by sharing common goals and combining resources while
fending off competition from other networks by setting up strategic cooperation” (Cas-
tells 2009, 45). Communication power is for Castells the power to create, maintain and
shape networks by communication. He reduces the power of the media and communica-
tion thereby to the cultural level – the production, and distribution and interpretation of
information in social relations.
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 107

Castells (2009, 10) defines power in a Weber-inspired way as “the relational capacity
that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social ac-
tor(s) in ways that favor the empowered actor’s will, interests, and values” (10). Power is
associated with coercion, domination, violence or potential violence, and asymmetry. He
refers to the power concepts of Foucault, Weber, and Habermas and argues that he builds
on Giddens’ structuration theory. However, as Section 4.2 showed, Giddens conceives
power in a completely different way, a way that is neither mentioned nor discussed by
Castells. For Giddens, power is s transformative capacity in all social relationships.

In Giddens structuration theory, power is not necessarily coercive, violent, and asymmet-
rically distributed. Therefore it becomes possible to conceive of and analyse situations
and social systems, in which power is more symmetrically distributed, for example situ-
ations and systems of participatory democracy. Power as transformative capacity seems
indeed to be a fundamental aspect of all societies. This also means that there is a huge
difference between Castells’ approach and Giddens’ structuration theory, which as such
is not problematic, but should also be explicated, especially because Castells (2009,
14) says that he builds on Giddens’ structuration theory (14), which he in fact does not.
The problem with Castells’ notion of power is that he sees coercive, violent, dominative
power relationships as “the foundational relations of society throughout history, geog-
raphy, and cultures” (Castells 2009, 9). Such power is for him “the most fundamental
process in society” (Castells 2009, 10). Furthermore, Castells (2009, 13) dismisses the

Media, Communication, and Power

“naïve image of a reconciled human community, a normative utopia that is belied by
historical observation”.

Is it really likely that all history of humankind and that all social situations and systems,
in which we live, are always and necessarily shaped by power struggles, coercion, vi-
olence, and domination? Relationships of love, intimacy, and affection are in modern
society unfortunately often characterised by violence and coercion and are therefore
frequently (in Castells’ terms) power relationships. But isn’t love a prototypical phenom-
enon, where many people experience feelings and actions that negate violence, domina-
tion, and coercion? Isn’t the phenomenon of altruism in love the practical falsification of
the claim that coercive power is the most fundamental process in society? Not coercive
power, but co-operation is the most fundamental process in society (Fuchs 2008, 31–34,
40–58). It is possible to create social systems without coercive power (in Castells’ terms)
or with a symmetric distribution of power (in Giddens’ terminology). Conceiving power
as violent coercion poses the danger of naturalising and fetishising coercion and violent
struggles as necessary and therefore not historical qualities of society. The problematic
108 Foundations of Digital Democracy

ideological-theoretical implication is that in the final instance war must exist in all soci-
eties and a state of peace is dismissed and considered as being categorically impossible.
Castells surely does not share this implication, as his analysis of communication power
in the Iraq war shows.

The task of Castells’ book Communication Power is to “advance the construction

of a grounded theory of power in the network society” (Castells 2009, 5). Castells
does not want to place himself in theoretical debates, he bases his approach on
“a selective reading of power theories” (Castells 2009, 6), does not want to write
books about books (Castells 2009, 6, 2010, 25), and thinks that social theory books
are contributing to the deforestation of the planet (Castells 2009, 6), which is just
another expression for saying that they are unimportant and not worth the paper
they are printed on. Lacking grounding in social theory, Castells cannot explain why
he uses a certain definition of power and not another one. His lack of engagement
with social theory results in a fetishisation of domination as an endless and natural
social phenomenon.

John B. Thompson (1995) distinguishes four forms of power (see Table 4.3). The prob-
lem with Thompson’s approach is that the media’s power is reduced to the symbolic

TABLE 4.3 J ohn B. Thompson’s four forms of power (based on Thompson 1995, 12–18)

Type of power Definition Resources Institutions

Economic power “Economic power stems from human Material and Economic institutions
productive activity, that is, activity financial
concerned with the provision of the means resources
of subsistence through the extraction of
raw materials and their transformation into
goods which can be consumed or exchanged
in a market” (14).
Political power Political power “stems from the activity of Authority Political institutions (e.g.
coordinating individuals and regulating the states)
patterns of their interaction” (14).
Coercive power “Coercive power involves the use, or Physical and Coercive institutions
threatened use, of physical force to subdue armed force (military, police,
or conquer an opponent” (15). carceral institutions,
etc)
Symbolic power Symbolic power is the “capacity to intervene in Means of Cultural institutions
the course of events, to influence the actions information and (church, schools,
of others and indeed to create events, by communication universities, media,
means of the production and transmission of etc).
symbolic forms” (17)
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 109

dimension and that the relationship of violence and power is unclear. Symbolic power is
an important dimension of the media: the media not only have form but also communi-
cate content to the public, which allows attempts to influence the minds of the members
of the public. But ideology is not the only aspect of the media, the media are rather a ter-
rain where different forms of power and power struggles manifest themselves: the me-
dia have specific structures of private or public ownership that tend to be concentrated.
There are attempts to politically control and influence the media and the media often
have political roles in elections, social movement struggles, etc. Violence is a frequent
topic in media content. The media are not just a realm of symbolic power, but rather ma-
terial and symbolic spaces, where structures and contradictions of economic, political,
coercive, and symbolic power manifest themselves. It is unclear why Thompson defines
violence as a separate form of power. Nick Couldry (2002, 4) defines media power as “the
concentration in media institutions of the symbolic power of ‘constructing reality’”. Like
Thompson’s definition of power, also the one given by Couldry focuses on the symbolic
and cultural dimension of the media.

Media power is not cultural, superstructural, or ideational. It is a multidimensional form of

economic, political, and cultural power. The media are not just cultural, they also have a
political economy that frames the production, diffusion, and interpretation of information.
James Curran (2002, Chapter 5) has identified 11 dimensions of media power and seven di-
mensions of media counter-power. I have classified these dimensions according to the three

Media, Communication, and Power

dimensions of media power (see Table 4.4): economic media power, political media power,
and cultural media power. Curran stresses that media power is not just symbolic, but multidi-
mensional. The distinction of three realms of society (economy, politics, and culture) allows
us to classify forms of media power (Table 4.4). Curran stresses the contradictory character
of contemporary media: There are “eleven main factors that encourage the media to support
dominant power interests” (Curran 2002, 148), but “the media are also subject to counter-
vailing pressures which can pull potentially in the other direction” (Curran 2002, 151).

The systematic typology of media power that is based on Curran’s approach shows
that modern media can best be viewed dialectically: they are subject to elite control,
but have potentials for acting as and being influenced by counter-powers that question
elite control. This form of struggle is a potential, which means that it does not auto-
matically arise. The power of dominant and alternative media tends to be distributed
unequally (see: Fuchs 2010; Sandoval and Fuchs 2010): alternative media are often
facing resource inequalities and have to exist based on precarious labour and resource
precariousness.
110 Foundations of Digital Democracy

TABLE 4.4 P ower and counter-power in the media (based on: Curran 2002, Chapter 5)

Dimension of Forms of media power Forms of media counter-power

media power
Economic media High entry and operation costs; Public media, alternative
power grassroots media, public
media concentration; funding for alternative media;
private media ownership; influence of companies on the staff power (e.g. critical
media via advertising; journalism, investigative
reporting);
market pressure to produce homogenous (often uncritical)
content with wide appeal; consumer power (e.g. by support
of alternative media in the form
content that appeals to wealthy consumers;
of donations)
the unequal distribution of economic resources (money)
allows economic elites more influence on and control
of the media
Political media State censorship of the media; Media regulation that secures
power quality, fair reporting, diversity,
public relations of large (political and economic freedom of expression,
organisations) results in bureaucratic lobbying assembly and opinion;
apparatus that aims to influence the media;
alternative news sources
the unequal distribution of political resources (influence,
decision power, political relations) allows economic state redistribution of resources
elites more influence on and control of the media from the more powerful to the
less powerful
Cultural media Focus on content covering prestige institutions, creation of counter-organisations
power celebrities, and others who have high reputation; that develop counter-
discourses and operate their
dominant ideologies influence dominant media to a own media
certain degree;

the unequal distribution of cultural resources (reputation,

prestige) allows economic elites more influence on
and control of the media

4.4 Social Media and Power

Discussions about “social media” such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, or Weibo have
in recent years often been discussions about power. The question in such debates is
often: What’s the power of social media? This question is wrongly posed and tends
to imply that technological system in a linear and deterministic manner have specific
one-­dimensional implications for society. The major claim of management gurus, the
tabloid press, certain politicians, observers, and one-dimensional scholars has been that
social media empowers citizens, consumers, has resulted in political revolutions, and
makes society, the economy, and culture more democratic. Conservative blogger Andrew
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 111

Sullivan’s (2009) claimed that the “revolution will be twittered” in the context of the 2009
Iran protests. In light of the Arab Spring, there was talk about a “revolution 2.0” (Ghonim
2012). Foreign Policy Magazine titled an article “The revolution will be tweeted”5 and
the New York Times wrote that the “Egyptian revolution began on Twitter”.6 In the schol-
arly world academics such as Manuel Castells (2012, 229) claimed that the “networked
movements of our time are largely based on the Internet”. Clay Shirky argues that social
media “will result in a net improvement for democracy” (Gladwell and Shirky 2011, 154).
Concerning the economic realm, management gurus Tapscott and Williams (2007, 15)
argue that social media result in “a new economic democracy […] in which we all have
a lead role”. Henry Jenkins sees social media in the context of the development that “the
Web has become a site of consumer participation” (Jenkins 2008, 137).

Authors sceptical of such claims have stressed that social media are in contemporary so-
ciety embedded into structures of control and domination. Malcolm Gladwell writes that
Facebook and Twitter activism only succeeds in situations that do not require “to make
a real sacrifice” (Gladwell 2010, 47), such as registering in a bone-marrow database or
getting back a stolen phone. “The evangelists of social media”, such as Clay Shirky,

seem to believe that a Facebook friend is the same as a real friend and that
signing up for a donor registry in Silicon Valley today is activism in the same
sense as sitting at a segregated lunch counter in Greensboro in 1960.
(Gladwell 2010, 46)

Social media would “make it easier for activists to express themselves, and harder for
Social Media and Power
that expression to have any impact” (Gladwell 2010, 49). Social media “are not a natural
enemy of the status quo” and “are well suited to making the existing social order more
efficient” (Gladwell 2010, 49).

Evgeny Morozov (2010) argues that the notion of “Twitter revolution” is based on a belief
in cyber-utopianism – “a naive belief in the emancipatory nature of online communica-
tion that rests on a stubborn refusal to acknowledge its downside” (Morozov 2010, xiii)
that combined with Internet centrism forms a techno-deterministic ideology. Technolog-
ical solutionism is recasting “all complex social situations either as neatly defined prob-
lems with definite, computable solutions or as transparent and self-evident processes
that can be easily optimised – if only the right algorithms are in place”. The consequence
of solutionism would be the risk to create “unexpected consequences that could even-
tually cause more damage than the problems they seek to address”. Morozov shows
that solutionism is a typical ideology of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and intellectuals
112 Foundations of Digital Democracy

who glorify the Internet as being the solution to societal problems or what is seen as
societal problems and may in fact not be problems at all. Thinkers that Morozov criticises
for being Internet centrists are on the one hand the likes of Eric Schmidt (Google) and
Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook) and on the other hand intellectuals such as Yochai Benkler,
Nicholas Carr, Jeff Jarvis, Kevin Kelly, Lawrence Lessig, Clay Shirky, Don Tapscott, and
Jonathan Zittrain. Internet centrism and technological solutionism “impoverish and in-
fantilize our public debate” (Morozov 2013, 43).

Social or other media neither result in positive or negative consequences. They do not
act. They do not make society. They do not have one-dimensional impacts. Media are
systems that are in a complex manner embedded into antagonistic economic, political
and cultural power structures that are antagonistic.

Social media in contemporary society are shaped by structures of economic, political,

and cultural power:

• Social media have specific ownership structures. If social media’s economic

power is asymmetrically distributed, then a private class owns social media. If
it is more symmetrically distributed, then a collective of users or all people own
social media.
• Social media have specific decision-making structures. If social media’s politi-
cal power is asymmetrically distributed, then a specific group controls decision-­
making. If it is more symmetrically distributed, then all users or all people in the
society can influence decision-making.
• Social media have specific mechanisms for the generation of reputation and pop-
ularity. If social media’s cultural power is asymmetrically distributed, then the rep-
utation and visibility of certain actors are in contrast to the attention and visibility
given to others large. Social media can also act as conveyors of ideologies that
misrepresent reality. If highly visible actors communicate such ideologies, then it
is likely that they have some effect. If cultural power is more symmetrically distrib-
uted, then all users have a significant degree of visibility and attention.

Social media are spaces, where media power and counter-power are played out. Domi-
nant platforms such as Facebook, Google/YouTube, and Twitter are privately owned and
there are economic, political, and ideological forms of media power at play: private own-
ership, concentration, advertising, the logic of consumption and entertainment, the high
visibility of and attention given to elites and celebrities shape and filter communication on
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 113

dominant social media platforms. At the same time, dominant structures are questioned
by phenomena such as file sharing, commons-based social media that are non-profit
and non-commercial (e.g. Wikipedia, Diaspora*), social movements’ use of social media
for political purposes, the development of alternative social media, protests against the
dominance of platforms like Google, protests and legal disputes over privacy violations,
etc. Contemporary social media is a field of power struggles, in which dominant actors
command a large share of economic, political, and ideological media power that can be
challenged by alternative actors that have fewer resources, visibility, and attention, but
try to make the best use of the unequal share of media power they are confronted with
in order to fight against the dominant powers.

Social media optimism and pessimism assume that the Internet is the solution to socie-
ty’s problem and can perfect society and get rid of the existence of problems. Karl Marx
(1867) used the term “fetishism” for the logic of assuming that things are more impor-
tant than social relations between humans: Techno-optimism and techno-pessimism are
forms of technological fetishism that sees an artefact as a solution to human-made prob-
lems. Max Horkheimer (1947) spoke in this context of instrumental reason and Herbert
Marcuse (1941/1998) of technological rationality: instrumental/technological rationality
assumes that society function like machines, are fully controllable and programmable
like an algorithm. Internet fetishism assumes that society is a machine and functions like
the Internet and that the Internet is therefore the solution for everything in society. Tech-
nological rationality wants to implement “dictates of the apparatus” that use a “frame-
work of standardized performances” (Marcuse 1941/1998, 44): Google’s standardized
algorithms tell people what they should like, define as reality, where they should go, Social Media and Power

what they should consider important, etc. A tool like Google Maps can indeed be helpful
for finding the way around, but it also allows Google (and as a consequence potentially
also other companies and the police) to track your movements and to subject movements
in space to the logic of advertising: targeted advertisements follow you wherever you
take your mobile phone and present reality and what you should eat, drink, watch and
like according to the logic of advertisers: “Expediency in terms of technological reason
is, at the same time, expediency in terms of profitable efficiency” (Marcuse 1941/1998,
47). Marcuse (1941/1988, 41) warned that organising society according to technological
rationality can result in fascism and said that Nazi Germany was ruled by “technical
considerations of imperialistic efficiency and rationality”.

It is no accident that Internet centrism and technological solutionism have become so pre-
dominant in the early stage of the 3rd millennium. After 9/11, policing has increasingly
114 Foundations of Digital Democracy

looked for security by algorithms in a world of high insecurity. It advances a fetishism

of technology – the belief that crime and terrorism can be controlled by technology.
Technology promises an easy fix to complex societal problems. 9/11 has resulted in “the
misguided and socially disruptive attempts to identify terrorists and then predict their
attacks” (Gandy 2009, 5). The world economic crisis that started in 2008 has added ad-
ditional uncertainties and created a situation of high insecurity. 9/11 was indicative of a
crisis of the hegemony of Western thought that was questioned by people and groups in
Arab countries that put religious ideology against Western liberal and capitalist ideology.
The “war against terror”, the security discourse, and the intensification of surveillance
resulted in a political crisis, in which war and terrorism tend to reinforce each other
mutually, which results in a vicious cycle that intensifies hatred and conflict. Financiali-
zation and neoliberalism made capitalism more unjust (which constitutes a social crisis)
and also crisis-prone, which resulted in a new world economic crisis that started in 2008.

Capitalism faced a multidimensional crisis in and beyond the first decade of the 21st
century. This crisis has further advanced ideologies of control and technological fixes
that advance the ideology of the solvability of societal problems by technologies. Unem-
ployment and lack of jobs? Social media will create them! Economic crisis? Invest in new
Internet platforms and everything will be fine! Uprisings, revolutions, and riots? All cre-
ated by social media! It is no accident that ideological discourses like these proliferate in
times of crisis: The Internet promises easy solutions to complex societal phenomena and
contradictions intrinsic to capitalism, bureaucratic control, and resulting inequalities.

Stuart Hall et al. (1978) describe how a moral panic about street robbery (“mugging”)
developed in the United Kingdom in the 1970s. They argue that this panic must be seen
in the context of the crisis of the mid-1970s. This crisis would have been a global crisis
of capitalism (recession), a crisis of political apparatuses (such as ruling-class and work-
ing-class parties), a crisis of the state, and a crisis of hegemony and political legitimacy
(Hall et al. 1978, 317–319). In crises, people look for causes and answers. Ideology that
wants to maintain the system does not engage with the systemic causes of crises, but
rather displaces the causes ideologically. There is a “displacement effect”: “the con-
nection between the crisis and the way it is appropriated in the social experience of
the ­majority – social anxiety – passes through a series of false ‘resolutions’” (Hall et al.
1978, 322). Technological solutionism and Internet centrism are contemporary ideologi-
cal false resolutions in situations of global crisis.

Technological solutionism and Internet/social media fetishism constitute a permanent

form of what Hall et al. (1978) called signification spirals: In a signification spiral, a
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 115

threat is identified and it is argued that “more troubling times” will come “if no action is
taken”, which results in the “call for ‘firm steps’” (Hall et al. 1978, 223). If we do not act
and use the latest Internet platform or app, the contemporary ideologues tell us, society
cannot be saved and we will become the victims of criminals, terrorists, paedophiles,
deviants, extremists, and our own non-knowledge that can only be, as they want to tell
us, technologically controlled. Today, there are many Internet signification spirals, where
the Internet is seen as the cause of and/or solution to evils in the world.

In a moral panic, a “control culture” (such as police discourses about crime or terrorism)
and a “signification culture” (like criminal hyperbole created by tabloid media) often act
together (Hall et al. 1978, 76). The media, just like the police, then act as “an apparatus

Conclusion: The Need for a Dialectic and Critical Theory of Media and Society
of the control process itself – an ‘ideological state apparatus’” (Hall et al. 1978, 76).
The Internet as a relatively new medium of information, communication, and collabora-
tion (Fuchs 2008) is inserted into contemporary moral panics in a different way than the
mainstream media that simply tend to act as ideological control institutions. The Internet
and social media act as arena of ideological projections of fears and hopes that are as-
sociated with moral panics – some argue that they are dangerous spaces that are used
by terrorists, rioters, vandals, and criminals and therefore needs to be policed with the
help of Internet surveillance, whereas others argue that the Internet is a new space of
political hope that is at the heart of demonstrations, rebellions, protests and revolutions
that struggle for more democracy. What both discourses share is a strong belief in the
power of technology independently of society, they mistake societal phenomena (crime,
terror, crises, political transformations) to be caused and controllable by technology. But
societal phenomena merely express themselves in communicative and technological
spaces; technologies do not cause them. Technological determinism inscribes power into
technology; it reduces power to a technologically manageable phenomenon and thereby
neglects the interaction of technology and society. The Internet is not like the main-
stream mass media an ideological actor, but rather an object of ideological signification
in moral panics and moral euphoria.

4.5 Conclusion: The Need for a Dialectic and

Critical Theory of Media and Society
A critical theory of media and technology is based on dialectical reasoning (see
­Figure 4.2). This allows us to see the causal relationship of media/technology and so-
ciety as multidimensional and complex: a specific media/technology has multiple, at
least two, potential effects on society and social systems that can co-exist or stand
116 Foundations of Digital Democracy

FIGURE 4.2 Two logics of the relationship between media technology and society

in contradiction to each other. Which potentials are realised is based on how society,
interests, power structures, and struggles shape the design and usage of technology
in multiple ways that are also potentially contradictory. Andrew Feenberg says in this
context that Critical Theory “argues that technology is not a thing in the ordinary sense
of the term, but an ‘ambivalent’ process of development suspended between different
possibilities” (Feenberg 2002, 15).

The revolution in Egypt was not a Twitter revolution, but related to the context of a highly
stratified society. Real wages have been decreasing over 20 years, strikes were forbid-
den, there was repression against the political left and unions, the gap between the rich
and the poor has been large, poverty constantly increased, wages in industry have been
low, the global economic crisis has resulted in mass lay-offs and a food crisis, Mubarak
controlled together with the army Egyptian politics and bureaucracy since 1981, the illit-
eracy rate has been high, and there has been a contradiction between Islamic traditions
and the values of modernisation (Björklund 2011).

Pierre Bourdieu (1986b) distinguished between economic capital (money), political capi-
tal (power), and cultural capital (status, skills, and educational attainments). Egypt was
under Mubarak a society with a highly stratified class structure: there was a class that
controlled the political-economic-military complex and accumulated economic, political,
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 117

and cultural capital at the expense of the masses of Egyptian people. The Egyptian revo-
lution was a revolution against capitalism’s multidimensional injustices, in which social
media were used as a tool of information and organisation, but were not the cause of
the revolution.

The UK riots were not a Twitter mob, but related to the societal structure of the United
Kingdom. The latter has a high level of income inequality, its Gini level was 32.4 in 2009
(0 means absolute equality, 100 absolute inequality), a level that is only topped by a few
countries in Europe and that is comparable to the level of Greece (33.1) (data source:
Eurostat). 17.3 per cent of the UK population had a risk of living in poverty in 2009 (data
source: Eurostat). In early 2011, the youth unemployment rate in the UK rose to 20.3 per

Conclusion: The Need for a Dialectic and Critical Theory of Media and Society
cent, the highest level since these statistics started being recorded in 1992.7 The United
Kingdom is not only one of the most advanced developed countries today, it is at the
same time a developing country with a lot of structurally deprived areas. Is it a surprise
that riots erupted especially in East London, the West Midlands, and Greater Manches-
ter? The UK Department of Communities and Local Government reported in its analysis
The English Indices of Deprivation 20108:

Liverpool, Middlesbrough, Manchester, Knowsley, the City of Kingston-upon

Hull, Hackney and Tower Hamlets are the local authorities with the highest
proportion of LSOAs amongst the most deprived in England. [...] The north east
quarter of London, particularly Newham, Hackney and Tower Hamlets continue
to exhibit very high levels of deprivation.
(1–3)

Decades of UK capitalist development shaped by deindustrialisation and neoliberalism

have had effects on the creation, intensification, and extension of precariousness and
deprivation. Capitalism, crisis, and class are the main contexts of unrests, uproar, and
social media today.

Social media are embedded into contradictions and the power structures of contempo-
rary society. This also means that in society, in which these media are prevalent, they are
not completely unimportant in situations of social struggles. Social media have contra-
dictory characteristics in contradictory societies: they do not necessarily and automati-
cally support/amplify or dampen/limit rebellions, but rather pose contradictory potentials
that stand in contradictions with influences by the state, ideology, capitalism, and other
media. Social media are not the causes of societal phenomena. They are rather a mirror
of the power structures and structures of exploitation and oppression that we find in
118 Foundations of Digital Democracy

contemporary society. They are tools of communication embedded in power structures.

They can both play a role for exerting control, exploitation, and domination as well as for
challenging asymmetric power structures of domination and exploitation. And in actual
reality, they do both at the same time.

One can however not assume that the economic, political, and cultural power structures
that frame media use are equally accessible and available for both sides. Economic,
political, and cultural elites tend to enjoy advantages in access to media and mediated
visibility. The political task is to find ways how less powerful groups can be empowered
so that their voices can be heard in the media and can have transformative influences on
society. How social and other media can empower citizens, workers, consumers, and pro-
sumers is not a given. It is not an automatism or a necessity. It is a difficult and complex
political challenge that has thus far not been adequately approached.

Notes
1 The data collection for the OccupyMedia Survey! took place from November 6th, 2012, until
February 20th, 2013. I conducted the research as online survey. Its aim was to find out more
about how Occupy activists use social media and what opportunities and risks of social media
they see. The survey resulted in a dataset with N=429 respondents.
2 “Power means every chance within a social relationship to assert one’s will even against
opposition” (Habermas 1986, 74).
3 “In itself the exercise of power is not violence; nor is it a consent which, implicitly, is renewa-
ble. It is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions: it incites, it induces,
it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely;
it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of
their acting or being capable of action” (Foucault 1982, 220).
4 Politics is for Weber (2008, 155–156) “leadership, or the influence exerted on the leadership,
of a political association”.
5 The Revolution will be tweeted. Foreign Policy Online. June 20, 2011.http://www.foreignpol-
icy.com/articles/2011/06/20/the_revolution_will_be_tweeted#sthash.fzgJPMdN.dpbs.
6 Spring awakening. How an Egyptian revolution began on Facebook. New York Times On-
line. February 17, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyp-
tian-revolution-began-on-facebook.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
7 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jan/19/youth-unemployment-heads-towards-
1-million.
8 http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/statistics/pdf/1871538.pdf.
 Chapter Four | Power in the Age of Social Media 119

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Chapter Five
The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism and Mihailo
Marković’s Theory of Communication

5.1 Introduction
5.2 Praxis
5.3 Communication
5.4 Ideology
5.5 Nationalism
5.6 Conclusion
References

5.1 Introduction
The Praxis Group was a community of scholars in Yugoslavia. It was predominantly based
at the University of Zagreb and the University of Belgrade. The founders included Gajo
Petrovic´, Milan Kangrga (­­both based in Zagreb) and Mihailo Markovic´ (­­based in Belgrade).
The Group edited the Praxis journal from 1964 until 1974. The international edition was
published from 1965 until 1973. Between 1963 and 1974, the group also organised the
annual Korčula Summer School. Having supported student protests in 1968, members of
the group came under increased criticism and were expelled from the Communist Party
(­­Bogdanovic´ 2015). In 1975, eight of them (­­the Belgrade Eight) were suspended from their
jobs at the University of Belgrade’s Faculty of Philosophy (­­ibid.). It became impossible to
continue organising the journal and the summer school. In 1981, the group founded the
journal Praxis International that existed until 1993.

Mihailo Marković (­­­­1923–​­​­​­2010) was the Group’s internationally most active and visible
member. This for example becomes evident when one looks at the biographies and
bibliographies of group members published in the 1979 volume Praxis: Yugoslav Essays
in the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences (­­Marković and Petrović 1979,
­­389–​­​­​­398) that collected English translations of the Praxis journal’s key articles. The
bibliographies indicate that Marković was the only member who had in 1979 pub-
lished two monographs in English: From Affluence to Praxis (­­Marković 1974a) and The

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-7
124 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Contemporary Marx (­­Marković 1974b). The only other Praxis ­­Group-​­​­​­monographs that
had at that time been published in English were Svetozar Stojanović’s (­­1973) Between
Ideals and Reality: Critique of Socialism and its Future and Gajo Petrović’s (­­1967) Marx
in the ­­Mid-​­​­​­Twentieth Century. Marković’s (­­1984) book Dialectical Theory of Meaning
(­­first published in ­­Serbo-​­​­​­Croatian in 1961) is explicitly dedicated to the analysis of the
mental, symbolic, linguistic, communicative realm, which makes his work particularly
interesting for engagement when one is interested in foundations of a critical theory
of communication. This chapter therefore asks: How did Mihailo Marković conceive of
communication?

Ideology is a particular type of communication. Marković became in the 1980s a

spokesperson for Serbian nationalism. From 1990 to 1992, he was the Vice President
of Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian Socialist Party (­­SPS). So one can observe a peculiar
contradiction of internationalism and nationalism. When dealing with communication in
Marković’s works, we therefore have to inevitably also ask questions about ideology and
nationalism. This chapter proceeds by engaging with the concepts of praxis (­­Section 5.2),
­communication (­­Section 5.3), ideology (­­Section 5.4), and nationalism (­­Section 5.5).
­Section 5.6 draws general conclusions.

5.2 Praxis
Markovic´ (­­1974a, 63) discerns between three types of activity: work, alienated labour
and praxis. Work is general production, whereas labour is an alienated form of work,
in which humans do not control the conditions and results of their activities. In another
work, he adds the term practice: Practice is “­­any Subject’s activity of changing and ob-
ject” (­­Markovic´ 1979, xxviii). Practice can be alienated. Praxis in contrast is “­­a specifically
human activity” that is “­­characterized by self-​­​­​­ ­­ determination, i.e., by a conscious pur-
poseful commitment to practically realize one specific, freely chosen possibility among a
set of alternatives” (­­Markovic´ 1979, xxxi). Praxis is “­­free creative activity” that realises
“­­specific potential faculties and satisfies the needs of other human individuals” (­­xxviii).
“­­Work becomes praxis only when it is freely chosen and provides an opportunity for in-
dividual ­­self-​­​­​­expression and ­­self-​­​­​­fulfillment” (­­xxix). Praxis is “­­a free human activity with
definite esthetic qualities, in which man objectifies all his potential powers, affirms him-
self as a personality, and satisfies the needs of another person” (­­1974a, 53). It “­­enriches
the lives of others and indirectly becomes part of them” and shows “­­direct concern for
another person’s needs” (­­65). Praxis “­­establishes valuable and warm links with other
human beings” (­­65).
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 125

Markovic´’s concept of praxis is not consistent. In Dialectical Theory of Meaning

(­­Markovic´ 1984), he uses praxis and practice synonymously, i.e. he does not give any
political meaning to the praxis concept. “­­Praxis is ­­subjective-​­​­​­objective” (­­xiv). Practice
is “­­activity by means of which people transform their nature and social environment in
order to improve their living conditions” (­­38), it is human subjects’ “­­purposeful creation
of inorganic and organic objects and the social conditions of human life” (­­39). Praxis, or
what he also calls practice or practical interaction, has for Markovic´ two dimensions:
the interaction with nature, i.e. the “­­utilization of natural resources for human purposes,
growing production”, and social interaction, in which “­­we become aware of ‘­­other
minds’” (­­xvi). It here already becomes evident that there is a certain dualism inherent
in Markovic´’s approach that separates the physical and natural world from the mental
and communicative world. Praxis is a uniting concept, but the two forms of praxis are
left separate.

Are there advantages of discerning between practice and praxis? In Marxist theory, the
distinction goes back to Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach:

#3 […] The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity

or self-​­​­​­
­­ change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolution-
ary praxis. […] #8 All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which
lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human praxis and in the
comprehension of this praxis.
(­­Marx 1845, 3, 5)­­1

It becomes clear that Marx sees human life as practical in the sense that humans change
the world in and through their practices. When he speaks of praxis, he means a particular
form of practice, namely political practice that aims at creating a humane society, under-
stands the needs of such a society, and deconstructs ideologies that mystify domination.
Praxis

For Gramsci (­­1971), the philosophy of praxis is critical because it criticises common sense
(­­330). Praxis aims at “­­absolute humanism” (­­417). Both Marx and Gramsci show that
praxis is the critical and political dimension of theory and human activity. By using praxis
in parts of his works as synonymous with practice, Marković depoliticises social theory.

In contrast to Marković, Gajo Petrović, who was another important member of the
Praxis Group, argues in his book Marx in the ­­Mid-​­​­​­Twentieth Century for an ­­axiological-​­​­​
­political concept of praxis: “‘­­Man is praxis means’ man in society, freedom, history and
future” (­­23). “­­There is no praxis without freedom, and there is no free Being that is not
praxis” (­­118). Praxis aims at a “­­free community of free personalities” (­­133). Praxis is the
126 Foundations of Digital Democracy

“­­authentic ‘­­mode’ of Being that reveals the true meaning of Being”, it is the “­­developed
Essence of Being” (­­189).

Most of Yugoslav praxis philosophy took the Marxian understanding of praxis serious
and focused on the political goal of a self-​­​­​­
­­ managed society and economy. In Yugoslavia,
Tito’s 1948 break with Stalin created foundations for such a form of democratic social-
ism. “­­Yugoslavia today is the only country in the world that is attempting to create and
apply an integrated system of workers’ ­­self-​­​­​­management” (­­Supek 1975, 3). Workers’
­­self-​­​­​­management in Yugoslavia was “­­the first successful implementation of an inte-
grated system of workers’ ­­self-​­​­​­management” (­­Horvat 1975a, ­­36–​­​­​­37). The Praxis Group
analysed Yugoslav ­­self-​­​­​­management and showed its potentials, problems and limits. On
the ­­ethico-​­​­​­political level, human praxis demands ­­self-​­​­​­management. According to Rudi
Supek (­­1971/­­1979, 253), ­­self-​­​­​­management means that

man as the producer has the right to make decisions about the results of his
work, that the state is not entitled to appropriate and dispose of the work sur-
plus, that the right to manage an enterprise is shared by all workers and em-
ployees who work in it.
(­­Supek 1971/­­1979, 253)

Yugoslav ­­self-​­​­​­management’s basic idea was that all workers formed a general assembly
and elected a workers’ council that in turn elected a management committee:

All workers and employees of a firm constitute the work collective [radni kole-
ktiv]. The collective elects a workers’ council [radnički savet] by secret ballot.
The council has 15 to 120 members elected originally for one year and recently
for a ­­two-​­​­​­year period. The council is a ­­policy-​­​­​­making body and meets at inter-
vals of one to two months. The council elects a managing board [upravni odbor]
as its executive organ; the board has 3 to 11 members, ­­three-​­​­​­quarters of whom
must be production workers. The director is the chief executive and is an ex
officio member of the managing board.
(­­Horvat 1975b, 165)

The Praxis Group argues that self-​­​­​­

­­ management as a form of participatory democracy
needs to be used at multiple levels of society.

Socialist ­­self-​­​­​­government should he constructed as an integral social system.

This means, first, that it must embrace all parts of society, and second, that in
addition to the sell government of individual elements, it must be seen as the
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 127

­­self-​­​­​­government of society as a whole. This assumes the governance of ­­self-​­​­​

­governing elements into a complete ­­self-​­​­​­governing society.
(­­Stojanovič 1975, 467)

One of the Group’s criticisms was that Yugoslavia was not a ­­self-​­​­​­governing, ­­self-​­​­​
­managing society, but limited ­­self-​­​­​­managing to the level of economic organisations: A
“­­vivid dualism exists in ­practice – ­​­­­​­­​­­­self-​­​­​­managing groups in the base and a rather strong
statist structure above them” (­­Stojanovič 1975, 469). Another problem was that banks
and trade organisations took on a monopolistic role that they used in order to control s­­ elf-​­​­​
­managed companies and “­­to illegally draw off profits from the producing organizations”
(­­Supek 1971/­­1979, 258). There was also a “­­middle class liberalism” (­­257) that tried to
foster entrepreneurialism and that atomised society into competing individuals. The re-
sults were “­­uneven compensation for the same work” and that unions “­­were forbidden
to fight for a uniform standard by which laborers were compensated” (­­259). The workers’
council elected the company-​­​­​­
­­ director from candidates nominated in public competition
by a selection committee that to a majority consisted of representatives of the commune
(­­Horvat 1975b, 166). Workers often considered the director as “­­a representative of ‘­­alien’
interests in the firm” (­­166).

Yugoslav ­­self-​­​­​­management certainly created its own contradictions that had to do with
the contradictory relation between state power and workers’ power in transitional so-
ciety, but it is clear that it was a very important attempt to foster democracy in the
economy.

Marxist Humanism is based on Marx’s insight that in approaching a problem, humans

need to “­­grasp the root of the matter. But for man the root is man himself”, “­­man is
the highest being for man” (­­Marx 1844a, 182). So it is convinced that all humans de-
serve a good life and the good life for all is an important political goal worth struggling
for. Therefore Marx formulated the “­­categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in
Praxis

which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being” (­­182). The Praxis Group
was guided by Marx’s Humanism and so assumed that “­­all relationships in which man
is a humbled, oppressed, abandoned and despised being should be destroyed” (­­Vranicki
1972/­­1979, 234). For Stalin, humans and their practices, praxis and knowledge were in
contrast mere reflections of the objective world (­­ibid.).

The Praxis Group was an important representative of Marxist Humanism. But what are
the most important assumptions of Marxist and socialist Humanism in general? Erich
Fromm (­­1965) edited a collection on Socialist Humanism that presented 36 chapters
128 Foundations of Digital Democracy

written by Marxist Humanist scholars. Taken together, the volume outlines Marxist
Humanism’s basic assumptions:

Ontology:

• Society is grounded in human practice and social production.

• Only humans themselves can achieve a humane society by their practical self-​­​­​
­­
­activity in social struggles. Praxis is a key aspect of achieving a humane society.
• Capitalism, class and domination constitute a form of human alienation that con-
stitutes a difference between how social life is and how it could potentially be.

Epistemology:

• Marx’s early writings, especially the ­­Economic-​­​­​­Philosophic Manuscripts, are im-

portant intellectual foundations of Marxist Humanism.
• There is no epistemological break in Marx’s works that led him away from Human-
ism. Marx’s later works are guided by the general principles formulated in his early
works.
• Humanism requires an open form of theory, dialectic, and praxis. Orthodoxies such
as Stalinism turn socialism into a dogmatic, deterministic, mechanistic, reduction-
ist, and ­­quasi-​­​­​­religious practice.

Axiology:

• Given society’s grounding in human praxis and social production, humans should
be collectively in control of the conditions and results of human activity.
• Democratic socialism is the society adequate for humans. It is not limited to poli-
tics, but the collective ­­self-​­​­​­management of the economy and society.
• Democratic socialism is the foundation for the full realisation of humans’ and so-
ciety’s potentials.

Based on the analysis of practice and praxis, we can next have a look at the concept of
communication.

5.3 Communication
Communication is for Marković besides sense development, reason, imagination, crea-
tivity, harmonisation of interests and aspirations, evaluative choice among alternative
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 129

possibilities, and ­­self-​­​­​­consciousness a fundamental human capacity (­­1974a, ­­13–​­​­​­14).

Communication involves language and the “­­ability to understand the thoughts, feelings,
desires, and motives of other persons from other social groups, nations, classes, races,
religions, and cultures” (­­13). Language plays a key role in communication: Language “­­is
an activity (­­energeia) which is a medium used by people to communicate and coordinate
their praxis” (­­1984, 262), it is the “­­activity of speaking and writing, i.e. a system of oper-
ations with signs” (­­320). Language is one of the human means of communication that are
used as means for the production of meanings and social relations. Raymond Williams
(­­2005, ­­50–​­​­​­63) therefore speaks of means of communication as means of production.

Marković in his analysis of communication again mixes up praxis and practice. Communi-
cation is certainly a human practice that in ethical and political action can turn into praxis
communication. All praxis communication is communicative practice, but not all commu-
nicative practices are praxis communication. The problem of Habermas’ (­­1984) theory
of communication is as in Marković’s terminology the ­­mix-​­​­​­up of the ­­ethico-​­​­​­political and
the ontological level of communication (­­for a critique of Habermas, see ­Chapter 6 in
Fuchs 2016). For Habermas (­­1984, 285), communicative aims at transcending “­­egocentric
calculations of success”, but at “­­reaching understanding”. Communication is not natu-
rally fair and does not naturally and automatically stand above or outside of structures
of domination. Communication is the basic human practice of creating and reproducing
social relations through symbol use, which implies that it is used both in domination and
emancipation from domination. That humans make meaning of each other in communi-
cation does not include and automatically imply that they understand and agree with
each other. The transformation of communicative practices into praxis communication is
a political task of social struggles that is not automatically given. Praxis communication
is communication that acts within d­­ emocratic-​­​­​­socialist structures or aims at establishing
Communication

such structures and a society built on them.

In Dialectical Theory of Meaning, Marković (­­1984, 39) defines communication as one of

six forms or elements of practice. The others are work/­­material production, ­­co-​­​­​­operation,
experience, evaluation, and thought/­­intellectual activity. “­­Communication is that specific
form of practice, which consist in operations with signs, by means of which people come
to mutual understanding and stimulate one another to engage in a particular type of
action” (­­39). This distinction’s problem is that it separates work and communication.
Work is seen as material production and “­­purposeful creation” (­­39). The implication is
that communication is neither material nor purposeful. But communication’s purpose is
that humans make meaning of each other and the world. It is a purposeful activity. And in
130 Foundations of Digital Democracy

­TABLE 5.1 M
 arković’s (­­1984, 72) typology of objects

Objects
Material objects Mental objects
Physical objects Material social objects Social mental objects Individual mental objects

cultural and communicative work, which is a form of work that has become widespread,
humans create ­­use-​­​­​­values that offer opportunities for making meanings to others. Fer-
ruccio ­­Rossi-​­​­​­Landi (­­1983) and Raymond Williams (­­1977) therefore stress that communi-
cation and work should not be separated, but be seen as material practices (­­see Fuchs
2016, ­Chapter 6).

Marković (­­1984) draws a strict separation between the material and the mental world
(­­see ­Table 5.1). He sees the realm of the material as the world of physical objects that
are either created by nature or by humans in society. Individual ideas or collective mental
phenomena, “­­including common experiences, feelings, ideas, value judgements, inter-
pretations of symbols, […] ‘­­class consciousness’, […] public opinion” (­­70) are in contrast
for him mental and “­­nonmaterial” (­­71). Matter “­­consists of all objects that exist in space
and time” (­­70). Mental is a “­­synonym of ‘­­psychic” (­­73). The problem of such an approach
is that it draws a crude distinction between base and superstructure that renders the
realm of culture and communication secondary and of minor importance. The problem is
not just that one thereby cannot explain the importance of communicative and cultural
work, but also that the result is a philosophical idealism that postulates two substances
of the world (­­matter and mind) and cannot answer the question of how the world is at
the foundational level grounded. Mental processes are not, as Marković argues, ­­non-​­​­​
­spatial and non-​­​­​­
­­ temporal: Individual ideas and values are stored in the human brain for
a particular period of time (­­until an individual dies, forgets them or gives them up). And
collective ideas have ­­space-​­​­​­time because a particular community shares them during
specific time periods. A community of humans has certain structures of feeling, it shares
particular collective “­­meanings and values which are lived in works and relationships”
(­­Williams 1961/­­2011, 337).

Now you can ask: What about dreams, the characters in a novel, fantasies, ideologies,
lies, myths, or the idea of God? Are these not ideas that do not have a material correlate
and are therefore “­­immaterial”? No, like all ideas, these ideas are material because par-
ticular humans or groups of humans live and express them. But we can say that certain
ideas are material, but not real. They are unreal. Any idea has a relation to an object. In
the case discussed here, the object is imagined and does not exist in the world.
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 131

For Hegel (­­1830), reality is ­­being-​­​­​­there (­­Dasein), “­­being with a determinacy” that is im-
mediate and is something with quality (§90). Reality is not just “­­inner and subjective”,
but has “­­moved out into ­­being-​­​­​­there” (­­addition to §90). So reality is an aspect of qualita-
tive being (­­Sein). Reality that does not have a referent in reality external to the human is
an unreal being. For Hegel, actuality (­­Wirklichkeit) is the unity of essence and existence
(§142). Actuality is reasonable being.

A house that I build is real just like the thoughts I have about it. Thoughts about how a
house I want to build should look like are unreal being that is however potential reality.
A dream about a house built out of chocolate on the imaginary chocolate planet Choco-
late Moon is a material being, but it is unreal and impossible and therefore no potential
reality. It is an imaginary being. What are the implications of these distinctions for the
notion of communication? Communication is a material and real process that creates
and maintains social reality by offering in symbolic forms interpretations about real and
unreal being, potential and imaginary being to other humans, who based on it produce
particular meanings of the (­­real, unreal, potential, imaginary) world. Communicative
practices turn into praxis communication when they are oriented not just on how society
is or can be, but on how it can be made an actual society.

A form of communication that invents imaginary existence and proclaims that the im-
aginary is actuality in order to defend and legitimate domination is termed ideology.
Ideology is an important dimension of critical communication theory.

5.4 Ideology
Ideology is one of the most difficult concepts in cultural theory because there are multi-
ple understandings and uses of it.
Ideology

Marković writes that ideology can on the one hand be understood as

any conceptualization of values, needs and interests, any theory about an ac-
cepted ideal, any choice of a general value orientation, any project of a future
for which we are ready to engage, and consequently, a critical attitude toward
existing social realities.
(­­1974a, 53)

He on the other hand contrasts this understanding with the definition of ideology as
the expression and disguise of “­­particular group interests […] in the form of indicative
statements, creating the impression that they refer to obvious facts, and thus demand
132 Foundations of Digital Democracy

acceptance as indubitable truths” (­­1974a, 54). In the book From Affluence to Praxis,
Marković (­­1974a) says Marx’s theory is an ideology in the first sense and ­­anti-​­​­​­ideological
in the second sense, but he leaves open his own understanding of ideology.

In the article Science and Ideology, Marković (­­1974b, ­­42–​­​­​­80) argues that both understand-
ings of ideology can be found in Marx’s works: Marx and Engels in the German Ideology
understand ideology as “­­inadequate, twisted, mystified” consciousness (­­44), whereas
Marx in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy speaks of the
legal, political, philosophical, religious, aesthetic and philosophic realms as ideological
forms that constitute “­­the superstructure of a historical epoch” (­­61). Marković clarifies
that he prefers the general definition because the other one does not allow speaking of
the “­­revolutionary ideology of the proletariat” (­­73). He therefore defines ideology as “­­the
ensemble of ideas and theories with which a class expresses its interests, its aims and
the norms of its activity” (­­74).

Marković’s justification for the superiority of the general ideology concept is confused.
The proletariat’s consciousness is neither automatically unitary nor progressive, as the
contemporary tendency of ­­blue-​­​­​­collar workers’ support for ­­far-​­​­​­right parties shows. It is
possible that we simply speak of a “­­revolutionary worldview”, which does not require the
notion of ideology. Also not all revolutions are politically progressive, so there can be rev-
olutionary worldviews that are ideological, in which case we can speak of a “­­revolutionary
ideology”. The problem is that the general concept of ideology is ethically and politically
relativist. If praxis is progressive social action, then situating the consciousness asso-
ciated with it on the same level as fascist consciousness (“­­socialist ideology”, “­­fascist
ideology”) denigrates the first and trivialises the second. One can now interpose that
Stalinism is certainly an ideology in the negative sense of the term. The critical concept
of ideology, however, allows us in such cases to argue that Stalinism is an ideology and
opposed to socialist worldviews. General concepts of ideology, such as the ones by Mark-
ović, Louis Althusser, Antonio Gramsci, or Karl Mannheim, “­­thoroughly purge from the
ideology concept the remains of its accusatory meaning”2 (­­Horkheimer 1972, 28).

Nationalism is a particular form of ideology, an ideological anti-​­​­​­

­­ praxis. We will next
focus on this concept.

5.5 Nationalism
According to Bogdanović (­­2015, 461), the Serbian part of the Praxis Group in the context
of the breakdown of Yugoslavia “­­practically overnight turned coats” and “­­turned into
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 133

nationalists and/­­or liberals”. Marković from the ­­mid-​­​­​­1980s onwards propagated Serbian
nationalism. We will in this chapter analyse this development, which however requires
that we first take a look at the context of the Yugoslav wars (­­Section 5.5.1) and discuss
­­left-​­​­​­wing positions on it (­­Section 5.5.2) before we then more closely engage with Mark-
ović’s perspective (­­Section 5.5.3).

5.5.1 The Crisis and ­­Break-​­​­​­Up of Yugoslavia

After Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia entered a phase of permanent economic and po-
litical crisis, featuring high unemployment, high inflation, high inequality, high national
debt, strongly falling average income, etc. It started disintegrating. Yugoslavia had to
take on IMF loans that brought along structural adjustment programmes. Over decades
there had been an uneven development, in which Slovenia and Croatia developed and
Kosovo, ­­Bosnia-​­​­​­Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were lagging behind.
Economic problems are a frequent trigger and context of the rise of ideologies, including
nationalism that invents scapegoats that are blamed for social problems. Nationalism
and independence movements were on the rise in the 1980s and 1990s in all parts of
Yugoslavia. According to the documentary film Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War, Ger-
many armed Croatian separatists.3 In 1990, Serbia limited the autonomy of Kosovo and
Vojvodina.

In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia. War
broke out between Yugoslavia, Slovenia, and Croatia. In late 1991, the Serbs of Croatia
proclaimed the Republic of Serbian Krajina that was not internationally recognised. Also
Macedonia proclaimed independence. In 1992, the EU, the USA, and the UN recognised
Slovenia and Croatia, which further spurred nationalism in the Balkans. Especially Ger-
Nationalism

many’s foreign minister ­­Hans-​­​­​­Dietrich Genscher and his Austrian equivalent Alois Mock
played important roles in recognising the two newly formed states. In 1992, ­­Bosnia-​­​­​
­Herzegovina declared independence and the Bosnian Serbs declared the independence
of the Republika Srpska. The Bosnian war started. The USA, the EU and the UN rec-
ognised ­­Bosnia-​­​­​­Herzegovina. Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (­­FRY) that was not internationally recognised. In 1993, Croatia got involved
in the war in Bosnia. Macedonia was internationally recognised in the same year. NATO
bombed the Republika Srpska in August and September 1995. In December 1995, B­­ osnia-​­​­​
­Herzegovina, Croatia, and the FRY signed the Dayton Peace Agreement. In 1998, war
broke out between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the FRY. From March until June 1999,
NATO intervened militarily and bombed the FYR and Kosovo. The FYR forces withdrew
134 Foundations of Digital Democracy

from Kosovo. The NATO intervention in Kosovo set a precedent that was later repeated
in the 2003 Western intervention in Iraq: It was a war without a UN Security Council de-
cision that was undertaken although no NATO country had been attacked or threatened
and that NATO justified on humanitarian grounds (­­Chandler 2000).

5.5.2 The ­­Left-​­​­​­Wing Discourse on

the Yugoslav Wars
There are at least two characteristic positions in the ­­left-​­​­​­wing debate on the Yugoslav wars.
Noam Chomsky represents the first position. He focuses in his analysis on NATO’s bombing
of Serbia and Kosovo in 1999. Chomsky argues that the US chose to “­­escalate the violence”
(­­2000, 44), which would have resulted in an escalation of Serbian attacks on ­­Kosovo-​­​­​­Albanian
civilians in Kosovo, hundred thousands of refugees fleeing the bombings in Kosovo, and in
unpredictable long-​­​­​­
­­ term consequences. Chomsky says that in the situation of humanitarian
crisis, it would always be possible to act according to the principle “­­First, do no harm” (­­2000,
48) and to do nothing if that elementary principle cannot be upheld. But the situation of hav-
ing to do nothing would never arise because “[d]iplomacy and negotiations are never at an
end” (­­2000, 48). The NATO bombings of the Balkans in 1999 are for Chomsky characteristic of
international politics that do not rely on a universal framework such as the UN Charter or the
International Court of Justice, but are based on the principle that the “­­powerful do as they
wish” (­­Chomsky 1999, 154). Whereas the US would tolerate the ethnic cleansing of Kurds in
Turkey, it would intervene in ethnic cleansings in Kosovo. “­­Serbia is one of those disorderly
miscreants that impede the institution of the U.S.-​­​­​­dominated global system, while Turkey is
a loyal client state that contributes substantially to this project” (­­1999, 13).

Herman and Peterson (­­2007) in a detailed analysis whose content is comparable to the one by
Chomsky argue that internal and external factors played a role in the breakdown of Yugosla-
via and that the external factors have often been denied. These factors would include finding
a justification for NATO’s existence after the fall of the Soviet bloc, the global assertion of the
“­­Washington consensus”, the role of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference
on Yugoslavia, and liberals and leftists’ support of Western military intervention. Herman
and Peterson also argue that the wars and bombings in the Balkans stimulated ­­al-​­​­​­Qaeda
and Islamic fundamentalism and resulted in a massive wave of displacement and refugees.

Slavoj Žižek (­­1999) is a representative of the second position. He argues that Yugoslavia
did not disintegrate when Slovenia declared independence, but already when Miloševič
deprived “­­Kosovo and Vojvodina of their limited autonomy” (­­40) so that Yugoslavia was
already dead and could only l have lived on under Serbian domination. Žižek’s assessment
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 135

is comparable to Chomsky in respect to the critique of NATO’s selective interventions in

the name of the defence of human rights based on its “­­strategic interests” (­­41) and the
“­­the end of any serious role of [the] UN and [the] Security Council” (­­50) in international
relations. However, Žižek much more than Chomsky also focuses his critique on Serbian
nationalism, arguing that the NATO interventions and the ­­Milošević-​­​­​­regime are not op-
posites, but symptoms of the New World Order that should be opposed (­­44). “­­When
the West fights Milošević, it is NOT fighting its enemy […]; it is rather fighting its own
creature, a monster that grew as a result of the compromises and inconsistencies of the
Western politics itself” (­­46) that over years mistook Milošević as a factor of stability in
the region, not seeing his “­­­­anti-​­​­​­Albanian nationalist agenda” (­­49).

The way to fight the capitalist New World Order is not by supporting local
­­proto-​­​­​­Fascist resistances to it, but to focus on the only serious question today:
how to build TRANSNATIONAL political movements and institutions strong
enough to seriously constrain the unlimited rule of […] capital, and to render
visible and politically relevant the fact that the local fundamentalist resist-
ances against the New World Order, from Milošević to Le Pen and the extreme
Right in Europe, are part of it?
(­­50)

Jürgen Habermas (­­1999) took a comparable position, arguing that NATO acted without a
UN Security Council mandate, that “[n]ationalistic dreams of a Greater Albania […] are
not the slightest bit superior to the nationalistic fantasies of a Greater Serbia which the
intervention is supposed to contain” (­­266). He also stresses that NATO intervenes in the
case of Kosovo, but not in favour “­­of the Kurds, Chechians, or Tibetians” (­­269), which
shows the selectivity of the politics of military intervention. Habermas concludes that the
only adequate answer in such situations is to establish “­­a global democratic legal order”
Nationalism

based on “­­UN institutions” (­­270) and “­­strengthened diplomatic efforts” (­­271).

The analytical difference between the first and the second ­­left-​­​­​­wing position on the
Yugoslav wars is that the first is based on an analysis of empirical facts and data,
whereas the second on uses ­­political-​­​­​­theoretical reasoning. They reflect a certain dif-
ference between ­­Anglo-​­​­​­Saxon empiricism and European continental philosophy. The po-
litical difference is that the first position takes an ­­anti-​­​­​­imperialist position that opposes
US interventions and seems to have some sympathies with Serbia, whereas the second
rejects the logic “­­the enemy of my enemy is my friend” and argues that there should be
no sympathies with any side because they are all barbaric and classical a­­ nti-​­​­​­imperialism
is mistaken here.
136 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Given that war always involves psychological war waged via the media and in public,
it is always difficult to trust any sources that report on the causes and consequences
of war. Often there are very different stories about the extent and perpetrators of war
crimes. So it is best that one encounters reports about war with scepticism and critically
and compares different sources. In respect to the war in Bosnia, there were several
investigations. Human Rights Watch (­­1992, 5) found that “­­all sides have committed se-
rious abuses, Helsinki Watch found that the most egregious and overwhelming number
of violations of the rules of war have been committed by Serbian forces” (­­Human Rights
Watch 1992, 5). A United Nations expert commission concluded that “[a]ll of the com-
batant forces, in significantly different degrees, have committed grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions” (­­UN Security Council 1994, §127). The International Committee of
the Red Cross (­­1999, v) reported:

The war enveloped all the communities of ­­Bosnia-​­​­​­Herzegovina. A third of both

Serbs and Bosniacs (­­31 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively) say a close fam-
ily member was killed. The Serbs report the highest incidence of being forced
to leave their homes (­­54 per cent). A near majority (­­45 per cent) of Croats lost
contact with a close relative; more than a third (­­36 per cent) were forced to
leave home; and 18 per cent report the death of a close family member. The
Bosniac community experienced the highest level of injuries related directly
to the war: 18 per cent of the total Bosniac population were wounded in the
fighting, 10 per cent were imprisoned, 7 per cent were tortured and 5 per cent
know somebody who was raped. In each instance, the percentage was two or
three times that for the other communities.

No matter to which extent one trusts these sources or not, they taken together suggest
that in the Yugoslav wars, all sides committed war crimes. Nationalism was a driving
force on the Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian, Bosnian, ­­Kosovo-​­​­​­Albanian, Macedonian and
Montenegrin sides. The Yugoslav war reminds us first and foremost of the violent dan-
gers of any form of nationalism.

Given this context, we can now turn to the discussion of Marković and Serbian
Nationalism.

5.5.3 Mihailo Marković and Nationalism

Marković ­­co-​­​­​­authored the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts
(­­SANU Memorandum) that was published in 1986 and that according to observers incited
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 137

Serbian nationalism (­­Magaš 1993, 4, 123, ­­199–​­​­​­200, Naimark 2002, 149). Marković was
from 1990 to 1992 the Vice President of Slobodan Milošević’s SPS. In 1995, Milošević
dismissed Markovic from the SPS’s executive committee (­­Djukic and Dubinsky 2001, 86).

The SANU Memorandum argues that in the 1960s, Yugoslav ­­self-​­​­​­management was
“­­pushed into a backseat” and remained limited to the microeconomic realm of the enter-
prise, lacking an expression at the ­­macro-​­​­​­economic and political realms. “­­Consequently,
­­self-​­​­​­management is mere window dressing and not the pillar of society” (­­Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Arts 1995, 103). “­­Sovereignty of the people” and “[s]­­elf-​­​­​
­determination of nations” (­­117) would (­­besides human rights and efficiency) have to be
part of the solution of Yugoslavia’s crisis. Yugoslavia would have unevenly developed
national autonomies at the expense of the Serbs, who would suffer from “­­persecution
and expulsion […] from Kosovo” (­­118) and political discrimination. Because of discrim-
ination, Serbia would also have an underdeveloped economy (­­120). The Memorandum
speaks of the “­­physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population
in Kosovo and Metohija” (­­128) via the “­­Albanianization of Kosovo” (­­128). Serbs would
also have been suppressed in other parts of Yugoslavia. “­­Prominent Serbian writers are
the only ones featuring on the black lists of all the Yugoslav mass media” (­­135). “­­The es-
tablishment of the Serbian people’s complete national and cultural integrity, regardless
of which republic or province they might be living in, is their historical and democratic
right” (­­138)

Also in 1986, Marković and other Praxis intellectuals such as Ljubomir Tadić and Zagorka
Golubović signed a petition that argued that there was a continuous Albanian takeover
of Kosovo and that called for the abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo (­­Magaš 1993, 4,
51, 52). It spoke of the need for the “­­defence of the foundations of Serb national culture”
and the right “­­to the physical survival of our nation on its land” (­­51). Golubović, Marković
Nationalism

and Tadić wrote in 1987,

In Kosovo the pursuit of a project of an ethnically pure Kosovo has resulted in

a flat refusal of any policy of family planning. […] In 1940 there were 55 per
cent Albanians in Kosovo, in 1985 it is already 80 per cent […] something can
be done and must be done about the forceful assimilation and expulsion of the
­­non-​­​­​­Albanian population from Kosovo.
(­­­­59–​­​­​­60)

In a New York Times-​­​­​­report, Markovič argued in 1992 that the EU’s recognition of Slove-
nia, Croatia, and Bosnia as states, which was led by Germany, led to war. The
138 Foundations of Digital Democracy

United States and European countries suddenly decided to recognize Bosnia

without any guarantees for the Serbian or Croatian community. That made war
inevitable. […] We Serbs don’t understand why our three traditional a­ llies – ​­​­​
­Britain, France and the United S­ tates – ​­​­​­don’t recognize that Germany is return-
ing to its old role, this time using economic and political means rather than
military invasion.
(­­Kinzer 1992)

The alternative is creation of a Muslim state in the heart of Europe. Perhaps the
Americans want to support this in order to be doing something for the Muslims,
hoping they could exercise influence here through their Turkish allies. […] But
we find this very disturbing […] and we don’t like the idea that Turkey, which
invaded our land and ruled us for 400 years, would consider this territory as
part of the Muslim world.
(­­Kinzer 1992)

Markovič in such statements completely forgets his Marxist roots. Strong population
growth has social causes. Kosovo was in the late 1980s Yugoslavia’s poorest region,
with an income of only 27 per cent of the Yugoslavian average (­­Herman and Peterson
2007, 4). In 1993, Marković contributed a chapter to a book on the democracy-​­​­​­
­­ theorist C.
B. Macpherson’s intellectual legacy. The editor Joseph Carens had, given Marković’s role
in Milošević’s SPS, doubts about including the chapter and prefaced it with a cautionary
note, to which Marković responded. Marković argued that there was widespread media
manipulation in reports about Serbia’s role in the war and that “­­Serbia has not committed
any aggression against its neighbors” (­­2003, 240).

So it is evident that at least between 1986 and 1993, Markovič, a key figure of Yugo-
slav democratic and Marxist Humanism, resorted argued for Serbian nationalism.
Mira Bogdanović (2015, 464), who studied Markovič’s intellectual and political life, ar-
gues that his turn towards nationalism is for her “­­inconceivable”. How can one explain
such an intellectual development from Marxist Humanism towards nationalism? Was
it a radical rupture and break? Or was there an element in Markovićs’ interpretation
of Humanist Marxism that was prone to nationalism? According to Magaš (­­1993), the
Praxis editors’ alignment with Serb nationalism “­­delineates a complete break with the
political and philosophical tradition represented by the journal” (­­52). So her argument is
that Marković betrayed Marxist Humanism. Keith Doubt (­­2006) takes a different position
and in contrast argues that “­­there is something in Marković’s writing that allows us not
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 139

to be surprised by his ignoble conduct supporting and planning Milošević’s genocidal

campaign of terror throughout ­­former-​­​­​­Yugoslavia” (­­­­45–​­​­​­46). Doubt says that Marković’s
identified six aspects of praxis: Intentionality, freedom as ­­self-​­​­​­determination, creativity,
sociality, rationality, and individual self-​­​­​­
­­ realisation. These dimensions would for Mark-
ović be independent and detachable.

In Marković’s reasoning, one’s practice can exemplify intentionality but not

creativity, sociality but not rationality, individual ­­self-​­​­​­realization but not free-
dom as ­­self-​­​­​­realization. […] Unless the six optimal dispositions that constitute
Marković’s concept of praxis are seen as coinciding within a whole, ‘­­a higher
order of normative principle’, it is difficult to see how Marković’s notion of what
good practice is is anything except chaos. Marković’s understanding of praxis
is nihilistic. Marković’s theorizing within the tradition of critical theory fore-
shadows, indeed predicts, his bad faith with which he cynically supported and
promoted evil in Bosnia. […] Although Marković is not a philosopher of Hei-
degger’s stature, the issues that Marković and Heidegger’s biographies raise
are comparable. […] The argument here is the opposite: it is the deficiency of
metaphysical thinking in Marković’s work that explains his ignoble promotion
of genocide in Bosnia.
(­­Doubt 2006, ­­49–​­​­​­50)

In order to analyse whether there is a nationalist potential in Marković’s theoretical

thought, we need to have a deeper look at his works. One can in his writings find ­­anti-​­​­​
­nationalist proclamations, as is typical for ­­Marxist-​­​­​­Humanist thought. Marković (­­1974a)
for examples argues that “­­nationalism and racialism” are “­­disintegrative and regres-
sive processes” (­­Marković 1974a, 79). Explaining the causes of nationalism, Marković
(­­1974b, 90) argues that “­­scarcity, weakness, lack of freedom, social and national insecu-
Nationalism

rity, a feeling of inferiority, emptiness and poverty […] give rise to […] nationalism and
class hatred, egoism, escape from responsibility, aggressive and destructive behaviour,
etc.”. Fascism is distinct from capitalism and socialism in that “­­the nation or the race”
is “­­the aim of politics” (­­1974a, 147). Fascism “­­tries to mobilize all social classes for the
promotion of national and racial interests” (­­1974a, 152). Fascists aim at “­­grabbing the
possessions of other nations and races” (­­1974a, 156).

The latter quote is on the one hand critical of racism and nationalism, but seems to
assume that different human races exist. We saw in Section 5.3 that Marković sees
language as a way of how social groups, “­­including nations, classes, races” (­­1974a, 13)
140 Foundations of Digital Democracy

communicate. In this general definition, Marković assumes that different human races
exist. The assumption that nations exist is ambivalent because the term is often used
either as actually existing nation-​­​­​­
­­ states or as an ideological construct that proclaims the
existence of a community based on biological or cultural ties.

Markovićs was always critical of Marx’s concept of essence. He says Marx “­­smuggled
values into ‘­­essences’” (­­Marković 1993, 242). For Marx, “­­selfishness, greed, envy, and
aggressiveness” are not part of human essence, but of alienation (­­Markovićs 1974a,
218). The 20th century was

an age of incredible eruptions of human irrationality and bestiality. The scope

and character of bloodshed and mass madness […] can no longer be explained
by the romantic, dualistic picture of a latent positive essence and a transient
bad appearance. Evil as a human disposition must lie very deep. Obviously it
is also a latent pattern of human behaviour, which is the produce of the whole
previous history of the human race, always ready to unroll as soon as favorable
conditions arise.
(­­Markovićs 1974a, 219)

Markovićs (­­1974b, ­­156–​­​­​­157) argues that Machiavelli’s Prince sees humans as inherently
egoistic, whereas Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts advance “­­an ­­over-​­​­​
­optimistic utopian conception of man as essentially free, peace-​­​­​­
­­ loving social, creative
being” (­­156). Both would have a “­­reified conception of human nature” (­­158). “­­Human
nature is constituted by contradictory latent predispositions” (­­1974b, 151). Human his-
tory would show the existence of such essential contradictions, for example “­­a striving
for ­­inter-​­​­​­group and international collaboration and solidarity but also class, national, and
racial egoism” (­­159).

The question arises whether there is a contradiction between human essence and hu-
man existence in class society or whether a fundamental contradiction between solidar-
ity and egoism forms human essence. The problem is that the transferal of nationalism
and racism onto the level of human nature (­­although in a contradictory manner) does not
allow us to provide an ethical grounding of the argument that nationalism and racism and
all other forms of domination are harmful. The consequence is a certain naturalisation
of domination.

We know from studies in development psychology that in the “­­­­9-​­​­​­month revolution”,

babies because of the recognition and care they receive start perceiving attachment
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 141

figures whose perspectives they take over, which contributes to their social development
(­­Tomasello 2008). Care for others is absolutely essential for human development. In con-
trast, violence towards babies harms their development. This example shows that care,
­­co-​­​­​­operation, solidarity, altruism, and recognition are more fundamental than neglect,
competition, separation, egoism, and hatred. Society and human development are not
possible without the first, but without the second.

The theoretical implication is, as Marx (­­1844b, 299) says in the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts, that the “­­individual is the social being” and that structures of domination
harm the development of humans and society. Marković in contrast wants to make his
readers believe that the social and the ­­anti-​­​­​­social are two equally essential features of
humans. It is surprising that Marković rejects the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts’
notion of the human, but operates within the theoretical and political universe of Marxist
Humanism. It is not an understatement to say that the Manuscripts are one of Marxist
Humanism’s foundational texts. As a consequence, Marković’s approach does provide an
adequate foundation for the critique of ideologies such as nationalism and racism.

Marković not only assumed that nations and races have a real existence, but also that
they have a right to ­­self-​­​­​­determination and ­­state-​­​­​­formation. This becomes for example
evident in the SANU Memorandum’s demand for the “[s]­­elf-​­​­​­determination of nations”
(­­Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 1995, 117), or when the 1986 petition that Mark-
ović signed talks about the “­­defence of the foundations of Serb national culture” (­­Magaš
1993, 51), or when Marković (­­1989, 408) writes that in Kosovo, “[t]wo nations [Serbs and
Albanians] claim the same territory” (­­Marković 1989, 408). Such assumptions naturalise
and essentialise the existence of nations. They disregard the basic insights of Marx-
ist critiques of nationalism. Rosa Luxemburg (­­1976) applied Marx’s fetishism critique
to the nation and nationalism. She argues that nationalism and the assumption that
Nationalism

biologically, historically, or culturally determined nations exist ignore “­­completely the

fundamental theory of modern s­ ocialism – the ​­​­​­ theory of social classes” (­­135). “­­In a class
society, ‘­­the nation’ as a homogeneous ­­socio-​­​­​­political entity does not exist” (­­136).

Marxist critiques of nationalism commonly assume that nation-​­​­​­

­­ states are the results of
wars, domination, violence and political conflict and that the nation is an invented, ide-
ological, fabricated, and illusionary product (­­Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, Hobsbawm
and Ranger 1983, Özkirimli 2010). Nationalism is an ideology that veils the class and
dominative character of society. That I speak the same language, hold the same pass-
port, live in the same region or nation-​­​­​­
­­ state, am ruled by the same elites as others do
not constitute a real bond that defines a particular group as superior to another. National
142 Foundations of Digital Democracy

bonds are illusionary, unreal, imaginary, ideological bonds that always constitute an out-
side and a potential for the violent defence of the imaginary border between the inside
and the outside of the nation. A worker has much less common interests with the owner
of the company that employs him than he has with the worker in a distant country, who
works in the local branch of the same company or the same industry.

Humans are different. When humans live together or next to each other, one needs to
take into account both their diversity (­­different ways of life) and what unites (­­basic hu-
man needs). Living together will fail when either diversity or unity is fetishised. Such
fetishisms can lead to the eruption of violence and sectarianism. Living together requires
human unity in diversity, a dialectic of the common and plurality. Unity in diversity re-
quires also that the basic needs of all can be fulfilled. It is therefore not compatible with
the principle of class.

There is also a nationalist potential in Marković’s (­­1975) peculiar interpretation of

­­self-​­​­​­management. He argues that ­­self-​­​­​­management means ­­self-​­​­​­determination (­­329).
A subject creates new conditions in order to achieve “­­­­self-​­​­​­realization, […] the actu-
alization of basic human capacities, […] the satisfaction of genuine human needs”
(­­330). ­­Self-​­​­​­management requires a federation of councils made up of representatives
from different economic levels, critical information sources, and a “­­powerful, demo-
cratic public opinion” based on free expression, open communication, and dialogue
(­­331) “­­The fourth condition of ­­self-​­​­​­determination is the discovery of the true self of
the community, the development of consciousness about real general needs of the
people” (­­331). The individual, nation, and class would need “­­a full sense of ­­self-​­​­​
­identity” (­­331).

The theoretical problem of what the “­­self” in ­­self-​­​­​­management is becomes in Marković’s

interpretation a question of nationality. For Marxist Humanism, the self is the community
of humanity that produces society in common and whose interest as a common humanity
is therefore undermined by divisions such as class, nation, and racism that play off one
group against another. Rosa Luxemburg (­­1970, 391) warned that nationalism resulted in
the First World War, in which “­­working men kill[ed] and destroy[ed] each other”. The right
to national ­­self-​­​­​­determination was for Luxemburg (­­1976) a “­­metaphysical cliché” (­­110).
There would only be a right of the working class to self-​­​­​­
­­ determination (­­108).

The right of the working class to s­­ elf-​­​­​­determination is a universal demand for human-
ity without the class principle, the demand for a classless society without domina-
tion. Marx’s argument that humans are social beings that should jointly control the
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 143

products of their common production implies a universal moral right to democratic

socialism. Although humans have different individual realities, preferences, and
choices, they all share the status of being human and as such deserving a good life.
Marković’s assumption that there is a right to national ­­self-​­​­​­determination is based
on the acceptance of the ideological constructs of nations and nationality, which
undermines Humanism’s universality. Marković can only make such an assumption
because the principle of division, including national division, is for him part of human
essence.

Praxis International in 1989 published Marković’s (­­1989) paper Tragedy of National

Conflicts in “­­Real Socialism”. The Case of Kosovo. It says that “­­race, blood or biology”
(­­409) have nothing to do with the conflict between ­­Kosovo-​­​­​­Albanians and Serbs and
argues that the conflict has national, political, socio-​­​­​­
­­ economic, religious and ideologi-
cal causes. Marković’s formulation that “[t]wo nations claim the same ­territory – ​­​­​­one,
Albania, on ethnic grounds, the other, Serbian on historical and cultural ones” (­­408)
implies however that nations are not ideological constructs resulting from class and
political conflicts, but are unitary historical, cultural and “­­ethnical” realities. Such an
assumption reifies nations. Whereas he criticises Albanian nationalism that aims to
establish Greater Albania, he rather lauds Milošević for having “­­invited people every-
where to an ‘­­­­anti-​­​­​­bureaucratic’ revolution” directed against the discrimination of Serbs
and focused on “­­Serbia’s having state functions on its entire territory as did other
republics” (­­411). Marković complains that the “­­Kosovo has the highest birth rate in
Europe” (­­414) and calls for population policies directed at ­­Kosovo-​­​­​­Albanians in order
“­­to prevent overcrowding of Kosovo” (­­424). Here Marković is actually, other than ini-
tially indicated, resorting to biological logic, indicating the view that procreation is a
political threat to Serbs.
Nationalism

Seyla Benhabib was ­­co-​­​­​­editor of Praxis International from 1986 until 1992. She says that
Marković at the time of the publication of the above-​­​­​­ ­­ mentioned paper had become a
“­­theorist of the ‘­­great Serbia’ dream” (­­Benhabib 1995, 676). She argues that the article
is “­­­­racist-​­​­​­nationalist propaganda” (­­676). It “­­exhibits the tragic mixture of ­­forward-​­​­​­looking
social engineering (­­use of monetary incentives to control birth rates) with paternalistic
racism (­­if the Moslem Albanians do not stop reproducing at this rate, they will never be
able to advance themselves economically)” (­­680, footnote 1). “­­Many of us felt that the
wool was being pulled over our eyes by our colleagues in former Yugoslavia in what
they were or were not publishing in the pages of the journal” (­­675), which contributed to
Praxis International’s termination.
144 Foundations of Digital Democracy

For Marković, selfishness, greed, envy, and aggressiveness are part of the human es-
sence. He thereby downplays the role of solidarity as an essential feature of humans and
society, which opens up a potential for the reification of nationalism in his theoretical
approach. It is therefore theoretical consequent that Marković uncritically accepts the
demand for the right to ­­self-​­​­​­determination of a “­­nation” that is based on a reification
of nations. The foundational problem of Marković’s approach is that he rejects Marx’s
concept of the human in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, which makes his
approach prone to theoretical nationalism. There are therefore certain potentials for a­­ nti-​­​­​
­Humanism and nationalism in Marković’s theoretical approach.

5.6 Conclusion
Marković has an ambivalent use of the praxis concept and tends to depoliticise it by
using it synonymously with the notion of practice.

He sees the realm of communication and ideas as immaterial and standing outside of ma-
terial production, which results in an idealist and dualist approach. His unclear distinction
between practice and praxis lacks an ­­ethico-​­​­​­political dimension and therefore fails in being
able to discern between the ontological concept of communicative practice and the ­­ethico-​­​­​
­political notion of praxis communication. Both Habermas and Marković collapse commu-
nication’s ontology and axiology into one and thereby rob communication theory of an ad-
equate critical potential. Whereas Habermas interprets the ontological as axiological (“All
communication is morally good”), Marković reduces axiology to ontology (“The concept of
communication praxis is ontological”). Marković propagates a general notion of ideology
that is purely analytical and robs it of its potential as an intellectual weapon of critique.

Marković rejects Marx’s insight that there is a positive social essence of humans. Marx’s
assumption has however been confirmed by contemporary development psychology.
Marković opposes Marx’s positive notion of the human as the social being. As a conse-
quence, he introduces division and separation into the concept of human essence, which
poses a potential for theoretical and political nationalism. The divisionary and dualist
character of Marković’s approach also manifests itself in his theory of meaning and com-
munication that separates the material realm from the mental realm.

There is a latent nationalist potential in Marković’s theory that derives from his ambiv-
alent equalisation of the concepts of practice and praxis, his general concept of ideol-
ogy that depoliticise critical theory, and the filling of this depoliticised vacuum by the
 Chapter Five | The Praxis School’s Marxist Humanism 145

political assumption that diversion, separation, egoism, selfishness, nationalism, greed

and envy are just like sociality, ­­co-​­​­​­operation, altruism, and solidarity part of human es-
sence. Development psychology has shown that such an assumption is mistaken. It is,
however, not just mistaken, but also politically dangerous because it opens up a divisive
potential in social theory that can undermine Humanism’s universality. The problem of
Marković’s theoretical approach is that it is not Humanist enough. It is a truncated form
of Humanism that at the political level turned into ­­anti-​­​­​­universalism, ­­anti-​­​­​­Humanism, and
nationalism.

This analysis does however under no circumstances imply that Marxist Humanism has
in general a latent nationalist potential. On the contrary, the positive, universal concept
of the human

Truncated Humanism is no Humanism at all because it is anti-​­​­​­

­­ universalist and makes di-
vision and separation part of human essence. Rudi Supek (­­1971/­­1979), who was another
key member of the Praxis Group, points out the democratic character of Marxist Human-
ism’s universalism. He stresses that Humanism is opposed to “­­­­ethno-​­​­​­centrism, every
stressing of one’s own social group or nation at someone else’s cost” (­­270). Nationalists
“­­are not capable of solving the problem of equality among peoples” (­­270). Equality would
only be achievable “­­from an international standpoint, from the standpoint of a huge com-
munion of peoples from whom should be expelled every ­­ethno-​­​­​­centrism, international
hatred and prejudice” (­­270).

There is positive and constructive legacy for a contemporary critical theory communi-
cation of that part of the Praxis School that advocated a complete Humanism as it can
be found in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. Gajo Petrović (­­1967, ­­42–​­​­​­43)
summarises the Humanism that can be found in the Manuscripts:
Conclusion

A fundamental idea of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts is that

man is a free creative being of praxis who in the contemporary world is alien-
ated from his human essence, but that the radical form man’s self-​­​­​­ ­­ alienation
assumes in the contemporary society creates real conditions for a struggle
against ­­self-​­​­​­alienation, for realizing socialism as a ­­de-​­​­​­alienated, free commu-
nity of free men.
(­­­­42–​­​­​­43)

The ­­ethico-​­​­​­political concept of praxis allows us to discern between communicative

practice and praxis communication and to thereby situate communication as praxis
146 Foundations of Digital Democracy

communication in the context of the struggle for a complete humanity and democratic
socialism.

Notes
1 In the English translation of the third and eighth ­­Feuerbach-​­​­​­theses, the term “­­practice” instead
of the term “­­praxis” was used. I have in the quotation changed in all three cases the occur-
rence of practice by the term praxis because Marx in the German original used the term Praxis.
2 Translation from German.
3 https://­­www.youtube.com/­­watch?v=u04IL4Od8Qo.

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Chapter Six
Sustainability and Community Networks

6.1 Introduction
6.2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology
6.3 Environmental Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks
6.4 Economic Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks
6.5 Political Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks
6.6 Cultural Aspects of Network Access
6.7 Conclusion: A Framework for Understanding (­­Un-​­)­Sustainability and Community
Networks
Acknowledgement
References

6.1 Introduction
The sustainability concept has originated and developed in the context of policy. It has
first taken on a purely environmental meaning that has later been extended to include
economic, institutional, and social dimensions. In the context of information technolo-
gies, sustainability has played a role in the World Summit on the Information Society.
This chapter deals with community networks as alternative forms of Internet access and
alternative infrastructures and asks: What do sustainability and unsustainability mean in
the context of community networks?

In Europe, the most w ­ ell-​­known community networks are Guifi in Catalonia, Freifunk in
Berlin, Ninux in Italy, Funkfeuer in Vienna, and the Athens Wireless Metropolitan Net-
work in Greece. The minimal definition of a community network that we can give is that it
is an ­IP-​­based computer network that is operated by a community as a common good (­see
Baig, Freitag and Navarro 2015, Baig et al. 2015, Maccari 2013, Maccari and Lo Cigno
2014). Community networks can be closed or open: they are either only accessible to a
specific community and then form a closed commons or provide “­bandwidth resources

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-8
150 Foundations of Digital Democracy

free of charge to the general public” as an open commons (­Damsgaard, Parikh and Rao
2006, 106).

The chapter starts with a section that focuses on theoretical foundations and methodol-
ogy (­Section 6.2). There are environmental (­Section 6.3), economic (­Section 6.4), political
(­Section 6.5), and cultural (­Section 6.6) aspects of the sustainability and unsustainability
of Internet access and community networks. These aspects are subsequently discussed
in this chapter’s sections. The analysis is drawn together in the conclusion (­Section 6.7).

6.2 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The methodology chosen is that the contradictions are analysed with the help of a lit-
erature review of works explicitly focused on community networks. The method chosen
for identifying these contradictions is a synthesis of expert literature on community net-
works. These works were identified by a search for they keyword “­community networks”
in Google Scholar, Scopus, and Web of Science. So expert literature should be under-
stood as works located in such databases. Such works tend to be highly specialised.
This chapter presents such works’ core findings and abstracts from them in order to
analyse how society’s ­macro-​­power structures shape community networks’ opportunities
and risks.

This chapter employs dialectical thought as a method of inquiry: Dialectics examines

reality as relational, dynamic, and contradictory (for a detailed discussion, see: Fuchs
2011; Fuchs 2014; Fuchs 2016, Chapter 2.4). As a methodological approach for studying
society, this means to study the dialectics of technology/­society, opportunities/­risks, and
the powerful/­the less powerful. Society is therefore analysed based on a critical theory
of power. Identifying, understanding and critically acquiring power structures is the key
task of a dialectical analysis of society. This chapter provides a typology of contradictions
and a practical checklist with questions relating to such contradictions that alternative
Internet projects can use for critically reflecting on the opportunities and risks they face.

So the aim of this chapter is to identify the contradictions that community networks
face in contemporary society that is shaped by power structures and power inequalities.
Many social theories share a distinction between economy, politics, and culture as the
three main domains of society (­Fuchs 2008, 2011): The economy is the realm of society,
where humans enter a metabolism with nature so that work organises nature and cul-
ture in such a way that ­use-​­values that satisfy human needs emerge. Given that it is
the economy, where the m­ an–​­nature relationship is established and that the ecological
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 151

system is closely linked to the economy, one could treat the ecological system as part
of the economy. The political system is the realm of society, where humans deliberate
on or struggle about the distribution of decision power in society. Culture is the realm of
the recreation of the human body and mind in such ways that meanings, identities, and
values emerge and are renegotiated in everyday life. It includes aspects of society such
as the mass media, science, education, the arts, ethics, health care and medicine, sports,
entertainment, and personal relations.

Definitions of power used in the social sciences often are based on Max Weber’s (­1978,
926) understanding as life chances exerted over the will of others. The problem with such
a definition is that it cannot account for processes of empowerment and cannot discern
between power and domination (­Fuchs 2015). In the theoretical approach underlying this
chapter, power therefore is a process and social relation, through which humans influ-

Environmental Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks

ence change in society.

Based on these foundations, we can now subsequently address each of society’s di-
mensions and have a look at how it relates to questions of community network’s
un/­sustainability.

6.3 Environmental Aspects of Internet Access

and Community Networks
According to estimations, around 50 million tonnes of e­ -​­waste are generated per year
and predictions are that within four years there will be further growth of 33 per cent.1
This amount of e­ -​­waste is around 7 kg per person in the world. Data on electronic waste
in Europe is incomplete. The recycling rate of e­ -​­waste has ranged in 2010 between 11.0
per cent in Malta and 64.9 per cent in Sweden (­data source: Eurostat). The total waste
from electrical and electronic equipment has increased in the EU28 countries from 14
million tonnes in 2004 to 18 million tonnes in 2010 (­ibid.). In 2012, the amount was 16
million tonnes. Given the recycling rates, it becomes evident that millions of tonnes of
­non-​­recyclable electronic waste are discarded every year in the European Union. The
total hazardous waste generated in 2012 in the EU28 countries in the manufacture of
computer, electronic and optical products, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, and
other transport equipment amounted to 2.0 million tonnes in 2010 and 2.4 million tonnes
in 2012 (­ibid.).

It is estimated that the total amount of e­ -​­waste generated in 2014 was 41.8
million metric tonnes (­Mt). It is forecasted to increase to 50 Mt of ­e-​­waste in
152 Foundations of Digital Democracy

2018. This e­ -​­waste is comprised of 1.0 Mt of lamps, 6.3 Mt of screens, 3.0 Mt

of small IT (­such as mobile phones, pocket calculators, personal computers,
printers, etc.).
(­Baldé et al. 2015, 8)

The worldwide e­ -​­waste generated per capita is forecast to increase from a figure of 5.0
kg in 2010 to 6.7 kg in 2018 (­Baldé et al. 2015, 24).

Up to 45 per cent of the total ­e-​­waste is treated informally and illegally (­Rucevska et al.
2015, 4, 7).

Key destinations for l­arge-​­scale shipments of hazardous wastes, such

as electrical and electronic equipment, include Africa and Asia. In West
Africa, a significant recipient is Ghana and Nigeria, but high volumes also
go to, but not limited to Cote D’Ivoire, and the Republic of the Congo. South
Asia and Southeast Asia also appear to be major regional destinations, in-
cluding, but not limited to, China, Hong Kong, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh,
and Vietnam.
(­Rucevska et al. 2015, 8)

E­ -​­waste recycling is a profitable business. The goal is to extract precious metals such
as gold, silver, etc. The problem, however, is that electronic goods contain hazardous
materials such as arsenic, mercury, cadmium, bromides, etc., which can easily poison
­e-​­waste workers and the soil.

E­ -​­waste recycling is flourishing in many parts of the world. South Asia and
Southeast Asia appear to be major regional destinations, including, but not
limited to, China, Hong Kong, India, Pakistan and Vietnam. In West Africa, com-
mon, but not limited destinations are Ghana, Nigeria, and Benin among others.
(­Rucevska et al. 2015, 38)

The average lifespan of a mobile phone is just 18 months2 and of a laptop two years.3
Planned obsolescence and lifestyle branding are part of the way in which computers,
tablets, and mobile phones are presented as a way of life that enforces the generation of
even more ­e-​­waste (­Lewis 2013, Maxwell and Miller 2012). ICT companies such as Apple
are at the heart of the computer age’s ecological problems. The ­large-​­scale production
and use of green ICTs that are ­re-​­useable and have flexibly exchangeable components
are not in sight. The vast amount of e­ -​­waste and its negative impacts on the environment
makes the information society ecologically unsustainable.
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 153

The production and consumption of energy can be measured in tonnes of oil equivalent
(­toe). One toe is the “­energy released by burning one tonne of crude oil. It is approxi-
mately 42 gigajoules”.4 In 2014, the worldwide production of energy was 13.8 billion toe
and worldwide consumption 13.7 billion toe.5 In 2000, these values were 10.0 billion toe
for both production and consumption. So the increase in world energy production and
consumption was almost 40 per cent in 15 years. Energy production and consumption as
such is not a problem as long as it does not harm the environment. One problem is that
at the same time, the emission of carbon dioxide increased from 22.8 Mega tonnes in
2000 to 31.2 Mega tonnes in 2014. The world’s main energy and electricity sources are
oil, gas, and coal. Wind and solar energy made up 4.0 per cent of electricity production
in 2014.

In 2012, the world energy generation was 21.53 trillion kilowatt hours (­kWh) and the

Environmental Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks

world energy consumption 19.71 trillion kWh.6 ­Table 6.1 shows the share of various
energy sources in world energy production for the year 2012. Nuclear energy tends to be
considered as a renewable energy source. However, the nuclear power plant disasters
in Chernobyl and Fukushima have shown how dangerous this energy form is for humans
and nature. The share of relatively clean, renewable energy types (­hydroelectric, geo-
thermal, wind, solar, tidal, wave, biomass, and waste energy) in world energy production
was therefore 21.7 per cent in 2012.

It is essential to consider how much energy the Internet consumes. Running the global
Internet “­consumed 1,815 TWh of electricity in 2012. This corresponds to 8 per cent of
global electricity production in the same year (­22,740 TWh)” (­De Decker 2015b). By 2017,

­TABLE 6.1 Share of energy sources in world

energy generation, year 2012

Energy type Share

Nuclear energy 10.9%
Hydroelectric energy 16.8%
Geothermal energy 0.3%
Wind energy 2.4%
Solar, Tidal and wave power 0.4%
Biomass and waste energy 1.8%
Fossil fuels 67.3%

Data source: International Energy Statistics,

https://­www.eia.gov, accessed on March 6,
2015.
154 Foundations of Digital Democracy

“­the electricity use of the internet will rise to between 2,547 TWh (­expected growth sce-
nario) and 3,422 TWh (­worst case scenario)” (­De Decker 2015b). Given the fact that the
majority of the world’s energy consumption is based on fossil fuels and nuclear energy,
the Internet’s growing energy consumption certainly contributes to environmental risks.

De Decker (­2015a) argues that ­long-​­distance ­Wi-​­Fi that uses ­point-­​­­to-​­point antennas for
establishing connections of up to several hundred kilometres consumes relatively low
amounts of energy.

Long range WiFi also has low operational costs due to low power requirements.
A typical mast installation consisting of two long distance links and one or two
wireless cards for local distribution consumes around 30 watts. In several l­ow-​
­tech networks, nodes are entirely powered by solar panels and batteries.

Baliga et al. (­2011) analysed the energy consumption of seven different wired (­DSL, PON,
FTTN, PtP, HFC) and wireless (­WiMAX, UMTS) Internet access network types.

At access rates greater than 10 Mb/­s, wired access technologies are signifi-
cantly more ­energy-​­efficient than wireless access technologies. […] Wireless
technologies will continue to consume at least 10 times more power than
wired technologies when providing comparable access rates and traffic vol-
umes. PON will continue to be the most e­ nergy-​­efficient access technology.
[…] Passive optical networks and ­point-­​­­to-​­point optical networks are the most
­energy-​­efficient access solutions at high access rates.
(­Baliga et al. 2011, ­75–​­76)

If wireless networks consume much more energy than wired ones, then a world of wire-
less community networks promises to be more e­ nergy-​­intensive than one of wired Inter-
net access. Community networks do, however, not have to be predominantly wireless,
but can to a certain degree also rely on optical fibre cables. Energy production and con-
sumption as such is not necessarily an environmental problem. Nuclear power and fossil
fuels are the dominant unclean electricity sources. If community networks want to be
environmentally sustainable, then they should strive to base their electricity consump-
tion on wind, solar, tidal, wave, and geothermal power.

Wireless communications are part of the rise of mobile communication. The typical user
nowadays has not just one computer or laptop, but accesses the Internet from different
places for a significant time per day with various devices such as a computer, a laptop,
a tablet, and a mobile phone. All of these devices consume energy and given the short
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 155

average lifespan of the devices also contributes to the production of ­e-​­waste and its
toxic effects on humans and nature.

The nodes of the Guifi community network use cheap wireless routing devices such as
Ubiquity or MikroTik (­Vega et al. 2012). The community networks FunkFeuer and Ninux
tend to use devices such as the T­ P-​­Link ­TL-​­wr841nd or Ubiquiti nanostations (­Maccari
and Lo Cigno 2014). Freifunk in Germany recommends the use of routers like ­TP-​­Link
­TL-​­WR842ND, ­TP-​­Link ­TL-​­WDR3600, ­TP-​­Link ­TL-​­WDR4300, Ubiquiti NanoStation M2 &
Loco, Ubiquiti NanoStation M5 & Loco, Ubiquiti NanoBridge M5, ­TP-​­Link CPE210/­510.7
Such routers consume energy and it is a technical task to try and minimise their energy
efficiency. Another question is, however, how long such routers are used and if they are
­re-​­useable and updateable. If not, then there is a risk that they will end up as e­ -​­waste in
developing countries, polluting the environment and poisoning e­ -​­waste workers.

Economic Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks

There is no comprehensive and reliable data available on the average lifespan of wire-
less routers. We also do not have data on how many routers end up as ­e-​­waste per year.
Routers are classified as small IT ­e-​­waste together with other devices such as mice,
keyboards, external drives, printers, mobile phones, desktop PCs, and game consoles
(­Baldé et al. 2015, 7­ 1–​­72). We know that in 2014, 3.0 Million tonnes of small IT e­ -​­waste
was generated globally and that in 2016 35 per cent more e­ -​­waste was produced than
in 2010 (­Baldé et al. 2015, 24). It is therefore likely that also the volume of routers cast
away as ­e-​­waste has increased.

6.4 Economic Aspects of Internet Access and

Community Networks
Yochai Benkler defines commons the following way:

Commons are an alternative form of institutional space, where human agents

can act free of the particular constraints required for markets, and where they
have some degree of confidence that the resources they need for their plans
will be available to them. Both freedom of action and security of resource avail-
ability are achieved in very different patterns than they are in p­ roperty-​­based
markets.
(­Benkler 2006, 144)

Vasilis Kostakis and Michel Bauwens (­2014) provide an understanding of the commons
that is related to the one by Benkler. They argue that the Commons are a “­social process”
156 Foundations of Digital Democracy

(­39) that involves resources, a community that creates u­ se-​­values, and rules so that they
constitute “­a paradigm of a pragmatic new societal vision beyond the dominant capital-
ist system” (­38).

Open ­Wi-​­Fi systems, such as wireless community networks, would form an “­­open-­​
­­access-​­spectrum commons” (­Benkler 2013, 1510). For Benkler (­2006, 395), both open
wireless community networks and municipal broadband initiatives are opposed to the
enclosure of the spectrum and the Internet by private property. Benkler (­2002) compares
wireless communications based on a spectrum property market to open wireless net-
works that use a spectrum commons. Open wireless networks are based on ­end-​­use
devices, and are an ad hoc infrastructure, scalable, both mobile and fixed (­Benkler 2002,
37). Benkler argues that open wireless networks, in which nobody owns parts of the
spectrum, tend to more rapidly increase the capacity of users to communicate informa-
tion wirelessly, are more c­ ost-​­effective, more advanced technological innovations, adapt
better to changing consumer preferences, and tend to be more robust and technically
secure. These are technological and economic advantages.

Vincent Mosco (­2014, 6) argues that in the contemporary world of the Internet and cloud
computing, we should think back to the 1950s, when there were discussions about
whether computing is a utility. We can say that the Internet as communications networks
is just like transportation, water supply, power supply, the education system, the sewage
system, the health care system, a clean and healthy natural environment, cultural institu-
tions, housing, food, and the political system. Like these the Internet is a public interest
infrastructure that is in the common interest of all: All humans need these infrastructures
in order to lead a decent life. Turning infrastructures into a commodity operated by ­for-​
­profit companies increases inequality in society. Those with lower incomes and with
little wealth will tend to find it more difficult to access infrastructures or will only get
access to ­second-​­class infrastructures than the class of the wealthy. It is therefore a
matter of justice and equality that infrastructures are treated as public or common goods
and not as commodities controlled by ­for-​­profit companies.

Internet backbones are ­long-​­distance data routes. The world’s largest Internet backbone
owners include companies such as Telefonica (­Spain), AT&T (­USA), Hurricane Electric
(­USA), Telecom Italia (­Italy), Zayo Group (­USA), Tata Communications (­India), Orange
(­France), Level 3 Communications (­USA), Deutsche Telekom (­Germany), Global Telecom &
Technology (­USA, Italy), NTT (­Japan), XO Communication s (­USA), TeliaSonera (­Sweden,
Finland), Verizon (­USA), CenturyLink (­USA), Cogent Communications (­USA),8 and Sprint
Corporation (­USA).9 These are s­ o-​­called tier 1 networks: They own so much Internet
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 157

backbone infrastructure that they do not have to make peering agreements with other
networks. They rather rent out their own backbone to smaller ISPs.10 Large ­for-​­profit
corporations control the Internet’s infrastructure.

PSINet and UUNET created the Commercial Internet eXchange (­CIX) in 1991. CIX was
an interconnection service funded by all participating firms. “­Each member of CIX paid a
flat fee to support the cost of the equipment and maintenance, and each agreed not to
charge each other on the basis of the volume of traffic they delivered” (­Greenstein 2015,
80). Today, the data exchange between networks is established by Internet Exchange
Points (­IXPs). Measured in average data throughput, the world’s largest IXPs are the
­DE-​­CIX (­Deutscher Commercial Internet Exchange) in Frankfurt, the ­AMS-​­IX (­Amsterdam
Internet Exchange), and the LINX (­London Internet Exchange).11 IXPs are typically n­ on-​
­profit organisations with commercial Internet Service Providers (­ISPs) as their members.
Their principle goes back to the CIX: All ISPs want to benefit from network effects: The

Economic Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks

more users one can reach, the better the network. They therefore have a commercial
incentive to be connected to other networks. The larger the Internet’s reach, the more
users they are likely to attract and the larger their profits promise to be. One can say that
Internet Exchanges are a commons for capital: It is a commonly owned infrastructure
that serves the interests of capital. It is an example of the “­communism of capital”: The
commons are subsumed under capitalist interests.

The Internet’s domain name system (­DNS) was privatised in 1992. The private company
Network Solutions controlled the DNS. In 1995, it started to charge for the registration
of domain names. In 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(­ICANN) was created. It is responsible for the Internet’s global DNS and ­top-​­level do-
mains. Also, the domain name service is a capitalist business.

A problem with the argument that community networks benefit areas in which commer-
cial providers cannot make a profit so that the market fails is that market failure not only
occurs in serving communications services to remote and sparsely populated regions.
The market principle is a failure in itself. In communications markets this becomes evi-
dent by the fact that they tend to be highly concentrated, i.e. capitalist competition leads
to oligopoly or monopoly. Community networks can therefore be a general mechanism to
challenge the economic concentration of communications markets.

Sadowski (­2014) studied Dutch broadband c­o-​­operatives, in which large numbers of

local community members joined and paid membership fees in order to set up fibre
networks. In a survey of such members of broadband ­co-​­operative (­N=481), Sadowski
158 Foundations of Digital Democracy

found that the motivation to support the c­ o-​­operative was not just the lack of other
providers, but also the associated individual technical support, the idea to pluralise the
communications market, the hope for the availability of specific advanced services via
the ­co-​­operative, the creation of local identity, and the promotion of the ­co-​­operative
idea. These results provide indications that alternatives to capitalist communications
providers have the potential to be accepted for a variety of reasons. Also in situations
when they compete against capitalist providers because citizens tend to appreciate c­ o-​
­operatives not simply for obtaining economic advantages, but also for political and cul-
tural reasons.

The question is how one should understand sustainability with respect to community
networks. A neoliberal, economic reductionist understanding would be to think about
how to make an economic profit by creating such networks. Such a position, however,
would neglect that the ­for-​­profit logic can easily come into contradiction with social
issues that concern justice, fairness, equality, and democracy. There are indications that
community networks tend to be receptive to a different understanding of sustainability. It
is certainly important to think about the economic issue of how the necessary resources
can be guaranteed and maintained in a community network. But this does imply the ne-
cessity of ­for-​­profit logic. Klaus Stoll (­2005) studied the introduction of W
­ i-​­Fi in a remote,
poor village in the Ecuadorian rainforest El Chaco. He shows that the people in El Chaco
asked:

How can the Internet help us in our schools, in our local government, in the
small and medium enterprises, in the ecology, the health services and tourism?
How can we make it sustainable not only in a financial but also in a technical,
social, cultural and political sense?
(­Stoll 2005, 192)

The question is do community networks have the potential to “­sustain entirely novel
communication paradigms that not only break the Telco and Internet Service Providers
(­ISP) oligopoly in communications” (­Lo Cigno and Maccari 2014, 49).

­ on-​­commercial community networks committed to the idea of providing gratis or cheap

N
access as a matter of freedom and democracy, face the problem of how to sustain the
service and how to survive if there is competition with commercial providers, who may
be able to provide faster and more stable access. Alison Powell and Leslie Shade (­2006)
discuss this problem in the Canadian context with the example of the M ­ ontreal-​­based
community network Íle Sans Fil (­ISF):
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 159

Like all v­ olunteer-​­based groups, ISF must worry about l­ong-​­term sustainability.
The organization is worried that over time their core volunteers will eventually
be unable to take on the responsibilities of deploying and servicing a larger
number of hotspots. This issue is even more pronounced for a group which aims
to provide a specific telecommunications service like free public wireless Inter-
net when technological developments make it likely that cities like Montreal
will soon be covered with ubiquitous wireless Internet signals.
(­Powell and Shade 2006, 399).

The problem such projects can face is that under neoliberal conditions, municipalities
and governments tend to use taxpayers’ money for attracting f­ or-​­profit businesses or f­ or-​
­profit private/­public partnerships and that ­co-​­operation of ­non-​­profits with ­for-​­profits may
require the first one to either commodify access or usage, i.e. to introduce access fees or
advertising. In all of these cases, the autonomy and freedom of ­non-​­commercial projects

Economic Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks

are undermined. Alternative, ­non-​­commercial, ­non-​­profit media and technology projects
in general face existential threats in a capitalist environment (­Fuchs 2010a, Sandoval and
Fuchs 2010). They often lack l­abour-​­power, resources, money, influence, attention, and
broad participation. Nico Carpentier (­2008, 250) argues in this context that like “­most al-
ternative media”, many “­community ­Wi-​­Fi organizations remain vulnerable, dependent on
a limited number of volunteers”. One community W ­ i-​­Fi activist remarked in this context:
“­If I disappear, the network will disappear” (­Carpentier 2008, 250). The danger is that re-
source precarity renders community networks a “­secondary Internet” (­Sandvig 2004, 596)
that always remains marginal and cannot challenge the power of capitalist incumbents.

Douglas Schuler (­1996) in his study of early ­computer-​­mediated community networks

devotes a chapter (­­Chapter 10) to the question of how community networks can survive.
He explicitly uses the term sustainability in this context. He however does not just mean
economic survival, but also survival of what he considers to be community networks’
six core values of conviviality, ­co-​­operative education, strong democracy, health and
­well-​­being, economic equity, information, and communication. He argues that ­for-​­profit
organisations are i­ll-​­suited to sustain community networks because the profit motive
contradicts “­social, ethical or environmental concerns” and because corporations do
not like to be criticised and therefore tend to censor free speech and alternative voices
(­355). Schuler stresses the potentials of n­ on-​­profit communities and community/­public
­co-​­operation.

Schuler discusses as funding options support by direct users or indirect users. The first
includes donations, payment for certain services, membership fees, and support by
160 Foundations of Digital Democracy

participating organisations. The second entails support by foundations and public fund-
ing. Schuler (­1996, ­370–​­371) also mentions advertising, but at the same time sees the
problem that it is likely to change or even destroy the community character. It results in
what Howard Rheingold (­2000, 389) called the “­commodification of community”.

Tapia, Powell, and Ortiz (­2009) argue that ISF managed to survive in a capitalist commu-
nications environment because it was able to create a hybrid public/­community model,
in which a municipality and civil society c­ o-​­operate and so provide a “­better alternative”
(­368) to privately owned ­for-​­profit networks. The authors suggest that public/­commons
hybrid networks can be economically sustainable and require that we “­think of broad-
band as a utility and a public service” (­369). They stress that grants are needed for fund-
ing “­broadband deployment for both municipal and citizen groups” (­370).

Municipal and community networks have good potentials to help overcoming digital di-
vides. Forlano et al. (­2011, ­22–​­23) argue that “[d]igital inclusion has been the impetus
behind many municipal and community wireless projects”. A survey conducted among
22 community networks shows that overcoming the material access digital divide by pro-
viding affordable gratis Internet connectivity is an important motivation for running such
projects (­Dimogerontakis et al. 2016, Maccari and Lo Cigno 2014). One can, however, not
always assume that poor local communities in developing countries consider Internet
access as a primary need and in some cases they may, for various reasons, be sceptical
including the suspicion of imperialism: that technology is offered to them in order to
create economic dependence on the West.

A frequently heard argument is that an advantage of community networks is that this

model can provide Internet access in rural and other areas, in which deploying infrastruc-
ture is not viable for commercial providers. Community networks certainly have a poten-
tial for lowering the digital divide by providing access to underserved areas. If community
networks are, however, significantly slower than commercial networks, then a new dig-
ital bandwidth divide is created and poor regions then only have a s­ econd-​­class Inter-
net. Another problem is that in urban areas there is a tendency that wireless community
networks are predominantly used by young, educated, and affluent citizens and do not
appeal to the poor (­Oliver, Zuidweg and Batikas 2010). Oliver, Zuidweg, and Batikas (­2010)
show that the Guifi community network in Catalonia has helped to reduce the geograph-
ical digital divide in Catalonia by increasing the Internet access rate in O
­ sona-​­county.

Whereas free software, as all knowledge, only needs to be developed once in order
for one version to exist that can be shared with others, hardware infrastructure has
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 161

considerable maintenance and renewal costs (­Medosch 2015), which makes it more
difficult to provide gratis access. Nonetheless creating access to wireless Internet net-
works tends to be relatively inexpensive (­Apostol, Antoniadis and Banerjee 2008; Bar
and Galperin 2004): W­ i-​­Fi uses an ­industry-​­wide standard (­IEEE 802.11), unlicensed spec-
trum, and relatively cheap equipment. In a wireless mesh network, not all, but only some
nodes need to be connected to a ­fixed-​­lined Internet connection. Problems may arise
when this architecture is significantly slower and much more unreliable than competing
commercial ­Wi-​­Fi networks. In many countries, there are legal limits on the unlicensed
use of the channels in the 5 GHz ­band-​­spectrum that tends to be less congested than
the 2.4 GHz spectrum. This circumstance puts additional pressure on n­ on-​­commercial
community networks in areas where they have to compete with commercial providers.

Free software guru Richard Stallmann (­2001) argues that the freedom of free software
is that

Economic Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks

the users have the freedom to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve
the software. Thus, ‘­free software’ is a matter of liberty, not price. To under-
stand the concept, you should think of ‘­free’ as in ‘­free speech’, not as in ‘­free
beer’. We sometimes call it ‘­libre software’ to show we do not mean it is gratis.

Such an understanding of freedom also underlies, in the realm of community networks,

the Guifi Network’s licence (­FONN Compact: Compact for a Free, Open & Neutral
Network):

You have the freedom to use the network for any purpose as long as you don’t
harm the operation of the network itself, the rights of other users, or the prin-
ciples of neutrality that allow contents and services to flow without deliberate
interference.12

Armin Medosch (­2015) takes a different position and argues for understanding freedom
as gratis use. He says that the economic crisis and the precarity it has created should
make us see that “[f]ree or at least cheap telecommunications is an important issue of
our times”. Freedom should also be an issue of being “­cheaper and fairer” (­Medosch
2015). We can add that providing gratis access to a common resource is a matter of
equality that guarantees that certain basic goods and services are available to all.

In 2013, there were reports that the Federal Communications Commission under, its then
Chairman, Julius Genachowski planned to free up frequencies that enable free public
162 Foundations of Digital Democracy

­ i-​­Fi (­Super ­Wi-​­Fi) that uses lower frequencies located between the ones that television
W
channels use (­­so-​­called white spaces). Jeremy Rifkin (­2015, ­180–​­181) interprets this de-
velopment very optimistically and sees the future of the Internet as one of gratis access
for anyone everywhere:

In the near future, everyone will be able to share Earth’s abundant free air
waves, communicating with each other for nearly free, just as we’ll will share
the abundant free energy of the sun, wind, and geothermal heat. […] The use of
open wireless connections over a free W­ i-​­Fi network is likely going to become
the norm in the years to come, not only in America, but virtually everywhere.

But there are strong capitalist interests that may well be able to impede such future de-
velopments because communications corporations fear their profits could be reduced: In
the United States, Republicans and companies such as AT&T, Intel, Qualcomm, ­T-​­Mobile,
and Verizon criticised the free W­ i-​­Fi model with the argument that licensing the airwaves
to corporations who then rent it out to customers would be a better approach and warned
that free ­Wi-​­Fi could harm Internet businesses.13 In August 2015, the FCC adopted rules
that allow the unlicensed use of certain channels in the 600 MHz band for W ­ i-​­Fi communi-
14
cation. But it also planned a Broadcast Incentive Auction for 2016, in which TV stations
are offered to sell the use rights of channels in the 600 MHz b­ and-​­spectrum so that wire-
less operators can bid for the use.15 So the decision that the FCC actually took is to free up
parts of the 600 MHz band for unlicensed use and to auction other parts to corporations.

6.5 Political Aspects of Internet Access and

Community Networks
Armin Medosch (­2015) argues that “­free networks contribute to the democratisation of
technology” because users are involved in the establishment and maintenance of tech-
nology. Antoniadis and Apostol (­2014) write that community networks can make a con-
tribution to fostering participatory democracy by advancing the right to the ownership of
the urban commons, by which they mean “­commonly held property, and use, stewardship
and management in common of the available and produced resources”. The urban com-
mons also include the communications commons. A survey conducted among 22 commu-
nity networks shows that ­decision-​­making tends to be participatory and transparent in
such community networks (­Dimogerontakis et al. 2016).

Edward Snowden has revealed the existence of global Internet surveillance programmes
that have been driven by the collaboration of the US security agency NSA and American
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 163

communications companies: In June 2013, Edward Snowden revealed with the help of
the Guardian the existence of l­arge-​­scale Internet and communications surveillance sys-
tems such as Prism, XKeyscore, and Tempora. According to the leaked documents, the
National Security Agency (­NSA), a US secret service, in the PRISM programme obtained
direct access to user data from seven online/­ICT companies: AOL, Apple, Facebook,
Google, Microsoft, Paltalk, Skype, and Yahoo!16

The Snowden leaks show that Internet surveillance concerns both the hardware infra-
structure of both wired and wireless networks as well as the levels of data storage and
applications. Community networks provide a wired and wireless infrastructure, based on
which general and ­network-​­specific applications operate. Surveillance is therefore for
a community network both an issue at the physical layer as well as at layers up to the
application level.

It has become evident that Internet surveillance, privacy violations, and lack of adequate

Political Aspects of Internet Access and Community Networks

data protection have resulted in major threats to democracy. Internet surveillance is a
threat to ­political-​­democratic sustainability. Thus far no adequate responses on how to
effectively tackle Internet surveillance’s threats and strengthen the Internet’s democratic
sustainability have been undertaken.

Surveillance after Snowden has on the one hand increased the interest in wireless com-
munity networks (­Antoniadis and Apostol 2014, Lo Cigno and Maccari 2014, Medosch
2015) because decentralised networks promise more security against the ­surveillance-​
­industrial complex. At the same time, there have been countries such as Germany, where
complex legal battles have occurred about the question whether a wireless community
network can be made legally liable for the illegal use of a network for terrorism, crime,
copyright infringement, child pornography, etc. (­Medosch 2015). Wireless community
networks face a contradiction between ­privacy-​­enhanced openness and surveillance.
Empirical research shows that privacy may not automatically be larger in wireless com-
munity networks than in other networks if the majority of the traffic is transported over
some key nodes (­Maccari and Lo Cigno 2014). The network architecture and routing
method therefore play a key role in the question of privacy and security in community
networks.

A survey among 22 community networks showed that such projects tend to be concerned
about protecting users’ privacy (­Dimogerontakis et al. 2016). Depending on national leg-
islation concerning user identification, data retention and surveillance, there can be more
or less complications for community networks because implementing such measures is
164 Foundations of Digital Democracy

expensive (­ibid.) and may violate privacy. Wireless community networks tend to use the
frequency bands of 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz that are mostly seen as open spectrum, for whose
use one does not need a licence. The regulation of spectrum use and the right to build
and use outdoor antennas can, however, create legal, administrative, and financial prob-
lems for community networks (­ibid.).

In respect to the political shutdown of the Internet in authoritarian regimes, community

networks are

means to communicate independently from the central command of govern-

ments and traditional operators. They enable citizen to organize (­politically or
otherwise) even in the eventuality that the established powers activate the
­so-​­called ‘­­kill-​­switch’ and shut down communications networks in a given area.
(­De Filippi and Tréguer 2015)

The potential that community networks and decentralised ­peer-­​­­to-​­peer systems for
network access and the storage, production, communication, distribution, and con-
sumption of information have for guaranteeing anonymity, privacy, security, and data,
poses at the same time also a problem in a political system that is obsessed with the
idea that surveillance can prevent terrorism and crime. There is the danger that given
such circumstances, decentralised IT systems that allow anonymity will be outlawed.
If access, storage, and processing are distributed, then it is legally difficult to argue
that the participating peers are liable for certain infringements because one cannot
assign intention and awareness to them (­Dulong de Rosnay 2015, Giovanella 2015,
Musiani 2014).

Melanie Dulong de Rosnay (­2015) argues that the problem is that the Western legal sys-
tem is based on liberal individualism. She identifies the “­need for cultural change away
from the neoliberal paradigm” so that the law is distributed and recognises “­community
rights and duties and collective persons as opposed to individual persons” (­Dulong de
Rosnay 2015). The question is if in the case of illegal use, the individual user, the ISP, or
the community network should and could be held accountable (­Giovanella 2015). Fed-
erica Giovanella (­2015) argues that it is unlikely that community networks can be held
accountable by European law, except if they are organised as associations. She acknowl-
edges the problem of applying “­old legal schemes to […] new technology” (­Giovanella
2015, 67) and argues that potential solutions are to hold the networks liable and/­or
to introduce user identification systems. Some community networks, such as Guifi, are
already organised as ­non-​­profit foundations. The difficulty is that the question arises
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 165

if a foundation should legally be held accountable for network use that is beyond their
control. It could limit liability by prohibiting illegal use of the network by issuing terms
of use.

Let us, however, assume that Daesh terrorists use such a community network for organis-
ing terrorist attacks. If the individual user cannot be identified, then the legal authorities
and the police may either try to shut the network down or hold it legally accountable. This
can then bias the network towards introducing a surveillance system that may infringe
users’ privacy and freedom of speech. Another possibility is that the network introduces
a user identification system. But of course, fake names and addresses could be used.
Only identification by an ID or a credit card could guarantee personal identification. The
first option, however, can be quite inconvenient because verification can be time and
resource intensive. Using credit cards for user identification can bias a network towards
charging for access, which may undermine the idea of free and open network access.
In a society that is obsessed with monitoring users, it is difficult to run free and open
communications networks.

In the ideal case, we could overcome the idea that communications surveillance is a
solution to crime and terrorism and instead focus on fighting the social causes of these
phenomena. As long as such politics is not in place, community networks are confronted
with the danger that the surveillance ideology may lead legal and policing authorities

Cultural Aspects of Network Access

to consider outlawing or criminalising them. They therefore have to think about how
to position themselves towards the political contradiction between p­ rivacy-​­enhancing,
free, open community networks and the surveillance ideology. The antagonism between
privacy and the surveillance ideology also shows that community networks must, by
necessity, be political if they care about freedom and democracy.

The Internet is today predominantly a communication system under commercial, au-

thoritarian, and paternal control (­see Williams 1976). Community networks promise a
democratic communications system in Raymond Williams’s (­1976) understanding, but at
the same time face the problems of an environment governed by the ­political-​­economic
control of communications.

6.6 Cultural Aspects of Network Access

A survey conducted among 22 community networks shows that providing local education
and training in technical skills is an important activity of such projects (­Dimogerontakis
166 Foundations of Digital Democracy

et al. 2016). Wireless communities have opportunities for users to engage in participa-
tory learning about “­the structure and the functioning of the Internet” (­Medosch 2015).

Community networks are not just technical networks, but allow creating neighbour-
hood communities (­Apostol, Antoniadis, and Banerjee 2008). Alison Powell (­2008) dis-
tinguishes between geek publics and community publics in community networks. The
first is a community that is brought together through creating and discussing community
networks, whereas the second is brought together through local discussions using a
community network. Powell found in a study of community networks in Canada that they
tended to primarily create geek ­publics – ​­“­social club[s] for geeks” (­1078). Everyday users
were “­not necessarily interested in using technology as a means of creating social links”
(­1081), but in gratis ­Wi-​­Fi access.

Christian Sandvig (­2004) concludes in a case study of W

­ i-​­Fi ­co-​­operatives that the stud-
ied cases were communities of technical experts (­geek communities) that were difficult
to join for outsiders. These communities therefore remained marginal.

Overall, the ­Wi-​­Fi ­co-​­ops examined here are ­inward-​­looking: they emulate
Douglas’s ‘­cult of the boy operator’ in radio before 1920 more than they provide
an ­outward-​­looking CN that builds its own internal community through an ex-
plicit mission of helping those outside the group that are disadvantaged. […]
Indeed, ­co-​­ops are in some cases so expert that this makes it impossible to
imagine their success as a populist movement.
(­Sandvig 2004, 596)

In Alison Powell’s research, the geek publics were strong communities organised around
joint activities and communication, and the community publics were weak communities
organised around sharing access to the same network as a gratis resource. One may be
disappointed that in her studied case no strong social user communities developed, but
one should not downplay the importance of the fact that users are interested in gratis
Internet access, which means that they consider Internet infrastructure as a common
good that should be available to everyone everywhere cheap or free of charge. The public
these users envision is one of public or common ownership of the Internet infrastructure.
That they all use a specific network is a potential for the creation of cultural communi-
ties, but it is no automatism and not an absolute necessity.

Tapia, Powell, and Ortiz (­2009) discuss the example of the community network ISF in Mon-
treal that managed via a public/­community partnership to develop from a geek public into
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 167

a more o­ utward-​­looking community. The example shows that it is also not an automatism
and a necessity that community networks are “­alternative ghettos” of ­tech-​­savvy experts,
from which everyday citizens feel excluded. In the end, it is an organisational question to
which degree community networks are able to reach out to and engage the general public.

6.7 Conclusion: A Framework for

Conclusion: A Framework for Understanding (­­Un-­)­Sustainability and Community Networks

Understanding (­­Un-​­)­Sustainability and
Community Networks
We have discussed four dimensions of sustainable and unsustainable development of
Internet access and how they affect community networks. Section 6.3 showed that commu-
nity networks face environmental issues in respect to the generation of ­e-​­waste and energy
consumption. Section 6.4 indicated that with respect to the economy, community networks
operate in a capitalist environment, which poses the question of how their existence is con-
fronted and threatened by corporate monopolies, how they deal with this threat, and the
question of how to obtain the resources necessary for paying their workers and providing
the necessary technology without having to use the same logic. Section 6.5 discussed that
community networks have the potential to provide more p­ rivacy-​­friendly communications
and at the same time exist in the context of contemporary surveillance societies that are
based on the ideology of categorical suspicion and the t­echnological-​­determinist assump-
tion that surveillance can solve political problems such as crime and terrorism. In Septem-
ber 2016, the European Court of Justice made a decision on a legal dispute between Sony
Entertainment and a supporter of the German Pirate Party.17 Its decision was that open
­Wi-​­Fi hotspots are no longer allowed to be anonymous, but need to implement user iden-
tification and individual ­password-​­based logins. This rule provides a drawback for commu-
nity networks’ quest for privacy in Europe. Section 6.6 showed that the culture associated
with community networks faces questions about being exclusive and limited to geeks or
being open to and oriented on a broad public. The discussion showed overall that there are
environmental, economic, political, and cultural questions that community networks face.

­Table 6.2 provides a checklist that based on the previous discussion identifies key issues
that should be considered when thinking about how sustainable development of a com-
munity network can best be achieved. It identifies ecological, economic, political, and
cultural sustainability issues.

At the environmental level, community networks face a contradiction between net-

work effects and environmental problems: The more users a network has, the better
168 Foundations of Digital Democracy

­TABLE 6.2 Checklist for sustainability issues in community networks

Dimension (­­Un-​­)­sustainability Sustainability questions

issue
Nature Energy use To what extent does the community network rely on relatively e­ nvironmental-​
­friendly energy sources (­wind energy, solar power, tidal power, wave
power, geothermal energy, biomass, and waste energy)?

To what extent does the network rely on suppliers of such energy forms?

What is the share of the total energy consumed per year by the network that
is based on relatively clean power sources?
Nature ­e-​­waste What is the average lifespan of different hardware types used in the
community network?

Can measures be taken for ensuring the ­long-​­term ­re-​­use and update of
hardware?

If hardware devices have to be replaced, is it possible to recycle the old ones?

How?

If hardware devices have to be trashed, is it possible to do so in a way that

does not threaten humans and nature? How?

If hardware devices have to be trashed, is it possible to do so in a way that

avoids the creation of ­e-​­waste that is shipped to developing countries
where it poses threats to ­e-​­waste workers, humans, and nature? How?

If old hardware devices that a network no longer uses are donated to other
networks, can it be ensured that this does not result in a t­ wo-​­tier Internet
access structure, in which poorer communities have slower Internet access
than others?
Economy Monopoly power How strongly concentrated is the Internet access market in a specific region,
and corporate country, and the world? What share of users and financial resources
concentration (­revenue, capital assets, profits) does the incumbent Internet service
provider have in a specific region, country and the world?

Does the operation of the community network help to challenge the financial
and market power of dominant Internet service providers? How?

What are the dangers and what happens when a community network
suddenly faces competition by a private ­for-​­profit Internet service provider?
Economy Survival and Will the community network manage to survive economically, i.e. to afford the
resources necessary hardware and ­labour-​­power necessary for running the network?
How does it do that? What are its financial sources?

Can the community network ensure that it has enough resources, supporters,
workers, volunteers, and users? Can the risk be avoided that the
community network is a “­secondary Internet” that is marginal, slower, and
less attractive than other services? How? What strategies can be used for
avoiding marginalisation and resource precarity?

Are there possibilities for the community network to obtain public or

municipal funding or to ­co-​­operate with municipalities, public institutions
or the state in providing access?
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 169

Dimension (­­Un-​­)­sustainability Sustainability questions

issue
Economy Economic democracy Is the community network collectively owned and controlled by its members
as a common good? How can the community network best ensure that it is
a ­not-­​­­for-​­profit project that is democratically owned and controlled?

Are those who work professionally for the maintenance of the network, fairly
remunerated for their labour so that they can lead decent lives?

To what extent does the network rely on community control, municipal

Conclusion: A Framework for Understanding (­­Un-­)­Sustainability and Community Networks

control, or private corporate control?

What are the potential dangers of collaboration with or inclusion of private

­for-​­profit companies? How can they be avoided?
Economy Tragedy and comedy Is the network large enough to attract significant numbers of users so that
of the commons this community can have mutual benefits from network effects?

How can possible congestion and slowdown of the network best be avoided
if it is very popular?
Economy Network wealth How can the community network provide gratis/­cheap/­affordable network
for all and Internet access for all? Can it help to lower the digital divide? How?
How can the community network help to avoid a t­ wo-​­tier Internet with
slower Internet access for some and faster for others?

How can the community network avoid the commodification of a) access (­i.e.
using access fees) and b) users (­i.e. using advertisements) that bring about
a) inequality of access and b) the exploitation of users’ digital labour?
Politics Participation How is the community network governed? How does it decide which rules,
standards, licences, etc. are adopted?

Does the community network allow and encourage the participation of

community members in governance processes? How?

Are there clear mechanisms for conflict resolution and proceedings in the
case of the violation of community rules?
Politics ­Privacy-​ How can a community network best be designed and governed so that the
­enhancement and privacy of users is guaranteed, is technically secure, and protects users
protection from from corporate and state surveillance?
surveillance
How can ­privacy-​­enhancing and ­privacy-​­friendly community networks
best face the threat that, in a culture of ­law-­​­­and-​­order politics and a
surveillance society in which governments believe that surveillance is
a way of preventing crime and terrorism, they are outlawed? How can
they best challenge the argument that they provide a safe harbour for the
communication of criminals and terrorists?

How does the community network deal with actual crime occurring in its
network? How can it best minimise the occurrence of crime?
(Continued )
170 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Dimension (­­Un-​­)­sustainability Sustainability questions

issue
Culture Conviviality, Does the community network provide mechanisms for learning, education,
learning, and training, communication, conversations, community engagement, strong
community democracy, participation, ­co-​­operation, and ­well-​­being? How?
engagement
To which degree is the community network able to foster a culture of
togetherness and conviviality that brings together people? How?
Culture Unity in diversity To which degree is the community network a “­geek public” that has an elitist,
exclusionary culture or a “­community public” that is based on a culture of
unity in diversity? How can a culture of unity in diversity best be achieved?

and more attractive it is (­network effect). But more Internet use today also tends to mean
more energy consumption, more deployed hardware, and more use of digital media de-
vices, which can increase the consumption of unclean energy sources and thereby the
depletion and pollution of nature and the generation of ­e-​­waste that can harm humans
and society. Community networks’ environmental challenge is therefore how to attract
a large user community, keep the network ­up-­​­­to-​­date with technological progress and at
the same time rely on clean, renewable energy sources and avoid e­ -​­waste.

At the economic level, community networks face a contradiction between the mo-
nopoly power of large communications companies and the resources required
for managing the network as a ­non-​­profit, commonly owned and commonly
governed, democratic, gratis good, and service: The communications sector is a
highly concentrated industry. Large communications corporations own large parts of the
Internet’s infrastructure. Communications in capitalism are shaped by monopoly power.
Communication is a process that is necessary for human survival. In contemporary soci-
ety, the access to communications networks and the Internet is therefore of importance
for organising everyday communication. If means of communication are privately owned,
then inequalities in access and use tend to emerge. ­Non-​­profit community networks can
challenge the power of corporate communications corporations. They can be founda-
tions of an alternative organisation of the Internet. But they also require resources such
as hardware, ­labour-​­power, money, users, attention, reputation, influence, support, and
volunteers, etc. The history of alternative media has not just been a history of spaces
for alternative, democratic communications, but also a history of resource precarity and
unpaid, highly ­self-​­exploitative volunteer labour. The danger for alternative media is that
they cannot economically survive or that they develop into privately owned ­for-​­profit
companies that turn access, content, or users into commodities and thereby foster ine-
quality and exploitation. Community networks’ economic challenge is to run community
 Chapter Six | Sustainability and Community Networks 171

networks as democratic, n­ on-​­profit, gratis commons that challenge the power of corpo-
rate monopolies and the economic concentration of communications, but can at the same
time economically survive and do not exist as ­second-​­class Internet that is marginalised.

At the political level, community networks face a contradiction between open,

­privacy-​­friendly participation and political control: Community networks have the
potential to be inclusive, allow open participation, to be democratic, and to enhance
privacy and the protection from corporate and state surveillance. At the same time, given
the prevalence of surveillance ideologies (“­surveillance helps to fight and prevent crime
and terrorism”), they face the threat of being shut down or criminalised by the state.
They also face the problem of how to avoid openness and being misused by criminals.
Community networks’ political challenge is how to be open, participatory, and p­ rivacy-​
­friendly and at the same time challenge the surveillance ideology and respond to actual
criminal abuse.

At the cultural level, community networks face a contradiction between geek

publics and community publics: Community networks have the potential to be open
public networks for learning, training, community engagement, togetherness, and com-
munication. But studies have shown that there is the danger that they develop a ­self-​
­centred, closed geek culture dominated by techies that is unattractive to others and has
an exclusionary and elitist character. There is also the danger that ­tech-​­experts develop
into a power elite inside of such networks. Community networks’ cultural challenge is
how to foster a culture of unity in diversity and to be a community public.

Community networks in a society, in which power is asymmetrically distributed, face

environmental, economic, political, and cultural contradictions. They have potentials to
Acknowledgement

foster sustainability in the information society, but at the same time face the problem of
how to survive and not become part of powerful mechanisms that advance unsustainable
development. Establishing a sustainable information society is not just a question of
introducing new technological networks and organisation forms, it is also a question of
changing the existing distribution of communication power and to foster struggles that
question this power’s asymmetrical distribution.

Acknowledgement
The research presented in this chapter was conducted with funding provided by the
EU Horizon 2020 project netCommons: Network Infrastructure as Commons, http://­
netcommons.eu/, grant agreement number: 688768.
172 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Notes
1 Toxic “­­e-​­waste” dumped in poor nations, says United Nations. The Guardian Online, Decem-
ber 14, 2013.
2 http://­www.thesecretlifeofthings.com/#!­phone-​­facts/­c611.
3 What is the lifespan of a laptop? The Guardian Online, January 13, 2013.
4 Wikipedia: Tonne of oil equivalent, https://­en.wikipedia.org/­wiki/­Tonne_of_oil_equivalent,
accessed on March 6, 2015.
5 Data source for all data in this paragraph: Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2015, https://­
yearbook.enerdata.net, accessed on March 6, 2015.
6 Data source: International Energy Statistics, https://­www.eia.gov, accessed on March 6, 2015.
7 https://­wiki.freifunk.net/­FAQ_Technik, accessed on March 7, 2016.
8 See: https://­en.wikipedia.org/­wiki/­Tier_1_network.
9 https://­en.wikipedia.org/­wiki/­Sprint_Corporation.
10 See https://­en.wikipedia.org/­wiki/­Tier_2_network for an overview of important tier 2 net-
works that buy transit from tier 1 networks.
11 See: https://­en.wikipedia.org/­wiki/­List_of_Internet_exchange_points_by_size.
12 http://­guifi.net/­en/­FONNC, accessed on February 8, 2016.
13 Tech, telecom giants take sides as FCC proposes large public WiFi networks. The Washington
Post Online, February 3, 2013.
14 https://­apps.fcc.gov/­edocs_public/­attachmatch/­­DOC-​­334757A1.pdf.
15 FAQ: The FCC’s upcoming ­broadcast-​­TV spectrum auction. Computerworld Online, October 15,
2015.
16 NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others. The Guardian Online.
June 7, 2013.
17 ­Wi-​­Fiprovidersnotliableforcopyrightinfringements,rulestopEUcourt.Butjudgementspellstroublefor
anonymity on wireless networks, warn MEPs. Ars Technica, September 15, 2016. http://­arstechnica.
co.uk/­­tech-​­policy/­2016/­09/­­wi-­​­­fi-­​­­providers-­​­­not-­​­­liable-­​­­for-­​­­copyright-­​­­infringements-​­cjeu/.

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References
Chapter Seven
Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy

7.1 Introduction
7.2 Marx and Journalism
7.3 Marx’s Concepts for Critical Journalism, Communication, and Media Theory
7.4 Conclusion and Outlook
References

7.1 Introduction
“­Marxism and communism mean state control, censorship and surveillance of the press.
They are incompatible with free journalism”. This is a common assumption about jour-
nalism and Marxism.

The task of this chapter is to clarify the significance of Karl Marx’s theory, the critique
of political economy, for the theory of journalism. To this end, Marx’s relationship to
journalism is first examined. Then, some of Marx’s important theoretical concepts are
introduced and their relevance for the critical theory of journalism is discussed.

The assumption mentioned in the first paragraph has partly to do with the real lack of
freedom of journalism in the Soviet Union, where the press was controlled and directed
by the state.

Immediately after the October Revolution, the Council of People’s Commissars decided
in the Decree on the Press to ban the bourgeois press. The Left S­ ocialist-​­Revolutionaries
objected to this decision. The question was then discussed in the ­All-​­Russian Central
Executive Committee. Lenin said at this meeting: “­Earlier on we said that if we took
power, we intended to close down the bourgeois newspapers. To tolerate the existence
of these papers is to cease being a socialist” (­Lenin 1917, 286). The Bolsheviks moved to
support the decree, which was adopted by the Central Committee with 34 “­yes” votes,
24 no votes, and one abstention. This sealed state control of the press in the Soviet
Union. In November 1917, the Socialist Revolutionaries became the strongest party in

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-9
178 Foundations of Digital Democracy

the election to the Constituent Assembly, where they then had an absolute majority. The
Bolsheviks dissolved the Assembly by force of arms on 6 January 1918, whereupon the
Socialist Revolutionaries went underground and fought the Bolsheviks’ power.

Stalin implemented the destruction of all opposition by means of terror. On the freedom
of the press, he said:

QUESTION. Why is there no freedom of the press in the U.S.S.R.?

ANSWER: What freedom of the press do you mean? Freedom of the press for
which ­class – the
​­ bourgeoisie or the proletariat? If you mean freedom of the
press for the bourgeoisie, then it does not and will not exist here while the
proletarian dictatorship exists. But if you mean freedom for the proletariat, then
I must say that you will not find another country in the world where freedom of
the press for the proletariat is as wide and complete as it is in the U.S.S.R. […]
We have no freedom of the press for the bourgeoisie. We have no freedom of
the press for the Mensheviks and S­ ocialist-​­Revolutionaries, who in our country
stand for the interests of the defeated and overthrown bourgeoisie. But is that
surprising? We never pledged ourselves to grant freedom of the press to all
classes, to make all classes happy. When taking power in October 1917, the
Bolsheviks openly declared that this meant the power of one class, the power
of the proletariat, which would suppress the bourgeoisie in the interests of the
labouring masses of town and country, who form the overwhelming majority of
the population of the U.S.S.R. How, after this, can the proletarian dictatorship
be required to grant freedom of the press to the bourgeoisie?
(­Stalin 1927, ­215–​­217)

Lenin and Stalin thus implemented state control of the press. This can give the false
impression that Marx and Engels held the same view, which can lead to the rejection of
engagement with their theoretical works on the basis of the argument that Marxism and
communism hold an authoritarian and ideological view of journalism.

Historian Tristam Hunt (­2009, 361) gives a clear answer to the question of whether Marx
and Engels are responsible for the crimes committed under the banner of Marxism in the
20th century:

In no intelligible sense can Engels or Marx bear culpability for the crimes of
historical actors carried out generations later, even if the policies were offered
up in their honor. Just as Adam Smith is not to blame for the inequalities of
 Chapter Seven | Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 179

the free market West, nor Martin Luther for the nature of modern Protestant
evangelicalism, nor the Prophet Muhammad for the atrocities of Osama bin
Laden, so the millions of souls dispatched by Stalinism (­or by Mao’s China, Pol
Pot’s Cambodia, and Mengistu’s Ethiopia) did not go to their graves on account
of two ­nineteenth-​­century London philosophers.

Rosa Luxemburg was an a­ nti-​­Stalinist and L­ enin-​­critical Marxist who criticised the abo-
lition of the opposition and freedom of the press as a deficit of the October Revolution:

Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the members of
one ­party – ​­however numerous they may b­ e – ​­is no freedom at all. Freedom is
always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently. Not because
of any fanatical concept of ‘­justice’ but because all that is instructive, whole-
some and purifying in political freedom depends on this essential characteris-
tic, and its effectiveness vanishes when ‘­freedom’ becomes a special privilege.
(­Luxemburg 1922, 169)

Luxemburg advocated the overthrow of the tsarist regime in Russia and a socialist soci-
ety but, unlike the Bolsheviks, stressed that socialism must be democratic. She charac-
terises the constituent assembly, the suffrage law, freedom of the press, and the rights
of association and assembly as “­the whole apparatus of the basic democratic liberties”
(­Luxemburg 1922, 48) and as “­the most important democratic guarantees of a healthy
public life and of the political activity of the laboring masses” (­Luxemburg 1922, 66).
It “­is a ­well-​­known and indisputable fact that without a free and untrammelled press,
without the unlimited right of association and assemblage, the rule of the broad mass of
Marx and Journalism

the people is entirely unthinkable” (­Luxemburg 1922, ­66–​­67).

Marx’s theory must therefore not be equated with the Soviet Union. It is worthwhile even
today to take a look at Marx’s contributions to the understanding of journalism.

7.2 Marx and Journalism

Marx was himself active as a journalist (­see Herres 2005): in 1842 and 1843 he was
­editor-­​­­in-​­chief of the Rheinische Zeitung until it was banned by the Prussian regime. After
the newspaper was banned, Marx went to Paris. There he first published the ­Deutsch-​
­Französische Jahrbücher together with Arnold Ruge and from 1844 to 1845 the weekly
newspaper Vorwärts. Pariser Deutsche Zeitschrift. Through an intervention of the Prus-
sian government, which found the criticism of absolutism in the Vorwärts a thorn in the
180 Foundations of Digital Democracy

flesh, Marx was expelled from France. Marx and Engels went to Belgium. In Brussels,
they collaborated on the ­Deutsche-​­Brüsseler Zeitung. The French February Revolution
of 1848 triggered a revolutionary phase throughout Europe. Marx was expelled from
Belgium, whereupon he went to Paris. In the course of the German March Revolution, he
went to Cologne, where he published the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in 1848 and 1849, on
which Engels also worked as editor. After the suppression of the revolution, Marx was
expelled from the country. He went to London, where he lived until his death in 1883.
From 1852 to 1862, Marx was the European correspondent of the New York Tribune, the
world’s ­largest-​­circulation newspaper at the time. Marx was considered by the Tribune
to be one of its most important contributors. Marx wrote about 500 articles for this daily
newspaper, many of which were editorials. The New York Tribune continued to exist
until 1966, from 1924 under the name New York Herald Tribune. In the late 19th and
20th centuries, it was a quality daily newspaper of a conservative character, for which
Walter Lippmann, among others, worked as a columnist. From the 1860s onwards, Marx
spent a lot of time working on his main work Das Kapital, but continued to be active as
a journalist, including as a correspondent for the V­ ienna-​­based Die Presse. Marx also
wrote for Der Volksstaat and Der ­Social-​­Demokrat. Der Volksstaat was the organ of the
Social Democratic Workers’ Party (­Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, SDAP) of Wil-
helm Liebknecht and August Bebel. Der ­Social-​­Demokrat was the organ of the General
German Workers’ Association (­Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein, ADAV) founded by
Ferdinand Lassalle. In 1875, the ADAV and the SDAP merged to form the Socialist Work-
ers’ Party of Germany (­SAP). Der ­Social-​­Demokrat became the ­SAP-​­published Vorwärts
in 1876, which still exists today as the organ of the Social Democratic Party of Germany
(­SPD).

Marx’s journalism is characterised by the fact that he asked critical questions about the
powerful and power structures. Marx’s journalistic works are documented in the Marx &
Engels Collected Works (­MECW) and are still worth reading in the 21st century as an
example of critical journalism.

The political economist of the media and communication Vincent Mosco (­2012, 575, 576)
characterises Marx’s journalism as follows:

his approach was to take an event in the news such as the second Opium
War in China or the American Civil War and, using the most ­up-­​­­to-​­date mate-
rial, address its political economic significance. […] Whereas the Grundrisse
suggested ways to theorize knowledge and communication labour, his journal-
ism demonstrated how to practice it with passion and intelligence. These are
 Chapter Seven | Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 181

lessons that communication students, and not just Marxist scholars, would do
well to learn.

Marx scholar and biographer David McLellan (­1973, 288) argues that Marx linked his
articles to the statistics and reports he used for his own research and that his journalistic
works are “­remarkably detached and objective”. In an anthology edited by Jakobs and
Langenbucher (­2004), whose contributions were printed as a series in the Süddeutsche
Zeitung, Marx is listed as one of the 50 “­role models of journalism”.1 “­Especially as
a journalist, he adopted an investigative approach that analysed interactions and at-
tempted to take into account a wide variety of factors”2 (­Herres 2005, 26).

Marx was not only a critical journalist but also a vehement advocate of the freedom of
the press. Marx’ “­practice of journalism was his relentless effort to fight back all attacks
on free speech” (­Shaw 2012, 620). Journalism theorist Hanno Hardt (­2001) emphasises
the ­freedom-​­loving character of Marx’s journalism and theory. Marx

sees freedom as a prerequisite for the success of socialism […] [and] comes
down on the side of press freedom in ways that produce a sharp contrast to
later ‘­­Marxist-​­Leninist’ interpretations of the role and function of the press in
socialist societies.
(­39)

Marx’s opposition to press censorship was linked to his own journalistic practice, in
which he was confronted with censorship. The Rheinische Zeitung für Politik, Handel
und Gewerbe was a daily newspaper. The newspaper was created in 1842, opposed
Marx and Journalism

Prussian absolutism, and was p­ ro-​­democracy. The main issue of political struggle at
the time was over the alternatives of absolutism and democracy. Marx began working
for the Rheinische Zeitung in 1842, rising to the position of editor in October 1842. In
Prussia, there was strict press censorship based on a law from 1819, the Carlsbad Reso-
lutions, which included a press law. Paragraph 6 stipulated that the Prussian state could
dissolve publications such as newspapers for the purpose of “­maintaining peace and
tranquillity in Germany”.3 Clause 7 imposed a f­ ive-​­year ban on the editor of a newspaper
or magazine banned by the state: “­If a newspaper or magazine has been suppressed by
a decision of the Federal Assembly, the editor of the same shall not be admitted to the
editorship of a similar publication in any state within five years”.4 This also explains why
Marx left Germany after the banning of the Rheinische Zeitung on 31 March 1843. In his
early writings, Marx (­1844) formulated the concept of the human being as a social being
(­cf. Fuchs 2020a, ­Chapters 3 & 4). Thus he argues that language and thought are “­social
182 Foundations of Digital Democracy

activity” (­Marx 1844, 298). For Marx, the human being also includes the abilities to write
and read. He argues that censorship seeks to restrict human essence:

The press is the most general way by which individuals can communicate
their intellectual being. It knows no respect for persons, but only respect for
intelligence. Do you want ability for intellectual communication to be de-
termined officially by special external signs? What I cannot be for others, I
am not and cannot be for myself. If I am not allowed to be a spiritual force
for others, then I have no right to be a spiritual force for myself; and do you
want to give certain individuals the privilege of being spiritual forces? Just
as everyone learns to read and write, so everyone must have the right to read
and write.
(­Marx 1842, 177)

Marx uses the logic of essence from Hegel’s dialectic for the theoretical justification
of the freedom of the press. For Hegel, something is authentic if it corresponds to its
essence. For Marx, freedom of the press is a human right that follows from the essence
of man as a social, speaking, and reading being. This implies for Marx that censorship is
an expression of social conditions that are domineering and p­ olitically-​­ethically wrong.
Censorship does not guarantee equality of people before the law and must therefore be
abolished:

The law against a frame of mind is not a law of the state promulgated for its
citizens, but the law of one party against another party. The law which pun-
ishes tendency abolishes the equality of the citizens before the law. It is a law
which divides, not one which unites, and all laws which divide are reactionary.
[…] The real, radical cure for the censorship would be its abolition; for the
institution itself is a bad one, and institutions are more powerful than people.
Our view may be right or not, but in any case the Prussian writers stand to gain
through the new instruction, either in real freedom, or in freedom of ideas, in
consciousness.
(­Marx 1843, 120 & 131)

Marx argues against the view that the ­poor-​­quality press must be censored. Such a logic
that Marx opposed allows the state arbitrariness. For Marx, the question of whether the
press is good or bad is not one of content, but of the social form of the press. He argues
that a press that glorifies the repressive state contradicts its own essence and argues for
a critical press:
 Chapter Seven | Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 183

A free press that is bad does not correspond to its essence. The censored
press with its hypocrisy, its lack of character, its eunuch’s language, its
­dog-​­like ­tail-​­wagging, merely realises the inner conditions of its essential
nature.

The censored press remains bad even when it turns out good products, for
these products are good only insofar as they represent the free press within the
censored press, and insofar as it is not in their character to be products of the
censored press. The free press remains good even when it produces bad prod-
ucts, for the latter are deviations from the essential nature of the free press.
A eunuch remains a bad human being even when he has a good voice. Nature
remains good even when she produces monstrosities.

The essence of the free press is the characterful, rational, moral essence of
freedom. The character of the censored press is the characterless monster of
unfreedom; it is a civilised monster, a perfumed abortion.
(­Marx 1842, 158)

Marx was not simply a political theorist or economist, but a political economist. He sees
politics and economics as dialectically connected. Therefore, Marx does not conceive of
press censorship as either a purely political or an economic phenomenon, but as both
political and economic. For Marx, not only does state censorship and control threaten
the freedom of the press, but he also considers the capitalist form of the press to be one
that is vulnerable to censorship. Marx was very critical of the idea that the press should
be commercially organised and p­ rofit-​­oriented: “­The primary freedom of the press lies in
Marx and Journalism

not being a trade” (­Marx 1842, 175). In this context, Marx criticises the tendency of press
capital to concentrate and form monopolies. He considers the monopoly capital tendency
as an economic censorship mechanism:

Press freedom in England up to now has been the exclusive privilege of cap-
ital. The few weekly journals which represent the interests of the working
­class – ​­daily papers were, of course, out of the ­question – ​­manage to survive
thanks to the weekly contributions of the workers, who in England are making
very different sacrifices for public purposes than those on the Continent. The
tragicomic, blustering rhetoric with which the Leviathan of the English ­press –​
­The Times – ​­fights pro aris et focis, i.e., for the newspaper monopoly, now
modestly comparing itself with the Delphic oracle, now affirming that England
possesses only one single institution worth preserving, namely The Times;
184 Foundations of Digital Democracy

now claiming absolute rule over world journalism, and, without any Treaty of
­Kuchuk-​­Kainardji, a protectorate over all European journalists.
(­Marx 1855, ­121–​­122)

Since the middle of the 19th century, the structural transformation of the public sphere
has gradually led to the commercialisation of the media and thus also to the rise of
advertising and media concentration. This was accompanied by the rise of media mo-
guls. These included, for example, in Great Britain, Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Camrose,
Lord Kemsley, Lord Northcliffe, and Lord Rothermere; in the United States, James Gordon
Bennett junior, William Randolph Hearst, Frank A. Munsey and Joseph Pulitzer; and in
Germany, Alfred Hugenberg, Rudolf Mosse, Leopold Ullstein, and August Scherl.

The 20th century saw the rise of a differentiated culture industry. The concentration
tendencies in the media sector then also took place more vertically and through the
formation of corporate conglomerates. The media moguls of the 20th and 21st cen-
turies are the owners of multimedia conglomerates that are organised and operate
internationally. ­Well-​­known examples of rich owners of 2­ 0th-​­and 2­ 1st-​­century media
conglomerates include Andrej Babiš, David and Frederick Barclay, Silvio Berlusconi,
Jeff Bezos, Michael Bloomberg, Robert Chapek, Richard Desmond, Hans Dichand, Jack
Dorsey, Robert Maxwell, Rupert Murdoch, Brian L. Roberts, Axel Springer, Ted Turner,
Mark Zuckerberg, etc.

Marx wrote against censorship and was involved in struggles for freedom of the press.
State, economic and ideological control are forms of censorship for Marx. In this way, he
anticipated Habermas’ critique of the public sphere.

In the book Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Jürgen Habermas (­1991),
drawing on Marx, argues that money capital and state power colonise the public
sphere, feudalise it and thus prevent or destroy democracy. If people lack education and
resources, there are restrictions on freedom of opinion and speech (­­227–​­228). When
economic (­corporations, economic interest groups) or political organisations (­parties,
states, state institutions, lobby groups, etc.) “­enjoy an oligopoly of the publicistically
effective and politically relevant formation of assemblies and associations” (­Habermas
1991, 228), When economic (­corporations, economic interest groups) or political organ-
isations (­parties, states, state institutions, lobby groups, etc.) “­enjoy an oligopoly of
the publicistically effective and politically relevant formation of assemblies and asso-
ciations” (­Habermas 1991, 228), the result is the limitation of the freedom of assem-
bly and the freedom of association. Habermas argues that advertising, commerce and
 Chapter Seven | Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 185

capital turn the public sphere into the public sphere into “­a sphere of culture consump-
tion” that is only a “­­pseudo-​­public sphere” (­Habermas 1991, 162) and a “­manufactured
public sphere” (­Habermas 1991, 217). Habermas argues that the public sphere is au-
tonomous from capital and state power. In the public sphere, the “[l]aws of the market
[…] [are] suspended as were laws of the state” (­Habermas 1991, 36). Habermas has
redeveloped the concept of the “­refeudalisation” of the public sphere (­Habermas 1991,
142, 158, 195, 200, 231) that he formulated in The Structural Transformation of the Pub-
lic Sphere into the concept of the colonisation of the lifeworld through “­monetarisation
and bureaucratisation” (­Habermas 1987, 321, 323, 325, 386, 403), which he formulated
in The Theory of Communicative Action. One aspect that Habermas underestimates,
but which, along with capital and the state, plays an important role in Marx’s works,
is the colonisation of the public sphere through ideologisation (­Fuchs 2020b, 2020c,
­Chapter 9).

Marx saw the Paris Commune of 1871 as a model of a democratic public sphere that
sought to implement the democratic organisation of politics and the economy:

The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal

suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short
terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men, of acknowl-
edged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a work-
ing, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time. […]
Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the Central
Government. Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hith-
Marx and Journalism

erto exercised by the State was laid into the hands of the Commune.
(­Marx 1871, 331)

Marx’s (­1842, 175) reference above to the connection between freedom and ­non-​
­commerciality of the media is an indication of the importance of ­non-​­profit media en-
terprises for a Marxist theory of journalism, communication and the media in the form
of public service broadcasting and citizen media. ­Table 7.1 illustrates the difference be-
tween four political economies of the media in Marxist theory (­see also Williams 1976,
­130–​­137; Jarren and Meier 2002, 103). In the Marxist theory of communication, jour-
nalism, and the media, a distinction is made between capitalist media, public service
media, citizen media, and authoritarian state media (­Fuchs 2020a, C­ hapter 8). In the age
of the Internet, this distinction is highly topical. The four political economies of the Inter-
net are (­a) the hegemonic model of the capitalist Internet platform, where personalised
186 Foundations of Digital Democracy

­TABLE 7.1 F our political economies of the media (­see Fuchs 2020a, ­Chapters 8 & 12 & 14)

Capitalist Public service media Citizen media Authoritarian state

media media
Organisation Capitalist Public organisation Civil society State control and
company organisation censorship of media
organisations
Goal ­Surplus-​­value, Public service remit, Public Participation Dissemination of
profit, capital Value: information, state ideology and
accumulation education, entertainment; propaganda
advancement
of democratic
understanding, arts,
culture, science, diversity
Main actors Professional Professional journalists Citizen journalists, ­State-​­controlled
journalists prosumers journalists
(­consumers as
producers)
Main funding Advertising, Licence and media fee Donations, State funding or state
source subscriptions, membership fees, funding combined
sale of single public subsidies with another funding
copies source
Property Private property Public property ­Non-​­profit State ownership or
association/­ private ownership
organisation, under state control
­co-​­operatives/­­ or mixed ownership
self-​­managed forms where the
companies state plays a key role

advertising is the dominant capital accumulation model; (­b) public service Internet plat-
forms; (­c) platform ­co-​­operatives; and (­d) authoritarian, ­state-​­controlled Internet plat-
forms (­Fuchs 2021a, 2021b).

Public service media and citizen media are alternatives to the capitalist, p­ rofit-​
­oriented organisation of the media as well as to authoritarian state media. Citizen
media often have the problem that although they are independent, they are based on
unpaid or ­low-​­paid labour, have few resources, and only a small audience (­Sandoval
and Fuchs 2010). Marx was aware of such possible limitations of the ­non-​­commercial
alternative press, which explains why he wrote not only for the socialist press but
also for mainstream media like the New York Tribune and bourgeois newspapers like
Die Presse.

In addition to Marx’s importance for critical journalism practice and a critical under-
standing of press freedom and the public sphere, his theory also offers a number of
 Chapter Seven | Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 187

general concepts that are relevant to journalism theory. The next section explores this
topic.

7.3 Marx’s Concepts for Critical Journalism,

Communication, and Media Theory
There are a number of concepts in Marx’s theory that are important for the critical explo-
ration and theorisation of communication, journalism, and media (­Fuchs 2020b, 2020c).
These include dialectics, materialism, the commodity form, capital, capitalism, labour,
surplus value, the working class, alienation, the means of communication, the general
intellect, ideology, socialism, communism, and class struggles. In the present chapter,

Marx’s Concepts for Critical Journalism, Communication, and Media Theory

for reasons of space, we shall confine ourselves to discussing the relevance of three of
these concepts: the commodity form, labour, and Ideology.

7.3.1 The Commodity Form

The first volume of Karl Marx’s main work Das Kapital begins with a sentence that
has become famous: “­The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of produc-
tion prevails appears as an ‘­immense collection of commodities’; the individual com-
modity appears as its elementary form” (­Marx 1867, 125). The capitalist economic
form is generalised commodity production. The production and sale of commodities
predates capitalism, but under capitalism commodity production is the generalised
form of production through which monetary profit is made. On the one hand, labour
power is s commodity, which has given rise to wage labour and the modern working
class. On the other hand, the everyday life of people under capitalism is shaped by
the commodity form. In capitalism, many activities are mediated through the com-
modity form. In the 20th century, advertising has become a ubiquitous phenomenon
in everyday life. According to Marx, a commodity has a ­use-​­value and an exchange
value. The u­ se-​­value is the qualitative aspect through which people satisfy needs in
the consumption of commodities. “­The usefulness of a thing makes it a ­use-​­value”
(­Marx 1867, 126). Exchange value is the quantitative aspect of the commodity. A
commodity is sold on a market. It exchanges itself for other commodities in a certain
proportion. In capitalism, money is the general equivalent of exchange. Marx char-
acterises exchange value as x commodity A = y commodity B (­Marx 1867, 139). One
commodity is exchanged for another commodity in a quantitative proportion. In the
money form, commodity exchange takes on the form x commodity A = y commodity
B = z money units. The implication of the commodity and money form is that without
188 Foundations of Digital Democracy

money one has no access to certain goods and services. Class relations and distribu-
tive injustice go hand in hand with commodity exchange. Marx understands the value
of a commodity to be the average number of hours of labour required to produce the
commodity.

T­ able 7.2 gives an overview of different commodity forms that we find in the media,
culture, communication and digital industries. Horkheimer and Adorno (­2002) called the
transformation of the organisation of cultural u­ se-​­values into ­exchange-​­values the cul-
ture industry. The culture industry is the process where the

use value in the reception of cultural assets is being replaced by exchange

value; enjoyment is giving way to being there and being in the know, connois-
seurship by enhanced prestige. The consumer becomes the ideology of the
amusement industry whose institutions he or she cannot escape.
(­Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, 128)

In the news media, two commodity forms are particularly important: advertising and the
sale of access to content in the form of subscriptions and single copies. Both capital ac-
cumulation models (­advertising, access to content) take digital forms (­digital advertising,
access to digital content) as well as physical forms (­print advertising, printed newspaper
copies).

T­ able 7.3 illustrates some data on the development of global newspaper revenues from
2013 to 2019.

Global newspaper revenue decreased from $126.2 billion in 2013 to $97.5 billion in 2021.
In 2021, about 45 per cent of global news revenue was sold through advertising and
about 55 per cent was sold through access to content. The share of revenue generated
digitally has been steadily increasing. The revenue share of advertising in printed news-
papers has fallen by 12 per cent in seven years. Newspapers are therefore trying to
compensate for this through the models of digital advertising, print, and digital subscrip-
tions. Overall, however, this does not succeed to a sufficient degree, which is why total
revenues and thus total profits in the newspaper industry are falling.

­Table 7.4 illustrates the structural change in the political economy of advertising: While
64.1 per cent of global advertising turnover was generated in print media in 1980, this
figure was only 7.8 per cent in 2020. Digital advertising has become the dominant form
of advertising, accounting for 53.1 per cent of global advertising revenue in 2020. The
absolute majority of digital advertising is controlled by Facebook and Google,5 which has
 Chapter Seven | Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 189

­TABLE 7.2 A
 typology of cultural goods in the culture industry

Cultural Exchange value ­Use-​­value Value Examples

commodity type
Cultural labour Wage labour: Creation and The average value Artists, musicians,
power Cultural workers distribution of of cultural journalists,
sell their labour meanings and labour power designers, software
power to cultural ideas is the average engineers, actors,
corporations in number of hours dancers, presenters,
order to earn a of reproductive technicians, printers,
living. In exchange labour that it etc.
for achieving a takes to create
wage, they help its means of
creating cultural subsistence
products that the

Marx’s Concepts for Critical Journalism, Communication, and Media Theory

companies sell as
commodities
Access to cultural Audience members Entertainment, The value of a Theatre performances,
events pay a ­one-​­time fee education, cultural event exhibitions, talks,
for access to a live information, is the average lectures, readings,
event, where they distraction, amount of ­labour-​ discussions, concerts,
are either present enjoyment ­time that it takes live performances, movie
in the space to organise and screening in the cinema,
where the event perform the event ­pay-­​­­per-​­view access to
is performed or live television events,
watch via cultural etc.
consumption
technologies
over a distance.
Consumption is
limited to a single
occasion
Cultural content Audience members Entertainment, The value of a certain Books, newspapers,
pay for having education, cultural content magazines, audio
access to a information, is the average recordings (­e.g. vinyl
copy of cultural distraction, amount of hours records), recorded
content that they enjoyment that its production, ­audio-​­visual content
can consume organisation, and (­e.g. movies distributed
repeatedly distribution take. on DVDs, B­ lu-​­ray discs,
The value of a computer hard disks,
single copy is the or downloaded on the
total amount of Internet) purchased
utilised labour artworks, posters, or
divided by the prints
number of created
copies
(Continued )
190 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Cultural Exchange value ­Use-​­value Value Examples

commodity type
Advertising space Advertisers sell Companies The more regular Outdoor and transit ads,
advertising space advertise their audience members direct mail, newspaper
and audiences’ commodities there are, the and magazine ads,
attention to ad higher the ad price radio ads, television
clients, who in can be set ads, digital, and online
return reach ads
audiences with
their product
propaganda
Subscriptions for Regular payment Entertainment, The value of a Newspaper and
regular access of money for education, subscription magazine
to cultural securing the information, service is the subscriptions, theatre
content access to content distraction, average amount subscription, museum
for a particular enjoyment of hours it takes subscription, cinema
subscription period to organise and subscription, pay
maintain this television
service
Technologies for Audiences purchase Humans are The value of a Record player, stereo,
the production, technologies enabled to communication television set,
distribution, and that enable produce, technology is the computer, mobile
consumption of the production, distribute average amount of phone, laptop, camera,
information distribution, or or consume hours that it takes and audio recorder
consumption of information to plan, produce,
information market, and sell
the technology
Access to The public pays a Access to The value of the Mobile phone contracts,
communication fee for access to information and access to a contracts with Internet
networks information and communication network is the service providers
communication networks number of labour
networks hours spent per
year to maintain
the network
divided by the
number of client
contracts
Mixed models Cultural corporations Entertainment, Mixed models Newspaper and magazine
of cultural make use education, combine models that combine
commodities of capital information, different cultural the sale of advertising,
accumulation distraction, commodities and printed copies and
strategies, where enjoyment therefore involve subscriptions, ­one-​­time
they combine the multiple forms of digital access, and
sale of several value digital subscriptions;
types of cultural cultural corporations that
commodities sell technologies and
access to content

Source: Fuchs (­2020b, 2020c, ­Chapter 4).

 Chapter Seven | Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 191

­TABLE 7.3 T he evolution of global newspaper sales, 2­ 015–​­2021

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021

Digital ad revenue (­bn US$) 9,115 9,680 10,201 10,710 11,206 12,192 12,804
Revenue from digital content 2,745 3,351 3,967 4,499 4,963 6,105 6,697
(­bn US$)
Revenue from print 55,535 51,530 47,924 44,760 41,959 33,777 31,595
advertising (­bn US$)
Revenue from print content 58,841 58,107 57,138 56,101 54,987 47,949 46,448
(­bn US$)
Total revenues (­bn US$) 126,236 122,668 119,230 116,070 113,115 100,023 97,544
Advertising (%) 51.2 49.9 48.8 47.8 47.0 46.0 45.5
Content (%) 48.8 50.1 51.2 52.2 53.0 54.0 54.5

Marx’s Concepts for Critical Journalism, Communication, and Media Theory

Digital (%) 9.4 10.6 11.9 13.1 14.3 18.3 20.0
Print (%) 90.6 89.4 88.1 86.9 85.7 81.7 80.0
Revenue share of digital 7.2 7.9 8.6 9.2 9.9 12.2 13.1
advertising (%)
Revenue share of digital 2.2 2.7 3.3 3.9 4.4 6.1 6.9
content (%)
Revenue share of print 44.0 42.0 40.2 38.6 37.1 33.8 32.4
advertising (%)
Revenue share from the sale 46.6 47.4 47.9 48.3 48.6 47.9 47.6
of printed content (%)

Data source: World Press Trends Database (­World Press Trends ­2020–​­2021 Outlook).

­TABLE 7.4 T he development of the share of certain forms of advertising in global advertising sales, in percent (%)

1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Advertising in magazines and newspapers 64.1 57.2 47.7 29.7 7.8
Television advertising 24.2 28.4 34.1 41.3 28.4
Radio advertising 8.2 8.2 9.3 7.1 4.7
Cinema advertising 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4
Outdoor advertising 2.9 5.8 5.5 6.3 5.6
Internet and mobile advertising 0.0 0.0 3.1 15.0 53.1

Data source: WARC.

192 Foundations of Digital Democracy

put pressure on the news media’s advertising revenues. For capitalist organised news
media, ­profit-​­making has become more difficult with the rise of Google and Facebook.
Robert McChesney (­2013, ­230–​­231, ­195–​­215) argues that the best way to overcome the
economic crisis of the news media is to eliminate the profit motive, to transform news
media into ­non-​­profit and ­non-​­commercial enterprises.

7.3.2 Labour

Labour is a concept for Marx that represents the dialectical antithesis of capital. For
Marx, capitalism is a class society based on the class contradiction between capital and
labour. The value of commodities is produced by labour. Workers receive a wage, which
is part of the value of commodities. But workers also produce surplus value, an unpaid
part of the value from which capital’s profit arises. For Marx, s­ urplus-​­value production is
the crucial aspect of capitalism. In order to survive, a capitalist enterprise must accumu-
late more and more capital, making more and more profit.

Marx distinguishes between concrete work and abstract labour. Concrete work produces
the ­use-​­value of the commodity, abstract labour produces the commodity’s value. Con-
crete work is “­the creator of u­ se-​­values” (­Marx 1867, 133) that satisfy certain human
needs. Abstract labour is a matter of “­how much” (­Marx 1867, 136), the temporal du-
ration of labour. “­Since the magnitude of the value of a commodity represents nothing
but the quantity of labour embodied in it, it follows that all commodities, when taken in
certain proportions, must be equal in value” (­Marx 1867, 136). The s­ urplus-​­value produc-
ing workers, who do not own the means of production, ­surplus-​­value, commodities and
profit, are for Marx the decisive productive force of capitalism. In capitalism, the working
class is “­merely a machine for the production of s­ urplus-​­value” and the capitalists class
is “­a machine for the transformation of this ­surplus-​­value into surplus capital” (­Marx
1867, 742).

Capitalists have an economic interest in reducing labour costs and investment costs and
increasing productivity in order to increase their profits. However, this is also associated
with potential problems for workers such as unemployment through rationalisation and
automation and precarisation. In the field of journalism, there is a tendency towards the
expansion of precarious labour on the one hand, and on the other, discussions about
whether artificial intelligence (­AI)-​­based digitalisation and automation will lead to the
­de-​­skilling and increased unemployment of journalists (­Diakopoulos 2019; Mosco and
McKercher 2009).
 Chapter Seven | Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 193

A survey by the European Federation of Journalists (­2015) found that 50 per cent
of respondents were freelancers, ­self-​­employed, or bogus ­self-​­employed. ­Thirty-​­four
per cent of respondents said they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their
work. Another survey (­Koksal and Grégoire 2017) by the EFJ of its affiliates showed
that 83.0 per cent of responding organisations said work overload was a problem for
journalists, 76.6 per cent said stress was a problem and 59.6 per cent said lack of
time was a problem. 80.9 per cent said journalists’ salaries were unfair compared to
their workload. One hundred per cent said that working conditions had worsened over
the years.

A study by the National Council for the Training of Journalists (­NCTJ) (­2018), in which 885

Marx’s Concepts for Critical Journalism, Communication, and Media Theory

British journalists took part, looked at working conditions, among other things. S­ eventy-​
­five per cent of the participants in the study said they were satisfied with their work. The
median annual income was relatively low at £27,500, the same level as in 2012, and with
prices rising due to inflation, this means that British journalists have seen real wages fall
in recent years. ­Fifty-​­six per cent felt that they were unfairly paid.

The overall picture is that journalists are characterised by what Boltanski and Chiapello
(­2005) call artistic labour: they identify themselves with their job, while at the same time
many of them work relatively precariously, feel their salary is too low, and are confronted
with a lot of stress and work overload.

Knowledge workers often work long hours and under time pressure. They are confronted
with a combination of the two strategies of capital to increase s­ urplus-​­value produc-
tion, which Marx calls absolute and relative surplus value production (­see Fuchs 2016,
­Chapters 7, 10, and 14). In absolute ­surplus-​­value production, the working day is ex-
tended in absolute terms, so that more commodities are produced by extending working
time without wage compensation. In relative s­ urplus-​­value production, productivity is
increased so that more goods are produced in less time. Management methods such
as control, supervision, work pressure play just as much a role as the mechanisation,
and automation of production. Whether ­AI-​­based automation in journalism will increase
productivity and lead to an increase in unemployment and ­de-​­skilling or whether jour-
nalism will prove to be more resistant to automation remains to be seen. The structural
transformation of the media towards greater capitalisation, digitalisation, and monopoli-
sation has led media capital to make greater use of the methods of absolute and relative
­surplus-​­value production to try to counteract the pressure on profits by intensifying and
extensifying the exploitation of journalistic labour.
194 Foundations of Digital Democracy

7.3.3 Ideology

In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels laid the foundations of the method of ideology
critique (­vgl. Fuchs 2020b, 2020c, Kapitel 9). Marx compares ideology there to a camera
obscura, where “­relations appear u­ pside-​­down” (­Marx and Engels 1845/­46, 36). Ideology
is a form of consciousness and practice whereby ideologues attempt to distort parts
of reality and make certain people believe that these distortions are reality. The aim,
according to Marx, is to legitimise domination and distract from the complex causes of
social problems.

In Capital, Marx (­1867, ­163–​­177) analyses the connection between capitalism and ide-
ology with the concept of the fetish character, through which things like the commodity,
capital, and money appear as natural properties of society, although they are specific to
capitalism. Georg Lukács (­1923/­1971) took up Marx’s concept of the fetish to character-
ise ideology as reifying and reified consciousness, which Max Horkheimer (­1947), based
on Lukács, also refers to as instrumental reason.

In recent years, authoritarian capitalism has emerged in many parts of the world (­Fuchs
2018, 2020d), in which predominantly very f­ ar-​­right and ­far-​­right politicians, groups and
parties spread nationalism, racism, authoritarianism, and fake news. They propagate dis-
trust of expert opinion and make people believe that what they agree with ideologically
and that which appeals positively to their feelings and emotions is true. P­ ost-​­truth pol-
itics declares lies to be true and facts to be false (­Fuchs 2021a, 2021b, C­ hapter 6). Fake
news is not new, but exists wherever there is ideology and tabloid media. Fake news is
factually false. Fake news is predominantly spread on social media. Fake news produc-
tion ignores journalistic professional norms. Fake news is ideological: its producers want
to misinform and mislead people.

Donald Trump is a kind of fake news factory. He has produced false news and r­ ight-​­wing
ideology that he spreads via social media such as Twitter (­see Fuchs 2018, Fuchs 2021a,
2021b, ­Chapter 9). At the same time, he calls media, journalists who report factually on
Trump and question his claims “­fake news”.

In the example shown in ­Figure 7.1, Trump suggests that illegal immigrants are to blame
for unemployment, low wages, and the American welfare system’s crisis. This ignores
the fact that the commodity form dominates large parts of society and that the high level
of exploitation of the working class has led to severe inequalities. Trump pretends to
defend the interests of the American worker, even though as a m ­ ulti-​­billionaire he is one
of the richest Americans, and promises in a nationalist way to make America great again.
 Chapter Seven | Karl Marx, Journalism, and Democracy 195

­FIGURE 7.1 An example of ideology on Twitter

Source: https://­t witter.com/­realDonaldTrump/­status/­5 91308288739962881.

With Marx, one can say that Trump spreads ideology that distracts from the class con-
flict between capital and labour and fetishises the US nation. Immigrants are presented
as enemies of the US nation and the US working class. Neoliberalism and the unequal
Conclusion and Outlook
distribution of wealth between capital and labour are silenced. Marx (­1870, 474) made
it clear that nationalism in 19th century Britain was a strategy of capital to make the
English worker “­feel himself to be a member of the ruling nation” in relation to migrant
workers. For Marx, nationalist ideology is the “­secret of the maintenance of power by the
capitalist class” and “­is kept artificially alive and intensified by the press” (­Marx 1870,
475). Marx’s analysis of ideology is still relevant in the 21st century in the age of digital
and authoritarian capitalism, with the role of the press often taken by social media.

7.4 Conclusion and Outlook

The Political Economy of Communication and the Media is an internationally established
research approach within media and communication studies, as evidenced by institu-
tions such as the Political Economy Section in the International Association of Media
and Communication Research and journals such as tripleC: Communication, Capitalism &
196 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Critique or The Political Economy of Communication. The critique of the political econ-
omy of communication and the media, based on Marx’s work, is an essential component
of the approach of the Political Economy of Communication and the Media (­Fuchs 2017,
Wasko 2014).

This chapter has shown that engagement with the works of Karl Marx provides concepts
that are relevant to the critical analysis of journalism, communication, media, and culture
in the 21st century and in the age of digital capitalism.

Notes
1 Translation from German: “­Vorbilder des Journalismus”.
2 Translated from German: “­Gerade als Journalist legte er eine Untersuchungsweise an den
Tag, die Wechselwirkungen analysierte und die unterschiedlichsten Faktoren zu berücksichti-
gen versuchte”.
3 Translation from German: “­Erhaltung des Friedens und der Ruhe in Deutschland”3 http://­www.­
heinrich-­​­­heine-​­denkmal.de/­dokumente/­karlsbad2.shtml, accessed on 14 April 2021.
4 Ibid.
5 https://­w ww.emarketer.com/­c ontent/­­f acebook-­​­­ g oogle-­​­­ d uopoly-­​­­ w on- ­​­­ t - ­​­­ c rack- ­​­­ t his- ​­ y ear,
https://­www.emarketer.com/­content/­­global-­​­­digital-­​­­ad-­​­­spending-​­2019.

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Chapter Eight
Towards a Critical Theory of Communication as
Renewal and Update of Marxist Humanism in the
Age of Digital Capitalism

8.1 Introduction
8.2 Marxist Humanism Today
8.3 Communication in Society
8.4 Communication, Alienation and Digital Capitalism
8.5 Communication and the Struggle for Alternatives in the Age of Digital Capitalism
8.6 Conclusions: Humanist Socialism in the Age of Digital Capitalism
References

8.1 Introduction
This chapter’s task is to outline some foundations of a critical, Marxist-Humanist theory
of communication in the age of digital capitalism. Foundations of the approach of a rad-
ical Digital Humanism have been outlined in the book Digital Humanism. A Philosophy
for 21st Century Digital Society (Fuchs 2022). This chapter is a kind of prolegomena to my
Digital Humanism book. Is was written as a preparatory work.

Since the 1980s, Marxist theory has become unfashionable. In social philosophy and the-
ory, postmodernism and poststructuralism challenged grand narratives, universalism and
decentred the focus on the economy. Postmodernism became, as David Harvey (1990)
points out, a legitimating ideology of capitalism’s flexible regime of accumulation. Iden-
tity politics and cultural reductionism replaced class politics and political economy. In
his last interview before his death, Stuart Hall, who championed poststructuralism and
identity politics in Cultural Studies, remarked on contemporary theory that “in its attempt
to move away from economic reductionism, it sort of forgot that there was an economy at
all” (Jhally 2016, 337) and that it is a “real weakness” that there is a lack of engagement
with the “Marxist tradition of critical thinking” (Jhally 2016, 338). The move away from
Marx and the critical analysis of class and capitalism took place at the time of the expan-
sion of neoliberalism, which had the paradoxical effect that Marxian analysis became

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-10
200 Foundations of Digital Democracy

political ever more relevant as social inequalities increased and new forms of austerity
and precarious labour emerged while the academic and intellectual mainstream denied
its relevance. In their hatred of Marx and Marxism, postmodernism and neoliberalism
have formed a strange ideological consensus.

In 2008, a new world economic crisis started as a result of the developing antagonisms
of neoliberal capitalism (Foster and Magdoff 2009, Harvey 2010, Roberts 2016, Waller-
stein et al. 2013). Ever since there has been a rising interest in Marx’s works (Fuchs and
Monticelli 2018). Today, it has become harder to deny that Marx can and should inform
the analysis of 21st-century society. In the light of this development, this chapter’s aim is
to contribute to the renewal of Marxist theory. Given the importance of information and
communication technologies and communication work in contemporary society, social
theory needs to ask: What is communication? What is the role of communication in soci-
ety? What is the role of communication in capitalism? What is the role of communication
in digital capitalism? This chapter contributes to answering these questions by renewing
the engagement with a particular tradition of Marxist theory, Marxist Humanism.

Section 8.1 outlines the importance of Marxist Humanism today. Section 8.3 analyses
the role of communication in society. Section 8.4 deals with the connection of communi-
cation, alienation, and capitalism. It gives special attention to communication in digital
capitalism. Digital capitalism is a dimension of contemporary society where the accumu-
lation of capital, influence, and cultural hegemony is mediated by digital technologies
such as the computer, the Internet, the mobile phone, tablets, robots, AI-driven (“smart”)
technologies, etc. Section 8.5 analyses the connection of struggles and communication
with a special focus on examples from social struggles in digital capitalism. Section 8.6
draws some conclusions in the context of digital capitalism and struggles for digital
Socialist Humanism.

8.2 Marxist Humanism Today

Marxist Humanism emerged in 20th-century social theory. Its theoretical foundations are
Hegel’s dialectical philosophical and Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.
Its axiological and political concern has been the establishment of democratic socialism as
an alternative to capitalism, fascism, Stalinism, and other forms of authoritarian statism. It
focuses its analyses on the human being, human essence, human practices, alienation, polit-
ical praxis, class struggles, ideology critique, and the dialectics of subject/object, practices/
structures, labour/capital, the economic/the non-economic, continuity/discontinuity, etc.
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 201

Representatives of Marxist Humanism have, among others, included Theodor W. Adorno,

Günther Anders, Kevin Anderson, Simone de Beauvoir, Ernst Bloch, Angela Davis, Raya
Dunayevskaya, Zillah Eisenstein, Barbara Epstein, Frantz Fanon, Erich Fromm, Lucien
Goldmann, André Gorz, David Harvey, Max Horkheimer, C.L.R. James, Karl Korsch, Karel
Kosík, Henri Lefebvre, Georg Lukács, Herbert Marcuse, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Kwame
Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Bertell Ollmann, the Praxis Group in Yugoslavia, Sheila Row-
botham, M.N. Roy, Edward Said, Jean-Paul Sartre, Adam Schaff, Kate Soper, E.Thomp-
son, and Raymond Williams (see Alderson and Spencer 2017, Fromm 1965). Marxist
Humanism’s decline had to do with the general decline of Marxist theory under neo-
liberal conditions, the postmodern turn against Marxism, structuralism’s attack on the
human being that fostered the rise of post-Humanism, and the influence of Althusser and
Foucault in social theory (Alderson and Spencer 2017).

There are five reasons why we need a renewal of Marxist Humanism today. The first
reason is the emergence of authoritarian capitalism. In critical theory, the concept of
authoritarianism goes back to Erich Fromm (1941/1969), who defines it as a social char-
acter who submits to those in power and enjoys dominating others. For Fromm, fascism
is the most developed form of authoritarian society and authoritarian capitalism. Max
Horkheimer (1939/1989, 78) sees authoritarian and therefore also fascist potentials
immanent in capitalism itself. But not every form of capitalism fully develops its au-
thoritarian potentials. Adorno et al.’s (1950) F-scale outlines a large number of charac-
teristics of the authoritarian personality. The core of this approach are four features:
authoritarianism combines the antidemocratic belief of the necessity of strong, top-
down leaders, nationalism, the friend/enemy-scheme and ideological scapegoating, Marxist Humanism Today

and the belief in law-and-order politics, violence, militancy, and war as the best politi-
cal means (Fuchs 2018a). Authoritarian capitalism is a society that combines capitalism
with these principles. New forms of nationalism and authoritarianism have emerged in
recent years. They pose dangers to democracy and can result in a new world war, gen-
ocide, fascism, etc. Marxist Humanism stresses socialism and Humanism as opposition
to fascism.

The second reason are the limits of postmodernism in contemporary capitalism. Al-
thusser and Foucault have had a major influence on the emergence and development
of postmodernism and poststructuralism that have attacked Marxist theory, class pol-
itics, the notions of the human being, truth, alienation, commonalities, universalism,
etc. While there are postmodern theorists who made productive use of Marx, certain
versions of postmodernism have contributed to the decline of Marxist theory in an age
202 Foundations of Digital Democracy

when class contradictions have been exploding. Marxist Humanism foregrounds praxis
as class struggle and Marxist theory. It is a critique of postmodernism. Postmodernism
has advanced a relativism and anti-universalism where there is no truth. In an age of fake
news, post-truth, new nationalism/fascism, we need a political concept of truth. Marxist
Humanism enables us to think critically about what is true and false. Postmodernism has
fostered identity politics without class politics and as a consequence liberal reformism.
Humanist Marxism advances democratic socialist politics. Postmodernism has advanced
the hatred of Marx. In a time of major capitalist crisis, Marx is urgently needed. Post-­
colonial theory and thought has advanced forms of reverse orientalism (Chibber 2013,
Warren 2017) where everything non-European and non-Western has been automatically
considered as being progressive, which partly legitimates authoritarianism. Marxist Hu-
manism stresses universalism and human beings’ commonality.

The third reason is the need for dialectical analysis. Post-Humanism, the concept of the
Anthropocene, Actor Network Theory, New Materialism, etc. are attacks on the human
being that collapse the dialectic of unity and differences into structures that eliminate
or reduce the importance of humans. Post-Humanism collapses the dialectic of human/
non-humans and human/technology (robots) into the post-human cyborg. Bruno Latour’s
Actor Network Theory declares that things and instruments such as machines are just
like humans social actors and together with the latter form actor networks. As a conse-
quence, Latour collapses the differentiation between the human as the social being and
the non-human into the actant as the social (see also Fuchs 2020a, 20–21). Deep Ecology
and animal liberation theory collapse the dialectic of nature/society into an undiffer-
entiated whole. Postmodernism collapses the dialectic of class/non-class into identity
and the dialectic of culture/economy into the culture. The concept of the Anthropocene
blames the human being and not capitalism for the environmental crisis. The result of
these developments has been the proliferation of undialectical, reductionist thought.
While postmodernism and its various currents have continuously claimed that Marxism
is reductionist and economistic, they have themselves advanced new forms of reduc-
tionism. In contrast, Marxist Humanism is dialectical. It foregrounds the importance of
humans in society and the dialectical relations that the human being is part of.

The problems of structuralism constitute the fourth reason. (Post-)Structuralism reduces hu-
mans to bearers of structures that resemble puppets on a string. It underestimates the impor-
tance of human practices, human thought, communication, production, and social struggles
in society. In contrast, Marxist Humanism stresses practices, praxis and the dialectic of prac-
tices/structures in society. For example, Althusser sees humans not as active agents but bas
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 203

earers and “the ‘supports’ (Träger) of […] functions” (Althusser & Balibar 2009, 199) defined
by society’s articulated structures and the mode of production. In Lacanian theory, humans
“interact like puppets” and are “tools in the hands of the big Other” (Žižek 2007, 8). Lucien
Goldmann in a debate with Foucault and Lacan argued that a famous slogan in the May
1968 Paris protests read that “structures do not take to the streets”, which means that “it is
never structures that make history, but men, although the action of these always has a struc-
tured and significant character” (in: Foucault 1969, 816). Lacan commented that “if there is
anything that the May events demonstrate, it is precisely the descent of structures into the
street” (in: Foucault 1969, 820). Structuralist accounts of society fetishise structures that are
interpreted as autonomous actors acting on and independently from humans. They disregard
Marx’s dialectical insight that humans “make their own history, but they do not make it as
they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under cir-
cumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 1852, 103).

The fetishism of difference is the fifth reason. Postmodernism’s focus on difference has
parallels to the ideology of the new right that demands the separation of cultures. The
new forms of nationalism that have proliferated in the past ten years fetishise difference
by ascertaining pride in the nation and the hatred of immigrants, refugees, people of
colour, etc. Marxist Humanism stresses the universality of humanity, humans’ common
features, and the indivisibility of humanity.

Marxist Humanism is a counter-narrative, counter-theory, and counter-politics to these

developments. A critical, dialectical theory of communication can draw on and start from
this intellectual tradition. The methodological approach that the present author takes Communication in Society
in this context is to make visible, engage with, draw on, start from, use, interpret, and
further develop elements from often unknown, hidden, ignored, neglected, and forgotten
Marxist-Humanist works (see Fuchs 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017a, 2017b, 2017d, 2018b,
2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2020a, 2020c).

The very basic questions from which the resulting approach starts is: What is communica-
tion? What is the role of communication in society? Section 8.3 deals with these questions.

8.3 Communication in Society

This section first analyses the relationship between work and communication (Subsec-
tion 8.3.1) and then broadens out the discussion to the analysis of communication’s role
in society in general (Subsection 8.3.2).
204 Foundations of Digital Democracy

8.3.1 Work and Communication

When thinking about a critical theory of communication, most scholars will immediately
think of Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which is the most prominent and
most widely read and cited critical approach to the analysis of communication in society.

The epistemological and methodological approach the present author takes is very dif-
ferent from the one that Habermas chose in the creation of his theory of communicative
action. The German philosopher engaged primarily with non-Marxist mainstream the-
orists of language and communication, especially George Herbert Mead, Jean Piaget,
and John Searle. Habermas implicitly has sustained the old, but incorrect prejudice that
Marxism has nothing important to say on communication and culture. The approach that
the present author has developed in contrast tries to invalidate this claim by showing
that there is a rich, but ignored the tradition of thinking critically about language and
communication in Marxist theory.

Starting from Hegel’s Jena philosophy, Habermas in the 1968 essay “Work and Interac-
tion” developed thoughts about work and interaction that in the 1980s formed one of the
theoretical foundations of his opus magnum Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas
1985a, 1985b). In the Jena lectures, Hegel (1803/1804, 1805/1806) argues that work
and interaction are two manifestations of the spirit. In his interpretation of Hegel’s Jena
philosophy of the spirit, Habermas (1968) argues that work and interaction are two as-
pects of society that are based on two different rationalities, namely strategic action
(work) and understanding (interaction). In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas
formalises and further develops this distinction as the antagonism between system/life-
world, steering media (money, power)/language, work/interaction, system integration/
social integration, and instrumental action/communicative action. In a key formulation,
Habermas (1985b, 281) characterises his own theory as “media dualism” that is based on
“two contrary types of communication media”. The German philosopher builds his theory
on the assumption that work and communication form two independent substances of
society that are radically different. “On the human level, the reproduction of life is deter-
mined culturally by work and interaction” (Habermas 1971, 196). In his latest book Auch
eine Geschichte der Philosophie (This Too a History of Philosophy) published in 2019
in German, Habermas reproduces the dualistic assumption that society consists of two
substances. He writes that “society’s structures not only contribute to social integration
by values, normatively binding expectations and communicative understanding, but also
contribute to society’s system integration by functional mechanisms such as relations of
power and exchange” (Habermas 2019, 137, translation from German).
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 205

Habermas is influenced by Kant’s dualism of subject and object and Weber’s (2019) du-
alism of purposive action on the one hand and value-rational, affectual, and traditional
action on the other hand. Habermas reproduces Weber’s dualism of economy and society
as the dualism of system and lifeworld. His theory of communication is a Kantian and
Weberian Humanism that lacks the Hegelian and Marxian dialectical logic that con-
ceives of two moments as being simultaneously identical and different. Marxist Hu-
manism therefore promises to be a good foundation for a dialectical critical theory of
communication.

Work and communication are not two separate human processes. They are identical and
different. In his early philosophical works such as Economic and Philosophical Manu-
scripts (Marx 1844c) and German Ideology (Marx & Engels 1845/46), Marx asked himself
what the human being is and how capitalism cripples the human being. He built his
critical theory of capitalism on these foundations. A basic insight of these works is that
the human being is a societal being. “The individual is the social being” (Marx 1844c,
299). Humans shape and are shaped by the social relations they enter in everyday life:

Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is

even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social
activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society
and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.
(Marx 1844c, 298)

Marx adds the insight that the social relations humans enter are relations of production. Communication in Society
The “production of material life itself […] in order to sustain human life” is “a fundamen-
tal condition of all history” (Marx and Engels 1845/46, 42).

The human being is a producing, social, societal being. By producing their conditions of
life, humans socially produce and reproduce society. Social production, production in
social relations, and the production of the social and society are the key features of the
human being. Materiality of society means that humans produce sociality and socially
produce. Production for the satisfaction of human needs is the key feature of society.
This means that work is the key process constituting society. It is an economic process
but extends from the economy into political and cultural life. Humans also produce po-
litical relations, where they take collective decisions, and cultural relations, where they
make meaning of the world. Therefore, production not just creates “eating and drinking,
housing, clothing” but also “various other things” (Marx and Engels 1845/46, 42), includ-
ing social, societal, economic, political, and cultural relations. Marx’s key sociological
206 Foundations of Digital Democracy

insight is that everything that exists in society is a social relation and is produced as so-
cial relation. Communication, i.e. “the production of ideas” and “the mental intercourse”
of humans, is not immaterial but part of “material activity” (Marx and Engels 1845/46,
36). Communication is “the language of real life” (36). Humans are “producers of their
conceptions, ideas, etc.” (36).

Marx and Engels argue that communication is a production process. There is a dialectic
of work and communication: humans communicate productively and produce commu-
nicatively. Communication aims at the production of a specific social use-value, namely
that humans understand the world and understand each other. Therefore, communication
is productive. The production of use-values that satisfy human needs cannot be achieved
individually, but only in social relations. Communication is the process that organises
social relations. Therefore, humans produce communicatively.

Already classical bourgeois economics assumed that the human being is by nature an
entrepreneur of the self and a homo oeconomicus, a rational economic being that is
egoistic, self-interested, competitive, and profit-maximising. Adam Smith argued that
“the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” is “a certain pro-
pensity in human nature” and “the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason
and speech” (Smith 1776, 18). Authors such as Brown (2015, Chapter 3) argue that with
the rise of neoliberalism, the concept of the homo oeconomics has further proliferated.
(Neo-)liberalism essentialises and fetishises the capitalist. The critique of neoliberalism
is prone to deny that human beings are economic beings by claiming that they are pri-
marily political or cultural animals. Such assumptions just replace one reductionism by
another one. For Marx, humans are simultaneously economic and non-economic beings.
As social production, the economic operates inside of the political and the cultural. But
the political and the cultural have their own emergent dynamics and go beyond produc-
tion. Power and meanings are produced and reproduced and at the same time constitute
structures, organisations, and institutions that have particular logics.

In his Politics, Aristotle (2013, §1253a) characterises the human being as zōon logon
echon (ζῷον λόγοϛ ἔχων). Hannah Arendt (1958, 27) and Charles Taylor (2016, 338)
point out that the translation of this term as “rational animal” is imprecise. Logos is
Greek for both rationality and speech. The Greek language here points us towards the
fact that rationality and language are intertwined and not two separate human sub-
stances. In contrast, the Cartesian dualism of mind and body separates two aspects of
the human being that belong together. According to Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1978), this sepa-
ration goes back to the invention of the division of labour in class societies that invented
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 207

the division between mental and manual labour. It is a basic human propensity that there
is a dialectic of the human as rational, producing animal and the human as languaging,
communicating animal. Language and communication are rational and human and so-
ciety’s rationality is organised through communication. Marx (1867b, 346, translation
from German) summarises this dialectic by writing that the human being is “by nature
[…] a societal animal” (“gesellschaftliches Tier”), which includes that communication is
production and communication organises production.

Aristotle (2009, §1139b) points out that human action is teleological: “everyone who
makes makes for an end”. Aristotle’s teleology influenced Marx’s assumption that hu-
man work is purposeful activity. Humans produce with means of production in order
to achieve the goal of satisfying needs. For Marx (1867a, 284), the human being “also
realizes [verwirklicht] his own purpose” in work. In his widely ignored book Ontologie
des gesellschaftlichen Seins (Ontology of Societal Being), Georg Lukács (1986a, 1986b)
argues that work as teleological positing is the model of human activity.

Teleological positing implies that humans are working beings. They set themselves goals
that they want to achieve by utilising certain means. The teleological positing of work
means the “intervention into concrete causal relations in order to bring about the reali-
zation of the goal” (Lukács 1978, 67), “the positing of a goal and its means” (22), that the
human being as worker and producer is a “conscious creator” (5). Communication means
that humans are “answering beings” (Lukács 1986b, 339, translation from German). Lan-
guage makes possible the “distancing of the object from the subject” (Lukács 1978, 100).
By communicating, humans can repeat production processes in a variety of spaces at Communication in Society
a variety of times. Production becomes routinised and regularised so that society can
reproduce itself. Society’s reproduction is the repetition of social production.

Language is a “complex inside of the complex” of society (Lukács 1986b, 181, translation
from German). It “mediates […] both the metabolism of society with nature and the inter-
actions between humans that takes place purely inside of society” (181, translation from
German). As a particular form of teleological positing, communication has a work charac-
ter and is a peculiar form of work that enables the mediation of humans’ social relations.

8.3.2 Society as Sphere of Communicatively

Organised Production
Communication is the process of the production of humans’ sociality, social relations,
groups, organisations, social systems, structures, and institutions. It is therefore also the
208 Foundations of Digital Democracy

FIGURE 8.1 Communication as the mediation and production of human sociality and social relations in society

process that organises and mediates the production and reproduction of society in a dy-
namic manner. Figure 8.1 visualises the role of communication in society. Communication
is the production process of human sociality and humans’ social relations.

Society is the totality – a complex of complexes, as Lukács (1986a, 1986b) says –, in which hu-
mans produce and reproduce social relations that condition, enable, and constrain their prac-
tices. It is a dialectical process where human social practices and social relations condition
each other mutually. Society consists of the three realms of the economy, politics, and culture.
These realms are neither separate nor fully reduceable to one system nor equally foundational
for society. They are all economic because all social systems are systems of production (Table
8.1). At the same time, all types of social systems have their particular, emergent qualities and
features whereby their sum is more than the total of the production of their parts.

Raymond Williams (1977) outlines that the relationship of the economic and the non-­
economic (the “base” and the “superstructure”) has in Marxist theory been characterised
as one of determination, reflection, mediation, typification (representation, illustration), ho-
mology, and correspondence. Williams criticises that all of these approaches leave the eco-
nomic and the non-economic separate and are therefore not “materialist enough” (92, 97).
Williams argues that culture is material. The same is true of politics. This means that the
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 209

TABLE 8.1 S ociety’s three realms of production

Realm of society Teleological positing

Economy Production of use-values
Politics Production of collective decisions
Culture Production of meanings

economy in the form of teleological positing operates inside culture and politics. Ideas, pol-
icies, laws, meanings, ideologies, etc. are just like cars and computers produced by humans
in social relations. Williams (1980, 50) writes that “communication and its material means
are intrinsic to all distinctively human forms of labour and social organization”. Communi-
cation is intrinsic to and operates inside of social systems and organises the production of
sociality. Because of the work character of communication, also work is intrinsic to commu-
nication. All social realms and systems are at the same time economic and non-economic.

Orthodox approaches have reduced society to an economic base. For example, Louis
Althusser (1969, 135–136) argues that the advantage of

the spatial metaphor of the edifice (base and superstructure) is simultaneously

that it reveals that questions of determination (or of index of effectivity) are
crucial; that it reveals that it is the base which in the last instance determines
the whole edifice.

E. Thompson criticises Althusser’s approach as “mechanical materialism” (Thompson

1978, 247) that disregards that society’s instances and levels “are in fact human activi- Communication in Society
ties, institutions, and ideas” that humans experience (97).

The river is a much better metaphor for society than a house or a clockwork. Society is a
dynamic and productive flow of human activities. Georg Lukács metaphorically describes
society as “the river of everyday life” (Lukács 1963, 13, translation from German; see the
visualisation in Figure 8.2). The river as society’s dialectic foregrounds the role of networks,
processes, and streams of social production. Rivers have various branches that dynami-
cally flow in and out of the main current. The metaphor of the river envisions society as dia-
lectical, creative, and contradictory flow of human production. The political and the cultural
are productive currents that flow out of and back into the economy. Communication is the
societal rivers’ water that mediates and enables life inside and reproduction of the stream.

In a capitalist society, rivers are often not as blue and clean as the title of Johann Strauss’s
waltz “On the Beautiful Blue Danube” implies. Capitalist reality more looks like the polluted
210 Foundations of Digital Democracy

FIGURE 8.2 Society as dialectical river

FIGURE 8.3 The polluted river as metaphor for alienation in class and capitalist societies
Source: Wikimedia Commons, Jan Jörg [Public domain].

river shown in Figure 8.3. The polluted river is a metaphor for how structures of class and
domination damage life, humans, society, and nature. A critical theory of communication
needs to also look at communication’s role in alienated society, i.e. class societies and capi-
talist society. The section of this chapter that follows discusses communication in capitalism.

8.4 Communication, Alienation and Digital

Capitalism
This section first discusses what alienation is about (Subsection 8.4.1) and then analyses
the connection of alienation and communication in capitalist society (Subsection 8.4.2)
with a special focus on examples from digital capitalism.
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 211

8.4.1 What Is Alienation?

Humans are the “ensemble of the social relations” (Marx 1845, 4) in which they interact
with other humans in everyday life. We are and are becoming in the course of our lives
through the social relations we produce, reproduce, enter, and where we meet others as
part of society. Social relations, organisations, institutions, and society can be organised
in different manners. In co-operative social relations, humans act in manners that benefit
all or at least the many. In competitive, instrumental social relations, humans try to take
advantage of each other so that one or some benefit at the expense of others. There is
a difference between co-operative and instrumental reason. Instrumental reason guides
human action in manners so that some instrumentalise others, whereas co-operative
reason shapes actions in ways that create advantages and a better life for all. Instrumen-
tal and co-operative actions are two forms of purposive action. Whereas the first is inter-
ested in creating benefits for the few, the second wants to create benefits for the many.

Alienation is the term that Marx uses for characterising dominative and unequal social
relations where humans do not control the conditions under which they live. In alienated
relations, humans do not control the relations, means, and results of social production.

Communication, Alienation and Digital Capitalism

Marx characterises alienation as “loss of self” (Marx 1844a, 228), “powerlessness”
(228), “the loss of the object” (Marx 1844c, 273), “the loss of his [the human’s] reality”
(279), “the product as a loss” (279). Alienation means a power gap and the loss and lack
of control. On the one hand, Marx sees alienation as economic alienation, i.e. as class
relations, relations where the worker’s activity “belongs to another; it is the loss of his
self” (Marx 1844c, 274). But on the other hand, he characterises religious ideology and
the bourgeois state as alienation (Fuchs 2018c), which shows that besides and together
with economic alienation there are also political and cultural forms of alienation. David
Harvey (2018) therefore argues that alienation is a universal process that extends beyond
economic production into the realisation of value, the consumption and distribution of
commodities, politics, culture, and social life. He speaks of universal alienation.

Harvey (2003, 2005) defines the new imperialism and neoliberalism as the commodification
of (almost) everything and accumulation by dispossession. Commodification and exploitation
and therefore the attempt to universalise alienation are immanent features of capitalism.
Neoliberalism has managed to break down welfare state barriers to the universalisation of
economic alienation so that commodification was able to intensify and extend itself.

Erich Fromm draws a distinction between Humanism and authoritarianism. In authoritar-

ian social forms, “an authority states what is good for man and lays down the laws and
212 Foundations of Digital Democracy

norms of conduct” (Fromm 1965, 6). In Humanist social forms, the human being is “both
the norm giver and the subject of the norms” (6). Authoritarianism is a type of charac-
ter structure, ideology, social structure, and social system where humans are treated
like things and instruments. Humanism is a type of character structure, ideology, social
structure, and social system where humans are treated in a humane way so that they
can realise their potentials and society can realise its possibilities so that many benefit.
Georg Lukács (1971) uses the term reification for processes where humans are treated
like things. Axel Honneth (2008) argues for the renewal of the concept of reification in
critical theory and interprets it as processes that create and sustain disrespect. Reifica-
tion (Verdinglichung) is closely related to alienation (Entfremdung). Whereas reification
more foregrounds the process of reducing humans to the status of things, alienation has
more stress on the result of this process, namely that humans aren’t what they could,
deserve and should be, but are out of control of the conditions that shape their lives.

Class and dominative societies are built on authoritarian, alienated, reifying, and disre-
spectful structures that turn humans into mere objects, instruments, and things. Human
subjects thereby become the objects of control, domination, and exploitation. Table 8.2
shows what forms instrumental reason and co-operative reason take on in society. Al-
ienation is the colonisation of society by instrumental reason so that instrumentality
dominates over co-operation. In instrumental, alienated societies, there is an antago-
nism between instrumental, alienating forces and forces that struggle for advancing the
logic of co-operation.

There is a basic antagonism between instrumental and co-operative reason. It takes

place both at the level of practices and structures that mutually shape each other. In the
economy, reification and alienation take on the form of class relations where private
property owners exploit workers. In a socialist economy, there is in contrast to class
societies common ownership of the means of production and workers collectively gov-
ern and control the organisations they work in. There is an economic democracy. In the
political system, reification and alienation mean domination of one group over others

TABLE 8.2 A
 lienation as the antagonism between instrumental and co-operative reason in society

Reification practices, alienated Co-operative practices, Humanistic structures

structures
Economy Exploitation: private property Self-management: commons
Politics Domination: dictatorship Participation: democracy
Culture Disrespect: ideology, demagoguery Love: friendship
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 213

and in the extreme case dictatorship. Co-operative political reason in contrast means a
participatory democracy, where humans collectively control the conditions that shape
their lives (Macpherson 1973, Pateman 1970). In alienated, reified culture, there are ide-
ologies that try to legitimate dominative interests by misrepresenting and dissimulating
reality and structures that give respect and fame to few and disrespect and disregard
the many, who lack voice and visibility. Co-operative cultural reason in contrast means
that everyone is treated in a respectful manner, is recognised, and has a voice in the
public sphere.

Erich Fromm (1947, 1965, 1976) introduces the social character as a level that mediates
between individual psychology and society. The social character is a dominant, typical
psychological character structure that has a higher likelihood in a certain social group
than in other groups. Authoritarianism and Humanism are the two basic social characters
that Fromm identifies. Authoritarian individuals are destructive, exploitative, competi-
tive, aggressive, and hateful. Humanists are creative, caring, loving, co-operative, and
helpful. A human being’s psyche and consciousness are shaped by the social relations
they enter over the course of their life and are therefore influenced by the experiences

Communication, Alienation and Digital Capitalism

they make and the micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of society, including the family, per-
sonal relations, the economy, political life, and cultural relations.

Capitalism is a mode of economic production, where humans are forced to sell their
labour-power to capitalists who own the means of production as private property and to
produce commodities that are sold on the market in order to yield monetary profit that
is reinvested with the goal of accumulating ever more capital. According to Marx, in the
capitalist economy, the working class is “a machine for the production of surplus-value”
and the capitalist class “a machine for the transformation of this surplus-value into sur-
plus capital” (Marx 1867a, 742) and an “extractor of surplus labour and an exploiter of
surplus-labour” (425).

In feudal societies, the feudal economy was closely integrated with the monarchical
political system. The political rulers were also members of the property-owning class.
Religious power formed an important ideological, political, and economic force interact-
ing and legitimating the monarchy. With the rise of capitalism, the economy became dis-
embedded from the political system and a new political economy emerged consisting of
the class relation between capital and labour as well as the modern nation-state. The au-
thority of the monarch, the aristocracy, and religion started to decline and in their place,
the authority of the capitalist class in the economy and a ruling political elite in the polit-
ical system emerged. A division of labour between capitalist owners, managers, political
214 Foundations of Digital Democracy

TABLE 8.3 C apitalist society

Sphere Dominant structure Dominant processes Underlying antagonism

Economy Capital/labour-class relation Capital accumulation Capitalists vs. workers
Politics Nation-state Accumulation of decision-power Bureaucrats vs. citizens
and influence
Culture Ideologies Accumulation of reputation, Ideologues/celebrities vs.
attention, respect everyday people

bureaucrats, and ideologues emerged. Bourgeois economy, state, and ideology are at the
same time relatively autonomous, intersecting, interpenetrating, and interacting.

Given that economic production shapes and takes on particular forms in the political and
the cultural system, the capitalist system is not just an economic mode of production but
a type of society, a societal formation. Capitalism is a type of society where the logic of
accumulation shapes the capitalist economic mode of production, the nation-state as a
mode of governance and mode of political production, and ideologies such as individu-
alism, racism, nationalism, etc. operate as a mode of legitimation and mode of cultural
production.

Table 8.3 shows the dominant structures and processes in capitalist society’s three
spheres. Capitalism is a general societal realm shaped by the logic of accumulation. In
the economy, accumulation implies and is based on the competition between actors on
the market who have to strive for controlling and accumulating capital. In capitalism’s
political system, there is competition between political groups who strive to accumu-
late influence and decision-power. In capitalism’s cultural system, there is competition
between individuals who strive to become celebrities that accumulate reputation, atten-
tion, and respect. Structures of accumulation imply that there are winners and losers. A
tiny minority of capitalists, managers, governors, and celebrities, and influencers accu-
mulate power whereby workers, citizens, and everyday people are disempowered.

8.4.2 Communication in the Context of Alienation

and Digital Capitalism
Instrumental reason and co-operative reason also shape communication (see Table 8.4).
Alienation is the expression and manifestation of instrumental reason.

The class character of knowledge work and communication constitutes the authoritar-
ian and alienated economic type of information. The property-owning class controls the
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 215

TABLE 8.4 C ommunication in the context of instrumental and co-operative reason

Instrumental reason Instrumental reason Co-operative reason

creating alienation and alienation in
capitalism
Economic system Knowledge and Knowledge and Knowledge and
communication as private communication communication as
property commodities, as capital and commons, co-ownership,
exploitation of knowledge commodities and co-production in
labour, means of self-managed knowledge-
communication as private creating companies
property
Political system Dictatorial control State control of Participatory knowledge and
of knowledge and knowledge and democratic communication,
communication processes communication public service media
Cultural system Ideological knowledge and Communication of Socialist-Humanist
communication individualism and knowledge and
nationalism communication, citizen
media

means of communication. In a capitalist society, many communication technologies are

Communication, Alienation and Digital Capitalism

organised as private property. There is a class relation between a dominant class and
an exploited class of knowledge and communication workers who create knowledge and
forms of communication that they do not own, govern, and control. In capitalism, com-
munication and knowledge are organised in the form of cultural commodities that are
sold on the market in order to accumulate capital. They are part of capitalism’s cultural
economy.

Let us have a look at an example of economic alienation in the context of digital cap-
italism: digital advertising. In digital capitalism’s economy, we find monopoly corpora-
tions such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, or Microsoft that control digital services
such as search engines, phones, social networks, online shopping, or operating systems.
­Figure 8.4 shows the development of global ad revenues.

The relevance of Internet advertising has continuously grown. Digital advertising today
controls the largest share of global ad revenues. In 2018, Google and Facebook together
accounted for 72.1 per cent of the world’s digital ad revenues and 31.9 per cent of the
total global ad revenues.1 Google and Facebook are the world’s largest advertising
agencies.

A Humanistic organisation of the information economy implies the collective own-

ership of the means of communication and the organisation of communication and
216 Foundations of Digital Democracy

FIGURE 8.4 The development of various types of advertising

culture as common goods and gifts. There are self-managed cultural companies (cultural
co-operatives).

When communication and knowledge are organised in an authoritarian and alienated

manner at the political level, there is a state monopoly of the means of communica-
tion that is used for disseminating ideological knowledge and political opposition and
opponents’ voices are stifled, repressed, or eliminated. For example, broadcasting and
publishing in Nazi-Germany were strictly controlled by the state that ensured that noth-
ing but the fascist ideology was broadcast and published. After Hitler came to power,
a state-owned broadcasting company, the Reichs-Rundfunks-Gesellschaft (RRG, Reich
Broadcasting Corporation), was created. It replaced regional broadcasting companies.
The Reich Chamber of Broadcasting required all media workers to register so that their
background and worldviews could be checked and monitored. Gleichschaltung meant
that the Nazi-state made sure that the content broadcast and published by the media
was aligned with fascist ideology, racism, anti-Semitism, etc. In the authoritarian or-
ganisation of political communication, there is mass propaganda that tries to make indi-
viduals to listen to the authoritarian leader. There are authoritarian elements not just in
fascism, but in all forms of capitalism. Capitalist media want us to listen and admire the
ruling class, the bureaucratic elite, celebrities, and influencers. “We listen to every voice
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 217

and everybody but not to ourselves. We are constantly exposed to the noise of opinions
and ideas hammering at us from everywhere: motion pictures, newspapers, radio, idle
chatter” (Fromm 1947, 121). In authoritarian communication, humans are compelled and
encouraged to give attention to a leader (an ideology, system, group, or individual).

Let us have a look at political alienation in the context of contemporary authoritarian

digital capitalism. In the political domain of digital capitalism, we have seen the rise of
new forms of nationalism and right-wing authoritarianism that constitute a new phase
of capitalist development that can be termed authoritarian capitalism (Fuchs 2018a).
Right-wing authoritarians make use of the Internet and social media for spreading their
ideology (Fuchs 2020d). Donald Trump is the most well-known example. With 71.5 million
Twitter followers in late January 2020, he is the individual with the tenth highest number
of followers. He has more followers on Twitter than Justin Timberlake and Kim Kar-
dashian. Figure 8.5 shows a typical example of how Trump uses Twitter for scapegoating
immigrants as criminals and blaming them for social problems in order to distract atten-
tion from how these problems are grounded in capitalism’s class and power structures.

Democratic governance of the means of communication and public knowledge is a key

Communication, Alienation and Digital Capitalism

feature of the Humanistic organisation of political communication. Citizens and cultural
workers participate in media organisations’ decision-taking procedures.

There is no state or other monopoly of voice. Citizens are empowered by the media to
speak and listen to each other. Media reports do not simply cover and glorify the elite,
but give attention to the lives of everyday people. “To be able to listen to oneself is a
prerequisite for the ability to listen to others” (Fromm 1947, 79). The Humanistic organi-
sation of political communication enables humans to listen to each other. It also enables
them to listen and give attention to themselves. In such a system, humans engage with
each other. There are public service media that are independent, which means that such

FIGURE 8.5 Donald Trump’s use of Twitter

Source: https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1088058726794387456.
218 Foundations of Digital Democracy

media are independent of state and corporate power and provide engaging information,
communication, education, and entertainment services. Public service media are enabled
by laws but not controlled by the state.

In a cultural system that is organised in authoritarian and alienated manner, we find the
constant public communication of ideology. Ideologies are forms of knowledge that legit-
imate domination and class society. By producing and disseminating ideology, particular
individuals and social groups aim at convincing and winning over the individuals of the
public so that they create hegemony that agrees with exploitation and domination and
sees these phenomena as necessary, natural, and good. Ideologues use strategies such
as acceleration, brevity, dissimulation, distortion, lies, manipulation, personalisation,
scandalisation, scapegoating, superficiality, etc. Ideologues produce and spread false
knowledge. They want to create and reproduce false consciousness.

Let us have a look at an example of alienated culture in the context of digital capital-
ism: the Cambridge Analytica scandal. In the cultural realm of digital capitalism, we
have seen the emergence of the new forms of online communication of ideology. In this
context, online fake news is of particular importance. Online fake news are fabricated
news stories that are spread on the Internet and social media. The goal is to reify the
consciousness of citizens through right-wing propaganda that appeals to emotions such
as anger, fear, hatred, and sadness. Fake news is ideology communicated online in the
form of manufactured news. Examples of alt-right websites are Breitbart, Drudge Report,
InfoWars, Daily Caller, Daily Wire, and WorldNetDaily.

The combination of digital advertising, digital authoritarianism, and digital ideology has
enabled the Cambridge Analytica scandal. Cambridge Analytica paid money to Global
Science Research for conducting fake online personality tests in order to obtain the per-
sonal Facebook data of almost 90 million users. The data was used for targeting political
ads and fake news to voters. Facebook benefited financially because big data flows
are part of its capital accumulation model. It therefore allowed open interfaces that
supported large-scale data gathering by external actors. The lack of political regulation
of the Internet has enabled digital surveillance. Right-wing authoritarians use all means
necessary, including data breaches and privacy violations, to spread their ideology. Cam-
bridge Analytica was enabled by the combination of far-right ideology, Facebook’s digital
capitalist practices, and neoliberal politics.

Because of the convergence of production and consumption as prosumption, we have

seen how particular questions concerning consumers have become questions of work
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 219

and production. The users of Facebook and Google produce commodities, namely data
and attention that enable targeted ads that are sold to ad clients. They are digital work-
ers (Fuchs 2017c). Surveillance, privacy violations, and data breaches are not simply
consumer issues but questions about digital labour that not just privacy advocates but
also trade unions should deal with. The reason why Google and Facebook collect and
never delete masses of personal data is that data is the digital oil that drives these
giant corporations’ profits. Internet use is not just a matter of consumers’ rights but a
matter of workers’ rights. We need digital trade unions and branches of existing unions
that deal with digital labour issues and campaign together with consumer protection
organisations, human rights organisations, and privacy advocates. In digital capitalism,

Communication and the Struggle for Alternatives in the Age of Digital Capitalism
questions about privacy rights, human rights, and consumer rights are questions about
the rights of digital workers.

A culture that is organised in a Humanistic manner does not require, produce, and dis-
seminate ideology. It is unideological. It produces knowledge that encourages critical
thinking, self-activity, and creativity.

Given the intensification of capitalism and alienation under neoliberalism, the question
arises about how alternatives and struggles for alternatives can look like and what role
communication plays in this context. The section that follows focuses on this topic.

8.5 Communication and the Struggle

for Alternatives in the Age of Digital
Capitalism
Social and class struggles are an important feature of Marxist Humanist approaches.
Given that Marxist Humanism stresses the human being, socialism as Humanism, Hu-
manism as socialism, and praxis, the logical implication is that it foregrounds the im-
portance of class and social struggles as part of and for attaining Humanist Socialism.

There is an etymological connection between communication, community, and the com-

mons. In a true communication society, the etymological origin of communication is real-
ised. A communication society that lives up to its promises is a society of the commons.
Communication then does not mean instrumentalisation, commodification, bureaucrati-
sation, and ideologisation of knowledge sharing and making something common so that
the many benefit. Commoning is a true communication society’s fundamental principle.
A communication society is a society where humans exert common control of the condi-
tions that govern and shape their lives.
220 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Communications are in such a society commons-based, i.e. communication systems

whose “primary freedom […] lies in not being a trade” (Marx 1842, 175). The basic eco-
nomic antagonism that shapes communication, culture, and technology today is the one
between commodification and commonification.

A society of the commons is a society that realises the creation of the economic com-
mons (wealth and self-fulfilment for all), the political commons (participatory democ-
racy), and the cultural commons (voice and recognition of all).

Raymond Williams envisions a communicative and cultural democracy. In such a democ-

racy, there is the co-operation of public service media, local community media, and cultural
co-operatives. Williams envisions “new kinds of communal, cooperative and collective
institutions” (Williams 1983, 123). Democratic communications are using the logic and ra-
tionality of co-operation. In a democratic communication system, corporations, the state,
and celebrities do not control voice and visibility. In such a system, we find true freedom
of speech that enables humans to listen, speak, and engage. Democratic means of com-
munication are “means of participation and of common discussion” (Williams 1976, 134).
Williams argues that the key means of production should be publicly owned and given for
use to self-managed organisations, which needs to make sure that there is a diversity of
political opinion and that state control of opinions is avoided (Williams 1979, 370).

For Marx, human beings are practical because they transform society through practices. By
praxis, Marx refers to a certain form of practice. Praxis means political practices that aim
at or organise a human-centred society. Praxis is the practical struggle for the creation and
sustainment of a commons-based society. The creation of a true and good communication
society is in need of struggles that are informed by “the categorical imperative to over-
throw all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being” (Marx
1844b, 182). Praxis includes class struggles that aim at abolishing exploitation, class, and
domination. Praxis wants to establish an “absolute humanism” (Gramsci 1971, 417).

Social struggles need their own culture, which includes the creation and communication
of stories that focus on how exploitation and domination damage humans and society
and how resistance can be self-organised. The communication of injustices and resist-
ance is an important aspect of the self-organisation of protest.

Praxis communication is a particular form of human communication that has an ethical and
political character. It is oriented toward the struggle for Humanism and socialism. Praxis com-
munication is always communicative practice. But only a subset of communicative practices
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 221

is praxis communication. Communication is not automatically good. It is not automatically

a means that questions exploitation and domination. Communication is a practice by and in
which humans reproduce and produce social relations. Progressive activists use communi-
cation technologies such as the Internet for challenging exploitation and domination.

Let us have a brief look at how social struggles are changing in the age of digital
capitalism.

Given the changes of the working class and the importance of the social worker, the
social factory, digitalisation, globalisation, the rise of prosumption and freelancers in
capitalism, new concepts, new strategies, and new methods of struggle are needed

Communication and the Struggle for Alternatives in the Age of Digital Capitalism
in the age of digital capitalism. A Marxist-Humanist theory of communication aims to
inform struggles for a good, commons-based, public Internet in a good, commons-based
society that has a vivid, democratic public sphere.

Neoliberalism’s individualisation of labour, the emergence of digital labour, and the blur-
ring of the boundaries between labour and leisure, the private and the public, production
and consumption, the office/factory and the home, have created new challenges for
trade unions and the organisation of the working class.

Given the globalisation, digitalisation, and informatisation of labour and the emergence
of productive consumption (prosumption), we need new methods of strike. A strike of
knowledge workers will not be effective if it isn’t qualitatively different from traditional
strikes organised in transportation or manufacturing. In general, strike as the refusal of
labour needs digital and global means and levels of organisation.

A study of communication in the protests of Occupy movements showed that activists

use multiple media for mobilisation-oriented communication (Fuchs 2014): classical in-
terpersonal communication via phones, email, face-to-face, and private social media
profiles as well as more public forms of communication such as Facebook groups, Twit-
ter and email lists. Posting announcements on alternative social media is much more
uncommon than doing the same on Twitter and Facebook. Correlation analysis showed
that a higher level of protest activity tends to result in a higher level of media use for
protest mobilisation. A higher level of engagement in protests has positive influences
on the usage of media for political mobilisation. Mobilisation in face-to-face communi-
cation tends to positively influence other forms of mobilisation communication. Posting
announcements on Facebook in order to mobilise others tend to positively impact other
forms of mobilisation communication.
222 Foundations of Digital Democracy

In digital capitalism, class and social struggles have taken on new forms. Adbusters is a
Canadian campaign and culture jamming group. It was very influential in the creation of
the Occupy Wall Street movement. In September 2018, Adbusters organised #Occupy-
SiliconValley, a one-day strike against Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. Here is an
excerpt from #OccupySiliconValley’s call for action:

How do we take on the largest and most corrupt corporate Goliaths to ever
exist? […] 1 Google No Search Day: The ONLY thing we search is: does google
do evil? We force the megabot to do some soul-searching. We see if it can tell
us, the people, what’s really going on behind that insidious techno-curtain.

#OccupySiliconValley was not simply a consumer boycott. It was a digital labour strike. It
was an example of what dimensions strikes should take into account in the age of digital
capitalism.

Digital Socialist Humanism is the alternative to digital capitalism (Fuchs 2020b). It is a

democratic socialist society where digital technologies benefit the many and help creat-
ing wealth, participation, recognition, and voice for all. Social struggles on the Internet,
utilising the Internet, and against digital capital are a key element of socialist praxis
communication today. But we cannot wait until after the disappearance of digital capi-
talism to create alternatives. The creation of alternative Internet platforms is itself part
of the struggle for digital socialism. Platform co-operatives and public service Internet
platforms are two types of digital alternatives. They are both non-profit models of In-
ternet organisation. Platform co-operatives are self-managed, collectively owned and
controlled Internet platforms. Users and the platform’s digital workers operate, own, and
govern a platform co-operatives. Public service Internet platforms are Internet platforms
that are controlled and operated by public service media such as the BBC.

A public service YouTube operated by a network of public service media such as BBC,
ARD, France Télévisions, etc. is an alternative to Google’s commercial YouTube. A public
service YouTube should encourage the creation of videos on topics that are important
for democracy. This can be done by creating challenges and campaigns where users are
invited to create and upload videos that accompany certain radio and TV programmes.
Collective production of such videos should be encouraged in institutions such as school
classes, groups of pupils and students, council houses, adult learning groups, unions,
religious and philosophical groups, civil society organisations, etc. Digital creativity can
be fostered by offering public service media’s archive material in digital format using a
Creative Commons CC-BY-NC licence that allows adoption and change of the material
 Chapter Eight | Critical Theory of Communication 223

for non-commercial purposes. Public service media shouldn’t co-operate with capitalist
media but with community and citizen media, platform co-operatives, and other public
cultural institutions such as museums, universities, and libraries.

The following section summarises the basic findings of this chapter.

8.6 Conclusions: Humanist Socialism in the Age

of Digital Capitalism
This chapter has argued for the renewal of Marxist Humanism and Humanist Socialism
in 21st-century digital capitalism. Marxist-Humanist theory stresses the importance of
humans in society. It is a practice- and praxis-oriented approach that stresses the trans-
formative capacity of class and social struggles against alienation and ideologies and for
a society that combines Humanism and socialism.

Conclusions: Humanist Socialism in the Age of Digital Capitalism

A Marxist-Humanist theory of communication stresses that communication is a form of
human practice and the process that produces understanding, sociality, social relations,
social systems, social structures, and society. There is a dialectic of work and commu-
nication. In alienated societies, we are confronted by alienated forms of communica-
tion that are governed by instrumental reason. Figure 8.6 summarises the antagonism
between instrumental and co-operative reason in the realms of society in general and
communication in particular.

FIGURE 8.6 The antagonism between instrumental and co-operative in society in general and the realm of
communication
224 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Praxis is the social struggle for a Socialist-Humanist society. The establishment of dem-
ocratic means of communication is a form of praxis communication. A democratic public
sphere requires democratic means of communication that are operated not-for-profit;
inform, educate and entertain in unbiased manners unbiased by ideology and economic
and political power; and give everyday people public voices in society.

Digital socialism is the Humanist alternative to digital capitalism (for an overview, see
the 15 contributions in Fuchs 2020b). Digital socialism is the struggle for an Internet and
a digital media landscape, and a digital society that is not dominated by corporations
but that is controlled by users, workers, and citizens in the form of a participatory digital
democracy.

Note
1 Data sources: WARC, SEC-filings forms 10-K for Google/Alphabet and Facebook (financial
year 2018).

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Chapter Nine
Digital Democracy, Public Service Media, and the
Public Service Internet

9.1 Introduction
9.2 Democracy and the Public Sphere
9.3 Digital Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere
9.4 Digital Media’s Democratic Deficits and Democratic Capacities
9.5 Legal Aspects of Digital Democracy in the Realm of Public Service Media
9.6 Summary and Recommendations for Action
References

9.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with a specific aspect of the democratic mandate of public service
media. In doing so, it analyses the relationship between digital democracy and public
service media. The main question is: What contributions can public service media make
to digital democracy?

Some sub-questions are asked about this overall topic of public service media and digital
democracy:

Question 1: What are digital democracy and the digital public sphere?
Question 2: What are the main trends in the development of digital media today, what
are digital media’s democratic possibilities and deficits, and what role can public
service media play in strengthening digital democracy and digital public sphere?
Question 3: What legal framework is needed so that public service media can
strengthen digital democracy?

This chapter is divided into four parts besides the introduction: Sections 9.2 and 9.3 deal
with research question 1, Section 9.4 deals with research question 2 and Section 9.5

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-11
230 Foundations of Digital Democracy

with research question 3. Section 9.6 draws conclusions and formulates recommenda-
tions for action.

9.2 Democracy and the Public Sphere

The term “democracy” comes etymologically from the Greek word demokratia.
(δημοκρατία), which is formed from the two words demos (δῆμος) and kratos (κρατός,
Macht). Democracy therefore means power emanating from the people. Democracy mod-
els and theories of democracy differ according to who is considered part of the people
and what is understood by power. Therefore, there is not one understanding of democ-
racy, but there are rather many different models of democracy.

David Held (2006), in his book Models of Democracy, which is one of the most widely read
introductions to democratic theory, distinguishes between two basic models of democ-
racy, namely direct democracy and liberal representative democracy. Direct democracy is
understood to be “a system of decision-making about public affairs in which citizens are
directly involved” (Held 2006, 4). Liberal representative democracy is “a system of rule
embracing elected ‘officers’ who undertake to ‘represent’ the interests and/or views of
citizens within the framework of the ‘rule of law’” (Held 2006, 4). In democratic theory, a
distinction is also made between parliamentary and presidential democracy, competitive
and consociational democracy, as well as between majority and consensus democracy
(Schmidt 1997, Waschkuhn 1998).

Held (2006) distinguishes nine models of democracy:

1) Classical Athenian democracy:
direct citizen participation in the agora;
2) Liberal democracy:
political freedom as liberal civil rights, election of representatives, the rule of law,
the constitution, the separation of powers;
3) Direct democracy or plebiscitary democracy:
direct participation of citizens in the political decision-making process through
voting or through rotating councils that are elected by citizens and can be voted
out at any time;
4) Competitive elitist democracy:
parliamentary government with strong executive and extensive decision-making
power of leaders, competition between rival political elites and parties for dom-
inance in the state;
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 231

5) Pluralist democracy:
civil rights, separation of powers, the government mediates between a plurality
of competing interests and tries to balance them, protection of minorities;
6) Legal democracy:
majority principle coupled with the constitutional state and the rule of law; mini-
misation of state intervention in the economy, civil society and private life; max-
imisation of the extension of market economy principles to society, the minimal
state, emphasis on individual freedom;
7) Participatory democracy:
grassroots democracy, the extension of democracy from the political system to
the workplace and local communities, creation of a resource base as well as
space, time and educational opportunities as the basis of grassroots democracy,
technological minimisation of socially necessary work coupled with the reduction
of working hours as the material foundation of grassroots democracy;
8) Deliberative democracy:
the focus is on political debate and communication among citizens, debate on po-
litical issues and discussions between citizens and political representatives; citi-
zens’ forums, consultative assemblies, deliberative polls for opinion assessment;
9) Democratic autonomy:
constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights, parliamentary election of rep-

Democracy and the Public Sphere

resentatives combined with direct democratic elements, citizens’ forums and
other deliberative mechanisms, extension of democracy to municipal services and
self-managed companies, transnational democratic institutions (cosmopolitan
democracy).

Models 1, 2, and 3 are classical approaches to democracy, while models 4–9 are newer
approaches. With regard to Held’s two basic models of democracy, it can be said that
models 2, 4, 5, and 6 are manifestations of liberal representative democracy, while mod-
els 1, 3, 7, and 8 are forms of direct democracy. Model 9 represents a combination of the
two basic models.

Communication is an important and indispensable aspect of the political system in all

models of democracy: In Athenian democracy, direct political communication of citizens
took place face to face in the marketplace. In liberal democracy, party programmes
must be communicated to citizens. In elite democracy, leaders communicate their pro-
grammes and decisions to the people. Similarly, competing positions are communicated
232 Foundations of Digital Democracy

to the people. In pluralist democracy, representatives of different interests communicate

through the state in order to reach a balance or to negotiate. In legal democracy, the
market is considered an important instrument of communication between consumers
and citizens. In participatory democracy, there is enough space and time for grassroots
political communication among citizens to bring about decisions. In deliberative democ-
racy, consultative processes take place to organise ongoing communication on political
issues. In democratic autonomy, grassroots and deliberative forms of communication
(e.g. citizens’ forums or assemblies) are combined with representative democratic forms
of communication (e.g. canvassing or media coverage of the programmes of the parties
campaigning for election).

On a general level, it can be said that the public sphere is a central mechanism of any
political system. By “public” we generally mean goods and spaces that are “open to all”
(Habermas 1991, 1). For example, one speaks of public education, public buildings, public
parks, public squares, public meetings, public rallies, public opinion, public service me-
dia, etc. Public goods and institutions are not reserved for a clique or a club of the privi-
leged, but are intended for the general public, i.e. all members of a community. Often, but
not exclusively, public goods and institutions are organised and regulated by the state.
There may be certain conditions of access, such as payment of the licence fee as a legal
condition of access to public broadcasting. However, these access conditions should be
affordable for the general public, i.e. they should not discriminate according to income,
class status, gender, origin, abilities, level of education, etc. The political dimension of
the public sphere was already present in ancient Greece, where the sphere of the polis
was “common (koine) to the free citizens” (Habermas 1991, 3).

The public sphere is a sphere of public political communication that mediates between
the other subsystems of society, i.e. the economy, politics, culture, and private life. In the
ideal type of the public sphere, it is a sphere that organises “critical publicity” (Habermas
1991, 237) and “critical public debate” (Habermas 1991, 52). The public sphere media-
tises political communication. It is a mediating space of political interaction in which
citizens meet, inform themselves politically and communicate politically, and in which
political opinions are formed.

Public communication is an important aspect of the existence of humans as social be-

ings and society. In modern society, the media system is the most important organised
form of public communication (Fuchs 2016). In the media system, media actors produce
public information. News informs citizens about political events and is an occasion for
political communication. In a complex society, there is a system differentiation as well
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 233

as a differentiation of social roles. In a class society, such differentiations take the form
of the division of labour and the division of power. Various organisations and interest
groups in the economy, politics, culture, and civil society (companies, business associa-
tions, trade unions, workers’ associations, clubs, citizens’ initiatives, lobbyists, religious
communities, parties, politicians, social movements, non-governmental organisations,
etc.) try to influence the form and content of public political information. This is done, for
example, through media presence, public relations, advertising, organisational interlock-
ing and networks, etc. The media system interacts with the economy, politics, culture,
and private life. Media organisations are not only cultural organisations that produce and
publicly disseminate content, but also economic organisations that need resources to ex-
ist. Media organisations are also politically shaped by legal regulations on the one hand
and by tax benefits (e.g. tax levies, public subsidies) on the other. Figure 9.1 presents a
model of the role of the media system in the public sphere.

Media have (a) a political-economic and (b) a cultural dimension. On the one hand, they
need resources such as money, legal frameworks, staff, and organisational structures in
order to exist. In this respect, they are economic organisations. However, they are special
economic organisations that are also cultural organisations, since they produce meanings
of society that serve public information, public communication, and the formation of opin-
ions. Since opinion formation and communication also include political opinion formation
and political communication, media organisations have implications for democracy and

Democracy and the Public Sphere

the political system. As cultural organisations, all media organisations are public because
they publish information. As economic organisations, on the other hand, only certain media

Economy Socio-economy
(owners, managers, (organised economic
employees) interests)

Public
information
Politics
(citizens,
politicians)
Media system
Socio-politics
(activists)
Lobbying,
information
sources,
Socio-culture Culture
regulation,
(communities of (private individuals,
funding interest) consumers)

FIGURE 9.1 The media system as the public sphere’s communication system
234 Foundations of Digital Democracy

TABLE 9.1 T wo levels and four types of media organisations

Capitalist media Public service media Civil society media Authoritarian state
media
Political Media companies Media institutions that Non-profit civil State-controlled,
economy that are privately are enabled by the society media state-owned, state-
(relations of owned for-profit state, are not-for-profit organisations censored media;
ownership organisations organisations and have that act such media are
and a defined public service either state-owned
production, remit that they follow or privately owned
legal and advance under state control
relations) or have mixed
models where the
state plays a key
role; might be not-
for-profit or for-profit
Culture Production and Production and distribution Production and Production and
(public distribution of of information that distribution of distribution of
circulation information that support members information that information
of support members of the public in support members that aim at the
meanings of the public in the production of of the public in member of the
and ideas) the production meanings, interpersonal the production public’s production
of meanings, communication, and the of meanings, of meanings in
interpersonal formation of opinions interpersonal manners that adhere
communication communication, to state ideology
and the formation and the formation and propaganda
of opinions of opinions

organisations are public, while others take on a private sector character, i.e. are organisa-
tions that have private owners and operate for profit. Public service media and civil society
media, on the other hand, are not profit-oriented and are collectively owned by the state or
a community. Table 9.1 illustrates these distinctions. Public service media are public in the
sense of the cultural public and the political-economic public. They publish information and
are owned by the public. A special form are authoritarian state media. These are media
where the publishing process is strictly controlled by an authoritarian state. Journalistic
work is controlled by state institutions. The political economy of such media can take on
different forms. They might have a not-for-profit imperative but serve yet another instru-
mental rationality, namely the advancement of state ideology and state propaganda.

Since public service media are public organisers and mediators of political information,
communication, and opinion-forming, the democratic mandate is usually also enshrined
as part of the public service remit of public service media.

The BBC Charter is the legal framework that governs the activities and organisation
of the BBC for a certain period of time. The current BBC Charter came into force on
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 235

1 January 2017 and is valid until the end of 2027. It states that it is part of the public
service remit for the BBC to “provide impartial news and information to help people un-
derstand and engage with the world around them […] [so that they can] participate in the
democratic process, at all levels, as active and informed citizens” (http://downloads.bbc.
co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/2016/charter.pdf, aufgerufen
am 20. Dezember 2017). In Austria, the ORF Act regulates the establishment, mission,
principles, organisation and control of the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation. According
to the ORF Act, the core public service mandate of the ORF includes, among other things
“the promotion of understanding for all issues of democratic life“1 (ORF-Gesetz, §4 [1]).
Similar definitions of public service media’s democratic remit can be found in many other
countries that have an independent public service broadcaster.

Both legal texts just mentioned define a democratic remit for public service media: pub-
lic service media must ensure that their services and offerings help to form active and
informed citizens who can participate in the democratic process and have an under-
standing of democratic issues. The democratic remit is a special quality feature of public
service media. Democracy is a public common good that is meant to protect the rights
of all and that is produced and reproduced only through the collective political behav-

Digital Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere

iour of all citizens. This collective political behaviour includes not only voting, but also
the formation of public and individual political opinion as well as political communica-
tion. Public service media, as public communication systems with a public cultural and
economic character, play a special communicative and informational role in democracy.
The democratic remit should therefore guarantee that public service media contribute to
democratic communication.

Digital media such as the Internet, social media, and the World Wide Web are relatively
new type of media compared to print media and broadcasting. They became popular in
the last fifth of the 20th century. Questions of democracy and the public sphere must
therefore be rethought in the context of digital media.

9.3 Digital Democracy and the Digital

Public Sphere
Kenneth L. Hacker and Jan van Dijk (2000) define digital democracy in the introduction to
the anthology Digital Democracy as follows:

Digital democracy is the use of information and communication technology

(ICT) and computer-mediated communication (CMC) in all kinds of media (e.g.
236 Foundations of Digital Democracy

the Internet, interactive broadcasting and digital telephony) for purposes of

enhancing political democracy or the participation of citizens in democratic
communication […] We define digital democracy as a collection of attempts to
practise democracy without limits of time, space and other physical conditions,
using ICT or CMC instead, as an addition, not a replacement for traditional
’analogue’ political practices.
(Hacker and van Dijk 2000, 1)

Several comments should be made on this definition:

• The term “digital democracy” is relatively widespread today. However, terms such
as electronic democracy, teledemocracy, cyberdemocracy, Internet democracy, vir-
tual democracy, or electronic participation are also used equivalently.
• Since 2000, when Hacker and van Dijk gave this definition, the media landscape
has evolved. The term “digital telephony” is hardly used today. Rather, people
usually speak of “mobile telephony” and the “mobile phone”. Furthermore, social
media should certainly be added to the example technologies (blogs, micro-blogs,
social networks, wikis, etc.).
• The term “information and communication technologies” is often used synony-
mously with the terms computer technology and digital technology/media. How-
ever, information and communication technologies also include classical media
such as the painting, the theatre, music, the concert, the book, the newspaper,
the cinema, the telephone, and radio. Information and communication technol-
ogies are information and communication systems that are mediated by social
and societal practices. The computer and the Internet are digital information and
communication technologies.
• Digital democracy is not linked to a specific model of democracy. There are cer-
tainly different forms of digital democracy that are linked to certain models of
democracy (such as direct democracy, liberal and representative democracy, or
participatory democracy). Digital democracy is therefore not about specific tech-
nological applications, but about technically mediated practices in which certain
democratic models and ideas are realised. Digital democracy is based on a dialec-
tic of technology and politics.

Jan van Dijk (2000, 40) distinguishes four democratic information processes: informa-
tion distribution and allocation, information registration, consultation, and conversa-
tion. Based on these information processes, he distinguishes three models of digital
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 237

Market model of Infocratic model of Network model of

digital democracy: digital democracy: digital democracy:
the distribution and the registration of consultation and
allocution of information conversation
information

FIGURE 9.2 Three models of digital democracy (based on van Dijk 2000, 49)

democracy that manifest themselves in certain forms of communication and communica-

tion technologies. Figure 9.2 illustrates these three models.

In the market model of digital democracy, political information is distributed by central

actors such as governments, ministries, parties, parliaments, offices, etc. via computer
networks. The model is an expression of liberal and elite democracy when the emphasis
is on political institutions and leaders, and legal democracy when the private sector

Digital Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere

character of digital media organisations is emphasised. The infocratic model of digital
democracy is about the registration of information via computer networks. This includes,
for example, filling out online forms, submitting applications online, online services
provided by public authorities (e.g. online tax returns), online surveys, online voting, or
expressing consent by pressing “like” or follow buttons on social media. van Dijk (2000,
51) argues that this model is an expression of the plebiscitary and legal models of de-
mocracy. In the network model, political issues are discussed by citizens via computer
networks and there is the possibility for online consultations of political institutions with
citizens. For van Dijk, this model is an expression of the plebiscitary, legal, pluralist, and
participatory models of democracy.

In linking forms of communication and democracy, van Dijk refers to David Held’s (2006)
distinction between different models of democracy. However, he does not take into ac-
count all the models discussed by Held. For example, participatory democracy and de-
liberative democracy are not distinguished but equated. van Dijk reduces participatory
democracy to deliberation and communication. van Dijk (2000, 44) regards “electronic
discussion” as the epitome of participatory digital democracy. While deliberative de-
mocracy is predominantly based on communication between citizens who have different
interests and lifeworlds, participatory democracy, however, is mainly about the extension
238 Foundations of Digital Democracy

of grassroots democracy beyond politics in the narrow sense to different areas of society
as well as the collective control of economic, political, and cultural power (Fuchs 2017,
67–68, 95–96). Grassroots democracy also has to do with new social protest movements,
which often have a grassroots form of organisation, struggle for aspects of participatory
democracy as societal formation (Fuchs 2008, Chapter 8). Jan van Dijk fails to take into
account that the use of computer technologies by grassroots democratic social move-
ments for political mobilisation and the organisation of protest (“cyber-protest”) is an
aspect of participatory digital democracy (Fuchs 2014, 2018).

Power is a complex theoretical concept (Fuchs 2008, 225–247): In objective concepts of

power, power is located in institutions. In subjective concepts of power, it emanates from
individuals and their human and social skills and practices. Dialectical concepts of power
speak of a dialectic of political practices of individual and social subjects and objective
power structures. Based on these concepts of power, four general models of democracy
can be distinguished: Representative democratic models emphasise that institutions and
institutionalised roles (parliamentarians, chancellors, presidents, ministers, etc.) repre-
sent the power of the electorate and the people. In direct democracy/plebiscitary mod-
els, it is emphasised that power emanates from the electorate as political subjects and
that collective political decisions should be made through referendums and popular con-
sultations rather than through representative institutions. In deliberative democracy, the
focus is on political subjects communicating and discussing political issues comprehen-
sively. In the grassroots democracy model (also referred to as participatory democracy),
the focus is on creating political and economic structures that provide people with space,
time, development, and educational opportunities that promote democratic practices and
political communication, so that social institutions are controlled, organised, and man-
aged in a grassroots democratic manner and political participation is encouraged.

The models of liberal democracy, elite democracy, and pluralist democracy are primarily
forms of representative democracy. Athenian democracy and plebiscitary democracy are
primarily forms of direct democracy. Grassroots democracy corresponds to the model of
participatory democracy. Deliberative democracy represents a distinct form of democracy
based on communicative consultation processes between citizens, politicians, and pol-
iticians/citizens. Participatory democracy is based on deliberation, but above all, it em-
phasises the need for institutions and resources that make democracy possible, the lack
or weakness of which creates democratic deficits. The “success of deliberative politics”
depends on “the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of
communication” (Habermas 1994, 7). The model of deliberation can be combined with
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 239

representative democracy, direct democracy, and participatory democracy. Deliberative

democracy is communicative democracy, as it considers political communication as the
central democratic process. Legal democracy combines forms of direct democracy and
representative democracy. Democratic autonomy combines representative democracy,
direct democracy, and grassroots democracy.

Information processes can be understood as coupled processes of cognition, communica-

tion, and co-operation (Hofkirchner 2002): In societal relations, people constantly inform
themselves about their environment and process sensory impressions and experiences
cognitively. Cognition is the basis of the communication process, in which parts of an
individual’s human experiences are shared with other people through symbolic interac-
tion, leading to feedback processes that involve the symbolic sharing of experiences.
In communication, experiences are symbolically communicated so that the respective
lifeworld of the other individual(s) become(s) signified and new meanings emerge. Some
communication processes lead to co-operation, i.e. the joint production of new social
systems and social structures. Figure 9.3 illustrates the role of information processes in
digital democracy.

Digital Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere

Political information processes take place within the public sphere, which is an inter-
face of economy, politics, and culture and interacts with these subsystems of society.
Digital democracy is a form of the public sphere in which digital media are used to
practice democracy. This happens through democratic information, communication, and

Economy Socio-economy
(owners, managers, (organised economic
employees) interests)

Public
information
Digital Media Politics
(citizens,
Political Political Political co-
information operation and
politicians)
communication,
& formation political decision-
of opinion discourse making
Socio-politics
Lobbying, Cognition Communication Co-operation (Aktivismus)
information
sources,
regulation,
Socio-culture Culture
funding (communities of (private individuals,
interest) consumers)

FIGURE 9.3 Digital democracy’s information processes

240 Foundations of Digital Democracy

co-operation. Representative democratic models of digital democracy emphasise how

political institutions use digital media to inform citizens politically. They operate pri-
marily at the level of political information. Plebiscitary models of digital democracy are
primarily concerned with how citizens can use digital media to register information and
opinions with the state. Like digital representative democracy, they operate primarily at
the level of political information, but in the opposite direction: while the flow of infor-
mation in digital representative democracy runs more strongly from the institutions to
the citizens, in plebiscitary digital democracy it takes place more strongly in the oppo-
site direction. Deliberative digital democracy emphasises above all the level of political
communication, which takes place via digital media. Participatory digital democracy is
predominantly about political co-operation, in which social structures and social sys-
tems are jointly produced, reproduced, and organised via digital media. Participatory de-
mocracy involves providing resources, making space and time available and supporting
the development of skills that allow people to critically influence social processes. The
democratic theorist Crawford Macpherson (1973) speaks of participatory democracy as
aiming to maximise the development opportunities of people and society and minimise
the extractive power whereby humans are exploited people and society is destroyed.
Participatory digital democracy is about, among other things, providing time, digital re-
sources, and digital spaces that allow people to develop and realise their skills. It also
involves people using digital media to organise social movements using digital media as
macro-publics that advocate for the creation of participatory democracy.

The political information processes and models of digital democracy can thus be consist-
ently coupled and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Political communication pre-
supposes political cognition. Political co-operation presupposes political communication.
Representative digital democracy and digital plebiscites remain primarily at the level of
political information. Digital deliberation adds the level of political communication to
that of political information. Participatory digital democracy builds on political informa-
tion and communication processes to practice political forms of co-operation. Table 9.2
gives an overview of typical aspects of the discussed digital democracy models and their
information processes. Processes of political communication affect the way information
processes are organised. Processes of political co-operation affect the way communica-
tion and information processes are organised. Thus, although certain elements of certain
digital democracy models can be used at other levels, they often take other forms.

The methods of representative digital democracy are the most widespread and most
practised form of digital democracy. Almost every politician, almost every party, and
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 241

TABLE 9.2 F orms of digital democracy

Model of democracy Example applications

Political information/cognition in the Websites of parties, politicians, parliaments, ministries, and
model of digital representative government agencies; online government information campaigns,
democracy state bureaucracy’s and public authority’s online applications, online
forms, online channels; use of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and
blogs by politicians and parties in election campaigns and everyday
political life
Political information/cognition in the Online voting, electronic elections, electronic referendums, online
model of plebiscitary digital democracy opinion polls, registering as a follower of a politician or party on
social media, registering a political preference by clicking approval
buttons on social media
Political communication in the model of Online discussion forums, political e-mail discussion lists, political
deliberative digital democracy teleconferencing, electronic town halls, electronic meetings
Political co-operation in the model of Cyber-protest, online petitions, computer-mediated participatory
participatory digital democracy budgeting; application of computer-mediated decision-making
systems in political, economic, and cultural contexts; wiki politics:
participatory development of political information as well as political
principles, demands, programmes, and laws with the help of wikis
and other computer-based collaboration systems

almost every political institution today has a web presence, an e-mail address through

Digital Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere

which they can be publicly reached, a social media presence, etc. Table 9.3 gives an
overview of the prevalence of certain political information processes in the EU in 2016
and 2020.

In 2016, 42 per cent of EU citizens viewed information on government websites, ac-

cording to EU statistics. In 2020, this share had increased to 47 per cent. The share was
particularly high in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Latvia, and Estonia. It
was particularly low in Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, and Poland. According to these statis-
tics, 28 per cent of EU citizens submitted forms online in 2016. In 2020, this share had
increased to 38 per cent. The use of online forms (e.g. online tax returns) is particularly
widespread in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, and the Netherlands, Sweden, while it is par-
ticularly low in Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Slovakia. It can be seen
that when mechanisms of digital representative democracy are used, there is a digital
divide between Northern and Central Europe on the one hand and Eastern and Southern
Europe on the other. This certainly has to do with Europe’s unequal social and economic
development. Overall, however, digital information processes are already relatively es-
tablished in Europe. At the level of political information and representation, therefore,
major democratic innovations are not necessarily to be expected in the future. Table 9.4
shows the spread of digital plebiscites and deliberation mechanisms in Europe.
242 Foundations of Digital Democracy

TABLE 9.3 Practices of digital representative democracy in the EU in 2016 and 2020

Country Proportion of people aged 16 to 74 who Share of people aged 16 to 74 who

have used the Internet for obtaining submitted completed forms online
information from public authorities within the last 12 months
within the last 12 months
EU 27 2016: 42%, 2020 (EU 27): 47% 2016: 28%, 2020: 38%
Belgium 2016: 46%, 2020: 46% 2016: 35%, 2020: 41%
Bulgaria 2016: 15%, 2020: 19% 2016: 7%, 2020: 15%
Czech Republic 2016: 33%, 2020: 53% 2016: 12%, 2020: 29%
Denmark 2016: 85%, 2020: 89% 2016: 71%, 2020: 68%
Germany 2016: 53%, 2020: 65% 2016: 17%, 2020: 26%
Estonia 2016: 66%, 2020: 67% 2016: 68%, 2020: 75%
Ireland 2016: 40%, 2020: 37% 2016: 48%, 2020: 54%
Greece 2016: 44%, 2020: 52% 2016: 26%, 2020: 27%
Spain 2016: 47%, 2020: 54% 2016: 32%, 2020: 49%
France 2016: 47%, 2020: 48% 2016: 49%, 2020: 64%
Croatia 2016: 34%, 2020: 36% 2016: 17%, 2020: 25%
Italy 2016: 19%, 2020: 19% 2016: 12%, 2020: 14%
Cyprus 2016: 36%, 2020: 48% 2016: 22%, 2020: 40%
Latvia 2016: 67%, 2020: 68% 2016: 31%, 2020: 63%
Lithuania 2016: 43%, 2020: 54% 2016: 33%, 2020: 45%
Luxembourg 2016: 55%, 2020: 30% 2016: 35%, 2020: 36%
Hungary 2016: 46%, 2020: 60% 2016: 24%, 2020: 37%
Malta 2016: 40%, 2020: 46% 2016: 19%, 2020: 35%
Netherlands 2016: 72%, 2020: 81% 2016: 55%, 2020: 73%
Austria 2016: 53%, 2020: 62% 2016: 33%, 2020: 50%
Poland 2016: 23%, 2020: 27% 2016: 19%, 2020: 34%
Portugal 2016: 42%, 2020: 39% 2016: 29%, 2020: 34%
Romania 2016: 8%, 2020: 10% 2016: 4%, 2020: 7%
Slovenia 2016: 41%, 2020: 56% 2016: 17%, 2020: 32%
Slovakia 2016: 44%, 2020: 51% 2016: 15%, 2020: 19%
Finland 2016: 78%, 2020: 85% 2016: 60%, 2020: 74%
Sweden 2016: 74%, 2020: 79% 2016: 48%, 2020: 74%
United Kingdom 2016: 42%, 2020: N/A 2016: 34%, 2020: 39%

Data source: Eurostat.

 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 243

TABLE 9.4 D
 igital plebiscites and digital deliberation in the EU in 2015 and 2019

Country Percentage of individuals aged 16–74 who participated in online

consultations or online voting in the last three months
EU 27 2015: 7%, 2019: 10%
Belgium 2015: 5%, 2019: 5%
Bulgaria 2015: 3%, 2019: 4%
Czech Republic 2015: 5%, 2019: 6%
Denmark 2015: 13%, 2019: 15%
Germany 2015: 13%, 2019: 17%
Estonia 2015: 11%, 2019: 26%
Ireland 2015: 3%, 2019: 7%
Greece 2015: 5%, 2019: 3%
Spain 2015: 10%, 2019: 11%
France 2015: 6%, 2019: 9%
Croatia 2015: 9%, 2019: 10%
Italy 2015: 6%, 2019: 7%
Cyprus 2015: 2%, 2019: 4%
Latvia 2015: 3%, 2019: 6%

Digital Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere

Lithuania 2015: 5%, 2019: 10%
Luxembourg 2015: 18%, 2019: 16%
Hungary 2015: 2%, 2019: 5%
Malta 2015: 12%, 2019: 16%
Netherlands 2015: 7%, 2019: 9%
Austria 2015: 7%, 2019: 9%
Poland 2015: 2%, 2019: 6%
Portugal 2015: 10%, 2019: 12%
Romania 2015: 2%, 2019: 3%
Slovenia 2015: 5%, 2019: 5%
Slovakia 2015: 2%, 2019: 5%
Finland 2015: 15%, 2019: 15%
Sweden 2015: 12%, 2019: 13%
United Kingdom 2015: 9%, 2019: 15%

Data source: Eurostat.

244 Foundations of Digital Democracy

With 8 per cent of the EU population who participated in online consultations or online
voting in 2015 and 10 per cent in 2019, the use of digital elections and digital consulta-
tions in Europe is relatively low. Mechanisms of plebiscitary and deliberative politics are
thus not widespread.

Plebiscites face the risk of charismatic, populist leaders defining the issues being voted
on and of fundamental rights being violated or restricted. The way questions are asked
in referendums and plebiscites often influences the outcome. Plebiscites are therefore
subject to a certain risk of manipulation. If the majority is in favour of restricting or
abolishing the fundamental rights of certain groups, it can be difficult to argue against
this, as plebiscitary populists then often argue that the people have spoken, that the will
of the people applies in democracy and that all objections are undemocratic. However,
direct majority decisions are considered the essence of politics only in plebiscitary sys-
tems. General democratic fundamental rights, as enshrined in constitutions, serve to
protect the dignity and liberties of all people regardless of the outcome of plebiscites.

How problematic plebiscites can be has recently been demonstrated in Hungary. Viktor
Orbán’s government held a plebiscite in 2017 asking (Bakos 2017): “What should Hungary
do if Brussels wants to force the country to allow illegal immigrants into the ­country –
despite the recent series of terrorist attacks in Europe?”. There were two answer op-
tions: 1. “We should allow illegal immigrants to move freely in the country”; 2. “Illegal
immigrants must be monitored until the authorities decide on their case”. Later that year,
the Fidesz government sent out questionnaires about George Soros to Hungarian voters,
consisting of seven yes/no questions:

Seven questions are put to the eligible voters: Whether they support Soros in
‘convincing Brussels to relocate at least one million migrants per year from
Africa and the Middle East to the territory of the European Union’? Whether
they think that EU member states, including Hungary, should dismantle their
border fences and open their borders to migrants? How they feel about Brus-
sels’ plan to introduce a mandatory quota for the resettlement of migrants?
Whether they support the idea of funding migrants for the first years of their
stay with the equivalent of 29,000 Euros a year? Whether migrants should be
punished more leniently for criminal offences? Whether European languages
and cultures should be diluted to facilitate the integration of illegal migrants?
And whether voters are in favour of countries being politically attacked and
financially punished for opposing immigration?
(Löwenstein 2017)
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 245

The state theorist Carl Schmitt (1933), who was a member of the Nazi party from 1933
onwards, argued that the political system of Nazi fascism was based on the “primary im-
portance of the political leadership” (8–9). Schmitt regarded the state, the party, and the
people as the three pillars of Nazi-fascist society. In the political system of Nazi fascism,
there was the legal possibility of the government enacting laws or holding a referendum
on their introduction. “The Reich Government acknowledges the authority of the peo-
ple’s will which it has called upon, and as a consequence, considers it binding” (Schmitt
1933, 10). On 14 July 1933, the Referendum Act was introduced in Nazi Germany, which
stated: “The Reich government may ask the people whether they agree or disagree with
a measure intended by the Reich government”.2 The political leadership was responsible
for deciding whether, when and on which question a referendum was to be held and how
the questions and answers were to be formulated. Four referendums were held in the
German Reich, namely on withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, the merging
of the functions of president and chancellor in 1934, the occupation of the Rhineland in
1936, and the annexation of Austria to Nazi Germany in 1938. The approval rate was 95.1
per cent, 88.1 per cent, 98.8 per cent, and 98.5 per cent (99.7 per cent in Austria).3 The
example shows that plebiscites do not automatically have a democratic character, but are

Digital Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere

also compatible with fascist systems where they serve to legitimise the will of the leader.

The principle of accumulation of consent and likes dominant on social media today is an
application of the plebiscite to digital technology and online culture. Social media lives
by constantly organising micro-plebiscites. Today’s dominant social media are constant
plebiscites. They elevate the plebiscite to a lifestyle of digital culture. Every user-gener-
ated content on Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and similar platforms demands acclamation
through the click of a consent or emotional button. In the age of social media, we expe-
rience the plebiscite by mouse click and mobile phone. Since we live in times of new
nationalisms and a shift of the political spectrum to the right, it cannot be ruled out that
there will be society-wide digital plebiscites on populist and nationalist issues in the
future. These can be organised particularly quickly via the Internet. If, for example, a ref-
ugee is suspected of murder, an immediately scheduled online referendum can lead to a
majority in favour of the deportation or internment of all refugees. Are you in favour of in-
troducing the death penalty for serious criminals? Should human rights be suspended for
Muslims in the face of Islamist terror? Should the police be allowed to use torture in order
to be able to act quickly and effectively in case of imminent danger? Should warships be
deployed at the sea border and tanks at the land border to protect the homeland against
the influx of refugees? If such questions are put to a referendum, plebiscites by mouse
click combined with political fear-mongering and scapegoating by the tabloid media and
246 Foundations of Digital Democracy

politicians can lead to the enforcement of legislative initiatives that achieve a majority
among the electorate and violate basic Humanistic principles and human rights. The dan-
gers of digital plebiscites should therefore be taken very seriously in today’s times.

9.4 Digital Media’s Democratic Deficits and

Democratic Capacities
For Jürgen Habermas (1991), the public sphere is a concept of critique that allows us
to examine how power relations limit the possibilities of democratic communication.
In feudalistic societies, the political and economic systems were identical. The ruling
emperors, kings, and aristocrats were also the owners of the land, which they leased to
peasants, thereby receiving rent. The public sphere was a non-democratic, represent-
ative public sphere in which the aristocracy and the church publicly represented and
displayed their power before the people. With the emergence of capitalism, society was
differentiated into the three relatively autonomous spheres of the economy, politics, and
private life. The modern public sphere emerged as a mediatising sphere that creates an
interface between the economy, politics, and private life and establishes links between
these three spheres (see Figure 9.1). Capitalism realised liberation from the feudal yoke
of serfdom and promised the realisation of new freedoms such as freedom of expression,
freedom of the press, and the democratic election of representatives.

Habermas shows how the logics of capital and bureaucracy have undermined these
promises and turned them into new unfreedoms. The bourgeois public sphere “contra-
dicted its own principle of universal accessibility” (Habermas 1991, 124). Money and
power structure access to and communication of the public sphere in complex ways.
Freedom of expression and the ability to freely form opinions are limited by the fact that
not everyone has the level of education and material resources needed to participate
effectively in the public sphere. The freedom of assembly and association is restricted
by the fact that large economic and bureaucratic organisations have “an oligopoly of
the publicistically effective and politically relevant formation of assemblies and associ-
ations” (Habermas 1991, 228). The consequence, according to Habermas, is that there
is a refeudalisation of the public sphere: corporations, political parties, and profit-ori-
ented media organisations, which often exercise financial power through advertising
orientation and journalistic power through their monopoly or oligopoly position in the
market, become modern feudal lords who control the power of opinion and thus the
public sphere.
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 247

In his Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas (1987) further developed the concept
of the refeudalisation of the public sphere into the concept of the colonisation of the
lifeworld. If the steering media of money and power assert influence, the result is the
monetarisation or bureaucratisation of communication and the social relations based on
it. “The communicative practice of everyday life is one-sidedly rationalized into a utili-
tarian life-style” so that “consumerism and possessive individualism, motives of perfor-
mance, and competition gain the force to shape behavior” (Habermas 1987, 325). “The
bureaucratic disempowering and desiccation of spontaneous processes of opinion- and
will-formation expands the scope for engineering mass loyalty and makes it easier to
uncouple political decision-making from concrete, identity-forming contexts of life”
and establishes “a legalistic reference to legitimation through procedure” (Habermas
1987, 325).

The colonisation and refeudalisation of the public sphere have led to market, advertising,

Digital Media’s Democratic Deficits and Democratic Capacities

and PR logic dominating politics, so that politics becomes an apolitical market in which
people and ideology are marketed. Citizens are seen and treated as “political consum-
ers” (Habermas 1991, 216). The public sphere is thus transformed from a debating to
a culture-­consuming public (159–175). It becomes a pseudo-public sphere (150). “The
public sphere assumes advertising functions” (175). The striving for profit maximisation
of the media goes hand in hand with a flattening, tabloidisation, and “depoliticization of
the content” (169).

The digital public sphere today is a colonised and feudalised public sphere dominated
and shaped by the logic of accumulation and acceleration. Almost all of the dominant
social media platforms are commercially oriented (see https://www.alexa.com/topsites).
Wikipedia is the only dominant web platform that is non-profit and non-commercial. Two
of the nine for-profit platforms sell goods through their platforms, seven use personal-
ised advertising in combination with free services to make a profit.

In the World Wide Web, public, semi-public, and private communication takes place
at the same time. The boundary between the public and the private sphere is thus
blurred in the online world. At the same time, the private online plays a role not only
in the form of private communication, but also as private property: the vast majority
of Internet companies are privately owned and act in a profit-oriented way by selling
attention, data, or digital content as a commodity. The colonisation and feudalisation
of the digital public sphere takes, for example, the following forms (cf. Fuchs 2017,
2018, Chapter 7):
248 Foundations of Digital Democracy

• Digital labour: The capital accumulation model of personalised advertising com-

bines the surveillance of all online activity with the exploitation of user activity
that produces data that is sold as a commodity to enable and personalise online
advertising;
• Digital surveillance: In the surveillance-industrial Internet complex, surveillance
by Internet corporations is combined with political surveillance of citizens. The
governmental thinking that has proliferated since 9/11 that online surveillance
can stop terrorism has proven to be inaccurate. The danger of the surveillance-in-
dustrial complex is that the presumption of innocence is abolished and a culture
of constant suspicion is created.
• Digital monopolies: Google has a monopoly in search engines, Facebook in social
networking, YouTube in video platforms, Amazon in online shopping. Facebook and
Google together form an oligopoly of online advertising.
• Digital attention economy: Although anyone can easily produce and provide us-
er-generated content on the Internet, online attention is unevenly distributed:
Corporations, large political organisations, and celebrities achieve very high
levels of attention, which manifests itself in the form of “likes”, “follows”, “re-
tweets”, etc.
• Digital commercial culture: Social media is dominated by shallow entertainment
and advertising, while political and educational content is in the minority.
• Digital acceleration: Information flows and communication on social media have
a very high speed. Therefore, there is usually no time for complex and in-depth
analysis and discussions. Due to the high speed of online information flows, the
attention span is usually very short.
• Lack of space and time: Information is presented in the form of very short snippets
of information on Twitter and other social media. The limited information space
(e.g. a maximum of 280 characters on Twitter) does not provide an opportunity for
discussion and to present the complexity and contradictions of society. Politics on
social media therefore often takes very one-dimensional, superficial, truncated,
polarising, spectacular and personalised forms.
• Unsocial social media and individualism: Many social media are about accumulat-
ing attention and approval for individual profiles. An online culture of individual-
ism is the result. Social media is primarily about the ego (“I”) and not the common
(“we”). Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube are not really “social” media at all, but
individualistic media.
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 249

• Post-factual online politics and fake news: In the age of new nationalisms and the
rise of authoritarian capitalism, a political culture has spread on the Internet that
is dominated by right-wing ideology and false news that spreads quickly.
• Automated algorithmic politics: To a certain extent, algorithms determine online
visibility and automated computer programs (“bots”) replace human activities. As
a result, it becomes more difficult to distinguish which online information and
consent are produced by humans and which by machines.
• Fragmented publics: Micro-publics are formed on the Internet, causing society to
fragment into smaller and smaller communities that are often self-contained, have
no contact with each other, and no possibility to deal constructively with political
conflicts and clashes of interest. The result is filter bubbles, online hatred, and
cyber-bullying.

These eleven tendencies together lead to a digital public sphere that is marked and

Digital Media’s Democratic Deficits and Democratic Capacities

divided by economic, political, and cultural asymmetries of power. The digital public
sphere takes the form of the colonised and feudalised public sphere through the logic
of accumulation, advertising, monopolisation, commercialisation, commodification, ac-
celeration, individualism, fragmentation, automation of human activity, surveillance,
and ideologisation. The Internet and social media are dominated by commercial culture.
Platforms are largely owned by large profit-oriented corporations. Public service media
operate on the basis of a different logic. However, the idea of a public service Internet
has not yet been able to gain acceptance and sounds alien to most ears, as there are
hardly any alternatives to the commercial Internet today.

The communication scholar Slavko Splichal (2007, 255) gives a precise definition of pub-
lic service media:

In normative terms, public service media must be a service of the public, by

the public, and for the public. It is a service of the public because it is financed
by it and should be owned by it. It ought to be a service by the public – not
only financed and controlled, but also produced by it. It must be a service
for the public – but also for the government and other powers acting in the
public sphere. In sum, public service media ought to become ‘a cornerstone of
democracy’.

The means of production of public service media are publicly owned. The production
and circulation of content are based on a non-profit logic. Access is universal, as
250 Foundations of Digital Democracy

all citizens are given easy access to the content and technologies of public service
media. In political terms, public service media offer diverse and inclusive content
that promotes political understanding and discourse. In cultural terms, they offer
educational content that contributes to the cultural development of individuals and
society.

Due to the special qualities of public service media, they can also make a particularly
valuable democratic and educational contribution to a democratic online public sphere
and digital democracy if they are given the necessary material and legal opportunities to
do so. Three ideas to expand digital democracy are the public service YouTube, Club 2.0,
and the online advertising tax.

9.4.1 Public Service YouTube

Digital media change the traditional relationship between media production and me-
dia consumption. While in classical broadcasting these two aspects are separated, on
the Internet consumers can become producers of information (so-called prosumers, i.e.
producing consumers). User-generated content offers the possibility for the audience
to become a producing audience. In this way, the educational and democratic mandate
of public service broadcasting can be extended in the form of a participatory mandate.
In this context, participation means offering an online platform with the help of which
citizens can make user-generated audio-visual content publicly available.

YouTube holds a de facto monopoly in the realm of user-generated video distribution

platforms. Public service media have the necessary experience and resources to de-
velop, offer and operate online video and online audio platforms. This could create
real competition for YouTube’s dominance. YouTube is often criticised for distributing
fake news, hateful, terrorist, and far-right content. Relatively little is done about these
problems because video content is not vetted by humans when it is uploaded. YouTube
works according to the logic “The more user-generated content, the better, as this
creates more advertising opportunities and more profit”. YouTube’s advertising- and
profit-orientation lead to blindness to the quality of the content. A public YouTube, on
the other hand, could fulfil public service media’s democratic remit by not simply al-
lowing videos on all topics (“anything goes”) to be uploaded, but by opening up certain
politically and democratically relevant topics (e.g. as accompaniment to certain TV or
radio programmes) to users for uploading content at certain times and for a limited
period of time.
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 251

The principle should be followed that all submitted contributions are published and
archived and thus made accessible to the public without time limit, thus creating a
­user-generated democratic online public sphere. However, the videos submitted should
be checked by trained moderators before release to see if they contain racist, fascist,
sexist, or otherwise discriminatory content. Such content should not be released.

The individualism of today’s social media could be broken by deliberately addressing

and encouraging social, cultural, and civic contexts such as school classes, university
seminars, adult education courses, workplace communities, civil society organisations,
etc. to submit collectively produced videos.

Public service media have large archives with vast amounts of content. These contents
could be digitised and made available on a public service video and audio platform.
The Creative Commons (CC) licence is a licence that allows content to be reused. The
CC-BY-NC licence allows content to be reproduced, redistributed, remixed, modified,

Digital Media’s Democratic Deficits and Democratic Capacities

processed, and used for non-commercial purposes as long as the original source is
acknowledged.4 The CC-BY-NC licence is very suitable for digitised content from the
archives of public service media that is made publicly available. In this way, the crea-
tivity of the users of a public service audio and video platform can be promoted, as they
are allowed to generate and distribute new content with the help of archive material.
In this way, public service media’s educational remit could take on the form of a digital
creativity remit. There is also the possibility that at certain points in time, topics are
specified and users are given the opportunity to edit and remix certain archive mate-
rial and upload their new creations with the help of this material. A selection of the
content submitted in this way could be broadcast on television or radio on a regular
basis or specific occasions. All submitted contributions could be made available on the
platform.

Public service video and audio platforms can be offered in individual countries (as
ORFTube, BBCTube, ARDTube, ZDFTube, SRGTube, etc.). However, it also makes sense
for public media broadcasters to co-operate and jointly offer such platforms or to techni-
cally standardise their individual platforms and network them with each other. The fact
that in the field of television there are cooperations, for example, between ORF, ZDF, and
SRG for 3sat or between ARD, ZDF, and France Télévisions for Arte, makes it clear that
it makes sense to create similar forms of co-operation in the field of online platforms. A
pan-European public YouTube could rival the commercial YouTube in terms of popularity
and interest and could create real competition for the Californian Internet giant Google/
252 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Alphabet that owns YouTube. However, the argument that one is too small oneself and
that one has to start at the European level is often used to postpone concrete projects
or not start at all. If the legal conditions are in place nationally, it may be easier to start
at the national level in order to then set an international example and, in a further step,
advance European co-operation.

Dörr, Holznagel, and Picot (2016) prepared a report for ZDF on the role of public service
media in the context of the Internet, social media, big data, and cloud computing. The
authors state that a strictly limited time period for which public service media content
remains available online time is not up to date and is unpopular with fee payers:

The current framework conditions for broadcast-related telemedia must be

adapted to current user expectations. The requirements for the length of time
spent on the net must therefore be made more flexible. […] With regard to the
presence of linear content on its own platform, the time span during which the
audiovisual offer is available should no longer be rigidly defined. Such a regula-
tion is not required by European law and is no longer in keeping with the times
in view of the increased importance of online services. […] It is impossible to
explain to the payers of the licence fee why the programmes produced with
these fees should not be available to the public irrespective of the broadcast-
ing date and why the ÖRR does not make its archives publicly accessible and
usable – similar to public libraries.
(Dörr, Holznagel and Picot 2016, 91 [translated from German])

In the context of the concept of a “Public Open Space”, Dörr, Holznagel, and Picot (2016)
advocate that public service media network with other public institutions to make politi-
cally and culturally relevant content available online:

It is repeatedly argued that the offerings of public service media should be

merged with other services that are important for political and cultural dis-
course, such as those of museums or scientific and cultural institutions. The
keyword for this debate is the desire to create a national public communication
space, a Public Open Space. […] The cultural responsibility of public service
media […] certainly suggests something like this in the changed media world.
Moreover, valuable integration effects can be achieved with such an approach.
[…] Within this framework, it is also possible to intensify the integration of
the content of public service media with that of other cultural and scientific
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 253

institutions. […] In addition, it should be pointed out that such an approach

would also significantly strengthen the cultural archive function and the open
access of public content.
(Dörr, Holznagel und Picot 2016, 95–96 [translated from German])

The initiative Public Open Space argues for a

public interest-oriented digital platform (#PublicOpenSpace) that enables

intensive cooperation between the world of media, education, culture and
society. […] The initiative ‘PUBLIC OPEN SPACE’ develops the perspec-
tive of a new digital, non-commercial platform (#PublicOpenSpace), which
makes content and offers accessible while taking social diversity into ac-
count, as well as offering a public discourse space for the entire population.
However, this requires a transformation process that necessitates new co-
operations and alliances between media with a public service mandate and

Digital Media’s Democratic Deficits and Democratic Capacities

public institutions from the fields of science and education, civil society, art
and culture. This includes, in particular, non-profit media committed to a
comparable mission as well as civil society knowledge and education initia-
tives. The aim is to create an attractive, comprehensive and quality-oriented
digital communication space #PublicOpenSpace, which, on the basis of the
protection of private data and personal privacy and with a guarantee of
content quality and diversity on all playout paths, allows users to communi-
cate in a network oriented towards democratic values and thus represents
a contribution to the success of a digital democracy. Such a #PublicOpen-
Space should make the knowledge and material that has come about with
public funding permanently digitally accessible and usable to a broad pub-
lic. Suitable versions of open, Wikipedia-compatible licences such as Cre-
ative Commons (CC-BY-SA) offer new possibilities for this. It is therefore
particularly important that, in addition to all public providers, archives and
museums, public educational and cultural institutions, universities and civil
society organisations are represented and involved. In particular, it must be
ensured that citizens can express themselves publicly and thus help shape
the democratic discourse.5

Forty-five representatives from science, civil society, and politics have signed a thesis
paper on the future of public service broadcasting. One of their demands is that public
service broadcasters should become platforms.
254 Foundations of Digital Democracy

In the interest of the general public, there must be strong platforms that offer
the public an easily recognisable contact point for public service offerings […]
A common, open and non-commercial platform of all public service providers
as ‘Public Open Space’ would be conceivable. On this platform, not only con-
tent produced by public service broadcasters should be available, but also, for
example, content from museums, the Federal Agency for Civic Education, Wiki-
pedia, etc.6
(translated from German)

Volker Grassmuck (2017, translated from German) argues for the Public Open Space to
be understood as a non-commercial platform of public knowledge, which is a “strong
public service platform of its own”, which is designed “together with other public and
civil-­society knowledge and cultural institutions, together with the users” and which is
“deally pan-European” (213). The Public Open Space is a co-operation of public service
media, a “co-operation with public scientific institutions” (215), a “co-operation with
civil society initiatives” such as Wikipedia (216), a “co-operation with users” (217), and
a “space of deliberative democracy” (218).

The concept of Public Open Space advocates an online platform on which various pub-
lic service media, other public, and civil society institutions and users make content
available as common property and public knowledge. A public YouTube is a specific
expression and aspect of Public Open Space and could be part of a comprehensive
open public platform. While the public service YouTube refers to publicly produced and
user-generated video content, the Public Open Space is about all possible forms of
open, commons-based content, i.e. not exclusively about videos published on a plat-
form. Public service media could collaborate with non-profit civil society and cultural
institutions by inviting such institutions to run special projects on the public service
YouTube.

The public service YouTube is a concrete utopia of participatory democracy. A con-

crete utopia is a realistic and realisable project that goes beyond the current state
of society and realises democratic innovations. A public service YouTube that aims at
user-generated production of democratic content promotes political participation and
co-operation of citizens as well as concrete, active, and creative engagement with
democratic content through digital production and cooperative production. Participa-
tory democracy means infrastructure, space, and time for democratic processes. The
public service YouTube offers a material possibility and infrastructure for the practice
of digital democracy.
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 255

9.4.2 Club 2.0

The dominant media are high-speed spectacles that are superficial and characterised
by a lack of time. They erode the public sphere and the culture of political debate. They
leave no time or space to grasp the complexity of society and develop arguments. We
need the de-commodification and deceleration of the media today. We need slow media.

Slow media and slow political communication are not new. Club 2 in Austria and After
Dark in the UK are prototypical examples. The journalists Kuno Knöbl and Franz Kreuzer
created the concept of Club 2 for the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF). It was a
discussion programme that was usually broadcast on Tuesday and Thursday. The first
episode was screened on 5 October 1976, the last on 28 February 1995. About 1,400
episodes were broadcast on ORF (Der Standard 2001). Club 2 had a new edition on ORF
from 2007 to 2012. However, a slightly different concept was used that did not respect
the original concept.

Digital Media’s Democratic Deficits and Democratic Capacities

In the United Kingdom, the media production company Open Media created a similar
format based on Club 2 under the name After Dark. After Dark was broadcast once a
week on Channel 4 between 1987 and 1991 and occasionally thereafter. In 2003, After
Dark was shown on BBC for a short time.

The producer of After Dark Sebastian Cody describes the Club 2/After Dark concept as
follows:

the number of participants in these intimate debates (always conducted in

agreeable surroundings and without an audience) was never less than four,
never more than eight (like, as it happens, group therapy); the discussion should
be hosted by a non-expert, whose job rotates, thus eliminating the cult of per-
sonality otherwise attaching to presenters; the participants should be a diverse
assortment, all directly involved in the subject under discussion that week;
and, most importantly, the programme was to be transmitted live and be open-
ended. The conversation finishes when the guests decide, not when TV people
make them stop.
(Cody 2008)

The concept of Club 2 sounds rather unusual to many people today, as we are so used to
short duration, high-speed formats, and the lack of time in the media and our everyday
lives. Open, uncensored, controversial live discussions that engage the viewer differ from
accelerated media in terms of space and time: Club 2 was a public space where guests
256 Foundations of Digital Democracy

met and discussed with each other in an atmosphere that offered unlimited time, that
was experienced publicly and during which a socially important topic was discussed.
Club 2 was a democratic public sphere organised by public service broadcasting.

Space and time are two important dimensions of the political economy of the pub-
lic sphere. However, a social space that provides enough discussion time does not
guarantee an engaged, critical, and dialectical discussion that transcends one-­
dimensionality, delves into the depth of an issue, and clarifies the commonalities and
differences of worldviews and positions. Public space and time must be intelligently
organised and managed so that appropriate people participate, the atmosphere is
appropriate, the right discussion questions are asked and it is ensured that all guests
have their say, listen to each other and that the discussion can proceed undisturbed,
etc. Unrestricted space, a dialectically controversial and intellectually challenging
space, and intelligent organisation are three important aspects of publicity. These are
preconditions of slow media, non-commercial media, decolonised media, and public
interest media.

We need slow media. Offline and online. A deceleration of the media. And slow media
2.0. Is a new version of Club 2 possible today? How could a Club 2.0 look and be de-
signed? If one speaks of a second version (“2.0”), this means on the one hand that Club
2 should be revitalised in a new form in order to strengthen the public sphere in times
of authoritarian capitalism. On the other hand, it also means that one has to take into
account that society does not stand still, has developed dynamically, and therefore new
public communication realities such as the Internet have emerged. A Club 2.0 therefore
also needs a somewhat updated concept of Club 2 that leaves the basic rules unchanged
but expands the concept. Whether Club 2.0 is transformed from a possibility into a real-
ity is not simply a technical question, but also one of political economy. It is a political
question because its implementation requires the decision to break with the logic of
commercial, entertainment-oriented television dominated by reality TV. Club 2.0 is there-
fore also a political decision for public service media formats. Its implementation is also
an economic issue, as it requires a break with the principles of colonised media, such
as high speed, superficiality, scarcity of time, algorithmisation and automation of human
communication, post-truth, spectacle, etc. The implementation of Club 2.0 is a question
of resources and changing power relations in the media system.

Figure 9.4 illustrates a possible concept for Club 2.0. It is a basic idea that can certainly
be varied. The essential aspects are the following:
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 257

Digital Media’s Democratic Deficits and Democratic Capacities

FIGURE 9.4 Concept of Club 2.0

• Club 2’s ground rules:

Club 2.0 uses and extends the traditional principles of Club 2. The television
broadcast is based on the tried and tested Club 2 rules, which are crucial to the
quality of the format. Club 2.0 broadcasts are open-ended, live, and uncensored.
• Cross-medium:
Club 2.0 is a cross-medium that combines live television and the Internet, thereby
transcending the boundary between these two means of communication.
• Online video:
Club 2.0 is broadcast live online via a video platform.
• Autonomous social media, no traditional social media:
Existing commercial social media (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) are not suita-
ble as they are not based on the principles of slow media and public interest me-
dia. The use of YouTube is likely to result in advertising breaks that would interrupt
and destroy the discussion.
• Autonomous video platform C2-Tube:
Club 2.0 needs its own online video platform (C2-Tube). C2-Tube allows viewers to
watch the debate online and via a range of technical devices.
258 Foundations of Digital Democracy

• Interactivity:
C2-Tube also has interactive possibilities that can be used to a certain degree.
• User-generated discussion inputs:
It is possible for users to generate discussion inputs and for these to be actively
included in the programme. This characteristic is linked to a non-­anonymous
­registration of users on the platform. Anonymity encourages Godwin’s Law,
which states: “As the length of an anonymous online discussion increases, the
probability of a comparison to Hitler or the Nazis being made approaches one”.
The number of registered and active users can be limited. For example, the selec-
tion of active users can be done randomly. Alternatively, all registered users can be
allowed to participate in the discussion. User-generated discussion inputs should
preferably have a video format. The number of user-generated discussion inputs
that can be uploaded to the platform should be limited (ideally to one upload per
active user). Since information overload makes discussion difficult, it makes sense
to set certain limits in order to facilitate a decelerated debate culture. Active users
can make contributions to the discussion on the platform.
• Interface between the studio discussion and the video platform:
At certain times during the live broadcast, a user-generated video is selected and
shown as input for the studio discussion. In such videos, users formulate their
opinion on the topic and can also introduce a discussion question. In a two- to
three-hour discussion, about two to three such user-generated inputs could be
used. It is inevitable that a selection mechanism will be used to decide which
user-generated videos will be shown in the live broadcast. There are several ways
to do this, such as random selection, selection by the production team, selection
by a registered user determined at random, selection by a special guest, etc.
• Discussion among users:
Club 2.0 allows users to discuss the programme topic with each other. The dis-
cussion can take place during and/or after the live broadcast. The selected vid-
eos that function as discussion inputs can be released for discussion on C2-Tube.
Comments should be possible in video form and written form. There should be a
minimum length for written comments and possibly a maximum length for video
comments. In order to implement the slow media principles and avoid the Twitter
effect of accelerated stagnation, the number of comments possible per user per
discussion should be limited.
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 259

• The forgetting of data:

Video data is very storage-intensive. Therefore, the question arises of what should
happen to all those videos that are uploaded to the platform but are not broadcast
and not opened for discussion. Since they are practically of less importance for
public discussion, they could be deleted after a certain time. To do this, users need
to be made aware that uploading a video in many cases involves forgetting the
data. Contemporary social media store all data and meta-data forever. Forgetting
data is therefore also a counter-principle. The online discussions consisting of
written and video comments can either be archived and kept or deleted after a
certain period of time.
• Data protection and privacy friendliness:
Most social media platforms monitor users for economic and political purposes
to achieve monetary profits through the sale of personalised advertising and

Digital Media’s Democratic Deficits and Democratic Capacities

to establish a surveillance society that promises more security but under-
mines privacy and installs a regime of categorical suspicion of all citizens.
Club 2.0 should be very privacy-friendly and only store a minimum of data and
­meta-data necessary to run the platform. This includes not selling user data
and using exemplary data protection routines. Data protection and privacy
friendliness should therefore be design principles of Club 2.0. However, this
does not mean that privacy protection should take the form of anonymous
discussion, as anonymity can encourage online hooliganism, especially on po-
litically controversial issues. Data protection is therefore much more about
the storage and use of data.
• Social production:
Today’s dominant social media are highly individualistic. In contrast, the pro-
duction of user-generated videos for Club 2.0 could take the form of coopera-
tive, social production that transcends individualism and creates truly social
media, so that Club 2.0 is integrated into educational institutions where peo-
ple learn and create knowledge together by elaborating discussion inputs and
collective positions and producing them in video form. This requires that the
topics of certain Club 2.0 programmes are known somewhat in advance. This
can be achieved by publishing a programme of topics. Groups of users can
prepare videos together, which they can upload to the platform on the evening
of the relevant Club 2.0 programme as soon as the upload option is activated.
260 Foundations of Digital Democracy

Club 2.0 is an expression of the democratic digital public sphere. It manifests a combi-
nation of elements of deliberative and participatory democracy. Club 2.0 offers space
and time for controversial political communication and enables citizens to participate
collectively and individually in the discussion through videos and comments. The com-
municative aspect of deliberative democracy and the participatory idea of grassroots
democracy are combined in the Club 2.0 model.

9.4.3 The Online Advertising Tax

The public sphere is not only a cultural space of political information and communica-
tion, but also has a political economy. Democratic innovations like Club 2.0 and a public
YouTube need to be financed. One possibility is to finance these services fully or par-
tially through the licence fee. The introduction of an online advertising tax and a digital
services tax that taxes big digital capital is a good possibility to finance public service
Internet services.

Google and Facebook form a duopoly in the field of online advertising. Advertising today
is increasingly shifting from print to online, i.e. predominantly to Google and Facebook.
However, both companies are masters of tax avoidance, which means that they pay very
little tax in Europe, which in turn has led to sharp public criticism. The problem of how to
effectively tax such online companies, however, has so far remained unsolved.

The sale of personalised online advertising enabled by Google and Facebook as a com-
modity takes place at the time of viewing or clicking on the advertisement. The adver-
tiser pays for the personalised attention of the user, which is only possible through the
collection and analysis of personal data. In other words, the users’ attention given to the
advertisement is sold. The users’ online behaviour generates the data and meta-data
necessary to enable and personalise online advertising. Facebook and Google users are
not only prosumers (producing consumers who create data and meta-data), but also dig-
ital workers who create value (Fuchs 2017). The digital labour of paying attention to or
clicking on online ads ultimately leads to a monetary transaction between the advertis-
ing platform (Google, Facebook, Twitter, etc.) and advertisers.

Assuming that monetary transactions should be taxed at the place where their value
is produced, this means that online advertising should be taxed in the country where it
is presented, viewed, and clicked on. The IP addresses of Facebook and Google users
tell us which country they are in at certain times of use. Each country that Google and
Facebook offer as a personalisation option for online advertising constitutes a digital
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 261

permanent establishment. If these companies are legally obliged to evaluate and publish
the annual advertising impressions per country, a revenue and profit share for a specific
country can be calculated from this. If this country introduces a tax on online advertising,
this can be used to determine an assessment basis for the online advertising tax. If on-
line companies refuse to co-operate, the tax authorities can alternatively estimate the
national share of the company’s global total and profit share and possibly add a penalty
for non-co-operation to the assessment basis.

Participatory democratic theory emphasises that democracy is not only a matter of com-
munication and decision-making, but also requires resources that enable democratic in-
stitutions. The taxation of online advertising provides a basis for financing democratic
innovations in the field of public service media.

Legal Aspects of Digital Democracy in the Realm of Public Service Media

9.5 Legal Aspects of Digital Democracy in the
Realm of Public Service Media
Many public service broadcasters face legal limits. One legal limit that public service
media encounter frequently is that they have to delete the offered content after some
days. This deletion is called the retention period of public service media content.

The public service YouTube can provide past news, documentaries, and educational
content on the basis of a CC-BY-NC Creative Commons licence in order to promote the
public’s engagement with politically and democratically relevant content. By enabling
the reuse of content, the public service remit can take on particularly active and creative
forms, whereby the educational and democratic mandate of public service media takes
on new forms.

If democratic education, information, and communication are to be strengthened through

creative and active engagement of citizens in the sense of public service media’s demo-
cratic mandate, this regulation is counterproductive and prevents the potentials of digital
media for the democratic mandate from being exploited. The educational and democratic
mandate of public audio-visual media is severely restricted by legally established tempo-
ral and geographical restrictions (retention period of audio-visual public online content
=> deletion after a certain number of days; geoblocking) on online access to material
relevant to democracy and education, which contributes to democratic information, ed-
ucation, and communication. The possibilities of digital media for storing and creatively
changing and reusing audio-visual content are thus limited and not fully realised. Such
legal limits should be abolished because they severely damage the digital potentials of
262 Foundations of Digital Democracy

public service media. The 2009 Communication from the European Commission on the
Application of State Aid Rules to Public Service Broadcasting states, among other things,
that an exception to the prohibition of state aid in the introduction of new services of
public service media is only permissible under certain criteria. These include that these
services serve the democratic, social and cultural needs of the population and that there
is no disproportionate market impact. The Communication says:

In order to guarantee the fundamental role of public service broadcasters in the

new digital environment, public service broadcasters may use State aid to pro-
vide audiovisual services over new distribution platforms, catering for the gen-
eral public as well as for special interests, provided that they are addressing
the same democratic, social and cultural needs of the society in question, and
do not entail disproportionate effects on the market, which are not necessary
for the fulfilment of the public service remit.7
(§81)

The introduction of Public Value Tests and their market test resulted from this regulation.

In 2000, the EU formulated the Lisbon Strategy, as part of which it wanted to become
“the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” (European
Council 2000). In terms of the Internet economy, this goal was not achieved: American
corporations, primarily from California, dominate the Internet. It was misjudged that
simply imitating and adapting the Californian model in Europe does not work, because
the European media landscape has a different structure than the North American one.
Public service media and alternative media (such as free radios) are important in Europe.
In terms of public service media, this means that there is a very large, as yet under-­
utilised potential to create public service Internet platforms to push back the dominance
of Google, Facebook, and similar companies on the Internet in Europe.

Market and competition tests within the framework of Public Value Tests, as legally
defined for example in Austria in Section 6 of the ORF Act or Great Britain as a “public
interest test” in the BBC Agreement, are intended to prevent public service media from
damaging competing services of commercial, profit-oriented providers. In the field of
online media, however, there is no real European competition to Google, YouTube, Face-
book, and Twitter. Public service Internet platforms are one way of practically challenging
the monopoly position of these Californian companies. The competition regulations for
public service media in the EU, which take the form of the market test in the course
of Public Value Tests, have the effect of legally legitimising, securing, and deepening
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 263

Internet monopolies. Public Internet platforms such as a public YouTube have great dem-
ocratic potential and could also advance a European Internet offer. This requires a rethink
and changes at the legislative level. The competition and market test of Public Value
Tests support the profit interests of the large American Internet corporations that domi-
nate the market. It is time to abolish market tests and regulations that damage and limit
the capacity of public service media to offer public service Internet platforms and other
digital services.

9.6 Summary and Recommendations for Action

This chapter looked at the relationship between digital democracy and public service
media. It addressed three questions:

Question 1: What are digital democracy and the digital public sphere?
Question 2: What are the main trends in the development of digital media today, what
are digital media’s democratic possibilities and deficits, and what role can public
service media play in strengthening digital democracy and digital public sphere?
Question 3: What legal framework is needed so that public service media can
strengthen digital democracy?

Summary and Recommendations for Action

The findings can be summarised as follows:

Question 1: What are digital democracy and the digital public sphere?

• Communication is an important aspect of all models of democracy. One can dis-

tinguish between liberal-representative democratic, plebiscitary-direct demo-
cratic, deliberative, and participatory types of democracy.
• The public sphere is a sphere of public political communication that mediates
between the other subsystems of society, i.e. the economy, politics, culture,
and private life. The public sphere mediates political communication.
• Public service media as public communication systems with a public cultural
and economic character play a special communicative and informational role
in democracy. The democratic mandate should therefore guarantee that public
service media contribute to democratic communication.
• Digital democracy means that democratic practices are based on digital media.
Political information, communication, and co-operation processes of democ-
racy are thereby supported by computer mediation. A distinction can be made
264 Foundations of Digital Democracy

between liberal-representative democratic, plebiscitary, deliberative, and par-

ticipatory/grassroots democratic elements of digital democracy.
• Methods of representative digital democracy are the most widely practised
form of digital democracy.
• Plebiscitary models of politics face the danger of accompanying the forma-
tion of an authoritarian state with charismatic leadership in which populist
measures are legitimised by the people at the click of a mouse. The role of
plebiscites in Nazi fascism illustrates the dangers of plebiscites. The dangers
of plebiscites remain topical in the age of digital media.
• Democratic innovations are most likely to come from the participatory (digital)
democracy model and the deliberative (digital) democracy model.

Question 2: What are the main trends in the development of digital media today, what
are digital media’s democratic possibilities and deficits, and what role can public
service media play in strengthening digital democracy and digital public sphere?

• The logic of commerce and power limit the democratic character of the public
sphere. The Internet and social media today are not an expression of a demo-
cratic public sphere and digital democracy, but are dominated by transnational
corporations such as Google, Facebook, Baidu, Yahoo, Tencent, Amazon, and
the Alibaba Group.
• The processes that Jürgen Habermas calls the feudalisation of the public sphere
and the colonisation of the lifeworld and criticises as anti-democratic tenden-
cies manifest themselves on the Internet as digital labour, digital surveillance,
digital monopolies, a digital attention economy characterised by asymmetric
power, digital commercial culture, digital acceleration, lack of space and time
for discussion and complexity, anti-social social media, post-factual online pol-
itics, fake news, automated algorithmic politics, and fragmented publics.
• Overall, these tendencies lead to a digital public sphere characterised by eco-
nomic, political, and cultural asymmetries of power. They are antithetical to
digital democracy.
• A public service YouTube would expand the democratic and educational remit
of public service media in the form of a participatory mandate and update the
democratic and education remit for the digital age. The public service YouTube
is an independent, non-profit video platform that offers archive material of pub-
lic media on the basis of a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC licence and allows
users to reuse and remix this content. Participation can take place by inviting
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 265

users to upload user-generated videos to accompany TV and radio programmes

on specific topics.
• The Europe-wide co-operation of public service media as well as the co-­
operation between public service media and non-profit civil society and cultural
organisations lends itself in the context of a public service YouTube.
• The public service YouTube is a specific audio-visual manifestation of the
concept of Public Open Space and an expression of elements of participatory
democracy.
• Club 2.0 is an update of the ORF concept of Club 2 in the age of digital media.
Club 2.0 combines uncensored studio discussion, which is broadcast on tel-
evision without a time limit and on its own video platform, with online user
discussions and user-generated videos on the discussion topic. Individual
user-generated videos are used as user-generated discussion inputs at cer-
tain points in the live broadcast and are aired on television as part of the live
broadcast.
• The communicative aspect of deliberative democracy and the participatory idea
of grassroots democracy are combined in the model of Club 2.0. Club 2 and its
digital democratic update in the form of Club 2.0 are mediatised practices of

Summary and Recommendations for Action

deliberative and participatory democratic public sphere.
• Advertising today is increasingly shifting from print to online, and predomi-
nantly to personalised advertising by Google and Facebook that form a duopoly
of online advertising, but at the same time are masters of tax avoidance, harm-
ing the public. The introduction of an online advertising tax pushes back mo-
nopolising tendencies and creates a financial basis for public digital democracy
projects.

Question 3: What legal framework is needed so that public service media can
strengthen digital democracy?

• The Broadcasting Communication issued by the EU Commission in 2009 has

made it more difficult for public service media to develop and provide online
public services that strengthen digital democracy. One expression of this trend
is the market and competition test in Public Value Tests.
• As the Internet is dominated by transnational capitalist monopoly corporations,
legal limitations and bans of public Internet platforms strengthen the monopoly
power of these predominantly Californian companies.
266 Foundations of Digital Democracy

• Geoblocking, limited retention time, and legal deletion requirements of public

service online content undermine the possibilities of the Internet and harm the
realisation of the democratic mandate of public service media.

Based on this analysis, the following recommendations for action are formulated:

• It is recommended that public service media develop digital democracy innova-

tions based on the models of deliberative and participatory democracy.
• It is recommended that public service media take active steps to build public ser-
vice Internet platforms to counteract the lack of digital democracy on the Internet
today.
• It is recommended that public service media revive Club 2 in the form of Club
2.0, realising Club 2 in its original format and combining it with an online video
platform (C2-Tube). Club 2.0 would make it possible to adapt the democratic remit
of public service media to the age of digital media, using elements of deliberative
and participatory models of democracy.
• It is recommended that public service media prepare a detailed concept of Club
2.0 and commission accompanying studies on the introduction of Club 2.0 and the
impacts on society.
• It is recommended that public service media seek to establish a public service
YouTube in order to actualise the democratic remit of public service media in the
age of digital media and contribute to the expansion of digital democracy and the
democratic digital public sphere.
• It is recommended that public service media speak out in support of the require-
ment that a digital capital tax and an online advertising tax be introduced and that
the revenues generated thereby be used to fund public service digital democracy
projects.
• It is recommended that as a basic measure to strengthen digital democracy and to
adapt the democratic mandate of public service media to the age of digital media,
the national and EU legal foundations be changed in such a way that competition
tests and market tests within the framework of Public Value Tests are omitted in
the future.
• It is recommended that as a basic measure to strengthen digital democracy and
to adapt the democratic remit of public service media to the age of digital media,
the national and EU legal foundations be changed in such a way that geoblocking
and the time-limited retention period of public service audio-visual content are
 Chapter Nine | Digital Democracy 267

abolished and public service media content is made accessible globally and with-
out time restrictions.
• It is recommended that, in order to strengthen the democratic remit of public ser-
vice media, laws be amended in such a way that public service media can offer
content without legal restrictions and prohibitions and without a limited retention
time, provided the content advances public service media’s remit in the digital age.

Notes
1 “die Förderung des Verständnisses für alle Fragen des demokratischen Zusammenlebens”.
Source https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetz-
esnummer=10000785, accessed on 27 March 2021.
2 http://www.verfassungen.de/de/de33-45/volksabstimmung33.htm, accessed on 27 March
2021, translated from German: “Die Reichsregierung kann das Volk befragen, ob es einer von
der Reichsregierung beabsichtigten Maßnahme zustimmt oder nicht”.
3 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_der_Plebiszite_in_Deutschland, accessed on 27 March
2021.
4 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/, accessed on 27 March 2021.
5 Translated from German, https://public-open-space.eu/, accessed on 27 March 2021.
6 Zur Zukunft öffentlich-rechtlicher Medien. Offener Brief, accessed on 27 March 2021: https://
zukunft-öffentlich-rechtliche.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Zehn-Thesen-zur-Zukunft-oef-
fentlich-rechtlicher-Medien_170914.pdf.
7 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:C:2009:257:FULL&from=EN,
accessed on 27 March 2021.

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Part III

Conclusion
Chapter Ten
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
and Alienation
Challenges and Opportunities for the Advancement of Digital Democracy

10.1 Introduction
10.2 The Public Sphere as a Concept of Critique
10.3 The Capitalist Colonisation of the Digital Public Sphere
10.4 For a Public Service Internet
10.5 Conclusions
References

10.1 Introduction
Over the last 15 years, the term “­social media” has become established. As a rule, this
category is used as a collective term for social networks such as Facebook and Linke-
dIn, video platforms such as YouTube, ­photo-​­sharing platforms such as Instagram, blogs,
and microblogs such as Twitter and Weibo, messenger apps such as WhatsApp, lives-
treaming platforms, video apps, and wikis such as Wikipedia. It is not always clear what
exactly is considered ”social” about “­social media” and why older information and com-
munication media such as email, the telephone, television, and books should not also
be considered social. The problem here is that in sociology there is not one, but many
understandings of the social (­Fuchs 2017, ­Chapter 2, 2021, ­Chapter 2).

Internet platforms like Facebook and Google, which dominate the social media sector,
are among the largest corporations in the world. At the same time, social media have be-
come an integral part of politics and public communication. Some ­right-​­wing politicians
have lots of followers on various Internet platforms and spread propaganda and false
news via these media. The Arab Spring and the various Occupy movements have shown
that social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are important in social move-
ments. Today, no politician, no party, no NGO, and no social movement can do without

DOI: 10.4324/9781003331087-13
272 Conclusion

profiles on social media. Therefore, the question of the connection between social media
and the public sphere arises. This chapter sheds light on this question.

Section 10.2 introduces a concept of the public sphere as a concept of critique. Section
10.3 uses the concept of public sphere to critique capitalist Internet platforms. Section
10.4 is about the potentials of a public service Internet.

10.2 The Public Sphere as a

Concept of Critique
The public sphere forms an important aspect of any political and social system. Habermas
understands “­public” to mean spaces and resources that are “­open to all” (­Habermas
1991, 1). That is why we speak, for example, of public service media, public opinion,
public education, public parks, etc. The concept of the public sphere has to do with the
common good, with the idea that there are institutions that are not only used and owned
by a privileged few, but from which everyone benefits.

Public institutions and goods are often, but not necessarily, regulated and organised by
the state. There may be certain access requirements. For example, public service media
in many countries are financed by a legally regulated licence fee. Such access conditions
should be affordable for everyone and there should be no discrimination by class, in-
come, origin, gender, etc. in access to public resources. Accordingly, a park to which only
people with white skin colour had access at the time of segregation in the United States
or South Africa was not a public good.

The public sphere also has to do with public debate about society, interests and decisions
that are taken collectively and bindingly for all. It therefore has an inherently political char-
acter. The public sphere mediates between other spheres of society as a kind of interface
between economy, culture, politics, and private life. An ­ideal-​­typical public sphere is a
sphere that organises “­critical publicity” (­Habermas 1991, 237) and “­critical public de-
bate” (­Habermas 1991, 52). If criticism is silenced or suppressed, there is no public sphere.

The public sphere is a sphere of public political communication that mediates between
the other subsystems of society, i.e. the economy, politics, culture, and private life. The
public sphere is a medium of political communication. Through the public sphere, it is
possible for people to learn about, discuss and participate in politics.

The media system is part of the public sphere in modern society. ­Figure 10.1 illustrates
a model of the role of the media in the modern public sphere (­see Fuchs 2016). Media
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 273

Economy Socio-economy
(owners, managers, (organised economic
employees) interests)

Public
information Politics
(citizens,
politicians)
Media system
Socio-politics
(activists)
Lobbying,
information
sources,
Socio-culture Culture
regulation, (communities of (private individuals,
funding interest) consumers)

­FIGURE 10.1 T he media system as part of the public sphere. Further development on the basis of Habermas
(­2008), Diagram 1 and 2

organisations produce publicly accessible information in the media system. Such infor-
mation usually serves to inform about news, to educate, and to entertain. Through public
news, members of the political system inform themselves about important events in
society and politics. News is a trigger of political communication. People talk about what

The Public Sphere as a Concept of Critique

is based in politics and ideally participate in the d­ ecision-​­making process themselves.
In capitalist society, different interest organisations such as employers’ associations,
workers’ associations such as trade unions, lobby organisations, political parties, NGOs,
private individuals, social movements, etc. try to influence the media companies’ re-
porting. This happens, among other things, through interviews, press releases, lobbying,
advertising, public relations, the interweaving of organisations, etc. The media system
interacts with the economy, politics, and culture. Citizens (­purchase, broadcasting fee,
subscriptions, etc.), the state (­e.g. media funding) as well as business organisations
(­advertising) enable an economic resource base for the media to operate with. Politics
regulates the framework conditions under which the media operate. Culture is a context
of worldviews and ideologies that shape the climate of society and thus also have an
influence on the media system and its organisations.

Following Jürgen Habermas, Friedhelm Neidhardt, and Jürgen Gerhards, we conceive

of the public sphere as a communication system that is in principle universally
accessible and open for participation by everyone, provides public access to information
and enables public voice, visibility, attention, communication, and debate about topics
that matter for and in society. The “­public can be perceived as a k­ nowledge-​­producing
274 Conclusion

system that follows its own rules of establishing attention and, sometimes, consent”
(­Neidhardt 1993, 347).

Neidhardt and Gerhards argue that the public sphere includes speakers, media of com-
munication, and audiences.

There must exist: speakers. who say something; an audience, that listens; and
mediators who relate speakers and the audience if they are not in immedi-
ate contact with one ­another-​­that is, journalists and the mass media. […] The
speakers try to win the attention and the consent of a larger collectivity of
fellow citizens, and out of this collectivity a subsample becomes interested and
engaged in those topics and opinions the speakers offer them. This subsample
is the audience. It is defined by a minimum of activity in the form of observ-
ing, listening, reading. attending a meeting, or sometimes becoming speakers
themselves. The audience is thus constituted by participation. […] Speakers
are conceived as all those behind the mass media who raise their voices in
order to reach the public and to constitute audiences. Regularly these are
‘­prolocuters’ of societal institutions, of interest organizations and civic groups;
often, too, some are experts and intellectuals.
(­Neidhardt 1993, 340, 342)

We define the public sphere (­1) as a specific communication system that is

distinct from other social systems. The system is constituted on the basis of the
exchange of information and opinions. Individuals, groups and institutions raise
certain issues and express opinions on the issues. If one does not necessarily
think of the term discussion as academic e­ vents – because
​­ public communi-
cation includes demagogic communication of persuasion as well as a rational
weighing of ­arguments – ​­one can describe the public sphere as a system of dis-
cussion. […] The peculiarity of the communication system of the public arises
(­2) from the fact that all members of a society may participate, the audience is
fundamentally ‘­unclosed’, the boundary of the system is open.1
(­Gerhards and Neidhardt 1990, 15)

There are different types of publics organised at different levels of society: ­Micro-​
p­ ublics are small publics where humans directly encounter each speech to each other,
mainly ­face-­​­­to-​­face, in everyday situations and spaces such as “­cafés, coffee houses,
and salons”2 (­Gerhards and Neidhardt 1990, 20). ­Meso-​­publics are ­medium-​­sized publics
that take on the form of public events. An example is a rock concert or an e­ vening-​­filling
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 275

book presentation with accompanying audience discussion. M ­ acro-​­publics are ­large-​

­scale publics at the level of society where many humans access information or commu-
nicate. Mass media often play an important role in ­macro-​­publics. The public sphere is
an interface of society that interacts with the economic system, the political system, and
the cultural system. Based on these assumptions, F­ igure 10.2 presents a model of the
public sphere.

We distinguish between ­micro-​­, ­meso-​­, and ­macro-​­publics as three types of public that
together constitute the public sphere. Economic, political, and cultural actors interact
with the public sphere in that they are the subject of news, information, and entertain-
ment. Furthermore, economic, political, and cultural groups often try to lobby in the pub-
lic sphere to gain visibility and support for their views and positions. Financial resources
from the economy provide funding for media organisations operating in the public sphere
(­e.g. in the form of ad revenue, subscription fees, licence fees, etc.). Policies and gov-
ernments’ laws regulate the media. Norms, moral values, worldviews, and ideologies

The Public Sphere as a Concept of Critique

­FIGURE 10.2 A model of the public sphere

276 Conclusion

as cultural structures influence public opinion, public debates, and the public sphere at
large. At the level of human practices, human beings cognise, which means that they
perceive, experience, and interpret the world; they communicate with each other about
what is happening in their social environment and society; and they c­ o-​­operate and so-
cially produce new realities and social relations. Processes of cognition, communication,
and ­co-​­operation are the practices that form the foundation of the public sphere where
opinions, content, and knowledge are produced. Opinions, content, and knowledge pro-
duced in the public sphere influence the way humans think, communicate, and produce.

The traditional public sphere in modern society has been shaped by mass communication
and mass media, where there is a small group of information producers using mass me-
dia for spreading information that is received and interpreted by audience members in
various ways. ­Figure 10.3 visualises the digital transformation of the public sphere that
has two main features (­see Fuchs 2021):

• Prosumption:
On the Internet, consumers of information become potential producers of informa-
tion, ­so-​­called prosumers (­productive consumers);
• Convergence:
On the Internet, the boundaries between different social practices, social roles,
social systems, and different publics converge so that humans on Internet plat-
forms with the help of single profiles act in a variety of roles with a variety of
practices and a variety of different publics.

The patterned boxes in F­ igure 10.3 indicate that in the digital public sphere, human prac-
tices, ­micro-​­, ­meso-​­, and m
­ acro-​­publics, economy, politics, and culture are mediated by
digital platforms. The dotted lines indicate that on digital platforms, individuals’ practices,
cognition processes, communication processes, ­co-​­operation processes, their activities in
various publics, and their social roles in the economy (­e.g. as worker or manager), politics
(­e.g. as citizen or politicians), and culture (­e.g. as member of a certain religion or com-
munity), converge on digital platforms’ user profiles. The information and communication
processes organised with the help of digital platforms are different from traditional mass
media in that all users are enabled to produce content and communicate with others
through the platforms. A digital platform is an online software environment that organises
human information, activities, and communication via mobile phone apps, the Internet, and
the WWW. Platforms are also social systems, which means they have a ­political-​­economic
organisation and specific cultures. In the platform economy, we find organisational models
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 277

­FIGURE 10.3 The digital transformation of the public sphere

that determine specific forms of ownership, work, economic activities, and relations of
production. Platform governance involves laws and policies that determine what the actors
involved in platforms are allowed to do, not to do, and are expected to do.

The Public Sphere as a Concept of Critique

For Habermas, the public sphere is autonomous from capital and state power, that is,
from economic and political power. In the public sphere, the “[l]Laws of the market […]
[are] suspended as were laws of the state” (­Habermas 1991, 36). State censorship of po-
litical opinion and private ownership of the means of production of public opinion contra-
dict the democratic character of the public sphere. For Marx, socialism is an alternative
to the capitalist economy and the bourgeois state. Marx describes the Paris Commune,
which existed from March to May 1871, as a socialist form of public sphere. It was an
attempt to organise politics and the economy democratically.

The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal

suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short
terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men, of acknowl-
edged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a work-
ing, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time. […]
Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the Central
Government. Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hith-
erto exercised by the State was laid into the hands of the Commune.
(­Marx 1871, 331)
278 Conclusion

Marx was a critic of the capitalism’s restricted public sphere. “­The public sphere with
which Marx saw himself confronted contradicted its own principle of universal accessi-
bility” (­Habermas 1991, 122). Liberal ideology postulates individual freedoms (­freedom of
speech, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly) as univer-
sal rights. The particularist and stratified character of capitalist class society undermines
these universal rights. It creates inequality and thereby unequal access to the public
sphere. There are two inherent limitations to the public sphere that Habermas discusses:

• The restriction of the freedom of speech and freedom of public opinion: If people
do not have the same formal level of education and the same material resources
at their disposal, this may constitute restrictions on access to the public sphere
(­Habermas 1991, 227).
• The restriction of the freedoms of assembly and association: Powerful political
and economic organisation possess “­an oligopoly of the publicistically effective
and politically relevant formation of assemblies and associations” (­Habermas
1991, 228).

Habermas argues that the bourgeois public sphere is colonised and feudalised as a re-
sult of these restrictions. Such a public sphere is not a true public sphere, but a ­class-​
­structured political space. The public sphere is a concept of immanent critique that lends
itself to the critique of the deficits and problems of modern society. Habermas does not
say that the public sphere exists everywhere, but that it should exist. Immanent critique
compares proclaimed ideals with actuality. If it finds that reality contradicts its own ide-
als, it becomes clear that there is a fundamental contradiction and that reality must be
changed to overcome this incongruity. The bourgeois public sphere creates its own limits
and thus its own immanent critique.

Public spaces and public spheres do not exist only in the West. The claim that the public
sphere is a W ­ estern-​­centric or Eurocentric concept is misguided. Such a critique also
risks justifying undemocratic regimes that are ­anti-​­Western and promote authoritari-
anism under the guise of opposition to W ­ estern-​­centrism and Eurocentrism. The public
teahouse is an ancient cultural practice and space that can be found in many parts of the
world. Di Wang compares the Chinese teahouse of the early 20th century to British pub-
lic houses (­Wang 2008). It is a public space that people from all walks of life and classes
frequent for different reasons. The Chinese word for the teahouse is 茶馆 (­cháguăn).
Chengdu is the capital of the ­south-​­western Chinese province of Sichuan. “­Teahouses in
Chengdu, however, were renowned for their multiclass orientation. One of the ‘­virtues’
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 279

of Chengdu teahouses was their ‘­relative equality’” (­Wang 2008, 420). Women were
excluded at first, but had full access from around 1930. These teahouses were not only
cultural spaces but also political meeting places where political debates took place and
where political plays were performed, attracting the interest not only of citizens but also
of government informers. Wang discusses the importance of teahouses in the 1911 rail-
way protests in Chengdu. Public meeting places are spheres of citizen engagement that
can become spheres of political communication and protest.

The various Occupy movements that emerged after the global economic crisis that began
in 2008 were movements in which protest and the occupation of spaces converged. ­Self-​
­managed public spheres were created for political communication. The creation of these
public spheres took place not only in the West, but in many parts of the world in times of
global capitalist and social crisis. A common aspect of these protests was that in many of
them the tactic of transforming spaces into public spheres and political spaces was used
and that these protests took place in a general social crisis. Resistance is as old as class
society. Public spheres have been produced as resistant publics throughout the history of
class societies. So public spheres exist wherever people gather to organise collectively
and express their anger and resentment at exploitation and domination.

One of the connections between Habermas’ Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere

The Public Sphere as a Concept of Critique

(­Habermas 1991) and his Theory of Communicative Action (­Habermas 1984, 1987) is the
elucidation of how stratification processes work in modern society. While Habermas
speaks of the “­refeudalisation” of the public sphere in his early work (­Habermas 1991,
142, 158, 195, 200, 231), later the term colonisation of the lifeworld comes to the fore,
encompassing “­monetarization and bureaucratization” (­Habermas 1987, 321, 323, 325,
386, 403). According to Habermas (­1987, 323), these two processes “­instrumentalise”
the lifeworld and thus the public sphere. In my own approach, I assume that it is not two
but three processes of exercising power that colonise and refeudalise the public sphere
(­Fuchs 2008, 2011, 2014, 2015, 2020a):

• Through commodification and class structuration, the logic of money, capital, and
the commodity form penetrates people’s everyday lives and lifeworlds.
• Through domination, society is organised in such a way that particular interests
prevail and some people or groups or individuals gain advantages at the expense
of others.
• Ideologisation presents partial interests, exploitation, and domination as natural
and necessary by presenting reality in a distorted or manipulated way.
280 Conclusion

The commodity form, domination, and ideology are the three main forms of stratification
in capitalist society. The critical theory of the public sphere is a critique of the commodity
form, a critique of domination, and a critique of ideology. A critical theory of the public
sphere is therefore a critique of alienation. What Horkheimer (­1947) called instrumental
reason, Marcuse (­1941) called technological rationality3 and Lukács (­1923/­1971) called
reification, takes on three forms in capitalism:

• Class structuration and the commodity form instrumentalise people’s labour power
and people’s needs in capitalist consumption.
• Political rule instrumentalises people’s ability to act politically in such a way that
they do not make decisions themselves but leave them to dominant groups.
• Ideology tries to bend and instrumentalise people’s consciousness and their sub-
jective interests.

Karl Marx (­1867) emphasised that the logic of accumulation shapes capitalism. This logic
has its origin in the capitalist economy. But it also shapes modern politics and modern
culture, which are about the accumulation of political and cultural power. The accumula-
tion of power takes the form of the accumulation of capital, ­decision-​­making power, and
defining power. Accumulation results in asymmetries of power, namely class structures,
structures of domination, and ideology (­see ­Table 10.1).

Alienation means that people are confronted with structures and conditions that they
cannot control and influence themselves. Individuals do not control the economic,
political, and cultural products that influence their lives and everyday life. Aliena-
tion means the “­loss of the object, his product” (­Marx 1844, 273). Alienation means
“­vitality as a sacrifice of life, production of the object as loss of the object to an alien
power, to an alien person” (­Marx 1844, 281). U ­ se-​­values, collectively binding deci-
sions, and collective meanings are social products resulting from human practices. In

­TABLE 10.1 A
 ntagonisms in three types of alienation

Type of alienation Alienating subjects Alienated subjects

Economic alienation: Ruling class, exploiters Exploited class
exploitation
Political alienation: Dictator, dictatorial groups Excluded individuals and groups
domination
Cultural alienation: Ideologues Disrespected individuals and groups
ideology that results in disrespect
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 281

­TABLE 10.2 T he main actors in alienated society and in Humanist society. Based on Fuchs (­2020a, 103: ­Table 4.4)

Alienated society Humanism

Economy The exploited The socialist/­commoner
Politics The dictator The democrat
Culture The ideologue/­demagogue The friend

capitalist society, however, they are controlled by only a few, resulting in objectively
alienated conditions.

­Table 10.2 illustrates the antagonism between alienated and Humanist society along the
three social dimensions of economy, politics, and culture. In an alienated society, the
main actors are the exploiter in the economy, the dictator in politics, and the ideologue/­
demagogue in culture. Humanism is the alternative to the alienated society. In a Human-
ist society, the main actors are the socialist and the commoner in the economy, the
democrat in politics, and the solidary friend in culture.

The Capitalist Colonisation of the Digital Public Sphere

10.3 The Capitalist Colonisation of the Digital
Public Sphere
In discussions about the Internet and social media, it is relatively often heard that through
the possibilities of prosumption (­consuming producers on the Internet: Media consumers
become producers of content) and ­user-​­generated content, an electronic democracy, a
digital/­virtual public sphere, and a participatory culture are emerging. These arguments
are also widespread in the academic debate.4 A f­ ar-​­reaching democratisation of society,
including the capitalist economy, is inferred from a technical change, although class
antagonisms, political antagonisms, and ideological lines of conflict continue to exist
and have even deepened. Is today’s Internet and social media a new public sphere that
expands democracy, or a new form of colonisation of the public sphere?

Jürgen Habermas has been sceptical in respect to the question of whether or not, how, and to
what degree the Internet and social media advance a public sphere. He argues that the Inter-
net is democratic only in that it “­can undermine the censorship of authoritarian regimes” but
that it also fragments the public into “­a huge number of issue publics” (­Habermas 2006, 423).
In a recent essay, Habermas (­2021) interprets studies of the public sphere as confirmation of
his view that the Internet and social media have resulted in “­­semi-​­public, fragmented and
­self-​­circulating discussion” and deform the public sphere (­Habermas 2021, 471, translation
from German). In his most recent monograph, Habermas (­2019, volume 2: 799, translated
282 Conclusion

from German) argues that containing the “­dangers of the oligopolistically dominated and for
the time being destructively rampant Internet communication” requires transnational political
regulation, which shows the importance of policies in the context of the (­digital) public sphere.

Users of today’s Internet and social media face ten problems (­see Fuchs 2016, 2017,
2019b, 2021):

1) Digital capitalism/­digital class relations:

Digital capital exploits digital labour. It results in capitalist digital monopolies and
contributes to the precarisation of life.
2) Digital individualism:
Digital individualism consists of users accumulating attention with and approval
of individual profiles and postings on social media. Its logic treats people as mere
competitors, undermining interpersonal solidarity.
3) Digital surveillance:
State institutions and capitalist companies carry out digital surveillance of people
as part of the ­digital-​­industrial and ­surveillance-​­industrial complex.
4) ­Anti-​­social social media:
Social media are ­anti-​­social social media. Edward Snowden’s revelations and
the Cambridge Analytica scandal have shown that capitalist social media are a
danger to democracy. ­Right-​­wing ideologues and demagogues spread digital au-
thoritarianism on social media and attack the public service media, independently
acting media and quality media as “­metropolitan elite media”.
5) Algorithmic politics:
Social media are characterised by automated, algorithmic politics. Automated
computer programmes (“­bots”) replace human activity, post information, and
generate “­likes”. This has made it more difficult to distinguish which information
and which approval comes from a human or a machine.
6) Filter bubbles:
Fragmented online publics are organised as filter bubbles in which opinions are
homogeneous and disagreements either do not exist or are avoided.
7) Digital tabloids:
The digital culture industry has organised social media as digital tabloids con-
trolled by digital corporations. Online advertising and tabloid entertainment dom-
inate the Internet, displacing engagement with political and educational content.
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 283

8) Influencer capitalism:
On social media, s­o-​­called “­influencers” shape public opinion, creating power
asymmetries in terms of online attention and visibility, and living a commodified
online culture that presents the world as an endless shopping mile and a huge
shopping mall.
9) Digital acceleration:
Due to digital acceleration, our attention capacity is strained by superficial infor-
mation that hits us at very high speed. There is too little time and too little space
for conversations and debates on social media.
10) Fake news:
P­ ost-​­truth politics and fake news are spreading globally through social media. In
the age of new nationalisms and new authoritarianism, a culture has emerged in
which false online news is spread, many people distrust facts and experts, and
there is an emotionalisation of politics through which people do not rationally
examine what is real and what is fiction, but assume something is true if it suits

The Capitalist Colonisation of the Digital Public Sphere

their state of mind and ideology (­see Fuchs 2018, 2020a).

These ten tendencies have led to a digital public sphere colonised and feudalised by
capital, state power, and ideology, characterised by economic, political, and cultural
asymmetries of power. The Internet certainly has potentials to socialise human activities
in the form of communication, cooperative work, community building, and the creation
of digital commons. However, class relations and structures of domination colonise the
Humanistic potentials of the Internet and society. In contemporary capitalism, people are
confronted with an antagonism between precarity and austerity. The Internet and social
media are shaped by class structures and inequalities.

Social media today are insufficiently social. They are dominated by capitalist corpora-
tions, demagogues, and ideologues, although they carry germinal forms and potentials
for a world and forms of communication beyond capitalism. Digital alternatives like Wiki-
pedia, digital workers’ cooperatives,5 alternative online media like Democracy Now! dig-
ital commons like Creative Commons or free software are the manifestation of a truly
social and socialised Internet. Within capitalism, however, such projects often remain
precarious and can only challenge the power of the dominant corporations and actors
(­Google, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, etc.) in a very limited way. The history of
alternative projects within capitalism is a history of resource scarcity and precarious,
often unpaid and ­self-​­exploitative labour.
284 Conclusion

­TABLE 10.3 T hree forms of digital alienation

Form of digital alienation Manifestations of digital alienation

Economic digital alienation:digital (­1) Digital capital/­digital labour (­digital class relations), digital
exploitation monopolies; (­2) digital accumulation/­individualism/­competition
Political digital alienation:digital (­3) digital surveillance, (­4) ­anti-​­social social media/­digital
domination authoritarianism, (­5) algorithmic politics, (­6) fragmented online
publics and online filter bubbles
Cultural digital alienation:digital ideology (­7) digital culture industry/­digital tabloids, (­8) influencer capitalism, (­9)
digital acceleration, (­10) false news/­algorithmic politics

­TABLE 10.4 Antagonisms in three forms of digital alienation

Form of alienation Alienating subjects Alienated subjects

Economic alienation: Digital capital Digital labour
exploitation
Political alienation: Digital dictators Digital citizens
domination
Cultural alienation: Digital ideologues Digital humans
ideology, disrespect

In ­Table 10.3, the ten problems of social media and the Internet in digital capitalism
already elaborated are related to the three forms of alienation. There are thus economic,
political, and cultural forms of digital alienation.

In ­Table 10.4, digital alienation is presented in the form of three antagonisms: class an-
tagonism, in which digital capital exploits digital labour; political antagonism between
digital dictators and digital citizens; and cultural antagonism between digital ideologues
and digital people. Alienation is the instrumentalisation of human beings. In digital al-
ienation, people are instrumentalised with the help of digital technologies such as the
Internet, mobile phones, social media, apps, Big Data, Industry 4.0, artificial intelligence,
cloud computing, etc. Digital alienation is the instrumentalisation of humans online.

For a detailed analysis of the digital antagonisms through which the public sphere is col-
onised and feudalised in digital capitalism, we must refer the reader to further literature
(­Fuchs 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019b, 2019c, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2021). However, we can
cite individual examples here.

In the year 2020, the world’s largest Internet corporations were Apple, Microsoft,
Alphabet/­Google, Amazon, Alibaba, and Facebook. In the Forbes list of the 2,000 largest cor-
porations in the world, they ranked ninth (­Apple), 13th (­Microsoft, Alphabet/­Google), 22nd
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 285

(­Amazon), 31st (­Alibaba), and 39th (­Facebook) in the same year.6 Digital commodities sold by
these corporations include hardware (­Apple), software (­Microsoft), online advertising (­Google,
Facebook), and digital services such as online shopping (­Amazon, Alibaba). The turnover of
these six groups amounted to 857.5 billion US dollars in 2019. The turnover of these six groups
is roughly equal to the GDP of the 22 least developed countries in the world, whose combined
GDP in 2018 was 858.3 billion US dollars. These countries are Sudan, Haiti, Afghanistan,
Djibouti, Malawi, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Yemen, G ­ uinea-​­Bissau, Congo, Mozam-
bique, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Mali, Burundi, South Sudan, Chad, the Central
African Republic, and Niger (­United Nations 2019). Five digital corporations are together
economically more powerful than 22 states. And these corporations constitute monopolies
in operating systems (­Microsoft), search engines (­Google), online shopping (­Amazon and Ali-
baba), and social networks (­Facebook). The Internet economy is dominated by a few global
corporations. Therefore, one cannot speak of digital capitalism having led to an end of mo-
nopoly power or a plural economy. Capital concentration is an inherent tendency of capitalism.

­Table 10.5 shows data on the ten most viewed YouTube videos. YouTube is the world’s

The Capitalist Colonisation of the Digital Public Sphere

most used Internet platform after Google.7 In discussions about the digital public sphere,

­TABLE 10.5 T he most watched YouTube videos of all times

Position Title Video Type Owner Number of

Views
1 Pinkfong Kids’ Songs & ­Stories –​ Children’s music SmartStudy (­Samsung 8.3 billion
­Baby Shark Dance Publishing)
2 Luis ­Fonsi – ​­Despacito Music Universal Music (­Vivendi) 7.3 billion
3 Ed ­Sheeran – ​­Shape of You Music Warner Music 5.3 billion
4 LooLoo ­Kids – ​­Johny Johny Yes Children’s music Mora TV 5.1 billion
Papa
5 Wiz ­Khalifa – ​­See You Again Music Warner Music 5.1 billion
6 Masha and the ­Bear – ​­Recipe Children’s Animaccord Animation 4.4 billion
for Disaster entertainment Studio
7 Mark ­Ronson – ​­Uptown Funk Music Sony Music 4.1 billion
8 ­Psy – ​­Gangnam Style Music YG Entertainment 4.0 billion
(­distributed by Universal)
9 Miroshka ­TV – ​­Learning Children’s music Miroshka TV 3.9 billion
­Colours – ​­Colourful Eggs on
a Farm
10 Cocomelon Nursery ­Rhymes – ​ Children’s music Moonbug Entertainment 3.9 billion
­Bath Song

Source: https://­en.wikipedia.org/­wiki/­­List_of_most-​­viewed_YouTube_videos, accessed on 14 April 2021.

286 Conclusion

it is often heard that u­ ser-​­generated content means that everyone has a voice on so-
cial media and that the public sphere has become pluralistic and participatory. On the
Internet, it is true that anyone can easily produce and publish digital content. But there
are asymmetries of visibility and attention. Entertainment dominates over education and
politics. At the content level, social media is primarily digital tabloid media. Multimedia
corporations and celebrities dominate online visibility and online attention. All of the ten
most viewed YouTube videos are music videos. Copyright is controlled by ­profit-​­oriented
corporations. The example shows that Internet platforms have not created a participa-
tory culture, but that media corporations and celebrities control online attention and the
online public sphere.

The Cambridge Analytica scandal dominated the world news in the first half of 2018.
Cambridge Analytica was a consulting firm founded in 2013 that was active in the use of
Big Data, among other things. Donald Trump’s former f­ ar-​­right adviser Steve Bannon was
the vice president of this company. Cambridge Analytica bought access to the personal
data of 90 million people collected on Facebook via a personality test. Personal data
was collected from participants’ Facebook profiles. Cambridge Analytica used this data
in Donald Trump’s election campaign to spread personalised fake news. This scandal is
remarkable in several respects:

• The Cambridge Analytica scandal shows that r­ight-​­wing extremists will resort to
any means at their disposal to spread their ideology. This also includes fake news
and surveillance.
• The Cambridge Analytica scandal shows that Facebook accepts dangers for de-
mocracy in order to make money from data. Facebook operates on the logic that
­ever-​­larger amounts of data processed and collected on the Internet are good for
the profits of the corporation, which uses them to personalise advertising, i.e. to
tailor it to individual user behaviour, and to sell it.
• The Cambridge Analytica scandal shows that the neoliberal deregulation of the
economy has led to Internet corporations being able to act as they wish.
• The Cambridge Analytica scandal shows the connection between digital fascism,
digital capitalism, and digital neoliberalism, which poses a threat to democracy.

The three examples (­Internet corporations’ economic power, YouTube’s attention econ-
omy, Cambridge Analytica) exemplify individual dimensions of the ten forms of coloni-
sation of the digital public sphere discussed in this section. The first example shows the
power of Internet corporations, which illustrated aspects of digital monopolies (­aspect
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 287

one of the ten problems of today’s Internet). The second example was about the digital
attention economy on YouTube. This is an expression of digital tabloidisation and the
digital culture industry (­Problem 7), where celebrities dominate attention and visibility
(­Problem 8). The Cambridge Analytica scandal illustrates a combination of several of
the ten problems, namely digital capitalism (­Problem 1), digital surveillance (­Problem 3),
digital authoritarianism (­Problem 5), and online fake news (­Problem 10).

The three examples illustrate that the assumption that the Internet and social media
are a democratic, digital public sphere is a myth and an ideology that trivialises the real
power of Internet corporations and phenomena such as online fake news and online
fascism. But the question is whether a democratic Internet is possible. The next section
deals with this question in the context of public service media.

10.4 For a Public Service Internet

The digital public sphere has the form of the colonised and feudalised public sphere
through the logic of accumulation, advertising, monopolisation, commercialisation,
commodification, acceleration, individualism, fragmentation, the automation of hu-
man activity, surveillance, and ideologisation. The Internet and social media are dom-
inated by commercial culture. Platforms are largely owned by large p­ rofit-​­oriented
corporations. Public service media operate on the basis of a different logic. However,
the idea of a public service Internet has not yet been able to gain acceptance and
sounds alien to most ears, as there are hardly any alternatives to the capitalist Inter-
net today. For a Public Service Internet

Media have (­a) a ­political-​­economic and (­b) a cultural dimension. On the one hand, they
need resources such as money, legal frameworks, staff, and organisational structures
in order to exist. In this respect, they are economic organisations. However, they are
special economic organisations that are also cultural organisations, since they produce
meanings of society that serve public information, communication, and ­opinion-​­forming.
Since opinion formation and communication also include political opinion formation and
political communication, media organisations have implications for democracy and the
political system. As cultural organisations, all media organisations are public because
they publish information. As economic organisations, on the other hand, only certain
media organisations are public, while others take on a private sector character, i.e. are
organisations that have private owners and operate for profit. Public service media and
civil society media, on the other hand, are not ­profit-​­oriented and are collectively owned
288 Conclusion

by the state or a community. ­Table 10.1 illustrates these distinctions. Public service me-
dia are public in the sense of the cultural public and the p­ olitical-​­economic public. They
publish information and are owned by the public.

The communication studies scholar Slavko Splichal (­2007, 255) gives a precise definition
of public service media:

In normative terms, public service media must be a service of the public, by

the public, and for the public. It is a service of the public because it is financed
by it and should be owned by it. It ought to be a service by the ­public – ​­not
only financed and controlled, but also produced by it. It must be a service for
the ­public – ​­but also for the government and other powers acting in the pub-
lic sphere. In sum, public service media ought to become ‘­a cornerstone of
democracy.’
(­Splichal 2007, 255)

The means of production of public service media are publicly owned. The production and
circulation of content are based on a n­ on-​­profit logic. Access is universal, as all citizens
are given easy access to the content and technologies of public service media. In political
terms, public service media offer diverse and inclusive content that promotes political
understanding and discourse. In cultural terms, they offer educational content that con-
tributes to the cultural development of individuals and society.

Due to the special qualities of public service media, they can also make a particularly
valuable democratic and educational contribution to a democratic online public sphere
and digital democracy if they are given the necessary material and legal opportunities
to do so.

Signed by more than 1,000 individuals, the public service media and public service Internet
Manifesto calls for the defence of the existence, funding, and independence of public
service media and the creation of a public service Internet (­Fuchs and Unterberger 2021).
Among those who have signed the Manifesto, which was initiated by Christian Fuchs
and Klaus Unterberger, are Jürgen Habermas, Noam Chomsky, the International Federa-
tion of Journalists, the European Federation of Journalists, the International Association
for Media and Communication Research (­IAMCR), and the European Communication and
Research Education Association (­ECREA).

Two ideas for the expansion of digital democracy and the creation of public service Inter-
net platforms are the public service YouTube and Club 2.0.
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 289

10.4.1 Public Service YouTube

Digital media change the traditional relationship between media production and me-
dia consumption. While in classical broadcasting these two aspects are separated, on
the Internet consumers can become producers of information (­­so-​­called prosumers, i.e.
producing consumers). ­User-​­generated content offers the possibility for the audience
to become a producing audience. In this way, the educational and democratic mandate
of public service broadcasting can be extended in the form of a participatory mandate.
In this context, participation means offering an online platform with the help of which
citizens can make ­user-​­generated ­audio-​­visual content publicly available.

YouTube holds a de facto monopoly in the realm of ­user-​­generated video distribution

platforms. Public service media have the necessary experience and resources to develop,
offer and operate online video and online audio platforms. This could create real com-
petition for YouTube’s dominance. YouTube is often criticised for distributing fake news,
hateful, terrorist, and ­far-​­right content. Relatively little is done about these problems
because video content is not vetted by humans when it is uploaded. YouTube works
according to the logic “­The more ­user-​­generated content, the better, as this creates more
advertising opportunities and more profit”. YouTube’s a­ dvertising-​­and ­profit-​­orientation
leads to blindness to the quality of the content. A public YouTube, on the other hand,
could fulfil public service media’s democratic remit by not simply allowing videos on all
topics (“­anything goes”) to be uploaded, but by opening up certain politically and demo-
cratically relevant topics (­e.g. as accompaniment to certain TV or radio programmes) to
users for uploading content at certain times and for a limited period of time. For a Public Service Internet

The principle should be followed that all submitted contributions are published and ar-
chived and thus made accessible to the public without time limit, thus creating a u­ ser-​
­generated democratic online public sphere. However, the videos submitted should be
checked by trained moderators before release to see if they contain racist, fascist, sexist
or otherwise discriminatory content. Such content should not be released.

The individualism of today’s social media could be broken by deliberately addressing

and encouraging social, cultural, and civic contexts such as school classes, university
seminars, adult education courses, workplace communities, civil society organisations,
etc. to submit collectively produced videos.

Public service media have large archives with vast amounts of content. These contents
could be digitised and made available on a public service video and audio platform.
The Creative Commons (­CC) licence is a licence that allows content to be reused. The
290 Conclusion

C­ C-­​­­BY-​­NC licence allows content to be reproduced, redistributed, remixed, modified,

processed, and used for ­non-​­commercial purposes as long as the original source is
acknowledged.8 The ­CC-­​­­BY-​­NC licence is very suitable for digitised content from the
archives of public service media that is made publicly available. In this way, the crea-
tivity of the users of a public service audio and video platform can be promoted, as they
are allowed to generate and distribute new content with the help of archive material.
In this way, public service media’s educational remit could take on the form of a digital
creativity remit. There is also the possibility that at certain points in time, topics are
specified and users are given the opportunity to edit and remix certain archive mate-
rial and upload their new creations with the help of this material. A selection of the
content submitted in this way could be broadcast on television or radio on a regular
basis or specific occasions. All submitted contributions could be made available on the
platform.

Public service video and audio platforms can be offered in individual countries (­as
ORFTube, BBCTube, ARDTube, ZDFTube, SRGTube, etc.). However, it also makes sense
for public media broadcasters to ­co-​­operate and jointly offer such platforms or to tech-
nically standardise their individual platforms and network them with each other. The
fact that in the field of television there are cooperations, for example, between ORF,
ZDF, and SRG for 3sat or between ARD, ZDF, and France Télévisions for Arte, makes it
clear that it makes sense to create similar forms of c­ o-​­operation in the field of online
platforms. A ­pan-​­European public YouTube could rival the commercial YouTube in terms
of popularity and interest and could create real competition for the Californian Internet
giant Google/­Alphabet that owns YouTube. However, the argument that one is too small
oneself and that one has to start at the European level is often used to postpone concrete
projects or not start at all. If the legal conditions are in place nationally, it may be easier
to start at the national level in order to then set an international example and, in a further
step, advance European ­co-​­operation.

The public service YouTube is a concrete utopia of participatory democracy. A concrete

utopia is a realistic and realisable project that goes beyond the current state of society and
realises democratic innovations. A public service YouTube that aims at ­user-​­generated
production of democratic content promotes political participation and ­co-​­operation of
citizens as well as concrete, active and creative engagement with democratic content
through digital production and cooperative production. Participatory democracy means
infrastructure, space, and time for democratic processes. The public service YouTube
offers a material possibility and infrastructure for the practice of digital democracy.
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 291

10.4.2 Club 2.0

The journalists Kuno Knöbl and Franz Kreuzer created the concept of Club 2 for the Aus-
trian Broadcasting Corporation (­ORF). It was a discussion programme that was usually
broadcast on Tuesday and Thursday. The first episode was screened on 5 October 1976,
the last on 28 February 1995. About 1,400 episodes were broadcast on ORF.

The concept of Club 2 sounds rather unusual to many people today, as we are so used
to short duration, ­high-​­speed formats, and the lack of time in the media and our every-
day lives. Open, uncensored, controversial live discussions that engage the viewer
differ from accelerated media in terms of space and time: Club 2 was a public space
where guests met and discussed with each other in an atmosphere that offered unlim-
ited time, that was experienced publicly and during which a socially important topic
was discussed. Club 2 was a democratic public sphere organised by public service
broadcasting.

Space and time are two important dimensions of the political economy of the pub-
lic sphere. However, a social space that provides enough discussion time does not
guarantee an engaged, critical, and dialectical discussion that transcends o­ne-​
­dimensionality, delves into the depth of an issue, and clarifies the commonalities and
differences of worldviews and positions. Public space and time must be intelligently
organised and managed so that appropriate people participate, the atmosphere is
appropriate, the right discussion questions are asked and it is ensured that all guests
have their say, listen to each other and that the discussion can proceed undisturbed,
For a Public Service Internet
etc. Unrestricted space, a dialectically controversial and intellectually challenging
space and intelligent organisation are three important aspects of publicity. These are
preconditions of slow media, ­non-​­commercial media, decolonised media, and public
interest media.

Is a new version of Club 2 possible today? How could a Club 2.0 look and be designed?
If one speaks of a second version (“­2.0”), this means on the one hand that Club 2
should be revitalised in a new form in order to strengthen the public sphere in times
of authoritarian capitalism. On the other hand, it also means that one has to take into
account that society does not stand still, has developed dynamically, and therefore
new public communication realities such as the Internet have emerged. A Club 2.0
therefore also needs a somewhat updated concept of Club 2 that leaves the basic
rules unchanged but expands the concept. Whether Club 2.0 is transformed from a
possibility into a reality is not simply a technical question, but also one of political
292 Conclusion

­FIGURE 10.4 Concept of Club 2.0

economy. It is a political question because its implementation requires the decision

to break with the logic of commercial, ­entertainment-​­oriented television dominated
by reality TV. Club 2.0 is therefore also a political decision for public service media
formats. Its implementation is also an economic issue, as it requires a break with the
principles of colonised media, such as high speed, superficiality, scarcity of time, algo-
rithmisation and automation of human communication, p­ ost-​­truth, spectacle, etc. The
implementation of Club 2.0 is a question of resources and changing power relations
in the media system.

­Figure 10.4 illustrates a possible concept for Club 2.0. It is a basic idea that can certainly
be varied. The essential aspects are the following:

• Club 2’s ground rules:

Club 2.0 uses and extends the traditional principles of Club 2. The television
broadcast is based on the tried and tested Club 2 rules, which are crucial to the
quality of the format. Club 2.0 broadcasts are o­ pen-​­ended, live, and uncensored.
• ­Cross-​­medium:
Club 2.0 is a ­cross-​­medium that combines live television and the Internet, thereby
transcending the boundary between these two means of communication.
• Online video:
Club 2.0 is broadcast live online via a video platform.
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 293

• Autonomous social media, no traditional social media:

Existing commercial social media (­YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) are not suita-
ble as they are not based on the principles of slow media and public interest me-
dia. The use of YouTube is likely to result in advertising breaks that would interrupt
and destroy the discussion.
• Autonomous video platform ­C2-​­Tube:
Club 2.0 needs its own online video platform (­­C2-​­Tube). ­C2-​­Tube allows viewers to
watch the debate online and via a range of technical devices.
• Interactivity:
­C2-​­Tube also has interactive possibilities that can be used to a certain degree.
• ­User-​­generated discussion inputs:
It is possible for users to generate discussion inputs and for these to be actively
included in the programme. This characteristic is linked to a n­ on-​­anonymous
registration of users on the platform. Anonymity encourages Godwin’s Law,
which states: “­As the length of an anonymous online discussion increases, the
probability of a comparison to Hitler or the Nazis being made approaches one”.
The number of registered and active users can be limited. For example, the se-
lection of active users can be done randomly. Alternatively, all registered users
can be allowed to participate in the discussion. ­User-​­generated discussion in-
puts should preferably have a video format. The number of ­user-​­generated dis-
cussion inputs that can be uploaded to the platform should be limited (­ideally
For a Public Service Internet
to one upload per active user). Since information overload makes discussion
difficult, it makes sense to set certain limits in order to facilitate a decelerated
debate culture. Active users can make contributions to the discussion on the
platform.
• Interface between the studio discussion and the video platform:
At certain times during the live broadcast, a ­user-​­generated video is selected
and shown as input for the studio discussion. In such videos, users formulate
their opinion on the topic and can also introduce a discussion question. In a
­two-​­to ­three-​­hour discussion, about two to three such u­ ser-​­generated inputs
could be used. It is inevitable that a selection mechanism will be used to de-
cide which u­ ser-​­generated videos will be shown in the live broadcast. There are
several ways to do this, such as random selection, selection by the production
team, selection by a registered user determined at random, selection by a spe-
cial guest, etc.
294 Conclusion

• Discussion among users:

Club 2.0 allows users to discuss the programme topic with each other. The dis-
cussion can take place during and/­or after the live broadcast. The selected vid-
eos that function as discussion inputs can be released for discussion on C­ 2-​­Tube.
Comments should be possible in video form and written form. There should be a
minimum length for written comments and possibly a maximum length for video
comments. In order to implement the slow media principles and avoid the Twitter
effect of accelerated stagnation, the number of comments possible per user per
discussion should be limited.
• The forgetting of data:
Video data is very ­storage-​­intensive. Therefore, the question arises of what should
happen to all those videos that are uploaded to the platform but are not broadcast
and not opened for discussion. Since they are practically of less importance for
public discussion, they could be deleted after a certain time. To do this, users need
to be made aware that uploading a video in many cases involves forgetting the
data. Contemporary social media store all data and m ­ eta-​­data forever. Forgetting
data is therefore also a c­ ounter-​­principle. The online discussions consisting of
written and video comments can either be archived and kept or deleted after a
certain period of time.
• Data protection and privacy friendliness:
Most social media platforms monitor users for economic and political purposes,
to achieve monetary profits through the sale of personalised advertising, and
to establish a surveillance society that promises more security but undermines
privacy and installs a regime of categorical suspicion of all citizens. Club 2.0
should be very ­privacy-​­friendly and only store a minimum of data and ­meta-​
­data necessary to run the platform. This includes not selling user data and
using exemplary data protection routines. Data protection and privacy friendli-
ness should therefore be design principles of Club 2.0. However, this does not
mean that privacy protection should take the form of anonymous discussion,
as anonymity can encourage online hooliganism, especially on politically con-
troversial issues. Data protection is therefore much more about the storage
and use of data.
• Social production:
Today’s dominant social media are highly individualistic. In contrast, the production
of ­user-​­generated videos for Club 2.0 could take the form of cooperative, social
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 295

production that transcends individualism and creates truly social media, so that
Club 2.0 is integrated into educational institutions where people learn and create
knowledge together by elaborating discussion inputs and collective positions and
producing them in video form. This requires that the topics of certain Club 2.0
programmes are known somewhat in advance. This can be achieved by publishing
a programme of topics. Groups of users can prepare videos together, which they
can upload to the platform on the evening of the relevant Club 2.0 programme as
soon as the upload option is activated.

Club 2.0 is an expression of the democratic digital public sphere. It manifests a combi-
nation of elements of deliberative and participatory democracy. Club 2.0 offers space
and time for controversial political communication and enables citizens to participate
collectively and individually in the discussion through videos and comments. The com-
municative aspect of deliberative democracy and the participatory idea of grassroots
democracy are combined in the Club 2.0 model.

10.5 Conclusions
Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the public sphere in his book The Structural Transformation
of the Public Sphere is often portrayed by critics as idealistic, idealising, Eurocentric,
and ­anti-​­pluralistic. Such critiques fail to recognise that Habermas’ concept of the public
sphere is above all an immanent concept of critique that makes it possible to compare
the real state of society with democratic possibilities.

I have argued in this chapter and other works for an interpretation of Habermas based
on Marx and Marx’s theory of alienation. I distinguish three forms of alienation that col-
onise and feudalise the public sphere: economic alienation (­commodification and class
Conclusions

structuration), political alienation (­domination), and cultural alienation (­ideologisation).

The critical theory of the public sphere is suitable as one of the foundations of a critical
theory of the Internet and social media, i.e. of communicative action in the age of digital
capitalism. A critical theory of the digital public sphere makes it clear that the Internet
and social media do not constitute a democratic public sphere in digital capitalism. In
digital capitalism, humans are confronted with problems such as digital class relations,
digital individualism, digital surveillance, digital authoritarianism, algorithmic politics,
online filter bubbles, the digital culture industry, digital tabloids, influencer capitalism,
digital acceleration, and online fake news.
296 Conclusion

A critical theory of the digital public sphere should avoid digital defeatism and digi-
tal Luddism. Digital technologies interact with society. The contradictions of society
are expressed in them. A digital public sphere is not simply a democratisation of
the Internet, but must go hand in hand with a strengthening of democracy in the
economy, politics, and culture. There are already ­non-​­capitalist forms of the econ-
omy today. In the field of the media, public service media play an important role
alongside alternative media. This chapter has pointed out that the development of
a public service Internet is a democratic alternative to the capitalist Internet and
digital capitalism.

R­ ight-​­wing and ­far-​­right forces have frequently attacked public broadcasting in recent
years. In Switzerland, a referendum on the abolition of broadcasting fees was held in
2018 as a result of an initiative by the neoliberal Jungfreisinnigen. In Austria, the Free-
dom Party (­FPÖ), when it was part of a coalition government (­­2017–​­2019), wanted to
replace the licence fee with tax funding for the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (­ORF),
which would have caused the public service broadcaster to lose its independence. In
Britain, the ­right-​­wing government of Boris Johnson wants to decriminalise the n­ on-​
­payment of licence fees, which could lead to the end of the BBC. Johnson and his sup-
porters have repeatedly criticised the BBC as being far removed from the interests of
the people and a manifestation of an urban liberal elite in London that has disregarded
the majority will of the people after a Brexit. The Alternative for Germany (­AfD)’s me-
dia spokesperson Martin E. Renner formulates the criticism of Germany’s public service
broadcasters ARD and ZDF as follows:

The availability of information, broadcasts and programmes is in principle

almost unlimited due to digitalisation. Conversely, everyone has the oppor-
tunity to freely disseminate information and opinions via social media or
their own platforms. […] Through the ­state-​­guaranteed compulsory contri-
butions, which add up to the unbelievable amount of around 8 billion euros
per year, the state organises a market power in the media sector and thus
intervenes in competition and indirectly in the freedom of information. […]
Therefore, in order to adapt the offer of the existing public broadcasters
to the wishes and needs of their users, all that is needed is the complete
abolition of the compulsory fees. […] It is thus to be casually ­re-​­educated
in the sense of the ‘­political correctness’ defined by them. At present, it is
all about propagating ‘­diversity’ and conjuring up the beautiful, ideal world
of ­multi-​­culturalism.9
 Chapter Ten | The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and Alienation 297

The AfD wants a purely private, p­ rofit-​­oriented media system. Public service media’s
democratic and educational remit is dismissed as “­political correctness”. The AfD wants
a private sector, völkisch broadcasting system and a c­ apitalist-​­völkisch Internet.

These ­right-​­wing attacks on public service broadcasting have not yet been successful.
In the Coronavirus crisis, public service media have reached a new heyday, as the pop-
ulation considers the public service combination of information, education, and enter-
tainment to be immeasurable, especially in times of crisis. While before the start of the
coronavirus crisis on 25 February 2020, the RTL soap opera Gute Zeiten, schlechte Zeiten
was the most watched German TV programme among ­14–​­49 ­year-​­olds with 1.5 million
viewers and a market share of 20.2 per cent,10 among the same group of viewers on 29
March, the ARD news programme Tagesschau had the highest reach with an audience
share of 28.2 per cent and 3.2 million viewers.11 Among the total audience aged 3 and
over, the Tagesschau even achieved 11 million viewers and an audience share of 29.2 per
cent.12 Special programmes on the crisis on ARD and ZDF were also particularly popular.
On 25 February, by comparison, just under 4.9 million people watched the Tagesschau.13

Independent, critical, n­ on-​­commercial public service media are an expression of the

democratic public sphere. A public service Internet is a dimension of the democratisation
of digitalisation.

Notes
1 Translated from German:

Wir fassen Öffentlichkeit (­1) als ein spezifisches Kommunikationssystem, das sich
gegenüber anderen Sozialsystemen abgrenzt. Das System konstituiert sich auf der Basis
des Austauschs von Informationen und Meinungen. Personen, Gruppen und Institutionen
bringen bestimmte Themen auf und äußern Meinungen zu den Themen. Denkt man bei
Notes

dem Begriff Diskussion nicht unbedingt an akademische Veranstaltun ­gen – ​­denn öffen-
tliche Kommunikation schließt demagogische Überzeugungskom munikation ebenso ein
wie ein rationales Abwägen von ­Argumenten – ​­kann man Öf fentlichkeit als ein Diskus-
sionsystems bezeichnen. […] Die Besonderheit des Kommunikationssystems Öffentlich-
keit ergibt sich (­2) daraus, daß alle Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft teilnehmen dürfen, das
Publikum ist grundsätzlich ‚unabgeschlossen‘, die Grenze des Systems ist offen.

2 Translated from German: “­Kneipen, Kaffeeehäuser und Salons”.

3 On the topicality of Marcuse’s concept of technological rationality in digital capitalism, see
Fuchs (­2019a).
298 Conclusion

4 See for example, Jenkins (­2008). A critique of Jenkins‘ works and similar approaches can be
found in Fuchs (­2017, 2019b, ­Chapters 3, 5, 8).
5 Siehe https://­platform.coop/, https://­ioo.coop/­directory/, http://­cultural.coop/.
6 Data source: https://­www.forbes.com/­global2000/­list, accessed on 14 April 2021.
7 Data source: https://­www.alexa.com/­topsites, accessed on 14 April 2021.
8 https://­creativecommons.org/­licenses/­­by-​­nc/­2.0/, accessed on 27 March 2021.
9 Data source: https://­www.dwdl.de/­magazin/­68116/­afd_ohne_den_rundfunkbeitrag_waere_
alles_besser/­page_1.html, accessed on 14 April 2021. Translated from German:

Die Verfügbarkeit von Informationen, Sendungen und Programmen ist durch die Digi-
talisierung prinzipiell nahezu unbegrenzt. Umgekehrt besteht die Möglichkeit für jeder-
mann über socialmedia oder eigene Plattformen Informationen und Meinungen frei zu
verbreiten. […] durch die staatlich garantierten Zwangsbeiträge, die sich auf die unglau-
bliche Höhe von rund 8 Milliarden Euro pro Jahr aufsummieren, organisiert der Staat
eine Marktmacht im Mediensektor und greift so in den Wettbewerb und indirekt in die
Informationsfreiheit ein. […] Um das Angebot der bestehenden ­öffentlich-​­rechtlichen
Sender den Wünschen und Bedürfnissen ihrer Nutzer anzupassen, bedarf es daher nur
der vollständigen Abschaffung der Zwangsgebühren. […] Es soll so beiläufig umerzo-
gen werden im Sinne der von ihnen definierten ‘­political correctness’. Aktuell geht es
darum, ‘­Diversität’ zu propagieren und die schöne heile Welt des M
­ ulti-​­Kulturalismus zu
beschwören.

10 Data source: https://­web.archive.org/­web/­20200226090231/­https://­www.dwdl.de/­zahlenzen

trale/, accessed on 18 April 2020.
11 Data source: https://­web.archive.org/­web/­20200330171813/­https://­www.dwdl.de/­zahlenzen
trale/, accessed on 18 April 2020.
12 Data source: https://­web.archive.org/­web/­20200330171813/­https://­www.dwdl.de/­zahlenzen
trale/, accessed on 18 April 2020.
13 Data source: https://­web.archive.org/­web/­20200226090231/­https://­www.dwdl.de/­zahlenzen
trale/, accessed on 18 April 2020.

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Index

Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables; italic page numbers refer to figures and page numbers
followed by “n” denote endnotes.

absolutism 179, 181 Badiou, Alain 40

abstract labour 192 Baliga, Jayant 154
accumulation logic 99 Barber, Benjamin 12
Actor Network Theory (ANT) 57, 202 Barclay, David 184
Adorno, Theodor W. 36–37, 54, 55, 57–59, 60, Barclay, Frederick 184
81, 85, 188, 201 Batikas, Michail 160
Alberts, Jürgen 73 Bauwens, Michel 155
algorithmic politics 282 Beauvoir, Simone de 201
alienation 3, 4, 16, 17, 53, 101, 128, 140, 187, Becker, Jörg 73
200, 211–215, 212, 214, 217, 219, 223; Benhabib Seyla 143
critical theory of communication 211–214, Benkler, Yochai 112, 155, 156
212; structural transformation 280, 280, Bennett, James Gordon Jr. 184
281, 284, 284, 295 Berlusconi, Silvio 184
Ali, Tariq 50 Bezos, Jeff 184
Althusser, Louis 132, 202–203, 209 Bhaskar, Roy 37–38, 55
Anders, Günther 60, 201 Big Data 77–79, 284, 286
Anderson, Kevin 201 Bisky, Lothar 73
anti-bureaucratic’ revolution 143 Bloch, Ernst 201
anti-fascist education 58 Bloomberg, Michael 184
anti-social social media 282 Bogdanović, Mira 132–133, 138
Antoniadis, Panayotis 162 Boltanski, Luc 193
Apostol, Ileana 162 Bourdieu, Pierre 97, 99, 116
Arendt, Hannah 60, 206 Brown, Wendy 206
Aristotle 207 Butler, Judith 54
Athenian democracy 8
Aufermann, Jörg 73 Cambridge Analytica scandal 286–287
Auschwitz 54–61 capital accumulation 36
authoritarian capitalism 201 capitalism 84; dialectic 79
authoritarianism 16 capitalist colonisation, digital public sphere
automated algorithmic politics 249 281–287, 285
autonomous social media 257 capitalist society 214, 214
autonomous video platform C2-Tube 257 Carens, Joseph 138
302 Index

Carpentier, Nico 159 control culture 115

Carr, Nicholas 112 correlation analysis 221
Castells, Manuel 106–108, 111 crisis-proneness of capitalism 79
Chapek, Robert 184 critical political economy 70–71
Chiapello, Ève 193 critical theory of communication: alienation
Chomsky, Noam 134, 135, 288 211–214, 212; capitalist society 214, 214;
class structuration 279 digital capitalism 214–224, 216, 217, 223;
Club 2.0 255–256, 257, 265, 266, 291–292, instrumental and co-operative reason 214,
292; among users 258, 294; autonomous 215; Marxian analysis 199–200; Marxist
social media 257, 293; autonomous video Humanism 200–203; neoliberal capitalism
platform C2-Tube 257, 293; cross-medium 200; in society 203–210
257, 292; data protection and privacy critique of the political economy of the
friendliness 259, 294; ground rules 257, media and communication 3, 9, 14, 196;
292; interactivity 258, 293; online video 257, capitalism 70, 75–85; commodification
292; social production 259–260, 294–295; process 72; critical social analysis 70–71,
studio discussion and video platform 258, 71; dialectic 115–118, 116; forgotten theory
293; user-generated discussion inputs 258, 73; macroeconomic data 73; national
293; video data 259, 294 and transnational state power 71; social
coercive power 101–102, 107 movements 83–85; social praxis 69; social
Commercial Internet eXchange (CIX) 157 production process 74; Social Sciences
commodity form 14, 16, 35, 36, 72, 77, 82, Citation Index 71; social theory 76
156, 187–188, 189–191, 192, 194, 247, 260, cultural goods 188, 189–190
279, 280 cultural materialism 82
communication 81; dialectic 73; society as cultural power 97, 97, 112
sphere, organised production 207–210, cultural theory 131
208, 209, 210; work and 204–207; see also cultural violence 100
critical theory of communication Curran, James 109
community networks 15–16, 149–150; cultural
aspects 165–167; cultural level 171; Davis, Angela 201
economic aspects 155–162; economic level De Decker, Kris 154
170; environmental aspects 151–155, 153; deliberation 6–7
environmental level 167, 170; geek publics deliberative democracy 8, 11–13, 231, 232,
vs. community publics 171; monopoly power 237–239, 254, 260, 265, 295
170; network effects vs. environmental democracy 3, 50, 73, 77, 83, 111, 115,
problems 167, 170; open, privacy-friendly 184, 201, 281–282, 286–288, 290, 295,
participation and political control 171; 296; absolutism 181; capitalism 84;
political aspects 162–165; political level communicative dimension 11–13; definition
171; (un-)sustainability 167, 170–171 5–8; deliberative 11–13, 254; economic
competitive elitist democracy 8, 230 212; participatory 8–11, 107, 126, 162, 163,
 Index 303

165, 213, 224, 254, 266; and public sphere tax 260–261; public service YouTube
230–235, 233, 234 250–254
democratic autonomy 8, 231, 232, 239 digital monopolies 248
democratic theory 6 digital public sphere 3, 4, 13, 17, 229, 249,
Derrida, Jacques 39, 40, 60 260, 263, 276, 282, 283, 285–287, 295,
Desmond, Richard 184 296; colonisation and feudalisation of 247;
dialectic 3, 4, 9, 13–15, 21–22, 62–63, 128, and digital democracy 235–241, 237, 239,
182, 202, 203, 205, 207, 210; Auschwitz 241–243, 244–246, 264, 266
54–61; capitalism 79; chance and necessity Digital Socialist Humanism 222
76, 80, 82; critical theory of media and digital surveillance 248, 282
society 115–118, 116; history of 24–25, digital tabloids 282
43–54, 62–64; logic 22–42; media and direct democracy 8, 230, 231, 236, 238–240
communication 73; plurality 142; power direct violence 100
97–106, 238; work and communication 74, displacement effect 114
206, 223 domination 279, 280
dialectical philosophy 13–14, 21, 29, 40, 41, Dörr, Dieter 252
61–64, 200 Dorsey, Jack 184
Dichand, Hans 184 Doubt, Keith 138–139
digital acceleration 248, 283 Dröge, Franz 73
digital attention economy 248 Dulong de Rosnay, Melanie 164
digital capitalism 77, 282; critical theory of Dunayevskaya, Raya 201
communication 214–224, 216, 217, 223
digital class relations 282 economic power 97, 97, 112
digital commercial culture 248 Eisenstein, Zillah 201
digital communication, digital democracy 12, 13 energy sources 153, 153
digital democracy 9, 17, 288, 290; democratic Engels, Friedrich 178–180, 194, 206
values 253; digital communication 12, Epstein, Barbara 201
13; digital plebiscites and deliberation e-waste recycling 152
241, 243, 244; and digital public sphere existential opportunism 60
235–241, 237, 239, 241–243, 244–246, 249, exploitation 14, 23, 36, 38, 39, 54, 72, 76, 78,
264, 266; forms of 240, 241; foundations 81, 98, 117–118, 170, 193, 211, 212, 218,
of 3–4; information processes 239, 239; 220, 221, 248
legal aspects 261–263; participatory 224;
practices of 241, 242; public service media fake news 249, 283
229, 263–266; public service YouTube 254 Fanon, Frantz 201
digital individualism 282 fascism 139
digital labour 248 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) 133–134
digital media’s democratic deficits 246–250; Feenberg, Andrew 116
Club 2.0 255–260, 257; online advertising fetishism 113, 114
304 Index

filter bubbles 282 Heraclitus 33–36, 42, 63

financial capitalism 79 Heraclitusian foundation 14
Forlano, Laura 160 Herman, Edward 134
Foucault, Michel 94, 95, 203 Holz, Hans Heinz 14, 29–31, 34, 48, 50, 60,
fragmented publics 249 63, 64
Fromm, Erich 127–128, 201, 211–213 Holzer, Horst 73–75
Fuchs, Christian 281, 288 Holznagel, Bernd 252
Honneth, Axel 53–54, 212
Galtung, Johan 100 Horkheimer, Max 85, 113, 188, 194, 201, 280
Genachowski, Julius 161–162 Hörz, Herbert 14, 46, 47, 50, 63, 64
Gerhards, Jürgen 273, 274 Hugenberg, Alfred 184
Giddens, Anthony 94, 96, 102, 107 Human Rights Watch 136
Giovanella, Federica 164 Humanist Socialism 223, 223–224
Gladwell, Malcolm 111 Hund, Wulf 73
global advertising sales 188, 191 Hunt, Tristam 178
global newspaper sales 188, 191 hyperindustrial capitalism 79
globalisation of capital 78
Golding, Peter 72 ideology 279, 280
Goldmann, Lucien 201 influencer capitalism 283
Golubović, Zagorka 137 information/digital capitalism 79
Gorz, André 201 institutional crystallization 106
Gramsci, Antonio 125, 132 instrumental and co-operative reason, critical
Grassmuck, Volker 254 theory of communication 214, 215
grassroots democracy 238 intelligent revolutionary strategy 50
interlocking capitalisms 76
Habermas, Jürgen 4, 12, 16, 60, 73–74, 81, 93, Internet access: economic aspects 155–162;
129, 135, 184–185, 204–205, 246–247, 273, environmental aspects 151–155, 153;
277–279, 281–282, 288, 295 political aspects 162–165
Hacker, Kenneth L. 235, 236 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Hall, Stuart 73, 114–115, 199 Numbers (ICANN) 157
Hardt, Hanno 181 Internet economy 79
Harvey, David 78, 199, 201, 211 Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) 157
Hearst, William Randolph 184 Internet’s domain name system (DNS) 157
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 21–33, 36, 38, Internet surveillance 163
40–43, 45, 47, 51, 54, 55, 61, 64, 131, 182
hegemony 102, 104–105 Jakobs, Hans-Jürgen 181
Heidegger, Martin 59–61 James, C.L.R. 201
Held, David 8, 230, 231, 237 Jameson, Frederic 40
Helsinki Watch 136 Jarvis, Jeff 112
 Index 305

journalism 3, 4, 12–14, 16, 77, 177–187, 186; Magaš, Branka 138

commodity form 187–188, 189–191, 192; Mannheim, Karl 132
ideology 194–195, 195; labour 192–193 Mao 43, 44, 50
Marcuse, Herbert 29, 31, 60, 81, 201, 280
Kangrga, Milan 123 Marković, Mihailo 15; communication
Kant 205 128–131, 130, 144; crisis and break-up,
Karatani, Kojin 39, 40 Yugoslavia 133–134; development
Kardashian, Kim 217 psychology 144–145; ethico-political
Kelly, Kevin 112 concept 145–146; ideology 131–132;
Kim Il Sung 44 left-wing discourse 134–136; nationalism
Kirchhoff-Hund, Bärbel 73 136–144; Praxis 123–128, 144; Truncated
Knöbl, Kuno 291 Humanism 145
Knoche, Manfred 73 Marx, Karl 4, 16, 17, 21, 23, 35, 36, 43, 55,
Korsch, Karl 201 62, 64, 70, 71, 74, 85, 98, 103–105, 113,
Kosík, Karel 201 125, 132, 140, 141, 144, 145, 205–207,
Kostakis, Vasilis 155 295; alienation 211, 213; capitalism and
Kreuzer, Franz 291 communication theorist 76–83; capitalist
Kurzweil, Raymond 45 economy 280; commodity form 187–188,
189–191, 192; critique of capitalism and
Lacan, Jacques 203 society 14; critique of political economy
Lacanian theory 203 177; ideology 194–195, 195; journalism
Langenbucher, Wolfgang R. 181 179–187, 186; labour 192–193; liberal
language 129, 181, 207 ideology 278; participatory democracy, Paris
Lassalle, Ferdinand 35, 36, 180 Commune 9–11, 220, 277
Latour, Bruno 57, 202 Marxist Humanism 13, 15, 16, 127–128, 138,
Lefebvre, Henri 201 141, 142, 145, 200–203, 205, 219, 223
legal democracy 8, 231, 232, 237, 239 Maxwell, Robert 184
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 64 McLellan, David 181
Lenin, Vladimir I. 50, 177, 178 McLuhan, Marshall 80
Lessig, Lawrence 112 Mead, George Herbert 204
liberal democracy 8, 230, 231, 236–238 media organisations 234, 234
Lippmann, Walter 180 media power 109
Lisbon Strategy 262 media studies 2.0 38
Luhmann, Niklas 74, 81, 93–94 media system, public sphere’s communication
Lukács, Georg 74, 81, 85, 201, 207–209, 212, 280 system 233, 233
Luxemburg, Rosa 141, 142, 179 Medosch, Armin 161, 162
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 201
Macpherson, Crawford 240 meso-publics 274
macro-publics 275 micro-publics 274
306 Index

mobility capitalism 79 political economy, Marxist theory 185, 186

Moravec, Hans 45 political economy of the media and
Morozov, Evgeny 111–112 communication see critique of the political
Mosco, Vincent 72, 156, 180 economy of the media and communication
Mosse, Rudolf 184 political power 97, 97, 112
Munsey, Frank A. 184 political-economic strategy 77
Murdoch, Rupert 184 positedness 28–29
Murdock, Graham 72 post-factual online politics 249
Postone, Moishe 50, 56
Nazi ideology and society 59 Powell, Alison 158, 160, 166–167
Negri, Toni 81 power 92, 118n2, 238; dialectical concept 93,
Neidhardt, Friedhelm 273, 274 97–106, 238; media and communication
neoliberal capitalism 85 106–109, 108, 110; objective concepts
Nkrumah, Kwame 201 92–94, 93; process 98, 98; and social media
Nyerere, Julius 201 110–115; structures 97, 97; subjective
concepts 93, 94–96
October Revolution 177 Praxis 123; absolute humanism 125; activity
Oliver, Miquel 160 types 124; advantages 125; axiology 128;
Ollmann, Bertell 201 communication 220–221, 224; definition
online advertising tax 260–261 124–125; epistemology 128; ontology 128;
Ortiz, Julio Angel 160, 166–167 Yugoslav self-management 126, 127
Prokop, Dieter 73
parson-power 104 Public Open Space 252, 253, 254
Parsons, Talcott 74 public service Internet 3, 12, 13, 17, 18, 56,
participatory democracy 5, 8–13, 107, 126, 186, 222, 249, 260, 262, 263, 266, 272,
162, 213, 231, 232, 237–240, 254, 260, 265, 287, 288, 296, 297; Club 2.0 291–295,
266, 290, 295 292; cultural organisations 287; economic
Peterson, David 134 organisations 287; public service YouTube
Petrović, Gajo 12–124, 145 289–290
Philippe, Louis 103 public service media 3, 4, 12, 13, 17, 185, 186,
physical violence 94 217, 218, 220, 222–223, 229, 232, 234,
Piaget, Jean 204 235, 249–254, 256, 272, 287–290, 292,
Picot, Arnold 252 296, 297; democratic communication 264;
plebiscitary democracy 8, 230, 237–238, digital democracy 229, 263–266, 261–263,
240, 264 264–267
pluralist democracy 8, 231, 232, 237, 238, 286 public service YouTube 250–254, 289–290
political consumers 247 public sphere 3, 4, 12, 13, 18, 213, 272–283,
political correctness 297 286, 288, 289, 291, 295, 296; colonisation
political deliberations 7 of 77, 185, 247, 249; as communication
 Index 307

system 273; as concept of critique Shade, Leslie 158

272–281, 280, 281, 293, 295, 297; Shirky, Clay 111, 112
critical theory 280, 295, 296; democratic signification culture 115
17, 73, 221, 224, 230–235, 233, 234, Smith, Adam 206
246, 250, 251, 256, 264, 265; digital Snowden, Edward 56, 84, 162–163
transformation 276, 277; journalism in social activity 181–182
16; manufactured public sphere 185; social democratic-reformist strategy 105
model 275, 275; political information social media 14–15, 283
process 239; pseudo-public sphere 185, social media economy 79
247; public political communication 263; social media: critical theory of media and
refeudalisation of 246–247; structural technology 115–118, 116; and individualism
transformation 184, 272–281, 273, 275, 248; and power 110–115; respondents
277, 281 identified risks 91–92
Public Value Tests 262 social praxis 69, 72
Pulitzer, Joseph 184 social process 155–156
social reality 131
Renner, Martin E. 296 Social Sciences Citation Index 71
revolutionary ideology 132 social theory 76
revolutionary politics 40–41 Sohn-Rethel, Alfred 206
Rifkin, Jeremy 162 Soper, Kate 201
Roberts, Brian L. 184 space and time, lack of 248
Rorty, Richard 60 Splichal, Slavko 249, 288
Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio 81 Springer, Axel 184
Rowbotham, Sheila 201 Stalin, Josef W. 44, 50, 127, 178
Roy, M.N. 201 Stallmann, Richard 161
Stojanovič, Svetozar 124
Sadowski, Bert M. 157–158 Stoll, Klaus 158
Said, Edward 201 Strauss, Johann 209
Sandvig, Christian 166 structural transformation: alienation 280, 280,
SANU Memorandum 137, 141 281, 284, 284, 295; capitalist colonisation,
Sartre, Jean-Paul 60, 201 digital public sphere 281–287, 285;
Schaff, Adam 201 public service Internet (see public service
Schamberger, Kerem 75, 76, 85 Internet); public sphere 272–281, 273, 275,
Scherl, August 184 277, 281; social media 271
Schmidt, Eric 112 structural violence 100
Schmiede, Rudi 73 sublation 14, 27, 28, 31, 32, 37–42, 47, 51, 55,
Schmitt, Carl 245 56, 62
Schuler, Douglas 159–160 Sullivan, Andrew 110–111
Searle, John 204 Supek, Rudi 145
308 Index

sustainability 3, 15–16; and community Van Dijk, Jan 235–238

networks 149–167, 168–170, 170–171 Vološinov, Valentin 81
symbolic power 109 Vygotsky, Lev 81

Tadić, Ljubomir 137 Wagner, Richard 25, 55, 56

Tapia, Andrea H. 160, 166–167 Walby, Sylvia 100
Tapscott, Don 111, 112 Wallerstein, Immanuel 45–46, 50, 64
Taylor, Charles 206 Weber, Max 93, 99, 151, 205
Thompson, Edward P. 201, 209 Western-centric/Eurocentric concept 278
Thompson, John B. 108, 108–109 Williams, Anthony D. 111
Timberlake, Justin 217 Williams, Raymond 80–82, 85, 129, 130, 165,
Tomasello, Michael 53 201, 208–209, 220
transformative capacity 96
Trump, Donald 17, 194–195, 217, 286 Zittrain, Jonathan 112
Turner, Ted 184 Žižek, Slavoj 13–14, 21, 37–41; Auschwitz
Twitter revolution 111, 116 54–61; dialectic of history 24–25, 43–54;
retroactivity as dialectical logic 22–24
Ullstein, Leopold 184 Zuckerberg, Mark 112, 184
Unterberger, Klaus 288 Zuidweg, Johan 160