Ammonius

On Aristotle Categories
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 Ammonius
On Aristotle Categories

Translated by
S. Marc Cohen &
Gareth B. Matthews

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 Contents

Introduction Richard Sorabji 1

Translation 7
Prolegomena 9
Commentary 22
On Substance 45
On Quantity 65
On Relatives 76
On Qualified and Quality 97
On Doing and Being Affected 112
OnOpposites 113
On Contraries 124
On Priority 126
On Simultaneity 127
On Change 128

Textual Emendations 130

Appendix: the commentators 132

English-Greek Glossary 142

Greek-English Index 145

Subject Index 162

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 Introduction

Richard Sorabji

Ammonius (AD 435/45-517/26) brought the ideas of his teacher

Proclus from Athens to the chair of philosophy in Alexandria.
He succeeded his father Hermeias in the chair, but he gave new
life to it. His pupils included all the most important remaining
Neoplatonist philosophers of the sixth century AD: Philoponus,
Simplicius, Damascius, Asclepius and Olympiodorus. His
father-in-law was Syrianus and his brother Heliodorus.
The Categories commentary, translated here, is described as
being written up by pupils from the voice of, that is from the
seminars of, Ammonius. Only one of the commentaries surviv-
ing in his name, that on the de Interpretations, is not so
described.
He is the first author to hand down to us the set of ten
introductory questions about the study of Aristotle which
thereafter are standardly prefixed to Neoplatonist commen-
taries on Aristotle's Categories. We know from elsewhere that
the set of ten was already laid down by Proclus in his Sun-
anagnosis (reading of a text with a master).1 There follows a set
of particular questions about the treatise to be commented on,
in this case the Categories. Some of these questions are
repeated when Ammonius comes to comment on the categories
of relative and quality.2
Perhaps the most important question is the point of studying
Aristotelian Philosophy. The aim is to ascend to the supreme

1
Elias in Cat. 107,24-6. For this and other information, see Richard Sorabji (ed.)
Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, London and
Ithaca N.Y. 1990.
2
66,5; 80,15.

1
2 Introduction
Neoplatonist God, the One.3 This will be made possible by a
reading of Aristotle and Plato, culminating in Plato's two
supposedly theological works, the Timaeus (on the second
God, the divine Intellect) and the Parmenides (on the One).
Ammonius' belief in the One is clearly expessed in this
passage and again in 36,25, where he gives the standard
Neoplatonist view that one can speak only negatively of it,
saying what it is not. This commitment to the One is
important, because Ammonius was accused of making some
disgraceful compromise with the Christian authorities in
Alexandria.4 And one of the reasons why the pagan
Neoplatonist school lasted so much longer in Alexandria than
in Athens has been thought to be that the Alexandrians were
closer to Christian monotheism, having abandoned the
supreme One, in favour of the Creator-Intellect.5 It is clear,
however, that Ammonius accepted the One in addition to the
Intellect and was free to express his belief.
Ammonius reveals his own view on the reinterpretations of
Aristotle's Categories which Porphyry and lamblichus had
devised, in order to protect the work from Plotinus' criticisms.
Plotinus' major complaint was that Aristotle's scheme of
categories took no account of Platonic Forms. Porphyry's reply
was that the work was designed for beginners, and therefore
was not intended to be about real things, but only about words
insofar as they signify things. lamblichus went further:
Aristotle's accounts of the various categories do apply, and
apply first and foremost, to the Platonic Forms and to things
at that higher level.6
In Ammonius, we find agreement with Porphyry that the
Categories is designed for beginners.7 It is therefore concerned
not with Platonic Forms, but with things perceptible to the
senses8 and familiar to the masses,9 inter alia with the kind of
3
6,9.
4
Damascius, Life of Isidore 250,2; 251,12-14.
5
Karl Praechter, 'Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus', Genethliakon fur
Carl Robert, Berlin 1910, 105-55, with reply by Koenraad Verrycken, ch. 10 in
Aristotle Transformed.
6
For the evidence, see P. Hadot, The harmony of Plotinus and Aristotle according
to Porphyry', translated in Aristotle Transformed ch.6, from the French ofPlotino e il
Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome
1974, 31-47.
7 8 9
36,11; 53,6; 55,12. 33,25; 41,10. 33,25.
 Introduction 3
10
substance that has matter as well as form. But as to
Porphyry's idea that Aristotle is talking about words which
signify things through the medium of concepts, Ammonius
claims that Aristotle is talking about all three: words, things
and concepts.11 Hence Ammonius sometimes describes him as
talking about things,12 sometimes as talking about words.13
Where Aristotle uses two different expressions, 'said of' and 'is
present in', Ammonius suggests that he employs the first
expression ('said of') to show that he is talking about words
which are said, while he employs 'is' to show that he is talking
about things.14 Universals are merely said of individuals,
because they do not depend on individuals for their being.15
Aristotle also describes himself at 2al2 as talking about what
is said to be the most primary substance, because according to
Ammonius, Aristotle's own view coincides with Plato's, that it
is universals, not these perceptible individuals, that are really
the primary substances.16
Ammonius does not at all endorse lamblichus' interpreta-
tion, according to which Aristotle's account of substance does
after all apply to higher realities such as the Platonic Forms
and the divine Mind in which they are lodged. Nor yet does
Aristotle's account apply to Universal Soul.17 The entities to
which Ammonius here refers, the Universal Soul and Forms
inhering in a divine Mind, are all derived, of course, from the
Platonist, not the Aristotelian, tradition.
Ammonius evidently sides with the view, which became
standard from Porphyry onwards, that there is fairly
substantial harmony between Plato and Aristotle. He does
not, however, in his section on the qualities required of a
commentator,18 go as far as his pupil Simplicius, who in a
corresponding passage makes it one of the commentator's
duties to display the harmony of Plato and Aristotle in most
things. What Ammonius does say in this section is that the
commentator must be dispassionate about Aristotle and not
act as if he was paid to prove him right at every point.19
Ammonius has a splendid explanation for Aristotle's
obscurity of style. The obscurity is deliberately designed so
10 u 12 13 14
34,5; 45,22. 9,17ff. 18,16. 26,23; 93,9. 26,23.
15 16 17
40,19-21; cf. 26,12-14. 36,13-14. 37,1-22.
18 19
8,11-19; cf. Simplicius in Cat. 7,23-32. 8,15-18.
4 Introduction
that 'good people for that reason may stretch their minds even
more, whereas empty minds that are lost through careless-
ness will be put to flight by the obscurity when they encounter
sentences like these'.20 Ammonius also has to discuss the
number and state of the manuscripts and the authenticity of
the work.21 He does not, like many modern scholars, suspect
the authenticity of chapters 10-15, but he does think their
positioning requires discussion. He also has occasion to
explain how Greek grammar sometimes followed different
rules nine hundred years earlier in the time of Plato and
Aristotle.22
Ammonius imports not only Platonist, but also Pytha-
gorean, ideas into his commentary on Aristotle. He thinks, for
example, that the numbers 4 and 10 have a special
significance.23 And he is taken in by a pseudo-Pythagorean
treatise on categories, probably from the first century BC,
which purports to come from Archytas. Since the real
Archytas preceded Aristotle, this gives Ammonius the
impression that Aristotle did not invent the scheme of ten
categories, but merely gave it its particular order.24 Among
the Platonist ideas of Ammonius, which would not be
approved by Aristotle, we find the view that our souls
pre-existed and enjoyed knowledge before our incarnation,25
and the opinion that universals are prior to individuals and do
not depend for existence on them.26 But the second, as
remarked above, is fathered onto Aristotle.27
Quite apart from its historical interest, Ammonius'
commentary is valuable in a further way. It provides a
gymnastic, probably unmatched in modern literature,
requiring the student to think through the viability of
Aristotle's scheme of categories. According to Aristotle, what
characterises a particular accident like Socrates' whiteness
(to take an example that Ammonius would accept) is that it is
20
7,7-14; cf. 25,14.
21
13,20ff.
22
17,8-9;18,9-11.
23
24,23ff.
24
14,1-2. For Pseudo-Archytas Peri toi katholou logoi, see Thomas Alexander
Szlezak, Pseudo-Archytas iiber die Kategorien, Peripatoi vol. 4, Berlin and New York
1972.
25 26 27
15,4ff. 26,12-14. 40,19-21.
 Introduction 5
in something (in Socrates), not as a part (of Socrates), and
that it cannot exist separately from what it is in.28 But in that
case, why will not form be an accident of matter? And
conversely, will not Socrates' fragrance fail, to be an accident
of him, since it exists separately from him when it floats off
into the surrounding air?29
There are other problems too. If there is a category of
passion to match that of action, why not one of being had to
match that of having?30 Where do points and privations fit in
the scheme?31 Are the differentiae which differentiate kinds
of substance themselves substances?32 Since place and time
fall under the category of quantity, how do the separate
categories of where and when relate to them?33 In fact, it
turns out that the first four categories are the basic ones, in
Ammonius' view, and the other categories arise from
interrelations among the first four.34 The category of relatives
is particularly tricky. Position (thesis) is a relative, but one
type of position, posture (keisthai), is a separate category.35
Knowledge is a relative, but one branch of knowledge, music,
is a quality.36 In fact, everything which counts as a relative
(e.g. a father) can also be classified as a thing in its own right
(e.g. a man) under a different category.37
A further question is why the categories have the order
which they have.38 The order is regarded by Ammonius as
Aristotle's particular contribution to the subject. To show why
the category of quantity comes second after that of substance,
Ammonius appeals to Aristotle's other works, in this case to
Metaphysics 7.3. There, on one interpretation, Aristotle
speaks of a first subject (hupokeimenon proton),39 or prime
matter. This subject has as a first layer of properties - length,
breadth and depth,40 in other words items drawn from the
category of quantity. Ammonius takes it41 that prime matter,
endowed with these quantities, acts in its turn as a second
subject which is endowed with further properties drawn from

28
Aristotle Cat. la24-5.
29 30 31 32
27,9-29,4. 33,16-19. 33,22-4. 45,7ff.
33 34 35 36
69,10-14; 92,9. 92,6ff. 69,9-10. 91,15-21.
37 38 39
91,29-92,2. 54,6; 66,7. Aristotle Metaph. 7.3,1029al-2.
40 41
Ibid., 1029al4. 54,4ff.
6 Introduction
42
the other categories. So endowed, it constitutes familiar
physical objects like Socrates, or bronze. This sort of analysis
had already been given by Porphyry.43 It is intended to show
that quantity constitutes a fundamental level in the make up
of substances, and so deserves its place as the second
category. In fact, Aristotle himself was somewhat haphazard
as regards the order in which he listed the categories. But it
has been plausibly suggested that Aristotelians came to feel
that they must provide a justified order, because this is what
had been done by the Stoics for their very different set of
categories.44
It can be seen that Ammonius imports many alien elements
into his study of Aristotle's categories, and yet that that
makes him no less adept at provoking reflection on the
categories themselves.
Readers should know that, since the preparation of our
volume, I. Hadot has argued for the authenticity of certain
passages that were excluded from the Busse text which we
have followed.45

Acknowledgments
The present translations have been made possible by
generous and imaginative funding from the following sources:
the National Endowment for the Humanities, Division of
Research Programs, an independent federal agency of the
USA; the Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett
Copyright Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Interna-
zionale A. Beltrame di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo
(Padua); Mario Mignucci; Liverpool University. I further wish
to thank Eric Lewis and John Ellis for assistance on this
volume. The translators wish to thank Thomas Hiinefeldt for
his assistance with the indexes; his work was funded by a
grant from the University of Washington whose support is
also gratefully acknowledged.
42
For these see Aristotle Metaph. 7.3,1029al2-13.
43
Porphyry ap. Simplicium in Cat. 48,11-33.
44
Hans Gottschalk, 'The earliest Aristotelian commentators', ch. 3 in Aristotle
Transformed.
45
Simplicius Commentaire sur les Categories, Traduction Commentee sous la
direction d'llsetraut Hadot, Fascicule 1, Leiden 1990,98-9.
 Ammonius
On Aristotle Categories

Translation

7
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 Prolegomena to the Ten Categories
by the Philosopher Ammonius

Since we want to delve into Aristotle's philosophy, as a useful

introduction to it for us, let us raise some questions, ten in
number. (1) Where do the names of the philosophical schools 1,5
come from? (2) What is the division of the Aristotelian
writings? (3) Where should one begin the Aristotelian
writings? (4) What obvious utility does the Aristotelian
philosophy have for us? (5) What will guide us to it? (6) How
should an auditor of philosophical lectures (logon) prepare
himself? (7) What is the form of the narrative? (8) Why has 10
the Philosopher obviously made a point of being obscure? (9)
How many and what sort of prerequisites are there for the
study off each of the Aristotelian writings? (10) What sort <of
person> should a commentator on them be?
The philosophical schools get their names in seven ways.
One is after their founder, as the Pythagoreans, Epicureans,
and Democriteans are named after those who founded each of 15
these schools - Pythagoras, Democritus, and Epicurus.
Another is after the country of the founders, as, for instance,
the philosophy called Cyrenaic. Another is after the place
where they studied, as, for instance, the Stoics, since they
studied in the Painted Stoa, or the members of the Lyceum or 2,1
the Academy, who also take their appellations from a place.
Another is after their kind of life, as, for instance, the Cynic
(kunikoi) philosophers, who were called dogs (kunes) on
account of their frank speech and contentiousness. For a dog
can distinguish family members from others, and that is how
these philosophers behaved. They received those worthy of 5
philosophy hospitably, but chased away those unworthy and
incapable of mastering philosophical reasoning. That is why
9
 10 Prolegomena
they are called Cynics, and also why Plato said, 'even a dog
has something of the philosopher in him'.1
Philosophical schools are also named after their manner of
disputation in philosophizing, as, for instance, the undecided
10 (ephektikoi) philosophers. They thought themselves quite
unworthy of the name of philosophers, since they sought the
nature of things, but did not succeed. For they said that there
is total ignorance (akatalepsia) and that no one knows
anything. Although Plato refutes them with other strong
arguments, he also uses this sort of refutation, which is drawn
from their own doctrine: 'Do you claim', he says, 'that you
15 know there to be total ignorance, or that you do not know? If
you do not know this, we will surely not believe you, since
your claim is just talk.2 But if you do know it, then there is
cognition (katalepsis).'
In support of their claim that there is no knowledge, they
used this argument: 'If there is to be knowledge, the knower
must conform to what is known; and if the knower is to
conform, then either what is known must stand fast and
20 always be the same, or if it should change, the knower would
have to go along and change with it. If, therefore, things are
not fixed but always change, and our soul cannot follow along
and change with them, the result will necessarily be
ignorance.' Now indeed they were right to say that things
change and are always in flux and effluence, i.e. in flow and
25 change. That is why when one of the ancients3 said that one
3,1 cannot step into the same river twice in the same place,
another one4 replied to him with the truly penetrating
thought that one cannot do it even once. For at the same time
one puts one's foot in, water flows over it, before the rest of the
body goes in. Now, as I said, they were right in asserting this,
5 but they were wrong to suppose that our soul cannot follow
along. For Plato proved that good souls not only do not come
upon things afterwards, but actually anticipate them and
meet them first with the speed of their own movement, and in
this way they apprehend them.
1
Rep. 376A.
2
Literally, 'your claim comes from your jaws': humin apo gnathon apophainome-
nois. This is not a verbatim citation of any surviving passage in Plato's dialogues.
3
Heraclitus, as reported by Plato (Crat. 402A).
4
Cratylus, as reported by Aristotle (Metaph. 1010al3).
 Prolegomena 11
The schools are also named after something accidental, as
with the Peripatetics. For since Plato walked while he taught,
wishing to exercise his body, lest its deterioration be an 10
obstacle to his mental activities, his successors - that is to
say, Xenocrates and Aristotle - were named Peripatetics (hoi
apo tou Peripatou). Of these, Aristotle taught at the Lyceum
and Xenocrates at the Academy. But later on, the place was
omitted and the followers of Aristotle were called Peripatetics
(Peripatetikoi) after the activity of their teacher, whereas in 15
the case of the followers of Xenocrates, it was the activity that
was omitted and they were called Academics after the place.
Schools are also named for the goal (telos) of their
philosophy, as with the Hedonists. For they said that pleasure
is the goal of life; not, indeed, the pleasure which the masses
seek -1 mean affective pleasure - but the soul's total freedom
from emotion.
Since, therefore, we have stated in how many ways and 20
from what source the schools of philosophers have been
named, let us <take up> the second <question> and produce
a division of the Aristotelian writings. Now some of them are
particular, some are universal, and some are in between the
universal and the particular. The particular are those that he
wrote to someone in particular, either letters or other such
<writings>. The universal <are those> in which he inquired 25
into the nature of things, such as de Anima, de Generatione et
Corruptione, and de Caelo. In between are the historical ones
that he wrote, such as the some two hundred. and fifty
constitutions written by him. He did not write these for
anyone in particular, nor are they universal (for the
Constitution of Athens or <those> of other <cities>, for
example, could not be universal). He wrote them so that 4,1
people after him, reading and making judgments about how to
govern justly and how not, might choose some and shun
others and be helped in this way. But let us put aside the
particular and the in-between.
Among the universal <works > some are systematic5 and
some are notebooks.6 The <works> called notebooks are 5
those in which only the main points (kephalia) are registered.
6
Suntagmatika, literally, 'drawn up in order'.
6
HupomnGmatika, literally, 'commentaries'.
 12 Prolegomena
Note that in ancient times, those who proposed to write would
compile in summary fashion their own particular discoveries
into an exposition of the subject; then they would take many
thoughts from even older books, in order to confirm the ones
10 that were correct and refute those that were not. Last of all, of
course, they composed their writings, making them beam
with the beauty of their words and the ornamentation of their
narrative. In this way the notebooks differed from the
systematic <works> in ordering and in beauty of expression.
Some of the notebooks are uniform, e.g. when an inquiry is
conducted into some one thing; others are diverse, <e.g.>
when <it is conducted> into many things. Some of the
15 systematic <works>, on the other hand, are in dialogue form,
e.g. those which are set out dramatically in question and
answer form among several characters; others are in propria
persona, e.g. the ones Aristotle wrote as <coming> from
himself.
The dialogues are also called popular (exoterika), whereas
the writings in propria persona are also <called> axiomatic
(axiomatika) or school <works> (akroamatika). It is worth
20 asking why on earth they were named this way. Some say
that the dialogues are also called popular because Aristotle
does not openly exhibit his own aim in them but rather models
his discussions after those of other people.7 But this is false.
They are called popular because Aristotle wrote <them> for
those who understand superficially. The philosopher deliber-
25 ately used a clearer style in these works and his proofs are not
so much demonstrative as they are plausible, <deriving>
from received opinions (endoxa). The others are called school
<works>,8 since they would have to be listened to attentively
by one who is serious and in fact a genuine lover of
philosophy.
Among the school <works> some are theoretical, some are
practical, and some instrumental. The theoretical ones are
concerned with the discrimination (diakrisis) of the true and
30 the false; the practical ones are concerned with the
7
The explanation is evidently etymological: the dialogues were called popular
(exdterika) because they were modeled after other people (ex allon).
8
Akroamatika ('school works') means, literally, 'to be heard orally'. Ammonius
proposes another etymological explanation: the school works were so called because
they have to be listened to attentively (akroasasthai).
 Prolegomena 13
<discrimination> of the good and the bad. But since in the 5,1
theoretical realm some things creep in as apparently true
without being true, and similarly in the practical realm some
things are coloured with the name of the good without being
good, we need some instrument to discriminate such things.
What is it? Demonstration. Next, among the theoretical
works, <there are> the theological, the mathematical, and 5
the natural (phusiologikon); and among the practical works
<there are> the ethical, the economical, <and> the political;
and among the instrumental works, some go into matters
concerning the first principles (arkhai) of the method, some
into matters concerning the method itself, and some into
matters concerning other ways of contributing to the method.
<By 'the method'> I mean the demonstrative one (apodeik-
tike). Since a demonstration (apodeixis) is a scientific
(epistemonikos) syllogism, before knowing it one must know 10
the syllogism in general. But since this name 'syllogism' does
not denote a simple, but rather a compound (for it signifies an
aggregation (sullogd) of statements (logon)), before <turning
to> the syllogism, it is therefore necessary to study the
simples of which they are composed; these are propositions
(protaseis). But these too are compounds, out of nouns and
verbs, which will be taught in the Categories. Propositions
<will be taught> in de Interpretations and the syllogism in 15
general in the Prior Analytics. These then are the principles of
the method. The Posterior Analytics teaches us the method
itself, that is, the demonstrative syllogism. But again, just as
physicians who pass on medical information to the young
mention teachings of noxious things along with beneficial
ones so that they might choose the former and avoid the
latter, so also here, since sophists cause trouble for those who 20
seek the truth and want to mislead them with sophistical
syllogisms, the Philosopher also writes them down so that we
may avoid them. These are said to be included in the method
in another way, just as if someone wanting to teach how
statements should be put together were to cover syllables
before nouns and verbs, and letters even before <syllables>. 25
Letters, syllables, and nouns and verbs are said to be the
principles of the method of how writing should be composed -
those concerning the composition itself concern the method
 14 Prolegomena
itself. But if one also wanted to count the vices of discourse, one
would say that he discusses things ,that are included in the
method in another way as well. And this is the division of
Aristotle's writings.
In the third place, let us ask where one should begin. The
6,1 natural sequence would be to begin with the ethical treatise, so
that after first disciplining our own character, we might in that
way get to the other writings. But he has used demonstrations
and syllogisms in that <treatise>, too, and we are likely to be
ignorant of them, being untutored in this kind of discourse. So,
5 for this reason, we must begin with logic, having first, of course,
disciplined our own character without the ethical treatise.
After logic we must go on to ethics, and then take up the
physical <treatises>, and after those the mathematical ones,
and finally the theological ones.
In the fourth place, in addition to these <questions>, one
10 must ask what purpose and what obvious utility the Aristote-
lian philosophy has for us. We answer that it is to ascend to the
common principle (arkhe) of all things and to be aware that this
is the one goodness itself, incorporeal, indivisible, uncircums-
cribed, infinite and of infinite potentiality.9 For <goodness> is
not the only thing that is good. Notice that just as what we call
white is a body that has received whiteness, whereas <what we
15 call> whiteness is the quality itself, so too a body that has
received goodness and participates in it is called good, whereas
goodness is a kind of substance and being (huparxis).
In the fifth place, in addition to these <questions>, let us ask
what will guide us to the aforementioned principle. And we
reply: first, the ethical treatise, and then after that the one on
20 physics, and then the mathematical one, and finally after these
we will grasp theology.
In the sixth place, let us ask how one should prepare oneself
to listen to what is to come in Aristotle's writings. We reply that
one must be educated in character and pure of soul. 'For the
impure is not allowed to attain the pure', as Plato said.10
9
Ammonius alludes here to the idea of an ascent to a mystical union with the One
(the supreme God of the Neoplatonists), an ascent which he supposed would be
facilitated by a reading of Aristotle and Plato, culminating in Plato's supposedly
theological treatises, the Timaeus (on the divine intellect) and the Parmenides (on the
One).
10
Pftaec£o67Bl.
 Prolegomena 15
Seventh, it is our task to inquire what the form of the 25
narrative is. We reply that the Philosopher evidently has
different styles of communication. In the school <works> he
is dense and terse and aporetic in his thoughts, yet not overly
refined in his expression, for the sake of the discovery and
clear knowledge of the truth; but he is also one who makes up
words, if need be. However, in the dialogues, which he wrote 7,1
for the general public, he deliberately employs a certain
volume and overelaboration of speech and metaphor;
moreover, he changes the form of speech depending on the
personalities of the speakers, and, in a word, he knows how to
embellish any type of discourse. And in his letters, finally, it is
evident that he has successfully adopted an epistolary style, 5
which must be concise and clear and free of any harsh
combination or expression.
Eighth, let us ask why on earth the philosopher is contented
with obscure teaching. We reply that it is just as in the
temples, where curtains are used for the purpose of
preventing everyone, and especially the impure, from
encountering things they are not worthy of meeting. So too 10
Aristotle uses the obscurity of his philosophy as a veil, so that
good people may for that reason stretch their minds even
more, whereas empty minds that are lost through careless-
ness will be put to flight by the obscurity when they encounter
sentences like these.
Next, the ninth <question> to be asked is how many and 15
what kind of <issues of> interpretation of any Aristotelian
work should be anticipated. We reply that they are six in
number. <First,> there is the aim (skopos) of the book (for
just as an archer, for example, has a mark toward which he
shoots and which he wants to hit, so also a writer has some
end in view, which he is eager to attain. One must then
inquire what this is). Second, in addition to this, <we must 20
ask> what use we will derive from the work, if this is not
apparent along with the aim (for it generally follows). Third,
what is its order? Fourth, what is the explanation (aitia) of
the title, if it is not clear beforehand, as in the case of de Caelo 8,1
or ofde Generatione et Corruptione? Fifth, is it a genuine or a
spurious book of the Philosopher? (Many people have
composed works signed with Aristotle's name which must be
 16 Prolegomena
rejected on the basis of both form and matter. The form here is
5 the intricacy of the thoughts and the truth that is evident in the
language; the matter is the expression and the narration of the
teaching.)11 Sixth, one should ask what main points it is
divided into. Just as it is someone who has carefully examined
each of the limbs and joints of a human being who knows best
the whole human being composed of them, so too it is one who
has gone through in detail the main points into which a
10 discussion (logos) is divided who knows the discussion best.
In the tenth place, after everything <else>, one must
inquire what sort <of person> a commentator on Aristotle's
writings needs to be. We reply that he must know very well that
which he is about to comment on, and must also be an
intelligent man, in order to present the Philosopher's thought
15 and to examine closely the truth in what he says. For one must
not, so to speak, sell oneself completely and accept what is said
and in all earnestness support everything one comments upon
as true, even if it is not. Rather one must examine each point
closely and, if it should turn out that way, prefer the truth to
Aristotle. In this way, then, should the commentator prepare
his commentary.
20 But since we want to begin with the treatise on the
Categories, let us now examine the questions raised a little way
back; the first <concerns> the aim. Notice that commentators
9,1 have differed on this, some saying that the Philosopher is
discussing words (phonai), some <saying> things (pragmata),
and some, concepts (noemata). Those of each group support
their claims with textual passages. Those who say it is about
words say that when he says 'Among things that are said, some
are said in combination, some without combination' (Ial6) he
5 is obviously distinguishing words. Those who say it is about
things say that he is obviously distinguishing these when he
says 'Among the things that there are, some are said of some
subject and some are in a subject'.12 And those who say it is
about concepts < point out> that after completing the doctrine
of the ten categories he says 'Concerning genera, that is

11
Reading M t&s didaskalias apangelia with Pelletier. The MSS read he tes
apangelias didaskalia, 'the teaching of the narrative'.
12
Ia20.
 Prolegomena 17
13
sufficient'. The genera he is talking about are clearly later in
origin and are notional entities (ennoematika), whence also
Porphyry says 'Therefore the description we have given of the 10
concept of genus includes nothing excessive or deficient'.14 So
Aristotle's aim concerns only concepts (noemata). Although
these people appear to disagree when they say these things, in
reality they all speak the truth, even though not completely,
but only in part. It is as if in defining 'man' one person were to
say that man is an animal, and another were to say that
'rational' by itself is enough, and yet another that <man is> 15
mortal. The three speak the truth, but none of them states the
complete definition.
The Philosopher's aim here, therefore, is to treat words that
mean things through mediating concepts. So when one says
that one of the things we mentioned is the aim, one
necessarily implies the remaining two as well, as we will 20
show. For in saying that it is about words one means that it is
about meanings (semantikai), for there is not even one study
by a philosopher dealing with meaningless <words>. These
meanings clearly signify things through mediating concepts.
For when talking about a certain thing one first has the
concept of it, and then one expresses (phesin) it. So it is
altogether necessary that one will be discussing all three. But
even those who say that it is about things must bring in the 25
means <i.e. the concepts>. Accordingly, since some of these
are in bare thought, such as goat-stags and the like, whereas
some really exist independently (huphestota), <those people>
will surely say that the Philosopher is not talking about
things found in bare thought, but rather about things that 10,1
have a real and independent existence. Aristotle will teach us
13
llbl5(inpart).
14
Ouden ara peritton oude elleipon periekhei he tou genous rhetheisa hupographe
tes ennoias (Isag. 3,19). The most natural interpretation of Porphyry's remark is that
he is trying to elucidate the concept of genus by means of a description (hupographe)
since he thought that genus could not, strictly speaking, be denned (cf. Boethius, in
Isag., Editio Secunda, CSEL 48, 180,20-2). If this is so, Ammonius has surely
misinterpreted him; Porphyry's remark about the concept of genus no more commits
him to the idea that a genus is a concept than Frege's discussion of the concept horse
indicates that he thinks that a horse is a concept. But another (less plausible) reading
of Porphyry's remark is also grammatically possible: 'Therefore the description we
have given of a genus embraces nothing more or less than a concept.' Such a claim
would well serve Ammonius' purpose, since it suggests that a genus is nothing but a
concept.
 18 Prolegomena
about these things, not by pointing at them with his finger,
but rather by means of words that signify them through
mediating concepts. And as for those who say that concepts
are the sole purpose, we reply that concepts are concepts of
5 things and that he who is engaged in teaching about these
things teaches through words that signify them. Thus
whichever one of the three one were to mention, one would
necessarily have to admit the other two as well. So we were
right to say that the Philosopher's aim is to lecture about
words that signify things through mediating concepts. And
this is reasonable. For the book at hand is primary both for
10 the treatment of logic (tes logikes pragmateias) and for all of
the Aristotelian philosophy. Thus as a primary treatment of
logic it teaches about words; but also as an introduction to the
rest of the Aristotelian philosophy it makes a division of
beings, that is, of things. That <this is done> through
mediating concepts is clear from the fact that when the
extremes are taught, necessarily the means are also taught
along with them.
15 We said a little while back that there are two branches of
philosophy, the theoretical and the practical, and that
whereas the theoretical concerns the recognition (katalepsis)
of the false and the true, the practical concerns the
discrimination of the good and the bad. But since in each of
these <branches> something that is not true masquerades as
20 true, or something that is not good <masquerades> as good,
in order for people not to be deceived by them they need an
instrument to discriminate such things for them, one that
they can use as a rule or a standard to reject what is
11,1 unsuitable. And this <instrument> is demonstration. But a
demonstration is a syllogism, and a syllogism, as we have
already said, is not a simple thing but rather a collection
(sulloge) of statements which are, to be precise, propositions
(protaseis) and which are composed of nouns and verbs.15
<We> also <said> that nouns serve as subjects (hupokeitai)
whereas verbs are predicated, and these are composed of
5 syllables. But these <syllables> do not per se signify
anything, and, for this reason, there is no study of them by the
15
We have followed Pelletier's emendation here. The received text reads: '... and
they are composed of nouns and verbs which are, to be precise, propositions'.
 Prolegomena 19
Philosopher. We will not stop with nouns and verbs, although
we will not go beyond to their syllables, either. It is therefore
necessary that there be something intermediate between
them. Accordingly we say that prior to <nouns and verbs>
there is the first application (thesis) of simple words. For one
should be aware that nature, recognizing that the <human>
animal was going to be sociable, gave him speech so that by 10
means of it <people> might indicate their own thoughts to
one another. And after they banded together, human beings
agreed with one another that this, for example, would be
named 'wood', and that, 'stone'; and that the word 'Socrates'
would signify a certain substance, and 'walk' (peripatein), a
certain action (energeia). In this way, then, all words <came
to> name what they signify. In sharpening the focus (epibole) 15
for a second time,16 people observed that articles, but not
tenses, can be attached to some words, which they called
nouns, and that tenses, but not articles, are attached to
others, which are <the ones they called> verbs.
Aristotle's aim, then, is to treat not simply nouns and verbs,
but rather the first application of simple words signifying
simple things by means of simple concepts. Then are all words 12,1
discussed in the Categories? I think not, for they are infinite
<in number>, and infinite things do not lend themselves to
science (episteme). But he reduces <them all> to certain
universal words, not an indefinite <number>, but limited to
the number ten. And all words are reduced to these, which 5
are: substance, quality, quantity, relative, where, when, 13,1
doing, being affected, position, having. And this is the aim.
The usefulness is clear immediately. If the book, the
Categories, is the beginning of the study of logic, and logic, as
we have said, discriminates for us the true from the false and 5
the good from the bad, the aforementioned book is therefore
useful to us. Moreover the order is also immediately obvious
to us, since we said that the first application of simple words
precedes <that of> nouns and verbs, whereas nouns and
verbs <precede> simple propositions, and they <precede>
16
Epibole is an Epicurean term for the focusing in thought or perception that yields
an impression of the shape or other property of an external object; cf. Epicurus, Letter
to Herodotus 46-53. For Epicurus' slightly different version of the two-stage
development of language, cf. ibid. 75-6.
 20 Prolegomena
10 universal syllogisms, and they <precede> demonstrative
syllogisms. It is with reference to the order of these things,
accordingly, that the books have been composed as well.
We must ask why on earth he entitled the book the
Categories. We answer accordingly that he proposes to teach
about genera and species and that the species are subjects
(hupokeitai) for their genera and the genera are predicated
15 (kategoreitai) of their species. Therefore individuals (atoma)
are subjects only, subordinate <species and genera> are
subjects for those that precede them and are predicated of
those that come after them, and the ultimate genera
(genikotata) are only predicated. So since the ten expressions
(phonal) <under investigation> are <names> of ultimate
genera (i.e. are only predicated and are never subjects) that is
why he entitled it the Categories.17
20 One should be aware that forty copies of the Analytics have
been found in the ancient libraries, but <only> two of the
Categories. One of these has the beginning, 'Among things
that there are, some are called homonyms, whereas some are
called synonyms'.18 The second is the very one we now have in
front of us. This is preferred, since it has the advantage in
order and material and everywhere declares Aristotle <its>
25 father. All agree that the work is a genuine composition of
Aristotle. For it is evident that in all of his writings he makes
mention of the theories here. Wherefore, if this is spurious, so
14,1 are those; but if those are genuine, this will be genuine also.
Nevertheless one should be aware that the discovery of the
categories is not his, but rather existed previously;19 however,
their organization is due to him.
The book is divided into three parts: one is that of the
'pre-categories',20 one the categories themselves,21 and one
5 the 'post-categories'.22 The pre-categories will be a useful
17
Literally, 'the predications', or 'the predicates'.
18
This is apparently a running together of the opening of the Categories with
Ia20ff.
19
The supposed inventor of the categories to whom Ammonius refers is Aristotle's
predecessor Archytas. But the treatise on categories Ammonius alludes to was
wrongly attributed to Archytas and is in fact of much later composition. Cf.
Introduction for details and references.
20
Praepraedicamenta.
21
Praedicamenta.
22
Postpraedicamenta.
 Prolegomena 21
<introduction> for us into the doctrine of the categories. For,
since he was going to mention in the doctrine of the categories
certain words that are unknown to us, that is why he wishes
to teach about them beforehand, so he would not appear to
throw his account into confusion. He discusses the post-
categories at the end. For since in teaching the categories he
used certain <other> words that are not known, he goes on 10
<later> to define them. But we must ask why on earth he did
not also teach <them> before the categories. We reply that at
the beginning he mentioned those <words> that he
anticipated would not be known at all. But some he kept for
the end, since they would be known from ordinary usage
without our having a precise understanding of them. That is
the reason he used them in the doctrine of the categories 15
without defining them. For in ordinary usage everybody uses
the word 'simultaneous' (hama) and the word 'before'
(proteron) and the noun 'motion' (kinesis). Accordingly he
gives a more precise account of what is signified by them. But
some have said that these have been appended spuriously by
people who want to read the Topics right after the Categories.
And indeed they even entitle the book before us the 'Pretopics' 20
(pro ton topon). But these people do outright battle with the
manifest facts and the order. If he really taught that the
primary position of simple words immediately precedes
<that> of nouns and verbs, and he teaches in the Categories
about the position of simple words, whereas in de
Interpretatione <he teaches> about nouns and verbs, then
each of the two <books> is connected to the other like a chain, 25
and before the latter one cannot read anything other than the
Categories, nor after the former anything other than de
Interpretatione. And the same argument and order <applies> 15,1
all the way up to the Posterior Analytics, that is, the
Apodictics.
 <Commentary>

lal. Things are called homonyms that have only their

name in common.
If souls were on high, separate from the body, each of them
5 would on its own know all things, without need of anything
else. But they descend at birth and are bound up with the
body, and, filled up with its fog, their sight becomes dim and
they are not able to know things it is in their nature to know.
This is why they need to communicate with one another, the
voice serving their needs in conveying their thoughts to one
10 another. Now everything is made known (delountai) both by a
name and by an account (logos). And this is reasonable
enough, since each of the beings is both one substance (ti esti)
and is also composed of many proper parts which, in
conjunction, satisfy its nature. For example, man is both one
substance and is composed of a genus and its constitutive
differentiae; it is signified as one being by the sound 'man',
15 which is a simple name, and is signified as a compound of
certain parts by an account which goes through each of the
properties of a man, e.g. mortal rational animal.
It therefore follows from this that if we take two things,
they will either (a) have both in common -1 mean both name
and account - or (b) differ with respect to both, or have one in
20 common but differ with respect to the other, and this in two
ways: either (c) they have their account in common but differ
in name, or, conversely, (d) they have their name in common
but differ in account. Thus, there are four different cases.
Now if they have both in common, they are called synonyms,
since they share with one another a definition (horismos)
together with their name,23 as it were. This is the way that
23
Sun toi onomati. Ammonius is suggesting a possible etymology for the word
sunonumon.

22
 Commentary 23
genera are predicated of their own species, for man is called 25
animal and is also a sensible animate substance.
But if they differ with respect to both, they are called
heteronyms, as is the case with man and horse. For you would
not call a man a horse, nor a horse a man, nor again do they
have the same definition, but different ones.
Now if they have their name in common, but differ in
account, they are called homonyms, as is the case with the two 16,1
Ajaxes. For they have the name 'Ajax' in common, but not the
same definition; in defining Telamon's Ajax we say 'the one
from Salamis', 'the one who fought Hector in single combat', or
some such thing, whereas we define the other one differently -
as 'the son of Oileus', or 'the Locrian'.
But if they have their account in common but differ in 5
name, they are called polyonyms, as is the case with sword,
scimitar, and sabre.
Of these four, Aristotle here discusses only two - I mean
homonyms and synonyms - since he takes only these to be
useful in his doctrine of predication, and because from them 10
the other two are obvious, since they are their opposites. For
polyonyms are opposed to homonyms in that the latter have
their name in common but differ in account, whereas
polyonyms, as we said, differ in name but have their account
in common. Moreover, heteronyms are opposed to synonyms.
For the latter have both in common, while the former differ 15
with respect to both. Therefore, one who knows these will
thereby know their opposites as well. The Philosopher's
brevity was deliberate, for opposites are known by the same
knowledge. Therefore the remaining two should be learned
along with the account of the first two.
He put homonyms before synonyms, not because24 being is
predicated homonymously of the ten categories, but because 20
in a course of study simpler things should always come before
those that are not as simple. Now homonyms are simpler than
synonyms, in that they have in common only their name,
whereas synonyms have, along with that, their account in
common.
It should be said that some things are just different
24
MS M reads:'... not, as some say, because ...'.
 24 Commentary
25 (heteron), while others are heteronyms. Things that are
entirely other, such as man and horse, are different (for they
have neither the same name nor the same definition), while
heteronyms are those that differ in both these respects but are
the same in their subject, such as ascent and descent. For
neither the name nor the definition of these is the same, yet
their subject is the same; for they are thought of in relation to
17,1 the same staircase. Similarly, too, seed and fruit, which differ
in both respects, are thought of in relation to the same grain.
For that <grain> is called fruit in reference to having already
grown, but seed in reference to future growth.

lal. Things are called homonyms that have only their

5 name in common; the account of being (logos tes ousias)
corresponding to the name is different.
The thought behind this passage is completely clear; those
things are homonyms, he says, that have their name in
common but differ in definition (horismos). The statement
raises the following questions: Why does he say 'homonyms'
and not 'homonym'? And why does he say legetai and not lego
10 or legontai?25 And why does he say 'name in common' and not
say further 'verb' as well? Next, why does he say 'account of
being' and not say 'definition' or 'description'? And why does
he not make mention of accidents as well?26 (The Philosopher
has thus <been> interpreted according to the order <of
presentation>, ignoring the things said here. In fact, he first
teaches about accent and inflection, and then mentions those
15 things, bringing them in as subordinate.)27
25
Legetai is the third person singular, lego the first person singular, and legontai
the third person plural of the verb 'to call".
26
A definition (horismos), for Aristotle, is an account of being (logos tes ousias) or
an account of what something is (logos tou ti esti - cf. Are. Post. 2.10, 93b29-94al9).
Ousia here has the generic sense of 'being" or 'essence'. But Aristotle also uses ousia
in the more specific sense of 'substance' as the name of the first category. So
Ammonius wonders whether Aristotle's claim that homonyms have different logoi tes
ousias commits him to denying that accidents, which are not ousiai (substances), can
be homonyms. He answers this question below (20,23-21,2), correctly distinguishing
between the specific and generic senses of ousia.
27
This parenthetical remark is obscure and difficult to translate. Busse proposes
that it be rejected. Pelletier suggests that it may be an interpolation by a student of
Ammonius, and that 'the Philosopher' here refers to Ammonius rather than (as it
normally does) to Aristotle.
 Commentary 25
See how precisely he says not 'homonym' but 'homonyms',
using the plural form of the word, since homonyms are thought
of as many things, or at least two, but one never speaks this
way in the case of one thing. One should know that homonyms
always require these three things: accent, inflection, and
breathing. For if we find names that differ in one of these 20
respects, they are not homonyms, as, for example, with argos
(idle) and Argos (the city). The accent here is changed; the
paroxytone means a city in the Peloponnesus, the oxytone
means a sluggish person. Because of the change in accent,
then, these are not called homonyms. It is the same with
inflection. For we say ho elates and mean a charioteer, and we 25
say tes elates and mean the wood of the silver fir tree. Thus, 18,1
because of the change in inflection,28 these are not homonyms.
We say the same about breathing, also. For we say oion and the
word with rough breathing (hoion) means 'of what sort', but the
unaspirated word (oion) means 'the only' and it is not a
homonym. With the word 'Ajax', however, the accent is the 5
same and the inflection is the same, and even the breathing is
the same for both. It will follow, therefore, that they <sc. the
two heroes named 'Ajax'> are homonyms.
The Philosopher sees that, even though homonyms are
multiple, they are, at any rate, signified by a single expression.
For this reason he himself makes his statement with legetai
(singular) and does not say legontai (plural). For it was always
the custom among Attic speakers to use that form of expres- 10
sion. Thus Plato said, 'These things, Gorgias, are said (legetai)
about Themistocles'.29 Moreover, it is clear that this word (sc.
'homonyms') was in use among the ancients and is not a
coinage of his. For when it is his own he says, 'I call' (kalo), as he
says in the Analytics, 'I call a term that into which a proposition
is resolved'.30

1 a 1. They are called homonyms ... 15

One must understand things.31
28
Ho elates is in the nominative case, tes elates in the genitive.
29
Gorg. 455E.
a
°An.Post.24bl6.
31
As opposed to expressions. Ammonius is clear on the point that for Aristotle it is
things, not expressions, that are homonyms.
 26 Commentary

lal.... that have only their name in common.

Do we not then find homonymy among verbs? We do, indeed,
say ero and it means both 'I will say' and 'I am erotically
20 affected'. How is it, then, that he says those things are
homonyms that have only their name in common? We say to
this that he understands 'name' (onoma) here, not in
opposition to 'verb' (rhema), but in a more common way,
according to which each semantic expression is called a name.
As Aristotle says in de Interpretatione: 'In and of themselves,
then, verbs are names' (16bl9). Thus ero is a homonym and
25 has a common name, but a different definition, and there is
homonymy among verbs.

9,1 lal. Only.

'Only' is said in two ways, either as opposed to yoked together,
as when we say there is only one person in the bath, as
opposed to another person besides, or as when we say there is
5 only one left behind in battle (to be sure, having with him,
perhaps, a spear and clothing, or something else, he is not
alone, but is called 'alone' for lack of his companions); or else
to mean unique, as when we speak of the only sun. In this
passage 'only5 is used in the first way.

lal. Common.
10 'Common' is said in two32 ways; either <it means> what is
partaken of indivisibly, for example, animal (for we all
partake of it indivisibly; it is not as if some partake only of
substance, some only of animate, some only of sensation), or
<it means> what is partaken of divisibly, like a field (for not
everyone touches the whole, but each <touches> a part).
Surely it is what is partaken of indivisibly that he means
here.33
32
The text reads 'four ways', but Ammonius mentions only two. There may be a
lacuna here.
33
MS M adds: For the 'Aj' of the word 'Ajax' is not predicated of one thing and the
'ax' of another, but the whole is predicated indivisibly of both Telamon's <son> and
Oileus" <son>.
 Commentary 27

lal. ... the account of being (logos tes ousias) 15

corresponding to the name is different; for example, both
a human and a drawing are animals.34
The Philosopher has confidently cited all these examples,
since someone might object that there are no homonyms at all,
but rather synonyms. For the Ajaxes have in common a name
and a definition - mortal rational animal. So he was right to
say 'the account of being corresponding to the name is 20
different', lest we select just any definition rather than the
one corresponding to the name they have in common. For one
of the Ajaxes is Telamon's son, from Salamis, who fought
Hector in single combat; the other is Oileus' son, the
fleet-footed Locrian. Therefore the definition corresponding to
the name is different for each of them.2
But someone might say that it is possible to call homonyms
synonyms as well, as in the case of the two Ajaxes. For they
are homonyms, in that they have a name in common but a
different definition corresponding to the name; one is
Telamon's <son>, the other Oileus'. But on the other hand
someone might say, 'Even with respect to the account 5
corresponding to the name they are synonyms;35 for both
Oileus' and Telamon's <sons> are men36 and so they will be
synonyms'. How, then, do they differ from one another? In this
way: homonyms, such as the Ajaxes, have a commonality
between them with respect to a name, e.g. to 'Ajax', and the
two of them also have a commonality with homonymy itself, in 10
that they participate in that homonymy. Of course, that does
34
Zdion may mean either 'animal' or 'image' (not necessarily the image of an
animal). A better example of homonymy in English might be 'ball', meaning either a
sphere or a dance.
35
At this point, MS M adds: for in so far as they are Ajaxes, they have
<something> in common with one another with respect to the name 'Ajax', but also
with respect to the definition corresponding to the name.
36
There may be a lacuna here. The text as we have it appears to conflate two
arguments, one of which (a) takes man and the other of which (b) takes homonym to
be a shared predicate ('name') whose definition is also shared by the two Ajaxes.
Pelletier, noting that Ammonius discusses only the second of these (cf. 20,7-20,12
below), proposes reading 'homonyms' in place of 'men'. Busse wants to reject the
entire passage (20,1-20,12). For further details on argument (b), cf. Philoponus (in
Cat. 20,22): 'Some say that perhaps even homonyms are synonyms, since they share
both the name homonym and also its definition. For homonym itself is predicated of
the Ajaxes, and so is its definition; for each of them has only his name in common with
the other, but a different definition.'
 28 Commentary
not make them synonyms; for here we are considering only
their relation to each other.37

Ia2. Account (logos).

For what sort of reason does he say account (logos) instead of
15 definition (horismos)?38We answer: it is because we cannot
give definitions to all things; for the supreme genera do not
receive definitions. Rather, there are times when we use
descriptions (hupographai). Still, there is homonymy even
among things for which we use descriptions. This is why he
does not say 'definition', since that would leave out things
signified by description. On the other hand, if he had said
20 'description', he would have omitted things signified by
definitions. So this is why he has used 'account', since it is
predicated in common of definition and description.

Ia2. [The account] of being [corresponding to the

name]...
Why is there not homonymy among accidents? We actually
observe it: sharp is predicated of taste and tone and voice and
25 knifeFor we say 'sharp taste', and similarly with all of the
others. So why <does he say> 'the account of being (logos tes
ousias) corresponding to the name'? We reply that he says
'being' (ousia, 'substance') here, not in contradistinction to
accidents, but in the more general sense of the being
l,l (huparxis) of each thing. In this respect even ac
said to be (huparkhein) among the things that there are (en
37
Ammonius seems to have in mind the following argument. Consider any two
homonyms, such as the two Ajaxes. Since they are homonyms, the name 'homonym'
can be predicated of each of them. But the definition of 'homonym' can also be
predicated of each. So the two Ajaxes have both a name and the definition
corresponding to it in common, and that makes them synonyms. Therefore, all
homonyms are synonyms.
His reply appears to be that this argument considers not just the relation between
the two homonyms, but between each of them and something else (viz. homonymy
itself), whereas to qualify as synonyms they would have to be considered (with regard
to sameness of name and definition) just in comparison with one another. (This seems
a not quite satisfactory way of saying that synonyms must have the same definition
corresponding to their common proper name - the definition Aristotle would call the
logos tes ousias.)
38
cf. n. 26.
 Commentary 29
tois ousi). So he says 'ofousia' as much as to say (anti) 'of the
nature of each thing in accordance with which it exists' (kath'
hen huphesteken).

Ia4. For if one were to set out what it is [for each of them
to be an animal].
If one wanted, he says, to give a definition of each of these as
being an animal, one would give two different definitions. Of
the genuine human being: mortal rational animal. Of the
drawing: perhaps, image (zoion) drawn with such and such
colours.39

Ia5. What it is to be zoidi [animal, image] is distinct for

each one.
And this is why he doesn't say 'to be an animal' (zoion einai)
but 'what it is to be an animal (zoidi einai)'.40 We say that
things are characterized either by their matter or by their 10
form or by both together, that is, by their matter and their
form. If, then, he had said zoion einai ('to be an animal'), he
would have signified their matter and their form, whereas in
saying zoidi einai ('what it is to be an animal') he signifies that
with respect to which it is characterized, that is, its form. For
the being of a thing is its form, and proper definitions are
derived from it, since definitions should be made up of genera
and constitutive differentiae. 15
This, then, is the division of homonyms: among homonyms
(1) some are so by chance (and these are called accidental), for
example, if someone were perchance to discover here and in
Byzantium someone called Socrates. These are not further
divisible. And (2) some are homonyms by intention, of which
39
Ammonias seems to have forgotten what his point is. He is supposed to be giving
two different definitions of zoion, and not a definition ofanthropos. Perhaps he offers
mortal rational animal (the stock definition of anthropos) not as a definition of zoion,
but only as a way of making clear that its definition will be different from that of zoion
in the other sense. The zoion that is a human being is a mortal rational zoion, and
that is clearly a zoion in the sense of living thing; the zoion that is a drawing is a zoion
drawn with such and such colours, and that is clearly a zoion in the sense of image.
40
The dative + infinitive construction, zoidi einai, literally 'being for an animal', is
a phrase Aristotle standardly uses to refer to an essence, zoidi einai is often
translated 'essence of animal'.
 30 Commentary
20 (A) some are homonyms of one another and paronyms of what
they are called after. Among these (i) some are called after the
efficient cause, as when both a scalpel and a book are called
medical, and (ii) some are called after the final cause, for
example, a healthy drug. (These are both after one (aph'henos)
<cause> and towards one (pros hen) <cause>. Those that are
after one are after the efficient cause, and those that are
towards one are towards the final cause.) (B) Some are both
homonyms of one another and also homonyms of what they are
25 called after. Among these (i) some differ temporally from what
they are called after. (And among these (a) some are called in
memory of another; for example, someone remembering his
own father, or teacher, or some such person, might call his own
son by that person's name; (b) some by chance, as when
someone calls a child Felicity; (c) some by hope, as when one
2,1 names <someone> hoping <he will> become <as one has
named him>.41) But (ii) some are not temporally different from
what they are called after. Among these, in turn, (a) some are
called according to the similarity among the things <as when
we call a prudent person Prudence>. (b) Some are called
according to participation: for example, a female musician and
musical knowledge are both called mousike, a philological
5 woman and philological knowledge are both called grammati-
ke.42 Some are called according to analogy, that is to say, as this
is to this, so is that to that, for example, foot of a bed and foot of
a mountain. And among those called according to a similarity
among things, (al) some are because of the similarity of their
behaviour (energeia), for example, calling a certain person
Swift (Gorgias) from his hurrying (gorgeuesthai); (a2) some
because of the similarity of the form, for example, between the
10 image and the original, and (a3) some according to metaphor,
as head and foot (literally, feet) of <Mt.> Ida.

41
This passage is apparently mutilated, but the sense of the original is evident
from the remarks of other commentators. Philoponus comments: 'As when someone
calls his own son Plato thinking he will be a philosopher.' Olympiodorus comments:
'As when someone names his own son Socrates or Plato hoping that he will be such as
they have been.'
42
Ammonius appeals to the Platonic notion of participation (methexis) to make the
point that a female musician (mousike) is so called by virtue of her participation in
musical knowledge (mousike).
 Commentary 31
Ia6. They are called synonyms.
After completing the discussion of homonyms he treats
synonyms. His teaching concerning synonyms is clear from
<that concerning> homonyms. He even uses the same
example here, since he wants to show that one can often call 15
the same thing both a synonym and a homonym, first in one
respect and then in another. For example, Ajax is both a
homonym of the other Ajax and a synonym. He is a homonym
because, though he shares a name <with the other>, he
differs <from him> with respect to the definition of Ajax. But
he can also share the definition of human being and is
therefore a synonym.

Ial2. Things are said to be paronymous in case one gets 20

its name from another.
One must recognize that there are four things to consider
concerning paronyms; more specifically, the first two are
commonality and difference with respect to the name, and the
second two are commonality and difference with respect to the
thing. Take, for example, grammar(grammatike)and
grammarian (grammatikos). With these there is obviously
commonality with respect to the name, but also a difference
concerning the last syllable: with one it is kos and with the
other, ke. It is the same with respect to the thing. <For there
is commonality in the thing, in that the grammarian is so
called because he partakes of grammar, and there is also a
difference in the thing. >43 For the grammarian is a
substance, whereas grammar is a science, which is to say, a
quality, i.e. an accident. If one of these <four things>
should be missing, you will not have paronyms. Thus suppose
there is commonality and difference with respect to the name,
and suppose there is also commonality but no difference with
respect to the thing; then you will not have paronyms — for
example, platanos (plane) and platanistos (plane).44 Here we
would not call them paronyms; for they are the same.
Again, suppose that all the other features <are present>,
43
Insertion by Olympiodorus.
44
The first term is a later, simplified, form of the second.
 32 Commentary
but there is no commonality with respect to the thing; then,
similarly, they will not be paronyms, as is the case with
Helene (the woman) and Helenas (the man). Again, suppose
that all the other features <are present>, but there is no
10 difference in the last syllable; then they will not be paronyms,
as with the science of music, mousike, and the woman
musician, mousike. These are homonyms and not paronyms.
Again, suppose the other <features are present>, but there
is no commonality with respect to the name. Then, similarly,
you will not have paronyms, as with virtue (aretg) and good
(spoudaios). It is therefore necessary that paronyms have all
the aforementioned features, as is the case with the art of
15 grammar and the grammarian. For they are so called
paronymously.
The Philosopher, then, has embraced all the
aforementioned features in a very concise way. Saying 'from
another' reveals both commonality and difference with
respect to the thing. If something <merely differs> from
another, it is clear that it has commonality with the other, but
if it <differs> completely from another, it is clear that it also
20 has a difference. Now in saying 'gets its name with some
difference in grammatical form (p£6sis)'45 Aristotle presents
the commonality and the difference in the name. GrammatikS
(grammar) differs from grammatikos (grammarian) in the
form of the ending of the name. What the Philosopher calls
ptosis is the variation (analogia) of the last syllable and not,
as the grammarians <use the term>, the difference between
the nominative and the genitive and dative.
25 One must recognize that some people say that paronyms
are exactly in the middle between homonyms and synonyms.
They have in common with them that both they and the other
<two> will have commonality in the name, but they differ
from homonyms in that the latter, that is the homonyms,
involve completely different things, whereas the paronyms
have a commonality <with respect to the thing>. Paronyms
4,1 differ from synonyms in that the synonyms impose a complete
commonality in the things, whereas the paronyms require a
difference as well.
45
Ptosis can mean, generically, any grammatical modification, or, specifically, the
case endings of nouns and adjectives.
 Commentary 33
One should be aware, however, that paronyms are not
exactly in the middle, but come closer to synonyms. For they
share with them commonality in the name and in the thing.
They differ from them only in that paronyms do not have 5
complete commonality in the thing and in the name, but have
only a diminished commonality along with a difference in
these respects. But paronyms are separated from homonyms
by no small amount. They approach them only insofar as
there is commonality in the name, but even in this
commonality one sees a difference. Whereas homonyms will 10
have complete commonality — the same name — with
paronyms there will be some difference. Thus paronyms come
closer to synonyms.

Ial6. Among things that are said, some are said in

combination...
Why did Aristotle put things <said> in combination ahead of
those <said> without combination? For good reason. Since he 15
is about to divide those without combination, he mentions
them last so that he can proceed directly to his teaching
concerning them. And indeed he does divide them when he
says 'examples of things said without combination are man,
ox, runs, wins' (Ial8-19). He puts the two nouns together on
purpose, and the two verbs together, so that one doesn't
connect the noun with the verb and take him to be saying 20
<them> in combination.

Ia20. Among the things that there are, some [are said] of
a subject.
The natural sequence would be to produce an account of the
categories themselves, but since he wants to produce a more
general fourfold division before his teaching concerning the
categories, he puts that in front. He does so because we first
obtain the number ten by adding up the numbers from the
monad to the tetrad; that is, one, two, three, four added up in 25
this way make ten. The tetrad is the substance and a kind of
origin (genesis) of the decad, just as the tetrad, in turn, is
derived from the dyad. After having divided expressions
 34 Commentary
(legomena) into two he next divides beings into four and then
25,1 <divides> both together into ten, going through the most
appropriate numbers for division up to their totality and
arriving at their most perfect limit. One should also be aware
that Aristotle produces his fourfold division of beings by
means of compounds (kata to sumplekomenon), but later he
produces the inventory often genera without combination.46
This is the division. Some beings are universal, some are
particular; and again, some beings are substances, some are
accidents. Thus six pairings are generated, as we learned in
the Isagoge.47 Two of these are nonexistent, but the remaining
four, I mean the subalterns and the diagonals, do exist. They
10 are these: some beings are (i) universal substances, some (ii)
particular accidents, some are (iii) universal accidents, and
some (iv) particular substances; for example, (i) man and (ii)
this white (or this knowledge) and (iii) white and (iv) this
man. This is our diagram:

If Aristotle had used these words, what he said would have

15 been clear; but he used other names in pursuit of obscurity, as
we have said, and also because he wants to use the more
appropriate names. The universal he calls 'of a subject',
because it is certainly said of some subject, and the particular
<he calls> 'not of a subject', because it is not said of any
46
Ammonius apparently has in mind the fact that the fourfold division is made by
means of compound expressions (e.g. 'said of a subject but not in any subject')
whereas each of the ten categories is introduced by a single term (e.g. 'substance').
47
See Ammonius in hag. 95,19-
 Commentary 35
subject. (He calls the one by the negation of the other.) The
accident he calls 'in a subject', because it needs some other
subject in order to exist(hupostenai);and substance he calls 20
'not in a subject'.
For this reason it is worth asking what Aristotle's purpose
was in not calling substance 'subject' but <describing it
instead> by means of the negation of the expression
signifying accident. We reply that (1) not every substance is a 26,
subject (for surely primary and divine substances are not
subjects). Therefore, it was reasonable that he did not call
substance 'subject'. But then, too, having made a division of
things, he wanted to make it by means of negation and
affirmation, so it would be exhaustive,48 i.e. would in fact 5
include everything. It is as if he said, 'Among colours some are
black and some are not black'. Indeed one who speaks this
way has included everything, whereas one who says that
among colours some are black and some are white has not
included everything; for he has not <included> yellow, grey,
and other colours. Therefore, \\A&right that Aristotle made 10
the division by means of negation and affirmation. (2) Another
reason is that 'subject' is said in two ways: on the one hand,
with respect to belonging (huparxis), as a substance <is a
subject> for accidents; on the other, with respect to
predication, as particular substances <are subjects> for
universal <substances>. For particular substances are
subjects for universal ones not in order for the <latter> to
exist (hupostosi) (for the universals pre-exist) but so that <the
universals> can be said of them. If therefore he had simply
called substance 'subject', someone might have objected, 15
saying that he calls the particular substance a subject for
universals only with respect to predication.49
Using these names he sets out four pairings: first, universal
substance, since it is most honourable; next, its opposite, I
48
Aphuktos, literally, 'from which escape is impossible'.
49
One would expect Ammonius' point to be that since a particular substance is a
subject in the second sense of 'subject', but not in the first, it would be inappropriate
to characterize a substance as a subject simpliciter, and we have translated
accordingly. But the text reads, literally:'... it is only the particular substance that he
calls a subject for universals with respect to predication.' This merely recapitulates
his first reason for objecting to the characterization of substance as 'subject', viz. that
not every substance is a subject. We surmise that in the MSS the word mon&n ('only')
was misplaced.
 36 Commentary
mean the particular accident. Then he gives precedence to the
universal accident over the particular substance because
20 discourse among philosophers concerns universals.
One should consider what the Philosopher means when he
says 'among the things that there are, some are said of some
subject but are not in any subject' (Ia20-l). It must also be
noted that here, where he is reasoning about words, he uses
'said', but whenever he is talking about things (ousiori) he
uses 'is'.

25 Ia24. But I call in a subject [what is in something, not

belonging as a part, and cannot exist apart from what it
is in].
Out of the six <possible> pairs, Aristotle now proposes to
clarify the four that we have highlighted, that is to say, (i) the
particular accident, (ii) the particular substance, (iii) the
universal accident, and (iv) the universal substance. He
begins with (i) the particular accident because it is clearer and
30 simpler. Since, then, we understand things from their
definitions, he gives, not a definition of it, but rather
something analogous to a definition. In something is
analogous to a genus and the rest to differentiae. In something
is said in eleven ways: in a time, in a place, in a container, as a
part in the whole, as a whole in its parts, as a species in a
27,1 genus, as a genus in a species, as the <affairs> of the ruled in
<the power or control of> the ruler,50 as form in matter, as in
an end, as in a subject, for example, an accident in a
substance. He then takes this in something in his definition as
a genus said of many things. He has added not belonging as a
part so as to distinguish it from things in something as parts,
5 for example, this hand. For it is in the man, too, as being part
of him. So to separate it from them he has added not belonging
as a part. But he has added cannot exist apart from what it is
in to separate it from the rest.
One must recognize that some people fault this definition
10 for both the defects of definitions, that is to say for
overshooting and exceeding the definition of the thing and yet
50
cf. Philoponus 32,23-4; Anonymous Paraphrase 6,16.
 Commentary 37
also for leaving out and not including all. They say that it does
not convert with the thing defined, as must be the case with
definitions and things defined, as we have said. For example,
man is mortal rational animal capable of understanding and
knowledge. This converts. For if something is a mortal 15
rational animal capable of understanding and knowledge, it is
a man. Some then say that the definition given does not fit all
accidents, and others say it fits other things also besides
accidents. For they say that Socrates being in a place is in
something and not as a part in a whole (for he is not part of
the place) and he cannot exist apart from what he is in (for he 20
cannot exist apart from a place), so that according to the
definition Socrates is an accident, which is absurd. We reply
then that Socrates can exist apart from what he is in. For if we
suppose him to have left behind the place where he was
earlier and gone to another place, he is no less Socrates,
whereas the accident separated from its subject has been
destroyed. Moreover, one must recognize that place goes along 25
with Socrates not as completing his essence but rather as
attending in the way that a shadow goes along with someone
walking in the light and not at all as completing his proper
essence. It is especially necessary to add 'in' (en) to 'belongs'
(huparkhon), so that it will be that which inheres
(enuparkhon) in something; for we do not say that a substance
inheres in a place but just that it is in it. We say this -1 mean
that they inhere - only of accidents.
Again it is said, 'Form is in matter and is not part of matter 30
and cannot exist apart from matter. Therefore according to
the aforesaid definition form, too, is an accident'. We reply
that, in the first place, the form, even if it is not part of the 28,1
matter, is yet part of the composite (for in this way we also say
that the hand is not part of the rest of the body but rather of
the whole body), and, in the second place, the form is
constitutive of the substance of each thing and when it is
destroyed the subject is destroyed. But the accident does not 5
constitute the substance of the subject and when it is
destroyed the subject is not damaged. These comments are
directed towards those who say that the definition fits other
things as well.
Those, however, who say that it does not fit all accidents say
 38 Commentary
that he has defined only the inseparable ones. Thus the
10 fragrance in the apple is separable and comes to us at a
distance from the apple, but it is still an accident. If, then, it is
separable from its subject, it would not be comprehended by
the definition given. We reply to them that we solve this in
two ways. First, Aristotle does not say in which it was but in
which it is (therefore it is impossible for the fragrance to exist
apart from the place51 in which it is; for it is either in the
15 apple or in the air). Further, not only does the fragrance of the
apple come to us, but it comes with some substance of the
apple. A sure sign of this is that after some time the apple will
shrink and shrivel up, which shows that some substance of
the apple in which the fragrance belongs is dissipated.
But if someone says, 'And yet when the apple was still on
20 the tree the fragrance came to us no less from the
nonshrivelling, sometimes even growing, apple', we reply to
him: "You do not understand nature's faculty of nourishment
and growth. Do we not see growth taking place among all
animals? And doubtless we do not for that reason say that
they are not reduced each day by dissipation because,
25 nevertheless, there is a greater amount brought in by reason
of nourishment than the quantities of waste. Nature is so
arranged that not only is evaporation imperceptible but
growth, to the contrary, is comparatively perceptible.' We
then say the same for the apple. For it is not that the effluence
from the tree is imperceptible to us and thanks to this no
substance is dissipated from it. It is rather that the substance
that goes into it by reason of nutrition is greater than what
goes out.
30 But it is possible to be persuaded of this in another way.
Passing by a stinking place we block our nostrils with a
garment and breathe air without the stench. For that reason
it is clear that the stench cannot pass through the garment
because of its thickness. But the air, having subtle parts,
29,1 travels through. Thus it is clear that this scent comes to us
with some substance of the subject. This is also shown by the
smoke given off from incense, which immediately comes to
51
Deleting melon (apple) and reading topou (place, genitive) for topdi (place,
dative). Unamended, the text reads: 'it is impossible for the fragrance to exist apart
from the apple in which place it is.'
 Commentary 39
view because of the incessant effluence and the thickness of
the substance that is its subject.
In something is said in eleven ways, as has already been 5
stated: (1) in a time (for the Trojan War or the Peloponnesian
War occurred in a certain time); (2) in a place (for we say that
Socrates is in a place, for example, in the Lyceum); (3) in a
container (for we say that wine is in the pitcher — in a place
differs from in a container in that the container is a movable
place, whereas a place is an immovable container); (4) as a 10
part in the whole, for example a finger in a hand or a hand in
the whole of the body; (5) as a whole in its parts (for we say
that the whole man is seen in his parts and not in apart); (6)
as a species in a genus, for example man in animal; (7) as a
genus in a species, for example animal in man; (8) as the
<affairs> of the ruled in <the power or control of> the ruler
(for we say that this particular thing is 'in' this particular
ruler); (9) as form in matter, for example the human form in 15
matter or the triangular or square figure in bronze; (10) as in
an end, as for example <we say> that medicine is 'in' health;
(11) as in a subject, for example an accident in substance.
Someone might say that a genus is found in a species or a
species in a genus as a whole in its parts or as the parts in the
whole. We reply to this that a whole is not preserved without 20
all of its proper parts, whereas a genus is preserved when
even one species or one individual is preserved; for Socrates is
Socrates and a man and an animal. So it is clear that whereas
one part does not make up a complete whole, one species does
make up a complete genus.
Having then clarified the particular accident for us, the
Philosopher gives us an example of a universal accident and 25
says: 'some things are both said of a subject and in a subject'
(Ia29-bl). Having then given examples of both universal and 30,1
particular accidents he now goes on to the example of a
particular substance and says 'but some things are neither in
a subject nor said of a subject' (lb3-4). But he introduces this
additional principle: 'absolutely without exception, things
that are individual and one in number are not said of any 5
subject' (lb6-7). He wants to show by means of this that no
individuals, whether accidents or substances, are predicated
of anything. Moreover, he divides and separates individual
 40 Commentary
accidents from self-subsistent individuals. Absolutely (haplos)
is said in three ways: either strictly (kurios) or solely or
universally. Here he has used it with the meaning
10 universally. For he means 'universally, things that are
individual and one in number'. We have written at length in
commenting on the Isagoge of Porphyry about how many ways
individual is said.52 We shall now say in how many ways one
is said, for it is also said in many ways: either one in species,
as we say Socrates and Plato are one in species in that they
15 are men; or one in genus, as when we say man, cow, and horse
are one in genus in that they are animals; or in number, as
when we say Plato is one — but one here means individual,
and this is what Aristotle says, for the sake of clarity, when he
means one <in this sense>. Individuals, then, beings that are
one in number, are never said of any subject but are often
found in a subject, as this white is in body. For this reason,
20 therefore, he has added nothing prevents, since they are not
all in a subject. For Socrates is not in a subject, but this
grammar, as Aristotle says, is in a subject, the soul. And to
speak universally, things that are one in number and not
substances are not said of any subject, but are in a subject.

IblO. When one thing is predicated of another [as of a

subject, whatever is said of what is predicated will also be
said of the subject].
25 The exemplar <for this> is that of universal substance. When
31,1 one thing is predicated essentially (ousiodos) of another, he
says, and in turn another thing is predicated of it, the last will
also be predicated of the first. One might raise this objection:
'If it is true that whatever is said of what is predicated will
also be predicated of the subject, and genus is predicated of
5 animal and animal of man, then genus will also be predicated
of man.' But this is not what Aristotle meant. For the
Philosopher said 'whatever is said of what is predicated', i.e.
as attributes of it (hos pragmata autou) and as characterizing
its essence (ousia), 'will also be said of the subject'. And he was
right to add 'as of a subject', in the sense of 'essentially'
52
There is no such discussion in the surviving text of Ammonius' commentary on
Porphyry's Isagoge.
 Commentary 41
(ousiodos) and 'really' (pragmatikos). For if something is 10
predicated accidentally of what is predicated, it need not also
be said of the subject. For genus is predicated accidentally and
relatively (kata skhesin) of animal.

Ibl6. Of heterogeneous things not subordinate one to

another [the differentiae, too, are different in kind].
Aristotle adds53 some small assumptions which will be useful
to him in setting out his lesson. He says that the specific 15
differentiae of heterogeneous things are always different; for
example, <those> of substance and quantity. For animate
and inanimate are differentiae of substance, but continuous
and discrete <are differentiae> of quantity. So the
differentiae are different when the genera are different. But
'different genera'54 is said in many ways. For <genera> called
different include: (1) those entirely distinct from one another, 20
such as knowledge and animal; (2) those not entirely
separate, for example winged and aquatic (for they have a
common genus, animal); even (3) subordinate genera, such as
substance and body. Aristotle therefore says 'and not
subordinate one to another'. For those <sc. genera one of
which is subordinate to the other> can have the same
differentiae; for example, both living thing (empsukhon) and
animal (zoion) have <the differentiae> mortal and immortal,
rational and irrational. 25
He was right to add 'in kind'. For here, take note, we have
the same differentiae of different genera: we call some
utensils 'footless', for example, a censer or a pestle or the like,
and some 'footed', such as a chair or a bed and things like that.
Likewise we say of animals that some are footless and some
are footed. However, the same differentiae are not specific and
not predicated strictly, but by a kind of analogy. 30

Ibl8. For the differentiae of animal [are footed, winged, 32,1

aquatic, and two-footed].
53
Reading proslambanei with MSS MF, rather than prolambanei ('anticipates'),
with Busse (following Philoponus).
64
Reading heteragene with MS M.
 42 Commentary
Differentiae of genera can divide them in many ways. For
example, the differentiae of animal are rational and
irrational, but <animal can be differentiated> also, based on
permanence of life, as mortal or immortal; and, based on
5 place, as winged, aquatic, or terrestrial; and, based on the feet,
as footed or footless. These different things are also
differentiae. Although Aristotle uses the example of a
differentia based on place, he inserts in its midst other
differentiae as well. He does so deliberately, wishing to show
that taking other differentiae makes no difference.

Ib20. [Yet nothing prevents] differentiae of genera that

are subordinate one to another [from being the same].
10 Aristotle was right to say 'nothing prevents'. For subordinate
genera will not necessarily have the same differentiae.
Rather, the essential differentiae of subordinate genera are
always entirely the same, but not always the accidental
[differentiae]. For this reason he has added 'nothing prevents'.
It often happens, however, that they are the same, on account
15 of the aforementioned general rule: 'whatever is said of what
is predicated will also be said of the subject.'

Ib25. [Each] of the things [said] without any combination

[signifies either substance or ... ].
Earlier, Aristotle handed down to us the four-fold division of
universal substance, particular substance, universal accident,
20 and particular accident. Now he presents a ten-fold division,
by means of examples, in order to give us some notion of them,
and later to teach [us] about each in detail. This is connected
to his remark above (Ial6): among things that are said, some
are said in combination, some without combination. Now in
accordance with this55 he says of the things without any
25 combination; in saying without any he makes clear that there
are many combinations. For (1) we can use a simple
expression with a compound meaning, as when I say 'I run'56
55
Reading de akolouthos touto to, following Busse's conjecture.
56
In Greek, person and number of verbs are indicated by their inflection, and
pronouns are not needed. Ammonius' sentence contains just one Greek word: trekhd.
 Commentary 43
(for I refer to myself and to my action); (2) the expression may
be compound but its meaning simple, like mortal rational 33,1
animal (for the expression is compound, but its meaning is
man);(3) both <expression and meaning> may be compound,
as when I say 'Socrates runs'; or (4) both may be simple, like
the categories themselves. So Aristotle is here distinguishing
those things said without any combination, i.e. the ten 5
categories.

Ib27. To give a general indication of what these things

are - examples of substance are man and horse.
At the start Aristotle kindly furnishes us with an explanation
of the categories, first to give us a notion of his teaching about 10
them, and so we may later accurately examine each category
in particular. He says that substances are man and horse, but
you must understand that the rest of the things that are
self-subsistent (authupostata) and need nothing else to exist
are also substances. So much for substance; we will
understand the rest of the categories clearly from the text.57

2a3. Examples of having are wearing shoes and being 15

armed.
Since having is opposed to being had, some people wonder
why Aristotle says that there is a category only of having, but
not one of being had, just as <there is> in the case of being
affected,which is opposed to oingand of which he has made a
category - I mean <the category of>being affected.Our
response is that being had can be subsumed under the 20
<category> of being arranged, but having cannot <be
subsumed> under any of the others. This is why he had to
define a category for it.
Now some people say that not every entity can be subsumed
57
At this point MS M adds: Here it should be indicated that although every quality
is in a subject, they are not all assigned the same kind of subject. Rather, some, such
as heat and cold, exist in body, while others, such as geometry, have their being in the
soul. Since he wanted to indicate the two types of quality by means of examples, the
Philosopher mentioned some, saying 'examples of quality are white and
grammatical', taking white as an example of a quality in a corporeal subject and
grammatical <as an example> of one assigned to be in the soul.
 44 Commentary
under the ten categories. Under what category should we
subsume a point or a privation! With respect to points, our
25 response is that Aristotle is here discussing things known by
34,1 perception, and to 'the many'. But a point is not an
independently existing thing; it is a principle (arkhe) of things
in general. One would be similarly puzzled about matter and
form, but as we shall explain,58 the present discussion
concerns neither the simple substance that is superior to the
composite, nor the simple substance that is inferior to the
5 composite, but composite substance. With respect to
privation, some have said that it belongs in the same category
under which possession is subsumed, since opposites are
subsumed under the same category. But we say it is not to be
subsumed under any one of the categories. For they are
categories of beings, whereas privation is not a being, but a
10 privation of being.

2a4. Each of the things mentioned above [said just by

itself is no assertion].
Since he wants to inform us that he is not here proposing to
distinguish affirmations from negations, Aristotle says that
each of the categories by itself does not signify anything true
15 or false. For if I say 'Socrates walks', then if he in fact walks, I
have spoken truly, and if not, I have spoken falsely; and
likewise for negations. But if I say 'man' ten thousand times I
am speaking neither truly nor falsely; and the same goes for
'walks'.
However, someone might object that one who says '(I)
walk'59 is speaking either truly or falsely. For if he is in fact
walking he speaks truly, and if not he speaks falsely. We reply
20 that one who says '(I) walk' (peripatd) has virtually included
the T (ego), as if he had said 'I walk' (peripatd ego). Thus once
again the pronoun has been included in the verb to produce a
truth or falsehood, since a single category all by itself cannot
do this. For it is obvious that none of the categories60 is by
58
Reading, with Busse, phesomen ('we will say") for ephamen ('we said'). The
explanation referred to occurs below at 35,27ff.
59
Peripatd, first-person singular, means 'I walk'. Cf. n. 56.
60
Ammonius clearly means that a single predicate from any category does not by
itself constitute an assertion.
 On Substance 45
itself either an affirmation or a negation, but that they combine
with one another to do this. For example, in 'man walks' an 25
affirmation is generated from a substance and an action. And
by inserting a negative particle in the middle we get a negation,
such as 'man does not walk'.

2a5. [Each of the things mentioned above said just by

itself] is no assertion.
Most of the manuscripts (biblion) that appear to have it right
do not have 'or negation'. For if no single category signifies an 30
affirmation, then certainly none signifies a negation. For it 35,1
would need a negative particle;61 and one would suppose
action to signify affirmation rather than negation.

2a7. For it seems that every affirmation or negation [is

either true or false].
Aristotle says 'seems', since in not all cases is an affirmation
or negation obviously true or false.62 An example <would be> 5
if someone says '(I) run' or '(I) do not run'.63 The reason why
Aristotle says 'seems' is that in these cases one virtually
supplies the unexpressed T. Either that <is the reason>, or
<it is> because the 'seems' is redundant, or because it is a
copyist's error, or because he means it is thus apparent to
everyone.

<On Substance>

2all. Substance in the most proper sense of the word, 10

that which is primarily and most of all called substance

Substance is first in order among the categories and for this

reason he naturally puts it in front of the others. It is
61
Omitting heterou with MS F.
62
The text says, literally: 'in not all cases is an affirmation true, nor in all cases is a
denial false.' We follow Pelletier in amending the text to read as we have translated:
oupantds he kataphasis kai he apophasis phaneros aletheuei epseudetai.
63
cf. n. 56.
 46 Commentary
64
entailed by the other categories, but it does not entail them;
15 it<s destruction> destroys them but it is not destroyed by
theirs, because it is self-subsistent whereas the other
categories have their being in it. From the fact that there is
substance it is not necessary that there are the other
categories, but if there were not substance the others could
not exist.
Some substance is simple, some composite. Some simple
substance is better than composite, some is inferior. Man and
20 things of that sort are composite substances. The substance of
the gods is simple substance that is better than the composite.
Simple substance that is inferior to the composite is prime
matter and form. These latter <two> gain recognition on
account of the composites, and things recognized because of
something else are always inferior to that on account of which
they are recognized. Thus, among crafts we call bridle-making
25 inferior to horsemanship, for horsemanship uses the finished
product of bridle-making as an instrument. The bridle is a
means, horsemanship is an end. And with other things it is
similar. But Aristotle will not discuss here what is simple and
36,1 superior to the composite (for that is theology), nor what is
simple and inferior to the composite (for that is the inquiry
into natural causes and phenomena [phusiologia]), but rather
the composite and relational, insofar as it is signified in such a
way.
He says of this substance that some is primary and some
secondary, calling the particular primary and the universal
5 secondary. For this reason it is worthwhile to ask why he says
this, since universals are more worthy than particulars. Our
response is that things prior by nature are secondary to us
and things prior to us are secondary by nature. For example,
matter and form, then the common elements, are prior by
nature. From them come the sperm and the blood and then, in
this way, the man. But for us the man is prior, for we discover
10 the man first and then the things previously mentioned,
which are recognized on account of it. Since, then, the
explanation is aimed at beginners and to beginners
64
Suneispherein literally means 'join in payments', and LSJ do not attest its use in
the sense of'entails'. Still, that is what it assuredly means in this context. Cf. Plato's
similar use of the related verb epipherein at Phaedo 104E10ff.
 On Substance 47
immediate things are more manifest, it is fitting that in the
present circumstance he calls particulars primary. For it is
from particulars that we are led to universals.
It is because he does not approve of this manner of speaking
that he does not say 'that which primarily and most of all is
<substance>', but '<that which primarily and most of all> is
called <substance>'. One must notice how Aristotle 15
expresses himself here. Because, as we have said, he
disapproves of calling the particular substance primary; he
says it is that which is said not of any subject. For the really
primary substance, that is, the universal, is of some subject.
So he says 'is said' to indicate his disapproval. But since he
knows that neither primary substance nor secondary is in a 20
subject, he says 'is': 'is not in any subject' (Ia21). He agrees to
'is' here because <the claim> is acceptable to him.

2al2. That which is neither said of any subject...

Some people question why Aristotle defines the most worthy
thing by means of negations, since they are less worthy than
affirmations. We reply that this is not inappropriate. We, too, 25
when we want to refer to the divine, do not affirm something
of it, but rather, as Plato says, we resort to negation.
Others are puzzled, saying that perhaps the definition 37,1
given of substance fits both the truly primary and divine
substance and also the individual soul.65 For God is neither
said of any subject nor is he in a subject, and the soul is, of
course, the same. We reply that in neither case does the
definition fit.
It is absolutely unthinkable to have this definition in mind 5
for divine substance. 'Not being in66 a subject' means as
opposed to things in a subject, and <the definition> fits things
that have some relation to those in a subject. But the divine is
completely unrelated and transcendent (exeirGmenon) both
from everything in a subject and from everything not in a
65
Ammonius apparently has in mind lamblichus' type of theory. Cf. Introduction
for details.
66
The MSS have 'of a subject'; we follow Pelletier in reading 'in a subject'. The MS
reading may be the result of haplography: 'not being of a subject' means <as opposed
to things said of a subject, and 'not being in a subject' means> as opposed to things in
a subject. Cf. Philoponus in Cat. 52,14.
 48 Commentary
10 subject that is nevertheless a subject for accidents. As for the
soul, if one understands the transcendent one, again the
definition, for the same reason, does not fit (for although it has
the thoughts and the knowledge of all things before it, it is
itself unrelated and transcendent). If one understands the
individual soul, perhaps the definition applies to it. For after
it has fallen into a relation and is seized by forgetfulness, it is
then driven to the memory of previous things and becomes a
15 subject for grammar at one time, for medicine at another time,
and in the same way for other skills. It is not surprising that
the definition fits the soul at one time but not at another, for it
has an intermediate order between the things which
completely transcend matter and those completely involved in
matter. When the soul is separated (exeiretai) from bodies, the
definition does not apply to it; but when fallen into matter it is
20 caused to forget. The definition then applies and there is no
paradox.

2al4. What are called secondary substances.

It is worth considering what manner of division Aristotle is
38,1 using in the case of substance. For some of his divisions are of
(1) genera into species, some are of (2) a whole into parts, and
some are of (3) an ambiguous expression into its different
senses. We reply first that it is not of a genus into species,
because it never happens that one of the divided species
includes another. For example, some animals are rational and
5 some irrational, but we cannot say 'Some animals are
irrational and some are horses'. For the second is included
under the first. And it is in just this way that primary
substance is included under secondary. Nor is he dividing as a
whole into parts. For one cannot say 'One <part> of the whole
is the hand and another is the finger'. For in the same way the
finger, too, is included under the hand. Rather, one <part> of
10 the whole is the hand and another is the foot. Nor, for the
same reason, is he here dividing an ambiguous expression
into different senses. For among things divided as an
ambiguous expression into different senses we do not find one
included under another. For example, the expression 'dog' is
predicated of the constellation and of the philosopher and of
 On Substance 49
the terrestrial dog, but none of these is included under any of
the others. And, above all, one finds only homonymy, not 15
commonality of definition, among ambiguous expressions
divided into different senses. But with primary and secondary
substance there is commonality not only of name but also of
definition. For Socrates, who is a primary substance, is called
by the name of the secondary, that is, by the name 'man';
moreover, Socrates and the universal man also have the same 20
definition. Likewise, an animal is called both sensible animate
substance and animal. Thus we say that he gives an ordering
(taxis) of substance, but not a division.

2al4. The species in which the things primarily called 39,1

substances fall [are called secondary substances].
Why does he not say 'genera and species are called secondary
substances', rather than 'the species in which ...'? Our answer
is that this is quite unassailable. For if he were to say 'genera
and species', then since there are genera and species in the 5
other categories (e.g. in <the category of> quality colour is a
genus and white and black are species), we could assume
there to be secondary substances even in the accidental
<categories>. That is why he does not speak of just any
species, but of the species in which primary substances are
found.

2al5. These, as well as the genera of these species.

Here the Philosopher draws together what he said above. By 10
saying 'these' he means primary substance, and by saying 'as
well as the genera of <these> species' he means secondary
substance.67

2al6. For example, the individual man.

Aristotle takes <this> as an example of a primary substance.
And from the example it is obvious that primary substance is 15
67
Ammonius seems confused. His idea apparently is that Aristotle understands
the species to be the genuine primary substance, so that among universals it is only
the genus, not the species, that is a secondary substance. Perhaps he is drawing on
Metaph. Z, which has seemed to many interpreters to link primary substance to
 50 Commentary
included under secondary. For the individual man is in the
species man, and animal is the genus of this species. Since
40,1 animal includes the universal man, and the universal man
[includes] the individual man, and the individual man is a
primary substance, therefore the universal man and <the
universal> animal are called secondary substances.

2al7. So they [man and animal] are called secondary

substances.
Aristotle is right in saying 'are called', since by nature they
5 are primary substances.

2a20. Both the name and the definition of a thing said of

a subject must be predicable of the subject.
Aristotle here deduces the following corollary: whatever is
said of something as of a subject, he says, shares both its
10 name and its definition with the subject (for Socrates is called
a man and a mortal rational animal), but what is in a subject
never shares its definition, although it sometimes shares its
name. For whiteness is in body and does not share its
definition <with body>; we would not call the body a colour
penetrative of sight. But it does share its name, for we call the
15 body white. Notice, however, that this is not always the case.
Consider: virtue (arete) shares neither its name nor its
definition with a subject. Someone who partakes of virtue is
not called 'virtued' (aretaios) but 'good' (spoudaios).68

2a34, Everything else [is either said of primary

substances as subjects or is in them as subjects].
Again, Aristotle does well to say 'is said'. For universals do not

species as opposed to both individuals and genera. But Aristotle's text in the
Categories is unambiguous: individuals are called primary substances, their species
and genera are called secondary substances.
68
In English, of course, a person with virtue is called 'virtuous'. But in Greek, the
adjective corresponding to the noun aret& (virtue) is the non-cognate form spoudaios,
usually translated as Virtuous'. Here the usual translation would obscure Ammonius'
point; we therefore render spoudaios as 'good'. We have translated his neologism,
aretaios, as 'virtued', to preserve the odd sound Ammonius intended this expression
to have.
 On Substance 51
need primary substances, i.e. particulars, in order to exist, but
in order to be said o/them. 20

2a35.... or is in them as subjects.

Again, the 'is' is good here. For accidents have their being in
particular substances. Aristotle wants, then, to heap praise on
primary substance. Since things are divided into three - into 25
universal substances, particular substances, and accidents -
each of them, he says, will need primary substances, some in 41,1
order to exist (for accidents have their being in substances)
and some in order to be predicated (for what are the
universals to be predicated of other than the particulars?).
And if primary substances were to be destroyed, accidents,
too, unable to exist (hupostenai) in anything, would be
destroyed. In the same way universals, unable to be said of 5
any subject, would be destroyed, too.
It is not what is prior to the many but what is in the many
that is called universal. This <remark> has been added on
account of what is said in Porphyry's Isagoge, <viz.> that it
would be possible for the genus to exist even on the hypothesis
that all the species had been destroyed.69 There, of course,
<Porphyry> was discussing intelligible genera and species,
which are prior to the many, whereas here <Aristotle> is 10
discussing perceptible genera and species, that is, those in the
many.

2b5.... or is in them as subjects.

That is, universal substances are said of particulars, whereas
accidents have their being in particular substances. If there
were, then, no primary substances, there would be neither 15
universals nor accidents. It is reasonable, then, that
particular substances are said to be primary. And he was
right to fix on 'are said' for universals and 'are' for accidents.

2b7. Among secondary substances, [species is] more

[substance than genus.]
89
/sag. 15,18ff.
 52 Commentary
Now he compares secondary substances (species and genus) to
20 each other, and proves by means of two arguments that a
species is more a substance than is a genus. One <argument>
is based on its relation to primary substance, that is, on its
proximity; for a species is closer to the primary, that is to say
particular, substance than is a genus. The other is from
analogy; as a primary substance is to its species, so is a
species to its genus.

25 2b8. For if one were to give an account of what some

primary substance is [it would be more informative and
more appropriate to give the species than to give the
genus].
Now if one were to give an account of what Socrates is, both
42,1 'man' and 'animal' would be appropriate answers, but 'man'
would be more appropriate than 'animal'. For saying 'animal'
we introduce more (for it signifies both rational and
irrational) and we did not indicate whether <we meant>
rational or irrational. On the other hand, by answering 'man'
we give a more immediate account of the nature of Socrates.

5 2bl2. For the former is more distinctive of an individual

[man].
To be a man is indeed more distinctive of Socrates than to be
an animal. For the latter is more general and <is predicated>
of many species. The same relation holds in the case of trees
and <the genus> plant.

2bl5. Further, primary substances [are subjects for

everything else].
10 This comes from the second argument, the one from analogy.
The reason that primary substances are called primary, he
says, is that they are subjects both for accidents with respect
to belonging (huparxis) and for universals with respect to
predication. For as primary substances stand to accidents and
universals, so species stand to genera. Species are subjects for
15 genera with respect to predication, but genera are not
 On Substance 53
<subjects> for species. For genera are predicated of species
(thus we say, 'Every man is an animal', and man, i.e. the
species, is the subject, and animal, that is to say, the genus, is
predicated), but species are not reciprocally predicated of
genera. Thus we cannot say, 'Every animal is a man', as we say
'Every man is an animal'. So for these reasons a species is more 20
a substance than is a genus.

2b22. Among species that are not themselves genera

[none is more a substance than another].
Aristotle was right to have added 'that are not genera', lest
you consider animal <as an example>; for animal is not only
a species but also a genus. Accordingly, one should not
consider these,70 but rather those that are only species, i.e. 43,1
the infimae species, for example man and horse.

2b24. For it is no more appropriate [to give man in

defining the individual man than it is to give horse in
defining the individual horse].
Having gone through a review of substance vertically, that is
from individuals to species and from species to genus, he 5
wants now to make the comparison horizontally in a similar
way, from species to species and from individual to individual.
Accordingly, he says that there will be no difference between
one species and another with respect to being a secondary
substance or between one individual and another with respect
to being a primary substance.

2b25. [For it is no more appropriate to give an account of 10

an individual man as a man] than of an individual horse
as a horse.
Indeed, the relation (logos) that man has to the individual
man, horse also has to Xanthus. For just as you can assert
nothing more distinctive of Socrates than man, so too you can
70
Omitting tout' esti to hupallela ('i.e. subordinates') with MS M. Ammonius' point
is not that we should ignore subordinate species, but that we should ignore those
species which, being genera as well, have subordinate species.
 54 Commentary
assert nothing more distinctive of Xanthus than horse.

15 2b29. It is reasonable that, after primary substances

[species and genera alone among everything else should
be called secondary substances].
Now he states the reason why he has called genera and
species secondary substances, but has not said that accidents
are tertiary substances. He gives two arguments, the first
derived from the setting out (apodosis) of a definition. For he
says: if to the question 'What is Socrates?' we respond 'man' or
20 'animal', we will be setting out the definition properly and
intelligibly. But if we respond 'pale' or 'he runs' or some such
thing, we will be setting it out improperly and unintelligibly.
Thus it is reasonable that we should call species and genera
secondary substances, but we absolutely do not call accidents
substances.

2b37. Moreover, [it is because they are subjects for

everything else that] primary substances [are most
properly called substances].
The second argument is by analogy. He says that just as
25 primary substances are called primary on account of their
44,1 being subjects for the rest, so too are species and genera called
secondary substances on account of their also being subjects
for others. But species and genera are subjects for accidents.
So they are, reasonably, called secondary substances. And it is
the same, too, for the others.

5 3a7. Not [being] in [a subject] is something common to all

substances.
Having divided substance into primary and secondary, and
having compared these to one another, he proceeds in good
order and now wants to give a definition of substance. But
since substance is an ultimate (genikdtaton) genus, and we
cannot give a definition of an ultimate < genus > because
10 definitions, as we know, are composed of genus and
constitutive (sustatikon) differentiae, he looks for a proprium
 On Substance 55
71
(idiori) of substance. Indeed, this is somewhat like a defi-
nition. For just as a definition belongs to all and only that of
which it is the definition and is convertible with what it defines,
so too aproprium belongs to all and only that of which it is the
proprium, and they are convertible with one another. This,
then, is the reason he wants to give a proprium of substance. 15
But he does not immediately produce an answer acceptable to
him; rather, he first says that not being in a subject is a
proprium of substance. This fits every substance, but not only
substance - it fits differentiae, too, whereas a proprium must
belong to all and only.
By saying 'common' he seems to be contradicting himself. For
if he wants to give a proprium of substance, how can he say
'common'? Our response is that two features absolutely must 20
belong to a proprium, viz. to all and to only. So by saying
'common' he meant '<belonging> to all'.
It is obvious that the proprium given belongs to primary
substances, but it is clear from this that it belongs to secondary
substances also. For animal and man are somehow in the
particular man not as in a subject, but as of a subject. 25

3al5. Moreover, although [nothing prevents the name] of

a thing that is in a subject [from sometimes being
predicated of the subject...].
Aristotle wants to show that for this reason, too, secondary
substances are not in a subject, <e.g.> the particular man.
For he says that what is in a subject can sometimes give its
name to the subject, but never its definition. For we call a 30
body white, and whiteness, which is in a subject, the body, 45,1
gives its name to the subject, but not its definition. For we do
not call the body colour penetrative of sight. But secondary
substances give both their names and their definitions. For
Socrates is called both a man and a mortal rational animal.

71
Idion means 'peculiar' or 'distinctive'. Aristotle uses it in a semi-technical way to
indicate a non-accidental characteristic that is distinctive, but not part of the essence,
of its subject (cf. Top. 102al8-30). We follow the common practice of having the Latin
translation proprium represent this semi-technical usage.
 56 Commentary

5 3a21. This, however, is not peculiar (idioii) to substance.

Rather, their differentiae are not in a subject, either.
Aristotle rejects the proprium of substance that he has given,
as it belongs not only to substance but also to differentiae.
And this makes it clear that he is separating differentiae from
substances. Does he therefore conclude that they are
10 accidents?72 That would be absurd. For it seems even to
Aristotle himself that they are substances, so that species are
made up of them and they are predicated essentially of the
species. For if they were not substances, substance would turn
out to be generated out of accidents, which is absurd. So if
differentiae are substances (for the parts of a substance are
substances and a definition consists of the parts of a
15 substance), how can Aristotle say 'this is not distinctive of
substance but <belongs> also to differentiae', which
obviously implies that differentiae are other than substance?
Now our response is that some substances are intelligible
and some are perceptible. Of the perceptible, some are
eternal, such as the heavenly bodies, and some are subject to
coming into being and destruction. Of these, some are simple,
such as rational and mortal - which are precisely the
20 essential differentiae that nature has combined to bring man
into being - and some are composite, such as genera, species,
and individuals. Now Aristotle's teaching here concerns only
composite substance that is subject to coming into being and
46,1 destruction, I mean individuals, species, and genera. And so
having compared substances with one another, he compared
species alone and genera and then individuals, too, since he
set himself to teach about them as well. But he made no
mention of differentiae, since they are simple and he is
5 constructing a definition of composites, as has <already>
been said. It is for this reason, therefore, that Aristotle says
that this <sc. not being in a subject> is 'not a proprium of
substance'. He did not mean every substance, absolutely, but
composite substance. And that was reasonable. For <not
being in a subject> belongs not only to the composite, but also
to the simple, i.e. to differentiae, to rational and irrational.
72
Busse does not punctuate this as a question, but the context makes clear that it
must be so intended.
 On Substance 57
And that is why he seemed to be distinguishing differentiae
from substances. 10
Others say that differentiae are not substances without
qualification, but that some of them are related to substance,
such as rational and mortal, some are related to accidents and
border more closely on them, such as the black in the raven or
white in the swan, and some are exactly in the middle
between substances and accidents, such as the heat in fire. 15
(For on the one hand it partakes of accident in that it is a
quality, and on the other it partakes of substance in that it
completes its subject.) These people have made a clever effort,
although it is not entirely correct. For under what category
shall we rank these <differentiae>? Or might we need an
eleventh? That is absurd.

3a29. We should not be afraid [that we might have to say] 20

that the parts of a substance [are not themselves
substances since they are in a subject, viz. the whole
<substance>].
The very point one was likely to have raised as an objection to
Aristotle, he himself has anticipated and solved. One might
have objected as follows: 'Since the parts of substances are in
something (for hands and legs are observed in a man) and
similarly accidents are also in something, as whiteness or
heat may perhaps be observed in a man, the parts of 25
substances are therefore accidents - which is absurd.'
Aristotle solves this by saying that he has explained in what
sense an accident may be said to be in something, <viz.> not
as a part of the subject.73 Differentiae, on the other hand,
provide what is needed by the whole; that is, they constitute
the subject. Thus, even if they have in common <with
accidents > that they are in something, there is this difference
between them: the differentiae make up <the subject> and 47,1
belong <to it> as parts, whereas accidents do nothing of the
sort. One must realize that Aristotle's discussion concerns not
73
Busse reads '<For an accident is in something> not as a part of the subject',
deriving from MS L the bracketed words, which were arguably omitted in MSS MF by
haplography. Since this emendation is superfluous, we have chosen to follow MSS
MF.
 58 Commentary
perceptible parts of substance, for example, hands and feet or
other such things, but intelligible (i.e. real) parts, for example,
5 rational and mortal. For some parts are perceptible and some
are intelligible, and his discussion concerns intelligible parts.
So the location (taxis) of this observation is appropriate. For
after saying, 'It is not a peculiarity of substance not to be in a
subject, for differentiae also are not in a subject' (3a21-22), lest
one think he meant by this that differentiae are not substances
(for they are indeed substances in the strict sense) he then
10 says, 'We should not be afraid [that we might have to say] that
the parts of a substance tare not themselves substances] since
they are in a subject, viz. the whole <substance>' (3a29-31).
The inclusion of this observation will seem inappropriate
unless we recognize that Aristotle is talking about intelligible
parts, such as rational and mortal. These are indeed properly
<counted as> parts of man, for man is <constituted> of them.

3a31. For 'things in a subject' was not being used to mean

[things belonging to something as parts].
15 This is what he has said: Accidents, even if they are in
something, are not so as parts of substances. But he has said
in what sense they are in something, namely, not as a part in
the whole.

3a33. It is a characteristic of substances and differentiae

[that they are said synonymously of everything they are
said of].
Aristotle has turned to a second concomitant (parakolou-
20 th&ma) of substance and immediately gives an unfavourable
judgment of it. This is clear from the fact that he has included
differentiae; for again it is evident that this proprium fits
them. Anyhow, it is not only for this reason that this proprium
does not fit substances, but also because it is not a
characteristic of every substance. For a primary substance is
not predicated of anything.

25 3a35. [For every such predicate] is predicated either of

individuals [or of species].
 On Substance 59
First Aristotle teaches that some things are recipients of
predication; then he connects them in the following way with 48,
synonymous predication. Individuals are not said of any
subject, species <are said> of individuals, and, again, genera
<are said> of both. And these things are said synonymously
of the things of which they are predicated. For whatever is
said of the predicate will also be said of the subject (3b4-5). For 5
Socrates is called a sensible animate substance and a mortal
rational animal. And man is called a sensible animate
substance, and this is with good reason. For since the genus is
predicated of the species and of the individual, and the species
<is predicated> of the individual, and whatever is said of the
predicate is also said of the subject, it is with good reason that
the genus is predicated synonymously of the individuals and 10
of the species, and the species of the individuals.

3blO. Each substance seems to signify a particular this.74

Having rejected the first two concomitants of substance - not
being in a subject and being said synonymously of everything
<it is said of> - he turns to the third: signifying a particular 15
74
Following this lemma, and preceding the subsequent commentary, MS F adds:
After rejecting the first twopropria of substance, Aristotle goes on to the third. Let us
<first> investigate their order, then why he used the <expression> 'particular this'
(tode ti), and third why he used 'signifies' and not 'is signified'. For 'signifies' applies to
words, and 'is signified" to things.
Now since he used the <expression> 'in a subject' in many ways and has already
demonstrated the way in which predication arises, it was necessary for him to put not
being in a subject first as a proprium of substance. He put being said synonymously of
<everything> they are said of second, since other things in addition to secondary
substances are predicated synonymously of an individual substance, e.g. differentiae.
He assigned the third position to particular this, since the remainingpropna, such as
more and less, and not having a contrary, are used for things.
Here he used the <expression> 'particular this' only for words. Aristotle
understood 'particular this' determinately (horismenos}, as applying to determinate
existing things, but <he understood> 'such' (toionde) to apply to the indefinite and to
the universal. (Indeed he was correct to withhold the term 'universal' from all things,
simpliciter.) Plato, on the other hand, had to understand 'particular this' to apply to
the universal as a determinate thing, i.e. to the Forms (for he said that they were
substances in reality), and 'such' to apply to the particular (tou kathekasta), (for he
said particulars are indeterminate because they are not at rest but have their being
in flow and effluence). Both are right in what they say, since they understand <the
expression> in two different ways.
The reason that Aristotle said 'signifies' is that he sometimes transfers a property
(pathos) of a thing to a word or a property of a word to a thing. For example, in the
case of <saying> 'Socrates walks', one transfers the activity to the word 'Socrates';
or, again, <in saying> 'A man thinks', <one transfers> thinking, which is strictly a
 60 Commentary
this (tode ti). 'This' (fade) signifies a pointing out (deixis), and
'particular' (ti) signifies a substance in the sense of a subject
(tes kata to hupokeimenon ousias), because it is permanent and
does not need anything and is not in a subject but is a subject
for all <the rest> and is the cause of their unity, that is, of their
49,1 signifying one thing, such as this log or this man. For
'particular this' is said of a substance in the sense of a subject,
that is, of the observable individual substance. For that is what
is capable of being pointed out. But he discovers that even if
this distinguishing mark is a concomitant of substance alone, it
5 is not a concomitant of every substance. For a species or a
genus, he says, such as man or animal, although it seems to
signify a particular this because it appears in the singular
form, signifies rather a plurality and a certain quality (poioteta
tina). For <a species or a genus> makes apparent the
commonality and uniting of particulars. On that account he
says, '<A species or a genus> is not a sort (poion) in the sense of
accident, but rather it marks off a sort with respect to
10 substance',75 i.e. a uniting and gathering together of particular
men. Indeed a sort in the sense of accident comes after the
substance is generated and needs the substance in order to
exist, whereas the latter <sort> certainly does not.

3b24. It is also characteristic of substances not to have a

contrary.
Aristotle proceeds to a fourth concomitant of substance,
although he recognizes that it belongs to other things as well.
15 For nothing is the contrary of a quantity, such as two-footed,
and likewise nothing is the contrary of a number. What would
be contrary to ten? If you say that three is contrary to ten,
then you are taking them as large and small, and these are
not contraries,76 but relatives, which do not have contraries.
property of the soul, <to the man>; or, again, <in saying> 'A man builds', <one
transfers to the man something> that is strictly only <a property> of the body.
75
This is not a precise citation of any extant Aristotelian text. Cf. 3bl5-23.
76
Ammonius must have meant to say 'quantities' here rather than 'contraries'.
Still, his argument is puzzling. It is, apparently, this: Ten and three are contraries
only if they are thought of as large and small, respectively, and only if large and small
are contraries. But large and small are relatives, not quantities. And relatives don't
have contraries. So ten and three are not contraries. However, Aristotle says (6bl5)
that some relatives do have contraries, as Ammonius is well aware (cf. 69,22-70,8).
 On Substance 61
3b26. Nor is anything [the contrary] of man or animal.
There is nothing contrary to Socrates, or to man, or to animal, 20
in the way that cold is contrary to hot or black to white.

3b30. Although someone might say that many [is 50,1

contrary] to few.
In truth, these are not strictly contraries, as Aristotle himself
proves a little later. But he says, by way of concession, that
even if these things are contraries, nothing absurd will follow
from the purported fact. For it takes only one case to overturn 5
a universal. Therefore if nothing is the contrary of two-footed,
it is clear that not having a contrary does not belong to
substance alone.

3b33. It appears that substance does not admit [of more

and less].
This is the fifth concomitant <of substance>. It is reasonable
that substance does not admit of more and less, since it does 10
not have contrariety. For there is more and less in things in
which there is contrariety, and there is contrariety in things
in which there is more and less. For a contradictory
(makhomenon) comes into being by a decrease in its contrary.
Aristotle does not add, in conclusion, that 'this is not
distinctive (idion) of substance; for quantity also does not
admit of more and less'. For since these concomitants are 15
interconnected, he has left it to you to understand and supply
this implied but unexpressed conclusion, which he had
already stated above.

3b34. I do not mean that [one] substance [is not more]

substance [than another].
For since earlier he said that the individual substance is more
a substance than the species, and the species more than the
genus, now he says that he does not mean by this that one
substance is not more or less a substance than another, but 20
that the same substance does not admit of more and less. For
 62 Commentary
example, Socrates is not said to be sometimes more Socrates
and sometimes less, nor is a man said to be more or less a
man.

3b39. For one [man] is not more [a man] than another.

25 Socrates is not sometimes more a man and sometimes less,
nor again is Socrates more a man, in respect of being a mortal
rational animal, than Plato, in the way that one white thing is
1,1 more white than another, and similarly for the rest. A thing
can even be said to be more white than itself. For what is now
white can later, its whiteness having increased, become
whiter than itself.

4alO. Most distinctive of substance [seems to be the fact

that something the same and one in number is receptive
of contraries].
5 This sixth concomitant Aristotle has rendered a proprium
(idion) of substance. He says 'one in number' <to indicate>
that one subject is preserved; he says 'the same' <to indicate>
that it does not change with respect to its real being
(hupostasis). For a colour goes from white to black and
changes with respect to its real being; but Socrates
<remaining one and the same is at one time hot and at one
10 time cold, and it is the same with the rest>.77 He says
'receptive of contraries' meaning having the capability of
receiving contraries in turn. <For he does not say 'receives
contraries'>,78 since <on that showing> opposites would be
in the same thing in the same respect. But by 'receptive' he
meant only that there is a capacity.
But how would this appear to be a proprium of substance?
For it does not fit secondary substances. We will say that even
15 if it is not a concomitant of all <substance>, still it is a
concomitant of <substance> alone. What belongs to
something alone is more distinctive of it, even if it does not
belong to all of it, than what belongs to all of it but not to it
77
The bracketed passage does not occur in any of the MSS. We follow Busse, who
derives it from Philoponus.
78
cf. n. 77.
 On Substance 63
alone. And this is reasonable. For how could what belongs to
other things also be a proprium of this particular thing? Of
the six characteristics of substance that have been presented, 52,1
the first, fourth, and fifth belong to all of it, but not to it alone,
whereas the second, third, and last belong to it alone, but not
to all of it. That is why the three which belong to all of it but
not to it alone have been defined negatively as being far from
the nature ofpropria, while the second, third, and sixth have 5
been defined positively as being more proper (idia) than the
others, on the grounds that, as we have said, a proprium must
belong to that alone of which it is a proprium.
The final one is given precedence over the second and third,
even if it seems to apply (semaineiri) in the same way they do
(for all three belong to substance alone but not to all of it)/The
reason is that signifying a particular this and being said
synonymously of everything it is said of are taken in 10
connection with an expression (phone), whereas the last
<derives> from the very being (huparxis) <of substance>.
The last < characteristic would belong to all and only
substance if we were to make a slight addition and say, after
the proprium given, 'or contains what is one and the same and
is receptive of contraries'. For in putting it this way we
include species and genera.

4a21. [This sort of thing] is to be seen in no other case. 15

He anticipates just what one would likely find puzzling, and
resolves it. That is, we say that spoken statements and
opinions can receive contraries. For the statement which says,
'Socrates is sitting', is true if Socrates happens to be seated,
but false if he happens to be walking about. And similarly
concerning the opinion. For one who judges about Plato that 20
he is sitting judges correctly if Plato happens to be seated, but
falsely if he is not. Thus the same statement, and the same
opinion, can receive both truth and falsity.
He resolves this in two ways, namely, by objection and by 53,1
counter-objection. The objection is not to accept the puzzle at
all, but to refute it as stated. The counter-objection is to admit
the puzzle and to grant its premises, but to show that even if
they obtain, they will do no damage to what he has said. Here
 64 Commentary
5 he has put the counter-objection before the objection to make
things clearer for beginners.

4a34. Statements and opinions, however, [remain

themselves entirely unchanged ...]
Note that among substances, contraries change into each
other (for what is hot becomes cold and conversely what is cold
10 <becomes> hot, and similarly what is dark <becomes> light
and what is light <becomes> dark). But with statements and
opinions this is not so. For a falsehood does not change into
truth, nor truth into a falsehood.79 Rather, it is by a thing
(pragma) being changed and altered that truth and falsehood
come into being. Truth and falsehood do not derive from
statements or opinions.

15 4b2. It would still be characteristic of substance that it

happens in this way ...
That is, a substance is capable of receiving contraries in a
different way from an opinion or a statement.

4b4. Even if one were to allow that statements and

opinions can receive contraries ...
20 With the counter-objection one proceeds by concession; in
truth, they are not capable of receiving contraries. For
statements and opinions are not said to be capable of
79
Literally, 'the false does not change into truth nor truth into false'. To pseudos
('the false') can mean either a falsehood (i.e. a false statement) or falsity (i.e. the
property of being false). On neither reading, however, is Ammonius' argument very
plausible. If he means 'a false statement', his claim is incompatible with Aristotle's
example: the true statement that a person is sitting will become false after that
person has got up (4a24-26). If he means 'falsity', the claim is correct (for the property
of being false does not turn into the property of being true) but the contrast with
substances is lost. For when what is hot becomes cold the property of being hot does
not become the property of being cold.
Aristotle's point is that when a statement changes in truth-value, the statement
itself does not undergo alteration; rather, the facts change. But even this point, one
might argue, is none too secure. For according to Aristotle the sense in which the
statement itself does not undergo alteration is that it remains the same statement.
But neither does a body that becomes cold undergo alteration in that sense: it
remains the same body. To maintain, as he wishes to, that statements do not undergo
change at all, Aristotle ought to have denied that one and the same statement can be
 On Quantity 65
receiving contraries in virtue of receiving anything them-
selves. For how will they ever be capable of receiving
contraries when they do not have any independent existence
(hupostasis) at all?80 This is precisely what is required for
there to be a future reception of contraries; but statements
and opinions perish as soon as they are uttered.
Let what has been said thus far concerning substance 25
suffice. Next we must discuss quantity.

On Quantity 54,1

4b20. Some quantities are discrete.

Having completed his discussion of substance, Aristotle now
takes up quantity, for quantity is second in order among the
categories. Prime matter, which is formless and incorporeal, 5
first receives the three dimensions and becomes a three-
dimensional object called the second subject, and next
<receives> its qualities and becomes a quantified81 compo-
site. For example, when the three-dimensional <subject>
receives heat and dryness, it becomes fire; when it receives
coldness and wetness, it becomes water, and similarly for the
others. So quantity quite rightly is second in order among the 10
categories, quality third, <and relatives fourth>.82 For
relatives are a kind of relation (skhesis) to other categories,
while place and time and the rest are derived (sesuletai) from

now true and later false. The utterance may be the same on both occasions (e.g. 'He is
sitting'), but the statements made are different.
80
Ammonius certainly believes that statements have being (cf. 60,10: the existence
[einai] of a statement consists in its being said). What he denies is that they have
hupostasis ('real being', or 'independent existence'). His reason for denying this is,
presumably, that statements exist only while being said. A statement cannot receive
a contrary in the future since it will not still be in existence in the future.
81
It is not clear why Ammonius says 'quantified' here (as all MSS agree that he
does). One would have expected to be told that, upon receiving its qualities, the
second subject becomes a qualified composite. It will, according to Ammonius'
account, already have become quantified when it became three-dimensional. Perhaps
his idea is that prime matter first receives the three dimensions and becomes
quantified, and then receives its qualities and becomes a quantified composite.
82
As Pelletier points out, the bracketed phrase must be understood if the next
sentence is to be relevant.
 66 Commentary
83
these. Moreover, we divide substance into primary and
secondary, and 'primary and secondary' itself involves number.
Hence, number is used for the three-dimensional, and number
15 is a quantity. So Aristotle is quite right to take up quantity in
the second place.
Aristotle divides quantity into continuous and discrete. He
further divides the discrete into two - number and statement
(logos) - and the continuous intofive- line, surface, body, time,
and place. Then he cross-divides quantity into those composed
55,1 of parts having position <in relation to one another> and those
not so composed. Quantities composed of parts having position
<he divides> into line, surface, body, and place; those not so
composed into time, statement, and number.
Some people say that, properly speaking, there are three
5 species of quantity - number, volume, and power, i.e. weight.
They argue that (1) statement and time are the same as
number; (2) line, surface, and body can be reduced to some-
thing common - magnitude; (3) place is the same as surface,
and therefore (4) one kind of quantity is number, another
magnitude, another power. (For under this last heading they
place heavy and light, which are weights of quantity, for they
10 fall under it.)
Why didn't Aristotle mention change (kinesis)? Our response
is that change is not an actuality (energeia), but an indefinite
thing. Therefore he did not mention it, since he was addressing
his discussion to beginners. For change itself is nothing other
than the transition (hodos) from something in potentiality to
something in actuality.

56,1 4b21. Some [quantities are composed of parts] which have

position in relation to one another.
In other words, those whose permanent and co-existent parts
have a certain order and continuity in which they are
83
Ammonius probably meant to say that the categories of where and when (along
with the four other secondary categories) are derived from the four primary
categories (substance, quantity, quality, and relatives). For, as 58,12ff. makes clear,
Ammonius is aware that Aristotle considers time and place to be continuous
quantities. Time and place, therefore, are not merely derived from quantities. At
69,10ff. Ammonius explains that place and time are species of quantity that give rise
to the categories of where and when.
 On Quantity 67
arranged in relation to one another in a subject.

4b22. While others are not so composed.

That is, the ones which have their existence in coming into 5
being. He means position not in its primary sense of position
in place, but in the sense of position with respect to a relation
(kata skhesin).

4b22. Some are discrete.

Discrete quantities are, just as he himself says, those whose
parts do not meet one another at any common boundary.
Continuous quantities are those whose parts meet at one
common boundary. 10

4b25. For there is no common boundary of the parts of a 57,1

number at which the parts meet.
He does not prove that number is a quantity, since that is
self-evident. But he does demonstrate that it is discrete, from
the fact that there is no common boundary joining any of its 5
parts.

4b28. Nor do three and seven meet at any common

boundary.
That is, a number is discrete by nature. Indeed, five and five
are always discrete and do not meet at any common boundary.

4b32. That [a statement] is a quantity [is obvious]. 10

Aristotle shows that a statement is a quantity, and that it is a
discrete quantity. But first he shows that it is a quantity,
since a statement's being a quantity cannot simply be taken
for granted if it is not supported by some kind of proof. For
this reason he says that a spoken statement is a quantity
because it is measured by syllables. For it is not <a quantity> 15
in respect of its signifying something or in respect of its being
compound. For if something is measured by something, what
 68 Commentary
is measured is either the double or a multiple of what measures
it. These arepropria of quantity. So ifaproprium of quantity is
evidently a concomitant of a statement, then a statement
would be a quantity.
But how can a statement (logos), which is one of those things
considered <to be said> in combination (if indeed it is
20 composed of a noun and a verb), fall under one of the categories,
if the categories are of things without combination? We reply to
this that logos here must be understood as having the more
common meaning of 'word'. Moreover, since logos is said in
many ways (it means spoken language, and it also means inner
language) here he is talking about spoken language.

25 Sal. A line, on the other hand, is continuous.

This is reasonable, for each part of it meets another at a
58,1 common boundary, a point. But one should take the division
<as> in the mind and not in actuality, since <actually>
dividing it would not allow it to be continuous.

5a3. For the parts of a plane [meet at a common

boundary].
The geometer calls a surface (epiphaneia) that is exposed by
5 slicing, a superficies (epipedon), but the ancients applied the
term 'superficies' to every surface. The common boundary of a
surface, at which its parts are joined to each other, is a line. A
body is also called a quantity, but only with respect to the
three dimensions, since it is counted under substance in
virtue of being a subject for accidents and being capable of
receiving contraries while <remaining> one and the same in
10 number. But quantity is connected with corporeal substance,
on which account it is reasonable to discuss it after substance.

5a6. Time and place are also like this.

That is to say, <they are> continuous, for past time and
future join at a common boundary, the presennun).
 On Quantity 69

5a8. Place, too, is one of the continuous quantities. 15

84
Place, as is said in the Physics lectures, is the limit of a
container (peras tou periekhontos) in so far as it contains what
it contains (to periekhomenon). For example, the place of wine
is the concave surface of a jug. It is not the whole jug; for that
has both convexity and concavity, and it contains the body of
the wine in its concavity. Even if we were to scrape a part of 20
the outside surface while preserving the inside, the wine
would be no less contained. What Aristotle means, then, is
this: if an entire body is in a place, and the body is continuous
and its parts are joined at a common boundary, then the place
of the body is also continuous and its parts are joined at a
common boundary. For if the parts of the place were not
joined at a common boundary, but rather were separated from 25
each other, there would be some parts of the body not in a
place - which is absurd.

5al5. Moreover, some [quantities are composed of parts]

which have position [in relation to one another].
After having divided quantity into the discrete and the
continuous and having divided it again into those quantities 59,1
whose parts have a position and those whose parts do not, and
having first discussed discrete and continuous quantities, he
now considers the second division. Quantities whose parts
have position must display these three characteristics: (1)
they endure,85 (2) their parts are arranged somewhere and do
not disappear, that is, they are in something, and (3) they 5
have an order with respect to one another.

5a23. But the parts of number ...

The parts of place are arranged in something, the body whose
place it is.86

84
cf. Phys. 4.4, 212a20. As Aristotle defines it, the place that a thing occupies is
two-dimensional: the inner surface of the thing's surroundings. Aristotle denies that
there is a three-dimensional space which a thing occupies.
85
Reading hupomenein with MS M.
86
There is evidently a lacuna in the text here, as Busse notes.
 70 Commentary

5a25. Or [see] which of its parts adjoin one another. Nor

10 can the parts of time ...
For the whole of time does not exist simultaneously, but only
at a moment, and it has its existence only in coming into being
and passing away. How could that which does not last take a
position?

5a28. Rather, [you might say they have] a certain order.

15 He means a natural order. The present comes before the
future, not the future before the present. There is a natural
order, as in this case, whenever <the order> cannot be
reversed. But an order is with respect to us whenever it can be
reversed without making a difference. For example, we say
'This is the first of them', beginning first with the one on the
right; but, on the other hand, we might have begun, if we had
wanted to, with the one on the left.

20 5a30. And it is the same with number.

Number is twofold: on the one hand, it is in the soul that does
the counting, and on the other, in the things counted (just as,
too, a pint is twofold, the pint as measure, for example, the
60,1 copper pint, and the pint as measured, for example, a pint of
wine or honey). Since, then, number is twofold, as Aristotle
says87 - that in the soul and that in the perceptible thing - it
is clear that number in the soul would not be composed of
parts with position (for its parts do not have any position;
5 rather it is intelligible, in the soul alone). But number in the
things counted, for example, in ten human beings or horses, is
composed of parts that have position. For its parts are
arranged somewhere and they have some position with
respect to each other. This is why he says 'You would not
exactly (ou panu) find position', and does not say, "You would
find none at all'.

5a33. And it is the same with a statement.

87
P%s.4.11(219b5-9).
 On Quantity 71
That is, a statement is also made up of things not having 10
position. For it is in being said that a statement has existence,
and none of its parts endure to have any position.

5bl. For example, [there is said to be] a large amount of

white.
The scientist's task is not only to investigate things he himself
proposes, but also to go through in detail and refute those that 15
seem to be so but in truth are not. Now white may seem to be a
quantity. For we speak of white as more and less, which is
characteristic of quantity; but then we also call an action long.
So Aristotle says that these are not quantities in the strict
sense, but only per accidens. For since white is in a surface,
and that can be more or less, we say that the white is more or
less. It is the same with an action; for example, a war is called 20
long per accidens. Thus, since a war goes on for a certain
period of time - e.g. for ten years - and we say that its time is
long, for this reason we say that the action, as well, is long, per
accidens. A change, too, is called large if its time is large. For
time is the measure of change. Thus, we call a revolution of 25
the moon a month, of the sun a year, and of the entire heaven
a day. So if someone were to ask how long an action is, the
answer is its time, e.g. ten years. It is the same with a surface;
one may say that the white is as large as the surface is. For if
we are asked how much white there is, we say two cubits if 61,1
that is how large the surface containing the white is.
Therefore, we mean that the surface, not the white itself, is
more or less. Indeed, the white in a one-cubit surface can be
whiter than that in a two-cubit surface, and then we do not
say that there is more white (leukon pleon) but that one white
is whiter than another (leukon leukou mallon). 5

5bll. Moreover, there is no contrary of a quantity.

Having presented to us his division of quantity and having
said which are quantities in the strict sense and which are
called quantities per accidens, he now wishes to set out, as he
did with substance, what is distinctive of quantity.
 72 Commentary
62,1 5bl4. But [could someone say that] many [is contrary] to
few...
Here, Aristotle appropriately examines whether large and
small are contraries. In his discussion of substance88 he
touches on it only lightly, conceding in his counter-objection89
5 that they are contraries. Now there are definite quantities,
and also indefinite ones. The definite ones are, e.g., two cubits
and three cubits, and they are quantities in the strict sense;
the indefinite ones are, e.g., large and small, many and few.
Moreover, large and small apply to the continuous (for we call
a body large or small, and it is the same with the rest of the
continuous <quantities> that have position), whereas many
(polu) and few (oligori) apply to that which is discrete and does
10 not have a position. Thus, time is spoken of as more (polus) or
less (oligos), and so is number. That is why, in illustrating
large and small with examples, Aristotle chose mountain and
millet seed. These are cases of the continuous, for each of them
is a body.

5bl6. For a thing is not said to be large or small just in

itself.
15 Here Aristotle once again makes a concession. Even if large
and small are contraries, they are not quantities, but
relatives. For the large is called large in relation to the small,
and the small is called small in relation to the large. And later
he shows that they are not contraries, but rather that they
make reference to one another.

5bl8. For example, a mountain [is said to be] small.

20 If a thing were said to be large or small just in itself, a
mountain would never be said to be small or a millet seed
large. But we call a mountain small obviously comparing it to
another mountain, or a millet seed large obviously because it
is larger than another. Therefore, a thing is not said to be
large or small just in itself, but in relation to something else.
88
cf. 3b31.
89
cf. Ammonias' gloss on 'counter-objection' at 53,3.
 On Quantity 73
It is the same, Aristotle shows, with many and few, which do
not belong to number, i.e. to the discrete; rather, they are
relatives.

5b26. Further, two cubits or three cubits [and each thing 63,1
of that sort signifies a quantity].
Aristotle constructs another dialectical proof that large and
small do not belong to <the category of> quantity, but rather
to that of relatives. Indeed, he says that quantity in the strict
sense is also definite. For example, this line is both a quantity
and definite in its own nature, being two cubits, let us say, or 5
ten cubits. And the rest of the quantities are likewise
determinate (horismena). But large and small, and many and
few, are determinate neither with respect to us nor with
respect to themselves; rather, they are indeterminate
(aorista). Therefore, large and small and many and few do not
belong to quantity.

5b30. Further, whether one reckons them [quantities or 10

not, there is nothing contrary to them].
Having shown that they are relatives, not quantities, he now
makes the concession, by way of counter-objection, that even
if they should be quantities, large is still not contrary to small,
nor is many to few.

5b30. There is nothing contrary to them.

What he means is this. Contraries must first exist in their 15
own right and have real and independent being. Only so do
they then meet in battle and declare war, that is, oppose each
other. This is not possible for relatives, for they do not fight
each other, but rather they bring each other in together. For
relatives differ from contraries in that contraries exist first in
their own right and thereafter join battle and fight, whereas 20
relatives produce each other reciprocally. In this way, then,
even if white didn't exist at all, black would remain, but if the
father were taken away, the son would be gone. Since large
and small <exist> not in their own right but with respect to
 74 Commentary
something else, and similarly for many and few, and <since>
neither large nor small exists independently in and of itself, it
25 is clear that they are not contraries.

5b33. Besides, if large and small are [contraries].

Here is a different proof, through reduction to impossibility.
Aristotle says that if we were to say that large and small are
64,1 contraries, it will follow that the same thing is both large and
small, that is, when compared with two different things.
Therefore, it can receive contraries at the same time and will
be contrary to itself, which is impossible. Therefore, large and
small are not contraries.

5 Gal. Although a substance, for example, [is thought] able

to receive contraries ...
Although a substance is able to receive contraries, it does not,
however, admit contraries together at the same time and in
the same part. For the same thing will never be cold and hot,
or white and black, at the same time.

10 6a4. And it follows that these things are their own

contraries.
Heightening the absurdity, Aristotle says that if large is
contrary to small, it will follow that the same thing is able not
only to receive contraries at the same time, but also to be
opposed to itself, which is absurd. For no being is opposed to
itself.

15 6a8. Therefore large is not [contrary to small].

Supposing first that these are contraries, Aristotle has shown
that they are not quantities; then supposing that they are
quantities he has shown that they are not contraries. But the
truth is that they are neither quantities nor contraries, but
among the relatives. But since, then, they are among the
relatives, they must be in a different category, so as to take on
20 the relation <appropriate to> relatives. And where would
 On Quantity 75
they be, if they are not included in the <category> of quantity
and are not contraries?

Gall. But [it seems] most of all [with respect to place]

that there is contrariety [of quantity].
If someone wants to contemplate contrariety in quantity,
Aristotle says, he should consider up and down. For these are
set at the greatest distance from one another, that is, they
admit the <popular> definition of contraries. For this is how 25
people define contraries: 'those things in the same genus that 65,1
are at the greatest distance from one another' (6al7-18). But
this is not acceptable to Aristotle; for there is no absolute up
or down, but only surrounding and centre?0 which are not
contraries, but relatives. For surrounding is called the
surrounding of something in the centre.

Gal7. For those things [in the same genus] that are at the
greatest distance from one another ...
Notice how nature, wanting to unite contraries, has put them 5
under the same genus. The genus of the contraries white and
black is colour, and that of hot and cold is quality. And they do
battle in a single subject.

6al9. It seems that a quantity does not admit [of more

and less].
He says that not having a contrary is a proprium (idion) of 10
quantity, and he shows that it belongs to every < quantity>,
but he does not mention that it does not belong to <quantity>
alone. (Indeed, this <last point> should be clear from what
has been said about substance.) Rather, he passed over to
another proprium of quantity: not admitting more or less. And
this is reasonable. For where there is contrariety there is
more and less, but where there is not, more and less are not 15
found. For more and less arise from a mixture of contraries.
One must realize that Aristotle again rejects this, since it also
90
Ammonius is assuming a spherical cosmos, with the earth at the centre, which is
viewed as down, and the stars at the periphery, which is viewed as up.
 76 Commentary
fits substance, and passes over to another proprium,
something which is indeed called a proprium in the strict
sense.

6a26. Most characteristic (idiori) of a quantity is [that it

will be said to be] both equal [and unequal].
20 Aristotle does not mention that the proprium he has just
given an account of is not <in the strict sense> & proprium of
quantity; for that should be clear from what was said in the
account of substance. But this one - to be called both equal
and unequal - is in the strict sense a proprium of quantity.
And if we predicate (legomen) both equal and unequal of
something in connection with something else, <this is> not
per se, but per accidens. For example, we say that this white
25 body is equal to that white body; but, in a similar way, also
unequal, not in so far as it is white but in so far as it is a body.
But a careful auditor might say: 'How is it that Aristotle has
put body under substance and again under quantity, although
we said in the introduction that no being is placed under two
categories?'
We answer that he understands body in two different ways.
6,1 There is enmattered(enulon) ody, for example, say, a stone
or a log, and there is also body contemplated by thought, <for
example,> a geometrical solid (mathematikon). So in the
category of substance Aristotle understood enmattered body,
but in quantity he understood body contemplated by thought.

On Relatives

Before going into Aristotle's teaching on relatives, these five

things must be examined: (1) their location; (2) the
explanation of the title; (3) their independent existence
(hupostasis); (4) the manner of teaching; (5) their division into
species.
(1) First, their location. For what reason have relatives been
discussed before quality, given that (a) the latter91 involves
91
Reading haute haple for haple, with Busse.
 On Relatives 77
simple predication whereas the predication of relatives is
compound, and (b) we understand simples more easily than
complexes (poluskhedon)? We reply that the reason why 10
Aristotle moves directly to his study of relatives is that he
mentioned them in his teaching on quantity and did not wish
to leave the hearer ignorant about them for too long. This is
just what he did after he mentioned quantity in his study of
substance; immediately after substance he discussed
quantity.
(2) Why did he use the title 'On relatives', and not 'On
relative', in the singular? We answer that it is because a 15
single thing cannot be a relative just by itself (auto kath'
hauto); rather, relatives are always considered in pairs. For
right is to the right of left — you would not say that something
is just by itself right. And this is why he used the title 'On
relatives', in the plural, but 'About substance', in the singular.
For it is possible for a single thing, for example a man or92 a
log, to be a substance. It is the same, too, with quantity - it is 20
possible to call two-feet long on its own (monon) a quantity.93
But it is not the same with relatives.
(3) Concerning the independent existence of relatives, (a)
some people have said that nothing is a relative by nature
(phusei), but only by <its> position (thesei), for example,
right and left and things like that. But what those people say
is not right. For cases have been observed that are this way by
nature; thus, the parts of the body are observed to stand in a
certain relation to one another. For example, the liver is on 25
the right and the spleen on the left, and it never comes about
that the liver is on the left or the spleen on the right, (b) Some
92
Reading e xulon with MS M.
93
The point is tricky, and Ammonius' grasp of it seems none too secure. The
appropriate contrast between quantities and relatives would be this: whereas a thing
cannot have to the right predicated of it except with reference (perhaps only implicit)
to something that is to its left, the predicate two-feet long can be applied without such
additional reference; a thing can be two-feet long on its own. In his gloss ('two-feet
long can, by itself, be called a quantity'), Ammonius seems to miss this point. For
right can also, by itself, be called a relative; so no contrast between relatives and
quantity has been provided.
Pelletier tries to help Ammonius by translating:'... ce qui est long de deux coudees
peut deja, tout seul, etre dit quantifie' ('what is two-feet long can already, all alone, be
called quantified'). But what is at issue is whether right (or two-feet long) is a
complete predicate, not whether it is a complete specification of a subject to which the
predicate relative (or quantity) can be applied.
 78 Commentary
say that everything is relative - Protagoras the Sophist is one
of these. For he says that whatever anybody says is true. One
67,1 who says that honey is sweet is speaking truly (for it is sweet
relative to some), and one who says it is bitter is also speaking
truly. For it is bitter to those who have jaundice. But Plato
refuted him by saying,94 'Protagoras, either you speak truly
when you say that whatever anybody says is true, or you speak
falsely. But if you speak falsely, it would be reasonable for us
5 not to believe you; and if you speak truly when you say that
whatever anybody says is true, and we say, about you, that you
are speaking falsely, then what we say is true. Therefore, once
again you are speaking falsely, and not everything is relative.'
Some have said, correctly, that some things are relative and
others absolute (auto hath' hauto). Right and left, for example,
are relatives; body and man are absolutes. For a man, just as a
10 man, is not a relative. And that bears on the independent
existence of relatives.
(4) The manner of teaching Aristotle has employed is this.
First he gives the definition the ancients proposed for relatives;
then he shows that a number of absurd consequences follow
from this definition. So he himself proposes a different pro-
prium for them, one that belongs to all of them and only to
15 them. In order not to seem to be attacking the ancients, he
presents first their definition as aproprium of relatives.
(5) The division of relatives is this. Some relatives involve
homonymy, as like is like like; others involve heteronymy, as
right is right of left. Of the latter, some relate superior and
inferior, as double is double of half; some relate ruler and ruled,
20 as a master is master of a slave; some relate judger and judged,
as what is perceived is perceived by perception; some relate
participant and what is participated in, as a knower is said to
be a knower by participation in knowledge; some relate cause
and effect (aitiaton), as a father is a father of a child; some
relate agent and patient, as a striker strikes what is struck;
25 some are related by a difference in place, as leftis leftof right
and right is right of left.

6a36. Those things that are called relatives are ...

94
Theaetetus 170C.
 On Relatives 79
He uses the term 'called' to indicate his dissatisfaction with
the <proposed> definition. Indeed, he goes even further and
shows that a number of absurd consequences follow from this
definition; and so he proposes another definition. 30

6a36.... those which are [said to be] just what they are ... 68,1
For example, it is not as a man that the man on the right is
said to be to the right of another, but as the one on the right.

6a37.... or in some other way [in relation to another].

Aristotle said, '[Relatives are those which are said to be just 5
what they are] of other things'; so lest you assume that the
relation is expressed only in the genitive, he says 'or in some
other way [in relation to another]', i.e. in the dative or the
accusative.

6b2. The following are also to be included among

relatives.
Since the preceding <examples> are of quantity, and the next
ones are of quality, Aristotle rightly treats them separately,
saying The following are also to be included [among 10
relatives]'. Alternatively, <he does so> because the former
have their correlative in the genitive, while the latter have
theirs in the dative or accusative.

6b2. [State], condition, perception, knowledge, and

position.
Having set forth examples, Aristotle gives us a method for
taking the converse (anakampsis) of relatives. Thus, the state 15
is introduced <as being> what it is in relation to the genitive
case (for it is said to be the state of its possessor) and,
conversely, the possessor in the state is introduced <as
being> the possessor that it is in relation to the dative case.
Similarly a condition is a condition of the thing conditioned
and the thing conditioned is a conditioned thing in the
condition, and knowledge is knowledge of the known and the
known is known by knowledge.
 80 Commentary
20 6bl 1. Lying, [standing, and sitting are positions.]
And lying, standing, and sitting, Aristotle says, are positions.
Since they are kinds of positions and position is one of the
relatives, they are therefore relatives. Either the whole body
is upright and is called standing, or the whole body is
arranged horizontally and is called lying, or part of it is
25 upright and part is reclining and it is called sitting.

69,1 6bl2. To be lying, to be standing, and to be sitting,

[however, are not positions].
These, Aristotle says, are not positions, at least if position is a
relative they are not positions. However, they are derived
paronymously from the kinds of position mentioned: to be
5 standing from standing, to be lying from lying, to be sitting
from sitting. And just as they are derived from the kinds of
position, so, too, from their genus, i.e. position (thesis), is
derived being arranged (keisthai), which is one of the
categories. <Position> is, in fact, the genus of to be standing
and to be reclining and to be lying and to be seated. So one
10 species of relatives, that is, position, has given rise to one of
the categories, that of being arranged. And that is not
surprising, since two species of quantity gave rise to two
categories: place to the where (pou), and time to the when
(pote). It is not that place is said <to be> somewhere (pou),
but rather things in a place are. Similarly time itself is not
<said to be> at a time (pote), but rather things that occur in
time are.
One might raise a difficulty for the Philosopher about why
15 he subsumes position and standing under relatives when he
ought to have subsumed them under the category of being
arranged. We reply that he does not always assign things to
the same category when one is called paronymously after the
other. You know we call a grammarian after grammar; but
grammatical knowledge is subsumed under quality, and the
grammarian under substance. And likewise in this case we
20 subsume the activity under relatives, but the thing that is
arranged under the category of being arranged.
 On Relatives 81
6bl5. There is also contrariety [among relatives].
Another concomitant of relatives, Aristotle says, is that they
admit contrariety. And that is reasonable. For since relatives
seem to be offshoots]\(paraphuasin)and not distinct things, 25
but rather are found in other categories, they imitate the
things they are attached to. For example, since nothing is the
contrary of a substance or a quantity, it follows that no
contrary is found in the relatives that concern them — for
example, in triple. Triple is a relative (for it is called the triple
of something) and nevertheless it has no contrary, since it is
combined with a category that does not contain (ekhousei) this 30
<sc. any contrary>. It is also the same <with a relative that
is attached> to a substance - with master, son, right, left. For
there isn't anything contrary to these, since the things they
are combined with are subsumed under a category that does 70,1
not contain any contrary. However, since quality admits
contrariety, relatives of quality do likewise. For example, vice
(kakia) is contrary to virtue (arete) and ignorance to
knowledge. One must realize, however, that although these
are contraries of one another, they do not answer
(apokrinetai) <to this> as relatives. For example, virtue <is
the virtue of a good person> and a good person <is good by 5
virtue>;95 likewise, too, vice is vice of a vicious person and a
vicious person is vicious through vice. But the contrary of
virtue is vice, and that of a good person is a vicious person. It
is reasonable, then, to find contrariety in relatives, and <to
find> that it is not a concomitant of every relative.96

6bl6. Each of which is a relative.

One must realize that those who say that Plato defines 10
relatives in this way and thinks that the real being
(hupostasis)of relatives is in their being spoken of, defame the
philosopher. For one can tell from what is said in the
Gorgias97 that he characterizes them as being (einai). For he
95
Suppletions added following Philoponus.
96
Ammonias' point here emerges more clearly in his examples than in his general
characterization. It is that although a relative may have a contrary, what it is a
relative o/will not be the same as what it is the contrary of.
97
476B.
 82 Commentary
says, 'If there is an agent, it is necessary for there to be a
patient also'. He says 'to be' and not 'to be spoken of'.

15 6bl9. [Relatives] seem [to admit of] more and [less].

Another concomitant of relatives, he says, is admitting more
and less. And this one is like the preceding <concomitant>,
for it belongs to relatives, but not to all of them. For it was
said that where contrariety is manifested, there is more and
less; and, on the contrary, where there is no contrariety there
20 is no more or less. So if there is contrariety in relatives, there
is also more and less in them. However, it is not a concomitant
of all of them, since contrariety is not found in them all.

6b28. Every relative [is spoken of in relation to its

converse].
This is another concomitant <of relatives >. To understand
25 what it is to be 'spoken of in relation to its converse', let us
first understand what conversion (antistrophe) is. Strophe is a
return(apokatastasis)to the same point one started from.
This is why we say that the universe (to pan) revolves
(strephesthai), since it moves in a circle and returns to the
' 1,1 same point it started from.
Conversion is really 'equiversion' (isostrophe);98in fact,
among the ancients, anti means 'equal' (ison). For example,
antitheon means 'godlike' (isotheon), antianeira ('a match for
men') <means> a woman who has strength equal to a man's,
and we call our largest digit the thumb (antikheiron)"
because it has strength equal to that of the other four digits in
5 the hand.100
Therefore, relatives are spoken of in relation to their
converses (antistrephonta). For example, a slave is the slave of
a master, and a master is the master of a slave. One begins
98
LSJ cite only Ammonius and Philoponus in their entry on this uncommon term.
Their translation, 'correspondence', conceals the etymological connection to
conversion, which we have tried to bring out in our neologism 'equiversion'.
"Although anti sometimes means equal, as Ammonius says, the whimsical
etymology he proposes for antikheiron is scarcely credible. The thumb is, as its Greek
name suggests, the opposable digit.
100 There is evidently a lacuna at this point.
 On Relatives 83
with the slave and returns to him once again. And not only is
slave convertible, but so is master.

6b36. Sometimes, if [... what <something> is spoken of

in relation to is] not properly [specified], it will not seem 10
to be convertible.
Aristotle means that relatives ought to observe an equality
with respect to one another, and so be convertible, as, for
example, human and capable of laughter are convertible.
When, however, they are unequal, the greater follows from
the lesser as animal <follows> from human, but the lesser
does not follow from the greater; for human certainly does not 15
follow from animal. So let this be the rule with relatives: there
is equality, such as <father and> father of a child, <or double
and> double of a half, in precisely those <cases> that are
convertible. But when they are unequal, they are no longer
<convertible>. Thus, it would be a mistake to call <a bird> a
bird of a wing on the grounds that there is <such a thing as>
a wing of a bird. For we would not call a bird a bird by virtue
of <its having> wings, since not every wing is the wing of a
bird - there are winged creatures that are not birds. For
among winged creatures, some are feathered, and these alone 20
are commonly called birds (as he himself said in the Historia
Animalium,101 'Creatures with feathered wings are called
birds'); others, such as bats, have membranous wings; still
others are sheath-winged, such as beetles, and these are not
birds. Therefore, since wing and bird are not coextensive, but
wing <applies> to more <things> than bird does, if we were
to increase the lesser <term>, i.e. bird, by saying winged 25
creature (pteroton), we would produce <the statement that> a
wing is the wing of a winged creature, and this is convertible.
For we do say that a winged creature is winged by <virtue of
its> wings. So in this example, it was bird, which is smaller
than wing, that we increased; but in the next example, it is
the greater <term whose extension will be decreased>. If we
were to say that a rudder is the rudder of a boat, it would not
be convertible, for we would not call a boat the boat of a 72,1
101
490al2.
 84 Commentary
rudder. Indeed, many boats - such as rowboats - do not have
rudders. So, since <the terms> are unequal, we have to
equalize them. Now unequals can be equalized either by
decreasing the greater or by increasing the lesser. Now if boat
5 has the greater <extension> and rudder the lesser, we would
make them equal if we were to decrease the greater by saying
'ruddered';102 made equal in this way, they would be
convertible. Let us therefore say that a rudder is the rudder of
a ruddered, and conversely that a ruddered is ruddered with a
rudder. Thus in the first example, bird was smaller in
extension than wing, and we increased it, while in the second,
10 boat was larger in extension than rudder, and we decreased
it.103
102
As Ammonius indicates below (72,13), Aristotle coined the term pedalioton for
the converse of rudder (i.e. for the thing a rudder is the rudder of). We have
translated it as 'ruddered' to help convey the neologism. Aristotle contrasts this case
with that of wing, for whose converse a substantive term (pteroton) did exist in
ordinary Greek. Unfortunately, the contrast is less clear in English, since 'winged' as
a substantive sounds as odd, perhaps, as does 'ruddered'.
103
Ammonius' account of the proper specification of the converse of a relative is less
clear than one would like. The converse of a relative is what the relative is (properly)
said to be related to. Thus, the converse of master is slave, and the converse of parent
is child. Another ingredient in Ammonius' discussion is what we will call the product
of a relative and its converse. Examples are such terms as 'master of a slave' and
'parent of a child'. As we will see, Ammonius is not always sufficiently attentive to the
distinction between converse and product.
According to Ammonius, if F is a relative, its converse is properly specified as G if,
and only if, these two conditions obtain:
(i) every F is F of a G (i.e. of some G or other), and
(ii) every G is G of an F (again, of some F or other).
Thus a wing is not properly specified as wing of a bird because the first condition is
violated. That is, some wings (those, as Ammonius mentions, of bats and beetles, for
example) are not wings of birds. A wing is properly specified as wing of a winged
<thing>, however, since every wing is a wing of a winged thing (and every winged
thing is winged thing of a wing).
By contrast, a rudder is not specified properly as rudder of a boat because, even
though the first condition is satisfied (every rudder, we are to suppose, is a rudder of
some boat), the second condition is not. That is, some boats, for example rowboats, are
not boats of rudders, that is, not ruddered boats.
When either of conditions (i) or (ii) obtains, the subject and predicate terms (e.g.
'master' and 'master of a slave') will, of course, be coextensive. (Terms are coextensive
if they apply to precisely the same things.) The two conditions are therefore
equivalent to the following:
(i*) 'F is coextensive with 'F of a G'
(ii*) 'G' is coextensive with 'G of an F°.
Ammonius frames much of the remainder of his discussion of relatives and their
converses in terms of the notion of equality (isotes) or being coextensive (exisazein). At
71,16 he gives this rule (kanon) relating convertibility and equality: 'There is
equality, such as <father and> father of a child, <or double and> double of a half, in
just those <cases> that are convertible.'
But Ammonius is often careless (if not actually confused) when he chooses
 On Relatives 85

7a5. Sometimes [it may be necessary] to make up a name.

We have to invent a name, he says, when there is not an
established name for what convertibility requires. For
example, he made up the term for 'ruddered'. Again, a head is
a relative (for it is the head of something),104 but if it were
specified in relation to animal and we were to say 'head of an
animal', it would not be convertible. For we would not call an 15
animal an animal by virtue of <its> head. Indeed, some
animals, such as the crab, do not have a head. Therefore it is
necessary to invent a name and to innovate a usage in order to
produce the conversion properly. Thus, it would be specifying
properly if we were to say 'a head is the head of a "headed"
(kephaloton)'. For we are able to convert this by saying that a
'headed' is 'headed' by virtue of <its> head. And in general,
when we want to make up a name, we will make the name of 20
the converse a paronym derived from the original <term>,
e.g. 'ruddered' from 'rudder' and 'headed' from 'head'. And it is
the same with the others. And so every relative is spoken of in
relation to its converse.

7al9. If [one were to derive] from the original [relatives

the names of their converses].
He gives us a rule we can use to make up a name properly in 25
case no name should be found in common parlance.

candidates for the coextensiveness requirement. For example, at 71,24 he points out
that 'wing" and its putative converse 'bird' are not coextensive. This is true, but
irrelevant. What he ought to have said is that 'wing" is not coextensive with 'wing of a
bird'. (Ammonius' confusion was perhaps abetted by the fact that the Greek word for
wing, pteron, can also mean 'flying creature'. But in Aristotle's ontology, a flying
creature is not a relative but a kind of substance; it is clearly pteron in the sense of
'wing" that denotes a relative.) Again, at 72,5 he claims that the reason 600* is not the
converse of rudder is that "boat' has a greater extension than 'rudder'. But what he
ought to have said is that 'boat' has a greater extension than 'boat with a rudder'.
In these passages, Ammonius makes it appear, misleadingly, as if he requires that
a relative term be coextensive with its converse. But, of course, this is not what he
requires. ('Master' and 'slave' are converses of one another, but they are obviously not
coextensive.) Rather, what is required is that a relative term be coextensive with the
product of itself and its converse.
104
Reading M kephatt tdn pros ti- tinos gar kephatt. ean oun apodothe with MS M.
 86 Commentary
73,1 7a22. Thus every relative [provided that it is specified
properly, is spoken of in relation to its converse].
Every relative that has been specified properly is convertible.
But if <relatives> are not specified properly, their
acknowledged converses can no longer be converted. For
example, we specify properly when we say, 'A slave is the
5 slave of a master', and this is convertible: 'A master is the
master of a slave.' But if the slave were not specified properly,
that is to say, <as> of a master, but instead <as> of a man, it
would no longer be convertible. For it is not possible to say, 'A
man is the man of a slave'. Therefore, if it were not specified
properly, it would no longer be convertible. For conversion
obtains in all and only <cases of> proper specification.

10 7a31. Moreover, if [what a thing is said to be related to] is

properly specified, [then, if everything accidental is taken
away and all that is left is that which it is properly
specified in relation to, it will always be said to be related
to that].
If one specified relatives properly, Aristotle says, then when
everything else has been stripped away and only that with
reference to which they have been properly specified remains,
the conversion and, in short, the relatives, will be preserved.
For example, if the slave were specified as of a master, but
being two-footed or capable of knowledge were taken away,
15 the slave would continue to be called a relative; whereas if the
master were taken away he would no longer be called a slave.

7a32.... if everything [accidental] is taken away ...

Moreover, it is not surprising that he says these105 are
accidents. For he does not mean accidents in an absolute
sense (haplos), but rather things which would be accidents
105
A few lines below, Aristotle writes: 'if everything accidental to the master is
taken away (such as his being a biped, capable of knowledge, human) and all that is
left is that he is a master, the slave will always be said to be a slave in relation to that'
(7a35-9). Ammonius is clearly, and rightly, puzzled when Aristotle calls such
predicates as human and biped 'accidental to the master', for he knows that in
Aristotle's view these are essential characteristics of the man, who only happens ('by
accident') to be a master. His solution is to say that Aristotle does not mean that
 On Relatives 87
with respect to the relation of slave and which would be
predicated <of the master> secondarily, whereas by nature it 20
is the master <who is predicated> primarily and with respect
to himself.

7bl5. It seems that relatives are simultaneous [by

nature].
Another concomitant of relatives, he says, is that they are
simultaneous by nature and it is never possible for one to exist 74,1
when the other does not. For in saying slave it is necessary at
the same time to think of the master, and if there is a double
there must also be a half and vice versa. But it is evident that
he says 'for the most part' because he is going to raise a puzzle
about some other cases.

7bl9. They are also destroyed together. 5

Not only do they exist simultaneously by nature, but they are
also destroyed together. Thus if there were to be no slave,
there would be no master, and without there being a master
there is no slave. It is the same in other cases as well.

7b23. For what is known would seem to be prior to

knowledge. 10
Aristotle then raises a puzzle, concerning what he has just
being human is in any absolute sense (haplos) an accidental characteristic, but that it
is accidental with respect to someone specified as a master, and is a secondary
predicate of the master so specified. Presumably he thinks that being human is an
essential characteristic of those things of which it is a primary predicate. Thus, the
fact that being human is an accidental characteristic of a master (so specified) can be
handled as a special case, in which it is considered in relation to a subject of which it
is a secondary predicate. 'By nature', Ammonius concludes, it is master that is
predicated 'primarily' of the master so specified.
Ammonius has, in effect, raised (but failed to grasp firmly) an issue of great
philosophical importance. For if human, like master, can be essential to something
under one description but accidental to it under another description, the entire
distinction between essential and accidental predicates is threatened with
relativization. Whether a predicate is essential or accidental, it might be argued, will
always depend on the way its subject is specified, and there will thus be no such thing
as what is essential or primary 'by nature' in any absolute sense. (Ammonius'
confidence that Aristotle's doctrine of essences is not threatened by the concession in
the text seems excessive.)
 88 Commentary
said, as to whether relatives are simultaneous by nature even
though what is known is evidently prior to knowledge. So prior
<must be taken> in two ways, on the one hand <prior> in
time, and on the other <prior> by nature. The prior in time is
that from whose past the distance to the present is greater.
15 Thus we say the war with the Medes is prior to the Peloponne-
sian war since its distance from the present is greater than that
of the Peloponnesian. With the future, on the contrary, it is the
prior whose distance from the present is smaller. Thus
tomorrow is prior to the day after tomorrow. And that is how it
is with priority in time. The prior by nature is the one <whose
destruction> destroys106 (sunanairoun) <the other> along
20 with it but which is not destroyed along with <the other>, that
is, the one which is entailed107 (suneispheromenon) <by the
other> but does not entail it, as is the case with animal and
human. What is known would seem to be prior to knowledge,
for if there is nothing to be known there is no knowledge, but
there can be something to be known even though there is no
knowledge. Similarly, if there is nothing to be perceived there
is no perception, but nothing prevents there being things to be
25 perceived, such as fire, earth, and the like, even though there is
no perception.

7b24. Since for the most part it is of already existing

[matters of fact that we gain knowledge].
Aristotle explains <why he says> 'for the most part' by
adding 'in few cases, or none at all, could one find knowledge
coming into being at the same time as what is known'. He
75,1 adds this to take account of discoveries by some art or through
reflection. Suppose, for example, someone invents written
characters other than the common ones. In that case what is
known does not already exist, but as soon as it is produced
through reflection, there is knowledge <of it>.
106
cf. also Top. 141b28 and Metaph. 1059b30 for definitions of natural priority in
terms of the notion of destruction. The idea, to use Ammonius' example, is that the
destruction of the genus animal (that is to say, the annihilation of all animals) would
involve the destruction of the human species, whereas the species could be destroyed
without destroying the genus. Hence, it is the superordinate (more generic) of two
entities in the same category that is prior by nature.
107
cf. n. 64.
 On Relatives 89

7b27. Moreover, although when what is known has been 5

destroyed, [knowledge is destroyed along with it...]
Having set out the temporal priority of what is known and
having said that 'for the most part it is of already existing
matters of fact that we gain knowledge', Aristotle now returns
to explain the priority in nature of what is known in terms of
destroying and not being destroyed.

7b31. For example, squaring the circle ... 10

Having erected a square equal to a given rectilinear figure,
geometers also sought, if possible, to find a square equal to a
given circle. Many geometers - including the greatest ones -
looked for it, but they did not find it. Only the divine
Archimedes discovered anything at all close, but so far the
exact solution has not been discovered. Indeed, it may be 15
impossible. And this is, in fact, why Aristotle says, 'if indeed it
is something to be known'. [It is perhaps because he produced
a straight line not dissimilar to the circumference <that he
was in doubt> whether it is or is not something to be known.]
He therefore says that if indeed the squaring of the circle is
something to be known although the knowledge of it does not
yet exist, it follows from this that what is known is prior to
knowledge.

7b33. Moreover with the destruction of animal [there will 20

be no knowledge, although there may be many things to
be known].
After first having shown that this concomitant108 is defective
in one example of relatives, he then shows this universally in
every case.109 If animal is destroyed, the sciences (hai
108
The concomitant feature in question is simultaneity. Ammonius' point is that
Aristotle first illustrates the non-simultaneity of knowledge and what is known in the
putative case of knowing how to square the circle, and then goes on to argue for the
non-simultaneity of knowledge and its objects in general.
109
'Universally in every case': Ammonius cannot mean for every pair of relatives,
for most relatives are still simultaneous in Aristotle's sense. Rather, he must mean
for every case of knowledge and what is known. Even this last claim is problematic,
however, since one can know things about one's own states of knowledge. Thus, if I
know that I know thatp, the object of this second-order knowledge (viz. that I know
 90 Commentary
epistemai) are destroyed, too, for the soul is the subject that the
sciences are in; but the things that are known by the sciences
are not destroyed. For they exist in themselves, not as things
25 that are known, but rather as actual things (pragmata).

7b35. It is similar [with perception].

After working out his argument for the case of knowledge,
76,1 Aristotle next turns to that of perception and shows that what
can be perceived110 - such as a hot, sweet, <or> bitter body -
is prior to perception. For even if there were no animal, a body
could still be, e.g., bitter or sweet or black or white. And it is
precisely these that can be perceived.

8a6. Further, perception comes into existence at the

same time as what is capable of perceiving.
5 Indeed, one cannot conceive of perception without body - a
body that is capable of perceiving111 comes into existence
simultaneously with perception - but the converse does not
hold. For what can be perceived - such as fire, earth, water,
and the like - can exist even though there is no perception.

Sail. Therefore, [what can be perceived] would seem to

be prior to perception.
that p) does not 'exist in itself; it will be destroyed if I and all my knowledge are
destroyed. One might try to argue on Ammonius' behalf (and contrary to much
traditional epistemolbgy) that the object of this second-order knowledge, while not
independent of all my knowledge, is still independent of my particular knowledge of
it. But this will not help Ammonius, who, like Aristotle, states the independence
condition in terms of all knowledge, or at least, all of a particular person's knowledge.
110
Aristotle's word aistheton covers both (what we might call) actual objects of
perception (things we perceive) and potential objects of perception (things that are
capable of being perceived).
111
Reading aisthetikon for aistheton. The aisthetikon is what is capable of
perceiving, i.e. the perceiver; the aistheton is the object (capable of being) perceived,
i.e. the perceptible. Aristotle holds that the perceiver is 'simultaneous' with
perception, in the sense that neither can exist independently of the other: there
cannot be perception unless there is a perceiver, nor can there be a perceiver unless
there is perception. But he adopts a firmly realist stance about the objects of
perception, which are capable of existing even though there is no perception of them.
The perceptible, therefore, is not simultaneous with perception, and Ammonius is
mistaken if (as the MSS have it) he claims otherwise. For his point about
simultaneity to be correct, he would have to be taken (as our emendation proposes) to
be talking about the body that is capable of perceiving, i.e. the perceiver.
 On Relatives 91
One must realize that Aristotle has not provided the solution 10
to the aforementioned puzzles. For that, one must note that
relatives can be thought of in two ways: either as independent
things (pragmata) in themselves, or as bound in a relation.
Take the example of father and child. Now if we think of the
father as Sophroniscus and the child as Socrates, Sophro-
niscus has got to be prior to Socrates. For the father as a cause
is prior to what is caused. This is the way it will be if we think 15
of each of them as <independent> things, for Sophroniscus
will be prior to Socrates. But if <we think of them> as father
and child bound in a relation, they will be simultaneous.
Now knowledge and what can be known112 are also like
this. If we conceive of what can be known as a thing, e.g. the
stars, what can be known conceived of as a thing will be prior,
for the stars are prior to knowledge about them. But if we 20
conceive of them as relatives, what is known will be
simultaneous with knowledge. For there would be nothing
known if there were not knowledge about it. For I say113 that
what is known and the knowledge about it are simultaneous.
But if someone should say that what is known exists
potentially even before the knowledge about it, I say that the
knowledge about it will also exist potentially at that time. 25
And for relatives universally, as it is with one <member of the
pair>, so too will it be with the other. For if one of them
actually exists, so will the other, and if one <exists>
potentially, so too will the other exist potentially. For
example, when what is known actually exists, of necessity the
knowledge about it will also actually exist; and when what is
known exists potentially, the knowledge will also exist 30
potentially. But when we think of what is known <as
existing> before the knowledge, or of what is perceived before 77,1
the perception, we are thinking of it not as what is known or
as what is perceived but as a thing by itself.

112
Aristotle's word episteton covers both what is actually known and what is
capable of being known.
113
The MSS have 'he says' rather than 'I say'. But it is unclear who 'he' can be, for
Aristotle denies that knowledge and what is known are simultaneous. Since the view
expressed here seems to be that of Ammonius, we have read 'I say' in place of 'he
says'.
 92 Commentary

8al3. There is a difficulty about whether no [substance is

said to be a relative].
Aristotle has completed <his examination of> the definition
of the ancients and its characteristic concomitants. Since he
5 now wants to introduce his own definition, he first establishes
some absurd consequences of their definition. Thus, it is
absurd for the parts of secondary substances to be found to be
relatives, i.e. for substances to be accidents. Now a division
like this is traditional: substance is either universal or
particular, and either whole or part. That plainly yields four
10 pairs: (1) universal part, e.g. head <or> hand; (2) particular
whole, e.g. Socrates and the like; (3) universal whole, e.g.
man; (4) particular part, such as this hand or this head. Three
of these are not relatives, but one - universal part, such as
head <or> hand - would seem <according to the definition of
the ancients> to be a relative. For it is called head of someone
<or something and> hand of someone <or something>.
15 Therefore, Aristotle says that according to the definition of
relatives given previously114 it will be impossible or <at any
rate> difficult to arrive at the solution (lusai) <that no
substance is a relative>.

Sal 7. For the individual man is not called this man of

someone <or something>.
When a man or an ox is said to be of someone, it is not in
respect of <being a> man or in respect of <being an> ox, but
as property.

20 8a28. Thus if the [definition] of relatives [given earlier] is

satisfactory...
He says that according to the definition of relatives that was
given earlier, it will be impossible or at any rate very difficult
to solve the problem. He says 'very difficult' because of the

114
At 6a36.
 On Relatives 93
115
possibility of there being some defence (apologia}. He
stated the <earlier> definition <of relatives> as 'those
things which are said to be just what they are of other things'
(6a36). Thus a head is a relative not in respect of <being a>
head, but in respect of <being a> part. For a part is called 25
part of a whole.

8a31. But rather relatives are [those things for which to

be is the same as to stand in a certain relation to
something].
What the Philosopher means is this: that relatives are things
whose being and essence is nothing other than their relation
to another. For even the fact that they are spoken of <as> 78,
themselves only with reference to another does not mean that
they are relatives; rather, it is the fact that they themselves
also have a relation to the things with reference to which they
are spoken of. If something is a relative, not only is it spoken
of with reference to another thing, but it stands in a relation
to that thing. But things that are not relatives may still be
spoken of with reference to another, although they do not
stand in a relation to it. Now if <the definition of> a relative 5
is like this, the parts of secondary substances will no longer be
relatives. For a head is spoken of with reference to various
other things, just as every part is (for every part is a part of
another thing) but its being in itself a head does not derive
from the relation it has to that of which it is the head. Thus, it
is possible to give an account of a head as a head just by itself.
For a head is a substance and a particular subject. But no 10
relative is a relative by itself. Thus, similar and equal are
acknowledged to be relatives, but neither signifies a thing
(pragma ti) that has a proprietary application.116 Rather, the
115
Ammonius presumably has in mind the possibility of defending the earlier
definition against Aristotle's objection that it implies that some substances are also
relatives.
116
In discussing semantic matters, Ammonius (like Aristotle before him and
ancient Greek philosophers generally) frequently fails to make clear whether he
means to be talking about words or things. The present passage is especially garbled.
He says that equal is a relative (i.e. a thing, not a word) but also that it signifies
(which is what linguistic expressions do). Further, the thing it signifies has an
application (epibole), which is a relation that words have to the things they apply to.
It is plausible therefore to suppose that Ammonius twice makes an unnoted
 94 Commentary
being of each of them <consists> in a relation <to
something>.
Aristotle then sets out the proper definition of relatives. In
15 fact, the first definition is really only a concomitant <of
relatives>; for if something is a relative, it will also be said
<to be what it is of another thing>, but it is not the case that
if something is said <to be what it is of another thing> it is
also a relative, for the reasons stated above.

8a35. From these considerations it is clear that [if one

knows definitely that something is a relative ...]
Having set out the proper definition, he draws a corollary that
follows from what has already been said. A corollary is a
useful result that becomes evident along with the proof of
20 something else. For example, if one claimed and proposed to
show that the soul is immortal, one might reason that if it
were not truly immortal but dispersed after its withdrawal
from the body, good persons would not differ from bad. But in
truth we all know that there is a divine providence that
assigns compensation to each soul for its deeds. Because of
25 this, some of those who have conducted their lives well hasten
to acquire virtues and thereby make their souls more at home
with providence. (For none of us is so foolish in our thinking
as to ignore this completely.) If, then, one were to consider the
consequences for the soul and show that it is brought to trial,
surely in the proof of this it would also become evident that
providence exists.
Accordingly, Aristotle says that if one knows one of the
30 relatives definitely, one will also know the other definitely,
and if <one knows one> indeterminately, then similarly one
will know the other indeterminately, and if <one of them>
'semantic ascent' (i.e. a shift from talking about a thing to talking about its name).
Making this ascent explicit, we can reformulate his claim as follows:
equal is a relative whose name signifies something whose name does not have a
proprietary application.
A bit of reflection on this formulation should reveal that the expression 'signifies
something whose name' is redundant. Deleting it, we obtain:
equal is a relative whose name does not have a proprietary application.
Clumsy verbiage thus swept aside, the point seems simple enough: the term 'equal'
does not apply to anything in a proprietary way, i.e. to that thing alone, without
comparison to anything else.
 On Relatives 95
absolutely, then <one will know the other> absolutely, and in
general, as one knows one of them, <so> also will one know the
other. Thus if one does not know at all what a thing is related to
in a certain way, one will not even know whether it is related to
anything in that way. For if someone knows that Sophroniscus
is a father, one surely knows Socrates as well; but if one does
one will not know whether Sophroniscus is a
father.

8b7. Similarly, if one knows of this such-and-such [that it

is more beautiful...]
If one knows that a certain magnitude is a double, one will
also know, he says, what it is the double of. If not, one will not 5
know it is a double. And if one knows that something is more
beautiful, one will also have to know what it is more beautiful
than. If one doesn't, but only knows that it is more beautiful
than the less beautiful, one will often make the mistake of
calling the worst matter of all more beautiful.118

8blO. That sort of thing is conjecture, not knowledge.

Whereas conjecture is a vague and unreliable awareness, 10
knowledge is an infallible awareness.

8bl3. [It may turn out that] nothing is inferior to it.

It is not unlikely that what by chance we call more beautiful is
the worst of all, as with the matter <discussed above>.

8bl5. But now [it is possible to know definitely] of a head 15

and a hand ...
117
By this' (touto) Ammonius must mean the fact that Sophroniscus is the father of
Socrates. So, too, in the previous sentence 'one surely knows Socrates' must be taken
as elliptical for 'one surely knows that Sophroniscus is the father of Socrates'.
118
Ammonius' argument seems to be this: suppose you are talking about some
thing that is (unbeknown to you) the foulest thing in the world. There is nothing it is
more beautiful than, and hence there is nothing you can know it to be more beautiful
than. But you can still know that it is more beautiful than anything that is less
beautiful than it is. Hence you might infer (wrongly) that there is something (viz. 'the
less beautiful') that it is more beautiful than. Aristotle's requirement of'knowing the
correlative' rules out the possibility of making this mistake.
 96 Commentary
From these considerations he then shows that a head and a
foot and a hand are not relatives. Assume that Socrates has
all the rest of his body covered, only a hand being exposed. In
that case I know definitely that it is a hand even though I do
not know whose it is. Now with <a pair of> relatives,
20 someone who knows one of them definitely will also know the
other definitely. But although I know the hand definitely, I do
not know definitely whose hand it is. It is clear then that a
hand is not a relative. Similarly, the same reasoning applies
also to the other parts.

8b21. It is perhaps difficult [to give a strong opinion] on

such matters.
25 Aristotle speaks in a very philosophical way. For, especially in
connection with investigations requiring much research, he
wants us to give an opinion neither at random nor by
0,1 happenstance [80,1], but after much testing and examination.
Since he teaches119 that raising a puzzle is the route to the
resolution of puzzlement, Aristotle says that raising a puzzle
in each of these cases is not useless. For not raising a puzzle
indicates <one of> two things: either, that one has an
awareness of everything, like providence (for whom nothing is
5 a puzzle), or that one is totally deprived of awareness; for
what one is not aware of does not puzzle <one>. But since we
are in the middle between those above us and those beneath
us, we know in a kind of middle fashion <by> systematically
inquiring into the puzzle. For just as firesticks rubbed against
each other send forth fire, so also do puzzled souls through
their inquiry send forth the light of truth. Therefore, since
10 Aristotle earlier thought that the definition of relatives as
things said of other things runs the risk of making some
substances into relatives, he now says that perhaps we should
not assert so confidently that things said of other things are
not relatives. For people often defend <the first definition>
against the puzzle we mentioned.

119
Reading mathesetai with MS F.
 On Qualified and Quality 97

On Qualified and Quality

In the case of quality we have used the same manner of 15

teaching as we did with relatives. Thus here, too, we must
preface that teaching with an examination of (1) the location
of the category, (2) its definition, (3) the title, On Qualified
and Quality, and, in addition to those, (4) the subdivisions of
the category.
The location of the category should already be clear to us 20
from what was said in the case of relatives. Concerning its
definition, we want to know why in giving the definition of
quality he says120 that by virtue of which those sharing in it
are said to be qualified,121 thereby taking just what was in
question as obvious and agreed upon. Our reply will be that
this definition leads us to our conception of quality in terms of
the qualified. For the qualified, inasmuch as it is grasped in 25
perception, is more obvious, and in general we proceed from
that to our conception of a quality. Thus, from looking at the
white in milk and the white in snow and the white in
carbonate of lead we arrive at our conception of whiteness;
likewise, from tasting honey and dates and figs we arrive at
our conception of sweetness. Therefore Aristotle bases his
explanation on the qualified thing that has received the
aforementioned qualities -1 mean whiteness and sweetness -
since it is more obvious. But the qualified itself is what
partakes of the quality, and the quality is what is partaken of.
So that is why he also put the qualified first in the title,122
120
Ammonius slightly amplifies the text of the Categories. What Aristotle says
(8b25) is this: 'that by virtue of which people are said to be qualified.'
121
Aristotle's term poion (cf. Latin quale) means, literally, 'of what sort'. The
translation 'qualified' is meant to bring out the connection Aristotle sees between
being of a sort (poion) and having a quality (poiotes, cf. Latin qualitas). The latter
term - an abstract noun derived from the interrogative adjective poion - was, as
Ammonius points out (81,25), a coinage of Plato's that Aristotle borrowed. Poiotes
means, literally, 'of-what-sort-ness'; small wonder it sounded odd to Plato's listeners.
Curiously, the abstract noun ('quality') survives in English, but the interrogative
adjective does not.
122
The text of the Categories that has come down to us contains no such title.
Pelletier wonders whether we should take 'he' to refer here to Ammonius, rather than
to Aristotle (the sentence presumably having been added by a disciple of Ammonius).
This seems implausible, in view of the reference to the title at 80,18. We wonder,
instead, whether Ammonius was working with a text that had already been amplified
with section sub-headings.
 98 Commentary
since this is what the quality is observed in.
In addition to these things, we must also discuss the
subdivisions of the category. Bear in mind that Aristotle
5 provides us with four species of quality: (1) state (hexis) and
condition (diathesis); (2) capacity (dunamis) and incapacity
(adunamia); (3) affective quality (pathetike poiotes) and
affection123 (pathos); (4) figure (skhema) and shape (morphe).
A state is, for example, what we say a geometer has with
regard to the theorems of geometry; a condition is, for
example, what we say a person with some mistaken notions
10 has of the theorems of geometry. This is the first species of
quality. The second is capacity and incapacity, which is a
fitness or unfitness for natural things. We call capacity fitness
and incapacity unfitness.124 The third species is affective
quality and affection. An affective quality is one such as the
coldness in snow or the heat in fire. This <kind of quality>,
15 however, is twofold; <a quality is affective> either because it
produces an affection or because it is generated by an
affection. The coldness of snow and the heat of fire are called
affective qualities not because they are generated by an
affection but because they produce an affection. For it is not
that some change occurs in the subject so that fire and snow
may receive those qualities, but rather they instill affections -
20 <the sensations of> heat and cold - in other things.125 But
the heat in a heated piece of iron is called an affective quality
because it is generated by an affection. We also call it an
affection when someone who is at first pale turns red with
shame - we say that this redness is an affection. The fourth
species <of quality> is figure and shape. One should note

123 'Affection' (our translation of pathos) is used in the philosophical sense of a kind
of accidental and alterable quality, and not in the more common sense of an
emotional state of love or good will.
124
The point of this curious remark is presumably that 'fitness' (epitedeiotGs) is the
common expression that corresponds to Aristotle's technical term 'capacity'
(dunamis).
125
Ammonius is not as careful here as he should be. He gives heat (thermotes) and
cold (psukhrotes) as examples of both affective qualities and affections. But it is more
properly the sensations of heat and cold that are affections. When the fire warms your
skin it produces in you the pathos of (perceived) heat; when it warms your coffee, it
produces in the coffee no pathos, but only the affective quality of heat. Aristotle puts
the point more clearly (9b3-7): 'heat and cold are said to be affective qualities not
because the things which have taken them on are somehow affected, but because each
of the qualities mentioned produces an affection of the senses ....'
 On Qualified and Quality 99
that 'figure' is applied to inanimate objects, and 'shape' to 25
animate. One should note, too, that Plato used the word
'quality' in the dialogue Theaetetus, and he was the original
inventor of the word. He says, "You seem to me not to know
what the word "quality" means, on account of its being used in
a general way.'126 But Aristotle extended the word 'quality',
<applying it> not only to bodies but also to the soul. He said 30
that knowledge and virtue are qualities in the soul.
It is possible to raise a difficulty for Aristotle and argue that
he has not made the division suitably. For we apply 'state' not
only to the soul but also to the body. Indeed, we say that
health is a state of the body and so is consumptive fever. But 35
under which of the four species of quality Aristotle mentions 82,1
do we include these qualities? So that the division may be
complete let us then say this: one kind of quality has to do
with fitness and another has to do with actuality. The kind
having to do with fitness makes up the second species, the one
described by Aristotle as having to do with capacity and 5
incapacity. The kind having to do with actuality is either
perfective (teleiotike) or hurtful (kakotike) or neither
perfective nor hurtful.127 Of the perfective, one kind produces
an affection of our senses and another kind does not produce
an affection. The kind that does not produce an affection is
either hard to lose (dusapobletos) or easy to lose (euapobletos).
If it is hard to lose, it is a state, either of the soul or of the
body; if it is easy to lose, it is a condition. A state of the soul is 10
<e.g.> knowledge <or> virtue, while one of the body is like
health.
Now if someone should say that health produces an
affection, since we perceive it, our reply will be that we do not
perceive health but rather the principal affective qualities of
128
Theaetetus 182A.
127
Ammonius' wording here is ambiguous. Has he divided the kind of quality
having to do with actuality into three sub-species - (a) perfective (b) hurtful and (c)
neither - or into two - (d) perfective or hurtful and (c) neither? The first (tripartite)
division may seem to be the one intended, since Ammonius appears to take up species
(a) explicitly in the next sentence (82,6). But it is more likely that he had the second
(dichotomous) division in mind, for all his other divisions are dichotomies. Further,
he seems to want to make at least some explicit comment about each of the
sub-species he distinguishes; yet he nowhere discusses (b). It is likely, therefore, that
his remarks at 82,6, which appear to be about (a), are intended to be about (d): he
says 'perfective' but he means 'perfective or hurtful'.
 100 Commentary
health. For those who have a fever perceive the unnatural
15 heat that is present; when it is gone, they do not perceive the
health itself. This is also why the incurable do not perceive the
faint <signs> of an illness that are present. For the illness in
that case is not manifest except to doctors, and even the
doctors themselves have certain diagnostic signs through
which they track down illness and health.
One kind of affection-producing <quality> is hard to lose,
20 and another is easy to lose. If it is easy to lose, it makes up one
section (tmema) of the third species mentioned by Aristotle,
which I call affection, for example, the blushing of someone
who turns red with shame. For a human nature, conscious of a
blunder it made and not wanting to be dishonoured or shunned,
sends something very valuable to its surface as a curtain for
the affection. And among the more valuable of all things in
25 nature are breath and blood. So nature dispatches blood to the
surface, and the colour of that humour produces the blushing.
But if it is hard to lose, it makes up another section of the
third species - affective quality that produces an affection.
If it is neither perfective nor hurtful, it is either observed on
the surface of the subject or has gone deep inside. And if it has
30 gone deep inside, it is either easy to lose or hard to lose. If it is
easy to lose, that makes it once again an affection of the third
species of quality; but if it is hard to lose, that makes it an
affective quality - not one that produces an affection, but one
that is generated by an affection, such as in the case of
someone who is ruddy from birth. For there is a manner in
which someone who turns red with shame has a certain colour
3,1 as an affection, and in the same manner someone who is
naturally ruddy has a certain colour as a natural affection.
It should be noted that Aristotle says in the Seventh
<Book> of the Physics128 that qualitative change arises, not
from every quality, but only from affective ones. Thus
5 qualities that are states do not bring about qualitative
change, he says, but rather a sort of road either toward
destruction or toward coming into being. For a change of state
is a substantial change. Continuing the inquiry the
Philosopher said there are six species of change: coming into
128
Physics 7.3.
 On Qualified and Quality 101
being, destruction, growth, diminution, qualitative change,
and change of place. These changes are observed in four
categories: in substance, in quantity, in quality, and in the 10
where. A change that occurs in regard to substance, he says, is
called coming into being if it occurs from not being into being,
whereas it is called destruction if it occurs from being into not
being. A change that occurs in the category of quantity is
called growth or diminution, that in the category of the where
<is called> change of place. But qualitative change does not 15
occur with every kind of quality. Thus changes in state are not
called qualitative changes, but, for example, some <sort of>
coming into being or destruction. For a state may be in the
soul, as knowledge or virtue would be, or in the body, like
health; and if one of these should change from not being to
being, some <sort of> coming into being occurs, but if it is <a
change> from being to not being, it is called destruction. 20
Those, he says, should not be called qualitative changes.
Therefore we say that there is a qualitative change when
there is a change in affective quality, that is, one that is not
substantial but rather accidental to the thing. And that is
what there is to be said about these matters.
If, however, <the quality> has not permeated the whole of
the substance but rather is manifested only on its surface, 25
then if it is in inanimate objects, it is called figure, whereas if
it is in living things it is called shape. This, we know, is the
difference between figure and shape; alternatively, it is that
figure is manifested in our own mental representation
(phantasia), whereas shape is in physical things. So the term
'shape' will apply to every inanimate thing, I mean to stone
and wood and iron and whatever other physical body partakes
of figure. But if someone should ask why we don't say that 30
colours are <a kind of> shape, since they are also manifested
on the surface, we reply that colours are manifested not
simply in a change on the surface; rather, the body is
completely changed even in its composition. But with shape
and figure, the substance <of the body> remains altogether
unaffected and change occurs only on the surface. Thus if we 84,1
take wax and make a triangular figure of it, and then change
it again and make a sphere from the triangle, making no
change of substance, we have changed only the figure. For it
 102 Commentary
5 will be none the less wax both when it has the shape of a
triangle and <when it is> spherical.

9alO. States are also conditions.

Just as 'name' (onoma) is predicated of both noun (onoma) and
verb, so also condition is predicated of both state and
condition. A state is also a condition according to their
10 common predicate, but a condition is not also a state. For in
one sense, conditions are divided into state and condition, but
in another <condition is> distinguished from state.

9al4. A second kind (genos) of quality.

Since quality is a genus, why does Aristotle say of its species
that one is primary and another secondary? We reply that in
respect of being qualities it isn't that one of them is primary,
15 the other secondary. They differ only in rank, as do human
being and horse. But why does he say 'genus of quality' when
<quality> is the highest genus? He says 'genus' in place of
'species' to show that it is not an infima species but rather a
subordinate genus. But it may be considered a species under
quality, as when we say that animal is a genus of substance,
20 instead of a genus under it.
The second species of quality he gives, then, is that with
respect to capacity and incapacity. He says that skilled boxers
and runners are those having by nature an aptitude for one of
those <activities>, that is, those who are such in capacity
(dunamei). The first species of quality - that of state and
condition - is manifested in actuality, whereas the second
25 <species is manifested> in potentiality (dunamei). For
potential boxers or runners are said to have their aptitude
with respect to natural capacity or incapacity. But if there is a
boxer or runner in actuality, he is not so called with respect to
natural capacity or incapacity, but rather <with respect to>
state and condition.

85,1 9al6. For <each of these things is said of someone> not

because of his condition.
 On Qualified and Quality 103
We do not say they are such by being <so> in actuality, but
rather by their having such a capacity.

9a21. They are said to be healthy because they have a

natural capacity not to be <easily> affected <by what 5
happens to them>.
Note that it is called capacity either in being a natural
disposition to do <something>, as when we say that a boxer is
capable of striking, or in being a natural disposition not to
suffer, as when we say that a healthy person has the capacity
not to suffer, and again we say that an ill person has the
capacity to suffer. But if someone should say that an
incapacity is not a quality, we refute this from its opposite. 10
For no one is foolish enough to say that a capacity is not a
quality. But it has been proved that what holds for one of <a
pair of> contraries holds also for the other, for they both
belong to the same genus. Accordingly incapacity, too, is said
in three ways. Incapacity is said in the case of one who is not
naturally prone to act, as when we say that someone who is ill
has an incapacity to act. But it is also said in the case of one
who is not naturally prone to suffer, as when we say that
someone who is healthy has an incapacity to be affected. But 15
again we say that someone who is ill has an incapacity not to
be affected, that is, the capacity to suffer. The negation of not
being affected introduces the capacity to be affected and,
conversely, the negation of being affected introduces the
capacity not to be affected. There is also another way of 20
speaking. Capacity is said (i) in relation to a universal, as if
we were to say that every human has the capacity to measure,
or (ii) with respect to ease, so that <we say that> a certain
human being has the capacity to measure instead of saying
that he is capable of measuring easily. And it is similar also in
the case of incapacity. For we say it, too, either with respect to
something naturally prone not to measure at all, for example,
a dog, or with respect to one who measures with difficulty, for 25
example, a dullard. For example, those who are ill have a
capacity to suffer something easily, so they have an incapacity
to not suffer, whereas the healthy have the reverse.
 104 Commentary
86,1 9a28. [Affective qualities and affections make up] a third
kind (genos) of quality.
Here once again he says genus (genos) instead of species
(eidos). This <kind of quality> is manifested in four ways.
Either (1) it is present in the entire species and it is called an
affective quality, like whiteness in snow; or (2) <it is
present> not in all but in some <members of the species>,
5 although naturally and from birth, and it is likewise called an
affective quality, like blackness in Ethiopians; or (3) <it is
present> not by nature but is acquired and hard to lose, and it
is called an affection classified under <the category of>
quality, like the pallor <that results> from a long illness or
from jaundice; or (4) it is acquired and easy to lose, like
redness <or pallor>, as when someone turns red with shame
or pale with fear, and it is called an affection classified under
10 <the category of> being affected (for participants in these are
certainly not said to be qualified by them). And bear in mind
that those are conceived of not only with regard to the body,
but also with regard to the soul.
Affective qualities <are spoken of> in two ways. Things are
said to have an affective quality either from having been
affected themselves, i.e. because produced129 by an affection,
15 or from the fact that our senses are affected in the perception
of them, as with fire. For the fire itself is not affected so as to
become hot, but we are affected by it and we become hot in the
perception of it. It is the same with honey. Such things130 are
qualities in that <their> form and essence are in a subject,
and it is because the senses are affected by them that it131 is
129
Reading pepoieisthai ('produced') with MS F and rejecting Busse's emendation
pepoiosthai ('qualified'). Busse's proposal has some plausibility, since being affected is
not the same thing as being produced by an affection, and what is affected can
plausibly be said to be qualified by an affection. But Ammonius tends to be careless
about what his subject is, often shifting in mid-sentence between a quality and the
thing that has it. The MS reading makes sense if it contains an ellipsis: '<a quality of
theirs> is produced by an affection.' Ammonius' point seems to be that a thing with a
certain quality may be said to be affected if that quality was produced by an affection.
130
Ammonius seems to have in mind such examples as the heat in fire and the
sweetness in honey.
131
The subject oflegetai ('said') may be either singular or (neuter) plural; here, no
subject is explicitly provided. The most plausible candidate would normally be the
subject of the antecedent clause, which is plural ('such things'). But in that case (as
Pelletier notes) Ammonius should have written einai (to be') rather than ekhein ('to
have'): 'they are said to be affective qualities'. If legetai is singular, we must take its
 On Qualified and Quality 105
said to have affective qualities. But a body that has become 20
white has an affective quality because it was itself affected. For
whiteness is accidental to it and is acquired, but is not its form
or in its essence. Now the senses are affected in these cases, too.
But since that which has itself been affected is more properly
called affective than is that which produces an affection,132 in
the case of things that are both < affected and produce an
affection>, it is perhaps better for them to derive their name 25
from the more proper one.133

9bl. For honey is not said to be sweet because it has been

somehow affected.
Indeed, it is not that being at first without sweetness <the
honey> later received it as a result of some affection. Rather,
it is, so to speak, essential.

9bll. [Now it is clear that many changes of colour] are 87,1

brought about by [an affection].
Having said that colours are affective qualities in virtue of
being brought about by affections, he establishes this and
shows it to be so.
implied subject to be to hupokeimenon (the subject in which the form and essence of
the qualities reside) from the antecedent clause: '<the subject> is said to have
affective qualities.' In either case, Ammonius' point is that hotness is (a) a quality of
fire because its form and essence are in fire, and (b) an affective quality because it
affects the senses of one who perceives fire.
132
Ammonius ought to have said: 'qualities of that which has itself been affected
are more properly called affective than are qualities of that which produces an
affection.'
133 Aristotle conceives of affective qualities as belonging to 'external' objects; as he
says, they are 'in' the objects. Such a quality is affective because it stands in a causal
relation to an affection (i.e. to a state of the soul). He thus divides affective qualities
into two classes:
(1) Those that produce affections of the senses. His examples are the hotness of
fire and the sweetness of honey, which affect the senses of those who feel the fire
or taste the honey.
(2) Those that are produced by affections. His examples are blushing from shame
and turning pale with fear.
Ammonius notes that class (2) affective qualities not only are caused by affections,
but also produce affections in the senses of those who perceive them. In the cryptic
final sentence of the section ('But since that which has itself been affected ... .') he
seems to be making (albeit none too clearly) the point that although such qualities do
produce affections, this is not the proper reason for calling them affective.The proper
reason is that they are produced by affections.
 106 Commentary

9bl9. Therefore, all such symptoms.

5 He calls colours 'accidents' (sumptomata) on account of their
supervening (episumbainein) on other affections.134

9b27. For in the same way we are said to be qualified on

account of them.
A quality is that in respect of which <things> are called
qualified. So if they are not called qualified after easily
removed affections, it is clear that those <affections> are not
called qualities.

10 9b33. In much the same way [we speak of affective

qualities and affections] with regard to the soul also.
Not only, he says, are affective qualities and affections
manifested in connection with the body, but also with the
soul.

9b35. For those that come into being at the moment of

birth.
Just as blackness in an Ethiopian, which is inborn, is called
15 an affective quality, so too is an inborn fit or a temperament
called an affective quality.

10a2. It is the same with fits [that are not inborn].

Again, just as pallor resulting from a long illness is called an
affective quality, so too a fit or something else <resulting>
20 from an accident (sumptoma) is called an affective quality.

10al2. A fourth kind (genos) of quality.

He gives yet a fourth species of quality, calling it too a genus
instead of a species. This is figure and shape. 'Figure' applies
8.1 more broadly than 'shape', for every shape also has a figure,
134
The word here translated 'accidents' is not the usual Aristotelian one
(sumbebekota), but an Epicurean term (sumptdmata) for a thing's non-permanent
 On Qualified and Quality 107
but not every figure also has a shape. The reason why Aristotle
puts figure before shape is that it is more important and
universal. For shape is said solely in the case of animate things,
whereas figure <is said> in the case of the inanimate as well.

10al2.... and also, in addition to these, [straightness and 5

curvature and the like ... ]
It is also with respect to these that their participants are
called qualified. For example, a line is called straight after
straightness and curved after curvature, and straightness
and curvature are affections of a line.

10al6. Porous and dense [and rough and smooth might

be thought to signify qualities].
'Might be thought to be', he says, since in truth they are not 10
qualities. A dense thing is one whose parts are arranged so
close together that it cannot admit a different kind of body; a
porous one has its parts so spread out that it can admit a
different kind of body. So it appears rather that the parts of
these things exhibit a certain position (thesis). Aristotle
understands porous to be the result of artifice; for example if
someone were to fill his hand with nuts, we might call the 15
body composed of all of them porous on account of its
rarefaction. In fact, in the Physics135 he himself defines porous
and dense differently.

10a25. Now perhaps some other [type of quality might be

brought to light].
Having presented four species of quality to us, he draws his
conclusion and says that these are the <only> types of 20
quality. Wanting us not to be content with what the ancients
said or to remain idle, but to investigate on our own, however,

attributes. Cf. Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus, 68-73; A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The
Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: 1987), 33-6.
135
Physics 4.9, 216b30.
 108 Commentary
he says that 'perhaps some other type of quality might be
brought to light'.136

10a27. What we have mentioned above, then, are

qualities.
25 Whiteness, blackness, and the like are qualities, he says. A
thing that participates in qualities, for example a body that is
white or black or sweet and so forth, is qualified. The qualities
are participated in, and the <things> qualified participate in
89,1 and are called paronymously after them. But this is not so in
all cases, as in the case of virtue. For one who participates in it
is not called Virtued'137 paronymously after it, but rather is
called 'good'. This is why he says 'or else in some other way'.

10a34. For example, a man good at running [or good at

boxing ... ]
5 Indeed the person good at boxing, who is so called according to
a fitness that Aristotle calls a capacity, is not named after a
quality. Certainly he is not named after <the quality>
boxing; for boxing is a science. And besides, those who
136
The division of the category of quality that Ammonius proposes may be
summarized in outline form:
I. In potentiality
A. Capacity
B. Incapacity
II. In actuality
A. Perfective or hurtful
1. Affection-producing
a. Easy to lose: affections
b. Hard to lose: affective qualities
2. Not affection-producing
a. Easy to lose: conditions
b. Hard to lose: states
i. Of the soul
ii. Of the body
B. Neither perfective nor hurtful
1. On the surface
a. Of something inanimate: figure
b. Of something animate: shape
2. In the interior
a. Easy to lose: affections
b. Hard to lose: affective qualities (produced by an affection)
Although this division includes the four species of quality that Aristotle discusses,
it is clearly more complex than what Aristotle had in mind.
137
cf. n. 68.
 On Qualified and Quality 109
participate in it perfectly and <are> in the <appropriate>
state are paronymously called boxers after it. It is the same for
the person good at running, for he is <not> named after a
quality either.138

10b5. Sometimes also when a name has been laid down ... 10
But often, even if a name has been laid down for the quality,
that which participates in it is not called paronymously after
it, for we do not say Virtued' but 'good'.

10bl2. Justice, for example, [is contrary to injustice].

Aristotle searches for what is peculiar (idion) to quality. So he 15
says that admitting contrariety is peculiar to quality. But
then he rejects this, for it does not belong to all qualities. For
yellow, which is a quality, has no contrary, nor does red, and
similarly neither do the other qualities of this sort. But it is
clear, he says, that when one of a pair of contraries is
subsumed under a category, the other is also subsumed under 20
the same one because it is not possible for us to classify it
under another category.

10b26. [Qualities] admit of more [and less].

Another concomitant139 (parakolouthema) of quality is to
admit of more and less. It is reasonable <to suppose> that
this is not a universal concomitant. For it is said that where
contrariety is manifested there is more and less, but where it 25
is not there is not more or less. Since, then, contrariety 90,1
belongs in <the category> of quality, more and less belong
<there, too>; but since <contrariety> does not belong to all
<qualities>, neither does more and less belong to all <of
them>. For justice, they say, is hardly said to be more or less
than justice, yet it is said that those things participating in 5
justice or health participate <in them> more or less.

138
Reading oude gar for kai gar, with Busse.
139
Ammonius makes much use of this Epicurean term for a thing's permanent
attributes. See n. 134 for references.
 110 Commentary

Ila2. [But then it is] indisputable [that the things called

after these] admit of [more and less].
And of course those things that are called paronymously after
these appropriately admit of more and less. But Aristotle
leaves unresolved the puzzles as to why justice is not said <to
be> more or less <justice>.
Well then, we say that justice does admit of more and less.
10 For whenever we say that one person is more just than
another, it is clear that <this is so> in so far as the one
participates in justice more than the other does. So justice
does admit of more and less.

Ila5. But triangle and square [do not seem to admit of

more].
One triangle is not more or less of a triangle than another
15 triangle, nor is a pentagon more of a circle than a square is.
For if things are to be compared as circles, they must both
admit the formula of a circle. But if they do not <both> admit
<it>, they cannot be compared at all. For one would not say
that a cow is more of a man than a horse is, since neither of
the two admits the definition of a man. And so it will be the
20 same with figures. All figures that admit the definition of a
circle are equally circles and those that admit the definition of
a triangle are equally triangles, and it is the same with the
rest.

Ila9. Whereas [none] of the things that do not admit it

[is said to be more than another].
But those things that do not admit <the definition> at all are
25 not compared. Therefore not all qualities admit of more and
less.

Ilal5. Now none of the things so far mentioned [is

peculiar to quality].
Aristotle here rejects two concomitants of quality, since they
are not concomitants of quality in every way. Then he moves
 On Qualified and Quality 111
on to aproprium in the strict sense when he says 'similar and
dissimilar'.140 Indeed this proprium applies to none of the 91,1
other categories.

Ila20. We need not be alarmed [if someone should tell us

that although we proposed to discuss quality we have
taken many relatives into account].
Since Aristotle was aware of having included many relatives
in his treatment of quality, he says that it is not necessary to 5
puzzle over the fact that the discussion concerns quality
<rather than relatives>. In fact we subsumed many relatives
under quality, for example, state and condition. For a state is
said to be the state of something and a condition the condition
of something. Then he solves this in two ways.

Ila23. For in nearly all [such cases the genera are

spoken of in relation to something].
This is the first solution to the puzzle. He says that the genera 10
of qualities are classified under relatives but their species
<are classified> under quality. For example, knowledge is
said to be a relative (for it is said to be knowledge of
something). Geometry, however, is not a relative, for it is not
said to be the geometry of something, but perhaps the
knowledge of something. But this solution is superficial; the
later one is more precise. We are called knowledgeable, he 15
says, not simply'for participating in knowledge but rather for
participating in either music or geometry or one of the other
<kinds of knowledge>. Knowledge, since it is indeterminate,
is a relative, but its species are not. For they are determinate,
and we do not call music or geometry the music or geometry of
something, but rather <we call them> qualities. Indeed we are
called qualified after them. So the genus is classified under 20
relatives, but the species under quality. So that we may
understand this more precisely, let us grasp it by way of
division, as follows. Some beings are subjects (hupokeimena),
such as substance, and some are in a subject, such as
140
'Now none of the things so far mentioned is peculiar to quality. But it is qualities
alone with respect to which things are said to be similar and dissimilar' (Ilal5-16).
 112 Commentary
accidents. And some things in a subject are in a relation
(skhesis) and constitute (ginetai) <the category of> relatives,
whereas some are not in a relation. Now some of those not in a
25 relation belong indivisibly and constitute <the category of>
quality, whereas some <belong> divisibly and constitute
<the category of> quantity. Thus it is not paradoxical for a
genus to be subsumed under relatives, but its species under
quality. And this is a precise solution. But above all, there is
no paradox when some things classified under another
category are also classified under relatives. Rather it is
30 altogether necessary that what is subsumed under relatives
be classified under some other category as well; for it has been
2,1 pointed out141 that <the category of> relatives does not
contain (ekhei) things that are peculiar <to it>; rather <its
members> are observed in other categories.

On Doing and Being Affected

5 llbl. Both doing and being affected admit of contrariety.

One must be aware that the principal and primary categories
are the four we have mentioned: substance, quantity, quality,
and relative. The other six arise from the combination of
substance with the remaining three. For from the combin-
ation of substance and quantity arise the two categories of
10 where and when. Again, from the mingling of substance and
quality arise two others: doing and being affected. From the
combination of substance and relatives arise the two
remaining categories: being arranged and having on.
Although he gave the definitions and concomitants of the
<first> four categories, he neither stated the propria nor gave
15 definitions or a division into species for the remaining six,
since we are able to figure those things out from what has
already been said. So we must give the definition of each as
well as its division into species.
So: (1) doing is operating (energein) on something. There
are two species of this. For either the agent (poioun) acts on
141
Ammonius may be referring to his discussion of contrariety among relatives at
69,24ff.
 OnOpposites 113
itself, e.g. the soul knows itself, or it acts on another, e.g.
heating. (2) Being affected, on the other hand, is being
qualitatively changed by something. There are likewise two 20
species of this. For a thing is affected either so as to be
brought to destruction, e.g. being burned, or so as to be raised
to perfection, as when we say that vision is affected by the
visible. (3) Being arranged (keisthai) is a certain position 93,1
(thesis) of the body, and this has three species: to be lying, to
be sitting, and to be standing. (4) When is indicative of time,
and also has three species: present, past, and future. (5)
Where is indicative of place, and this has six species: up,
down, right, left, in front, and behind. (6) Having on is an 5
arrangement of a substance around a substance; for it
signifies having shoes on, having armour on, and other such
things.

On Opposites

Ilbl6. [We must talk] about opposites, and the various

ways [in which things are usually opposed].
Aristotle's aim here is to teach us about the words mentioned
in the doctrine of categories that require some articulation 10
and explanation, although from common usage they are not
completely unknown to us. He speaks first about opposites.
For indeed he mentioned opposites in the <discussion of>
relatives, when he said that large and small are opposed not
as contraries but as relatives.142 Thus he wants to teach
<us> in how many ways opposites are spoken of, and he says 15
that they are opposed in four ways: (1) as relatives, (2) as
contraries, (3) as privation and state, (4) as affirmation and
negation.
So that we may have a practical understanding of how

142
Ammonius apparently has in mind a passage (5bl5-6all) in the chapter on
quantity, where Aristotle says that large and small are relatives and not contraries.
But Aristotle does not there call them opposites. As Pelletier points out, the word
'opposite' (antikeimenon) and its cognates do not occur in the passage cited.
 114 Commentary
opposites are spoken of in four ways, let's obtain them by
division. Opposites are opposed either (A) in statements, as
affirmation and negation, e.g. 'Socrates walks' / 'Socrates does
20 not walk', or (B) in things. In the latter case they either (Bl)
have a relation or (B2) are manifested on their own. The ones
having a relation are said to be opposed as relatives, e.g. right
and left; the others are opposed not with respect to a relation
but on their own. These either (B2a) change into one another or
94,1 (B2b) do not change. If they change, they are opposed as
contraries, e.g. dark and pale; if they do not change, they are
opposed with respect to privation and state, e.g. sight and
blindness.
But why did he list them in this order? We reply that he
5 began with the ones having the mildest opposition, I mean
relatives. For it is scarcely in their nature to be at war with one
another. In fact they bring "each other in together, and if one
exists the other always exists as well, and conversely if one
does not exist neither will the other exist. Second he talks
about contraries, for contraries are more violently opposed.
10 Indeed, they destroy one another, and if one exists the other
always perishes. Yet things <opposed> as privation and state
are more violently <opposed> than these. For contraries
destroy one another, as we said, but they also change into one
another (for pale comes to be from dark, and conversely). But
things opposed as privation and state do not change into one
another. For a blind person will not recover his sight nor will a
15 bald one grow hair. Yet more violent than this is the opposition
of affirmation and negation. For this one alone is manifested in
the case of everything that exists; the others are not. For the
opposition between relatives is not said to apply in every case.
Thus if one happens to be alone one is not said to be either on
the right or on the left.
Nor do contraries apply in every case. For a substance has no
20 contrary, and a word is not said to be white or black according
to the contrariety of colours. Likewise the opposition of
privation and state is not spoken of in all cases. For a stone is
not said to be blind or to have sight or to be bald. But the
opposition of affirmation and negation is manifested in every
case. For Socrates is either said to be on the right or not to be on
the right, and a substance is either said to have a contrary or
 On Opposites 115
143
not, and a stone either to have sight or not to have sight. 25
And in the same way in every case you will find the opposition
of affirmation and negation in abundance. Hence it was
reasonable to mention first the <opposition> of relatives,
second that of contraries, third that of privation and state,
and fourth affirmation and negation.

1 Ib32. Therefore things opposed [as relatives]. 95,1

Aristotle wants to show that the opposition between relatives
is not the same as that of contraries, and this is how he does it.
Things opposed as relatives are said to be the very things that
they are of other things, e.g. what is to the right is <said to
be> to the right of what is to the left. But things opposed as 5
contraries are not said to be the very things they are of other
things. For white is not said <to be> white of black. Therefore
things opposed as relatives are different from those opposed
as contraries.

Ilb38. Those contraries [which are such that it is

necessary for one or the other of them to belong].
Having distinguished the opposition between relatives from
that of contraries, Aristotle now wishes to distinguish it also
from the rest. For this purpose he offers a division of 10
contraries which he sets out as follows. Some contraries have
no intermediate, such as odd and even; others have an
intermediate, such as white and black and anything like that.
Some of the contraries that have an intermediate are such
that it is not necessary that one or the other of them be
present in a subject, such as white and black. For it is not
necessary that every body is either white or black; <a body> 15
143
A subtle confusion may have crept into Ammonius' comments. The point he
seems to be making here is that whether F is (i) a relation, (ii) a contrary, or (iii) a
state (or privation), a substance, S, either has F or does not have F. But if so, his way
of expressing (ii) is unfortunate. For his talk of a substance 'having a contrary or not'
recalls his comment at 94,19 that 'a substance has no contrary'. But his point there
was the altogether different one that substances themselves are not contraries (e.g.
horse is not the contrary of anything). But a substance may nevertheless have a
property which is itself a contrary (e.g. Socrates is pale, and pale is contrary to dark),
and in this sense the substance may (misleadingly) be said to 'have a contrary'.
Ammonius seems to be speaking this way here.
 116 Commentary
can also be grey or some other intermediate <colour>. But
some are such that it is necessary that one or the other of
them be present in a subject, such as heat in a fire. For cooling
never takes place in it; and likewise in snow <there is>
coldness and never the contrary.144

20 12a6. Also odd and even [are predicated of numbers].

For every number is either odd or even, and no number can be
found that is not like that.

12a6. Also [while] bad and good can be predicated [both

of men and of many other things ... ].
It is not only in the case of man that we use the <terms> bad
25 and good, but also in the case of many other things, for
example, horses and dogs and the like.

12a20. In some cases [there are established] names [for

the intermediates, e.g. grey and yellow between light and
dark... ].
Among contraries having an intermediate, some have an
intermediate that has been given a name, as white and black
96,1 have <as intermediates> pale and grey and the like, whereas
others do not but <their intermediate> is signified by the
144
Ammonius' commentary here is misleading. Let us call contraries mediated if
they have something intermediate between them, and bare if they do not. Aristotle
does not, in fact, divide mediated contraries in the way that Ammonius suggests.
After noting (Hb38, 12b27) that it is necessary for one or the other of a pair of bare
contraries to belong to any subject capable of receiving them, he asserts emphatically
(12b35) that it is not necessary for one or the other of a pair of mediated contraries to
belong to any subject capable of receiving them. At 12b37 he notes an apparent
exception: a pair of mediated contraries (heat and cold) one of which (heat) belongs
necessarily to a subject (fire).
As a little reflection will show (and as Aristotle is well aware - cf. 12b41-13a3), this
is not a genuine exception. Heat (and therefore heat or cold) belongs necessarily to
fire. But the rule is that with mediated contraries it is not necessary for one or the
other to belong to every suitable subject. That is, when contraries are mediated there
will always be some suitable subject that lacks them both. A genuine exception would
consist of a pair of mediated contraries one or the other of which belongs necessarily
to every subject capable of receiving either. The example of heat and fire, on the other
hand, is one of a particular subject to which some mediated contrary belongs
necessarily. Fire is necessarily hot, but some things (e.g. lukewarm water) are
neither hot nor cold. So Aristotle's rule remains intact.
 On Opposites 117
negation of the extremes. For example, the mean between bad
and good is not called by a name, but we make it known by
denying the extremes, saying, for example, 'that which is
neither bad nor good'.

12a26. Privation and state are spoken of [in regard to the 5

same thing, e.g. sight and blindness in regard to the eye].
Wishing to distinguish the opposition between relatives from
the opposition between privation and state, Aristotle teaches
first about things opposed in respect of privation and state. He
says that the thing of which the state is said is also the one in
which the privation is observed.

12a29. We say [that a thing capable of admitting a state] 10

is deprived [of it if the state is one that naturally belongs
to that thing ... ].
The Philosopher quite convincingly asserts that if we are
going to say that something is deprived of something, we must
consider these three points: first, whether the thing we are
speaking about is capable of admitting <the state>; next, the
place in which it is naturally said <to have the state>; third,
the proper time at which the state should have existed. Thus,
it is necessary first to consider the subject, because some
things are utterly unreceptive. (For we don't say that a stone 15
is deprived of sight, since it is totally deprived of the capacity
to acquire sight; we might as well say that it is deprived of
justice. Rather I think it is clear that a privation is spoken of
only with respect to a pre-existing possession.) Second, it is
also <necessary to consider> the part in which it is natural
for it to have <the state>. (A man is capable of receiving
sight, but we do not say that his foot is deprived of sight 20
because, as we said, he does not naturally have sight in that
part.) Finally in these matters <it is necessary to consider>
the proper time. A young puppy naturally has sight and <has
it> in the required part; yet it does not see and it is not said to
be deprived of sight because the proper time has not yet
arrived for it to receive sight in actuality. At first it < simply>
does not see; <only> later does it become blind. So the 25
 118 Commentary
Philosopher rightly and convincingly tells us to watch for and
consider these three points. Tor it is not what<ever> lacks
teeth that we call toothless' - surely not what has just now
been born — 'and not simply145 what lacks sight <that we
call> blind' (12a31-32) - surely not a puppy.

97,1 12a35. But to be deprived is not a privation and to have a

state is not a state.
With these <words> the Philosopher wishes to show that to
be deprived is not the same thing as privation nor to have a
state <the same thing> as a state; but they are said
5 paronymously from the same thing. For if they were the same
thing, they would both be predicated of the same thing. If a
state and having a state were the same, they would both be
predicated of the same thing, and similarly with regard to a
privation. But in fact it is not so. For we do not call a blind
<man> blindness.

12b6. But similarly146 what an affirmation or a negation

10 is about is not [an affirmation or a negation].
From the fact that an affirmation and a negation are
statements, whereas the things signified by them are things,
Aristotle shows that affirmation and negation are not the
same as the things that are signified by them. But these, too,
15 are said to be opposed as affirmation and negation, <just as>
'Socrates is sitting* <is opposed> to 'Socrates is not sitting5.
By 'these' I mean the things themselves, for example, <the
things signified by> 'is sitting' and 'is not sitting'.

12bl6. [It is evident] that privation and state [are not

opposed as relatives].
Having distinguished relatives from contraries he now
distinguishes them from things opposed as privation and
state. He begins with what is more obvious and agreed upon, I
20 mean with the fact that sight is not said to be the sight of
145
'Simply' (haplos) added by Ammonius.
146
'Similarly' added by Ammonius.
 On Opposites 119
blindness. Later he shows, and this is doubtful, that blindness
is not said to be <the blindness> of sight. For this does seem
to be said.

12bl8. [For sight is not said to be sight of blindness,] nor

is it spoken of in any other way in relation to it.
Instead of: 'When you coin words, they are not spoken of at all
in relation to things conversely related to them.'147

12bl9. Nor, in the same way would blindness be said to 98,1

be the blindness of sight.
Aristotle points out that blindness is not called <the
blindness> of sight, for if it were so called, sight would also be
called <the sight> of blindness. For relatives are spoken of
with respect to things they are conversely related to, as with
'to the left of the right' and 'to the right of the left'. 5

12b26. [That the things spoken of as privation and state

are not opposed as contraries is clear from the following.]
Note that it would be natural <at this point> to distinguish
the opposition of relatives from that of affirmation and
negation. But Aristotle omits this, since he is about to
distinguish that <opposition>148 from the other three in a
single statement; instead he distinguishes the opposition of
privation and state from that of contraries. He makes a 10
division of contraries and explains them, first by means of
particular cases and then in a universal statement: 'Of
contraries which have nothing intermediate between them it
is necessary for one or the other always to belong to the things
in which they naturally occur, or of which they are
predicated.'149 We would not say that fire is odd or even or
147 The point of this obscure remark may be that Aristotle often coins a word for the
converse of a relative precisely so that he will have a term for what the relative is said
to be related to. But its relevance to the lemma, which deals with a privation and
state (blindness and sight) that both have names, is unclear.
148
i.e. the opposition between affirmation and negation. The passage Ammonius
refers to occurs at 13a37: 'It is evident that things opposed as affirmation and
negation are not opposed in any of the ways we have discussed.'
149
12b28-9, but not verbatim.
 120 Commentary
15 that a stone is ill or healthy, since they are not at all naturally
capable of receiving <these contraries>. He says 'for one or the
other always to belong to the things of which they are
predicated' on account of unmediated contraries; as he himself
says, 'in the case of illness and health and even and odd'
(12b30-31). For it is necessary for every number to be either
even or odd and for every body capable of receiving these <sc.
illness and health> to be ill or to be healthy.

20 12b33. It is not necessary for everything to be white or

black that is capable of receiving them.
It is not necessary for a body to be either white or black (for it
can also be grey) or for it to be cold or hot (for it can be
lukewarm) unless perhaps one of them necessarily belongs to
99,1 the subject as white belongs to snow or hot to fire, i.e. to the
conception itself, since just as heat is essentially combined
with fire so too are cold and white with snow.

13a3. But [neither of the things just mentioned is true] of

privation and [state].
5 Having set out the types of opposition between contraries,
Aristotle now shows that in none of the types mentioned can
the opposition between contraries be the same as that of
privation and state. For in the case of contraries that have
nothing intermediate, of necessity one or the other will belong
to the subject, but in the case of things <opposed> as
privation and state, it is not the case that of necessity one or
the other is always present in the subject. Therefore the
10 opposition between contraries that have nothing intermediate
is not the same as that between privation and state.150

150
Omitting all' oude tei ana meson with MS F.
 On Opposites 121
13a4. For it is not [necessary that one or the other of
these] always [belong] to what is capable of receiving
them.
Now first of all he distinguishes things <opposed> as
privation and state from contraries that have nothing inter-
mediate, arguing that one <or the other> of the latter is of
necessity present in the subject. For necessarily every number 15
is either odd or even, but not every body will of necessity be
called blind or sighted. For surely a stone will not, nor in
general will things that are not capable of receiving <either of
them>.151

13a8. Nor are they among those that have something

intermediate.
Next he distinguishes them from contraries that have an
intermediate, arguing that it is not the case that one or the
other of those is of necessity present in the subject. For it is 20
not necessary that every body be white or black, but in the case
of things <opposed> as privation and state, of necessity one
<or the other> of them is present in anything capable of

151
Ammonius' example of a stone is not appropriate here. For Aristotle explicitly
restricts his discussion to subjects that are 'capable of receiving" (dektika) the
contraries in question. A stone cannot be said to be blind (i.e. deprived of sight), to be
sure, but that is because it is not the sort of subject that is capable of having sight. If
such unsuitable subjects were allowed, Aristotle's claim that one or the other of a pair
of bare contraries belongs to every subject would be in jeopardy. (Clearly not
everything can be said to be odd or even.) In fact, Aristotle says that 'a thing for which
it is not yet natural to have sight is not said either to be blind or to have sight'
(13a5-6). His point is thus more subtle; it concerns only those subjects in which the
state naturally occurs (cf. 12a26ff.) and depends on considering the time at which it is
natural for them to have the state. (For more on Ammonius' neglect of temporal
considerations, see the next note.)
Aristotle's point is better illustrated by examples of the following sort. A newborn
kitten cannot see, but we would not say that it is blind on that account, for it is not
natural for newborn kittens to have sight. A newborn baby lacks teeth, and so may an
old man, but it is only the latter that we call toothless, for it is not natural for babies
to be born with teeth. And we would never say that an earthworm is toothless or
blind, for there is no time in an earthworm's life at which it would naturally have
teeth or sight.
 122 Commentary
receiving them.152 He adds 'to everything'153 since among
contraries that have an intermediate there are some of which
one or the other is of necessity present in a subject, as, for
example, heat in fire. But nevertheless he also points out a
25 difference these have in comparison to things <opposed> as
privation and state, namely, that it is definitely one or
<definitely> the other of these that is present in the subject.
For in the case of hot and cold, which are contraries that have
an intermediate, it is definitely heat that belongs to fire and not
just one or the other of them. But with things <opposed> as
100,1 privation and state it is not like that. For it is not necessary
that it be definitely sight that is present in what is capable of
receiving <it>, or <definitely> blindness, but whichever of
the two happens to belong.

13al8. Moreover, [it is possible for there to be change]

from one contrary [into another as long as there is
something capable of receiving them].
Having divided contraries into those which have something
intermediate and those which do not, and having compared
5 relatives with both of them, he now distinguishes them by
means of a general formula when he says that all contraries
change into one another unless one of them belongs to the
subject naturally and essentially. 'For change occurs', he says,

152
Ammonius ought to had said 'is at some time present in anything capable of
receiving them'. In distinguishing the opposition between privation and state from
the opposition between contraries of the two kinds (bare and mediated) previously
marked off (Ilb38-12a21), Aristotle uses a subtle blend of modal, temporal, and
quantificational notions. Every subject capable of receiving predicates opposed as
privation and state, Aristotle says, will (i) necessarily at some time in its career but
(ii) not necessarily at all times, be characterized by one or the other of them. These
two features distinguish privation and state both from mediated contraries, which do
not satisfy (i), and from bare contraries, which do not satisfy (ii). That is, some subject
may never have either of a pair of mediated contraries (e.g. black and white) even
though it is capable of receiving them (e.g. it has a colour, but its colour at any given
time falls between the two extremes); in the case of bare contraries, on the other
hand, every subject capable of receiving either of them necessarily at all times has
one or the other. Ammonius seems not to have recognized how crucial the temporal
dimension is (his commentary is devoid of temporal language with the sole exception
of a single occurrence of'always' at 99,9). As a result, he misleadingly makes Aristotle
appear to have contradicted himself (compare 99,8-9 with 99,21-2).
153
Aristotle's next sentence reads: 'For it is necessary that one or the other of these
at some time belong to everything capable of receiving them' (13a8-9).
 On Opposites 123
'from state into privation; from privation into state is
impossible.'154
But what is <the meaning of> 'he restores himself to the 10
contrary state, time permitting'?155 That means 'if he is not
too old when he starts doing philosophy'. For in that case time
will not permit his progress to advance all the way to the
contrary.

13a37. [It is evident that things opposed] as affirmation

[and negation are not opposed in any of the ways we have
discussed].
Having distinguished the three oppositions from one another
he now compares the remaining one to the three and 15
distinguishes it <from them> in a single statement by saying
'for only with these is it always necessary for one of them to be
true and the other false' (13b2-3). For it is distinctive of
affirmation and negation to divide in every case (epi pantos
pragmatos) <into> the true and the false, as he teaches in de
Interpretations^ If I say 'Socrates is sitting' <and>
'Socrates is not sitting', necessarily one of them is true and the 20
other false. And it is the same with all things <opposed> as
affirmation and negation.

13blO. But nothing at all [said] without any combination

[is either true or false].
Things said without any combination are clearly neither true
nor false; and relatives, contraries, and things <opposed> as
privation and state are said without combination. Clearly, 101
then, these are neither true nor false. Therefore they are not
the same as those said <to be opposed> as affirmation and
negation.

13bl2. Although it is not the case, it might certainly

[seem that this is how it is with contraries said in
combination].
154
13a32-4, slightly reworded.
155 156
13a30-l, slightly reworded. 17a25ff.
 124 Commentary
Aristotle raises an objection, saying that in the case of
5 contraries not said without combination it would seem that
one is true and the other false, whereas this is not the case. He
resolves this by <the method of> objection and counter-
objection. <He says> that, first of all, they do not always
(pantos) divide <into> the true and the false. For if someone
should say 'Socrates is well' <and> 'Socrates is ill', then if
Socrates exists (huparkhei), they divide, but if he does not
exist, the one which says that a nonexistent person is well and
10 the one which says that he is ill are both false. On the other
hand, if they do divide <into true and false>, then they are in
effect affirmation and negation; for that is what a statement
(legomenon) signifies. For we know that of opposites in
language (en logois), affirmation and negation are opposed in
this way. Therefore <contraries said in combination> do not
always divide <into the true and the false, i.e. they do not do>
precisely what is distinctive of affirmation and negation.

On Contraries

15 13b36. A good thing's contrary is [necessarily a bad

thing].
Having completed his discussion of opposites, Aristotle now
wants to talk about the various ways in which contraries are
said. He says that the contrary of a good thing will always be
bad, but not conversely - the contrary of a bad thing is not
always good. The contrary of a bad thing is sometimes good
and sometimes bad - not good exclusively. For excess, a bad
20 thing, is contrary to deficiency, which is bad, and similarly
rashness is opposed to cowardice, which is bad. But such
contraries are rare, since for the most part a bad thing is
contrary to a good one.

102,1 14a7. Moreover, with contraries [it is not necessary that,

if one exists, the other will, too].
It is clear that Aristotle is now also examining contraries as
things and not as contraries. For if white exists, he says, it is
 On Contraries 125
not necessary for black to exist, but if it exists as a contrary, of
necessity black exists. For a contrary is said to be contrary to
something, as has already been pointed out in <the discussion
of> relatives.

14alO. Moreover, if Socrates' being healthy [is contrary to

Socrates' being ill and it is not possible for both to belong to
him at the same time, then if one of the contraries existed
it would not be possible for the other to exist as well].
He says this because contraries are destructive of one
another, and when one of them exists the other would never
exist in the subject in the same part at the same time. For
health and illness are contraries and will never belong to the
same thing simultaneously. 10

14al5. It is clear that [contraries naturally arise] in

something which is the same [either in species or in
genus].
Another concomitant of contraries is that both of them are
found in a single subject. And this is reasonable. For things
that are at war with and fight one another must do so by
meeting in a single subject or place.

14a22. But justice and injustice are [in separate genera]. 15

Although above he had said that contraries must be in the
same genus, Aristotle now shows that they are not all in the
same genus. Indeed, justice and injustice, which are contrary
genera, are not found in the same genus; for justice is in the
genus, virtue, whereas injustice is in the genus, vice. We reply
that genera that are themselves contraries still have some 20
common genus. Thus virtue is a state and vice is likewise a
state.157

157
At this point MS M adds: The good is thought of as the care (sustasis) of
substance, just as evil is the abandonment (ekptosis) of substance, so that the
categories do not become more numerous than promised.
 126 Commentary

i03-1 On Priority

14a26. One thing is said to be prior to another [in four

ways].
Since Aristotle mentioned priority in his doctrine of the
categories, it is reasonable for him to enumerate its meanings.
5 He makes a division and says that there are four, but later he
adds a fifth. He says, first, there is what is called priority in
time, according to which we say that an elder is prior to a
youth. (Notice that we say 'elder' (presbuteron) for the
animate and 'older' (palaioteron) for the inanimate.) The
second meaning <of'prior'> is <that in which> the converse
of an implication of existence does not hold. That is to say,
10 that which is entailed (suneispheromenon) does not entail
(suneispherori) <the other>.158 For that is what it is for there
to be no converse implication of existence. For example, if
there are two things, there will necessarily be one <thing>
(for one is entailed), but if there is one there will not
necessarily be two (for <two> is not entailed by one).
Therefore one is prior to two. Again, if there is a human being,
there will necessarily be an animal (for animal is entailed by
15 human being), but if there is an animal there will not always
be a human being. For human being is not entailed by it.
There are many animals that are not human beings.
Therefore, animal is prior to human being. But this way of
talking has to do with nature and not with time. The third is
<priority> in order (taxis), in the way that the introduction is
prior to the narrative. The fourth <is priority> in worth
(axioma), in the way that the commander <is prior> to the
20 commanded. The fifth is that in which there is a converse
implication of existence, but <the prior> is the cause of the
other's existence.

14b7. This is perhaps the strangest [of the ways.]

This is precisely because it has been established by our choice
and not by the nature of things.
158
cf. n. 64.
 On Simultaneity 127
14bll. For when there is a converse [implication of 104,1
existence].
For if, Aristotle says, one of the reciprocals were the cause of
the existence of the other, it would rightly be called prior.159
For example, a father is the father of a son, but they
reciprocate with each other: the son is the son of the father. If,
then, the father is the cause of the existence of the son, he 5
would rightly be called prior in nature to the son.

14b22. Therefore there are five ways in which one thing

might be said to be prior to another.
In talking about the prior, Aristotle has also <in effect>
mentioned the posterior.160 For his account of the posterior is
clear from his teaching about the prior. Indeed these <two>
belong together, since they are both relatives. For the prior is 10
said to be prior to the posterior, and posterior is said in each of
the ways in which prior is said.

On Simultaneity

14b24. It is things that come into being [at the same

time] that are said to be, simply and in the strictest
sense, simultaneous. 15
Since Aristotle mentioned the simultaneous in his teaching on
the categories,161 he also discusses it <here>. Just as we said
about priority, that its first meaning, strictly speaking, is with
respect to time, so also here, Aristotle says. Nature is second,
just as was also said about the former. This < sense > is
opposed to the second and fifth senses of priority, for <with 20
them> there is a converse implication of existence and
neither is the cause of the other's existence. Examples <of 105,1
naturally simultaneous things> are terrestrial, aerial, and
169
Reading to heteron for to heterou.
160
Reading kai ('also') with all MSS and rejecting Busse's ouketi ('not yet'), which
he derives from Philoponus.
161
7bl5ff.
 128 Commentary
aquatic animals. For one type of animal is aerial, another is
terrestrial, and a third is aquatic. They are therefore said to be
simultaneous, since they are <obtained> from the same genus
by the same division, as Aristotle says. But if the aerial
<kind> is divided, perhaps into birds and insects (akrides),
5 then bird and aerial are no longer said simultaneously; rather,
aerial is prior, because it is obtained from the first division of
animal.

On Change (kinesis)

15a<l>3. There are six kinds of change.

Aristotle once again talks about change, since he also
10 mentioned it in what has preceded.162 Motion is thus change
(metabole), and the changeable changes either substantially
(kat' ousian) or accidentally (kata sumbebekos). If <the
change is> substantial, it constitutes coming into being
(genesis) and destruction (phthora). (If it is from not being to
being, it will be coming into being; if it is from being to not
being, it constitutes destruction.) If it is accidental, the
change is either in the thing <that changes>, or on it, or near
15 (peri) it. And if it is in the thing itself, it is called growth and
diminution; if it is on the thing it is <called> qualitative
change; if it is near the thing it is called change of place.
Therefore there is change in four categories - in substance:
coming into being and destruction; in quantity: growth and
diminution; in quality: qualitative change; in the where:
change of place. Aristotle now does exactly what he did in the
20 case of opposites: he distinguishes the forms of movement
from one another.

15a25. For if it were the same, a case of qualitative

change [would have at once to be a case of growth, too, or
diminution...]
162
There is only one prior occurrence of the word kinesis in the Categories (5b3).
Pelletier suggests that Ammonius may have in mind Aristotle's earlier references to
action and affection. Perhaps Ammonius is thinking of his own previous commentary
(83,8ff) on Aristotle's discussion of change (metabole) inPhysics 7.3.
 On Change (kinesis) 129
Aristotle does not elaborate on any of the other < forms of
movement>, since they are clear. Concerning qualitative
change, he does, and says that if qualitative change were the
same as growth, a thing that has grown would have to change
in every way, which does not happen. Thus a square grows
when a gnomon is put around it, but it is not qualitatively 25
changed163 in any way, for it remains still a square. The
gnomon is the peripheral thing (peripheria) with two
complements around the diagonal.

When the gnomon AFEGC was put around it, the square 106,1
AC was enlarged but not qualitatively changed. For GF is also
a square. And again when the gnomon HFBGI was put
around it, the square ED was enlarged but not qualitatively
changed. For EB is also a square. Thus the gnomon is a
square with two complements around its diagonal. 5
So much for these matters. The rest we pass over, since
it is easy.164

IBS 'Not qualitatively changed' since its shape remains the same. Alloiosis (literally,
'alteration') is a change in quality, not in quantity. Hence the enlargement of a square
is not a qualitative change so long as it remains a square.
164
Ammonius offers no comments on the very brief Chapter 15, in which Aristotle
discusses the various senses of'having* (ekhein).
 Textual Emendations

The following textual changes have been adopted in the

translation:

8,5-6 he tes didaskalias apangelia for he tes apangelias

didaskalia with Pelletier
11,2-3 haiper eisi protaseis kai suntithetai ex onomaton kai
rhematon for kai suntithetai ex onomaton kai
rhematon haiper eisi protaseis with Pelletier
19,10 dikhos for tetrakhos
28,14 tou en hoi esti topou for tou melon en hoi esti topoi
31,14 proslambanei forprolambanei with MSS MF
31.19 hetera gene for heterogene with MS M
32,24 de akolouthos touto to for de akolouthos touto with
Busse
34.3 phesomen for ephamen with Busse
35,1 deitai arnetikou for deitai heterou arnetikou with
MSF
35,4-5 ou pantos he kataphasis kai he apophasis phaneros
aletheuei e pseudetai for ou pantos he kataphasis
aletheuei oude pantos he apophasis pseudetai with
Pelletier
37,6 en hupokeimenoi for kath' hupokeimenou with
Pelletier
43,1 Omitting tout'esti ta hupallela with MS M
46,27 Omitting to gar sumbebekos en tini with MSS MF
58,27 5al5 for 5al3
59.4 hupomenein for hupokeimeno with MS M
59,6 5a23 for 5a22
59.20 5a30 for 5a23
64,22 6allfor6al2
66,8 haute haple for haple with Busse
130
 Textual Emendations 131
66,19 e xulon for xulon with MS M
70,15 6bl9for6b20
72,13-14 he kephale ton pros ti- tinos gar kephale. ean oun
apodothe for he kephale ean apodothe with MS M
76,6 aisthetikon for aistheton
76,22 phemi forphesi
80,2 mathesetai for matheseos with MS F
86,14 pepoieisthai forpepoiosthai with MS F
89,9 oudegar for kaigar with Busse
99,11 Omitting all' oude tei ana meson with MS F
104,2 to heteron for to heterou (sic)
104,8 kai for o«&e£i with all MSS
 Appendix
The Commentators*

The 15,000 pages of the Ancient Greek Commentaries on Aristotle are the
largest corpus of Ancient Greek philosophy that has not been translated
into English or other modern European languages. The standard edition
(Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, or CAG) was produced by Hermann
Diels as general editor under the auspices of the Prussian Academy in
Berlin. Arrangements have now been made to translate at least a large
proportion of this corpus, along with some other Greek and Latin
commentaries not included in the Berlin edition, and some closely related
non-commentary works by the commentators.
The works are not just commentaries on Aristotle, although they are
invaluable in that capacity too. One of the ways of doing philosophy between
A.D. 200 and 600, when the most important items were produced, was by
writing commentaries. The works therefore represent the thought of the
Peripatetic and Neoplatonist schools, as well as expounding Aristotle.
Furthermore, they embed fragments from all periods of Ancient Greek
philosophical thought: this is how many of the Presocratic fragments were
assembled, for example. Thus they provide a panorama of every period of
Ancient Greek philosophy.
The philosophy of the period from A.D. 200 to 600 has not yet been
intensively explored by philosophers in English-speaking countries, yet it is
full of interest for physics, metaphysics, logic, psychology, ethics and
religion. The contrast with the study of the Presocratics is striking. Initially
the incomplete Presocratic fragments might well have seemed less
promising, but their interest is now widely known, thanks to the
philological and philosophical effort that has been concentrated upon them.
The incomparably vaster corpus which preserved so many of those
fragments offers at least as much interest, but is still relatively little
known.
The commentaries represent a missing link in the history of philosophy:
the Latin-speaking Middle Ages obtained their knowledge of Aristotle at
least partly through the medium of the commentaries. Without an
appreciation of this, mediaeval interpretations of Aristotle will not be
understood. Again, the ancient commentaries are the unsuspected source of
ideas which have been thought, wrongly, to originate in the later mediaeval

* Reprinted from the Editor's General Introduction to the series in Christian

Wildberg, Philoponus Against Aristotle on the Eternity of the World, London and Ithaca
N.Y., 1987.

132
 The Commentators 133
period. It has been supposed, for example, that Bonaventure in the
thirteenth century invented the ingenious arguments based on the concept
of infinity which attempt to prove the Christian view that the universe had
a beginning. In fact, Bonaventure is merely repeating arguments devised by
the commentator Philoponus 700 years earlier and preserved in the
meantime by the Arabs. Bonaventure even uses Philoponus' original
examples. Again, the introduction of impetus theory into dynamics, which
has been called a scientific revolution, has been held to be an independent
invention of the Latin West, even if it was earlier discovered by the Arabs or
their predecessors. But recent work has traced a plausible route by which it
could have passed from Philoponus, via the Arabs, to the West.
The new availability of the commentaries in the sixteenth century,
thanks to printing and to fresh Latin translations, helped to fuel the
Renaissance break from Aristotelian science. For the commentators record
not only Aristotle's theories, but also rival ones, while Philoponus as a
Christian devises rival theories of his own and accordingly is mentioned in
Galileo's early works more frequently than Plato.1
It is not only for their philosophy that the works are of interest.
Historians will find information about the history of schools,2 their methods
of teaching and writing and the practices of an oral tradition. Linguists will
find the indexes and translations an aid for studying the development of
word meanings, almost wholly uncharted in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, and
for checking shifts in grammatical usage.
Given the wide range of interests to which the volumes will appeal, the
aim is to produce readable translations, and to avoid so far as possible
presupposing any knowledge of Greek. Footnotes will explain points of
meaning, give cross-references to other works, and suggest alternative
interpretations of the text where the translator does not have a clear
preference. The introduction to each volume will include an explanation
why the work was chosen for translation: none will be chosen simply
because it is there. Two of the Greek texts are currently being re-edited -
1
See Fritz Zimmermann, 'Philoponus' impetus theory in the Arabic tradition';
Charles Schmitt, 'Philoponus' commentary on Aristotle's Physics in the sixteenth
century', and Richard Sorabji, 'John Philoponus', in Richard Sorabji (ed.), Philoponus
and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987).
2
See e.g. Karl Praechter, 'Die griechischen Aristoteleskommentare', Byzantinische
Zeitschrift 18 (1909), 516-38 (translated into English in R. Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle
Transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence (London and Ithaca, N.Y.
1990)); M. Plezia, de Commentariis Isagogicis (Cracow 1947); M. Richard, 'Apo
Phones', Byzantion 20 (1950), 191-222; E. Evrard, L'Ecole d'Olympiodore et la
composition du commentaire a la physique de Jean Philopon, Diss. (Liege 1957); L.G.
Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962) (new
revised edition, translated into French, Collection Bude; part of the revised
introduction, in English, is included in Aristotle Transformed); A.-J. Festugiere,
'Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus', Museum Helveticum 20 (1963),
77-100, repr. in his Etudes (1971), 551-74; P. Hadot, 'Les divisions des parties de la
philosophie dans 1'antiquite', Museum Helveticum 36 (1979), 201-23; I. Hadot, 'La
division neoplatonicienne des ecrits d'Aristote', in J. Wiesner (ed.), Aristoteles Werk
und Wirkung (Paul Moraux gewidmet), vol. 2 (Berlin 1986); I. Hadot, 'Les
introductions aux commentaires exegetiques chez les auteurs neoplatoniciens et les
auteurs Chretiens', in M. Tardieu (ed.), Les regies de Interpretation (Paris 1987),
99-119. These topics are treated, and a bibliography supplied, in Aristotle
Transformed.
134 Appendix
those of Simplicius in Physica and in de Caelo - and new readings will be
exploited by translators as they become available. Each volume will also
contain a list of proposed emendations to the standard text. Indexes will be
of more uniform extent as between volumes than is the case with the Berlin
edition, and there will be three of them: an English-Greek glossary, a
Greek-English index, and a subject index.
The commentaries fall into three main groups. The first group is by
authors in the Aristotelian tradition up to the fourth century A.D. This
includes the earliest extant commentary, that by Aspasius in the first half
of the second century A.D. on the Nicomachean Ethics. The anonymous
commentary on Books 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics, in CAG vol.
20, is derived from Adrastus, a generation later.3 The commentaries by
Alexander of Aphrodisias (appointed to his chair between A.D. 198 and 209)
represent the fullest flowering of the Aristotelian tradition. To his
successors Alexander was The Commentator par excellence. To give but one
example (not from a commentary) of his skill at defending and elaborating
Aristotle's views, one might refer to his defence of Aristotle's claim that
space is finite against the objection that an edge of space is conceptually
problematic.4 Themistius (ft. late 340s to 384 or 385) saw himself as the
inventor of paraphrase, wrongly thinking that the job of commentary was
completed.5 In fact, the Neoplatonists were to introduce new dimensions
into commentary. Themistius' own relation to the Neoplatonist as opposed
to the Aristotelian tradition is a matter of controversy,6 but it would be
agreed that his commentaries show far less bias than the full-blown
Neoplatonist ones. They are also far more informative than the designation
'paraphrase' might suggest, and it has been estimated that Philoponus'
Physics commentary draws silently on Themistius six hundred times.7 The
pseudo-Alexandrian commentary on Metaphysics 6-14, of unknown
authorship, has been placed by some in the same group of commentaries as
being earlier than the fifth century.8
3
Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics (Oxford 1978), 37, n.3; Paul Moraux, Der
Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, vol. 2 (Berlin 1984), 323-30.
4
Alexander, Quaestiones 3.12, discussed in my Matter, Space and Motion (London
and Ithaca, N.Y. 1988). For Alexander see R.W. Sharpies, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias:
scholasticism and innovation', in W. Haase (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der
romischen Welt, part 2 Principat, vol. 36.2, Philosophic und Wissenschaften (1987).
5
Themistius in An. Post. 1,2-12. See H.J. Blumenthal, 'Photius on Themistius
(Cod.74): did Themistius write commentaries on Aristotle?', Hermes 107 (1979),
168-82.
6
For different views, see H.J. Blumenthal, 'Themistius, the last Peripatetic
commentator on Aristotle?', in Glen W. Bowersock, Walter Burkert, Michael C.J.
Putnam, Arktouros, Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M.W. Knox (Berlin and
N.Y., 1979), 391-400; E.P. Mahoney, 'Themistius and the agent intellect in James of
Viterbo and other thirteenth-century philosophers: (Saint Thomas Aquinas, Siger of
Brabant and Henry Bate)', Augustiniana 23 (1973), 422-67, at 428-31; id.,
'Neoplatonism, the Greek commentators and Renaissance Aristotelianism', in D.J.
O'Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (Albany N.Y. 1982), 169-77 and
264-82, esp. n. 1, 264-6; Robert Todd, introduction to translation of Themistius in DA
3.4-8, in Two Greek Aristotelian Commentators on the Intellect, trans. Frederick M.
Schroeder and Robert B. Todd (Toronto 1990).
7
H. Vitelli, CAG 17, p. 992, s.v. Themistius.
8
The similarities to Syrianus (died c.437) have suggested to some that it predates
Syrianus (most recently Leonardo Taran, review of Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus,
 The Commentators 135
By far the largest group of extant commentaries is that of the
Neoplatonists up to the sixth century A.D. Nearly all the major
Neoplatonists, apart from Plotinus (the founder of Neoplatonism), wrote
commentaries on Aristotle, although those of lamblichus (c. 250 — c. 325)
survive only in fragments, and those of three Athenians, Plutarchus (died
432), his pupil Proclus (410 - 485) and the Athenian Damascius (c. 462 -
after 538), are lost.9 As a result of these losses, most of the extant
Neoplatonist commentaries come from the late fifth and the sixth centuries
and a good proportion from Alexandria. There are commentaries by
Plotinus' disciple and editor Porphyry (232 - 309), by lamblichus' pupil
Dexippus (c. 330), by Proclus' teacher Syrianus (died c. 437), by Proclus'
pupil Ammonius (435/445 - 517/526), by Ammonius' three pupils
Philoponus (c. 490 to 570s), Simplicius (wrote after 532, probably after 538)
and Asclepius (sixth century), by Ammonius' next but one successor
Olympiodorus (495/505 - after 565), by Elias (fl. 541?), by David (second half
of the sixth century, or beginning of the seventh) and by Stephanus (took
the chair in Constantinople c. 610). Further, a commentary on the
Nicomachean Ethics has been ascribed to Heliodorus of Prusa, an unknown
pre-fourteenth-century figure, and there is a commentary by Simplicius'
colleague Priscian of Lydia on Aristotle's successor Theophrastus. Of these
commentators some of the last were Christians (Philoponus, Elias, David
and Stephanus), but they were Christians writing in the Neoplatonist
tradition, as was also Boethius who produced a number of commentaries in
Latin before his death in 525 or 526.
The third group comes from a much later period in Byzantium. The Berlin
edition includes only three out of more than a dozen commentators
described in Hunger's Byzantinisch.es Handbuch.10 The two most important
are Eustratius (1050/1060 - c. 1120), and Michael of Ephesus. It has been
suggested that these two belong to a circle organised by the princess Anna
Comnena in the twelfth century, and accordingly the completion of
Michael's commentaries has been redated from 1040 to 1138.n His
commentaries include areas where gaps had been left. Not all of these
gap-fillers are extant, but we have commentaries on the neglected biological
works, on the Sophistici Elenchi, and a small fragment of one on the
Politics. The lost Rhetoric commentary had a few antecedents, but the
Rhetoric too had been comparatively neglected. Another product of this
vol. 1, in Gnomon 46 (1981), 721-50 at 750), to others that it draws on him (most
recently P. Thillet, in the Bude edition of Alexander de Fato, p. Ivii). Praechter
ascribed it to Michael of Ephesus (eleventh or twelfth century), in his review of CAG
22.2, in Gottingische Gelehrte Anzeiger 168 (1906), 861-907.
9
The lamblichus fragments are collected in Greek by Bent Dalsgaard Larsen,
Jamblique de Chains, Exegete et Philosophe (Aarhus 1972), vol.2. Most are taken
from Simplicius, and will accordingly be translated in due course. The evidence on
Damascius' commentaries is given in L.G. Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on
Plato's Phaedo, vol.2., Damascius (Amsterdam 1977), 11-12; on Proclus' in L.G.
Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962), xii,
n.22; on Plutarchus' in H.M. Blumenthal, 'Neoplatonic elements in the de Anima
commentaries', Phronesis 21 (1976), 75.
10
Herbert Hunger, Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner, vol.1
(= Byzantinisches Handbuch, part 5, vol.1) (Munich 1978), 25-41. See also B.N.
Tatakis, La Philosophic Byzantine (Paris 1949).
11
R. Browning, 'An unpublished funeral oration on Anna Comnena', Proceedings of
the Cambridge Philological Society n.s. 8 (1962), 1-12, esp. 6-7.
136 Appendix
period may have been the composite commentary on the Nicomachean
Ethics (CAG 20) by various hands, including Eustratius and Michael, along
with some earlier commentators, and an improvisation for Book 7. Whereas
Michael follows Alexander and the conventional Aristotelian tradition,
Eustratius' commentary introduces Platonist, Christian and anti-Islamic
elements.12
The composite commentary was to be translated into Latin in the next cen-
tury by Robert Grosseteste in England. But Latin translations of various logi-
cal commentaries were made from the Greek still earlier by James of Venice
(fl. c. 1130), a contemporary of Michael of Ephesus, who may have known him
in Constantinople. And later in that century other commentaries and works
by commentators were being translated from Arabic versions by Gerard of
Cremona (died 1187).13 So the twelfth century resumed the transmission
which had been interrupted at Boethius' death in the sixth century.
The Neoplatonist commentaries of the main group were initiated by
Porphyry. His master Plotinus had discussed Aristotle, but in a very
independent way, devoting three whole treatises (Enneads 6.1—3) to
attacking Aristotle's classification of the things in the universe into
categories. These categories took no account of Plato's world of Ideas, were
inferior to Plato's classifications in the Sophist and could anyhow be
collapsed, some of them into others. Porphyry replied that Aristotle's
categories could apply perfectly well to the world of intelligibles and he took
them as in general defensible.14 He wrote two commentaries on the
Categories, one lost, and an introduction to it, the Isagoge, as well as
commentaries, now lost, on a number of other Aristotelian works. This
proved decisive in making Aristotle a necessary subject for Neoplatonist
lectures and commentary. Proclus, who was an exceptionally quick student,
is said to have taken two years over his Aristotle studies, which were called
12
R. Browning, op. cit. H.D.P. Mercken, The Greek Commentaries of the
Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation of Grosseteste, Corpus
Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VI 1 (Leiden 1973), ch.l, 'The
compilation of Greek commentaries on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics'. Sten
Ebbesen, 'Anonymi Aurelianensis I Commentarium in Sophisticos Elenchos', Cahiers
de I'lnstitut Moyen Age Grecque et Latin 34 (1979), 'Boethius, Jacobus Veneticus,
Michael Ephesius and "Alexander" ', pp. v-xiii; id., Commentators and Commentaries
on Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi, 3 parts, Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in
Aristotelem Graecorum, vol. 7 (Leiden 1981); A. Preus, Aristotle and Michael of
Ephesus on the Movement and Progression of Animals (Hildesheim 1981),
introduction.
13
For Grosseteste, see Mercken as in n. 12. For James of Venice, see Ebbesen as in
n. 12, and L. Minio-Paluello, 'Jacobus Veneticus Grecus', Traditio 8 (1952), 265-304;
id., 'Giacomo Veneto e 1'Aristotelismo Latino', in Pertusi (ed.), Venezia e I'Oriente fra
tardo Medioevo e Rinascimento (Florence 1966), 53-74, both reprinted in his
Opuscula (1972). For Gerard of Cremona, see M. Steinschneider, Die europaischen
Ubersetzungen aus dem arabischen bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts (repr. Graz 1956);
E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London 1955), 235-6
and more generally 181-246. For the translators in general, see Bernard G. Dod,
'Aristoteles Latinus', in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (eds). The Cambridge
History of Latin Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge 1982).
14
See P. Hadot, 'L'harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d'Aristote selon Porphyre
dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Categories', in Plotino e il neoplatonismo in
Oriente e in Occidente (Rome 1974), 31-47; A.C. Lloyd, 'Neoplatonic logic and
Aristotelian logic', Phronesis I (1955-6), 58-79 and 146-60.
 The Commentators 137
the Lesser Mysteries, and which preceded the Greater Mysteries of Plato.15
By the time of Ammonius, the commentaries reflect a teaching curriculum
which begins with Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories, and is
explicitly said to have as its final goal a (mystical) ascent to the supreme
Neoplatonist deity, the One.16 The curriculum would have progressed from
Aristotle to Plato, and would have culminated in Plato's Timaeus and
Parmenides. The latter was read as being about the One, and both works
were established in this place in the curriculum at least by the time of
lamblichus, if not earlier.17
Before Porphyry, it had been undecided how far a Platonist should accept
Aristotle's scheme of categories. But now the proposition began to gain force
that there was a harmony between Plato and Aristotle on most things.18 Not
for the only time in the history of philosophy, a perfectly crazy proposition
proved philosophically fruitful. The views of Plato and of Aristotle had both
to be transmuted into a new Neoplatonist philosophy in order to exhibit the
supposed harmony. lamblichus denied that Aristotle contradicted Plato on
the theory of Ideas.19 This was too much for Syrianus and his pupil Proclus.
While accepting harmony in many areas,20 they could see that there was
disagreement on this issue and also on the issue of whether God was
causally responsible for the existence of the ordered physical cosmos, which
Aristotle denied. But even on these issues, Proclus' pupil Ammonius was to
claim harmony, and, though the debate was not clear cut,21 his claim was on
the whole to prevail. Aristotle, he maintained, accepted Plato's Ideas,22 at
least in the form of principles (logoi) in the divine intellect, and these
principles were in turn causally responsible for the beginningless existence
of the physical universe. Ammonius wrote a whole book to show that
15
Marinus, Life of Proclus ch.13,157,41 (Boissonade).
16
The introductions to the Isagoge by Ammonius, Elias and David, and to the
Categories by Ammonius, Simplicius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Elias are
discussed by L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena and I. Hadot, 'Les
Introductions', see n. 2. above.
17
Proclus in Alcibiadem 1 p.ll (Creuzer); Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena, ch.
26, 12f. For the Neoplatonist curriculum see Westerink, Festugiere, P. Hadot and I.
Hadot in n. 2.
18
See e.g. P. Hadot (1974), as in n. 14 above; H.J. Blumenthal, 'Neoplatonic
elements in the de Anima commentaries', Phronesis 21 (1976), 64-87; H.A. Davidson,
'The principle that a finite body can contain only finite power', in S. Stein and R.
Loewe (eds), Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History presented to A.
Altmann (Alabama 1979), 75-92; Carlos Steel, 'Proclus et Aristote', Proceedings of the
Congres Proclus held in Paris 1985, J. Pepin and H.D. Saffrey (eds), Proclus, lecteur
et interprets des anciens (Paris 1987), 213-25; Koenraad Verrycken, God en Wereld in
de Wijsbegeerte van loannes Philoponus, Ph.D. Diss. (Louvain 1985).
19
lamblichus ap. Elian in Cat. 123,1-3.
20
Syrianus in Metaph. 80,4-7; Proclus in Tim. 1.6,21-7,16.
21
Asclepius sometimes accepts Syranius' interpretation (in Metaph. 433,9-436,6);
which is, however, qualified, since Syrianus thinks Aristotle is really committed
willy-nilly to much of Plato's view (in Metaph. 117,25-118,11; ap. Asclepium in
Metaph. 433,16; 450,22); Philoponus repents of his early claim that Plato is not the
target of Aristotle's attack, and accepts that Plato is rightly attacked for treating
ideas as independent entities outside the divine Intellect (in DA 37,18-31; in Phys.
225,4-226,11; contra Prod. 26,24-32,13; in An. Post. 242,14-243,25).
22
Asclepius in Metaph from the voice of (i.e. from the lectures of) Ammonius
69,17-21; 71,28; cf. Zacharias Ammonius, Patrologia Graeca vol. 85, col. 952
(Colonna).
138 Appendix
Aristotle's God was thus an efficient cause, and though the book is lost,
some of its principal arguments are preserved by Simplicius.23 This
tradition helped to make it possible for Aquinas to claim Aristotle's God as a
Creator, albeit not in the sense of giving the universe a beginning, but in the
sense of being causally responsible for its beginningless existence.24 Thus
what started as a desire to harmonise Aristotle with Plato finished by
making Aristotle safe for Christianity. In Simplicius, who goes further than
anyone,25 it is a formally stated duty of the commentator to display the
harmony of Plato and Aristotle in most things.26 Philoponus, who with his
independent mind had thought better of his earlier belief in harmony, is
castigated by Simplicius for neglecting this duty.27
The idea of harmony was extended beyond Plato and Aristotle to Plato
and the Presocratics. Plato's pupils Speusippus and Xenocrates saw Plato
as being in the Pythagorean tradition.28 From the third to first centuries
B.C., pseudo-Pythagorean writings present Platonic and Aristotelian
doctrines as if they were the ideas of Pythagoras and his pupils,29 and these
forgeries were later taken by the Neoplatonists as genuine. Plotinus saw
the Presocratics as precursors of his own views,30 but lamblichus went far
beyond him by writing ten volumes on Pythagorean philosophy.31
Thereafter Proclus sought to unify the whole of Greek philosophy by
presenting it as a continuous clarification of divine revelation,32 and
Simplicius argued for the same general unity in order to rebut Christian
charges of contradictions in pagan philosophy.33
Later Neoplatonist commentaries tend to reflect their origin in a teaching
curriculum:34 from the time of Philoponus, the discussion is often divided up
into lectures, which are subdivided into studies of doctrine and of text. A
general account of Aristotle's philosophy is prefixed to the Categories
commentaries and divided, according to a formula of Proclus,35 into ten
questions. It is here that commentators explain the eventual purpose of
studying Aristotle (ascent to the One) and state (if they do) the requirement
of displaying the harmony of Plato and Aristotle. After the ten-point
introduction to Aristotle, the Categories is given a six-point introduction,
whose antecedents go back earlier than Neoplatonism, and which requires
23
Simplicius in Phys. 1361,11-1363,12. See H.A. Davidson; Carlos Steel; Koenraad
Verrycken in n. 18 above.
24
See Richard Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion (London and Ithaca N.Y. 1988),
ch. 15.
25
See e.g. H.J. Blumenthal in n. 18 above.
26
Simplicius in Cat. 7,23-32.
27
Simplicius in Cael. 84,11-14; 159,2-9. On Philoponus' volte face see n. 21 above.
28
See e.g. Walter Burkert, Weisheit und Wissenschaft (Nurnberg 1962), translated
as Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism (Cambridge Mass. 1972), 83-96.
29
See Holger Thesleff, An Introduction to the Pythagorean writings of the
Hellenistic Period (Abo 1961); Thomas Alexander Szlezak, Pseudo-Archytas fiber die
Kategorien, Peripatoi vol. 4 (Berlin and New York 1972).
30
Plotinus e.g. 4.8.1; 5.1.8 (10-27); 5.1.9.
31
See Dominic O'Meara, Pythagoras Revived: Mathematics and Philosophy in late
Antiquity (Oxford 1989).
32
See Christian Gu^rard, 'Parmenide d'Elee selon les Neoplatoniciens',
forthcoming.
33
Simplicius in Phys. 28,32-29,5; 640,12-18. Such thinkers as Epicurus and the
Sceptics, however, were not subject to harmonisation.
34 35
See the literature in n. 2 above. ap. Elian in Cat. 107,24-6.
 The Commentators 139
the commentator to find a unitary theme or scope (skopos) for the treatise.
The arrangements for late commentaries on Plato are similar. Since the
Plato commentaries form part of a single curriculum they should be studied
alongside those on Aristotle. Here the situation is easier, not only because
the extant corpus is very much smaller, but also because it has been
comparatively well served by French and English translators.36
Given the theological motive of the curriculum and the pressure to
harmonise Plato with Aristotle, it can be seen how these commentaries are
a major source for Neoplatonist ideas. This in turn means that it is not safe
to extract from them the fragments of the Presocratics, or of other authors,
without making allowance for the Neoplatonist background against which
the fragments were originally selected for discussion. For different reasons,
analogous warnings apply to fragments preserved by the pre-Neoplatonist
commentator Alexander.37 It will be another advantage of the present
translations that they will make it easier to check the distorting effect of a
commentator's background.
Although the Neoplatonist commentators conflate the views of Aristotle
with those of Neoplatonism, Philoponus alludes to a certain convention
when he quotes Plutarchus expressing disapproval of Alexander for
expounding his own philosophical doctrines in a commentary on Aristotle.38
But this does not stop Philoponus from later inserting into his own
commentaries on the Physics and Meteorology his arguments in favour of
the Christian view of Creation. Of course, the commentators also wrote
independent works of their own, in which their views are expressed
independently of the exegesis of Aristotle. Some of these independent works
will be included in the present series of translations.
The distorting Neoplatonist context does not prevent the commentaries
from being incomparable guides to Aristotle. The introductions to
Aristotle's philosophy insist that commentators must have a minutely
detailed knowledge of the entire Aristotelian corpus, and this they certainly
have. Commentators are also enjoined neither to accept nor reject what
Aristotle says too readily, but to consider it in depth and without partiality.
The commentaries draw one's attention to hundreds of phrases, sentences
and ideas in Aristotle, which one could easily have passed over, however
often one read him. The scholar who makes the right allowance for the
distorting context will learn far more about Aristotle than he would be
likely to on his own.
The relations of Neoplatonist commentators to the Christians were
subtle. Porphyry wrote a treatise explicitly against the Christians in 15
books, but an order to burn it was issued in 448, and later Neoplatonists

36
English: Calcidius in Tim. (parts by van Winden; den Boeft); lamblichus
fragments (Dillon); Proclus in Tim. (Thomas Taylor); Proclus in Farm. (Dillon);
Proclus in Farm., end of 7th book, from the Latin (Klibansky, Labowsky, Anscombe);
Proclus in Alcib. 1 (O'Neill); Olympiodorus and Damascius in Phaedonem
(Westerink); Damascius in Philebum (Westerink); Anonymous Prolegomena to
Platonic Philosophy (Westerink). See also extracts in Thomas Taylor, The Works of
Plato, 5 vols. (1804). French: Proclus in Tim. and in Rempublicam (Festugiere); in
Farm. (Chaignet); Anon, in Farm. (P. Hadot); Damascius in Farm. (Chaignet).
37
For Alexander's treatment of the Stoics, see Robert B. Todd, Alexander of
Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics (Leiden 1976), 24-9.
38
Philoponus in DA 21,20-3.
140 Appendix
were more circumspect. Among the last commentators in the main group, we
have noted several Christians. Of these the most important were Boethius
and Philoponus. It was Boethius' programme to transmit Greek learning to
Latin-speakers. By the time of his premature death by execution, he had
provided Latin translations of Aristotle's logical works, together with
commentaries in Latin but in the Neoplatonist style on Porphyry's Isagoge
and on Aristotle's Categories and de Interpretation, and interpretations of
the Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics and Sophistici Elenchi. The
interruption of his work meant that knowledge of Aristotle among Latin-
speakers was confined for many centuries to the logical works. Philoponus is
important both for his proofs of the Creation and for his progressive
replacement of Aristotelian science with rival theories, which were taken up
at first by the Arabs and came fully into their own in the West only in the
sixteenth century.
Recent work has rejected the idea that in Alexandria the Neoplatonists
compromised with Christian monotheism by collapsing the distinction
between their two highest deities, the One and the Intellect. Simplicius (who
left Alexandria for Athens) and the Alexandrians Ammonius and Asclepius
appear to have acknowledged their beliefs quite openly, as later did the
Alexandrian Olympiodorus, despite the presence of Christian students in
their classes.39
The teaching of Simplicius in Athens and that of the whole pagan
Neoplatonist school there was stopped by the Christian Emperor Justinian
in 529. This was the very year in which the Christian Philoponus in
Alexandria issued his proofs of Creation against the earlier Athenian
Neoplatonist Proclus. Archaeological evidence has been offered that, after
their temporary stay in Ctesiphon (in present-day Iraq), the Athenian
Neoplatonists did not return to their house in Athens, and further evidence
has been offered that Simplicius went to Harran (Carrhae), in present-day
Turkey near the Iraq border.40 Wherever he went, his commentaries are a
treasure house of information about the preceding thousand years of Greek
philosophy, information which he painstakingly recorded after the closure in
Athens, and which would otherwise have been lost. He had every reason to
feel bitter about Christianity, and in fact he sees it and Philoponus, its
representative, as irreverent. They deny the divinity of the heavens and
prefer the physical relics of dead martyrs.41 His own commentaries by
39
For Simplicius, see I. Hadot, Le Problems du Neoplatonisme Alexandrin:
Hitrocles et Simplicius (Paris 1978); for Ammonius and Asclepius, Koenraad
Verrycken, God en Wereld in de Wijsbegeerte van loannes Philoponus, Ph.D. Diss.
(Louvain 1985); for Olympiodorus, L.G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to
Platonic Philosophy (Amsterdam 1962).
40
Alison Frantz, 'Pagan philosophers in Christian Athens', Proceedings of the
American Philosophical Society 119 (1975), 29-38; M. Tardieu, Temoins orientaux du
Premier Alcibiade & Harran et a Nag 'Hammadi', Journal Asiatique 274 (1986); id.,
'Les calendriers en usage a Harran d'apres les sources arabes et le commentaire de
Simplicius a la Physique d'Aristote', in I. Hadot (ed.), Simplicius, sa vie, son oeuvre, sa
survie (Berlin 1987), 40-57; id., Coutumes nautiques mesopotamiennes chez Simplicius,
in preparation. The opposing view that Simplicius returned to Athens is most fully
argued by Alan Cameron, "The last days of the Academy at Athens', Proceedings of the
Cambridge Philological Society 195, n.s. 15 (1969), 7-29.
41
Simplicius in Gael. 26,4-7; 70,16-18; 90,1-18; 370,29-371,4. See on his whole
attitude Philippe Hoffmann, 'Simplicius' polemics', in Richard Sorabji (ed.),
Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987).
 The Commentators 141
contrast culminate in devout prayers.
Two collections of articles by various hands have been published, to make
the work of the commentators better known. The first is devoted to
Philoponus;42 the second is about the commentators in general, and goes
into greater detail on some of the issues briefly mentioned here.43

42
Richard Sorahji (ed.), Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science
(London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1987).
43
Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle Transformed: the ancient commentators and their
influence (London and Ithaca, N.Y. 1990). The lists of texts and previous translations
of the commentaries included in Wildberg, Philoponus Against Aristotle on the
Eternity of the World (pp.!2ff.) are not included here. The list of translations should
be augmented by: F.L.S. Bridgman, Heliodorus (?) in Ethica Nicomachea, London
1807.
I am grateful for comments to Henry Blurnenthal, Victor Caston, I. Hadot, Paul
Mercken, Alain Segonds, Robert Sharpies, Robert Todd, L.G. Westerink and
Christian Wildberg.
 English-Greek Glossary

accident: sumbebekos condition: diathesis

account: logos constitute: sunistanai
action: praxis constitutive: sustatikos
activity: energeia continuous: sunekh&s
actuality: energeia contrariety: enantiotes
affected, to be: paskhein contrary: enantios
affection: pathos convert: antistrephein
affective quality: pathetike poiotes
affirmation: kataphasis define: aphorizein, horizein
agent: poioun definite: horismenos
aim: skopos definition: horismos, horos
analogy: analogia demonstration: apodeixis
animate: empsukhos demonstrative: apodeiktikos
appear: phainesthai description: hupographe
argument: epikheirema destroyed, to be: phtheiresthai
arrange: keisthai destruction: phthora
determinate: hdrismenos
be, being: einai different: heteros
being: huparxis differentia: diaphora
belong: huparkhein discrete, to be: diorizesthai
body: soma discussion: logos
distinctive: idios
capacity: dunamis discriminate: diakrinein
category: kategoria divine: theios
cause: aition division: diairesis
change (n.): kinesis, metabole, trope
change (v.): metaballein enmattered: enulos
characterize: kharakterizein entail: suneispherein
coextensive, to be: exisazein equal: isos
cognition: katalepsis essence: ousia
colour: khroma essential: ousiode's
combination: sumploke examination: diakrisis
coming into being: genesis example: paradeigma
commentator: exegoumenos exist independently: huphistanai
common: koinos existence, independent: hupostasis
commonality: koindnia explanation: aitia
complete (v.): sumpleroun expression: phone; phrasis
complete (adj.): teleios
composite, compound: sunthetos false: pseudos
concept: ennoia, noema few: oligos
concomitant: parakolouth&ma figure: skhema
concomitant, be a: parakolouthein fitness: epitedeiotes

142
 English-Greek Glossary 143
form: eidos odd: perittos
formless: aneideos one: heis, hen
formula: logos opposite: antikeimenos
future: mellon opposition: antithesis
order: taxis
genus: genos
good: spoudaios paronym: paronumos
grammar: grammatike part: meros, morion
growth: auxesis partake of, participate in: metekhein
particular: merikos, tode ti
heterogeneous: heterogenes perceptible: aisthetos
heteronym, heteronymous: perception: aisthesis
heterdnumos perfect: teleios
homonym, homonymous: homdnumos place: topos
homonymy: homdnumia popular (writings): exoterika
human being: anthropos position: thesis
predicate (v.): kategorein
implication: akolouthesis predicate (n.): kategoroumenon
inanimate: apsukhos predication: kategoria
incapacity: adunamia premise: protasis
include: periekhein present: nun
indefinite, indeterminate: aoristos primary: protos
independent existence: hupostasis principle: arkhe
individual: atomos prior: proteros
inflection: ptosis privation: steresis
instrument: organon proof: apodeixis
intelligible: noetos proper: idios, oikeios
intermediate: mesos proposition: protasis
intermediate, having an: emmesos proprium: idion

knowledge: episteme qualitative change: alloiosis

known: epistetos quality: poion, poiotes
quantity: poson
language: logos
large: megas real being: hupostasis
limit: peras received opinions: endoxa
receptive: dektikos
magnitude: megethos reflection: epinoia
many: polus relation: skhesis
matter: hule relative: pros ti
mean: s£mainein rule: kanon
meaning: sSmainomenon
middle: mesos school (writings): akroamatika
mind: nous science: episteme
scientific: epistemonikos
name: onoma self-subsistent: authupostatos
natural: phusikos, phusiologikos sensible: aisthetikos
naturally: pephukds sentence: logos
nature: phusis shape: morphe
negation: apophasis sight: opsis
noun: onoma signified: semainomenon
number: arithmos signify: semainein
similar: homoios
objection: enstasis simple: haplous
144 English-Greek Glossary
simultaneous: hama thing: pragma
small: mikros thought: noema
soul: psukhe time: khronos
species: eidos transcendent: exeiremenos
standing: stasis true: alethes
state: hexis truth: al&theia
statement: logos
strictly: kurios ultimate (genus): genikotaton
subject, to be a: hupokeisthai understanding: nous
subject: hupokeimenon universal: katholou
subordinate: hupallelos unmediated: arnesos
substance: ousia
surface: epiphaneia verb: rhema
syllable: sullabe virtue: arete
syllogism: sullogismos
synonym, synonymous: sunonumos when:pote
where: pou
teaching: didaskalia white: leukos
theoretical: theoretikos word: lexis, phone
 Greek-English Index

References are to the page and line numbers of the CAG edition, which appear in
the margin of this translation.

abebaios, unreliable, 79,10 akhroia, pallor, 87,18

adiairetos, indivisible, 19,10.14 akolouthein, follow from, 50,4;
adiaphoros, indifferent, 32,8 71,13.15
adiarthrotos, unresolved, 90,9 akolouthesis, implication, 103,9-20;
adikia, injustice, 102,19 104,21
adunamia, incapacity, 81,6.12; 82,5; akolouthos: feature, 23,7; 23,9;
84,22.26.27; 85,9-26 natural sequence, 5,31; 24,22;
agathos, good, 4,30; 6,13.14; 10,17; consistent, in accordance with,
13,5; 101,17 32,24; corollary, 78,18
agathotes, goodness, 6,15 akouein, understand, 57,21
agnoein akris, insect, 105,5
ignore, 78,27 akroasthai, listen to, 1,9; 4,26; 6,21;
be ignorant of, 81,28 65,26
agnoia, ignorance, 70,3 akroamatikos, esoteric, 4,19.26.28;
agnosias: unintelligible, 43,21; 6,27
unknown, 14,7.12; 93,11 akroates, reader, 66,11
agros, field, 19,13 akros, extreme, 10,13ff; 96,2ff
aidios, eternal, 45,18 alethes, true, 4,29; 5,lff; 8,17; 10,17;
aisthesis 10,19; 13,5; 34,14; 64,17;
perception, 33,25; 67,21; 74,23; 78,21.23; 92,22ff; 100,16-20;
75,27-76,7; 77,1; 80,25 100,23-101,7
sense, 82,7; 86,15-23 aletheia, truth, 5,20; 6,28; 8,5.18;
aisthetikos, sensible, capable of per- 14,18; 34,21; 50,2.20; 52,22;
ceiving, 15,25; 38,21; 48,5.6; 76,6 53,11.13.20; 60,15; 80,8ff; 88,10
aisthetos: that which is perceived, aletheuein, speak truly, 9,13.15;
67,21; 77,1.2; perceptible, capable 34,15ff; 35,4; 52,19; 66,28; 67,6
of being perceived, 28,26; 41,10; alethinos, genuine, 21,5
45,17; 47,2.3; 60,2; 74,23.24; alloioun, change qualitatively, 92,20;
76,1.3.6.7 105,24-106,3
aitia, explanation, 7,22; 66,6 alloiosis, qualitative change,
aition, cause, 21,21ff; 67,23; 76,15; 83,3-21; 105,15-23
103,20; 104,2ff; 105,1 alias, other, 21,15; 22,16; 27,27;
aitiatos, caused, 67,23; 76,15 65,29; 91,28
aitiatike, accusative case, 68,7.11 allotrios, improperly, 43,21
akairos, inappropriate, 47,11 allotrioun, be different, 16,25
akatalepsia, total ignorance, 2,llff alogos, irrational, 31,25; 32,3; 42,2ff
akation, rowboat, 72,2 ambluottein, be dim-sighted, 15,7
akhlus, fog, 15,7 ameres, indivisible, 6,12
akhoristos, inseparable, 28,9 ameristos, indivisible, 91,25

145
146 Greek—English Index
amesos, unmediated, having 101,12.16; 105,19
nothing intermediate, 95,12ff; antikheir, thumb, 71,4
98,16; 99,7.10 antikrus, outright, 14,21
amoibe, compensation, 78,24 antilepsis, perception, 86,15ff
amphibolos, doubtful, 97,21 antiparastasis, counter-objection,
amudros, faint, vague, 79,10; 82,16 53.1.3.5.20; 62,4; 63,11; 101,6
anabasis, ascent, 16,27 antistrephein
anagein, subsume, 33,20.23ff; 69,25ff convert, 27,12ff; 42,18; 44,12ff;
anairein, destroy, 41,3.8; 75,22; 94,9ff 70,24; 71,5; 71,12-73,8; 97,24;
anairesis, destruction, 96,2ff 98,4;101,18; 103,9ff.20
anakamptein, to reverse, 59,17 reciprocate, 104.2.4.20
anakampsis, converse, 68,14 antlstrophe
anakeisthai, to be reclining, 69,8; conversion, 70,25; 71,1; 72,17;
93,2 73,8-13
anakkoresis, withdrawal, 78,22 correlative, 68,12
anaklinein, to be lying, 69,5.9 antitheos, godlike, 71,2
anaklisis, lying, 68,21.24; 69,4 antithesis, opposition, 94,5-95,9;
analogein, to be analogous, 26,32 96,6.7; 98,7.9; 99,5.7.10; 100,14
analogia: analogy, 22,5; 31,30; antonumia, pronoun, 34,21
41,23; 42,8.10; 43,24; variation, anupostatos, meaningless, 25,8
23,23 aoristos
analogos, analogous, 26,31 indefinite, 12,4; 55,11; 62,5ff
anamnesis, memory, 37,14 indeterminate, 63,8; 78,31; 91,17
anapalin, conversely, 15,21; 68,16; apagoge, reduction, 63,27
76,6 apangelia, narrative, 1,9; 4,11; 6,25;
anaphainein, be evident or obvious, 8,5
1,7; 13,7 apareskein, disapprove, 36,15.18
anapherein, classify, 91,llff aparithmein, include, 91,4
anatrepein aparithmesis, inventory, 25,4
overturn, 50,5 apatheia, freedom from emotion, 3,19
refute, 53,2 apeikos, unlikely, 79,13
aneideos, formless, 54,5 apeirodunamos, of infinite potentia-
anekoos, untutored, 6,3 lity, 6,12
anepaisthetos, imperceptible, 28,26ff apeiros, infinite, 12,2
anepitedeiotes, unfitness, 81,11.13 aperileptos, uncircumscribed, 6,12
angeion, container, 29,8ff aperioristos, infinite, 6,12
aniatos, incurable, 82,15 aperittos, not overly refined, 6,28
anisos, unequal, 65,22; 71,13.16; 72,3 aphairein, take away, 73,14ff
and, up, 15,4; 64,24; 65,2; 93,4 aphanizein, make disappear, 59,4
anoetos, unthinkable, 37,5 aphorizein, define, 33,21; 46,9; 49,9;
anomoios, dissimilar, 75,16; 91,1 69,25
anthropos, human being, 9,14; 15,16; aphorismends, definitely, 99,25.27,
19,19; 21,6; 27,13; 40,11; 48,6 100,1
antianeira, a woman with the aphuktos, exhaustive, 26,5
strength of a man, 71,2 apodeiknunai, prove, 3,5; 50,3; 57,4;
antidiastellein, to be opposed, 18,21; 79,16; 85,11
19,2ff; 20,27; 84,11 apodeiktikos, demonstrative (argu-
antidiastole, opposition, 37,6 ment), 2,13; 4,25; 5,8.17; 13,10.17
antikeisthai, to be opposed, 16,11; apodeixis: demonstration, 6,3;
16,14; 33,16; 63,17; 93,14-94,9; 10,22ff; exposition, 4,7; proof,
97,14; 101,12-21; 104,20 4,25; 5,4.9; 57,13; 78,19.28
antikeimenos, opposite, 16,10.16.17; apodidonai, set out, 21,3; 43,21
26,18; 33,18; 34,7; 85,10; 93,7-18; apodosia, setting out (of a defi-
94,13; 95,3-7; 96,8; 97,19; nition), 43,18
 Greek-English Index 147
apodokimazein, reject, 65,16; 90,27ff article, 11,16ff
apographein, register, compile, joint, 8,8
4,5.8 artios, even, 95,12.21; 98,14ff; 99,15
apokatastasis, return, 60,26; 70,26 asaphes, obscure, 7,7
apokathistanai, restore, 71,1; 100,10 asapheia, obscurity, 1,10; 7,11; 25,14
apokrinein, to answer, 42,1.3; 70,4 asemos, meaningless, 9,21
apolauein, partake, 19,12 askesis, ornamentation, 4,11
apologeisthai, defend, 80,13 asomatos, incorporeal, 6,12; 54,5
apologia, defence, 77,23 astroos, constellation, 38,13
apoluein, make independent, 63,16; asumplokos, without combination,
76,12 25,4
aponemein, assign, 78,24 athanatos, immortal, 31,24; 32,4;
apophainein, give an opinion, 79,26 78,21ff
apophasis, negation, 25,18.21; 26,4.9; atmos, smoke, 29,2
34,12ff; 34,26ff; 35,1-5; 36,23ff; atomos, individual, 13,15; 29,21;
85,18.19;93,16.17.19; 30,4-17; 43,5-8; 45,21; 46,1.3;
94,15.19.23.29; 97,11.12.15; 98,8; 49,2; 50,18
100,14.17.21; 101,2.11-13 atreptos, unchanged, 83,34
apophatikos, negative, 52,4ff authupostatos, self-subsistent, 30,8;
aporein, raise puzzles, 80,1.3ff 33,12; 35,15
aporetikos, aporetic, 6,28 autoagathotes, goodness itself, 6,12
aporia, puzzle, 80,6ff autoprosopos, in propria persona,
aporos, puzzling, 80,4 4,16.18
aporroe, effluence, 2,24 autos, self, the same, 51,6; 62,20ff;
aporroia, effluence, 28,28 63,22; 67,8ff; 76,11
apostasis, distance, 74,14.17 auxanein, auxein, grow, increase,
apoteinein, expose by slicing, 58,4 28,21; 71,25-72,9; 105,24-106,3
apotelesma, finished product, 35,25 auxesis, growth, 28,23.27; 83,8.14;
apothein, reject, 48,13 105,15ff
apous, footless, 31,26.28; 32,5 auxetikos dunamis, faculty of
apsukhos, inanimate, 31,17; 81,24; growth, 28,22
83,29; 88,4; 103,8 axioma
aptaistos, infallible, 79,11 rank, 84,15
araiosis, rarefaction, 88,16 worth, 103,19
arete, virtue, 23,13; 40,15ff; 70,3-6; axiomatikos, axiomatic, 4,19
78,25; 81,31; 82,10; 83,18; 89,2;
102,19ff barus, heavy, 55,9
aretaios, virtued, 40,16; 89,2.12 basanizein, examine, 8,17
argos, idle, 17,21.23; 88,21 basanos, testing, 80,1
aristeros, left, 59,19; 66,17-67,8; bathos, deep, 43,4; 82,29.30
67,18; 67,25ff; 69,31; 93,4; 93,22; bebelos, impure, 7,9
94,18; 95,4; 98,5 brakhulogia, brevity, 16,17
arithmos, number, 7,17; 12,4; 24,25;
25,lff; 30,4.15.22; 49,15; 51,5; daktulos, digit, 10,2; 71,3.4
54,13.17; 55,3ff; 57,3ff; 58,8; deilia, cowardice, 101,21
59,21; 60,2ff; 62,10.25; 95,21; dein, need, 17,19; 25,19; 35,1;
98,18; 99,15 40,19.26; 48,17
arithmStos, counted, 59,22ff deixis, pointing out, 48,15.16; 49,3
arkhaios, ancient, 88,21 dekas, ten, 12,4; 24,26
arkhe, principle, 5,7.16.26; 6,llff; dekaetes, ten years, 60,28
34,1 dekapekhus, ten cubits, 63,5
arkhein, to rule, 67,20; 103,19 dektikos, receptive, able to take on,
arnetikos, negative, 34,26; 35,1 51,9ff; 64,6.13; 73,14; 96,13ff;
arthron 98,15.19
148 Greek-English Index
deletGrios, noxious, 5,19 didaskalia
demiourgos, inventor, 81,27 teaching, 7,7; 8,6; 67,11
dermopteros, having membranous lesson, 31,14-15
wings, 71,22 diegesis, narrative, 103,19
desmoun, bind, 76,12.17 diexerkhesthai, go through in detail,
deuteros 60,16
second, 11,15; 36,3-19; 38,6-40,2; diiskhurizesthai, assert confidently,
41,19; 43,8; 51,14; 54,6.13.15; 80,12
77,7; 78,6 diistanai, set apart, 64,24; 88,12
secondary, 36,6.7 dikaiosune, justice, 90,3; 102,17.18
dexios, right, 59,18; 66,17-67,8; diokein, put to flight, 7,14
67,18.25.26; 68,2.3; 69,31; diorizesthai, be discrete, 31,17;
93,4.22; 94,18.24; 95,4; 98,5 54,16ff; 56,8; 57,4.8.9.11; 58,28;
diagnosis, diagnosis, 82,17 59,2; 62,9.25
diagonios, diagonal, 25,9 dipekhus
diairein, divide, 38,1.3; 98,10 two-footed, 49,15; 50,5
diairesis, division, 1,5; 3,21ff; 8,6; two cubits, 61,1.4; 62,5; 63,5
32,20; 37,22ff; 58,1; 91,21; 93,18 diplasios, double, 79,4.5
diairetos, divisibly, 19,13 dogma, doctrine, 2,14
diakonein, serve, 15,9 doidux, pestle, 31,27
diakrinein, discriminate, 5,3; 10,21; dokein, seem, 35,4ff
13,5 dokesis, opinion, 52,17
diakrisis: disputation, 2,9; discrimi- dotike, dative, 23,24; 68,6.11.17
nation, 4,29.30; 10,18 doulos, slave, 71,6; 73,4ff.l9; 74,2ff
diakritikos: able to distinguish, 2,4; doxazein, tojudge, 52,20.21
penetrative, 40,14 doxa, opinion, 52,19-53,24
dialambanein, treat, 11,18; 22,13 dramatikos, dramatic, 4,15
dialogikos dromeus, runner, 84,27
in the form of a dialogue, 4,15 dromikos, skilled runner, 84,22ff;
dialogue, 4,18ff; 7,1 89,8
diametros, diagonal, 105,26; 106,5 duos, dyad, 24,27
dianoia dunamis
intention, 21,19 capacity, 51,12; 81,6.11ff; 82,5;
thought, 8,14 84,21ff; 84,25.27; 85,6-26; 89,6
diaphonein, disagree, 9,12 faculty, 28,22
diaphora, differentia, 15,13.22; 21,15; potentiality, 55,13; 76,23-30
22,22-4,11; 23,9.28; 26,32; 31,15- power, 55,4.8
32,12; 44,10.17; 45,8; 45,9-46,11; strength, 71,3
46,22.28.29; 47,2.7.8.20; 67,25; dunamei, virtually, 34,20; 35,6
83,26; 99,25 dusapobletos, hard to lose,
diaphorein, dissipate, 28,18 82,8.9.19.26.30.32; 86,6
diaphoresis dusodia, stench, 28,32ff
evaporation, 28,26
effluence, 29,3 eidikos, specific
diaporein, raise difficulties, 80,2 eidikotaton eidos, infima species,
diaporthmeuein, convey, 15,9 43,2; 84,17
diarthroun, articulate, 14,13; 32,22 eidopoios, specific, 31,15.29
diarthrdsis, articulation, 93,11 eidos
diaskedannunai, disperse, 78,22 form, 1,9; 6,25; 7,3; 8,4; 21,10.13;
diastasis, dimension, 54,5; 58,7 27,1; 27,30-28,3; 29,15; 34,3;
diastatos, dimensional, 54,6.8.14 35,22; 36,7; 86,18.22; 105,20
diathesis, condition, 68,17; 81,6.9; kind, 2,2; 31,25; 68,21-69,11; 83,15
82,10; 84,8-11.24.28; 91,7 species, 13,13.14; 15,24; 26,34;
diathetos, conditioned, 68,18 29,12-18.21.23; 30,13; 38,1-4;
 Greek-English Index 149
39,2-12.16; 41,7.9.10.20ff; enantiotes, contrariety, 50,10ff;
42,2-11; 42,7-43,5; 43,6.7; 43,16- 64,23; 65,14; 69,23ff; 70,18ff;
44,2; 45,11; 45,21-46,2; 49,4; 89,16.25; 90,2
50,18.19; 52,14; 66,7; 81,5-82,31; enargeia, manifest facts, 14,21
83,8; 84,13.17.18.21.24; 86,2.3; enarges, self-evident, 57,3
87,22.23; 88,19; 91,11-27; endeia, deficiency, 101,20
92,15-20; 93,1.3.4 endiathetos logos, inner language,
eike, at random, 79,25 57,23
einai endidonai, grant, 53,4
to be, being, 9,26.7; 10,1.12; 16,19; endoxos, received opinion, 4,25
21,13; 25,5ff; 26,24; 35,16; energeia
36,15ff; 40,23.24; 41,17; 60,11; action, 11,13
77,29 activity, 3,14.15; 32,27; 69,20
exist, existence, 56,5; 59,12; actuality, 55,11.13; 58,1; 76,27ff;
103,9.11.20 82,3.5; 84,24-85,2; 96,24
eisagomenos, beginner, 36,11; 53,6; behaviour, 22,7
55,12 energein, operate, 92,17
ekhein, have, 13,1; 33,17-20; 92,12; enginesthai, generate, 81,16ff
93,5 engutes, proximity, 41,22
ekmisthoun, sell, 8,15 eniautos, year, 60,26
ekstasis, fit, 87,15.19 enistanai, to object, 26,15
ektithesthai enestos khronos, the present time,
explain, 75,8 93,3
set out, 75,6; 78,14.18 enkomion, praise, 40,23
elate, silver fir, 17,25 ennoein, understand, 50,15
elates, charioteer, 17,25 ennoematikos, notional entity, 9,9
elattoun, decrease, 72,4.5.10 ennoia, concept, 9,11.23; 17,6;
elenktikos, contentious, 2,3 32,21; 33,9; 80,24.25.27.28
elithios, foolish, 78,26 enstasis, objection, 53,lff; 101,4.6
ellatton, lesser, 71,13-72,8; 74,17 entos, in, within, 1,3; 2,6; 6,2
elleipein, leave out, 27,11 enudros, aquatic, 32,4; 105,1.2
elpis, hope, 21,28 enulos, enmattered, 37,18; 66,1.2
emballein, include, 47,11 enuparkhein, inhere, 27,30
emmesos, intermediate, 95,12ff; epagein, add, 50,13
99,19ff epanapauesthai, be content, 88,21
emphainein, make apparent, 49,6.7 epano, above, 50,16
emphilosophos, philosophical, 79,25 epanthein, be evident, 8,5
empoiein, affect, 81,17; 82,7ff; 86,24 epeiserkhesthai, come, 49,10
emprosthen, in front, 93,4 ephistanai, notice, figure out, 36,14;
empsukhos, animate, 15,25; 31,17.24; 92,16
48,5.6; 81,25; 88,4; 103,7 epiballein, make an effort, 46,17
en, in, 26,32ff; 29,5ff epibole
enallage, inflection, 17,14; 18,1; 83,7 application, 78,12
enallattein, to change, 17,21 elaboration, 11,15
enantios, contrary, 49,12ff; 49,15-18; epigraphein, entitle, 8,3; 13,12.19;
49,20-50,12; 51,10ff; 52,13.17; 14,20; 66,14.18
53,8-24; 58,9; 62,3-18; 63,12- epigraphe, title, 7,22; 80,18; 81,2
64,20; 63,15ff; 63,19ff; 64,25ff; epidiairein, divide, 54,18; 58,28
65,3.5.6.10.16; 69,27-70,6; 74,17; epidiairesis, division, 59,2
85,12; 89,17.19; 93,13.14.16; epidosis, progress, 100,12
94,1.9.18; 95,3; 95,10.12.27; epikheirema
97,18; 98,9; 99,5.13.19; 101,4.14; proof, 63,2.27
102,4.7.12 argument, 41,20; 42,10; 43,24
enantiosis, contrariety, 94,20 epikheiresis, argument, 43,17
150 Greek-English Index
epiklesis, name, 86,25 erotikos, erotic, 18,19
epiktetos, acquired, 86,6.8.21 eruthros, ruddy
epilanthanesthai, forget, 37,19 ek genetes eruthros, ruddy from
epiluein, solve, 28,12; 46,22.25; 52,16; birth, 82,34
91,8 ekphuseos eruthros, naturally
epilusis, solution, 91,10.28 ruddy, 83,1
epinoein, think of, 37,5; 74,2 ethikos, ethical, 5,5
epinoia ethike, ethics, 6,1.5.18
conception, 99,1 ethos, character, 6,1.5.23
reflection, 75,1.3 euapobletos, easy to lose,
en psilei epinoiai, in bare thought, 82,8.10.19.30.31; 86,8; 87,9
9,26 eukheres, easy, 106,6
epipedon, superficies, 58,4.5 euodia, fragrance, 28,9ff
epiphaneia, surface, 54,17ff; 55,2-7; euphues, clever, 46,17
58,4ff.l8.20; 60,19-61,3; 82,29; eutaktos, well-ordered, 44,7
83,24-84,1 euthus, straight, 88,7
epipolaios, superficial, 4,23 eutheia, straight line, 75,16
epipoles, surface, 82,23.25 euthugrammos, rectilinear, 75,11
epiprosthen, in preference to, 8,18 euthutes, straightness, 88,6.8
episkeptesthai, examine, 33,10 euzoia, living well, 78,25
episteme exegeisthai
knowledge, 16,18; 22,4.5; 25,11; exegoumenos, commentator, 1,12;
27,14.15; 31,20; 67,22; 68,18.19; 8,1 Iff
69,18; 70,3; 73,14; 74,12.21ff; exegesis, interpretation, 7,16
76,18ff; 79,10; 81,30; 82,10; exiiiresthai, be separated from, tran-
83,17; 91,11.12.16ff scend, 37,8.10.12.17.18
science, 12,2; 23,2.10; 89,7 exetasis, review, 43,4
epistemon: scientist, 60,14; know- exisazein, to be coextensive, 71,24
ledgeable, 91,15; knower, exisoun, equalize, 72,3.5
67,22.23 exoterikos, popular, 4,18-22
epistemonikos, scientific, 5,9
epistetos, known, 68,19; 74,12.21ff; geitniazein, border on, 46,13
75,23ff; 76,18ff genesis
epistole, letter, 3,24; 7,4 birth, 15,6
epistolimaios, epistolary, 7,5 coming into being, 34,21;
episumbainein, supervene on, 87,5 45,18.20.22; 83,8.12; 105,12ff
epitedeiotes origin, 24,27
fitness, 51,10; 81,11.12; 82,2.3ff; genete, birth, 82,34; 86,4; 87,15
84,25; 89,5 genike, genitive, 23,24; 68,5.11.15
capacity, 96,16 genos, genus, 9,8.10; 13,13.14;
epitedeia, aptitude, 84,22 15,13.24; 21,24; 25,4; 26,32.34;
epitedeuein, invent, 75,2 27,3; 29,12-18.20.23; 30,14ff;
epiteinein, increase, heighten, 51,2; 31,4-12.18.22; 32,llff; 39,2-12.16;
64,11 41,9.10.20ff; 42,14-43,5; 43,16-
epitekhne'sis, artifice, 88,14 44,2; 44,10; 45,21; 46,lff; 48,2-9;
erastes, lover, 4,27 49,5; 50,19; 52,14; 65,1-6; 69,6.8;
ereuthos, redness, blushing, 81,23; 84,18; 85,13; 86,2; 87,22;
82,21.26 91,10-26; 102,16-20; 105,3
ereuthrian di' aidd, turn red with genikdtatos, ultimate, highest,
shame, 81,23; 82,21.34; 86,9 13,16ff; 20,16; 44,8ff; 84,16
ergon, task, 60,14 geometrein, to measure, 85,21-5
erd, I will say, I am erotically affected geometres, geometer, 58,4; 75,11;
(example of an homonymous 81,8
expression), 18,19 geometria, geometry, 91,13.16ff
 Greek-English Index 151
geometrikos, concerning geo- hexis
metry, 81,8.9 possession, 34,6
ginesthai, come into being, 59,12 state, 68,15.16; 81,6-82,10; 83,5-17;
ginoskein, know, 2,17ff 84,8-11.24.28; 89,7; 91,6.7;
glukutes, sweetness, 86,27 93,16ff; 94,2-29; 96,7-14; 97,4-19;
gnathos, jaw, 2,16 98,10; 99,7-100,24; 102,20.21
gnesios, genuine, 8,2; 13,25.27; 14,1 hieros, temple, 7,8
gnomon hippike, horsemanship, 35,25.26
gnomon, 105,25.26; 106,4 histanai, stand, 69,4.8; 93,2
rule, 10,21 hode, this, 48,15ff; 49,1
gnorizein, make known, 96,4 hoios, of what sort, 18,3; 24,27
gnorimos, known, 33,25; 43,20 holos, whole, 77,9ff
gnosis, awareness, 79,10 holoskheres, general, 24,24
gorgeuesthai, hurry, 22,8 homoios, similar, 31,28; 67,17; 70,17;
grammatike 74,25; 78,11; 91,1
literary, 22,4.5 homoiotes, similarity, 22,2.9
grammar, 22,23ff; 23,1; 37,15 homologein, acknowledge, 10,6; 73,3;
grammatikos, grammarian, 22,23ff; 78,12; 90,7
23,1.14.24 homonumos, homonym, 13,22; 15,29;
gramme, line, 54,17; 55,2.6; 57,26ff; 16,8-17,6.8.16; 17,19-18,4;
58,7; 63,4; 88,7.8 18,6.7.12.20-4; 19,18; 20,1-7;
graphein, draw, 21,6 21,16-24; 22,12-24,9; 38,2-15
gumnazein, work out, 75,27 homonumia, homonymy, 18,18.25;
20,10.17.23; 38,16; 67,17
haima, blood, 36,8; 82,25 homozugos, being yoked together,
hama, simultaneous, 3,2; 14,16; 19,2
24,18; 59,11; 64,7.12; 73,23- hoplizein, to arm, 93,6
74,11.28; 75,3; 76,6.17.21ff; hopdsoun, in whatever way, 68,6
102,10; 104,9; 104,13-105,5 horasis, vision, 92,22
haplous, simple, single, 5,llff; horatos, visible, 92,22
11,2.8.19; 12,1; 13,7.9; 14,22ff; horismos, definition, 15,23-17,7.11;
15,14; 16,20.22; 26,30; 30,8; 19,19-20,3; 20,14-21; 21,4-14;
32,26; 33,1.3; 34,3ff; 35,18-36,1; 22,18.19; 26,30.31; 27,9-28,11;
45,19-46,8; 66,8ff; 78,31 37,19; 38,16-19; 40,10-16; 43,18;
hedone, pleasure, 3,17 44,7-12; 44,29-45,3.14; 64,25;
heis, hen, one, 21,22; 30,12; 50,5; 67,12-30; 77,4-23; 78,14;
51,5.6 80,10-21; 90,19.21; 92,14.16
henikos, singular, 49,6; 66,15.19 horismenos, definite, determinate,
henotes, unity, 48,18 62,5; 63,6.7; 78,30; 79,18-21
henoun, unite, 65,5 horistos, denned, 27,13; 44,12
hektikos, consumptive, 81,35 horizein, define, determine, 62,5;
hektos, possessor, 68,16 63,6.7; 78,30; 91,18
helios, sun, 19,7 horman, set in motion, urge on
hemeis, we, 59,17; 63,7; 80,5.6 ho horman, charioteer, 17,25
hepar, liver, 66,25.26 horos
heterogenes, heterogeneous, 31,15ff; boundary, 56,9.10; 57,4-58,25
88,11.13 definition, 9,16; 18,24; 27,13; 78,18;
heteronumos, heteronym, 15,26; 92,13
16,14.24.25 term, 18,13
heteronumia, heteronymy, 67,17 hosanei, as if, 15,23
heteros, different, 16,24.25; 31,18.25 hosos
heterotes, difference, 23,17.24 hosa toiauta, things like that, 16,3;
heurema, discovery, 14,1 66,23
heuresis, discovery, 6,28 hugiainein, to be healthy, 85,8ff
152 Greek-English Index
hugeia, health, 82,llff hupomnematika, commentaries,
hugieinos, healthy, 85,27 4,5-12
hule, matter, 8,4.5; 21,10-12; 27,1.30- hupopous, footed, 31,27.29; 32,5
28,1; 29,15; 34,2; 35,21; 36,7; hupostasis
37,18.19; 54,5; 79,7.14 real being, 51,7.8; 63,16; 70,11
hupallelos independent existence, 53,23;
subaltern, 25,8 66,6.21; 67,10
subordinate, 13,15; 31,22ff; 32,llff; hupotassein, count under, 58,9
84,18 hupothesis, hypothesis, 41,8
huparkhein hupotithesthai, suppose, 64,16.17
belong, 27,4.6.28; 28,18; 44,20; 47,1; husteros, posterior, 104,8-11
50,6; 51,15.17; 52,2.3.6.8; 65,11; husterogenes, later in origin, 9,9;
67,14; 70,17; 89,16; 90,1-3; 91,25; 49,11
98,13.16.24; 99,8.27; 100,7;
102,10; 104,10 iatros, physician, 5,18
be a characteristic of, 47,1 iatrike, medicine, 37,15
be, 6,4; 21,1 iatrikos, medical, 5,18; 21,21
exist, 101,9 idea, type, 7,4
huparxis idiazein, be distinctive, 51,15
belonging, 26,11; 42,12 idios
being, 6,16; 20,28; 52,10 proprium: of substance, 44,11-22;
huperairein, overshoot, 27,10 45,7; 46,6; 47,21.22; 51,5- 52,12;
huperballein, exceed, 27,10 of quantity, 57,17.18; 65,10ff; of
huperbole, excess, 101,20 quality, 67,13.15; 90,28; 91,2;
hupertithenai, set out above, 98,9 92,14
huphainein, compose, 4,11 distinctive: of substance, 45,15;
huphesis, decrease, 50,12 50,13; of quantity, 61,9; of qual-
huphistanai, exist independently, ity, 100,17; 101,13
9,27-10,1; 21,2; 25,19; 33,13; 34,1; peculiar, peculiarity: of substance,
35,17; 41,1.4; 59,11; 63,24; 102,8 47,6; of quality, 89,15
hupoballein, propose, 60,14 distinguishing mark: of substance,
hupodedesthai, have shoes on, 93,5 49,3
hupoduein proper: definition of relatives, 78,13;
creep in, 5,1 parts of humans, 47,13
masquerade, 10,19 ikterian, to have jaundice, 67,2
hupographe, description, 20,16 ikterikos, concerning jaundice, 86,7
hupokeisthai isos, equal, 65,22ff; 71,2-4; 75,11.12;
assume, 79,17 78,11.12
be a subject, 11,3; 13,14-16; 26,12; isotes, equality, 71,11.15
42,12-16; 43,25-44,2 isostrophd, 'equiversion' (syn. of anti-
hupokeimenon, subject, 9,6; 13,18; strophe), 71,1
16,27.29; 25,16-26,16.22; 26,25ff; isotheos, godlike, 71,2
27,1-29,17.25; 29,26-30,23;
31,3.8.11; 32,15; 36,16.18.19.20; kainotomein, innovate, 72,17
37,3-9; 40,9.11.16; 41,1.5; kairos
44,16.24.27-30; 45,1; 46,17.27.28; appropriate, 47,5
47,7.10; 48,1.4.9.16-49,2; 51,6; at the proper time, 96,13.21.23
54,6; 56,3; 58,8; 65,7; 75,23; kakos
78,10; 81,18; 82,29; 86,18; bad, 4,30; 10,18; 13,5; 101,18-21.22
91,22.23; 95,14.17; 96,14; 98,24; vicious, 70,6
99,8-26; 100,6; 102,8-14 kakia: defect, 27,10; vice, 5,28;
hupolepsis, conjecture, 79,10 70,3-7; 102,19.20
hupomenein, last, be permanent, kakizein, to fault, 27,9
56,2; 59,13 kakotikos, hurtful, 82,6.28
 Greek—English Index 153
kalligraphos, copyist, 35,7 kathesthai, sit, 93,2; 97,14-16;
kallopizein, embellish, 7,3 100,19
kampulos, curved, 88,7 kathedra, sitting, 68,21.25; 69,5
kampulotes, curvature, 88,7.8 kathezesthai, sit, 69,5.9
kanon katholou, universal, 3,23-4,4; 5,10;
rule, 32,14; 71,15; 72,25 12,3; 13,10; 25,5-16; 26,12-28;
standard, 10,21 29,25; 30,1.9.25; 32,19; 36,4-18;
kantharos, beetle, 71,23 38,20; 39,3-41,17; 42,12ff; 77,8-13
karkinos, crab, 72,16 katholikos, general, universal,
karpos, fruit, 17,1.3 75,22; 88,2; 98,11; 100,5
karuon, nut, 88,15 katopin, afterwards, 3,6
katabasis, descent, 16,28 katorthoun, succeed, 2,11
katadelos, manifest, 82,16 keisthai
kataginoskein, discover, recognize, be arranged, 13,1; 33,20; 59,4.7;
47,20; 49,3.13 60,6; 68,24; 69,7-21; 88,11; 92,12;
kataleipein, leave, 50,15 93,1
katalepsis be found, 9,27
cognition, 2,17ff lay down, 89,11
recognition, 10,17 kenkhros, millet seed, 62,12.21ff
katalimpanein, remain, 73,12 kephale, head, 72,14ff; 77,13.24, 78,6
katametrein, measure, 57,14.16 kephalaios, main point, 4,5; 8,6.9
kataphasis (opp. toapophasis, q.v.) kephalaiodos, in summary fashion,
affirmation, 26,5.10; 34,12-35,4; at the start, 4,8; 33,8
36,24; 93,16.19; 94,15-29; kephalotos, 'headed', 72,18.19.22
97,11-14; 98,8; 100,17.20; keramos, j ug, 58,18
101,2-13 keros, wax, 84,2.4
kataphaskein, affirm, 36,25 khalinos, bridle, 35,26
kataphatikos, positively, 52,5 khalinopoietike, bridle-making,
katarrathumein, lose through care- 35,24.25
lessness, 7,12 kharakter
kataskeuazein character, 75,2
has enarges, prove, 57,3 form, 49,6
hosprophanon, elaborate, 105,22 style, 7,5
katatrekhein, to attack, 67,15 kharakterizein: characterize,
kategorein, to predicate, 11,3; 13,14ff; 21,10.13; 59,3; 70,13; derive, 78,8
15,24; 16,20; 20,21.24; 30,6; khaunos, empty, 7,13
30,25-31,5; 31,1-12; 38,13; 41,2; kheir, hand, 79,17ff
42,16; 45,11; 47,24; 48,3.7.10; khersaios, terrestrial, 38,14
73,20; 84,7.8; 97,5.6; 98,13.16 khliaros, lukewarm, 98,23
kategoroumenon (opp. to khreia, what is needed, 46,28
hupokeimenon, q.v.), that which khrtethai, use, 25,14; 35,26
is predicated, a predicate, khresimos, useful, 1,7; 6,10; 7,20;
31,3.6.10; 32,15; 48,4-8 13,3ff
kategoria khroma, colour, 26,6ff; 82,26; 83,30;
predication, 16,9; 26,12.16; 87,2
42,12.15; 47,26; 48,1; 66,8; 84,9 khronnunai, be coloured, 5,2
category, 9,8; 13,4; 14,1.4-15; 16,20; khronos
24,22; 33,4-35,17; 39,4; 46,18; time, 21,25-22,1; 26,33; 28,17;
54,4.10.11; 57,20; 64,19; 65,28; 29,5.6; 54,11.18ff; 58,13; 59,11;
69,8-70,1; 80,17.19; 81,4; 60,22-7; 62,10; 64,2-12; 66,11;
83,10-14; 89,19.20; 91,1.29; 69,12.13; 74,13-75,6; 81,22; 93,2;
92,2.6; 93,10; 103,3; 104,16; 100,10-12; 102,9; 103,6-18;
105,17 104,18
katekhein, seize, 37,14 tense, 11,16.17
154 Greek-English Index
khumos, humour, 82,26 logopoiia, composition, 5,27
kinein, to change, 2,21ff; 53,12 logos
kinesis, change, 3,7; 14,16; 55,10-13; account, 14,7; 15,10-17,8; 19,20-
60,24.25; 105,7-20 20,26; 24,22; 65,21; 67,28; 78,10;
klimax, staircase, 16,29 104,9
kline, bed, 31,28 argument, 2,17; 15,1; 75,27
koinos, common, 6,11; 17,10; definition, 27,20.32; 80,23
18,5ff.22; 19,10.19; 20,3.28; discourse, 5,28; 7,3; 26,20
31,21; 36,7; 42,7; 44,18-21; 55,6; discussion, 8,9.10; 22,12; 34,5;
56,9.10; 57,4-58,25; 72,26; 75,2; 47,2.5; 54,3; 55,12; 62,3; 91,6;
84,9; 102,20 101,16
koinonia, commonality, 15,8; 20,9; explanation, 36,11
22,22-24,10; 38,16.17; 49,7 formula, 90,16; 100,5.15
koinonikos, sociable, 11,9 language, 57,23; 101,12
koinonein, have in common, share lecture, 1,9
with, 23,26-24,3; 46,29 proposition, 13,9
koleopteros, sheath-winged, 71,23 reason, 28,25.29
kosmein, to discipline, 6,1 reasoning, 2,6; 79,22
kouphos, light, 55,9 relation, 43,11
kratunein, to support, 8,16; 9,2 sentence, 7,13
krinein statement, 5,11.23; 11,2; 52,17-
to judge, 67,21 53,24; 54,17; 55,3ff; 57,11-19;
bring to trial, 78,28 60,10; 93,19; 97,12; 98,8.11
krisis, examination, 80,1 study, 9,21; 11,5
ktesis, possession, 96,18 thought, 37,12; 66,1.3
kuklos, circle, 70,27; 90,15.16.20 word, 4,11
kudn, dog, 2,3ff; 38,13.14 writing, 6,2
kurios lumainein, do damage to, 53,4.5
primarily, 56,6 lusis, solution, 91,14
principally, 92,6
properly, 21,14; 55,4; 86,23.25 makhaira, knife, 20,24
strictly, in the strict sense, 30,8; makhesthai
31,29; 47,9; 50,2; 60,18; 61,8; fight, 63,20
62,6; 63,3; 65,18ff; 90,28; 104,18 oppose, 64,14
kurioteron, more important, 88,2 makhomenon, contradictory, 50,13
malakos, mild, 94,5
legein, say, call, 26,24; 36,15ff; mallon, more, 36,14; 41,20ff; 42,20;
40,4.19; 41,17; 67,28 50,10-51,1; 61,5; 65,13.14.15;
legesthai kata, be said of, 31,2.6; 70,16.19-21; 89,23-90,25
32,15; 41,13; 43,3 manos, porous, 88,9.12-16
lemmation, small assumption, 31,14 mathema, teaching, 5,18
leptomer&s, subtle parts, 28,33 matMmatikos, mathematical, 5,5;
UtM, forgetfulness, 37,14 6,7.19; 66,2
leukos, white, 6,13; 51,2; 60,16; megas, large, 49,17; 62,2ff.l6; 63,2-
80,26ff 12.22-8; 64,18; 71,3; 75,13; 93,13
leukotes, whiteness, 6,14; 40,12.13; megethos, magnitude, 55,7.8; 79,4
44,30; 45,2; 51,2; 86,4; 88,25 meiosis, diminution, 83,8.14;
lexis 105,15.19
speech, 7,2.3 meiousthai, shrink, 28,17
text, 9,3; 17,6; 33,14 melanin, blackness, 86,5; 87,14; 88,25
word, 14,6-16; 57,22 mellein
logike, logic, 6,4.6; 10,9.11; 13,3.4 mellon khronos, to mellon, the
logikos, rational, 31,24; 32,3; 42,2 future, 17,3; 58,13; 59,15.16;
logopoiein, compose, 5,27 74,16; 93,3
 Greek-English Index 155
melon, apple, 28,9ff nodos, toothless, 96,26
melos, limb, 8,7 noein, conceive, 76,18-20
men, month, 60,25 noema: concept, 9,1-10,13; 12,1;
meros thought, 4,9; 6,27; 8,4; 11,10; 15,9
part, 4,7; 9,13; 26,33-28,3; 29,10-22; noStos, intelligible, 41,9; 45,17;
38,2.7; 45,13.14; 46,22-47,17; 47,3-12; 60,5
49,7.9; 51,10; 77,6-78,7; 79,23; nosein, be ill, 85,8ff
96,19-22 nosSma, illness, 86,7
particular, 98,11 nosodes, ill, unhealthy, 85,26
merikos, particular, individual, nosos, illness, 82,15ff; 86,7
3,22-4,3; 25,6-17; 26,12-29; 29,24- nothes, dullard, 85,25
30,2; 32,19.20; 36,4-16; 37,2.13; nothos, spurious, 8,2; 13,27
40,20-41,23; 44,24ff; 77,9-12 nous
meristos, divisible, 91,26 mind, 58,1
mesos understanding, 27,14
centre, 65,2.3 nukhthemeron, day (24 hours), 60,26
intermediate, 95,27 nukteris, bat, 71,22
mean, 9,25 nun,now
middle, 80,6 ho nun khronos, to nun, the present,
metaballein, to change, 51,6.8; 58,14; 59,11.15.16; 74,14-17
53,8.11ff; 83,18; 93,23-94,14;
100,6.7; 105,10ff oikeios, proper, 15,12.24; 25,15; 27,27;
metabole, change, 2,24; 83,7-21; 29,20; 41,26; 42,1; 43,20; 62,2;
83,32-84,3; 100,9; 105,10-19 71,18ff; 72,17-73,12; 78,12.26
metapherein, derive, 69,4.7 oikhesthai, be gone, 63,22
metaphora, metaphor, 7,2; 22,9 oikonomikos, economical, 5,6
metaskhematizein, to change, 7,3 oikothen, on one's own, 15,5
metekhein okhrian, pale, 86,9
partake of, 19,10-14; 40,17; okhriasis, pallor, 86,8
46,15.16; 80,22; 81,1; 83,30 dkhros
participate in, 6,15; 20,10; 67,22; pale, 81,22; 96,1
86,10; 88,6.26-90,11; 91,15.16 yellow, 89,17
methektos, being partaken of, oligos, few, 60,17-61,2; 62,7-10; 62,25-
19,10.13.14 63,23; 72,5.8
methexis, participation, 22,3 onkos, volume, 7,1; 55,4
methodos, method, 5,7-29 onoma
metrein, measure, 59,22; 60,1.25 name, 1,5; 2,10; 5,2.11; 15,10-17,20;
mikros, small, 49,17; 62,3.16-64,11; 18,22; 19,19-20,26; 21,27; 22,17-
93,14 24,10; 25,14.15; 26,16; 38,17.19;
mixis, mixture, mingling, 65,16; 92,10 40,10-15; 44,29-45,3; 72,12-26;
mneme, memory, 21,26 89,11; 96,3
monas, monad, 24,24 noun, 5,13-26; 11,3.6.16.18; 13,8;
monadikos, unique, 19,7 14,16.21.24; 24,18.19; 57,19; 84,7
monimos, permanent, 32,3 term, 83,28
monos, only, 19,2-7; 50,5; 73,8 word, 18,11; 81,26-9
monoeides, uniform, 4,13 onomatopoiein, make up a name,
morion, part, particle, 34,26; 35,1; coin words; 72,20.25; 97.24
55,1.2; 56,2.8.9; 57,5.26-58,26; onomatothetein, invent a name,
59,1-7; 60,3-11; 66,24; 88,11-13 6,29; 72,12.16
morphe, form, shape, 22,9; 81,7.24.25; opisthen, behind, 93,4
83,25-34; 87,23-88,3 opsis, sight, 94,3; 96,15; 97,20; 98,3
mousikos, musical, 23,10 organikos, instrumental, 4,29; 5,6ff
mousikS, music, 91,16ff organon, instrument, 5,3; 10,20;
muriakis, ten thousand times, 34,16 35,25
156 Greek-English Index
orge, temperament, 87,15 pareispherein, introduce, 30,3;
ornis, bird, 71,17; 105,4.5 77,5
orthe, nominative, 23,24 pareleluthos, past, 58,13; 74,14; 93,3
ouranios, heavenly, 45,18 parelkein, be redundant, 35,7
ousia paremballein, insert, 32,7
being, 21,1 parepesthai, go along, 27,25.26
essence, 27,25.27; 31,7; 77,29; parienai, pass over, 106,7
86,18.22; 100,7 paristan
substance, 6,16; 11,13; 12,5; 15,25; inform, 34,12
17,11; 19,12.20; 20,26; 21,1; 23,1; present, 8,13
24,26; 25,6-32,19; 26,2; 27,29; paronumos, paronym, 21,20; 22,21-
28,4.18.19; 30,2.25; 31,16; 24,12; 69,3.17; 72,21; 88,27-89,11;
33,11.13; 34,5-35,21; 36,3ff; 90,7; 97,4
37,22-38,21; 39,15; 40,20.25; parresiastikos, speaking frankly, 2,3
41,20ff; 43,4.9-44,3; pas, all, 25,2; 70,17
44,6ff.l0.16ff; 45,7-46,16; 46,22- paskhein, be affected, 13,1; 33,16.17;
47,16; 47,19-48,6.14.15; 67,24; 85,7-27; 86,10.13-23;
49,1.2.8.11.13ff; 50,6.10-20; 51,5- 92,3.10.19.20
52,1.11; 53,8-25; 54,3ff; 58,9-11; pater, father, 104,5
61,9; 62,3; 64,6; 65,12-66,19; pathetikos, affective, 3,18
69,19-30; 77,7.8; 78,6.10; 80,11; pathetikepoiotes, affective quality,
83,7-84,3.19; 91,22; 92,7-93,5; 81,6-82,32; 83,5-21; 86,3.5.13-20;
94,19.24; 105,11.17 87,2-20
thing, 26,24 pathos, affection, 81,6-83,2; 86,2.6-
ousiodes, essential, 32,11; 45,20; 87,12; 88,8
83,22; 86,28 pedalion, rudder, 71,29ff
ousiodos, essentially, 31,1; 45,11 pedaliotos, 'ruddered', 72,6.7.8
oute, nor, not, 50,21.22.25.26; 53,11; pekhuaios, one cubit, 61,3
94,18.19 pentagdnon, pentagon, 90,15
oxus, sharp, 20,24 pephukos, naturally, by nature,
85,14-24; 96,22
palaios, ancient, 58,5; 67,12.15; 70,2; perainein, be definite, 63,4.5
103,7.8 peras, limit, 25,2; 58,16
parabole, comparision, 43,6 periairein, strip off, 73,11
paradeigma periekhein, include, 38,4; 39,15;
diagram, 25,12 58,16ff; 67,18.19
example, 29,25; 39,14 periergia, overelaboration, 7,2
exemplar, 30,25 perikleiein, to limit, 12,4
original, 22,9 periorizein, include, 27,12
parakolouthema, concomitant, 27,26; periphereia, peripheral thing, 105,26
47,19; 48,13; 49,13; 50,9.15; 51,5; periskeles, harsh, 7,6
69,23ff; 70,16.24; 73,23; 75,22; perithesis, arrangement, 93,5
77,4; 78,14; 89,23; 90,27; 92,13; peritithenai, put around, 105,25;
102,12 106,1.3
parakolouthein, be a concomitant, perittos
49,4; 51,15; 57,18; 89,24; 90,28 odd, uneven, 95,12.21; 98,14-18;
parakousma, mistaken notion, 81,9 99,15
parakrouesthai, mislead, 5,21 excessive, 9,10
paralambanein, recognize, 35,22.23; perix, surrounding, 65,2.3
36,10 pezos, terrestrial, 32,5; 105,1.2
parapetasma, curtain, 7,8 phaidrunein, brighten, make beam,
paraphuas, offshoot, 69,24 4,11
parapleroma, complement, 105,27; phainesthai
106,5 appear, 57,17; 88,13
 Greek-English Index 157
be evident, 6,26; 7,4 82,25
be obvious, 1,10 poiein, do, 13,1; 33,16; 34,25; 35,2;
phainomenos, observable, 49,2 67,24; 85,6-15; 92,3.11-17
phaios, grey, 96,1; 98,23 poietikos, efficient, 21,21.22
phalakros, bald, 94,14 poioun, agent, 67,24; 70,13; 92,18
phantasia, representation, 83,27 poikilos, diverse, 4,14
phaulos, bad, 95,24; 96,2ff poikilia, intricacy, 8,4
philanthrdpos, kind, 33,8 poios
philosophos, philosopher, 38,13 sort, 49,8.10
phone what sort of, 1,11.12; 7,15; 20,14;
expression, 13,17; 18,8.9.22; 25,21; 33,23; 37,22; 46,18; 61,7.8; 66,7;
32,26.27; 33,2; 38,2-15; 52,10 81,35
sound, 15,14 topoion: quality, 12,5; 39,5; 54,10;
speech, 11,10 65,7; 66,8; 68,9; 82,2ff; 83,10;
tone, 20,24 89,15.17.23; 90,1.25-8; 91,5-27;
voice, 15,9; 57,14 92,7.10; 105,18; qualified, 80,14-
word, 8,22-10,11; 11,8.15.19; 13,8; 81,2; 86,10; 87,8; 88,6-27
14,22.24; 17,17; 18,4; 25,13; poiotes
26,23; 93,9; 94,19 quality, 6,14; 23,3; 46,16; 54,7;
metaphones, spoken, 57,14 69,19; 70,2; 80,14-18; 80,21-81,3;
phrasis, expression, 6,28; 7,6; 8,5 81,5-82,32; 83,4-15.22.23;
phronesis, prudence, 22,3 84,13-24; 85,10.11; 86,2.7.13.18ff;
phthainein, anticipate, 46,21 87,8.9.11.22; 88,10.19-23; 88,25-
phthartikos, destructive, 102,7 89,11; 89,15-18; 91,11-25
phtheiresthai being of a sort, 49,7
be destroyed, 28,4.5; 94,10 polemein, be at war, 94,6
pass away, 59,12 politikos, political, 5,6
perish, 53,24 poluonumos, polyonym, 16,5-13
phthongos, voice, 20,24 polus, many, 41,5ff; 60,17-61,2.4;
phthora, destruction, 45,18.21; 62,7-10.25; 63,6.8.13.23; 71,13-
83,6.8.13.17.20; 92,21; 105,12-17 72,9; 87,23; 101,22
phuein, grow, 94,15 poluskhedes, complex, 66,9
phulattein, preserve, 51,6 porisma, corollary, 40,8; 78,19
phusiologia, inquiry into natural posos
causes and phenomena, 36,1 how many, how much, 1,11; 7,15;
phusiologikos, natural, 5,5 60,27; 61,1
phusis, nature, 2,10; 3,25; 11,9; toposon, quantity, 12,5; 31,16.17;
15,8.12; 21,2; 28,22.25; 36,6.8; 49,14; 50,14; 53,25ff; 54,1.4.16ff;
40,4; 42,4; 45,20; 52,4; 57,8; 63,5; 55,4; 57,3; 57,11-18; 58,7.10.28;
65,5; 66,22.24; 73,21.23-74,11; 60,16-18; 61,7-9; 62,5.6; 62,16-
74,13-75,8; 82,14-25; 83,1; 84,22; 63,12; 64,16-20.23; 65,10.12.21-7;
86,6; 100,7; 103,17; 104,5.19 66,3.10.13.20; 68,9; 69,11.27;
phusikos, natural, 6,7.19; 59,15.16; 83,10.13; 91,26; 92,7ff; 105,17
81,12; 83,2.28.30; 84,26.27; 86,4 posotes, quantity, 28,25
piptein, fall, 37,13.19; 57,20 potanws, river, 2,25
pithanos, plausible, 4,25 pote, when, at some time, 13,1;
platanistos, plane, 23,5 69,12ff; 92,29-93,3
platanos, plane, 23,5 pou, where, somewhere, 13,1; 59,4;
plates, horizontal, 43,6 60,6; 64,20; 69,12ff; 83,10.14;
pleroun 92,9; 93,3; 105,18
complete, 9,7 pous, foot, 22,6.10
satisfy, 15,12 pragma, thing, 9,1-10,12; 11,19;
ploion, boat, 72,2ff 15,7.17; 17,17; 18,16; 20,15.17;
pneuma, breathing, breath, 17,9-18,5; 21,9; 22,2-24,6; 40,25; 66,15-67,7;
158 Greek—English Index
69,25; 75,25-77,2; 78,12; 92,1; prosplekein, attach to, 69,26
93,20 prosupakouein, supply, 35,6; 50,16
pragmateia, treatise, 6,1 protasis
pragmatikos: really, 31,9; practical, premise, 53,4
93,17 proposition, 5,13.14; 11,3; 18,14
praxis, action, 60,18-27; 78,25 proteros, prior, 14,16; 36,6-9;
praktikos, practical, 4,28.30; 5,2.5; 59,15.16; 74,12-21; 75,6-76,20;
10,16.17 81,22; 103,1-105,5
presbuteros, elder, 103,7.8 protos, primary, first, ll,8ff; 13,7;
pro ton kategorion, pre-categories, 14,22; 35,21; 36,3-37,1; 38,6ff;
14,3-11 43,8-44,22; 47,23; 54,12ff; 59,18;
proairesis, choice, 103,23 73,20; 84,13.14; 92,6
proapodidonai, give previously, proiiparkhein, pre-exist, 96,18
77,15.21 pseudein, be false, speak falsely,
probainein, advance, promote, 57,13; 34,15-35,5; 52,19; 67,4.6
100,12 pseudes, false, 4,22.30; 10,17; 13,5;
prod£los, clear beforehand, 8,1 34,14
proegeisthai pseudos, falsehood, falsity, 34,22;
introduce, 10,11 52,22; 53,11-14; 100,16-20;
precede, 13,8 100,23-101,7
proepinoein, think, 76,30 psilos, bare, 9,26.27
prokalumma psimmuthion, carbonate of lead,
curtain, 82,24 80,27
veil, 7,10 psukhe
prokatarkhein, to found, 1,16 soul, 2,23-3,6.19; 6,23; 15,4; 37,2-18;
prolambanein 59,21-60,4; 75,23; 78,21-28; 80,8;
anticipate, 7,15 81,30-82,10; 83,17; 86,12; 87,12;
be a prerequisite, precede, 1,11; 92,18
105,9.10 mind, 7,12
pronoia, providence, 78,24ff; 80,4 psukhrotis, coldness, 81,14.20; 95,19
prooimion, introduction, 65,28; psuxis, coldness, 81,16; 95,18
103,18 ptaisma, blunder, 82,22
prophangs, clear, 105,22 ptenos, aerial, 32,4; 71,19ff; 105,1.2.4
propherein, utter, 53,24 pteron, wing, 71,17ff
prophorikos, spoken, 52,17; 57,23.24 pterotos, winged creature, 71,25ff
prophorikos logos, spoken language, ptosis
57,23 grammatical form, 23,20.22.24
pros ti, relative, 13,1; 49,18; 54,10; inflection, 17,14-18,5
62,16-63,20; 64,18.19; 65,3; 66,4- puknos, dense, 6,27; 88,10-17
11.14-21; 66,22-67,11.15.16; pukt&s, boxer, 84,27; 89,9
68,15; 68,22-69,20; 69,23-70,8; puktike, boxing, 89,6
70,10.11.16-20; 71,5-15; 72,23; puktikos, boxer, 84,22ff; 89,5
73,11-15.23; 74,11; 75,21; pur, fire, 46,15; 81,16; 86,16; 98,15
76,11-25; 77,7-78,16; 78,30-79,22; puretos, fever, 81,35
80,10-12.16.20; 91,4-92,1.7.11; purettein, have fever, 82,13
93,13-95,9; 96,6; 97,18; 98,4.7; purion, firestick, 80,7
100,5.24; 102,5; 104,10 purros, red, 89,18
prosekhes
connected, 32,22 rhema, verb, 5,13-26; Il,2ff.l7.18;
immediate, 36,12; 42,3 13,8; 14,22.24; 17,10; 18,18-25;
proskhresthai, be used for, 54,14 24,19.20; 34,21; 57,19; 84,7
prosopon rhetos, remark, 32,22
character, person, 4,16.22 rhoe, flux, 2,24
personality, 7,3 rhope, weight, 55,5.9
 Greek-English Index 159
Musis, flow, 2,24 sdmatikos, corporeal, 58,10
rhutidoun, shrivel, 28,17.20 sophist&s, sophist, 5,20; 66,27
sophistikos, sophistical, 5,21
sapheneia sperma, seed, sperm, 17,1.3; 36,8
clear knowledge, 6,29 sphaira, sphere, 84,3
clearness, 53,6 sphairikos, 84,5
saphes, clear, 7,5 sphalma, error, 35,7
seira, chain, 14,25 sphodros, violent, 94,9ff
semainein spUn, spleen, 66,25.26
apply, 52,8 spoudaios, good, 23,13; 40,17; 70,5.7;
indicate, 11,10; 42,3 78,23; 89,3.12; 95,24; 96,2
mean, 9,17.22; 17,22-18,19; stasis, standing, 68,21.23; 69,4.5
39,11.12; 44,21; 51,13; 57,22; sterein, be deprived, lack, 96,11-23;
71,2; 78,1; 80,3; 81,28 97,4
refer to, 36,25 steresis, privation, lack, 19,6; 33,23-
signify, 5,12; 10,3.5.8; 11,19; 21,12; 34,9; 93,16-94,28; 96,6-97,19;
26,1; 34,14.30; 36,2; 42,2; 44,21; 98,10; 99,7-100,24
48,15; 49,5.6; 52,9; 57,15; 78,12; stoapoikite, Painted Stoa, 1,18
93,5; 96,2; 101,11 stoikheion
semainomenon: meaning, 20,28; element, 36,7
32,26-33,2; 103,4.8; 104,18; signi- letter, 5,25.26
fied, 11,14; 14,17; 20,19.20; strephein, revolve, 70,27
97,12.13 strophS, a return to one's starting
semantikos: meaning, 9,20.22; sem- point, 70,25
antical, 18,22; signifying, 11,13; sukophantein, defame, 70,12
48,16 sulan, derive, 54,12
sSmeion: point, 33,23-34,1; 58,1; sullabe, syllable, 5,25.26; ll,4ff;
sign, 82,17 22,25-23,23; 57,15
skazein, be defective, 75,21 sulloge, aggregation, collection, 5,11;
skeuos, utensil, 31,26ff 11,2
skhema, figure, 29,16; 81,7.24; 83,25- sullogismos, syllogism, 5,9-21; 6,3;
84,5; 87,23-88,4; 90,19-20 11,Iff; 13,9.10.17
skhesis, relation, 37,7.13; 41,21; sumbainein, follow, 63,28; 64,12
54,11; 56,6; 64,19; 66,24; 73,19; sumbeb&kos, accidental, accident;
76,12.17; 78,2.13; 91,23 3,8; 17,12; 20,23-8; 21,17; 23,2;
kata skhesin, relatively, 31,12 25,6-32,19; 37,9; 39,6; 40,23ff;
skhetikos, relational, 36,2 41,1; 43,17-44,2; 45,9.12;
skhizopteros, creature with feathered 46,13-16; 46,23-47,15; 49,8.10;
wings, 71,20.22 58,8; 60,19-61,8; 65,24; 73,18-20;
skia, shadow, 27,26 77,8; 86,21; 91,23; 105,11.13
skopein, consider, 96,12.14 sumbebekuios, accidental, 32,12;
skopos, aim, 4,21; 7,17.21; 8,21ff; 83,23
9,llff; 11,17; 13,1; 93,9 sumballein
skulakion, puppy, 96,22 be useful, 1,4; 13,5; 14,5
soma, body, 3,3.9; 6,14.15; 15,4.6; join, 63,20
28,2; 29,11; 30,19; 31,22; 37,18; include, 5,23
40,12-15; 44,30ff; 54,18; 55,6; sumperasma, conclusion, 88,19
58,7.19.21-59,7; 62,8.12; 65,24- sumperilambanein
66,2.24; 67,9; 68,23; 76,2-5; 78,22; include, 26,7; 34,20.21; 52,13
79,18; 81,29-82,11; 83,18-34; comprehend, 28,11
86,11.20; 87,11; 88,12-15.26; 93,1; sumplekein, combine, 32,26; 69,30;
95,15; 98,18.22; 99,16.20 70,1
soma mathematikon, geometrical sumplekomenos, compound, com-
solid, 66,2 bined, 25,3; 34,24
160 Greek-English Index
sumplok€, combination, 9,4; suntaxis, organization, 14,2
24,14-19; 32,23-33,4; 57,19.21; sunteinein, stretch, 7,12
92,8.11; 100,23-101,5 suntelein, contribute, 5,8
sumpleroun, complete, constitute, sunthesis, combination, 7,6
make up, 27,25.27; 28,5; 45,11; sunthetos
47,1; 77,4 (of substances), composite, 34,3-5;
sumplerotikos, constitutive, com- 35,18-36,2; 45,20-46,8; 54,7
pleting, 28,3; 46,16 (of expressions), compound, 5,11;
sumpseudein, to be false together, 33,2.3; 57,15; 66,9
101,9 suntiktein, produce, 63,20
sumptdma, accident, 87,5.19 suntomos, concise, 7,5
sunagein sunuphistanai, co-exist, 56,2
draw together, 39,10 sustasis, existence, 49,11
deduce, 40,8; 78,18 sustatikos, constitutive, 15,13;
interconnect, 50,15 21,15; 44,10
imply, 9,19 sustrephein, make terse, 6,27
sunagoge, uniting, 49,7.9 suzugia, pair, 25,7ff; 77,9
sunairein, destroy, 35,14.15
sunanaginoskein, connect, 24,20 tattein, fix on, 41,16
sunanairein, destroy, 74,6.19 t'auton, the same, 51,6-12; 52,12;
sunanaphainein, become evident, 55,5; 58,9; 97,3-11
7,21; 78,19.29 taxis
sunaptein, meet, join, be connected, location, 47,6; 66,5.7; 80,17.19
56,9.10; 57,5.9ff; 58,10 order, 7,22; 13,6.10.24; 14,21; 15,1;
sunathroisis, gathering, 49,9 17,13; 35,11; 37,17; 54,4.10; 56,2;
suneidenai, be conscious of, 82,22 59,5.15-17; 94,4; 103,18
suneisagein, bring in together, 63,18; ordering, 4,10.12; 38,22
94,6 tekhne, method, 68,14
suneispherein, entail, 35,13.14; telein, assign, 69,17
74,20; 103,10 teleios, complete, perfect, 9,13.16;
sunekhes, continuous, 31,17; 25,2
54,16.17; 56,9; 58,2-59,2; teleiotes, perfection, 92,21
62,7.8.12 teleidtikos, perfective, 82,5.6.28
sunekheia, continuity, 56,3 telikos, final cause, 21,23
sunengus, close, close together, 75,14; telos, end, 7,19
88,11 terein, observe, 71,11
sunetheia, usage, 14,13.15; 72,17-26; tetras, tetrad, 24,25.27
93,11 tetragdnon, square, 75,11.12; 90,15;
sungramma, writing, 3,21ff 105,24ff
sunistanai tetragonismos, squaring (of the
consist of, 45,14 circle), 75,18
constitute, 46,28; 75,11 tetradikos, fourfold, 24,23
exist, 25,9; 40,20 thedrein, contemplate, think of,
sunkeisthai, be a compound, 5,13 66,1.3; 77,2
sunkerannunai, combine, 45,20 theoreisthai: be manifest, 70,19;
sunkhdrein, concede, 62,4; 63,12 83,25.27.32.33; 84,24; 86,2; 87,11;
sunkhoresis, 50,3; 53,20; 62,15 89,25; 93,21; 94,16.23; be
sunkrinein, compare, 90,16.17.24 observed, 66,25; 81,3; 82,29; 83,9;
sunkrisis, comparison, 41,19 92,1
sunonumos, synonym, 13,22; 15,23- theorema: observation, 47,6.11;
16,23; 19,18-20,10; 22,12-24,11; investigation, 79,26
48,1-14; 52,9 theoretikos, theoretical, 4,28.29;
sunousioun, combine essentially, 99,2 5,1.4ff; 10,16
suntagmatikos, systematic, 4,4-15 theos, god, 37,2
 Greek-English Index 161
theios, divine, 26,2; 35,20.21; topos, place, 1,17; 3,1-15; 26,33;
36,25; 37,8.15 27,18-28; 28,14.31; 29,9; 32,4.7;
theologia, theology, 6,20; 35,28 54,11.18ff; 56,6; 58,16-59,7;
theologikos, theological, 5,4; 6,7.8 67,25; 69,11-13; 83,9.15; 93,3;
thermasia, heat, 81,16.21; 82,14 96,13; 102,14; 105,16.19
thermotes, heat, 46,15; 81,15.20; tragelaphos, goat-stag, 9,26
95,17 trigdnon, triangle, 84,2ff; 90,14.22
thesis trikh&i diastaton, three-dimensional,
application, 11,8.19; 13,7 54,6-8
coinage, 18,12 tripekhus, three cubits, 62,6
position, 14,22.23; 55,1-3; 56,6; trope, change, 81,18
59,1.3.13; 60,3-12; 62,9; 66,22; tukhe, chance, 21,17.27; 79,13
68,22ff; 69,15; 88.13; 93,1 tunkhanein, happen to
thnetos, mortal, 31,24; 32,4 ei tukhoi, for example, 3,29
thrasutes, rashness, 101,21 hds etukhen, by chance, 79,25
threptikos, concerning nourishment, tuphlos, blind, 96,27; 97,8
28,21 tuphlotts, blindness, 94,3; 97,8.20ff;
thronos, chair, 31,27 98,3
thuisM, censer, 31,27 tuphldttein, become blind, 96,25
thumiama, incense, 29,2
tiktein, give birth, 96,27 xest&s, pint, 59,22ff
tis, particular, 48,16 xulon, wood, ll,12ff
tode ti (literally, 'a this'), a particular,
48,15-49,5; 52,9 zetesis, research, 79,26
toios e toios, such and such, 21,7 z66, life, 2,2; 32,3
tonos, accent, 17,14-18,5 zoion, animal, 19,11; 21,9ff; 31,11.12;
32,2ff; 38,21ff; 103,17; 105,1
 Subject Index

References are to the page and line numbers of the CAG edition, which appear in
the margin of this translation.
accidents, sumbebekota an action, 34,25
are in substances not as parts, 47,15 not in all cases obviously true or
are not third substances, 43,15-22 false, 35,4ff
belong among the realities, 21,1 Archimedes, 75,14
do not constitute substance of the arrangement, keisthai
subject, 28,5 category arising from the combin-
have their being in particular sub- ation of substance and relatives,
stances, 40,24-41,5 92,12
need to be in a subject in order to definition and division into species,
exist, 25,18 93,lff
only accidents inhere, 27,29
particular accident, merikon sum- be, being, einai
bebekos, 26,25-29,23 in bare thought vs. independent
universal accident, katholou sum- existence, 9,26-10,12; 70,11
bebekos, 29,25 predicated homonymously of the ten
account, logos categories, 16,19ff
each thing is made known both by a is form, 21,13
name and by an account, 15,10 'is' vs. 'is said of, 26,24; 36,15ff;
includes both definition and descrip- 40,23ff; 41,17; 60,11
tion, 20,14-22 of other categories requires category
of being (logos tes ousias), 17,10- of substance, 35,16
21,3 of relatives, 77,29
affection, pathos beings, ta onta: division of, 10.12;
a sub-species of quality, 81,6-83,2; 25,5-25,12
86,2.6-87,12 belong, huparkhein
being affected, paskhein: a second- belonging in a subject divisibly vs.
ary category combining substance indivisibly, 91,25ff
and quality, 92,10; species of, contraries belonging to a subject,
92,19ff 98,13-24; 99,27; 100,7; 102,10
affective quality, path&tikepoiotes: differentiae belong to a subject as
and affection constitute a species intelligible parts, 47,1-17
of quality, 81,13ff; either pro- features belonging to: substance,
duces or is generated by an 51,13-52,14; quantity, 65,llff;
affection, 81,15ff; affective qual- relatives, 67,14ff; 70,16ff; quality,
ity vs. affection in relation to 89,15ff; 90,lff
things vs. sensations, 86,13ff not belonging as a part is differentia
affirmation (see also negation), in definition of particular acci-
kataphasis dents, 27,4ff
is generated from a substance and opposites belonging to a subject,

162
 Subject Index 163
99,8.27 shape, 83,30ff
proprium ofx belongs to a: alone, coming into being, genesis
51,15ff as a species of change, 83,8.12
relatives belong together, 104,10 of a proposition from a substance
vs. inherence, 27,27ff and an action, 34,19ff
of substances, 45,18ff
capacity, dunamis substantial change constitutes gene-
species of quality, 81,10ff; 84,21ff sis, 105,12ff
fitness for natural things, 81,llff common, koinon
natural disposition either in boundary, 56,9ff; 57,1-9; 57,25-
relation to a universal or with 58,25
respect to ease, 85,5-27 said in two ways: what is partaken
category, katlgoria of indivisibly vs. divisibly,
signifies nothing true or false, 19,10-14
34,12ff with respect to: homonyms, 15.17-
neither an affirmation nor a nega- 16,6.20ff; 17,10; 18,5f.20ff;
tion, 34,18-27 19,17ff;s;y«07iyms, 15,17-
said without any combination, 16,6.20ff; 19,17ff; proprium,
32,20fT 44,18-21
four principal and primary catego- concepts, noSmata
ries: substance, quantity, quality, Aristotle's aim concerns only,
relative; the other six arise from 8,20-9,16
the combination of substance words and things mediated through,
with the remaining three, 92,5ff 9,17-10,14
origin of, 24,21-25,4 condition, diathesis
cause, aition perfective actuality not producing
paronyms called after efficient or an affection and easy to lose,
final cause, 21,21ff 82,9ff
cause and effect as relatives, 67,23; state and condition constitue a
76,15 species of quality, 81,7ff
priority of, 76,15; 103,20; 104,2ff; two senses of, 84,6-11
105,1 continuity, 54,16-55,3; 57,25-58,26
change, kinesis line, surface, body, time, and place
is either substantial or accidental are continuous quantities,
change, 105,9fF 54,17-18
is found in four categories: sub- the parts of a continuous quantity
stance (coming into being and meet at a common boundary,
destruction), quantity (growth 56,9-10
and diminution), quality (qualita- exhaustive division of the conti-
tive change), where (change of nuous is possible only in thought,
place), 105,17ff 58,1
vs. actuality (energeia), 55,10ff contraries, enantia, 101,14-102,21
change, metabold and substance, 49,12-50,12;
species of: generation, destruction, 52,13.17; 53,16-24; 58,9; 64,6;
growth, diminution, qualitative 69,27; 94,19
change, change of place, 83,9 definite quantities do not have con-
found in four categories: substance, traries, 62,3-18; 64,15-65,18;
quantity, quality, where, 83,10 69,27
colour, khrdma division of, 95,10-96,4
division by means of affirmation and do not always divide into the true
negation, 26,6ff and the false, 100,22-101,13
in respect to affecting quality and examined as things and not as con-
affection, 82,21ff; 87,1-3 traries, 102,lff
distinguished from figure and found in a single subject, 102,llff
164 Subject Index
have independent reality, different, 31,18ff
63,15-25 are intelligible parts of substance,
need not be in the same genus, 41,3-13
102,16ff are simple substances, 45,17-46,10
never coexist in a single subject, can divide genera in many ways,
63,27-64,9; 102,6ff 32,lff
quality admits, 70,2 constitute the subject, 46,28
species of opposites, 93,13ff; 94,lff; differ from accidents, 46,20-47,2
95,1-27; 98,10ff; 99,10ff essential (but not accidental)
subsumed under the same category, differentiae of subordinate
89,19ff genera are always the same,
vs. relatives, 63,15-25; 69,23-70,8 32,9ff
conversion, antistrophe' of heterogenous things are always
of relatives, 73,1-13; 97,24; 98,4 different, 31,15
is really 'equiversion', 70,25-71,8 of substances cannot be accidents,
convert, antistrephein: definition but must be substances, 45,5ff
and thing denned must convert, divine, theion
27,12ff; proprium and that of the divine is completely unrelated
which it is the proprium must and transcendent, 37,5ff
convert, 44,12ff; priority preclude division, diairesis exhaustive by
converse implication of existence, means of negation and affir-
103,9ff; relatives ought to be con- mation, 26,4ff
vertible, 71,9-73,1 four-fold and ten-fold division of
counter-objection (see also objection), things, 32,19ff
antiparastasis, 53,lff; 62,4; 63,11; in thought vs. actual, 58,1
101,6 of the Categories into three parts,
Cratylus, 3,1 14,3ff
Cynics, the, 2,2.7 doing, poiein
Cyrenaics, the 1,17 category arising from the combin-
ation of substance and quality,
definition (see also synonyms, homo- 92,10
nyms, heteronyms, polyonyms), definition and division into species,
horismos 92,17ff
a kind of logos, 20,14-21
some things cannot be defined, e.g. Epicurus, 1,15
supreme genera, 20,15; 26,30ff;
44,7-12 figure, skh&ma.
should be made of genus and consti- and shape constitute a species of
tutive differentiae, 21,14 quality, 81,24ff
of what is in a subject and of what is is applied to inanimate objects,
said of a subject, 40,7-16; 44,29- 81,24ff
45,3 is manifested only on surface, sub-
vs. description, 20,14-22 stance remains unchanged,
Democritus, 1,15 83,24-84,5
demonstration, apodeixis is manifested in our own represen-
instrument to distinguish true and tation, 83,28
false, 10,15-22 every shape also has a, 87,21
is a syllogism, 11,1 form, eidos
description, hupographe being of a thing, 21,13
there is homonymy among things and quality, 86,18.22
signified by, 20,17 is prior by nature, 36,7
a kind of logos, 20,21 proper definitions are derived from
differentiae, diaphorai it, 21,14
are different when genera are not an accident, 27,30ff
 Subject Index 165
genus, genos among accidents, 20,23-21,2
'different genera' said in many
ways, 31,19ff in something, en tint
each has specific differentiae, genus in the definition of particular
31,15ff; 32,llff accident, 26,32ff
intelligible vs. perceptible, 41,9ff is said in eleven ways, 29,5-23
not all are secondary substances, incapacity, adunamia
39,1-12 capacity and incapacity constitute a
notional entities, 9,8ff species of quality, 81,10ff
of contraries, 65,1-6; 102,16-20 is unfitness for natural things,
of quality, 84,13ff; 86,2; 84,22; 81,llff
91,10-26 is a quality said in three ways,
of substance, 15,13; 41,20ff; 50,19; 85,9-27
52,14 individuals, atoma
secondary substances, 43,15-44,4 are subjects only, 13,15
predicated accidentally and rela- not predicated of anything, but are
tively of a subject, 31,12 in subjects, 30,4-23
predicated of species, 13,14; 29,20ff; beings that are one in number,
41,20ff; 42,14-43,5; 48,2-9 30,18
signifies a plurality and a certain inhere, enuparkhein, only accidents
quality, 49,6ff inhere, 27,29
ultimate genera, genikotata: are intelligible, notion
only predicated, 13,17; entitled differentiae are intelligible parts,
'categories', 13,19 41,3ff
Gorgias, 22,8
grammatical form, ptosis knowledge, eplst£m&
variation of the last syllable, 23,23 contrary to ignorance, 70,3
differentia in definition of man,
having, ekhein 27,14; 73,14
category arising from the combin- homonymous, 22,5
ation of substance and relatives, infallible awareness, 79,10
92,12 is a relative, 67,22; 68,18; 70,3; 74,9-
definition and division into species, 75,25; 76,17-77,2; 79,10; 91,11
93,5ff opposites known by the same know-
there is a category of having, but not ledge, 16,18
of being had, 33,15-22 quality in the soul, 81,30
Hedonists, the, 3,16 species of knowledge are qualities,
Heraclitus, 2,25 91,10-21
heteronyms, heteronyma state of the soul, 82,10; 83,17
things differing in both name and what is known is prior to know-
definition, 15,27 ledge, 74,9-75,25
are not entirely different, but are
the same in their subject, 16,24- Lyceans, the, 2,1
17,3
homonyms, homdnuma man, anthropos
things having in common their individual man is an example of
name, but differing in definition, primary substance, universal
15,29-16,4 man is called a secondary sub-
always have the same accent, inflec- stance, 39,14-40,2
tion, and breathing, 17,5-18,14 mathematical body, 66,2
are not synonyms, 19,15-20,12
division of, 21,16-22,10 negation, apophasis
homonymy, homdnumia not in all cases obviously true or
among verbs, 18,18-25 false, 35,4ff
166 Subject Index
appropriate means of denning Categories is concerned with
substance, 36,22ff things known by perception,
and affirmation: as opposites, 33,25
93,16ff; 94,15ff; 98,8; 100,14ff; is a relative, 67,21
101,1-13; generated by combining is the basis of our conception of
items from different categories, quality, 80,25
34,26ff; not the same as what what is perceived is prior to percep-
they signify, 97,llff; provide an tion, 74,23ff; 75,26-76,8; 77,1
exhaustive division, 26,4ff Peripatetics, the, 3,14
and truth, 34,12ff; 100,14ff; philosophical schools, 1,14-3,20
101,1-13 Plato, 2,7; 3,5.9; 6,24; 18,10
number, arithmos his refutation of Protagoras, 67,2-8
as a quantity, 54,13; 57,1-9; has no his refutation of the undecided
contrary, 49,15; is discrete, 54,17; (ephektikoi) philosophers, 2,13
57,1-9 invented the word 'quality', 81,25
contrariety and, 95,21; 98,18; 99,15 on relatives, 70,10-14
in the soul vs. in perceptible things; said that reference to the divine is
the latter is composed of parts by negation, 36,26
having position, the former is not, polyonyms, poluonuma
59,20-60,9 things differing in name, but having
one in number, 30,4.15.22; 51,5; definition in common, 16,5
58,8 Porphyry, 9,9; 25,7; 41,7
opposed to relatives, 62,25 position, thesis
a species of relatives giving rise to
objection, enstasis category of being arranged
and counter-objection, 53,lff (keisthai), 69,6-21
one (see also number, substance), heis, predication, katGgoria
hen, 21,22; 30,12; 50,5; 51,5.6 and substance, 41,2; 45,11; 47,24
opposites, antikeimena, 93,7-101,13 in language, 11,3; 20,21.24; 38,13
four kinds of opposition, 93,15-17; of genera, species and individuals,
affirmation and denial, 94,15ff; 13,14ff; 15,24; 30,6; 42,16; 45,11;
100,13-101,13; contraries, 94,9ff; 48,3ff
95,lff; 98,6-100,12; privation and simple vs. compound, 66,8ff
state, 94,10ff; 97,18-100,129; transitivity of, 30,24-31,12; 48,3ff
relatives, 94,5ff priority, proteron, 103,1-104,12
order, taxis, of the study of logic, 13,6 five meanings of, 103,3-21
the prior and the posterior are rela-
paronyms, pardnuma tives, 104,8ff
commonality and difference with privation, sterGsis
respect to both the name and the not a being, but a privation of being,
thing, 22,22-23,19 34,9
not exactly in the middle between not the same as to be deprived,
homonyms and synonyms, 23,25- 97,1-8
24,12 spoken of only with respect to a
neither in a subject nor said of a pre-existing possession, 96,5-28
subject, 30,2 proprium, idion
particular, to merikon belongs to all and only that of which
not said of any subject, 25,17 it is the proprium, 44,13
particular accident, merikon sum- of quality, 67,13.15; 90,28; 91,2;
bebekos, 26,25-29,23 92,14
particular substance (see also pri- of quantity, 65,10ff
mary substance), merike ousia, of substance, 44,11-22; 45,7; 46,6;
25,5ff; 26,18; 36,4; 40,19ff. 47,21.22; 51,5-52,12
perception, aisthesis Protagoras, 66,26-67,2
 Subject Index 167
puzzle, aporia statement), 54,16ff; 56,7-58,26
raising a puzzle is the route to the definite and indefinite, 62,5-13
resolution of the puzzlement, determinate, 63,1-9
79,24-80,13 distinctive characteristics of,
Pythagoras, 1,15 61,9-66,4
division of, 54,16-55,3
qualified, poios has no contrary, 62,1-66,4
is what partakes of quality, 80,25- in the strict sense and per accidens,
81,3 60,14-61,8
on qualified and quality, 80,14-92,2 opposites such as large and small
things qualified participate in qual- are not quantities but relatives,
ity but are not always called paro- 62,15-64,21
nymously after them, 88,25-89,13 position among the categories:
qualitative change, alloiosis quantity rightly occupies the
change (metaboU) in affective qual- second position, 54,3-15
ity, 83,22 propria of quantity
accidental change (kin&sis) in the not having a contrary, 65,15ff
category of quality, 105,14-19 being called both equal and une-
distinguished from growth, 105,24ff qual, 65,20-66,3
quality, poiotSs
alteration arises not from every relatives, to pros ti, 66,5-80,13
quality but only from affective being and essence of a relative is
ones, 83,4ff nothing other than its relation to
features of: contrariety and more or another, 77,27-78,16
less are not features of all quali- contrariety: some relatives, but not
ties, 89,15-91,1 all, admit it, 69,22-70,8
further division of: fitness/actuality; convertible if properly specified,
perfective/hurtful; producing/not 73,1-23
producing an affection; hard/easy division of 67,16-25
to lose, 82,2-83,2 independent things in themselves or
genera of qualities are classified bound in relation: can be thought
under relatives but their species of either way, 76,8-17
under quality, 91,10-92,2 knowledge of: as one knows one
is defined in terms of the qualified, relative, so also will one know the
80,21-81,3 other, 78,29-79,8
is that in respect of which things are more and less: some relatives, but
called qualified, 87,8ff not ajl, admit it, 70,15-27
many relatives are subsumed under one species of relatives, position,
quality, 91,3-92,2 gives rise to one of the categories,
on qualified and quality, 80,14-92,2 69,6-21
location of the category, 80,20 position among the categories,
species of quality: (1) state and con- 66,5-13
dition, manifested in actuality, reality of, 66,21-67,10, 70,10-14
84,20-85,3; (2) capacity and inca- simultaneous by nature, 73,22-74,8
pacity, manifested in potentiality, species of, 68,13-69,21
84,24-85,26; (3) affective quality title: why is it 'On relatives' and not
and affection, 86,1-87,20; (4) 'On relative'?, 66,13-21
figure and shape, 87,21-88,4 universal parts are not relatives,
quantity, poson, 54,1-66,3 79,15-23
composed of parts having position what is subsumed under relatives is
vs. not so composed, 55, Iff; necessarily classified under some
56,1-6; 58,27-60,12 other category as well, 91,29-92,2
continuous (line, surface, body,
time, place) vs. discrete (number, shape, morphe
168 Subject Index
applies to animate objects, has no reality at all, 53,22ff
81,24ff is a discrete quantity, 57,10-24
figure and shape constitute a made up of things not having posi-
species of quality, 81,24ff tion, 60,10ff
manifested only on surface, sub- Stoics, the, 1,18
stance remains unchanged, subject, hupokeimenon
83,24-84,5 and contraries, 102,8-14
simple, haplous, see under words, sub- and opposites, 95,14ff; 96,14; 98,24;
stance, predication 99,8-26; 100,6
simultaneity (see also under relatives, constitution of, 46,28
contraries), to hama, 104,13- destruction of, 28,3ff
105,6 differentiae of, 46,28; 47,7ff
its first meaning is with respect to in a subject vs. said of a subject, 9,6;
time, its second with respect to 25,16-26,22; 29,25-30,22; 30,25ff;
nature, 104,15ff 36,16ff; 37,3ff; 40,8-17; 44,16-30;
sovl,psukhe 47,7ff; 48,15ff; 91,22ff
definition of substance applies to subject and accidents, 25,19ff;
the individual soul, but not to the 27,23ff; 28,5ff; 41,Iff; 46,17ff;
transcendent one, 37,10-20 91,22ff
number in the soul vs. in the percep- substance vs. subject, 25,21-26,16;
tible thing, 59,21-60,4 28,9ff; 36,16ff; 41,Iff; 46,17ff;
is the subject that the sciences are 47,7ff; 48,15ff; 58,8; 91,22ff
in, 75,23 with respect to existence, 26,llff
category of quality as applied to, with respect to name and definition,
81,30-82,10; 83,17; 86,12; 87,12 16,27ff; 40,8-17; 44,27ff
species (see also under quality, rela- with respect to predication, 13,13ff;
tives, change), eidos 26,llff; 30,25ff; 32,15; 40,8-17;
is more a substance than a genus is, 48,4ff
41,19-42,20; 50,18ff substance, ousia, 35,10-53,25
not all are secondary substances, ancients' definition leads to absurd
39,1-16 consequence that some substan-
signifies a plurality and a certain ces are relatives, 77,3-25
quality, 49,6ff Aristotle uses 'is' when talking
species in genus vs. genus in about, 26,24
species, 29,12-23 composed of genus and constitutive
species of substance are called differentiae, 15,11-16
secondary substances, 43,15-44,4 composite (see simple vs. composite)
subject for its genus, 13,14; 15,24 definition of'substance':
state (see also condition, privation), cannot be given, since substance is
hexis an ultimate genus, 44,9
change of state is substantial, 86,5ff applies neither to God nor to the
of the soul and of the body, 81,34 transcendent soul, 37,1-20
one species is a perfective actuality division, manner of, 37,22-38,22
that is hard to lose and does not concomitant features (parakolou-
produce an affection, 82,9ff themata) of: being said syno-
state and condition: constitute a nymously of everything, 47,18-
species of quality, 81,7ff; 84,8- 48,14; not admitting of more or
11.24; as relatives, 91,6ff less, 50,8-51,3; not being in a sub-
vs. privation, 93,16-94,29; 96,7-14; ject, 44,5-46,10; not having a con-
97,4-19; 98,10; 99,7-100,24 trary, 49,12-50,7; being one in
statement, logos number and receptive of contra-
does not receive contraries in virtue ries, 51,4-52,14; signifying a par-
of receiving anything itself, 52,15- ticular this, 48,12-49,11
53,25 general sense: the reality of each
 Subject Index 169
thing, 21,27 things, pragmata
not every substance is a subject, are characterized either by their
25,22-26,16 matter or by their form or by
not in a subject, 25,20 both, 21,10
other categories presuppose time, khronos
category of, 35,10ff is the measure of change, 60,25
primary vs. secondary: have their natural order of, 59,10-19
name and definition in common, truth, aletheia
38,17; particular substance is affirmation and negation divide in
called primary, universal second- every case into true and false,
ary, 36,3-21; primary is included 100,16ff
(in divisions) under secondary, and falsehood do not derive from
38,6ff; 39,15; primary substances statements or opinions, but come
serve as subjects both for the into being by things being
existence of accidents and for the altered, 53,7-17
predication of universals, 42,12ff; in assertions, 34,14ff; 52,22; 53,llff
secondary substances are not in a requires combination of subject and
subject, 44,27-45,4; species and predicate, 34,14ff; 100,23ff
genera are secondary substances,
39,2ff; without primary substan- universal accident, katholou
ces neither universals nor acci- sumbeb&kos
dents would exist, 41,13-17 both said of a subject and in a sub-
proprium of: being one in number ject, 29,25
and receptive of contraries, 51,4- universal substance, katholou ousia
52,14 said of a subject but not in a subject,
self-subsistent, 33,13 25,16ff
simple vs. composite, 35,18-36,2; universals, ta katholou
Categories is concerned with com- do not need primary substances in
posite substances, 34,4; prime order to exist, but in order to be
matter and form are simple sub- said of something, 40,18ff
stances that are inferior to the not prior to the many but in the
composite, 35,2 Iff; substance of many, 41,6-11
the gods is simple substance that said of a subject, 25,16
is superior to the composite, utility of Aristotle's philosophy,
35,20ff 6,9-15; 13,4-11
ultimate genus that cannot be given
a definition, 44,5ff virtue, ar&te
vs. subject (see under subject) is a quality, 70,2-6; 81,31; 82,10;
surface, epiphaneia 83,18; 89,2; 102,19ff
and quality: in respect to affection, as a contrary, 102,19ff
82,24ff; in respect to figure and shares neither its name nor its defi-
shape, 83,24-84,1 nition with its subject, 40,15
species of continuous quantity,
54,17-55,7; 58,18.20; 60,19-61,3 when,pote
vs. superficies, 58,4ff category derived from species of
syllogism, sullogismos quantity, 69,1 Iff
collection of propositions composed category arising from the combin-
of nouns and verbs, 11, Iff ation of substance and quantity,
demonstration is a kind of syllo- 92,9
gism, 11,1 definition and division into species,
synonyms, sunonuma 93,2ff
things having in common both name where, pou
and definition, 15,17-24 category derived from species of
quantity, 69,1 Iff
170 Subject Index
category arising from the com- form of the narrative in,
bination of substance and quan- 6,25-7,6
tity, 92,9 way of teaching in, 7,6-14
definition and division into species, interpretation of, 7,15-8,10
93,3ff systematic (suntagmatika) vs.
words, phonai notebooks (hupomnematika) 4,4ff
Aristotle uses 'is said' when reason- popular (exoterika) vs. axiomatic
ing about, 26,23 (axiomatika) [= school works
simple: first application prior to (akroamatika)}, 4,18ff
nouns and verbs, 11,8; 13,7.9; theoretical vs. practical vs. instru-
14,22; signify simple tilings by mental (division of school works),
means of simple concepts, 12,1; 4,28ff
15,14 commentator on, 8,10-19
writings, Aristotelian, sungrammata
division of, 3,21-5,31 Xenocrates, 3,11-13