PROPERTY – Right to recover

PACENCIO ABEJARON vs FELIX NABASA AND CA

DOCTRINE: The Title to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive
possession for at least thirty (30) years. Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the
titles legally issued by the State. In such cases, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom
the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the
grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions
imposed by the law. Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, an applicant cannot ask for reconveyance.

FACTS:
Petitioner Pacencio Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118-sq.m.
portion of a 175-sq.m. residential lot in Silway, General Santos City described as "Block 5, Lot 1, Psu-154953,
bounded on the North by Road, on the South by Lot 2 of the same Psu, on the East by Felix Nabasa, and on the West
by Road."

In 1945, Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land had
not yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store. In
1949, he improved their abode to a 2-storey house measuring 16 x 18 feet or 87.78 sqq.m. made of round wood and
nipa roofing. This house occupies a portion of Lot 1, and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 belonging to Abejaron’s
daughter, Conchita Abejaron-Abellon. In 1951, Abejaron planted 5 coconut trees, as well as some banana and
avocado trees on the property, which he and his wife Matilde Abejaron harvested. Respondent Nabasa did not
oppose or complain about the improvements.

For taxation purposes, Abejaron declared only his house knowing that the land was public in character.
The tax declaration state Abejaron’s house stands on Lots 1 and 2 of Block 5. Abejaron submits that beginning
1955, Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-sq.m. portion of Lot 1, who built his house about 4 meters away from
Abejaron. The land was surveyed by Bureau of Lands (BoL). Abejaron did not apply for title of the land on the
belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government property. Without Abejaron’s knowledge and
consent, Nabasa clandestinely caused the titling in his name of the entire 175 sq.m. of Lot 1 (including Abejaron’s
portion). Abejaron imputes bad faith and fraud on the part of Nabasa because in applying for the titles, Nabasa
represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor of the property, despite knowledge that Abejaron occupied
the 118 sq.m. portion thereof.

On 24 Sep. 1974, Nabasa was issued OCT P-4140 pursuant to Free Patent No. 2877. But before the FP
could be transcribed on the Registration Book of the RoD, the same was recalled for administrative investigation
because Abejaron filed a protest with the BoL, who dismissed the case for failure of the Abejaron’s to attend the
hearings. Eventually, Nabasa was issued his FP, duly transcribed in the Registration Book of the RoD. On 12
March 1982, Abejaron filed an action for reconveyance with damages against Nabasa before RTC Gen.Santos City,
as well as a notice of lis pendens. Nabasa’s version was different from Abejaron, but in many parts of his testimony
he declared that he started occupying the “180 sq.m.” area in 1976.

On 27 Sep. 1985, the trial court ruled in favor of Abejaron declaring the possession of the said land was in
good faith, and further ordered Nabasa to reconvey title in favour of Abejaron. Nabasa appealed to the CA, who
ruled in Nabasa’s favour and reversed the RTC decision. The CA states that Abejaron failed to substantiate the
existence of fraud as his only basis for reconveyance, and that no irregularity occurred in the issuance of the FP.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari. Abejaron posits CA’s errors in not finding actual fraud committed by
Nabasa, and in disregarding Abejaron’s right over the property he being the actual and lawful possessor for many
years, and a claimant as well.
ISSUE: [1] Whether Abejaron satisfied the condition laid down in the Public Land Act of being in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for 30-
years, before entitled to a certificate of title.
[2] Whether Abejaron is entitled to reconveyance.

HELD: [1] NO.

Abejaron claims that he started occupying the disputed land in 1945. At that time, he built a nipa house, a
small store, and a fence made of wood to delineate his area. Improvements were introdueced thereon. While
Abejaron showed continued existence of these improvements, they were introduced later than January 24, 1947.
He has failed to establish the portion of the disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and wooden fence
actually occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, the SC cannot determine the land he actually
possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may acquire under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of
notice is the fact that the disputed land was surveyed, subdivided into and identified by lots only in the 1970's.
Therefore, prior to the survey, it would be difficult to determine the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims
to have occupied since 1947 in the absence of specific and incontrovertible proof.

Problems arose in determining the area actually occupied and possessed by Abejaron at least since 24
January 1947, to enable him to meet the 30-year requirement. Abejaron’s neighbors could not further Abejaron’s
causes as they could not specify whether it was on or prior to24 Jan.1947 that the improvements were introduced.
Also, as admitted by Abejaron, he has never declared the disputed land for taxation purposes. While tax receipts and
tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired
by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or supported by other effective
proof. Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title
through possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24, 1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic presumption is that lands of whatever classification
belong to the State and evidence of a land grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible." As petitioner Abejaron has not
adduced any evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of title, or homestead,
sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance.

It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be
erroneously titled in another's name. In the case at bench, Abejaron does not claim to be the owner of the disputed
portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual
possession since January 1947. . . Title to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and
exclusive possession for at least thirty (30) years. . . Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present suit.
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the State. In such
cases, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is
ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable
to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to comply with the conditions imposed by the law. Not
being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance." (emphasis supplied)

Equity is invoked only when the plaintiff, on the basis of the action filed and relief sought, has a clear right
that he seeks to enforce, or that would obviously be violated if the action filed were to be dismissed for lack of
standing. In the present case, Abejaron have no clear enforceable right, since their claim over the land in question is
merely inchoate and uncertain. Admitting that they are only applicants for sales patents on the land, they are not and
they do not even claim to be owners thereof. In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of
a public land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, respondents
have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.

Petition denied; CA decision affirmed.