Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.

) 5, 875–893

UDK 11:27
27-247(091)
316.7(4)
https://doi.org/10.53745/bs.93.5.6
Received: 2. 5. 2022
Accepted: 21. 6. 2022
Original scientific paper

METAPHYSICAL TURMOIL

Alojz ĆUBELIĆ
Catholic Faculty of Theology, University of Zagreb
Vlaška 38, p.p. 5, HR – 10 000 Zagreb
[email protected]

Abstract
In the article, we present, comment and analyse some elements of our cultural and evan-
gelical history, which have been marked by numerous philosophers and theologians
starting from the ancient Church to the present day. Closing into the present actually
means a ban on living. Present life has its roots in the past and offers its promises, ex-
pectations and courage to the future. History exists, and man can dwell in history, with-
out which there is no creative culture, only when three dimensions of time are lived
organically. In this context, we also observe the contribution of an immense procession
of thinkers like St Thomas Aquinas in successive historical periods. In the article, we
explore the possible contribution of metaphysics to the questions posed to the modern
man. The evangelical influence on culture, which is a complex phenomenon, should cer-
tainly be shed light on. Furthermore, it can be more or less deep. It can be hidden, more
or less conscious. It is not always strongly present where it is most required, it is not real
where it is explicitly ordered. In addition to authentic fruits, one should also be aware
of counterfeits and hypocritical activities. In short, its paths are different and manifold.
It seems important to point this out so that we could evaluate this influence, which is
authenticated and credibly confirmed in the eyes of Christian orthodoxy, and which es-
tablishes piety. Certain errors, exaggerations and deviations are not imaginable outside
the Christian horizon, which unmask it or wage a battle with it.

Key words: philosophy, theology, gospel, faith, reason, revelation, influence, Christi-
anity, European culture.

Introduction
At the very beginning of the research, we remove the possibility of a compre-
hensive presentation and analysis of the polyphonic culture in Europe, for
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 Alojz ĆUBELIĆ, Metaphysical Turmoil

that would be a presumptuous and above all an unrealistic attempt. For that
reason, we limit ourselves to those areas of spiritual and intellectual history
into which numerous thinkers have woven themselves in their own way, start-
ing from the Middle Ages as a kind of model for thinking about the entire
reality. Initially, we present some elements of the relationship between faith
and reason that have been burdened by different approaches throughout the
history. Rationalism and Enlightenment are presented as the completion of a
long process, the beginnings of which can be traced back to the Middle Ages..
Starting with St Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine, we engage in some metaphysical
questions that lead us to wonder whether metaphysics is still a possible and
completed science. Afterwards, we probe several objections to the idea of God
by the most prominent representatives of atheism in contemporary philoso-
phy and culture. The paradox is in the fact that even the anti-Christian ele-
ments bear the seal of the influence of the Gospels, regardless of the fact that
the widespread »positivist« mentality denies the possibility of metaphysical
and religious principles. In the times that are all but unexciting, we look back
at the epochal changes that we bear witness to, repeatedly searching for the
return to the true principles that were an inexhaustible source for the life and
culture of any man.

1. The example of St Thomas Aquinas

The conflict between faith and reason seems to have been at the common cen-
tre of doctrinal struggles in the Middle Ages. In that context, it suffices to
recall different approaches to philosophy and the possible contribution of rea-
son in theological reflections of the Church fathers. Origen and Tertullian1,
for instance, serve as antipodes. This is undoubtedly true if theologians of
that time are not imagined as those being particularly preoccupied with dis-
cussions of epistemological order or with critical reflections such as Kant.
We should emphasize that in the Middle Ages there was no explicit division
into »autonomous philosophy« on the one hand and »theology« on the oth-
er.2 Pointing out the conflict between faith and reason, the first historians of
medieval philosophy entirely elude the rationalistic and critical atmosphere
they felt, and contemplate the past through their personal philosophical field.

1
Cf. Marijan CIPRA, Spoznajna teorija, Zagreb 2007, 64-104.
2
Cf. Joël BIARD, Langage, sciences, philosophie au XII e siècle, Paris, 1999. Paradoxically, this
putting things into a historical prospective, or this philosophical environment, proves
to be productive for contemporary philosophical reflection.
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Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.) 5, 875–893

Rationalism seems to have been a mere completion of a long process, the be-
ginnings of which can be traced back to the Middle Ages. In that sense, the
teaching that stands out is the one of Thomas Aquinas, which demonstrated a
certain toughness and resilience as opposed to those »philosophies« that have
an extremely negative approach to the possibility of reaching metaphysical
truths.3 This constancy of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is primarily
manifested in his methodology which bears a seal of permanence, that is, it is
applicable at any time. Notwithstanding, the advance of historical studies and
transformations within the philosophical world convince us that the conflict
between reason and faith is to be placed within a broader phenomenon. Cer-
tain laws seem to have been included in both the physical and the spiritual
world, enabling man on both a theoretical and practical level to face directly
the problems posed by reality. Given that the Middle Ages came to know theo-
logical discussions on its own, its physiognomy indisputably arises from a cul-
ture that relies on its own sources of human nature. One of those endeavours
comprises a peril of certain naturalism, indifference, even hostility regard-
ing the revelation and the Christian civilisation. The very historical sequence
is a true testimony of it.4 Great theologians of the 12th and the 13th century
were aware of this peril. By means of this sharpened sense of the energy of
nature in general, as well as of human nature, the Middle Ages in particular,
and especially the 13th century, can be compared to the period which arose in
Greece and spread the classical culture and its philosophy.5 The influence of
Aristotle’s naturalism on the medieval west has been interpreted as a certain
kinship between one cultural period and another, despite various documents
and works that show continuity. If it is true that man by means of his reason
becomes aware of his autonomy as opposed to reality, knowledge does not
establish the only connection between man and reality. Man is neither merely
mind, nor will, nor affectivity, nevertheless, the connections between him and
the beings surrounding him are no less real or important in the founding of
culture.6 Therefore, the discovery of nature is to be positioned in the Middle

3
Therefore, it is no wonder that even today it appears to be miraculous and constructive
due to the capacity of its receptiveness.
4
Cf. Recent studies on the history and future of Christianity in Europe. René RÉMONT
– Marc LEBOUCHER, Le Christianisme En Accusation, Albin MICHEL (ed.), Paris, 2005,
Jean DELUMEAU, Un christianisme pour demain, Guetter l’aurore, Le christianisme va-t-il
mouris?, Paris, 2003.
5
Cf. Jean JOLIVET, Philosophie médiévale arabe et latine, Paris, 1995.
6
Cf. Ivan DODLEK – Nenad MALOVIĆ, Otisci suvremene kulture, Zagreb, 2023. The book
reflects on contemporary culture.
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 Alojz ĆUBELIĆ, Metaphysical Turmoil

Ages alongside the problems of the relationship between natural knowledge

and religious knowledge. It is a complex issue that was of a particular interest
to St Thomas Aquinas, who in his works takes interest in psychology, mor-
als, literature, mysticism, in brief, the whole of reality. This demonstrates that
his teaching was appropriate not only for the 13th century but that it was, in
its own way, used also by some eminent Croatian thinkers of the 20th century
including Tomo Vereš, Hijacint Bošković and Jordan Kuničić. In the long line
of authors dealing with the Thomistic heritage, they devotedly got toto work,
which had been particularly encouraged by popes Leo XIII,7 Paul VI8, St
John Paul II,9 and persistently confirmed and promoted by the Second Vati-
can Council. Among numerous statements, we outline one by Pope Pius XI,
who in his encyclical Studiorum ducem proclaims Thomas Acquinas in the title
»The Master of study« ordering all teaching in the Church to do so in accord-
ance with Thomas’s teaching.10
Thomas Aquinas brought the intellectual dimension of Christian culture
of the 13th century to its pinnacle by using the entire heritage of the Church fa-
thers and teachers who had preceded him. From the first one among them, St
Irenaeus, all the way to his own teacher, St Albert the Great, from the Fathers
of the Wast to the Fathers of the West.11 Rather than merely creating a kind of
a synthesis, Thomas wanted to provide a complete and well-rounded science
of Christian wisdom and theology.
It would not be true to the fact to state that these sciences were put to a
halt by Thomas’s death, thus remaining within the framework of his teaching.
It that sense, it has been questioned whether he was originally a philosopher
or whether it is the the sacra doctrina (sacred doctrine) that predominates in

7
Cf. The Encyclical of His Holiness Pope LEO XIII, Aeterni patris, Katolički list, XXX, no.
37, p. 289-291; no. 39, p. 305-307; no. 40, p. 313-315. Zagreb, 1879. Pope LEO XIII, To eternal
memory, breve by which Holy Father proclaims Saint Thomas Aquinas the patron saint
of all Catholic Colleges, Katolički list, XXXI, no. 38, p. 299-300, Zagreb, 1880.
8
Cf. PAUL VI, Svjetlo Crkve (Lumen Ecclesiae), epistle to the general of the Order of Friars
Preachers, Vinko de Couesnongle, on the occasion of the 700th anniversary of the death
of St. Thomas Aquinas, Kršćanska sadašnjost, Zagreb, 1975.
9
JOHN PAUL II, Speech about St Thomas Aquinas on the occasion of the 100th anniver-
sary of the »Aeterni patris«, in: Obnovljeni život, 35 (1980) 3-4, 281-288, JOHN PAUL II,
Naučitelj čovječnosti – Doctor humanitatis i drugi spisi o suvremenosti sv. Tome Akvinskoga,
Zagreb, 1998.
10
POPE PIUS XI, On the sixth anniversary of the canonization of St. Thomas Aquinas,
Studiorum Ducem (encyclical), in: Vrhbosna (Sarajevo) 37 (1923), 15-16, 113-120.
11
Cf. Alojz ĆUBELIĆ, Neki vidovi traženja istine kod svetog Tome Akvinskog, in: Ivan
DODLEK – Nenad MALOVIĆ – Željko PAVIĆ (ed.), Religija između Hermeneutike i fenom�
enologije, Zagreb, 2018, 67-78.
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Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.) 5, 875–893

his work, given that he does not use the word theology.12 It would be difficult
to explain why Thomas, apart from all of his teaching duties, was able and
willing to deal solely with the works of philosophical nature. Nonetheless,
Thomas was also a theologian who used philosophy extensively. The Papal
encyclical of John Paul II, Fides et ratio13, demonstrates that the Church does
not solely and exclusively adhere to a single privileged philosophical system.
The remark would be of value if Thomas’s philosophy was taken as an en-
closed system. However, not being confined is the exact feature of the philoso-
phy of St Thomas. Philosophical systems are characterised by certain truth, a
particular way of understanding reality. The entire reality is considered, and
interpreted by philosophers in a particular way. For that purpose, they cre-
ate a system. Thus, they inevitably condemn themselves to overlooking other
aspects of reality and falling into misapprehension. Later, new philosophers
came, directing their attention towards aspects of reality disregarded by oth-
ers. They also strived to reduce everything to new aspects and interpret eve-
rything through those very aspects. They created a system that seems to be in
opposition to everything that had preceded it. This is actually how opposing
systems in the history of philosophy are created.14 However, Thomas’s philos-
ophy is characterised by openness towards all partial truths that complement
one other in various philosophies and towards everything that was known by
the human mind as truth, regardless of its provenance or its location. That was
precisely what the Second Vatican Council claimed by declaring that Church
was willing to acknowledge anything that is true and genuinely religious in
every religion. Therefore, Thomas Aquinas possesses a comprehensive pow-
er of accumulating everything that human thought can discover as truthful,
regardless of its provenance.15 This comprehensive power of accumulation
truly becomes all-inclusive, which, in fact, means (etym.) »universal«. This
comprehensive power of accumulation was particularly evident in the works
of French Thomists from the 20th century (among others: Garrigou-Lagrange,

12
See a comprehensive study on Thomas’s understanding of philosophy: Ruedi IMBACH
– Adriano OLIVA, La philosophie de Thomas d’Aquin, Paris, 2009, 177.
13
This year we will have the opportunity to read it 25 years after publication. On the oc-
casion of the 20th anniversary of the encyclical, an international scientific meeting was
organised at the Catholic Faculty of Theology in Zagreb entitled: Encyclical Fides et ratio
– faith and reason. An updated reading 20 years later, which took place on 14.IX.2018.
14
Cf. for example, a very interesting and uncommon approach to philosophy in the Mid-
dle Ages: Kurt FLASCH, Einführung in die Philosophie des Mittelalters, Darmstadt, Wis-
senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987.
15
Cf. Léo J. ELDERS, Thomas d’Aquin, Une introduction à sa vie et à sa pensée, Paris, 2013, and
the same author: Thomas d’Aquin et ses prédécesseurs, Paris, 2015.
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 Alojz ĆUBELIĆ, Metaphysical Turmoil

Charles Journet, Jean-Pierre Torrell16, Servais-Théodore Pinckaers, Jacques

Maritain)17. In the 20th century there were numerous Thomas’s true disciples.
In Croatian domains, we have mentioned, among others, Toma Vereš18, Hi-
jacint Bošković and Jordan Kuničić.
If St Thomas Aquinas remains a teacher in philosophy for the many even
nowadays, it is so because for him the purpose of knowledge was truth in the
light of the natural mind. This, however, is not a system. On the other hand,
Thomas Aquinas engaged in philosophy with the purpose of using it in theo-
logical thinking, which is actually a reflection of faith on all content as to im-
bue the entire Christian thought. For such a reflection theology is in need of
a reliable and appropriate philosophical tool. Thomas’s theology certainly is
a theological science. Like any true theology, it is not founded on philosophy
that was used as an aid, but on the very faith and on the sources of the faith
found in the Word of God. Theology is theology to the extent that its founda-
tion and source is in the Word of God. This is the case with Thomas. When
his theological work is being studied, not a single article that is not based on
a biblical text can be found. In case one observes the actual space taken by his
work in libraries, it is noticeable that the major part belongs to the Commentar�
ies on the New Testament.
Those who are not sufficiently initiated into his thought are inclined,
like many of our contemporaries, to simplify things and thus, perhaps inad-
vertently, distort Thomas’s thought. For instance, this can be easily perceived
in case we claim St Augustine to be a disciple of Plato, and Thomas Aquinas
a disciple of Aristotle. This simplification, in fact, leads them to be opposed to
each other. The truth is really the opposite. They are successive and comple-
ment each other just like the other doctors of the Church.19 On the contrary,
we can claim that neither Augustine was Plato’s disciple nor Thomas was Ar-
istotle’s. They both have but one Teacher, Jesus Christ.
At one time, Blaise Pascal posed the famous question: Is the God of phi-
losophers identical to the biblical God, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob?
He does not even seem to be identical in the thought of St Thomas. We are, in
a way, are already accustomed to thinking that it is above all Aristotle’s God

16
Cf. Jean-Pierre TORRELL, Saint Thomas d’Aquin, maître spirituel, Fribourg, 1996, 575.
17
Cf. Jacques MARITAIN, Anđeoski naučitelj, Zagreb, 2011.
18
Cf. Collection on the occasion of the 700th anniversary of the death of St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-
1974, Dominican Provincial, Zagreb, 1974; Anto GAVRIĆ (ed.), Love for the truth, Collec-
tion in honour of Thomas Vereš OP on the occasion of his 70th birthday and 50 years of
religious vows, Zagreb, 2000.
19
Cf. Léo J. ELDERS, Thomas d’Aquin et ses prédécesseurs, Paris, 2015.
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Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.) 5, 875–893

whom he calls, in his philosophical terminology, »pure act«. However, we have

to add that, ultimately, the God of St Thomas Aquinas is actually Jesus Christ.
In that sense, it is understandably demonstrated that, being Christians, both
Thomas Aquinas and Aurelius Augustine are on the same path of faith and
theology – theology being an extension of faith – having but one teacher, Jesus
Christ.20 It is also necessary to emphasise that St Thomas was not the initiator
of theological research, because it was the Church fathers who had engaged
in it long before him, but he was rather the initiator of a complete and compre-
hensive theological science.
A philosophical system regularly dies with the death of its founder.
Those who remain are the disciples, better or weaker commentators. Neither
Thomas’s philosophy nor his theology did by any means end with his death.
Likewise, they were not limited by what he had thought and written dur-
ing his lifetime. It is a genuine Christian philosophical and theological sci-
ence. Their power of accumulating is open to all the advancement of human
thought, from Thomas until the present day, to the entire contribution of the
development of the science in any respect. There is no doubt that the loyalty
to Thomas consists in being open towards any truth in philosophical research
that has followed after his time as well as towards the advancement of other
sciences.21 Thomas’s disciples have made an effort to open the master’s teach-
ing to any contribution of contemporary thought and modern sciences, conse-
quently, enriching it with countless opportunities. When the Church recom-
mends Thomas’s philosophical and theological teaching, it does not do so in
order to set up a barrier to be stopped by, but for us to be aware of a beacon
casting light on any progress, so that we are be able to adopt the contribution
of an enhanced human thought. That is precisely what can be called Thomas’s
contemporaneity. Here we have briefly indicated Thomas’s philosophy and
theology as being rich and burdened with the meaning. Additionally, we have
outlined how Thomas’s thought can be enriched by various contributions of
contemporary sciences and how it can cast its own light upon them.

20
In that sense, professors Danijel Tolvajčić and Alojz Ćubelić held a lecture at the inter-
national scientific symposium »Komunikacije istine u post-globalnom svijetu«, which
took place in Zagreb on 10.VI.2022, entitled »Razumijevanje istine kod Augustina i Tome
Akvinskog«.
21
Here we wish to emphasise that our intention is by no means an »ideological« cheer
for Thomas Aquinas, but rather a mere indication of some traits of his philosophy and
theology which bear a stamp of permanence.
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 Alojz ĆUBELIĆ, Metaphysical Turmoil

1.1. Is metaphysics a fulfilled and completed knowledge?

This question cannot be answered if metaphysics is envisaged as a theory of
given and factual knowledge starting from a modern paradigm of »objectivi-
ty«. In case the metaphysics wants to pursue the path most frequently taken by
sciences, then, as it were, its fate is sealed. It is a matter of a certain metaphysi-
cal defeat. »Metaphysics precedes the theory of knowledge since the question
of Being is primary to the question of knowledge, that question which in itself
already comprises a certain type of knowledge, namely, that Being is, and non-
Being is not, and that it is not possible for being not to be, because if all being
would collapse into nothingness, the very Being of a being, Being as a being
necessary is and it cannot not be. Being itself cannot disappear or collapse, for
it necessary is, and it is independent of this or that being that is not a necessary
but only a possible being. Being can be without a being; however, a being can-
not be without Being.«22 Nevertheless, from its very beginning metaphysics
wanted to elude any risk of completion or an exact definition. Its very distinc-
tiveness is that what steps away from being exact and certain. According to
Kant »we are unable to know the Being of things, because that what we know
is always and just an appearance – a phainomenon, and not the Being-in-itself
– noumenon, so that Being, that ‘is’ in everything that exists, remains princi-
pally unknown and unknowable«.23
In addition to what is evident and certain there is an overabundance of
meaning which calls for an entirely different practice of thinking. Thus, meta-
physics begins where we reach some concrete, visible and measurable reality.
From the experience of subjectivity to a form of artistic, economic, political
or moral creativity. From the religious domain to self-awareness, from the re-
lationship to our own carnality to what becomes the subject of our everyday
thinking. It is a matter of a different set of experiences which do not allow
reduction to the dimension of objectivity. Furthermore, we are talking about
experiential areas that represent an ever-renewing abundance to the subject,
consequently, making metaphysics an ever-open discipline.24 As it were, met-
aphysical strictness is its openness to the possibility of being ever-new and
its availability to repeat creatively its fundamental questions, because what is

22
Marijan CIPRA, Spoznajna teorija, 38. Kant’s hesitancy regarding synthetic judgments a
priori is well known, which includes the pre-initial question of the first philosophy, that
is, metaphysics.
23
Marijan CIPRA, Temelji ontologije, Zagreb, 2003, 127.
24
Cf. In this context, a very interesting and creative approach to: PIERRE – MARIE
EMONET, Une metaphysique pour les simples, Chambray-lès Tours, 1993, 158.
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Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.) 5, 875–893

given as overabundance does not accept definitive renewal into concepts and
demands to be always thought in a state of possibility. Therefore, metaphysical
tradition, since its Greek origins, all to the present day, have not allowed for
the equivalence of knowledge, certainty and the object. Metaphysics is actu-
ally imposed as a possible science because it has nothing in common with a
scientific research program in the modern sense of the word. It is not focused
on a comprehensive understanding of Being as an object or as objectivity. »Be-
ing is unlimited and illimitable, it is neither concluded nor conclusive, but in-
finite and limitless.«
If it does not fit any definition, it then eludes every opinion that moves
discursively and in time going from predicate to predicate, for Being is neither
a predicate, nor a category, nor an attribute. Consistently, Being is unthinkable,
and yet, all the thinking moves in that »is« and »is not« and without affirma-
tion and negation, there is no thinking. Being is, in that sense, closest to our
thinking, but it is also, as Being-in-itself, the furthest and the most elusive for
all thinking.25
Overabundance of Being, which remains to be understood in the form
of a paradox possibility, enables metaphysics to have its historically and meth-
odologically open character. The history of metaphysics possesses a plural di-
mension, wherein the idea of that discipline is being continually multiplied
and discerned, every time questioning its tradition, its methods, forms and
purpose.26
Unless the history of metaphysics is a simple cross-section of thinking,
for there always remains something that is permanent and disputed, this tra-
dition cannot be denied as some kind of fate. The meaning of metaphysics is
neither unique nor definitive, therefore the discussion of the history of meta-
physics must take into account its plural background. For that reason, it keeps
reappearing, as in Aristotle’s time, as the most sublime science. Given that
we want to respect that unpredictable and plural historical meaning, we can-
not reduce the history of metaphysics to determinism. In this unique vision
of its history, metaphysics is presented as a kind of a project which is being
realised, wherein all possible meaning is rooted. The metaphysical tradition
shows that the distinction of the idea of »first philosophy« is knowledge that

25
Marijan CIPRA, Misli o etici, Zagreb, 1999, 16.
26
Here we are addressing a certain pluralistic vision of the history of philosophy, such
as is contained, for example, in the work of Jean-Luc Marion. Cf. Philippe CAPELLE –
DUMONT, Philosophie de Jean-Luc Marion, Phénoménologie, théologie, métaphysique, Paris,
2015.
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 Alojz ĆUBELIĆ, Metaphysical Turmoil

remains open to radical change. It is a matter of restless knowledge that tran-

scends and keeps eluding some grounded, objective and definitive content.
Therefore, »questioning the limits of metaphysics« and »observing its possible
transgression« is in effect the most faithful to the call of every first philoso-
phy.27 As long as it differs from all limited and pre-given knowledge, meta-
physics is the knowledge, open and restless, of what remains infinitely pos-
sible. It is the knowledge of the inexhaustible wealth of the overabundance of
Being. The »first philosophy« is knowledge that is open to what is given in the
state of overabundance. Metaphysics is a possible science and knowledge of
the possible, it does not allow for a definitive conclusion or fulfilment. From
Kant onwards, the concept of metaphysics as a never completely actualised
science has prevailed. Given that all sciences aspire to realization, metaphys-
ics, opposite to that, remains aporetic. Metaphysics is an ascent towards an
idea, that is to say, towards that which never becomes a concept remaining,
therefore, a source of tension. Kant »performed the destruction of traditional
metaphysics like no one had done before him, and philosophy will have to
take a completely new path after Kant if it wants to give an answer to perma-
nent and constant metaphysical questions«.28
Rationality, at its most sublime level, is not identified with a definitive
content, but remains a knowledge of possibilities. The fact that reason can-
not find a solution to its final problems requires a complete change in the
meaning of research, which becomes the appalling task of leaving an open
and free access to the possible. In our view, for this reason, metaphysics is
considered to be an unfinished science, the science of what never completely
transforms into the known. Metaphysics can never be done with its work,
because its job is to leave the possibility of novelty open. Here the novum
is what resurrects from the possibilities which can be experimented by the
reason, as its deepest passion, yet which cannot be reached by its own forc-
es. In that context, we could remember famous Kant’s questions about what
one can know, what is one to do, and what is one to hope for. This question
of hope reveals that metaphysical reason in itself is the openness towards
something that can neither be predicted nor dominated. In that sense, hope
is, genuinely, a strive of a metaphysical reason, for as Plato wrote »we are full
of hope for all our lives«.29

27
Cf. Jean-Luc MARION, Au-dela de soi, Paris 2008, 9.
28
Marijan CIPRA, Temelji ontologije, 127.
29
PLATON, Fileb, 39e 5-6. in: Platon, Fileb / Teetet, Zagreb, 1979.
884
Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.) 5, 875–893

If the first metaphysical question raises a question about the power of

knowledge – what can I know?, the second turns to responsibility, what must
I do? The third question eludes rational control and power, because it is not
based on security. In Kantian perspective, the question of hope is the heart
of all rationality.30 Reason is presented as openness from the beginning. In it
a possibility is more deeply rooted than any presence. Therefore, at the be-
ginning of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses the »fate« of reason,
namely, its mission. Fate is not something that would be given as defined, but
it is creative because it includes freedom and responsibility that are not being
exhausted.
Metaphysics, therefore, needs to remain open, unfulfilled in its essence,
knowledge that cannot and does not want to fully reach certainty. It needs to
remain a science open to its own possibility, unfulfilled in its essence, knowl-
edge that cannot and does not want to arrive at certainty. Therein lies the turn
between metaphysics and other knowledge. Metaphysics remains open to an
event of possible content. It is always new in itself, for its renewal is a way to
remain faithful to its own essence and credibility.
From its beginning, this appalling and unknown science called meta-
physics – which remains systematically and historically incomplete, because
it can never be presented in the form of a completed discourse, has been char-
acterized by a qualitative difference in relation to other knowledge. Aristotle
clearly wrote: »There is a science that observes Being as Being and its existence
in itself. It is not equal to any of the partial sciences, because none of them
study Being in general and as Being, but by cutting off one part of it, observe
it as the phenomenon of the mind like the mathematical sciences.«31 Meta-
physics, consequently, requires a departure and a break without which its true
mission can never be understood. Every partial science, has as its object some-
thing that can be defined and identified simply and obviously, unlike meta-
physics, which is disturbed by the infinite nature of its own subjects. »The
science of being insofar as it is a being« was for Aristotle »the science of re-
search«, that is to say, it remains in an aporetic and open state. Partial sciences
have the privilege of knowing their content, there where the first science has
the role of preserving the ever-possible and structured field that is emerging.
Specifically, metaphysics is a completely open knowledge ready to change its
content and yet again articulate its categories. »It is obvious, namely, that if the

30
Immanuel KANT, Kritika čistog uma, Zagreb, 2021, 520.
31
Cf. ARISTOTEL, Metafizika, Zagreb, 1988, 1003a 21-25, p. 75.
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 Alojz ĆUBELIĆ, Metaphysical Turmoil

divine is present anywhere, it is present in such a nature; and the most hon-
ourable of sciences is to deal with the most honourable kind.«32 As knowledge
of that which is given merely as a possibility, metaphysics is, undoubtedly, the
most desirable and the most eminent science. Metaphysics remains knowledge
to be renewed, which is created historically, in time, because it cannot exhaust
its possible content. If, from its beginning, the first philosophy has the need to
listen to its past and to create a genealogy – and to create endlessly anew, as
always, a contemporary work – it is because it never stops. Aristotelian call to
philosophers from the past at the beginning of Metaphysics, thus, takes on a
new and perhaps deeper meaning: »And even though we have done enough
research on this in the books On Nature, still, let us also help ourselves with
those who before us had been explaining about beings and reasoning about
laws and causes. Therefore, the current research will profit from considering
them as well. Namely, this is how we will discover some other kind of cause,
or else, we will rely more on the ones just mentioned«.33 That listening is, in
fact, the necessity for metaphysics to feel that it looms over the past, to form an
identity by confronting the past and, thus, to create a tradition. When meta-
physics observes its past, it does so because it wants to direct itself towards a
future that has not been tried yet. If it is a science of the possible, metaphysics
remains an uncertain science in its status, topic and history. It is always dis-
turbed by self-doubt. Thanks to this uncertainty, metaphysics in its abundance
remains always new. The expression »if metaphysics is possible« is the first
formula of any metaphysics for it begins with an uncertainty which opens its
subject. For that reason, all metaphysical discourse begins anew, and it cannot
be presented as a definite understanding of content that has been either giv-
en or acquired. The history of metaphysics is continually demonstrating this
openness and pluralism, which calls for an effort and constant renewal. As in
the original Aristotelian version, metaphysics is extraordinary because it ab-
stracts from every natural knowledge. This model of philosophy and science
that was established as such by Aristotle with his first philosophy remained
a classical role model of philosophical thinking and scientific knowledge for
centuries until the revolution of science and technology in the Modern Age.
If »partial sciences« work effortlessly, the concept of effort is central in
metaphysics. In addition to the features traditionally attributed to the word

32
»The most honourable philosophy« is, naturally, Aristotle’s expression. Cf. ARISTO-
TEL, Metafizika, 1026a 21, p. 151.
33
Ibid., 983b 2-5, p. 10.
886
Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.) 5, 875–893

first philosophy, the goal of metaphysics here becomes a sign of its openness to
what is not given, to the simple possibility of its subject and status.

1.2. C
 riticism of the idea of God
These ideas and concepts lead us towards those thinkers who deny both the
possibility of metaphysical claims, as well as religious assumptions. This is
best manifested in the criticism of the idea of God by some of the most famous
representatives of atheism, such as Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche or Sigmund
Freud.34 This criticism happens indirectly. It is previously undertaken with
regard to questions about God. This question, they claim, arises in separate
social or psychological situations. It appears in the depths of the human spirit
as such. Refutation is not primarily about answering a question. The problem
of God was rejected as not credible.35 Therefore, it is not the terms of the prob-
lem that are examined in themselves. The question is not whether the state-
ments are true or false, whether to agree with yes or no to the arguments that
asses the statement of what is. It tends to settle at the previous stage before the
question appears. That stage is actually the act of the subject who sets it up.
Furthermore, the question itself is dubious. Why, with what right did it ap-
pear? Consequently, it will establish its genealogy. And the history of the ques-
tion will show its untrustworthy character. Thus, the problem of God has the
value of a sign, like a hint. The reality of the level of some metaphysical being
and the possibility of the human spirit to reach it are denied. Setting that level
means being a victim of some illusion. The one who studies the problem of
God is similar to a semiologist, that is, to the one who studies the behaviour of
different signs within society. What is being examined is the pathology of the
spirit. The statement of the problem is not to rely on the object it indicates, but
on the subject who raises the scaffolding of the building to the extent that he is
ill. In addition, if the problem of God is expressed by a subject, this expression
is not direct and immediate. It does not arise from the intention to manifest
itself, but rather to hide. We are dealing with a lie, and the real problem is to
find out what motives the subject has for saying that type of lie. We should add

34
Paul RICOEUR, speaking of these three thinkers, utters a clever formulation: »teachers
of doubt«.
35
The basic tenets of positivism, and then neo-positivism, can be seen there, which deny
the value of metaphysical, aesthetic, moral and religious judgments or reduces them to
some psychological states. The attitudes of »neo-positivism« are similar to the agnostic
attitude towards God and religiosity. It is simply not possible to discuss it because it is
not possible to »know« anything about it.
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that this lie is not the result of a conscious will to deceive the other person. Its
roots are unconscious, and the subject who utters them is the first to be de-
ceived. Hence, we will find out its meaning indirectly. Knowledge should hap-
pen cunningly in order to reveal in the background what the speech clearly
says. That which is clear and distinct is deceptive as such. The lie is what mat-
ters most. Apart from that, our authors diverge more or less on this point. In
contrast to the supposed truth of the world of ideology, of which religion and
philosophy are the leaders, Marx sets the criterion of the »scientific nature«
of historical materialism and its truth.36 Nietzsche is more radical: truth is a
belated concept, and nothing assures us that by nature our spirit is made for
truth rather than for lie. As a philosopher, Freud oscillates between two posi-
tions. He is sceptical of the nature of the orientation of our spirit towards truth
and confirms the value of psychological science in deep research.
The problem of God is presented as an important place for the sick man
to be exposed in order to deceive himself about his evil and to find compen-
sation in the illusion that helps him endure. A philosopher armed with »me-
thodical distrust« would have to show relentless courage so as to break the
strong armour and approach the anatomy of the ideological organism.
The problem of God is included in the existential dynamism of practice
(praxis) or »life«. Man, individual or social, is an animal that fights for life.
The first drive of his activity and representative service is vital interest. The
problem of God is presented as a means in the service of life. Schopenhauer
also expressed the idea that is the foundation of these conceptions when he
promoted the sunset of that invention of the Greeks, taken over by Christian-
ity: the primacy of the mind over the will.37
The first examination of the position we are reporting on shows us the
assumptions. In the foundation we find a materialistic or positivist concep-
tion of man, in the sense of positivism of the 19th century. The influence of
Darwin, or at least the acknowledged kinship with his thought, is particularly
noticeable here. It is from there that the emphasis was placed on the idea of
the struggle for life in both Nietzsche and Freud. Thus, man is understood as

36
»Marx, Nietzsche and Freud are supporters of the naturalistic image of man. It mostly
distances itself from the Christian view of man and is most often associated with one
form of atheism or another. It is characteristic that this concept has also developed a
certain ethics, which, however, is reduced to biological, material, vital or subconscious
values and tends to reduce man to fundamentally lower forms of his personality«.
Marijan CIPRA, Misli o etici, 101.
37
Cf. Among other works Arthur SCHOPENAHAUER, Savjeti i načela, revised and sup-
plemented by Natalija Topić Popović, Zagreb, 2005, 158.
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Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.) 5, 875–893

a biological living being whose social life is governed by a defensive struggle,

against a hostile world, for his vital interests. Reason appears as a subordinate
element in the service of life. It is a weapon of battle, and its primary service
consists of being cunning. It is no longer a matter of selfless knowledge. In ad-
dition to the deep contradictions dividing them, we find what is common to
the philosophers we have focused on. The first criticism is, therefore, raised on
an anthropological level. It will show what are the particularities, the breadth
and the object of reason in man, who is consequently irreducible to an animal.
Simultaneously, with the autonomy of the metaphysical mind, what is
disputed is the selfless character of speculative knowledge. The fundamental
questioning is of an ethical order. When Marx draws attention to the interest
of a social group, when Nietzsche, as a genius psychologist, establishes the
genealogy of moral feeling starting from the instinct of cunning and domina-
tion, when, finally, Freud projects the light of his analysis on the unconscious
roots of conscious activities, these thinkers mark in our reflection so many
forms of conditioning of the life of the spirit. This conditioning is tied to two
initial poles: the biological instincts of man, or the species, and social life. The
interpretation of the facts that we are presented with, suggests the importance
of the philosophy of culture in relation to the problem of God. In metaphys-
ics we establish that the human mind is capable, by means of its own light, of
reaching a certain knowledge of God.38 Such proof is essentially placed on the
level of human nature observed in itself. It is here that the human ability of
knowing is considered, insofar as it is proportional to its object.39
However, the problem is to be taken at the level of the practice. The mind
cannot permanently and in the long-term develop its initial possibilities with-
out acquiring a habitus, that is, a stable mood, and this cannot happen in the
subject without education and cultural exchange.40 Apart from that, on the
level of the habitus, and although it is a matter of intellectual habitus, a fact is
to be taken into account that intellectual life develops in the complete dyna-
mism of the subject’s life in search of a purpose. A reasoning practice refers to
38
»While it is possible to reach the philosophical knowledge of God, the philosophers’
God, in a natural way, the revealed God can only be understood based on revelation
and accepting its truths in faith.« Marijan CIPRA, Spoznajna teorija, 99.
39
In the third thesis the professor presents, comments and analyses, »The analogy of hu-
man knowledge, which brings to light the analogous structure of reality itself. Based
on Being, the analogy requires a systematic distinction of the ontological laws of being,
according to the spirit of classical metaphysics.« Josip ĆURIĆ, Study entitled Ontologija,
Zagreb, 1984, in manuscript, 13-25.
40
Cf. A very interesting and intriguing book was published by Neven SESARDIĆ, Kon�
senzus bez pokrića, Zagreb, 2020, especially 128-178.
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 Alojz ĆUBELIĆ, Metaphysical Turmoil

the whole of personal activities and thus has an ethical value. Speculative ori-
entation towards the object is inscribed in the nature of the mind. Performing
speculative activity is to be evaluated in the service of the subject’s progress
towards his good. According to this ethical detour, knowledge of God, inso-
far as it represents the pinnacle of speculative knowledge, becomes a cultural
problem. The ethics of that act requires a necessary awareness of one’s so-
ciological and psychological presumptions, as well as their correction. At the
level of a cultural situation that is given, it is not in vain to ask the question of
why the ethics of practicing metaphysics? From the point of view at which we
position ourselves, that which is inscribed as an initial need in the nature of
the mind must be taken up at the level of conscious and voluntary activity as
well. Rediscovering at the cultural level, that which is postulated in the nature
of the spirit, involves a critical awareness of the conditions to which that spirit
is subject. These conditionings, moreover, are not homogenous. In the psycho-
logical field, we pay attention to the cunning of the instinct, which, using the
spirit for escape or sublimation, attacks the purity and independence of the
theoretical view. Here, critical attention refers to the ethics of knowledge and
the asceticism which precedes its execution.
In the social area, we try to determine which elements determine the
free exercise of thought, which are the prevailing ideas in confronting the lan-
guage of the interests of political or economic power, as well as the activities
of the mass media. This time, critical attention refers to the problems of the
sociology of knowledge.
If the initial mission of the reason is to inquire about Being and its foun-
dation, the existential situation wherein this mission is performed will be the
gradual acquisition of culture. Amid a world of interests and conflicts, philos-
ophers as representatives of a given culture are to reach a state of selflessness
where the purest reflection of metaphysical theory will shine.

Closing insights
At one time, Luigi Pareyson fiercely opposed the logic that motivated most
of the contemporary philosophers in their research and the outcome of that
search. »I have always been amazed at the fact that immediately after the war,
philosophies devoted exclusively to technical problems of extreme abstrac-
tion and subtlety spread widely, while humanity was barely getting out of
the abyss of evil and pain into which it had plunged. How is it possible, I
wondered, for philosophy to turn a blind eye to the triumph of evil, to the ab-
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Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.) 5, 875–893

solutely diabolical nature of certain forms of wickedness?«41 And we appear

to be facing precisely such challenges. It would be best or perhaps simplest
to remain silent in the face of suffering and violence, or to shake the dust off
our sandals with indifference, because while guns, drones, rockets and tanks
roar, the muses are silent. Those who consciously or unconsciously cherish
words and dialogue suddenly find themselves in a deadlock, because they
have to practice silence, any reflection, regardless of how much it may be the
result of a long and systematic research, seems to be useless and does not help
with understanding the current situation. Furthermore, various »authorities«
are not acknowledged, therefore any theodicy, and metaphysics in the back-
ground, seems to be meaningless and redundant, as they fail to help those
who have been exposed to the greatest of perils for months. Of course, we
would not wish to lecture Ukrainians, Russians and those who are directly
or indirectly involved in the vicious cycle of violence, but we cannot be dis-
pensed from thinking about major events that affect the fabric of the entire
humanity. Therefore, it seems, nowadays we must return to large and urgent
theodicy meditations, reconsider what has actually happened, is happening,
and why the spiral of evil seems to be defeating the principles of dialogue
and truth. Jean Lacroix says: »Dialogizing does not mean either refuting the
other’s thought or simply integrating it into one’s own, but questioning oneself
in order to improve contact with others or to accept the perspective of moving
forward thanks to the other«.42 When we decide to take such a step, the situ-
ation becomes very difficult, especially when it comes to the content of faith,
for every religion has the intention of absolutizing its own credo and exclud-
ing that of the other. The Second Vatican Council showed Catholics the way by
finding the essential thought of the Gospel message. We do not own the truth:
we are embraced and encouraged by it to ever deeper discovery. We need one
another in order to access the whole truth. Certainly, this claim is not to be
understood in the manner of contemporary ideological relativism, which goes
so far as to deny the very existence of truth, and consequently, the possibility
of reaching it. In current conflicts, it can be said that there is no real dialogue
because everyone sticks to their own tactics of evangelization. It is not enough
to say, love each other and do it as though differences and fear do not exist. It
is not enough even to condemn violence. Living in this globalized world, we
know the difficulty of being tempted to retreat into ourselves, the difficulty of
41
Luigi PAREYSON, Pensiero ermeneutico e pensiero tragico, in: J. JACOBELI (a cura di),
Dove va la filosofia italiana?, Bari, 1986, 137.
42
Cf. Jean LACROIX, Le sens du dialogue, Neuchatel, 1944, 2nd edition, 15.
891
 Alojz ĆUBELIĆ, Metaphysical Turmoil

understanding and valuing each other. We can fully measure the abyss that
divides. We cannot cross the chasm that divides us alone. Yet, God in Jesus al-
lows us to measure the length, breadth, depth and extension of his love. If, in
fact, we think that we in the Catholic Church are the absolute holders of the
truth or that we speak on behalf of the whole of humanity, then we fall into
totalitarianism and exclusion. No one owns the truth; everyone is searching
for it. Obviously, there is objective truth, but it transcends us all. This path
towards truth can only be approached by taking a long journey and put that
truth back together, by finding it in other cultures, in other types of humanity,
what others have also reached, sought on their own journey towards truth.43
We are believers, we believe that there is one God, but we have no claim to
own that God, neither according to Jesus who is revealed to us, nor according
to religious dogmas. We do not own God. We do not possess the truth and we
do need the truth of others. This is the experience we wish to share today with
those who slaughter one other, and these are the questions asked by all of us.

Sažetak
METAFIZIČKA PREVIRANJA

Alojz ĆUBELIĆ
Katolički bogoslovni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu
Vlaška 38, p.p. 5, HR – 10 000 Zagreb
[email protected]

U članku predstavljamo, komentiramo i analiziramo neke elemente naše kulturne i

evanđeoske povijesti kojima su svoj pečat dali brojni filozofi i teolozi počevši od drevne
Crkve do današnjega vremena. Zatvaranje u sadašnjost zapravo znači zabranu živ�
ljenja. Životna sadašnjost pruža svoje korijenje u prošlosti a budućnosti nudi svoja
obećanja, očekivanja i smjelost. Samo tamo gdje su tri dimenzije vremena organički
življene postoji povijest i čovjek može boraviti u povijesti bez koje nema stvaralačke
kulture. U tom kontekstu vidimo i doprinos neizmjerne povorke mislilaca, poput sve�
tog Tome Akvinskog, za susljedna povijesna razdoblja. U članku smo istraživali mo�
gući doprinos metafizike za pitanja koja se postavljaju suvremenom čovjeku. Svakako
bi trebalo rasvijetliti i evanđeoski utjecaj na kulturu, što je složen fenomen. Doprinos

43
Cf. Current and above all inspired books: BENOȊT XVI, L’Europe, ses fondement,
aujourdh’hui et demain, Milano, 2005, 137 and KURT KOCH, Chrétiens en Europe, Nouvelle
évangélisation et transmission des valeurs, Basel – Wien, 1993, 165.
892
Bogoslovska smotra, 93 (2023.) 5, 875–893

metafizike ili evanđeoski utjecaj) nadalje može biti više ili manje dubok. On može biti
skrovit, više ili manje svjestan. On nije snažno prisutan uvijek ondje gdje se najviše
iziskuje, nije stvaran tamo gdje se izrijekom nalaže. Uz vjerodostojne plodove treba ra�
čunati na krivotvorine i licemjerne djelatnosti. Ukratko putovi metafizike su različiti i
mnogostruki. Čini se važnim to istaknuti kako bismo mogli vrednovati taj utjecaj, koji
se ovjerovljuje i vjerodostojno potvrđuje u očima kršćanske ortodoksije, a utemeljuje
pobožnost. Određene pogreške, pretjeranosti i zastranjenja nisu zamisliva izvan kr�
šćanskog obzorja, koja ga razobličuju ili s njime vode bitku.
Ključne riječi: filozofija, teologija, evanđelje, vjera, um, objava, utjecaj, kršćanstvo, eu�
ropska kultura.

893