PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ISAGANI GUITTAP y PENGSON (Acquitted), WILFREDO MORELOS y CRUZ
(Acquitted), CESAR OSABEL @ DANILO MURILLO @ DANNY @ SONNY VISAYA
@ BENJIE CANETE, ARIEL DADOR y DE CHAVEZ (Discharge), DECENA
MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS, LUISITO GUILLING @ LUISITO (Acquitted), and
JOHN DOE @ PURCINO, accused.
DECENA MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS, appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. de Ramos assails the decision1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 92-387, finding her and accused
Cesar Osabel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide
and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victims the
amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P67,800.00 as actual damages.

On September 1, 1992, an Amended Information for Robbery with Double Homicide

was filed against appellant Masinag, Isagani Guittap y Pengson, Wilfredo Morelos y
Cruz, Cesar Osabel,2 Ariel Dador y De Chavez, Luisito Guilling and John Doe @
"Purcino". The accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 17th day of July 1992, in the City of Lucena, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, armed with bladed
weapons, by means of violence, and with intent to gain, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away certain personal
items, to wit:

one solid gold ring valued at P8,000.00

(1)
one diamond ring valued at P40,000.00
(1)
one necklace with pendant valued at P2,000.00
(1)
cash money in the amount of P4,500.00
one samsonite bag valued at P650.00
(1)
one .22 Cal. Squibbman with SN 64130 valued
(1) at P5,000.00
one pair of sandal valued at P650.00
(1)
one music mate (karaoke) valued at P5,000.00
 (1)
one jacket (adidas) valued at P1,000.00; and
(1)
one pair of shoes valued at P1,000.00
(1)

with a total value of P67,800.00, owned by and belonging to spouses Romualdo

Jael and Lionela3 Caringal, without the consent and against the will of the latter,
to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned offended parties in the
aforestated sum of P67,800.00, Philippine Currency, and, on the same occasion
of such robbery, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with one
another, armed with the same bladed weapons, taking advantage of superior
strength, and employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity, and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously stab both of said spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela
Caringal thereby inflicting upon the latter several fatal wounds which directly
caused the death of the aforenamed spouses.

Contrary to law.4

Upon arraignment, appellant Masinag pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued. Accused Ariel Dador was discharged as a state witness while accused Purcino
remained at large.

On February 15, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds Cesar Osabel and Decena
Masinag GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide
and they are sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory
penalties provided by law. For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Isagani
Guittap, Wilfrido Morelos and Luisito Guilling are hereby ACQUITTED.

The accused Cesar Osabel and Decena Masinag are also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Romualdo Jael and Leonila Caringal Jael in the
amount of (P100,000.00) One Hundred Thousand Pesos plus actual damages of
(P67,800.00) Sixty Thousand and Eight Hundred Pesos, Philippine Currency.

SO ORDERED.5

During the trial, state witness Ariel Dador testified that in the evening of July 15, 1992,
Cesar Osabel asked him and a certain Purcino to go with him to see appellant Masinag
at her house in Isabang, Lucena City. When they got there, Osabel and Masinag
entered a room while Dador and Purcino waited outside the house. On their way home,
Osabel explained to Dador and Purcino that he and Masinag planned to rob the
spouses Romualdo and Leonila Jael. He further told them that according to Masinag,
the spouses were old and rich, and they were easy to rob because only their daughter
lived with them in their house.

The following day, at 7:00 p.m., Dador, Osabel, and Purcino went to the house of the
Jael spouses to execute the plan. Osabel and Purcino went inside while Dador stayed
outside and positioned himself approximately 30 meters away from the house. Moments
later, he heard a woman shouting for help from inside the house. After two hours,
Osabel and Purcino came out, carrying with them one karaoke machine and one rifle.
Osabel's hands were bloodied. He explained that he had to tie both the victims' hands
with the power cord of a television set before he repeatedly stabbed them, He killed the
spouses so they can not report the robbery to the authorities.

Osabel ordered Dador to hire a tricycle while he and Purcino waited inside the garage of
a bus line. However, when Dador returned with the tricycle, the two were no longer
there. He proceeded to the house of Osabel and found him there with Purcino. They
were counting the money they got from the victims. They gave him P300.00. Later,
when Dador accompanied the two to Sta. Cruz, Manila to dispose of the karaoke
machine, he received another P500.00. Osabel had the rifle repaired in Gulang-Gulang,
Lucena City.

Dador and Osabel were subsequently arrested for the killing of a certain Cesar M.
Sante. During the investigation, Dador executed an extrajudicial confession admitting
complicity in the robbery and killing of the Jael spouses and implicating appellant and
Osabel in said crime. The confession was given with the assistance of Atty. Rey Oliver
Alejandrino, a former Regional Director of the Human Rights Commission Office.
Thereafter, Osabel likewise executed an extrajudicial confession of his and appellant's
involvement in the robbery and killing of the Jaels, also with the assistance of Atty.
Alejandrino.

Simeon Tabor, a neighbor of the Jaels, testified that at 8:00 in the morning of July 17,
1992, he noticed that the victims, who were known to be early risers, had not come out
of their house. He started calling them but there was no response. He instructed his son
to fetch the victims' son, SPO1 Lamberto Jael. When the latter arrived, they all went
inside the house and found bloodstains on the floor leading to the bathroom. Tabor
opened the bathroom door and found the lifeless bodies of the victims.

Dr. Vicente F. Martinez performed the post-mortem examination on the bodies of the
victims and testified that since rigor mortis had set in at the back of the neck of the
victims, Romualdo Jael died between six to eight hours before the examination while
Leonila Jael died before midnight of July 16, 1992. The cause of death of the victims
was massive shock secondary to massive hemorrhage and multiple stab wounds.

Appellant Masinag, for her part, denied involvement in the robbery and homicide. She
testified that she knew the victims because their houses were about a kilometer apart.
She and Osabel were friends because he courted her, but they never had a romantic
relationship. She further claimed that the last time she saw Osabel was six months prior
to the incident. She did not know Dador and Guilling at the time of the incident.
According to her, it is not true that she harbored resentment against the victims because
they berated her son for stealing their daughter's handbag. On the whole, she denied
any participation in a conspiracy to rob and kill the victims.

From the decision convicting appellant Masinag and Osabel, only the former appealed,
based on the lone assigned error:

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF CONSPIRING WITH HER
CO-ACCUSED TO COMMIT THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE
THE ABSENCE OF HER ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
SAID CRIME.

The appeal is meritorious.

While it is our policy to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the trial
court,6 owing to their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note
their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination,7 where there exist
facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been ignored or
misconstrued, or where the trial court acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of facts,8 we
may disregard its findings.

Appellant contends that the extrajudicial confessions of Osabel and Dador were
insufficient to establish with moral certainty her participation in the conspiracy. Firstly,
Dador was not present to hear appellant instigate the group to rob the Jael spouses. He
only came to know about the plan when Osabel told him on their way home. Thus,
Dador had no personal knowledge of how the plan to rob was actually made and of
appellant's participation thereof. Secondly, while Osabel initially implicated her in his
extrajudicial confession as one of the conspirators, he repudiated this later in open court
when he testified that he was forced to execute his statements by means of violence.

On direct examination, Dador narrated what transpired in the house of appellant on July
15, 1992, to wit:

PROSECUTOR GARCIA:

Q. And do you remember the subject or subjects of that conversation that

transpired among you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Please tell us what was the subject or subjects of the conversation that
transpired among you on July 15, 1992 at the house of Decena Masinag?

A. The subject of our conversation there was the robbing of Sps. Jael, sir.
 Q. How did that conversation begin with respect to the proposed robbery of
Sps. Jael?

A. It was only the two (2) who planned that supposed robbery, Daniel Murillo
and Decena Masinag, sir.

Q. And why were you able to say that it was Danilo Murillo and Decena
Masinag who planned the robbery?

A. Because they were the only ones who were inside the house and far
from us and they were inside the room, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. On that night, July 15, 1992 did you ever have any occasion to talk
with Decena Masinag together with your companions Danilo Murillo and
Purcino?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was there any occasion on the same date that Decena Masinag talk
to you?

ATTY. FLORES:

Already answered, your Honor.

COURT:

Witness, may answer.

WITNESS:

None, sir. (emphasis ours)9

We find that the foregoing testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal
knowledge but from what Osabel told him. He admitted that he was never near
appellant and that he did not talk to her about the plan when they were at her house on
July 15, 1992. Thus, his statements are hearsay and does not prove appellant's
participation in the conspiracy.

Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his
own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
defined as "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard
from others."10 The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites
what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing.11 In Sanvicente v.
People,"12 we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the
witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar
and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.13

Osabel's extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant. The res

inter allos acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another.14 Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is
binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The
reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's
own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct
and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly
unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a
party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct
be used as evidence against him.15

The rule on admissions made by a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing,

does not apply in this case. In order for such admission to be admissible against a co-
accused, Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires that there must be
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In
the case at bar, apart from Osabel's extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of
appellant's alleged participation in the conspiracy was presented by the prosecution.
There being no independent evidence to prove it, her culpability was not sufficiently
established.

Unavailing also is rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is

used as a corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-
accused. The implication of this rule is that there must be a finding of other
circumstantial evidence which, when taken together with the confession, establishes the
guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt.16 As earlier stated, there is no other
prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession may
corroborate.

In People v. Berroya,17 we held that to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason

of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may consist of active participation in the
actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the crime, or by exerting
moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the conspiracy.

In the case at bar, no overt act was established to prove that appellant shared with and
concurred in the criminal design of Osabel, Dador and Purcino. Assuming that she had
knowledge of the conspiracy or she acquiesced in or agreed to it, still, absent any active
participation in the commission of the crime in furtherance of the conspiracy, mere
knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is not sufficient to constitute
one as a party to a conspiracy.18 Conspiracy transcends mere companionship.19

Conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Like any element
of the offense charged, conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.20 Direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established, for conspiracy
may be deduced from the acts of appellant pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action
and community of interest. Nevertheless, except in the case of the mastermind of a
crime, it must also be shown that appellant performed an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy.21

All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant with moral certainty. Its
evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the
constitutional presumption of appellant's innocence must be upheld and she must be
acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 60 in Criminal Case No. 92-487, insofar only as it finds
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. De Ramos is
ACQUITTED of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. She is ORDERED RELEASED
unless there are other lawful causes for her continued detention. The Director of Prisons
is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the date and time
when appellant is released pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Vitug, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.