ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

General Editor: Karl H. Potter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

VOLUMES ALREADY PUBLISHED INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
I. Bibliography. Sections I and II, 3rd ed. (1995)—Ed. Karl H. Potter.
H. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-
VOLUME IX
Vaiśesika up to Gañgeśa (1977)—Ed. Karl H. Potter
HI. Advaita Vedānta up to Śarhkara and His Pupils (1981)—Ed. Karl H.
Potter. Buddhist Philosophy
IV. Sāmkhya: a Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy (1987)—Eds.
Gerald James Larson & Ram Shanker Bhatlacharya.
from 350 to 600 A.D.
V. The Philosophy of the Grammarians (1990)—Ed. H.G. Coward.
VI. Indian Philosophical Analysis: Nyāya-Vaiśesika from Gañgeśa to
Raghunātha Siromani (1993)—Eds. Karl H. Porter & Sibjiban
Bhattacharyya.
VII. Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. (1996)—Eds. Karl H. Potter with
Robert E. Buswell Jr., Padmanabh S. Jaini & Noble Ross Reat.
VIII. Buddhist Philosophy from 100 to 350 A.D. (1999)—Ed. Karl H. Potter.
IX. Buddhist Philosophy from 350 to 600 A.D. (2003)—Ed. Karl H. Potter. EDITED BY
KARL H. PO11'ER
VOLUMES UNDER PREPARATION

X. Buddhist Philosophy from 600 to 750 A.D.— Ed. Karl H. Potter.

XI. Buddhist Philosophy from 750 to 1300 A.D.— Ed. Karl H. Potter.
XIL Yoga Philosophy—Eds. GeraldJ. Carson & Rama ShankarBhanacharya
XIII. Nyāya-Vaiśeşika from after Raghunātha to Gadadhara's Time
Eds. Sibjiban Bhattacharyya & Karl H. Potter.
XIV. Advaita Vedānta from 800 to 1300 A.D.— Ed. Paul Kuepferle.
XV. Advaita Vedānta from 1300 to the present— Ed. Karl H. Potter.
XV I. Jain Philosophy [Part I]— Eds. Dalsukh Malvania & Jayendra Soni.
XVII. Jain Philosophy [Part Ill — Eds. Karl H. Potter.
XVIII. Kashmir Saiva Philosophy— Ed. Navjivan Rastogi.
XIX. Viśis hdvaita Vedānta Philosophy—Eds. Stephen H. Phillips &
M. Narasimhacharv.
XX. Dvaitādvaita Philosophy— Eds. Rum Sitankar Bhattacharya & Karl ~ USrgG
I
H. Potter. P
XXI. Pūrvamīmāritsā Philosophy— Eds. K. T. Pandurangi & Karl H. Potter. o KNIH OVNA
.a
XXII. Acintyabhedābheda Philosophy— Ed. Srivatsa Goswami. `
PRA
XXIII. Dvaita Vedānta Philosophy— Ed. K.T. Pandurangi.
XXIV. Cārvāka Philosophy— Ed. Eli Franco.
XXV. ŚuddhādvaitaVedānta Philosophy--Eds. SharadAniruddha Goswami
& Shyam Manoharaji Gosv.nmi.
XXVI. Vīraśaiva Philosophy— Eds. [Inch Sen. MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS
XXVH. Collective Glossary-Index— Ed. Karl H. Potter. PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI
 CONTRIBUTORS:
First Indian Edition: Delhi, 2003

William L. Ames
0 MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED
Stefan Anacker
All Rights Reserved
Sitansushekar Bagchi
ISBN: 81-208-1968-3 Robert E. Buswell Jr.
Binayendra Chaudhury
Also available al: Edward Conze
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Richard P. Hayes
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Shotaro Iida
Padmanabh S. Jaini
Shoryu Katsura
Hidenori Kitagawa
Karen Lang
Bimala Chum Law
Christian Lindtner
Prabhas Chandra Majumdar
James P. McDermott
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Karl H. Potter
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Printed in India Mark Tatz
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 CONTENTS
PREFACE 6
ABBREVIATIONS 15
PREFACE
PART ONE
In the Preface to Volume VIII, the previous volume of this Encyclopedia INTRODUCTION
dealing with Buddhist philosophy. certain disclaimers were made by
this Editor. These remarks, concerning the limitations on our knowledge Chapter One: Historical Overview 19
of the Buddhist authors and works and the shortcomings of the Editor ' s Chapter Two: Abhidharma Developments 25
understanding of the material there surveyed, apply likewise to material
Chapter Three: Epistemology, Logic and Language 34
in the present Volume, whose Editor is unfortunately the same person.
I. Dignāga on Perception 36
I can only hope that someone more conversant with the language and
literature of Buddhist philosophy can be found to write the Introductions II. Dignāga on Inference 42
to the future Volumes. III. Dignāga on Language 47
This Volume, like its predecessors, has been made possible in IV. Bhavya on Inference 53
part by grants from various agencies: the American Institute of Indian V. Mapping the Three Natures onto the Two Levels 58
Studies, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the
Smithsonian Institute, as well as the University of Washington. Many PART TWO
thanks to all. I should like particularly to thank Prof. Eli Franco for his SUMMARIES OF WORKS (Arranged Chronologically)
needed last-minutue corrections to the Introduction, some of which Sarvadharmapravrttinirdeśasīstra (351)
1. 73
came unfortunately, though no fault of his, too late to incorporate into
2. Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśasūtra (Nāgārjuna) (354) 73
the final version published here. And Dr. Christine Mullikin Keyt has,
as before, provided invaluable aid in resolving many of the problems 3. Tathāgatagugajñānacintyavi.sayāvatārasūtra (355) 83
that have arisen during the preparation of the manuscript on my present 4. Anantadhārarīdharmaparyāyasūtra (355) 83
computer and its predecessors. 5. Bhadraśerasūtra (355) 83
6. Sūtra on Ananda's thinking (355) 83
January 2003 Karl H. Potter 7. Śrikarthasūtra (355) 83
8. Ākāśagarbhasūtra(363) 83
9. Ksudrakasūtra(365) 84
10..4nantamukhasādhakadh5ranlsūtra (369) 84
11. Buddhadhyānasamādhisāgarasīrtra (369) 84
12. Buddhadharntācintvanirdeśasūtra(369) 84
13. Devarāja.rariuustamańgalagāthāsīara (369) 85
14. Karurulpuñdarrkasūtra (369) 85
15. Mahāmeghasūtra (370) 86
16. Ratnaketitdhūranīsūtra (370) 86
usr

FE: KNIHOVNAy`al
8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES CONTENTS 9

17. Sūryagarbhasūtra (370) 94 49. Sammohavinodani or Vibhahga-Atthakathā

18. Suvar{taprabhāsāsūtra (370) 95 (Buddhaghosa?) (425) 194
19. Caturdevarājasūtra (377) 98 50. Kathāvatthu-Atthakathā (Buddhaghosa?) 195
20. Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (380) 98 51. Yamaka-Atthakathā (Buddhaghosa?) (425) 212
21. Karmāvarañavi.śuddhiśāstra (380) 98 52. Patthāna-Atthakathā (Buddhaghosa?) (425) 215
Daśacakraksitigarbhasūtra (385) 98 53. Dhātukathñ-Atthakathā (Buddhaghosa?) (425) 215
22.
23. Vajrasamādhisūtra (385) 98 54. Puggalapaññatti-Atthakathā (Buddhaghosa?) (425) 215
24. Alpadevatāsūtra (390) 99 55. Abhidhammāvatāra (Buddhadatta) (425) 217
Bodhisattvagocaropāyavikurvāñanirdeśasūtra (390) 99 56. Rūpārūpavibhāga (Buddhadatta) (425) 254
25.
26. Dvajāgrhasūtra (390) 99 57. Tarka.dstra (425) (Vidyabhusana) 256
58. Samantapāsādikasūtra (438) 257
27. Jyotiskasūtra (390) 99
28. Mahāmatisūtra (390) 99 59. Pratttyasamutpādaśāstra (Ullañgha) (440) 257
Tsui fu pao ying ching (390) 99 60. Anyūnatvāpūrñatvñnirdeśaparivartasūtra (440) 261
29.
61. Ratnagotravibhāga/Vyākhyā (Sāramati) (450) 262
30. Mahābherihārakaparivartasūtra (390) 100
Caturvargaśiksādharmasūtra (390) 100 62. Mahñyānadharmaviśesa (Sāramati) (450) 272
31.
63. Abhidharmāvatāra (Skandhila/Sugandhara) (450) 274
32. Livarakartrtvanirākarañavisnorekakartrtva -
64. Abhidharmakośa-Tikopāyika (Śamathadeva) (450) 280
nirākaraña (Nāgārjuna) (400) 100
65. Bhava.sa»tkrāntisūtra (450) 282
33. Nāgaśripariprcchāsūtra (400) 101
66. Dharmadhātubuddhakasūtra (453) 283
34. Śuddhodanarājaparinirvāñasūtra (405) 102
67. Ratnameghasūtra (453) 283
35. Sidra on the advancement of learning (405) 102
68. Śraddhābñlādhñnāvatāramudrñsūtra (454) 283
36. Sidra on a pupil who received (seven days)
69. Sarvabuddhavisayāvatārñiñānālokālarhkārasūtra (457) 283
after his death (405) 102
70. Aśokarñjasūtra (462) 283
37. Candanavatdeśarājasūtra (405) 102
71. Dharmasarimgītisūtra (465) 283
38. Mudrādeśarñjasūtra (405) 103
72. Mañjuśrtpariprcchāsūtra (468) 284
39. Malarājasūtra (405) 103
73. Pratityasamutpādahrdaya-Vyākhyñna CS' uddhamati) (470) 284
40. Sidra on the five (elements) not retuming again (405) 103
74..Saptaśatikñprajñāpāramitāsūtra (470) 284
41. Rājāvavādakasūtra (405) 103
75. `Samantamukhaparivartasūtra (470) 285
42. Samavabhedopacakra (Vasumitra) (405) 103 76. Vajramandadhāranīsīttra (475) 285
43. Bodhisattvabuddhānusmrtisamādhi (412) 107
77. Buddhanāmasūtra (475) 285
44. Mahāśrayārthaŗddhimantrasūtra (412) 107 78. Ksemāvatīvyākaranasūtra (475) 285
45. Upāva (kauśalya) hrdayasūtra (Nāgārjuna) (422) 107 79. Sirhhanādikasūtra (475) 285
46. Kusumasanccayasūtra (422) 110 80. Abhidhannāvatāra-Sārasamuccaya (475) 286
47. Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa) (425) 111 81. Madhyamakasūtra-Vrtti (Buddhapālita) (480) 286
48. Dhammasańgañī-Atthakathā (425) 173 82. Anaksarendraka(vai)vocanagarhhasūtra(485) 305
10 CONTENTS II
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

83. Sarvabālapāladhāran sūtra (485) 113.5 Apohapanksā 349

305
84. Mañjuśriparicaranasūtra (485) 306 113.6 Jāti 360
85. Maitreya (bodhisattva) pariprcchāsūtra (485) 306 114. Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraña (Dignāga) 362
86. Sarhghātasūtra (488) 306 115. Traikālyapartksā (Dignāga) 367
87. Saddharmasmrtyupasthānasūtra (489) 306 116. Sñmānyalaksañapariksā (Dignaga) 367
88. Yog5cārabhūmi(Buddhasena)(490) 307 117. Nyāyaparīksā (Dignaga) 368
89. Marīcidhāranjsūtra (490) 307 118. Rājaparikathāratnamālāsūtra (510) 368
90. Maitreya (ma/0) simhanādasūtra (491) 307 119. Prajñāpāramitāpigdārtha-Vivarana (Tńratnadāsa) (510) 368
91. Vimala (nāna) upāsikāpariprcchāsūtra (492) 307 120. Vidyānirdeśasūtra (515) 368
92. Kanakavarñapūrvayogasūtra (492) 308 121. Vidyāpravartanaśāstra (515) 368
93. Mañgalāstakasūtra (492) 308 122. Vidyāmātŗsiddhi (515) 369
94. Niyatāniyatāvatāramudrāsūtra (492) 308 123. Tryalaksanaśātra (515) 369
95. Paramārthadharmavijayasūtra (492) 308 124. Anūkaracintārajas (Jina) (515) 369
96. (Rsi) Vyāsapariprcchāsūtra (492) 308 125. Mustiprakaragaśāstra (Jina) (515) 369
97. Susthitantatipariprcchāsūtra (492) 308 126. Life of Vasubandhu (515) 369
98. Sūtra on the highest reliance (492) 308 127. Buddhñbhidharmasūtra (515) 369
99. Buddhagotraśāstra (495) 309 128. Catursatyaśāstra (Vasuvarman) (515) 369
100. Kārañdavyūhasūtra (495) 310 129. Patisambhidāmagga-Saddhammappakāsiñt
101. Aparāmitāyurjñānahrdayadhārantsūtra (500) 311 ( Mahānāma) (520) 369
102. Mahāmañivipulyamānaviśvasupratisthitaguhyasūtra (500) 311 130. Pitaputrasamāgamasūtra (520) 370
103. Saptabuddhakasūtra (500) 311 131. Abhidharmakośakārikā-Bhāsya(Vinītabhadra)(520) 370
104. Pradīpanīyasūtra (508) 370
311 132. Mahāyānābhisamayasūtra (520)
105. Sumerugarbhasūtra (508) 312 133. Mahāyānasathgraha-Upanibandha(Asvabhāva)(520) 371
106. Lokaprajñaptyabhidharmasūtra (509) 312 134. Mahāyānasūtrālarimkāra-Tikā (Asvabhāva) (520) 371
107. Abhidhannakośa-Manna(pra)dīpa (Dignāga) (510) 313 135. Ekādaśamukhahrdayasūtra (525) 371
108. Alambanaparīksā ( Dignāga) 314 136. Alokamālā (Kambala) (525) 372
109. Hastavālanñmaprakarañavrtti ( Dignāga) 318 137. Astasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra-Piñdārtha or
110. Hetucakra (Dignāga) 319 Navaśloka (Kambala) (525) 378
111. Nyāyamukha (Dignāga) 320
138. Abhisamayapañjikā ( Kambala) (525) 379
112. PrajñāpāramitāpincArtha (Dignāga) 322 139. Prajñāpārarnitopadeśa (Kambala) (525) 379
113. Pramāña.samuccaya (Dignāga)
140. Saptaślokībhagavattprajñāpāramitāsūtra (Kambala) (525) 379
113.1 Pratyaksa 328
141. Tattvaprabhāsākarañadipa ( Kambala) (525) 379
113.2 Svārthānumāna 337
142. Dharmadāsa (530) 379
113.3 Parārthānumāna 342
143. Suvikrāntavikrāmiparipŗcchāsūtra (530) 379
113.4 Drstānta 347
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES 13
CONTENTS
144. Laksñnusārin7tīkā (Gunamati) (530) 380 167. Nyāyapraveśa (Śamkarasvāmin)(555) 463
145. Vyñkhyāyukti-Tikā (Gunamati) (530) 381
168. Abhisamayālatitkāra-Vrtti (Arya Vimuktisena) (555) 470
146. Pratīryasamutpādādivibhatiganirdeśa-Tikā
169. Ālambanapariksā-Vyākhyā ( Dharmapāla) (560) 471
(Gupamati) (530) 381 170. Catuhśataka-Vrtti (Dharmapāla) (560) 474
147. Padmamukha- or Puñdarikamukha-sūtra (534) 382
171. Śataśāstra-Vrtti (Dharmapāla) (560) 479
148. Sūtra on the good qualities of rare comparison (536) 382 486
172. Trititsikā-Commentary (Dharmapāla) (560)
149. Dvñdaśahuddhakasūtra (537) 382 173. Trititśikā-Commentary (Paramārtha) (560) 487
150. Amoghapāśahrdayasūtra (537) 382 490
174. Vasumitra (560)
151. Candrottarādhikārikāvyākarañasūtra (540) 382 491
175. Abhidharmakośa-Tattvārthattkā (Sthiramati) (560)
152. Bhadrapālaśresthipariprcchāsūtra (541) 382 176. Abhidharmasamuccaya-Bhāsya (Sthiramati) (560) 495
153. Mahādharmolkādhārañīsūtra (544) 383 510
154. Acintyaguna.sarvabuddhaparigrahasūtra (544) 177. Madhyamakakārikā-Bhāsya (Sthiramati) (560)
383
178. Madhyāntavibhāgabhāsya-Tikā (Sthiramati) (560) 510
155. Pañcasahasrapañcaśatabuddhanāmasūtra (544) 383
179. Mahāyānasūtrālaritkāra-Bhāsya (Sthiramati) (560) 514
156. Sarvadharmāvacñrasūtra (545) 383 514
180. Pañcaskandhaka-Vaibhāsya (Sthiramati) (560)
157. Mahāsannipātāvadānarājasūtra (545) 383 523
158. Mahābaladharmikadhārañīsūtra (546) 181. Trititśikā-Bhāsya (Sthiramati) (560)
383
182. Vith. atikā-Bhāsya (Sthiramati) (560) 525
159. Agrapradaadhāranīvidyārājasūtra (546) 383 183. Kāśyapaparivartasūtra-Tikā (Sthiramati) (560) 526
160. Sidra on the Bodhisattva Akiñcana (546) 384 532
184. Sūtra on the original cause of raising the world (565)
161. ' Karatalaratna (Bhavya) (550) 384 185. Abhidhatmadīpa/Vibhāsāprabhāvrtti (Vimalamitra) (580) 532
162. Madhyamakahrdayakārikā/larkajvālā (Bhavya) (550) 397
186. Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna(Śilabhadra)(580) 558
162. 1 Bodhicittaparityāga 398 187. Bodhisattvabhūmi-Vrtti (Gupaprabhā) (580) 561
162. 2 Munivratasamd raya 400 188. Pañcaskandhaka-Vivaraña (Gupaprabhā) (580) 562
162. 3 Tattvāmrtāvatāra 401
189. Niddesa-Saddhammappajotikā (Upasena) (580) 564
162. 4 .Śrāvakatattvaniścayāvatāra 410 190. Abhidharmakośa-Sphutārthavyākhyū (Yaśomitra) (580) 565
162. 5 Yogāedratattvaniścaya 411 191. Īśvarasena (580) 593
162. 6 Sāritkhyatattvāvatāra 416
192. Buddhabālādhānapratihātyakūrvanirdeśasūtra (590) 593
162. 7 Vaiśesikatattvanficaya 417 193. Abhidamayālaritkāra-Vāritika
162. 8 Vedāntatattvaniścava 417 (Bhadanta Vimuktisena) (590) 593
162. 9 Mīmāritsātattvanirnayāvatāra 419
194. Devatāsūtra (598) 594
162.10 Sarvaiñasiddhinirdeśa 421
162.11 Śtutilaksananirdeśa 422 595
ENDNOTES
163. Madhyamakakārikā-Prajñāpradipa (Bhavya) (550) 422
164. Madhyamakārthasatńgraha (Bhavya) (550) GLOSSARY-INDEX 621
442
165. Madhyamakaratnapradipa (Bhavya) (550) 443
166. Manimekhalai (Cittalai Cāttanār) (550) 457
 ABBREVIATIONS
ADV Abhidharmadipa-Vibhāsūprabhāvrtti (ed. P.S. Jaini).
Patna 1959
AKB Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa, ed. P. Pradhan. Patna
1967
AS : Abhidharmasamuccaya
ASBh Sthiramati, Abhidharma.samuccayabhāsya
Asl : Buddhaghosa, Dhammasañganī-Atthakathā
ASV Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā
Bagchi Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, Le canon bouddhique en Chine,
les traducteurs et les traductions. Paris 1927
ca. around (the year ...)
CSL Paramārtha, Chuan Shih lun
EnBud Encyclopedia of Buddhism
Feer Leon Feer, Fragments extraits du Kandjour. AMG 5, 1883
GT Giuseppe Tucci, Opera Minore (Roma 1971-72)
K : A Comparative Analytical Catalogue of the Kanjur Division
of the Tibetan Tripiraka. cp. Bunkyo Sakurabe. Kyoto 1930-32
Lancaster : Lewis R. Lancaster, The Korean Buddhism Canon: a
Descriptive Catalogue. Berkeley 1979
Kosa : Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa
Law : Bimala Churn Law, Buddhaghosa. BBRAS Monograph
1 (Bombay 1946)
Ligeti : Lajor Ligeti, Catalogue du kanjur mongol imprime, par
Rinchen. New Delhi 1964
LVPAK : Louis de la Vallee Poussin (tr.), Abhidharmakośa
MMK : Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
MPPS : Mahāprajñāramitopadeśa
MRP : Bhavya, Madhramakaratnapradipa
MSA : Mahāyānasūtrālarhkāra
MV : Asaitga, Madhyāntavibhāga
MvB : Vasubandhu, Madhyūntavibhāgabhāsya
N(anjio) : Nanjio, A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the
Buddhist Tripiraka (Oxford 1883)
NCat : New Catalogues Catalogorum
op.cit : referred to above
 ENCYCLOPEDIA
16 OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

P(eking) The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition. Tokyo 1962

Pati : Patisambhidāntagga
PHK Nāgārjuna, Pratītyasamutpādahŗdayakārikā
PSAVDh : Praī:tyasamutpādādivibhaitgadharmaparyāya
PSK Ullangha,Pratītyasamutpādasāstra
Ratna Sāramati, Ratnagotravibhūga
SAKV Yaśomitra, S''phutārtha-Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (ed. U.
Wogihara). Tokyo 1932-36
T Canon de Taisho (Tokyo 1924-35)
TJ Bhavya, Madhyamakahŗdaya-Tarkajvālā
Toh(oku) : Catalogue of the Tibetan Works in the Tohoku University
Collection. Sendai 1953 PART ONE
Vism : Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga
INTRODUCTION
 INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

This Volume attempts to cover the development of Buddhist

philosophical notions from approximately the time of Vasubaiidhu and his
acrimonious critic .Samghabhadra--that is from about the mid-fourth
century, to the end of the sixth century A.D. It is a glorious period in
Indian history generally, the time of the Gupta kings and relative peace
throughout the subcontinent, though perhaps the same cannot be said of
Lańkā (until recently called Ceylon) to the south. However, even there,
whatever political difficulties there may have been, this age saw in Lańkā
the two large treatises of Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta, two scholars
whose works constitute the most thorough reviews we have of Theravāda
Buddhism.
In India visits of Chinese travellers continued and increased.
Perhaps most notable was Fa-hsien, who between 399 and 412 travelled
through Inner Asia to Samarkand, crossed from Kashgar to Kashmir and
Gandhara, visited Mathura, Varanasi, Nalanda and Kalinga, and exited by
way of Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka, returning to China by way of Sumatra
and the Pacific. Other Chinese translator-travellers to India in this period
include Seng-chien (388-408), Chih-yen (427), Pao-Yiin (427, who
travelled to India with Fa-hsien), Hsiang Kung (420-479), Chii-ch'ii
Ching-sheng (455), Kong To-che (=Gupasatya?), who travelled to China
between 454 and 465). T'an Yao (472), and Ki Kia Ya (472).
There were also a large number of Indians traveling to China who
translated Buddhist works in this period. Among Indian translators of
philosophical works dealt with in the present Volume, besides
Buddhayaśas and Kumārajīva, many of whose translations were of works
dealt with in our Volume Eight, we may note, in what is said to be
relative chronological order: Buddhabhadra, born in Kashmir, who was
in China at the beginning of the fifth century and who died in 429;
Dharmaksema from Central India, who got as far as Cutch, modern Qizil
in Chinese Turkestan and translated a large number of works, dying in
433; Gupabhadra, also from Central India, who went to China by way of
Ceylon and died in Canton in 468; Mandrasena, who came from Funan
to Leang and was translating in 503; Dharmaruci, translating in 504;
Samghabhara, born in 460, translated between 506-523, and died in 524;
Gautama Prajñāruci, a Brahmin from Varanasi who was in China between
516 and 538; Bodhiruci, who was in China between 508 and 536;
20 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES HISTORICA
L
OVERVIEW 21

Buddhaśānta, who flourished in China between 520 and 539; Theravāda in this sense."
Vimoksasena, in China around 541; Upaśūnya, in China 538-565; "...(0)nly a few of the sects mentioned in the context of the early
Narendrayaśas (there are perhaps two persons of that name); Jinayaśas doctrinal controversies succeeded in developing a consistent system of
from Magadha; Dharmagupta of royal lineage from South India who philosophy which had its impact on the progress of philosophical thought
travelled through Kashgar, Tashkent, Cutch and Turfan to China, arriving in India. Later sources usually list four schools of Buddhist thought, viz.,
there in 590; as well as Paramārtha, for whose life and travels see the Sarvāstivādin (or Vaibhāşika), Sautrāntika, Śūnyavādin (or Mādhyamika)
introduction to #173 below. and Vijñānavādin (or Yogācāra)... "
As for the authors of the works summarized in this Volume, we "There should be no confusion of these philosophical schools with
know of the whereabouts and lives of only a few of them. From north the earlier doctrinal and the early vinaya sects. A Sarvāstivādin, in the
India we can count Skandhila/Sugandhara, Samathadeva, Buddhasena sense of the follower of the Sarvāstivāda philosophy, could well be a
and Vimalamitra, while from the south came Buddhaghosa, Buddhadatta, member of a rather different vinaya sect, particularly of a sect which had
Buddhapālita, Dignaga, Kambala, Gupamati and Cāttanār. Bhavya and no philosophical tradition of its own. There is a well-known vinaya sect
Paramārtha came from Central India, while the Theravāda monks which adopted not only the philosophy but also the name of the
Mahānāma and Upasena appear to have come from, or at least spent their Sarvāstivāda, viz. the Mūlasarvāstivādin. This sect was not a sub-sect of
lives in, Lanka. the Sarvāstivādin but it had a vinaya tradition of its own.
"

The meager traditions about the dates and location of these authors "...The formation of Mahayana Buddhism was an innovation of a
provide little insight into the history of our period. We are entirely at a new kind, quite dissimilar from the formation of Buddhist sects. It was
loss concerning the earlier part, the 4th-5th centuries. Concerning the 6th an event taking place not on the basis of the understanding of monastic
century there is more information available, largely centering on the two discipline nor of doctrinal controversies of the traditional kind, but on a
great Universities at Nālandā and Valabhī, the inceptions of which must different level, viz. by a new definition of the goal of the religious life.
be supposed to date from around 500 or perhaps a bit before. Instead of attaining to personal liberation as a follower of the advice
In Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia we reviewed Andre Bareau's given by the Buddha, a Mahāyānist has decided to go along the path of
accont of the Buddhist schools that appear to have been active during the a Bodhisattva, but a bhil su of Mahayana Buddhism did not at all cease
second to the fourth centuries and in many cases before that time. Many to be a member of one of the nikāyas, because nobody could become a
of these persisted and appear to have thrived during our present period. bhikśu except by an upasampadā based on the vinaya tradition of one of
However, Heinz Bechert points out that " (T)here is, unfortunately, the nikāyas. When Mahayana developed, there originated two factions in
still much confusion on the nature of Buddhist 'sects' or 'schools' in spite most of the ancient Buddhist nikāyas or sects: a mahāyānistic and a
of the enormous amount of writing that has been done on Budddhist hinayanistic faction." '
sects. This confusion is caused by confounding different types of sects. A lot of what is standardly written and supposed about the
...(A) nikāya or sect can be described as a group or community of monks "
Hinayana" and " Mahayana" contrast stems from likely confusions of the
that mutually acknowledge the validity of their upasampadā or higher sort indicated by Bechert. In this Volume we have not attempted to
ordination and therefore can join together in the performance of wield a strong editorial pen over references to Buddhist "schools" and
vinayakarmas, i.e., legal acts prescribed by Vinaya or Buddhist especially over references to these two supposed great traditions within
ecclesiastical law...(T)he controversies leading to the formation of these Buddhism. In this Introduction, at any rate, we shall try to avoid making
sects did not completely stop after the final codification of the various those distinctions determinative except where we are actually reporting
'sectarian' recensions of the vinaya scriptures, but turned to minor matters textual references.
not clearly regulated in the texts and to disputes on the interpretation of The question of "schools" also has implications concerning the
the texts. The nikāyas formed in this way should be termed 'sub-sects', proper way to relate the positions of those whose works are covered in
and the three nikāyas in mediaeval Ceylonese Buddhism are 'sub-sects' of the present Volume. The "traditional" story views these works as
22 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 23
representing differing accounts of reality that, it is implied, stood against
surely be the installation of the great Universities of Nālandā and
each other as starkly alternative interpretations of the Buddha's words.
Valabhī, where most of the figures whose writings make up Buddhist
This is the basis for the view, exemplified in Bechert 's passage just
quoted, that there are essentially four philosophical schools of Buddhism, philosophical literature in the latter part of the sixth century taught, and
several of whom occupied administrative positions there. A fourth aspect
viz., Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, Yogacara and Madhyamaka, and that they of the period here under review comprises the interpretations of
" "
constitute the main alternative Interpretations. This traditional story Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka methods provided by Buddhapālita and
appears to have perhaps been inherited from the theories of Tibetan Bhāvaviveka (or, as we shall refer to him for brevity's sake, Bhavya).
interpreters of Buddhism, and it certainly received its most influential
Some would say that another theme must be found in the development of
authority in recent times from Th. Stcherbatsky ' s account, which was
Yogācāra thought, though in the period under study here only the
disseminated in English in the early 20th century before more thorough
commentaries of Sthiramati on Vasubandhu's Yogācāra works constitute
readings of the many texts relating to the question were available.
clear contributions to Yogācāra literature. Whether Dignāga' s or Bhavya 's
The position that will be taken in the present Volume is that there
works are to be counted as Yogācāra is a debatable matter. We shall
are not just four schools of Buddhism, and indeed that the views
refer to Dignaga's position simply as that of the " Buddhist Logicians".
associated with these four schools are not necessarily to be viewed as
And if one looks to eventual developments in Buddhism outside of India
rival alternatives. The relation between Buddhist philosophers' ideas is one will have to count the tradition stemming from the
more complex than that. While it is true that one finds occasional explicit Ratnagotravibhāga and its commentaries as still a sixth feature of
attacks by one Buddhist philosopher against things said by other Buddhist
importance in the period here covered.
philosophers, such passages are rather infrequent before the time of From another, less " academic" point of view, the most important
Bhavya in the latter part of the sixth century. Not that Buddhism is
contribution of our period is the vastly increased emphasis on the notion
entirely free from intraBuddhistic squabbling. In particular it is clear that
of a Bodhisattva. As a conception of what one should aim to be in life,
later Buddhists, who arrived at the ideal of the Bodhisattva as an even it increasingly appears that this Bodhisattva ideal comes to supplement
loftier aim than the mere natural final demise of an arhat, did not avoid
that of the liberated Buddha as a state which is capable of being realized
using the terms that characterize the older understanding--terms such as in a thinkable amount of time, and which can appeal to the humanitarian
"
Hinayana" or "pratyekabuddha " . The contrast between the two ideals-- sentiments of the populace rather than the austere, otherworldly aim of
of Buddha vs. Bodhisattva--is, however, a separable question from that complete release from the cycle of rebirths.
of properly understanding Buddhist philosophical theses. After all, a Among the themes or topics listed in the last two paragraphs, five
Bodhisattva will eventually be a Buddha, and the aim of gaining
concern specific aspects of Buddhist philosophical thought and will be
enlightenment and eventual release from rebirths remains a common and dealt with later in separate sections in this Introduction. Concerning the
undisputed feature for all Indian Buddhism. rise of the Universities, however, it seems best to turn to that now.
A broad overview of the period this Volume covers may well pick Fortunately, there is a monograph, originally an M. A. thesis, by H. D.
out several themes of special importance. One is, as said above, the Sankalia which reviews in detail what is said about Nālandā (and some
development of further comprehensive surveys of Abhidharmika notions, stray information about Valabhi) published in book form in 1934 and
not only by Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta in the fifth century, but also reprinted in 1972. 2 While the account Sankalia gives is somewhat dated
notably by Vimalamitra and Yaśomitra toward the end of the sixth. A now, since there seems to be little else to go on we shall follow his lead.
second development, of overreaching import for the subsequent centuries Nālandā, in Magadha, was very early associated with Buddhism, and
of Buddhist thought in India, is to be found especially in the work of is indeed referred to in canonical tales about the Buddha's lifetime. He is
Dignaga, who for the first time and almost single-handedly provided said to have visited there many times with Ananda, and Tāranātha says
Buddhism with a thorough, detailed, and analytic epistemology, logical it was the birthplace of the monk Sāriputta, and that King Aśoka erected
theory and theory of language. A third noteworthy development must "
a great Buddhist temple" there. ' Tāranātha also claims that Nāgārjuna
24 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

and Aryadeva (see Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia) "took interest in

the educational institutions of the place " .° Fa-hsien mentions Nālandā
(though not by name: Sankalia argues he did not visit it), and Hsfian- CHAPTER TWO: ABHIDHARMA
tsang later on confirms that it was located seven miles from Rājagrha, not
far from modem Patna in Bihar state. Both I-tsing and Hsuan-tsang agree The process leading to enlightenment and nirvdna receives extensive
that a temple there was built by a " akrāditya" who, Sakalia argues, was treatment by many of the authors surveyed in the following pages. The
in fact Kumaragupta I, the Gupta king coins and other evidence of whom overall process, however, remains essentially unchanged from its
are to be found still in the region. Kumāragupta flourished in 415-455, formulation in earlier Buddhist literature, e.g., in Vasubandhu's
and was followed by the subsequent Gupta monarchs in supporting the
Abhidharmakośa, a work which may have been composed only a little
building of classrooms and living places for the monks/students,
before the period surveyed in this Volume. After committing himself to
culminating in Harşavardhana of Kanauj at the close of the sixth century, the life of a seeker, a person appeals to a teacher, a "good friend" ,
who built a brass vihāra there. Sankalia concludes "that there were at
(kalyāñamitra), for help in initiating meditation designed to eliminate the
least six (or possibly seven) colleges at Nālandā", each with a vihdra built hindrances (sensual desire, ill-will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and
by one or another of the Gupta emperors down to Hama. ' It also had " a
worry, and doubt). By adopting vows to follow a moral way of living, by
grand library . At Nālandā the study of the Vedas and Upanisads, along
" "
showing disinterest in attractive objects and neutrality toward unattractive
with Sārhkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeşika and Buddhist works was carried on, ones, by developing mindfulness and discernment in the deportment of
though perhaps only by advanced students. ' his life, he prepares himself for the practice of meditation.
If the dates Sankalia argues for are right, then, Nālandā was an
Following again his teacher 's advice, the seeker at this point begins
active center of instruction and learning at least by the middle of the fifth practicing entering meditation either with the aim of suppressing the five
century. Although the dating of Buddhist authors is a chancy (and much
hindrances fully one by one (the gradual path, or path of serenity (śuddhi)
argued) business, there are traditions associating Asañga and Vasubandhu,
or by reflecting analytically on the causes and conditions of those
as well as Dignaga, with Nālandā. Several other authors of works hindrances and thus developing insight and calm (the path known as
summarized in this Volume appear to have been teachers at, and in
vipassand in Pali).
several cases the Presidents of, the University. They include Gunamati,
Although the requisites for enlightenment can thus briefly be
Paramārtha, and Sthiramati. Sthiramati is known to have eventually
described as abandonment of the five hindrances, what Abhidharma path-
abandoned Nālandā in favor of Valabhi.
philosophy is largely concerned with is the advancement through several
stages (basically four) of meditative concentration, each of which can be
understood as the abandoning of certain factors blocking one's way
together with the attainment of other factors constituting that stage's
attainment. (It has to be kept in mind, in reading these texts, that the
context of these discussions, and their terminology, is technical in the
sense of referring to quite private experiences whose precise nature can
only be understood by attaining the requisite state of meditation.
Translation of technical terminology, although in many cases standard,
is thus nonetheless not necessarily particularly helpful to the
nonpractitioner in understanding the stage's nature, at least in the sense
of the mental state experienced therein.)
In descriptions of beginning meditation we are first confronted with
 73

1.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Sareadharmapravrttinirdeśa (351)

Translated by Kumārajīva in 401. '

2.NAGARJUNA, Mahāprajilāpāramitopadeśasūtra (ca. 354)

This is a commentary on the Pañcavimśatīsūhasrikā-
prajñāpāramitāsūtra, #54 of our Volume VIII. We refer to this
"
commentary in what follows as " Upadeśa . The Upadeśa was translated
by Kumārajīva around 404, and constitutes Taisho 1509. Its Chinese title
is Ta tche tou louen. It is ascribed to Nāgārjuna as early as 597 in Li tai
san pao ki, the catalogue of the Tripitaka compiled in 597 by Fei tch'ang
fang. As we have noted before many works are ascribed to Nāgārjuna,
and we have tried to guess the approximate age of them (see Volume
VIII under the various Nāgārjunas for more details on such works). That
this is not a work of Ur-Nāgārjuna, the author of Madhyamakakdrikd, is
suggested by several points summarized by Lewis Lancaster. "
Etienne Lamotte has translated the first part of the Upadeśa, which
consists of fifty-two chapters and constitutes an integral Indian text. The
second part, in eighty-nine chapters, is not summarized here. One chapter
of the second part is translated into French at the end of Lamotte 's
translation (cf. Volume 5, pp. 2374-2445). Von Rospatt, The Buddhist
Doctrine of Momentariness (Stuttgart 1995) translates a number of
passasges; cf. p. 281 for the list.
Kumārajīva was born in 343-344 in Cutch (Northwest India); he went
to China in 401-402 at age 58 and remained there until his death, and is
renowned as a great teacher of famous Chinese scholars such as Seng-
chao, Tao-sthena, and Seng-jui; he was a friend of the famous Buddhist
scholar Hui-yiian. He translated many Buddhist sūtras such as the
Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, Saddharmapundarīka, Vajracchedikd, Astasāha.srikā
and Sūraiigamasamādhi, and also translated some philosophical texts, for
'
example, Harivannan s Tattvasiddhi.
Part One of the Upadeśa is translated into French by Lamotte in five
$1
volumes published between 1949 and 1980. We indicate this French

'
Kumārajiva translated this work in 401 in the "3d year of Hung
Shih, Later Chin dynasty (A.D.401) in Hsiao-yao Garden, Ch'ang-an"
(Lancaster, p. 72). K. 168 = T.1650 = N. 164 = Bagchi's #30 on p. 192.
On Kumārajīvās remarakable life cf. Bagchi, pp. 178-185.
 MAHAPRAJNAPARAMITOPADEŚA 75
74 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
` no other.
volumes published between 1949 and 1980. We indicate this French Answer: Not precisely. The four points of view taken separately,
translation in the following summary by "F". K. Venkata Ramanan in being true Thusness, dharmatā, ultimate reality, do not exist from the
1966 published an English translation of selected passages rearranged
mundane point of view but do as absolute truth. Likewise the person
topically. We have indicated these passages by "E". Venkataramanan's exists as a collection of aggregates, but not actually.
work also includes translations of a number of passages from the second (b) (E139) In order to preach the dharma one must take an individual
part of the Upadeśa. When the text refers to itself we use the to be a seat of awareness, so that he may understand or fail to understand
abbreviation "MPPS" for such self-reference. Numbering corresponds to the dharma.
that in use in F. (c) (E139-140) Factors exist as antidotes, though not absolutely.
Examples to show that a thing is a remedy or not depending on situation;
I (F4-55) Question: Why did the Buddha preach the MPPS? e.g., the twelve causes and conditions.
Answer: 1.The Buddha in the Tripitaka preached the law of the
Objection: The Buddha said that the twelve causes and conditions
Ajīvakas, but only in the MPPS does he speak to the Bodhisattva. were profound, difficult to understand. Then how can a confused (mūdha)
2 Besides, he enunciates the MPPS specifically for those cultivating person be counselled to study them?
the practice of concentration on the memory of the Buddha Answer: A confused person has faulty views, but is capable of
(b uddhān u.smrtisamād hi). arriving at correct ones through consideration of the right teachings, such
3 provides a biography of the Buddha 's life. as dependent origination. Likewise, momentariness is a remedy for one
4-8 The MPPS is directed toward those who deny that the Buddha is
who believes in continuity, but not as absolute truth. Why? Because
omniscient; explain the Buddha 's teachings to those able to understand it; conditioned factors cannot really have the three marks of birth,
refutes nay-sayers; and gives solace to those who accept his dharma; and maintenance and destruction. If they did, they would all three have to be
is for the delight of his hearers, for whom it refutes heretics. present at once, which is absurd. Furthermore, if momentariness were
9 The Buddha is the doctor who cures the heretic 's malady. really true there could be no retribution for acts.
10 The MPPS shows the Buddha's (superhuman) body as (d) (E72-73, 140-141) From the ultimate point of view all factors, all
inconceivable, immense. the subjects of discourse can neither be cor r ectly maintained nor denied.
11 summarizes the life of the Buddha again. This is recognized in the three stances reviewed in the Arthavargyasīitra:
12 Some who desire to be saved seek pleasure or practise asceticism
the wise man neither adheres to any belief nor intervenes in any scholarly
and lose the way to nirvana, for which the MPPS is a remedy. quarrel; he does not espouse or deny any view, but examines it; he doubts
13-15 The MPPS explains the difference in retribution between anyone who claims to have found the truth.
worship of the body of birth and of the body of the law; shows that the Question: But if all views are false, how can there be absolute truth?
Bodhisattva does not regress; honors the prajñāpāramitā; and explains the Answer: It is the path that transcends all linguistic expression, that
triple vehicle. terminates thinking; without support, it is both the denial and the true
16 Explanation of the highest teaching (pāramārthika siddhānta) from character of factors, without beginning or end, indestructibility,
four points of view of (a) the ordinary person, (b) each individual, (c) unalterability.
providing antidotes; (d) the ultimate point of view. 17 The Buddha preaches the MPPS so that great masters (whose
(a) (E137-138) Real factors provide causes and conditions for existing names are provided) will have faith in the Buddhist law.
things. A man consists of five aggregates, reborn according to karmic 18-19 The Buddha preaches the law in two ways, one to fit the
retribution. Good actions lead to rebirth as god or man; bad actions lead assumptions of his listeners, the other to convert them; or again, as topics
to the three lower destinies. The ordinary person is attached to the self. of dispute and as undisputed. Of course, there are no actual topics of
which exists only from the mundane point of view, not as absolute truth. dispute, since factors are absolutely empty.
Objection: Only the absolute point of view should be taken as true,
76 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
MAHAPRAJÑAPARAMITOPADEŚA 77
20 In other sūtras the Buddha speaks of good, bad and neutral
Buddha. Doubting arguments refuted.
factors. Here he shows that factors are none of these. Elsewhere he
XVI (F621-649) (EEI69) The story of Śāriputra at the
addresses the foundations of mindfulness in terms of the understanding
of the seeker, but here he teaches the pefection of wisdom. Giryagrasamaja festival. His conversion to Buddhism along with that of
II (F56-79) (E83, 103-104, 131-133, 195-197, 200) Word by word Maudgalyāyana. Review of all the aspects contemplated by the wise man,
and all the factors which constitute the contents of their meditations:
explanation of the first sitra of the Padcavimśdtī.
those objects which are sense-contents, the four truths, classified into
III (F80-I14) Explanation of the sense of the first part of that sutra.
IV (F115-161) (E147-148, 150) Names of the Buddha. groups of two, three, four, five and six.
XVII (F650-657) (E128, 140, 169) "Prajñāpāramitā" explained.
V (F162-197) On the city called Rājagŗha.
VI (F198-231) The great assembly of monks there, with recounting XVIII (F658-661) Eulogy of the virtues of giving.
" XIX (F662-691) Classification of kinds of gifts and how given.
of who was in attendance, and explanation of names such as "sarigha ,
" and that Ananda is not an arhat because of his vow. XX (F692-769) (E79-84, 219-224, 227-228, 230, 349) The virtue of
"arhat ,
giving and of propounding the dharma. The thing given does not exist,
VI1 (F232-234) The Buddha is accompanied at the assembly by 500
since there are no external objects.
nuns, 500 laymen and 500 laywomen.. Their status explained.
VIII (F235-308) (E297-298, 3i2) Bodhisattvas explained. The Refutation of the realist belief that external things exist. The realist
argues that things really exist because they have names and because they
distinction between those Bodhisattvas who are subject to regression and
have effects and are caused. The response is that we have names for both
those that are not. How the Bodhisattva is viewed in the Abhidharma
real and unreal things, so the fact of being named doesn't necessitate an
(viz., in the Vibhāsa) and in the Mahayana. The 32 marks of a
actual thing named. Secondly, there are three kinds of things: relative
Bodhisattva explained.
existents, nominal existents, and real entities. Examples:
IX (F309-317) Explanation of the term "mahāsattva " : it refers to
Long and short are relative terms; things are not intrinsically long or
Bodhisattvas who have taken a great vow and arrived at high status.
short, but only in comparison with other things. Milk is a complex of
X (F316-356) (E238, 246-247) Eighteen qualities of a Bodhisattva
four factors--color, smell, taste and touch: thus milk is not real in the way
reviewed. that the composing factors are real. Even color, smell, taste and touch are
XI (F357-390) (E93-96, 98-99, 100, 112, 179, 183-184, 205) Ten
merely names for what are ultimately composites of atoms; though they
analogies to help understand how things said by the Buddha not to exist
are "real" in contrast to other things, they are not so in contrast to atoms.
can nevertheless appear to us to exist: a magical creation, a mirage, the Atomist: But the atoms at least exist! They are not composite; they
reflection of the moon in water, empty space, an echo, the city of the
are ultimately small; they have no parts.
Gandharvas, a dream, a shadow, a reflection in a mirror, a magically
Refutation of the atomist: The "ultimately small" doesn't exist, being
appearing thing.
merely a way of speaking. "Large" and " small " being relative notions,
XII (F391-402) Explanation of the ascription of "untrammelled
nothing is intrinsically large or small. If there could be an atom, it would
awareness", "extreme patience" and "excelling in saving" to a
have to have spatial divisions; otherwise it couldn't be a component of a
Bodhisattva.
XIII (F403-430) The various activities of Bodhisattvas. A list of larger thing.
Moreover, for those who believe in emptiness matter is a function of
twenty-two principal Bodhisattvas.
awareness (cittānuparivartin). Thus one can meditatively view a thing as
XIV (F431-528) Further description of the variety of ways in which
earth, water, fire or air, as blue or yellow or absolutely empty, just as one
the Buddha assists beings toward liberation. can see the same woman as attractive or repulsive depending on how she
XV (F529-616) (E20 I, 313) The ten Bodhisattvas. Why should there
is analyzed, or see her as empty. And since these things are known as
be more than one? In fact there are an infinite number inhabiting an empty they are seen as nonexistent
infinite number of heavens, but they are all apparitions of the one The giver too is nonexistent, being a complex of causes and
 MAHAPRAJÑAPARAMITOPADEŚA 79
78 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
teachings themselves; the Abhidharma; and the teaching of the emptiness
conditions. All distinctions are nominal only. This includes the self. of persons and of factors. A Bodhisattva knows how factors are identical
But the believer in a self argues that a self must exist, since otherwise and how they differ.
(1) we wouldn 't have the idea of me and you as different; (2) we wouldn't XXXI (FI121-1207) The thirty-seven allies of enlightenment are
find things differing in color, etc.; and (3) there would be no difference reviewed and analyzed from the points of view of Abhidharma and
between me and you with respect to our karmic residues and so Mahayana.
frustration could not occur and liberation is irrelevant. Answers to (1) Question: Since the allies of enlightenment belong to the path of
include the following: (a) if 1 only know myself as different from you, seekers and self-enlightened, evhy are they discussed here under the path
how do I know you without already knowing myself? Your reasoning is of the Bodhisattva?
circular. (b) If the person is a composite of the five aggregates, since Answer: The Bodhisattva must follow all the paths. In fact it isn't
those five are born from causes and conditions and so empty, the person anywhere said that the allies of enlightenment are for seeker and self-
is empty too, and only supposed to exist by the influence of karmic enlightened alone.
traces. Answer to (2): it is the visual consciousness that grasps the Objection: But since the thirty-seven allies are only present for the
difference between the colors of things, so the self is unnecessary. Bodhisattva at the penultimate stage of his path, after which counselling
Answers to (3). (1) The self plays no necessary role in the causal him to accomplish the perfections and great compassion has no point, one
account of karmic bondage and of liberation from it. (2) It is the can readily infer that the allies of enlightenment are not meant for
psychophysical complex that is referred to in ordinary language when a Bodhisattvas.
"
"person (pudgala) is spoken of, so the self has nominal existence only Answer: Since the Bodhisattva spends a long time in sathsāra it is
and is not ultimately real. necessary for him to understand the true way and the false way, the world
The six perfections related to giving. and liberation. Taking a great vow, he promises to practice the
XXI (F770-781) (E106) Morality defined and analyzed. perfections. It is because he has not yet practiced them that he is not
XXII (F782-852) Part One deals with the five precepts against killing, immediately liberated. In the Abhidharma it is (wrongly) taught that
stealing, sexual perversion, lying and drinking. Part Two concems the saritsāra and nirvāpa are different, but in the Mahāyāna it is (rightly)
moral behavior of laymen and laywomen, seekers and monks. understood that they are the same, namely emptiness (Madhyamakakārikā
XXIII (F853-864) Moral virtue. XXV. 19-20 is quoted).
XXIV (F865-901) (E280) Patience defined and analyzed. The roots of the thirty-seven allies of enlightenment are ten: faith,
XXV (F902-926) (E90-91, 93, 107-108, 145, 211, 215-216) Dharmic morality, thought, energy, memory/mindfulness, concentration, wisdom,
patience (dharmaksānti) occurs in the face of extreme provocations such tranquility, joy, equanimity.
as adulation, flattery, violence and luxury. The seven groups comprising the thirty-seven allies of enlightenment
XXVl (F927-945) Energy defined and analyzed. are analyzed successively. These seven are: four establishments of
XXVII (F946-984) Energy's virtues mindfulness, four right efforts, four supernatural powers, five faculties,
XXVIII (F985-1057) Meditation is necessary for the Buddhist five powers, seven aspects of enlightenment, eight members of the path.
aspirant. Explanation of the procedures to be followed in learning to XXXII (F1209-1238; E190, 233, 294) Three concentrations on
meditate properly: elimination of sensual desires; overcoming various emptiness, signlessness, aimlessness are analyzed from the standpoint of
obstacles. Abhidharma and Mahāyāna. The four meditative levels are classified in
XXIX (F1058-1065) (E286-287) Wisdom's virtues. Abhidharma into two basic sorts: those of worldly purity and those of
XXX (F1066-1113) (E73, 142, 144-146, 212-213, 287) The transcendent purity.
knowledge appropriate to seekers, adepts and those who are neither, to Question: In the MPPS you speak of factors as only empty of
self-enlightened ones, to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, and to heretics. The character, so how can the Bodhisattva meditate on empty factors?
literature of Buddhism is divided into three: Pitaka, that is, the Buddha's
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
80 MAHAPRAJÑAPARAMITOPADEŚA 81
Answer: The Bodhisattva knows that all factors stem from causes and this score. Review of the list of eighteen found in the
conditions, have no self-nature and are empty. So it is easy for him to Abhidharmavihhańga.
reject them. But ordinary folk, who find pleasure in things wrongly XLII (F1705-1717) The great benevolence and compassion of the
supposed to exist, think meditation is profound and marvellous. Buddha.
XXXIII (F1239-1279) Four boundless states of loving kindness, XLIII (F1809-1879) (E105-106, 148-149, 302) The six higher
compassion, joy and equanimity. The four immaterial states of infinite- faculties. Knowledge of other's thoughts.
space, infinite consciousness, nothingness and neither-identification-nor
'
Objection: A thought, which you claim can be known by another, is
nonidentifcation. either gone (gala) or not gone (agata). If it is gone it doesn't exist, like
XXXIV (F1281-1309) Eight liberations (vimoksa): seeing both the thought of a dead man. And if it is not gone, then how can it be
external and internal things; seeing interior but not exterior things; pure known by another?
liberation from the body; the four immaterial states just discussed; the Answer: It is neither gone nor not gone; the notion that a thought
cessation of identification and feeling. occurs at a fixed time is wrong.
Eight masteries: knowing the number, beauty, exteriority of visible Question: Can the Buddha or Bodhisattva know all the thoughts of
things as well as knowing internal things: knowing those things plus others? If so, beings are of a finite number.
knowing that the internal is dominant; knowing those aspects of external Answer: No, there are an infinite number of beings, and the Buddha 's
things but not internal things; knowing only exterior things as blue, omniscience can comprise such an infinite group, being limitless.
yellow, round and white. Anyway, the Buddha declined to answer such questions.
The ten organs of entirety (krtsnāyatana). What the seeker, the self-enlightened one, and the Bodhisattva can
The nine successive liberations. know distinguished.
XXXV (FI311-1328) Nine foul states according to Abhidharma and Spells, i.e., preparatory exercises to help the aspirant retain what he
Mahayana. has heard, which he approaches as either words (ghosa) or syllables
XXXVI (F1329-1430) Eight memorable things (anusmrti): the (aksara).
Buddha; the dharma, the order, morality, renunciation (tyāga), gods, Concentration as described in Abhidharma and in Mahayana
breath, death. reviewed.
XXXVII (F1431-1463) Ten identifications: transitoriness, frustration, XLIV (1180-1890) Sympathetic joy (anumodand) discussed. The
no self, the first three as one, dislike (pratikūla) towards food, Bodhisattva's action in helping others surpasses those of the seeker and
displeasingness of the whole world, death, foul things, abandoning, self-enlightened ones in this connection.
disenchantment, cessation. XLV (F1891-1930) (E70-72) Practice of the six perfections. The
XXXVIII (F1365-1503: T289-290) Eleven knowledges of the connections between wisdom and giving. The marks of a Bodhisattva,
Mahayana: and the nature of his family.
Three concentrations. Three faculties: knowing what was unknown, XLVI (F1931-1974) The good roots and the six perfections.
knowing that one knows, perfect knowledge. XLVII (F1975-1994) More on the marks of a Bodhisattva.
XXXIX (F1505-1566; T77) Ten powers. XLVIII (F1995-2151) (E76-77, 215-216, 298-299) Eighteen
XL (F1567-1624; Four convictions of the Buddha: that I am emptinesses: emptiness of factors internal, external, and both; emptiness
completely enlightened, that I am free of all impurities, that I have of emptiness; the great emptiness of ten regions; emptiness of the highest,
renounced all hindering factors, that my noble path yields liberation. Four i.e., of liberation; emptiness of the conditioned and the unconditioned
discriminations: of objects, factors, grammar and perspicuity. factors; absolute emptiness; emptiness of factors that have not come into
XLI (F1625-1703; T134, 136, 197-199) Eighteen attributes -
peculiar
being; emptiness of factors that have already occurred; emptiness of
to the Buddha (āveñikadharma). Refutation of the Sarcastic ado theory on su
pposedly ultimately real things, such as prakrti, emptiness of all factors,
 i
82 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
83
emptiness as nonperception; the emptiness of absences, of self-nature, and
3.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
of both together. Tathāgatagunajñānacintyaviśayāvatāranirdeśasūtra (ca. 355)
XLIX (F2163-2230) (E91, 184, 190-194, 254-255, 261-264) The four The title is rendered by Nanjio as " Sara on crossing the wisdom,
conditions: causal, directly antecedent, supporting and dominant. The five
light, and adornment of the place of all Buddhas." SS It was translated
causes: connected, simultaneous, homogeneous, pervasive, retributory. anonymously by someone in the period 350-431. T.302 = N.85.
Explanations of terms tdthatā, dharmadhāttt and bhūtakoti. The four great
elements.
L (F2231-2277) (E263) Arrival at the other bank, of conditioned and 4.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Anantadhārapīdharmaparyāyasūtra
unconditioned factors.
(ca. 355)
Question: How can a Bodhisattva, who has not yet destroyed his
K. 334 = N. 374 = T. 1342. Lancaster tells us that the translation was
contaminants, yet find himself among the noble persons? made by Sheng-chien during the years of T'ai Ch 'u, Western Ch'in
"
Answer: He has had a glimpse of enlightenment, and his merits and dynasty (A.D.388-407)."
understanding is great, greater than those of seekers and self-enlightened
people.
The three positively meritorious actions (punyakriydvastu) are giving, 5.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Bhadraśerīsūtra (ca. 355)
morality and meditation. They are explained. K. 469 = T. 570 = N. 510, translated by Sheng-chien around the same
The five eyes: the fleshly eye, the divine eye, the eye of wisdom, the time as the previous entry. Nanjio renders the title as " Sara spoken by
eye of dharma, and the Buddha's eye. They are used by the ascetic in Buddha on (the request of) Bhadraśerī (a queen of Bimbisāra)".
visualizing the past, present and future states of the Buddha.
LI (F2279-2342) (E263) The Bodhisattva finds perfection of wisdom
through hearing, reciting, memorizing and retaining the teaching of the 6.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Sūtra on Ananda' s thinking (ca. 355)
Buddha having twelve members, namely (I) text (sūtra), 2) chants (geya), Translated by Fa-chien (or Fa-hsien) around 400. Fa-chien travelled
3) predictions (vyākaraña). 4) metric passages (gātha>, 5) exclamations from China to India between 399 and 414, and prepared a record of his
(uddna), 6) conditions (niddna), 7) short recitations (avadāna), tales travels (T.2085 = N. 1496 = K.1073). '
( thus have we heard , ityuktaka), 9) birth-stories (jātaka) and 10) large
" "

texts (vaipulya), 11) marvels (adhibhūta) and 12) explanations (upadeśa).

LII (F2343-2372)(E281) Examination of the three bad roots or 7.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Śrīkañthasūtra (ca. 355)
poisons: attachment, hatred and delusion. =
K.374 T.744 = N. 398, translated by Fa-Hsien.
Question: If the Buddha, who is the Lord of dharma, can disappear
why doesn't the dharma likewise disappear?
Answer: Because it is retained in memory by the Bodhisattva even 8.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Akāśagarbhasūtra (363)
without being realized. In fact the nature (dharmatd) of the Buddha's K. 62 = T.405 = N. 68, translated by Buddhayaśas in 408-413.
dharma is nonarisen, undestroyed, uninterrupted, impermanent, neither Chapter I I is translated by Bendall and Rouse (London 1922; Delhi
one nor many, neither come nor gone, unattached, unsupported,
nonexistent, it is nirvana.
Question: So it is indestructible?
Answer: Indeed, the true character of the dharma is indestructible. The Chinese name of the text is A nan Jen pieh citing; it is T. 495
By hearing the innumerable names of the Buddha one attains illumination = N. 637). It comprises 7 leaves. Cf. Sudha Sengupta,
C Buddhism in the
(abhisambodhi). lassical Age (Delhi 1985), pp. 64-71 for further details about the visit
to India of the Chinese translator Fa-hsien and his translations.
 I
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES BUDDHAD IYANASAMADHISAGARA 85
84
I 3.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
1971, 1981), pp. 61-70. Buddhayaśas was in China at the same time as Dcvarājasa»uuctahhagavanmmigalagāthāsūtra (369)
Kumārajīva. Cf. P.C.Bagchi, Le Canon Bouddhique en Chine (Paris Yet another porton of the Avatamśakasūtra. Besides the locations
1927), pp. 200-204 for more information on his life and travels. Acording
cited in the previous entry, see also Bagchi, p. 344, (1), where we are
to Sudha Sengupta, Buddhism in the Classical Age (op. cit.), p. 56, the told that the translation was finished in "320-321", presumably a misprint.
work "describes five root sins which are to be avoided by princes and
eight sins which the young novices are liable to commit; and the way to
get rid of them is prescribed as the worship of the Bodhisattva
" 14.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Karunāpundarka (369)
Akāśagarbha. This text is reported by Isshi Yamada as available from six Sanskrit
manuscripts held in various collections around the world (London,
Cambridge, Paris, Calcutta, Tokyo and Kyoto), in two Tibetan
9.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Ksudrakasūtra (365)
translations, and in two Chinese translations. The Chinese version that
Goes under several other titles, e.g., :amyuktapitakasūtra. K.767 = appears to be the earliest, K. 126 = Ti57 = N. 142, is a translation by
T 745 = N 676. Comprises 1 chapter in 11 leaves. Lancaster tells us
' Dharmaksema made some time between 414 and 421. On Dharmaksema
that this text was translated by Fa-hsien in Tao-ch ang monastery, Yang-tu see Bagchi, pp. 212-221 and Sudha Sengupta, op. cit., pp. 56-57: he was
in 405. from Central India, went to Kashmir to study Mahāyāna, and travelled to
China in 414 and remained there till his death in 433. " E" refers here
to the Sanskrit text as presented by Isshi Yamada in Karundpundarika.
I0.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Anantamukhasādhakadhāramsūtra
The White Lotus of Compassion. Volume II (New Delhi 1989). Pages 63-
(ca. 369)
120 of Volume I of Yamada 's publication provide an English summary
K. 325 = T. 1012 = N 356, translated in 419 by Buddhabhadra (cf.
on which our present summary is based.
Nanjio, pp. 341-346), a person bom in Kapilavastu of royal blood who
is supposed to have bested Kumārajīva in some sort of controversy and CHAPTER ONE: Turning the Wheel of Dharma
eventually become his advisor. Nanjio says: He met Kumārajīva in
"
(E1-13) Śākyamuni, the Buddha, is staying on Mt. Grdhrakūta in
China, and whenever the latter found any doubts, the former was always
" Rājagrha, attended by many thousands of Bodhisattvas and other
asked for an explanation. Bagchi describes him as man of elegant and
courteous manner and profound erudition. He died in China in 429. Some followers. This Chapter provides a description of the Padmā Buddha land
in the southeastern direction, and of the miracles performed there by the
of his translations were done in collaboration with Fa-hsien (see above).
Buddha.

11.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Buddhadhyānasamādhisāgarasūtra CHAPTER TWO: The Source of Spells

(ca. 369) (E14-50) History of the Buddha Land. How Gaganamudra became
Padmottara and helped millions of Buddhas attain the patience
A good-sized work of 12 chapters, translated by Buddhabhadra. K.
constituting the dharma of nonarising by following ten Dravidian spells
401 = N. 430 = T.643.
(dhdraqi). This is confirmed by Maitreya, who traces the sources of these
spells. Śākyamuni explains five additional spells, and notes that they are
hard to practice, and that Buddhas only rarely appear on earth. He turns
12.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Buddhadharmācintyanirdeśasūtra (369) into a huge tongue (abhīdajiltvard) as testimony the truth of his
This text comprises a portion of the (Buddha)Avatathśakasūtra, i
nstruction.
constituting K. 79 = T. 278 = N. 87, translated by Buddhabhadra between
418 and 422.
86 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
RATNAKETUDHARANI 87
CHAPTER THREE: Bestowal of a Gift
the 5th or 6th century. There is a Tibetan translation by Śīlendrabodhi
(E51-104) Śāntimati asks how Śākyamuni, despite living in the
and a Tibetan Lotsava. It was, however, first translated by Dharmakśema
fivefold world of defilements (of short life, of a bad age, of bad people,
between 414 and 421, K.56 (9) =T. 397 (9) = N.61 (9)5J .
of wrong views and of desires), managed to attain enlightenment without
resorting to a pure Buddha land where the defilements are lacking. The Summary by Nalinaksha Dutt
Buddha answers that he inhabits such a fivefold world because of his
great compassion for others. To explain this he tells the story of King
CHAPTER ONE: Mārajimhīkarana
Arapemin, who is to become Amitābha, and his minister Samudrarepu, "The first chapter...begins with the story of the conversion of
who will become Śākyamuni, each through their particular vows.
Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana. Śāriputra met Aśvajit and was greatly
impressed by his saintly appearance and on enquiry found out that he was
CHAPTER FOUR: Classification of Bodhisattvas a disciple of Buddha. On hearing (a certain) stanza Śāriputra developed
(E105-326) Display of the Bodhisattvas in various places by name,
an insight into the Truth and communicated the same to his friend
capped by Samudrarepu, who hearing this takes five hundred vows that Maudgalyāyana according to their mutual understanding. Maudgalyāyana
cover the entire legendary biography of the Buddha. also penetrated into the teaching (dharma) and attained the first stage of
sanctification (srotāpanna). Both of them decided to join the Buddhist
CHAPTER FIVE: The Gift order of Śākyamuni, who was then in Rājagrha, and before doing so, they
(E327-387) A collection of six Jātaka stories about former lives of the apprised their students of the intention to become Buddhist monks. Their
Buddha. 500 students also followed them and became disciples of Śākyamuni.
Mara, the lord of Kāmadhātu, was very much agitated at the change of
CHAPTER SIX: Epilogue mind of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana and apprehended that his realm
(E388-420) Praise to the Buddha. His ten names. would be gradually denuded of persons with secular leanings on account
of Buddha's teachings. He then took the form of Aśvajit and approached
the two leaders telling them that whatever he had communicated to them
15.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mahāmeghasūlra (ca. 370) heretobefore was all wrong and that there was in fact neither cause nor
K. 164 = T.387 = N.244, translated by Dharmakşema (see under the its effect, there were neither fruits of deeds nor rebirth. He was, however,
55
previous entry (#4). According to Paul Demieville this work is also found out by the two leaders, who advised their students to take
known as " Mahāparinirvānasūtra" and " Alakşapa- or Asarhjñā-sūtra". ordination in order to escape from old age and death. Failing to deceive
Demieville provides a summary in French. He says it is a different work them, Mara put up obstructions on their way to Śākyamuni by creating
from Nanjio 187-188 and 970, rendered into English by Cecil Bendall in miraculously a waterfall, a mountain and roaring lions but all these were
the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 12.2, pp. 288-311, which counteracted by Śākyamuni's superior supernatural powers. Unaware of
according to Demieville is a "purely Tantric" work. Māra's obstructive activities, the two leaders with their 500 students
proceeded to Sakyamuni, who ordained them then and there without any
formal ceremony. Mara then appeared before Buddha in the form of gods
M
16.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Ratnaketudhāran sūtra (ca. 370) aheivara and Brahma to dissuade him from his mission but received a
Nalinaksha Dutt provides details about this sutra in Gilgit sharp retort from the Teacher. He was very much disappointed and went
Manuscripts Volume IV (Calcutta 1959), pp. i-iii, and a summary in the back to his palace and entered into his chamber of grief..He was cheered
succeeding pages iii-xiv, from which we have drawn in preparing the by the Apsarases with the words that he must not fight shy of anybody
summary given below. The text is known from a single mansucript as there was none who could go beyond the ocean of desires. Mara
discovered at Gilgit and which Dutt estimates as having been written in replied that there was one who had realised the evanescence of worldly
88 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES RATNAKETUDHĀRANI 89

objects and collected around him disciples who lived in forests practising sanctification and for acquiring knowledge, supernatural powers,
meditations for removing the mental impurity of hatred. This man would compassion, means of expediency and power of correct intonation. In
bring about havoc in his realm. Hearing these words of Mara about reply, Bhagavān gave them the following instructions: One should (a) not
'
Śākyamuni s sanctity and greatness the Apsarases felt a reverence for develop any attachment for the pāramitā practices nor form any
Sakyamuni and approached him to ascertain how a female could become conception about them; (h) eradicate from one's mind the notion of the
a male and ultimately a Buddha. They rebuked Mara for his evil designs existence of a being or soul; (c) remain dissociated from sound, smell and
and advised him to show due regard to Buddha. They then left the service other sense-objects and (d) not entertain any notion about the elements
of Mara and became devotees of Buddha. Mara felt sore at the changed constituting the three planes of existence as also about their origin and
attitude of his female attendants. He then called his sons and asked them continuity on account of certain causes and conditions.
to make the maximum war preparations to conquer his enemy. In reply In order to develop the above mental attitude, one must realise that
to his sons ' enquiry about the strength of his enemy, Māra said that his the so-called practices prescribed for Bodhisattvas are without any real
enemy was Sakyamuni, who was mean and deceitful and had been basis and that all objects are in fact non-existent and without origin and
beguiling all good men of his realm including his female attendants by decay, are devoid of a permanent substance and individual characteristics.
his wrong teachings. Mara 's army then advanced against Sakyamuni and The only means to attain omniscience is to get rid of the notion of
hurled all their deadly weapons upon him, who, however, then entered duality, viz., that there are practices of attaining omniscience and that one
into...meditation...which changed all the missiles into flowers and jewels is exerting to perfect oneself in the practices to attain omniscience, and
and their war-cries into the sounds of buddha, dharma, samgha, pāramitā so forth. Then a few Bodhisattvas, who were spiritually advanced, gave
and so forth. Witnessing the supernatural feats of the great Buddha all out their individual experiences, and the steps taken by them for the
beings of the universe from the lowest to the highest developed faith in realisation of the Truth, and the nature of their actual realisations.
him and started eulogizing him in beautiful verses in which they said that Bhagavan Buddha endorsed fully the views of Kautūhalika Bodhisattva,
Buddha's mind, although as free as space, was however permeated with who said that there was neither any teaching nor any teacher nor any
love and compassion because he wanted to rescue all beings from the words or sentences conveying the teaching, nor were there the taught who
fleeting worldly existence. studied the teaching or exerted according to the same. By comprehending
Observing the wonderful powers of Buddha, the daughters of Mara that everything was inexpressible one could realise sameness (tathatal of
showered on him muktd flowers, all of which through his miraculous the Reality of omniscience (.sar-vajñajñāna) or the Truth that everything
power turned into canopies hovering in the air over the heads of countless was without origin and decay. After these expositions of the truth given
Buddhas, who were all of the same form, colour and appearance. There by . the Bodhisattvas, Mara's sons and daughters developed the faith that
were however differences in the shape and size of their thrones, number all objects were without origin...They then showered flowers on
of their followers and nature of their Buddha-ksetras. Mara's sons Sakyamuni as an expression of their gratitude....
returned to their father at night and acknowledged their discomfiture and
inability to move even a hair of Buddha's body. Many of them again CHAPTER III Mūradamana
approached the Teacher and listened to his teachings. Hearing this news, The Third chapter...opens with the statement that when the
Mara became very much dejected and applied his mind to devise other Ratnaketuditāranī was recited by Sakyamuni while recounting his past
means to conquer Buddha. existence, there was not only an earthquake but also a flash of bright light
flooding all corners of the universe. On enquiry made by the countless
CHAPTER II Maras about the source of the light, Mara the lord of Kamadhatu told
The second chapter is entitled "Pūrvayoga" (associated with past them that a deceitful magician had been born in the family of Sakya. For
existences). It opens with the solicitation of Mara's sons and daughters to six years he had exerted alone in a solitary place to acquire the magical
Buddha to explain what is the best course for attaining perfect powers. Mara's army could not move a single hair of his body and was
 RATNAKETUDHARANI 91
90 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

routed by his signless magic and over and above this the female Kāmadhātu, being thus deserted by his friends, became almost mad with
attendants of Mara deserted him to become devotees of the magician. grief and fear, and while shedding tears he attempted to destroy the
Mara therefore sought the help and co-operation of other Maras to subdue lotuses, but he failed to do anything as he could neither see nor touch
the wicked and deceitful magician. On hearing this, the other Maras had them. He was dumbfounded and could not let out a shriek or throw out
a look at Bhagavān and were dismayed at the sombre voice of his his hands. He wanted to return to his house, but that also he could not do
preaching. Each of them, one by one, uttered one or two verses dwelling and found himself bound down as if by five fetters. He was advised by
on the excellence of the great man and of his teaching and advised their another Mara to take refuge in Buddha. In order to get release from his
friend not to court peril by showing anger and enmity towards the great fetters, he offered salutation to Buddha and found himself unfettered then
Being. Mara of Kāmadhātu gave to each of them suitable replies in and there. As he wanted to get away from Buddha, he was fettered again
choice verses with a view to incite their wrath. The verses of other Maras as before. At last he submitted to Buddha wholeheartedly
presented the best features of Buddha's teachings as those of Kāmeśvara.
Mara did the same under the garb of pointing out the utility and CHAPTER IV: Rsi Jyotirasaprasāda
"
importance of worldly life.... The title means "conversion of ascetic Jyotirasa . The opening
At last, however, the other Māras agreed to give him military aid and account reverts to the four Mahāśrāvakas, who were compelled by the
they all came with their army fully armoured and hovered in the air on attendants of Mara to sing and dance with them, but whose utterances
the border of Artga and Magadha. They also got the aid of other non- relating to Nirvāpa made the earth quake. The temporary discomfiture
human beings who had no faith in Buddha. Mara of Kāmadhātu, in the encountered by the great disciples made the gods nervous about the future
meantime, came across in the Himalayas a hermit-saint called Jyotirasa, well-being of the teaching and so they solicited the Teacher to see that
who was a devotee of Maheśvara and proficient in eighteen branches of the discipline of the monks was properly maintained. Bhagavān assured
learning. He persuaded him to meet Buddha with a view to see him them that no one could do any harm to his teachings and that he would
triumph over the Teacher in knowledge and magical feats. While his now go to convert to his faith the Maras, who had assembled at Rājagŗha.
friends were getting ready with their weapons of war, Mara advised his He was however wamed in verses uttered by the gods dwelling at
attendants to make friends with Buddha's four great disciples, viz., Rājagŗha not to risk his life by going to teach the Maras, but the
Śārīputra, Maudgalyāyana, Prima Maitrāyanīputra and Subhūti while they Suddhavasakayika gods told the other gods that they were confident that
would come out on their begging rounds, and to dance and sing with he could not be harmed by any Mara. Bhagavan then consoled them all
them. The attendants did so but they were told by the four great disciples by recounting in verses his virtuous and meritorious acquisitions and his
in verse that the constituents of a being and worldly enjoyments were consequent invincibility.
their enemies which must be destroyed, and uttered a mantrapada, which All beings felt greatly relieved at the words of Bhagavan and were
changed the minds of the attendants and made them devotees of the convinced that they would be rescued by him from the ocean of existence
disciples. The verses uttered by Subhūti were replete with Mahāyānic to the state of fearlessness. They expressed their devotion by offering
teaching of śī iyard. flowers to the Buddha.
Śākyamuni Buddha then wrought a miracle by which the four Buddha then entered into śūratiganrasasnddhi and while meditating
disciples found them seated in a wide crossing of streets, one facing the he moved about among men and gods and other beings, all of whom
other, and on that spot appeared countless lotuses, from the leaves of regarded him as a fellow-being of theirs. At that time he met Jyotirasa
which issued forth thoughtful verses. Seeing this miracle, Mara of who was persuaded by Mara to challenge him. But Jyotirasa on seeing
Kāmadhātu became extremely disappointed while the other Māras hint became not only a changed man but an ardent devotee of Buddha,
reproached him for misguiding them to fight against a divine saint. They eulogizing him in glorious terms. He offered flowers to him in deep
congregated at Rājagŗha and after taking forms of different celestial reverence. Buddha then rose from his sīrrariganiasamūdlti and made the
beings, they worshipped the Teacher with folded hands. Mara of prophecy that Jyotirasa would ultimately become a Buddha.
92 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
RATNAKETUDHARANI 93
CHAPTER V: Laksana
The title refers to characteristics of worldly objects. It is fragmentary by the very large congregation of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and
and the available portion opens with the remark that Bhagavan had a look Mahāśrāvakas.
round the whole universe. He imparted instructions to Mara and said that Bodhisattva Candraprabha Kumārabhūta then uttered with folded
hands a few laudatory verses praising the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and
the appearance of Buddha and his teachings were extremely rare in this
world. He explained the Mahāyānic principles of Buddhism and declared that the dhāragī (mudrāpada) would increase the merits of
established that there were neither worldly objects nor their characteristics Bodhisattvas and lead them to Bodhi. The laudation of Candraprabha was
endorsed with one voice by the other Bodhisattvas who added that if any
nor their originator.
monk or nun, or a male or female lay-devotee cleanly dressed and
As the main topic of the chapter is a dissertation on the nonexistence
standing on a throne, should utter this mantrapada, he or she would not
of phenomenal objects and their characteristics, it has been called the
Laksanaparivarra. suffer from any m ental or physical pain nor suffer from any disease. The
hearers of the mantrapada would also enjoy the same benefit.
'
Candraprabha then uttered a formula for giving one s approval to the
CHAPTER VI: Dhāranī
This chapter...opens with the account of a congregation of countless mantrapada. Then the Bodhisattvas, Mahāśrāvakas and gods
Buddhas (nahāsannipāta) in the (Sahā)Lokadhātu of Śākyamuni acknowledged the excellence of the mantrapada.
At that time Bhūteśvara Mahābrahmā, seated in a well-decorated
Tathagata. At the sight of the Buddhas, the three impurities of attachment,
hatred and delusion, etc. of all beings subsided and their minds became female form in front of Amitāyus Tathāgata, announced that he would
give protection to the reciter and hearer of the mantrapada from any
calm and serene. Śākyamuni Tathāgata then addressed the assembled
injury caused by an evil Mara of spirit.
Buddhas that in consequence of his past resolutions he had attained
The neatly adorned Śikhīndhra Śakra was seated near Amitāyus
enlightenment with a view to rescue beings from the evil states in which
Tathāgata. He mistook Bhūteśvara Mahābrahmā as a female goddess and
they had fallen. He said that the fallen beings had given up their noble said that it was improper for her to sit just in front of Amitāyus
resolutions, were plunged in darkness of ignorance, and had become
Tathāgata. He then explained in a few words the real meaning of tathatā.
bereft of roots of all merit. In order to fulfill his purpose, he was moving
Amitāyus Tathāgata pointed out the error of Śikhīndra Śakra and said that
about on foot, eating uneatable articles of food, wearing rough robes and
Bhūteśvara Mahābrahmā was not a female but a highly advanced
dwelling in forests and cemeteries. He was imparting to the kings, traders, Bodhisattva who could take any form at will. The god Indra craved
brāhmapas and workers, instructions suited to their tastes and inclinations.
forgivenness for his error. Then Bhūteśvara Mahābrahmā announced in
He was being abused and ill-treated to the extreme by his hearers while a loud voice to all Brahma gods to give protection to the reciters of the
his disciples were being misguided by the wicked beings, and his
mantrapāda from any injury or suffering and uttered a few curses which
doctrines were being trampled down by the Maras, but in spite of all would befall those who would do any harm to the faithful.
these he was labouring hard to preach his doctrines in order to enlighten
the beings. It is with the object of making this struggle of his against
The next three chapters are missing.
odds known to all Buddhas that he had in this dark age invited an
assembly of Buddhas. He wanted their support and help so that all beings
might get rid of their worldly woes, enjoy abundance of food and clothes, CHAPTER X: Araksa
and above all develop the bodhicitta. He would futher request them to The beginning of this Chapter is also missing. Its title means "giving
utter the dhārarrī known as "Vajra protection (to the treatise, its reciters and hearers)" .
samuccaya-vidhvaritsapī d
dharma-samatā-pratītya-dhanna-hrdaya- The large congregation of Buddhas informed the gods, men and other
- hārapi-mudrāpada-prabheda-pravea-vyākarapa-
beings of the (Sahā)Lokādhātu that it should he their responsibility to
dharma-paryāya". In response to this request all Buddhas then recited the preserve and propagate the Mahāsannipāta-dharnrparyāya. This treatise,
dhāranī. They were then praised by all beings who were highly impressed
they said, would keep up the religion and help all beings to achieve
 95
94 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
18.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Suvarnaprabhāsāsūtra (370)
perfection. They added that the monks and nuns, male and female lay- The text was first translated into Chinese by Dharmakşema. There
devotees, who would propagate this treatise by teaching or copying it,
are other translations into Chinese, German, French, Japanese ssand
deserved worship of the people. Then they enumerated the manifold English. See Bibliography, Third Edition, I, 182-183 for references. It
merits that would accrue to the preservers and propagators of the treatise. comprises K. 1465 = T.663 = N. 127.
On hearing these words of the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas with The present summary is based on Sitansushekar Bagchi s in Buddhist
Maitreya as their leader promised to protect the treatise. The gods also Sanskrit Texts 8 (Darbhanga 1967), pp. 1-18. "E" references are to the
made smilar promises and they were all complimented for this noble edition Bagchi provides in the same publication.
resolution of theirs by the assembled Buddhas.
Summary by Sitansushekar Bagchi

CHAPTER XI: Saddhammanayarak,s 1.Nidānaparivarta

In the eleventh chapter, Śākyamuni Tathāgata told Śakra, Brahma and
(EI-3) This chapter "is devoted to the glorification of listening to this
the Cāturmahārājika gods that he had obtained enlightenment in this dark sacred text and its efficacy to lead to the attainment of different desired
age of five impurities, rescued many beings from misery, and conquered objects and the ultimate aims of human life and to the pacification of the
the Mara. He now requested them to preserve and protect this baneful influence of evil spirits, unfavourable planets, celestial beings and
treatise...which had been entrusted to their care by the assembled the like."
Buddhas.
Then Kauttihalika Bodhisattva enquired of Śākyamuni Tathāgata 2. Tathāgatāyuhpramātranirdeśaparivarta
whether all the Māra gods had assembled there and whether they had all (E4-9) "The theme of the second chapter is pregnant with profound
developed faith in the triratna. Śākyamuni said that a thousand Mara significance. The mind of the Bodhisattva Rucirāketu was assailed with
gods with their retinue had not faith in the triratna and were ever a grave doubt. Śākyamuni himself practised what he preached as means
attempting to find fault with the dharma and to bring about its ruin but of extending the length of human life. Yet his life came to an end at the
they would, ultimately, after seeing the large assemblage of Buddhas, age of eighty. Consequently his teachings and sermons cannot lay claim
develop faith in the triratna and would also attain enlightenment. to authenticity. He was not immune from the sphere of metempsychosis
like an ordinary creature....(With) a view to eliminating this sceptical
The last two chapters 12 and 13 are also missing. attitude of...mind...gāthās recited by the four Buddhas (Aksobhya,
Ratnaketu, Amitābha and Dundubhīśvara) and the long dialogue between
Kaundinya and the Litsavi prince have been set forth...The sum and
substance of them is that the body of the Buddha is not composed of
physical elements. It is essentially a spiritual one and as such immutable
17.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Sūryagarbhasūtra (370) and imperishable. So there is absolutely no warrant for the alleged
Edward Conze writes: "This Stara first compares the concentration of doubt."
a skilful Bodhisattva with the sun from seven points of view. It then sums
up the metaphysics of Perfect Wisdom, enumerates the blessings derived 3.Svapnaparivarta
from a study of the Prajfiā-pāramitā-sūtra, and ends up with a few (E10) Ruciraketu's dream.
"
gāthās . It was translated into Chinese by Dharmaksema K.56 (13) = T.
397 (13) = N. 61 (13). 4.Deśanāparivarta
(Ell-23) "An account of the recitation of those gāthās which were
96 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES SUVARNAPRABHASA 97

"
heard by the Bodhisattva Rucirāketu. the highest possible degree...
"

5. Kam al ākarasarva t athāgatatattvaparivarta 12.Sathj ñeyamahāyakseñ āpat iparirarta

(E24-29) "...(T)he hymns of all the Buddhas which pass under the (E68-69) "...Sarhjñeya, the great commander of the military forces of
name of Kamalākara...(T)he way of reflection on emptiness of all things yaksas, accompanied by other twenty-eight commanders, came near to the
has been set forth in brief. Besides, the six sense-organs have been Blessed One and assured their loyal cooperation in the matter of
compared with the burglar of a village and the natural propensity to their promulgation of the Suvarñaprabhāsa...
"

relevant objects has been repeatedly stressed in it. The unsteadiness of

citta has been brought to light. The four physical elements (dhcitu) have I 3.Devendrasamayapa rivarta
been metaphorically identified with a serpent. The twelve links of (E70-73) ...(D)eals with the science of government and political
dependent origination have been enumerated in its accredited order...It has affairs (rājaśāstra)."
called upon all spiritual aspirants to sever the net of afflictions by means
of the sword of enlightenment and to realize the abode of 14.Sasathbhavaparivarta
conglomerations as absolutely empty and void.... " (E77-82) " ..(A)n account of the king named Sasarhbhava whose
"
dominion extended over the four islands...
6. Sūnyatāparivarta
(E30-35) Emptiness 15. Yaksā..śrrvāraksavyākarañaparivarta
(E83-89) ...(P)rotection extended to the listeners of the
7. Caturmahārājapari varta Suvarñaprabhāsa by the Yakşas and other Buddhist deities...
(E36-54) "The seventh chapter is chiefly devoted to the glorification
of the Suvarñaprabhāsa-sīrtra... I6.Daśadevaputrasahasravyākarañaparivarta
(E90-92) "...(T)he Blessed One's prediction that ten thousand gods
"
8.Sarasvatīdevīparivarta will attain perfect enlightenment and the state of Buddhahood....
(E55-59) "The eighth chapter narrates that the goddess Sarasvati
appeared before the Blessed One and promised to provide the preacher 17. Vyādhipraśamanaparivarta
of the Doctrine with presence of mind conducive to the embellishment of (E93-97) "...(G)ives an account of providing remedy for malady (by
his speech..." "
Jalavāhana).

9. Śrīm ahādevīparivarta I8.Jalavāhanusya sat.syavaineyaparivarta

"
(E60-62) " ... An account that Sri Mahadevī appeared before the (E98-105) "...(T)he legend of conversion of the fishes by Jalavāhana ,
Blessed One and solemnly declared that she would provide both material to whom he provided water.
and spiritual welfare for the preacher of the Doctrine..."
19. Vyāghrīparivarta
I 0. Sarvabuddh abodh isa ttvanām asamdhāranīparivart a (E105-122) "...(T)he story which the Blessed One told...about the
(E63) "...The holy names of the Tathāgatas and Bodhisattvas..." sacrifice of his life for the satisfaction of the hunger of a tigress.
"

1 I. Drdh āp rth ivīd eva t āpariva rto 20.Sarvatathāgatastavaparivarta

(E64-67) "The earth-goddess, named Drdhā, told the Blessed One that (E123-125) ...(H)ymns..recited by the hundreds of thousands of
"
she would render the seat of the expositor of the Doctrine comfortable to Bodhisattvas in order to extol the spiritual glory of the Tathāgata...
98 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES 99

21 .Nirgamanapari varla 24.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Alpadevatāsūtra (390)

(EI23-125) "Those gāthās which were chanted by Kuladevatā_.in Between 435 and 443 this was translated by Guñabhadra as a part of
honor of the Blessed Lord with a special emphasis upon emptiness. The the mammoth collection called the Samyuktāgamasūtra (K.650 = T. 99
Lord himself congratulated her on her brilliant performance." = N. 544, section 49.6). See Bagchi, pp. 378-388 and S. Sengupta, op.
cit., pp. 58-59, for Guñabhadra and his translations. Another emissary
from central India, Guñabhadra arrived in China by way of Ceylon in 435
19.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Caturdevarājasūtra (ca. 377) and died in China in 468.
Translated by two Chinese monks who visited India, or at least
Kabul, in the company of Fa-hsien and, returning home, translated
(among others) this text. It is Nanjio's 722 (= K. 856 = T.590). Nanjio 25.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
gives the following rendition (hardly a translation!) of the title: "Sūtra Bodhisattvagocaropāyavisayavikurvāñanirdeśasūtra (390)
spoken by Buddha on the four heavenly kings (caturmahārājas), who go Also translated, apparently for the first time, by Guñabhadra. Cf. K.
round the world on six fasting days every month, and who, observing the 162 = T. 271 = N. 178 = Bagchi, p. 380, #5.
good or bad actions of mankind, raise their joy or grief'. Lancaster tells
us "Translation by Chih-yen and Pao-Yiin: after the 4th year of Yuan
Chia, Liu Sung dynasty (A.D.427-) in Chih-yuan Monastery, Yang-tu." 26.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Dvajāgrhasūtra (390)
Again a translation of Guñabhadra 's, it is another part of the vast
Sarhyuktāgamasūtra. Cf. K. 650 = T. 99 = N. 544, Chapter 35, section
20.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Tathāgatagarbhasūtra (380) 12.
There are a number of works with similar names to this. Here we
refer to K.413 = T. 821 = N. 443, translated anonymously by someone
between 350-431. It is a brief work of 2 fascicules. The translator lived 27.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Jyotiskasūtra (390)
during the Three Ch'in dynasteis (A.D. 350-431), according to Lancaster. K.505 = T. 540 = N. 453, translated by Guñabhadra between 435 and
443 in Wa-kuan Monastery, Yang-tu. It is Bagchi's #13 of pp. 381-382.

21.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Karmāvaranaviśuddhiśāstra (ca. 380?)

Another anonymously translated work, constituting T. 1494 = N. 28.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mahāmatīsūtra (390)
1094, presumably from the same period as the previous entry. Translated by Gunabhadra during the same period and at the same
place as the previous three. K. 499 = T. 177 = N. 527 = Bagchi, #11 of
p. 381.
22.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Daśacakraksitigarbhasūtra (385)
Anonymously translated. between 412 and 439. Constitutes K. 58 =
T. 410 = N. 65. The translator is " listed in the Pei Liang lu (A.D. 397- 29.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Tsui fu pao ying ching (390)
439)" , also known as the Nothem Liang dynasty, says Lancaster. Translated by Guñabhadra, same place and period. K838 = T. 747 =
N. 741 = Bagchi, p. 383 (23). Nanjio (quoted by Bagchi) provides the
following " title": "Sūtra spoken by the Buddha on transmigration
23.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Vajrasamādhisūtra (385) throughout the five states of existence, being the result of both virtuous
K.521 = T.273 = N.429, translated anonymously between 421 and and sinful actions".
439. Constitutes eight chapters.
 1ŚVARAKARTRTVA... 101
100 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

30.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mahābherihārakaparivartasūtra (390) pp. 97-99, who gives a short summary.
1.416 = T.270 = N.440 = Bagchi, p. 381 (10), who says the work
was translated at the monastery of Tong ngan sse. Nanjio gives the Objector: Iśvara exists as a creator.
following description of this work: This sūtra contains three jātakas, Answer: No, for what does He, hypothetically, create? He does not
namely: I.The Bodhisattva was once a woman of excellent (or silver) create what already exists, because it already exists. Nor does He create
colour; and having cut off her breasts she saved one who was just going what does not exist, for then He might create e.g. oil out of sand, or hairs
to eat his own child. 2.The Bodhisattva who was once a king and on a tortoise, etc. The third possibility, that He creates something that
exists and does not exist, is also absurd, because these two exclude one
governed his country according to the right law, giving his body as
charity to birds and beasts. 3.He was once the son of a Brāhmana; and another as light excludes darkness.
by fasting he asked to be allowed to become an ascetic. Throwing away Furthermore, assuming for the sake of argument that Iśvara
his body he saved a hungry tigress. " nevertheless creates something, one must ask: Is He himself created or
not created to begin with? If He is not created He cannot create
anything, because then the son of a barren woman might also be a
31.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Caturvargaśiksādharmasūtra (390) creator. If, alternatively, He is created, we face two possibilities: Either
K.995 = T.771 = N.I417 = Bagchi, p. 383 (25). Translated by He is created by himself - but that is absurd, not only because no activity
can be its own object, no dancer can dance on his own shoulders, for
Gupabhadra. Nanjio reports that it has been identified as an Abhidharma
example, but also because the agent of creation can never be identical
work.
with the object of creation (a father would he his own son). Or else He
is created by another - but that is also wrong. Why? Well, either He is
not there at all (i.e., untreated), but in that case there is no one else to
32.NAGARJUNA, create Him (either because something that does not exist cannot be
created, as we saw, or because the very concept of God excludes the
Iśvarakartrtvanirākarañavisñorekakartrrvanirākaraña (400?)
possibility of another being there when He is not there). Or He may be
there for another to create Him. But then that other God would also need
Summary by Christian Lindtner
another to create Himself in turn, etc., and that would involve an infinite
regress which means that the process would never get started.
Though this refutation of Iśvara as the creator entitled " The refutation
Finally, God cannot be created both by himself and another, for this
of Vispu as the sole creator" is ascribed
55 to Nagarjuna it is more probably
would imply a double set of absurdities.
composed by one of his students. Its prose is strikingly similar to that
Hence a creator cannot be established.
of Vigrahavvāvartanī and other early Madhyamaka works in prose. A
comparison of its content with other early extant refutations of a creator
seems to indicate that this is a fairly early text. Basically the author only
33.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Nāgaśrīpariprcchāsūtra (400?)
argues that creation is impossible since there can neither be an object nor According to Lancaster the translation is by "Hsiang Kung: during the
a subject of creation. Further, and more sophisticated, arguments may be "
years of the Liu Sung dynasty (A.D.420-479) in Nan Hai Prefecture . K.
found in Dvāda3advāraka, Chapter X, translated into Danish by
12 = T. 234 = N. 16. Bagchi, p. 404, translates the title of N. 16 as
Lindtner. "
"Sutra on the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī s highest pursuit of seeking alms ,
'
The summary is based on the Sanskrit and Tibetan edited in Papers and says this is the second translation, the first having been made by Yen
of Th. Stcherbatsky (Calcutta 1969), pp. 13-16. There are English
Fo-T'ian. But this latter work is (p. 49 (2)) said to be lost. Thus while the
translations by Stcherbatsky on pp. 10-12, and by George Chemparathy
translation by Hsiang Kung may not be the first translation it is the first
in Wiener Zeitschrift far die Kunde S&d- and Ostasiens 12-13, 1968-69,
102 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES 103

clearly identifiable among our four sources. 38.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mudrādeśarājasūtra (405)
K.845 = T.519 = N.773 = Bagchi, p. 395 (10). Same translator.

34.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Śuddhodanarājaparinirvānasūtra (405)

K.796 =T. 512 = N.732, translated by a Chinese whose name is given 39.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Malarājasūtra (405)
by Lancaster as Chii-ch'ii Ching-sheng (various other spellings in other N. 772. Same translator
sources). The title is translated by Nanjio as " Sūtra spoken by Buddha on
the Parinirvāña of the King Śuddhodana". Bagchi (pp. 221-223, although
most of this translator's works are cited in a different place, pp. 394-398) 40.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "Sūtra on the five (elements) not
describes the translator as "a man of great erudition and natural piety" returning again" (405)
who studied with Dharmakşema and Buddhasena. Travelling to Turfan he K.847 = T.751 = N.742 = Bagchi, p. 395 (7). Same translator.
procured a number of texts and translated them on his return to China Lancaster gives the Chinese title as Wu wu fan fu thing.
"some time after the 2nd year of Hsiao Chian, Liu Sung dynasty
(A.D.455) in Chu-yiian Monastery, Yang-tu and Ting-lin-shang
Monastery, Mt. Chung " (acording to Lancaster). He died in 464. The 41.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Rājāvavādakasūtra (405)
dating of the works he seems to have been the first to have translated is K.260 = T.514 = N.248 = Bagchi, p. 394 (2).
thus a bit arbitrary. (It is to be noted that this translator appears to have
made the first translations of quite a number of texts, only a few of which
are identified here.) 42.VASUMITRA, Samayabhedopacakra (405)
This is not a philosophical discussion, but rather a review of the
schools of Buddhist thought of which the author knows at the time of
35.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "Sūlra on the advancement of learning" writing. Chinese translations by Paramārtha and by Hsiian-tsang are
(405) known (T.1031-1033). Were these the earliest translations?
K.795 = T.798 = N.690 = Bagchi, p. 395 (5).. "Sūtra spoken by Another clue concerns the name of the author, which is regularly
Buddha on advancement in learning", translated by Chii-ch'ii Ching-sheng given as Vasumitra. The problem here is, which Vasumitra are we dealing
at the same place and time as our #34 above. The Chinese title is given with? Jikyo Masuda finds five Vasumitras referred to in Chinese texts,
by Lancaster as Chin hsiieh ching. and gives reasons for his conclusion that our present author must have
been the Vasumitra who is regularly referred to in the Mahāvibhāsā (see
the summary of that work in Volume 7 of this Encyclopedia). This
36.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "Sūtra on a pupil who received (seven accords with the conclusion of "most Chinese scholars beginning with
days) after his death". (405) K'wei-chi (632-682 A.D.)",60 although Tāranātha identifies our author
'
K.842 = T.826 = N.767. = Bagchi, p. 396 (14). Same translator as Vasumitra with one who wrote a commentary on Vasubandhu s
#s 33 and 34 above. Abhidharmakośa.
But it seems that we have no hard evidence that the text existed much
before the beginning of the fifth century A.D. Furthermore, Andre
37.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Candanavatdeśarājasūtra (405) Bareau reports that our present text stems from Sarvāstivādin origins and
K. 846 = T.5l8 = N.774 = Bagchi, pp. 395-396 (12). Same translator that some of the sects to which it refers are not known in India prior to
as the previous three. the fourth century, for example the Sautrāntikas who are espoused by
Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa This sect is known to various
104 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES SAMAYABHEDOPACAKRA 105

writers under various names such as "Sarhkrāntivāda", "Uttariya", (TI8-32) Doctrines common to the Mahāsarńghikas, Lokottaravādins,
"Tāmraśatīya " , and appears to descend from the Sarvāstivādins whose Ekavyavahārikavādins and Kaukkutikas include: a number of beliefs
earlier texts are summarized in our Volume 7. From all this we may about Buddhas, such as that they are transcendent, have no impure
conclude that our present Vasumitra may have been the Vibhāsā master factors, have limitless material bodies and limitless powers, that a Buddha
but that we have insufficient grounds for concluding anything for certain neither sleeps nor dreams, etc. About Bodhisattvas: they do not actually
about the date of this text. go through physical rebirth in the mother's womb, appearing to enter the
' " "
Jikyo Masuda s translation is referred to here as T . We have womb as a white elephant and leave their mother's body from its right
prepared the summary on the basis of the translation; there is no Sanskrit side; they are free from greed, anger or violence; can be reborn in any
text extant. The work begins with five introductory verses which are states they choose. The five consciousnesses occur both with and without
likely later interpolations. Masuda provides extensive footnotes for attachment. The six consciousnesses are found in both the material and
practically every sentence explaining which schools are being referred to. the immaterial levels. Sense-organs are only lumps of flesh and are not
(T14-15) One hundred or so years after the Buddha's death, when a capable of consciousness by themselves. There are no neutral factors.
king named Aśoka living in the Magadha kingdom ruled over There are nine kinds of unconditioned factors: calculated cessation,
Jambudvipa (i.e., India), the great Buddhist order for the first time split uncalculated cessation, space, the realms of infinite space, of infinite
into four groups over the five points of Mahādeva. The four groups were consciousness, of nothingness, and neither-identification-nor-non-
the Nāgas, the Pratyantika (border) group, the learned (bahuśrutīyas) and identification, being a member of the chain of dependent origination, and
the venerable (sthaviras). The first three constituted the Mahāsatńghikas, being a member of the noble path. Proclivities are different from
the last the Sthavira schools. envelopers. Past and future factors do not exist. There is no intermediate
(T15-16) From the Mahāsatńghikas in the second century abd (i.e., state.
after the Buddha 's death) rose the Ekavyavahārikas, the Lokottaravāda, (T32-34) Later Mahāsamghika views include: that two awarenesses
and the Kaukkutika sects. Even later the Bahuśrutīyas and Prajñaptivādins can occur at once; defilements occur while on the path; actions and
arose. maturations occur at the same time; the mind permeates the whole body.
Toward the end of the second century another Mahādeva, a heretic (T35-36) Views of the Rahuśrutīyas. Transcendent doctrines are five:
(non-Buddhist) became a monk and was ordained in the Mahāsamghika momentariness, frustration, emptiness, no self and liberation. Other
order. He instigated further discussions about the five points, and as a doctrines are mundane. The five points of Mahādeva. Otherwise their
result the order was split up into three (more) schools, the Caityaśaila, views are the same as those of the Sarvāstivāda.
Aparaśaila and Uttaraśaila schools. Thus there are nine branches of (T36-38) Views of the Prajñaptivāda school. Frustrations are not
Mahāsamghika. aggregates. The twelve organs (six senses and six objects) are not real
(T16-17) The Sthaviravādins eventually in the third century abd entities. Traces only produce frustration in combination with each other.
separated into the Sarvāstivādins and the older Sthaviras, who named There is no death that is not determined by past karma. One attains the
themselves the Haimavata. And one school, the Vātsīputrīyas, issued from noble path by actions, not by meditation. Once attained the path is never
the Sarvāstivāda, which soon (still in the third c. abd) separated again into lost.
the Dharmottarīyas, Bhadrāyapīyas, Sammatīyas and Channagirikas, and (T38) Views of the Caitya-, Apara- and Uttara-śaila schools.
a bit later into the Mahīśāsakas. From this last, still during the third c. Bodhisattvas can still be reborn into lower states. Arhats can be tempted.
abd, arose the Dharmaguptakas, whose founder declared himself the (T38-52) Views of the Sarvāstivāda school. Past and future factors
successor of Maudgalyāyana. And at the end of the third c. abd one exist. Birth, maintenance, old age and death are dissociated factors
school, the Kāśyapīya, otherwise known as Suvarşaka. And finally, at the belonging to the category of traces. The stage of the highest worldly
beginning of the fourth century abd the Sautrāntikas, otherwise known as factors last but a moment; there is no regression from this stage. A noble
Sathkrāntivāda, arose. being can regress, but a stream-enterer cannot.
106 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES SAMAYABHEDOPACAKRA 107

An ordinary person can destroy desire and anger in the meditational of the Dharmaguptakas
level of desire. Even heretics can gain supernatural powers. Some gods (T66-69) Views of the Sautrāntika school. The aggregates are reborn,
lead a religious life. The limbs of enlightenment are acquired only which is why this school is called "Samkrāntivāda". Their views largely
through the seven meditative attainments (of mindfulness, investigation, resemble those of the Sarvāstivādins.
energy, joy, tranquility, concentration and equanimity).
All the meditative stages are included in the establishment of
mindfulness (smrtyupasthāna). The four stages of streamenterer, once- 43.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Bodhisauvabuddhānusmrtisamādhi
returner, etc. are not necessarily attained serially. All proclivities are (412)
mental associates and so supporting objects of awareness. The proclivities N.71 = K.60 = T.4I4 = Bagchi, p. 399 (1) was translated by someone
are all envelopers but not vice-versa. An arhat is still govemed by some whose Chinese name is given (variously transcribed) as, e.g., Kong To-
aspects of dependent origination. Intermediate states are found only in che or Kub-to-kih, which Bagchi suspects is a Chinese transcription of
the level of desire and the material level. The supporting objects of states Gupasatya, Nanjio renders as Gupaśīla, and Lancaster decides should be
of consciousness and associated mental states are actual entities. There are Gugaśāla. It was translated in 462 in Yang-tu.
neutral factors. Arhats are still subject to karma. No one ever dies while
meditating. Bodhisattvas are still ordinary persons; their fetters are not yet
destroyed. Traces perish at each moment. No one can actually 44.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mahāśrayārtharddhimantrasūtra (412)
transmigrate. K.434 = T.1335 = N.473 = Bagchi, p. 243 (I). The translator's name
(T52-53) Views of the Haimavata school. Heretics cannot gain is given as T'an Yao by Bagchi, op. cit., pp. 242-243 (supported by
supernatural powers. No god can lead a religious life. Lancaster), who provides a bit more information about him.
(T53-57) Views of the Vātsīputrīya school. A person is neither the
same as the aggregates nor different from them. Some traces persist for
a while; others cease immediately on being horn. Factors are reborn only 45.NAGARJUNA, Upāya(kauśalya)hrdaya (422) fi'
in connection to a person. A person is called " free from desire " when Yuichi Kajiyama in Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (Kyoto 1989)
(s)he has abandoned the fetters destroyed in the path of vision, not those argues that this work is by Ur-Nāgārjuna and that it is prior to the
destroyed in the path of cultivation. Nyāyasūtras. Christian Lindtner (Nāgārjuniana, note 44 on p. 17) gives
(T58-62) Views shared by all Mahīśāsaka schools. The future does reasons why it is not.
not exist. The four noble troths are to be meditated on simultaneously. A
proclivity is neither an awareness nor an associated mental state, and is Summary by Satischandra Vidyabhusana° '
never a supporting object. A proclivity is thus a dissociated factor,
whereas an enveloper is an associated factor. No god can lead a religious
"
The Upāyakauśalyahrdayusūtra, the Essence of Skill in the
life. There is no intermediate state. Arhats do not gain satisfaction Accomplishment of Action, is stated to be a work on the art of debate by
through action. Streamenterers can retrogress, while arhats cannot. All Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna. In Chinese this work is called Fāñpien-sin-lun. It
traces cease at every moment. was translated into Chinese by Ci-cia-ye and Than-yāo in A.D. 472.
(T62-63) Views of the later Mahīśāsakas. Past and future really exist. Seeing that the Vaiśeśika and other systems were obscure in their
t
There is an intermediate state. Proclivites are always present, along with erminology, Nāgārjuna, it is reported, undertook to write this book to
aggregates, sense-organs and elements. give a clear exposition of the art of debate. The book is divided into four
(T64-65) Views of the Dharmaguptakas are mostly similar to those chapters styled respectively as (I) an elucidation of debate
of the Mahīāsakas. (vādavisad karatsa), (II) an explanation of the points of defeat
(T65-66) Views of the Kāśyapīya school are largely similar to those (nigrahasthdna), (III) an explanation of the truths (tattvavvākhyāna), and
108 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES UPAYAHRDAYA 109
(IV) the analogue or far-fetched analogy (kin). (a) The quibble in respect of a term (vdkchala), e.g. a man pretends
(I) The first chapter consists of eight sections which treat respectively to use the term navakanibala in the sense of nine blankets when he really
of (1) an example (udāharaga), (2) a tenet, truth or conclusion means a new blanket.
(.siddhānta), (3) the excellence of speech (vākyapraśańrsā), (4) the defect (b) The erratic reason or undistributed middle term (savyabhicāra),
of speech (vākyadośa), (5) the knowledge of inference (anumāna or e.g. to say that all external things are nonetemal is to employ an erratic
heat/liana), (6) the appropriate or opportune speech (samayocitavākya), reason, because the sky is an external thing which is etemal.
(7) the fallacy (hetvābhāsa), and (8) the adoption of a fallacious reason (c) Balancing the doubt or false assumption (sańtśayasarna), e.g.
(dustavākyānusara9a). there is doubt as to a certain tall object being a post or a man, and yet if
(I) The example is necessary to clear the reasons of a disputant and we proceed to act on the assumption that it is a man, we commit the
his respondent. It is of two kinds: (1) the affirmative or homogeneous fallacy of false assumption.
example (anvayī udāharaña), and (2) the negative or heterogeneous (d) The mistimed (kālātūa), e.g. we attempt to prove the eternity of
example (vyatireki udāharaña). the Veda on the ground that sound is eternal, when no proof has been
(2) The tenet, truth or conclusion is of four kinds, viz. (1) that given for the eternity of sound.
accepted by all the schools (sarvatantra siddhdnta), (2) that accepted by (e) Balancing the point in dispute or begging the question
a particular school (pratitanera siddhdnta), (3) that accepted (prakaranasama), e.g. the soul is eternal, because it is distinct from the
hypothetically (adhikaraga siddhānta), and (4) that which is implied or body. (It is a matter of dispute if a thing which is distinct from the body
accepted on assumption (abhyupagama siddhānta). is eternal or not).
The means, by which the tenets, truths or conclusions are established, (f) Balancing the predicate (sddhyasama), e.g. the sky is eternal,
are called pramiinas (the sources of valid knowledge) which are of four because it is intangible.
kinds, viz., perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumdna), comparison (g) Showing absurdity (vyāghātapradarśana), e.g. the five objects are
(uparnūna), and scripture (āgama). non-eternal, because they are apprehended by the senses: the four
(3) A speech is said to be excellent if its words are neither inadequate elements being also so apprehended are non-eternal. If you say so it will
nor redundant, and its reason and example well expressed. follow that a tortoise possesses hair and salt possesses smell, because they
(4) A speech is said to be defective if its words are inadequate, or are apprehended by the mind: this is absurd.
redundant, or if it employs the same word to convey different meanings (h) The contradictory (viruddha)--either in respect of the example or
of different words to convey the same meaning. in respect of the conclusion.
(5) The inference is of three kinds, viz., (1) a priori (phrvavat), (2) (8) The adoption of a fallacious reason--if in the course of one 's
a posteriori (śesavat), and (3) commonly seen (sāmānyatodŗsta). The argument one commits fallacies, one will be thrown into difficulties and
respective examples are: on seeing a cloud one infers that there will be disgrace.
rain; and on seeing a man move from one place to another, one infers (II) 'The points of defeat ' are the following:--(1) The unintelligible
that the sun, which rises in the east and sets in the west, must have (avipictārtha), (2) non-ingenuity (apratibhii), (3) silence (ananubhāsaña),
moved. (4) saying too little (nyīma), (5) saying too much (adhika), (6) the
m
(6) The appropriate or opportune speech consists in its being eaningless (nirarthaka), (7) the inopportune (aprāptakāla), (8) the
in
pertinent to the subject and occasion, e.g. in the discussion as to whether coherent (apārthaka), (9) hurting the proposition (pratijñā hdni).
there will be rain tomorrow one may appropriately speak of the condition (III) 'An explanation of the truths' deals mainly with the admission of
of the sky of the previous day. an opinion (matānujña>.
(7) The fallacies signify reasons which are derived from an imperfect (IV) The 'analogue' or far-fetched analogy is of various kinds as
perception, inference, or comparison, or which deviate from the scripture. follows: (1) balancing an excess (utkarsasamd), (2) balancing a deficit
There are various kinds of fallacies designated respectively as follows: a
( pakarsasama), (3) balancing the unquestionable (avarnvasamd), (4)
110 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES BUDDHAGHOSA 111
"
balancing the non-reason (ahetusama7, (5) balancing the co-presence epics, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyana." '
(prāptisama7, (6) balancing the mutual absence (aprāptisama>, (7) While still in South India he apparently wrote a work called
balancing the doubt (sarhSayasamd), and (8) balancing the counter- Ñānodaya which is now lost. He refers occasionally to languages of
" India including a number of Dravidian dialects. We do not know
example (drstānta-samd).
precisely when he left for Sri Lanka, apparently urged there by one of his
teachers. But having arrived there he must have spent some time studying
46.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Kusumasatńcayasūtra (422) the (now-lost) Sinhalese commentaries on the Abhidharma Buddhist texts,
K.371 = T.434 = N. 402 = , it was translated by Ki Kia Ye eventually writing commentaries on several texts. "The Visuddhimagga
(Kimkārya) around 472. Cf. Bagchi, pp. 244-245. and other works of Buddhaghosa are full of personal reminiscences" of
Ceylon: the tradition of the kings, the tradition of the monasteries and
fellow monks, the social and religious life of the people, the shrines and
BUDDHAGHOSA (425) monasteries, and the arts and crafts. i6'
We know little about this Pali Beside the works summarized below, Buddhaghosa is held to be the
63 important writer, the greatest known
commentator and exegetist" He seems to have been bom in India and author of commentaries on the Digha-, Majjhima-, Sathyutta- and
was brought up in Brahmanic tradition, being converted to Buddhism, Anguttara-nikāyas. These were written after the Visuddhimagga, since
peregrinating to South India and eventually finding his way to Lanka (i.e., that work is referred to in them. He also is supposed by some to have
Ceylon or modem Sri Lanka). About his date, Law reports that tradition written a commentary on the material conceming the prātimoksa.
places him in Ceylon during the reign of Mahānāma, author of the Commentaries on still other parts of the Pali canon (e.g., on the
Mahāvarhsa, an important source for Buddhist chronology and belief. Dhammapada, Jdtaka, Khuddakapdtha and Suttanipāta), are ascribed to
Mahānāma 's headship at Anuradhapura is generally agreed to cover the Buddhaghosa. Scholars disagree on most of these ascriptions. '"
period 409-421 or -431 A.D. Law discusses this tradition critically. He
'
notes that all of Buddhaghosa s references are to persons whose dates
seem to be no later than the fourth century A.D., and that one of his 47.BUDDHAGHOSA, Visuddhimagga
works, Samantapāsādika, was translated into Chinese in 489, so he must After moving to Ceylon Buddhaghosa's works were written, according
have been prior to that date. Law concludes that it is practically certain to Bimala Chum Law, in the following order: Visuddhimagga;
that Buddhaghosa was in Ceylon during Mahānāma ' s reign, thus fixing commentaries on the first four Nikāyas; and then the commentaries on the
his date in the beginning of the fifth century A.D.' seven Abhidharma books, following their usual order. However, as
Law considers the evidence that can be gleaned from Buddhaghosa's argued below, it seems unlikely that the seven commentaries were written
writings concerning his place of origin and what Buddhaghosa seems to by the same author as the composer of the Visuddhimagga.
know about the geography of India. He concludes that it is still unclear The Visuddhimagga is not a commentary, but a compendious account
" of Abhidhanna Buddhism as a whole, based, according to Buddhaghosa
whether Buddhaghosa stemmed from North or South India. It is certain
that he was an Indian who went to Ceylon from the country of Cole in himself, on the (now lost) Sinhalese Atthakathās. Visuddhimagga is a
"65 Pali word meaning " path of purity " ; the corresponding Sanskrit term
South India when Kāñcīpura was its capital. But he seems to have
only a dim understanding of the geographical locations of key places. On would be viśuddhimārga. In our summary below we give technical terms
the other hand he is well-trained in Patañjali s Yoga, and is evidently in their Pāli spelling.
"
acquainted with Nyāya. He also shows sound understanding of Pāñini's "
E" references are to the edition by Dwarikadas Sastri, Varanasi 1977.
grammar, which he cites several times in his writings. Law remarks that T' indicates the translation by Nanamoli in two volumes (Shambhala,
"
he nowhere shows his knowledge of the Upaniśads. There is nowhere in 1976). Section headings correspond to those in T.
his writings evidence of his acquaintance with the two great Sanskrit
112 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 113
Summary by Karl H. Potter 1. As that which has the feature of composing, as above.
2. As of two kinds: doing what should be done and not doing what
Part I: Virtue (śīla) should not be done.
Chapter 1: Description of Virtue 3. Two kinds: good behavior and the beginning of a life of purity.
1-15 (E3-7; T1-6) When a man of insight is established in virtue, The latter consists in the code of bhikkhus and bhikkhunis, whereas the
Develops awareness and insight, former involves the duties set out in the Khandakas (of the Vinaya).
Then as an ardent and wise bhikkhu 4. Two kinds: as abstinence and nonabstinence from killing, etc.
He untangles this tangle. (Sariryuttanikāya 1.13) 5. Two kinds as dependence and nondependence. Dependence itself
"
The " tangle is the network of thirst which arises again and again as is of two kinds: through thirst and through false views.
craving for one's own needs and awarenesses as well as those of others. 6. Two kinds as limited in time, or temporary, and as unlimited, or
It is the disentangling of this tangle which is the path of purification lifelong.
"
(visuddhimagga). A " man of insight is a living being who possesses the 7. Two kinds as limited and unlimited by gain, fame, relatives, limbs
understanding that arises from karma by way of the three causes or life.
"
mentioned here, viz., virtue, awareness and insight. Here "awareness 8. Two kinds as worldly and otherworldly. The worldly is subject to
means specifically that awareness involved in meditation. The bhikkhu contaminants, the otherworldly not.
"
is "ardent" in that he bums up the defilements, and he is "wise in that "
9. Three kinds, as inferior, middling and superior in intensity of
he has the protective understanding guiding affairs. A bhikkhu is awareness, energy, etc.
so-called because has sees fear (bhayam ikkhati) of rebirth. 10. Three kinds, as giving precedence to the self, giving precedence
How these three causes relate to a series of distinctions found to the world, and giving precedence to the Dhamma.
elsewhere in the tradition is now explained: how virtue, awareness and 11. Three kinds, as adhered to--dependent virtues of the kind in #5
insight constitute the threefold training, the avoidance of extremes above--as not adhered to by those on the path, and as tranquilized, for
through the middle way, the abandoning of defilements, the reason for those who have achieved the fruit of the path.
entering the states of stream-winner and the others. 12. Three kinds, as purified in one who has not committed a bad act
16-23 (14? in T) (E7-11; T6-9) What is virtue? There is virtue as or has made amends if he had, as impure--the reverse of the above--or as
volition (cetanā), one who refrains from killing and practises duties, and doubtful, in one who is not sure whether something he did was bad or
the others of the first seven of the ten courses of action. There is virtue how bad.
as concomitant of awareness (cetasika) in the abandonment of 13. Three kinds, viz., the four paths and the first three meditative
covetousness, absence of ill-will and right view, the last three of the ten. fruits--as practised by those in training (seekers), by those not in training,
There is virtue of restraint in five ways: by the rules of the community, i.e., by those who have become arhats, viz., adepts, and by those neither
by mindfulness, by knowledge, by patience, and by energy. in training nor not in training--the rest.
"
The characteristic feature of virtue is "composing consisting of being 14. Four kinds, as (a) that which partakes of destruction, (b) that
the locus of good factors and coordinating bodily actions. Its function which partakes of stagnation, (c) that which partakes of distinction, (d)
is stopping misconduct and the achievement of blamelessness. Its that which partakes of penetration. The first has virtue mixed with bad,
manifestation is purity, and its proximate cause is conscience and shame. the second is for one contented with mere virtuousness, the third for one
The benefits of virtuousness are listed in the Dīghanikāya as five: who has concentration as his goal, and the fourth for one who has
wealth, good name, entrance into an assembly of peers without fear, disenchantment as his goal.
unconfusedness at death, happy rebirth. Other accounts are mentioned. 15. Four kinds, of male monks, of nuns, of those not fully admitted
25-161 (El 1-47; T10-58) Now the kinds of virtue are classified (into the order), of the layman or householder.
according to different principles in nineteen different groupings: 16. Four kinds: natural--belonging to Uttarakuru men,
114 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 115

customary--according to the group's rules of conduct, necessary--required rightly on a single object. Its characteristic feature is nondistraction; its
by nature, and born of prior causes--such as Mahākassapa and the function is to eliminate distraction; it is manifested as nonwavering; its
Bodhisattva in his various births. proximate cause is satisfaction.
17. Four kinds: the virtue of prātimoksa restraint, the virtue of It may be classified in the following ways:
restraining the sense faculties, the virtue of purification of life, the 1. As one kind, viz., nondistraction.
virtuous use of the requisites. Each of these is explained at some length 2. As two kinds, as the practise of six kinds of mindfulness, and the
through quotes from Vibharga, Mahāniddesa and other such works and unification of mind which follows in the first meditative state.
copious illustrations through stories. The requisites include the monk's 3. As two kinds, worldly in the first three meditative levels, and
robe, alms food, his resting place, medicines. They are to be used for otherworldly in relation to the noble beings.
appropriate purposes only. Examples are given, and authorities. 4. Two kinds, as accompanied by joy in the first two meditative
18. Five kinds according to the Patisambhidd classifications of virtue levels, and without joy as accompaniment in the last two levels.
consisting of limited purification, unlimited purification, fulfilled purific- 5. Two kinds, accompanied by satisfaction in the first three levels and
ation, unadhered-to purification and tranquilized purification. The first accompanied by equanimity in the last level.
applies to those not fully admitted to the order, the second to those who 6. Three kinds, as inferior, middling and superior in development.
" 7. Three kinds, with initial thought in the first meditative level,
are fully admitted. The third is the virtue of magnanimous ordinary
men" who deal with good factors and have given up attachment to life. without initial thought but with sustained thought in the second, without
The fourth is the virtue of seekers, while the fifth is the virtue of the either initial or sustained thought in the last three levels.
8. Three kinds, as accompanied by joy in the first two levels, as
Tathāgata s pupils and of the self-enlightened, Tathāgatas and arhats.
'

19. Five kinds of virtue as abandoning, refraining, willing, restraint accompanied by satisfaction in the first three levels, and as accompanied
and nontransgression. A lengthy passage from the Patisambhidā explains by equanimity in the last.
9. Three kinds, as limited on the plane of service, exalted in the
these.
A section follows in which it is explained how virtue is defiled and material and immaterial levels, and unlimited in connection with the
how the defilement is purified. The exposition consists almost entirely noble persons.
10. Four kinds, as (1) frustrating progress and difficult of
of quotations from the Atiguttaranikāya.
understanding, (2) frustrating progress but easy of understanding, (3)
Chapter 2: Description of Ascetic Practice satisfying progress but difficult of understanding, (4) satisfying progress
and easy of understanding.
(E48-67; T59-83) Practices intended to perfect the virtues indicated
11. Four kinds, as limited with a limited object, limited with an
in the preceding chapter are classified here into thirteen varieties: (1)
unlimited object, unlimited with a limited object, unlimited with an
wearing of rags, (2) wearing of the triple robe, (3) seeking alms-food, (4)
unlimited object. A "limited object" is one that is unfamiliar and not a
from house to house, (5) one meal a day, (6) from a single bowl, (7)
condition for a higher meditative level, whereas an unlimited object is
refusing seconds, (8) forest-dwelling, (9) at the roots of a tree, (10) in the
one that is well-developed and capable of being a condition for a higher
open air, (11) or in a charnel ground, (12) sleeping wherever he happens level.
to be, but otherwise (13) remaining in a sitting posture rather than lying 12. Four kinds, according to the factors of the four meditative levels,
down. These are further classified and discussed.
viz. (I) the first level, having as factors initial and sustained thought, joy,
satisfaction and concentration, (2) the second level, having as factors joy,
Part II: Concentration
satisfaction
co
and concentration, (3) the third level, having satisfaction and
Chapter 3: Taking a Subject for Meditation ncentration as factors, (4) the fourth level, having concentration and
(68-72; T84-90) What is concentration? One-pointedness of mind. equanimity as factors.
It is called "concentration" since it centers consciousness evenly and
 VISUDDHIMAGGA 117
116 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
foulnesses are bloatedness, lividness, etc.--various stages found in a dead
13. Four kinds, as partaking of destruction, partaking of stagnation, body. The ten memories are of the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sańgha,
partaking of distinction and partaking of penetration. of virtue, generosity, deities, death, the body, breathing, and peace. The
14. Four kinds, according to location in the desirous, material, four sublime states are friendship, compassion, restraint and equanimity.
immaterial or unlimited level. The one conceptual identification is the identification of repulsive food.
15. Four kinds, as making interest predominant, making energy The one determining is the defining of the four elements.
predominant, making awareness predominant, making one-pointedness of 2. Which bring access only and which bring absorption: the former
mind predominant. includes the ten kasinas, remembering to breathe, the repulsiveness of
16. Five kinds, according to the (alternate) classification of meditative food and the defining of the four levels. The rest bring absorption.
levels into five (rather than four) sets of factors, by dividing what was 3. By the kind of meditative level brought: the ten kasinas and
called the second meditative level into two kinds, one involving the remembering to breathe bring all four levels. Meditation on the ten
transcendence of initial thought and the other the transcendence of initial foulnesses plus the memory of body bring on the first level. The first
and sustained thought.. three sublime states bring on the first three levels. The fourth sublime
(E72-88; T90-112) How should concentration be developed? Briefly, state and the four immaterial subjects bring on the fourth level.
worldly concentration is to be developed by one established in completely 4. By what they overcome. There are two kinds of overcoming, (1)
purified virtue, having cut himself off from the ten impediments (viz., of factors and (2) of objects. Type (1) includes the sublime states, since
residence, family, wealth, class, building, travel, kin, illness, books and they are required to reach the third and fourth level. Type (2) includes
magic powers), who approaches a good friend and gets from him one of the four immaterial subjects, since for each the first of the kasiñas has to
the forty subjects for meditation which suits his temperament. He should be overcome, and for the others its predecessor has to be overcome.
then go to a monastery favorable for concentration, sever the lesser 5. By extension and nonextension: only the ten kasipas are
impediments to concentration and follow the directions for development. necessarily extended, the subjects of the rest need not be.
The ten impediments are explained in detail with stories. The 6. By their objects: only twenty-two of the forty have corresponding
characteristics of a good friend are illustrated by references to traditions supporting objects--the ten kasinas, the ten foul things, memory of
about teachers. Temperaments are classified into six (greedy, hating, breathing and of body. Only twelve have essential factors as supporting
confused, faithful, intelligent and speculative) or 14 if permuted by pairs objects--eight of the ten memories (excluding the two just mentioned), the
and triplets. Some (specifically, Upatissa, author of Vimuttimagga) say repulsiveness of food, the defining of the four levels, the formless states
that the first three kinds of temperament arise from previous habit, from of consciousness and neither-identification-nor-nonidentification. The
the elements and humors expounded in the At(hakathās. But the correct remaining six are not classifiable as either. Eight have mobile objects
view is that they arise from the predominance in a person's karmic stock (some of the foul states, together with water, fire and air); the rest are
of the particular qualities (greed, etc.) leading to rebirth. The opponent immobile.
(in Upatissa's passage, above) appeals to nonexistent and contradictory 7. By stage (bhūmi): the twelve (ten foul things, memory of body,
'
laws about elements and humors, and the explanation offered can t handle repulsiveness of food) do not occur among the gods, and these plus
those of faithful temperament. It is then explained what sort of memory of breathing do not occur in the Brahmaloka. Only the four
appearance and conduct characterize those of each of the six immaterial states occur in the immaterial world. All occur among
temperaments. humans.
(E88-92; TI12-118) The forty subjects for meditation can be 8. By (the way of) grasping: nineteen are apprehended by sight (nine
understood in ten ways: 1. By enumeration, as ten meditative kasiñas, ten kasipas excluding air, ten foul things). Memory of body is grasped by
foulnesses, ten memories, four sublime states, four immaterial subjects, sight or hearing (language) depending on which part of the body is in
one conceptual identification, and one determining. The ten kasipas are: question. Memory of breathing is grasped by touch. The air kasina is
earth, water, fire, air, blue, yellow, red, white, light and ethereal. The ten
118 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 119
" "
grasped by sight and touch. The remaining eighteen are grasped by concept, the name earth, so that he becomes able to conceptualize it
language. with his eyes shut as easily as with them open. After that he no longer
9. By condition: the nine meditative kasiñas excluding space are needs to sit in front of the piece of earth, but can contemplate it wherever
conditions for the immaterial states. All ten kasiñas are conditions for he is. If his concentration is distracted he should return to the piece of
higher faculties. Three sublime states are conditions for the last one. earth and reconsider it.
Each lower formless state is a condition for the next one. The neither- (E101-102; T130-I3I) The foregoing procedure restrains the
identification-nor-nonidentification formless state is a condition for obstructions, the defilements subside, the mind takes up contemplation,
cessation. All forty are conditions for satisfaction, for insight and for and the day 's sign arises. This sign differs from the piece of earth itself
fortunate rebirths. in that it lacks the faults apparent in the lump of clay, because it lacks
10. As to suitability to temperament: the foul things and memory of such properties as color and shape. It is not cognizable by the eye.
body are for greedy folks; the sublime states and four color kasinas are Meditation is of tw-o kinds: access meditation and absorption. The
for those who hate. Memory of breathing is a subject suitable for a difference is that in the former the factors are not strong, so that the
deluded person or a speculative one. The first six memories are for meditator passes back and forth between concentration and ordinary
faithful types. Memory of death, of peace, the defining of the four stages experiencing. In the latter stage the mind can remain in concentration for
and repulsiveness of food are for intellectual types. The rest are for all a whole night and day.
sorts of temperaments. But this is to put it in extreme terms--meditation (E102-109; T132-141) The absorption meditation is difficult to gain
on any of these should suppress greed, etc. and thus must be carefully guarded by paying attention to the following
(E92-94; T118-121) The procedures to be followed in seeking, seven kinds of threat: (1) an unsuitable abode, (2) an unsuitable village,
receiving and practising meditation on any one of these forty topics is (3) unsuitable talk, (4) association with unsuitable persons, (5)
outlined. inappropriate food, (6) unsuitable climate, and (7) unsuitable postures.
Or, if merely avoiding these unsuitable conditions is not enough, he
Chapter 4: Description of the Earth Meditative Kasina should practise the ten kinds of skill in absorption: (1) cleansing body
(E95-99; T122-126) The meditator should go to a favorable abode. and mind, (2) maintaining balanced faculties (viz., faith, energy, memory,
Eighteen defects of unfavorable abodes are described--too large, too new, concentration and understanding) so that one does not preclude any of the
dilapidated, too busy, etc. A favorable abode is one that is accessible but others, (3) protecting the absorption once it has been developed in
not too near; little frequented; free of physical distractions like wind, sun, concentration, (4) choosing the proper time to meditate in different
flies; where food, lodging, robes, alms and medicine are available; where ways--initial thought when the mind is not keen, etc., so that keenness is
elder monks who are capable of explaining the meaning about which one developed naturally through inquiry (the factors of initial thought are
described), (5) restraining the mind when it should be restrained--so that
is puzzled live. He should then cut his hair and nails, patch his clothes,
and begin. when the mind is overly energetic he should, instead of initial thought,
(E99-101; T126-130) The meditator should cognize a sign of earth. practice tranquility (the factors of tranquility are described), (6)
stimulation of the mind when it is slack, (7) looking indifferently on the
At the outset he will want to construct a piece of earth for himself,
avoiding the colors blue, yellow, red or white, either a fixed piece or a mind when it is neither too energetic nor too slack, (8) avoiding
no
nmeditating persons, (9) cultivating meditating persons, (10)
movable one either the size of a bushel or the size of a saucer. Sitting re
in front of it, he should consider the dangers of sense desires, the soluteness in concentration.
(EI11-112; T142-144) Now, while he is concentrating on earth in
happiness connected to the special qualities of the Buddha, Dhamma and
this way, a series of four or five impulsions--the access consciousnesses,
Sangho, and then should open his eyes not too wide nor too narrowly and
meditate on the earth-sign. This sign is not to be confused with the color the last of which is the absorption consciousness, which changes his
of the piece of earth in front; rather, he should concentrate on the lineage. Then concentration lapses and he returns to ordinary awareness.
120 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 121
"
This last or "absorption consciousness is counted as a single moment of to mind, still using the same sign (say, earth). Now, on this third level
consciousness. (There are seven cases in which the normal way of (again, following Vibhańga 245), there is nonattachment to joy; he gains
counting moments doesn't apply: the first absorption, worldly faculty, the equanimity; he experiences satisfactions through his body. His
four paths, the fruit following the path, ordinary awareness in the equanimity is of ten kinds: (1) six-factored equanimity, where the
material and immaterial conditions, neither-identification-nor- contaminants are destroyed as the six kinds of objects are viewed
nonidentification as condition for cessation, and the fruit of cessation.) indifferently; (2) equanimity of sublime state, neutrality toward beings
(E112-122; T144-158) At this point the meditator has gained the first generally; (3) equanimity as a factor of enlightenment, neutrality as
level. Vibhańga 245's description of this state is quoted and explained. between various concurrently arising factors; (4) equanimity of energy,
Such a meditator is said to be "secluded from sense desires and from where he is neither too much nor too little energetic in practising
unprofitable things, " his state is "accompanied by initial and sustained meditation; (5) equanimity concerning traces comprises indifference
thought with joy and satisfaction born of discrimination (discrimination among the various ways of terminating the obstructions, etc.;
is explained as the disappearance of the obstructions), and joy and (6) equanimity of feeling, i.e., experiencing neither satisfaction nor
satisfaction are illustrated with stories. He has abandoned the five frustration; (7) equanimity about insight is indifference to what is
obstructions and possesses the five factors (of initial thought, sustained investigated; (8) equanimity as neutrality concerning the states born
thought, joy, satisfaction and one-pointedness), is good in the beginning, together such as interest, etc.; (9) equanimity of meditation is indifference
middle and end, and has the ten features of those as described in even toward the highest satisfaction; (10) equanimity of purity is the
Patisambhidāmagga (quoted). indifference where there is nothing more to be quieted. Here what is
(E123-125; T158-161) The meditator should now extend his ability intended (in the quote characterizing the third level) is the ninth item,
by thinking of the sign as smaller and larger in extent, and thus making equanimity of meditation.
the boundaries of his thought stretch out to encompass the sun and the In this third meditative level he is mindful and fully aware. Though
moon, etc. But one who has just come to the first meditative level he has no interest in experiencing satisfaction, he nevertheless does so in
should enter it often rather than strive too soon for the more advanced his name-body (nāmak(7va) and so when he comes out of concentration
levels. He should practise the five meditation factors until he gains he naturally experiences some in his material body as well.
mastery of them. The five factors are adverting, attaining, resolving or (E132-136; T171-175) Similarly, having mastered the third level he
steadying, emerging and reviewing. He should gain mastery at each of is able to take up the fourth. On the fourth meditative level (Vibhańga
these, and thus be able to contemplate the flaws of the first level as he 245 again) bodily satisfaction and frustration having been given up in
brings the second level to mind by using the earth kasina (or some other) previous levels, contentment and depression now likewise disappear.
as before. These cessations take place at the moment of access into the meditation,
(E125-128; T161-165) Now Vibhańga 245, describing the second even though in some texts they are said to disappear in the meditation
meditative level, is quoted and explained word by word. Initial and itself--what those texts mean is that the cessation of satisfaction and
sustained thought are stilled, but confidence, singleness of mind, joy and frustration is pre-eminent, in that it will not arise again through external
satisfaction born of concentration are found here. stimulation in absorption. By the time of the fourth meditative level one
Objection: Isn 't confidence present in the first level oo, as well as has a feeling that is neither satisfying nor frustrating, that is, it consists
single-pointed concentration? So why are they mentioned as in equanimity, which also involves purity of memory/mindfulness.
distinguishing features of the second level? (E!36-137; T175-176) The same development is briefly reviewed
Answer: The confidence and singleness are not fully attained in the using the fivefold meditative reckoning.
first level.
(E128-132; T165-171) Ina similar fashion he eventually masters the Chapter 5: The Remaining Kasinas
factors of the second level and is able to bring the third meditative level (E138-144; T177-184) The other nine kasinas are explained one by
122 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 123

one. In each case one constructs or recognizes the sign in the appropriate Chapter 7: Six Recollections
medium--water, fire, air, colored things that are blue, red, yellow or (E161-187; T204-246) Of the ten recollections mentioned among the
white, in a patch of sunlight or moonlight, in any place of limited forty subjects for meditation, six are considered in this chapter. The first
extension. Special powers accrue for those who utilize each of these is the (1) recollection of the enlightened one--that the Buddha is an arhat,
kasiñas. We are also informed that no kasiña can be fruitfully meditated with all that that implies; that the Buddha is fully enlightened, having
on by one who is burdened with one of the five kinds of bad karma that understood all things rightly; that the Buddha has understanding and
have immediate effect, or by one who has fixed wrong views, or who has virtue--three kinds of the former and eight of the latter (following
not had several morally-positive rebirths, or who lacks faith, zeal or canonical sources); that the Buddha is sugata, literally well-gone, having
understanding. gone by the noble path without retuming to the defilements and speaking
only things appropriate to the occasion; that the Buddha is a
world-knower, knowing it in myriad ways which are described in suitably
Chapter 6: Foulnesses as Subjects for Meditation vast numbers; that the Buddha is an incomparable leader of those needing
(E145-160; T185-203) The ten kinds of foulness--various stages of taming--those are the animals, men and gods who were disciplined by the
decaying of dead bodies--are listed and explained. Each of them may be Buddha according to tradition; that the Buddha is teacher of men and
made the subject of meditation, and the way this can be done is explained gods; he is enlightened and blessed.
fully in connection with the first of the ten (the bloated state) as (2) is the recollection of the dharma, rightly proclaimed by the
illustrative of the others. Essentially the method is to make as before a Buddha; presently visible (or, alternatively, preaching the correct view);
sign of the subject, which is then developed through meditation so that inviting inspection; directly experienced by wise men.
it is seen large, small, in various places and times. For this the subject (3) is the recollection of the Order, taking a good path, comprising
must be considered in a variety of ways--by its shape, its color, its four or eight pairs of kinds of persons (depending on how one counts),
location, etc. The body should be of the same sex as the meditator to i.e., whether one counts the person who is on the first path and the one
avoid improper excitement. The purpose of this kind of meditation is to who gains its fruits as one or two persons); fit for giving to, for
gain nondelusion, so that one will not be panicked and fearful in the hospitality, for offering, for salutation; an incomparable field of merit for
presence of the dead. the world.
The difficulty of developing this kind of meditation subject is shown (4) is the recollection of virtue, where virtues are listed following
by pointing out that the initial acquisition and the earlier stages require Ańguttara 3, 286 and are explained.
"
the meditator to be in the presence of a dead body. However, if he is (5) is recollection of generosity: various synonyms for "generous are
interrupted by someone asking him the time of day, etc., he will likely explained.
lose the sign, and if by then the body has been disposed of he will have (6) is the recollection of gods, their special qualities of faith, etc.
a difficult time regaining the sign. Thus he is counseled to continuously These six recollections succeed only for noble persons, since they
review the path by which he has gained the sign as a way of reinforcing alone appreciate the special qualities of the Buddha, the dharma and the
it even in the absence of the original body on which it was acquired. order, possess virtue, generosity and the kind of faith, etc., appropriate to
Ultimately the meditator gains reverence for the dead body and comes gods.
to love it, and through this meditation comes to believe he will be
liberated from aging and death. And indeed once the "counterpart" sign Chapter 8: The Remaining Recollections
"
is gained the five defilements are overcome and one gains access to the (E188-196; T247-259) (7) is the recollection of death. Flere "death
meditative level. does not mean the conventional momentary dissolution of traces normally
associated with the word, but rather the distinction between timely and
untimely death. A timely death is one that comes about through either
 124 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
VISUDDHIMAGGA 125
the exhaustion of merit or through the exhaustion of the normal life span
of people of today, who live for only around 100 years. Untimely death fat, tears, grease, spittle, snot, oil of the joints, urine (these translations
is the death of those whose bhavańga is interrupted by a very bad act or mostly follow T, and only very approximately reflect the references of the
who are felled by weapons, etc., due to previous karma. One meditating descriptions provided).
on this recollection properly destroys the defilements and gets access to (E218-239; TI285-317) (9) The ninth recollection is of breathing.
the meditative levels. There are eight ways of properly recollecting The canonical account of 16 bases in Suttanikāya 5, 321-322 is quoted.
death: meditating on death as a murderer, since it takes away life; Each of the sixteen ways of breathing are explained at length. This
meditating on it as the ruin of success; viewing it by comparison with recollection of breathing brings peace and cuts off initial thought. It also
famous persons reflecting that even these great ones eventually died, even perfects the four foundations of mindfulness, thus leading to perfection
the enlightened ones themselves; meditating on the body as the abode of of the limbs of enlightenment, in tum leading to clear insight and
many--many worms as well as the target of many others; meditating on liberation. The meditator on this kind of recollection will always be able
the difficulty of keeping alive; meditating on it as without occasion, since to know how to bring his life to an end.
beings die unpredictably; meditating on the shortness of a lifetime; (E239-242; T317-321) (10) The tenth and last recollection is that of
meditating on the fact that, properly speaking, the lifetime of a being is tranquility. One meditating on it contemplates the special qualities of
a single moment of consciousness, that one dies every moment, so to nirvāna according to Ańguttaranikāya 2.34, which is explained.
speak.
(EI96-204; T259-268) (8) The eighth kind of recollection is that Chapter 9: The Sublime States
occupied with the body. Actually this meditation is related to a number (E242-252; T321-332) The first sublime state is love. One
of topics--breathing, posture, the four kinds of comprehension, the kinds developing meditation on it should choose a person of the right sort as
of repulsiveness, the kinds of elements, and the nine things of a funeral supporting object--one who is not antipathetic or very close to one, who
ground. Of these, posture, the comprehensions and the elements belong is neither neutral nor hostile, who is of the same sex and not dead. He
to the discussion of insight, while the things of a funeral ground have should cultivate love as a way of warding off hatred and developing
been implied in the foregoing discussion of the ten foulnesses. Breathing patience. He should begin with himself and with his teacher. After that
is treated as a separate topic (the recollection of breathing). Here the he can move on to a dearly beloved, a neutral person, a hostile person,
discussion is confined to the meditation on the body under thirty-two using the love felt toward each preceding one as a base for developing it
aspects. This involves considering the body under each of these aspects toward the succeeding one.
according to the seven kinds of skill in learning--by verbal recitation, Various texts are cited as providing methods for controlling
mental recitation, consideration of color, shape, direction, location and resentment against difficult persons, e.g., by thinking on their positive
li mit--and the tenfold skill in attending--following the order of exposition, qualities instead of their faults.
not too quickly and not too slowly, avoiding distraction, going beyond the (E252-258; T332-340) The mark of possessing love is that one does
name to the thing, abstracting the relevant parts, coming to absorption on not prefer any of the four--himself, the beloved one, the neutral person
each part, and linking energy with concentration through the sutras and the hostile one--but treats them with equal friendship. At this point
dealing with the higher meditative levels, with mindfulness and with the he has attained the first meditative level. By practising with that sign he
factors of enlightenment. goes on to gain the other three levels. This is illustrated at length with
(E204-217; T268-285) The thirty-two aspects are now considered quotations from scriptures.
one by one. They are the hairs of the head, the body hairs, nails, teeth, (E258.261; T340-343) The second sublime state is compassion, the
skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone marrow, kidney, heart, liver, the inner third restraint, the fourth equanimity. These are explained in terms
skin covering, spleen, the covering of the heart and kidneys, the bowel parallel to the first.
tube, entrails, gorge, excrement, brain, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, (E26I-264; T343-347) The four terms are analyzed etymologically.
Each is further analyzed according to characteristic feature, its
126 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 127

manifestation, function, proximate cause and condition of success and of Objection: But in Ańguttaranikāya 4, 300 the Buddha teaches that the
failure. Thus love's feature is the promotion of welfare, its function is to boundless states should be practised in all four meditations.
prefer welfare, its manifestation is the removal of annoyance, its Answer: If it were so, then even contemplation of the body would
proximate cause is seeing a being as lovable, and it succeeds when it apply on all four levels. So the Buddha must have had a different
makes malice subside and fails when it produces selfish affection. The intention in the passage mentioned, and it is explained how to interpret
feature of compassion is the producing of nonfrustration, its function is the passage consistently with the thesis advanced here.
not allowing people to be frustrated; its manifestation is noninjury; its Still, each of the four is the basis for the next one.
proximate cause is seeing people helpless in the face of frustration; it
succeeds when it makes cruelty end and it fails when it produces Chapter 10: The Immaterial Levels
frustration. The feature of restraint is delight; its function is nonenvy; its (E269-273; T354-360) One who wants to develop the organ called
manifestation is the elimination of dislike; its proximate cause the success endless space sees danger in material things because of its leading to
of beings; it succeeds when discontent subsides; and it fails when it hitting with sticks and thousands of afflictions, and so he takes up the
produces derision. The feature of equanimity is neutrality towards fourth meditative level through any of the nine meditative kasinas
beings; its function is seeing beings as the same; its manifestation is quiet excluding the limited-space kasina. But though this gets him to the
resentment towards approval; its proximate cause is seeing that each fourth level of the material level, he still wants to get beyond even the
being is the doer of his deeds and thus it is their choice how to live; it matter of the kasina. So he tums his attention to endless space and takes
succeeds when resentment and approval subside; and it fails when it it as his kasina, seeing everything as boundless space. Then he removes
merely produces the equanimity of ignorance. the materiality from this kasina by attending only to the space touched by
The general purpose of meditation on the sublime states is the matter but not to the matter, saying to himself " space, space."
satisfaction of insight and the attainment of a good rebirth, while the Developing this meditation through practice he follows the same stages
specific purposes of each are listed above. of development as described under the earth-kasina above, except that
Each sublime state has its long-term and short-term enemies. Love instead of looking at his kasina he is looking at empty space.
has greed as the latter and ill-will as the former. Compassion has Vibhariga 245 is quoted and explained in a word-for-word
depression based on the home life as short-term, and cruelty as long-term commentary.
enemies. Restraint has joy based on home-life as its short-term and (E273-281; TI360-371) Similarly, one who wants to develop
discontent as its long-term enemies. Equanimity has the equanimity of boundless consciousness concentrates and meditates on it in parallel
ignorance based on home life as its short-term, with passion and fashion. Likewise, one who wants to reach nothingness meditates on it.
repugnance as its long-term enemies. Fourthly and similarly for the final immaterial state, viz., neither-
(E264-268; TI347-353) Why are they called " sublime states?" They identification-nor-nonidentification. The remainder of Vibhariga 245 is
are pure and superlative like Brahma. Why only four of them? Because quoted and explained with word-for-word commentary and several
they provide four paths to purity for four types of persons. In what order similes.
should they be practised? In the order listed, since the ends--welfare,
removal of suffering, gladness and equanimity--are naturally ordered that Chapter 11: The Remaining Subjects of Meditation
way. Why are they called " boundless " in the Abhidharma? Because they (E282-288; T372-380) The identification of repulsiveness in food is
are taken toward beings without limit. the next topic to be considered in the list of forty subjects of meditation.
The first three are applicable in three meditative levels (of the It is the " one identification" listed after the four immaterial states.
"
fourfold classification, or four of the fivefold) only, since they are not Food" in general isn't limited to physical nourishment, but also includes
dissociated from contentment. But the last applies only to the last level, contact which nourishes feelings, conceptual identifications which nourish
being associated with equanimity. rebirth-linking, and consciousness which nourishes the psychophysical
128 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 129

complex at the moment of linking. However, here only physical food is Chapter 12: The Kinds of Higher Faculties
intended. The repulsiveness of food and drink is reviewed from a variety (E313-316; T409-412) There are five kinds of higher faculties: (1)
of angles. supernormal power, (2) knowledge of the divine ear element, (3)
(E288-308; T380-406) Last of the forty subjects for meditation is the knowledge of penetration of minds, (4) knowledge of recollection of past
"defining of the four meditative levels " . The authority for this is traced life, (5) knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of beings.
to the Mahūsattipatthāna Shiro, where it is given in brief, and the (1) Supernormal Power. 'The yogi who wishes to develop
Mahātthipadūpamā, Rāhulavāda and Dhātuvibhańga Sūtras, where it is supernormal powers must attain in fourteen ways the eight absorptions
given in detail. The idea is that one meditates on the fact that everything from earth through white-color. The fourteen ways are as follows: (1) the
is composed of the four elements and thus loses the conception of each yogi attains meditation first with the earth kasiña, then with the water
thing as a single whole entity of some sort or other. Thus the subjects kasiña and so on through the eight; (2) he does it in the reverse order; (3)
meditated on here are in fact the essential features of earth, water, fire he does it first in the order and then in the reverse order; (4) he attains
and air. Each is analyzed into its essential features, and then it is shown each of the four meditative levels in order; (5) he attains them in reverse
how the meditator should analyze each of forty-two parts of the order; (6) he attains them first in order and then in reverse order; (7) he
body--hairs, nails, teeth, skin, etc.--into its elementary constituents. Then practises all eight kasinas but skips every other meditative level; (8) he
it is explained that the meditator may consider the classes into which practises all four levels but skips every other kasiña; (9) he skips every
these forty-two (thirty-two?) items may be classified according to the other of both levels and kasinas; (10) he attains the first level with the
number of components among the four elements. Again, the meditator earth /casino and then the other three levels with the same kasiña; (11) he
may consider the meanings of the words used to designate each of the attains the first level with each of the eight kasinas; (12) he attains the
elements, the groups of factors of which each of the parts of the body first level with the earth kasiña, the second level with the water /casino,
is composed, the particles into which each part can be divided, the third with fire, fourth with air, the meditation on endless space by
characteristic features of each element, how each part of the body removing the blue kasiña, the meditation on endless consciousness by
'
originates, its variety and unity, the elements necessarily arising in every removing the yellow kasiña, the meditation on nothingness by removing
minimal group of eight but being different in feature, their similarity and the red /casino, and the neither-identification-nor-nonidentification
dissimilarity, their role in internal and external things, their connection, meditation by removing the white /casino; (13) he classifies the
their conditions, their lack of consciousness and their collective meditational states as having different numbers of factors respectively;
conditions, viz., action, awareness, food and temperature. (14) he classifies merely according to the objects of the kasinas.
This concludes the section answering the question (begun at E72, T90 This extensive meditative practice is very difficult, and only a few
" can manage it. However, Buddhas, self-enlightened, chief disciples, etc.,
above) " How should concentration be developed? .
(E308-309; T406-408) It is also asked, What are the benefits of because of their special qualities, obtain supernormal powers merely on
developing concentration? This is the question which is now taken up in attainment of the state of arhat and don't need the prolonged meditation
the next sections. The general answer is this. For noble persons whose practice described.
contaminants are destroyed the benefit is satisfying views and states. For (E316-317; T412-414) Now Dīghanikāya 1, 77 is given a
ordinary people and seekers the benefit is insight. When these have word-by-word explanation. It describes how one who has attained the
attained the eight absorptions and seek higher faculties, the benefit of fourth meditative level through practising these fourteen kinds of
developing concentration is gaining those faculties. For ordinary persons meditative practice and thus has a concentrated, purified, malleable mind
while in meditation the benefit is the gaining of rebirth in Brahma's directs his thoughts to the supernormal powers, explained as derived from
"
world. Noble persons who have mastered the eight absorptions gain the word meaning success."
cessation and eventually liberation. (E317-322; T414-420) There are ten kinds of "success." (1) The
first is the power of becoming many by resolving to be so. (2) The
130 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES AGGA
VISUDDHIM 131
power of displaying other forms. (3) The power created by mental
Chapter 13: The Other Four Kinds of Higher Faculties
activity in another body which he displays. (4) The power created by an
(E342-366; T446-478) The second kind of supernatural power is the
arhat's contemplating impermanence as Bakkula did who was preserved
divine ear. By "divine" is meant similar to the gods' hearing capacities.
alive in the belly of a fish. (5) The power created by concentration, as
One who has this hearing hears both divine and human sounds, far off as
Sariputta did when attacked during concentration, or Sañjīva who was set
well as near by, even from another world. The meditation for de v eloping
on fire during concentration and was not burnt. (6) The power of the
this capacity is described in parallel to the previous methods.
noble persons who see repulsive things as unrepulsive. (7) The power The third kind is knowledge of the minds of others. One who has
born of the maturation of karma to fly through the air which is shared by
this power knows another's mind as troubled, deluded, exalted, etc.,
birds, gods, some humans, etc. (8) The power of meritorious ones to
according to what actually characterizes that other's mind. The monk
travel through the air, etc. (9) The power gained through success in the
gains this power by meditating on the color of the other's blood, which
sciences, a power of flying, bringing about various illusions, etc. (10) The
changes color according to the defect characterizing his consciousness.
power gained through right effort applied in appropriate places, e.g., This works on the material level, and gradually he can extend the method
when one overcomes lust through renunciation, or even everyday efforts
to the finer levels required for the higher levels. Brief explanations are
such as making a cart, etc.
provided of the various defective and advanced kinds of consciousness.
(E322-341; T420-445) It is now explained how the monk gains these
The fourth kind is remembrance of past lives. Six kinds of people
powers. He must obtain the four stages, the four footings, the eight can do this: members of other sects, ordinary disciples, great disciples,
footings, the sixteen roots, and then he establishes himself in knowledge.
chief disciples, those self-enlightened, and Buddhas. These in order are
The four stages are the four meditative levels. The four footings are
able to recall more and more past births (up to an infinity of lives for
those bases which involve respectively zealous-striving, concentration due
Buddhas); conceive births in a less and less material fashion; see their
to desire, energy, and inquiry. The eight footings are the strivings for
past lives in a progressively more glorious fashion; manage it faster and
each of the above four kinds of concentration, plus the four above- faster. The method of gaining this power is through carefully expanding
mentioned footings themselves. The sixteen roots are awarenesses free one 's recollective ability farther and farther back into the past. Special
from various defects, as follows: B9 undejected consciousness, unelated
effort may be required for remembering the death prior to a birth, as well
consciousness, unattracted consciousness, unrepelled consciousness, as the linking to the next birth. Eventually one will attain a remembrance
independent consciousness, untrammelled consciousness, liberated
of more and more past lives, so that one comes to remember lives that
consciousness, unassociated consciousness, consciousness rid of barriers, occurred even before the present eon.
unified consciousness, consciousness reinforced by faith, consciousness
This leads to a review of the temporal cosmogony set forth in
reinforced by energy, consciousness reinforced by mindfulness,
classical Buddhist texts. The end of an eon involves prolonged drought,
consciousness reinforced by concentration, consciousness reinforced by so that water-dwelling creatures die, as well as others who depend on
understanding, illuminated consciousness. He establishes himself with vegetable matter for sustenance, including humans. Some who have
knowledge when, having attained these first four things, he attains attained meditative levels are reborn in the Brahmaloka; others who have
meditation as a basis for a higher faculty and emerges from it. Then he not are reborn in the world of the gods where they develop concentration
can attain any of the ten kinds of power merely by reentering the and eventually gain the Brahmaloka. The sun multiplies, so that there is
meditation and resolving appropriately. Discrimination is commented on no night, and the waters dry up, including even the oceans. This happens
in this connection; Cula-Panthaka is cited, who became many through in all the 100,000,000 worlds along with ours, which all catch fire, so
meditation after having been counselled by the Buddha. Other such that the three lower Brahmalokas are consumed. After a period of
miracles are detailed, and it is narrated at length how meditation on darkness it begins to rain, and eventually the lower Brahmaloka reappears
kasinas of various sorts prepared the way for development of these followed by the other divine worlds above. The wind holds the water
supernatural powers. together, and earth begins to form on it. Then those in the highest
 VISUDDHIMAGGA 133
132 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
abolish the delusion that hides these natures. And its proximate cause is
Brahmaloka fall on to this lower world through the exhaustion of their concentration.
merit or life span, and on eating the earth come to crave it. They thus Wisdom can be classified in twelve ways. (1) As itself, it is of one
become material beings themselves. This creation story is told at great kind. (2) As worldly and otherworldly, it is of two kinds, depending on
length and with a wealth of detail. which path is relevant. (3) As of two kinds, e.g., subject to contaminants
One who has the fifth kind of supernatural power sees with his or not subject to them. (4) As of two kinds, viz., material vs. immaterial
divine eye the passing away and rearising of beings according to their (the rest of the aggregates). (5) As two kinds, that accompanied by
karrnic deserts. He sees beings in hell and in heaven, and comes to know contentment and that accompanied by equanimity. (6) As two, that
"
what kinds of karma brought these states about through his "divine eye, wisdom which pertains to vision and that which pertains to meditative
'
i.e., his special knowledge. There is no special preliminary work for this, practice. (7) As three, as reasoned, heard, and meditatively developed. (8)
any more than for knowing the future. As three, depending on whether its content is limited, exalted, or
A final section explains the objects which are grasped by each of the measureless. (9) As three, involving skill in improvement, skill in
five higher faculties. E.g., knowledge of supernatural powers grasps detriment, and skill in means. (10) Three, as interpreting the internal
seven kinds of objects--limited, exalted, past, future, present, internal or (one 's own factors), the external (the factors of others) as well as of
external. Knowledge of the divine ear element grasps four kinds of inanimate matter), and both. (11) Four kinds, according to knowledge of
object--limited, present, internal or external. Knowledge of other minds the four noble truths. (12) Four kinds, called the four discriminations—of
has eight kinds of objects--limited, exalted, measureless, path, past, future purpose, of law, of language, and of perspicuity (ref to Vibhañga 293,
or present. Knowledge of past lives has eight kinds--limited, exalted, which is quoted and explained).
measureless, path, past, internal, external, neither-internal-nor-external. Wisdom is developed by first cultivating the " soil " of
Knowledge of the divine eye has four kinds--limited, present, internal or wisdom--aggregates, factors, elements, faculties, etc.--having perfected the
external. Knowledge of the future has eight kinds--limited, exalted, "
roots" of wisdom--the purification of virtue, the purification of
immeasurable, path, future, internal, external, neither. And knowledge of awareness--and then developing the five purifications of the "trunk ",
faring according to one 's deeds has five kinds--limited, exalted, past, namely, (1) purification of view, (2) purification of overcoming doubt, (3)
internal or external. purification through knowledge and vision of what is the path and what
is not, (4) purification by knowledge and vision of the path, and (5)
purification by knowledge and vision.
Part III: Wisdom
Chapter 14: The Aggregates The Matter Aggregate
(E367-375; T479-493) Wisdom is insight associated with good (E373-379; T489-502) This is divided into two varieties: primary
awareness. It is called " wisdom (prajña7" because it is a knowing in a material, viz., the four elements (cf. Ch. 11), and derived material, which
different mode from identification or consciousness. Whereas has twenty-four kinds, as follows:
" "
identification cognizes the object by identifying it as "blue" or yellow, 1. The visual organ. Its characteristic feature is the sensitivity of the
etc., and consciousness does this and also apprehends the distinguishing primary elements ready for impact of visible things or (alternatively) the
features of a blue or yellow thing, neither can apprehend an object as sensitivity of the primary elements arising from karma resulting from
manifesting the path, whereas wisdom does this also. An example is desire to see. Its function is to pick up something from among the
given: whereas a child knows coins as round and colored, etc., but doesn't colors. It is manifested as the basis of visual-consciousness. Its
know that they are valuable, and a villager knows that too, the proximate cause is the primary elements born of karma arising from
money-changer knows these things but in addition he knows all its desire to see.
features, where it was made and by whom, etc. Thus wisdom has as its 2. The auditory organ is explained in a parallel fashion, substituting
characteristic feature knowing the natures of factors. Its function is to
134 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 135

auditory for visual throughout. 9. Taste.

3. The olfactory organ is explained likewise with relevant 10. The feminine faculty has as its feature the female sex, and its
substitutions. function is to reveal things as female.
4. The gustatory organ is explained likewise. 11. The masculine faculty likewise relates to the male sex. Both (10)
5. The body is explained likewise, substituting "tangible" in the and (11) are coextensive with the body but not necessarily located either
relevant places. where the body is or where it is not.
Another view (certain Mahāsathghikas, says Paramatthamañjūsa7 is 12. The life faculty has as its feature that of maintaining matter that
that these five organs differ in that each has a certain element is born together (as a living body); its function is to induce, etc. Factors
predominating--fire for the visual, air for the auditory, earth for the come to be because of their own causal conditions, but once arisen this
olfactory, and water for the gustatory, and the body has all four elements faculty maintains them. When it is absent the maintenance no longer
in balance, and it is thus that the differences between the five organs are occurs, and it dissolves at the same time the matter it maintains dissolves,
to be explained. This view is rejected by Buddhaghosa as having no so that that matter does not continue.
authority, and as ascribing different qualities to items composed of the 13. The heart is the material support of the mental element and the
same mixture of the same elements. The proper explanation for the mental consciousness element. Its function and manifestation is to
differences among these five organs is rather the difference in the karma support them. It depends on the blood in the heart (cf. Clt. 8, section 3).
from which each arises. 14. Bodily intimation is the change in the air-element arising from
(E375-380; T493-506) At this point the list of twenty-four derived awareness that causes bodily movement forward, etc. Its function is to
material objects is begun again, with a different way of approaching the display intention, and it is manifested as the cause of bodily excitement.
first five in the list. 15. Vocal intimation is the change in the earth-element arising from
1. The eye, what is called the " eye" in the world, is described as the awareness which instigates utterances of speech in the vocal apparatus.
pupil in which the sensitivity (=the organ) is located, and in which the Its function is also to display intention, and it is manifested as that which
images of things seen are reflected. It is assisted by the four elements causes verbal awareness.
through their respectively functioning to uphold, bind, mature and move, 16. Space limits matter, and functions to display the boundaries of
It is consolidated by temperature, consciousness, and food; it is things.
maintained by life, and furnished with color, smell, taste, etc. 17. Material lightness functions to dispel heaviness.
2. The ear is likewise described as the auditory cavity, with the 18. Malleability is not stiff and functions to dispel stiffness. It
remainder of the description following that of the eye. manifests as the nonopposition to any activity.
3. The nose likewise, 19. Workableness of matter is that which enables matter to mold itself
4. The tongue likewise, in accord with bodily actions on it. The distinction between (17), (18)
5. and the body likewise, as a sort of liquid that covers the physical and (19) is spelled out further through examples:
body. 20. Growth of matter refers to the first arrival at a material state;
6. Color--or what is visible, is now defined. Its feature is to impinge 21. Continuity of matter is the noninterruption of a state. Since (20)
on the visual organ, its function and manifestation to be the content of the and (21) in Dhammasmigañī are practically identified, Buddhaghosa
visual consciousness. and its causes are the four elements. These defining quotes an Atthakathā in making the distinction.
characteristics are the same for the rest of the derived material objects 22. Aging is the maturing of matter, leading on (to termination).
following in this list, except where differences are indicated. The Immaterial states of matter undergo hidden aging as well as the evident
varieties of color are blue, yellow, etc. aging of material states such as tooth-decay and the continual aging of
7. Sound is likewise defined, rocks, etc.
8. Smell, and 23. Noneternality of matter is its breaking up, destruction.
136 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 137

24. Physical food is matter that feeds other matter. and not conditioned--e.g., when a child give- a gift to a monk in imitation
In the Atthakathā some more kinds of matter are added to these of his parents;
twenty-four, viz., matter as power, matter as procreation, matter as birth, (1 a4) accompanied by contentment, dissociated from knowledge
matter as sickness. Some (Abhayagirins, says Paramatthamañjūsa7 also and conditioned--e.g., when the child is urged by others;
list matter as torpor. But this last is not a kind of matter according to (I a5) accompanied by equanimity, associated with knowledge
canonical authority, and the others may be included within one or another and conditioned--like the first except that there is no cause for pleasure;
of the twenty-four listed. Still, one may consider the number of kinds to (1a6) accompanied by equanimity, associated with knowledge,
be twenty-eight. conditioned;
(la7) accompanied by equanimity, dissociated from knowledge
and not conditioned;
These twenty-eight kinds of matter are now classified in various (1a8) accompanied by equanimity, dissociated from knowledge
ways: into contrastive pairs, as, e.g., internal vs. external to the self, gross and conditioned.
vs. subtle, distant vs. near, produced vs. unproduced, sensitive (the As to the material level, there are five kinds of good consciousness:
organs) vs. nonsensitive, faculties vs. non-faculties, etc. (lbl) associated with all five meditation factors--initial thought,
into triads as, e.g., karma-born, not karma-born, neither-karma-nor sustained thought, satisfaction, joy and concentration;
non-karma-born; consciousness-born, not consciousness-bom, neither (Ib2) associated with the last four of those;
consciousness born nor not consciousness-born; nutriment-born, etc.; (lb3) associated with the last three of those;
temperature-bom, etc. (lb4) associated with the last two of those;
into fours, as, e.g., according to the faculty by which they are grasped (lb5) associated with concentration and equanimity only.
(visual, auditory, sensing involving contact, and consciousness); as In the immaterial level there are four kinds of good consciousness
concrete, delimiting, mode and defining; as actual entity, door, both entity (Icl-4) each associated with one of the four immaterial states, viz.,
and door, neither entity nor door. concentration on infinite space, etc.
into fives, as, e.g., bom of one, two, three, four or nothing. In the higher level there are four kinds (ldl-4) of good
consciousness. each associated with one of the four paths. Thus the total
The Consciousness Aggregate number of kinds of good consciousness is twenty-one.
"
(E381-382; T506-508) The words "vijñāna, " "citta" and "manas all (E382; T508-509) All the bad kinds of consciousness occur in the
mean the same aggregate. It may be initially classified into three major level of desire only. They are:
varieties: (I) good, (2) bad, and (3) neutral. Each of these can be (2a1) rooted in greed, accompanied by contentment, associated
considered in four ways: (a) in relation to the level of desire, (b) in with views and not conditioned, e.g., when a man enjoys sensual desires
relation to the material level, (c) in relation to the immaterial level, (d) and, believing in their substantial basis, has spontaneous consciousness;
in relation to the higher level. (2a2) rooted in greed, accompanied by contentment, associated
(la) Good in the level of desire are eight kinds of conscious- with views and conditioned--e.g., when that consciousness is urged on by
ness: something or someone;
(lal) accompanied by contentment, associated with knowledge, (2a3) rooted in greed, accompanied by contentment, dissociated
not conditioned--e.g., when one gives a gift spontaneously and with from views and not conditioned--e.g., when a man steals happily without
pleasure; being dominated by wrong views;
(lag) accompanied by contentment, associated with knowledge, (2a4) the same, but he is conditioned by others;
conditioned--e.g., gives the gift when urged to by others; (2a5-8) rooted in greed, accompanied by equanimity, associated
(1 a3) accompanied by contentment, dissociated from knowledge with views and not conditioned, etc.;
138 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 139

(2a9) rooted in hatred, accompanied by depression and At the immaterial level there are four kinds (3c l-4) corresponding to
associated with repugnance and unconditioned--e.g., when one kills a 1cl-4 among the good kinds of consciousness.
living thing spontaneously; And in the transcendent level there are four kinds (3d1-4)
(2a10) same but conditioned; corresponding to the maturation of each of the four paths comprising
(2al1) rooted in delusion, accompanied by equanimity, ldl-4. Thus there are in all thirty-six kinds of maturation of neutral
associated with doubt; consciousness.
(2al2) same and associated with worry. (E384-385; T512-513) The neutral functional (kiriya) kinds of
(E382-384; T509-512) The neutral kinds of consciousness are consciousness occur in the first three levels. On the level of desire there
divided into two main classes, (3) matured and (4) constructed or are two kinds found, viz., (a) without root-cause and (b) with root-cause.
functional. They occur in most of the four meditative levels. Thus we have
Among the matured kinds of neutral consciousness in the level of (4a 1) Mental element without root-cause, i.e., without nongreed,
desire we find: etc., and causing a result, which accounts for attending to objects of
(3al) having good results, without root-cause, visual visual consciousness, etc., and the proximate cause of which is the
consciousness; interruption of the bhavańga. It is associated only with equanimity.
(3a2) likewise, auditory consciousness; (4a2) Mental consciousness element without root-cause and
(3a3) likewise, olfactory consciousness; devoid of nongreed, etc., and causing a result, which is shared by
(3a4) likewise, gustatory consciousness; everyone, whereby cognition of the six kinds of sense-objects is
(3a5) likewise, tactual consciousness; accomplished.
(3a6) likewise, mental element - the mental state immediately (4a3) Mental consciousness element without root-cause, etc.,
following any of the above; but not shared by everyone, since it is accompanied with contentment and
(3a7) likewise, mental consciousness element accompanied by causes smiling by arhats about things that are repulsive ordinarily.
contentment; and (4a4-11) The desire-level kind of neutral functional
(3a8) likewise, mental consciousness element accompanied by consciousness with root-cause corresponds to lal-8 above.
equanimity, in each of which objects come to be cognized, desirable There are five kinds of neutral functional consciousness at the
objects in the case of 3a7, neutral ones in 3a8. material level, 4b1-5, corresponding to lbl-5.
(3a9-16) These are the same as the preceding eight, except that There are four kinds of neutral functional consciousness at the
they are with root-cause, which is to say that they are caused by such immaterial level, 4cl-4, corresponding to IcI-4.
states as lack of greed, etc. This causation operates in karmic Thus there are 21 kinds of good consciousness, 12 kinds of bad
conditioning: the objects that are so caused are rebirth-linking, bhava, consciousness, 36 kinds of neutral maturation and 20 kinds of neutral
functional consiousness, for a total of 89 kinds of consciousness.
death and such factors.
(3a17-23) Here are those neutral consciousnesses having bad (E385-387; T513-518) These 89 kinds occur in 14 ways, as follows:
results, without root-cause only: they are (17) visual, (18) auditory, (19) (1) When through the influence of lal-8 there is rebirth among the
olfactory, (20) gustatory and (21) tactual consciousnesses, (22) mental gods or men, then 3a8-16 occur as rebirth-linking consciousnesses having
consciousness with the function of receiving, and (23) mental as their contents either the act, the sign of the act, or the result that
a
consciousness element having the five functions of investigating, etc. ppeared at the time of death (cf. Ch. 17 below).
These have undesirable or neutral objects but not desirable ones. When through the influence of lbl-5 and lcl-4 there is material level
and immaterial level rebirth, then 3bl-5 and 3cl-4 resultant
At the material meditative level there are five kinds (3bl-5) of cons
matured consciousness, corresponding to lbl-5. But they occur in ciousnesses occur as rebirth-linking having as their content the
attainment of meditations as rebirth-linking, bhavatiga and death. karmic sign that occurred at the time of death.
140 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
VISUDDHIMAGGA 141
When through the influence of 2al-12 there is rebirth in a lower state,
then 3a23 occurs as rebirth-linking having as content the action, sign or are l al-8, if bad they are 2al-12, and if they are neutral they are 4a3-11.
result that appeared at the time of death. This applies in the case of the five "external" doors. In the case of the
Thus 19 kinds of maturation consciousness are rebirth-linking. mind the same impulsions arise after 4a2 mind-door adverting.
(2) When the rebirth-linking consciousness has stopped, then, Beyond lineage-change any of the following 26 impulsions occurs:
resulting from the same kind of karma (sign or result) that operated in the lbl-5, 4b1-5, lcl-4, 4c1-4, ldl-4 and 3dl-4. Thus there are 55 kinds of
impulsion consciousnesses.
case of (1), there occurs the bhavariga consciousness of that same content
and according to the same pattern as just reviewed under (1) above. This (13) At the end of the impulsions, if the object is very vivid in one
continuum goes on until something internipts it, e.g., during the state of of the five doors, or is clear in the mind-door, at the level of desire one
or two maturation consciousnesses arise as registering previous
dreamless sleep. So 19 kinds of maturation consciousness are life-
continuous. karma--3a9-16, or 3a7, 3a8 and 3a23--the content of this consciousness
(3) During this continuation of life, when a being's senses have being some object other than the one that was the content of the
become capable of apprehending things, and when a visual object comes bhavariga consciousness. So there are 11 kinds of registration
into the field of the visual organ, there is a disturbance in the bhavariga, consciousness.
which then ceases and is replaced by the occurrence (4a1) having that (14) At the end of registration the bhavariga reassumes its sway. And
visual content and creating attention (or adverting). This in turn is when it is eventually exhausted the last living consciousness is called
followed by the occurrence of 4a2 and a second moment of adverting. death-consciousness. It has the same 19 kinds as rebirth-linking (1) and
The same analysis applies in the case of auditory and the other doors. So bhavariga (2) above.
there are two kinds of adverting consciousness.
(4) After that visual consciousness (3a1) in the visual door having the Feeling Aggregate
visual organ as its base, being 3a1 and 3a17 respectively for good and (E387-388; T518-520) Feeling can be studied under three heading-
bad contents. s--as good, bad or neutral under five headings--as satisfaction, frustration,
contentment, depression and equanimity. Each of these is associated with
(5) The auditory consciousness (3a2 and 3a18),
the appropriate kinds of consciousness in among the 89 listed above
(6) the olfactory consciousness (3a3 and 3a19),
(7) the gustatory consciousness (3a4 and 3a20), under Consciousness Aggregate. Thus satisfaction is associated with 3a5,
frustration with 3a2l and contentment is associated with 62 kinds of
(8) and the tactual consciousness (3a5 and 3a21). So there are ten
consciousness, viz.: lal-4, 3a9-12, 3a7, 4a4-7, 4a3, 2a1-4 at the level of
kinds of maturation consciousness in these five ways.
desire; lbl-4, 3bl-4 and 4b1-4 at the material level; ldl-4 and 3d1-4 for
(9) Next the mental element arises from each such sensory
each of the first four meditation levels (in the 5-level model) in the
consciousness as receiving 3a6 and 3a22, depending on whether the
content is good or bad. So there are two kinds of receiving consciousness. transcendent (i.e., leaving out the eight kinds of consciousness associated
with the fifth meditative level). Depression is associated with 2a9-10,
(10) And in turn the mental consciousness element occurs
investigating that same content received by the mental element, so that and equanimity is associated with the remaining 55 kinds of
c
if the receiving is 3a22 because its content is bad the investigating is onsciousness.
3a23, while if the receiving is good the investigating will be either 3a7 Each of the five--satisfaction, etc.--are analyzed in the standard
fashion. Satisfaction has as its mark experiencing a desirable object
or 3a8. So there are three kinds of investigating.
through contact; its function is to intensify associated factors; it is
(11) After that 4a2 occurs determining that same content. So there
manifested as bodily enjoyment; and its proximate cause is the bodily
is one kind of determining. '
(12) If the visual, etc., content is vivid, then next in turn six or seven faculty. Frustration s defining mark is experiencing an undesirable object
impulsions arise with respect to the visual, etc., content. If good these through contact; its function is to wither associated factors; it is
manifested as bodily affliction; its proximate cause is the bodily faculty.
142 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 143

'
Contentment s mark is experiencing a desirable object; its function is to attention, (31) neutrality, (32) compassion, (33) restraint, (34) avoidance
enjoy that desirable object; it manifests as enjoyment of awareness; its of bad bodily action, (35) avoidance of bad vocal action, (36) avoidance
' of bad mental action.
proximate cause is confidence. Depression s mark is experiencing an
1a3-4 have all the above 36 except for 15. la5-6 have the original
undesirable object; its function is disliking the undesirable object; it is
manifested as mental affliction; its proximate cause is the heart. 36 minus 5, 1a7-8 have the 36 minus 5 and 15.
IbI have the 36 minus 34-36. lb2 have those 33 minus 3, 1b3 those
Equanimity's mark is the feeling of neutrality; its function is not to
intensify nor to wither associated states; it is manifested as peace; its 32 minus 4, lb4 those 31 minus 5, and lb5 those 30 minus 32 and 33.
proximate cause is joyless awareness.. lcl-4 have the same as 165, while ldl-4 have states as traces (the 36
minus 32-36). So much for the dispositional states associated with the
good kinds of consciousness.
Identification Aggregate
(E388-389; T520-521) This aggregate can likewise be understood as As for the dispositional states associated with bad kinds of
consciousness: gal has 17 dispositional states associated with it, viz., (1)
three--good, bad or neutral. Since there is no consciousness without
contact/touch, (2) volition, (3) initial thought, (4) sustained thought, (5)
identification its kinds number 89 just as consciousnesses do. Its mark
is identifying; its function is to make a sign which occasions recognition joy, (6) energy, (7) life-force, (8) concentration, (37) shamelessness, (38)
fearlessness, (39) greed. (40) delusion, (41) false view, (28) interest, (29)
in the form of the awareness "this is just that "; it is manifested as
resolve, (42) worry and (30) attention. The new items 37-42 are each
identifying through the sign apprehended as the blind do who cognize an
explained.
elephant; and its proximate cause is a cognitive field however it appears,
2a2 has these 17 plus 43 lethargy, which is explained. 2a3 has the
as when fawns see scarecrows as men.
17 minus 41 and plus 44 pride. 2a4 lacks 41 but has 44 and the rest. 2a5
Traces Aggregate and 2a6 have the 17 associated with 2a1 except for 5. 2a7 is like 2a5_but
also lacks 41. 2a8 is like 2a6 but also lacks 41 and 44. 2a9 has states
(E389-397; T521-535) The mark of dispositional states or traces is
conditioning. Their function is accumulation (says Nanamoli), their 1-8, 27, 29-30 and 42, along with 37-38 and 40. 2a10 has the same as
2a9 plus 43. 2a11 has 1-7, 30, 37-40, and 42, plus (49) steadiness of
manifestation is operation, and their proximate cause is the three
consciousness and (50) perplexity. 2a12 has the same as 2a11 except for
aggregates other than matter.
50 and with the addition of 39.
When associated with good kinds of consciousness traces are good,
Coming to the neutral maturational dispositional states: 3a1-5 and
when associated with bad kinds of consciousness bad, and when
3a8, and 3a17-21 and 3a23 have states 1-2, 7, 30 and 49. 3a6 and 3a22
associated with neutral kinds neutral. Each of the 89 kinds of
have 1-4, 7, 24, 30 and 49. 3a7 has 1-5, 7, 30 and 49. 3a9-16 have the
consciousness (cf. above under Consciousness Aggregate) are examined
states associated with lal-8, except that they lack 22 and 23; this is if
and the associated dispositional states listed and explained. Thus, for they are determined (niyata). Undetermined 3a9-16 also lack 34-36.
example, the first and second kinds of consciousness Oat-2) are found 3b1-5, 3cl-4 and 3dl-4 have the same associated states as lbl-5, lcl-4
to have 36 traces: they are as follows: (1) contact or touch, (2) volition, and ldl-4.
(3) initial thought, (4) sustained thought, (5) joy, (6) energy, (7) life-
Among the neutral functional states: 4a1 have the same dispositional
force, (8) concentration, (9) thith, (10) memory/mindfulness, (11) shame,
states as 3a6. 4a2-3 have the same states as 3a7-8, except that 6 needs
(12) fear, (13) nongreed, (14) nonaversion, (15) nondelusion, (16) bodily
to be added and 8 is strong here. 4a4-11 have the same states as lal-8,
tranquility, (17) tranquil awareness, (18) lightness of bodily weight, (19)
except 34-37 are lacking. 4bl-5 and 4c1-4 have the same states as lbl-5
lightness of awareness, (20) malleability of body, (21) malleability of and lcl-4.
consciousness, (22) bodily adaptability, (23) adaptability of awareness,
(E397-401; T535-541) What has just been given is the classification
(24) bodily proficiency, (25) proficiency in awareness, (26) bodily
of aggregates according to the Abhidhamma-teaching (of the Vibhariga).
rightness, (27) rightness of awareness, (28) interest, (29) resolve, (30)
144 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 145

But in the suttanta-bhajanīya (of that text) the Buddha classifies traces just this number, viz., five, of them, because they collectively include all
under eleven headings, which are now reviewed. These eleven headings states of self and what pertains to self and because they include all other
are (1) past, (2) future, (3) present, (4) internal, (5) external, (6) gross, (7) supposed kinds of aggregate; (4) as to what is figuratively likened to
subtle, (8) inferior, (9) superior, (10) far and (11) near. Thus the first them--e.g., matter is like the hospital room where the sick man
kind of trace, material, has past, future and present forms in four ( =consciousness) lies, feeling is like his sickness, and so on; (5) how they
senses--that of (i) extent, referring to the time prior to rebirth-linking as should be seen, which is described both briefly and in detail: the idea is
past, after death as future, between those as present; (ii) continuity, so that the aggregates should be viewed under certain descriptions which are
that when there is a change in the temperature or in the cognitions in a more conducive to progress than their alternatives; (6) as to what benefits
series, etc., what was before the change is past, what subsequent to a new accrue to one seeing an aggregate in the proper fashion, what specifically
change is future, what between present; (iii) period, in that for any such a person gains.
temporal stretch--moment, minute, morning, day, etc.--which is present,
what occurs prior is past, what occurs subsequently is future; (iv) Chapter 15: Organs and Elements
moment, where the period of arising, maintenance and dissolution (E405-413; T547-558) There are 12 organs: (I) visual, (2) tactual,
comprises a moment is present, what is prior to it past, and what (3) stream, (4) faith, (5) olfactory, (6) smell, (7) tongue, (8) taste, (9)
subsequent future. Only the last is a literal sense of temporality, the touch, (10) tangible, (11) pride, (12) factor. These are discussed under
others are relative. Internal and external have been explained for matter, the following six headings:
as have gross and subtle, far and near. Some deities have inferior matter (a) the respective meanings of each of the twelve, and the
to others, which are thus superior to them. general meaning of the term " organ" (āvatana), examined etymologically;
Turning to the feeling aggregate, the first five headings are (b) their respective characteristics;
straightforward as above. A gross feeling versus subtle feeling can be (c) how many they are, no more, no less;
understood in four ways: (i) according to its kind, since neutral feelings (d) the order in which they are listed;
are subtler than good or bad feelings, and good ones subtler than bad; (ii) (e) their classification in brief as the mental and material organs
according to nature, since bad feelings are unsatisfying, catalyzing, and objects, and in detail according to condition, destiny, the kind of
disturbing and overpowering, while neutral feelings are the opposite and being to which it belongs and the particular person involved;
good feelings in between; (iii) according to person, depending on the state (I) how they should be seen: as without intrinsic nature, with
of attainment of the person having the feeling; (d) according to meditative no past or future, unconscious, etc.
level, depending on whether the feeling is experienced in a state subject The elements are eighteen in number: (1) visual organ, (2)
to contaminants, etc., or not. We are warned not to confuse these various matter/form, (3) visual awareness, (4) auditory organ, (5) sound, (6)
kinds of grossness and subtleness. Inferior and superior in feeling auditory awareness, (7) olfactory organ, (8) smell, (9) olfactory
corresponds to the gross-subtle distinctions. And far and near here awareness, (10) tongue, (11) taste, (12) gustatory awareness, (13) touch,
"
merely mean difference in kind, so that a bad feeling is "farther from a (14) tangible, (15) tactual awareness, (16) pride, (17) factor, (18) mental
good feeling than from another bad one, and even farther from a neutral awareness. They are discussed under seven rubrics:
one. (a) the meanings of the individual terms and the term " element"
Likewise for the other three aggregates. (dhdtu);
(E401-404; T541-546) Awareness of the aggregates is classified into (b) the defining features of each;
six types: (1) as to order, whether the order of arising, the order of (c) the order in which listed;
abandoning, the order of practice, the order of meditastive level, or the (d) why just that many, viz., 18, for in various places in the
order in which taught; (2) as to species, e.g., whether an aggregate is sūtras and in Abhidhamma one finds references to other elements, e.g.,
being considered per se or as an object of clinging; (3) as to their being progress? (abha), beauty (Sabha), etc. (the passages are quoted), and each
146 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 147

of these must be reduced to one of the above eighteen; (E416-428; T562-578) The four noble truths are now discussed under
(e) how classified; fifteen rubrics:
(f) what each element conditions; (1) according to the distinctions between the meanings of the
(g) and how they are to be seen for the most beneficial results. constitutent terms, such as " duhkha, " etc.;
(2) through derivation, i.e., etymology, of the constituent terms;
Chapter 16: The Faculties and the Truths (3) through division according to the defining marks, etc., of each
(E414-416; T559-562) The 22 faculties are listed: (1) eye, (2) ear, truth; thus the frustration truth has the mark of binding, the function of
(3) nose, (4) tongue, (5) skin, (6) mind, (7) femininity, (8) masculinity, burning, and is manifested as positive occurrence or activity. The second
(9) life-force, (10) satisfaction, (11) frustration, (12) contentedness, (13) truth, of origin, has the mark of producing, the function of causing the
depression, (14) equanimity, (15) faith, (16) energy, (17) unblocking of obstructions, and is manifested as awareness of obstacles.
memory/mindfulness, (18) concentration, (19) wisdom, (20) knowledge The third truth, of cessation, has as its mark peace, as function not being
of what is unknown, (21) perfect knowledge, (22) knowledge that one cut off, and is manifested as signless. The final fourth truth, the path, has
knows. They are discussed under the following headings: as mark leading out, as function destruction of defilements, and is
(a) the respective meanings of the individual terms and of manifested as emergence.
"
indriya " which relates etymologically to the idea of being a ruler (indra); (4) through understanding the meaning of " truth," and
(b) the defining features of each; (5) appreciating all its connotations;
(c) the order in which listed, which is the order of teaching, (6) Why are there just four truths and no more? Because of the
running from obvious and mundane to less evident and relating to authority of the Buddha, and because four is the permutation of two and
liberation; two--two kinds of happening (frustration, cessation) and two causes, one
(d) as to what has varieties or does not--only one of the 22 has of each (origin, path).
varieties, viz., life, which is divided into the material and immaterial life (7) through considering the order in which the four truths are listed;
faculties; (8) with respect to birth, etc., shown by citing various Vibhariga
(e) their functions. The visual, auditory, etc., organs function passages in which the truths are alluded to. These characteristically
to cause visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc. The mind involve terms such as
functions to coordinate factors born at the same moment, the life faculty (a) birth, viz., the first manifestation of aggregates in a living
being, manifested as frustration. Frustration has many kinds, including
to maintain those conascent factors. The masculine and feminine
faculties allot the marks and habits of men and women respectively. The (1) the frustration of frustration, "intrinsic frustration, "
faculties of happiness, frustration, joy, sorrow and equanimity impart their bodily and mental frustration;
(2) bodily and mental satisfactions, which breed
special features to factors born with them. The faith, energy, memory,
subsequent frustrations;
concentration and wisdom faculties function to overcome opposed states
and to bolster confidence. (20) Knowledge of what is unknown functions (3) indifferent feelings and the many other conditioned
states in all the first three meditative levels;
in abandoning the fetters, while (21) perfect knowledge attenuates and "
(4) concealed" frustrations, which are not exhibited
destroys desire, passion, ill will, etc. The last faculty, (22) knowledge
publicly except upon questioning;
that one knows, functions to terminate any kind of endeavor.
(5) unconcealed frustrations which are openly evident.
(f) their meditative levels. Faculties (1-5), (7-8), (10-11), and In the Vibhariga (1) is called " direct" frustration, while the rest are
(13) operate at the desire-level only. (6), (9) and (14), along with (15-19) "
called indirect" since they produce subsequent feelings.
operate on all four levels. (12) operates on three levels excluding the
material, while (20-22) operate in the fourth, transcendent, level only. (a) The frustration of birth stems from the awkward position in
which the foetus finds itself positioned in its mother's womb, the heat,
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 149
148

jolting, etc., it undergoes there, etc., which are described in some detail. no support for the clinging contained in liberation with residues, and
(b) Aging is frustrating because one's limbs become tired, one's absence of defilements can occur even before the path is realized.
faculties lose their strength, memory is lost, etc. It is indirect frustration. Furthermore, if liberation were just (posterior absence or) destruction,
(c) Death is frustrating because it is a basis for future then it would be temporary, conditioned, and obtainable even without
frustration in addition to the experiences of pain accompanying the event right effort, and thus liberation would itself be frustrating.
of death itself. It is indirect.. Question: Isn't liberation destruction without any subsequent activity?
(d) Grief is frustration since it consumes one internally; it is Answer: No, for there is no such destruction, and even if there were,
direct frustration. the above faults would be committed; in addition, it would follow that the
(e) Lamentation, crying out accompanying the loss of relatives, path was itself liberation, since subsequent to it there is no more activity.
etc., a type of frustrating trace, and so indirect. Liberation, unlike the path, has no beginning; it is not created but rather
(f) Pain, i.e., bodily affliction, is both direct frustration and reached through the path; that is why liberation is free from old age and
indirect frustration, the latter since it brings about mental frustration in death.
Question: Then is liberation permanent like the atom (is claimed by
turn.
(g) Depression is frustration, mental distress. It is direct but some to be)?
also indirect, since it brings on bodily frustration when persons mentally Answer: No, there is no reason to say that, since the atom, etc., are
distressed tear their hair, commit suicide, etc. unestablished. Liberation is not material since it goes beyond the nature
(h) Despair is the dejection left over after grief and lamentation. of matter. Liberation can be thought of first as with residues, because it
is experienced by the arhat during meditation while the results of past
It is a frustrating trace.
(i) Association with undesired things is an indirect frustration defilements are still clinging though one has stopped gathering further
which brings about mental distress. defilements. Secondly, it can be thought of as without residues, since
after the arhat's last awareness, since further defilements have been cut
(j) Separation from what is desired is indirect frustratioin, for
it is a basis for grief and so forth. off, there is no further arising of the aggregates, there is no clinging left.
(k) Not getting what one wants is indirect frustration which is But liberation is not unknown (not nonoccurrent) since in the highest
manifested as disappointment. sense it is (has?) an independent nature.
"In short, " said the Buddha, "all the five aggregates are objects of (E430-431; T582-584) The fourth noble truth, the eightfold path, is
clinging" and it is this clinging which occasions these various kinds of now reviewed. (1) Right view has right seeing as mark, its function is
frustration. to reveal elements, and it is manifested as the removal of the blindness
The second noble truth speaks of the cause of frustration under the of ignorance. (2) Right thinking is characterized by directing one 's mind
rubric thirst, and the third noble truth teaches the cessation of frustration on to liberation, its function is attainment, and it is manifested as the
stemming from the cessation of its cause, viz., that thirst. avoidance of wrongly directed volition. (3) Right speech is manifested
(E428-430; T578-581) Here there is a section in which various as the avoidance of wrong speech. (4) Right (bodily) action is avoiding
questions about liberation are posed and answered. wrong bodily actions. (5) Right livelihood is the purification through
Question: Is liberation nonexistent because unexperienceable like a right speech and action; purification is the mark, and it functions to bring
hare's horn? about a proper life. (6) Right effort is the proper exertion not directed
Answer: No, for it is experienceable by the right means, and it exists, toward wrong, bad things. (7) Right mindfulness (or memory) is through
otherwise the path would be futile. right effort to come not to forget. (8) Right concentration is not being
subject to distraction.
Question: But what arises from the path is absence (e.g., of
aggregates or defilements). (E431-435; T584-591) (Returning now to pick up the rest of the
Answer: No, for absence (=nonoccurrence) of aggregates would leave discussion of the noble truths under 15 rubrics which was begun at E4I6,
150 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 151

T562) (9) With respect to the function of awareness, awareness of the noble truths but not frustrating, viz., cessation or liberation; (c) factors
truth(s) is of two kinds, (i) awareness of the ideas involved, and (ii) which are both truths and frustrating, e.g., the aggregates and the factors
understanding of them. The former comes through hearsay, etc.. and is associated with them; (d) factors which are neither noble truths nor
worldly; the latter involves understanding and belongs to the higher frustrating, viz., the states associated with the path as experienced by one
levels. So, the type-(i) awareness of the first truth precludes the wrong who knows and is living a life of purity.
view that there is a self, of the second truth precludes nihilism, of the (13) With respect to emptiness--all the truths are empty, since there
third truth precludes eternalism, and of the fourth truth precludes the false are no knowers, no doers, nothing liberated, no goers. Or it may be
view that moral actions are inefficacious. Again, the first truth precludes interpreted to mean that each truth is devoid of the other three, etc.
wrong views about the results of karma through seeing beauty and (14) With respect to their analysis into one, two or more kinds. E.g.,
permanence in the aggregates, etc.; the second precludes wrong theories frustration is of one kind as it occurs, of two kinds since it is both name
about causation such as those which identify God, prakrti, time, essential and form, three kinds as being at the level of desire, the material level or
nature, etc., as ultimate cause; the third precludes wrong theories of the immaterial level, four kinds according to the four nourishments, etc.
liberation such as that one which locates it in the material world or in a Similar classifications are proposed for the other three truths. The
(Jain) shrine; and the fourth precludes wrong theories about what the way classification of the constituents of the path.
of purification is. (15) As to their similarities and differences. All four truths are
(10) As to how the various factors are to be included within which similar by being not false, devoid of self and hard to understand. The
truths, the first truth may involve all the factors except for desire and first two are alike in being worldly and impure, but they are unlike in that
noncontaminating factors. The second includes the 36 types of thirsty one is result and the other cause, one to be understood and the other to
behavior, the third is unmixed (?). The fourth can be subdivided into its be avoided. And so on.
eight components, so that (I) right view includes investigation, the faculty
of wisdom, wisdom itself and the factors of enlightenment; (2) right Chapter 17: The Grounds of Wisdom
thinking includes the three beginning with initial thought the renunciation Part One: Dependent Origination
of factors; (3) right speech includes the four varieties of right way of (E436-440; T592-599) The " grounds of wisdom " are the factors
speaking; (4) right action includes the three right ways of acting; (5) classed as elements, organs, aggregates, and dependent origination as well
right livelihood includes a minimum of wishes of contentment; (6) as the dependently originated factors. The factors of dependent
right effort includes the four right exertions, the faculty of energy, origination are the twelve listed in the sūtra, while those that are
energetic power; (7) right mindfulness includes the foundations of dependently originated are those that are generated by the twelve.
mindfulness, mindful power and (8) right concentration includes Dependent origination lists the conditions for the continuation of
concentration with and without initial thought, with and without sustained frustration, for the wrong path. It is termed " suchness" because as long
thought, concentration of awareness, concentration of faculties, the power as the conditions function these factors are produced. It is termed "not
non-such" (avitathd) since when the conditions coexist the effect must
of concentration, joy, confidence, and right equanimity .
occur. It is called " not otherness" (ananyatathā) since only the
(11) With respect to similes the truths are respectively likened to
various things, e.g., the first truth is like a burden, the second like taking correlated effect can arise from a given set of conditions. And it is
specific conditioning since each factor (of the twelve) is itself conditioned
it up, the third like putting it down, and the fourth the means of putting
in the same way.
it down.
An alternative etymology is refuted, according to which
(12) In a fourfold manner, since the combinations of frustration and " r
p atītyasamutpāda" is derived from pratītya + sama + utpāda, so that
noble truths are four: (a) factors which are frustrating but not noble
it is taken to apply to those rightly-considered effects of any causes
truths, such as factors associated with the path and its fruits but not
whatever (where "rightly-considered" excludes the wrong views of other
experienced by one knowing the truths; (b) factors which are aspects of
152 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 153

schools). This derivation is wrong: there is no sūtra authority for this (4) According to groupings as singles, pairs, triads, etc., and
interpretation; furthermore, it contradicts what is said in various sūtras; (5) According to the role of each in an endless "wheel of becoming"
it is not sufficiently deep in meaning to warrant the attention the chain of which breeds grief, etc.
dependent origination is paid in the scriptures; and it is syntactically (E447-449; T608-611) Now each of the twelve is taken up in tum
ill-formed. for detailed examination.
Instead, " pratītyasamutpāda must be taken as combining pratītya +
"
(1) Ignorance is ignorance of the four truths (according to Suttanta
"
sam + utpdda, where "sam" gives the sense, with "utpāda, of arising method) and about the past, the future, about both and about dependent
together, while "pratitya" indicates that this arising together is to be origination and the originated factors (according to the Abhidharma
understood or gone (deeply) into (prati + i). (Other methods of method).
etymology for the word are also set out.) (2) Traces are classified into good, bad, and neutral plus bodily,
(E441-447; T599-608) Dependent origination is difficult to explain. mental and vocal. Of these (i) the good include thirteen volitions
It is now discussed under five rubrics: constituted by eight of the desire-level and five of the material level; (ii)
(1) According to different ways of teaching, i.e., from the beginning, the bad comprise twelve bad thoughts beginning with killing, etc.; (iii)
from the middle to the end, from the end, and from the middle back to the neutral are the four immaterial good thoughts. (iv) Bodily traces are
the beginning. The Buddha teaches in these various ways because he the eight good thoughts at the level of desire and twelve bad thoughts,
wants to show how insight can be gained from understanding dependent which occur in the bodily "doors " of action. (v) The same are called
origination wherever one plunges into it. However, there are also specific vocal and mental when they occur in the speech door, except that higher-
purposes for each of the four ways: for the first (from the beginning), faculty-awarenesses and worries are not to be included as they are not
when the teacher wants to show the lawfulness and particular order of the conditions for consciousness (at conception). (vi) All twenty-nine traces
twelve items; for the third (from the end) he wishes to show how he are "mental" when they arise in the awareness door. It is shown in detail
himself discovered them; for the fourth (from the middle back to the how each depends on ignorance.
beginning) in order to show how the chain runs back indefinitely into the (E449-457; T611-622) Twenty-four conditions are listed by the
past; for the second (from the middle to the end) to show how future Buddha. Each is a condition in virtue of its assisting in bringing about
lives follow from present causes for rebirth. Here the method followed a result. So, (1) a "root" or stable causal factor which assists in bringing
is the first, from beginning to end. about results is a state, like a tree (as opposed to moss), which is firm
Why are the first (viz., ignorance) and the " middle " (viz., desire) and stable; (2) an object condition is a factor that assists by being a
picked out particularly as starting-points in discussion as above? Because content of awareness, such as the data of sense; (3) predominant
these two are the critical causes of karma leading to happy and unhappy conditions are two sorts: (i) those which are conascent with their result,
future lives. Ignorance leads to the performance of actions, such as and (ii) those which function as contents of awareness; (4) proximate and
killing, which gives no happiness and leads to unhappy future outcomes, (5) and (directly) antecedent conditions, factors that operate as condition
while desire leads to performance of activities, such as refraining from by being proximate or contiguous in the order of events leading to
killing, which gives satisfaction and leads to happy future outcomes. awareness, e.g., visual consciousness is proximate cause of mental
(2) According to the meaning of each of the twelve terms. consciousness, which is again proximate cause of mental consciousness,
Traditional explanations. mostly etymological, of the terms are provided. etc. (Buddhaghosa thinks that (4) and (5) come to the same thing, and
(3) According to defining features, etc.--that is, each of the twelve is refutes the opinion of others who differentiate. them.) (6) A conascent
identified briefly according to the now-standard formula, giving its condition is a condition which assists by arising together with its result,
differentiating feature, its function, how it is manifested and what its as a lamp assists by lighting itself up along with its surroundings. (7)
proximate cause is. In fact, part of the series was already accomplished Supporting condition is a factor that assists by giving, together with
in previous chapters. others, mutual support. (8) Necessary condition assists by providing a
154 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 155

base, e.g., as the earth does for trees. (9) A decisive support condition (E457-460; T622-626) Now it is explained how ignorance is a
(upanLicayapratyaya) is a strong cause of one of three sorts: (i) as condition: It is so as object condition of meritorious traces when it is
content, something the presentation in awareness of which is critical in comprehended at the level of desire that ignorance is liable to destruction,
conditioning an effect; (ii) as proximate strong causing condition which and at the material level when one knows another's mind as confused.
cannot occur without that effect; (iii) by nature, i.e., a condition which It is so as a supporting condition of meritorious traces at the level of
arises by the very natural circumstances of the person involved, e.g., desire when one practises giving, etc., in order to surmount ignorance,
faith, virtue, habitual food, climate. (10) Prenascent condition is a and at the material level when one meditates to the same purpose, or
condition which arose previously and is present conditioning the result, when one makes merit for the purpose of sensory satisfaction being
as e.g. a visual organ is such a condition with respect to its visual confused by ignorance. It is a condition for bad factors in many ways.
consciousness organ and the associated factors. (11) Postnascent, a It is a condition for neutral traces only as supporting condition (7), as
condition which exists alongside the result and helps by providing a base. above.
For example, the appetite for food assists young birds' bodies in this way. Question: Is ignorance the only condition for traces, or are there
(12) Repetition condition which assists the immediately following factors ' others?
efficiency and power, e.g., repeated study of a book. (13) Karmic Answer: There are other conditions, and furthermore for any set of
condition, which assists through an intervening period of awareness. It conditions there area multitude of effects. Talk of one condition and one
has two kinds: (a) good and bad thinking performed at another (earlier) effect is only for convenience, besides which one may speak of a certain
time. and (b) conascent thought. (14) Karmic maturation condition, by condition alone because it is representative of and more basic (say) than
which factors experienced during a life arise and in particular by which the other conditions.
rebirth-linking operates. (15) Nourishment condition, the four kinds of Question: How can ignorance, which is bad, be a condition for
food. (16) Faculty condition, viz., the twenty-two faculties listed at the meritorious and neutral traces?
outset of Chapter 16 minus the masculine and feminine faculties, which Answer: The conditions of things in the world are found not to be
assist by being predominant conditions. (17) Meditative condition, which always like their effects in their essence, function and so forth.
assists in the arising of the factors arising on specific levels. (18) The (E460-461; T626-628) (3) Consciousness. The awarenesses which
twelve path conditions that assist in leading away to liberation. (19) are conditioned by traces are of thirty-two kinds, viz., (3a1-23), (3b1-5)
Connected condition: the conditioning a set of factors that occur in the and (3c1-4). This is known from the fact that these awarenesses are
same place or with the same object have for each other. (20) maturations of karma and thus require conditioning through stored karma.
Dissociation conditions which condition the factors that do not have the Otherwise everyone would experience every kind of awareness
same basis or object, etc. (21) Presence condition, conditioning by being indiscriminately.
present, of seven sorts: immaterial aggregates, great elements, the (E462-466; T628-635) All conditioned awarenesses occur either
psychophysical complex, awarenesses and mental associates, faculties, during an individual's life or at the moment of rebirth-linking. Among
and entities. In each case when a factor occurs of one of these kinds it the thirty-two kinds of awareness listed in the previous paragraph, 13
is assisted by others of that kind. (22) Nonexistent conditions are those (viz., (3a1-7) and (3a17-22)) occur only during life while the remaining
which by ceasing previously assist in causing the arising of another 19 can occur either during life or at conception. The process during life
factor. (23) Disappearance conditions, the same factors as the is reviewed following the bhavariga pattem.
nonexistent condition, since they have disappeared when the effect arises. (E466-470; T635-641) Now the operations of karma at death and
(24) Nondisappearance conditions, the factors that constitute the presence birth are explored. One can consider karma (a) as mixed with matter or
condition (21), since they have not disappeared at the time of the arising not, and whether even if so mixed it has masculine or feminine nature (at
of the effect. the level of desire) or neither (as at the material level); (b) as to whether
This section follows the Patthāna, quoting liberally from it. the birth is egg-born, womb-born, born of moisture (e.g., sweat), or
156 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 157

constructed, (c) in terms of its varieties of outcome; (d) according to its then reanalyzed to show the same thing under the respective headings.
stations of consciousness; (e) according to the abodes of beings. A (E472-475; T644-649) (4) The psychophysical complex.
passage ensues which describes death and rebirth-linking, emphasizing Consciousness is the condition for the psychophysical complex
(nāmarūpa) -- "'Oma " meaning the three aggregates of feeling,
that the process which pushes karma on to the next life involves desire r

and traces which operate whether or not there is any supporting entity, identification and traces, "rūpa" meaning the material aggregate. The
just as a man crosses a river by hanging on to a rope tied to a tree on the factors involved can be reckoned in various ways, depending on whether
bank--the conditions which operate may merely involve the object we are considering the psychophysical complex that determines rebirth or
condition, etc. Thus the series' parts are related neither by identity nor the complex that occurs during a lifetime.
difference. Not identity, for then curd could not come from milk, and not (E472-478; T649-652) (5) The six organs are conditioned by the
difference, for the same reason. psychophysical complex. It is explained in detail how nāma and rūpa
Question: Then why must the fruits of karma one experiences be and the two together condition either the sixth sense, viz., the mind, or
one's own? And anyway, who is there to experience anything? the five exclusive of mind, or all six together, at rebirth and during life.
Answer: It is like the fruit growing from the seed: the seed contains (E478-479; T652-654) (6) Contact is of six kinds corresponding to
traces which are responsible for the maturing of its fruits and not another the six organs. In all there are thirty-two kinds of consciousness
seed 's; but the traces do not exist when the fruit arises. As for who resulting, viz., five good (3a1-5), five bad (3a17-21), and twenty-two
experiences, the notion of an experiencer is merely conventional. associated kinds of resultant consciousness (3a6-16, 3a22-23, 3bl-5 and
Objection: But even so, these traces must produce the fruit either 3c 1-4).
when they are present or when they are not present. If it is when they But which are the six that condition the arising of these thirty-two
are present, they can't produce maturations of karma in a time future to kinds of consciousness? There are two different theories. According to
the seed's existence, and if it is when they are not present, they should be the first, the six are the six organs including the mind. According to the
bearing fruit all the time. second, it includes these as well as the corresponding six "external '
Answer: Traces are conditions of their fruit not because of being dyatanas, viz., the color, sound, taste, etc., grasped by the organs.
present or not present, but rather because the act in question has been Several of the organs jointly condition their resultants--e.g., eye
performed. It is just as in ordinary life: an agent's activity--buying contact is produced from the visual organ and the mind, from the mental
something, say--is the condition for completing the transaction, and once organ functioning as visual consciousness, and from the "factor organ "
the activity is over it does not bear any further fruit. consisting of the remaining associated factors.
(E470-472; T641-644) Now it is shown which of the traces are (E479-480; T654-655) (7) Feelings. These can be classed as six
operative in bringing about which kinds of resultant awarenesses both at according to the "door," i.e., organ, that conditions them, or as ninety-
the time of birth and during life in each of the several stages. So, eight when classified in association with the 89 kinds of consciousness.
referring once again to the eighty-nine consciousness-factors as before, (E480-481; T655-657) (8) Desire. Again, these are of six kinds
the good factors (lal-8) condition, as karmic condition and decisive depending on the door involved--they are so named after their contents
support condition, the kinds of resultant consciousness (3a8-I6) at birth in the Vibhańga. But each of the six has three kinds depending on
in a happy life on the level of desire. (lbl-5) likewise produce (3b1-5) whether it occurs as sense-desires respectively for visible, etc., things; as
at birth in the material level. On the other hand, (lal-8) produce (3al-7) the desire for becoming when it involves greed conditioned by the view
during a life in the realm of desire in a happy course, but not at birth; that things are continuants (etemalism); and as the desire for
they also produce (3a1-2) and (3a6-8) on the material level in a happy nonbecoming when it involves greed accompanied by the view that
course, of (3a1-8) on the level of desire in unhappy lives, (2a1-12) everything is destruction (nihilism). So there are eighteen kinds. But
condition at birth on the level of desire in an unhappy course, but not since each of the eighteen can be considered with respect to both one's
during life; of (3a17-22) during life but not at birth, and so on. This is own contents and with respect to the contents of others, they become
158 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 159

thirty-six in number, and when one remembers they can be past, present happiness and frustration.
or future the number becomes one hundred eight. 4. Question: What is its emptiness?
(E481-483; T657-660) (9) Clinging. There are four kinds of clinging: Answer: These twelve things are devoid of permanence, of beauty, of
(i) clinging to sense-desires, (ii) clinging to false views, (iii) clinging to happiness, of self-nature.
monastic vows, (iv) clinging to the theory of a self. These are unpacked (E489-495; T668-678) Among these twelve items in the chain of
into a large number of factors. dependent origination the first two, ignorance and traces, belong to the
(E483-487; T660-665) (10) Becoming. It has two kinds. The former past, the next eight belong to the present, and the last two, birth and
(karmabhava) is volition together with the factors associated with it such aging (and death) belong to the future.
as higher faculties, etc. The latter (upapattibhava) , comprises the As to the causal roles the items play in rebirth-linking, a verse is
aggregates produced by karma, of nine kinds according to the Vibhańga offered which speaks of "five causes in the past" (viz., ignorance, traces,
(namely, the coming to be of desire, matter, immaterial things, desires, clinging and becoming, which are conditions for linking to the
" "
identification, nonidentification, neither identification nor status gained in the next birth), a fivefold result (viz., consciousness,
nonidentification, existence in one group, in four groups and in five the psychophysical complex, the six senses, contact and feeling, which
groups). The factors associated with each are explained, and it is also are the things conditioned by those five causes just mentioned), "five
explained in detail which kinds of clinging are conditions for which kinds causes in the present" (viz., desire, clinging, becoming, traces associated
"
of becoming. with them, and ignorance which is their concurrent condition), and in the
(E487-; T665-) (11-12) "Birth, etc., " by which is meant the karmic future five kinds of result" (viz. consciousness, the psychophysical
process leading to the gradations of kinds of rebirth. These involve complex, the six senses, contact and feeling).
sorrow, etc., and can also be referred to under this term. A final section considers the chain of dependent origination or wheel
of becoming from several additional points of view: as to how it can be
Part Two: The Wheel of Becoming classified under the headings of the four noble truths; as to the functions
of each of the twelve items, largely repetitive of things said earlier; as to
(E488-489; T666-668) Dependent origination should be viewed as
a wheel without beginning, spinning ceaselessly, without any creator or how understanding several of the items prevents one from wrong views;
experiencer of it--this is its emptiness. But four questions are raised. as to similes by which the understanding of the working of the chain and
its members can be assisted; as to the profoundness of implication for
1. Question: If it is a continuous wheel, ignorance, the first of the
understanding, for law, for teaching it, and for the penetration of its
twelve members of the chain, must have a cause. What is that cause?
insights.
Answer: It is "sorrow, " etc., which always involve ignorance. Or, as
"
said in Madhyamāgama I. 54, when there is the arising of contaminants
there is the arising of ignorance", and it is the contaminants that give rise Chapter 18: Purification of Views
(E496-504; T679-692) It was said (in Chapter 14, T379; E488) that
to sorrow, etc.
wisdom is cultivated "having perfected the 'roots ' of wisdom--the
2. Question: How does this wheel of becoming have no beginning,
since ignorance is identified as its beginning? purification of virtue, the purification of awareness--and then developing
Answer: No, for ignorance is listed first not only because it is the the five purifications of the 'trunk,' namely (1) purification of view,
(2) purification of overcoming doubt, (3) purification through knowledge
first but because it is fundamental, being both basic to the production of
bondage and basic for one who by abandoning it achieves liberation from and vision of what the path is and what it is not, (4) purification by
knowledge and vision of the path, and (5) purification by knowledge and
bondage.
vision." The purification of virtue was explained in Chapters 1 and 2,
3. Question: How is it that there is no creator nor experiencer?
Answer: There is no creator such as Brahmā that makes the round of and the purification of awareness in Chapters 3 through 13. The present
rebirths, and there is no single self that experiences all these states of chapter begins the discussion of the five purifications of the 'trunk,' viz.,
160 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 161

purification of view. karma remembered at the time of death and thus determining his next
Purification of view is right vision of the psychophysical complex. birth; (iv) stored up karma, karma not included under the previous three
The psychophysical complex can be classified from various and bringing about rebirth-linking in the absence of the others ' operation.
perspectives--(i) by studying either nāma or rūpa first and then (3) Karma can again be classified as (i) productive karma, producing
understanding the other as support, etc.; (ii) classified under the eighteen material and immaterial maturations, good or bad, both at the time of
elements; (iii) classified under 12 organs; (iv) classified under the rebirth and during life; (ii) consolidating karma that prolongs the type of
aggregates; (v) classified in brief under the four elements. In one of experience--satisfying or frustrating--produced by the maturation of karma
these fashions one learns to distinguish the material from the immaterial. of types (i) or (iv); (iii) attenuating karma, which gradually diminishes the
If he fails to accomplish this he should continue examining materiality, type of experience produced by karma of types (i) or (iv); (iv)
until he begins to discriminate the awarenesses associated with supplanting karma, which terminates weak karma and makes its own
sense-contacts from the physical characteristics of the things contacted. result arise.
In this way he distinguishes the matter aggregate from the other four Having seen all these twelve kinds of karma and realizing that the
aggregates, which are collectively nāma, and realizing that all factors are entire psychophysical complex is due to conditioning by one or more of
exhausted under one or the other of these categories of nāma and rāpa, them, he understands that in the past as well as in the future the
he understands that there is no self distinct from these factors. The conditioning also holds, and thus he comes to understand that nothing
chapter concludes with citation of similes that have been offered to makes (kr) any result except karma itself, that there is no maker over and
illustrate this point. beyond the makings, and so his doubts about whether he--something over
and beyond the series of makings--exists, existed in the past or will exist
Chapter 19: Purification by Overcoming Doubt in the future, disappear.
(E505-511; T693-703) The "doubt" in question is the doubt whether
Chapter 20: Purification by Knowledge and of The Path and
I existed in the past and will continue to exist in the future. This is
"overcome " by examining carefully the conditions for the psychophysical What It Is Not
complex, that is, the conditions under which I exist. First I reflect that (E512-517; T704-713) After doubts have been overcome one should
' next develop that point of view of insight involving understanding of the
there always are such conditions--that I don t exist conditionlessly--and
second, I consider that karma and its results summarize those conditions groups. This understanding comes in three worldly varieties: (i)
as taught in such teachings as dependent origination, which I may study understanding of what is known, (ii) understanding as investigating, and
by considering it both in its given order as well as the reverse order. (iii) understanding as abandoning. (i) involves understanding the
Karma can be classified in various ways. (1) As of four kinds, characteristic specific features of the factors, the materials for which have
explained as (i) the volition of the first impulsion among the seven been set forth in Chapters 18 and 19. (ii) involves understanding what
awarenesses in a single cognition, whether good or bad, gives rise to its general features, e.g., impermanence, characterize groups of factors; it is
result in the same lifetime; (ii) the volition of the seventh impulsion in set forth in this chapter and the next through the contemplation of the rise
the series produces its result in the next life; (iii) the volitions of the five and fall. (iii) is that understanding which consists in not seeing general
impulsions in between give rise to their results in a future lifetime when features such as permanence. It is set forth in the remainder of Chapter
the opportunity is provided and never lapses; (iv) lapsed karma is karma 21.
of type (i) that cannot produce its result in this lifetime; it lapses and does Understanding of the groups is set forth in a long passage in the
Patisambhidhāmagga, here quoted.
not produce any result.
(2) Karma can also be classified as (i) heavy, very bad or very good It explains how the adept should practise meditation on the factors.
karma such as matricide or action in the higher levels; (ii) habitual karma Next Buddhaghosa describes various methods for strengthening
which is repeated and thus matures quicker than otherwise; (iii) vivid understanding of the general features of factors, such as
162 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES AGGA
VISUDDHIM 163

impermanence--some forty such features in all. Factors are to be the three features in question; (6) those material factors that are
understood as impermanent, frustating, disease, boils, darts, calamities, conditioned by consciousness arise either when one is happy or
afflictions, etc. The number can be calculated as fifty by adding ten dissatisfied but not both, and so they have the three features; (7) all
more. He also describes nine ways of sharpening one 's senses, counsels material factors have as their nature materiality; the meditator realizes that
avoiding the seven unsuitable things as was explained in the section about any such factor goes through stages--e.g., a branch of the aśoka-tree is
the earth kasina (Ch. 4) and cultivating their suitable opposites, and first pink, then red, then green, then darker as it withers--and so the three
explains that one should distinguish what is material from what is features are once again found.
immaterial and meditate on them at different times. (E528-530; T728-731) The immaterial factors are likewise found to
(E517-520; T713-719) Matter is produced from four kinds of have the three characteristics. There are two methods for seeing this: (i)
conditions--karma, awareness, food and temperature. Each is discussed the method following the Viśuddhikathā, and (ii) following the noble
in turn, explaining what precisely is produced by each. As far as the first kw/O. " In the treatment here the latter method is followed. An immaterial
condition, karma, is concerned, it produces the factors (3a1-3b5) plus factor is found to have the three characteristics since (1) each awareness
seventy kinds of matter. The eighty-nine kinds of awareness produce the can be grasped by a subsequent one as impermanent, frustrating and not
three immaterial aggregates and seventeen kinds of matter comprising the self; (2) each awareness x by which one grasps a material factor as
nine starting with sound, bodily consciousness, verbal consciousness, the having the three characteristics, together with the awareness y that grasps
space element, lightness, pliancy, adaptability, growth, and continuity. that x, form a pair which in tum can be grasped (by a third awareness (z))
Matter born of food includes fourteen items and eight kinds of stuff, as having the three features; (3) one can grasp that any awareness occurs
space, lightness, pliancy, adaptability, growth and continuity. Matter at and is limited to a moment and disappears thereafter; (4) these methods
conditioned by temperature includes sound, smell, taste, feminine and can be extended into indefinite series of awarenesses about any such
masculine faculties, life faculty, heart, bodily intimation, vocal intimation, series where it can be grasped that that series has the three characteristics;
space, lightness, pliancy, adaptability, growth and continuity--15 in all. (5) by removal of false views one grasps that all factors have the three
(E520-521; T719-720) The process by which awareness of immateri- features; (6) by overcoming pride one does so; (7) by bringing an end to
al factors arises is reviewed; it has the same stages as the process of attachment one does so.
awareness of material factors described at E385-387; T5I3-518. (E530-53I; T732-734) There are eighteen principal insights which
(E521-528; T720-728) Turning to (ii) understanding of the general one practises as a meditator now that one has understood the material and
characteristics, of which there are three (frustration, momentariness, no immaterial factors in the foregoing manner. These eighteen are:
self), one may meditate on either the material factors or the immaterial (1) the contemplation of impermanence
ones in seven aspects. As to material factors, (1) they are taken up (at (2) the contemplation of frustration
rebirth-linking) and put down (at death), showing the impermanence, (3) the contemplation of selflessness
frustratingness, and selflessness of such factors; (2) they mature and (4) the contemplation of aversion
decay, showing the same things; (3) those material factors that are (5) the contemplation of nonattachment
conditioned by food (see E517-520; T713-719) have the same three (6) the contemplation of cessation
features since those factors that occur while one is hungry disappear (7) the contemplation of abandonment
before one is satisfied, while those that occur before one is hungry again (8) of destruction
disappear also; (4) those material factors that are conditioned by (9) of vanishing
temperature (cf. E517-520; T713-719) occur when it is hot or cold but no (10) of change
one of them is sustained during both periods; (5) those material factors (11) of the signless
that are born of karma are such that any one such factor that occurs in the (12) of the aimless
visual door is absent in the other doors, and so forth, and so they have (13) of emptiness
164 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 165

(14) of higher wisdom on danger, he loses interest in all conditioned factors and sees no joy in
(15) of the awareness of things as they are them; (6) knowledge of desire for liberation: thus losing interest, he
(16) of disadvantage comes to desire liberation from all conditioned factors; (7) knowledge of
(17) of reflection contemplation of reflection: so .desiring, he now reflects on the three
(18) of turning away characteristics in their application to all conditioned factors in order to
In attaining each of these insights one comes to abandon its opposite in develop a path to liberation through recognizing the emptiness of them
each case, e.g., one comes to abandon the notion of permanence by (1), all; (8) knowledge of equanimity about conditioned things: one thus
of satisfyingness by (2), etc. becomes completely indifferent to all conditioned factors.
(E531-534; T734-738) Now the meditator proceeds to contemplate the (E553-556; T766-772) The meditator now settles on one of the three
rise and fall of all things, i.e., the fact that everything is conditioned and characteristics and adopts it as a gateway to liberation. One who adopts
so subject to immediate decay. Thus various aspects of the noble truths, impermanence as his gateway leads to the signless liberation; who adopts
the chain of dependent origination, the truth that causality is continuous frustratingness as his gateway leads to desireless liberation; who adopts
(thus precluding nihilism) but that every effect is new (thus precluding selflessness as his gateway leads to emptiness liberation. It is noted that
eternalism). Understanding thus he once again understands the in "the Abhidhamma" there are only two gateways to liberation, viz., the
selflessness and the frustrating features of all things. last two, and this is explained in a passage from the Patisambhidāmagga,
(E534-538; T739-744) There are ten imperfections of insight. They quoted here.
do not arise for a noble person who has fully understood or for immoral This knowledge of equanimity conditions seven kinds of noble
persons, but only for those moral ones who are meditating assiduously persons: (1) one who understands impermanence, the faith-follower at the
but who are beginners. These ten imperfections constitute distractions. time of entry into the stream who then becomes (2) the one liberated by
They are: (1) brightness, (2) knowledge, (3) joy, (4) tranquility, (5) faith. When he understands frustratingness he is called a (3) body
satisfaction, (6) resolve, (7) determination, (8) establishing, (9) witness, and when he reaches the higher meditations (4) one liberated
equanimity, and (10) attachment. The idea is that the meditator is both ways. When in addition he understands selflessness he becomes (5)
distracted by each of these accompaniments to meditation, so that a dharma-follower at the moment of entering the path, (6) one who has
attachment to them becomes an obstacle to further success, even though attained vision, and (7) finally, one liberated by insight.
they are not bad things in themselves. In the list of the eight kinds of knowledge in the previous section the
last three--viz., knowledge of contemplation of disenchantment,
Chapter 21: Purification by Knowledge and Vision of the Path knowledge of contemplation of reflection, and knowledge of equanimity
(E539-553; T745-766) Insight culminates in eight knowledges, with about traces--are three names for the same state, the difference consisting
conformity to truth as the ninth. The eight are: (1) knowledge of the rise in the first naming the beginning of it, the second the middle, and the
third the end.
and fall of things (discussed in the previous chapter), which allows the
meditator to see the three characteristics clearly; (2) knowledge of the (E556-561; T772-778) Attainment of the eighth knowledge--knowle-
contemplation of dissolution, when one realizes that conditioned factors dge
e of equanimity about traces--leads to the culmination of insight and
are destroyed and thus sees the three characteristics, he does not further mergence on the path. The kinds of emergence are classified into
eighteen varieties depending on which type of insight one starts from.
grasp such factors and so is not further reborn; (3) knowledge of
appearance (of things) as fearful: one so meditating comes to see all This insight and emergence is then illustrated by twelve similes,
conditioned factors as continually ceasing: what he sees is fearful, but he beginning with stories about a bat, a black snake, a house, oxen, etc.
does not fear it; (4) knowledge of contemplation of danger: meditating d (E561-563; T778-782) It is argued in this section that it is the
thus, he realizes there is no recourse from destruction in any conditioned ifferences in knowledge of equanimity about traces that governs the
di
thing; (5) knowledge of contemplation of disenchantment: meditating thus fferences in enlightenment, type of path and meditative stage, in
166 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 167

opposition to three other theories about what governs these things. Each he practises conformity knowledge. Every sign and activity seem to him
of these three theories counts the factors of enlightenment, of the path to block enlightenment. For such a one who has practised this conformity
'
and of the stage of meditation as different in number from the other two knowledge change-of-lineage knowledge ensues, an awareness whose
theories. The first theory (attributed by Dhammapāla to Cūlanāga) says object is nirvana. This awareness is the first adverting to this new
it is the meditative stage used as the basis for insight leading to meditative object, and thus indicates the entering (of the meditator) into
emergence that governs the difference in these numbers. The second a new lineage, the lineage of the nobles. (Various analogies are offered
(ascribed by Dhammapāla to Mahadatta) says it is rather the aggregates to illustrate this.)
which are the objects of the insight that make the difference. The third (E569-571; T788-792) This first adverting is immediately followed
theory (ascribed by Dhammapala to Cūlabhayā) says that it is the by two or three resultant awarenesses that are transcendent and good.
individual intention of the meditator that governs. However, since (Other accounts of the number of resultant awarenesses are considered
knowledge of equanimity of traces is present at each point of arrival at and rejected.) One who has arrived at this point, after these two or three
"
enlightenment, a path or a meditative stage, Buddhaghosa contends that resultant awarenesses, is called "second noble, since he is now on the
it is these awarenesses constituting that knowledge that in each case path and must attain liberation after seven rebirths.
governs the number and distinctions in these three aspects of progress. The stream-enterer now reviews the path, the resultant awareness, and
(E563-565; T782-784) As the meditator develops this knowledge of the defilements he has abandoned along with those still to be
equanimity about traces he sinks into the bhavatiga, after which overcome, and he meditates on liberation. The once-returner and
mind-door adverting occurs in which one attends to traces as fleeting or non-returner also review all these five things when they arrive on their
frustrating or not-self. After this comes the first impulsion awareness, paths, but the arhat, having no defilements left to overcome, does not
and the process leading to it is called " concentration " (P. parikamma). meditate on any such. So the total number of reviewings on the way to
After that a second impulsion awareness arises with the same kind of nirvana is nineteen.
content, and this is called "access-concentration" (upacāra). The third Next the stream-enterer strives for the next stage--that of
impulsion awareness constitutes adaptation (anuloma)--but adaptation to once-returner--by reducing his desires and passions, and he goes through
what? To the truth involved in the eight kinds of insight knowledge that the same series of meditations about the traces as was explained in the
preceded and the thirty-seven allies of enlightenment which are to follow. previous chapters. And in due course conformity and change-of-lineage
So the ninth stage of the path is conformity to knowledge, the last stage awarenesses arise and he becomes a once-returner, and is called "third
which takes traces as the object of meditative awareness. noble." The "fourth noble" is the once-returner when he has experienced
the resultant awarenesses which follow upon this arising of the
Chapter 22: Purification of Knowledge and Vision conformity and change-of-lineage awarenesses.
(E566-568; T785-788) Next comes "change-of-lineage" knowledge. In a parallel fashion the once-retumer now strives to eliminate desires
It falls between the purification by knowledge and vision of the path, just and passions altogether, and going through the same stages arrives at a
discussed, and the purification by knowledge and vision about to be meditative insight which is called the "fifth noble" and is the beginning
discussed, so it doesn 't strictly fall within either, although it conforms of the stage of non-returner. The non-returner who experiences the
with its precedents as being a kind of insight. resultant awarenesses that follow is the "sixth noble."
The purification of knowledge and vision, the subject of the present And now this non-returner strives to reach the fourth stage (of arhat)
chapter, is the understanding of the four paths of stream-enterer, by eliminating all passions in the immaterial as well as the material
once-returner, non-returner and arhat. meditative levels, as well as eliminating pride, agitation and ignorance,
The meditator who has arrived at the ninth kind of knowledge by goes through the meditative process once again and arrives at the stage
passing through the others has thereby reached the first of these paths (of of arhat, the "seventh noble." And experiencing the resultant
stream-enterer). The awareness of such a one recoils from every trace as awarenesses this arhat is known as the "eighth noble." He is now
168 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 169

occupying his final embodiment, has laid down his burden, reached the Once again a long quote from Patisambhidāmagga is given to answer
final goal of liberation. a sophistical argument designed to show that the abandoning of
(E571-581; T792-808) The next section indicates the stages the defilements, etc., cannot come about since the defilements cannot be past,
seeker goes through along the path to enlightenment in the fashion present or future consonant with the teaching. The answer is explained
followed earlier which relates the stages to the factors involved. by Buddhaghosa as involving analysis of the several meanings of terms
Thus, the fulfilment of the states sharing in enlightenment relates to indicating past, present and future time. For example, the tens "arisen"
thirty-seven factors--four applications of mindfulness, four right exertions, is shown to have at least eight different meanings as applied to different
four supernatural powers, five faculties, five powers, seven limbs of kinds of cases or contexts. To say something has arisen may be to say
enlightenment and the eightfold path. The four applications of (1) that it is occurring now, (2) that it has been and gone, (3) that it has
mindfulness are here the constant awareness that (1) the body, (2) been laid down (e.g., karmic t races) and will ripen eventually, (4) that it
feelings, (3) consciousness and (4) factors are foul, frustrating, nonetemal, has arisen in potentiality (say, on that plane), (5) that it is happening
not self; and they bring about the abandoning of their opposites, the (same as (1), a fact noted by Buddhaghosa himself), (6) that it has arisen
awarenesses of cleanliness, satisfaction, eternality and self-nature in those in virtue of having been seen on a previous occasion (e.g., a defilement
four. The four right exertions follow, since the one who is constantly due to seeing something inauspicious), (7) that it has not been suppressed
aware as just described abandons bad things already arisen, preventing the yet, (8) that, though suppressed, it is still not abolished since the
arising of bad things not yet arisen, arousing unarisen good things, and possibility of its rearising has not yet been cut off.
maintaining good things already arisen. The four supernatural powers, (E581-588; T808-818) When one arrives at truth during any one of
which are higherworldly as well as worldly, lead to success in pursuing the four path knowledges, that knowledge is said to perform four
the subsequent stages of the path. The five faculties and five powers functions at once, viz., full-understanding, abandoning, realizing and
were explained earlier, as were the seven limbs of enlightenment and the developing. Each of these is explained as penetrating respectively each
eightfold path. of the four noble truths--thus such a knowledge at one and the same
A section now details which of these thirty-seven factors are meditat- moment understands fully frustration, understands the cause of frustration
ed on in the earlier stages of the path. When one arrives at the four by understanding its abandonment, understands the path by understanding
kinds of awareness just described (corresponding to the stream-enterer, its development, and understands cessation of frustration by realizing it.
etc.) all thirty-seven factors are meditated on in one single awareness, and The four functions are also explained and analyzed independently. Thus,
the resultant awareness cognizes thirty-three (thirty-seven minus the 4 full understanding is said to be of three kinds: fully understanding
right efforts). (something) by having complete direct awareness of it, fully
A lengthy quotation from the Patisambhidāmagga follows which understanding it by investigating it completely (in terms of the kinds of
explains how the various elements in the eightfold path emerge from distinctions developed in the present work), fully understanding it by
entry onto each of the four paths of stream-enterer, etc., and how the abandoning it. Abandoning is also divided into three: abandoning by
various powers are combined in these in the course of these paths. suppressing, abandoning by suppressing opposites, and abandoning by
Likewise, the factors that need to be abandoned, and how they are to be cutting off. Eighteen varieties of the second (designated as " 18 great
abandoned, are rehearsed once again, beginning with the fetters, insights") are detailed. Realizing has two kinds: ordinary and
ot
defilements, wrongness, worldly factors, stinginess, perversions, knots, herworldly. Since the otherworldly can be divided into view and
wrong path, contaminants, floods, obstructions, adherence, clingings, practice, one could also count three kinds. Worldly realizing involves the
proclivities, impurities, bad paths of action and bad arisings of awareness. arrival at the first meditative state and so on, when one thinks " I have
Then it is explained how each of the varieties of these factors is realized this stage". Realizing as vision is the seeing of liberation at the
overcome by which of the four kinds of knowledge (of the stream-enterer, time of arriving on the first path, and realizing as developing is that
once-returner, non-returner and arhat). awareness of liberation at the other moments during progression on the
170 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 171

path. Finally, developing, the fourth function, is likewise divided into insight achieves a fruit, in the meditative stage relating to the path he has
two, worldly and otherworldly. arrived at, but he does not achieve the result of the entire path until he
has travelled it.
Chapter 23 : 6. How does the meditator make the noble fruit last? By not
The Benefits of Developing Understanding meditating on signs, by meditating on the dharma without signs (viz.,
(E589-592; T819-824) The last question (in Chapter 14, T698) was liberation), and then through prior volition to emerge from meditation at
" What are the benefits in developing understanding?" Though these a particular time.
benefits are impossible to summarize completely, still one may divide 7. How does the meditator emerge from the noble fruit? By thinking
them into the following four major classes: (1) removal of the many on signs and not meditating on elements without signs.
defilements, (2) experiencing the taste of the " noble fruit," (3) the ability 8. What comes next after the noble fruit? Either more fruition or else
to obtain cessation, and (4) achievement of worthiness to receive gifts, the bhavariga.
etc. The " noble fruit" is explained as the outcome of the paths of 9. What does the fruit immediately follow? Fruition comes either
stream-entering, etc., not merely the abandoning of the fetters, etc. A through the path, after (a previous) fruition, after change-of-lineage
number of questions are asked about this "fruit." insight, or after the organ which is neither identification nor
1. What is it to attain it? To become absorbed in the cessation in nonidentification.
which it consists. (E592-598; T824-833) Concerning the ability to achieve cessation a
2. Who do and 3. Who do not attain it? Ordinary men do not, and similar series of questions is now asked and answered.
all arhats do attain " noble fruit. " In addition, each of the 1. What is the attainment of cessation? The nonoccurence of
three--stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner--attain fruit appropriate awareness and the concomitants of awareness.
to their stage. It is to be noted that there are those who think that the 2. Who attains cessation? Non-returners with cankers destroyed attain
stream-enterer and once-returner do not reach the "noble fruit, " but only it.
the non-returner and arhat, because only the latter show achievement in 3. Who do not attain it? Ordinary stream-enterers, once-returners,
meditation. But this is to be rejected, since if to show achievement in non-returners or arhats do not attain it. These lack, but the attainers
meditation were all that is required for the results to be called " noble possess, two powers of serenity and insight, the tranquilization of three
fruit," even ordinary persons who succeed in their meditations would be traces--verbal ones in the second meditative level, bodily ones in the third
so-called. level, and breathing in and out in the fourth level, sixteen kinds of
4. Why do arhats attain the " noble fruit" ? To experience the exercise of knowledge, nine kinds of exercise of concentration, and five
satisfaction accruing. kinds of mastery--in adverting, attaining, resolving, emerging and
5. How does attaining it come about? Through meditating on nothing reviewing. A lengthy quotation from Patisambhidāmagga explains these.
but liberation. That is, after attaining the change-of-lineage knowledge 4. Where do they attain it? In the state involving all five aggregates.
about traces the meditator's awareness becomes absorbed in cessation In the state involving only four aggregates (the disembodied state) one
since his fruit has come about, and here it is just the fruit, not the path, cannot attain the first meditative level, so cessation is not available there.
that arises even in a seeker. 5. Why do they attain it? Because they are tired of traces and wish
Objection: When a stream-enterer arrives at insight he becomes a to reach the state without awareness.
once-returner, and a once-returner achieving insight becomes a 6. How does this attainment of cessation come about? One who
non-returner. strives with serenity and insight causes the cessation of the awareness of
Answer: Then a non-returner becomes an arhat, an arhat a self the neither-identification-nor-nonidentification stage. One who strives
-enlightdBua,self-nightdBua .th with serenity but not insight reaches the fruit of the neither-identification-
is nonsense. The correct view is that even the seeker when he arrives at nor-nonidentification stage and remains there; one who strives with
172 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VISUDDHIMAGGA 173
insight but not serenity attains the fruit of his endeavors and remains there. It is the one who follows the fourth path who is termed liberated
there; but one who strives with both reaches cessation. This is the and who follows the path of purification, who attains noble understanding
account in brief. There follows a detailed review of the conditions under and unties the knot; it is he who is worthy of reverence.
which meditation ensues, and the order of attainments from meditation. After the Visuddhimagga Buddhaghosa is said to have written four
We are also told what the meditator who reaches the stage of meditation works conceming the Buddhist Agamas or Pāli canon. These are titled
on nothingness does: it involves four things, (i) being without property Sumańgalavilāsinī, Sāratthappakāsinī, Papañcasūdanī and
of his own, he uses others ' bed, bowl and robe, etc., but does not damage Manorathapūranī. A brief account of their contents may be found in
them; (ii) availability to the order; (iii) availability to the master 's B.C.Law, op. cit., pp. 82-87. These four works are supposed to be
summons; (iv) close attention to the length of his expected life; the last followed by commentaries on the seven books of the Pali
because, since one can 't die during cessation, he will be inadvertently Abhidhammapitaka.
brought out of meditation if he has to die during the required period (here
specified as seven days).
7. How is cessation made to last? It lasts as long as it is 48.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa),
predetermined to do so, unless it is interrupted by death, the behest of the Atthasālinī on the Dhammasańganī
order, or the master 's summons. It is commonly said that Buddhaghosa wrote commentaries on the
8. How does emergence from cessation come about? Either by not seven Theravāda Abhidharma works. However, there are reasons to think
returning in the case of the non-returner, or through attainment of the that the author of these commentaries was not the same person as the
state of arhat. author of the 47.Viśuddhimagga. The reasons for this are neatly summed
9. On what does one who has emerged think? On liberation. up by N. /A. Jayawickrama." The author of works #48-54 identifies
10. What is the difference between one who has attained and one who himself in various places as having been requested by Buddhaghosa to
is dead? Though for both traces have ceased, for the attainer life has write these commentaries, and makes no claim to having been the author
'
ceased, but not for the dead person; the dead person s faculties are still of the ViSuddhimagga and the Agama commentaries which Buddhaghosa
whole, while those of the attainer have broken up. wrote. When he cites these latter works he always treats them as
11. Is the attainment of cessation conditioned or unconditioned? The authoritative works by someone else. Finally, P. V. Bapat has pointed out
question does not arise, because there is no essential nature to ask about. twenty-five instances where the interpretations in the Atthasālinī differ
"
Likewise with other questions, such as whether cessation is worldly or from those in ViSuddhimagga and the Agama commentaries. It seems
otherworldly, etc. likely that the author of the seven Abhidharma works that follow was a
(E598-599; T833-835) The one who is able to attain cessation is also Ceylonese pupil of Buddhaghosa. On the other hand, the author(s) of
worthy of being paid reverence in the form of gifts and offerings. In these works #s 48-54 sometimes refer to himself (themselves?) as author
particular, one who understands the first path with sluggish insight and of the Visuddhimagga, which is not decisive either, as students are
limp faculties is one who will be reborn seven times at most; with regularly known in India to ascribe their works to their teachers.
medium insight and medium faculties is one who goes for two or three " "
E references are to the edition by P.V.Bapat and R.D.Vadekar,
rebirths from noble family to noble family; with sharp insight and keen Bhandarkar Oriental Series No. 3, Poona 1942. " T " refers to the
faculties he is a once-returner. Such a one has obtained understanding of translation by Pe Maung Tin, The Expositor (Atthasālinf). Section
the second path. A non-returner who has developed understanding of the numbering accords with that in the summary of the Dhammasańga iī,
third path, after he has departed from this world, completes his course Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia, pp. 137-164.
either early in the next existence, more than halfway through, who
completes it without prompting, with prompting or else he is "one who Summary by Karl H. Potter
is going upstream bound for the highest gods" and becomes extinguished
174 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ATTHASALINI 175

Introduction ocean, that of method.

'
(EI-2; T2-3) The author proposes to explain the doctrine of the (E12-16;TI6-22) There follows a traditional account of the Buddha s
Buddha that was passed down through Sariputra and Ananda to the meditating and then teaching the Dhammasańgant to $āriputra and
brethren. The immediate occasion for this exposition is a request from Ananda, which took three months. Sāriputra in tum taught it to his 500
Buddhaghosa to explain the meaning of that Abhidhamma that was first pupils.
"
taught by Mahākassapa and was brought to "the peerless isle (Ceylon) (E16; T22-23) The entire corpus of the Buddha 's teachings constitutes
by Mahinda, where it was written down in the local language of
" three pitakas, five nikāyas, nine arigas and 84,000 khandas. The
"
Tambapanni . Our author announces he will eschew that language and Vinayapitaka comprises two prātimoksas (for monks and for nuns), two
"
write down on palmleaf in "the faultless tongue (presumably Pali) the vibhańgas (for monks and for nuns), 22 khandakas and 16 pravaras. As
true meaning of Abhidhamma free from the heresies of people with to the Sūtrapitaka, the Digha Nikāya comprises 34 sūtras beginning with
different views. He remarks that in his Visuddhimagga he has already the Brahmajdla; the Majjhima Nikāya comprises 152 sūtras beginning
explained matters affecting the behavior of monks, meditation and other with the Mūlapariyaya sitra; the Samyutta Nikāya comprises 7,762 sūtras
matters, and that here he will expound the declarations of the sūtras beginning with the Oghavatarañasūtra; the Ańguttara Nikāya of 9,557
(E2-6; T3-8) "Abhidharma " means what goes beyond and improves sūtras beginning with the Cittapariyadānasūtra and the Khuddaka Nikāya
comprises 15 treatises: Khuddakapātha, Dhammapdda, Udāna, Itivuttaka,
on dharma, i.e., on the sūtras. E.g., Abhidharma explains the aggregates
Suttanipdta, Vimdnavatthu, Petavatthu, Theragāthā-Therigāthā, Jdtaka,
more completely than the sūtras do; likewise, the twelve organs, eighteen
elements, etc. Abhidharma classifications include those of the sūtras as Niddeśa, Patisambhidāmagga, Apadāna, Buddhavamsa, and Cariyapitaka.
The Abhidhamma Pitaka comprises the seven books listed earlier.
well.
(E16-20; T23-29) The Vinaya Pitaka sets forth the principles (viz.
The seven works of Abhidharma are Dhammasańgan , Vibhańga,
methods relating to the seven classes of offences dealt with in the
Dhātukathā, Puggalapaññati, Kathāvatthu, Yamaka and Patthāna. The
prātimoksa and vibhańga) and precepts (viz., the methods taught in the
wranglers (vitandāvādins, explained in the Manid pa commentary to be
" remaining sections, which interpret how to follow the original ordinances
the Abhayagiri and Jetavana sectarians referred to as people of different
which guide the activities of both the body and of speech). The
views" in El-2 above) exclude Kathāvatthu and replace it with a book Sūtrapitaka shows what is good for oneself and others. And the
called Manddharmahrdaya. This account is refuted by the contention that
Abhidhamma Pitaka is the book that shows the worthwhile factors, which
the Buddha foresaw that 218 years after his own death Moggalaputra
makes understanding of them grow in one. The term "Pitaka " means both
Tissa would explain the Kathdvatthu to 1,000 monks following the Table a "basket" that contains wisdom and the study thereof. Various ways of
of Contents he (the Buddha) had laid down.
distinguishing the respective thrust of each of the three baskets are
(E6-10; T8-13) There now follows a resume of the contents of the
explained. The vinaya is taught from authority, instructs offenders, is
seven works of Abhidharma in the order cited above.
about restraint and control. The sūtra concerns popular philosophy, is
(E10-11; T13-16) There are four oceans--of repeated births, of water,
adapted to various circumstances, and refutes heretical views. The
of method and of knowledge. The ocean of repeated births has no known abhidhamma concems metaphysical truths, is directed to those who
beginning (though it is implied that there was a beginning). The ocean of
wrongly imagine a self-nature in collections of factors, speaks of the
waters is immeasurable. The ocean of method is the Tripitaka, and in distinction between nāma and rūpa.
particular the Vinaya- and Abhidharma-pitakas, by means of which the (E20-21; T31-37) The five nikāyas are identified again. The "nine
li mits of the watery ocean are made apparent, though its limits--the limits ańgas" are: (1) sūtra (including Suttavibhāga, Niddesa, Khandaka,
of the Patthāna--are not. This ocean consists of the myriad distinctions Parivara, Mańgalasūtra, Ratanasūtra, Nālakasūtra); (2) (geya) (i.e., the
taught by the Buddha as classified in the Abhidharma. Finally, the ocean Sa
myuttanikāya in verse; (3) veyyakaraña (the Abhidhammapitaka and
of knowledge is omniscience, without which the foregoing three oceans other non-versified words of the Buddha); (4) gāthā, including
cannot be understood. In the present context we have to do with the third
176 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES 177
ATTHASALINI
Dhammapada, Theragāthā, Therigāthā and those portions of the Chapter One: Triplets
suttanipāta not called sūtra and entirely in verse; (5) udāna--eighty-two (E31-39; T46-60) Buddhaghośa reviews the matikas (to be found in
suttantas in verses due to knowledge and joy; (6) itivutthaka (112 Book Three of the summary of Dhammasańganī in Volume 7 of this
"
suttantas that begin with "itivutthaka ); (7) jcitaka, the 550 birth-stories; Encyclopedia). He notes that there are fifteen divisions--one of triplets,
(8) abbhūta, about wonderful things; (9) vedalla, suttantas in the form of fourteen of pairs.
questions asked through repeated attainment of delight and understanding. Now Buddhaghoşa enters into extended explication of each of the
The entire text can be analysed into 84,000 units, and it is indicated what technical terms used in the matika. These explications utilize etymological
the principle of analysis was, and that it was self-consciously planned by derivations sometimes but not necessarily. For example, "kusala" has
those at the First Council. Examples are given of just how the Tripitaka different meanings in different contexts. Likewise with the word
was composed through the combined efforts of various teachers
"dhamma" which in context may mean a text, a causal condition, virtue,
expounding on the sūtras, and how volunteers were critically examined etc.
to ensure that they were up to the mark. The Abhidharma was composed Question: In the phrase "kusala dhamma" do both words have the
in the same way as the other two baskets, it is asserted; this is in reply same meaning or different meanings? If they have the same meaning
to critics who feel that the Abhidharma is not as authoritative as the other "kusala " , " akusala" and "avyākrta " would all have the same meaning,
two baskets. Indeed, only Buddhas can teach the Abhidharma. being synonymous with "dhamma " . But if they have different meanings
(E25-31; T37-45) Objection: If the Abhidharma had been taught by '
one couldn t ask which dhammas are the good (kusala) ones.
the Buddha it would have had an introduction (nidāna), just as other Answer: "Dhamma " has generic meaning, specified differently by
sections taught by the Buddha, e.g., Jātaka, Dhammapada, etc., have each of "kusala", " aku.sala", and "avyākrta". So the question above is
"
introductions, e.g., "one day the Blessed One was staying in Rājag;ha , unproductive.
etc. Explications of the terminology in which each of the triplets is
Answer: But since only Buddhas can teach the Abhidharma, whereas expounded.
others might well preach the dharma or prescribe for the order, no (E36; T54) "Associated with" is explained by reference to
introduction is necessary. Furthermore, Tissabhūti wrote what was Kathdvatthu as having a common origin, a common end, a common basis
intended as an introduction to Abhidharma, viz., the Padesavihārasutta, and common sense-content.
but Sumanadeva found such a thing misleading and irrelevant and
produced a one-line introdction indicating that the Buddha taught the
Abhidharma to the gods in Tavatimsa. In fact, there are two introductions (E36; T54-55) "Factors which have results" are those which
to Abhidharma, one on adhigama (the career and goal) and the other on intrinsically involve the production of results.
darśana (the teaching). Since these two relate to different moments in the (E36; T55) "Factors grasped at and favorable to grasping" are those
Buddha' s career, consideration of them will provide the necessary material and immaterial factors that are born of karma accompanied by
information about the place of teaching, the audience, the time, the the contaminants.
occasion, and the line of teachers who transmitted the Abhidharma (E37; T56) "By seeing" means by the stream-enterer, since with it he
doctrine to India and eventually to Sri Lanka. gets his first sight of nirvāna. However, since he has not yet gotten rid
of the defilements he does not really have such sight. "By development"
BOOK ONE: On the Arising of Awareness (bhāvanā) means by the last three of the paths.
Chapter One: Good Factors (E37-38; T57) "Factors whose causes are to be eliminated by neither
Section One: Relating to the Sensuous Universe (seeing nor training) " does not refer to factors not removable by either,
First Type of Awareness but rather to those factors which do not have causes removable by either
Part One: The Table of Contents (matika) insight or training.
 178 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ATTHASA
LINI 179

" Chapter One: Good Factors

(E38; T57-58) Accumulation" (ācaya) means what is accumulated
by karma and defilements, i.e., rebirth and death. " Leading to (E46-48; T73-766) The exposition in Dhammasariganī proceeds for
accumulation", then, means good and bad factors accompanied by each topic by way of question, exposition of occasions, exposition of
accumulation. "Elimination of rebirths" (apacava) is the same as nirvāña, factors, and conclusion. There are five kinds of questions: those that show
and what leads to it is the noble path. something not seen before, those that evoke discussion of what is already
" seen, those to clear up doubts, those that elicit opinions, and those that
(E39; T60-61) Confined to persons" means those factors occurring
in one's own stream. explain. The first three kinds of questions are not asked by Buddhas,
since they do not need answers to them. But the other two kinds of
Chapter Two: Pairs questions do occur to Buddhas, and the questions in this work should be
(E40; T61-62) We confine ourselves to explaining terms not already understood in those last two senses.
"
explained'in the previous section on the triplets. (E48-53; T76-85) A lengthy commentary on the phrase (on which
" "
Moral causes " (hetu) are root (mūla) conditions. There isn 't any occasion) good awarenesses relating to the sensuous universe is now
" is explained as having many
actual difference between occurring within moral causes and being given. The word "occasion (samaya)
associated with moral causes; the distinction is made occasion for spelling meanings according to context. Five meanings are selected: (1) collection
out the particular things which are accompanied by moral causes. of sufficient conditions (sāmagri); (2) the opportune moment (ksana) for
(E40; T63) " Factors have conditions (pratyaya) " which occur together gaining merit; (3) time (kāla), (4) causal condition (pratyaya), (5)
with their own completed causes. They are called " conditioned" collections of factors (samūha). The usefulness of each of these meanings
(sarhskrta). is illustrated. By showing that the causal conditions are a collection one
(E41; T63) Contaminants are things which flow out from the senses shows that there is no single agent. By showing that the moment of
or the mind. Or, they flow up to the stage of change of lineage and, like opportunity occurs infrequently one shows how difficult it is to achieve
space, to the highest place. Or they are intoxicants like the fermented merit. By indicating the shortness of the time a good thought takes we are
juices of the madira fruit. Or they catalyze the frustrations of many advised to be zealous in intuition. The other two meanings emphasize the
rebirths. multiplicity and mutual dependence of factors.
(E41; T64) Fetters are factors which bind a person. Factors which, The world of desire is now explained. Briefly, it is the realm of
becoming supporting objects, help the fetters to grow are called things (vastu) and defilements (kleśa).
"
favorable to the fetters " .
(E41; '164-65) Knots are factors that tie the person to repeated By " good" is meant either moral worth or skill. "Awareness" (citta)
rebirths. is so-called because it thinks (cit), comes in a series (cinoti) or is varied
(E41-42; T65) Those factors are called " floods" which sink the person (citra) in its effects,
into repeated rebirths. (E55-57; T88-92) The "arising of awareness" is now explained. It
(E42; T65) The perverse factors are those which, e.g., are taken to be means that awareness occurs, but it does not occur alone but with many
permanent and so handled perversely. associated factors. For worldly factors awareness is the forerunner or
principal, while for otherworldly factors intuition or wisdom is the
Chapter Three: Sūtra phrases forerunner or principal.
(E43; T68) Factors are said to be like lightning because of their (E57-59; T92-94) The rest of the terms in the opening sentence (of
inability to destroy corruptions, like thunderbolts because of their ability the summary) are explained, and sensory contents are illustrated in
to destroy corruptions completely. lengthy detail. The functions of the various phrases are explained as
follows: good factors include all stages; by specifying the sensuous
I.1.1.1.1A. Analysis of Terms universe the awarenesses of the three higher stages are excluded, leaving
180 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ATTHASALINI 181

the eightfold sensuous good awarenesses. Specifying " accompanied by from karma beginning with visual and ending with the faculty of life,
joy" reduces the relevant awarenesses to those excluding hedonic plus the four elements along with color, smell, taste and nourishing
neutrality; and " connected with knowledge" excludes two of those four, essence (ojas); (2) the qualities made from food; (3) those same qualities
those dissociated from awareness. What are left are the two types of produced from the caloric order; (4) the same born of awareness.
awareness known as "consciously prompted" and " automatic (or not Specifically, when one -thinks "I will move forward" or
"
consciously prompted)". "...backward , bodily qualities arise. The one called "fire" can move the
(E59-61; T94-98) Each sense-content comes into the "avenue" of two body, but mere attending--in the first six moments--leads to a seventh
doors, the sense-door and the mind-door. So, the visible content comes moment that sets up movement. As to the bodily qualities born of
into the avenue of the mind-door as soon as it contacts the sense-organ awareness, these are certain bodily signs which intimate or communicate
and causes the life-contiuum to vibrate. Right after this, the vibration is one's intentions or wishes. These four kinds of bodies then are " doors "
cut off through the sense-door and attention arises (or may arise), after through which bodily actions occur, as well as those of speech and mind.
which an awareness of the content occurs. This holds for the five
"
external " sense-contents; where the mind is the (sixth) sense- " door" there Chapter Two: Door of a Speech-Act
is of course no contact between sense and content. These processes are (E71-72; T114-116) The intimation (vijñapti) which accompanies
illustrated at length. language-sounds is the door of a speech act, according to the Mahā-
(E61-62; T98-99) Another way of explaining is found in the earlier Atthakathā. The Agamātthakathās construe it as sound produced by the
commentaries (atthakathā) and that distinguishes between experience, initial application of analytic attention (vitarka) and spoken in sleep or
where both doors are operative, and the gaining of information by being while in a faint, thus revealing the speaker's intention. The interpretation
told something, which does not involve actual contact with the sense- of the Patthūna is also cited.
organs.
(E62-63; T99-101) Good awareness of the " experiencing" type arises Chapter Three: Door of a Mental Act
with a content that is attractive, desirable or at least pleasing. (E72; T I16-117) The internal organ or mind is the door of the mental
Objection: How can such an awareness be good, since it is the cause act. It has different varieties according to the plane under consideration:
of greed? there are 54 kinds of mind on the level of desire, 15 on the material
Answer: Because it is the awareness of a person who practises good level, 12 on the immaterial level, and 8 in the higherworldly level.
deeds, who has his mind bent on good things. Faith, purity of views, and
other good characteristics produce awareness which is accompanied by What does a mental act make (karoti)? It is that volition (cetana7 by
joy. The thoughts of the bodhyaiigavibhañga are summed up in this which are accomplished higher or lower faculties, malice or lack of it,
connection. false or true views. It is this volition that is the "mental act "
(E63-67; T101-108)The " automatic" type of moral awareness is (manokarman).
brought about by giving, virtue or meditation. These are illustrated. It is
suggested that any sense-contents may be good if thought of in these Chapter Four: On Karma
ways--the sight, sound, smell, etc. of the monastic robe is offered as a (E73-74; T117-119) Bodily, vocal or mental karma is volition, as
case in point. cited scriptures show. Those factors associated with volition are also acts
of four varieties--(1) pure and productive of purity, (2) impure and
Part Three: On the Doors productive of impurity, (3) both pure and impure and productive of both,
Chapter One: The Door of a Bodily Act (4) neither pure nor impure and productive of neither. This fourth variety
(E67-71; T109-114) The doors of action are bodily, vocal and mental. consists of the seven aids to enlightenment and the eightfold path. These
Bodies are fourfold: (1) those grasped at, viz., material qualities arising fifteen factors together with the six mentioned in the previous chapter
 ATTHASALINI 183
182 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(higher and lower faculties, malice and lack of malice, true or false Chapter Five: On the Paths of Bad Actions
views)--are the factors associated with volition. (E79-85; T126-136) The five consciousnesses--seeing, etc.--are
The transcendent path can be classified under the three kinds of awarenesses arising through five doors--viz., visual, auditory, etc.
Volition arising through these doors is mental action, not the other two.
karma as follows: restraining wickedness of transgression by the body is
The six contacts (of eye, ear, etc. and mind) and the six doors of contact
bodily restraint of desire, and the same by speech is vocal restraint of
(talk of) desire. This pair comprehends right living. The other five are likewise explained. And the right nonrestraints (asamvāra) are those
of eye, ear, nose, tongue, touch, of the motor-body (copanakāya), speech
factors--right view, intention, effort, memory and concentration--are
included under mental restraint of desire. and mind.
(E74-79; TI19-126) Certain occasions involve action which has not These nonrestraints concern five factors, viz., immorality,
forgetfulness, ignorance, impatience and laziness. Nonrestraint arises only
been completed even though certain bodily or vocal motions have taken
place, and are classed under the rubric of " doors " . An example is a at the moment of exercitive awareness. It is then called "arisen in five
hunter who has prepared to hunt and made many bodily and vocal doors " . This nonrestraint doesn't arise for mind-contact, for volition, for
consciousness. for initial and sustained thought, but only for any one of
movements hut has not shot anything--is this bad? No, it is merely bodily
misconduct. However, the case is different with mental acts, for there it the five external sense-organs.
When the exercitive awareness by the mind-door and having a
is just the thought that constitutes the immoral act--one who intends to
supporting object of matter, etc. occurs without the help of the vocal door
kill with ill will commits a bad act even though he doesn't actually kill
and results in a purely bodily act, then it is called mind-contact. The
anything. Thus bad mental action arises in all three doors (bodily, vocal,
volition is called a bodily act and is not spoken of as by the mind-door.
mental), unlike the other two kinds of action.
Objection by a " vitaiutāvādin": No. Bad bodily action may arise in Likewise, a volition involving movement of the vocal door without the
body door is a mind-contact, but not spoken of as by the mind-door. But
the mental door. In the Kulumpasutta we are told of an infanticide carried
when the volition involves the pure mind-door without bodily or vocal
out by someone thinking evil thoughts about an embryo in some womb.
doors it is mind-contact and a mental act.
Answer: There are ten kinds of powers by which killing could take
There are eight restraints corresponding to the eight nonrestraints,
place: which is the one you have in mind?
Objector: By meditation. explained in a parallel manner.
Now ten courses of immoral action are listed: taking life, theft, wrong
Answer: No, you misunderstand the sutra.. It refers to the power
actions, falsehood, calumny, harsh speech, frivolous talk, covetousness,
gained by those who practise the kind of magic spoken of in the Atharva
ill-will and wrong view. These are explained and illustrated, with
Veda, but these magical acts--austerities, repeating certain formulas--do
reference to Buddhaghosa's Samantapasādikā on the Vinayapitaka. These
involve bodily and vocal doors, so your contention is incorrect.
ten courses can be considered as factors, as groups, as supporting objects,
A bad vocal act can arise in the bodily door, as when one " speaks"
as feelings and as roots. As factors the first seven courses are volitions
falsely by misleadingly pointing.
and the other three are accompaniments of volition. As groups the first
Objector: A bad vocal act can arise in the mental door, when a monk
seven plus wrong view are courses of action and not roots, while
remains silent rather than confess a sin that he remembers. covetousness and ill-will are both courses of action and roots. The objects
Answer: But no act has been performed--only an omission. There is
of each of the ten are explained, as are the feeling associated with each.
an offence committed, that of frustratingness, though not an act of lying.
And the roots of each are also explained.
The Buddha's authority is cited for the classification of this case as one
of omission in the vocal door, not the mental one.
Chapter Six: Courses of Good Acts
Examples are given of the varius possible combinations of acts and
(E85-86; T136-138) Likewise, there are ten courses of moral action,
doors.
the opposites of the foregoing. They are explained in parallel manner.
184 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ATTHASALINI 185

Part Four: Good Awarenesses function is forerunning, its manifestation is connecting, and its proximate
(E87-88; T141-142) " ...(A)nd they (the good awarenesses) are cause is the psychophysical complex. It is called the "forerunner"
accompanied or followed by..." (in summary of text in Volume 7). This because, like a guard at the crossroads who can see travellers coming
indicates there is no particular order in which the contents of awareness from various directions, it functions in cognizing through any of the
are cognized. Or, according to the Mahā-Atthakathā, it merely means that doors. It is "connecting " since irarises immediately following a preceding
awareness may have any content. moment of thought. As for its proximate cause, it only occurs to an
(E88-90; T142-145) Now each of the fifty-six items in 1.1.1.1.1A of organism (a mental and material complex of five aggregates).
the text are considered. Question: Is awareness different from or the same as the type of
I.Contact. It is mentioned first because it is the first relation between awareness mentioned previously above at E53=T84?
awareness and its content that arises. The characteristic feature of contact Answer: The same.
is touching; its function (rasa) is impact, its manifestation (patthāna) is Question: Then isn't the present passage redundant?
contiguity, and its proximate cause (padasthāna) is a thought-content. The Answer: Just as although there is no difference between the sun and
"
contiguity " in question is the coming together of three--the object, the its quality, heat, since they arise together although they are distinct,
organ and consciousness. And the proximate cause is the attention to it likewise though thought arises with one or more of the foregoing factors
by awareness. such as contact, etc., still it is distinct from them and so listed as distinct
(E90-91; T145-146) 2.Feeling. Its characteristic feature is being felt here.
(vedayita); its function is experience, i.e., possessing a desirable form as (E94; T151) 6. Initial thought. Characteristic feature: the initial
content; its manifestation is "taste of the mental properties " (T says the directing of one's attention to an object. Its function: the striking or
phrase is cetassika assada); and its proximate cause is tranquility. impinging of thought on its object. Its manifestation: the binding of
Experience is not confined to pleasurable only. The "taste" which feeling thought to the object.
is capable of is contrasted with the more limited experiences that contact, (E94-95; TI52-153) 7.Sustained thought. Feature: contemplation on
identification, volition and thought have of the object; it is like the the object. Function: linking the concurrent facts with its object.
contrast between the king's enjoyment of food, involving full mastery and Manifestation; the binding of thought.
expertise, and the cook ' s, who merely tastes the dishes to see if they are Sustained thought involves vibration, a mental thrill associated with
worthy of being served up. And since. it is a tranquil body that feels discovery like a bird about to fly or a bee alighting on a flower.
pleasure, tranquility is called its proximate cause. Reflection is a calmer, contemplative state of mind. Again, attention is
(E91;1'146-147) 3. Identification's characteristic feature is identifying like holding a dirty bowl and reflection is like cleaning it with a brush.
an object as blue, etc. Its function is recognizing what has been identified. (E95-96; T133-154) 8. Joy has five kinds ranging from ordinary
Examples are the carpenter's recognition of a piece of wood, or the king's thrills to transporting rapture, the latter illustrated by Mahātissā s rapture
servant identifying a desired garment by its label. Its manifestation is when thinking on the Buddha. There is an inspiring description of this
attending, as exemplified in a blind person 's identification of an elephant, culminating stage of joy, stopping just short of the ecstatic concentration
and its proximate cause is the object which is identified. that represents the pinnacle of meditation.
(E91-92; T147-148) 4. Volition has as its characteristic feature (E96-97; T154-156) 9. Satisfaction has the same features as joy. The
binding to itself associated factors as supporting objects. Its function is difference is that joy is a trace, satisfaction a feeling; the former is delight
conation, but only in good and bad factors, not completely in the case of in attaining a desired object, the latter the enjoyment of the function of
good and bad acts: there the function is a matter of energy which what is acquired. This distinction is illustrated by the gladness of a
instigates it, like the landowner whose energy catalyzed fifty-five parched man on hearing of a lake nearby as contrasted with the bliss of
workers. The manifestation of volition is directing. having bathed and drunk.
(E92-94; TI48-151) 5. Awareness is characterized by cognizing. Its (E97; T156-157) 10. One-pointed awareness is concentration. The
186 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ATTHASALINI 187

Atthakathā says its characteristic feature is leadership and nondistraction. hatred that causes rebirth there. And through understanding one is not
Another explanation is that its characteristic feature is non-scattering and reborn as a lower animal, since it is confusion that causes rebirth there.
nondistraction; its function is the bringing together of concurrent factors, The places of these three at various points on the path are indicated.
its manifestation is equanimity or knowledge, and its proximate cause is (E108-109;T174-176) There are nine more factors beyond the fifty-six
a peculiar satisfaction. listed above as types of good awareness: these are interest, resolve,
(E97-99; T157-158) 11. The faith-faculty has purifying as its feature, attention, equanimity. pity, restraint, abstinence from bodily misconduct,
or, on another view, as its function. On this latter account its abstinence from vocal misconduct and wrong living. The first four are
characteristic feature is confiding, its function purifying or aspiring, its acquired together at the same time; the others at different times.
manifestation is freedom from pollution, and its proximate cause is an Interest has as its characteristic feature the desire to be an agent, as
object worthy of faith, or the factor of stream-winning. its function seeking for an object, as its manifestation the availability of
(E99; T158-159) 12. The faculty of energy has as its feature the object, and as its cause the object so desired.
strengthening. On another account it has energy as its feature, Resolve has determination as its feature, opposition to slinking as its
strengthening the associated factors as function, and stubbornness as its function, unshakeableness as its manifestation, and dharma fit to be
manifestation. determined as its cause.
(E99-100; T159-161) 13. The faculty of mindfulness or memory has Attention has three kinds: (a) attention regulating an object, (b)
as its feature not allowing the object to slip away from awareness, not attention regulating order of appearance, (c) attention regulating exercitive
forgetting as its function, guarding or attention as its manifestation, and awareness. The first kind (a) has as its feature bringing associated factors
firm identification as its proximate cause. to mind with a content, its function is joining those factors to the object,
(E100; T161) 14. The faculty of concentration is that which its manifestation is facing the mind toward the object. The second kind
overcomes distraction. Its features are as in (10) above. (b) is the attention of the mind at each of the five doors. (c) is the
(E100; T161-162) 15. The faculty of wisdom has illumination or attention of directing the mind-door.
understanding as its feature. On another account it has penetration of Equanimity has as its feature treating awareness and associated
essential nature as its feature, illumination as its function, nondelusion as properties equally, its function is warding off defect and excess, its
its manifestation. manifestation is middleness.
"
(EI01; T162) 16. " Mind " is a synonym for "awareness . Pity and restraint will be explained below under the sublime states,
" "
(E101; T163) 17. Contentedness is another term for satisfaction. except that here they belong to the level of desire.
(E101-102; T163) 18. The faculty of life has as feature ceaseless (E109-111; T176-180) The sixty-five factors discussed in the present
watching over its own factors, as function the activity of those factors. section are now classified in various ways. An objector who sees this
The fixing of those factors is its manifestation, and those factors which classificatory activity as pointless is answered by likening the Buddha to
must be kept operative are its proximate cause. the wise king who apportions wealth to his subjects according to their
(E102-104; T164-167) 24-30. These seven are called "powers" knowledge of one or several skills.
because they do not shake. The last two, conscientiousness and shame,
are distinguished: conscientiousness is subjective, shame has an external
cause; conscentiousness is based on shame, shame is based on fear. Chapter Two: On Exposition
Examples are offered. Conscientiousness involves obedience, while shame (E1 12-124; T I80-202) A variety of ways of considering these factors
involves fear of wrong-doing. in relation to each other are reviewed For example, they can be compared
(E104-106;T167-170) 31-33. Through noncovetousness one is not and contrasted according to the word-stems, according to their prefixes,
ac
reborn among the ghosts, since it is greed that causes rebirth there. cording to the meanings expressed, or they can be compared and
co
Through restraint there is no rebirth in the intermediate state, since it is ntrasted according to name, characteristic feature, function, and which
188 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ATTHASALINI 189
factors they are opposed to. Then each of the terms used in the foregoing "
satisfaction , i.e., the fivefold joy that is the basis of concentration.
section is reviewed in the light of these points of comparison and There are two kinds of meditative stage: in one kind one meditates
contrast. (As making sense of the subject requires knowledge of Indian on supporting objects, in the other one meditates on characteristic marks.
linguistics we shall not attempt to summarize.) Here it is the first kind that is spoken of.
"Earth-gazing": meditating on the after-image. (We are directed to the
Chapter Three: Summary Classifications (I.1.1.2) Visuddhimagga for a detailed account.)
(E124-126; T202-205) Explanation of the various classifications of
p.140 of the summary of Dhammasańganī in Volume Seven of this Second Meditation
Encyclopedia. (E138-140; T225-228) In the second meditation " he suppresses initial
" "
and sustained thought . becomes tranquil" through faith, and "dwells on
The Eight Types of Awareness (1.1.1.3-10) "
high , since he is not held down by initial and sustained thought.
(E126-132; T206-215) Each of eight types of good awareness is Question: Isn't all this true of the first meditative state as well?
illustrated. LEmptiness is the awareness of the 65 factors as merely Answer: Faith is not completely strong in the first stage, but becomes
factors in consciousness but without any being in themselves. 2.A monk so in the second.
who first considers it too far to go to see the shrine, then reconsiders and Question: Aren't all the last three stages such that initial and sustained
goes. 3.The respect shown to a monk by young children even though they thought are suppressed?
do not understand the dharma. 4.Parents prompt their children to pay Answer: No, since in the last two they have never arisen, they do not
homage. 5-8 are like the first four except they are acccompanied by exist.
equanimity.
There is also a discussion of ten bases of good acts: charity, virtue,
cultivation, respect for elders, dutifulness, sharing of merit, giving thanks, Third Meditation
teaching, listening to the dharma and correcting of mistaken opinion. (E140-144; T228-234a) "Neutral ". There are ten kinds of neutrality:
The four infinities are explained: space, worlds, beings and the (1) the sixfold neutrality of a monk toward the six kinds of sense-objects,
knowtedg of a Buddha. since he is without the contaminants and is thus neither happy nor sad but
neutral. (2) The neutrality of the sublime states, of one who is neutral
regarding beings and occupies a part of a region with an equanimous
Section Two: Relating to the Material World mind. (3) The neutrality of the factors of enlightenment, where neutrality
Chapters 1-4: Meditation--the Fourfold System (I.1.2.1) is developed toward the simultaneously arising factors. (4) Neutrality of
First Meditation energy, which is neither too intense nor too slack. (5) The neutrality of
(E133-138; T216-225) A number of critical terms in 1.1.2.1A of the the traces, that is, the neutrality regarding the number and kinds of
text are explained, notably bhāvanā. Here it means the practice by which equanimity that arise by concentration. (6) The neutrality of feeling is
seekers develop the four applications of mindfulness. "Taking leave of free from satisfaction or frustration. (7) The neutrality involving
desires... "--in the first meditative state one has left sense-desires. " Sense- equanimity in investigation, in which one puts aside reflection on what
desires" are the desires specified in, e.g., the Vibhahga, those involving has come to be. (8) The neutrality of equanimity which balances things
passion and interest, i.e., the defiling sense-desires based on objects. equally. (9) The neutrality of knowledge in which one lives without even
"...Involving initial and sustained thought...", that is, the first the satisfaction of the third meditative level. (10) The neutrality of purity,
meditative stage arises together with initial attention to and sustained which is the neutrality of the fourth level and is purified of all opposed
co
consideration of the same factors that were listed in Section One. "In nditions. The neutrality referred to in the text is (9), that of knowledge.
solitude", i.e., free from the obstructions. "Accompanied by joy and Objection: Isn't this neutrality of knowledge the same as the neutrality
190 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ATTHASALINI 191

of equanimity, available in the first and second meditative levels? Chapter Six: The Fourfold Progress (I.1.2.1B)
Answer: That neutrality is overcome by initial and sustained thought, (E149-150; T243-246) Depending on the nature of the meditator,
etc., but the neutrality of the third level is not thus overcome and has a progress in meditation along either the fourfold or fivefold system may
distinct function. be slow, painful and sluggish, or quick and easy.
"Being mindful and self-aware --mindfulness is remembering,
"

watchfulness; self-awareness is not being confused, free from doubt. In Chapter Twelve: The Three Liberations (I.1.2.4)
this third meditation, in contradistinction to those factors in previous (E155-156; T255-257) The illustration given is of the meditator
levels. awareness is maintained like a man moving on razors. associating various beautiful colors with the parts of his body that display
Despite his renouncing satisfaction one in this stage may still those colors, but without awareness that they are parts of his body. The
experience bodily satisfactions associated with his mental state, which Patisambhidāmagga is quoted.
produce a:subtle bodily matter which is however essentially mental.
Chapter Thirteen: The Sublime States (L1.2.5)
Fourth Meditation (E 156-161; T257-263) The four states are explained extensively. They
(E144-146; T235-239) But in the fourth meditative stage even these are called "sublime" because just as Brahmadevatas live with our
last-mentioned satisfactions and frustrations are taken leave of. There is thoughts, so the aspirant who cleaves to these four states lives like them.
a discussion of just when satisfactions and frustrations are abandoned in These four states are also called " boundless", since objects of love,
each meditative stage--before arriving at the stage, or during the compassion, etc. should be without limit.
'
experiencing of the stage. The author s view is that it is in the stage that
the abandonment takes place. But then, it is asked, why are satisfaction
and frustration, settled or unsettled mind, still present to be abandoned in Section Three: Relation to the Immaterial World (I.1.3.1-4)
the fourth stage? The answer is that this is for the purpose of effecting Part Four
the teaching--the Buddha is not saying these are still present, but praising (E 164-173; T269-283) "Neith er-identification-nor-nonidentifi-cation"
the final fourth stage where they are not present. is to betaken as indicating that in this stage there is neither feeling nor
The neutrality free of satisfaction and frustration experienced in the nonfeeling, consciousness nor nonconsciousness, contact nor noncontact.
fourth stage is not merely absence of those, but a third feeling. The By "identification" is to be understood the taking note of objects. In the
uniqueness of this fourth stage lies in the purity of mindfulness, which state in question there is not enough identification to effect such noticing,
has not occurred in the previous stages. It is this purity which allows the but since the satisfactions born of traces still remain it is not
light of neutrality (likened here to a crescent moon) to shine with full nonidentification alone.
radiance. These four attainments of space, etc., on the immaterial level have
gone beyond objects, but not altogether beyond the factors, since two
The Fivefold System meditation factors still remain, namely neutrality and one-pointedness.
(E146-149; T239-243) The genesis of this system arose because the
'
Buddha taught in a manner fitting certain persons inclinations. For them Section Four: Stages of Good Awareness (I.1.4.1)
the Buddha distinguishes five stages, in which the second stage contains (E173-174; T284-287) There are five methods (naya) in each of the
sustained thought but not initial thought, and the fourth stage lacks four
do
planes--a basic one, a low, a medium, a high, and a method
sustained thought while maintaining joy, satisfaction and one-pointedness, minated by interest. So there are twenty methods, and they are related
and the fifth comprises only neutrality and one-pointedness. The to the section of the Patthāna which is called " Low Triplet".
application of this analysis is illustrated by a lengthy story.
Section Five: Relating to the Transcendent (I.1.5)
 ATTHASALINI 193
192 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
are seven allies of enlightenment and eight allies of the path in the
Part One: The First Path (1.1.5.1)
fourfold method (see above), while in the fivefold method there are only
(E175-177; T289-293) One who cultivates this meditation and
produces a single, momentary awareness of absorption goes out of this six allies of the path in the fourth stage and seven allies of the path in all
the stages. The difference arises from the presence of neutrality and joy
world, does not accumulate residues but rather demolishes birth and
in the first three, but of joy alone in the fourth. This is the view of one
death.
In the list of fifty-six factors, under heading #19, the faculty of group of Theras, but two other opinions are also rehearsed.
In explaining the last three references in the quotation (viz., the sign,
coming to know what is unknown, along with #s 22-24, are distinctive
the path, the chief) the discussion here reverts to a moment-by-moment
to this stage. These, along with the designation of "being an item in the
" analysis of the meditation process. The sign, i.e., the object of meditation,
path are specific to this list; otherwise, this list is identical with the list brings about adoption, but (depending on the ability of the meditator)
given earlier. What is new is the development through successive stages.
So, the fivefold path (items 19-23 of the original list of fifty-six after two or three repetitions comes path-consciousness, then one or more
moments of maturations of this consciousness, after which awareness
factors in I.1.1.1A, together with the new #s 22-24 of the list in I,1.5.1, lapses into the bhavariga again. The path-consciousness is what destroys
make up the Eightfold Path.
" " the proclivities.
(E180-184; T298-304) There is an emptiness section... ; here
" (E190-194; T314-319) The different paths of stream-entry, etc. are
"emptiness " indicates the name of the path of the higher world. "Aimless
also indicates the name of the path. now distinguished. The streamenterer gets rid of four false views and
Objection: The Buddha gives three names to the path: emptiness, doubts. It is these that produce matter/form; they are the consciousness
aggregate and the aggregates of feeling, identification and traces
signless, aimless. Why has the second been left out here?
associated with it. What the streamenterer accomplishes is a state in
Answer: Ultimately a "signless" path is deficient. The signless
liberation is said to be distinguished from the others through involving which these materialistic interpretations of what comes through the senses
are precluded, so that for them matter is not grasped at.
the discernment of nonetemality, so that faith is the dominating faculty
there, just as wisdom is for emptiness and concentration is for The once-returner and the nonretumer get rid of four kinds of
aimlessness. Now wisdom and concentration are factors in the noble path, awareness dissociated from false view as well as two kinds accompanied
by depression. The arhat gets rid of the four immoral awarenesses
but faith is not, any more than interest and awareness are path factors,
and just as those two do not determine a name of the path, faith should dissociated from false view and one accompanied by distraction. It is
explained why these paths are necessary in order to avoid future rebirths.
not either. This is the opinion of another teacher. However, on the
authority of the sūtras it may be allowed, though on Abhidharma The streamenterer's path cuts off the five defilements--three fetters, the
proclivity to wrong view and the proclivity to doubt--and thus brings
principles there can be no signless path.
(E184-190; T304-314) A verse (from an earlier commentary?) is about the discontinuing of the clinging aggregates, which would otherwise
quoted. It mentions "internal" and "external" aspects of "the material, the continue in force. If the once-returner didn't practice his path he would
experience five more rebirths after the two he will still have to
immaterial, the five, the evolution of seven or eight, the sign, the path
experience. And if the nonretumer didn't do his thing he would
and the chief." This verse is explained as follows. One is convinced that
he is composed of the five aggregates and that they are impermanent, experience another rebirth after the next. If the arhat doesn't practice his
" path he will be reborn on the material and immaterial levels.
frustrating, without self, and so goes beyond the " subjective . He is then
led to analyze other persons and arrives at the same understanding, thus Is progress wavering or not? Tales of the progress of the Buddha, or
Śāriputra and Mahāmogallāna show that it does.
getting on the path. So also with the analyzing of the impermanence, etc.
Thus cultivating all or some of the twenty great aspects according to
of the material and the immaterial. As for the "evolution of seven or
one's inclinations, when one practises meditation on these topics he also
eight", this reflects the different number of factors of enlightenment and
practices the path leading to escape from rebirth.
of the path in the differing accounts of the four meditative stages. There
194 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES SAMMOHAVINODINI 195

Part Two: The Second Path (I.1.5.2) sections dealing with the expositions of five khandhas (e.g., rūpa, vedanā,
(E194; T319-320) The once-returner is not as frequently beset by saññā, sańkhāra, and viññāna), dyatanas (spheres), dhātus (elements),
desires and ill will, and when these do arise they are weaker, though sacca (truth), indriyas (senses), paccayākāra (causes interdependent),
some say they arise in great strength but less often. satipatthāna (right recollection), sammappadhdna (right concentration),
iddhipādas (bases of miracles), seven bojjhańgas (supreme knowledge),
Parts Three and Four: The Third and Fourth Paths (1.1.5.3-4) magga (the Noble Eightfold Path), jhāna (stages of meditation),
(E194-200; T320-329) Comparison of the thousands of methods appamañña (four appamaññas consisting in an unlimited or perfect
taught in this text for attaining the stages of the path in contrast to the exercise of the qualities of friendliness, compassion, good will, and
even larger number of methods taught in the Vibhańga. equanimity), sikkhāpadas (precepts), patisambhidā (analytical knowledge),
Comparison of the subtler mistaken views that are still to be found ñāna (true knowledge), khuddakavatthu (minor points), and
in the streamenterer, the once-returner and nonreturner. Actually, the last dhammahadaya (religious heart)..It should be noted that in the section on
three paths do not involve cognition of anything not known to the the dhātus, 32 parts of the body have been discussed. In the section
practitioner of the first path. dealing with truth, the noble truths (ariyasacca) are deal with. In the
section on the Paccayākāras we find a disucssion of the topic of
Chapter Two: Bad Factors dependent origination....The Sammohavinodanī contains short notes on
Section One: Twelve Types (I.2.1-13) avijjā (ignorance), kāya (body), jdti (birth), jarā (old age), tanhd (desire),
(E200-211;T330-347) After a review of the thirty-two types of factors domanassa (despair), nibbāna, nāma-rūpa (name and form), bhava
that can be bad, the generic meaning of terms such as "bad", (existence), bodhi (enlightenment), macchariya (sloth), marana (death),
"
perversion " , etc. ensues. The various factors discussed are not classsified māyā (illusion), etc."
as lower or higher, as they are all bad. Except for the eleventh type of
bad awareness, viz., the type accompanied by neutrality and perplexity,
all of them occasion bad rebirths.
Question: Why do these constitute exceptions, while the kind 50.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Atthakathā on the Kathāvatthu
involving doubt does not?
Answer: The other eleven are removed through the path of insight, Summary by James P. McDermott
but these are not.
The Kathāvatthu Commentary's prime contribution is to identify the
The remainder of this commentary explains the terms used in the text Theravādit s opponent in the Kathāvatthu debates, and to indicate to
along the lines indicated in the portion given above. whom the questions and answers during the course of the debates are
attributable.
"
49.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (attributed to Buddhaghosa), E" references are the edition by N. A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text
Sammohavinodanī or Atthakathā on the Vibhańga Society Text Series No. 169 (London 1979). "T" refers to the translation
by Bimala Chum Law in The Debates Commentary (London 1940, 1969).
Summary by Bimala Chum Law Numbering of sections corresponds to the numbering followed in the
summary of the Kathāvatthu at pp. 266-304 of Volume Seven of this
E
This work was edited by A.P.Buddhadatta as Pali Text Series 93, ncyclopedia.
1921. It is not translated. B.C.Law makes the following remarks:
"In many places we find that this commentary and the Introduction
Visuddhimagga comment on the same subjects. This book consists of 18 (El-2; T1-2) The Buddha in the deva-world set forth the outline of
196 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KATHAVATTHU-ATTHAKATHA 197

" means "self, being, vital principle (atta sotto jivo).

the Kathāvatthu ("Points of Controversy ), knowing that at the time of
the third Council Moggaliputra Tissa would fill in the details here on The method of argument is explained. The Theravādin conditionally
earth. The finished text would include 500 discourses expressing his own establishes the opponent's proposition in order to refute it. This involves
views (Sakavādin), and 500 those of his opponents (Paravādins). The positing (sthāpana), gaining (P., papana), and assigning (P. aropana). 73
Buddha began with a discourse on the theory of the person (pudgala) in Negative and affirmative presentations are each fivefold, involving
eight sections involving four questions, each of two fivefold divisions. He proposition, rejoinder, refutation, application, and conclusion. The
then provided a table of contents for the remainder of the text according opponent 's arguments are considered pretentious, those of the Sakavādin
to the same pattern, descended to earth, and attained final nirvana. well done and his victory just.
(E2; T2) The collection of the dharma (doctrine) and discipline under The Commentary notes that the debate over the reality of the person
Mahākassapa is noted. One hundred years later the Vātsīputrīya monks is expanded by a simple comparison with other realities, this being
called for relaxation of the monastic rules, and 10,000 seceded forming followed by a comparison by way of analogy. The argument proceeds
the Mahāsarhghika school. The Gokulikas and Ekabyokarikas seceded following a fourfold discussion of dependence which leads the opponent
from this. From the Gokulikas there arose the Prajñaptivādins and the to the verge of admitting nihilist views.
Bāhulikas or Bahuśrutīyas in turn, and among these the Cetiyavādins. When in the course of debate the Sakavādin acknowledges the
(E3-5; T2-5) In the second century the Mahitńśāsikas and statement " there is a person " he is doing so in accordance with the sūtra
Vātsīputrīyas split from Theravāda. From the Vātsiputrīyas there further only in a conventional sense.
split the Dharmottariyas, Bhadrayāpikas, Channagarikas, and Sammitiyas. Since all reals with the exception of liberation are conditioned by
From the Mahīthśāsakas arose the Sarvāstivādins and Dharmaguptakas. relations, the inquiry considers whether characteristics can be associated
From the Sarvāstivādins arose the Kāśyapīyas, and from them in turn the with the person.
Sańkrāntikas. From the latter the Sūtravādins arose as an offshoot. This An examination of terminology follows. To say the person " is got at",
lineage of 17 schismatic schools (Theravāda is considered orthodox) is "is found," "is a reality," "exists" are all synonymous. To say two terms
based on the Dīpavamsa. are "the same in meaning" is to say the only difference is one of
(E6-7; T5) Subsequently the Haimavatikas, Rājagirikas, Siddhārthikas, expression.
"
Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas and Vajirīyas also arose. The term transmigrates" means "moves on continuously" . After
(E7-8; T5-7) The decline of the monastic order at the time of King examination of rebirth, the debate focuses on the concept of derivation,
Aśoka' s patronage is outlined. In order to reform the order, Aśoka called and then in turn on human action. The contrast between one who does a
on Moggaliputra Tissa. On the basis of what he taught, Aśoka convened deed and an instigator of action is defined. An instigator is one who acts
the order and expelled 60,000 heretics. It was then that Moggaliputra by commanding, instructing or the like.
Tissa filled in the details of the Points of Controversy, effectively The term "bhava", "becoming", is defined as " the state of being
crushing the dissident points of view. At this time the Abhidharma was rebom (upapatti)". When Suttanipāta 1119 speaks of looking on the
recited and included as the third scriptural collection. world as empty, it means to contemplate the world of aggregates as
empty of being (satta7. The term "abbhantara gato" refers to one who
BOOK ONE has entered into material form and persists therein. The term " anattā"
1.(E9-36 T9-43) The debated questions and answers cannot be refers to the absence of self, vital principle, or person. Again it is noted
attributed to any specific person, thus the convention of classifying the that scriptural use of the term "person" in both its general and specific
views expressed as Sakavādin (one of ours = Theravādin) and Paravādin sense is but popular convention rather than expressive of metaphysical
(the opponent). truth. In this vein it is noted that the Buddha taught in both popular terms
The view that the person (pudgala) exists is attributed to the and at a higher level of discourse characteristic of thing as they really are.
Pudgalavādins, that is, to the Vātsīputrīyas and Sammitīyas. "Pudgala" The two levels of discourse must be recognized for what they are.
198 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KATHAVATTHU-ATTHAKATHA 199

2 (E36-40; T43-48) The view that an arhat can backslide (parihāni) 7 of E, 5 of T (E58; T70-72) The Andhakas believe that the apparent
is ascribed to the Sammitiyas, the Vatsiputriyas, the Sarvāstivādins, and continuity of consciousness in meditation implies that a single state of
some Mahāsāmghikas. Some hold that an arhat can fall away from that consciousness can last over an extended period of time.
state, some that nonreturner can fall, and some that a once-returner can. 8 of E, 6 of T (E59; T70) Gokulikas hold that all conditioned things
No one believes it possible for a streamenterer to fall away. are, without distinction, no better than an ash-heap.
3 (E41-42; T48-51) The meaning of the term "religious life" 9 of E, 7 of T (E59-60; T70-72) Andhakas, Sarvāstivādins,
(brahmacarya) is twofold: (1) renunciation of the world, (2) cultivation Sammitiyas and Bhadrayāñikas hold that one can become a streamenterer,
of the way. No god renounces the world. Except for those on the etc., gradually through realization of the truths one by one.
unconscious plane, they may cultivate the way. The Sammitīyas, 10 of E, 8 of T (E60-61; T72-73) The Andhakas hold that the
however, deny that gods of the Paranirmitavasvatti class and above can Buddha 's everyday hearing, speech, etc., is transcendent or mundane
cultivate the way. depending upon whether what is heard, said, etc., is transcendent or
4 (E42-43; T51) The view that the corruptions are given up piecemeal mundane.
(odhisodhiso) is held by the Sammitiyas, among others. 11 of E, 9 of T (E61-62; T73-74) The Andhakas and Mahītńśāsakas
5 (E43-44; T51-52) The position that an average person who achieves hold that there are two kinds of liberation.
higher states does so while still a man of the world is that of the
Sammitiyas, for example.
6 (E44-50; T52-60) It is the Sarvāstivādins who hold that everything BOOK THREE
exists. I (E63-64; T75-77) The Andhakas hold that all the powers of the
8 (E51-52; T61-62) The view that the past survives in part in the Buddha are shared by his disciples.
present is held by the Kāśyapīyas. 2 (E64-65; T77-79) The Andhakas further maintain that all ten
9 (E52-53; T62-63) The view that the factors are applications of powers of insight are to be considered noble. It is noted that two kinds
mindfulness arose among the Andhakas. This group includes the of emptiness are to be distinguished, namely emptiness of self and
Pūrvaśailas, Aparaśailas, Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas. emptiness of conditioned things. "Emptiness of self ' refers to the
10 (E53-54; T64) The view that things exist in one temporal mode emptiness of these aggregates. "Emptiness of conditioned things " refers
only is also held by the groups listed in I and IX above. to detachment from what is conditioned. That is, it is a reference to
nirvana.
BOOK TWO 3 (E66; T79) It is the Andhakas who hold that it is awareness (citta)
1 (E55-56; T65-66) Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas wrongly hold that which is filled with lust, hatred and/or delusion and which is emancipated
from these impurities.
gods of the Mara class can cause an arhat to have an impure seminal
4 (E66-67; T80-82) The view that liberation is a process is based on
emission.
confusion concerning the relationship between partial liberation from
2-4 of E, 2 of T (E56-57; T66) Pūrvaśailas also hold: (1) an arhat
obstacles to meditation on the one hand, and complete liberation in a
can be ignorant, (2) can experience doubt, and (3) can be excelled by
others. path-moment on the other. The error is in thinking that the partial
liberation of the former is completed in the latter through a gradual
Pūrvaśailas and others hold that on attaining the state of
process.
streamenterer an individual who has entered the first meditative level
5 (E68; T82-83) The Andhakas and Sammitiyas assert that an
utters the truth of frustration.
individual at the eighth or lowest stage of entry on the path is no longer
5-6 of E, 3 of T (E57-58; T67-68) One can induce insight by
" subject to doubt and wrong views. The Sakavādin maintains doubt and
repeating the word "duhkha . Thus reciting the word is considered part
wrong views are left behind only at the state of streamentry.
of the path by the Pūrvaśailas.
200 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KATHAVATTHU-ATTHAKATHA 201

7-8 (E68-70; T84-85) It is the opinion of the Andhakas and BOOK FIVE
Sammitīyas that biological vision and hearing become higher (divya) 1 (E80; T99-100) The Andhakas indiscriminately maintain that any
vision and hearing when they are the medium of a spiritual idea. knowledge of liberation has the quality of liberation.
10 (E70-71; T87-88) notes that self-restraint implies reference to a 2 (E80-81; T100) Uttarapāthakas hold that seekers such as Ananda
matter over which such restraint ought to be exercised. have the knowledge of arhats,
11 (E72; T88) Andhakas think there is perception among beings in 3 (E81-82; T100-102) Some, such as the Andhakas, think that
the sphere of nonperception. perception can be perverted in the case of one who has attained
12 (E72; T88-89) Andhakas also believe it wrong to say there is meditation using a device.
perception in the sphere of neither-identification-nor-nonidentification. 4 (E82-83; TIO2-103) It is the Uttarapāthakas who hold that in one
not yet fixed on the path there is insight requisite for going on to
BOOK FOUR assurance. The tern "assurance " (niyama) is a synonym for "the way.".
1 (E73; T90) On the basis of the case of Yasa, who attained 5 (E83-84; T103-104) The Andhakas believe that in the case of an
perfection while living the lay life, the Uttarapāthakas hold that a layman arhat all awareness is transcendental, that is, discrimination (pratisathvid).
can become an arhat. 6 (E84; T 104-105) The Andhakas do not admit the distinction
2 (E73-74; T90-91) The Uttarapāthakas hold that one can become an between conventional and ultimate truth.
arhat in the first moment of rebirth-consciousness. 7 (E84-85; T105-106) The Andhakas, among others, hold that insight
3 (E74; T91-92) It is further the opinion of the Uttarapāthakas that into the awarenesses of another has no other object beyond that state of
everything about an arhat is free from the intoxicants. awareness itself.
4-5 (E75; T92-93) The Uttarapāthakas hold that spiritual attainments 8 (E85-86; T106-107) It is the Andhakas who hold insight into the
can be permanently acquired. The Sakavādin recognizes only two types future to be possible. The Commentary notes that the following terms are
of spiritual attainment, namely (1) actual attainment during one 's life and synonymous: "root" (mīda) " , " cause " (kārana), "reason " (niddna),
(2) attainments which arise at the moment of rebirth as a result of actions "source" (sambhava), "rising" (samutthāna), "nutriment " (āhāra),
"
in a past life. "supporting object" (ālambana), "condition" (pratyaya), "origination
6 (E76-77; T93-95) The term "bodhi" refers to (1) insight into the (samudaya).
fourfold way and (2) the omniscience of a Buddha. The Uttarapāthakas 9 (E86-87; T107-108) The Andhakas hold possible insight into the
do not distinguish the two meanings, and hence hold that one becomes present as a whole.
a Buddha through bodhi 10 (E87-88; T108-109) Andhakas further maintain a disciple can have
7 (E77; T95-96) The Uttarapāthakas further hold that one possessed knowledge of the spiritual fruition of another.
of the thirty-two supematural marks is a Bodhisattva (i.e., is destined for
enlightenment). BOOK SIX
8 (E78; T96-97) The terms "niyāma" and " brahmacarya " are 1 (E89; T110-111) Andhakas, among others, consider assurance or
synonyms for the noble path. Some, such as the Andhakas, hold that the fixedness on the path to be unconditioned, that is to say, eternal.
Bodhisattva actually entered the path of assurance at the time of Kāśyapa 2 (E89-90; T111-112) Pūrvaśailas and Mahtiii/ sakas hold the
Buddha. members of the chain of dependent origination to be unconditioned.
9 (E78-79; T97-98) The Andhakas, for example, hold a person 3 (E90-91; TI12-113) Pūrvaśailas hold the four noble truths to he
practising to attain the fourth state and become an arhat permanently unconditioned.
possesses the fruits of the three previous stages of attainment. 5 (E9I-92; T113-114) Attainment of cessation means suspension of
10 (E79; T98) The Andhakas further maintain that arhatship means conscious procedure in meditation. Andhakas and Uttarapāthakas hold
the total putting off of all fetters. that because this cessation is not conditioned it is unconditioned.
202 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KATHAVATTHU-ATTHAKATHA 203

6 (E92; T114) Three types of space are distinguished: (1) enclosed, state of existence between death and rebirth.
"
(2) removed from an object in absorption, and (3) open. Enclosed space 3 (E106-107; T132-133) Pūrvaśailas limit the term "kāmadhātu to
is conditioned, the others mere concepts. Uttarapāthakas and only the five strands of sensuality (kāmaguna). The Sakavādin, however,
Mahīrhśāsakas hold that since (2) and (3) are not conditioned they must more broadly applies the term to (1) the objects of sense desire, (2)
be unconditioned. corrupt worldly desires, and (3) sensuous existence.
"
7-8 (E92-93; T114-115) Andhakas maintain that empty space, the 4 (E108; T133-134) Pūrvaśailas hold the term "kāma refers only to
earth element, etc., are visible. the five strands of sensuality. The Sakavādin, to the contrary, maintains
that defilements constitute sensuality.
BOOK SEVEN 5 of E, 5--6 of T(E108-109; T134) Andhakas apply the term
"
1 (E94; T116) Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas hold that particular "rūpadhātu (sphere of form or material element) "
only to material
material qualities cannot be classified under the single generic concept of qualities (rīrpa), and the term "arūpadhātu (immaterial sphere or
matter. element) only to the immaterial sphere as a level of existence.
2 (E94-95; T116-117) Rājagińkas and Siddhārthikas maintain mental 7 of T (E109-110; T135-136 Andhakas and Sammitīyas maintain that
states are not interconnected. beings in the material sphere have all six senses.
3 (E95; T117-118) The same two groups assert that properties of 6 of E, 8 of T(E79; T134-135) Andhakas hold that a subtle, refined
awareness do not exist as things. type of matter, but not grosser matter, exists in the immaterial sphere.
4 (E95-97; T118-119) The term "dāna" refers to (1) liberality, (2) 8-9 of E, 9 of T (E110-111; T136-137) Mahīrisśāsakas and
abstinence or the act of giving, (3) the gift itself. This triple distinction Sammitīyas hold that physical and vocal acts are immaterial, and thus that
involves (1) a mental state and (2) material offerings. Rājagirikas and matter can be of ethical import.
Siddhārthikas recognize dāna only as a mental state. 10 (E111-112; T137-139) Pūrvaśailas and Sammitīyas think there is
5 (E97-98; T119-122) Rājagirikas, Siddhārthikas and Sammitīyas nothing material in the life-faculty (jvitindriya).
think that merit increases with enjoyment. 11 (E112-113; T139-140) Pūrvaśailas and Sammitīyas argue that
6 (E99; T122) Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas hold that what is given because of calumny against an arhat in a previous life, an arhat can
in this life remains in the word of ghosts. backslide. They do not discern any assurance (niyama) in becoming an
7 (E99-100; T123-124) Andhakas hold that land is a result of karma. arhat.
8 (E101; T124-125) Some actions lead to the worsening of life, that
is, to old age or decay. Some actions lead to death. Thus the Andhakas BOOK NINE
hold that old age and death are maturations of karma. 1 (E114-115; T141-142) Andhakas maintain that only in seeing
9 (E102; T126-127) Andhakas further hold that the mental objects of liberation as commendable are the fetters put off.
the arhat are not maturations of karma. 2 (El15; T142-143) Pūrvaśailas consider the deathless as an object
10 (E102-103; T127-128) They also think that results entail further of thought to be a fetter.
results. 3 (El I6; T143) Uttarapātakas hold matter is a co-condition
(.sālmnhana) since it causes mental presentation. They do not distinguish
BOOK EIGHT between a supporting object (ālambana) and a causal condition (pratyaya)
1 (104; T129-130) Andhakas and Uttarapāthakas hold that the asuras as the Sakavādin does.
(demons) form a sixth, separate realm of rebirth. 4 (E116-117; T144) Andhakas and some Uttarapāthakas hold that
i
2 (E105-106; T130-132) On the basis of an incorrect interpretation mmoral proclivities lack a corresponding mental object since they are
of the scriptural passage "completed existence within the interval" distinct from mind, unconditioned, and neutral.
(Dīghanikāya III. 237) Pūrvaśailas and Sammitīyas posit an intermediate 5 (E117; T145) The opponent is the Andhaka.
204 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KATHAVATTHU-ATTHAKATHA 205

6 (E117; T145) The opponent is the Uttarapāthaka. consciousness.

8 of E (E118; T146-147) Uttarapāthakas hold that all thought is 2 (E129-130; T159-160) Mahāsamghikas argue that one who has
sustained. The Sakavādins, on the other hand, distinguish between an overcome spiritual ignorance cannot have insight and mundane thought
object of sustained thought and thought sustained in its operation. simultaneously.
9 (El18; T147-148) Pūrvas4ailas, defining sound as the diffusion of 3 (E130; T160) Pūrvaśaila6 hold that insight is not conjoined with
sustained thought, maintain that sound can be cognized apart from the mundane consciousness.
operation of sense. 4 (E130-131; T161) The opponent is identified as the Andhaka.
10 (E119; T148) Pūrvaiailas further contend that speech and action 5 (E131-132; T161-163) Mahāsamghikas believe one possessed of
can proceed even without conscious thought. magical power can live an entire kalpa. The term "kalpa" can refer to (1)
11 (E120; T148-149) Andhakas hold that past and future experiences a great cycle, (2) part of a cycle, (3) a lifetime.
can be possessed in the present by those who have attained past and 6 (E132-133; T163-164) Sarvāstivādins and Uttarapāthakas hold that
future states of absorption. This view fails properly to distinguish between continuity in the flow of consciousness constitutes concentration. They do
the notions of being in possession of (samandgata) and of acquisition "
not take the term "concentration (samādhi) to mean collectedness of
"

(pratilābha). thought " .

BOOK TEN 7 (E133; T164) Andhakas consider each term in the chain of
I (E121-122; T150-151) Andhakas hold that before one congeries of dependent origination to be predetermined.
five aggregates ceases, another set of karmically functional aggregates 8 (E133-134; T165) They also consider impermanence itself
arises. predetermined.
2 (E122; T151) MahīrhiSsakas, Sammitīyas, and Mahāsatghikas
contend that right speech, right action, and right livelihood are material BOOK TWELVE
and, hence, that the body of one practising the path is included in the 1 (E135; T166-167) Mahāsamghikas hold that both self-restraint and
path. its lack are karmically efficacious.
3 (E122-124; T151-154) It is the view of the Mahāsariighikas that one 2 (E135-136; T167) They also hold that all action produces karmic
can practise the path while enjoying fivefold sense-consciousness. results. Although the Buddha spoke without qualification of volition
5 (E124-125; T154-155) Mahāsamghikas consider fivefold sense- (cetand) as karma, he meant that only good or bad volition entails karmic
consciousness co-ideational. result.
6 (E125; T155-156) Mahāsatghikas recognize both a worldly and an 3 (E136-137; T167-168) Mahāsamghikas consider sound a karmic
otherworldly morality. result.
7 (E126; T156) Mahāsamghikas further affirm that morality is 4 (EI37; T168) They also hold sense-organs to be a result of karma.
nonmental. 5 (E137-138; T169-170) Uttarapāthakas hold that an individual who
9 (E126; T156-157) The Mahāsamghīka is the opponent. is said to be liable to seven more rebirths at most becomes subjectively
10-11 (E127-128; T157-158) Mahāsarghikas and Sammitīyas think assured of final liberation only at the end of the seven. The Sakavādin
that manifesting (vijiaapti) acts are moral, and the former thinks that does not admit such an immutably fixed pattern. The only two fixed
nonmanifesting acts are immoral. orders are (1) the truth order of the Noble Path which assures an
individual that he will not be punished in purgatory and that he is
BOOK ELEVEN destined to attain the fruits of the path, and (2) the false order of acts
1 (E 129; TI59) Mahāsariighikas and Sammitīyas consider proclivities which inevitably result in retribution in the immediately succeeding
morally neutral, without root conditions, and independent of existence.
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KATHAVATTHU-ATTHAKATHA 207
206
i
7 (El 38-139; TI70-171) Pūrvaśailas hold that since an individual who the mind moves on to a definite mental object.
has attained sound views is not necessarily free of enmity, such an 2 (E148; T181) Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas contend that the six
individual can willfully deprive a creature of life. sense-organs all originate together at the moment of conception as the
8 (E139; TI71) The opponent, who is identified as the Uttarapāthaka, result of single act. The Sakavādin holds that only the co-ordinating organ
arrives at a bad rebirth as a result of failing to distinguish between evil and organ of touch originate at conception, the other four sense-organs
ways and natural desires. taking 77 days to develop, partly through the action that resulted in
conception and partly through other karma.
BOOK THIRTEEN 3 (E148-I49; T182) It is the Uttarapāthakas who maintain that one
1 (E140; T172-173) The contested view is that of the Rājagirikas. sensation immediately follows another.
2 (E141; T173) The Uttarapāthakas arrive at this position through 4 (E149; T182-183) Uttarapāthakas also hold that the noble forms of
failing properly to distinguish between the lower goodness of the world speech and action are material qualities.
of sense-desire and goodness in the ultimate sense. 5 (E149-150; T183-184) Andhakas hold that proclivity toward a vice
is different from open manifestation of that vice
6 (E150; T184) The opponent is identified as the Andhaka.
7 (E150-151; T184-185) Those expressing the contended position are
3 (141-142; T173-175) One can instigate a crime entailing immediate the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas.
retribution in two ways, namely (1) through a permanent, standing 8 (E151; T185-186) When applied to maturational consciousness,
action, matter and liberation, the term "neutral (avyākrta) means cannot
" "
injunction or (2) through an occasional injunction. The former way
assures one's doom because there is volition to carry through. In the latter be said to be either moral or immoral because of the absence of ripeness
"
case, the Sakavādin considers reform possible, which the Uttarapāthaka (avipākatva) . Applied to speculation on unproved matters it means
denies. "undeclared " (akathitatva). Because they do not make such a distinction,
4 (E143; T175-176) Assurance is of two types depending on whether Andhakas and Uttarapāthakas hold that speculation or false doctrine
it is in the right or wrong direction. The latter leads to immediate (dŗ.stigatha) is neutral.
retribution; the former is the Noble Path. Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas fail 9 (E151-152; T186) The opponent is the Pūrvaśaila.
to make this distinction.
5-6 (E143-144; T176-177) Uttarapathakas hold that only one who is BOOK FIFTEEN
obstructed by the hindrances or fetters can overcome them. 1-2 (E153-154; T187-188) The opponent is the Mahāsarhghika.
7 (E144; T177) Andhakas maintain that one who attains absorption 6 (E155; T189) Death and decay are not predetermined, and hence
"
enjoys it. not to be considered to belong either to the category "mundane or the
category transcendent." Mahāsamghikas wrongly class them in the latter
"
8 (E145; T178) The opponent is the Uttarapāthaka.
9-10 (E145-146; T178-179) Here the opponent is the Pūrvaśaila. category.
7-8 (E155-156; T190) Hetuvādins hold that to attain cessation of the
BOOK FOURTEEN experience of identification is (1) transcendent, (2) mundane.
9 (E156-157; T190-191) Rājagirikas hold that one who has entered
1 (E147; T180-181) That which is good cannot immediately follow
that which is bad. Mahāsamghikas, however, hold that the good and bad the state of cessation of consciousness can nonetheless die.
roots can be directly linked to one another. 10 (E157; T191-192) Attainment of the cessation of consciousness is
of two types, mundane and transcendent. The former only leads to rebirth
The terms "adverting" (āvartana) and "adjusting" or "aiming"
(prañidhi) are defined as referring to the turning of the mind. In in the sphere of unconscious being. The Hetuvādins do not recognize this
adverting, the mind is turned to the life continuum. In adjusting or aiming distinction.
208 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KATHAVATTHU-ATTHAKATHA 209

11 (E157-158; TI92-194) Andhakas and Sammitīyas hold that action 6 (E168-169; T206-207) The Vetulyakas, also known as the
is one thing and its accumulation another. They further maintain that the Mahāśūnyatāvādins, are the opponents in this debate and apparently in
accumulation of karma is undetermined and not a mental object. 17.7-9, although the commentary does not make this explicit.
11 (E171; T209-210) Uttarapāthakas hold that a gift is sanctified by
BOOK SIXTEEN the donor, not by the recipient.
1-2 (E159; TI96) Mahāsarhghikas hold that power in the world is
genuine only if it includes power to control the consciousness of others. BOOK EIGHTEEN
Here "to control " is taken to mean "to prevent an offence which involves 1 (E172; T211) The Vetulyakas hold that when the Buddha
corruption " . descended into this world from the Tuşita heaven it was merely as a
3 (159-160; TI95-196) Hetuvādins believe one can produce happiness docetic chimera.
in others. 2 (E172-173; T212) As a corollary of the former thesis, the
4 (E160-161; T196-197) There are two aspects to attention, Vetulyakas hold that the Buddha himself did not teach the dharma here
depending on whether we consider the object or the method of attention. on earth.
When we attend to present things, we cannot attend to the consciousness
by which they arise. But Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas generalize to argue
that one can attend to all things at once. 3 (E173; T212-213) The way those who have not conquered their
" passions respond to the misfortune of others suggests the identification of
5-6 (E16l; T198) The term "cause (hem) can refer specifically to
motives or moral conditions, or more generally to any causal relation. pity with passion. Thus the Uttarapāthakas hold that the Buddha, being
Making no such distinction, the Uttarapāthakas hold that primary material free of passion, felt no compassion.
qualities are the causes of secondary qualities. 4-5 (E173-174; T213-214) Out of indiscriminate devotion for the
7 (E161-162; T199) Mahīmśāsakas and Sammitīyas maintain that the Buddha certain Andhakas and Uttarapāthakas hold (1) that the fragrance
physical motions involved in action are moral or immoral. of even the Buddha's excrement surpasses that of all other things, and (2)
8 (E 162; T 199) Andhakas and Sammitīyas hold that material qualities that the Buddha realized the fruits of all stages of the religious life
arise as a result of action. simultaneously.
9-10 (E162-163; T200) The opponent on these issues is the Andhaka. 6 (E174-175; T214-215) Mahīśāsakas and certain Andhakas hold the
passage from one state of absorption to another is immediate without
BOOK SEVENTEEN intervening procedure.
1 (E164; T201) Andhakas contend that an arhat can accumulate 7 (E175-176; T215-216) Sammitīyas and certain Andhakas hold that
merit. in delineating the fivefold absorption series the Buddha did not intend to
2 (E164-165; T201-202) Rājagirikas and Siddhārthikas claim an arhat classify five types of concentration, but only to indicate three distinct
cannot die an untimely death. types. According to the Sakavādin, these three types of concentration are
3 (E165-166; T203-204) These two groups also hold that all the states of meditation, but not meditative intervals.
cycles of actions, corruptions and results arise from karma. 8 (E176-177; T216-217) The opponent here is the Pūrvaśaila.
4 (E167; T204-205) Frustration is to be understood as bound up with 9 (E177-178; T2I7-218) Mahāsarhghikas contend that it is the
"
the faculties or as not so bound. In the latter case, "frustration refers to sentient surface of the eye which sees.
being subject to the law of impermanence. Hetuvādins, not drawing this
distinction, hold that frustration is constituted by painful feeling alone. BOOK NINETEEN
5 (E168; T205-206) Hetuvādins contend that with the exception of 1 (E179; T219) Uttarapāthakas hold that we can put away the
the noble path all conditioned things are frustrating. corruptions of our past and of our future. To say the latter is nothing
210 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
KATHAVATTHU-ATTHAKATHA 211
more than to say that for the person who attains liberation corruptions do
5 (E188-189; T230) Mahīmśāsikas consider the noble path as fivefold
not arise. only.
2 (E179-180; T220-221) The term "emptiness" refers (1) to absence 6 (E189; T231) Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas consider transcendental
of self as a feature of the aggregates and (2) to liberation. In holding that
insight to have a twelvefold base.
the empty is included in the aggregate of mental formations the Andhakas
ignore this twofold analysis.
BOOK TWENTY-ONE
3 (E180-181; T221) The Sakavādin defines "fruit of monkhood"
1 (E190; T232) Uttarapathakas hold that the Buddhist religion was
(śramañyaphala) as " the consciousness resulting from the thought
reformed as a result of the three Councils.
processes in the noble path and occurring in the mental process 2 (E190-191; T232-233) Whereas the Uttarapathakas maintain that an
accompanying the attainment of its fruits. " Pūrvaśailas, however, define
ordinary person cannot be separated from phenomena of the three worlds,
the term differently, holding that the fruit of monkhood is simply success
Sakavādins teach only that the individual cannot be separated from
in putting away the corruptions and, hence, is unconditioned. mental phenomena which arise in him at present.
4 (E181; T221-222) This is the opinion of the Pūrvaśailas.
3 (E191; T233) Mahāsamghikas think that one can attain perfection
5 (E181-182; T222) Uttarapathakas believe in suchness as an without actual elimination of the fetter of ignorance.
immutable reality in the very nature of all things. They consider this
suchness immutable.
4 (El 91-192; T234) Supernatural power does not make all things
6 (E182; T222-223) The term "good" (kuśala) can be applied to
possible. For example, it cannot make permanent what is impermanent.
mental states both because they lead to desirable results and because they
Andhakas, however, contend that supernatural power makes possible
are free of corruptions. The Andhakas do not admit this twofold aspect.
whatever is resolved.
They thus define nirvana as good because it is free from corruptions. The 5 (E192; T235) The Andhakas are the opponents.
Sakavādin denies that liberation can be classified as good, since it leads 6 (E192-193; T235) Here the opponent is the Mahāsathghika.
to no further results. 7 (E193-194; T236-237) That all things are fixed (niyata) in their
7 (E(E182-183; T223-225) Some Uttarapāthakas hold the ordinary fundamental nature is the view of the Andhakas and certain
person can possess final assurance. Uttarapathakas. The Sakavadin argues that things are fixed in two ways
8 (E183-184; T225) Hetuvādins and Mahīśāsakas contend the only, namely in rightness and wrongness.
faculties are not worldly.
8 (E194; T237) The Andhakas and Uttarapathakas also hold all karma
to be fixed.
BOOK TWENTY
I (E185-186; T226-227) This is the opinion of the Uttarapāthakas.
BOOK TWENTY-TWO
2 (E186; T227-228) Knowledge (1'ñāna) is of two kinds: (1) worldly 1 (E195; T238) Since one can attain final liberation without achieving
knowledge concerned with righteousness and the like, and (2) spiritual
omniscience, Andhakas argue that final liberation can be attained without
knowledge concerned with the path and its fruits. Hetuvādins do not casting off one of the fetters, viz., ignorance.
distinguish between the two, applying the term ' jñāna" only to spiritual 2 (E195; T238-239) Since an arhat is lucid at the moment of final
knowledge. death, Andhakas consider him to have moral consciousness at that
3 (E187; T228-229) Andhakas deny the existence of guardians in moment.
hell. 3-7 (E196-198; T239-242) These contended views are held by the
4 (E187-188; T229-230) Various gods assume the shape of animals. Uttarapathakas.
On this basis the Andhakas wrongly assume that animals are reborn in the 8 (El 98; T242) Pūrvaśailas and Aparaśailas hold that as impermanent,
realm of the gods. all conditioned phenomena persist but for a moment of consciousness.
 YAMAKA-ATTHAKATHA 213
212 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
of good roots, i.e., the absence of greed, hatred, and confusion. The
The Sakavādin, however, considers it arbitrary to equate imutability with remaining good phenomena such as contact are not. Mental phenomena
momentariness. include the four mental aggregates and liberation.
11.1 (E57-61) Questions and answers on the aggregates classified
CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE according to a fourfold method of analysis: (1) examination of terms, (2)
1 (E199; 243) This is held by the Andhakas and Vetulyakas. series based on the examination of terms, in which each aggregate is
2 (E199; T243) Uttarapāthakas espouse this view. examined in relation to the others, (3) simple aggregates, (4) the series
3 (E199-200; 7'243-244) The Andhakas hold this opinion. based upon the examination of simple aggregates.
4 (E200-201; T244-245) These views are also ascribed to the 11.2 (E61-69) Discussion of the marks origination, destruction, and
Andhakas. both as applied to persons, places and both under six divisions of time:
5 (E201; T245-246) Uttarapāthakas and Hetuvādins consider only past, present, future, present-past, present-future, and past-future. For
frustration to be predetermined. example, present phenomena which arise for persons are understood
through direct perception; past phenomena, through prior experience
based on direct perception; and future phenomena, through an inference
51.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa), based upon prior experience of direct perception. A further division of
Atthakalhā on the Yamaka questions into four types, based upon the number of terms (one or two),
" "
E refers to the edition by C.A.F. Rhys-Davids in sound and unsound questions, and answers into five types, based upon
"
"
Yamakappakarai athakathā , Journal of the Pali Text Society VI, how the meaning of the term is determined from the text, the reply,
1910-1912, pp. 51-107. The work is untranslated. similarity, negation, or exclusion, occurs. These types are further
subdivided into 27 classes with reference to person, place, and
Summary by Karen C. Lang combinations of the two.
11.3 (E69-71) Discussion of the person's full understanding of the
This section of the Pañcappakaragātthakathā contains a concise aggregates in regard to the transcendent path of noble persons.
commentary, little more than a table of contents in some cases, on the III (E71-76) Discussion of the twelve bases under the same fourfold
three volumes of the Yamaka. Buddhaghosa follows the arrangement of method of analysis and in regard to persons and places under the same
the Yamaka and discusses in order the ten topics: I. roots (m ild), six divisions of time as in 11.1-3.
aggregates (skandha), III. bases (dyatana), IV. elements (dhātu), V. truths IV (E76-77) Same method of analysis applied to the elements.
(satya), VI. traces (samskāra), VII. proclivities (anus'aya), VIII. V (E77-79) Discussion of the arising and ceasing of three of the
consciousness (cilia), IX. factors (dharma), and X. faculties (indriya). He noble truths, the exception being the truth of cessation, which neither
begins each topic with a discussion of the arrangement of the paired arises nor ceases. The section on full understanding mentions three types:
questions (yarnaka) into various sections and then comments on selected full understanding of the known, full understanding as investigating, and
passages from the text. full understanding as abandoning. Since these three types of
I.1 (E52-54) Good, bad, neutral and mental (nāma) phenomena are understanding do not apply to transcendent phenomena, there are two
subjected to twelve questions each: four which refer to four synonymous truths, i.e., conventional and ultimate.
terms, i.e., root, root-condition (mūlamūla), being caused by a root VI.1 (E79-81) Explanation of the expressions "bodily formations " ,
(mūlaka), or being caused by a root-condition (mūlamūlaka); each of
"
verbal formations", and "mental formations". "Bodily formations " , here
these is in turn examined by three pairs of questions with regard to root, used as an equivalent for in and out breathing, is so called because it
having the same root, or having reciprocal roots. refers to the body which arises from karma, its cause. Verbal formations
I.2 (E54-57) Commentary on selected terms used in the questions consist of applied and sustained thought, which give rise to speech. The
and answers, e.g., three good phenomena are included within the group
214 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES YAMAKA-ATTHAKATHA 215

mental formations designate the mental factors, e.g., identification and of aggregates and the series of paired questions which analyze them this
feeling, which arise simultaneously with mind. is the longest topic treated by the Yamaka.
VI.2 (E81-83) Discussion of the arising and ceasing of these
fomiations, e.g., bodily formations do not arise at the moments of dying
and rebirth. 52. AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa), Atthakathā
VII (E84-98) Discussion of the seven proclivities, sensual desire on the Patthāna
(E87-88), hatred (E89-90), pride (E90-91), erroneous views (E9I), doubt
(E9l), desire for existence (E91), and ignorance (E91), as arranged in Summary by Bimala Chum Law"
seven sections: (1) proclivities, (2) possessed of proclivities, (3)
abandoning the proclivities, (4) full understanding, (5) abandoned "This is a commentary on the most difficult of the seven
proclivities, (6) arising of proclivities, and (7) their spheres. The Abhidhamma treatises known as Patthāna or Mahāpakarana. The most
discussion of which people, e.g., ordinary people, stream-enterers, important dissertation on the subject of the twenty-four paccayas or
once-returners, non-returners, and arhats, possess these proclivities and relations is found in the first two sections, namely, uddesavdra and
in which of the levels the possession occurs is much the same as in the' niddesavāra. Buddhaghoga's explanations of the relations differ, in some
first section, e.g., sensuous desire arises in ordinary people, respects at least, from the treatment of the subject by Vasubandhu in his
stream-enterers, and once-returners and occurs on the sensuous level with Abhidiharmakośa. In this work Buddhaghosa rightly points out that the
regard to pleasant and neutral sensations. The other sections, with the term hetu is employed neither in the Nyāya sense of the major premise
exception of the arising of the proclivities which is said to have been in a syllogism nor in the philosophical sense of cause (kārana); it is
discussed in the first section, are briefly mentioned: the path is the means employed just in the psycho-ethical sense of 'motive ' or 'spring of action'
for ordinary peoples etc., to abandon the proclivities (E95); full (mūlattena)."
understanding refers to the three types (E95); the proclivities are
abandoned once the path is cultivated (E95-96); and for which persons
and in which place the proclivities arise depends upon action and its 53.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa),
maturation (E96-98). Atthakathā on the Dhātukathā
VIII Discussion of the arising and ceasing of consciousness in regard
15
to persons, phenomena, and both (E98-102). E.g., for persons whose Summary by Bimala Churn Law
proclivities have been exhausted, e.g., the arhat, the consciousness of
dying arises in one moment, but at that time the moment of destruction "This is a commentary written by Buddhaghosa on the third book of
has not yet occurred. After the moment of destruction has occurred, the the Abhidhamma Pitaka presumably at the request of the Bhikkhu or Yati
consciousness of this person will cease and no longer arise because of the Buddhaghosa. It has fourteen sections containing interpretations of the
absence of rebirth-consciousness. five khandhas (constituents), twelve āyatanas (spheres), sixteen dhātus
IX Discussion (E102-104) of the arising, cessation, and both of (elements), and the like."
good, bad, and neutral phenomena with reference to persons, places, and
both, according to the six divisions of time. The third section is entitled
" " " 54.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Buddhaghosa),
cultivation rather than "full understanding since good phenomena are
to be cultivated (bad phenomena are to be abandoned, and neutral Atthakathd on the Puggalapaññatti
phenomena neither cultivated nor abandoned).
X Discussion (E104-107) of the 22 faculties, according to the Summary by Bimala Chum Law"
method of analysis developed for the aggregates; because of the number
216 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES BUDDHADATTA 217
"
"This commentary has an important dissertation on the Paññattis or C. V. Udaya Sankar reports that Buddhadatta wrote the
concepts classified and defined according to three different nayas or Vinayavinicchaya in a monastery at Bhutamangala in the heart of the
methods, namely, the Pālinaya, the Auhakanaya, and the Acariyanaya. " "
Chola kingdom , and wrote the commentary on the Buddhavarrt.sa while
According to the first method, these are to be classified as the concepts residing at Kaveripattana. a sea port that seems to have been modem
of sacca, khandha, dhātu, āyatana, indriya and puggala, the last forming Puhar at the mouth of the - Cauvery". The commentary is titled
the subject-matter of the treatise itself. According to the second method, Ma d h u rat t h a vi lās i nis
we are to discuss the logical significance of the concepts divided into two
groups of six each. According to the third method, too, the concepts are
to be considered as divided into two groups of six each... " 55.BUDDHADATTA, Abhidhammāvatāra
"
E " references are to the edition by A.P. Buddhadatta, Pali Text
Society 7, London 1915. The edition and translation (Delhi 1987) by
Mahesh Tiwari contains a lengthy summary of this work.
BUDDHADATTA (425) "T" references are to the two volume edition in Burmese script of the
B. C. Law writes: "Buddhadatta was born in a town called Uragapura, 7ikā of Sumangala, now available in the Vipassana Research Institute's
which was in the Kaveri kingdom of the Colas." Buddhadatta, we are 'Dhammagiti ' CD-ROM. "Porāpatīkā" refers to the small commentary of
told, came back from the island of Sri Lanka after failing in his attempt unknown authorship found in Volume One of the same work of
to translate back into Pali all the commentaries and sub-commentaries on Sumarrgalā s.
the Master's teaching which were stored up in Singhalese. At the same
ti me Buddhaghosa was on his way to Sri Lanka to undertake the same Summary by Lance S. Cousins
great task. It is said that when the two ships met the two great authors
'
greeted one another and on hearing of Buddhaghosa's plans, Buddhadatta 1. The Abhidhammāvatāra or Entrance to Abhidhamma' is a survey
said, ' I could not fulfill my wish to complete the task that you now intend of the basic notions of the systematic Abhidhamma as it had developed
to do. I could only do such lesser works as the Jinālahkāra and the down to the closure of the aiihakathā literature in Sinhalese Prakrit. It
Dantadhāubodhivarhsa. When you accomplish the task kindly send your consists of 24 chapters. In the first thirteen the ground covered closely
works to me so that I may summarise them '. Buddhaghosa, it seems, did parallels Buddhaghosa 's Abhidhamma commentaries, especially the
complete the task and send his work as promised. Buddhadatta is said to Atthasālinī (Ad) and the Sammohavinodanī, but omitting matter which
'
have composed his Vinayavinicchaya from Buddhaghosa s relates specifically to the canonical texts concerned. Chapter XIV of the
Samantapa.sādika and his Abhidhammdvatdra from the Abhidhamma Visuddhimagga (Vism) also contains much corresponding material. The
commentaries." next ten chapters of Abhidhammāvatāra give an account of the path very
K.R.Norman points out that the story in Vācissara 's similar to that given in Vism except that no material from the first two
Vinayasārauhadīpanī agrees that Buddhadatta made summaries of chapters of Vism (i.e., the section on sīla) is included. The last chapter
Buddhaghosa's works which were translations of the Sinhalese gives a description of the system of 24 conditions.
Atthakathās. 2. The work is mainly in verse but prose sections are used for
According to the Gandhavahsa Buddhadatta wrote the two works technical material and in order to present controversial issues in debate
summarized here plus two more, the Vinayavinicchaya and form. Numbering in this summary refers to the verses, pagination
Uttaravinicchaya, which are summaries of the Vinayapitaka. K.R.Norman (" pp. " ) to the pages of E. A verse number followed by f. indicates prose
expresses doubt that Buddhadatta did indeed summarize Buddhaghosa's matter subsequent to the verse indicated (e.g., 2If.).
works--he doesn't say he did. A commentary on the Buddhavam.sa, 3. (El-7) Introduction. Before commencing the first chapter
ascribed to Buddhadatta, must have been compiled at a later date." Buddhadatta pays homage to the three jewels and gives a brief statement
218 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 219

of the preaching of the Abhidhamma in the godly realm. He refers to three levels of existence (i.e., of desire and material). It is manifold
developing skill in the 'highest pitaka' in order to break down the 'door because of the many different meditational objects which can give rise to
of delusion which prevents entry to the 'great city of abhidhamma.' He it. Material realm awareness is, for example, single because it can only
concludes the introduction by emphasizing that the work should be read be joined with one kind of feeling (equanimity). Transcendent awareness
with a concentrated mind. is single because it has only one type of object, i.e., the unconditioned
4. (El-15) Verses 8-66. Chapter One: Factors are declared to be of factor of nibbdna, but is, for example, twentyfold when analyzed by its
four kinds: awareness (citta), associated or concomitant mental factors four types together with the five meditation factors. Buddhadatta also
(cetasika), matter/form (rūpa) and liberation (nirvāna) This is apparently mentions which fetters are abandoned at each of the four stages of
the first explicit occurrence of this important distinction, although it is transcendent awareness.
implied in the couplet mātikā of the Dhammasańganf 9. Bad awareness (29-31): 12 kinds. Apart from additional numeric
5. The chapter enumerates the types of awareness in much the same breakdowns for unskilful awareness in general, Buddhadatta describes this
manner as Visuddhimagga 452-7, but following a slightly different order in the same way as does Vism 454.
for neutral awareness. That followed in Dhammasańganī is slightly 10. Maturational (vipāka) ' awareness (pp. 7-12): 36 kinds. Desire
different from either. In general Buddhadatta includes almost everything level maturation is taken first. Within that, skilful maturation is first
in the Visuddhimagga lists but makes some additional points. Notably he divided into caused and causeless. The caused skilful maturations are the
gives more numeric breakdowns: onefold, twofold, threefold and the like. eight great maturations (mahāvipāka (as at Vism 455-6) which occur as
Vism tends to give only the minimum necessary; e.g., Vism refers to bhavaiiga and similar awarenesses (31-32). Buddhadatta points out that
awareness as onefold and threefold initially whereas Buddhadatta adds these eight awarenesses cannot produce vijñapti, can only have small
twofold. objects and occur only in the reealm of desire. He also explains why
6. Good (kusala) awareness (10-27): 21 kinds, divided initially into they can never be accompanied by compassion, restraint, the three kinds
four levels (bhūmi) of desire (kāmāvacara) and so on, dealt with in of unmanifest matter or the four dominant factors (37-399).
sequence. The term kāmāvacara is discussed, distinguishing between 11. Causeless maturational awareness (42 ff.) is of eight kinds (Vism
desire (as the defilement which loves) and desires (as the objects which 454-5). Almost everything found in the Vism account is given here.
are loved). Kdmiivacara refers to the type of awareness which frequents Buddhadatta adds a fivefold analysis and one or two others. He also
the region in which the two kinds of desire predominate, i.e., the eleven specifies seven types of person for whom skilful maturational mental
lowest forms of existence (4 lower, human, 6 divine realms). consciousness elements can be the rebirth-linking and bhavańga
Alternatively it is the type of awareness which brings about rebirth in that awarenesses.
region (19). 12. The remaining thirteen good maturations belong to the three
7. The eight desire-level skilful types of awareness are described as higher levels (42 -53). They are listed as at Vism 456, but Buddhadatta
at Vism 452-3 but adding mention of the ten bases for making merit (Asi discusses why the maturational awarenesss are categorized in exactly the
157 foil., cf. also 77 foil.). Buddhadatta also adds a mention that the same way as the corresponding good awarenesss (44-47). He points out
eight can be further analyzed into 17,280 types (27). According to the that these awarenesses cannot be the result of actions performed in an
earlier life than the one immediately previous, at least in the case of an
twelfth century 7tkā this is made up by multiplying the eight awarenesses
by: 10 bases, 8 objects of sense, 4 dominating factors, 3 kinds of action individual who has not fallen away from meditation. He adds that the
(body, speech and mind) and distinguishing them all into weak, medium
and refined.
8. The remaining levels of good awareness are enumerated as in '
Cousins notes that the rendering of "vipāka" as "maturational " is
Vism with additional numeric breakdowns. "Material" level (rūpāvacāra) based upon Tibetan doctrinal biases, i.e. Sautrāntika doctrines of the
awareness, for example, is twofold because it can occur in two of the "
seed".
220 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 221
four dominant factors occur in the transcendent maturational awareness
but not in any other maturational awarenesses and also refers briefly to aggregates.
"
the discussion of the use of the terms "empty" , "signless" and "aimless 19. Buddhadatta points out that loving kindness and equanimity are
for different kinds of maturational awareness (50-51; cf.Asl 221-5). not included in the third category because they count as faultless and
13. The seven bad maturational awarenesses again correspond closely middling (tatramajjhattatata7 (in the first and second categories
to the treatment at Vism 456 and 457. respectively). He then raises the question as to why the factors of the
14. Kiriyd awareness (55-62). Twenty kinds. It is divided in second and third categories are not specifically mentioned (i.e., in
accordance with the three levels (excluding transcendent) with the first Dhammasańgañi). He gives three reasons: (a) some (i.e., those in the
level split into caused and causeless. Caused kiriyā is eightfold as at third category) are not necessarily present, (b) some are omitted because
Vism 457. they do not belong to one of the groupings of factors (in
15. Causeless kiriyā awareness (pp.12-13) is of three kinds. To a Dhammasańgañi), (c) some are omitted because they are weak (71-2).
straightforward treatment Buddhadatta adds (in the context of the mental 20. He then discusses the reason why contact is placed first in the
consciousness element with pleasant feeling) an account of the thirteen list (74-80). This is a versified version of the arguments also found at
laughing awarenesses. Laughter takes place by means of one of the Asl 107-8.
desire-level awarenesses accompanied by pleasant feeling. 21. Then the speaking, definitions, function, proximity and usually
16. The kiriyās of the two higher levels (57 ff.) are enumerated. the footing of these 38 factors are given, as at Vism 463-467.
Buddhadatta points out that these differ from the corresponding good Buddhadatta does, however, cite a variant opinion in regard to the kinds
awarenesses in that they are not meritorious acts of cultivation but a kind of unmanifest matter (virati) (p. 21 below). The differences for the
of quasi-cultivation. Presumably the point is that arhats have no need to remaining good awarenesses are then given as at Vism 467.
develop the path. He also makes the interesting comment that if an arhat 22. Bad awareness and its factors are then dealt with in the same
has developed meditation prior to becoming an arhat, his attainment way (pp. 22-26; cf. Vism 468-71). Then come resultant (pp. 26-7) and
(samāpatti) remains good until he next enters meditation (58-9). kiriya (pp. 27-8). The treatment includes the descriptions as at Vism
Buddhadatta also comments that there are no transcendent kiriyds because 471-2 but follows the same order as in Chapter One.
the path occurs for only one moment (61). 23. Buddhadatta adds a discussion of the reason why the sensory
17. At intervals during this chapter and throughout most of the book consciousnesses (excluding touch) have only calm feeling. This is
" "
we find verses of a more poetic kind, employing alliteration and other attributed to the fact that they involve contact between clinging matter,
stylistic features (e.g., 29, 31, 55, 62, 66). These are probably intended whereas touch involves the powerful impact of (three of) the primary
to lighten the dryness of Abhidharma enumeration. elements upon the tranquil matter (vv.84-6).
18. Chapter Two: Explanation of accompanying mental factors or 24. Chapter Three: Explanation of the distribution of concomitant
(mental) concomitants (cetasika) (67-88; pp.16-28). These are defined awarenesses (89-126; pp.29-3i). Buddhadatta now lists the 52
either as closely joined (samprayukta) with awareness or as existing in concomitant awarenesses and specifies the 121 clinging awarenesses
awareness. Then the concomitants which occur in the first type of (89-90). He then goes through the concomitant awarenesses in order,
awareness are enumerated, first the 29 explicitly mentioned (in the detailing in mnemonic verses how many awarenessess each concomitant
canonical texts) and invariably present, then the four which are invariably is associated with (93-113). Finally he examines meditation factors,
present but are taken as referred to obliquely in the canonical literature organs, path factors and powers. In each case he specifies how many
"
under the heading of "or whatever others , and finally the five which are awarenesses have e.g. five factors and so on (114-126). He notes that
not necessarily present in this kind of awareness but may occur. The list meditation factors do not occur in the sensory consciousnesses and path
is more or less as at Vism 462-3, but with the addition of feeling and factors are absent from all causeless awarenesses.
identification which Vism treats elsewhere under their respective 25. Chapter Four: Explanation by numerical groups (127-128;
pp.32-5). This is clearly intended to develop facility in the system, both
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABH IDHAMMA V ATARA 223
222

in terms of ease of recall and to increase the understanding of in the Pure Abodes and ten other kinds of Brahmās on the material level,
four kinds of immaterial Brahmās. The thirty-first level of the
Abhidharmika monks (127).
nonidentifying is omitted, since it is without awareness. After mentioning
26. Awareness is single because all awareness has the nature of
that persons can be similarly classed as thirty and that twenty kinds of
discriminating (vijanana). It is of two kinds as causeless and caused
person can be distinguished from the point of view of rebirth-linking,
(128-30). It is of three kinds with regard to base (vastu), i.e., with,
Buddhadatta concentrates upon an elevenfold classification. Three kinds
without or either (131-134). Similarly with regard to supporting object,
of ordinary person are distinguished according as their bhavańga
i.e., having one, having five or having six. Interestingly the first kind
awareness is causeless, two-caused or three-caused (v.188).
includes not only the sensory consciousnesses, but also the transcendent
31. Most of the content of this chapter can be derived from the final
awarenesses and even the mandgatta awarenesses (apart from the higher
Dhammahadaya section of the Vibhańga, but Buddhadatta arranges it very
faculties). The second kind is of course the three types of mind element.
simply and systematically.
Again awareness is of three kinds as being good, bad or neutral (135-8).
32. First of all he explains how many awarenesses are found in all
27. Awareness is of four kinds with regard to cause, i.e., having 30 levels, then how many in each of the three levels and how many in
none, having one, having two or having three (139-42). This simply
two or three of them, then how many in 26 levels, 25 levels, 24, 23, 22,
follows Dhammasańgantī. Another analysis into four kinds concerns
21, 17. 11, 7, 6, 3 or in just one level (190-205). Then he goes through
which types of awareness can affect matter/form in which ways. (a) 32
the levels in ascending order: 37 awarenesses can occur to beings in the
kinds of awareness originate material entities, control modes of activity
four descents, 80 occur to human beings and desire-level gods, 65 on the
and communicate (vijńapti); (b) higher consciousnesses do not generate
lower material levels, 51 in the pure abodes, 46 can occur on the
physical communication; (c) most of the remaining types of immaterial level (206-14).
consciousness can only originate matter/form; (d) the fourth group of 16
33. Various items can easily be extracted from all of this. In the
awarenesses do not affect matter/form in any way, i.e., the sensory
four lower realms no higher consciousness can occur. Also the bhavańga
consciousnesses, immaterial resultants, all rebirth-linking awarenesses and
mind there is impoverished: always unskilful maturations and lacking the
the dying awareness of an arhat (143-50). richness of the normal bhavańga mind of the human level. Human
28. Awareness is of five kinds with regard to the consciousness beings and desire-level gods have the widest range of experience, but
process (P. citta-vīthi) according as it occurs in only one position of the cannot experience the nine awarenesses which act as rebirth-linking and
ten, in two, three, four or five (151-165). It is of six kinds by division bhavańga in the two higher meditative levels. Sensory experience in the
into the six consciousnesses but sevenfold with regard to the material level is restricted to seeing and hearing. (The young Aristotle
consciousness elements (165-166). It can be divided into eight kinds: the appears to have held a similar view.) Hatred does not occur to beings in
five sensory consciousnesses, the higher consciousnesses which can only the two higher levels. Brahmās of the pure abodes do not experience
be supporting objects of factors, mind element and the remaining mental doubt or fixed view. Awarenesses connected with sensory experience do
consciousness element because these can have either a single specified not occur to beings of the immaterial level.
object, or five objects only, or any of the six kinds of object. 34. In the next section the eleven persons are taken in ascending
29. The sevenfold list is subdivided in various ways to lists of nine order and placed in the various levels also in ascending order. Some
kinds, of ten kinds, of eleven kinds and twelve kinds. A list of fourteen
examples to illustrate this: 54 awarenesses can occur to an ordinary
kinds is derived from the consciousness process. Finally awareness is person born in the Brahma realms; 50 awarenesses can occur to a
declared to be manifold, given the diversity of levels and persons. stream-enterer who is a human being; 44 can occur to a human arhat; 31
30. Chapter Five: Explanation of the Arising of Awareness (182-2- awarenesses can occur to a once-returner who is reborn on the first
90). This gives an account of which awarenesses occur in which levels meditative level; in the pure abodes 31 awarenesses can occur to a
and to which kinds of individuals. Thirty levels are employed: the four never-returner, 27 to an arhat; 21 awarenesses are possible for an
lower realms (apdya), human beings, six kinds of desire-level gods, five
224 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 225

ordinary person in the fourth immaterial level; 17 are possible for the differentiating is what is labelled citta or vijñāna. In the sixth chapter
stream-enterer there. Most unified of all is the mentality of an arhat born Buddhadatta takes up the subject of the various objects which different
on the fourth immaterial level. He can experience only 12 awarenesses awarenesses can have. In fact the basis for his discussion is the early
35. It is again possible to extract a few points of special interest. A elaboration of this topic in Dhammasańga/u and its matrix with some
defective human being with a causeless bhavańga is like the inhabitants material from the Patthāna
of the four lower realms in that he never experiences the caused good 40. First, however, he defines the six types of supporting object
maturations. These would occur to a normal human being as (292-306). The dharma-object is defined as covering everything other
adventitious, e.g., on viewing attractive scenery, producing a temporary than the objects of the five senses; it includes even the three marks which
state of passive goodness (215-6). Again those whose bhavańga are the object of insight and also the various kinds of nominal
awareness lacks wisdom can never experience adventitious life-continua designations. Buddhadatta rejects the notion that sensory objects which
with wisdom (217) nor can they experience any malzāgatta or are too brief or too small to be perceived by the sensory consciousness
transcendent awarenesses (218-19). would be supporting object factors. In other words he accepts that the
36. Beings reborn in any of the four meditational levels are still able mind when operating to perceive such things would be classifed as e.g.
to develop all four material meditations and all four immaterial a supporting object of a material thing
meditations too (228-31). This is not the case with beings born in the 41. The different awarenesses are then examined from the standpoint
immaterial level, who do not experience either material awarenesses or of the matrix triplet: (a) having a small object, (b) having a large object,
immaterial awarenesses of a level lower than their own. So a Brahma (c) having a measureless object (306-320). 25 awarenesses can only be
reborn on the first immaterial level can experience all four good (a). This means that they can only take as their object material or desire-
immaterial awarenesses, but one reborn on the fourth level can only level awarenesses and concomitants, not nominal designations. Of these
experience the fourth of the good immaterial awarenesses (247-273, 13, all causeless, can only have matter/form as their object. Notably the
especially 261-262). eight great resultants and the three kinds of investigating are included in
37. In the final section of the chapter various groupings are pointed (a). These include every kind of bhavańga possible to beings on the
out. 19 awarenesses occur only to arhats. 13 awarenesses occur both to material level.
ordinary beings and to never-returners in addition to the 17 which occur 42. Two kinds of immaterial-level awareness can only be (b).
both to all three kinds of ordinary beings and to all four "bearers of noble Transcendent awarenesses can only be (c) - their object is always
bodies. " Various other such combinations are considered (274-85). liberation. 20 awarenesses lacking wisdom can be (a) or (b) or
38. Throughout the work Buddhadatta adds little encouraging verses triplet-excluded i.e. with nominal designations as their object. 11 others
to relieve the aridity of constant enumeration and motivate the reader. (10 with wisdom + the determining consciousness) can also be (c). All
This chapter concludes with two examples: the remaining awarenesses can only be triplet-excluded, in most cases
"After examining what is before and after and thinking again because their object is a nominal designation.
and again, the person of penetration should search out and grasp the 43. The next section employs the triplet: (a) having a past object, (b)
meaning. The man who constantly and thoroughly ponders and recites having a fixture object, (c) having a present object (321-27). The 2 + 5
this extremely pithy Entrance to Abhidhamma - in high degree a light to sensory consciousness naturally come into category (c), while all
the darkness of the delusion of beings - him greed and hate will not long awarenesses whose object is liberation or a nominal designation are
approach (289-90)." triplet-excluded. This is presumably because they are nontemporal in
39. Chapter Six: Analysis of supporting object (291-375). In nature.
Abhidharma awareness is seen as necessarily supported by an object. An 44. Then follow several groupings (328-38). The main point seems
unsupported awareness is not conceivable since awareness is precisely to be that it is not possible to know that part of the mind of another
defined as that which discriminates an object. The activity of which is beyond one's own highest level of attainment. Eleven
226 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMA V ATARA 227

awarenesses can know nirvana, transcendent, material-level and These always take the same object and closely resemble the exercitives
immaterial-level awarenesses, but only six of them (all karmic) can have preceding (at least in the paradigm case of skilful exercitives). The
the path or fruit of arhatship as their object. significance of saying that it " takes the same supporting object" is that it
45. Buddhadatta then proceeds in order through the types of is a kind of temporary bhavańga which momentarily displaces the usual
awareness - good, bad, maturational and kiriya (339-56). He lists for bhavańga. Of course the usual bhavańga still has the same object as the
which groups each type of awareness can be the supporting object original action which brought about the life in question. Buddhadatta
"
condition. The same is then done with matter, liberation and nominal (like Asl) in fact uses the terms "root bhavańga, "visiting bhavańga" and
"
designations in order. Then follows a section dealing with the "after bhavańga to refer to various types of subsequently supported
complications which arise for immaterial level awarenesses due to the fact objects (e.g., 391, 394, and 402). The figure of 16 maturations is made
that the second and fourth immaterial meditations have as their object the up of the eight great maturations, the five sense consciousnesses,
first and third respectively (366-74). receiving, and two investigating awarenesses, i.e., all 16 good
46. Chapter Seven: Explanation of the occurrence of maturational maturational desire-level awarenesses. The texts, however, indicate that
awareness (376-474). " this is only applicable if the rebirth-linking awareness was accompanied
47. Buddhadatta begins by pointing out that the list of awarenesses by wisdom. The different possibilities are spelt out in the text (387-411).
includes 29 which are actions and 32 which are maturations (377). " With If the rebirth-linking awareness was one of the four great maturations
one volition one relinking has been made known " (379). Each action is lacking wisdom, then the number of possible maturations in sensory
like a seed which can give rise to only one shoot. This is not quite rigid, activity is reduced to twelve. Since the original action which brought
since there is some variety in the possible rebirth-linking awarenesses about rebirth lacked wisdom it cannot have as its result any of the four
which can arise from a given act, but there could only be one rebirth- great maturations which are associated with wisdom. The different
linking from a given volition. Variations are allowed, but must follow possibilities are again spelt out (415-29).
the principle that variation is from stronger to weaker and not vice versa, 52. In the remaining case of defective human birth the action is
e.g., three-caused action can lead to two-caused rebirth-linking but not the two-caused, there being no lesser good actions, but rebirth-linking is
reverse way round (380-384). causeless. Since the subsequently supported object cannot be superior to
48. The implication of the simile is that the shoot will then give rise the rebirth-linking and bhavańga awarenesses, all eight great maturations
to many different fruits (414); for "with one good feeling there are are excluded. The number of maturations is then eight and the different
sixteen maturational awarenesses" (385). This leads into a discussion of possibilities are again spelt out (430-49). This case in effect covers those
various aspects of sensory experience. reborn in the four lower realms. Although their rebirth is the result of
49. Two important points are made. Firstly it is emphasized that at bad action and their bhavańga is a bad maturation (causeless)
the stage of initial sensory processing the nature of the feeling is entirely investigating, they can experience good resultant, i.e., desirable sensory
controlled by the nature of the object (386). If this is strongly desirable, stimuli, but only as a result of the advent of a being of a much higher
then the feeling is pleasant. If only moderately desirable, then the feeling spiritual order whose intervention can alleviate their condition - the
'
will be neutral. Of course if it is undesirable, the feeling will be neutral example given is that of Mahāmoggallāna s descent to the hell realm.
or unpleasant and the maturational awarenesses will be unskilful 53. All of this assumes that the exercitive awarenesses are good. If
maturations. This means that the initial feeling is a mechanical response they are bad, the case is different. Only the causeless awarenesses can
to the external sensory stimulus. Even at the exercitive stage this may follow as subsequently supported object and hate awarenesses cannot be
still be the case and at the end of the process the feeling of the followed by subsequently supported objects with pleasant feeling (451-7).
subsequently supported objects is still governed by that initial stimulus. Buddhadatta then raises a dilemma based upon the Patthāna rules for
(Of course subsequent mental process might well overlay this.) succession condition (458-67; cf. Asl 278). In the case of someone
50. The second point concerns the subsequently supported objects. regretting the loss of meditation, a problem arises if the normal bhavańga
 ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 229
228 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
occur are listed in some detail (523-31). It does not follow higher or
awareness lacks pleasant feeling. The rules do not permit a
subsequentlysupported material-level object; so an exercitive awareness supernormal exercitive awarenesses. The reason given is that it only
with a desire-level object from past experience occurs momentarily. follows a desire-level exercitive which resembles the kinds of awareness
which produce subsequently supported object awareness. In other words
54. The chapter concludes with a brief account of the five kinds of
if, for example, material-level exercitives were followed by material-level
law (niyama) (468-73; cf. Asl 272-4). The five are the laws of cycle (rtu), maturational awarenesses performing the function of a subsequently
seed, action, factor and awareness.
supported object, those maturational awarenesses would not have a
55. Chapter Eight: Explanation of the Prak rñaka. Asl 279 cites a suitable producing action - a desire-level action acting as seed to produce
verse listing a number of similes under the heading of Pakinnaka-nava
the shoot of desire-level rebirth-linking will not be able to bear as its fruit
and then comments upon them (Asl 279-84). This chapter begins with the
a material-level subsequently supported object.
same material (476-511). Most ofit elaborates the sensory process.
60. Nor can a subsequently supported object occur when the
56. First comes the simile of the thread of the ground spider in which
the ground spider with threads in five directionsis like the mind awaiting exercitive has as its object higher consciousness. This is because such
stimulation at the five senses (476-488). Buddhadatta intorduces the smile objects are unfamiliar. Moreover the authority of the Atthakathās is cited
of the bird alighting on a branch at the same moment as its shadow in support of a list of exercitives which are not followed by subsequently
supported objects; exercitives whose object is name and family, nominal
strikes the ground. He then simply refers to other smiles without listing
designations or the three marks (i.e., strong insight meditation);
them (497).
exercitives which are factors fated to wrongness; exercitives whose object
57. He then details four condiitons which must concur in order for
one of the sensory consciousnesses to arise (498-511; of. Asl 282-3). For is higher factors, transcendent factors or even the rebirth-linking
eye consciousness these are (1) a healthy eye, (2) a visual object within knowledges.
the sensory field, (3) light, (4) attention. Similarly in the case of the other 61. The more normal case of sensory process in the four lower realms
as opposed to the exceptional case (above 51) is then described (535-6).
senses including mind.
58. After a brief discussion of the nature of the objects of the 19 Now only seven maturations would occur: the five sense consciousnesses,
awarenesses which can be rebirth-linking (512-514), the 11 kinds of receiving and investigating - all bad resultants. Rebirth-linking would
subsequently supported object awareness are discussed (515-532). always be bad resultant investigating.
Subsequently supported object awareness is completely absent from both 62. Kiriyā is distinguished as of two kinds: not exercitive and
"
the material and the immaterial levels. The reason given for this is that exercitive. The former is "just doing" like "a wind-blown flower. Those
the seed for relinking awarenesses on those levels cannot beget which occur as exercitive (i.e., to at-hats) are nevertheless without karmic
"'
subsequently supported objects when a sensory process occurs (520). The fruit like " the flower of a tree whose root has been cut (537-8).
63. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with various aspects
point seemt to be that a subsequently supported object is normally
produced because the passive state (rebirth-linking or bhavatiga) being a of conditionality (539-58). A condition for a given factor is defined as
" "
whatever factor assists the arising or continuation of that factor. Other
desire-level state still has a tendency to be concerned with sense objects
terms meaning cause or "producing " are viewed as synonyms for
and can therefore incloide to take a sensory object during sensory
stimulation. Materil-level awareness has no such tendency and so a condition.
64. Causal condition (hetupratyaya) is discussed in detail. It is
subsequently supported object does not occur. The fact that some sense "
defined as "that which assists in the sense of being the root. This is
consciousnesses do occur on those levels is not a valid objection, since
they are produced by the power of the senses and not because of a explained as meaning that it brings about goodness for good factors, bad
for bad, etc., in the other cases. Buddhadatta rejects this on the grounds
tendency towards sensory objects in the passive state.
that the explanation does not cover the case of matter/form factors which
59. Other cases where a subsequently supported object does not occur
are conditioned by one of the six (or nine) causes. He prefers the
230 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 231

explanation that a cause functions as a root in the sense of making a for consciousness in the previous life, while the far bank is compared to
factor well-established (541-547). the new body of the next life as the new support condition for the rebirth-
65. The different factors which can be conditioned by cause linking awareness.
condition are listed (548-554). Then the four dominant conditions are 70. Buddhadatta again takes up the nature of the transition and
listed. "Dominant condition" is defined as "that which assists in the sense discusses various possible objections (600-620, cf. Vism 555). The
of being chief." It may be noted that causal condition is the first of the rebirth-linking awareness has not come here from the former life, but
24 conditions while dominant condition is the third. Object condition, neither has it arisen spontaneously from nothing since it could not appear
which is the second, was covered in Chapter Six. without karma and other causes. He cites the examples of an echo, light
66. Chapter Nine: Explanation of the conditions for good resultants or the impression of a seal to illustrate this.
(560-621; pp.60-63). The chapter begins with a description of which 71. The connection is one of serial continuity (samtāna); hence there
resultants occur in different levels of being as a result of good, bad or is neither identity nor difference. If continuity means that subsequent
neutral traces. The levels of being are classified in terms of a series of things remain identical, then milk would always remain milk and never
lists - 3 existences (bhava), 4 origins (yoni), 5 courses, 7 stands of become curds. If it means that they become different, then the owner of
consciousness and 9 abodes of beings, but only the first is given in full. the milk would not own the curds. Hence complete identity or complete
The case of rebirth-linking (and life-continuum) is distinguished from the difference are equally unacceptable.
situation of mental activity during the course of life. 72. An objection to this is possible. Given that there is no
67. The eight desire-level wills which are fortunate manufacturers are transmigration of the aggregates from one life to another and given
conditions at rebirth-linking for nine desire-level maturations in a pleasant therefore that there is equally no transmigration of the original karma
course on the level of desire in two ways: (a) by the condition of action either, why should we not regard the result as related to a different person
applying to various moments; (b) by the condition of determination or the product of a different karma? Buddhadatta quotes a verse from the
(upaniścaya) (563-564). The various other cases are then set out, varying commentarial tradition in reply. The point is illustrated by a simile
the type of manufacturer and the level of being (565-86). referring to the practise of dressing seeds with honey in order to produce
68. Buddhadatta then discusses the nature of the change from one sweeter fruit at a later stage. The fruit is not identical with either the
life to the beginning of the next (587-90). Material and immaterial do seed or the honey. However, seed is part of the same continuity and
not cross over from one life to the next "because it is a past state, " i.e., would not have been sweet without the honey acting as a condition.
a causally produced state of being has dissolved. Because there is no Similarly skills acquired in childhood bear fruit in old age (607-15).
crossing over, it follows that awareness will not appear without a cause 73. A dilemma is then raised by asking whether the action which is
the condition for the fruit is existent or nonexistent. If the former it
(588). It is simply material and immaterial as product of conditions
which arise. There is no person who transmigrates to another state. would occur at the same time as its result. If the latter, then it could
equally operate at other times and bear fruit constantly. Buddhadatta
69. The next section describes the sequence of rebirth-linking which
again cites a commentarial verse in reply which gives the simile of a
is "very hard to understand " (591-599). Taking as its starting point the
dying body in which the senses have perished, the awareness is dependent guarantee for repayment. It is the fact that action has been performed
that is relevant, not whether it still exists or not.
upon the heart base. At this point it takes as its object some previously
performed action or sornething symbolizing that, whether a fortunate act 74. Chapter Ten: Explanation of matter/form (622-767; pp. 64-78).
It is defined as that which is afflicted (rūpati). Alternatively it is that
or an unfortunate one. The danger in that object is concealed by
which reveals (rūpāyati). The four great elements are distinguished from
ignorance. Craving inclines consciousness towards it and the conascent
the 24 dependents (utpāda). For each the name is explained (i.e., the
traces impel the mind onto it. The actual process of transition between
vacanakatha7. Then the defining mark, function and proximity are given
one life and the next is compared to crossing a watercourse by means of
for each one. These terms are defined (633-634). The mark is either the
a rope. The near bank is compared to the body as the support condition
232 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 233

general nature or the essential characteristic of a factor. Its rasa is either basic eight material things. It is simply so called because it is a specific
its function or its quality. Its proximity is either its result or the way in alteration of material things which is consciousness-originated (687). It
which it manifests. Which of these alternatives is intended seems to vary is both the cause of communication and the actual act of communicating
with the context. (686).
75. The basic list is identical (apart from a slight variation of order) 80. The remaining kinds of dependent matter are given standard
with that used in Vism. Almost identical definitions are given (632-695; explanations and definitions. So space is defined as simply a gap in
cf. Vism 433 foil.). Only a few additional points can be mentioned. material things (688). Lightness of matter, softness of matter and
76. Buddhadatta gives a brief account of the five kinds of "eye made readiness of matter are explained as " specific modes of activity of matter"
by wisdom" as well as of the more material kinds of eye (vv.635-656; cf. (689). Accumulation of matter and continuity of matter are both
Asl 306 foil.). He rejects the theory (attributed by Vacissara's Tikā to understood as birth matter. The difference is simply that whereas
some among the Mahāsaritghikas) that the difference between the senses accumulation refers to the first occurrence, continuity refers to the
is due to a difference in the predominating element - energy, fire/light for subsequent birth of a similar matter (692). Aging of matter is considered
the eye, space for the ear, wind for the nose, water for the tongue and more evident than aging of non-matter.
earth for the tactile organ. He does not cite the alternative theory which 81. The next section of the chapter is devoted to explaining a
gives wind for the ear, earth for the nose and all for the body (cf. Asl 312 collection (prak rñaka) (696-742 f; pp.71-77). Similar but for the most
foil.; Vism. 444). The reason given for rejecting such theories is that the part less complete material is found at Vism 450 foil. and especially at
matter which forms the effective portions of the sense-organs is precisely Asl 339 foil., presumably deriving from the old commentaries.
a state of tranquility of the four elements. Buddhadatta gives five headings in effect for this: (1) summation, (2)
77. The nature of the female (and male) sense-organs is discussed origination, (3) the conditioned, (4) objection and refutation, (5) the
(664-672 f; Asl 321 foil.). The female organ is produced by weak good ascending number of guidelines of analysis.
action, the male by strong good action. Even a hermaphrodite would 82. " Summation" refers to the sum total of material factors being 28.
have only one of these two senses; in such a case the sexual appearance The view that sleepiness (middha) is a kind of matter (attributed by the
would not be produced by the sense-organ but by karma- supported Ikā to the Abhayagirivāsins) is rejected. Buddhadatta cites Suttanipāta
passionate awareness. 541, Dhammasańgapī 206 and two passages from the Patlhāna as textual
78. The difference between food in its Abhidharma sense of refutations. A view from the ancient commentary (cf. Vism 450) which
nourishment and the gross matter of food and drink is explained (675-677 expands the list of material factors to 32 is also rejected on the grounds
f.; cf. Asl 330-1). The gross matter removes distress due to hunger thāt power (hala) matter is a form of the wind element, cohesion is the
(explained as karma-born fire). The nourishment protects life. The two water element, birth matter is accumulation and continuity, while sickness
act together. (roga) matter is aging and impermanence. It is however interesting to
79. Bodily communication (kāyavijñapti) is explained as a specific note that earlier in the chapter (644-647) Buddhadatta does include
mode of activity of the wind element, acting to produce bodily cohesion and all four elements as distinct items in an enumeration (cf.
movement. It takes effect at the seventh exercitive moment; so the wind also 726). Presumably this was an established view in the earlier
element can only be referred to as bodily communication when it occurs tradition.
at that time. It is always consciousness-originated and only occurs in 83. " Origination " gives an account of the four modes of origination
mind-door processes. From another point of view it is simply a form of of material factors: awareness, cycle, food and karma. 26 of the material
bodily action. Verbal communication is similar except that it is a specific factors are classified according as they originate from one or more of
mode of activity of the earth element, i.e., the hardness of the vocal these. Aging of matter and impermance of matter cannot however be so
organs acting to produce sounds. Buddhadatta points out that the two classified. They are the maturing and breaking up of what is originated
communications are not consciousness-originated in the same sense as the (707). If they were themselves originated, they would mature and break

i
234 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 235

up. By implication there would be an infinite regress. spontaneously. Otherwise all four modes of birth occur.
84. The objection could be brought against this that in that case the 90. The basic eight material factors are the simple octad. With the
same would apply to (the two factors which constitute) birth (cf. Vism life faculty they are the life nonad. With in addition one of the sensory
452). This however is denied on the grounds that origination is a tranquilities, the (heart) base, masculinity or femininity they form the
designation which refers to the state of being conditioned by a supporting appropriate decad. At conception human beings and mammals would
(janaka) condition. Birth is so conditioned. Aging and impermanence normally have three decads - base decad, body decad and one of the
are not conditioned in this way at their moment of potency (717) and gender decads. The last would be absent in some defective human beings
hence cannot be referred to as "being born" or "existing." and mammals, as well as being absent in all egg-born creatures. Since
85. It can of course be objected that this either implies that they are the other four senses are operational from conception, beings that arise
" "
nonexistent like a flower in the sky or that they are permanent like the spontaneously as well as mature human beings have seven decads, i.e.,
unconstructed, i.e., liberation. This again is denied on the grounds that 70 kinds of matter. Brahmas of the material level lack the senses of
they are conditioned by the four elements as support conditions (like the smell, taste and touch, as well as gender. They have only three decads,
other dependent material factors). Since they exist when the four but the mass of their body consists of the life nonad - a total of 39 kinds
elements do, they are not nonexistent. Since they do not exist when the of matter. (This must mean at birth.) Nonidentifying beings have only
four elements do not exist, they are not permanent. the life nonad. Human beings who are defective would have less than the
86. (3) "The conditioned" refers to the distinction between the 18 full seven decads, but always at least three (body, base and tongue).
material factors which are produced and the remaining 10 which are 91. In summary 27 of the 28 material factors would occur for a
unproduced. The 10 unproduced material factors are simply modes of given desire-level being, but only 23 for Brahmās. All four kinds of lives
activity (or alterations? vikāra) of the 18 kinds of produced matter. occur on the level of desire, i.e., karma-born, mind-bom, cycle-born and
Hence they are not unconstructed. food-born. The last is absent in the material level. Nonidentifying
"
87. (4) "Objection and refutation brings up an objection to the beings also lack mind-bom material factors. The external world has only
traditional statement that femaleness or maleness, life, cohesion and also one kind of life, i.e., cycle-born matter (761). At conception matter is
bodily sensitivity are in every place (726-732). "From the highest first of all exclusively action-born.
standpoint one thing within another does not occur," i.e., space is a 92. Chapter Eleven: Explanation of liberation (768-77; pp. 79-82).
"
construction based upon irreducible factors - they are not themselves Buddhadatta explains "nirvāña" as "absence of weaving (varlet), i.e.,
spatial. This objection is refuted on the ground that what is meant here absence of craving which links one life to another life. Peace is its mark;
is simply that difference of place cannot be declared in the case of factors absence of passing away is its quality or bringing security is its function;
which cannot be separated. Nevertheless there is no mingling. These the signless is its proximity and escape is its result.
factors are distinct factors because their marks, function and proximity 93. An objector (according to the Tiled this is the Vitapdavādipakkha)
differ. argues that from the highest standpoint liberation is not a single entity
88. An elaborate numerical analysis of matter follows (733-742 f.; "because it cannot be apprehended, like the self of sectarians or the horn
pp.75-77). All matter is single insofar as it is worldly, not a cause, of a hare." Buddhadatta rejects this on the grounds that it is apprehended
"
constructed, capable of being the object of contaminants and dependent by the wisdom eye of those investigating and by appropriate practice on
upon conditions. It is twofold from various standpoints, threefold from the part of those seeking it."
others and so on up to elevenfold and manifold. The 28 varieties of 94. The objector cites the canonical passage (Sathyuttanikdya.IV 251)
" "
matter are assigned appropriately in each case. in which liberation is referred to as the destruction of desire in order to
89. The final section (5) of the chapter discusses material bundles prove that liberation is the mere absence of something and not an existent
and the different realms of being (743-764; pp.77-8). As regards the in its own right. Buddhadatta replies that in the same canonical context
modes of birth some ghosts. hell beings and most gods always arise an arkat is defined in the same way. On the objector's interpretation this
236 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDIIAMMAVATARA 237

would imply that the supreme supernormal fruit awareness was also the condition for the paths and fruits. It is permanent since it does not arise.
mere absence of desire. In Buddhadatta's view "destruction of desire" is It is not matter since it lacks the appropriate characteristics. It is free
simply the type of figurative expression in which the cause is given the from all proliferation (nisprapadca). He concludes the chapter with four
name of its result. Liberation determines the destruction of desire but verses listing epithets which refer to nirvana:
is not identical with it. Ultimate end, deathless, peace, without beginning or end,
95. Moreover if liberation were nothing but the cessation of desire, undecaying,
then it would be reached whenever desire ceases. Everyone would reach Subtle and safe refuge, shelter, sanctuary and support,
it, not just the saintly. There would be a multiplicity of liberations. Untroubled, deep, true, extinction of suffering, free from
Nirwina would be constructed and hence impermanent and necessarily contaminants,
frustrating. Very hard to see, other, far shore, liberation, beyond the visible,
96. Again, even if extinction of desire is the object of the fruition Extinguishing of craving, firm, island, free from distress,
awareness, how could it be the object of the prior awarenesses when that without troubles,
extinction has not yet taken place. That being so, what could be the Passionless and cessation, liberation and freedom too. By these
object of those awarenesses? names nirvāia is spoken of
97. Since the extinction of desire is something which can be brought 102. Chapter Twelve: Explanation of nominal designations (778; pp.
about by appropriate practice, it could not be the same thing as liberation, 83-4). Buddhadatta treats the topic of nominal designations entirely in
which is not brought about by anyone. Buddhadatta cites the passage prose except for a single concluding verse. He distinguishes two ways
(Dhammapada 97) where the arhat is described as " knower of the of looking at designations. A nominal designation is either (a concept)
unmade" in a "punning" verse. Hence liberation, the undying, is unmade, to be made known or (a label) which makes known. (According to the
i.e., unconstructed. l ikā this is equivalent to the distinction between an object (artha) and a
98. Discussion then follows of the use of the word "abandoning" name (nāma) designation.)
(nihsarana) as applied to liberation. Buddhadatta points out that when 103. Buddhadatta cites the adhivacana couplet (Dhammasmiganī 226;
abandoning of sense objects is referred to, this does not imply the Vinava V 176; Niddesa I 124, etc.) and gives definitions of the ten words
nonexistence of the first meditative level. So there is no reason why given there as equivalents (including prajñapti itself) (much as Asl
escape from " whatever is constructed and dependently originated " should 390-91). According to him the first four refer to designation in the first
imply the nonexistence of liberation. sense. In this sense such concepts as the ego, although referring to
99. Buddhadatta then goes on to prove by means of various factors such as matter and although conditioned and caused by them, do
canonical citations that the Buddha, speaking from the highest standpoint, not arise and pass away like them but are simply brought about by
has referred to liberation as a factor, and in the small triplet he classes it general agreement. The remaining six refer to the second sense of
together with the paths and fruits. Since immeasurability could hardly designation. In this sense a designation is simply the word or label which
apply to a mere absence, liberation is from the highest standpoint a single makes a given factor known.
existent. It is not then nonexistent as is the prakrti (of Sāmkhya), the self 104. Nominal designation divides into three types: (a) appropriate,
of sectarians and the horn of a hare. (b) dependent, (c) relative. Appropriate designations name realities.
100. Buddhadatta also rejects the possibility that liberation could be Dependent designation is itself of two types - either a compound which
just nominal. He points out that this is ruled out by the small object refers to a collection of factors such as a bear or hyena, or a simple
triplet where the paths and fruits are declared to have an immeasurable which is the case with such things as the directions, space, time (signs
object. Those factors whose object is a nominal designation are declared and so on).
not to have an object which can be defined in terms of this triplet. 105. It is mind door exercitive consciousness, following ear door
101. Liberation, says Buddhadatta, does exist. It is the object e
xercitive consciousness and taking hold of a prior label, which is
238 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 239

conscious of designation. That designation is then made known by (a 112. If it does possess volition, then either the self is the same thing
further) mind door exercitive consciousness taking hold of the prior label. as volition or the two are different. If they are the same thing, then the
106. A set of six is then given, describing the various combinations destruction of volition would entail the destruction of self precisely
of (a) designation based upon the existent anti (b) designation based because they are not different. If the intention is to argue that because
"
upon the nonexistent. For example, "the sound of a woman would be self is (by definition) permanent, it is not destroyed even when volition
classified as (a) based upon (b), since sound is a real entity and woman is destroyed, the reply to this is to assert that if self is not destroyed
is not. All of these are however included under dependent designation. then volition will not be destroyed.
107. Relative designation is also a kind of dependent designation. 113. For, given that self and volition are held to be identical, it is not
This refers to such cases as long in relation to short, where one concept reasonable to speak of one being destroyed and the other not. Since
is related to another. they cannot be distinguished, it is just as possible to speak of a self as
108. Chapter Thirteen: Penetration of the agent (779-788; pp.85-88). being destroyed and volition as not being destroyed. Conversely if it is
This Chapter also is largely in prose, apart from verse quotations from held that when volition is destroyed, self is not destroyed, then it fol-
the canon. It begins with an objection: the skilful and other factors lows that self is different from volition; for destruction of a self, which
have been explained, but not the self which is the agent of these things. is not volition, would not entail destruction of volition. So your thesis
Yet without a self as agent and experiencer there could be no good or that self and volition are identical is faulty. Alternatively given no dif-
bad factors, in which case there could be no resultants. Obviously if ference between self and volition and the nondestruction of self, there
there were no restilts of good and bad factors, there would be no point could be no destruction of volition. That however is not the case -the
in teaching about them. proposition is faulty.
109. Buddhadatta points out in reply that if the nonexistence of an 114. In the case of the opposite position -that self and volition are
agent might imply the nonexistence of good factors, it would equally different - the question arises as to precisely what is meant by differ-
i mply the nonexistence of the assumed self. If the agent and the self ence. Is it affirmed that the two are different in characteristic mark or in
are taken as identical, this must be so. (The point is that if factors are location? In the first case the difference between self and volition is
produced by an agent, the agent would be absent whenever the factors argued to be parallel to the difference of characteristic mark between
are absent. If self and agent are identical, then the self would be imper- such things as visual appearance and taste even when they occur in
manent, which of course contradicts the definition of self as the per- one place. However if uncooked vegetables are burned by fire, we
manent ego.) If on the other hand it is argued that the self persists as find that when the visual appearance changes, so does the taste. This is
the performer even in the absence of an agent who is actually doing precisely because they occur in one place. If it is claimed that this is
something, then there is no valid objection to the occurrence of good not the case with the self and volition, it can be replied that the fact that
and other factors in the absence of an agent. The fact that the objector the two are inseparable implies that one would not be destroyed with-
is fond of the notion of (self as) the performer, is no argument. out the other. If of course they can be separated then this would imply
110. It can also be compared to the way in which shoots and other that one could have volition without self (the very proposition which is
parts of plants are produced as a result of such conditions as the ele- being denied).
ments or the right season. Similarly good and other factors are pro- 115. If you do not assert that they occur in one location, then the
duced because of a sufficient collection of causes and conditions. comparison with visual appearance and taste is invalid. So if you do
assert that they occur in one location, it follows that the indestructibility
111. If it is said that it is ascertained by wisdom that a self, which is the
constant and permanent performer of good and other actions, exists from of self will entail indestructibiliy of volition. This is unacceptable; so
the highest standpoint then we must examine this. Does this self which is your proposition is faulty .In the converse case the possibility of sepa-
the agent and experiencer, possess volition? If it lacks volition, it would ration will entail the destruction of self and nondestruction of volition.
be as incapable of being an agent or experiencer as grass or trees. Otherwise there is no occurrence in one place.
 ABHI DHAMMA V ATARA 241
240 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
The kasinas have to be increased; the remainder not. 22 karmic states
116. In the second case, where the difference between self and can become semblance signs; the others cannot. 12 (10 foul ones, food
volition is held to be one of location, the difference would be like that and body mindfulness) do not occur for gods. 13 do not occur for
between a pot and a piece of cloth. If so, they would be quite distinct
Brahmās (adding mindfulness of breathing to these 12). Only the four
and there would be no inseparability. The self would lack volition in immaterial karmic states occur in the immaterial level.
which case it could not be the agent and experiencer.
123. 19 karmic states can be grasped only by seeing. 18 can be
117. The objector then responds with a series of passages in which grasped only by hearing. Mindfulness of the body may be either of
the Buddha speaks in terms of personal identity. Buddhadatta counters
these. Breathing mindfulness is grasped by touching. Wind meditative
this with the claim that such passages were spoken from the conventional
kasiña is grasped by seeing and touching. Five karmic states cannot be
viewpoint, not from the highest standpoint, and cites a counterpassage (S grasped right from the beginning of meditation practice. The rest can.
I 135).
Nine of the kasinas can lead to the immaterial levels. All ten can lead
118. So one should not hang on to just the mere words nor cling to to higher faculties. Three sublime states can lead to the fourth. All forty
them foolishly and rigidly. It is necessary to "serve the lineage of the can lead to insight, to success in achieving a state of being and to
teachers, " understand the intention of the phrases in the sūtras and make
happiness.
an effort to understand their meaning. It is important to understand the
124. If the meditator continues to dwell with the teacher, the karmic
two truths--highest and conventional--without confusing them. Having state should be expounded as experiences occur. If he wishes to live
understood these, one should investigate on the basis that there is no elsewhere, it should be expounded "neither too succinctly nor in too
permanent fixed self that is the agent or experiencer according to highest
much detail" (837). The karmic state is referred to as the vital spot of the
truth. Then the wise seeker should develop insight into the occurrence mind-born god (i.e., Kārnadeva).
of factors through the concordance of conditions and practice in order to 125. The aspirant should live in a suitable dwelling place free from
make an end of frustration. the 18 possible defects and located neither too far from a village nor too
119. Chapter Fourteen: Explanation of the bringing into being of near. Any minor housekeeping tasks which have been left undone should
material-level concentration (789-979; pp.89-99). The next five chapters be got out of the way. Instructions are then given for the construction of
are entirely in verse as are Chapters 20-22. In fact, as mentioned above, a kasina and the method of meditating on the earth kasiña is explained
most of the remainder of the Entrance to Abhidharma consists of a (843-862).
summary of the stages of the path along the same lines as are found in 126. When the object of meditation is as clear to the mind 's eye of
Viśuddhimagga. the yogin with his eyes shut as it is when looked at with open eyes, the
120. After eight verses praising morality and emphasizing the acquired sign has arisen. Fixing the mind on this gradually obstructs the
necessity for it, the ten obstacles are listed (cf. Vism 90 and VinA II hindrances until the mind becomes concentrated in access (upacāra)
416). After cutting those off, the aspirant should approach the teacher. concentration (863-870). At this point the semblance sign arises. This
The qualities of the ideal teacher are briefly described. The aspirant emerges as if breaking up the acquired sign "like the polished disk of a
should perform the duties owed to the teacher. mirror drawn from a bag" and appears to the meditator as much purer
121. The teacher should accept him as student when he knows the than the acquired sign. Nevertheless it is simply produced by meditation
character type (carita) of the aspirant. The usual list of six character practice - a mere mode of appearance, born of conceptual identification
types is given. Then an expanded list of 64 types is mentioned (805; the (870-876).
Tfkā attributes this to Upanandatthera). The 40 karmic states are listed 127. The mind enters concentration in two ways: at the moment of
and assigned to the appropriate character types.
access by abandoning the hindrances and at the moment of obtaining
122. The 40 are then analysed from various points of view. Ten meditation through the appearance of the meditative factors. The
bring access, the remainder absorption. The latter are divided in difference is that in the first case the factors are weak, whereas in
accordance with the level of meditation possible when they are practised.
242 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 243
absorption they have become strong and that state can be maintained even
for a whole day (877-880). disenchantment, then the trance is classified as "tending to penetration"
128. Instructions are then given for the development of the (928-931).
semblance sign. If absorption cannot be reached immediately it must be 133. When it is time to go on to the second meditational level, the
carefully guarded. Unhelpful things must be avoided and helpful wise yogin sees the danger in the first meditation - its factors are weak
circumstances cultivated. The ten kinds of skill in absorption should be because it is still near to the stage when the unskilful is overcome and
accomplished. If absorption is still not attained, the meditator should not because conceptual and sustained thought, the first two factors, are
give up but try to make the mind occur evenly, free from lax and relatively gross. He therefore reflects on the second level as peaceful,
energetic states (881-893). overcomes affection for the first level and undertakes the practice to
129. The mind door process in which absorption is attained is then attain the second level of Meditation. In due course the second level is
described. After three or four desire-level exercitive moments, absorption reached in a similar way to the first. The mind door process again
occurs at either the fourth or the fifth moment. Reference is made to the culminates in the fourth or fifth moment with a single material-level
view of the Abhidharmika Godatta which allows absorption to arise even awareness, this time of the second trance (932-943).
134. A similar process of succession from the second to the third
in the sixth or seventh moment on the ground that these awarenesses have
the support of previous repetition to strengthen them (904). This is level and then from the third to the fourth is described (946-975). Finally
rejected on the ground that the bhavańga is near - just as someone the difference between the method of five levels and that with four is
briefly outlined (976-977).
running towards a cliff is unable to stop at the edge even if he wishes to
do so. The absorption moment is a single material-level awareness 135. Chapter Fifteen: Explanation of the bringing into being of
immaterial-level concentration (980-1042; pp.I00-103). The meditator
followed immediately by falling into bhavańga and then by a new mind
door process in which the mind recollects the meditation (907-908). now becomes disenchanted with matter/form and seeks to go on from the
130. The five hindrances and the five meditative factors are listed fourth meditational level which he has thoroughly mastered. He therefore
and reasons given why each factor overcomes a particular hindrance spreads the sign out as far as he wishes and directs his attention to the
area pervaded by it.
(910-916). The first meditative level which abandons the five hindrances
136. The process of attainment of immaterial-level meditation is
and has these five factors is also beautiful in three ways and has ten
similar to the material-level meditations. The succession from level to
characteristic marks.
131. The greater the care taken in the prior process of purification, level is now however a matter of changing the object of attention rather
the longer the meditation will last. For fuller development the semblance than diminishing the number of meditation factors. The second
sign should be expanded; so instructions for this are given (920-923). immaterial mind is reached by directing attention to the consciousness of
the first immaterial level as limitless. Buddhadatta (surely correctly)
When the first meditative level has been obtained, it must be thoroughly
mastered. The five kinds of mastery are listed: adverting, attaining, points out that the consciousness which then occurs is known as "the
li mit of consciousness", not as " li mitless consciousness" (1005-1006). In
controlling, emerging and recollecting. Only when these five are fully
developed, should any attempt to obtain the second level be made. order to reach the third immaterial level the yogin must direct his
132. Four types of meditation are described. That of the careless attention to the consciousness of the first immaterial level as " empty of
yogin whose identification and attention turns to sense objects is that." In due course that disappears and the third meditational level arises
"
seeing just the absence of that. " To attain the fourth he directs attention
classified as "tending to decline." That of the slow yogin for whom
mindfulness of this kind becomes settled is classified as "tending to to the consciousness of the third immaterial meditation.
137. In each case the level which has been reached must be let go
stability." The trance of the careful yogin whose identification and of. The danger of it is seen, affection for it is overcome and the next
attention turns to absence of applied thought is classifed as "tending to
distinction". If however identification and attention turn to level is seen as peaceful. In the case of the attainment of the fourth level
the situation is slightly different. One sees the very peaceful nature of
 ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 245
244 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
" Later it must be strengthened by delimiting larger and larger areas in
the attainment which can "abide with pure nonexistence as its object. which the sounds will be heard and can be investigated.
This is surmounted not by disenchantment but "because there is no desire 143. Knowledge which encompasses minds is based upon the divine
to reach " the fourth stage. Thereby he reaches a nonidentifying eye but developed by increasing the light so as to see the color of the
awareness which is extremely subtle, i.e., attains the fourth immaterial blood which occurs dependent upon the heart matter/form. Then the
mind, known as neither identification nor nonidentification (1020-1032). yogin can become conscious of the awareness of another. When this
138. In fact in this highest stage not only identification but also knowledge has been strengthened by practice, he will not need to see the
feeling and all other mental concomitants are similarly subtle. color. Recollection of previous lives is aroused by direct attention to the
Identification and the others do not perform their function; hence they are past, commencing from just previously and extending recollection further
"
"not cognition. Because they are the residuuin of traces, they occur with and further back. Divine eye is developed on the basis of an energy
"
subtlety; hence they are "not noncognition. (fire) kasiña, white kasiña or best of all, light kasiña. Absorption must
139.Chapter Sixteen: Explanation of the higher faculties (1043-1103), not be aroused. Instead attention is directed to visual objects appearing
pp.104-7). After the eight attainments have been produced, the, yogin in the light established and enlarged on the level of access. Eventually
should bring into being the five ordinary higher faculties. Indeed even the yogi can position light where he wishes and see images at will.
a thorough mastery of just the fourth meditative level would allow this 144. Chapter Seventeen: Explanation of the objects of the higher
to be attempted. The higher faculties are the origin of limitless faculties (1104-1168; pp.108-111). For this chapter the five higher
advantages. When they are produced, the bringing into being of faculties are expanded to seven by the addition of knowledge of the
concentration has reached its goal (1047). future and knowledge of proceeding in accordance with karma. These
140. First of all the attainments must be thoroughly mastered in the two are taken as modifications of the divine eye (1101). The seven are
fourteen ways - such things as the ability to move directly from the first analysed in terms of the four Dharmasamgraha triplets concerned with
to the third level or moving from a level involving one kasiña directly to objects (cf. Vism. 429-35).
another with a higher kasiña. The prior state of mind possesses eight 145. Knowledge of the various higher faculties can have seven types
qualities: it is purified, clear, unmarked, without affliction, realized, ready, of object, i.e., small, great, past, present, future, personal or external.
firm and unmoving. Before trying to arouse one of the higher Examples are given of each of these. However, they are not all mutually
knowledges, the meditative level which is the basis for that should be exclusive (1107-1115).
entered. Then, on emerging, the preliminary work for the higher 146. Divine ear can only have four types of object, i.e., small,
knowledge in question is undertaken. This takes the form of making the present, personal or external. If one hears the sound of one 's own belly,
appropriate resolve.. the divine ear would have a personal object (1116-1118).
141. Eventually the resolve succeeds in arousing the basic meditation, 147. Knowledge which encompasses minds can have eight kinds of
but after emerging from the basic meditation (whose object is the object: small, great, immeasurable, path, past, present, future and external.
semblance sign) he resolves again. This time the resolve succeeds Buddhadatta specifies that it can only have a path object figuratively
50
immediately. The process is similar to that which occurs on first speaking (I 122).
attaining one of the material or immaterial levels: three or four mornents 148. Some discussion also occurs in relation to the fact that this
of ever stronger material-level awareness followed by a single moment knowledge is said to be able to have present objects. The point is that
which is a material-level awareness of the fourth meditative level. The awarenesses unlike matter last for a single moment only. Since
mind then immediately lapses into bhavariga awareness. knowledge which encompasses minds must as an exercitive awareness be
142. The five higher faculties all follow this basic pattern. preceded by adverting awareness whose object will be the mind which is
Knowledge of the various higher faculties is the product of a resolve for being encompassed, by the time the knowledge arises its object will have
"
the faculty in question - "may I be a hundredfold and so on. Knowledge already ceased. Buddhadatta then distinguishes three kinds of "present."
of the divine ear is the product of adverting to various kinds of sound.
246 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 247
"
"Present can refer to a single moment, i.e., as made up of the three transcendent path. It is of three kinds according as it is produced by
smaller moments (of arising, persisting and ceasing). It can refer to the thinking, by learning or by bringing into being. The first of these is
period of one or two continuities (cf. Vism 431). Finally it can refer to wisdom produced by one's own thinking. The second is wisdom obtained
the present existence. after hearing from another, while the third is that obtained by absorption
149. The view is cited that knowledge which encompasses minds has concentration (1181-1185).
a present object in the first sense of present (1128 cf. Vism 432, Asl
156. Wisdom is of four kinds with reference to the four
421). This is rejected on the grounds that it entails a difference of object discriminations. The first is knowledge as to things and refers to
between the adverting awareness and the subsequent exercitive knowledge of five things: whatever has arisen through a condition,
awarenesses. The other two senses of "present " are considered
resultant, karma, liberation and the object of what has been spoken. The
appropriate. second is knowledge of factors and refers to the knowledge of the
150. The recollection of previous abodes can have eight kinds of corresponding things: the cause, the noble path, what has been spoken,
object: small, great, immeasurable, path, past, personal, external or the skilful and the unskilful. The third is knowledge of grammar and
unclassifiable (i.e., a concept such as a name or family) (1143-1152). refers to the Pali language which describes things and factors. The fourth
151. Divine eye can have only four types of object, exactly as in the is knowledge which reviews the first three knowledges and which is
case of divine ear. It is interesting to note that this limitation does not considered as perspicuity. The five causes which produce perspicuity are
apply to its two modifications, nor to knowledge which encompasses listed (1186-1191).
minds even though that is developed by means of the divine eye 157. The fifth and final heading is the bringing into being of wisdom
(1153-1154). itself Prior to this the yogi should familiarize himself with such lists as
152. Knowledge of the future has eight kinds of object: small, great, the five aggregates by study, since these lists are the ground (in which
immeasurable, path, future, personal, external or unclassifiable wisdom grows). He should first have aroused the two purifications of
(vv.1155-1163). Knowledge of proceeding in accordance with karma has morality and awareness and then subsequently arouse the purification of
five kinds of object, i.e., small, great, past, personal and external. view and the remaining four purifications (1192-1194).
153. Chapter Eighteen: Explanation of purification of view 158. The five aggregates are each briefly defined (11951201). Then
(1170-1225; pp.112-115). Since wisdom should be brought into being as they are grouped as (1) name, i.e., 4 aggregates or the concomitant
soon as concentration and the higher faculties have been brought into awarenesses together with the 81 kinds of ordinary awareness; (2) matter,
being, Buddhadatta devotes the remainder of the book to that topic. i.e., one aggregate or the 28 kinds of matter. "Matter" is defined as that
154. Five questions are set out as headings for the discussion of which is affected. "Name " is defined as that which impels. Having
wisdom. First, wisdom is defined as "insight wisdom associated with understood the difference between the two, the nonexistence of any
" "
meritorious awareness. " Secondly, the meaning of the word wisdom is individual is established. The two are compared to a mechanism made
given as that which understands or as many-sided knowing. At this point of string and wood which is in fact lifeless but appears to move and have
a discussion is introduced of the difference between wisdom, life. They are mutually dependent. Name is without force; for it cannot
consciousness and identification (cf. Vism 437). The latter two have accomplish anything with its force. Matter/form also is without force; for
" "
li mited functions. Wisdom is a many-sided knowing because it does without name it too cannot accomplish anything (1202-1223).
everything that consciousness or identification can do and more besides, 159. It is this seeing in accordance with reality, with the notion of a
since it can bring to the path. Thirdly the mark, function, and proximity being entirely removed from "name and form" i.e., (from the
cause are given (as Vism 438) (1172-1180). psychophysical complex) which is called "purity of view" (1224).
155. Under the fourth heading is given a numerical analysis. Wisdom 160. Chapter Nineteen: Explanation of purification by crossing over
is single as to defining mark. It is of two kinds, ordinary and doubt (1227-1261; pp.116-119). The knowledge which is called crossing
otherworldly, according as it is associated with the ordinary or the over doubt is established when one knows the causes and conditions of
248 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 249

the psychophysical complex and crosses over doubt as to the three times. created by destroying karma are termed "arisen" (vv.1244-45 f.).
Buddhadatta describes two methods for doing this. 165. By understanding the way in which these twelve kinds of karma
161. The first method commences with grasping the 32 parts of the bring maturations in the circle (of birth and death), he is able to
body and then seeking the causes and conditions of the body. Ignorance, generalise to the universal nature of the succession of action and
craving, clinging and action are given as the four causes of the material maturation as an aspect of the linking of cause and result. After quoting
body, while food is given as its condition. The difference between a eleven verses on this subject attributed to the Porānas (as at Vism 602-3),
, "
cause and a condition is explained as the difference between what Buddhadatta concludes the chapter with three synonyms for knowledge
"
produces and what protects. So a seed is the cause of a shoot, while such known as crossing over doubt. It is the same thing as knowledge of the
things as soil are its conditions. In this case ignorance, craving and abiding nature of dharma, knowing things as they really are and as
clinging are comparable to a mother. Karma is the producer comparable perfect seeing. The yogin who possesses this knowledge is known as a
to the father as the begetter of his son, while food is the maintainer like "lesser stream-enterer " (1254-1261).
the (wet) nurse for a boy (1228-36). 166. Chapter Twenty: Explanation of purification by knowledge and
162. Then the conditions for the psychophysical complex are grasped. seeing of path and false path (1262-96; pp.120-122). One who wishes to
Eye consciousness, for example, arises in dependence upon eye, visible, reach knowledge of path and false path should make effort (yoga) by
object and light. When the yogin sees that both name and form occur as means of comprehending through groupings. The yogic path understands
a result of conditions, he should contemplate the universal nature of its that the psychophysical complex is not collected together from a
occurrence in this way. As he contemplates this, all doubts as to the past, pre-existent heap or accumulation, nor does it go anywhere when it
future or present are abandoned (1236-41). ceases. It is comparable to (the sound produced by) a musical instrument
163. The second method is by means of understanding karma and (viid) which does not come from anywhere nor go anywhere when the
maturation. Karma is described by means of three sets of four. The first music stops - it is simply the product of various conditions (1262-1267).
set consists of karma to be experienced: (a) in this visible state, (b) upon 167. This comprehension of rise and fall in brief can be elaborated
rebirth, (c) some time after and (d) "has-been karma". The first of these in detail by means of the analysis of this knowledge. Fifty characteristic
occurs in the exercitive process as the volition constituting the first marks, ten for each of the five aggregates, can be elaborated (from Pati
exercitive moment. It produces maturation in this life, but if it cannot do 1 55; cf. Vism 630-1) (1268-70).
so, it is has-been karma. (The reference is to Pati II 78.) In that case 168. When he sees the rise and fall of the various factors clearly, he
it will never produce any maturation. The second is the seventh comes to know clearly the evanescence and insubstantial nature of all
exercitive moment of thought which either takes effect in the next life or factors. The vogin has attained young (tarund) knowledge and is a
is has-been karma. The third category is the karma of the remaining five beginner in insight (1271-6).
exercitive moments. This will take effect sometime in the course of the 169. It is by means of this young insight that ten afflictions arise:
cycle of rebirths when an opportunity occurs (vv.1242-3 f.). radiance, joy, tranquility, knowledge, faith, mindfulness, happiness,
164. The second set of four is karma which is (a) serious, (b) equanimity, strength and affection. "'
frequent, (c) near (to death), (d) performed. Nothing is said about this 170. These various afflictions distract the yogi who believes he has
set. The third set consists of (a) producing, (b) supporting, (c) hindering, attained the goal. In this way he grasps a false path and enjoys the
(d) destroying. The first of these produces the maturation aggregates various experiences, departing from the insight process. So long as he
whether at conception or subsequently. The second cannot itself produce keeps directing attention to these afflictions, his cultivation declines.
maturational aggregates but supports and lengthens the effect of the When, however, he can clearly separate the afflictions as "the false path"
producing karma. The third hinders or weakens the effect of the and insight as "the path, " then knowledge of path and false path is
producing karma. Destroying karma, however, overrides the producing established in his mind (1277-1296).
karma and produces maturations of an opposite kind. Such maturations
 ARA
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVAT 251
250

171. Chapter Twenty-One: Explanation of purification by knowledge were, an identification of the path. It acts as a condition for the path in
six ways (cf. Vism 673) (1325-30).
and seeing of the way (1297-1317; pp.123-4). Insight reaches its peak by
means of eight knowledges. These eight consist of a very clear 176. The path now arises. Henceforth the way to the hells is shut.
knowledge free from the afflictions (1) of rise and fall, (2) of breaking The eightfold wrong path is rejected. The yogi becomes a true son of the
Buddha and wins many advantages. This knowledge of the first path is
up, (3) of fear, (4) of danger, (5) contemplation knowledge of
disenchantment, (6) knowledge consisting in desire to be released, (7) knowledge and seeing, i.e., it accomplishes the seventh purification
renewed consideration, (8) knowledge of balanced viewing of traces. (1333-1337).
172. Purification by knowledge and seeing of the way is a name for 177. The path awareness is followed immediately by two or three
the ninth knowledge which succeeds these (1297). This is known as resulting awarenesses, two or three because the alternative allowed for the
knowledge which inclines to the truths or simply as inclination meditations, but not mentioned previously here (173 above), of either
three or four desire-level exercitive awarenesses prior to the breakthrough
(anuloma). When the yogi contemplates traces as impermanent,
suffering, not-self and progresses stage by stage through the eight to the higher consciousness is being envisaged. Membership may be
preceded either by preparatory, access and inclination moments or by
knowledges, his insight becomes well-established, reaches its peak and is
access and inclination moments only. In the latter case there would be
on the way to emergence. It is just this which is called knowledge of
inclination to the truths, i.e., the ninth knowledge is simply the eighth three fruit awarenesses, since exercitive awarenesses run for seven
moments and no further. The preparatory, access and inclination
occurring at the time when the noble path is arising (1300-1305).
moments can all be referred to by these three names (1340; cf. v. 898).
173. The process of the attainment of that path is described in a
similar way to that of the attainment of the meditative levels. Four 178. Buddhadatta also mentions the view of some that there can also
be one or four resultant awarenesses (cf. Vism 138 and 675). He rejects
moments of ordinary exercitive awareness culminate with lineage
the possibility of four resultant awarenesses on the grounds that this
membership. Each of these has traces as its object. These moments are
would require a single inclination awareness and a single inclination
given the same names as the corresponding moments in the attainment of
awareness would not constitute the necessary repetition condition.
meditation. The first is called preparatory, while the second is known as
access. The third is called inclination for two reasons: it follows the Presumably the possibility of one resultant awareness (allowed at Asl 231
for those of sluggish wisdom) is rejected on the same grounds as those
inclination of the previous eight knowledges and it inclines towards the
given in relation to meditation (v.904-6). In the succeeding exercitive
factors of enlightenments.
174. Chapter Twenty-Two: Explanation of purification by knowledge processes arise exercitives which recollect the path, the fruit, the
abandoned defilements, the defilements yet remaining and liberation. In
and seeing (1318-73; pp.125-28). At the next moment there comes the
full there are 19 kinds of recollection knowledge (for the four kinds of
mind of the lineage member. This strictly falls between purification by
nobles), since arhats do not have any remaining defilements (1339-1347).
knowledge and seeing of the way and purification by knowledge and
179. The yogi is now a stream-enterer. He commences work (yoga)
seeing because it is in the position of adverting in relation to the path
for the second level by contemplating the five aggregates as impermanent,
awareness. The word "lineage member " can be understood in two ways.
frustrating and not-self and plunges directly into the process of insight.
Either it means one who has transcended the family of ordinary beings
The stages up to balanced viewing of traces develop as before and the
or it means one who is of the lineage, " lineage" being a name for nirvana
second path of once return arises. Ill will and passionate desire are
(according to the iTkā because it preserves the noble name).
weakened by this. The process of attainment and subsequent recollecting
175. Lineage membership differs from the preceding exercitive
are as for the first path (1348-1355).
moments in having a different object; for it is both the first adverting to
180. Again 'the same course of development is undertaken. This
liberation and the first experiencing of that. So in this special case there
ti me the third path is reached. 111 will and passionate desire are totally
is a change of object within the exercitive process. Membership stands
destroyed. The never-returner is of such a nature that he never returns (to
in the place of adverting, although not in fact adverting, and gives, as it
252 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHAMMAVATARA 253

rebirth here), but attains parinirvātta there (in the Brahma world). For and environmental factors. (10) Prenascent condition is of two kinds.
the last time the wise individual commences work (yoga) in order to Base prenascent is the material factors of the bases. Object prenascent
reach the fourth level. By the same process he attains to the path of the is other material factors such as those of the present moment. (11)
arhat. He is the eighth noble person, has destroyed all the fetters, Postnascent condition is awareness and concomitant factors. (12)
reached the real goal and is unsurpassed (1355-1371). Repetition condition is ordinary good, bad and karmic factors apart from
181. Chapter Twenty-three: Discourse on the abandoning of the two adverting.
defilements (1374-1393; pp.129-33). The first part of this chapter 185. (13) Act or karma condition is of two kinds. Conascent karma
consists of a prose passage on the abandoning of defilements with one is all volition including higher awareness volition. Karma involving a
introductory (1374) and one concluding verse (1375). The contents are plurality of moments is good or bad contaminating volition. In the case
extremely close to the parallel passage in Vism (pp.682-85) with a few of purely good it takes effect immediately. (14) Maturation condition is
omissions. It seems likely that this section is an addition (earlier than the karmically resultant awareness and concomitants. (15) Nutriment
Porāgotīkal derived from Vism. Chapter 22 may have originally condition is the four kinds of food. (16) Faculty condition is 20 of the
concluded at the end of the present Chapter 23 as indicated by the title 22 faculties. (17) Meditation condition is the five meditation factors.
still preserved there in the manuscripts. (18) Path condition is the nine factors which make up the perfect and
182. The remainder of the present Chapter 23 is concerned with the false paths. (19) Association condition is awareness and concomitants.
topic of full understanding of the truths. At each of the four levels the (20) Dissociation condition is both prenascent bases and postnascent
four functions of comprehending, abandoning, realizing and bringing into awarenesses and concomitants. (21) Presence condition and (24)
being occur in a single moment at the time of path knowledge. The three nondisappearance condition is life faculty, food in mouthfuls, object
similes of a lamp, the rising sun and a boat are given in detail (Pat 134; prenascent and support condition. (22) Absence condition and (23) .
cf. Vism 690-91) (1376-1393). disappearance condition are the same as directly following condition
183. Explanation of conditions (1394-1398 f.; pp.134-7). The final (pp.134-5).
chapter is devoted to an account of the 24 conditions. Most of this 186. The relations between matter and nonmaterial factors are then
chapter is in prose. It is difficult to see why it should be placed here as examined. Matter can be a condition for matter in seven of the 24 ways.
the final chapter since there is no parallel at this point in Vism. It can be a condition for psychological factors ("name " ) in 11 ways. No
184. The 24 conditions are listed and then a brief summary is given material factor is a condition for the two mixed together.
of each one. (1) Root or cause condition is the six roots. (2) Object- A nonmaterial factors can be a condition for nonmaterial things in 21
content condition is all ordinary and transcendent factors. (3) Dominant ways. It can be a condition for matter in 15 ways. It can be a condition
condition is of two kinds. Conascent dominant is the four dominants. for the two together in 13 ways. The two together may be a condition
Object dominant is everything except for matter which is bad and is the for matter in four ways. They may be a condition for immaterial things
object of bad resultant, neutral action, hate awareness, doubt or worry. in six ways. The two together are never a condition for the two together
(4) Directly antecedent or proximity and (5) directly following or (1395-1397).
contiguity conditions are immediately ceased awareness and concomitant 187. Prenascent condition is exclusively matter. Twelve conditions
factors. (6) Conascent and (7) mutual conditions are awarenesses, are exclusively immaterial. The remaining eleven are mixed (1397ff).
concomitants, the great elements and heart base. (8) Dependence 188. Fifteen conditions are invariably present. Five conditions
condition is the base material factors, the great elements, awarenesses are invariably past. Act condition is either past or present. Object,
and concomitants. (9) Strong dependence condition is of three kinds. dominant and dependence conditions may be past, present, future or
Object dependence condition is the same as object dominant condition. nontemporal (1397-1398).
Directly antecedent dependence condition is the same as directly
antecedent condition. Natural dependence condition is various qualities
 RUPARUPA V IBHAGA 255
254 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
principle in matter; heart base; element of space; intimating elements,
189. All of the 24 conditions are included in four conditions, i.e., bodily and vocal; lightness or buoyancy; pliancy or softness; adaptability;
object, support, act and presence conditions (1398).
collection or integration; continuity; decay, unsubstantiality; and bodily
190. The work ends with 17 concluding verses (1399-1415).
nutriment or food value in matter. These 28 kinds of material elements
Buddhadatta says he was requested to compose it by Sumati. He advises
have been classified in the Rūpārūpavibhāga in different groups
the reader to think and investigate very carefully if he finds any fault in
according to their qualitative function. For instance, the first four rūpas
the meaning or the text or the argument. He declares that it is based are basic elements of corporeal existence and the rest are upādārūpa, i.e.
upon the way of exposition of the Mahāvihāravāsins and is not mixed
the forms subsisting on something else. Again, the first 12 material
with the opinions of other schools. He mentions that he wrote it while elements except the element of water are gross material qualities, while
dwelling in the eastern hall of the vihāra constructed in Kaveripattana by
the rest are subtle qualities, etc. Truly speaking, the above 28 kinds of
Kaphadāsa (vl. Khapthadāsa). matter are combined together to form a normal healthy human being. In
the blind, the dumb, and certain others having organic defects, all 28
56.BUDDHADATTA, Rūpārūpavibhāga
material elements are not found.
(E4-10; T33-59) In the section on states of consciousness 89 types of
"E" references are to the text provided by Binayendra Nath
consciousness have been classified according to the gradation of four
Chaudhury, Abhidhamma Terminology in the Rūpārūpavibhāga. Calcutta
" " planes or spheres, viz., sensuous sphere, form sphere, formless sphere,
Sanskrit College Research Series No. CXIII (Calcutta 1983). T is the and transcendent sphere. Consciousness which arises on the level of
edition of the Pali text and English translation by Dipak Kumar Barua,
desire is non-reflective and the consciousness appertaining to the
Rūpārūpa-Vibhāga of Acariya Buddhadatta Thera (Calcutta 1995). The remaining three spheres is reflective. The types of consciousness arising
"
summary below is found in Binayendra Chaudhury, Life and works of at the desire-level may be good, bad, resultant or kiriyā; but the types of
Buddhadatta ", Journal of the Department of Pali, University of Calcutta
consciousness belonging to other sphere are not bad.
4, 1987-88, pp. 75-77. Chaudhury provides Pali technical terms, which (E10-11; T60-65) In the section on mental concomitants or factors
have been omitted. seven universal mental factors which are common to all types of
"
The Rūpārūpavibhāga is a manual or handbook written by
consciousness, six mental factors which may or may not be common,
Buddhadatta to enlighten the beginners in the Abhidharma system of
fourteen immoral concomitants, twenty mental factors common to moral
thought....(It) may be regarded as the most abridged summary of the
consciousness, three belonging to abstinences and two belonging to the
entire Abhidharma. It deals in a nutshell with four topics, viz., (1) Rūpa
category of illimitables -- 52 factors in total have been dealt with.
or matter and material qualities; (2) Citta or state of consciousness; (3) (El 1-12; E65-68) Under the section of cetasikasamprayoga the types
Cetasika or mental concomitants; and (4) Cetasikasamprayoga (nirvāña)
of consciousness that arise in liberation have been treated. This topic has
under two heads, viz., Rūpārūpavibhāga which treats of different aspects not been adequately discussed in the Rūpārūpavibhāga. Here liberation
of rūpa and the Arūpavibhāga which deals with the remaining three is described as a stage which is infallible, permanent, tranquil and
topics. unconditional."

Summary by Binayendra Chaudhury

(E1-4; T27-32) According to the Rūpārītpavihhāga, 28 kinds of

-
material elements which constitute the normal physical side of a being are
as follows: element of earth; element of water; element of fire, element
of wind; elements of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, vision or visible form,
sound, odor, taste, touch; female sex; male sex; vital force or life-
256 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
TARKASASTRA 257
57.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Vasubandhu), Title balancing the infinite regress (prasatigasama>.
unknown (usually referred to as "Tarkaśā.s(ra) (425)
C. A contrary rejoinder (viparitakhandana), which consists of (14)
balancing the nonproduced (anutpatttisama7, (15) balancing the eternal
The title given was probably not the work's actual title; Tarkaśāstra
(nitt'asamd), and (16) balancing the presumption (arthāpaoisamd).
is a generic term for works on logic, of which a number seem to have
'
existed by shortly after Vasubandhu s ti me. The Japanese title of this
Boris Vassiliev has made an extended study of this CHAPTER THREE: The Ways of Losing an Argument
work is Ju-shih lun.
(E34-40) Chapter III deals with twenty-two kinds of points of defeat
work," but is unable to come to any firm conclusions about its date and (nigrahasthāna) enumerated below:--
authorship. Its earliest translation is by Paramārtha around 555, and there (1) Hurting the proposition (pratijñāhāni), (2) shifting the
is evidence to suggest it was at that point a large work of some 2,000 proposition (prajñāntara), (3) opposing the proposition (pratijñāvirodha),
ślokas, but Vassiliev suggests that by that time it may have been mixed (4) renouncing the proposition pratijñāsathnyāsa), (5) shifting the reason
together with possibly two other works on logic which are otherwise lost
(hetvantara), (6) shifting the topic (arthāntara), (7) the meaningless
from the Chinese literature. (nirarthaka), (8) the unintelligible (avijñātārtha), (9) the incoherent
Giuseppe Tucci in Gaekwad 's Oriental Series 49 presents a Sanskrit (apdrthaka), (10) the inopportune (aprāptakāla), (11) saying too little
(re?)-translation of the work, our "E". There is no translation into any (nyūnata>, (12) saying too much (adhika), (13) repetition (punarukta),
'
Western language. Vidyabhusana s summary appears in his History of (14) silence (ananubltāsana), (15) ignorance (ajñāna), (16) non-ingenuity
Indian Logic (Calcutta 1920; reprinted Delhi 1970), pp. 268-269.
(apratibha), (17) evasion (viksepa), (18) admission of an opinion
(matānujñd), (19) overlooking the censurable (paryanuyojyopeksana), (20)
Summary by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana
censuring the non-censurable (niranuyojyānuyoga), (21) deviating from
a tenet (apasiddhānta), and (22) the semblance of a reason or fallacy
CHAPTER ONE: The Five Parts of an Argument
(hetvābhāsa).
(E3-I1) In Chapter I, Vasubandhu treats of a proposition (pratijñai), a
reason (heat), an example (udāharaña), an application (upanaya), and a
conclusion (nigantana), which constitute the five parts of a syllogism. 58.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Samantapāsādikasūtra (438)
K.937 = T.1462 = N.1125 = Bagchi, pp. 408-409, which goes by a
CHAPTER TWO: Futile Rejoinder
different title in Nanjio and Bagchi. Bagchi informs us that it is studied
(E12-32) In Chapter II there is an account of the Futile Rejoinder
in detail by M. Takakusu in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1896,
(jāti) which is subdivided under three heads as follows:-- pp. 415-439 and shown in fact to be the Santantapāsādika. The translator
A. A rejoinder on the basis of reversion (viparyaya-khamla) which is named Samghabhadra; it was translated in the year 488 in Chu-lin
consists of (1) balancing the homogeneity (sādharmvasantai), (2) Monastery, Kuang-chou.
balancing the heterogeneity (vaid/tarnrasama7, (3) balancing the thesis
(sādhyasama), (4) balancing the unquestionable (avarnyasamā), (5)
balancing the mutual absence (aprāptisamc~). (6) balancing the non-reason 59.ULLAIVGHA (440?), Pratītyasamutpādaśāstra
(ahetusanuī), (7) balancing the demonstration (utpattisama), (8) balancing
the doubt (saritśayasanui). (9) balancing the nondifference (avisesasamal, Summary by Marek Mejor
and (10) balancing the effect (kāryasama).
B. A rejoinder on the ground of meaninglessness (nirarthakhaiulana)
PSK is a short treatise on the central Buddhist doctrine of dependent
which consists of (11) balancing the point in dispute (prakarañasantaD,
origination. It was composed in Sanskrit by a Buddhist master *Ullangha.
(12) balancing the counter-example (pratidtstāruasamd), and (13) It consists of two parts: thirty stanzas (kārikd) and a brief commentary
258 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRATITYASAMUTPADA 259

thereon (i't'ākhyāna). It has been preserved in two Chinese translations translations of technical terms with the ones used in this Volume, as
and in a Tibetan version. " usual. (KHP).)
Nothing is known about the author of the text. According to the
Foreword by an anonymous Chinese author which precedes T.1652, the 1. From one arise three, from these three arise (also) six; from the six
master Ullańgha composed his brief treatise to supplement the *Pratītya- (arise) two, from the two arise six, from the six originate (also) six.
samutpāda-ādi-vibhatiga-dharmaparyāya (PSAVDh). The Foreword is 2. From the six are three and from the three are (also) three; from the
also appended to the Chinese translation of PSAVDh by Dharmagupta three four arise, from the four originate three.
(T.716; T717). Further it is said in the Foreword that Ullańgha always 3. From the three one is born, and from the one originate seven; that
gets to the point, follows the threefold division of the vehicles (triyāna), much of suffering which is (inherent) in these (factors) was declared by
but does not favor the standpoint of a particular school. It seems that the Muni as "all " , in short.
translators Dharmagupta and his Chinese counterpart Yancong (Yen- 4. There are twelve different kinds which are called " empty" by
ts'ung, d. 610) first translated PSAVDh and afterwards the present work. clearly perceiving (people); by virtue of the links of dependent origination
It is translated into German by Vasudev Gokhale, these should be known as twelve states (dharma).
Pratītyasamutpādaśāstra des Ullaitga, kritisch behandelt and aus dem 5. (These are:) ignorance, traces, consciousness, name and form,
chinesi.schen ins Deutsche ūbertragen. Inaugural-Dissertation (Bonn sense-organs, assemblage of the three (factors), perception, thirst,
1930). grasping, origination, ripening, and the other end.
Doctrinally Ullańghā s treatise is based on the Abhidharmic exposition 6. The first, the eighth, and the ninth are (called) defilement (kleśa),
of dependent origination, with clear traces of Mahāyāna teachings. the second and the tenth are (called) action (karman), (while) the
Ullańgha includes five stanzas (our of the total seven") from Nāgārjuna 's remaining seven are (called) suffering (dultkha); (thus) the twelve factors
Pratītyasamatpāda-hrdaya-kārikā (PHK) (Work No. 39 of Volume Eight are comprised in three rubrics. S °
7. The first two (belong) to past time, the last two (belong) to future
of this Encyclopedia), which he intersperses in his treatise. (PHK 2 =
time, (and) the remaining eight are (grouped) in the present time; these
PSK 6, PHK 1 = PSK 26, PHK 3 = PSK 27, PHK 4 = PSK 28, PHK 5
' are called three-times-factors."
= PSK 30). It seems that Ullańgha shaped his work after Nāgārjuna s
8. From defilements originate actions which accomplish karmic
model. Some of the classifications and subdivisions show close similarity
to those found in the Sanskrit text of the golden plate inscription from maturation (vipāka). By means of result originate defilements, and
NS defilements produce actions; by virtue of action there is karmic
Indonesia which contains a version of this text.
maturation.
According to V.V.Gokhale ' s inaugural dissertation (cited above), after
9. How can there be action while the defilements are absent? When
a careful study of the internal criteria, the probable time of Ullańgha's
action is annihilated there is no result either. When there is no result,
floruit is the first quarter of the fifth century. Gokhale provides a helpful
table on pp. 8-9 displaying the contents of the treatise. defilements are excluded too. In such a way the three are excluded
themselves.
The treatise can be divided into three main parts: in the first part
10. The cause which consists of five members brings forth results
(stanzas 1-5) the twelve links of the dependent origination fomula are
(phala); they are known as defilement and action: seven members make
defined; the second part (stanzas 6-16) is devoted to various
the result which is to be considered as sevenfold suffering. "
classifications and divisions of the twelve links; in the third part (stanzas
11. An empty cause does not include any effect, nor does cause
17-30) is explained the philosophical meaning of causal relations in
(itself) include any cause. An empty effect does not include any cause,
general, with reference to the canonical sūtras (stanzas 20-21), examples
nor does an effect (itself) include any effect. Both cause and effect are
(st. 30), etc. My translation of the versified part of Ullańgha's text that
empty; wise men should remember this.
follows is based on Gokhale's German translation from the Chinese, and
12. In the course of time, as a result of the connection of cause and
verified against the Chinese and the Tibetan version. (We have replaced
260 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRATITYASAMUTPADA 261

effect, there is a fourfold division, and one should consider that the of dependent origination.
connection of defilement, action, and result becomes the six-membered 24. When one is not deluded as to dependent origination, one
desire. understands emptiness as having abandoned arrogance, and because of
13. When being (bhava) is taken as a node (sandhi), as a result there regret towards the aggregates (of attachment), one is not deluded with
are two nodes and three groupings (samimksepa); when a node is causally regard to the connection of action with effect.
R9
conditioned, in consequence there are three nodes and four groupings. 25. When the stream (of life) arises due to conditions produced by
14. Two, two, three, three, and two - these are the five factors actions, then a condition which has not come about by action does not
(dharma) which occur during the (state of) suffering; they refer to: agent, exist; when it exists with regard to the condition of emptiness, the result
90
womb, sphere of (sense) activity, effecting, and arising. of action is experienced. '
15. Delusion-effect and development-effect, as well as result-effect 26. Twelve different links, which were earlier explained (by the
and natural consequence-effect (produce,) under their respective bases, Sage) as originated in dependence, are put together, according to the
(the following) links: one, one, three and two. 91 Teaching, into three: defilement, action and suffering.
16. The effects, passion and misery, as well as the effects 27. From three arise two, from two arise seven, from seven arise
development and natural consequence, produce in the other related three again. In this way the wheel of life moves around.
division factors (with the respective numbers:) two, one, one, and one. 28. Cause and effect make the world, and the sentient beings are not
17. These are of twelve kinds; when they are of the same power, different from them. There are merely empty factors from which come
they originate out of themselves in mutual dependence. They are to be forth again empty factors.
9
known as inanimate, lifeless, and immovable (acala). ` 29. Defilement arises only as a conditioned (factor), action arises
18. There are four kinds of ignorance regarding emptiness, viz., only as a conditioned (factor), and result also arises only as a conditioned
when it is related to the nonexistent self, when it is related to the (factor). There exists nothing unconditioned.
" " " "
nonexistent mine , when it is (related to) the nonexistent I , when it is 30. By (means of examples like) recitation, light, stamp, mirror,
related to the nonexistent cause of self. The remaining links are (to be sound, sun-stone, seed, and sour (taste), the wise men should perceive
known) like that. both the connection of the aggregates and the non-appearance of
19. The middle way is what avoids both extremes: nihilism and transition.
etemality. When complete perfection is accomplished, the Buddhas
(attain to) full comprehension of intrinsic nature.
20. After having attained to complete perfection, the Noble Sage 60. AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
proclaimed to the multitude of beings (worlds) the nonexistence of a self. Anyūnatvāpūrnatvānirdeśaparivartasūtra(440)
The meaning (of it) has already been explained by the Guide (Exalted Translated by Bodhiruci this constitutes K.490 = T. 668 = N. 524.
One) in the City Simile Sutra (Nāgaropamāsūtra). Nanjio, p. 255, as also reported in Bagchi, p. 255 (8), who does not try
21. The Kātyāyana(-sūtra) explains right view and view of to produce a Sanskrit title, but translates the Chinese title into English as
emptiness, and the Phalagunasūtra also explains the most excellent Sūtra on neither increasing nor decreasing." B.E.Brown, The Buddha
"

(teaching of) emptiness.

22. When dependent origination is well cognized, then its equality
with emptiness is accordingly cognized. When dependent origination is '
not cognized, emptiness is not cognized (also). Gokhale's German translation may be rendered as: " Action as
23. When arrogance arises with regard to emptiness, then there arises condition produces arising of stream (of life), and (when it fails,) there
no (repentance) towards the five aggregates (of attachment). When there is also no origination which was conditioned by it. It should be empty
is no negative view with regard to them, one is deluded as to the sense conditioning by which action is accompanied with the visible
consequences."
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES RATNAGOTRA V IBH AGA 263
262
Sources of the Ratnagotravibhāga. 1" The Ratnagotravibhdga is the
Nature (Delhi 1991), p. 43, implies that the doctrine of dharmakāya is only text extant in Sanskrit that elucidates the tathdgatagarbha theory. It
first found in this sutra.
is composed on the basis of various scriptures expressing this theory or
referring to the basic ideas consituting this theory. In the commentary
many of these scriptures are quoted and by this the text offers us a
61.SARAMATI, Ratnagotravibhāga and Vydkhyd thereon (450?)
pregnant mine of the source materials of the tathdgatagarbha theory prior
Summary by Jikido Takasaki to the Ratnagotravibhāga.
The first declaration of this theory in terms of " sarvasattvās
"
This text is also known in the Tibetan tradition as Uttaratantra. The tathātagarbhāh comes from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, 1" which explains
it merely with illustrations. It was succeeded on the one hand by the
Ratnagotravibhāga (Analysis of the Mine of the (Three) Jewels) is a Mahāparinirvāñasūtra, which created the term "buddhadhdtu" for
treatise on the so-called tathdgatagarbha theory written by a Yogācāra
author in the fifth century. It consists of three parts, namely the basic tathdgatagarbha and modified the saying as "asti buddhadhātuh
sarvasattvesu" ("there exists the Buddha nature in all living beings"). On
verses called ślokas, the commentary verses and their explanation in prose
furnished with quotations of the sources. Besides the Sanskrit text edited the other hand, it was deepened at the hands of the authors of the
99 Śrīmālā.sūtra (#109 of Volume 8) and the Anyūnatvāpūrñatvanirdeśasūtra
by E.H.Johnston, our "E", we have at present the Chinese and the
B5
95 translations. There are English translations by E. Obermiller
9B (#60 of the present volume), making the term "tathāgata-garbha" an
Tibetan
9' 9" internal principle identified with the dharmakāya and at the same time
and by Jikido Takasaki, our "T".
differentiating it from the latter in its state of being covered with
As for the author, there is no name recorded in the Sanskrit text,
defilements. The Ratnagotravibhāga follows mainly these two scriptures
but the Chinese tradition gives the name Sāramati to the whole text, while
in elucidating the core of the doctrine. For the interpretation of doctrinal
the Tibetan tradition attributes the verse sections, both basic and concepts, however, the Ratnagotravibhāga received a great deal of
commentarial, to Maitreya as one of his five treatises, and the prose
influence from the works of the Yogācāra such as the Yogācārabhūmi,
commentary (called vyākhyal to Asańga. Because of the relative
the Mahāv#nasūtrālathkāra, the Madhyāntavibhāga and the
antiquity of the Chinese tradition, we here accept hypothetically Sāramati
Mahāyānasatñgraha of Asańga. But the concept of ālayavijñāna and the
as the author. But the fact that the text actually consists of the basic vijñāna theory in general is not referred to at all.
verses and the commentary allows for the existence of a second author
who made the commentary on the basic verses, and there is a possibility Neither the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra nor the concept tathdgatagarbha
99
was known to Nāgārjuna, and we can see that this theory is, like the
that Sāramati is that second author.
Vijñānavāda, a later development after him. But the origin of each
The peculiarity of the Ratna lies in the fact that it consists of two
parts, in verse and in prose, while the verse section consists again of two concept component of the theory goes back to early Mahayana scriptures
such as the Prajñāpāramitā, the Saddharmapundarīka, etc., those names
parts, one basic, and the other supplementary. In other words, the basic
being mentioned in the Ratnagotravibhāga. A special influence came
part of this text is in verse only, while the other part, the commentary, is
from the Tathāgatotpattisatnbhavanirdeśasūtra (#51 of the works listed
in both verse and prose. The prose section of the commentary is quite
in Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia) of the Avatatńsakasūtra, as shown
detailed in Chapter I but quite scanty for other chapters.
The Chinese translation includes a kind of ślokagrantha which, in the composition of v. I, 27 of the Ratnagotravibhāga. This sūtra,
except for the eighteen verses in the beginning, matches mostly with the treating the meaning of the enlightenment of the Buddha, established the
concept of dharmakāya, i.e., the Buddha identified with dharmadhātu.
collection of verses regarded as basic. On the basis of this Chinese
1" The J11cnālokālarńkārasūtra (Adornment of the Illumination of Wisdom)
selection and adding a minor revision, we get 170 basic verses. (The
Chinese text adds one verse each in Chapters I and II, which are to be belongs in the same line as the Avatatńsakasūtra. The one path (ekayāna)
doctrine of the Saddharmapundarīka is another source for the declaration
classified as uddāna or index of subjects.)
264 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES RATNAGOTRAVIBHAGA 265

of the possibility of enlightenment for all living beings due to Buddha's (seekers), and indifference to the purposes of beings (self-enlightened).
compassion. To this should be added the influence of the Amitāyus cult, Antidotes to these are, respectively, faith in the doctrine, wisdom,
which is confessed at the end of the basic text of the Ratnagotravibhāga. meditation and compassion.
There are many other scriptures quoted in the Ratnagotravibhāga. 3.Result. The outcome of these antidotes is purity, union,
Among them the most important ones are those belonging to the group happiness and eternity.
of the Mahūsanńipātasūtra (Big Collection of Sūtras) such as the 4.Function: One has aversion to the frustrations of rebirth,
Dh#raaīśvararājasūnu (#144 of Volume 8), the Ratnadārikasūtra, the and prays to gain liberation.
Sāgaramatiparipŗcchā, the Gaganagañjapariprcc_hā, the Ratnacūdasūtra, 5.Has its foundation in factors causing purification and
and the Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra (#73 of Volume 8). These texts mostly with result.
deal with the practice of Bodhisattvas and on the doctrine of the pure 6.Manifestation in ordinary folk, arhats, and Buddhas
innate mind. Besides them we find quotations from the Kāśyapaparivarta 7.States: impure, pure and impure, and perfectly pure.
(#17 of Volume 8), the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa (#46 of Volume 8), the 8.Pervasiveness of the basic awareness' clean nature.
Didhādhyāśayaparivarta, etc., and from the Agamas of early Buddhism. 9.Changelessness of the impure in ordinary beings, the
There are also independent verses of unknown sources quoted as pure and impure in the Bodhisattva, and the perfectly pure Buddha..
authorities. 10.Undifferentiatedness of liberation, of the essence of the
Thus the Ratnagotravibhāga is a composite of doctrines collected Buddha.
from a vast area of the Mahayana scriptures, but its basic tone is the (E59-78; T268-309) 27-57. Nine illustrations of how the embryo of
eulogy of the Buddha's equanimity and compassion and the emphasis of the Tathagata is covered over by limitless defilements
faith in it rather than the gradual practice towards the goal. It may well The threefold nature of the tathdgatagarbha: as the Buddha's
be said to he representing a side of Buddhism as a religion of faith. 1" dharmakāya, thusness, and the essential nature of the lineage. The
The work is translated into English by Ernst Obermiller from its dharmakāya has two aspects: the dharmadhālu or sphere of
Tibetan translation in Acta Orientalia (Copenhagen) 9, 1931, reprinted nondiscriminative wisdom, and its outflow as the communication of the
Shanghai 1940. David Seyfort Ruegg has provided several important teaching to others. Thusness is naturally unchangeable, perfectly pure.
analyses of the concepts developed in this work. 1" The lineage of the thus-gone is illustrated.
The tathdgatagarbha exists everywhere and at all times among
CHAPTER ONE living beings. It is the ultimate instrument of knowledge, accessible only
(E1-25; T141-195) 1-4.There are seven thunderbolt topics by faith. In relation to emptiness it is thus: to it nothing can be removed
(vajrapada): the Buddha, the dharma, the order, the element (dhatu) of from nor added to it, and one who sees it becomes liberated. It is free
the Buddha, the enlightenment, the Buddha's qualities and his actions. from defilements, perfectly pure.
The first three are explained as the three refuges, while the last four Question: If this essence is so difficult to understand why teach it
together are characterized as the source of the three refuges, with the to ordinary beings who can't understand it?
analogy shown of a mine (gotra) from which jewels (ratna) are coming Answer: In this doctrine the Buddha taught the existence of the
out, and to be of inconceivable purity cause of enlightenment in every living being in contrast to the previous
(E25-59; T 196-267) 105 5-26. All sentient beings are possessed of the scripture which teaches the emptiness of all, in order to prevent the
embryo° " of the Tathāgata (tathdgatagarbha). This fundamental truth is defects caused by the previous teaching, namely a depressed mind,
analyzed under ten aspects. contempt for inferiors, clinging to things unreal, speaking ill of truth, and
1.Essential nature: the Buddha is undefiled by nature. affection for one's self.
2.Cause: there are four causes of obstruction-resistance to
the dharma (icchāntikas), belief in a self (heretics), fear of transmigration
266 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PATNAGOTRA V IBHAGA 267

CHAPTER TWO CHAPTER FOUR

(E79-90; T310-335) 1-13. The pure thusness of the Buddha (E98-114; T351-379) 1-98. The Buddha acts without effort and
constitutes his revolution at the basis free from impurity, to be known without interruption. Nine stories are told illustrating these qualities of the
under eight categories. Buddha.
Its essential nature: what is known as the
tathāgatagarbha in the defiled state is to be called pure (viśuddhi), the CHAPTER FIVE
natural revolution at the basis. (E1156-119; T380-390) 1-28. The merits of having faith in the
2.Its cause is transcendent wisdom. Buddha's teaching.
3.Its result is liberation from the defilements and from the
obstructions to knowledge.
4.Its function is one 's own and others' aims. ANALYSIS
S.Its foundation is qualities inseparably associated with
it. The Basic Text. The subject of the basic text is, as shown in the
6.It is manifested as the three bodies of the Buddha, viz., title, the analysis of the mine of the Jewels in four aspects being the
the essential body, the enjoyment body and the apparitional or magical realm of the all-perceiver, i.e., the Buddha (v. I, 23), inconceivable even
body, which are characterized respectively by profundity (sūksma), to men of pure mind (i.e., bodhi.sattvas) (v. V, 1). The interrelation of
magnificence (auddrya) and magnanimity (māhātmya). the four aspects is that the tathāgatagarbha within living beings,
7.He is eternal, having infinite compassion, powers, characterized as the Reality mingled with pollutions, is the cause of
wisdom and bliss._ Buddhahood, while that Buddhahood, otherwise called Enlightenment,
8.He is inconceivable. being the result of purification of the tathāgatagarbha, is characterized
as Reality free from pollution, which is endowed with virtuous qualities
CHAPTER THREE of the Buddha and has activities of discipline for the sake of living
(E91-97; T336-350) 1-39. The Buddha's qualities comprise 64 pure beings, working forever without effort and unceasingly. Thus the three
sorts aspects after the second represent Buddhahood in contrast to unpurified
ten powers: of the right and wrong occasions for things, living beings, but fundamentally both are identical as signifying Reality.
of maturations of actions, of the faculties, of the elements, of resolve, of This reality (tathald) is the substratum (dhātu) of the Three Jewels (dhātu
the path leading everywhere, of pure and itnpure contemplation, of the = gntra). The main part of the text consists of four chapters in
memory of previous abodes, of the divine eye, and of peace. accordance with the four aspects of the mine of the Jewels, while the
four convictions: understanding of all factors, destruction author's expression of taking refuge to the Three Jewels in three verses
of all obstacles, preaching the path, and gaining cessation. is given prior to the main part, and the merit of faith in this doctrine is
eighteen unique properties: without error, without bad emphasized in the last chapter. In the last verse (V, 25) the author
speech, without failure to remember, without distraction, unaware of any expresses his prayer of transfer of merits made by him to living beings
identifications, indifferent, uncalculating, with no lack of interest, nor of so that they may have a chance to see the Buddha Amitāyus and
energy, nor of memory, nor of wisdom, nor of liberation nor the achieving the highest enlightenment.
awareness of his liberation, perfonning wise bodily, vocal and mental In the main part, the highest importance is put on the first aspect,
acts, with knowledge of past, present and future. i.e., the Tathāgatagarbha, the embryo of the Tathāgata. It is first of all
The Buddha's thirty-two marks of a great person are reviewed. an epithet of living beings (sattva) in the expectation of their growing
finally into buddhas, because of their identity with the Buddha in their
"
essence, and this essence is sought for in their "innate pure mind
268 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES RATNAGOTRA V IBHAGA 269

(cittaprakrti). In actuality, however, living beings are polluted by "The wisdom of the Buddha penetrates into the groups of
temporary defilements (āgantukak/eśa) which cover the pure innate mind. living beings,
So the text starts with the elucidation of the Buddha's saying that all Its immaculateness is nondual by nature,
living beings are possessed of the embryo of the Tathāgata (v. I, 27), then Its result is imposed upon the lineage of the Buddha,
proceeds to the explanation of the essential characteristics as the cause or Therefore it is said: "all living beings are possessed of the
the substratum of the Buddhahood in ten aspects beginning with his embryo of the Buddha."
essential nature, and next has the explanation of the polluted states with The first three lines show in succession the reasons for the
the nine illustrations taken from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra.. statement in the last line, and the commentary makes three meanings out
Of the ten aspects, the first six, i.e., 1. svabhāva (essential nature), of these lines, namely, (1) penetration of the dharmakdya of the
2. hetu (cause), 3. phala (result), 4. karman (function), 5. yoga Tathāgata, (2) undifferentiatedness of the Reality of the Tathāgata, and (3)
(association), and 6. vrtti (manifestation) are a set of categories used for the existence of the lineage of the Tathāgata. It regards the dharmakdya,
denoting any subject: they appear in the Yogācārabhūmi and the tathatā, and gotra as the threefold essential nature of the dhātu (cause as
Abhidhannasamuccaya of Asaitga. 1" Its applications are observed in the well as substratum) of the Tathagata (=tathāgatagarbha). Here we find
Mahāyānasīdrālatkāra. The Ratnagotravibhdga, too, utilizes these another expression of the ratnagotra with various aspects.
categorical terms, but it adds some other items for a further explanation The dharmakdya shows the result aspect as the same as nirmalā
of the last one, i.e., the meaning of vrtli. It may be called a kind of tathatā, and tathāgatagotra shows the cause aspects as the same as
modification. A similar modification is observed in Chapter II, where samalā tathatā, while the tat/totā may be termed the ground aspect
two items (nitya and acintya) are added for denoting duration and mode common to both. But the undifferentiatedness of Reality is again said to
of manifestation. be due to the penetration of the dharmakāya as activities of Buddha 's
Description of the tadzāgatagarbha by means of these six categories wisdom (based upon his compassion). Thus the doctrine of this text is
in the basic verses goes as follows: well characterized as the monism of the dharmakdya.
"Being always undefiled by nature like a pure jewel, sky and water;
Following after faith in the doctrine, the excellent intellect, The Commentary. In the present Sanskrit text the title of the
meditation and compassion; (1.30) commentary is not clear, but the term ślokārthasarhgrahavyākhyāna
Having the climax of virtues of purity, unity, happiness and eternity appearing in the colophons of Chapters I, IV and V suggests the character
as its result; of the commentary, namely, the "summing up" (samgraha) of the
Having aversion from suffering and desire for and vow to meaning of the basic verses (.ślokārtha) which may indicate the verse
attain quiescence as its functions (I, 35) section of the commentary, and the "detailed explanation" (vyākhyāna)
Being like the ocean, the imperishable receptacle of treasures of the meaning of the basic verses, the prose section. The verse section or
innumerable qualities, commentary verses exist constantly throughout the text, but the prose
Being united inseparably with its properties by nature, like a section is scanty after Chapter II. This fact may mean that the author of
lantern (with its light); (1.42) the commentary put the stress on the tathāgatagarblta aspect, from which
And as its (manifestations in the fonns of) ordinary beings, the he wished to explain the monistic structure of this doctrine.
sages and the Buddhas are not distinct from reality A typical style of the commentary is shown, for example, in the
This embryo of the Victors (existing) in the living beings is taught passage on the Jewel of the Buddha. It starts with the heading "Here is
by those who perceived the truth. " (I. 45) a sloka on the buddharatna", and after mentioning the basic verse (śloka
Among all verses, however, the most important one is Verse I, 27 — v. I, 4), it gives the summary of the contents in four verses (vv. 5-8),
(śloku 5) which elucidates the fundamental statement of this doctrine. It then proceeds to the explanation in prose of the eight points on
goes as follows: Buddhahood picked up in the verses. The eight points are: 1. immutable,
270 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES RATNAGOTRAV1BHAGA 271
2. free from effort, 3. awakened without help of others, 4. wisdom, (adhigamadharma), and its natural outflow, the teachings of the Buddha
5. compassion, 6. (supernatural) power, 7. fulfilment of self benefit, (deśanādharma), which again divides into two, one being for
8. fulfilment of benefit for others. Lastly it quotes the Bodhisattvas representing the ultimate truth, and the other being for
Jñūnālokālathkārasūtra as the source authority for composing the basic Śrāvakas representing the conventional truth. These three correspond to
verse. the first three illustrations, respectively.
Thus the commentary follows the structure of the basic text, but in (b) The dhdtu as tathatā, the Reality, representing the unalterable
some passages it has its own explanation apart from the basic verses. As character of the pure innate mind, is analogous to the geld in the fourth
these passages have a special importance for the interpretation of the illustration. Here, Tathāgata is interpreted as the reality (tathata- ) that
doctrine, we shall turn to them next. reached (dgata) to its purity (quoting Mahāyānasūtrālatńkāra IX, 37).
(1) Introduction -- Seven adamantine subjects (vv. 1-3). Prior to (c) The dhātu as tathāgatagotra (lineage of the Tathāgata). This
explaining the meaning of the ślokas the commentary explains the frame includes the two kinds of gotra and the triple body of the Buddha,
of the text as the seven adamantine subjects (vajrapada). They are, illustrated by the remaining five examples, respectively. The relation
namely, the Three Jewels and the four aspects of the lineage. This between the two gotras and the triple body is explained as follows: that
enumeration corresponds to that in the last verse of the basic text (v. V, from the innate (prakriistha) gotra comes the Body of essential nature
25). The fourth subject, i.e., the first aspect of the lineage, is here called (svabhāvakāya), while from the developed gotra comes the Body of
"
"dhātu , which signifies buddhadhdtu, the cause of the buddha, or enjoyment (sambhogakdya) and the apparitional Body (nirmāñakāya).
Buddha nature. This term dhdtu is favored by the commentator as the These terms originally belong to the doctrine of the Yogācāra, but their
basic concept ?or speaking of a monistic doctrine because of the implication is rather unique in this text. At the end, a famous
pregnancy of its meaning (i.e., substratum, cause, the whole realm (of Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra referring to the beginningless foundation
activities)). (The terms gotra and garbha are synonymous with dhdtu and (anddikdlako dhdtu) is quoted and explained by quoting the
also pregnant in meaning, but they are more analogical and signify Śrīmālādevīsūtra to the effect that this "dhātu" means tathāgatagarbha.
merely the sense of cause or latent.) After mentioning authorities for A further important point in relating to the threefold nature of the
each subject, the commentator says that the whole frame of seven dhdtu is the threefold way of interpretation of the term tathdgatagarbha
subjects is taken from the Dhārañīśvararājasūtra and explains it through in accordance with the threefold nature. Namely,
quotations of its passages. In this sutra, Buddha's activities are compared (1) all living beings are the " embryos of the Tathāgata" (i.e., are
with the jewel-maker 's acts of polishing precious stones after taking them inside the dharmakāya which is all-pervading),
out from the mine (gotra). It may show the origin of the title of the (2) the " Tathāgata, " being the Reality (tathatd) is the "embryo" of
basic text, and from this fact we can assume the possibility of the same these living beings (i.e., living beings are possessed of tathāgata or
person's writing both the basic text and the commentary. tathatā in the inside),
(2) The three jewels as refuges (vv. 19-22). In this passage, the (3) the embryo of these living beings is the cause (dhātu=hetu) of
'
significance of the three jewels is explained and Buddha s state as the the Tathāgata (i.e., the living beings are possessed of the cause to be
t
ultimate refuge is concluded (the source is the Śrīmālādevīsūtra). athāgatas).
(3) Nine kinds of defilements and the threefold nature of the Tat
Of them the second one is near to the original sense used in the
Buddhadhātu (vv. 130-143, 144-152). Though this passage belongs to the hāgatagarbhasūtra. ( " Garbha" used as a latter part of a compound
section on the nine illustrations taken from the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, means having something in the interior, or containing; it is a possessive
doctrinal application of the illustration is unique to the commentary. Of (bahuerīhi) compound.)
them the explanation of the threefold nature has a special significance. (4) inaccessibility of the tathāgatagarbha and necessity of faith (vv.
1
(a) The dhdtu as dharmakāva (vv. 145-147) is explained as of two 53-155).
kinds, dharmadhātu (foundation of teachings) signifying the realized truth The doctrine that all living beings are possessed of the embryo of
272 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MAHAYANADHA RMAV IŚESA 273

the Tathāgata, as the logical truth showing the nature of things in its classification of living beings into sattvadhātu, bodhisattva, and
(dltarmāndrh dharmatd) regardless of appearance or nonappearance of tathāgata in the Anyūnatvāpūrgatvanirdeśa. Besides, under (1) phala the
Tathāgatas, is so inaccessible that even the Bodhisattvas in the tenth stage text says that phala means nirsdnadhātu which is nothing but the
can hardly perceive it. Therefore for most living beings it is accessible dharmakdya characterized as āśrayaparivrtti, and explains it in the same
only by faith in the doctrine. Here those who need that faith are said, way as the Ratna did in its explanation of the śuddhñvasthāyātñ
according to the Śrīmālādevīsūtra. to be (1) ordinary people being avikārārtha. Under (2) hetu it explains 4 causes, i.e. dharmādhimukti,
dominated by the Ego concept, (2) Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas who prajñā, samddhi and karunc, with a verse containing the same ideas as
delight in the reverse concept and (3) those Bodhisattvas, newly entered verse 1.34 of the Ratna. Under (3) svabhāva, prakrtyasatñklistatva is said
on the path, whose mind deviates from emptiness. For the second group, to be the own nature of bodhicitta. In (4) paryāya, a synonym of
the doctrine of the four perfections of virtues, i.e., eternity, bliss, the bodhicitta in its phala state, is called śubhāmasukhanityapramitā and so
highest self, and purity, taught in the Mahāparinirvññasūtra, is authorized by a quotation from the Śrīmālādevīsūtra. The verse in (8)
inaccessible, while for the third group the tathāgatagarbha as nitya is identical with verses I.53 and 54 of the Ratna in its contents,
representing the emptiness is inaccessible. The emptiness signified by explaining that dharmadhātu is, like ākāśadhātu, of neither origination
tathāgatagarbha means that the tathāgatagarbha is empty of temporary nor destruction (anutpādanirodha). Under (9) yoga the text has two
defilements, but is not empty of, i.e. is filled with the virtues of the verses of which the first one is identical to the śūnya and aśūnya of the
Buddha. This is directly taken from the Śrīmālādevīsūtra. This is a kind gotra. And lastly, the contents of (l2) ekatva are the same as those under
of expression of the sole reality of the Buddha as representing the truth "asambheda" (X) in the Ratna, saying that the bodhicitta is nothing but
of emptiness, possessed of virtues and acting constantly for the sake of the dharmakdya, the tathāgata, the ārvasatya or nirvāña, and
living beings. Interpretation of emptiness in this way is, however, quite emphasizing the oneness of rtitvāña with buddhatva.
peculiar to the tathāgatagarbha theory. "The remaining parts above seem to be taken mostly from Chapters
II and IV of the Ratna. Namely, a reference to the two sides of
bodhicitta, termed śukladharmamayalaksana and vaimalyapariśuddhi-
62.SARAMATI, Mahāyānadharmaviśesaśāstra (450) laksana, reminds us of the characterization of dharmakdya as
prakrtiviśuddhi and vaintalyaviśuddhi (p. 80) or the distinction of
Summary by Jikido Takasaki 10" prakrtisthagotra and samudānītagotra in the Ratna; a verse under (7)
asathklista resembles v. 11.3 in the Ratna; similes used under (10)
"
(T)his small śāstra is attributed to Sdramati in the Chinese anarthakriyā and (11) arthakriyā are the same as those in Chapters 1
Tripitaka. From its contents, this work seems quite consistent with the (among 9 illustrations), II and IV of the Ratna; and the 10 characteristics
Ratnagotravibhāga. The main point of doctrine in this work is the of asambheda under (5) can be traced one by one in various passages in
bodhicitta which is synonymous with cittaprakrti in the Ratna, and hence the Ratna.
"
is nothing but the tathāgatagarbha. The text describes this bodhicitta Thus examining the contents, we may say that the author of this
under 12 divisions, namely: (1) phala, (2) hetu, (3) svabhdva, (4) text composed it on the basis of the Ratna, compressing and revising the
paryāya, (5) abheda, (6) avasthāprabheda, (7) asatitklista, (8) nitya, (9) form according to his own view....(I)t is possible that...(the) Sāramati to
yoga, (10) anarthakriyā, (11) arthakriyā, and (12) ekatva (or ekadhātu), whom this work is attributed may have been the author of the
and is mainly based upon two Sūtras, the Aryaśrīmālā and the commentary on the Ratna. "
Anyūnatvāpūrñatvan irdeśa.
'This division has a resemblance, not only in its terminology but
also in its contents, to the ten meanings of the gotra (in the Ratna). In
particular, (6) avasthāprabheda is fully identical with that in the Ratna
274 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAVATARA 275
63.SKANDHILA or SUGANDHARA, Abhidharmāvatāra (450) viz., earth, water, fire and wind. They have, respectively, the nature of
solidity, humidity, heat and movement, and their function is, respectively,
Summary by Christian Lindtner, with Fred Greiner to support, cohere, cook and expand. Space (ākāśa) is not to be
considered a great element. (ii) Moreover there are eleven kinds of
This Introduction to Abhidharma is the work of a certain derived matter, viz., eye, ear, nose, tongue, body; visible matter (i.e.,
*Skandhila, a fifth century° Sarvāstivāda scholar living in the Himatala color and shape, having, respectively, twelve and eight subdivisions),
district, intellectually and geographically not far from Kashmir. He sound, smell, taste and a part of tangible derived matter (viz., softness,
closely follows the doctrine of the Vaibhāsikas, apparently only differing hardness, gravity, levity, coldness, hunger and thirst).
from them on three minor points: (i) there are four neutral roots, (ii) Apart from these five senses and five objects - each of which is
wickedness or regret (kaukrtya) can be undetermined, and (iii) sleepiness defined and subdivided - there is an eleventh kind of matter, namely
and excitedness are included in the contaminants. Otherwise *Skandhila unmanifested matter. It consists in not informing others about the various
classifies, enumerates and defines the factors in accordance with the changes going on in one ' s mind and (mental) attitude. There are three
Mahāvibhā;rā, but, of course, in accordance with the scope of an kinds: When it is due to self-discipline - of which there are, again, three
introductory manual, in an extremely abridged and much more systematic kinds - it is good mental karma. When it is due to lack of self-discipline
form. Thus his intellectual background is much the same as that of the it is bad mental karma. Sometimes, however, it is not due to any of these
authors of the Abhidharmakośa, Abhidharmad pa, Nyāyānusāra, etc., two. In such cases the moral value of one's action depends on the value
though the way he arranges his material is significantly different from of the vocal or physical actions one actually performs. Like the five
their way of doing so. In this respect he seems to have influenced senses unmanifested matter can only be known by one's own mental
Candrakirti 's Pañcaskandhaprakarana. cognition.
*Skandhila's work is now lost in its original Sanskrit form and thus
only (apart from a few fragments in Tocharian) available in a Chinese II. Feeling (Peking 396a2; Comm. 330b2; F11-12)
(Taisho 1554) and Tibetan (Peking edition 5599) version. The Tibetan A feeling may either be satisfying or pleasant, frustrating or
text is edited and translated into French by Marcel Van Velthem unpleasant, or neither. It is born from a corresponding contact with an
(Publications de 1'Institute Orientaliste de Louvain 16: Louvain-la-Neuve object of experience, be it external or internal. It forms the basis of
1977). K. Dhammajoti in Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies 2, 1988, desire.
160-174 edits and translates a few passages on the viprayuktasarirskāras.
In my summary I follow the Tibetan version, for the sake of III. Identification (Peking 396b2; Comm. 33168; F13)
convenience referring to the Peking edition. The Chinese version often A notion makes us aware of a specific mark, a name or a thing. It
interpolates or rearranges the original text. I also refer to Marcel van is the cause of initial and sustained thought. Depending on the object
Velthem's French translation made from the Chinese version 1 ° (referred apprehended it may be considered a small, big or immeasurable notion.
to below as " F").
IV. Traces (396b6; Comm. 33168; F13-69)
After a brief prologue paying homage to the Buddha and stating the Traces or synergies (saniskāra) may either be associated with mind
purpose of this manual, the author claims that all the factors of Buddhism or dissociated from mind. That they are associated with mind means that
can be summarized under eight main headings. They are dealt with as they are similar to mind in five ways, viz., in regard to basis, object,
follows: aspect, time and substance. The opposite applies to traces dissociated
from mind.
I. Matter (Peking 3936 ; Comm. 319a3; F2-I1) First of all thirty-seven formations associated with mind are
Basically there are two kinds of matter: (i) the four great elements, enumerated, defined and, usually, briefly discussed:
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMA V ATARA 277
276
of existence, aspects and classes,
I. Volition,
28. Minor afflictions, viz. - to mention only the most important
2. Contact,
'
3. Attention, of three types: (a) seeker s, the nondefiled attention ones - (i) deceit, (ii) arrogance. (iii) violence, (iv) perversity or spite, (v)
of the seven seekers, (b) adept 's, the attention of the arhar, (c) neither, vengefulness, and (vi) craftiness,
29. Ten envelopers, viz., (i) languor (styāna), (ii) torpor (middha),
i.e., all defiled attention.
4. Interest, (iii) excitedness, (iv) anger, (v) jealousy, (vi) stinginess, (vii)
shamelessness, (viii) disregard, (ix) malice, and (x) hypocrisy,
5. Resolve,
30. Three contaminants: (i) pleasure, (ii) existence, and (iii)
6. Faith,
7. Energy, ignorance,
31. Four floods, viz., that of (i) pleasure, (ii) existence, (iii)
8. Memory/Mindfulness,
dogmas, and (iv) ignorance,
9. Concentration,
10. Discernment or wisdom, determining the inclusion, association 32. Four bonds, as in 31,
and relationship of things as well as their causes, conditions, effects, 33. Four kinds of clinging, i.e., to (i) pleasure, (ii) dogmas, (iii) rule
and ritual, and (iv) belief in a self,
specific and common characteristics,
34. Four bodily knots, viz., (i) desire, (ii) malice, (iii) rule and
11. Initial thought,
ritual, and (iv) attachment to views,
12. Sustained thought,
13. Heedlessness, 35. Five obstructions in the form of (i) longing for sensual
pleasures, (ii) ill-will, (iii) languor and torpor, (iv) excitedness and malice,
14. Heedfulness,
and (v) wavering.
15. Dispassion or disgust toward life
16. Delight, Before passing on to the final traces associated with mind and to
those dissociated from mind *Skandhila presents a survey of the various
17. Tranquility,
divisions of the three worlds: (i) the world of sensual pleasure comprises
18. Noninjury,
19. Shame, twenty levels, i.e., eight hells, animals, ghosts, human beings living in
four continents, and six kinds of gods, (ii) the material world, i.e., the
20. Modesty,
21. Equanimity, first, second, third and fourth meditative level comprising, respectively,
two, three, three and eight levels, and (iii) the immaterial world
22. Three good roots, viz., (i) nongreed, (ii) nonhatred and (iii)
nondelusion, comprising four places of birth, five destinies and four ways of birth.
23. Three bad roots, viz., (i) greed, (ii) hatred and (iii) delusion, Some of these are impure, others pure.
24. Four neutral roots, viz., (i) desire, (ii) dogmas, (iii) conceit, and 36. Ten cognitions, namely (i) cognition of the Dharma, (ii) the
(iv) ignorance, cognition following that (cognition of the Dharma), (iii) cognition of the
25. Nine fetters, viz., (i) affection, (ii) repugnance, (iii) pride, of mind of others, (iv) conventional cognition, be it impure or pure, etc., (v)
which there are seven kinds, (iv) ignorance, (v) dogmas, of which there cognition of frustration, (vi) cognition of its origination, (vii) cognition
of its cessation, (viii) cognition of the path (to its cessation), (ix)
are three kinds, (vi) firm adherence or overestimation (parāmarśa), viz.,
taking an inferior view as superior, and mistaking adherence to ritual and cognition of the extinction (of the impurities), and (x) cognition of the
nonorigination (of the impurities).
vows as the correct path, (vii) perplexity, (viii) envy, and (ix) stinginess,
37. Of the eight kinds of patience or competence, the first four are
26. Three bonds, viz., (i) greed, (ii) hatred, and (iii) delusion
27. Seven kinds of proclivities. (i) sensual passion, (ii) repugnance, concerned with cognition of the Dharma in relation to frustration, its
(iii) lust for rebirth, (iv) conceit, (v) ignorance, (vi) false view, and (vu) origin, its cessation and the way to it, whereas the remaining four are
perplexity; they are analyzed in detail based on the differences of sphere concerned with the cognition following the cognition of the Dharma in
278 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAVATARA 279

relation to frustration, etc. All these kinds of patience must be distingui- Now these four marks characterize all conditioned things, including,
shed from certain knowledge, and are to be abolished as one progresses in a certain sense, themselves. In order, however, to avoid the absurdity
along the path of vision After providing a brief survey of the way a of their characterizing one another - for this would imply a total
monk gradually gets rid of all the defilements according to orthodox confusion - these four marks are said to have each their own secondary
Sarvāstivāda, *Skandhila deals with the fourteen kinds of traces mark, i.e., birth, for instance, is conditioned by birth, etc., not by aging,
dissociated from mind as follows: etc. Thus, in other words, each of the four basic, or primary, marks
1. Possession is a real thing (dravya) that accounts for the fact that characterize eight factors whereas a secondary mark only characterizes
someone can acquire something and keep it in his possession, be it good, one basic, or primary, mark. In the moment one factor is born there is
'
bad or neither. Without it there would be no continuity in one s thus a simultaneous production of nine factors, i.e., that factor itself and
development. In some cases possession will be simultaneous with its the eight primary and secondary marks.
object, in other cases before or after it. It is, as said, an independent 12-14. The three final traces dissociated from mind are (12)
thing in its own right, but its moral value depends on the object one name-collection, (13) phrase-collection and (14) phoneme-collection.
' They are all communicated through speech
attains and keeps in one s possession. and reflect a sort of
2. Nonpossession is, obviously, the opposite of possession but it knowledge of how things are. They are not, as the Sautrāntikas maintain,
cannot be defined as either good or bad. It applies to factors belonging to be regarded as belonging to the aggregate of matter, but rather as
to the past or future. independent traces dissociated from mind and apart from the things or
3. The nonidentifying level is a good factor without mind (citta) or meaning to which they give expression.
mental phenomena (caitta, cetasika) - including, of course, identification
- belonging to the fourth level; it is the result of effort, not of V. Consciousness (P414a3; Comm. 384b5; F70-71)
renunciation. Consciousness, the fifth aggregate, is defined as a conscious
4. The cessation meditation is also a good factor; it is obtained by distinction (prativijñapti) of the six kinds of sense-objects. It is an
effort and occurs at the summit of existence, and constitutes bliss in this immediate awareness supported by the sense-organs, of perceptible or
life. conceivable things as such.
5. Unconscious absorption (asat tjñika) is rebirth among the Before passing on to the three unconditioned factors *Skandhila
"unconscious gods"; it is the fruit of the fourth meditative level but now gives a survey of the classical Sarvāstivāda theory of causality
morally neutral. (P414a8; Comm. 385b1; F71-74). As mentioned above under birth,
6. Life-force is simply a term for the reality of the bhavańga due extemal causes and conditions necessarily supplement the internal causal
to one 's previous karma. power that accounts for the origination of things. There are, then, six
7. Homogeneity-force accounts for the fact that the same groups of causes: (i) connected (samprayukta-), i.e., mind and the ten permeating
living beings are alike or different in regard to their activities and desires; mental phenomena when perceiving an object, (ii) simultaneous
if it did not exist there would be no difference between saints and (sahabhū-), (iii) homogeneous (sabhāga-), (iv) pervasive (sarvatrāga-),
common people and all worldly usages would be confounded. (v) causes of retribution (vipākahetu), and (vi) instrumental (karana-).
8. Birth is the internal causal power accounting for the origination These six are the causes of all conditioned things and in various
of factors when the necessary external causes and conditions are present. combinations they give rise to five corresponding kinds of result.
9. Duration is a factor having the power to project new effects and Moreover, there are four conditions: (i) causal conditions (hetupratyaya),
thus account for temporal duration. i.e., all the causes mentioned above except the efficient one, (ii)
10. Old age is a power preventing new factors from arising. immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya), i.e., all past
11. Impermanence is a destructive power causing present things to and present thoughts and mental phenomena, apart from the final thought
become past. of an arhat, (iii) supporting object as condition (ālantbattapratvaya), i.e.,
280 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-TĪKOPĀYIKA 281

any factor, and (iv) dominant factor as condition (adhipatipratyaya), i.e., Sarvāstivāda but from the Satityuktāgama of the Mūlasarvāstivādins.
the instrumental cause mentioned above.
Summary by Stefan Anacker
VI. Space (P415bI; Comm. 389b1; F74-75)
Space (ākāśa), the first of the three unconditioned traces, is defined Of all the curious works that claim to be commentaries on the Kośa
by its capability to contain, or give room to resistant and compact things. (cf. Vinitabhadra, Dignāga), this is by far the strangest. It includes very
It is provided with light and is a substance giving support to the element few quotations from the Ko,ia or explanations of difficult passages in that
wind. Thus it cannot just be defined as lack of something tangible as the work. Its aim seems instead to be to demonstrate that almost the entire
Sautrāntikas do. range of Abhidharma categories derives from the Sūtrapitaka. As a
result, it consists almost entirely of Sūtrapitaka passages. These
VIi. Calculated Cessation (P4I5b5; Comm. 38967; F75-77) quotations are all from the basically accepted canon, and include no
Calculated cessation (pratisathkhyānirodha) is an extinction due to Mahāyāna references. The author, of whom one knows practically
a special kind of insight bringing about the final cessation of frustration, nothing, was obviously a very erudite scholar. He attempts to show in
i.e., of rebirth, when one understands the four noble truths. It is just as many passages that an assiduous study of the Sūtrapitaka would have
unlimited as all the things that have to be abandoned. made many of the later Abhidharma controversies impossible. The work
makes very interesting reading, but as it consists almost entirely of sūtra
VIII. Uncalculated Cessation (P416b6; Comm. 391b8; F78) quotations, it is not very apt for summarization in an encyclopedia of this
This unconditioned trace prevents the arising of certain future kind. It is this work, rather than that of Vinītabhadra, which should be
factors for good. It is a real power that is, however, not due to called "Sūit'ānurūpiu ." Its "upāya" is precisely that it wishes to
intellectual insight or "calculation" (pratisatńkhya> but rather due to the demonstrate that the entire framework of Abhidharma is contained already
insufficiency of conditions (pratyayavaikalva). It can be compared to a in the Sūtrapitaka!
situation where one's being absorbed in impressions from one sense-organ I. Begins with vast sūtra quotations which serve as a commentary
prevents other sense-impressions from coming to mind. This kind of on Vasubandhu's introductory verse: in these he gives the original
cessation must be clearly distinguished from cessation due either to Sūtrapitaka citations for the aggregates, sense-bases, etc.
impermanence or, as said, to insight. (p. 101, 3, lines 6-7) Śamathadeva states that there is a difference
A concluding epilogue reaffirms that this manual was composed in between the appropriating (upādāna) aggregates and the immaculate
order to provide beginners with an introduction to orthodox Buddhism. aggregates of the Buddha endowed with ultimate knowledge. The latter
can in fact not be limited by the usual definitions of the aggregates, but
are rather (I) ethical conduct (śīla), (2) meditational concentration
64. SAMATHADEVA, Tikapayika on Vasubandhu's (samādhi), and (3) ultimate insight (prajñ(i) only. For within these three,
Abhidharmakośa (450?) the entire eightfold path is succinctly included. Right speech, right
This work is lost in the original Sanskrit, and exists only in a livelihood, and right action are included in the "aggregate " of ethical
" "
Tibetan translation by Jayasri and Ses-rab-hod-zer, Peking/Tokyo Tibetan conduct; right mindfulness and right concentration in the aggregate of
Tripitaka volume 118, pp. 97-275. The date given here is a wild guess. meditational concentration; and right views, right intention, and right
Marek Mejor reviews some passages from this commentary on Chapter effort are included in the "aggregate" of insight.
Three of the Ahhidharmakośa. '" The citation of tiaras goes on for pages and pages, and in fact
It is a large work. The colophon says that the author was "born in constitutes the bulk of the entire book. In these citations, Śamathadeva
Nepal." It is "a collection of full quotations and extracts from the shows how all the basic categories used in Abhidharma are derived from
canonical sūtras," "' which Schmithausen "' shows are not from the Sūtrapitaka, including even the controversial one of "seed" (p. 109,
282 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES DHARMADHATUBUDDHAKA 283

1, 5 ff). 66.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Dharmadhātubuddhakasūtra (453)

(p.109, 1, 2) defines "materiality" (rūpaskandha) as being K.22 (8) = T.310 (8) = N. 23 (8) = Bagchi, p. 415 (2). Translated
perceptible by the senses of smell and taste, as well as touch. The author by Mandrasena in 503. For Mandrasena see Bagchi pp. 414-415.
agrees with Vasubandhu ( Kośa IV, Karmasiddhiprakaratta) that rīrpa as
an aggregate (the visible) is basically only color.
Samathadeva shows how the root occupation of Abhidharma, to 67.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Raarameghasūtra (453)
find and analyze basic moment-events, exists and is explicitly mentioned Translated by Mandrasena in 503, this is K.134 = T.658 = N.152
as such already in the Sūtrapitaka (p. 110, 1, 7 ff). = Bagchi, pp. 414-415 (1).
Samathadeva admits the existence of awarenesses, which may even
be accompanied by other mental associates, which are not accompanied
by identification, and quotes sutras to this effect. In this, Samathadeva 68.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Śraddhābālādhānāvatāramudrāsūtra
seems to be implying that a careful reading of the Sūtrapitaka could have (454)
dispelled many of the controversies that arose in Abhidharma. K.81 =T. 305 = N. 90 = Bagchi, pp. 246-247 (1). The work was
translated by Dharmaruci, the date of the translation being given as 504.
For Dharmaruci see Bagchi, pp. 246-247. The work comprises 5
65.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (450?), Bhavasatirkrānlisūtra fascicules. Nanjio renders the title as "Sūtra on the gate of the law of the
Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti give in Buddhist Studies seal for entering the power of faith " .
Review 2.1, 1986, pp. 3-18 a complete account of what is known and
conjectured about this work. The earliest Chinese translation (T.575) is
by Bodhiruci between 508-537, closely followed by T.576, translated by 69.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Buddhaśānta in 525-539. The Tibetan translation is Toh. 226. An (Sarvabuddhavisayāvatāra)Jñānālokālamkārasūtra (457)
apparently different work known by the same title and attributed to K.188 = N. 245 = T. 357 is the first translation, by Dharmaruci, of
Nāgārjuna consists of 16-21 stanzas. This is T.1574 = Toh. 3840, 4162, this frequently translated work, made in 501 in Pai-ma Monastery, Lo-
4558. It contains five of the stanzas of T.575. There is a good-sized yang. Nakamura says this work "is cited in the Ratnagotravibhāga...It
literature (under 238 in the Bibliography of this Encyclopedia). It has exists in Tibetan, and fragments of its Sanskrit original and its Chinese
"'
been translated several times by Aiyaswami Sastri (Journal of Oriental version were found in Central Asia.
Research 5, 1931, 246-260 and Adyar Library Bulletin 1, 1937, i-iv, 1-
60-2, 1938, 61-112, i-xxxvi) as well as by Tola and Dragonetti in the
work cited above. 70.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Aśokarājasūtra (462)
Paul Williams (Journal of Indian Philosophy 8, 1980, p. 26) points K.1013 = T.2043 = N. 1343, translated by Satftghapāla in 512. It
out that there are several related works (dates unknown), including a is a work of 8 chapters. Nanjio comments: "This may be a translation of
Bhav
asmńkrāntiparikathā which says " that san)sāra is the product of the Aśokūvadāna. For the Sanskrit text see the Catalogue of the Hodgson
vikalpa, which is in turn generated by mind (cilia)" (p. 27), a Mss. V. 23; VI. 12; VI1.3."
Madhvantabhavasa»tkrānti, in which " the mind is said to arise from
vikalpa" (p. 27), and a Bhavasatńkrāntitikā, which says that "vikalpa
involves the conceiving of good and bad, and in dependence of this 71 AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Dharmasathgītisūtra (465).
sańrsāra occurs" (p.28). Translated in 515 (=K.404 =T.761 = N. 426 = Bagchi, p. 254 (4))
by Bodhiruci. For information about this Bodhiruci cf. Bagchi, op. cit.,
pp. 252-260.
284 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES SAPTAŚATIKAPRAJÑAPARAMITA 285
72.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mañjuśrīpariprcchāsūtra (468)
conditions (37a-38b), qualities of the sermon and of the listerners worthy
K.412 = N. 442 = T.468 = Bagchi . p. 417 (3) is translated by a
of it (38b-41b). 5.End. Sakra and miracles, 41b-43a."
person whom Nanjio calls Sadtghapāla, which according to Bagchi is a
confusion, the proper rendering of the name being Samghabhara. Cf.
Bagchi, pp. 415-418 for his life and works. 75.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (470?),
*Samantamukhapari vartasūtra
T. 310 (10), 315; P760.10; Toh. 54; Ligeti 801(5).
73. *ŚUDDHAMATI (470?), Vyākhyāna on Nāgārjuna's
Pra tītyasamutpādahrdaya
We know nothing about the author of Taisho 1651 and 1654 76.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Vajramandadhāranīsūtra (475)
(=Tohoku 3537 and 4554), which was first translated by Bodhiruci K.336 = N. 373 = T. 1344, first translated by Buddhaśānta in 525.
between 508 and 537. The date given is only the usual estimate based on
the translator 's dates. The work has been thought by some to be
Nāgārjuna 's own; this has been controverted by Carmen Dragonetti with
''' 77.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Buddhanāmasūtra (475)
rebuttal by Christian Lindtner. K.390 = T.440 = N.404 = Bagchi pp. 253-254 (1) translated in 525
by Bodhiruci. A big work of 12 chapters, it is said to enumerate the
Buddhas, Bodhisattvas and Pratyekabuddhas by name, some 11,093 of
74.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Saptasatikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra them. (cf. N., p. 99). Bagchi reports that it is said to have been made in
(470)
the palace of Minister Hou.
This sūtra has been edited several times, and a translation of one
version, T. 310, is available in Ganna C. C. Chang, A Treasury of
Mahāyāna Sūtras (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1983), pp. 100-114. For 78.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Ksemāvativyākarañasūtra (475)
another translation see Edward Conze, "The Perfection of Wisdom in K.492 = T.573 = N.461 = Bagchi, p. 255 (10). Translated by
Seven Hundred Lines", Kalpa 1, 1963, nos. 2, 4-20, reprinted in Conze, "
Bodhiruci in 525 in Lo-yang. Nanjio explains: It is stated that when
Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies (Oxford 1967). Full references to Buddha, together with Maitreya, went to Rajagrha to beg alms, and
editions and partial translations are in Conze, The Prajñāpāramitā arrived at the palace of Bimbisāra, the queen Kshamāvatt spread excellent
Literature (op. cit.), pp. 58-59, along with the following summary. clothes and asked Buddha to sit down on them. Then Buddha spoke with
her on the meaning of the adornment of trees, and finally gave her the
Summary by Edward Conze prophecy.."

"The SUtra falls roughtly into five parts: I. Niddna, la-3a - 2.

Dialogue, 3a-22b. The problems covered here are: The Suchness of the 79.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Simhanādikasūtra (475)
Tathāgata, development of perfect wisdom (6b-9a), reasons for not K.242 = T.835 = N.262. Bagchi seems not to know this work.
trembling (9a-13b), the non-existence of enlightenment, and of all the Translated by Buddhaśānta in 525 at Lo-yang.
stages preceding it...3.Cosmic phenomena, and Ananda's question, 22b-
23a. This first half may originally have been entitled punyaksetranideśa
(2eb). 4. Discussion continued, 23b-412b: The unthinkable concentration
and cognition (23b-26b), qualifications of the believers (27a-34a), the
concentration on one single array (34a-36b), full enlightenment and its
286 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKASŪTRA-VRTTI 287

80.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (475?), Sārasamuccaya on It is a curious fact that Buddhapālita's commentary on the last five
Skandhila's (?) Abhidharmāvatāra of the twenty-seven chapters of the MMK is nearly identical to the
Available in Chinese, T.1554, and Tibetan, Toh. 4097 = Peking corresponding chapters of the Akutobhayā. (This is particularly true of
5598. Translated by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla et al ca. 800. Marek Mejor the last four chapters.) The style and the brevity of these chapters much
briefly summarizes its contents as follows: more resemble the first twenty-two chapters of the Akutobhayā than they
"The treatise offers a concise smmary of the Sarvāstivāda teaching do the first twenty-two chapters of Buddhapālita's commentary. Thus it
of the dharma theory. Firstly there is a classification schema of the seems likely that Buddhapālita, in fact, wrote only the first twenty-two
conditioned elements (samskŗta-dharma) which are distributed into five chapters of the commentary ascribed to him. The remaining chapters
aggregates (skandha); then follows a separate section on the operations were presumably taken from the Akutobhayā and added later. Hence I
of the causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya), and on their effects have summarized only the first twenty-two chapters here.
(phala); and finally an explanation is given of the three unconditioned In his commentary, Buddhapālita stays close to the thought of
elements (asamskrta-dharma)." 16 Nāgārjuna as expressed in the MMK. To avoid simply resummarizing
the MMK, I have tried to locate passages in which Buddhapālita sets
forth central themes of the Madhyamaka in a manner at least partially
81.BUDDHAPALITA (480), Vrtti on Nāgārjuna's independent of the text of the MMK. These passages have been
Madhyamakasūtras organized according to subject. In the absence of a complete, published
edition or translation, I have identified the passages by the chapter and
Summary by William L. Ames' verse of the MMK on which they comment. Sanskrit words in
parentheses are reconstructed from the corresponding Tibetan terms.
Buddhapālita is the earliest identifiable author whose commentary Where the Sanskrit original is uncertain, Tibetan may be given instead of
(Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavŗtti) on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamaka- or in addition to Sanskrit.
kārikā (MMK) survives today. (The Akutobhayā, "" #137 of Volume
Eight of this Encyclopedia, may well be older, but its authorship is Reductio ad Absurdum Arguments
disputed. There is also a Chinese translation of a commentary ascribed to Buddhapālita is best known to modem students of Buddhism as the
Asañga that deals only with the dedicatory verses of the MMK. )
19 object of Bhāvaviveka's criticism and Candrakirti's defense. The main
Buddhapālita was active probably around 500 A.D. "-0 Tāranātha 12' tells subject of controversy was Buddhapālita's use '29 of reductio arguments
us that he was born in South India'22 and gives a very brief account of his rather than independent (svatantra) syllogisms. Ina reductio argument,
life, but it is not clear how reliable his information is. Although both the thesis to be refuted is shown to have consequences (prasartga) which
Tāranātha and the colophon "- ' to the Tibetan translation say that he the opponent himself cannot accept. The followers of Buddhapālita and
composed commentaries on many works, only his commentary on the Candrakirti became known as Prāsañgika-Mādhyamikas, while those who
MMK has come down to us. Aside from a few very brief quotations in followed Bhāvaviveka were called Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas.
Candrakirti's Prasannapadā, it exists only in an early ninth-century There are many examples of reductio arguments throughout
Tibetan translation by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu ' i rgyal mtshan. Buddhapālita's commentary. Some of the most important occur in the
The first twelve chapters were edited by M. Walleser. '2d Chapter following passage:
One has been translated by Judit Feller. '" A portion of Chapter Two has (l) Here if any entity (bhdva) originated, that origination of that
been translated and edited by Musashi Tachikawa. ''e Chapter Eighteen entity would be either from itself, from another, from both
has been translated and edited by Christian Lindtner. 12' Akira Saito has itself and another, or from no cause; but when one investigates,
edited the entire text and translated the first sixteen chapters in an (origination) is not possible in any way...
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. "" To begin with, entities do not originate from their own selves,
288 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKASUTRA- V RTTI 289

because their origination would be pointless and because there would be according to worldly convention by means of expressions such as
no end to origination. For originating again would be useless for entities "origination." In that connection, even to this day, some whose
which (already) exist by their own selves. But if they originate (again) minds are attached to mere verbal expressions do not understand
even though they exist (already), they would never not be originating... the supremely profound dependent origination, but think that
Nor do they originate from others. Why? Because it would follow entities indeed exist because their origination and cessation and
that everything would originate from everything. Nor do they originate going and coming are spoken of...In order to teach them
from both themselves and others, because the faults of both (of the two the intrinsic nature of dependent origination, the teacher
previous alternatives) would follow. Nor do they originate from no (Nāgārjuna) has composed this (treatise), which is connected with
cause, because it would follow that everything would always be (both) reasoning (yukti) and scripture (agama). (fol. 1-B)
originating from everything and because there would be the fault that all Here Buddhapālita probably has in mind non-Mahāyāna Buddhists in
undertakings would be pointless. (fol. I-1) general and especially the Vaibhāşikas. Buddhapālita reiterates the point
'
Here we might mention another controversial point in Buddhapālita s that not all statements of the Buddha can be taken literally:
commentary. In his commentary on MMK 7-34, he implies that absence (6) Therefore the blessed Buddhas have said various things
of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is taught even in the scriptures of the according to worldly convention. Therefore those who wish to see
Hinayana schools. This idea was also criticized by Bhāvaviveka and reality (tattva) should not be attached to what has been said
'
defended by Candrakīrti, especially in the latter s Madhyamakāvatcra. according to woridlyconvention but should grasp just that which
is reality. (fol. 18-8)
Dependent Origination and Its Implications Applying this principle to a specific case, he says,
Throughout the MMK, Nāgārjuna lays great stress on the notion of (7) The Blessed One has taught the three times (i.e., past, present,
dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), a fundamental doctrine in and future) according to worldly convention; but in reality the three
early Buddhism. Buddhapālita also underlines the importance of ti mes are not possible. (prec. 19-1)
dependent origination. Thus he refers to: How then is the teaching of dependent origination to be understood?
(2) ...the teacher (Nāgārjuna), wishing to explain dependent Following Nāgārjuna (see, e.g., MMK 7-l6ab, 15-I&2, 23-2, Chapter 24),
origination, it really is the profundity of dependent Buddhapālita holds that dependent origination implies lack of intrinsic
origination... (prec. 1-A) nature. For example, he says,
He speaks of: (8) Because action arises from the defilements ' as (its) cause and
(3) ..the supremely profound ultimate truth (pāramārthasatya) the defilements arise from error as (their) cause, therefore (we) say
called "dependent origination " ... (fol. I-B) that action and the defilements are without intrinsic nature.
Since dependent origination is the truth, the knowledge of it sets one free: (fol.17-26)
(4) The teacher (Nāgārjuna), having a compassionate nature and In another passage, Buddhapālita explains these causal relationships in
seeing that beings are afflicted by various sufferings, wished to more detail:
teach the real state (yāthātathya) of entities in order to liberate (9) Those actions and defilements, moreover, arise from false
them. Therefore he undertook the teaching of dependent origination, conceptualization (ahhītavikalpa) but do not exist by intrinsic
because it has been said, "One who sees the unreal is bound; one nature. A defilement arises from superficial conceptualization
"
who sees the real is liberated. (fol. 1-B)
On the other hand, Buddhapālita feels that some have taken the
teaching of dependent origination too literally:
The defilements (kleśa) are undesirable emotional states. The three
(5) It is true that the Tathāgata himself has explained and taught
most often mentioned are desire (raga), hatred (dvesa), and confusion
dependent origination. Nevertheless, he explained and taught it
(moha). See quotation (9).
290 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKASUTRA-VRTTI 291

(ayoniśo vikalpa), for even in regard to one single object, some will are evidently those who accept the principle of dependent origination but
desire, some will hate, and some will be confused. not that of emptiness, the absence of intrinsic nature in things. Elsewhere
Therefore, defilements arise from conceptualization. What the Buddhapālita seems to equate the "proponents of dependent origination"
body, speech, and mind of one whose awareness is defiled perform with the Mādhyamikas themselves. Thus he says,
" (14) Therefore, for those who see entities and nonentities, bondage
is called "action ... Therefore action and defilements arise from false
conceptualization as (their) cause. (fol. 18-5) and liberation are not possible, because the views of permanence
Action and the defilements are said to be the causes of the bodies in and annihilation follow (if there are entities and nonentities); but
which one is reborn. With regard to bodies, Buddhapālita says: bondage and liberation are established only for the proponent of
(10) We have shown that the causes of bodies, that action and those dependent origination. (fol. 16-10)
defilements, are empty of intrinsic nature because they are Likewise he says,
dependently originated. It must be held that an effect possesses the (15) For the proponents of dependent origination, the entity which
nature of the qualities of its cause. Therefore if the causes of a is originating does not exist; and the origination of the entity which
body, action and the defilements, are themselves empty, they being is originating does not exist. (prec. 7-16ab)
empty, how can one say that a body has intrinsic nature? (fol. Moreover, when Buddhapālita refers to dependent origination, he
17-27) usually takes it for granted that it implies, indeed, is virtually identical
"
The term " appropriation (upādāna) is sometimes used to designate with, absence of intrinsic nature. Thus he goes on to explain "does not
the five skandhas, the five psycho-physical aggregates which constitute exist" in quotation (15) as meaning "empty of intrinsic nature." And he
' " "
an individual s body and mind. They are appropriated as the basis for also says,
imputing a self although, in fact, no permanent, unitary self exists. Once (16) ... all conceptual constructions (rtog pa, probably kalpand) of
again, Buddhapālita infers their lack of intrinsic nature from the fact that entities and nonentities lead to the faults of permanence
they originate in dependence on causes and conditions: and annihilation; but dependent origination stands outside of views
(11) Even that appropriation, which (you) suppose exists, does not of entities and nonentities. Therefore it is free from the faults of
exist (by) intrinsic nature because it is dependently originated. (fol. the views of permanence and annihilation. (fol. 17-33).
22-9ab) And similarly,
Thus Buddhapālita is critical of those who accept dependent (17) Therefore we teach that because the aggregates, elements and
origination without seeing that it implies that there is no intrinsic nature sense-bases are dependently originated, they are free from the faults
in things: of existence and nonexistence, not annihilated and not eternal...
(12) Do you not see the horse even though you are mounted on it? (prec. 5-8)
You say that entities are dependently originated, but you do not see Thus having said in quotation (5) that Nāgārjuna composed the MMK
their lack of intrinsic nature. (prec. 15-lab) in order to explain dependent origination, Buddhapalita can also say
Again, Buddhapālita is presumably thinking of the Vaibhāsikas and other without any inconsistency.
non-Mahayana Buddhists. And it is probably with them in mind that he (18) Therefore the teacher (Nagarjuna) composed this (treatise) in
says, order to explain entities' lack of intrinsic nature. (fol. 1-B)
(13) It is not possible for the proponents of dependent origination And having said in quotation (4) that Nāgārjuna taught dependent
(to say) that that (which is called) "this action" has arisen from origination because he wished to teach the real state of entities,
causal conditions; nor is it possible for the proponents of Buddhapālita goes on to ask,
origination without a cause (to say) that that (which is called) " this (19) Question: What is the real state of entities ?
action" has arisen without a cause. (fol. 17-29) Answer: (Their) lack of intrinsic nature. (fol. t-B)
In the preceding passage, the " proponents of dependent origination" Thus from Buddhapālita's Madhyamika perspective, dependent origination
292 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKASŪTRA- V RTTI 293
and absence of intrinsic nature are not two separate facts but are rather
and
aspects of the same fact. (25) ... it is established that the expression "origination" is a mere
The connection between dependent origination and lack of intrinsic conventional usage (fol. 1-14).
nature means that dependent origination is, in a sense, nonorigination:
(20) Because action lacks intrinsic nature, therefore it does Intrinsic Nature
not originate. For if the intrinsic nature of action existed, Though Buddhapālita almost always negates intrinsic nature, the
(its) origination would also be possible (so that one could say) reader may have noticed that in quotation (5) he says that Nāgārjuna
"
This is the origination of action." But if the intrinsic nature of wrote the MMK in order to teach the intrinsic nature of dependent
action does not exist, what would originate? But even if it origination. Moreover, he says,
originates, it would not originate as intrinsic nature. That which (26) Therefore one should understand that the defining
does not originate as intrinsic nature is not action, since it tacks the characteristic of reality is the cognition of such an intrinsic nature,
intrinsic nature of action. (fol. 17-21b) known by oneself, not learned from another. (fol. 18-9)
If there is no origination, there is no cessation, either. In Chapter The idea seems to be that things' very lack of intrinsic nature is, in
Seventeen of MMK, Nāgārjuna criticizes a Buddhist Abhidharma school a sense, their intrinsic nature. Commenting on MMK 15-8, Buddhapālita
which took the "nondisappearance " (avipranāśa) of action, of which the says,
Buddha spoke, to be a distinct entity. Buddhapālita comments, (27) For the antidote of change is intrinsic nature. Therefore
(21) Therefore, not having understood reality, having become intrinsic nature must be unchanging, permanent; but alteration
attached to the mere word " nondisappearance" as an entity, (you) appears in entities. Therefore existence by intrinsic nature is not
have uttered so many numerous and varied and worthless possible for them. (fol. 15-8cd)
(statements). For action is simply without intrinsic nature. Because On the other hand, entities' lack of intrinsic nature is a permanent, albeit
it is without intrinsic nature, therefore it is unoriginated; and negative, fact. Hence Buddhapālita can equate things ' lack of intrinsic
because it is unoriginated, therefore it does not disappear. (fol. nature with reality (tattva):
21-cd) (28) If to see entities and nonentities were to see reality, there
Buddhapālita reiterates that lack of intrinsic nature implies would be no one who would not see reality; therefore that is not the
nonorigination and noncessation. He refers to: vision of reality. Therefore entities' lack of intrinsic nature is
(22) ... one who sees that all entities are unoriginated and unceasing reality, and only by seeing that will one be liberated. (fol. 15-7)
because they are empty of intrinsic nature...(fol. I8-7cd). And likewise he says,
And conversely, (29) Thus because the view of existence and nonexistence of
(23) ... by saying that it is without beginning or end, the Blessed entities will have many faults, therefore that " lack of intrinsic nature
One taught that samsāra also is empty of intrinsic nature. For if "
of entities is the vision of reality; it is the middle path; and just
any entity called "sathsdra" existed, it would undoubtedly have both that is the attainment of ultimate reality (fol. 15-11)
a beginning and an end...Therefore, because (the Buddha) said that
it is without beginning or end, no entity called "rebirth" is possible. The Two Truths
(fol. 11-1) We have already seen references to " convention" versus "reality " in
Nevertheless, Buddhapālita does not wish to abolish all talk of quotations (5), (6), and (7). This distinction is based on the well-known
origination but to relegate it to the conventional level: Mādhyamika doctrine of the two truths, the truth of ultimate reality
(24) Thus because the origination of entities is not possible in any (paramārthasatya) and the truth of relative or superficial reality
way, therefore, since origination does not exist, the expression (samvŗtisatya). (See MMK 24-8,9,10)
"
origination" is a mere conventional usage (syavahāra), (fol. 1-1) As far as ultimate truth is concerned, the lack of intrinsic nature in
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKASUTRA-V RTTI 295
294

things is said to be reality in quotations (28) and (29) and the real state "difference, " he says,
of entities in quotation (19). In quotation (3), dependent origination is (36) Dependent origination has the following nature: To begin with,
"
said to be ultimate truth; but we have seen how dependent origination and because (one thing) is called "different in dependence on
absence of intrinsic nature are inseparable for the Mādhyamikas. (something) different (from it), therefore, according to
Likewise, Buddhapālita says of emptiness worldly convention, it is said to be "different"... Because a jar's
(30) Therefore emptiness is reality... (fol. 18-5) "difference " in relation to a straw mat is relative to the straw mat,
On the other hand, ultimate reality is beyond the reach of conceptual because it is dependent on the straw mat and not established by
itself, (therefore) difference does not exist in the jar. Difference,
formulation. As Buddhapālita said in quotation (26), it must be directly
being incompatible with nondifference, also does not exist in an
experienced for oneself. Paraphrasing MMK 22-11, he says,
(31) "Empty" should not be said; nor should " nonempty " be said; isolated. "nondifferent" jar which is unrelated to a straw mat.
Therefore, according to ultimate reality, it is said that difference
nor should " both empty and nonempty" and "neither empty nor
nonempty " be said. (But) they are said for the sake of rejecting does not exist. (prec. & fol. 14-7ab)
In his commentary on MMK 19-4, Buddhapālita considers a number
false conceptualizations (abhūtasamkalpa) and for the sake of
of relative categories: past, present, and future; best, middling, and worst;
designating (praj,iapti) ultimate reality. (fol. 22-11)
Likewise, in a long commentary on MMK 13-8, Buddhapālita states beginning, middle, and end; far and near; former and later; oneness and
separateness; identity and difference; cause and effect; long and short;
that emptiness is a mere expression, a name for the cessation of views
about entities, and that: small and large; self and nonself; conditioned and unconditioned; one and
" " two and many. He concludes by saying,
(32) ... there is not any entity called emptiness. (fol. 13-8)
He concludes by saying, (37) Therefore all those, too, are not established by themselves in
(33) As for those who are attached to emptiness as an entity, that reality. They are stated according to worldly convention. (fol. 19-4)
While conventional reality cannot claim ultimate validity, it must be
attachment cannot be removed by anything else. For example, if
someone is told that there is nothing and says, "Give (me) that acknowledged on its own level. Buddhapālita remarks that:
same nothing!" how can he be made to grasp the nonexistence (of (38) ... all expressions are not possible. But they are also possible
according to worldly convention. (fol. 19-6cd)
any gift for him)?...Those who see that even emptiness is empty;
reality, for them, emptiness is accomplished. (fol. 13-8) Therefore, as we saw in quotations (5), (6), and (7), the Buddha often
teaches according to worldly convention. Buddhapālita also says,
As for conventional truth, Buddhapālita says,
(34) It is established that the appearance of entities is like a magical (39) ... the Blessed One, also, though he saw that entities are empty
of intrinsic nature, said, "This is real; this is unreal; this is both real
illusion, a mirage, a city of the Gandharvas, or a reflection. (fol.
and unreal." (fol. 18-8ab)
11-8)
For the Madhyamika, the understanding of emptiness does not lead to a
If one claims that the existence of real entities is established by direct
refusal to deal with conventional reality, but to nonattachment.
perception, Buddhapālita replies,
Buddhapālita says,
(35) Even that which is called " apprehension by direct perception"
(40) For us, engaging in conventional activities without attachment
(pratyakśopalabdhi) or " apprehension of the immediately evident"
to existence and nonexistence, it is not the case that (liberation) is
is seeing, like seeing mirages and dreams due to the fault of one's
own confused mind; but here there is nothing real at all. In order impossible. (fol. 15-7)
While conventional truth has to be recognized in conventional
to remove the attachment, "this is real," the Blessed One has said
matters, it is no criterion of ultimate truth. Thus Buddhapalita sometimes
(prec. 22-10)
uses the phrase "when one examines how things really are " (yang dag
Buddhapālita does not propose to abolish the conventional truth but
to show that it is merely conventional. Discussing the concept of pa ji lta ba bzhin du brtags na; fol. 11-8, prec. 14-7ab, prec. 14-8cd) to
296 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKASUTRA-VRTTI 297

indicate that the object of investigation is ultimate truth, not conventional intrinsic nature. These worlds, also, are designated in dependence
validity. He also remarks, on this and that; but they are not established by themselves at all;
(41) Because this is an investigation into reality (de kho na bsam therefore the world also, like the Tathagata, is without intrinsic
pa, probably tattvacinta), what is the use of (arguing on the basis nature. (fol. 22-16cd)
ot) worldly expressions here...? (fol. 10-14) The principle of dependent designation establishes things as valid
The following passage also clarifies the distinction between the two conventionally but not ultimately. Buddhapālita asserts,
levels of investigation, the conventional and the ultimate: (45) Therefore, one should grasp that which we have thoroughly
(42) According to that same worldly superficial truth by which it ascertained: An entity is a dependent designation. Thus the
is said, "The jar exists; the grass hut exists, " it is also said that they teachings about agent, action, result, experiencer (of the result),
are impermanent: "The jar is broken; the grass hut is burned. " affliction, and body are possible; but the faults of permanence and
When one investigates reality, then the jar and the grass hut ate not annihilation will not follow; and also samsāra is established. (fol.
possible since they are dependent designations. How would it be 17-33)
possible for them to be broken or burned? Moreover, the In quotation (14), Buddhapālita made a similar statement about dependent
Tathagata, also, is said to be impermanent according to worldly origination.
superficial reality: " The Tathāgata is old; the Tathagata has passed Buddhapālita says of agent and action,
into nirvana." When one investigates according to ultimate reality, (46) The agent depends on the action, is based on the action, In
then the Tathāgata himself is not possible. How could his old age relation to the action, (he) is designated as and said to be an agent.
and nirvūña be possible? (fol. 22-16c) The action of that agent also arises in dependence on that same
agent; and it is designated as and said to be the action of that
VI. Dependent Designation (agent). Therefore those two are designated in relation (to each
In MMK 24-18, Nāgārjuna equates emptiness not only with other); but they are not established or nonestablished by intrinsic
dependent origination but also with dependent designation nature. Therefore since, in that way, those two are not maintained
(upādāyaprajñapti). " Dependent designation " refers to the principle that to be existent or nonexistent, (this) is designated as the middle way.
names and concepts are imposed on reality rather than simply correspond Apart from that designation, we see no other defining characteristic
to it. of the establishment of those two. (fol. 8-12)
Buddhapālita often uses the idea of dependent designation instead of "
The same analysis is applied to the appropriator and the
"
"
or in addition to dependent origination. As with dependent origination, appropriation," that is, the self and the five aggregates:
dependent designation is incompatible with existence by intrinsic nature: (47) ... as the agent is designated in dependence on the action, so
(43) If the Buddha is designated in dependence on (his) aggregates, the appropriator, also, is designated in dependence on the
doesn't that mean that the Buddha does not exist by intrinsic appropriation. As the action is designated in dependence on that
nature? For what use does something which already exists by same agent, so the appropriation, also, is designated in dependence
intrinsic nature have for also being designated dependently? It on that same appropriator. For those two (i.e., the appropriator and
would be designated by just that which is its intrinsic nature. the appropriation), also, we see no defining characteristic of
Because that Buddha is without intrinsic nature, therefore he is establishment apart from that. (fol. 8-13a)
designated by means of (his) appropriation. Therefore, the Time, also, is dependently designated but does not exist as an
Tathagata does not exist by intrinsic nature. (fol. 22-2ab) independent entity. Buddhapālita says,
This is true not just for the Buddha, but also for the whole world: (48) If those, former and later and so on, are the marks (lieiga) of
(44) Because the Tathagata is designated in dependence on (his) ti me, in that case, time is designated simply in dependence on an
aggregates but is not established by himself, therefore he has no entity; but it is not established by itself (fol. I9-6a)
298 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKASUTRA-VRTTI 299
He concludes his commentary on Chapter Nineteen, "Examination of Therefore both exist, but they cannot be said to be identical or
Time," by saying, different.
(49) Therefore one should understand that there is not any entity Answer: Do you call an enemy as a witness, with the idea (that
called "time"; it is established as a dependent designation.(fol. 19-6) he is) a friend? You undertake to establish the appropriator and the
Dependent designation does not establish the real existence of appropriation by means of that same (fact) due to which it
anything, but only its conventional, relative existence. Thus Buddhapālita is impossible to establish them! For if an appropriation
says, and appropriator existed, they would undoubtedly be either identical
(50) When the Tathāgata is sought for in five ways ' in that same or different. How could those which do not exist either as identical
appropriation by which he is designated, (one finds that) he does or as different exist in (some) other way? Therefore the
not exist in the appropriation, (since he is) inexpressible as being appropriation does not exist, and the appropriator also does not
identical to or different (from it). (Then) how can itbe said that the exist Even if one speaks of the appropriator and the appropriation
Tathāgata exists? Therefore it is not possible (to have according to convention, it must be said that they are neither
both) dependent designation and existence. (fol. 22-8) identical nor different... (fol. 22-7)
Here the argument is that real entities, possessing intrinsic nature, Finally, it should be pointed out that in MMK 18-10 and
would have to be identical or different. As Buddhapālita puts it, Buddhapālita's commentary on it, an argument is made that some thing
(51) Those two things which are not established as being identical which arises in dependence on another thing is not identical to or
or different, are not established, because establishment in a different from it. Therefore, once again, parallel arguments are made
( manner) different from those two (alternatives) is not possible. concerning dependent origination and dependent designation.
(fol. 20-20)
On the other hand, something which is dependently designated cannot be VII. Nihilism and Mādhyamika
held to be identical to or different from anything, since it has no intrinsic In his commentary following MMK 18-7, Buddhapālita has an
nature: opponent raise the issue of nihilism in classical Indian terms:
(52) For us, dependently designated entities, which are empty of (54) Objection: What difference is there between one who has the
intrinsic nature and are like magical illusions and mirages and view that "this world does not exist; the other world does not exist;
reflections, have no identity or difference. To what would that apparitionally born beings do not exist" and so on and one who has
entity belong? From what would it be different? (fol. 21-16) the view that all entities are unoriginated and unceasing? (fol.
It is inadmissible to say that things are not identical or different but 18-7cd)
yet exist as real entities: Buddhapālita replies that there is a great difference. The nihilist
(53) Objection:... The appropriator and the appropriation are not speaks without really having seen, without really having experienced any
"
said to be identical or different. To begin with, they are not said to nonexistence" of the world, etc. On the other hand, one who has seen,
be identical because the agent-noun is different (from the noun who has had a direct experience of the fact that things are unoriginated
denoting the action or the object of the action). Nor are they said and unceasing because they are empty of intrinsic nature, speaks of what
to be different, because they are not established separately. he knows. The nihilist is merely uttering words whereas the
Mādhyamika 's statements are based on actual knowledge. Buddhapālita
gives the example of two 'witnesses in court. Both give the same
' testimony; but one actually saw the events in question, whereas the other
The five ways in question are five possible relationships between
testifies because he has been bribed or because he is partial to one side
two things: sameness, difference, the first possessing the second, the first in the case. The second witness, though his words are correct, is
existing in the second, and the second existing in the first. See MMK 10, considered to be a liar because he has no actual knowledge of the events
4.
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAS UTRA- V RTTI 301
300

of which he speaks. existent or really nonexistent. We maintain that agent and action are
(55) We see that entities are nonexistent like the horns of a hare; dependent designations...Those two are not maintained to be either
" existent or nonexistent... (prec. & fol. 8-12)
but in order to avoid faults of speech, we do not say neither
existence nor nonexistence. " For we speak according to seeing that Likewise, with regard to a person and his six sense faculties (the five
existence and nonexistence are like reflections because they physical senses plus the mind), Buddhapālita says,
are dependently originated. (fol. 18-7cd) (60) No (person) who is established by himself (so that one could
Throughout his commentary, Buddhapālita makes the point that the say) "Ile is this" exists when he is sought for in every way
fundamental Mādhyamika principles of dependent origination, dependent (whether he is supposed to exist) prior to the visual faculty, etc., or
designation, and emptiness are not doctrines of nonexistence. With at the same time as the visual faculty, etc., or at a time later than
regard to dependent designation, we have the following exchange between the visual faculty, etc. The suppositions that he is designated as
existent or as nonexistent by means of the visual faculty, etc., do
Buddhapālita and a hypothetical opponent:
not apply to that (person). To begin with, because he is not
(56) Objection: If time does not exist and cause and effect and the
group (of causes and conditions: sāmagri) also do not exist, what established by himself, how can it be said that he exists? Also,
other exists? Therefore that (view of yours) is just nihilism because he is made manifest by the visual faculty, etc., how can it
(nāstivāda). be said that he does not exist? Therefore, in his case, the
Answer: It is not. Your conceptual construction that time and so suppositions that he exists or does not exist are not possible.
Therefore, like agent and action, that appropriation (i.e., the sense
on exist by intrinsic nature is simply not possible, but they are
established as dependent designations. (fol. 20-24) faculties and so on) is also simply designated; but apart from that,
Elsewhere he says, no other establishment of it is possible. (fol. 9-12)
Buddhapālita also discusses the question of existence and
(57) Therefore the meaning of dependent designation is precisely
that an entity which is dependently designated cannot be said to be nonexistence as it relates to dependent origination, as well as dependent
designation. Sometimes, in fact, he uses a formulation which combines
existent or nonexistent because it is completely empty of intrinsic
elements of both:
nature. (But) there is no fault in a conventional statement. (fol.
22-10) (61) ... by this dependent origination, it is designated as an entity
according to causes and conditions; but entities do not exist by
In the following passage, Buddhapalita spells out in more detail why
intrinsic nature... (fol. 13-8)
a dependently designated thing cannot be said to be either existent or
nonexistent. This discussion is couched in terms of the Tathagata and his And similarly in the following passage,
(62) The teaching of the blessed Buddhas is that an entity is simply
aggregates or appropriation:
(58) How is it logically possible to say that the Tathagata, who is designated due to causes and conditions, but it does not exist or not
exist. (fol. 18-8)
dependently designated, either exists or does not exist? For if a
Speaking purely in terms of dependent origination, Buddhapālita, in
Tathāgata existed, he would just exist, even without an
appropriation; but he does not exist without an appropriation. How a passage quoted in part earlier, asserts that the Madhyamikas propound
neither existence nor nonexistence:
can one who does not exist without an appropriation be said to
exist? How, too, can a Tathāgata who is dependently designated (63) We do not say the the aggregates, elements, and bases are
nonexistent. Rather we reject the doctrine that they exist. Both
he said not to exist? For a nonexisting flower cannot be
designated. (fol. 22-11) existence and nonexistence have great faults...Therefore we teach
that because (the aggregates, elements, and bases) are dependently
With regard to an agent and his action, Buddhapālita says,
originated, they are free from the faults of existence
(59) We do not say that agent and action are nonexistent. We have
and nonexistence, not annihilated (and) not permanent; but we do
rejected the conceptual construction that their activity is really
302 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAS ŪTRA- V RTTI 303

not say that they are nonexistent. (fol. 5-7) is made, except that the terms used for origination and cessation are
Likewise, he asks rhetorically, sabhava and vibhava, rather than utpāda and nirodha. "
Here, too,
" "
(64) How is it possible to say that the dependently originated exists "empty " seems to imply nonexistent ; but then nonexistent" is
or does not exist? (fol. 17-30) immediately equated with "nonexistent by intrinsic nature. " (Again, I
Moreover, in his commentary on MMK 12-8, Buddhapālita denies have supplied the emphasis.)
that the Mādhyamikas hold that frustration is nonexistent; rather, they say (68) To begin with, it is not possible for an entity which is empty
that it is dependently originated. of intrinsic nature to have origination and cessation. Why? Because
Buddhapālita also holds that emptiness is different from both it does not exist. For how could what what does not exist
existence and nonexistence. Thus he says, by intrinsic nature have those (i.e., origination and cessation)?
(65) How can it be said that entities which are empty of intrinsic How could it be said that "something arises, something ceases," in
nature, which are like magical illusions and dreams and mirages reference to that which lacks even the conventional designation
and reflections and echoes, are real or unreal? Therefore that (i.e., "this, " because it does not exist by intrinsic nature? Therefore
" origination and cessation are not possible for what is empty. (fol.
"not real, not unreal ) is the teaching of the blessed Buddhas, free
from the faults of existence and nonexistence, not in common with 21-9ab)
any Tirthakāras (i.e., founders of non-Buddhist sects), elucidating
ultimate reality. (fol. 18-8cd) VIII. Liberation According to the Madhyamaka School
Likewise he says, Buddhapālita defines liberation as follows:
(66) Therefore, by saying "false (mrsā) (the Buddha) did not teach
" (69) By the cessation of samsāric existence (bhava), (re)birth
that entities do not exist. That statement by the Blessed One ... that ceases; that is called " liberation. " That one who thus sees (things)
'
what is deceptive (mo.sadharma) is false teaches entities emptiness as they really are, understands reality. By understanding reality,
of intrinsic nature, which is not understood by any Tīrthakāras (and) one will be liberated. (fol. 18-4)
is free from the faults of existence and nonexistence. (fol. 13-2) Moreover he says,
Occasionally, Buddhapālita seems to say that emptiness implies or is (70) For one who sees reality, there is nothing (further) to be done.
equivalent to nonexistence. A case in point is his commentary on MMK (fol. l 8-7cd)
20-18, in which he argues that an empty result of a cause cannot be said Thus Buddhapālita accepts the common Buddhist view that liberation
to arise or cease: is the cessation of rebirth in sarhsāra and that the cessation of rebirth is
(67) How will that result, which is empty of intrinsic nature (and) brought about by a direct experience of reality. The difficulty is that,
not established by itself, arise? How will it cease? But if one from the Mādhyamika point of view, what reality can there be?
supposes that that result, even though it is empty of intrinsic nature, (71) Objection: Here (you) have said that by seeing reality, one will
arises and ceases, to that the following must be said: Does be liberated. "Reality " (de kho na, tattva), moreover, is the nature
something else, apart from the nature of the result, arise and cease? of that (de 'i dngos po, probably tadbhdva or tadvastu), thatness
But if something else, apart from the nature of the result, arises, (tattva); the meaning is that it is the intrinsic nature of an entity
what would that do for the result? For the "nonresult " which arises (dngos po'i ngo bo nyid, bhāvarvabhāva). As to that, if the
would not be the result. Therefore, even if one supposes that the intrinsic nature of an entity simply does not exist, in that case won't
result is empty, because it does not exist (my emphasis), it would the vision of reality be impossible for you? If there is no vision of
also follow that it is unceasing and unoriginated; (but) that, also, is reality, how can liberation be possible? Therefore that view that
not accepted (by you). Therefore an empty result, also, will not entities are without intrinsic nature is not good. (prec. 15-6)
arise; nor will it cease. (fol. 20-18) Buddhapālita replies,
In MMK 21-9ab and its commentary, an almost identical argument (72) Those who thus see intrinsic nature and the nature of another
304 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
MADHYAMAKASUTRA- V RTTI 305
and nonexistence (or "a nonentity, abhāva) do not, even in that
(77) In brief, seeing that a self and what belongs to a self do not
way, see the the reality in the supremely profound teaching of the
exist extemally or internally is the highest reality. By the meditative
Buddha. We see entities' lack of intrinsic nature as it really
cultivation of the view of reality, one will comprehend reality.
is, illuminated by the risen sun of dependent origination. Therefore,
(prec. 18-1)
because just we have the vision of reality, only for us is liberation
And
also possible. (fol. 15-6)
(78) Thus not to see a self and what belongs to a self externally or
He continues, in a passage already quoted in part in quotations (28)
internally is the vision of reality. That yogi meditatively cultivates
and (40), that and makes it firm. (fol.l8-2ab)
(73) Those who see entities as existent and nonexistent do not see
To seek liberation in a way which perpetuates one's clinging to
reality. Therefore, for them, liberation is also not possible. For us,
notions of "I" and " mine" is self-defeating. For liberation to occur, one
engaging in conventional activities without attachment to existence
must thoroughly understand that self and other are only conventional
and nonexistence, it is not the case that (liberation) is impossible.
designations. Buddhapālita discusses this problem in his commentary on
If to see entities and nonentities were to see reality, there would he
MMK 16-9:
no one who would not see reality therefore that is not the vision of
(79) Here the complete cessation of appropriation is called
reality. Therefore entities' lack of intrinsic nature is reality; and only "
nirvana " ; but the root of all appropriation is the grasping of self
by seeing that will one be liberated. (fol. 15-7)
and what belongs to a self. Therefore those who vainly imagine "I
In the Indian context, any theory of liberation has to deal with the
will enter final nirvana" (parinirvāna) with no appropriation! May
actions which bind one to samsāra and the passions - in Buddhist
final nirvana be mine!" continue to embrace a grasping of a self
terminology, the defilements - which produce them. Buddhapālita says,
and what belongs to a self. Therefore, that very grasping of theirs,
(74) Here, since action and the defilements are the cause of
of a self and what belongs to a self, is an appropriation which is
(re)birth, it is said (in MMK 18-5a) that liberation is due to the
not well grasped. How would liberation be possible for one who
ending of action and the defilements. (fol.18-5)
has an appropriation? Who is that one who would enter final
What does seeing that things have no intrinsic nature have to do with
liberation with no appropriation? And of whom would there be a
putting an end to action and the afflictions? Buddhapālita explains,
final liberation? All these are produced by the craving and
(75) When the unwise, whose intellectual eye is obscured by the
ignorance of the one (who grasps in that way).
darkness of confusion, conceptually construct intrinsic nature in
entities, desire and hatred are produced in them. When the light of
the knowledge of dependent origination has dispelled the darkness
82. AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
of confusion and one sees with the eye of discernment (prajñā) Anakşarendraka (vai)vocanagarbhasūtra (485)
entities' lack of intrinsic nature, then that (person's) desire and
K.213 = T.828 = N.221 = Bagchi, p. 256 (12) in 7 leaves, translated
hatred do not arise in regard to (something) without a basis. (fol.
by Bodhiruci around 535. Nanjio's rendition of the title is somewhat
1-B) different.
Buddhapālita sums up his position on the question of liberation in a
passage quoted in part earlier:
(76) Therefore emptiness is reality, and only by the meditative
83.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Sarvabālapāladhāranīsūtra (485)
cultivation of emptiness will one comprehend reality. The
Nanjio identifies this as "Sūtra spoken by Buddha on the Dhāraud-
comprehension of reality is called "liberation." (fol. 18-5) mantra for protecting boys or children." K.440 = N.488 = T. 1028a
The insight into reality which is essential for liberation shows that the
Bagchi, p. 256 (18), in 4 leaves. Translated by Bodhiruci by 535.
self does not exist as a real entity. Buddhapālita says,
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES SADDHARMASMRTYUPASTHANA 307
306
V. 18-21 (S23-29) Animals, classified in the usual way according
84.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mañjuśrīparicaranasūtra (485)
K.265 = T.470 = N. 286 = Bagchi, p. 257 (20). "SUtra spoken by to how they reproduce. Animals in hell and animal ghosts. Nāgas and
" Asuras are discussed, the latter being divided into ghosts and animals.
Buddha on Mañjuśri s going (round to examine the Bhikshus' rooms).
Translated by Bodhiruci by 535. Their length of life and location.
VI. 22-63 (S29ff.) Gods, specifically the four celestial kings
Vaiśravana, Dhrtarāştra, Virūdhaka and Virūpākşa in the four quarters of
85.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, the universe (22-24), 33 deities (a list not found elsewhere, according to
Maitreya(bodhisattva)paripŗcchāsūtra(485) Li-Kouang), and the Yāmas (36-63).
K.551 = T.1525 = N. 1203, translatred by Bodhiruci. A commentary VII. 64-70 Concerning the applications of mindfulness
(smrtyupasthāna) pertaining to the body.
in 7 fascicules on No. 23 of the Mahāratnakūta colection. The title is
rendered by Lancaster as Maitreyapariprcchopadeśa.
88.BUDDHASENA (490?), Yogācārabhūmi
86.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Samghātasūtra (488) "Lamotte (Histoire du bouddhisme ancienne, p. 772)
K.398 =T. 423 = N. 449 = Bagchi, p. 266 (1), translated by mentions...another Yogācārabhūmi, which is ascribed to Buddhasena, who
appears to have taught in Kāśmīr toward the end of the 5th century
Upaśūnya. On Upaśūnya's life and works cf. Bagchi, pp. 265-267.
A.D. i10 Presumably this is the same Buddhasena to whom David Seyfort
Ruegg attributes T. 618, Ta-mo-to-lo ch 'an-cing (*Dharmatāla-
dhyānasūtra?). "'
87.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Saddharmasmrtyupasthānasūtra
(489)
K.801 = T.721 = N.679 = Bagchi, p. 262 (I), translated at Yeh by
89.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Marīcidhāranīsūtra (490?)
Gautama Prajñārūci in 539. On the translator Gautama Prajñārūci see
Nanjio, p. 428 and Bagchi, pp. 261-265. This is a vast work, comprising K.311 = T.1256 = N.847, translated anonymously during the Lian
dynasty (502-557). A small work, 2 leaves.
70 fascicules in 7 chapters.
This work has been translated into French by Lin Li-Kouang (Paris
1949). It is divided into seven chapters. We provide below a rough
90.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Maitreya(mahā)sin)hanādasūtra
translation of the titles comprising Li-Kouang ' s critical analysis which
constitutes Chapter One of his book. It is an extensive commentary on 70 (491)
kārikūs, numbered in the outline below along with the pages of Li- K.22 (23) = T.310 (23) = N.23 (23), translated by Upaśūnya or
Urdhvaśūnya, who travelled to Ye in 538-541 and settled down in
Kouang's summary, abbreviated as "S".
Nanking around 542-546.
I. 1-2 (S2-3) Ten Acts.
11.3-5 (S3) Birth and Death
91. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Vincila(nāna)upāsikāpariprcchāsūtra
III. 5-15 (S3-16) Hells. The usual eight: Sarhjiva, Kālasūtra,
(492)
Samghāta, Raurava, Mahāraurava, Tāpana, Mahātāpana and Avici. Their
K.855 = T.578 = N.770 = Bagchi, pp. 262-263 (6), translated by
locations, length of life, temperatures, guardians, etc.
Gautama Prajñāruci in 542.
IV, 16-17 (S16-23) Ghosts. Some thirty-six species of ghosts are
identified by name and their penances briefly described. Special attention
to Varna and to Mara.
308 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES "HIGHEST RELIANCE " 309

92.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Kanakavarñapūrvayogasūtra (492) and circumstances of its translation.

K.370 = T.162 = N.390 in 11 leaves, translated by Gautama
Prajñārūci in 542 at the Chin-hua Monastery in Yeh-tu.

93.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mańgalās/akasūtra (492) 99. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Buddhagotraśāstra (495)

K.493 = T.429 = N.410 = Bagchi, p. 262 (3) (where the title is given
as Astabuddhakasūtra). Translation also by Gautama Prajñāruci. Nanjio Summary by Jikido Takasaki 12
reports that " In this Sūtra Buddha tells the śresthin or elder (rich
merchant) Shan-tso (Sukara?) the names and good qualities of eight "The Buddhagotraśāstra is another work which, like the
Buddhas of the eastern quarter." Dharmadhātvaviśesaśāstra, expounds the ten meanings of the gotra
described in the Ratnagotravibhāga, but with the same terminology and
with explanations much similar to those of the
94.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Niyatāniyatāvatāramudrāsūtra (492) Dharmadhātvaviśesaśāstra. It is translated into Chinese by Paramārtha,
K.138 = T.645 - N.132 Bagchi, p. 264 (17), translated by Gautama is attributed, according to the Chinese tradition, to Vasubandhu and is
Prajñāruci in 542. highly esteemed among Chinese Buddhists throughout the centuries as a
representative work on the garbha theory. This attribution is rather
doubtful..."
95.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Paramārthadharmavijayasūtra (492) "The whole text consists of four chapters, of which the last one
K.202 = T.833 = N.210 = Bagchi, pp. 264-265 (19). " Stara spoken treats the subject of the ten meanings of the gotra under the title Analysis
by Buddha on the excelling of the law of the first (or highest) meaning." of the Characteristics (laksaña) (of the tathāgatagarbha). Explanations
Same translator as previous four works. under each laksana are in most cases quite equivalent to those in the
Ratnagotravibhāga even in their wording, but sometimes doctrines based
upon the Vijñānavāda are interwoven among passages, and sometimes
96.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, (Rsi)Vyāsapariprcchāsūtra (492) those passages which are in other chapters or other parts of Chap. I in the
"
K.55 = T.354 = N.60 = Bagchi, p. 264 (15). Same translator as Ratnagotravibhāga are inserted between lines.
above. The Chinese translation consists of 14,457 Chinese characters, "... We are led to imagine that, as far as the garbha theory is
according to a note at the beginning. concerned, this work was composed by borrowing many sentences from
the Ratnagotravibhāga but arranging them more systematically by adding
' '
the author s own opinion. This author s opinion appears in descriptions of
97.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Susthitamatipariprcchāsūtra (492) the five dosas and the five guñas in relation to the purpose of the
K.45 = T.341 = N.48 = Bagchi, p. 268 (6), translated by teaching; of the five meanings of the garbha taken from the
Vimoksasena and Gautama Prajñāruci in 542. For Vimoksasena cf. Śrīmālādevīsūtra; of the three natures of the garbha taught in (I)
Nanjio, p. 429 svabhāva; of the attainment of Buddhahood by the icchantikas (in (IV)
karman); of the āśrayaparivrtti, dharmakāya, and nirvāpa (in (V) yoga;
of the six meanings of avikāra, of the five /aksañas and five gunas of
98. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "Sūtra on the highest reliance" (492) dharmakāya as one of trikāya (in (IX) avikdra, etc. These passages show
Translated by Paramartha (our #I28 below) in 557. K.235 = T.669 - the more developed doctrines, some of which are based upon the
N.259. Bagchi, pp. 424-425, gives a lot of information about the date Vijñānavāda... "
 KARANDAVYUHA 311
310 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

100. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Kārandavyūhasūtra (495) merits of the Kāranda Vyūha itself, the Blessed One made a prophecy
regarding the future decay of the religions and he predicted that the
There is an English translation in E.J.Thomas, The Perfection of
Wisdom (London 1952, 1954), pp. 72-78, and a partial translation by bhiksusarhgha would fall into a degenerate state 300 years after his
Edward B. Cowell in Journal of Philology 6, 1876, 222-23I; see also demise and the bhikśus at that time would become demoralised and live
like householders with wives and children, grossly deviated from the path
Indian Antiquary 8, 1879, pp. 250-252. P.L.Vaidya, who provides a text "
of this sūtra in Mahāyānasūtrasathgraha I (Darbhanga 1961), pp. 258- of virtue.
The date of this writer is quite unknown. It can hardly predate 500,
308, writes in his Introduction (p. xv): "...(M)ostly in prose. The text was
which we are estimating here; it probably is a century or two after.
published in Calcutta in 1873, edited by Satyabrata Samasrami, and my
edition is based on it...It is...clear that there are two texts called
Kārandavyūha, one in prose dealing with Avalokiteśvara, and the other
in verse dealing with Mañjuśñ..." 101.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
ra
Aparāmitāyurjnc5nahŗdayadhārañīsūt (500)
Summary by Prabhas Chandra Majumdar "3 K.443 = T.370, which says it is the same as N. 485, although the title
given of N. 485 in Nanjio is quite different. It was translated
"The Kāranda-vyūha is a Mahāyāna Sūtra mainly consecrated to the anonymously some time between 502 and 557. Assuming this is the
'
glorification of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara and his exploits for the same text, we give Nanjio s description of it: "Buddha is introduced as
living in the great city of Campā, and telling Bhikshus the names of the
deliverance of beings. The work exists in two versions, one in prose 14
and the other in verse. The subject-matter of both the versions is more parents, son, disciples and Māra of Amitabha; he also teaches a spiritual
or less the same. Mantra or Vidyā by the practice or recital of which for ten days a man
"
would certainly be born in his country (Sukhāvati).
The prose text consists of two sections, each section containing in History of Buddhist Thought
On the other hand, E.J.Thomas (
their turn several chapters. The first section...of the prose...is as follows: (London, 1933, p. 188) reports that a text of this name was edited by
While the Blessed One was sojouming in the Jetavana with a large
Max Walleser at Heidelberg 1916. "It is a spell of 108 syllables for
number of Bodhisattvas, Devas, Nāgas and others, a ray of divine light
obtaining unlimited life ".
came and flooded the whole of the universe and made all the objects
around distinctly visible. Then the Bodhisattva named Sarva-Nivarana-
Vişkambhin requested the Blessed One to explain the causes of that
102. AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
divine illumination. The Lord said that the Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara Mahāmañivipulyamānaviśvasupratisthitaguhyasūtra (500?)
had entered into Avīci hell to deliver the beings and thence was coming . '
K.430 = T.I007 = N.536; translator s name unknown.
the divine light. The Blessed One continuing his discourse narrated how
the Avalokiteśvara was redeeming the down-faced creatures (adhomukha-
sattva), liberating the demon-king Bali, removing poverty and affliction
of the Brahmin Sukundala who was once a...god, saving the life of the 103.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Saptabuddhakasūtra (500?)
'
mechant Simhala from the clutches of the Rākşasīs, delivering K.346 = T.1333 = N.368. The translator s name is unknown' he is
said to have translated during the Liang dynasty (502-557).
innumerable worms and insects at Vāranasī and so on. "
" ...
A large part in the later section of the prose text is occupied by the
glorification of the well-known mystic knowledge (Sadaksarī vidyā); and
I04.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Prad panīyasūtra (508)
the rest consists of a small chapter on the Dhārapī or magic formula viz., K.408 = T.702 = N.428 = Bagchi, p. 271 (6), translated by
wit cūle cūe cūye svāhā etc. which is said to have been recited by seven '
crores of perfectly enlightened Tathāgatas. Lastly while enumerating the Narendrayaśas in 558 in T'ien-P ing Monastery.
312 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES 313

105.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Sumerugarbhasūtra (508) 107.DIGNAGA, Marma(pra)dipa on Vasubandhu's

Another of Narendrayaśas' translations. K.59 (where the title is given Abhidharmakośa
as Tathāgatasrīsamayasūtra) = N.66 = T.397 (16) = Bagchi, p. 271 (5).
Bagchi gives the date of translation as 558, and cites authority for not Summary by Mark Tatz
identifying this with the 25th section of the Mahāsamnipāta collection.
Dignaga's commentary ( Vrtti) on the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu
is entitled Marmad pa (var. Marmaprad ipa)--that is to say, a presentation
106.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Lokaprajñaptyabhidharmasūtra of crucial points. This commentary is known only from Tibetan sources,
(509) and survives in the Tibetan Sacred Canon (Bstan- 'gyur). Toh. no. 4095,
Nanjio gives the title as Lokasthiti(?)-abhidharma-śāstra under N. Derge Nyu 95b.1-214a.7 in a translation by the Indian pandit
1297 (= T. 1644 = K.967 = Bagchi, p. 428 (40)). It was translated by *Yogacandra (Rnal-'byor-zla-ba) in collaboration with the Tibetan
Paramārtha in 559. Nanjio reports: "The subject of the first chapter is the translator 'Jam-dpal-gzhon-nu, entitled Gnad-kyi-sgron-ma. This data
motion of the earth, and that of the nineteenth is that of the sun and is borne out by the Zhwa-lu catalogue of Bu-ston (Collected Works, ed.
moon. The latter chapter is the principal text for some Buddhist who L. Chandra, 26, 608.7).
make astronomical calculations for the almanacs." Dignaga is a direct disciple of Vasubandhu, according to the Tibetan
historians. This view is probably a deduction, at least in part, from the
nature of the Marmadīpa, which is nothing but derivative of
Vasubandhu s source work. (But the Jain scholar Sirhhasūri also
'
DIGNAGA (510)
recognizes their guru-disciple relationship. ") Dignaga has reduced the
The name of the native home of this important philosopher, the Abhidharmakośa to a handbook, reproducing word-for-word the main
original "Buddhist Logician " , is given to us as Sirithavaktra near Kāñcī comments of Vasubandhu's Bhāśya upon the kārikās. (The Tibetan
( modem Conjeveram). According to Tibetan tradition he lived in a cave translations of the two works also correspond.) In effect, Dignaga
on Bhoraśaila in Orissa and sojourned in Nalanda, but Hsiian-tsang is presents the first sentences of each topic, deleting the derivative
reported to have found a hill in Andhra near Vangi in the West Godavari discussions and the accounts of how the various Abhidharmists and their
district, and that Dignaga was born in Simhapura or Nellore. "s followers differ on details. Hence there are no references to schools and
K.S.Murty (Amala Prajñā: Aspects of Buddhist Studies. Professor authors by name save in the final appendix chapter, Pudgalapratisedha,
P.V.Bapat Felicitation Volume (Delhi 1989, p. 356) says that Dignaga where such references are crucial to the discussion. In connection with
founded sixteen Mahāvihāras, and gives more historical information. He this last chapter, Hattori has noticed "' that Dignaga omits some
summarily states that Dignaga was born in "a suburb of Kaficipura, important arguments against the views of the Vātsīputrīya school,
resided for some time in Orissa...mostly lived in Andhra...died in a forest apparently contradicting the account of the Tibetan historians (Bu-ston,
in Orissa." Tāranātha) that Dignāga once belonged to this school but found it
There is an extensive critical literature dealing with Dignaga's logic, seriously wanting.
epistemology and philosophy of language. Dignaga's division of chapters follows that of Vasubandhu--dhātu,
indriya, lokaprajñapti, karmaprajñapti, anuśaya, mārga, jñāna, samāpatti,
pudgalapratisedha The Marmadipa presents the system of Vasubandhu's
abhidharma for students whose main concern is to learn its essentials,
rather than tangential controversies.
314 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ALAMBANAPARIKSA 315

108.DIGNAGA, Alarnbanaparīksā '

the cognition s supporting object, because it has been taught that in this
way it is the determining condition of the birth (of the cognition).
Translation by Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti Concerning the molecule as well it is not (the support of a cognition),
2b: because (the molecule) does not exist as something real, just as
"E" references are to the edition provided by N. Aiyasvami Sastri in the second moon (does not exist).
Adyar Library Series No. 32 (Madras 1942). The translation by Tola and As regards the vision of a second moon owing to some defect in the
Dragonetti is found in Journal of Indian Philosophy 10, 1982, 105-129, senses, even if (the cognition) bears its representation (i.e. the
our "T". There are as well translations to be found into English by representation of a second moon), it (the second moon) is not the object
"s
Aiyaswami Sastri, above, and by Alex Wayman (kārikās only). David of that (cognition). In the same way an aggregate is not the (condition's)
19
J. Kalupahana has summarized the work. There are also German support, because it is not the cause (of the cognition), since it does not
translations by Frauwallner and Schott, and a French translation by exist as something real.
Yamaguchi; for references see the Tola/Dragonetti article, pp. 106-107. 2cd: Thus, in both cases, (something) external cannot be the
Sanskrit terms are inserted as reconstructed by N.A.Sastri, op. cit. The perception ' s object.
translations of terms used in this Volume replace those provided by Tola The extemal things that are called " atoms " and "molecules " are not the
1a0
and Dragonetti where appropriate. (cognition's) supporting object, as a part (of the requirements necessary
to be a cognition's supporting object) is missing.
Those who postulate that the supporting object (ālambana) of the Concering this (matter)
cognition (jñāna) through the eye etc. is an external thing, consider that 3ab: some (masters) hold that the forms of the molecules are the
'
either the atoms are (the cognition s supporting object) or that a molecule efficient cause (of the cognition).
(sathghāta) (of atoms) is (the cognition's supporting object), because there Some people hold that things, because they are possessed of several
arises a cognition which bears the representation (abhijñāna) of that forms, are perceptible under one or another of these forms.
(molecule). There exists also in the atoms the nature of (being the) cause, which
Concerning that (thesis, the author says): produces a cognition that bears the representation of a molecule.
1: Even if the atoms are the causes of the sense-cognition (vijñapti), 3cd: The atom's form is not an object of the (visual) cognition just a
since (the cognition) does not bear the representation of those solidity (is not).
(atoms), the atoms are not the content(s) (visaya) of that (cognition), Just as solidity, etc., although they exist, are not the objects of the eye 's
just as the sense-organs (are not the cognition's object). perception, so also atomicity is like that (i.e., is not a perceptual object).
It is said (about something that it is) the cognition's object (when) its 4ab: According to them (it would be the case that) the
essential nature (svarūpa) is grasped by the cognition, because (the perceptions of a pot, a cup etc. would be all the same.
cognition) arises (provided) with the form of that (essential nature). Among the atoms of a pot, a cup etc., although they are very numerous,
Concerning the atoms, even if they are the cause (of the cognition), there is not any difference.
they are not the cognition's object(s) any more than the sense-organs. 4c: If (it is held that) the diversity (between the pot, the cup etc.) is
Therefore no atom is the (cognition's) supporting object. due to the diversity of the forms (which they poss), (that is to say,)
Concerning the molecule, even if (the cognition) bears its if some person thinks that, owing to the difference of the forms of the
representation, neck etc. (of the pot, the cup etc. as wholes), which comes forth as
2a: that (cognition) does not arise from that whose a difference in their perceptions, (then we must answer that) the
representation it bears (i.e. does not arise from a molecule). difference (of the pot, the cup etc. as wholes) exists (only) in the pot,
It is right (to consider) that any thing, which produces a cognition which etc..
bears its representation (i.e. the representation of that thing), is, only it,
316 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ALAMBANAPARIKSA 317
4d-5a: But it (i.e., the difference) does not exist in the atoms, which interior cognition.
(according to the opponent are the only things that) exist as Even if (the knowable interior form) comes forth together (with the
something real, because there is not in them any diversity of interior cognition), it happens to be the determining condition of what
measure. comes forth out of another, because there exists a necessary relation
(Effectively) even if the atoms are real different matter, there is no (between the two). Then the logicians say that the concomitance of being
difference (among them), because they are all of a spherical form. and not being is the essential characteristic of cause and effect, even if
5b: Therefore it (i.e. the difference between the pot, the cup they have been born successively.
etc. and in general between things) exists (only) in those (things) 7b: (Even if the knowable interior form and the cognition are born)
which do not really exist. successively (the knowable interior form) is (the determining
The pot etc. exist only by (human) convention, condition of the cognition), because it leaves a trace. ''
5cd: because, if the atoms are eliminated, the cognition which bears There is no contradiction even if (the knowable interior form and the
its representation (i.e. the representation of the pot) ceases. interior cognition) come forth successively, because the representation of
In relation to the things that really exist, even if one eliminates what is an object gives rise to a trace which (in its own turn) produces the birth
connected (with them), the perception which is (their) own is not of an effect (i.e. a new representation) similar to the representation (of the
eliminated. previous object) and which lies in the consciousness.
Therefore, the objects of the perceptions through the senses do not Now if it is asked: if only the (knowable) interior form is the
exist externally. determining condition, the (cognition's) support, how can the eye ' s
6ac: The knowable interior form, which appears as external, is the cognition (i.e., the cognition through the eye) be born depending on that
object (of the cognition). (knowable interior form) and on the eye? (We answer that) the senses do
Even if an external object does not exist, what appears as (if it were) not exist as something constituted by elements, but taking into account
external, but exists only internally, (that) is the determining condition, the their own effect one infers that they are the form (or aspect) of the trace.
(cognition' s) support, 8a: Neither is it contradictory that this (trace lie) in
6cd: because it (the knowable interior form) is the form of the consciousness.
cognition and (also) because it is also its (the cognition's) The trace either exists in consciousness or exists in its own indefinable
determining condition. form; (in both cases) there is no difference in relation to the production
What exists only internally is the determining condition (of the of the effect.
cognition), the (cognition's) support, because it is provided with the two 8b-d: So the form of the object and the trace function mutually
characteristics (indicated in paragraph 5), since the interior cognition caused beginninglessly.
bears the representation of that object (i.e. the knowable interior form) The cognition, depending on the trace (that is) called "eye " and on the
and comes forth through it. (knowable) interior form, comes forth bearing the representation of the
If somebody asks: How can it be understood that, when (the interior object, (which is) not produced by an (external cognition's) support.
cognition) happens to bear in the indicated way the representation (of the These two (i.e. the form of the object or knowable interior form and the
knowable interior form), (this knowable interior form which is only) a trace) are mutually caused beginninglessly. And the cognition comes forth
part of that (interior cognition and) which comes forth together (with that from the trace fully matured under the form of an object and at its turn
interior cognition) can be the determining condition (of that intererior the trace (comes forth) from the form of that (object). Both (i.e. the form
cognition)?, we answer: and the trace) must be considered, according to one 's own will, either as
7a: Even if (the knowable interior form comes forth) together (with different or as not different from the cognition.
the interior cognition), it is the determining condition because of the So we can admit that an internal support is the object (of cognition),
necessary relation (between the knowable interior form and the because it is endowed with the two characteristics (indicated in
318 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES HASTAVALA 319

paragraphs 2 and 5). (E283; T282) 4. (Answer:) If illusion, that also, since it is not true,
is not such as it appears; being appearance without reality, it is of like
109.DIGNAGA, Hastavālanāmaprakaratsavŗtti character with those.
Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti have provided complete How do we know this? In the world if a seed lies fallow we don 't see
information on this work in their article in the Journal of Religious any shoots.
Studies (Patiala) 8.1, 1980, 18-31, which contains a Tibetan text and (E285; T284) 5. Whoso with subtle intelligence conceives all things
English translation. The work with its commentary is translated into as merely dependent, that intelligent man easily abandons attachment,
Chinese by Paramārtha as T. 1620 and by I-tsing as T.1621. In Tibetan etc., like the fear of a snake.
also we have two versions, Toh. 3844 translated by Sraddhākaravarman Just as a man frightened by what he takes to be a snake loses his fear
and Rin-chen bzan-po, and Toh. 3848, translated by Dānaśīla. The when he discovers it is a rope.
Tibetan translations attribute the work to Aryadeva, the Chinese to (E282; T281) 6. When considering worldly things one should think
Dignāga. The Chinese translations are by Paramārtha, who was translating in the conventional way. When desiring entirely to abandon infirmities
in the first part of the sixth century. The title 's translation is something one must seek according to ultimate reality.
like "Treatise named 'the hair on the hand', according to Tola/Dragonetti.
It was also translated and restored to Sanskrit (our "ET") by F.W.Thomas
and Hakuju Ui as "The Hand Treatise " in Journal of the Royal Asiatic 110. DIGNAGA, Hetucakra
Society 1918, pp. 274-287. A brief work in which Dignāga considers the possible ways in which
The work consists of six kārikās together with commentary. We the examples in an inference can be related to the hetu. The work is only
'
provide below Tola/Dragonetti s translations of the six verses along with 12 verses long, even with the examples it provides for each of the ways,
'
our (i.e., the editor s) summary of the commentary where called for. which number nine. See Bibliography, Third Edition, p. 211 for reference
to the several translations. The summary given here is drawn from Karl
Translated by Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti Potter's Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (op. cit., pp. 69-71). 142
According to Hajime Nakamura (Indian Buddhism, op. cit., p. 300)
(E275; T274) Since men take what is conventionally understood to there are two distinct texts, both extant in Tibetan only: one is titled
be real this work is composed to provide them knowledge. Hetucakranirnaya and the other Hetucakradamaru.
(E277; T276) 1. The cognition of a snake, in regard to a rope when
the rope is seen, is without reality. When we see its parts, in regard to it There are nine possible ways in which the sapaksa (sp) and vipaksa
also the cognition is illusory, like the snake. (vp) can be related to the hetu (h). They are given below, with indication
(E279; T278) 2. All dependent things, if we examine their proper of which cases satisfy the requirements of validity (of course, there are
form, throughout the range of conventional cognition are dependent upon many fallacies, besides the invalid one in this list, which will vitiate an
something other. inference if present).
(E281; T280) 3. Since things without parts cannot be conceived the (I) h completely includes sp, completely excludes vp. Valid
last (part) is equivalent to the non-existent. Therefore a wise man should (2) h completely includes sp, includes some but not all vp. Invalid
not regard what is mere illusion as reality. (3) h completely includes sp, completely includes vp. Invalid
The first part of this verse is addressed against atomic theory, (4) h includes some but not all sp, completely excludes vp. Valid
appealing to the standard criticism that if the alleged atom has no parts (5) h includes some but not all sp, includes some but not all vp.
it cannot combine and if it does it isn't an atom. invalid
(Objection:) Even if things like atoms don't exist, the perception and (6) h includes some but not all sp, completely includes vp. Invalid
thought of them does, as does our thought of magical entities. (7) h completely excludes sp, completely excludes vp. Invalid
320 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES NYAYAMUKHA 321

(8) h completely excludes sp, includes some but not all vp. Invalid 3 (T19-21) Answer: A term, say h, cannot prove another term; e.g.,
(9) h completely excludes sp, completely includes vp. Invalid smoke cannot prove fire. Rather it is the residence of h in p that
constitutes paksadharmatā.
4 (T21-28) Explanation of the three features of paksadharmatā. The
discussion recapitulates the gist of the nine cases reviewed in the
111.DIGNAGA, Nyāyamukha Hetucakra.
The title is also sometimes restored as Nyāyadvāra. It is translated by 5-9 (T29-36) Further exposition of the nine cases. As can be seen in
Giuseppe Tucci (Materialen zur Kunde des Buddhismus 15 (Heidelberg the summary of the Hetucakra above, two cases (#s 1 and 4) are valid.
1930), from Hsiian-Tsang 's Chinese translation. This is our "T". The Furthermore, another two cases (#s 5 and 9) are such that precisely the
summary is by the Editor on the basis of the translation. The text is opposite of the thesis is proved, and the remaining five cases are
arranged in standard fashion into sūtras, numbered below, and inconclusive and lead to doubt.
commentary 10-11 (T36-38) Explanation of example--the third member of an
argument--and of fallacious examples. He classes examples into two:
1 (T1-2) A proving (thdhana) is giving one's own conclusion as homogeneous and heterogeneous, i.e., sp and vp.
shown by the paksa and the other terms. There must be no contradictory 12 (T38-44) If we wrongly assume that absence of h pervades
conclusion. absence of s, or that wherever s is present h must necessariliy be present,
An argument is fallacious if one or more of the following faults is then by postive and negative concomitance we shall be able (wrongly) to
committed: (1) it contradicts itself (e.g., "all words are false " ); (2) it prove a thesis other than and contrary to the thesis being argued for or we
"
contradicts one's own opinion (a Vaiśeşika says sound is eternal"); (3) shall commit various fallacies.
it is opposed to a commonly accepted tenet and lacks a sapaksa, being 13 (TT44-47) Dignaga rejects the ten-membered syllogism
a unique entity (e.g., śāśi is not the moon, because it exists" (where
"
(mentioned e.g. by Vātsyāyana); no other members than those already
"
śāśi" is a name of the moon); (4) what is predicated of the p is referred to are necessary for a proper inference.
contradicted by perception or inference generally accepted (e.g., "sound 14 (T47-50) There are only two instruments of knowledge, perception
cannot be heard " or "the pot is eternal " ). and inference. By the first we grasp the svalaksana, by the latter the
Objection: Contradiction of the reason or the hypothesis sāmānyalaksana. There is nothing else knowable by any instrument of
"
(pratijñāvirodha) is another fallacy, as in, e.g., sound is eternal because knowledge.
all (things) are noneternal. " 15 (T50) Perception is free from conceptual construction
Answer: This is a wrongly-formed inference, since in giving the (kalpandpodha).
reason one must give a proposition whose subject term is the same as that 16 (T50-53) There is also mental awareness (manobhūmi), self-
of the thesis. awareness (svasamvedana) and yogic perception as further types of
2 (TI 1-18) The h has three features: it resides in the p and the sp and perception. The instrument of knowledge is actually not different from the
does not reside in the vp, where residence can be either complete or result of that instrument.
partial. Inference can be of two kinds: that derived from perception, and that
The p must be accepted by both parties in the discussion to exist; derived from inference or memory. For example, by remembering the
the same goes for the examples offered as sp and vp. And the existence validity of former inferences one comes to infer the validity of this one.
of the h in the p (paksadharmatal must likewise be agreed upon by both 17-18 (T53) Since one object has many properties a sign (nimitta)
parties. cannot apply to more than one thing unless the dissimilar cases are
Objection: But suppose we are trying to prove that the p, say excluded. And a characteristic mark (laksaña) comprises many factors;
prakrti, exists? Or suppose it does not exist? only if it stays within the limits of those applicable can it properly apply.
 PRAJIVAPARAMITAPINDARTHA 323
322 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
locus (āśraya), qualification (for instruction), the actions (of Bodhisattvas)
19 (T53-54) To refute an argument one shows that the fomulation of with their spiritual cultivation, the (sixteen) different aspects of
the argument is defective. The fallacies possible in refutation are called emptiness), logical arguing, the faults into which one may fall, the
"
"futile rejoinders (jdti). advantages (of knowledge).
20-29 (T54-72) Review of futile rejoinders: parity through similarity, 3. The recorder, in order to state his own authority, indicates the
through dissimilarity, through shuffling, through differentiating features, factors that can lead believers to appropriate actions: he indicates who is
through awareness, through doubt, through presumption, through union, the teacher, whose assembly listened to the teachings, and the time and
through nonunion, through lack of a hetu, through continued question, the place where the teaching was held.
'
through eternality are discussed. Dignāga clearly has Gautama s 4. As a matter of fact, in this world the recorder, expounding things
Nyāyasūtras in mind here, and refers to him at least once. Dignāga lists of which witnesses are known and that are definite as regards space and
the remaining futile rejoinders in Gautama 's list. (For explanations see ti me, becomes an authority when he relates them.
Volume VI of this Encyclopedia, pp. 349-358.) 5. All (these) references, viz. the fact that he (the recorder) heard the
As for the ways of losing an argument, also discussed by Gautama, " " " "
teaching as explicitly indicated by the adverb ( thus ), the pronoun ( I )
it is said that they are like quibbles and so will not be mentioned here. and the verb ( "have heard "), etc. are occasional (and thus not included
A number of other categories of a similar sort are referred to and set among the thirty-two principal items to be discussed). The fundamental
aside. teachings of the knowledge are in fact thirty-two only.
6. The sixteen aspects of emptiness have been expounded
112.DIGNAGA, Prajñāpāramitāpiñdārtha
progressively in the Astasāhasrikā: they must be understood as being
Giuseppe Tucci, ( "Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñā-pāramitā. I. explained for different hearers.
The Prajñā-pāramitā-piñdārtha of Diñnāga ", Journal of the Royal Asiatic 7, So this Astasāhasrikā results from these arguments, as many as
Society 1947, pp. 53-75), who provides our E and T, reports that he
have been enunciated, not one less; a summary of the book is needed and
found a manuscript of this work in the monastery of Zalu in 1939. He offered here.
characterizes it as an epitome of the Astasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā. The
Chinese translation is by "She lu, who arrived in K ' ai fung in the year
The Sixteen Emptinesses
A.D. 980. " There is also a Tibetan translation by Tilakakalāśa and Blo
(E56-57; T60-61.) 8. The sage correctly said "I do not see a
Idan ses rab dating from the 11th century. The work is quoted at least
Bodhisattva. " In this way he explained the emptiness of the enjoyer of
five times in Haribhadra's Abhisamayālatimkārāloka.
(supposedly) real entities.
We provide below a rendering based on Tucci's translation, replacing
9. When it is said that visible, etc. objects are empty in so far as in
his translations of technical terms by those in use in this Encyclopedia.
them there is no such thing in them, this denies that there are external
There is also a translation by Bhikkhu Pasadika in The Wisdom Gone
things to be enjoyed.
Beyond (Bangkok 1966), pp. 91-106. Christian Lindtner edits and
10. If a visible object and the like do not exist, it is implicit that the
translates verses 26-29 (Wiener Zeitschrifl f.ir die Kund Siidasiens 41,
body in which they (are supposed to exist), the world which constitutes
1997, 176) to show that Dignāga accepted the three svabhdvas of
the support of this, and the (thirty-two) marks of the great man vanish;
Yogācāra.
when one realizes this, individuality appears to that man unreal, as being
a mere inner assumption.
(E56; T59-60) 1. Prajñāpāramitā is nondual knowledge; it is the
11. If the inner experiences are empty the emptiness of prakrti is
Tathāgata, that which is to be proved; this word expresses the book in
implicit; in fact one's lineage consists of consciousness and is held to
which this knowledge is expounded and the path to liberation as well, in
result in compassion and wisdom.
so far as both are intended to this same end.
12. When he (the Buddha) says that beings are neither born nor
2. These are the topics dealt with in the text of the A.stasāhasrikā: the
324 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAJÑAPARAMITAPINDARTHA 325

cease, etc. he is saying that individuals as well as rebirth are empty. 25. Insofar as he does not see in any way either a name or field of
13. When it is stated that he does not see either the factors of the experience or action or the constituents of human personality, therefore
'
Buddha nor those of Bodhisattvas, he shows that the Buddha s powers, he says that he does not see any Bodhisattva.
etc. are empty. 26. This is the refutation of all constructions, the synopsis of the
14. Since it is stated that factors are constructed he states that factors teaching. All aspects taken to be contents of knowledge are constructions
are not ultimately real. of thought.
15. Since by every means he (the Bodhisattva) uproots the view that 27. This teaching based in the perfection of wisdom is based on the
there is a self, the Blessed one has declared that in no way does there triple aspects: constructed, dependent, perfected.
"
exist a person. 28. Saying nothing exists" all constructions are refuted, when by the
16. So when he says that all factors are not born, the Buddha, who example of illusory appearances the dependent is indicated,
knows the truth, has implicitly declared that factors are without a self- 29. By the fourfold purification the perfected is explained. In the
nature. perfection of wisdom there is no other teaching of the Buddha than this.
17. By stating that there is neither growth nor diminution of pure and 30. In the teachings of the antitheses of the ten imputations the three
impure factors the existence of good factors, whether conditioned or aspects of things are indicated both collectively and distributively.
unconditioned, is denied. 31. So, for instance, in the introductory section of the Astasāhasrikā,
18. Good actions are empty; their conduciveness to liberation is on the basis of these three aspects the Buddha refutes the distraction
constructed and empty. which consists in the imputation of absence.
32. When it is said "I do not see either an enlightened one or
The Ten Distractions of Awareness: 1. The Distraction of Nonexistence enlightenment" , throughout the work the refutation of imputations is to
(E57; T61-62) 19. When awareness is distracted from knowledge in be understood from this.
ten ways then it is unfit, as happens with fools (bāla), for realization of
nondual knowledge. 3. The Distraction Based on Superimposition (adhyāropa)
20. The Prajñāpāramitā is meant to eliminate reciprocally these (E57; T62) 33. Since matter is empty, how and by whom can it be
distractions by having recourse to thesis and antidote. These distractions taken to be an essential nature? The same point is implied as to the other
are taught thus: (nine) distractions
21. When the teacher says "a Bodhisattva exists " he, showing that
there are aggregates from the concealed (samvrta) viewpoint, refutes the 4. Distraction Based on Denial (apavdda)
distraction involving the imputation of the absence (of things). (E57-58; T63) 34. When he (the Buddha) says that emptiness is
22. According to this same rule in the A.slasāhasrikā, as well as in empty he expresses a complete refutation of any denial.
other sources from beginning to end, the imputation of absence (of 35. Likewise in other expressions such as "the Buddha is like māyā"
things) must be refuted. or " he is like a dream. " Those who understand apply this same point in
23. These are not logical arguments (hetuvākya); rather suggestions other contexts.
are given here as regards what one must do. Inferences are to be learned 36. The Buddha is said to be like mdyd through collocation with the
elsewhere, as for instance in the Brahmajdlasdtra. speaker. "Like mdyd" indicates the dependent nature.
37. That knowledge which, being natural, is present in ordinary
2.The Distractions of Existence beings is expressed by the word "buddha"; Bodhisattvas are likewise
(E57; T62) 24. When the Blessed One says "I do not see any indicated.
Bodhisattva", etc. he refutes the bewilderment consisting in the 38. This knowledge, its nature obstructed by ignorance, appears quite
conceptual construction of existence. different from what it really is, like a magic show, just as (what is dreamt
 PRAJÑAPARAMITAPINDARTHA 327
326 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
are constructions. Thus the relation of word to object is not a natural
in) a dream appears quite different (when one awakens). (svābhāv(ka) one.
39. This is a denial (apavdda) of the constructed denials of those who 49. The attachment to external things as if they were real is proper
improperly understand either nondual knowledge or the result of having to fools and is a consequence of error. It is a convention adopted in
it. common life, but in reality there is nothing.
50. Therefore in this world a name is imputed but in fact there is no
5. Distraction Based on Assumed Identity object expressed by it; it is therefore established that objects are imputed
(E58; T63) 40. One should not say that matter is emptiness, for they according to their names.
are contradictory terms; emptiness is immaterial, while the psychophysical
complex requires some form. 10. Distraction Based on the Assumption that Nothing Corresponds to
Names
6. Distraction Based on Assumed Diversity (E58-59; T64-65) 51. The Buddha also stated that the perfection of
(E58; T63-641) 41. Thus the construction of manyness undermines wisdom, the Buddha and the Bodhisattva are mere names and in this way
the construction of unity. Matter is in no ways different from emptiness. he refuted the imputation that something really exists.
42. It is a creation of ignorance that something nonexistent appears 52. This refutes things being named, but it does not deny that there
"
as if existent. It is called "ignorance just because it has the power to are objects. This point should be understood elsewhere the treatise.
make something that does not exist appear to exist. 53. The man who truly knows does not perceive anything
43. The same thing may be considered matter and the perfection of corresponding to a name.. Therefore this refutation is made as regards the
wisdom. Duality is really only identity. Thus both assumptions are existence of objects connoted by names, but it does not deny that sounds
refuted. have a conventional purpose.
44. The Buddha explained the logical nature of this statement, 54. But Subhūti said "I do not find any name for the Bodhisattva" ,
inasmuch as things are essentially pure and nonexperienceable. He also denying both the language and things named.
considers manyness inadmissible since existence and nonexistence are 55. There does not exist in the perfections of wisdom any expression
contradictory. which should not be understood according to this method of
interpretation; its various meanings are to be grasped in this way by
7. Distraction Based on an Assumed Essential Nature intelligent men.
(E58; T4) 45. When it is said that matter is merely name, really 56. The perfection of wisdom is called counterfeit when one
without an essential nature, this does not allow. any place for the disregards or misunderstands what is said here.
imputation of a nature to it. 57. This, then, is the synopsis of the arguments contained in the
46. When it was said before that matter is empty of the nature of perfection of wisdom; its meaning comes again and again in other books
matter, this was meant to refute the false assumption that it has a nature. (of the PrajñāpāramitI).
58. If I have gained some merit by this summary may it help men to
8. Distraction Based on Assumed Diversity of Nature reach the supreme merit that transcends this existence.
(E58; T64) 47. When the Buddha says that he does not see either the
arising or the destruction of things, he refutes the construction of an
independent individuator (viśera).

9. Distraction Based on the Assumption that Things Correspond to

Names
(E58; T64) 48. A name is a constructed entity and speakable factors
328 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 329

113.DIGNAGA, Pramdnasamuccaya aggregates (samcita) of atoms as their objects

See Bibliography, Volume 3, pp. 211-213, for a collection of titles of Answer: What that passage means is that the sense grasps many
secondary books and articles on this important work, Dignāga's magnum atoms together, not that it conceptually constructs them into a whole. But
opus. a sense-organ cannot grasp the many properties making up a factor. A
sense-content is a shape/color which is cognized as it is (svasamvedya)
113.1. Perception (pratyaksa) and is unspecifiable (anirde.iya).
The verses of this Chapter have been restored into Sanskrit by H. R. 6-10 (E17-26; T27-29) There are as well the following (kinds of)
Rangaswamy Iyengar (Mysore 1930), our "E", and both the verses and awareness: mental awareness of a thing, self-awareness of desire, etc., '
the commentary translated into English by Masaaki Hattori in Digndga, which are constructionfree, and the yogi's awareness of thing as it is
" "
on Perception. Harvard Oriental Series 47 (Cambridge 1968), our T . unassociated with the teacher's instruction.
Numbering of verses follows T. Even the awareness of constructions constitutes perception considered
merely as awareness, but it is not perceptual considered as a grasping of
Summary by Karl H. Potter an object.
The following are not perception: error (e.g., a mirage), empirical
113.1.1: The Theory of Perception awareness (which superimposes properties on something conventional),
1-3 (E1-8; T23-24) After a salutation 1 s we are plunged immediately inference and memory (because their content is something previously
'
into the Buddhist theory that there are precisely two instruments of perceived), and desire.
knowledge, perception and inference. This is because there are only two The instrument of cognition, since it includes the idea of an
kinds of marks of such instruments, namely the " self-mark " or pure instrument (vyāpāra), is itself the result, though really there is no activity
particular (svalaksana) and the general mark (sāmānyalaksana), that is, involved. Or one can say that self-awareness (i.e., an awareness's
the particular and the universal. awareness of itself) is the result since the awareness of an object precedes
Objection: How about the cognition of something momentary as it, but that when an object is the content we overlook the self-awareness
colored, or successive awarenesses of the same object, (don 't they require to simplify matters. Thus the roles of instrument and object of awareness
other instruments of knowledge)? are metaphors, since there are no objects capable of function.
Answer: No. One grasps the particular and mentally relates colomess 11-12 (E27-28; T29-31) An awareness has two forms (dvirūpa): as
to momentariness, but no additional instrument is needed. As for the
second part of the objection: to postulate a new instrument of knowledge
for each in a series of successive awarenesses would lead to infinite
regress, and furthermore one would have to allow such things as memory,
'
Eli Franco, "Dharmakīrti's deviation from Dignaga", Journal of
etc. to be instruments of knowledge. Indian Philosophy 14, 1986, 79-97, as well as in "Did Dignāga accept
3-5 (E8-15; T24-27) Perception is free from conceptual construction four types of perception? " , Journal of Indian Philosophy 21, 1993, 294-
(kalpanāpodha). Conceptual construction is association with a name, a 299, argues, contrary to almost universal opinion, that " he (Dignaga) did
universal property, a quality, an action, or a substance. not accept svasarirvedana as a fourth type of perception. " (p. 82).
Why is the word "pratyaksa " ("relating to the sense") used for the
'
first mark, and not, say, "prativisaya" ("relating to the object")? Answer: This passage concludes with the word "sataimiram " . Eli Franco (op.
Because the sense-organ is the specific cause: an object is the cause of cit.) argues, contra Masaaki Hattori and Alex Wayman, for instance, that
various sorts of awareness, but the sense-organ is involved in perception their interpretation of this word as indicating an additional (fourth) kind
specifically. of perceptual fallacy is mistaken, or at least that (following Lambert
Objection: But Abhidharma texts tell us that the five senses have Schmithausen's suggestion) Dignaga changed his mind between the time
of composing the kdrikds and composing the vŗtti.
330 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 331
awareness of a content and as the awareness of that awareness. Otherwise
its content. Since such a reference involves the universal form of a thing
(if an awareness had only one form) the awareness of an object would be
(and that is unreal), an actual object is unnameable.
indistinguishable from the awareness of an awareness, and furthermore an
object cognized by one awareness could not appear in a subsequent
113.I.3.The Nyāya Theory
awareness. The fact of memory also demonstrates the two forms, and
(E39-47; T36-41) The Naiyāyikas say that perception is a judgment
also supports our theory of self-awareness, since a memory is never of
which is (1) produced from connection between sense organ and object,
something not previously experienced, and an infinite regress would result
(2) is inexpressible (avyapadeśya), (3) does not wander and (4) is well-
if we did not postulate self-awareness.
defined. But in this definition the qualifiers (1-4) are not correct, since
what is produced by sense-object contact cannot be expressed. What is
113.1.2: The Vādavidhi's Definition expressible is necessarily the content of inference. Thus (2) should be
1-4 (E31-37; T32-35) The Vādavidhi (VV) is not by Vasubandhu, or
expunged. As for (3): it is not possible for a sense to wander; error is
if it is it does not constitute his mature opinion, since things are explained produced by the mind. Again, what does (4) " well-defined " mean? If it
differently in his Vādavidhāna.
means "ascertained (niścita), since ascertainment requires conceptual
"
"
The VV defines perception as consciousness produced from that identification through association with universals, etc., perception cannot
object. " But if " from that object " means from the object-condition be well-defined. Every sensory awareness gasps its own content alone
(ālambanapratyaya) the definition is incorrect, since authority (the
without predicating anything of it.
Abhidharmakośa) says that awarenesses and mental concomitants cause Naiyayika: Perception in any case always involves sense-object
all four conditions (and not just the object-condition). And if VV's
contact.
definition instead means consciousness produced only from that object Answer: Then one could not perceive colors and sounds at a distance
that supplies the name of the awareness, then the definition will wrongly or as larger than the sense-organ involved, since there can be no contact
include as perceptions awarenesses arising from memory, inference,
of the organ with such objects.
covetousness, etc. Naiyāyika: In those cases the organ goes out of the body to contact
Does "supporting object (ālambana) refer (1) to the content of an
"
its object..
awareness or (2) to the actual entities causing the awareness? If (1) then Answer: No, an organ can't go out. One treats medically each organ
it must be admitted that the five sensory awarenesses have aggregates of at its location in or on the physical body. And how could the sense get
atoms as their content, i.e., they must take a merely empirical entity as there if it were covered up?
the content (and they must then admit that perception is not valid). If (2) Now if there are only five senses (as Nyāya avers) such things as
and it is, say, blue atoms that cause perception, though the content of the satisfaction, etc. would not be contents of awareness, or else there are
awareness produced is only a merely empirical entity, then substances, more instruments of knowledge than the Nyāya theory allows.
'
qualities, etc. would really exist (which they don t according to Specifically, one would have to add the mind as an additional sense-
Buddhism). One might avoid this by assuming that the atoms are causes organ.
"
of the awareness but that they appear in a different form from their actual Naiyāyika: All right. We do not deny it, and we say if our school
form since atoms do not have form as jars, etc. do. But if one adopts this "
'
does not deny a theory it is all right to accept it.
stance it will contradict the VV s statement that an awareness with a Answer: Then lots of things the Nyāya avers are unnecessary because
content C is named after C, since no awareness grasps an atom. Each they are put forth by other schools!
atom is, when operating together, a cause of awareness, but not as an If (as Nyāya holds) it is awareness itself that is the instrument of
aggregate, since the aggregate exists only in the conventional sense (and knowledge, that will conflict with the Nyāya theory that the result is
not in reality). different from the instrument, since the instrument is defined as (4) well-
An awareness cannot be spoken of without referring to the nature of defined, which shows that the thing cognized is already contained in the
332 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 333

instrument itself they arise from sense-object contact.

Naiyayika: The instrument is the awareness of the qualifier Vaiśeşika: But a sense-organ grasps the qualifiers that are actually in
(viśesa?va), and the result is the awareness of a qualified thing. the thing and thus ascertainment naturally follows.
Answer: The instrument must have the same object as the result Answer: Then no doubt could ever arise or be removed!
Naiyāyika: Since the cause here is known as the cause of the Now the Vaiśeşikas say in various places that perception grasps its
qualified, knowledge of it must involve knowledge of the qualified. content as depending on universals, individuators, and as substance,
Answer: Then there will be no difference between cause and etTect quality or motion, etc. But if an awareness is produced merely from
in this case. Furthermore, there may not even be a resulting awareness, sense-object contact then there is no possibility of it having any relation
e.g., when we see a cow at dusk and cognize cowness but no particular to any qualifier, since it is merely the object that is presented. In order to
cow. And since there is no result in such a case there is no instrument cognize a qualified entity one must cognize the qualifiers by conceptual
either. construction and as prompted by the memory of one of the qualifiers.
Naiyāyika: The awareness of the qualifier has two aspects: an Vaiśeşika: Just because something is grasped by two awarenesses
instrument and an object cognized, as when someone cognizes himself as does not make it dual. For example, the same substance can be grasped
both object and subject of the awareness. by sight and touch.
Answer: Then the same goes for the awareness of the qualified thing. Answer: If so it is not a single entity. Otherwise there would be no
Only if you accept our theory of self-awareness (svasamvitti, see above), difference between colors and other objects.
that an entity has a double aspect, do you avoid this regress. Vaiśeşika: Just as existence or qualityness, though grasped by
Naiyāyika: The result of knowledge of an object is the cessation of different senses, are taken to be single entities, so it is here.
ignorance, doubt and any false awareness. Answer: We do experience undifferentiated awarenesses of
Answer: No, since ignorance is not always present. Sometimes we substances, but that awareness is not provided through the senses, since
merely decide to cognize something. And anyway cessation cannot be a the difference between the sense-organs would vanish.
result since it is an absence. Vaiśeşika: If a sense-organ could only cognize a single object it could
not grasp the difference between entities.
113.1.4.Vaiśesika Answer: A sense-organ, say vision, can grasp varieties of color, as
(E49-58; T42-51) In the Vaiśesikasūtras perception is defined as well as number, etc., but colors cannot be grasped by other senses.
follows: an awareness produced from contact between a self, a sense- Otherwise we should be able to smell colors, etc.
organ, the mind and an object. Some Vaiśeşikas say sense-object contact Vaiśeşika: We do not subscribe to the view you ascribe to us. Each
is the instrument since it is the specific cause, but others of them say it kind of sense-object, such as color, has its particular kind of property
is contact between the self and the internal organ that is the instrument which is graspable by a certain sense but not by others.
since that is the predominant (pradhāna) cause. Now elsewhere the Question: How do objects determine which organ they are grasped
Vaiśesikasūtras remark that this definition explains (the stages of) doubt by?
and ascertainment (niścaya). But ascertainment is not the same as Vaiśeşika: Something which lacks colomess cannot be grasped by
awareness produced by the fourfold contact mentioned, since vision, etc.
ascertainment also requires conceptual construction, whereas perception Answer: Then one cannot see or touch substances, since a substance
lacks that. The fourfold contact is the simple presentation of an object, lacks colomess, etc.
not its ascertainment. Vaiśeşika: We cognize that the substance seen is the same substance
Vaiśeşika: But sense-object contact does not involve conceptual as touched. How could this be if there is no substance available to
construction. perception by all the five senses?
Answer: Then even doubt and inference must be perception, since Answer: Such an awareness has as its content not substance but a
 PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 337
336 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
internal organ and self, accompanied by a trace.
functioning of the mind.
Answer: If so, what is the point of the words "the awareness that
Answer: If the mind has not previously experienced a thing it can't
arises in the sūtra? And why should the word "pratyakśa , which
" "
very well remember it. And to answer this by saying that the sense-organ
emphasizes the sense's ( Asa) role, be singled out in the words used?
and mind function simultaneously, the mind will still not be viewed as a
The commentator: Perception is that by means of which an
content of awareness. We do not have the same problem, for our doctrine
ascertainment of the form " this is a cow " (say) arises with regard to a
of self-awareness (svasamvitti) allows us to say that we remember
perceived object.
pleasures, etc.
Answer: The sense cannot associate the object with the universal
Sārhkhya: But even though the mind and the sense-organ operate
cowness on your own view. So the relation between a qualifier and a
simultaneously they do not operate on the same content.
qualified thing, or a name and its object, arise from conceptual
Answer: Then the other sense-organs would be useless, for the mind
construction, not from sense-perception, since the sense-object is a color
alone could do all the work!
(say) which is itself an aspect of awareness and inexpressible. Moreover,
if one by perception cognizes all the properties of a thing than one would
113.1.6.Mīmārhsā
perceive universals such as qualityness and existence.
(E89-109; T63-70) MTmāritsāsūtra I.1.4's account of perception is that
Mīmāmsaka: Then perception is precisely the arising of awareness.
it is the awareness that arises when the sense-organs are connected with
Answer: If so, there is no result of awareness different from the
something existent. But if here "existent " (sat) excludes nonexistent (asat)
instrument of awareness, contrary to Mīmāmsā belief. If the result is
things their definition is wrong because the term "something existent" is
different from the awareness an awareness will inhere in its own cause,
redundant.
the self, but since inherence is eternal how could anything result? And if
Mīmāmsā: "Something existent" merely indicates the counterpositives the result is not different from that awareness there's no point in speaking
(pratiyogin) (of the relation of the senses, etc. to their objects).
of its "arising".
Answer: Then those objects should be named. Anyway, connection
When an awareness arises does the self change its state or remain the
can only be with what exists. A sense cannot be in contact with a mirage,
" " same? If it changes it must be nonetemal, contrary to Mīmāmsā
which doesn 't exist at all. If you mean that something existent
contention. And if it remains the same it cannot become a cognizer.
designates just that kind of object to which the sense-organ is related, that
is still wrong, since atoms (which are not perceptible) and ointments
(which are not intended) are also related to sense-organs, so it would
113.2.Inference for Oneself (svārthānumāna)
follow that perception should arise from contact with such entities.
References preceded by "K" are to folio numbers in the Tibetan
Mīmārirsā: Just as "go", meaning what goes, is a term for cows even
translation by Kanakavarman (Text 5702 of the Peking Edition of the
though other things than cows go, so "exists " in our definition applies
Tibetan TripiTaka, Vol. 130). References preceded by "VP" are to folio
even if it applies to other things as well.
" " numbers in the Tibetan translation by Vasudhararakşita (Text 5701 of the
Answer: " Go" is commonly accepted to mean cow, but sat is not
Peking Edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka, Vol. 130); those by "VD" are to
commonly accepted as a word for sense-objects only. And if the senses
the Sde-dge ( "Derge ") edition (Text 4204) of this same translation.
always came into contact with their objects one could not experience
References preceded by " T " are to the page numbers of the English
things far away nor large in size.
translation of the first 25 kārikās and their attendant vrtti in R.P. Hayes,
A commentator (vŗttikāra): Perception as the result of awareness is
different from the instrument; now since the result of perception is just Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs (Dordrecht 1988).
the awareness that arises when the sense-organs are connected with
Summary by Richard P. Hayes
something existent the definition is correct. In fact, the only instrument
that could fill these requirements is the joint contact of sense, object,
338 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 339

Reasoning Distinguished from Sensation since it is commonly accepted that there are slight differences between
I (K109a; VP27b; VD27a; T231-232) There are two types of the testimony of tradition and the process of inference. What correct
inference (anumāna): inference for oneself(svcirthc7numdna) and inference reasoning and reliable verbal testimony do have in common are the
for others (parārthānumāna). Inference for oneself consists in discerning characteristics of (1) dealing with conceptual realities rather than sensible
an object by means of an inferential sign that has three characteristics. realities and (2) not being false. But scriptural tradition often deals with
(Inference for others is the subject matter of the following, third section objects that are not observable and about the reality of which we cannot
of this work.) Inference differs from sensation in that it has as its subject know. Examples of such unverifiable and unfalsifiable objects are heaven
matter a different kind of object. (svarga) and primordial matter (pradhdna). Insofar as scripture deals
2-3 (E248-250; T232-233) The subject matter of perception is the with such matters that are in principle beyond the range of experience,
inexpressible particular (svalaksaña), while the subject matter of inference scripture fails to meet the canons of inference and so fails to yield
is the universal (sāmānyalaksana), which has the nature of a concept that genuine knowledge.
is expressible in language. The mind is capable of being aware of
exactly two kinds of object: particulars and universals. The mind is The Characteristics of Legitimate Evidence
engaged in inference only if it is aware of universals, and it is engaged Seel-7 (T239-240) An inferential mark (lirtga) has the three
in perception only if it is aware of particulars. There is no cognitive act characteristics (trirūpa): (I) presence in the object being inferred
in which the mind is aware of both universals and particulars at the same (anumeye sadbhdva), (2) presence in what is similar (tattulye sadhhāva),
time. and (3) absence in the absence of what is similar (asati nāstita>.
3 (K109b; VP28b; VD27b; T233-236 ) An objection arises from the 144i
The object to be inferred is a locus (dharmin) qualified by a
perspective of the Vaiśeşika system. According to them, the assertion property (which one wishes to know) (dharmaviśisto dharmy anurneyah)."
that there are exactly two kinds of awareness and that every cognitive act "After having known, either by perception or inference, (the presence
is an awareness of either a particular or a universal but never of both at of an inferential mark) there (i.e., in the object be inferred.), we also
once appears to be false if one considers that the element wind (vāyu) establish in a general manner (its) presence either in all or some members
cannot be directly observed and so must be known through inference. of the class similar to it (i.e., the object of inference)."
But wind is a particular, not a universal, and so it must be a "
(Question:) Why is it so (i.e., a valid inferential mark is present in
counterexample to the rule that inference deals only with universals. "
all or in some members of the class, not in all members of the class)?
Dignāga replies that even in this case all that can be concluded through "(Answer:) Because we restrict (avadhārana) (the second
inference is that there must exist some substratum in which the quality of characteristic) in the way that it is present only in what is similar to it
touch (sparśa) inheres, by which we putatively infer the existence of (i.e., the object of inference) (tattulya eva sadbhāvah), not in the way that
wind. It is the Vaiśesika contention that wind has a special kind of touch it is necessarily present (in what is similar to the object of inference
that is discernible from the quality of touch that inheres in any other (tattulye sadbhāva eva)."
element, but this contention is not commonly accepted and is derived "
(Objection:) If so, it will be useless to state (the third characteristic,
only from their scriptural tradition (āgama). i.e.,) absence in the absence (of the property to be inferred and/or what
4-5ab (K110-111a; VP29; VD28b-29a; T236-239) If the special "
is similar to the object of inference) (nāstitāsati).
quality of touch by which wind is inferred is known through scripture, "(Answer:) It is (stated) in order to determine that (the inferential
then it seems in effect to be known through inference, since scriptural mark is) absence in the absence (of the property to be inferred and/or of
tradition is held by Dignaga to be merely a type of inference. So if what is similar to the object of inference), not in what is other than or
scripture deals with such particulars as the element wind, then this still incompatible with (what is similar to the object of inference). "
seems to be a counterexample to the rule that inference deals with only "Thus we understand the marked Origin, i.e., the property to be
universals and never particulars. But this is not truly a counterexample, inferred) through the inferential mark (liriga) which possesses the three
340 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 341

characteristics." Pervaded Properties and Errant Properties

If any of these three characteristics is missing from a property used 12-15 (K1 12b-113a; VP31a-32a; VD30a-32a; T244-246). Any object
as an inferential sign, then the sign is not a reliable indicator of the has innumerable properties, only some of which can be confirmed
property to be confirmed (sādhyadharma) through it. through inference. If it were the case that inference made one aware of
6 (KI11; VP30; VD29; T241) An inferential sign is a property that all the properties of an object, then our awareness of an object would be
can be used to confirm the presence of a second property in the same as vivid and complete through inference as it is through direct sensation.
locus. In order for the property h to serve as evidence for a property s But in fact our awareness of an object learned through inference is much
in a locus p, h must have three characteristics. (1) h must be a property less vivid and much more indistinct than is our awareness of an object of
of p; if it is, it has the characteristic called paksadharmatā (being a direct sensation. The nature of the awareness of an object that we gain
property of the subject). (2) h must be a property of at least one object through inference is purely conceptual and propositional; that is, we do
q such that q is not identical with p and q is similar to p in virtue of not experience a given property directly, but rather we know that a given
having the property s; if it is, then it has the characteristic called anvaya property is not absent from a given locus.
(association with the property to be confirmed). (3) h must not belong 16 (KI 13; VP32a; VD3la; T246) There can be no such thing as a
to any locus r such that it is not the case that r is similar to p in virtue universal that exists as an object independent of our experience. A
of having the property s; if it does not belong to any such locus then it universal is traditionally defined as a single object that occurs in a
has the characteristic called vyatireka (dissociation from the absence of plurality of particulars without losing its integrity. But no such object
the property to be confirmed). can actually exist. For if it did exist, it would have to be either wholly
resident in each particular or only partially resident in each particular. If
The Property-Bearer as the Inferable Object wholly resident in each particular, then the universal could not be single
8-1 I (KI12; VP30b-31 a; VD29b-30a; T242-244) 145 There are various but must be as numerous as the particulars in which it wholly occurs; or
views as to what the inferable object (anumeya) is. Some say that it is else it would occur wholly in just one particular and so would not be
the property to be confirmed, s (sādhyadharma). Some say that it is the resident in a plurality of particulars. But if the universal were to exist
relation between the locus p and the property s. But it is not the case only partially in each of a number of particulars, then it would be
that one gains through inference new knowledge of the confirmed internally divided and so would lose its integrity. Therefore, a universal
property; when one infers the presence of fire through the observation of is merely a concept that is superimposed by the experiencing mind upon
smoke, it is not the case that one learns for the first time that fire exists. the discrete particulars of experience.
Therefore, it is not the case that the inferable object is the property s that 17-19 ( KI 13b; VP32a; VD31a; T246-247) An inferential sign makes
is indicated through the inferential sign. As for a relation, it cannot be known the presence in its locus of only those properties to which the
the locus of either the inferential sign or the confirmable property, sign's presence is restricted. One property is restricted to a second
because relations are not the sort of thing in which properties occur; that property in case the first property occurs only where the second is
relations have an ontological status different from that of concrete objects present. A property that is restricted to a second property is said to be
is shown by the fact that concrete objects are expressed by specific pervaded (vydpta) by that property. If one property is not restricted to a
words, whereas relations are expressed only by means of case markers second property it is said to be deviant (vyabhicārin) from the second
that are affixed to words that name concrete objects. The inferable property. An inferential sign cannot convey reliable information about
object, therefore, is neither the confirmable property s nor the relation the presence or absence of any property from which it is deviant. Since
between the confirmable property and its locus. Rather, the inferable an inferential sign is a general property that is associated with more
object is the p, that is, the locus p as a possessor of the property s. particulars than one, the sign is deviant with respect to characteristics in
an individual that are unique to that individual. Therefore, inference
cannot tell us anything about the particularities of an object. For this
342 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 343

reason. inferential knowledge is necessarily relatively vague and Some portions (the Nyāya theory of the reason and the Vādavidhi theory
indistinct. of the fallacious reason) of the second section have been studied by
20-25 (K1 13b-114b; VP32b-33a; VD3 lb-32a; 247-249) Pervasion is Kitagawa (pp. 378-404) and the Vaiśeşika portions have been put into
a nonsymmetrical relation. That is, it is possible that A pervades B Sanskrit by Muni Jambuvijaya in his Vaiśesikasūlra ofKattāda with the
without B pervading A, but it is also possible that A and B do pervade Commentary of Candrdnanda (Baroda 1961), pp. 197-206.
one another. For example, the property of being horned pervades the
property of being a cow, since all cows have horns, but the property of
being a cow does not pervade the property of being homed, since not all Definition of Inference for Others
homed animals are cows. On the other hand, the property of being lab (K124b; VP42b; VD40b) Inference for others is that which
perishable and the property of being complex are mutually pervasive, makes others realize what one has experienced. After having inferred
since all complex things are perishable and all perishable things are for oneself the inferrable object (lirigin) by means of an inferential sign
complex. (līriga) which has three characteristics (trirūpa), one states such an
26-28 (K1 14b-115a; VP33; VD32) Criticisms of the definition of inferential sign for others, so that they can infer the same object in a
inference contained in the Vādavidhi. similar manner. The statement of an inferential sign can be called
29-31 (K115a-116a; VP33b-35a; VD32b-336). Criticisms of the "inference " for others because the name of the resultant knowledge,
Naiyāyika theory of inference. "inference " , can be metaphorically transferred (upacāra) to its cause, i.e.,
32-37 (K116a-119a; VP35a-37b; VD33b-36a). Criticisms of the the statement.
Vaiśeşika theory of inference.
38-47 (K119a-123a; VP37b-41a; VD36a-39a) Criticisms of the Definitions of Thesis and Pseudo-Thesis
Sārhkhya theory of inference. led-2. Of the three members of a proof the thesis does not really
48-53 (K123a-124b; VP41b-42b; VD39a-40b) Criticisms of the prove anything but it presents what is to be inferred or proved (anumeya).
Mīntātńsaka theory of inference. The thesis is that which is intended by the proponent himself as
something to be presented in its proper form alone; and with regard to his
113.3. Inference for Others (parārthāmmiāna) own topic (dharma) it is not opposed by perceptible objects, by inference,
by authority or by what is commonly recognized. (cf. Nyāyamukha verse
Summary by Shoryu Katsura 1).
Thus, Dignāga first of all admits the following four types of
"
For the first time in the history of Indian logic Dignāga called proof fallacious thesis (paksābhāsa): (1) "Speech is not audible because
(scidhana) "inference for others " so that he could integrate the traditional opposed by perception, (2) "A pot is eternal" because opposed by
system of argumentation (vāda) into his new system of epistemological inference, (3) " There are no instruments of knowledge which take
logic. Inference for others consists of three members, viz. thesis (pa ss), cognizable objects as their objects" because opposed by authorities, and
(4) That which possesses a rabbit (śaś o)" because it is opposed by what
"
reason (hetu) and example (drstānta). Chapter Three of this work deals
with the first two members and Chapter Four with the last one. is commonly recognized. These are cases where the property to be
Chapter Three consists of two sections, viz. one in which Dignāga proved is itself opposed (dharmasvarūpanirākarapa). There are other
mainly discusses his own theories of thesis and reason and the other in cases: (5) a specific quality of the property to be proved is opposed
which he criticizes those of his rival schools, viz. the Vādavidhi, Nyaya, (dharniaviśesanirākarana), (6) the property-possessor itself is opposed
Vaiśeşika and Sārhkhya. The first section has been thoroughly studied by (dha-misvarūpanirākarana), (7) a specific quality of the topic under
I-lidenori Kitagawa in his annotated Japanese translation of this text (Indo discussion is opposed (dharmiviśesanirākarana), and (5) a specific quality
Koren Ronrigaku no Kenkvū, Jinna no Taikei (Tokyo 1965), pp. 126-138. of both is opposed (uhhayaviśesanirākarapa).
344 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 345

3-4 (K125b; VP43b; VD41a) Criticisms of the Nyāya Definiton of substratum of the thesis) is unproved for one or both of them.
Thesis, viz., "The thesis is a presentation of that which is to be proved" In this connection, he argues, it should be accepted by both parties
( Nyāyasūtra I.1.33). that a reason in a proper proof (sādhana) is a property of the topic and
5 (K126a; VP44a; VD4Ib) Criticism of the Vddavidhi Definition of that a reason in a proof to be rejected (dūsana) is not a property of the
Thesis, viz., "The thesis is a statement of that which is to be proved." topic. In other words, both parties should agree on whether the p of a
6-7ab (kI26b; VP44b; VD42a) Criticism of the Nyāya Definition of legitimate reason is present or not.
Fallacy of the Thesis, viz., " When thesis and reason are incompatible 13 (K128a; VP46a; VD43b) Again Dignāga stresses that a proper
there is the point of defeat called 'incompatible thesis'" (Nyāyasūtra reason should be a property of the topic of the thesis (paksadharma) or
V.2.4). In this connection Dignaga discusses how to formulate a proof that of what is to be proved (sādhyadharma). Only a proving property
properly. (sādhanadharma) proves another property which is to be proved
(sādhyadharma) as well as that which possesses that property (dharmin).
Definition of The Reason It is not the case that a property-possessor (dharmin) proves another
8 (KI27b; VP45b; VD42b) All proper reasons (hetu) and most property-possessor, nor that a property-possessor proves a property, nor
fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa) are properties (dharma) of that which is that a property proves a property-possessor (cf. Nyāyamukha k. 3).
to be proved (sādhya), i.e., those of the topic of a thesis (paksa). In other 14-17 (K129a; VP47a; D44a) Criticisms of several arguments of other
words, a proper reason should poseesss the first characteristic of schools which Dignaga considers to be ill-formulated. He does not regard
legitimate evidence. an argument by means of reductio ad absurdum (prasańga) as a proper
proof (sddhana) but rather as a mere refutation (parihāra) or disproof
Nine Types of Reason (dūsana). A kind of indirect argument employed by the Sāmkhya called
9 There are nine types of the reason in accordance with its being avīta is considered to be a reductio ad absurdum and to be essentially not
present in all, some or no members of the domain of similar examples independent of a direct proof (vita). In this connection Dignaga suggestS
(sapaksa) and its being present in all, some or no members of the domain how to reformulate an ill-formed argument.
of dissimilar examples (vipaksa). (Cf. Nyāyamukha k. 2) 18-20 (KK130a; VP48a; VD45a) The sapaksa is defined as that
which is similar (samāna) to the topic of the thesis (paksa) with respect
Definition of Reason Examined to the universal (sāmānya) which is the property to be proved. Thus a
10 The expression " that which is to be proved " (sādhya) or " topic of sapaksa should be differentiated from a paksa. The vipaksa is that which
a thesis" (paksa) can be used with three different meanings, viz. (I) a is, the absence (nāstitā) of the sapaksa; it is not that which is either
thesis which consists of a topic and a property to be proved as e.g. " there incompatible (viruddha) with or different (anya) from the sapaksa,
is fire on the mountain", (2) the topic of a thesis such as " the mountain ",
and (3) the property to be proved, such as " fire" . Strictly speaking it Nine Types of Reason Explained
should be used with the first meaning only but it can be metaphorically 21-22 (K131a; VP48b; VD45b) The following nine formulations of
used in the second and the third. a proof are under consideration:
11-12 (K127b; VP46a; VD43a) A proper reason should be recognized (1) Speech is eternal because of its being grasped by a means of
by both the proponent and the opponent to be a property of the topic of knowledge.
the thesis (paksadharma), and the topic itself should be admitted to be (2) Speech is not eternal because of its being produced.
real by both parties. (3) Speech is produced by human effort because of its being
Dignaga seems to admit the following kinds of "unproved" (asiddha) nonetemal;
reason: (1) that where the topic is unproved for both parties, (2) that (4) Speech is eternal because of its being produced.
where the topic is unproved for one of them, and (3) that where the (5) Speech is eternal because of its being audible.
346 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 347

(6) Speech is eternal because of its being produced by human effort. Criticisms of the Theories of Other Schools
(7) Speech is not produced by human effort because of its being non- 33-38ab (K137a; VP53b; VD50b) Criticism of the Vādavidhi Theory
eternal. of the Reason.
(8) Speech is not eternal because of its being produced by human 39-43 (K138b; VP55a; VD51b) Criticism of the Nyāya Definion of
effort. the Reason: "The reason is that which proves what is to be proved on the
"
(9) Speech is eternal because of its being nontangible. basis of similarity to examples (Nvāyasīrtra I.1.34).
Of the time reasons mentioned above the second and third ones are 44-45ab (K140b; VP56b; VD53a) Criticism of the Vaiśeşika Theory
considered to be valid because they are present either in a part of or all of the Reason.
members of the sapaksa and absent from all members of the vipakśa; in 46-52ab (K141b; VP58b; VD54a) Criticism of the Sāmkhya Theory
other words these reasons possess the second and third characteristics of of the Reason.
a valid argument. In this connection it is to be noted that Dignaga regards 53-54 (K145a; VP61a; VD57a) Criticism of the Vādavidhi Theory of
absence from the vipaksa itself to guarantee possession of the third the Fallacious Reason.
characteristic. 55 (K145b; VP61a; VD57b) Criticism of the Nyāya Theory of the
The fourth and the sixth reasons are regarded as fallacies and called Fallacious Reason.
"contradictory" (viruddha) because they establish what is incompatible 56ab (K147a; VP64b; VD59a4) Criticism of the Vaiśeşika Theory of
with the original thesis. The rest are other fallacious reasons called the Fallacious Reason.
"
equivocal" (anaikāntika/aniścita); the fifth is called "unique as well as
equivocal" (asādhāraiiānaikāntika), and the others are "common as well
as equivocal" (sūdhārancnaikāntika). (Cf. Nyāyamukha k. 7.) 113.4 Example (drstānta) and Fallacies of the Example
23-24 (K 132a; VP49b; VD46b) According to Dignāga, when we
examine reasons as to whether they are valid or not, we should consider Summary by Shoryu Katsura
only one reason at a time, for two incompatible reasons may cause
doubt. Chapter Four consists of two sections, one in which Dignāga
25-26 (K 133a; VP50b; VD47b) Two summarizing verses on fallacies. discusses his own theories of the example and of fallacies of the example,
(Cf. Nvāyamukha ks. 8 and 10.) and the other in which he criticizes those of rival schools, viz. the
Then Dignāga discusses the four kinds of "contradictory" reasons, viz. Vddavidhi, Nyāya and Vaiśeşika. The first section has been thoroughly
(I) one which proves the opposite of the property to be proved, (2) one studied by Kitagawa (Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkyū, pp. 239-281) and
which proves the oppposite of a specific quality of the property to be the Vaiśeşika portion has been put into Sanskrit by Muni Jambuvijaya
proved, (3) one which proves the opposite of the topic of a thesis itself, (Vatśesikasūtra of Kandda, pp. 207-208).
and (4) one which proves the opposite of a specific quality of the topic It is also to be noted at the outset that Dign5ga uses the term df3(dnta
of a thesis. (example) in two senses, namely, in the sense of the third member of a
27 (K134a; VP51a; VD48a) The verse summarizes the above proof which consists of a general statement of pervasion (vyāpti) and its
discussion. (Cf. Nyāyamukha k. 9.) In this connection Dignāga refers to exemplification and in the sense of an actual example in our experience.
Vasubandhu's criticism of the Sārhkhya proof of the eternal soul. As a matter of fact, the same is true with the term heat (reason); it means
28-32 (K134b; VP5lb; D48a) Further elucidation of the nine types the second member of a proof as well as an item or a property to which
of reason. In this connection, Dignāga briefly touches upon the theory of it refers.
apoha within the context of the inferential process. 1 (K148a; VP63b; VD60a) It has been stated that a proper reason
possesses the three characteristic marks (trirūpa). The second member of
a proof indicates that the reason possesses the first characteristic, i.e., its
348 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 349

being a property of the topic of a thesis (pakśadharmatd). The third proved. They are expressed respectively in "reason", "example" and
member of a proof indicates that the reason possesses the other two, i.e, "thesis", viz. the three members of a proof. It is not necessary to state
its positive as well as negative concomitance (anvayavyatireka) with what other members, such as "application" and "concluson". (Cf. Nyāyamukha
is to be proved. k. 13.)
2 There are two formulations of examples, viz. similar (sādharmya) 7-8 (K151a; VP65b; VD62a) It is necessary to formulate " example"
and dissimilar (vaidharmya). According to Dignāga the two kinds of separately from "reason" but the formulations of the two should not be
examples should be formulated in the following manner: a reason (h) is unrelated.
followed by a property to be proved (s) (i.e., wherever there is h there is 9-12 (K151a; VP66a; VD62a) Dignāga criticizes ill-formed proof
s) in a similar example and absence of the reason in the absence of a formulae which are commonly used by his contemporaries who adopt the
property to be proved (i.e., wherever there is no s there is no h) in a Nyāya definition of reason (Nyāyasūtra I.1.34-35). Further he points out
dissimilar example. (Cf. Nyāyamukha k. 11.) that a mere statement of an actual example without reference to a general
For instance, "(Thesis:) Speech is not eternal, (Reason) because it is law of pervasion will require further examples ad infinitum. (Cf.
produced by human effort (prayatnaja); (Similar Example) It is observed Nyāyamukha k. 14.)
(drsta) that whatever is produced by human effort is not eternal, as e.g. 13-14 (K152a; VP67a; VD63a) Dignāga recognizes ten types of
a pot and others; (Dissimilar Example) It is observed that whatever is fallacies of the example. With reference to a similar example he cites (1)
eternal is not produced by human effort, as e.g. space (ākāśa). one which lacks a reason, (2) one which lacks a property to be proved,
3 (K148b; VP64a; VD60a) Dignāga points out that the negative (3) one which lacks both, (4) one in which the positive concomitance
particle in a similar example (" not eternal" ) is used in the sense of an (anvaya) is stated in a reverse way, and (5) one in which it is not stated
implicative negation (paryudāsa) which presupposes the presence of what at all. With reference to a dissimilar example he cites (1) one which lacks
is negated (noneternal things) and that the negative particle in a dissimilar a reason, (2) one which lacks a property to be proved, (3) one which
example ("eternal" = not nonetemal") is used in the sense of a simple lacks both, (4) one in which the negative concomitance (vyatireka) is
negation (prasajyapratisedha) which does not presuppose the presence of stated in a reverse way, and (5) one in which it is not stated at all.
what is negated (eternal things). Thus the dissimilar example holds even 15-18ab (K152b; VP67a; VD63b) Criticism of the Vādavidhi Theories
for those who do not admit any eternal things. of Examples and Fallacies of Examples.
4 Dignāga emphasizes that the two examples should be formulated 19-21 (K153b; VP68a; VD64a) Criticism of the Nyāya Definition of
in a proper way; namely, the orders of the two terms (h and s) should be Example: "Exemplification (uddharana) consists of an example which
reversed in the two examples: h > s in a similar example and -s > -h in possesses a property of the object to be proved because of similarity with
a dissimilar example. (Cf. Nydyamukha k. 13.) that object, or of that which is the opposite because it is opposite to that "
5 (K149a; VP64b; VD60b) Thus the formulae of the two examples (Nyāyasūtra I.1.36-37).
are logically equivalent because they are in the relation of contraposition. 22-23ab (K155b; VP72b; VD66a) Criticism of the Vaiśeşika Theories
Dignāga is well aware that one of the two examples can imply the other of Examples and Fallacious Examples.
but he strongly adheres to his position that both similar and dissimilar
examples should be formulated in a proof, which suggests the inductive
nature of his system of logic. If one or two examples were not 113.5 Apohaparik.sa
formulated, he thinks, even fallacies could be counted as valid reasons.
6 (K150b; VP65b; VD61b) In inference for others, in order to Summary by Richard P. Hayes
produce for others the same knowledge as one has obtained, one states
(1) a reason's being a property of the topic of a thesis, (2) its inseparable References preceded by "H" are to numbers of paragraphs in Hattori 's
relation (sambandha) with what is to be proved, and (3) the thesis to be (1982) critical edition of the Tibetan translations of
350 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 351

Pramānasamuccayavrtti Chapter Five by Kanakavarman and by example, in a phrase such as " real pot," there are two general terms,
' "
Vasudhararakşita, accompanied by Jinendrabuddhi s commentary "real" and "pot. The terms can be coreferential only if both refer to the
translated into Tibetan by Blo Bros brtan pa, all found in Memoirs of the same object. But if "real" indicates the universal reality, and "pot"
Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University No. 21 (Kyoto 1982). References indicates the universal pothood, then it is not the case that both terms are
preceded by "K" are to folio numbers in the Tibetan translation by referring to the same object, and therefore the two terms could not be
Kanakavarman (Text 5702 of the Peking Edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka, coreferential, in which case we should expect them to appear in a
Vol. 130). References preceded by "VP" are to folio numbers in the sentence with different case markings and grammatical gender. Finally,
Tibetan translation by Vasudhararakşita (Text 5701 of the Peking Edition a general term cannot express a relation, because relations are indicated
of the Tibetan Tripitaka, Vol. 130); those by "VD" are to the Sde-dge not by separate words but by case endings that are applied to separate
"
( " Derge " ) edition (Text 4204) of this same translation: "T refers to the words in sentences. A relation is expressed only through the properties
translation by Richard Hayes, Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs. of its relata but never as an independent entity. Unless both relata in a
Studies of Classical India 9 (Dordrecht 1988). relation are named, the reference to a relation is incomplete. For this
reason, a relationship cannot be expressed by a single general term.
What Verbal Signs Make Known 4 (H6-9; KI56b-157a; VP7I; VD67a; T261-265) It is not the case
1 (HI; K156a; VP70a; VD66a; T252-255) A verbal sign (Salida) is that a general term expresses an individual in its role as the instantiation
no different from an inferential mark (liriga) as a means of acquiring of a universal, for if it did it would have to be grammatically subordinate.
knowledge (pramāna), for both types of sign convey information by a Moreover, if the general term is applied to the instantiation at all, the
process of excluding what is incompatible with what is signified. Some application is only figurative. And in fact there is no basis for figurative
schools of thought accept scriptural tradition as a source of knowledge application, since there is no resemblance between the universal and the
concerning matters beyond the range of both sensation and inference. instantiation of the universal that would warrant figurative application of
But actually verbal signs function in exactly the same way and have the the term for one to the other. Grammatical subordination is a linguistic
same limitations as ordinary inferential signs (the functions of which are phenomenon whereby a word loses its own grammatical gender and
outlined in 114.2, above). Therefore the authority of scripture cannot be number and acquires the gender and number of a head-word that it
regarded as a separate means of acquiring knowledge that transcends the qualifies. In the expression " real pot," "real " is grammatically
limitations of sense experience and reasoning. subordinate to "pot. " But if the word "pot " is itself construed as
2-3 (H2-5; K156; VP70b-71a; VD66b; T255-260) General terms do expressing not the universal pothood but a particular that possesses the
universal pothood, then " pot" would have to be translated as
not express particulars. But a general term also does not express a "
universal or the relation between a universal and a particular. Just as an pothood-possessing," in which case it would take on the form of an
inferential sign can give rise to knowledge only of that to which it is adjective that should be subordinate to some head-word either expressed
restricted (or, to say it in another way, by which it is pervaded), a verbal or implied. The implications of this move would be that in an expression
sign can express only that to which it is restricted. A general term such such as " real pot," "real" would no longer be grammatically subordinate
to " pot" but rather would be subordinate to the word to which "pot " (_
as " woman " can be applied to a wide variety of individual human beings, "
so it is not restricted to any one individual, so it cannot express any given pothood-possessing") is subordinate. In this case, "real" and " pot" would
individual. Linguistic evidence indicates that general terms do not simply become two adjectives modifying the same head-word. But this
express universals. The principal piece of evidence is the phenomenon runs counter to our linguistic intuitions. Therefore, a general word should
of coreferentiality, whereby two words agree in grammatical case, gender not be construed as expressing an instantiation of a universal. Moreover,
and number on the grounds that both words refer to the same object. But if the general term is applied to the instantiation at all, the application can
if general terms were construed as expressing universals, it would be only be figurative. The literal referent of a general term in the sense of
a particular that possesses the universal can only be regarded as
impossible to give a fair account of this grammatical phenomenon. For
352 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 353

figurative. But in fact there is not even a basis for the figurative applicable to pluralities of particulars.)
application of a universal. Figurative application to an object B of a term 12-13 (H22; K159a; VP73a; VD69a; T277) That to which a verbal
that literally signifies an object A is possible only if A and B have some sign is applied has many properties, only some of which are made known
feature in common. But there is no feature that universals have in through the verbal sign. The verbal sign merely serves to isolate what it
common with instantiations of universals. Therefore, no figurative usage expresses from other properties;•it also isolates the particular to which the
of a term that literally expresses a universal to an object that is an word is applied from particulars that do not have the property isolated by
instantiation of a universal is possible. the verbal sign. A verbal sign also has numerous properties, but it is
5 (H10-11; K157a; VP71b; VD67; T266-267) When two objects A significant only in virtue of those properties of the sign that are restricted
and B have a feature F in common, then we can say "A has F and B has to the object expressed.
"
F. But there is no feature F that actually occurs in both a universal and
an instantiation of a universal such that we can say "The universal has F The Relationships among Signs
and the instantiation of the universal has F." Nor is there any feature F 14-16 (HT23-25; K159; VP73; VD69; T278-282) If it is accepted
that actually occurs in the universal but only apparently occurs in the that verbal signs do not express real qualities or universals but serve only
instantiation of the universal (as the color red actually occurs in a rose to isolate particulars from one another, it is still possible to account for
but only apparently occurs in a crystal placed next to the rose) on account the linguistic phenomena of grammatical agreement, also known as
of which apparent resemblance between the universal and the instantiation coreferentiality (sārrtānādhikarañya), and the qualification of one term by
of the universal one could figuratively construe the term expressing the another (viśe7yaviśerañabhāva). When a single verbal sign is applied to
universal as a term expressing the instantiation of a universal. a situation, there is greater uncertainty concerning which particulars the
6-8 (H12-15; K157b; VP71b-72a; VD67b; T267-268) If sign is being applied to than when several signs are applied in
instantiations of a universal apparently had the features of universals, then juxtaposition. Insofar as " lotus" is less certain than " blue lotus," "blue:'
it would not be possible to distinguish instantiations of a universal from and "lotus" may be said to be qualifying one another. But in the
one another, for all things would apparently have the same features as all expression " blue lotus " the sounds " blue" and " lotus" do not have any
other things. Moreover, the instantiation of a universal is in the final meaning of their own, any more than in the word " lotus " the syllables
"
analysis nothing other than a particular, and it has already been lo" and "tus" have any meaning by themselves. Still, despite the fact
established (5:2) that relations cannot be expressed by general terms. that the individual words in a phrase or sentence do not have any
9 (HI6; T269-272) One might think that a general term expresses the meaning of their own, the phrase or sentence as a whole does express
mere fact of possession, that is, the particular 's possession of a given something, naming the fact that the state of affairs to which the phrase or
universal. But possession is just a type of relation, and it has already sentence is correctly applied is isolable from other states of affairs,
been shown (in 2 above) that relations cannot be expressed by general namely, those to which the phrase or sentence is not applicable.
terms. 17 (1-126; T282-283) There can be no such thing as an object that is
10-11 (H17-22; K158a-159a; VP72a-73a; VD68; T272-277) The a single whole made up of parts that are different Morn one another. For
only feature held in common by a plurality of particulars to which a if there were such a single simple object, it would follow that its putative
given general term is applicable is the very fact that the general term is parts are in fact identical to one another. If, for example, a blue lotus is
applicable to them. But the question now arises: what is the basis on construed as a simple object, then it must follow that the color blue is
which the same general term is applicable to a plurality of particulars that identical with the universal lotushood. If on the other hand the words
"
actually have nothing in common? It cannot be that the basis is a single blue" and "lotus" are understood as expressing distinct real objects, it
universal that actually occurs in a plurality of particulars. (Dignāga raises follows that there is no individual thing to which the expression "blue
this question and rules out answers that might be given, but he offers no lotus" applies.
account of his own as to the basis on which a general term can be 18. (H26(d)-27(a); K160a-161a; VP74; VD69b-70b; T283-286) One
354 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 355
" "
might imagine that the word "blue in the expression "blue lotus relation of qualifying and qualifiable expression. In summary, the
expresses the color blue, while the word " lotus " expresses the universal phenomenon of grammatical agreement between two expressions is
lotushood. In that case there would be no basis for saying that "blue " putatively grounded on the fact that both expressions express the same
and "lotus" are in grammatical agreement owing to their referring to the object, but the fact that the two expressions in grammatical agreement are
same object. Positing that "blue" does express lotushood would entail the not synonymous indicates that they express different objects. Therefore,
unwelcome consequence that "blue" also expresses every blue substance; it is uncertain whether two expressions in a coreferential relationship
but it has already been shown (in 4 above) that a general term does not express identical or different objects. Since insurmountable problems
express the individuals that instantiate it. Furthermore, if the word "blue" arise from making the assumption that words express real objects outside
did indeed express lotushood, there would be no need to utter the word thought, it not being certain whether those objects are identical or
"lotus " ; "blue" by itself would express " blue lotus." Given all the different, one must abandon the assumption that verbal signs express
problems pointed out in 17-18 it is untenable that the substratum of objects outside thought. Verbal expressions, therefore, express only
"blue" is identical to the substratum of "lotus." But it is equally concepts the relations among which do not correspond to the relations
untenable that the substratum of "blue" is different from the substratum among objects in the world outside thought.
of "lotus." It cannot be the case that the whole is an entity that is 25 (1136; T287-290) A verbal sign does not directly express anything;
different from its parts, for there is no satisfactory account of the relation rather, it excludes the application of other signs to the object to which it
between whole and part. The whole cannot reside completely in each of is applied. But a sign does not exclude the application of all other signs.
its parts, nor can the whole reside only partially in each of its parts. It does not, for example, exclude terms of wider extension, terms of
19-24 (H27b-35; K161a-163a; VP75a-76b; VD70b-72a; T286-287) narrower extension or terms of exactly the same extension as itself.
Let it be granted then, for the sake of argument, that the whole is an 26-27 (H37; K163; VP77; VD72b; T290-291). A term does not
entity distinct from its parts. Even if this is granted, it turns out to be exclude terms of narrower extension, because it engenders anticipation for
impossible to account for the grammatical agreement of two or more them alone. For example, if the word " animal" is applied to an object,
different expressions. Suppose that there are two objects, a quality and anticipation arises in the mind of the hearer as to whether certain other
a universal, that both occur in one locus. Suppose, for example, that terms, such as "horse" or "cat " or " elephant," are also applicable to that
there is a single locus in which the color blue and the universal lotushood same object. Since terms such as "horse," etc. apply only to those objects
both reside. If that is the case, the color blue and the universal lotushood to which " animal " applies, these are terms of narrower extension than the
are not related as qualifier and qualifiable object (viśe.sana and viśeśya), term " animal. " The wider term selects a set of narrower terms as possible
for the color blue is not a quality of lotushood. nor is lotushood a quality candidates to apply to the same object to which the wider term is applied,
of the color blue. The color blue is neither a species nor a genus with but of course the wider term cannot select any particular narrower term.
respect to the universal lotushood. Alternatively, suppose that the But in any case, the wider term does not exclude the application of
possessor of the color blue is a part of the same whole as is the possessor narrower terms. The application of a narrower term to an object entails
of the universal lotushood. But if the whole is distinct from its parts and the applicability of several wider terms.
the parts are distinct from one another, it still follows that the 28-30 (H38-41; K163b-164a; VP77b-78a; VD72b-73b;1'291-195) If
blue-possessing part and the lotushood-possessing part are not related as two terms are both narrower than a given wider term, each narrower term
qualifier and qualifiable object. And the part possessing the color blue excludes the other, and each narrower term also excludes whatever is
is neither a species nor a genus with respect to the part possessing the excluded by terms wider than itself. For example, "cat" excludes "horse, "
universal lotushood. A parallel observation can be made with respect to since "cat" and "horse" are both narrower than "animal." But "cat " also
the words that express the color blue and the universal lotushood. Since excludes "plant," since "plant" is excluded by " animal," because "animal "
the words differ in what they express, it cannot be said that they are and "plant" are both narrower than "Iifeform." The sign "cat" does not
coreferential, and since the words are not related, they are not in a exclude "plant" directly. A narrower term only indirectly excludes the
356 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 357

application of terms that are incompatible with its wider terms. the simplicity and independence from individuals that universals are
Adjectives do not necessarily exclude one another, because several supposed to have. The distinction between a universal and an exclusion
adjectives can be used to modify the same noun. is that the former is believed to exist as a part of reality outside the
31-33 (H42-45; K164a-165a; VP78a-79a; VD73b-74a; T295-297) intellect, whereas exclusion is purely an intellectual fiction that plays a
The phenomena of the compatibility and incompatibility of terms are role in analysis and understanding.
often accounted for by an appeal to an underlying relationship among
objects of various kinds, such as substances, qualities, actions and so on. Anticipating Some Objections from Other Schools of Thought
But such explanations lead to numerous problems. Therefore, preferable 37-38 (H51-54; K166a-167a; VP80a-81a; VD75; no T). A defender
to accounting for linguistic phenomena by an appeal to ontological of the view that universals are real entities that exist outside the mind
hypotheses is simply observing them without trying to offer an points out that the realistic position does not entail any of the difficulties
explanation of what facts in the world underly the facts of language. For that the apohavānin nominalist ascribes to it. What makes the word
example, it is sufficient simply to note that in conventional usage the "color" apply to colors but not to tastes and other sensibilia is that there
terms "cat " and " elephant" are not applied to the same objects, but really is something that all colors have in common that is not had in
"
"horse and "animal" are. Similarly, it is sufficient to note that "horse
" common by tastes, smells and so forth. Dignāga replies that one should
and "white" are sometimes applied to the same object; it is not necessary neither discard the ordinary speech of people altogether, nor should one
to posit that "horse" names a substance and "white" a quality that inheres take ordinary language to be giving a completely accurate representation
in the substance and so forth, and indeed positing such things leads to a of the way things are in the world. It is true that in ordinary speech
number of problems that have nothing to do with the linguistic signs that people speak as if there were something that all colors have in common,
one is trying to interpret. and so when one listens to ordinary speech one should pay attention to
34-36 (H46-50; K165a; VP79; VD74-75a; T297-300) The theory that the fact that when people say "color" they are expressing a belief in
a verbal sign expresses only the exclusion of incompatible signs and universals; but it should also be borne in mind that this common belief
properties is not subject to the same criticisms as the other theories is not necessarily true. To see that there are problems in the commonly
criticized in 2-11 above. A sign that expresses only exclusion (apoha) held belief that the universal color is a real entity that all particular colors
does not apply to objects in the extension of the contrary term, and it have in common, one need only ask what the precise nature of this color
does apply to members of its own extension. Therefore it has the is; one need. in other words, only try to define it. According to the
characteristics of a good inferential sign. The wider a term, the greater ordinary users of language, for example, the definition of color is that
the hearer's uncertainty concerning the nature of the object to which the which is cognizable through the eye. But such a definition is too wide,
speaker is applying the term; the narrower the term, the greater the for it includes such categories as substance (dravya) and physical contact
certainty. This is so because narrower terms eiiminate (apohate) more (samvoga). So we cannot place too much confidence in the intuitions of
possibilities of what is being talked about than do wider terms. This meaning that we get from ordinary language as ordinarily used.
means that for the purpose of giving an account of such linguistic According to the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, the meaning of a word
features as principled grammatical agreement and qualification relations, or morphological feature is ascertained by the joint observations of
exclusion functions in all important ways as a universal ( dti) functions. association (anvaya) and dissociation (vyatireka); for example, one
In the exclusion theory of meaning, words express greater and smaller ascertains that the sixth case endings are a sign for possession by
exclusions in just the same way that in other theories of meaning words observing that when possession is present the sixth case markers are used,
express narrower and wider universals. It is possible, therefore, to but when possession is not present the sixth case markers are not used.
conceive of taxonomical hierarchies purely in terms of exclusion, without Now if universals do not exist, it would apparently follow that all
having to posit the existence of universals to account for such hierarchies. ascertainment of the signification of a general term is based exclusively
Moreover, an exclusion does not admit of internal divisions and so has on dissociation (the word "cow" is not applied when the universal
358 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 359

cowhood is not present), not on association (the word "cow" is applied the latter is the case, then the basic stuff is in fact not one simple stuff
when the universal cowhood is present). But one should not be deceived but a complex.
by this apparent consequence, for all that the exclusion theory of meaning 46 (H60: K168; VP182b; VD77a) An individual word has no
states is that when a term is applied to an object, it excludes the meaning in isolation from a sentence; like conjugational and declensional
applicability to that object of certain other words. The denial of endings, a word has no application to any object except in the context of
universals as real entities does not imply anything positive or negative a complete sentence. The sentence is the primary unit of speech, and the
about how it is that we learn what linguistic features signify. object that it makes known is the intuition (pratibhā) of the speaker. Just
as the sentence is an undivided whole, an intuition is an undivided whole.
Points of Dispute with the Sā hkhya School But both sentences and the intuitions they express can be artificially
39-43 (H55-58; K167a-168a; VP81a-82a; VD75b-76b) According to divided into parts for heuristic purposes. The meanings of words and of
the Sāmkhya philosophers, every particular is the transformation of some morphological suffixes within sentences can be learned by a process of
basic stuff that is the true essence of all things. Now if it is said that systematically comparing the similarities and differences in the overall
words signify nothing but exclusion, which is an absence, it would meanings of sentences that differ from each other. Unsophisticated
apparently follow that all particulars therefore have absence or people form the mistaken impression that the words abstracted from
nothingness as their essence. Such a consequence would indeed follow sentences for heuristic purposes actually refer to real external objects, but
from accepting both the exclusion theory of meaning and the Sārhkhya in fact they refer only to conceptual fictions.
view that all particulars have fundamentally the same essence. But there 47-49 (H61-62; K168b; VP82b; VD77a) Although there are no
is no need to accept the view that all particulars have fundamentally the external objects, people form definite concepts and mental images when
same essence. For if one were to hold that a particular piece of pottery they hear sentences spoken. For example, the concepts that someone
is in no essential way different from the clay of which the pot is made, forms are the result of the history of his personal experiences and the
then it would follow that one could not tell one piece of pottery from habits of thinking that he has developed. A passionate man on hearing
another. In fact, though, one can tell one piece of pottery from another. an erotic verse is liable to become sexually aroused, whereas a
What this fact of being able to distinguish among particulars is due to is dispassionate man on hearing the same verse will develop a feeling of
just the capacity that words have to evoke certain images in the minds of distaste. The "meaning" that a sentence conveys, being private, is
hearers. This capacity is itself the result of a beginningless history of therefore variable with the individuals who hear the sentence spoken. In
linguistic convention, but the convention itself is not necessarily grounded this privacy and variability, the intuitions evoked by a sentence are
in reality. similar to the impressions of a state of affairs that different individuals
44-45 (H59; K164a; VP82a; VD76b) If the grounds for applying a may get upon seeing an inferential sign. In this respect, then, interpreting
term (śabdapravrttinīmitta) is an absence, as the exclusion theory of the meaning of a sentence is similar to interpreting the meaning of an
meaning holds, then it is difficult to see what the basis can be of such inferential sign ((itiga). But from the perspective of the individual who
grammatical features as number. But the same criticism can be made of hears a sentence, the intuition that arises in his mind is immediate and
any theory by which the grounds for applying a term is a real universal; simple, and in this respect it is like an object of sensation. But no matter
for, given the fact that the universal can only be one, only the singular how one looks at verbal communication, it is in no way outside the range
number would really make any sense. One could argue, as the Sāmkhyas of sensation and inference.
do, that although the universal is one basic stuff, each particular evolves 50 (H63-65; 1(169; VP83a-84a; VD77b-78a) All of the above
out of it owing to some potentiality (śakti). But it must be asked whether observations that have been made about linguistic meaning are true of
there is one potentiality in the basic stuff that generates all the general terms, but it may not be so obvious that they are also true of
particularities or whether each particular has its own potentiality. If the singular terms that apply to and name unique individuals. But in fact a
former is the case, then the several particulars would be indiscernible; if so-called "individual" is in fact a collection (sanuudūra) of parts in much
360 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PRAMANASAMUCCAYA 361

the same way that a class is a collection of individuals. There is no Fallacious disproof is called "futile rejoinder" (jdti).
difference at all in principle between a general term (/ātiśabda) and a Dignāga examines the following fourteen types of futile rejoinders;
term for a collection (.samudāvaśanda). There are, then, no parts of 1. prāpty-aprāpti-.sama, 2. ahetusama. 3. nitva.sama, 4. *anukti.sanm, 5.
speech to which the observations about general terms do not also apply. anutpatti.sama, 6. kūryasama, 7. sūdharmyn.satna, 8. vaidharmyasama, 9.
All parts of speech signify concepts rather than realities that exist rikalpasama, 10. aviśesasanm, 11. upalabdhisanta, 12. sa»tśayasama, 13.
independent of thought. In this respect, the interpretation of verbal signs arthāpattisama and 14. pra.satigasama. '"
is indistinguishable in principle from the interpretation of any other kind 3-4a (K170a; VP84b: VD78b) Futile rejoinders called
of inferential sign. Therefore, the Brahmanical contention, that speech is prāptyaprāptisama and ahetusama are fallacious disproofs which wrongly
a means of acquiring knowledge that is independent of and superior to claim that a proper reason is missing in the opponent 's proof For
both perception and inference, is false. Rather, the Buddhist contention, example. when one argues that speech (śabda) is not eternal because it
that the only two means of acquiring knowledge are sensation and is produced by a human effort like so-and-so the opponent criticizes the
inference, is true. given reason by claiming that it cannot prove what is to be proved
whether or not it reaches the latter. If the reason reaches what is to be
proved, it will become indistinguishable from the latter just like the river
113.6.Futile Rejoinder (//ti) flows into the ocean, and if it does not reach what is to be proved, it will
become indistinguishable from what is not the reason. Such an objection
Summary by Shoryu Katsura is a futile rejoinder called prāptyaprātisama.
Dignaga identifies such an objection as a fallacious disproof which
Chapter Six consists of two sections, one in which Dignāga expounds wrongly finds a fallacy of incomplete reason where there is none.
his own theory of futile rejoinders. and the other in which he criticizes According to him, it is also self-destructive because the same argument
the theory of the V/ davidhi. The former has been thoroughly studied by applied to the proof by the above disproof, though unreasonable, can be
Kitagawa Undo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenkvū, pp. 282-351). The latter has equally applied to the disproof itself. It may be interpreted as a fallacious
been analyzed by Erich Frauwallner in his article "Vasubandhu's disproof which wrongly claims there to be a fallacy of an unproved

1
Vādavidhih", Wiener Zeitschrift fair die Kunde Siid- and Ostasiens 1, (asiddha) reason.
1957, pp. 104-146. 4bd (K170b; VP85a; VD79a) The futile rejoinder called nityasa.ma
According to Dignāga there are two kinds of pramānas (viz. is a fallacious disproof which wrongly finds a fallacy of the thesis
perception and inference) and two kinds of fallacies (pramān bhāsa), viz. .(paksadośa).
fallacious perception and fallacious inference. Inference for others 5 (Kl7la; VP85b; VD79b) The futile rejoinder called *anuktisa.ma
(parārthānuntāna) is traditionally called " proof ' (stīdhana) and consists is that which wrongly imputes fallacies of unproved reason, incomplete
of three members, viz. thesis (pakca), reason (hetu) and example reason and/or incomplete example.
(drstānta); there is also a fallacious proof (sādhanābhāsa) which contains 6 (Kl 71b: VP86a; VD79b) The futile rejoinder called anutpattisama
such fallacies as fallacious thesis, fallacy of the reason and fallacious is that which wrongly claims to discover a fallacy of unproved reason or
example. equivocal reason (anaikāntika).
1-2 (K169b; VP84a; VD78b) There is a disproof (dūsapa) which 7 ( Kl7lbl VP86a; VD80a) The futile rejoinder called kārvasama is
points out such fallacies (e.g., the lack (nyūnatd) of any of the three that which wrongly points to a fallacy of unproved reason, contradictory
characteristics (trairūpya) of a valid reason; 16 in short, fallacy of the reason (viruddha) or doubtful reason as well as a fallacy of an example
reason) in a proof of the opponent, so that the latter should be rejected (drsidntado ;ra).
as a fallacious proof. There is also a fallacious disproof (dūsanāhhāsa) 8-11 (K mising; VP86a: VD80a) Futile rejoinders called
which wrongly points out such a fallacy in a proof of the opponent. sādharmyasama and vaidharmya.santa are those which wrongly interpret
362 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES UPADAYAPRAJÑAPTI 363
1b
the similar example and the dissimilar example respectively. They both Summary by Hidenori Kitagawa
wrongly identify the fallacy of a common-and-equivocal-reason
(sādhāragānaikāntika) or an incompatible-but-nonequivocal-reason "The Ch'ii-vin-chia-she-lun is...a very brief work--a work consisting
(virudd/rānaikāntika) as well as the fallacy of an example. In order to of only 13 stanzas--but fortunately it has been translated into Chinese
avoid those futile rejoinders one should state the pervasion in one's proof. together with a commentary (probably by Dignāga, according to
12-13a, (K171 b; VP87a; VD81a) The futile rejoinder called Kitagawa) with the help of which the meaning of the stanzas may be
vikalpasmna is one which incor rectly finds a fallacy of equivocal reason. better understood....
13a,-14 (K172a; VP87b; VD81a) The futile rejoinder called Two problems are discussed in the Ch'ii-yin-chia-she-/un. One
aviśesasama is one which wrongly discovers a fallacy of doubtful reason, concerns the structure of the world as conceived by religiously
unproved reason or contradictory reason. unenlightened people, and the other the peculiar mannerisms of the
r
15 (K172b; VP88b; VD82a) The last four types of futile rejoinders Buddha's preaching. But these two problems are so closely inter elated
can become proper proofs or disproofs provided that the arguments they that they should not be discussed separately. The introductory part of the
criticize contain real logical fallacies. commentary placed in front of the first stanza explains the relation
16-17 (K173a; VP89a; VD82a) The futile rejoinder called between these problems. The following is an abridged translation of that
upalabdhisanta is one which incorrectly alleges the fallacy of a doubtful part of the commentary:
reason or of unproved reason. When the Buddha outlined the Religious Truth, he assumed the
18 (K173b: VP89b; VD82b) The futile rejoinder called existence of matter for the sake of convenience and referred to it. lie
ardmpattisania is one which wrongly points out the fallacy of a doubtful needed material on which to demonstrate that one-sided definitions in
reason. terms of identity, non-identity, or non-existence are inadequate when one
19 (K I 74a; VP90a; VD83a) The futile rejoinder caled prasańgasama is not concerned with real entities such as the elements of the universe.
is one which wrongly identifies the fallacy in a fallacious example. This is the Buddha's method when preaching to unenlightened people.
20a-c (K174b; VP90b; VD83b) Those are only a part of innumerable Those entia, whose existence is assumed by the Buddha for the sake of
types of futile rejoinders. In this connection Dignāga refers to convenience not just fictitiously but in dependence on realities, are
utkarsasama and apakar,rasmna which are included in the list of twenty- classified in three categories: wholes, continuants and aspects. An example
four hypes of futile rejoinders in the Nyāyasūtras. of a whole is a body, which is a conglomeration of hands, feet, etc. An
21 (K174b; VP90b; VD83b) Criticism of the Vādavidhi theory of example of a continuant is the life of a human being, which is a series of
Futile Rejoinders. physical and psychical developments from the very earliest stage of the
22 (K176b; VP92b; VD85a) Final words on futile rejoinders of other embryo onwards. In other words, a continuant is a unity conceived in
schools. terms of time while a whole is a unity conceived in terms of space. As
23-25 (KI76b; VP92b; VD85a) Concluding Remarks to the against these two kinds of entia, aspects are explained as stages or
Pr
amā;msanurccat'avrttl, characteristics of a thing conceived either in terms of time or space. For
example, the states arising into existence, holding it, and falling off it,
I I4.DIGNAGA, Upādāyaprajriaptiprakaraña and characteristics such as non-durability, perceptibility, impenetrability,
Hidenori Kitagawa, whose article on this work we use as the basis for being the outgrowth of past deeds etc. are aspects of the material
our summary, identifies this work only by its Chinese title, Ch'ii.vin-chia- elements. The Buddha assumed the existence of these three kinds of entia
she-lun. It is available in I-tsing's translation (T. 1622). The article also because his preaching had to conform with the structure of the world as
contains as an Appendix a full translation of the commentary on Verse conceived by unenlightened people. However, since the existence of these
10, not reproduced here. entia is assumed--though unenlightened people are not aware of that fact--
they cannot be spoken of in terms of identity and nonidentity. Neither can
364 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES UPADAYAPRAJÑAPTI 365
their existence be denied completely; for, although it is true that their present moment) is suffering (from a disease,) would make medical
existence is only an assumed one, it is assumed not just wrongly but in efforts in vain...."
dependence on realities. The Buddha, knowing these conditons, never Or, one more example:
talked of the three kinds of entia in terms of identity, non-identity or Stanza 8: "Through the aspects such as 'being the outgrowth (of past
absolute non-existence; he referred to them when he preached to deeds)', etc. we grasp their substratum and give it a name. (Therefore)
unenlightened people by pedagogical devices, i.e. without setting forth his the substratum would have no existence if it were not identical with the
ultimate point of view. aspects. The contradictions, (on the other hand) that result from the
Then the question may arise: "What is wrong in speaking of those identity (of the aspects and their substratum can easily) be pointed out in
entia in terms of identity, non-identity or non-existence?" Stanzas 1-8 the same way as in the previous (stanzas, where the contradictions of the
answer the first two alternatives. Stanzas 1-4 are concerned with the identity of a whole with its parts etc. were dealt with). "
logical contradictions that will result from speaking of a whole arid its Throughout these arguments it is presumed that the existing matter
parts in terms of identity and non-identity. Stanza 5 deals with a in the strict sense of the word is capable of being spoken of in terms of
supplementary question. the question of the atoms; thus the possibility of identity or non-identity. Therefore, the contradictions pointed out by these
assuming the existence of atoms as real entities is denied. The arguments actually imply the non-existence of the three kinds of entia-
contradictions that will arise from speaking of a continuant and its wholes, continuants and aspects. The denial of the existence of these
successive members in terms of identity and non-identity are discussed entia, however, is not the ultimate intention of the Ch 'ii-yin-chia-she-lun:
in Stanzas 6-7. Stanza 8 points out the logical errors which will take for Stanza 9, which is concerned with the criticism of the last alternative
place when we speak of aspects and their substratum in terms of identity in question, namely the criticism of speaking of these entia in terms of
and non-identity. However, the arguments employed in these stanzas are absolute nonexistence, runs as follows:
not very original. They are of a kind of conventional Madhyamika Stanza 9: "If you do not admit of the existence of a body, (the
dialectics. Examples are shown below: following will be concluded: Buddha,) the holder of the right view,
Stanza 1: "If (a whole) were identical (with its parts, each of the should have preached (for example, the four methods of contemplation)
component parts) would be of the same entity (as the whole, and, in vain: moreover, there should be no person accused of holding nihilistic
therefore,) a part would be identical with another part (of the same whole. views of the universe and there should no distinctions in our deeds (with
For example, a hand would be a foot). Or, (if you say, 'Indeed. a whole regard to their religious merits)."
is nothing more than its parts, but each of the component parts must be Thus, the denial of the existence of three kinds of entia, which is
allowed to) be of different entity than the whole,' (another contradiction) implied by the contradictions pointed out in Stanzas 1-8, is protested
will result in that a (single) whole has many svahhāvas (independent against by Stanza 9. The reconciliation of these two opposite claims,
natures). " however, is proposed in Stanza 10 by the theory of vijñaptimātratā, i.e.
Or, the theory that the world of the unenlightened people is nothing but a
Stanzas 6-7, line 2: "If a continuant were identical with (each of its construction of their mind. It may easily be understood that such an
successive members, a person--who is one example of a continuant--) idealistic theory as the theory of vijñaptrmātraid can offer the ground on
would have lost his whole being and existence when he left his babyhood which to base the unreality of the three kinds of entia; but how can it be
behind and, after gradual growth, achieved boyhood; (therefore, a the basis for their reality as well? The point is as follows:
continuant) cannot be identical with (its successive members). If you say That the whole world is a construction of the mind does not
that he should not have lost (his whole being and existence even when he necessarily mean the absolute non-existence of all entia in all senses. For,
achieved boyhood,) then (you must concede the complete) mixing (of to say that the world is a construction of the mind is only to say that
babyhood and boyhood). If, (on the contrary) a continuant (and its everything is of assumed existence; but by no means does it nullify the
successive members) were not identical, (a person whose) body (at the distinctions between the two groups of entia, those whose existence is
366 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES UPADAYAPRAJ1 APTI 367

assumed just wrongly and those whose existence is assumed in which is the equivalent to the phenomenal world of Kant, is constructed
dependence on realities. Since the three kinds of entia with which we are on the elements of the universe, taking the forms of the whole, the
concerned belong to the latter group, they should be allowed to have continuant and the aspect. But here the analogy ends. For, according to
some kind of reality while those belonging to the former group can never Kant, the Ding-an-sich is utterly beyond the faculty of our cognition and,
have reality. Thus by the theory of vijñaptirnātratū the ground is prepared therefore, nothing can be said about it pro or con, while, according to the
for the reconciliation of the seemingly incompatible claims; accordingly, Ch'ii-yin-cha-she-lun the elements of the universe are truly capable of
the three kinds of entia which are unreal in that their existence is assumed being the objects of designation and, therefore, can be spoken of in terms
by the mind, these same entia are real in that their existence is assumed of identity and non-identity. Why is it then that only the elements of the
in dependence on realities. universe are truly capable of being the objects of designation'? The reason
Then what are the realities on which the existence of these entia is is that they are real in the strict sense of the word and, therefore, are in
based? The analysis of the statements of the commentary on Stanza 10 possession of the real svabhūvas (—independent natures). Those entia, on
will lead to the conclusion that the realities are the elements of the the other hand, whose existence is merely assumed by mind through the
universe. In other words, the elements of the visible, the audible etc., as categories of the three kinds of entia, have no real svabhdvas, and
traditionally accepted in Buddhist scholasticism, are the realities on which therefore cannot he spoken of either in terms of identity or non-identity.
the existence of the three kinds of entia is based. The manner of the The structure of the religiously unenlightened people's world having
argument of Stanza 11 gives support to this conclusion. Stanza II been thus explained, Stanza 12 proceeds to the problem of the peculiar
supplements Stanza 10 in that it denies the idea of true reality to the three mannerisms of the Buddha's preaching. It reads as follows:
kinds of entia although it grants them relative reality. The argument it Stanza 12: " Since (Buddha,) the Holy One, wanted to root out the
employs for the denial of the true reality of the three kinds of entia is spiritual defilemements (of the ordinary people who were not familiar
based on the ground that none of these entia can properly be placed either with metaphysical thinking), he adapted himself to (the situation and
in the category of the samskrta nor in that of the asariukrta. Since it is referred only to) those entia that existed within the ranges of their
the tradition of Buddhist scholasticism to classify all the elements of the (meagre) understanding; therefore, he never talked of those entia in terms
universe into these two categories, the true reality of the elements of the of identity and non-identity. It was thus that he preached by pedagogical
universe has been presumed in order that the true reality of the three devices and converted the people (into the pathway of the Religious
kinds of entia can be denied on such grounds. Thus the conclusion which Truth)."
we have reached from the analysis of the statements of the commentary ...Stanza 13, the last Stanza, is written only to encourage the people
on Stanza 10, namely that the elements of the universe such as the to practise religious discipline."
element of the visible, the audible etc. are the realities on which the
existence of the three kinds of entities are assumed, is backed by the fact
that the true reality of the elements of the universe is presumed in the I I5.DIGNAGA, Traikāļvaparīksā
argument of Stanza II. Translated into German by Frauwallner in Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die
By the support of Stanza 11 the reconciliation proposed by Stanza 10 Kunder Siid and Ostasiens 3, pp. 109-113. It is a report or translation of
is now confirmed. As to the structure of the unenlightened people ' s world, a section of Bhartrhari 's Vākyopacfñ a.
the ultimate intention of the C'hii-yin-cha-she-lun seems to be to propound
a theory that may be interpreted as follows:
The elements of the universe are something like the thing-in-itself 116.DIGNACA. Siīmcñn'alaksa,taparīkśā
(Ding-an-sich) in Kantian philosophy, and the classification of the This work is apparently lost.
assumed existence into three kinds of entia like his theory of the twelve
categories of understanding. Thus, the world of the unenlightened people
368 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VIDYĀMATRSIDDHI 369

122.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Vidyārnatrsiddhī (515)

117.DIGNAGA, Nyāyaparīksā
Another of Paramārtha's later translations, being N.1239.
Also lost.

123.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, T 'alakśaltaśāstra (515)

K.622 = T.1617 = N.1219, translated by Paramartha in 557-569.
118. AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ascribed to Nāgārjuna)
Rājaparikathāratnarnālāsūtra (510) 1"
K.6I7 = T.1656 = N.1253, translated by Paramartha at Chih-chih
124JINA, Attākaracintārajas (?) (515)
Monastery around 557-559 (not noted in Bagchi). It is available in
Another work translated by Paramartha, this is N. 1172. We know
English translation in The Wisdom of Tibet Series Nos. 1-2 (London
nothing about the author Jina. The work is characterized by Nanjio as
1975), pp. 111-187. The translation, from Tibetan, is by Jeffrey Hopkins "
"based on an oral tranmission and explanation of the text received from Śāstra on the dust of shapeless thought".
His Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, in Dharamsala,
India in May of 1972. " There is also a " guide " to the work by Gyel-tsap,
a disciple of Tsong-ka-pa, translated in the same volume with the 125.JINA (?), Mus(iprakaran cistra (515)
translation, pp. 188-203. Since the translation doesn't indicate which A work in three chapters, comprising N. 1255 translated by
Paramartha and attributed to the mysterious Jina.
Buddhist terms (in any Buddhist language) are being translated by which
English terms we refrain from attempting to summarize the work on the
basis provided there.
126.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, " Life of Vasubandhu" (515)
K.1038 = T.2049 = N.1463 = Bagchi, p. 428 (43), translation by
Paramartha. This has been translated into English by M. Takakusu in
119. TRIRATNADASA, Vivaraña on Dignāg3 s
T'oung Pao 1904, pp. 269-296.
Prajñāpāramitāpindārtha (510?)
Guiseppe Tucci writes: "Triratnadāsa is well known to the Tibetan
tradition: according to Tāranātha he was a pupil of Vasubandhu and a
I 27.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Buddhābhidhannasūtra (515)
friend of Diitnāga, who commented on one of his works. Some Tibetan
K.938 = T.1482 = N.1107 = Bagchi, p. 437 (36), translated by
authorities were inclined to identify him with Aryaśūra, though there is
Paramartha.
no support for such a view. 150 His commentary exists in Chinese (Taisho,
no. 1517) as well as in Tibetan (mDo agrel, xiv, no. 3." 151 T.1517 =
K.1459 = N.1310; the translation is by Dānapāla in 1011.
I28.VASUVARMAN, Catursatyaśāstra (515)
K.974 = T.I647 = N.1261, translated by Paramartha. We know
120.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Vidyānirdeśaśāstra (515) nothing of Vasuvarman, and this is the only work attributed to him.
K.611 = N.1217 = T.1587 = Bagchi, p. 426 (28), translated by
Paramartha in 557-569. 15 leaves.
129. MAHANAMA, Saddhamrnappakūsiaī on the
Patisambhidñrnagga (520)
The author mentions his name as " Mahānāma..who lived in the
121.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Vidrāpravartanasastra (515)
Mahāvihāra in a pariurena donated by a minister", and gives his date as
N.1214, translated by Paramartha in 557-569. 8 leaves.
370 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MAHAYANABHISAMAYA 371

when king Moggalāna was dead for three years". 1n Jinayaśas. on whom see Bagchi, pp. 274-275, who rejects the translation
"
The commentary begins with the statement that Sāriputta explained of this author's name by Nanjio as "Jñānayaśas". He was the teacher of
the Dhammacakkapavattanasutta by composing the Patisanthhidāmagga, Yaśogupta and Jñānagupta. and translated six works during 564-572.
thus indicating the main theme of the attainment of enlightenment by
understanding the four truths. It continues by seeking to present the
Patisantbhidāmagga as a systematic and orderly exposition of the way to ASVABHAVA (520?)
arahant-ship, with each topic leading necessarily to the next. This is Asvabhāva 's commentary on the Mahāvānasūirālarimkāra seems to
done by supplying lengthy expositions in the commentary to smooth out have been known to Sthiramati, a sixth century author (see below), and
the rough statements and extend them with elaborations." '" his commentary on the Mahāyāna.sańtgralia was known to Dharmapāla
of about the same period.

130. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Pītaputrasanuīgamasūtra (?) (520)

This work is translated by Narendrayaas in 568, and is identified 133.ASVABHAVA, Upanibandha on Asaitga 's
in K.22 (16) = T.310 (16) = N.23 (16). However, Bagchi, p. 270 (1) Mahāyānasamgraha (520?)
reports that at least one Chinese authority denies that what Narendrayaśas Volume One (Bibliography) of this Encyclopedia, Third Edition, p.
has translated is T.310 (16). 215, wrongly indicates this work has been translated by Lamotte. It has
not been translated at all to the best of our knowledge.

131. VINITABHADRA, Bhnsya on Vasubandhu's

Abhidharmakośakārikās (520?) 134.ASVABHAVA, Fad on Asadga's Mahāyānasūtrālarizkāra
(520?)
Summary by Christian Lindtner Noriaki Hakamaya has studied this work in two articles. 15" It exists
only in Tibetan (Peking 5530). Hakamaya is mainly interested in the
The original Sanskrit is lost; what survives is the Tibetan relation of this work, and its author 's date, to Sthiramati 's commentary on
translation (Peking/Tokyo Tibetan Tripitaka text no. 5592), volume 115, the MSA, and his study is confined to only a few verses (viz., IX.56-76
p. 282 to Volume 116, p. 43. This is a simple rehash of Vasubandhu's and XIV.34-35).
Abhidharmakośabhāsya, which shortens Vasubandhu 's Sautrāntika
objections to the Vaibhāşika system, and, aside from the invocatory
verses, adds absolutely nothing new. ' 135.AUrHOR UNKNOWN, Ekādaśamukhaht'davasūtra (525)
K.309 =T.1070 = N.327 = Bagchi, p. 276 (3) was transiated by
Yaśogupta into Chinese for the first time some time between 561 and
I32.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mahāyānābhisamayasūtra (520) 578. See Bagchi for information about Yaśogupta.
K.15I = T.673 = N.195 = Bagchi, p. 274 (2). The translator is

KAMBALA (525)
I. Marek Mejor, op. cit., pp. 29-38 discusses the attribution of this
Christian Lindtner has discussed the dating of this author (in
work to Sariighabhadra in the Tibetan tradition, and concludes that it may
Miscellanea Buddhica (Indiske Studier 5) (Copenhagen 1985), pp. 114-
indeed perhaps be a version of Sadtghabhadra's Samayapradipikā.
115. He comes to the conclusion that Kambala flourished in the period
372 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ALOKAMALA 373

between 450 and 525 A.D. Sukumar Dutt (Buddhist Monks and kind of conceptual thinking. It is not really what we think, but the fact
Monasteries of India, London 1962, p. 291) reports that Kambala is said that we think that prevents us from becoming free. Conceptual thinking
by Hsiian-tsang to be a man of South India who settled finally at Valabhī creates the world, which is, therefore, an error.
with Sthiramati. 10-14. It is extremely difficult to achieve that state of mind, or
liberation, where subject and object have vanished. Only the Buddhas
know it from personal experience. Though, in a way, it is all quite
136. KAMBALA, Ālok,ndlū (525) simple, the rest of us can only try our best to come that far.
15-17. Nevertheless phenomena such as dreams and illusions are
Summary by Christian Lindtner very helpful analogies for getting an idea of what everything is really
like.
This is a didactic poem on mind-only (cittamātratā) in 282 verses, 18-26. It all comes about as a result of ignorance. The sun, the
composed by Kambala (ca. 450-525 A.D.). It may well have been the moon, the sky - all are manifestations of mind and as long as our karmic
last śāstra of its kind to have been written in India before Mahayana traces are still active, duality will prevail.
philosophy was " officially" split into two "schools": Mādhyamika and 27. In the perfected state there is no subject inside, no object outside.
Yogācāra. For Kambala, the old masters Nāgārjuna, Asaitga,
28-35. This means that emotions and all other psychological
Vasubandhu, etc., simply represent Mahayana. A few decades after the phenomena are as unreal as the external ones, and therefore one can say,
Alokamālā was composed Bhavya (ca. 490-570) launched his critique of somewhat paradoxically, that absence of pleasure is really not much
Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, etc., and thus created a schism which
better than pleasure.
subsequent generations did their best either to enhance, or, more 36-43. Obviously, therefore, there is no such thing as "objective
frequently, to "resynthesize." truth." Consequently, the ultimate criterion of truth is (psychological)
We can trace the influence of Kambala in Bhavya, Dharmakirti and usefulness, and nothing is as useful for what really matters, namely
many later authors, especially some of those belonging to a Tantric freedom from ignorance, as the teachings of Mahayana.
tradition.
44-52. We all agree that liberation is the ultimate goal and that this
There is an old Indian commentary ( )Tka) ascribed to *Asvabhāva can only be achieved by understanding the true nature of things.
who may have been almost a contemporary of Kambala. From a According to Mahayana everything arises from the trace-seeds stocked in
philosophical point of view it hardly has more to offer than AM itself and the storehouse consciousness. One cannot rationally explain how duality
does, therefore, not call for a separate sumtnary. 15 The summary of AM comes about, but it does, in the same way as a sound and its echo.
is based on the first edition of the text (with the Tibetan translation) 53-55. As said, only the Buddha really understands the nature of
published by me with an annotated English version in Miscellanea mind.
Buddhica (Copenhagen 1985), pp. 109-221.
56-60. What we can do is to practise spiritual cultivation which has
the power of transforming e.g. poison into elixir of life.
1-3. The Buddha is to be praised for having taught that everything is 61-76. The practice of cultivation, however, presupposes a rationally
but mind, a fact that can only be realized by development of the three founded philosophy of the world. Therefore the author provides a long
natures, the abolition of ignorance. If one realizes the expanded world list of arguments to the effect that we can only explain everyday
(prapañca) to be mere mind one is not reborn any more and therefore an phenomena on the assumption that they are really only mind. For
intelligent person will meditate on the three natures so as to obtain the instance, the power of a magnet to attract metal is due to its mental
liberating insight. power.
4-9. Samsāra is a mind beset by defilements. These defilements are 77-96. The truth is, to be sure, that the organs and objects of our
due to conceptual thought and therefore a sensible person will avoid any senses are created by the traces stocked in the storehouse consciousness.
374 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ALOKAMALA 375

The duality is unreal, due to ignorance. The doctrine of mind-only is an constructed has its basis in mind, i.e., in the dependent nature, our task
excellent hypothesis for explaining numerous phenomena that would is clearly to see the absence of the former in the latter. The former is
otherwise be difficult to account for. Another positive effect of this unreal, the latter real. This is emptiness or the perfected nature. One
doctrine is that when one secs that the world is but a reflection of mind, can, therefore, only enter emptiness, which is simply absence of the
one will develop a laudable moral behaviour, for "When mind takes the constructed nature in the dependent nature, through a personal experience
form of a woman, which bashful lover will by himself love himselfl". of the three natures. The presence of construction is due to the activity
97-103. The Mahāyāna doctrine of mind-only also explains why "
of traces and can only be overcome by cognition. The dependent nature
different beings experience different things even under the same shines clearly when the constructed (imagined) object is in a state of
circumstances. This is due to the variety of their karma. In a strange way cessation, " and "When (the dependent nature) has gradually eliminated
"the variety of the sense objects at the same time in various ways follows the appearance of (the constructed nature), emptiness shines anew in one's
"
a conceptual scheme, just like the symphony of an orchestra." mind, sustaining, so to speak, the (dependent nature). From time
104-111. One cannot argue that the external world must be real without beginning there is a strong tendency to duality that can only be
because it " works" in a purposeful and efficient manner. It is a matter of abolished when emptiness is finally established, i.e., in Buddhahood.
common experience that ideas are often no less powerful than "things." 142cd-165. The concept of emptiness has nothing to do with nihilism,
"Objects" are no more than wrongly interpreted experiences, sheer because negation and affirmation, existence and nonexistence, are
ignorance. interdependent conceptual constructions only operating on a relative level
"
112-116. When a yogi understands--and this is a wonderful of truth. The same goes for language and the "objects referred to. They
experience--that the triple world is simply a creation of karma, he has are mutually dependent, which means that language has no bearing upon
abandoned fear and all kinds of defilements. absolute reality. Language is, so to say, talking to itself. Perception and
117-125. "But what is the point of wasting many a word? If one inference are valid in a relative sense, the former provides direct
practises cultivation one may even see horns growing on the head of a knowledge, the latter indirect. But they have nothing to do with reality
dog, a rabbit, or a horse! " After all these arguments to the effect that beyond duality.
everything is only mind the important thing is now to change one's entire 166-169. Philosophers must understand the (three) natures, viz., the
"
personality by getting used to the idea. It is spiritual cultivation that constructed, etc., in due order: The object "elephant, its appearance and
accounts for how we experience things and what we take to be real. Half its absence based on one single elephant created by a magician (are
an hour's separation from the woman you love seems to last a hundred respectively) being empty of objective status, having objective appearance
years. and being the basis of belief in an external thing which is false. To a
126. An enlightened person does not discard the world of Buddhist yogi considering the three natures thus together, the belief in an external
practise, he just looks upon it as an illusion. object is the first to cease while mind appears before him having that
126-142ab. In order to enter a state of freedom, tantamount to image of the dependent nature. Later on, in the eighth stage, the impurity
emptiness or undivided consciousness, one must contemplate the three of the dependent image, being without residues, disappears by seeing the
natures by means of practice, which thus serves as a sort of meditative nonexistence of that thing (i.e., of a dependent essence).
self-psychotherapy based on knowledge and rational understanding of 170-200. In the perfected state one "is unmanifest, desireless and
"
Buddhist tradition. - The three natures are, we would say, but three motionless like a portrait. From the ultimate point of view all the
different degrees, or modes, of understanding of the same " thing", they Buddhist teachings belong to the realm of conventional reality. Those
are neither absolutely the same, nor absolutely different. Things are who have lapsed into conceptual constructions are under the law of karma
usually understood in terms of language, names, etc. This is the dual and rebirth. The world of common experience is abolished in emptiness.
constructed nature. This is, as arguments have demonstrated, unreal. "
When the yogi thus sees the triple world consumed by the fire of
Things are not what they first appear to be. Since, however. the emptiness he does not desire anything, even if he traverses samsāra.
376 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ALOKAMALA 377

When he abides in emptiness he is not subject to the slightest application, Placed in (one's mental) continuum the perfection of wisdom
behaviour. discrimination or sphere of action." The yogi who has (incorporated in this treatise) always (fulfills every wish), like a magical
realized emptiness is beyond suffering and desire. thought-gem. "'
201-202. When he has taken up position in the immovable he is in
possession of unlimited power. We should all strive to reach this state
without fear.
203-245ab. Meditation is extremely important and even a householder
is advised to meditate "on the three natures of phenomena whenever he
has a moment's leisure." He should become familiar with the idea that
'
things are not what they appear to be. The constructed nature is like a Considered from a somewhat modem point of view we can
dream. Gradually the dependent nature becomes free from conceptual distinguish the following main formative elements in Kambala's
constructions and the practitioner abides in the perfected nature. When exposition of Mahayana. The religious element is the first and also the
he understands that the constructed is unreal he should he careful not to most basic. One starts by accepting, with faith and devotion, the corpus
think that it does not exist, emptiness being beyond duality. "A yogi of Buddhist tradition, probably from one ' s personal guru and as a member
enters (the state of pure) mind without touching the two 'flanks', just as of the order. This is āgania. Reason may have some role to play, but the
a demon (enters his) abode through a door besmeared with magic decision to follow one religion rather than another is based largely on
plaster." He then has a vivid experience of the illusory nature of the factors beyond reason, such as environment, etc. Then philosophy comes
world. The experience of the absence of the unreal in the real, i.e., in the in as the handmaiden of religion. One's knowledge of tradition is
dependent nature which is his own mind, is at the same time a "mystical" worthless if not supported by arguments. Epistemology, logic, and
experience of the perfected nature as being "without parts, without dialectics serve to clarify and defend one's own beliefs. When one has
beginning and end, without appearance and without apprehension; without cone that far a psychological element plays the major role. In Sanskrit
agitation, without labour, neither long nor round, spotless like space it can be expressed in one word, "(spiritual) practice " (bhāvanol. There
where darkness has been dispelled by the sun." is no single word in any western language to cover all the shades of
"
245cd. Again the author is careful to underscore that "The visible meaning of this term, for the simple reason that it is a " make-become of
world is only acceptable in a conventional sense, not in the absolute what tradition and reason have persuaded us to believe to be true and
sense." real, though we ourselves are still far from experiencing it as such. It has
246-250. Speaking of the two truths means the presence of to_ do with meditation, sure, but also with creating a new world infinitely
construction, the dependent nature the absence of constructions. The more real and rewarding than the one(s) we are used to. If we are to
-
absolute is beyond words, but words are nevertheless indispensable for follow Kambala and his fellow Buddhists, EAOland has the wonderful
teaching and converting those who are generally attached to the world power to bring us into a state where the old world is experienced as an
and their conceptual ideas about it. illusion and a new one unfolds itself as omnipotence, omniscience and
251-282. Kambala concludes his work by extolling all the marvellous ineffable satisfaction. We are, in other words, dealing neither with
benefits and merits to be derived from adhering to Mahāyāna and finally philosophy nor even religion, but with phenomena belonging to that
realizing emptiness, omniscience, etc. "I have composed the Alokamālā branch of modem psychology which deals with "altered states of
to dispel the darkness of ignorance for those who are heading the wrong consciousness. " It can hardly be denied that the description of the
way. It abolishes the belief in the reality (of object and subject); it accomplished yogi and the methods employed to attain fulfilment
destroys the desire for sense objects; it engenders the light (of cognition) coincide with observations made by modern psychology in the study of
in the mind (of a Bodhisattva) as clearly as a big lamp. By creating the dreams, hypnosis and the effects of various intoxicants (hallucination.
light of cognition the absolute truth even rests in one's hand, so to speak. psychedelic experiences, etc.).
378 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES NAVAŚLOKA 379

137.KAMBALA, Navaśloka or Piñdārtha mirage.

on the Astasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra (525) 7 (T228).What is cognized or grasped, then, is not an external object,
but only a reflection of mind. Since time without beginning mind has
Summary by Christian Lindtner been appearing as a duality of grasping subject and grasped objects, the
two constantly reflecting and mutually influencing one another.
This text consists of nine verses ascribed to Kambala. There is no 8-9 (T228-229) Even the experience in deep meditation as well as a
reason to doubt that it is by the same author as Alokamālā when one yogi's cognition of the mind of other beings (see Alokamālā 110) cannot
compares the two texts carefully. Being a summary of the Astasāhasrikā be said to have something real as its object. This, then, means that all
recension of the Pra iidpāramitā it belongs to the same literary genre as the acts and " objects" of cognition are empty like space..
the Prajñāpāramitāpindārtha of Dignāga, a work to which Alokamālā has A person who considers things in this way and in addition has a
some allusions. Indeed the nava, "nine" or "new", in the title not only strong wish to obtain realization will finally (i.e., by means of spiritual
refers to the rather odd number of verses (really 10) but may well allude cultivation (see the preceding summary of Alokamālj) experience the
to Dignāga 's summary. The Sanskrit text is edited with two Tibetan and highest knowledge, i.e., a nondual cognition, or prajñāpāramitā.
one Chinese version by G. Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts (Roma 1956), pp.
209-231, and translated there (our "T"). There is also a commentary
(Tad) to our text. It is quite elementary and contains nothing of 138.KAMBALA, Abhisamayapañjikā (525) 158
independent philosophical interest. I incorporate it occasionally in the
summary of the verses. in themselves quite condensed.
I39.KAMBALA, Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (525) 15 '
1 (T226) Rebirth, or individual existence, can, from a relative point
of view, be defined as the six internal, or personal āvatanas, i.e., the five
senses and mind. They are all created by the power of karma and can, 140.KAMBALA, Saptaśloktthhagavatīprajñāpāramitāsūtra
'5"
from the absolute point of view, be compared to a reflected image. (525)
2 (T226) To the six internal senses correspond the six external ones,
i.e., material form and the remaining objects of sense. The material
159
world is also created by the power of karma and therefore, from the 141.KAMBALA. Tattvaprabhāsākaranadīpa (525)
absolute point of view, comparable to a town created by the power of
magic.
3 (T227) The second external sense, sound, is similar to an echo. 142.DHARMADASA (530)
This applies even to the words that communicate the Dharma. A Vijñānavādin, he taught Dharmapāla, according to Tāranātha.
4 (T227) Also, the other objects of sense, viz., smell, taste, and touch, Candrakirti in his Catuhśatakavŗtti speaks of examples set forth by
can be compared to a dream. Dhannadāsa, suggesting Dharmadāsa may have commented on or at least
5 (T227) Since, as said, the internal as well as the external senses do studied Aryadeva 's Catuhśataka.
not exist from the absolute point of view, one can compare the individual
body that acts without a soul "inside" to a puppet moved by the magic
contrivance of karma. 143. AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
6 (T227) What about the objects of mind, the factors? From a Suvikrāntavikrñmipariprcchñ.sīara (530?)
relative point of view, it is true, they are momentary, but from the Suvikrñntavikrāmipaript cchāsūtra
absolute point of view they are deprived of individual nature, like a This snow is quoted by Bhavya as well as by Candrakirti.
380 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES LAKSANUSARINITIKA 381

Bibliographical information will be found in Volume One, Part One of Frustration are acknowledged by them, but they say that each of the
the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, the Bibliography, pp. 237-238. others has only one real aspect. Vasubandhu follows the sūtropadeśa
teachers, Gupamati says.
Conditioned factors are without an intrinsic nature, Gupamati says,
GUNAMATI (530) because they do not arise of themselves. Having arising and destruction,
"Gupamati originated from South India. In the beginning of the sixth they are impermanent.
century he moved from Nālandā to Valabhī and was a founder of the The citations of Yaśomitra (in #190 below):
school in Valabhi. He was a teacher of Sthiramati. Tāranātha informs us (1) Introductory verse. Gupamati is simply mentioned, along with his
that Gupamati, having acquired many-sided knowledge, composed a pupil Vasumitra. His Kośa commentary has not survived.
commentary on the Abhidharmakośa and a commentary. on the (2) Introductory verse. Yaśomitra says that Guñamati's interpretation
Mūlamadhyamaka(-kārikā), in which he followed Sthiramati and refuted of Vasubandhu ' s homage to the Buddha isn't correct (!).
the arguments of Bhavya. Sarhpradūta, Bhavya's disciple, was defeated (3) is the passage cited in the summary of Yaśomitra on I, 4, where
in a dispute by Gupamati in the town Balapuri in the East. i160 The Gupamati claims that all factors may be taken as objects of consciousness
contradiction in the above passage, which speaks of Gupamati as both for afflictions.
teaching and following Sthiramati, is noted by Tom Tillemans (4) occurs at III, 11: In commenting on the passage where
(Materials..., op. cit., p. 57, note 123), who reports that Kajiyama and Vasubandhu states that an intermediary existence between two lives does
Ruegg take Gupamati as Sthiramati's teacher, an opinion which leads us not really exist, ' because the series retakes its course immediately after
to the placement of him at this place in the chronology. death in a new existence without any discontinuity, Yaśomitra states that
Gupamati and his pupil Vasumitra object to this passage " because their
opinions have been influenced by their attachment to their own school of
144. GUNAMATI, Laksānusārinīttkā (530) thought," but gives no details on what this difference of opinion actually
is.
Summary by Stefan Anacker

This work is known only from a fragment, extant in Chinese 145.GUNAMATI, Tikā on Vasubandhu ' s Vyākhyāyukti
translation (Taisho 1641), and by four references by Yaśomitra. This is available in Tibetan as Tohoku 4061.
Taisho 1641 is an examination of the sixteen aspects (ā a:ra) of the
Four Noble Truths, and corresponds to Abhidharmakośa VII, 13 ff.
Gupamati here says: The Vaibhāşikas claim that there are actually sixteen 146.GUNAMATI, TTkci on Vasubandhu's
aspects: four for the Truth of Frustration: "impermanent," " suffering," Pratītyasamutpādādivibhańgan irdeśa
" This is available in Tibetan as Tohoku 3996.
empty," and "without a self'; four for the Truth of the Origination of
Frustration: "cause, " "origin, " "successive causation" (prabhava) in the
sense of forming a series, and " condition " in the sense of supplying a
conditional complex (sāmagr); four for the Truth of the Cessation of
Frustration: " cessation," " calm, " " excellent," and "leading to liberation"
(nihsarana); four for the Truth of the Path: "the Path," "conformable to
logic" (nyāya), "practise" (pratipad), and "relating to liberation"
(nairyānika). But the sūtra-upadeśa teachers say there are only seven
This undermines the rationale underlying the Tibetan Book of the
real aspects involved: the four the Vaibhāşikas accept for the Truth of
Dead!
382 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MAHĀDHARMOLKĀDHĀRANĪ 383
I53.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mahādharmolkādhāranīsūtra (544)
147.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Padmamukha- or
Puñdarīkamukha- sūlra (534) K.388 = T.1340 = N.422 = Bagchi, pp. 449-450 (2) in 20 fascicules.
Translated by Jñānagupta in 594 (or 596) in collaboration with others. Cf.
Translated by Narendrayaśas in 584. K.420 = T.386 = N. 465, which
Bagchi, pp. 449-450 for details.
describes its contents thus: "Buddha spoke this Stara just before he
entered Nirvana, in which he foretold that Lotus-face would in a future
"
ti me break the bowl of Buddha.
154.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Acintyagunasarvabuddhaparigrańasūtra (544)
148. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "Sidra on the good qualities of rare N. 412 = Bagchi, p. 450 (4). Translated by Jñānagupta and others in
594. See Bagchi, p. 450. It comprises 8 chapters.
comparison " (536)
K.249 = T.690 = N. 268 = Bagchi, p. 454 (21), translation is by
Jñānagupta.
I55.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Pañcasahasrapañcaśatabuddhanāmasūtra (544)
K.394 = T.443 = N. 408 Bagchi, p. 450 (5), translated by Jñānagupta
I49.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Dvādaśabuddhakasūtra (537)
and others in 594.
K.301 = N.335 = T.1348 = Bagchi, p. 454 (25), translated by
Jñānagupta in 587. Nanjio describes the work as "Sūtra of the spiritual
156. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Sarvadharmāvacārasūtra (545)
Mantra of the names of twelve Buddhas, which recounts their good
" K.405 =T.649 = N.424 = Bagchi, p. 451 (8), translated by Jñānagupta
qualities, removes obstacles, and destroys sin.
and others in 595.

I50.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Amoghapāśahŗdayaśūtra (537)

157.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mahāsannipātāvadānarājasūtra
K.288 = T.1093 = N.312 = Bagchi, p. 454 (24). Translated by
(545)
Jñānagupta in 587.
K.73 = T.422 = N.78 = Bagchi, p. 452 (15), translated by Jñānagupta
and others in 595.
151.AUTHOR UNKNOWN,
Candrottarādhikārikāvyākaranasūtra(540)
158.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Mahābaladharmikadhāranūūtra
The work is translated into Chinese by Jñānagupta in 591. K.415 =
(546)
T. 480 = N.441 = Bagchi, p. 452 (12). There is also a Tibetan translation.
K.389 = T. 1341 = N. 423 = Bagchi, p. 450 (3), translated by
See Encyclopedia of Buddhism 3.4, 1977, 660-662 for an extended
Jñānagupta and others in 596. A work of 20 chapters.
summary by Ratna Handurakande.

159.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, Agrapradipadhārapīvidyārājasūtra (546)

152. AUTHOR UNKNOWN, K.350 = T.1354 = N.366 = Bagchi, pp. 456-457 (36), translated by
Bhadrapālaśre.sthiparipŗcchāsūtra(541)
Jinagupta around 596. Nanjio 's description: "Sūtra on the spiritual
K.22 (39) = T. 310 (39) = N. 23 (39) = Bagchi, p. 452 (14). mantras of the Tathāgata Anuttaradīparāja who helps, protects and holds
Translated by Jñānagupta and others in 591. the world."
384 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KARATALARATNA 385
160.AUTHOR UNKNOWN, "Sīttra on the Bodhisattva Summary by Karl H. Potter
Akiñcana" (546)
K.409 = T.485 = N.439 = Bagchi, p. 457 (37), translated by CHAPTER ONE
lñānagupta around 596. Lancaster gives the Chinese title as Wu so yu p'u (E33-36; F68-72) The work begins with an introductory section that
sa thing. explains that the purpose of the text is to help readers understand the
truth about emptiness. The author provides a proof of emptiness of
conditioned elements and puts it into the form of an argument as follows:
BHAVAVIVEKA or BHAVYA (550) (I) Thesis: Conditioned (samskrta) elements are empty.
J. Sitaramamma (in Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society 79, 1988, Reason: Because they are originated through causes and
385) has investigated traditions about this author's life. He finds that conditions.
Bhavya was " born in a Kshatriya family of Malayagiri about 20 miles Example: Like things magically created (māyāvat).
from Dhānyakatika," which was Maitgalagiri. He "resorted to Madhyade ga (II) Thesis: Unconditioned elements are nonexistent things
where he became a disciple of Sarhgharakśita and studied with him." (asadbhiita).
There are several stories repeated about him; cf e.g. Malcolm Eckel, To Reason: Because they are not products.
See the Buddha (Princeton 1994), p. 12. Also the Tibetan tradition Example: Like a flower in the sky.
ascribes a number of works (other than those summarized below) to him. All cognizable objects are either conditioned or unconditioned. Those
For example, Nettier and Prebish, "Mahāsāhghika'origins...", History of who do not understand the natures of these two kinds of objects think
Religions 16, 1977, p. 320, report that a work titled they have essential natures and develop false judgments about them, like
Nikāyabhedavibhañgaryākhyāna is attributed to Bhavya by Andre Bareau a painter who imagines his creations to be real. But those who understand
at Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule (Paris 1955), p. 20; Bareau the precise nature of conditioned and unconditioned things admit only
translates this work into French in Journal Asiatique 244, 1956, pp. 167- things that actually exist, and rejecting false views, enter into
171. Von Rospatt (The Buddhist Doct rine of Momentariness (Stuttgart constructionfree wisdom.
1995), p. 29, says that the Tibetan Tanjur ascribes to Bhavya a work What the world unanimously believes exists we admit to exist
titled Śramañapañcāśatkārikādābhismaraña. Sitarammatna reports that the conventionally (sarizvrtisat). On the basis of conventional perception the
Tibetans ascribe to Bhavya a Pañcakramapañjikā. conditions on which those things depend also really exist, comprising the
eye, etc. Thatness (tattva), which is to say the truly essential nature, is
the highest truth (paramdrthasatya), and it is from that point of view that
161. BHAVYA, *Karatalaratna (550) the author intends his thesis that conditioned things are empty, not from
Nanjio 1237 is a work translated into Chinese under the title Chang- the conventional standpoint. To be "conditioned" is to arise from causes
Cheng-lun, which has something to do with a hand and a jewel. It has and conditions: the twelve organs it comprises excluding the factor-organ
been (re-?)translated into Sanskrit (our "E ") and summarized in English (dharmāyatana), i.e., space, calculated and uncalculated cessation and
by N. Aiyasvami Sastri in Visva-Bharati Annals 2, Santiniketan 1949, and thusness. Also excluded from the class of conditioned things are false
reprinted as Visvabharati Series 9 of the same date. Aiyaswami Sastri has appearances such as magical apparitions. And all conditioned factors,
published a briefer (10 pp.) summary as well in the Proceedings of the which opponents take to be actual entities, we hold to be actually empty
Tenth All-India Oriental Conference (Madras 1941), pp. 286-295. Prior from the highest standpoint. "Empty" is a synonym for "without essential
o this Louis de la Vallee Poussin had published a French translation in nature", "falsely appearing".
Melanges chinois et bouddhiques 2, 1932-33, pp. 68-138. This translation (E36-39; F2-74) Something that has both the s-quality and the h-
is signified by "F" below. The summary that is provided here is based quality constitutes the sp, here "things magically created". Not that the sp
on Poussin's translation. has all the qualities of the h and the s--people say, e.g., "the lady's face
 386 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KARATALARATNA 387

is like the moon (in beauty)" but one should not suppose they mean that rūpas are a kind of substance (dravya), and substances a species of
all the moon's properties exist in her face, rather that her face is like the existents (bhāva). According to Sāritkhyas the buddhi is unconscious;
moon in certain respects. things that are destroyed and what is still to be born are real things.
The vp should be something which is absent from the actual case. These sorts of positions that are developed in the schools must be
How does one establish an inference? Truly the eye is empty, devoid admitted to contradict what is commonly understood.
of essential nature, since it is dependently originated. Everything that is Thus the point of view of the highest truth is to examine factors and
dependently originated is empty. This is commonly recognized among not merely accept what is commonly supposed by ordinary folk. Now
cowherds, etc. Since this is the case for various magically appearing we claim that our position represents the true point of view. Thus the
things such as men, women, elephants, horses, palaces, forests, water, attributions of contradictions are without reason, since our position is
fire, etc., which are all born from causally conditioned wood, earth, etc., confirmed by experience. So we do not contradict common experience.
if these magically appearing entities had their actual nature it would not Objection: Proponents of the emptiness of essential nature claim that
be an error to call them erroneous appearances. actually the eye-faculty is empty. This thesis is faulty since the subject
(E40-43; F75-79) Objection: If one could prove that all conditioned (dharmin) is unproved, and the h is also faulty since no locus is specified.
things are empty, then there would be no colors, etc. Now one cannot Answer: Ordinary folk know well eyes, etc. which constitutes our
logically suppose that evidence for the existence of a hare's horn is subject, and the emptiness of those same eyes, etc. is our h. So there is
known; likewise one cannot have evidence for absence of color, since no fault.
such awareness is immediately evident. So your thesis denies the nature Bad logicians object: If eyes, etc. are empty, how can they cognize
of the eye, etc. that are generally known all ordinary people, and a wise conditions? And if they do cognize how can they be empty? If to remedy
man will consequently reject your thesis. Thus your claim contradicts the this one offers an argument it will commit the fallacy of unproven
"
evidence of both one's own and others' experience. (asiddha). E.g., if one says Sound is eternal, because everything is
Answer: What is called " evidence" is, from the highest standpoint, nonetemal, " this commits the fallacy of unproved, since sound is included
empty of essential nature, because it is born from conditions. So my within everything.
"
claim does not contradict the evidence of one's own nature. And men Answer: But we offer as our h because of being dependently
"
with clear vision (vitimira) do not experience the unreal horses, moons, originated" and as our example "like something magically created , which
etc. which are seen by those suffering from eye trouble. So my thesis are generally understood (unlike your alleged counterexample).
does not contradict the experiences of others. We do not deny out of Defenders of essential nature argue: You must admit the visual sense
hand, as deluded men do, the things shown on the evidence of as something having an essential nature, because it functions
experience, since they are experienced. Rather, we reject "evidence" on (sakāritratvāt). What is without an essential nature cannot function, like
the grounds of reasons. the son of a barren woman. The eye has a function, which is to produce
Objection: Your thesis contradicts common experience visual awareness.
Answer: That is not right. We do not contradict our position when Answer: If you are arguing that conditioned things such as the eye,
properly understood, and even if we did, we would not therefore etc. have an essential nature from the conventional standpoint as
contradict common experience. That our thesis contradicts what is understood by ordinary folk you are merely proving what we already
generally understood in other theories is no objection, since all theses admit. But your sp is objectionable if understood from the highest
have as their purpose to undermine what is generally thought to be the standpoint (as there are no sons of barren women). Furthermore, you
position of others. cannot say that an argument (without an .sp) with only a vp is sufficient
Furthermore, according to disciples of the Buddha conditioned things to establish a conclusion, for then one could say that from "Sound is
perish at the same moment (they arise). So all factors are without a self; eternal because it is audible. A pot is neither eternal nor audible " the
there are not living beings (sattva). According to the Vaiśesikas material conclusion that sound is eternal follows.
388 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
KARATALARATNA 389
(E44-47; T79-82) Another objection: The argument and the example
given for "all conditioned things are empty" are themselves conditioned examples are provided.)
There are bad logicians who in order to show the defects in our thesis
things. This constitutes a fallacy.
Answer: But since both parties accept that "all conditioned things" is say: If (conditioned things) are empty of intrinsic nature then the s and
the p there is no problem. If we had said "The eye is empty, because its the h are unproved quite as much as the sound of a son of a barren
nature is empty of essential nature" then the fallacy of unproved h woman's voice. But this argument applies against their contention as
certainly would be committed. Again, if we were to include magical much as ours, and so cannot be used to hide the defects in their system..
(E47-51; T82-87) Objection: Your thesis "truly-all conditioned things
things within our p this would constitute a fallacy of proving what is
already accepted. are empty" is unclear. If it means "actually, all conditioned things are
Some persons of little understanding object: If you claim that all without reality" that very statement, being a conditioned thing, is unreal ,
like the other conditioned things, so the statement contradicts itself, like
conditioned things are empty, your argument, being conditioned, is itself "
empty, and so your h is unproved. saying "this very statement is false. But if your thesis is that "really all
Answer: The unprovenness is only apparent. Followers of the Buddha conditioned things are absolutely absent" then everything is denied and
your thesis as well.
hold that all conditioned things are selfless since causeless. One might
object that this argument itself, being among the conditioned things, is Answer: From the conventional standpoint the existence of a
selfless, and that thus the argument is unproved. But likewise the conscious self is taken as true; from the ultimate standpoint there is no
Sāritkhyas hold that manifest things have as their nature sattva, rajas and self. So there is no contradiction. As for the second claim, we have
lamas because they are different from consciousness. One might object already pointed out that "empty" does not mean absolute absence.
that this argument itself, being among the manifest things, has those three Objection: If conditioned things are, ' like magical creations, empty
as its nature, and so the argument is unproved. Or a Vaiśeşika, who and without an essential nature, then they don't exist, so your view is
argues that language (śabda) is nonetemal because it is a product, can be after all nihilism.
objected to by saying that since his argument is linguistic it is unproved. Answer: You value positive injunctions; we value negative ones.
This sort of argument cannot establish a fault in a theory, for if it could, Though you view a negation as implying some contrasting positive
no one could establish anything by inference. statement, our negation is complete; e.g., for us "there is no white cloth "
Objection: The argument "because it is causally conditioned" is indicates the absence of white cloth alone, and does not imply the
incapable of establishing what you intend it to establish, for it is empty presence of a cloth of another color. Our view is intended to avoid the
of intrinsic nature, like the sounds of the voice of the son of a barren extremes of both etemalism and nihilism.
woman. (E51-54; T87-91) The reason (that things arise from causes) is
Answer: Your reason "because it is empty of intrinsic nature" is unproved from both the standpoint of one's own system or from that of
something you yourself reject, so it can't be a reason for you. others.
Answer: A reason should be something admitted in general by both
Objector: But it is the argument of my opponent!
Answer: No. The meaning of your phrase " for it is empty of intrinsic parties, even if they differ over its specific properties. For example,
nature" is unclear. Does it mean " because it doesn't exist"? Then we don't Vaiśeşikas seek to prove that sound is nonetemal because it is a product,
and their opponent attempts to disprove the reason by questioning
admit it, since we don 't say that our argument doesn't exist. Does your
whether sound is caused by the throat or a stick, etc. And Sātimkhyas
phrase mean "because it falsely appears"? Then the voice of the son of
argue that the five sense-organs are not material products because they
a barren woman is not a proper example. In other words, it is wrong that
an argument admitted by only one adversary is sufficient to establish a are organs like the mental organ, and their opponent questions whether
an organ is produced from the five great elements or from the three
thesis if it is not admitted by the other adversary, whether it is countered
gemas, etc. But such criticisms are futile and constitute a false disproof
by an opposing argument or rejected as leading to absurdity. (Buddhist
of reasons (since both parties agree in admitting the reason offered in its
390 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KARATALARATNA 391

general sense). nonoccurrent it is empty, and that merely proves what is already accepted.
Other teachers who have a high opinion of their position and are Furthermore what is dependently originated is empty for you, and thus
incapable of properly assessing it say: Different actual objects, having a you do not believe in emptiness. But my position is not yours, and so you
certain nature, manifest themselves as colored signs (rītpanimitta) of other do not agree with my argument.
varied actual things. We do not admit that these manifestations are empty You say your dependent nature is unreal to avoid eternalism and that
of essential nature, and so we reject your example of magical apparitions. it is real in order to avoid nihilism. I also accept this kind of reality, and
If you say that these objects and signs are empty inasmuch as they are indeed hold that things ordinarily taken to be real are indeed real in this
unreal, then your thesis merely proves what has already been accepted. sense. So my position is not nihilism.
Answer: Then you admit that the things that appear are other than Objection: But if magically created things are indescribable (as either
they really are, and so you accept my thesis! only real or only unreal) then, since they cannot function as the example,
(E54-62; T91-99) Sātitkhya: Manifest things are evolutes, so your my thesis will not be proved.
reason is unproved. And since the sense-organs pervade everything even Answer: Why should it be thought to be of an indescribable nature?
a magical being must be pervaded'by them, so that your example does If you accept that you 'll be unable to refute the logicians, etc. And if you
not establish emptiness. accept things of dependent nature as real even magically created things
Answer: Awarenesses are not manifestations of, but are caused by will be real. It is unnecessary to point out that nothing real corresponds
their contents which are their conditions. So your charge that our reason to the words of our language.
is unproved is mistaken. Secondly, your claim that the sense-organs Objection: Many defilements arise from attachments born of
pervade everything is untenable, since different things would be language.
manifested and thus appear in the same place. And it is patent that each Answer: Animals do not have language. The cause of defilement is
sense-organ is confined to is proper place and range and that they do not failure to correctly grasp the natures of things. There are many views and
pervade everything. teachings; among them the teaching of the dependent nature is partly
Yogācāra: We agree with your argument. Still, it is rightly said "That applicable, not completely That is why I only speak to you of emptiness.
of which a thing is empty doesn't exist, but what is empty exists ". That (E62-66; T100-104) Objection: If the eye is real it defeats your thesis
is to say, the constructed (parikalpita) nature is absent from the and your h is inconclusive. But if it is actually lacking in essential nature
dependent (paratantra) nature; it is unreal, and so empty. But the your conclusion is unproved.
' Answer: No. The Buddha says there is nothing true and nothing false,
dependent nature exists. If it didn t, that would be nihilism. (For more on
this cf. my (162.3) Tattvāmrtāvatāra.) and I cannot prove anything true or false. Since there is nothing to deny
Answer: If you are saying that conditioned things like the eye are you have denied nothing.
Objection: If there is nothing to be illuminated there are no
empty because in the dependent nature there is nothing that is not
dependently originated, then your are merely proving what is already illuminators.
Answer: In my view an s, an h, a thing denied and a denial and the
accepted. The Sārhkhyas and Vaiśeşikas accept similar theories. But your
rest of logic all exist on the conventional level. So my reasoning is not
position is more specifically that conditioned things are empty through
their lacking the essential nature of nonarising (anutpattiniluvabhāvatas), defective.
The reason "because they are dependently originated " is not the only
not through their lacking the nature of arising. If when arising things
really have the nature of arising than how could they lack the nature of one proving emptiness; one could also argue from perishability, from the
arising'? If things do not really arise then, since they lack an essential difference in causes, etc.
Objection: The eye really has an essential nature since its properties,
nature, you should not say that there is consciousness-only
causes, and results clearly exist, and what has real properties is real.
(r(jitaptinitrata). However, if you clarify you position thus, then since
the . dependent nature lacks the essential nature of arising and so is Answer: This cannot be established from the highest standpoint. On
392 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KARATALARATNA 393

the conventional level affirming it is proving what is already accepted. apply to all that is nonexistent, and your argument commits the fallacy
And the same argument applies to all the other senses. A yogi should of unproved reason.
meditate on all of them and penetrate their insubstantiality, and then Answer: This is only a futile rejoinder through presumption. What is
repeat the process for all other factors and worldly concepts. Having done contended is that all nonproduced things are unreal, not that all unreal
so, he should continue to repeat this meditation. As soon as he achieves things are nonproducts. E.g., existing following effort can be a good h
the sixth stage of a Bodhisattva he will feel great joy and acquire great even if it is not present in every sp.
virtue and wisdom, helping others on a grand scale. Only a person who Objection: The sky has an essential nature since it is unanimously
is free from any wrong ideas is capable of walking the Bodhisattva path. admitted. Flowers are also generally seen. So neither are without essential
And realizing that what is unborn is not bound by the limitations of time nature, and thus their combination, a sky-flower, can't be without essential
past, present or future he attains the highest enlightenment (mahābodhi). nature either. So the example is defective.
Answer: The Sanskrit compound being translated as "sky-flower" is
CHAPTER TWO actually a genitive compound which can be rendered as "a flower in the
sky" (not "flower and sky"!). Since that flower is nonexistent it can
(E67-70; T105-108) As regards properly function as example.
II.Thesis: Unconditioned things are nonexistent (asadbhūta), (E70-73; T108-112) Vaibhāşika: The Buddha has said that there is an
Reason: Because they do not arise (anutpāda), unconditioned entity called calculated cessation which is an antidote to
'
Example: Like a sky-flower. conditioned things. If you deny this you deny the Buddha's words
Again this is not the only h that can be adduced for the thesis: failure to validity.
function, etc. can also be used. And (again) this argument is offered from Answer: Buddha teaches this to instil disgust for composite things
the highest standpoint, not the conventional level. Unconditioned things and a desire for deliverance and peace. From the highest standpoint he
include space, calculated and uncalculated cessation, and thatness: it is denies such a thing exists. There is no contradiction in this: the same
that part of the factor-organ (dharmdvatana) to which thesis (I) does not holds for all talk of liberation, peace, etc. These are all metaphors: from
apply. the highest standpoint there is no thing with an essential nature called
"
The word " space" (ākāśa) suggests what is empty, that which is nirvana."
without resistance and substantiality. Thus we argue that space, which is Objection: Since noncomposite things are unreal, your thesis lacks a
familiar to the world, is actually empty, unreal. Both systems p. And because there are no sky-flowers you have no sp. So your
( Mādhyamikas and Sautrāntikas, suggests Poussin) agree on this. argument is defective.
Vaibhāşika: If your thesis is that unconditioned things are Answer: There is no fault since all these things are commonly
nonexistent, i.e. absences, then the meditation on space is without a referred to.
supporting object. So how can it occur? Actually, space is that existent Vaibhāşika: Calculated cessation is real since it provides the
which is free from any obstruction. supporting object for (our idea of) the path and acts as an antidote to
Answer: If your argument is that the meditation on space has a defilements. An unreal thing couldn't act thus.
supporting object because it is a meditation, then your argument Answer: This argument, having no vp, has already been refuted.
necessarily lacks an sp, since all meditative objects are empty, and is thus Sautrāntika: (II) merely proves what is already accepted, since we do
defective. not hold unconditioned factors to exist.
Objection by some of our own followers as well as by others: If you Answer: My thesis not only affirms that, but also negates
are correct then what is produced really exists: this is known by unconditioned factors' nonexistence as well.
presumption (arrthāpatti). Do you want to say that whatever is produced Tāmraśātiya: What is termed "space" is actually the color of empty
does not exist? Then the reason " because they do not arise" does not holes. For us space is conditioned; we deny unconditioned space. So your
394 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KARATALARATNA 395

argument proves what is already accepted. Hīnayāna: Though the three vehicles (seekers, those self-enlightened
Answer: We have already shown that conditioned things are without and Bodhisattvas) differ about the equipment, the senses and in resolve
essential nature. they see eye to eye on what constitutes full understading and the noble
Since the Vaibhāsika theories are the same as those of the path.
Vātsīputrīyas, refuting the one refutes the other. Answer: All we Buddhists believe these. But in trying to avoid the
(E73-76; T112-116) Yogācāra: There is no higher truth than the defilements by taking the standpoint of conventional truth, the path (of
highest truth. Thusness is the highest truth about factors, so one can say each vehicle) seems different. But it is impossible to cover over the
that thusness is truly empty. But it is wrong to add that it is without contents of awareness without entering into the selflessnes of all factors.
essential nature. How can it be that transcendent and constructionfree Hīnayāna: In that case the Buddha should have taught a partial
knowledge is about an unconditioned content? It can't. Just as it is wrong deliverance, rather than (as he did) asserting the nondifference in the
to say that awareness has what is unconditioned as the supporting object liberation gained through all the paths.
of its content, so one cannot confirm that thusness really exists, since the Answer: He spoke correctly, and did not intend to assert
nature of reality is impossible to establish. If one could know that '
nondifference from all standpoints. Both a hair on one s head and the
thusness is truly transcendent and constructionfree it would be a universe are alike empty, but the difference between them remains. If it
supporting object and so conditioned. In other words thusness is not were otherwise there would be no distinction between better and worse
really the highest thing, because it is an object like matter/color. results.
Answer: If a thing is termed " empty " because it is not found in that (E78-80; TI17-120) So a yogi should penetrate not only Buddhist
"
thing, then everyone knows that. But emptiness is put forth to refute categories but those of other ("Hindu and Jain) systems as well.
wrong views, not right ones. The view that inside the truth there is Sāmkhya: Our system holds that the three elements (the guñas)
another truth is a wrong view. And to say that thusness is not real transform themselves into a flower in the sky, so a sky-flower is not
contradicts the following correct argument: the Tathāgata (i.e., the unreal. So your example is defective inasmuch as it contradicts the thesis.
Buddha) does not see sarihsāra or nirvana. He knows that there are no Answer: Are these three elements the sky-flower or not? If so it
defilements produced by errors, that passions are really unborn. Being contradicts both your system and common sense. And if not, there being
"
thus-gone " (tathāgata, i.e., realized, a Buddha) is to be absolutely free no sky-flower, our example is acceptable and your position is
from conceptual constructions. undermined.
If you argue that thusness, although beyond language, has an essential Sāmkhya: I do not attempt to prove the reality of purusa and prakrti
nature (i.e., is real), then what you call "thusness" is just the self of the directly, but rather point to the common experience of evolved things to
Tīrthikas (non-Buddhist philosophers), for they say the same things about establish their reality. On the one hand, manifest things have existence as
the self you are saying about thusness--e.g., that it is beyond language, their cause, for they are that sort of thing. On the other hand, manifest
beyond conceptual construction, beyond categorization. It is wrong to things have enjoyers since they are enjoyed, like food and drink for
equate thusness with the self of the non-Buddhists. Brahmins.
(E77-78; TI 16-117) Hinayana: Conditioned and unconditioned factors Answer: This argument either proves what is already accepted or, if
belonging among the twelve senses (āyatana) certainly have essential it is understood in only a general way, is unproved, since not everyone
natures, comprising as they do the twelve starting with frustration, etc. accepts the Sāmkhya categories. Or else it lacks an acceptable sp since
which comprise the four noble truths. One who understands the four e.g. delusion, a gaga, is found nowhere among the aggregates. As for the
truths and follows the paths of vision and cultivation destroys the fires of argument about enjoyers and enjoyed, it is not commonly admitted that
their defilements and terminates the frustrations of the three spheres. the einjoyer, food and drink have substantial essences. So your argument
Answer: Since all factors are empty who is it that will avoid these fails.
faults, who will cultivate the spiritual qualities? (E81-83 T120-122) Vaiśesika: Breathing, opening and closing the
 KARATALARATNA 397
396 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

eyes, mental occurrences, changes in one's organs -- all these are marks should reason thus: when things are empty of essential nature, a
discriminative thought of emptiness is also not a real entity, as it has been
of something that is marked (viz., a self).
conditioned by causes like magically created things. Meditating in this
Answer: Again, if this argument is understood generally it merely
manner he suppresses the thought which discriminates emptiness, etc. By
proves what is already accepted. But if it is supposed to prove an eternal,
suppressing it he avoids the two•extremes of emptiness and nonemptiness,
all-pervading self it fails for want of an sp. In the same fashion we refute
and no more looks at things in the aspect of either." (A long passage
the reality of time, space, etc.
from the Śatasāhasrikāprajflgpāramitā is cited in support of this.)
Vaiśeşika: Atoms and internal organs are unconditioned entities. Your
argument for their emptiness, viz., " because they are not produced" is "...This path is termed "formless" as it is free from the grasp of
conditioned and unconditioned things; " matchless" as there is nothing that
unproved both for you and for your opponent (since it doesn 't apply to " "
may be compared with it; supportless because there is neither supporter
unconditioned entities).
nor supported; "imageless" because there persists no image whatever of
Answer: It is only conventionally that the internal organ and atoms
either conditioned or unconditioned things; and it is named also
are unconditioned entities. The internal organ is not actually
"consciousnessless " since no consciousness of any kind is at work
unconditioned, since it is the cause of the occurrences of awareness, just
there...„'''
as color, etc. are such causes. Atoms are not really unconditioned since
(E88-99; T128-138) Yogācārins say "the highest constructionfree
they are material causes of the arising of things, like a thread (which is
awareness is free from all notions of grasper and grasped." Others
the material cause of a cloth). Other arguments defeat further aspects of
respond that that awareness should not be termed " constructionfree"
(the Vaiśesika) view. For example, gross things constituted by double-
since it involves the construction of an essential nature and is produced
atoms do not have causes that are eternal (as Vaiśesikas claim atoms are),
by causes, being the supporting object of the Yogācārin's knowledge.
since they are produced things like pots. These arguments show that
These arguments show the defects in the Yogācāra definitions. From the
atoms and internal organs are empty of essential nature.
highest standpoint transcendent constructionfree awareness is not real,
(E83-88; T123-127) Having dealt with all these objections the yogi
since it is causally conditioned, like a magic show.
understands through correct reasoning the nature of emptiness. It remains
When all grasping has ceased no further ideas are entertained.
for him to master the cultivation through meditation by which the
(Scriptural passages cited.) That is correct vision, that is comprehension..
obstructions are finally overcome.
" The remainder of the text extols the character of the realized state, its
When...the image of conditioned and unconditioned things appears
lack of movement, its quietude, its wisdom, its knowledge Finally, the
as one aspect before the mind's eye of the yogin, he should suppress it by
results of achieving this state are succinctly summarized.
looking upon it as empty of essential nature, and thus he enters into its
original emptiness on the plea that all elements of existence are aloof
from any nature; and then he gradually enters into the principle of
162. BHAVYA, Madlryamakahrdayakārikñ and TarkajrXii (550)
nonduality by dwelling upon things as bereft of any aspect. By this
thereon
process of meditation he is able to suppress the image of either Christian Lindtner has discussed the evidence that favors the
conditioned or unconditioned things in such a way as they will never
identification of the author of both the kārikās and the Tarkajvālā as the
arise again."
" same person, a view that was once questioned.' He finds sufficient
Though the yogin does not dwell on it, he is not yet absolutely free reasons to accept their identity. Lindtner points out that the Sanskrit text
from the flow of consciousness which is stained with a tendency to have of the kārikās is extant, that it was handcopied by Rahula Sankrtyayana
a content since the discriminative thought of selflessness is still operating. and the manuscript photographed by Giuseppe Tucci in Tibet.
As he is not yet in the possession of unshakable knowledge, he is
The kmikrīs are available in Chinese as T.5255, and the Tarkajvālā as
removed from transcendent constructionfree knowledge through this
T.5256. Lindtner notes that "much work has been done, above all in
persistence of discriminative thought. In order to remove this handicap he
398 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJVALA 399

Japan; see H. Nakamura, 'A survey of Mahāyāna Buddhism with who are in the depths of despair, what use would his achievements be?
biographical notes (II)', Journal of Intercultural Studies 4, 1977, 126-128." 1.12-14 (ET9I-92) A stingy person is reproved by wise men for
It is likely that the original name of this work was Tattvāmrtāvatāra enjoying himself alone; how much more the realized one who has the
and that it first existed in the form of the first three chapters below. means to end all kinds of frustrations.
1.15-16 (ET94) Before, when I was beset with defilements I inflicted
162.1 Bodhicittūparityūga frustrations on those already suffering. But to those who in another birth
"ET" references are to the edition and translation found in would repay me with love, respect and kindness how can I respond
V.V.Gokhale, ""Madhyamakahrdayakārikā Tarkajvāļā , Miscellanea
"
except by leading them to release from their frustrations?
Buddhica (ed. Chrs. Lindtner). Indiske Studier 5 (Copenhagen 1985), pp. 1.17-19 (ET96-97) Wise men are not bound by their various
76-108. Gokhale provides the Sanskrit text and an English translation of existences; they are gladdened by the joy of helping others, having
the kārikās together with an English translation from the Tibetan of the blocked the doors of bad courses, having seen emptiness and destroyed
commentary (TJ). For the most part the commentary fleshes out what is the defilements. Because of their merit these wise men see the six courses
given in the verse. as a festival and are not scared by rebirth.
1.20-21 (ET98-99) Having seen into faults they abide neither in the
Summary by Karl H. Potter world nor in liberation, since they are touched with mercy, continuing to
dwell here having seen that both samsāra and nirvāna are neither the
I.1-3 (ET81-82) Reverence is paid to the instructor whose speech is same nor different.
without error, who reveals the truth beyond language, inference and 1.22-25 (ET99-100) Having attaned the seven factors of enlightenment
comprehension, which truth is without characterizing marks, which is to which gods and devils pay homage, having filled the ten quarters with
inconceivable, which has neither beginning nor end, which is the light of their glory, having preserved the lineage of the three jewels
constructionfree, peaceful and beyond thought. through their spiritual sons, they who have attained liberation through
" "
TJ: The truth (tattva) is "beyond language" since words do not working both for their own and others' liberation are truly completed
name actual entities. Its synonyms are suchness, the dharmadhātu, and (nirvrta); even those whose aggregates are not yet cut off can be called
emptiness. It is "beyond inference" since it has no form to serve as so.
content. 1.26-28 (ET102) One with low ideals hardly yearns for Buddhahood.
I.4 (ET85) To help others to attain enlightenment what I can Who then will not desire to achieve such an immeasurable state?
understand is being explained here. I.29-32 (ET103-106) Who, engaged in heroic acts for others' benefit,
1.5 (ET86) The road (carya) to the attainment of all ends involves the would not live in sarhsāra, however long, as if it were only for a day?
nonabandonment of the awareness of enlightenment (bodhicittāparityāga) What wise man will not follow the path of a teacher and become a
and a quest for correct awareness (tattvajñānai3añai). legend? Who would not turn frail body into one having the strength of
1.6 (ET87) Awareness of enlightenment is the seed of the Buddha Mt. Sumeru by making it into an instrument for others' welfare? Out of
who has great loving kindness, great compassion and great knowledge, compassion he makes his body into a source of emerging happiness for
which leads a wise man to seek its nonabandonment. others.
TJ: Great knowledge is of two sorts, knowledge of means and of I.33 (ET106) That moment (of birth) when the eight kinds of bad
wisdom. moments are excluded provides the illumination of the true dharma, and
I.7-8 (ET88-89) It is appropriate that one who cannot stand the should be made to bring about its result through the road of a great man.
frustrations of others should, after having rescued himself, seek to rescue
the whole world from the lower realm of rebirth.
I.9-11 (ET90) If one who is liberated should not rescue the others
400 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA/TARKA J VALA 401

162.2 Munivratasamāśraya (kamnandalu) in the form of Faith (śraddha7, and with the gates of his
"ET" refers to V.V.Gokhale, "The second chapter of Bhavya's senses guarded as it were by constant awareness (smrti), he has his seat
Madhyamakahrdaya (Taking the Vow of an Ascetic)", Indo-Iranian on the reed-mat of Endurance (dhrti).
Journal 24, 1972, 40-45. Since the Chapter is short we provide Gokhale's I1.9 (ET44) He has his dwelling in the luxurious forest-hermitage of
translation of the kārikās in its entirety. Mahāyāna, where he nourishes himself upon the fruits of happiness, born
of meditation; and the sphere of his actions is represented by the location
Translation by V.V. Gokhale of (the four kinds of) mindfulness (smrtyupasthdna).
11.10 (ET44) He has destroyed all his sins by giving oral instruction
11.1 (ET42) Having thus gone in for a resolute acceptance of the in the Sūtrānta-texts, which are profound and extensive, while chanting
(vow, in respect of the) Great Wisdom for the sake of the good of the to himself as it were the Hymn to the Sun (Sāvitr) in the form of the
world, and having established himself in the Right Path, he is covered chain of causation, founded upon the twofold aspect of truth.
with glory. I1.11 (ET44) And day after day he worships the sun, who is the
11.2 (ET42-43) With his love (maitri), which (always protects and) perfectly enlightened one (the Buddha), with flowers in the form of his
never injures, and the development in him of a feeling of compassion achievements, which waft their fragrance in all directions and are rich
(kāruñya), he is insatiable in his greed for knowledge of the Good Law, with (colorful) praise.
and is far from sparing in his religious gifts. II.12 (ET44) Having sacrificed all undesirable notions in the fire of
I1.3 (ET43) With a mind straightforward and devoid of self-conceit, reflection (pratisaritkhyāna), one has to live an ascetic life of this type for
he visualises the Absolute Truth, and while turning a blind eye towards reaching the summit, where there is nothing beyond.
the sins of others, he is anxious about himself falling into (the merest)
error.
1I.4 (ET43) He turns his back on (all kinds of) disputations, on social 162.3 Tattvāmrtāvatāra
"
contagion and on those confounding sophists belonging to the Lok5yata ET" references are to the edition and translation of the first 136
cult, and his faith in the continuous generation (pratati) of virtue in (the verses by Shotaro Iida, Reason and Emptiness. A Study in Logic and
minds of) even those who are devoid of all virtue, is unswerving Mysticism (Tokyo 1980), pp. 52-242.
(aśratńsita).
11.5 (ET43) While practising charity out of (sheer) commiseration Summary by Karl H. Potter
(krpd), he creates in himself a desire for omniscience (only) for the sake
of pacifying all the miseries of the entire world of living beings. III.1-3 (ET55-57) One who has the eye consisting of knowledge has
1I.6 (ET43) He takes his (holy) bath as it were in the pure waters of the (real) eye of one in quest of knowledge. Even a blind man, if wise,
Morality (śīla); Patience (ksamaD is as it were the white ring of hemp on sees distant, subtle and concealed objects if he wishes, whereas one who
his finger (pravitraka); he has tied up his matted hair, representing as it has a thousand ordinary eyes is eyeless since he doesn't see the path to
were his Fortitude (virya); and he has dedicated himself to contemplation heaven and to liberation.
(dhyāna) and knowledge. II1.4-6 (ET57-60) One whose eye is opened by insight does not go on
11.7 (ET43-44) With his eye of intelligence wide opened and his skill performing actions such as giving, etc., like a poisonous thorn consisting
in theoretical as well as practical matters, he puts on his garments of of desires for future life. Out of compassion and for omniscience he seeks
modesty and bashfulness as it were, and he wears a girdle as it were of the threefold purity, though his mind is not fixed there. Wisdom is like
dignified softness (sauratya) around his waist. ambrosia, an unblocked light, the stairs to liberation, the fire that burns
11.8 (ET44) Wearing the dark deerskin as (a symbol of) defilements.
"
Commiseration (krpd) and having a spotlessly clean water-jug TJ explains threefold purity" in several altemative ways. "Not fixed",
402 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJVALA 403
i.e., the Bodhisattva has few wishes: he does not even wish for Objection: Since you have no thesis your rejection of another's
enlightenment.
thesis is cavil.
I11.7-9 (ET61-63) Two kinds of thought correspond to two kinds of Answer: No. Our thesis is that emptiness is the essential nature
reals. When the equipment of giving, etc., of knowledge and or merit is of all things.
realized, one ascertains the marks and relation to the results of that cause. II1.27-30 (ET90-93) Earth is not essentially solid, etc., because it
Through repetition of kindness and compassion comes about conventional
exists (bhūtatvāt), like wind. It does not hold things because it is a
wisdom concering the twelve sense-bases. product, like water.
111.10-15 (ET65-71) That highest wisdom involves the complete
Objection: Though there are no essential natures earth is actually
negation of the net of conceptual constructions, penetration into it free solid.
from identity and difference, clear as space, beyond language, this
Answer: Then yogis cannot go down and up through earth. Earth
quiescence is what is to be realized. Without it ascent to ultimate reality cannot be fluid, since essential nature is unchangeable. Likewise water,
is not attained. That is why the conventional truth must be distinguished air and fire are not essentially fluid, nor does earth have the functions of
first, and then the general characteristics of factors needs to be those three, viz., sticking things together, making room for things, and
investiaged. The wise man should concentrate on the awareness provided ripening things.
by what has been heard, which is the cause of the other (i.e., higher)
TJ: Since the function of each great element is present in each of the
knowledge. As one does not see a face in rippling water, so reality is not others none have an intrinsic nature of solidity, etc. An atom is an
discerned by the mind covered by obstructions. agglomeration of eight, viz., earth, water, fire, air, color/form, smell, taste
TJ: The "obstructions" are desire, hatred, stupidity, regret and doubt. and touch. So no atom has an intrinsic nature. If they did yogis could not,
111.16-22 (ET72-77) The meditator should proceed gradually to e.g. make a fiery forest cool.
insight. Antidotes to worry and depression, vagueness and fear, lack of Objection: A yogi can move freely through things that are
control, greed, hatred and delusion are specified. One who has mastered impenetrable for us. If things did not have an intrinsic nature of being
these obstructions should remain concentrated and, reviewing factors, anywhere, of a certain size, etc., then earthly beings could move around
should inquire whether they are acceptable from the highest standpoint. at will like yogis. And even a yogi can bump his head in the dark!
If they are not, then one can conclude that those other than these are the Answer: Moving around like that only happens in a yogi's
paramārthatattvas. meditations, not actually.
11I.23cd-24 (ET79-80) Factors conditioned and unconditioned include 1I1.31-35 (ET97-100) We admit that these (four great) elements have
aggregates, senses and elements (dhātu). 't'3 qualities from the conventional standpoint, since they are experienceable
I11.25-26 (ET81-82) The Great Elements (mahābhūta). Earth, etc. do by the sense-organs and since they exist. But earth, etc. are not actual
not have essential natures from the ultimate standpoint, because they are entities (dravyo.rat) since they are not experienced when the constituents
products and because they have causes, like awarenesses. sufficient to constitute them are not experienced, as e.g. a forest is an
TJ: The great elements are examined first since they are gross
unreal entity. Likewise an awareness of earth, etc. is not an ultimately
(auddrika). "Do not have essential natures from the ultimate standpoint " : real entity, since it has a cause and is destructible, like a forest.
the "not" is a prasajya, not a paryudāsa negation (i.e., to say that they do Objection: Well at least the sound of the word "earth" is an actual
not have essential natures does not imply that there is something else that entity!
has an essential nature). Answer: No. since it is heard, like a sound indicating an army.
Objection: Everyone knows there are objects in the world, and 111.36-39 (ET10I-104) And we do not say that the trees produce a
that they are smooth, wet, etc. forest, for the trees themselves have causes, e.g., their roots. A forest,
Answer: That is from the conventional standpoint; that is why which has parts, is not formed by trees, since the trees do not complete
we said "from the ultimate standpoint" things have no essential natures. it. So the Vaiśeşika charge of our inference having a faulty example is
404 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJVALA 405

unsubstantiated. Nor does the Sāmkhya charge along the same lines hold: specific purusa (according to you). Nor is the eye in contact with fire
the word "forest" does not name a group of different entities, since it is (and thus able to move about as fire does), since it is an organ, just as
caused by a qualified awareness, just like the word "pot " . skin, which is not thus movable, is the organ of touch. And the eye, the
1I1.40-43 (ET106-110) Matter/foam is not really grasped by the visual nature of which is subtle and caused by the four great elements, does not
sense-organ, because it is resistant (pratighāta) and elemental (bhautika) have fire as its dominant part–Anyway, the visual organ does not reach
like sound. That is, since the eye's form/matter is produced from elements out to a content because it is an organ like the internal organ. Rather,
what it grasps cannot also be produced from those elements. But vision itself is caused just as matter/form is.
matter/form is not actually even elemental since it is produced and I11.61 (ET134) We do not agree that the sense-organ (e.g., the nose)
because it has a cause. Matter/form is a construction from shapes and actually comes into contact with its object where it is reached, since the
colors. nose does not perceive past and future objects any more than the eye can
I1I.44-49 (ET111-119) The visual organ cannot see matter/form any see them.
more than the organ of taste can, since these organs are of a different I1L66 (ET137) Feeling. It is wrong to define "feeling" (vedana7 as
nature from awareness and mental associates, and where no awareness experiencing (anubhava) from the highest standpoint, since it is
occurs there is no vision. A sense-organ cannot grasp its own form, but associated with consciousness and so different from experiencing, just
without an organ no vision, etc. takes place. like mental associates.
111.51-55 (ET121-127) Objection: But a cognizer has awareness III.67-68ab (ET139-140) Satisfaction is not the experiencing of
eternally something beneficial (anugrāhika), since it is produced by touch like
Answer: No, since what is experienced is many awarenesses, not one. pain. And we do not admit feelings which are neither satisfying nor
Objection: The visual organ (the eye) is the cause par excellence of frustrating, since the result of feeling is desire.
the experience of matter/color/form. 1II.68cd-69 (ET140-141) Identification and Traces. Later we shall
Answer: No, since separate from the internal organ the organ is not show that consciousness is without an essential nature, and this will
a seer any more than the ear a hearer, etc. constitute our comment on identification and traces as well.
Sāmkhya: The purusa is the seer, hearer, etc. III.70 (ET142) Consciousness. Consciousness is not an actual
Answer: No, since like the internal organ this purusa can only see, awareness of a real entity, since it has a supporting object like an
etc. because of the operation of the sense-organ. How can the eye be a identification. And it is destroyed, like a lamp.
seer like the internal organ, since it cannot be seen? The internal organ I1I.71 (ET143) The Senses and Realms. Now that we have shown the
doesn't really see colors any more than a self does. There is no substantial nature of the five aggregates (to be conventional only), the natures of the
entity to be seen. It is awareness that is conventionally said to see, just senses and realms are to be understood (likewise, as conventional only).
as we say "a bell rings" while actually there is merely an awareness of I11.72-74 (ET148-150) Objection: The essential nature of any entity
ringing. is to arise, persist and perish, since it is a conditioned entity.
III.56-60 (ET 128-134) Objection: But the eye has rays of light which Answer: No, since arising, persisting and perishing are themselves
reach out to objects seen. Light is the very nature of vision (not conditioned.
something that the eye has). Objection: But still they exist, since they have actual defining
Answer: No, for an animal in the night can see, and since the eye is properties (lakrana). For example, the mark of earth is solidity, since
not found to be bright. Nor does the eye have satisfaction, etc., since it solidity is the cause of our awareness of a thing as bodily.
is a thing, and not all things experience satisfaction, etc.--e.g., your Answer: No, for how can solidity characterize fiery things?
purusa. Nor does the visual organ go out (as the Vaiśeşikas claim), any 111.77-80 (ET155-159) Conditioned Factors. Objection: Really, what
more than the eyeball can. And (to Sāmkhya) the eye cannot move is going has not gone (yet).
around anywhere since it is confined to the body associated with a Answer: This is not correct from the highest standpoint, since there
406 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
MADHYA MAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJ VALA 407
is really no going at all. No one sees going apart from what has gone and
Answer: No, for there is no sp, and since there is no concomitance.
what has not gone. Going is a process (and so cannot be spoken of as a Objection: The word "self' must have a direct meaning since it is
thing), and since it is unproved (since unspeakable) one cannot confirm used metaphorically.
the existence of a goer, or for that matter of a nongoer
Answer: You cannot prove the existence of a self that way, since all
111.81-84 (ET161-165) Objection: One perceives a goer in relation that is proved is something which is a content of consciousness, and not
with an object other than the one going, just as we observe a person
something that is permanent, omnipresent, etc.
holding a stick.
111.100-108 (ET185-195) When one has achieved the destruction of
Answer: No. There is no positive concomitance relating the person consciousness, who is it that is attached? Who is it that desires that
and the stick. It is like the wheel of fire, which conventionally is spoken destruction? If you say that attachment is that which is about to arise, we
of as tuming but does not actually turn. wonder what it is, since it is without a locus and unborn. A nonattached
Sārirkhya: An agglomeration, even though not a substance, really awareness doesn't exist, since what is unspeakable is unspeakable.
moves_
Objection: An awareness is called "attached " when it is produced by
Answer: No, since an agglomeration is not ultimately real. that aspect of energy, just as a crystal is colored red by the red thing
Sāmkhya: The entity is real, ; since it is grasped even when the
behind it.
agglomeration is not grasped. Answer: Then how can there be the attachment of awareness to that?
Answer: No, it is unreal. So the attachment-notion is a conceptual construction, since there is no
II1.85 -89 (E'T168-172) Objection: If there are no essential natures then
such thing as an attacher. Since a thing has a substantial locus it is
how can bondage and release be attained? inseparable from that locus; it is wrong to distinguish between desire and
Answer: Bondage and release are admitted like a magical being or a the desirer, and if they are separated one has to do with something else
dream object, and acquire a self-nature thereby. But ultimately rebirth entirely, e.g. attachedness. Consciousness is not an actual entity that is
of the psychophysical complex is just as nonoccurrent as the rebirth of affected by something else, attachment, for that (attachment) is the
the earth, etc. Really there can be no liberation of the psychophysical supporting object, and there is another cause. So what we ordinarily call
complex, since it has already arisen. an aggregate's (desire, say) is dependent on the arising of desire
1II.90-93 (ET173-175) Really no person (pudgala) is reborn nor is according to its own nature in a single aggregated nature, just as we say
liberated; he is only nominally conceived, like a house, and is "the tree is blossoming " when the flowers on the tree are blossoming.
linguistically referred to, like perfume. Again, the traces do not constitute II1.109-116 (ET195-204) To speak of attaining liberation is wrong,
a person, since they are caused, like a jar, since they arise and cease, and for if liberation exists it must be a conditioned thing. Also, liberation
since they are knowable things like a lump of clay. cannot be an antidote, because an antidote is conditioned, like a
Objection: The person is real even though indescribable. conditioned thing which has ceased to function. But if liberation is an
Answer: Not all indescribable things are real; take the color of a absence then, because of its nature of being a nonexistence, it depends on
barren woman's child. other things, like any other thing that has become absent. Liberation is
So traces are without an essential nature not unconditioned either, as we've already shown. Thus what is the
111.94-98 (ET 176-181) The collection of body with organs is selfless, difference between our notion and Sāmkhyā s idea of (the liberation of
since it is caused, like a pillar, and since it is accumulated like an anthill. purusa from) consciousness'? Defilements arise from conceptual
Objection: The existence of a self is proved by there being memory constructions and die naturally. Since there is nothing accumulated, from
and recognition and from the arising of awareness having to take place what and because of what does your liberation constitute deliverance?
somewhere. Since nothing is born constructions also do not exist, so both (bondage
Answer: No. and liberation) are the same, since there is no one to be liberated and
Objection: A body having a sense-organ must have a self. nothing to be liberated from. Having realized the emptiness of essential
408 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHY AMAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJ V ALA 409

nature the knowledge of it itself ceases. So those who do not attain (Here ends ET. Shotaro Iida, the editor and translator of the first part
anything attain the nature (dharmatva) of the nonextinction of of III, has provided a brief table of contents of the rest of III, without
1o4
nonextinction! Thus, those who investigate (factors) as they really are for edition or translation. Shikafumi Watanabe likewise gives an outline.
their own benefit do not address the wrong views of those of bad vision. What follows is a summary of the remainder of III provided for this
111.1 17-124 (ET206-215) One should not suppose that (desire) must volume by Christian Lindtner on the basis of his Sanskrit edition of the
actually exist since the perverted views actually exist, for perversions are entire work published as Adyar Library Series 123 (Adyar 2001), which
like desire; they too are merely conventionally existent. is our "E".
"
Earth is real (lit., ' not other than itself)" is not correct from the
highest standpoint, since it has a cause, like wind, or because it is an Summary by Christian Lindtner
actual entity, like consciousness. And "water is other than earth" is not
ultimately true either, since both water and earth arise and since both III.137-193 (E23-29) Actually nothing has itself or anything else as
have the same essential nature that are not different. its cause. Also the traditional four causes maintained by Buddhists are
Objection: But earth and the other elements differ since the words for shown to be empty. Nor can causality be established on the basis of
them are different. our ideas of them differ, and they have different common experience and the like. A cause cannot be defined as something
properties. that manifests someting.
Answer: This is fallacious, for the h fails to share the same properties 111.194-214 (E29-31) Surely, the concept of causality has a
with the s, since all ascriptions are merely verbal. conventional and practical validity. Everything in this world is determined
III.125-129ab (ET215-220) It is wrong to hold (as the Jains do) that by the laws of cause and effect. Our present karma is responsible for our
things are really both similar and dissimilar to other things, for that is future destiny. Karma is bound to our mind and our will. Rebirth is a
contradictory, just as ascribing cold and heat to the same thing is. fact, the continuity of consciousness is only discontinued by ultimate
Objection: No. What is meant is that the ascription to a thing of a release.
feature is always relative to the denial of another feature. 1II.215-223 (E32) There is, therefore, no room for God as a creator
Answer: But what establishes the ascription of a feature relative to of the world. The only "God " is one's own karma. Refutation of God as
another feature? If one of the two features is not established, the other a creator. (See also 9.95-113 below.)
isn't either. So this is mind-games. 111.224-229 (E33) The continuity of life is a fact,
Now by this very sort of method the thesis of things' having essential 11I.230-233 (E33-34) Life is characterized by suffering. Suffering,
natures is refuted. however, only exists conventionally.
II1.129cd-136 (ET220-232) Vaibhāşika: Unconditioned factors are 111.234-246 (E34-35) The Buddha is beyond suffering, but even a
four: the two cessations, space and suchness. Buddha can be seen in the light of the two truths, i.e. in two different
Answer: Calculated cessation is not ultimately real, since its form is ways, both of which are rational.
eternally malformed. like the figure of a child of a barren woman, and 1I1.247-265 (E35-37) One must awaken to the highest reality. Using
because unconditioned factors are unborn, causeless, effectless, neither a his intelligence a scholar must see that everyting lacks independent being,
collection of conditions nor a generator of cessation. A thing without a that is, is empty. Even emptiness--as a concept--is empty.
cause cannot be an effect, since it has not been born. The wise man 111.266-291 (E37-40) Bhavya concludes with a description of the
realizes there are really no unconditioned factors. Buddha who cannot really be described. According to Buddhist tradition,
A self is conceptually constructed by the believers of both others' and supported by the means of logic, the Buddha is identical with thatness,
our own schools. But having understood the selflessness of things, may tattva; he is unborn, etc. But just as one must distinguish between two
the wise enjoy knowledge of the nature of things. kinds of truth and, accordingly, between two kinds of reason, thus one
must also distinguish between the two (or even three) bodies of a
410 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJVALA 411

1i,
Buddha. With numerous allusions to the sūtras Bhavya now maintains advanced and competent yogis.
that the Buddha's dharmakāya is the same as emptiness, the absolute
truth--and even Brahman.
11I.292-345 (E40-46) Then follows a description of the bodhisattva, 162.5 Yogūcāratattvani.śraya
the yogin, the sage, and his compassion, his virtues, his omnipotence and
magical powers, and his superknowledge. In what follows, a summary contributed by Christian Lindtner has
111.346-360 (E46-48) Finally, the bodhisattva himself becomes a been supplemented with translations of selected passages found in an
buddha, which is, in fact, the ultimate purpose, as already stated, of article by Jay Hirabayashi and Shotaro lida titled "Another look at the
following the Mahāyāna path, the mahāpurusacaryā. Madhyamaka vs. Yogācāra controversy concerning existence and non-
existence " , Prajfldpāramitā and Related Systems. Studies in Honor of
Edward Conze (ed. Lewis Lancaster) (Berkeley 1977), pp. 341-360. TJ
162.4 SrāvakatattvanHcayūvatāra' s indicates translations of selected passages of the Tarkajvālā by
Hirabayashi and lida. Their translations of technical terms has been
"
E " references are to the Lindtner edition cited above. replaced by ours. Page references in parentheses are to the
Hirabayashi/lida article. "E" references are to the Lindtner edition
Summary by Christian Lindtner previously cited.

IV.1-14 (E49-50) Objection: One obtains hodhi as the Buddha, whose Summary by Christian Lindtner, Jay Hirabayashi and Shotaro lida
virtues are extraordinary, but still quite human, by following the eightfold
noble (ārya) path. In this way one may destroy all emotional and V.1-5 (E59) Objection (by a Yogācāra, presumably Dharmapāla):
intellectual obstructions. Mahayana is partly unorthodox. Several of its Reality can, in fact, be the content of a cognition without images. The
contentions are contradicted by perception and common sense. It is highest truth is described in Yogācāra works (Madhyāntavibhāga, etc.) in
absurd to maintain that things are unborn in reality; nor is it true to claim various terms such as absence of the constructed nature in the dependent
that everything is consciousness-only (vijñaptimātrata7. nature, etc. It is only by penetrating the three natures that one achieves
IV.15-74 (E50-57) Answer: The bodhi of the Buddha consists in the true understanding of the perfection of wisdom.
cognition--without any object at all--of the emptiness of all factors. It is (Yogacara objection continued:) 6. The designation (prajñapti) as
only in a relative sense, not in the ultimate sense, that the noble truths are ātma-dharma is accompanied by material causes, otherwise the two (i.e.,
valid. The path of Hinayana does not lead to bodhi. Mahāyāna is, in fact, grāhva-grñhaka) are nullified. Defilement is perceived, therefore the
orthodox, for it can afford a good explanation of each of the four noble existence of the paratantra-svahhāva is maintainted (p. 349).
truths. The important thing is to realize emptiness through personal TJ (explaining Dharmapāla): (It is inferred from the following three
experience and meditation. One does not deny that there are reasonable reasons that the paratantra-svabhāva) is a real existence.) The first reason
ideas to be found e.g. in Vedanta, and in a relative sense Madhyamaka is that what indicates the existence of mind and mental associates is a
of course accepts that there exists a natural relationship between cause representation accompanied by the material cause of a perverted view
and effect. In Madhyamaka it is exactly because one sees everything in (viparydsa). The second is that if the dependent nature (paratantra) does
the perspective of two truths that one does not cone into conflict with not exist, it would become a fallacy that the two,...the constructed and the
perception and common sense. Because of ignorance most people never perfected, are existent, because those two are dependent upon the
see the absolute truth. Finally, Madhyamaka does not accept that dependent (nature). The third and last reason is that when the dependent
everything is consciousness-only in an absolute sense of that term. True nature does not exist, defilement (sariikleśa) cannot be perceived. But in
reality cannot be described; it can only be experienced as such by actuality, defilement is perceived. Defilement is dependent upon the mind
 412 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJVALA 413

and mental associates. The separateness from it is emancipation being identical with a nihilist's view, is not expedient for obtaining
(vimoksa). Thus, out of these three reasons, it is evident that the omniscience.
dependent nature (paratantra) is really existent. This is a summary of the Yogācāra doctrine (pp. 352-353).
V.8-15 (E59) (Bhavya s answer to Yogācāra) Before an interpretation
Because this dependent nature is comprehended by the purified '

knowledge which is acquired after the non-conceptual knowledge of the holy scripture can be considered trustworthy it must be rational and
(pŗslhalabdhaSuddhilaukikajñāna), it is an object of supramundane, non- consistent. This, however, is hardly the case with the interpretation (naya)
conceptual knowledge, and as such is pereived by experiencing the offered by Yogācāra. Their interpretation of reality is not sound. The
absolute truth (pp. 349-350). same applies to their interpretation of Buddha's words about everything
(Dharmapāla continuing) 7. This guiding principle of the being consciousness-only.
prajñāpāramitā leads to the attainment of omniscience (sarvajñd), but the 16 (E60) If essential nature is objectified the insight (bodhi) (of the
method which aims at negation of arising, ceasing, etc. does not..(p. 352) Tathāgata) would be conceptual construction, would not be free from the
TJ: (It can be proved from the following six textual testimonies that bifurcation of subject and object (sālamband), and would not become
our exposition of prajñāpāramitā doctrine is the means to obtain conceptionfree knowledge (nirivkalpakadhi) (p. 347).
omniscience.) TJ: Question: What makes the three turnings (parivarta) (of the wheel
(1) "All dharmas are nourished, fulfilled, manifest, and of dharma) differ regarding their depths? '
agitated by these dharmas. Nothing to be made āunan or Answer: There are two interpretations. The first is Bhāvaviveka s and
ātmya exists here." other ( Mādhyamikas ' who maintain the following: The first turning of
)
These passages indicate conceptual constructions in the form of " I" and
"
the wheel of doctrine concerned with the teaching of the four noble truths
mine" (ātma-ātmiya-ākāra-grāha), and that by the (condition of) non-
is meant for the Srāvakas (disciples). It teaches only the non-substantiality
clingingness to them, the ālayaviiñāna transforms itself. of persons (pudgalanairātmya) and does not teach that of dharmas
"
(2) The mind is not mind." (dharmanairātmya). It is therefore not a deep teaching but a shallow one.
This includes the non-existence of object and subject (grāhya-grāhaka). The second, the Mahāyāna teaching concerned with (the perception) of
(3) " The no-mindedness (acittatva) is beyond comprehension." marks, and based on the Sathdhinirmocanasūtra, still talks about the
This indicates consciousness-only (vijñaptimātrata). perception of entities. Therefore, it is not deep either. The third, the
(4) " Thus rūpa is a material cause. Up to bodhi also, all things Mahāyāna teaching concerned with the markless, and based on the
are material causes. " Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, is the deepest, for it teaches the emptiness of all
This shows the constructed nature (parikalpita), for it is represented by the factors.
name and mark (nāma-saritketa). As for the second (interpretation), Dharmapāla and others maintain
(5) Further, by showing the surmounted (apodita), the the following on the basis of (their) dgamas: (The Buddha) taught the
perceived (upalabdha), the represented dharma, and the parts of the four noble truths in the first turning of the wheel the teaching of the
dharmas which are conducive to enlightenment (hodhipaksadharma), markless in the second turing, and the teaching of the ultimate meaning
the
dependent nature is indicated. in the third turning. The meaning of the first turning has already been
(6) "Suchness (tathatal, the end of ultimate reality (bhūtakoti), explained in this commentary.
the separatedness (vivikta), result (phala), knowledge of all The last two turnings deal with the markless, wherein no distinction
forms." of depth exists regarding their guiding principle. The only reason for
The perfected nature (parinispanna) is indicated by these words. which a distinction of neya- and nītārtha is made between these two
Thus, the prajñāpāramitā guiding principle expounded by is an sutras (i.e., the Samdhinirmocana and the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras) is that
-
expedient for obaining omniscience (sarvajñatd). But the Mādhyamika the nonsubstantiality of entities (nihsvahhāvata ) also has the three aspects
doctrine, infatuated with the refutation of origination and annihilation, which are well explained in the nītārtha.cūtra, for it clearly shows the
 414 MADHYAMAKAHRDAYAiTARKAJVALA 415
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

logical reasoning which discerns existence and nonexistence. (Although Bhāvaviveka: If the paratantra-svabhāva exists absolutely, then it
the Prajñūpāramitāsūtra) teaches the nihsvabhāvatā of all dharmas, it will contradict the following statement of a sūtra: The factors are born
still has an aspect of concealment, hence, it is said to be a .sūtra of from causes and conditions; they, therefore, do not exist absolutely. He
provisional meaning. who knows this well is said to be an adept of dependent origination. If
Question: Which of the three natures is to be removed before (this any factor is born from a condition, then that factor is totally devoid of
doctrine) may be called (the teaching of) the markless? intrinsic nature. If a factor is devoid of intrinsic nature, then that factor
Answer: There are two accounts for that. According to Dharmapāla, is not produced from a condition at all.
only the constructed nature is to be removed. According to Bhāvaviveka, 76. (E66) If you think that (its) origination is from other forces,
on the other hand, the dependent nature should also be removed (pp. 347- because of this nature of arising out of (other) causes, this is blindness,
348). like illusion. This view is established (p. 353).
V.17-54 (E60-65) Without success Dignāga, in various ways, tries to TJ: Dharmapāla: The paratantra has an independent existence which
conies into being through the arising of causes and conditions--this is the
explain everything as the projection of one's own mind without assuming
the existence of any external object. Consciousness, he thinks, has a dependent nature. Since it originates from other forces, it is not the
double aspect, a subjective and an objective one, the distinction begin ultimate reality.
'
purely subjective, determined by one 's personal karma. On the basis of Bhāvaviveka: If this is the opponent s view, we, the Mādhyamika, say
as follows: If you admit that this (paratantra) arises out of other forces,
the distinction between two truths, Bhavya points out the contradictions
to be found in Dignāga's position. why do you find it substantial existence when (at the same time) it is
V.55-92 (E65-68) Then he goes on to show the emptiness of the three unreal like an illusion? If it is like this (i.e., unreal), our theory is
natures, first the constructed, including Dignāga's curious theories about therefore proved by your statement (pp. 353-354).
language and meaning (apoha), then the dependent nature and finally the 77 (E66) (Bhāvaviveka:) Also, the paratantra, as absolute perception,
perfected nature. does not exist. Therefore, it is maintained that (the paratantra) is not
71-72 (E66). For those who talk about the existence of the dependent born as far as an intrinsic nature is concerned. As far as origination at the
nature and say that the dependent nature does exist, (the following highest level (paramārtha) is concerned, illusory phenomena are not
fallacies would occur: From the point of view of phenomenal truth,) feasible (p. 354).
establishing what is already well-known in the world; from the point of TJ: That is to say that because it is maintained by you that the
view of ultimate reality, they would have no example and thus the reason paratantra is devoid of an essential nature (involving) grasped and
becomes contradictory. grasper, you therefore maintain that there is no perception. If by means
If (the dependent nature) has the nature of no essential nature of an essential nature, i.e. if it is being generated by an essential nature,
because, by being produced, it is not produced as a real existence, then to talk about the arising of erroneous appearance does not make
certainly, the negation of origination and annihilation will be possible (p. senses because an essential nature is indeed not being generated. Because
348). no essential nature is being generated, then, that is why these erroneous
TJ: With regard to this theory of the Vijñānavāda that the dependent appearances occur (p. 354).
nature is devoid of any essential nature in its origination, if this is what Dharmapāla: Granted that these sūtras teach the nonessential nature
the Yogācāra really means, then the theory of our Mādhyamika school of factors, still it does not conflict with our former assertion, for there are
will be established, because it is admitted in our Mādhyamika school also two kinds of factors of dependent origination, i.e., the constructed and the
that the things which originate from the reality of homogeneous direct dependent natures. Here, the purported meaning is that the
and indirect causes do not originate from themselves, are devoid of any essencelessness (nihsvabhāvatal of the former is taught. but that of the
independent existence, and therefore there is no origination and latter is not referred to at all. If the latter is devoid of essential nature
annihilation, etc. (pp. 348-349). from the beginning, then it negates the substratum of defilement and
416 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJVALA 417
impurity. That is nothing but an ill-conceived notion of emptiness. This consciousness (caitania). A closer examination shows that there is no
view is harmful to both self and others. such thing as a permanent or omnipresent consciousness. A permanent
Bhāvaviveka: Who would (waste time) by refuting this wrong view'? "
self cannot change or reflect its image in prakrti. Nor can it enjoy"
(No one,) but when the correct view is attained, it will be clear by itself. prakrti as an object. The principles of Sāmkhya are in conflict with one
Dharmapāla: If awareness (citta) and mental associates (caitta) which another.
are born from causes and conditions do not have any substratum at all,
then, similar to the constructed nature, they (awareness and associates) 162.7 Vaiśesikatattvaniśraya
will be like a flower in the sky. How could they constitute a
consciousness which is subject to sathsdric existence? "E" refers to the Lindtner edition cited above.
Therefore, the dependent nature (paratantra.svabhāva) cannot be other
than some kind of substratum. The primary intention of the śāstra writer Summary by Christian Lindtner
should undoubtedly be something of that nature. Otherwise, how could
he maintain "the bondage of the dependent nature is broken by the VII.1-28 (27-28 edited E78) According to the Vaiśesika school, the
realization of emptiness"? Does anyone on earth see that the hairs of a self is a substance that has intelligence (buddhi) and other qualities. These
turtle do constitute something and a hare's horn is something that can be qualities imply that the self is subject to change. Therefore it cannot be
seen and removed? From the foregoing, you should know that while permanent, and so it cannot become free. As Bhavya points out, an
awarenesses and mental associates do exist, those external objects which extensive refutation of the self as an entity has already been provided
are grasped apart from the mind do not (pp. 354-355). above. Vaiśeşika is irrational and not worthy of serious consideration.
V.93-114 (E68-71) Other errors in the Yogācāra exegesis are also (The entire chapter consists of merely 28 stanzas of which only the final
pointed out. Only Madhyamaka exhibits the proper rational explanation two are available in Sanskrit.)
of the Buddha's teachings. The highest cognition is real, but it has no
content. It can be experienced, but cannot be described in words, only
suggested. 162.8 Vedūntatattvaniścava
This section comprises some 103 verses, of which the first sixteen,
stating the Vedanta position, are given in Sanskrit and translated in
162.6 Sūrirkhvatattvūvatūra V.V.Gokhale, "The Vedanta-philosophy described by Bhavya in his
Madhyanwkahrdava " , Indo-Iranian Journal 2, 1958, pp. 165-180. Hajime
"F." references are to Lindtner's edition cited previously. Nakamura supplies the subsequent section giving the Buddhist answer in
Adyar Library Bulletin 39, 1975, 300-329. The entire text is edited in
Summary by Christian Lindtner Sanskrit and translated into English by 011e Qvarnstrom, Hindu
Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective. Lund Studies in African and Asian
VI.I-4 (E72) Objection by a Sāmkhya (the Sārhkhyakārikās are Religions Vol. 4 (Lund 1989). This is our "E" and "T". Qvarnstrom
quoted): Prakrti is unconscious, it consistes of the three gunas, and it is provides an "analytical survey" on pp. 51-61, which we reproduce here
productive (prasavātmikd). The purusa is exactly the opposite of prakrti, minus a number of the Sanskrit terms and with some stylistic changes to
viz., conscious, etc. By seeing itself as different from prakrti it becomes suit the style of this Volume.
free. Some authorities, however, opine that it is prakrti that, once her task
has been fulfilled, makes herself free by withdrawing from association Summary by 011e Qvarnstrom
with the purusa.
VI.5-46 (E72-77) Answer: The self cannot be identified with The Vedāntin
418 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJVALA 419
1 (E28; T620) Liberation arises out of the knowledge of the Self of that clay are different.
(ātman) or Person (purura). The Buddhists, who deny the notion of a Self 13 (E30; T67) Just as when dust, smoke, etc. cover the space in a
and maintain that all traces are empty, without an essential nature or single pot, all other pots are not similarly covered, so when one person
"self' , therefore cannot obtain liberation. is happy or suffers, all other persons are not similarly happy or suffering.
2 (E28; T62-63) The liberating knowledge results from the perception 14 (E30; T67) Happiness and suffering arise only within the person
of the Self, the Person or the great Lord (tnaheśvara) located beyond the who does not know the Self and who is not awakened to become
three-realm universe, which results from cause and effect. absorbed into the Self. Happiness and suffering therefore do not belong
3 (E28; T63) When one perceives the person and is consequently in to the Self, just as dust, smoke, etc. do not belong to space. That person
union with him, one realizes that he is the agent and the Lord (śvara) of who is ignorant of the Self and not awakened to become absorbed into
the three-realm universe. it thinks of his experiences as real, just as the person who dreams
4 (E28; T63-64) This three-realm universe is completely pervaded by imagines himself to have waking experiences. In effect, impressions are
this Person in time and in space. accumulated from activity, and depending on their good and bad results,
5 (E28; T64) The person remains unchanged and unspent while happiness or suffering is experienced.
creating the three-realm universe, just like a spider which remains 15 (E30; T68) The very Self, however, is not defiled as the agent and
unchanged and unspent while producing threads. The one who, through the enjoyer of the three-realm universe, since It is nonattached.
the practice of meditation, perceives the Person and therefore is dissolved 16 (E30; T68) The Self (Brahman) is one due to its supremacy over
into Him, is not reborn into another existence. the whole body; all-pervasive due to the fact that it pervades the whole
6 (E28; T64-65) The one who does not perceive the immortal Person world; eternal, due to its indestructibility; and it is the immortal state due
and accordingly is not awakened to become absorbed into Him, does not to the fact that it is without beginning or end. When through meditation
attain immortality, since the entire world--of which he is a part--is mortal one knows the Self, one is free from rebirth.
by nature. 17 (E31; T68) The Self is also eternal, because it is capable of being
7 (E29; T65) There does not exist anything superior, more excellent objectified by the yogi at all times. It is nonconceptual (avikalpa) because
or subtler than this Person who is the upholder of the entire empirical it is different from the senses and consciousness; and it is beyond the
reality. realm of speech because it is not within the reach of the mind. Words
8 (E29; T65) The one who perceives the Person is endowed with like ātman, purusa, īśvara, sarvatraga, nitya, etc. are, however, applied
perfections or supernatural powers . (siddhi), since the Person has the to it by those whose minds are led astray by difference because they have
nature of epitomizing all the aggregates of the three-realm universe. not experienced the Self.
9 (E29; T65-66) The experiencer of Him realizes that all entities as
well as the very Self of the three-realm universe are comprehended within
that Person. All beings, such as the ignorant and the learned, the outcaste mūmsūtattvanirnayūvatūra
162.9
and the brahmin, are therefore intrinsically identical from the perspective
of the experiencer of the Self or the person. "
E " references are to Lindtner's edition referred to above.
10 (E29; T66) The Self does not have the same nature as bodies, etc.,
just as space does not have the same nature as pots.
Summary by Christian Lindtner '"'
I I (E29; T66) The Self is one and not many, although it exists in
different embodied beings, just as space is one and not differentiated, IX.1-17 (E92-94) Objection: According to Mīmārhsā liberation is to
though occupying different pots. be obtained not by dhyāna or meditation but by the performance of
12 (E30; T67) The Self is one, even though bodies created out of that various rituals alone (kriyāmātra). These rituals are prescribed by the
Self are different, just as clay is one, even though pots, etc. created out authority of scripture, the three Vedas. This scripture derives its authority
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAHRDAYA/TARKAJVALA 421
420

from the fact that it consists of words that are permanent, i.e. not created again the three Vedas should be rejected.
by a fallible human author. As scripture it is reliable because it has been IX.95-119 (E102-105) God, as the creator of the world, has already
handed down without interruption. As an instrument of knowledge been refuted in Chapter III. If it is now asked what he. hypothetically, has
scripture informs us of our ritual duties (apīuva=dharma). and as such created, some possibilities are examined--and excluded. Nor can God be
considered single, permanent, etc. In fact, God seems to be cruel and
it is quite different from inference. The Bhagavat of the Buddhists (and
Jains) is not omniscient and his words are therefore unreliable. unjust, so it is safer to say that karma, not God, is responsible for the
emanation (srsti) of the world. Again, meditation on God will not bring
IX.18-23 (E94) Answer: If a tradition is to be considered scripture it
an end to suffering.
must be true and logical. The highest goal, liberation, can only be
achieved by knowledge (jddna), not by action (kriyi). Sometimes the IX.120-147 (E105-108) Moreover, the Vedas are wrong when
claiming that bad karma can be removed by means of water, for karma
words of human beings are reliable.
IX.24-42 (E94-96) The three Vedas do, in fact, have a human author, is bound to consciousness (citta) with which water obviously cannot get
even an evil one. This is because the Vedas prescribe violence (hiritsa7, in touch. There are other silly doctrines in the Vedas, e.g. that it is good
to throw oneself into fire, and to abstain from food and drinking. It is,
etc., which is the cause of frustration. It is impossible to protect oneself
and others against the frustration of violence by incantations (mantra) and under certain circumstances, all right to eat meat, it mostly depends on
such things. Even if done for some holy purpose or in some sacred place one's motive. The Vedas are also mistaken in claiming that trees are
sentient beings endowed with a soul. Again, it is karma that is responsible
violence is to be rejected. The same goes for drink (madyapāna).
IX.43-49 (E97) The reasons for claiming that the words of the Vedas for "life".
(the Word) are permanent, and thus authoritative, are not valid. Thus the IX148-167 (148 at E108) Finally, one cannot argue that the Vedas
"
Word cannot have a permanent relation to any thing. On the contrary, must be authoritative because they are endorsed by various "authorities,
understanding (pratipatti) is based on convention (samketa). for these authorities are obviously not always reliable. Some of their
IX.50-54 (E97-98) As an instrument of knowledge scripture is not statements are true, others false. As said, scripture should only be
essentially different from inference, which also has a manifold (abstract) followed to the extent that it satisfies the demands of logic and inference.
object. Both are, in the end, based on perception. The Buddha, on the other hand, is reliable and omniscient in the sense
IX.55-58 (E98) Since rituals are impermanent their results must also that he knows and preaches the path to heaven and liberation. It is quite
be impermanent. So the Vedas are obviously wrong in saying that they true that the Jains also refute the three Vedas, but of course this does not
lead to immortality (apavarga), etc. mean that the Buddhists are also Jains.
IX.59-73 (E98-100) Since the main teachers of the three Vedas, i.e.
Brahma, Vişpu (Krşpa) and Siva--as seen by many examples in the
Mahābhārata, etc.--lack knowledge (jñāna) and are full of faults (klesa), 162.10 Samajñasiddhinirdesa
they should not serve as authorities. Their immoral behavior cannot be
justified by referring to the necessity of protecting the law (elharmagupti). "E" references are to the Lindtner edition.
Moreover, they lack compassion and are full of hatred, desire etc.
IX.74-86 (E100-101) Also, the idea that Vişpu has two bodies is Summary by Christian Lindtner
absurd, and has only been introduced for the purpose of protecting one's
wishes (ryasanagupti). So there is no point in meditating, in terms of X.1-14 (13-14 only provided at E109) The Nirgranthas point out
yoga, on the body of Hari. various passages in the Buddhist scriptures that apparently show the
Buddha to have been very human indeed. Many of his actions can only
IX.87-94 (EIOI-102) Since the gods are ignorant of causality (in the
Buddhist sense) and full of passions, etc., they cannot serve the cause of be accounted for by assuming his deep ignorance of the motives of other
protecting the law, be it by teaching or by their personal behavior. So human beings.
422 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJÑAPRADIPA 423
Bhavya argues that this is a misunderstanding. The Buddha merely A number of objections are considered and refuted, of which the
pretended to be ignorant, the reason being that he was motivated by the following is a sample: Objection: Your thesis is that dependent
desire to help ignorant human beings overcome their passions. So he had
origination is nonoriginated; but if so, your own statement is
to play along their lines (upāyakauśalya). The Buddha always had a good
nonoriginated, just as if you had said "All language is false".
reason to appear not to be omniscient. For reasons already given above,
Answer: We do not say that all dependent origination is
the Buddha is, in fact, omniscient (sarvajña). nonoriginated. We agree that, conventionally, dependent origination is
originated, and that includes our statement.
162.11 Śtutilaksananirdeśa Objection: Dependent origination is viewed by other Buddhists as an
unconditioned entity. Now you are a Buddhist, and you do not agree with
Summary by Christian Lindtner that, so you shouldn't be offering your argument as a defence of
Buddhism.
XI.I-4 (E I l0) Here Bhavya summarizes his position. The Buddha is
Answer: Our view of dependent origination is different from that of
praised for having preached the two truths. The true relative truth is a the śrāvakas, since we deal with dependent origination negatively (not
means of achieving the absolute truth. It is Bhavya's hope as author of postulating it as an entity), and also because there is no reason to suppose
this text to be able to help intelligent students in obtaining enlightenment an unconditioned dependent origination exists. After all, dependent
(bodhi). The text itself is described as a śāstra that serves as a mirror in origination has a cause like the (supposed) existence of things, so it
which one can see the contents of numerous sūtras reflected in brief
doesn't exist any more than they do. Dependent origination has
form.
nonorigination as its essential nature.
(T21.220-223) There are four possible ways in which things are
supposed to arise and the author denies them all, as follows:
(1) Dependently originated things do not arise from themselves, (2) nor
163.BHAVYA, Prajrtāprad pa on Nāgārjuna's
from another, (3) nor from both, (4) nor from no cause at all. The denial
Madhyamakakārikās (550) must be understood as a prasajya-, not a paryudāsa- negation. which is
This work is not extant in Sanskrit, except for a few lines quoted in to say, e.g., that (1) does not mean that a dependently originated thing
Candrakirti's Prasannapadd. The Tibetan translation by Jñānagarbha and
arises from something else.
Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan was made in the early ninth century. (This Objection: You have not showed that your h is absent from a vp, so
Jfihnagarbha is not the same person as the author of Satyadvayavibhmiga.)
your argument fails.
A Chinese translation by Prabhākaramitra dates from around 630, but is, Answer: Because there are no vps the h cannot be faulted for not
according to Yuichi Kajiyama and Christian Lindtner, very bad. being absent from them!
Sāthkhya: When you say that things do not arise from themselves do
Summary by Karl H. Potter you mean they don't arise from the the result or from the cause? If the
former you merely prove what is already accepted, but if the latter you
CFIAPTER I: Investigation of the Four Conditions 'fi" contradict yourself (since a "cause" is precisely what a thing arises
3-4 (T21.214-220) Defence of Nāgārjuna' s understanding of
from).
dependent origination against grammatical complaints about his Answer: What we deny is that things arise from themselves
understanding of the compound "pratītyasamutpāda". Buddhapālita: Things do not arise from themselves since the
Each of the terms in the eight negative predications of verses 1-2 is origination would be pointless and it would lead to infinite regress.
explained. Dependent origination is the quiescence of discursiveness,
Answer: Then the opponent could say that things originate from
since attachment to language is pacified. another because origination has a result and an end, and this would
424 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJÑAPRADIPA 425

contradict Buddhapālita's own belief. also refutes the Jains, who likewise hold such a position.
Objection: Nobody claims that things arise from themselves, so your (4) "Nor from no cause at all", for there is nothing to show that
argument is irrelevant. things arise without a cause, and to suppose so would contradict inference
Answer: But you yourself hold that a thing manifests its own as well as common sense. An alternative reading of (4) is "nor from bad
potentiality, which is a way of saying things arise from themselves. causes," that is, from essential nature, God, purusa, prakrti, ti me, etc.
(T21.223-226) As for (2) things do not arise from another, here is our These are had causes since they don't exist and thus can't cause.
argument: Things like organs do not arise from causes that are different A believer in essential natures (svabhāvavādin): Inner organs arise
from those things, because they are different, as the conditions making up from their essential natures, because things arise, like color, shapes, etc.
a jar are different from the jar. Answer: If this is said conventionally we agree. If it is intended from
Objection: The reason is defective since it just restates part of the the highest standpoint and is intended to show that actually everything
thesis. arises from no cause at all, then your h commits the fallacy of
Answer: Valid arguments sometimes feature such a reason: consider contradiction, since it is presumably something that has actually arisen (if
"the sound of Vedic hymns is impermanent, because it is sound, like the not, no proof has occurred).
sound of a drum." Svabhāvavādin: We cannot argue that causes don 't exist to someone
Vajśeşjka: Since "because they are different" means "because of who believes they do without giving a reason. Likewise one cannot argue
having the guña difference", and since you do not accept our categories, with a foreigner without speaking his language.
your argument is fallacious. Answer: But by using his language we can establish an h for him, so
Answer: We are not referring to a Vaiśeşika category, but merely '
this excuse won t wash.
speaking generally. Anyway, the atomic theory of the Vajśeşikas is Nor is God the cause of the world.
mistaken, as the following argument proves: Earth-atoms do not actually Objection: Karma, the cause of the varieties of things in the world,
produce earth, because they are atoms, like fire-atoms (and likewise, fire- is called "God", because it produces arising, maintaining and destruction,
atoms do not produce fire, because they are atoms like earth-atoms, etc.). satisfaction and frustration, etc.
Abhidharmika: If (your h) "difference" in the Vaiśeşika argument Answer: All right conventionally, but not ultimately, since we do not
refers to things which do not have causal power then your h is unproved. accept that there is actually any arising, etc. This also negates the theory
And if it refers to things which do have that power then your sp fails. that the self (purusa) is the cause of the world.
Answer: This is a futile rejoinder, since we just answered it (we were Nor is prakrti the cause of the world. Sārhkhya arguments for it fail
merely speaking generally). systematically because they require examples and we deny that any
Nyāya: Since you do not accept organs your p is unproved examples that may be offered are actual entities.
(aSrgvāsiddha), and this is a fallacy. Sārirkhya: We agree that nothing originates. But nevertheless things
Answer: But we do accept organs and difference conventionally. So are manifested (vyakta).
the argument is proper. Answer: How can an unoriginated lamp make unoriginated jars
Buddhapālita (according to Avalokitavrata): Things do not arise from manifest? A hare's horn can never be made manifest.
something else; if they did, then anything could originate from anything. 2 (T22.93-end) Causal condition (hetuprarvaya) includes what is
Answer: That contradicts your earlier argument, and is incoherent standardly termed the simultaneous (sahahhū), homogeneous (sabhāga),
anyway, since there is no connection between your reason and conclusion. connected (samprayukta), pervasive (sarvamraga) and maturation (vipāka)
Sāritkhya: A sprout arises both from factors which are different from conditions. Supporting object (alanthana) conditions comprise all factors.
it (e.g., soil) and from factors that are the same as it (e.g., the seed). The proximate (ramanantara) condition consists of all awarenesses and
(T21.226-234) Answer: (3) " not from both"; i.e., the arguments mental associates that have arisen except for the last (consciousness and
against (1) and (2) refute (3), since (3) is just the sum of (1) and (2). This mental factors of an arhat). The dominant factor (adhipati) condition is
426 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJNAPRADIPA 427

the nonobstructing or instrumental cause (kciranahetu). they are the purpose of practical activities, unlike the activities of the son
Nāgārjuna says (3) "The intrinsic nature of things does not of a barren woman.
exist in their conditions. If an essential nature does Answer: If this is intended as a matter of conventional truth, fine, but
not exist, an other-nature (parahhāva) does not exist if it is intended to describe an aspect of the highest reality your h is
either." unproved, since there is no practical activity ("going" or "passing") and
The meaning is that from the highest standpoint things do not arise from your h only occurs in cases of the vp.
themselves or from others; they do not arise at all. The Chapter explains in the form of argument and counterargument
Objection (by Gunamati, according to Avalokitavrata): When (in each step in Nāgārjuna' s rejection of motion.
I.4) Nāgārjuna denies that actions have causes what he is denying is that
awarenesses occur.
10
Answer: Nāgārjuna does not deny that there are awarenesses CHAPTER THREE: Investigation of the Sense-Bases
conventionally, only from the highest standpoint. From the highest standpoint the eye does not see matter/form,
Sāmkhya: The absence of a hare's horn exists, because it is a because it does not see itself, like the ear. Again, from the highest
qualified thing, like matter/form and like a blue lotus standpoint matter/form is not seen by the eye, because it is a collection,
Answer: We deny that matter/form and a blue lotus exist; we do not like the eye itself.
affirm that they are absences. Can an eye grasp an object with which it is in contact, or one with
Sautrāntika: We hold that the causal nexus of conditions that occurs which it is not? Neither, since an eye cannot see itself, just as the nose
precisely at the time the effect occurs (and not earlier) are the causal cannot smell itself, etc. How can it see other things, whether it is in
conditions. contact with them or not, especially since we have already shown that
Answer: No. In actuality, a seed is not a cause at the time the sprout other things do not exist from the ultimate standpoint?
arises, because it is neither the same nor different from the sprout, like Objection: You say that the eye does not see itself, and therefore
the seed at a previous moment. cannot see another either. But the eye can see itself, just as fire can burn
Sautrāntika: We agree that there can be no cause for either something itself, and thus it can see another as well.
that already exists or for something that does not exist. The reason is this: Answer: Even conventionally it is not the case that the essential
at the time the causal nexus assembles it is not the case that the result nature of fire is to burn. Buming is a transformation of the fuel that is
does not exist, since it is arising, but it is not the case that it does exist, produced by fire, not the essential nature of fire. Again, parallel to the
because it has not yet arisen. argument in the previous Chapter (Chapter 2) it can be proved that fire
Answer: But we have shown that each of these two claims is wrong, does not bum fuel that has been burned, that has not been burned, or that
so that the conjunction of them, being falsely imputed, cannot justify the is being burned. Thus the eye does not see forms which have been seen,
attribution of causes to things. which have not been seen, or which are being seen. Indeed the eye does
not see at all, being a lump of earth
Objection: The eye first exists without seeing anything and is called
CHAPTER TWO: Investigation of Motion 10° "eye" figuratively because of the power it will eventually exercise in
1-7 (T300-336) Nāgārjuna provides this chapter to show that seeing.
dependent origination is actually empty of either coming or going, and to Answer: That is all right as regards conventional truth, but fails to
refute the position contrary to ours (in Chapter I) that nothing arises. By make a case for the eye 's seeing from the highest standpoint.
first refuting the conventional notion that there are things to be done he Sāmkhya, Vaiśeşika: The eye is the instrument; it is instead the self
removes the thorn of attachment (that ordinary folk are pricked by). that sees.
Objection: Things (such as the six senses) really have arisen, because Answer: Our foregoing arguments refute this as readily as the thesis
428 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES 429
MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJÑAPRADIPA
that the eye is the seer, and for the same reasons. E.g., the self is really Materialist: We hold that all things originate from no cause at all.
a seer, because it does see itself, like the ear.
Answer: That is why Nāgārjuna adds that things not originated from
Does this seer of yours have the essential nature of being a seer or causes do not exist either. Anyway, if something could be a cause of
not? If so, as Sāthkhya for example says, then a seer would see even matter and there be no matter that thing would be a cause without an
without any visual organs. If not, as the Vaiśesikas say, then a seer is just
effect--but there can't be a cause without an effect! And if matter already
a group of things different from the visual organ that is conventionally
exists nothing can cause it.
termed "the seer Devadatta", e.g., and is other than the visual organ and
Materialist: What I am trying to say is that there are no causes for
so is not a seer.
matter.
Objection: From the highest standpoint awareness and the eye etc. Answer: That is surely not possible in the conventional world.
really do exist, since appropriation (upādāna), etc. exist.
Abhidharmika: The effect is in some cases like the cause, and in
Answer: But appropriations, like desires, views, morality, etc., do not others unlike it.
exist ultimately, but only conventionally. Answer: We have shown that the effect cannot be like its cause; it is
also the case that it cannot be unlike it either.
8-9. To attempt to answer these arguments (and the others in the
CHAPTER FOUR: Investigation of the Five Aggregates "' entire work) by denying them is to aver that they are empty, which thus
1-7. Matter/form does not ultimately exist, because awareness of
admits the very position we are advocating! Scriptural quotations are
matter/form requires awareness of its cause, like an army (which does not
provided in support.
exist since it has no cause). Or the awareness of matter/form does not
have an actual object as its content, because it is an awareness, like the CHAPTER FIVE: Investigation of the Six Elements
12
awareness of a forest. Or, the word " matter" does not denote a real thing,
1-7. The six elements (dhdtu) in question are the four great elements
because it is a word, like the word "army". These arguments refute the
plus space and consciousness.
existence of secondary matter (upādāya- or bhautika-rūpa).
Objection: The Buddha taught that these six had- defining
Objection: But elemental matter (bhūtarūpa) does really exist, characteristics respectively of solidity, cohesion, heat, motion, making
because secondary matter must have a cause, like earth and unlike a sky- room and cognizing. Nonexistent things like sky-flowers cannot cause
flower.
these things. So Nāgārjuna is contradicting himself.
In answer Nāgārjuna adds that the cause of matter is not seen apart Answer: But, for example, there is no space without a mark of it,
from matter, i.e., that " matter" is a conventional designation or
here making room; indeed the two are the same thing. Thus the
construction, indeed, empty as stated in the Larikāvatārasūtra (quoted).
Vaibhāşikas and Vaiśeşikas who distinguish space from its marks are
In denying the existence of matter/form we are not, like Sārhkhya, '
wrong. Space is not a real thing because it is unoriginated, like a hare s
affirming that it is something else, say, visible form. horn. If space and its mark were different one should occur without the
Vaiśeşika: Your reason is inconclusive, because even though the form
other. And if the mark could occur before the thing it marks, it wouldn't
of a thing's parts is not seen it may still be apprehended in some way, be that thing's mark. Furthermore, nothing can exist without a mark.
just as a jar unlit by a lamp may be lit by sunlight, etc. '
Jain: A mark applies to a thing that has it in one mode and doesn t
Answer: No, since there is no way other than by awareness of it that have it in another mode.
matter is going to be known.
Answer: That is contradictory and will be refuted further in Chapter
Objection: You indicate that an army is unreal. But an army is really 10 (of the text). In any case both of the two "modes " has been refuted
composed of parts.
previously.
Answer: No, any more than the collection of roots, trunk and Buddhapālita: What verse 3ab says is that a mark does not apply to
branches constitutes a tree. a thing which has no mark, since without a mark a thing does not exist,
430 MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJNAPRADIPA 431
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

nor does a mark apply to a thing which has a mark, since it is not weak-minded who do not understand this do conceive the possibility of
needed. quiescence of visible things, which is felicity.
Answer: That is not right, since you implicitly admit that its mark Quotations from sūtrar to confirm this.
exists while denying the thing marked, which is a contradiction. s
Vaibhāşika: Space is a positive entity because it is unconditioned like CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Investigation of Reality"
nirvāna. 1 (T113-116) Two sūtras in which the Buddha stated that everything
Answer: Nirvana isn't an entity. is false are quoted, one attributed to Śrāvakayāna and the other to Mahāyāna.
Sautrāntika: Space is not an entity, but it is the absence of a resisting The Buddha's argument is given thus:
substance.
All conditioned entities are false (unreal),
Answer: But space is a meditative object for one who meditates on
Because they are deceptive (mosa),
the infinity of space. And how can there be an absence of something
Like the body of an illusory woman projected by a magician.
which is not a positive entity?
Vaibhāşika: Matter/form, etc. are positive entities, because their Objection: You've left out the other two members of an inference, the
absences exist in relation (to their counterpositives), like the absence of application and the conclusion.
Answer: We do not consider these members, but we can generate
flavor, and unlike a horse's horn. And you have previously asserted that
them from what is provided in the three we specify. Three members are
the aggregates, senses and elements do not essentially exist, i.e. do not
exist as essential natures. So, since their absences exist in relation to their considered sufficient by the authors of śāstras.
presences, they must exist. 4 (T118-119) The sutra says: "Change is the...true nature of
"
Answer: Since we do not admit that absences exist, your example emptiness.
Objection: No. The argument is that conditioned entities are false, i.e.,
"like the absence of flavor" is fallacious.
without essential natures, but it does not conclude the nonexistence or
Objection: Both presences and absences exist since their cognizer
exists. emptiness of things. The body of an illusory woman projected by a
magician is without essential nature, but it exists.
Answer: The cognizer must either exist or not exist, and since we
Answer: But emptiness just is being without an essential nature, no
have shown that neither is the case your argument fails. So space is '
your distinction is groundless. The example of the illusory woman s body
neither a positive thing, an absence, a marked thing or a mark. The same
serves to illustrate that being deceptive would not occur unless there were
goes for the other five elements.
Sarhghabhadra: Your negation (apavāda) of all things from the emptiness. When a rope is seen as a snake the essential nature of the rope
is not lost. So deception is the result of being wrongly judged to involve
ultimate standpoint constitutes an extreme view, as the Buddha himself
noted. Your position is like the materialists'. a self; it is not that the nature of anything changes, rather that things have
8. Answer: We denied things have an essential nature; we did not no self-natures.
6 (T120-121) Objection: Fresh milk changes into curdled but is still
assert that they are absent altogether. It is a prasajya, not a patyudāsa
milk!
absence that we claim. The Buddha said that when one says " it is not
Answer: Then the same milk is both sweet and curdled! "Nothing
black" he does not necessarily mean " it is white " . Both extreme views,
can change..."
that things exist or that they do not, are bad views because they provide
Objection: Entities are not empty since their opposites exist. A sky-
an obstacle to the wise who desire the quiescence of every discursive flower, which has no opposite, is nonexistent, but the opposite of
development. If things had an essential or intrinsic nature then effort to
nonemptiness (i.e. emptiness) exists (according to you). So nonemptiness
produce or avoid them would he vain, and people would not be able to
must as well.
avoid frustrations or increase satisfactions. The same pointlessness of "
things would accrue if the absence of things had an essential nature. The 7 (Tl21-124) Answer: ...there is nothing nonempty (i.e., permanent
432 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJÑAPRADIPA 433
and substantial), and one cannot talk of an alternative called empty." from the series called "volition", and is still there when the volition
"Empty" and "nonempty" are conceptual constructions, based on
begins to arise, but is gone when the volition has arisen. Thus the ten
convention.
paths of action result from the five kinds of sensory maturations.
Some yogis (i.e., Yogācāra) think that because the constructed
12-20. Another objection: If what you hold were true a human could
(parikalpita) nature īs empty entities have a real unconstructed nature. not be reborn as a god, and generally one sort of being could not be
But both emptiness and nonemptiness are conceptual constructions
reborn or meditate in different species or realms, since the results of
Objection: Scripture says e.g. "those who cognize emptiness see action would be fixed forever. Karma is like a debt that will come due on
reality", etc., so emptiness must exist.
a certain date.
Answer: But other passages say e.g. "one should not suppose 'form 21-33. Answer (to both objections): Karma does not originate at all,
is empty' and one should not suppose 'it is nonempty'." The view of
since it lacks an essential nature.
emptiness removes grasping, but it too must be abandoned, since all
Objection: But the Buddha specifically said that karma does not
conceptual constructions must be abandoned..
disappear.
Answer: What he meant is that since action never occurs it never
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: Investigation of Karma and Its
disappears.
Fruits°' Objection: Actions must actually occur since they are caused to occur
1-1l.Objection (by a Śrāvaka-Vaibhāsika according to by the defilements. If the defilements are not real how could action be
Avalokitavrata): You argued (in Chapter 16) that rebirth does not occur
produced by them?
to traces because that would lead to the faults of eternalism or nihilism. Answer: All are empty; they do not actually occur.
15
We agree that those faults do not occur, but we will prove that rebirth
exists for traces because actions have results and vice versa, unlike for the
traces belonging to a barren woman's son. Actions, e.g., volitions, result CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: Investigation of the Self and Factors
in good, bad or neutral bodily or vocal traces. "Seven divisions" of
8. (summary by Shotaro Iida) Here Bhavya divides the world into
bodily, mental and vocal actions are: language, movement, good and bad conventional reality and ultimate reality, and further divides conventional
unmanifest karma, merit and demerit and volition. These seven have
reality into real (taihya) and false (mithyā). He also separates ultimate
pure particulars (svalaksana). From these seven kinds of acts result the by others
reality into two kinds: suprarnundane (aparVāya)--uncognizable
''"
five aggregates in the five courses. Thus rebirth really does occur.
--and mundane (paryāya), available to discrimination.
Answer: If that were so karma, once having been laid down, would
either (1) persist until it bears fruit or (2) cease immediately. So if it
persists at all it will persist forever. CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE: Investigation of Nirvāna
Objection: Like a plant the trace ceases after its fruit matures. Appendix
Answer: No, since bearing fruit happens only conventionally, not The following summary is based on the translation and analysis by
from the highest standpoint: also, a thing's nature (svalaksasa) cannot
Malcolm David Eckel in Miscellanea Buddhica (Indiske Studier 5:
change, so a thing that is permanent by nature must remain so. But (2) Copenhagen 1985), pp. 25-75. Eckel tells us that this Appendix occupies
if it ceases immediately how can the karma produce any result? 19 folio sides in the Tibetan Tripitaka. The Tibetan text itself is edited
Objection: The series that we call the "sprout" arises from the series by Christian Lindtner, Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica 29/2, pp. 77-97;
called " seed". The seed-series is still there when the sprout-series begins " " references below are to this, while "T" refers to the pages in Eckel s
'
E
to arise, but is gone when the sprout has arisen. Thus the seed (or the translation.
sprout) is neither gone before the sprout arises, nor does it last eternally.
In the same way, the series of mental actions of consciousness arises (E 1; T45-46) Yogācāra: If as verse 24 of this Chapter says "There is
434 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJÑAPRADIPA 435

no Buddha who has preached anything to anyone," and since we are told (E4; T54-56) (2) "Because otherwise defilement and purification
(by Asañga) that the three natures are empty with regard to their could not occur." But it is not a denial of defilement and purification to
definition, origin and reality, then the dependent nature cannot be denied say that ultimately nothing arises.
reality, though it is not noticed (na samanupaśyati) since it is not grasped Yogācāra: A Mahāyānābhidharmasīara says: There is an element
as having the mark (of the constructed nature). (dhdtu) that is the basis of all seeds (i.e., factors), and because it exists
(E2; T49-52) The constructed nature involves conceptual the various courses of life exist as well as the attainment of liberation.
constructions of essential natures of factors, the notion that there are Mādhyamika: This passage concems conventional reality only. The
things such as matter/form, feeling, etc., and that they have qualities such "element " being referred to is consciousness, which indeed does contain
as visibility, etc. This constructed nature is empty, not corresponding to all seeds, i.e., traces.
any of the five kinds of factors. But defilements arise from language; (E5; T56-57) The Lasikāvatārasūtra affirms that something dependent
people become attached to the constructed natures through words. exists.
Madhyamika: To be sure, a constructed object is not what it is taken Mādhyamika: Again, you misconstrue the passage: all it means is that
to be, but it it is something conventionally--a coiled snake is a snake--to what is dependent exists only conventionally (quoting another passage
say otherwise would contradict common sense. Otherwise you could not from the La,ikāvatāra to support that interpretation).
even cite it as an example. A reason (in inference) must be accepted (E6; T57-59) (3) "Because defilements are apprehended."
conventionally by both parties (to the debate). If your argument is: the Yogācāra: The dharmadhātu is neither defiled nor undefiled, and
constructed nature does not exist, because it is false", it is unproved, since defilements are adventitious. So the Madhyāntavibhāga says that
names are instances of matter/form and traces, conceptual constructions emptiness can be considered pure like water, gold or space. And it goes
are among the aggregates of consciousness and traces. Furthermore, if on to say that it is neither afflicted nor unafflicted, neither clear nor
'"
things have no natures and no qualities no one could be defiled. It is not unclear, since afflictions are adventitious.
the name that causes attachment to a thing; rather what that involves is Mādhyamika: But then those who believe in a self argue that there
careless attention (ayoniśomanasikāra). is a self that is eternal and pure and yet that there is also transmigration
(E3; T52-54) What is this "dependent nature"? and liberation. That position is as self-contradictory as your own.
Yogācāra: It is the nature of factors that arise dependently and is the Purity in water, etc. arises from causes and conditions; likewise,
locus of defilement and purification. A dependent nature exists, because consciousness can arise involved with defilements or as purified from
(1) ideas have causes, since (2) otherwise defilement and purification them. But the dharmadhātu doesn't arise at all, and so cannot be pure or
could not occur, and (3) because defilements are apprehended. impure in that way.
Mādhyamika: If this dependent nature is just being said to be Yogācāra: So likewise space, a real entity, can be stained when there
conventionally real (vyavahārasat) there is no problem. If it were is smoke and clear when there is not.
ultimately real, however, it could not arise dependently. As for your three Mādhyamika: Space is not a real entity. Even if it were it does not
reasons, arise or cease; thus it is like the dharmadhātu, which as you yourself
(I) "Because ideas have causes" cannot be a statement of a reason, have said is neither defiled nor undefiled.
since it does not state a property of the p (viz., dependent nature). What (E7; T59-60) You said that (the three natures, and thus) the
it appears to provide is an sp. dependent nature is empty with regard to origin. But if that means that
Yogācāra: The inference is as follows: Ultimately the meaning of it really is so, since nothing can arise at all, then (cf. Chapter One) you
each word (e.g. "matter") has a cause, because it is an idea. " are wrong about that. And if you merely mean that it is conventionally
Mādhyamika: But since for you everything is an idea, you haven 't taken to be so that is uncontroversial.
given an sp (i.e., something other than the p, i.e., a non-idea). And in (E8-9; T60-64) If you said that it (the dependent nature) is not
any case nothing is a reason "ultimately". noticed because it does not exist as it appears, we agree. If you say that
 MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJÑAPRADIPA 437
436 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
permanent.
it is not noticed because external objects don't exist, then what are we Asañga (in Madhyāntavibhāga 1.6): "Apprehending this,
speaking of when we refer to external objects? nonapprehension arises; based on this nonapprehension. nonapprehension
You argue that consciousness is empty for various reasons and on the "
arises.
basis of scripture, specifically the Latikāvatāra again. But to repeat, do Mādhyamika: But only. if we accept consciousness-only
'
you mean that it is empty ultimately or conventionally? In the former (vijñaptimūtratd), which we don t. Or if you are saying that external
case you can provide no example, and in the latter there is no objects are not cognized because there are no objects at all, that is
disagreement with us. As for scripture, the passage from the Latikāvatgra precisely our position!
in question, which concludes by asserting consciousness-only, means that (E13; T70) You advocate meditating first on the selflessness of
there is no agent or enjoyer other than consciousness. But we accept this; objects and subsequently on consciousness and awareness. But why not
indeed, it is what the Bodhisattva realizes at the sixth stage. meditate on both of them from the start?!
(E10; T64-65) Yogācāra: Material things are by nature awareness, (E14; T70-71) And what is the perfected (parinispanna) nature for
because they are contents of awareness. you? You say it is the suchness (tathatd) of factors, but how can factors
Mādhyamika: Your reason is equivocal, since mental associates have a nature if they are unestablished? If you say that factors only exist
(caitta) are contents of awareness but are different from consciousness conventionally you agree with us Madhyamakas.
(citta). Is your "absence of two things" (in Madhyāntavibhāga I.14ab: "the
(Ell; T65-67) Yogācāra: Is the content of an awareness an atom or absence of two things, and the existence of this absence, is the defining
a combination of atoms? Not the former since an atom is invisible, and characteristic of emptiness ") a prasajya absence or a parvudūsa absence?
not the latter, since a combination of atoms is not a real thing, any more ' "
If the former it doesn t follow that there is "the existence of this absence ,
than a double-moon (seen in error) is. and if the latter it would amount to asserting the existence of absences,
Mādhyamika: By saying "atoms are invisible" do you mean to imply which is an extreme view, viz. nihilism.
that something else is the cbject of sight? But this denies your earlier (E15; T72-74) Anyway, how can grasping this perfected nature be
position. Or do you mean that awareness has no content at all? But you termed "pure"? It can't be conceptionfree, since there is an appearance
haven't proved that. Furthermore, the form of a single atom can be the (āhhāsa) of an object. So how is it pure?
content of an awareness when it is combined with the forms of other '
Yogācāra: Just as one s fear of a snake is laid to rest when he comes
atoms. Indeed, the Abhidharmakośa (I.35d) says that the ten organs to know it is only a rope, so when someone sees thusness defilements
(āyatana) are combinations (smiicita).
cease--and this is the grasping of the dharmadhātu,
But you have just now argued that a combination of atoms is not the Mādhyamika: When one has a correct awareness it causes no fear.
object of awareness because it is not a real thing, being like the double Grasping thusness is like that. The reality of things is that they are
moon. We agree that double moon is not an object of awareness; there completely unestablished, and since this is in no way present as a content
is no such object. But if you are saying the double moon is cognized of awareness it is not grasped.
even though it is not a real thing your example fails to instantiate your Yogācāra: If a Tathāgata does not grasp the dharmadhātu what is it
h. And if you say that an awareness of matter does not have matter as it that makes him a Buddha?
content, then your example fails to instantiate the s. Mādhyamika: There are no factors. The awareness of thusness does
(E12; T68-69) To deny that supporting-object conditions not have an ultimately real object, for it is conditioned. So if it grasps
āl
( ambanapratyaya) even exist conventionally is contradictory. some thing that thing must be false.
(Yogācāra: There are no supporting-object conditions. Rather, it is the Yogācāra: Then it cannot be reasoned about.
store-consciousness which appears as the object .) Mādhyamika: No. Inference following scripture negates all concepts
Mādhyamika: Since the store-consciousness remains the same, if it and brings about conceptfree awareness. The perfected nature is not a
were the cause of a particular cognition the awareness of it woujld be
438 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJÑAPRADIPA 439

content of inference, but there is no other way of coming to know it. '
(svatantrānumānas) are given to prove Bhavya s fundamental thesis.
(E16; T74) Consult the Madhramakahfdavatattvāvatāra (presumably 5. Having thus refuted sādhana-prantāña as a whole each of the three
now lost) for a more extensive inquiry into the Yogācāra position. members of the syllogism are refuted. Now a thesis is defined as a pakśa
The section concludes by quoting a number of sutras. which is desired to be proved (sādhyatvenepsita) and free from
contradiction (viruddhārthādyanirākrta) ' N (cf. Nyāyamukha 1;
Pramānasamuccaya 11I.2). In the ultimate sense it can be proved that the
CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN: Investigation of Dogmatic View notion of sādhya is untenable and various objections to the contrary can
An Appendix to this Chapter has been translated by Christian easily be discarded. Similarly the thesis, the reason and the example can
Lindtner in "Bhavya, the logician". Visva-Bharati Annals n.s. 2, 1990, pp. be disposed of in the ultimate sense whether taken one by one or as a
30-50. We provide here Lindtner's summary from pp. 37-38 of this "whole".
Appendix, with the usual translations replacing Sanskrit technical terms. 6. The dū,anapramāna can be refuted similarly.
7. Since it has thus been proved that there are no instruments of
Summary by Christian Lindtner knowledge in the ultimate sense, there are, of course, also no objects
known by such instruments. Hence it cannot, as initially claimed by the
1. The opponent claims that the fact that Bhavya throughout his opponent, be said that Bhavya's arguments for nonarising are
commentary has availed himself of sādhana and dūsana as instrument of inconclusive. Strictly speaking all arguments, etc. are like illusions, but
knowledge either implies that they, like all other entities, lack intrinsic since the opponent believes in their value they are quite useful to the
natures--and so they cannot establish anything--or, if alternatively they do extent that they refute all vipaksas to dependent origination.
possess intrinsic natures it implies that all his arguments are inconclusive
(anaikāntika) or antinomic (viruddhavyabhicārin). In the Tibetan translations of this whole work (but not in the Chinese)
2. First Bhavya launches a paroktadośaparihāra from the level of one finds an Appendix. This has been translated by Christian Lindtner,
'"

common experience. When the opponent supports his objection with the and since it serves as a summary of the entire work and is relatively
hetu that the instruments of knowledge lack intrinsic natures there are, brief, we provide here the first part (with our translations of technical
hypothetically, two possibilities: Either the opponent accepts the reality terms as usual).
of the thing referred to by the hetu--but that is obviously not the case--or
he does not accept it--but in that case he cannot advance it against the Translation by Christian Lindtner
Mādhyamika (because a hem has to be admitted by both proponent and
opponent, otherwise it is anvatarāsiddha). Thus it has been shown (by us above) that all entities lack an intrinsic
Again. if the opponent, as he seems to, refutes the pramānas from the nature. Nevertheless charlatans (kuvādika) whose understanding is
highest standpoint, this is a case of proving what is already accepted (a impaired by their innate clinging to the (assumed) substantial existence
fallacy). If he refutes them on the level of common sense, it is a case of of things and who, as it were, suffering from timira see (things which do)
(the paksābhāsa called) abhyupagatabādhā, i.e., sublating what everyone not really exist, try to refute (us) in order to establish their own opinion:
accepts. (Objection:) Here you have metaphorically demonstrated your own
3. Then Bhavya provides a general example of an h to prove his thesis (namely) that all entities are empty of intrinsic nature) by means
thesis that the instruments of knowledge lack essential natures. Many of proof and refutation as instruments of knowledge. But if proof and
reasons may be given, but the fundamental reason is, as shown refutation as instruments of knowledge lack intrinsic nature
previously, that there is no origination or action (see They (instruments of knowledge) are unable to
Afūlamadhramakakārikā I, etc.) comprehend what the truth is about a thing one wants
4. After this general refutation specific independent arguments to investigate really is,
440 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKAKARIKA-PRAJ1IAPRADIPA 441

Because they lack intrinsic nature, Similarly,

As, for instance, the son of a barren woman. In the ultimate sense inference does not possess the
If, altematively, (you claim) that they do in fact possess intrinsic natures, intrinsic nature of inference
all entities, including these two, must exist. but in that case the inferences Because it is an instrument of knowledge,
adduced in the entire thstra are also quite unconvincing (anaikāntika). As, for instance, perception.
(Answer:) To this (we reply): If you maintain that the logical Or again,
reason (viz.) "because they lack intrinsic nature" does not carry any In the ultimate sense inference is not an instrument
meaning. because (the h also) has no intrinsic nature, then (you are of knowledge,
forgetting that) the meaning of the logical reason is certainly not Because it is conceptual construction,
established for you (a priori in your own system). If the opposite were As, for instance, the (erroneous) idea of a man
the case (then the lack of intrinsic nature would only be established) for instead of a post.
the opponent (viz. the Mādhyamika). The same applies to the (three) members of proof, the thesis, etc.
In the ultimate sense the instruments of knowledge, etc. do not have (Our opponent claims that) a demonstration of s by these (three) is an
any intrinsic nature. So when (you) deny their power (to comprehend etc. ascertainment (avadhāraya). A thesis is something which its proponent
as above) this is (a quite superfluous attempt) to prove what has already wants to prove and which is not excluded by something contradictory
been proven (by us) (siddhasādhana). (On the other hand, to deny them etc....
pragmatically (vvavahāratah) would bring you into conflict with what In the ultimate sense a thesis does not establish
(you) generally accept as true. anything,
Well, Because a thesis is a thing which (itself) remains
In the ultimate sense the instruments of knowledge to be demonstrated,
have no power (respectively) to apprehend what As, for instance, a promise made by one merely
should be apprehended and to show what is worth making an assertion....
relying on, (A series of arguments are reviewed.)
Because they are conditioned (saritskrta) The purpose of this treatise is to show the emptiness of (all) views
Like a lump of earth. by expressly refuting the tenets propounded by various heretics. Therefore
In the saute way, (to prove that the instruments of knowledge have it is said (in the Suvikrāntavikrāniipariprcchti) for instance:
"
no power etc.) one should extensively advance inferences supported by
g
Suvikrāntavikrāmin, matter/form is not a type of view, nor is it an
lo ical reasons such as " because they possess origination", " because they abandonment of a type of view. Similarly feelings, identifications, traces
change due to varius conditions," " because they perish," " because they and consciousness are not a type of view, nor are they an abandonment
may be experienced," "because they may be spoken of," etc. This is of a type of view. The fact that matter/form, feelings, identifications,
because origination (utpāda) has already been negated in the manner traces and consciousness are neither a type of view nor an abandonment
"
shown above in a general way, and because activity (kriyal has also of a type of view, that is the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramita..
already been negated. And so it has been established that the purpose of the
Let us now refute (the instruments of knowledge) in particular: (Madhvamakalśāstra is to show that dependent origination by being
In the ultimate sense perception does not possess distinguished by nonorigination etc. is the ambrosial truth of contentless
the intrinsic nature of perception, consciousness; namely, the ultimate truth of contentless consciousness,
Because it depends on the senses, comparable to the clear autumnal sky: all manifestations (prapaica) are
As, for instance, erroneous cognition totally extinguished. it is free from duality and unity, it is peaceful and
(bhrrintijñāna). must be known through personal experience.
442 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKARTHASAtVIGRAHA 443

Even though Bhagavat's law (of dependent origination) is absolutely 8 The absolute is approximately like this: totally devoid of both
true, bad logicians do not place faith in it. Therefore this (principle of . extremes, i.e. the extreme of being and the extreme of nonbeing.
dependent origination) should mainly be secured through 9 Relativity (sarhvt-ti) as it appears (yathābhāsa) must be known
inference. also to have two forms, viz. false (mithyd) relativity and genuine (tathya)
relativity.
10 A thing capable of efficiency (arthakriyāsamartha) is called
164. BHAVYA, Madhyamakūrthasatitgraha (550) tathyasatiivrti, but one which appears incapable of efficiency is
mithyāsatńvŗti.
Translation by Christian Lindtner 11 This again has two forms: one with discursive thinking
(savikalpa), and one without discursive thinking (nirvikalpa). Savikalpa
This translation is provided by Lindtner in "Atiśa's introduction to "
is e.g. to take a rope for a snake, nirvikalpa is e.g. to perceive" two
the two truths, " Journal of Indian Philosophy 9, 1981, p. 200. It is based moons.
on the Tibetan version published by Yasunori Ejima, Chūgan-shish no 12 Thus it must be taught that everything consists in the two truths.
tenkai-Bhdvaviveka kenkyū: Development of Mādhyamika Pilosophy in By taking the meaning of this to heart full perfection (sampad) is
India: Studies in Bhāvaviveka (Tokyo 1980), pp. 18-21. The work is also achieved."
edited and translated by N. Aiyasvami Sastri, Journal of Oriental 13 Concluding stanza.
Researech 5, 1931, 41-49. There is also a translation by Daniel Ferrer in
The Tibet Journal 17.2, 1992, pp. 52-55. As noted in the Introduction to
the next entry (#165 the ascription to this Bhavya is doubtful.

1 Initial stanza. 165. BHAVYA, Madhyamakaratnapradipa (550)

2 I have composed this brief text in order to make the actual On the ascription of this work (as well as of its predecessor) to the
meaning (yathārtha) of the two truths intelligible. author of #s 161-163, see D. Seyfort Ruegg, " On the authorship of some
3 The teaching of the Buddhas is consolidated in the two truths, works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya" in Earliest Buddhism and
viz. the absolute and the relative. Madhvamaka: Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference Volume II
4 The absolute is devoid of the principle of language (prapañca), (ed. D. Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen) (Leiden 1990), pp. 59-
and it is of two kinds, viz., the absolute which can be rendered into 71. Ruegg is cautiously inclined to favor the distinctness of the two
words (paryāyaparamārtha) and the absolute which cannot be rendered authors. Many scholars have publicly questioned Lindtner 's ascription of
into words (apatyāvaparamārtha). these two works #s164-165 to this Bhavya, and there is even question
5 Again, the first is of two kinds, viz. the absolute which is about #161 by those, like Ruegg, who suspect that all three works are by
expressed in terms of logic (yuktiparyāyaparamārtha) and the absolute a later Bhavya about whom we know nothing. However, since Dr.
expressing negation of origination (utpādapratisedha). Lindtner is our summarizer here, we retain his ascriptions, which he has
'"
6 The absolute which is expressed in terms of logic (yukti or nyāya) cogently argued for in several places.
is concerned with the four logical reasons (hetu) refuting origination,
destruction, etc. of the quadrilemma (catuskoti) (viz. being, nonbeing, Summary by Christian Lindtner
etc.). Again the absolute expressing negation of origination is every
apparent thing (āblttīsabhava). The Madhyaniakaratnapra Epa ( MRP) consists of nine chapters, the
7 That which is devoid of all empirical status (prapañcaśūnya) titles and contents of which are related below. Chapter I provides an
must be known as the absolute which cannot be rendered into words. introduction to the system of two truths, a theme developed further in
444 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADIPA 445
Chapter V. Then follows a critique of various heretical philosophies
(Chapter II), and the two major rival Buddhist schools, Śrāvaka (Chapter view.
III) and Yogācāra (Chapter IV). II-IV thus relate to the two kinds of (ii) Secondly, he is accused of being in conflict with the evidence
conventional truth. the mistaken, and the two kinds of correct, both of of perception. But Bhavya admits no sublation by perception, because it
which are only preliminary. Madhyamaka alone represents the two kinds can be demonstrated by four basic arguments that all the "facts" of
of highest truth, be it effable (saprapañca) (V) or ineffable perception are really neutral contents of mind. So there is nothing
"
(prapañcaśūnya (VI). Whereas Chapters II-VI correspond to insight "evident, no perception, with which he can be in conflict.
(prajñd) based on knowledge of tradition (śrutamay) and rational (iii) Thirdly, he is accused of doing violence to common opinion.
understanding (cintāmayi), Chapter VII naturally deals with insight based But what happens to be common opinion solely depends on the eyes that
on spiritual cultivation (bhāvana7. The concluding chapters extol the see. The mental eye of common people is covered by the film of
grandeur of Nāgārjuna (VIII) and the merits and purpose 'of his ignorance whereas the vision of emptiness enjoyed by sages is a pure
philosophy (IX). insight free from blemishes. From their point of view, and this is what
really counts, there is no conflict with common opinion.
(iv) Finally, the grim charge is levelled against the Mādhyamika
CHAPTER I: The Two Truths that he is a nihilist denying the existence of a world to come. - Not at
The MRP opens with an exposition of the basic concept of all! At the level of the absolute the world is like an illusion. Here, of
Madhyamaka, the theory of two truths. '' The distinction between two course, there is really nothing to affirm or deny.
truths (or two kinds of reality) is, according to Buddhist tradition, not The author intends to revert to all this subsequently (Chapter V).
valid at the absolute level of dharmadhiitu, but only as long as one's
insight is obscured by the cataract of ignorance. CHAPTER II: Wrong Understanding of the Relative Truth
Though conventional truth is thus really false and delusive one may Here is given a survey of erroneous views held by debaters
nevertheless, with "the old masters, " distinguish between a mistaken (tārkika) (Buddhists and non-Buddhists) who like blind people resort to
relative truth, which is sheer appearance, and a correct (tathya) relative inference as their main instrument of awareness. These people are only
truth, at the level of which all external and internal factors are in possession of a wrong understanding.
characterized by being acceptable when not analysed, born from causes, First of all, there is a series of 363 views held by a large number
and useful for practical purposes. of heretical schools or teachers. Of these dogmas 110 may be regarded
The highest truth is simply emptiness, of which there are eighteen as fundamental. A comparable list, we may observe, is also known from
kinds. according to scripture. various Jaina sources, but apparently from no other Buddhist source
The conventional truth is a knowledge of the specific and common (apart from 162.Tarkajvāld).
characteristics of all knowable objects. It is an indispensable prerequisite Moreover, there are seven groups each of which comprises
for the attainment of the absolute truth, because it provides the necessary respectively 62, 20, 12, 12, 5, 3 and 2 dogmas. Among these, all of
basis on which reason (i.e., cintāmayī prajña-) is enabled to unveil the which are known from other sources, only 62 views - those of the
inherent emptiness of each and every factor The "relationship" between Brahmajālasūtra - receive a brief separate critique in the light of
the two truths, then, is, to quote Candrakīrti, one of means and ends. Aryadeva's Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi.
Now Bhavya is exposed to various objections: (i) First of all, he Then follows a brief account - based on 162.Tarkajvālā - of the 25
cannot, as he seems to, claim that all factors exist and at the same time principles of Sāri:khya, the six categories of Vaiśeşika, the nine (!) of the
claim that they do not exist. But according to Bhavya there is no question nirgranthas, and finally a summary of the tenets of Kalavada, Puruşavāda
of contradicting his own claims, because the former is only made from (including the Vātsīputrīya!), Karmavāda, Brahmavāda as well as those
a conventional point of view, the latter only from the highest point of of the adherents of Siva and Visnu.
It falls outside the scope of MRP to give a detailed account and
446 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADIPA 447

refutation of this endless series of vain speculations. They may all, Chapter III).
however, be refuted in a general way by means of four basic arguments In the second part of this chapter it is argued that the system of the
proving, respectively, (i) that nothing can arise from anything (viz. itself, Śrāvakas can only be taken as having a preliminary meaning, because it
something else, etc.); (ii) that neither that which exists, nor that which fails to abolish the obstructions to the knowables as it lacks perfection in
does not exist, etc., can possibly arise; (iii) that nothing can be conceived wisdom.
as one or many; and (iv) that all things are dependently co-originated. As far as the unconditioned factors are concerned, the notion of the
All this has already, the author recalls, been amply demonstrated in Sautrāntika, Tāmraśātīya and Vātsiputrīya of nirvana as some sort of
Nāgārjuna 's Vaidalyasūtra, Mi lamadhvamakakārikās, Vigrahavyāvartanī, nonexistence can only be taken in a preliminary sense also.
Śūnyatāsaptati, Yuktisastikā, etc. - Therefore one can safely conclude that The following quotation from Nāgārjuna's Bodhicittavivarana not
origination only exists from a conventional point of view. only sums up the foregoing and introduces the following, but also reveals
one of Bhavya's basic authorities for the hierarchical tripartition of the
Buddhist schools given in MRP, Chapters III-V: "The (Buddha's)
CHAPTER III: Right Understanding of the Preliminary instruction about the aggregates, elements, etc. (merely) aims at dispelling
Understanding of the Truths, Part One the belief in an ego. By establishing themselves in pure consciousness
the greatly blessed (Bodhisattvas) also abandon that (instruction). "
This is the first of three chapters dealing with a gradually more
profound and orthodox system of Buddhism (tathyasarñvrtivāda). It CHAPTER IV: Right Understanding of the Preliminary Relative
refutes the Vaibhāşika conception of the ultimate existence of the Truth, Part 2 1"t
composite factors, viz., the aggregates, the bases and the elements. This deals with a recurrent theme of particular philosophical and
These factors are only to be understood in a preliminary sense historical interest, namely, Bhavya's critique of the major rival Mahayana
(neyārtha), not in a final or definite sense (nītm-tha). In other words, the school, Yogācāra, as represented by Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga, etc.
system of Abhidharma only serves as a preamble to that of Madhyamaka Their arrogant ingenuity cannot be questioned, but their orthodoxy, as
in the sense that as a lower form of true relative truth it is a "ladder" to yukti based on āgama shows, certainly can.
the definitive conventional wisdom (see Chapter V) and the highest I (T247) It is, of course, true that several sūtras such as
wisdom (see Chapter VI). As such it is certainly indispensable. Lañkāvatāra, Daśabhūmikā, etc., contain several pronouncements to the
In the ultimate sense matter/form, etc. do not exist, because the effect that the universe is but mind (civamātra). But these āgamas, also
accepted by Bhavya, should not be taken, as the Yogācāra takes them,
atom, assumed to be their first cause, is in fact an impossible notion (see
Vitimśatikā 12). Hence all the material factors supposed to be derived to convey nītārtha, but only, with the Madhyamaka, neyārtha. What they
from these "atoms, " as well as all our ideas based upon them, must want to tell us is merely that no agent or enjoyer exists.
obviously be unreal (ava.rtuka). Incidentally, how could one otherwise 2. (T248) Nevertheless, there are two groups of Yogācāra taking the
account for the fact that accomplished yogis can rush unhindered through term "cittamātra " at its face value. Consequently, they are merely in
mountains, walls, etc.? These magic powers can, of course, only be possession of a conventional truth of the neyārtha kind.
accounted for on the assumption that all these things are without "hard" 3 (T248) Now, those claiming that (cognition in itself) is invested
substance. These incontestable siddhis cannot simply be discarded as a with (a true objective) image (sākāra) argue as follows:
matter of wishful thinking (adhimukti) on the part of the yogis as insinua- (i) The entire triple world and nirvana are also simply mind
ted by the " rationalistic" Vaibhāsikas. - For further arguments to the (cittamātra), because (cognition) is void of objects such as material form
etc., as, for instance, (cognition in) a dream-state.
effect that the four elements and the aggregates, etc., derived from them
(ii) They also claim that consciousness (vijñāna) itself appears
only exist conventionally, the reader is advised to consult Candrakīrti 's
Paitcaskandhaprakaraila and the author's 162. Tarkajvdld (especially as two (dvābhāsa), because it is both an instrument of knowledge
 MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADIPA 449
448 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
cleave a log with an axe: first you are about to do it, then you hit it, and,
(pramdna) and a result (phala) (of cognition). here (it is to be noted) that
voila, you have got two pieces!
an instrument of knowledge is so-called because (awareness) infers (the
To this we reply: (According to your theory of perception) an
result) by means of it. Cognitive consciousness appears as itself. The
immediately evident perceptual awareness perceives the pure particular
result is its understanding of the content, i.e., cognition appearing as and is devoid of the dichotomies of construction and memory.
content. The instrument and the result of cognition appertain to Accordingly the manifold perceptual contents such as matter, etc. have
consciousness appearing as object alone.
blue, etc. as their inexpressible nature (anirdeśyarūpa = svalaksana),
(iii) And moreover (they claim) that all external and internal Similarly it (i.e., perceptual awareness), in the form of self-awareness
factors are (only) awareness (citta), because they are contents (visaya)
(svasarhvedanākāra), apprehends (a perceptual object which is) just as
(consisting) of awareness-only, as, for instance, the immediately
inexpressible in its nature. Since, therefore, the instrument of knowledge
preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya). and the result only belong to one single awareness appearing as content,
Therefore they say that the apprehension to be realized is the
the logical reason (viz., "because it is both instrument of knowledge and
"nature of things (dharmatārūpa) which can only be understood by the
"
result") is not proved. Consequently the assumption that one awareness
direct self-cognition of a Buddha, i.e., in the original state of the nature appears as two (i.e., as instrument and result) must be erroneous.
of one' s mind when it is free from the impurity of grasper and grasped.
(iii) The third argument is also not correct. In fact the thesis,
4.(T248-250) Now we shall refute these arguments in due order:
the logical reason and the example (consist of) a paksa (in this case, an
(i) As far as the first is concerned the thesis (pratijñd) and the external object (bāhyāriha)) and a hetu logically establishing it (in this
logical reason (hetu) (cannot be) established as valid (siddha) in this case.
case, its mental nature (cittasvabhāva)). However, your thesis (that all
As far as the example (drstānta) is concerned, viz., like a dream, this external and internal factors are only awareness) is not established for you
analogy must in fact (illustrate an awareness) which is either empty, its
(by the h "because they are contents (consisting) of awareness only".
object being constructed (kalpitārthaśūnya) (i.e., unreal), or empty, its
Now, in this case, awareness must either be the content existing outside,
object not being constructed (akalpitārthaśūnya) (but really existent). In
or it must be the content located inside (mental phenomena (caitta) such
the first case awareness and the content of that awareness cannot be as) feeling, etc. But if an external awareness is the content, then, when
established and must be false (mithyd). Hence your basic thesis is not
one proposes the thesis that everything external and internal is only
valid. If the example illustrates an awareness that is empty, its object
awareness, there cannot possibly be a content nor a content-possessor.
being constructed, it cannot exclude that (remaining) part of the object Nor can an internal awareness be the content of awareness: that is a
which is not imagined (but real), and for that reason also (the theory) of
fallacy. (Hence awareness cannot be a content and, consequently, your
cittamātra is illogical. The other example is not established as valid
thesis remains unproved.)
either, because it is only the dreaming awareness (not the external object
5.But there are also faults such as this: If everything is only
as such) which is false, because it perceives the nature of things (and
awareness, then, for instance, when one sees a jar, one would also have
believes in their presence). So it cannot serve as an example. to perceive the series of awarenesses (cittasariitāna) of all other living
(ii) With regard to the statement about consciousness
beings. By perceiving this (everybody) in the five destinies would
appearing as content, Dignāga maintains that consciousness does not automatically have the higher faculty (abhijña) cognizing the awarenesses
apprehend a content as long as it is only arising (utpadyamāna). Hence of others (paracitta) (which is, of course, quite absurd).
the awareness which is still merely arising is (not yet objectified as result, And again, if everything were awareness, an image (dkdra) would,
but it is only) an instrument of knowledge. But when consciousness has like awareness, be immaterial, or else awareness, like something
arisen, a content is perceived (by it) and therefore one 's awareness is appearing *drawl)), would be material. But then awareness would also,
definitely and fully established. This, therefore, is maintained to be the
like the image, be inert matter, or the image would understand and
instrument of knowledge and the result of the very awareness which, as cognize (which is, of course, absurd).
a result, appears as content. It is, by way of illustration, like when you
450 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADIPA 451

6. Again, you cannot possibly attain liberation "by freeing (mind) aspects" (sarvākārajhajhāna), so how can you (even dream of) getting the
from the impurity of grasper and grasped." But (a Mādhyamika) who cognition of a Buddha! Please point out, without professional jealousy
maintains the existence of external objects (on the conventional (samvrti) (mātsarya), those things determined by your logic!
level), and apprehends, through yoga, the unsubstantial nature of that If you say that (svasańrvedana) cannot be expressed to others
content (on the higher, pāramārthika level) can certainly generate the because it is a matter of self-cognition, then it is not different from the
higher constructionfree awareness by eliminating grasper and grasped. ātman maintained by nonBuddhists. But which sensible person can
According to you, (Dignāga,) who assert that there is no supporting consider taking seriously their statements that a self is eternal, one,
object (ālambana), there has never been an external object in the first omnipresent, incorporeal and rigmarole not even congruous with their
"
place. Nevertheless (you claim that one can) penetrate the essential nature own (notion of a self)! The idea about "sva.sathvedana and that of a
of grasper and grasped later on. But by what can one really eliminate it "self' are in fact sheer subjective discriminations (prativikaipamātra). The
later on (when it never was there in the first place)? You have no means Yogācāras do not understand the selflessness of persons
whatsoever of getting a higher constructionfree awareness. So when you (pudgalanairātmya) and they do not understand the selflessness of factors
say that "when a supporting object such as matter, etc. do not appear (dharmanairātmya) either, because this is such a tremendous clinging to
outside awareness, then awareness, definitely located in the original state egoity (altamkāra).
of one's mind, is called 'nondual awareness' (and that) truth, reality, Apart from that there are many more mistakes, but let this suffice
immortality, the highest level of all Buddhas constitutes (the nature of) for now.
the three bodies (trikāya)" '" --we must be aware that this is based on a 9. Here (the adherents of) nirākāravāda (interrupt and) attempt to
misunderstanding. refute, saying: (perhaps the adherents of sākāravāda do not have it but)
7. Nor do those who claim that (awareness) does not have (a real) we do understand the ultimate wisdom! In fact, it is said in a
image (nirākāravādin) possess an awareness of the higher truth. Their Prajñāpāramitā text which imparts definite sense (nītārtha): "Maitreya, a
basic text (Vasubandhu's Virhśatikd) begins as follows: Bodhisattva must understand the concept of various types of material
"
The entire universe is only a mental act, form from three points of view, which are identified (here) as parikalpita,
"
Because the "object" which appears is unreal, vikalpita, and dharmatārūpa , and so on. Therefore an awareness which
As, for example, when a person suffering from amblyopia has as its content the actual nature of factors (dharmatārūpavisaya)
Sees (unreal tings) such as hair or moons. " conveys ultimate wisdom (pararnārthaprajñā)!
With a whole lot of arguments they try to prove that to take an (No!) This has been stated by Bhagavat in a provisional sense
image as an object is wrong, and maintain that ultimately only awareness (neyārtha), so (you Yogācāras) do not yet attain the highest wisdom.
exists. But this is not at all reasonable. According to logic as well as 10. But these mediocre minds interrupt us once again, saying:
scripture, the fact is that when an external image is false the subjective What must be established, viz., enlightenment, is also possible in our
awareness of it is also false, and to the extent that an awareness is correct system, for Bhagavat has declared:
the image must also exist. In order to abandon traces totally
8. Moreover, granting your opinion that there is such a thing as They should not be said to have essential natures.
self-cognition (.svasathvedana), it must be possible to examine it critically. This wisdom consists in self-awareness
"
As what kind of entity can it be cognized by you among the three In that state one may speak of "tathāgata .
(possibilities of) cognizable (vedya), cognizer (vedaka) or cognition Therefore (we Yogācāras say ''"):
(vedaka)? How can the cognizer be such an entity? What can a By revolution at the basis (āśrayaparāvŗtti)
cognition independent of those two (viz., cognizable and cognizer) One gets the transcendental awareness
cognize so that it is "self-cognition"? Consequently, you have not (got This is the pure element (anāsravo dhātUh):
the faintest idea of) the meaning of the teen "cognition knowing all The great Muni's dharmakāva.
452 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADIPA 453
When one's consciousnes does not
ignorance and all that this entails. Mankind is bound by the four kinds
Any more apprehend a supporting object of traces, like a silk-worm swathed in its own cocoon.
Then it abides in consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratd) Conceming conventional truth Nagarjuna is quoted to the effect that
As there is no object it cannot be grasped. all empirical phenomena are like illusions.
Now the correct (tathya) relative truth, i.e., dependent origination,
By revolution at the basis has an external as well as an intemal aspect. For an account of the
One gets the pañcajñāna and the trikāya.
former one must consult the &ilistambasūtra and its commentary by
As long as he is in the world, for the sake of the world, Nagarjuna. The internal twelvefold chain of dependent origination should
He (as Bodhisattva) remains in apratisthitanirvāna....
in accordance with Nagarjuna's Pratītyasamutpādahrdayakārikās be
11. We (Madhyamakas) must object to this! The statement "by
divided into three phases. Thus ignorance, desire and clinging constitute
revolution at the basis..." is not true. The argument for this has been the defilement-phase whereas traces and existence constitute the
expressed by Nāgārjuna (in Bodhicittavivarana 31):
karma-phase. The remaining seven factors amount to frustration. This is
Since the past does not exist the causal wheel of life wherein karma originates from defilements and
Therefore the future does not exist either. frustrations from karma, etc. Thus all the factors of the external and
The present occurrence of the basis transformed-- internal aspect of conventional truth are, in the final analysis, founded on
In which (period) can it take place? ignorance from time without beginning. They are in fact no more real
According to this argument the (notion of) revolution at the basis cannot than illusions and phantoms.
be proved. Therefore the five cognitions and the triple body cannot be The real truth, then, is the highest. It is not accessible through
established either. Hence you do not have "what must be established, viz. inference but by means of cultivation (cf. Chapter VII) it proves to be
enlightenment".
svasanivedya. A Mādhyamika who realizes the eighteen kinds of
12. To conclude this refutation of the Yogācāra interpretation of
emptiness through the three doors of liberation is absorbed in the
scripture we may again, says Bhavya, quote Nāgārjuna's
dharmadhātu. This is the culmination of the perfection in wisdom where
Bodhicittavivarana: " The Muni's doctrine that the entire world is only
there is neither object, subject nor activity.
mind, is intended to remove the fear of fools. It has nothing to do with Here the Mādhyamika is accused of incriminating himself with
reality."
eight logical mistakes. In general, according to Bhavya, these objections
are based on sheer ignorance and a deplorable failure to recognize that
the Madhyamaka theory of two truths conveys the nitiirtha of the sutras.
CHAPTER V: Right Understanding of the Relative Truth in a Here, then, are the objections and Bhavya's replies:
Final Sense (i) First of all, the Mādhyamikas are said to be simple cheaters as
This meets the promise of a further discussion of the Madhyamaka they merely refute others without affirming an opinion of their own. - But
theory of two truths made in Chapter I. Accordingly it affords a succinct according to scripture tattva consists in not seeing anything as real, so
restatement of his basic philosophical and religious persuasions. how can one affirm or deny the existence of anything at all, everything
The main exponents of the Madhyamaka system are Nagarjuna and being unoriginated!
his successor Aryadeva. It is to be considered the most orthodox school
(ii) Secondly, the Madhyamika is accused of identifying nonorigi-
of Buddhism because its founder, Nagarjuna, was predicted by the nation with nonexistence. - But actually, since nothing exists, there is no
Buddha himself in various sutras (cf. Chapter VIII). existence to deny, hence no nonexistence. The Mādhyamikas steer a
To be sure, from the point of view of dharmadhātu there is neither
middle course "between " being and nonbeing.
conventional nor ultimate truth. The distinction between two truths is
(iii) Thirdly, the Mādhyamikas are once again accused of being
only valid as long as one's mind's-eye is obscured by the cataract of nihilists rejecting the fundamental factors of Buddhism such as causality,
454 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADIPA 455

truth, jewels, etc. But here the (Buddhist) opponent forgets the philosophical agreement between MRP and Bhavya's earlier works.
Madhyamaka theory of two truths. On the relative level they certainly The following chapter, on the other hand, is more explicit on the
accept dependent origination, etc., and the sublime moral ideals of topic of meditative spiritual cultivation than any of his previous works.
compassion, etc. Nor can they be regarded as nihilists from the absolute
point of view, because nihilists affirm the nonexistence of something CHAPTER VII: Progress in Meditation
previously existing, whereas for the Madhyamaka there is nothing that Now that the "theoretical" aspects of the highest truth have been
exists a priori Hence true nonexistence is precluded. It is only in a very discussed in detail, the "practical" question arises: What kind of person
limited sense that one can identify nonorigination and nonexistence on the is able to enter such a profound and great path as described above? -
relative level. Various authorities are quoted to the effect that Madhyamaka addresses
(iv) The Mādhyamika is then charged with being in conflict with itself to " great beings" of extraordinary moral and intellectual capacity.
Buddhist scriptures. - But this charge is merely due to the failure of At the level of conventional truth a Bodhisattva must first, in
Śrāvakas and Yogācāras to recognize that their own scripture should be general, practise the five perfections, the four foundations of social
taken nevārtha, whereas that of Mādhyamika should be taken nītārtha. solidarity, etc., and then exert meditation at the ultimate level.
Hence the alleged conflict is only apparent. But no matter how much merit one may gain by worshiping all the
(v-viii) Finally, Bhavya is accused of being in conflict with Buddhas it is of no avail unless one generates the awareness of
perception, inference, common opinion and what he himself otherwise enlightenment. This one is motivated to do when one listens to the
accepts. But, as already pointed out in Chapter I, the fault lies with those doctrine of emptiness with joy and enthusiasm.
who believe in the ultimate reality of the relative truth. From the Then one should go in search of a teacher in the lineage of
ultimate point of view there is no empirical world with which the Nāgārjuna. Thus motivated one should seek the three jewels and generate
Mādhyamika enters in conflict. the awareness of unsurpassed enlightenment.. For a novice numerous
From the above we may conclude that the Madhyamaka philosophy additional rules are prescribed in the works of Nāgārjuna, Asanga, etc.
is consistent with reason as well as with scripture, as the theory of two If a Bodhisattva is of inferior intellect he should confess his sins in
truths saves it from being in conflict with anything. the words of the Caturdharmakasūtra, the Triskandhaka, the
Karmāvaranapratiśrabdhisūtra and the Upāliparipŗcchā. If his intellect
CHAPTER VI: Understanding of the Highest Truth is quite keen sins must be confessed in the words of the
This chapter consists of five verses purporting to describe that Akāsagarhhasīdra, the Bhaisajyagurusūtra and the Dhārattīsūtra. If his
highest wisdom of which there are two kinds, one with conceptual intellect is superior he should do so in the words of such sutras as the
constructions (cf. Chapter V as a whole), and one without such Mahāyanopaduia, the Prajitāpārarnitā, the Sarvadharmapravrttinirdeśa,
constructions. At the level of dharmadhātu, however, both kinds are the Sāgaranāgaraparipŗcchā, the Tathāgataguhya, the
extinguished. Karmāvaranaviśuddhi, etc.
These two kinds of highest wisdom, as may be recalled, were Having thus purified the three stages of the resolved path he is
already adumbrated in 162. Tarkajvālā III, 10-11, and in III, 26 a prepared to engender the higher path by practising tranquility and insight.
'
distinction was introduced between highest truth without discursive As the activities of conceptual construction are based on one s breath it
development and highest truth with discursive development. To the same must be controlled. There are six ways to do so, by counting, following,
effect the 164. Madhyamakārthasamgraha speaks of two kinds of fixing, observing, modifying and purifying it.
ultimate truth, one with modes (paryāya) and one without modes. The One should then sit cross-legged on a comfortable mat and generate
sole distinguishing factor is discursive development, language. At the a compassionate awareness of enlightenment, expressing the desire to
level of rlharmadhātu there is none. liberate all living beings.
In retrospect this brief chapter clearly shows the fundamental Having thus attained tranquility one should by means of insight
456 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADIPA 457

recognize that all material and immaterial factors are incorporated in without difference. The sambhogakāva is based upon its support. The
mind. and that mind is incorporated in one's body, and that the body may nirmātrakāya is determined by the support of the sombhogakāya so as to
thus. being merely mind, be analyzed away into dharmadhdtu where comply with the interests of those to be converted."
nothing remains. This form of yoga is said to be gross. There is,
however, also a subtle form of yoga, a procedure which derives its CHAPTER VIII:• Grandeur of the Teacher
authority from the celebrated passage in Lańkāvatāra.rūtra X, 256-257. Here it is emphasized that there is only one authority upon whose
First one assumes that external objects are only mind. Then one forgets exegesis we can rely for a correct understanding of scripture. This is, of
about them. Since mind, then, has no object one can also forget all about course. Nāgārjuna, for he was predicted by the Buddha e.g. in the
mind. Then one abides in a blank state without subject or object. Lańkāvaidrasūtra, Mahānrañjuśrītantra, and, above all, in the
This, then, implies that on the level of relative truth there are two Mahāmeghasūtra, from which a long (and most interesting) extract is
ways a Mādhyamaka may consider the factors when he argues and given.
meditates, either as existing (thus the śrāvakas) or as consisting of mind Nevertheless, there is no reason to make a secret of the fact that
"
only (thus Yogācāra). The gross way is called " external or " official " extraordinary moral and intellectual achievements are required before the
Madhyamaka, the subtle, " internal" or " private" Madhyamaka. All the final attainment of Buddhahood.
logical works of the Madhyamaka school are concerned with the "gross "
and thus serve a purely eristic purpose. When one pursues reality CHAPTER IX: The Value of Buddhism
(tattvārtha) one must cultivate the " subtle" yoga. Still, there is no reason for despair! By following these instructions
To sum up: At the level of conventional truth mind falsely assumes one is relieved of the fear of .sarhsāra and finally overcomes any kind of
the illusory appearances of the various factors, but at the level of ultimate suffering, even death.
truth, as shown by reason, mind is just as unoriginated and empty as any
other factor.
Having thus armed himself with wisdom and means the Bodhisattva 166. CITTALAI CĀTTANĀR, Mañimekhalai (550)
arises from his mat. He should observe the rituals by reciting such texts
as the Tri.skandhaka,the Prapidpāramild,the Bhadracaryāpranidhāna, Summary by Paula Richman
the P agidhānarirñśikā and the Prapidhānasaptati at regular intervals so
as to keep up good spirits. Mañimekhalai contains intriguing philosophical materials in its final
Then follows a brief survey of the nine aspects of the three stages chapters. although it is not a philosophical text per se. Instead,
of the resolved path. Upon further subdivision the number of proper Mañimekhalai is a literary narrative, taking as its main theme the spiritual
(aeulomik) kinds of patience amounts to 24. The nonorigination maturation of a courtesan's daughter who renounces her hereditary
'x'
patience, however, which belongs to the level of śuddhāśraya, occurs occupation to become a Buddhist nun. The text first depicts
only on the highest path. Mapimekhalai's successful attempts to overcome societal obstacles to her
Bhavya, accordingly, discusses the ten stages stressing that after the renunciation and then portrays her religious progress under the direction
attainment of the thunderbolt concentration there is no more any kind of of her mentor, Aravana Atika. The Buddhist sage Aravapar enjoins
awareness, even constmctionfree awareness. Mapimekhalai to journey to Vañci, where religious specialists
Finally, there is a long account of the three bodies of Buddha, representing a variety of viewpoints gather to expound their beliefs. As
especially the dharma body (with numerous quotations from Nāgārjuna's a result, Chapter Twenty-seven of Mañimekhalai contains brief accounts
Dharmadhātustava). It is summarized in the following words: "The of the main assumptions of a number of contemporary philosophical
dharmakāva comprises the buddhaguñas, viz. the ten powers, the systems which Mapimekhalai encounters in Vañci. After Manimekhalai
confidences, the unique factors, etc. It is prajfldpāranmitā, nondual, determines that none of these systems is entirely satisfactory, Aravapar
458 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MANIMEKIIALAI 459

deems her ready to learn the principles of Buddhist logic. Therefore, Aiyangar's translation of Chapter Thirty in his article "Buddhism in South
Chapter Twenty-nine contains a lengthy and detailed description of the India." In it, he has slightly altered the terminology and provided
instruments of knowledge (pramāna) and types of fallacious statements. references to places in the ViSuddhimagga where such material is also
When she understands these concepts. Aravañar reveals to her essential discussed. "" Also note that S. Suryanarayana' s article provides his own
Buddhist philosophical concepts. For this reason, the epic culminates with translation of the account of Sātńkhya philosophy found in verses 201-
Chapter Thirty, a summary of selected Buddhist doctrines. 204 of Chapter 27. 190
These three philosophical Chapters deserve special scrutiny because Several noteworthy secondary sources on the philosophical
of Mañirnekha/ai's unusual history and unique status. It seems likely that materials in Mañimekhalai also exist. Kandaswamy 's Buddhism as
it was composed sometime during the sixth century, though the issue Expounded in Mañimekhalai contains two chapters of great interest to
remains controversial. '"° Of Mañimekha/ai's author, Cittalai Cāttanār, we Buddhologists: Chapter Five discusses Cāttanār's presentation of Buddhist
know precious little--sources tell us only that he was a prosperous grain logic in great detail, while Chapter Six analyzes the contents of
merchant and wrote in excellent Tamil. '" After the Buddhist community Mañimeklialai's Chapter 30 in insightful ways. Several scholars have also
in Tamilnadu dies out (ca. the eleventh century?) no other Tamil Buddhist written on the presentation of Buddhist logic in helpful fashion (see note
texts remained. ' " Why, then, did Mañimekhalai survive? Perhaps its 133 above). Finally, asham discusses Maitimekhalai
'
s presentation of
status as "twin-epic" to Cilapattikāram accounts for its preservation. Ajivika philosphy in his history of the Ajivikas.
tm

While the two texts share some of the same character and hence were
regarded as " twins " , Cilapattikāram was not tied to the fate of any one CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN
religious community. '"° At any rate, both texts continued to be recopied Chapter 27 (verses 1-289) contains a curious survey of nonBuddhist
over the centuries but were not considered approriate reading for religious systems. Mañimekhalai listens to representatives of ten
orthodox Hindus. Not until the late eighteen hundreds, when U. Ve. philosophical schools summarize their main tenets. These religious
Cāminātaiyar rediscovered, edited, and published Mañimekhalai, did the summaries vary greatly in length, with the first comprising eighty verses
text become available for scholarly study. "" As the only extant Tamil and others as short as one or two lines:
Buddhist text, it alone can reveal how members of the South Indian 5-85. The Account of the Speaker about Instruments of
Buddhist community translated their philosophical terms and concepts Knowledge.
into Tamil. The speaker begins by listing, defining, and sometimes giving
Whether or not one can read Tamil, there are several ways to gain examples of ten instruments of knowledge. In addition to an English
access to Mañimekhalai's philosophical chapters. U. Ve. Cāminātaiyar's translation of the Tamil, the Sanskrit equivalent: is provided.
1921 edition will be helpful, particularly because of his glosses on I.direct perception (pratyakśa)
Chapter Twenty-seven and his references to similar passages in other 2.inference (anumāna)
Tamil texts. The best edition for philosophers, however, is the one by Na. 3. comparison (upama7
Mu. Vehkatacāmi Nāttār and Auvai Cu. Taraicāmi Pillai because of its 4.authority (āganm)
copious notes on the sections concerning Buddhist logic and religious 5.presumption (arthāpatti)
formulations (Chapters Twenty-nine and Thirty). 101 All verse references 6.appropriateness (svabhāva)
in the summary below are to this edition. For those who do not read 7.tradition (ailihva)
Tamil, however, S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar has provided a slightly 8.non-existence (ahhāva)
abridged translation of Mañimekhalai, preceded by an extended essay 9.inference by elimination or correlation (pariśe$a)
which discusses in detail the material in Chapters 27, 29 and 30. '92 10.occurrence (sambhava)
Pandit Hisselle Dharmaratara Mahathera has reprinted Krishnaswami The speaker then lists more briefly eight things which are
Aiyangar's translation of Chapter Thirty in his article "Buddhism in South sometimes thought incorrectly to be instruments of knowledge. Next he
460 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MANIMEKHALAI 461

mentions six philosophical systems based on pramāñas and lists one matter and a statement about how death and existence are the essence of
teacher for each system. He concludes his discourse with the comment matter.
that only six instruments of knowledge are presently accepted as valid: 264-276: The account of the Bhūtavādin. He tells of how
1-6 as listed above. consciousness comes into being when elements combine, and how it will
86-95: The account of the Saivite speaker. He briefly discusses the disappear when the elements break up. The speaker then comments that
constituents of the universe, the nature of Siva, creation as an act of play, the details of his teachings are the same as those of the Lokāyatas (i.e.,
and the destruction of creatures. the Cārvākas). He also rejects all pramāñas except direct perception. He
96-97: The account of the speaker about Brahma. He discusses how ends by declaring that both the idea that there is another life and the idea
Brahma created the universe by means of a cosmic egg. that that life is the result of deeds in this life are false.
98-99: The account of the Vaişñavite speaker. The speaker, Chapter 27 ends with a list of the ten systems which were
described as one who eagerly studies the Vi,sñu Purāña, states that Viśnu discussed.
protects creatures.
100-105: The account of the Vedic specialist. He describes the CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE
Vedas as the unborn and eternal source of knowledge and then lists the This Chapter beings by discussing instruments of knowledge, but
six limbs of the Vedas: l.ritual (kalpa), 2.prosody (chandas), 3.astronomy soon moves on to the main subject matter of the chapter: valid and
(jyotisa), 4.etymology (nirukta), 5.pronunciation (śiksal, 6.grammar invalid propositions, reasons, and examples. S.N.Kandaswamy (op. cit.,
(vyākaraña). pp. 257-258, 270), who discusses this chapter in great detail, identifies
110-170: The account of the Ajivikan speaker. He discourses at Cāttanār as following the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school of logic in his
length about life and the four elements which compose the universe. account. Buddhologists will want to consult Chapter Five of his Buddhism
as Expounded in Manimekhalai for a comparison of Cāttanār s discussion
'
Particular attention is paid to atoms and the ways in which they combine.
These atoms are said to be of six different colors and it is claimed that of logical fallacies with those of other major Buddhist logicians. Also
if one is born pure white, religious liberation (moksa) can be attained. He helpful is Kandaswamy's section by section comparison between this
ends his talk by describing what is said in Markali's treatise. 1" Chapter and relevant portions of the Nyāyapraveśa. More than half of
'
171-179: The account of the Nirgranthan 19' speaker. He begins by Mañimekhalai s Chapter 29 consists of list of different kinds of logical
listing and explicating six entities: 1) the principle of movement fallacies. This material is both highly technical and familiar to scholars
(dharmāstikāya), 2) the principle of stationariness (adharmāstikāya), 3) of Dignāga. Therefore it is summarized only very briefly below.
time (kāla), 4) ether (ākāśa), 5) life (jīva), 6) irreducible atoms 47-56: The instruments of knowledge, concluding that the only
(parantāgu). Then he describes how thejīva is connected with good or valid ones are perception and inference.
bad deeds through the body. He concludes by explaining how to break 57-67: The five-membered syllogism. Cāttanār later indicates that
out of life's bondage to attain religious liberation. only three members are necessary.
201-240. The account of Sārhkhya. He explains at length the 68-110: The analytical reason, the logical reason, and the negative
nature of prakrti, describing how it forms the matrix of all things, how form of the syllogism.
elements such as water and mind arise from it, and how the process of 112-120: Valid propositions.
involution and evolution takes place. Then he explains the nature of 121-135: Valid reason.
purusa and lists the 25 entities (tattva). 136-142: Valid example.
241-263: The account of the Vaiśeşikas. He lists the six categories: 148-153 lists nine types of fallacious propositions.
154-190 defines and gives brief examples of each type.
substance, quality, motion, universal, individuator, and inherence. He
191-192 lists three kinds of fallacious reason. The first of these
then proceeds to discuss the substances and qualities of matter at some
length. He concludes with some statements on what is common to all fallacious reaons is called "unproved" (asiddha), and Cāttanār lists its
462 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES NYĀYAPRAVEŚA 463

four types in verses 193-210. The second fallacious reason is called 167. SAMKARASVAMIN, Nyāyapraveśa (555)
"uncertain" (anaikāntika) (or one which is only recognized as truthful by
one group among debators) and Cāttanār lists its six kinds in verses 211- Summary by Douglas Daye, Musashi Tachikawa and Karl H.
274. The third kind of fallacious reason is " contradictory " (viruddha), and Potter
Cāttanār lists its varieties in verses 275-325.
325-339 explain that fallacious examples are of two types, This brief text on inference is attributed to Dignāga in Chinese
homogeneous (sddharmya) and heterogeneous (vaidharmya) and lists five tradition and to Śaritkarasvāmin, a pupil of Dignāga 's, in Tibetan
types of each. tradition. A lively discussion occupied Western scholars in the early part
340-401 give examples of the five types of homogeneous ones, of the twentieth century, with Hakuju Ui, Giuseppe Tucci and others
while backing the Chinese interpretation, Satischandra Vidyabhusana and
' 00
402-468 give examples of the five types of heterogeneous ones. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya the Tibetan. - The text was edited by A. B.
Dhruva in 1930 201 and by N. D. Mironov in 1931. 202 Musashi
CHAPTER THIRTY Tachikawa203 provides a complete translation together with the Sanskrit
Kandaswamy labels Chapter Thirty a Buddhist " manual " because text as found in Dhmva. This is the basis of our E and T. A number of
Cāttanār presents his material in a concise and fomrulaic way. 19X Cāttanār articles have contributed to better understanding of certain sections; these
devotes more than half the Chapter to an exposition and analysis of the are identified in footnotes. We are also in possession of a summary of
twelve links (nidāna) in the chain of causation (pratītyasamutpāda). The this text by Douglas D. Daye which was submitted for the present
remainder of the Chapter deals very briefly with a number of other Volume. The summary that follows is the work of the Editor of this
'
Buddhist fomulations in relationship to the twelve links. Volume based on Tachikawa s translation and Daye's summary but using
17-44: A general discussion of the links. the translations of technical terms chosen for this and the preceding
45-50 lists each of the twelve links. Volume of this Encyclopedia on Buddhism.
51-103 gives a definition of each link. 10 Giuseppe Tucci translated the work in 1930, and published notes
104-118 discuss how these links arise and lead to suffering. on the text in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of 1931, pp. 381-
119-133 describe how suffering ends through the cessation of the 413, reprinted in Guiseppe Tucci, Opera Minore (Rome, 1971-72), pp.
links. 277-304. We have indicated by GT the passages on which he comments
138-147 divide the links into four divisions. and the pages in the reprinted version.
148-154 discusses the three junctions or connections of the links.
160-168 analyzes the links in terms of past, present, and future. (E140; T120; GT279-283) I. Summary. Means of proof (sādhana)
169-188 relates the links to the four noble truths. and refutation (dūsana) together with their fallacies (ābhāsa) are
189-249 discuss modes of rhetoric, including an analysis of four pertinent for bringing understanding to others. Perception (pratyakśa) and
'
different kinds of questions and answers. inference (anumāna) together with their fallacies are pertinent for one s
250-259 discuss the three flaws (desire, hatred, and delusion), the own understanding. This is a summary of the doctrine.
four characteristics (impermanence, suffering, no self, and (E140; T120) 2. Means of Proof. Of these two branches of our
impurity), the three attitudes (friendliness, kindliness, and doctrine, the means of proof is the statement of the paksa and the other
joy), and the four ways to eliminate darkness: (hearing, members of an inference, because a matter unknown to questioners is
thinking, meditation and envisioning). transmitted by statements of the thesis, the reason,, and the example.
(EI40; T120-121) 2.I.The Thesis. The pakya is a recognized
property-possessor which the arguer wishes to prove to be qualified by
a recognized qualifier. It is tacitly implied that no thesis is contradicted
464 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES NYAYAP RA V EŚA 465
by perception, etc. Thus, for instance: "Sound is permanent", or " Sound permanent",
is impermanent." (3) a thesis that is contradicted by traditional doctrine, e.g., when
(E140; T121; GT283-286) 2.2.The Reason. The h has three aspects. a Vaiśeşika would prove that sound is permanent,
What are its three aspects? They are (1) that h be a property of p, (2) that (4) a thesis that is contradicted by common knowledge, e.g., "A
h be present in the sp, (3) that h not be present in vp. What is the sp and human skull is pure, because it is a part of a living being, like a conch
what is the vp? The sp is whatever is similar to the p by the common or an oystershell",
possession of the s, i.e., the property to be proved. For instance, when (5) a thesis that is contradicted by one's own statement, e.g., " My
sound is to be proved impermanent, a pot, which is impermanent, is an mother was barren " ,
sp. The vp is that which lacks the .s-property. Now we know that (6) a thesis in which the qualifier (viśesaña) is not admitted to exist
whatever is permanent is unproduced, like space. In this case, the is seen when a Buddhist says to a Sārhkhya that sound is perishable,
property of being produced, or the property of ensuing upon human (7) a thesis in which the qualificand (viśesya) is not admitted to
effort, is present only in the sp, never in the tp. Therefore, these are the exist is seen when a Sātirkhya says to a Buddhist that the self is sentient,
marks for an h's proving something to be impermanent. (8) a thesis in which the qualifier and the qualificand are not
(E140-141; TI21; GT286-289) 2.3.The Examples. There are two admitted to exist is seen when a Vaiśeşika says to a Buddhist that the self
examples according to whether they are given through similarity (sp) or is the inherence cause of happiness, etc.,
through dissimilarity (vp). Of these, that where the h is present alone (9) a thesis in which the relation between the qualifier and the
(eva, that is, is never found to be absent) is an sp. For example, qualificand is well established and not in need of demonstration, e.g.,
"Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent, like a pot. " The vp is "sound is audible " .
that in which the h is said to be absent wherever the s is always (eva) Statements of these nine sorts are faults of the thesis (pratijñādośa),
absent. For instance, "whatever is permanent is seen to be unproduced, because they reject the s itself that one is proving to exist in the p, as in
like space". By the word "permanent" is here meant the absence of the first five sorts, or because they cannot convince the opponent, as in
"
impermanence. Likewise, by the word "unproduced is meant the absence the next three sorts, or because the means of proof would be useless . as
of producedness, just as the absence of an absence is a presence. We in the last sort. We have now explained the fallacious thesis.
have now explained the p, (the h, and the examples). (E141; T123; GT293) ) 3.2. Fallacious Reasons. There are three
(E141; T121-122) 2.4.Statements of the Thesis, the Reason, and the kinds of fallacious reasons: unproved (asiddha), equivocal (anaikāntika),
Examples. Statements of these factors, are the means of proof when one
"
and contradictory (viruddha).
would convince others. For instance, "Sound is impermanent is a (EI41-142; T123-124; GT293-294) Unproved reasons. Of these
statement of the thesis that the p has s. "Because it is produced " is a three fallacious reasons the unproved reason is of four varieties:
statement that the p has the h". " Whatever is produced is seen to be (1) a reason that is unrecognized by both the proponent and the
impermanent, like a pot, etc." is a statement of positive concomitance opponent;
with the sp. " Whatever is impermanent is seen to be unproduced, like (2) a reason that is unrecognized by either the proponent or the
space" is a statement of negative concomitance with the vp. We say that opponent,
these three statements make the members of the argument, and no more. (3) a reason that is unrecognized because its existence is in doubt,
(E141; T122-123; GT289-296) 3.1. Fallacious Theses. A fallacious (4) a reason that is unrecognized because its substratum is not
thesis is one which the arguer wishes to prove but which is contradicted admitted to exist.
by perception or other factors. Thus: Of these,
(1) a thesis that is contradicted by perception, e.g., "sound is An instance of (1) would be if one should give as his reason
inaudible " , "because sound is visible" in trying to prove that sound is impermanent.
(2) a thesis that is contradicted by inference, e.g., " a pot is An instance of (2) would be if one gives as his reason "because
466 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES NYAYAPRAVESA 467

sound is produced" in trying to prove sound's impermanence to someone quality common to both lightning and pots.
who holds that a sound is (only) a manifestation (abhivyakli). A case of (5) is "Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal".
An instance of (3) would be if one should try to prove fire by The thesis is that sound is permanent. The sp consists of space, atoms,
pointing not at smoke but at something suspected of being mist, etc. Incorporeality resides in some sps such as space, etc. but not in
An instance of (4) would be if one should try to prove that space other sps such as atoms. The vp consists of pots, happiness, etc.
is a substance to someone who denies the existence of space. Incorporeality reside in some of those, e.g., in happiness, but not in
(EI42; T124-125; GT296-298) Equivocal Reasons. There are six others, e.g., pots. Therefore, this reason is also inconclusive, because it
kinds of equivocal reason: (l) too general, (2) too specific, (3) occurring appeals to a property common to both happiness and space.
in only a part of the sp and in all of the vp, (4) occurring in part of the A case of (6) is " Sound is impermanent, because it is produced, like
vp and in all of the sp, (5) occurring in parts of both the sp and the vp, a pot sound is permanent, because it is audible, like soundness." As these
(6) nondeviating from what is contradictory. two marks lead us to doubt, the two taken together constitute a single
A case of (1) too general is " Sound is permanent, because it is equivocal reason.
object of knowledge " . This reason is equivocal because being an object (E142-143; T125-126; GT298-299) Contradictory Reasons. There
of knowledge is common to both permanent and impermanent things. The are four varieties of contradictory reasons, (1) a reason involving an h
question remains: is sound impermanent because it is an object of that actually proves the opposite of the s; (2) a reason involving as h
knowledge, like a pot, or is sound permanent because it is an object of something that proves the opposite of some attribute of the s; (3) a reason
knowledge, like space? involving•an h that proves the opposite of the nature of the p; (4) a
A case of (2) too specific is "Sound is permanent because it is reason involving an It that proves the opposite of some attribute of the p.
audible " , for the reason, i.e., audibility, is a cause of doubt, since it is Examples:
excluded from both permanent and impermanent things other than sound, (I) An example of (1) is "Sound is permanent, because it is
and because it is impossible that there should be anything that is neither produced, or because it ensues upon human effort." Here the h is
permanent nor impermanent. The question remains: To what sorts of contradictory, because it exists only in the vp.
things (--permanent or impermanent--) does the audibility of sound (2) An example of (2) is "The eyes and the other senses are for the
belong? sake of some entity other than themselves, because they are aggregates,
A case of (3) is " Sound does not ensue upon human effort, because like the individual parts of a bed or a chair." Just as this h aggregateness
it is impermanent". The thesis is that sound does not ensue upon human proves of the eyes their property of being for the sake of some other
effort. Sps comprise lightning, space etc. Impermanence i.e., the h resides entity, so also it proves of the other entity, namely the self, its property
in some sp, e.g., in lightning, etc., but not in space. The vps comprise of being an aggregate, because aggregateness definitely leads us to both
pots, etc. Impermanence resides in all such things. But this reason is (conclusions).
equivocal because impermanence is common to both lightning and pots. (3) An example of (3) is is "Existence is neither a substance nor an
The question remains: Does sound ensue upon human effort because it is action nor a quality, because it possesses one substance as its locus and
"
impermanent like a pot, or does sound not ensue upon human effort because it reside in qualities and actions like lower universals . Just as
because it is impermanent like lightning, etc.? this h proves that existence is not a substance, etc., so also it proves that
A case of (4) is "Sound ensues upon human effort because it is existence is not existence, because the h leads to both conclusions.
impermanent." Here the thesis is that sound ensues upon human effort. (4) An example of (4) is provided in a (Vai§eşikās) argument that
Sps comprise pots, etc. Impermanence resides in all such things as pots. an individuator (viśesa) exists, which also occasions our idea that that
Vps comprise things such as lightning, space, etc. Here impermanence individuator does not exist (as per the previous argument).
resides in some sp, namely lighnng, etc., but not in space, etc. Therefore, (E143, T126) There are two kinds of fallacious examples according
this reason is also inconclusive, as in the previous case, because it is a to whether they are sp or vp .
468 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES NYAYAPRAVEŚA 469

(E143; T126-127; GT299-300) Fallacious sps. There are five "

be corporeal, like an action. Here the s, permanence, is excluded from
varieties of fallacious sps: (I) one in which the h is not found, (2) one in an action, for an action is impermanent; but the Is, incorporeality, is not
which the s is not found, (3) one in which neither the h nor the s is excluded, for an action is incorporeal.
found; (4) one that lacks the statement of pervasion; (5) one where the (3) An example from which neither the s nor the h is excluded is:
pervasion is reversed. "Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal. Whatever is impermanent
(1) An example in which the h is not found is: " Sound is is seen to be corporeal, like space " as said to one who holds space to be
permanent, because it is incorporeal, like an atom". Here the s, existent. Here neither permanence nor incorporeality is excluded from
permanence, resides in an atom, but the h, incorporeality, does not, space, because space is permanent and incorporeal.
because atoms are corporeal. (4) An example that lacks the statement of negative concomitance
(2) An example in which the s is not found is: " Sound is is one where the fact that the given example is a thing dissimilar to the
permanent, because it is incorporeal, like the intellect (buddhi). Whatever p is shown without any expression of negative concomitance between the
is incorporeal is seen to be impermanent, like the intellect." Here the h, h and the s. Thus: "Corporeality and impermanence are seen to reside in
incorporeality, resides in the intellect, but the .s, permanence, does not, a pot. "
because the intellect is impermanent. (5) An example where negative concomitance is expressed in the
(3) There are two kinds of examples in which neither the Is nor the reverse order: one says, "Whatever is corporeal is seen to be
s is found: existent examples and nonexistent examples. In the last impermanent " when he should say, "Whatever is impermanent is
argument if we substitute the example "like a pot," we have an existent corporeal.
"

example in which neither is found, because in a pot there are both (E144; T128) Fallacious Instruments of Knowledge. Statements
impermanence and corporeality. "Like space" is a nonexistent example containing the above fallacious ps, hs and examples are fallacious
when one argues against a man who denies the existence of space. instruments of knowledge.
(4) An example that lacks the statement of positive concomitance (E144; T128; GT300-302) Perception and Inference. On the other
is one where the coexistence of the h and the s is given with no statement hand, for one 's own understanding the only instruments of knowledge are
of positive concomitance. Thus: " Impermanence and the property of being these two: perception and inference. Of these, perception is devoid of
produced are seen to reside in a pot." conceptual construction. It is that kind of cognition which does not
(5) An example where positive concomitance is expressed in the construct any notion of name, universal, etc., upon a sense-object such as
reverse order is this: " Whatever is produced is seen to be impermanent." color, etc. It is called perception (pratvaksa) because it occurs to each
(E143-144; T127-128) Fallacious vps. There are five varieties of (prati) sense (aksa). Inference is the understanding of an object through
fallacious vps, (1) an example from which the s is not excluded, (2) an its mark. We have explained that a mark has three aspects. Accordingly,
example from which the h is not excluded, (3) an example from which the cognition of an inferential object in the form "here is fire. " or "sound
neither the s nor the h are excluded, (4) an example that lacks the is impermanent, " is also called inference. In both cases (perception and
statement of negative concomitance; (5) an example where negative inference) the cognition itself is the result, for the nature of cognition is
concomitance is expressed in the reverse order. comprehension of the object. They are called instruments of knowledge
Of these, (1) an example from which the s is not excluded is: because they appear to involve an activity.
"
Sound is permanent, because it is incorporeal, like an atom. Whatever (E144; T128-129) A cognition in the form of a mental construction
is impermanent is seen to be corporeal, like an atom." Here the h, of something other than a particular is a fallacious perception. The
incorporeality, is excluded from an atom, for an atom is corporeal, but the cognition "a pot " , "cloth", which arises in one who is building mental
s, permanence, is not excluded, for an atom is permanent. constructs, is fallacious perception because its object is not the particular.
(2) An example from which the Is is not excluded is: " Sound is Fallacious inference is a cognition based on a fallacious reason. We have
permanent, because it is incorporeal. Whatever is impermanent is seen to explained many varieties of the fallacious reasons. Accordingly, the
470 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHISAMAYALAMKARA-VRTTI 471

cognition of an inferential object that arises in a person untrained in these Edward Conze remarks "This is a commentary to both the
rules of inference will be fallacious inference. P(Pañcaviñ 4atī-) and AA(Abhisamayālamkāra), side by side, and it is
(E144; T129; GT302-303) A refutation (dūcaña) is the pointing out chiefly concerned with showing, point by point, the correspondence
of faults in an argument. An argument is faulty when it lacks one of its which exists between the division and verses of AA...and the text of
members. The thesis is faulty when it is contradicted by perception, etc.
The reason is faulty when it is unproved, equivocal or contradictory. The
example is faulty when the h or the s is not found in it. To point out such
a fault, to make one 's questioner recognize it, is refutation. DHARMAPALA (560)
(E144; T129) A fallacious refutation is that which points out Hsiian-tsang, a Chinese who was in India during the sixth century,
nonexistent faults in the instrument of knowledge. E.g., stating that the gives us what must be considered fairly solid information about this
instrument is incomplete when it is complete; stating that the thesis is author. We are told by him that Dharmapāla "was born in Kāñci (modern
faulty when it is not faulty; stating that the reason is unestablished when Conjeeveram) in South India as the eldest son of a high official;
it is established; stating that the reason is inconclusive when it is subsequently, fearing that he was to be forced to marry a daughter of the
conclusive; stating that the mark is contradicted when it is not king, he fled to a monastery and later became a famous Vijñānavādin
contradicted; stating that there is the fault of faulty example when the teacher in the monastic university of Nalandā in the North. In 559 A.D.
example is faultless. These are fallacious refutations, for the opponent's at the age of twenty-nine he retired from Nalandā to meditate in Bodh
' 0'
viewpoint is not refuted by them, being without fault. Gaya, where he remained until his death in 561 A.D." -
At the outset i.e., in this introduction only the meanings of the Dharmapāla seems to have written a work on Vyākarapa (or
terms have been explained, so as to show the general direction that Grammar). Aiyaswami Sastri identifies it as the
further research should take. The arguments for and against them are Śabdavidyāsariryuktaśāstra in 25,000 ślokas. The Chinese title is Sheng
'
examined elsewhere. ming za lun, '" and Tillemans finds Sastri
s reconstruction "rather
improbable " .
168. (ARYA) VIMUKTISENA, Vrtti on Asañgās None of Dharmapālā s works survives in Sanskrit, and they are also
Abhisamayālamkāra (555) unavailable in Tibetan. Bhavya criticized Dharmapāla in Chapter Five of
David Seyfort Ruegg has reviewed the information the literature his Madhyamakahŗdayakārikā-Tarkajvālā; see the summary above of that
provides concerning this author.i " The colophon of the Vrtti contained Chapter for a representation of Dharmapāltis view on the three-natures
in the Nepalese manuscript as well as in Tibetan translation...merely theory.
states that Arya-Vimuktisena was the nephew of a certain Buddhadāsa,
a master of many Vihāras of the Kaurukulla-Aryasammatīya school." Bu
169. DHARMAPALA, Vyākhyā on Dignāga s Ālambanapartk.gā (560)
'
ston believed he was a pupil of Vasubandhu. Tāranātha agrees. but calls
him also a younger contemporary of Buddhapalita as well as a Dharmapālās commentary on the Alambanaparīkcd is not available
contemporary of Bhavya, and a pupil of Dignāga. As Ruegg remarks, in its entirety. The Chinese translation is T. 1625; it was translated by I
"
These statements are difficult for us to evaluate". Ching. The translation extends only up to the seventh verse. It is
The first part of the work has been edited by Corrado Pensa as reconstructed into Sanskrit and translated into English by N. Aiyaswami
Serie Orientale Roma 37, 1967, with an introduction in Italian. Ruegg in Sastri in his edition and translation of the .4lambanaparīksā itself; this is
the article just cited studies a short section (I. 37-39). The book by our "E and T".
Hirofusa Amano, incorrectly listed in Volume 1, Bibliography, of this
Encyclopedia, Third Edition, p. 224 under this author, actually20ideals with Summary by Karl H. Potter
Harihhadra's later commentary on the Abhisamayūlarimkāra,)
472 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ALAMBANAPARIKSA-VYAKHYA 473

(E21-23; T56-60) The Vaiśeşikas say: "The five sense-organs cause consciousness has grasped it as its object. A double-atom does not
to be constructed five sensory awarenesses of real external objects. The represent a form reflected in consciousness, and so cannot be the
mental consciousness does not do so, for it concerns objects which supporting object
though real are not actually confronted and which do not have a form Objection: Whatever is the cause, that is the object.
matching the one grasped." Answer: Then the sense-organ can be the object!.
But the truth so realized, although it appears perceptible, is actually So we must conclude that the mind is not only the cause but
only realized through meditation; it is not the object of reasoning (tarka). appears as well as both sense-organ and in the form of the supporting
There can be no real object grasped by mental consciousness. object. How could an atom be both the cause and the object? Atoms are
Vaiśeşika objection: The contents of mental perception are what is not contents of consciousness, because they do not manifest a form in
first grasped by sensory awarenesses. which they are cognized, like the visual organ.
Answer: That is not possible. It cannot do so at the first moment, Objection: Your reason (in the just-formulated inference) is
since the sense is grasping then; and at the next moment since the object inconclusive, since your h has nothing to do with yours. Atoms have an
which constitutes its content has vanished. indeterminate (anirdhdrana) nature, are neither by nature form-
Objection: Then mental consciousness naturally grasps external manifesting nor non-form-manifesting. Various causes conspire to
objects. produce consciousness.
Answer: Then nobody can be blind or deaf! Answer: Though an atom functions as a cause it is not the content
In fact there is no actual supporting object at all. The supposed of consciousness.
content is just the joint product of the force that is the sense together with Objection: Then let the aggregate of atoms be the content.
consciousness. This cause is not itself a substance, though it concerns a Answer: Though the aggregate has the form of consciousness it is
substance. not its cause, since an aggregate is not an actual thing, any more than the
The Vaiśeşikas conceptually construct atoms as the supporting vision of a double moon seen by one with a diseased eye is a vision of
objects. But an atom is imperceptible, so they think the double-atom two real moons. Indeed, such an error is a mental consciousness.
(dvranuka) is actually the supporting object, since it is capable of existing A mental consciousness does not arise immediately following the
at the time of perception and is caused by atoms. occurrence of visual awareness and its supporting object, but the
(E23-30; T61-73) So, others (Vaibhāśikas) say that aggregates of combined form of those two arises depending on the images of those two.
atoms are the objects of awareness, since our awareness is in the shape A supporting object has two parts: the reflection of its own form
of the aggregate. and the causality of the consciousness of it. The atom is not what is
Answer: This inference lacks an sp. Further, we do not recognize reflected in form, and the aggregate is not what causes the consciousness.
the h, since we do not believe there is any external thing called an (E31-39; T73-86) Sautrāntika: It is the combined form of atoms that
"
aggregate" causes the consciousness and is the content as well. That is, each atom
Atoms by themselves cannot constitute the supporting-object-cause has a combined form (of the four great elements) as well as an atomie
of awareness any more than the sense-organs by themselves can, since form (single), just all things are commonsensically seen to be constituted
neither one has the form (dkdra) of consciousness So it is consciousness of parts and yet single entities themselves.
itself that both has that form and grasps it. It arises in a form which Answer: Then, since all atoms are composed of the same four great
resembles the mind (or internal organ, manas) when there is coordination elements there would be no difference between them!
(.rārīgrna) between consciousness and the content-condition Objection: Atoms may differ in other ways.
(visavapratyaya) Really there is no object apart from consciousness, yet Answer: Well, atoms have no parts, are very subtle, have precisely
there is in the preceding moment something having the form of the the same size, so how could they differ? But since aggregates have parts
content, and when it becomes reflected in consciousness we say that they must be unreal anyway, since they cannot grow or diminish in size,
474 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES CATUHŚATAKAVRTTI 475

'
etc. So our ideas of the differences between pots, cups, etc. are as empty the help of a teacher. Outsiders understand nothing even if they should
of real objects as are our feelings of satisfaction and frustration. That they happen to hear the truth. This is not the Buddha's fault.
are empty is shown by the following: One sees a pot; atoms of the pot The outsiders agree that liberation is a state where only the self
are removed gradually; the result is we do not see a pot any more. remains free from bondage, inactive and indifferent. For us, though,
Likewise, an army disappears when its component soldiers leave or are liberation is not just the elimination of possessions but the very emptiness
killed. of the self itself, whereas you say that the self remains existent in
Question: So what is it that we see? liberation. This emptiness never ceases. Thus the outsiders will never
Answer: A form internal to consciousness itself that appears as if realize liberation,
it were external. There are no external things. That part of an object (T90-93) 5. though they may say a few things that are true.
which appears to exist externally is actually a part of consciousness itself, Objection: The Tripilaka contains a number of incorrect claims,
the part we speak of as "grasped" part. Consciousness has two parts, then. such as concern miracles, the Buddha's remarkable magical abilities, and
Objection: How can that part of consciousness, arising that despite being free of desire he is still reborn, e.g., as a householder.
simultaneously with it, be itself a condition for consciousness. Answer: If factors really occurred there might arise such doubts.
Answer: The knowable aspect of one awareness gives rise to But the Buddha teaches one thing only: emptiness. Factors are all either
another awareness. contents of thought or meant by words. But one object can produce at the
same time many different thoughts, so factors do not correspond to one
external object. As for words, they indicate universal properties, and
170. DHARMAPALA, Vrtti on Aryadeva's Catuhśataka (560) universals are shared by many different factors, so are just nominal
The Chinese title of this work is Guang bai lun shi lun; translated designations. The emptiness of factors is their. characterlessness; thus
by Hsitan-tsang, it constitutes T. 1571 and is not available in either emptiness is a characteristic, but not a distinct entity.
Sanskrit or Tibetan. It is actually a commentary on the last eight chapters (T93-101) 6-10. Since outsiders are wrong about things in this
of the Catuhśataka. There is a Japanese translation by N. Endo published world, they are likely to be wrong about the next. E.g., Vaiśeśikas believe
in Kokuyaku Issaikyo. that there are an infinite number of limited universals (sāmānyaviśesa)
Tom J. F. Tillemans has translated two chapters of this work which are perceptible by the senses. But cowness, horseness, etc. are
corresponding to Chapters 12 and 13 of our summary of Aryadeva 's work actually nominal designations comprised of colors and the like. Since they
published in Volume 8 of this Encyclopedia. We provide below a are entirely present in each of their loci it is like inherence itself, which
summary of those two Chapters, made entirely on the basis of the is entirely present in each of its loci and is imperceptible to the senses;
translation, referred to as " T" . '°9 A few sentences are translated by thus cowness, horeseness, etc. must also be imperceptible to the senses.
Giuseppe Tucci '10 and Louis de la Vallee Poussin 2" Several passages in Likewise, substances are conceptual constructions from factors like color
which Dhannapāla criticizes Bhavya are translated and studied in Yuichi and so are not directly perceptible, despite what the Vaiśesika claims,
Kajiyama, " Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla ", Wiener Zeitschrift because awarenesses of substances arise from what are classed as their
fur die Kunde Sudasiens 12-13, 1968-69, pp. 200-203.

Summary by Karl H. Potter '

Tillemans uses this term to identify what Lang in her summary of
"
Aryadeva's work calls "hypocritical philosophers . Tillemans says these
CHAPTER FOUR (on Chapter Twelve of the Catuhśataka
outsiders include Pūrpa Kāśyapa, Maskarin Gośāliputra, Ajita
(T87-90) 1-4. A person needs three qualities to be a vessel for the
Keśakambalin, Kakuda Kātyāyana, Nirgrantha Jñātiputra and Samjayin
dharma: unbiassed gentleness, untiring application, and natural
Vairatiputra. But it is evident below that Dharmapāla uses the word to
intelligence. If he lacks these he will not achieve understanding even with
cover nonBuddhist philosophers as well.
476 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES CATUHŚATAKAVRTTI 477

qualities (or motions) such as blue, etc. Awareness of things beionging retribution like caste status and is not a cause of liberation.
to the other Vaiśeşika categories are also not directly perceptible, for the
same reason. CHAPTER FIVE (Chapter Thirteen of Catuhśataka)
The Sāmkhyas say that there are real things comprised of the three (T135-138) 1-4. The argument is directed at Sārhkhya. Since its
guñas and that they are perceptible. But again they can only be nominal tradition holds that each sense organ grasps only one kind of content, one
designations; they cannot really exist, since sattva, say, is found in many cannot directly perceive e.g. a pot.
things. Also, since each guns has a distinct essential nature different from (T145-147) 8-9. Vaiśeşika: One can only see substances when they
the others' how could they combine? have the qualities of large size and color.
Objection: Each of the three guñas has the properties of all three, Answer: But shapes (such as "large size") don't exist when divided
so we perceive them as constituting one thing. and colors cannot be seen. What is the cause of color? Perhaps you say:
Answer: Then how could we ever know that the three are different a substance. Then you should be able to see substances separately, but
from each other? And why should a combination of them produce you cannot. Perhaps you say: colorness. But since colorness is a universal
anything else, say, a single thing, different from all three? everything would be visible. Perhaps you say: colorness is a limited
(T101-102) 11. Asūtra says: "It is better to break moral discipline universal. We have refuted this previously. Colomess cannot be seen with
than to destroy the correct view." By moral discipline one gets a good the eyes since it is all-pervasive. One cannot see two different things, a
rebirth; by the correct view one gains liberation. color and its colomess.
(T102-104) 12. Objection: If people hear that selflessness is the (T148-149) 10. Tillemans explains Dharmapāla's interpretation of
nature of all factors they will be led to nihilism, anticausality, etc. this verse (which is different from the interpretation found in our
Answer: That's because their views are at fault; it is not a defect in summary of Catuhśataka): "If substances existed we would have to be
the doctrine of selflessness. able to see that they undergo change, but in fact we see nothing of the
Objection: If the Buddha teaches emptiness to dispel erroneous sort. "
grasping it will lead people to grasp all factors as empty. Outsiders and other Buddhist schools can be refuted simply thus:
Answer: True. So the Buddha also teaches that factors exist. Objects must either be resistant or not. If they are resistant they are
Objection: So which is true? divisible, and thus not substantially existent. If they are not resistant they
Answer: Neither; it is beyond conceptualization. are not existent either, like flowers in the sky.
Objection: Then the Buddha should not teach emptiness for the (T150-155) 11. Since the five sense organs are said by other
most part, since both emptiness and nonemptiness are equivalently true Buddhists to have the same constituents, viz., subtle matter derived from
or false. the four great elements, how is it that only the eyes, say, can see and not
Answer: It is because people most often grasp at existence that the the nose?
Buddha for the most part preaches emptiness. All language is Objector: It is because people have different karma. One karmic
metaphorical. trace has many powers.
(T108-111) 18-22. The shrewd ancient Brahmins invented the Answer: Then why not just say that one act produces many
Vedas and passed them off as beginningless. But the Vedas are language different sense organs!
and thus not natural entities, and the Brahmin caste is not worth Objection: Action (karma) produces traces (vāsana) which later
venerating, since Brahmins beg for alms just as lepers do. Jain outsiders produce different kinds of awarenesses.
(= the " naked ascetics " of the summary of Aryadeva 's text) are just Answer: Then that should happen in the immaterial realm too.
bewildered. They are respected because they know a little about Objection: No. In the immaterial realm one is without desire for
astronomy and can interpret birds, dreams and fortunes. People pity the material things, so visual, etc. consciousness doesn ' t arise there.
Jains because they inflict suffering on themselves, but suffering is karmic Answer: But though one has become desireless the seeds of sense-
478 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES CATUHŚATAKAVRTTI 479

consciousnesses are not necessarily destroyed. Actually, sense-organs are awareness.

themselves the transformations (paripāma) of karmic traces, and (T167-168) 21. If the mind lacks sense organs its going to the
consciousness conforms to these transformations: it is these object would be useless. Also, if the mind goes out to the object the self
transformations which are mistaken for manifest existent entities in the must remain mindless, which is absurd.
world. Of course, this itself is not the highest truth. The highest truth (T171-172) 23-24. Objection: Illusions are real, not false.
about karma is inconceivable; only the Buddha understands it. This is Answer: What we mean by saying that things are illusory is that
proved in the following way: The eye does not see, nor the ear hear, etc., when one analyzes them properly one finds that factors are nonexistent,
because they are themselves elemental and the effects of karma. empty. Lots of things about the world are difficult to understand: how
(T155-156) 12 is directed at Sāriakhya, which teaches that the mind one mental act can produce endless different results, how a plant can
understands what the senses apprehend. But does the sensory act precede grow, why a woman 's body should cause arousal, etc. (ten things in all
the mental one or are they simultaneous? Neither is possible, as the verse that are difficult to understand).
says.
(T160-162) 17. Vaiśeşika: Verses 13-16, addressed to Sāmkhya,
accost them because for them the sense organs are made of the same stuff 171. DHARMAPALA, Vrtti on Aryadeva's Śataśāstra212 (560)
(prakrti) as their objects. But we differentiate organs from objects--each Title in Chinese by Hsuan-tsang as Ta-ch'eng Kuang Pai-lun Shih
sense is composed of a distinct substance, and sees things made of certain lun this work is found as T. 1571 (our "E"). John P. Keenan has
specific substances. translated Chapter Ten of the work as Dharmapālaś Yogācāra Critique
Answer: Still, your sense organs and your objects are both ofBhāvaviveka ś Mādhyamika Explanation of Emptiness (Studies in Asian
substances, so they can't very well see substances--they see qualities, Thought and Religion 20: Lewiston 1997), pp. 67-126, and introduced the
according to you. You say that perception involves fourfold contact translation with a helpful Introductory study. The translation is our "T".
between the organ, the form/color/matter/object, the internal organ and Since Chapter Ten of the Sataka is the same as Chapter Sixteen of
the self. But (as the verse states) these things, lacking the necessary Aryadeva's Catuhśataka, translated by Karen Lang and summarized by
functions, cannot produce perception, since even when in contact they are her on pp. 213-215 of Volume Seven of this Encyclopedia, we provide
no different than when apart. the numbering of the passages in that work for easy reference
Abhidharmika: How so? When in contact they constitute sight. The summary that follows is made entirely and solely on the basis
Answer: Do you mean that when together they are no longer what of the translation (T).
they were? Then they are not organ, form, and self by nature as you
yourself hold they are. Two things cannot both be the same and different. Summary by Karl H. Potter
(T162-l64) 18. (Dharmapāla's understanding here seems to be
different from the reading adopted in our summary of Catuhśataka.) If 1 (E242c21-243b16; T67-72) Objection: If all things are empty,
linguistic sounds do not refer how can they produce awareness? how can we even speak about them?
Objection: It is because a mental consciousness (manovijñāna) Answer: That is so from the standpoint of highest truth
arises whose content is a universal property. (paramārthasatya); still we can speak about them from the lower
Answer: But by the time this mental consciousness arises the sound standpoint.
and the auditory awareness have ceased. 2 Objection: If the speaker and what he is speaking about exist then
Objector: Still, one remembers those previous events. emptiness cannot be the case.
Answer: But then the memory has as its content those events, Answer: Since everything is causally conditioned neither the
Aryadeva's universal property. Anyway, a memory(-event) cannot recall speaker, his words or their meanings exist. Or on another (the Yogācāra)
more than one thing, e.g., it cannot recall both a sound and an auditory
480 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ŚATAŚASTRA-VRTTI 481
' things must exist.
interpretation the speaker, words and meanings are only consciousness
.and established conventionally, so do not exist ultimately. To be If so, each of the four incompatible alternatives of the catuśkoti
dependent on other things is what we mean by "empty", must be true! You cannot seriously affirm that what is refuted actually
3 Now we have already refuted nonemptiness On preceding exists; if it were so, there would he no error, only truth!
Chapters), so you can't prove nonemptiness merely by refuting emptiness. 11 Objection: If everything is nonexistent nothing is born and
4 In order to disprove the theses of others one must prove one's nothing dies.
own view. Answer: When have the Buddhas said that things do not really
Objection: Then "emptiness" and "no self' do not mean anything! exist?
Answer: Precisely! Indeed, the Buddha explicitly said (In the Kāśyapaparivarta) that
5 (E243b21-243c24; T72-76) Thus our "theses" are merely what lies between being and nonbeing cannot be asserted or denied. Talk
provisional. In order to refute the positions of others we establish a thesis; of things is only conventional.
once that is done, however, our own thesis has to be given up. 12 (244b15-246a9j (T81-93) Objection: If nothing either exists or
Indeed, we shape our theses by basing ourselves on the opinions of fails to exist why do you talk of conventional existence?
others. Answer: Since you yourself believe it, why do you ask?
6 Objection: Even so, your thesis that all things are empty is clearly 13 Objection: If nothing exists then differences wouldn 't exist
wrong, since pots, etc. are clearly perceived to exist in the world. either.
Answer: No. We do not accept that standard view that inference Answer: It is clinging to existence that causes you to differentiate
depends on perception, since pots, etc. are not directly perceived, as we things.
have shown in preceding sections of this work. 14 Objection: If things don't exist, an argument for that doesn't
7 Objection: If nonemptiness does not exist, what is the argument exist either!
for emptiness? It doesn't exist either! Answer: We've given the argument above.
Answer: (7b) If you do not establish emptiness nonemptiness 15 Objection: Refutation is easy; proof is hard.
cannot be proved either. Answer: Just the reverse: establishing emptiness is easy, refuting it
But the emptiness of which we speak serves only to dispel wrong hard.
notions, not to establish an alternative to it. Contrasts are found in things 16-17 Objection: The fact that we have the term "being" shows that
in the world, not in emptiness. In parallel fashion, for example, we argue things cannot actually be nonexistent.
for momentariness (impermanence) in order to refute etemalism, not to Answer: By the same reasoing, the fact that we have the word
"
establish momentariness. nothing" shows that things cannot be existent.
8 (E244a5-15; T76-77) If there is no thesis of nonexistence then 18 Everything we can speak of is only conventional.
the thesis of existence cannot be proved. 19 Objection: That is nihilism.
Objection: Then how can the things we perceive have different Answer: No, we are merely removing false opinions.
qualities, e.g., as fire has heat? 20 Objection: If you reject the nonbeing of reality you must accept
9 Both fire and heat are conventional., not ultimately real. the being of reality.
10 (E244a15-244614; T77-80) Objection: If things really have no Since both being and nonbeing do not really exist, reality is
being what does emptiness refute? Emptiness is the opposite of being, so neither.
The following objection to what has just been said ("reality is
neither") has two possible interpretations.
Interpretation One: What is under discussion is only conventional
t
T identifies this alternative interpretation in parentheses as that of nonbeing, not something else, real nonbeing.
Yogācāra .
482 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ŚATAŚASTRA-VRTTI 483
Answer: No. Nobody claims that a real nonbeing exists. That would Objection: Activity requires a real agent. If it were not so, a hare's
be an affirmation. ' horn could function! So, since passions and good roots are nonexistent
Interpretation Two: After one has achieved insight he never sees the (according to you) and beings are still defiled and purified, people could
conventional again, and that is what "reality is neither" intends. have been liberated from their passions and still be subject to rebirth, and
Answer: What is it that is realized upon insight? Not "reality", those without good roots could be liberated!
since that is already "realized" in language and thought. And if what is Answer (by a Svātantrika, according to T): Conventional things are
referred to is an independent reality (the " Absolute?! " ) then it should not not nonexistent.
be held that everything is only constructions. Furthermore, scriptures tell Objection to the Svātantrika: It is contradictory to say that
us that to see reality is not to see anything. something both exists and does not exist.
21 Objection: If one proves emptiness through an argument about Svātantrika: The same factor can be real qua relating to no object
being, then (since that argument itself is not empty) emptiness cannot be and conventional qua relating to an object. Likewise, for example, one
established. and the same giving can be bad because contaminated and good because
Answer: Since both a thesis and an argument are empty our associated with the good roots.
argument has no basis in what exists. They are conventional. Objection to the Svātantrika: But the two truths do not differ in
22 Objection: Moreover, an example (dŗstānta) must either exist or their object. Rather, they differ as to the time of their functioning.
not exist. If it exists then something exists, and if it does not exist it Svātantrika: Though occurring at the same time a thing can have
cannot prove anything, e.g., that all things are empty. one function and not another So (consciousness) is spoken of as "self'
Answer: The example is conventional too. conventionally because of our attachment, but as " no self' from the
23' (246a15-247a3) (T94-101) Objection: Even if it is so, that ultimate standpoint. Any thing exists as itself ("the highest standpoint")
everything is empty, what value is there in knowing that? but does "not exist " being dependent on others (" the conventional
Answer: Meditating on emptiness can get one rid of his standpoint").
constructing of what was not (abhūtaparikalpa). Answer to the Svātantrika: Nevertheless it is the same thing that is
Objection: What is this constructing of what was not? both conventional and real. The two truths were taught because of two
Answer: All awarenesses (cilia) and associated mental factors different ways of cognizing, one through language and the other free from
(caitta). Though all such are empty, yet through imagining what is language.
actually unreal we engender the appearances of defilements or (247a6-248b25) (T101-114) Dharmapāla ' : But direct perceptions as
purifications in beings as in dreams. dependently originated cannot be described in language, so are not
conventional truths, being nonlinguistic.
(Bhavya)' : So there must be a third "truth" (the dependent

With some trepidation we provide Keenan 's attempt to interpret this

at T, p. 89, note 31: " Here the point seems to be that, even though one
'
makes conventional and independently reasoned statements, and refutes Identification of the participants in the following debate are
naive affirmations of being, this does not entail another affirmation within provisional: we take our cue from Keenan, but without much conviction.
that same naive context of being. Rather it entails an awareness of the (Keenan himself appears a bit unsure here: note 54, p. 103 begins "If I
disappearance of the entire horizon in which conventional affirmations have interpreted the flow of the argumentation correctly...)!
and negations occur."
'
'
Keenan points out that the text never identifies the opponent in
Keenan in T considers this the beginning of " Part II: The Yogācāra what follow, but gives copious evidence that it is in fact Bhavya's
Perspective". views which are being considered.
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ŚATAŚASTRA-VRTTI 485
484

(paratanIra truth) neither conventional (since nonlinguistic) nor ultimate " We describe various things through the various names we establish. But
(since dependently originated). the nature of things is such that those (names) essentially do not exist."
Dhannapāla: If your position is that this "third truth" of perceptions You read the last line as "...that those objects do not exist". But you are
wrong: names can only indicate common characteristics of things, not
is a variety of the conventional we are ready to accept that, since it is
only on such a basis that the statements (alluded to above) about their individuating features. Common characteristics do not exist, while
defilement and purification can have meaning. individuating features do. That is why this passage can only be read in
(Bhavya): If that means that these things do not exist at all then, the way we have given, not in your way.
since nonconstructive wisdom could never arise at all, we object. Bhavya: The Buddha himself says that there are no essential
Although the dependently originated perceptions are not themselves real, natures.
still they do manifest real things, even though ultimately those things do Dharmaraja: The underlying meaning (neydrtha) of his words
not exist. ' denies only dependent nature; they do not mean that everything is
Dharmapāla: Then you must know what ultimate truth is! But one nonexistent.
cannot conceive the highest truth, since its content is undifferentiated and Quotations from Buddhist literature are appealed to by both sides.
cannot be analyzed. So words cannot refer to ultimately real things. (248c7-249a7) (T114-118) Objection: What kind of wisdom has
(Bhavya): But if so how can language engender the activities of dependence as its pattern?
defilement and purification? Answer: It is worldly wisdom purified by conceptfree
Dharmapāla: That is why we take the position that the construction (nirvikalpaka) wisdom. Otherwise it could not have any effect in reality.
If it could per impossiblile do so because its object is constructed, then
of what was not is able to bind beings to the world, and that by
suppressing it one can practic a path to realize emptiness. If it were false judgments would lead to successful activity.
nothing at all it couldn't bind anything to defilement, etc. That is, our Objection: Anyway, your position is inconsistent with your own
position is that the dependent nature, by which we refer not to names (Yogācāra) texts. They say that both ordinary folk and sages can have
(that is the constructed nature) but to things, does actually exist. dependent awareness, not just the latter.
Bhavya: That is wrong. If names like objects arise from conditions Answer: What happens is that awarenesses and mental concomitants
they too must exist. Why do you say that one exists and the other arise from causes and conditions--the evolutions of consciousness--and we
doesn't? become aware of ourselves (svasadivitti) and of factors such as names,
Dharmarāja: The Bhavasarhkrāntisūtra (quoted) reads as follows: etc. as if they were external objects. But those objects are totally
imagined and cannot be the supporting conditions (dlambanapratyaya) of
our awarenesses. So they are not the contents of dependent awarenesses.
Objection: If the awarenesses and mental concomitant arising from
causal conditions are merely imagined and everything is without an
essential nature, how can they bind beings into transmigration?
'
Here is Keenan's explanation of this obscure passage: Answer: Aryadeva surely supports our interpretation. Otherwise he
"
Bhāvaviveka is trying to draw from Dharmapālā s contention that would not have said that insight gained through realizing emptiness can
what is directlly perceived is not included in worldly convention the terminate the bondage through construction of what was not. We can't
implication that it must then be included in the truth of ultimate actually see horns on a hare, but we can imagine them and come to reject
meaning, which is impossible, he argues, because then it would have the image. So, awareness and mental concomitants exist, but objects
no activity whatsoever saince the ultimate wisdom of awakening is external to the mind do not.
beyond conventional objects. Bhāvaviveka would by contrast hold that (249a1l-249c6) (Tl18-123) More quotations from scripture are
since the conventional does exist as it appears, his position does not offered to support this interpretation. The position defended here is
entail such a logical conundrum." (T, p. 103, note 54).
486 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PARAMARTHA 487

summarily stated (249b28) of the 6th century. Paramārtha apparently arrived in Canton in 546; he
Wise men say there are three kinds of mental contents: those that was in his early forties. Political unrest caused him to keep moving
can be spoken of and have features, those that are ineffable but have around the country, translating many of the most important Buddhist
features, and those ineffable and without features. The first involves works such as the Abhidharmakośa, Madhyāntavibhāga and several of
language, the second has a propensity toward language but no cognizance Vasubandhu 's works, as well as sūtras such as the Samdhinirmocana. He
of language, and the third involves neither awareness of language not any died in Canton in 569 at the age of 71.
propensity toward it. It is not clear whether Paramārtha wrote any original works other
24-25 (249c13-250a22) (TI23-126) Reality can be neither one nor than translations of works already extant. Diana Paul writes that of all the
many. and all theses, like these, are likewise only true from the many works composed by Paramārtha only one, titled in Chinese Chuan
conventional standpoint. shih lun, has any special claim to being an independent work of
Paramārtha s. Yūki Reimon, for example, makes the point that since
' "

Paramārtha in all his other translations preserved the corresponding

172. DHARMAPALA, Commentary on Vasubandhu's Triritśikā (560) literary form, he was not in this instance simply changing the form from
Dharmapāla is regularly credited with a work, famous in China, verse to prose. Other Buddhologists, including Fukaura Shobun and Ui
entitled Cheng wei shi lun and referred to often as Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, Hakuju, maintain that the Chuan Shih Lun is not just a translation '
of a
supposed to have been translated by Hsiian-tsang into Chinese and line-by-line commentary on the Triritśikā but Paramārtha s own
i214
available as T. 1591. However, as Tillemans points out, this is not an exegesis.
Indian text at all, but " a work by Hsiian-tsang himself...as a compilation We will follow her lead and count this work as written by
of various Indian Vijñānavāda masters' thought " . It "relied especially Paramārtha himself.
heavily on Dharmapāla's commentary to the Trimśikā, very possibly
because Dharmapāla was himself the teacher of (Hsiian-tsang)'s guru, '
Śīlabhadra.". ' ° Cf. Bibliography, Third Edition, p. 224 for some 173. PARAMĀRTHA, Commentary on Vasubandhu s Trirrsikā (560)
references. This text exists in Chinese under the title Chuan shih lun,
" "
abbreviated here as "CSL . It is a Chinese translation of the
Triihdikākārikās
"]'5
by Vasubandhu, along with a lengthy exegesis by
''''
PARAMARTHA (560) Param5rtha. Diana Paul provides a running summary account, from
Diana Y. Paul has made a life's work of studying this author. In which we draw. "'
"
her article The life and times of Paramārtha (499-569)", Journal of the
International Association of Buddhist Studies 5.1, 1982, pp. 37-69, Summary by Diana Paul
working with a number of Chinese sources, she has reconstructed a full
account of Paramārtha's remarkable life. (The account provided in Paul's 1."The text opens with a striking statement, found in verse 1 of the
book Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century Chinea, Stanford, Cal. 1984, Triritśikā, paraphrased as follows: 'Consciousness evolves in two ways:
is even more complete.) He was born in Ujjain, at that time in a province (1) it evolves into selves (dtman); (2) it evolves into things
'
of Malwa, into a Brahmin family of the Bharadwaja caste, he became a (dharma). ...Everything is mentally conditioned, the exegesis adds, and
Buddhist monk, but little is known of his life in India except that he not truly existent independent of consciousness and its own
travelled a lot. His travels took him, we don't know when, to Funan fabrications... "
province, an Indian colony in what is now Cambodia. He was not the 2.The store-consciousness "originates in defilement and karma; it
first Indian Buddhist monk to go to China to translate texts--we know is the most fundamental of all functions, because it is a repository for
"
that several others-were in fact sent to China from Funan in the first half all...'seedś ...bearing moral valuation.
488 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES TRIMŚIKA-COMMENTARY 489

3. Paramārtha "argues that by inference from its observable effects the ālayavijñāna, and are 'reflected together as in a minor'."
we know of its (the storehouse-consciousness') existence. One cannot 16. " In Verse XVI conditions or situations are given for when the
directly apprehend the images and objects of this retributive faculty, but faculty of the intellect (mano-vijñāna) no longer occurs...The CSL adds
its effects such as ignorance are knowable." to this list a sixth state, 'dreamless sleep.' All thought processes associated
4 "asserts that these mental states associated with the indeterminate with the intellect (such as language, symbol making, integrating sense
moral quality of ālavavijīiāna are constant and ever moving, momentary, data, and concept formation) cease in these five or six situations."
like the current in a river." l7."The exegesis adds: "...the discriminator also does not exist.
5. "' (A)ppropriating' (ādāna) is its .the thinking consciousness: Without a sense object to be grasped, consciousness cannot occur.' Then
essence." the CSL cites the last part of the verse: "Therefore, the principle of
6 "presents the four types of delusion--ignorance (dtma-moha), Consciousness-Only can be upheld. ' This passage...may be an indication
views of self or ego (ātma-drsti), conceit or self-pride (ātma-māna), and that Paramārtha is here developing a new idea that departs from the tenets
self-love (āttna-sneha)--these being the accompanying states associated of Sthiramati's and Vasubandhu's school of thought. The CSL elaborates:
with the manas, described as indeterminate. as was the ālaya, but hidden 'What does it mean to establish the principle of Consciouness-Only? The
(nti'rta) (because of defilement), unlike the ālaya (which is anīvrta)." meaning, fundamentally, is to dispense with sense objects and to dispense
7."' When the path of insight (darśana-nidrga) destroys the defiled with the mind. ' This passage, frequently cited in the literature, is evidence
consciousness and its mental states and when there is the attainment of that this was a significant redefinition of vijñaptimātratā not common to
the transcendent path (lokottara-mārga) of the sixteen practices of other Buddhist treatises and perhaps unique to Paramārtha's own thought.
meditation on the Four Noble Truths then it (the defiled consciousness) It is a much more radical statement than either verse XVII or Sthiramati 's
is ultimately eliminated.' exegesis."
8."The exegesis relates these sense-objects to the three natures 18. " (T)he CSL states: 'As for the consciousness containing the .
(trisvabhāva)." seeds of all phenomena (namely, the ālaya-vijñāna), it creates and
9-14. "The exegesis comments on the ten good actions together. evolves from one to another form, evolving from each other onward and
These ten pervade the mind of the triple world of desire, matter, and onward into varieties of discriminations and discriminated objects through
spirit and the mind in the realm without outflows from defilement, ""
mutual interaction (of the ālava with the other states of consciousness).
namely anāsravadh,ātu, and are classified as the great mental elements. 19."There are two kinds of influences (h.siin-hsi) from past karma
Their nature is intrinsically good. " and two kinds of influential forces (hsi-ch'i)...The CSI. interprets hsfin-h.si
15. " Paramārth2 s translation of verse XV reads as follows: 'The five as vāsanā of karma and hsi-ch'i as defilement. These are then considered
sense-consciousnesses (subsumed) in the six consciousnesses--the intellect synonyms for the seeds (bīja) of karma. The CSL comments that the
(manorijñāna), the fundamental consciousness, and the appropriating vāsanā of attachment from past karma is the discriminator, the vāsanā
consciousness--these three groups of faculties ensue from causes and from past karma being the discriminated object. (T)he CSL elaborates on
conditions. They occur either simultaneously or sequentially.' The influential forces of habit (hsi-ch'i) that have a defiled character, a notion
exegesis elaborates on the conditioning process for sensation, taking that has no analogue in the Trimśikā...
attention as the (immediate) cause and the external sense data as the These influential forces...are of two kinds: the influential habits of
(secondary) condition for consciousness to occur...Each sense imputing features or characteristics on things, and primitive (or gross)
consciousness has a corresponding sense datum (vision to form, hearing latent defilements. The former is the subjective side of consciousness,
to sound, and so on). Multiple sense consciousnesses must occur dependent in nature: the latter is the objectified side of consciousness, the
simultaneously with multiple sense data in order to register as a single, discriminated nature. By eliminating both types of influences and their
coherent image. All seven consciousnesses (in these subjective-objective defilement, one arrives at the absolutely real nature...(T)he CSI, construes
dynamics of consciousness/sense data series) interact with each other in each seed as dual (dvaya-vāsanayal, including the vas-and of karma and
490 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES VASUMITRA 491

not only what strictly corresponds to grāhavāsanā or the vāsanā of Sautrāntika; they might have belonged to the school of Mahīśāsikas since
dualistic perception as Sthiramati and Vasubandhu construe the twofold one of their theses is found on the list of the tenets of that school.
nature of this latter category of vāsanā... "
21-22."'Arguing against the separability of these two natures,
parikalpila and paratantra, the CSL opposes what constitutes the position STHIRAMATI (560)
of Sthiramati: 'If they were separable from each other, then the principle "It is said that Sthiramati originated from Lāta country (Gujarat
of Consciousness-Only would not be upheld, because sense objects would Central and South). He was a disciple of Gupamati but probably turned
be different from consciousness. Because they are inseparable, there is away from his teacher as he had established himself in Valabhi. It seems
Consciousness-Only without an objective world. Because there is no that Sthiramati was not always in perfect doctrinal agreement with the
objective world, consciousness also does not exist. Because the sense school in Nālandā for the Chinese comentators very often point out the
object does not exist and neither does consciousness, the principle of differences, if not the open contradictions, with the opinions of
Consciousness-Only is established.' The CSL does not affirm the Dharmapāla. He must have succeeded his master in Valabhi: we know
existence of either a mental or a material world, both being contingent from the inscription that the king Guhasena of Valabhi (ruled 558-566
upon each other, suggesting a strong Mādhyamika line of reasoning. " A.D.) presented a monastery to Sthiramati. i219 Sthiramati's dates as given
24. " The CSL expands at some length on each of these three by e.g., Masaaki Hattori and Erich Frauwallner as 510-570 are accepted
naturelessnesses: 'The essence of an object in consciousness appears as by scholars at present. Since both Sthiramati and Dharmapāla criticize
the aspect of matter. Matter is the nature of discrimination. Since Bhavya's views Sthiramati must postdate Bhavya. The tradition that
discrimination does not exist, the essence of an object does not exist. Sthiramati was a direct disciple of Vasubandhu is unlikely.
Since the causes do not exist either, the sense object, being derived from
the nature of discrimination, can bring about effects on consciousness.'
27."'If one says 'there is only the existence of consciousness' based 175.STHIRAMATI, Tattvārthaūkā on Vasubandhu ' s
upon attachment to what is presented before him as an object, then since Abhidharmakośa
he has not yet eliminated this attachment (to dualistic perceptions), he
does not enter Consciousness-Only."' Summary by Robert E. Buswell Jr.
30. " The CSL ends with some of its most frequently quoted lines,
on how both the sense object and consciousness doe not exist; and this The Chinese title of this work is Chi-she-fun shih-i shu. The
is the definiiton of both Consciousness-Only and the amala-vijfl na. " Chinese text appearing in the Taisho Tripilaka is a reprint of a Tun-huang
manuscript (Pelliot no. 3196), belonging to the French collection of the
Bibliotheque Nationale. No other Chinese recensions are known, but a
174.VASUMITRA (560) fragment of a Uighur translation of portions of the Chinese text has been
Vasumitra was a pupil of Gunamati's and the author of a discovered 2 20 A prefatory note to the extant Chinese text states that the
commentary on the Abhidharmakośa which now seems to be lost. Marek commentary comprises a total of 28,000 ślokas, which corresponds
'
Mejor (op. cit.) has discovered a number of references in Yaśomitra s closely to the size of the Tibetan recension of the commentary. Only
Abhidharmakośavyākhyā to Vasumitra's views. Marek concludes: fragments of the first five fascicles (chuan) of the Chinese text are extant,
"
Vasumitra often followed literally the explanations of his teacher and it covering the first three fascicles of Hsiian-tsang's Chinese translation of
can be surmised that he wrote a subcommentary on Gunamati's Abhidharmakośa (T.1558); this treats part of the first and second
commentary; Gupamati and Vasumitra belonged to a school different Kośasthānas. The commentary cites 15 full and two half-verses of the 48
from that of Vasubandhu, they contradicted the opinions of the kārikās in the Sanskrit recension of the first Kośasthāna, Dhātunirdeśa,
Abhidharmikas, and their opinions were criticized by Yaśomitra, a and eight of the 73 kdrikds in the Sanskrit of the second chapter,
492 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-TATTVARTHATIKA 493
2
Indriyanirdeśa. ° Such important texts as Mahāvibhāsā (T 1545) and skill-in-means to explain the dharma in such a way that sentient beings
Satńghabhadrās Nyāyānusāra (T 1562) are quoted by Sthiramati (though "
will benefit. "I will explain the śāstra (l.Id) is the perfection of
without citing his sources by name), and there is little in the extant resolution, because one has the resolute intention to write this śāstra.
fragments that can be considered particularly innovative. "
"Treasury of Abhidharma (1.1d) refers to the perfection of the name.
Based on the existing evidence, it is impossible to determine the Sthiramati then continues on to discuss the five classifications of
original size of the complete translation of the commentary. We are on factors (matter, consciousness, mental associates, dissociated and
equally unsure footing as to when and by whom the translation was unconditioned), and explains why only a Buddha, not a seeker or a self-
made. There are, however, close affinities between the translation style enlightened one, may fully understand their significance. This is
and terminology of this text and that found in parallel Abhidharma works illustrated with tales of the inability of Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana
rendered by Hsiian-tsang and his associates; this could suggest that this to match the extensive knowledge of the Buddha. Śāńputra had refused
translation also was done by Hsiian-tsang, probably sometime after the ordain a certain postulant because the elder had been unable to find any
completion of the translation of the Mahāvibhāsā in 659 A.D. The affinities with monastic life in the man over the last two uncountable
contents of the Chinese-Uighur and Tibetan recensions seem to have little eons; the Buddha, however, was able to discover that still farther back in
in common, the'" former apparently being a much abridged rendition of the the past, that person had such affinities and allowed him to ordain.
commentary. Maudgalyāyana, despite his reputation as an adept in spiritual powers,
was unable to determine where his mother had been reborn; only the
Fascicle One: Dhātunirdeśa (T1561.29.325a.5-326a.l). Sthiramati Buddha was able to discern her destiny outside the Trichiliocosm.
begins with an invocation, which he then explicates in the following The third verse, on the value of the analytical investigation of
manner: Because of one's reverence toward the dharma, one constantly factors in bringing an end to the defilements is also illustrated by
enjoys hearing the dharma; this produces learned knowledge Sthiramati with a story from Kāśyapa Buddha's time, about a monk
(śrutamayiprajña7, which gives rise successively to understanding whose constant criticisms of his fellows ordained and lay had led him to
generated through reflection (cintamayiprajñd), wisdom deriving from rebirth as a large fish. After being landed by a fisherman, the Buddha
spiritual development (bhāvanāmayiprajña), and finally wisdom which is came to realize the being's previous state, and preached the dharma for
free from any associations with the outflows (anāsravajñāna). Thanks him. Becoming repentant at his past conduct, the fish refused all food
to this last one is able to bring an end to all the proclivities and thus and drink, and starved himself to death. He was reborn in heaven, where
realize enlightenment. Sthiramati subsequently uses a similar chain of he was able to hear the dharma and benefit from it. These treatments are
relationships to explain the dependence of Abhidharma on instinctive typical of Sthiramati ' s nontechnical approach to most of the kārikās.
knowledge and learned knowledge. "'
Based on Sarhghabhadra's explanation in Nyāyānusāra (T Fascicle Two (T1561.29.326a.2-b.16). The major focus of the
I562.29.329a) the seven purposes of the text are next treated, which are fragment remaining of this chapter is an examination of the meaning of
explicated in terms of the invocatory verse of Kośa 1.1. These are the unmanifested matter as given in 1.11. The Kośa had defined
perfection of knowledge, forsaking, benefitting others, skill in means, unmanifested matter as that stream which was the product of the material
acting as a spiritual guide, resolution, and the title. "' "He who has elements and which occurred even in the mind of a distracted or
dispelled all darkness entirely" (1.1a) refers to the perfection of unconscious person. Sthiramati cites a verse, taken verbatim from
knowledge. " Dispelled all of it" (l.la) is the perfection of forsaking. Sarhghabhadra's Nyāyānusāra, which instead describes unmanifested
"He has pulled all beings out of the mire ofsamsāra " (1.lb) refers to the matter as a physical element which is unimpeded and which is found in
perfection of benefitting others. "Having paid respects" (I.lc) is the either an active, concentrated or absent state of mind. '''' Sthiramati
perfection of skill. "The teacher who teaches things as they are " (l.lc) unfortunately gives no further explication of unmanifested matter such as
refers to the perfection of skill, i.e., the Buddha's ability to use is found in his commentary to Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaka. '3° This
494 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKO$A-TATTVARTHATIKA 495

fascicle concludes with the verses in the Kośa summarizing the five with his enlightened eye and discovers that there are sentient beings of
aggregates (1.13, 14c-d, 15, I6), but without any further explication. all different capacities, some of whom would be capable of understanding
his teaching. He thus consents to turn the wheel of the dharma.'"
Fascicle Three (T1561.29.326b.17-c.21). The three classifications Sthiramati then turns to a consideration of the faculty of life-force
of factors as aggregates, organs, and elements are discussed, and their (jivitendriya), which AK 1I.10 had classified as the only sense which was
meanings of aggregation (rāśi), gate for coming into being (ayadvāra), always resultant (vipāka), i.e., the product of actions in previous
229
and element (gotra) are given, following the explanation of Kośa I.20a-b. rebirths. Sthiramati cites a verse which shows the differences in the
A simile for the meaning of element is related: just as a single mountain possible lifespans of various regions; our realm was of indeterminate
may contain many types of ore, such as copper, iron, gold, and sil ver, so lifespan, as was shown from the Buddha ' s statement that the lifespan of
too does a single body or a single continuum (samtāna) contain 18 humans in Jambudvīpa had varied from 80,000 years during the time of
elements--the 18 elements. Four verses (Kara I.25, 28, 29, 33) are then the Buddha Vipaśyin to 20,000 years during the Buddha Kāśyapās age,
given with no further explication, and the discussion on the three types to only 100 years during Gautama's own era. Hence, lifespan was
of construction (vikalpa) (Kaiabhāsya 1.33) is cited verbatim from definitely dependent upon one ' s previous karma, and could be extended
Hsiian-tsang's translation (T1558.29.8b.2-4). Sthiramati adds that an through meritorious deeds, such as building stūpas and monasteries.
eightfold division of construction is incorrect.

Fascicle Four (T1561.29.326c.22-327a.21) The following verses

from the Kośa are cited without explication: AK 1.37, 38, 41c-d, 42, 46, 176. STHIRAMATI, Bhdsya on Asañgā s Abhidharmasamuccaya (560)
47. The commentary continues by citing verbatim Hsiian-tsang's
translation of the Kośa's listing of the 22 senses (T. 1558.29.13a.20-23), Summary by Paul Griffiths
Sthiramati adding only the relevant sutra passage where this list appears.
Author: The colophon of the only extant Sanskrit manuscript does
Fascicle Five: Indriyanirdeśa (T1561.29.327a.220-328a.27) This not give the author's name. The Chinese tradition suggests that the work
fascicle begins the treatment of the second Kośasthāna. After citing is by one Buddhasithha and was later revised by Sthiramati. The Tibetan
'
Abhidharmakośa I1.1 and three explanatory verses from Nyāyānusāra (T tradition, in contrast, unanimously states that it is by Rgyal Ba i Sras -
1562.29.377b.18-23), Sthiramati then continues on to show how the mind probably best reconstructed as Jinaputra. There is now no external
predominates over the physical and verbal activities. He illustrates this evidence to resolve this issue; extensive discussion was given to it by
with the example of a fetal libido: even in that unborn state, a male Prahlad Pradhan in 19502'- 9 and much of the relevant material may be
embryo will lust after the mother and hate the father, while a female fetus found in his analysis. Internal evidence shows that there are substantial
will have the opposite feelings. similarities--to the point of precise verbal parallels--between this work
Six more verses are then cited in succession (Kara ii.2, 3, 4, 7, 8, (—ASBh) and other works that are clearly attributed to Sthiramati. While
9), after which Sthiramati continues with a discussion on the fact that the existence of such parallels is by no means clear evidence, it may
only the last three senses in the list are free from the outflows--i.e., the suffice to adopt, as a provisional solution, Sthiramati's name as the author
faculties of "I shall come to understand the not yet understood " (anājñātā of the work. If in fact the ASBh was by either Buddhasiritha or Jinaputra
ājñāsyāmīndriya), understanding (ājñendriya) and having achieved full this is not terrible enlightening since we know little about either figure.
understanding (ājñātāvīndriya). He illustrates this point with a long Editions: A single complete manuscript of the Sanskrit original of
excerpt from a scripture in which the Buddha 's reticence to teach the this text was discovered by Rahula Sankrtyayana in 1934 during his first
dharma after his enlightenment is overcome through the intercession of major journey into Tibet in search of Buddhist Sanskrit texts. '" An
27
the god, Brahma Sahampati. The Buddha surveys the beings of the world edition of this manusript was produced by Nathmal Tatia in 1976, and
496 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYABHAŞYA 497
it is on this edition that the following summary is largely based. Tatia's Mahāyānasaritgrahabhā.sya of Vasubandhu and Asvabhāva's
edition appears reasonably accurate, though there is no doubt that it Upanibandhana; Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasūtrālamkārabhārya and
would have benefited from greater use of the Chinese and (especially) Asvabhāvā s 7Tkā, Asańga's Bodhisattvabhūmi and VinOcayasarngrahan .
Tibetan translations. Some of the more important of these parallel passages will be pointed
Translations: (i) Tibetan: the entire work was translated into Tibetan out.
by Jinamitra, īlendrabodhi and Ye Shes Sde (Tohoku #4053, D The structure of the ASBh follows that of the AS. The section
Sems-Tsam LI lbl-117a5; Peking #5554, P Sems-Tsam SHI lbl-143b2). numbers given here correspond to those in the summary of the AS. The
The translation is, as far as can be judged, faithful and accurate. It absence of a section number in this summary may indicate either that the
provides a useful check upon Tatia's Sanskrit edition and has been so ASBh has no comment on that section or that I judge the comment given
used in the summary that follows. The Tibetan canonical collections also to be of only philological or historical interest. The abbreviation T refers
contain a work entitled Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā (ASV), translated to page and line of Tatia's edition of the Sanskrit text.
from a Sanskrit original also attributed to Rgyal Ba'i Sras (Jinaputra) by
Jinamitra and Ye Shes Sde (Tohoku #4054, D Sems-Tsam LI A. COMPENDIUM OF CHARACTERISTICS
117a5-293a7; Peking #5555, Sems-Tsam SHI 143b2-362a8). This text (Lakśanasamucuccaya) (El.1-48.17)
is essentially a conflation of the AS and the ASBh, though there are some The introductory section (T 1.1-9) describes the purpose with which
minor differences with the material found in those texts; also, the Tibetan the text was composed in terms of the twofold advantage which results
translation found in ASV is often different from those found in the from the attainment of intellectual skill in handling the categories
Tibetan versions of AS and ASBh, while undoubtedly reflecting an programmatically defined by the AS. The advantages are those of
identical Sanskrit original. These differences will not be significant for attention and analysis of debate, relating respectively the development of
the summary that follows. concentration and insight and that of skill in logic and philosophical
(ii) Chinese: there is extant in Chinese only a complete translation debate.
of the ASV - that is to say, a Chinese version of a text that is A5 Characteristics of the Aggregates, Elements and Spheres (E
substantially identical to the AS and ASBh taken together. This 2.10-3.2). Physical form is defined as being characterised by changeab-
translation, like that of the AS, was made by Xuanzang (i.e., Hsiian- ility; sensation is defined as experience resulting from good or bad
tsang) (Taisho #1606, Vol. 31, 695a-774a). actions committed in the past, and is connected to the functions of the
(iii) Other languages: there is no complete translation extant in any store-consciousness as receptacle for the effects of both good and bad
language other than those noted above. Various short sections have been actions; conceptualization is defined as the expression in language of
translated and commented upon by contemporary Western, Indian and what is experienced through the senses; no comment is offered on either
Japanese scholars."' of the aggregates of traces or consciousness.
Form and Influence: The ASBh is a commentary to the AS, The.store-consciousness is also given a key role in the operations
designed to elucidate many of the terse definitions found in that text. of the sense-consciousnesses. It is the store-consciousness that
Many of its cotnments therefore simply gloss key terms in the AS with accumulates the karmic seeds from previous operations of the
synonyms or near-synonyms and give grammatical analyses of Sanskrit sense-consciousnesses and, as a result of the ripening of these seeds,
compounds. But there are also occasional longer and more systematic enables them to operate in the present and future.
philosophical discussions. Not every section of the AS receives A6 Arrangement of Aggregates, Elements and Spheres
discussion in the ASBh, but, like the text upon which it comments, the (E3.3-20.2)
ASBh expounds the philosophical system of Indian Yogācāra. The text A6.1 Arrangement of the aggregate of form: here the ASBh
has close links with the other major texts of that tradition: there are expounds the five types of cause which define the senses in which
parallels with, for example, the 182. Tridifikābhāsya, the physical form is dependent upon the four great elements (earth, water, fire
 ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYABHAŞYA 499
498 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
consequences can be seen to follow: (i) If the store-consciousness does
and air). The first is the cause of arising, the second is the cause of not exist then the operation of the effects of previous karma could have
existence, the third is the cause of similarity, the fourth the cause of
no locus (five subsidiary reasons are given for this); (u) If the
endurance, and the fifth the cause of increase.
store-consciousness does not exist there could be no first functioning of
A6.2 Arrangement of the aggregate of feeling the six sense-consciousnesses since there would be no basis from which
A6.3 Arrangement of the aggregate of identification
they could arise. Also, as the ASBh points out, the fact that the different
A6.4 Arrangement of the aggregate of traces: a detailed
sense-consciousnesses (visual, auditory, etc.) sometimes function
exposition of the fifty-three Yogācāra mental concomitants. The ASBh simultaneously - as when they are all directed to an identical object -
discusses in detail the five errors contained in the view that there is an
indicates that they must have a common locus, which must he the
existent individual, errors which were simply mentioned in the AS. The
store-consciousness. Denial of the store-consciousness leads to denial of
first error (dosa) is that of identifying any of the aggregates with the self:
the possibility of the simultaneous operation of different consciousnesses;
this is incorrect because the aggregates do not possess the defining
(iii) If the store consciousness does not exist then there could be no clear
characteristics (permanence and so forth) of a self. The second error is
mental images in the mind (mamas, mental organ, in this case). This is
that of locating a self among the aggregates; this is incorrect because the
so because, for one who denies the existence of the store-consciousness,
aggregates are impermanent, and the idea of basing a (permanent) self the sense-consciousnesses can operate only serially and not simultan-
upon non-(permanently) existent aggregates makes no sense. The third eously (see argument (ii) above), and this would mean that whenever the
error is that of thinking that the self possesses (the qualities of) any of the
mental consciousness is operating only that consciousness can be
aggregates, since this would mean that the self (which is by definition
operating. The result would be the abandonment of any distinction
permanent, uncaused and existent) must not be self-dependent. The
between memory - which, according to this system, possesses less clear
fourth error is that of thinking that the self is something quite separate
mental images than does mental cognition of a present object - and
from the aggregates: this would mean that the self must be bodiless (since
mental awareness of a (metaphysically and epistemically) present object,
the physical body comprises one of the aggregates, that of matter), and
which operates simultaneously with the apprehension of the given object
no such bodiless self is in fact apprehended. The fifth error has to do
by one of the other sense-consciousnesses; (iv) If the store-consciousness
with spontaneous liberation: if a self entirely separate from the aggregates
does not exist there is nothing of which the quality of seedness can be
exists then it would automatically be liberated since liberation is defined
predicated. This is because the six sense-consciousnesses mutually
as separation from bondage to the aggregates. And this is not seen to
condition one another from moment to moment and do not plant seeds -
occur.
that is, perform actions the results of which need not occur for some time.
Substantial attention is also given to the six kinds of distraction as Another locus is required for such seeds, and this can only be the
one of the mental concomitants.
store-consciousness. Also, it is only the store-consciousness which can
The definitions of the twenty-three traces dissociated from mind
account for the renewed operation of a given mental continuum after a
amount to little more than grammatical and schematic glosses on the very period of quiescence since it is precisely the store-consciousness which
brief definitions found in the AS.
holds the seeds that make such a renewal possible; (v) If the
A6.5 Arrangement of the a „regate of consciousness: the The
store-consciousness does not exist then action cannot occur.
ASBh begins with a discussion of the nature of mind, identifying it with
argument here suggests that since action (karma) is apprehended as
the store-consciousness and providing brief definitions of the key terms
operating under a number of different aspects at once, and since this can
used in the AS.
only be the case if a number of different sense-consciousnesses can
The ASBh then gives an eightfold proof of the existence of the
operate simultaneously (see arguments (ii) and (iii)), the
store-consciousness, quoting explicitly the Viniścayasamgrahañī, another
important Yogācāra text.”' store-consciousness is a necessary postulate; (vi) If the
The proofs are framed as negative
store-consciousness does not exist then physical experience
conditionals; if the store-consciousness does not exist, then certain absurd
500 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYABHAŞYA 501
(kdyikdnubhava) cannot occur. The argument here is that the physical
experience of a person in a wide variety of mental states goes on, in its essential nature is equated with constructed nature (parikalpitasvabhāva)
richness and variety, largely independently of those mental states. This because it is without any defining characteristic of its own (svalaksana);
can only be explained on the basis of store-consciousness; (vii) If the emptiness which consists in nonexistence in any particular manner is
store-consciousness does not exist, emergence from the attainment of equated with dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) because any mode
meditative states which are entirely without consciousness is inexplicable. of existence that is imagined to exist does not in fact do so; and natural
This is because the only cause for the re-emergence of consciousness emptiness is equated with perfected nature (parinispannasvabhāva)
would be the body - a manifest absurdity for the Yogācāra; (viii) If the because such existence is naturally empty.
store-consciousness does not exist then there could be no transmission of B2.4 On momentariness. The momentariness of mental
consciousness from one body to another at the time of death. The only events is taken as established and is used as a framework for the
other possible candidate for such transmission is the mental consciousness demonstration of the momentariness of physical form. The ASBh
- one more reductio ad absurdum for the Yogācāra. therefore attempts to show that physical form is in all important senses
The ASBh concludes section A6 with a long series of grammatical dependent upon awareness (citta); this is done through a series of
glosses on compounds from the AS. It also includes, as part of its categories which explain from all angles the complete dependence of the
discussion of the meaning of the term "aggregate" (skandha), a list of the physical upon the mental: the physical is grasped or appropriated by the
eleven kinds of greedy desire to which the eleven modes of existence mental; it is given continued existence by its association with
appropriate to physical form (already mentioned in outline in the AS) consciousness; it is based upon mind and its modes of existence depend
correspond. upon those of the mental continuum upon which it is based; since mind
A7 Division of the Aspects of Aggregates, Elements and Spheres is momentary and physical form acts as the material support of mind,
(E 20.3-46.4) Here a series of categories is applied by means of question- physical form too must be momentary since a material support cannot be
and-answer (see the summary of section A7 of the AS) to the aggregates, different in kind from that which it supports.
elements and spheres. The ASBh states that the point of this method of B3 The Truth of Origin (E 55.5-74.9)
analysis is the removal of false attribution and delusion pertaining to B3.3 The ASBh gives long analyses of the AS 's brief outline
objects and their defining characteristics. Each of the categories is then of the types of action; the basic division, as in the AS, is that between
briefly discussed. Most of these discussions take the form of the volitional action (cetand) and action that occurs subsequent to volition
provision of synonyms and grammatical glosses for terms and compounds (cetayitva). The latter is in turn subdivided, as is standard in almost all
in the AS; there are few instances in this section of sustained Buddhist texts, into three: physical, vocal and mental. These three in tum
philosophical prose. Perhaps the greatest space is devoted to a discussion can be either good or bad. There are ten kinds of bad action, ranging
of the scheme of dependent origination and the causal system which from murder through sexual misconduct to the holding of false
underlies it (sections A7.24-A7.25), though even here only detail is added philosophical views. Each of these actions in turn has five aspects: its
to the outline AS account. object, its intention, its application, its defilements, and its final
A8-A10 Analyses of Collection, Conjunction and Concomitance accomplishment. The ASBh gives examples of these aspects in the case
(E 46.5-48.17) of murderous action: here, the object of the action is the being to be
killed; the intention is the intention to kill; the application is the
B. ANALYSIS OF THE TRUTHS (satyaviniścaya) murderous action proper; and the final accomplishment is the bringing
(E 49.1-94.15) about of the death of the being concerned. All these aspects are
B2 The Truth of Suffering (E 49.1-55.4) necessary in order for a karmically productive action to occur, and the
B2.3 The ASBh analyses the third defining characteristic of same schema is applied to the other types of good and bad action. The
suffering - that of emptiness - in the following terms: emptiness of remainder of this section of the ASBh consists of a multiplication of
subcategories of action and its results - much of which can be directly
 YA
ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYABHAŞ 503
502 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
closely the mechanisms by which passions occur in the mind of the
paralleled in the Abhidharma texts of other schools, for example the practitioner; the sixth acts as an antidote to all the passions below the
lengthy discussions of action in the fourth chapter of the Abhidhannakośa stage of the relevant meditative level; and the seventh and final act brings
- and of comments upon the catena of sūtra quotations found in the AS. the practitioner to the attainment of the meditative stage under
B4 The Truth of Cessation (E 74.10-76.4) "" The ASBh provides consideration. There are seven such acts belonging to each of the four
very sparse and incomplete commentary upon this section of the AS; of ""
meditations and the four formless states.
the twelvefold division of the truth of cessation offered in that text, only B5.5b In its discussion of the relationship between the
three (B4.2, B4.8 and B4.12) are commented on at all, and only the last condition of being freed from the passions proper to the material level (as
- the extensive list of synonyms - in any detail. Even here we find only part of his analysis of the transcendent path of cultivation) and the
lists of synonyms and brief grammatical comments. condition of attaining the peaceful liberations of the immaterial levels, the
B5 The Truth of Path (E 76.5-94.15) ASBh provides a good example of the use of the tetralemma in order to
B5.4 The ASBh explains how it is that upon the path of unpack all the possible alternatives; there are conditions under which the
vision the practitioner is enabled to perceive objects without using either practitioner can have become free from the passions proper to the
of the two kinds of conventional designation - that which describes an material realm and yet not attain the immaterial states. Similarly, there
object as a being or a thing. This occurs, according to the ASBh, are conditions under which he can attain the latter but not the former,
because during the practise of this path the practitioner does not mentally both, and neither.
construct images of selves or things, but instead perceives the world as B5.5f The ASBh gives an interesting analysis of the four
it actually is, completely without subjects and objects. Extensive applications of mindfulness from a Yogācāra point of view, placing a
discussion is given to the standard division of the path of vision into great deal of stress upon the importance of manipulating mental images
patiences and knowledges. in one's contemplation of body, sensation, mind and mental objects.
B5.5 The path of cultivation is defined as the obtaining of According to the ASBh four errors are abandoned by the practise of
the complete comprehension of the four truths on the part of noble mindfulness: the error of thinking that there is something pure within the
seekers. individual mental continuum; of thinking that there is something pleasant
B5.5a The description of the mundane path of cultivation, therein; of thinking that there is something permanent therein; and of
upon which the meditations and immaterial states are practised, is largely thinking that there is a self therein. Also, as a result of these practices,
given over to a detailed analysis of the psychological components of the practitioner enters into a further understanding of the truths: the four
these meditative states and their functions in removing passions and objects of mindfulness are correlated with the four truths. Finally, as a
'
depravities. An especially interesting feature of the ASBh s discussion of result of these practises the practitioner realizes separation from
this issue - which in most respects is not significantly different from the attachment to body, sensations, mind or mental objects. Similarly
corresponding discussions in Abhidharma texts of other schools - is the detailed commentary is given to the other practises contained with the
occurrence of a sevenfold list of acts of attention by means of which the thirty-seven qualities which aid enlightenment.
meditative stages are obtained. The seven are, first, that which B5.6 Analysis of the final path.
recognizes characteristics - which means that the practitioner recognizes B5.6a The ASBh provides detailed definitions of each
the characteristics of the state in which he finds himself as a result of of the twenty-four types of depravity.
hearing the doctrine and considering its meaning; the second goes beyond B5.6c A detailed discussion of the threefold division
such hearing and considering and zealously applies itself to the of the continuous revolution at the basis. The first division consists irr
development of tranquility and insight; the third separates itself from the the continuous revolution belonging to one who has attained the path of
passions appropriate to the stage upon which the practitioner finds the adept, and is defined in typically Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha terms as
himself; the fourth cultivates pleasure in the idea of abandoning passions the removal of those adventitious defilements which belong to the
beyond those which have already been abandoned; the fifth investigates
504 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYABHASYA 505

naturally radiant mind. The other two divisions concern the who studies dharma in a concentrated manner: all except the fourth -
transformation of the mundane path into the transcendent and the dharma considered as radiance (āloka) are given cursory exposition by
complete removal of all depravities. This section of the ASBh provides the ASBh.
a useful insight into the Yogācāra psychology of enlightenment. C3.4d Dharma considered as radiance: here the ASBh
describes the practitioner's progress from a perception of sense-contents
C. ANALYSIS OF DHARMA (E 95.1-116.12) (visaya) to a realization that what appear to be sense-objects are actually
Cl Divisions of the Canonical Literature (T 95.1-98.7). Brief nothing other than the practitioner's concentrated mind; on the basis of
definitions of the major divisions of the Buddhist canon, together with this realization the practitioner directly perceives the absence of both
some discussion of the functions and goals of each type of literature. subject and object.
C2 Dharma considered as the Object of Mental Activity (E C3.4e The process culminates in revolution at the basis,
98.8-99.6) the complete rejection of all mental depravities.
C3 Reasons, Methods and Results of Studying Dharma (E C4 On the Meaning of Vaipulya and the Nature of the Perfections
99.7-102.4). (E 102.5-112.7) As the major part of the discussion here the ASBh
C3.1 The ASBh explains the four reasons for studying includes an extensive outline of the nature of pāramiiā practise - the
dharma in the following terms: (i) the reason of dependence, since practise of the six perfections (of charity, ethics, forbearance, meditation,
dharma explains what depends upon what - for example, just as the zeal and wisdom. Most of the material here does not differ from that to
arising of conditioned phenomena is dependent upon causes and be found in any of the major Mahāyāna expositions of the practise of the
conditions, so the arising of shoots is dependent upon seed-bearing fields; perfections. The ASBh expounds the pāramitās under the headings of
(ii) the reason of cause and effect, since dharma explains what causes number, characteristics, order, etymology, meditative development,
what; (iii) the reason of establishing a conclusion, since dharma teaches divisions, grouping, opposed qualities, advantages, and mutual analysis.
proper conclusions with regard to things that need to be established; (iv) C5 Twenty-Eight Wrong Views of the Mahāyāna Doctrine (E
the reason of the true nature of things, since dharma establishes the truth 112.8-114.13) There is also a substantial analysis of the twenty-eight false
about the way things really are. views which result from a superficial and literalistic examination of the
C3.2 The four methods of studying dharma: (i) the method doctrines found in the Vaipulya (=Mahāyāna) scriptures: (i) the first has
of studying words, which consists in the investigation that realises the to do with excessive attachment to signs, which here means the verbal
true nature of language as being simply a designation; (ii) the method of formulation of the doctrine. This happens to someone who reads in a
studying things by means of language - the language of the doctrine - and sīara that, say, "all dharmas are without essential nature " and becomes
the concomitant realization that things also have no independent attached to that form of words without understanding the indirect
existence; (iii) the method of studying the putative essential nature of intention behind the words. It may be possible to recognise a polemic
things as consisting simply in the means used to designate them. This against some excessively doctrinaire followers of Nāgārjuna here; (ii-iv)
has to do with the relation between propositions and their referents, and these wrong views have to do with casting aspersions upon the doctrines
the concomitant realization that there is an irreducible mutuality between of designation and the three essential natures basic to Yogācāra ontology;
that which designates and that which is designated. This necessarily
(v-vi) these views have to do with incorrectly grasping the sense of the
means, from the Yogācāra point of view, that essential nature actually has sacred literature and warping its meaning to suit one's own purposes,
no existence outside of the fact that it can be the object of an act of essentially by the application of an incorrect hermeneutic; (vii-viii) these
designation; (iv) a method similar to (iii) except one that is concerned '
views - concerning the irreproachability of one s views and actions and
with particulars (viśesa) rather than abstract essences. The same points the certainty of one ' s attainment of nirvana - are also the product of
about the referential relationship are made. incorrect understanding and tend to lead to inappropriate practises; (ix-x)
C3.4 The five stages of spiritual practice belonging to one these views, which lead to despising those who have a different view
506 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES 507
ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYABHAŞYA
from one's own and to being angry with them - especially those who
follow the way of the seekers - spring from excessive confidence in and intention which leads to entry, explained as the teaching of (false)
doctrines such as the existence of physical form in order to encourage
attachment to one's own views; (xi-xii) these views consist in
misapprehending key Mahayana doctrines - such as that of emptiness - seekers to enter the Mahāyāna; (ii) indirect intention as regards defining
characteristic, explained as the relation of the (apparently straightforward)
and thinking to develop merit as a result of holding such misapprehended
views; (xiii-xiv) these views have to do with ignoring arguments against teachings of the essencelessness of defining characteristic, the
essencelessness of nonarising, and the ultimate essencelessness to the
one's own views and using incorrect argument-forms in support of one's
threefold-essence teaching of the Yogācāra. he point here seems to be
own views; (xv) a view that considers only one 's own position as doing simply that an apparently univocal teaching can often be, if not equivocal,
honour to the Buddha and all others as inferior; (xvi) the view of
then at least multi-levelled; (iii) indirect intention of antidote. This is the
profound illusion, which considers one 's own view to be unassailable;
use of a specific (apparently univocal) doctrinal formula in an attempt to
(xvii) this has to do with the proclivities and depravities which
correct a specific fault in a hearer; (iv) indirect intention of
accompany all the previous views. In turn. these proclivities and transformation. The basic idea here is that some (apparently clearly false)
depravities influence the following views; the remaining eleven views in
doctrine may be used to alter the complacent ideas of some practitioners.
fact are essentially variants on some of those already mentioned. ""
But the meaning of this final category is not entirely clear.
C6 The Implications and Indirect Intentions of Doctrinal
C7 Criteria for Recognizing Competence in Meditative
Formulae (E 114.15-115.25)
Practice Related to Dharma (E 115.26-116.12)
This section of the ASBh gives a reasonably detailed commentary on the
hermeneutical categories outlined in the AS. The discussion centers upon
D. ANALYSIS OF OBTAINING (E 117.1-140.5)
two key terms--abhiprdya, here translated implication, and abhisarhdhi,
here translated 'indirect intention.'
"r6
D1 Classification of Individuals (E 117.1-122.8). Section D1
consists almost entirely of brief grammatical and semantic glosses on the
Four kinds of implication are distinguished: (i) the implication of
complex classificatory system set out in the AS. There is little or nothing
sameness, which is illustrated by the Buddha 's saying that he was at one
time Vipaśin (a former Buddha) in virtue of the undifferentiated nature here of philosophical interest.
D2 Classification of Realization (E 122.9-140.5)
of the Dharma-body. (This is not entirely clear, but seems to stress the
idea of identifying two separate things (in this case Buddha and Vipaśin) D2.3 The ASBh gives detailed analyses of the nineteen
in order to bring out a feature that they share, in this case the special qualities. Many of these detailed discussions find precise or
almost-precise parallels in other commentarial literature of the Yogācāra
undifferentiated Dharma-body); (ii) the implication of different times
school, notably in Asvabhāva s commentaries on the Mahāyānasamgraha
'
(kalātara), illustrated by the future effects of past religious vows, like
those involving a wish to be reborn in Sukhāvatī. (The point here seems and the Mahāyānasūtrālaritkāra. Many of them also reproduce"'
standard
definitions from early Buddhist canonical literature. Much of this
to be simply that a present event (the religious vow) needs to be
material is relatively easily available elsewhere; a list of the qualities may
understood not simply in terms of its present effects but also in terms of
be found in the relevant section of the AS summary.
its future results); (iii) the implication of different meanings (arthāntara),
D2.4c The explanations given by the ASBh of the ten kinds
which refers to the fact that statements such as "all dharmas are without "
of conceptual construction or discrimination are thus' (i) the basic
essential existence" should not be understood au pied de la lettre but in store-consciousness; (ii)
discrimination is identified with the
accord with a more sophisticated hermeneutic (see the discussion of
discrimination of images relates to such things as physical form, which
indirect intention, below); (iv) the implication of the inclinations of
are characterised as being a content of cognition; (iii) discrimination of
individuals, which is illustrated by the teaching of different doctrines to
the appearance of an image refers to the six sense-consciousnesses, which
individuals of different temperaments.
are defined as performing this function; (iv) discrimination of the
Four kinds of indirect intention are distinguished: (i) indirect
transformation of an image refers to cognition which has as its object
 ABHIDHARMASAMUCCAYABHAŞYA 509
508 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
concerned to demonstrate whether persons or things in general possess
things - such as the human body - which by their nature undergo any such putative essence. The second has to do with specifics, and is
alteration; (v) discrimination of the transformation of an appearance of an concerned to ask whether specific persons and things possess such
image refers to those cognitions which are transformed by the addition of qualities as permanence/impermanence, form/formlessness and so forth.
affective tones - pleasure, displeasure and so forth; (vi) discrimination
E7.3b The method of proof (see AS summary) is
caused by someone else refers to discriminative thought evoked by divided into eight kinds. The definitions are quoted from the AS and
hearing the doctrine taught by someone else; (vii-viii) incorrect and commented on word-by-word; they add little to our understand-ing of
correct discrimination resulting from hearing incorrect or correct
Buddhist logic at this period,2a° with the exception of the ASBh's detailed
expositions of the doctrine; (ix) discrimination consisting in attachment presentation of a proof of the proposition "there is no self' as a
to the sixty-two species of false view; (x) distracted discrimination ;. this demonstration of the methods outlined in the AS (compare section A6.4).
last category is itself given a detailed tenfold subdivision. The proposition mentioned is defined as the thesis (pratijña).). The
reason (hetu) for accepting that proposition is the apprehension of the
E. ANALYSIS OF DEBATE (E 141.1-156.29) fourfold error in asserting (the existence of) a self among the aggregates.
El Definition and Subdivisions (E 141.1-2)
Briefly outlined, the four errors consist in asserting that the self is the
E2 Analysis of Meaning (E 141.3-142.4) Brief glosses on the
same as the aggregates, in which case it would possess all the standard
sixfold division outlined in the AS. characteristics of the aggregates - such as being caused, arising and
E3 Analysis of Explanation (E 142.5-147.26) passing away - and therefore would not be a self, which is by definition
E3.1 The six types of explanation are explained thus: the permanent and unchanging; that it occurs "among " (locative case) the
object to be explained consists of such things as the aggregates; the aggregates, in which case it would also have to take on the characteristic
meaning to be understood consists in such qualities as impermanence; the of impermanence, since it makes no sense to postulate something
approach to what needs to be understood is the practise of morality and permanent based on something impermanent; that it is located elsewhere
guarding the doors of the senses--preliminary meditative practices; the than the aggregates, which would mean that the self would be bodiless,
essential nature of understanding consists in those qualities which aid something that it apparently regarded as unlikely; and that it is something
enlightenment; the result of understanding consists in liberation itself; and quite other than the aggregates, in which case all selves would be
the experience of that liberation consists in the knowledge and vision of spontaneously liberated, since it is (according to many of those who hold
liberation.
to some form of the self-theory) inherent to the nature of selves to be
E3.2 The fourteen methods for interpreting sacred texts -
liberated and it is clearly not the case that all selves are in fact
listed already in the AS - are here given brief definitions rather than liberated. 2 ' The example (drstānta) is that of the relationship between
extensive discussion. This material is of interest for the history of past and present, where the past plays the part of the self and the present
Buddhist hermeneutical theory, and operates within the framework laid that of the aggregates. The same four errors are distinguished, and the
out in section C6. The concern here, though, is more for the purely
discussion of each stresses that past and present are correlative concepts;
mechanical questions of exegesis and the proper arrangement of to designate the one is to designate it in relation to the other and therefore
systematic texts than it is for purely theoretical . interpretive questions. to deny, ultimately, that there is any separate enduring principle which
E4 Analysis of Analytical Demonstration (E 148.1-149.16) might be called the "self" of the past or the present. The application
E5 Analysis of Questions (E 149.17-150.7) (upanaya) of the arguments here developed is said to be the
E6 Analysis of Grouping (E 150.8-19) demonstration of the nonapplicability of other concepts--such as
E7 Analysis of Argument (E 150.20-155.5) permanence--to the aggregates. The final conclusion (nigamana) is that
E7.3 On objects of proof and methods of proof:
the five aggregates are appropriately qualified by a series of adjectives,
E7.3a The object of proof, the thing to be proved, is beginning with "impermanent " and ending with "without a self."
divided into two. The first has to do with essential nature and is
510 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
MADHYANTAVIBHAGABHAŞYA-TIKA 511
In its brief discussion of the three instruments of knowledge the
CHAPTER ONE
ASBh stresses that the third, authoritative tradition is valid only if it does
(E3-9; TI1-37) Sthiramati explains each word in the Introduction
not come into conflict with the first two--direct perception and inference.
at length.
In the later (Dignaga and after) Buddhist epistemological tradition this
1 (E9-12; T38-54) Some (Madhyamakas) say that all factors are
category of authoritative tradition was dropped altogether as a separate
without essential natures like the horns of a hare. To repudiate this kārikā
reliable means of obtaining knowledge.
I says "Construction of what was not exists". This does not contradict
E8 Analysis of Indirect Intention (E 155.6-156.22) "
(Buddhist) śāstra since he adds "There is no duality in it , i.e., the
E9 The Meaning of the Title Abhidharmasamuccaya (E 156.23-29) construction is not divided into object apprehended and subject
apprehender.
Objection: Then why aren't we liberated?
177. STHIRAMATI, Commentary on Nāgārjuna's "
Answer: That is why Asańga says "Emptiness does exist there . I.e.,
Madhyamakakārikās (560)
since emptiness exists in the construction of what was not, you are not
It is said this is available in Chinese.
liberated, you do not understand it.
Others (Abhidharmists) claim that not only consciousness and
mental concomitants exist but matter, etc. as well. To refute them it is
said: "Construction of what was not exists", i.e. it really exists, and there
"
are not such things as matter, etc., since "There is no duality in it , i.e.,
178. STHIRAMATI, ~kā (Agamanusdriul) on Vasubandhu's
it is neither grasper nor grasped.
Madhyāntavibhūgabhāsya(560) Objection: But if so there can be no liberation, since there is no
supporting object (of the liberating awareness).
Summary by Karl H. Potter Answer: No, since " Emptiness does not exist there " , i.e., emptiness
itself is the pure supporting object itself.
This text has been edited several times, and its first chapter has
Again, "Construction of what was not exists" and " emptiness does
been translated twice. For the purpose of this summary by the Editor "E" " "
exist there" refute the extreme skeptic; there is no duality in it refutes
references are to the edition by Ramchandra Pandeya, Delhi 1971, and
the extreme realist.
our " T" is the translation in Th. Stcherbatsky, Soviet Indology Series No.
Or yet again, this verse indicates that the nature of the construction
5, which originally appeared as Volume 30 of the Bibliotheca Buddhica,
of what was not is defilement but illusory because "there is no duality in
Moscow-Leningrad 1936. In summarizing the first Chapter David "
it ", but that because "emptiness does exist there the path and the
Friedman 's translation (Utrecht 1937) has also been consulted. In
liberation that result are available, though this liberation is nothing
numbering the kārikās we follow the numbering used in the earlier
different, involving a mistaken construction of grasper and grasped.
summaries, so that the Introductory section does not constitute a This construction of what was not, which includes past, present and
numbered section. E's numbering, which counts the Introduction as the
future, causes and effects, is beginningless, issues in liberation and
first verse, consequently numbers each section one higher than our
constitutes ordinary life, is divided into two, what is grasped, i.e., matter
numbering indicates. The summary tries to bring out only those points
etc., and the grasper, i.e., visual consciousness, etc. Although these things,
which mark fresh ground beyond what is found in the summaries of
e.g., grasper and grasped, do not exist one shouldn 't conclude that the
Asańga's and Vasubandhu's works in Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia. construction of what was not doesn't exist, any more than one should
We have provided materials from the commentary on the first few verses '
suppose that because a rope is not a snake the rope doesn t exist. Rather,
to give an impression of its style and complexity.
what is real (the construction of what was not) is empty (i.e., emptiness
exists in it and it in emptiness). Thus two things are actual--the
 512 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES MADHYANTAVIBHAGABHASYA-TIKA 513
construction of what was not and emptiness. show the unreality of awareness (prajñapti) alone?
2 (E13-14; T56-60) "Because of existence", i.e., the construction of Answer: Because the reality of awareness depends on the actuality
what was not exists. " Because of nonexistence", i.e., the grasper-grasped of the external objects it supposedly cognizes, so that when the object is
relation does not exist, "again because of existence" of the construction disproved it easily follows that awareness is unreal. The reverse
of what was not.. procedure would land us in nihilism.
3 (E14-17; T60-76) "These do not exist" includes consciousness as 8 (E14-16; T107-117) Objection: The construction of what was not
well as the objects that appear among "these" . The four comprise all is just thinking, i.e., initial and sustained thought constitute it, but not
experiences, and the passage says that there are no actual entities having other mental activities.
the form of which these are the experiences. Others say that since objects Answer: No. He says "the three realms " , meaning to include both
appear to have a form (ākāra) the mistake is rather in our attributing mind and all accompanying mental factors. These three realms comprise
external reality to these forms. But a " form" is only the chief qualifier the realm of sensual desire, the material and the immaterial realms; they
(prakāra) by which a momentary supporting object is grasped, and since are distinguished in various ways, but basically in order to enable one to
it is what is grasped (and not the grasping) it can have no form. And recognize different types of beings inhabiting the universe with their
having no form it doesn't exist. differing requirements.
Nor is it that an awareness has two parts, the perceiving and the "
"Consciousness perceives things alone, i.e., distinct particulars
perceived. Since there are no objects there are not really ideas of objects. (videsa). " Mental factors (perceive) their specific qualities", e.g., the
But it seems that there are. feelings they produce, or the class to which we ascribe them. The
4 (E17-18; T77-81) That is why it is as wrong to say that nothing distinctions between them is abstracted from reality.
exists as to say that everything does. If either were true there would be Vaibhāşika: No, each distinct consciousness and each distinct
neither bondage nor liberation. mental factor comprise a separate, particular awareness. Otherwise one
6 (E19-22; T88-102) Some (Mīmātńsakas) say: At the moment thing could also be many.
when it is grasped the object takes on a new property of knownness. Answer: That might be all right if factors were real entities. But we
Answer: But if so a different entity is grasped than the one that was have shown that factors are illusory. So there is no problem for us.
initially grasped, since it has a new characteristic. 9 (E16-18; T120-128) The only real thing is the construction of
Sautrāntika: The object--an atom of color, e.g.--that is disappearing what was not. So there cannot really be distinctions between causes and
causes our perception of it at the next moment by creating its image and " "
effects. Causality is another word for the construction of what was not.
projecting it into the external world. Its mark is activity (pravrtti). But this can be viewed in two ways, as a
Answer: But perception never is of a single atom, and a collection series of momentary occurrences or as the stages that one passes through
of atoms, being a nominal existent, cannot be a cause of awareness. during a lifetime. This is what is described in the chain of dependent
Where does the image come from, then? origination.
Sarvāstivāda: We don't accept that past and future entities cannot The Storehouse consciousness is the causal condition of all other
be objects of perception. consciousnesses. It is the projection of the appearance of beings and their
Answer: If so one can have perception without any object, since world. Though itself katmically neutral, it contains all the seeds of
that occurs in dreams, etc., and it is unnecessary to postulate independent experiences; our experiences are produced through maturation of karmic
entities as the causes. Furthermore, at any moment the representation seeds, not by external objects. The storehouse consciousness is the
(vijñapti) is either already produced or not yet produced; if the latter it dominant condition of all functioning consciousnesses, but not their
cannot grasp an object since it ' s not there to do it, and if the former it's immediate causes; the immediate cause is the functioning consciousness.
too late to do anything!
Question: If both subject and object are unreal why don't you first
514 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PAÑCASKANDHAKA-VAIBHASYA 515
179. STHIRAMATI, Bhūsya or Tikū on Asairgā s 2 (fol. 197a2-198a6) The question may arise whether there are
Mahāyānasūtrālañtkāra'4` (560) only four great elements and why that should be the case. Sthiramati
answers that if there were fewer, then a great element could not fulfill all
the four necessary functions of holding together, combining, displacing
180. STHIRAMATI, Vaibhāsya on Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaka (560) and supporting. Because there are not any other basic functions which
require a great element, there is no need for the addition of another. An
Summary by Ronald Davidson objection is raised that there is the function of supplying room for
movement that space governs, and therefore the element ākāśa should be
In the following summary, numerical references are to the sūtra considered one of the great elements. Sthiramati answers that the
divisions adopted by Shanti Bhikshu Shastri;47 wherein he has also "
description "supplying room merely indicates that there is the lack of
translated the work both into English and back into Sanskrit. The folio some hindering matter/form and not the presence of another kind of
numbers refer to the Derge edition (sDe-dge par-khang) To. 4066, element called ākā.śa. If indeed there were some great element called
bsTan'gyur, Sens-tsam, Shi, fols. I95b5-250a7. Unfortunately, the work ākāśa, then it too would hinder the presence of the other great elements,
was translated during the early period (snga-gyur) by Jinamitra, thus defeating its own definition. So in the interests of economy ākāśa
Sīlendrabodhi, Dānaśīla and Zhu-then Ye-shes sde. As a result it suffers need not be called a great element.
some of the problems associated with obscurities in the earlier There are five causal relationships obtaining between the great
translations. Fortunately, though, the Sanskrit materials and Tibetan elements and the derivative material elements. A productive cause
translations of the Tritńśikābhāsya and the Abhidharmasamuccaya serve (jananahetu) indicates that if the great elements are lacking there will not
to render the difficulties intelligible. arise the dependent varieties of matter/form. A dependence cause
(sarhniśrayahetu) indicates that if the great element arises the dependent
The Pañcaskandhaprakarañavaibhāsya has been written by the matter/form will follow. A maintaining cause (pratisthāhetu) indicates
Acārya to bring about the comprehension of the specific and general that the dependent matter/form will survive for the duration of the
characteristics of all factors. One may object that this is pointless since element. The supporting cause (upastambhahetu) indicates that it is by the
the examination of these factors has been done in detail in such extensive power of the element that the dependent matter/form remains. An
works as the Yogācārabhūmi. Such an objection, however, is invalid. embracing cause (upabŗtrihahetu) indicates that if the element increases,
Some people understand things very quickly, comprehending all the the dependent matter/form will also increase.
specific details merely by grasping a part, and for the sake of their 14 (fol. 199b6-201b4) Although Vasubandhu has included shape
conversion this summary has been written. Altematively, it is impossible (saritsthāna) in his description of the object of vision, there is no real
for householders to persevere in the study of works with many chapters shape separate from color. There are two reasons for this. First, the
since they have many duties, and even monks may become indolent in identification of any of the shapes--long, short, circular, etc.--is only a
the study of a many-chaptered work, so this summary was written for function of thought (mati) and involves the process of inference, not
their sake. Altematively, understanding this summary of the
sensual cognition. It is similar to the case of inferring the color of a
characteristics of factors, one is able then to comprehend the extensive flower from its smell. Second, whereas an atom of the visual object is
discussions without further effort. Therefore the Acārya has written this possessed of color, there are no atoms of shape, which is only perceived
examination as a cause for the future investigation of works with many based on the aggregation of the atoms in question. Thus shape is only
chapters, such as the Yogācārabhūmi, etc. An investigation of this nominally existent and not really so. Manifest form (vijñapti), moreover,
variety is the only source for the ability to delineate and answer is the physical form arising from the mind directed on the object
questions, for one-pointedness of mind, and for fearlessness obtained immediately in front of it. Thus the shape of lips in prayer are not
through the highest insight. manifest, since their form is derived from aspiration and a mind intent on
 PAÑCASKANDHAKA-VAIBHASYA 517
516 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
arising of pleasurable feeling. This is unacceptable, though, since we
an object other than that directly in front of it. Because the physical
would have to set contact aside from all of the other factors associated
action of manifest form is directed by a mind intent on good or ill, we
with consciousness and classify it as causal and the others as resultant.
attach the labels of good or ill to the action itself. Like shape, though,
We prefer to define the experience of happiness and unhappiness as
manifest form is nominally, not actually existent. Vasubandhu has
arising with contact from the' storehouse consciousness. Absolutely
merely included these two, shape and manifesting, in the definition of the speaking we should say that there is the maturation of goodness and
material basis (rūpāyatana) to be in accordance with what is known in badness from the storehouse consciousness and its conjoint equanimity.
the world and what is found in the scriptures.
23 (fol. 206b2-207a4) Moreover, feelings can be further divided
19 (fol. 203a7-205a7) With respect to the definition of unmanifest
into physical and mental, attached to the body or not, and attached to the
form/matter, manifest form may be either physical or vocal, and these
objects of desire or not.
may be good, ill, or neutral. Unmanifest form may operate in the sensual
24 (fol. 207a4-207b2) An objection to Vasubandhu 's definition of
level, the material level, or be pure. Desire level unmanifest form arises conceptual identification is that it is unable to distinguish between
from either good or bad manifest form. The other class of unmanifest
identification and consciousness since both of them grasp the
form mentioned by Vasubandhu, that arisen from concentration, includes characteristic of the object. The difference between them, however, is that
the unmanifest form pertaining to the material level and pure form,
identification is weak and is not the complete comprehension of the
distinguished by the presence or absence of defilement. Vasubandhu also-
object. While Vasubandhu classifies conceptual identification into three
qualifies unmanifest form as invisible and unimpeded form. Properly kinds, Sthiramati expands the list to the six varieties found in the
speaking, this should include all the five members of the form included
Abhidharmasamuccaya: (a) signful (sanimitta) is identification oriented
in the mental object: minute (abhisamksepika), representational
towards all those objects not included in signless (animitta) identification;
(abhyavakāśika), contractual (samādānika), imaginary (parikalpita), and (b) signless consists of (i) the perception of a pure particular (svalaksana)
powerful (vaibhūtvika). Now since Vasubandhu wished to include eleven
unalloyed by linguistic cognition, (ii) the perception of liberation wherein
actually existing elements in the aggregate of matter/form, he has only
all conditioned factors have passed away, and (iii) the perception of the
mentioned contractual form, being the same as unmanifest form, in this
bhavañga which is signless only due to its lack of clarity; (c) limited
list. Why not the others? Minute and representational form are the same
(paritta), consisting of perceptions of the sensual level; (d) mahadgata,
as the atom. Imaginary form consists of images, such as skeletons, which perception of the material level; (e) boundless (apramāna), perception of
are imaginary meditative objects. Likewise, powerful form is the object the two entrances of endless space and consciousness; and (f) nothingness
of one practising concentration for the purpose of liberation. Neither of
(akiñcanya), perception of nothing whatsoever.
these latter two exist apart from consciousness. Those wishing to 38 (fol. 211b3-213bl) With respect to the three tYPes of objects of
understand Vasubandhu's intention should consult his discussions in the
faith--action and its fruit, the truths, and the triple gem--action is of three
Abhidharmakośa. Now, in the same manner as the manifest form
kinds: having merit, lacking merit, and immovable. The first two are
imagined by the Vaibhāşikas, unmanifest form is not actual but
concomitant with good or bad factors and have their maturation in the
conventional, since it has the content of any valid means of knowledge. level of desire. Immovable (aniñjya) action has its fruition on the
This does not, of course, mean that the desire level unmanifest form, etc., material and immaterial levels. Confidence (abhisampratyayaśraddha>
does not exist. Rather those things are seeds planted in the storehouse
in action and its fruit means that one has confidence in the existence of
consciousness at the time of undertaking the specific discipline and good and bad acts and that these acts generate certain kinds of desirable
continue to ripen as memory when the restricted situation presents itself. or undesirable fruits, rather than believing that the fruition is the
20 (fol. 205a7-206a3) Satńghabhadra has objected to Vasubandhu's
manifestation of God and so forth. Faith in the truths refers to the four
definition of feeling as "threefold experience" (Abhidharmakośabhā.rya on
noble truths. When there is confidence that five aggregates of grasping
I1.24). Instead he wished to define it as " experiencing contact" and their concomitant factors exist as the truths of frustration and its
(sparśānubhava), that is, based on pleasurable, etc., contact there is the
518 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PAÑCASKANDHAKA-VAIBHAŞYA 519

arising, this is clear faith. When there is confidence that cessation is to (pra tyaveksana) is insight and its explanation, this latter being directed
be obtained and the path is to be developed, this is called faith of toward its proper objects, insight, meditation and effort. Indeed, the
aspiration. Faith in the triple gem refers to the Buddha, Dharma, and definition of that which is directed towards examination is insight joined
Sangha. They are like gems, because they are rare, precious, give joy, with meditation and effort. We may again define understanding thus: that
are beneficial, and are antidotes to nonhumans, etc., who would cause which has the nature of knowledge of things just as they are and that
harm. Without regard to himself, the Buddha has taken three specific knowledge having the nature of examination.
immeasurable eons to obtain complete enlightenment. He has completed 62 (fol. 218b6-221a3) The theory of the self may be imputed as
the two collections of knowledge and merit in completing the six "I" or "mine" in one of two ways: as consisting of an essential nature or
perfections. The Dharma, being dependent on the Buddha and obtained through induction by examining results. An example of the former is the
by the abandonment of all the compounded elements, is rare and Sāthkhya system which imagines that cognition exists as the self because
precious. Likewise, the gem of the Sañgha is superior to the highest the Sāthkhyas are not knowledgeable about the distinction between
worldly accomplishment and to be obtained by the two accumulations. awarenesses and mental factors. Therefore the four aggregates (excluding
The Buddha is like a wish-granting gem by his spontaneous matter/form) are imagined as "p" and the fifth (matter/form) as " mine. "
accomplishment of the welfare of beings through his gnosis and ability. Likewise the nirgrantha (Jain) tradition, whose analysis is similar to that
The Dharma is of three varieties: the Dharma of the Pitaka, which is to of the Sārhkhya. An example of the inductive method is that of the
be explained; the Dharma of the eightfold noble path, which is to be Vaiśeśika system. Objects and organs of perception are existents. These
accomplished; and the ultimate Dharma known as nirvana. The Saftgha two must occur in the proper relation to the subject of perception in order
refers either to those upholding the eight varieties of the prat/ma/era or for the act of perception to occur. Therefore, the presence or absence of
those who have obtained one of the four fruits. Faith is also of three this subject is the ultimate unique cause for the occurrence or
kinds. That which has the element of confidence is oriented towards an nonoccurrence of the perceptive act. Alternatively, they imagine that
object either possessed or nonpossessed of beneficial qualities. That there is an actor because it can become the object of inspection.
which has an element of clarity is oriented toward an object possessing This latter viewpoint imputes the existence of an operator based on
beneficial qualities. That which has the element of aspiration is oriented the premise of action needing a subject separate from the act itself. In
toward the obtaining or generation of an object possessing beneficial response we will examine the act of passing out of existence since all
qualities. It may be objected that, because this faith has the element of elements are momentary. If the action obtains as the agent then it has no
aspiration, is it not basically the same as thirst or interest? This is ti me to remain acting since it must pass out of existence. If the agent is
unacceptable since it is oriented toward a good object and therefore the cause of destruction then the elements will never pass out of
cannot be thirst. Moreover, because it operates as the basis for interest, existence, not being obtained before. If the cause of destruction is
"
it cannot be that factor itself. Furthermore, clarity of mind is based on different from the agent, then the cause is neutral, since "destruction is
faith, and this clarity is entirely dissimilar to the obscuration of the bad not an existent separate from the elements to be destroyed. Destruction
factors. could not have existed prior to the elements of destruction for then it
41 (fol. 213b7-214a4) Nongreed may have its negation considered would be meaningless. Now if the elements and the action are no
in one of three ways: absence, being otherwise, or being the antidote. different, it is incorrect to divide them into agent and action. On the
"
Here Vasubandhu has indicated that he intends the latter. other hand, it is irrational to assume that elements obtain "agentness
43 (fol. 214a6-214b4) Vasubandhu has equated understanding having already come into existence. This latter case assumes that the
(amoha) with the thorough comprehension of reality elements, the action, and the agent are all dissimilar items, despite their
(vathābhūtasampratipatti). This latter is of two varieties: knowledge and identification. Only if one assumes that all elements of existence contain
examination. Knowledge again is of four types: that which has its cause automatically their own destruction can this dilemma be overcome. Thus
in fruition, in the scriptures, in volition, and in realization. Examination is established the doctrine of momentariness, a construct entirely
520 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PAÑCASKANDHAKA-VAIBHASYA 521

antithetical to the maintenance of eternal wholes. Collected (sahcita) here means either that time and again there is the
94 (fol. 226a2-4) With the phrase " these and other varieties" development of seeds or that there is the continuity of traces born of
Vasubandhu indicates the list to be nonexhaustive, and we will include seeds. These are born from the four conditions: (1) The causal condition
below between sūtras 110-111 the following: operation (pravrtti), is the traces (vāsand) present within the storehouse consciousness.
individual determination (pratiniyama), connection (yoga), speed (lava), (2) The dominant condition consists of the various organs of sensory
sequence (anukrama), ti me (kāla), place (deśa), number (satńkhya7, and consciousness, such as the visual organ and so forth. (3) The antecedent
collection (sāmagr). condition is the immediately preceding consciousness which has just
95 (fol. 226a4-226b1) With the threefold division of seed, control, passed away. (4) The supporting object condition is whichever object,
and manifestation Vasubandhu redefines the traditional categories of color-form, etc., is associated with that particular sense organ. Following
obtainment and endowment. Seed applies to both of these two while the arising of the sensual consciousness there arises the searching
control and manifestation only apply to endowment. The state of being intellectual consciousness, the establishing intellectual consciousness, and
a seed lasts from the first moment of obtainment until the point of then the cognitive intellectual consciousness. According to the object it
control. A seed is a specific ability to generate in the future within a becomes oriented either towards defilement or purification. At that time
certain stream of consciousness associated with factors good, bad, and are formed the traces--good, bad, or neutral--whose nature is that of
neutral, the cause of yet another factor which is consistent with that volition. From these is directly generated maturational traces and
stream. Control indicates the circumstances of the future accomplishment indirectly intoxicating traces, each of which operates in its own way to
of the fruit in that stream, dependent on the conditions of the seed. continue the generation of both the storehouse consciousness and new
Manifestation indicates the moment of the accomplishment of that seed. traces.
96 (fol. 226b1-227a5) Nonidentifying absorption (asarhjñi.samāpatti) 115 (fol. 232b5-233a6) The storehouse consciousness operates
indicates certain functions occurring out of the third and fourth meditative uninterrupted as a dual supporting object: internal grasping cognition and
levels. When Vasubandhu mentions that it is brought about by mental cognition of the extemal environment. The former consists of those
application preceded by an idea of "going forth", he means that one 's traces intent on the constructed nature and the forms of the localized
concentration is initially focused on liberation or the path and this is what internal organs. The essential nature of a functioning consciousness may
is indicated by " going forth." Finally, it is the cessation of all the be good, bad or neutral, but the storehouse consciousness is of only one
unstable factors of mind and mental events, a definition excluding only variety, neutral. This is because it only forms associations with the
the storehouse consciousness and the defiled mind together with the factors always present and is unilaterally uninterrupted, unlike the
latter's permanently associated four defilements. functioning consciousnesses. In this way various factors and states of
98 (fol. 228a4-228b1) Birth among the nonidentifying gods being may arise without the undesirable implication that a defiled state
(ā.sanijñika) is the fruit of nonidentifying concentration. The process is or lower state of being issues directly from an undefiled state or a higher
that there is a restriction of the self-referential (svasatñvedya) mind and state of being. These lower states and defiled states issue from the traces
mental events occurring in one born on that level. Thus these factors present in the storehouse consciousness. The storehouse consciousness,
grow ever more subtle, their seeds being injured and restricted to their though, is not a single substance, but a continuous stream of operations.
own locus, so that there is no further arising of the mental factors. The proof of the storehouse consciousness rests on both scripture
110-111 (fol. 230b6-231a6) (Sthiramati provides here definitions and reasoning, the former being the specific references found in the
of the nine dissociated factors which he introduced under sntra 94. His Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra and the Samdhinirmocanasūtra. Reasoning
definitions are taken, with very slight elaboration, directly from the consists of the arguments given by Vasubandhu that the arising of the
Ahhidharma.samuccaya, p. 11.17-25.) functioning consciousnesses after the states of nonidentifying, cessation
114 (fol. 231h6-232b5) Vasubandhu has explained that mind is and unconsciousness meditations would be untenable if there were no
called citta because the seed of all traces are collected in every moment. storehouse consciousness.
 522 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PAÑCASKANDHAKA-VAIBHASYA 523

The Sarvāstivādin objects that his theory of existence of three time consciousness would not be always dependent on traces but also the
periods would make this possible without the assumption of the psychophysical complex. But if this were the case then this would involve
storehouse consciousness since the existent past would carry its effects multiplication of the psychophysical complex into two species, one
over into the present. The proper response to this is that this supposition dependent on traces and the other dependent on consciousness, an
entails the differentiation of the factor from its activity (kriya). Factors implication which is unacceptable.
would therefore be permanent and nonfrustrating, both of these in turn Furthermore, liberation is not merely accomplished by the
entailing perverse views and the nonabandonment of defilements. elimination of outbursts (samudāedra) of the emotions and other negative
Furthermore, there would have to be postulated a sixth aggregate to mental events, but due to the elimination of their seed causes. Otherwise
contain the activity of the various factors, since these are now separate, we would have to assume that one who is in a neutral mental state at a
and since this activity must be included as a psychophysical constituent. certain moment has obtained enlightenment, an entirely unwarranted
The Sarvāstivādin responds that activity can be defined as that conclusion. If there were no storehouse consciousness, then we could not
which brings about fruition. The factor is then existent as the causal assume any mechanism among the functioning consciousnesses which
element bringing about another factor. The answer is that if the factors could sustain these seeds and in which locus they could be entirely
are differentiated according to time, this still entails the differentiation of eliminated.
the factor and its activity. Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādin would still be
defining cause and fruit as identical so that all factors would be
permanent. 181. STHIRAMATI, Bhārya on Vasubandhu's Trirhśikā (560)
The Sarvāstivādin might then define the activity as neither the same " " " "
E and T references are to the edition and translation by Krishna
nor different from the factor. But the response must be that whatever is Nath Chatterjee as found published at Kishor Vidya Niketan, Bhadaini,
neither the essential nature of the factor nor of anything else is Varanasi in 1980. The translation was earlier published in Anviksa 3.1,
nonexistent, and it therefore cannot be causal. 1968. There are several editions and a German translation by Hermann
Others claim that a functioning consciousness, which arises after Jacobi. Quoted references are to the summary of the 192. Trińdikā by
these three states of being, is generated by the body. This claim, Stefan Anacker in Volume Eight of this Encyclopedia. '40
however, would entail that there are for each person two streams of Introduction (E27; T29-33) This work explains two kinds of
consciousness: one arising from the body, the other from the mind. selflessness, (1) of the person and (2) of the factors. Realization of (1)
Moreover, for cessation meditation, which occurs at the immaterial level, involves the elimination of the defilements and the obstructions to
there is no body from which a functioning consciousness can arise. It knowledge. One gets rid of these by understanding the selflessness of the
must be acknowledged that functioning consciousness and storehouse person. By realization of (2) one gets rid of the obstructions to awareness
consciousness are different, the former being interrupted and the latter that constitute ignorance; one attains omniscience.
noninterrupted, to account for these states of being. 1 (E27-30; T33-40) " Metaphors " (upaedra) means various sorts of
Finally, there could be neither activity in existence nor cessation constructions like aggregates, elements, sense-organs etc., which are
from it if there were no storehouse consciousness. The former is the case superimposed on consciousness. "Develop", that is, evolve (parityma),
because there is a gap between the traces of the previous existence and meaning to appear differently than they are through conceptual
the rebirth-linking consciousness obtained at the moment of obtaining a construction proceeding from the storehouse consciousness. Thus
new body. Thus there is a problem of continuity between the second and consciousness is the only real entity; there are no selves or factors in
third members of the chain of dependent origination, and the storehouse actuality. This provides the middle way between the extreme views that
consciousness naturally supplies the process whereby this continuity may there is nothing at all and that everything really exists.
be maintained. It may be objected that the psychophysical complex, Question: If only consciousness exists and not external objects, how
being present at birth, could supply this continuity and therefore can our experiences of objects occur?
524 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
TRIMSIKABHASYA 525
Answer: We suppose that an external object is the supporting-object
condition of consciousness by producing consciousness which actually stream.
has its own form (svābhāsa) and does not cause it, for otherwise there Who is an arhat? One who has knowledge of the destruction (of his
defilements) and of his nonarising.
would not be other kinds of conditions such as antecedent, etc.
conditions. Question: Now as to the second kind of evolution of consciousness,
The five sensory kinds of consciousness (v(jñānakāya) have as thinking. We know what the loci and objects of sensory experience are,
contents the collective form (sañcitālambana), but there is no collective viz., color/form, etc., but what is are the loci and objects of the defiled
form of a thing other than the forms of its parts, since there can be no mind (klistamanas), the subject of ordinary thinking?
awareness of a collective form without there being those parts there. It is Answer: "Dependent on this store-consciousness " , etc. And thinking
always has the storehouse consciousness as its supporting object.
not that real atoms combine to form objects as contents, since atoms have
no form. And so the collective form of atoms cannot function that way 6 (ET53-55) Defilements are of six kinds, but the mind associates
either. with four of them, ignorance, the belief in a self, pride and desire,
Objection: The collective form is perceptible. 7 (ET56-59) as well as with others such as touch, attention,
Answer: But since it is composed of atoms which have no shape, feelings, identifications and volitions. These defilements are unobstructed-
no front or back, etc., it too cannot produce an experience. neutral in the storehouse-consciousness but obstructed-neutral in the
Objection: If there is no self, and no substantial entity, metaphor, defiled mind. The arhat does not have a defiled mind when he has got
i.e., conceptual construction is not possible. Metaphor requires association rid of all defilements through the endless path attained by spiritual
cultivation culminating in cesssation meditation, though he regains one
between three actual things: some thing, something like it, and a property
that they share. when he comes out of that meditation.
8 (ET59-60) identifies the third kind of evolution of consciousness,
Answer: But things can be similar without sharing an actually
viz, the six kinds of perception. It is good when involving absence of
existing property. And properties may be related without there being any
actual thing constituting their relation. A substance is cognized only in desire, of hatred or of ignorance; when associated with desire, hatred or
terms of its qualities, not its essence, and language functions without ignorance it is bad, and when with neither it is neutral.
there being any essential relation between a thing and its name. Thus all 9-14 (ET60-95) Each of the defiled factors and the afflictions are
these things are evolutions of consciousness. And there are three kinds of explained at some length.
such evolutions. 19 (ET 107-116) " Proclivities " , karmic traces (vāsand), together with
2 (E30; T40-41) There are three' kinds of evolution of twofold grasping, "cause other maturations of seeds to occur, when the
consciousness: maturation (vipdka), thinking (manana) and awarenesses former maturation has been exhausted" in the storehouse-consciousness.
of contents (visayavijñapti). The first is an evolution of the storehouse Without a storehouse consciousness there could be neither bondage nor
consciousness, which stores the seeds of experiences and ideas. It liberation, since the traces would be gone as soon as they have their
result and couldn't do anything else.
functions in two ways, internally and externally.
3 (E31-32; T41-47) " It is not fully conscious "--i.e., we are not
clearly aware of the locus and nature of the ideas contained in the '
storehouse consciousness, and they have no specific supporting object, 182. STHIRAMATI, Bhāsya on Vasubandhu s Virrtśatikā (560)
etc. This commmentary has been edited several times; cf. Bibliography,
Objection: How can an awareness be unclear? Third Edition, p. 226.
Answer: Just as in meditations such as the cessation-meditation,
though consciousness is there it is not consciousness of any content.
5 (E41-49; T47-53) The store-consciousness is both single and a
526 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KAŚYAPAPARIVARTA-TIKA 527

183. STHIRAMATI. flkā on the Kāśyapaparivartasūtra205 (560) III Form of the merit of right practice (samyakpratipatty-
anuśamśd).
Summary by Jikido Takasaki IV Form of the method of abiding in the right practice
(samyak-pratipattisthitinaya) ---
The Kāśyapaparivartasūtra, which forms the 43rd parisat of the I. lawful activity (dharmacaryd),
(Mahā-)Ratnakūtasūtra, is a collection of 49 sūtras that appear in the 2. equal activity (samacarya-),
Chinese and Tibetan Tripitakas. 245 The Sanskrit original of Sthiramati's 3. good activity (kuśalacaryā)),
commentary is missing. Only Chinese and Tibetan translations are 4. dwelling in the lawful activity (dharmacaryāyām
available at present. "' Both translations are almost identical with each sthiti)
other and are no doubt translated from the same version. The Chinese V Form of similes (upama) denoting the superiority of virtues of
translation does not mention the name of the author, nor is there any bodhisattvas, thus abiding in the right practice in order to let the people
record conceming the author in Chinese tradition, while the Tibetan produce faith in them.
'
translation gives the '" name in the colophon as slob dpon blo brtan,' i.e., VI Form of the precept of bodhisattvas, abiding in the right
Acārya Sthiramati. practice (śiksd).
The basic text on which this Tad comments seems different from VII Form of the superiority of bodhisattvās precept to that of
the present Sanskrit version edited by Stael-Holstein 209 on the basis of a śrāvakas (śiksā-viśesa).
Central Asian manuscript, and judging from its construction of VIII Form of altruistic deed of bodhisattvas by means of worldly
commented sections, it seems nearest to the Tsin version among the and superworldly wisdom (laukika-lokottarajñānena parārthakriyal.
Chinese translations. 250 Namely, the following sections of the present IX Form of the precept of śrāvaka (śrāvakaśiksal kept in the
Sanskrit edition are lacking in the ā: #s 21, 22; 27, 28; 33; 50, 51; 55; precept of bodhisattvapitaka.
84, 89; 119, 120; 126; 150-156; 158; 164, 165. X Form of the ascetics not well-trained (asuśiksitaśramaña).
This Tikd utilizes a portion of the Viniścayasamgrahan of the XI Form of ascetics well-trained (*suśiksitaśramapa).
351
Yogācārabhūmi, which is, in its turn, a kind of summarized XII Form of those who are abiding on sham (or conventional)
commentary upon the Kāśyapaparivarta. Namely, in the introductory precept (*sarimketavratasthita).
section, the 3ksi mentions the sixteen topics given in the Yogācārabhūmi XIII Form of those abiding on the ultimate precept
as the frame of the sūtra, and accordingly is divided into sixteen sections. (*paramārtha vratas thita).
In each section, sometimes in combinations of three or four sections, the XIV Form of Tathāgata 's means of discipline
Tīkā gives its own commentary first, then adds the Yogācārabhūmi (tathāga tavinayopāya).
passage together with quotations of the sūtra passage. XV Form of the word of hidden meaning (.sarhdhyābhāsya).
From this fact, we come to know that the Kāśyapaparivarta was XVI Form of the merit of believing in the precept of
highly esteemed among Yogācāras as showing the whole scope of the Bodhisattvapitakabodhisattvapitaka-asvavāde adhimuktyanuśarimśā.
Bodhisattvapitaka and that the author of the Tikā as a member of the Commenting on the title of the basic sūtra, Ratnakūta, the hill of
Yogācāra school followed this tradition, but with addition of his own jewels, the Tīkā says that the sūtra is so-called because it has the entire
interpretation when necessary.' " forms of these sixteen, within which are enclosed all teachings of
4 Sixteen
25' topics showing the frame of the Bodhisattvapitaka are Mahāy5na. 2$4 This statement suggests that the original title of the Tikā
as follows: was Mahāratnakūta-tīkā.
I Form (ākāra) of wrong practice (*mithyāpratipatti) of a 5 In the following a summary of the contents will be given
bodhisattva. section by section. Sūtra passages are referred to by their section
II Form of right practice (samyak-pratipatti). number.
528 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KA ŚYAPAPARI V ARTA-T1KA 529
I-II-III, 1-20 (-22) VI. Bodhisattvaśiksā, 52-71
The Taco treats these first three sections together under the title: Of this section, the sutra says that in teaching the middle way the
Twenty (or twenty-two) sets of catuspādika, stanza consisting of four real intuition of the factors constitutes the core doctrine of the
feet. Of these three, I (mithyāpratipatti) includes I, 3, 5, 7, 9, I I, 13, Ratnakūta.
'S'
Accordingly the Tikā first defines the meaning of the
and 15. They are respectively said to show (1) regress of wisdom, (2) middle way as being apart from both extremes of substantial view on ego
forgetfulness of right memory, (3) causing to destroy pure qualities, (4) of heretics and nihilistic viewś on nonego of Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha
sham conduct of bodhisattva caused by wrong mind, (5) difficulty to be followers, and its true intuition is sought for in nondiscriminative wisdom
trained, (6) mischievous conduct of stealing, (7) impossibility to approach (avīkalpajildna). The Ţikā introduces also the theory of
(good) and possibility to approach (bad) things, (8) causing (the people) consciousness-only, saying that through nonaffirmation of the nature of
not to help in bodhisattva practice, and to perform wrong practice. the falsely imagined on things causally conditioned and through the
Opposite to them are II (samyakpratipatti), which covers 2, 4, 6, establishment of emptiness as the real nature (dharmatal by perfection (of
8, 10, 12, 14, and 16. practice) (parinispatti), there are avoided both extremes of
over-affirmation (samāropa) and blasphemy (apavāda).
III. Samyakpratipattyanuśatitśā (the merit of right practice) The whole passage is summarized, after the YBh, into the 13
involves 17-22 with (1) perfection of accumulation of moral conduct and forms of the middle way. They are, namely:
wisdom, (2) purification of hindrances, (3) causing one to attain the gates 1 emptiness of personality (pudgalaśūnyatd) (52),
to precepts, (4) practice of immeasurable merit, (5) causing one to 2 nonsubstantiality of personality (pudgalanairātmya) (52),
overcome the fundamental ignorance, and (6) causing one to attain the 3 emptiness of factors (dharmaśūnyata] (53),
unobscured state. (Of these six, the last two, corresponding to 21-22, are 4 nonsubstantiality of things (dharmanairātmya) (53-54),
found only in the Chinese version.). 5 extreme of over-affirmation (samāropānta),
6 extreme of blasphemy (apavādānta),
IV. Samyakpratipattisthitinaya, 23-26 7 realization of the truth (dharmābhisamaya) (61-62),
The 73kā otherwise calls this section the 32 forms of a 8 transfer of merit of the realization of truth to the great
Bodhisattva's right practice. The same counting of virtues (dharma) is enlightenment (*dharmābhisamayamahābodhiparinamana), (63)
given in the Yogācārabhītmi, too, but the way of their distribution to the 9 nongrasping of mind by defilement and suffering
four subdivisions, dharmacaryā, etc., differs between the YBh and the (*kleśaduhkhābhyām cittāgrahagati) (63),
Tikd proper. Namely, the YBh counts 5, 8, 7, 12 factors for (1) 10 superiority (viśesa) in (a) perception (64), (b) remoteness (64-
dharmacaryā, for (2) samacaryā, for (3) kuśalacaty and for (4) 65), (c) (overcoming of) perplexity on extinction, (d) (overcoming of)
dharmacaryāsthiti, respectively, while the Tad, 5, 10, 6, 11, respectively. perplexity in mind (66-67).
(In the basic sūtra, 23 covers
255 one to eight factors, 24, nine to eighteen, 11 cause (of superiority) ( 68-69),
and 25, nine to thirty-two.) 12 pervasion of emptiness (śirnyaldparravasmta) (70),
13 strength of emptiness (śūnyatāprabhāva) (71).
V. Upamā , 29-32, 34-49
- There are 19 similes in total given in this section, and their order
is said to be in accordance with the way in which the dissimilarity of a VII. Śikāraviśesa, 72-92 (excluding 85 & 89)
simile is overcome by the next simile, and thus the last simile shows the Of this section, the YBh counts 13 points of superiority of
superior and unparable qualities of the bodhisattva. Bodhisattvas to Śrāvakas.' '' They are the superiority in:
1 intention (āśaya) (72-75),
2 perfection of pure dharma (śukladharmasatnadāgama) (76-77),
530 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES KAŚ YAPAPARI V ARTA-TIKĀ 531
3 perfection of wisdom (jñānāgamasamudgama) (78-79), other two refer to the dependent nature. This interpretation is not clearly
4 succession (anvaya) (80-81), observed in the Yogācārabhūmi. The purity of the mind which is referred
5 clan (gotra) (82), to as āryagotra "" or the lineage of the saints and, characterized as
6 retaining of lineage (gotrāvadhāraña) (83), unconditioned, is explained from three standpoints: (1) nonattainment and
7 practice (prayoga) (86), attainment, (2) nine features of unconditioned in comparison with the
8 strength (prabhāva) (84) conditioned, and (3) the essential nature of the unconditioned in five
9 establishment (siddhi) (87), points.
10 venerability (daksinīya (88),
11 the highest superiority (`viśistānānt prativiśistatd) (90), IX. Śrāvakaśiksā in the Bodhisattvapitaka, 105-118
12 cause and result (hetuphala) (91), This section showing criticism of the morality of Sravakas,
13 birth (Tāti) (92). according to the }' ogācārabhūmi, has three subdivisions:
The 77kā regards, on the contrary, the first point as showing the 1. the simile of a dog running after a thrown stone (105-107),
general statement and picks up twelve points of superiority. 2. the threefold precepts of a Bodhisattva (108-110),
Prior to explanation of superiority, the YBh refers to the four 3. eightfold defects against a Bodhisattva's precept (111-118).
kinds of Śrāvakas namely: 1. incarnated (nirmita) seekers, 2. haughty The eightfold defects, which are arranged in order so that the
(abhimānika) seekers, 3. seekers turning to enlightenment (bodhi- previous one stands as the cause of the next one, are respectively: (1)
pariitamana), 4. seekers striving only for quiescence (śamaikāyana), and unpurified mind, (2) twofold bondage, (3) twofold obscurity, (4) twofold
says the last group is here referred to for comparison with Bodhisattvas. stains, (5) dharma-destroyer (simile of hail), (6) twofold tumors, (7)
Generally speaking, we can observe here the lineage theory of the twofold fever, (8) twofold uncurable disease. By the last item is meant
Yogacara for explaining a Bodhisattva 's superiority to seekers. (a) haughtiness and (b) slander of a Mahāyānist.

VIII. Parārthakriyāviśesa, 93-104 X-XI-XII-XIII, 121-137 (excluding 126)

This section deals with Bodhisattva's cure of mental disease of The Tkā treats these four sections in succession, probably
living beings by means of the medicine of wisdom in four ways, namely, because all relate to the states of ascetics. Namely, the sūtra classifies
(a) to know causality, (b) to understand non-ego-ness of things, (c) to ascetics into the following four:
have no fear of emptiness, and (d) investigation into the mind. (97) Of 1. ascetics merely in outer features,
them the Yogācārabhūmi and the 77kā alike give a special importance to 2. ascetics who delude others by keeping moral conduct,
the investigation of the mind. The whole passage is subdivided in the 3. ascetics seeking for honor and fame,
following way: 4. ascetics of real practice.
1 Bodhisattva's altruistic deed by means of worldly wisdom Of them, #I-3 belong to X, not well-trained ascetics, which are
(93-96), explained by 121-124, while #4 refers to XI, well-trained ascetics,
2 the same by means of supraworldly wisdom (97-104), explained by 125. The following sections 127-133 explain these four
a. general feature of the mind (97), kinds of ascetics with similes.
b. particular feature of a mind (98), The next two sections (134 & 135) are said to refer to Xli,
c. defiled feature of the mind (98-101), mendicants of sham morality and XIII, those of real morality. XI,
d. purified feature of the mind (102-104). well-trained ascetics, are naturally XIII, mendicants of real morality, and
Of these four features, the lTkā explains again through the they are Bodhisattvas.
doctrine of the threefold nature that by the defiled character is meant the The following two sections in the sīttra (136-137), consisting of
constructed nature, and by purified feature, the perfected nature, while the ten verses, refer to the Bodhisattva of right precepts.
 ABHIDHARMADIPA-V IBHASAPRABHA V RTTI 533
532 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
photographs of a single palm-leaf manuscript discovered in Tibet by
XIV. Tathāgatawnayopāra, 138-144
Rahula Sankrtyayana in the year 1937. The work has not been translated
This section comments on the story of 500 mendicants who
into Tibetan or Chinese and is also not noted anywhere else. The edition
recited front the assembly after hearing the teaching on the right precepts contains two works, the metrical Abhidharmadpct and a prose
and the two incarnated mendicants seeking to convert to Mahayana. The
commentary on it known as the Vihhāsāprabhā-Vrtti. Both works are by
means of conversion are (1) through appearance and (2) through
the same author, who is merely called " Dīpakāra" . The /cārikā text,
instruction. The latter includes (l) the ground for producing fear toward
namely the Abhidharntad pa, closely follows the Ahhidharmakosa of
purity and defilement, (2) annihilation of the ground of defilement, (3)
Vasubandhu, and the vrtti contains several portions which are identical
annihilation of the ground for fear towards purity, and (4) the means for
with the Kośabhāsya. The work is divided into eight adhygyas which deal
dwelling in the higest pleasure in this life.
with the following topics, arranged in the same order as in the Kośa: I-
Skandhāyatanadhātu, I1-Indriya, III-Lokadhātu, IV-Karma, V-Anusaya,
XV. Sadidlryābhāsya, 145-148
VI-Mārga, VII-Jr'ūtna, VIII-Samādhi. The original work probably
This section is on the conversations between Subhūti and the 500
consisted of some 1200 verses in about 150 folios. Only 62 folios have
mendicants just converted to Mahayana. The 'ikā regards this passage as
survived; they contain 597 kārikās together with their vrtti. The
referring to the great merit of the true wisdom, and summarizes it in six
points, namely: (1) nirvana, (2) basis (āśraya), (3) sound (śabda), (4) importance of Abhidharmadipavrtti lies in the fact that it is the only
surviving Sanskrit text which contains a criticism of the author of the
rational thought (yoniśo manasikāra), (5) instruction (avavāda), (6)
establishment of factors in accordance with truth Abhidharmakośabhāsya. Vasubandhu, the author of this latter text, is
never mentioned by name but is simply called " Kośakāra " , and is
(dharmūnud/taratanispatti), and by dividing the last one again into ten,
criticized for his upholding of the Sautrāntika positions on several
makes fifteen subjects of conversation.
occasions against those of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāsikas.
The name of the author of the Ahhidhartnadipa has not survived,
XVL Adhimuktyanusamśā, 149, 157, 159-163, 166
This section, according to the Yogācārabhūmi, consists of the but two possibilities regarding his identity have been suggested on the
basis of Hsiian-tsang' s account of the Abhidharma authors who flourished
fivefold merit of faith and the fivefold cause of receiving pleasure.
in the area of Kāśmrīa-Gandhāra. The editor of the text (faint) has
At the end, there are added two verses expressing the altruistic
suggested the possibility that Vimalamitra, a Sarvāstivādin master of
turning of merit, composed by the author of the Tad.
Kashmir whose legend is given in detail by Hsiian-tsang and who
flourished within a hundred years after Vasubandhu (circa 550 A.D.),
might have been the author of this work.
184.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (565), " Sidra on the original cause of
Professor J.W. de Jong has proposed as author of this work the
raising the world"
name of another master called Iśvara, whose legend also appears in
Nanjio 549, another work translated for the first time by
Dharmagupta around 615 or before. Hsiian-tsaitg 's account. For details see his article "L'Auteur de
I' Abhidharmadīpa " in T'oung-Pao, Volume 51, Parts 4-5 (1965); Kenyo
Mitomo, "The date of the authorship of the Abhidharmadīpavibhāşā-
prabhāvrtti" in Studies in Buddhology (in Honour of Professor Zuiryu
I85.VIMALAMITRA ('?) (580), Abhidharntadipa with
Nakamura), Tokyo 1985. pp. 676-688. In this article, Professor Mitomo
Vihhāsāprabhāvŗtti thereon
assigns the date of 490-570 for this work. See also Funio Enomoto, "A
fragment from the Sanskrit manuscript of the Abhidharmadipa found in
Summary by Padmanabh S. Jaini
Turfan" in Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 36.1, 1988, pp. 414-
420. See also Samuel Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World, Vol.
The present edition of the Abhidharmadipa is based upon
534 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADIPA-VIBHASAPRABHA V RTTI 535

I, London 1884. the Buddha, the name of the text, and a grammatical analysis of the
formation of the word "huddha."
Abbreviations used in this summary:
ADV: Abhidhannadīpa-Vibhāsāprabhāvrtti (ed. P.S. Jaini), K.P. Chapter I, Section 2
Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959 The next available folio is no. 31, which contains a portion of an
AKB: Abhidharmakośa-Bhāsya of Vasubandhu (ed. P. Pradhan), K.P. interesting discussion on the unconditioned factors of the
Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1967 Vaibhāsikas--calculated cessation, uncalculated cessation, and
LVPAK = La Vallee Poussin (tr.), Abhidharmakośa space--which are claimed by the Vaibhāsika to be eternal, i.e., uncaused.
SAKV: Sphutārtha-Abhidharma-Kośa-Vyākhyā of Yaśomitra (ed. U. In this connection, the Dīpakāra refutes the Vaiśesika and Sāriakhya
Woghihara), Tokyo, 1932-1936 categories of the eternal. Only a single line of the refutation of the
category of self as "constructed" by the Vaiśesikas has survived: the
Introduction Dīpakāra says that, being a nonexistent, the Vaiśeşika category of the soul
Unlike AKB which is divided into kośasthānas (chapters), ADV is neither eternal nor nonetemal. The discussion on why the soul does
is instead apportioned into eight adhydyas, each of which is in turn not exist appeared earlier in the chapter, in the folios which are no longer
subdivided into four pddas. The text of ADV follows closely the scheme extant.
of AKB and, in a great many cases, offers little that could be considered A brief refutation of the Sārhkhya doctrine of the eternal
new to the latter's discussion; we will note here only those things which pradhāna, i.e., prakrti, has survived. Pradhdna is also not eternal, for
distinguish ADV from its model. There are three categories of such two reasons. First, if the three guñas (sattva, rajas, lamas) were identical
features: with pradhāna, then there would be no increase or decrease of those
(1) ADV adds something to the discussion of specific problems guñas, and without that evolution, there would be no "manifestation"
which is not directly relevant to Abhidharma per se or is not explicitly (vyakta), i.e., creation, at all. Second, if the guñas were different from
covered in AKB. prakrti, then they would be impermanent anyway, thus proving the
(2) ADV includes materials directly connected with Abhidharma Vaibhāsika view.
which go back probably to the Vihhāsās, but which, for some reason, are The Sārhkhya may suggest here that the guñas will indeed
neglected by the Kośakāra. Occasionally, the Dīpakāra points out these undergo change according to the action (karman) of individual beings and
omissions in AKB and remedies them in some detail. thus there is no fault arising. That explanation too is inappropriate, since
(3) Perhaps most importantly, the Dīpakāra takes the Kośakāra to if the actions, whether volitionally undertaken or not, belong to prakrti
task for espousing Sautrāntika views, and defends the orthodox itself, then the assertion that there is a single pradhāna common to all
Vaibhāsika standpoint. individual souls is futile. But if it is maintained that the actions do not
Because of the fragmentary state of the ADV manuscript, a great belong to prakrti but to the souls, then surely there would never be
many sections detailing the Vaibhāsika positions have been lost. In liberation for those purusas; this is because since the purusas are eternal,
addition, in a number of cases, the Dīpakāra simply has nothing new to i.e., free from any change, their karma also would have to be eternal and
relate concerning these controversies, limiting the overall value of his text unchanging, which is impossible. If, in order to escape this untenable
to Ahhidharma studies. Nevertheless, the distinctive views appearing in position, the Sārimkhya were to maintain that karma belongs to pradhāna,
ADV will be briefly summarized to indicate wherever possible the then one could show many other faults; for example, since there is a
traditional Vaibhāşika interpretation. single prakrti, there would be no way to determine which karma belonged
to which individual (i.e., the fault of akrtāhhyāgama), and in the absence
Chapter 1, Section 1 of such a determining factor, there would be no possibility of any
Only the first folio has survived, which includes the salutation to individual ever escaping from the bonds of karma. These two refutations
536 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADIPA-VIBHASAPRABHAVRTTI 537

are not found in AKB. the standard Vaibhāşika view that vikalpa is of three types: natural
(svahhāva), consisting of examination (abhinirūpa{ta). and consisting of
Chapter I, Section 3 recollection (anusmaratta). According to Yaśomitra, however,
This section describes the factors, i.e., the eighteen elements, in Vasubandhu does not agree with the threefold division, since the
terms of matrices. In discussing the dyad contaminated/pure, the Kośakāra believed that natural construction was nothing but initial
Dipakāra quotes the Kośakāra's etymological derivation of the word for thought itself. Here, too, the Dipakara does not show any awareness of
"
proclivity" (anuśara) at AKB I.4c-d. Here, Kośakāra does not explain Vasubandhu 's disagreement with the Vaihhāśika view; he does state,
the word according to the more common root anu + sru (to flow), but however, that the latter two types of construction are its principal
instead derives it from anu + śri (to lie dormant or latent). The Dipakara constituents. His statement is thus in agreement with that of the
calls this interpretation sacrilegious (abrahrna), since it misrepresents the Kośakāra: memory and examination are the properties of mental
true etymological meaning of the word " amigaya". The Dipakara is consciousness and not of the five sensory consciousnesses; these latter
'
certainly aware that, in making this unusual derivation, the Kośakāra consciousnesses are constructionfree, and, in the Dīpakāra s words, act
intended to interpret anuśava as "to gain nourishment" or "to gain a firm like a person born blind or deaf.
foundation". By recourse to such an interpretation, the Kośakāra sought This discussion on construction serves as a springboard for the
to avoid the possibility of including the Noble Truths of the path and of Dipakara to elaborate three topics relevant to the discussion on the
liberation (which, by definition, were free from the contaminants) among elements, all of which are missing in AKB. The first topic is to identify
the contaminating factors, since a person entertaining wrong view could which of the three constructions is present at any given moment in the six
turn these salutary factors into sources of attachment and thence of consciousnesses. The second topic deals with the further categorization
contaminants, much as he might do with sensory objects or other of these consciousnesses into good and bad varieties.
contaminating factors. It should be noted here that the definitions of the The third topic deals with memory, a form of construction, and
words sāsrava and anāsrava are of primary importance for the with how a previously-experienced object is remembered. In this
factor-classification scheme of the Abhidharmikas. since this dyad connection, the Dipakara examines how memory remains possible, even
epitomized the entire Abhidharma (see AKB I.4a). Yaśomitra devotes in the absence of an eternal soul, when the series of momentary
several long paragraphs of his commentary on AKB to a discussion of consciousnesses perishes without having established a connection between
'
this problem of precisely what renders a factor contaminated, and quotes one consciousness and another, and in the absence of the soul s eternal
the viewpoints of various Vaibhāsika masters, including Gunamati, whose quality, called saritskāra (faculty of memory, or trace), which serves as
perspective he rejects. Although the Dipakara does not add anything new the primary cause of such memory by providing the connection between
to our knowledge on this topic, it seems reasonable to assume that he had the soul and the object. This is undoubtedly an extremely important topic
no access to such controversial views as are found in Yaśomitra's which the Kośakāra should have examined; he apparently reserved it for
Sphutārtltā. treatment in the eighth kośasthāna, entitled Pudgalanirdeśa. The
The next dyad pertains to whether a factor involves initial or Dīpakāra shows no acquaintance with that chapter at all, however. In
sustained thought. It is agreed by all schools that the five sensory verse 27, Dīpakāra gives three conditions for memory to occur: (1)
consciousnesses involve both initial and sustained thought, while the ten repeated activity (prayoga), (2) close proximity, i.e., the presence of the
material elements are without either initial or sustained thought. In this suitable conditions (ariga.sānnid/rya), (3) a homogeneous stream of
regard, a question is raised in both AKB and ADV: If the five sensory consciousness (sabhāgasantati).
consciousnesses involve both initial and sustained thought, then how is Having stated the Buddhist case, the Dipakara seeks to refute a
it that they are also called constructionfree? The word " construction" heretical view, possibly that of the Vaiśesikas. It is suggested by the
(vikalpa) has never been precisely defined in the Ahhidharma, but opponent that memory occurs in dependence on a particular kind of trace,
probably referred to some sort of ratiocination. The Kośakāra first gives which itself arises due to the conjunction of the internal organ with the
 538 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADIPA-VIBHASAPRABHAVRTTI 539

soul. The Dīpakāra's refutation of this view is quite simple. An eternal called consciousness. Based on this sūtra passage and the self-evident,
self can never be in conjunction with an internal organ nor play any role momentary nature of all these factors, the Sautrāntikas made a bold
in the production of traces. Moreover, how would the opponent explain extrapolation and rejected the Vaibhāşika doctrine of the simultaneity of
the conjunction of the traces with such an eternal and omnipresent self? these three factors. The Sautrāntikas probably arrived at their view by
If a single trace were to occupy the entire self, there would be no room interpreting the gerund form, pratitya, appearing in the sutra too literally,
left over for a second trace. But if it occupied only a portion of the self, by taking it as indicating a real sequence of events. The Dīpakāra frames
then this implies that the self, which according to the opponent is their perspective as follows: The consciousness, being an effect, does not
indivisible, can be divided. Therefore, concludes the Dipakara, the coexist in the same moment as does the eye and forms which, being the
Buddhist explanation of memory is the correct one. causes, came into existence previously.
The loss of memory of previously-experienced objects also The Dipakara does not name the Sautrāntikas as the advocates of
happens when the three conditions leading to memory are missing, or this view, but in a different context, he later (v. 77) mentions by name a
when one is overcome by weakness or disease. It appears from the school called the Dārştāntika to which was attributed a virtually identical
earlier statement of the Dipakara that this problem was covered in the view. He describes the Dārştāntika position as "all is nonperception"
nonextant portions of the first chapter. (sarvam apratyaksam). Since the five sensory consciousnesses have past
things as their objects, when eye and matter/form exist, consciousness has
Chapter I, Section 4 not yet come into existence; by the same token, once consciousness
This section begins with a much-discussed problem concerning comes into existence, the eye and matter/form are then no longer existing.
the respective functions of the sense-faculties and of consciousness: Both the previous view and that attributed to the Dārştāntikas seem to
namely, whether there is a distinction between seeing and knowing. This belong to the same school; this seems certain because, as Yaśomitra
is discussed in great detail in AKB 141-142. The Dīpakāra's treatment pointed out, the Dārştāntikas were a subsect of the Sautrāntikas. This
of this topic does not differ much from that of the Kośakāra, but there are Sautrāntika view that external objects are not directly perceived becomes
certain important statements pointing to a proto-Sautrantika view, which a distinguishing feature of this school in later times and differentiates it
denies the perception of external objects. The traditional Vaibhāşika view from the Vaibhāşikas, who uphold the doctrine of sārūpya or the
is that the eye sees the matter/form and consciousness knows it. It is its si multaneity of object, sense-organ, and consciousness. This distinction
nature to perceive, but its efficacy (Sakti) is aroused only by the coming was considered to be quite significant by non-Buddhists, as can be
together of the appropriate conditions, such as light, etc.; only then does gleaned from the brief description of these two schools in
that power of seeing manifest. Perception itself, however, takes place Sarvadarśanasarhgraha: "The Vaibhāşikas consider the object to be
only when it is accompanied by the corresponding visual consciousness. joined with consciousness. The Sautrāntikas consider that the object is not
"
The two act simultaneously and thus give rise to the function called directly perceived and, therefore, is external to consciousness. To the
perception. The simultaneous operation of these three--i.e., sense-object, best of our knowledge, ADV is the only Sanskrit Abhidharma text which
sense-organ, and sense-consciousness--is therefore prerequisite to the attests to this bāhyānumānavāda of the Sautrāntikas.
activity known as sense-perception. The Dīpakāra's criticism of this position is very terse. In the
Contrary to this Vaibhāşika view, the Sautrāntikas seem to have absence of the direct perception of the object, he says, both inference as
developed a view which established a sequence in regards to the process well as scriptural testimony cannot be considered valid. This is because
of sensory perception. This sequence was between the object and the both of these means of knowledge cannot proceed without the initial
sense-organ on the one hand, and consciousness on the other. This view perception of the objects thus inferred or acknowledged.
is apparently based on the sūtra passage, " conditioned by the eye and The next point of importance appears in a discussion concerning
forms, eye-consciousness arises". Here, eye and matter/form appear to the problem of whether the senses perceive objects only when they come
be presented as the initial cause, depending upon which arises the effect into direct contact with those objects, or even at a distance also. The
 540 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
ABHIDHARMADIPA-V IBHASAPRAB HAVRTTI 541
Dipakara's treatment of this topic is almost identical to the Kośakāra's,
except for the following point of interest. In this passage, the Dīpakāra matter/color which is other than aggregated form. He then offers his own
refutes the view of a person called Vindhyavāsi, who holds the doctrine alternate definition: "The material atom is the most subtle one". Dīpakāra
that the sense-organs are omnipresent (sarvagata). Nothing more is does not elaborate whether the Vaibhāşikas believed that there were two
known about this Vindhyavāsī, and there are no references in other kinds of atoms--namely, aggregated and nonaggregated.
Abhidharma texts to the view attributed to him. He is probably identical Yaśomitrās comments (AKB ch. 2, 22a-b) on atoms are worth
to the Sārirkhya teacher Vindhyavāsa, who is said to have been a noting here. He says that- by "paromāgu" the ācārya meant the
contemporary of Vasubandhu. The precise meaning of sarvagata is aggregated atom, not the substantial atom (dravvaparanu2gu). Explaining
unknown, and the refutation too is very terse. The Dīpakāra says that to the latter term, Yaśomitra says that a dravyaparamāinr is that factor
call the sense-organs sarvagata is like claiming that oil is found all over which has no forms that may enter into aggregation, and he divides it into
former and latter. It is that essential thing which is devoid of all other
the sesame seed rather than just inside it. Similarly, he says, who but a
fool would imagine that the sense-organs exist outside their supports of matter/form and which enters into aggregation. While the Dīpakāra's
eye, ear, etc. statement lacks this detail, the problem was seriously taken up in other
Finally, toward the end of the first chapter, we may note a topic texts, such as Nvāvānusāra (LVPAK 2, p. 144, n.3) and
which is characterized by the Dīpakāra as being the quintessence of Abhidharmasamuccaya (pp. 41-42).
Abhidharma, which was forgotten by the Kośakāra. This concerns which
of the eighteen elements is overcome by recourse to which stage and to Chapter II, Section 3
which transcendent path. The correlations are given in verses 58-70, This Section deals with the various types of traces, including the
mental associates and the traces dissociated from awareness. In the
where the elements are said to be overcome through the removal of
specific proclivities as one progresses on the pure path. former category, ADV contributes something new only in his treatment
of initial and sustained thought. These two factors are generally
described as consisting of a searching and fixing state of mind
Chapter It, Section 1
In this Section, which treats the sense-organs, the following topic respectively, but no adequate definition of their specific characteristics
which is not discussed in AKB is alluded to by the Dipakara. If appears in any Abhidharma text. AKB itself does not define the terms,
"
īndriya" means sovereignty (adkipati; mastery, lordship), then why is it and distinguishes the two purely in terms of their comparative subtlety,
that certain factors such as interest, contact, attention, identification, and initial thought being the grosser of the two.
volition, certain dissociated traces like birth, and even such unconditioned Kośakāra then proceeds to debate the problem of the simultaneous
factors as liberation are not included in the list of senses? Appropriate operation of these two factors in one mornent of consciousness. The
answers are given in vv. 81-85, and the Dīpakāra concludes that the Vaibhāşikas maintained that grossness and subtlety themselves were the
orthodox number of senses. twenty-two, is correct, and need not be characteristics of initial and sustained thought. Kośakāra, however,
supplemented or reduced. rejects this view, saying that unless a specific distinguishing feature of
each of these two factors were noted, they would have to be considered
as different states of a single factor. If that were so, then it would be
Chapter II, Section 2 impossible to claim, as the Vaibhāşikas had, that both initial and
sustained thought could exist in the same thought-moment. Diverging
This Section contains only one statement worth noting. It
pertains to the Kośakāra's definition of " atom" (paramāqu), which is somewhat from AKB 's treatment, ADV does attempt to define the specific
characteristics of initial and sustained thought. Dīpakāra professes that
defined there as the most subtle aggregation of matter. The Dipakāra
seems to take objection to the word "rītpasarrighāta" in Kośakāra 's initial thought produces the manifestations of the five sensory conscious-
definition, for he says that the Kośakāra should have stated if there is any nesses, while sustained thought conduces only to the manifestation of the
mental consciousness. Hence, Dipakāra attempts to show that the
 542 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADIPA-VIBHASAPRABHAVRTTI 543

gross/subtle distinction between initial thought and sustained thought is meditation, for example, the mind and all the mental factors are rendered
not simply a qualitative difference, but a functional one. totally inoperative. But because this state takes place in the immaterial
Such a functional difference is not corroborated in level, there is also no physical body present and the meditation renders
Samghabhadra's Nvāyñnusāra, the relevant passages of which have been the mind and mental factors totally inoperative. Such a state cannot even
quoted by Yaśomitra. Sarhghabhadra is purported to have claimed that be said to exist unless one were to assume that there are forces outside
initial thought and sustained thought can subsist in one moment of the psychophysical complex which would automatically--that is, as a
thought, but cannot function simultaneously. He therefore defended the maturation of some previous karma--sustain the life-force of the
Vaibhāśika view that these two factors could coexist. individual and maintain his meditation. The Vaibhāśikas consider that
Dīpakāra seems to agree with that assessment, since he says that these two functions are fulfilled by the life-force and cessation meditation
the Vaibhāśikas acknowledge only the coexistence of these two factors respectively, which thus come to be classified as separate dissociated
in the same moment of thought, not their simultaneous operation. conditions.
However, the examples provided by Samghabhadra and Dipakāra to Certain of these dissociated conditions, called the conditioned
illustrate this point differ in an important aspect. Satitghabhadra gives the marks (samskrtalaksana), are also employed by the Vaibhāśikas to
example of attachment and delusion as two distinct factors which are, explain the alleged distinction between the intrinsic nature of a factor and
nevertheless, complementary and capable of operating symbiotically. its function (kāritra). The dispute between the Sautrantikas and
Dīpakāra offers instead the examples of knowledge and ignorance, and Vaibhāśikas on the reality of these factors sheds a great deal of light on
doubt and decision (nirnaya), none of which are complementary factors. the understanding of factor-theory, as well as on the precise meaning of
By " knowledge" (vidyal, the Dīpakāra apparently means wisdom (prajñd), momentariness, continuity, and causation, as they were understood by
which the Vaibhāśikas advocated could coexist with ignorance. ''"' But these two schools. A very rich discussion on the merit of this
Dipakara's claim that doubt and decision could coexist is uncorroborated Abhidharma category and on the correct interpretation of the sūtra
and demands further examination. Dīpakāra apparently believes that he passages which allegedly support their reality is found in AKB. Dipakāra
has handily defeated Kośakāra with his remarks, for at the end of these certainly intended to make a long rejoinder to Kośakārā s prominent bias
two examples, he chides the Kośakāra to remain silent and not allow toward the Sautrāntika school and, at the beginning of this chapter, he
himself to become the butt of ridicule of the " learned." articulates the following questions, allegedly raised by the Sautrāntika
Initial thought and sustained thought fall into the category called interlocutor: "Now, what are these viprayuktasarimskāras and how many
"
connected conditions" (samprayuktasañtskāra). The next topic discussed are there? We do not apprehend any own-nature of these dharmas, nor
in ADV is that of " dissociated conditions" (viprayuktasamskāra), also any function. These dharmas are not well known in the world, or in the
known as " forces dissociated from both matter and mind" words of the Buddha, or in the Vedic treatises either. " Dīpakāra then
(rūp aci t taviprayuktasaritskāra), a category of real factors (dravya) unique proclaims that he will indeed describe both the nature and function of
to the Vaibhāśika school. AKB contains a lengthy debate between the these factors and would also quote the appropriate words of the
Vaibhāśikas and Sautrāntikas on the admissibility of these factors. The omniscient Buddha in support of his statements.
Vaibhāśikas seek to defend the reality of these factors through quoting a One wonders why the Dīpakāra would have the Sautrantikas say
large number of sūtra passages. The Sautrantikas, however, while also that these factors are not found in the Vedic scriptures, since one would
admitting these same passages, still consider those factors to be purely not expect a Buddhist to justify the existence of a factor by reference to
nominal (prajñapti). Kośakāra himself sides with the Sautrāntikas on this a non-Buddhist school. It is well known that during the course of their
point, and he characterizes the Vaibhāśikas as being overly literal in their dispute with the Vaibhāśikas, the Sautrantikas accused their opponents on
interpretation of these scriptural passages.' many occasions of borrowing these factors from the Vaiśeśikas as, for
Some of these forces were probably introduced to explain example, when they alleged that homogeneity was modelled upon
meditational states associated with the immaterial level. In the cessation universals (AKB I, 41a). The Dipakara's statement that these factors are
544 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADI PA-V IBHAS APRABIIAV RTTI 545

not found in heterodox scriptures thus seems to be an attempt to preempt of life (for three months in order to initiate Subhadraparivrājaka into the
any such suggestion of borrowing. The Dīpakāra says that one should Sańgha) could also be considered a result of past karma or the result of
not look for these factors in the Vedas, since they can be comprehended his exercising miraculous yogic powers. Kośakāra maintained that the
only by the omniscient Buddhas or by those Bodhisattvas like extension of life was not a maturation but a projection of a force
Arya-Maitreya, Sthavira-Vasumitra, and Acārya-Aśvaghosa, who have generated by meditation. The Dīpakāra takes the opportunity to examine
attained to the special knowledges (pratisathvid) by virtue of their clarity this view of Kośakāra in his discussion of its being a dissociated
of mind. How could it be possible that these factors would come within "
condition. He first has an opponent pose the following question: The
the range of childish beings with inferior intelligence, or by those dullards Kośakāra says that the extension of life takes place through the force of
whose minds have turned away from the Abhidharma? We may note in meditation, upon the termination of the life which is born of karma.
passing that the mention of Arya-Maitreya as one who knows the What should be the answer to such a statement?" The Dīpakāra's position
Abhidharma is quite significant and confirms even the Mahāyāna tradition makes it clear that he is emphatically opposed to Kośakāra's view. He
as preserved in Śāiistambasūtra that Maitreya was an exponent of says that there is no need for a rejoinder here since the Kośakāra s
'

dependent origination. It is also significant that no other Bodhisattva position is not attested in the sutras or vinaya, and is contrary to the
recognized in the Mahayana school has been mentioned, indicating that dharmatā. Therefore, it should be ignored as the words of a fool, for the
the Vaibhāśikas accepted only one Bodhisattva, Maitreya, as a future sūtras say clearly, "It is impossible merely by one's own strenuous
Buddha. It is also notable that scholars like Vasumitra and Aśvaghosa exertions or by violent means that one might be able to bring to maturity
should also receive the title of Bodhisattva, but this must be used here as something that is not yet mature, or, once it has matured, to lead it to
a term of respect, since they are properly designated as Sthavira and yield a result not originally expected." In the Vinaya too it is stated,
Acarya, respectively. "The threefold karmas which fall into the category called 'destined to be
With such a prolix introduction, Dīpakāra obviously intended a ' "
experienced cannot be averted by anybody, including the gods. And in
detailed rejoinder to the Sautrāntika biases of Kośakāra. Unfortunately, the Abhidharma too, the possibility of a life which is infinite in length
two important folios pertaining to this controversy have been lost, leaving has been rejected. Having said this, the Dīpakāra accuses Kośakāra of
only a few places where Dīpakāra makes some original contributions. entering the portals of Mahayana Buddhism. "For surely, if the Lord, by
The first of these concerns life-force, that factor which is held responsible the powers of meditation, could at will produce a new living personality
for sustaining life on the sensory, material and immaterial levels. It is or could cast a new life-span independent of karma, then indeed, the
agreed by all Buddhist schools that the life-force is sustained for a fixed Buddha would be turned into a Nārāyana. Moreover, he would never
duration of time as a result of one's past karma. This renders life-force attain parinirvāña, such is his compassion for worldly beings. Therefore,
a karmic maturation, which cannot be altered at will. The Sautrāntikas this view deserves no consideration, as the Kośakāra here is following the
take it as being a cumulative effect of karma and, consequently, not an Vaitulikaśāstra."
independent factor at all. The Vaibhāśikas, however, advocate that it is As we have noted, the first ten of the dissociated factors
a separate factor operating independently of both mind and body, but still discussed by the Vaibhāśikas have some bearing on the Buddhist theories
as a result of past karma. The issue of life-force's being a maturation of of causation, Unconscious meditations, or life-duration, and thus are
past karma is not relevant to the question of whether it is in fact a directly or indirectly related to the working of the traditional five
dissociated factor and, therefore, it was not discussed by the Kośakāra in aggregates. The last three of these conditioning factors, however,
his examination of it. He had, however, dealt with this topic at mmnakā'a, padakāya, and vvañjanakiīya, have a bearing only on the
Abhidharmakośa I1,10a, under the rubric of which of the twenty-two nature of words and meanings, as they are "forces" that impart
senses were maturations and which were not. significance to words, sentences and letters, respectively. An influence
Having explained that the life-force is a maturation, Kośakāra of the theory of sphota and also of the Mīmātitsaka theory of eternal
raised a further question as to whether the Buddha's alleged prolongation words in the formulation of these three Vaibhāśika conditioning factors
546 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADIPA-V IBHAŞ APRABHAV RTTI 547

was long ago noted by Stcherbatsky. Little material on these sariukāras meaning is not created by any person.
appears in AKB. The Sautrāntikas themselves were certainly acquainted The Sautrāntika here brings forward the theory of sariketa. He
with certain aspects of these controversies as can be seen from the says that the nāman, etc., are not different from verbal speech. Verbal
Kośakāra's arguments against the revelation of the name (nāman) by sound alone, acting itself as the factor which gives rise to the cognition
series of vocal sounds--arguments which are not different from those of of the object, conveys the meaning to the listener when its constituent
the Mīmārhsakas and others against the theory of the revelation of sphoia parts are grasped as a unity by memory. Why, therefore, postulate these
by dhvani. But neither the Kośakāra nor his commentator Yaśomitra separate nāman, etc.? The Dipakāra points out that verbal sounds, being
makes any reference to the Mīmārhsaka or the Sphotavādins, remaining atomic, are not capable of revealing the thing meant. As a collection of
content with giving only a brief refutation of the Vaibhāşika position. atoms, a verbal sound can reveal only those objects with which it has
The treatment of this topic in ADV is much more comprehensive and is come into contact, like a lamp. Things which are not born or which are
one of the Dīpakāra's most important contributions to the Vaibhāşika destroyed or are inaccessible to the senses, like heaven, are not reached
Abhidharma. ADV refutes the Sautrāntika position, makes pointed by sound. Naturally, therefore, a sound cannot convey these objects.
reference to the theories of sound held by the Mīmārhsaka and Vaiśeşika, Moreover, sounds cannot convey a meaning either serially or
and briefly examines the sphoia theory of the Grammarians. simultaneously. The stems of baivaja grass, for instance, which are
After briefly stating the Sautrāntika argument that the nāmakāya, individually incapable of being used in the action of dragging a piece of
etc., are not different from verbal sounds and, therefore, are unreal, the wood, become so capable when they are put together in the form of a
Dīpakāra sets forth the Vaibhāşika theory of these conditioning factors. rope. But the words of a sentence which consist of atoms of sound, and
A verbal sound (vāldabda), he says, is synonymous with speech or which come into existence in series, are merely conceptual unities of the
utterance, and is therefore included in the matter aggregate. The constituent parts which are received by the mind. They are, therefore,
nāmakāyas, etc. are dissociated factors, and hence included in the incapable of conveying the meaning either individually or if taken
aggregate of traces. The nāmakāyas, etc. are dependent for their origin together, since they cannot stand in unity like the baivaja grass. Thus it
on verbal sound and manifest the meaning which is dependent on the is proved that the sounds do not convey the meaning either serially or
utterance (or the individual word-shape); thus they are representatives of simultaneously.
the thing meant, as in the case of the content of a knowledge. Just as the Moreover, as in the case of a lamp, there is no relationship of
five sense conditions are dependent on their corresponding five objects, revealed-revealer between sounds and meanings. Thus people who wish
so too are the nāmakāyas, etc. dependent for their origin on verbal sound. to see a pot use a lamp which has the capacity of revealing a pot and
For this reason, it is said, "A verbal sound operates on the nāman, the other things as well; and there are no spoken sounds which have the
nāman expresses the object." predetermined activity of revealing or acting on any meaning taken at
Here the Sautrāntika raises the following objection: you say that, random by some particular relationship.
along with speech, letters (like ka, ca, etc.) are produced, and by speech Nor is this particular relationship of revealed-revealer
the nāmakāyas are brought into operation. apppropriate in the case of the thing meant and a sound. This is because
But if this were the case,
speech would be subject to divisibility, since it would follow each letter sounds do not convey that which is not agreed upon by convention to
in turn. Therefore, there can be no such thing as a nāmakāya functioning mean a particular thing.
as meaning-conveyor (abhidhāna), since for this purpose a unitary entity Even if we accept the theory of sariketa obtaining between a
would be required. The Dipakāra rejects this argument, saying that when sound and its meaning, such a sound is still subject to the argument of
the aggregate of the sound-parts is perceived, there is a possibility of its seriality. If it is said that the memory of each sound conveys the
nāmakāya having the capacity of being a meaning-bearer. Moreover, its meaning, then also it is subject to the same fault. And if it is maintained
existence is evident from its activity, which is to convey its meaning. that the trace left by the sounds in the mind conveys the meaning, then
And it conveys its own meaning, since the relation between ndman and also we deny it as it is not proved.
548 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHA RMADIPA- V IBHA Ş AP RABHA V RTTI 549

The Dipakara further elaborates the atomic nature of sounds. He raises a question as to whether the nāmakāya, etc., are eternal or not.
says that sound (ghosa) cannot be a unity as it consists of several atoms. Such a question is indeed unnecessary, for the nāmakāya is a trace and
It is accepted that the diphthongs a and ai are produced in the throat and consequently nonetemal. The question raised, therefore, suggests that a
palate. But it is not correct to say that a sound consisting of only one similarity between the sphota and nāmakāya was present in the mind of
atom operates in two different places. But this is possible in the case of the Dipakara. He is, therefore, unduly emphatic when he says that the
aggregates of atoms. Even then the atoms cannot convey a meaning nāmakāyas are nonetemal, as they depend for their function on such
individually, for their individual existence cannot be proved. Nor can causes as sound, etc.
they do so in a collection (sahghāta), for a collection does not exist in The Dipakara does not accept the theory of sphota. He examines
reality apart from its constituent parts. a statement of Patañjali that sphota (the unchanging substratum) is the
After thus showing that verbal sounds alone cannot convey a word, the sound being merely an attribute of the word. ( Mahābhāsyā, I.
meaning, the Dipakāra sums up his position. " The correct form of 1, 70, Kielhorn's edition, vol. I, p. 181, lines 19-20) The Dipakara does
exposition, " he says, "is that the letters which are past with reference to not admit any difference between a substratum and an attribute, and
the last letter are grasped by a (single) mental effort and then cause to therefore says that since these two are identical, even sound (dhvani)
arise the mental concept as directed towards the relevant meaning and would become etenal. For him, "dhvani", "śabda", and "sphota" are
thus only in this fashion convey the meaning. " synonymous. Sphota, being thus identical with verbal sound, was subject
As regards the common belief that a verbal sound conveys a to the same fault of seriality and therefore incapable of conveying the
meaning, the Dipakara says that this belief does not correspond to the meaning.
facts. "In fact speech operates on the nāman, i.e., it expresses or speaks Dīpakāra further confirms his rejection of the theory of sphota by
the name, i.e., it gives voice to it. The name brings to light the object. openly favoring a view, which Patañjali calls naive, that śabda is dhvani.
Thus the speech passing over each letter in order, speaking or giving Patañjali in his Mahābhūgya gives two views on the nature of a word
voice to the name and at the same time giving rise to the perception of (śabda): (i) a word is that by means of which, when uttered, there arises
its own form, but existing only in the form of series, is said to reveal the an understanding of the thing meant; (ii) a word is a sound capable of
artha only by a process of metaphorical transfer. The meaning is not conveying a meaning. The Dīpakāra does not refer to the first view, but
expressed or brought to light by the sound." quotes the second view, showing his preference for it. But this second
This exposition of the nāmakāya offers several points of view equally goes against his theory of nāmakāya. He, therefore, says
comparison with the sphota-theory of early Grammarians. Sphota is that name, etc., are different from sound (dhvani) (i.e., from śabda),
defined as "the abiding word, distinct from the letters and revealed by because they are sarvārthanirnaya. The significance of this statement
them, which is the conveyor of the meaning" (Mādhava,
seems to be that whereas a sound refers to a particular thing, the
Sarvadarśanasamgraha (ed. Abhyankar), p. 300). The ndmakdya is also nāmakāya as a trace is capable of conveying all meanings.
distinct from letters (i.e., sound), is revealed by them, and is claimed to The sphota theory referred to by the Dipakara shows his
be the conveyor of meanings. The Vaibhāşika argument that sounds, on acquaintance only with the Pātañjala school of grammar. He does not
account of their seriality, cannot convey a meaning, is identical with the refer to the later developments of this theory as contained in the
argument of the Sphotavādins against the Naiyayikas who, like the
Vākyapadrya of Bhartrhari. While dealing with the nature of sounds, he
Sautrāntikas, maintained that verbal sounds (with the help of .catimketa) says that the Vaiyākarapas (together with the Mīmānssakas) do not
convey the meaning. But whereas the sphota is called a Salida and recognize the atomic nature of sounds, and proceeds to show that sounds
described as one and eternal, the nāmakāyas are nowhere designated as are atomic, because they possess resistance. The Vākyapad ya refers to
śabda and are declared to be many and noneternal. a view that some consider words (śabda) as consisting of atoms. It is
The Dipakara does not appear to be unaware of this similarity.
possible that the Dipakara was not aware of this view, or did not consider
As if anticipating an attack from the Sautrāntikas on this account, he it an authoritative view of the Grammarians.
550 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADIPA-VIBHASAPRABHAVRTTI 551

As seen above, the Sphotavādins understand the term "Salida" in is evident from the use of such expressions as apauruseva for denoting
the sense ofsphata and not in the ordinary sense of a sound. This śabda, the Buddha-vacana.
therefore, is not perceived by the ears hut only by the mind. The
Chapter III
Dīpakāra plays with the ambiguity of this term and ridicules the
Grammarians for maintaining a view that sound is perceived by the mind. A large portion of the third adhyāva, corresponding to the third
The Dīpakāra further gives some more details about the nāmakāvas, etc. kośasthāna, is lost. Only a small portion of the text, dealing with the
seven types of destruction of the world, has survived.
The nāmakāvas are twofold: those which have a determinate meaning,
and those which do not in themselves mean any particular thing. The
Chapter IV, First Section
former is again divided into two kinds: apauruseya (not created by any
The fourth chapter deals with karma. Dīpakāra opens the
person) and laukika (mundane). The nāmakāvas which convey the
elements, organs, and aggregates are apauruseva. They are primarily discussion with a refutation of the doctrine that a creator God is the cause
either of the universe itself or of its diversity. Dīpakāra remarks that he
perceived only by the Buddha. It is therefore said, "The
had already referred to this issue earlier, but now intends to expound
nāmapadavvafijanakāyas appear only when the Tathāgatas appear in the
upon it in detail. The earlier reference probably appeared in the second
world".
chapter, which has a corresponding passage in AKB II.64d. It should be
The laukika (worldly) nāmakāyas are twofold: those which
convey a particular thing (niyata), and those which are conventional noted however that, unlike Dīpakāra, Kośakāra does not repeat the
discussion in his fourth chapter.
(vādrechika). Of these, the apau useya as well as the niyatalaukika
nāmakāvas convey only those meanings for which there exists a Dīpakāra's refutation of Iśvarakārapavāda is of some significance
convention (sailketa). and contains material not found in AKB. Dīpakāra points out that if
indeed a unitary, eternal God were to be the cause of the production,
The use of the term "apauruseva" for the nāmakāyas which
continuation, and destruction of the universe, then, since effect must
convey the Buddhist categories of factors is significant. It reminds us of
the opapatikammia of the Theravādins and shows the direct influence of accord with cause, all these three effects would have to occur
the Mīmāthsakas. For the latter, the Vedas are apauruseva and eternal. simultaneously--a logical impossibility. This is neither observed to be so,
For the VaibhāŞika, the Buddha-vacanas (i.e., nāmakāvas) are nor is it advocated even by those who accept God as the creator. In
apauruseva, but not eternal. addition. if this were so, the world would also be without any diversity,
since its creation would take place just as the Lord Siva (the symbol of
It appears from the above discussion that the Vaibhāşika theory
of the nāmakāyas was a continuation and a development of an earlier destruction) wanders onto the scene, naked and carrying his begging-bowl
tradition represented in the form of nūma-paññaui in the Pāli Abhidharma skull. This also is not the case, and therefore God is not the cause of the
and Atthakathās. As in the case of many other prajiiiaptidharmas, the diversity of the world either--it is the karma of each individual that is the
nāmakāyas, etc. also came to be recognized by the Vaibhāśikas as cause.
dravvadharmas, and thus found a place in the dissociated factors It might be maintained by the opponent that the overlordship of
God in the matter of creation is proved because his existence is necessary
category. The lack of speculation on the nature of the Buddha-vacana in
the P51i tradition and its presence in the Vaibhāsika school suggests that to maintain the order of the world, just as a village headman is not a
creator, but maintains order in his village. This is rejected, because of
this was a later development brought about by a certain influence of other
schools, particularly the Mīmāmsakas and the Vaiyākarapas, who, the following faults: dependence upon others, nonetemality (i.e.,
impermanence), and the ability of others to hinder one's power.
although for different reasons, had a primary interest in the problems of
Moreover, the idea that anything at all could exist eternally, as is
words and their meanings. The Vaibhāşikas seem to have benefitted from
the arguments of the early Sphotavādin Grammarians. alleged in the case of God, has been rejected by the Buddha in his
But the
Mīmārhsakas seem to have exercised a far greater influence on them, as utterance in the Gomayapindopamāsiitra (the Dīpakāra no doubt is
552 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADIPA-V IBHASAPRABHA V RTTI 553

referring to the Gomayapindasutta, Saripndtanikāya iii.142), where the experienced as happy and unhappy feelings respectively at the level of
Lora states there has never been a being even as small as a lump of desire. A question therefore is raised as to whether feeling, namely
,owdung who was eternal. vedanā alone. is the result of actions. In answer to this, the Dīpakāra
'
Moreover, God cannot be the creator of the universe, since even says that the word "vedanā here is used only' to denote the most
those who believe in him still censure him. It is well known that the important element of karmas and should not be considered as their sole
Bhāgavatas (i.e., Vaiśpavas) censure Siva (whom the Saivites claim to be result. Instead, the words "happy feeling" or "unhappy feeling" should
God), while the Māheśvaras (i.e., Saivites) censure Vişnu (whom the be taken as referring to the totality of the four mental aggregates. The
Vaiśpavas consider to be God). Therefore, God cannot be considered the Dīpakāra here mentions the Dārśtāntikas by name and says that according
overlord of the world. to them, vedand alone is maturation. Moreover they also maintain that
It might be maintained that God relies upon causes for the volition alone is karma. By contrast the Dīpakāra says that for the
production of the universe but creates the universe nonetheless through Abhidharmikas all five aggregates are causes of karma, as well as the
the majesty of his own austerities. Just as a potter produces his wares effects thereof. The statement that the Dārśtāntikas, who are considered
through his own creativity but still makes use of clay and the wheel, so a variety of the Sautrāntika, believed that a single aggregate, namely the
too does God create the world by his own majesty while still making use volition and the feeling respectively, was the cause and effect of karma,
of the efficient causes (sahakārikārana). This is rejected, however, is not attested elsewhere.
because this would make God--who is claimed to be unitary, eternal and The next important discussion pertains to one of the three mental
independent--actually dependent on factors other than himself. Such a actions called wrong view (mithyādrsti). It is maintained by the
being surely could not be considered self-sustained—the meaning of the Abhidharmikas that when this wrong view attains to its highest grade it
word iśvara". By this same argument is refuted such theories as that the is capable of destroying even the most subtle of the good roots. In this
cause of the universe is either time or the purusa and prakrti of the connection, Dipakāra examines Kośakāra's view, which apparently was
Sādikhyas. identical to that of the Sautrāntikas. The Kośakāra, in the second
The opponent might reply that if the cause of the diversity of the kuśasthāna, had debated this point in connection with the dissociated
world is karma and not God, then why would it be that the world factor called "possession " (prāpti), and had maintained therein that
commonly acknowledges God, time, and so forth as being the creator? whereas all defilements or bad factors are totally eradicated by the
To this the Dīpakāra responds (verse 157): " It is the power of karman transcendent path, the good roots were never entirely destroyed by any
that is expressed by such notions as fate (vidhi), time, and the planets defilement. In this connection he had stated that the subtle seeds of the
(i.e., astrology). Therefore, that word " karman" can be applied to those good factors may be injured by wrong view, but they persist and will
notions in a secondary manner. " As it was also said elsewhere: " Fate, grow strong again should appropriate conditions present themselves. This
destiny, rule, nature, time, astrology, God, action, chance, merit, fortune, is patently the Sautrāntika view. 'h0 The Dipakāra finds this view
and inevitable result and chance: all these are synonyms of deeds done unacceptable and declares that wrong view is the root of all bad factors
previously." and is capable of destroying all forms of good roots, even those which
Moreover, it has also been said, "The conjunction of the planets, are considered "innate " . Having stated this "Saugata" view and having
the quivering of the shoulders, dreams, a full pitcher, etc.--all these mentioned Kośakāra by name, Dīpakāra rejects it on the grounds that it
merely foretell to men the maturation of their own actions." Thus, the is contrary to both reasoning and scripture: "It is opposed to reasoning
term " karman" may be employed in all these cases as well. because it violates the law of homogeneousness: to maintain that good
Returning to the problem of karma itself, we may note an roots will grow in the presence of wrong views is to admit that one can
important statement found in the ADV but not in the AKB concerning the get rice grains from barley seeds, or that wrong views can result even
attribution of a certain doctrine to the Dārśtāntikas. It has been generally when an aspirant has listened with careful attention to true teachings.
maintained that the results of meritorious and demeritorious actions are Moreover, two things which are opposed to each other, as for example,
554 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADIPA-V IBHASAPRABHA V RTTI 555

light and darkness or happiness and unhappiness, are never seen arising respectively to the 8rāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and the Buddha)."
together. This view is also contrary to scripture, wherein it is stated Therefore, the Dīpakāra declares: The Bodhisattva path is not outside of
unequivocably that wrong view totally destroys the good roots, and hence the Sūtra, Vinaya and the Abhidharmapitaka. Anyone who should assert
a person holding a wrong view comes to be called samucchinnakuśala- that the Bodhisattva doctrine is outside these pitakas must surely be
mīda." considered as one speaking the words of Mara." The Dipakara further
Although Dipakara does not put forth any new arguments in supports his statement by quoting the scriptural passage which states that
defense of the Abhidharmika view, he certainly draws attention to a most one should declare those words which are not to be found in the Sūtra or
glaring contradiction which the Sautrāntika, in maintaining his hīja the Vinaya. and which go against the established law (dharmata7, to be
theory, cannot easily resolve. spurious, and the reverse (that those words which appear therein are truly
The last section (pāda) of the fourth chapter, which is completely the words of the Teacher). He further qualifies this statement by
preserved, is of great importance, as it deals with the Bodhisattva claiming authenticity only for those scriptures, namely the four Agamas,
doctrine. This topic is conspicuously absent from the Pāli Abhidharma which were compiled by such Elders as Mahākāśyapa and Ananda, and
literature. and even in the AKB it receives only scant attention. The the contents of which were entered into the Udanagathas.
Kośakāra introduces the Bodhisattva topic in the course of a discussion The statement that the Bodhisattva doctrine is part of the Pitaka
on the miantarrakarrna, deeds which result in immediate rebirth in hell. teaching and that the highest form of that Bodhisattva path leads to the
It is the Vaibhāśika view that killing a predestined Bodhisattva is such an attainment of the enlightenment of the Buddha is highly significant. Such
act. In this context a question is raised as to the point at which a person a claim was undoubtedly meant to repudiate the Mahayana assertion that
comes to be designated as a Bodhisattva. This problem is then discussed one cannot attain Buddhahood through the teachings of the Pitakas.
in the Kośa in verses 108-111ab. In contrast, the Dīpakāra devotes While discussing the nature of bodhi in the sixth Chapter, the Dīpakāra
almost the entire fourth pāda to this question, and fills in a great many returns once more to this topic and makes the bold assertion that the
details not found in other Abhidharma texts. Having declared that an entire Buddha teachings consisting of the 37 bodhipaksyadharmas is
aspirant eams the designation Bodhisattva only after having reached the Mahāyāna, but is divided into three parts, namely the Buddhayana, the
anirarh'a stage, i.e., the stage of nonreturn. the text then enumerates the Pratyekabuddhayāna and the Srāvakayāna, merely because there are such
32 marks of a great person (mahāpurusalakvaga), as well as the 80 qualitative grades among those who practise the path. To the best of our
amnryaGjanas, the physical characteristics which distinguish a Buddha knowledge, the term "Mahayana " is not attested anywhere else in the
'
from other beings. The Dīpakāra then takes up a very important polemic non-Mahayana texts other than the ADV. The Dīpakāra s attempt to
against those heretics whom he describes as "those whose minds have equate the Vaibhāśika school of Buddhism with Mahāyāna as he
been banished from the words of the Buddha," and who consequently understood it is certainly novel and noteworthy. It may be noted that
there is no reference to the word "Hinayana made by the Dīpakāra. We
"
maintain that the Lord did not teach the Bodhisattva path in the
will never know if he was indeed unaware of the term "Hinayana , or
Tripitakas. thereby suggesting that this path was outside the purview of "
"
the Ahhidharma. He confronts these heretics and labels their view merely chose to ignore it while he appropriated the word "Mahayana for
erroneous, because "The Lord has from his own mouth declared the the Pitaka teachings.
following factors which constitute the causes leading to the attainment of The remaining three Chapters of the ADV cover more or less the
enlightenment, namely the three meritorious actions, the four adhisthānas, same topics that are dealt with in the .4KB. The only noteworthy section
the seven .saddharn:as, the seven yogas, the three aggregates, the three where the Dīpakāra 's treatment differs considerably from that of the
trainings, the four perfections (as enumerated in the Vinayapitaka), as Kośakāra is to be found in the fifth Chapter devoted to a debate over the
well as the 37 bodhipakfradharmas. (For details on these items, see ADV reality of past and future aggregates, the central doctrine of the
p. 196. notes 1-8.) These lead to the attainment of enlightenment which Sarvastivada Abhidharma. Here too the Dīpakāra stays close to the
is of three grades, the lowest, the middle and the highest (corresponding Vaibhāśika arguments as put forth by the Kośakāra in the AKB but
556 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMADIPA-VIBHASAPRABHAVRTTI 557

introduces a few new points not found in other Ahhidharma texts. His two terms and denounced them as false doctrines comparable to the
description of the four schools within the fold of Buddhism is certainly Sātitkhya doctrine of an eternal self (purusa). Moreover he also shows
novel: (1) the Sarvāstivādins declare that factors exist in all three times; a good deal of acquaintance with the Madhyamika śñnyavūda school,
(2) the Vibhajyavādins (meaning probably the Theravādins) and the whose members he labels as Vaitulikas. According to him, the Vaitulika
Dārştāntikas (i.e., the Sautrāntikas) declare that the present and only a imagines the following: "That which is produced by the coming together
portion of the past and future exist; (3) the Vaitulikas, characterized as of causes does not exist by its own nature." Elaborating on this statement
ayogatāśūnyavādins (the Mādhyamika?) maintain that no factor exists in the Dipakāra says: "That which is devoid of its own nature and is devoid
any of the three times; (4) the Paudgalikas (i.e., the Sammitīyas) are of a self, and is brought into existence by depending upon causes, that
characterized as avyākrtavastuvādins, who hold the view that the pudgala truly does not exist by its own nature. For it could not be considered to
exists as a reality. Of these four (Buddhist) schools, says the Dīpakāra, be abiding severally within the various causes which produced it, nor
only the first one, the Sarvāstivādin, is the speaker of the truth, as his within the totality of the causes, nor anywhere else. And that which does
words are consistent with reasoning and scripture. As for the other three, not abide anywhere--how could such a thing be said to emerge with its
the Dārştāntika, Vaitulika and the Paudgalika, the Dipakāra declares that own nature. And that which is devoid of its own nature--how could such
these should be relegated to the respective company of the Lokāyatika a thing even be described as existent? Therefore all factors are devoid
(Materialist), the Vaināśika (Nihilist), and the Nagnāta (Naked Wanderer). of self, that is, of their own nature, and , are comparable to the wheel of
Dīpakāra's identification of the three non-Sarvāstivāda schools with the a firebrand."
three non-Buddhistic schools is significant. It is especially remarkable The Dīpakāra condemns this as an absurd statement, and proceeds
when we consider that this is probably the first Buddhist text which has to reassert the Vaibhāşika view that factors exist in all three times
identified the Paudgalikas with the Nagnatas, a term which in the context endowed with their own nature, but that they depend upon the chain of
of the doctrine being discussed must refer to the Digambara Jainas, whose causes for the manifestation of their activity and the changing of their
doctrines of syādvāda and changing soul offer many points of similarity mode, namely their passage from the state of future to present, and then
with that of the avyākriapudgala of the Sammitiya. to past.
The Dīpakāra discussion proper on the validity of the doctrine of In this connection he even quotes Bhadanta Kumāralāta, a
three times does not vary significantly from that of the Vaibhāşika renowned Dārştāntika, according to whom the three times doctrine is
position appearing in the AKB. Dipakāra is vehement in his opposition described by the following example: "Particles of dust are to be found on
to the Sautrāntika position, and now and then makes a few observations both sides of a beam of light entering through a window. But, whereas
which appear to be unique to this text. For example, in his examination the dust in the beam is visible, the dust on either side of the beam is not
of the Sautrāntika position that even a nonexistent entity can become the seen but can only be inferred. Thus is explained the existence of factors
object of consciousness, and that hence past and future factors can in the past and future. (That is, these two aspects of the factors are
become objects without necessarily being real, the Dīpakāra quotes inferred, whereas their present aspect is visible.) However, the sages,
certain sūtras in rejection of this theory and states: "The sūtras uphold a having attained to supematural knowledge, perceive all three aspects (and
middle path: compounded things (sarhskāra) are in some respects empty, hence the factors exist in all three times). "
i.e., devoid of such false imputations as purusa, ālayavijñāna and It should be noted that this view of the Dārstāntika Kumāralāta
abhūtrioarikalpa, etc. They are also nonempty in some respects, i.e., with is certainly not in keeping with the acknowledged view of the
reference to their own characteristics, or their universal characteristics. " Sautrāntika, as known to us through both the AKB and ADV. Nor is this
Although it would he reasonable to assume that the Abhidhar- view ascribed to Kumāralāta attested elsewhere. One would have
mikas were well acquainted with the doctrines of ālayavijñāna and expected the Dīpakāra to examine the significance of this example, but
abhūtaparikalpa, the twin doctrines of the Vijñānavāda school, the unfortunately the quotation stands without any comment.
Dipakara seems to be the only Abhidharmika to have recognized these The Dīpakāra's treatment of the Vaibhāşika doctrine of three
558 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES BUDDHABHUMIVYAKHYANA 559

ti mes does take into account the Sautrāntika objections as fully laid out
"
Wisdom in Yogācāra Thought (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980),
by Vasubandhu in the fifth Chapter. Barring a few minor points such as contains a translation of a Chinese work attributed to a Bandhuprabhā, the
the distinction between the nominal and the real or the definition of Sanskrit title of which is Buddhabhūmyupadeśa. In Tibetan there is a
function (kāritra), Dīpakāra 's contribution to this discussion cannot be parallel text, titled Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, attributed to īlabhadra.
considered as having broken any new ground. The conclusion of the Keenan has determined that about one-half of Bandhuprabhā'.s text is
discussion is however of some interest, as the Dīpakāra uses this occasion identical with ilabhadra's, with the other half being taken almost entirely
to condemn the Kośakāra once more for his alleged inability to from Dharmapala's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and inserted in appropriate
understand the Vaibhāśika viewpoint. The Dīpakāra undoubtedly has the places in the original Sanskrit test of Silabhadra's work. Keenan translates
'
Kośakāra in mind when he says: "Here the Vaitulika, an apostate from Bandhuprabhā s text in his unpublished dissertation, indicating those
the Sarvāstivāda, asserts, We too imagine the existence of three
'
sections which were originally writtten by īlabhadra. The summary by
'
characteristics similar to the Vaibhāśika doctrine of three times. the Editor provided below is based on Keenan's translation from the
'
The Dīpakāra s rejoinder to what appears to be the Vaitulika, that Chinese of those portions he indicates correspond to the passage
is the Mahāyāna, doctrine as put forth by Vasubandhu in his contained in the Tibetan.
Trisvabhāvanirdeśa does not provide any meaningful discussion but
merely expresses his hostility to the Kośakāra. For he says: "The world Introduction
is pervaded by such imaginings which can delight only foolish minds, but The Buddhabhūmisūtra deals with five factors: the pure
that theory which can capture the minds of the learned is a rare one dharmadhātu, the knowledge of the mirror (ādarśanajñāna), the
indeed. The three-nature theory entertained by you has already been knowledge of evenness (samatd), reflective (pratyaveksa) knowledge, and
refuted. False doctrines similar to this should also be rejected. This is the knowledge that dharma has been fulfilled.
one more occasion where the Kośakāra has demonstrated his confusion
regarding the doctrine of times. " (ADV p. 282) Part One: Why This Teaching is Given
1.1 There are four kinds of meaningful language: (1) analogical,
as in "monks are like treasures", (2) exhortations as to how one should
186.ŚILABHADRA (580), Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna conduct oneself, (3) answers to questions, (4) temporizing. How many
" ilabhadra, according to Hsiian-tsang, belonged to the family of of these are involved when a sūtra is spoken? Some say only one, others
the king of Sarhtata and was of Brahmans caste. Having travelled widely two; others still say that all are.
in India, improving his store of learning, he came at last to Nālandā Explanation of the introductory words of the Buddhabhūmisūtra.
where he met Dharmapāla and expressed to him a wish to be his disciple. 1.2 This passage of the sūtra, which is found in several texts
About that time Dharmapāla had received a challenge to a disputation including the Samdhinirmocanasūtra and the Mahāyānasoritgraha,
with a heretic of South India and the king had asked him to accept it. He describes the perfection of the land of the Buddha, comprised of eigheen
proceeded to the venue along with his disciples, Śīlabhadra being among kinds of plenitude: of his form of appearance, his beauty, his extent, his
them. Śīlabhadra asked his master to allow him to hold the disputation locations, his causes, his effects, his supremacy, his entourage, his retinue,
himself and his request was granted. At the time he was only thirty years his sustenance, the effects of his actions, the benefits he provides, his
of age. The heretic was defeated and the king pressed on him a fearlessness, his abode, the paths of his lords, his vehicles, his doors and
substantial reward for his scholarhips which the latter at first refused, but his support.
finally accepted on the king 's insistence. With the money awarded, he 1.3 The Buddha 's complete enlightenment is extolled as involvng
""'
built a monastery near Nālandā. 21 aspects.
'
John P. Keenan s doctoral dissertastion titled "A Study of the 1.4 The merits of the Buddha's disciples described.
Buddhabhūmyupadeśa: the Doctrinal Development of the Notion of 1.5 Objection: Those seekers who have achieved the state of
560 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES BUDDHABHUMIVYAKHYANA 561

adepts will automatically escape from bondage--so why does the Buddha 2.6 Dharma-fulfilment knowledge realizes the magical body
teach them the dharma all over again? (nirmānakāya) of the Tathāgata, his spiritual powers, powers of rebirth,
Answer: So that they will turn toward enlightenment. manifesting karmic results, the joy of speech providing assistance and
Objector: But what is it they lack that leads them to seek explanation, etc.
enlightenment?
Answer: Seekers lack the happiness of full wisdom (sambodhi). Part Three: The Practice Based on the Teaching
But in this state of enlightenment short of full wisdom, though they have 3.1 Bodhisattvas as well as a Buddha can experience wisdom.
attained uncalculated cessation, they can still, through the power of their 3.2 Four verses from the Mahāyānasūtrālaritkāra are recited by
vows, remain embodied and gradually turn toward full realization. the Buddha to explain the pure dharmadhātu. They provoke extended
1.6 The merits of Bodhisattvas. discussion.

Part Two: The Content of the Teaching

2.1 The five factors that comprise enlighenment explained. Does GUNAPRABHA (580)
an enlightened one see images'? There are different opinions: (I) No, an This author apparently specialized in Vinaya given the works
enlightened person sees things directly unmediated by images (i.e., preserved in Chinese that are attributed to him. Bu-stoń refers to him as
without marks (animitta or nirākāra). (2) Yes, they see images with an authority on Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, while Hstian-tsang makes him
marks, but they are not attached to them, which is what is meant by originally a Mahāyānist who later converted to Hinayana.
calling them animitta. (3) Consciousness that is constructionfree has no
images, but the subsequent awarenesses (pr;ctalalabha) do have contents.
'
The Alambanaparīksā does not say that just because there are no images 187.GUNAPRABHA, Vrtti on Asańga s Bodhisattvabhūmi
of atoms there no objects at all. Rather, the enlightened one's pure mind In the Encyclopedia of Buddhism 3.2, 1972, pp. 236-237 we find
has pure seeds that appear as if they were contaminated objects but are a description of this work from which we quote below, omitting the
actually not. This (3) is the correct view. But remember we are still Tibetan references. The work exists in Tibetan as No. 4044 of the
speaking from the conventional standoint, not the highest, which is Tengyur and No. 5545 of the Peking edition. The translators are named
beyond discursive thought and lacks both images and insights. as Jayaśīla and Dīpaitkaraśrījnāna. "The text is very long, containing nine
2.2 The pure darmadhātu is like empty space in reflecting all chapters. They are as follows:--
sorts of forms. Though it has no form both it and space are pure, inactive, (1) The method of the earliest step of meditation of the
unconditioned by birth or death or increase or descrease, without Bodhisattvabhūmi.
movement, eternal, unfrustrating, etc. (2) The arising of the bodhicitta.
2.3 The mirror wisdom, like a mirror reflecting all sorts of (3) The advantages (thereof) for oneself and for others.
images, is itself unreflected, free from obstacles as a clean mirror is free (4) The method of meditation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi.
from dust, reflecting images that move and act but not itself moving or (5) The power of meditation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi.
acting, omniscient, omnipresent. (6) The complete perfection of the meditation of the
2.4 Evenness knowledge has ten kinds of marks corresponding to Bodhisattvabhūmi.
ten stages. (7) The method of meditation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi.
2.5 Reflective knowledge has kinds of causal activity: to support (8) The eightfold ways of meditation.
spells and concentration, causing ideas to arise, causing delight, (9) The method of giving."
discernment, experiencing, the five destinies, the desire, material and
immaterial levels, dharma, suppression of Māra, and the ending of doubt.
562 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES PAÑCASKANDHAKAVIVARANA 563

188.GUNAPRABHA, Vivarana on Vasubandhu's (p. 30, 5.1 if). All four material elements take part in the genesis
Pañcaskandhaka of a sentient being.
The Tibetan translation is found at Peking/Tokyo Tibetan (p. 31, 1.2) Though Gupaprabhā does not explain the nature of
Tripitaka volume 114, pp. 2942. References in the summary below are sentient materiality, he states in the case of the eye that it is the
to this translation. Some passages are translated and discussed in Brian brightness covering the pupil of the eye, and that it is absolutely
Galloway, "A Yogācāra analysis of the mind, based on the Vijñāna necessary for the arising of a visual consciousness. Whereas the sentient
section of Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaprakarapa with Gupaprabhā 's materialities connected with the other sense-organs cover only a portion
commentary", Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies of these organs, the sentient materiality related to body and touch
3.2, 1980, pp. 7-20 pervades the whole body.
(p. 32, 1.2) Quotes an ancient Tripitaka sūtra to show that the
Summary by Stefan Anacker idea of manifest and unmanifest action are already in the Sūtrapitaka.
(p. 32, 2.6 ff.) Gupaprabhā makes subdivisions of feelings:
(p. 29, 2.5). Gupaprabhā states that an exact determination (1) basic: pleasure, suffering, or indifference felt by the eye,
(vibhakti, vibhdga) of momentary phenomena is the main aim of etc., with contact,
Abhidharma, particularly as regards the question as to which are good, (2) by essential nature: satisfaction, frustration, indifference,
bad, and neutral Both their particular characteristics (svalaksana) and (3) compounded: when experienced together with material
their general characteristics (sāmānyalaksana) are to be discussed. and immaterial aggregates,
(p. 29, 4.2). Why are the aggregates always enumerated in the (4) defiled when connected with thirst,
order they are? Materiality is enumerated first because it is the most (5) conducive to alleviation: all those involved in a path
manifest, because it is the support of the five sensory consciousnesses, conducive to the elimination of frustration.
and an object of consciousness also for the sixth, or mental (p. 32. 3) Gives as reason for the category " immeasurable cogni-
consciousness. Feelings, after materialities, are most manifest, and are tion" the fact that cognitions of "immeasurability, " or of "ocean, " " space,"
important for the entire sentient world. Cognitions inform the etc., can arise.
consciousnesses, and present them with the "signs" for determining (p. 32. 5) Beginning of discussion of why, among motivating
events, thus they are the next manifest. The motivating dispositions are dispositions dissociated from consciousness, only feelings and cognitions
already less manifest, though they color all of experience. Consciousness, are counted as separate aggregates. Feelings and cognitions are the root
being the most subtle, is numbered last. of disputes and the motivating cause for the world. For the root of any
(p. 29, 5.1 ff.) There is also a causal reason for this enumeration. dispute may be connected either with desires, or with views. The reason
Feelings are linked to the materiality of an aggregate-series, and these why cognitions may be given as a causal motivator for the world, is that
feelings in turn condition cognitions. But once cognitions are fixed, false views, such as the view of self in a body, are causes for the
motivating dispositions arise (since motivating dispositions arise only in continuation of samsāra.
regard to phenomena distinguished by signs). Motivating dispositions in (p. 33) Sometimes adds phrases (which seem akin to Asańga,
turn are the chief impellers of consciousness. Abhidharmasamuccaya) to Vasubandhu 's definitions,, but in general, has
(p. 30, 2.3), States that Vasubandhu gets his definition of little new to say on these.
materiality from the sutras. (p. 34) Long discussions of which motivating dispositions are
(p.30, 4.5). The reason why space is never listed as a material predominant in a Buddha.
element in any Buddhist work (in contrast to Vaiśeşika, for instance) is (p. 39, 4.1) States that the characteristic of consciousness is the
that the material elements must be causally produced in a causal knowledge of an object of consciousness.
sequence. This is not the case with space, which is eternal. (p. 39, 5.1) But finally reduces objects of consciousness to seeds
 YAŚOMITRA 565
564 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
Abhidharmakośa and the Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur
of consciousness, as does Vasubandhu in Vitñśatikā 9, and regards the (Stuttgart 1991), pp. 38-42. Mejor cites a number of opinions, concluding
internal processes of traces being more important than any inferentially for a date a bit later than ours, but noting that Andre Bareau and Etienne
deduced object-stimulus.
Lamotte in private communications expressed their agreement with the
(p. 40, 1.1). The storehouse-consciousness is regarded as the
dating decision made here.
cause of all motivating dispositions entering into affliction.
(p. 40, 1.2) There are two aspects to the store-consciousness:
causal and resultant. The "causal" aspect is the equivalent to impression.
190. YAŚOMITRA, (Sphutārtha) Vy5khyet on Vasubandhu's
The "resultant" aspect is the equivalent to karmic maturation. These
Abhidharmakośa (580)
karmic retributions arise because of the impressions left by former
volitions. Summary by Stefan Anacker
(p. 40, 2.1 f .) Develops the inferential arguments for the
existence of the store-consciousness in a manner quite akin to the This work of profound elegance is the only favorable commentary
Karmasiddhi's: the six consciousnesses are suspended in the attainment
on the Kośabhāsya to survive in Sanskrit. Yaśomitra explains difficult
of cessation: there must be some other consciousness to account for the
passages of the Kośabhāsya, but also defends it against attacks by
continuity of consciousness, and this consciousness must exist even in the '
Satńghabhadra and others, and often adds his own discussions and
attainment of cessation. "
solutions. In these, he is very "Sautrantika, not alluding to later
(p. 40, 2.7) The author equates the store-consciousness to a
Yogācāra solutions of Vasubandhu re: psychic continuity, and sometimes
support of the seeds, in contrast to Vasubandhu who often (Karmasiddhi
even defending definitions of the Kośa (cf. summary at I, 11) which
39, Tritńśikā 18) equates the storehouse-consciousness to the seeds. Vasubandhu rejected in works such as the Pañcaskandhaka, though
(p. 42) Spells out in detail the categorizations Vasubandhu makes
Yaśomitra is quite familiar with this latter work, and quotes it frequently.
for the sense-fields.
Yaśomitra has quite independent opinions on a number of subjects.
(p. 42, 4.4-6) According to Guñaprabhā, the last two sentences Aside from such passages of philosophic interest, Yaśomitra has also
of the Pañcaskandha refer to the terms sabhāga and tatsabhdga A
much information of interest to the history of Indian philosophy. There
material organ such as the eye may exist without its corresponding are summaries below of passages of both types.
consciousness--in that case, the eye is called tatsabhāga.
I, 3: As proof that the Abhidharma is not the word of the
Buddha, he cites the authors of the books of the Sarvāstivāda
Abhidharma: Kātyāyanīputra for the Jñānaprasthāna, Vasumitra for the
I89.UPASENA (580), Saddhammappajotikā on the Niddesa
The author "himself states that he wrote the work at Prakarapapāda, Devaśarman for the Vijñānakāya, Śāriputra for the
Anuradhapura in the 26th year of the reign of king Siri-Sańghabodhi, Dharmaskandhaka, Maudgalyāyana for the Prajñaptiśāstra, Pūma for the
Dhdtukdya, and Mahākauśthila for the Sañgītiparyāya.
whose dates are disputed. He probably lived about the middle of the sixth
He defines the Sautrāntikas as those who follow the sūtras and
century A.D..Buddhadatta concludes that Siri-Sańghabodhi is Aggabodhi
I, who came to the throne c. A.D.554. This would give a date around not the śāstras.
"
He defines satitskŗta as "engendered by causes and
' "
I, 4:
A.D. 580 for the completion of' this work.
conditions. "
On the question why all conditioned events except those taking
part in the Noble Path are contaminated he quotes Gunamati, who asks
YAŚOMITRA (580)
how this can validly be said, since all factors are supporting objects of
A discussion of the date of this author, about whose life etc. we '
consciousness for contaminants. Yaśomitra replies that Gunamati s
have no information, is contained in Marek Mejor, Vasubandhu's
 566 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPI-IUTARTHAVYAKHYA 567

opinion is not an interpretation conformable to the Abhidharma because of contaminants to arise in a series.
space and calculated cessation are never in the state of being supporting I, 5: On the question as to what the three unconditioned factors
objects of contaminants. He quotes Kośa V, 14 as support of his claim. are, Yaśomitra cites the Vātsīputrīyas, who say that only nirvāna is an
According to some, Yaśomitra says, the supporting objects of the unconditioned factor
cessation path can arise as contaminants. All it takes is for there to be He cites the Sautrāntika opinion that space has only one
"
view of self and craving: as soon as these appear, their proclivities, which characteristic, "the lack of impinging materiality . He cites the
entail the possibility of the arising of yet other contaminants, also arise Vaibhāşikas as quoting a sūtra proving that space exists as a factor
just as there is the possibility of dust adhering rapidly to a wet cloth. (which the Sautrantika definition actually denies, since space for them is
Thus, in this sense, a state may be "not pure" until the higher states of the a mere absence), for when the Brāhmapas ask the Buddha about the
Path. When antidotes are made to arise, and in the Path leading to support of the Earth, the Buddha says it rests on the water-sphere, that in
liberation, there is finally a state where there is no more support for turn on wind-sphere, and that in tum on space, which is unbased on
contaminants, just as a foot can find no support on a heated rock. anything and thus needs no support.
Accordingly, there are two kinds of cessation path: worldly (where there I, 6: He makes a clear distinction between calculated cessation
are still contaminants developing) and transcendent. and uncalculated cessation, which relate to a series, and cessation by
Others again claim that as soon as satisfaction, frustration, and noneternality (anityatārirodha), which is the cessation of a
feeling which is neither one nor the other arise, contaminants, moment-factor.
noncontaminants, and a combination of both arise, so everything is both I, 7: States that this Kośa verse is now making a new kind of
contaminating or pure, or putting this another way, neither contaminating distinction (no longer the distinction contaminant and pure), namely, the
nor pure. distinction unconditioned/conditioned.
But in that case, Yaśomitra says, why would there be a category I, I1: Yaśomitra introduces here an elaborate defense of the
"
pure" at all? Or a category for those that are both contaminating and Kośabhāsya 's definition of unmanifest action against the criticisms of
pure? Yaśomitra says that the Vaibhāşikas make the distinction clear, Sathghabhadra, which are cited in tote, thus giving us the Sanskrit for
when they say that there are two kinds of residues of defilements: defiled these Nyāyānusāra passages. These are objections which prompted
and undefiled (cf. Kośa V, 32). According to this interpretation the eye, Vasubandhu himself to alter his definition in the Pañcaskandhaka, but
etc. and visibles, etc. are undefiled, but contaminated by contaminants. Yaśomitra endeavors to prove that the Kośabhāsya definition is at least
'
According to the Dārştāntikas, the eye, etc. and visibles, etc. of as good as Samghabhadrās own. To Samghabhadra s objection that
an arhat ' s series are pure, because of their state of being not being a Vasubandhu 's definition defines a series only, and thus cannot refer to a
support to contaminants. real moment-event, Yaśomitra replies that a stream of moment-events
The contaminated states are those where there is no antidote to (pravāha) is nothing but many moments. Since Vasubandhu says that
the contaminants: thus in this way the eye, etc., must be reckoned as both unmanifest action arises in one whose awareness is distracted (viksipta),
contaminated and pure, the Dārştāntikas claim. Sathghabhadra objects that the series of unmanifest action
Yaśomitra replies: There is a passage. which says that the pure exists in meditationally concentrated (samāhita) states, too. Yaśomitra"
' "
factors are the Truth of the Path and the unconditioned. Thus the eye replies that this is taken care of by Vasubandhu s clear and unclear
taking part in the Truth of the Path is pure (i.e. noncontaminating). The (śubhāśubha), and further makes an elaborate and sometimes humorous
Vaibhāşikas however claim that the eye, etc., is contaminating. But why ' " "
explanation of Vasubandhu s term "api" as meaning "too ( It arises in
should factors with such a low level of contaminants be called "
one of distracted awareness, too ), and not implying exclusivity, as
contaminating? Sathghabhadra wants to interpret the Vasubandhu passage.
'
Reply: Because contaminants may still adhere to them. Sarhghabhadra also states that Vasubandhu s definition does not
Yaśomitra is rather of the opinion that " contaminating" means the ability sufficiently differentiate a clear unmanifest action. Yaśomitra says this
 568 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 569

objection is worthless because one of the characteristics of an undistracted the atoms of an eye, etc., become common causes for the arising of a
awareness, namely its clarity, is covered by the term "clear. " consciousness, but not all atoms of the sense-object do. Futhermore, the
"
Furthermore, Samghabhadra's own definition of unmanifest action, that atoms of the sense-object "blue take part only in the arising of a visual
it is materiality exercising no resistance, which occurs even when the consciousness of blue, and not for a visual consciousness of yellow. And
originator-series is not functioning or in states beyond awareness, does even though atoms of "blue take part in the arising of a visual
not sufficiently distinguish the clear unmanifest actions either. consciousness of blue, they are reckoned in a different kind of position,
I, 17: He cites YogācārAs as saying that there is a mental because their manner of operating is unequal. For all these reasons, it
element (manodhdtu) beyond the six consciousnesses, and Tāmraparniyas would also be illogical that eye and visibles be considered a single
(the Theravādins of Ceylon) as upholding a material basis for psychic sense-field.
continuity, the heart (hrdayavastu). Vasubandhu has said that the "rūci" of the faculties is of three
He states that there are some awarenesses which do not become kinds. Yaśomitra explains: Those who are centered on peace have
"
mental" since they don't give rise to a mental consciousness. compressed rūci, those who are centered on peace and insight have
I, 19: He cites Satiighabhadra as arguing that the limitation of 18 middle rūci, and those centered on insight alone have extended rūci.
sensory domains (dhātu) is to show the minimum necessary for the I, 33: The sensory consciousnesses (one through five) do not
contain defining discrimination (abhinirūpanavikalpa), e.g., This is
" " "
consciousness to arise: thus one eye is counted, not two, etc. "
I, 20: He states that there are five kinds of cessation: momentary materiality, this is feeling, etc. All such distinctions are made by the
cessation; cessation brought about by a meditational attainment; mental consciousness.
2"'
spontaneous cessation, which exists in the unconscious states such as Vaibhāşika discussions of memory assume that memory has
certain god-states; calculated cessation; and uncalculated cessation. as its object only things previously experienced, but this, Yaśomitra says,
He makes a distinction between "the Bhadanta " quoted by does not take into account the definition of memory as a "discourse of
'
Vasubandhu and the Bhadanta Dharmatrāta (some commentators were of awareness" . He quotes Vasubandhu s Pañcaskandhaka without naming
the opinion that "Bhadanta" meant Bhadanta Dharmatrāta), says the latter it, giving its definitions of initial and sustained thought, of which
was a Sarvāstivādin, as the Vibhāsā tells us, but that the former WAs a Yaśomitra approves, thus giving us the Sanskrit for these passages. Thus
Sautrāntika, and is always quoted by the Vibhāsā as "Bhadanta." initial thought is for Yaśomitra, as for Vasubandhu in Pañcaskandhaka,
Yaśomitra includes a highly interesting discussion of which of the identical to either wisdom or volition. It is discernment if it involves a
sensory domains, sense-fields and aggregates are considered as real by deduction from the sense-impression; volition if it doesn't. Thus even the
various philosophers: sensory-consciousnesses have basic construction, which is initial thought.
Sautrāntika: Sensory domains (eye, visibles, visual consciousness, Thus it is proper to call the sensory consciousnesses constructionfilled
etc.) are real, the sense-fields (eye and visibles) by themselves are (savikalpaka). The only reason they are called constructionfree
nominal, and the aggregates by themselves are nominal. (nirvikalpaka) is because other kinds of construction do not exist in them.
"
Vasubandhu: Sensory domains and sense-fields are real, II, 1: He explains "papdaka in a different manner than La
aggregates by themselves are nominal. Vallee Poussin, as including all those whose powers of sexuality are lost,
"
Samghabhadra: Sensory domains, sense-fields, and aggregates are whether temporarily or permanently, mentions as subdivisions "pandaka
all real. by nature, through jealousy, where functioning is physically deficient,
Vibhāsā itself: Aggregates are nominal. Yaśomitra quotes where use of organs is simply not known, or where organs are lacking.
Vasubandhu to this effect. Il, 12: In commenting on Vasubandhu's statement that depression
Does the arising of an awareness depend on the atoms of the doesn't exist in the realm of images starting with the simpler meditational
sense-faculties or on the atoms of the sense-objects? Primarily, says states, because all causes of interpersonal worry are absent in these states,
Yaśomitra, it depends on the atoms of the sense-faculties, because all of Yaśomitra brings up the nine chief causes of interpersonal worry:
570 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 571

" " '

"someone has done me a wrong," someone is doing me a wrong, the path of vision is immediately followed by the path of cultivation,'
"someone will be doing me a wrong," " someone has done a wrong to and Haribhadra's comments on it. The fruit of a stream-enterer is gained
someone I like, " " someone is doing a wrong to someone I like," in moment sixteen. In this stage, five faculties of faith, energy,
"someone will be doing a wrong to someone I like, " "someone I don't mindfulness, meditational concentration and insight arise necessarily,
like has done me a favor," " someone I don't like is doing me a favor," because this stage is always beneficial. The stage of forbearance for a
"
someone I don't like will be doing me a favor." With these nine subsequent knowledge of the path is marked by equanimity, whereas the
grounds of interpersonal worry not existing in these meditational states, stage of subsequent knowledge of the path is where the five previously
there can be no object for interpersonal worry. named faculties, as well as the knowledge of what was unknown, the
II, 15: He lists gradual understanding (abhisamayakrama), which knowledge that one knows, the mental organ, and equanimity, are all
are the twelve moments of the path of vision: present.
1 forbearance (patience) necessary for the knowledge of dharma, II, 25: Follows Ghoşaka in admitting motivating dispositions
or a factor, in frustration: present in every moment of awareness (sarvatrAga).
2 knowledge of a factor in frustration; Sleepiness (styāna) is not listed among the motivating
3 forbearance necessary for the subsequent knowledge in dispositions invariably giving rise to defilements, because it may be
frustration; favorable to meditational concentration. This is the opinion of some
4 subsequent knowledge in frustration; Abhidharmikas, Yaśomitra says, but the Vibhāśā itself lists sleepiness
5 forbearance for the knowledge of a factor in the origination of among the motivating dispositions invariably giving rise to bad factors.
frustration; Yaśomitra himself is against the idea that one kind of factor can be
"
6 knowledge of a factor in the origination of frustration; classified in contradictory ethical categories in different circumstances.
' s statement that initial
7 forbearance necessary for subsequent knowledge in the II, 33: Yaśomitra backs up Vasubandhu
origination of frustration; thought and sustained thought cannot be situated in the same awareness-
8 subsequent knowledge in the origination of frustration; moment, since they are different stages in the same series. He also
'
9 forbearance necessary for the knowledge of a factor in the emphasizes further Vasubandhu s statement that initial thought is a less
cessation of frustration; subtle state, sustained thought a snore subtle one, and that these
10 knowledge of a factor in the cessation of frustration; descriptions are relative, by stating that grossness and subtlety are always
II forbearance for subsequent knowledge in the cessation of a matter of degree, e.g., feelings are subtle in relation to materiality, but
frustration; gross in relation to identifications.
12 subsequent knowledge for the cessation of frustration; Yaśomitra quotes Sarhghabhadra as objecting: In one awareness,
13 forbearance for the knowledge of an event in the path that there may be both grossness and subtlety. There is no contradiction in
leads to the cessation of frustration; this, because of the difference between the times of their predominance.
14 knowledge of a factor in a path leading to the cessation of E.g., there may be a series in which greed and confusion both exist, but
frustration; in one moment, greed is predominant; in the next, confusion.
15 forbearance through a subsequent knowledge of a path leading YaSomitra replies: But there is no special characteristic to
to the cessation of frustration; distinguish initial and sustained thought other than their grossness and
16 subsequent knowledge in the path. subtlety. They are series of the same kinds of factors, volition and
These sixteen moments are equivalent to the faculty of coming to know. discernment.
But the sixteenth moment is itself sixteenfold, and is the path of The "pūrvā dr.vas" (who in this case are both the Vibhāśā writers
cultivation and is the faculty of knowing, too. This differs a little from and Asańga--cf. Abhidharmasamuccaya, Pradhan ed., p. 10)-- deny that
the interpretation of the Abhisamayālamkāra, where the last moment of initial and sustained thought are the same kind of factor, and say that
 572 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES HYA
573
ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAK
these two are based on volition and discernment, rather than being strictly '
identifiable with them. of Sarhghabhadra s, which prompted Vasubandhu to speak of a separate
II, 36: Yaśomitra quotes a later Vaibhāşika, probably seed-series in the Karmasiddhiprakarana. Yaśomitra merely retorts that
"
Samghabhadra, who attempts to refute Vasubandhu's characterization of the definition of "seed" as "a special force shows that a "seed" is really
only a metaphoric designation. The difference between Vasubandhu's
a "seed" as a special force in the awareness-series, and who asks whether
"seed " and Sarhghabhadra s "possession lies in this, says Yaśomitra:
' "
this special force is something different from the awareness itself, or the Vasubandhu knows his "seed" to be a metaphor, whereas the Vaibhāşikas
same. If it is something different, this Vaibhāşika claims, then you are
want to speak of actual entities (dravyasat), not conventional ones
accepting our notion of possession (prdpti), and your dispute over it is
(prajñaptisat), and to introduce possession and nonpossession as actual
only a matter of words. If it is not something different from awareness,
entities .
then a bad seed would be coexistent with a good one, so the absurdity
R, 44: Note on the Bhadanta Vasumitra, stating that he wrote not
ensues of the commingling of all three ethical categories.
Yaśomitra replies: It's if one assumes that the seed is something only the Pariprcchd, but also the Pañcavastuka and other treatises.
II, 46: On the discussion of whether birth can be considered
different that there will be a commingling of the ethical categories. The
something apart, the Sautrāntika has objected that the birth of a factor is
seed is not to be spoken of as something either different or nondifferent always dependent on causes, and that arising has no efficacy, and is not
from the awareness itself, because of its being only a designation for
a factor at all. Yaśomitra cites a certain Bhadanta Anantavarman, who
something appropriated. And even if one does assume that it is
objects: "Even though the eye doesn't produce a visual consciousness
something nondifferent from the awareness itself, the flaw adduced by the without light being present, yet the eye is still a cause for the visual
Vaibhāşika doesn't exist, since as soon as a good awareness arises, a good
consciousness. " Yaśomitra replies: An injury to the eye can result in
seed does, too. This special awareness gets its power in the efficacy
blindness--thus the efficacy of the eye towards a visual consciousness is
effected by a good seed. Thus, though a good seed may arise from an
clearly demonstrated. However, it is not clear that "birth" does anything
awareness of any kind, its result will always be good. The " special" in which cannot be explained by other causes, i.e., the causes for arising!
the definition "special force" means that its efficacy is always
differentiated. In fact, Yaśomitra says, there is no difference between the II, 54: Vasubandhu states that there is a kind of act whose
retribution is included in a single sense-field, the sense-field of mentally
meanings of the words "Sakti," " hi]a," and "vdsand".
cognizables (dharmāyatana). This kind of act is any act which has as its
The Vaibhāşika (and here we obviously have to do with
Sarhghabhadra's opinions (cf. Nyāyānusāra chapter 51)) continues his retribution a life-force with its concomitants, which all belong to the
dharmāyatana. Yaśomitra cites the Bhadanta Vasumitra as objecting to
objections: If immediately after a contaminated awareness a pure
this opinion. Bhadanta Vasumitra says: A life-force is the result of an act
awareness may arise, does it arise endowed with force (iaktimdn) or which projects a new existence. If the retribution which brings about a
unendowed with force? If it is endowed with force, then is this force in
life-force matures at the level of desire one necessarily has a tactual-organ
the contaminated awareness itself contaminated or pure? Talk about the
element (karmendriya) and life-force in the first stages of embryonic life
commingling of the efficacies for forces--it would be rampant in this already: after the evolving of the six sense-fields in the embryo, five
case! If the awareness is not endowed with force, how can it be a
other sense-organs and five other mental organs (referring to the sensory
directly antecedent condition for the succeeding awareness? There must
consciousnesses) also evolve. If the life-force matures in the material
be yet another efficacy to the awareness different from this force. Also,
level of images there are seven organs from the beginning. In the
Vasubandhu does not seem to know the real characteristics of seeds, immaterial level), there is only the sense-field of mind and mentally
where seeds of such and such a sort always give results of such and such
a sort. And if a good awareness is stopped, a bad one (with a different cognizables. But at certain times in the imageless realm, there is no
sense-field of mind, and thus also no sense-field of mind which is
seed) would necessarily arise.
It is not clear that Yaśomitra completely answers these objections retributory. Now a life-force which arises as a result of an act which
projects a new existence is made known only through the sense-field of
574 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 575

mind. But can one really call a life-force itself the retribution which case prakrti becomes actually without efficacy. To assume a prakrti
ripens, when this life-force is in turn known only through feelings among other causes which can take care of arising of phenomena by
becoming manifest? Here someone may say: The life-force is not itself themselves is pure devotionalism. Ifprakrti takes care of everything, the
retribution unless the awareness born of retribution isn't functioning in other acknowledged causes have no efficacy. But if prakrti can exercise
that moment, however, where this retributory awareness isn 't functioning, its efficacy only when there are auxiliary causes (sahakdrakarana), then
it is the life-force itself which is responsible for the continuation of the "pradhāna " (chief) becomes an "apradhdna" (subsidiary). If one says
retribution in the series. that primary creation is the efficacy of prakrti, then since prakrti has no
Yaśomitra replies: It is true that it is the life-force which beginning, creation also can have had no beginning. If it is the character
constitutes retribution. But at the same time the life-force retributionally of prakrti to produce effects then it has to exercise this efficacy
matures, the sense-fields of mind, etc., also retributionally mature. This constantly, since it has no need of other causes. These other causes must
is consistent with the idea that retributional maturation takes place within themselves be the result of prakrti. Thus they are analogous to that
the sense-fields. which is manifested, and not to the manifestation. To accept other causes
Yet it has been said that there are acts whose retribution is at all would be for the theist to admit that the manifested has itself the
included in a single sense-field. If all the other sense-fields are included power to further manifest something, which isn't so according to his
in the process of retribution, how can one say this? system!
Yaśomitra replies: What is the problem with having other IV, 2b-3b: He cites "Sthavira Vasubandhu" and others as saying
sense-fields also enter into the process of retribution? For there is a that a flame ceases due to an absence of a cause of duration. It is the
'
coexistence of all kinds of elements for one retributional maturation: the Vaiśesika who objects that an absence cannot be a cause.
first is actually taking part in an organism, then the life-force, then the IV, 4a: He again makes the point that matter may be either
sense-fields of mind, etc. contaminated or pure. In an arhat matter is pure because it gives no
Here it may be objected: Just because of the necessity of basis for afflictions.
sense-fields arising when there is retribution, can one say that these IV, 23: There are manifest actions with the characteristic of
sense-fields are themselves retribution? No, for one-kind of effect should restraint of religious discipline until there is an abandonment of these
come from one kind of factor. In fact, then the sense-fields of whatever manifest actions through the casting away of religious discipline, etc.
type that arise may just as well be retribution also. Thus the aggregate-series is endowed with past manifest actions or their
Reply: No, because the sense-field of the eye can arise, for traces as long as they haven't been abandoned in this way. The manifest
instance, only when there is already the sense-field of the body. So it is actions involving lack of restraint are abandoned by the unmanifest
dissimilar to factors which could be called responsible for retribution in actions of restraint and resolution (e.g., the resolution of the prātimoksa),
every moment. and until they are abandoned in this way, the aggregate-series is endowed
Sarhghabhadra says that all sense-fields take part in retribution. with them. The manifest actions which are neither restraint nor lack of
For the life-force, homogeneity-force, etc., take place with a mutual restraint, such as revering a stūpa, etc., are abandoned when the force of
invariable concomitance. Thus they may all be considered a part of tranquility and the cutting of the force of the afflictions are abandoned,
retribution.
Both opinions (i.e., that only life-force is retribution, or that other
sense-fields are retribution, too) are upheld by the writers of the Vibhāsā.
1.This passage has encouraged many in the belief that there was
Thus one can follow whichever opinion one wants, Yaśomitra concludes. an earlier Vasubandhu. However, the point made here by "Sthavira
II, 64: If prakrti (pradhāna) were the cause of creation, then all
Vasubandhu" is precisely the point the Kośa wishes to make. Could the
things in the world would arise simultaneously. If one assumes other
term "Sthavira Vasubandhu" be interpreted to mean "Vasubandhu when
causes for a gradual arising, then an infinite regress results. Also, in that "
he was still a Hinayanist ?
576 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 577

and until they are abandoned in this way the aggregate-series is endowed Yaśomitra explains the efficacies of various defilements: Greed
with them. In other words, in the next moment the aggregate-series is engenders a fundamental malaise of susceptibility to harm, because it
necessarily endowed with an unmanifest action which corresponds to the gives rise to a lack of skill in dealing with adversity; hostility opposes
fundamental ethical or unethical manifest or unmanifest act preceding. good qualities; pride gives rise to disputes, because the wise are no longer
IV, 46: Yaśomitra explains the feelings accompanying the three respected; views make for a falling away from the good path, because
meditational states belonging to the realm of desires (i.e., the first three reversed opinions become predominant; doubts as to the truths, jewels,
meditational states may belong there): From the first and intermediate etc., increase the seeds for various untrue opinions which in turn produce
level to the second, there is bodily pleasure and mental contentment. In all the injustices of sari ra.
the second meditational state, mental contentment alone predominates, Yaśomitra sees greed as a sort of root-proclivity, and says that
whereas in the third, bodily pleasure has totally ceased and the pleasure when it exists, other adverse factors immediately spring up.
experienced is mental. V, 2: To the Vaibhāsikas, with their doctrine of the existence of
The only retributional actions (that is, actions which have an past and future factors, the residues and the defilements are equivalent,
ethical retribution) which exist without the initial factor for ratiocination thus the residues are afflictions; to the Vātsīputrīyas, residues are
(initial thought: fundamental discrimination-- " mental application") occur possessions; to the Sautrāntikas they are "seeds" or the potentialities for
in meditation. All other retributions] actions must be accompanied at new defilements arising, which are left behind by past defilements. Once
least by initial thought. these residues of defilements are eradicated, there is no more possibility
V, 1: In commenting on Vasubandhu's statement that the source for any afflictions of whatever kind to arise in the series. The
of rebirth is properly the proclivities or defilements, Yaśomitra says that Vātsiputrīyas, in affirming that the residues are possessions, must also
even in an arhat, it's not that the actions which he committed while he admit that they are motivating dispositions (traces) dissociated from
was still an ordinary person do not have an effect which is lasting in him awareness since possession belongs to this category. But in that case,
also, but rather that there are no residues that become capable of Yaśomitra says, how could they be associated with satisfaction,
producing a new rebirth. Thus the residues can be demonstrated to be frustration and neutrality, as a sūtra states they are? For them to be
'
nonlasting. linked to these factors, and yet be dissociated factors, would be illogical.
The effects of actions previously committed become But the Vaibhāśika opinion also has its problems, since the same sutra
nonefficacious towards the development of a new existence in the arhat. states that greed for desires (or for the level of desires) is eradicated
It is only the nonexistence of residues which makes release from rebirth together with its residues. If the Vaibhāśika view is correct, this would
possible. be redundant. Yaśomitra will of course in the final analysis accept
Yaśomitra explains how a residue of a defilement may make Vasubandhu's opinion, which is that the residues are not the same as the
other afflictions arise: greed will engender lack of shame, excitedness, defilements, that they are traces connected with awareness, and that they
selfishness, etc.; hostility will engender anger, envy, etc. are fundamentally "seeds".
He explains "bhava" in the dependent origination formula as V, 5: If one says that the supporting object of consciousness
meaning karma which can engender a new existence. associated with a residue of a defilement can be abandoned by the path
The residues intensify their own preparatory cause, which is of vision, does this also include an object of consciousness focused on the
improper mental attention. four noble truths? No, Yaśomitra says. what is abandoned are the
defilements which serve as objects of consciousness which can be
abandoned by the path of vision.
' Now if one says that a trace to be abandoned by the seeing of the
The significance of this statement rests on the fact that the truth of the origination of frustration is always a trace associated with
Sarvāstivādins wish to make the residues of actions eternal, which theory, ignorance, an object of consciousness which can be abandoned by the
according to Yaśomitra, would make the state of an arhat impossible.
 VYAKHYA
578 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOSA-SPHUTARTHA 579

other truths must also be included there, so does not the absurdity ensue He cites an unidentified Abhidharmika who objects to the idea
that such a trace can be abandoned by the other truths as well since all that all defilements which have a contaminated object are related to
of them have actually as their object of consciousness the five frustration. For some contaminated objects are unconnected to the truth
aggregates? No, Yaśomitra says: If it is in their aspect as origination of of frustration, but others are connected with it. Only those which are
frustration that the trace takes as its object of consciousness the connected with the truth of frustration can be abandoned by this truth.
aggregates, then it can be abandoned only by seeing the origination of For instance, attachment to rules and rituals can be abandoned only by a
frustration. knowledge of the truth of frustration, thus it is connected with frustration.
Because of the nonexistence of frustration on the material and the But a view such as "There is no path of deliverance proclaimed by the
immaterial levels there is the nonexistence of unpleasantness in these Buddhas, " gives rise to false views of other sorts, and all these can be
states because the unpleasant exists only in the feeling of frustration. But abandoned only by seeing the truth of the path, thus are connected with
sentient beings in these states are aggregate-series which adhere to the truth of the path.
complete calm, and there is an absence of retributional maturation (which Objector: But how can any object be connected with the truths of
would account for certain other kinds of frustration still existing) for the origination and cessation of frustration?
these states are devoid of unpleasant retributions. Samghabhadra affirms that attachment to rules and rituals can be
V, 6: In quoting Brahmajalasutta (Dīghanikāya I, 1) he shows abandoned by these two truths because of their establishing an absence
"
humorously how the idea of eternality of Brahma, or of one's being of ground for its "body " or "essence . The essence of attachment to rules
Brahmā oneself, may come from meditation where right views have not and rituals is to cling to the idea that that which is not a cause is a cause,
been assimilated. Such a meditator may wish others to worship him, and and to cling to the idea that that which is not the path is the path. For
at the same time consider himself to be the only true entity! Thus he is instance, a denial of the truth of origination may come about when one
actually still stuck in the level of desires since such false views are assumes a causeless origination simply because one doesn't know any
operative only in this realm. cause. But in reality there is in this case also no exclusion from the
V, 8: Yaśomitra states that the Yogācāras claim that there are truths of frustration and the origination of frustration. The idea of God
128 defilements or traces of defilements. There are ten abandoned by rests on the idea that there is no cessation, but with the knowledge of the
seeing the truth of frustration: the view of a self in the body, views truth of cessation this idea becomes meaningless: thus there is no
"
regarding the impermanence or the permanence of the elements occasion for the first of the items enumerated under the "essence of
constituting " personality", false views, adherence to views, adherence to attachment to rules and rituals. The other item cannot be abandoned by
mere rule and ritual, doubts, greed, aversion, pride, and ignorance. The seeing the truth of the path, because a Buddhist path is precisely what is
same ten are to be abandoned by seeing the origination of frustration, and being denied in this error. Thus this type of attachment to rule and ritual
the same ten by the truth of the cessation of frustration, and the same ten has to be abandoned by the truths of origination and cessation of
by the truth of the path--thus there are 40 to be abandoned by seeing the frustration, and not by the truth of the path.
truths. Six are abandoned by meditation: the unconstructed view of a self Yaśomitra replies: The truths of origination and cessation are
in the body (which is a spontaneous sense of self which has nothing to inadequate to remove attachment to rules and rituals. For the idea of
rules and rituals is to obtain liberation, thus it is the truth of the path
do with any intellectually formed opinion), the view that there is a
discontinuity, greed which is innate, aversion, pride, and ignorance--thus which serves as the best antidote for such confusion. Yaśomitra concedes
that some kinds of attachment to rule and ritual may be abandoned by
there are 46 residues on the level of desires. Forty-one of the same ones
exist at the material level --all of the preceding except the aversions (i.e., seeing the truth of frustration. For instance, an object of consciousness
the four kinds of aversions to be abandoned by each of the four truths, relating to the suffering caused by ascetic practises can be abandoned in
and the kind of aversion to be abandoned in meditation). The same 41 this way: for instance, the idea that the suffering of ascetic practises is
exist at the immaterial level, too, thus 46 + 41 + 41 = 128. itself praiseworthy. But as soon as there is an attachment to rules and
580 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 581

rituals which considers that which isn't the path to be the path, such an give rise to dejection since they cannot be associated with satisfaction.
attachment can be abandoned only by the Truth of the Path. Nor in fact is there any faculty for frustration in these states.
V, 13: He states that not all judgments which have a reversed V, 61: A difficulty arises from the Vaibhāşika thesis that a
object of consciousness belong to the category of views. For instance, a contaminant cannot be separated from its traces associated with
judgment which considers that what is not the self is the self belongs to awareness, but that it can be separated from its object in such a way that
the category of "the view of self in a body " . Only if the view becomes it can't arise again in relation to this object. Vasubandhu has objected
the basis for a sense of self is it " the view of self in a body," thus this that he can see how a future contaminant can be separated from its
category does not include views such as considering that Brahman is a object, but how can a past contaminant, according to the Vaibhāşikas an
being because this does not involve the view of a self. existent entity, be so separated, because the object which it takes stays in
V, 24-27: Though Yaśomitra completes Vasubandhu's sūtra the state of being the object of the contaminant, following all the
quotations and fills in certain other details, he adds little which is new to implications of Vaibhāşika theory. If the Vaibhāşika replies that the
these important discussions. expression "to be separated from its object" means "to be separated
V, 28: He states that that which is abandoned by seeing the through the complete knowledge of its object " , this wont do because,
truths is the essential nature of four aggregates, and that that which is according to the Vaibhāşikas, not all contaminants are abandoned by a
abandoned by meditation is the essential nature of five aggregates. Those knowledge of their objects.
that are abandoned by seeing the truths are the essential natures of Yaśomitra cites Sathghabhadra's attempt to resolve this difficulty:
" "
feelings, identifications, traces and consciousness, and what this means Contaminants have to be abandoned by separation from their objects
precisely is: feelings associated with residues of afflictions, etc. For because it is through the power of knowing the object that the
"
traces" this means dissociated factors of both consciousness and contaminant is abandoned. There are two kinds of traces of
associated mental factors such as birth, decrepitude, etc. The additional contaminants: those of association and those of nonassociation. The
kind of aggregate which is abandoned by meditation is of course matter, possessions of the traces which have as their object an associated thing,
both internal and external, which is susceptible to contaminants. and also those traces which don't have one but which are produced by the
V, 29-38: He goes into great detail on which residues are first kind of trace, exist in a series even when the series consists of
abandoned by which part of the path. uncontaminated awarenesses. For the possession continues, which is the
V, 42: He cites Sarhghabhadra as stating that envy and selfish-
effect of the past contaminant and the cause of the future contaminant.
ness must be considered fetters apart because of the intensity of their In the case of traces which do not have an actual associate or which have
functioning. Samghabhadra says they exist even in divine realms. an actual nonassociate it is also the present possession which is the cause
V, 56: He completes the information given by him at IV, 46 by of future contaminants. But the possessions of these traces is
stating that there are four consciousnesses operating in the first counteracted by the possession-series which enters into function with a
meditational state of the immaterial level, i.e., the visual, audial, tactile, path countering these traces. That is to say, the traces actually remain in
and mental consciousnesses. Joy is associated with the first three of relation to their objects, but they are no longer associated with the
these, satisfaction with the fourth. All four are associated with possession which is the cause and effect of the past and future traces:
equanimity. But after the first meditation of the immaterial level, there
thus one says that they are abandoned. When their object is not
is only the mental consciousness. In the second meditation of the
completely known, however, the possession of these traces continues.
immaterial level, there is satisfaction and equanimity; in the third, joy and Yaśomitra objects: In that case, why is it said that the
equanimity; and in the fourth, only equanimity. Some residues of contaminants are abandoned by the abandonment of their objects? To
contaminants may still exist in the beginning, but there will be neither state that this refers really to their being abandoned by complete
elation nor dejection because series in these states adhere to complete knowledge of their objects is an unwarranted extension of what the
peace. There will not be any regret or any other factors which would
Abhidharma says. They are in fact not abandoned by a complete
 ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 583
582 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
consciousnesses to the 4 material elements.) He quotes another sūtra
knowledge of their objects, but by a complete knowledge of the truths. which states that the cause of the sensory organs is karma, that the cause
It's also said that contaminants are abandoned directly by their antidotes,
of karma is craving, that the cause of craving is ignorance, and that the
for instance, those which can be abandoned by meditation.
cause of ignorance is improper mental attention. The truth of the
V, 63: He objects to Sarhghabhadra's opinion that " acquisition"
(siddhi) is a synonym for the attainment of (spiritual) fruitions. He states origination of frustration is understood only when this is realized. In
other words, it is not sensory pleasures themselves that give rise to
that the attainment of fruition is really an increase of the sense-faculties
frustration, but craving towards them, which in turn is due only to
and has reference to both the beginning as well as the concluding stages
ignorance, which in turn is due only to improper mental attention.
of this process, whereas "siddhi" is actually a synonym for the fulfillment '
of the antidotes. VI, 4: On commenting on Vasubandhu s statement that that
which is susceptible to decomposition is only conventionally existent, he
He explains Vasubandhu's statement that disconnection from the states that there are two kinds of decomposition: a pot breaks into pieces
contaminants takes place in six different moments by stating that one type "
through a forceful impinging; water, etc., is "broken into pieces by
of disconnection takes place after the immaterial meditational attainments One can also
mental analysis of its different constituents: its taste, etc.
are practised, but this does not mean that it may not be attained again in say that that which is conventionally existent can be divided into two
another moment. This is the disconnection from contaminants in those
categories: the conventionally existent which is based on another
of sharp sense-faculties. For them there is disconnection at these six
ti mes: at the time when there is the fulfillment of antidotes towards the conventionally existent (e.g., a pot, which is itself composed of
earth-elements, etc., which themselves are only conventionally existent),
contaminants to be abandoned by the truths, at the time when the fruit of
and the conventionally existent which is based on something existent as
the stream-enterer has been attained, at the time when the fruit of the
an entity (e.g., water, which is based on atoms). The first kind may
once-returner has been attained, at the time when the fruit of the
undergo either kind of decomposition; the second kind only"
non-returner is attained, at the time when arhatship is attained, and at the
"decomposition by mental analysis, otherwise known as "anyāpoha
"
time when the sense-faculties are made totally perfect. Yaśomitra further
(separating that which is different). It is true, Yaśomitra says, that even
elaborates these correspondences to show that when a certain acuteness
that which is conventionally existent in the second sense could still give
of sense-faculties has been attained, disconnections from contaminants
rise to further analyses, thus the atom on which water is based consists
may take place only at five, four, three, or two moments, i.e., at the
itself of eight elements (cf. Kośa II, 22), but these elements cannot be
minimum, it takes place either at the time of the fulfillment of antidotes,
separated out from the atom. On the two truths, conventional and
at the time of attaining arhatship, or at the time when the sense-faculties
ultimate, he quotes Nāgārjuna, Madhyamakakārikā XXIV, 8. He quotes
are perfected. "
VI, 3: He agrees with Vasubandhu that satisfaction truly exists, the Yogācāras as being the "ancient masters (pūrvācārya) cited by
Vasubandhu. '
and in fact defines the state of frustration as a transformation of
VI, 8: He explains craving towards existence and nonexistence
conditioned events experienced as satisfying. Furthennore, frustration is "
as follows: The wish "Would I were Indra! is craving for a certain kind
"
not a constant because it arises and ceases. It it is claimed that there is of existence; the wish "Would that I no longer exist after this life! is
no satisfaction because there is no occasion for the causes of satisfaction,
craving for a certain kind of nonexistence.
then there will also be no frustration either because there is also no VI, 19: Includes an elaborate description of which aids to
occasion for the causes of frustration. In other words, there is a sense to
the term " frustration" only if there is its opposite, satisfaction. He quotes
a .sūtra where the Buddha states that there are nine quintessences which
are unbroken, nondefective, pure, unaffected by disorders, which serve as
sources of satisfaction, and which arise from the seeds of the five sensory I.This term ("ancient masters") could, of course, mean simply
consciousnesses. (N.B. The figure 9 is arrived at by adding the 5 masters previous to Vasubandhu.
584 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 585

penetration belong to which level of existence and which kinds of which must be followed because the Vibhāsā itself continues with another
contaminants or afflictions may be removed by each part of the path. option: that a practitioner who enters into the path of vision in basing
VI, 21: Vasubandhu has said that noble persons lose aids to himself on the first and second meditative levels obtains the fruition of
penetration only by a change of level and never by dying (in other words, a nonreturner, with all the levels which this implies, in the sixteenth
when a noble person dies, the aids to penetration carry over into the new moment, but that he is also endowed with the fruitions of these inferior
existence) and that the non-noble loses them only by death. Yaśomitra levels.
quotes Vasumitra as stating that non-nobles may lose them by either VI, 44: Further extremely elaborate correspondences of meditative
death or a change of level. Yaśomitra says this view is incorrect, since levels, their functioning, and mainly how many may arise at one time.
there is no arising of the aids to penetration, for instance, in the Similar elaborations of the path are found also on VI, 54, 57, and 63.
Brahmakāyika world. He quotes Sarhghabhadra as being of the opinion VII, 1-8: Several quotations by Yaśomitra from Prakarapapāda
that non-nobles lose them only by death, and seems to agree with this regarding the exact nature of the moments on the path of vision.
opinion. VII, 9: The truths of the cessation of frustration and of the path
VI, 28: If one considers that the sixteenth moment which follows are not to be considered as belonging to any of the three levels of
on the path of vision, i.e., the subsequent knowledge of the path (cf. experience. When a realization of a moment-event in the cessation of
summary of II, 15--according to the interpretation now brought up, there frustration occurs, though this relates to the level of desire, it also relates
would he only 15 moments to the path of vision) must itself be part of to the other two levels since the defilements of the higher states are also
the path of vision on the basis that it serves as a support for the countered in this moment.
abandonment of contaminants abandoned in the path of vision, there is VII, 1 1: On the question of whether an awareness accompanied
a flaw of overextension of principles because the entire path of cultivation by sleepiness can be considered nondistracted (.samksipta) because it does
serves as a support for the abandonment of contaminants abandoned by not allow for the conditions necessary for distraction, he cites the
the path of vision. Thus it would have to be part of the path of vision, Vaibhāsikas, who claim that such an awareness, if defiled, must be
too. But the opponent wishes to have 16 moments in the path of vision, considered both distracted and undistracted. Vasubandhu thinks rather
not 17, 18, etc. And since these moments of reflection continue in a that sleepiness and distraction are contradictory, since a certain intensity
series, even the reflections of the second and third day after the practise of reaction in awareness is necessary for there to be distraction, thus an
of the 15 moments would still be a part of the path of vision. Thus there awareness accompanied by sleepiness must be considered nondistracted.
would never be an end to the abandonment effected by the path of vision! The Vaibhāşikas object that this contradicts the Jñānaprasthāna itself,
VI, 33: Vasubandhu has said that the practitioner who is not because according to it a nondistracted awareness must be accompanied
practising the third meditative level, and who enters into the path of by knowledge, which knowledge is contradictory to torpor. Vasubandhu
admits that his view contradicts the Jñānapra.sthāna, but says that it s
'
vision based on the first and second levels, realizes a path superior to
what one might expect as the result of this level. For as he passes on to better to contradict treatises than to contradict the sutras. Yaśomitra
the fourth level he is endowed with pleasure only. Yaśomitra cites the elaborates this retort even further, repeating again (as at I, 3) that the
Vibhāsā as stating that it is certain that the practitioner is endowed with Abhidharma is not the word of the Buddha.
such a pure pleasure because he still has it on entering the fourth level, VII, 14-15: He cites Sarhghabhadra as stating that the knowledge
but if he enters the path of vision from the third level being still endowed of a factor in the path of vision must be directed at the level of desires
with an impure pleasure, he will lose the faculty for this pleasure on only because of the absence of a cognitional support which would
entering the fourth level. Now, if he enters the path of vision, and he is transform it into an awareness on a different level. In fact, the
endowed with a pure pleasure, then he realizes a path superior to the cognitional supports for such knowledges are in the material elements
fruition one might expect, i.e., the fruits of the nonreturner. Yaśomitra which belong to the level of desires. Only at the level of desires do the
states that though this opinion is in the Vibhāsā, it is by no means one awarenesses which emerge from meditation exist (whereas the
586 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOSA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 587

awarenesses of the meditations themselves may belong to the other two Buddha-factors are the ten powers (I) one knows with insight, as it is,
levels), and it is only with the awarenesses which emerge from meditation what can be as what can be, and what can't be as what can't be; (2) one
that knowledge of factors is realized. Yaśomitra quotes this opinion of knows with insight, as they are, the karmic results of past, future, and
Samghabhadrās without objection, probably because it is itself in present actions; (3) one knows with insight, as they are, the various
conformance with what Vasubandhu thinks but has not completely elements in the world; (4) one knows with insight, as they are, the
elucidated. various dispositions of beings; (5) one knows with insight, as they are,
VII, 21: In contrast to the truth of the path, which is realized the practises and the processes of defilement and alleviation; (6) one
fully actually only in the path of cultivation, every human being can knows with insight, as they are, the faculties of sentient beings; (7) one
understand frustration. the origin of frustration, and the cessation of knows with insight, as it is, the path that leads everywhere; (8) one
frustration, even in a mundane path. recollects one's previous lives; (9) one sees the death and rebirth of
VII, 26: If one becomes an arhat after having been born at the beings as it is; (10) one realizes the end of all defilement; the four
level of desires, one has cultivated the meditations belonging to all three grounds of confidence: confidence in knowing all events as they happen,
levels. If one becomes an arhat after having been born in the material in knowing the destruction of all defilements, in having correctly
level, one has cultivated the meditations belonging to two levels: the described the impediments to liberation, and in having shown how one
material level and the immaterial level. If one becomes an arhat after must enter on the path that leads to liberation; the three higher
having been born in the immaterial level, one has cultivated the meditat- applications of mindfulness--the mindfulness focused on feelings,
ions belonging to the immaterial level only. If one becomes an arhat in awarenesses and accompanying mental factors, and the great compassion.
the stage which is neither cognitional nor noncognitional, one has had to But others, says Yaśomitra, claim the eighteen are something quite
practise this meditation only. different, namely: There is, in a Tathāgata: (1) no failing; (2) no violent
There are inferior qualities, usual in sarhsāra, which are not to be speech (explained by some as "no violent action whatsoever ; (3) no
"

included in cultivation because they are not retained in the future. But action of play or pure amusement; (4) no cognition of diversity, meaning
qualities which are unusal in samsāra, such as the meditations, are that there is no cognition connected with greed, hostility, or confusion,
retained in the future also. Yaśomitra cites Samghabhadra: If dharmic regarding sense-objects of satisfaction, frustration, and that which is
features previously acquired are lost for a time and then re-emerge, they neither satisfying nor frustrating; (5) no unconcentrated awareness, (6) the
are not "cultivated " if they arise again without effort. A dharmic feature Tathāgata' s equanimity is not due to a lack of consideration; (7) there is
not previously acquired, which is acquired by effort, is cultivated also for no obstruction to knowledge as regards past events; (8) there is no
the future because of its state of having a power of penetration. If this obstruction to knowledge as regards future events; (9) there is no
opinion of Samghabhadra is correct, Yaśomitra says, then everything obstruction to knowledge as regards present events; (10) all one's bodily
which is true for conventional knowledge should also be true for the actions revolve around knowledge; (11) likewise for verbal actions and
conventional knowledge of arhats, and this is in fact what An-rya '
(12) mental actions; (13) one s zest (for good action) never fails; (14)
Vasumitra has written. But certain Vaibhāśikas object that whatever one's vigor never fails; (15) one's mindfulness never fails; (16) one's
dharmic feature is obtained again after having been left, it arises again meditational concentration never fails; (17) one 's insight never fails; (18)
because of cultivation, i.e., because of an effort. If it has been obtained the seeing of the knowledge necessary for liberation never fails.
before, how can it be something which has not existed before? Others Yaśomitra's list here differs a little from the standard one given in
again explain this as follows: "That which has been obtained" means "that Mahāvyutpatti 135 ff.
which has been obtained in this life, but not for the next." That is, it is VII, 30: When the Buddha recognized the innate potentialities
not obtained again if it is not cultivated anew, because the former for sainthood in "individuals," this rested on his being able to recognize
cultivation has been forgotten. their "seeds" or traces of the past.
VII, 28: The Vaibhāśikas claim that the eighteen special VII, 36: Yaśomitra explains the qualities of a Buddha which are
588 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 589

also qualities of arhats as including araña, the power of prohibiting the VIII, 3: If it is stated that the psychophysical complex has as its
arising of defilements in another. Yet the degree of this nonconflicting condition consciousness (which is one of the links of the dependent
is different in a Buddha and an arhat, Yaśomitra says. A Buddha can origination formula), this means that consciousness is the condition for
eradicate defilements in another; an arhat can only effectuate an absence every psychophysical complex. But not every consciousness is the
of defilements in others directed towards himself. I.e., an arhat can bring condition for the arising of a psychophysical complex. Some
it about that another has no hostility in regard to himself, but he cannot consciousnesses. such as those in the immaterial level, are conditions only
eradicate the view of a self in the body which another has towards him, for psychological aggregates. It may be claimed that if every
because once the view of a self in the body exists, it exists in that consciousness were not a condition for the psychophysical complex, that
"series" in regard to all so-called individuals. it wouldn't have been so designated in the formula. But to this it can be
VII, 45: As regards the higher faculties, he quotes replied that in spontaneously generated beings consciousness is a
Bhagavadviśesa, who claims that they are thus enumerated because this condition for the six sense-fields and not for the psychophysical complex.
is the order of their genesis. I.e., one removes errors relating to the past The designation "psychophysical complex" in the dependent origination
by the memory of one's former lives, one removes errors relating to the formula refers to the five aggregates before the six sense-fields have been
present by the knowledge of deaths and rebirths, one removes errors completely developed.
relating to the future by the knowledge of the removal of contaminants. VIII, 9: The equanimity of meditational concentration is defined
But Samghabhadra, Yaśomitra notes, explains the matter differently: one as a lack of elation or depression, attraction or repulsion. Elaboration of
removes errors relating to the past by the memory of one's former lives, the elements existing in various meditative levels states that all the
one removes errors relating to the future by the knowledge of deaths and elements (initial thought, sustained thought, satisfaction, pleasure) exist
rebirths, and one removes errors relating to the present by the knowledge in the first level; in the second, where initial and sustained thought are
of the removal of contaminants. Yaśomitra approves of this interpretation lacking, there is, however, strictly speaking, the addition of equanimity,
of Samghabhadra. mindfulness, and insight; the third is truly concentration; and the fourth
VII, 53: As regards magically created beings, nine sense-fields has only elements which cannot be described by speech.
can be so created: eyes, visibles, ears (but not sounds), nose, smells, He describes initial thought as a mental discourse of inquiry, and
tongue, tastes, body, and tactile sensations. But the sense-field of mind sustained thought as a mental discourse of examination--these definitions
and of mentally cognizables cannot be so created in a magically created derive from Vasubandhu's Paiicaskandhaka.
being because the latter has no mental activity. A magically created
being moves because of the mental activity of the one who has produced
it, and he quotes Karapaprajñapti to this effect.
VIII. 1: He describes "adhicina" as being the concentrations of which can be inferred from it, even though Vasubandhu's logical works
(later than the Kośa) had already raised the more exact definition of
the four meditative levels. "
VIII, 2: It is not necessary to state that initial thought exists in invariable concomitance " (cf. Vūdavidhi 4). Yaśomitra describes this
regular coexistence as " where there is smoke, there is fire", but not
the first level, since if one says it is endowed with sustained thought it
necessarily has initial thought also. This is just like smoke necessarily "where there is fire, there is smoke. " In addition, there is a problem with
existing with fire. One can define this, as Vasubandhu says, as the Yaśomitra's statement, since initial and sustained thought are successive
according to Vasubandhu (Kośa II, 33), and thus cannot exhibit a regular
regular coexistence of smoke with fire. '
coexistence! For instance, the intermediate state between the first and
second meditative levels is endowed with sustained thought, but not with
initial thought! In effect, it should be said that the intermediate state is
'
It is interesting that Yaśomitra retains "regular coexistence" without initial and thought, and that the second level is without sustained
(sahacarya) as the relation of that which is directly perceived to that thought!
590 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPIIUTARTHAVYAKHYA 591

VIII, 25-28: On the very interesting discussion of emptiness in Bhadanta (cf. comment on I, 20), and that by the same token there were
Hinayana, which occurs in meditations having as their focus emptiness Vaibhāşikas who were not Kashmirians!
and selflessness, he elucidates the meditational concentration of the IX: Yaśomitra considers IX an annex to VIII.
emptiness of emptiness by stating that it relates to emptiness only, and IX, p. 1190 (Dwarikadas Shastri edition): The object of
not to selflessness, for this meditation comes after the aspect of emptiness consciousness of the mental consciousness is defined by Yaśomitra as
(as emptiness?) has already been determined. But why can't selflessness being both the sense-field of the factor-organ (dharmāyatana) and those
play the same role as a preliminary to the emptiness of emptiness? extra objects which yogis only perceive, such as the awarenesses and
Because it is the realization of emptiness, and not selflessness, which mental concomitants of others. But since a mental consciousness arises
allows for the realization of the emptiness of emptineśs. Interestingly in regard to an object only after the original consciousness which has
enough, emptiness is here linked, quite unlike in Mahayana, with perceived the object has ceased, apprehension by a mental consciousness
abhorring samsāra. can't be a direct perception. Some Sautrāntikas claim however that a
Calculated cessation through contemplation of the four noble mental consciousness may immediately apprehend its object, e.g., when
truths is disconnection from everything contrary to a saintly state. a mental concomitant of desire or aversion arises, or a feeling of
A second level free from afflictions, as Vasubandhu says, has as satisfaction or frustration. _
its result the acquisition ofjñānadarśana. Yaśomitra explains: Jñāna is IX, p. 1191: He identifies Vātsīputrīyas with Arya-Sammitīyas.
a discernment (prajña7 linked to a mental consciousness, thus contains IX, p. 1197: The Vātsīputrīya has said that all six conscious-
constructions which can even be verbally expressed. Darśana, on the nesses may recognize the " person " (pudgala). But, Yaśomitra retorts,
other hand, is a vision which is associated with the visual consciousness what sense does it make to say that a person is recognized when a sound
and is exempt from discrimination. has been perceived? Does the sound become the cause of the
In commenting on Vasubandhu's statement that it is in the fourth apprehension of the "person, " or does one apprehend the person when the
unafflicted level that thunderbolt concentration is reached, where all sound is being apprehended? If the sound is itself the cause of the
defilements are totally and forever eradicated, he states that the future apprehension of a person, then there 's no difference between the sound
Buddha, directly before his enlightenment, practised the first level to and the person, just as one cannot really claim that there is a difference
master meditational skills, then acquired the divine eye by which he could between the sound and the mental consciousness of hearing which
see the deaths and rebirths of sentient beings, then realized the perceives it. If the second alternative is true, is it apprehended by the
meditations on emptiness, the signless, and the wishless, then, basing same apprehension as the sound is, or by another? If by the same, then
"
himself on the fourth level, accomplished the eradication of all fetters there is no difference of intrinsic nature between the so-called "person
through the thunderbolt concentration. and the sound. Or alternatively, the sound itself is only a designation for
VIII, 29: On the four boundless states, he says that loving the person. In that case, how could a difference be made between the
kindness is an antidote to ill-will, compassion is an antidote to desire to judgments "This is a sound! " and "This is a person!"? If there is no
harm, rejoicing at the joy of others is an antidote to dissatisfaction, and difference to be made, then it should be asked how one can even say that
equanimity is an antidote to both greed for desires and ill-will. a sound exists and a person exists, too.
VIII, 39: The scriptures (āgama) will last longer than the IX, p. 1203: He quotes a sūtra to the effect that Buddhists are
adhigama or path without afflictions. to take as their refuge the dharma, but never the idea of a person, that
VIII, 40: In commenting on Vasubandhu's statement that he has they are to take as their refuge the sūtras which are to be taken literally
followed the interpretation of the Vaibhāşikas of Kashmir (in the kārikās), (ntārtha), and not those which need further interpretation (neyārtha), that
YaSomitra defines the Vaibhāşikas as those who rejoice in the Vibhāśā, they are to take their refuge in knowledge, and not in the six
and specifies that there were Kashmirian masters who were not consciousnesses.
Vaibhāşikas, such as the Vinaya scholars and Sautrantikas such as the IX, p. 1205: He says that the view of a person constitutes a kind
592 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ABHIDHARMAKOŚA-SPHUTARTHAVYAKHYA 593

of "view of self in the body" which is so frequently condemned by the later solutions in the Karmasiddhiprakarana.
Buddha. He says further that the idea of a person arises only as a result
of many factors viewed in a heap.
IX, p. 1206: In reply to the Vātsīputrīya's statement that there is 191.IŚVARASENA (580)
a sīītra which speaks of the person as "that which takes the weight " Iśvarasena was a teacher of Dharmakīrti, so we may estimate his
(bhārahara), he says that this is only an illustration. and that the sūtra sixtieth year at around 580. Dharmakīrti cites his teacher at several
goes on to say that neither the "weight" nor "that which takes the weight" points, and Arcata in his Hetuhindutīkā also refers to this teacher. He
really exist. seems to have been "the proponent of the sadlaksanahetu doctrine against
IX, p. 1215: He says that the Vātsīputrīyas hold to the idea that which Dharmakirti repeatedly argued.
'"

a person exists, and that the Madhyamakas, by contrast, hold to the idea Ernst Steinkellner26' remarks: "According to Iśvarasena the
that nothing exists. Both these points of view are extremes. absence of the probans in the heterologue is proved by a third kind of
IX, p. 1216: In explaining memory, he again strictly follows the valid cognition (pramān ntaram) called non-perception (anupalabdhi),
Kośa, not alluding to later Yogācāra explanations of Vasubandhu's made which is nothing but mere absence of perception. In consequence of this
in part necessary by objections of Sarhghabhadra. new concept Iśarasena seems to have re-thought the whole theory of the
IX, p. 1218: He states that the idea that an action needs an agent infallibility (avyabhicāra) of the probans and of the conditions the
is an idea of the Grammarians, and that it has no place in Buddhism. probans has to fulfil to be considered infalliable to the probandum. As a
IX, p. 1220: There is in fact no difference between a conscious- result of his concept of non-perception he taught the infallibility of the
ness and a perceiver, because no differentiation between them can be probans no longer as with Dignāga to be due to the three marks only, but
apprehended. If one makes the differentiation, one is falling into the to at least four marks, the fourth being that its object, the probandum,
category-splitting typical of the Vaiśesikasītras. must not have been cancelled by perception."
IX, p. 1222: He identifies the opponents of Vasubandhu in the
latter half of Kośa IX as being the Vaiśeşikas.
IX, p. 1223: The contact of internal organ with the self which 192.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (590?),
the Vaiśesikas claim leads to several absurdities: the self would have to Buddhabālādhānapratihāryakūrvanirdeśasūtra
move when the internal organ moves; the self would have to perish when Originally summarized by Nalinaksha Dutt in Gilgit Manuscripts
the internal organ perishes. Volume 4, pp. xxv-xxvii, five leaves of this text have been edited by
IX, p. 1224: As a matter of fact, when it is said " mine", "yours" , Gregory Schopen from both Dutt's Sanskrit fragment and the Tibetan
these are only awarenesses with seeds making for such conceptions translation (Tohoku 186) in Journal of Indian Philosophy 5, 1978, pp.
coloring them. 319-336.. It apparently does not exist in Chinese. Schopen promises a
IX, p. 1228: Yaśomitra states that Vasubandhu is making a critical edition and translation of the Tibetan.
reference to his own Pañcaskandhaka when he talks about frustration and
satisfaction being experienced by the sense-fields themselves, and not by
a self. ' ° '
IX, p. 1233: He makes reference to both "Tīrthikas" and Vātsīpu- 193.BHADANTA VIMUKTISENA (590?),
trīyas as being fundamentally mistaken in their view of a self. Are the Abhisamayālatńkāra vārttika
"
Tirthikas" the Jains, or are the Vaiśeşikas also included there? David Seyfort Ruegg reports that this work was translated into
He resumes the early theories of Vasubandhu in speaking of Tibetan " at the time of King Byan chub 'od by Śāntibhadra and Sakya 'od
dispositional traces and seeds as factors for retribution and memory, with the Sanskrit title Arya-Pañcavińthatīsāhasrikāprajñāpāramitopadeśa-
r "
without alluding to the problems in these theories, or to Vasubandhu's śāstrābhisamayāla»mkārakīa ikāvārttikam.' As to the date, Rueggg tells
594 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES BHADANTA VIMUKTISENA 595
us that Bu ston identifies him as a pupil of Arya Vimuktisena, Tāranātha
makes him a contemporary of Candrakīrti. 2 ° 9 That does not seem out of
keeping with the other relevant dates we have proffered in this Volume.
The work is available in Tibetan as Tohoku 3788.
ENDNOTES

194.AUTHOR UNKNOWN (ca. 598?), Devatāsūtra

This work seems to have been first translated by the famous 1. Heinz Bechert, " Mahayana literature in Sri Lanka: the early phase:, in
Hsiian-tsang, a Chinese who traveled to India in 629 and returned in 645, L. Lancaster (ed.), Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems (Berkeley, Calif.
having visited many interesting places; he has left an array of uniquely 1977), pp. 362-364.
important information about India in this period. He also translated some 2. H. D. Sankalia, The University of Nālandā (Delhi 1972).
75 works, almost all of which had been translated by others earlier. Born 3. Ibid., p. 40.
in 602, he died in 664. We happen to know of the precise dates of many 4. Ibid.
of his translations. Of the few previously untranslated works this one, 5.Ibid., p. 71.
which we are told contains nine questions and their answers, was 6. Ibid., p. 72.
translated in 648. It is catalogued as T.592 and Nj 753. 7. Ibid., p. 77.
8. For a much more developed account of bhavańga see Rupert Gethin,
"Bhavańga and rebirth according to the Abhidharma ", The Buddhist
Forum. Volume III (ed., Tadeusz Skorpuski and Ulrich Pagel) (London
1994), pp. 11-35. Gethin emphasizes that it is the bhavańga that explains
"not merely the logic of continuity but also why a particular being
continues to be that particular being throughout his or her life, rather than
becoming some other being" (p. 29).
9. The account just given is based on Henepola Gunaratna, The Path of
Serenity and Insight (Delhi 1985), pp. 72-74. A similar account is to be
found in Someshwar Prasad, "The Abhidhamma view of momentariness " ,
V V. Mirashi Felicitation Volume (Nagpur 1965), pp. 264-269, who
provides some helpful information about each of the momentary steps in
the series.
10. See Paul J. Griffiths, On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and
the Mind-Body Problem (La Salle, Illinois 1986). See also H. S. Cooray,
"
Abhiññānirodha", Encyclopedia of Buddhism 1.1, 1963, pp. 122-125.
11. See Edwina Pio, "Mutations in the arahant ideal", Indira 23.1-2,
1986, pp. 21-30.
12. Pio, ibid., p. 27.
13. Pio, ibid., p. 29.
14. Nathan Katz, Buddhist Images of Human Perfection (Delhi 1982).
15. Katz, ibid., p. xviii.
"
16. Shanta Ratnayaka, The Bodhisattva ideal of Theravada", Journal of
596 ENDNOTES 597

the International Association of Buddhist Studies 8.2, 1985, p. 106. Epistemological Tradition (ed. Ernst Steinkellner) (Wien 1991), pp. 69-
17. See Roy W. Perrett, "The bodhisattva paradox", Philosophy East and 84.
"
West 36, 1986, pp. 55-59, in which he cites relevant passages from 35. Ole Pind, "Dignāga on śabada.sāmānya and śabdaviśesa , Studies in
Danto. the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, op. cit., p. 273.
18. Georges B. J. Dreyfus, Recognizing Reality (Albany, N. Y. 1997), p. 36. Mark Siderits, "Apohavāda; nominalism and resemblance theories",
'
101. in Dharmakirti s Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan
19. Richard Hayes, "The question of doctrinalism in the Buddhist Philosophy (ed. Shoryu Katsura) (Wien 1999), pp. 344-346.
"
epistemology", Journal of the American Association of Religion 52, 1984, 37. Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya, the logician , Adyar Library Bulletin 50,
p. 648, note 4, with references to sources and authors cited. 1986, pp. 61-62. The translation of technical Sanskrit terms left
20. Dreyfus, op. cit. untranslated by Lindtner have been supplied in parentheses.
21. Dreyfus, op. cit.., p. 49. He goes on to suggest an analogous attitude 38. Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhāvaviveka and the Prāsańgika school", The
toward ontological commitment in Willard Van Orman Quine 's views. Nava-Mālandā-Mahāvihāra Research Publication Volume I (ed. Satkari
22. See Dreyfus, op. cit., pp. 336-337. Mookerjee) (Patna 1957), pp. 303-305.
23. Dignāga himself outlines the double aspect theory at the end of his 39. Malcolm David Eckerl, "Bhāvaviveka and the early Mādhyamika
Chapter on perception in kārikās 11-12, though he does not use the term theories of language", Philosophy East and West 28, 1978, p. 329.
ākāra (for " aspect ") there, but rather merely say that " an awareness has 40. Kajiyama, op. cit., pp. 310-311.
two forms". 41. Kajiyama, op. cit., p. 314. '
24. Eli Franco, "Valid reason, true sign", Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die 42. Christian Lindtner, "A treatise on Buddhist idealism: Kambala s
Kunde Siidasiens 24, 1990, p. 202. Alokamālā , in Miscellanea Buddhica. Indiske Studier 5 (ed. Chr.
"

25. Franco, ibid., p. 204. Lindtner) (Copenhagen 1985), pp. 117-118.

"
26. Franco, ibid., pp. 206-207. 43. Christian Lindtner, "Cittamātra in Indian Mahāyāna until Kamalaśīlā ,
27. Franco, ibid., p. 207. Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde Siidasiens 41, 1997, p. 184.
28. Franco, ibid., p. 208. 44. Lindtner, ibid., p. 186.
'
"
29. Shoryu Katsura, Dignāga and Dharmakirti on adarśanamātra and 45. Lindtner, ibid., p. 185. Sanskrit terms found in Lindtner s text are
anupalandhi", Asiatische Studien 46.1, 1992, pp. 222-231. preceded by the translations of those terms standard in this Volume, with
30. Katsura, ibid., pp. 227-228. the Sanskrit terms given in parentheses.
31. Bimal Krishna Matilal, The Character of Logic in India (ed. Jonardon 46. Tom J. F. Tillemans, Materials for the Study of Aryadeva,
Ganeri and Heeraman Tiwari) (Albany, N.Y. 1998), pp. 91-98. Quotations Dharmapāla and Candrakirti. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie and
that follow are from this section. The latter parts of the passage(s) quoted Buddhismuskunde, Heft 24.1 (Wien 1990), pp. 54-55.
can also be found in B. K. Matilal and R. D. Evans (ed.), Buddhist Logic 47. Tillemans, ibid., pp. 56-58.
and Epistemology. Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and 48. Tillemans, ibid., p. 60.
Language. Studies of Classical India, Vol. 7 (Dordrecht 1986), pp. 9-10. 49. Tillemans, ibid., pp. 41-46.
32. Richard Hayes, " An interpretation of anyāpoha in Dińnāga 's general 50. Tillemans, ibid., p. 68.
51. Lindtner, "Cittamātra in Indian Mahāyāna... , op. cit., p. 178.
"
system of inference" in Matilal and Evans, ibid., p. 36.
33. Katsura, op. cit., pp. 262-263. There has been a good deal of 52. Lindtner, "Cittamātra... " , ibid., p. 179. '
discussion of the use(s) of eva in Dharmakīrti; what Katsura claims is that 53. Lewis Lancaster 's review of K. Venkata Ramanan, Nāgārjuna s
Dhannakīrti is actually picking up Dignāga's language and perhaps Philosophy as Presented in the Mahñprajñāpāramitā-śāstra (Tokyo 1966)
expanding it to apply to all three marks. in Philosophy East and West 18, 1968,-pp. 97-99. Lancaster cites R.
34. See Masahiro Inami, "On paksābhāsa", Studies in the Buddhist Hikata, Suvikrāntavikrāmi-pariprcchū-prajirūpūramitūsūta (Fukuoka,
598 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES TO PART TWO 599

1958), pp. LII ff. as pointing out the following inconsistencies with Ur- 60. Jikyo Masuda, "Origin and doctrines of early Indian Buddhist schools,
Nāgārjuna's works: " These are: (1) the arrangement of the Vinaya code ' ' "
a translation of Hsiian-Chwang s version of Vasumitra s treatise , Asia
of the (work) does not agree with the code in the other writings; (2) place Major 2, 1925, p. 6.
names are unaccountable with regard to what we know about the life and 61. K. 627 = T. 632 = N. 1257, translated by Kekaya in 472 at Pei-t'ai
travels of Nāgārjuna; (3) certain sections are directed to a Chinese
(cf. Lancaster, p. 206).
audience, not an Indian one." Lancaster also points out that "the dharma 62. Taken from S. C. Vidyabhusana, A History ofIndian Logic (reprinted
list presented by the Sarvāstivādin layer of the Ta Chih Tu Lun does not
Delhi 1978), pp. 259-261.
agree with the dharma list in the Vigrahavyāvartani-", commenting that
63. Bimala Chum Law, Buddhaghosa.. Bombay Branch Royal Asiatic
this "distorts his doctrine into a polemic against this one school only." Society Monograph No. 1 (Bombay 1946), p. 1. Law 's work is a revised
54. Etienne Lamotte, Le Traite de Ja Grande Vertu de Sagesse de
edition of his Life and Works of Buddhaghosa published in 1923.
Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra). Pp. 1-1118 = Volume I and II, 64. Law, pp. 24 ff. These surmises are supported by the more recent
Chapters 1-30; Bibliotheque du Museon Volume 18, Louvain 1949. Pp.
discussion in K. R. Norman, Pali Literature ( Wiesbaden 1983), pp. 120-
1119-1734 = Volume III, Chapters 31-41. Pp. 1735-2162 = Volume IV, 130.
Chapters 42-48 = Publications de l 'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 12
65. Law, p. 29.
(Louvain 1976). Pp. 2163-2451 = Volume V, Chapters 49-52 with
66. Law, p. 33.
Chapter 20 of the second section = Publications de 1'Institut Orientaliste
67. Law, p. 36.
de Louvain 24 (Louvain-la-Neuve 1980).
68. Cf. Norman, op. cit., pp. 127-129 for a critical summation. Norman
55. Translated anonymously some time between 334 and 431 (cf. K. 85
is himself rather inclined to accept that most of these works are indeed
= T. 302 = N. 85). A brief work (1 fascicule). Its Chinese title is Ta See the published dissertation by Friedgard
by Buddhaghosa.
chang kuang ju ju lai chih to pu ssu i ching.
56. Paul Demieville, "Les versions chinoises du Milindapafiha", Bulletin Lottermoser, Quoted Verse Passages in the Works of Buddhaghosa:
Contributions Towards the Study of the Lost Sīhalatthakathā Literature
de I 'Ecole Francais d 'Extreme Orient 24, 1924, 220-230.
(Gottingen 1982), pp. 5-9 for a summary of various published views on
57. Lamotte, op. cit., Volume Three (1990), p. xxxvii. '
Buddhaghosa s works.
58. For an account of this text's use in Japan see M. W. de Visser, '
69. We adopt Nanamoli s translation; see T423.
Ancient Buddhism in Japan. Siitras and Ceremonies in Use in the Seventh
70. These are probably names of works among the Singhalese
and Eighth Centuries A.D. and Their History in Later Times. Two
commentaries, no longer extant.
volumes. Leiden 1935.
59. Although Lindtner considers this probable, without any reasons being 71. In the Introduction to his edition of Kathāvatthuppakarapa-Atthakathā
comprising Pali Text Society Text Series 169 (London 1979), pp. ix-xi.
given we prefer to locate the work among later works ascribed to a 72. Cf. Bapat 's introduction to his edition of our work in E. For an
"
Nāgārjuna". In this case there seems little to go on in assigning any '
argument to the contrary on Buddhaghosa s authorship of this and other
particular date to the author. It may noted as well that George
commentaries ascribed to him cf. K. R. Norman, op. cit., pp. 123-125.
Chemparathy, " Two early Buddhist refutations of the existence of īśvara
" 73. The translations of these three terms are those of B. C. Law, The
as the creator of the universe , Wiener Zeitschrift Hr die Kunde
Siidasiens 12-13, 1968-69, pp. 89-92, suggests that this work may perhaps Debates Commentary (London 1969), p. 11 et passim.
be ascribed to a seventh century Nāgārjuna since there is a reference at 74. Taken from B. C. Law, Buddhaghosa, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
75. Law, ibid., p. 89.
the outset to Vajrasattva, which Chemparathy says is a development in
Tantric Buddhism of a period no earlier than the seventh century. 76. Law, ibid. p. 89.
77. "...a town near Trichinopoly", says C. V. Udaya Sankara in
Chemparathy cites Andre Bareau and Edward Conze as of a similar
opinion. Contribution of Buddhism to World Thought and Culture. Proceedings of
the 6th International Buddhist Conference (Bodhgaya 1980), pp. 134-135.
600 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES 601

78. Norman, op. cit., pp. 130-132. original stanzas and the ascription of the work to Nāgārjuna or to
79. The contents of this and the next Chapter correspond quite closely to uddhamati.
the Vipākuddharakathā of Asl 267-288. Buddhadatta, however, presents 85. See J. G. de Casparis, "Selected inscriptions from the 7th to the 9th
the views of Tipitaka-Cūlanāga only whereas Asl gives the views of two century A.D.", Prasati Indonesia II (Bandung 1956), pp. 47-167; "A
other Theras. Buddhadatta is not following Asl directly, since in places Buddhist text engraved on gold plates", pp. 338-341: Addenda.
his account is more complete. No doubt both are following the same 86. See de Casparis, ibid., p. 339.
source. 87. See de Casparis, idib., p. 339 (a).
80. The rkā attributes this view to the Mahā-Athakathā which apparently 88, See de Casparis, ibid., p. 339 (b).
held that only awareness and not the other three mental aggregates are the 89. See de Casparis, ibid., p. 340 (e).
object of this knowledge. It goes on to argue that it is in fact a path 90. See de Casparis, ibid., p. 340 9f) for the Sanskrit equivalents of the
object literally speaking and declares this to be the decision of the fivefold division: kdraka, garbha, visayapravrtti, prabhava, pravāha.
Sarhghakāras. Buddhadatta appears to differ from Buddhaghosa here, cf. 91. See de Casparis, ibid., p. 340 (g).
Vism 431; Asl 416 where the same discussion occurs; Vibhatigatthakathā "
92. Gokhale has acetana, ohne Regung .
"

373-374. 93. Edited by E. H. Johnston with T. Chowdhury, Journal of the Bihar

" "
81. It is interesting to note that the order here differs both from that and Orissa Research Society 36, 1950, 128 pp. This is our E .
found at Pati II 100 = Vism 693 and also from the different order in the 94. Chu thing i ch'eng pao sing lun, translated by Ratnamati around 510.
Abh idhamm a tthasairgaha. Available as T. 1611.
82. Boris Vassilieff, "' Ju-shih Lun'--a logical treatise ascribed to 95. Theg pa then po rgyud bla mai bstan bcos and Theg pa then po
Vasubandhu", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, rgyud bla mai bstan bcos main par bsad pa, translated by Ratnavajra
University of London 8, 1935-37, 1013-1038. Sajjana and Blo ldan ses rab at Srinagar in later I lth century A. D. Sde
83. (a) Yuanshenglun (Yuan sheng tun) by Dharmagupta of 607 A.D. dge Ed., Tohoku Catalogue, Nos. 4024 and 4025 respectively: Peking
( =Nanjio 1227; Taisho 1652, vol. 32; Foreword, p. 482a, 30 stanzas, p. Edition No. 5525, 5526 respectively; Reprint Edition, Vol. 108, pp.
482b-483a, stanzas with commentary, p. 483a-486a); (b) 24.1.7-31 and pp. 31.1.6-56.3.7 (Textual Studies).
Dachengyuanshenglun (Ta ch'eng yiian sheng lun) by Amoghavajra of 96. E. Obenniller, "The sublime science of the great vehicle to salvation,
746-771 A.D. (Nanjio 1314; Taisho 1653: 30 stanzas, pp. 486b-487a, being a manual of Buddhist Monism. The work of Arya Maitreya with
stanzas with commentary, pp. 487a-490a); (c) Tibetan version of the a commentary by Aryāsahga. Translated from the Tibetan with
"
whole text, translated from the Chinese by Chos grub (Dharmasiddha!-i, introduction and notes , Acta Orientalia 9.2-3, 1931, 81-306, and
Chin. Facheng, born in Dunhuang, active from 822, died c. 865), has separately printed.
been preserved among the Dunhuang manuscripts under the title Rten 97. Jikido Takasaki, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra).
cing 'brel par 'byung ba tshig le'ur byas pa sum cu pacing 'brel part Serie Orientate Roma XXXIII (Roma 1966).
'byung ba tshig le'ur byas pa sum cu pa'i main par bs'had pa 98. There is a sizable secondary literature on this text. In addition to the
(Pratītyasannrtpāda-trinVikā-kārikāvyākhyñna) (La Vallee Poussin, works cited on pp. 202-202 of the Third Edition of the Bibliography
Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang in the India Office (Third Edition of Volume One of this Encyclopedia of Indian
Library (London 1962), No. 588.3 (with one folio missing), foil. Nga Philosophies) the following items should be noted: Masatoshi Nagatomi
30a-32b) and Bien 33a1-53a6; No. 619, foil. Ka 94, 99-100; kha 1; No. has an extensive review of D. S. Ruegg's book in Journal of Indian
620, fol Kha), respectively. Philosophy 2, 1972, 53-64; Z. Nakamura, A Study of Ratna-Gotra-
84. See Carmen Dragonetti in Wiener Zeitschrift frir die Kunde Siidasiens V:bhāga-Mahāyānottaratantra-Sāstra based on a Comparison and
22, 1978, 87-93 and 30, 1986, 109-122, and Christian Lindmer in the Contrast Between the Sanskrit Original and the Chinese Translations
same Joumal 26, 1982, 167-172 for a controversy about the number of (Tokyo 1960). See also G. M. Nagao, "'What remains' in śūtnyatā: a
602 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES TO PART TWO 603

Yogācāra interpretation of emptiness" in Minoru Kiyota (ed.), Mahāyāna Buddhist Studies 4.2, 1981, 33-43) studies the Tathāgatagarbha idea that
Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice (Honolulu 1978), pp. 66-82; nirvana means nonorigination (anutpdda) of prapañca, not extinction.
Jikido Takasaki, "Description of the ultimate reality by means of the six "Suffering is not a dharma one should extinguish, but an illusion one
categories in Mahayana Buddhism", Journal of Indian and Buddhist should not produce" (p. 37). So the third noble truth of the extinction of
Studies 9.2, 1961, 24-33; Zahiruddin Ahmad, "The womb of the suffering is regarded as the practice of nondiscrimination (avikalpajñāna),
Tathagata or Buddhist monism", Journal of the Oriental Society of "
a practice that is already deliverance, for ignorance and its attendant
Australia 15-16, 1983-84, 27-44. passions and sufferings are simply not originated " (37). He contrasts
99. Hakuju Ui, Hoshoronkenkhu (Tokyo 1959), attributes the whole text ekayāna texts such as the RGV with trivāna texts such as the
to Sāramati for the reason that the first person is used in the salutation to Saritdhinirmocanas ūtra.
the three jewels in the basic verses and in the prose commentary as well. Z. Nakamura, op. cit., has an English introduction. Nakamura
Jikido Takasaki on the contrary attributed the second part to Sāramati and finds that the Chinese translation has eleven chapters, while the Sanskrit
the basic verses to Maitreya. At present, however, he is inclined to and Tibetan only have 7 (or 5?) chapters by collapsing the first seven
negate the participation of Maitreya in this text because of the later origin chapters into one.
of the legend of his five treatises. 105. D. S. Ruegg edits and translates 1.9ab at Journal of Indian
100. For this selection, see the Introduction to E. pp. 32-45. Philosophy 5, 1977, p. 33. Lobsang Dargyay (same Journal 18, 1990, pp.
101. On this subject see T, Introduction, pp. 32-45. A detailed study was 86-87) translates Chapter One, verses 154-155.
done by J. Takasaki in his work in Japanese Nyoraizo shiso no keisei. 106. Brian E. Brown, op. cit., pp. 44-45, reviews the various translations
102. Apparently not the same text as #116 of Volume Eight of this chosen by scholars to translate the term garbha in this context, and gives
Encyclopedia. reasons why "embryo" seems the most appropriate choice.
103. Brian Edward Brown, The Buddha Nature: A Study of 107. On this set of categories see T, Appendix III, pp. 400-408.
Tathāgatagarbha and Alayavijñāna (Delhi 1991). 108. This summary is provided by Prof. Takasaki on pp. 45-46 of his
104. Cf. D. S. Ruegg, La Theorie des Tathāgatagarbha (Paris 1969), translation of the Ratnagotravibhāga cited previously.
summarized by Nagatomi at Journal of Indian Philosophy 2, 1972, 53- 109. However, Marek Mejor, Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and the
64), and Ruegg's article in Journal of Indian Philosophy 5, 1977, 32-34. Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur (Stuttgart 1991), p. 83, cites M.
Z. Ahmad, op. cit., follows Ruegg 's analysis, but in English, and Masaaki "
Van Velthem as identifying Skandhila as a teacher of Sanghabhadra and
Hattori (Journal of Indian Philosophy 2, 1972, 56-64) reviews Ruegg's a contemporary of Vasubandhu " on the basis of Chinese sources, and says
book and prefers an earlier date for Sāramati. Summaries of portions of " "
Skandhila is frequently cited by Vasubandhu and Safighabhadra. Mejor
the text are found by E. H. Johnston in Journal of the Bihar Research translates a few passages on pp. 84-87.
Society 36, 1950 (reprinted Patna 1950, 1960); S. C. Goswami, 110. Publications de ('Institute Orientaliste de Louvain 16, Louvain-la-
Philosophy, Grammar and Indology (ed. Hari Shankar Prasad), Delhi Neuve 1977.
1992, pp. 275-282; and Richard King, Early Advaita and Buddhism, 111. Mejor, op. cit., pp. 63-74.
Ithaca, N.Y. 1995. Papers by Jikido Takasaki (Journal of Indian and 112. Mejor, ibid., p. 64.
Buddhist Studies 7.1, 1958, 48-53; 9.1, 1961, 24-33; and 10.2, 1962, 26- 113. L. Schmithausen, "Beitriige zur Schulzgehorigkeit and
33) are helpful but hard to understand. Ruben L. F. Habito, " On '
Textgeschichte Kanonischer and postkanonischer buddhistischer
dharmakāva as ultimate reality: prolegomena for a Buddhist-Christian "
Materialen , in Heinz Bechert (ed.), Zur Schdlzugehorikeit von Werken
dialogue", Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 12, 1985, 233-252, as der Hinayana-Literature (Gottingen 1985), pp. 338 ff. He edits Chapter
well as in Journal of Dharma 11, 1981, 368-378, studies the use of the Three, verses 1828 of the Tibetan text.
term dharmakāva and the three-body theory in RGB. 114. Hajime Nakamura, Indian Buddhism (Delhi 1987), p. 230.
William Grosnick (Journal of the International Association of 115. Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde Siidasiens 22, 1978, pp. 87-93
 604 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES TO PART TWO 605
makes the case; Lindtner in the same Journal 26. 1982, pp. 167-172
criticizes Ms. Dragonetti's claims on some points but does not question 126. See Musashi Tachikawa, "
A study of Buddhapālita's
her conclusion on the identification of the commentator, except to note Mdlamadhyamakavrtti (I)," Journal of the Faculty of Literature, Nagoya
that the reconstruction of the name as Śuddhamati is doubtful as had been University 63, 19074, pp. 1-19.
"
some time ago noted by de la Vallee Poussin. 127. Christian Lindtner, "Buddhapālita on emptiness , Indo-Iranian
116. Marek Major, op. cit., p. 83. Passages are studied on pp. 87-88. Journal 23, 1981, 187-217. '
117. This summary was prepared by Professor Ames for our 128. Akira Saito, A Study of the Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamakavŗtti. Ph.
Encyclopedia. Most of it has been published in Ames' article D. Dissertation, Australian National University 1984.
"
Buddhapālita's exposition of the Madhyamaka", Journal of Indian 129. See, for example, Ruegg, Literature of the Mādhyamika School...,
Philosophy 14, 1986, pp. 313-349. op. cit., pp. 36, 60, 64-65, 76-78.
118. See C. W. Huntington, Jr., The Akutobhaya and Early Indian 130. George Chemparathy, op. cit., p. 86, note 9.
Madhyamaka. Unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan 1986. 131. David S. Ruegg, Buddha-Nature, Mind and the Problem of
119. See D. S. Ruegg, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective (London 1989), p. 151.
Philosophy in India. Vol. VII, Fascicule 1 of A History of Indian 132. This summary is found in Jikido Takasaki, A Study on the
Literature (Gen. Ed. Jan Gonda), Wiesbaden 1981, p. 49 and John P. Ratnagotravibhdga, op. cit., pp. 47-49.
'
Keenan, " Asartga's understanding of Mādhyamika notes on the Shung- 133. This summary is excerpted from Prabhas Chandra Majumdar s article
"
chwg-lun", Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
"
The Kāranda Vyūha: its metrical version , Indian Historical Quarterly
12.1, 1989, pp. 93-107. 24, 1948, pp. 293-299.
120. See D. S. Ruegg, ibid., p. 60 and Ruegg, " Toward a chronology of 134. The prose text has been published by Satyavrata Samasrami with its
the Madhyamaka school" in L. A. Hercus, F. B. J. Kuiper, T. Bengali translation, Calcutta 1873.
"
Rajapatirana and E. R. Skrzypcsak (eds.), Indological and Buddhist 135. P. S. Sastri, "Some Buddhist thinkers of Andhra , Indian Historical
Studies: Volume in Honour of Prof. J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Quarterly 32, 1956, p. 165.
Birthday (Canberra 1982), p. 512. 136. See the discussion by Masaaki Hattori, Digndga on Perception.
121. Tāranātha, Tdrandthae Doctrinae Buddhicae in India Propagatione Harvard Oriental Series 47, Cambridge, Mass. 1968, pp. 68-69.
(ed. Anton Schiefner), St. Petersburg 1868, pp. 105-106. 137. Ibid., p. 2.
"
122. According to Christian Lindtner in Indo-Iranian Journal 23, 1981, 138. Alex Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist logicians , Journal of
pp. 176-217, Buddhapālita was born in *Harńsakrīda in the south. the International Association of Buddhist Studies 2.1, 1979, pp. 68-69.
"
*Samgharakşita, a disciple of a certain *Nāgamitra, became his teacher 139. David J. Kalupahana, "Dignāgas theory of immaterialism ,
and his residence was the vihāra of Dantapuri. *Samgharakşita is Philosophy East and West 20, 1970, pp. 123-125.
supposed to have also taught Bhavya. 140. Richard Hayes, Dignāga's Interpretation of Signs (Dordrecht 1988).
123. Bstan 'gyur Dbu ma Tsa, Peking (Vol. 95 of Japanese reprint) 317a- pp. 175-177, gives us a summary of this work, as do Georges Dreyfuss,
8; Derge (Vol. 1 of Japanese reprint) 281a-3. Recognizing Reality (Albany, N.Y. 1997), pp. 101-102 and David
124. See M. Walleser, Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavrtti, Bibliotheca Kalupahana, ibid., pp. 121-128. Atnar Singh, The Heart of Buddhist
Buddhica vol. XVI (St. Petersburg 1913-1914). Philosophy: Dirināga and Dharmakīrti (Delhi 1984), pp. 61-63, 122)
125. See Judit Feher, "Buddhapālita's Mūlamadhyamakavrtti: arrival and argues that the position of this view is not idealism, as it has sometimes
spread of Prāsangika-Mādhyamika literature in Tibet" , in Louis Ligeti been assumed to be.
(ed.), Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th 141. N. A. Sastri's text gives Sakti, which Tola and Dragonetti translate
" "
Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csonia de Koros. Bibliotheca as "virtuality ". We replace that with the term trace which is standard
Orientalis Hungarica, Vol. XXIX, part 1 (Budapest 1984). throughout this Encyclopedia as one of the preferred translations of the
term.
606 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES TO PART TWO 607

142. The proper interpretation of this brief text has been the subject of an Pramāñasamuccayavrtti nos. 5 and 3, and no parallel). The list contains
extended interchange between Richard Hayes (in Dignāga on the the types of refutations which are parallel to all of the fourteen jātis of
Interpretation of Signs, op. cit.), B. K. Matilal (in Matilal, ed. Buddhist Dignāga.
Logic and Epistemology, Dordrecht 1984, pp. 31-49), and Hans The Nyāyasūtras contain a similar list of twenty-four jātis in the
Herzberger (pp. 59 ff. of the same collection. Bimal Matilal summarizes following order: 7, 8, utkarsa-, sama-, upakarsa-, vatya-, avarya-, 9.
with a chart on pp. 7-8 of his The Character of Logic in India (Albany, sādhya-, la. (prāpti-), lb (aprāpti-), 14. pratidrstānta-, 5, 12, prakarana-,
N.Y. 1998). Lambert Schmithausen translates verses 8-9 at Journal of 2, 13, 10, upapatti-, 11. anupalabdhi-, 3. anityd- and 6. This list contains
Indian Philosophy 27, 1999, 79-82. all but one of the fourteen jātis• of Dignāga.
143. This salutation becomes of great importance in the view of later The Upāyahrdaya or Prayogasāra attributed to Nāgātjuna lists
authors, especially in the Tibetan tradition. Cf. Roger R. Jackson, " The the following twenty types of objections (*dūsana), namely, utkarsasama,
Buddha as pramānabhūta: epithets and arguments in the Buddhist 'logical' apakarsa-, bhedābheda-, praśnabāhulyam, uttardlpatd-,
tradition " , Journal of Indian Philosophy 16, 1988, 335-365. praśnālpottarabāhulya-, hetu-, kārya-, vyāpti-, avyāpti-, kāla-, prdpti-,
144. We quote this important section of the Svavrtti from Shoryu aprāpti-, viruddha-, aviruddha-, satitśaya-, asanHaya-, pratidrstānta-,
Katsura's translation in " Dignaga on trairūpya reconsidered: a reply to śruti-, śrutibhinna-, anupapatti-sama. It is to be noted that the author of
Prof. Oetke", Tosaki Hiromasa Hakase Koki Kinen Ronbunshū the text does not regard these objections as futile rejoinders but as
(Festschrift for Dr. Hiromasa Tosaki, Culture and Logic in India), legitimate ones.
Kyushu University Press 200, pp. 244-245. Katsura remarks (p. 245) that 148. This summary is taken from Prof. Kitagawa 's article " A study of a
"
throughout Dignāga's works this is the only place where he discusses the short philosohical treatise ascribed to Dignāga", in H. Kitagawa, Dignāga
theory of trairūpya at length." no Taikei (Kyoto 1965), pp. 430-439.
145. An analysis of this section is found in Bimal Krishna Matilal, 149. T. 1656 = N. 1253, translated by Paramārtha between 557 and 569.
"
Dińnāga's remark on the concept of anumeya", Journal of the 150. See Thomas, "The works of Aryadeva, Triratnadāsa, and
Ganganatha Jha Research Institute 24, 1968, p. 159. Dharmādhikarabhūti " , Album Kern (Leiden 1903).
146. In the Nyāyamukha nyūnatā is defined as " lack of any member of 151.Quoted from Giuseppe Tucci, "Minor Sanskrit texts on the
a proof' as in the Nyāya tradition. Prajñāpāramitā", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1947, pp. 53-75.
147. Exactly the same types of fourteen jātis are discussed in the Essentially the same information is provided in Edward Conze, The
Nyāyatnukha in a different order, namely, in the order of 7, 8, 9, 10, II, Prajñāpāramitñ Literature (Second edition, Tokyo 1978), p. 52.
12, 13, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 14 and 3. In the Vādavidhi of Vasubandhu the same 152. Oskar von Hiniiber, A Handbook of Pdli Literature (Berlin 1996),
fourteen jūtis are classified into three categories, namely (1) "wrong" = pp. 143-144. Hinuber concludes "Thus Patis-a appears to have been
7, 8, 9, 10, 2, 1, 11, 12, 4 and 6; (2) "unreal" = 14 and 13; and (3)
" completed between AD 459 or 499 " --which date depending on the correct
contradictory" = 5 and 3. dating of Moggallana, which is not certain. So we split the difference!
In the Tarkaśāstra attributed to Vasubandhu we find a similar list 153. K. R. Norma, Pāli Literature, op. cit., pp. 132-133.
of sixteen refutations (*khañdana), namely (l) " wrong" 154. Noriaki Hakamaya, "Asvabhāva's commentary on the
(*viparŪakhañdana) = sādharmyakhandana, vaidharmya-, vikalpa-, Mahāyānasūtrālańkāra IX. 56-76", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies
aviśesa-, prāpti-, aprāpti-, ahetu-, upalabdhi-, sarhSaya-, 20.1, 1971, pp. 473-465, and "Asvabhāvā s and Sthiramati's
kāryabhedakhandana (cf. Pramānasathgrahavrtti nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 1, 2, commentarties on the MSA, XIV, 34-35 " , Journal of Indian and Buddhist
11, 12, 4, 6); (2) "unreal" (*asatkhañdana) - avaryavyañjakakhañdana, Studies 27.1, 1978, pp. 491-487.
arthāpattivyañjaka-, pratidrstānta- (cf. Pramāñasamuccayavrtti nos. 14 155. It seems more likely that this commentary is by an Asvabhāva other
and 13 and Nyāyasūtra V.1.9) and (3) "contradictory " than the author of #s 134-135 above. It will be summarized in a later
(*viruddhakhañdana) = anutpattikhandana, nityatā-, svārthaviruddha- (cf. Volume.
608 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES TO PART TWO 609
156. See NCat III, p. 169. " "
169. This Chapter is translated (our T ) by William L. Ames in Journal
157. See NCat Ill, p. 169. of Indian Philosophy 23, 1995, pp. 295-365. Our summary is based on
158. See NCat III, p. 169. Ames' translation alone.
159. See NCat III, p. 168. 170. Translated by William L. Ames in his Ph. D. dissertation at the
160. Mejor, op. cit., p. 50. University of Washington, 1986. The summary is made on the basis of
161. Quoted, with stylistic emendations, from N. A. Sastri's summary in this translation alone.
Visva-Bharati Annals 2, 1949, pp. 28-29. 171. This Chapter has been translated by William L. Ames in his
162. Christian Lindtner, " Adversaria Buddhica II. On the authenticity of dissertation at the University of Washington in 1986, pp. 162-207. The
Madhyamakaratnapradipa", Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde Siidasiens summary here is made on the basis of that translation alone.
26, 1982, pp. 172-184. 172. This Chapter is translated by William L. Ames in his dissertation,
163. A portion is translated and studied in Donald S. Lopez, .Jr., "Do
ibid. The summary is made on the basis of the translation alone.
.irāvakas understand emptiness?", Journal of Indian Philosophy 16, 1988, 173. This Chapter of Bhavya's commentary is translated (our "T") by Paul
pp. 71-81.
Nietupski in Journal of Indian Philosophy 24, 1996, '103-143. This
164. Shikafumi Watanabe, " A translation of the summary is based solely on that translation.
Madhyamakahrdayakārikā with the T 'arkajvālā III. 137-146", Journal of
174. Translated by William L. Ames in his dissertation, op. cit.
the International Association of Buddhist Studies 21.1, 1998, p. 127. 175. A portion of this section is translated and studied in D.S.Lopez, Jr.,
165. Passages from this Chapter are translated and studied in Donald S.
op. cit.
Lopez, Jr. 's article cited in footnote 111.
176. Shotaro Iida, "The nature of samvrti and the relationship of
166. Jens Braarvig has provided the Tibetan text and a summary of a
paramdrtha to it in Svātantrika-Mādhyamika", in Mervyn Sprung (ed.),
small section of Chapter Four in his paper "Bhavya on mantras:
The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Veddnta (Dordrecht 1973),
apologetic endeavours on behalf of the Mahayana" in Studia Indologiczne pp. 68-69.
Volume 4, 1997, from the Oriental Institute, Warsaw University, pp. 31-
177. This is Madhyāntavibhāga 1 .16, 21 and 22 in the numbering used
39.
in the summary of that work in our Volume Eight, p. 376.
167. The summary provided here is taken from Christian Lindtner's article
178. Cf. Nyāyamukha 1; Pramānasamuccaya III. 12.
"Bhavya on Mīmātńsā " in Studia Indologiczne Volume 4, ibid., pp. 91-
179. Christian Lindtner, "Bhavya, the logician", Adyar Library
123. Also verses 133-140, which concern meat-eating (allowable) and the
Bulletin 50, 1986, pp. 69-76.
question whether plants have feelings (he thinks not) are provided and
180. For a typical discussion with references see footnote 1 in Christian
analyzed in Shinjo Kawasaki, "Principle of life according to Bhavya" in
R. K. Sharma (ed.), Researches in Indian and Buddhist Philosophy: Lindtner' s " Bhavya ' s critique of Yogācāra in the
Madhyamakaratnapradipa" in Bimal Krishna Matilal and Robert D.
Essays in Honour of Professor Alex Wayman (Delhi 1993), pp. 69-83.
Evans (eds.), Buddhist Logic and Epistemology (Dordrecht 1986), p. 255.
Prof Kawasaki has published the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts in several
issues of Studies from the University of Tsukuba Institute of Philosophy: 181. A portion of this first section (Peking edition N. 5254, Tsha fol.
'
1976 (Sept. 1977), pp. 1-15; 12 (March 1987), pp. 1-23; 13 (March 326a6-330a2 is translated and discussed by Christian Lindtner in "Atīśa s
1988), pp. 1-42. introduction to the two truths", Journal of Indian Philosophy 9, 1981, pp.
168. This Chapter has been translated by William L. Ames in Journal of 169-177.
182. Christian Lindtner has translated this Chapter in his article from the
Indian Philosophy 21-22, 1993-1994 (our "T"). The summary provided
collection edited by Ivlatilal and Evans cited earlier, pp. 246-254. This
here is based on Ames' translation. Numbering of verses of this Chapter
is "T". He has also kindly provided an independent summary for this
follows the " E" of the summary of Nāgārjuna's work in Volume Eight of
this Encyclopedia. Volume. What follows is a combination of the summary (sections 1-2
and 12) with his translation of sections 3-11. Lindtner's translations of
610 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES TO PART TWO 611

technical terms has been replaced by ours in the usual fashion. 321-329. Others dispute that dating, claiming that both Cāttanār and
183. Lindtner points out that the passage quoted is found in Tarkajvālā Dignaga shared a common source. See SKA,pp. 34-107. S.
on Madhyamakahrdaya 5.41-42 minus the reference to trikāya. Suryanarayana Sastri claims that Chapter 29 is a later interpolation; see
184. The passage is Vasubandhu's Trimśikā 28-30. "
his "Buddhist logic in the Manimekhalai , Joumal of Indian History 9.3,
185. For an analysis of Manimekhalai's main narrative and sixteen branch 1930, p. 356. If one were to accep this view, it would not make sense
stories, with discussion of Cāttanār's use of Tamil literary conventions, to date the material in the rest of the text by evidence provided in that
Hindu myths, and a Buddhist cosmology, see Paula Richman, Women, Chapter. S. N. Kandaswamy argues that Cāttanār incorporated Dignāgā s
Branch Stories and Rhetoric in a Tamil Buddhist Text (Syracuse 1987). system into the epic, but made a few small changes in the process of
186. Scholarly dating of Manimekhalai varies from the second to the translation. See his Buddhism as Expounded in Manimekhalai
early ninth century. Some Tamil scholars have dated Manimekhalai as (Annamalinagar 1978), p. 236.
early as the second century A.D. For example, Varatarāja Ayyar provides Both Kandaswamy and Kamil Zvelebil make convincing cases for
a second century date. See his Tamil Ilakkiya Varaldru ( Madras 1957), dating Mañimekhalai in the sixth century. Zvelebil uses internal evidence
p. 148. S. Kandaswami Aiyangar claims that Cilapattikdram and as the basis for his discussion and assigns approximate dates of 550 A.D.
Manimekhalai were both written at the same time and both belong to the for Manimekhalai and 450 for Cilapattikāram. See Kamil Zvelebil, Tamil
Cairkam period. See his Manimekhalai in its Historical Setting (London Literature, Volume 2, Fascicute I of Handbuch der Orientalistik (General
1928), p. 11-12. This very early dating of the text seems to be popular Editor Jan Gonda) (Leiden 1975), pp. 114-116. Kandaswamy does a
among Tamil scholars of a more traditional bent. At the other extreme, comprehensive survey of the issue, concluding on pp. 5-74 of Buddhism
Vaiyāpuri Pillai has assigned Manimekhalai to the eighth or early ninth as Expounded in the Manimekhalai that Cāttanār "lived in the latter half
century and considers the two epics to be roughly contemporary. He of the fifth century A.D. and the early part of the sixth century A.D."
bases his case on the allusions made to purāpic and epic literature. His Many of his conclusions about the dating issue are especially convincing
orientation is more Sanskritic than that of writers mentioned earlier. See because he also places Mañimekhalai in the context of events occurring
S. Vaiyāpuri Pillai, Kāriyakālam ( Madras 1962), pp. 33, 141, and his outside of Tamilnadu. While the earliest dating of the text seems
History of Tamil Language and Literature ( Madras 1956), p. 153. intended to vest Mañimekhalai with a hoary Cańkam venerability and the
Some scholars have also made claims about Mañimekhalai's date datings according to Buddhist logic attempt to date the entire epic by a
based on the philosophical materials contained in the chapters at the end single chapter, the date agreed upon by Kandaswamy and Zvelebil seems
of the epic. Suryanarayana deals with the dating issue on the basis of the to account for the nature of the epic as a whole.
description of Sāmkhya philosophy contained in Chapter 27 of 187. See Appendix A of Paula Richman, Women, Branch Stories..., op.
'
Mañimekhalai. See S. S. Suryanarayana, "The Magimekhalai account of cit., for a discussion of the issue of Manimekhalai s authorship.
the Sārhkhya", Journal of Indian History 8, 1929, pp. 322-327. Others 188. For a discussion of other Tamil Buddhist texts which have not
try to date it on the basis of its chapter dealing with Buddhist logic. survived, see Kamil Zvelebil, Tamil Literature, op. cit., p. 142.
Some claim that Mañimekhalai is a seventh century text and, therefore, 189. For a discussion of the relationshp between Manimekhalai and
it was written after Dignāga, the sixth century Buddhist logician. Cilapattikāram, see Richman, op. cit., pp. 2-5.
Because they feel that the material on Buddhist logic in Chapter 29 is 190. U Ve. Cāminātaiyar, ed., Mañimekhalai (Madras 1898).
based on Dignāga's syste, they assume Manimekhalai must be later. See 191. Na. Mu Veńkatacāmi Nāttār and Auvai Cu. Turaicāmi Pillai,
S. Kuppuswami Sastri, " Problems of identity in the cultural history of Mañimekhalai (Tinnevelly 1946).
ancient India " , Journal of Oriental Research (Madras) 1.2, 1927, p. 192 192. S. K. Kandaswamy in Buddhism as Expounded in the Mañimekhalai,
and K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, The Colas (Madras 1955), pp. 55-56, 62 n. op. cit. provides a nearly complete translation, along with an extensive
117. The issue is discussed further in K. G. Sesha Aiyar, "The date of introduction to the text. Especially interesting to philosophers will be pp.
Magimekhalai", Journal of Oriental Research (Madras) 1.4, 1927, pp. 54-107, which discusses the philosophical systems described. In addition,
 612 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES TO PART TWO 613

Kandaswamy Aiyangar includes, on pp. xxxi-xxxv, a short supplement by p. 8. For a full discussion see N. Aiyaswami Sastri, " On Dharmapāla",
the German Indologist Fl. Jacobi concerning the relationship between Journal of the Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute 2.2, 1941, pp. 347 ff.
Dignāga and Chapter 29. Also helpful is a short supplement by Tubianski
208. Tillemans, ibid., p. 11. Tillemans, p. 12, discusses the possibility
entitled " The authorship of the Nyāyapraveśa (sic)", found on pp. 108-.
that this work may have been a commentary on Bhartrharis Vūkyapad ya.
1 10 of the book.
209. Tillemans, ibid.
193. Hisselle Dharmatara Mahathera, "Buddhism in South India", The
210. Giuseppe Tucci's Le versione cinese del Catuhśataka di Aryadeva,
Wheel Publication volumes 124-125, 1968.
confrontata col testo sanscrit e la traduzione tibetana. Rivista Degli
194. S. S. Suryanarayana, "The Ma9imekhalai accont of the Sāritkhya",
Studi Orientali X, 1925, pp. 521-567. _
op. cit.
211. Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Le nirvāna apres Aryadeva , Melanges
" "
195. A. L. Basham, History and Doctrines of the Afivikas: A Vanished
Chinois et Bouddhiques 1, 1932, pp. 127-135.
Indian Religion (London 1951; Delhi 1981).
196. Refers to Makkali Gosāla. 212. Listed at NCat LX, p. 253, but not known to Hsiiang-tsang or found
See Basham, ibid., p. 215 and
in the Taisho collection of translations. This reference should be checked
Kandaswamy, op. cit., p. 194.
against the the commentary on the Śata.istra attributed to "Vast["
197. Note that in line 289 of this Chapter it is said that five systems of
translated in Gisueppe Tucci's Pre-Dignāga Texts on Logic from Chinese
thought have been expounded. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar interprets these
Sources (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 49) (Baroda 1929).
five as being (1) the Vedic schools, (2) the Jaina schools (in which
213. Tillemans, op. cit., p. 8
category he includes both the Ajivikan and Nirgranthan speaker), (3) the
214, Diana Y. Paul, Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China
Sāritkhya school, (4) the Vaiśeşika school, and (5) the Lokāyata school.
(Stanford, Cal. 1984), p. 120
See Kandaswamy, op. cit., p. 199.
198. Kandaswamy. op. cit., p. 313. 215. Paul, ibid., p. 7
199. For a discussion of this section and a chart comparing Sanskrit, Pāli 216. Paul, ibid., pp. 121-130
217. For analysis of the beginning of this work see Robert K. C. Forman,
and Tamil terminology for each link see Kandaswamy, op. cit., pp. 320-
322. "Paramārtha and modern constructivists on mysticism: epistemological
200. See Musashi Tachikawa, " A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic monomorphism versus duomorphism " , Philosophy East and West 39,
(A Translation of the Nyāyapraveśa)", Journal of Indian Philosophy 1.2, 1989, esp. pp. 398 ff.
218, Marek Mejor, op. cit., pp. 51-57
1971, p. 119, note 3 for a list of articles devoted to this discussion.
201. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 38, Baroda 1968. 219. Mejor, op. cit., p. 90 "
202. N. D. Mironov, Nyāyapraveśa. 1. Sanskrit Text, edited and 220. See Haneda Toru, "Kaikotsuyaki Anne no Kusharon Itsugiso (The
' in Shiratori
Uighur translation of Sthiramati s Chi-she lun shih-i shu)
reconstructed. T'oung Pao 28, 1931, pp. 1-24.
203. Tachikawa, op. cit., pp. 111-145. hakushi kanreki kinen Tayoshi ronso (Tokyo 1925), pp. 745-793.
204. David Seyfort Ruegg, " Arya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the 221. The numbering of the kārikās in Hsiiang-tsan s Chinese translation
differs slightly; I will follow the order of the extant Sanskrit recension for
gotra-theory of the Prajfidpāramitā", Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde
Siidasiens 12-13, 1968-69, pp. 303-318. ease of comparison.
205. Also see John J. Makransky, " Controversy over dharmakdya in India 222. Marek Mejor, op. cit., pp. 90-110 has provided an extended
discussion reviewing the opinions of various scholars on the date and
and Tibet: a reappraisal of its basis, Abhisamayālahkūra Chapter 9",
works of Sthiramati and in particular the "serious problem connected with
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 12.2, 1989,
the history of (the) transmission " of this work. For one thing, Mejor
pp . 45-78.
206. Conze, The Prajiidpāramitā Literature, op. cit., p. 112. concludes that the Tibetan translation "is one of the latest ever made in
207. Tom J. F. Tillemans, Materials for the Study ofAryadeva..., op. cit. Tibet". Mejor concludes that "it is by no means an easy task to
determine what precisely Sthiramati wrote himself. A comprehensive
614 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES 615

study of Sthiramati's Tattvārtha, with the help of all existing materials-- Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyogakubu Kenkyu Kiyo/Journal of the Faculty
its Chinese, Uigur, Tibetan versions as well as the commentaries of of Buddhism of Komazawa University 36, 1978, pp. 1-26. This article
Pūmavardhana and Yaśomitra--is a desideratum." discusses in detail the parallels between this section of the ASBh and the
'
Masahiro Shogaito (Tuofan, Hotan and Dunhuang (Berlin, 1996), Viniścayasarhgrahar). A. Charlene S. McDermott s briefer study of the
pp. 293-306) says that both Chinese and Tibetan translations exist. The same issue (A. C. S. McDermott, "Asańgās defense of ālavavijñāna. Of
Tibetan version was translated by Dharmabālabhadra (1441-1528). catless grins and sundry related matters", Journal of Indian Philosophy 2,
Shogaito's article concerns a Uighur version in the British Library that 1973, pp. 167-174) contains some perceptive philosophical discussion.
contains the complete first volume and more of the fourth volume of the Other illuminating materials may be found in the first chapter of Asańga's
Chinese text from which it was translated. Mahāyānasarhgraha, conveniently available in Etienne Lamotte's French
223. Cf. also Nyāvānusāra T.1562.29.329b. translation.
224. The first listing mistakenly repeats updya as the last member. 234. Some discussion of the philosophical issues raised here has been
225. A-pi-ta-mo shun cheng-li lun 2, T.1562-29.355c7-8; quoted in provided by Noriaki Hakamaya, "Nirodhasamāpatti--its historical
"
Yaśomitra, Sphutārtha Abhidharmakośatyākhyā, ed. Dwarikadas Sastri meaning in the Vijñaptimātratā system , Journal of Indian and Buddhist
(Varanasi 1981), vol. 1, p. 41. See also V. V. Gokhale, " What is Studies 23.2, 1975, pp. 33-43, and more recently by Paul Griffiths, "On
avijñaptirūpa (concealed form of activity)?" in New Indian Antiquary 1, being mindless: the debate on the reemergence of consciousness from the
1938, pp. 70-71. attainment of cessation in the Abhidharmakośabhāşyam and its
226. See the outline of Sthiramati's position in Gokhale, ibid., p. 72. commentaries " , Philosophy East and West 33, 1983, pp. 379-394.
'
227. Cf. Sasivuttanikāya vi.l.1 (Brahmavacana); T.seng-i A-han Ching 235. This section of the ASBh reads very like a summary of Asańga s
(Ekotlor gama), T.125.2.593a-b. Śrāvakabhūmi (ed. Karunesha Shukla, 439.9-443.11) and provides some
228. See the discussion of the controversy over the true character of evidence that the author of the ASBh was acquainted with that work. The
jivitendriya in P. S. Jaini, "Buddha's prolongation of life " , Bulletin of the discussion in the Śrāvakabhūmi is the only other analysis of this
sevenfold category that I have been able to locate; it appears to have been
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 21, 1958,
a specifically Yogācāra creation.
pp. 550-551.
229. Prahlad Pradhan, "A note on Abhidharmasamuccaya Bhāşya and its 236. For a recent excellent discussion of the problems involved in
translating these terms see Michael M. Broido, "Abhipraya and
author Sthiramati (?)", Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society "
35.1-2, 1950, pp. 34 ff. implication in Tibetan linguistics , Journal of Indian Philosophy 12, 1984,
230. The original (largely erroneous) description of the ms. given by pp. 1-34.
Sankrtyayana may be found in Rahula Sankrtyayana, " Sanskrit palm-leaf 237. A largely parallel discussion of these categories may be found in
mss. in Tibet " , Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 21, and Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra 12.19-23.
1935, p. 35. 238. For the standard definitions see the materials gathered, discussed and
translated into French by Etienne Lamotte in the third volume of his
231. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 17, 1976. '
232. Some of this material is listed and annotated by Noriaki Hakamaya translation of the Mahāprajñāpārantitāśāstra. See also Asvabhāva s
Mahāyānasathgrahopanibandhana D /sense-)-tsan /ri 2803ff/P Sems- kā
in his bibliographical introductions to these texts found in Volumes 12
Tsam LI 338b3ff and the same author s Mahāyānasntrālamkāratī
'
and 13 of Tibetan Tripitaka Sde Dge Edition Bstan Hgyur Semis Tsam,
(Komazawa Daigaku Bukyogakubu Kenkyu Kiyo/Journal of the Faculty
compiled and edited by K. Hayashima, J. Takasaki, Z. Yamaguchi and N.
of Buddhism of Komazawa University 41, 1983, pp. 2-36.
Hakamaya (Tokyo 1980).
233. This eightfold proof has been studied by Noriaki Hakamaya, 239. A close parallel to these definitions may be found in the second
"Alayashiki sonzai no hachi ronsho ni kansuru shobunken" ("Materials chapter of the Mahāyānasamgraha. See Etienne Lamotte's translation,
concerning the eightfold proof of the existence of the alayavipidna"), Chapter 2, #20.
 616 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES TO PART TWO 617

240. For an introductory discussion of Indian inferential schemata see the 204a-230c). Tibetan translation: Hphags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa then
chapter on " Good Reasons in Philosophical Discussions" in Karl H.
po clros kyi rnam grans leāu ston phrag brgva pa las āod sruris kyi
Potter, Presuppositions of India ś Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
leā cii rgya Hier āgrel pa (Arva-rnahāratrrakūta-dharmaparyāya-
1963; Delhi 1991, 1999), pp. 56-92. More detailed discussions--also of śatasāhasrikāparivartakāśvapaparivarta-kka-. Peking Edition No. 5510
more relevance to specifically Buddhist ideas--may be found in some of (Reprint Ed. Vol. 105, pp. 153.5.1 - 196.2.7.7.
Douglas Dunsmore Daye's works. See Bibliography (3rd edition) for 248. Tib. Peking Repr. p. 196.2.6.
references. 249. The Kāsyapaparivarta, a Mahāyānasūtra of the Ratnakūta Class,
241. This outline of the errors involved in postulating a self is of
edited in the Original Sanskrit, in Tibetan and in Chinese, by Baron A.
common occurrence in Indian philosophical literature. The fullest and von Stael-Holstein, Shanghai 1926. The editor divides the whole sūtra
most standard form of this analysis occurs in Candrakirti's into 167 sections (pp. 1-166) and in each section the Sanskrit text and
Madhvamakāvatāra (T. 120 ff.; see Louis de la Vallee Poussin's edition parallel passages in Tibetan and four Chinese translations are provided.
and translation) where a sevenfold analysis rather than this fourfold one Hereafter, in referring to the sutra. this section numbering is used.
is employed.
On this sūtra see Friedrich Weller, Index to the Tibetan
242. Available in Tibetan as P. 5531. The only information about this translation of the Kāśyapaparivarta (Harvard Sino-Indian Series, Vol. 1,
work in Western languages, to my knowledge, is contained in an article
pt. 1) 1935; Zum Kāśyapaparivarta, Heft 1: Mongolischer Text, Berlin
by Noriaki Hakamaya, " Asvabhāva's and Sthiramati's commentaries on 1962; ibid., Heft 2; Verdeutschung des sanskrit-tibetischen Texts, Berlin
the MSA, XIV, 34-35 " , Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 27.1, 1965. Also see Gadjin M. Nagao's Japanese translation in the Daijo
1978, pp. 491-487. Butten, vol. 9, Tokyo 1974.
243. Shanti Bhiksu Shastri, " Paficaskandhaprakarapa of Vasubandhu", 250. There are four Chinese translations: 1. Han version, tr. by
'
Indian Historical Quarterly 32, 1956, pp. 368-385. Lokakśema. T. 350: 2. Tsin version, tr. anonymous, T. 351; 3. Ts in
244. Passages are studied in D. S. Ruegg, Journal of Indian Philosophy version, tr. anonymous, T. 310 (43); T. 351; 4. Sung version, tr. by Che
5, 1977, pp. 30-32; Y. Kajiyama, Asiatische Studien 43.1, 1992, pp. 212- hou (Dānapāla), T. 352. Of them, 4. Sung version is identical with the
221; J. Takasaki and P. Griffiths in N. K. Wagle and F. Watanabe (eds.), Sanskrit edition and Tibetan translation, while 3. Ts'in version includes
Studies in Buddhism in Honou r of Professor A. K. Warder (Toronto sections on Samantāloka' s questions (secs. 150-156) but lacks secs. 157-
1993), pp. 149-159; G. M. Nagao in Indianisme et Bouddhisme offerts it 165, 2. Tsin version lacks Samantāloka's questions and others, and 1.
Msgr. Etienne Lamotte (Louvain-la-Neuve 1980), pp. 245-258; P. S. Jaini Han version lacks all after section 150 with additions of secs. 35, 53, 62,
in In the Mirror ofMenioty (ed. J. Gyatso) (Albany, N.Y. 1992), pp. 47-
91, and 107.
60.
251. Chinese tr.: Yii-chia-.shih-ti-lun, tr. by Hstian tsang, Tisho No. 1579,
245. Yuichi Kajiyama, " Bhāvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmapāla",
fast. 79-89, Vol. 30, pp. 738c - 747b. Tib. tr.: rNal ābyor syod paāi sa
Wiener Zeitschrift fir die Kunde Siidasiens 12-13, 1968-69, p. 197,
rnam par gran la dbab pa bsdu ba, Barn pos. 41-43, Peking Ed. No.
expresses doubt that this work is actually by Sthiramati. 5539, Repr. Vol. 111, pp. 110.2.1 - 118.5.8. It consists of the Viniścaya
246. Chinese: Tn pao-tsi-chirg, compiled and translated by Bodhiruci on the term "bodhisanvapitaka in the Bodhisattvabhūmi.
"

between 693-713, 120 fascicules. Taisho No. 310 (1-49). Tibetan: 252. Parallelism between Tikā and YBh was early noticed by Tun-lun in
Hphags padkon mchog hrtsegs pa then poāi (-has. kvi roam grams leāu his commentary on YBh (Taisho No. 1828, Vol. 42, p. 793c - 794a).
ston phrag brgya pa, Cases, Dkon brtsegs 1-6, Peking Ed. No. 760 (1-
Also see Tsukinowa, Kenryu: Ku/ton Daihoshakukvo ni !suite (On the Old
49). Arrangement of the sī tras in the Tibetan version seems to have Ratnakiītasūtra) (in Japanese), Butten no Hihanteki Kenku (Kyoto 1971),
followed after the Chinese version. pp. 393-407.
247.Kāśyapaparivarta-Hkā: Chinese translation: Ta-pao-tsing-lun, As for the priority between the two texts, some scholars are of
translated by Bodhiruci (between 508-537). Taisho No. 1523 (Vol. 26, pp. the opinion that YBIi utilized the present work, but this is quite unlikely.
618 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES ENDNOTES 619

265. This attribution of Yaśomitra s seems rather unlikely, as Kośa

It is difficult to fix the date of YBh but it is probably some time in the ' IX is
early fifth century at the latest. This is inferred from the date of the certainly anterior to the Par"icaskandhaka, and the self-reference is rather
Chinese translation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (before 433, by to Kohl I, as Vasubandhu himself indicates.
Dharmakşema), in which is suggested the existence of all five parts of the 266. Tom J. F. Tillemans, "Dharmakirti and Tibetans on
"
YBh. The date of Sthiramati, on the other hand, is usually held to be adrSyānupalandhihetu , Journal of Indian Philosophy 23, 1995, p. 129.
510-570 A.D., but this date is too late to be that of the author of the 71kā, See also Tillemans, "Pre-Dharmakirti commentators on Dignāga's
since its Chinese translation was made between 508-537. We should, definition of a thesis (paksalaksana)", The Buddhist Forum Volume III
therefore, consider a wrong attribution of the Tib. version or the existence London 1994), pp. 295-305, and Shoryu Katsura, "Dignāga and
"
of another Sthiramati. Dharmakirti on adarśanamātra and anupalandhi , Asiatische Studien
253. 11kB, Taisho Vol. 24, 204a; Peking, Repr. Vol. 105, pp. 153.5.6 - 46.1, 1992, pp. 222-231.
154.1.6. 267. The following paragraph is quoted from Ernst Steinkellner,
"Bemerkungen zu Iśvarasena s Lehre vom Grund , Wiener Zeitschrift fir
' "
254.WI, ibid. 204a; Peking, p. 153.5.3-6.
255. A different kind of interpretation is given in the die Kunde Siidasiens 10, 1966, p. 84. "
Mahāyānasamgraha, T.31, 141c-142a. 268. D.S. Ruegg, Arya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the gotra-theory ,
"

256. On this section see Takeuchi, Shoko: " Kāśyapaparivarta no Chudo in Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde Siidasiens 12-13, 1968-69, p. 305,
Setsu o megutte (On the doctrine of the Middle Way in the note 6.
Kāśyapaparivartā" (in Japanese), Ryukoku Daigaku Ronshu 38, 1967, pp. 269. ibid., p. 307
55-78.
257. On this section see Jikido Takasaki, Nyoraizo Shiso no keisei
(Formation of the Tathdgatagarbha Theory) (in Japanese) (Tokyo 1974),
pp. 453-465.
258. See Takasaki, ibid., pp. 465-474.
"
259. See P. S. Jaini, Prajñā and drsti in the Vaibhāşika system" , in
Lewis Lancaster (ed.), Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems. Studies in
Honor of Edward Conze, Berkeley Buddhist Series No. 1 (Berkeley,
Calif. 1977), pp. 403-417.
260. P. S. Jaini, "The Sautrāntika theory of bya", Bulletin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 22, 1959, pp. 236-
249.
261. Sukumar Dutt, op. cit., p. 291.
262. K. R. Norman, Pali Literature, op. cit., p. 133. but cf. von Hiniiber,
op. cit., pp. 142-143, who is inclined to date this work into the ninth
century. Furthermore, he contends that Upasena "borrows material from
Dhammapālā" (p. 143) which if correct would place this Upasena 's date
after Dhammapāla's, which seems to be around 970 (although von
Hiniiber dates Dhammapāla much earlier).
263. Notably also by Satitghabhadra in Nyāyānu.sāra, Chapter 50, cf. La
Valee Poussin, Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 5.
264. Abhisamayālarirkāra II. 10b.