FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137621. February 6, 2002.]

HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION , petitioner, vs.

MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, respondent.

Emerico B. Lomibao for petitioner.

Joselito H.J. Reyes for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan

enacted Ordinance No. 28 increasing the stall rentals of the market vendors in
Hagonoy. Members of petitioner association participated in several public
hearings conducted by the Sangguniang Bayan. The ordinance was approved
by the Acting Mayor on October 7, 1996. Copies of the ordinance were given to
the Municipal Treasurer and posted in three public places in lieu of publication
as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the municipality. On
December 8, 1997, petitioner's president appealed to the Secretary of Justice.
The appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time. Petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals. The appeal was dismissed for failure to attach certified true
copies of the assailed resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. On motion for
reconsideration, petitioner explained that it exerted due diligence to get copies
of the resolutions but failed to do so on account of typhoon "Loleng." The
motion was denied. Hence, the present recourse.

The appellate court should have tempered its strict application of

procedural rules in view of the fortuitous event and considering that litigation is
not a game of technicalities.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government
Code, an appeal questioning the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance
must be filed within thirty (30) days from its effectivity to the Secretary of
Justice. In the case at bar, the filing of the appeal more than a year after the
effectivity of the ordinance is barred for being filed late and was rightly
dismissed by the Justice Secretary. Petition dismissed.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; CERTIFIED COPIES OF ASSAILED

RESOLUTION MUST BE ATTACHED TO PETITION; FAILURE TO ATTACH
RESOLUTION ON GROUND OF FORTUITOUS EVENT IN CASE AT BAR. — We find
that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal on the ground
that it was formally deficient. It is clear from the records that the petitioner
exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed Resolutions certified by
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 the Department of Justice, but failed to do so on account of typhoon "Loleng."
Under the circumstances, respondent appellate court should have tempered its
strict application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous event considering
that litigation is not a game of technicalities.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; TAX

ORDINANCE; 30-DAY PERIOD OF APPEAL TIME-BARRED IN CASE AT BAR. — We
hold that the petition should be dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with
the Secretary of Justice is already time-barred. The applicable law is Section
187 of the 1991 Local Government Code. The aforecited law requires that an
appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary
of Justice within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even
during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be
suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No. 28 took effect in
October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in December 1997, more than a
year after the effectivity of the ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of
Justice correctly dismissed it for being time-barred. At this point, it is apropos to
state that the time frame fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies
before competent courts is not a "mere technicality" that can be easily brushed
aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are
mandatory. Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the
municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being its
lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is of paramount
importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic
services to its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections.
Thus, it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain
for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time limit for an
aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances.
cCHITA

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC HEARING PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. —

Petitioner's bold assertion that there was no public hearing conducted prior to
the passage of Kautusan Blg. 28 is belied by its own evidence. In petitioner's
two (2) communications with the Secretary of Justice, it enumerated the
various objections raised by its members before the passage of the ordinance
in several meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose. These show
beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of the proposed increase and in fact
participated in the public hearings therefor. The respondent municipality
likewise submitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearings conducted by
the Sangguniang Bayan's Committee on Appropriations and Market on February
6, July 15 and August 19, all in 1996, for the proposed increase in the stall
rentals. Petitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no public hearing
conducted as its objections to the proposed measure were not considered by
t h e Sangguniang Bayan. To be sure, public hearings are conducted by
legislative bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a
proposed law or ordinance. These views, however, are not binding on the
legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the same. Sanggunian
members are elected by the people to make laws that will promote the general
interest of their constituents. They are mandated to use their discretion and
best judgment in serving the people. Parties who participate in public hearings
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 to give their opinions on a proposed ordinance should not expect that their
views would be patronized by their lawmakers.
4. ID.; ID:, ID.; PUBLICATION OR POSTING; COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT
BAR. — On the issue of publication or posting, Section 188 of the Local
Government Code provides that . . . municipalities where there are no
newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2)
conspicuous and publicly accessible places." The records is bereft of any
evidence to prove petitioner's negative allegation that the subject ordinance
was not posted as required by law. In contrast, the respondent Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, presented evidence which
clearly shows that the procedure for the enactment of the assailed ordinance
was complied with. Municipal Ordinance No. 28 was enacted by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy on October 1, 1996. Then Acting Municipal
Mayor Maria Garcia Santos approved the Ordinance on October 7, 1996. After
its approval, copies of the Ordinance were given to the Municipal Treasurer on
the same day. On November 9, 1996, the Ordinance was approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan . The Ordinance was posted during the period from
November 4-25, 1996 in three (3) public places, viz: in front of the municipal
building, at the bulletin board of the Sta. Ana Parish Church and on the front
door of the Office of the Market Master in the public market. Posting was validly
made in lieu of publication as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the
municipality of Hagonoy. This fact was known to and admitted by petitioner.
Thus, petitioner's ambiguous and unsupported claim that it was only "sometime
in November 1997" that the Provincial Board approved Municipal Ordinance No.
28 and so the posting could not have been made in November 1996 was
sufficiently disproved by the positive evidence of respondent municipality.
Given the foregoing circumstances, petitioner cannot validly claim lack of
knowledge of the approved ordinance. The filing of its appeal a year after the
effectivity of the subject ordinance is fatal to its cause.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO LIMIT OF PERCENTAGE INCREASE TO TAX RATES. —

Finally, even on the substantive points raised, the petition must fail. Section 6
c.04 of the 1993 Municipal Revenue Code and Section 191 of the Local
Government Code limiting the percentage of increase that can be imposed
apply to tax rates, not rentals. Neither can it be said that the rates were not
uniformly imposed or that the public markets included in the Ordinance were
unreasonably determined or classified. To be sure, the Ordinance covered the
three (3) concrete public markets: the two-storey Bagong Palengke , the burnt
but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recent Lumang Palengke
with wet market. However, the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon was
excluded from the increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift, dilapidated
place, with no doors or protection for security, intended for transient peddlers
who used to sell their goods along the sidewalk.

DECISION

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 PUNO, J : p

Laws are of two (2) kinds: substantive and procedural. Substantive laws,
insofar as their provisions are unambiguous, are rigorously applied to resolve
legal issues on the merits. In contrast, courts generally frown upon an
uncompromising application of procedural laws so as not to subvert substantial
justice. Nonetheless, it is not totally uncommon for courts to decide cases
based on a rigid application of the so-called technical rules of procedure as
these rules exist for the orderly administration of justice. Interestingly, the case
at bar singularly illustrates both instances, i.e., when procedural rules are
unbendingly applied and when their rigid application may be relaxed.
This is a petition for review of the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals,
dated February 15, 1999, dismissing the appeal of petitioner Hagonoy Market
Vendor Association from the Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice for being
formally deficient.

The facts: On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy,

Bulacan, enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28, 2 which increased the stall
rentals of the market vendors in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take
effect upon approval. The subject ordinance was posted from November 4-25,
1996. 3
In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioner's members were
personally given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it
shall be enforced in January, 1998. On December 8, 1997, the petitioner's
President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice assailing the
constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the
posting of the ordinance.

Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended that the ordinance took

effect on October 6, 1996 and that the ordinance, as approved, was posted as
required by law. Hence, it was pointed out that petitioner's appeal, made over a
year later, was already time-barred.
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was
filed out of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the effectivity of the
Ordinance on October 1, 1996, as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991
Local Government Code. Citing the case of Tañada vs. Tuvera, 4 the Secretary
of Justice held that the date of effectivity of the subject ordinance retroacted to
the date of its approval in October 1996, after the required publication or
posting has been complied with, pursuant to Section 3 of said ordinance. 5

After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals. Petitioner did not assail the finding of the Secretary of Justice
that their appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. Instead, it urged
that the Secretary of Justice should have overlooked this "mere technicality"
and ruled on its petition on the merits. Unfortunately, its petition for review
was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for being formally deficient as it was not
accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice. 6
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 Undaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 7
Hence, this appeal, where petitioner contends that:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED
IN ITS STRICT, RIGID AND TECHNICAL ADHERENCE TO SECTION 6,
RULE 43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF COURT AND THIS, IN EFFECT,
FRUSTRATED THE VALID LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONER
THAT ORDINANCE ( KAUTUSAN) NO. 28 WAS NOT VALIDLY
ENACTED, IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
TANTAMOUNT TO AN ILLEGAL EXACTION IF ENFORCED
RETROACTIVELY FROM THE DATE OF ITS APPROVAL ON OCTOBER
1, 1996.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED
IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
NOTWITHSTANDING PETITIONER'S EXPLANATION THAT ITS FAILURE
TO SECURE THE CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WAS DUE TO THE INTERVENTION OF
AN ACT OF GOD — TYPHOON "LOLENG," AND THAT THE ACTUAL
COPIES RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER MAY BE CONSIDERED AS
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES.

III

PETITIONER WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IF

ORDINANCE/KAUTUSAN NO. 28 BE NOT DECLARED NULL AND VOID
AND IS ALLOWED TO BE ENFORCED RETROACTIVELY FROM
OCTOBER 1, 1996, CONTRARY TO THE GENERAL RULE, ARTICLE 4
OF THE CIVIL CODE, THAT NO LAW SHALL HAVE RETROACTIVE
EFFECT.
The first and second assigned errors impugn the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of its petition for review for petitioner's failure to attach certified true
copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The petitioner
insists that it had good reasons for its failure to comply with the rule and the
Court of Appeals erred in refusing to accept its explanation.
We agree.

In its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, 8 the

petitioner satisfactorily explained the circumstances relative to its failure to
attach to its appeal certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice, thus:
". . . (D)uring the preparation of the petition on October 21, 1998,
it was raining very hard due to (t)yphoon "Loleng." When the petition
was completed, copy was served on the Department of Justice at about
(sic ) past 4:00 p.m. of October 21, 1998, with (the) instruction to have
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 the Resolutions of the Department of Justice be stamped as "certified
true copies. However, due to bad weather, the person in charge (at the
Department of Justice) was no longer available to certify to (sic) the
Resolutions.
"The following day, October 22, 1998, was declared a non-
working holiday because of (t)yphoon "Loleng." Thus, petitioner was
again unable to have the Resolutions of the Department of Justice
stamped "certified true copies." In the morning of October 23, 1998,
due to time constraint(s), herein counsel served a copy by personal
service on (r)espondent's lawyer at ( sic ) Malolos, Bulacan, despite the
flooded roads and heavy rains. However, as the herein counsel went
back to Manila, (official business in) government offices were
suspended in the afternoon and the personnel of the Department of
Justice tasked with issuing or stamping, "certified true copies" of their
Resolutions were no longer available.
"To avoid being time-barred in the filing of the (p)etition, the
same was filed with the Court of Appeals "as is."

We find that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal

on the ground that it was formally deficient. It is clear from the records that the
petitioner exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed Resolutions
certified by the Department of Justice, but failed to do so on account of typhoon
"Loleng." Under the circumstances, respondent appellate court should have
tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous
event considering that litigation is not a game of technicalities. 9
Nonetheless, we hold that the petition should be dismissed asthe appeal
of the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice is already time-barred. The
applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code which
provides:
"SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax
Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings . — The
procedure for the approval of local tax ordinances and revenue
measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code:
Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior
to the enactment thereof. Provided, further, That any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may
be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof
to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60)
days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such
appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the
ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax, fee or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary
of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings.
The aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue
measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice within thirty (30) days from
effectivity of the ordinance and even during its pendency, the effectivity of the
assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal
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 Ordinance No. 28 took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal only in
December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of the ordinance in 1996.
Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being time barred. At
this point, it is apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to
avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a "mere
technicality" that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section
187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory. 10 Ordinance No. 28 is a
revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy to fix and collect
public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the
government is of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its
agencies and provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived
from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity of
revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. 11
Hence, the law provided a time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality
of revenue measures and tax ordinances.
In a last ditch effort to justify its failure to file a timely appeal with the
Secretary of Justice, the petitioner contends that its period to appeal should be
counted not from the time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time
its members were personally given copies of the approved ordinance in
November 1997. It insists that it was unaware of the approval and effectivity of
the subject ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds: first, no public hearing was
conducted prior to the passage of the ordinance and, second, the approved
ordinance was not posted.

We do not agree.
Petitioner's bold assertion that there was no public hearing conducted
prior to the passage of Kautusan Blg. 28 is belied by its own evidence. In
petitioner's two (2) communications with the Secretary of Justice, 12 it
enumerated the various objections raised by its members before the passage of
the ordinance in several meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose.
These show beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of the proposed increase
and in fact participated in the public hearings therefor. The respondent
municipality likewise submitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearings
conducted by the Sangguniang Bayan's Committee on Appropriations and
Market on February 6, July 15 and August 19, all in 1996, for the proposed
increase in the stall rentals. 13
Petitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no public hearing
conducted as its objections to the proposed measure were not considered by
t h e Sangguniang Bayan. To be sure, public hearings are conducted by
legislative bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a
proposed law or ordinance. These views, however, are not binding on the
legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the same. Sanggunian
members are elected by the people to make laws that will promote the general
interest of their constituents. They are mandated to use their discretion and
best judgment in serving the people. Parties who participate in public hearings
to give their opinions on a proposed ordinance should not expect that their
views would be patronized by their lawmakers.
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 On the issue of publication or posting, Section 188 of the Local
Government Code provides:
"Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue
Measures. — Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true
copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue
measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a
newspaper of local circulation; Provided, however, That in provinces,
cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local
circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous
and publicly accessible places." (italics supplied)
The records is bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner's negative
allegation that the subject ordinance was not posted as required by law. In
contrast, the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy,
Bulacan, presented evidence which clearly shows that the procedure for the
enactment of the assailed ordinance was complied with. Municipal Ordinance
No. 28 was enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy on October 1, 1996.
Then Acting Municipal Mayor Maria Garcia Santos approved the Ordinance on
October 7, 1996. After its approval, copies of the Ordinance were given to the
Municipal Treasurer on the same day. On November 9, 1996, the Ordinance
was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . The Ordinance was posted
during the period from November 4-25, 1996 in three (3) public places, viz: in
front of the municipal building, at the bulletin board of the Sta. Ana Parish
Church and on the front door of the Office of the Market Master in the public
market. 14 Posting was validly made in lieu of publication as there was no
newspaper of local circulation in the municipality of Hagonoy. This fact was
known to and admitted by petitioner. Thus, petitioner's ambiguous and
unsupported claim that it was only "sometime in November 1997" that the
Provincial Board approved Municipal Ordinance No. 28 and so the posting could
not have been made in November 1996 15 was sufficiently disproved by the
positive evidence of respondent municipality. Given the foregoing
circumstances, petitioner cannot validly claim lack of knowledge of the
approved ordinance. The filing of its appeal a year after the effectivity of the
subject ordinance is fatal to its cause.
Finally, even on the substantive points raised, the petition must fail.
Section 6c.04 of the 1993 Municipal Revenue Code and Section 191 of the Local
Government Code limiting the percentage of increase that can be imposed
apply to tax rates, not rentals. Neither can it be said that the rates were not
uniformly imposed or that the public markets included in the Ordinance were
unreasonably determined or classified. To be sure, the Ordinance covered the
three (3) concrete public markets: the two-storey Bagong Palengke , the burnt
but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recent Lumang Palengke
with wet market. However, the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon was
excluded from the increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift, dilapidated
place, with no doors or protection for security, intended for transient peddlers
who used to sell their goods along the sidewalk. 16
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
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 pronouncement as to costs. AaEcDS

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Per Justice Cancio C. Garcia and concurred in by Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and Teodoro P. Regino; Rollo , pp. 25-26.
2. Annex "E," Petition; Rollo , pp. 35-36; The ordinance was signed by Councilor
Felix V. Ople, Tagapangulo ng Sanggunian and Dr. Maria Garcia Santos as
Pangulo Punong Bayan.
3. Per Certification of Sanggunian Secretary Ma. Perpetua R. Santos; Rollo , at p.
49.

4. 146 SCRA 448, 452-454 (1986).

5. Resolution, dated February 25, 1998; Rollo , pp. 27-29.
6. Resolution, dated December 17, 1998; Rollo, pp. 22-23.
7. Resolution, dated February 15, 1999; Rollo , pp. 25-26.

8. Rollo , pp. 11-12.

9. Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA
187(1997).

10. Reyes, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 320 SCRA 486 (1999), citing
Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995 edition, p. 266.

11. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1998).
12. Pagtutol sa Kautusan Blg. 28, C.A. Rollo , p. 18; Paghahabol, CA Rollo , pp.
29-30.
13. Rollo, pp. 82-95.
14. Certification of Sanggunian Secretary Ma. Perpetua R. Santos; Rollo , p. 49;
Affidavits of municipal employee Ruperto dela Cruz and Municipal Councilor
Cruz; Rollo , pp. 99-100.

15. See Reply; Rollo , at p. 54.

16. As shown in pictures attached to respondent's Memorandum; Rollo , pp.
117-118.

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