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CRR
3,3 Keeping key suppliers alive during
the COVID-19 pandemic: artificial
supply chain resilience and
282 supplier crisis response strategies
Received 27 August 2021 Mauro Fracarolli Nunes and Camila Lee Park
Revised 21 October 2021
Accepted 22 October 2021 EDC Paris Business School, Paris la d
efense, France, and
Ely Paiva
FGV-EAESP, Sao Paulo, Brazil
Abstract
Purpose – The study investigates supply chain leaders’ initiatives to support their partners in the early stages
of the coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, identifying measures taken to increase supply chain
resilience and their impact on the quality of supply chain relationships.
Design/methodology/approach – Two complementary phases are employed. First, an exploratory
approach is adopted, with the method of discourse analysis being employed in the identification of the supplier
crisis response strategies by S&P500’s top 30 firms. Second, two scenario-based experiments with 983
participants evaluated the impact of such strategies in two dimensions of supply chain relationships’ quality
(supplier satisfaction and supplier commitment).
Findings – Phase one revealed five initiatives’ groups adopted: safety measures, innovative tools, information
and knowledge sharing, supply chain finance and supply chain continuity. Phase two results indicate that
supplier crisis response strategies have positive effects on both supplier satisfaction and commitment. Data
also suggest that safety measures, innovative tools, and information and knowledge sharing strategies
negatively impacted supplier satisfaction and commitment, when compared with strategies adopted by other
buying firms competing for the same supplier. Supply chain continuity was negatively associated with both
dimensions when other buying firms implemented innovative tools and information and knowledge sharing
strategies with their suppliers, while supply chain finance yielded in no differences in comparison to strategies
adopted by competing buying firms.
Originality/value – The authors offer a theoretical typology for supply chain resilience (i.e. natural and
artificial), providing support for buying firms’ decisions regarding supplier crisis response strategies through
the strengthening of artificial supply chain resilience to increase the likelihood of vulnerable key suppliers’
survival.
Keywords Artificial supply chain resilience, Natural supply chain resilience, Supply chain management,
COVID-19, Supplier crisis response strategies, Crisis management
Paper type Research paper

Beyond a critical public health emergency (FDA, 2020), the COVID-19 crisis represented a
stress test for the global economy (WTO, 2020). The very measures taken to curb the
pandemic and avoid the saturation of health systems (WHO, 2020) left a legacy of economic
side effects (Boissay and Rungcharoenkitkul, 2020). Restriction imposed on citizens’
circulation and on the functioning of businesses (Reuters, 2021), for instance, led to a drastic
interruption in the flow of goods (PwC, 2020), causing the greatest economic, financial and
social shocks of the 21st century (OECD, 2020). As a result, companies found themselves
struggling to deal with a series of immediate and often acute changes (Accenture, 2020).
Among the many challenges faced by firms is the impact of the crisis on the structure of
modern business models, particularly those anchored on global supply chains (Alfaro and
Continuity & Resilience Review
Faia, 2020).
Vol. 3 No. 3, 2021
pp. 282-299
© Emerald Publishing Limited The authors would like to thank Professor Barbara B. Flynn for the valuable exchanges, suggestions,
2516-7502
DOI 10.1108/CRR-08-2021-0029 and comments that certainly enhanced our study.
 In such an extreme scenario, the debate on supply chain resilience becomes even more Artificial
complex, as the actions adopted considerably vary. At the same time the relocation or the supply chain
substitution of suppliers were effective strategies for industries such as call centers (Jogani
et al., 2020), “keeping suppliers alive” was essential for many others. Depending on factors
resilience
such as the level of differentiation of purchased items (Ellram et al., 2013), the dependence of
buying firms on suppliers (Elking et al., 2017), buyer–supplier relationship tenures (Paulraj
and Chen, 2007) and supply chain integration (Wiengarten et al., 2019), the focus of many
supply chain strategies shifted from speed and minimization of costs (Christopher, 2016) to 283
survival (Ivanov and Dolgui, 2020). In this set, in addition to work for their own endurance,
supply chain leaders were pushed to intervene in the operations of their partners in order to
guarantee, or, at least, favor the continuation of their operations.
In light of the likelihood that the economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis will last longer than
the pandemic itself (UNCTAD, 2020), understanding the nature and effects of practices
adopted by supply chain leaders early in the COVID-19 crisis should prove valuable. In times of
uncertainty and economic hardship, effective actions on that regard may avoid a string of
bankruptcies, increasing the chances that networks built over decades will withstand. In
particular, the investigation of strategies to provide small, yet critical, suppliers assistance to
weather the economic storm becomes urgent. Aiming to offer empirical evidence on that
direction, the present study is composed of two paired phases. The first consists of an exploratory
approach focused on the identification of the supplier crisis response strategies reported by large
companies to support their partners during the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis.
Building on five categories of initiatives identified (supply chain finance, supply chain
continuity, safety measures, innovative tools, and information and knowledge sharing), their
effects on the quality of relationships with supply chain partners are evaluated in the second
phase of the study. More specifically, through the conduction of two behavioral scenario-
based experiments with a total sample of 983 participants, the impact of each strategy
adopted is measured in terms of supplier satisfaction and supplier commitment. In addition,
the influence of initiatives employed by competitors is analyzed. These objectives translate
into the following research questions: (1) What measures have large companies adopted to
support their supply chain partners during the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis? (phase
one); and (2) what are the impacts of such measures in the quality of relationships between
large firms and the supported partners? (phase two).
Based on our discussions and results, we develop the theoretical concept of artificial
supply chain resilience, which comprises strategies for supplementing the natural resilience
of a supply chain. The study is organized as follows: the section ahead presents a literature
review on supply chain resilience, supply chain leadership, and supply chain relationship
management. Next, the two hypotheses of the study are developed. The following section, in
turn, details the method applied, continued by results, discussion, conclusion, and limitations
and suggestion for future research.

Literature review
By bringing together the concerning literatures on supply chain resilience, supply chain
leadership and supply chain relationship management, the following literature review
supports the development of the two hypotheses of the study. Along with the presentation of
the main arguments and debates issued from each of these sub-fields, the discussion is
intended to contribute to the construction of a contextualized and integrated understanding
of the topics addressed in the investigation.

Supply chain resilience

Despite common in the business literature, the concept of resilience derives from child
behavior research (Garmezy, 1978), referring to the attributes of children who, regardless of
CRR the exceptionally challenging environments they were exposed to (Gorman and Hoopes, 1999;
3,3 Coutu, 2002), were capable to remain positive and proactive, while keeping their focus and
flexibility (Reinmoeller and Van Baardwijk, 2005). Accordingly, the adaptation of this idea to
business contexts evolved in the most varied forms, with authors associating it with
corporate attributes, or bringing it closer to an overall search to reduce vulnerabilities (Starr
et al., 2003). In the strategic management literature, for example, resilience is typically seen as
a process capability. Among other things, this means that for firms to reinvent themselves,
284 they need to overwhelm barriers to change (Hamel and V€alikangas, 2003).
In the supply chain management literature, in turn, the idea of resilience has been more
often employed as the capacity of organizational schemes to absorb acute shocks. Coherently,
Christopher and Peck (2004, p. 4) define it as “the ability of a system to return to its original
state or move to a new, more desirable state after being disrupted”. Within this view, scholars
have concentrated on the most assorted themes. Kim et al. (2015a), for example, investigate
the influence of different structural relationships in the level of resilience of supply networks,
while Lotfi and Larmour (2021) concentrate on role of supply chain collaboration as a vector
of supply chain resilience. Issues linking resilience to supply chain disruption are also
frequent (e.g. Ambulkar et al., 2015; Zhao et al., 2019; El Baz and Ruel, 2020). From a broader
perspective, Burnard and Bhamra (2019) define resilience as either active or passive. While
active resilience would concern a system’s pro-active engagements and adjustments in
relation to change, passive resilience would comprise a system’s resistance to impacts and the
development of robustness within its elements. In this view, authors have stressed the
importance of diligent measures to increase the resilience of both single organizations (e.g.
Bell, 2019) and supply chains (e.g. Naghshineh and Lotfi, 2019).
Building on these developments, the present study proposes a theoretical typology for
supply chain resilience, classifying it into natural and artificial. Natural supply chain
resilience would result from the intrinsic supply chain characteristics that favor the
absorption of impacts. This may include distinct levels of internationalization, institutional
aspects, supply chain structures, the attributes of different industries, and country of origin,
among others. In this way, natural supply chain resilience would provide a built-in defensive
layer, akin to immunity, that prevents a supply chain disruption from having severe
consequences. Because it is inherent, natural supply chain resilience functions without
conscious activation, representing the outcomes of passive resilience strategies. On the other
hand, artificial supply chain resilience refers to the results of the specific strategies that are
intentionally activated to minimize the impact of a supply chain disruption (Chopra and
Sodhi, 2004) or shock (i.e. active resilience). When effectively implemented, artificial supply
chain resilience can compensate for lower levels of natural supply chain resilience.
Noteworthy is the fact that, depending on their strategic orientations, companies may also
damage the natural resilience of the supply chains they are inserted in. Cases in which buyers
put excessive pressure on suppliers for cost reductions, more favorable payment conditions,
faster outputs or for any other related issue may somehow alter the inherent characteristics of
supply chain relationships, and thus, the original resilience of these arrangements. In this set,
the use of bargaining power by buyers (Porter, 1980) must be more carefully analyzed, as
beyond its immediate gains, they may cause long-term losses in natural resilience. Suppliers’
demands must have similar effects.
An important element in the building of artificial supply chain resilience is provision, by a
buying firm, of assistance to vulnerable key suppliers (DeSmet, 2018), which are often small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Song et al., 2018). SMEs are especially vulnerable to demand
fluctuations because they typically lack deep reserves and may dedicate a substantial
amount of their production to a reduced number of customers. Artificial supply chain
resilience strategies for helping vulnerable partners survive a crisis include the maintenance
of orders to suppliers (even if there is no immediate need) (Lekkakos and Serrano, 2016),
the intensification of information sharing (Kembro et al., 2017), the provision of supply chain Artificial
financing, the offering of technical assistance (Tong et al., 2018) and the increase of buyer- supply chain
supplier embeddedness (Kim et al., 2015b). We refer to such strategies as supplier crisis
response strategies. As anticipated, the employment of these strategies by supply chain
resilience
leaders may impact the quality of supply chain relationships, as further discussed next.

Supply chain leadership and supply chain relationship management

The structuring of international supply networks brought inter-organizational management 285
to the center of business debate, with the role played by leading firms in the administration of
these schemes receiving growing attention (Mokhtar et al., 2019a). Accordingly, globalization
– and the reorganization of production resulting from it – increased the need for an enhanced
coordination with suppliers, moving competition from individual firms to whole supply
chains (Gosling et al., 2017). Among other things, supply chain leaders are expected to
disseminate sustainable practices among their partners (Jia et al., 2019), help them improve
their reverse flows (Mokhtar et al., 2019b) and even directly finance their operations (Jiang
et al., 2021).
In investigating the relationship between supply chain leadership and firm performance,
Chen et al. (2021) show that they are positively related, with the effect of leadership varying in
face of factors such as region, industry and type of performance investigated. Upon acute
crises it is possible, however, that the actions perpetrated by supply chain leaders come to be
even more critical for the continuity of the operations of their upstream and downstream
partners. In the specific case of the COVID-19 emergency, supply chain leaders’ actions on
restart support (e.g. loans) and inventory management are pointed out as essential for supply
chain stabilization (D’Auria and De Smet, 2020). Beyond allowing for the continuity of
suppliers’ operations, these actions may have long-term impacts, particularly in the quality of
supply chain relationships. It is possible, for instance, that the assistance provided upon
difficult times comes to strengthen the ties between a leading company and its partners, with
outcomes such as more intense collaboration or loyalty being expected.
As pointed out by Ahmed et al. (2017), however, supply chain relationships are not
homogeneous, with companies using different metrics, processes, people and mentalities for
managing distinct types of connections (Beth et al., 2003). These differences would be
basically due to the large number of relationships that organizations need to deal with, as the
quantity of supply chain partners often surpasses the hundreds and even thousands. Still
accordingly, the management of supply chain relationships would have important
competitive implications for firms, with the growing level of specialization making the
access to partners’ resources and capabilities vital. In this sense, the development of metrics
and standards allowing the comparison of the different sorts of relationships would be
particularly useful. Adds to that the fact that procurement processes seem to have become
particularly harsh on suppliers in the last decades, as time and cost-based competition
became mainstream in many industries (Christopher, 2016). On that regard, Essig and
Amann (2009) argue that the assessment of supplier satisfaction would be necessary for the
management of buyer–supplier relationships, with the consideration of both interaction
processes (e.g. exchange of information) and contexts (e.g. power dependence) being relevant.
The authors define the construct as “a supplier’s feeling of fairness with regard to buyer’s
incentives and supplier’s contributions within an industrial buyer-seller relationship” (p. 103).
Within this view, different levels of supplier satisfaction would denote different levels of
buyer–supplier relationship quality.
Similarly, supplier commitment is associated with the stability of supply chain
relationships (Lai et al., 2005), being a requisite to increase performance from suppliers
(Patrucco et al., 2020). As stressed by the authors, supplier commitment would be preceded by
factors such as buyer commitment, goals alignment and the collaboration initiatives adopted
CRR by suppliers. In investigating both constructs in the context of the German automotive
3,3 industry, Ghijsen et al. (2010) show that, while supplier commitment is influenced by the use
of promises and by human and capital-specific supplier development, supplier satisfaction is
affected by influence strategies and by capital-specific supplier development. We build on
these views to employ the constructs as the dependent variables of the study, as argued in the
development of our hypotheses.
286
Hypothesis development
In addition to directly supporting the survival of key suppliers, investing in supplier crisis
response strategies may strengthen the bonds between a buying firm and its key partners.
Enhanced inter-firm relationship quality should be expressed – among other factors –
through higher levels of supplier satisfaction and commitment to the buying firm,
valuable assets for unanticipated future crises. Differently put, the two constructs employed
as dependent variables in the study are here considered to (partially) capture the extent to
which the supply chain relationships investigated are perceived to be built in a purposeful,
collaborative and mutually beneficial mindset, meaning that the value generated by the
interactions is not excessively captured by the most powerful partner. This is proposed here
to be a facet of the quality of inter-firm relationships.
The reasoning is translated in the first hypothesis of the study.
H1. The use of supplier crisis response strategies is expected to enhance inter-firm
relationship quality.
During worker lockdowns and material shortages caused by the COVID-19 crisis, multiple
buyers sometimes were forced to compete for the parts provided by a single supplier. For
example, many Chinese suppliers were unable to operate, due to worker’s lockdowns during
the first few months of the crisis. Although establishing backup suppliers for critical parts is a
typical resilience strategy, many buying firms discovered that their backup suppliers were
also in China and, thus, were also in lockdown. This led to fierce competition for the services
of suppliers located in parts of the world that had not yet been locked down. As the pandemic
progressed and confinement orders shifted to different geographic areas, the competition for
available suppliers continued. A buying firm’s supplier crisis response strategies may be
evaluated in light of the strategies that alternative buying firms implement to help their
suppliers. Hence, it is also important to consider supplier crisis response strategies relative to
the strategies used by other buying firms. These ideas are expressed in the second hypothesis
of the study.
H2. The impact of a buyer’s supplier crisis response strategies is evaluated by key
suppliers relative to what other buyers are offering.

Phase one
Materials and methods
The situation embodied by the COVID-19 crisis calls for immediately responsive research
methods, to tap into approaches used by supply chain leaders in real time. We propose a two-
phase exploratory approach. In phase one, we used a discourse analysis (Forray and
Woodilla, 2005; Grant and Iedema, 2005) approach. We selected the S&P 500’s 30 top firms,
and their websites were searched to identify whether they had adopted any supplier crisis
response strategies to help their direct or indirect suppliers during the COVID-19 pandemic
crisis. We found that 17 out of the 30 top firms did not indicate any information about how
they dealt with suppliers, while two only provided generic statements, such as “remarkable
efforts to restore our supply chain” (Apple, 2020) and “3 M North American respirator supply
chain running 24 h per day and seven days per week” (3M, 2020), without specifying concrete Artificial
strategies. For the remaining 11 firms, we compiled a list of supplier crisis response strategies supply chain
they applied during the COVID-19 crisis. We identified five broad categories: supply chain
finance, supply chain continuity, safety measures, innovative tools, and information and
resilience
knowledge sharing strategies. Table 1 summarizes the categories and supplier crisis
response strategies by firm.
287
Results and discussion
The exploratory phase of the study revealed that the implementation of pro-active strategies
to support suppliers did not figure among the priorities of all the 30 companies investigated.
The fact that some of them did not mention such concern suggests that the role that supply
chain leaders are expected to play is not yet fully understood, or, if so, it has not been
adequately incorporated. Such inaction, however, may be explained by factors that have not
been detected, such as the specific characteristics of the industries in question, or the sheer
lack of need to do so. It is possible, for example, that these specific firms are not significantly
dependent on their suppliers, with the resilience of their supply chains not representing an
essential aspect in their business models. As discussed earlier, in some cases, the substitution
of suppliers may be more attractive than the offering of support, at least from a pure economic
perspective. In other situations, companies may not neglect their partners, as in case a critical
supplier ceases to operate, the situation might have a detrimental impact for their own
continuity.
This is probably the case for the companies that disclosed their supplier crisis response
strategies in greater detail, with the five categories of pro-active actions identified being
themselves revealing. The implementation of supply chain finance mechanisms, for instance,
denotes a potentially high relevance of supply chain resilience for the leading firms, as the
transfer of financial resources may be the fastest and most efficient way to guarantee
suppliers’ survival in the short-term. Actions classified as supply chain continuity may have
a similar, yet more timely effect, mainly because the financial transfer is indirect (e.g. the non-
interruption of orders placing). In turn, safety measures showed to be more associated with
the combat to the immediate effects of the pandemic itself and not to its unpredicted side-
effects. Depending on the exposition of suppliers to the direct risks issued from the COVID-19
crisis, the focus on such issues may prove essential to their endurance. This may be more
evident to companies that are highly dependent on their workforce, where the use of robots
and automation is low or non-existent. Finally, innovation and knowledge sharing may work
both on the short and long-terms, possibly increasing the efficiency of suppliers’ operations
beyond the most acute moments of the crisis.
Building on these insights, phase two uses scenario-based experiments to assess the
expected impact of supplier crisis support strategies. Two experiments were conducted with
a total sample of 983 respondents, as further detailed ahead.
Phase two. Developing from the results pointed above, in phase two, we conducted two
scenario-based experiments, both of which described Firm A, based in the US, operating in 22
countries, having over 160,000 employees, and annual revenues exceeding $76 billion.
Respondents were asked to imagine they worked for Firm B, one of Firm A’s suppliers, and
were randomly assigned to manipulations in both studies. The first one carried six
manipulations, reflected in six different vignettes: one in which Firm A did not apply any
supplier crisis response strategy and five in which it applied a crisis response strategy
corresponding to one of the five groups identified in Phase One (i.e. supply chain finance,
supply chain continuity, safety measures, innovative tools, and information and knowledge
sharing). Thus, the first experiment tested the perceived effectiveness of each crisis response
strategy in isolation. In the second experiment, we examined the expected effect of various
CRR Supplier crisis response strategies reported
3,3 Supply chain Supply chain Innovative Information and
Firm finance continuity Safety measures tools knowledge sharing

American Accelerated
express payments
Boeing Provided safe Compiled
288 facilities for informative
visitors and documents on
suppliers governmental
Expected measures and
suppliers to programs
comply with
safety measures
(e.g. wearing
masks
Caterpillar Monitored Provided safe
supply chain facilities for
disruptions with visitors and
protocols to suppliers
diminish them
Cisco Provided guidance
for suppliers’ actions
Coca-Cola Respected Supported Expected Simplified Helped suppliers
payment timing supply chain suppliers to supplier getting back to
and supply continuity comply with compliance business by
chain financing safety measures with remote engaging public
program (e.g. wearing technology authorities and
masks) regulators
Provided safety Shared information
equipment to with suppliers
suppliers if
necessary
Home depot Supported
supply chain
continuity
Nike Supported
supply chain
continuity
Pfizer Supported
supply chain
continuity
United Created of Compiled
technologies supply chain informative
focused team documents on
governmental
measures and
programs
Shared information
Table 1. with suppliers and
Supplier crisis suppliers of
response strategies suppliers
during the COVID-19
pandemic crisis (continued )
 Supplier crisis response strategies reported
Artificial
Supply chain Supply chain Innovative Information and supply chain
Firm finance continuity Safety measures tools knowledge sharing resilience
Verizon Expected Shared information
suppliers to with suppliers
comply with
safety measures 289
(e.g. wearing
masks)
Walgreens Supported
supply chain
continuity and
safety measures
expectations Table 1.

crisis response strategies, relative to crisis response strategies applied by other buying firms
in the same industry. The base scenario remained the same, and the manipulations used
groups of strategies employed by other buying firms. For each strategy used by Firm A, there
were vignettes describing each of the other strategies used by other firms competing for the
same supplier. The two-by-two combination of the five types of supplier crisis response
strategies generated 20 different vignettes for the second study (see Tables 2 and 3).

Respondents and manipulation checks

The respondents comprised supply chain professionals in the US and the UK. US respondents
were recruited from a professional’s social media site (www.linkedin.com). LinkedIn profiles
were searched for the terms “supply chain,” “supply chain manager” and “supply chain
analyst.” Potential respondents were invited to participate, incentivized by a drawing for
three Amazon gift cards valued at about $60 each. UK respondents were obtained from
Prolific Academic, a crowdsourcing research platform providing respondents for online
surveys (www.prolific.ac). They were rewarded at a rate of £0.53, equivalent to £6.36/hour, for
successful completion. Out of the initial pool of 418 responses for the first experiment, 54 were
incomplete, 20 were excluded for failing an attention check, and eight were provided by the
same respondent, thus excluded. The final sample comprised 336 valid responses. The
majority of participants ranged between 25 and 34 years old (39.29%) and between 35 and
44 years old (30.65%), with bachelor’s (32.44%) and master’s (34.52%) degrees, currently
employed (70.54%) or self-employed (12.50%) and work in the private-for-profit companies
(65.18%). Respondents rated the vignettes as realistic (X 5 5.64, t 5 24.379, p < 0.000),
believable (X 5 5.66, t 5 24.305, p < 0.000) and likely (X 5 5.63, t 5 22.867, p < 0.000). The
manipulation checks indicated that respondents understood their role as Firm A’s supplier
(X 5 5.87, t 5 23.765, p < 0.000) and Firm A’s large size (X 5 6.45, t 5 60.782, p < 0.000).
No significant disparities were found between respondents sourced from LinkedIn versus
Prolific for either dependent variable (supplier satisfaction: X L 5 5.84, X P 5 6.05, t 5
0.768,
p < 0.451; supplier commitment: X L 5 5.88, X P 5 5.94, t 5
0.269, p < 0.791). Thus, we relied
solely on Prolific for the second experiment. An initial pool of 727 responses was collected,
among which 25 were incomplete, 48 failed an attention check, and seven were duplicates,
leaving a final sample of 647 valid responses. As in the first experiment’s sample, most
respondents ranged between 25 and 34 years old (41.42%) and between 35 and 44 years old
(25.81%), with bachelor’s (35.39%) and master’s (29.37%) degrees, currently employed
(63.99%) or self-employed (13.76%), and work in the private-for-profit companies (69.52%).
CRR Common module
3,3
Founded in 1916 and headquartered in Chicago, USA, firm a is one of the largest companies of the world,
employing over 160,000 people in 22 countries and selling more than US$ 76 billion a year. The firm counts on
more than 1,000 different suppliers, among which are individual entrepreneurs, small companies, medium
companies, and large companies

290 Manipulation modules

No supplier crisis Upon the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic crisis, firm a decided to concentrate on its own
response strategy challenges, opting not to get involved with suppliers’ eventual difficulties
Supplier crisis Upon the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic crisis, firm a offered help to its suppliers, among
response strategies which firm B. In particular, the firm . . .
Supply chain finance . . . sought to offer supplies financial support. That
included the acceleration of their payments and the
additional credit for those who needed the most
Supply chain continuity . . . took a series of measures to ensure the continuity of
suppliers’ operation. That included the uninterrupted
placing of orders, and the creation of multi-skilled business
continuity teams to identify and solve suppliers’ problems
Safety measures . . . took a series of measures to improve the security of
suppliers’ operations. That included safety compliance
programs followed by each of the firm’s facilities, and the
offering of safety equipment and material such as masks
and alcohol when needed
Innovative tools . . . took a series of measures to improve the efficiency of
suppliers’ operations. That included the application of
online methods and technologies, such as remote audits
and assessment using virtual technology
Information and . . . took a series of measures to improve the efficiency of
knowledge sharing suppliers’ operations. That included the sharing of
Table 2. information such as safety measures and governmental aid
Scenarios and programs with suppliers and suppliers of suppliers, and the
manipulations for the provision of advice and guidance on the strategies to be
first experiment adopted

Participants also described the scenarios as realistic (X 5 5.63, t 5 33.740, p < 0.000),
believable (X 5 5.59, t 5 32.292, p < 0.000) and likely (X 5 5.51, t 5 28.766, p < 0.000). The
manipulation checks indicated that the respondents understood their role as Firm A’s
supplier (X 5 5.55, t 5 26.193, p < 0.000) and Firm A’s large size (X 5 6.00,
t 5 39.977, p < 0.000).

Measurement of dependent variables

The two dependent variables for supplier satisfaction and supplier commitment were
operationalized using seven-point Likert scales adapted from existing literature (Ghijsen
et al., 2010). The results of the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for construct validity are
shown in Table 4. All items loaded on standardized factors above the acceptable limit in both
experiments, and both measures had strong Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability
values, demonstrating internal consistency. The average variance extracted (AVE) scores
indicate that the greater portion of the variances were captured by the constructs rather than
by errors in measurement. We assessed unidimensionality using CFA models, with both
constructs linked through a covariance factor. Although the X2 value for the model in the first
experiment did not yield acceptable values (X2 5 27.061, p < 0.001), X2 per degrees of freedom
was below the acceptable limit (X2/df 5 3.383). For the second experiment, X2 was not
 Firm A’s supplier crisis response strategy
Artificial
Supply Supply Information supply chain
chain chain Safety Innovative and knowledge resilience
finance continuity measures tools sharing

Other Supply chain – Scenario 2,1 Scenario Scenario 4,1 Scenario 5,1
buying finance 3,1
firms’ Supply chain Scenario – Scenario Scenario 4,2 Scenario 5,2 291
Supplier continuity 1,2 3,2
crisis Safety measures Scenario Scenario 2,3 – Scenario 4,3 Scenario 5,3
response 1,3
strategy Innovative tools Scenario Scenario 2,4 Scenario – Scenario 5,4
1,4 3,4
Information Scenario Scenario 2,5 Scenario Scenario 4,5 –
and knowledge 1,5 3,5
sharing
Note(s): Example: Scenario 1,2; Upon the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic crisis, Firm A offered help to its suppliers,
among which is Firm B. In particular, Firm A sought to offer its suppliers financial support that included the
acceleration of payments and additional credit for those who needed the most; You also know that other
companies in the industry are helping suppliers with measures such as uninterrupted placing of orders, and the Table 3.
creation of multi-skilled business continuity teams to identify and solve suppliers’ problems, which have not Design of the second
been offered by Firm A experiment

Factor loadings
Measure First experiment Second experiment

Supplier satisfactiona
Dealings with firm a benefit my firm 0.82 0.83
I would be satisfied with dealings with firm A 0.86 0.87
Firm a is good to do business with 0.89 0.90
X (Std. Dev.) 6.039 (0.878) 5.503 (1.087)
Cronbach’s alpha 0.892 0.900
Composite reliability 0.892 0.900
AVE 0.734 0.751
Supplier commitmenta
I am interested in long-term alliances 0.83 0.85
I want to preserve the relationship with firm A 0.90 0.86
Buyers from firm a are considered partners 0.65 0.66
X (Std. Dev.) 5.939 (0.886) 5.597 (0.992)
Cronbach’s alpha 0.820 0.828
Composite reliability 0.840 0.835 Table 4.
AVE 0.640 0.632 Measurement analysis
Note(s): aAdapted from Ghijsen et al. (2010), 1 5 strongly disagree, 7 5 strongly agree of dependent variables

significant (X2 5 8.155, p 5 0.422), with X2/df of 1.014, indicating good fit. In both
experiments, the incremental indexes exceeded threshold values (first experiment:
NFI 5 0.978, IFI 5 0.985, CFI 5 0.985; second experiment: NFI 5 0.994, IFI 5 1.000,
CFI 5 1.000).

Results and discussion

The results from the first experiment (Table 5) show statistically significant differences
between the no strategy manipulation and each of the other five manipulations for both
CRR Supplier crisis Supplier satisfaction Supplier commitment
3,3 Response strategy X(Std. dev.) Sig. differences1 X(Std. dev.) Sig. differences1

1. None 5.544 (1.075) 2, 4, 5, 6 5.316 (1.285) 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

2. Supply chain finance 6.140 (0.934) 1 6.128 (0.757) 1
3. Supply chain continuity 6.061 (0.985) – 6.105 (0.740) 1
4. Safety measures 6.283 (0.651) 1 6.133 (0.721) 1
292 5. Innovative tools 6.144 (0.659) 1 5.983 (0.662) 1
6. Innovation and knowledge sharing 6.076 (0.641) 1 6.000 (0.644) 1
F 0.000*** 0.000***
Table 5. Prob 5.398 8.304
ANOVA results for Note(s): ***p < 0.001; 1Pairwise comparisons, using Tukey and Games–Howell tests, significant at p < 0.05
first experiment or less

supplier satisfaction and supplier commitment at the p < 0.001 significance level, indicating
strong evidence in this direction. This indicates that respondents believe that implementing
supplier crisis response strategies during the pandemic crisis will have a positive effect on
both supplier satisfaction and supplier commitment, thus confirming Hypothesis 1.
Data from the second experiment (Tables 6 and 7) also confirm our Hypothesis 2,
indicating that safety measures, innovative tools, and information and knowledge sharing
strategies were negatively associated with supplier satisfaction and commitment, when
compared with strategies adopted by other buying firms competing for the same supplier.
For safety measures adopted by the company, supplier satisfaction scored X no strategy 5 6.28
when competitors applied no strategy, while its difference with the remaining variables were
statistically significant at p < 0.05 for X supply chain finance 5 5.66, X innovative tools 5 5.63,
X information and knowledge sharing 5 5.40, and at p < 0.01 for X supply chain continuity 5 5.43, while
supplier commitment scored X no strategy 5 6.13 with significant differences at p < 0.05 for
X supply chain finance 5 5.55, X supply chain continuity 5 5.50, X innovative tools 5 5.61, X information and
knowledge sharing 5 5.48. Innovative tools, in turn, scored X no strategy 5 6.14 for supplier
satisfaction, being statistically different at p < 0.01 in comparison to X supply chain
continuity 5 5.38 and at p < 0.05 to X supply chain finance 5 5.53, X safety measures 5 5.49, and
X information and knowledge sharing 5 5.58, and X no strategy 5 6.13 for supplier commitment, while
statistically different from all other strategies (X supply chain finance 5 5.66, X supply chain
continuity 5 5.50, X safety measures 5 5.61, and X information and knowledge sharing 5 5.48) at the p < 0.05
level. For information and knowledge sharing, differences in supplier satisfaction were
detected at the p < 0.001 level between X no strategy 5 6.08 and X safety measures 5 4.87, and
X innovative tools 5 5.49, and at the p < 0.05 level for X supply chain finance 5 5.19, and for supplier
commitment, significant differences at p < 0.01 for X safety measures 5 5.08, as well as at p < 0.05
for X supply chain finance 5 5.37. Supply chain continuity was negatively associated with
supplier satisfaction (X no strategy 5 6.06) and commitment (X no strategy 5 6.20) when other
buying firms implemented information and knowledge sharing strategies with their
suppliers also for both supplier satisfaction (X information and knowledge sharing 5 5.35) and
commitment (X information and knowledge sharing 5 5.45) at the p < 0.05 significance level, while
supply chain finance did not yield in significant differences when competitors applied
different strategies.
While results of the analysis in the first experiment are relatively intuitive (any supplier
crisis response strategy produces better outcomes than no strategy), the outcomes of
experiment two call for further consideration. Contrary to what might be initially expected,
Firm A’s supplier Other buying companies’ Supplier satisfaction Supplier commitment
Artificial
crisis response supplier crisis response Sig. Sig. supply chain
strategy strategy X (Std. dev.) Diff.1 X (Std. dev.) Diff.1 resilience
Supply chain 1 None 6.140 (0.934) – 6.128 (0.757) –
finance 2 supply chain continuity 5.696 (0.830) – 5.787 (0.828) –
3 safety measures 5.656 (1.153) – 5.656 (1.059) –
4 Innovative tools 5.616 (1.145) – 5.808 (0.816) – 293
5 Information and 5.813 (0.792) – 5.882 (0.686) –
knowledge sharing
F 5 2.251 F 5 2.034
Supply chain 1 None 6.061 (0.975) 5 6.205 (0.740) 5
continuity 2 supply chain finance 5.559 (0.982) – 5.666 (1.125) –
3 safety measures 5.802 (0.732) – 5.843 (0.733) –
4 Innovative tools 5.635 (1.360) – 6.597 (1.158) –
5 Information and 5.352* (1.072) 1 5.450* (1.171) 1
knowledge sharing
F 5 2.978* F 5 2.827*
Safety measures 1 None 6.283 (0.651) 2, 3, 4, 5 6.133 (0.721) 2, 3, 4, 5
2 supply chain finance 5.552** (0.989) 1 5.656* (0.730) 1
3 supply chain continuity 5.436** (1.172) 1 5.505* (1.056) 1
4 Innovative tools 5.636* (0.976) 1 5.616* (0.886) 1
5 Information and 5.400*** (1.081) 1 5.485* (1.103) 1
knowledge sharing
F 5 7.251*** F 5 4.395**
Innovative tools 1 None 6.144 (0.659) 2, 3, 4, 5 6.133 (0.721) 2, 3, 4, 5
2 supply chain finance 5.526* (1.084) 1 5.656* (0.730) 1
3 supply chain continuity 5.382** (1.018) 1 5.505* (1.056) 1
4 safety measures 5.489* (1.176) 1 5.616* (0.886) 1
5 Information and 5.580* (0.788) 1 5.485* (1.103) 1
knowledge sharing
F 5 7.251*** F 5 4.385**
Information and 1 None 6.076 (0.641) 2, 4 6.000 (0.644) 2, 4
knowledge sharing 2 supply chain finance 5.198* (1.311) 1 5.374* (1.063) 1
3 supply chain continuity 5.406 (1.217) – 5.593 (1.073) –
4 safety measures 4.862*** (1.449) 1 5.088** (1.393) 1
5 Innovative tools 5.494*** (0.999) – 5.551 (0.818) –
F 5 5.541*** F 5 3.918** Table 6.
Note(s): *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001; 1Pairwise comparisons, using Tukey and Games–Howell tests, ANOVA results for
significant at p < 0.05 or less second experiment

the provision of supply chain finance was not perceived to be any more effective than the
other alternatives. This suggests that supply chain finance strategies are fundamentally
important to suppliers, not just during an acute disruption. Some of the relative findings are
also curious. For example, a supply chain continuity strategy is perceived as less important
when other buying firms offer information and knowledge sharing strategies. This may
underline the importance of supply chain leaders providing guidance to their suppliers. It was
also intriguing that the offering of safety measures was perceived as inferior when any other
supplier crisis response strategy was used by competing firms. This may reveal a greater
supplier risk tolerance during the crisis. These and the other outcomes suggest the existence
of a hierarchy of supplier crisis response strategies.
Still, the confirmation of hypotheses 1 and 2 may be particularly useful for managers, with
results indicating the need for more adapted crisis management strategies in supply chain
contexts. Regarding the evidence around the impacts of lead firms’ support on the quality of
CRR Other buying Supplier satisfaction Supplier commitment
3,3 Firm A’s supplier companies’ supplier
crisis response crisis response
strategy strategy B t VIF β t VIF

Supply chain (Constant) 47.547*** 55.963***

finance Supply chain
0.171
2.079* 1.303
0.155
1.884 1.303
294 continuity
Safety measures
0.184
2.248* 1.297
0.213
2.587** 1.297
Innovative tools
0.202
2.458* 1.303
0.13
1.772 1.303
Information and
0.127
1.546 1.309
0.114
1.375 1.309
knowledge sharing
Supply chain (Constant) 45.360*** 48.644***
continuity Supply chain finance
0.176
2.193* 1.2368
0.164
2.041* 1.268
Safety measures
0.092
1.143 1.274
0.099
1.230 1.274
Innovative tools
0.151
1.879 1.274
0.155
1.915 1.274
Information and
0.258
3.187** 1.285
0.254
3.137** 1.285
knowledge sharing
Safety measures (Constant) 51.529*** 53.506***
Supply chain finance
0.274
3.537*** 1.274
0.195
2.455* 1.274
Supply chain
0.304
3.963*** 1.256
0.247
3.125** 1.256
continuity
Innovative tools
0.245
3.160** 1.279
0.214
2.688** 1.279
Information and
0.342
4.397*** 1.290
0.274
3.429*** 0.290
knowledge sharing
Innovative tools (Constant) 51.432*** 53.762***
Supply chain finance
0.238
3.017** 1.267
0.143
1.774 1.267
Supply chain
0.304
3.836*** 1.283
0.280
3.460*** 1.283
continuity
Safety measures
0.255
3.233*** 1.272
0.162
2.009* 1.272
Information and
0.217
2.755** 1.267
0.152
1.886 1.267
knowledge sharing
Information and (Constant) 33.102*** 36.616***
knowledge Supply chain finance
0.287
3.214* 1.474
0.233
2.561* 1.474
sharing Supply chain
0.219
2.453* 1.474
0.151
1.664 1.474
continuity
Table 7. Safety measures
0.405
4.514*** 1.493
0.347
3.797*** 1.493
Regression results for Innovative tools
0.188
2.111* 1.464
0.134
1.485 1.464
second experiment Note(s): *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

inter-firm relationship quality (H1), findings corroborate the idea that help offered upon
extreme moments may be greatly valued by those receiving it, mainly when the aid is critical
to the continuity of their operations. In increasingly competitive environments, the
maintenance of stable and fruitful relationships with suppliers may represent an
important source of differentiated performance, with the protection of supply chain
networks possibly leading to abnormal returns in the long run (i.e. competitive advantage).
This view also dialogues with the confirmation of the second hypothesis of the study, which
stresses the need for the support offered to be more generous than those granted by
competitors. Altogether, our results suggest that lead firms’ managers may consider
diminishing the use of bargaining power upon moments of acute crises, ideally substituting it
(maybe proportionally to the level of their supply chain leadership) by supplier crisis
response strategies.
It may be argued then that both the preservation of natural supply chain resilience and the
development of an artificial one may be critical to lead companies’ success. For natural
resilience this relates to powerful partners avoiding the use of their force upon periods of Artificial
crisis, ceasing to exert additional pressure on the already weakened suppliers. For artificial supply chain
resilience, in turn, the implementation of emergency measures may the expression of lead
firms’ determination to keep their supply chains alive and operating, regardless of the
resilience
difficulties faced by their smaller partners. The expected result of both attitudes is the
continuity of those in more sensitive situations and an enhanced resilience of the whole
system.
295

Conclusion
As discussed throughout the text, supply chain resilience can be both natural and artificial,
with objective measures being fundamental for the establishment of the latter. Despite
logical, the reasoning lacks empirical evidence, not only regarding the recognition of which
actions are taken by companies in this regard but also their effectiveness. In order to
contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of these factors, the present study
sought to identify the initiatives effectively adopted by large companies to assist their supply
chain partners in the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis. Thus, claims from the 30 largest
companies composing the S&P 500 list were examined. This initial investigation revealed
that while some companies do not even mention offering support to their weaker partners,
others describe their initiatives in detail. Between these two extremes are the companies that
addressed the issue in a generic way, without actually discussing the measures they
implemented. The treatment of these data through the method of discourse analysis revealed
five groups of supplier crisis response strategies: supply chain finance, supply chain
continuity, safety measures, innovative tools, and information and knowledge sharing.
Based on this exploratory phase and on the discussion on the literature on supply chain
resilience, supply chain leadership and supply chain relationship management, two vignette-
based experiments were conducted in the testing of the hypothesis that (1) the use of supplier
crisis response strategies is expected to enhance inter-firm relationship quality, and (2) the
impact of a buyer’s supplier crisis response strategies is evaluated by key suppliers relative to
what other buyers are offering. In doing so, the effects of the five groups of supplier crisis
response strategies identified on supplier satisfaction and supplier commitment were
measured, as, together, the two constructs were considered to form a proxy of the quality of
supply chain relationships. Likewise, the outcomes of a firms’ actions in face of those of
another one competing for the same supplier were evaluated.
As discussed in the previous section, the confirmation of both hypotheses of the study
corroborates the view that supplier crisis response strategies indeed hold the potential to
enhance inter-firm relationship quality. Among other entailments, the confirmation of the
first hypothesis of the study suggests that pro-active measures constitute the building blocks
of artificial supply chain resilience. Similarly, the ratification of our second hypothesis
indicate that the power of the supplier crisis response strategies examined is relative,
meaning that they depend on the offers made by competing firms. Along with adding to the
understanding of the value of pro-active measures per se, finding contribute to the
comprehension of corporate competition within business-to-business contexts (i.e.
competition for the establishment of buyer–supplier relationships).
With the expectation that the economic effects of the COVID-19 crisis will be profound and
probably last longer than the pandemic itself, this research is useful in several ways. First, it
provides support for a buying firm’s decisions regarding supplier crisis response strategies,
enhancing artificial supply chain resilience and increasing the likelihood that vulnerable key
suppliers will survive. Artificial supply chain resilience strategies are also beneficial in that
they contribute to the maintenance of economic activity and job conservation. Our research
supports the adoption of similar strategies in the advent of future severe and unpredictable
CRR crises. Finally, by investigating the effectiveness of emergency measures taken during an
3,3 extreme crisis, it adds to the study of supply chain configurations.

Limitations and suggestions for future research

Despite the rigor often applied in their conduct, scientific investigations do have limitations,
with the present study not being exceptional in this regard. The first issue to be recognized
296 refers to the relatively narrow scope applied in the identification of the supplier crisis
response strategies adopted by large companies (phase one). While significant in terms of the
economic power of companies publicly traded on American stock exchanges, the supplier
crisis response strategies adopted by S&P500’s top 30 firms may not adequately represent
the conduct of large organizations in general. It is possible then that our study did not capture
some actions or categories of actions employed during the crisis. Qualitative in-depth
interviews might also be employed in order to gain more detailed perspectives on our results.
In order to treat this issues, future research should ideally extend the analysis,
investigating the initiatives adopted by a larger group of companies. This may include firms
operating in distinct regions, as well as smaller enterprises. Still on that matter, researchers
should consider a wider range of information sources, expanding the types of secondary data
considered (e.g. newspapers, magazines and institutional videos) and even adding primary
data issued from direct interviews with those directly responsible for the concerned decisions.
Likewise, scholars must profit from the investigation of more dependent variables, both in
terms of the quality of supply chain relationships – as performed in this study – and other
potentially relevant factors (e.g. suppliers’ trust, word-of-mouth and corporate image).
Research to come may also focus on more complex supply chain networks, investigating
whether the position occupied by supply chain leaders affect the observed results.

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Corresponding author
Mauro Fracarolli Nunes can be contacted at: [email protected]

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