Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars

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The first Vietnam: The U.S.-Philippine war of 1899

Luzviminda Francisco

To cite this article: Luzviminda Francisco (1973) The first Vietnam: The U.S.-Philippine war of
1899, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 5:4, 2-16, DOI: 10.1080/14672715.1973.10406345
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1973.10406345

Published online: 05 Jul 2019.

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The U.S.-Philippine War of 1899

by Luzviminda Francisco

*With apologies to Mexicans, American lndians and student of Philippine history, such a state of affairs is not
other early victims of American imperialism. merely discouraging or upsetting, it is tragic. This is true for
many reasons, but it is especially true for one reason in
particular. The degree to which Filipino false consciousness
exists is the measure of American success in obliterating from
popular consciousness knowledge of what American historians
Introduction have chosen to call (when they refer to it at all, which is
seldom) the "Philippine Insurrection." 1
One of the most startling phenomena of recent
One prize of victory is that the winners get to write the
Philippine history has been the development of a popular
history books. This was never so true as it has been about the
movement calling for the relinquishing of Philippine
Philippine-American War, and this fact, more than any other,
sovereignty and for political re-union with the U.S. as the 51st
has denied to Filipinos all but the merest scraps of distorted
state. Although the "statehood movement" was understand-
information about one of the most heroic struggles ever waged
ably treated as something of a joke when it first surfaced
in modern times; a struggle waged against implacable odds and
several years ago, its popular reception and rapid growth,
at terrible cost. The Philippine-American War, by which name
especially in the face of surging Phlippine nationalist and
it should properly be known, is one of those bits of
anti-imperialist sentiments, demands that the movement and
historiography which-like the American Indian Wars-seems
the ideology which it represents be carefully analyzed.
to have sunk beneath the surface of popular awareness." Most
It may well be that the statehood movement is a curio, a
Americans have never heard of it, most Filipinos understand it
quirk in the Philippine body politic, a nostalgic last
only through the prism of the victors' own account of how the
remembrance of colonialism, emerging now only to be
war was waged and won. And yet the Philippine-American War
inevitably and inexorably swept away by the tide of history.
was one of those illuminating moments of history which threw
These are comforting thoughts, but there remain some nagging
a shaft of light on an era. As far as Filipinos are concerned, an
doubts. Philippine nationalism has, historically, been poorly
understanding of our liberation struggle at the turn of the
defined. For a myriad of reasons, American colonialism as
century is without question or doubt the prerequisite, the
perceived by Filipinos has been qualitatively different from,
starting point for a genutiie understanding of modern
say, Vietnamese perception of their relationship with the
Philippine sociery.
French. One must reluctantly conclude that perhaps the most
serious cancer of twentieth-century Philippine society has been It is ironic that it has taken half a century and the
the traumatizing effect of mystification and false remarkably similar situation in Indochina to re-focus attention
consciousness regarding the American colonial period. For the on the Philippine struggle for national liberation against the
forces of American imperial aggression. In all, save the
ultimate outcome, history has uncannily repeated itself in
Vietnam, a fact which should be driven home to American
Note: This essay is taken from a broadside, "The Philippines: End of an apologists who hold that Vietnam is an "aberration" of U.S.
Illusion," published by the Association for Radical East Asian Studies
in London, copyright © 1973. Permission to reprint is gratefully policy, unrepresentative of American foreign policy in general,
acknowledged. but simply a situation brought. about by a series of mistakes
2
 and miscalculations. Leaving aside the obvious fact that The founder of the Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, lost
"mistake" is equated with being beaten, and the curious control over the organization in March 1897 when Emilio
frequency with which imperialist "aberrations" seem to crop Aguinaldo was elected as the head of a newly formed
up, it is important for Filipinos to recognize that we must Revolutionary Central Government. After Aguinaldo's victory
vindicate ourselves by comprehending our own history. With the revolutionary forces became increasingly prone to
such a view in mind and within the limits of this essay, vacillation and compromise as a number of frustrated elitist
attention will be focused on the three aspects of the war which reformers began to attach themselves to the organization.
are the most critical and yet, for reasons which are perhaps In June a Provisional Republican Government was
obvious, have attracted the least amount of attention, let alone established at Biak-Na-Bato, Bulacan, and this event initiated
analysis. Therefore, attention will not be focused so much on several months of dilatory negotiation with the Spanish. The
the war against Spain, which preceded the Philippine-American older Katipuneros argued for the continuation of the military
War, nor will it deal with the political infighting in the Malolos struggle along guerrilla lines, but the reformist and
Government or General Emilio Aguinaldo's surrenderist assimilationist elements began to see the possibility of finally
prevarications. Attention will be focused on the nature of achieving their long-sought-after goals. via negotiation. After
America's policy of aggression, the depth of popular mass hesitancy and debate, a compromise treaty was negotiated in
resistance to the American forces and the duration of the November by a wealthy mestizo, Pedro Paterno. Under the
struggle in what became, ultimately, suicidal refusal to terms of the treaty, the Spanish governor general, Primo de
capitulate to imperialism. Rivera, promised to consider the reformist demands in
Spain never had an easy time in pacifying its Philippine exchange for the surrender of the rebel army. Satisfied with
colony and in the course of over three centuries of colonial such weak promises and even more by the promised initial
rule, scarcely a year went by which did not witness rebellion in payment of P400,000 to himself and his staff, Aguinaldo and
one form or another somewhere in the archipelago. The his men voluntarily exiled themselves to Hong Kong, but
fragmented, insular nature of the country and the separate Spanish refusal to promulgate reforms led to agitation for a
regional, ethnic and language groupings made it difficult to renewed military confrontation.
coordinate a nationwide anti-Spanish struggle, but at times Fighting broke out again in February 1898 and by May,
the Filipinos came close to achieving a broad united front when the American Commodore George Dewey. steamed into
against the foreign foe. As early as 1587, for example, a secret Manila Bay to attack the Spanish fleet; the Spanish Army (the
society was formed in Manila by Magat Salamat which spread Guardia Civil) had been all but thoroughly beaten. The
throughout Central Luzon to the Visayas and as far south as Spanish, in fact, controlled only the area of the old walled city
Borneo. This early movement was not typical, however, and it of Manila. Aguinaldo had, meanwhile, been intermittently
was to be more than 300 years before such unity of action was negotiating with the Americans in Hong Kong and Singapore,
again achieved. Subsequent rebellions were commonly local or and he returned to the Philippines to resume command of the
regional affairs, sparked by local conditions and grievances. Filipino forces with Dewey's sanction and with (verbal)
Sometimes they lasted for a surprisingly long period of time, assurances that the Americans would aid the Filipinos in
as in Bohol, where Spanish authority was denied for over securing their independence.
eighty years. The Islamic areas 'of Mindanao and Sulu were A three-way stalemate persisted until August, Dewey in
never really conquered. Manila Bay without forces to land, the Spanish holed up in the
Spain was always able to exploit divisions in Philippine walled city, and the Filipinos dug in along the perimeter of the
society in such a way as to prevent a coordinated national city. The Spanish decided they would rather surrender to the
struggle and this situation was maintained until the last Americans than to the Filipinos and in August 1898 a bizarre,
decades of the nineteenth century. The rise of a native tragi-comic "battle" was quite literally staged between the
moneyed class, consisting mainly of Chinese-native (or Indio) Spanish and the Americans, ostensibly to preserve Spanish
mestizo elements, gave rise to a liberal reformist movement "honor"-although six died in the farce. The resulting
anxious to win greater political and economic concessions surrender terminated three centuries of Spanish colonialism
from Spain. The Propaganda Movement, as it came to be and the American forces, newly reinforced, took possession of
called, was essentially an assimilationist effort. Its leaders Manila.
aimed, ultimately, at closer ties with Spain. (It was during this By autumn .1898 it was clear that the Americans
time that the hispanized Chinese-mestizos began referring to intended to retain the Philippines as a Pacific colony.
themselves as Filipinos, a term previously reserved for American troop strength was increasing and Admiral Dewey
Spaniards born in the colony.) But the Propagandists made •showed no sign of weighing anchor. Battle lines around Manila
little headway against entrenched and often reactionary continued to be drawn roughly as they had remained at the
Spanish authority. end of the mock battle against the Spanish in the previous
The failure of the Propagandist efforts spurred the August. The Americans held the city and had trenches along
formation in 1892 of the Katipunan, a secret society which, its perimeter, facing Filipino trenches along a semi-circle of
after some initial indecision, began to recognize the futility of several miles.
the earlier reformist efforts. By 1895 independence became an The Treaty of Paris, designed to e~d the war with Spain
increasingly realistic prospect. Spain was having a difficult and to cede the Phlippines to the U.S., was signed in December
time suppressing the Cubans, who were then in revolt, and her and awaited confirmation in the U.S. Senate, which required a
ability to sustain a similar effort in the Philippines was an open two-thirds majority vote as necessitated by the Constitution.
question. By 1896 Katipunan ranks had swollen to 30,000 and When Congress reconvened in January 1899, the
fighting between the Katipunan forces and the Spanish pro-annexationist faction in the Senate held a clear majority,
commenced. but were one or two votes shy of the required two-thirds
3
majority they needed to ratify the treaty. Voting on the treaty Although an overt policy of guerrilla war was not specifically
was scheduled for Monday, February 6, and during the week enunciated until the following November, guerrilla tactics were
preceding it seemed fairly clear to most observers that the employed out of necessity immediately after the initial rout at
McKinley Administration was not likely to rally enough Manila. The first battle also indicated to the Filipinos' that
support in the Senate to win ratification. By implication, this they were faced with a foe which gave no quarter and which
put American retention of the Philippines in jeopardy. 3 was prepared to disregard the fundamental rules of warfare.
In the Philippines, insults-and occasionally shots-were The Americans were contemptuous of Filipinos generally and
being traded across the trenches by the two opposing armies they had little respect for the fighting ability of the Philippine
throughout the month of January. But war did not come until Army. They referred to the Filipinos as "niggers,"
the evening of February 4, 1899, when general fighting "barbarians," and "savages," reflecting both the racist and
erupted all along the line. The American command in Manila imperialist attitudes of American society at large.
claimed at the time that the Filipinos initiated the fighting,
but there seems little doubt that the Americans themselves The Americans were elated by their initial success and
started the war and as much was later admitted by u.S. their commander, the rather wooden and unimaginative Gen.
commanders. That the outbreak of the war was carefully Elwell Otis, confidently predicted that the war would be
orchestrated to influence the outcome of the treaty vote in the ended in a matter of weeks. Otis had convinced himself that
Senate seems almost beyond question, and although initiating the opposition to u.S. rule came only from the Tagalog
a war to influence the passage of legislation seems a tactic "tribe," which (it was claimed) was only one of eighty or so
singularly lacking in subtlety, historically it seems to work and "tribes" in the Philippines. This theme, which was trotted out
in this instance it proved successful. The news of the by domestic u.S. annexationists at every opportunity, gave the
fighting-and the false information as to its instigation- was impression that the war in the Philippines was but a slight
wired to Washington and its dramatic effect persuaded the variation of the familiar Indian wars of the American West.
After the devastating first battle, the Filipino Army
Senate to ratify the treaty by a margin of one vote.
retreated into Central Luzon, fighting rear-guard actions as it
went. Malolos, capital of the Philippine Republic, quickly fell
The First Battle
and within the conventional framework within which he was
From the very beginning, superior American firepower operating, Otis equated this event with the fall of the
had a telling effect, and although the Filipino troops bravely Philippine Government, which in turn would mean the
stood their ground, weaponry ensured the one-sidedness of the surrender of the Philippine Army. Or so he hoped. Confident
conflict. Dewey steamed up the Pasig River and fired predictions of imminent victory were forthcoming again and it
500-pound shells into the Filipino trenches at close range with was with some degree of dismay that the Americans began to
pulverizing effectiveness. The first battle was so one-sided that realize that Aguinaldo considered his "capital" to be wherever
the American troops jokingly referred to it as a "quail shoot" he himself happened to be camped-which was always just out of
and dead Filipinos were piled so high that the Americans used reach of the slow-moving American columns. It was with a
the bodies for breastworks. A British witness to the carnage growing sense of uneasiness that' the American command
commented, "This is not war; it, is simply massacre and began to realize that the further they were drawn into Central
murderous butchery." 4 Luzon and the more they had to disperse their forces, the
Although the Americans had been sending reinforce- more difficult it became to defend themselves against
ments to the Philippines throughout the fall of 1898 (there counter-attack, ambush, and harassment by the highly mobile
were 21,000 U.S. troops in the Islands by the start of the war) Philippine Army, which was itself free of the need for the
they were still outnumbered by the Filipinos. But the Filipino ponderous supply chain required by the Americans. The odds,
troops were at a dreadful disadvantage owing to their lack of which were so disastrously against the Filipinos in early
rifles. Only one man in three had a gun; others fought with February, began to even up.
bolos and spears or simply waited to snatch up a rifle from a There was another-and to the more perceptive
fallen comrade. Although some of their weapons were fairly American commanders, rather more disturbing-character to
new Remingtons and Mausers captured from the Spanish or the fighting. It gradually dawned on the Americans that the
smuggled in from abroad, many were rust-eaten museum reason the Filipino troops could move around so easily
pieces, more dangerous to the user than to the intended target, without concern for a supply base, and the reason information
Thousands of Filipinos were killed in the first battle, and advice were so difficult to elicit from the native
hundreds .more died soon after from wounds.f Few prisoners population, were due to the fact that the Aguinaldo
were taken by the Americans, and Red Cross personnel government and the Philippine nationalist cause had the total
reported an extremely high ratio of dead to wounded on the support of the Philippine masses, They slowly began to realize
battlefield, indicating" the determination of our soldiers to that their major foe was not really the formally constituted, but
kill every native in sight ,,6 in many ways ineffectual, Philippine Army; rather, it was the
For the Filipino patriots, the opening battle in what Filipino people, who, having finally gotten rid ,of the Spanish,
proved to be one of the longest and bloodiest wars in the sorry were unrelentingly and implacably hostile to American
history of imperial aggression produced two sharp lessons. It imperialist designs. The implications of this understanding
was clear thai: the Filipinos could not hope to survive by were fully realized only later and in the bloodiest manner
fighting on American terms of fixed position, set-piece battles imaginable. But as early as April 1899, General Shafter gave
in the classical military tradition. The Philippine Army was grisly portent to the future conduct of the war: "It may be
quickly forced to resort to mobile warfare where their superior necessary to kill half the Filipinos in order that the remaining
knowledge of the terrain and the universal support they half of the population may be advanced to a higher plane of
enjoyed among the people could be utilized to their advantage. life than their present semi-barbarous state affords.',7
4
 The American command had presumably been taken in occupied territory-as indeed it was-and the American
by its own press releases. Gen. Arthur MacArthur,S Otis's command 'set about establishing garrisons throughout Luzon
subordinate (and later replacement), commented, "... I and the rest of the country. Filipino guerrillas were no-longer
believed that Aguinaldo's troops represented only a faction. I treated as soldiers of an opposing army but were considered to
did not like to believe that the whole population of be bandits and common criminals (ladrones). When captured
Luzon-the native population, that is-was opposed to us they were treated as such. With the break-up of the Philippine
.•. ,,9 But this he was "reluctantly compelled" to believe Army, Otis once again felt he had victory within his grasp.
because the "unique system of warfare" employed by the Even MacArthur, usually more realistic about such matters,
Filipino Army"... depended upon almost complete unity of announced, "The so-called Filipino Republic is desrroyed.T'!
action of the entire native population." 10 But two developments forced them to once again regret their
With the approach of summer and with victory still sanguine reports to the War Department. First, the fighting
beyond their grasp, the War Department began to suggest to simply continued. Chasing Aguinaldo into the mountains had
Otis that he might need more troops. Embarrassed by his made no difference, breaking up the Filipino Army made no
earlier confident predictions and even more so by his growing difference, and garrisoning the archipelago simply invited
inability to produce tangible results, he at first declined the guerrilla attacks on isolated outposts. Secondly, as the
offer, but then he reversed himself' and surprised the Americans spread their forces and their garrisons to other areas
Department by. asking for 60,000 more troops. Otis was of Luzon and to other islands, they found they were
limited by his textbook approach to war and failed to realize confronted with exactly the same kind of public hostility and
that American "victories" in which the Filipinos were guerrilla opposition which characterized the situation in
"scattered" or "routed" were next to meaningless. Otis was, in Central Luzon. The notion that opposition to the U.S. was
keeping with the time-honored phrase, winning the battles but confined to, the Tagalogs was simply wrong. The Americans
losing the war. Few of the battles were actually more than were at war with seven million Filipino people and wherever
skirmishes and hit-and-run affairs, but on June 10, 1899, in they went in the Islands they took the war with them-a
Laguna, Filipino Generals Ricarte and Noriel with 3,000 men disconcerting state of affairs and one to which Otis could
caught an American division of 4,000 in a cross-fire ambush never reconcile himself.
and cut it to pieces. Battles of this size became increasingly
rare, however.
By October all the American reinforcements had arrived
Settling in for a Long War
and it was decided that the best way to terminate the war was The war, far from being over, had entered a new and far
to capture Aguinaldo and his staff. An ambitious more difficult phase for the Americans. The enemy was now
three-pronged encirclement campaign, encompassing the whole no longer simply the Philippine Army, the remnants of which
of Central Luzon, was decided upon. One column went north had been scattered over the whole of Luzon in any case. Now
from Manila along the rail line, another went by sea to the the Americans found themselves harassed and attacked
Lingayen Gulf port of Dagupan, and a third went north from throughout the Islands by poorly trained and poorly organized
Manila along the eastern rim of the Central Luzon plain in a but fanatically determined peasant irregulars. MacArthur
giant pincer movement. The idea. was to prevent Aguinaldo's observed: " ... all regular and systematic tactical operations
escape into the mountains of northern Luzon. ceased; but as hostile contact was established throughout the
Aguinaldo did manage to escape, however, and from his entire zone of activity an infinite number of minor affairs
mountain headquarters he issued orders to formally adopt the resulted, some of which reached the dignity of combats." 12
guerrilla policy. While there was ambivalence about this move A major problem for the Americans resulted from their
from some of the more orthodox members of Aguinaldo's inability to penetrate the guerrilla infrastructure. They soon
staff, the directive in actuality simply reflected the de facto began to realize, to their dismay, that a whole underground
situation and the hopelessness of engaging in frontal and network of dual government loyal to the guerrillas existed,
positional warfare against the vastly strengthened U.S. forces. even in areas considered thoroughly "pacified." When a town
Political circumstances also dictated a policy of protracted was. occupied the stars and stripes flew, and gratifying
warfare. The Filipinos began to realize that although outright expressions of loyalty and support for the American cause
military victory was unlikely at best, simply by keeping their were publicly proclaimed by town officials. But reliable
forces intact they preserved the possibility of an ultimate information about the guerrillas was almost never
political victory. forthcoming, supplies and equipment were forever
The Filipinos had some knowledge of the divisions being disappearing, and occasionally an American soldier would
created in American society by the McKinley Administration's stray too far from camp and be found the next day hacked to
imperialist policy. The Anti-Imperialist League was strongly pieces by bolo. Albert Robinson, one of a handful of
condemning the war and the opposition Democrats were American newsmen covering the war (and the most ingenious
taking a position against the retention of the Philippines. It when it came to circumventing Otis's strict censorship), wrote
appeared likely, even a year before the event, that the that unqualified U.S. control in the Islands extended "about as
November 1900 presidential election would be fought on the far as a Krag-Jorgensen could throw a bullet." 13
issue of McKinley's colonial policy. This held out some hope By early 1900 U.S. outposts were being established
at least for a political settlement of the war favorable to the everywhere.i" As a rule the Filipinos allowed the Americans to
Philippines. capture and occupy any town they wished without opposition.
The war took on a somewhat new character after the Otis was so deceived by this that he once again declared flatly
completion of the Central Luzon campaign. From November that the war was over, hoping perhaps that repetition of the
1899, the U.S. considered the entire Philippines to be statement would make it so. But the garrison network
5
 seriously thinned the U.S. troop strength and the Americans " ... they are the bravest men I have ever seen." 17
were continually being counterattacked and ambushed. It was The Filipinos used conditions to their advantage; they
becoming clear that the entire Islands would have to be laid booby traps, they attacked at night and during driving
"pacified." Moreover, guerrilla activity was both increasing tropical rainstorms, and they ambushed the Americans by
and becoming increasingly effective. Being incessantly getting as close as possible by stealth and employing their
ambushed, boloed and betrayed was nerve-wracking and the bolos at close quarters, thus neutralizing the disparity in
Americans began to exercise their mounting frustration on the firepower. The American troops, who depended so heavily on
population at large. All the "niggers" were enemies, whether their weapons, were frightened by the ferocity of such attacks,
or not they bore arms. Patrols sent to fight the guerrillas especially as the Filipinos often made up in numbers what
usually had difficulty locating the enemy and often simply they lacked in firepower. But such tactics were difficult to
resorted to burning barrios in their path. Village officials were maintain as the Filipinos almost invariably took heavy losses
often forced at bayonet point to lead American patrols, and even in victory. In bolo fights the American dead were
non-combatants began to be held responsible for the actions of inevitably mutilated in the course of the fighting, a situation
the guerrillas. Any form of resistance to American objectives which the War Department was quick to capitalize on as
subjected the perpetrator to a charge of treason. evidence of the "savagery" of the Filipino guerrillas, thus
Press censorship was so effective that few Americans justifying, to !hemselves at least, all manner of retaliatory
actually knew the difficulties being experienced in the slaughter.
Philippines-or, in fact, that there were 70,000 U.S. troops in Otis was clearly unsuited for his job. His frequent
the Islands. In early 1900 the first whiff of scandal reached pronouncements of victory and his incompetent handling of
American shores when it was disclosed that the American- the war were proving to be an embarrassment to the McKinley
forces had been issued expanding "dum-dum" bullets, in Administration, which was nervously anticipating the
contravention of the 1899 Hague Convention concerning forthcoming presidential election. Accordingly, Otis resigned
humane warfare (which the U.s. had conveniently neglected to "for pressing personal reasons" and was replaced by General
ratify). Reports of the burning of villages, the killing of MacArthur. MacArthur had had experience in the American
non-combatants and the application of the "water cure" to Indian wars and he, more than anyone on Otis's staff,
elicit information began to filter back to the U.S. Often this understood the wide-ranging implications of the problems then
information was contained in letters written by U.S. soldiers confronting the American expeditionary force in the
to their families which found their way into local newspapers. Philippines. A convinced imperialist, he was also a realist. He
A typical example: "On Thursday, March 29th [1900] ... openly admitted that the Filipinos hated the Americans and he
eighteen of my company killed seventy-five nigger bolomen did not flinch from estimating that it would take "ten years of
and ten of the nigger gunners.... When we find one who is bayonet treatment" to subdue the Filipino people-a prescient
not dead, we have bayonets, .." IS observation, as it turned out.
Such atrocities were systematically denied by the War Heavy fighting coincided with the change in command
Department. When the evidence was irrefutable, they were and it was' remarked that when he left, Otis " ... had the
minimized and countered with examples of Filipino situation so little in hand that to go six miles out of Manila
"barbarity." A standard response was that "harsh" methods without a company furnished plenty of wholesome
had to be employed against "savages." As the war progressed excitement." 18 With one eye on the upcoming November
and as American atrocities became routinized, so did election, McKinley also sent a federal judge, William Howard
platitudinous defenses of American action. MacArthur called it Taft, to Manila with instructions to establish a "civilian"
"the most legitimate and humane war ever conducted on the government in the Islands no later than September 1, 1900.
face of the earth." Senator Foraker, a staunch defender of The move was purely a public relations venture designed to
annexation, announced solemnly (and with a touch of trick the American voters into thinking all was progressing
unintended irony), "Our army has shown in this work a smoothly in the Philippines. Taft was densely ignorant about
surprising degree of humanity." the Philippines.P but he knew enough about class society to
General Shafter, who, it will be recalled, was not averse to detect a certain amount of pliability in the upper-class
killing half of the Filipino people in the name of this mission elements in the country. This group, composed largely of
cioilisatrice, was becoming preoccupied with the idea and had mestizo landlords and export agriculture interests, had been
worked out a new reason to wipe out half ,of the Island largely ignored by the U.S. military command, but Taft set out
population. "My plan," he disclosed in January 1900, "would ta woo them, appealing to their economic interests by offering
be to disarm the natives of the Philippine Islands, even if we protected markets for their agricultural products in the U.S.
have to kill half of them to do it." 16 The effort bore fruit insofar as Taft was able-on cue-to
Lack of firearms indeed continued to be perhaps the establish his Civil Government on September 1. Laced as it
single most pressing problem for the Filipinos. By mid-1900 was with quislings and traitors-Buencamino, Legarda,
they had at most 20,000 rifles, meaning that only one partisan Luzuriaga and, inevitably, Pedro Paterno notable among
in four was actually armed. The American naval blockade them-the Taft regime was a useful propaganda weapon and it
made it all but impossible to obtain arms and supplies from provided the Americans with another excuse to prosecute the
abroad andralthough efforts were made to manufacture war. Having created puppets, the continuation of the war and
gunpowder locally, cartridge shells had to be used over and the retention of the Philippines were necessary to protect
over to the point of uselessness. The Filipinos had to adapt to those who "loyally sided with the Americans" against poten-
their limitations as best they could. They stood up to the tial and future revenge at the hands of the guerrillas. With, one
heavily armed Americans with spears, darts, the ubiquitous presumes, appropriate sarcasm, one American Congressman
bolo, and even stones, prompting General Lawton to remark, commented, " ... and so it appears that in order to keep them
6
from shooting each other down we have got to go in and shqot explained, was the only reason Filipinos gave any support at
them down first."2o all to their guerrilla brethren, the only reason people did not
With the nomination of William Jennings Bryan as the welcome the foreign occupying force with open - arms.
Democratic presidential candidate, the question of American "Without this system of terrorism," Taft allowed, "the
colonialism and continued military intervention appeared guerrilla campaign would have ended very quickly."22
likely to become a major issue in the 1900 campaign. The MacArthur was not deluded by such fantasties:
Filipinos hoped to topple the "imperialist party" of McKinley the success of this unique system of war depends upon
by launching an offensive just before the election, and almost complete unity of action of the entire native
September and October saw some of the sharpest fighting of population. That such unity is a fact is too obvious to
the war. In spite of these efforts the question of the admit of discussion; ... fear as the only motive is hardly
Philippines never became the issue it might have been. Aided sufficient to account for the united and apparently
by heavy press censorship and the inability to obtain spontaneous action of several millions of people. One
independent information on the Philippine situation, traitor in each town would effectively destroy such a
McKinley predictably pointed to the Taft Government as complex organization. 23 .
proof that all was going well in the Islands. Bryan, moreover,
was a rank political opportunist. By his own admission he had
supported ratification of the Paris treaty simply in order to "Pacification" Begins in Earnest'
provide himself with what he thought would be a good issue
with which to attack the Republicans. When he began to see
that his anti-colonial-position was hurting his campaign rather In December 1900, with the election safely out of the
than helping, he backpedaled furiously and quickly way, martial law was declared and the pretense of civil
compromised himself, arguing now for a vaguely government was scrapped. American operations were extended
defined American "protectorate" for the Philippines. In any to southern Luzon and to the Visayan islands of Leyte, Samar,
event, both McKinley and Bryan perceived that the electorate Panay, Negros and Cebu. As far as the American command was
was bored by the Philippine issue and by the end of the concerned there were no longer any neutrals. Everyone was
campaign it had been quietly dropped by both candidates. now considered an active guerrilla or a guerrilla supporter.
Predictably perhaps, McKinley was an easy victor. The Thus in the Visayas campaign the Navy felt free to shell the
result was a crushing blow for the Filipino guerrilla leaders coastal villages with its gunboats prior to invasion. In January
who had counted heavily-too heavily-on a Bryan victory. and February 1901, the entire population of Marinduque
Indeed, the guerrilla leadership began to falter badly after Island (pop. 51,000) was ordered into five concentration
November and the surrender of several commanders (with men camps set up by the Americans. All those who did not comply
and guns) was a sharp blow to the Filipino cause. The theory with the order"... would be considered as acting in sympathy
of protracted war was, of course, only imperfectly understood, with the insurgent forces and treated accordingly.v j " This was
and with U.S. strength at its peak of 75,000 men the struggle to be the first of many instances of the application of the
began to take on suicidal overtones.P The class divisions reconcentrado policy in the Philippines. Ironically, it was the
within the Filipino forces began now to emerge. The officers, abhorrence of just this sort of policy-when it was practiced
like Aguinaldo himself, were usually fairly well educated and by the Spanish General "Butcher" Weyler in Cuba-which so
came largely from middle-class backgrounds; the ranks were exercised American public opinion against Spain prior to the
invariably filled by men of peasant origins. The American outbreak of the Spanish-American War. 2S
command played upon these class divisions and treated In April 1901 major operations began in northern
surrendering commanders with the respect due to fellow Luzon. The frequent examples of American terror tactics
"officers and gentlemen," sometimes dangling choice civil which had heretofore occurred were, arguably, the acts of
service positions as inducement for officers to defect. individual units in at least technical violation of overall U.S.
Despite MacArthur's claim, American conduct of the policy. With the advent of the northern Luzon campaign such
war heretofore had not been the "most humane" in human pretensions and qualifications could no longer be maintained.
history, as attested by the countless and documented examples If the people sympathized with and supported the guerrillas,
of callous and brutal conduct which were already being and if, indeed, this was a "people's war," then the only
recorded. But in the autumn of 1900 there was a perceptible solution was war against the people. The American Governor
alteration in American tactics. Tired of being chronically • of Abra Province described the "depopulation campaign" in
harassed and boloed by the Filipinos and finding it difficult to the following terms: "Whole villages had been burned,
pin the guerrillas down in the kind of conventional firefight storehouses and crops had been destroyed and the entire
they so urgently desired, the Americans began to resort to province was as devoid of food products as was the valley of
revanchist attitudes and policies. If the American command Shenandoah after Sheridan's raid during the Civil War." 26 An
had ever believed they enjoyed any popular support in the American congressman who visited the Philippines, and who
Philippines (apart from the handful of wealthy puppets serving preferred to remain anonymous, spoke frankly about the
in the Taft regime), a year and a half of war certainly dispelled results of the campaign: "You never hear of any disturbances
any continued illusions on the matter. If the people supported in Northern Luzon," he reported, "because there isn't
the guerrillas then the people must also be classified as the anybody there to rebel. . . . The good Lord in heaven only
enemy. The grim implications of such an evaluation were knows the number of Filipinos that were put under ground.
beginning to emerge, although the fiction that widespread Our soldiers took no prisoners, they kept no records; they
public support for the U.S. existed in the Islands was simply swept the country and wherever and whenever they
maintained for domestic U.S. consumption. Terrorism, it was could get hold of a Filipino they killed him."z7
7
 The observation that no records were kept of operations of warfare they were engaged in, calling it "protective
of this kind later became a point of contention asnews of the retribution." Semantic nonsense, perhaps, but its meaning was
atrocities began to leak out. A case in point was the murder of not lost on the intended v i c t i m s . ' -
approximately 1,000 Filipino prisoners of war in Sorsogon. In late September, in the town. of Balangiga, Samar,
Eyewitnesses (U.S. soldiers) testified that the prisoners were American troops had for some time been abusing· the
forced to dig their own graves in groups of twenty and that townspeople by packing them into open wooden pens at night
each then received one bullet in the temple. When confronted where they were forced to sleep standing' in the rain. Several
with this evidence the War Department dismissed it out of score of guerrilla Gen. Vicente Lukban's bolomen infiltrated
hand:, "No report has been received at the War Department in the town and on the morning of September 28, while the
respect of or referring to the alleged incident." 28 This became Americans were eating their breakfast, Lukban's men suddenly
standard government response to such charges, even when the fell upon them. Heads dropped into breakfast dishes.
orders themselves necessarily implied butchery, as when Gen. Fifty-four Americans were boloed to death, and few of the
"Howlin' Jake" Smith ordered his men to kill "everything over eighteen survivors escaped serious injury.32
ten" in the notorious Samar campaign. (In that particular The Balangiga massacre initiated a reign of terror the
instance the War Department rather feebly declared that their likes of which had not yet been seen in this war. General
records "did not indicate" that the order-which was Smith, fresh from his "victories" in northern Luzon and
admitted-was. ever carried out, eyewitness testimony of Panay, was chosen to lead the American mission of revenge.
American soldiers engaged in the campaign notwithstanding.)
Smith's orders to his men embarking upon the Samar
Also in April 1901, Aguinaldo was finally captured. The campaign could not have been more explicit: "Kill and burn,
Americans had been so unsuccessful at trying to catch him kill and burn, the more you kill and the more you burn the
that for a long period they simply gave up the effort. But an more you please me." It was, said Smith, "no time to take
intercepted message resulted in a daring raid led by Brig. Gen. prisoners." War was to be waged "in the sharpest and most
Frederick Funston 29 and Aguinaldo's capture. The Americans decisive manner possible." When asked to define the age limit
were delighted with the news, which made banner headlines in for killing, Smith gave his infamous reply: "Everything over
the U.S. Taft felt the war was as good as over, especially after ten." Smith ordered Samar to be turned into a "howling
he persuaded Aguinaldo to sign an oath of allegiance and a wilderness' so that "even the birds could not live there." It was
proclamation calling upon his erstwhile comrades to give up boasted that"... what fire and water [i.e., water torture] '"
the struggle. Aguinaldo did more damage to his place in the had done in Panay, water and fire would do in Samar." 33 The
history books than he did to the Filipino cause, however, and now-familiar pattern of operations began once again. All
the Americans were dismayed to discover that his capture and inhabitants of the island (pop. 266,000) were ordered to
surrender appeal made no perceptible difference in the present themselves to detention camps in several of the larger
fighting, which continued unabated. This was too much for coastal towns. Those who did not (or those who did not make
MacArthur, who resigned and was replaced by Maj. Gen. Adna it their business to learn of the existence of the order), and
Chaffee. were found outside the detention camp perimeter, would be
By mid-summer 1901, the focus of the war started to shot "and no questions asked." Few reporters covered the
shift south of Manila. Some of the guerrilla leaders of carnage; one who did noted:"During my stay in Samar the
Northern and Central Luzon who were close to Aguinaldo only prisoners that were made .. , were taken by Waller's
began to surrender. Others held out, however, and Gen. Miguel commandr'" and I heard this act criticized by the highest
Malvar, operating in Batangas, was proving to be every bit as officers as a mistake.... The truth is, the struggle in Samar is
difficult for the Americans as Aguinaldo had been. one of extermination.v "
In August, General Smith invaded Panay Island and When Smith's barbaric and outrageous orders gained him
repeated the scorched-earth tactics employed in Abra, "The public notoriety, the War Department attempted to portray
18th regulars marched from Iloilo in the south to Capiz [now his Samar campaign as an aberration of standard practices.
Roxas] ... in the north under orders to burn every town from Samar was a deviation from a war which (according to one
which they were attacked. The result was they left a strip of typically gushing statement from the Secretary of War) " ...
land 60 miles wide from one end of the island to the other, has been conducted by the Army with scrupulous regard for
over which the traditional crow could not have flown without the rules of civilized warfare with careful and genuine
provision." 30 consideration for the prisoner and non-combatant, with
On the eve of the Samar campaign, the war was clearly self-restraint and with humanity never surpassed if ever
degenerating into mass slaughter. It was hardly precise to call equalled in any conflict, worthy only of praise, and reflecting
it "war" any longer. The Americans were simply chasing credit upon the American people."36 In actuality the Samar
ragged, poorly armed bands of guerrillas and, failing to catch campaign was simply a stronger dose of the same kind of
them, were inflicting the severest punishment on those they extermination policy previously conducted in northern Luzon
could catch-the people of the villages and barrios of the and in Panay. Nor did the Samar campaign mark the end of
theater of operation. U.S. commanders were becoming this kind of practice, despite the heavy criticism it provoked.
increasingly .outspoken about the true nature of their policy. If anything, the Batangas campaign which followed Samar by a
Chaffee wrote in September, " ... we are dealing with a class few months was even more "pinching"-to use the
of people whose character is deceitful, who are absolutely then-current euphemism for such pogroms. Indeed, General
hostile to the white race and who regard life as of little value Smith could legitimately defend himself the way Waller had
and, finally, who will not submit to our control until done. He was, in fact, simply following orders. His superior
absolutely defeated and whipped into such condition." 31 The and the overall U.S. commander in the Philippines, General
American command even developed a new term for the kind Chaffee, was as explicit as Smith, although he expressed
8
himself somewhat less flamboyantly when he wrote on the eve mercy. She feared to leave her home which had just been
of the Samar campaign: fired-accidentally, I believe. She faced the flames with her
children, and not a hand was raised to save her or the little
.. : it is necessary that we be stern and inflexible; and both
ones. They perished miserably. It was sure death ifshe left
officers and men must be cordially supported in this duty
the house-it was sure death if she remained. She feared the
in this regard. There is one thing necessary; and that is the
American soldiers, however, worse than the devouring
wholesome fear by these people of the Army, and that flames. 40
every hostile motion of any inhabitants toward the troops
will be quickly and severely punished. . .. It is to our In the face of mounting and irrefutable evidence of the
interest to disarm these people and to keep them disarmed, true conduct of the war, the War Department resorted to
and any means to that end is advisable. 37 {emphasis added] by-now-standard procedure-deny, minimize, obliterate
charges and criticism with a blizzard of rhetorical overkill.
Even if the American commanders issued inhuman and Secretary Root: " ... the warfare has been conducted with
draconian orders, the War Department argued that of course marked humanity and magnanimity on the part of the U.S."41
the men would not actually obey them. In Senate hearings, the Major General Wheaton: "Unexampled patience was exercised
obsequious Beveridge was at pains to make this point: throughout the department in the treatment of these savages
Sen. Beveridge: The general conduct of our soldiers and [sicl."42 General Hughes: "The policy as practiced in the
officers there, irrespective of orders from headquarters, Philippines has no element of cruelty in it.,,43 Governor Taft:
was in the direction of kindness, mercy and humanity, " ... it is my deliberate judgment that there never was a war
was it? {emphasis added] conducted, whether against inferior races or not, in which
Gen. MacArthur: Absolutely, Sir. 38 there were more compassion and more restraint and more
generosity ... ,,44 Furthermore, were it not for the bleeding
But in spite of MacArthur's implicit faith in the
hearts and hand-wringers back home who, by criticizing the
propensity of his men to disobey orders (one imagines it
army, were encouraging the enemy to resist, "the insurrection
would have been interesting to hear from Major Waller on this
would have been suppressed finally in January 1900,"
score), information about the true nature of the conduct of
according to General Funston. 4s
the war came, as usual, f~om the soldiers rhemselvesr''' One
letter, which was later republished in the New York World,
gives an indication of what the Filipinos were up against. It The Batangas Campaign
bears reproduction in its entirety:
As Smith ravaged Samar, General Malvar and his men
It was on the 27th of December, the anniversary of my carried on the guerrilla struggle in Batangas, Tayabas, Laguna
birth, and I shall never forget the scenes I witnessed that and Cavite. With General Smith already occupied, command of
day. As we approached the town the word passed along the the Batangas campaign was given to Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell.
line that there would be no prisoners taken. It meant we By word and by deed, Bell made it clear that he was not going
were to shoot every living thing in sight-man woman" or to be put in the shade by his brother officer when it came to
child. slaughtering Filipinos. Even before he took command, Bell
Tbe first shot was fired by the then 1st Sergeant of made his feelings known in unmistakable terms. "All
our company. His target was a mere boy, who was coming consideration and regard for the inhabitants of this place cease
down the mountain path into toum astride of a carabao. from the day I become commander," he said. "I have the force
The boy was not struck by the bullet, but that was not the and authority to do whatever seems to me good and especially
Sergeant's fault. The little Filipino boy slid from the back to humiliate all those in this Province who have any
of his carabao and fled in terror up the mountain side. Half pride.... ,,46
a dozen shots were fired after him. Beginning in early December 1901 and continuing for
The shooting now had attracted the villagers, who the rest of the month, Bell issued a frightening series of orders.
came out of their homes in alarm, wondering what it all On December 8 he began setting up his concentration camps.
meant. They offered no offense, did not display a weapon, The people of Batangas had two weeks in which to move into
made no hostile movement whatsoever, but they were the garrisons. Everything lying outside the perimeter of the
ruthlessly shot down in cold blood, men, women and camps was subject to confiscation or destruction. Anyone
children. The poor natives huddled together or fled in found there would automatically be considered an
terror. Many were pursued and killed on the spot. Two old "insurgent." Neutrality was not to be entertained. Everyone
men, bearing a white flag and clasping hands like two "should either be an active friend or classified as an enemy."
brothers, approached the lines. Their hair was white. They How did one become an "active friend"? "The only acceptable
fairly tottered, they were so feeble under the weight of and convincing evidence of the real sentiments of either
years. To my horror and that of the other men in the individuals or town councils should be such acts publicly
command, the order was given to fire and the two old men performed as must inevitably commit them irrevocably to the
were shot down in their tracks. We entered the village. A side of the Americans by arousing the animosity and
man who had been on a sickbed appeared at the doorway opposition of the insurgent element." How did one arouse the
of his ho-me. He received a bullet in the abdomen and fell animosity and opposition of the "insurgent element"? By
dead in the doorway. Dum dum bullets were used in the guiding troops to the camps of the enemy, by publicly
massacre, but we were not told the name of the bullets. We identifying "insurgents," by accompanying troops in
didn't have to be told. We knew what they were. In operations against the guerrillas, by denouncing the "enemy"
another part of the village a mother with a babe at her publicly, and by identifying secret guerrilla supporters.
breast and two young children at her side pleaded for Suspicion of aiding the guerrillas in any way was sufficient
9
cause for arrest without charge and incarceration for an enormous dent in the population of the province (which was
indefinite period of time. "It is not necessary to wait for reduced by a third) is reflected in the census figures. 55
sufficient evidence to lead to a conviction by a court.,,47 American policy was so brutal that even some of the U.S.
Bell's subordinates were given the widest latitude: government personnel became apprehensive. The American
"Commanding officers are urged to use their discretion freely civil governor of Tayabas noted in his official report that
in adopting any or all measures of warfare...." The people of killing, burning, torture and other harsh treatment was
Batangas were to be made to "want peace and want it badly."
... sowing the seeds for a perpetual revolution. If these
On December 13, Bell announced that the killing of American
things need be done, they had best be done by native
troops would be paid back in kind. Whenever such an event
occurred, Bell proposed to select a prisoner "by lot from troops so that the people of the U.S. will not be credited
therewith. 56
among the officers or prominent citizens" and have him
executed. On December 15, Bell announced that "acts of With Malvar's surrender in April 1902, the Americans at
hostility or sabotage" would result in the "starving of unarmed long last felt the war was finally over, and Taft dutifully
hostile belligerents."48 The warning to Malvar was clear: he intoned this fact once again. The Washington Post editorialized
either had to give up the struggle or the "detainees" would in response:
face mass starvation. To show that he meant it, on December
20 Bell ordered all rice and other food lying outside the camps
to be confiscated or destroyed. Wells were poisoned and all We have learned to repose the utmost confidence in Judge
farm animals were slaughtered.t" Taft's opinions and predictions relative to affairs in the
January I, it was announced, was the deadline for Philippines. Ever since he solemnly announced the fourth
rendering "valuable service" to the Americans, and "those who and final termination of hostilities two years ago, we have
have not fully complied with their duty" by that date were refused to accept any view of the situation in our new
subject to prison. On the 24th, Bell admitted that the only islands which did not have his sanction and endorsement.
course open to the Americans was " ... to adopt apolicy that The fact that it has been brought to an end on six different
will create in the minds of all the people a burning desire for occasions since the Governor's original proclamation serves
the war to cease-a desire or longing so intense, so personal ... only to confirm our estimation of his wisdom. A bad thing
and so real that it will impel them to devote themselves in cannot be killed too often. 57
earnest to bringing about a real state of peace, that will impel
them to join hands with the Americans..." 50 "These people
need a thrashing," Bell announced on the day after Christmas. The surrender of Malvar completed the capture or
" ... I have become convinced that within two months at the surrender of what the Americans considered to be the
outside there will be no more insurrection in this brigade, and "respectable military element." The only people left in the
nothing for conspirators to negotiate about." Since " ... hills, it was thought, were ignorant ladrones (bandits), but
practically the entire population has been hostile to us at heart they were, it was said, a traditional feature of rural life in the
... it is necessary to make the state' of war as insupportable as Philippines and were not to be taken seriously as a threat to
possible, and there is no more efficacious way of American hegemony. Just to make sure, President Roosevelt
accomplishing this than by keeping the minds of the people in proclaimed the war to be over on July 4,1902. Bands played,
such a state of anxiety and apprehension that living under such soldiers marched in parade, speeches were read, and just the
conditions will soon become unbearable." Batangas, Bell tiniest flaw marred an otherwise grand occasion. The fighting
concluded, will "be thoroughly searched and devastated." 51 did not stop. The war would not admit to so tidy a solution.
Beginning January I, 1901, as promised, Batangas was Declaring it over did not make it so. A sullen, hostile people,
indeed thoroughly searched and devastated, as were the the victims of three and a half years of the most savage
neighboring provinces. Bell assembled 2,500 men in columns aggression, simply refused to give up.
of 50 and the hunt for Malvar was on. Expecting to destroy Malvar may have surrendered, but many of his men had
everything, Bell was at least as ruthless as Smith had been in not, and fighting in Batangas continued. Elsewhere, new
the preceding extermination campaigns. The details of the leaders such as Sakay, Ricarte, Ola and Bulan emerged to carry
concentration camp policy were, by now, depressingly on the struggle in places previously considered pacified.
familiar. Filipinos were rounded up and herded into detention Others, such as Felipe Salvador and "Papa" Isio, both of
camps where overcrowded conditions and lack of proper food whom had been fighting the Spanish for many years prior to
and clothing resulted in the predictable spread of infectious 1898, simply kept on fighting. Not all of them were principled
diseases. Malaria, beriberi and dengue fever took their toll. One men; many were without ideology and fought simply out of
correspondent described the prisoners as ".. . a fanatical hatred of the occupying power; some interjected a
miserable-looking lot of little brown rats ... utterly confusing welter of reactionary religious dogma to their often
spiritless." 52 ill-defined and unsophisticated response to (ill-defined and
In the "zone of death" outside the camp "dead line," unsophisticated) colonialism. Moreover, there were depressing
"all rendered themselves liable," according to Bell. 53 All tendencies toward blind revanchism, dead-end milennarism,
property was destroyed, all houses put to the torch and the and the development of personality cults 58 which paralleled
country was made a "desert waste ... of death and similar "primitive rebellions" 59 in other areas of the world at
desolation." 54 According to statistics compiled by U.S. the time. Having noted this, the point cannot be
Government officials, by the time Bell was finished at least overemphasized that these movements represented the
100,000 people had been killed or had died in Batangas alone collective will of the vast majority of the Filipino people
as a direct result of the scorched-earth policies, and the who-however imperfectly they understood the phenomenon-
10
simply refused to subJ?it to imperial aggression. Central Luzon, where he engaged in organizing, unifying and
recruiting activities. For months he eluded capture, much to
The "Post-War" War the consternation of the Americans. -
In July 1904, fighting broke out in Samar, where Bulan
"Post-war" fighting flared up in Albay in October 1902,
and Juliano Caducoy led several hundred men. Coastal villages
when approximately 1,500 guerrillas led by Simeon Ola
were attacked and Philippine Constabulary (puppet) troops
refused to surrender. This was politically embarrassing to the
and pro-UiS. municipal officials were killed. One
Americans, and to Roosevelt and Taft in particular. This war
U.S.-appointed teniente (mayor) had a kerosene-soaked U.S.
was supposed to be over! Although there were still upwards of
flag tied around his head and ignited, which Caducoy said was
20,000 U.S. troops garrisoned on the Islands, it was thought
"a lesson to those serving that flag.,,63 By August, the
the better part of wisdom to deploy Filipino puppet troops
governor of Samar was frantically demanding more troops
(led by American officers) against the Albay guerrillas. In
from Manila because guerrillas "are boldly roaming the
November, the Brigandage Act was passed, authorizing the
country." 64 "Thousands joined in the movement," according
death penalty for membership in a guerrilla organization. The
to the local commander, Gen. William H. Carter, and. the
new law simply gave legal sanction to what had become guerrillas took control of large areas of coastal territory in
common practice and it had little appreciable effect on the
northeastern Samar. Constabulary patrols, led by American
situation in Albay, which continued to deteriorate for the
officers and sent out to engage the guerrillas, came in for some
Americans. In March 1903, the situation had reached a point hard fighting. At Oras, Bulan's men, armed only with bolos,
where reconcentrado tactics had to be once again
engaged the Constabulary troops in hand-to-hand combat and
employed-this time on a wider scale than anything heretofore
secured 65 guns. At Dolores, 38 Constabulary troops fell,
attempted. Three hundred thousand Filipinos were herded
prompting the American commander to plead for the
into concentration camps at gunpoint. Ola finally surrendered
reintroduction of American troops. The problem, he said, was
in October 1903, but this event did not end the fighting there
", . not solely one of killing and capturing the leaders or great
by any means. 60
numbers of their followers, for there are others ready to rise in
Fighting also continued in Cavite, where a new
their places."65 By April 1905, U.S. reinforcements had to be
Katipunan was formed by a former Aguinaldo aide, Gen.
sent to Samar and fighting there continued for two more
Luciano San Miguel; in Nueva Ecija and Tarlac, led by Felipe
years.
Salvador; in Rizal and Bulacan, led by Montalon, Felizardo
Elsewhere, in late 1904 and early 1905, guerrilla activity
and others; in Tayabas, led by Saria and Roldon-the list
reached a "post-war" peak, with fighting erupting in Rizal,
indeed could go on and on. In the year after the war had been
where Felizardo successfully attacked a number of
declared officially at an end, 357 separate engagements with
Constabulary garrisons, and in Taal, where Montalon and De
the guerrillas were recorded by the U.S. military command.
Vega marched up the main street of town and people "openly
The inability to stamp out the fighting induced the
fraternized with the bandits." In Malabon, which "was a
Americans to adopt more sophisticated techniques, some of
hotbed of disloyal citizens and sympathizers with the outlaw
which have become familiar features of more recent
element," Montalon and others disguised in Constabulary
counterinsurgency efforts. The 1903 census of the Philippines
uniforms seized the garrison and very nearly kidnaped the
was a determined effort to enumerate not only people, but to
provincial governor.
also record the presence of cattle, hogs, chickens and so forth
In January 1905 the Writ of Habeas Corpus was
in hopes of tracing guerrilla sources of supply and to
suspended and a state of insurrection was declared. "It is
intimidate people into denying provisions to the guerrillas for
hoped the result will be the effectual cleaning out of these
fear of being discovered. Such techniques proved to be of
bands and that the people will be so inconvenienced that
limited value and, at times, counterproductive. Attempts to
instead of sympathising with and aiding the outlaw bands an
conduct such a survey in Misamis Province sparked off an
effort will be made to aid the authorities ,,,66 reported the
uprising there. 61 In the following year an identification card
district commander. Familiar tactics these, but by March
system was inaugurated and a "registration tax" was imposed
conditions had deteriorated so badly in Batangas and Cavite
on all male residents of the Philippines between 18 and 60
and in some parts of Laguna and Rizal that reconcentrado had
years of age. These Cedulas Personales, as they were called,
to be employed there for five months-three years after
" ... also serve the purpose of a domestic passport ..." (their
Malvar's surrender and General Bell's boast that within two
obvious intended purpose), according to the Secretary of
months of January 1902 there would be no more insurrection
Finance and Justice. 62
in Batangas.
The Americans were hoping that by imposing such In Pangasinan, where Sakay was active, the American
restrictions they would hamper efforts at unifying the various military commander wrote plaintively, "This Province seems
resistance organizations. The activity of Artemio Ricarte, a to be the rendezvous of disturbers ... and we scarcely get one
case in point, illustrates the kind of organizational work the broken up until another is started. We have had '" various
Americans feared. Ricarte, formerly a member of Aguinaldo's classes of Katipunan organizations, seditions and efforts at
staff, was captured early in the war and, because he refused to organization for insurrection .. and the province in
take an oath of allegiance to the U.S., was deported to Guam. consequence has furnished its quota to swell the population of
Upon being returned to Manila, he once again refused to take Bilibid [prison] " .,,67 In Albay, "conditions were in a rather
an oath and was sent to Hong Kong and exile, where he began disturbed state." Agustin Saria had taken up where Ola left off
to correspond and coordinate with other guerrilla leaders in and it was noted that his " ... principal aim was to levy tribute
the Philippines. He secretly returned to Manila in December on the people and to maintain an independent insurgent
1903 and embarked upon a clandestine tour of northern and government."68 In Ambos, Camarines, " ... practically open
11
insurrection existed due to the influence of Jose Roldon.... The Americans understood this, of course, and the hunt for
He reorganized his forces in the most impoverished sections of Sakay in particular became an obsession with them. Sakay was
Ambos, Camarines, and had remarkable success in securing considered by many to be Aguinaldo's heir and was referred to
municipal officials and prominent individuals to assist him.,,69 by the forces in his command and by the people in the
Roldon and Saria were killed in September and October 1905 districts in which he operated as the President of the Republic.
respectively, but others picked up the cudgels. In Tayabas it Filipino morale received a tremendous (albeit
was reported that "the inhabitants of certain localities are unwarranted) boost with the Japanese success in the
exceedingly inflammable and easily influenced by the Russo-Japanese War. 74 News of the war-and cheap color
oratorical flights and acrobatic gyrations of demagogic outlaws prints of little brown men slaying big white men-filtered into
or fanatical propagandists." 70 Whatever the cause, the the most remote and backward corners of the Philippines and
"demagogic outlaws" were becoming increasingly effective. generated tremendous interest "even among the ignorant taos
One American officer described the nature of the attack ... who otherwise are uniformly impervious to the progress of
employed against constabulary compounds; the outside world ..." 75
Things were not going too well for the Americans in
The attempts are always preceded by a thorough spying out
spite of uniformly glowing reports of success heaped upon
of the surroundings, strength and habits of the intended
success (such propaganda as was being churned out had long
victims, a careful weighing of chances and a deliberate
since bcome an endemic feature of America's Philippine
planning. Consequently, an enterprise once undertaken
adventure and was, unfortunately, usually accepted at face
seldom fails. Frequently they try to minimize the risk of
value in the U.S.-and by later historians). Occasionally,
jumping a police station or looting a municpal treasury by
information would filter through the official veil and chip
establishing relations with and winning confederates on the
away, if only ever so slightly, at the orthodox, roseate view.
inside. 71
An Englishwoman wrote from Iloilo in 1905:
The guerrillas were also learning how to. utilize their The Americans give out and write in their papers that the
solidarity with the people to advantage and they began to shun Philippine Islands are completely pacified and that the
the uniforms they previously wore in order to facilitate Filipinos love Americans and their rule. This, doubtless
intermingling with the general population. Funds were often with good motives, is complete and utter humbug, for the
extorted from wealthy landowners (who hoped thereby to country is honeycombed with insurrection and plots, the
purchase immunity from more permanent depradations) and fighting has never ceased, and the natives loathe the
used to purchase food and provisions from peasants. An Americans and their theories, saying so openly in their
underground communication system was established in the native press and showing their dislike in every possible
various areas of guerrilla operation, but interregional fashion. Their one idea is to be rid oftheUS.A . . . . 76
communication and coordination was all but totally lacking
and this proved to be a fatal handicap when, as occurred in By 1906 the ultimate futility of engaging in continued
1904-06, the resistance was progressing well in other respects. resistance without regional coordination, without agreed-upon
In Central Luzon, Sakay continued to elude the aims, without more than the most rudimentary ideological
Constabulary. In June 1905 the American commanding officer overview, and without any hope-or thought-of international
wrote that previous indications were" ... that we were making support for their movement took its predictable toll. By
material progress against them [Sakay and his men] ... but mid-year, Sakay, Montalon and De Vega had surrendered and
that like 'Brer Rabbit' they were not exterminated but were this ended whatever flickering hopes might have remained for
simply lying low ..." 72 Almost all of the guerrilla leaders the re-establishment of the Philippine Republic.
active in 1905 had, of course, been deeply involved in the Yet, incredibly, the war was still not over, nor would it
1899-1902· struggle. As fighting flared up the class be for several years to come, and fighting continued in a
contradictions in the old Philippine Army leadership began to number of areas. In Mindanao, Moslem resistance to American
emerge once again. The members of Aguinaldo's staff and the efforts at subjugation continued unabated and led to the
various commanders of the earlier period who had surrendered adoption of the standard extermination policies. Moslem
or been captured had, for the most part, been well treated by resistance differed from that which typified other areas in that
the Americans and were content to make their peace with it was largely unconnected with questions of Philippine
American colonial rule. (Aguinaldo himself settled down on independence or anti-colonialism, but was rather predicated an
. 500 hectares of land near Imus, Cavite, and reaped the benefits the desire to maintain Islamic communal laws and customs
of one or two profitable arrangements with the Colonial free from interference from the "conquered North." (It should
Government. 73 Many of the 1899-1902 leaders disparaged the be noted that the Spanish never actually subjugated the
later efforts and echoed the American position that such Moslem areas.) Guerrilla tactics adopted in other areas were
guerrilla bands were simply ladrones, and that there was no not typical in the Moslen regions, where the practice was for
real political significance attached to the various movements. whole communities to band together and retreat to a fortified
This was sad commentary on the ideological pliability of the position (usually a hilltop) in the face of an attack. For
early leaders, and such statements. had a measurable American troops grown callous by years of fighting against
propaganda effect. But the damaging influence of such men non-combatants, attacking such communities necessitated no
was offset somewhat because almost all of the new guerrilla departure from previously established norms. The resultant
leadership had emerged at one point or another from the slaughter from such wanton tactics, however, was fearful. In
ranks. Moreover, with men like Ricarte, Montalon, Felizardo, March 1906, American troops killed over 600 men, women
and especially Sakay still alive, a direct link was maintained and children in an assault on the Mount Dajo community.
with the highest leadership circles of the 1899-1902 period. Photographs of the ileaped bodies of women and children
12
 created a sensation in the U.S., but this did not reflect itself in more than eager to accomodate the bacenderos, and Col. (later
any alteration of American policy. Sporadic fighting continued Gen.) Smith initiated his career in the Philippines by going to
to flare up in Mindanao as late as 1916, and martial law was Negros with a battalion of the First California Volunteers. He
not lifted until December 1906. Even then, the preparedness also tried to organize native troops but abandoned the practice
of the Moslem community to lay down their arms was due when the men signed up and promptly went over to Isio with
simply to the recognition that superior force of arms had been their new weapons. For several months after Smith's arrival,
brought to bear against them, nothing more. class war reigned' in Negros. Sacadas flocked to the hills and
Negros was another area where fighting continued joined in attacks on plantations. By September 1899, over 100
beyond 1906, led by the intrepid "Papa" Isio. Isio's movement plantations lay in ruins, expensive sugar-milling machinery had
was unique in its longevity; by the time of the arrival of the been wrecked, farm animals were lost, and sugar production
Americans, Isio had been in the hills for nearly twenty years (the second most valuable Philippine export product at the
against the Spanish. In 1880, the 39-year-old farm laborer Isio time) had come to an almost complete standstill. 78
(then Dionisio Magbueles) quarreled with a Spaniard, wounded Such was Isio's background, and for seven more years
him, and fled to the mountains of Negros, where he joined the mountainous interior of Negros remained a "liberated
with and eventually became the leader of a rebel group known zone" despite repeated forays by American and Constabulary
variously as Babaylanes ("priests") and Pulabanes ("red troops. By 1905 Isio had become a folk hero, a symbol of
trousers"). Negros, especially the fertile northwest crescent of continued resistance when all realistic hope of overthrowing
the island, presented unusual economic conditions inasmuch as the hacendero oligopoly had long since vanished. In January
the sugar plantations there represented the most commercially 1905, when it was reported (incorrectly) that Isio had been
advanced agricultural area to be found in the Philippines. killed, thousands wore black armbands in mourning. In June
Because of this, class contradictions reached their most of that year, after Isio and his men had taken possession of the
advanced level and chronic labor unrest characterized town of Isabela, the American commander ruefully
conditions in the Negros canefields in the late 19th century. hinted at the depth of the popular support Isio still enjoyed
Disaffected sacadas (canefield workers) provided a when he reported, "It remains to be seen whether or not the
steady stream of men to Isio's mountain band prior to 1898. people of Isabela will come forward and identify the raiders or
The founding of the Malolos Republic and the arrival of aid in their capture. If they do, it will be unprecedented."?" It
the Americans further sharpened the divisions between the was not until August 6, 1907, that "Papa" Isio, age 67, finally
plantation and mill owners and the sacadas. Dewey's arrival in came down from the mountains.
Manila Bay and the resultant crisis led to the withdrawal of The major guerrilla organization still active after Isio's
Spanish forces from Negros and in the power vacuum Isio and surrender was the Santa Iglesia led by Felipe Salvador (alias
his men declared allegiance to the Republic and marched into Apong Ipe), one of the most colorful and charismatic leaders
the capital of Bacolod. Isio's army by this time numbered in a movement which produced an abundance of such men.
between five and six thousand and he enjoyed almost total Allegedly the son of a friar, Salvador, like Isio, had been active
support among the sacadas and peasant farmers. Landlords and against the Spanish long before Malolos and Manila Bay. The
mill owners on Negros, who. had previously co-existed Santa Iglesia, a "fanatical and oath-bound society" (according
peacefully and profitably with the Spanish authorities (and to the Americans) was founded in 1893 in Pampanga. In 1898
with whom they identified socially) viewed developments with it joined forces with the revolutionary movement and Salvador
consternation. Their major fear was that the Malolos and his men attacked Spanish garris~ns at Dagupan and
Government would sanction and solidify the Isio regime. Lingayen in Pangasinan. Salvador was made a colonel by
To checkmate Isio, the Negros hacenderos tried to Aguinaldo, but he never became a part of the Malolos inner
prevent him from getting arms and from establishing direct circle and his organization always maintained a separate
contact with Malolos. In the autumn of 1898 some of the identity, never fully incorporated into the Philippine Army. In
planters sent a delegation to the captain of a U.S. man-of-war 1902 Salvador refused to surrender when many of Aguinaldo's
then at anchor in Iloilo harbor to ask him for U.S. protection generals were heeding the call of the latter to lay down their
and armed intervention against Isio. The Americans refused arms. Salvador was captured soon after but escaped from jail
the request because at this point they were not yet at war with and resumed his guerrilla activities in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija
the Filipinos. They did not want to trigger the fighting before and Bulacan. It is perhaps the best testimony to Salvador's skill
the arrival of needed reinforcements and the signing of the as a leader and organizer that his movement came into full
Paris Treaty. The hacenderos then established an • flower only after other organizations and guerrilla movements
"independent" Republic of Negros, adopting an had been beaten into submission and surrender in the
American-style Constitution which defined the new power post-1905 period.
configurations. For several months until the outbreak of By 1906 Salvador had begun to roam throughout
fighting on February 4, 1899, two regimes vied in Negros, the Central Luzon. He negotiated alliances with other guerrilla
Republican (Malolos) Government, supported by Isio and his organizations and staged spectacular raids, the most notable
men, and the "independent" Republic of Negros, which being the one on the Constabulary barracks at Malolos, the
existed mostly on paper and in the minds of a few hundred political implications of which escaped no one. The support
wealthy plantation owners. and respect he and his men commanded from the people of
On February 22, 1899, a delegation of hacenderos went Central Luzon was legendary. Reported one American with
to Manila and again asked for U.S. intervention, reminding the finality, "inhabitants ... do not volunteer information of
Americans pointedly that "their action would cause much [his) .. , presence to the authorities." 80 In spite of
hatred among the insurgents." 77 Now that the concentrated efforts to portray members of the Santa Iglesia
Philippine-American War had started, the Americans were as "some of the most wicked and desperate men ever at large
13
 in the Philippine Islands," Colonel Bandholtz, charged with his The Cost of the War
capture, admitted, "He treats the barrio people well and it is
said he does not rob them of provisions, but prays with the How many Filipinos died resisting American aggression?
people and asks them for contributions, which they usually It is doubtful if historians will ever agree on a figure that is
give." 81 anything more than a guess. The figure of 250,000 crops up in
The Americans took pains to portray Salvador as simply various works; one suspects it is chosen and repeated in
a religious sectarian, a polygamist, a wild man. Such an ignorance and in the absence of hard evidence to the contrary.
interpretation, of course, was aimed at belittling and Records of the killing were not kept and the Americans were
dismissing Salvador's political seriousness of purpose which anxious to suppress true awareness of the extent of the
was obviously striking a responsive chord among the peasants slaughter in any case, in order to avoid fueling domestic
of Central Luzon. Salvador's avowed aim was the overthrow of anti-imperialist protest. How many died of disease and the
the American Colonial Government. This was the cornerstone effects of concentration camp life is even more difficult to
of the Santa Iglesia movement. Also of interest was the assess. General Bell, who, one imagines, might be in as good a
socially progressive nature of the movement, which indicated a position to judge such matters as anyone, estimated in a New
political shift from the vaguely defined post-colonial vision of York Times interview that over 600,000 people in Luzon
the Katipuneros. Salvador repeatedly raised the land question alone had been killed or had died of disease as a result of the
and promised his supporters that land redistribution, the war. The estimate, given in May 1901, means that Bell did not
breaking up of haciendas, and the abolition of tenancy would include the effects of the Panay campaign, the Samar
swiftly follow his assumption of state power. campaign, or his own bloodthirsty Batangas campaign (where
One aspect of the post-1896 period which has been at least 100,000 died), all of which occurred after his 1901
largely overlooked was the class nature of the Philippine interview. Nor could it include the "post-war" period, which
Revolution. That the war represented Filipino resistance to saw the confinement of 300,000 people in Albay, wanton
Spanish colonialism and American aggression is obvious. That slaughter in Mindanao; and astonishing death rates in Bilibid
the period represented class struggle on several levels is not as Prison, to name but three instances where killing continued.
clearly understood today, probably because it was most A million deaths? One does not happily contemplate
imperfectly understood' at the time. Except for the tiny such carnage of innocent people who fought with
collaborationist elite, whose economic, ethnic and class origins extraordinary bravery in a cause which was just but is now all
put them in a category quite far removed from the mass of but forgotten. Such an estimate, however, might conceivably
Indio peasants, few understood clearly their economic and err on the side of understatement. To again quote the
class interests and how they were being manipulated by the anonymous U.S. Congressman, "They never rebel in Luzon
Americans as part of the imperial design. Within the anymore because there isn't anybody left to rebel."
anti-imperialist camp, class antagonisms were muted, both
because they were not understood and because of the need to
present a united nationalist front. But the latent class Notes
contradictions were always present.rand they began to surface
in the second and third year of the war against the Americans 1. The choice of terms for the Philippine-American War and the
with the defection of a number of army officers. These men corresponding reference to the Filipinos as "insurgents" was not
haphazard or accidental, as it gave semantic reinforcement to the.
came largely from middle-class backgrounds and, with a few American position that the (Malolos) Philippine Government was
notable exceptions, were prone to elitist thinking and illegitimate and that those who took up arms against the Americans
surrenderist attitudes. The speed and apparent ease of were engaged in rebellion against (legitimate) American authority. It is,
conscience with which many such men were able to take up perhaps, overstating the obvious to make the point that quite a
different interpretation is not only possible but, in my view, more
posts within the American colonial bureaucracy was to a large accurate, historically speaking. The Malolos Government was, for at
degree attributable to their class solidarity which, on the least a year after its inception, the only legitimate government in the
evidence, was stronger than their racial and ethnic ties to the Philippines insofar as Malolos alone exercised unchallenged legal
Indio peasants. authority throughout the Islands. That Malolos was not recognized by
So it was that the fight was left to be fought by the poor the U.S. did not, legally speaking, alter this fact. Nor did it make the
subsequent war against the U.S. an "insurrection." At no time were
and uneducated, bandits and outlaws, religious screwballs and Filipinos themselves in revolt against their own government. A more
wild men-or so we are told. And yet, significantly, when the accurate interpretation-and, I believe, the only correct one-is based
officers and gentlemen had made their peace with imperialism, OR the understanding that the Philippine-American War was, both

the only people left defending the honor of Philippine legally and objectively, Filipino resistance to American military
aggression against the sovereign Philippine state. The fact that the
nationalism were now also fighting for primitive social justice
Americans eventually won the war does not, in my view, alter this basic
as well. The class struggle began to emerge as co-equal to the fact. Accordingly. the terms "insurrection" and "insurgent" will not be
national struggle-long after any immediate hope of winning employed in this essay except when used in quotation.
either had passed. 2. Literature on the war is woefully skimpy and no adequate
In 1909, a decade after the first battle on the outskirts political analysis now exists. Little Brown Brother by Leon Wolff
(Manila: Erehwon, 1968) is an excellently written popular
of Manila, Felipe Salvador was still fighting. "His influence introduction. Domestic U.S. reaction to the war has received far more
over the low-er class has defied the efforts of the Government attention than the war itself, especially in recent years. Daniel
to capture him ... " He was not to be captured until the Schirmer's Republic or Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1971)
following year, snuffing out the last t1ickering t1ame of a is the best recent account of the anti-imperialist, or, more accurately,
the anti-colonialist movement in the U.S.
fourteen-year struggle against colonial aggression. Salvador,
3. At least insofar as the Treay of Paris was concerned, Had the
who had been in the hills for seventeen of his forty-one years, treaty not been approved, theoretically the Islands would have been
was tried for banditry, convicted, and executed in 1912. retained by Spain. although as a practical matter [he Spanish were
14
 hardly in a position to reassert themselves in the Islands. It seems 29. Later charged with (and' eventually acquitted 00 torturing
improbable also that the McKinley Administration would have 134 Filipino P.O.W.s to death.
withdrawn U.S. troops simply on the basis of the treaty vote, had it 30. Boston Herald, August 25, 1901 (quoting a letter from an
gone against them. American officer). Quoted in Storey and Codman, 116.
4. Wolff, Little Brown Brother, p. 226. 31. Chaffee to General Hughes, Manila, September 30, 1901,
5. Forty-five hundred dead bodies were counted by the Senate Doc. no. 331, part 2,1592.
Americans. Witnesses estimated the total number of dead to be 32. Testimony of William J. Gibbs, a survivor of the massacre.
8·10,000. H. Van Mete~, The Truth About the Philippines from Official Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3,2284 et seq.
Records and Authentic Sources (Chicago: Liberty League, 1900), p. 33. Storey and Codman, 116. Congressional Record, 57:1, May
333. 15,1902,5525.
6. Van Meter, 332. 34. Major Waller was later court martialed for his actions in
7. Van Meter, 368. Samar, one suspects in retaliation for his refusal to engage in the
8. Father of Douglas, World War II commander in the Pacific. extermination practices of his fellow officers. During the course of his
9. Van Meter, 366. trial he revealed the nature of Smith 's orders and the public disclosure
10. Eyot, Canning, ed., The Story of the Lopez Family (Boston: created a sensation in the U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt
J. H. West Co., 1904),23. (McKinley's successor upon the latter's assassination in 1901), in order
11. MacArthur later admitted, "The Filipino idea behind the to neutralize outraged public opinion, had Smith himself brought up on
dissolution of their field army was not at the time of occurrence well charges. The charges did not stem from any overt act of the Samar
understood in the American camp. As a consequence, misleading campaign (it is recalled that the War Department had "no record" that
conclusions were reached to the effect that the insurrection itself had the orders were actually carried out) but rather because the orders,
been destroyed and that it only remained to sweep up the fag ends of themselves were "unprofessional." Smith was convicted, "admonished"
the rebel army." Renato Constantino, Dissent and Counter- by the tribunal, and sentenced to "early retirement." Smith became
Consciousness (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1970), 80, quoting War something of a cause celebre in jingoist circles, causing Roosevelt to
Department Annual Reports, 1901, vol. 1, part 4,88. regret his actions: "The court martial of General Smith cost me
12. Senate Document no. 331, vol. 2; 57:1 (1902), 1926·27. votes-votes!" (Schirmer, 239 n).
13. Wolff, 294. Robinson, who reported for the New York 35. Stephen Bonsai, Boston Transcript, quoted in Storey and
Evening Post, was by far the most courageous American newsman in Codman, 38.
the Philippines. His outspoken reporting won him hasty re-assignment 36. Secretary of War Elihu Root, Senate Doc. no. 205, 57:1,
to Africa. part 1, pp. 2,3.
14. Senate Doc. no. 331, vol. 2, 57:1, pp. 1927-28. Report of 37. Chaffee to Gen. Hughes, September 30, 1901, quoted in
General MacArrhur There were 53 garrisons in November 1899, over Storey and Codman, 28.
400 by the following August. 38. Senate Doc. no. 422, 57:1, 5.
15. Fairfield, Maine Journal, excerpted from a letter from Sgt. 39. It should be remarked that not all of the U.S. soldiers reveled
Howard McFarlane, 43rd Infantry. Quoted in Wolff, 305. The soldiers in the bloodlust of their commanders. Many were repulsed by what
who wrote such letters were invariably contacted by military they had witnessed and experienced in the Philippines and were anxious
authorities and forced to write retractions, which were then hastily to expose American policy upon their return to the U.S. Others took to
published to refute the original information. Reading the retractions drink or went mad. Alcoholism and insanity followed venereal disease
tends to confirm in one's mind the verity of the original statement. as the major cause for the reduction in available U.S. manpower in the
Refusal to write a retraction was not kindly looked upon by the Philippines. Desertion was difficult due to geographical factors, but
military and the kinds of pressure tactics employed by the War incidences of offic'ers being shot in the back "by snipers" were not
Department became something of a scandal after being disclosed in unheard of, and a handful of Americans actually joined with and fought
Senate hearings in 1902. Senator McLaurin called it a "remarkable with the guerrillas (see Ellwood Bergerey, Why Soldiers Desert from the
coincidence" that in every case where the soldier was still in the army, U.S. Army (Philadelphia: William Fell & Co., 1903), 132.
-retractions were forthcoming. But when the soldier had already been 40. Cpl. Richard O'Brien, New York World, reprinted in the
discharged and was no longer subject to military discipline, " ... there Congressional Record, 57:1, May 15, 1902,5500.
was not an instance found where there was any modification, 41. Root to Lodge, Army and Navy Journal, April 5, 1902.
qualification or retraction of what had been said ... " Congressional Reprinted in Storey and Codman, 88.
Record, 57:1, May 15, 1902, 5480. 42. Senate Doc. no. 205, 57:1, part 1, p. 50.
16. Quoted in the Boston Transcript, January 12, 1900, cited by 43. Senate Doc. no. 422, 57:1, p. 19.
Wolff,299. 44. Senate Doc. no. 422, 57: 1, p. 4.
17. Wolff, 290. 45. Address before the Marquette Club, Chicago, March 11,
18. Boston Herald, August 25, 1902. Quoted in Moorfield 1902. Quoted in Frederick Chamberlin, The Blow from Behind
Storey and Julian Codman, Marked Severities in Philippine Warfare: (Boston: Lee & Shepard, 1903), 109.
Sec. Root's Record (Boston: George H. Ellis Co., 1902), 115. 46. Eyot, 146-47.
19. As was McKinley, who confessed he could not find the 47. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 16, 1902, 5552 et seq.
Philippines on the map the first time he looked for them. In light of 48. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 16, 1902, 5552.
later disclosures, this remark smacks of coyness, but it is true 49. James H. Blount, American Occupation of the Philippines
nevertheless that the Americans had the most limited understanding of (Manila: Malaya Books, 1968),388.
Philippine society. 50. Storey and Codman, 71-72.
20. Statement by Rep. Vandiver, Congressional Record, 57:1, 51. Storey and Codman, 73. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 2, pp.
May 15,1902, 5505. 1628, 1690-1.
21. At their peak, Spanish forces in the Philippines never 52. Storey and Codman, 91.
numbered more than a few thousand. 53. Senate Doc. no. 331, 57:1, part 2, p. 1632.
22. Taft testimony, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,69. 54. Storey and Codman, 92-93.
23. MacArthur testimony, Senate Doc. no. 331, part 1,135. 55. Philippine Census, 1903 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
24. Senate Doc. no. 331, part 3, 2443. Government Printing Office, 1905), vol. 2, p. 20. Comparing the 1903
25. In his first annual message to Congress, McKinley expressed figures with the Spanish figures of 1887, Batangas lost 54,000 people in
his (evidently feigned) outrage at the concentration camp policy being absolute terms, making no allowance for intervening population rise.
employed 'in Cuba. This "cruel policy," he said, "was not civilized Estimating on the basis of an annual population increase of 1.5 percent,
warfare: it was extermination." Quoted in Storey and Codman, 94. it is certain that Batangas was depopulated by 100,000 or more.
26. Report of the Provincial Governor of Abra, Senate Doc. no. 56. Report of Major Cornelius Gardiner, Governor of Tayabas,
331, part 1,430. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 15, 1902, 5500. By native troops
27. Wolff, 352. Gardiner was referring to the Macabebes, a tiny, pro-U'.S. ethnic
28. Charles E. Magoon, Acting Chief of Division, Senate Doc. no. sub-group which had played a praetorian role during the Spanish regime
331, part 3, 2263. and for this reason was well hated by the majority of Filipinos.

15
 , 57. Congressional Record, 57:1, May 16, 1902, 5542. Philippine Constabulary, Sixth Annual Report of tbe Pbilippine
58. A current diversion in some areas of the Filipino left of late Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 69.
has been to try to decide which guerrilla leaders were principled 69. Ibid., 69.
revolutionaries and which were opportunist manipulators. Few-if 70. Ibid., 78.
any-of these men can withstand such a rigorous and, ultimately, unfair 71. Report of D. J. Baker, Provincial District Commander, ibid.,
historical test, precisely because all of them lacked one or more of the part 3, Appendix A, 130.
following: (a) a revolutionary. ideology; (b) a theory of imperialism; 72. Report of W. S. Scott, 53.
(c) anything other than a primitive understanding of the class nature of 73. Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission
the struggle in which they were engaged: (d) an understanding of (1906), part I, pp. 3031. I am not aware of any of the prominent
protracted warfare and guerrilla strategy. There was no real experience leaders of 1899-1902 going back into the field after a spell of civilian
(except their own) upon which they could draw, nor was there a life under American rule, although there may have been isolated cases
historical example known to them of the successful prosecution of such where this did occur.
a struggle. They fought by their wits and their instincts alone, which led 74. Euphoria at the outcome of that war was not, of course,
in tum to terrible reversals and, ultimately, .defeat in an uneven, suicidal confined to Japan and the Philippines. News of the Japanese victory
struggle doomed from the start. So all of them to one degree or another electrified the masses of people in Southeast Asia generally, e.g.,
fail the exacting test of their modern critics. Simeon Ola surrendered, Indochina, where guerrilla war was being waged against the French.
betrayed his men, and turned state's witness against them. Macario 75. Report of Maj. Samuel D. Crawford, Commanding Officer,
Sakay was tricked into surrendering for principled (but tactically Fourth District, Philippine Constabulary, Sixth Annual Report of the
faulty) reasons and was betrayed and executed by the Americans, who Philippine Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 101-2.
had previously promised amnesty. Artemio Ricarte survives better than 76. Blount, 505, quoting Mrs. Campbell Dauncy, An
most, and for years after 1910 he waged an almost singlehanded Englisbwoman in the Philippines, 88.
struggle from abroad. But, sadly, in old age he could not see that 77. Which of course it did. Testimony of Frank J. Bourns, First
Japanese and American imperialism were cut from the same cloth. (Schurmann) Report of the Philippine Commission, part 2, p. 356.
"Papa" Isio finally surrendered, one suspects, because at the age of 78. Ibid., 355-56, 414-16. Eighth Annual Report of the
sixty-seven and after more than twenty-five years in the mountains the Pbilippine Commssion, part 2, p. 311. The story of the short-lived
rigors of guerrilla lifersimply got to be too much. And so it went. To Negros Republic and, more importantly, the development of the social
hold such men against a standard which has only slowly evolved in the forces which led to its founding have not, to my knowledge, been
course of the 20th century seems to miss the point. Given the historical adequately treated by Filipino historians, which points up the sorely
context within which the struggle was enjoined, how can it reasonably felt need for regional histories of the Philippines.
be expected that it could have evolved differently? The real heroes were 79. Report of Colonel Taylor, Sixth Annual Report of the
not so much the leaders, who served their people with a greater or lesser Philippine Commission, part 3, Appendix A, 88.
degree of fidelity and ability, but the people themselves. A simple 80. Seventh Annual Report of the Philippine Commission
point, perhaps, but one which I believe bears making. (1906), part 1, p. 142.
59. The struggle in the Philippines never degenerated into social 81. Report of Colonel Bandholtz, First District, Philippine
banditry in the strict sense of the term, although in its later stages Constabulary, ibid., part 2, p. 239.
several of the guerrilla organizations developed into "Robin
Hood"-type bands. The fascinating history of such movements as they
have occurred historically and in various parts of the world has been
largely ignored by orthodox historians, partly, no doubt, because of the
inherent difficulties in researching such phenomena. The opportunities
for such work in the Philippines are immense. The reader is directed to
the pioneering work of E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels (New York:
Praeger, 1959) and Bandits (New York, 1971).
60. Report of the Governor of Albay, in Sixth Annual Report of Pacific Imperialism
the Philippine Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1905), partL, Appendix H, 144. Blount, 49. Notebook .
61. Fourth Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1903),
A Monthly Report. with Complete Index
part I, p. 30. $7.50ycarly (Institutions'$15; Airmail -
62. Report of the Secretary of Finance and Justice, Sixth $8 extra.)
Annual Report of the Philippine Commission (1905), part 4, p. 177.
63. Blount, 453. Nuts & bolts of US, Japanese &
European imperialism in the Asia/Pacific
64. Cable, Governor Feito to Carpenter, August 9,1904. Quoted region ... Capital export & trade, by
in Blount, 461. country, company & business deal.
65. Report of Col. Wallace C. Taylor, Sixth Annual Report of
Typical subjects:
tbe Pbilippine Commission Appendix A, 54.
67. Scott, 55. Conditions in Bilibid were scandalously bad, and " International runaway shop: US &
in 1903 it became a point of controversy because American prisoners Japan export auto & electronics
production.
were being kept there as. well as Filipinos. American investigators
reported, "Considering the appalling mortality in Bilibid and the charac- • Overproduction crisis & rising US-
Japan contradictions.
ter of the diseases with which the prisoners are afflicted, there is no
question but that the latter are suffering greatly from the effects of • Japan's zaibatsu & rebirth of the
crowd poisoning." In reporting on conditions in late 1904, Secretary of Greater East Asia Coprosperity
Sphere.
Commerce and Police William Cameron Forbes issued a statement
which can only be described as incredible: "In Bilibid Prison discipline • Minerals & oil investment ... Extent
has been uniformly good and conditions on the whole satisfactory. On of foreign control, against a back-
ground of struggles for national
the 7th day of Dec. 1904 a small outbreak occurred among the liberation.
detention prisoners, in which 200 endeavored to gain their liberty. The Free with
prompt use of a gatling gun in the tower and the riot guns with which (Sample on Request) SUb: Who's
Who in
the guards on the walls were armed ended the trouble in eight minutes. Write to: Zaibatsu:
There were 19 killed and 40 wounded, but the work in the shops and Guide to
PACIFIC RIM PROJECT Japanese
other industrial departments of the prison was not interrupted, and in Box 26415 Finance
30 minutes' time there was no evidence except in the hospital that San Francisco CA 94126 Capital
($1.50
there had been any trouble." The "uniformly good" conditions Forbes separately)
spoke of included a death rate of 438 per 1000 by 1905. To be
sentenced there was tantamount toa death sentence.
68. Report of H. H. Bandholtz, Commander, Second District
16