Public Prosecutor v Yazid bin Sufaat & Ors
[2015] 1 MLJ (Abu Samah JCA) 571
A
Public Prosecutor v Yazid bin Sufaat & Ors
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CRIMINAL APPEAL NO
B
W-05–141–05 OF 2013
ABU SAMAH, AZAHAR MOHAMED AND MOHD ZAWAWI JJCA
27 JANUARY 2014
C Criminal Procedure — Charge — Defective charges — Charges of promoting
terrorism and abetting act of terrorism — Application to set aside or permanently
quash charges — Whether charges defective, confusing and ambiguous
— Whether charges mala fides and abuse of process of court — Whether SOSMA
meant to deal with actions or threats committed within Malaysia — Whether
D appeal could proceed in absence of one of the respondents — Whether High Court
erred and misconceived charges against respondents
The three respondents were arrested under s 4 of the Security Offences (Special
Measures) Act 2012 (‘SOSMA’) for committing security offences. SOSMA,
E which was enacted pursuant to art 149 of the Federal Constitution, merely
regulated the trial of security offences but did not create the said offences.
Instead such security offences were punishable under the Penal Code. Thus, the
respondents, who were arrested under the SOSMA, were later separately
charged for security offences under s 130G(a) of the Penal Code.The first
F respondent was charged for promoting a terrorist act between 1 August 2012
and 20 October 2012 at a house situated in Ampang with the intention of
advancing an ideological cause with such an act being regarded as a threat to the
members of public in Syria, while the second and third respondents were
charged for abetting the first respondent in promoting the commission of the
G terrorist act at the same place and time. The three respondents applied to set
aside and/or permanently quash or stay the charges against them on the
grounds that the charges were defective, confusing and ambiguous, that the
charges were mala fides, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process court,
and finally that the SOSMA was unconstitutional as it was enacted contrary to
H arts 149, 5 or 8 of the Federal Constitution. The High Court was of the view
that SOSMA was meant to deal with actions or threats committed within
Malaysia. It then went on to find that the charges against the respondents were
related to acts of terrorism committed outside Malaysia ie in Syria. As such the
High Court ruled that proceeding against the respondents by invoking the
I provisions of SOSMA would be an abuse of the process of court. On those
grounds that High Court set aside or quashed or stayed permanently the
charges against respondents and ordered them to be acquitted and discharged.
This was an appeal by the public prosecutor against that decision of the High
Court. The first and third respondents (the respondents) objected to the
572 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
hearing of the appeal on the grounds thatthe second respondent was absent. A
The respondents submitted that the appeal should be heard in the presence of
all the respondents. However, the appellant insisted on proceeding as there was
no foreseeable likelihood of securing the attendance of the second respondent,
who could not be traced.
B
Held, allowing the appeal:
(1) There was no rule of law that the appeal against the first and third
respondents could not proceed in the absence of the second respondent
(see para 12). C
(2) The High Court had clearly erred and misconceived the charges against
the respondents. An act of terrorism is a transnational phenomenon that
has no territorial limits. Thus, for instance, an act of terrorism could be
planned or hatched within Malaysia with an intention to execute it
D
outside Malaysia. The intention for SOSMA was, among others, to
prevent Malaysia from being used as a terrorist haven. Further, s 2 of the
SOSMA made it clear that the procedure laid down in SOSMA applied
to the trial of any person charged with committing any security offence
under the Code. The High Court judge therefore erred in holding that it
E
would be an abuse of the process of court to invoke the provision of
SOSMA for the purpose of trial of the respondents for security offences
under s 130G(a) of the Penal Code (see paras 20, 23 & 24).
(3) In the circumstances the orders of the High Court ought to be set aside
and the respondents’ case should be remitted to the High Court for trial F
(see para 25).
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Ketiga-tiga responden telah ditangkap di bawah s 4 Akta Kesalahan
Keselamatan (Langkah-Langkah Khas) 2012 (‘AKKLK’) kerana telah G
melakukan kesalahan keselamatan. AKKLK, yang telah digubal selaras dengan
perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan, hanya mengawal selia perbicaraan
kesalahan keselamatan tetapi tidak membentuk kesalahan-kesalahan tersebut.
Sebaliknya kesalahan keselamatan sebegitu boleh dihukum di bawah Kanun
Keseksaan. Oleh itu, responden-responden, yang telah ditangkap di bawah H
AKKLK, kemudian telah dituduh secara berasingan kerana kesalahan
keselamatan di bawah s 130G(a) Kanun Keseksaan. Responden pertama telah
dituduh kerana menggalakkan tindakan pengganas antara 1 Ogos 2012 dan
20 Oktober 2012 di rumah yang terletak di Ampang dengan niat memajukan
punca ideologi dengan apa-apa perbuatan yang dianggap sebagai ancaman I
kepada orang awam di Syria, manakala responden kedua dan ketiga telah
didakwa kerana bersubahat dengan responden pertama dalam menggalakkan
perlakuan tindakan pengganas di tempat dan pada masa yang sama. Ketiga-tiga
responden memohon untuk mengetepikan dan/atau membatalkan sementara
Public Prosecutor v Yazid bin Sufaat & Ors
[2015] 1 MLJ (Abu Samah JCA) 573
A atau menggantung pertuduhan-pertuduhan itu terhadap mereka atas alasan
bahawa pertuduhan-pertuduhan itu adalah defektif, mengelirukan dan tidak
jelas, bahawa pertuduhan-pertuduhan itu adalah berniat jahat, remeh,
menyusahkan dan satu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah, dan akhirnya
AKKLK adalah tidak berperlembagaan kerana ia telah digubal bertentangan
B dengan perkara-perkara 149, 5 atau 8 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Mahkamah
Tinggi berpendapat bahawa AKKLK bermaksud untuk mengendalikan
tindakan-tindakan atau ugutan-ugutan yang dilakukan dalam Malaysia. Ia
kemudian mendapati bahawa pertuduhan-pertuduhan terhadap
responden-responden adalah berkaitan dengan tindakan pengganas yang
C dilakukan di luar Malaysia iaitu di Syria. Oleh itu Mahkamah Tinggi
memutuskan bahawa prosiding terhadap responden-responden dengan
menggunakan peruntukan-peruntukan AKKLK akan menjadi
penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah. Atas alasan tersebut Mahkamah Tinggi
mengetepikan atau membatalkan atau menggantung secara kekal
D pertuduhan-pertuduhan terhadap responden-responden dan memerintahkan
mereka dilepas dan dibebaskan. Ini adalah rayuan oleh pendakwa raya
terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi itu. Responden-responden pertama
dan ketiga (‘responden-responden tersebut’) telah membantah terhadap
perbicaraan rayuan itu atas alas an bahawa responden kedua tidak hadir.
E Responden-responden telah berhujah bahawa rayuan itu patut didengar
dengan kehadiran kesemua responden. Walau bagaimanapun, perayu
mendesak untuk meneruskan kerana tiada kemungkinan yang boleh dijangka
untuk menjamin kehadiran responden kedua, yang tidak dapat dikesan.
F Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan:
(1) Tiada rukun undang-undang bahawa rayuan terhadap
responden-responden pertama dan ketiga tidak boleh diteruskan dengan
ketidakhadiran responden kedua (lihat perenggan 12).
G (2) Mahkamah Tinggi dengan jelas terkhilaf dan tersalah tanggap tentang
pertuduhan-pertuduhan terhadap responden-responden. Tindakan
pengganas adalah fenomena transnasional yang tiada had kawasan. Oleh
itu, contohnya, suatu tindakan pengganas boleh dirancang atau
dimulakan dalam Malaysia dengan niat untuk melakukannya di luar
H Malaysia. Niat untuk AKKLK adalah, antara lain, untuk mengelakkan
Malaysia digunakan sebagai lokasi pengganas. Selanjutnya, s 2 AKKLK
jelas menyatakan bahawa prosedur yang dinyatakan dalam AKKLK
terpakai kepada perbicaraan sesiapa yang dituduh melakukan apa-apa
kesalahan keselamatan di bawah Kanun tersebut. Hakim Mahkamah
I Tinggi dengan itu terkhilaf kerana memutuskan bahawa ia adalah
penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah untuk menggunakan peruntukan
AKKLK bagi tujuan perbicaraan responden-responden kerana kesalahan
keselamatan di bawah s 130G(a) Kanun Keseksaan (lihat perenggan 20,
23 & 24).
574 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
(3) Dalam keadaan itu perintah-perintah Mahkamah Tinggi patut A
diketepikan dan kes responden-responden hendaklah dikembalikan
kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk perbicaraan (lihat perenggan 25). ]
Notes
For cases on defective charges, see 5(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2014 Reissue) B
paras 1318–1360.
Cases referred to
Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v PP [2010] 6 MLJ 585, FC (refd)
C
Karpal Singh & Anor v PP [1991] 2 MLJ 544, SC (refd)
People’s Union For Civil Liberties & Anor v Union of India 2004 AIR SC 456
(refd)
Legislation referred to
D
Criminal Procedure Code s 177A
Federal Constitution arts 5, 8, 149
Penal Code ss 4, 109, 130B(2), 130B(5)(b), 130G(a)
Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 ss 2, 4, 12, 13
E
Abdul Wahab bin Mohamad (Mohamad Hanafiah bin Zakaria, Ishak bin Mohd
Yusof, Mohd Farizul bin Hassan Bakri, Choo Hueay Ting & Nadia Mohd Izhar
with him) (Deputy Public Prosecutor, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the
appellant.
Amer Hamzah bin Arshad (Edmund Bon Tai Soon, Wan Hidayati Nadirah bt F
Wan Ahmad Nasir, Nur Zatulitri bt Md Yusof, Farida bt Mohamad, New Sin
Yew and Chan Yen Hui) (Zatul, Hida & Partners) for the first and third
respondents.
Abu Samah JCA (delivering judgment of the court): G
[1] This is an appeal by the public prosecutor against the decision of the
High Court, Shah Alam allowing a joint application by the respondents by way
of a notice of motion:
H
(a) to set aside and/quash or stay permanently the charges against them in
exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction; and
(b) that the respondents be acquitted and discharged of the said charges.
[2] The respondents were arrested on 7 February 2013 under s 4 of the I
Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (‘SOSMA’) and were separately
charged before the Magistrate’s Court, Ampang for security offences under
s 130G(a) of the Penal Code (‘the Code’). Their cases were later transferred for
trial before the High Court, Shah Alam pursuant to s 177A of the Criminal
Public Prosecutor v Yazid bin Sufaat & Ors
[2015] 1 MLJ (Abu Samah JCA) 575
A Procedure Code. Section 12 of the SOSMA provides that all security offences
shall be tried by the High Court.
[3] Yazid bin Sufaat (‘the first respondent’) was charged for committing a
security offence under s 130G(a) of the Penal Code, namely for promoting the
B commission of a terrorist act with the intention of advancing an ideological
cause which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
thirty years and shall also be liable to fine. The charge against him reads:
Bahawa kamu antara 1 haribulan Ogos hingga 20 haribulan Oktober 2012 jam
C antara 8.30 pagi dan 10.30 pagi, di rumah beralamat DL11, Taman Bukit Ampang,
Lorong Mutiara 2, Lembah Jaya, Ampang di dalam Daerah Ampang, dalam Negeri
Selangor Darul Ehsan, dengan diketahui oleh kamu menggalakkan pelakuan
perbuatan keganasan dengan niat untuk memajukan suatu tujuan ideologi, dan
perbuatan tersebut boleh semunasabahnya dianggap sebagai diniatkan untuk
D menggugut orang awam di Syria dan oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan
suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 130G(a) Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574) dan boleh
dihukum di bawah seksyen yang sama.
[4] Halimah bt Hussein (‘the second respondent’) was charged for abetting
E the first respondent in promoting the commission of the said terrorist act,
which is an offence under s 130G(a) of the Code read with s 109 of the said
Code. The charge against her reads:
Bahawa kamu antara 1 haribulan Ogos hingga 20 haribulan Oktober 2012 jam
antara 8.30 pagi dan 10.30 pagi, di rumah beralamat DL11, Taman Bukit Ampang,
F
Lorong Mutiara 2, Lembah Jaya, Ampang, di dalam Daerah Ampang, dalam Negeri
Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah bersubahat dengan Yazid bin Sufaat dengan diketahui
oleh kamu menggalakkan pelakuan perbuatan keganasan di mana perbuatan itu
dilakukan dengan niat untuk memajukan suatu tujuan ideologi dan perbuatan
tersebut boleh semunasabahnya dianggap sebagai diniatkan untuk menggugut
G orang awam di Syria di mana kesalahan tersebut telah dilakukan atas sebab-sebab
persubahat kamu, dan oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan
yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 130G(a) Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574)
dibaca bersama seksyen 109 Kanun yang sama.
H [5] Muhamad Hilmi bin Hasim (‘the third respondent’) was similarly
charged for abetting the first respondent in promoting the commission of the
said terrorist act at the same place and time, which is an offence under
s 130G(a) of the Code read with s 109 of the said Code. He was charged as
follows:
I
Bahawa kamu antara 1 haribulan Ogos hingga 20 haribulan Oktober 2012 jam
antara 8.30 pagi dan 10.30 pagi, di rumah beralamat DL11, Taman Bukit Ampang,
Lorong Mutiara 2, Lembah Jaya, Ampang, di dalam Daerah Ampang, dalam Negeri
Selangor Darul Ehsan, telah bersubahat dengan Yazid bin Sufaat dengan diketahui
oleh kamu menggalakkan pelakuan perbuatan keganasan di mana perbuatan itu
576 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
dilakukan dengan niat untuk memajukan suatu tujuan ideologi dan perbuatan A
tersebut boleh semunasabahnya dianggap sebagai diniatkan untuk menggugut
orang awam di Syria di mana kesalahan tersebut telah dilakukan atas sebab-sebab
persubahat kamu, dan oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan
yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 130G(a) Kanun Keseksaan (Akta 574)
dibaca bersama seksyen 109 Kanun yang sama. B
[6] In this judgment, reference to ‘respondents’ means the first and third
respondents only unless otherwise stated.
[7] We felt it necessary to reproduce the abovesaid charges against the C
respondents as the High Court’s decision in setting aside and/quashing the
charges and acquitting them of the said charges was based on the ingredients of
the offence as stipulated in the charges.
D
[8] What is a ‘terrorist act’? The term ‘terrorist act’ is defined in s 130B(2) of
the Penal Code:
130(B)2 For the purposes of this Chapter, ‘terrorist act’ means an act or threat of
action within or beyond Malaysia where:
(a) the act or threat falls within subsection (3) and does not fall within E
subsection (4);
(b) the act is done or the threat is made with the intention of advancing a
political, religious or ideological cause; and
(c) the act or threat is intended or may reasonably be regarded as being F
intended to:
(i) intimidate the public or a section of the public; or
(ii) influence or compel the Government of Malaysia or the
Government of any State in Malaysia, any other government, or any G
international organization to do or refrain from doing any act.
[9] An offence under s 130G(a) of the Code is one of the offences relating to
terrorism referred to in Chapter VIA of the Code. Offences under Chapter VIA
of the Code are classified as ‘security offences’ by virtue of s 2 of the SOSMA. H
[10] SOSMA is an Act of Parliament enacted pursuant to art 149 of the
Federal Constitution (‘the Constitution’). The long title to the Act expressly
states that it is, ‘An Act to provide for special measures relating to security
offences for the purpose of maintaining public order and security and for I
connected matters’. By reason of s 2 of the SOSMA, a person charged for
committing a security offence will be tried according to the procedures as laid
down in SOSMA. It must be noted that SOSMA merely regulates the trial of
security offences. It does not create the said offences. Security offences are
Public Prosecutor v Yazid bin Sufaat & Ors
[2015] 1 MLJ (Abu Samah JCA) 577
A offences under Chapters VI and VIA of the Code and punishable under the
said Code.
[11] When the case was called up before us, learned counsel for the first and
third respondents objected to the hearing of the appeal on the ground that the
B second respondent was absent. It was submitted that the appeal should be
heard in the presence of all the respondents in order to avoid any possible
conflict of decisions by different panels of this court. The appellant insisted on
proceeding with the appeal as there was no foreseable likelihood of securing the
C
presence of the second respondent who could not be traced after she was
acquitted of the charge against her. Attempts to execute the warrant of arrest
against the second respondent were unsuccessful.
[12] After hearing submissions from both parties, we ruled that we could
D proceed with the appeal against the respondents before us in absence of the
second respondent. The appeal in respect of the second respondent could be
heard separately after the execution of the warrant of arrest against her. There is
no rule of law that the appeal against the first and third respondents cannot
proceed in absence of the second respondent. Any further adjournment of the
E appeal would result in the respondents being held in custody longer than
necessary as s 13 of the SOSMA states that no bail shall be granted to a person
charged with a security offence.
[13] The application to set aside and/quash or stay the charges permanently
F against the respondents is based on three grounds. Firstly, the charges against
them are defective, confusing, ambiguous and thus do not disclose any offence
in law. Secondly, the charges against them are made mala fide, baseless,
frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of court. Thirdly SOSMA is
unconstitutional and enacted contrary to arts 149, 5 and/or 8 of the
G Constitution.
[14] Before the High Court, the appellant conceded that the court has
inherent power to set aside and/quash or stay the charges against the
respondents on the grounds of mala fide or that they are oppressive or an abuse
H of the process of court (Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor [2010] 6
MLJ 585, Karpal Singh & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1991] 2 MLJ 544). On the
first ground, the High Court held and correctly, that it has inherent power to
set aside and/quash or stay the charges permanently, ‘to prevent an oppressive
and mala fide prosecution, abuse of its process and to undo wrong in the course
I of administration of criminal justice’. As for the third ground, it is clear from
the notes of proceedings before the High Court that learned counsel for the
respondents did not dispute the constitutionality of SOSMA which was passed
pursuant to art 149 of the Constitution. Thus the High Court did not in its
grounds of judgment decide on this issue.
578 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
[15] The crux of the respondents’ contention is that the respondents are A
charged for promoting an act of terrorism and that act may reasonably be
regarded as being intended as a threat to the members of public in Syria and not
in Malaysia. It is the contention of the respondents that SOSMA was enacted
pursuant to art 149 of the Constitution to deal with action or threat committed
within Malaysia by any substantial body of persons from inside or outside B
Malaysia. Article 149 states:
149(1) If an Act of Parliament recites that action has been taken or threatened
by any substantial body of persons, whether inside or outside the
Federation: C
(a) to cause, or to cause a substantial number of citizens to fear,
organised violence against persons or property; or
(b) to excite disaffection against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or any
Government in Federation; or
D
(c) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races
or other classes of the population likely to cause violence; or
(d) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of
anything by law established; or
E
(e) which is prejudicial to the maintenance or the functioning of any
supply or service to the public or any class of the public in the
Federation or any part thereof; or
(f) which is prejudicial to public order in, or the security of, the
Federation or any part thereof, F
any provision of that law designed to stop or prevent that action is valid
notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of Article 5, 9,
10 or 13, or would apart from this Article be outside the legislative power of
Parliament; and Article 79 shall not apply to a Bill for such an Act or any
amendment to such a Bill. (Emphasis added.) G
[16] Thus, while art 149 of the Constitution empowers the Legislature to
pass an Act of Parliament to deal with action taken or threat by any substantial
body of persons from within or outside Malaysia, it does not empower
Parliament to legislate or make laws meant to deal with action or threat by any H
substantial body of persons committed outside Malaysia. As the charges against
the respondents specifically refer to terrorist act against members of public in
Syria and not in Malaysia the said charges are thus defective, bad in law and do
not disclose any offence under s 130G(a) of the Penal Code.
I
[17] It follows that the special measures provided in SOSMA relating to trial
of a security offence under s 130G(a) of the Penal Code are not applicable for
trial of the respondents. It is an abuse of process of court to charge the
respondents for security offences under s 130G(a) of the Code and apply the
Public Prosecutor v Yazid bin Sufaat & Ors
[2015] 1 MLJ (Abu Samah JCA) 579
A provisions in SOSMA for the trial of the respondents.
[18] The High Court agreed with the submissions of counsel for the
respondents that the charges against them were related to acts of terrorism
committed outside Malaysia, ie in Syria. It held the view that SOSMA which
B was enacted pursuant to art 149 of the Constitution, which is meant to deal
with action or threat committed within Malaysia by any substantial body of
persons from within or outside Malaysia, clearly does not apply to the trial of
the respondents for offences relating to acts of terrorism committed outside
Malaysia. The High Court ruled that should the prosecution proceed with the
C said charges against the respondents by invoking the provisions in SOSMA it
would be an abuse of the process of court. On those grounds, the High Court
set aside and/quashed or stayed permanently the charges against the
respondents and ordered them to be acquitted and discharged.
D
[19] For convenience, we reproduce paras 22(b) and (e) of the judgment of
the learned judge which contained His Lordship’s reasoning in allowing the
application by the respondents:
(b) Mahkamah ini berpuas hati dan bersetuju dengan hujahan oleh
E peguam bela bagi pihak Pemohon-Pemohon di mana terdapat merit
dalam hujahan yang diutarakan oleh pihak peguam bela mengenai isu
berkaitan dengan pertuduhan dan pemakaian SOSMA yang digubal di
bawah Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Adalah dipersetujui
bahawa Perkara 149 Perlembagaan Persekutuan hanyalah terpakai bagi
maksud ancaman keganasan yang ditujukan kepada keselamatan dalam
F negeri Malaysia oleh orang atau sebilangan orang yang sama ada berada di
dalam mahu pun di luar negara. Oleh sebab pertuduhan-pertuduhan yang
dikenakan terhadap Pemohon-Pemohon adalah melibatkan keganasan
yang berlaku di luar negara Malaysia iaitu di negara Syria, maka pada
pandangan Mahkamah ini keadaan tersebut tidak tertakluk di bawah
G ruang lingkup atau skop pemakaian Perkara 149 Perlembagaan
Persekutuan. Oleh itu SOSMA yang digubal di bawah Perkara 149
Perlembagaan Persekutuan pada pandangan Mahkamah ini tidak boleh
digunapakai sebagai prosedur dalam perbicaraan bagi membuktikan
pertuduhan-pertuduhan yang telah dihadapkan terhadap
Pemohon-Pemohon di dalam kes ini. Jika ini dilakukan, ia akan
H membawa makna bahawa di dalam kes terhadap Pemohon-Pemohon di
sini, SOSMA telah digunapakai secara ultra vires Perkara 149
Perlembagaan Persekutuan itu sendiri. Perkara ini tidak sewajarnya
berlaku. Mahkamah ini tidak bersetuju dengan hujahan Tuan TPR yang
bijaksana bahawa SOSMA mempunyai extra territorial application atau
I extra territorial jurisdiction, sama seperti KK apabila melibatkan
warganegara atau harta benda kepunyaan warganegara Malaysia;
(e) Sekiranya pihak Responden/Pendakwaan meneruskan dengan
pendakwaan terhadap Pemohon-Pemohon atas pertuduhan-pertuduhan
yang seperti sedia ada dengan menggunapakai prosedur diperuntukkan di
580 Malayan Law Journal [2015] 1 MLJ
bawah SOSMA, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa ia adalah satu A
penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah dan Mahkamah ini sewajarnya
bertindak dengan kuasa yang sedia ada, menghalang pihak
Responden/Pendakwaan daripada meneruskan dengan pendakwaan
terhadap Pemohon-Pemohon atas pertuduhan-pertuduhan di dalam
keadaan kes ini. (Emphasis added.) B
(There are no paras (c) and (d) in the grounds of judgment).
[20] In our judgment, the High Court had clearly erred and misconceived
the charges against the respondents. The charge against the first respondent is C
for promoting a terrorist act between 1 August 2012 and 20 October 2012 at
a house bearing address DL11, Taman Bukit Ampang, Lorong Mutiara 2,
Lembah Jaya Ampang, Selangor with the intention of advancing an ideological
cause and that such act can reasonably be regarded as being a threat to the
D
members of public in Syria.
[21] The third respondent is charged with abetting the first respondent for
the commission of the said offence at the same place and time, in Malaysia. The
charges against the respondents are therefore in respect of acts of terrorism E
committed within Malaysia. Be that as it may, s 4 of the Penal Code clearly
states that any offence under Chapters VI and VIA of the Code include offence
done outside Malaysia. Section 130B(5)(b) of the Code states that, ‘a reference
to the public includes a reference to the public of a country or territory other
than Malaysia’. F
[22] Learned counsel for the respondents conceded before us that the
charges against the respondents refer to the commission of security offences
committed within Malaysia. Learned counsel also conceded that the threat to
the security of Malaysia may come from within or outside Malaysia. G
[23] An act of terrorism is a transnational phenomenon. It has no territorial
limits. It transcends national borders. For instance, an act of terrorism may be
planned or hatched within Malaysia with an intention to execute it outside
Malaysia. The intention of SOSMA is, among others, to prevent Malaysia from H
being used as a terrorist haven. S Rajendra Babu and GP Mathur JJ in People’s
Union For Civil Liberties & Anor v Union of India, 2004 AIR SC 456 aptly
describe acts of terrorism as follows:
The terrorist threat that we are facing is now on an unprecedented global scale. I
Terrorism has become a global threat with global effects. It has become a challenge
to the whole community of civilised nations. Terrorist activities in one country take
on a transnational character, carrying out attacks across one border, receiving
funding from private parties or a government across another, and procuring arms
from multiple sources. Terrorism in a single country can readily become a threat to
Public Prosecutor v Yazid bin Sufaat & Ors
[2015] 1 MLJ (Abu Samah JCA) 581
A regional peace and security owing to its spillover effects. It is therefore difficult in the
present context to draw a sharp distinction between domestic and international
terrorism. Many happenings in the recent past caused the international community
to focus on the issue of terrorism with renewed intensity. The Security Council
unanimously passed resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001); the General
Assembly adopted resolutions 56/1 by consensus, and convened a special session.
B
All these resolutions and declarations inter alia call upon member states to take
necessary steps to ‘prevent and suppress terrorist acts’. India is a party to all these
operation among nations. It has thus become our international obligation also to
pass necessary laws to fight terrorism.
C
[24] In our judgment s 2 of the SOSMA makes it clear that the procedure
laid down in SOSMA apply to trial of any person charged with committing any
security offence under Chapter VIA of the Code. The learned judge therefore
erred in holding that it would be an abuse of the process of court to invoke the
provisions in SOSMA for the purpose of trial of the respondents for security
D
offences under s 130G(a) or s 130G(a) read with s 109 of the Code.
[25] For the aforesaid reasons, we allowed the appeal by the public
prosecutor and set aside all the orders of the High Court. We made a further
E order that the respondents’ case be remitted to the High Court, Shah Alam for
the said court to set the dates for trial.
Appeal allowed.
F Reported by Kohila Nesan
