Cliffe LandReformSouth 2000
Cliffe LandReformSouth 2000
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Review of African Political Economy
Lionel Cliffe
With the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994, the newly elected
government introduced a programme of land reform. This had three components:
* land redistribution,
Following the elections of 1999, a new Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs
announced a moratorium on new land redistribution and sent the draft Land Rights
Bill, which would have enacted a comprehensive land tenure reform, back to the
drawing board, while she reassessed policy on the basis of evaluation of the past five
years' experience. Now after six months of deliberations, a new policy has been
outlined. It seeks to accelerate redistribution of white-owned commercial farm land,
setting a target of 15 per cent of it to change hands in five years, but seeking to orient
reallocation to black commercial farmers of varying scale of operation; there will also
be some pilots for a switch to a less 'market-led' form of redistribution. Restitution
will be speeded up and reoriented to incorporate a more developmental rather than
simply a rights-based approach. Land tenure in the former bantustans will be subject
to reform legislation, different in some respects from the draft Land Rights Bill of
1999, to be introduced this year, which will aim to give greater security under a
rationalised system, utilising local institutions. This article will seek to assess the first
five years of land reform, explore the characteristics of the new policy and examine
how far it meets the shortcomings of the old.
Redistribution
The Land Redistribution Programme aims to reallocate land to the landless poor,
labour tenants, farm workers and emerging farmers for residential and productive
uses in order to improve their livelihoods and quality of life. Special attention is to be
given to the needs of women. The following legislation has been enacted to facilitate
the programme:
* The Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act, 126 of 1993 (renamed in 1998):
provides for the designation of land for settlement purposes and financial
assistance to people acquiring land and for settlement support;
* This section is derived from a briefing from Robin Palmer, Oxfam/UK Land Reform
Adviser, with thanks.
The programme gathered momentum so that by June 1998 almost 250,000 people, in
279 projects, had received land. More people received land during 1998 than in the
previous three years combined. In the first quarter of 1999, more than 50,000 people
obtained land through the redistribution programme. By mid-November 1999, the
Department of Land Affairs had 447 redistribution projects in the implementation
phase which involved 360,256 people (55,424 households) and the transfer of 714,407
hectares of land (see below for details).
Restitution
A Land Restitution Programme aims to restore land to those dispossessed of their
rights in land since 1913 through racially discriminatory laws and practice. The
objective is 'to promote justice and reconciliation'. The Restitution of Land Rights Act
22 of 1994 was enacted to guide implementation and give it a legal basis. As of 31
March 1999, 63,455 restitution claims had been lodged. Finalised claims totalled 241,
involving the restoration of 311,484 hectares to 13,584 households (83,378 beneficiar-
ies). A further 4,365 claims were gazetted by March 1999, with another 200 nearing
completion of the work required to certify claims. Some 284 claims were rejected.
About 80 per cent of all restitution claims relate to urban land and involve substantial
financial settlement rather than resettlement on the land confiscated originally. The
status of this programme is that once a claim is recognised by the Claims Court, the
government is required to compensate the existing 'owner' and/or pay recompense
to the claimants; the commitments under it are not limited by specific budgetary
provision or shifts in policy.
Tenure Reform
The Land Tenure Reform Programme deals directly with the means through which
land is owned. In particular, it seeks to address issues pertaining to the insecure,
overlapping and disputed land rights resulting from the previous systems of
governance, especially in the former bantustans. The following laws have been
enacted to facilitate reform: The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of
1996, a mechanism to protect people with insecure tenure from losing their rights, and
interest, in land pending long-term reform measures; the Communal Property
Associations Act 28 of 1996, which enables communities or groups to acquire, hold
and manage property under a written constitution; and The Land Reform (Labour
Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, which provides for the purchase of land by labour tenants and
the provision of subsidies to this end. In addition, the Extension of Security of Tenure
Act 62 of 1997 ('ESTA') provides for tenure security in two ways: first, by helping
people living on rural or peri-urban land to obtain stronger rights to the land on
which they are living, or on land close by; and second, by laying down certain steps
that owners and persons in charge of rural or peri-urban land must follow before they
can evict people. The Act also regulates the day-to-day relationships between owners
and people living on rural or peri-urban land. A proposed Land Rights Bill was
intended to finalise the programme and, pursuant to the 1997 Land Policy, was to
significantly reform the context within which South Africans in the ex-homelands
occupy property.
It was this thrust that was behind the inclusion of a land restitution provision in the
land reform package, distinct from the patterns of land reform in ex-settler colonies in
southern Africa where the complexity of establishing and implementing such historic
rights was put aside in favour more simply of land redistribution. But South Africa's
formula was also different from those in Zimbabwe, Namibia, even Swaziland and
before that in Kenya, in that the redistribution programme was not implemented
through a government agency acquiring large areas of land and then parcelling it up,
providing infrastructure and back-up services for individual African smallholders.
Instead redistribution was left to be initiated by 'communities', envisaged as similar
to those that would be pursuing restitution, but without qualifying legally under that
programme. Government would play a facilitating role, making grants available for
such communities to purchase land through the market. This grants-based approach
also owes much to the limited number of previous activists who had pursued land
causes in the recent past: one of the few constituencies from which policy makers,
advisers and reform implementing officials could be drawn.
On the other hand, this approach to redistribution through grants and land transfer
through the market was also very much to the economic thinking of another set of
actors: the World Bank and other international 'experts' wedded to a 'market-led'
land reform. This perspective is perhaps best represented in a collection of papers,
most of them general readings of international experience or of South African realities
and designed to yield a model for the right policy choice, authored by interconnected
'experts' from the World Bank, herded together by a senior analyst from Washington,
Hans Binswanger. They included those from the Southern Africa Development Bank
waving apartheid era reformist, verligte credentials and some agricultural economists
based in one academic institution (Van Zyl, Kirsten & Binswanger, 1996). Their
influence was fed into the policy-making process through a series of conferences and
other dialogues with the ANC, government and activists from the early 1990s. Their
thinking was based on a particular reading of the lessons of experience elsewhere in
Africa, and in other parts of the world, such as Central America, which were dealing
with different inherited structures and thus were of limited relevance. What must be
recognised about this approach is that World Bank officials and experts have been
urging some degree of land reform in South Africa since the start of the transition in
1991. Their reasons are straightforward:
Bernstein (1998) is right to criticise the view of those like the Liptons who assert that
small always will be more efficient. However, all too often in South Africa the polar
opposite position is so deeply embedded in the subconscious that it is beyond the
powers of persuasion even of the World Bank experts to convince many practitioners
that smallholder farming might be more productive in certain circumstances.
Bernstein (1998) is also correct that one common approach to generating guidelines
for redistribution is simply to scale down, without fundamentally changing, the mix
of factors of production on large commercial farms to some minimum viable scale.
One can add that the supposed 'technical' basis for the inherited regulations which
preserve the size of farms by prohibiting sub-division beyond a certain 'floor' is
derived from assumptions of what is an appropriate target income for a white farmer
(in some cases a generation ago, and for a 'poor white' as well) rather than any logic
relating to economies of scale of production!
Whatever the status of these arguments, it is the consequences of some of the World
Bank's type of thinking for the shaping of policy that should be noted here. Convinced
of the necessity for some redistribution, authors like Binswanger (1996) have
marshalled arguments against any approach based on confiscation of land: to do so
without any compensation, they felt, was precluded because the political situation
was not revolutionary enough to overcome the inevitable opposition - probably a
correct reading of the situation even in the early 1990s - and in any case this was
precluded by South Africa's new constitution. But they also argued against
confiscation with compensation, especially if below the market price of land, on the
grounds that it would be costly and slow, involving contestation through the courts
or in the political arena, and would have to be administered via a state agency which
should be avoided at all costs, as it would be bureaucratic and would ultimately be
rent-seeking.
Combined with the 'rights-based' tradition, this thinking led to a policy that allowed
some restitution of judicially established rights of evicted peoples and envisaged
greater security of tenure in former bantustans, but also put the major emphasis on 'a
market-led redistribution' approach. Land would be transferred on a willing-buyer/
willing-seller basis, where the transaction would be between farm-owners and
communities, but where the latter would be entitled, on application, to a grant (as a
recognition of historic wrongs) from government. This approach would obviate the
need for a separate land reform bureaucracy (although as we shall see the market-led/
application-grant based approach (MAG) succeeded in spawning a considerable one).
DLA sought to meet these needs by adding a lttle to the grant, but also by farming the
planning out to 'consultants'. The advice provided was often lacking or superficial,
and seldom coupled with continuing support such as credit and agricultural advice:
some consultants never consulted their clients. In those regions away from the main
metropolitan centres where there were few local consultancy firms or NGOs,
provision was particularly problematic. Without the expertise to provide the required
range of assistance, and inhibited from becoming a 'rural development agency' by the
programme's conceptual framework as 'market-led' reform, much of the pre- and
post-plan making and other advice, as well as some core functions of the DLA itself,
were 'out-sourced' in a manner in keeping with the pattern in today's climate of
economic liberalisation around the globe. While scarcely preventing the emergence of
a very considerable bureaucracy, these measures inhibited the emergence of an
agency that could institutionalise the lessons of the experience that was accruing and
the build-up of a trained and experienced cadre of professionals that could perform
the many and complex tasks required.
In spite of these cumbersome processes, efforts by DLA provincial staff have since
1997 begun to see a significant number of projects emerge at the end of a long pipeline.
But overall the process has been modest by most measurements. Against the ANC's
target of redistributing 30 per cent of white-owned land in five years, less than 1 per
cent has changed hands. Compared with Zimbabwe, for instance, where the World
Bank's nightmare scenario of a state-led redistribution nevertheless led to over two
million hectares (about 15 per cent of the large-farm sector) being redistributed in five
years, the market-led system with its much vaunted speed and efficiency, achieved
just over a third of that aggregate and the transfer of only a tiny proportion of white-
owned farms in a vastly larger country.
Given the nature of the grant/application system, and the often rather vague
aspirations around which initial proposals are framed, large numbers of projects
lodged at the early, formulation stages, never come to fruition. Inevitably, therefore,
DLA offices have portfolios with large numbers of projects on their books at any one
time, and as of mid-1999 when the new Minister called a moratorium on new projects,
most were still at the pre-transfer stages. Significant catching up with this backlog has
been achieved up to March 2000, however, when the moratorium was lifted.
The crucial two stages at which a project becomes a reality are those in Phase 3, the
moment when it is 'designated' by the Minister and announced in the Government
Gazette as approved, authorising the subsequent actual transfer of title to the legal
entity formed by the beneficiaries. Therefore, while the total number of projects on the
books, including those in the first two stages, is useful in indicating how many are in
the pipeline, the number having reached Phase 3 is more indicative of what is actually
happening on the ground.
The latest figures supplied by DLA, to mid-November 1999, and summarised in the
Table below, indicate that the number of designated projects was officially 447,
benefiting over 55,000 households on land totalling 0.7million hectares.
These totals include 46 Commonage Projects and 35 Equity schemes; the number of beneficiaries of the former
are particularly difficult to quantify as the use of these areas can be open to all (poor) municipal residents.
The great majority of these projects are of the mainstream land redistribution type,
but they do contain significant numbers of equity (joint ventures of registered groups
with commercial farmers) and commonage (transfer of mainly peri-urban state land
for use as common grazing and other uses by residents) projects. There are also a
number of projects that have emerged as a result of restitution cases and the granting
of security to labour tenants, which are not included in the Table One.
One limitation of the DLA project database from which the above figures are taken,
whether as a management or evaluative tool, stems from the paucity of data retrieved
about the type of project and the composition of beneficiaries. The data from some
provinces merely classifies projects into two categories: where land is used for
production and where it is used for settlement. This simple two-way categorisation is
used routinely by DLA in its reports and policy documents, including the influential
Transformation Workshop Document which sought to define 'The Products of the
DLA' (December 1998). However, some of the data supplied by Provincial DLA
offices incorporate further distinctions as to the type of production - irrigation,
livestock, commercial crops, etc. Such information is badly needed for planning and
review purposes, and certainly for prioritising between products.
In contrast there has been a tendency in the present policy-revision environment for
some in the DLA and many in other spheres of government to address the core of the
problem in stereotypical fashion. The picture they portray is of a long 'pipeline' of
Data supplied by DLA.; Key: WC - Western Cape; FS - Free State; NW- North West; G - Gauteng; EC -
Eastem Cape; KZN - KwaZulu-Natal; NC - Northern Cape; NP - Northern Province; Mp'a - Mpumalanga
Available figures that seek to give a more nuanced view of actual situations are
presented in Table 2. These tend to demonstrate the falsity of the view that land is
used essentially for residential purposes in a large minority of designated projects.
Only 10 per cent could be said to correspond to the literal definition of what in DLA
parlance is a 'settlement' project, that is, where the land was unutilised or used
primarily for residence. The overwhelming majority involved some agricultural
usage of the transferred land, for either cultivation or grazing - although these
categorisations do not allow distinctions to be made as to the level of production.
This last concern, with the type of collective activity and joint property arrangements
envisaged or implied in a project, has been even less investigated - although it goes to
the root of the appropriateness of the past policy approach. In fact, an important
assumption behind the application/grant-based approach is that the land is
transferred to a single legal entity made up of a group of households and/or
individuals, with the further implicit assumption that they will organise productive
use of that land as a collectivity of some kind. Little provision, legal or managerial,
seems to be made for land use and thus for rights to it to be sub-divided to individuals
or households. Thus within the 'market-led' approach there is a hidden presumption
for cooperative production - even within a new policy emphasis on commercial
farming ventures. Yet any kind of cooperative or collective organisation of
production is notoriously complex and difficult to introduce and maintain - desirable
though such aims might be in terms of equity and social cohesion. Such challenges
and difficulties are compounded in circumstances where the members of the group
are moving onto new land, where there is limited sense of community, and where the
only types of farms with which they are likely to be familiar are those of the individual
family plot or the authoritative management of a capitalist farm, rather than any form
of self-managed collective activity. Such problems are made more acute where the
members include those who are in fact 'workers', seeking to use the land as their main
source of livelihood, and others who are 'shareholders' with other sources of
livelihood, often at some distance away.
The DLA has a Community Support Facility, funded by international donors, which is
in theory one resource to help project groups acquire the skills necessary for
cooperatively organised activities. But it seems seldom to be used for such purposes -
perhaps due to the lack of successful pilot experiences and thus of the acquired know-
how and available facilitators and trainers in South Africa. Such expertise in self-
managed activities or even in commercial small-holder production is also lacking in
the various departments of Agriculture, which come under provincial governments
in the South African constitution - and even more crucially in the assumptions which
inform the whole practice of agricultural professionals and structures in South Africa.
These assumptions are often justified as 'technical', but are more often covers for
social and economic value judgements about desirable levels of farmer incomes and
thus of the overall distribution of income in the country, and about what is considered
to be the appropriate sociological and cultural make-up of a 'real' farmer. Although
such assumptions reflect an implicit, though far from crude, form of racial
stereotyping, they are also often swallowed as part of the common sense economic
and technical wisdom by African technical personnel and policy-makers.
Some data about the actual level and type of group activity on projects was beginning
to come out of the Quality of Life Survey undertaken as part of DLA's work in late
1999. Thus, the Survey reveals that out of 87 projects for which respondents supplied
data, only 35 had any kind of 'communal farm'. However, some 45 cited other kinds of
common productive activity or shared facility.
A more immediate feel for what this programme has in fact delivered in terms of
projects may be gleaned from the following thumb-nail sketches of a selection which I
visited. While they are in no sense a representative sample, they underline the great
diversity of projects: extending from 10,000 beneficiaries in one case to a single
extended family in another and from intensive commercial crop production under
irrigation to a housing estate. They may be a useful corrective to simple
dichotomisation into 'settlement' versus 'production' or real 'commercial' farmers
versus 'subsistence', or other stereotypes.
Cornfields, KwaZulu-Natal
This is a real 'community' which formerly occupied a 'black spot' in a white farming
area, having successfully resisted removals since 1910. They were given title to the
land and a grant to buy three neighbouring white-owned farms under legislation of
the transitional government in the early 1990s. Between 8-10,000 people are
beneficiaries; many are migrant workers who have a home-base to fall back on
through resident family members. These latter have 'block farms' and are hoping to
start other group enterprises (more irrigation, poultry, handicrafts). A piped water
supply and access road are being completed, utilising a DLA redistribution grant. But
land-based economic activities are not likely to provide a sole source of adequate
livelihood for more than a proportion of beneficiaries. Some tensions still exist with
local white farmers ('we may get beaten up when we go to recover livestock that have
strayed').
Tumbleweed, KwaZulu-Natal
This is a collection of some 50 households gathered together by a 'landless' nkosi
(chief) to whom they owed allegiance. They used a grant to buy a farm in a peri-urban
area where some prospect of jobs exists and are building a small housing estate upon
it.
Perhaps only the latter of these four cases would be prioritised under the new policy
guidelines for enhanced grants.
One point of consensus that has emerged is to give sharper focus to grant/application
redistribution by prioritising such projects as have a clear potential for improving
livelihoods through meaningful land and resource-based productive activities. There
has also been a realisation that the rigid formula of a R16,000 grant per household is
unrealistic, given the present market price levels of high potential land. This emphasis
has been given a particular interpretation in the new formulations of March 2000
which announce that 'commercial farming' projects will be the main focus of the new
policy, and that they can qualify for higher levels of grant than the basic one, but at
three levels: small, medium and large-scale. This is seen as the most important short-
to-medium term measure for achieving the target of redistributing 15 per cent of the
white-owned farm sector. Certainly, the R16,000 formula has meant that a group's
total grant has often been insufficient for meeting purchase costs, let alone
development, and that more people than could obtain a reasonable livelihood from
the land have had to be incorporated to come up with enough money to get the land.
Circumstances could well remain difficult for groups looking to move into 'peasant'
farming, and to engage in commercial as well as subsistence production. Whether the
level of enhanced grants will provide working capital, or even enough to buy the high
potential (irrigated) land, is by no means certain. Nor is it clear whether this new
formula offers any mechanism for the redistribution of one huge portion of
commercial land that is marked by its owners' readiness to sell at reasonable prices:
the large maize (plus cattle) farms of the high veld (see Bernstein, 1996).
A more welcome dimension of new policy is that it incorporates some of the emerging
thinking that has questioned the whole market-led, application/grant-based ap-
proach. It will include a parallel approach to land reform programmes that is 'supply-
driven', in the common but inappropriate current terminology, whereby suitable land
coming onto the market is earmarked, purchased and then made available to
identified beneficiaries, and where such activities are more closely situated within
district-based spatial and development plans for integrated rural development that
are formulated by a cohort of district councils, provincial and national line ministries,
with participation from community-based organisations and the public at large.
However, such a shift of emphasis will require the development of new guidelines for
plan formulation and implementation, and amended methods of work and skills, not
just for DLA, but also for a range of other staff in ministries of agriculture, housing
and in local authorities. It will also require major breakthroughs in promoting 'co-
operative governance', the South African jargon for coordination. And it will
necessitate the working out of appropriate approaches to specific areas and their
physical and social environments: e.g. the maize Boer heartland, densely populated
former bantustans along with neighbouring areas, agro-pastoral areas, specialist tree
crop plantations and estates.
Pilot district-wide programmes will be initiated in the next plan period to generate
the necessary learning experience to allow South Africa to transcend the 'market-led'
approach that their own rights-based political traditions - and their reliance on one
narrow-band of international 'expertise' - has landed them with and which, in the
eyes of this analyst, is one of the reasons for the limited extent of land reform so far.
The oft-repeated explanation of radical critics, that there is a 'lack of political will' is
not wrong but it is simplistic. A 'capitalist' reform may be the best that can be
expected in the present conjuncture, but the nature and extent of such reform should
not just be left to capitalists and, in particular, not to those whose calculations are
short-term and opportunistic. But more radical entrants to this (still ongoing) policy
debate need to generate concrete formulations. They must also challenge two
dominant paradigms in the process: first, the so-called 'technical' formulae of the old-
fashioned paternalist white agriculturalists and, equally, the black officials and
policy-makers who have bought their assumptions of World Bank-type
'smallholderism'. Only then will it be possible to go beyond aspirations of merely
Africanising prevailing (massively inegalitarian) production relations.
Another crucial area of the policy shifts is in relation to land tenure, especially in
former bantustans. After some hesitation over, and redrafting of, the 1999 draft of a
Land Rights Bill, a new law that will seek to overcome the present, often chronic,
insecurity of tenure will be presented to Parliament this year (2000). Its precise form is
thus not yet known but it aims to provide a basis for security of rights which go
beyond simply registering individual, negotiable titles. There is also talk that it will
lodge such rights with 'tribes', though what that means in practice will have to be
clarified in law. It also remains to be seen whether it will imply a democratisation of
allocation of land use and will facilitate common resource management, or be a
vehicle for reinforcing what Bernstein (1998), echoing Mamdani (1996), correctly
refers to as the system of 'decentralised despotism' set-up under apartheid.
References
Bernstein, Henry (ed.) (1996), The Agrarian Mpumalanga, South Africa', Africa World Press:
Question in South Africa, London: F Cass. Trenton, NJ.
Bernstein, Henry, (1998), 'Social Change in McIntosh Xaba Associates et al. (1999), 'Review
the South African Countryside? Land & of the Land Reform Support Programme', Report
Production, Poverty & Power',Journal of Peasant to Department of Land Affairs, Pretoria, 30
Studies, 25, 4 July: 1-32. November.
Brown, Marj et al. (1997), Land Restitution in Ministry of Agriculture & Land Affairs (1998),
South Africa: An Independent Evaluation, Institute
'Agricultural Policy in South Africa: A Dis-
for Development Policy & Management, Univer-
cussion Document', Pretoria.
sity of Manchester.
National Land Committee (NLC) (1999), 'A
Deininger, Klaus (1999), 'Making Negotiated Report on the National Land & Agrarian Reform
Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from Conference', Pretoria.
Colombia, Brazil and South Africa', World
Ntsebeza, Lungisile (1999), 'South Africa's Land
Development, 27, 4: 651-672.
Tenure Reform Programme in the former
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) (1998), Bantustans: The example of the Eastern Cape
Province', paper for NLC Conference.
White Paper on South African Land Policy, Pretoria
Kepe, Thembela (1998), 'The Problem of Van Zyl, J, J Kirsten & H P Binswanger (eds.)
Defining "Community": Challenges for the (1996), Agricultural Land Reform in South Africa:
Land Reform Programme in Rural South Policies, markets and mechanisms, Cape Town:
Africa', Land Reform and Agrarian Change in Oxford University Press.
Southern Africa, Occasional Paper no. 6, School
Wildschut, Adele & S Hulbert (1998), 'A Seed
of Government, University of Western Cape.
not Sown: Prospects for agrarian reform in South
Levin, Richard & Daniel Weiner (eds.) (1997), Africa', Deutsche Welthungerhilfe & Interfund.
'No More Tears ... Struggles for Land in