Astronomy, Astrology, and Historiography

by Michael Segre

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed a profound change in the study and under-
standing of the physical world, though historians of science do not as yet fully understand its
nature and causes. One still relatively neglected historical process is the loss of a considera-
ble quantity of knowledge paralleled by the discovery of a new world – a medley of crafts and
skills, including much esoteric knowledge. In this context the study of the universe and celes-
tial mechanics has brought in its wake the separation of astronomy from astrology. Can this
watershed indicate some possible models which astronomy has contributed to other modern
sciences?

The question concerns philosophy, sociology and historiography of science no less that its
history. Astrology, like magic and other “unorthodox” domains, has been banned not only
from the sciences but also from their history, following the view that norms accepted in sci-
ence dominate in all related domains.1 The result has been the neglect of relevant historical
aspects of science and a misrepresentation of the scientific revolution. But history of science
ought not to follow any accepted view of the science it deals with, and my suggestion is that,
with due historiographical care, more attention should be given to astrology and to esoteric
science in general. Astrology, in particular, has the advantage that it still survives, albeit on
the popular level.

Let me illustrate this by an analogous example: The neglect of Isaac Newton’s (1642-1727)
broad alchemical interest and its relation to his mathematical contribution.

1
It is curious how a certain view of science can be adopted by historiography without regard
to the qualitative difference between science and history. See my "The Role of Experiment in
Galileo's Physics,” where I note that inductive or deductive views of science can lead respec-
tively to an inductive or deductive historical interpretation of Galileo. Cf. my In the wake of
Galileo, Chap. 2. I am indebted to Joseph Agassi for having drawn my attention to this point.
In his Towards an Historiography of Science, p. 78, he remarks that “historians borrow gen-
eral laws from scientists and scientists develop general laws in order to explain curious histor-
ical events.”
 2

The Fate of Newton’s Alchemy

Newton’s followers and his early biographers presented his science in the spirit of their time.2
Bishop Samuel Horsley (1733-1806), editor of Newton’s 'Complete Works' (1779-85), avoid-
ed publishing any evidence of the latter’s alchemical interests and even suppressed material
that could betray “heretical” features in Newton's religious belief. The same way of thinking
persisted throughout the Nineteenth century.

Sir David Brewster (1781-1868), the outstanding physicist, inventor of the kaleidoscope,
writer of popular science, and biographer of Newton, was one of those who painted science as
“black and white”. In his early biography of Newton (1831), he pretended that the latter had
not advocated the corpuscular theory of light, since that theory had been declared refuted
about a decade before Brewster’s work appeared.3 in his broader biography of Newton
(1855), he made the emblematic, repeatedly quoted, remark: “We cannot understand how a
mind of such power, and nobly occupied with the abstractions of geometry, and the study of
the material world, could stoop even to be a copyist of the most contemptible alchemical poet-
ry, and be the annotator of a work, the obvious product of a fool and a knave.” 4 Brewster,
like Horsley, neglected Newton’s alchemical work, regarding it as a threat to the latter’s or-
thodoxy.

2
I rely heavily on the excellent Introduction on Internet to the “Newton Project.”
“http://www.newtonproject.ic.ac.uk/catalogue/introduction.htm, November 2001, updated 9
August 2002 .
3
This is a typical “black and white” history of science. I had at my disposal only a German
translation of Brewster’s biography of Newton entitled Sir Isaac Newton’s Leben nebst einer
Darstellung seiner Entdeckungen. See pp. 84-85. Brewster’s book is also important because
it advocates, contrary of the spirit of the age, bold hypothesis.
4
Brewster, Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton. Vol. 2, pp.
374-375.
 3

The result was a distortion of Newton’s image and severe damage to subsequent historical re-
search. There was a unique opportunity, for instance, in 1872, when the 5th Earl of Ports-
mouth, owner of some of Newton’s papers, offered the latter’s scientific manuscripts to Cam-
bridge University. The committee set to sort the papers rearranged the manuscripts according
to the contemporary classifications of science and by doing so destroyed clues which might
have suggested how various manuscripts interrelated. The alchemical papers were first put
under the heading of “Chemistry” (a distinction Newton himself would hardly have recog-
nised), but finally, together with additional alchemical material, were returned as being “of
very little interest in themselves.” As a result, these manuscripts were sent to auction in 1936,
and it is only a matter of luck that most of them ended up in the faithful hands of the econo-
mist, John Maynard Keynes, and the Jewish scholar and businessman, Abraham Yahuda, and
are now available to scholars at King’s College, Cambridge and at the Jewish National and
University Library in Jerusalem. Later studies carried out on these manuscripts, showed how,
in contrast to what Newton’s early biographers wanted to believe, his alchemical and mathe-
matical works were part and parcel of his religion and metaphysics.5 The result is a reassess-
ment of the traditional history of the scientific revolution. This is, nevertheless, only the be-
ginning of a chapter in history of science.

Alchemical sources like astrological ones, have to be published and studied bearing in mind
their unusual and complex context, works that require the development of appropriate histori-
ographical tools.

Astrology: Success and Failure

5
A pioneering work is Dobbs’ The Foundations of Newton's Alchemy, later developed in her
The Janus Faces of Genius. Further work has been done by Figala in “Die exakte Alchemie
von Isaac Newton.”. For an English abridgement see Figala, „Newton’s alchemy.“ There are
by now many works concerning Newton’s alchemy: For a brief bibliographical essay see
Westfall, Never at Rest, p. 883.
 4

Historiography of science is an interdisciplinary field. It may not have the same approach as
the science it describes but is part and parcel of philosophy of science and is strongly condi-
tioned by contemporary social environment.

As far as the philosophy of science is concerned one could say that astrology, like other eso-
teric domains, is based on the assumption of a universal, concealed harmony between the
physical and the metaphysical worlds. On the methodological level it applies free association
rather than rigorous logical deduction, and when results contradict postulates it does not reject
the latter but often attempts explanations taken from the twilight zone between science and
metaphysics.

Modern astronomy, on the other hand, has attempted to avoid metaphysical considerations
and adopt a rational approach, based on rigorous logical processes. Today it is witnessing a
comeback of metaphysics, though in a totally different way from that related to astrology.
These are, nevertheless, general statements, since after the scientific revolution many philoso-
phies of science have been formulated conceiving science in different, at times contradictory,
ways. One fact is undeniable: Whereas on the intellectual level astronomy, and modern sci-
ence in general, have had an extraordinary success, astrology and magic have been almost to-
tally ignored.

From a social point of view, however, astrology, unlike other esoteric practices, has had no
less success than science, at least on the popular level. This is widely testified today by the
media and was discussed as early as 1946 by historian of art and anthropologist, Robert Eis-
ler, in a provocative book, The Royal Art of Astrology. Eisler is surprised that “A detailed
study of the extent and nature of astrological belief among ordinary people conducted by
‘Mass observation’ over the three months May, June, July, 1941” led to the result that “Nearly
two-thirds of the adult population glance at or read some astrological features more or less
regularly.” 6 This success of astrology is, of course, not intellectual, i.e. it is not of the same
kind as that of modern scholars dealing with the history of esoteric science, such as Betty
Dobbs. Nor is astrology successful in getting practical results - if one defines technology as

6
Eisler, The Royal Art of Astrology, p. 13.
 5

the use of knowledge for practical purposes one could say that astrology is unsuccessful tech-
nology. It is more of an entertainment success.

Why so much interest in astrology? Eisler’s answer is: For irrational reasons. People want to
believe in something which at least appears to interpret events and trends in a complex and
dangerous civilisation in which uneducated people find themselves confused, worried and
many of their certainties weakened. Mass astrology reflects the insecurity of the times and of-
fers temporary antidotes.

Eisler goes one step further and analyses astrology on a rational and historical level, and
delves into its origins in ancient astronomy, mythology, religion and art, whether Mesopota-
mian, Greek or Jewish. On most of these aspects our information is fragmentary, and one re-
quires considerable interdisciplinary knowledge to deal with it. In a humorous but determined
way Eisler convincingly undoes the main tenets of astrology such as solar and lunar influ-
ences, astro-meteorology and astrological houses. He shows how these came to be part of as-
trology not through thorough studies, but by the way, later being referred to as predetermined
tenets. The book basically argues that the so called “Royal Art of Astrology” is a major fake.

No matter how convincing Eisler’s arguments against astrology may be, his attempt was
doomed to failure and, as evidence shows, it has failed; The number of astrology devotees has
only increased since his book was published.

Eisler applied a rational argument to an irrational domain, disregarding the methodological

question of the extent to which this can be done. Yet one does not have to go as far as con-
sidering esoteric sciences to analyse the problem: It subsists also in what is considered as
genuine science, which, as leading philosophers and sociologists of science argue, contains
much irrationality. Michael Polanyi was one of the first theorists of science to claim that sci-
ence could not avoid tradition with its irrational elements.7 Vice-versa one could say that as-
trology is not always irrational.

7
Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension.
 6

In dealing with the relationship between astronomy and astrology we are confronted with a
mass of rational and irrational arguments and, interestingly enough, relating to them could
give historians a good opportunity of better understanding developments in astronomy as a
model for other sciences. The two domains have separated, but unlike other analogous do-
mains, such as chemistry and alchemy or modern medicine and Hippocratic medicine, astron-
omy and astrology continued to develop in parallel. I do not suggest considering modern as-
trology as a whole, like Eisler, but a contextual analysis of limited astrological areas within
their cultural historical context could help us to understand developments in astronomy.
Moreover, if astrology is irrational, its history is not necessarily so. The problem here is ra-
ther the working approach to adopt.

Astrology and Historiography

Historians have applied different methods in tracing the roots of modern science. The classi-
cal approach of historians such as David Brewster remains most popular, in Europe in particu-
lar. It favours progress, gives facts, neglects context, and avoids dealing with occult scienc-
es, with the possible exception of Lynn Thorndyke’s massive but barely readable compila-
tion.8 Eisler, too, belongs in a sense to this tradition. He puts up with Newton’s interest in al-
chemy as “the chemistry of his time” but rejects the possibility of a work of Newton in astrol-
ogy.9

Only in the middle of the last century, shortly after Eisler’s day did historians start paying any
attention to occult sciences, and some progress has been made in accounting for the interac-
tion between magic and modern science, thanks to pioneering works such as that of Frances
Yates or, more specifically in alchemy, of Betty Dobbs.10

8
Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science.
9
Eilser, The Royal Art of Astrology, pp. 239-242.
10
Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. Many other works studying the inter-
action between magic and science followed. For Dobbs’ work see note 4.
 7

The end of thee last century nevertheless witnessed an emphasised relativism, masked by the
term “post-modernism,” which is, in a way, close to the approach Eisler ascribes to astrology.
This approach has found its way into the contemporary history of science, and has also recent-
ly been adopted by scholarly works attempting to deal with history of esoteric science. De-
spite a certain similarity between esoteric thinking and post-modern history of science, I
doubt that dealing irrationally with an irrational domain can produce satisfactory results.

The twentieth century, on the other hand, has also seen historians attempting to interpret the
past in its own context, which is perhaps the most far-reaching effort toward a rational history
of science. The pioneering work of Alexandre Koyré is still a turning-point in modern histo-
ry of science despite occasional imprecision. Koyré did not write about astrology, but in a se-
ries of articles on Galileo published in the ‘thirties of the last century, he drew attention to the
importance of considering the context of science and of studying scientific mistakes and un-
successful chapters as a mean of better understanding the history and nature of science.11

More or less in the same period Karl Popper formulated a general approach to scientific inves-
tigation. He called it “methodological nominalism,” this rather pompous name simply indi-
cating an attempt to find out how things and processes in science and humanities behave in
various limited circumstances.12 According to Popper, science and knowledge in general pro-
ceed through conjectures (i.e. tentative testable solutions to problems having no claim to
truth), and refutations - an infinite process in which a refuted conjecture is replaced by a new
one till the latter is, in turn, refuted. Since there is no way to test an astrological claim, such
as the existence of celestial influences on man’s character, astrological conjectures are, ac-
cording to Popper, not scientific. Yet Popper does not suggest disregarding astrology and its

11
These articles have been collected in Koyré, Etudes Galiléennes, English translation as Gal-
ileo Studies. On Koyré’s contribution to Galileo studies see my “The Never-Ending Galileo
Story,” pp. 403-405. For a criticism of Koyré’s work see Finocchiaro, Galileo and the Art of
Reasoning, Chapter 9. Finocchiaro reproaches Koyré for carelessness in his scholarly work
but admits the importance of Koyré’s contribution to history of science. For a useful collec-
tion and general study of Koyré’s works see Koyré, De la mystique à la science.
12
Popper’s general view of science is expounded in his Logik der Forschung (1934) translat-
ed into English as The Logic of Scientific Discovery.
 8

influence, past and present, on science. “Methodological nominalism” is, then, defined by
Popper as a contrast to “methodological essentialism.”13 Whereas the latter is “the theory that
it is the aim of science to reveal essences and to describe them by means of definitions,”
methodological nominalism“ aims at describing how a thing behaves in various circumstanc-
es, and especially, whether there are any regularities in its behaviour.” In other words Popper
proposes a contextual analysis that can be applied to science as well as to its history: One pos-
es questions and attempts to answer them as rationally as possible.

Popper’s view has been further developed, as far as historiography of science is concerned, by
his pupil, Joseph Agassi.14 Agassi claims that classical history of science bears the stamp of
Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) inductive and radicalist philosophy of science according to
which scientific theories emerge from facts and “true” science is essentially, as well as histor-
ically, distinct from any “occult” science. Thus ideas are either “black” or “white” and histo-
ry of science results in an excessively detailed, dogmatic, and ritualistic tale.15 Such a presen-
tation naturally dismisses astrology as belonging to a world of superstition.

Attention to astrology has been indirectly drawn by the nineteenth century reaction to Bacon’s
inductivism and radicalism, i.e. by the conservative historiography of science whose major
representative was the physicist and philosopher of science Pierre Duhem (1861-1916). Du-
hem attempted to re-evaluate ideas preceding to the scientific revolution, in particular the con-
tribution of Catholic medieval thinkers. His historiography is called “conventionalist” be-
cause it regards the development of science as a sequence of theories (mainly mathematical)
which are pigeonholes for classifying facts. Agassi criticizes this view, too, since it presents
the history of science as a continuous development of theories, comparable to a cancerous
growth. This historiography, too, dismisses occult sciences but must admit a certain continui-
ty between them and a “true” science.

13
The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 1, p. 32.
14
Agassi’s Towards an Historiography of Science is a milestone in modern history of science;
see also Agassi’s “Three Views of the Renaissance of Science.”
15
I admit at this point to making a “black and white,” oversimplified presentation. Brewster’s
Life of Newton (1831, see note 3), on the other hand, by favouring bold hypotheses, is against
the Baconian spirit.
 9

There remains, then, Popper’s method of posing questions, conjecturing answers and testing
them. It does not regard mysticism as part of science, but opens the door towards accounting
it as part of the history of science. Applying this approach with due care to some meeting
points between astronomy and astrology could perhaps throw considerable light to some as-
pects of history, philosophy and sociology of science which might be helpful in better under-
standing the nature of modern science in general.

Bibliography

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Agassi, Joseph. Science and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Science. Dordrecht, Boston,
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Brewster, David. Sir Isaac Newton’s Leben nebst einer Darstellung seiner Entdeckungen.
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Brewster, David. Memoirs of the Life, Writings, and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton. Vol. 2.
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Greene Lyon'. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Dobbs, Betty Jo Teeter. The Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of Alchemy in Newton's
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 10

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