North American Philosophical Publications

KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM

Author(s): Alberto Vanzo
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 1 (JANUARY 2013), pp. 53-74
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical
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History of Philosophy Quarterly
Volume 30, Number 1, January 2013

KANT ON EMPIRICISM
AND RATIONALISM

Alberto Vanzo

This inging Kant's

paper roleaims
Kant's in the
roleformation of athe
to in correct widespread
formationnarrative of early
some widely of a widespread held misconceptions narrative concern- of early
modern philosophy.1 According to this narrative, which dominated the
English-speaking world throughout the twentieth century,2 the early
modern period was characterized by the development of two rival schools:
René Descartes's, Baruch Spinoza's, and G. W. Leibniz's rationalism;
and John Locke's, George Berkeley's, and David Hume's empiricism.
Empiricists and rationalists disagreed on whether all concepts are de-
rived from experience and whether humans can have any substantive
a priori knowledge, a priori knowledge of the physical world, or a priori
metaphysical knowledge.3 The early modern period came to a close, so
the narrative claims, once Immanuel Kant, who was neither an empiri-
cist nor a rationalist, combined the insights of both movements in his
new Critical philosophy. In so doing, Kant inaugurated the new eras of
German idealism and late modern philosophy.
Since the publication of influential studies by Louis Loeb and David
Fate Norton,4 the standard narrative of early modern philosophy has
come increasingly under attack. Critics hold that histories of early
modern philosophy based on the rationalism-empiricism distinction
(RED) have three biases - three biases for which, as we shall see, Kant
is often blamed.

The Epistemological Bias. Since disputes regarding a prion knowledge

belong to epistemologa the RED is usually regarded as an epistemologi-
cal distinction.5 Accordingly, histories of early modern philosophy based
on the RED tend to assume that the core of early modern philosophy
lies in the conflict between the "competing and mutually exclusive epis-
temologies" of "rationalism and empiricism."6 They typically interpret
most of the central doctrines, developments, and disputes of the period
in the light of philosophers' commitment to empiricist or rationalist
epistemologies. As a result, they have been criticized for the following:

53

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54 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

- misinterpreting those disputes between so-called empiricist

rationalists that derived from divergences on ontological i
rather than epistemology;7
- subordinating the ethics and aesthetics of early modern ph
phers to their epistemology, even when they were indepen
from epistemological matters;8
- marginalizing political philosophy because of its indepen
from epistemology.9

An author has the epistemological bias if he interprets most o

(those that he identifies as) the central philosophical doctrin
velopments, and disputes of the early modern period in the lig
philosophers' commitment to empiricism or rationalism.
The Kantian Bias. Histories of early modern philosophy based
RED tend to portray Kernt as the first author who uncovered the l
of empiricism and rationalism, rejected their mistakes, and incorpo
their correct insights within his Critical philosophy.10 This interpr
relies on the view that Kant's Critical philosophy is a superior a
tive to empiricism and rationalism - not just a superior empir
rationalist alternative to earlier forms of empiricism and ration
but a superior alternative to empiricism and rationalism as suc
order to have the Kantian bias, one must endorse this view.
The Classificatory Bias. Typically, histories of philosophy ba
the RED classify most or all early modern philosophers prior t
into either the empiricist or the rationalist camps. However, the
sifications have proven far from convincing. Some claim that ca
empiricists were, in fact, rationalists or vice versa.11 Others cla
canonical empiricists or rationalists were both empiricists and ra
ists, neither empiricists nor rationalists, or occupied an interm
position between the two camps.12 Yet others note that the tra
classifications invite historians to assume that "successive figure
the school's basic (rationalist or empiricist) principles with inc
rigor to a common body of problems, ultimately carrying them thr
to their 'logical conclusion.'"13 This led historians to overestim
degree of continuity within each camp; underestimate the man
positive influences of earlier empiricists on later rationalists and
rationalists on later empiricists;14 and overlook the affinities b
the views of empiricists like Berkeley and Hume and those of r
ists like Malebranche and Leibniz.15 Thus, standard histories of
modern philosophy have a classificatory bias that consists in clas
most or all early modern authors as empiricists or rationalists.

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 55

It is often alleged that Kant introduced the three bi

much post-Kantian historiography. As for the classific
is said to have "argued, in the Critique of Pure Reaso
cism and rationalism represent two comprehensive o
the philosophers of his day were drawn respectively
of them."16 "[T]his was the easiest way to describe th
philosophy in the two centuries prior to Kant in the
problem:"17 namely, an epistemological problem. Kan
the epistemological bias because he reduced "the histo
philosophy to an epistemological clash between ration
piricism."18 He did this to "argue for a third option,
incorporated, as he saw it, what was true in both [
rationalism], while avoiding their errors."19 He exhib
tian bias by recommending his own philosophy as th
course' between the self-revealing one-sidedness of e
rationalism."20

This paper provides an alternative account of Kant's contribution to

the development of the standard narrative. The paper argues for the
following claims:

1. Kant is not directly responsible for the three biases of the stan-
dard historiography. In fact, Kant did not have any of the three
biases. He did not regard most or all early modern philosophers
as empiricists or rationalists. He did not regard his own philoso-
phy as an alternative to empiricism and rationalism as such but,
rather, as a form of rationalism. And he did not interpret most
or all of the main philosophical doctrines, developments, and
disputes of the early modern period in the light of philosophers'
commitment to empiricism or rationalism.
2. However, Kant made three indirect contributions to the develop-
ment of the standard narrative:

(а) He formulated the notions of empiricism and rationalism that

are at the basis of the standard narrative, and he employed
them in his sketches of the history of modern philosophy.
(б) He outlined, most notably in the antinomies, a dialectical
pattern of argument that would inform the standard narra-
tive.

(c) He promoted a way of writing histories of philosophy that,

once combined with (a) and (6), would give rise to the biases
of the standard narrative.

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56 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

By arguing for these claims, the paper provides a first ste

comprehensive reconstruction of the history of the standar
of early modern philosophy.
The paper is divided into seven sections. Section 1 outlin
notions of empiricism and its rivals. Section 2 examines the
RED in Kant's sketches of the history of philosophy. Section
gue that Kant did not have the three biases. Section 6 highli
indirect contributions to the development of the standard
Some conclusions are drawn in Section 7.

1. Three Empiricisms and Their Rivals

Kant's Critical works contain three different notions of empiricism

They all relate to sensory experience, albeit in different ways. The first,
which I will call immodest empiricism , is the denial that nonsensib
objects exist. The second, modest empiricism , is the denial that we can
experience certain items, regardless of whether they exist. The third
history -empiricism, is the denial that we can form concepts or justif
synthetic judgments a priori , independently from experience.
Immodest empiricism is introduced in the Antinomy chapter of th
Critique of Pure Reason . Kant writes that, because of their "essenti
distinguishing mark," the theses can be called "the dogmatism of pur
reason," whereas the antitheses conform to "a principle of pure em-
piricism" (A465-66/B493-94). To clarify what the "principle of pure
empiricism " and the "distinguishing mark" of dogmatism are, it is
important to recall how the theses diverge from the antitheses. The
diverge on whether certain items exist. The theses are distinctive of
dogmatism and assert the existence of a beginning of the world, spati
boundaries of the world, indivisible objects, contracausal free action
and a necessary being. The antitheses express an empiricist position
and deny the existence of those items.
Empiricists deny their existence because they take the possibility o
having sensory experience of an item as a necessary condition for it
existence (A468/B496). According to empiricists,
[Immodest Empiricism] only sensible objects exist.
The reason for the charge of immodesty will become clear in what follows
In Kant's view, humans could never have sensory experience of the items
the antinomies are about: a moment prior to which the world did no
exist, spatial boundaries of the world, objects without parts, and so on
Humans cannot infer the existence of those items on the basis of experi-
ence either. They are not sensible objects. Therefore, empiricists deny
their existence. For instance, empiricists deny the existence of simple

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 57

objects because they "can never be exhibited in concr

or imagination" (A469/B497). They reject contracausa
it "cannot be encountered in any experience" (A447/
Against empiricists, dogmatists claim that
[Antinomy-Dogmatism] there are nonsensible objec
In their view, sound deductive arguments prove the exis
sible, "intellectual starting points" of the world (A466/B
of the world, indivisible atoms, contra-causal freedom
use of the term "dogmatism" to refer to this position is
Kanťs broad sense of "dogmatism." Dogmatism in th
[Broad Dogmatism] the presumption of being able to acquire
metaphysical knowledge by means of a priori reasonings, without a
prior inquiry into whether metaphysical knowledge lies within hu-
man grasp.21

Not only the supporters of the theses but also the empiricists that en-
dorse the antitheses are dogmatists in the broad sense. In fact, Kant
qualifies the empiricism of the antinomies as dogmatic (A471/B499).
As is well known, Kant rejects this dogmatic form of empiricism. In
his view, empiricists should not claim that the world is eternal, that it
is infinitely extended, and that all bodies are divisible.22 They should
only claim that we can continue indefinitely in discovering new regions
of the world, identifying earlier causes of past events, and dividing each
body into increasingly smaller parts (A517-27/B545-55). Empiricists
should endorse a modest form of empiricism:
[Modest Empiricism] "in the empirical regress there can be encoun-
tered no experience of an absolute boundary , and hence no experience
of a condition as one that is absolutely unconditioned empirically"
(A517/B545)

This empiricism is modest because it warrants claims on only what we

can experience, not on what exists or does not exist beyond the bounds
of experience. Modest empiricism is as consistent with dogmatism and
the positive claims of the theses as it is with immodest empiricism and
the negative claims of the antitheses.
The third notion of empiricism can be found in the last section of
the first Critique , titled "The History of Pure Reason." Kant states that
philosophers can be empiricists or noologists " with regard to the origin
of pure cognitions of reason" (A854/B882). Empiricists claim that those
cognitions "are derived from experience." Noologists claim that, "inde-
pendent from" experience, pure cognitions of reason "have their source
in reason" (A854/B882). The cognitions that Kant is referring to are

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58 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

concepts and judgments. As for concepts, empiricists "take

of the understanding from experience" ( Metaphysik Mrongovi
As for judgments, empiricists claim that no synthetic jud
have an a priori justification. Kant's proof that such judgm
makes empiricism "completely untenable."23 In synthesis, the e
of the "History of Pure Reason" claim that
[History-Empiricism] all concepts are formed a posteriori,
synthetic judgments can be justified only a posteriori.
By contrast, noologists hold that
[Noologism] some concepts are not formed a posteriori, an
synthetic judgments are justified a priori.
"Rationalism" is the term that Kant uses from the late 1780s onward to
designate noologism, that is, the admission of nonempirical concepts and
a priori principles. For instance, Kant's unfinished manuscript on the
Progress of Metaphysics states that an affirmative answer to the question
as to whether all knowledge must "be derived solely from experience
. . . would inaugurate the empiricism of transcendental philosophy, and
a negative one the rationalism [not "noologism"] of the same" (20:275).
Thus, Kant identifies the RED with the distinction between empiricism
and noologism that he first drew in the "History of Pure Reason."

2. Empiricism and Rationalism

in Kant's History of Philosophy

Kant employs the notions of empiricism and rationalism in his sketch

of the history of ancient and modern philosophy.24 Some ancient philoso
phers, like Socrates, focused only on practical philosophy. Those wh
had a theoretical philosophy were either dogmatists or skeptics.25 U
surprisingly, Kant identifies a central problem of his own philosophy
a main source of disputes between dogmatists: What is the origin of o
intellectual concepts?26 Depending on how philosophers answered tha
question, Kant divides them into philosophers "ex principiis sensitivi
and philosophers "ex principiis rationalibus" {Refi. 1636 [1760-72?],
16:60), that is, empiricists and noologists or rationalists. Interestingl
some lecture transcripts differentiate not two, but three positions
mysticism, empiricism, and rationalism.27 These classifications are
summarized in Diagram 1.
According to mystical philosophers, our concepts do not differ in kind
from perceptions or, to use Kant's term, intuitions. Concepts are int
itions stored in memory. The intellect, not the senses, generated tho
intuitions. Our intellect has a quasi-perceptual capacity to apprehen
concepts, in the same way in which our senses have the capacity to

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 59

Ancient philosophers

Practical philosophers Theoretical philosophers

Dogmatists Sceptics

Empiricists [Rationalists] Mystics

Diagram 1:A classification of ancient philosophers

in Kant's lecture transcripts.

apprehend sensory stimuli. The paradigmatic example of thi

Plato. Kant's lecture transcripts portray his doctrine of remin
a sort of Malebranchean vision in God. During an earlier life,
an intuition of God from which we derived all remaining ideas,
of which we now have only weak memories, that occur to us o
occasion of sensible appearances. Now we no longer have this be
our soul is locked up in our body as though in a prison.28

Our concepts are faded copies of the intuitions that we had in th

ous life, when our soul was looking directly into Goďs mind.29
Unlike Plato, rationalist philosophers differentiate concep
intuitions, but, unlike Aristotle, they do not take intellectual con
have empirical origin. This view was not instantiated in antiquity
be found only among the moderns, starting with Leibniz. He
in innate ideas," but, unlike Plato, he "left the mystical aside
tinguishing ideas from intellectual intuitions (. Metaphysik Mron
29:761, 763).
Empiricists , too, distinguish concepts from intuitions. They claim
that all concepts are acquired a posteriori on the basis of sensations.
The paradigmatic examples of this view are Aristotle and Epicurus in
antiquity, Locke and Hume in modern times. Aristotle's intellectual
concepts are similar to Locke's concepts of reflection. "Aristotle says: the
concepts of the understanding are not innate but rather acquired, we

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60 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

obtained them on the occasion of experience, when we refle

objects of the senses."30 Aristotle and Locke trespassed the boun
their professed empiricism when they claimed that "the existen
can be proven from experience ... ; but since God cannot b
of experience, how should I come to know his existence? The
system of Locke and Aristotle is inconsistent."31
Epicurus and Hume were more consistent than Aristotle
because they did not assert the existence of God, human freedo
immortality of the soul. In fact, they rejected metaphysics
( Metaphysik von Schön , 28:466; Metaphysik K3 , 29:953) an
themselves to physics. Within that discipline, Hume endorsed
sal empiricism of principles" ( KprV , 5:13). Acornerstone of this
Hume's psychological account of the origin of the notion of cau
5:51). This doctrine led to an unwelcome consequence: "the m
skepticism with respect to the whole of natural science," especi
respect to inferences rising from effects to causes" ( KprV , 5:5
Kant, the skeptical consequences of Humean empiricism ar
ceptable as the contradictions arising from dogmatism, high
the antinomies. Having ruled out dogmatism as well as skept
concludes the "History of Pure Reason" by claiming that "[t
path alone is still open" (A856/B884).

3. The Classificatory Bias

Having surveyed Kanťs distinctions between empiricism and its r

and the role of the RED in Kant's comments on the history of philosop
we can determine whether Kant has the classificatory bias, the Kan
bias, and the epistemological bias. Kant will have the classificatory
if he claims that most or all of his early modern predecessors are ei
empiricists or rationalists. We have seen that Kant classes two ear
modern philosophers as empiricists: John Locke and David Hume
example, A854/B882; KprV , 5:13, 50-53). Kant classes only one ear
modern philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, as a rationalist (A
B882). These classifications are represented in Table 1 (with an addi
that will be explained in the next section).

Empiricists Rationalists
Locke Leibniz

Hume Kant

Table 1 : Early modern philo

classes as empiricists or r

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 61

There are good reasons to hold that Kant regards other

philosophers as rationalists or empiricists, as summariz
below.

1. The Metaphysik Mrongovius (29:761) associates C

gust Crusius with Plato and Leibniz. This suggest
takes Crusius to be a rationalist.

2. By combining two passages from the second Critique (5:40,

70-71), one can infer that Kant regards Michel de Mon-
taigne, Bernard Mandeville, and Francis Hutcheson as
moral empiricists, Christian Wolff and Crusius as moral
rationalists. Moral rationalists establish whether an action
is morally good on the basis of its conformity to an a priori
law. Moral empiricists establish whether an action is mor-
ally good on the basis of its consequences, namely, whether
it promotes one's happiness.
3. By combining two passages from the third Critique (5:277-78,
346-51), one can infer that Kant would call Edmund Burke
an empiricist about beauty. Aesthetic empiricists claim that
judgments of taste can be based only on empirical principles
Aesthetic rationalists claim that whether an object is beautiful
depends on its conformity with an a priori principle.
4. Kant does not mention any aesthetic rationalists in the thir
Critique. However, he criticizes a form of aesthetic rationalism
that assimilates beauty to perfection.32 It is not difficult to iden-
tify this view with those of Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, and
Georg Friedrich Meier, all authors whom Kant knew well.

Empiricists Rationalists

In general Crusius
In ethics Montaigne Wolff
Mandeville Crusius

Hutcheson

In aesthetics Burke Wolff

Baumgarten
Meier

Table 2: Early modern philosophers that Kant appears

to regard as empiricists or rationalists.

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62 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

In order to extend Kant's list of empiricists and rationalists, it

ing to identify the empiricists and noologists of the "Histo
Reason" with the immodest empiricists and dogmatists of
mies. This temptation should be resisted because the two d
do not map onto each another. Immodest empiricists can be
They can claim that all objects are sensible and that we kn
their features a priori. For instance, we may know a priori that
are subjected to the causal law. Modest empiricists can be n
too. As we shall see, Kant himself endorses not only modest
but also noologism.
Additionally, the antinomies do not introduce any clear-cut d
among Kant's predecessors. For instance, if we look at the first
we find the Newtonian Samuel Clarke endorsing the argume
thesis and the rationalist Leibniz endorsing the argument
tithesis.33 This is the opposite of what one would expect be
ascribes the theses to dogmatists and the antitheses to empirici
look at the second antinomy, we find both Leibniz and Clark
key assumptions at the basis of the proofs of the thesis and ant
Kant reserves the term "rationalism" for the noologism of t
of Pure Reason," rather than antinomy-dogmatism. It is bes
Kant's policy and avoid conflating the RED, introduced in th
of Pure Reason," with the distinction between immodest emp
antinomy-dogmatists.
Tables 1 and 2 fail to mention many prominent early modern
These include canonical empiricists like Francis Bacon, Pierr
Robert Boyle, and George Berkeley, and canonical rationalis
Descartes and Nicolas Malebranche, in addition to Thomas Hobbes,
Jean le Rond d'Alembert, Julien Oñray de La Mettrie, Claude Helvetius,
Thomas Reid, James Oswald, James Beattie, and Joseph Priestley. Kant
mentions them all, but he categorizes none of them as an empiricist or
a rationalist.35 Since so many authors escape the RED in Kant's texts,
Kant is hardly responsible for introducing the classificatory bias within
the historiography of early modern philosophy.
I am not claiming that, given Kant's statements, it would be incon-
sistent for him to have the classificatory bias. Nor am I denying that,
when Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and others carried out extensive
classifications of early modern authors as being either empiricists or
rationalists, they were acting in a broadly Kantian spirit. Kant often
looks at earlier philosophers as examples of ideal types like empiri
cism or rationalism, rather than as exponents of determinate historica
movements. The classificatory bias that can be found in Tennemann
and others derives from an extensive application of Kant's typologic

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 63

approach to the history of philosophy. Nevertheless,

sificatory bias means classifying most or all early m
empiricists or rationalists, and such classifications can
Kant's texts.

4. The Kantian Bias

According to several scholars, the only early modern philosopher th

Kant classes neither as an empiricist nor as a rationalist is himself.
placing himself over and above empiricism and rationalism, Kant wo
be the source of the Kantian bias.

Kant had a lifelong tendency to single out apparently irresoluble

contrasts between pairs of philosophical theories, only to put forward
his own views as superior to both alternatives: Newtonian dynamics
and Leibnizian monadology in physics, dogmatism and skepticism in
metaphysics, Epicureanism and Stoicism in ethics, realism and sub-
jectivism about beauty. The antinomies of the first Critique provide
a famous example of this strategy, while introducing the distinction
between empiricism and dogmatism. It is natural to expect that Kant
applied his strategy of divide et impera to position his own philosophy
over and above empiricism and rationalism.
Contrary to this expectation, Kant's texts never state that his phi-
losophy is an alternative to empiricism and rationalism as such. There
are plenty of occasions on which he could have made this claim. For
instance, Kant makes clear in the "Annotation to the Amphiboly" that he
takes his philosophy to be superior to those of Locke, who "sensitivized
the concepts of understanding," and Leibniz, who "intellectualized the
appearances" (A271/B327). Since Kant classes Locke as an empiricist
and Leibniz as a rationalist, the passage indicates that Kant takes his
philosophy to be superior to their particular brands of empiricism and
rationalism. Yet neither on this occasion, nor on others, does Kant add
that his philosophy is superior to empiricism and rationalism as such.
On the contrary, while he argues in the second Critique that his moral
philosophy is superior to the moral rationalism of Wolff and Crusius
and the moral empiricism of Montaigne and others, he still character-
izes his moral philosophy as a kind of rationalism - a " rationalism of
the capacity of judgment" ( KprV , 5:71). Similarly, Kant rejects Burke's
empiricism and Wolff's rationalism in aesthetics in the third Critique.
However, he still endorses "rationalism of the principle of taste" {KU,
5:347). Kant contrasts his own aesthetic rationalism with the rational-
ism of Wolff, Baumgarten, and Meier by qualifying their rationalism as
realist and his as idealist. He portrays his idealist aesthetic rationalism
as superior to aesthetic empiricism on the one hand and realist aesthetic

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64 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

rationalism on the other. However, he still characterizes his po

a form of rationalism instead of characterizing it, as Kant scholars
do,36 as a Critical alternative to aesthetic empiricism and rati
as such.

Did Kant regard his theoretical philosophy, too, like his ethics and
aesthetics, as a form of rationalism? Kanťs texts provide three reasons
to hold that he did.

1. According to the "History of Pure Reason," noologists hold that

we have "pure cognitions of reason" and that these "have their
source in reason," "independent from" experience (A854/B882).
Some of the central arguments of the first Critique aim to estab-
lish precisely those claims. Specifically, they argue that some of
our concepts - the categories - have a nonempirical origin and
that we can know some synthetic judgments to be true a priori .
For Kant, these are distinctive views of noologists, that is, ra-
tionalists.

Note that Kant could not call himself a rationalist if he regarded

the claim that we have innate concepts as constitutive of ratio-
nalism, as scholars sometimes do.37 Kant agrees with empiricists
that "all our cognition commences with experience" (Bl) and
that there are "absolutely no implanted or innate representa-
tions''' (. Entd ., 8:221). Kant only ascribes the claim that we have
pure (that is, nonempirical) concepts to rationalists. He takes
his categories to be pure, nonempirical concepts because they
are acquired through a mental process that, albeit triggered by
experience, "brings them about, a priori , out of' our "cognitive
faculty," without relying on any information provided by the
senses.38 Some Kantian texts refer to this process as the original
or a priori acquisition of the categories,39 which is parallel to the
original acquisition of our representation of space C Entd . , 8:223).
2. A passage of the Progress of Metaphysics, written in the first
half of the 1790s and already mentioned, discusses the possible
answers to the question as to whether "all knowledge" is "to be
derived solely from experience" (20:275). The text states that a
negative answer inaugurates "the rationalism" of transcendental
philosophy. Kant had given such a negative answer a few years
earlier, at the beginning of the 1787 introduction to the Critique
of Pure Reason :
As far as time is concerned, then, no cognition in us precedes experi-
ence. . . . But although all our cognition commences with experience,
yet it does not on that account all arise from experience. (Bl)

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 65

The "Transcendental Aesthetic" and "Transcende

of the first Critique provide extended arguments f
3. Three transcripts of Kant's metaphysics lectures
half of the 1790s indicate that Kant, at that time,
a form of rationalism. The transcript of Kant's third
the winter semester 1792/1793 outlines his view
such as those of cause and effect are not innate b
priori. Then, after alluding to alternative positio
empiricism and Plato's mysticism), the text state
nalism that we seek, in fact, we want to regard o
as acquired a priori " (28:619). The transcript of t
ends three sentences later. The transcript of the
starts by elaborating on the earlier endorsement o
The text explains that there are two types of rat
matic rationalism and Critical rationalism. The la
by inquiring into human reason ... as regards i
content and limits" (28:619). As we know from th
(4:261), the philosophy that Kant took to have firs
the extension, content, and limits of human reas
Critical philosophy. This suggests that Critical ra
Critical philosophy and identical.
The Metaphysik K2, based on lectures from the
outlines the same distinction between dogmatic
rationalism and laments that, in the past, "the crit
rationalism has never been followed."40 This rules out the identi-
fication of Critical rationalism with any pre-Kantian philosophy.
For the Metaphysik K3, based on lectures from 1794/1795, ratio-
nalism is "the principle of the possibility to represent cognitions
a priori " (29:953). A priori cognitions are either analytic or
synthetic. liant finds the possibility to represent analytic cogni-
tions a priori relatively unproblematic. Instead, the possibility to
represent synthetic cognitions a priori is as puzzling as it is vital
for the sorts of metaphysics. As Kant states in the Prolegomena
(4:278), "[a]ll metaphysicians are . . . solemnly and lawfully sus-
pended from their occupations until such a time as they shall
have satisfactorily answered the question: How are synthetic
cognitions a priori possible ?" By satisfactorily answering that
question, Kant's Critical philosophy provides the foundations
of the true metaphysics. Accordingly, the Metaphysik K3 calls
Critical rationalism "the first proposition of all metaphysical
truths,"41 confirming the identification of Critical rationalism
with Critical philosophy.

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66 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

Admittedly, the most explicit indications that Kant took h

phy to be a form of rationalism can be found in lecture notes,
far less reliable than Kanťs own works and must be used with care.
However, the passages at stake are from three different transcripts. Th
approximate datings of the lectures on which the transcripts are ba
are uncontroversial and can be traced back to a time span of only f
years (1790-95), 42 all well within the Critical period. The meaning
each passage taken individually is rather clear, and the passages ar
consistent with one another. They are also consistent with the doctr
of the original acquisition that is sketched in several texts from 177
the 1790s and with statements in the first Critique , the Prolegome
and the Progress of Metaphysics. As we saw above, some of those ot
statements also suggest that Kant took his theoretical philosophy to
a form of rationalism. This is in line with Kanťs explicit categorizat
of his ethics and aesthetics as rationalist. For all these reasons, we c
rely on the collective evidence provided by the lecture transcripts
the other texts to conclude that Kant did take his philosophy to b
form of rationalism.

Of course, Kant took his philosophy to be more than just another

form of rationalism. He regarded it as the only true rationalism. As
we saw in Section 2, he criticized earlier forms of rationalism as much
as earlier forms of empiricism. At the same time, he accepted tenets of
earlier empiricists and rationalists. For instance, he combined Locke's
emphasis on the necessity of sensory input for knowledge acquisition
with Leibniz's admission of substantive a priori knowledge. Neverthe-
less, Kant did not see his combination of the views of earlier empiricists
and rationalists as an alternative to empiricism and rationalism as such
but, rather, as a higher form of rationalism.
One may question whether Kant was right in viewing his philosophy
in that way. Few scholars ever claimed that Kant was indeed a rational-
ist, with the notable exceptions of some of his first readers and Erich
Adickes.43 Most regarded Kanťs philosophy as a via media between
empiricism and rationalism that is neither empiricist nor rationalist.
Others, like Wayne Waxman, take Kanťs project to be steeped in Locke's,
Berkeley's, and Hume's philosophical tradition.44
However things may be, whether Kant had the Kantian bias does
not depend on whether his philosophy actually is a form of rationalism,
empiricism, or neither. One has the Kantian bias if one holds that Kant's
Critical philosophy is a superior alternative to empiricism and rational-
ism as such, regardless of whether one is correct in holding this. This
applies to Kant, too. The evidence assembled in this section establishes
that he did not take his own philosophy to be an alternative to empiri-

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 67

cism and rationalism as such. This is sufficient to conclude that he did

not have Kantian bias, regardless of whether he was correct in viewing
his own philosophy as a form of rationalism.

5. The Epistemologica]. Bias

It is hard to deny that epistemology occupies an important place wit

Kant's philosophical project. In the theoretical sphere, Kant answers t
"general question" as to the possibility of metaphysics {Prol., 4:271)
determining the possibility, extent, and boundaries of a priori knowledg
In the practical sphere, Kant defends the possibility of moral respo
sibility by relying on the assumption that we cannot know wheth
our actions are free or determined. However, whether Kant had th
epistemological bias that is at issue in this paper does not depend o
whether he ascribed an important place to epistemology within hi
overall philosophical project. It depends on whether he interpreted most
or all of those that he identifies as the central philosophical doctrin
developments, and disputes of the early modern period in the light
philosophers' commitments to empiricism and rationalism.
As we have seen, Kant interprets some of Locke's, Hume's, and Lei
niz's doctrines in the light of their empiricism and rationalism. These ar
Locke's and Leibniz's views on the origin of concepts, Locke's proof of th
existence of God, and Hume's account of the origin of the notion of cau
Kant also suggests that Locke's and Hume's philosophy of mathemat
is best assessed in the light of their empiricism.45 Additionally, Kan
interprets one early modern development, the development from Loc
to Hume, in the light of the notion of empiricism. Finally, he explai
the divergence between Locke and Leibniz on the origin of concepts
a divergence between Locke's empiricism and Leibniz's rationalism.
There are several other early modern doctrines and developments that
Kant does not interpret in the light of the RED. I will provide examples
concerning Bacon, Descartes, and Berkeley. Kant holds that a centr
development at the roots of early modern thought is the emergence of
new method for natural philosophy based on experiments and observ
tions. Like his contemporaries, Johann Nikolaus Tetens and Christ
Garve, Kant praises Bacon for pioneering this new method.46 Tetens and
Garve held that Locke and Hume applied Bacon's method to the study
the human mind.47 Many authors after Kant would make similar claims,
linking Bacon to Locke and Hume in their accounts of early moder
empiricism. Unlike them, Kant does not relate Bacon's reliance on ob
servations and experiments to Locke's and Hume's empiricism. Kan
lecture transcripts do not mention Locke or Hume, but Descartes as
follower of Bacon's new method.48

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68 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

Kant sees Descartes as a source of important early modern

He often mentions and criticizes the cogito argument, Desca
that introspection is more trustworthy than the outer sens
version of the ontological argument for the existence of God (f
A355, B274-75, A347/B405). From a Kantian standpoint, th
argument and Descartes's version of the ontological argume
good examples of the rationalist attempt to establish synth
independently of experience. Yet Kant never includes thes
Cartesian arguments within a history of early modern ratio
never groups Descartes, Malebranche, or Spinoza together w
so as to provide a rationalist counterpart to his account of h
skepticism derived from Locke's empiricism.
Instead of grouping Descartes together with Spinoza and
Kant categorizes him as an idealist together with Berkeley
author who, since Kant first replied to the Garve-Feder rev
Prolegomena, was important in his eyes but was never categ
empiricist or a rationalist. Kant does not articulate any accou
modern thought based on the evolution of idealism or its co
realism. More fundamental than idealism and realism, empi
rationalism, are to him the three categories of dogmatism,
and Critical philosophy or Criticism. The unfinished manusc
Progress of Metaphysics identifies them repeatedly as the t
stages in the history of metaphysics, and the first Critique
ends by locating Kant's critical philosophy with respect to
nism between dogmatism and skepticism (Avii-xii, A855-56
Yet he typically describes them in abstract terms, with few
erences to early modern philosophers. He could have easily
the distinction between dogmatism, skepticism, and Criticis
distinction between empiricism and rationalism, identifying th
two varieties of dogmatism that can be found in the early mod
The distinction between empiricism, rationalism, and skept
then have provided a template for a comprehensive accoun
modern thought that focuses on epistemological issues. Ka
Reinhold would provide such an account as early as in 1791
Reinhold and many authors after him, Kant did not provid
account. He interpreted some , but not most , of the central ph
doctrines, developments, and disputes of the early modern peri
light of the distinction between empiricism and rationalism
but his followers employed the epistemological dichotomy of em
and rationalism as the overarching organizing principle for
of early modern thought.

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 69

6. Kant's Contribution to the Standard Narrative

of Early Modern Philosophy

Although Kant did not have the classificatory, Kantian, and epistem
logica! biases that characterize the standard narrative of early mode
philosophy, he promoted a way of writing histories of philosophy from
which those biases would naturally flow. He did so by endorsing fou
tenets.

(а) The history of philosophy is a philosophical discipline. Kant took

the section of the first Critique on the history of pure reason to
designate "a place that is left open in the system" of philosophy
(A852/B880). This provides "a secure touchstone for appraising
the philosophical content of old and new works in this specialty"
(B27). Historians should assess past philosophies from a Kantian
point of view.
(б) Historians of philosophy should reconstruct the "natural train
of thought through which philosophy had to progressively de-
velop from human reason" ( Briefwechsel , 12:36). The "temporal
sequence" of dogmatism, skepticism, and Criticism "is founded
in the nature of man's cognitive capacity" ( Fort ., 20:264). Given
the nature of human psychology, humans have an inclination to
embrace dogmatism, discover its flaws, move on to skepticism,
be dissatisfied by it, and keep searching until they reach the safe
haven of Criticism. Historians of philosophy should show how the
temporal sequence of specific systems exemplifies this natural
psychological development of the human mind.
(c) Given the nature of human psychology, it is unavoidable that
humans go through the three stages of dogmatism, skepticism,
and Criticism. Historians should make the unavoidability of this
process apparent. They should show how the "opinions which
have chanced to arise here and there" instantiate "what should
have happened," how reason must necessarily develop "himself
from concepts" {Fort., 20:343).
(< d ) In line with his tendency to endorse intermediate views between
two extremes, as discussed above, Kant regards his Critical
philosophy as a middle way between the extremes of dogmatism
and skepticism. It combines the dogmatists' claim that we can
know the external world with the skeptics' claim that we can-
not know mind-independent objects. Historians of philosophy
should describe this historical movement from the two extremes
of dogmatism and skepticism to their higher synthesis in Kant's
Critical philosophy.

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70 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

Although Kant regarded his philosophy as a synthesis of d

and skepticism, he did not regard it as a synthesis of emp
rationalism as such. He also employed a pattern of argume
the rejection, unification, and overcoming of dichotomies i
viewpoint. The standard historiography of early modern p
saw the light once Reinhold, Tennemann, and others picke
notions of rationalism and history-empiricism; they empl
dialectical pattern of argument to portray his philosophy
synthesis of those movements; and they followed Kant'
writing philosophical histories of philosophy. Their histor
the inexorable, necessary process (c) whereby human reaso
evolved (6) from two unacceptable, extreme positions to Kant's
intermediate (d) point of view. Post-Kantian historians dev
narrative by focusing on epistemological issues, classifying
modern thinkers as empiricists or rationalists and portray
philosophy as a synthesis of both movements. Kant did not
three biases. Yet, given his influence on the standard histori
should not be surprising that it retains a Kantian flavor.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that Kant did not have the three biase
although he indirectly contributed to the development of the stand
narrative. The first historians who developed accounts of early mod
philosophy that revolve around the RED and display the three bias
did this by employing Kantian notions and embracing Kantian vie
on the historiography of philosophy.
According to the Kantian historian par excellence , Wilhelm Gottl
Tennemann, "[t]he Critical inquiries of the philosopher from Königsber
had the most beneficial consequences not only for philosophy itself,
also for the history of philosophy."50 Nowadays, few would agree that
consequences of Kant's views on the historiography of philosophy w
the most beneficial. Nevertheless, Kant's views had a remarkable in
ence on how many philosophers have understood their early mode
predecessors. It is important to recognize the extent to which their
derstanding was shaped by Kantian views on the nature of philosoph
historiography. This should alert us to the wide-ranging consequenc
that historians' assumptions on the nature and method of philosoph
historiography can have for the way they reconstruct their philosophic
past. To be aware of this is especially important now, when the limits o
the traditional historiography of early modern philosophy have bec
apparent and many are looking for new, enhanced narratives.51

University of Warwick

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 71

NOTES

1. The Critique of Pure Reason is cited, as customary, with A/B number

Other writings by Kant are cited with the title (sometimes in an abbreviat
form), followed by the volume and page number of the Academy Edition. Quot
from Kanťs writings which have been translated into English are from th
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, gen. ed. P. Guyer and A. W
Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999-).
2. See, e.g., B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connec
tion with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to t
Present Day (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945); J. Shand, Philosophy a
Philosophers : An Introduction to Western Philosophy (London: UCL Pres
1993), chs. 4-6.
3. See, e.g., S. Brown, "Introduction," in Routledge History of Philosophy
vol. 5: British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment, ed. S. Brown (London:
Routledge, 1996), 1-15, at 10; S. Priest, The British Empiricists, 2d ed. (London:
Routledge, 2007), 5.
4. L. E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and th
Development of Modern Philosophy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981)
D. F. Norton, "The Myth of British Empiricism," History of European Idea
(1981): 331-44.

5. See, e.g., P. J. Markie, "Rationalism vs. Empiricism," in The Stan-

ford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. E. N. Zalta, Fall 2008 Edition, <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rationalism-empiricism/>, §1.
6. S. Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility:
Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1680-1760 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2010),
156. See K. Haakonssen, "The History of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy:
History or Philosophy?" in The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century
Philosophy, ed. K. Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), 3-25, at 6.
7. See H.-J. Engfer, Empirismus versus Rationalismus? Kritik eines phi-
losophiegeschichtlichen Schemas (Padeborn: Schöning, 1996), 112, 235, 292;
S. Buckle, "British Sceptical Realism: A Fresh Look at the British Tradition,"
European Journal of Philosophy 7 (1999): 1-29, at 1-2.
8. See Haakonssen 2006, 14.
9. Ibid. For a related criticism, see I. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments: Civil
and Metaphysical Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 1-29.
10. For an early example, see W. G. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie,
12 vols. (Leipzig: Barth, 1798-1819).
11. See, among others, N. Rescher, Leibniz: An Introduction to His Phi-
losophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 124 on Leibniz's empiricism; H. M.

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72 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

Bracken, Berkeley (New York: St Martin's Press, 1974), 15-17, 259

rationalism.

12. See, e.g., R. A. Watson, "Shadow History in Philosophy," Journal of

the History of Philosophy 31 (1993): 95-109, at 97; D. Garber, "Descartes and
Experiment in the Discourse and Essays ," in Essays on the Philosophy and Sci-
ence of René Descartes , ed. S. Voss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993),
288-310, at 306.
13. Loeb 1981, 13-14.
14. For example, Descartes's influence on Locke (ibid., 36-62) and Leibniz's
influence on Hume (Engfer 1996, 329-32).
15. See, e.g., H. Ishiguro, "Pre-established Harmony versus Constant
Conjunction: A Reconsideration of the Distinction between Rationalism and
Empiricism," in Rationalism , Empiricism , and Idealism: British Academy
Lectures on the History of Philosophy , ed. A. Kenny (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996),
61-85.

16. R. Scruton, Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey (London

Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994), 30. See M. Gentile, Se e come è possibile la storia
della filosofia (Padua: Liviana, 1966), 60; Gaukroger 2010, 156.
17. Gentile 1966, 60. See R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 148.
18. Haakonssen 2006, 18. See A. Waldow, "Empiricism and Its Roots in th
Ancient Medical Tradition," in The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge:
Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science , ed. C. T. Wolfe and O. Gal
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 287-308, at 307.
19. Scruton 1994, 30. See S. Schmauke, Wohlthätigste Verirrung : Kants
kosmologische Antinomien (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002), 106
H. Holzhey and V. Mudroch, Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism
(Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2005), 111-12.
20. Engfer 1996, 357, see 411; E. Papadimitriou, "Zu den philosophie-
geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen der Kantischen Kritik der reinen Vernunft," in
Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses , ed. G. Funke (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1981), vol. 1.1, 39-47, at 39, 41; I. Hunter, "The History of Philosophy and the
Persona of the Philosopher," Modern Intellectual History 4 (2007): 572-600, at
592-94.

21. See Bxxxv.

22. I focus on only the first two antinomies for the sake of brevity.
23. Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte , die die Metaphysik seit Le
zens und Wolfs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? (henceforth Fort.
24. To reconstruct Kant's views, we must rely to a significant extent
terials that Kant never intended to be published, especially manuscri
(Reflexionen) and lecture transcripts. These materials must be used with c
(see E. Conrad, Kants Logikvorlesungen als neuer Schlüssel zur Archit

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 KANT ON EMPIRICISM AND RATIONALISM 73

der Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Stuttgart: Frommann-Hol

In what follows, I take materials from the 1770s into acco
texts from the Critical period narrowly understood (1781-
of the history of philosophy in Kanťs texts from the 1770s a
mostly consistent with his later views.
25. See Refi. 1636 (ca. 1760-72?), 16:60; Logik Philippi , 2
26. Metaphysik Mrongovius , 29:759; Metaphysik Volckm
27. Ibid.; Metaphysik Dohna , 28:619; Metaphysik K3, 29:95
der praktischen Vernunft (henceforth KprV), 5:70-71, on prac

28. Metaphysik Mrongovius , 29:760; see Metaphysik K3 ,

29. See, e.g., Refi. 6050-51 (1776-89?), 16:434-35, 437
28:232; Metaphysik K3 , 29:953.
30. Metaphysik Mrongovius , 29:761; see Logik Philippi ,
31. Metaphysik Volckmann , 28:375; see A854-55/B882-8
32. See Kritik der Urtheilskraft (henceforth KU), 5:347.
33 . See H. E . Allison, Kanťs Transcendental Idealism: An
Defense , 2d ed., revised and enlarged (New Haven, CT: Yal
2004), 366.
34. See M. Grier, Kanťs Doctrine of Transcendental Illus
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 205-9.
35. See A752/B780; B274; Prolegomena , 4:258; KU , 5:30
6:74 n.; Pragmatische Anthropologie, 7:223; Opus postumum
Philosophie Powalski, 27:100; Danziger Physik, 29:107.
36. See, e.g., R. Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology: An
the Critique of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University
37. See, e.g., R. Schwartz, "Rationalism vs. Empiricism,"
clopedia of the Cognitive Sciences, ed. R. A. Wilson and F.
MA: MIT Press, 1999), 703-5, at 704.
38. See Über eine Entdeckung nach der alle neue Kritik de
durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll (henceforth
39. For example, De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis fo
2:395; Metaphysik Dohna, 28:619; Metaphysik K3, 29:951-52
40. Metaphysik K2, 28:710.
41. Metaphysik K3, 29:953.
42. See S. Naragon, Kant in the Classroom, http://www
kant/Notes/notesMetaphysics.htm (accessed March 11, 201
43. See, e.g., C. G. Selle, "De la realité et l'idéalité des obje
s ance s," Memoires de V Académie Royale des Sciences et Belle
577-612; E. Adickes, "Die bewegenden Kräfte in Kants philosophischer

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74 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY

Entwickung und die beiden Pole seines Systems/' Kant-Studie

9-59, 161-96, 352-415, at 29.
44. See W. Waxman, Kant and the Empiricists : Understanding U
ing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
45. See KprV, 5:13, 52; Entd., 8:211 n.
46. See, e.g., Pragmatische Anthropologie, 7:223; Wiener Log
Danziger Physik, 29:107.
47. See J. N. Tetens, "Über die allgemeine speculativische P
[1775], in Uber die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie. Phi
Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung (Ber
& Reichard, 1913), 1:1-72, at 68-69; C. Garve, "Einige Beobachtun
die Kunst zu denken," in his Versuche über verschiedene Gegenst
Moral , der Litteratur und dem gesellschaftlichen Leben , vol. 2 (B
1796), 245-430, at 297, 401, 403, 405, 427.
48. See, e.g., Wiener Logik, 24:804; Metaphysik L2, 28:539; Danzi
29:107.

49. See K. L. Reinhold, Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens

nebst einigen Erläuterungen über die Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögen, in
Gesammelte Schriften : Kommentierte Ausgabe, ed. M. Bondeli, vol. 4 (Basel:
Schwabe, 2001 [1791]); partial trans, as The Foundation of Philosophical
Knowledge : Together with Some Comments Concerning the Theory of the Fac-
ulty of Representation, in Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of
Post-Kantian Idealism, ed. G. di Giovanni and H. S. Harris, 52-103 (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1985).
50. W. G. Tennemann, "Revision der Bearbeitung der Geschichte der Phi-
losophie in den letzten drey Quinquennien," Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung.
Ergänzungsblätter 2 (1801): cols. 25-30, 33-64, 529-49, at 27-28.
51. I would like to thank Peter Anstey, Tim Mehigan, Eric Watkins, and
participants at conferences in Dunedin and Mainz for helpful comments and
criticisms on earlier versions of this paper.

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