THE MAKING OF

MODERN AFRICA
VOWAAL1
960
Mak The making of modern Africa.

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ALBION PUBLIC LIBRARY

501 S. SUPERIOR ST.
ALBION, MICHIGAN 49224

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The Making of Modern Africa^

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Volume 1 The Nineteenth Century

A.E. Aflgbo B.A., Ph.D.

Professor of History, University of Nigeria at Nsukka

E.A. Ayandele B.A., Ph.D.

Formerly Professor of History, University of Ibadan

R.J. Gavin M.A., Ph.D.

Professor of History, University of Ulster

J.D. Omer-Cooper M.A.

Professor of History, University of Otago, Dunedin

This edition revised in collaboration with

Robin Palmer B.A., Ph.D.
Professor of History, University of Malawi

ALBION PUBLIC LIBRARY

501 S. Superior
ALBION, Ml 49224

Longman
Longman Group Limited,
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Published in the United States

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First published 1968

New edition 1986
© Longman Group Ltd 1968, 1986

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

The Making of modern Africa. — New ed.

Vol. 1: The nineteenth century
1. Africa — History
I. Afigbo, A.E. II. Palmer, Robin
960'.23 DT20

ISBN 0-582-58508-2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Making of modern Africa.

Includes index.
Contents: v. 1. The nineteenth century — v. 2.
The twentieth century.
1. Africa — History — 19th century. 2. Africa — History
1884-1960. 3. Africa — History— 1960-
I. Afigbo, A. E.
DT28.M32 1985 960 85-18132
ISBN 0-582-585-08-2 (v. 1)
ISBN 0-582-585-09-0 (v. 2)

Set in 10/12 pt Plantin (Monophoto)

Maps by Oxford Illustrators Ltd

Produced by Longman Group (FE) Ltd

Printed in Hong Kong
Contents

Introduction J.D. Omer-Cooper l

The geography of Africa 1
The peoples of Africa north of the Sahara 5
The peoples of Africa south of the Sahara 13
External influences on Africa before 1800: Islam and the Arabs 23
External influences on Africa before 1800: Europeans 28
The changed situation in the nineteenth century 30
Contents and divisions of the two volumes 31

Part one
West Africa A.E. Afigbo

1 West Africa to 1800 33

Introduction 33
Trans-Saharan trade routes 34
Islam 35
Development of European trade 37
The influence of European trade on West African states 39
Trans-Saharan trade and the trans-Atlantic trade compared 43

2 The growth and character of European

influence (c. 1800-61) 45
Introduction 45
The campaign against the slave trade 48
African attitudes to abolition 53
Anti-slavery treaties 55
The founding of Sierra Leone 56
 I

The founding of Liberia 59

Economic consequences of abolition 61
European exploration and penetration 62
British penetration 63
French penetration 70
African reactions to European penetration 72
The coming of Christian missions 73
The African educated elite 77

3 Revolutions and wars 80

Introduction 80
The jihads of the Western Sudan 80
Fulani Muslims 82
Usman dan Fodio 82
Reasons for the success of the jihad 84
Repercussions of the jihad 86
Ahmadu Lobbo 87
al-Hajj Umar 89
The effects of the jihads 91
Samori Ture 93
Rabih ibn Fadlallah 95
The collapse of the Oyo empire 96
The Yoruba wars 98
The impact of the wars 100
Dahomey 102
Asante, Fante and the British 105
The end of Asante independence 112

4 The establishment of European rule in West

Africa (c. 1880-1900) 115

The origins of European rule in West Africa 115

The French 115
The British 118
After the scramble 121
Reasons for the conquest of West Africa - treaties, force and
African disunity 125

IV
Part two
Northern Africa E.A. Ayandele

5 Egypt from the Napoleonic invasion to the

British occupation 129

Egypt, an Arab nation 129

The Mamluks, 1249-1517 130
Egypt under the Ottoman empire 130
Napoleon invades Egypt 131
Consequences of Napoleon’s invasion 132
The British force Napoleon to leave Egypt 133
The rise of Muhammad Ali 134
Destruction of the Mamluks and social reforms 135
Military reforms: the creation of a national army 136
Attempts to modernize the Egyptian economy 137
Muhammad Ali’s foreign policy 140
Achievements of Muhammad Ali 142
Abbas I 143
Said and the Suez Canal agreement 143
Ismail Pasha and his extravagance 144
Towards self-government 145
British purchase of Suez Canal shares 145
International control of Egyptian finances 146
Nationalist reaction and the rebellion of Arabi Pasha 147
British occupation of Egypt 148

6 The Sudan and Ethiopia in the nineteenth

century 150

Egypt and the Sudan 150

The Funj sultanate in the Sudan 151
Turco-Egyptian conquest and administration of the Sudan,
1820-81 152
Unpopularity of the Turco-Egyptian government 154
Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi 155
Collapse of the Turco-Egyptian regime and triumph of the
Mahdi 157
The Sudan under the Khalifa, 1885-98 159
The British conquest of the Sudan, 1898 162

v
 f

The Ethiopian empire at the beginning of the nineteenth

century 164
Emperor Tewodros (Theodore) 165
The reign of Emperor Yohannes (John) IV 169
Emperor Menelik II and the Italians 170

7 The Maghreb and European intervention 176

Introduction 176
Morocco: the monarchy and bar aka 176
The Berbers 178
The Turkish Maghreb 180
European influence in the Maghreb before 1830 182
The French occupation of Algeria, 1830 184
Abdel Kader and resistance to the French occupation 186
European settlement in Algeria 191
French legal policies 192
European pressure on Morocco 193
Hassan III 196
Tunisia and the French occupation of Algeria 197
The reign of Ahmed Bey 198
Muhammad es Sadek and the growth of European influence 198
The French occupation of Tunisia, 1881 201
Libya under the Turks 204
The Sanusiyya brotherhood 205
The Sanusiyya and the Turkish administration 208

Part three
Southern and Central Africa J.D. Omer-Cooper

8 Southern and Central Africa at the beginning

of the nineteenth century 211
The geographical features 211
The Khoisan peoples 211
The Bantu-speaking peoples 215
Social and political organization of the Bantu-speaking
peoples 216
The Portuguese in Mozambique 219
White settlement at the Cape 221

vi
 Reaction of the Khoisan peoples to the expansion of the
Cape Colony 224
Origin of the Commando system 225
Khoisan resistance and the conciliation policy 225
Migration of the Korana 226
Origin of the Cape Coloured and Griqua peoples 226
Origin of the Orlam communities in Namibia 227
White settlers and Bantu-speaking peoples encounter one
another 228

9 The great nineteenth-century migrations 229

Origins of the Mfecane 229

The rise of Shaka’s Zulu kingdom 231
The Ngoni diaspora 235
Other migrations: the Sotho, Mfengu, Kololo and Ndebele 237
Developments on the Cape frontier: farmers, servants,
missionaries and administrators 239
The Boer Great Trek 244

10 South Africa from the GreatTrekto thefirst

Anglo-Boer war 251

Consequences of the Great Trek 251

The British annexation of Natal 252
The eastern frontier, Moshoeshoe and the Boers 255
Annexation of British Kaffraria and the Orange River
Sovereignty 259
Boer independence in the Transvaal and Orange Free State 261
The Cape Parliament 264
Grey and the eastern frontier 265
The first Orange Free State-Lesotho war, 1858 266
The creation of the South African Republic in the Transvaal 267
The second Orange Free State-Lesotho war, 1865 269
British annexation of Lesotho 270
British annexation of the Kimberley diamond fields 272
Carnarvon’s confederation policy 274
British annexation of the Transvaal, 1877 276
The ‘War of the Guns’ 277
The Zulu war 277

Vll
 I

The first Anglo-Boer war, 1880-1 279

The Pretoria Convention, 1881 280

11 The consolidation of white rule in Southern

Africa 281

The mineral revolution and the scramble for territory 281

The rise of Cecil Rhodes 283
The Transvaal and President Kruger 285
Rhodes and the conquest of Central Africa 287
Transvaal-British conflict over Swaziland 292
Rhodes tries to seize Mozambique 293
The destruction of the Ndebele kingdom 294
The struggle for the Transvaal 295
The Shona and Ndebele risings, 1896-7 299
The second Anglo-Boer war, 1899-1902 300

Part four
Middle Africa R.J. Gavin

12 States and societies in Middle Africa in the

nineteenth century 306

Peoples and rulers 306

The Kongo kingdom 308
The Lunda empire and Kazembe 309
Luba and Kuba 310
The inter-lacustrine kingdoms 311
Buganda and Bunyoro 312
Nkore and Haya 312
Rwanda and Burundi 313
Tanzania and Kenya 314
Conclusion 316

13 Crisis, revolution and colonial conquest in

Middle Africa, 1840-1900 317

Introduction 317
Shipping and commerce 318
New firearms and diseases 319

Vlll
 Sayyid Said and Zanzibar commerce 321
Nyamwezi and Arab traders 323
The Ngoni impact 324
Mirambo and Msiri 326
Tippu Tip and the Arabs 328
Arab traders in Kenya and Uganda 329
Angola, western Zaire and the Atlantic trade 331
The colonial invaders and the Berlin Conference 332
The establishment of European power on the coast 335
The establishment of European power in the interior 337
Disease and famine 339

Conclusion R.J. Gavin

14 The European conquest of Africa 340

Africa before the colonial conquest 340

The Industrial Revolution and the search for markets 342
European pressure groups in Africa 344
Obstacles to conquest 348
Early European military campaigns, 1867-85 350
The deadly new weapons 352
Divisions in African society 354
The Egyptian crisis and its consequences 356
On the eve of the conquest 359
The conquest of the powerful African states 362
The assault in the east and south 363
Europe seizes the commanding heights in Africa 363

Index 364

IX
 i

List of maps

1 Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century 2

2 West African peoples mentioned in the text 39
3 States, towns and physical features of West Africa 40-1
4 European forts and trading posts 46
5 Sierra Leone and Liberia 58
6 European exploration of West Africa 64
7 The spread of missionary activities in West Africa 75
8 The Fulani jihad 84
9 The empires of Ahmadu Lobbo, al-Hajj Umar and
SamoriTure 92
10 Yorubaland at the time of the wars 99
11 Asante and the coastal states 110
12 West Africa, showing the progress of European penetration 119
13 Egypt in the nineteenth century 137
14 The area of the Funj sultanate and the Nile confluence 152
15 Sudan under Egyptian rule 155
16 The Mahdist state 160
17 The European advance on the Sudan 163
18 Napier’s march from Zula to Magdala 168
19 The Italian campaign in Ethiopia in 1896 172
20 The provinces of Ethiopia after Menelik’s conquests and
European colonization 174
21 The Maghreb in the nineteenth century 178-9
22 The European advance into the Maghreb 202
23 South-East Africa showing modern international boundaries 222
24 The main movements of people during the Mfecane 236
25 Routes followed by the Boers in the Great Trek 248
26 Boer-Zulu and Boer-Ndebele battlefields 249
27 The Trekkers’Republic 254
28 British annexations in Southern Africa up to 1848 259

x
29 South Africa after the Sand River and Bloemfontein
Conventions 263
30 Lesotho showing the territorial effect of repeated attempts to 271
annex the territory
31 The diamond-yielding areas of South Africa 273
32 The area which the first Boer and Zulu wars were fought over, 280
showing the positions of the major battles
33 South Africa at the time of the second Anglo-Boer War,
showing main railway lines 300
34 The consolidation of white rule in South Africa 301
35 The larger groups of Middle African peoples mentioned in
the text 307
36 Population density in eastern Africa 314
37 Trade routes in Middle Africa 323

xi
 I

Acknowledgements

The publishers are grateful to the following for permission to reproduce

photographs:

BBC Hulton Picture Library for pages 52, 66 and 296; British Museum,
London for page 322; Historical Picture Service, Chicago for pages 286
and 289; Illustrated London News for page 270; Mansell Collection for
pages 159, 173, 302 and 335; National Archives of Zimbabwe for page
246; Popperfoto for page 135; Public Record Office for pages 122, 123,
124, 303 and 304; Robert Harding Picture Library for page 212; Royal
Commonwealth Society for pages 47 and 50; the Slide Centre for page 247;
Werner Forman Archive for pages 9, 18, 20, 22 and 27.

The publishers regret that they have been unable to trace the copyright
owners of artwork and photographs not credited in the above acknow¬
ledgements and would welcome any information enabling them to do so at
the first opportunity.

The cover illustration shows the defeat of the Italians at the Battle of
Adowa in 1896 and was provided by the Mary Evans Picture Library.

Xll
Introduction

The geography of Africa

In size the African continent with its 30 233 100 square kilometres may be
compared with Asia (27 593 900 square kilometres), and the USSR
(22 401 000 square kilometres). This vast land mass straddles the equator,
facing the Mediterranean Sea in the north and the Antarctic in the south.
Its wide variety of climates and natural conditions has greatly influenced
the development of its inhabitants.
One characteristic of Africa is the striking regularity of its coastline,
which has relatively few bays and inlets or peninsulas reaching out to sea.
This has meant that the African peoples have not had the same opportuni¬
ties and incentives for the development of navigation on the sea, whether
for long- or short-range trade, as have the peoples of Europe and Asia.
Thus, except for the countries bordering the Mediterranean, they have not
until comparatively recent times been brought into close and frequent
contact with other continents. Until the nineteenth century African de¬
velopment was relatively self-contained, though this does not mean that
there were no contacts with other nations, nor that such contacts were
unimportant.
The northern part of the continent lies along the Mediterranean Sea and
enjoys a climate similar to, though warmer and drier than, that of southern
Europe. This Mediterranean area is a narrow coastal strip varying in width
according to geographical circumstances. It is widest in the north-west
corner of the continent, known as the Maghreb (the Arabic word for
west), where the modern states of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are
situated. There the Atlas mountains cause winds from the Mediterranean
and the Atlantic to deposit their moisture and the soil has been noted for
its fertility from ancient times.
Behind this narrow strip of fertile country with its Mediterranean
climate lies the vast desert of the Sahara, greater in extent than the whole

1
of Europe and by far the largest desert in the world. This huge area -
which is now almost entirely uninhabited outside the occasional oases
which provide welcome islands of green in the almost endless wastes of
barren rock and burning sands - was once very different. In remote
prehistoric times it enjoyed a reasonable rainfall and supported a consider¬
able population. Gradually, for reasons which are still not well under¬
stood, it dried up and its peoples congregated around the oases or moved
further afield. By the times of the ancient Greeks and Romans it was in

Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century

2
much the same condition as today. But though the Sahara is such a vast
and formidable desert it must not be thought that it separated the northern
part of the continent from all contact with the centre and south.
On the eastern side of the continent the river Nile, starting from two
sources, one in the highlands of Ethiopia (the Blue Nile) and the other in
the Lake region of East Africa (the White Nile) threads it way across the
desert to reach the sea through the many mouths of its delta in Egypt.
Every year the rains in Ethiopia and East Africa cause the river to overflow
its banks, and as the water subsides it leaves behind a layer of fertile mud
which it has brought from the Ethiopian highlands. Along the banks of the
Nile there is a narrow cultivable strip containing some of the richest
agricultural land in the world. Though it is often no more than a few
kilometres wide it can support a dense population and it gave rise to one of
the world’s most ancient and elaborate civilizations. Navigation is possible
along great stretches of the river, and the winding thread of water and the
vivid strip of green beside it form one of the strongest links binding the
history of the peoples north and south of the Sahara.
In the central and western parts of the Sahara the mountains of Tibesti,
Air and the Hoggar capture sufficient rain to make agriculture possible. In
other places underground water provides wells and springs to nourish
oases. These provide natural staging posts on the caravan routes which
from ancient times have criss-crossed the desert, bringing the peoples of
West Africa and the Maghreb into contact with each other.
To the south of the Sahara in the west, desert conditions gradually give
way to increasing vegetation nourished by the rains brought by warm
equatorial winds from the Atlantic. A great belt of savanna which is called
the Sudanic belt stretches across the continent. South of the Sudanic belt,
along the coast of much of West Africa, stretching inland to varying
distances, lies the great West African rain forest which, with a few gaps,
meets the dense forests of Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo) to form one
of the largest tropical forests in the world.
Thus the pattern of West African geography consists of a fairly regular
succession of belts of vegetation, from the Sahara desert, across the
grasslands of the savanna belt to the lush forests of the coastal strip. But
this pattern is broken by major rivers which have had a significant influ¬
ence on history, such as the complex Niger-Benue river system which
might be described as the Nile of West Africa. Rising in the mountains of
the Futa Jallon range in modern Guinea, the river Niger makes a great
northward loop almost into the Sahara before turning south into modern
Nigeria where it links up with the Benue, another mighty river which rises
in the mountains of Cameroon. The combined waters finally find their
way to the sea through the maze of creeks and rivers of the Niger delta. In

3
its northward path the Niger runs for part of its course over level ground
where it overflows its banks every year when the rains in the Futa Jallon
bring down the flood waters to form what is often called the inland delta of
the Niger. A relatively dense population can be supported there and it is
not surprising that the valley of the Niger should have been the centre of
some of West Africa’s most ancient and powerful kingdoms. Further east,
Lake Chad, lying on the fringes of the Sahara and fed by rivers rising in
the Cameroon mountains, also modifies the climate and provides agri¬
cultural opportunities.
On the eastern side of the continent the highlands of Ethiopia, lying
within the triangular projection known as the Horn of Africa, constitute a
special environment of their own. They consist largely of volcanic material
which breaks down to give a rich soil of almost unlimited depth. It is this
soil which washes down the Nile to provide the fertility of Egypt. Abun¬
dant rains fall every year and the climate of the cool uplands has been
described as the closest to paradise on earth. No wonder the ancient
Greeks regarded Ethiopia as the favourite earthly residence of the gods.
Between this fertile highland area - a natural centre of civilization - and
the sea, is the plain of Somalia largely dry and torrid and therefore for the
most part suitable only for nomadic herdsmen and incapable of sustaining
a large settled population.
Further south again, the African continent consists of a vast plateau
rising to its highest point in the Ruwenzori mountains, sometimes de¬
scribed as the spine of Africa. To the west of the Ruwenzori lies the great
basin of the Zaire and Kasai rivers system, much of it covered by forest
which towards the south gives way to savanna and the Benguella and
Shaba (formerly Katanga) plateaux where the Zambezi river has its
source. East of the Ruwenzori is the region of the Great Lakes: Victoria,
Tanganyika, Malawi and many others that are smaller but still large and
important. In spite of the presence of the Great Lakes much of this East
and Central African plateau is hot and rather dry, covered with a poor tree
scrub. There are important exceptions, however. The cool and fertile
Kenyan highlands provide excellent farming country. The area between
Lakes Victoria, Kyoga and Kivu, the so-called inter-lacustrine region
which forms the heart of modern Uganda, benefits from abundant rains
which make it a green and fertile land. Here was another natural centre
for the development of African civilizations. The slopes of Mount Kili¬
manjaro and the Shire highlands of modern Malawi are other examples.
The southernmost part of the continent constitutes a prolongation of the
great African plateau, surrounded by a coastal strip of varying width, the
result of age-old erosion of the plateau edge. Like most of the African
plateau this is generally rather dry, open savanna country with grass or

4
bush or thorn scrub. Its climate is strongly affected by its southerly
latitude and the winter months of June and July can be bitterly cold. On
the other hand the southern part of the continent is free from malaria and
the tsetse fly which are plagues north of the equator. It is ideal country for
cattle-keepers and mixed farmers but cannot support a dense agricultural
population.

The peoples of Africa north of the Sahara

The peoples of this vast continent and the story of their development are
as varied as the geography. The northern part of the continent, facing the
Mediterranean Sea, and including the lower reaches and delta of the Nile,
was the home of the ancient Egyptians and the Berbers in the Maghreb.
They were basically similar in appearance and physique to the people of
southern Europe and the structure of their languages suggests a link with
Mesopotamia and Arabia also. Men of a similar stock probably formed the
basic population of the Ethiopian highlands, though there and in the
upper Nile valley they intermarried with blacks and hence came to be
known by the name of ‘Ethiopians’, which means ‘burnt face’.
In the Nile valley, where the conditions for human settlement were
particularly favourable, a dense population grew up in very ancient times
and one of the most important civilizations of the ancient world de¬
veloped. It was a civilization strongly influenced by the natural conditions
of the Nile valley and the dependence of man on the river and its floods.
For the large population to support itself it was essential to make the best
use of every drop of the flood waters and of the rich mud which they
spread over the land. This could only be done successfully if irrigation and
land-use up and down the valley were carefully controlled. Thus, from
about 3000 bc, a very powerful state system grew up which exercised
close control over the use of water and land and the crops derived from
them. As these were the matters of fundamental importance to the Egyp¬
tian peasants the state virtually controlled all the most important aspects of
their lives. One of the world’s earliest known systems of writing, the
hieroglyphic script, was developed, and an elaborate civil service of scribes
grew to perform the complex tasks of administration. The king, or phar¬
aoh, was, at least in theory, all-powerful and the owner of all the land in
Egypt. It was believed that he was divine and that he and his ancestors in
the spirit world influenced the fertility of the land. He was thus a central
figure in an elaborate religious system with a complicated order of gods
served by powerful priests. Though the standard of living of the ordinary
peasant was always low, the king, the civil servants and the priests were

5
able to live in great luxury and splendour. The mighty pyramids which
have fascinated all subsequent generations were built as tombs for some of
the kings, while others were buried in vast chambers cut out of the rock of
mountain sides and decorated with paintings of rich and almost unbeliev¬
able beauty. Palaces too were built and splendid temples of great size. Arts
and crafts of many different kinds were developed to a high pitch of
perfection.
The Egyptian kingdom was not self-contained but traded widely with
the outside world, using the enormous surpluses of wheat grown on the
rich valley soil to profit from high prices resulting from famine in various
parts of the Mediterranean world. Relations with the neighbouring and in
some ways similar civilization of Mesopotamia were always close, though
often hostile. Syria and Palestine suffered much in biblical times from the
competition of the two world powers of the day. For long Egypt exercised
imperial authority over Syria but gradually its power declined and it was
itself conquered, first by the Assyrians (663 bc) and then for a longer term
by the Persians (525-332 bc). Thereafter Egypt was conquered by the
Greeks (332 bc) and later by the Romans (30 bc). It formed one of the
richest provinces of the Roman Empire and was converted, like most of
the Empire, to Christianity. It was there that the idea of religious men
withdrawing from the world to found monasteries for prayer and medita¬
tion was first developed and subsequently spread to Europe.
In ad 640 Egypt was conquered by the Arabs, who brought with them
Islam, a religion and a way of life which has formed the basic framework of
the life of the majority of Egyptians ever since. Egypt after the Arab
conquest knew a variety of different rulers, including a long period from
ad 1259-1517 under dynasties of foreign soldiers who were originally

recruited as slaves (mamluks) and were consequently known as the Mam-

luks. In the sixteenth century the Mamluks were conquered by the Otto¬
man Turks and Egypt became part of the Ottoman empire. But under the
Turkish administration the Mamluks were allowed to rise again and by the
end of the eighteenth century they were virtually independent of the
Turkish sultan who was their nominal ruler.
In spite of all these changes, certain factors have remained constant in
Egyptian life from the time of the pharaohs to the present day: the
absolute dependence on the Nile and the irrigation system, and rising
from this, the high degree of dependence of the people on the administra¬
tive system; the powerful position of rulers and civil servants; and the
large role played by the state in all development. These are not so much
the results of particular ideologies and beliefs as of the inescapable facts of
Egyptian life.

6
A Mamluk

Though Egypt traded widely with Mediterranean lands and competed

with the Mesopotamian civilizations for control of the Middle East, it was
no less interested in its African neighbours higher up the Nile in the
northern parts of the modern Sudan. This part of Africa was inhabited
from very early times by black peoples and Egypt was always a multi-racial
state, or rather a state in which peoples of different race lived together
without attaching much importance to racial differences. There are, it is
true, pictures of pharaohs conquering the black peoples of the upper Nile
and capturing them as slaves, but statues of important officers show that
blacks could rise to high positions in the state. As a result of Egyptian
influence in the upper Nile valley, a civilization grew up there based
largely on the Egyptian pattern though modified by local traditions. Its
rulers became very powerful and about 730 bc the great Nubian warrior
Piankhy conquered Egypt and established a new dynasty generally known
as the Ethiopian dynasty, on the throne of the pharaohs. After being
defeated by an Assyrian attack, in 663 bc, however, the Nubians severed
their connection with Egypt and established an independent state on the
upper Nile known as the kingdom of Kush. The first capital of the
kingdom was at Napata. Later it was moved further up the Nile from
Napata to Meroe and there the kings and queens of Kush continued to

7
keep alive a form of the Egyptian civilization - even building small-scale
pyramids - long after the old religion and way of life had died out in Egypt
itself. Gradually the state was weakened, probably by the decline of
agriculture caused by soil exhaustion, and by trade competition from the
rising kingdom of Axum in Ethiopia. About ad 350 King Ezana of Axum
stormed the capital and the kingdom came to an end.
This did not mean the end of civilization and independent development
for the upper Nile valley. Missionaries from Egypt, then under the East¬
ern Roman, or Byzantine empire, introduced Christianity into Nubia and
a number of Christian kingdoms grew up where beautifully decorated
churches and monasteries were built. These kingdoms too fell into decline
and Muslim merchants and missionaries from Egypt converted many of
the people to Islam. Then in the sixteenth century a brilliant leader,
Amara Dunkas, in alliance with the Abdullab, the most important of the
Arab sheikhs who had penetrated the upper Nile valley, conquered the
whole area of the previously Christian kingdoms and united them in a
Muslim sultanate known as the Funj kingdom with its capital at Sennar on
the Blue Nile. This kingdom survived until the nineteenth century,
though it was by then in the last stages of decline.
The history of Ethiopia is closely linked with that of the upper Nile
valley on one side and of South Arabia, across the narrow straits of the
Bab-el-Mandeb, on the other. Movements of population have probably
taken place in both directions. Certainly, when powerful kingdoms grew
up on the mountain plateau of modern Yemen it was only natural that they
should take an interest in the fertile highlands, so similar to their own
country, across the narrow seas. A series of South Arabian city-state
colonies grew up in Ethiopia, taking with them the pagan religion of
ancient Sabaea and the ancient South Arabian language and script. Even¬
tually these separate cities were brought under the control of Axum, which
laid the foundations of the Ethiopian empire. In Axum a form of the South
Arabian language was used, modified by local influences, to form a
national language known as Geez. The holy books of Ethiopia are written
in this language which is also used in Church services. Amharic, the
modern official language, is related to it in the sense that both probably
have a common root, rather than - as was once believed - Amharic having
developed out of Geez.
As Axum extended its authority over the city-states of Ethiopia it
became rich and powerful. Mighty temples were erected to the gods and
colossal monuments were erected in their honour. Axum also became a
naval power with a strong interest in the Red Sea trade, and at times it
extended its authority over parts of South Arabia whence much of its
culture originally came. These developments brought Ethiopia into con-

8
Royal burial monument at Axum (c. ad 400)

tact with the outside world and made it one of the recognized world
powers. Greek traders from the eastern parts of the Roman empire
thronged its court and Greek became a second official language in which
some of the royal inscriptions were written.
Through these contacts Ethiopia was brought in touch with the reli¬
gious changes taking place in the world. Many were converted to Judaism,
which was spreading actively in South Arabia, and a Judaic community
sprang up which still survives. In the reign of the same King Ezana who
destroyed the kingdom of Kush about ad 350, the kingdom as a whole
was converted to Christianity, which remained the state religion until the
overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974. With the rise of Islam and the Arab

9
 *

conquest of Egypt the kingdom was isolated from the rest of the Christian
world. It also suffered from internal upheavals; the old dynasty which
claimed descent from Solomon and the Queen of Sheba went into eclipse
for a time and the kingdom lost control of trade routes to ports on the vital
coastlands occupied by the nomadic Somalis who adopted Islam as their
religion. After this dark period the empire revived. The Solomonic dynas¬
ty was restored and by the beginning of the sixteenth century it was once
more a powerful state engaged in attempting to reassert its control over the
Muslim states along the coast. Just when it seemed at the high tide of
prosperity, however, a brilliant Somali leader, Mohammed Gran, relying
on the religious fervour of his supporters and a troop of Turkish mus¬
keteers, turned the tide and came near to conquering the whole of
Ethiopia. In despair the Ethiopian king turned to the Portuguese, who had
already established contact with the kingdom, for help against his Muslim
enemies. With their aid Mohammed Gran was killed and the Somalis
defeated, but disagreements on religious matters between the Roman
Catholics and the national Church of Ethiopia led to a number of upheav¬
als and much bitterness. Ultimately the Catholics were expelled and the
traditional Church re-established, but the monarchy had been weakened
and it was faced with a new threat in the form of the slow but steady
infiltration of the nomadic and warlike Oromo (Galla) from the south-east.
Princes and local chiefs struggled over succession to the throne and the
empire almost ceased to exist as an effective state. But the long tradition of
past history and the strength of the national Church kept the feeling of
unity alive and made it possible for a series of powerful rulers in the
nineteenth century to revive the kingdom, expand its empire and make it a
state to be reckoned with in world affairs.
The Maghreb has from very ancient times been the home of many
different Berber peoples. Their way of life depended largely on geog¬
raphical circumstances. Some who lived on the rich lands near the coast or
in well-watered parts of the mountains were settled agriculturalists; others
on the desert fringes or in the Sahara itself lived the life of nomadic
pastoralists. The basic pattern was only slightly modified when traders
from Phoenicia on the Syrian coast established the city of Carthage in
about 750 bc. An empire was gradually built up along the coastal strip
and more intensive methods of agriculture were introduced. Carthage had
imperial interests in southern Spain and in Sicily, where it engaged in a
long struggle with the Greek city-states. This ultimately brought it into
conflict with the rising power of Rome, and after the failure of Hannibal’s
heroic but futile invasion of Italy (218-203 bc) the power of Carthage was
destroyed, most of the Maghreb being taken into the Roman empire. A
long period of peace and prosperity followed. Agriculture was greatly

10
improved, irrigation works established and desert land brought into cul¬
tivation. The Berber peoples increasingly took to settled life and many
new cities were founded. To this day the ruins of mighty theatres and
other monuments standing in what is now virtually desert land testify to
the prosperity of the Roman period. The wealth of the Maghreb cities was
not due only to their agriculture, for even at that time caravans were
crossing the Sahara to West Africa and bringing back precious cargoes of
gold and ivory.
Under the Roman empire Christianity spread to the Maghreb, which
produced one of the most revered of Christian scholars, St Augustine of
Hippo. But by this time the Roman empire was already in the last stages of
decay and excessive taxation and resulting over-farming were wreaking
havoc on the Maghreb’s agricultural system. As the Roman empire in the
west collapsed the Maghreb was overrun in ad 429 by Germanic warriors
known as the Vandals. Their kingdom in turn was destroyed in ad 534 by
the forces of the Byzantine empire, which under Justinian was attempting
to recapture the lost western provinces. The Byzantine empire, faced with
mounting burdens of military expenditure, was oppressive and inefficient.
It failed to keep the loyalty of the Berber peoples or to establish itself
firmly in the country. In about ad 670 Uqba ibn Nafi began the long
series of campaigns which culminated in the Arab conquest of the country.
The decadent Byzantine administration offered little resistance but the
Berbers held out desperately until ad 709. Thereafter they joined with
their conquerors and participated in the Muslim conquests of Spain and
Sicily.
The Arab conquest brought with it a major revolution through the
introduction of Islam, which entirely replaced Christianity. Under the
new religion the Maghreb went through a long series of political changes.
Successive attempts were made to bring the whole area under unified
political control together with Muslim Spain, and repeatedly they broke
down, giving rise to kingdoms roughly corresponding to the present
division into Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The city life of the Roman
period continued to flourish and the Maghreb enjoyed a high level of
cultural development in the early Muslim period.
The most important development between the Arab conquest and the
nineteenth century, however, was the migration into the area of nomadic
Beduin Arab peoples generally known as the Banu Hilal and the Banu
Sulaym. Their invasion began in the second half of the eleventh century.
They infiltrated on to the cultivated land like a swarm of locusts and
gradually spread westward from Tunisia to Morocco. The rulers often
ignored or even encouraged this invasion for they saw in the newcomers
valuable irregular troops who would be pleased to fight under any banner

11
in return for land on which to settle. As the nomads spread out, their
demands and the over-grazing of their animals tended to drive the settled
cultivators off the land. Much agricultural land reverted to desert condi¬
tions. Towns diminished or were abandoned altogether and power shifted
nearer to the coast where trade with the outside world still provided a
measure of prosperity. All over the fertile lands of the Maghreb agricul¬
ture decayed and the intensive techniques of the past gave way to mixed
farming of a very poor type. At the same time the coming of the Beduin
peoples brought considerable numbers of true Arabs into the Maghreb
where previously they had been a tiny minority. Through intermarriage a
high proportion of the Berbers were assimilated to the Arabs and the
Arabic language became the normal everyday tongue for most of the
population, except in mountainous areas such as the Atlas range in Moroc¬
co and the Kabylie mountains of Algeria, where the Berbers maintained
their old language and culture together with a fierce spirit of independ¬
ence.
As Muslim Spain receded before the progress of the Christian recon¬
quest, the weakened Maghreb states suffered from repeated invasions
from across the Straits of Gibraltar. In the fifteenth century Portuguese
and Spanish strongholds were established on the coast though there was
little attempt at outright conquest of the whole country. This Christian
invasion in turn fired the spirit of national and religious resistance. As the
states proved ineffective in fighting the infidels, religious organizations
known as the sufi brotherhoods took over leadership of resistance. In
Algeria and Tunisia the Turks were invited to come to the aid of their
fellow Muslims and in the sixteenth century seized control of these coun¬
tries, which became incorporated in the Ottoman empire.
In Morocco a new and vital dynasty, the Saadian, came to power and the
Portuguese were drastically defeated at the Battle of the Three Kings in
1578. The Moroccan ruler died of natural causes at the beginning of the
battle and his brother succeeded to the throne and the glory with the title
of El Mansur (‘the victorious’)- He ruled from 1578 to 1603. He restored
the power of the state in Morocco and then in 1591, hoping to increase his
revenues in order to meet the expenses of his large army, he sent an
expedition on a fantastic march across the Sahara to seize the empire of
Songhai, whence caravans brought gold to Morocco. The expedition
succeeded in destroying the greatest of the black kingdoms of West Africa
but it could not establish an effective administration to succeed it. El
Mansur was temporarily enriched by the gold looted from Songhai cities
but in the long term the trade of his kingdom was damaged. After El
Mansur’s death, his sons fought for the crown and Morocco fell into chaos
again until after 1660 when a new dynasty, the Alawite, established itself.

12
Under the energetic ruler Mawlay Ismail (1672-1727), who based his
power on a large army of black slaves from the Niger area, the kingdom
once more knew unity and strong government, but after his death it split
up -again and, although the dynasty survived, by the beginning of the
nineteenth century it effectively controlled only a part of the country.
In the rest of the Maghreb, Turkish administration declined, as it did in
the whole Ottoman empire. In Algeria the finances and prosperity of the
state were heavily dependent on the profits of war at sea against the
shipping of Christian powers. This not only led to a lack of attention to the
administration and development of the hinterland, parts of which, like the
Kabylie mountain area, were never brought under effective control, but
also excited the hostile attention of European powers and the United
States. By the nineteenth century all the Maghreb states were in a weak
position for they had not been able to keep pace with the progress of
western European countries. But where religion formed the basis of life,
community of religion between the rulers and the people, even when the
rulers were foreigners, assured them of a considerable measure of loyalty
in the face of any infidel power.

The peoples of Africa south of the Sahara

The black peoples of Negro physical type who now occupy practically the
whole of Africa south of the Sahara were once confined to a relatively small
part of it. Their early place of origin and the course of their migrations
have been much debated but no definite conclusions have been drawn.
Nevertheless, it seems fairly certain that at one time they were settled
along the Sudanic belt to the south of the Sahara and for a considerable
way into the Sahara itself at a time when it was more suitable for human
habitation. South of this the whole of the rest of the continent was
occupied by other peoples who are now known mainly by discoveries of
their stone implements, cave paintings, and occasional skeletons.
Throughout most of East, Central and Southern Africa the early inhabi¬
tants probably belonged to a people related to the San (or Bushmen) who
still survive in parts of Southern Africa. They lived by hunting and
gathering wild fruits and tubers. In part of East Africa skeletons and other
remains suggest at one time the people there may have been similar to
those of North Africa and the lower Nile valley, and in Zaire and parts of
the West African forestlands the earliest inhabitants may have been related
to the pygmies who still live in the forests of Zaire.
In course of time the peoples of Negro physical type living in the eastern
part of the Sudanic belt around the upper Nile valley tended to diverge

13
 i

culturally from the West African group. Their languages developed a very
different pattern and their way of life became nomadic and pastoral, based
on cattle. They probably also mixed to a considerable extent with the
peoples of the Nile valley. The blacks of West Africa, where higher
rainfall and the fertile lands of the inland delta of the Niger encouraged a
sedentary way of life, became mainly agriculturalists, though there is a
major exception in the case of the Fulani, who probably mixed extensively
with Berber-speaking groups such as the nomadic Tuareg of the desert.
The two main sections of the Negro peoples were never entirely separate;
migrations took place in both directions and some of the peoples around
Lake Chad, for example, are thought to have come from further east.
The agricultural Negroes of West Africa were naturally able to develop
much larger and more dense populations than those who relied exclusively
on cattle-keeping. It is probable that they domesticated crops of their own
from wild plants, and they also began to grow crops domesticated else¬
where. Then at a period in the remote past which is still unknown, they
began to expand very rapidly. This may have been the result of the
introduction of techniques for producing and using iron which made it
possible to clear the bush more easily, and perhaps also of the introduction
of new crops from Asia. Not only did they colonize the great forest areas of
West Africa itself but one branch of them spread out of West Africa
altogether and gradually spread over almost the whole of the continent
south of the Sahara, giving rise to the great family of Bantu-speaking
peoples.
These peoples have developed many different ways of life and hundreds
of different languages, but they are called by a single name because,
although the speakers of one language cannot understand the others, a
study of the languages shows that they are related to one another and must
have developed from a common origin. Recent research has shown that
these Bantu languages are related to the main language group of West
Africa and probably developed out of one of its languages.
As the Bantu-speaking peoples advanced they gradually absorbed or
expelled the previous inhabitants. In East Africa they came in contact with
the cattle-keeping peoples known as the Nilotes and Southern Nilotes.
The two groups, Bantu and Nilotes, have commonly been hostile to one
another but they have also influenced each other. It may be that it was
from contact with the Nilotes that some Bantu-speaking groups acquired
the habit of cattle-keeping which they carried with them on their migra¬
tions to the south. The expansion of the Bantu-speakers over more than
half the surface of Africa was a slow and gradual process taking hundreds
of years. Though they began to enter Central Africa in the first few
centuries ad, Bantu colonization of Southern Africa was not complete by

14
the nineteenth century. The southern tip of the subcontinent and the area
now known as Namibia still provided a home for the earlier peoples who
elsewhere had disappeared. Indeed the San and their relatives, the Khoi
(or Hottentots), still form a significant element in the population of
modern Botswana and Namibia, and it is only comparatively recently that
Bantu-speakers began to settle in significant numbers in the neighbour¬
hood of Cape Town.
For thousands of years the Bantu-speaking peoples have been engaged
in a tremendous enterprise which even to this day is not fully complete.
They have had the task of opening up most of sub-Saharan Africa to
settled agriculture. They are the true pioneers of Africa. When in addition
it is remembered that millions of Africans, including Bantu-speakers,
were carried across the sea to the Americas and now form the vast majority
of the population of the West Indies as well as a significant part of the
population of both the American continents, the scale of their expansion
can be realized. Inevitably this colossal colonizing effort absorbed much of
their energies.
The development of a complex material civilization depends on the
growth of large towns and the development of specialization and division
of labour. These in turn require a relatively dense population with a
well-established agricultural system. Over much of Africa these conditions
were lacking. Nature had still to be tamed or natural conditions precluded
dense settlement. Furthermore, for geographical reasons, much of the
continent was isolated from the contact with other peoples and cultures
which is always the greatest stimulus to the development of new ideas and
techniques. Thus over much of the continent the life of the average man
has remained that of the simple peasant, tilling the land with the simplest
of tools, living in a humble hut built of mud and thatched with grass or
leaves, and recognizing a political order no wider than that of his clan. But
this is not the whole story. Wherever conditions were favourable Africans
abundantly proved their ability for constructing complex political systems
and mastering sophisticated techniques.
The upper Nile valley was one of these areas, where as we have seen (p.
19) the kingdom of Kush, in spite of its isolation, preserved and modified
the heritage of Egyptian civilization for hundreds of years before being
replaced by the Christian kingdoms of Nubia and later by the Funj
sultanate. Meroe, as the huge heaps of slag found around the site of the
ancient city show, was a great centre of iron-working and may have been
the main centre from which knowledge of the technique spread to other
African peoples.
The Sudanic belt of West Africa was particularly favourable to the
development of complex civilization. The fertility of the upper Niger area

15
 I

and modern northern Nigeria encouraged the growth of a relatively dense

agricultural population, well placed to trade local products and those of
the forest belt for those of North Africa, using the caravan routes across
the desert. In particular the presence of gold deposits in the western parts
of the savanna and the adjacent forest was a powerful stimulus to trade.
The powerful empire of Ghana, essentially a trading state, with its capital
on the fringe of the Sahara, flourished from the eighth century ad until at
least the latter half of the eleventh, and was still a force to be reckoned
with in the twelfth century. In the eleventh century Ghana came into
contact with the Almoravids, a movement of religious reform in Islam
among the Tuareg of the western Sahara under the inspiration of a holy
man who settled on the Senegal river. In addition to their contact with
Ghana - which has often been interpreted as a conquest of that state - the
Almoravids conquered most of the Maghreb and Spain. The interpreta¬
tion which sees Ghana as having been attacked and destroyed by the
Almoravids in 1076 needs, however, to be treated with caution, and not
only because of the clear evidence of Ghana’s importance in the twelfth
century. Positive evidence of an Almoravid conquest is scanty and, in¬
deed, what evidence there is suggests co-operation between the Almor¬
avids and Ghana as much as conflict.
By the beginning of the thirteenth century Ghana had virtually dis¬
appeared, perhaps as much because of environmental degradation of its
always marginal desert-side lands as because of military defeat. The
vacuum left was filled by the rise of a new empire, the kingdom of Mali,
based on the agriculture of the upper Niger valley but also actively
engaged in the trans-Saharan trade. This kingdom became officially Mus¬
lim under the rule of its best-known king, Mansa Musa (1312-37) who
made a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 and created a sensation in Cairo by his
immense wealth and lavish gifts of gold. Under the Mali empire West
African towns like Timbuktu and Jenne became important centres of
Islamic learning and scholarship and missionary activity. Internal disputes
gradually weakened the Mali empire and nomadic Tuareg from the desert
and hostile neighbours from the south began to raid its provinces. When it
finally crumbled in the fifteenth century its place was taken by the
Songhai empire, which had its base in what had once been the easternmost
province of Mali. Songhai was the largest of the West African Sudanic
empires. It was a great Islamic centre and exercised a wide influence,
particularly on the Hausa towns of modern northern Nigeria which were
growing into important centres of trade and civilization. It was destroyed
in the sixteenth century by the Spanish mercenaries of El Mansur, the
king of Morocco, who sent his forces across the desert to capture the
sources of the rich gold trade. The Moroccan army broke up the Songhai

16
empire but failed to provide a stable alternative government. New king¬
doms like the Bambara states of Segu and Kaarta arose, but the collapse of
the old order was a blow for the cause of Islam in West Africa. The
religion did not die out and a community of learned men still survived
who kept alive the tradition of scholarship and contact with the holy places
of Arabia, but they often found themselves living under rulers who
practised traditional religion or were only partly Islamized, who did not
respect Islamic law but feared the political power of the Muslim holy men.
To the east of Songhai and the Hausa city states, a powerful kingdom
developed in Kanem, north-east of Lake Chad, which traded in slaves and
ivory with Tripoli in modern Libya. The precise data of the kingdom’s
foundation is not known but it was possibly between ad 700 and 800. The
conversion of one of the early rulers to Islam provoked a split in the ruling
family, and prolonged hostilities between the two sections led the royal
family to flee south into Borno (Bornu) in 1384. The Kanem-Borno
kingdom, thanks to the energy of some of its rulers, for example Mai Idris
Alooma (1571-1603), was able to conquer many of the earlier inhabitants
of the Borno area and incorporate them permanently into itself. At its high
point it controlled the Fezzan, now a province of Libya, and in spite of the
attacks of many enemies it was still powerful in the nineteenth century and
survives as an important element in northern Nigeria today. Further east
still the states of Bagirmi, Wadai and Darfur stretched out to meet the
Funj sultanate of the Nile valley.
Though the Sudanic belt was particularly favourable for the develop¬
ment of complex societies it did not have a monopoly. The forest and its
fringes in West Africa also saw the rise of powerful kingdoms. Amongst
the most remarkable of these was the civilization of the Yoruba peoples in
what is now western Nigeria. Its ancient centre was the town of Ife, with
its magnificent artistic tradition of bronze casting and modelling in terra
cotta, its stone carvings and monoliths and the potsherd floors of its tightly
packed mud houses. Under its cultural influence a whole series of city-
states grew up, some in the heart of the forest, others well to the north of
it, each ruled by a king, who possessed some of the attributes of divinity,
and a complex hierarchy of chiefs.
During the fourteenth century one of these city-states, Oyo, near the
northern limits of Yoruba settlement, became an important military power
and built up a supremacy over other towns which extended outside the
limits of modern Nigeria to what is now the modern state of Benin
(formerly Dahomey). One of the cities which experienced the influence of
Ife was Benin amongst the Edo people. It in turn became a powerful
empire with a highly developed bronze casting tradition based on that of
Ife, and exercised influence over a wide area. It was already a powerful

17
state when Portuguese travellers arrived there in 1485 and is today a
Nigerian state capital.
Another kingdom whose history is closely bound up with that of the
Yoruba is Dahomey. It emerged as a powerful state centred on Abomey in
the eighteenth century when Agaja Trudo conquered the small city-states
of the Aja people and brought them under unified control (1724—30).
Dahomey developed a highly complex administrative system including a
method of maintaining an accurate population census. It was dominated
by Oyo throughout most of the eighteenth century, but strengthened itself
through the slave trade with Europeans. In the nineteenth century it was
able to assert its dependence and engaged in a series of ferocious wars
against the Yoruba.
Further west the powerful kingdom of Asante was founded in the late
seventeenth century by Osei Tutu, who bound a number of small Akan
states together in a federation under the paramountcy of the Asantehene.
The association was given permanence by the religious reverence attached
to the Golden Stool, the symbol of Asante unity, and by the nature of the
military system. Originally created as a measure of self-defence, the
Asante empire soon became the dominant power in the area of modern
Ghana. It was at its height in the early years of the nineteenth century.
In addition to these particularly powerful states there were many others
which though less extensive showed a high degree of administrative com¬
plexity and sophistication: the Fante states of the coast of modern Ghana,
the city-states of the Niger delta area, the rich commercial cities of
Hausaland, the mysterious kingdom of the Kwararafa on the Benue,
which suddenly expanded vigorously in the seventeenth century and then
rapidly declined; and the kingdom of the Nupe with its complicated
political system and its tradition of handicrafts.
Though the peoples with large-scale political structures have naturally
tended to receive the greatest attention from the historians it should not be
thought that the culture and skills of those whose political life was orga¬
nized around clan villages was necessarily inferior. Peoples like the Igbo
(Ibo) of modern Nigeria may not have built large kingdoms, but they
produced bronzeworks of great beauty such as those found at Igbo Ukwu.

Bronze from Igbo Ukwu in the form of a

shell surmounted by a leopard, possibly a
ritual drinking vessel

18
 Further south, down the western coast of Africa, the land around the
southern banks of the Zaire river, where the forest gives way to savanna,
was the centre of a complex and powerful kingdom which attracted the
attention of the early Portuguese travellers. The Portuguese, who made
contact with the kingdom in 1483, hoped to convert the king and people to
Christianity and to build up the Kongo kingdom as a powerful Christian
ally. Nzinga Nkuwu, who took the name Afonso I, the most famous of the
Kongo kings (1506-40), gave himself wholeheartedly to the project but
the Portuguese expected to be reimbursed for their expenses in slaves, the
only commodity the Kongo had to sell which could command a large
market. Gradually the slave trade corrupted the fabric of the kingdom and
the Portuguese connection became a curse rather than a blessing. By the
eighteenth century the kingdom had almost ceased to exist as an effective
political system, though its memory persists amongst the Bakongo people
of modern Zaire, Congo and Angola. Further into the interior of Zaire, the
Luba people developed a powerful state, possibly as early as ad 1500,
which had a far-reaching influence and stimulated the development of
other political systems. Amongst these was the powerful kingdom of the
Lunda of Katanga under their king, the Mwata Yamvo. This state bene¬
fited from trade with the Portuguese. It was at its height in the eighteenth
century when one of its armies under a general called Kazembe established
a Lunda kingdom on the Luapula river in modern Zambia. Also in the
Zaire area was the Kuba kingdom with its tradition of beautiful wood
carving.
The East African coastline was visited by ships trading in the Indian
Ocean from very remote times. An account written in the first century ad
mentions that there was a large port, possibly on the Tanzanian coast,
called Rhapta, where Arab merchants settled and intermarried with the
African population. Later, Persian and Arab refugees from political
persecution settled on the East African coast and a chain of towns grew up
stretching from Mogadishu in modern Somalia to Sofala in Mozambique.
The population of these towns was a mixture of Arabs and Bantu-
speakers, There the Swahili language was developed, a basically Bantu
tongue with strong Arabic influences which now forms a common lan¬
guage in much of East Africa and is widely spoken in Zaire also. The East
African coastal cities lived largely by trading in ivory and other African
commodities. Sofala also exported considerable quantities of gold and iron
which was considered to be of the highest quality for making sword
blades. These goods were taken to India and China by Arab ships which in
return imported Chinese porcelain and Indian and Chinese cloths. The
Chinese themselves made two voyages to the East African coast, but the
direct trade contact was not maintained. Diplomatic relations survived,

19
 I

however, and early in the fifteenth century the ruler of Malindi sent a
giraffe as a present to the Chinese emperor. In the towns the richer
citizens enjoyed a high standard of living and were dressed in the most
expensive cloths of the East. Kilwa boasted neat streets of stone houses
and a large mosque. Some towns minted their own coins and Islamic
scholarship was eagerly pursued. The arrival of the Portuguese in the
fifteenth century brought the golden age of the East African cities to an
end. The Portuguese, inspired by a mixture of greed and religious enthu¬
siasm, brutally pillaged the cities and largely destroyed their trade. There¬
after they mouldered on, a shadow of their former glory, until the

Part of the Great Mosque at Kilwa, built in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries

20
nineteenth century when the coming of the Omani ruler, Sayyid Said, to
Zanzibar infused new life into the old trading system.
In the interior, the fertile area of the inter-lacustrine region was a
natural centre of African civilization. Legends speak of a mysterious
people called the Bachwezi and an ancient kingdom of Kitwara. Whatever
the truth of those legends may be, the discovery of ancient earthworks
shows that powerful states existed there in remote times. In more recent
periods the area saw the rise of a series of related kingdoms, Bunyoro,
Nkore, Buganda, Toro, and Busoga.
Bunyoro, one of the oldest, was for long the most powerful, but during
the eighteenth century the newer state of Buganda with its highly central¬
ized administrative system and efficient military force began to get the
upper hand. Further south in the mountainous areas around Lake Kivu
there were the two powerful kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi, each
ruled by an aristocracy of cattle keepers, probably of Nilotic descent.
The area south of Lake Tanganyika and north of the Zambezi river
(now occupied by the republics of Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique) is
one of the great crossroads in African history.
The first Bantu-speakers probably arrived there soon after the begin¬
ning of the Christian era and thereafter successive groups of immigrants
came into the country, steadily driving out or absorbing the earlier popula¬
tion of ‘bushmen’ and pygmies. These first waves of Bantu settlement
seem to have come from the north and the early Bantu-speaking settlers
brought with them the art of cattle-keeping which they took on their
further migrations across the Zambezi into what are now Zimbabwe and
South Africa.
Long after these immigrants from the north another chain of migrants
began to move into the area, this time from the west. The centre of this
movement seems to have been the area occupied by the Luba and Lunda
peoples on the Shaba plateau of Zaire, and its cause may have been the
political upheavals in those two kingdoms which have been mentioned
earlier. Some of the earliest of these immigrants from the west were the
Yao and Makua and the Chewa and other related peoples who are known
as the Malawi or Maravi. The present Republic of Malawi is named after
them. They established a network of interrelated kingdoms in modern
Malawi and the eastern part of modern Zambia. These kingdoms were in
contact with the Portuguese from the sixteenth century. In the late seven¬
teenth and eighteenth centuries still further migrations from the Luba-
Lunda area took place. These included the Bisa and the Bemba who built
up a powerful kingdom around Lake Bangweulu. The establishment of
the Lunda kingdom of Kazembe on the Luapula river by one of the
generals of the Lunda king, Mwata Yamvo, in the eighteenth century was

21
 '

Great Zimbabwe: the solid drystone ‘conical tower’ built within the ‘elliptical building’

22
one of the latest of these migrations. It is also probable that a migratory
group from the Luba-Lunda area was responsible for building up the
powerful kingdom of Lozi on the flood plain of the upper Zambezi.
These migratory groups from the west brought with them their custom
of matrilineal descent and a predominantly agricultural culture. They
largely overlaid the previous migrations from the north, though some
peoples who belonged to the earlier group survived and maintained their
cultural identity. It is because of the west to east migrations that there has
come to be a great belt of matrilineal agricultural peoples known as the
Central Bantu separating the patrilineal cattle-keeping peoples of East
Africa from the patrilineal cattle-keepers of South Africa who probably
originated from them.
South of the Zambezi in what is now the Republic of Zimbabwe there
arose one of the most extensive and interesting African kingdoms. This
was the empire of Mwene Mutapa, whose rulers built elaborate stone
buildings at Zimbabwe and many other sites. Its origin is lost in obscurity
but it was certainly flourishing by ad 950 when the Arab traveller, al
Masudi, visited East Africa. Its prosperity was based on the export of gold
and other minerals from innumerable small diggings which were sold to
Arab traders at Sofala. When the Portuguese seized Sofala from the Arabs
they made contact with the empire and established markets at Sena and
Tete on the Zambezi as well as at other points in the kingdom. Portuguese
traders took advantage of quarrels in the ruling family to gain concessions
of land for themselves and to bring the king under their control. The
kingdom was weakened to the verge of collapse, but in the late seven¬
teenth and early eighteenth centuries a new group, which had once been
tributary to the Mwene Mutapa, made its appearance. This was the Rozvi
under a dynasty of rulers called Changamire. The Rozvi defeated the
Portuguese and though they did not expel them altogether they confined
their occupation to Sena and Tete and a few points on the coast. Under the
Rozvi the old stone-building culture flourished again and in the eight¬
eenth century the buildings at Zimbabwe were enlarged to the impressive
size of the ruins which now survive. At the beginning of the nineteenth
century Mwene Mutapa under its new rulers appeared as strong as ever.

External influences on Africa before 1800:

Islam and the Arabs

The most important external influence on Africa before the nineteenth

century was that of the Arabs and Islam, and it may be worth pausing for a
moment to examine some of the most striking characteristics of a cultural

23
 I

system which has vitally influenced the life of a very large part of the
continent.
The Holy Prophet Muhammad was born in about ad 570 and brought
up in Mecca, a trading city on an important caravan route through
Arabia. He had visions in which he believed that he received direct
messages from God (Allah) through the Angel Gabriel. These divine
messages were written down without modification and make up the Quran
(Koran). This holy book is therefore for all Muslims the direct word of
God, recorded in the original Arabic words used in the Revelation. It
contains injunctions to believe in the unity of God and the duty of prayer,
but also many commands of a moral or even legal nature. As Muhammad
became well known and began to gather a body of disciples around him he
became unpopular in his native city where it was believed that his attacks
on idol-worship would damage the trade derived from pilgrims who
visited the pagan shrines of the city. In ad 662 he and his followers fled
on what is called the Hijra (‘exodus’) to the neighbouring city of Medina
and a separate religious community was constituted under the authority of
the Prophet. In this community there was naturally no distinction between
the faith and society, or between civil and religious laws. The whole
society was a religious body, its ruler was the Prophet of God, and its
whole life was dedicated to God. In 630 Muhammad and his followers
conquered Mecca and under his successors the Islamic community en¬
gaged in a spectacular career of conquest and expansion. But because of its
early history the Muslim community has always regarded itself in theory
as a single religious body in which religious belief and conformity to
religious law is the qualification for membership. Other religious bodies
which believed in a single God and had written scriptures were recognized
be the Prophet. He laid down that they should be well treated, protected
and left free to practise their religion, but they could never become part of
the Islamic community itself. They were not supposed to participate in
military service in Islamic countries or to take part in affairs of state, but
they paid a special tax, the jizya, in return for protection.
Within the Muslim community itself there was no distinction in theory
between religious and civil affairs. The words of the Quran, the practice of
the Prophet and the way of life of the early community as handed down by
tradition constituted a basic law, the sharia, which every Muslim, whether
ruler or commoner, was bound to respect. This law was administered by
learned men known as qadis. The Prophet himself and the caliphs or
deputies who succeeded him were both political and religious heads of the
community they governed, and they led the people in prayer. There was
never a formal hierarchy of priests similar to that of the Roman Catholics;
any good Muslim could lead prayer in the mosques. In practice, however,

24
this duty was generally the prerogative of learned men known as imams
who, together with the qadis, made up the class of ulema or men of
learning, one of the most influential bodies in any Islamic society. As the
Arab conquests gave them control of Persia, most of the lands of the
eastern Roman empire, Egypt and North Africa, they became heirs to the
greatest civilization in the world of the time. For centuries they were far in
advance of western Europe and preserved and expanded the wisdom they
inherited from others. Philosophy, poetry, mathematics, medicine,
architecture and many other arts were cultivated while education was
developed to a high level in the madrasas, as Muslim universities were
called, with their magnificent libraries. For centuries scholars laboured on
codifying the sharia law and eventually four great schools, Hanbalite,
Malikite, Shafiite, and Hanafite emerged. They differ slightly in inter¬
pretation but recognize one another as valid.
In spite of the vast area covered by the Arab conquests the Islamic
community has never ceased to feel itself a single body, and this has been
reinforced by the spread of Arabic as the universal language of learning
and often of everyday speech throughout the Muslim world, by the
custom of facing towards Mecca during prayers, and by the duty which
every good Muslim feels of making a pilgrimage (hajj) to the Holy Places if
he can possibly afford it. Every year this brings Muslims from the most
remote parts to Mecca and Medina, and powerfully emphasizes the unity
of the religious community.
At first in practice, and always in theory, the whole Islamic community
had one head, the caliph or deputy of the Prophet, but early in the history
of Islam disagreement occurred about the qualifications for rulership. Ali,
the son-in-law of the Prophet, became the fourth caliph in 656, but he was
challenged by Muawiya, who used the strength of the army in Syria to
secure his overthrow and founded the Umayyad dynasty of caliphs in 661.
This led to a split between those who believed that the only person entitled
to lead the Islamic community must be a member of the family of the
Prophet and the direct descendant of Ali and Fatima, the Prophet’s
daughter (they are called Shi’ites), and those who felt that the choice of a
leader depended on the will of the community (these are the Sunni). As
the direct line of descendants from Ali was broken, some Shi’ites de¬
veloped the theory that the last true caliph had disappeared and would
come back to earth in the fullness of time as the saviour or Mahdi. The
Mahdi would head the whole Muslim body and restore the faith to
perfection, a variant of belief in a Mahdi which differs from its recurrent
appearance among Sunni Muslims. Generally the Sunni group were politi¬
cally more successful than the Shi’ites, but Shi’ite dynasties arose from
time to time in Africa as well as elsewhere. Shi’ism is still dominant in Iran

25
 $

and in other parts of the world there are powerful Shi’ite groups such as
the Ismailis, who have many adherents in East Africa.
Although all Muslims believed that there ought to be one head of the
whole community, political unity did not survive after ad 750. Quarrels
over who should be the true caliph led to the rise of separate caliphates.
The most important caliphs, those in Baghdad, fell under the control of
the commanders of their Turkish bodyguards who took the title of sultan,
reducing the caliphs to mere figureheads.
The slave soldiery who ruled Egypt under the name of Mamluks from
1259 to 1517, maintained a nominal caliph in Cairo, but when Egypt fell to
the forces of the Ottoman Turks in 1517 the authority of the caliph was
taken over by the Turkish sultan. Nevertheless the belief in unity con¬
tinued, and is inseparable from the religious beliefs of Islam. What is
more, throughout the Muslim world a fairly uniform pattern of govern¬
ment emerged. Every community was governed by a single head who
might be called caliph if he believed that he was entitled to be the supreme
head of all Muslims, otherwise sultan if he was very powerful, or alterna¬
tively amir (emir). Amir simply means commander and one of the titles of
the caliph is amir al-muminin (Commander of the Faithful). Under the
head there was always a chief minister known as wazir, and judges called
qadis who administered the sharia. All rulers in theory recognized this as
the highest law, but in practice they also applied a good deal of executive
law, administered through the wazirs rather than the qadis, concerning
matters not covered by the sharia. Revolutions have been common in the
Islamic world, but until very recent times they never took the form of
trying to replace this type of government by some other system such as
representative democracy, but simply of attempts to purify the system or
to place someone who was believed to be the rightful ruler on the throne.
Claims to descent from the Prophet have also often formed the basis of
claims of political authority. (Such people are called shanfs or sayyids.)
From time to time also people have appeared in various parts of the
Islamic world claiming to be the Mahdi and therefore rightful rulers of the
whole Muslim world.
One of the most important forms of organization in the Islamic world is
that of the sufi brotherhoods. Islam is very much a written religion with
hard and fast doctrines and set duties. Some people found the mere
conformity to the religious commands of their faith too cold and formal.
They formed associations dedicated to the contemplation of God and the
attempt to enter into a mystic sense of unity with him. Though they
conformed to the requirements of prayer and other duties they laid more
emphasis on the emotional side of religion, the love of God rather than
formal obedience to his commands and correctness of belief. These

26
brotherhoods appealed particularly to the less educated who could not
read for themselves, and the brotherhoods became the most powerful
missionary organization in Islam. Their number is very large. Some run
right through the Muslim world; others are local. Most of them have a
strong sense of community and often revere their founders as saints.
Inevitably the brotherhoods have often wielded political power and be¬
cause of the closeness within their ranks they are often jealous or even
hostile to one another and to all powers outside themselves. It sometimes
happened that when people belonging to different societies became con¬
verted to Islam they joined different brotherhoods and kept up their
feuds.
The influence of Islam in Africa has been, and is, enormous. After the
Arab conquest of Egypt in ad 640 that country became overwhelmingly
Muslim, though a substantial Coptic Christian community survives. Ara¬
bic became the language of daily life as well as of learning, and Islamic law
set the pattern of existence. From Egypt Islam travelled up the Nile and
became the religion of the Funj sultanate in the northern part of the

The Great Mosque at Jenne in Mali

27
 I

present Sudan. In the Maghreb also Islam became dominant after the
Arab conquest, and from there it was carried along the caravan routes
across the Sahara to establish itself in the states of the Sudanic belt. From
there in turn it has been and still is being carried south into the forest
lands. Today it is estimated that roughly 45 per cent of the population of
Nigeria, which has far more people than any other West African state, is
Muslim. In East Africa also Islam was brought by Arab traders and
refugees to the coastal city-states. It established itself Firmly there and
spread inland along the caravan routes. In the nineteenth century Muslim
communities had begun to arise as far inland as the inter-lacustrine region.

External influences on Africa before 1800: Europeans

In comparison with the effects of the Arab invasions and the coming of
Islam, European contacts were much less significant. Only at the southern
end of the continent could they be said to have had results for the life of
African peoples in any way like those of Islam.
Apart from the northern coastline of Africa, which was always in
contact with European states across the Mediterranean, European contact
with Africa began with the voyages of the Portuguese in the Fifteenth
century. They were inspired by a mixture of economic, military and
religious motives. The Portuguese wanted first to discover a route of their
own to the gold of West Africa which did not pass through the hands of
their traditional enemies, the Muslims of the Maghreb. Later they sought
a direct sea route to India and its rich trade. They also hoped to Find in
Africa the legendary Christian king known as Prester John who they felt
would prove an invaluable ally and enable them to attack the Muslims
from the rear. They also sought to convert Africans to Christianity and to
develop alliances with African kingdoms which would give them trade
advantages and possibly military assistance. Their voyages brought them
First to West Africa in 1482 when they established a fort on the coast of
modern Ghana called Sao Jorge da Mina (now known as Elmina castle).
There they traded for gold and succeeded in diverting part of the supplies
from the northern route. They also made contact with the empire of Benin
and colonized the islands of Sao Tome and Principe. Their attempts at
evangelization were far from successful, and increasingly they turned their
attention to the slave trade.
Their policy of building up Christian allies in Africa was centred on the
Kongo kingdom but as we have seen the plan was compromised by
dependence on the slave trade and ended in collapse. In neighbouring
Angola the Portuguese established a more permanent settlement after

28
1576. This was essentially a colony of slave traders who used local agents
to maintain the supply of human beings to be loaded on the ships for
transport across the sea to Brazil. Though the capital of the settlement,
Luanda, was rich enough to be described in the eighteenth century as
Lisbon in Africa, its prosperity rested on a very slender basis and the
settlement had little direct effect on development inland apart from en¬
couraging wars and supplying arms which ambitious rulers could use to
strengthen and expand their kingdoms.
When they rounded the Cape of Good Hope and reached the East
African coast the Portuguese found the flourishing Muslim trading cities.
The Portuguese intrusion, however, had disastrous results on their
prosperity and threw the old trading system into a long period of decline
and decay. Only in Mozambique did the Portuguese acquire a permanent
foothold. They were attracted by the gold trade of the Mwene Mutapa
empire and succeeded in establishing trading posts within the heart of the
kingdom. By adapting themselves to African conditions the local Portu¬
guese acquired a great deal of influence in the empire and virtually
brought the king of Mwene Mutapa under their control. But their num¬
bers were always very small indeed and their behaviour was often such as
to make them very unpopular. With the rise of the Rozvi in the late
seventeenth century their wide influence and landholdings disappeared
and by the beginning of the nineteenth century Portuguese influence in
Mozambique hardly extended beyond gunshot range from their forts.
In addition to establishing two small white communities in Angola and
Mozambique the Portuguese contributed in two ways to African develop¬
ment. In the first place they were responsible for introducing a whole
range of new crops which had their natural home in South America. These
included cassava (manioc), maize, groundnuts and tobacco. Some of
these, particularly cassava and maize, have been of tremendous import¬
ance as they have come to form the staple diet of large sections of the
African population, partially replacing the indigenous millets and yams.
The effect which this has had on the development of Africa can only be
guessed at, but it must be enormous. The second way in which the
Portuguese influenced Africa was through the introduction of the Atlantic
slave trade.
There had always been a slave trade with the Arabs in parts of Africa,
and in North Africa European slaves were bought and sold, but the trade
across the Atlantic was to eclipse in scale anything of the kind that had
happened before. At first the Portuguese were mainly interested in the
gold trade but they always wanted slaves to sell in Portugal where there
was a great shortage of labour. In time the African slaves formed about 5
per cent of the population of Portugal. But the slave trade only became

29
 I

really massive with the development of sugar planting on Sao Tome and its
later transference to Brazil and the West Indies. This created an almost
unlimited demand for labour. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the Danes, the
French and the British transported millions of Africans across the Atlan¬
tic. The Portuguese mainly traded from Angola though in the eighteenth
century they revived their West African trade from the coast of modern
Benin. The other nations traded mainly from West Africa and there the
British succeeded in controlling the major portion.
The trans-Atlantic slave trade is one of the greatest crimes in all human
history whether we think of the personal sufferings of the captives, their
treatment on board ship, the degradation and humiliation of the life to
which they were doomed or the misery, loss of life and brutalization which
it brought to the African communities from which the slaves were taken.
Undoubtedly the colossal business in human beings had terrible and
widespread effects on the development of African societies, making war¬
fare profitable, supplying the firearms which made it more deadly, en¬
couraging militarism and a callous attitude to the value and dignity of
human life.
Nevertheless it should not be imagined that the slave trade completely
dominated the development of African societies. On the contrary, the
period of the slave trade was one in which some of the most important and
impressive African kingdoms developed or reached their high point and a
study of their history shows that the slave trade in many cases played a
relatively minor part in their lives. Throughout most of Africa south of the
Sahara, therefore, pre-nineteenth-century European contacts were
relatively superficial. The Europeans were confined to a few forts along
the coast; the indirect effects of the slave trade may have been great but
the direct impact of European culture was minimal.
An exception to this is found in modern South Africa where the Dutch
East India Company established a small colony at the Cape of Good Hope
to provide fresh vegetables for its ships travelling to India. In the healthy
climate this tiny white community began to expand vigorously. As it did
so it took away the land of the aboriginal San and Khoi, fighting and
largely destroying the San and turning the Khoi into labourers on white
farms. By the nineteenth century this community, still growing rapidly,
was in contact with the advance guard of the Bantu-speakers who were
pushing steadily southward.

The changed situation in the nineteenth century

Up to the nineteenth century the main direct outside influence on African

societies was that of Islam, and over the greater part of the continent

30
African peoples continued to evolve their own cultural systems without
much interference or stimulus from outside the continent. During the
nineteenth century, however, Africa underwent a dramatic period of
revolutionary change which is still continuing. Part of this process was due
to external factors. The Industrial Revolution was already under way in
Britain, and Europe would soon be looking to Africa as a source of raw
materials and as a market for the goods produced by the new factories.
Europe was also acquiring technical means which would make it relatively
easy to break down the physical barriers to penetration into Africa and an
overwhelming military power sufficient to annihilate resistance. At the
same time the social changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution
aroused stirrings of conscience. A more vital attitude to religion sprang
up, a hostility to the slave trade, and a desire to convert the heathen which
went well with a situation in which it seemed more profitable to trade with
Africans in Africa than to export them elsewhere, and in which Christian
conversion seemed necessarily to imply the adoption of European tastes
and a demand for European goods. Thus through traders and dedicated
missionaries Europe began to exert an influence by actually changing
African societies in the light of Christian ideas. This inevitably brought
with it political consequences. European political authority gradually ex¬
tended itself until under the influence of almost hysterical competition
between the European powers it culminated in the Scramble for Africa
which brought the vast preponderance of the continent under the control
of European states.
It must not be thought, however, that the revolutionary changes in
African history were ail the result of external influence. By the beginning
of the nineteenth century internal stresses within the continent were
preparing the way for two massive movements. In West Africa the inevit¬
able tensions occurred between Muslims and rulers who practised tradi¬
tional religions. These resulted from the situation caused by the fall of
Songhai and were coming to a head, preparing the way for a whole series
of religious movements known as the West African jihads. In modern
South Africa population pressure in Zululand had already set in motion a
process which was to culminate in the dramatic rise of the Zulu as a
military power and a vast series of wars and migrations which vitally
affected the whole history of Southern and Central Africa.

Contents and division of the two volumes

The partition of Africa between European powers forms a natural division

in the history of Africa since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

31
 t

Subsequent developments took place within the new borders imposed by

colonialism which often bore little logical relationship to older divisions
between peoples. From this point on the story is of the struggle of African
peoples to master the techniques of their white rulers, of their regaining
their independence and the developments which have followed and cre¬
ated the picture of Africa as it is today.
It is with this revolutionary period in African history that this book is
concerned. The first volume will deal with the changes leading up to
partition, and the second with developments from then till the present.
Our purpose is to describe the development of the African peoples them¬
selves and to deal with external influences from the point of view of their
effects on Africa rather than as a subject in their own right. For this
purpose it is necessary to look closely at the histories of particular peoples
rather than just at continent-wide developments, and we have found it
necessary to study the continent region by region. The development of the
continent will throughout be treated in accordance with these regions,
except for the case of the process of partition itself (discussed in the
Conclusion to this volume) which is most easily looked at from a continen¬
tal point of view. The regions have been chosen on historical grounds.
Africa north of the Sahara forms a natural unit of study and with this is
connected the history of the Nile valley and neighbouring Ethiopia. West
Africa, again, is a convenient unit from the geographical and historical
points of view. In talking of the great block of Africa from Zaire to East
Africa as another division we had in mind the effects of Arab penetration
from the East African coast to the Zaire river in the nineteenth century.
Finally Southern and Central Africa, including South Africa, Zimbabwe,
Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, have links which make it convenient
to group them together. It should not be thought, however, that these
regions are absolute, or that they have any other purpose than as a
convenience to avoid the difficulty of trying to talk about everything at
once. There are no sharp divisions between the peoples of the continent
and the history of every African people is connected with that of its
neighbours in a great network which covers the continent without a break.
It would be perfectly possible to use different divisions from those we have
chosen; any such divisions are arbitrary and useful only as an aid to
explanation.

32
Part one West Africa

1 West Africa to 1800

Introduction

If history is not to be mistaken for antiquarianism, it must be written with

the eyes firmly focused on those events, factors and persons which help to
explain the present look of things, or how the present evolved from the
past. Thus while it is true that in 1800, West Africa was colourful and
richly varied geographically, ethnically, economically and politically, it is
not this rich variety which by itself explains the transformation which the
region underwent in the one and a half centuries or so that followed. Rather
that change can be accounted for mainly in terms of two factors. The first
was international trade and the attempt to ensure the conditions consi¬
dered appropriate for carrying on with it. The second was religion. This
chapter is therefore concerned to give a brief analysis of the origins of
these two factors in West African history and of their state of development
by 1800. This will help to highlight the factors of change and continuity in
West African history.
Each of the above two factors divides into two. For West Africa around
1800, international trade was made up of the trans-Saharan caravan trade
and the trans-Atlantic trade. The factor of religion was made up of Islam
and Christianity. Both Islam and Christianity were alike in that each is
exclusivist, that is intolerant of the idea of any other religion co-existing
with it. Each centred around a belief in the unquestionable authority of a
book - the Quran for Islam, and the Bible for Christianity. Each laid
emphasis on literacy. The spread of either, but more so of Islam, was
closely associated with the growth of trade and of centralized authority
able to maintain law and order over a wide area. But while Islam was not
prepared to make any distinction between religion and politics, Christian¬
ity had conceded control over the state to secular politicians on condition
that its claim to a monopoly over the spiritual welfare of peoples was not
contested by the state. These elements of similarity and difference are

33
 I

important for an understanding of the fortunes and roles of the two

religions in the period under study.
From what follows it will be seen that the habit of dividing history into
neat periods, though a convenient and widespread practice amongst histo¬
rians, is justly condemned as artificial and misleading. The factors which
transformed West African history after 1800 were already present in her
society in one form or the other before that date.

Trans-Saharan trade routes

For well over sixteen centuries after Christ, the dominant factor in West
African history was the trans-Saharan caravan trade, in which the initia¬
tive lay outside West Africa, or, to be more exact, in the Maghreb and
North Africa. Recent evidence from archaeology and geology has estab¬
lished beyond reasonable doubt that in the very distant past the region of
the present Sahara desert, which now looks like a formidable divide
between West Africa and North Africa, carried a richer vegetation and
enjoyed a better supply of rivers and rain. It was therefore more thickly
populated by mixed groups of Caucasoid and Negroid physical type, some
of whom lived from seasonal agriculture and others of whom grazed large
herds of cattle. As the Sahara began to dry up, the Caucasians retreated
northwards and the Negroes southwards. Continued contact was possible,
however, because here and there in the Sahara there survived green
patches, known as oases, carrying enough water and vegetation to support
human existence. Contact in the forms of trade and war led to established
routes from one oasis to the other, and thus linked the fertile belts which
lay to the north and south of the Sahara.
Until the fifteenth century these routes across the Sahara remained
West Africa’s most sure and certain link with the outside world, while
until even later the trade and ideas which penetrated the region through
them constituted the most dynamic forces in its history. Because of its
location and peculiar characteristics, the Sudan of West Africa benefited
more from this link than the Guinea lands and so assumed historical
leadership of West Africa. The Sudan, with its vegetation of grass and
orchard bush, is a more open country than Guinea, with its vegetation of
thick evergreen bush; thus travel was easier. This advantage of the Sudan
over Guinea was emphasized through the use by the Sudanese of beasts of
burden, especially with the introduction of the horse as a riding animal.
This ease of travel favoured conquerors and traders, as well as the rise of
empires and of commercial centres enjoying international renown.
The Sudan also had the advantage of being able to support a wider

34
variety of occupations than Guinea; it was able to combine occupations
borrowed from the desert to the north of it, and the tropical rain forest to
the south. Along the main river banks the Sudanese practised artificial
irrigation agriculture, as did the Negroes of the Saharan oases and of the
Sahel. With this, in certain areas, they combined rainy season agriculture
supplemented by husbandry, which was more characteristic of the forest
zone. Certain classes of Sudanese peoples, especially the cattle Fulani,
practised nomadic pastoralism, and in addition there was long-distance
trade. From this rich variety of occupations the Sudan was able to support
a sizeable population and maintain the soldiers and politicians required for
large-scale political organization.
Because of its location, the Sudan was able to play a key role in the
international trade that went to North Africa. This trade was between the
products of the Mediterranean and Europe on the one hand, and of the
forest zone of West Africa - gold, kola nuts, ivory and slaves - on the
other. The Sudan had a few gold-bearing areas, in the valleys of the
Senegal and the Niger, and produced animal skins, but the actual role of
the Sudanese in the trade was to collect the products of their forest
neighbours to the south for exchange with the dates, salt and manufac¬
tured articles brought from the desert, North Africa and Europe by the
North African caravans. In a sense, therefore, the historical pre-eminence
of the Sudanese in West Africa was for centuries rooted in their economic
exploitation of their neighbours to the south. The impression which the
outside world had of Sudanese wealth was so exaggerated that, even up to
the nineteenth century, European travellers expected to find Timbuktu a
fabulously wealthy city and were disappointed to find it a decaying town
with only drab mud huts and mosques. But, however exaggerated the
wealth of the Sudan was in European and Asiatic imagination, there is no
doubt that the trade made the Sudan, until about the eighteenth century, a
much richer land than Guinea.

Islam

International trade brought the Sudan in particular, and West Africa in

general, face to face for the first time with one of the world’s universalist
religions. From time immemorial all West Africans had followed the
religion of their fathers which some, for lack of a better term, have called
Paganism. Then from ad 632 Islam gained a foothold in Egypt and from
there set out to conquer the rest of North Africa. The ancient North
African urbanized cities were relatively easy to conquer, but the Berbers of

35
 »

the desert put up a stout resistance. Rather than submit, some of them
started to migrate, the Lemtuna taking the lead in this. But the Arabs and
Islam followed them on; refugees and their pursuers followed the beaten
track of the ancient trade routes across the Sahara. By the eighth century
the Sanhaja had got to what is now Mauritania; by that same century a
Muslim state of southern Algeria, Tahert, was already trading with
Awdaghast, a Sanhaja city. From the latter place Islam penetrated further
south into the Sudan proper, the ruling dynasty of Takrur being the first
black dynasty to embrace the new religion.
This new factor which entered West Africa through the trade routes
eventually proved a more permanent and dynamic historical force than the
trade which brought it. At first, however, its role in shaping events
appeared subordinate to that of trade. Only in the nineteenth century did
Islam become the chief determinant of political change in the Sudan.
In other spheres of life Islam also represented a factor of change. The
pilgrimage which it encouraged brought the elite of the Sudan into contact
with the most advanced ideas of the time and so kept them up to date and
progressive. Idris Alooma of Borno (1571-1603), for instance, learnt of the
use of firearms in the course of his pilgrimage, introduced their use into
the Borno army and thus won himself a place in history as a military
reformer and conqueror. Islam also introduced into the Western Sudan
the mode of dressing now considered traditional in the Sudan belt, and,
more important, the Arabic script.
This latter event is perhaps, from the historian’s point of view, the most
important innovation by Islam in West Africa, for it made the keeping of
written records possible.
The state of Islam in the Sudan by about 1800 is now a matter for
dispute amongst historians of West Africa. According to one view Islam
had, by 1800, gone to sleep in the courts of petty monarchs, that is, it had
become the religion of lukewarm and pleasure-loving princes and of the
rich commercial classes. It had grown very formal, attaching a lot of
importance to institutions and titles rather than to purity, piety and
simplicity. It had not made, and was not making, any noticeable impact on
the peasants and their rural way of life. It was not based on a living
knowledge of the Quran. Consequently even the urban Islam that existed
had absorbed many of the practices and symbols of the traditional reli¬
gions of the Sudanese peoples.
But other scholars have pointed out that this unfavourable view of the
state of Islam around 1800 derived from an uncritical use of the works of
propaganda produced by the jihadists of the nineteenth century about
whom more will be said. It has also been argued that the career and work
of the jihadists, which go back to the last few decades of the eighteenth

36
century, show something of the life and capacity for self-criticism which
continued to characterize West African Islam even during periods when it
appeared to have lost its zeal for rapid expansion.

Development of European trade

Earlier in this chapter, it was indicated that the role of the trans-Saharan
trade as an important historical force was not limited to the Sudan.
Directly and indirectly it determined political and economic development
in the forest. European merchants, especially from Italy, the Iberian
peninsula and France, were early participants in the trans-Saharan trade,
but only indirectly. The merchant princes and kingdoms of the Maghreb
succeeded in creating for themselves middlemen’s monopoly of this trade.
To preserve, and benefit from, this position they prevented their Euro¬
pean customers and rivals from going into the interior with them to
participate directly in the Sudanese trade. One or two Europeans suc¬
ceeded in breaking through the middlemen’s cordon and penetrated the
interior along these routes. A merchant from Toulouse, Anselme d’ls-
alguier, is said to have got as far as, and lived in, Gao between 1405 and
1413, while a Genoese merchant was able to get to Touat in 1447. But such
cases as these remained exceptional. By and large, what Europeans knew
about the interior came to them second hand. Fed on stories of fabled
cities of gold and the like they grew all the more anxious to participate
directly in this trade. It was this desire that was partly responsible for the
European bid, starting in the fifteenth century and led by the Portuguese,
to reach West Africa by sea. The Europeans hoped that when they got to
West Africa they would be able to divert this trade towards the south to
their incalculable advantage. In a sense, therefore, the trans-Saharan trade
gave rise to the impulses which created the trans-Atlantic trade which first
competed with it and then stifled it.
But the European exploration of the West African coast derived not
only from this economic motive. There was also a missionary motive.
From about the eighth century, when the Muslims gained control of the
Mediterranean and seriously embarked on the conquest of southern
Europe, especially the Iberian peninsula, Christian Europe had been
involved in a seemingly endless conflict with Islam. From the internal
crusade for the liberation of Portugal and Spain the struggle had de¬
veloped into the crusade against Islam in the Holy Land during which
Christian Europe for a while actually seized the initiative. By the fifteenth
century the crusading ideal had died in the rest of Europe but not in
Portugal and Spain, the two countries which had suffered most from the

37
 I

Muslims. As part of their offensive against Islam the Portuguese now had
the ambition of side-stepping the Muslims of North Africa to reach the
(pagan) black Africans of West Africa, whom they hoped to convert to
Christianity. Along with this ambition went the even vaguer hope of
making contact with Prester John, a legendary Christian potentate whom
they hoped would come to the aid of the Christians.
Spurred on by economic ambitions as well as these vague dreams, the
Portuguese in about 1417 launched their plans to reach West Africa. With
the able management of Prince Henry the Navigator they achieved start¬
ling success in a short time, considering the navigational difficulties they
encountered and dealt with. They reached Cape Verde in 1444 and the
Bight of Benin in 1475. Seven years later, in 1482, they arrived at the Zaire
(formerly Congo) river.
On getting to West Africa the Portuguese set out to put their discoveries
to their advantage. Contacts for trade were made in the regions of what are
now Senegal, The Gambia, Ghana, Benin and Nigeria, and adventurers
were sent inland to find the gold mines that supplied the trans-Saharan
trade. Hand in hand with the trade went missionary effort. In the key
islands off the shores of the Windward Coast and the Gulf of Guinea,
Portuguese colonies were planted to serve as centres for the exploitation of
the continental trade. In this trade at first emphasis was on products such
as gold, ivory, and pepper. But early in the history of Portuguese contact
with West Africa there was also a small volume of trade in slaves who were
sent to Portugal. The first of the unfortunate Africans who were shipped
to Portugal were not actually captured as slaves. They were to be trained
for missionary work in West Africa. But then it was discovered they were
useful as farm hands in the underpopulated areas of Portugal and so the
trade grew in volume.
With the Spanish colonization of America, and the discovery that
Africans were better able than the native Indians to work the Spanish
mines and plantations, the trade progressively acquired a new importance
and grew in scale. By about 1650 slaves had become West Africa’s main
export.
The first effective challenge to the Portuguese came only in the 1590s
from the Dutch. In 1642 and 1647 the Danes and the Swedes respectively
entered the race for West African trade, while the British and the French
intensified their participation in the trade from the 1650s. The Prussians
were the last on the scene, entering as they did in 1682. In any case by the
middle of the sixteenth century the trans-Atlantic trade with Europe had
become an established concern. Like the trans-Saharan trade in the
Sudan, this international trade with Europe proved an important historical
force in the West African forest.

38
! *

The influence of European trade on West African states

The forest lands of Ghana inhabited by the Akan-speaking peoples were

rich in gold and kola, two of the principal items of the northern trade.
From here trade routes radiated northwards via Begho to Jenne and
Hausaland. In consequence of this northward trade the earliest Akan
state, Bono-Tekyiman, rose on the forest fringe some time after ad 1450,
and perhaps the foundation of a number of petty principalities was laid in
the forest zone proper and along the coast. Then, about 1470, the Portu¬
guese got to the coast of Ghana and in 1482 built the castle of Elmina to
establish effective exploitation of the trade of the region. With the estab¬
lishment of this trade there developed more intense rivalry amongst these
petty kingdoms for its control than there had ever been for the more
remote northern trade. Up to about 1650 among the more successful of the
older states were Denkyira, Fante, Akyem and Akwamu. Then about
1670 the Asante kingdom was founded with its capital at Kumasi. While
fully exploiting the northern trade it sought also to control the coastal
trade. In this process it swallowed up Denkyira in 1701, Akyem in 1742,
and then got ready to engulf Fante.
In modern southern Nigeria west of the Niger an identical event led to
the rise of Oyo. Benin’s case was a little different since it was already a
flourishing state by the time the European trade was established. Its rise

West African peoples mentioned in the text

39
would seem to owe much to its trade with Yorubaland which connected it
with the northern trade. Edo oral traditions link the rise of Benin’s historic
dynasty with Yorubaland. In Yorubaland a number of principalities would
seem to have arisen between ad 1000 and 1500. Of these Oyo, the most
strategically located to participate in these two international trades, be¬
came pre-eminent. Being on the northern fringe of the forest it had
commercial links with Hausaland, while in the south-western direction its
cavalry could operate as far south as Porto Novo. In the region of modern
Benin Republic (formerly Dahomey), the earliest states, Allada and Why-

40
dah, arose along the coast after 1550 and must have done so largely in
response to the Atlantic trade. Abomey, the youngest of the Aja states,
rose after 1620 and in direct response to the challenges of the coastal trade,
thereby creating the state known as Dahomey. The rise and expansion of
this last Aja state resulted directly from the attempt of the Fon of Abomey
to organize themselves for defence against the Oyo, Allada and Whydah,
who constantly raided them to supply the trans-Atlantic slave trade.
The regions of Guinea to the east of the Niger and to the west of Ghana
were isolated from the direct impact of the northern trade. Political
developments here were inspired largely by the Atlantic trade. Along the

41
 I

eastern Nigerian coast the House system, whose origin goes back to about
the fourteenth century, became important among the Ijo and the Efik in
meeting the challenge of the Atlantic trade. On the Windward Coast small
principalities and chieftaincies, but no empires, emerged to organize and
exploit the European trade. It would appear, therefore, that except in
those areas which participated in the northern and more ancient traffic,
the Atlantic trade was not able by itself to inspire large-scale political
organization. Even in modern Benin Republic, where a moderately-sized
state arose in the period, there was a trade route linking Whydah and
Abomey with the Sudan.

An Oba of Benin. The Benin dynasty is one of the oldest in West Africa and maintained its
independence for over five hundred years until conquered by a British expedition in 1897

42
Trans-Saharan trade and the trans-Atlantic trade compared

On the economic side, the Atlantic trade ended the isolation of Guinea as
well as the period when it lay in the economic backwaters of West Africa.
But, contrary to Portuguese expectation, this trade was not able, until the
twentieth century, to stifle completely the northern traffic and focus
attention on Guinea alone. The trans-Saharan routes were still important
by the nineteenth century, so important in fact that, as will be shown,
Europe at times seriously thought of using North Africa (in particular
Tripoli) as the gateway to the West African interior. Indeed the attraction
of these routes remained strong enough to make Sir Frederick Lugard
contemplate seriously, between 1900 and 1906, exporting the produce of
Northern Nigeria across the Sahara. The Atlantic trade, unlike the north¬
ern trade, was not an unmixed blessing for those who participated in it.
From about 1650 the slave trade was its lifeblood. This trade was not only
morally bad for the Africans and Europeans alike, it also caused a heavy,
and for West Africa unprofitable, transfer of population from Guinea to
the New World. The total loss to West Africa in human beings in the
course of the trade has been variously estimated as between ten and forty
million souls. Even the latest efforts to resolve the debate on how many
slaves were actually shipped across the Atlantic have only brought more
heat to the controversy. However, as most of those sold were the most
vigorous sections of the population, their enforced emigration was a severe
loss to the land of their birth. It was partly because of this and partly
because of the insecurity and destruction caused by the forcible recruit¬
ment of the slaves that many productive indigenous industries declined, or
at least stagnated, with the triumph of the trade.
Like its northern counterpart, the Atlantic trade brought with it to
Guinea another universalist religion, Christianity, which was subsequently
to contribute immensely in shaping the destiny of West Africans. Up to
the nineteenth century, however, it was of even less account than Islam.
Portuguese missionary efforts on the Windward Coast, at Benin and
Warri, achieved nothing, partly owing to lack of well-trained missionaries
and partly owing to the stifling influence of the slave trade.
In West Africa, therefore, before 1800 the factors that determined much
of the history of the indigenous peoples were international trade, and alien
universalist religion. With varying emphasis they remained the same in
the period covered in this book. European commerce and Christianity led
first to the exploration of West Africa and then to its colonization by
France, Britain, Germany and Portugal. West African nationalism and the
achievement of independence were the results of African reaction to this
new form of economic exploitation. But even before these forces had

43
 ft

unfolded themselves, Islam had inspired a series of attempts at empire¬

building in the Sudan. The subsidiary effects of this, allied with the
militant advance of European economic exploitation, led to the fall of the
Guinea states which had survived into the nineteenth century. In the
following chapters these new developments of the nineteenth and twen¬
tieth centuries will be dealt with. They should be seen in perspective as the
further unfolding of forces already present in West Africa by 1800.
But there was some difference. Whereas it was the northern trade that
dominated life in West Africa before 1900, after that date the Atlantic
trade gradually took over the leadership and eventually completely des¬
troyed the northern trade. Whereas Islam and Christianity in the main
played a subsidiary role to the economic factor before 1800, after that date
they assumed an importance of their own. Christianity in particular be¬
came more central than previously in the political, social and moral
evolution of West Africa. And finally whereas international trade, espe¬
cially the European trade, did not threaten the independence of West
Africans before 1800, except the few occasions when some states of the
Maghreb had designs on Songhai and Borno, after that date it became
more and more evident that for some time, at least, the two things could
not exist side by side.

44
2 The growth and character of
European influence (c. 1800-61)

Introduction

For nearly three centuries European interest in West Africa had two main
features. In the first place it was dominantly commercial. In the second
place it was limited to the coast, despite the fact that the climate of the
West African interior was healthier than that of the malaria infested coast
along which Europeans conducted their trading business for over three
centuries. The Europeans remained at the coast for so long because of the
nature of the trade in which they were primarily interested. The slave
trade did not need European intervention inland to maintain the steady
flow of captives.
In the fifteenth century the Portuguese, who had hopes of discovering
the gold mines that supplied the northern trade, had tried to penetrade the
interior. On the Senegal, for instance, they had gone as far inland as the
Felou falls, while on the Gambia they had reached the Geba river. In 1485
they got to Benin City. But these early voyages inland proved uniformly
unrewarding. Unlike South America, with its rich mines of Peru, the West
African interior had no dazzling attractions for the Europeans, at least
until the nineteenth century.
It has often been contended that it was indigenous opposition that kept
the Europeans off. It would seem, however, that if the latter had seriously
wanted to penetrate the interior they could have done so in spite of local
African obstruction. The African communities of Guinea were certainly
better organized and better armed in the nineteenth century than they
were in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the Europeans had
the monopoly of the musket and the cannon. Yet African opposition in the
nineteenth century could not keep off the Europeans.
Until about 1800 therefore the European nations did not seriously
consider the conquest and colonization of West Africa for economic ex¬
ploitation. The Portuguese colonized the Canary Islands, Madeira, San-

45
 I

tiago, Sao Tome and some other offshore islands but these were used as
centres from which to tap the continental trade. Sao Tome was in addition
a plantation colony which by the middle of the sixteenth century was an
important source of sugar for Europe. The French between 1687 and
1702, and the British in 1763 had sought to plant colonies in the Senegal
and Gambia areas respectively. All these efforts were tentative and not
vigorously pressed. In consequence, in spite of three centuries of Euro¬
pean presence, trade along the West African coast was conducted as
between equals. The Africans remained their own masters, and lived their
own lives according to their own standards and traditions. Even when they
copied European ways they did so at their own wish. They were in fact
responsible for seeing that law and order were maintained on the coast in
order to protect trade. On the coast of modern Ghana they were able to

46
The Danish fort at Christiansborg (Osu) before the nineteenth century

enforce the payment of rents by the Europeans for the pieces of land on
which the latter’s forts stood. And in spite of these forts the Europeans
found themselves devoid of any real political power or influence over the
coastal Fante. From time to time they managed to exploit rivalries
amongst African chiefs, and used bribes to establish some influence, but
by and large it was the Africans who were politically supreme. In 1786, for
instance, the commandants of the forts of Tantamkweri, Sekondi and
Mouree were kidnapped, stripped and flogged for insulting Africans,
while in 1812 the commandant of Winneba was killed. On both occasions
the Europeans lacked the power to avenge this drastic treatment.
On the coast of Dahomey the Yevogan - the representative of the
Abomey king - dictated to Europeans and Africans alike the regulations
guiding trade and had the means of securing obedience to his master’s
will. There, as on the coast of the Oil Rivers (the name by which the
creeks of the Niger delta were known) and elsewhere, Europeans had to
pay harbour and trade duties before being allowed to engage in the coastal
trade. A detailed study of the relationship which existed about 1800
between Africans and Europeans along the coast shows that the latter were
neither feared nor liked but tolerated by the former. They were tolerated
because Africans realized that Europeans were useful in providing goods
which could not be manufactured locally and which, from being luxuries,
had become necessities, especially amongst the richer classes.
But in the course of the nineteenth century this relationship, based on

47
 ft

equality and mutual advantage, was undermined and superseded by a new

one which increasingly approximated to that between a master (the Euro¬
pean) and his servant (the African). At heart European interest remained
economic. But revolutionary changes which took place in European socie¬
ty caused a shift of emphasis from trade in human beings to trade in
natural produce. This shift in emphasis dictated a new trading strategy
which in time called for direct political domination. For some time, how¬
ever, the full implications of this change were obscured by apparently
harmless interests in the abolition of the slave trade, the exploration of the
interior and the propagation of Christianity. It is with these three move¬
ments that we shall now deal.

The campaign against the slave trade

The reasons behind the abolition of the slave trade were many and various,
but the most important of them was economic. To some extent the slave
trade destroyed itself. By the middle of the eighteenth century surplus
capital, part of which came from the slave trade, had helped to bring about
the Industrial Revolution in Britain. In the other parts of Europe the same
changes were slower in taking place. Fundamental to the Industrial Re¬
volution was the application of science to industry which made it easier
and quicker to turn raw materials into manufactured goods. The economic
implications of this were far-reaching. More raw materials were needed to
keep the machines fully and profitably employed and it was discovered, or
in any case seriously believed, that of these raw materials West Africa
could supply vegetable oils, rubber, indigo, cotton, ivory, timber and the
like.
Hand in hand with the quest for raw materials went a quest for new and
expanding markets to absorb the products of the industries. With regard
to this it was again discovered that West Africa had great promise because
of her size and population.
The old relationship between Europe and West Africa based on the
slave trade came to be seen as unsuitable in the new circumstance. The
slave trade not only carried away from West Africa men and women who
could help in raising the new crops needed by British industries and in
providing an ever-expanding market, but also the raids and wars associ¬
ated with it were believed to create such chaos and insecurity as would
hamper agriculture and peaceful trade. In the light of these new needs the
slave trade appeared outdated and so had to be abolished.
There was also another side to the economic factor. About this period
there arose in Europe a group of economic thinkers who propagated and

48
popularized the idea that free trade, free competition and free labour were
more profitable than rigidly regulated trade and forced labour. Slavery
was forced labour and so, according to these thinkers, was unproductive
and wasteful. The slave could not give of his best because he was made to
work against his will. Furthermore, he was generally not a skilled worker.
Here again, the slave trade was shown to have become an anachronism.
But it was not the economic arguments alone that gave birth to the
campaign against the slave trade. In fact it was not the rational economists
and the new trading interests which launched and carried through the
movement. The importance of these new interests lay rather in the fact
that, without their support, the spearheads of the abolitionist movement
would have achieved little. For, at the same time as the economic develop¬
ments sketched above were taking place, a group of men generally known
as humanitarians began to campaign against the slave trade and other
forms of oppression in many parts of Europe and America. These men
opposed the slave trade and gave their lives to its abolition not on econo¬
mic grounds but because it caused too much human suffering. It was these
men who never tired of collecting for publication stories of atrocities
committed in the process of the trade. In their effort they were supported
by churchmen who at about the same time developed a keen interest in the
propagation of Christianity amongst Africans and Asians. Members of
this group, known as the Evangelicals, opposed the slave trade mainly on
religious grounds. They argued that slavery was evil because it con¬
travened a divine law, according to which all men should be brothers and
equal under the Fatherhood of the Almighty Creator.
It was these economic, humanitarian and evangelical arguments which,
in the second half of the eighteenth century, combined to give rise to the
British anti-slavery movement. The detailed story of the struggles and
campaigns of the movement belongs properly to British domestic history.
Only the outlines will be given here. The foremost leaders of the move¬
ment were Granville Sharp, Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce,
the last being the representative and spokesman of the movement in the
British Parliament for many years. Apart from these, however, there were
other participants in the crusade whose roles have not yet been properly
assessed or even widely recognized. Among this later group was a former
Igbo slave, Olaudah Equiano, also known as Gustavus Vasa the African.
Equiano (Ekwoanya?) who was born either at Essaka in mid-western
Nigeria or at Isieke in eastern Nigeria, was kidnapped and sold into
slavery early in the eighteenth century. After a most startling life of
adventure and travel which took him to America, the West Indies, Europe
and Turkey he purchased his freedom and settled in Britain. With the rise
of the anti-slavery movement he plunged himself wholeheartedly into it.

49
 I

Olaudah Equiano, the ex-slave who became prominent in the British anti-slavery movement

He organized public lectures at various centres in Britain in which he

ventilated the evils of the slave trade and told the British public what rich
material reward they could reap if they suppressed the slave trade and
developed the natural resources of Africa. He embodied these ideas in his
autobiography which he published in 1789. This book contained one of
the earliest enunciations of the idea that only legitimate commerce, agri¬
culture and Christianity could effectively destroy the slave trade.
The anti-slavers achieved their first success in 1772 when Granville
Sharp brought a case about a runaway slave to an English court. In dealing
with the case Chief Justice Mansfield declared that English law did not
recognize slavery and that as soon as a slave set foot on English soil he
became free. This decision had an important consequence for West Africa
which will be dealt with later in this chapter. From this time the campaign
grew in volume and intensity. After a long and hard struggle in and
outside the British Parliament by Sharp and others a law was passed in
1807 which made the trade illegal for British subjects. After this the scene
of the campaign shifted from Britain, where it had been carried out by

50
means of public lectures, parliamentary lobbies and highly coloured pam¬
phlets and newspaper articles, to West Africa, where these methods were
replaced by naval force, diplomatic persuasion and pressures, legitimate
commerce and missionary propaganda. All these methods, with the possi¬
ble exception of the last, were interrelated, and the campaign in West
Africa must be seen as a piece. Its outlines are bold and clear.
Until the later 1830s Britain concentrated her effort on getting other
European nations and America to give up trading in slaves. She sought to
achieve this by the use of diplomacy, and in addition a detachment of the
Royal Navy (often called the West African, or the Preventive, Squadron)
was stationed permanently in West Africa for the purpose of seizing slave
ships. The two instruments of diplomacy and naval force were com¬
plementary. The British Foreign Office negotiated treaties banning the
trade with nations which had not yet done so, while the Royal Navy
enforced the terms of these treaties. In theory all those nations which
either outlawed the slave trade completely or restricted the area in which it
could be carried on by their nationals were expected to co-operate with
Britain in capturing and bringing to justice those who continued the trade;
but in practice it was only Britain that was both able and willing to assign a
reasonable naval force to this patrol.
Since Britain was not at war with the other nations of Western Europe
and America, her gunboats could not capture their slaving ships on the
high seas without breaking international law. Hence the British Foreign
Office took pains to negotiate treaties with the chief slave-trading nations
which would give British warships the scope to do their duties without fear
of creating international crises. Thus Britain persuaded France and Brazil
to ban the trade for their nationals in 1815 and 1830 respectively although
the ban was not at all seriously enforced until 1831. Meanwhile,
Spain (1817) and Portugal (1819) were persuaded to restrict their slave¬
trading activities in Africa to areas south of the equator. Britain also
negotiated Reciprocal Search Treaties with Spain (1817) and
Portugal (1819), under which British warships could stop and search north
of the equator any ship flying the flag of either of these two countries
which was suspected of carrying slaves. Spain and Portugal enjoyed simi¬
lar rights with regard to ships flying the British flag. If a ship was found to
be carrying slaves it was seized and taken either to Sierra Leone or to some
port in America where special courts known as Courts of Mixed Commis¬
sion were established to deal with such activities. These were courts whose
membership comprised judges from countries which had agreed by treaty
to co-operate in this matter. In 1831 France signed a similar treaty.
Soon it was found that the Reciprocal Search Treaties did not give
sufficient scope to the British Preventive Squadron to deal with slavers,

51
 I

because they contained the provision that only ships actually carrying
slaves could be seized. But many ships were seen which, though not
carrying slaves at the time, were certainly slaving ships since they carried
equipment for the purpose. To make the naval patrol more effective the
Foreign Office bent its energies to negotiating treaties which covered this
loophole. This was the origin of the so-called Equipment Treaties which
British negotiated with France in 1833, with Spain in 1835, and with
Portugal in 1842, under which ships could be caught and condemned if
they carried equipment used by slaving ships.
This method of fighting the slave trade by persuading or forcing Euro-

British anti-slavers attack a settlement of slave traders

52
pean and American nations to give it up did not prove very effective, as
many of the nations were not prepared to co-operate with Britain. This
was partly because they suspected that the British zeal was not entirely the
result of humanitarian intentions but was also connected with a desire to
promote her economic interests. Some of the nations were jealous of
British naval power and feared that Britain would misuse rights granted
her under the Reciprocal Search and the Equipment Treaties. The United
States, for instance, refused to sign any of these treaties.
There were other reasons which helped to make the campaign ineffec¬
tive. There were not enough gunboats in the Preventive Squadron. As
mentioned above, Britain alone maintained a naval force of any conse¬
quence in West Africa, yet up to 1832 the British West African Squadron
never had more than seven ships at a time; often it had less, and sometimes
it had only two. Since these few ships had to watch the entire coast
between Cape Verde and the equator it is not surprising that many slave
ships escaped and that in this period more slaves were carried from West
Africa annually than in any year before. It has in fact been suggested that
not more than 25 per cent of the slavers were caught. Moreover not all the
ships used in this strenuous watch were suitable. Some of them were old
and rotten, while the class of ships known as frigates were not only too
large and too slow but had the extra handicap that their masts were easily
seen from long distances by slave ships, which naturally made good their
escape. Also the ships which now engaged in slaving were built to suit the
difficult times and were relatively fast.
There was only one place on the West African coast, Sierra Leone,
where captured slavers could be sent for trial. This meant that even if a
ship was caught at the southernmost end of West Africa, it had to be taken
on a journey of nearly 3000 kilometres before it could reach the nearest
place where it could be tried. What was worse, the members of the Courts
of Mixed Commission did not always co-operate. The non-British mem¬
bers carried their national jealousies to the sittings of the Court, and their
intrigues not only caused delays but often led to the acquittal of guilty
ships.

African attitudes to abolition

The ineffectiveness of the methods used to stop the trade was to some
extent the result of African opposition. It was not easy for West Africans
to abandon overnight a trade which had lasted for so long that they had
come to regard it as part of the normal way of life. The slave trade was
accepted as part of their economic, social and even ritual life. The coastal

53
 I

peoples in particular had become so entirely dependent on the trade, had

invested so much capital in it, that they could not abandon it without
serious economic loss. Throughout West Africa the trade had come to be
the normal means of getting rid of thieves, bankrupt debtors, witches and
other undesirables; it was also the means of procuring the men and women
who were used in satisfying some of the demands, for instance human
sacrifice, of ritual life. In Dahomey it was the basis of economic life. The
royal plantations depended on it and part of the army received its training
in military tactics during the annual slave raids. Throughout West Africa
slaves were also economically useful in the sense that they were used as
currency, and by acting as carriers played a great part as a means of
transport in an area that had no wheeled carriage. At the time of the
abolition it was not easy to think of a ready economic substitute for the
slave trade. The British talked of ivory, vegetable oil, timber, indigo and
so on, but profitable trade in these needed time to develop. By the 1830s
much of the coast of modern Nigeria had built up a viable substitute to the
slave trade in the palm produce trade. The coast of Dahomey was soon to
follow. But in other areas the story was different. In what later became
Ghana the gold trade failed to expand and it was not until the 1880s that
cocoa was introduced. And even then whatever promise it held as an item
of profitable export still lay in the future. In the Senegambian region, the
groundnut was to become an important item of legitimate trade but not
before the active intervention of the French. One coastal chief, when
persuaded to sell ivory in place of slaves, pointed out that slaves were
easier to catch than the elephants from which ivory came.
African traders wondered what right the British had to dictate to them
about their trading practices. Many simply refused to consider abolition,
because the slave trade had become traditional in their society. In 1863
King Glele of Dahomey told Commodore E. Wilmot of the West African
Squadron that slave trading was the custom of his ancestors. As a king, it
was held, he could not break with custom without bringing disaster on his
people. Much later, in the 1890s, the Aro of eastern Nigeria told a British
political officer that they would not give up slave dealing because it was
the custom of their fathers. There were other aspects of the problem.
Those African chiefs who signed the treaties of abolition did so unwillingly
rather than because they had suddenly become more enlightened than
their fathers. So whenever they felt they could break the treaties and
export slaves without being found out and punished, they did so gladly
and very profitably. There were also the fact that the nineteenth century
was a particularly turbulent one. There were, for instance, the great and
small jihads of the Western and Central Sudan, the Yoruba wars and the
Dahomean invasions of Yorubaland. These disturbances yielded a rich

54
harvest of captives whom their captors were anxious to dispose of through
sale.
African objections to abolition were strengthened by the activities of the
Portuguese, Spaniards, Cubans, Brazilians and others. While the British
told West Africans to abhor the slave trade and to patronize the oil trade,
these others persuaded them to do the opposite. This was very confusing.
Africans took the conflicting attitudes of the different European powers to
mean that Britain was at war with the other nations of Europe and
America, and as the quarrel did not concern them, African middlemen did
not see why they should ruin their business by siding with Britain. Some
of the coastal middlemen were able for a long time to ignore the menace of
the British gunboats because of the nature of the coast along which they
lived. On the coast of Nigeria, for instance, there is such a maze of creeks
and water channels that, while gunboats watched one port closely, traders
could ship their slaves through another which was quite unknown to the
British. When, for instance, the British boats watched Bonny too closely
Bonny men transferred their slaving business to Brass. For similar reasons
the slave trade in the region which became modern Guinea (Conakry)
proved particularly difficult to abolish.

Anti-slavery treaties

In the late 1830s, therefore, Britain was forced to re-examine and modify
this method of fighting the slave trade. As a result of the reassessment the
campaign was extended to the West African interior. First Britain signed
slave trade treaties with a number of West African chiefs. Under this kind
of treaty the African chief undertook to abolish the slave trade in his
territory and to encourage trade in palm oil and the other products of the
forest. In return he received annual subsidies from Britain for a fixed term
of years. Britain reserved the right to say when the treaty was broken and
to mete out punishment in consequence. Two chiefs of what is now
Cameroon entered into this type of treaty with Britain in 1840 and 1842.
In what is now Nigeria the Calabar villages of Creek Town and Duke
Town made treaties in 1843, as did Bonny in 1848. The Bond, which
bound Fante chiefs to abolish ‘barbarous’ customs, seems to come under
the category of slave trade treaty (though this treaty will be discussed in
detail later). Treaty-making as a means of fighting the slave trade was not
limited to the coast. It became in fact a permanent feature of European
strategy in West Africa throughout the nineteenth century.
By the 1840s the practice had penetrated the interior. The British
‘civilizing mission’ of 1841, for instance, concluded such a treaty with a

55
 I

prince as far inland as the Ata of Igala. One interesting revelation of these
treaties is that the Africans who opposed the abolition were not necessarily
morally bankrupt. On the contrary they were hard-headed businessmen
whose concern was that there should be good business. Bonny’s treaty
with Britain came so late for a coastal state because over and over again
Britain would not live up to the terms of the contract. Since this occa¬
sioned financial loss for Bonny she too over and over again ignored the
treaty and revived the slave trade. Another illuminating example was the
attitude of King Obi Ossai of Abo in 1841. This king did not need much
persuasion to sign the treaty. His first request was that British men and
ships should visit Abo in large numbers to buy Abo’s natural produce.
These treaties gave Britain the excuse to intervene in the affairs of many
West African states, even in matters which lay beyond the scope of the
treaty. As another way of dealing with the slave trade, British missionaries
and legitimate traders decided to push into the interior, establish their
posts there and cut the root of the slave trade by persuading Africans to
embrace Christianity, legitimate commerce and agriculture. The details of
this development will be given later.

The founding of Sierra Leone

Both in the short and long run the campaign against the slave trade had
far-reaching consequences and significance for West Africa, Europe and
America. The earliest and most tangible of the results was demographic.
The enforced exodus of blacks from West Africa was checked. What was
more, an attempt was made to reverse the migration through shipping
former slaves from Europe and America back to West Africa. This did not
happen to many, but it led to the foundation of first Sierra Leone and then
Liberia. How this came about needs to be told in some detail, in view of
the places which Sierra Leone and Liberia occupy in West African intel¬
lectual and political history.
For long it had been the practice of British planters in the West Indies
who were going home to England either on leave or on retirement to take
along with them their black domestic slaves. In this way by 1772 there
were about 14 000 such slaves in Britain. When therefore Chief Justice
Mansfield gave his celebrated decision in 1772 on the place of the slave and
slavery under the English law and constitution all these men became free.
Their owners, who were not happy with Mansfield’s judgment, turned
them out. Since these ex-slaves had not been previously prepared for
emancipation they could not all fend for themselves effectively, with the
result that many of them resorted to begging and thus became a nuisance

56
in English society. Soon their state aroused the pity of the humanitarians
who in 1786 formed the Committee for Relieving the Black Poor to
organize the giving of alms to these destitute men. The Committee soon
found that the numbers of those needing its help grew daily, and was
forced to think of another way of tackling the problem. As early as 1783
Granville Sharp had thought of settling the ‘Black Poor’ somewhere along
the coast of West Africa. Now his scheme was taken up seriously. Dr
Henry Smeathman, who had once visited Sierra Leone, recommended it
as suitable for such a settlement. As the Committee prepared for the
venture the British government undertook to contribute towards the cost
of the project at the rate of £14 for each settler. In February 1787 the first
party, 411 in number, left the British Isles for West Africa, and arrived in
Sierra Leone some time in May.
It proved very difficult to establish the settlement on a firm basis. To
start with, the party got to Sierra Leone in the wet season, that is at a time
when it was too late to start the planting of crops or the building of houses.
Without good shelter and care, disease soon spread, and by March 1788
only about 130 of the 411 original settlers were alive. The others had died
from fever. What was worse, the two coastal chiefs who had sold the
settlers the land they occupied had done so without consulting their
paramount ruler, Miambana, King of the Temne. The infant settlement
now faced the rage of this king. The other European traders on the coast,
especially members of the Royal African Company, were also hostile.
Though Sharp sent a new party of settlers with fresh supplies in May
1788, the future of the settlement remained gloomy.
Sharp and his friends, who now realized that a new arrangement was
needed if the colony was to survive, formed a company, first known as St
George’s Bay Company, to take over the affairs of Sierra Leone. By
forming such a commercial company, Sharp and his friends hoped to
persuade wealthy businessmen to invest in the project. To some extent
they were successful. On receiving a charter from the British government
the company was renamed the Sierra Leone Company. Somehow the
affairs of the colony began to improve. In 1792 about 1200 former slaves,
known as Nova Scotians, arrived to swell the population of the settlement.
These men had sided with the British against the Americans in the
American War of Independence. After the war the British had settled
them in Nova Scotia in Canada where they found life very difficult and as a
result applied for transfer to Sierra Leone. In 1800, 550 Maroons, a batch
of ex-slaves who had been involved in a slave revolt in Jamaica in 1796 and
had been sent to Nova Scotia, also arrived in Sierra Leone.
In spite of this growth in population the Sierra Leone Company failed to
prosper and found the work of defending and administering the colony

57
 $

beyond its resources. Revenue was restricted because the company did not
engage in the slave trade, which was the only lucrative business at that
time. Legitimate trade in which alone it was interested was only being
pioneered, and was as yet unpopular with Africans and Europeans alike.
The company therefore appealed to the British government to take over
responsibility for the settlement. In 1807 Britain abolished the slave trade
and committed herself to the difficult task of preventing other nations
from continuing it. As she needed a naval base in West Africa from which
to carry out the campaign, Sierra Leone, with its good natural harbour,
was the obvious choice. As a result on 1 January 1808 Sierra Leone
became the first British Crown Colony in West Africa. The same year a
Vice-Admiralty Court was established in Freetown for the purpose of
trying slave traders whose ships were seized by the Preventive Squadron.
When later Britain persuaded Spain, Portugal and France to abolish the
trade, a Court of Mixed Commission was established in Freetown to try
ships of these nations caught carrying on the prohibited trade. Sierra

58
Leone benefited immensely from all this. Her population was greatly
augmented since the slave cargoes of many of the arrested ships were
liberated and settled there. In order to ensure that Sierra Leone’s economy
benefited from this rapid growth of population a Liberated Africans
Department was established to do the work of settling the new arrivals
either by apprenticing them to trade or by grouping them in villages to
pursue agriculture.

The founding of Liberia

The successful issue of the Sierra Leone venture was to some extent
responsible for the American experiment in settling free blacks on the
portion of the West African coast now known as Liberia. In the early
decades of the nineteenth century the United States faced problems which
were in some ways similar to those which Britain faced as a result of
Mansfield’s famous judgment, but which were more acute. There were in
the United States in 1800 about 200 000 free blacks. Some of these were
people freed by masters who in course of time had become convinced that
slavery was evil and contrary to the divine law, some were those who by
their own hard work had purchased their freedom, some were those freed
on the death of their masters, others were simply runaways. Many of the
free blacks became small businessmen and were able to find honourable
means of living; others lived by less honourable ways, including theft, not
so much becaue they were lazy but because they could find no employ¬
ment.
The existence of this large and growing community of free blacks
presented a serious problem to the United States. It was thought, for
example by Thomas Jefferson, that the best solution lay in settling the
blacks somewhere, preferably outside the United States. This view was
shared by the large section of the community which still owned slaves, and
argued that free blacks were a nuisance in society because they endangered
the institution of slavery. Especially in the Southern states, laws were
passed designed either to make it impossible for more blacks to become
free or to force those already free to return to slavery. The Northern
states, most of which had emancipated their slaves, feared that the free
blacks in the South would flock into their territories, and so passed laws to
prevent this.
About this time there arose in the United States a movement which was
both humanitarian and evangelical, and which aimed at helping the poor
and oppressed and at applying Christian principles to social life. The
members of this movement, out of sympathy, came to favour the idea of

59
 I

transporting the free blacks back to Africa. This step, they hoped, would
save the blacks the humiliation and degradation they suffered in America,
while enabling them to be the instrument by which ‘civilization’ and
Christianity would spread to the ‘darkest’ parts of Africa.
It was these different groups of people who in 1816 formed the Amer¬
ican Society for Colonizing the Free People of Color of the United States,
more popularly known as the American Colonization Society. In 1818 this
society sent Samuel J. Mills and Ebenezer Burgess to Sierra Leone to
survey the possibilities of carrying out its intentions. These men picked on
Sherbro Island about 50 kilometres south of Sierra Leone. It was here that
the first party of 88 landed in 1820. It was soon found that the site was
very unhealthy for within a short space of time 22 of the settlers died. The
remaining 66 ran to Sierra Leone in panic. When the second batch of
settlers arrived in 1821 they took local advice and moved lower down the
coast to Cape Mesurado where they secured a piece of land from the local
chiefs and founded a settlement in 1822. A few months after this another
batch of 55 settlers arrived under Jehud Ashmun, who was to prove
himself the real founder of Liberia. One General Harper now suggested
the name Liberia (Land of the Free) for the settlement, and Monrovia,
after President Monroe of the United States, as the name of the capital
city.
When the settlers first arrived the local chiefs, not knowing that they
had come to settle permanently, welcomed them enthusiastically. When
these chiefs discovered their mistake they became hostile and sought to
wipe out the settlement, partly because it interfered with their slave¬
dealing activities and partly because the settlers adopted an irritating and
superior attitude towards the established people. The Spaniards and
Cubans urged the local chiefs on, and even helped to provide them with
the arms and ammunition with which to attack the colony. The stability
and progress of the colony was also threatened by the fact that many
settlers refused to undertake agriculture. They preferred trade which
yielded quick profits and they spent these profits on foreign goods. The
economy of the country was thus unstable.
Though Liberia was many years younger than Sierra Leone its political
development was more rapid. This was largely because the United States
government was not prepared to carry the burden of administering Liberia
and so did not interfere, while the American Colonization Society, which
was responsible for the welfare of the settlement, was also liberal. The
officials of the colony were white men up to 1841, after which blacks took
over. In 1828 the elective principle was introduced. In 1830 the Liberia
Herald was published and it remained for 25 years the only newspaper in
West Africa. In 1838 Liberia was divided into two counties, Montserrado

60
and Grand Bassa, each of which had a national council of ten elected
members who, with two officials called the Agent and the Vice-Agent,
formed its governing authority.
All this while, the authorities of Sierra Leone remained hostile to
Liberia and their hostility was one of the factors which forced the infant
settlement to declare its independence rather prematurely. By 1830 Liber¬
ia laid claim to about 500 kilometres of the coast, most portions of which
were hardly populated. But European traders and the authorities of Sierra
Leone who made fun of the idea of a black government refused to
recognize Liberia’s claims to the whole of the area, or her right to levy
harbour and customs duties at any point of it. Liberia’s attempt in 1845 to
collect customs dues from an English trader, Captain Davidson of Sierra
Leone, only provided an occasion for humiliation, for the Sierra Leone
government sent Commander Jones of the West African Squadron to seize
from a Liberian port a vessel belonging to a Liberian subject. The United
States government was not prepared to take up the case of Liberia with
Britain, or with any other power. The American Colonization Society was
powerless to assist and so advised Liberia to declare her independence in
order to ensure recognition as a sovereign nation. In June 1847 the
Liberian authorities summoned a constitutional convention and on 26 July
of the same year proclaimed Liberia a sovereign republic with a constitu¬
tion modelled on that of the United States.

Economic consequences of abolition

The suppression of the slave trade also brought about an economic revolu¬
tion in West Africa, a revolution which not all the former participants in
the coastal trade - European and.African - could survive. The slave
traders who had invested heavily in the business by way of equipment
suffered heavily. True, these men were already familiar with the techni¬
ques and tricks of business in West Africa, and some of them had also
accumulated capital, but the transition from slave running to legitimate
commerce was painful and profits at first were low and uncertain. The
changeover estranged former friends. The arrangements for the trade
throughout the period of the slave trade recognized and respected the
position of the middlemen. But the rise of legitimate trade demanded a
new arrangement which would enable the Europeans to penetrate the
interior. The Europeans wanted to go inland partly to increase their profit
margin and partly to establish collecting centres for produce which were
more efficient than those existing along the coast. In the event a war
ensued between the middlemen and the European merchants. By the time

61
 I

the conflict died down the middlemen had lost their pre-1800 privileged
position. For those communities along the coast this loss of economic
position also meant loss of political stability. The history of the trading
states of the Oil Rivers in the second half of the nineteenth century
provides the best illustration of the truth of the above analysis. There the
House system which had served the needs of the slave trade largely went
down with that trade.

European exploration and penetration

During the last two decades of the eighteenth century European interest in
West Africa began shifting from the coast to the interior. Explorers sent
out by private European organizations and governments made determined
attempts to penetrate and explore inland. The earliest attempts in this
direction were dictated perhaps more by scientific than by commercial
interests. The eighteenth century witnessed the exploration of the interior
of many continents and countries. For instance southern Asia, the basin of
the Amazon and the interior of Australia were all explored in this period.
In view of this progress being made in the exploration of other parts of
the globe, some scientifically minded men in Europe felt that their
prevailing ignorance of the interior of Africa was a challenge. They wanted
to know more about Africa’s river systems, especially about the course of
the Niger, about Africa’s botany and natural history, about its peoples and
their ways of life.
But there was also an economic motive for the enterprise even from the
beginning, and as the business of exploration progressed this motive
acquired greater importance and even came to overshadow all others. One
of the results of the Industrial Revolution, as already noted, was Europe’s
pressing need both for new markets and for raw materials. For Britain in
particular, which took the lead in exploring the African interior, this need
became more pressing after the loss of America in 1783. In fact it was only
five years after this event that the African Association, which at first led
the movement for exploration, was founded. It is also significant that the
Association, though a scientific organization, was not slow to call the
attention of British businessmen to the economic promises held out by its
discoveries.
The third important factor partly responsible for this growing interest
in the interior of Africa was the movement for the abolition of the slave
trade. This did not influence the promoters of African exploration until
after the second decade of the nineteenth century. Before that time Bri¬
tain, as already shown, had thought that her plan to abolish the slave trade

62
could be achieved through naval patrols off the coast of West Africa and
diplomatic negotiations in the courts of European nations and America.
But experience later showed that this hope was exaggerated. It was only
then that a number of far-seeing men, the first of whom was James
McQueen, started to argue that the only way to abolish the trade effective¬
ly was to persuade Africans to turn from it to agriculture and legitimate
commerce. Since it was believed that Africans could not do this by
themselves, it was urged that European traders, agriculturalists and mis¬
sionaries should penetrate the interior and teach the people how to earn a
living by exploiting the natural produce of their country. For many years
McQueen was a lone voice crying in the wilderness. Though he advocated
this policy in the book A Geographical and Commercial View of Northern
and Central Africa, published in 1821, it was not until 1841 that the first
really organized attempt was made to carry out the programme.

British penetration

The exploration of the West African interior was the affair of the few
private individuals who formed the African Association before it became a
government-sponsored enterprise. The Association was formed on 9 June
1788 and with that the European drive to penetrate the interior of West
Africa could be said to have begun in earnest. Between 1788 and 1805 the
Association sponsored all the British exploratory missions into the in¬
terior. There were six of these. Then the British government stepped in
and took the lead. The African Association had taken time to publicize the
successes of its agents and to advertise the possibilities for profitable trade
in the Western Sudan which these agents had found. This propaganda
captivated the commercial and industrial classes who were becoming
progressively influential in British politics and public life. If the mouth of
the Niger, for instance, were to be discovered, it was argued that British
commerce would have a highway into the Western Sudan. Also about 1800
it came to be known that the French were showing serious interest in the
region of the Senegal. This caused some concern; if Britain did not act fast
enough the French would reap the benefits of the labours of the African
Association. In the light of these new developments it became clear that
the work of African exploration was too weighty an issue to be left in the
hands of private men who had no authority to act on behalf of the nation.
The problem of exploring West Africa was tackled from two main
directions, from the west coast and from North Africa, especially Tripoli.
The first and second attempts were made from Cairo and Tripoli respec¬
tively. When penetration from here seemed to hold no promise whatever,

63
 I

both explorers having died before they reached the Sahara, Britain de¬
cided to use the southern approach through the coast. In a sense this
seemed the natural route of approach. British business here was already
about three centuries old and there was no single barrier as great as the
Sahara to be encountered from the south. What was more, British busi¬
ness along the coast was already immense and it would not be difficult to
organize trade after initial exploration, since what was already established
could be extended. However, it soon became clear that the southern
approach could easily turn out to be the graveyard of British explorers.

64
The leaders of the three expeditions sent out between 1805 and 1816 died,
and this loss of life led Britain to the conclusion that the west coast was
not the best base from which to explore the Sudan.
Once again attention turned to Tripoli in the north, which now showed
promises of providing the long-sought-for gateway to the Sudan. For one
thing, Tripoli stood at the narrowest crossing of the Sahara. Secondly,
Tripoli now had an able and energetic ruler, Yusuf Karamanli, who had
established peace in the interior. Furthermore, this prince was on good
terms with Shaikh Muhammad al-Kanemi of Borno and Sultan Muham¬
mad Bello of Sokoto, the two men who controlled the southern half of the
route from Tripoli to the Sudan. Karamanli could thus guarantee safe
conduct to all travellers crossing the Sahara with his consent. Though the
attempt to use this route in 1819 failed, the leader of the expedition having
died at Murzuk, the next attempt in 1821 was a success. The explorers
reached the Sudan, and of the three members only one died. But the
expedition which followed this failed, the leader, Major Gordon Laing,
dying in circumstances which caused estrangement between Britain and
Tripoli. In consequence, attention shifted to the Niger waterway, whose
mouth had been discovered in 1830, but this route soon proved as
treacherous. Two expeditions which sought to use it in 1821 and 1841
suffered severe loss of human life.
Britain once more turned her attention to the northern route which had
meanwhile come under the control of friendly Turkey. The preparations
she made for return to this route gave the impression that, if things went
well, the route would be in use for a long time. For instance she estab¬
lished a vice-consulate at Murzuk in 1840, and another at Ghadames in
1847, which soon became centres for spreading British influence and
acquainting the people with British goods. Then in 1854 the Central
African Mission was sent to open up a secure way of communication with
the interior of West Africa across the Sahara. But this expedition, which
held out so much hope and promise, sealed the fate of the northern route.
Two-thirds of its members died, while a supplementary expedition sent to
help it lost four of its five members. There were also other factors which
helped to resolve the choice between the northern and southern
approaches in favour of the latter. Dr William Balfour Baikie, leading a
government expedition up the Niger in 1854, showed that the dangers
posed by malaria on the southern route could be effectively met by using
quinine as a prophylactic. Furthermore, as the southern route became
more frequented, more European goods got to the Central Sudanese
empires - Nupe, the Flausa cities and Borno - from the south. This meant
that much of the trade which hitherto travelled between Hausaland and
North Africa via the Sahara was diverted to the south. The rivalry between

65
 $

the northern and southern approaches was to some extent another side to
the old rivalry between the trans-Saharan trade and the Atlantic com¬
merce. By resolving it in favour of the southern approach the British
achieved what the Portuguese had aspired to long before but failed to
achieve.
The list of West Africa’s explorers and would-be explorers is long and
impressive. It is headed by John Ledyard who sought to penetrate through
Cairo but died before he could leave the ancient city. He was followed by
Simon Lucas who made the first attempt to use the route through Tripoli
but had to abandon the idea owing to the disturbed political situation in
southern Tripoli. The third on the list was Major Daniel Houghton who,
starting from The Gambia, explored the region of modern Senegal and
Mali and then disappeared without trace. More famous are Mungo
Park, Walter Oudney, Hugh Clapperton, Major Dixon Denham, Major
Gordon Laing, Richard and John Lander, James Richardson, Dr Hein¬
rich Barth and Dr Adolph Overweg.
The first major success in the exploration of West Africa was achieved
with Mungo Park’s first journey which was sponsored by the African
Association. He was charged with finding the course and if possible the
termination of the Niger, about which there was great ignorance in Europe
at the time. One theory about the Niger, for instance, maintained that this
great river rose in the east, flowed to the west and entered the Atlantic as

Mungo Park (1771-1806), the Scottish

explorer of the upper and middle Niger

66
three rivers. It was also hoped that Park might get to Timbuktu, about
which Europe had heard so much but knew nothing that was reliable.
Leaving England in May 1795 Park entered West Africa through The
Gambia and reached the Niger at Segu in July 1796. His plans to move
further down the river could not be implemented, partly because a state of
war existed between the Bambara states of Segu and Kaarta, partly be¬
cause his resources were running short, and partly because the rainy
season was getting more severe. He therefore went back to England in
1796 with reports of his travel which excited so much public interest that
in 1805 the British government sent him back to Africa. Park got to Segu
from where he set out down the Niger and to his death. Later reports
revealed that he perished at the Bussa rapids. Park’s travels were a
landmark in the history of West African exploration in the sense that he
was the first European in centuries to set eyes on the Niger and thus
establish beyond any dispute that the river existed. His testimony that the
Niger flowed west to east disposed of the earlier belief that it flowed in the
reverse direction. But it also created a new complication. Some armchair
geographers speculated, on the basis of this, that the Niger joined the Nile
somewhere, or disappeared into an inland sea in the desert.
The other great landmark in West African exploration was the discovery
of the estuary of the Niger by Richard Lander. Lander had been intro¬
duced to the field of West African exploration by Captain Hugh Clapper-
ton, who had been a member of the expedition also comprising Walter
Oudney and Dixon Denham which for the first time, in 1821, showed that
the northern gateway through Tripoli was a possible route into the Sudan.
When sent back to Africa to follow up the results of this expedition
Clapperton took Lander as his personal servant. This expedition had not
only failed but had also seen the death of Clapperton. Lander got back to
Europe only to be sent back by the British government to complete his
master’s half-finished assignment. Taking his brother John with him,
Lander first got to Bussa by land and then, travelling down the Niger,
emerged into the Atlantic through the river Nun in the Oil Rivers. The
Landers thus solved the puzzling geographical problem of the course and
termination of the Niger.
The significance of these journeys was mainly twofold. The first was
scientific. Europe came to know more about the geography and topogra¬
phy of the interior of West Africa than she did before 1800. For instance,
the sources of West Africa’s main rivers as well as the estuary of the Niger
were discovered. The explorers brought back much useful and detailed
information on the peoples of the region they visited, on their commerce
and civilization as well as on the flora and fauna of the interior. The
explorers’ narratives, especially Heinrich Barth’s five volume Travels and

67
 A Kanembu spearman from an engraving by Major
Dixon Denham. This is a detailed drawing typical of
those that nineteenth-century explorers made on their
travels, before the invention of photography

Discoveries in North and Central Africa, constitute a rich source of informa¬

tion on the geography, history, languages and peoples of the Western
Sudan.
The second importance of these journeys was economic. The explorers
painted an attractive picture of the opportunities which existed in the
Sudan for profitable business. To the mercantile interests in Britain this
was perhaps more important than the scientific information brought home
by the explorers. Thus each major advance in the exploration of the
interior was followed up with grandiose schemes and plans for the intro¬
duction of British commerce. The best illustration of this point was the
reaction of the British business class to the discovery of the mouth of the
Niger by the Landers. They considered it, and rightly, as opening a
highway for British commerce into the interior and immediately set about
exploiting it. A Scottish merchant, MacGregor Laird, led the formation of
the African Inland Commercial Company, which declared that its purpose
was to penetrate the interior and establish a commercial depot at the
confluence of the Niger and Benue, as a centre for collecting the produce

68
of the Sudan. The first expedition of the company left in July 1832 under
Richard Lander, but the project failed hopelessly. Many of the members,
including Lander, died from malaria. The African Inland Commercial
Company wound up in 1834. For about six years after that only indi¬
viduals like John Beecroft and Robert Jamieson attempted to trade up the
Niger, but they did not actually go beyond the Oil Rivers. This was not
the end of organized attempts at the commercial exploitation of the
discoveries of the explorers. In fact the drive received further justification
from humanitarian impulses.
By the 1830s it had become abundantly clear that diplomacy and naval
blockade were not enough as measures against the slave trade. What was
more, the bid to reach the Sudan through the northern gateway had
brought the British face to face with the internal slave trade from the
Sudan to North Africa. In consequence of this the humanitarians, now led
by Thomas Fowell Buxton, the author of The African Slave Trade and Its
Remedy (1839), started pressing for the implementation of the programme
which McQueen had put forward in the early 1820s. In 1841 an expedition
directed towards the attainment of these two purposes - the commercial
exploitation of the interior and the supplanting of the slave trade with
legitimate commerce backed by agriculture and Christianity - was orga¬
nized on a large scale by the British government and sent up the Niger.
This also turned out to be a failure. About fifty of the Britons who took
part in it died within three months and the expedition had to be aban¬
doned.
But the attempt continued. The British were not to be cheated of the
profits of their labours by a capricious climate. The next organized
attempt to tap the resources of the Niger was made in 1854. In that year a
goverment expedition under Baikie was sent up the Niger. This expedi¬
tion eventually became famous for two achievements. Firstly, through the
use of quinine as a prophylactic, Baikie was able to prevent the loss of even
a single life among the members of his party. This expedition thus turned
out to be the first up the Niger during which nobody died. Secondly, the
Pleiad the ship in which the expedition was made, navigated thenNiger
without great difficulty. This showed that the technical problems con¬
nected with navigating the Niger were being satisfactorily met.
In 1857 the British government entered into a five-year contract with
Laird under which it agreed to pay him an annual subsidy in return for his
maintaining a steamer service on the Niger. Between 1857 and 1859 Laird
and his agents established trading stations at Abo, Onitsha and Lokoja on
the Niger. From now on European enterprise and influence started to
penetrate the various sections of our region of study.

69
 I

French penetration

Though they certainly dominated hinterland exploration, it was not the

British alone who were active at this time in the business of exploring the
West African interior and exploiting its resources. France, Britain’s great
rival in West Africa from the eighteenth century, not only played some
part in the exploration, but was also concerned with tapping the resources
of the interior from the Senegal, the other important waterway of West
Africa. In the field of West African discovery France’s two most disting¬
uished travellers were G. Mollien and Rene Caillie. Mollien discovered the
sources of the Gambia, the Rio Grande and the Senegal in 1818, while
Caillie was, perhaps, the first European to reach Timbuktu and return
alive to relate his experiences. In many British circles, however, it was
believed that Caillie did not enter Timbuktu but had merely stolen the
journals of the English explorer, Major Gordon Laing, who reached
Timbuktu but later died in the Sahara.
With regard to exploiting the resources of the interior the French
concentrated their activities on the Senegal, where their interests had been
dominant since 1659 when an agent of the Compagnie Normande estab¬
lished the city now known as Saint Louis. A little later, in 1672, a French
admiral drove the Dutch from Goree, while another chartered company,
the Compagnie du Senegal, occupied such coastal towns as Rufisque and
Joal. In 1818 the French returned to the posts on the Senegal from which
they had been expelled by the British in the course of the Revolutionary
and Napoleonic wars. As part of the attempt of the restored Bourbons to
strengthen the economy of France they conceived a grand programme of
establishing on the Senegal large plantations of tropical crops like ground¬
nuts, cotton and indigo. To this end they appointed Colonel Schmaltz as
governor. The experiment, however, proved a failure owing to hostile
climate, lack of labour, poor soil and indigenous opposition.
Still the attempt continued. The French obtained land from the Walo
kingdom in return for an annual subsidy. On this land they established
experimental farms and gardens under the charge of experts specially sent
out from France. But this again ran into trouble. The Traza branch of the
Moors, who inhabited the right bank of the Senegal, claimed that the Walo
had no right to the land they leased to the French and so ravaged the
plantations and drove off the planters. Also the problem of labour re¬
mained unsolved. At one time the French government thought of an
arrangement with the Spanish government under which the latter would
send labour from the Canary Islands. But this plan was soon dropped and
about 220 black prisoners were sent down from Martinique (a French
island in the West Indies) to work on the farms. Indigenous Senegalese

70
prisoners were also made to work there. Still the labour was not enough.
Attempts to raise free labour failed.. Meanwhile the Traza continued to
ravage the farms. The French attempt to punish them only led to the
further destruction of the farms. Disillusioned, the French abandoned the
dream of flourishing tropical plantations on the lines of the Dutch Indies
and turned to commerce.
Nor did this flourish. For many years the only profitable trade was that
in guns. French penetration of the interior was made hazardous by the
Traza who through a system of alliances with the African peoples ringed
the French colony with a hostile combination. The rise of al-Hajj Umar in
the 1840s made the penetration of the interior even more difficult.
Moreover there was the fear that Umar would soon issue a call to all
Muslims to take up arms against the French ‘infidels’. This, it was felt,
would make the French position even more untenable. Governor Bouet-
Willaumez (1844) advocated the use of force to solve the problem of
interior penetration, but since the French treasury had no money for this
the home government did not support him. French presence on the
Senegal remained precarious and economically unrewarding until the
appointment of Louis Faidherbe as governor in 1854.
Faidherbe turned out to be a very able soldier and administrator as well
as a clear-headed diplomat. His first period as governor of the colony
(1854—61) transformed its history and brightened its prospects. On his
arrival he started a number of public works, and founded the Ecole des
Otages for the training of interpreters and French emissaries into the
interior. By means of military demonstrations on the river he firmly
established French prestige. In 1855 he brought the Walo kingdom under
direct French control, while in 1858 he defeated the Traza and forced
them to cease their molestation of French traders in the interior. To open
up the overland route connecting Dakar and Saint Louis he intervened in
the politics of the state of Cayor and deposed the Darnel in 1861. To
defend the colony and offer effective protection to French traders he built
forts at Medina, Joal and Kaolack.
Towards al-Hajj Umar he adopted a wise policy. He was not, like many
of his contemporaries, full of blind prejudice against Muslims, perhaps
owing to his wider experience with Muslims in Algeria. Therefore he was
not prepared to blame Umar for every indiscretion committed by his
over-zealous supporters and admirers on the Senegal, who at times acted
without his direction. All the same he was not opposed to showing Umar
that French enmity could be dangerous. Thus when his garrison at Fort
Medina was attacked by Umar’s forces he first relieved it by force before
talking of negotiation. Faidherbe knew he had not the forces to pursue a
policy of confrontation against Umar and so did not seek to follow up his

71
 »

victory. He was also lucky that at the time Umar’s eyes were fixed on Segu
and Macina. In 1860 the two reached a peaceful settlement delimiting
their frontiers. Faidherbe left Senegal in 1861, the most successful admi¬
nistrator the colony had so far had. He came back a second time (1863-5)
but with less dramatic results. Thanks to his achievements Senegal be¬
came the base for French advance into West Africa.

African reactions to European penetration

What, one is bound to ask, was the reaction of Africans to this growing
European invasion of their fatherland? What the common people thought
about this we do not know, but the vested interests in traditional African
society were plainly hostile. A few examples can easily be given. During
his second expedition Mungo Park got into Segu with an odd assortment
of goods. He displayed these in a small shop and sold them at great profit.
In doing this he aroused the hostility of the Mandingo traders from Jenne
and of the Moors who had hitherto monopolized all the trade here. They
decided to make things difficult for Park, and even tried to bribe the
authorities to kill him.
The same attitude was typical of the middlemen traders in the Oil
Rivers. Part of the difficulties which wrecked the 1832 expedition of the
African Inland Commercial Company was the opposition of these men.
They wanted to protect their position by preventing direct European trade
in the interior, and the Liverpool merchants who had long been estab¬
lished on the coast joined the African middlemen in opposition to their
fellow Europeans. They feared that if the trade shifted to the interior they
would sustain heavy losses in consequence of their having already spent
much money in equipping themselves for the coastal trade.
African rulers were generally enlightened and friendly in their attitude
to the explorers. Park’s journals record the hospitality and readiness to
help displayed by the chiefs of the territories through which he passed.
The king of Segu, for instance, was deeply impressed by Park’s arguments
on the advantages of establishing direct trade with Europe. In spite of the
hostility of the traders in his territory he was prepared to give Park an
escort. Clapperton’s relations with Sultan Muhammad Bello of Sokoto and
Muhammad al-Kanemi of Borno on his first mission tell the same story.
But the chiefs, concerned with the safety and peace of their territories,
were also suspicious and on their guard against the intruders. The attitude
of Bello was a case in point. When Clapperton on his first journey talked of
the advantages of European traders coming to trade directly within the
caliphate, Bello warned him against ‘big capitalists’. On his second mis-

72
sion Clapperton came at an inauspicious time, when relations between the
Sokoto and Borno empires had worsened. Without knowing of this
changed relationship Clapperton included in his gifts for al-Kanemi guns
and pistols. Bello confiscated these weapons on seeing them and forbade
Clapperton and Lander to go to Borno. Bello’s first duty was to protect the
caliphate which he had inherited from his father Usman dan Fodio.

The coming of the Christian missions

At the beginning, European interest in West Africa was not only commer¬
cial, it also had a missionary motive. This was particularly true of the
Portuguese who in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries attempted to
introduce Catholic Christianity into the Senegambian region, Sierra
Leone, Benin City and Warri. However this missionary aspect of Euro¬
pean interest was soon blighted by the slave trade. With the onset of this
traffic in human beings, slave traders not only maintained that Africans
were such inferior beings that their miserable position in life would not be
bettered by admission into the Christian fold, but also opposed any
attempt by missionaries to convert Africans along the West Coast.
Although in 1800 there were European priests in many of the coastal forts,
they were there to cater for the souls of the European agents, and to carry
out a meaningless baptism of African slaves before shipment. In places
like Benin City and Warri what remained of the earlier attempts at
planting Christianity were memories preserved in oral traditions, the motif
of the cross which had been adopted by indigenous artists, and ruined
temples.
In the nineteenth century the attempt to Christianize West Africans was
revived, first by Protestant missions and then by Roman Catholics. The
Evangelical Movement which had supported the abolition of the slave
trade and slavery also took steps to introduce the Christian message to the
non-Christians of Asia and Africa. The first missionary society to arise out
of this movement was the Baptist Missionary Society, founded in 1792 by
William Carey. Others followed: the London Missionary Society (1795),
the Glasgow Missionary Society (1796), the Church Missionary Society
(1799), the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804), and the General
Missionary Society of the Methodists (1818). The movement was not
limited to Britain. Societies were being founded at the same time in
America and Europe. In the United States the American Board of Com¬
missioners for Foreign Missions was founded in 1810 and the General
Missionary Convention of the Baptist Denomination in 1814. On the
European continent the Netherlands Missionary Society was founded in

73
 I

1797 and the Basel Missionary Society in 1815. Catholic missionary

societies came much later. Among the earliest was the branch of the
Society for the Propagation of the Faith founded in Lyons (France) in
1822. Fifteen years later the missionary society of the Holy Ghost Fathers
was founded in Paris, then came the Society of African Missions founded
by Father de Bressilac in 1856.
Before the end of the eighteenth century British missionary societies,
led by the Baptists, began work in West Africa, starting with Sierra
Leone; but by 1800 none of these missions had a solid outpost in West
Africa. The real beginning of the new missionary effort in West Africa can
be taken to be 1806 when the Church Missionary Society (CMS) was
established in Sierra Leone. From then on mission stations grew apace
along the coast. By 1853 the CMS had other stations at Abeokuta (1844),
Lagos (1851), and Ibadan (1853); the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary
Society at Sierra Leone (1811), in the Fante states (1833) and at Abeokuta
(1844); the Basel Missionary Society among the Fante (1827); the Church
of Scotland Mission at Calabar (1846) and the Bremen Society among the
Ewe of Ghana (1847). The American missions, also led by the Baptists,
concentrated on Liberia.
For many decades and for a variety of reasons missionary enterprise in
most of West Africa was limited to the coast. Until the discovery made in
the 1850s that quinine could be used in preventing malaria, the missionar¬
ies, like other European visitors to the coast of West Africa, died in large
numbers, with the result that there was a perpetual shortage of the
qualified men needed for expansion inland. The tendency therefore was to
concentrate on the coast. Also, African rulers and elders in the interior,
unlike their counterparts along the coast, often proved very hostile to the
new religion. It was only after they had been forcibly brought under
European rule that they were compelled to allow missionaries a free hand
in their territories.
In Sierra Leone the missionaries had more than enough to do as a result
of the continued addition to the population of the colony of thousands of
liberated slaves who needed conversion and education. In Liberia the
hostility, open or veiled, between the Americanized settlers and their
indigenous neighbours in the interior was an obstacle to the spread of the
influence of the missions beyond the boundaries of the republic. On the
coast of Ghana the incessant war between the Asante and the British made
it unsafe for missionaries to venture inland, though it must be mentioned
that Thomas Birch Freeman, who was half-black West Indian and half-
European, opened a Wesleyan outpost at Kumasi in 1839. The reputation
of Dahomey for barbarism and bloodthirstiness, whether merited or not,
warned missionary intruders off her interior for a long time.

74
 + CATHOLIC MISSIONS + PROTESTANT MISSIONS
IS. Lyons Society S.M. Sasef Mission
hQ.F Poly if host fathers M.f.C. Methodist Episcopal Church
SAM. Sacred Near! of Mary Ntj.M. North ferman Mission (Eremen)
W A kite Fathers PEC Protestant Episeopat Church (U.S)
PM. Primitive Methodists
PM.S. Fans Missionary Society (Societe
woo des Missions Evanyehyucs)
SPQ. Society for the Propagation of the
(jospei (C.ofEO
SUM. Sudan United Mission
U. S. United Erethren in Christ (U.S.)
fens, (wo) JEMS. Nesieyon Methodist Missionary
w.r (1895)+—.. f°c^ty
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tms. (l82l)\MF (l$9S)

+
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C.G.F. (1890)
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flBOS)
IS. (19/1) FEM. (1913) \ CM.S. (1905) _
FU.S.CSSS) MOM (1905) ± Ateokuta w SUM. (1904VAPT (1902)
Ml (1396) CMS, (1842) (1884)
F£.C.(1S36)X +
mS. (18%h * WM (1844)* + +' CMS. (1890)
MFC. (1855) cms. dm) Calabar
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^ r SH.M.(1885)
v#

The spread of missionary activities in West Africa

In Yorubaland, where by 1853 the CMS had gone as far as Ibadan,

about 150 kilometres from Lagos, the situation was different. The rivalry
among the states which emerged after the collapse of Oyo in 1830 made
many Yoruba states willing to accept any group of Europeans, traders or
missionaries, as each state hoped to strengthen itself through alliance with
Europeans who brought the guns it needed for war. The Egba found the
CMS missionaries who settled amongst them a great asset in their wars
with Dahomey. Otherwise indigenous opposition to missionary activity
was the rule in the interior. As a result the great age of missionary

75
 I

expansion did not come until the establishment of colonial rule, with
which event Africans ceased to be masters of their own fates.
Since the nineteenth century was spent by most missionary bodies in
gaining toeholds on the West African coast, missionary impact on West
Africa did not manifest itself in any pronounced form until the twentieth
century. But from the beginning there was clear indication that socially,
morally and politically missionary propaganda was going to inaugurate
many changes. These lines of change can be briefly indicated here.
Conversion to Christianity necessarily involved weaning Africans away
from traditional religions as well as from traditional social values which
were based on those religions. From their past experience the missionaries
believed that to make their work permanent they needed to change most
aspects of African traditional life. Thus they preached not only against the
slave trade and slavery, against human sacrifices and twin destruction, but
also against such practices and institutions as polygamy, the taking of
titles, body tattooing, secret societies, traditional dances and modes of
dress. In return they extolled the adoption by Africans of European ways
of life, for instance of European modes of dressing and the habit of tea
drinking.
The missionaries’ chief instrument of effecting change was the spread of
western European education. They felt that to achieve their ambition in
West Africa they needed to raise an indigenous class of people who would
be able to carry on the work of evangelization if for any reason Europeans
should withdraw. And in any case, because of the ravages of the West
African climate and of malaria on the Europeans, Africans were required
who were used to West African conditions. To fit into the missionary shoe
the Africans had to know how to write, and how to read, interpret and
teach the Bible. To achieve this, western literary and technical education
had to be introduced into West Africa. In pursuit of this programme the
missionaries became the greatest champions of western education in West
Africa, especially in the areas which later became British territories. In
Sierra Leone, for instance, by 1861 the CMS already had 21 elementary
schools. During the following four yearss it founded a secondary school
for boys and another for girls. The Fourah Bay College, now the Univer¬
sity of Sierra Leone, was founded by the same missionary body in 1829.
The other missionary bodies were not as energetic as the CMS in this
period, but they all contributed towards the establishment of educational
institutions in West Africa. Moreover, since the missions were confined to
the coastal areas until much later, the impact of the education they
provided was felt most in Lagos, Accra, Freetown, Bathurst (now Banjul)
and like places.
The missionaries also initiated the scientific and systematic study of

76
West African languages and gave most of them a written form. The
missionaries needed a thorough knowledge of the languages of West
African peoples in order to approach them directly instead of through
interpreters, and also in order to translate the Bible or sections of it into
vernacular languages for the use of the people. The missionary study of
West African languages was born in Sierra Leone between 1830 and 1832
when the CMS Missionary, Rev. J.T. Raban, began a study of Yoruba
with a view to effectively reaching the increasing Yoruba population of the
colony. When the ‘civilizing mission’ of 1841 was being projected the
study of Nigerian languages was intensified under Rev. J.F. Schon in
order to raise interpreters. From these small beginnings the study of
indigenous West African languages had made rapid progress by 1862. By
that year many primers, dictionaries and grammars of indigenous lan¬
guages had been produced by the missionaries. Rev. S.W. Koelle pro¬
duced in 1854 a Grammar of the Bomu or Kanuri Language and African
Narrative Literature in Kanuri; Schon published a Hausa Primer in 1857
and his Grammar of the Hausa Language in 1862. In the latter year also the
Rev. Hugh Goldie of the Presbyterian Mission produced his Principles of
Efik Grammar and Specimens of the Language. In the years that followed
the missionaries not only deepened and broadened their achievements in
the fields indicated above, but also extended their services to providing
such social amenities as hospitals and maternity homes.

The African educated elite

As a result of this spread of education there arose in West Africa a new

class of people generally called the western-educated elite. They came to
occupy leading positions in West Africa because they could read and
write, and had learnt many of the ideas and techniques which were
responsible for the progress of Europe in the nineteenth century. These
people dressed in a new way, thought in a new way, and led their people
when it came to dealing with white men. The missionaries and other
Europeans expected them to spread western civilization, western com¬
merce and western Christianity among their people. For many years
members of this class believed that they and the missionaries and Euro¬
pean traders were all pursuing the same goals in West Africa, that is
promoting progress and spreading civilization. It soon became evident,
however, that many Europeans who came to West Africa were concerned
more with their own gain than with serving West Africans. It shocked
many educated Africans to discover that there were even missionaries who
were sometimes ready to help those who wanted to deprive West Africans

77
 t

of their independence. With this discovery relations between the educated

Africans and Europeans soon turned into mutual hostility.
The beginning of this quarrel could be seen in the politics of Sierra
Leone in the 1850s. Sierra Leone, like Liberia, produced many members
of this new elite; in fact it was from there that many of them spread to
Ghana and Nigeria. In Lagos in the 1860s nearly all the members of this
class came from Sierra Leone. Most of them were freed Yoruba slaves
who, after their stay in Sierra Leone, started, from about 1839 onwards, to
go back to the land of their birth. In the 1850s the educated class in Sierra
Leone were disappointed by British unwillingness to introduce repre¬
sentative government into the colony, though the British themselves en¬
joyed parliamentary government at home. These educated Sierra Leo¬
neans became all the more discontented when they compared what was
happening in the colony with what was happening in Liberia, where the
people governed themselves. They therefore started to attack the Crown
Colony system of government which was imposed on them. In 1853 they
formed the Sierra Leone Committee of Correspondence to ask for more
political rights and for a change in the existing situation. Here we can see
that, from the beginning of the quarrel between the new elite and the
Europeans, the former adopted the method of grouping themselves
together which in later years led to the growth of the highly organized
political parties which helped to bring an end to European rule in West
Africa.
One other consequence of the introduction into West Africa of western
Christianity with its hallmark of literacy in the Roman script, remains to
be mentioned. This was the rift it caused in African communities. Men¬
tion has already been made of the rise of a new elite who became the rivals
of the traditional elites of chiefs, priests, diviners, artists and the like for
the leadership of society. In those societies where European rule at the
local level later took the form of indirect rule, this rivalry was to loom
large, at times becoming bitter in tone. This was all the more the case as
the first converts to Christianity, and therefore the first members of the
new elite were usually ex-slaves, or in any case from the underprivileged
sections of society.
There was another side to this tendency for Christianity to introduce or
reinforce divisions within African society and thus weaken African resist¬
ance to alien invasion. From purely accidental and historical and logistical
reasons, Christianity sought to penetrate West Africa from the coast.
Consequently it achieved its greatest success in the southern forest areas.
The Sudan or the northern regions remained largely the domain of Islam.
The result was, as time went on, a north-south religious dichotomy which
went far to reinforce differences of outlook arising from differences of

78
geography, economy, and political experience. The problems posed by
this fact are best seen in contemporary Nigeria.
Even in the forest or southern regions which were more or less the
domain of western Christianity, the introduction of that religion helped to
emphasize long-standing divisions between ethnic and political units.
There were too many rival Christian denominations soliciting for converts
in the region. This fact enabled each small community to ensure that it did
not embrace the same denomination as any of its neighbouring rivals or
enemies. In this way ancient lines of rivalry and conflict were baptized and
dressed up in the idioms and symbols of the new age.

79
 t

3 Revolutions and wars

Introduction

The first eight decades of the nineteenth century brought great and often
violent changes to many areas of West Africa. In the Sudan the period saw
the forcible establishment of new states by men who claimed to be inspired
by the desire to ensure that relations between man and man, as well as
between man and state, were guided by Islamic codes of law, justice and
morality. In Guinea it witnessed the disintegration of one of the greatest
empires of the forest region, as well as attempts at military expansion by
two of the remaining three. It is with these happenings and how they
helped to shape the history of many West African peoples that this chapter
deals.

The jihads of the Western Sudan

The jihads, which were among the most significant events in nineteenth-
century West African history, were brought about by factors which were
so many, so varied and so complex that historians are not yet agreed on
their true nature. However, they may be seen as resulting from tensions
which had existed in Sudanic society for some time before the nineteenth
century.
In the first place there was a conflict in most Sudanic communities
between Islam and the traditional religions of the peoples. Though by
1800 Islam was many centuries old amongst most Sudanic peoples, it had
not succeeded in displacing the traditional cults. This was an explosive
situation, for Islam, although it recognized Christians and Jews as ‘people
of the book’, did not recognize the validity of any other religion. In
orthodox Islamic doctrine the only way to the good life in this world and to
salvation in after life was provided by the teachings of the Prophet
Muhammad. Furthermore Islam commanded that all faithful believers

80
had a duty to persuade, and if need be to force, all non-Muslims who were
not ‘people of the book’ to embrace the faith. The parallel existence of
Islam and the traditional religions in the Sudan was thus very unsatisfac¬
tory and challenging to orthodox Muslims.
Moreover Islam was not just a religion to be practised privately by
individuals; it was also a way of life and so had its own codes of law, justice
and morality, which it held should guide all properly ordered societies and
states. At the opening of our period of study the ways of life pursued in
many Sudanic states and societies were a contradiction of this ideal. Some
of the states, like Segu and Kaarta, were ruled by adherents of traditional
religions. Other states like the Hausa Bakwai were nominally Muslim in
the sense that their dynasties were Muslim, but did not enforce the code of
laws known as the Malikite code which most orthodox Muslims in the
Sudan expected them to follow. Since there were Muslim communities in
most of the Sudanic states it meant that orthodox Muslims were made to
live under conditions which did not satisfy their religious consciences.
What was more painful to such Muslims was that states ruled by followers
of traditional religion or nominal Muslims often forced them to pay
tributes and to undertake other obligations which were either not com¬
manded by the Quran or were forbidden by it.
From the above general sketch it becomes clear that if some determined
Muslim reformers were to come into existence at any time in the Sudan
there would be open conflict between them and those who did not want
the existing state of society to change. This was precisely what happened
in the nineteenth century.
There were also political reasons for the jihads. Generally the Muslim
clerical class were better educated than their traditionalist or nominally
Muslim neighbours and rulers, with the result that they believed they
knew more about the world in which they lived than their illiterate
neighbours. As educated men they were often employed as secretaries and
advisers by rulers; they also had a high reputation as makers of powerful
charms which could protect their wearers from evil-minded people and
dark forces, or ensure victory in war. These Muslim clerics enjoyed a great
deal of influence in the communities in which they lived. This was another
source of trouble between them and the non-Muslim or nominally Muslim
groups in the Sudan. The clerics felt superior to their neighbours and
rulers who depended so much on their services, and also became political¬
ly ambitious after having tasted power as advisers and secretaries. The
rulers on their side not only became jealous of the influence which their
advisers accumulated but they also grew very suspicious of their political
intentions.

81
 »

Fulani Muslims

These tensions started coming to a head from about 1725 when the
reforming Muslim clerics began pressing their points of view. Most of
these men came from among the Fulani, especially from the town Fulani
who were often fanatical Muslims. The Fulani led in these movements not
only because they were good Muslims, but also because they had economic
grievances against the Sudanic peoples, who saw them as strangers and
discriminated against them in matters of land ownership and rights of
trade. Because they were scattered throughout the Sudan the movement
spread over the whole region. Some other Sudanese peoples, such as
Tuareg, certain branches of the Songhai and Mande-speaking peoples who
had been associated with Islam for a long time and some Hausa, also took
part in the jihad. Though the participants in the revolution thus differed
in their ethnic origin, they were united in the fact that they had a common
ideology (Islam) and were generally from sections of the people who could
be described as politically underprivileged.
Open conflict between the Muslim reformers and the non-Muslim or
lukewarm Muslim dynasties of the Sudan began in the eighteenth century
in the western half of the Western Sudan. In 1725 some Islamic reformers
led by a Fulani called Alfa Ibrahim bin Nuhu successfully rose against the
pagan rulers of Futa Jallon and established there an imamate, that is a
state under an imam, a religious leader who claimed to rule in the name of
his maker. A little later a similar move occurred in Futa Toro, a state west
of Futa Jallon and on the southern bank of the river Senegal. There the
reformers, led by a man called Suleiman Bal, declared a jihad against the
pagan rulers of the state in 1769. In 1776 the latter were overthrown and a
state along the lines of Futa Jallon was established by the victorious
reformers. Later still another imamate was founded at Bondu in the region
between Futa Jallon and Futa Toro.

Usman dan Fodio

But the most important of these jihads were fought in the nineteenth
century, and of these the most successful and the one with the most
enduring results was that fought in Hausaland under the leadership of
Usman (Uthman) dan Fodio.
Usman dan Fodio, a Fulani of the Toronkowa clan, was born in
December 1754 at Maratta near Birnin Konni in the then leading Hausa
state of Gobir. At the early age of 7 he was taught to read and copy the
Quran by his father who was himself a scholar and teacher of some note.

82
After this, like other young Muslim students, he started wandering from
place to place in search of distinguished teachers under whom he could
further his education. In the process he passed through the hands of many
sheikhs who introduced him to the rich intellectual heritage of Islam.
Abdul-Rahman ibn Hammada taught him syntax and grammar; Uthman
Binduri imparted to him his zeal for right living and action; while a third
cleric, Jibril, also infected him with his zeal for radical religious, social and
political reform. Jibril had got so exasperated with what he considered
social injustice and irreligion in the Hausa states that he had at one time
planned a jihad but had been thwarted.
By the time he was 20 Usman dan Fodio had finished his studies and
settled down to teach (1774—5). With his centre at Degel, he travelled far
and wide in Hausaland teaching the Islamic religion and pleading for
social reform. His preaching journeys took him especially to Kebbi and
Zamfara. By the time he completed these travels he had become so famous
that he decided to settle at Degel while those in need of instruction flocked
to him. It did not take long before the king of Gobir, Bawa, recognized the
political danger in Usman dan Fodio’s activities and sought to control him
by appearing to conciliate him. But it was with Bawa’s successor, Nafata,
that the clash between the reformer and established authority came into
the open. In a bid to counter Usman’s influence, Nafata issued decrees
which laid down that only those born as Muslims could practise the
Muslim religion and that all those who had been converted to Islam as a
result of the recent propaganda of Usman should return to the faith of
their fathers. Some of the decrees denied any cleric except Usman dan
Fodio the right to preach, and forbade such Islamic practices as the
wearing of turbans by men or of veils by women. This conflict deepened
when Yunfa, a former pupil of Usman dan Fodio, succeeded Nafata as
King of Gobir. The final break came when Usman released a group of
Muslims who were about to be sold into slavery by Yunfa’s men, for
according to the Quran Muslims should not be slaves. This action of
Usman angered Yunfa, who gave orders that his former teacher should be
seized for trial. Before this could be done Usman dan Fodio and his
followers fled to Gudu on 21 February 1804, and from there declared a
jihad against Gobir, At the same time Usman dan Fodio was proclaimed
Amir al-Muminin (Commander of the Faithful) by his followers.
Yunfa was quickly defeated by Usman’s brother, Abdullah. Fearing
that the Fulani would support Usman, other Hausa states attacked the
Fulani in their areas. This step made matters worse, since it forced the
cattle- and town-Fulani to unite against their Hausa oppressors. The
jihad thus spread beyond Gobir and covered all Hausaland. One after the
other the Hausa states fell into the hands of Usman and his followers. By

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1810 most of Hausaland had come under the control of the Fulani who
formed them into an empire (caliphate) under a caliph with his capital at
Sokoto, which was founded in 1808 to mark the dawn of the new era.
After seeing the jihad through its early years Usman dan Fodio retired
from active politics to resume his life of contemplation and scholarship
which the wars had interrupted. Before doing so he divided his empire in
two with capitals at Sokoto and Gwandu. The Sokoto part he gave to his
son Muhammad Bello who was later to succeed him as sarkin musulmi
(Leader of the Faithful); Gwandu went to his brother Abdullah.

Reasons for the success of the jihad

Why, one might ask, did the Fulani rebels find it so easy to overthrow the

84
 Bludgeon of wood Wrist dagger

Sword

Bow A selection of northern Nigerian weapons.

It should be remembered that the majority
of the soldiers fighting in the jihads had no
firearms. Much skill and care was thus
taken with the manufacture of traditional
Knife with sheaf
weapons, as can be seen from these
drawings

Quiver and arrows

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 I

old Hausa aristocracy? The reasons were many but the main one was the
inability of the different Hausa states to unite in a common effort against
Usman dan Fodio and his followers. The states had risen as rivals and they
remained rivals to the end. Neither the invasions of the Songhai in the
early sixteenth century, nor of the Borno from the fifteenth century nor of
the Jukun of Kwararafa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nor
the unceasing raids of the Tuareg of the desert over the centuries, had
succeeded in inducing the Hausa states to co-operate. Instead they gloried
in their independence and often went to war against one another. Thus,
when Yunfa appealed to the other states for help, he received no response.
The mutual jealousy and suspicion among the Hausa rulers gave the
Fulani the opportunity to attack and defeat each in turn. In contrast the
Muslim leaders in the Hausa states responded favourably to Usman dan
Fodio’s call for support. So did the great leader’s Fulani kinsmen.
Another reason for Usman’s success was that it was not the Fulani alone
nor Muslims alone who resented the rule of the old Hausa aristocracy.
Different sections of the Central Sudanese society at this time felt discon¬
tented for different reasons. Some resented over-taxation, while others
resented the moral and religious laxity of their rulers. All these discon¬
tented elements saw Usman dan Fodio’s uprising as a chance to build a
better and happier world, and joined him. Some of them were later to find
that Fulani rule was no less irksome than Hausa rule, but not before they
had helped to destroy the Flausa city states. There were some who sup¬
ported the Fulani because they saw the ensuing confusion as an opportun¬
ity for loot and rape. At the time of the conflict, therefore, the Hausa kings
lacked enough supporters to overwhelm the Fulani.
What was more, Usman dan Fodio and his followers, convinced of the
purity and righteousness of their own cause, fought with a zeal and
enthusiasm which the bewildered Hausa rulers could not match. Finally,
from a strategic point of view, the wide dispersal of the Fulani in previous
centuries worked to their advantage. The Hausa rulers had to deal not
with foreign invaders but with organized rebel groups within their gates.

Repercussions of the jihad

The echoes of Usman dan Fodio’s jihad were not restricted to the Hausa
states; on the contrary they were heard with varying intensity and results
in three other neighbouring states and beyond. In 1808 a section of the
Fulani in the Borno empire rose in sympathy with Usman against the
Sefawa; as a result that ancient but decadent dynasty lost its western
provinces, which became emirates of Hadejia (1808) and Katagum (1810)

86
under Fulani lieutenants of Usman within the Sokoto caliphate. The
Sefawa dynasty and empire already seriously weakened by the attacks of
the Tuareg of the desert, the Mandara kingdom of the mountainous south
and the states of Wadai and Bagirmi to the east were only saved from
complete ruin by a remarkable Islamic scholar and soldier from Kanem,
popularly known as Muhammad al-Kanemi. It was not al-Kanemi’s milit¬
ary genius alone that saved the Borno empire. He was also a reformist
Muslim, and his puritanical reforms in Borno made the religious prop¬
aganda of the Sokoto jihadists sound hollow in the ears of the Kanuri. He
also wrote books, in which he accused Usman and his followers of self-
seeking and hypocrisy and defended the stand of Borno. But, although the
Fulani failed to capture the whole of Borno, their jihad affected that
empire seriously. The jihad not only deprived it of its Hausa satellites and
of some of its western provinces, but was also responsible for the rise of
al-Kanemi and his children to positions of political importance. The latter
development was to end in the total eclipse of the Sefawa. After saving the
Borno empire, al-Kanemi came to enjoy a great deal of political authority
and influence in Borno as the commander-in-chief of the military forces
and as a great religious leader. What was left for the Sefawa was simply the
title of mai (ruler). Al-Kanemi died in 1835, to be succeeded by his son
Umar who in 1849 completed the political revolution which his father had
started by dethroning and killing the last of the Sefawas and stepping into
his shoes as the undisputed ruler of Borno.
The jihad of Usman dan Fodio also affected the fates of the non-Muslim
states of Nupe and Oyo lying to the south. We shall deal with Oyo and the
jihad later. In Nupe there were Fulani Muslims, led by Mallam Dendo
who, like their counterparts elsewhere, wanted to benefit from the revolu¬
tion started by their kith and kin in the Hausa states. Fortunately for them
at this time the Nupe state was in the throes of a disputed succession. The
Fulani supported first this and then that contestant and after they had
weakened the old dynasty sufficiently, quietly installed themselves as
rulers and brought Nupe under Gwandu.

Ahmadu Lobbo

The second of the three great jihads of the nineteenth century in the
Western Sudan took place in Macina, which lies west of Hausaland around
the great bend of the Niger. Here it was led by a reforming Fulani Muslim
called Shaikh Ahmadu (Ahmad, Hamad, Hamadu) Lobbo. This man had
taken an active part in Usman dan Fodio’s jihad in its early stages. Fired
with the spirit of this movement he returned west to Jenne from where he

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was soon expelled for subversion by the conservative Islamic scholars of

the city’s ancient mosque. He had accused them of ignoring the strict
practice of Islam which enjoined prayer and simple living in favour of
futile philosophical disputations. From there he fled north to Sebera
where he established a school and rallied men around him. In addition to
his routine teaching, Ahmadu tried to persuade his fellow Muslims that in
the present corrupt state of society the only course open to a faithful
Muslim was the jihad. In 1808 he said he had a vision in which he was
instructed to establish a Caliphate along orthodox Islamic lines. He did
not, however, meet with much success until the writings of Usman dan
Fodio on his own jihad reached the region, and those who doubted
whether Ahmadu was correct in his view read these works and were
convinced. Meanwhile Ahmadu had sent to Usman dan Fodio for a flag,
which was the accepted symbol that a jihad had Usman’s blessing; but
before this could arrive Ahmadu and his followers had fallen out with the
Bambara ruler of Segu, who was their overlord, and had declared a jihad
and defeated the armies sent after them.
Feeling confident of his ability to stand on his own, Ahmadu rejected
the flag when it eventually arrived. From Sebera he conquered Macina,
Jenne and Timbuktu and the neighbouring areas. He pitched his capital at
Hamdullahi, from where he organized his theocracy to which he recruited
the advice and help of Muslim scholars from the whole region. The empire
of Ahmadu Lobbo of Macina was perhaps better organized than that of
Usman dan Fodio though much smaller in size. Within it a more deter¬
mined attempt was made to abide by the dictates of Islam on how to run a
rightly guided state. Detailed regulations were made on environmental
hygiene and many other aspects of life. For instance married people were
not allowed to loiter around town after dark, horses and donkeys were to
be treated kindly, horse riders were not to look over fences lest they
should catch the women off guard.
Still the empire had its internal weaknesses and internal critics. Islamic
zeal and Ahmadu’s simple life were not enough to unite the diverse
elements in the state who had not forgotten their old rivalries going back
to the eclipse of the Songhai empire in the sixteenth century. Many
ancient families in Jenne and Timbuktu resented his rule, criticizing it as
harsh just like the ones it superseded. On Ahmadu’s death in 1845 his son
Ahmadu Seku was able to maintain his inheritance intact. But Ahmadu
Seku’s son Ahmadu, who succeeded to the caliphate in 1852, was unable
to do the same. What was more, under him the Macina caliphate came into
conflict with another - that of al-Hajj Umar - which had arisen further to
the west. Indeed the Macina caliphate was destroyed by al-Hajj Umar’s in
1862.

88
al-Hajj Umar

This other caliphate grew out of a similar movement led by another

Muslim reformer known popularly as al-Hajj Umar, but his full name was
Umar b. Said Tall, who, in all probability, was a Fulani, though some
scholars have described him as Tukolor. Umar, born either in 1794 or
1797, was a great soldier as well as a scholar of considerable ability. Like
Usman dan Fodio he started his studies under his father, Saidu Tall, who
was in his own right a learned man. After graduating from his father,
Umar travelled widely in the Sudan in search of learned scholars under
whom he would finish his studies. This took him to Mauritania, Futa
Toro (his home) and Futa Jallon. In the latter place he met the Tijani
scholar Shaikh Abdul-Karim al-Naqil who initiated him into the Tijaniyya
sufl brotherhood. In 1826 he undertook the pilgrimage to Mecca where he
met Sidi Muhammad al-Ghali who gave him further instructions in Tijani
lore. At Mecca Umar came into contact with the revolutionary ideas which
agtitated the Islamic world at this time. He travelled extensively in the
east, visiting Egypt where he met the sheikhs of al-Azhar University in
Cairo. After leaving the east Umar passed through Borno where he met the
reformer al-Kanemi, and Sokoto where he spent twelve years in close
touch with the court of Muhammad Bello. He married two Sokoto
women, one of them a sister of Bello.
In 1838 Umar left Sokoto for Macina soaked in the revolutionary ideas
of his time and world. His stay at Macina was short since his relations with
Ahmadu Lobbo were strained. From there he renewed his wanderings,
going to Segu and Futa Jallon preaching reform, making friends as well as
enemies. Finally he withdrew to Dinguiray with his followers to lay deep
plans for the jihad which he eventually launched in 1851, succeeding in
conquering Kaarta by 1854. His plan would seem to have been to create a
caliphate on the Senegal but he was thwarted by the French who drove
him from Medina which he had invaded in 1857. He then decided to strike
eastwards against the Bambara states and by 1861 had conquered Segu and
Kaarta. In capturing Segu, Umar alienated Ahmadu Ahmadu of Macina,
who regarded Segu as falling within his sphere of influence. The Macina
authorities had in fact sent forces to aid Segu against al-Hajj Umar. The
latter, regarding this as justifying war, invaded Macina and captured it in
1862, killing Ahmadu Ahmadu in the process. For the next two years
Umar found himself entrapped in Macina trying to suppress local rebel¬
lions.
At his death in 1864, Umar’s far-flung empire had no administrative
system to hold it together. Ahmad Seku, his son and successor as caliph,
inherited administrative problems which he never succeeded in solving.

89
Ahmad Seku, the son of al-Hajj Umar. No picture of al-Hajj Umar himself was apparently
ever produced but he must have worn similar clothing and perhaps bore some family
resemblance

Unfortunately he did not inherit his father’s great influence and pres¬
tige, which had helped to keep the conquests together and his followers
under control. As soon as Umar’s death was announced the empire broke
up into three virtually independent states. One part was under Ahmad
himself who ruled from Segu, the others were respectively ruled from
Hamdullahi and Nioro by Umar’s brother, al-Tijani, and a slave, Mustafa.
Mustafa and al-Tijani, while they acknowledged Ahmad Seku as caliph,
remained practically independent. In addition to these problems there was
the threat posed by the French based on the Senegal, who had developed
an appetite for the whole of the Sudan and looked upon Ahmad’s empire
as a mere obstacle to their advance. Had the French heeded his advice and
concerned themselves only with trade while he established himself as the
ruler of the Senegal basin, he would have had no quarrel with them.
Umar’s jihad differed from the other jihads of the Western Sudan in two
ways. Firstly it was centrally organized. Its military campaigns were
carried out from the centre according to previously laid plans, while
Usman dan Fodio’s jihad, for instance, had depended on uncoordinated

90
risings by his Fulani brethren who sympathized with his cause. Secondly
this jihad depended on the use of firearms to a greater extent than any of
the preceding ones. It was to obtain these arms that Umar encouraged
trade even with European unbelievers.

The effects of the jihads

In spite of the ease and rapidity with which some of these caliphates
disappeared, the jihads of the nineteenth century in the Western Sudan
made a great impact on the lives of the peoples in the region. On the
political plane they brought appreciable sections of the Western Sudan
under large empires, a feature that recalled the glorious days of Ghana,
Mali and Songhai. Usman dan Fodio’s jihad brought about 466 200 square
kilometres of territory under the allegiance of the caliph at Sokoto. The
jihad of Shaikh Ahmadu Lobbo of Macina created a state of about 145 000
square kilometres, while that of al-Hajj Umar created an empire 388 500
square kilometres in area. To a great extent within these states, at least
within the states of Usman dan Fodio and Shaikh Ahmadu Lobbo, this
meant the re-establishment of order and good government over a wide
area, leading to the expansion of trade.
The Macina caliphate was the most centralized of these states. The
Sokoto caliphate, though a loose confederation of practically autonomous
states acknowledging allegiance to the sarkin musulmi at Sokoto, was also
able to ensure a certain measure of law and order. The explorers of West
Africa who entered the Central Sudan and lived to tell their story were full
of admiration for the peace which reigned within the caliphate. But with
al-Hajj Umar’s empire, the story was different. Umar died before he had
organized an administrative system. His son and successor had not suffi¬
cient energy and drive to provide one. In consequence, unregulated and
apparently purposeless wars and raids rendered life here nasty, brutish
and short. To some extent the French were regarded by many communi¬
ties here as deliverers from an intolerable state of affairs.
On the religious side these jihads led to extensive conversions of non-
Muslims to Islam, while strengthening the faith of those nominally
attached to Islam. In northern Nigeria for instance, places like Bauchi and
Adamawa were for the first time brought within the influence of Islam.
Further west the wars and rule of Shaikh Ahmadu Lobbo of Macina
brought about extensive and permanent conversions. In the empire of
al-Hajj Umar things were again different. Extensive conversions were
achieved or enforced at the point of the sword. But when that sword was
withdrawn there were equally large-scale reversions to the traditional

91
 »

religion, especially among the Bambara. Although the jihads on the whole
strengthened Islam, they also weakened it in some areas, especially within
Umar’s caliphate. Umar made no distinction between outright non-
Muslims and Muslims who did not belong to the Tijaniyya brotherhood.
His Tijani exclusiveness and arrogance alienated many Muslims, especial¬
ly those who belonged to the older Qadiriyya brotherhood. This explains
why they did not support him, and in fact were sympathetic to the French.
Even in the central Sudan the two Islamic states there, Sokoto and Borno,
remained irreconcilable. Co-operation between them was impossible even
in the face of foreign aggression.
Socially the jihads were revolutionary. The old aristocracies of the
states against which the jihads were fought were overthrown, and in their
place rose new groups who hitherto had been among the unprivileged in

92
society. In particular, the Fulani underdogs of previous centuries became
the arrogant aristocrats of the future.
On the cultural plane the jihads were important mainly in the ferment of
intellectual activity they encouraged and created. The jihadists felt called
upon to produce written justifications of their actions, especially of their
attacks on supposedly fellow Muslims. Usman dan Fodio and his son
Muhammad Bello were particularly productive in this field. So was al-Hajj
Umar, but not on the scale of the former two. In other spheres of culture
the movement does not seem to have been very significant. In the central
Sudan, for instance, the Hausa, who suffered political defeat at the hands
of the Fulani, culturally conquered the latter. Even in political and admi¬
nistrative fields, the Fulani merely took over Hausa institutions. In lan¬
guage too most of the settled Fulani ruling group lost their language and
adopted Hausa.
By and large, however, the jihads caused much dislocation, much
confusion and much suffering, especially among the non-Muslims who
were raided to swell the volume of the trans-Saharan slave trade. The
distinction in Islam between the ‘abode of war’ and the ‘abode of Islam’
provided philosophical and religious justification for raids against non-
Muslims. This was at least so in northern Nigeria where raids against
non-Muslims stopped only with the imposition of British rule in the early
part of the twentieth century. The exact purpose of these raids which had
become a normal state of existence is a matter of dispute.

Samori Ture

A similar state of dislocation existed in the upper Niger region and it was
to some extent this which enabled Samori Ture, the son of a Malinke
farmer, to establish an empire for himself there from the 1850s onwards.
Samori, who was born about 1830, became a trader, until in 1852 he
joined the army of Sori Birama, King of Bisandugu.
It was immediately obvious that Samori was a brilliant soldier, and it
soon became his ambition to create a force strong enough to establish an
empire and impose peace throughout Malinke-land. With peace, trade
would flourish. After a few years in the army of Sori Birama, Samori felt
strong enough to establish himself independently, and his abilities as a
leader attracted many to serve under him; those who were less willing to
join him he persuaded, by force or diplomacy, to rally to his side.
Sanankoro became the main town of his new army and from the later
part of the 1860s and through the 1870s, Samori’s armies campaigned
regularly. By 1879 he controlled an area from Sierra Leone in the west to

93
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Ivory Coast in the east, and from a point near Bamako in the north, to the
Liberian frontiers in the south. His capital was at Bisandugu.
The system Samori gradually built up to administer this empire was to
split it into provinces; the three central provinces were directly controlled
by Samori and his ministers, while each outlying province was governed
by an appointed military official, who shared his authority with a qadi
(judge) who was also the local head of the religious community. This
direct control was carried down to the level of the village, groups of which
formed a district within each province.
But Samori depended on the army to acquire, and then to hold, his
empire. His power rested in the loyalty of the army and not, as for
example with al-Hajj Umar, on his authority as a religious leader. The
ranks of this army were filled mainly with captives, who were trained as
rifle-carrying infantrymen, and were known as sofa. These men formed a
standing army directly loyal to Samori, while in times of need a con¬
scripted reserve was also available, as well as a volunteer militia made up
of those who owned horses. Samori’s flexibility in using his forces - as
raiding parties, as protection for caravans or towns, or to lay siege to

A drawing based on a contemporary print of Samori’s arsenal. When Samori’s supply of

firearms from the coast was cut off he was compelled to manufacture and repair his own arms

94
fortified enemies - lies at the heart of his genius as a soldier. In addition
the army was supported by a highly organized administration which
ensured that supplies of all sorts were readily available. Apart from food,
Samori established groups of metalworkers to manufacture rifle parts,
cartridge cases and other military requirements.
Up to the year 1882 Samori’s armies continued to expand his empire.
Then, while they were laying siege to the village of Keniera (near Siguiri in
modern Guinea), there came the first clash with the French. This was
ultimately to result in the defeat and capture of Samori, and the destruc¬
tion of his empire, but his military genius enabled him to resist the French
for a long time, so that it was not until 1898 that he was finally over¬
whelmed.
Samori’s career has been the subject of controversy. He has been
regarded by some as a national leader fighting to maintain his empire in
the face of a colonizing power, and by others as a ruthless and cruel tyrant
who brought suffering to very many people, especially through his wars
and involvement in slave trading. Some have been impressed by the
gestures he made to Islam. He embraced the religion in 1850 just before he
took to professional soldiery. But it was not until the 1880s, after he had
become sure of his power base and with the increasing threat from the
French, that he began to identify his empire more closely with Islam. First
he changed his title from faama which was pagan to almamy (imam) which
was Muslim. Then in 1886 he issued a decree calling on all his subjects to
embrace Islam. But when this evoked spirited resistance, he withdrew it.
That was after 1888. In spite of all this, however, he cannot be numbered
amongst the great religious revivalists of the century. His Islamism would
appear to have drived largely from reasons of state.

Rabih ibn Fadlallah

Another empire builder cast somewhat in the Samori mould was Rabih ibn
Fadlallah, who started his career in what is now the Sudan, where he had
served under a slave dealer called Zubair Pasha. Like Samori, Rabih
broke away from his former master, and built up a strong and well-
organized army of his own, with which he invaded the Chad region around
1891. Rabih invaded and conquered Borno but, before he could consoli¬
date his conquests around Chad, he was challenged by the French in
Bagirmi. He was defeated by them and killed in 1900, after which his
empire collapsed. It had been held together only by his own ability as a
soldier and, although he tried to associate himself with the Mahdist
movement in the Sudan, religious zeal was not a notable part of his career.

95
 I

The collapse of the Oyo empire

The Yoruba empire of Oyo, founded about the fifteenth century, reached
the height of its power about the middle of the seventeenth century and
then disintegrated in the nineteenth century. Its collapse can be traced to
constitutional and administrative breakdown going back to the mid¬
eighteenth century. The strength and peace of the Oyo empire depended
on the readiness and ability of the alafin and the Oyo Mesi (State Council)
to keep each other in check. Some time in the eighteenth century the
balance between the two was upset as the alafin lost more and more
control over the army and the administration to a number of chiefly
lineages. The well-known career of Bashorun Gaha was only one of the
signs of the evil times into which the office of alafin had fallen. A politician
of great ability, influence and fame, Gaha used his traditional position as
chief king-maker to bring a succession of alafin and his fellow members of
the Oyo Mesi under his control. In this way he made himself the virtual
ruler of the empire. Though his tyranny was later ended in 1774 by Alafin
Abiodun, who destroyed him and almost his entire family, the events
associated with the years of his ascendancy left a lasting imprint on the
fortunes of the empire.
In the years before the eighteenth century some of the chief officials of
the Oyo empire were usually slaves of the alafin’s household. This was
particularly the case with certain offices at the metropolis, especially with
the elite corps of 70 warriors known as Eso who had command of the Oyo
army. Since these slaves were usually eunuchs they had no children and so
never raised families which could be in rivalry with the royal lineage. The
slave officials knew that they owed their position to the alafin and so
obeyed him implicitly. But during the course of the decline of the central
authority in the eighteenth century this tradition was quietly set aside and
the alafin were compelled to give important offices of state to some
powerful Yoruba families of free status who did not owe all they possessed
to the alafin. Thus the chief officials of the empire became less dependent
on the alafin, with the result that the office of alafin became weakened by
a continuous struggle for power. As the alafin and his advisers and
lieutenants were preoccupied with the constitutional crisis at the centre,
the provinces of the empire were less effectively governed. The provincial
residents (the ajele) did as they liked and became corrupt and oppressive,
while the local population of the provinces became restive and indepen¬
dent and rebelled at the earliest opportunity. For instance the Egba took
the opportunity of the conflict between Abiodun and Gaha in 1775-80 to
rebel against the oppression of the ajele and to throw over the yoke of Oyo.
All subsequent attempts to bring the Egba back to Oyo rule failed. The

96
trouble between Gaha and the alafin had led to the neglect of the army,
which therefore decayed.
The Oyo empire thus entered the nineteenth century afflicted with a
serious constitutional and administrative crisis which rendered it incap¬
able of effectively facing external threats to its existence. But in 1804
Usman dan Fodio had launched his great jihad, and the triumphant Fulani
advance towards the south which followed threatened the northern pro¬
vinces of the Oyo empire. To meet this threat Alafin Abiodun appointed
Afonja, a descendant of the Yoruba royal line, to the post of Are-Ona-
Kakanfo (an ad hoc commander-in-chief of provincial forces), with head¬
quarters at Ilorin and the duty of defending the empire against the Fulani.
But following the example of many other nobles at the metropolis, Afonja
treacherously proceeded to use his office to strengthen himself against the
central government. Abiodun’s successor, Alafin Awole therefore decided
to destroy him in the traditional way by setting him an impossible task
which he had to accomplish or commit suicide, Afonja not only refused to
tackle the task or to commit suicide he also rose in revolt against a later
alafin in 1817. At once all the discontented people, of whom there were
many in the empire, joined him. Unfortunately for the Oyo empire the
hands of the alafin were weakened by a struggle with the Oyo Mesi at this
time. What was more important, Afonja further strengthened himself by
allying with the Fulani and in doing so opened the gate into the Oyo
empire for the Fulani jihadists. First the Fulani helped Afonja to establish
the independence of Ilorin, and then they overthrew and killed him in
order to become the rulers of the province, which now became an emirate
under Gwandu. The extension of the jihad into Ilorin was the immediate
cause of the collapse of Oyo. It touched off a chain of events which kept
Yorubaland disturbed by wars and rumours of wars for the rest of the
nineteenth century.
These events greatly affected the outcome of the Owu war which broke
out in 1820. The people of Owu had quarrelled with the Ife and the Ijebu
over trade matters, as a result of which the Ife and the Ijebu began a
combined attack on Owu in 1820. About this time the war between Oyo
and Ilorin was causing the inhabitants of northern Yoruba towns to flee to
the south for safety. These displaced men thronged the highways and the
paths, seeking for means of livelihood and spreading panic and unrest as
they went. When they got to Owu they joined the Ife and the Ijebu, thus
helping to bring about the fall of the invested town. The fall of Owu did
not mean the end of the disturbance in Yorubaland, since the army that
destroyed Owu contained many homeless refugees, who had become
accustomed to live by plunder and who were not ready to demobilize and
settle down. This army therefore continued southwards from Owu until it

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got to the place now occupied, by Ibadan, where it destroyed Egba towns
and villages, thus forcing out the Egba who had to start a new settlement
at Abeokuta. About the same time the war between the Fulani of Ilorin
and the Oyo empire grew in volume and intensity. In 1830 the alafin made
a great effort with the aid of the Bariba of Borgu to recover Ilorin. The
attempt not only failed hopelessly but led to the destruction of Oyo, the
capital of the empire, by the Fulani. The alafin and his court fled in panic
into the forest town of Ago-Oja to the south, where a new capital was built
and named after the old. This is the present Oyo, which lies about 50
kilometres north of Ibadan. The old Oyo empire had thus completely
collapsed. The aftermath was a series of wars waged by a number of states
which sought to occupy the position of pre-eminence which Oyo had
hitherto enjoyed in Yorubaland.

The Yoruba wars

Though Ariba, the first alafin to rule in new Oyo, tried to revive the
time-honoured traditions of the empire and to maintain the prestige and
dignity of the royal court, Oyo ceased to play an important part in Yoruba
politics after 1830. The alafin was forced to recognize that Oyo was no
longer a military power, and that the defence of Yorubaland against the
outsider had passed to the towns which were either founded or grew in
importance as a result of the confusion following the Fulani invasion. The
best he could do was to confer traditional imperial honours and titles on
the leading chiefs of these rising towns in the hope of using them for his
purposes.
There were four principal Yoruba states involved in the struggle for
ascendancy. The first was Ijaye which was situated between Oyo and
Ibadan, and which was dominated by Kurunmi, one of the ablest Yoruba
generals of the day. Ijaye was responsible for defending the western
provinces of Yorubaland against Dahomey which now threatened to con¬
quer the Yoruba. In order to keep Ijaye within the imperial system Atiba
conferred on Kurunmi the title of Are-Ona-Kakanfo.
Then there was Ibadan which began as a war camp but soon became one
of the leading powers in Yorubaland. Here Oluyole was supreme. To
control him Ariba made him Basorun. Ibadan had the duty of defending
the northern and north-eastern provinces against the Fulani.
The Egba with their new capital at Abeokuta were also in the struggle
for supremacy in Yorubaland. They were not interested in the reconquest
of the provinces which the Fulani had seized, but only wanted to defend
themselves first against Ijebu and Ibadan and then against Dahomey and

98
Ibadan. For this they wanted an outlet to the coast from where they could
get the necessary European weapons.
Lastly there were the Ijebu. These shrewd businessmen were keenly
interested in the confusion in the interior, since it offered them immense
opportunities for profitable business. Success in these wars depended
greatly on the availability of guns and powder, which came from the coast
through Ijebu. The wars also produced a large crop of slaves which passed
through the hands of the Ijebu to those Europeans on the coast who still
traded in the commodity in spite of the British naval blockade. The Ijebu
therefore were determined to preserve their monopoly of the trade be¬
tween the port of Lagos and Benin. They were thus hostile to the Egba
who were trying to get a port on the coast. But when later Ibadan
threatened to swallow up all the rest of the Yoruba states the Ijebu were
frightened and allied with the Egba to frustrate this ambition.

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 The struggle between these states grew very intense after the battle of
Oshogbo (1840), where the Ibadan defeated the Fulani and put a check to
Fulani advance towards the south. The history of this struggle falls into
two clearly marked phases. The first phase was dominated by the struggle
between Ibadan and Ijaye in which the latter enjoyed the support of the
Egba. The rivalry between Ibadan and Ijaye led first to the battle of
Batedo (1844) which neither party won; and then to the more famous Ijaye
war (1860-2) in which Ijaye was destroyed.
The disturbances and skirmishes associated with this war lingered on
until 1878 as an engagement between the victorious Ibadan and the Egba.
One important development in this period was the fact that the British
became involved in the conflict. The British had seized Lagos in 1861, not
only as a means of stopping the slave trade but also in order to benefit from
the trade of Yorubaland. Their hopes were disappointed as the wars in the
interior disturbed the flow of trade, and they therefore became interested
in the restoration of peace. In 1865 they sent soldiers to expel the Egba,
who were besieging Ikorodu and so harming the trade of Lagos. In this
way the British entered the war on the side of Ibadan.
The second phase of the rivalry covered the years 1878 to 1892-3.
Ibadan emerged from the conflict of 1840 to 1878 as the strongest single
state in Yorubaland, and seemed likely sooner or later to assume the
position of leadership which Oyo had occupied before the nineteenth
century. The other Yoruba states were alarmed and formed a series of
military alliances and coalitions against her. The leaders of the coalitions
were the Ekiti, a people who had never come under the rule of Oyo and
now wanted to recover the independence which they had lost in 1858 when
Ibadan conquered them. For them, therefore, this was a war of independ¬
ence. The Egba and the Ijebu were by now the traditional enemies of
Ibadan and wanted to break her up. The Fulani of Ilorin sought to gain
from the confusion in Yorubaland and entered the war against Ibadan.
By 1886 all the sides in the conflict had exhausted themselves without
any side gaining a clear victory. From this time negotiations to end the war
started. But no progress was made until in 1892, when the British allies of
Ibadan defeated the Ijebu and forced all rival groups to end the war, which
they were no longer able to continue effectively or end on their own. In
1893 the Lagos government also forced the Ibadan and the Ilorin to end
their struggle. Peace now returned to Yorubaland.

The impact of the wars

The collapse of the Oyo empire at the hands of the Fulani thus had grave

100
ALBSOM PUBLIC LIBRAFL
501 S. Superior
ALBION, Ml 49224
consequences for the Yoruba people. First, it brought about a massive
shift in population. As the Fulani advanced from Ilorin the Yoruba fled
from the more open lands of the north to the thickly forested lands of the
south in search of shelter. This flight of population southwards led to the
growth of new towns. Here two good examples were New Oyo and
Abeokuta. Old settlements and towns also benefited from this develop¬
ment and expanded both in area and population.
Secondly, it brought the full impact of the slave trade to Yorubaiand.
Before the events of the nineteenth century most of the slaves from the
west coast came from the Niger Delta ports, Dahomey, the area of
modern Ghana, and the region to the west of it. The influence of the
alafin was somehow able to limit the extent to which the Yoruba caught
and sold each other, with the result that most of the slaves sold by the
Yoruba came from the markets to the north of Yorubaiand. When the
Fulani conquest of Ilorin closed the northern markets to the Yoruba the
slave demands of Ijebu and other coastal groups had to be met by in¬
creased raiding in Yoruba country. The interstate rivalry which followed
the fall of Oyo supplied these needs. Thus, though the desire for slaves did
not cause the wars, the fact that the wars produced slaves provided an
extra reason for prolonging them unduly. The wars were lucrative busi¬
ness.
Thirdly, the wars were a landmark in the history of Islamic expansion in
Yorubaiand. Even before the nineteenth century, there were Muslims in
the Oyo empire. But they were mainly Hausa slaves who were kept as
horse attendants and veterinarians. Their support was an important factor
in the success of Afonja and his Fulani allies against Oyo. With Ilorin
becoming an emirate within the Sokoto caliphate, Islam gained a firm
foothold within the Yoruba culture area. And as people fled from the
north to the south many important elements in society - soldiers, long¬
distance traders, charms specialists - who were already attracted by Islam,
penetrated further into Yorubaiand. The result was that by 1858, the Timi
of Ede was Muslim while such towns as Iwo and Iseyin were considered
strong centres of Islam. Then, in 1871, Ibadan got its first Muslim Bale
while by 1878 Oyo was said to have about 12 mosques.
Fourthly, the wars caused a military revolution in Yoruba society. As
the crisis deepened and spread, warriors began arming themselves more
and more with firearms imported from Europe in place of traditional
weapons. This change compelled people to become professional as leaders
spent time training their followers in marksmanship, camouflage and
other aspects of tactics. It was with the new importance attached to
firearms that interest in the coastal trade grew. The guns and the powder
were bought from the Europeans at the coast. This was one reason why

101
neither the Ijebu nor the Egba could have stayed out of the war even if
they had so wished for they controlled the access to the coast where these
purchases could be made.
Fifthly, the wars created the opportunity for British intervention in
Yorubaland. Since the Yoruba were divided amongst themselves the
British found it easy to have their way. While appearing to be bringing
peace to the Yoruba people the British actually deprived them of their
independence.

Dahomey

From about 1840 to the end of the nineteenth century the kingdom of
Dahomey made a number of military incursions into Yorubaland. These
invasions have sometimes been treated as part of the internal history of
Yorubaland, and in particular as a phase in the Yoruba wars of the
nineteenth century. Here, however, they will be examined as part of the
history of the Dahomean state from which the invasions originated.
There were two main reasons behind the invasions. The first was
political. Ever since Dahomey rose to greatness in the first half of the
eighteenth century it had been a dependency of Oyo. Various attempts by
its kings to become independent of Oyo had only brought severe punish¬
ments at the hands of the Oyo army. Oyo overlordship at times meant for
Dahomeans subordination to irritating laws and regulations. For instance
the alafin of Oyo regarded the Dahomean army as part of his military
forces which should be placed at his service as he wanted. Also the alafin
from time to time passed regulations forbidding the kings of Dahomey to
use certain materials for clothing because those materials were considered
as only fit to be used by the alafin himself. Though the Oyo were never
really able to enforce obedience to these rules, they were humiliating to
Dahomean national prestige. Then Dahomey had to pay tributes to the
alafin throughout the eighteenth century. It was thus certain that any
king of Dahomey who could do so would end this subservience to Oyo,
which the proud Dahomeans found uncongenial. Also it must be remem¬
bered that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Dahomey was still an
energetic state full of imperial ambitions. It thus had a mission not only to
win its independence from Oyo, but if possible to expand at the expense of
that empire.
The second reason behind the invasions was economic. From about the
1740s the Dahomean economy rested mainly on slavery. Some of the
s aves were sold to Europeans on the coast, from whom the kings of
a omey got the manufactured goods needed by their people, especially

102
the arms and ammunition which were required for the army. Of those
slaves who were not sold overseas some were used in working the extensive
royal plantations while others served as the unfortunate victims of the
human sacrifices for which the kings of Dahomey were notorious. It was
to provide the slave needs of the state that the Dahomean army was
constantly in action to the west and north of the kingdom. By the begin¬
ning of the nineteenth century these traditional raiding grounds had been
seriously depopulated. Dahomey thus had to turn to the country to the
east and south-east, that is to a section of the Yoruba country. This change
was made possible by the break-up of the great Oyo empire which had
hitherto frightened Dahomey off Yorubaland.
In the nineteenth century the economic motive for expansion in the
direction of Yoruba country was reinforced. In 1807 Britain prohibited
her subjects from engaging in the slave trade and started a campaign to
abolish the trade throughout the world. By the end of the first half of the
nineteenth century the volume of the slave trade across the Atlantic was
being drastically reduced. For Dahomey this meant economic ruin. It
became essential to find a substitute for slaves as an export. This meant
that Dahomey had to find new tracts of fertile territory in which to grow
the products which the Europeans now required. The region to the west
and north was dry and infertile. It was the area to the east and south-east,
the Yoruba country, that once again answered Dahomey’s needs. Thus
whether it was slaves or land that Dahomey needed she had to look to
Yorubaland. Nothing could have prevented the clash between the Daho-
means and the Yoruba in the nineteenth century. The Dahomeans them¬
selves were conscious of this fact as shown by their war song which asked:

Yoruba and Dahomey

can two rams drink from one calabash?

For Dahomey the conditions appeared favourable: 1817 was the year of
Afonja’s revolt at Ilorin which opened a gate into Yorubaland for the
Fulani; 1820 was the year of the Owu war which started a civil war in
Yorubaland which lasted for 80 years. On the other hand Dahomey was as
strong as ever. In 1818 Gezo, a very energetic and ambitious man, came to
the Dahomean throne. When he saw that the time was ripe he declared
Dahomey independent of Oyo. d his claim was not contested and it looked
as if nothing would prevent Dahomey from overrunning the country to the
east and south-east, occupied by the Egbado and Awori Yoruba. Until the
1850s the Dahomeans financed this programme from the proceeds of the
slave trade which grew in volume in the 1840s through the encouragement
of the Brazilians. After the collapse of that evil trade in the 1850s attention
was shifted to the trade in palm produce. The Dahomean kings had

103
established extensive palm plantations. But the proceeds from the new
trade could not be compared to the yields of the slave trade. Contemporary
visitors to Dahomey contrasted the wealth and splendour of Gezo’s court
(1818-58) with the rather drab court of his son and successor Glele.
The political situation was complex. As a result of the confusion arising
from the Owu war the Egba had been expelled from their ancestral home
around Ibadan and forced to found the new town of Abeokuta. The nature
of politics in Yorubaland at this time made the Egba develop ambitions in
the direction of Egbado and Awori. To be able to defend themselves
against their enemies, the Egba needed a port on the coast through which
they could obtain the guns which were changing the nature of warfare in
Yorubaland. Since they could not hope to control Lagos, which was held
by the Ijebu, their enemies at the time, they hoped to gain control of
Badagri. To do this they needed to control the roads leading from Badagri
to Abeokuta. This in turn meant they had to control the Egbado and
Awori country. In this way the Egba came to stand in the way of
Dahomey.
It was these rival interests that soon brought the Egba and Dahomey
into conflict. Dahomey opened the aggression by sending forces to help
Egbado and Awori towns which the Egba were trying to seize. The Egba
bitterly resented this Dahomean intervention and retaliated in 1844 by
ambushing a Dahomean army which was going to attack the Egbado town
of Ilaro. In the scuffle that followed, the Dahomeans suffered more than
the Egba. King Gezo narrowly escaped capture but lost his royal umbrella,
stool and war charms. It was in that year that Gezo made up his mind to
destroy Abeokuta as a punishment for the insult. To prepare the way he
destroyed Oke Odan in 1848. The Egba retaliated two years later by
sacking Igbeji which was under Dahomey. The following year (1851) Gezo
undertook his long-expected, full-scale invasion of Abeokuta only to be
beaten off with severe losses. He was not able to return to the attack before
his death in 1858. But his son and successor, Glele, regarded the destruc¬
tion of Abeokuta as his life’s assignment and refused to complete the
ceremonies connected with his coronation until he had achieved this
ambition. But events proved him no luckier than his father for when he
attacked Abeokuta in 1864 he suffered a severe defeat. After this attempt
Dahomey did not again try to seize Abeokuta by storm, but resorted to
isolated raids and forays against the Egba. Glele, however, met with better
luck in his attack on Ketu, a Yoruba kingdom, which he devastated in
1883 and took by siege in 1886.
Abeokuta s victory over Dahomey was to some extent the result of
British aid. The Lagos government in particular supplied the Egba with
guns and powder and sent trained soldiers to educate the Egba on how to

104
King Behanzin, the last independent nineteenth-century king of Dahomey. He succeeded
Glele in 1888 and was deposed by the French in 1894

repair their defences and how to fire some of the new guns they supplied.
The CMS missionaries who at this time were settled at Abeokuta identi¬
fied themselves with Egba interests. In their writings they presented the
Dahomeans as devils against whom the British should help the harmless
Egba to defend themselves. This propaganda proved very effective as a
means of evoking the help of the Lagos government.

Asante, Fante and the British

As already shown in an earlier chapter the rise of the Atlantic trade had
precipitated intense rivalry among the numerous Akan principalities for
its control. By 1800 Asante, the youngest of these, had emerged as the
greatest power in Akan-land. It had a buoyant economy based on
flourishing agriculture, richly diversified village industries and crafts, gold
and kola nut trade with the Sudanese states, and gold and slave trade with
the Europeans at the coast. The southern trade was particularly important
as it was the source of firearms on which the formidable Asante army was

105
coming to depend more and more. This was why the effective suppression
of the siave trade here after the 1820s created a serious economic and
political crisis for the empire.
Along with a rich economic base Asante entered the nineteenth century
with a fairly strong monarchy. There was increasing use under Asantehene
Osei Bonsu (1801-24) of professional civil servants who took control of
taxation, provincial administration and foreign affairs from the traditional
office holders. Because of their family connections these latter had not
always been very loyal, nor were they always very efficient or honest. This
trend towards the building up of a bureaucracy had actually started in the
last few decades of the eighteenth century. Osei Bonsu improved on it and
even made use of foreigners like Muslim clerics from the Sudan and even
renegade Europeans. The use of Muslim clerics was indicative of the
spread of Islam into the empire. Again this was another trend traceable to
the eighteenth century. Indeed Osei Kwame (1777-1801) is said to have
been overthrown in a coup partly because he patronized Islam too openly.
Osei Bonsu continued to use Muslims and to express a deep liking for their
religion while wisely avoiding conversion.
On the face of it, therefore, Asante, now at the height of her power, was
poised to conquer and annex all the remaining neighbouring petty inde¬
pendent states, especially the Fante and Ga states of the coast. However,
contrary to expectation the history of nineteenth-century Akan-land is not
the story of the triumphant achievement of the Asante ambition and the
universal reign of Asante peace throughout Akan-land. On the contrary it
is a monotonous story of a series of wars fought between the Asante and
the British. One interesting aspect of these wars is that neither the British
nor the Asante really desired them. Both parties wanted to trade peaceful¬
ly with each other, yet they constantly found themselves at war with each
other. The main causes of these wars and their results for those involved
will be briefly sketched here.
On the side of the Asante there were two factors which drove them into
war with the British. The first was political and derived mainly from the
nature of the Asante constitution. The Asante Union or Confederacy was a
great military power, but never a highly centralized state in spite of the
increasing use ol professional servants. In fact this reform created distrust,
at times expressed in rebellion, between the Asantehene and his provincial
chiefs. Administratively speaking the union consisted of three concentric
rings of divisions under varying degrees of control. At the centre was the
state or province of Kumasi which was the capital of the Asantehene who
ruled it directly in his capacity as Kumasihene, that is as the original king
ol Kumasi before the union. Here the power of the Asantehene was
extensive and effective. After Kumasi came the other states of Ofinso,

106
Nsuta, Dwaben and Kokofu which with Kumasi had originally brought
the Asante Union into existence. Each of these states had its own king who
before the union was equal to the Kumasihene. He ruled his state with his
own council of chiefs, but recognized the Asantehene as his overlord.
Within this circle the supreme authority was the Asante state council or
Asante Kotoko of which all the chiefs of the above states were members.
In this council if the Asantehene was not merely the first among equals,
neither was he a dictator. The council dealt with all important matters of
war and peace; it was the supreme court of the realm before which even
the Asantehene could be tried. It was also responsible for crowning and
removing the Asantehene. The great bond of union within this wider
circle was the fact that all these states descended, or believed that they
descended, from the Oyoko matrilineal clan; also all of them recognized
the Golden Stool as embodying the spirit of their nation.
Outside this circle was one more, occupied by the conquered provinces
of the Union such as the states of Akyem, Akwamu, Akwapim, Denkyira,
Wassa and Ga in the south, and Dagomba and Gonja in the north. This
circle had an ever-changing radius, shrinking when any of these states
rebelled, and expanding when new conquests were made. The provinces
in this group were not effectively integrated into the Asante Union. Their
kings had no seats in the Asante Kotoko and though they might be under
the supervision of Residents appointed by the Asante, they practically ran
their affairs without reference to Kumasi. The Residents were often
absentees.
Being under so loose a control, and not having forgotten their ancient
independence and greatness, while also living near their kith and kin who
were still independent of Asante and who often encouraged them to rebel,
these states were constantly in revolt. This was a situation that forced the
Asante state to be constantly at war in order to punish rebellious chiefs and
provinces, and to conquer those neighbouring groups who were still
independent and who instigated rebellion against the Asantehene. In the
nineteenth century the Fante states of the coast were notorious for aiding
and abetting rebellions within the Asante kingdom. Partly for this reason
it became necessary for the Asantehene to bring the Fante under his
control.
The other factors which helped to determine Asante policy towards the
Fante and the British were economic. Asante was an inland power and
wanted to gain free access to the coastal forts in order to trade directly with
the Europeans. In particular the Asante wanted to ensure a steady supply
of arms and ammunition which they needed for their wars. By 1800
Asante had gained access to the forts of Appollonia and Accra, but still
wanted direct business with the Europeans at the forts of Anomabu,

107
Kormantine, Cape Coast and Mouree. It was in these places that the
Asante came into conflict with the Fante. The latter had built up a strong
and prosperous position as middlemen in the trade between Europeans on
the coast and their fellow Africans in the interior, and since they did not
want to lose this lucrative position, they insisted that the Asante should
continue getting the European goods they wanted through them. To this
end they tried to prevent the Asante from getting to the forts. If the Fante
succeeded in doing this the Asante would then buy imported European
goods in the interior markets at prices fixed by the Fante. For the Asante
to prosper economically the Asantehene had to incorporate the Fante into
his empire.
Since the British on the coast were all traders, one would have expected
them to co-operate with the Asante to promote trade. For instance the
British could have helped the Asantehene to assert his authority in his
empire in order to maintain peace in the interior, which would help to
promote trade. But this the British would not do. They believed that the
Asante empire was a savage state, and after the abolition of the slave trade
came to regard the Asante as incorrigible slave dealers. For humanitarian
reasons the British therefore adopted the policy of giving protection to
rebels against the authority of the Asantehene. The result was that the
British intervened in the internal affairs of Asante against the authority of
the Asantehene and his council.
Also one would have expected the British to welcome direct trade
contact with the Asante and try to promote it, especially as it was common
knowledge that the Asante wanted the goods which the British brought to
the coast. The British therefore might have been expected either to have
allowed the Asante to conquer the Fante, or to have controlled the Fante
themselves in order to deal directly with the Asante. But they saw the
Asante empire as a tyranny and would not allow their Fante allies to be
made part of it. More importantly they were afraid that if the Asante held
the entire coast of modern Ghana the Asantehene would control the
Europeans as strictly as the king of Dahomey did along his own coast, and
this might have meant high tolls and less profit for them. The existing
situation along the coast, in which the Fante were disunited and weak,
suited the British because it allowed them to have their way by playing off
one Fante chief against his neighbour. Up to the 1870s the British did not
seek to gain control themselves; for the most part they were not interested
in acquiring colonies along the West African coast since colonies were
considered expensive to maintain.
For all these reasons the British and the Asante found themselves
re^ate<^ at war* story of the origin of the first Anglo-Asante war is
su idem to show how most of these wars came about without either side

108
wanting to fight the other. In 1807 two Assin chiefs rebelled against the
Asantehene. The rebellion was easily put down but the chiefs managed to
escape to the Fante for protection. The Asantehene asked the Fante to
surrender the refugees but the Fante would not. If the Asantehene had
allowed them to keep the refugees his authority would have been greatly
endangered, because all other rebels could easily run to the Fante to
escape punishment. When the Fante refused to surrender the rebels the
Asantehene had to invade the coast. In the battle which followed the Fante
were easily defeated. But once again the two chiefs in question managed to
escape capture and fled to the British fort of Anomabu for protection.
Though the British did not want a war with the Asante they would not
surrender the fugitives because they did not believe they would receive a
fair trial. Nor would they allow the Asante to continue their slaughter of
the Fante since it might end in the Asante controlling the coast and
imposing their will on the Europeans. The British therefore came to the
defence of the Fante and the refugee chiefs. The result was the first of the
Anglo-Asante wars.
Within a hundred years the British and the Asante fought wars in 1807,
1811, 1814—16, 1823-4, 1826, 1863, 1873-4, 1896 and 1901. In all these it
was only on three occasions, in 1873-4, 1896 and 1901, that the British
invaded Asante. On the remaining occasions it was the Asante who in¬
vaded the coastal districts. This does not mean that the Asante were
bloodthirsty. On the contrary they were essentially a peace-loving people
who did not resort to arms unless diplomacy and negotiation failed In fact
many of their invasions of the coast came after weeks or even months of
fruitless attempts to achieve peaceful settlements of outstanding quarrels.
The Anglo-Asante wars started because the British would neither con¬
trol the Fante nor allow the Asante to do so. When they ended, the British
had annexed not only the Fante but the Asante as well. The process by
which this came about is interesting. At the beginning of the wars the
affairs of the British forts were in the hands of merchants. After the third
Asante war of 1814-16 it was felt that there would be no peace on the coast
as long as merchants, who were preoccupied with ways of maximizing gain
and minimizing loss, were in charge of British interests on the coast. The
Company of Merchants was therefore dissolved in 1821, when all the
British possessions on the west coast were taken over by the Crown and
placed under the Governor of Sierra Leone. In 1822 Sir Charles MacCar-
thy, the Governor at that time, visited his Gold Coast provinces to see
Britain’s Fante friends. In the process he treated the Asante shabbily, thus
precipitating the war of 1824, in which he lost his life. Two years later the
British managed to avenge the death of MacCarthy by defeating the
Asante at Katamansu, near Dodowa. The British government then recons-

109
idered the whole question and having found that it was not easy to
maintain the peace decided to abandon the forts. But the merchants on the
coast persuaded it to hand the forts over to a committee of three London
merchants, who formed themselves into a company in 1828 and appointed
a governor, Captain George Maclean, to administer the affairs of the forts
with the aid ol a council of merchants resident on the coast.
Maclean arrived on the coast in 1830 and the following year signed a
treaty which maintained peace between the British and the Asante for over
30 years. He raised a small body of men whom he used as policemen and
soldiers as the occasion demanded, and with this was able to make sure
that the Fante did not provoke the Asante. He maintained peace along the
coast by patiently listening to and settling all disputes that might lead to

110
trouble. Though this administration was cheap and effective, complaints
against it soon arose. Some traders who did not like Maclean accused him
of not fighting slavery on the Gold Coast, others accused him of misusing
his powers. A Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to
look into the matter found that Maclean was not guilty of the charges
made against him, but recommended that since his administration of the
Fante was illegal, it should be legalized.
Once again the British government took back the forts and placed them
under a Lieutenant Governor who was responsible to the Governor of
Sierra Leone. Maclean, who was made the chief justice in the new admi¬
nistration, negotiated a series of treaties with the Fante chiefs in 1844—5
which gave the British the loophole through which to intervene in Fante
affairs and help the chiefs in settling cases of murder and robbery. These
treaties are known in history as ‘The Bond’ and did not in any way hand
over Fante territory to the British.
The British now tried to face the problem of raising money locally to
cover the cost of administration. After an attempt to levy taxation had
aroused so much opposition that it had to be abandoned, the British
sought to raise money by imposing customs duties. But if they imposed
duties on goods passing through their forts, then traders would divert
their activities to Dutch forts. The British therefore sought a way of
buying out the Dutch, the Danish having been bought out earlier in 1850.
Before this could be arranged the British and the Asante blundered into
war again in 1863. The British had once more refused to surrender an
Asante refugee. For the second time the British government started
wondering whether it had acted wisely in assuming responsibility for the
affairs of the Gold Coast, for the whole business was costing too many men
and too much money. Since at the same time Britain was finding it
difficult to administer her other possessions along the west coast, a Select
Committee of the British Parliament was appointed in 1865 to investigate
the whole question. The Committee recommended that the British gov¬
ernment should, if possible, stop getting involved in West African politics,
except perhaps in the affairs of Sierra Leone.
The news spread quickly along the coast that the British were about to
withdraw. If this happened the Fante would have to face the Asante alone.
The Fante then decided to make their own defence arrangements. In 1869
about thirteen of their chiefs came together and formed the Fante Confed¬
eracy. With the aid of some educated Africans these chiets in 1871 drew
up a constitution at Mankessim under which they would govern them¬
selves and raise forces to defend their territory against the Asante. I he
British, who had said they were about to go, turned round and said the
drawing up of the constitution was a rebellion against their authority. The

111
leaders of the movement were arrested and thrown into prison and the
scheme collapsed.
As these things were happening the British succeeded in buying out the
Dutch from the Gold Coast. This meant that the people of Elmina, who
had been the allies of the Asante, were handed over to their British
enemies. The result was an Asante invasion of the coast in 1873. The
British replied by sending a force under Sir Garnet Wolseley, which
marched to Kumasi and destroyed it. Then the British turned round, and
without consulting the people, declared Fante territory their colony. This
was how the Fante lost their independence 32 years before the Asante.

The end of Asante independence

The British sack of Kumasi in 1874 was a great blow to the Asante empire
from which it never recovered. Many of the chiefs of the northern and
southern provinces seized the opportunity to declare their independence.
The British did nothing to discourage the rebellions; in fact they encour¬
aged the rebellious provinces by promising some of them protection. At
the same time the power of the central government declined as a result of
disputes between the Asantehene and his council. One Asantehene was
destooled in 1874 for breaking an ancient tradition. After some struggle a
successor was enthroned, only to be removed in 1883 for not being in
favour of war to reconquer the southern states which had broken away.
Then there followed a period of confusion during which the member states
of the empire could not agree on a successor. In 1888, however, Agyeman
Prempe, then a young man of about 16 years of age, was elected as
Asantehene.
The Asantehene-elect succeeded to a difficult inheritance. After so
many wars, with their interruptions of trade and dislocation of normal life,
the Asante kingdom was not only impoverished, but also depopulated as
people fled southwards to the coast either to escape punishment for crimes
or to pursue their business in peace. Also, on his accession Prempe was
faced with rebellion from several provinces - Kokofu, Nsuta and Mam-
pong. Two events of the early years of the reign clearly indicate to what
depths the fortunes of the empire had sunk. First the Asantehene sent a
personal message to the Governor of the colony requesting a loan of £320
towards the cost of his enstoolment though when this was made public he
denied it to save his face. Then in 1890 the Asante war machine was
reduced to such impotence that the Asantehene asked for troops from the
colony to help him quell rebellions against his authority. While Prempe
was turning and twisting helplessly to keep the empire together, the

112
Asantehene Agyeman Prempe I. Asantehene from 1888, he was deposed and exiled by the
British in 1896
British came to the conclusion that the only effective way to maintain
peace in the interior was to bring the Asante Union and. its dependencies
under their control.
In 1891 the Governor of the Colony, Brandford Griffith, sent his Acting
Travelling Commissioner, H.M. Hull, to Asante with a letter inviting the
Asantehene to place his kingdom under British protection; but this
Prempe refused with firmness and dignity. In 1894, the year of Prempe’s
enstoolment, the British again asked the Asante to accept the stationing of
a British Resident at Kumasi. In 1895 Joseph Chamberlain became Colo¬
nial Secretary and pressure on Asante increased. The Asantehene in
despair sent an embassy to London to get a guarantee from the British
government that Asante independence would be respected, but this
embassy was disgraced and ridiculed. Even while the embassy was still
away the British sent an ultimatum to the Asantehene asking him to
explain his failure to fulfil all the terms of the Treaty of Fomena, imposed
on the Asante Union in 1874. Prempe wanted to hear the result of his
embassy before replying. The British regarded this as a refusal of the
ultimatum. The forces in the colony were put on a war footing. In 1896
they occupied Kumasi without resistance. Behind this occupation lay the
fact that the French were advancing from west to east in the Sudan, and
seizing territories as they went. It was therefore feared that if the British
did not act fast enough the French or even the Germans would seize
Asante.
There was a sequel to this event. The Asante had decided not to resist
the British in 1896 because they hoped for a peaceful settlement. But they
had been disillusioned. The British seized Prempe and his principal chiefs
and courtiers and exiled them. The Asantehene’s court was looted, a
Resident was stationed at Kumasi, and then the British proceeded to
encourage the disintegration of the Asante Union by treating each pro¬
vince as an independent state. This hurt the pride of the Asante. There¬
fore when in 1900 the Governor of the Colony, Sir Frederick Hodgson,
asked for the Golden Stool of Asante to sit on, a privilege not even enjoyed
by the Asantehenes, the Asante rose against the British. The uprising was
put down after nine months of dogged resistance. In 1901 the Asante state
was annexed to the British crown.
These wars thus ended in the loss of their independence by the Fante
and the Asante. The dream of a union of all the Akan under the leadership
o sante vanished. On the side of the British, the wars drew them deeper
an deeper into the politics of what was then the Gold Coast and is now
ana. In consequence by the time of the Scramble they already had a
strong excuse for the conquest of what remained of Akan-land.

114
4 The establishment of European
rule in West Africa (c. 1880-1900)

The origins of European rule in West Africa

As their interests and influence changed in character and expanded in

scope in the course of the nineteenth century, European nations, especial¬
ly Britain and France, began to develop outright political ambitions in
West Africa. Britain was the first European nation to acquire a West
African territory over which she exercised direct political control. British
interest in the campaign against the slave trade and in the protection of
legitimate commerce necessitated her seizure of some territories along the
West African coast from which to supervise these interests effectively. In
1808 she took over the Sierra Leone colony as a base from which the West
African Squadron would carry on the campaign against the slave trade,
while in 1843 she finally took over control of certain forts on the coast of
Ghana in order to give effective protection to her commerce and her Fante
allies against what was considered the Asante menace. For the same reason
she bought out the Danes (1850) and the Dutch (1870) from the coast of
Ghana. In 1874 she sought to consolidate her control of the Ghanaian coast
by annexing the Fante states.
It was the same desire to protect her interests that led Britain to assume
political control in one or two areas along the coast of what later became
Nigeria. In this region she took the first step towards political power in
1849 when she appointed John Beecroft as consul for the Bights of Benin
and Biafra. Supported by the then much-dreaded British gunboats this
official started meddling in the politics of the coastal states. In 1851 he
interfered in a succession dispute in Lagos, an act which helped to prepare
the way for British rule. In 1861 Britain seized this little Yoruba kingdom
as a means of controlling the activities of Brazilian slave traders there and
the overland trade route which ran from Lagos, through the heart of
Yorubaland to Hausaland via Jebba on the Niger.
Meanwhile the new developments in the trade and politics of nineteenth

115
century VTest Afn.es had weakened the city ststes of the Bight of Bisfrs
with the result that these states became increasingly unable to maintain
order between the European and African traders as effectively as they had
done in centuries past. The white traders immediately seized the oppor¬
tunity of the new development to usurp part of this waning political
control. About 1832 those of them in Bonny formed what in 1854 was
named the Court of Equity which assigned itself the duty of regulating
relations between African and European traders. This court, which was
presided over by Europeans, was soon brought under the control of the
British consul. From Bonny the institution spread to the other states of the
Niger delta and the Cross River estuary. Though this method of political
control in the Bight of Biafra remained informal for a very long time, it
was nonetheless real. The consul, the gunboat and the Court of Equity
became very important factors in the politics of the region throughout the
rest of the century.
With the French, political activity was concentrated in the region of the
river Senegal, an area in which they had shown great interest even in the
days of the slave trade. If in the course of the eighteenth century France
had lost the greater part of her colonial empire to Britain, she now sought
to build a new empire in Africa. Thus in 1817 she occupied the mouth of
the Senegal where she established an administration and sought to encour¬
age the cultivation of export crops like cotton and groundnuts. By 1865
French rule had reached the upper Senegal, where her influence covered
an even wider area.
In spite of these early political developments, however, European rule
in West Africa remained severely limited in its territorial extent up to
about 1880. There were many reasons for this. For the greater part of the
nineteenth century, indeed up to about 1879, French governments were
very unstable and throughout that period France could not entertain a
vigorous extension of the area in West Africa over which she exercised
political rule. Britain, which had more stable government, was busy
colonizing Australia and New Zealand which she found more attractive
than West Africa. Also at this same time British economic thinkers,
known as the free traders, preached against colonization. They argued that
colonies were very expensive to maintain and that disputes over them
often led to unprofitable international wars. They were confident that
given a fair chance Britain would be able to dominate any market through
peaceful competition with other nations. What was more, until about
1854, Europe had no answer to the problems presented by malaria in West
Africa. In these circumstances European rivalries in West Africa declined.
The Dutch and the Danes were even prepared to withdraw, and no other
European power rose to challenge the West African interests of either the

116
French or the British. For all these reasons therefore, though European
political ambitions in West Africa were born early in the nineteenth
century, they did not achieve an appreciable growth for nearly eighty
years.
However, from about 1880 the European attitude to colonies in Africa
changed remarkably and as a result within a space of only twenty years
nearly the whole of the African continent was under European rule. The
factors which caused European nations to scramble for colonial posses¬
sions in Africa are discussed in the Conclusion to this volume. Here we are
concerned only with the form which that scramble took in West Africa.
To a large extent the scramble in West Africa was a straight fight
between the French and the British. As we have already seen, Denmark
and Holland had withdrawn from West Africa in the period when colonial
possessions in Africa were not very much in favour with European powers.
Portugal, which preceded all the other European nations in West Africa,
showed very little interest in expansion there. In consequence she was
confined to the small enclave of Portuguese Guinea, the conquest of which
taxed her resources and determination until about 1915. It was only the
intervention of Germany that tended to make the scramble in West Africa
a three-cornered fight. Except on the coast of Togoland German interest in
West Africa was very negligible by 1880. But in 1884 Germany quickly
seized not only Togoland but also the Cameroons, the latter being an area
where British interests had been clearly dominant for some time. After
this swift move Germany did not attempt to acquire more territories in
West Africa but settled down to giving precise definition to the boundaries
of these two protectorates, an exercise that involved long negotiations with
Britain and France.

The French

The two latter powers thus had the rest of West Africa to fight over. Each
not only held what she already had along the coast but from there sought
to expand into the interior. Thus French expansion was directed largely
from Senegal. This, however, does not mean that the French were not
active elsewhere along the West African coast. On the contrary, from the
beginning of the scramble they reasserted their control over all their
forts along the coast which they had tended to neglect in the previous
decade. In 1878 they formally took possession of Cotonou. Four years
later they declared a protectorate over Porto Novo. In 1886 they reoccu¬
pied their forts on the Ivory Coast which they had abandoned in 1871.
From these forts they extended their control over the whole coast between

117
Liberia and Ghana through treaties with the local chiefs. Higher up the
coast they occupied Conakry and from there claimed the whole region
between Sierra Leone and Portuguese Guinea. In 1893 they formally
proclaimed the Ivory Coast and French Guinea their colonies and under¬
took the conquest of Dahomey, a task which they completed in 1894.
But in spite of all this Senegal was the main base for French expansion
in West Africa. Since the 1850s the French had entertained the ambition
of obtaining the undisputed control of the Western and Central Sudan
whose ancient fame and glory as a region rich in commerce attracted them
very much. To them Timbuktu was still the centre of this trade which they
greatly wanted to capture. In consequence they regarded their stations
elsewhere along the coast as merely providing alternative routes to the
Sudan rather than as bases from which independent expansion could be
made. Even their colony of Algeria in North Africa was seen as providing a
gateway into the Sudan. From 1880 the French started sending out from
Senegal a series of military and exploratory expeditions into the heart of
the Sudan with the object of seizing the whole Sudan and linking it with
other French bases along the west coast. By 1883 the French had gone as
far as Bamako. In 1890 they started the conquest of the empire of Ahmad
Seku, the son and successor of al-Hajj Umar. By 1893 they had succeeded
in over-running the whole of this empire. Then they launched an attack on
the empire of Samori in the region of Upper Guinea and Ivory Coast,
driving him from pillar to post until 1898 when they captured and exiled
him. In 1894 the French occupied the ancient and romantic city of
Timbuktu. In 1896 they occupied Say. As the French advanced they
developed even wider territorial ambitions. At one stage they had plans for
a great and glorious French African empire that would stretch across the
whole continent Irom the Senegal to the Nile, thus embracing the whole of
the Sudan. This empire was to be continuous with Algeria in North
Africa, with French Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey on the west
coast as well as with French possessions in Equatorial Africa. It was to be
served by a network of modern railways which would tap the resources of
this whole region to the everlasting benefit and glory of metropolitan
France.

The British

The British on their part concentrated mainly on the forest region of West
nca s*nce they did not fall victim to the ancient romance of the Sudan,
ey set out to expand their holdings in the forest zone where they could

118
119
West Africa, showing the progress of European penetration
create very profitable markets for their goods and at the same time obtain
cotton, indigo, vegetable oil, timber and many of the other products
needed by their industries.
There was another great difference between the French and British
approach to the scramble in West Africa. To a great extent France
extended her influence and rule mainly through the activities of men who
were state officials. But the British relied partly on government officials
and partly on private traders. For instance the region of modern northern
Nigeria was secured for Britain by a commercial company. In the 1870s
the trade on the Niger north of the delta was dominated by four British
companies: James Pinnock and Company of Liverpool, the West African
Company of Manchester, Alexander Miller and Brothers of Glasgow and
Holland Jacques and Company of London. The intense competition be¬
tween these companies made the Niger trade less profitable than it would
otherwise have been. To put an end to this unprofitable competition
George Taubman Goldie, who had an interest in Holland Jacques and
Company persuaded the four companies to form the United African
Company in 1879. But no sooner was this done than competition was faced
from the French who by 1882 had at least seven trading stations south of
Nupe. However, Goldie dealt with this new threat to British interests and
influence by buying off the French. By 1884 British interests and influ¬
ence were once again supreme on the lower Niger. What was more,
Goldie’s company collected a large number of treaties from the communi¬
ties and states all along the rivers Niger and Benue which purported to
give the company a measure of political power in the region. The area was
therefore easily recognized by the other European powers as falling prop¬
erly within the sphere of British influence. Goldie himself was present at
the Berlin West African Conference where this recognition was given, and
he was very useful in helping to present the British case. When later it
became necessary to establish an administration in the region in order to
convince other powers that Britain was in effective control of the area, the
British made use of Goldie’s company. To this end, in 1886 the company
was granted a royal charter which gave it the right to undertake the
government and defence of the region. In that same year the company’s
name was changed to the Royal Niger Company (RNC). For many years
the RNC was able to keep the French out of northern Nigeria by giving
the false impression that it had an effective administration throughout the
region. Later, however, the French discovered the trick. In 1890 a French
expedition sailed up the rivers Niger and Benue which were international
waterways only to find out that the RNC had no administration or influ¬
ence whatever in a place like the emirate of Adamawa. Immediately a
struggle for the control of this region ensued. The RNC, however, suc-

120
cessfully met the challenge and secured for Britain not only Yola, the
capital of Adamawa, but also much of the extensive Borno empire. But the
company was able to meet successfully all such challenges. Thus after the
conquest of Dahomey in 1894 the French started moving up towards the
Niger, and in the process discovered that the company had no influence or
establishment whatsoever in Borgu and much of the area around it. The
French again made a determined effort to seize the region. In the course of
the ensuing struggle for Borgu the British government realized that the
RNC had not the resources with which to meet this fresh and more serious
challenge. The Borgu question brought Britain and France to the brink of
war and Britain was forced to create the West African Frontier Force
under the command of Frederick Lugard in 1897. It was this direct
intervention of the British government that resolved the Borgu crisis and
kept the region under British rule. On 1 January 1900 the RNC was
deprived of its charter and Northern Nigeria was declared a British
Protectorate. Nevertheless it can be said that the RNC served Britain well
in winning for her the extensive area of Northern Nigeria.
Elsewhere in West Africa the establishment and expansion of British rule
was in the main the result of official action. As soon as Germany seized the
Cameroons the British consul in the Niger delta, Edward Hewett, took
steps to ensure that Britain was not pushed out of the Oil Rivers. Fie
collected treaties of protection from various chiefs and villages on the basis
of which Britain proclaimed the whole region between Lagos and the
Cameroons the Oil Rivers Protectorate in June 1885. This protectorate
which extended as far inland as Lokoja on the Niger and Ibi on the Benue
had no real administration until 1891, the year when its name was changed
to the Niger Coast Protectorate. British acquisition of Yorubaland was the
work of the Lagos government, which since the 1860s had been deeply
involved in Yoruba politics. In 1888 the Lagos authorities made a treaty
with the alafin of Oyo who is said to have placed all Yorubaland under
British protection, even though the alafin never controlled more than a
fraction of Yorubaland during the peak period of his empire. In the region
of modern Ghana, Asante was occupied in 1896 and forced to admit a
British resident to Kumasi. From there the authorities ot the colony
proceeded in 1898 to annex the Northern Territories of Ghana to Britain.
In 1896 the Freetown government extended British rule to the Sierra
Leone hinterland. British expansion on the Gambia was in like manner the
work of British officials rather than of private businessmen.

After the scramble

By 1900 the scramble was virtually over, and all West Africa, except the

121
 %

small Repubic of Liberia, was now under European rule. Even then
Liberia was not unaffected by the scramble for she lost a considerable
portion of the coast to which she had laid claim since the 1830s. Further¬
more she lost all opportunity for expansion into the interior. Of all
the powers involved France emerged from the scramble with the lion’s
share of the territory. Whereas Britain, her nearest rival in West Africa,

The treaty made between Consul Hewett and Jaja of Opobo in 1884

Treaty with Kin^l and Chiefs of

r
Signed at

HER Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Ireland, Empress ot India, &c., and the Kings and Chiefs of
C^ ^ th- tr
being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the relations of peace and
friendship which have for so long existed between them;
Her Britannic Majesty lias nany&pid appointed E. H. Hewett, Esq., Her
Consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra, to conclude a Treaty for this
purpose.

The said E. H. Hewett, Esq., and the said King* and Chiefs of
(S- /_ & t,
have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles

ARTICLE I.

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Irelamj, &c , in compliance
with the request of the King*, Chiefs, and people of & A ca.

> hereby undertakes to extend to them,

flu, ttri itory under their authority and jurisdiction, Her gracious favour
and protection.

ARTICLE II.
The King§ and Chiefs of c^ L ^ <a

agree and promise to refrain from entering into any

122
 2

correspondence, Agreement, or Treaty with any foreign nation or Power,

except with the knowledge and sanction of Her Britannic Majesty’s Govern¬
ment.

ARTICLE III.

It is agreed that foil and exclusive jurisdiction, civil and criminal, over
British subjects and their property in the territory of & f *—
*■•-***■■-*--*—^ —~~~ —- is reserved to Her Britannic
Majesty, to he exercised by such Consular or other officers as Her Majesty
shall appoint for that purpose.
The same jurisdiction is likewise reserved io Her Majesty in the said
territory of (9~ r^L-o J '.. ' ...
over foreign subjects enjoying British protection, who shall be deemed to be
included in the expression " British subject ” throughout this Treaty.

, ARTICLE IV.

All disputes between the King* and Chiefs of cf~

--- , or between them and British or foreign
traders, or between the aforesaid Kingfc.aud Chiefs and neighbouring tribes,
which cannot be settled amicably between the two parties, shall be submitted
to the British Consular or other officers appointed by Her Britannic Majesty to
exercise jurisdiction in L% L o~ t.A- ' territories for
arbitration and decision, or for arrangement.

ARTICLE V.

The King! and Chiefs of ^ ^ "

—<— hereby engage to assist the British Consular or other officers
in the execution of such'duties as may be assigned to them ; and, further, to
act upon their advice in matters relating to the administration of justice, the
development of the resources of the country, the interests of commerce, or in
any other matter in relation to^peace, order, and good government, and the
general progress of civilization.

ARTICLE VI.

Tl\ subjects and efrizens of all couikries may fritMy carry batrade in
every parTNrf* the territorieKpf the Kings anti Chiefs parties hereto, arKl^may

have houses arid, factories therein.

123
 ARTICLE VII.

All ^ministers of the Christian religion shall be permitted to reside and

exercise their calling within the territories of the aforesaid Kingf and Chiefs,
who hereby guarantee to them full protection.
All forms of religious worship and religious ordinances may he exercised
within the territories of the aforesaid King* and Chiefs, and no hindrance
shall be offered thereto.

ARTICLE VIII.

If any vessels should be wrecked within the ''jf O- <J

territories, the King! and Chiefs will give them all the assistance in their
power, will secure them from plunder, and also recover and deliver to the
owners or agents all the property which can be saved.
If there are no such owners or agents on the spot, then the said property
shall be delivered to the British Consular or other officer.
The Kingt and Chiefs further engage to do all in their power to protect
the persons and property of the officers, crew, and others on board such wrecked
vessels.
All claims for salvage dues in such eases shall, if disputed, he referred to
the British Consular or other officer for arbitration and decision.

ARTICLE IX.

This Treaty shall come into operation, so far as may be practicable, from

c. l x

124
acquired a total area of 1 243 200 square kilometres, France’s empire in
West Africa measured about 4 662 000 square kilometres, Germany came
third with Togoland which measured 854 700 square kilometres, and the
Cameroons which had an area of 518 000 square kilometres, Portugal
came last with a colony measuring 36 300 square kilometres in area. To
some extent France achieved her ambition which at first appeared vision¬
ary. She secured most of the Western Sudan and linked this up with all her
territories on the coast. Furthermore, she was able to link her West
African empire with her possessions in North Africa. But she failed to link
all this up with the Nile. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan stood in her way.
The main rivers of West Africa fell into French and British hands. Britain
controlled the lower Gambia, the lower Niger and the navigable portions
of the Benue, while France controlled the whole of the Senegal, upper
Gambia, the upper and the middle Niger. These rivers were useful as
gateways into the areas of West Africa which they drain. Though Britain’s
four colonies, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Nigeria were all
widely separated, each of them enjoyed the advantage of having direct
access to the sea. But whereas the French could travel from one end of
their West African possession to the other without passing through any
other power’s colony or entering the sea, the British could not.

Reasons for the conquest of West Africa - treaties, force

and African disunity

The ease with which the European powers partitioned West Africa with¬
out fighting among themselves should be explained. In the first place
before the scramble had started in earnest the European nations had held
the Berlin West Africa Conference (1884-5) to set down the rules of the
game. This conference did not partition West Africa, or any other part ol
Africa, as is often popularly believed. Among other things it declared the
Niger and the Congo (now Zaire) international waterways, which meant
that these rivers were to be free for navigation by all nations of the world.
Though this principle was soon infringed on both the Niger and the
Congo, no international crisis resulted because no nation seriously took it
upon herself to challenge the action of those who controlled the two rivers.
The conference also set down the conditions under which the occupation
of a territory by one power would gain the recognition of the others. An
occupying power was not only required to notify the others of the fact of
her occupation but also was to set up an administration as a visible
evidence of her effective presence. By and large this principle was adhered

125
to. As a result no power deliberately trespassed against the established
rights of her neighbour. Germany, who had offended the British by her
seizure of the Cameroons, soon withdrew from, and lost interest in,
further territorial expansion in West Africa. There was therefore no
opportunity for them to clash again in West Africa. Britain and France
seemed most likely to clash but did not actually do so because their
interests were not really in conflict except perhaps in one place. France for
the most part wanted the savanna belt, Britain the forest region. It was
only the British ‘intrusion’ into the Sudan by way of her interest in
Northern Nigeria that nearly brought the two countries to war over
Borgu. There would have been a crisis over the imamate of Futa Jallon in
which the French had shown interest since 1860, but the French suspicion
between 1880 and 1882 that Britain wanted to annex Futa Jallon to Sierra
Leone, turned out to be unfounded.
European rule was imposed on West Africans by ‘diplomacy’ and war.
What is described as ‘diplomacy’ here, would be better described as
‘trickery’. Britain, France and Germany claimed to base their rule in many
areas on treaties of protection which they said they had signed with the
local chiefs. In these treaties the chiefs are said to have signed away for
ever their territories and peoples. Since no West African ruler ever had the
right to give away his people and their land, it is doubtful whether these
so-called treaties were treaties in fact. If any chief ever signed such a treaty
it was invalid in traditional law. A critical study of some of these treaties
seems to reveal that many of them were fake. In 1880 a French officer,
J.S. Gallieni, visited the empire of Ahmad Seku of Segu (the successor of
al-Hajj Umar) and came out with a treaty which claimed that Ahmad had
agreed to place under ‘the exclusive protection of France’ the basin of the
Niger passing through his empire. This copy of the treaty did not carry
Ahmad’s signature or the seal of his empire. The Arabic copy of the same
treaty which bore Ahmad’s signature and imperial seal did not mention
that Ahmad had made any such grants to the French. The Arabic copy
merely reveals that Gallieni and Ahmad Seku signed only a treaty of peace
and friendship. But in order to keep off possible European rivals Gallieni
must have tampered with the contents of the original treaty. This is
perhaps a good example of how many of the so-called treaties of protection
were obtained.
If some of these treaties were actually signed by African chiefs, there is
reason to believe that such chiefs did not know the full implications of
what they were asked to do. When Consul Hewett was touring the Niger,
hunting for treaties with African chiefs, he came to Opobo which was
then under King Jaja. He asked this delta chief to sign a treaty of
protection and free trade’ with Britain. Jaja, who was a very intelligent

126
man, asked him to explain what he meant by ‘free trade’. When the
explanation which Hewett gave did not satisfy him, Jaja refused to sign the
treaty unless the section referring to trade was removed. This section was
duly removed before Jaja signed the treaty. It is unlikely that, if the
Europeans had explained the full meaning of these treaties to the people,
most West African chiefs would have signed them.
In most places, however, sometimes even in places where they claimed
to have obtained the so-called treaties of cession, Europeans had to impose
their rule by force. Though West Africans often clamoured for European
goods, they did not clamour for European rule, and never trusted Euro¬
peans. One of Ahmad Seku’s lieutenants told Gallieni in 1880: ‘We like
the French but do not trust them, they trust us but do not like us’. Most
West Africans knew that their way of life was different from that of
Europeans, and that European rule would tamper with this way of life.
They also did not want to lose the right to govern themselves. When the
Mogho Naba of Mossi was informed that the French would civilize his
country, he told them he was satisfied with his country as it was. For these
reasons West Africans could not accept European rule with enthusiasm.
The Europeans therefore had to conquer them in order to rule. It was by
force that the French established themselves in Dahomey, Futa Jallon,
Upper Guinea, Upper Ivory Coast, Kaarta, Segu and Macina. The British
also had to fight many wars in order to subject the people in their West
African colonies to their rule. They fought the people of Sierra Leone
Protectorate (1898); fought the Asante throughout the nineteenth century;
in Nigeria they fought Ijebu (1892), Brass (1895), Ilorin and Bida (1897),
Benin (1897), Arochukwu (1901-2) and Northern Nigeria (1900-4). In
certain parts of West Africa armed resistance lasted till the second decade
of this century. By 1919 the British were still fighting to subdue certain
villages in the Igbo and Ibibio areas for the first time. Military resistance
in the French colony of Niger lasted until 1922. In Portuguese Guinea
military action became an aspect of normal government. Thus the first
problem which the Europeans faced in ruling West Africa was to get the
West Africans to accept their rule. In this they never wholly succeeded.
West Africans never accepted European rule with all their heart.
Though the opposition to European rule was widespread in West Africa
the Europeans succeeded all the same in bringing West Africans under
their rule. This was so for two reasons. Firstly, the Europeans were better
armed and had better trained soldiers than any West African people. The
Maxim gun and incendiary rockets which played a major part in these
wars were weapons the like of which no West African people had ever seen
or heard of before. They therefore had no answer to them. Secondly, West
African opposition was not co-ordinated. Each kingdom, and sometimes

127
each village, fought its own battle and suffered defeat without any help
from its neighbours. Even the Muslim states of the Sudan which had many
common ties failed to combine against the European invaders. Samori of
Guinea and Ahmad Seku of Segu were so opposed to each other, that
Ahmad sometimes preferred co-operation with the French to co-operation
with Samori. Futhermore, many of the better-organized African states
were in decline at the time. Borno started to decline again after al-Kanemi.
After the death of Muhammad Bello in 1837 the Fulani empire lost its vigour.
The empire of Ahmad Seku of Segu was never properly governed, as a
result of which the provinces were already breaking away when the
scramble started. The French exploited this situation by posing as the
liberators of the rebellious provinces and in so doing weakened Ahmad
Seku. The empire of Samori was still rising when the scramble started.
The Asante state had been severely weakened by a century of continuous
warfare. The Oyo empire was already in disarray by the second decade of
the century while the states which rose after its fall were engaged in
mutual destruction. The kingdom of Dahomey was probably the strongest
and best-organized West African state on the eve of the scramble. But then
it had been very much weakened by its wars with the Egba, and in any
case fought without any help from its neighbours.
Then there was the co-operation which renegade West Africans gave to
the invaders. The armies which conquered West Africa were made up
largely of West Africans, with a sprinkling of West Indians, trained and
led by European officers. In Nigeria, for instance, the British used mainly
Hausa troops to conquer the south, and mainly Yoruba and other non-
Muslims to conquer Hausaland. Even the educated elements did not all
speak with one voice in defence of African independence. Some of them
considered a period under European tutelage necessary for Africa. Bishop
Samuel Ajayi Crowther, for instance, is said to have strongly recom¬
mended the British annexation of Lagos. There were many other similar
cases.
There is no doubt that African leaders did not fully recognize the extent
of the dangers they had to cope with, especially in those areas where
Euiopean Christian missions were already well established. These mis¬
sions and their agents formed the vanguard of the invaders’ intelligence
network and thus supplied much of the information the armies needed.
On occasions they provided personnel such as doctors and nurses, and
facilities such as hospitals, for the treatment of wounded colonial troops.
In the campaign against the Aro of south-eastern Nigeria, for example,
Presbyterian missionaries in Calabar provided these facilities and more.
hey allowed their river crafts to be used in the movement of troops, thus
irectlv assisting the process of colonial conquest and occupation.

128
Part Two Northern Africa

5 Egypt from the Napoleonic

invasion to the British occupation

Egypt, an Arab nation

As was pointed out in the Introduction, Egypt had lived under a series of
foreign rulers ever since the defeat and conquest of the last dynasty of
pharaohs in 341 bc. Of these foreign rulers the Arabs who conquered the
country from the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) empire in ad 639 made the
most profound impact on its life. From the Arab conquest began the
process which led to the adoption of Islam as the religion of the over¬
whelming majority of the population. As Islam is not just a matter of
personal beliefs but a comprehensive way of life, the adoption of the
religion has influenced every aspect of the peoples’ existence. The admi¬
nistrative and legal systems, family life, education and the attitude of the
people to life and to other peoples have all been profoundly influenced by
Islam. This, together with the fact that Arabic became the language of the
people, almost completely replacing the native Egyptian tongue, and the
considerable admixture of Arab blood, accounts for the situation in which
Egypt to this day regards itself as an Arab state with ties to the Middle
East as well as Africa. Islam is still such a powerful force in the country
that many, especially the fanatical religious organization called the Muslim
Brotherhood, would like to take the country towards a system of govern¬
ment based on Islamic fundamentalism after the pattern of Iran.
Although Egypt after the Arab conquest became, and has remained, an
Islamic society there always survived a substantial community of Christ¬
ians who are known as the Copts. These Christians, who are still a large
community today, occupied an ambiguous position in Egyptian society.
Under Muslim law they were entitled to protection but could not be full
members of an Islamic state. They often held important posts in the
service of the state but they were distrusted because of their religion and
disliked by their Muslim fellow subjects.

129
The Mamluks, 1249-1517

After the Arab conquest Egypt was at first part of the vast empire
established by the early caliphs, but with the break-up of the political
unity of Islam it fell under a number of different dynasties in succession.
In 1249 the slave bodyguard of the ruler (who belonged to a dynasty
known as Ayyubid) seized power. This was the beginning of a long period
in which Egypt was governed by a military class of slaves of foreign origin.
These slave rulers were recruited from Turkey and South Russia and were
known as Mamluks. They gave Egypt one of the most glorious periods in
its history and the magnificent buildings erected under the Mamluks are
still among the wonders of modern Cairo. But the Mamluks weakened
their power and wasted the resources of the country in internal struggles
for power. They divided up the land of Egypt between themselves and
forced the peasants to pay heavy taxes. They failed to keep up with
progress in the rest of the world and in 1517 they were utterly defeated by
the forces of the Ottoman sultan of Turkey.

Egypt under the Ottoman empire

Thereafter Egypt became a part of the Ottoman sultanate. At first the new
rulers introduced many welcome improvements. Regular centralized
administration was established, taxes were lightened, irrigation canals
were cleared and improved and the country became prosperous again. But
in time the Ottoman sultanate fell into decline. The sultan’s administra¬
tion became weak and corrupt, and the generals and other officers in the
provinces were left to do much as they pleased. In these circumstances the
Ottoman officials in Egypt began recruiting their own slave bodyguards
and the Mamluk system was revived in a new form. By the eighteenth
century Ottoman authority had so declined that the sultans had virtually
no influence in the country which was still officially part of their empire.
The real rulers ol the land were the Mamluks headed by officers known as
beys. Only the bitter rivalries between the beys, which gave the Ottoman
ruler the chance to play ony faction off against another, prevented the
Mamluk beys irom establishing complete independence. Inside Egypt one
Mamluk band fought against another to make its leader the most powerful
igure in the country. Bloody battles were fought in the streets, the shops
o merchants were looted and the peasants (fellahin) were unmercifully
ovet taxed to support the fighting bands of their overlords.
n t ese gum circumstances the peasants began to neglect the cultiva-

130
tion of the land, the irrigation system deteriorated, merchants were unable
to make improvements in commerce or industry, and the once prosperous
country became steadily poorer, falling far behind the developments that
were taking place in western Europe. The Mamluks themselves were so
absorbed in the continual struggle for power that they did not even keep
abreast of changes in military methods and continued to cling to long-
outdated methods of warfare on horseback. To complete the miseries of
Egypt the land was subject to repeated epidemics of plague and the
population dwindled from about 8.5 million in the fourteenth century to
about 3 million at the beginning of the nineteenth century

Napoleon invades Egypt

In 1798 the course of Egyptian history was suddenly and violently altered
when Napoleon with his French forces landed on Egyptian soil. His
reasons for making this move were complex. Amongst the ideas of the
French Revolution, of which he considered himself the leader, was the
belief that there should be a universal law for all humanity, and that the
whole human race sould be liberated to enjoy the ideals of Liberty,
Equality and Fraternity as well as other aspects of the French revolution¬
ary system. Although a soldier, Napoleon had a real interest in, and respect
for, the ancient Egyptian civilization, and his army included a large team
of scholars and experts to study the monuments of the land he was about

The Battle of the Pyramids, 1798

131
to conquer. His deeper reasons were less unselfish. As he told his govern¬
ment in France, his main objects were to ensure the exploitation of the
riches of the country for the benefit of France and to use it as a stepping
stone for the conquest of the British empire in India.
When Napoleon’s forces reached Egypt power was in the hands of two
notoriously quarrelsome beys, Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey. The mass of
the people, long used to being passive spectators as one group of foreigners
after another seized their country, and worn out by the oppressions of
their Mamluk overlords, could hardly be expected to rally to the defence
of their masters, even against an infidel invader. The Mamluks themselves
were militarily years out of date and in no position to offer serious
resistance to the French army. Their magnificently clad horses and riders
fell in heaps before the accurate musket and cannon fire of the French at
the Battle of the Pyramids (1798), and Napoleon made himself the master
of Egypt.

Consequences of Napoleon’s invasion

The Napoleonic conquest of Egypt, even though it lasted for no more than
three years, had important consequences for the history of Egypt and the
entire Arab world. Ever since the ending of the Crusades (towards the end
of the thirteenth century) the heart of the Islamic world in Egypt and the
Middle East had been free from serious attack from Christian Europe.
During the later Ottoman period the whole area had become increasingly
backward and out of date in contrast with Europe. But because of belief in
the superiority of the Islamic religion this was not obvious to the peoples
of those areas, who had continued to drift complacently downhill. The
unexpected conquest of Egypt, a key province of the Ottoman empire, by
Christian forces suddenly made the real situation painfully clear. There¬
after the whole Islamic world began to be agitated by reforming movements
of one kind and another, which had begun with the rise of the Wahhabis in
Arabia fifty years before Napoleon. Some aimed at the adoption of Euro¬
pean ideas and their reconciliation with Islam, others at sweeping away
corruption and a return to the purity of the original faith. All were aimed
at wiping out the shame of the weak position of Muslims in relation to
Christian Europe and restoring the power and prestige of Islam. This
movement was felt throughout the whole Ottoman empire and as far away
as fghanistan and northern India. In Africa it influenced not only Egypt
itse but the eastern Sudan, Somalia, Libya and the Sudanic belt of West
rica. t was the beginning of a revolution in thought and attitudes as
we as in techniques and political systems which is still in progress in

132
much of the Islamic world.
In Egypt the short period of French rule brought many important
developments. In the attempt to win the support of the Egyptian masses,
Napoleon proclaimed that he had come to Egypt to deliver the Egyptians
from their Mamluk oppressors, whose greed and injustice had ruined the
once prosperous land. He would give Egyptians freedom, respect Islam
and help all Muslims, including the Ottoman Turks, to fight against
Christian ‘infidels’. He ended his proclamation by saying: ‘Let every qadi,
imam and sheik in Egypt proclaim these truths from his mosque. Glory to
the Sultan, glory to the brave French army, curses on the Mamluks and
happiness to Egypt.’ The Egyptian populace could not be expected to
accept these sentiments wholeheartedly from the mouth of an ‘infidel’
conqueror. However much they had disliked the Mamluks, their deep
religious beliefs made them hate Christian invaders even more. Violent
riots broke out in Cairo which were severely suppressed. Nevertheless,
Napoleon still attempted to take Egyptians into partnership in the admi¬
nistration of their country by setting up local and district councils on
which native Egyptians - as opposed to alien Mamluks - were repre¬
sented. He also established a central council called the Diwan to advise
him on matters of state. Two newspapers were founded, one of them in
the Arabic language. This was the first Arabic newspaper in the Nile
valley, and was an important development, considering the role which
newspapers subsequently played in the growth of Egyptian nationalism
and its struggle against British rule. Another significant innovation of the
French period was the founding of the Institut de 1’Egypte (Egyptian
Institute) to study the rich past of the country. It played an important part
in the development of the study of ancient Egypt, now known as Egyptol¬
ogy, and in reminding Egyptians of their cultural heritage. The same idea
can be seen in many countries of modern Africa where institutes of African
studies have been established.

The British force Napoleon to leave Egypt

The French occupation of Egypt was seen in Britain as a direct threat to

the British possessions in India and it became the object of British policy
first to prevent Napoleon from carrying out his plans to use his conquest
as a base for an attack on India, and secondly to force him to withdraw
from Egypt altogether. British forces sent to the Syrian fortress of Acre
prevented Napoleon from advancing through the Middle East on his
planned invasion of India from the north and Nelson destroyed the power
of the French navy in the Mediterranean by defeating the French fleet at

133
Abukir Bay in August 1798. This meant that the army in Egypt could
easily be cut off from its supplies and the French were forced to leave the
country in 1801. This struggle between the British and the French was
only the first step in a long process which resulted in the British occupa¬
tion of Egypt. The basis of the struggle was a conflict of strategic interests.
Britain could never feel that her position in India was safe if another
powerful European country which might at some time become hostile had
a dominant influence in Egypt.

The rise of Muhammad Ali

When the French departed, Egypt returned to a state of chaos. The

Mamluk beys resumed their rivalry, the British gave their support first to
one and then another, and the Ottoman sultan sent forces to the country
in the attempt to make his rule effective. This confused situation provided
the opportunity for a remarkable man to come to the fore and make
himself the real ruler of the country. His name was Muhammad Ali. An
Albanian born in 1769, he had taken to the career of soldier of fortune in
the sultan’s army. Though fully trained in the principles of the Ottoman
regime under which he lived, he clearly saw the need for the Muslim world
to adopt and apply the methods and techniques of western Europe. It was
to be his role to wake Egypt from its slumbers, and to attempt to bring it
in one great leap into the modern world. Though many of his plans
resulted in disastrous failure, and though some of the policies which he
initiated resulted, when they were later carried on by less able men, in
Egypt coming under foreign rule, there are few who would deny him the
title of founder of modern Egypt.
Muhammad Ali first showed his political genius in triumphing over the
numerous factions struggling for power in Egypt. At first he played the
two main Mamluk factions - Bardisi and Elifi - off against one another.
Then he threw his weight behind the official Ottoman governor {pasha),
Kirshid, against both Mamluk groups. Then as Kirshid became unpopu¬
lar both in Cairo and Constantinople, Muhammad Ali led the people of
Cairo against him. Kirshid was deposed and his successor lasted for six
months. Having weakened all the powerful factions that were struggling
for power Muhammad Ali then seized the leadership of the country for
himself, taking care to win the Sultan’s approval for his action. By 1805 he
was effectively in control of the country. In 1806 Muhammad Ali was
officially confirmed in the position of wali (governor) by the Sultan.
Once in power he consistently pursued a number of closely related
policies. Firstly he sought to strengthen his own position in Egypt, to

134
Muhammad Ali, effective ruler of Egypt from 1805 until his death in 1849

destroy all possible rivals and to ensure that this power would be handed
down hereditarily to his descendants. This inevitably involved the policy
of establishing the independence of Egypt from the Ottoman sultanate
because as long as the country was in theory just a province of the
Ottoman empire he was legally no more than an Ottoman official, liable to
dismissal at any time and with no guarantee that his children would be
allowed to succeed him. This in turn meant that he must strive to make
Egypt a rival to Turkey as the centre of the Muslim world and was related
to the most famous and deeply cherished of Muhammad Ali’s policies,
namely the attempt to turn backward and poverty-stricken Egypt into a
fully fledged modern state.

Destruction of the Mamluks and social reforms

One of Muhammad Ali’s first and most significant acts was to stamp out
the Mamluks and put a final end to a system which had lasted since ad
1249. In 1807 the Mamluk beys rose in an unsuccessful revolt against the
new master of Egypt and were suppressed with the aid of Muhammad
Ali’s Albanian soldiery. In 1811 he invited a large part of the surviving

135
Mamluks to a great banquet in Cairo. Then when his guests had assem¬
bled he gave the order and they were all put to death. This crushing blow
was followed by an all-out attempt to hunt down and destroy the remain¬
ing Mamluks in the provinces. Only a small number escaped to take
refuge in the lands of the Funj sultanate higher up the Nile valley. Having
destroyed the Mamluks, Muhammad Ali abolished the system of land
ownership under which they had exploited the peasantry and declared the
land returned to the tillers of the soil.

Military reforms: the creation of a national army

The elimination of the Mamluks meant that Muhammad Ali had to base
his military power on other means. To rely exclusively on his Albanian
troops would have been too dangerous, for they were soldiers of fortune in
a foreign land. Having put him in power they might have easily turned
against him and removed him. He was thus led to take the momentous
step of recruiting native-born Egyptians into the armed forces and laying
the foundations of a modern national army. This was a step of tremendous
importance for the future for it meant that the native Egyptians, who for
centuries had been unarmed and helpless under successive foreign rulers,
would be in a position to decide their own destiny. It is not too much to
say that the creation of a truly Egyptian army meant the beginning of
effective Egyptian nationalism. This was first seen in the nineteenth
century in the career of Arabi Pasha, and more recently in the career of
Gamel Abdul Nasser. At the time, however, the move was not at all
popular. For more than a thousand years the Egyptian fellahin had taken
no part in the military defence of their country. Army life was something
that was alien and dreaded. What is more the Egyptians recruited to the
army were taken only into the lowest ranks; the officers remained Alba¬
nians or Turks. Thus the peasants had to be forced most unwillingly into
the armed forces and Muhammad Ali was anxious to find alternative
sources of military manpower.
Muhammad Ali’s new army (Nizam Jadid) was an innovation. He
deliberately set out to equip and train it in the most modern fashion. A
French military instructor, Captain Seres, was appointed to take charge of
the training programme and the latest military equipment was imported
from Europe. To the astonishment of the world, which tended to regard
the Egyptians as incapable of fighting, the new army went on to disting¬
uish itself in a number of very difficult and laborious campaigns.
Land forces were not Muhammad Ali’s only concern. He clearly real¬
ized the importance of sea power and with speed and determination set
about building up a modern navy.

136
Attempts to modernize the Egyptian economy

To support these new and expensive forces and pay for the campaigns on
which he used them, Muhammad Ali required a greatly increased revenue
and he devoted himself with as much energy to the modernization ot the
E§Trptian economy as he did to the improvement ol the armed torces. By
far the most important of his innovations in this field was the development
of cotton growing as a major agricultural activity. Seeing the economic
value of the crop he introduced a strain of cotton grown in the upper Nile
valley previously little grown, if at all, in Egypt itself. A tremendous
campaign was launched to persuade the peasants to plant the new crop

137
which became, and still remains, the main basis of the Egyptian economy.
In addition Muhammad Ali undertook many measures to improve the
position of agriculture generally. He cleared old canals and dug new ones
to extend the area of cultivable land. In upper Egypt large new areas were
brought into cultivation and by 1844 he had introduced no less than
38 000 waterwheels to supplement the traditional method of canal irriga¬
tion.
With his keen interest in European techniques Muhammad Ali saw that
agricultural improvements alone would not be enough to turn Egypt into a
fully modern state. He devoted a great deal of energy to the establishment
of industries and spent £12 000 000 on factories for the manufacture of
military equipment and cotton cloths, for making sugar and distilling
rum. Unfortunately Egypt at the time did not have enough people with the
business and technical skills and experience to make these ventures a
success. Most of Muhammad Ali’s industrial schemes failed and became a
financial burden on the state. Nevertheless they show that he had seen
what all African states recognize today, namely that industrialization is
essential to raise the living standards of the people and build a prosperous
and powerful state.
In order to carry out his programme of modernizing Egypt it was
essential that Egyptians should be trained to understand the science and
technology of western Europe. One of Muhammad Ali’s most important
contributions to the future of Egypt was that he sent a number of young
Egyptians abroad for education, mainly to France. When these young men
came home they took part in a real cultural revolution. The eyes of
educated Egyptians were opened to the ideas of western Europe and many
great works of European writing were translated into Arabic. Some of
these young men were to be the pioneers of modern Egyptian nationalism.
In the administration of the country Muhammad Ali also made impor¬
tant reforms which gave the native Egyptians some say in the running of
their country. Some Egyptians were employed in the civil service, though
usually under better-educated Turks, and Egyptians were appointed as
village heads, district heads and tax collectors.
In spite ol his modernizing and Europeanizing schemes Muhammad Ali
was well aware of the strength of tradition and took care not to offend the
religious beliefs of his subjects too deeply. He himself built one of the
most magnificent mosques in Egypt on the top of the citadel in Cairo. The
Islamic judges (,qadis) and muftis were also kept in office to dispense justice
in accordance with Muslim law. Realizing that Egypt was becoming
cosmopolitan, however, he established two courts for foreigners. These
courts were dominated by merchants, not by Muslims. The one at Alexan-

138
 V
*

The Citadel Mosque, Cairo

dria had nine members; four of them were Arabs and there was one
Frenchman, a Jew, a Greek, and two .Middle Eastern Christians. Muham¬
mad Ali was liberal in religious matters and allowed freedom of worship to
the Copts and other Christians and to the Jews.

139
Muhammad Ali’s foreign policy

Foreign policy was probably Muhammad Ali’s greatest interest. Unless he

could win a considerable degree of independence for Egypt from the
Ottoman empire he could in theory be deposed at any time by the
Ottoman sultan, and all his plans might be undone. He therefore tried to
strengthen Egypt’s position as an Islamic power and to win more inde¬
pendence from the Ottoman empire. At first he set out to achieve his aims
by co-operating with the Ottoman sultan. The Ottoman sultan on the
other hand was afraid of the growing power of his overmighty subject and
hoped to weaken him by getting him involved in difficult and expensive
military campaigns.
In 1812 the Ottoman sultan asked Muhammad Ali to undertake the
suppression of a rebellion by the fanatical Wahhabi sect in central Arabia.
Egyptian forces were sent to Arabia and in spite of the extreme difficulties
of fighting in that mountainous and desert area they succeeded in defeat¬
ing the Wahhabis and establishing Muhammad Ali as the dominant power
in the neighbourhood of the Holy Cities of Islam.
The next task for which the Sultan asked Egyptian aid was to help
suppress the Greeks, who had risen against the Ottoman empire in a war
of independence. Muhammad Ali’s forces, led by his son Ibrahim, almost
turned the tide of the war, but the British and French navies came to the
aid of the Greeks and destroyed the new Egyptian navy at the battle of
Navarino in 1827.
Muhammad Ali’s military schemes were not all outside Africa. He set
out to extend his power up the Nile valley, where the ancient Egyptians
had had their gold mines. He also hoped to recruit large numbers of black
slaves to strengthen his army and to obtain timber from the tropical areas
ol the Upper Nile for his navy. In 1820 his armies invaded the area which
is now the Republic of the Sudan. That area was then under the Funj
sultanate (see Introduction) but the Funj kingdom was in the last stages of
decline. A number of different claimants to the throne were struggling for
power, many chiefdoms had asserted their independence from any central
government and the position was made worse by the squabbles and
intrigues of the Mamluk refugees who had fled into the area at the time of
Muhammad Ali s destruction of Mamluk power in Egypt. The people of
the Sudan were therefore not able to offer a united resistance and Muham¬
mad Ali was able to establish his authority. He introduced a number of
important reiorms in the Sudan which will be discussed in the next
chapter. He found that the gold of the Nubian desert had been largely
ex austed in ancient times but he did succeed in forcing large numbers of
blacks from the Sudan into his army.

140
 Muhammad Ali had undertaken his campaigns in support of the Otto¬
man sultan as a way of winning greater autonomy for Egypt but the sultan
was unwilling to grant this and the Egyptian ruler then tried to strengthen
his position by taking possession of the Turkish province of Syria. His
son, Ibrahim, began the campaign in 1832 and the Egyptian forces easily
gained the upper hand. He was hailed by the Syrians as a deliverer from
the corrupt and oppressive rule of the Ottoman Turks and there seemed to
be nothing to prevent him attacking. But this campaign involved Muham¬
mad Ali in the politics of the major European powers. The Ottoman
empire had been declining for a long time and Russia was hoping that
when it collapsed its territories would be divided between the European
powers in such a way that Russia would gain control of the Bosphorus and
access to the Mediterranean. She did not wish to see a more powerful ruler
take the place of the Ottoman sultan as he might revive the Ottoman state
and deny Russia the chance of gaining her ambition. As the sultan’s armies
had been defeated and there seemed a possibility that Muhammad Ali
might advance on Constantinople the sultan appealed for Russian aid. In
the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi of 1833 Russia promised to give military
support to the Ottoman sultan in case of need in return for access to the
Bosphorus. This treaty was much disliked by Britain; for in the interests
of safeguarding her trade routes, Britain had always tried to bolster up the
Ottoman empire to keep Russia from gaining too much influence in
Constantinople. Britain was therefore anxious to prevent the sultan from
making use of the Russian offer and hoped to win the 1 urks away from a
pro-Russian policy. For this reason Britain was anxious to prevent
Muhammad Ali from putting the sultan in a position where he had to ask
for Russian military assistance under the terms of the treaty. Faced with
this international situation Muhammad Ali stopped his forces and fell
back on trying to get his way by negotiation.
In spite of the weak position of the Ottoman empire, however, the
sultan refused to give him what he wanted. In 1839 fighting began again
and Muhammad Ali’s forces easily defeated the Turks and began to
advance rapidly towards Constantinople. His forces reached as far as
Konieh and the way seemed open to the Ottoman capital. This move
created great alarm amongst the European powers, with the exception ol
France which was particularly friendly to Muhammad Ali and hoped to
gain trading advantages.
In 1840 the European powers, with the exception of France, signed a
treaty in London in which they agreed to limit Muhammad Ali s territorial
ambitions. They agreed to maintain the sovereignty of the Ottoman sultan
over Egypt but they also agreed that Muhammad Ali should be recognized
as the hereditary governor (pasha) representing the Ottoman sultan in

141
 *

Egypt and life governor of Acre in Syria. France refused to sign the treaty
and continued supporting Muhammad Ali. The British navy then began
bombarding Syrian ports and landing troops to cut off Muhammad Ali’s
advance forces from their base. He had the wisdom to see that he could not
hope to fight against the combined forces of the major European powers
and therefore agreed to accept the London treaty.

Achievements of Muhammad Ali

Muhammad Ali thus failed to achieve his ambition of winning complete

independence from the Ottoman empire. But at least he ensured that his
descendants would succeed him in the rulership of Egypt and he had taken
the country a long way on the road to complete independence. Like his
foreign policy his internal schemes in Egypt were also a mixture of success
and failure. His industrial plans were unsuccessful and the heavy expenses
involved in maintaining his armed forces and using them on major cam¬
paigns meant that the Egyptian peasants had to be very heavily taxed. This
did a great deal to undermine the value of his agricultural reforms.
Peasants began to refuse to plant the new crops as the taxes were so high
that they received very little profit. Some of them abandoned the land
altogether. Muhammad Ali then began to grant land to individuals on a
large scale. This was done to bring land which had fallen into neglect back
into cultivation, but it brought into existence a class of wealthy landlords
to replace the Mamluks whom he had earlier destroyed. Muhammad Ali’s
own family was naturally prominent in this class and acquired enormous
estates. This landlord class was later to gain a great deal of political
influence until its power was greatly reduced by the reforms of Gamel
Abdul Nasser.
It should be remembered that the mass of the Egyptian peasants had
lived tor more than a thousand years under oppressive foreign rulers.
Poverty-stricken, uneducated and overtaxed they were little interested in
government. They were intensely conservative, and ill-disposed towards
any improvement in their age-old methods. It was simply not possible to
change all this in the course of a single lifetime.
Nevertheless Muhammad Ali’s achievements are amazing. He had put
Egypt on the way to modernization and independence. He had established
her as a major cotton producer. He had built a national army and showed
that Egyptian soldiers could be the equal of any in the world. He had given
Egyptians some place in the government of their country and laid the
oundations loi the growth ol a western-educated class. Under him Egypt
a suddenly appeared on the world stage as a power to be reckoned with,

142
and he had done all this without taking any loans from the European
powers which might have committed him to them.

Abbas I

Muhammad Ali died in 1849 and it was the tragedy of Egypt that none of
his successors had his ability. Abbas I who ruled from 1849 to 1853, was
almost his exact opposite. He was deeply conservative, and lacked
Muhammad Ali’s understanding of the modern world. Under his rule the
factories were abandoned, schools were shut and many European advisers
dismissed. This did mean, however, that state expenses were reduced.
This large cut in state expenses in turn lightened the burden of the
fellahin, for Abbas found it possible to lower their taxes. Moreover Abbas
endeared himself to the fellahin by treating them kindly.

Said and the Suez Canal agreement

Abbas I was succeeded in 1853 by Said. He had received a French

education, was highly westernized, and loved to surround himself with
European friends. He fully shared Muhammad Ali s desire to modernize
Egypt but he lacked his shrewd sense of political realism. In his reign
Egypt became a happy hunting ground for the promoters of various
schemes of improvement and for the agents of European bankers who
were only too eager to advance the money on conditions favourable to
themselves. The greatest of these schemes was the project lor building a
canal at Suez to link the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. This idea had
been put forward some time before, but it became a practical reality when
the Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps persuaded Said to give his support
on terms very unfavourable to Egypt. Under the agreement Egypt was to
provide the labour for the construction of the canal as well as a substantial
proportion of the other costs. Egypt was also to give up to the Internation¬
al Company of Suez a stretch of territory through which a sweet water
canal was to be cut for irrigation. At the same time the control of the
Company and the bulk of the profits were to remain with the French
shareholders. It was a clear case of swindlrng. In order to fulfrl his part ol
the bargain as well as to finance other expenses Said resorted to European
bankers who gave him huge loans in return for heavy interest. By the time
Said died in 1863 Egypt had borrowed £14 million from foreign bankers.

143
Ismail Pasha and his extravagance

Said was succeeded in 1863 by Ismail Pasha, the man who is often held
responsible for allowing Egypt to fall under British rule. His character is
difficult to judge. To British imperialists like Lord Cromer and Sir Alfred
Milner, Ismail was a weak, cunning and selfish pleasure-seeker who
borrowed money from Europeans and later turned against them and
ungratefully refused to pay his debts. An American writer, Pierre Cra-
bites, however, described him as a shrewd, progressive and enlightened
ruler with the best interests of Egypt at heart and a victim of the swindling
tricks of unscrupulous Europeans. Neither of these views is entirely right
or entirely wrong.
Ismail’s main failing was that while he sought to carry out a policy very
similar to that of Muhammad Ali he lacked the cleverness and sense of
proportion to carry it out successfully. He tried to do everything too
quickly and on too big a scale for the economy of the country. He was too
easily tricked by the moneylenders and their agents who flocked around
him. In the attempt to modernize Egypt overnight he built over 13 000
kilometres of irrigation canals, almost 1500 kilometres of railway, 8000

The procession of ships at the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869

144
kilometres of telegraph lines, 450 bridges, 4500 elementary schools and a
modern port at Alexandria. Enormous sums were also spent on personal
and prestige affairs. He spent £1 million on entertaining guests at the
formal opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. He built luxurious hotels and
patronized art on a lavish scale. Like Muhammad Ali he sought to extend
his power in Africa. He employed European explorers to search for the
sources of the Nile, and he despatched costly expeditions to Ethiopia
which met with complete defeat. To carry out his schemes he employed
ever-increasing numbers of Europeans who rose from 5000 in 1836 to
100 000 in 1875.

Towards self-government

One project in which he was fairly successful was in winning further

concessions from the Ottoman sultan. Unlike Muhammad Ali, his grand¬
father, he did not use force but bribes of silver and gold with which he
persuaded the sultan to increase the independence of Egypt. In 1863 the
sultan conferred the administration of Egypt on Ismail and his heirs and
gave the important Red Sea ports of Suakin and Massawa to Egypt. Then
in 1867 the Sultan gave Ismail the title of Khedive and the right to enter
into administrative and commercial conventions as well as to make laws
and regulations for internal government. The measure of self-government
which Egypt had gained was internationally recognized in 1874 at the
Conference of Berne, when Egypt was admitted to the General Postal
Union and became one of the original signatories of the Berne Convention.
Ismail’s character was a strange mixture. He was strongly attracted to
European culture but still deeply attached to the traditional Islamic way of
life, and he could never work out how to combine the best of both. Thus
he remained a traditional Muslim landlord while at the same time he tried
to abolish the system of slavery which was the basis of that type of
landownership. To impress Europeans that he was a modernist he intro¬
duced a constitution that laid the foundations for a parliamentary system
but at the same time he went on behaving as an autocrat whose authority
should not be questioned.

British purchase of Suez Canal shares

As a result of his grand schemes and lavish spending Ismail accumulated

enormous debts for Egypt and as he was careless in financial matters he
was easily cheated. By 1879 Egypt had acquired debts of £100 million. Of

145
this the country had only actually received £65 million, the rest going to
swindlers. As the debts grew Ismail inevitably reached the situation where
he was unable even to pay the interest on outstanding loans. It was
this situation which made him sell Egypt’s shares in the Suez Canal to
Britain.
Ever since the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, Britain had been aware of
the danger that if the country were dominated by a hostile European
power it could be used as a stepping-stone for an attack on India. At first
Britain did not want to get politically involved in the country but merely
wished to prevent French influence getting too strong. When the project
for the Suez Canal was launched Britain expected it to fall and took no
part, but when it proved a success the British government saw that Egypt
had become very much more important to her than before, as the shortest
way to India was through the Canal. The British Prime Minister, Ben¬
jamin Disraeli, seized on the chance offered by Ismail’s financial difficul¬
ties to buy Egypt’s shares in the Canal for the sum of £4 million, which was
only a fraction of the amount Egypt had spent on the project. Disraeli’s
purchase of the Canal shares was not simply a clever business deal. It was a
deliberate attempt to establish a foothold in Egypt and control of the vital
Canal which was becoming the lifeline of the British empire. Disraeli told
the British Parliament on 21 February 1876 that his motives in buying the
shares were political and imperialist. He said: ‘I have never recommended
and I do not recommend this purchase as a financial investment ... I do
not recommend this purchase as a financial speculation ... I have always
and do now recommend it to the country as a political transaction, and one
which I believe is calculated to strengthen the empire.’ Disraeli’s motives
in buying the Canal shares can be compared in some ways with the
imperialist motives of the Royal Niger Company in Nigeria or the British
South Africa Company in Rhodesia. Once Britain had come to feel that
Egypt was vital to the survival of the British empire it was clear that she
would stop at nothing to prevent the country falling under the influence of
any other power. The weakness of Ismail and Tewfik, his son and succes¬
sor, were convenient excuses for further intervention. The days of Egypt’s
independence were numbered.

international control of Egyptian finances

rom 1876 onwards Egypt’s independence began to disappear. As the

.edive was unable to pay his debts, Britain and France, the countries
with the largest stake in the country, began to exert increasing pressure to
ensure that debts to their citizens were paid. During 1876 the British

146
government sent Stephen Cave, the Paymaster-General, to investigate
Egypt’s financial situation. Then in 1878 Britain and France, acting
together, forced the Khedive to place Egyptian finances under joint Anglo-
French control on the grounds that Egypt could not be relied upon to fulfil
her obligations to the European moneylenders. The scheme of joint con¬
trol was a convenient device whereby Britain and France could both
secure their essential interests in the country without coming into conflict
with each other. As Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary, ex¬
plained: ‘When you have got a neighbour and faithful ally who is bent on
meddling in a country in which you are deeply interested - you have three
courses open to you. You may renounce - or monopolize - or share.
Renouncing would have been to place the French across our road to India.
Monopolizing would have brought very near the risk of war. So we
resolved to share.’

Nationalist reaction and the rebellion of Arabi Pasha

With joint Anglo-French control over Egyptian finances, Egypt virtually

lost her independence and this provoked a powerful reaction, which
brought the system of joint control to an end and led to outright British
occupation. Educated Egyptians began nationalist agitation through the
press and the General Assembly, demanding that Ismail and his son,
Tewfik, together with a number of corrupt Turkish office holders be
removed from office. They denounced British and French interference
with the affairs of the country and insisted that if allowed to control their
country’s financial affairs, they could fulfil Egypt’s international obliga¬
tions. The British and French, however, did not trust the nationalists and
were not prepared to surrender control of the Egyptian finances. They
were also anxious to preserve the power of the Khedive so that they could
continue to control the country through him.
As the nationalist agitation grew it spread to the army and a man
emerged who was to become the leader and inspirer of the whole move¬
ment. His name was Arabi Pasha and he was one of the few senior army
officers of pure Egyptian descent. He had joined the army at 17 and like
many other true Egyptians in the armed forces he suffered a great deal at
the hands of Turkish officers. He thus fully shared the growing hatred of
the mass of the fellahin for the privileged class of wealthy Turks, relatives
of the Khedival family, court favourites and a few wealthy landlords.
Arabi Pasha was an embodiment of the growing spirit of nationalism, with
its demand of Egypt for the Egyptians and its hatred of both external
European interference in the country and of the dominance of a small,

147
Arabi Pasha

Ismail Pasha

largely Turkish class in Egypt itself. He was so popular that Egyptians

nicknamed him ‘The Only One’.
Arabi Pasha was far-sighted enough to see that in order that Egyptian
independence could be re-established, thorough reform would have to be
undertaken before abolition of the monarchy and the introduction of a
republican constitution. His movement was very nearly successful and
Lord Cromer, who became British ruler of Egypt for twenty-four years
from 1883 to 1906, confessed: ‘Had he been left alone there can be no
doubt that he would have been successful. His want of success was due to
British influence.’

British occupation of Egypt

As the nationalist movement grew the Khedive’s position became weaker

and weaker. It was obvious that unless something were done the system
of joint British-French control of Egyptian finances would collapse, and
Arabi Pasha and the nationalists would emerge as the effective rulers of the
country. Both European governments were under pressure from those of
their own citizens with financial interests in Egypt, and Britain was
anxious to ensure that whatever happened the French should not be
allowed to act first and establish a position which would endanger the
route to India. The excuse lor armed intervention came in June 1882 when

148
nationalist riots broke out in Alexandria and about fifty Europeans were
killed. Britain decided that a show of force was necessary if the collapse of
European authority in the country was to be prevented. The French were
asked to take part but they refused to take immediate action before their
National Assembly had given its consent. Thus the British fleet alone
mounted the show of force. On 10 July the warships bombarded Alexan¬
dria and when this did not put an end to the nationalist movement, troops
were landed. The British Parliament lost no time in voting money for
military occupation. On 13 September the British forces under Sir Garnet
Wolseley, who was already famous for his victory over the Asante in 1874,
met Arabi Pasha’s forces. The Egyptian army could not stand up against
the well-trained and well-armed British forces. Arabi was defeated and
three days later the British occupied Cairo. Egypt became for all practical
purposes a part of the British empire until 1922.

149
6 The Sudan and Ethiopia in the
nineteenth century

Egypt and the Sudan

As we have seen, the life of Egypt is, and always has been, dependent on
the river Nile. This great river has two main sources. The White Nile
starts from Lake Victoria and flows through the modern Sudan. The Blue
Nile rises in the Ethiopian uplands and flows westward to meet the White
Nile at Khartoum, the capital of the modern Sudan Republic. The two
rivers then unite their waters and flow on northwards through the desert
to reach the sea at the Nile delta. Both branches of the Nile are of great
importance to Egypt. The White Nile maintains the flow of water down
the Nile valley throughout the year and provides most of the water that is
now used for irrigation in the summer months. The Blue Nile is responsi¬
ble for the annual floods which until recent times provided the most
important means of irrigation. The Blue Nile also brings down from
Ethiopia the rich silt which is left behind when the flood waters dry up and
which produces the great fertility of the Egyptian soil. Egypt, the Sudan
and Ethiopia are thus linked together geographically and have a joint
interest in the use of the Nile waters.
In addition to the geographic link the three areas have longstanding
historical relations. The ancient kingdom of Kush in the Sudan arose
under the influence of Egyptian civilization and then for a brief period
kings of Kush ruled in Egypt itself. Much later Kush suffered from the
rivalry of the kingdom of Axum in Ethiopia, and about ad 350 it was
destroyed by the Emperor Ezana, the first Christian ruler of Axum.
Christianity was introduced into the northern part of the modern Sudan
from Egypt and by the sixth century two Christian kingdoms, Maqurra
and Aiwa, had come into existence. In Ethiopia Christianity was intro¬
duced by Greek traders, but the Ethiopian Church affilated itself to the
Church in Egypt and received its Patriarchs from Alexandria.
After the Arab conquest, Egypt was gradually converted to Islam and

150
inevitably the new religion tended to spread up the Nile along the routes of
trade which linked Egypt with the upper Nile area. By the fourteenth
century due to the infiltration of Islam and the immigration of Arab
peoples moving up the Nile, Maqurra had ceased to be a Christian
kingdom. The kingdom of Aiwa, further south, survived for another
century.

The Funj sultanate in the Sudan

In 1504 the remains of the kingdom of Aiwa were destroyed by the

conqueror Amara Dunkas, who built in its place an Islamic kingdom, the
Funj sultanate, with its capital at Sennar. This state survived until 1821
and was known as the Black Sultanate. Its founders, the Funj, were blacks
though their origin is not precisely known. Some writers believe that they
were Shilluk, a people who are still important in the Sudan.
At the height of its power the Funj sultanate controlled a very large
area, from the neighbourhood of its capital at Sennar to as far north as the
first cataract of the Nile. It did not, however, include the Dinka, Azande
and other peoples of the southern area of the modern Sudan.
Within the large territory of the Funj sultanate many areas enjoyed
considerable independence. This was particularly true of the Arabs along
the Nile valley north of the confluence of the Blue and White Nile, who
were ruled in the name of the Funj Sultan by an Arab viceroy called the
Abdullab. It was also true of many chiefdoms in the southern part of the
kingdom, who kept their own chiefs and merely accepted the paramount-
cy of the Funj ruler. This type of kingdom was naturally very fragile and
could not be held together if the power of the sultans remained strong.
This power depended on a well-trained cavalry force and an infantry lorce
made up of slaves who were captured in the Nuba mountains. The
strength of the Funj kingdom was shaken when the Shaiqiya who lived
around the great bend of the Nile rebelled against the Sultan’s viceroy and
succeeded in asserting their independence. This revolt damaged the trade
of the Funj sultanate and in compensation the sultans attempted to expand
into Kordofan. This led to too much power being given to the army
commander Abu Likeilik and he marched on Sennar and deposed the
Sultan. Thereafter the sons and grandsons of Abu Likeilik fought one
another for power, each of them supporting one or other member ol the
Funj royal family as puppet sultan. In these conditions of civil war many
chiefdoms broke away from the kingdom and its authority became con¬
fined to a very small area. After 1811 the position was further worsened by
the arrival of quarrelling bands of Mamluk refugees from Egypt.

151
Turco-Egyptian conquest and administration of the Sudan,
1820-81

It was this weak and contused territory that was invaded in 1820 by the
army of Muhammad Ali under the command of his third son, Kamil
asha. The Funj sultanate was in no position to make an effective stand

152
and the 4000 troops under Kamil Pasha met with little severe resistance
except from the Shaiqiya. Muhammad Ali’s objectives in conquering the
Sudan were to find the gold mines of the ancient Egyptians, and to acquire
sources of timber for his fleet and manpower for his army. The first
proved a complete disappointment and the second of relatively little value,
but Muhammad Ali did succeed in forcibly recruiting large numbers of
Sudanese blacks into his army. In addition he and his successors intro¬
duced into the Sudan much of their modernizing programme.
Between 1820 and 1881 the Sudan was administered by Turco-Egyp-
tian governor-generals known as likimdars. The area was divided into a
number of provinces administered by provincial administrators called
mudirs and the provinces were in turn divided into districts called qisms,
each administered by an officer called qism naziri. Finally each of the qisms
was divided into still smaller units called khatts ruled by khatt hakimi. The
Turco-Egyptian government was maintained by a large army of 10 000
infantry recruited from the Sudanese blacks and known as the Jihaniyya,
and about 9000 cavalry largely recruited from the Shaiqiya.
Muhammad Ali’s conquest of the Sudan naturally led to a greatly
increased flow of trade between that country and Egypt. Egyptian cultiva¬
tors were also sent into the area to teach new farming methods and
introduce new crops. Cotton growing was started on a substantial scale
and now provides the Sudan’s major export crop. New lands were brought
under irrigation and plantations of indigo and sugar were established.
Improvements in communications were also made in the Turco-Egyptian
period. A telegraph system was introduced which by 1866 linked Wadi
Haifa to upper Egypt. In 1874 this was extended to Khartoum. Another
line was built linking the Sudan to the Red Sea and another extended
westward through El Obeid to the borders of Darfur. Nile steamers
speeded up communications and helped the administration. The founda¬
tion of Khartoum, capital of the modern Sudan, was also an achievement
of the Turco-Egyptian administration. In 1825 it was a mere village neai
the confluence of the Blue and White Niles but by 1833 it had expanded so
much that it was made the administrative capital of the country. By 1837
its population was estimated at 20 000.
The Turco-Egyptian government expanded its area of authority far
beyond the limits of the Funj sultanate. The ‘pagan’ blacks of the southern
Sudan were conquered and for the first time brought under common
government with the Muslim peoples of the north. The rulers of Egypt
employed many European administrators and experts in the territory in
their efforts at modernization and they engaged European explorers to
investigate the hinterland with a view to further extensions of territory.
One of these, Samuel Baker, discovered the sources of the Blue Nile and

153
confirmed that the White Nile did rise in Lake Victoria. Another Euro¬
pean employee of the Turco-Egyptian regime, a German called Emin
Pasha, reached as far as the northern part of modern Uganda with a
number of Egyptian soldiers, and the Turco-Egyptian regime might have
been extended into the heart of East Africa if it had not been for the
outbreak of revolt in the Sudan itself.

Unpopularity of the Turco-Egyptian government

Though modern Sudanese patriots like to dwell on the seamy side of the
Turco-Egyptian regime, there can be doubt that it conferred many bene¬
fits on the peoples of the Sudan. Nevertheless, it was far from popular.
In the first place, like most conquerors, Muhammad Ali and his successors
were concerned first and foremost to exploit the Sudan for their own
benefit rather than in the interests of the Sudanese. In the attempt to
profit from the area they imposed heavy taxes which were much resented.
This was particularly so in the reign of Khedive Ismail (1863-79) who
tried to increase his revenue from the Sudan as much as possible to help
meet his ever-mounting debts to Europeans. The administrators who were
sent to the Sudan disliked being sent there. They tried to get away as
soon as they could. Between 1821 and 1885 there were no less than 23
likimdars serving for an average period of two years. Only one of them,
named Kurshid, served for a substantial period - 13 years. During their
stay many of the administrators at all levels engaged in corrupt practices in
the hope of making quick money. The administration was strongest in the
reign of Muhammad Ali himself and afterwards fell into a sad state of
decline. The Khedive Ismail managed to restore efficiency to some extent
but after 1876 he became so preoccupied with his European debts that he
could only think of the Sudan as a source of revenue. In addition to their
maladministration the Turkish administrators belonged to the Hanafite
school of Muslim law, the most lax of all the Islamic codes. Many of them
were open wine-drinkers, and this was particularly shocking to the
Sudanese, who belonged to the strict Malikite school. The religious feel¬
ings of the Sudanese were also disturbed by the employment of European
Chiistians in important positions and the belief grew that the country was
to be handed over to Europeans. The position was not helped when in
1877 Ismail Pasha appointed an Englishman, Charles George Gordon, as
governor-general. Gordon’s active opposition to the slave trade and the
steps he took to punish slave traders disturbed the traditional economy of
the Sudan and aroused bitter opposition. The fact that he employed
increasing numbers of Europeans in administrative posts under him furth¬
er increased the bitterness.

154
Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi

Almost immediately after the 1820 conquest there were revolts against the
taxes imposed by the new masters. There were uprisings in Darfur against
the new administration in 1838 and 1878, and in the Bahr el-Ghazal in

155
 Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi

1877 and 1878. These sporadic outbursts of discontent were suppressed

but events took a new turn with the emergence of a new political and
religious leader, Muhammad Ahmad. He was born in 1844 in Dongola
Province to a family of boat-builders. As a young man, he received an
education in Islamic law and theology at the feet of a famous learned man,
Sheik Tayib. He was an eager scholar and himself became a faqih, that is a
man learned in Islamic laws. He became a member of the Sammaniya sufi
brotherhood and opened a lodge on Aba island, south of Khartoum. Like
other religious reformers in the Islamic world at the time - such as the
Fulani reformer Usman dan Fodio in West Africa - Muhammad Ahmad
dreamt of a return to the ideal Islamic government that was believed to
have existed in the days of the first four Muslim caliphs. He hoped to see
the whole Islamic world reunited under a righteous ruler who would
govern in strict accordance with the sacred teaching of the Quran. He also
preached against the luxury and corruption of the times and called for a
return to the purity and asceticism of the ideal Islamic life. He saw the
lurks as ungodly and corrupt and condemned the Sudanese sheikhs for
their lax and luxurious way of life and their acceptance of offices under the
Turco-Egyptian regime. He began to see himself as the heaven-sent
deliverer destined to rule the entire Muslim community and restore it to
godliness and purity. In 1881 his followers proclaimed him as the Mahdi
(The Guided One).

156
! Collapse of the Turco-Egyptian regime and triumph of
i the Mahdi
I The proclamation of Muhammad Ahmad as the Mahdi alarmed the Tur-
: co-Egyptian administration and he was summoned to Khartoum. He
’ refused to come and an expedition sent against him was defeated. The
news spread rapidly among the masses that Allah had fought on the side of
the Mahdi and that he had defeated his enemies without military effort.
Support for the new leader grew rapidly and soon became too much for the
' Turco-Egyptian forces. The Mahdi conducted his campaign on
I Islamic lines modelled on the life of the Prophet Muhammad. He began by
performing a hijra (or flight from the ungodly) like Muhammad’s flight
from Mecca to Medina. This flight took him to Kordofan in the west
where most of his supporters were to be found at first. There the numbers
; of his followers, who were called the Ansar, increased rapidly. In Kordo-
i fan and Darfur he won several military successes and then began to extend
I his power eastwards. By 1883 he was not only ruling over Kordofan and
i Darfur but was also master of areas around the Buie Nile. The eastern part
j of his conquests was governed in his name by Osman Digna.
The Turco-Egyptian administration was in a particularly weak position
j for, as we have seen, the British had occupied Egypt in 1882 to support the
j authority of the Khedive and ensure the payment of Egypt’s international
: debts. In 1883 the British decided to support their puppet regime in Egypt
j in its attempt to restore Turco-Egyptian control of the Sudan. A mainly

! Egyptian army led by an English commander, Hicks Pasha, was sent to

; capture the Mahdi in Kordofan. The invaders were decisively defeated
j and the Sudanese, who interpreted the victory as another miracle and a
j sign that Muhammad Ahmad really was the Mahdi, hesitated no longer in
i rallying to his side. Lord Cromer, the British Consul-General in Egypt,
was in a difficult position. The Khedive, whose government the British
occupation was officially intended to support, was naturally anxious to
! regain control of the Sudan, but W.E. Gladstone, the British Prime
Minister, was opposed to what he regarded as unnecessary extensions of
British responsibility and had often spoken of the rights of the Sudanese to
struggle for their independence. The British cabinet was divided, and
there were some who felt that as Egypt was dependent on the Nile, British
: strategic interests in Egypt demanded that she should control the upper
\ Nile valley.
An official decision was taken to evacuate the Sudan and leave it to the
\ Mahdi, but those who disliked this decision managed to ensure that the
i man sent to carry out the evacuation should be the eccentric General
l Gordon, a man who could be relied upon to disobey his official instruc-
 $

General Gordon

tions. When Gordon reached Khartoum he refused to proceed with the

evacuation and announced his intention to smash the Mahdi. His forces
were far too small, however, to face the massive following of Muhammad
Ahmad and he found himself cut off and besieged in Khartoum. Glad¬
stone, who was furious at Gordon’s behaviour, refused for a long time to
do anything to rescue him. Finally, however, a relief expedition was
organized under General Wolseley and fought its way to Khartoum. By
the time it arrived the town had fallen to the Mahdists and Gordon was
dead. The relief column therefore retreated, leaving the Mahdi in com¬
plete control of the Sudan (1885).
Muhammad Ahmad did not live to enjoy the fruits of his victory for
long. He died soon after his troops had occupied Khartoum. During his
short reign he had tried conscientiously to put into practice his ideals of
Islamic government. He collected only taxes that were laid down in the
Quran and based his administration of justice on the sharia. He tried to
purity society and administered severe punishments for theft, adultery,
drunkenness, smoking and bringing of false accusations. He succeeded in
enforcing the law requiring women to wear veils, though he was unable to
suppress some traditional Sudanese practices of which he disapproved,
such as the wearing of amulets, elaborate wedding ceremonies and mourn¬
ing customs at funerals. During his reign he minted gold and silver coins.
To help him in his campaigns the Mahdi appointed three deputies or
khalifas named Abdullahi, Ali and Muhammad Sharif. The title is the
same as that used by the political successors of the Prophet Muhammad,

158
 Khartoum in the nineteenth century

I the early caliphs who ruled the whole Islamic world. The three khalifas
were army commanders during the life of the Mahdi and on his death soon
after the capture of Khartoum one of them, Abdullahi, succeeded to the
supreme position in the Sudan.

The Sudan under the Khalifa 1885-98

' The rule of the Khalifa has been described in the past by European
writers, some of whom were anxious to justify the subsequent British
conquest and others who had suffered as prisoners of the Khalifa, as one of
unrelieved brutality and barbarism. Recent researches have shown,
however, that it was in fact a remarkably successful system. The death of
the Mahdi created a crisis for his followers. As the Mahdi was supposed to
be immortal his death led many to doubt whether he was really the Mahdi
at all. Abdullahi also found it difficult to make the other two khalifas accept
his position as the supreme head of state, and members of the Mahdi s
own family felt that they should hold the highest offices in the land.
The Mahdist movement was one of religious as well as political reform.
Muhammad Ahmad, by virtue of his claim to be the Mahdi, denounced all

159
the traditional law schools of the Islamic world and prepared his own code;
though he had himself been a member of a sufi brotherhood he also
denounced all the suli orders. These moves were naturally unpopular
among the more conservative learned men and the leaders of the powerful

160
 ; sufi groups in the country. The reforms were much more difficult to
[ maintain when the Mahdi himself was dead. The movement had grown up
j very quickly under the inspiration of the Mahdi’s personality and brought
many societies together in common opposition to the Turco-Egyptian
* rule. Once the hated foreign government had been overthrown and the
1 Mahdi was gone, traditional hostilities were soon renewed.
Abdullahi thus had to struggle against many difficulties. In 1888 and
I 1892 he was faced by revolts led by members of the Mahdi’s family. A
: more serious source of trouble, however, was the attempt of some of the
; chiefdoms to establish their independence from central government con¬
trol. Abdullahi’s own chiefdom, the Baqqara, a cattle-keeping people near
Darfur, were among the most obstinate. Expeditions had to be sent
j against them in the first three years of the Khalifa’s reign. In 1889 he sent
j one of his relatives, Uthman Adam, to administer them and when even
j this did not put an end to the troubles he forced a number of them to leave
[ Darfur and settled them in the Omdurman district.
In addition to internal problems there were also questions of foreign
| policy. Although the British government had at first decided on a policy of
s non-intervention in the Sudan the Egyptian rulers had never abandoned
| hope of recovering the territory. A large section of the Egyptian army was
i stationed near Aswan, not far from the frontier and this forced the Khalifa

r to maintain a large army in preparedness for an attack. In 1889 he took the

| initiative and himself invaded Egypt but he was repulsed.
On the eastern frontier of the Sudan lay the Christian empire of
Ethiopia. As a religious leader the Khalifa was duty bound to make war
;! against the ‘infidels’ and a jihad was declared against Ethiopia. Sudanese
forces invaded Ethiopia in 1889 but were severely defeated at the battle of
Metemma, where the Ethiopian Emperor Yohannes (John) was killed.
This did not mean the end of the struggle, however, and tension continued
when Menelik came to the throne of Ethiopia and began a policy of
vigorous expansion. In this he had the tacit support of Britain, France and
Italy, with whom he had treaty relationships. Menelik was regarded with
particular hostility by the Khalifa as he openly claimed Fashoda and
Khartoum as part of his empire. Between 1892 and 1897 Menelik made
overtures to the Khalifa suggesting that they unite their forces to resist the
designs of European imperialists but no permanent alliance between the
Christian empire and the head of an Islamic reforming movement proved
possible.
By about 1892 Abdullahi had succeeded in solving most of the country’s
internal problems. The capital was established at Omdurman on the other
bank of the Nile from Khartoum and a metropolitan area grew up around
Aba island which the Khalifa ruled directly. The rest of the state was

161
 4

divided into provinces governed by amils (agents) who in accordance with

the practice of the early Caliphate were both governors and tax collectors.
It was the Khalifa’s policy to appoint amils who were not necessarily
members of the peoples over whom they ruled. The attempt to purify
society in accordance with Islamic beliefs, which had been such a marked
feature of the Mahdi’s policy, was continued, and a high moral tone was
maintained in the administration, where corruption was severely
punished. Taxes were much lighter and more honestly collected than in
the Turco-Egyptian period and the people paid them much more willing¬
ly. The necessity for the state to maintain a large army meant that most of
the revenue was spent on defence and relatively little was done in the way
of economic improvements. The army was provided with firearms, some
of which had been captured from the defeated Egyptian army but most of
which were made in Omdurman. The men came largely from the Nuba
mountains where Muhammad Ali had previously recruited soldiers for his
Egyptian forces. They were brave fighters and remained loyal to the state
to the end.
Ethnic disturbances were eventually brought under control. The Baq-
qara, who gave most trouble of all, were finally converted into a group of
the Khalifa’s most ardent followers; a number of its leading men were
taken to Omdurman and given high positions in the government. The
Khalifa had succeeded in establishing a theocratic system which might
have proved satisfactory to the Sudanese people if it had been left alone by
the European powers.

The British conquest of the Sudan, 1898

In the last decade of the nineteenth century the imperialist designs of

several European powers were moving towards the upper Nile. The
Germans were heading towards it from Tanganyika, the British from
Uganda and Kenya. The Belgian king, Leopold II, was extending his
possessions in that direction from the Congo Basin. The Italians were
looking inland from the Red Sea coast and the French were thinking of
seizing a stretch of territory right across Africa from their possessions in
Equatorial Africa and Senegal to the Red Sea. In South Africa, Cecil
Rhodes was dreaming of a great chain of British territories from the Cape
to Cairo, linked together by a transcontinental railway and telegraph
system.
As already stated, Britain was concerned first and foremost with the
strategic position oi Egypt and realized that she could not hold her
position there ii a strong and possibly hostile power controlled the upper

162
[ Nile valley. The British government therefore did its best to keep other
i powers out of the area and bought off the threat from Belgium, Italy and
) Germany by agreeing to recognize the sovereignty of those nations where
they already had interests, at the price of their agreeing to leave the upper
Nile valley alone. The French, however, refused to be bought off. They
had always regarded Britain’s occupation of Egypt as a treacherous act and
hoped to undermine the British position there. Accordingly the French
prepared a grand programme for a march on the Nile. They planned to
send expeditions from the French Congo and North Africa. In 1896 the
French explorer, Major J.B. Marchand, set out from the Upper Congo
and achieved the difficult task of reaching Fashoda on the Nile, a frontier
town of the Sudan. Britain became thoroughly alarmed, and the govern¬
ment decided that it could no longer leave the Sudan as a tempting bait lot
another European power. Plans for an invasion ol the Sudan were hurried¬
ly prepared, a railway line was built and troops armed with the most
modern weapons marched under the command of General H.H. Kitchen¬
er into the country. In 1898 Kitchener faced Marchand at Fashoda and

163
 ft

forced him to withdraw, thus provoking the ‘Fashoda incident’ which

nearly led to war between Britain and France. But before this happened
Sudan’s independence had already been destroyed by Kitchener’s army.
The Khalifa’s forces were substantial and very courageous though they
lacked the firepower of the British troops. Unfortunately for them they
advanced too far instead of falling back on a position where the nature of
the land would have given them the best chance of resisting the British
attack. In their forward position they found it very difficult to maintain
enough supplies and they did not have the weapons to attack the British
camp successfully. Thus their morale declined and their numbers grew
less so that when the British felt strong enough to push ahead they were
able to pass the most difficult point on their advance without serious
opposition. The most severe battle of the war was fought near Omdurman
but in the open country the bravery of the Khalifa’s followers was of no
avail against the deadly fire of the British troops. They were defeated with
great loss of life and the British occupied the Sudan. Kitchener, the head
of the British expedition, proclaimed that the reconquest of the Sudan was
being undertaken on behalf of the Khedive of Egypt and the administra¬
tion which was established in the country was known officially as the
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. But it was the British who had the real
power and they administered the country until its attainment of independ¬
ence in 1956.

The Ethiopian empire at the beginning of the nineteenth

century

Ethiopia, as we have seen in the Introduction, is the centre of one of

Africa’s most ancient civilizations. From the beginnings of the empire of
Axum more than two thousand years ago until today the Ethiopian high¬
lands have had a continuous history. From about ad 350 when the
Emperor Ezana adopted Christianity as the official state religion, and
throughout the history of the empire the Church played a vital role as the
guardian of Ethiopia’s culture, just as the authority of the emperor, who
was held to be descended from King Solomon of the Holy Scriptures, was
a sym ol of unity and political identity. Geography has played a double
part in Ethiopian history. On the one hand, the great height of its
flat-topped mountains, ranging from 1500 to 3700 metres, with great
va eys and gorges, and the semi-desert lowlands which surround them,
ave made Ethiopia a land very difficult for a foreign aggressor to attack,
ese natural features have isolated the Ethiopians from other peoples and
ma e it possible for them to continue developing their own unique cul-

164
 .

i ture. On the other hand the mountainous country and the difficulties of
| communications have placed obstacles in the way of the development of a
strong and highly centralized kingdom. There has always been a tendency
s for rulers of provinces (rases) to take advantage of any weakness of the
: central government to establish themselves as virtually independent kings.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the kingdom was in a very
weak state. Ever since the invasion of Ethiopia by the Somalis under
| Mohammed Gran in the sixteenth century the position of the emperors
had been growing weaker. The Muslim invasion led to the emperor
inviting Portuguese aid. With this help the Somalis were defeated but the
coming of the Portuguese brought religious controversy into the country.
The conversion of one of the emperors to the Roman Catholic faith and the
| civil wars which followed before the traditional church was restored,
r weakened the emperor’s position. Worse still, they distracted attention
| from a more serious problem, the gradual movement onto the plateau of
the cattle-keeping Oromo (Galla). In the end the Oromo overran almost
half the area traditionally belonging to the Ethiopian empire and their
raiding activities made travel difficult even in the areas they did not
occupy. In these circumstances the provincial rases broke away completely
from the central government and fought each other in endless little wars
for the almost worthless dignity of the imperial crown. Nevertheless in
spite of the sad state to which the country was reduced the traditional
civilization did not collapse entirely. The Church still survived and suc¬
ceeded in preserving the values of traditional Ethiopian culture. The Oro¬
mo began to settle down and adopt much of the Ethiopian way of life.
Some of them became Christians, others became Muslims. Finally, even
though the emperors had lost almost all their power and there were often
several persons claiming the title at the same time, the tradition that there
should be an emperor who was the rightful ruler of all Ethiopia still
survived. It was in these circumstances that three great rulers arose who
succeeded in restoring the power of the monarchy, reuniting Ethiopia and
making it a powerful state once more.

Emperor Tewodros (Theodore)

The first of the three great Ethiopian rulers of the nineteenth century was
the son of the governor of the small frontier province of Kwara His
childhood was very poor but he grew up a brave and adventurous lad an
began his climb to power by building up a band of followers who helped
him in plundering trading caravans. Eventually his following became so
powerful that he was in a position to intervene in the struggle for power

165
 $

Emperor Tewodros II of Ethiopia

that was going on between the great rases. The two main contenders for
the imperial title at the time were the rases of the two large provinces of
Gondar and Shoa. He defeated them both and forced the Abuna or
Patriarch of the Ethiopian Church to crown him as emperor in 1855. He
took Tewodros (Theodore) as his imperial name and soon showed that he
intended to make his imperial position a reality in a manner that had not
been attempted for more than a hundred years. For this purpose he
maintained a very large and well-paid army which he used to put down the
numerous rebellions which broke out from time to time. He attempted to
destroy the independent power of the rases completely and to turn them
into salaried officers to be appointed and dismissed at will. He also tried to
improve the taxation system, to regulate the power of the Church, to
suppress the slave trade, and to enforce monogamy.
In foreign affairs Tewodros had sweeping ambitions. He dreamed of
conquering the Sudan, Egypt and Jerusalem and wiping Islam from the
face of the earth. In particular he was determined that Ethiopia should be
given the respect she deserved from the great powers. Tewodros saw the
advantages ol modernization, particularly in the field of weapons, and
many Europeans were attracted to his court. Two of them, John Bell and
Walter Plowden, became his trusted advisers and encouraged his prog¬
ramme of reforms. Others were not such worthwhile persons, and contri¬
buted to turning the emperor’s mind against the Europeans.

166
 As Tewodros’s reign continued he ran into increasing difficulties. He
: tried to do too much too fast. His attempts at centralization naturally
i aroused bitter opposition from the provincial rases, and this opposition
1 was increased by resentment at the heavy taxes needed to maintain his
: inflated army. As a result Tewodros became more and more unpopular
: and steadily lost control over growing areas of the country. This in turn
i produced a sense of bitter frustration which affected his personality until
I by the end of his reign he had become almost insane.
The crisis which ended in the fall and death of Tewodros began when he
. addressed a letter to Queen Victoria proposing the opening of an Ethio-
: pian embassy in London. Unfortunately the letter was given no serious
j attention and no reply was sent. Tewodros took this as a calculated insult
I from a ruler whose subjects he had always befriended. In his rage he threw
the British Consul, Charles Cameron, into prison. When the British sent
i an agent to demand Cameron’s release, with a message condemning the
j emperor’s action as uncivilized, he threw the agent and 60 other Euro¬
peans into jail also. The British government then felt in honour bound to
rescue its subjects and in 1867 an expedition under Sir Robert Napier was
sent out for the purpose. The British expedition found great difficulties in
surmounting the geographical obstacles in the way of an invasion of
Ethiopia but they met with no serious military opposition. By this time the
I great majority of the Ethiopian people were in opposition to their ruler and
j as the British made it clear that they did not intend to occupy the country
j permanently but merely to rescue their own subjects the rases were in-
j clined to encourage them. Indeed the progress of the British force was
[ made much easier by the fact that for much of their journey one of the
: rases provided them with free food for men and animals. Tewodros was
j deserted by all but a small fraction of his once massive army. He decided
to make a stand at his capital of Magdala and on 10 April the remnants of
his followers were easily defeated by the British troops. The unfortunate
emperor shot himself rather than fall into the enemies hands.
After the successful achievement of their purpose the British left the
country again, taking the released prisoners with them. The British ex¬
pedition to Ethiopia created a quite false impression about the strength ol
the country. It looked as if the kingdom had been very easily defeated
when in actual fact the only fighting had been between the British and the
small remnant of Tewodros’s bodyguard. The mass ol the people had been
neutral or actively supported the invaders. To conquer Ethiopia in face ol
a real national resistance would be quite a different matter.
Tewodros’s reign could thus be said to have ended in failure but from
the point of view of Ethiopian history this was not really so. Even though
he became so unpopular that he was deserted by the majority of his

167
 I

168
„ subjects, and even though his schemes for centralization of government
i were unsuccessful he had restored the position and prestige of the monar-
i chy. Henceforward no one doubted the power of whoever occupied the
: imperial throne. Indeed the throne became a precious jewel which the
3 rases coveted and struggled among themselves to win.

! The reign of Emperor Yohannes (John) IV

' The death of Tewodros left three great rivals for the imperial throne. They
j were Gobaze the ras of Amhara, the ras of Tigre and Menelik, the ras of
i Shoa. Gobaze proved the strongest at first and was crowned as emperor in
1868. He ruled for four years only, and his reign was uneventful. The end
: of his reign in 1872 left the two great rases of Tigre and Shoa face to face.
Of the two, the ras of Tigre proved the most successful and was crowned
i as the Emperor Yohannes (John) IV. Menelik remained largely indepen-
\ dent, however, and it was not until 1878 that Yohannes was able to force
him to renounce the imperial title of Negus Negast (King of Kings) which
j he had claimed ever since the death of Tewodros. Yohannes was a skilful
; diplomat and with wise statesmanship he did not attempt to crush Menelik
completely. Instead, in return for recognition of the emperor’s para-
mountcy, Menelik was given a free hand to extend his territorial posses¬
sions in the southern part of the empire over provinces which had long
j been overrun by the Oromo. In 1882 the relationship between the two
j great men was further strengthened by a marriage alliance between two of
! their children, coupled with an agreement that the succession should pass
i to Menelik after Yohannes’s death.
The energies of the Emperor Yohannes were largely absorbed by the
necessity to defend the empire against a succession of aggressors. The threat
came first from Egypt. Amongst the grandiose plans of Ismail Pasha was
I the idea of building a great empire in Africa, and included in this was the
J design to invade and occupy the Christian empire of Ethiopia. The Turco-
Egyptian government had a base on the Red Sea coast at Massawa which
| had originally been seized by the Turks in the sixteenth century. With the
; aid of European advisers and the most up-to-date weapons two attempts
were made to invade Ethiopia, in 1875 and 1876. In spite of the superiority
of weapons in the hands of the Egyptian forces and the presence of expert
European military advisers, both these invasions were decisively defeated.
Large quantities of arms and equipment were captured by the Ethiopians.
The defeat of the second Egyptian expedition, the Egyptian financial crisis
and the outbreak of the Mahdist revolt in the Sudan, meant the end of the
threat to Ethiopia from Egypt.

169
 I

But the withdrawal of the Egyptians from the scene was followed by the
appearance of an even more serious danger. The French had acquired the
Red Sea port of Obok as early as 1862 and this was destined to become the
nucleus of French Somaliland. The Italians acquired a coaling station in
the Bay of Assab in 1869 and thereafter began to take an increasing
interest in Somaliland and the interior. With the collapse of the Egyptian
schemes the Italians began to emerge as the chief contenders for control
over the Ethiopian kingdom. They established themselves on the coast of
the area now known as Eritrea in 1885 and began to push inland in the
direction of the Ethiopian province of Tigre. At the same time the Italians
did their best to weaken the kingdom by playing Menelik against Yohan-
nes. Menelik took the arms and money they offered him as he had
previously accepted aid from the Egyptians, but he gave no real help to the
invaders. In 1887 Italian forces clashed with Ethiopians at a place known
as Dogali. The Italians were defeated and forced to fall back on Massawa.
It was clear however that it would not be long before the Italians tried
again.
The dangers which Yohannes IV had to face did not come only from the
direction of the Red Sea. The fanatically religious government of the
Khalifa in the Sudan declared a jihad against its Christian neighbour and
the Sudanese forces overran a large part of Ethiopia before they were
decisively defeated by the Ethiopians at the battle of Metemma in 1889. In
this battle the Emperor Yohannes lost his life and Ethiopia was left
without a ruler at a critical time.

Emperor Menelik II and the Italians

Throughout the reign of the Emperor Yohannes IV, Menelik, the ras of
Shoa continued to take every opportunity to strengthen his position. He
allowed first the Egyptians and then the Italians to believe that they might
be able to use him in their attempts to gain control of the country, and by
this means he acquired large quantities of up-to-date firearms which he
used to extend his conquests over the Oromo areas. He had, however, no
intention of being used as a tool to establish foreign rule over the empire to
which he hoped to succeed, and in spite of the aid he received he did
nothing to help the invaders. With the death of Yohannes the question of
succession arose. Under the agreement which had been made between
Yohannes and Menelik, Menelik was entitled to the succession but Yohan¬
nes had a son, Mangasha, who hoped to establish his claim to the
throne. Phe Italians, who had been intriguing with Menelik for some
time, believed that he would be a useful puppet ruler and at first gave him

170
 Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia

their support. He realized that Ethiopia’s chances of survival depended

on the possession of modern armaments and found it convenient to allow
the Italians to continue believing that he would be a willing tool tor their
ambitions. Thus Menelik and the Italians entered into the Treaty of
Wichale (Ucciali) in 1889 under which the Ethiopian emperor received
huge supplies of arms and ammunition.
The clause in the treaty for which Italy had been prepared to pay so
heavily was one which stated that Ethiopia consented to use Italy as her
intermediary in foreign affairs. This could be interpreted to mean that
Ethiopia was no longer an independent state but under Italian protection.
The Italian government exploited this and informed the European powers
that she had established a protectorate over the Ethiopian kingdom. Thus
the kingdom of Ethiopia disappeared from maps produced in Europe and
was replaced by Italian East Africa. In preparing to accept the Treaty of
Wichale, however, Menelik had taken care to see that there should be
nothing in it which could be interpreted as a surrender of independence to
the Italians. Two versions of the treaty had been drawn up, one in Italian
and one in Amharic, and the wording of the two versions was subtly
different in an important way. It was only the Italian version which said
that the emperor consented to use the services of the Italians in foreign
affairs; the Amharic version merely said that he might do so if he wished.
Menelik wisely signed the Amharic version only. Thus when he heard of
the way in which Italy was exploiting the treaty he was in a position to

171
 I

respond. In 1891 he sent a circular letter to the European powers pointing

out that Ethiopia had not surrendered any part of her independence. In
the same letter Menelik claimed very wide frontiers for the Ethiopian
empire, including Khartoum and Lake Rudolf (now Lake Turkana), and
stated that he did not intend to sit idly by while distant powers came to
partition Africa.
By the time Italy realized that she had herself been cheated by the
Ethiopian monarch she had hoped to cheat it was already too late. She fell
back on giving support to Mangasha who was still holding out in Tigre but
it soon became clear that he would be no more willing than Menelik
himself to buy a throne at the price of placing his country under foreign
domination. Thus Italy was faced with the fact that she could only hope to
establish her claims by a direct attack on a ruler who she herself had armed
and strengthened. Plans were therefore made for an invasion of Ethiopia.
The example of the British expedition led the Italians to believe that the
conquest of Ethiopia would be a relatively easy task for a modern Euro¬
pean army. They forgot that they had themselves supplied the emperor

172
 The Battle of Adowa: a drawing based on a picture in Addis Ababa University

with arms at least as good as those they intended to use against him. They
\ gravely underestimated the numbers of men that he could assemble for
f battle, and above all they failed to realize that while the Napier expedition
[ had only had to fight against a small bodyguard, their invasion would be
j opposed by the whole mass of the people. Indeed as the menace of an
. Italian invasion grew nearer Menelik whipped up the sense of national
patriotism. Rases who had hitherto been dissidents gave him their support
and even Mangasha rallied to the national cause. The Italian army which
invaded Ethiopia in 1896 was thus inferior in numbers and no better
armed than the defenders of Ethiopia. Its commanders had very little
conception of the gravity of the task before them and were deceived for
some time by false rumours, deliberately put about, that the emperor had
died suddenly of a snake bite. They allowed themselves to be brought to
battle on most unfavourable ground at Adowa by the whole Ethiopian
army under the personal command of the emperor. The result was an
overwhelming Ethiopian victory. The Italians were completely and dis¬
astrously defeated. Most of their armaments fell into Ethiopian hands and
large numbers of their troops were taken prisoner. Italy was forced to
abandon her claims and recognize Ethiopian independence in return tor
the release of her subjects. This humiliation, the greatest ever suffered by
a European power in Africa, continued to rankle in Italian hearts, and one
of the reasons behind Benito Mussolini*s invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 was
the desire to wipe out the memory of this disgrace.

173
 The victory of Adowa established Ethiopia’s independence beyond
question and Menelik was free to continue his policy of consolidating and
extending his rule. In a series of campaigns led by Hapta Giorgis, Tessama
and Ras Makonnen, the frontiers of the empire were pushed outwards and
during his reign Menelik is said to have more than doubled the territory
under effective Ethiopian control.
With the dramatic defeat of Italian claims Ethiopia appeared once more
on European maps and the European powers hastened to establish di¬
plomatic relations with the Ethiopian court. In the year following the
battle of Adowa, Britain, Russia and Turkey opened legations in Ethiopia.
When Britain was about to engage in the conquest of the Sudan she was
very anxious to ensure that Menelik did not give aid to the Khalifa which

The provinces of Ethiopia after Menelik’s conquests and European colonization

174
 might make the reconquest more difficult, or even impossible. Britain
accordingly sent the Rodd mission to Ethiopia, which in return for the
promise not to give aid to the Khalifa or allow arms to pass through
Ethiopia to the Sudanese, recognized all Menelik’s conquests and gave
him a further 39 000 square kilometres in the settlement of the Somali
frontier. Finally in 1906 Britain, France and Italy signed a Tripartite
1 Treaty formally recognizing the independence and territorial integrity of
Ethiopia. However, the treaty makers - in the expectation of Menelik’s
imminent death and a subsequent period of disunity and possible outside
intervention - also stated their respective spheres of influence in Ethiopia.
Thus at the end of the nineteenth century, whilst the Sudan lost the
independence she had won from Egypt in 1885, Ethiopia had her inde-
: pendence strengthened and was recognized - if somewhat ambiguously -
j by the colonial powers.

175
 I

7 The Maghreb and European

intervention

Introduction

Broadly speaking, in the opening years of the nineteenth century, the

Maghreb was divided into two administrative and political systems. On the
one hand was the independent Maghreb el Aksa (Morocco), under the
Sherifian dynasty of the Alawites or Filali, a dynasty founded in 1664 and
still on the Moroccan throne. On the other were the semi-independent
administrations of the Regencies of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, under the
effete suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey. Located between Mediterranean
Europe, the Middle East and Africa south of the Sahara the Maghreb has
for centuries been influenced by, and in turn has influenced, sometimes
decisively, events occurring in these three areas. For instance by 1800 the
Berber-Arab inhabitants of the Maghreb were culturally identified with
the Middle East. Islam had been embraced for centuries and Islamic
institutions adopted; the cult of the saints had become strong, particularly
in Morocco, and the sufi brotherhoods had begun to attract a larger
number of adherents. Arabic was becoming the language of learning, of
religion, of government and of administration. The people, Berber-Arabs
as they may be called, were agile and abstained from alcohol; they had
already begun to bathe frequently and to wear the cylindrical tobe with a
coat; they had begun to veil their women and to nurse contempt towards
Christians.

Morocco: the monarchy and baraka

The political and administrative state of affairs at the beginning of the

nineteenth century was as follows. Starting from the west to east is
Morocco, a country in which the monarchy has for centuries been of the
greatest significance. The monarchy, through Islam, came to be the focus

176
for Berber sentiments of nationality and solidarity. Before the Islamic
invasion of the eighth century the Berber inhabitants of the Maghreb had
had no form or emblem of unity. But the majority of them having
embraced Islam, the Berbers came to have a mystical reverence for the
Prophet Muhammad and his descendants. The first of the Prophet’s
descendants who came to Morocco and established a dynasty was Idris,
whose dynasty, the Idrisids, lasted for about a hundred years into the
tenth century. Henceforward one dynasty followed the other in Morocco,
and although the centrifugal forces in the country undermined the power
and efficiency of the monarchy, the fact that the monarchical institution
persisted helped to make it the hub of the country’s unwritten constitu¬
tion. But what ensured its permanence and the veneration in which it was
held, was the belief of the Moroccan people in baraka, the celestial
unction which the Prophet was believed to have in an inexhaustible
abundance, and part of which was transmitted to his descendants and to
saints.
For the cult of saints with its belief in baraka came to be central to the
lives of the Moroccan Berbers, the logical extension of the idea of the cult
of ancestors traditional to the Berbers before Islam was introduced to the
Maghreb. The saints were believed to possess supernatural powers to
foretell the future and to say extraordinarily potent prayers and utter
dreadful curses. In a sense these saints held the same position in Muslim
thought as that held by Catholic saints. Saints acquired their baraka by
communion with the deity, by holiness of life, by the performance of good
works and by leadership in the holy war against the ‘infidels’. In many
cases baraka could be inherited. The great saints transmitted to their
descendants, known as marabouts (murabitin) the baraka with with they
had been so richly endowed. But the most fortunate in this regard were the
sherifs, the descendants of Prophet Muhammad. No one had approached
the Prophet in the amount of efficacy of the baraka with which he had
been possessed, and to the sherifs this priceless inheritance had been
transmitted unimpaired, although diffused and unequally distributed.
By their genealogical connection with the Prophet and their inheritance
of baraka, the celestial unction which the Prophet was believed to possess
in inexhaustible abundance, the Filali sultans came to be venerated by the
Moroccans. The sultan’s person was sacred; he was the first of all Mus¬
lims, ‘Lord of the Believers’, the great Imam, Commander of the Faithful
and the viceregent of God on earth, whose faults should be excused and
attributed to a divine inspiration which ordinary mortals were incapable ol
understanding. It was the sultan’s duty to prevent a diminution of his
baraka from the action of the sun’s rays, and to this effect his sacred
person was shielded by a magnificent umbrella, which thus became the

177
symbol of royal authority. The welfare of the whole Moroccan community
was thought to depend on the sultan’s baraka.

The Berbers

The significance of the divinity that hedged the sultan lies in the fact that
it provided him with the spiritual qualifications with which he comman¬
ded the obedience of the entire Berber-Arab population of the country in
specified circumstances. For politically the Berbers, particularly those of
the Sanhaja, Masmuda and Zenata groups living in the Bilad es Siba (‘the
country of disobedience’), were traditionally unsubmissive. They
eschewed centralization in any form and would not transfer their loyalty to
any unit larger than the clan except when the entire race was threatened by

178
external aggressors. Semi-nomads, these Berbers who lived in the moun¬
tainous interior had an intense aversion for the descendants of Arab invaders
in the lowlands, for Arab culture and for the Berber agriculturists living in the
Bilad es Makhzen (Land of Order) who were law-abiding and tax-
paying citizens, and who were prepared to accept the Sultan politically. By
contrast, the Berbers of the Bilad es Siba (Land of Disorder) had the habit
of repudiating the sultan’s political claims. They would pray for him in
their mosques every Friday and follow him in the holy war; they might
allow him to represent them in dealings with foreign powers and some¬
times to settle quarrels among them; their chiefs might even accept
investiture from him as his officials. But to him they paid neither taxes nor
troops, except for services in the holy war. Even the supremacy of the
sultan in the Bilad es Makhzen was not always complete. It was only in an
ineffectual way that the sultan’s authority was diffused, administratively,

179
throughout the country. He was the head of the Makhnes or Council,
which in turn had supervisory control over the caids or tribal chieftains,
the sheikhs or village heads and the khalifas, the local administrators.
From the ninth century, when the Idrisids began the welding of the
Berber groups into a Moroccan nation, to the period of imposition of
French colonial rule, the preoccupation of the various governments was
how to bind the various societies together under one ruler in a territory
where geography aided particularism, factiousness and sectionalism.
In the circumstances the extent of the power of a sultan depended on his
ability and military power. And indeed only three monarchs in Moroccan
history before 1800 ever succeeded in welding the various societies into
one. No nineteenth-century sultan succeeded in achieving this end. It is
not surprising then that Mawlay Suleiman, the occupier of the throne in
1800, was weak, in the face of the political confusion that engulfed the
country, a situation worsened by the plague which visited the territory in
1799 and 1800 and which carried away thousands of the inhabitants.
Furthermore Suleiman was deprived of the help and loyalty of the abid al
Bukhari, the army of blacks which had been founded by Mawlay Ismail,
ruler from 1672 to 1727, and which had been the prop of Sherifian
authority. For in the eighteenth century this army had to be disbanded
when it began to interfere with politics. The sultan had to fall back on the
unreliable military succour of the loyal chiefdoms of Arab descent whose
services were rewarded with grants of land, exemption from taxes and
facilities for reaching the highest ranks in government service. It is no¬
thing to wonder at then that the chief feature of Morocco’s domestic
history throughout the century was the rebellion of one locality after the
other. Sultan Suleiman who ruled from 1792 to 1822 was forced to fight
almost without respite against rebellious subjects in every part of his
dominion. In 1820 his army was completely defeated by rebels between
Meknes and Fez, two of the largest cities in Morocco.

The Turkish Maghreb

The situation in the rest of the Maghreb was no more encouraging, and
perhaps even more confused in the absence of a monarchy of the Sherifian
type. Algeria was being administered from Turkey, in whose orbit the
territory had fallen since 1518. The Turkish administration was headed by
the dey, appointed by the Ottoman empire from among the soldiers
quartered in the nine garrison towns in the country. He was expected to be
advised by a diwan, or council, composed principally of 30 yiah bashees
(colonels). As in Turkish Egypt the relations between the diwan and the

180
dey were anything but cordial. Continual struggle for power among the
colonels characterized Turkish administration. But more often than not
the latter reduced the dey to a mere cypher. The struggle for power among
the colonels, all of whom could legitimately aspire to the position of the
dey, made the Turkish administration in Algeria more chaotic than in
Egypt. Unlike in the latter country where the Mamluk beys who were in
virtual control of the administration had a stake in the country, the
Turkish officials, all of whom came to Algeria from Anatolia, cared little
for the interests of Algeria per se and remained an exclusive group speaking
a language different from Berber and Arabic. The Regency was divided
into three administrative provinces, viz, western, Titan and eastern, with
headquarters respectively at Oran (after 1792), Medea and Constantine.
Outside the administrative and garrison towns Turkish ascendancy in
Algeria existed more in theory than in practice. The Berber groups,
fanatical lovers of their independence, were allowed to rule themselves and
many of them found refuge in the physically difficult Aures, Kabylie and
other mountains. Whatever influence the Turkish officials — who are said
to have numbered about 20 000 — had over the country was owed to their
tactic of siding with the stronger factions among the Berbers against the
weaker factions in the eternal clan warfare characteristic of the people.
Tunisia, like Algeria, had been a beylik of the Ottoman empire since the
end of the sixteenth century. But in 1705 Husayn ibn ‘Ali Agha’, a
janissary (infantryman) of Cretan origin, usurped the supreme authority
and founded the Husaynid dynasty which ruled over the country until
1957. Unlike the Algerian deys the Husaynid dynasty was hereditary and
had some root in the sentiment of the Berbers. For in the eighteenth
century the Husaynid deys acquired Berber blood and established genealo¬
gical connection with the Hafsid dynasty, the purely Berber dynasty
which had ruled Tunisia from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. The
Husaynid dynasty attempted to enforce the authority of the central admi¬
nistration against the centrifugal forces of tribal life.
Libya was in 1800 being administered by the most powerful of the
Karamanli dynasty which had established itself, independent of the
Turks, in 1711. This dynasty of kuloghus (descendants of Turco-Arab
marriages) remained on the throne till 1835. And yet it was during Yusufs
reign that the centrifugal forces in the territory were fully unleashed.
Yusuf had to face revolt upon revolt in a territory where the social
structure was conducive to the growth of localized parochialism. For to
the east of the territory were the fierce descendants of the Banu Suleiman
of the notorious Hilalian invasion of the eleventh century. In the interior,
nearest to the desert, were the factious Berbers and in the towns were the
Jews, some blacks, kuloghus and Turkish elements. The Beduin, semi-

181
nomads, were not only averse to town life but were relentless opponents of
taxation. It was natural that Yusufs attempt to impose centralized author¬
ity over them failed. From 1803 to 1804 he had to fight against rebels in
Gharyan, against Ghadames from 1806 to 1810, against Mahmud Sherif,
governor of Fezzan in 1812, against the Djabal Nafusain in 1815-21 and
against his own son, Muhammad, in the east of the country from 1821 to
1822.

European influence in the Maghreb before 1830

But the internal political weakness and problems and the tendencies
towards political disintegration in the Maghreb notwithstanding, all the
governments were sovereign vis-a-vis the European powers. For centuries
the ‘Barbary corsairs’ and European countries had indulged in mutually
beneficial piracy on the Mediterranean waters and the former had estab¬
lished their superiority over the Europeans. They captured Europeans as
slaves, a situation that contrasted with that on the Atlantic seaboard of
West Africa; they compelled the European slaves to erect their palaces, till
their land and row their galleys. The European powers recognized the
sovereignty of the Maghreb governments. This sovereignty was more than
just paper recognition. For instance by 1783 there were no less than eight
consular representatives in Tripoli, including consuls from the Nether¬
lands, Sweden, Denmark, Spain and the Italian states. When in 1798
Sweden did not want to pay the usual tribute to the Libyan government,
the Libyan navy compelled her to do so. About the same time Napoleon
signed a treaty with Yusuf Karamanli against Portugal. When the French
army invaded Egypt under Napoleon, Hamouda Bey, ruler of Tunisia
from 1782 to 1814, declared war on France because she had invaded a
province of the Ottoman empire. However in 1802 he concluded peace
with the French government without reference to the Ottoman govern¬
ment. Morocco had ambassadors at St Petersburg, London, Berlin, Mad¬
rid and Paris at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while as late as
1811 Yusuf Karamanli placed the British consul, W.W. Langford, under
house arrest with impunity.
The sovereignty being exercised by the Maghrebian rulers over the
Europeans and Americans was not palatable to the latter. From 1800
onwards they began to undermine the sovereignty of the rulers either by
refusing to pay customs duties or ‘exactions’ or by bombarding their coast
or by supporting rival candidates to the thrones. The undermining of the
sovereignty of the Maghreb rulers by the European powers was a man¬
ifestation of European economic imperialism in Mediterranean Africa, a

182
factor of decisive importance in North African history throughout the
nineteenth century. Also the ‘suppression’ of ‘piracy’ and non-payment of
tributes to the authorities meant a loss to the revenue of the Maghreb
states. Then the activities of European powers in these early years of the
century were a prelude to the actual subjugation of North Africa and
active interference in the politics of the Maghreb. In Egypt, it may be
noted, France and Britain were already interfering in the internal politics
of the country towards the end of the eighteenth century. Both countries
acted in this way in the furtherance of their political and commercial
interests. And as early as 1804 the United States had made an attempt to
remove Yusuf from the Libyan throne in favour of a puppet by the name
of Hamed.
Indeed the doings of the British consul in Libya in the second and third
decades of the nineteenth century show the loosening of the Maghrebian
rulers’ grasp of affairs. Hanmer Warrington, the British consul in Tripoli
from 1814 to 1835, became friendly with Yusuf Karamanli in a way that
made the former wield considerable influence. In 1816 he introduced
vaccination into Tripoli and suggested ways and means of increasing the
agricultural output of the territory. In order to push British influence far
into the interior he proposed to the British government that a vice-
consular post should be established at Murzuk, the capital of the oasis of
Fezzan conquered by Yusuf in 1811.
By 1824 Yusuf had been driven into such financial straits that he asked
for a loan of 200 000 Spanish dollars (about £40 000), to be repaid in six
years. Yusuf Karamanli thereby established a precedent which in most
cases provided the excuse for the displacement of traditional rulers in
North Africa by European powers. In many respects foreign and domestic
policies bore the unmistakable marks of Warrington. By 1825 those Euro¬
pean countries which had no diplomatic relations with Tripoli entrusted
him with their affairs. By that date he was acting in the capacity of a consul
for Austria, Hanover, the Netherlands, Portugal, the two Sicilies and
Tuscany. Between 1815 and 1827 he used his good offices to settle
differences between Tripoli and Denmark, Sardinia, Tuscany and Sweden.
Indeed, to all intents and purposes Warrington became, in the late 1810s
and throughout the 1820s, the de facto Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs of Tripoli. In domestic affairs Warrington persuaded Yusuf not to
increase the tributes by the chief, and converted the consulate to a sanc¬
tum for ‘oppressed’ subjects and slaves. Yusuf was later to regret the
confidence he had reposed in Warrington who in 1832 plotted with rebels
to effect his overthrow, which event Warrington hoped ‘would establish
British influence for the next half century in Libya.

183
The French occupation of Algeria, 1830

Traditionally the Regency of Algiers and France were on friendly terms.

Since the eighteenth century the French connexion had been economically
beneficial to Algeria, the latter producing grains and olive oil for France.
Moreover, in the deys’s view, the French were, of all the European
powers, the least hostile to the Turks before the nineteenth century, a
situation that was likely to temper the traditional hostility of the Berber
and Arab Muslims to France. Franco-Algerian commercial relations im¬
proved during the Napoleonic wars when Algeria supplied provisions for
the armies of Egypt and Italy. Indeed Louis XVIII entered into commer¬
cial treaties with the deys. Franco-Algerian friendship was reinforced by
Algieria’s hostility to the growing naval strength of the British in the
Mediterranean.
Friendship foundered over the joint economic interests of two influen¬
tial Jews and some Frenchmen in Algeria, and over the insulting be¬
haviour of Deval, the French consul, a man of questionable character. As
in Morocco and other parts of the Maghreb the Jews were financiers and
traders of considerable importance in Algeria. And towards the end of the
eighteenth century two Jews, Bacri and Busnach, had attempted to mono¬
polize all Algeria’s export trade. The dey who was a creditor to France and
who expected to be paid the debt owed him saw himself swindled and
presented as a debtor to the two Jews. The latter connected themselves
with the French administration somehow and made a deal with Tal¬
leyrand. After the Restoration the interrupted negotiations over the pay¬
ment of the debt were resumed, and a commission finally reduced the sum
outstanding from 24 million to 7 million francs. Bacri and Busnach were
only interested in getting their own share, and the dey, Hussein, who had
lost his grip of the situation, was left with the general impression that he
had been swindled.
The appointment of Deval as French consul in Algiers did not improve
the situation, for he had the reputation for shady transactions. Several
times Hussein had in vain asked for his removal, but the French govern¬
ment persistently ignored his requests, and refused to investigate the
charges he brought against the consul. Hussein began to suspect that the
French were not sincere in their friendship, for while they were anxious to
have Algerian grain they refused to strengthen the Algerian navy as the dey
demanded. In 1827 Deval and Hussein quarrelled over the supply of
grain to France. Tension was already high before the celebrated meeting
which took place on 29 April 1827 between Deval and the dey. The latter
struck the French consul with a fly-whisk because, according to the dey,
he had been provoked. Deval had said in an insulting manner that the

184
dey could not expect the French government to reply to his letters, and
then added insulting remarks about Islam. This episode led to the French
attack on and occupation of Algeria in 1830, an event which marked a
turning point in North African history.
The fly-whisk incident was no more than an occasion for the invasion of
Algeria by the French, for worse treatment had been meted out to Euro¬
peans continually for three centuries. Nor can the French declaration that
the invasion was undertaken to suppress piracy be taken seriously, for
piracy was until the Conference of Paris in 1856 recognized by France and
Britain as a legitimate form of warfare. More to the point was the fact that
Charles X, the last of the Restoration Bourbons, wished to turn the
Algerian issue to advantage in an effort to revive the prestige of his regime.
He sent a fleet that blockaded Algiers for three years but General Bour-
mont’s victory of July 1830 over Hussein was too late to influence the
elections which overthrew him.
At first the French prime minister, the Prince de Polignac, fearing the
reaction of Britain to any French attack on the Regency, wished Muham¬
mad Ali to occupy Tripoli and Tunis and punish Algeria. In this enter¬
prise the French were to aid the Egyptian pasha with a naval fleet and
financial encouragement. Britain persuaded Muhammad Ali to refrain
from such an adventure and advised the Ottoman sultan to punish the
pasha should he venture westwards. Later, when Polignac advised a show
of strength, he indicated that he had been dreaming of a scheme ‘to
establish the influence of France on the African shores of the Meaiterra-
nean and right into the heart of Asia’. The Minister of War, General
Gerard, justified the conquest of Algeria by the ‘need to open up a vast
outlet for our surplus population and for our manufactured products in
return for other products foreign to our soil and to our climate . Louis
Philippe, who came to power only a few weeks after the expedition landed
near Algiers, declared that it was France’s intention to found ‘an impor¬
tant colony’ in Algeria.
As they had claimed on the occasion of their Egyptian invasion the
French issued a proclamation in which they announced that their attack
was not directed at the Berbers and Arabs but against their Turkish
taskmasters. The reaction of the Algerians to the French invasion was
different from that of the Egyptian fellahin. Unlike the latter the former
did not look upon the French as liberators, but as ‘infidels’ against whom
the holy war should be fought. So far as the Berbers were concerne it was
the entire race and their patrimony that were threatened and they spo e
with one voice, in a manner unexpected by and disconcerting to t e
French. Berber nationalist feelings and sense of common identity rose to
heights unknown since the days of Kusailah, Princess Kahina an

185
Kharijite movement against Arab cultural and political imperialism in the
seventh and eighth centuries. The Berbers reacted sharply and swiftly
against the French. They saw their resistance as a jihad against the French
‘infidels’. The man on whom Berber nationalism and resistance to the
French invasion devolved was Abdel Kader. The almost universal spon¬
taneous support given to this man in Algeria from 1832 to 1847 and the
continuation of resistance to the French by the Berbers after his capture
by the French, were a clear testimony to the fact that, in a sense, Algeria
was a living political entity before the advent of the French. The view
often expressed by French writers that the Algerian nation was exclusively
the creation of the French is not substantiated by facts.

Abdel Kader and resistance to the French occupation

Abdel Kader is one of the few African personalities of the nineteenth

century whose qualities and career have attracted the attention of foreign
biographers. Abdel Kader emerges from these works as a patriot, a
soldier, a religious leader, a statesman, an administrator, a learned man
and a diplomat - all rolled into one. In many ways he can be compared and
contrasted with Muhammad Ali of Egypt, a man whom he met and of whom
he was enamoured. But unlike the Albanian adventurer who had no
Egyptian blood in his veins but seized power by plots and counter-plots
and forced himself upon the masses, Abdel Kader was a Berber-Arab
called to power by popular acclamation. He used the occasion of the
French danger to weld together eternally factious chiefdoms. The groups
who submitted to his authority included the Banu Yakub, the Banu
Abbas, the Banu Amer, the Banu Mejaher and the Banu Hashem. But
although not all the groups submitted to his rule at all times - many
withdrawing their loyalty whenever the French aggression receded -
perhaps no one before him ever administered centrally as large an area in
Algeria as Abdel Kader did. Administratively he divided the country into
eight khalifaliks, the most important of which were those of Tlemcen,
Mascara, Miliana and Medea. Tekedemt, a town 100 kilometres south¬
east of Oran, was made the capital. Fortified, it became a centre for the
manufacture of muskets, for minting and for learning.
Every group was held responsible for the peace and good order of its
locality. Weekly reports on the state of affairs were expected from every
khalifa who was given a number of soldiers to help him. The Quran was
the basis of his administration and he himself has been described by all his
biographers as a genuinely pious man who observed punctiliously the
ceremonies and rituals of the Muslim faith. He sent salaried qadis to all

186
districts for administration of justice and he punished crimes severely.
Himself an ascetic and hater of luxuries, he forbade men from using gold
and silver ornaments, proscribed alcohol and tobacco and attempted to
put an end to prostitution. As he moved from place to place he constituted
himself the sole dispenser of justice. He indicated his punishment with a
gesture. If he raised his hand the victim was carried back to prison; if he
held it out horizontally, the victim was executed; if he pointed to the
ground the victim was caned. He himself presided over a tribunal of ulema
(learned men) which was the final court of appeal, but sometimes he
referred doubtful cases to Egypt and Morocco.
Abdel Kader never demanded anything outside the Quranic taxes of
ashur (one-tenth of agricultural produce) and zakat (two and a half per cent
of one’s property to be given to the poor by all faithful believers). He
attached importance to education, opened schools throughout the terri¬
tory, where students were taught the principles of Islam, reading, writing
and arithmetic. Those who wanted higher education were encouraged to
enter into the zawaya (singular: zawiya) (similar to the monasteries of
medieval Europe) and mosques.
The military resistance organized by Abdel Kader stupefied Europe as
that of Abdel Karim in the Rif war of the present century in Spanish
Morocco was to do. Although in terms of weapons and numbers Abdel
Kader’s forces were inferior to those of the French, the Berbers enjoyed
the advantage of local knowledge. By persuading the Berbers to deny sale
of any form of provisions to the French, who depended mainly on local
supply, the French were in many instances starved into submission. The
Algerian forces used British and French muskets purchased at Tlemcen,
Mascara, Miliana, Medea and Tekedemt. And at the seat of government of
each of his khalifas he placed tailors, armourers, and saddlers, to make the
clothing for his troops, repair their arms, and maintain their cavalry
equipment. Swift French incursions into the interior were generally fol¬
lowed by swift retreats, largely because of lack of provisions which, on
Kader’s orders, the Berbers buried beneath the surface of the ground.
Kader also employed the tactics of luring the French into the mountain
passes and into trenches he had dug for them. He was also militarily strong
so long as his lines of communication were not menaced by the French.
Much against their will the French had to concede victory to Abdel
Kader twice, in 1834 and 1837. In the former year General Desmichels,
the French commander, decided to negotiate with him, without prior
consultation with Paris. The Desmichels Treaty of 26 February 1834
indicated the extremities into which the French had been driven by Berber
resistance. Abdel Kader had compelled the French to sue for peace, he
had dictated his terms. By this treaty Abdel Kader was to pay no tribute

187
and his territory was not limited. The French general acknowledged his
independence by offering him the power to appoint and receive consuls.
The French were to load at one port alone, and to submit to his tariff.
Kader felt he had in fact obtained a mandate to organize the trade of
Algeria on a state monopoly basis. Certainly he had scored a major
diplomatic triumph.
But the Desmichels Treaty was not a complete victory for Abdel Kader
and the Berbers. It gave tacit approval to a French presence on Algerian
soil by recognizing French rights to the maritime area of the territory.
Some of the more fanatical Berbers became disappointed at a treaty which
they regarded as a gross betrayal of the sacred cause of the jihad. However
to Abdel Kader negotiation with the ‘infidels’ was a realistic policy. Like
Muhammad Ali of Egypt in his foreign policy and like Bismarck in the
way he united Germany in stages, Abdel Kader knew when, where and
how to stop. He was aware that henceforth French imperialism had come
to stay, and that the Berbers must learn to live with it. He knew that the
French had superior arms and that if the French were to mobilize all their
military resources the French could easily crush the Berber resistance. In
Abdel Kader’s view, it was better to salvage as much as he could of
Algeria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a war such as the Berbers
were engaged in, ultimate and complete victory by them was out of the
question. In Abdel Kader’s judgment he had obtained concessions for
Islam and its culture. In any case he needed some breathing space to
grapple with the problems of administration and the centrifugal tenden¬
cies among the groups who found his stringent application of Islamic laws
unpalatable.
In fact the French government regarded the Desmichels Treaty as a
great humiliation and its architect was instantly recalled. His successors,
particularly General Bugeaud, sought either to reduce the power given to
Abder Kader in the Desmichels Treaty or neutralize it completely. The
Algerian sultan - he had become sultan by the wish of the people - was
able to stand up to the French generals. Through the French newspapers,
which he read olten, he was able to measure the barometer of public
opinion in France. He employed spies and agents who organized prop¬
aganda in his favour among influential people in France. The French were
persuaded to believe that it would be in France’s interest to befriend,
rather than alienate, such a revered person. These agents, it is said,
extolled Kader’s merits and enlarged upon his talents for administration.
General Bugeaud, who took over the French army in 1836, at first decided
to appeal to arms, but after reviewing his resources he agreed to peace with
Kader as a humiliating necessity. After a meeting with the Berber leaders
Kader handed over the plain of Algiers to the French.

188
 On 30 May the controversial Treaty of Tafna was made. In the copy to
which Abdel Kader did not affix his seal, the sultan acknowledged the
sovereignty of France. But according to the Arabic text which he signed
Abdel Kader said only that he acknowledged that there was a French
sultan, and that he was great. Still according to the French version the
frontiers of France in Algeria were delimited, consisting mainly of the
plains of Algiers. Kader was recognized as the sultan, to administer the
provinces of Oran and Titteri and part of the province of Algiers not yet
occupied by the French. The sultan was not to exercise any authority over
the Muslims who resided on the territory reserved to France, but these
should have the liberty to go and reside on the territory under the sultan’s
jurisdiction; the Arabs living in French territory were to enjoy the free
exercise of their religion; they might build mosques, and follow their
religious discipline in every particular, under the authority of their spir¬
itual chiefs. In addition, the sultan was to give the French army 30 000
measures of corn, 30 000 measures of barley, and 5000 head of oxen; he
should be empowered to buy in France powder, sulphur, and the arms he
required; commerce was to be free between the Arabs and the French; and
the farms and properties which the French had acquired, or might ac¬
quire, on the Arab territory would be guaranteed them. The sultan also
engaged not to give up any part of the coast to any foreign power whatso¬
ever, without the authorization of France; the commerce of Algeria should
be carried on only in French ports and France should maintain agents near
the sultan, and in the towns under his jurisdiction, to act as intermediaries
for French subjects in any commercial disputes they might have with the
Arabs. The sultan would have the same privilege in French towns and
seaports.
It is clear that the Treaty of Tafna severely modified that made with
Desmichels. The independence of Algeria was already compromised poli¬
tically and economically. The French in effect became a state within a
state. Algeria’s independence in foreign affairs was bartered away. Never¬
theless the French were not satisfied with the attenuated power granted to
the Algerian sultan. General Bugeaud had been strictly enjoined by Paris
to confine Abdel Kader to the province of Oran only; on no account, he
was instructed, must he cede to the sultan the province of Titteri, and he
must insist on his paying tribute. Indeed the Treaty of Tafna confined the
French substantially to a few towns on the sea coast, with very circums¬
cribed adjacent territories, whilst all the fortresses and strongholds in the
interior were left in the hands of their victorious adversary.
There is nothing to wonder at then that within two years ol the Talna
agreement differences over the text and interpretation of the treaty by
France and Algeria led to a resumption of war. Apart from the dispute

189
over sovereignty there was the boundary question. Marshal Valee, who
had assumed the functions of governor-general in Algiers in November
1837, was asked to discuss the details of the treaty with the Algerian
sultan. In 1839 Abdel Kader occupied a territory also claimed by the
French. This country, lying to the south-east of the province of Algeria,
was one of the greatest utility to the French since the garrison of Constan¬
tine drew its provisions from it, and they could not help feeling that Abdel
Kader could now at any moment stop the supply. Marshal Valee wanted
the Treaty of Tafna modified; Abdel Kader would not budge. And as
European powers were to do in other parts of Africa in the course of the
century, the French began to violate the treaty, firstly by assailing Abdel
Kader’s agents in the areas occupied by the French with studied affronts
and by preventing Muslims in the French territory who wanted to settle in
Abdel Kader’s territory from doing so, as had been sanctioned in the
treaty. Abdel Kader’s agent in Algiers, through whom he obtained
ammunition and other supplies from France, was suddenly arrested by the
French, put in chains and sent to France. Then recognition was with¬
drawn from Abdel Kader’s consul at Algiers, an Italian called Garavan,
and the French attempted to instruct Abdel Kader whom he was to
appoint. Also the French deliberately violated Abdel Kader’s territory.
The sultan declared war on 18 November 1839.
The French decided to seize the bull by the horns. A big military
offensive was launched, granaries hidden underneath the ground were
scouted out and corn was milled by machines carried about by the troops.
A systematic dislodgment of Abdel Kader’s infantry was undertaken.
Attempts were made to cut Abdel Kader’s communications with Morocco
and Tunisia and assistance was given to those tribes who opposed Abdel
Kader. The cupidity of the Tijaniyya sufi brotherhood was satisfied and it
began to side with the French against the Berber resisters.
By 1843 the backbone of the Berber resistance was already broken.
Many of his khalifas were either captured or dead and many of the Berber
groups not only surrendered to the French but openly fought with the
latter against Abdel Kader. Abdel Kader’s state had lost cohesion. The
sultan himself fled to Morocco, whose sultan was persuaded by the French
to put a price on his head. In the circumstances Abdel Kader was betrayed
by Sultan Abdel Rahman, after the French had defeated the Moroccan
army at the battle of Isly in 1845. In fact the Moroccans and Abdel
Kader’s forces fought each other in many engagements. In December
1847 Abdel Kader saw that he could no longer rouse the Berbers to
continue the holy war. He was at the end of his tether. Rather than
surrender to the Moroccan sultan he decided to hand himself over to the
French. This he did on 23 December 1847, on the condition that he was

190
taken to another country annd treated generously. The French gave all
these guarantees, and were relieved at the removal of this remarkable
soldier, statesman, administrator and patriot from Algeria.
Exemplary punishment of the most brutal kind was meted out to the
Berbers; land and animals were seized, fines were imposed, many people
were executed, others were deported and many were transferred to France
as hostages. War was waged on plantations and several thousand olive
trees were destroyed, hundreds of villages were burned down and suppor¬
ters of Abdel Kader had their throats cut. Well could General Bugeaud
declare to settlers in Algiers after an expedition in 1846: ‘We have burnt a
great deal and destroyed a great deal. It may be that I shall be called a
barbarian, but as I have the conviction that I have done something useful
for my country, I consider myself as above the reproaches of the press’.
Not only were the Berbers punished physically but they were also
forced to pay for the punishment. The casbah treasury was found to
contain a treasure worth 49 million francs, of which 43 million francs were
dispatched to France. With other booty the entire sum captured was 55
million francs. This covered the 48 million francs which the expedition
had cost, leaving France with a profit of 7 million francs.
The punishment meted out to them notwithstanding, the Berbers did
not down their arms with the surrender of Abdel Kader. Kabylie, the
mountain land guarding the interior, was not occupied by the French until
1857. Here in 1871 a violent insurrection broke out again, the last great
attempt by the Berbers in the nineteenth century to win back their
independence. Even by 1860 there had been little consolidation of the
areas occupied by the French, and, to 1869, Algeria had cost France the
lives of 150 000 soldiers and a large number of colonists.

European settlement in Algeria

The French invasion of Algeria was a turning point in the history of the
Algerian Berbers and struck terror in the rulers of the other parts of the
Maghreb. ‘Infidels’ began to settle in the best parts of their country from
which they had either been forcibly removed or bought out by question¬
able means. Algeria became the receptacle of all kinds of European settlers
— soldiers, wealthy investors, Spanish, Italian, Maltese and Corsican
peasants and fishermen. After the 1848 revolution, for instance, no less
than 13 500 unemployed from Paris, who were considered a threat to the
maintenance of law and order, sailed for Algeria under an official scheme,
though few preparations had been made for their reception. Even a group
of German emigrants stranded in one French port en route to the United

191
States was diverted to North Africa and settled in the countryside. In 1878
some of the winegrowers who were affected by the blight that had hit
French vineyards went to Algeria to retrieve their fortunes. In 1839 there
were 25 000 colons, of whom 11 000 were of French nationality. In 1849
the figures were 109 000 and 47 000. By 1871 the French element had
increased to just over half the total European population and numbered
130 000 as against the 115 000 of other nationalities. By 1912 the Euro¬
peans numbered nearly 800 000 in the country.
The consequences of this influx of Europeans into Algeria were
tremendous and far-reaching. The Berbers were systematically deprived
of their lands, to the tune of 8-9 million hectares, the equivalent of
four-fifths of the area available for cultivation in the Tell and on the High
Plateaux. The objective of the settlers was, in the words of a general,
‘deportation of the Muslim population to other selected areas in order to
dispose of the land freely’. In the words of another general, ‘colonization
and the exigencies which it implies will be the proof that submission [of
the Berbers] is genuine’. As in Kenya, South Africa and the Rhodesias the
settlers began to look upon the Berbers who owned land as unprogressive
cultivators withholding from mankind enormous resources that they, the
settlers, were best able to develop. The local communal concept of land
was dealt a mortal blow.

French legal policies

The Algerian Berbers suffered also in matters of justice. The original aim
of the French was to uproot the Berber past and replace it with French
ideas and machinery of justice. The French idea was that French institu¬
tions were not only just - absolutely just - but were also universally
applicable. French justice was beyond question and good everywhere and
therefore any Berber form was simply an obstacle to be brushed aside in
order that the supposedly backward Berbers could the better experience
the freedom and equity of the French forms. Therefore the Muslim qadis
and their tribunals were suspended and the Code Napoleon introduced for
both civil and criminal cases. Later the native penal law (the code de loi
Indigenat) was promulgated and customary law continued to prevail in the
Kabylie.
Clearly opposed to this French concept was the Berber-Arab viewpoint.
For Muslims the Quran was the basis of their religion and their law; its
precepts were immutable and sacred; to violate them was to assail their
religion and liberty, and might result in a holy war. They held the view
that the law, as declared by Muhammad, was fixed and they could not

192
accept the French contention that the law had to keep pace with the
changing conditions in Europe. In their view the French were disseminat¬
ing heresy. The Berbers, absolutely powerless before their masters, swal¬
lowed the humiliation. After the Kabylie revolt of 1871 the French
attempted a clean sweep of the customs and institutions of the Berbers of
Kabylie.
Politically the Berbers were not taken into partnership. Administration
remained under the control of the white colonists, usually hot-headed,
opinionated, arrogant men but influential with the French administration,
through their connections in the world of business and politics. They
regarded Algeria as a mere extension of France, a view consistently en¬
dorsed by the French government until the advent of Charles de Gaulle.
The Berbers were considered as backward, uncultured, ineducable and
almost irredeemable, and were consequently excluded from the adminis¬
tration of the country. They did not qualify for French citizenship, the
only citizenship recognized in Algeria, though in 1870 the Jews were
naturalized en masse. Jules Ferry, a French Prime Minister, said of the
indigenous Algerians in 1892: ‘The Moslems have no notion of the politic¬
al mandate or of limited and contractual authority; they know nothing of a
representative regime or of the separation of powers, but they have in the
highest degree the instinct and need and ideal of a strong power and just
power’.
The Algerian Berbers’ reaction to the repressive policy of the French
taskmasters was one of sullen resignation to their fate. Their past was
being uprooted, their present miserable and their future bleak. They had
no love for French rule; they despaired and disaffection began to seethe
among them. The eloquent silence of the masses was misconstrued by the
French as evidence of satisfaction with their rule, and in later days when
the effendiya (educated elite) launched the nationalist movement, the
French began to argue that these nationalists did not represent the wishes
and aspirations of the apparently apathetic masses.

European pressure on Morocco

The French invasion and occupation of Algeria had effects on North

Africa as a whole and on the Maghreb in particular. The rest of the
Maghreb saw the writing on the wall. It became clear that the occupation
of the rest of Mediterranean Africa by the European powers was only a
question of time. European imperialism had evidently come to stay. What
postponed the evil day for many of the North African states was the
mutual jealousy arising out of the conflicting interests of the various

193
European powers who had interests in the appropriation of this part of the
continent. For many decades the interest of one power cancelled out that
of the other, until they agreed among themselves on how to share the
spoils. The postponement of the establishment of European rule was also
partly due to the role played by many North Africans. The Maghreb
produced many shrewd rulers who exploited the differences among the
European powers to knock the head of one power against that of the other,
thereby postponing the inevitable doom.
The situation in Morocco and Tunisia showed this clearly. In this
area the imperial interests of Britain, France and Spain converged.
For Britain Morocco was of the highest strategic value. The northern
coast, and especially that part of it forming the southern shore of the
straits of Gibraltar, guarded the entrance to the Mediterranean. British
interests in Greece, the rise of Muhammad Ali and French activities in
other parts of Mediterranean enhanced the importance of Morocco for the
British. British trade with the territory was substantial. The British for¬
tress of Gibraltar depended on the territory for provision. To France too
Morocco was of first-class interest, particularly after the Algerian invasion
of 1830. The boundary between Algeria and Morocco was purely an
artificial one, having been determined by fortuitous historical events. The
border chiefdoms, who were naturally anti-French, could not be made to
recognize its existence. Moreover there were linguistic, cultural and reli¬
gious ties which the border chiefdoms of Morocco and Algeria shared. For
instance there were the sufi brotherhoods which knew no international
boundaries. The French had observed the power of the brotherhoods in
the movement led by Abdel Kader. Of the brotherhoods the most impor¬
tant was the Taibiya whose leader was the Grand Sherif of Wezzan in
Morocco. Should he command the faithful in Algeria to rise up against the
French, would the faithful not obey him? Moreover establishment of
French influence in Morocco was absolutely necessary in the plans of the
French to extend into the desert and semi-desert regions of the Algerian
coast. The French feared that Morocco could become a sanctuary to those
Berbers who might resist their penetration into the Sahara. Spain’s in¬
terest in Morocco of course dated back to the fifteenth century. To all
these powers Morocco was potentially promising for financial investment.
The rivalry of these three powers became the strength of the sultan,
guaranteeing the independence of the territory until the French and
British concluded the agreement which gave to the former a free hand to
annex Morocco in the first decade of the twentieth century.
Sultan Abdel Rahman’s (1822-59) weakness and domestic problems
were exploited by the European powers. In 1828 the British blockaded
Tangier; the tollowing year the Austrians bombarded Arzila and Titta-

194
win, as reprisals for the seizure of some merchant ships by Morocco, thus
putting an end to the sultan’s corsair navy. The French attack on Algeria
was a real crisis for Morocco. Immediately after the French attack the
Arabs of Tlemcen appealed to the sultan for help. Abdel Rahman seized
the chance to extend his influence into western Algeria by appointing
khalifas to Tlemcen, Miliana and Medea. Between 1832 and 1834 the
sultan also gave moral and material support to Abdel Kader. By 1842 the
French had begun to consider the invasion of Morocco. In 1844 war broke
out between Morocco and the French over the help the former was
believed to be offering to Abdel Kader. Fiqq, a territory claimed by
Morocco, was peremptorily annexed by the French and Mogador and
Tangier were bombarded. The battle of Isly, mentioned earlier, compelled
Abdel Rahman to accept French wishes. France claimed no territory, no
indemnity, not even the expenses of the war. The sultan was merely asked
to deliver Kader to France. The treaty stipulated that should the French
capture the Algerian leader they should treat him generously; but should
Morocco capture him the sultan should restrict him to one of the towns on
the western coast of Morocco until the two governments could decide how
best to prevent Abdel Kader continuing to be a menace to them.
But the battle of Isly strained Franco-Moroccan relations. In 1851 the
French bombarded the port of Sale, following the capture of some French
vessels by the Moroccans. The weakness of Morocco was exploited by the
Spanish who in 1859, at the accession of Sidi Mohammed IV, declared war
on the sultan, after a dispute over the Spanish fortification of Mellila.
With an army of 30 000 men Spain took Tetuan and was only prevented
from advancing into the heart of Morocco by British intervention. A
convention was signed in 1860 by which more territory around Mellila was
ceded to Spain, the latter’s right to avenge any Berber attack on the
Spanish without hostility from the sultan was acknowledged and Morocco
was to pay an indemnity of £4 million. This latter sum was obtained from
the territory’s customs receipts until the 1880s. A most-favoured nation
convention was also signed by which no trading privileges were to be
granted to other powers except they were granted to Spain as well.
The commercial privileges forced on Morocco by Spain opened the way
to France and Britain, both of whom soon extracted the same demands. In
1865 Moroccan goods were allowed to go free of duty to Algeria. Never¬
theless Franco-Moroccan relations did not improve and during the 1871
rebellion in Algeria, France violated Morocco’s territorial integrity by
pursuing some of the rebels into Moroccan territory. In order to meet the
European challenge the sultan established an artillery school, revive
sugar plantations in the south and began a sugar refinery. The Muhamma
diyah Printing Press was also founded.

195
Hassan III

The successor to the Sherifian throne in 1873, El Hassan III, was a

dignified, well-respected strong man who attempted to halt the unhappy
developments in the country. He was in a sense a modernizer who carried
out some reform of the administration and judiciary. He appealed to
pan-Islamism and renewed diplomatic relations with the Ottoman sultan.
But the situation was beyond repair. European influence had come to stay
and could not be driven out as he wished. All he could do was to play one
power against the other. He was fortunate that the French were preoccu¬
pied in other parts of the globe. There was reconstruction in France;
Egypt and Tunisia were of greater immediate attention, and it was not
until the 1890s that France could concentrate on Morocco in a forceful
fashion. In these years too Anglo-Moroccan relations improved, and
Morocco looked to Britain to safeguard Morocco’s interests against the
intrigues of other European powers, in return for commercial conces¬
sions. Britain was given a monopoly of the merino wool and exploited
Moroccan iron and phosphates. Morocco also imported a great deal from
Britain. This is not to say that Britain keep other European powers out of
Morocco’s trade. In fact Spain’s commercial interests enlarged during the
period and Germany and Belgium also entered the commerce of the
territory in the last decade of the century.
In the meantime Hassan had to deal with internal problems. It took him
ten years to consolidate his kingdom and to obtain undisputed possession
of the country. Nevertheless, with the exception of Mawlay Ismail, none
of his Filali predecessors ever succeeded in exercising authority over the
Berbers of the south as he did. Throughout his reign he was constantly
engaged in military expeditions in parts of the country where rebellion
occurred. He succeeded in compelling the caids of the south to pay him
tribute regularly. The main consequence of his constant involvement in
the pacification of his country was that he did not have the time to carry
out administrative, economic and military reforms, such as those carried
out by Muhammad Ali for the modernization of Egypt. He tried to
introduce an army trained by Europeans, but Arab aversion to professional
soldiery led to the failure of the scheme. Many who received arms from
him deserted to the dissident chiefdoms and fought against him.
It may be asked why, in spite of his strong character, Hassan did not
obtain the co-operation of his people. In the latter’s view all the nineteenth-
century sultans had committed a heinous crime by associating themselves
in any manner with Europeans. For instance Abdel Rahman had betrayed
the interests of the country by not supporting Abdel Kader. The masses
came to believe that their sultans were selling their country to rapacious

196
‘infidels’. Hence in 1878 and 1887 there were Berber demonstrations
against Hassan when foreign men-of-war in the ports demonstrated,
ostensibly to protect their nationals. What could this be, asked the Ber¬
bers, but a combined design on their independence?
In 1894 Hassan died and was succeeded by Abdel Aziz who did not
reach his majority until 1900. Until the latter date the real ruler was Bou
Ahmad, a strong ruler and the son of a black slave. Abdel Aziz was the
opposite of his immediate predecessor, a timid and idealistic ruler. Nor
was he a powerful religious dignitary. His chief mistake however was that
he allowed himself, like Said and Ismail of Egypt and Muhammad es
Sadek of Tunisia, to be unduly fascinated by European gadgets. One man
who influenced him in this respect, simply to improve British commerce
in Morocco, was Maclean, an enterprising British ex-officer from Gibral¬
tar, who came to make a fortune in Morocco. He became the sultan’s
instructor and colonel of his bodyguard. He came to be nicknamed Caid
Maclean. Maclean introduced the youthful sultan to sport of all kinds,
including bicycle races at court, to the delight of spectators. He spent a
great deal of money on lawnmowers, cameras, cigarette-lighters, musical
boxes, silk dresses and ostrich-feathered Parisian hats. His court came to
be known as the court of amusements and he was nicknamed ‘the mad
sultan’ who was believed to have been bewitched by the foreigners.
The significance of the extravagance of this ‘mad sultan’ lies in the fact
that he was soon compelled to do what other rulers in North Africa had
done, and which became the pretext on which European powers occupied
their territory — borrow money. By 1900 the establishment of French rule
over Morocco was only a question of time.

Tunisia and the French occupation of Algeria

The bey of Tunisia’s first reaction to the French attack on Algeria was one
of delight partly because the dey of Algiers was his traditional enemy and
partly because he felt that by allying with France the latter would allow
him to annex Constantine in eastern Algeria. In fact at one time it seems
that the French toyed with the idea of handing over the administration of
Algeria to a Husaynid prince. A treaty was signed with France on 8
August 1830, a clause of which ceded to France a conspicuous spot on the
coast for the erection of a memorial chapel in honour of Louis IX and
another article of which restored to France the coral fishery on the coast.
However the bey was soon disappointed in the French who were embarras¬
sed by the support which the Tunisians began to give to Abdel Kader. T e
bey had to maintain a policy of strict neutrality.

197
 Indeed the bey soon began to regret his pro-French manifestations. For
the British lost no time in encouraging the sultan of Turkey to reassert his
suzerainty over Tunisia. The permanent presence of the French fleet at
Goletta, a Tunisian port, the influence the French were believed to be
wielding in the bey’s court and the gifts made to the bey by the French
from time to time - all these alarmed the British. Rather than have French
influence increase in Tunisia the British government decided to encour¬
age the Turks to neutralize French influence in Tunisia, as the Turks had
been persuaded to do with Muhammad Ali in Egypt. For just as they had
encouraged Muhammad Ali’s intransigence in Egypt the French wished to
encourage the bey to assert his independence of the Ottoman empire, and
thereby depend on France even more than before.

The reign of Ahmed Bey

During the reign of Ahmed Bey, 1835-55, French influence in Tunisia

increased considerably. In 1842 the bey was successfully persuaded to
abolish the slave trade. In 1846 he went on a state visit to Paris and was
received with great pomp. The French government asked him to relieve
the Jews of the disabilities they were suffering and to grant concessions to
Roman Catholic schools in Tunisia. The bey acceded to these requests in
an attempt to please the French, whose support he felt he needed for the
maintenance of his independence against the Turkish threat.
Ahmad Bey also decided to become a modernizer in order to prevent
annexation of his country on the grounds of his country’s ‘backwardness’.
Like Muhammad Ali of Egypt, he attempted to modernize his army and
navy. In 1840 he founded a military academy where Italian, British and
French teachers instructed the cadets in sciences, in military strategy, and
in history, geography and languages. At this academy about forty books in
these various fields were translated into Arabic. He also attended to the
navy. Porto Farina became the naval base and 12 ships were built for the
use of the navy. It is estimated that on the whole Ahmed Bey spent not less
than two-thirds of the country’s revenue on defence alone. Like Muham¬
mad Ali too, aware of the political implications of borrowing, he kept
Tunisia solvent and was cautious in yielding to European pressure for
social and constitutional reforms. At his death in 1855 he left 120 million
francs in the treasury.

Muhammad es Sadek and the growth of European influence

His successor, Muhammad es Sadek, ‘the Magnificent’, was comparable

198
 Muhammad es Sadek, Bey of Tunis

to Ismail Pasha of Egypt. He dissipated the Tunisian revenues on beauti¬

ful Georgian, Turkish and Circassian slave girls, leaving only a small
surplus to be swallowed up by French engineers in bringing pure wafer to
Tunis over the aquaduct of Adrian. On 24 October 1855 Muhammad es
Sadek signed his first convention with France for the construction of
electric telegraph lines throughout Tunisia. By 1862. the Treasury was
empty, and in May 1863 a loan was negotiated in Paris for £1 400 000
from Messrs Oppenheim and Erlanger. The terms imposed on this loan
were so onerous that the bey only received in cash one-seventh of the sum.
By 1869 the financial condition of the country had become so desperate
that an international commission was established to consolidate the debt
and arrange for its service. On this commission the British, French and
Italian interests were represented, though the greater part of the debt was
in the hands of the French creditors.
In the meantime the European commercial and financial interests were
scoring one success after the other. The British held a concession foi an
important railway from the city of Tunis to Goletta. After 1870 the Italians
joined in the scramble for opportunities and soon began to outbid the
British in competition with the French. The interest exacted on the
various loans the bey was encouraged to take varied from 12 to 15 per cent.
The financial burden on the state could be alleviated only by increasing
taxes. A special tax called majba of 36 rials was levied on all able bo le
men and this provoked.a popular rebellion led by Ali ibn Ghadhahim, w o
was styled ‘the Bey of the People’. The struggle to suppress this uprising

199
plunged the bey still further into debt.
Not only were inroads being made into the sovereignty of the bey by the
loans he had taken, but he was compelled to grant economic concessions as
well. In 1870 he granted an Italian agricultural company an estate at
Jedeida, while a French citizen, the Count de Saucy, was put in possession
of the fruitful domain of Sidi Tabet. The latter concession was destined to
provide one of the excuses for the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881.
Indeed the Italian concessionaires were hardly installed at Jedeida when
they put forward claims to exercise such jurisdiction over the inhabitants
as would effectively constitute them into an independent state within the
state. And the concession to Count de Saucy for the improvement of ‘the
breed of horses, cows and sheep’ was 1400 hectares of the most fertile land
in Tunisia.
The position of the bey in Tunisia became very weak as a result of his
prodigality. The prime minister from 1837 to 1873, Mustapha Khazinda,
who was behind the foreign loans, was not only corrupt but also encour¬
aged the bey to rule despotically. Despotic rule was however against
European interests. For the narrow sea that separates the territory from
Sicily made the Europeans fear that a despotic ruler in Tunisia identified
with the Ottoman empire could easily make Tunisia a part of the ‘Eastern
Question’. If this were to happen, it was feared, the balance of sea-power
would be overturned by any power that had Tunisia on its side. For many
years therefore the Europeans were incessant in pressing the bey to liberal¬
ize the constitution of the territory. In 1857 and 1861 the bey made
abortive attempts at constitutional reforms. In the former year religious
reform was proclaimed, the immunities enjoyed exclusively by the Mus¬
lims were abolished, a mixed commercial court was set up, liberty of
commerce was announced and monopolies were abolished. In 1861 the bey
announced a liberal constitution and established a ‘representative’ cham¬
ber. The bey was henceforward to act only on the advice of his ministers,
who were in turn to be responsible to the Assembly. The financial admi¬
nistration was to be improved by the introduction of a budget and civil
list, and a court of appeal and a criminal tribunal were to be instituted.
This 1861 constitution (Destour) later became a rallying cry for twentieth-
century nationalists (the Neo-Destour party of Habib Bourguiba, who later
became President of Tunisia).
By 1871 the bey began to find French relations irksome and he began to
feel that 1 unisia was being milked by the French. Against the wishes of
the French he decided to cultivate the goodwill of the Ottoman sultan. To
this end an imperial firman was issued by the sultan, declaring Muham¬
mad es Sadek Pasha as wazir of Tunisia and conferring upon him ‘the right
of hereditary succession’, renouncing the annual tributes Tunisia had been

200
obliged to pay for centuries and binding Tunisia to give positive support to
Turkey in case of war between the latter and any other power. It stated
further that the bey was not to conclude any treaties with any foreign
powers, the prerogative of which was to remain in the hands of the
Ottoman empire. The bey furthermore alienated the French by flatly
refusing to entertain Ferdinand de Lesseps’ suggestion of an ‘inland sea’ in
Tunisia. Finally in 1880 the bey refused the French harbour concessions at
Goletta.

The French occupation of Tunisia, 1881

France was enraged at these events and began to look for pretexts to justify
the occupation she had been entertaining for a long time. Up till 1878 it
was British opposition that had prevented France from declaring her
suzerainty over Tunisia. In this year, however, the British gave the French
a blank cheque in return for French recognition of British occupation of
Cyprus. At the Congress of Berlin in which Britain gave the French a free
hand in Tunisia, Bismarck was also favourably disposed towards a French
occupation of Tunisia, hoping thereby to draw France’s attention away
from Alsace-Lorraine which had been annexed by Germany in 1870.
The only remaining formidable opponent of France over Tunisia was
Italy. Tunisian friendliness to Italy as a counterpoise to the dangerous
aspirations of the French made the latter decide in 1880 on an occupation.
In that year the bey was actually asked to sign a protectorate treaty, a
proposal sponsored by the Tunisian ruler. After 1860 the Italians began to
establish themselves in Tunis, which was just across the sea from Italy. By
1880 there were 20 000 Italians settled in Tunisia, as opposed to 200
Frenchmen. This flow of population was accompanied by a growing
agitation in Italy for the acquisition of Tunisia. For, according to national¬
ist Italian writers, Tunisia was a part of the old Roman empire which the
new unified Italy was expected to revive in a modern form. In fact m 18/0
the Italian government had been tempted to take advantage of France s
disasters in the Franco-German war to seize the territory of the bey. On
that occasion it was only the unveiled threat of the Frenc provincia
government which deterred Victor Emmanuel from taking action.
At the Berlin Conference of 1878 Italy had concentrated attention on
Italia Irredentia, the Trentino and Trieste, which it expected Austria
might grant to it. Andrassy, the Austrian foreign minister, a
Count Cord’s attention to the Mediterranean as the area on
should concentrate its aspirations. But for Corti the territory in
was the more important. He returned to Italy only to regret that he did not

201
follow up the suggestions as to Tunisia. It is said that the indignation in
Italy was so great that Corti was almost stoned in the streets and soon after
resigned his position as foreign minister.
But in the French-Italian scramble for Tunisia the Italians were the
weaker power. So far as the Italians were concerned the struggle was really
a hopeless one. For the French had much greater resources, financial and
military, at their disposal, and what was more, they had the other great
powers behind them. Nevertheless the Italians made a last bid to neutral¬
ize French influence by allowing Italian interests to continue the competi¬
tion with the French. The two governments clashed in the matter of the
Tunis-Goletta railway, which the British owners had offered for sale. By
the lavish use of money the Italian Rubattino Company finally secured the
line, after which the Italian Parliament passed a bill granting the new
owner an annual subvention. The incident led to a sharp exchange of notes
between Paris and Rome, and the French would probably have proceeded
to take action in the summer of 1880 had it not been for the opposition of
prominent French leaders. Even so, Charles de Freycinet, the French
premier, appears to have considered the establishment of a protectorate
just before his ministry fell from power in September 1880.
However the French still hesitated, for there was little sentiment in
Paris in favour of colonial adventure, and there was much disagreement in

202
government circles as to what should be done. President Grevy maintained
that Tunis was not worth a cigar while Leon Gambetta felt that Bismarck
was driving the French towards Africa in order to make France forget the
humiliation of 1870. But the incident of 10 January 1881 precipitated
events. At Palermo, the brother of the bey, leading a delegation of Italians
resident in Tunis, met King Umberto of Italy. High-sounding speeches
were made and the Italian press took care to point out the politicial
significance of the visit. These demonstrations, naturally, had an electrify¬
ing effect in Paris. Even Gambetta was forced to admit that action was
imperative. Efforts appear to have been made almost immediately to
induce the bey to sign a treaty with France and accept some form of
protectorate. The bey refused to entertain these ensnaring proposals.
It was too late for the French government to turn back. A pretext for
military action was found in a raid on the Algerian frontier by the Krumirs
in March 1881. There was nothing unusual about these raids. Indeed it is
said there had been over 2000 of them between 1870 and 1881. In 1879,
the French also alleged, the Krumirs had provided the Berber rebels in the
Aures with ammunition. Moreover the French liked to believe that the
pan-Isiamic movement in North Africa - including the Arabi Pasha revolt
in Egypt, the Mahdi movement in the Sudan, the killing of Flatters, a
French colonel, in the desert and the insurrections of South Oran —- was
most active in Tunisia. Moreover, although the pan-Islamic movement was
directed against the Christian powers of Europe generally, it was orga¬
nized ‘specially’ against France. This Muslim fanaticism, the French
contended, endangered the lives of the French nationals in Tunisia and
demanded French intervention.
After a ‘military promenade’ the bey surrendered in May and signed the
Treaty of Bardo which established what amounted to a French protecto¬
rate over Tunisia. By the articles of this treaty France was to control
Tunisian foreign policy. By another treaty, the Treaty of Marza, signed in
1883, the French established control over the internal affairs of the coun¬
try as well, including finance and the judiciary.
The French occupation of Tunisia was similar in many ways to the
British occupation of Egypt. The relationship between the bey and the
resident-general was similar to that between the pasha or khedive and the
governor in Egypt. The local administrators in Tunisia, who supervised
the qadis and sheiks in the interior, were counterparts of the Britis
muffalash in Egypt. There was, however, a difference. The bey appointed
his own ministers who had limited functions, while there were epart
ments under the French resident-general alongside. In Egypt the governo
appointed ministers.
But the treaties of Bardo and Marza are not a true gui e to t e po

203
actually wielded by the French. Tunisian ‘independence’ was in reality
fictitious,.for the protectorate was one in which the authority of the bey
was gradually usurped by French administrators. Armed opposition to the
presence of the French continued into the last years of the nineteenth
century, by which time the Ottoman sultan had finally relinquished his
sovereignty over Tunisia.
Nevertheless the protectorate status of Tunisia made it impossible for
the French to administer Tunisia in the same way they were administering
Algeria. By the very circumstances of the occupation of the former, the
so-called policy of assimilation was out of the question. The difference is
best expressed in the words of S.H. Roberts:
[Algeria] was a colony assimilated to France, [Tunisia] a protectorate
which retained an Oriental organization: the one was a country of
small settlers, the other of entrepreneurs alone; the one was essentially
rural, the other equally urban; the one saw everything native shat¬
tered and priority given to European codes and methods, while the
other retained the old native policy as the basis of future organiza¬
tion; the one thus had the natives driven back, the other left them
predominant; the one had its trade subordinated to France, the other
kept its development free.

Libya under the Turks

Unlike the other parts of the Maghreb, Libya was much less subject to the
threat of European imperialism in the nineteenth century, but imperialism
came all the same - from Turkey. France’s attitude towards Yusuf Kara-
manli stiffened after the Algerian invasion. One month after the event
Admiral Rosamel forced a treaty on Yusuf. By this treaty Yusuf was to
apologize to the French consul, Rousseau, for previous humiliations, trade
monopolies were abolished, enslaving of Christians (Europeans) was to
cease, all forms of exactions from the French were to cease, Libya’s navy
was not to be strengthened any further and Yusuf was to pay 80 000 francs
as war indemnities on amounts lost by French nationals in Tripoli. The
French and British encouraged rival candidates to Yusufs throne, War¬
rington living among the rebels and the French consul supporting the legal
heir, Ali Pasha. In the circumstances, under pretence of sending reinforce¬
ments to restore law and order in Libya, a territory then composed of the
three loosely administered areas of Cyrenaica, Tripoli and Fezzan, the
Ottoman government sent a punitive expedition under Mustapha Nedgib
to Tripoli. The general landed without any opposition, arrested all mem¬
bers of the royal family, declared the Karamanli dynasty entirely abo-

204
lished, and then proclaimed himself governor of the Regency.
But Turkish rule was confined in the main to the coastal areas, and it
was not an efficient administration. Between 1835 and 1911, the year of
the Italian invasion of Libya, 33 walis (governors) ruled the territory.
Three of them held office for about thirty years, leaving the others with an
average term of just over one year. Evidently the frequent change of
governors impaired administrative efficiency. Nor were there large forces
to control so vast a territory. Moreover Constantinople had no desire to
have strong walis in Libya, lest the latter became strong enough to assert
independence.

The Sanusiyya brotherhood

But Turkish rule in the country was very weak. It was in this circumstance
that a sufi brotherhood came to exercise the greatest influence in the
interior of Libya. In Islamic history religious brotherhoods have been of
considerable importance. Although essentially religious and spiritual in
their purpose, the brotherhoods often assumed a political complexion. A
phenomenon which often impelled them to perform political functions
was a threat from the ‘infidels’. In Morocco for instance the brotherhoods’
zawaya or lodges, were among the focal points of Moroccan patriotism and
resistance in face of the Spanish and Portuguese danger in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries. In Arabia in the nineteenth century the Wahabbis
rebelled against Constantinople and for a time founded their own state.
And in the last years of the nineteenth century until 1932 the Sanusiyya
became anti-French and anti-Italian. But a branch of a sufi brotherhood in
one territory might behave differently from one in another territory. For
example in the nineteenth century the Quadiriyya were fiercely and un¬
compromisingly anti-French in the Maghreb, while the Tijaniyya became
pro-French and pacific. But in Northern Nigeria the Tijaniyya became the
spearhead of the anti-British resistance, while the Quadiriyya remained
conservative and soft-pedalled with the British.
The brotherhoods’ zawaya, besides being centres of religious activities,
often served also as schools, infirmaries and charitable institutions, and
might be compared with the monasteries of medieval Europe. For many
important religious and political figures in Islamic Africa were influenced
one way or the other by one of the brotherhoods. Usman dan Fodio, for
instance, was a member of the Qadiriyya and the Mahdi of the Sudan was
influenced by the Mirghaniyya.
The Sanusiyya was named after the founder, Sayyid Muhammad bin
‘Ali al-Sanusi, the Grand Sanusi. He was born in Algeria about 1787 into a

205
distinguished family of sharifs. Well-informed in Muslim theology, juris¬
prudence and interpretation of the Quran, he became interested in the
Moroccan order of the Tijaniyya. In the 1820s he left Fez on pilgrimage
for Mecca, probably in order to avoid the hostility of the Moroccan
authorities, who were alarmed at the political consequences of his pan-
Islamic propaganda. Al-Sanusi’s teachings were alarmist to Muslim rulers
and seemed heterodox to the ulema. From Fez he went to Tripoli and
Benghazi, preaching all the way. He had by the 1830s gathered around
him his first disciples, ikhwhan, mostly Algerians, many of whom followed
him to Egypt. It is probable that the independence of Muhammad Ali and
the cultural and intellectual revival in Egypt at this time left their mark on
his mind. Having studied in the Hijaz under a number of sheikhs at Mecca
and Medina, he began to preach a return to Islam as practised zealously
and genuinely in the days of Prophet Muhammad. The man who influ¬
enced him most was Sayyid Ahmad bin Idris al Fasi, the fourth head of the
Moroccan order of the Qadiriyya, whom the Grand Sanusi followed for
two years.
In 1837 the Grand Sanusi established his Order at Mount Abu Qubais,
near Mecca. In 1841 he left the Hijaz for North Africa, with his disciples.
In 1842 he reached Libya and the following year he established the mother
Lodge of the Order at al-Baida on the central Cyrenaican plateau. In 1856
he made Jaghbub, 160 kilometres from the coast, his headquarters. This
place became the centre of the Sanusiyya and the seat of an Islamic
university, second only in Africa to al-Azhar. This place was chosen
because it had certain political advantages. It was out of reach of the
Turkish, French and Egyptian governments; it was on the main pilgrim¬
age route from north-west Africa through Egypt to Mecca, and this
pilgrimage route bisected at the oasis one of the trade routes from the
coast to the Sahara and the Sudan. By 1856 this predominantly missionary
brotherhood had converted the nomad and semi-nomad Beduin chiefdoms
of Libya and Egypt.
It was in this oasis of Jaghbub that the Grand Sanusi gathered the
learned men, over three hundred of them. Under his personal supervision
and that of his disciples, far from worldly distractions, the Grand Sanusi
was able to train the future leaders of the Sanusiyya. The shaikhs of the
Sanusiyya zawaya, established throughout the territory, were appointed
by him Irom among his intimate circle of disciples, many of whom
follwed him from Algeria and other parts of the Maghreb. A very
learned man and a writer of distinction, he had a library of about eight
thousand books, mostly works on Islamic law and jurisprudence, mystic¬
ism, philosophy, history, Quranic exegesis, poetry, astronomy and astrol¬
ogy. It was in this oasis that he died in 1859.

206
 In 1859 he was succeeded by his eldest son, al-Sayyid Muhammad al
Madhi, after a period of regency. It was under ai-Madhi that the Sanusiyya
extended into the Sahara and the Sudan. In 1895 he moved the headquar¬
ters to Kufra. The choice of this latter place was due partly to its strategic
location with reference to Libyan oases and routes, partly because of the
rise of the Mahdi in the Sudan and partly because of the military and
political activities of the French.
The point has to be emphasized that the Sanusiyya, particularly in its
early stages, was predominantly a missionary organization. It aimed not
only at reviving Islam and infusing it with new spirit, but at bringing
Islam within the reach of people who had not known it. And until the last
years of the nineteenth century the Sanusiyya refused to be drawn into the
vortex of European conflict with other Muslim states. Hence although the
Sanusiyya co-operated with the Turks in the administration of Libya the
Sanusi family and the brothers of the Sanusiyya disapproved of their way
of life. They resisted Turkish demands for assistance in the latter’s war
against the Russians from 1876-8; they refused the aid asked for by Arabi
Pasha in Egypt in 1882, and by the Sudanese in 1883, against the British.
Sayyid al-Madhi likewise rejected diplomatic overtures by the Italians and
Germans. It was not until France invaded the Sanusiyya’s Saharan terri¬
tories and destroyed its religious houses, and when later the Italians, also
without provocation, did the same in Cyrenaica, that the Sanusiyya re¬
sisted militarily the European imperialists.
But within Libya itself the Grand Sanusi and his successors could not
resist exercising political authority over the people. For the almost total
acceptance of the Sanusiyya by the Beduin was due mainly to political and
religious reasons. By virtue of the baraka which the Grand Sanusi was
believed to possess in great profusion he became a centripetal force weld¬
ing the factious groups together, as did the sherifian sultans of Morocco.
Both the Grand Sanusi and his band of followers, who were mainly
foreigners to the Beduins of Libya, thus stood outside the tribal system.
They were therefore not involved in the traditional loyalties and feuds
inherent in Beduin society. For the missionary organization of the Sanu¬
siyya was separate from the tribal system, and by centering it in the distant
oasis of Jaghbub the Grand Sanusi prevented it from becoming identified
with any one people or section of the country, as it might have become had
it been centred in Cyrenaica, where the brotherhood was strongest. Also
many of his immediate lieutenants, the sheikhs, came from outside. The
Dardafi and Ismaili families came from Tripolitania, the Ghumari family
from Morocco, the ‘Ammur, Bu Jibali and Khattab families from Algetia,
and so on.
Moreover the tribal groups in the country were made to believe that the

207
Sanusiyya belonged to them. To this end the distribution of the zawaya was
based on tribal particularism. The zawaya were founded by tribes or tribal
sections, and came to be regarded as tribal institutions. But each zawiya
also came to be a cult centre. Through the Sanusiyya the tribes of Cyrenaica
became linked from above in a common, if loose, organization under a
single sacred head. Thus a loose federation of tribes was turned into a
nation and national sentiment became strong, particularly in face of out¬
side interference by the Turks, and later by the Italians, against whom all
the tribes had common hostility.
The Sanusiyya succeeded in establishing peace among traditionally
warring tribes. It was the Sanusiyya which established peace between the
Tibu and the Beduin Arabs in the north and the Tibu and Uled Sliman in
the south, thus rendering the Tripoli-Fezzan-Wadai trans-Saharan route
safe. Hussein Bey, an Egyptian Oxford graduate who travelled along the
route in 1923, met some Beduin who told him that in the days of al-Madhi,
a woman could walk from Berea in Cyrenaica to Wadai unmolested.
Hussein wrote:
There can be no doubt that the influence of the Senussi brotherhood
upon the lives of the people of that region is good. The ikhwhan of
the Senussi are not only teachers of the people both in the field of
religion and of general knowledge, but judges and intermediaries
both between man and man, and between tribe and tribe... The
importance of these aspects of the Senussi rule in maintaining the
tranquility and well-being of the people of the Libyan desert can
scarcely by over-estimated.
Economically the Sanusiyya took part in the cultivation of land. For like
the Christian church in medieval times the brotherhood was endowed with
lands. The Sanusi were not mendicants, but they tilled their estates,
controlled the trade of their territory and collected gifts. By 1919 the lands
of the Sanusiyya totalled more than 200 000 hectares. Moreover its
zawaya, usually built along the trans-Saharan route, served as hotels for
pilgrims and traders. Many of the sheikhs of these lodges even became
great caravans themselves and gave every stimulus to the trade’.

The Sanusiyya and the Turkish administration

Indeed the Turkish administration appreciated the importance of the

Sanusiyya, and recognized its supremacy. In 1856 the Ottoman sultan
gave it a charter which exempted its properties from taxation and permit¬
ted it to collect a religious tithe from its followers. Another finnan confer¬
red on the Sanusiyya the right of sanctuary within the precincts of zawaya.

208
The local Turkish officials were content for the most part to sit in the
towns, many of them regretting that they had ever been sent to Cyrenaica,
where their salaries were low and often in arrears, and to let the Sanusiyya
control the interior so long as taxes were paid and no overt act was
committed against the Sultan’s authority, which might bring them to the
notice of Constantinople. And, for its own part, the Turkish government
was quite prepared to forget that Cyrenaica formed part of the sultan’s
dominions so long as there was peace there and it sent annual tribute to
Constantinople. The Turks were otherwise indifferent to what happened
in Libya, which was a poor province. They had quite enough troubles and
they saw no wisdom in alienating to no purpose a powerful sufi brother¬
hood and the warlike Beduin who supported it. They therefore let the
Sanusiyya perform many of the functions of government in the interior,
including education, justice and the maintenance of security. Whenever
any question which required direct contact with the head of the Sanusiyya
arose, it was established through the sheikh of the zawiya at Benghazi, or a
special messenger was sent from Jaghbub or Kufra to the Turkish gov¬
ernor at Benghazi, or he sent a messenger to the head of the Sanusiyya in
his oasis seat. From time to time the central administration in Turkey sent
an envoy to the head of the Sanusiyya with gifts and instructions to report
on what was going on in the Sahara.
It is important to note that although the Turks were not much loved by
the Sanusi both shared a community of interest in Libya. As Muslims
the Sanusi would rather ally with the Turks against the European infidels,
than with the latter against Turkey, a lesson which Italy was to learn
bitterly. Although the Grand Sanusi and his successors regarded the Turks
as usurpers of the Caliphate yet since it had long been in Turkish hands,
and since Turkey was the only independent Muslim power capable of
protecting Muslim interests in the nineteenth century, the Sanusi felt that
the Turks should be respected and the name of the Sultan proclaimed at
Friday prayers.
It was certainly in the interest of both the Turks and the Sanusiyya that
there should be order, security, justice and trade in the country, and tney
co-operated to maintain them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants
who had dealings with the Beduin or sent caravans to the Sahara and
Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Sanusiyya. It is for this
reason that in all the towns a small body of the richer and more cultured
citizens were affiliates.
The Sanusiyya used the Turks to buttress its position in its dealings
with them, and combined with the tribes to resist any encroachments on
its prerogatives by the Turkish government. It was in the interest of both
the Sanusiyya and the tribes that the Turkish administration should not

209
become too powerful. The Sanusiyya acquired from its central position
between the other two parties a pre-eminence in the interior which led to
the tribal system becoming even in Turkish times a proto-state with an
embryonic government of its own. The tribes first began to see themselves
as a nation through Sanusiyya relations with the Turkish administration.
They became acutely aware of their separate identity as being all Sanusi
vis-a-vis the Turkish administration.
The ideology of nationality and the feeling of oneness which the Sanu¬
siyya infused into the inhabitants of Libya assumed a military complexion
at the turn of the century when the French attacked the Sanusiyya and
when the Italians occupied Libya in 1911. The brunt of the defence of the
country against the invaders fell on the head of the brotherhood, Sayyid
Ahmad ash-Sharif. When after long-drawn out negotiations with the Italian
and British governments, he concluded, in 1920, the Treaty of ar-Rajma,
he naturally became the head of a state, recognized by his people as their
spokesman and ruler and by the two concerned European powers as such.
Even when the Italians destroyed the zawaya they came to see that the
only way by which their administration might appease the inhabitants was
to rebuild some of them. The importance of the Sanusiyya until modern
times is clear from the fact that at independence Libya initially became a
monarchy under a descendant of the Grand Sanusi, Muhammad Idris,
who took the title of King Idris I.

210
Part three Southern and Central Africa

8 Southern and Central Africa at the

beginning of the nineteenth century

The geographical features

Southern Africa is not marked off by any clear line of demarcation from
the rest of the continent but is simply a continuation of the great African
plateau. Around the edge of the plateau there runs a coastal strip separated
from the interior highland by an escarpment which is particularly marked
on the eastern coast of South Africa where it is known as the Drakensberg.
The whole area lies well within the southern hemisphere and has its winter
from June to August and its summer from November to February. The
severity of the winter is naturally more marked in the extreme south. In
South Africa frosts are normal and snow not unknown. Nearer the Zam¬
bezi it is much milder.
The whole area has a basic climatic pattern of dry winters, and summer
rains brought from the Indian Ocean. In South Africa these rains fall first
on the eastern coastal escarpment and then die away gradually leaving the
most westerly part of the sub-continent extremely dry and arid. The is the
area of the Kalahari desert. In the Cape territory itself the general pattern
is disturbed by mountains known as the Cape series and a winter rainfall
climate of the Mediterranean type is experienced. Behind the Cape moun¬
tains lies a very dry area of semi-desert known as the Karoo.

The Khoisan peoples

Southern Africa was the last area to be settled by the expanding Bantu-
speaking peoples and to this day there are still pockets in which the earlier
peoples survive. These were the San (known to the Dutch settlers as
Bushmen) and the closely related Khoi (the Dutch settlers gave them the
uncomplimentary name Hottentots). Both belong to a race with a tawny
yellow skin colour and short stature. They both speak languages which

211
 A San carrying his bow and arrow, Namibia

contain clicking sounds, unknown in any other human tongues except

those of people who have borrowed them through contact. For these
reasons, they are often referred to collectively as the Khoisan peoples.
Their religious beliefs and practices are also very similar but in other
respects the original culture of San and Khoi was very different.
The San were the earliest group and belonged to a people who at one
time occupied a great part of the continent. They practised no agriculture
and kept no cattle but lived entirely on the wild animals that the men
killed with their poisoned arrows, on wild fruits, and on the wild roots and
tubers that the women dug up with their digging sticks. They had no
permanent houses but lived in temporary shelters made of branches, or in
caves which they decorated with beautiful pictures of hunting scenes and
animals. Their way of life made it impossible to provide food for a large
number of people in a small area and they lived in fairly small groups
House-building in a Khoi settlement, a contemporary engraving

213
known as hunting bands. These might contain a hundred or more mem¬
bers, usually all related by blood or marriage. Their political organization
was very simple, some bands accepted the leadership of a particular
individual as chief, in others the adult men took what decisions were
necessary after discussion. The San were very attached to their simple but
free way of life and were not easily persuaded to abandon it, even for a
much richer existence. They could and did enter into trading and other
relationships with other peoples, however, and this sometimes led to their
taking up new practices such as cattle-keeping. Each hunting band was
jealous of its hunting territory. Though the group was always moving in
search of animals each band had a definite area within which its members
moved. They would resist to the death any intrusion on their hunting
grounds.
At one time the San may have occupied most of East and Central Africa
as well as Southern Africa but by the nineteenth century they had long lost
most of their original homeland to other races. They remained numerous
mainly in Namibia, the Kalahari and Angola, though small groups still
remained in the northern parts of present Cape Province, southern Orange
Free State and Transvaal, and the Lesotho mountains.
The Khoi differed from the San in their way of life. They were cattle-
keepers, and their lives centred around their flocks and herds. They
probably had their origin from a group of San who adopted the keeping of
animals through contact with Bantu-speaking peoples. Like the San the
Khoi were always on the move and lived in flimsy shelters which were
sometimes carried on the backs of oxen. Though each group had its own
home area they were less strongly attached to their territory than the San
and were also more easily persuaded to change their habits for material
rewards. The Khoi always supplemented the produce of their stock by
hunting and gathering. If they lost their animals they could return to a
pure hunting and gathering culture like that of the San. One group of
Khoi lived very largerly on fish and shellfish. They were known to the
Dutch as strandloopers (beach walkers) and have left traces of their exist¬
ence in numerous middens of empty shells on the beaches of the Cape.
The Khoi were organized in tribes, each made up of a number of related
clans. The head of the senior clan was the tribal chief, but these chiefs had
little power. Decisions were taken by consultation among all the clan
heads and when there were disagreements tribes often split up. One or
more of the clans would simply break away and in time grow into another
large tribe. This type of split was often caused by tribes growing too big to
keep their cattle together. The Khoi were less widespread than the San.
They mainly occupied Namibia, the coastal areas around the Cape of Good
Hope, and the eastern coastal strip as far north as modern Transkei. By

214
 the nineteenth century they had been driven from much of their original
home, but they still occupied much of Namibia and groups of them were
found around the Orange and lower Vaal rivers.

The Bantu-speaking peoples

! At the beginning of the nineteenth century, as today, by far the largest

: proportion of the peoples of Southern and Central Africa belonged to the
| Bantu-speaking group (see Introduction). They had been established as
far south as modern Zimbabwe as early as ad 200 and had probably begun
to enter the area south of the Limpopo river as early as the fourth century.
In South Africa, however, the process of settlement was still not complete
| as late as the nineteenth century. Bantu-speaking people had advanced
i furthest on the east coast. There by the eighteenth century they had
; reached the Fish river and begun to settle in the land between it and the
Sundays river which is known as the Zuurveld. It was in this area that they
first came into contact with the white settlers who were advancing from
the Cape. In the central part of South Africa the Bantu-speaking groups
were still north of the Orange river by the nineteenth century, and in
Namibia they were still confined to the area north of modern Windhoek.
The Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa, Zimbabwe and the south¬
ern parts of Mozambique were mixed-farmers who kept cattle but also
cultivated the land. It is possible that their ancestors may have come from
the far north where they would have been in contact with the cattle¬
keeping Nilotes. They fall into several different language groups. In South
Africa one important group is the Nguni-speaking people who live along
the eastern coastal strip from Zululand to the Zuurveld. This group has
adopted more of the click sounds from the languages of the San and Khoi
than any other Bantu-speaking people. The Sotho people occupied most of
the central plateau of South Africa as far as the Kalahari desert. The
languages of the many different peoples of this group have close similar¬
ities though those of the most westerly peoples are rather different, they
are called Tswana. In spite of differences of language and culture, Ngum
and Sotho peoples were often in contact with and influenced one another.
Several Nguni-speaking groups migrated into the mainly Sotho-speaking
areas of the Transvaal and Lesotho. In time some of these ost t eir
original languages and came to speak Sotho dialects. West of the Kalahari,
two Bantu-speaking groups lived in the northern areas o ami la, t e
more southerly were the Herero, whose way of life was rather similar 0
the Khoi for they relied only on cattle; and further north were the Ambo,
who lived by mixed farming.
215
 In southern Mozambique the main population belongs to a group called
Thonga, who are thought to be related to the Nguni-speaking group of
South Africa although they do not use the click sounds. In Zimbabwe
there were many different peoples belonging to the group who are now
called Shona.
North of these peoples there lived another large group known as the
central Bantu-speaking peoples. They are different from the southern
peoples because, while all southern Bantu-speaking peoples trace descent
from father to son and regard a child as belonging to his father’s clan,
those in central Africa trace descent through the mother and regard a child
as belonging to his mother’s people. In their social systems the person a
man respects most is not his father but his mother’s brother, and the
person to whom he leaves his property is not his own but his sister’s son.
Many central Bantu-speaking peoples did not keep cattle but relied only
on farming.

Social and political organization of the Bantu-speaking

peoples

The Bantu-speaking peoples lived in larger groups than the San or Khoi
and their chiefdoms might contain several thousand members. They
moved much less frequently than either of the other peoples though they
sometimes shifted their homes to find new land and grazing for their
cattle. Their homes were much more substantial. Some were round huts of
mud decorated with designs drawn in coloured clay and thatched with
grass or leaves, their floors carefully smeared with cow dung to give a
smooth surface without dust; some were beehive-shaped structures of
woven grass. Usually the family possessed a few simple stools, some mats
and cooking pots, and cloaks made of animal skins against the winter cold.
Among cattle-keeping peoples the cattle enclosure was the centre of every
settlement and grain was carefully stored to last until the next harvest.
Though the material standard of living of the Bantu-speaking people was
generally very simple their social organization was complex. They had a
strong belief in law, and a respect for traditional ways, and they had
complicated rules governing the conduct of individuals. Many of these
were connected with their family systems which were very strong and
linked large numbers of persons. They also believed that the spirits of
their ancestors took a close interest in, and exerted an influence on,
everyday life. This strengthened their devotion to their traditions and
customs. The young men of the southern Bantu-speaking peoples had to
go through prolonged and severe initiation ceremonies before they were

216
i admitted to manhood and allowed to marry. During the ceremonies the
customs of the chiefdoms and the proper behaviour of a man were deeply
imprinted on their minds.
Warfare between chiefdoms was frequent and was often caused by
quarrels over farming land or the theft of cattle, but these wars did not
usually result in great loss of life. They were governed by rules which were
known to all and generally respected. The greatest cause of bitterness and
loss of life among the Bantu-speaking people of Southern Africa was fear
I of witchcraft. Many diseases of which the cause was unknown were
1 believed to be caused by the ill-will of witches and when someone,
j particularly an important person, fell mysteriously sick the witch-doctor
would be consulted and the individual he named as responsible would be
j put to a cruel death. Among the central Bantu-speaking groups, persons
accused of witchcraft or other crimes were given a poison called mravi; it
was believed that if they were innocent they would vomit it but if they
were guilty it would kill them. These practices led to much loss of life and
gave opportunities for wicked people to take a terrible revenge on their
enemies by having them accused of witchcraft. Generally speaking the
Bantu-speaking peoples of Southern Africa were peaceful and law-
abiding, with few material goods apart from cattle. They were dignified
and courteous in accordance with their rules of etiquette and kind to
strangers if they respected their customs.
Though there were considerable differences between different peoples,
the southern chiefdoms were generally organized on similar basic princi¬
ples. At the head of each chiefdom was a hereditary chief who was the
supreme head of the community. Under him districts of the community s
territory were ruled by subordinate chiefs who were often important
members of the royal family. The chief was assisted by officials often
called indunas and among these there was a senior induna who acted as
deputy chief. Holders of these offices had a great deal of power and were
therefore usually chosen from families with no claim to the throne.
Although the chief was very powerful he did not rule as an autocrat. The
subordinate chiefs were also important and might rebel or break away if
the chief behaved in an unpopular way.
Chiefs were careful to discuss their plans with important members of
the community before taking decisions. In day-to-day matters they had a
small circle of close personal advisers, but before taking major decisions
they would summon the subordinate chiefs to a large conference. Amongst
the Sotho-speaking peoples public assemblies were also held in which
anyone could make suggestions or criticize the chief. The government of
subordinate chiefs was very similar to that of supreme chiefs, only on a
small scale. They had their own indunas and councillors and they sat in

217
judgment over cases which occurred in their own districts, but in these a
right of appeal to the court of the supreme chief always existed.
One of the characteristics of the southern political system, especially in
South Africa itself, was the tendency for chiefdoms to divide into two or
more at frequent intervals. Such divisions usually arose from disputes over
succession, but sometimes happened if a chief became unpopular or
annoyed some of his subordinate chiefs. They would then break away with
their own followers and set themselves up as independent rulers. This
process was continually taking place as they moved into and settled new
land.
Although the southern political organization seemed to encourage
the splitting of chiefdoms it could also work in the opposite direction.
If conditions enabled an ambitions chief to conquer a neighbouring com¬
munity he could add them to his own following and build an enlarged state
by simply making the defeated chief a new district sub-chief. In this way
extensive empires could be built up without altering the basic system of
government. This happened at a very early date in the area of modern
Zimbabwe and southern Mozambique. An empire grew up there under
rulers of the Kalanga group which extended its authority over some
non-Kalanga peoples. In this area trade in gold with Arab and Swahili
traders began at least as early as the thirteenth century. Under the stimu¬
lus of this trade a powerful chiefdom emerged at the site of the Zimbabwe
ruins. By the late thirteenth century a beginning had been made in the
construction of the massive stone buildings which have made this one of
the most dramatically impressive sites in all Africa. The original chiefdom
reached its greatest heights of wealth, artistic and architectural achieve¬
ment by the beginning of the fifteenth century. By this time its cultural
influence had spread over a wide area and many smaller stone buildings
built on the Zimbabwe style were erected. By the mid-fifteenth century,
however, the area was suffering from shortages of various essential com¬
modities and one of its leaders, Mutota, led an expedition to the north.
He established a new centre of power in the Dande area bordering the
middle Zambezi. From there he conquered a large number of communi¬
ties thus building the Mwene Mutapa empire. This, as we learn from
Portuguese records, had many provinces and districts governed by chiefs
some of whom enjoyed considerable autonomy. They even at times fought
minor wars with one another though all recognized the supremacy of the
Mwene Mutapa. The original site of the stone buildings was now reduced
to a regional centre and fell into a long process of decline, although the
stone-building tradition continued at other sites. The Portuguese managed
to gain influence in the kingdom by taking part in succession disputes and
the power of the kings crumbled away. In the seventeenth century the

218
 5 Rozvi broke away from the empire. Under their chiefs, who were called

I3 Changamire, they began to conquer the Kalanga and drive out the Portu-
\ guese. Eventually they reconquered almost the whole of the empire and
though the Portuguese were allowed to remain in their main trading posts
and trade with the new rulers they lost their influence in the interior. The
stone-building tradition was continued under the Rozvi right down to the
final destruction of their empire in the nineteenth century.
Amongst the central Bantu-speaking peoples there were many different
types of government. Many societies did not feel the need for government
systems wider than the organization of the local village. This was the case
with the Yao and Makua of northern Mozambique. The Tumbuka, Henga
and Tonga of the northern shores of Lake Malawi were also organized in
! this small-scale way. Other groups built empires along somewhat similar
principles to those of the southern Bantu, though each kingdom had its
own peculiar and often highly complicated system of government.
Amongst these larger states there was the Lozi kingdom of the western
province of modern Zambia and the powerful state of the Bemba with its
king, the Chitimukulu, which had its centre near Lake Bangweulu in
modern Zambia. Both these kingdoms are believed to have been founded
by immigrants from the area of Shaba in modern Zaire. In addition,
during the eighteenth century Kazembe, a general of the Lunda king,
Mwata Yamvo, in the Shaba area, penetrated to the Luapula valley and set
up a powerful kingdom. In the same century an adventurous elephant
hunter from modern Tanzania visited the Tumbuka people near the head
of Lake Malawi and succeeded in uniting many villages into the Kamanga
kingdom which was ruled by his successors with the title of Chikula-
mayembe. The great Maravi group of peoples who live in modern Malawi
and the eastern parts of Zambia are believed like most of the central
Bantu-speaking peoples to have had their origin in the area of modern
Zaire. In the seventeenth century they built up a widespread empire ruled
by a chief called Kalonga who had his capital near the Shire river in
modern Malawi. This empire broke up within a century of being termed
but a relative of the Kalonga named Undi broke away from his overlord
and moved westward to establish his capital in modern Mozambique near
the eastern border of modern Zambia. There he built up a second Malawi
empire covering a very wide area. This empire still existed at the begin¬
ning of the nineteenth century but it was not very strongly organized.

The Portuguese in Mozambique

Portuguese influence in the area of Mozambique dates back to the fif

219
teenth century and the opening of the sea route from Europe to India. The
Portuguese captured the Swahili/Arab trading settlements on the east
coast of Africa including Sofala in Mozambique. They established a base
on Mozambique Island and a number of small settlements along the coast
and at Sena and Tete on the Zambezi. From these posts they tapped the
gold trade of the Shona empire of Mwene Mutapa and other powerful
Shona kingdoms. An initial attempt to establish direct rule over the
Mwene Mutapa empire was a complete failure. Thereafter the initiative in
extending Portuguese influence passed into the hands of private traders.
Some of these were Portuguese, others Portuguese citizens of Indian
descent from Goa. These traders succeeded in persuading the Mwene
Mutapa or other powerful rulers to put them in command of chiefdoms
within their states. They ruled these chiefdoms through subordinate chiefs
who were generally the traditional rulers of the area. The new overlords
maintained their authority with the help of personal bodyguards of slave
soldiers who were known as chikunda. They used the resources of the
chiefdoms for their trading ventures and to support their bodyguards.
They could also call on the fighting manpower of the whole population in
times of war.
Though they obtained their chiefdoms from African rulers the traders
wanted to keep up their Portuguese connections. They therefore formally
offered their territories to the King of Portugal and received legal title to
them from him. These estates were known in Portuguese as prazos. Each
prazo was in fact a small kingdom with its own army. The prazo owners
were thus able to use their forces to intervene in succession disputes in the
Mwene Mutapa empire. The empire was gravely weakened and its control
restricted to a small fractioon of its original extent. The prazo owners
however weakened their position by over-exploiting their subjects and the
gold resources of the area. They received a major setback in the seven¬
teenth century with the rise of the kingdom of Changamire in western
Zimbabwe which drove them off the Zimbabwean highveld for good.
They still ruled substantial states in the neighbourhood of the lower
Zambezi into the nineteenth century however. By this time as a result of
• •
intermarriage most of the prazo owners were of predominantly African
descent. They had some African names, ruled as African chiefs and
practised traditional religious rites. On the other hand they were also
proud of their Portuguese connection, had some Portuguese names and
liked to hold Portuguese titles. They also often practised Christian reli¬
gious worship.

220
An early painting showing the landing of Jan Van Riebeeck and the first Dutch settlers
at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652

White settlement at the Cape

In 1652 a European settlement was established by the Dutch East India

Company at the Cape of Good Hope. The colony was very small at first
and was intended merely as a refreshment station for the Company’s ships
on their way to India. To begin with it consisted only of the Company’s
servants, but it was soon decided to allow a few of these to settle as free
citizens with farms of their own. They would then have the incentive of
personal profit to farm diligently and efficiently. The first of these settlers,
nine in number, were established on small farms in 1657. Gradually their
numbers increased and then under the governorship of Simon van der Stel
(1679-1700) a deliberate policy of increasing the population was under¬
taken to strengthen it against possible attacks by France. More Dutchmen
came and a party of French Huguenots, Protestant refugees from religious
persecution in France, was also settled in the colony. They were equal to
about one-third of the European population and many modern white
South African families are their descendants. The French refugees intro-

221
South-East Africa showing modern international boundaries

222
 i duced efficient farming techniques but they lost their language and were
IS absorbed into the predominantly Dutch population.
In the healthy climate this little community continued to grow rapidly
t in numbers and soon began to spread over a vast territory. The majority of
i: the whites were farmers and this meant that as their population increased
: they would need more land. At first they concentrated on growing veget-
j ables, wheat and wine on fairly small areas and the colony expanded

; slowly. The costs of production were high, the land was not as fertile as
j that in Europe and suffered from uncertain weather conditions, and the
: market for agricultural produce at the Cape was very small. Farmers
: depended on selling to the Company itself and to passing ships. Attempts
j to find export markets for Cape produce failed to come up to expectations
| and matters were made worse by the corrupt practices of Company offi-
: cials. The notorious Willem Adriaan van der Stel, in particular, used the
! Company’s servants to help him operate a private farm which gave himself
s and his friends almost a monopoly in supplying provisions to the Com¬
pany.
In these circumstances only the rich could farm successfully and poorer
men found themselves falling ever deeper into debt. Thus while some
became rich and comfortable and built substantial houses beautifully
decorated with gables in the Dutch style, others were forced to look for
another means of livelihood. In comparison with growing wheat and wine
at the Cape the life of a cattle trader or cattle rancher in the interior offered
fairly easy profits with little initial expense. There was always a market for
meat and animal skins. Cattle could be led to market and did not need
expensive transport. Unlike perishable agricultural produce they could be
kept for another occasion when prices were not high enough. What is
more young men in the interior could lead a very inexpensive life with
none of the costs of city existence. They could feed themselves and their
families to a considerable extent by shooting wild animals, and they could
hope to persuade or force Khoi to work for them as herdsmen for very low
wages. The life was hard and without much material comfort but it
provided a great sense of freedom. The Dutch settlers came to regard it as
the happy life.
In spite of all prohibitions to the contrary, settlers began to drift away
from the Cape, first trading with the Khoi for cattle, later taking up
farming themselves and often forcing the Khoi to abandon their lands.
Cattle-keeping required very ’arge areas of land in the dry and often
drought-stricken South African conditions; to be successful a cattle farmer
in the interior needed at least 10 square kilometres. Once considerable
numbers of settlers took to cattle-farming, therefore, the colony was
bound to expand at tremendous speed and in spite of its very small white

223
population and large area there was always a shortage of land. The Dutch
East India Company disapproved of this expansion, but it needed the meat
provided by the cattle farmers, and it lacked the resources and was too
inefficient and corrupt to prevent or control it. The main stream of
expansion flowed up the east coast where the rains were heavier, and there
in the eighteenth century settlers began to enter the area called the
Zuurveld, near the Fish river, which the Bantu-speaking people belonging
to the Nguni-speaking group were also just beginning to settle.
When the colony was first founded there was no intention on the part of
the Company to encourage racial discrimination. To show approval for
inter-racial mixture the surgeon of the original tiny settlement was given
promotion and a wedding feast in the commander’s house when he mar¬
ried a Khoi girl called Eva. Simon van der Stel, the greatest of the early
governors, was the son of an Indian woman. The situation began to change
after 1716 when the Company decided to allow the free importation of
slaves. Blacks were brought from West Africa, Delagoa Bay and Madagas¬
car, and a few Malays came from Indonesia to form the origin of the
present Cape Malay community. As manual work became the monopoly of
slaves or Khoi, the whites began to develop the attitude that they were
naturally superior and entitled to rule over the inferior people.
This attitude was fostered still more on the cattle farms of the interior
where the whites felt themselves extremely isolated, surrounded by large
numbers of slaves and Khoi servants who might easily turn against them.
They believed the only way to protect themselves was to support one
another at all times against the non-European peoples and keep them very
firmly down. Thus the attitude of white superiority and non-white in¬
feriority was strengthened by fear and established a deep hold on the
minds of the settlers. The Calvinist form of religion which the Dutch
settlers brought with them supported these attitudes for it taught that all
men were divided from birth into the chosen and the damned. Thus
although the officials of the Church did not accept it, the ordinary farmer
came to believe that the whites were the chosen race and non-whites the
condemned heathens, and that the distinction between the races was in
accordance with the will of God.

Reaction of the Khoisan peoples to the expansion of the

Cape Colony

As the colony expanded it took away the land of the indigenous San and
Khoi. Within a few years of the beginning of the colony a war broke out
between the Dutch East India Company and a Khoi group which corn-

224
 ; plained that its lands were being taken away. The war lasted from 1658-60
and the Company emerged victorious. After that Khoi numbers were
severely reduced by smallpox epidemics. Their political system and cul-
j ture were undermined by contact with white traders who tempted them to
i sell their cattle for strong drink, tobacco and other European goods. As
i they lost their cattle many gave up their land with little resistance and
§ either entered the service of the whites as herdsmen or drifted further into
1 the interior. Others, however, forced by the loss of their cattle to revert to
1 living by hunting and gathering like the San, continued to offer a bitter
i resistance. The settlers called these groups Bushmen-Hottentots and sub-
> sequent historians have tended to confuse them with the San who resisted
} white encroachment with fierce determination, launching lightning raids
s on stock and killing herdsmen with their poisoned arrows.

Origin of the Commando system

In response to Khoi and San resistance the settlers developed the Com¬
mando system. Local officials known as veld komets were given authority
in case of need to call upon the white farmers in their area to come
forward, each with his horse and gun, and sometimes armed Khoi servants
as well, to form a small mounted force which could take immediate action
in response to small-scale raids or cattle rustling. In cases where larger
forces were needed the farmers of two or more neighbouring areas would
combine under the leadership of a commandant. Where really substantial
campaigns were planned the forces of an entire magisterial district or of
two such districts could be summoned to form a ‘grand Commando’. The
Commando system developed in the struggle against San and Khoi was
later to be used in conflicts with Bantu-speaking groups. Though it was
sponsored by the Dutch East India Company, the government at the
Cape, the system once developed could easily be used by private indi¬
viduals to conduct campaigns without official support. It could even be
used by the settlers against the government itself.

Khoisan resistance and the conciliation policy

Though the commandos waged a war of extermination against San and

Khoi raiding bands, hunting them down like wild animals, they did not
succeed in destroying them. Indeed, their resistance was so fierce that
farmers became increasingly reluctant to turn out for such dangerous
service offering so little loot. Several districts became so unsafe that they

225
were temporarily abandoned. The farmers turned to buying peace with
gifts of sheep and cattle to save the San and Khoi bands from the hunger
which led them to fight. In response many San and Khoi raiders settled
and in time became absorbed as herdsmen on the white farms. Then, as
the settler population increased further, resistance became impossible.

Migration of the Korana

Among the Khoi groups who remained beyond the colonial frontier one of
the most important was the Korana (or Kora). They lived around the
junction of the Orange and Vaal rivers. In the course of the eighteenth
century they expanded northwards along the course of the Vaal and Harts
rivers. There they came into conflict with the southernmost of the Tswa-
na. There they were joined by a German deserter from the Company’s
service, called Jan Bloem. He married several Khoi women and became
the head of a Korana clan. With the help of the guns he brought from the
Cape he led his people in many raids on the Tswana, robbing them of their
cattle which he sold to the Cape. He died in 1790 after a raid on one of the
most powerful Tswana chiefdoms and was succeeded by one of his sons,
Jan Bloem II, who became an even more daring bandit than his father.

Origin of the Cape Coloured and Griqua peoples

Khoi and San who became servants on white farms were thrown together
with slaves and persons of part European descent. In time they lost their
original languages and culture. The distinctions between the different
groups gradually disappeared and they evolved into the Cape Coloured
people. In place of their original cultures they adopted that of their white
masters and came to speak a simplified form of the Dutch language which
was also coming to be used by the children of white farmers. In this way
the Afrikans language was born. In time it became the spoken language
of the great majority of the white population as well as of the Cape
Coloured community.
In the early days of the colony persons of mixed Khoi-white or slave-
white descent had little difficulty in becoming landowners and being
accepted in white society. Some Khoi and San who became trusted ser¬
vants and were employed as farm managers also gained social acceptance
and became independent farmers. As colour feeling increased, however,
people of this sort who were generally known as Basters or Orlams, found
themselves rejected from white society and their rights to land ownership

226
S called in doubt. They tended to migrate to the frontier areas where things
\ were less settled and then to move out of the colony altogether. A number
i: of such groups settled along the Orange river where they were associated
\ with Korana and other Khoi groups and some San as well. One such
3 composite group congregated near the confluence of the Orange and Vaal
] rivers under the leadership of Cornelius Kok and Barend-Barends. Under
3 missionary influence they adopted the name Griqua, drew up a constitu-
j tion and made laws. In time conflict developed between the missionaries
[ and members of the Kok family. In their place the missionaries persuaded
I the people to choose a young catechist of San descent named Waterboer.
: He and his descendants long ruled the first Griqua settlement around
! Griquatown just to the west of the confluence of the Vaal and Orange
: rivers. Some members of the Kok family, however, rejected the new
3 leader and broke away to establish two new Griqua communities. One
i under Cornelius Kok II was established north of Waterboer’s community
i around the village of Campbell. It ceased to exist as an independent
: community on the death of its founder. The second was established by
Adam Kok around Philippolis on the Orange river east of the confluence.
It persisted as a separate political community under descendants of its
founder until 1861, when they trekked to a new settlement in Griqualand
East on the border of Lesotho.

Origin of the Orlam communities in Namibia

Further down the Orange river than the Griqua settlement another group
of Khoi and Basters gathered on an island in the river under the leadership
of a daring brigand, Jager Afrikaner. Her terrorized alike white farmers
within the colony and Tswana beyond the frontier. He beat off all attempts
to arrest him until he was finally converted to Christianity by the
missionary Robert Moffat. He then visited the Governor in Cape Town,
was granted a pardon, and soon afterwards died peacefully. His son
Jonker Afrikaner led his people to Namibia and established something of a
hegemony over the different Khoi communities there, leading them in
conflicts with the Herero. This was the beginning of a long chain of
disturbances which in the late nineteenth century were to provide part of
the pretext for German annexation of the area. A number of other groups
of Khoi and mixed Khoi/white descent migrated independently to Nami¬
bia. Like Afrikaner’s people they were generally called Orlams.
One such group which has kept the name Baster settled around a village
they called by the biblical name Rehoboth. They form a distinct political
community in Namibia to this day.

227
White settlers and Bantu-speaking peoples encounter
one another

During the eighteenth century white settlers began to enter the Zuurveld
and settle alongside the indigenous Africans who were also just settling the
area. The latter belonged to branches of the Xhosa, the southernmost of
the Nguni-speaking peoples. This situation did not please the Dutch East
India Company which feared rightly enough that contact between settlers
and indigenous Africans would lead to trouble. In 1778 Governor van
Plettenberg made a tour of the frontier and decided that the tw7o races
should be kept apart. After discussion with some chiefs on the Fish river
he fixed that landmark as the frontier without realizing that these chiefs
had no authority over the people on the Zuurveld and certainly no right to
give their land away. Settlers and Xhosa continued to live side by side and
soon began quarrelling over land and cattle and in 1779 war broke out
between them. This was the first Xhosa resistance war. The Xhosa were
temporarily driven from the Zuurveld but soon returned and the tension
continued.
In 1786 a magistracy for the eastern districts of the colony was estab¬
lished at Graaf Reinet. After the first magistrate had proved incompetent
he was succeeded by H.C.D. Maynier, a sincere and devoted man who
tried to bring law and order and a sense of justice to the frontier. He
insisted that farmers must not ill-treat their Khoi servants and allowed
runaway servants with tales of cruelty to find refuge at his court house. He
also tried to regulate the behaviour of settlers towards the Xhosa.
When in spite of his efforts war (the second Xhosa resistance war) broke
out in 1793 he made terms which permitted the Xhosa to remain on the
Zuurveld on condition of good behaviour, and refused to allow farmers to
undertake private expeditions against the Xhosa on the pretext of reclaim¬
ing stolen cattle. He maintained that the number of cattle reported stolen
by Xhosa was grossly exaggerated and that the conduct of the settlers was
also responsible for the troubles on the Zuurveld. This made him intensely
unpopular with the farmers who accused him of preferring the heathens to
Christians. Early in 1795 they rose in rebellion, expelled Maynier and
proclaimed an independent Republic of Graaf Reinet. The farmers of the
neighbouring district of Swellendam followed their example and also
proclaimed a republic.
The Company had not been able to deal with this rebellion when
towards the end of 1795 the Cape was seized by the British and the rule of
the Dutch East India Company in South Africa was brought to an end.

228
 9 The great nineteenth-century
migrations

The first half of the nineteenth century in Southern Africa is dominated by

| two great upheavals. The first took place amongst the Bantu-speaking
I peoples. It started in Zululand and gave rise to a chain of movements
which affected areas as far afield as the northern part of what is now
Tanzania. It is often called the Mfecane, an Nguni word used for the wars
and disturbances which accompanied the rise of the Zulu. The second was
a sudden movement of expansion of the white settlers at the Cape, known
as the Great Trek. It was far less extensive in scale than the Mfecane but is
of fundamental importance for the history of Southern Africa. As the
Mfecane was the earlier of the two movements and the course of the Great
Trek was considerably influenced by it, we shall look first at developments
in indigenous African society and later turn back to take up the thread of
the development of the Cape Colony which forms the background to the
Greak Trek.

Origins of the Mfecane

Zululand and Natal are part of the eastern and coastal corridor which runs
between the Drakensberg mountains and the sea. They are favoured by
relatively abundant rains and were well suited to support a fairly dense
population. We know from the reports of shipwrecked Portuguese in the
sixteenth century that the area was already heavily settled by indigenous
African peoples at that time. In South Africa moreover the healthy climate
and the absence of diseases like malaria encouraged a rapid growth of
population, and if we examine the history of South African communities
and see how frequently they split into two or more it is obvious that the
population was increasing rapidly. The coastal corridor was a narrow area
fenced in by the mountains and indigenous Africans were settled along it
as far south as the Fish river. If the Zululand communities continued to
grow, therefore, they were bound to come into conflict with one another

229
over farming and grazing lands. Involvement in a growing trade in ivory at
Delagoa Bay may also have led to conflict between chiefdoms and encour¬
aged the building of expanded political systems. Chiefs were usually able
to take a substantial share of the proceeds of such trade and this gave them
an incentive to expand the area and the numbers of people under their
control and so increase their wealth. During the eighteenth century the
Pedi living near the Leoulu mountains in the Eastern Transvaal and on a
trade route from Delagoa Bay conquered a number of neighbouring
communities and built a substantial kingdom. In the Tswana area the
Ngwaketse likewise brought a number of chiefdoms together in an en¬
larged state. Among the southern Sotho, Motlume temporarily united
several chiefdoms under his leadership but they broke up again when he
died. Nowhere did the movement acquire such massive proportions as in
the Zululand area, however.
This situation of overcrowding and conflict seems to have developed
during the course of the eighteenth century. Wars became more frequent
and more severe and as they did so great leaders emerged who began to
build up enlarged kingdoms. At the same time there was a need for more
efficient military organization.
About the middle of the eighteenth century three great figures
appeared. One of these was Sobhuza, the chief of a community then
known as Ngwane (but now called the Swazi after Sobhuza’s successor
Mswati). He had his original home near the Upper Pongola river. The
second was Zwide, chief of a very powerful chiefdom known as the
Ndwandwe in central Zululand. The third was Dingiswayo, chief of the
Mthethwa, the most powerful and best known of them all.

Four Zulus in traditional costume (but without weapons) at a modern cattle sale

230
 All these chiefs built up empires and in doing so they developed a new
i method of military organization. The traditional initiation ceremonies had
! always created a sense of fellow-feeling amongst young men of similar age
1 who went through them together. The new development in Zululand,
; which is often said to have been introduced by Dingiswayo, was to abolish
I the traditional ceremonies altogether and in their place to form the young
men of an age suitable for initiation into a regiment of the army. This had
great advantages over the older system, in which local chiefs commanded
their own local contingents, because it gave the army more unity. It also
provided a means of strengthening enlarged states. The young men of
conquered communities were put into regiments according to their ages,
together with boys from other sections of the empire, so that by fighting
together they would develop feelings of comradeship and loyalty to the
wider unit instead of just to their home group. During Dingiswayo’s time,
however, the regiments assembled only in times of war, and warfare
remained relatively mild.
As the powerful leaders built up their armies they inevitably clashed
with one another. First Zwide clashed with Sobhuza and the latter was
driven out with his people to settle in the central area of modern Swazi¬
land. There his people found a large number of small chiefdoms of the
Sotho-speaking group. These were conquered one after another and in¬
corporated into what is now the Swazi kingdom.

The rise of Shaka’s Zulu kingdom

After Sobhuza had withdrawn from the scene, Dingiswayo and Zwide
clashed with one another. Dingiswayo was victorious on several occasions,
but at last Zwide succeeded in trapping him. He walked into an Ndwand-
we ambush and was taken prisoner in Zwide’s home, where he was put to
death. Startled by the loss of their leader the Mthethwa army fled and the
chiefs who had been conquered by Dingiswayo took the opportunity to
declare their independence. Zwide seemed to have emerged supreme, but
by this time another leader had appeared on the scene.
His name was Shaka and he was a son of the chief of a small community
known as the Zulu. His mother had made herself unpopular at his father s
home and been driven away, and Shaka had a very unhappy childhood,
teased and bullied by his playmates. He grew up with a fierce determina¬
tion to gain and exercise power, a reckless bravery and a callous indiffer¬
ence to human suffering. He began his career as a warrior in Dingiswayo s
army and won the notice of the great chief by his feats of bravery. W ien
his father died Shaka persuaded Dingiswayo to lend him the military

231
 a, . m
ipg

Shaka

support needed to seize the Zulu throne from one of his brothers who was
the rightful heir.
Once established as chief of the Zulu he began to train his followers in
accordance with his own military idea. He saw that the traditional
weapons, which consisted of shields and throwing spears, were not suit¬
able for close-formation fighting. A warrior who had thrown his spear was
bound to fall back. If the warriors kept hold of their spears they could
advance in an ordered line, protected by their shields, right up to the
enemy and then finish them off. He therefore made his men discard the
old weapon and use a short-handled stabbing spear and forbade them on
pain of death to leave it on the battlefield. They were carefully drilled to
fight in a formation known as the ‘cow’s horns’. The great mass of
wariiors would be drawn up in a body several men deep while two
regiments, one on each side, advanced in a thin curving line around the
enemy. When the two horns met and the enemy was surrounded the main
mass would advance to complete the massacre. Such ordered manoeuvres
needed considerable training and Shaka introduced a new idea in keeping
his age-regiments on permanent duty for many years. They were housed
in special military towns each of which was an official homestead of the

232
(chief. When not at war they were engaged in practising manoeuvres or
(ceremonial dances.
When Dingiswayo marched to fight Zwide, Shaka was summoned to go
(to the aid of his overlord. Whether he deliberately betrayed him, as some
3 believe, or merely arrived too late for the battle, as others maintain, he
i certainly took no part in the fighting. He withdrew from the scene of the
f Mthethwa defeat and began at once to build up his own forces by conquer-
: ing surrounding chiefdoms and putting their young men into his regi-
(ments. He even conquered the Mthethwa themselves, killed their new chief
i and appointed a nominee of his own. As soon as Zwide became aware that
' Shaka was rebuilding the empire of Dingiswayo for himself he sent an
Ndwandwe force to attack the Zulu chief. The superior discipline of the
! Zulu gave them the victory and the Ndwandwe retired with heavy losses.
| Zwide then sent his full force in an all-out invasion of Shaka’s domain:
The Zulu wore them out by constantly retreating, driving away the cattle
: and destroying the crops as they went. Then as the Ndwande turned
i homewards tired and hungry, Shaka’s troops caught them on the banks of
the Mhlatuse river and defeated them in a decisive battle. This was
probably in the year 1818.
The victory over the Ndwandwe left Shaka supreme in Zululand. Every
year his regiments went out conquering chiefdoms and capturing cattle.
They passed right through Natal, forcing almost the entire population to
flee to the south, and reached as far as Pondoland. As chiefdoms were
conquered Shaka brought them into his expanding kingdom. The con¬
quered communities kept their own chiefs, though sometimes the existing
head was killed and Shaka appointed another member of the royal family.
These chiefs continued to administer their own people but had less power as
all the young men of fighting age were taken into the age-regiments.
The ever-growing army was accommodated at a series of military towns,
each under the authority of a military commander. These and the com¬
manders of individual regiments were usually chosen from commoner
families and were closely dependent on the king. Each regiment had its
own name and its own distinctive equipment. Some had shields of a
distinctive colour, others special kinds of head-dress. There was keen
rivalry between the regiments for honour in war and the favour of the
monarch. The arms and equipment were supplied to the warriors by
Shaka and each regiment had a section of the royal herds attached to it. As
far as possible these herds were made up of cattle with skins of the same
colour as the regiments’ shields. Each military settlement was also a royal
homestead and contained a section of Shaka’s family under the authority
of a senior female member who had equal powers with those ot the
military commander. A large proportion of the marriageable girls in the

233
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country were brought to the military towns and formed into regiments
corresponding to those of the men. They took part in ceremonial dances
and agricultural work. Shaka regarded them as his wards and when a
regiment had served long enough to be retired from active service he
would dissolve a female regiment at the same time and give the girls as
wives to the warriors. Shake himself never officially married and was
terrified of having a son who might one day take over his power. Thus the
whole way in which his kingdom was organized was designed to increase
its military strength and to create among the peoples conquered by his
armies a feeling of unity and complete loyalty to Shaka himself.
In 1824 a small party of English traders landed at Port Natal (the site of
present Durban) and made their way to see the Zulu king. Shaka received
them well. He was delighted with the goods they brought and impressed
by the medical skill of one of them, Francis Farewell, who treated him
successfully for a stab wound inflicted by a would-be assassin. He was also
quick to realize the potential military value of firearms and anxious to
remain on good terms with the government of the Cape, which he believed
to be very powerful. He allowed the traders to settle in Natal and gather
together the pitiful remnants of the Natal population around them. In
return the traders fought with their guns in some of his expeditions. The
settlement was particularly important because it was through its existence
that information about the almost deserted state of Natal and the rich
farming land there spread to the settlers at the Cape.
The way that Shaka’s state was organized concentrated all power in his
hands. The district chiefs who, in the traditional system, could check the
actions of a ruler, lost their power when their fighting men were all in the
central army. The only persons who could threaten Shaka’s power were
the army commanders, and they were commoners raised up by Shaka
himself. Thus he did not need to consult the traditional type of council but
exercised an autocratic authority. As his reign progressed, however he
became increasingly despotic until even the loyalty of his devoted soldiers
was undermined. The climax came after the death of his mother which
upset him deeply. He forced his people to undergo severe deprivations as a
sign of mourning. Then at the end of a year’s mourning period he sent his
army out on a great expedition. They travelled to the south as far as
Pondoland and ravaged the Pondo but Shaka was warned by one of the
traders that he might come into conflict with the colonial forces. There¬
upon he wheeled his army round and sent them off immediately to the
extreme north of his territory in southern Mozambique. He himself re¬
mained behind at one of his military towns and two of his brothers took
advantage of the absence of most of the fighting men to plot his downfall.
Together with his most trusted induna, Mbopa they stabbed him to death.

234
 The assassins quietened the people by assuring them that they had
; killed the king to put an end to the never-ceasing wars and the hardships
! that Shaka had imposed on them.
Dingane, one of the assassins, and a brother of Shaka, succeeded him on
the Zulu throne. He was by nature a rather lazy and peace loving man and
| he tried at first to relax the discipline of the Shaka period, but a revolt led
by one of Shaka’s generals convinced him of the need to keep the army
i occupied and he sent his regiments out on a number of expeditions.

The Ngoni diaspora

The sudden rise of the Zulu kingdom led to many peoples being driven
from their original homes. Once they had left their crops and their cattle
they could only hope to live by plunder and so they tended to move over
, long distances attacking other peoples as they went and setting them in
motion also. After the bloody battle on the Mhlatuse river in 1818, two
: sections of the defeated Ndwandwe army abandoned their homes and fled
! northwards into southern Mozambique. They were the Shangane led by
Soshangane, and the Ngoni led by Zwangendaba. Both these groups had
experienced the value of Zulu fighting tactics at first hand and employed
them in conquering other peoples. After a time the leaders clashed with
one another. Soshangane was victorious. He remained in Mozambique
and brought almost all the peoples of the vast area between the Limpopo
and the Zambezi under his control in a Zulu-type kingdom. He forced the
Portuguese of Senna and Tete to pay him annual tribute and his forces
destroyed some of the other Portuguese forts where the commanders were
foolish enough to oppose them.
Zwangendaba travelled westward through the Mwene Mutapa empire
wreaking havoc as he went. His warriors hunted down and killed the last
Rozvi ruler and brought the ancient kingdom to an end. When he reached
the vicinity of modern Bulawayo, he turned northwards, and on 19
November 1835, a day marked by an eclipse of the sun, his regiments
crossed the Zambezi. They moved northward by a series of long stages till
they reached a place called Ufipa near the southern end of Lake Tanga¬
nyika, where Zwangendaba died about 1848. Then his army, swollen with
captives from many communities, broke up into a number of sections.
One group, known as the Tuta, cut a path northward into the country of
the Nyamwezi people of northern Tanzania. They established their head¬
quarters to the north of modern Tabora and from there they raided as far
as the shores of Lake Victoria.
Another section known as the Gwangara travelled east and south as ai

235
 i

The main movements of people during the Mfecane

as the present Songea region of Tanzania. There they encountered another

invading group, the Maseko Ngoni, who had come up from Mozambique
by a more easterly route than Zwangendaba’s main party. The two groups
co-operated at first but then fell to blows. The Maseko were driven south
again and finally established themselves in the highlands of the Kirk range
near the southern end of Lake Malawi. The Gwangara split into two
kingdoms and devastated a vast area. But they found their match in the
warlike Hehe people. Several bitter battles were fought and then the two

236
sides agreed to make peace until their children had grown old enough to
resume the struggle.
The rest of the Ngoni army split into two main sections, one of which,
under Mpezeni, fought many battles with the Bemba and then finally
settled near Chipata in modern Zambia. The other under Mbelwa invaded
the country of the Kamanga, overthrew the kingdom and forced the
Kamanga and neighbouring Tumbuka, Henga and Tonga to enter their
age-regiments. All these Ngoni groups absorbed captives into their fight¬
ing forces to such an extent that the different groups came in time to speak
different languages, although they all remembered their common history
and kept the main outlines of the Zulu-type political system they had
brought from the south. The Ngoni invasions caused untold suffering and
destruction, but they also brought into existence a whole series of power¬
ful states which included persons of many different origins. They encour¬
aged local leaders to arise in self defence and build kingdoms. Undoubted¬
ly they were one of the most important historical developments in East
Africa in the nineteenth century before the advent of colonialism.

Other migrations: the Sotho, Mfengu, Kololo and Ndebele

While the Shangane and the Ngoni were carrying Zulu fighting methods
to the north, two other chiefdoms, the Hlubi and the Ngwane (a different
people from the followers of Sobhuza who later became the Swazi), fled
across the Drakensberg on to the central plateau between the Orange and
Vaal rivers. They spread destruction amongst the Sotho-speaking peoples
of the area and also fought bitterly with one another until the Ngwane
finally succeeded in destroying their rivals. The Ngwane recrossed the
Drakensberg in 1828 and entered the area near the colonial frontier
occupied by the Thembu. They were encountered by the British force
which had been sent to protect the peoples of the area against an expected
Zulu invasion. The Ngwane were attacked by mistake and the chiefdom
broke up. Many remained in the area as homeless refugees called Mfengu.
The invasion of the Hlubi and Ngwane drove a powerful Sotho-
speaking community to take to a life of plunder. These were the Tlokwa
under a warrior queen called Mantatisi and her son Sikonyela. They
travelled round much of modern Orange Free State creating havoc until
they finally settled on a fortified mountain top in the north of modern
Lesotho.
The period of warfare and destruction which suddenly descended on the
peaceful Sotho peoples between the Orange and the Vaal rivers had two
further important consequences. One group, known originally as the

237
 i

Fokeng and later as the Kololo, fled across the Vaal and made its way
towards modern Kuruman where there was a station of the London
Missionary Society. The missionary, Robert Moffat, rode to Griquatown
and called on the Griquas for aid and the invaders were defeated. The
Kololo moved northwards, spreading destruction amongst the Tswana,
until they reached and crossed the Zambezi. They then moved up the river
and invaded the Lozi kingdom in Zambia. The kingdom was overthrown
and a Kololo empire established which lasted till it was overthrown in turn
by a national uprising which re-established the Lozi kings. By this time
the Kololo language had gained so firm a hold that it remains the
language used by most of the Lozi.
The Kololo kingdom was visited by the missionary explorer David
Livingstone who took Kololo porters with him on his journeys of explora¬
tion. Some of these remained behind on the banks of the Shire river,
which flows from Lake Malawi to the Zambezi. The people of the area
were in a pitiful position at the time as a result of Ngoni raids and the
activities of slave hunters. The Kololo, with the guns given them by
Livingstone and their knowledge of large-scale political organizations,
were able to rally the people for their own defence and build up Kololo
kingdoms hundreds of kilometres away from the rest of their community.
The second important consequence of the Hlubi and Ngwane invasions
was the creation of the Lesotho kingdom by Moshoeshoe. He was the son
of an unimportant member of the royal family of a small Sotho chiefdom,
but early in life he showed evidence of great foresight and powers of
statesmanship. He saw that in difficult times a strong defensive position
was of the utmost important and established himself with a few followers
on a mountain called Butha Buthe in northern Lesotho. There he beat off
a series of attacks from more powerful enemies and increased his follow¬
ing. After experiencing a prolonged siege by the Tlokwa, however, he
decided that the mountain was not large enough for his people and moved
to the almost impregnable hill of Thaba Bosiu in central Lesotho. There
he was able to beat off every attack and gradually gathered the remnants of
many Sotho communities around him to form the Basotho people. In 1833
he invited missionaries of the Paris Evangelical Society to come to his
kingdom. They proved very helpful in the long struggles with the Boers of
the Orange Free State. Unlike many leaders of his time, Moshoeshoe was
essentially a man of peace, who preferred to attain his objectives by
diplomacy. He was one of the most remarkable statesmen in Southern
African history and the independent state of Lesotho is his memorial.
One of the chiefdoms incorporated in the Zulu kingdom was the Kuma-
lo with its energetic young chief Mzilikazi. Contrary to his usual custom
Shaka made the young chief a regimental commander, but in 1821 he

238
rebelled and fled with his warriors into the Transvaal. Mzilikazi and his
men, who came to be known as the Ndebele, devastated much land in the
Transvaal and built up a powerful kingdom there on Zulu lines. In 1837
after being twice attacked, first by the regiments of Dingane and later by
the Boers, Mzilikazi fled and ultimately settled in the Matabeleland area of
modern Zimbabwe.
As a result of Shaka’s campaigns in Natal many refugees poured out of
the area and together with the remnants of the Ngwane took refuge with
the coastal communities near the colonial frontier. They were known
collectively as Mfengu (the colonists called them Fingos).

Developments on the Cape frontier: farmers, servants,

missionaries and administrators

Returning to the history of the Cape Colony, we have seen how the settlers
had spread, depriving the indigenous inhabitants of their land and em¬
ploying them as herdsmen on the white farms. At the same time the white
settlers had developed strong attitudes towards colour and regarded all
non-Europeans as intrinsically inferior and not entitled to the same legal
rights as whites. This had created a problem of internal tension in the
community between white masters and non-white servants but the prob¬
lems were to become much more serious when the colonists came in
contact with the Bantu-speaking peoples. The San and some of the Khoi
had fought fiercely against the white occupation of their lands. Their
numbers were too small, however, for their resistance to be effective for
very long. When they became reduced to serving as herdsmen on white
farms they soon lost their identity and adopted the language and culture of
their masters. The Bantu-speaking peoples on the other hand were far
more numerous than any other group. They had strong political systems
and they were very strongly attached to their culture. They were certainly
not prepared to surrender their lands without a fight. So long, however, as
the white population of the Colony continued to increase, and farming
remained the main occupation of the settlers, young Boers would continue
to need new farming land and labour to work on it. The result could only
be the addition of severe border conflict to the already existing tensions of
the Colony. In this situation any attempt by the central government to
ensure fair treatment for non-whites, or to control the expansion of the
farmers, would arouse the resentment of the frontier settlers.
This had already happened by 1795, when the attempts of Maynier in
the name of the Colony’s government to control the farmers treatment of
their Khoi servants had led to rebellion and the declaration of the Repub-

239
 I

lie of Graaf Reinet and Swellendam. The British occupation of the Colony
at the end of 1795 did nothing to alter the basic situation. The British
Governor forced the republicans to surrender by threatening to cut off
their powder supplies. Soon afterwards, however, another rebellion broke
out and this time the government sent troops to suppress it.
These troops contained a body of Khoi soldiers and when Khoi servants
saw them coming with the British they assumed that a war with their Boer
masters was to be fought. They deserted in large numbers, often stealing
their masters’ guns, and flocked to the British camp. When the comman¬
der tried to disarm them, they fled and formed armed bands which began
attacking and pillaging the farms of their former masters. In the general
confusion the Bantu gained the impression that they were to be attacked
and they too joined in. By the end of the first British occupation in 1803
the eastern frontier districts had been severely ravaged and many farmers
reduced to destitution.
The British administration marked the beginning of a new influence
with the coming of overseas missionaries to South Africa. The pioneer was
Dr van der Kemp of the London Missionary Society who arrived in 1802.
He took up work amongst the Khoi and began to champion their cause.
He argued that the chief cause of tension was the fact that Khoi had no
land and were forced to take service with white masters no matter what the
conditions. He asked for land to be set aside for Khoi mission stations
where they could support themselves and learn skills which would enable
them to command higher wages. This idea was supported by the govern¬
ment but before it could be fully carried out the Colony was handed over
to the authorities of the Dutch Republic.
The three years of Dutch rule (1803-6) were relatively uneventful. All
parties in the frontier area were worn out and anxious for peace. The
government continued the policy started by the British of allowing mis¬
sionaries to establish Khoi settlements, and kept an eye on conditions of
service to which Khoi were subjected. In these improved circumstances
many Khoi returned to work on white farms, while others settled at the
mission stations. Bantu and Boer remained on the Zuurveld and no wars
broke out for a time. In 1806 the British recaptured the Cape and this time
they kept it.
Under the second British administration the government of the Cape
was at first strongly conservative. It tended to favour the farmers rather
than their servants. Nevertheless the Evangelical movement was gaining
force in Britain and missionaries came out to South Africa in ever-
increasing numbers. They began to extend their work even beyond the
frontiers of the Colony, and they became increasingly powerful advocates
of Khoi rights. In 1809 the Governor issued regulations defining the

240
position of the Khoi. These regulations largely confirmed existing customs
and were distinctly favourable to the settlers. Every Khoi was to have a
fixed address, which meant an address on a white farm, or he would be
liable to imprisonment for vagrancy. If he wished to leave an employer to
look for another he must establish a fixed address within 14 days. These
regulations made it very difficult for a Khoi to change his employer or take
refuge on a mission station. A later regulation made their lot even more
difficult; it was laid down that if a Khoi child had been brought up to the
age of 8 on a white farm the farmer could keep him as an apprentice for a
further ten years. Thus if other means failed the farmer could retain a
workman by holding his children as apprentices. Nevertheless, inequit¬
able as they were, the regulations did recognize that the Khoi had rights to
fair treatment and payment of wages and that these could be the subject of
legal action.
In 1811 missionary protests about the failure of the courts to take an
interest in Khoi complaints led to questions being asked in the British
Parliament, and the Governor was stung into action. He instructed the
Circuit Court to look into every Khoi complaint in the fullest detail and to
try all cases on the basis of strict equality before the law. The Circuit Court
of 1812 was a new experience for the frontier farmers and became so
unpopular that it was called the Black Circuit. Many were summoned to
leave their farms to answer charges brought by their coloured employees,
a situation they regarded as intolerable and degrading. Many of the
complaints proved trival but a good deal of evil was uncovered and two
farmers were actually convicted of murder.
So bitter was the feeling against the procedure by which coloured
persons could bring their employers to court that another frontier rebel¬
lion broke out in 1818. A farmer was summoned to answer a charge
brought by his Khoi servant but refused to go. An officer with a party of
Khoi soldiers went to arrest him but he fired at them from a cave where he
was hiding. They returned the fire and the farmer was shot. His family
then vowed vengeance and rode round stirring up the farmers to rise in
revolt. The government forces soon rounded up the rebels and they were
publicly hanged at Slagters Nek. In future it would seem safer to leave the
Colony in protest against the behaviour of government than to start an
armed rebellion.
While the affair of the Black Circuit was causing ill-feeling the govern¬
ment was also turning its attention to the frontier. Its idea, like that of its
predecessor, was to keep the races apart by drawing a definite line between
them, and for this purpose it was decided to make the long-standing Fish
river frontier effective. In 1812, 20 000 Xhosa were uprooted from theii
homes and driven out of the Zuurveld. This did little to resolve the

241
 »

situation, for the arrival of refugees from Zuurveld caused severe over¬
crowding on the far bank of the Fish.
A prophet named Makana arose who promised supernatural aid to win
back the lost territory and in 1818 fighting broke out between his followers
and those of Gaika, a Xhosa chief who had always lived outside the
frontier and had no quarrel with the Colony. Colonial troops intervened in
this affair and the Xhosa then invaded the Colony in force. They were
eventually driven back but the only remedy to the situation produced by
overcrowding which the government could think of was to take yet
another strip of land from the Xhosa to be kept empty of inhabitants as a
buffer zone between the two races.
After the 1818 war, the government of the Cape attempted a radical
solution to the problems of the Colony. It tried to alter the situation in
which the farmers were always demanding more land while their popula¬
tion was too scanty to defend itself adequately. A system of more intensive
agriculture on much smaller farms which would not need non-European
labour would, it was believed, provide a denser population which could
defend itself. It would also give rise to villages and towns and create new
avenues of employment so that the Colony need not continue to expand in
area but could develop a richer and more varied life. Laws were introduced
to encourage Boers to divide their farms amongst their children and it was
made more difficult to acquire new land by ending the free distribution of
Crown lands and putting them up for auction instead. The main means of
bringing this about was by the scheme to settle British families on the
Zuurveld on farms of about 40 hectares instead of the normal Boer farm of
2400 hectares. This plan had additional attractions. It would provide a
substantial British element in the predominantly Dutch Colony and it
might be a way of relieving unemployment in Britain. In 1820 about 1000
British families were settled on the Zuurveld but the experiment failed in
its main object. The new settlers did not find it practical to farm on the
small farms given them; most drifted away to the towns and the remainder
pressed for farms of the Boer type.
In the meantime missionary pressure for an improvement in the lot of
the Khoi was growing. John Philip, the energetic general superintendent
of the London Missionary Society in South Africa, launched an all-out
attack on the laws governing the movements of Khoi, which left them at
the mercy of white employers and reduced them to a position of semi¬
slavery possibly even worse than outright slavery. If Khoi were given
equal rights with Europeans, he argued, many would be able to earn better
wages and this would create a large market for British goods.
These views, contained in a book called Researches in South Africa,
created a great stir in Britain and the acting governor at the Cape was

242
asked to draw up regulations freeing the Khoi from their legal disadvan¬
tages. In fact he had already done so. After consultation with a philanthro-
pically-minded Dutch official named Andries Stockenstroom he had
issued the famous 50th Ordinance. The British Parliament simply decreed
that the provisions of the 50th Ordinance should not be altered without
reference to the King in Parliament.
The 50th Ordinance freed the Khoi from all their legal disabilities and
gave them and all free non-Europeans in the Cape complete legal equality
with whites. It was indeed a revolutionary measure for it tried to destroy
the whole pattern of racial discrimination which had grown up at the Cape
ever since the establishment of the white colony there. It set a pattern of
racial equality in the Cape which survived in theory until the unification of
South Africa in 1910. But though the 50th Ordinance constituted a legal
revolution it did not in practice succeed in destroying the pattern of racial
discrimination and the social attitudes which went with it. The Khoi
gained their freedom but they were without property or much skill. Most
of them remained the poorest members of society and the general pattern
continued to be one of white property-owning masters and coloured
propertyless servants.
The average white inhabitant of the Colony, and especially the Boers of
the frontier areas, objected strongly to the 50th Ordinance. It denied the
whole attitude of racial superiority which was the basis of their way of life
and it proclaimed an equality between races which they regarded as
contrary to the laws of God. It also directly affected their interests, for
many Khoi servants took the opportunity to abandon their masters and
flock to the towns or mission stations.
This blow to the pride and the pockets of the farmers was followed by
another. The campaign against slavery had been gathering force in Britain
throughout the early years of the nineteenth century. The abolition of the
slave trade in 1809 had caused a steady rise in the price of slaves, and their
treatment had been subjected to ever-increasing regulation. In 1833 came
the decision to abolish slavery in British possessions altogether. What is
more, it was decided that in South Africa the freed slaves, after a period of
three years’ apprenticeship to their former masters, would fall under the
provisions of the 50th Ordinance. That is to say they would have legal
equality with their one-time owners. Slave owners were to be compensated
for their losses, but the arrangements were mismanaged and many re¬
ceived only a fraction of what was due.
In the meantime tension continued along the eastern frontier, and Boers
began to turn away from the fertile lands of the east coast in search of new
farms further in the interior. The missonaries also turned their attention to
the problem of the expanding frontier. They pleaded for protection for the

243
indigenous peoples and an end to the system of raids to recover supposedly
stolen cattle which, they pointed out, caused the innocent to suffer for the
guilty and opened the way to many abuses. Governor D’Urban, who came
out in. 1834 to carry through the emancipation of slaves, also brought with
him instructions to reform the frontier system.

The Boer Great Trek

By that time news of the situation in the interior had been reaching the
Cape from the British traders and travellers who visited Natal, and from
missionaries and travellers on the central plateau. It became general
knowledge that there was excellent farming land virtually unoccupied in
Natal and also in the areas around the Vaal and Orange rivers. Finding
insufficient land in the Colony to provide for their growing families, and
furious at the government’s attitude to the racial situation in the Colony
and to frontier relations with the indigenous Africans, the farmers began
to talk openly of migrating into the interior to occupy the empty lands and
set up a government of their own in accordance with their cherished
principles. In 1834 three spying parties (commissie trekke) were sent out to
discover if the rumours of good land lying empty were really true. One
went to Natal, another to the Transvaal and the third to Namibia. The
third gave an adverse report but the other two were enthusiastic and the
Trek would probably have started at once if the farmers had not been
engaged in another frontier war.
Tension had never ceased on the frontier since the war of 1818 and the
decision to take a strip of land from the Xhosa as a neutral zone. This had
made the Xhosa even more overcrowded and they naturally looked with
envy at the rich herds of the white farmers grazing on land they regarded
as rightfully theirs. The situation was made worse by the arrival of
thousands of refugees from Natal and the interior, who settled with the
Xhosa as Mfengu. Seeing their plight the government had allowed some
chiefs to come back to the neutral strip but insisted that this was depen¬
dent on good behaviour. Along such an open and unguarded frontier there
were inevitably many complaints of cattle theft and as the settlers looked
for new farms for their sons they continually pressed for the Xhosa to be
driven further back.
When D’Urban arrived he was at first sympathetic to the philanthropic
point of view and sent Dr Philip to explain to the chiefs that a new system
of regulating the frontier would be put into force which would be more
favourable to their people. This produced considerable goodwill and the
frontier was quiet for a time, but D’Urban, tied down by paper work

244
concerned with emancipation of slaves, kept delaying his journey to the
frontier. In the meantime the military authorities did not co-operate with
the new scheme, and continued to send punitive parties into Xhosa
territory while the settlers demanded that the Xhosa be driven back. The
chiefs became increasingly convinced that Dr Philip’s visit had been a plot
to lull them into a sense of security while the whites prepared to attack
them and take away still more of their desperately needed land. They
therefore prepared for war and in 1835 they invaded the Colony in force.
When D’Urban at last reached the frontier he was so horrified at the
scenes of desolation that he declared the Xhosa to be ‘irredeemable sav¬
ages’ and decreed that they should be driven out of the whole area from the
Fish to the Kei rivers for ever. The farmers and the troops succeeded in
turning back the invasion of the Colony but the Xhosa fought for their
lands with such determination that the military commander admitted that
the policy of driving them out altogether was impossible. At the same time
the missionaries and the philanthropists in Britain raised a storm ol protest
against the whole policy of D’Urban. He was told to prepare the public
mind for the abandonment of the newly annexed area, which he had called
Queen Adelaide Province and the philanthropic Stockenstroom was sent
to the Eastern Frontier as Lieutenant Governor.
The farmers had abandoned thoughts of leaving the Colony while they
had hopes of gaining new lands in Queen Adelaide Province, but its
abandonment was the last straw and during 1836 they poured out of the
Colony across the Orange river in ever-increasing numbers. The Great
Trek was under way. There were several motives behind it. To some
extent it was simply an acceleration of the process of expansion that had
brought the settlers from the shadow of Table Mountain to the banks of
the Fish river. But the Trek was different from this earlier movement
because of its size, and because it was a deliberate attempt to break away
from the British government and establish an independent state where
there would be no ungodly equality between the races and proper rela¬
tions’ would be maintained between masters and servants. From this point
of view the Great Trek was a revolt against the philanthropic policies of
the British government and the spirit of the 50th Ordinance. Finally the
decision to embark on the Great Trek, and the direction in which the
trekkers moved, depended on information about empty land in the in¬
terior resulting from the devastations of the Mfecane. From this point o
view the Great Trek was a response by land-hungry Boers to the opportu
nities offered by the previous movements of the indigenous Africans.
Turning away from the eastern frontier where the sturdy defence of the
Xhosa offered little hope of progress, the trekking parties crossed the
Orange river into the plains of the modern Orange Free State, ome

245
The Boer laager — a defensive circle of waggons

lingered on the borders of Moshoeshoe’s country but the majority moved

on, keeping well clear of the Basotho, towards a meeting place near Thaba
Nchu. Then, as they waited for their numbers to increase with new
arrivals, some of the first-comers crossed the Vaal to hunt and prospect the
land for settlement.
Unfortunately they gave no notice of their coming to Mzilikazi, the
Ndebele king, and his regiments mistook them for hostile Griqua maraud¬
ers. The waggons were attacked and a number of Boers were killed but the
rest gathered together under the leadership of Potgieter and beat off the
Ndebele attack at the Battle of Vegkop in October 1836. The Ndebele
seized their cattle, however, and they were grateful for the help of the
Rolong chief, Moroka, who helped them back to their fellows near Thaba
Nchu. In the main trekker camp there was much discussion whether to
move into Natal or continue the struggle with Mzilikazi. The majority
decided to follow Piet Retief into Natal but a few determined to continue
on the highveld. In January 1837 they made a daring raid on one of
Mzilikazi’s military towns and seized a large herd of cattle. Shortly after,
Dingane also sent his regiments to attack the Ndebele. Then in November
1837 the Boers launched an all-out attack. Unable to ward off the hail of
bullets from the Boer guns or to get near enough to attack the mounted
gunmen who used their horses to keep always just out of spear range, the
Ndebele were completely defeated. Their military towns were captured
one after another in seven days of fighting, and Mzilikazi led his people on‘
a flight to the north which took them to modern Zimbabwe. The victo-

246
 rious Boers then laid claim to the wide area which had been under
! Mzilikazi’s rule.
In the meantime Retief rode to visit Dingane and ask him for the gift of
S Natal for his people to settle. But the Zulu king was worried and afraid of
this horde of armed white strangers. He had heard from a Xhosa interpre¬
ter who had come with the British traders how the white men gradually
infiltrated the frontier areas and ended up by overthrowing the chiefs and
seizing the land. He wished to avoid this fate for himself and his people but
he was afraid to refuse the request outright. According he thought of a
plan to buy time. He told Retief that some of his cattle had been stolen by
the Tlokwa chief Sikonyela and promised if they were brought back to
give Natal to the Boers.
He probably hoped that Retief and his party would be involved in a
struggle with the Tlokwa and would leave him. alone. But further develop¬
ments proved even more alarming. Retief tricked Sikonyela into trying
on a pair of handcuffs and then locked them on his wrists, making him a
prisoner. To regain his freedom he had to surrender the cattle asked for by
Dingane. Then the news came that the Boers had defeated Mzilikazi and
driven his people from their country. Retief wrote in haughty tones to the
Zulu king demanding the fulfilment of his promise and then came riding

A great dance at Mbelebele, a Zulu war settlement. The Zulu used a large number of
different dances in connection with many formal occasions in their social life such as
marriage, initiation, war and death. (From a contemporary engraving)

247
 »

to see him. Even before he arrived the Boers began pouring over the passes
in the Drakensberg into the fertile land of Natal.
Dingane was desperate and felt that the only way to save himself and his
people was to catch the Boers unprepared and destroy them before they
could establish themselves firmly. He massed his regiments at his main
homestead, Umgungundhlovu, and awaited the arrival of Retief and his
men. He received them well and made his mark on the paper they asked
for. Then he invited them to a farewell dance.and when they were standing
unarmed amidst his warriors he suddenly gave the order to kill them.
Retief and his party were put to death and the Zulu regiments were sent
out at once to attack the Boer waggons unawares. But though the first
parties met by the warriors were slaughtered, the firing of guns alarmed
the others and the regiments were driven back with heavy loss. Dingane’s

Routes followed by the Boers in the Great Trek

248
 coup had failed. The position of the Boers was not enviable, however, for
their numbers were few, they had lost many of their cattle and they dared
not disperse to give proper grazing to those that remained. A first Boer
counter-attack ended in a retreat from which it got its name, the Vlug
j Commando (Flight Commando). Many thought of giving up the struggle
s and returning across the mountains but new reinforcements came from the
Cape and some of the Boers on the highveld, and the outstanding leader
Andries Pretorius from the Cape, came to the help of their fellows.
A large commando with waggons loaded with ammunition was prepared
and advanced towards Umgungundhlovu. On 16 December 1838 the
! decisive battle of Blood River took place. The superb Zulu discipline
i proved useless in the face of firearms. They were shot down in large
i numbers and heavily defeated. The commando advanced to Umgungun-
| dhlovu itself, which Dingane had deserted, and found the bodies of Retief
and his comrades together with the piece of paper ceding Natal. By this
time the government at the Cape was becoming alarmed at the news from
the interior and sent a small force to watch developments at Port Natal. It
arrived when the Boers were away on the Blood River campaign. When

249
they returned victorious there was little the British force could do except
try to arrange terms of peace between the two sides. Both were by this
time ready to negotiate. Dingane did not wish to be involved in another
encounter, but although defeated he was still strong and the Boers were
still not free to disperse and settle down. A meeting was arranged and a
peace treaty drawn up. The Boers drove a hard bargain and in a secret
clause of the treaty they forced Dingane to give up not only Natal but a
strip of territory across the Tugela in Zululand itself. Satisfied that peace
had been made but unaware of the full details, the British force then sailed
away.
Dingane tried to fulfil his side of the bargain and sent his regiments to
clear a way for his retreat by raiding the Swazi. But many of his people
grumbled at leaving their land and one of Shaka’s surviving brothers,
Mpande, seized the opportunity to start a rebellion. He fled with a
number of followers across the Tugela and asked for Boer protection.
Then as his following continued to grow he proposed to march into
Zululand and overthrow Dingane. The Boers were pleased to support him
and sent a commando which marched in support of the rebel chief. The
two Zulu armies fought a fatal battle at Magongo, and Mpande was
victorious. Dingane fled to Swaziland and was captured and killed by a
Swazi chief in revenge for his attacks on them. The Boers did not have to
fire a shot, but they reaped the fruits of Mpande’s victory. They crowned
him the new Zulu king and demanded 17 000 head of cattle for their
support and as recompense for their past sufferings. At last they were
firmly established in Natal and could build up their republic in security.

250
! 10 South Africa from the Great Trek
to the first Angio-Boer war

i Consequences of the Great Trek

The Great Trek marks the beginning of a new phase in the history of
South Africa with important consequences for Southern Africa as a whole.
Before the Trek, contact between indigenous Africans and whites had been
restricted to the eastern frontier. In that area a situation had developed in
which as we have seen the white settlers, impelled by a constantly rising
population, were always trying to gain possession of more grazing land. At
the same time they were employing more black labour and so turning the
indigenous African from a member of an independent society into a
subordinate member of a multi-racial society, firmly kept at the bottom by
barriers of racial prejudice as well as lack of skills and capital. This
situation was only slightly improved by the educational work of the
missionaries and by the philanthropic pressures which had caused the
government at the Cape to insist on the ending of formal legal discrimina¬
tion.
Before the Great Trek the number of people affected was comparatively
small. As a result of the Boer migrations the problems of racial contact and
conflict spread over much greater areas. The white settlers were always
trying to advance. The pace of expansion in the new areas ol settlement
was increased by the fact that as the trekkers gained control of large areas,
individuals staked out claims to far more land than they actually occupied.
New arrivals thus found no land available for them and pressed for further
expansion of the frontiers. At the same time much of the white-owned
land remained occupied and farmed by Africans who became tenants of
their white landlords and had either to give them a share of their crops or
pay a rent in cash or crops. The pressure of the newly established white
groups on neighbouring African people was met by brave and determine
resistance and in some cases the whites were driven back. White conquest
was only completed at the end of the nineteenth century after a long series
of bitter wars. The wars increased the sense of insecurity among white

251
settlers and strengthened the determination of the trekkers to preserve the
principles of racial distinction.
The Great Trek also presented the British government at the Cape with
a difficult problem. The chief value of the Cape to Great Britain, as to the
Dutch East India Company, was as a strategic position on the route to
India and there was a natural reluctance to spend precious resources on an
otherwise poor and unproductive area unless such expenses were directly
related to security. On the other hand Britain could not avoid responsibil¬
ity for the behaviour of her subjects who had trekked into the interior, or
for the fate of the indigenous peoples with whom they were in contact.
Still more important, a policy of leaving the Boers to themselves, which
appeared economical in the short run, might have very expensive consequ¬
ences in the long run. The direction which the Trek had taken meant that
white settlers were established on three sides of a great mass of African
societies including the Basotho of Moshoeshoe and the Nguni-speaking
peoples along the coastal corridor between the Cape frontier and the
southern borders of Natal. As these societies were increasingly short of
land and very close to one another, any conflict along one section of the
frontier between the races was likely to start a chain of disturbance. Thus
if the British left the Boers to themselves in their areas they might find
themselves plunged into war on their own eastern frontier at any time. A
similar situation also prevailed with regard to the white settlements in
Natal and the Transvaal. Both had frontiers with the Zulu kingdom and
either might plunge the other into war at any time. Faced with this
situation British policy alternated between the two opposite extremes of
annexation and withdrawal in accordance with the developing situation in
South Africa and shifts of opinion in Britain.

The British annexation of Natal

When the Great Trek took place the influence of the philanthropic move¬
ment was at its highest and British admitted responsibility for the conduct
of its citizens in the interior by passing the Cape of Good Hope Punish¬
ment Act, under which British subjects who committed crimes anywhere
in South Africa, south of the 35th line of latitude, were liable for trial at
the Cape. The government also refused to entertain a request from the
Natal Boers to be considered an independent people but insisted that they
were and must remain British subjects. This meant that Britain ought to
occupy the areas in which the Boers were settled, as it was useless to
declare them subject to the law at the Cape but provide no means of
enforcing that law. When it came to taking active steps that would involve

252
expense, however, the Governor at the Cape found that he could not get
authorization for even a moderate force to intervene in Natal. The tiny
contingent which was sent to Port Natal at the time of the Blood River
campaign (1838) was unable to play any major part in influencing events
and was withdrawn soon after the Boer victory. The progress of events,
however, soon forced the British government to intervene more effectively
in Natal.
The jubilant reception given to an adventurer named J.A. Smellekamp
who arrived at Natal claiming to be a representative of the king of
Holland , as well as the visit of some American ships, created fears lest a
foreign power might establish itself on the east coast of South Africa and
threaten the route to India. Other reasons for intervention arose from the
conduct of the settlers themselves in relation to their black neighbours.
The conquest of Natal had given the Boers large areas of excellent farming
land, but the heroes of the Zulu war registered so many farms in their
names that soon there was no more unallocated land available for newcom¬
ers. The cattle paid by the humble Mpande after his victory over Dingane
were well in excess of the losses the trekkers had suffered, but their
distribution was not controlled firmly enough to prevent the more power¬
ful members of the community from seizing more than their share, so that
others did not receive enough to build up a satisfactory herd. When the
news of the defeat and death of Dingane became widely known, communi¬
ties which had fled out of Natal to the south, or been forced to join the
Zulu kingdom, began pouring back to settle in their old homes, now the
legal property of Boer setders. The Natal Boers found the utmost difficulty
in coping with this ever-growing influx because they only effectively
occupied a small proportion of the farms registered in their names.
The government which was called upon to deal with these problems was
weak and rickety. When the Boers trekked out of the Cape they regarded
themselves as a single body, and this idea was preserved in theory through
the life of the Natal Republic. As the main body of settlers had moved into
Natal this was the main centre of government. Subordinate governing
bodies were established at Winburg in modern Orange Free State and
Potchefstroom in the Transvaal. These were represented on the main
governing body in Natal and supposed to be subject to it though in fact
distance and difficulty of communications meant the local bodies were
virtually self-governing. In Natal itself power was divided between an
elected legislative body called the Volksraad and the President, who
controlled the executive. Both authorities were supposed to be subject to
the people and this meant in practice any assembly of settlers.
With such a constitution it was difficult for the Volksraad to prevent
policy being decided by the feeling of the moment. Thus even though it

253
was aware of the danger that philanthropic opinion in Britain would exert
itself in favour of British annexation of Natal in order to protect the
indigenous peoples, the Volksraad was unable to prevent its citizens from
an aggressive approach to its non-European neighbours which amply
justified the arguments of the humanitarians. Not satisfied with the herds
already extorted from the Zulu, the Natal Republic pressed Mpande for
still more cattle and proposed to levy a heavy fine on the Swazi, claiming
that they had taken Zulu cattle which belonged to the Boers by right of
conquest. A still more shocking development was the behaviour of the
Boers towards their southern neighbours. The theft of some cattle by San
was made the pretext for a raid on the Bhaca, a group made up of
communities which had fled from Natal in the time of Shaka and who
were living under their chief Ncapayi in the close vicinity of the Pondo.
The Boers killed many Bhaca and seized large booty in cattle. At the same
time they proposed to take land from the Pondo to provide for the
increasing numbers of indigenous African refugees returning to Natal,
whom they regarded as a threat to their security. By this time humanita-

254
rian feeling was strongly aroused and the procedures of the Natal govern¬
ment also gave cause for grave alarm from the strategic point of view. If
they were allowed to push chiefdoms back from their southern border this
must inevitably produce a chain reaction along the closely packed coastal
strip, resulting in increased pressure on the frontier of the Cape.
Accordingly, in 1841, a small contingent of British troops was despatch¬
ed. It halted first at the Pondo and then moved on to Port Natal. When
they came in contact with the Boers fighting started and the British
government felt too heavily committed to withdraw. In 1845 Natal was
formally annexed to the Cape, but already many Boers were leaving the
area in disgust to join their fellows on the high veld in modern Orange
Free State and Transvaal. Even in the period of the Republic some
individuals had begun accumulating numerous claims to farms and build¬
ing up large speculative landholdings. As the Boers trekked out of the
country, recrossing the Drakensberg on to the high veld, Englishmen from
the Cape who often had connections with businessmen in London were
able to gain title to immense areas of land in the name of land companies.
Other land was set aside in substantial blocks as Reserves for the African
population. Theophilus Shepstone, who was appointed as diplomatic
agent with the African groups and later became Natal’s Secretary for
Native Affairs, persuaded large numbers to settle in these Reserves but
many more stayed on the land of the land companies, on crown land or on
land owned by the missionary societies. There they were able to support
themselves and to pay their taxes without working for whites. In the 1850s
several schemes were adopted for bringing settlers to Natal from Britain.
The white population of Natal came to be the most self-consciously British
of any part of South Africa. As the British settlers began developing
commercial agriculture, especially sugar growing, however, they found it
difficult to obtain cheap African labour. They tried to get laws im¬
plemented to force Africans off the land but they were checked by the
interests of the land companies which wanted to continue to get rent from
their African tenants. So in the 1860s it was decided to import cheap
Indian labour for the sugar plantations. This was the origin of the South
African Indian community which in time spread out of Natal to the
Transvaal and the Cape.

The eastern frontier, Moshoeshoe and the Boers

With the annexation of Natal the British government had taken a major
step in the direction of bringing the areas inhabited by its runaway
subjects under British control. In the meantime events in the arva between

255
the Orange and the Vaal rivers were preparing the way for another step in
the same direction. When it decided not to allow the annexation of Queen
Adelaide Province the British government proposed to adopt a policy
suggested by the philanthropic Dutch official Stockenstroom. The idea of
this was to persuade the chiefdoms near the colonial frontiers to enter into
treaties with the government of the Colony, under which the chiefs would
be made responsible for maintaining peace in the frontier areas, catching
and returning runaways and deserters from the Colony, and making good
any losses of stock stolen by their subjects. This would end the practice of
commandos crossing the frontier to recapture stolen cattle which had
proved a grave source of injustice and friction in the past. British Resi¬
dents would be sent to the more important chiefdoms to help the chiefs
understand and carry out their obligations and to represent their views to
the British government. The policy was to be applied not only to chiefs in
the eastern frontier area but also to others further inland.
The plan was never fully tried out. It was very unpopular with the
settlers and the military authorities, and the British government was
unwilling to spend enough to make it work. In the area between the
Orange and Vaal rivers it was faced by especially difficult problems. There
the Griquas and Basotho were living alongside a growing white popula¬
tion, made up partly of Boers who had entered the area before the Trek
and who regarded themselves as British subjects, and partly by Trek Boers
who denied British authority. This white population was greedy for farms
and labour and was subject to no single political authority. Both sections
were unwilling to be governed by the non-European rulers that the British
government recognized as the legal authorities in the area, and possessed
weapons which enabled them to defy these rulers. Seeing the situation, Dr
Philip urged immediate annexation as the only means of preventing the
Boers from seizing the lands of the indigenous peoples and turning them
into landless labourers serving on white farms. Nevertheless the British
government, anxious to limit expenditure, attempted to apply the treaty
system without taking into account the military power of the Boers.
Two Griqua chiefs, Waterboer and Adam Kok, were given treaties in
which their authority over their territories was recognized, and they were
asked to maintain law and order and return colonial criminals for trial at
the Cape in return for small subsidies. A similar treaty was made by
Governor Napier with Moshoeshoe, though his request for a Resident to
come and live with him was not granted by Napier.
The position of the Basotho ruler was very difficult. He ruled a compo¬
site state made up of members of many different chiefdoms. The majority
of these had been broken up during the Mfecane and were settled in small
groups in his kingdom, under the administration of some members of the

256
I paramount’s family who had their headquarters in different parts of the
! kingdom. Others remained substantial chiefdoms governed by their own
! hereditary rulers under the paramountcy of Moshoeshoe. The majority of
i the members of this state belonged to the Sotho-speaking group, but there
* were also considerable numbers who spoke the western Sotho or Tswana
tongue. They included the powerful Taung under their brilliant leader
Moletsane. Finally there were several groups who spoke Nguni languages
i and differed considerably in culture from the Sotho-speaking majority.
The most important of these were the Phuti or Morosi. On the borders of
the kingdom in the north, the Tlokwa of Sikonyela were entrenched in
their hilltop position awaiting any sign of weakness to renew their old
quarrel, and at Thaba Nchu a powerful group of Tswana refugees - the
Rolong under Moroka - refused to accept the authority of the Basotho
] king, though they had been allowed to settle in what he regarded as his
territory.
The Boers, who began to settle on the borders of Moshoeshoe’s country
at the time of the Great Trek, at first asked for the right to graze their
cattle temporarily while they prepared to move further into the interior;
but they soon showed signs of settling permanently. They treated the land
they occupied as private property which they bought and sold to one
another, their numbers increased, and they infiltrated ever deeper into the
kingdom. In attempting to preserve the nation he had created,
Moshoeshoe had to tread very carefully. He was anxious to avoid an all-out
collision with the whites, whose superior armaments must in the end give
them the victory. On the other hand he could not afford to offend any of
his own followers for, lacking the power which a centralized military
system gave to rulers like Shaka or Mzilikazi, he could only hope to rule
by consent. A concession made for the sake of peace might, if it sacrificed
the interests of some of his people, lead to a breakaway and the disintegra¬
tion of the state he had created and was trying to preserve.
In his difficult dealings with the whites Moshoeshoe had the support
and advice of the French missionaries, and this was invaluable to him. But
missionary activity also created problems, for the missionary attack on old
and revered customs inevitably had a disturbing effect, and produced
divisions between Christian converts and more conservative members of
the community. In addition, the fact that the Rolong were served by a
different mission, the Wesleyans, was an important factor in preventing
them from becoming part of the Basotho nation, and differences of opin¬
ion between the French and Wesleyan missionaries made matters even
more complicated.
The attempt by the British government to settle the affairs of the area
between the Orange and the Vaal, by recognizing the most important

257
chiefs and giving them subsidies, was doomed to failure since it did not
give those chiefs any protection against their Boer neighbours. The futility
of the arrangement was shown in 1845 when Waterboer attempted to
exercise his legal powers under the treaty by arresting a Boer for an alleged
crime. The Boers at once flew to arms and threatened to destroy the
Griquas once and for all. A hastily assembled colonial force with Griqua
support routed the Boers at Swartkopjes, but it was obvious that once it
withdrew the problem would arise again. Governor Maitland therefore
tried a more realistic plan. The fact was recognized that the Boers occu¬
pied, and could not be removed from, much of the area legally belonging
to the chiefs. It was also recognized that they would not allow themselves
to be governed by the Griqua rulers.
At the same time there was an attempt to protect the chiefs from the loss
of any more of their land, and to provide a system of government for the
whites and to settle any disputes between whites and non-whites. In
arrangements drawn up at Touwfontein in June 1845, it was agreed that
each chief should divide his land into two sections, an inalienable section
in which no whites could acquire rights and an alienable section in which
land might be leased to white settlers. The theoretical ownership of the
alienable section would still belong to the chief, but he would delegate his
powers in that area to a British Resident, who would be responsible for
governing the white settlers and deciding any disputes between them and
the indigenous peoples. Any whites living in the inalienable area would
have to withdraw and the expense of the Residents would be paid from
annual rents on the farms of the white settlers. The plan had much to
commend it, but it depended on the Resident being in a strong enough
position to prevent the Boers from settling in the inalienable areas, and
forcing them to withdraw if they had already done so. This would require
a military force that would cost far more than the rents would bring in and
the British government was not prepared to pay. Moshoeshoe marked out
an area to be classified as alienable, but the Boers who were already
pushing deeper into his kingdom rejected it as far too small. A British
Resident was appointed but without the power to control the situation.
While tension rose towards a conflict north of the Orange river the
situation on the eastern frontier also grew worse. At first the treaty system
seemed to work well. The chiefs were anxious to co-operate and the
frontier had a short period of unusual calm but magistrates were far too
ready to accept farmers’ stories about cattle thefts. The chiefs found
themselves faced with a lengthening list of demands for the return of
stock, some of which had been killed by wild animals or merely allowed to
stray out of carelessness. So bitter was the hostility of the settlers to the
whole scheme, and to Stockenstroom who was appointed Lieutenant

258
 Governor to carry it out, that he resigned his position in disgust and
: disillusion. The situation drifted towards yet another war. It was touched
: off by a minor incident. In 1846 a relative of the Xhosa chief Sandile was
j arrested for stealing an axe. He was freed by other members of his family,
i who killed the Khoi policeman escorting the prisoner. Sandile refused to
return the murderers and war was declared. It proved to be one of the
most bitter and costly in the history of the eastern frontier.

Annexation of British Kaffraria and the Orange River

! Sovereignty

The War of the Axe was brought to an end just as Sir Harry Smith, a new
and energetic governor, arrived in South Africa. He speedily decided that
the frontier chiefs were unable to control their own people sufficiently to
prevent conflicts with the Colony. He therefore annexed the frontier area
from the Fish to the Kei river, declared the people living on it to be British
citizens, and proposed to introduce direct rule by British magistrates while
recognizing the rights of the indigenous Africans to their land. The newly
annexed area came to be a separate little colony called British Kaffraria.
Smith then dashed off to attend to the situation in Natal where the
Boers were steadily streaming out of the country. On his way he passed
through the area of modern Orange Free State, and concluded that so long

British annexations in Southern Africa up to 1848

259
as there was no common, settled and effective government over the
different peoples, conflicts would be inevitable which would endanger the
peace of the eastern frontier as well. He summoned the chiefs to a short
conference and, when he reached Natal, he announced the annexation of
the whole area between the Orange and the Vaal as the Orange River
Sovereignty (February 1848).
Smith’s action was welcomed by Moshoeshoe, who saw in it the only
hope for protection against the Boers, but it had been undertaken hastily,
without authorization from England and without consideration for the
state of opinion there. In Britain, the theory of free trade was gaining
increasing strength. According to this theory prosperity could be in¬
creased most by trading with every nation freely and without preferences
or restrictions. If this were so then colonies were no advantage since one
could trade just as well with independent countries. Expenditure on
colonial administration was therefore a sheer waste of resources. Britain
should restrict her spending on such matters to a minimum, get rid of
colonies where possible and at all costs refrain from acquiring new and
expensive responsibilities. In this atmosphere the news of the new annex¬
ation was far from popular. It was accepted reluctantly and only on the
assumption that it would not involve new expense.
Thus Smith’s scheme was doomed from the start. Without funds, a
force large enough to enable the Sovereignty government to control Boer
as well as indigenous African could not be maintained, and the objects of
the annexation were unattainable. The first reaction of the Boers in the
area was an ill omen for the success of the Sovereignty. While those who
had entered the area before the Trek accepted the annexation without
enthusiasm, the Trek Boers rose in rebellion, invited Pretorius to come to
their aid from the Transvaal, and drove the British Resident out of
Bloemfontein. Smith responded promptly, and in August 1848 defeated
the Boer forces at Boomplaats. The rebellion collapsed but the Resident
was left to exercise a government which would mean arbitrating between
the interests of white and non-white without the necessary force.
Not surprisingly, the British Resident, Henry Warden, tried to concili¬
ate the Boers. He set up a commission to look into the problem of frontiers
between Boer and Basotho which contained no Basotho representatives. It
proceeded to define a line which left every white farm on the white side of
the frontier but cut off whole villages of Basotho from their fellows.
Warden tried to get Moshoeshoe to agree to this one-sided arrangement.
Aware of Basotho dislike for the frontier proposals, Warden tried to
weaken their position. He gave his support to the Rolong, the Tlokwa and
other small groups who were jealous of Moshoeshoe. He defined frontiers
for them which cut off a good deal of Basotho territory. This led to

260
I fighting, and to support his frontier arrangements Warden marched
I against the Basotho ruler in June 1851. He based his hopes for success on
i the loyal support of the Boers whose interests he had tried to serve, and on
the fighting forces of the Rolong and their lesser allies. But the Boers
failed to answer the summons with anything like enough men and the
strength of the Rolong had been exaggerated. Warden was defeated at
Viervoet and had to fall back. The Orange River Sovereignty fell into
chaos and was only saved by the restraint of Moshoeshoe, who held his
men back from looting the helpless farmers. Warden called for aid from
the Colony but by this time Smith’s eastern frontier settlement had also
broken down. Yet another frontier war was in progress and no troops
could be spared. The Governor of Natal sent a force of Zulus to the aid of
the Sovereignty, but they were undisciplined and plundered all sides
indiscriminately.
The renewed fighting on the eastern frontier, like that in the Sovereign¬
ty, arose from the attempt to do too much without the necessary resources,
and from a failure to appreciate the need for a law which would respect the
customs of the people. After British Kaffraria was annexed it came in
theory under the law of the Cape Colony, and although magistrates in
practice modified the law in accordance with common sense and local
conditions the prohibition of such a sacred institution as the payment of
bride-price cattle inevitably provoked violent opposition.

Boer independence in the Transvaal and Orange Free State

The outbreak of war both in the Sovereignty and on the eastern frontier
brought opposition to the forward policy of the British government in
South Africa to a head. The wars seemed to reveal the uselessness of
annexations undertaken to protect the indigenous people. The voice of the
philanthropic movement, which had recently suffered a heavy blow in the
failure of Buxton’s Niger expedition, was almost silenced. The Free
Traders criticized colonial expansion as unprofitable. Others, impressed
by the inefficiency of government from a distance and the advantage o
giving power to local communities, felt that South African alfairs should
be left to the settlers. Others again, influenced by the theory of evolution,
felt that the conquest of black peoples by whites was an inevitable law ot
history and that it was a waste of time and resources to oppose it.
There was general agreement that the attempt to follow the treJ^e*s
into the interior should be abandoned. No further annexations should be
made and if possible the Sovereignty should be abandoned, commissi
was accordingly sent out to South Africa to look into the matter. oug

261
the war on the eastern frontier was brought to an end in February 1853,
and Moshoeshoe still did not take advantage of his victory, the position in
the Sovereignty continued to be difficult. The authority of the Resident
had bfoken down, and while some farmers were intriguing with Pretorius
in the Transvaal, others were conducting their own negotiations with
Moshoeshoe.
The first task of the commissioners was to prevent the Transvaal
farmers from taking part in the already complex situation. In view of the
changed attitude in Britain they felt able to offer the Transvaalers the legal
independence which had always been denied to them in return for a
promise not to interfere south of the Vaal river. In 1852 an agreement,
known as the Sand River Convention, was drawn up between the commis¬
sioners and representatives of the Transvaal Boers. In this convention the
British government abandoned its policy of admitting responsibility for
the behaviour of its subjects in the interior. The Transvaalers were given
complete freedom of action north of the Vaal river, and Britain renounced
any right or intention to interfere in that area. Far from attempting to
protect the African peoples from the Boers, Britain even sided openly with
the white farmers by promising the Transvaalers free access to the gun¬
powder market at the Cape while not allowing blacks to purchase ammuni¬
tion there. The Sand River Convention put an end to interference from the
Transvaal and a measure of peace and order returned to the Sovereignty,
but there seemed no way of establishing effective British government
without the expense which Britain was determined to avoid.
Moshoeshoe remained the dominant figure in the area, and Governor
Cathcart, who succeeded Sir Harry Smith, felt that no settlement was
possible in the Sovereignty until Moshoeshoe had been made to accept the
overriding power of British rule. Accordingly, he brought his forces to the
borders of Lesotho and demanded payment of a large number of cattle as a
fine for the losses caused by Moshoeshoe’s men in the recent war.
Moshoeshoe begged for time but Cathcart refused to listen, and marched
towards Thaba Bosiu. His troops captured a herd of cattle but they got
into difficulties with this booty when the Basotho launched their counter¬
attack. Cathcart had to withdraw, to regroup his forces and wait for more
men to arrive. Moshoeshoe took advantage of this to bring off a diplomatic
coup. He wrote a humble letter to Cathcart saying that as the British had
defeated his people and captured many cattle he hoped that they would
consider it enough and agree to peace. Cathcart was pleased to be offered
an easy way out and agreed. The British forces withdrew leaving
Moshoeshoe victorious.
After this there was no longer any question of holding on to the
Sovereignty, and in spite of the fact that many of the settlers were

262
I reluctant to see the British authority withdrawn, a group was found who
I were prepared to accept independence, and the Bloemfontein Convention
, was signed with them in 1854. This document was similar to the Sand
! River Convention. It denied all British responsibilities in the area north of
i the Orange river and gave the Boers complete freedom of action. So
anxious were the British to be rid of their responsibilities in the area that
I they failed even to settle the vital problem of the frontier between the
Boers and the Basotho. Moshoeshoe claimed that the frontier defined by
! Warden, to which the Basotho had always objected, had been cancelled by

South Africa after the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions

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400
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(ANNEXED 1891,
TO CAPE 1866)

263
war and that he could start negotiations afresh. The Boers maintained that
the Warden line stayed the effective frontier. With the departure of the
British, the Boers of the Sovereignty area drew up a republican constitu¬
tion with an elected Volksraad (parliament) and President. Thus the
Orange Free State came into existence, but in the circumstances it could
not be long before it came into conflict with the Basotho.
The Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions represented the lowest
point of British policy in South Africa. Solemn obligations to the indige¬
nous peoples were cynically given up in the interests of short-term eco¬
nomy. The blacks were left to fight it out with the Boers as best they
could, hampered by the gunpowder clauses in the conventions which
strengthened the military advantages of the whites. It was not long before
this hastily adopted policy was regretted and the British government
began to try to undo the consequences of its own acts.

The Cape Parliament

Closely related to the Conventions policy was constitutional reform at the

Cape. British critics of colonial expenditure, and those who wished to see
colonial rule replaced by more independent government, were agreed in
the desire to allow settlers to take a larger part in administrative and
financial responsibility. The first step in giving administrative powers to
the settlers in South Africa had been taken in 1836 when municipal
councils were set up. In 1852-3 the next major step was taken when
provision was made for the Cape to have an elected parliament.
The Cape Parliament consisted of two houses. The lower house, or
House of Assembly, was elected for five years at a time, and the upper
house, or Legislative Council, was elected for ten years. When the Cape
Parliament was established it was decided to carry on the tradition of legal
equality between the races which had been established by the 50th Ordi¬
nance, and which had also been applied in the constitution of the municip¬
al councils. There was to be no racial qualification for the vote for
members of parliament. The only qualifications required were economic
and these were set at a low level to make sure that at least some non-whites
would be entitled to vote. This was known as the ‘colour-blind’ constitu¬
tion, and under it considerable numbers of Cape Coloured people came to
exercise the vote, and in time some of the Cape blacks also acquired the
right to vote.
But although the economic qualifications for the vote were low they
were unfavourable to non-Europeans, who were generally by far the
poorest members of the community. There was always a large majority of

264
i white voters, and when the settlers feared that the situation might change
j they altered the qualifications to safeguard their majority.
When parliamentary institutions were later established in Natal the
: principle of the ‘colour-blind’ system was maintained, but so many diffi¬
culties were put in the way of Natal blacks acquiring the vote that they
were practically excluded.
The Cape Parliament, whose constitution was decided in 1853, was at
first given only legislative powers. Executive power was still in the hands
of the Governor and his officials. It was only in 1872 that the Cape
acquired a constitution in which the ministers were chosen by Parliament
and were responsible to it.

Grey and the eastern frontier

In 1854 Sir George Grey came to govern the Cape. He had been Governor
of New Zealand, where he believed that he had successfully solved the
problems of relations between the settlers and the Maori. He was therefore
confident that he could solve the problems of racial conflict in South
Africa. He had also enjoyed considerable freedom in the exercise of power,
and he was impatient of control from Britain. One of his plans was to find
a permanent solution to the problem of the eastern frontier. His idea was
that if white and black were brought into closer contact the blacks would
learn the farming practices and general culture of the whites, adopt white
civilization and cease to be a threat to security. Accordingly he planned to
introduce white settlers into British Kaffraria and in fact settled consider¬
able numbers of German settlers there.
Unfortunately the area was already overcrowded, and by depriving the
indigenous African of still more of their farming land his measures re¬
duced them to desperate poverty.
Another war would certainly have broken out if the Xhosa in despair
had not looked to supernatural means of salvation. A woman prophet
named Nonquase declared that, if all the cattle were slaughtered and the
grain destroyed before an appointed day, the sun would rise in the west
and the spirits of the ancestors, aided by a mighty wind, would return to
help them drive the whites from their land. Under her inspiration the
Xhosa destroyed their food supplies, but when the day came no miracle
occurred. The disillusioned and starving people were in no condition to
fight. Thousands died of starvation, though the British government sent
supplies of food. Thousands more took refuge in the colony as workers on
white farms. The fighting power of the Xhosa was broken tor a time.

265
 Another of Grey’s plans was the settlement of Adam Kok’s Griquas in a
series of valleys at the base of the Drakensberg, between the Basotho and
the coastal chiefdoms. Even before the Sovereignty was given up these
Griquas, whose territory lay along the Orange river around Philippolis,
had been feeling the pressure of land-hungry Boers. After the creation of
the Orange Free State the position became steadily worse. Adam Kok and
his council made laws forbidding their subjects to lease land to whites but
the temptation of immediate gain always proved too much, and once a
white farmer was established it was practically impossible to get rid of him
again. Though many of the Griquas were comparatively wealthy their
territory was steadily shrinking. Adam Kok accordingly decided to look
for a new home and Grey proposed that he should settle in the valleys of
what was then called Nomansland, where he would act as a buffer between
the Basotho and the east coast chiefdoms.
In 1861 Adam Kok sold the Philippolis lands to the Free State and his
people undertook their own Great Trek to establish a new state in what is
now called Griqualand East. There they built a Griqua republic which
flourished for a time, but pressure from the Bantu-speaking peoples and
the weakness of the Griquas brought about its ruin. The Griqua progres¬
sively mortgaged their property to canteen-keepers from the Cape, in
return for loans spent on drink and other commodities. Finally, the
Griquas lost almost all their land.
It was with regard to the relations between the Cape and other white
settler communities that Grey produced his most ambitious plans. He saw
that the peace of the eastern frontier could not be separated from the
effects of relations between the Boers and the Basotho and this was
particularly impressed upon him by the outbreak of the first Orange Free
State-Lesotho war.

The first Orange Free State-Lesotho war, 1858

Though friendly relations between the new white republic and

Moshoeshoe in Lesotho were maintained at first, the problem of the
frontier inevitably brought them into conflict. In 1858 war broke out and
Free State forces advanced towards Thaba Bosiu, but they were not strong
enough to storm its precipitous slopes. In the meantime highly mobile
groups of Basotho penetrated deep into the Free State. When the farmers
camped in front of Thaba Bosiu learnt that their homes were in danger
they suddenly broke up the camp and scattered to defend their families.
The Free State President found himself in a desperate situation and
appealed to Grey for help in making peace. Moshoeshoe, anxious not to

266
; earn the hostility of the British, agreed. Under the first Treaty of Aliwal
j North, the Basotho gained a slight modification of their territory but not
enough to satisfy the needs of their population. Moshoeshoe agreed unwil-
i lingly to the arrangement. He felt that his people should have been given
more after a successful war.
Grey then began to press with increasing determination for a federation
of all the white states in South Africa. He argued that so long as the
different white groups conducted their relations with their black neigh¬
bours without any co-ordination there could be no stable peace in South
Africa. What is more, none of the white states was strong enough on its
own to maintain law and order by normal means along its frontiers.
Incidents were unavoidable, and the only means such weak states posses¬
sed for dealing with them was to attack the indigenous Africans in an
all-out war, in the hope of striking terror into them. A federal government
would adopt a uniform policy to blacks, and would be able to police its
frontiers and suppress cattle raids by normal means without recourse to
war. It would attract the most enlightened minds from the white popula¬
tion of the sub-continent, and it would be more likely to act impartially
and justly than a small local assembly made up of men whose interests
were directly involved in the matters they debated. His arguments fell on
deaf ears in the British Colonial Office, where it was felt that his schemes
would inevitably involve the British government in the affairs of the
interior, and thus in all the trouble and expense that it had tried to avoid
by accepting the Conventions.
In 1859 Grey received a request from Britain to investigate the possibili¬
ties of a federation of the British colonies of the Cape, Natal and British
Kaffraria. He took this as an invitation to proceed with his far wider
scheme, and without authorization from Britain he caused the idea of a
South African federation to be discussed in the Free State Volksraad and
introduced for discussion in the Cape Parliament. This was too much for
the British government to tolerate and he was immediately recalled. With
a change of government in Britain he was sent back the following year
(1860) but with clear instructions not to raise the issue of federation again.

The creation of the South African Republic in the

Transvaal

Soon after the collapse of the Boer Republic in Natal the trekker commun¬
ity in the Transvaal divided into three main communities. One was in t e
initial area of settlement around Potchefstroom. This gave rise to o s oots
along the line of the Magaliesberg range and in the Manco va ey. e

267
second was in the north-east Transvaal near the Pedi kingdom. It was first
established at Andries Ohrigstad but the effects of malaria and pressure
from the African population led to withdrawal to Lydenburg. The third
centre was in the Zoutpansberg mountains. Its prosperity depended large¬
ly on the ivory trade, and as elephants were shot out it declined. Under
pressure from the Venda people it was eventually abandoned. The three
settlements were formally united and a common Volksraad was estab¬
lished in 1849, but in fact they tended to go their own ways and their
leaders openly rivalled one another. Andries Pretorius, the hero of Blood
river, was the leader of the south-western communities. He took the lead
in negotiating the Sand River Convention with the British. He continued,
however, to strive to unite all the Transvaal white communities and bring
them together with the Boers of the Orange Free State in a single trekker
state.
After his death in 1853 his son, Martinus Wessels Pretorius, succeeded
to his father’s position of leadership and continued to pursue his ideals. In
1856 Pretorius succeeded in persuading the Volksraad to agree to a con¬
stitution for the Transvaal which was now to be called the South African
Republic. As well as a single Volksraad the constitution provided for an
executive president. The Lydenburg community, however, refused to
accept the constitution and because of a quarrel over church matters,
declared itself a separate and independent republic. Stephanus Schoeman,
who had succeeded Andries Potgieter as head of the Zoutpansberg com¬
munity, also refused to accept Pretorius’s position as President. By late
1859, however, unity was restored and all the Transvaal white settlements
became parts of the South African Republic under Pretorius’s presidency.
At this point, however, the new-found unity was endangered by Pre¬
torius’s desire to achieve unity with the Orange Free State. Earlier attempts
had been frustrated by resistance from within the Orange Free State and
the divisions in the Transvaal. After the Free State defeat by Moshoeshoe,
however, the Free Staters looked seriously to the idea of union with the
Transvaal. Grey, anxious to unite the Free State with the Cape, stopped
this by threatening that such a union would put an end to the Conven¬
tions. After Grey’s scheme was squashed by the British government,
however, Pretorius tried another way of achieving his aims. In 1860 he put
himself forward and was elected to the presidency of the Orange Free
State, hoping that as President of both Republics he would be able to
bring them together. His rivals in the Transvaal, however, forced him to
resign his presidency of the South African Republic. His supporters
refused to accept this and a civil conflict ensued. In the Orange Free State
Pretorius was unable to resolve the problems of relations with the king¬
dom of Lesotho. In 1864 he resigned and returned to the Transvaal where

268
. he was again elected President. The trekker community had been definite-
; ly divided into two separate republics.
In the Transvaal as in Natal the trekkers staked out far more farms than
they actually occupied. Many were desperately poor and quickly parted
with their land claims to more prosperous neighbours or to British traders.
The government, moreover, was so hard up that it often had to pay its
officials in land claims and to offer large areas of land to foreigners in order
to raise loans. Most of the land in the Transvaal thus came into the hands
of a class of relatively wealthy landowners who dominated the political life
of the country or into those of foreign-based land companies. A growing
proportion of the Boers in the Transvaal were landless and lived as tenants
(known as bywoners) on the land of the wealthier citizens or land com¬
panies. Most of this land, however, was actually occupied and cultivated
by Africans who in time came to pay a rent whether in labour, or a share of
the crop or in cash to their landlords.

The second Orange Free State-Lesotho war, 1865

Although the British government rejected Grey’s idea of a South African

federation, it soon found itself forced to go back on the Conventions
policy and take the road he had suggested. The decisive factor in this was
the developing situation between the Basotho and the Boers. The basis of
the quarrel between Moshoeshoe and the Free State was simple. As the
Boer population increased it needed more and more land, but the Basotho
population was also increasing and much of its land had already passed
into Boer hands. The Warden line had left many Basotho settlements on
the Free State side of the border, and the changes made after the first Free
State-Lesotho war did not fundamentally change this situation. The Boeis
could not tolerate Basotho living in their Republic except as servants on
white farms, and as the demand for land became more acute they became
increasingly impatient of the continued presence of Basotho villages on
their side of the border. Moshoeshoe did not see why the arangement of
frontiers should affect the right of those of his own people who weie left on
the Free State side to continue to live on their land. He had no 100m to
accommodate them in his own overcrowded kingdom and he feared the
effects on public opinion of supporting their expulsion. In 1865 the second
Free State-Lesotho war broke out.
Jan Hendrik Brand, the new President of the Free State, was both able
and forceful. He took advantage of the gunpowder clause in the Bloemfon¬
tein Convention. Moshoeshoe on the other hand was very old, he could no

269
 J.H. Brand, President of the Free State

longer keep a firm hold on affairs, and his sons were divided against one
another over the question of the succession. The Free State forces were
able to overrun most of the fertile areas of the country, and although they
failed to capture Thaba Bosiu they were able to reduce the Basotho people
to starvation. Moshoeshoe, faced with this state of affairs, decided to buy
time, and in April 1866 signed the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu in which he
ceded almost all the cultivable area of his kingdom to the Free State. It was
only a ruse to enable his people to replenish their food supplies, and as
soon as the commandos withdrew the Basotho reoccupied their land and
began planting their crops.

British annexation of Lesotho

In the meantime the plight of the Basotho began to attract closer attention
from the British government. It was clear that if the terms of the treaty
were fulfilled Lesotho would break up. The Free State on the other hand
lacked the means to replace the government it was about to destroy.
Instead of a relatively peaceful and stable African kingdom there would be
chaos which would undoubtedly affect the eastern frontier area, throwing
it into turmoil again. Governor Woodhouse, who succeeded Grey in 1862,
urged the British government to respond to the repeated requests of
Moshoeshoe and annex Lesotho. Pressure in the same direction was

270
 exercised by philanthropic opinion, which was further inflamed by the
! fact that the Boers had expelled the French missionaries from their sta-
. tions in Lesotho.
The Boers soon realized that the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu was no more
i than a trick. The first farmers who went to take up land allocated to them
in the area ceded under the treaty were immediately murdered by the
Basotho. The war then started again, and again the Basotho were reduced
to starvation, but Moshoeshoe continued to hold out on his mountain top,
addressing ever-more pressing requests for annexation to the Governor.
Woodhouse secretly urged him to hold on at all costs till he could get the
necessary permission. At last, after Natal had shown an interest in taking
over Lesotho, Woodhouse received permission to annex the area provided

Lesotho, showing the territorial effect of repeated attempts to annex the territory

271
Natal would take responsibility. The Governor used this to announce the
immediate annexation of Lesotho and sent the Cape police to hoist the
British flag. He subsequently stated that annexation to Natal was impossi¬
ble and Lesotho became a direct dependency of the British crown.
Lesotho had been saved and Moshoeshoe died peacefully and content.
But the Basotho had suffered grave losses. Woodhouse was forced to allow
the Free State to keep a large part of their fertile land, and thereafter the
Basotho were unable to support themselves on their own territory without
a proportion of the population going out too earn its living as workers in
the white-controlled parts of South Africa. Though Basutoland (now
Lesotho) has been able to survive as a separate political unit in Southern
Africa it has remained from the economic point of view a satellite of white
South Africa.

British annexation of the Kimberley diamond fields

The annexation of Lesotho meant a definite reversal of the Conventions

policy, and was an obvious breach of the Bloemfontein agreement.
Another step in the same direction soon followed. The discovery of
diamonds in the land round the meeting of the Orange and Vaal rivers had
revolutionary effects for the development of South Africa. A country
which up to that time had been dependent on agriculture of a relatively

272
 unprofitable type was suddenly discovered to possess fabulous mineral
i wealth. Railways would soon be laid across the vast expanse that had
i previously known only the groaning ox-waggon, and South Africa would
i be launched on the first step towards becoming the industrial country it is
i today. Soon after diamonds were first discovered in 1858, near where the
, Vaal and Harts rivers meet, the rush began and hordes of enthusiastic
! diggers of many different nationalities arrived in the diamond fields.
Parts of the area in which diamonds were found was claimed by the
Orange Free State, and part by the Transvaal. These claims would prob-
I ably have been accepted by the British government if a lawyer named
David Arnot had not seen the possibilities of making a claim to the area in
the name of the Griqua chief Waterboer. He managed to get himself
appointed by the chief as his agent and then advanced claims in his name,
strongly supported by the diggers themselves who rejected the authority of
the Republics.

The diamond-yielding areas of South Africa. The political problems described in the
text resulting from the bordering of three separate territories on the diamond area
are clearly seen

273
 By this time the British government had begun to feel that the only
answer to South Africa’s problems was a federation along the lines laid
down by Grey, in which the Cape would be the senior partner. It was felt
that this should be achieved at Cape expense, however, and for this
purpose it would be desirable to give the Colony a responsible govern¬
ment. On the other hand if the two Republics became too rich and
powerful they might not wish to join a British federation. At the same time
philanthropic groups urged British annexation of the diamond fields to
save the Griquas from Boer slavery. At the diamond fields the situation
became increasingly chaotic, with a turbulent population living under no
recognized government. A sailor named Matthew Parker hoisted a flag
and declared an independent Diggers’ Republic.
The Governor at the Cape, Sir Henry Barkly, was given authority to
annex the lands belonging to Waterboer if the Cape Parliament agreed to
take them over, but the Cape Parliament did not give a firm assurance and
the Governor was anxious to act before the situation became still more
difficult. In 1871 he hoisted the British flag. This action was bitterly
resented by the Republics, and public opinion in the Cape largely sup¬
ported them. The Cape Parliament refused to take over the diamond fields
which became another direct British responsibility.

Carnarvon’s confederation policy

In 1872, shortly after the annexation of the diamond fields, the Cape was
given responsible government and Sir John Molteno became the first
Prime Minister. In Britain the Liberal government fell and was replaced
by the Conservatives with Benjamin Disraeli as Prime Minister and Lord
Carnarvon as Colonial Secretary. Carnarvon had a great belief in the value
of federal arrangements for creating unity amongst communities of diffe¬
rent culture; he had been responsible for bringing about a federal constitu¬
tion in Canada. The development of diamond mining in South Africa led
to the rapid construction of railways from Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and
East London to the interior. It also created an export market for agricultu¬
ral goods and stimulated commercial farming mainly in the Cape and
Natal. All these developments created an enormously increased demand
for cheap African labour. African labour for the diamond fields was drawn
from all over South Africa, and from as far afield as the Ndebele kingdom.
Natal similarly, in addition to Indian labour, sought to attract migrant
African labour from the Transvaal and beyond. This brought the interests
of the white states into open conflict with one another. To attract workers
from independent African states, moreover, employers on the diamond

274
) fields had to tempt them with the opportunity of buying guns. As African
: states began to rearm themselves in this way whites became increasingly
] afraid of the possibility of a general African rising against white authority.
' The answer to these problems seemed to lie in uniting the white states into
a single state and extending its control over the remaining African areas so
: that Africans could be disarmed and forced by taxation to offer their
labour to white employers. Carnarvon believed the way to achieve this was
by persuading the white states in South Africa to join together in a
; federation, and determined to take an active hand in bringing it about. By
* bringing the Boer states into a federation within the British empire,
] moreover, Carnarvon hoped to remove any possible threat to the British
» control of the Cape and to strengthen its security as a bastion of the
: empire. Another reason for moving in this direction was the feeling that
I the Free State might have been badly treated over the diamond fields, and
j federation would be a way for Britain to get rid of its unwanted responsi-
( bility for the diamond area.
Carnarvon wanted to go smoothly and therefore wished to be sure of the
1 votes of as many of the white states as possible. He therefore sent Wolseley
• to try to persuade the settlers in Natal to agree to an increase in the
proportion of nominated officials in their legislative council, so that the
British government would be in full control. At the same time he sent
■ round a letter to the heads of governments in South Africa suggesting a
: conference to discuss federation. Finally he sent his friend J.A. Froude,
the historian, to South Africa to use his influence in the cause ol the
; scheme.
Carnarvon’s plan met with strong opposition from Molteno, the Cape
Prime Minister. He saw it as interference in the affairs of a self-governing
state. He did not want to share the revenues of the Cape with the poorer
Republics at a time when these revenues were already heavily committed
to a programme of railway building, and he was afraid that federation
might upset the balance of parties at the Cape and bring about the fall of
his government. Froude, however, began a public agitation in favour of
federation which almost forced Molteno to change his mind. The Orange
Free State was not unwilling to consider the matter. In the Transvaal,
Pretorius had been deposed for his failure to get better terms from the
British over the diamond fields and the more liberal and cosmopolitan
T.F. Burgers had been elected President. He was away in Europe trying to
raise money for a railway line to be built from Delagoa Bay to the
Transvaal but his deputy indicated willingness to consider the proposal.
At the crucial moment, however, Carnarvon wrote to suggest shifting the
conference to London, and this gave Molteno an excuse for not taking

275
part. As Burgers was also absent and Brand refused to discuss confedera¬
tion, the London conference was a fiasco.

British annexation of the Transvaal, 1877

Faced with this check Carnarvon looked round for some means of hasten¬
ing the federation on which he had set his heart, and an opportunity
seemed to arise in the Transvaal. In the north-east of the Republic the
Leoulu Mountains offered something like the defensive possibilities
of the Lesotho mountains, and there the Pedi under Sekhukhuni
had built up a paramountcy similar to that of Moshoeshoe. Inevitably,
the Pedi and the Boers came into conflict. But the Pedi defended
themselves bravely in their mountain strongholds. Horse sickness
killed many of the Boer horses. President Burgers was unpopular for his
religious views, which were considered too liberal by many settlers. Sud¬
denly the Boers broke up their camp and went home, leaving Sekhukhuni
victorious.
The position of the Transvaal Republic was then desperate. The railway
scheme had failed and the state was heavily in debt to Cape banks, which
refused further credit. There was a danger that the Zulu would take
advantage of the situation to invade the Republic. Carnarvon thought that
if he could annex the Transvaal it would be easy to bring about federation,
as all the white states except the Orange Free State would then be British.
He sent an emissary, Shepstone, to see whether the Volksraad could be
persuaded to agree. It did not, but several members confessed privately
that it was the only way out of a desperate situation, and Shepstone hoisted
the British flag in spite of all protests. Carnarvon then felt sure that his
plans were bound to succeed and sent Sir Bartle Frere to South Africa as
Governor and High Commissioner to achieve the federation.
But instead of federation coming nearer it seemed to become more
difficult. The Free State refused to consider it until the Boers of the
Transvaal had a representative assembly and were allowed to express their
opinions on the annexation. Molteno in the Cape adopted a similar atti¬
tude and in the Transvaal the new British government became increasing¬
ly unpopular. At first the intention had been to allow the Boers to have a
representative council, but Shepstone delayed creating it for fear it might
refuse to ratify the annexation. The longer he delayed, the more hostile the
Boers became and the greater the volume of protests. Hence the introduc¬
tion of representative government continued to be postponed. What is
more, though the government was generous at first, the British Treasury
insisted that the Transvaal must pay for itself, and this meant collecting

276
fairly heavy taxation from a people who were notorious for refusing to pay
taxes even to their own government.
In 1878 Sir Bartle Frere seized an opportunity to get rid of one of the
main obstacles to federation. In 1877 another war had broken out on the
eastern frontier and Molteno asked for the aid of imperial troops. But he
refused to allow the Governor to take part in directing the campaign and
Frere, aware that the Prime Minister was growing unpopular, dismissed
him. A new government at the Cape, under Sir Gordon Sprigg, was
favourable to federation, but the problem of the Orange Free State re¬
mained. It would never agree to federation until the Transvaalers were
given the right to speak their mind, but to allow the Transvaalers to hold a
representative assembly while the government was so unpopular would be
dangerous.

The ‘War of the Guns’

Frere saw the unification of the white states and the extension of their
authority over their African neighbours as two inseparable parts of a single
policy. After the frontier war of 1877-8 he encouraged Sprigg to extend the
Cape’s rule over the chiefdoms of the Transkei that were still independent
and to disarm those African peoples who were under the Cape’s authority.
These policies of the Cape soon met a serious setback. A law was passed
requiring all guns to be surrendered. This applied also to the Basotho,
since administration of Lesotho had been handed over to the Cape in 1871.
The measure was bitterly resented by the Basotho, who saw no reason why
they should be punished by the confiscation of their weapons and who
knew only too well how their military strength had prevented the seizure
of their lands in the past. But Sprigg insisted, in spite of the advice of the
administrative officers and missionaries in Lesotho and petitions from the
chiefs. The result was the outbreak of the ‘War of the Guns’ in 1880. This
prolonged struggle was fought entirely by the Cape forces and ended in
victory for the Basotho, for not only did the Cape fail to break their
resistance but also had to agree to a settlement under which the Basotho
kept their guns. Moreover the government of the Colony relinquished the
administration of the kingdom to the imperial authorities. Henceforth it
was to remain a separate entity from the rest of South Africa, and on 4
October 1966 became the independent state of Lesotho.

The Zulu war

As his plans for confederation of the white states remained deadlocked,

277
Frere became convinced that the way to precipitate it lay in the rapid
extension of British authority over the African peoples of South Africa. In
addition to encouraging the Cape to follow this path, he prepared to use
imperial forces to conquer the most powerful of the remaining indepen¬
dent African kingdoms, that of the Zulu.
The Transvaalers had long advanced claims to a strip of land known as
the Blood River Territory, which was claimed by the Zulu also. Frere
realized that if the Zulu were defeated the Transvaalers could be given the
land and could be expected to become more favourably disposed towards
federation. The Cape Province too, would be more willing to accept
federation if the burden of defending Natal was lightened. Frere therefore
came to see the Zulu kingdom as the key to the South African situation
and prepared to bring matters to a head. He set up a commission to look
into rival claims to the Blood river lands, confident that it would decide in
favour of the Boers and that the Zulu king, Cetewayo, would fight rather
than give up his territory. Troops were sent to Natal in preparation for the
coming struggle. The commission, however, found in favour of the Zulu
and declared the Transvaal claims to be valueless.
This left Frere in an awkward situation and he determined to precipitate
war with the Zulu by any means. He took advantage of a violation of Natal
territory, by warriors pursuing a runaway wife of the king, to send an

Cetewayo, King of the Zulu

278
ultimatum demanding the break up of the military system on which the
Zulu state was based. In 1879 the British troops marched into Zululand
for what was expected to be a short and decisive campaign. But almost
incredible thoughtlessness and mismanagement led a whole regiment to be
trapped by the Zulu at Isandhlwana, with their ammunition in boxes that
could not be opened. The Zulu army was able to follow its traditional
tactics with success and the regiment was almost completely destroyed.
The news of this military disaster produced a great swing of opinion in
Britain. Frere was censured for his Zulu policy but not recalled. Instead a
lieutenant-governor was sent to Natal who proved incapable of co¬
operating with Frere. The Zulu war was continued and at the Battle of
Ulundi the Zulu armies were finally defeated. Cetewayo was taken a
prisoner to Cape Town but British policy in South Africa had lost its
momentum. Instead of annexing Zululand the government tried to keep it
militarily weak by setting up 13 chieftaincies in place of the old kingdom.
In spite of the setback to his leadership Frere made a last attempt to get
the confederation policy moving. Sprigg was persuaded to introduce a
motion supporting it to the Cape Parliament. Paul Kruger from the
Transvaal, however, met Dutch-speaking members of the Cape Assembly
and persuaded them to oppose the motion. As a result it had to be
withdrawn without a vote.

The first Anglo-Boer war, 1880-1

Noticing the weakening in British policy the Boers of the Transvaal

redoubled their protests and even held open-air meetings condemning tne
annexation of their territory. In Britain an election campaign was under
way and Gladstone then in opposition condemned the annexation and the
suppression of Boer freedom. The Transvaal was tense with expectation
but later, when he came to form his own government, Gladstone disco
vered the difficulties of the problem. Queen Victoria was strongly opposed
to surrendering British territory and the philanthropist wing of his party
disliked the idea of leaving the Transvaal blacks at the mercy of the Boers.
Gladstone decided to hold on, but the Boers were no longer prepared to
wait. They rose in rebellion, besieged the British garrison in Pretoria and
routed a relief column at Bronkhorstspruit. Troops were rushed up from
Natal but they met a severe check at Laing’s Nek. Shaken in his resolution
Gladstone decided to negotiate, but before any settlement was reached the
final battle was fought at Majuba (1881). The British forces were decisive¬
ly defeated and the commander killed. Gladstone was then prepare to
make peace on any terms less than complete surrender.

279
The Pretoria Convention, 1881

By the Pretoria Convention the Transvaal was given self-government

under British suzerainty (paramountcy). Foreign policy was to remain
under British control and there was to be a British Resident in Pretoria
with the right to exercise authority in regard to native policy. In practice
the Transvaal had won the war and regained independence in all matters
except relations with other European powers. The attempt to produce a
British federation in South Africa had ended in failure and a policy of
withdrawal which was similar to that of the Sand River and Bloemfontein
Conventions.

280
11 The consolidation of white rule
in Southern Africa

The mineral revolution and the scramble for territory

Soon after the rebellion of the Transvaal farmers and the re-establishment
of virtual independence for the Transvaal Republic, the history of South¬
ern Africa began to undergo important changes.
The discovery of diamonds had already begun to turn Southern Africa
from a poor farming country into a relatively rich industrial one. Within
five years of the Pretoria Convention, gold was discovered on the Wit-
watersrand and the whole economic position of the Transvaal and South
Africa was transformed. The old quest for new farming land for white
farmers continued but was now linked with the search for minerals, the
financial resources of mighty capitalist organizations and international
competition for territory in Africa. The racial attitudes of the old farming
society were transferred to the new world of mines and industry, the
battleground gradually shifting from the country to the towns. The pro¬
cess by which Africans had been brought under white rule was greatly
speeded up and extended out of South Africa into modern Zimbabwe,
Zambia and Malawi. The Portuguese, after centuries spent holding a few
isolated ports, suddenly woke up and established their authority over the
vast areas of modern Mozambique. The Germans arrived in Namibia. The
struggle between the Boer desire for complete independence in their
Republics and the British determination to maintain their paramount
position in South Africa led to a major war which was to solve little and
leave the deepest problems of South Africa untouched. However, it did
prepare for the political unification of the country. By the end of the first
decade of the twentieth century, white rule had consolidated itself in
Southern Africa.
Immediately following British withdrawal from the Transvaal, the Re¬
public began to expand vigorously. White larmers and adventurers took
advantage of disputes between chiefs to grab land and cattle. They

281
supported one side and claimed huge areas in return and in 1882 they were
able to set up two small republics on the western border of the Transvaal,
Stellaland and Goshen, with the passive support of the Transvaal author¬
ities. The British government was supposed to have overriding authority
on questions of native policy in the Transvaal but the British Resident was
treated with contempt and would do nothing to prevent the activities of
the white adventurers. Similarly, a group of whites helped Dinuzulu
defeat contenders for the Zulu throne in return for which he was forced to
surrender nearly half the remaining area of Zululand to the east of the
Transvaal. A republic, the New Republic, was set up here in 1884.
This affected British interests: Stellaland and Goshen cut across the
road to the interior that had been opened by the missionaries, Moffat and
Livingstone, thus threatening British traders’ access to the far interior.
Britain first tried negotiating and in 1883 in London the British agreed to
abandon the power of veto on native policy, to reduce the British Resident
to Consul and to drop the word ‘suzerainty’ from the new convention. In
return the borders of the new republics were altered so as to leave the road
to the north outside them. The British retained control of the Transvaal’s
foreign policy and the Republic was not to make treaties with any state
except the Orange Free State or with any chiefdoms to the east or west
without British approval. This ‘London Convention’ was ratified by the
Transvaal Volksraad in 1884.
As long as Britain did nothing to occupy areas supposedly outside the
Transvaal, the possibility of their eventually joining that state would still
remain. Moreover, a new danger threatened British interests from 1883
when the German flag was hoisted at Angra Pequena Bay in Namibia and
the following year Britain was forced to recognize a German protectorate
over the territory. It seemed Gemany might try to link this new possession
with the Transvaal thus severing the Cape from the interior and threaten¬
ing the security of the Cape itself. To prevent this, a British expedition
under Charles Warren annexed Stellaland and Goshen as British
Bechuanaland, and a protectorate was declared over the lands of the chiefs
Sechele and Khama and their area became the Bechuanaland Protectorate
in 1884.
The eastward expansion of the Transvaal also seemed a danger. The
Boers might gain control of a possible port at St Lucia Bay in Zululand
and thus make contact with a foreign power, a fear heightened by the fact
that the area round the bay was acquired from Dinuzulu on behalf of the
Transvaal by a German agent. As a precaution Britain annexed the area by
virtue of an old treaty made with the Zulu king, Mpande. The leaders of
the New Republic were forced to renounce their authority over the Zulu
kingdom and the boundaries of their state were redrawn to keep them well

282
back from the coast. In return Britain recognized the New Republic which
later became part of the Transvaal. In 1887 the remains of Zululand were
annexed and placed under the Governor of Natal. In 1884 the Cape
annexed the lands of the Gcaleka, the Xhosa and the Thembu. In 1886 a
show of force ensured the annexation of the Xesibe lands. The Mpondo
were still left with internal independence but their coastal area was de¬
clared a British Protectorate. (They were finally annexed by the Cape in
1894.)
Thus in the years after the British withdrawal from the Transvaal,
European authority over the African peoples of Southern Africa was
enormously extended. The Germans established claims to the vast area of
South-West Africa (now Namibia). Britain took British Bechuanaland and
the huge Bechuanaland Protectorate thus driving a wedge of British
territory between the Germans and the T ransvaal as far north as the
Zambezi river. On the east coast the Zulu kingdom and all the peoples
between Natal and the Cape with the exception of the Mpondo were
brought under European rule. The only substantial area in South Africa in
which African chiefs still ruled in independence was the Swazi kingdom
and a short stretch of coast occupied by the Thonga people between
Zululand and the borders of Mozambique.

The rise of Cecil Rhodes

Cecil Rhodes was destined to play a major part in the history of Southern
Africa. Born in England, the son of a parson, he came to South Africa for
health reasons settling first with an elder brother on a farm in Natal and
then, as the rush on the diamond fields began, trekking to Griqualand
West to seize advantage of the new opportunities.
At first each diamond prospector was allowed to dig in a square patch of
ground but as they tunnelled deeper the area became a vast honeycomb.
Everyone wanted to dig as much of his claim as possible so the walls
between the shafts were very thin and it became increasingly difficult to
manoeuvre wheelbarrows laden with diamond-rich soil along them. Earth
at the side of the diggings began caving in, often burying miners alive.
When the shafts became very deep, water began to seep m and it was
difficult and expensive to remove it. Costs thus grew greater and greater.
As the mines poured huge volumes of diamonds onto the international
diamond market prices slumped and profits consequently roppec
Rhodes realized that if an individual could obtain several patches along-
side each other and work this area as a single unit the mining won e
more efficient and therefore more profitable. He began buyinfe tie c aim

283
 of bankrupt and disillusioned miners and he was soon making a great deal
of money and pressing on with his policy of buying more claims and
forming larger units. While studying for a degree at Oxford, he continued
his financial business through agents, travelling out to South Africa during
each long vacation. As his holdings grew he came to see that to control
prices and maintain profits the amalgamation of the entire diamond fields
was essential. He had a powerful rival in Barney Barnato, a Jew from
London. By 1889 these two men virtually controlled the diamond fields
and it remained to be seen which one would absorb the other. Although
Barnato held the richer areas, Rhodes, through his friend and business
associate, Alfred Beit, obtained powerful capitalist backing from Lord
Rothschild. With this support Rhodes was able to force Barnato to
amalgamate the two enterprises into one vast company, called De Beers
Consolidated. Barnato remained immensely rich and was one of the direc¬
tors of the new company but the greatest power in the organization was in
Rhodes s hands. By 1891 the company controlled most of the remaining
mines in South Africa and thus dominated the largest source of diamonds
in the world. By this time Rhodes had also acquired a substantial share of
the Rand goldfields for his Goldfields of South Africa Company.
Rhodes was never interested in making money merely for its own sake.
Money meant power, power to fulfil his own fantastic dreams. He believed
fervently in the destiny of the British and other racially related people such

Cecil Rhodes (in the centre of the front row) with officials of De Beers Consolidated Mines.
Barney Barnato is sitting to the right of Rhodes

284
as the Dutch and Germans to dominate the world in the interest of
mankind. He envisioned the extension of the British empire throughout
Africa, a vast block of British territory linked together by a transcontinen¬
tal railway and telegraph running from the Cape to Cairo. This block
would form part of an imperial federation economically united by a
customs union. Britain would ally with the United States and Germany to
dominate the world and ensure peace and prosperity. But Rhodes had
little confidence in the ability or willingness of the British government to
fulfil his dreams.
During his years in South Africa, he had absorbed the attitudes of the
white settlers, British and Boer, together with their contempt for
Whitehall. Rhodes therefore believed that the extension of British rule
throughout Africa should be undertaken from the Cape with assistance of
British capital but without direct interference from the British govern¬
ment. The two white South African peoples should be brought together to
partake in the venture. His attitude towards the Africans was thoroughly
paternalistic. Though at times he mentioned equality, he fundamentally
saw Africans as destined to be under white rule for their own good. They
would supply the physical labour in combination with European brains
and capital. Rhodes considered himself as the central figure in this grand
scheme since he alone could provide the leadership and drive to bring
about the new world order.
Naturally, the road north must remain open and Rhodes played an
active part in the agitation which eventually led to the annexation of
British Bechuanaland. And in the constitution for De Beers Consolidated
he ensured that a clause was included allowing profits to be used for
purposes other than diamond mining. Thus he obtained the essential
financial basis for his schemes.

The Transvaal and President Kruger

In 1886 gold was discovered by settlers in the Witwatersrand in the

Transvaal and the whole economic and political situation in South Africa
was transformed. Until that time a poor farming republic, it had been
economically dependent on the Cape and it seemed that the Transvaal
might eventually be absorbed by her rich southern neighbour, together
with the Orange Free State. It was so poverty-stricken that in 1885 it had
been forced to ask the Cape to agree to a customs union but the Cape was
too selfish to agree and in the following year the chance had gone, go
deposits had been found and the gold rush was on.
Suddenly, the Transvaal became the richest state in South Africa and

285
soon the other states became dependent on the profits from the supply of
goods to their wealthy neighbour. It now looked as if the Transvaal would
be in a position to absorb the other white states. Certainly, it had the
means to maintain its independence and frustrate Rhodes’s ambitions.
The Transvaal was led by President Kruger, a Boer with the character¬
istic Boer spirit of independence. Though he had little formal education,
he was an astute, capable politician with a fierce determination to be rid of
British rule. His experiences of British policy up to the Pretoria Conven¬
tion had given him a deep suspicion of British hypocrisy and deception.
He wanted an independent sovereign state with the right to make treaties

Paul Kruger, President of the Transvaal

286
with foreign powers without interference from Britain.
The British government did not share Rhodes’s ideas of a British Africa
and continued to regard the acquisition of territory in the continent as an
unjustified expense. But powerful factions supported Rhodes, and the
government still regarded the possession of the Cape as essential for the
protection of the route to India in spite of the rapid increase in traffic via
the Suez Canal. Now, alarmed at the Transvaal’s wealth and aware of
Kruger’s determination to escape from British control, the British saw
their strategic position in the area threatened and this led to an alliance
with Rhodes against Kruger.
Rhodes now prepared for his grand scheme of expansion northward.
While he set about consolidating his base in the Cape by attempting to
bring about an alliance between the British and the Boers, he sent his
agents into the areas of modern Zimbabwe and Zambia to secure treaties
to provide a legal justification for his intended occupation of the area.
Finally, he sought British government approval for the formation of a
chartered company which would undertake the occupation and administer
the new areas.
Meanwhile, in South Africa, the successful uprising by the Transvaal
farmers against the British government had roused very strong nationalist
feelings amongst the Boers. A Boer nationalist organization, the Afrikaner
Bond, had been formed dedicated to encourage the use of the Afrikaans
language and to protect the interest of the Boer farmers. The society
spread rapidly after the rebellion but it died down again in the two Boer
Republics, maintaining its strength in the Cape only. Soon the character of
the society changed since Afrikaans-speaking whites in the Cape were long
accustomed to being part of the British empire. The organization’s new
leader, ‘Onze Jan’ Hofmeyr, believed, like Rhodes, in co-operation be¬
tween the white peoples and a firm alliance grew between the two men
which finally resulted in Rhodes becoming Premier of the Cape with the
support of the Afrikaner Bond in 1890. Rhodes consolidated his hold over
the white electorate by introducing measures to restrict the numbers of
African voters.

Rhodes and the conquest of Central Africa

The kingdom of the Ndebele held a key position north ot the Zambezi
river. Under their first king, Mzilikazi, they had built up a Zulu-type state
with a society organized on military lines. Each able-bodied man was a
member of one of the various regiments accommodated in a series ot
military towns.

287
 Even before Mzilikazi died white infiltration had begun. The king had
established a close friendship with the white missionary, Robert Moffat,
and even after the Ndebele had been driven out of the Transvaal in 1837
Mzilikazi retained his feeling for his white friend. Moffat persuaded him
to allow white men into his country so that his capital was crowded with
white hunters even before his death in 1868.
The heir to the throne was believed to have been killed on his father’s
orders but others said that he was still alive somewhere in South Africa.
This gave Sir Theophilus Shepstone, an officer of the Natal government,
an opportunity to establish his influence over the Ndebele kingdom. He
let it be known that one of his servants was Nkulumane, the missing heir,
and tried to ensure that he would be chosen as king. The majority,
however, were not convinced and supported Lobengula, a rival contender.
After a minor civil war, the latter was secure in his position.
But the end of the succession dispute did not end white interference in
the area. Europeans clamoured for a written treaty. Lobengula’s position
was difficult. Aware that his people could not defeat the whites in battle,
he needed to re-equip his army with new weapons but this would take time
and he had therefore to be careful not to offend the whites too deeply. On
the other hand, he knew the whites would take advantage of his ignorance
of writing to get him to agree to documents that he did not really under¬
stand. He described the position as like a chameleon creeping nearer and
nearer the fly: He darts his tongue and the fly disappears; England is the
chameleon and I am the fly.’
The first treaty to which Lobengula agreed, with the Transvaal, was
arranged by Peter Grobler and gave special rights to Transvaal citizens in
the Ndebele kingdom. Grobler was appointed consul for the citizens.
Britain immediately took counter action and Robert Moffat’s son, John
Smith Moffat obtained a treaty forbidding the giving away of territory
without permission from the British High Commissioner in South Africa.
Then Rhodes’s three agents, Charles Rudd, Rochfort Maguire and Fran¬
cis ‘Matabele’ Thompson, persuaded Lobengula to sign the ‘Rudd Con¬
cession’ which gave Rhodes exclusive prospecting rights in the area. In
return, the king was given rifles and ammunition and promised an annual
subsidy and a steamboat for use on the Zambezi river.
Soon Lobengula regretted signing this last treaty and sought assurance
that Rhodes had the right to dig only for minerals. He even sent envoys to
Britain for assurance. His suspicion was justified for Rhodes interpreted
his rights to mean that he could occupy the Shona parts of Zimbabwe. He
formed a company, the British South Africa Company, to occupy
Mashonaland and persuaded the British government to give him a charter
giving the company administrative powers in the area.

288
Lobengula, King of the Ndebele

Rhodes hastened to extend his influence further by encouraging his

agents to sign treaties with chiefs far into the interior. He found an able
ally in Harry Johnston, another believer in a grand British Africa. John¬
ston, British Consul in Mozambique, was particularly interested in mod¬
ern Malawi. This area had been thrown into a state of confusion by the
activities of Arab, Yao and Portuguese traders. Small Makololo kingdoms
succeeded in holding the Portuguese back from the south of the region. Dr
Livingstone’s example had attracted many missionaries and this angered
the Arab traders who knew that they were determined to end the slave

289
 I Jionr it is published in the newspapers that I have
panted a
Concession of tho Minerals in all my Country to Chables Du
Kocuioiu) Maguibe, and Francis Uobebt Thompson. NELL Kcdd,

Ah there is a great misunderstanding about this, all a f

respect of said Concession is hereby suspended pending an invest'1011
to be made by me in my country.

(Signed) LOBENGULA
Koyal Kraal,
Matabeleland,
.18tb January, 1889..

(L 0*l~

'/-v-c-e?

U^<
a «£>
_0t - -^7

7a
11c> K

A notice issued by Lobengula while he was attempting to clarify the terms of the Rudd
Concession. Bottom, the original notice carrying Lobengula’s seal; top, as it appeared
in the Bechuanaland News

290
trade. To help the missions, the African Lakes Company was formed but
its resources were too small to be of effective assistance. The Portuguese
now realized that they must act quickly to protect their claims in Africa.
They planned to seize a wide corridor linking Angola to Mozambique and
prepared an expedition to acquire rights in the south of modern Malawi
and Zambia. Rhodes retaliated by giving Johnston money and assistance
to make treaties with the chiefs in these areas.
Whatever their real worth, these pieces of paper were used to establish
the British South Africa Company’s rights to Zambia. However, Rhodes’s
agents were beaten by King Leopold of the Congo in the race to make
treaties with the rulers of the Shaba area. Thus the copperbelt was split
between two colonial powers.
Rhodes’s and Johnston’s plans were almost frustrated by the Portuguese
when Serpa Pinto began to force his way through the resistance of the
Makololo but the British government intervened and the Portuguese plans
were abandoned. The area of the modern Malawi came directly under the
British government. Rhodes paid Johnston £10 000 annually to establish
British rule there and to act as administrator on behalf of the British South
Africa Company in Zambia.
Rhodes’s quest for official backing in London for his policies faced
many difficulties. He wanted the extension of British territory to be
undertaken by colonists like himself with minimum interference from
Whitehall. London’s distrust was increased by Rhodes’s association with
the Afrikaner Bond and his far-reaching schemes were the dread of more
conventional spirits who feared the responsibility and expense. People like
the missionaries strongly supported the view that newly acquired areas
should be administered from Whitehall in the interests of the indigenous
peoples. But in spite of all this opposition, Rhodes had his way with the
backing of powerful financial interests.
Rhodes argued that gold in Mashonaland was richer than that of the
Transvaal and that a rich, dominant northern region would reverse the
economic and political situation brought about by the rise of the Trans¬
vaal. The latter could be absorbed into the vastly expanded British sphere
without the British government having to pay for it. Rhodes was finally
granted a Royal Charter for the British South Africa Company in October
1889. In return, Whitehall insisted on putting powerful, independently
minded men on to the Board to watch Rhodes’s activities, though Rhodes
retained his right to act as sole authority for his company in South Africa.
Thus, for all practical purposes he had an almost completely free hand.
Back in South Africa Rhodes prepared his pioneer column to occupy
Mashonaland. The majority of recruits were English-speaking but a de¬
liberate effort was made to include Afrikaners. Volunteers weie attracted

291
by the promise of prospecting rights and farming land though the Rudd
Concession did not give Rhodes’s company the right to make such offers.
The column set out to the north at the end of June 1890 carrying with it
the traditional South African idea of farming with large areas of land
worked by labourers and all the prejudices this system produced.
Deeply concerned, Lobengula sent a message to the British High Com¬
missioner at the Cape denying Rhodes’s right to enter his kingdom in force
but the High Commissioner would do nothing. By September the Union
Jack was hoisted at Fort Salisbury (now Harare) and Mashonaland was
declared occupied in the name of Queen Victoria.
Rhodes was now a man of gigantic stature: master of the largest di¬
amond mining complex in the world; controller of an important gold
mining company in Johannesburg; Premier of the Cape, the largest if not
the richest white state; head of the British South Africa Company and
therefore the uncrowned king of the newly acquired territories.

Transvaal-Rritish conflict over Swaziland

Meanwhile, in the Transvaal Kruger was seeking to preserve and streng¬

then the state’s independence and the Transvaalers, like the British and
Boer settlers at the Cape, saw modern Zimbabwe as a possible area for
expansion. The Grobler treaty had been the first step in this direction. But
Transvaal’s main interest was expansion eastward in the independent
Swazi kingdom and a strip of coastline occupied by the Thonga. This strip
contained a possible port at Kosi Bay. Swaziland was organized on similar
lines to the Zulu and Ndebele kingdoms but was not so highly militarized.
Having witnessed the defeat of powerful African peoples by the whites,
the Swazi were determined not to be drawn into any quarrel with Euro¬
peans. Moreover, Shepstone, the Natal officer responsible for relations
with the chiefdoms, had protected them from the Zulu on several occa¬
sions. Thus white settlers in the kingdom were well-received. These
settlers were of two kinds; Boer farmers in search of new winter grazing
land and a host of concession hunters, mainly British, looking for mining
rights and other commercial privileges. These two groups naturally
opposed each other since prospectors wanted mining rights on land sought
for farming by the Boers. The Swazis found this situation very difficult to
deal with since the whites despised the tribunals of the chiefs and ignored
Swazi custom. The king summoned Shepstone’s son to help control the
affairs of the European population but the scramble continued. The king
was bribed or tricked into signing more and more pieces of paper until he
had given away all his land and resources more than once over. Kruger

292
was anxious to take advantage of the situation to win his access to the sea
and was even prepared to threaten intervention in the Ndebele kingdom
as a bargaining counter with Rhodes. But his intentions were strongly
resented by powerful commercial groups in Britain.
A stalemate was reached which lasted for a number of years. In 1890
and again in 1894, Britain and the Transvaal jointly agreed to respect the
independence of the Swazi kingdom but as Transvaal pressure increased
Britain agreed that the kingdom could be taken over if the Swazi author¬
ities consented. However, the authorities flatly refused and asked for
British protection. This was refused and finally in December 1894 the
Transvaal was permitted to take over the region whether the people were
willing or not. But Kruger’s successful occupation of Swaziland was
countered by British occupation of the coastal Thonga area and the
Transvaal lost its route to the sea. The offer of a railway strip to Kosi Bay
was promised but never granted.

Rhodes tries to seize Mozambique

With the successful occupation of Mashonaland, it seemed Rhodes’s

dreams would be fulfilled. A new powerful British Southern African state
seemed about to be born which could eventually absorb the landlocked
Boer states further south. But these hopes were not fulfilled. Linked with
the occupation of Mashonaland was the intention to seize territory claimed
by the Portuguese and thereby obtain a route to the sea. The Transvaal
would then be completely surrounded by British territory.
Although the Portuguese claimed wide areas of land, for hundreds of
years they had done little more than occupy a few ports along the coast and
the Zambezi river. The greater part of Mozambique south of the Zambezi
was dominated by the Gaza empire, ruled at this time by Gungunyana who
had established friendly relations with the Ndebele; his daughter had
married Lobengula. Denying Portuguese claims to his kingdom, Gun
gunyana sought British protection but this was refused since it was con
trary to British treaties with Portugal.
Rhodes believed that if he could obtain concessions from Gungunyana
along the lines of the Rudd Concession, he could exploit the region,
occupy Mozambique and then squeeze Portugal out of the rest of the area.
In 1891 these plans were set in motion and agents were sent to the Gaza
capital. But Portugal’s position was beginning to undergo a change since
trade with the Transvaal was increasing Mozambique’s wealth and
Lourengo Marques (now Maputo) was steadily growing from a ever
ridden port into a prosperous settlement. Public opinion in Portuga was

293
 waking up to the potential value of the colony and imperialist feeling
supported the retention and expansion of Portugal’s empire. Governmental
authority was re-established along the Zambezi and the independence of
Portuguese prazo (estate) owners destroyed. Rhodes’s activities roused
Portuguese imperial feelings further and Whitehall realized that if Portug¬
al was humiliated again her present government might fall to a strongly
anti-British regime. Rhodes therefore lost backing from Whitehall. His
plans to occupy Mozambique were frustrated and Delagoa Bay, which was
the key to much subsequent history, remained in Portuguese hands.
Portugal was now determined to establish effective control of the area
but, being one of the weakest and poorest European states, she was racked
with bitter divisions at home and it took some time before she could
summon up the strength to grapple with Gungunyana and the forces of the
Gaza empire. Only in 1895 did the Portuguese feel ready to commence
hostilities. Gungunyana had long seen that sooner or later Portugal would
try to destroy him and he made repeated efforts to obtain British protec¬
tion. However, all his overtures were rejected and he was left to his fate.
At last, the Portuguese found an opportunity for a quarrel and hostilities
began. For some time it seemed they might be defeated after all but in the
end the bravery of Gungunyana’s people was no match for modern Euro¬
pean weapons. Gungunyana was captured and exiled and the fabric of his
kingdom systematically destroyed.
Rhodes s failure in Mozambique was less disastrous than another dis¬
appointment. Far less gold was found in Mashonaland than Rhodes and
his backers had hoped. There was a real danger that the Company would
go bankrupt and the settlement would collapse. Rhodes therefore turned
his attention to lands occupied by Lobengula and the Ndebele. It was
rumoured that a ridge of gold-bearing rock ran through Lobengula’s
capital, Bulawayo, which could rescue the Company’s finances and pro¬
vide for the building up of a prosperous British colony. And even if the
gold did not exist, the area contained some of the best grazing land
between the Limpopo and the Zambezi.

The destruction of the Ndebele kingdom

Lobengula did all he could to prevent a quarrel with the whites but his fate
was also sealed. A party of Ndebele came near to Salisbury in pursuit of
royal cattle stolen by the Shona. Rhodes’s Company ordered them to
withdraw but, since this retreat was not as swift as was demanded, the
Company’s patrol opened fire and the Ndebele retaliated. The incident
was used as a pretext for war. A large section of the Ndebele army was in

294
quarantine for smallpox and, though Lobengula possessed a considerable
quantity of firearms, his people were not yet skilled in their use. The
whites had the new and deadly Maxim guns and opposition to them was
suicidal. Lobengula fled with a small group of devoted followers to make
contact with the Ngoro to the north in modern Zambia. He died of fever
on the way.
News of the Company’s victory restored the investors’ confidence and
the price of its shares rose to unprecedented heights. But the longed for
gold was not found and it soon became apparent that the new settlement
would be more of a liability than an asset for many years. The plan to
maintain British paramountcy in Southern Africa by creating a richer
British state to the north of the Transvaal had failed and inevitably the
struggle between Kruger’s desire for Boer independence and the British
determination to maintain overall control became sharper.

The struggle for the Transvaal

This struggle had many aspects. Transvaal’s new-found wealth gave the
Republic the need for a greatly expanded and more efficient means of
communication with the outside world. It was to Britain’s and Rhodes s
advantage if the Transvaal could be linked with the railway systems of the
Cape as this would entail drawing her into the British orbit. It was also
vital to the British and Boer in the Cape who were increasingly dependent
on trade with the Transvaal. Natal shared this dependence and the Orange
Free State also had a strong interest in trade with the Transvaal. Both the
Cape and Natal were anxious to build railway lines to the Transvaal, and
the Orange Free State willingly allowed the line to pass through her
territory. However, the Transvaal sought an alternative route to the sea
and the Portuguese possession of Delagoa Bay provided the opportunity.
Even before the British annexation of the Transvaal in 1887, a railway had
been planned to the Bay. This had ended in disastrous failure, but now
that the Transvaal was so rich the project could begin again.
Kruger resisted the extension of the lines to the south until the Delagoa
Bav line was near completion. Rhodes therefore decided that his railway
link to the north to Cairo must go through Bechuanaland instead of the
Transvaal. Kruger finally allowed the southern lines in return tor a loan to
enable the Netherlands Railway Company to complete the track from
Delagoa Bay; the company was also to control the track from the Orange
Free State border to Johannesburg. The Cape line enjoyed a few years
monopoly but the Delagoa Bay line was soon completed and the link wit
Natal established also. This placed Kruger’s state in a stronger position

295
than ever thus threatening British interests in Southern Africa. It could set
the Cape against Natal by favouring one against the other and could
blackmail the southern states by threatening to close their lines and send
all traffic via Delagoa Bay. Nothing would prevent the Transvaal, with
independent access to the sea, from establishing relations with foreign
powers like Germany and breaking free from British control over her
foreign policy.
But Transvaal’s wealth gave her grave internal problems. Capitalists
and white mineworkers flocked to Johannesburg. The majority were
British but they also came from many other parts of the world and Kruger
was determined not to allow them the vote. The new settlers’ culture and
attitudes were very different from the conservative Transvaal Boers.
What is more, these Uitlanders (foreigners), had no permanent stake in
the country. It was expected that as soon as the gold ran out they would
depart leaving deserted mines behind them. Finally, the Uitlanders’ vote
might bring British influence back to the state and destroy the independ¬
ence for which the Boers had fought so hard.
On the other hand many of the Uitlanders were discontented with the
situation in the Transvaal; they had little in common with government
officials, many of whom could speak no English and they resented the lack
of English-medium education for their children. Uitlander agitation would
have been of little significance, however, if it had not received the backing
of some of the most powerful mining magnates. Gold mining on the
Johannesburg gold reef (the Rand) involved many difficulties. The layers
of gold-bearing material were tilted at an angle of about 20°. They
appeared above ground along the ridge of the reef but sank deeper and

Surface (outcrop) mining in South Africa: the Ferreira Gold Mining Company, 1888

296
deeper further south. Some gold could be mined near the surface (outcrop
mines) but to develop mines with a long-tem future it was necessary to
strike the gold-bearing layers at deeper levels to the south of the ridge.
Mining at these deep levels, however, involved huge expenditure for the
construction and maintenance of shafts and underground galleries. The
gold, moreover, occurred in small fragments dispersed through masses of
rock so that only a few grams of gold could be extracted from each tonne.
All this meant that deep-level mines could only hope to make a profit if
costs could be kept to the absolute minimum. Kruger’s government,
however, gave concessions to individuals and companies to carry out a
variety of activities in a manner which raised the costs of mining opera¬
tions. One of the most important of these concessions was the one given to
the Netherlands Railway Company for a rail line to bring coal to Johannes¬
burg. This monopoly allowed them to overcharge the mining companies.
Another was the dynamite monopoly given to a company to encourage it to
manufacture dynamite in the Transvaal. This made one of the most
essential mining materials more expensive than it need have been.
The most important need of the mining companies, however, was for
abundant supplies of African labour at very cheap rates. The Transvaal
farmers, who dominated the government of the Republic were, however,
in competition with the mines for available labour and the Republican
authorities were not able to enforce pass laws and anti-drink laws efficient¬
ly enough to enable the mines to force Africans to work to the absolute
limits of their physical endurance for the very low wages the mines felt
they could afford to offer. After 1895, when deep-level mining was proved
to be practical, therefore, some of the major mining companies decided
that the Transvaal government must be replaced by a more modern system
that would be more helpful to capitalist profits. One of these major mining
concerns was Rhodes’s own group of companies. As it became evident that
no vast gold deposits were to be found in the British South Africa Com¬
pany’s lands beyond the Limpopo, the profitability of his Goldfields of
South Africa Company became a matter of great concern lest his entire,
vast economic empire should collapse. Rhodes thus had direct financial as
well as political motives to seek to overthrow Kruger’s government. He
believed that the Uitlanders could easily overthrow the Boer government
and that they should be supported lest they establish a republic of their
own as anti-British as the former Boer one. Thus an elaborate conspiracy
was hatched, involving Joseph Chamberlain, the imperialist-minded Co o
nial Secretary, Sir Hercules Robinson, British High Commissioner in
South Africa, and Flora Shaw (later Lady Lugard), the impena ist
minded colonial editor of The Times. Rhodes’s plan was to smuggle arms
to the Uitlanders who would rise in revolt on a fixed day wit t e

297
assistance of a column of the British South Africa Company’s forces from
Bechuanaland. Robinson would announce the annexation of the Transvaal
on a pretext of British duty to maintain peace in the area and The Times
would justify the action of the British public. The attraction of the plan
was that it would provide a means of solving Britain’s strategic problems
in Southern Africa without the direct aid of the British government.
Rhodes began to concentrate his troops in Bechuanaland on a strip of
land that had theoretically been given him to protect the railway against
the ‘ferocious Bechuana’ tribes. But as the date for the revolt drew near
the Uitlanders began to weaken. Many of the capitalists did not intend to
fight but to use the situation to create rumours of war so that the price of
gold shares would fall temporarily on the London Stock Exchange. They
would make their fortunes when the prices went up again. Rhodes was
sent a telegram suggesting that the revolt be postponed. He realized that
his scheme was going to collapse but Dr Jameson, his lieutenant in charge
of the column in Bechuanaland, had other ideas. He was even more
confident than Rhodes that the Boer government would collapse and his
successful war against the Ndebele had given him tremendous confidence.
He therefore decided to lead his troops into the Transvaal and force the
Uitlanders into action. Rhodes was thunderstruck when he heard the
news, for he thought it was an unjustified gamble which would have
terrible consequences if Jameson’s action failed. However, by the time he
had sent a telegram to Jameson telling him to stop, the column was already
on its way to the Transvaal, the telegraph wires being cut behind it.
The Uitlanders were horrified when they heard that Jameson was
corning to rescue them uninvited. A half-hearted uprising took place and if
Jameson had reached Johannesburg the plot might have succeeded but the
column lost its way. A Boer guide led them into a perfect trap in a shallow
bowl with Boers up in the hills surrounding them where the column’s
Maxim guns were useless. Jameson was forced to surrender and the
rebellion collapsed. This was a bitter blow to Rhodes who had to resign as
Premier of the Cape and his friendly alliance with the Afrikaner Bond was
succeeded by bitterness and mistrust. There was even a danger that Rhodes
would lose his control of the British South Africa Company. Kruger, on
the other hand, emerged triumphant and in his hour of victory he acted
with extraordinary magnanimity. The captive raiders were handed back to
the British for punishment and even the Uitlanders were treated leniently.
But the collapse of the Jameson raid could not alter the basic situation;
it merely ensured that the conflict must come into the open and be settled
by war. It also emphasized the Transvaal’s strength and a wave of sym¬
pathy swept through the whole of Southern Africa indicating the possibil¬
ity that the Cape might join the Transvaal in an anti-British federation.

298
 Even the German Emperor sent a congratulatory telegram to Kruger and a
German warship was rumoured to have landed marines at Delagoa Bay.
War between Britain and Germany seemed possible until the Kaiser
I offered his apologies to Queen Victoria.

The Shona and Ndebele risings, 1896-7

The Jameson Raid fiasco provided the opportunity for a massive African
uprising in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). White farmers had
introduced a rigid colour discrimination into the lands between the Lim¬
popo and the Zambezi. No sooner was the settlement in Mashonaland
established than the Shona lands began to be confiscated to form cattle
ranches for the whites, and chiefs were forced to send their men to the
mines and the farms. The arrogance of the invaders shocked the African
sense of personal dignity and provoked a rapidly growing resentment.
After the conquest of the Ndebele kingdom royal cattle were confiscated
and the Ndebele were left with the poorest farming lands. Finally, an
epidemic of rinderpest decimated their cattle and naturally even this
calamity was associated with the whites.
With most of the Company’s forces away on the Jameson Raid, an
opportunity was offered for striking back. In March 1896 the Ndebele
rose in a massive uprising, called Ckimurenga. Isolated whites were killed
on their farms and the forts were besieged. In June, the Shona also rose
and succeeded in killing a substantial number of whites in their area. The
rising proved long and costly to suppress for the Africans had learnt not to
expose themselves to the Maxim guns. In spite of heavy losses, the
Ndebele held out in the Matopo mountains. They were in a desperate
condition but the Company was also in difficulties. Its debts were moun¬
ting without a hope of being able to pay them let alone give its share¬
holders a dividend. Another costly campaign would be difficult to mount.
At this point Rhodes took the bold step of going into the mountains to
negotiate with the Ndebele and in October he persuaded them to surren¬
der in return for concessions and thereby salvaged his personal reputation
in white Southern Africa. The Shona resistance continued for a further
year but was finally decisively crushed.
The raid was followed by a period of calm in which it looked as it me
differences between Britain and the Transvaal might be settled peacefully.
But this impression was deceptive. Chamberlain was moie than ever
determined to maintain British paramountcy and Krugei was a)n irme
in his worst suspicions of British policy by the raid and what fol owe .
had expected Rhodes to be tried and publicly disgraced but tne ommitte

299
of Enquiry was first postponed and then, when it finally met, did every¬
thing to hush up the affair. Rhodes, in possession of telegrams implicating
Chamberlain, was able to have him make a statement in the British House
of Commons that Rhodes had done nothing contrary to his personal
honour. Kruger now despaired of reaching any agreement with such a
dishonest opponent and the Transvaal entered into a close military alliance
with the Orange Free State and both states began to arm themselves with
German weapons.

The second Anglo-Boer war, 1899-1902

Chamberlain came increasingly to believe that there was nothing to be

done except to force the Transvaal to submit and he was strongly sup¬
ported by the British High Commissioner in South Africa, Alfred Milner,
another dedicated imperialist. As they recovered from the shock of the
raid fiasco the mining magnates renewed their efforts to overturn the

South Africa at the time of the second Anglo-Boer War, showing main railway lines

300
 Vv
\
.x-—
---
\
/
ii lit
III MCHMMLAND
\
\
N
\
i
I
/

SOUTH WEST a -J* protectorate k N-. // GAZA

mcA (Proclaimed after Warren '$ ■ KINGDOM
(German Ptvtecta rate expedition 1885^ ^ \ (Conquered Ip
\ proclaimed 7884) - J TZANSVAAL Portuguese 1885)

1 Proclaimed a Crown Colony afterWamn's 7 Zulu land. Annexed and attached to dotal 1887
expedition 1885 subsequently attached to Cape $ (friqualond Past 1379
2 Annexed 1871 To Cape 1877 9 Xesik 1884
3 lb Transvaal 1894. Subsequently resbred 10 Pondobnd 1894
b tmpenat Govt 11 Themtm 1884
4 Annexed 1858. Joined to Cape 1871. 12 HngoLand 1879
Pesbred to Imperial Gevt 1889
5 Gate la Scmvana 1884
5 Mem Pepublic 1884
14 British Paflrama (To Cape I860)
6 Thonga Land 1895

The consolidation of white rule in South Africa

Kruger government. They backed an imperial pressure group, the South

Africa League, which with Rhodes as its chief patron, developed branches
in the Cape and Natal as well as in the Transvaal. The League encouraged
and organized Uitlanders’ agitation in Johannesburg, holding mass meet¬
ings, organizing petitions and keeping up a continual stream of propagan
da in the Johannesburg Star newspaper. The League had a branch in
London also where it acted as a powerful pressure group using the Britis
press to rouse public opinion against Kruger and exerting all possible
influence to push the British government into open confrontation with t ie
South African Republic. Milner at last prepared to force a showdown. In
May 1899 he prepared a despatch comparing the lot of the British in the
Transvaal with that of the helots (serfs) in ancient Sparta claiming that

301
their situation was undermining British prestige throughout the empire.
Kruger realized the danger and offered large concessions. In August, he
agreed that the Uitlanders could vote after five years' residence provided
that Britain would leave his republic alone and not interiere in its allairs.
But Britain was still determined to prevent the republic from consolidat¬
ing its independence and rejected the oiler, British troops moved to the
borders of the two republics. Kruger and the Orange Free State decided to
act before all the British forces arrived. An ultimatum was issued deman¬
ding the withdrawal of British forces from the frontiers and when this was
not complied with the Cape and Xatal were invaded in October 1S99.
In spite of overwhelming odds, the little Boer republics had a consider¬
able advantage at the beginning. The British lorces were vastly scattered
and in Southern Africa the Boers' fighting men outnumbered them. Also,
the British generals had little conception of the military problem they
faced and seriously underestimated their enemy. The war thus began with
a series of British defeats and. had the Boers taken full advantage of then-
victories, the British forces might have been at their mercy. But the Boer
generals made the serious mistake of wasting their strength blockading the

A pound note issued by the besieged British forces inside Mafeking in March 1Q00

ffo. /(a
evcinc Sl£,
o )( a t'c/> 1>Q

1
i

t* *. as.-ctnue-l /or
This no it is yood for On* Pcond dvnny Mr s*+fr
11 I ti ao
; com at M* typndord Bank Mafmhng. Mr rtturtpho'

V 4 ^ r' ^ ' f **

302
 ARMY HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH AFRICA.

General Lord Kitchener of_Khartoum

Commanding in Chief

AND
His Excellency Lord Milner
High Commissioner
on behalf of the BRITISH GOVERNMENT

AND
Messrs S.W.Burger, F.W.Reitz, Louis Botha, J.H.de la Roy,
L.J.Meyer and J.C.Krogh
acting as the GOVERNMENT of the SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC

AND
Messrs W.J.C.Brebner, C.R.de Wet, J.B.M.Herzog

and C.H.Olivier "

acting as the GOVERNMENT of the ORANGE FREE STATE
on behalf of their respective BURGHERS
Desirous to terminate the present hostilities, agree on the

following Articles.

1. The BURGHER Forces in the Field will forthwith lay down

their Arms, handing over all Guns, Rifles, and Munitions of War,
in their possession or under their control, and desist from any
further resistance to the Authority of HIS MAJESTY KING EDWARD
VII whom they recognise as their lawful SOVEREIGN.
The manner and details of this Surrender will be arranged
between Lord Kitchener and Commandant General Botha, Assistant
Commandant General De la riey, and Chief Corrraandant De Wet.

2. Burghers in the field outside the limits of the TRANSVAAL

and ORANGE RIVER COLONY, and all Prisoners of War at present
outside South Africa, who are burghers, will, on duly declaring
their acceptance of the position of subjects of HIS MAJESTY
KING EDWARD Vll, be gradually brought back to their homes as
scon as transport can be provided and their means of subsistence

a period of years with 3 per cent interest. o foreigner or

rebel will be entitled to the benefit of this Clause.

Part of the Treaty of Vereeniging, 1902 (for the rest, and signatures, see next page)

303
 Signed at Pretoria this thirty first day of May in the

Year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Two.

Signatures on the Treaty of Vereeniging

British garrisons at Ladysmith and Mafeking, giving Britain time to

reinforce her troops in South Africa. Two first-class generals, Lord
Roberts and Lord Kitchener, were sent out to command them and the
initiative passed to the British. British troops invaded the Orange Free
State, a whole Boer army was captured almost intact and Mafeking was
relieved. The news gave rise to wild rejoicing in England. Then the troops
marched on Pretoria. During 1900 the annexation of the two states as
Crown colonies of Transvaal and the Orange River was announced and
Kruger retired down the Delagoa railway line to die in exile. The war
seemed over and Milner began to prepare the administration of the new

304
colonies but many Boers refused to surrender. They began a guerrilla
struggle which lasted for another year-and-a-half and their commandos
even invaded the Cape. But some Boers felt that continued hostilities
would destroy the prosperity of the country and joined the British side as a
body called the National Scouts. They were naturally regarded as traitors
by those who continued the struggle.
Impatient to end the war, Britain was baffled by those Boers who sat
quietly at home one day and fired a British troops the next. In retaliation
they burned Boer farms in the neighbourhood of guerrilla activity and
took women and children into concentration camps. They also began to
run barbed wire fences across the country to hem in the Boers but these
measures still did not bring about an end to the war. The tough measures
increased the bitterness and many women and children died from diseases
which spread through the camps. Gradually the Boers’ fighting spirit was
undermined and they were ready to compromise. The British, too, were
ready to make concessions and end the war.
In May 1902 the Boer and British leaders met at Vereeniging where the
Boers agreed to surrender their independence in return for vital conces¬
sions from the British, the most important of which concerned African
political rights. Britain had an opportunity of fulfilling her obligation to
the Africans by securing their right to vote, perhaps on the same terms as
in the Cape. This might have created a peaceful constitutional advance
towards majority rule. But the Boers made it clear that they would rather
continue fighting than accept such conditions and Britain capitulated. The
question of African voting rights would be set aside until the two ex¬
republics had returned to responsible government. Britain also agreed to
release all prisoners of war, to pardon all those still under arms and to
provide massive financial aid to get the Southern African economy back on
its feet.

305
Part four Middle Africa

12 States and societies in Middle

Africa in the nineteenth century
Middle Africa comprises the tropical part of the continent south of West
Africa and the East African Horn, and north of the Benguela Railway and
the Ruvuma river in southern Tanzania. This large slice of Africa, lying
between northern Africa and southern Africa is divided into the modern
western states of Gabon, Congo, Angola and Zaire and the eastern states,
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. In the nineteenth cen¬
tury it was divided into a far greater number of political units, both large
and small.

Peoples and rulers

The northern boundary is artificial. There has been regular contact be¬
tween people on either side. During the nineteenth century whole peoples
came down into Middle Africa from the north. This line, however, does
roughly represent the northern boundary of the equatorial forest, and
beyond it lie the open spaces of the savanna, in which the civilizations of
the Sudan had flourished. The Sudanic peoples tended to look northward
and eastward across parkland and desert to North Africa, the Nile valley
and to Mecca. The equatorial forest was strange to them, the economy and
rhythm of life of its peoples was in many ways different from their own.
For them, therefore, the forest was a considerable natural obstacle to their
southward progress, and the largest movements of Sudanic and Nilotic
cattlemen went round its eastern fringes into Uganda and Kenya.
The forest was the natural habitat of the Bantu-speaking peoples who
formed the overwhelming majority of the population of Middle Africa.
Many Bantu-speakers lived in the forested areas of the Zaire basin and
around the Great Lakes. They grew their tubers or bananas in forest
clearings, or turned their hands to the savanna cultivation of maize or
millet or even to the rearing of cattle. The southern and eastern edges of
the forest did not form a sharp dividing line across Middle Africa as did

306
 The larger groups of Middle African peoples mentioned in the text

307
the northern forest line. The two different types of environment com¬
plemented each other and had a stimulating effect upon the people living
just inside or just outside the forest. It was along these fringes that some of
the largest states in Middle Africa flourished at the opening of the
nineteenth century.
It is a mistake to think of large states as being necessarily superior to
stateless societies. Many people in Middle Africa preferred the democracy
of stateless societies to the exploitation which rulers sometimes imposed in
large states. In the modern world, where easy communications bring
people together, and the division of labour and growth of big cities make
man dependent on man, the large centralized state ruling millions of
people has become the most usual form of political organization. In the
past this was neither technologically possible nor economically necessary.
When each village was able to supply most of its requirements from the
produce of its own fields, there was no compelling reason for large
numbers of people to accept the common rule of a single government.
Where people agreed to belong to one of the larger states they generally
did so because they believed in the strength of the moral and material
power of those who ruled and also in their ability to offer protection to
subjects who accepted their authority. Once that belief waned or once
incompetent or ailing rulers began to lose control, the state or kingdom
would crumble and divide into its separate parts - the many self-
supporting village communities which had comprised the whole. Unlike
today, therefore, political boundaries were constantly changing according
to local circumstances. The same was true in much of the rest of the world
before the Industrial Revolution. In Europe, for example, the ruling royal
dynasties were constantly faced with the danger that their states might fall
apart because of internal revolts or foreign defeats. So it was in Middle
Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century. We shall now look at
some of these Middle African states.

The Kongo kingdom

During its greatest days in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Kongo
kingdom dominated the country between the Zaire (formerly Congo) river
in the north, Luanda Island in the south-west and the Kwango river in the
east. Since the coming to power of a Catholic convert in 1506 it had been a
Christian kingdom. It had sought to modernize by importing Portuguese
traders, craftsmen and priests and in return sent some of its own people to
Portugal for educational and religious training. Portuguese traders in
Angola through their economic greed, their slave raiding and their assist-

308
 A seventeenth-century impression of Mbanza Kongo (Sao Salvador)

lance to Kongo’s enemies, were largely responsible for the kingdom’s

) downfall in 1665. After that time the power of Kongo’s kings steadily
> declined and the kingdom fragmented into small chiefdoms. By the
[nineteenth century royal authority was not recognized outside the old
j capital of Sao Salvador. But literacy and a knowledge of Portuguese
j survived, as did a centuries-old royal archives until this was destroyed by
j fire towards the end of the nineteenth century. Although the now power¬
less Kongo rulers were still crowned by Christian missionaries, for the
majority of the Kongo-speaking people Christianity had become absorbed
within the local religions.

! The Lunda empire and Kazembe

At about the same time that the Kongo kingdom began to disintegrate,
another important state to the south-east, the Lunda empire, was rapidly
expanding outwards from the upper Kasai basin. By 1800 it stretched
from the Kwando river in the west to the Luapula in the east. Its dynasty,
whose title Mwata Yamvo (or Mwaant Yaav) survives to the present day,
controlled subordinate chiefs who ruled a million people. An efficient
system of messengers meant that tribute was regularly paid by subjects
from as far as two months’ distance from the capital. Such efficiency
sometimes meant hardship for the ordinary people, who were forced to

309
work as serfs for the ruling aristocracy. The Lunda developed a great
trading empire involving copper, ivory, slaves, cloth, beads and salt.
Trading links were established with the Portuguese in Angola and
Mozambique, who supplied prestige items for the Lunda aristocracy,
while the new crops of cassava and maize gradually replaced millet and
bananas. A long period of stability ended in the 1870s, when the empire
was successfully challenged by other traders.
In order to extend its control over resources the Lunda often sent out
colonists to establish outlying states. One such group moved eastwards
into Shaba (formerly Katanga) to exploit the local copper and salt. Its ruler
took the title Mwata Kazembe. Kazembe sold ivory and slaves to the
Portuguese at Tete on the Zambezi in return for cloth and guns and sent
back copper, salt and possibly slaves to the imperial capital. The Kazembe
kingdom grew rich on tribute and by the nineteenth century had become
almost as powerful as the empire itself. But its wealth attracted rival
Swahili and Nyamwezi traders from the east and by the 1870s they had
seriously weakened it.

Luba and Kuba

To the east of Lunda lay the Luba empire. This was not a single political
unit, but rather a number of different dynastic states drawn together by
trade, especially during the heyday of the empire from about 1840 to 1870.
The Luba heartland contained rich iron and salt deposits, and as Luba-
speakers expanded eastwards across the savanna towards Lake Tanga¬
nyika they were also able to exploit ivory, copper palm oil and fish. Political
control was exercised through secret societies, known as bambudye, which
offered hospitality and protection, resolved serious disputes and gathered
information. Luba society was noted for its sculpture, its music and its
elaborate praise poetry. But it could also be cruel, as when prisoners of
war were mutilated and marched in front of Luba armies to terrify and
intimidate opponents. From about 1870 the empire began to weaken as
ivory supplies diminished and new trading rivals, such as the Nyamwezi
and Swahili, arrived with guns. The Luba then began selling their own
people as slaves in order to buy guns. This naturally created serious
tensions, as a result of which the empire virtually disintegrated in the
1880s.
To the north of Luba and Lunda lay the Kuba state, which reached its
peak around 1750. The great seventeenth-century Kuba leader Shyaam is
credited with the introduction of maize, cassava, beans and tobacco.
Thereafter agricultural output and population expanded rapidly while

310
trading links grew in all directions. Increased specialization led to regular
markets and the use of raffia squares, cowries, beads and then copper bars
as currencies. The Kuba also developed one of the most complex adminis¬
trative systems in Middle Africa, including something similar to a modern
jury system. But they were best known for their arts, which were strongly
encouraged both in ceremonial and in daily life. Their sculpture and their
pottery were particularly famous. The Kuba rulers were known as
Bushong.

The inter-lacustrine kingdoms

Moving further eastwards across Middle Africa one reached the kingdoms
which grew up between the Great Lakes of East Africa. These are some¬
times referred to as the inter-lacustrine (between-the-lakes) kingdoms,
and they include Buganda, Bunyoro, Toro, Nkore, Hava, Rwanda and
Burundi. This is generally an area of good, reliable rainfall and of fertile
soils which is able to support a much denser level of population than is
normally possible in tropical Africa. Here, too, especially in Buganda,
cultivation of the very long-lasting banana plant made permanent settle¬
ment possible and desirable. Such factors obviously encouraged the
building of states.
These kingdoms resembled each other in their political organization.
The king usually possessed strong and often autocratic executive powers
in addition to the ritual and symbolic eminence customarily accorded to
monarchs in Middle Africa. All state authority was concentrated in the
king’s hands, though he delegated part of that authority to provincial
governors and they in turn to local sub-chiefs. But these provincial gov¬
ernors were normally directly appointed by the king and could therefore
be dismissed by him at will. Periods of tutelage at the royal court enabled
the ruler to select as officials only those whose loyalty he felt he could
trust. In only a few kingdoms, such as Rwanda, did these officials become
strong enough to make their posts hereditary. A further safeguard for the
monarch lay in the fact that in most kingdoms no clear provision was made
for the succession to the throne, and whilst this could sometimes lead to
fierce succession disputes on the death of a ruler, it also meant that theie
was no danger of opposition forming around the person of a chosen heir to
the throne.
In virtually all of the kingdoms the ruling dynasties claimed to be
foreigners who had come from afar, sometimes through divine interven¬
tion. Elaborate royal traditions, emphasizing the superiority and sepaiate-
ness of the ruling classes, were carefully handed down from generation to

311
generation, and these tended to ignore the extent to which local culture
had been adopted by the rulers. Often, as in Rwanda, Burundi and Nkore,
non-Bantu pastoralists ruled over Bantu agriculturalists, and though clear¬
ly pastoralists and farmers needed each other’s skills, it was generally true
that cattle-keepers were held in high esteem throughout the inter-
lacustrine area. Finally, these highly centralized kingdoms were able to
extract a great deal of tribute from their subjects, sometimes amounting to
as much as one-third of a family’s labour time. This enabled the rulers to
live in some luxury and enhanced their ability to think of themselves as a
superior'caste.

Buganda and Bunyoro

The two most powerful of the northerly inter-lacustrine kingdoms were

the traditional rivals Buganda and Bunyoro. With the assistance of a
secure southern boundary along the shores of Lake Victoria, Buganda
increased her size during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, largely
at Bunyoro’s expense. The king, or Kabaka, of Buganda extended his own
power greatly and established a permanent army and an efficient navy. In
an area of land scarcity - a rare occurrence in Middle Africa - the Kabaka,
who was thought to be semi-divine, owned nearly all the land, which he
distributed to sub-chiefs, who in turn divided it amongst their followers.
Because land was relatively scarce it took on a symbolic value (accorded
elsewhere to cattle) and those to whom land was given had to pledge their
loyalty to the Kabaka. There was no hereditary aristocracy, no royal clan
was allowed to emerge, and close kinsmen of the Kabaka could not
become chiefs. With a thriving economy, kept under strict royal control,
with excellent internal communications and a population of perhaps half a
million, Buganda was in a very strong position to confront and respond to
outside influence in the late nineteenth century.
Bunyoro, lying to the south of Lake Albert, was less centralized than
Buganda. It tended to suffer more succession disputes and to have greater
difficulty holding on to its frontier provinces. Indeed around 1830 one
such province broke away to become the independent kingdom of Toro.
But a Bunyoro revival later took place under the strong rule of Kabarega.
He reconquered Toro in the 1870s and made the kingdom once more a
leading military power in the region.

Nkore and Haya

To the south of Buganda and Bunyoro, between Lakes Edward and

312
Victoria, lay the Nkore kingdom and the Haya states. Nkore, a mixture of
ruling Bahima pastoralists and Bairu subjects who were agriculturalists,
began to emerge in the eighteenth century and reached its peak in the
1870s, only to decline swiftly as a result of a series of epidemics and attacks
from neighbouring Rwanda. While cattle were accorded great prestige in
Nkore, there was far more social mobility between rulers and subjects
than in most other kingdoms. A very similar social structure existed in the
Haya states, which also comprised Bahima rulers and Bairu subjects.
These were economically flourishing societies which exported coffee to
Buganda, Bunyoro and Nkore in exchange for cattle. They also began to
import luxury goods from the east coast.

Rwanda and Burundi

The kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi were located south of Nkore and
the Haya states and to the north of Lake Tanganyika. This is an excep¬
tionally fertile and well-watered mountainous area, capable of supporting
extremely dense populations. Here the social and indeed racial division
between ruling non-Bantu Tutsi pastoralists (of uncertain origins) and
their agricultural subjects, the Bantu-speaking Hutu, was at its most
extreme. Intermarriage was expressly forbidden. Highly complex hierar-

A young Mututsi, showing the white robes and traditional hairstyle now rarely worn

313
chical structures and patron-client relationships were established which
rigidly controlled the ownership of cattle. Both kingdoms were militarily
strong, with Rwanda the more aggressive during the nineteenth century.
They tended to be unresponsive to the new economic opportunities and
dangers which were beginning to be felt everywhere in the second half of
the century.

Tanzania and Kenya

Moving eastwards from the Great Lakes one comes finally to the lands
stretching away to the Indian Ocean, which we know today as Tanzania

Population density in eastern Africa. The map is in two parts as information from the
different countries does not in all cases agree

314
and Kenya. In this area in the nineteenth century there were very few
centralized societies (and certainly no great empires) of the type described
above. There were very good reasons for this. Over much of the land
rainfall is inadequate or uncertain, the soils are poor, agriculture is preca¬
rious, and man is engaged in a constant battle with nature. Population
densities in the nineteenth century were extremely low, far lower than in
the more fertile inter-lacustrine region. Indeed Bantu-speakers were still
colonizing the land in Tanzania - one of the last parts of Africa where this
was happening. People had concentrated around the more fertile peri¬
meter, leaving large parts of the drier interior virtually unpopulated. In
such circumstances there were few incentives towards state formation.
Instead people preferred to live in small groups, able to move on when
disputes arose because there was so much land available. Small chief¬
tainships did emerge in Tanzania and societies certainly became more
complex during the nineteenth century, but the dominant theme was one
of considerable movement and fission. People were constantly colonizing
new land, forming new political units, and then breaking off again in
search of new land or greater security. Contrary to the beliefs of later
European colonialists there were certainly no fixed, unchanging ‘tribes’ in
Tanzania at this time, and such states as did exist tended to be fragile and
impermanent. But as people came into greater contact with each other, as
they began to occupy the marginal lands of central Tanzania, and as the
external pressures increased, so societies began to change more rapidly
and to look for new forms of political organization and new rulers with
which to meet these challenges.
In Kenya the overall pattern was very similar. Here too there were no
great economic pressures for political centralization. Chiefs were few;
lineages and age-sets were all important. Even the dreaded and feared
Maasai, the Nilotic warrior-pastoralists who dominated the plains of cen¬
tral Kenya and were pushing their way south into northern Tanzania, had
neither chiefs nor a centralized form of government. During the
nineteenth century the Bantu-speaking peoples of the forests, such as the
Kikuyu, began for the first time to hold the Maasai in check. Frustrated
and searching desperately for new grazing lands, the Maasai embarked on
a series of destructive civil wars. By contrast, Kikuyu farmers, Kamba
traders, and Nandi cattle-keepers enjoyed periods of expansion. Though
there was undoubtedly fear and mistrust between agriculturalists and
pastoralists, there was also trade and some intermarriage. As in Tanzania,
a need was felt for new men to assume greater powers in order to offer
people greater protection. We shall look at some of these in the next
chapter.

315
 A Maasai with traditional hairstyle and clothing at Tabora

Conclusion

Most people in Middle Africa, whether they were subjects of large kingly
states like Buganda or inhabitants of small autonomous villages, were not
directly involved in high politics. In the kingly states the struggle for office
concerned only those classes born to rule or the few adventurous common¬
ers willing to run the considerable risks of attendance at the royal court in
the hopes of one day rising to positions of power. Those who lived in small
self-regulating communities, such as those of south-eastern Tanzania,
tended to be more politically conscious than their counterparts in the
kingly states, for a greater proportion of people were involved in dispens¬
ing justice and in deciding issues of war and peace. But for most of the
people most of the time the dominant concerns were the constant struggles
with nature and with disease, the annual planting and harvesting of the
crops, the rearing of children who would take their place in the labour
force, and the performance of the religious rituals which bound societies
together. These societies of Middle Africa were about to be tested by
powerful new forces which would ultimately sweep away their autonomy
and independence.

316
13 Crisis, revolution and colonial
conquest in Middle Africa,
1840-1900
Introduction

The nineteenth century was a time of crisis and revolution in Middle

Africa. It was a century during which outside forces had an ever-
increasing impact upon the continent as a whole, culminating in the
conquest of Africa by Europe in the 1880s and 1890s. Increasingly Middle
Africa was linked to the expanding capitalist economies of western
Europe and North America as earlier demands for slaves gave way to
demands for commodities such as palm oil, ivory, rubber and wax. These
were exported in exchange for the new firearms and the mass-produced
cloth of the west, where the Industrial Revolution was now underway,
giving Europe a new technological supremacy over the rest of the world.
In the second half of the nineteenth century almost all of Middle Africa
witnessed the penetration of traders from the Atlantic and Indian Ocean
coasts and the subsequent creation of new kinds of states led by new men
who seized power and sought to exploit the new opportunities. Change
tended to be more rapid in the savannas than in the forests. The new states
with their gangs of mercenaries often resembled mobile armies of occupa¬
tion. They posed a great threat to the older-established kingly states,
which tended to fall easy prey to the new forces. Huge trading caravans
shot their way across Middle Africa, those from the west and east coasts
eventually meeting and clashing in present-day Zaire. With Europeans
and Arabs at the coasts willingly supplying guns and credit, Middle Africa
entered a phase of growing violence and insecurity, when strangers were
automatically assumed to be hostile. The African imperialism of the
Chokwe, Ovimbundu, Nyamwezi and Swahili trading empires almost
certainly weakened Middle Africa on the eve of its confrontation with
European imperialism. Moreover the rapid commercial revolution associ¬
ated with ivory and rubber was not accompanied by improvements in

317
agricultural technology and too many scarce resources were plundered and
not replenished. The end result was to leave Middle Africa ecologically as
well as politically vulnerable at a crucial point in time.

Shipping and commerce

One important external factor which affected Middle Africa during the
nineteenth century was the great improvement in naval communications.
Up to the close of the Napoleonic wars in Europe in 1815, the seas both
west and east of Middle Africa were seldom free of pirates and the ships of
warring nations, such as the British, the French, the Portuguese and the
Dutch. After that date, mainly beause the British had secured mastery of
the seas, there was a period of unprecedented maritime peace which
lasted throughout the nineteenth century. Not only were the great naval
powers at peace but piracy of all kinds was rigorously stamped out. The
seas to the east of Africa particularly benefited from this. While the
Atlantic had known a few periods of peace during the eighteenth century,
the Indian Ocean had been the scene of continual piracy and warfare for
more than three centuries. Now for the first time merchants could load
their vessels in the confidence that they would reach their destinations.
Obviously this greatly encouraged trade as did the new instruments for
navigating at sea and the gready improved charts of African waters made in
the 1820s and 1830s. Ships became larger and faster and were no longer
weighed down by guns. Regular postal services were established on the
west coast in the 1850s and on the east coast in the 1870s, and these kept
businessmen in African ports in touch with markets in other parts of the
world. Such developments increased the commercial power of the trading
communities on the coasts of Middle Africa.
In addition to this, markets in other countries for certain goods which
Middle Africa could produce were steadily expanding. The value of slaves
sent to the sugar and coffee plantations of Cuba and Brazil tended to rise in
the first half of the century until that traffic was put down. The price of
palm oil produced around the mouth of the Zaire river rose rapidly up to
the 1860s, the price of ivory which was gathered widely in the heart of
Middle Africa rose throughout the century, and in the 1880s there was a
boom in rubber which was found in large areas of present Zaire and
Angola. At the same time, the price of the goods which Middle Africa
imported from the outside world was tending to fall. First Indian and then
British and American cheap cotton manufactures came flooding into
African ports. The price of haberdashery and metalware was also falling as
was the price of those deadly imports - guns. In economists’ language, the

318
terms of trade were moving steadily in favour of Middle Africa during
much of the nineteenth century. On the one hand this gave a considerable
incentive to Africans in all parts of the area to engage in a commerce which
year by year yielded increasing profits. On the other hand, the main
beneficiaries were the merchants in the coastal towns and those nearest
them, who secured the largest share of the rising trade. Throughout the
century this was the general tendency: the centres of economic power and
initiative moved away from the heart of the continent towards the coasts.
The predominant part played by external commerce in the total trade of
Middle Africa, which was so evident at the end of the nineteenth century,
was something new in the history of the area. At the beginning of the
nineteenth century the people mostly provided themselves with their own
cloth and manufactured their own tools and weapons. Foreign trade was a
fringe affair which affected the lives of only a few in such states as Lunda
or Kazembe. The main trade routes ran north and south rather than east
and west, and the bulk of the commerce was carried on between the
populous states of the inter-lacustrine area and the Zaire basin. Much of
the trade was on a fairly local basis, such as the manufacture and distribu¬
tion of hoes and other farming implements by specialist blacksmiths, or
the trade in raffia work and bark cloth. Nevertheless, some of the markets
for these commodities were to be found hundreds of kilometres from the
place of manufacture, and this was even more strikingly the case with the
copper products of Katanga (now Shaba), which were traded as far west as
the Luba kingdom on the Kasai and as far east as Nyamwezi country in
modern Tanzania.

New firearms and diseases

With the increase in foreign trade came a vast increase in the number of
firearms imported into Middle Africa. Their impact generally was to make
warfare far bloodier than it had been before, thus offering new opportuni¬
ties to rulers but bringing greater misery to people who were raided.
During the eighteenth century and for the first half ol the nineteenth
century, the standard infantry weapon was the flintlock musket. It was not
very effective. It was heavy, it took up to a minute to reload and was very
inaccurate when aimed at distances of more than 50 metres. Even in the
open country of much of Europe, soldiers who used it also carried a
bayonet which enabled them to convert the musket into a stabbing spear.
In the close warfare of the forests and tall grasses of Middle Africa it was
noisy, but scarcely more effective than the spear or the poisoned arrow.
The late nineteenth-century rifle, however, was an entirely different gun.

319
Weapons used in Middle Africa: right, an eighteenth-century musket with fixed bayonet.
Left, a nineteenth-century officer of an indigenous East African army armed with a
repeater rifle

It was lighter and easier to handle, it was far quicker to load, and it could
kill someone 300 metres away. From around 1850 western firearms tech¬
nology advanced rapidly, guns quickly became out of date and each time
inventors designed new improved models they were bought by the armies
of Europe and America, and the old models were sold off cheaply. A
growing number of these cheap but increasingly effective firearms found
their way into Middle Africa after 1860, and they greatly facilitated the
acquisition of slaves, war captives and ivory. Only in the 1890s, when the
Europeans were trying to conquer Middle Africa, did they attempt to
restrict the sale of arms.
The ships, which called ever more frequently at African ports bringing
firearms and other western goods, also introduced deadly new diseases,
such as smallpox, cholera, jiggers and rinderpest. The combined impact of
new firearms and new diseases was devastating. In the later nineteenth
century large parts of Middle Africa presented an almost apocalyptic
picture of people fleeing from their homesteads in the plains to seek the
safety of stockaded villages on hilltops or the less comfortable security of
marshes. Many became refugees when their homes were plundered and
destroyed by marauding bands of mercenaries. Cattle keepers, their herds
destroyed by disease or captured by raiders, wandered in search of new
means of livelihood. Whole areas were abandoned because of war, disease

320
or famine and that enemy of man, the tsetse fly, moved in to occupy many
of the vacant lands.
These hard times threw up a number of outstanding leaders who, by
harnessing and controlling the dynamic forces of the period, were able to
offer security and prosperity to their followers, though generally at the
expense of less fortunate neighbours. Some were traditional rulers but a
greater number were self-made men with trading and military skills. We
shall be looking at the careers of some of these men in this chapter.

Sayyid Said and Zanzibar commerce

The trading communities of the east coast of Africa had remained where
they were for several centuries, without making any significant attempt to
move inland or make contact with the densely populated areas around the
Great Lakes. They were mostly of mixed African and Arab blood, repre¬
senting several waves of immigrants who, over a long period of years, had
settled in such places as Kilwa, Mombasa and Zanzibar, intermarried and
made their homes there. They were known as Swahili. In the early
nineteenth century, especially after 1820, things began to stir in the coastal
towns. The community of Indian traders, already well established
when the century began, swelled in numbers and became more active.
Many of them were agents of firms established in the large commercial and
manufacturing cities of north-western India. These firms were well-
organized and enterprising, and many were linked indirectly with the
growing economic power of Britain. They had money to invest and as the
Indian Ocean became safe for business they were encouraged to take a
closer interest in East Africa. Then there were the Arabs of the Persian
Gulf, warlike men who were being squeezed out of their own waters by
British and Indian pressure. Omani Arabs had a long history of shipping
and trading contact with East Africa, but in the nineteenth century they
came in larger numbers and with more warlike intent than before.
The influx of these new elements into the coastal towns was presided
over and controlled by Sayyid Said, Sultan of Oman in Arabia. Omani
dynasties had held important possessions on the East African coast since
the seventeenth century. In the early years of his reign, between 1806 and
1820, Sayyid Said tended to neglect his East African dominions. But after
1820, when his efforts to enlarge his empire in the Persian Gulf were
visibly failing, he switched his attention from his Arabian homeland. His
visits to Zanzibar became more frequent and in 1840 he established his
capital there permanently. By that time he had consolidated his control
over most of the ports between Mogadishu and Cape Delgado. He had

321
 Sayyid Said, Sultan of Zanzibar

also, by his diplomacy, cemented an alliance between the enterprising

Indian businessmen and the Arab soldiers and sailors, and directed the
energies of both toward the economic exploitation of the interior. Exten¬
sive clove plantations were established on the islands of Zanzibar and
Pemba, most of them owned and run by Arabs and backed by Indian
capitalists who provided the money to buy African slaves to work on them.
The inland trade was also developed by the same combination of Arabs
and Indians. Indians provided goods on credit which enabled caravans to
set off from the East African ports laden with articles to exchange with the
peoples of the interior. Indians also provided the money to stock trading
depots, such as that at Tabora in central Tanzania. The leadership of these
expeditions to the interior was mostly in the hands of immigrant Arabs
and Swahili families established at Zanzibar. By 1825 men from the coasts
were trading near Tabora, and by 1850 they had reached the Kabaka’s
court in Buganda, and were established at Ujiji on the eastern shores of
Lake Tanganyika, from where they traded with the people of the Zaire
basin further west. Two Arabs even crossed the continent to the west
coast. The Arab caravans sought principally slaves and ivory. Slaves were
needed to provide labour for the Zanzibar clove plantations, and for
export to Arabia, Somaliland and islands in the Indian Ocean. Ivory found
a ready market in Europe and America, and it was shipped off with the
cloves by the American, French, German and British Indian vessels which

322
called in increasing numbers at the port of Zanzibar from the 1830s
onwards.

Nyamwezi and Arab traders

The spectacular extension of Zanzibari trading activity between 1820 and

1850 was by no means a purely Indo-Arab affair. Men from the coast may
have led the caravans, but the guides and the men who actually carried the
goods came mostly from Nyamwezi country in western Tanzania. Indeed
many of the trade routes which the Arabs are credited with discovering
were in fact those which the Nyamwezi, and other African traders such as
the Kamba and the Yao, had long been using. The Nyamwezi were one ol
the greatest trading peoples of Middle Africa. They had already developed
trading routes north to Buganda, south to Katanga (Shaba) and east to the
coast. Indeed Zanzibar’s first contact with the far interior had been
through their agency. They had come down with the produce of their own

323
and neighbouring countries for barter in the coastal towns. But, as more
Indian capital was invested in the trade, the commercial initiative passed
from the Nyamwezi to the people of the coast. The Indians were able to
send thousands of pounds worth of trade goods to the interior, and sit and
wait for a year or more until their caravans returned with produce they
could sell to European shippers. Thus, instead of beginning in Unyam-
wezi, business deals now began at Zanzibar and those entrusted with their
execution were people of that town.
Yet the commercial expertise and co-operation of the Nyamwezi was
still essential to the trade. They provided most of the porters, both for the
Arab caravans and for those they continued to run on their own account.
They were also more or less in command of the trade routes. In 1839
Sayyid Said signed a commercial treaty with them, and shortly after the
Nyamwezi agreed to the passage, free of tolls, of caravans flying Said’s
flag. For a time the agreement worked, but it came under strain as the
caravans grew larger and ate up more of the food supplies of villages they
passed through. Food was always hard to come by in the badly watered
areas of central Tanzania, where droughts and local famines were com¬
mon. So it was not to be expected that people would take kindly to the
constant passage of hungry caravaners, and quarrels over tolls became
exceptionally serious in the 1850s.
The result was trouble between the Arabs and their Nyamwezi hosts,
and to maintain their position the Arabs began to interfere in local politics,
backing one clan of the fragmented Nyamwezi against another and involv¬
ing themselves in chieftaincy disputes. The Arab depot at Tabora became
a stronghold rather than a group of warehouses, and by 1860 it was
fighting a regular war with Mnwa Sele, a leading Nyamwezi chief. Mnwa
Sele was defeated and beheaded in 1865, and the Arabs thus secured
control of the central point of communications in this area. But they were
not to remain undisturbed for long, for while they were quarrelling with
their former allies the Nyamwezi, the whole of western Tanzania was
being torn apart by new forces advancing from the south.

The Ngoni impact

The effects of the great Mfecane, already discussed in connection with the
history of Southern Africa, were not confined to that part of the continent
alone. Zwangendaba’s Ngoni warriors moved northward as far as the Fipa
plateau between Lakes Tanganyika and Rukwa, and when that leader
died, around 1848, his followers set off on a typical Ngoni career of
conquest across the grasslands to the north and east. They brought a new

324
ruthless professionalism which was to revolutionize the art of warfare.
They struck northward towards Ujiji, which they devastated in the 1850s.
From there they moved north again but failed to make any headway
against the solidly organized Ha people and the kingdom of Rwanda.
Instead they struck eastward, laid waste Uzinza and western Sukumaland,
and then made off south-westward again to the neighbourhood of Ujiji,
where they were active in the late 1880s. While this was going on in the
north, another large body of Ngoni had pushed across the Ruvuma river in
the 1850s and begun to terrorize vast areas of southern Tanzania and
northern Mozambique.
Most of these Ngoni were Ngoni in name only and not by descent. They
had been prisoners of war taken during the long migrations, and then
brought up within the Ngoni military system as full-time soldiers. Wher¬
ever they went they disrupted the societies with which they came in
contact. Some communities were scattered, some were absorbed within
the Ngoni armies, while others reorganized themselves along Ngoni lines
in a desperate effort to survive. When a community did this it in turn
became a threat to its neighbours, and so the torch which the Ngoni lit was
carried further afield by others until much of western Tanzania was
ablaze.
Among the imitators of the Ngoni was Munyigumba, who ruled the
Hehe people to the north-east of Lake Rukwa between about 1855 and
1879. A brief description of the methods by which Munyigumba built up
the nucleus of a unified state will give some impression of how a Ngoni
imitator worked and what sort of revolution the Ngoni brought about.
Munyigumba’s conquest of a Hehe chiefdom, of which about thirty were
eventually absorbed into his state, may be divided into three phases. Phase
one — the ‘break in’ — was achieved by force of arms. Munyigumba s
soldiers would attack a neighbouring chiefdom, carry off its cattle and
force its leaders to accept his rule. During phase two the traditional rulers
would either be driven out and replaced by younger brothers or, if their
loyalty could be relied upon, they would be confirmed in their positions
and made sub-chiefs under Munyigumba’s control. At the same time
members of Munyigumba’s large ‘school’ of 12-to-20-year old followers,
trained in the ideology of the new state, would be sent out as military
colonists among the chiefdom to spread the idea of loyalty to Munyigum
ba. By the end of the second phase the people would be completely
absorbed. In the third phase, they would be called on to provide warriors
for the central army and some of their young men would be selected for
training in the royal school. They would render obedience to Munyigum
ba, who controlled the collection of ivory and distributed coastal tra e
goods to each according to his rank. He also monopolized the iunction o

325
rain-making, and his ancestors were made the object of special ritual
offering by the whole state.
A striking feature of Munyigumba’s work was its amazing permanence.
Altough it was a very recent creation, the Hehe state, under his son
Mkwawa, stood solidly together against the Germans when they arrived in
the 1890s, and some thirty years of direct rule thereafter failed to make the
people forget the idea of unity and loyalty to the dynasty.
The Hehe state has been described at some length because, altough it
was comparatively small it contained significant features common both to
Ngoni groups and to their many imitators to the south, west and east of
Uhehe. In many cases those who wished to follow Munyigumba’s example
had no need to ‘break in’ to the territories of their neighbours. The
breaking had already been done for them by the ravages of the Ngoni.
During the period between 1850 and 1880 thousands of villages were
destroyed and burnt by raiding forces, and young men wandered off in
search of new ways of making a living. Some became dagga (cannabis)-
smoking hooligans, ‘ruga-ruga’ as they were often called, who formed
small gangs and sallied forth with spears and guns to rustle cattle and
terrorize peaceful villages, like their contemporaries in the American West
after the Civil War. Others joined one or other of the emerging states or
the trading caravans. They were essentially mercenaries. Even in peaceful
villages in Unyamwezi there was a growing urge among adventurous
youths to take to the road in search of a quick fortune. Men of this type
combined with others from the shattered west to form the backbone of the
great trading empires established by two outstanding Nyamwezi leaders,
Mirambo and Msiri.

Mirambo and Msiri

Mirambo was born around 1840. He spent his youth as a caravan porter
and succeeded to the chiefdom of a small district north-west of Tabora in
about 1858. With the assistance of the Ngoni and ruga-ruga warriors he
gradually gained control of the surrounding chiefdoms, obtaining regular
tribute in the form of ivory and young men for his armies. He also
plundered many guns from passing caravans. By 1871 he controlled the
vital Tabora-Ujiji trade route and demanded tolls from the caravans. This
provoked a war with the Arabs, who were defeated and eventually agreed
to pay tolls. Mirambo used the tolls to extend his influence over a wide
area ol north-western Tanzania. He was certainly aware of the dangers
facing nineteenth-century African rulers and he pursued an ambitious
foreign policy, seeking alliances with Buganda, with Msiri and Tippu Tip

326
in eastern Zaire, and with the British at Zanzibar. He sought European
missionaries and traders to act as a counterbalance against the Arabs. His
was essentially an empire of the trade routes, far-flung but also loose-knit
and vulnerable. It was not sufficiently well established in the minds of the
people to survive Mirambo’s death in 1884.
Mirambo’s work was more spectacular but less lasting than Munyigum-
ba’s. But while he lived Mirambo’s name was feared along all the
approaches to the inter-lacustrine kingdoms from the east, and his activi¬
ties contributed to the revolution in people’s ideas and their ways of life
which was taking place in much of Middle Africa at this time.
There are striking similarities between Mirambo’s career and that of his
fellow Nyamwezi, Msiri. Msiri was born around 1830 and was the son of a
trader whose main business lay in the region of Katanga (now Shaba).
Msiri too became a porter and caravan leader, and about 1858 he estab¬
lished himself in the country to the west of Lake Mweru, which was rich
in copper and ivory. His own people, called Yeke by the local inhabitants,
were already trading there in considerable numbers. But it was Msiri who
conceived the idea of turning from trade to politics. He brought in guns
from the east coast and a flood of uprooted young men from western
Tanzania. With these tough warriors at his back, he interfered in the
quarrels of local chiefs, forced the settlement of disputes and imposed his
own rule on the successful parties. By 1869 he was powerful enough to
break away from Kazembe’s overlordship and declare himself king (mwa-
mi) of the area he controlled. He established his capital at Bunkeya, which
became one of the largest towns in Middle Africa, he stopped and pushed
back the Luba who had been advancing from the north, and he cut
communications between Kazembe and the main Lunda empire to the
west. In the 1870s he married the daughters of a Portuguese trader from
Angola and an Arab trader from the east coast, and soon caravans were
leaving Bunkeya on the journeys of over 1500 kilometres to the Atlantic
port of Benguela and the Indian Ocean port of Bagamoyo, opposite
Zanzibar. The caravans carried goods such as ivory, slaves, copper, rub¬
ber and wax.
His empire, which he called Garenganze, was located between the upper
Lualaba and Luapula rivers and was one of the most successful conquest
states of Middle Africa. Whereas Mirambo had concentrated on controll¬
ing the trade routes, Msiri sought to control the sources of production,
especially of copper and ivory. His provincial governors were primarily
concerned with the collection of ivory. But the subject people were begin
ning to revolt in the late 1880s, and when Msiri was killed by an agent o
the Congo Free State in 1891, the empire quickly collapsed.

327
Tippu Tip and the Arabs

While Msiri was building up his kingdom in Katanga, Arab traders were
moving into the country to the north from their base at Ujiji. They came
initially in small numbers to trade, but by the 1860s they had turned to
raiding for ivory and slaves, and had established fortified strongholds. The
bulk of the Arabs’ supporters were in fact Nyamwezi and other Africans
from western Tanzania with, in addition, new recruits raised from the
remnants of the many broken villages in what is now eastern Zaire. Many
of these were Tetela people, who adopted a form of Islam and the Swahili
language. They were responsible for spreading Arab/Swahili culture
throughout a large area of eastern Zaire, where Swahili became widely
spoken. But in their search for ivory and slaves they destroyed the power
of local rulers and spread much terror and anarchy, as well as Swahili.
Some degree of political order was then established by Tippu Tip. He
was an Afro-Arab, born in Zanzibar around 1830. He worked on his
father’s Tabora plantations and then in the caravan trade. In the 1870s
when he decided to move into the ivory-rich Tetela territory of eastern
Zaire, he had the wisdom to construct for himself a genealogy which made
him the alleged descendant of a Tetela princess. The Tetela were at this
time coming under heavy pressure from their Luba neighbours, and to

Tippu Tip

328
make himself more acceptable to his prospective subjects, Tippu Tip
defeated a Luba force. On arrival among the Tetela he delivered to them
some of their captured sons whom he had released from Luba captivity.
According to Tippu Tip’s (no doubt idealized) own account, the chief
immediately resigned in his favour. Tippu Tip thus became a Tetela ruler
and so was able to obtain ivory as tribute instead of having to pay for it.
He made his capital at Kasongo on the Lualaba river, established roads
and plantations, and stopped raiding within his own domains. He had to
allow his followers to raid elsewhere, for slaves for the plantations and for
ivory which was sent to Zanzibar, helped by an agreement with Mirambo
giving his caravans safe passage. In the 1880s he became involved in a
violent struggle for control of the resources of eastern Zaire with agents of
what was to become the Congo Free State. Though initially successful he
was forced to admit defeat by 1890, when he retired to Zanzibar a rich
man. There he died in 1905, the last of the great but ruthless caravan
traders.

Arab traders in Kenya and Uganda

North of a line from Mount Kilimanjaro westward to the southern shores

of Lake Victoria, people were not affected by the same destructive com¬
bination of Ngoni raids and Arab penetration as those further south. It is
true that Arabs traded in these parts; they first reached Buganda from
their base at Tabora in 1844. Then in the 1860s they began to take over the
trade routes leading from the east coast opposite Pemba island to western
Kenya — routes which had up to that time been monopolized by Kamba
traders. But the quality of the Arab impact was different. They met with
very strong African resistance, especially from the Maasai who constantly
raided and sometimes captured well-protected Arab caravans. Moreover
the Kikuyu and Nandi refused to let them through and so the caravans
were forced to bypass them. The Arabs could only establish small depots,
not major centres as they did further south and west. There was little
slaving along this route; the Arabs sought ivory in return for cloth and
other items from the coast.
To the west of Lake Victoria lay the inter-lacustrine kingdoms, most of
them too powerful to be dominated by even the strongest Arab caravans.
Immediately to the south of Lake Victoria the Ngoni had managed to
create havoc in the Zinza kingdoms by interfering in succession disputes.
But that was as far north as they were able to reach. Immediately to the
north the Arabs also interfered in a succession dispute, in the Haya state of
Karagwe. But beyond that they were within the sphere of influence ot the

329
powerful kingdom of Buganda. There they traded successfully, but they
did so only on terms laid down by the ruling Kabaka. These included no
trading with rivals like Bunyoro or outside the capital of Buganda. The
Arabs were barred from entering Buganda during the years 1852 to 1862,
but they were then allowed back by Kabaka Mutesa, who needed their
guns in the face of a threat from Egypt on his northern border. Instead of
playing the role of itinerant caravan leaders, most Arabs settled down to
commerce pure and simple, spiced with a certain amount of political
intrigue. They also made more conversions to Islam than elsewhere, and
the establishment of a Muslim faction in Ganda society was to be an
important factor in the religious civil wars which shook Buganda later in
the century.
Bark cloth had always been much in demand in Buganda. When the
Arabs came, their cotton cloth replaced it as the fashionable wear for men
about the court. The new textiles were much sought after as were the guns
which the Arabs also brought. But Buganda had little ivory to offer in
return. Instead it began to raid its neighbours for the ivory and slaves
needed to pay for its imports. It is thought that during Kabaka Mutesa’s
reign from 1856 to 1884, Buganda made no fewer than sixty raids on its
neighbours. This activity brought it into direct conflict with its rival

Mutesa, Kabaka of Buganda

330
Bunyoro, which was undergoing a revival under its ruler Kabarega (1869—
97). In both kingdoms in fact the power of the rulers was tending to
increase as a result of the growing importance of firearms, most of which
passed into the hands of the kings. Buganda got most of its guns from the
Zanzibari Arabs, Bunyoro from Arabs from the north, from Khartoum.
For the inter-lacustrine kingdoms were situated at the edge of the com¬
mercial empire which the Egyptians built up between 1841 and 1884 on
the upper Nile. From the late 1850s indeed, ‘Khartoumers’ began slave
raiding in Acholi and Lango country in present-day northern Uganda. But
the Egyptians were never able to acquire the same sort of influence as the
Zanzibaris in either Buganda or Bunyoro. The Zanzibaris were for the
most part regarded as friendly traders, while the Egyptians were repre¬
sentatives of an expansionist state close enough to pose a serious threat.
While Bunyoro carefully sought to avoid hostilities with them, Buganda
tried to secure their alliance against Bunyoro. In fact, although Egyptian
officials claimed to have annexed both states formally in the 1870s, and
although Egyptian posts were established in northern Bunyoro, the two
kingdoms were just too powerful and too far south to be dominated by
Egypt. Instead they were soon to fall under British control.

Angola, western Zaire and the Atlantic trade

Over in the western half of Middle Africa, many of the same influences
were making themselves felt as in the east. There was a continuing
demand from the Atlantic ports for ivory and slaves, and later for palm oil,
rubber and beeswax, while more and more western goods and firearms
found their way into the interior. As a result, the old kingly states such as
Lunda, Luba and Kazembe found themselves increasingly challenged by
new trading empires built on modern guns and the thousands of displaced
refugees prepared to join anyone who promised them booty. Violence was
inseparable from the search for slaves, ivory and rubbei. The violence
penetrated well into the equatorial forests and few areas of Middle Africa
escaped it. By the 1870s the Atlantic trading zone pushing eastwards met
the westward-expanding Indian Ocean trading zone in the middle of the
continent, in the present Zaire.
The Chokwe provide an excellent example of a hitherto relatively insig¬
nificant people rising to prominence through long-distance trade. They
began the nineteenth century as small-scale producers of beeswax an
hunters of ivory in their eastern Angolan homeland. They sold these
commodities to the Ovimbundu, the traditional long-distance traders of
western Middle Africa. With the profits the Chokwe bought guns and

331
women and began their long period of expansion northwards and east¬
wards into Zaire. This expansion took place partly because the Chokwe
had killed all the elephants in their homeland, and partly because they
switched from being producers to being traders. They moved into slaves
and rubber and organized huge caravans, supported by highly efficient
armies. In the 1870s they got involved in succession disputes in the Lunda
empire, and they captured the Lunda capital in 1886. By this time they
had become masters of large parts of northern and eastern Angola and
western Zaire. The Chokwe expansion was a destructive process however;
not just the violence associated with Chokwe trading, but the wholesale
slaughter of elephants and destruction of rubber trees, with no attempt to
replenish them.
A similar pattern of destruction was to be found in southern Angola.
Here the Ovambo and Nkhumbi people, impressed by modern Portu¬
guese firearms following a series of clashes around 1860, began to buy
guns from the proceeds of their trade in ivory and hides. But they too had
shot out all their elephants by 1880, and thereafter they annually raided
the Ovimbundu and others for cattle in a desperate attempt to keep their
army up to date. Violence in this area escalated right up to the time of
effective colonial occupation.
The position of the Portuguese on the Angolan coast tended to decline
during much of the nineteenth century and their energy at the end of the
century was largely a response to the increasing imperialism of other
European powers, notably France and Britain. In Luanda, the capital, the
white population of 2000 were mostly deported criminals while the milit¬
ary garrison comprised local African convicts. Luanda was heavily depen¬
dent upon the slave trade, the importance of which steadily declined.
Further south a serious attempt was made at white colonization around the
fishing town of Mossamedes. Trades in ivory, cattle, slaves and beeswax
was established, but the area suffered from increasingly severe Ovimbun¬
du raids. A new element was introduced in the 1880s with the arrival of
Afrikaners from what was to become South Africa.

The colonial invaders and the Berlin Conference

Five European powers - Portugal, France, Britain, Germany and King

Leopold of Belgium - took part in the invasion and conquest of Middle
Africa which occurred in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
The underlying causes of what Europeans referred to as the ‘Scramble for
Africa’ - but which in fact was the conquest and subjugation of the
continent — are discussed in the Conclusion to this Volume. Here we shall

332
be concerned solely with events relating directly to Middle Africa.
Portugal had maintained possessions on the coast of Angola since the
sixteenth century. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these
had prospered from the slave trade but had then declined and during most
of the nineteenth century were poor settlements struggling to change from
the slave trade to a trade in palm oil, beeswax and ivory. The Portuguese
garrisons were small and poorly paid and seldom ventured beyond the
ports. The few Portuguese traders in the hinterland were dependent upon
the goodwill of African trading societies, such as the Ovimbundu, to
conduct their business. Although deriving little profit from Angola or
from their settlements in Mozambique, in south-east Africa, the Portu¬
guese were very jealous of these possessions because, together with their
imperial possessions in China and India, they represented Portugal’s main
claim to distinction and importance among its larger and economically
stronger European neighbours. Portugal was anxious to retain and, if
possible, extend them. In 1884 an opportunity to do this came when
Britain offered to recognize Portugal’s claim to the mouth of the Congo
(now Zaire) river. Up to that time the British had been hostile towards any
extension of Portuguese claims to the coastline because Portugal imposed
heavy taxes on trade and this antagonized British merchants. But in 1882
the British government had become worried that the French, who were
exploring the area of the Ogowe river to the north, might themselves claim
the mouth of the Congo and then close the basin of that river to British
trade. The British and Portuguese governments thus negotiated an agree¬
ment by which Britain would have recognized Portugal’s claims to the
mouth of the Congo in return for trade concessions. However, before the
agreement could be ratified, France and Germany protested and the whole
matter was referred to a conference of the European powers and the
United States which met in Berlin in October 1884.
The main business of the Berlin West Africa Conference was to decide
the fate of the Congo basin. The Conference itself did not deal with claims
to territory, but mainly with the facilities which occupying powers should
offer to traders and missionaries of other nations. While the Conference
was going on, the various European governments negotiated their territo¬
rial claims in Middle Africa. King Leopold of the Belgians put forward the
claims of the International African Association, a private organization
working under his presidency, which had already sent a number of expedi¬
tions to the Congo area. When first formed in 1877 it may have had no
territorial ambitions, but when Portugal, Britain and France began to
quarrel about claims to the mouth of the Congo, Leopold suggested that it
be given to his organization, so that the river would be neutral. He
promised that he would impose low duties on exports from the area and

333
thus satisfy the traders of all nations. The United States and Germany
supported this idea and, with assurances that Leopold would protect their
interests, France and Britain also agreed. Thus by the end of the Berlin
Conference in February 1885, Leopold’s Congo Free State had emerged as
a new government recognized by the European powers with a claim to
most of the Congo basin, together with agreed boundaries near the coast
separating its territory from the French colony of Middle Congo to the
north of the river and from Portuguese Angola to the south.
Germany also acquired a colony in Middle Africa. In February 1885 the
German government gave a charter to the German Colonization Society,
permitting it to hold territory on Germany’s behalf in East Africa. The
British government gave a similar charter to the Imperial British East
Africa Company. Neither government intended at first to remove the
control which the Sultan of Zanzibar exercised over the coastline. The two
companies were supposed to operate beyond a 16-kilometre coastal strip
belonging to the Sultan. However, there was constant friction between the
Germans and the Sultan’s men and in 1890 Germany and Britain com¬
bined to force the Sultan to renounce his claim to the Tanganyikan
coastline. The Sultan still had a claim to the coastline of Kenya further
north, and the British East Africa Company continued to act as the
Sultan’s agent until the Company handed over to the British government
in 1895. In fact the administration of the Kenya coastline had effectively
slipped from the Sultan’s hands by 1890.
By about 1885 the various colonial powers were preparing to move in
and conquer those parts of Middle Africa which they had so arrogantly
assigned to each other in Berlin and elsewhere. The Portuguese were
anxious to advance from their positions along the coast of Angola. King
Leopold sent off more expeditions to push out along the lower Congo river
up to Stanley (now Malebo) Pool. The Imperial British East Africa Com¬
pany was examining the resources of the domain it had acquired. But
claims on paper (or on maps) were very different from realities on the
ground. Before 1890 the agents of European colonialism made little im¬
pact on the life of Middle Africa and were able to secure a position of
command in only a few places. The period of exploration continued but
Europeans did not penetrate far beyond the main routes. The caravans of
European missionaries, traders and political agents were scarcely disting¬
uishable from African, Arab or Swahili trading caravans. Europeans sel¬
dom ventured beyond the trade routes or the capitals of the major states. It
was there that they first began to intrigue and manoeuvre towards posi¬
tions of real power.

334
The establishment of European power on the coast

On the east coast the Germans and British first pushed themselves into a
commanding position in areas directly under the Sultan of Zanzibar’s
control. The Sultan s rule was itself of very recent origin. Sayyid Barghash
had begun, from the middle of the 1870s, to establish a regular administra¬
tion over the peoples of the coastal districts where his predecessors had
exercised only very informal influence. Barghash appointed fumbes, or

Sayyid Barghash, Sultan of Zanzibar

335
chiefs, to rule over groups of villages and they were supported by a small
disciplined army. His administration was still pushing inland along the
trade routes when the German and British companies arrived. The Sul¬
tan’s capital on the island of Zanzibar lay open to blockade or the threat of
bombardment by European fleets, and both methods were used to extract
concessions from Sayyid Barghash and his successor. His administration
in the coastal areas also depended on European goodwill. An English
officer commanded his army and British advice and support had helped
him establish his administration. But after conflicts between the Sultan’s
officials and agents of the German Colonization Society, the German
government insisted on limiting and finally removing his jurisdiction.
Although Britain would have preferred that the Sultan retain nominal
control over the coastline, she was not prepared to challenge Germany on
this issue. But while the Sultan was obliged to make diplomatic conces¬
sions, his subjects and followers were less conciliatory. They resented the
high-handed actions of European officers, and when the Sultan conceded
to the Germans the right to raise their flag and collect customs taxes in
August 1888, they rose in revolt. The ‘Abushiri rising’, which affected the
coastal districts under British as well as those under German rule, caused
the German government to assume direct control as the German Coloniza¬
tion Society was unable to cope with the belligerent situation that de¬
veloped.
During 1889 the German and British governments blockaded the coast
to prevent the import of modern arms, and in May a German government
officer arrived with a thousand well-equipped soldiers recruited in other
parts of Africa. By the end of 1889 Abushiri bin Salim, the principal leader
of the revolt, had been executed and German forces were imposing their
rule on the coastal districts until by the end of 1891 they were in control of
the entire coast of German East Africa (later called Tanganyika). To the
north the British, operating from Mombasa, also suppressed opposition to
their rule. They were not however firmly in control until 1895, with the
formal declaration of British rule in the East Africa Protectorate (later
called Kenya).
On the west coast the major starting points for the routes into the
interior were already in European hands by 1885. The Portuguese had
garrisons in the ports of Angola. King Leopold’s agent, H.M. Stanley,
had pushed his way along the lower reaches of the Congo and established
stations that secured access to the navigable stretches of the river. By
about 1890 the Europeans were ready to begin their assault on the interior.
Before doing this they made agreements amongst themselves at the Brus¬
sels Conference of 1890 to ensure that modern weapons, especially
machine guns, did not fall into the hands of African rulers. They were able

336
to enforce this agreement by virtue of their naval supremacy and their
control over the coastline of Middle Africa.

The establishment of European power in the interior

Between 1885 and 1890 the various European expeditions which travelled
through Middle Africa generally negotiated their safe passage with the
African or Arab authorities who still held power. But during the 1890s the
situation changed rapidly. In 1890 the Portuguese at last moved inland,
defeated Ndunduma, one of the most important Ovimbundu leaders, and
won a commanding position on the Bihe Plateau at the centre of the largest
trading system in the interior of Angola. In 1891 Leopold’s Katanga
Company sent a force to Msiri’s capital, Bunkeya. Msiri refused to surren¬
der his authority to the Belgians and was shot. His empire quickly disinte¬
grated. Other columns broke the power of Chokwe caravans operating in
Lunda territory. The uneasy alliance between Tippu Tip and the Congo
Free State broke down by 1890 and the Belgians proceeded to drive most
of the Arabs and Swahili out of the Congo between 1892 and 1895, making
themselves military masters of the eastern Congo basin.
Meanwhile in East Africa the Germans had suffered two defeats; one at
the hands of the Hehe led by Mkwawa in August 1891, the second by the
Chagga at Moshi in June 1892. But then the tide began to turn in the
Germans’ favour. In January 1893 they defeated Isike, the Nyamwezi
leader at Tabora, and gained control of the central caravan routes. In
August 1893 they won a decisive battle against the Chagga and secured
control of the Kilimanjaro region. In October 1894 they stormed the Hehe
capital, and although Mkwawa carried on a guerrilla campaign until 1898,
the Germans were free of the threat of serious Hehe attacks after 1894.
Further north, in what was to become Kenya, the British made an
agreement with the Maasai which guaranteed them free passage over most
of the territory’s principal trade routes. The neighbouring Nandi were not
so easily won over however, and when the British attacked them in 1895
the result was inconclusive. They continued to attack British caravans and
railway builders until they were finally subdued in 1906.
To the west in what became Uganda, the British advance was greatly
facilitated by an alliance made by missionaries with a faction at the Kabaka
of Buganda’s court. The agents of the British East Africa Company came
as allies of Buganda. The British victories were the victories also of Ganda
soldiers who provided the main body of the armies which marched against
Bunyoro in 1891 and 1893. Individual Ganda also helped in the establish¬
ment of British rule in Busoga, Nkore and northern Uganda. In the early

337
A LITTLE PARTY IN EAST AFRICA ONLY GOING TO COLLECT A FEW
BUTTERFLIES AND FLOWERS FOR THE DEAR KAISER, THAT IS ALL !!
“We came very near to having Kilima-Niaro attached to the British Empire, only the
German Emperor said he would very much like it, because he was so fond of the flora and
fauna of the place . . . Would the English have expected to get any territory on account
of their great interest in the flora and fauna here.”—Stanley speaking at Chamber of
Commerce, May 21.

A cartoon depicting a German ‘scientific’ expedition in East Africa

stages the establishment of British rule in Uganda was hardly more than an
extension of the Ganda political system over the neighbouring peoples.
Meanwhile, through skilful diplomacy and by exploiting the rivalries of
the different factions at the Kabaka’s court, the British gradually altered
their position from being allies to becoming the arbiters of politics in
Buganda. The years 1897 to 1900 were crucial. Kabaka Mwanga was
deposed, his party defeated, the faction favoured by the British installed in
power, and the 1900 Uganda Agreement signed. As a result the principal
Ganda leaders recognized British sovereignty over Buganda and the rest of
the area included within the Uganda Protectorate.

338
Disease and famine

While the European colonial powers were pushing their way inland from
the coasts, Middle Africa was shaken by a series of unparalleled natural
disasters which gravely weakened people’s ability to resist the invaders. In
1889 the first recorded outbreak of rinderpest in Africa outside Egypt was
noted in Somalia. Within a year it had spread to Kenya, then crossed East
Africa and reached Lake Malawi by 1892. Thereafter it swept back and
forth across the whole of Middle Africa - and Southern Africa too -
attacking the herds of most cattle-keeping peoples. When the plague
struck severely it could kill every animal a community possessed. Pastoral-
ists such as the Maasai or the Bahima, who knew no other life but herding,
were absolutely devastated by the rinderpest. Many people starved to
death — perhaps half the Maasai of German East Africa — while survivors
fought over the few remaining cows. Others who kept cattle as a store of
wealth found their riches obliterated overnight. Less dramatic but more
prolonged and debilitating was the spread of new diseases against which
people had no immunity. Jiggers appeared in Angola in the 1870s and had
reached the east coast by the 1890s. Outbreaks of smallpox occurred in the
Congo basin and elsewhere in the wake of the European invasion. Sleeping
sickness around the turn of the century killed perhaps half the population
of Buganda and the lower Congo region. Venereal diseases also became
more virulent during and after the period of invasion. The last two
diseases not only killed the living but also caused a dramatic fall in the
birth rate. On top of all this there were also particularly severe famines.
One of the worst occurred in Kenya where, together with disease, it
severely reduced the Kikuyu and Kamba populations, leaving wide areas
of formerly inhabited land vacant - and soon to be seized by white settlers.
There was famine also at a crucial moment in Katanga, just when the
troops of the Congo Free State arrived in 1891. It continued after Msiri’s
death, killing large numbers of the population. It is little wonder that the
societies of Middle Africa were unable strongly to resist the coming of the
Europeans.

339
Conclusion

14 The European conquest of Africa

Africa before colonial conquest

For a great part of recorded history Africa has been in contact with peoples
living outside the continent in Europe and in Asia. This contact was
closest in the case of the peoples living north of the Sahara desert. North
Africans, Egyptians and, to a lesser extent, Ethiopians discussed religion
and trade and disputed power with neighbours beyond Africa’s shores in
southern Europe and the Middle East. As for the rest of the continent,
contacts with non-Africans were mainly confined to the coasts and their
immediate hinterland. Above all Africa was seldom successfully attacked
by forces from outside. While conquering hordes and powerful states from
time to time swept across the Eurasian land mass between China and India
and the shores of the Atlantic and while every substantial state in that area
had to calculate the strength or weakness of its neighbours, Africa south of
the Sahara was very much a closed world of its own which made its own
adjustments between rising and falling African empires without reference
to the state of things in Europe or Asia.
Apart from the Portuguese incursions into Angola in the seventeenth
century, the Europeans, Arabs and Indians who traded on Africa’s coasts
did not venture far beyond their trading ships or forts at any time before
the nineteenth century. The foreign traders on the coast could to some
extent influence the politics of the hinterland especially by their en¬
couragement of the slave trade. But the impact of the slave trade has often
been exaggerated by historians as have been the estimates of the number of
slaves carried across the Atlantic. The political influence of foreign traders
did not reach far inland and the traders themselves seldom secured more
than a local dominance while many carried on their businesses by leave of
the African rulers. The peoples of North Africa who were involved in
power struggles with non-African states were, from the time of the
seventh-century Arab invasions onward, more or less able to hold their

340
own. Between the eighth and tenth centuries they extended their empires
to Spain and Syria. In the sixteenth century all North Africa up to
Morocco fell under Ottoman rule but the local governments maintained a
large measure of autonomy within the Ottoman system. Egypt in particu¬
lar remained an important centre of power within the Ottoman empire and
from time to time parts of western Arabia fell under the control of Cairo.
It is easy to confuse Europe’s subjection of people of African descent in
the Americas with European dominance over Africa itself. Such a confu¬
sion existed in the minds of many people in Europe from the late eight¬
eenth century onward. The fact that African rulers and traders sold
prisoners of war, convicted criminals and others into European slavery did
not of itself diminish the political independence of those who made such
sales. The slaves once sold became a subject people but Africa remained as
free as ever. The European trading posts on the African coasts were, until
the nineteenth century, like flies on the back of an elephant. Africa went
its own way, settling its own problems without having to take account of
the pressure of invading forces from outside.
This situation began to change during the nineteenth century, as the
chapters in this volume have shown, and by 1900 most of Africa had been
invaded by outsiders for the first time in its history and had fallen into the
possession of a number of European states. Egypt, which, despite invasion
in 1798, had driven off a British attacking force as late as 1807, was
occupied by Britain in 1882. Morocco, which had once ruled Spain, was
partitioned between Spain and France in 1912. Everywhere throughout
the continent the Europeans in the small trading forts along the coast had
pushed out over the land, and soldiers and administrators from European
countries had imposed their rule upon the people of the continent. Why
did all this come about? Why did Africa so suddenly fall, for the first time,
and, as it turned out, for a very brief period in its history, under foreign
rule? These are the questions we shall be seeking to answer in this
conclusion.
Many historians and others have tried to find answers to these ques¬
tions. Much thought has been given to the question of why Europe decided
to occupy Africa in the late nineteenth century. Somewhat less attention
has been paid to the related question of why Europe was able to do so. It is
easy to take it for granted that whenever Europe decided to occupy Africa
it could do so and that therefore one only looks for European motives. We
need not agree that Europe could have taken Africa whenever it liked.
First, however, let us investigate the former question which has concerned
so many historians, ‘why did Europe decide to occupy Africa in the late
nineteenth century?’

341
 »

The Industrial Revolution and the search for markets

In the hundred years before the 1880s Europe had been steadily drawing
ahead of the rest of the world in the fields of economic organization and
application of science and technology to production. The Industrial Re¬
volution began in England in the eighteenth century as large cities grew
and the numbers ot those working in industry began to exceed those
engaged in agriculture. From England, large-scale industry spread in the
early nineteenth century across the Channel to Belgium, north-east France
and western Germany. Thence it extended further, reaching the Hapsburg
empire and northern Italy by the end of the century. Europe during the
nineteenth century became the workshop of the world with an insatiable
appetite for the raw materials to feed her industries and an ever-vigilant
eye on the growth of markets for her manufactures. By the late nineteenth
century this concern about sources of raw materials and markets had
become more serious in the different European countries than at any time
hitherto. European industry in the 1890s was still producing more or less
the same things - iron and steel goods and textiles - as it had at the start of
the Industrial Revolution. But the numbers of firms producing these
goods had steadily multiplied, and they were competing vigorously with
one another. Improved methods of production usually favoured larger
firms with larger financial resources and so the smaller, weaker businesses
were being increasingly driven into bankruptcy or eaten up by the larger.
All were engaged in a race tor survival. The smaller firms were trying
desperately to maintain their positions, the larger were seeking to extend
themselves to avoid being overtaken by their rivals. All were subject to the
effects of periodic trade depressions when it became particularly difficult
to sell goods, so that factories and men stood idle. At the height of the
‘Scramble’, 1884-5, European industry was in a depressed condition and
industrialists were especially anxious at that time to protect themselves.
They asked their government to help them by imposing high tariff barriers
to keep out foreign goods. In 1880 Germany went over to a high tariff
policy. Within twelve years, France, the United States and many Euro¬
pean countries (except Britain) had followed suit. This ended the free-
trade period of the mid-nineteenth century. There followed a period when
the idea that governments should protect their industries became one of
the strongest economic ideas in Europe.
It was but a short step from the idea of protecting a market for industry
at home to the idea of creating a new, protected market for industry by
seizing colonies abroad. This was especially so in the late nineteenth
century because the idea of what ‘colonies’ were was changing. In the early
nineteenth century, colonies’ had been thought of mainly as places where

342
 Europeans could go and settle - like Canada, Australia, New Zealand or
Algeria. The setting up of this sort of ‘colony’ did not particularly interest
i industrialists. It was also the sort of ‘colony’ that men like Otto von
Bismarck, the Chancellor of Germany, did not want. But at the very time
: that Bismarck was saying that he did not want ‘colonies’, some writers
were changing the meaning of the word ‘colony’. They spoke of ‘colonies
I of exploitation’ where Europeans would not settle but where European
I money could be used to increase production and create new markets and
: sources of raw materials. This sort of colony did interest industrialists.
The idea of such colonies also became popular among people generally,
I apart from those directly connected with industry. As enthusiasm for such
i colonies grew, people began to press governments to establish them and
! create new markets for national industry which would, they expected, be
protected from the competition of goods produced in other countries by
high tariffs. Britain still stuck to free trade. But as other powers, anxious
; to challenge Britain’s position as the leading industrial power, became
interested in establishing colonies with high tariff barriers, British indus¬
trialists became alarmed and called on the British government to set up
colonies where British goods would not be kept out. Moreover the late
nineteenth century was a period of increasing political tension and national
rivalry in Europe, following the unification of Italy and Germany by 1870.
The emergence of a powerful united Germany under Bismarck upset the
traditional ‘balance of power’ between Britain, the leading naval power,
and France, the dominant land power. In particular, France’s humiliating
defeat at the hands of Germany in 1870, involving the loss of Alsace and
Lorraine, left her seeking revenge and compensation elsewhere. After
1870 Europe rapidly became an armed camp, and European rivalries were
exported to Africa, Asia and the Pacific, with colonies increasingly being
seen as symbols of national prestige.
The development of protectionist ideas and the background of indust¬
rial and political rivalry which gave rise to them in Europe produced a
general disposition favourable to the acquisition of colonies. It streng¬
thened the already prevailing belief that governments had a duty to use
national power overseas to support national economic enterprise. But this
general disposition favourable to the acquisition of colonies should not be
confused with specific pressures placed upon government actually to seize
territory in Africa. These broad ideas may have altered the level of
national aggressiveness but they were not necessarily followed through in
detail in all circumstances. For example, despite what was said of the
necessity to secure exclusive markets, the goods and trade of other Euro¬
pean countries were not in fact excluded from the great majority of
colonial territories seized by particular European states in Africa. Further-

343
 I

more, Africa was not regarded as an area in which huge commercial

profits could be made. The existing trade between Europe and Africa was
small in the 1880s by comparison with European trade with other parts of
the world. In particular, industrialists in Britain, which was to acquire
such a large number of African colonies, had a low opinion of Africa’s
commercial potential. Germany’s trade with Africa was rising at the time
of the ‘Scramble’ but so was Germany’s trade elsewhere and the African
proportion of Germany’s total foreign trade was extremely small. The
competitive search for markets and sources of raw materials that was
growing in Europe only affected European attitudes to Africa in a very
general way. Few of the great producers of goods in Europe put direct
pressure on their governments to occupy territory in Africa.

European pressure groups in Africa

Direct pressure came rather from those in Europe who were already
directly involved economically in Africa at the time the ‘Scramble’ began.
It came from those who had invested money in trading establishments on
the African coasts, those who had lent money or secured concessions of
land in Egypt and North Africa, and those who were making money from
South African diamond and gold mines and who hoped to make more by
extending their operations northward. All of these groups had behind
them the financial power of industrial Europe. To a greater or lesser extent
they could draw upon the capital resources of the European money market
which during the nineteenth century had become incomparably larger,
better organized and wider spread than any money market the world had
hitherto known. During the nineteenth century the European banker or
moneylender could lend money more cheaply and in larger quantities than
anyone else. The European trader who could more easily borrow from
these sources could wait longer than his rivals for repayment for the goods
he sold. The result of this was that wherever legal arrangements were
favourable, European merchants, moneylenders and their local agents had
penetrated African society and secured control of a large part of the
economic life of particular countries.
This was most outstandingly the case in Egypt and North Africa where
the system of ‘capitulations’ which placed Europeans and their proteges
under a special legal statute operated to their advantage. The ‘capitula¬
tions’ were only meant to provide the sort of special arrangements that
predominantly agricultural societies all over the world had frequently
accorded to the small communities of foreign or cosmopolitan traders. But
the amount of credit available in North Africa and Europe was not equal

344
 and the ‘capitulations’ opened the door to large European investment in
trade and other branches of North African economic life. Not only this but
j North African governments who wanted loans to extend their activities
j had to turn to Europe which alone could provide finance on the scale
> required. Elsewhere in Africa there was not the same scope for the
< penetration of the economy by European finance. Along most of the West
! African coast, the inland movement of European economic enterprise was
blocked by so-called ‘middlemen’ - these were states or groups of indi¬
viduals who combined the control of politics and economics in the areas
close to the coast and who would not permit the establishment of direct
| contact between European firms and those in the hinterland. The ‘middle¬
men’ themselves absorbed substantial amounts of credit from European
sources but they made their own commercial links with neighbouring
: peoples, thereby hindering the free flow of credit. In East Africa European
: merchants were active and, in addition, the Indian merchants used the
: capital concentrated in the money markets of western India to finance
trade along the routes from Zanzibar to the Great Lakes. In South Africa
English law prevailed although its form was modified in the case of the
Boer Republics. Generally speaking, European capital could move in
freely and it did so in the form of investment in diamond mines and
railways and, after 1886, in the important gold mines of the Transvaal.
Those who had invested money in Africa were apt to turn from time to
time to seek the assistance of European governments in protecting their
investments or furthering their trade.
Before the late nineteenth century European merchants in West Africa
were not very enthusiastic about getting European governments to inter¬
fere in Africa. When they were doing good business, as they had been at
the middle of the century, government interference could sometimes be
more of a hindrance than a help. Certainly they were happy to have
government warships come and help them collect debts. But the actions of
the government could often cause them inconvenience. For example, in
the middle of the nineteenth century, the interference of the British
government in the Niger delta made it easier for new European and even
African traders to start business in competition with the old-established
European merchants on the coast. The traders in Senegal quickly tired ol
the political interference and consequent wars of the colonial government
during the 1850s because the wars were too often paid for by taxes on their
trade. But in the 1880s business for European traders in West Africa was
bad. Trade was stagnant and the prices in Europe of palm oil and ground¬
nuts _ needed to lubricate the new factory machines and cleanse the
industrial workforce — were not rising as they had been thirty years before.
The European merchants therefore had either to find new ways ol em-

345
 I

ploying their capital, or else they had to force Africans with whom they
were trading to accept lower prices. If they failed, their profit margins
diminished. A number of them sank into bankruptcy as a result. The rest
anxiously sought ways out of their difficulties either by combining to force
down producer prices or by forcing their way past the middlemen to
employ their capital in organizing the purchase of cash crops nearer the
source. 1 he twists and turns they made to achieve these ends brought
them into conflict with African traders and rulers who were under similar
pressure, and as relations deteriorated the European traders turned to
European governments for political and military assistance.
But which governments were to interfere? This question frequently
produced divisions among the traders because each tended to fear that the
government of some country other than their own would tend to discri¬
minate against them. So, in most cases, each set of merchants appealed to
its own government to interfere first before the other governments had a
chance to act. And when it came to the question of breaking through to the
interior markets, which interested merchants so much in the 1880s,
another reason for international rivalry came up. The traders in each port
feared that the land behind the port would be taken by a European
colonial power which owned another port nearby. For example the French
at Cotonou might take Abeokuta and divert all the trade of Egbaland away
from Lagos. The Lagos merchants would thereby lose many of their
customers and the valuable shops and warehouses they had built would
become worth much less. The Germans in Douala similarly feared a
British movement round Cameroon mountain, and the French in Ivory
Coast feared the British moving across from the Gold Coast. Merchants in
all the ports of West Africa were very anxious that as a much as possible of
the country behind the ports should be brought under the same govern¬
ment as the port itself. So they petitioned their governments in Europe to
take land in the interior.
Such petitions from European merchants in West Africa carried less
weight than the clamour of those who had money invested in Egypt and
North Africa, either privately or in Egyptian or Tunisian government
bonds. The Egyptian public debt amounted to 96 million Egyptian
pounds in 1884, most of which was held in Europe. Much of the debt had
been incurred during the middle 1860s when Egypt was exporting cotton
heavily at attractive prices. When the American Civil War ended and
American cotton began once more to compete, Egypt’s economic boom
came to an end. The Khedive was not able to find the money to repay
debts he had contracted and to cover other commitments, and so he had to
borrow more at ruinous rates of interest. Egypt had scarcely the resources
available to continue paying the interest on the debt but the European

346
 )bondholders were determined to have their ‘pound of flesh’. The bondhold-
i ers were numerous and vociferous especially in France. They included
: more men of importance in European political society than the West
j African merchants could muster. The bondholders did not actually tell the
i governments of Europe to occupy Egypt but they insisted that the interest
: on their loans be repaid and it soon became clear that no Egyptian
> government which depended on the consent of the Egyptian people could
: afford to do that. Their demand for repayment therefore amounted to a
. demand that Egypt be brought under European control.
Traders in West Africa and bondholders in Egypt were trying to get
; governments to protect investments which had gone sour. Investors in
I South Africa sought government sanction for new optimistic enterprises
beyond the frontiers of Cape Colony in present-day Zimbabwe and Zam¬
bia. The British South Africa Company had less difficulty in raising
capital than any of the European chartered companies that operated in
Africa in the 1880s. British investment in South Africa amounted to £34
million in 1884 and increased tenfold over the next 27 years. The South
African economy was booming in the 1880s as Transvaal gold was added to
Kimberley diamonds. The imperialist entrepreneur Cecil Rhodes hoped
to find new goldfields to the north and so did other groups and individuals
who scrambled across the Limpopo river. When Rhodes asked the British
government for a charter for his British South Africa Company and
permission to bring new territories under the British flag, he was asking
that the government sanction a self-financing force which would thrust as
far northward as it could in search of new mineral resources. The British
South Africa Company was hoping to make substantial profits; elsewhere
in Africa European investors and traders during the 1880s were mostly
asking governments to shoulder a political burden in order to save them
from losses.
Merchants and investors, however, were not the only people who were
pressing European governments to invade Africa. There were also adven¬
turers and visionaries of various types who hoped to cut a figure for
themselves and boost their own prestige by acquiring territory. There was
King Leopold of the Belgians who hoped to give his country an empire in
Central Africa if nowhere else. There was Carl Peters who hoped to do
likewise on behalf of Germany in East Africa. There was the ambitious
Francesco Crispi who hoped to divert attention from his government s
failure to solve Italy’s internal problems by securing an empire in
Ethiopia. French army officers - after the defeat by Germany - sought to
win promotion and glory by successful campaigns in Senegal and Mali.
And then there were the missionaries who had become politically involved
in such areas as the Lagos hinterland, Uganda and Lake Malawi, and who

347
 I

had come to regard the intervention of European governments to protect

them and their growing Christian communities as essential to the exten¬
sion of Christianity.
With all these groups at various times demanding government interven¬
tion one might assume that the cause of Africa’s invasion has been identi¬
fied. But governments did not always respond to such pressures. In the
first place although the various investors and merchants interested in
Africa carried weight in the politics of European countries, they were not
as influential as some similar groups interested in trade and investment
elsewhere. Europe s trade and investment in Africa was small by compari¬
son with her trade and investment in other continents such as North and
South America and Australasia. So long as what those urging government
action in Africa asked for did not conflict with what others wanted the
government to do - for example reduce taxation or provide protection for
trade elsewhere — the comparative weakness of the pressure groups in¬
terested in Africa would not matter. But if it did, and the government had
to make a choice between conciliating them or others, the fact that they so
often represented a minority even among the small class of influential
capitalists would tell against them.
The response of European governments to the pressure of the traders
and investors was regulated by the state of the relations between the
various European powers themselves. Each watched the other before
moving. If a European government felt it would weaken itself in relation
to others by grabbing African territory, it would hold back. If it felt that it
could do so with impunity because others were doing likewise it would be
encouraged to go ahead. In the early 1880s European governments were
hesitant on this score; as time went on they became less so because thev
were able to make agreements with each other as to who should have what
in Africa.

Obstacles to conquest

There was however one other important factor which all European govern¬
ments had to take into account and which, unlike the diplomatic factor
just mentioned, always stood against the political intervention by Euro¬
pean governments in Africa. This of course was the armed force of the
peoples and governments of Africa itself. The peoples and governments of
Africa were the major obstacle to the European invasion of Africa. The
European governments had to take the strength of African opposition into
account because although the various groups in Europe, already men¬
tioned, were telling governments to occupy, no government wanted to

348
 fight costly and diplomatically compromising wars in order to do so. It was
extremely difficult to get European parliaments to provide men and
! m°ney for wars in Africa. Governments feared to approach parliaments on
such matters as they knew that they would be asked embarrassing and
unpleasant questions and perhaps fail to secure the necessary money in the
end. This was the case during the 1880s whether the country was Britain,
France or Germany. The government could count on the support of those
who had an interest in securing African territory in any particular instance
but they had to contend with the opposition of the mass of members of
parliaments who did not want higher taxation. If the occupation of Africa
meant costly wars and therefore higher taxes, most members of parliament
would have been strongly against any such idea. Apart from a minority
who worried about international morality, the peoples of Europe were
generally prepared to welcome an extension of their national territory. But
they did not want to pay for it. They would certainly have objected
strongly if the governments had asked them to pay a very high price.
This was why European governments at least in the early stages of the
invasion sought for ways of occupying Africa without asking their parlia¬
ments to pay anything. For this reason the British government allowed the
Royal Niger Company, the Imperial British East Africa Company, and the
British South Africa Company to occupy various parts of the continent.
This was why the German government persuaded the German East Africa
Company to occupy East Africa and the merchant Adolph Liideritz to
occupy South-West Africa. It had hoped to do the same in the Cameroons
and Bismarck was much annoyed when he had to do it himself. King
Leopold occupied the Congo through his own organization, quite inde¬
pendent of the Belgian government and parliament. Another method used
by governments to occupy Africa without recourse to parliament was to
make the few existing colonies pay for expansion out of their own re¬
venues. But this was difficult in the 1880s because most African colonies
were short of revenue. Much use was made during the 1880s of naval
vessels which could be despatched without consulting parliament, but
they could only work on the coasts or in areas adjacent to navigable rivers.
The British government employed contingents of Indian soldiers - an old
method of avoiding parliamentary scrutiny. King Leopold got the Belgian
army to transfer fully paid officers to the Congo. Various other means
were used to find resources for small wars in Africa. Perhaps the worst
case was the 1897 Benin expedition which was paid for by selling the
looted art treasures of Benin to museums in Europe and the United States.
This brings us again to the question ‘why was Europe able to occupy
Africa in the late nineteenth century?’ European powers had seized col¬
onies in Africa before the 1880s and had fought wars there but the colonies

349
 I

they held were small and close to the coast. Only in Algeria and what
became South Africa had European powers occupied territory any dis¬
tance inland. In both these cases, the wars resulting from moving inland
had involved European governments in considerable expense. At the peak
of its campaign to occupy Algeria in 1847, France had 100 000 soldiers in
that country, the largest European army to stand on African soil before the
end of the nineteenth century. The frontier wars fought by the British in
South Africa were costly too. About one-tenth of the British army had to
be maintained there even in peacetime. These examples were enough to
discourage European powers from attempting to move inland in other
parts of Africa during most of the nineteenth century. Interference by
European warships on the coast was common enough but European
governments feared moving away from the sea. They feared defeat by
African armies. In many instances even victory would have been so costly
as to be worthless.

Early European military campaigns, 1867-85

European powers received some clear reminders of the dangers of med¬

dling in African politics in the twenty years before the Berlin West Africa
Conference of 1884—5. In 1863 the British and French consuls in Ethiopia
had both been imprisoned by Emperor Tewodros for disrespectful be¬
haviour. The British government anxiously tried to get their man released,
but failed. In 1867, after four years of unsuccessful negotiations the
British government decided, after much hesitation, to send an expedition¬
ary force to free the consul. Since it was feared that Tewodros, whose
empire was already crumbling, might still be strong enough to defeat any
force sent, it was announced, to avoid angering the whole of the Ethiopian
people, that there was no intention of occupying the country. The ex-
pendition was to go in, release the prisoners, and leave as fast as possible.
To do this limited work the commander of the British army in India was
told he could spend as much as he pleased to ensure victory. The force
sent was the largest the British believed could be transported across the
Ethiopian mountains. It succeeded: but at a cost of £9 million - at that
time a very large sum. The government was severely criticized for spend¬
ing so much of the taxpayers’ money. After this Britain stopped meddling
in Ethiopian affairs for some considerable time.
In 1874 another British expedition was sent to the interior of Africa,
again after much hesitation, this time against the Asante of Ghana. The
Asante of Ghana had already defeated one British army and killed its
commander in 1826. In 1863 they had marched to the coast through

350
i British protected territory while the British watched powerless from their
forts. The first episode had led ultimately to the British government’s
i abandonment of the Gold Coast forts; the second brought about a general
reappraisal of British West African policy in favour of caution. Fear of the
Asante persuaded the British in 1863 not to strike back. In 1874, however,
ambitious military men who had reorganized and re-equipped the British
army with new weapons persuaded the government that they were strong
enough to beat the Asante. Two thousand picked troops were sent and
with the help of thousands of Fante allies the Asante were defeated and
their capital, Kumasi, taken. The British commander maintained that he
had proved at last that British soldiers could fight successfully in West
Africa. But again the object was limited. After Kumasi had been taken and
burned the British troops hurried back to the sea. The expedition was
costly and the commander admitted that were it not for his superior
weapons, the Asante would probably have won. The British government
remained as impressed as before by the fighting qualities of the Asante and
were anxious to avoid another war with them.
In 1878 Britain fought another African power - the Zulu under Cete-
wayo. The British commander was overconfident. His army had superior
weapons but the Zulu impis moved too swiftly. The result was a decisive
victory - and what was left of the British army struggled back to Natal
after the battle at Isandhlwana. The British sent out reinforcements,
raised men from throughout South Africa and the Zulu were finally
defeated, but their courage became a legend in Britain and the war was
regarded as a mistake. It had cost £4 million and the ministers responsible
were violently attacked. These events in South Africa were one of the main
reasons for the government’s defeat at the subsequent election.
The next major battle between Britain and an African power came in
1882 when a British force of 40 000 men met at Egyptian army of much
the same size and strength. The British won after a surprise attack on the
main Egyptian fortress at Tel-el-Kebir. The British disembarked on the
Suez Canal after a clever surprise manoeuvre and the final battle was
fought along the short line of railway between the Canal and Cairo. Two
years later a British force was sent to relieve General Gordon who was
besieged in Khartoum deep in the Sudan. The force never reached its
objective and suffered severely at the hands of the Mahdi’s army. This
failure so impressed the British that they were prepared to risk leaving the
Sudan a threat to Egypt rather than try to defeat these Sudanese forces. A
new expedition was not sent until 1896 and then it advanced to victory
while taking the most careful precautions.
The French had similar difficult experiences which made them reluc¬
tant to engage in military adventures. The French Assembly approved the

351
 I

establishment of a Protectorate in Tunisia in April 1881 but turned round

and violently attacked the government in October when it had to gather
together 50 000 soldiers to suppress the subsequent rising. The French
Chamber also withdrew its support from the project for building a railway
from the Senegal to the Niger in 1885, when four years of campaigns
showed that military costs had absorbed the greater part of the funds voted
for construction. At the time of the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 therefore,
the European powers were hesitant about moving inland in force because
they still had not found the means of fighting wars in the interior at an
acceptable cost. They concerned themselves mainly with claims to the
coast and the main navigable rivers.

The deadly new weapons

From the 1860s onward important improvements were made in the manu¬
facture of weapons in Europe. In time these were greatly to facilitate the
conquest of Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Hand firearms were produced
with rifled barrels making .them more accurate than the smooth bore ‘dane
gun' type. The rate of fire was improved with the introduction of rifles
which could be loaded at the breech instead of at the muzzle. Further
improvements in this system in the 1870s made it possible to increase once
again the accuracy of the shot, its range and killing power. In the 1870s the
magazine or repeater rifle was invented. This most effective weapon came
into general use in the middle 1880s. In the late 1860s the first machine
guns were invented — the French mitrailleuse and the American Gatling
gun. These fired shots rapidly from revolving barrels but they were heavy,
difficult to handle and often broke down. In 1889 a far more effective
machine gun was invented by H.S. Maxim. Its performance was not
basically different from modern machine guns. It had only one barrel but
the recoil from each shot mechanically reloaded the gun so that it could
fire an almost continuous stream of bullets. This gun, one of the most
deadly weapons man has ever invented, ultimately forced armies to change
radically their methods of fighting.
Before the late nineteenth century most European weapons could not be
used properly in Africa. Powerful cannon had been used for a long time on
the battlefields of Europe but until the second half of the nineteenth
century few cannon were seen in the interior of Africa. Poor, narrow roads
made it difficult to wheel these guns inland and often there were no horses
or mules to pull such heavy weapons. Ships at sea and on the rivers could
carry them - many coastal African states were well equipped with cannon.
But inland, especially in thick bush, heavy cast-iron or cast-bronze cannon

352
were usually more trouble than they were worth. Even the early models of
the Gatling gun were too heavy and cumbersome to use there. But the
Maxim machine gun was not. And in the second half of the nineteenth
century, better and lighter steel cannon were devised until it ultimately
became possible for one of these guns of substantial calibre to be carried
by two men. Between 1860 and 1890 one after another of these revolu¬
tionary weapons came out of the arms factories of Europe. After 1870
nearly every large expedition that went to Africa from Europe carried with
it yet another new and more terrible weapon of war. When the French
Assembly was becoming disgusted with the cost of wars in the Western
Sudan in 1885, new magazine rifles were on their way to the French forces
there which enabled them to win battles even with the restricted funds
available.
Most European commanders insisted on having the latest and best
weapons the arms factories could give them for expeditions to Africa. In
fact some expeditions were used to try out the most modern systems of
fighting. The British expedition against the Asante in 1874 was of this sort
and the men carried the newest rifle just issued to the British army. They
also had the new light cannon and Gatling guns. The deadly Maxim gun
was first tried on a large scale against the Ndebele of Zimbabwe in 1893,
though one had been used in Uganda in 1891. In 1896 it was still a very
new weapon and the inventor Maxim himself helped to prepare the six
machine guns for the Royal Niger Company’s expedition against Bida in
that year.
Most invading armies used these newest guns in as large numbers as
possible. The West African Frontier Force, for example, which the British
government raised in 1897, was deliberately equipped with an abnormally
large number of machine guns and cannon. No army unit in Europe at the
time or for the next fifteen years had so large a proportion of machine guns
to fighting men. The Royal Niger Company force which marched against
Bida in 1896 was little more than an escort for its four small and one large
cannon. It marched on Bida as a small square with the large 12-pounder
steel gun in the centre. And it was the 12-pounder gun that defeated Bida
by bombarding the city while machine guns and rifles kept the Nupe army
at a distance. The European commanders had no intention of fighting it
out man to man with the African armies if they could avoid it. They
deliberately set modern European technology against African men. In fact
the European armies that invaded Africa were predominantly African in
composition. Almost all the soldiers were African; in the French armies
some of the officers were Africans too. But the European-controlled
armies, although much smaller than the defending African armies, were
incomparably better armed.

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As the power of the weapons increased so the cost to Europe of fighting

wars in Africa feli. As victories became easier and cheaper for Europe, so
European military men in Africa became anxious for further victories and
higher promotion for themselves. The power of their weapons also
boosted the morale of the invading armies and they became bolder and
more daring. Although such boldness sometimes brought disaster it more
frequently resulted in victories for the small powerful army over the much
larger opposing forces. The boldness of the invading armies and the
terrible effects of the new weapons contributed to widespread demoraliza¬
tion among African states. Stories of the awful destructiveness of the white
man’s cannon and machine guns spread throughout the continent. One
might say that some African armies were beaten in spirit before they ever
reached the battlefield and resistance to invasion was thereby greatly
weakened.
Advances in medical knowledge, which drastically reduced the death
rate of Europeans in West Africa, also made conquest less costly than it
would have been earlier. In general by 1880 Africans found themselves in
a rapidly shrinking world of iron ships, telegraphs and machine guns
which enabled European armies to arrive quickly, to keep in touch with
their home bases, to call reinforcements from thousands of miles away - as
in the case of the South African War in 1899 - and to massacre the
traditional massed armies of Africa. It is true that on the ground European
armies were by no means always in a position of overwhelming superior¬
ity, but the power of their ultimate ability to retaliate was very soon
appreciated. Buttressing their military power was a racist ideology which
persuaded most Europeans to believe quite genuinely that they were doing
great benefit to the world by conquering it.

Divisions in African society

The severe divisions that existed in African society at this time made
things much easier for the foreign powers. The nineteenth century had
seen a whole series of political, religious and military revolutions in Africa
south of the Sahara which had produced sudden and severe changes in the
political systems. The campaigns of Usman dan Fodio, Samori Ture and
others in the Western Sudan had brought widespread and continuing
political change throughout the valley of the Niger and beyond. In the
eastern Sudan, the military incursions of Muhammad Ali Pasha and his
successors followed by the Mahdist movement and the activity of such
men as Zubair and Rabih produced vast changes in that area also. From
the southern confines of the continent the effects of the Mfecane and the

354
 growth of new military empires spread northward almost reaching the area
of jihadist turbulence in the north. Also, from the middle of the
nineteenth century, an increasing flood of European firearms poured in
! from ports all round the continent, usually confirming, but also on occa-
i sion undermining what the African revolutions had achieved. The number
of new states multiplied at the expense of self-governing independent
i farming communities.
By the late nineteenth century a number of these ‘new states’ which had
been set up earlier in the century had achieved a measure of internal
stability. The emirates in the north of present Nigeria, Ibadan in the west
of Nigeria, al Hajj Umar’s Tukulor empire, the Hehe and other similar
states in East Africa were fairly stable internally. But most of these states
were so dynamic socially and politically that they were almost compelled
to expand. Most of them were empires which did not recognize any clear
limits to their growth since so many were based on a revolutionary
challenge to the existing social and political order. Those which followed a
policy of jihad were usually able to adjust their relations with each other
within each caliphate. The Sokoto caliphate system was on the whole more
successful in solving disputes among the constituent emirates than the
‘Concert of Europe’ was in maintaining peace among the governments of
Europe. But the jihadist states did not properly recognize independent
non-Muslim communities. Thus although some states were internally
strong and stable, the international system as a whole was weak and
vulnerable. The new states often created wide areas of conflict around
them and were feared and hated by neighbouring communities which
believed they would be the next to be attacked.
The European invaders were able to exploit these divisions in African
society especially during the diplomatic phase of the invasion which
preceded military conquest. The agents of the European governments
were very short of money at this time but they had the advantage of having
powerful guns to sell. Arms-selling was a profitable business because, as
European armies changed to new rifles, they sold their old guns cheaply
and in large quantities. Therefore the European explorers and trading
companies had a good supply of cheap weapons which African rulers and
communities in most parts of the continent were anxious to buy. African
rulers who fought from time to time against European colonial powers
were often ready to make agreements with their European enemies in
order to acquire guns for defence or attack. Indeed governments all over
the world were trying to buy modern military equipment from Europe and
were prepared to run the risk of falling under European control by asking
for loans in order to do so. While the European powers were scrambling
for other peoples’ territory, African rulers were scrambling for European

355
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guns, railways and other items of military value. This was because the new
technological discoveries had changed the basis of military power. Modern
rifles and cannon produced a revolution just as the discovery of iron, of
war chariots and effective cavalry equipment had fundamentally altered
the basis of military power in past periods of human history.
The new weapons, by reducing military and other costs and weakening
the effectiveness of African resistance, provided European governments
with increasingly tempting opportunities. They produced a context in
which the invasion of Africa became increasingly possible and likely. But
each power still had to consider the reactions of its European neighbours
before undertaking schemes of African conquest. Changes in the diploma¬
tic situation in Europe were of crucial importance in determining whether,
when and how Africa would be invaded. In this respect, the British
occupation of Egypt in 1882 represented an especially important turning
point because it produced a set of diplomatic circumstances which
favoured, and in the view of some European statesmen, required a forward
movement by particular European powers in Africa.

The Egyptian crisis and its consequences

The British occupation of Egypt resulted from the breakdown of the

system of informal control that Britain and France had been trying to
exercise over Egypt with varying success since the beginning of the
nineteenth century. Both powers had important interests in that country.
France had created strong commercial, financial and cultural links with
Egypt and was concerned also about the distant threat it could possibly
pose to French Algeria. Britain was interested in Egypt as one of several
routes across the Middle East by which European forces might advance
towards Britain’s important colony of India and her commercial interests
in the Far East. Egypt was part of the Ottoman empire and while France
had tried to secure influence there by supporting Egyptian attempts to
break free of the Empire, Britain until the 1870s sought to control Egypt
as well as the other Middle East routes by supporting the Ottoman sultan’s
claim to suzerainty. During the 1870s Britain’s policy altered. The Otto¬
man sultan appeared to be too weak to defend the routes to the East
effectively, his finances were in a bad state, his government seemed
unprogressive, his European provinces were in revolt and his new pan-
Islamic policy of claiming the allegiance of all Muslims threatened the
British position in Muslim countries, including India. Furthermore, the
completion of the Suez Canal in 1869 had made the Egyptian route to
India more vital than ever because now a European navy as well as an army

356
could travel to India by that route. British eyes were focused more closely
ion Egypt and the purchase of the Suez Canal shares in 1875 from the
Khedive gave Britain a financial lever to strengthen her influence there.
iBritain therefore swung towards the policy of supporting the Egyptian
Khedive against his Turkish master, and this made possible a deal with
iFrance which was pursuing a similar policy, and which had also been
upset about the possible disturbing effect of the Sultan’s pan-Islamic ideas
in Algeria. The two governments agreed to share influence in Egypt.
The Khedive’s bankruptcy in 1876 helped the French and British
governments to exercise a joint control over the Egyptian government.
Their determination to make Egypt pay the interest on its £96 million debt
was politically motivated. It enabled them to force on the Khedive two of
their nationals as controllers to supervise the Egyptian government’s
finances. But as Egypt was squeezed dry to satisfy its creditors, political
disadvantages began to appear. The economies and severe taxes imposed
alienated various sections of the Egyptian people - the overtaxed peasants,
the landowners, the sacked army officers and civil servants. Traditional¬
ists and modern nationalists rallied the people against the hated regime
and the movement of protest found a leader in Arabi Pasha. The British
and French governments were too suspicious of each other to adjust to this
situation. They backed the Khedive against the nationalist movement and
refused financial concessions. The result was a conflict between the two
European governments and the nationalists, and when Arabi Pasha
threatened to seize the Suez Canal the British government sent a force
which defeated the Egyptian army in September 1882 and occupied Cairo.
The British government hoped that having removed Arabi Pasha from
power they would be able to withdraw. But they soon found that the state
of nationalist sentiment was such that they could not establish a govern¬
ment which would at the same time co-operate with Britain and be
sufficiently popular to maintain itself without the backing of British arms.
It appeared that the British troops would have to stay and Britain in effect
became responsible for Egyptian affairs. Being placed in this position, the
British government felt that it would have to have a free hand in trying to
organize the Egyptian government. So it told France, which had refused at
the last minute to participate in the occupation, that the Anglo-French
dual control in Egypt was at an end. This enraged French opinion an
from then on France tried to upset the British position in Egypt and also
began aggressively to acquire positions elsewhere in Africa in reta lation
whenever opportunities offered. Britain had become responsible for a
country which was burdened with debt and with a complicated mac incry
of international financial control which could not be got rid of France was
still represented on the International Debt Commission which contro e

357
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60 per cent of Egyptian revenue. So was Germany. With France hostile,

Britain was dependent on German support and Bismarck was determined
to secure the maximum benefit from this situation.
Various people in Germany were pressing Bismarck to allow them to
establish colonies in Africa. Adolph Llideritz wanted to collect guano in
South-West Africa. German merchants in West Africa wanted political
support for their commercial ventures. Carl Peters hoped to build a great
empire in East Africa. Bismarck himself may not have been very in¬
terested in seizing colonies, but for various reasons of domestic and
international politics it became rather advantageous for him to do so in
1884 and 1885. At the wave of his ‘Egyptian stick’ - the threat to vote
against Britain in Egypt - Britain gave him what he wanted in Africa. The
British government told the colonial government at the Cape to give up its
claim to keep others out of South-West Africa and to let Llideritz in. The
British consul in Zanzibar was told to use his influence over the sultan to
allow Peters to make treaties of protection’ with African chiefs, who
feared any extension of the sultan’s power into the interior. The British
attempt to prevent the mouth of the Congo (Zaire) from falling under
French control by recognizing inactive Portuguese rule over that area was
stopped largely owing to Bismarck’s intervention, and the way was open
for Leopold to embark on his Congo schemes. The large inroads made into
areas where Britain had hitherto exercised informal control made it clear
that the old system of informal control was no longer effective and Britain
herself entered the race to claim the coastline. These changes in the
diplomatic situation made it expedient for governments to pay more heed
to the urgings of interested merchants and investors who had been asking
them to seize African territory.
In addition to this, the financial weakness of Egypt and the rising of the
Alahdi in the Sudan in 1884 led Britain to force the Egyptian government
to cut its losses by abandoning control of the whole African coastline from
the confines of Egypt to the borders of present-day Kenya. This evacua¬
tion of Khedive Ismail’s African empire in order to avoid financial and
diplomatic complications exposed another large part of the African coast¬
line to European encroachment. The Italians moved into Eritrea and the
French and British (and later, the Italians) established themselves in
Somalia. The British occupation of Egypt had even wider-spreading
repercussions because within seven years it became clear that the White
Nile was vital to Egypt’s irrigation. The headwaters of that river became
the object of a race primarily between Britain and France but in which
Leopold and Peters also participated. The prize was the control of a vital
area which could closely affect the still unstable British position in Egypt.
Investors and merchants did not need to encourage the British govern-

358
i ment to take an interest in or occupy the area of present-day Kenya and
Uganda; it decided that for strategic reasons the route to the Upper Nile
I had to be secured.

On the eve of the conquest

By 1885 the inland rush had still not begun and for five years the
i Europeans advanced gradually from their positions on the coasts and
navigable rivers, selling their guns, gathering information and making
treaties. Sometimes they allied with the powerful new African states and
sold guns to them; sometimes they sold guns to the older and smaller
communities which the new states were trying to absorb or destroy;
sometimes they allied with one new state against another. The French in
Senegal for example, allied at different times with almost all the different
states and groups - with the Tukulor empire, with their Bambara enemies,
with Samori Ture and with his enemies at Sikasso. The British at Lagos
sought good relations with all the contending parties in Yorubaland at
different times. The Royal Niger Company supplied arms both to the
emirates of northern Nigeria and to those who fought them. King
Leopold’s agents in the Congo sometimes allied with Arab state builders
like Tippu Tip and sometimes they supplied arms to their opponents. The
Imperial British East Africa Company and Lugard allied with Buganda
against Bunyoro, with Christian Ganda chiefs against Muslim Ganda
chiefs, and with the Protestant Ganda faction against the Catholic faction
in Buganda. And thus during this diplomatic phase of the invasion the
European agents twisted and turned in several parts of Africa allying now
with this, now with that African power, but always strengthening their
own position and proving to their governments that the occupation of
Africa was perhaps not so difficult as it had seemed.
There was, however, a limit to what diplomacy could achieve and by the
end of the 1880s that limit was being reached in several parts of the
continent. African rulers were becoming increasingly suspicious of Euro¬
pean intentions. Some began to launch serious attacks on European estab¬
lishments and expeditions. There was a violent flare-up of opposition in
the coastal areas of East Africa, ‘the Abushiri rising , in 1888 and news of
this spread quickly along the trade routes of Middle Africa. On the other
hand diplomatic successes were making the European agents bolder. They
became impatient, wanting to rule and control rather than ally with the
African states
At about this time Europeans began to speak of their civilizing mission
- an idea which suggested that Europe had not only a right but a duty to

359
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conquer Africa. The troubles and many wars being waged in Africa in the
late nineteenth century were taken in Europe as evidence that Africa was
unable to rule itself. Also, the reports from European agents in various
parts of Africa of how they were winning battles with their modern
weapons helped the idea to develop that Europe could easily conquer
Africa and impose its rule. The fear created by the military skill and
courage of such people as the Asante was now forgotten as confidence in
the overwhelming superiority of modern European arms grew, or rather
confidence simply in European superiority over Africans. People in
Europe easily confused the superiority of the weapons with the superiority
of the men who handled them. Since the middle of the nineteenth century
European writers, when speaking of ‘race’, gave the impression that man
was imprisoned by the customs of his society, that the ideas of each ‘racial’
society were fixed in time and that there could be no flow of ideas between
societies of different race. They also maintained that the ‘races’ of the
world could be arranged in order of superiority, and of course they put
themselves at the top. As these ideas spread Europeans became increasing¬
ly arrogant in their dealings with other peoples. When these ideas were
first put forward Britain was involved in quarrels with Abeokuta, with the
King of Asante and with Tewodros of Ethiopia and, consequently, British
people were inclined to believe that the fewer dealings they had with
Africa the better. Moreover, the racialist writers suggested that because of
racial differences peaceful co-operation between Europe and Africa was
impossible. But in the late nineteenth century, when Europe had the
weapons to win wars in Africa, the idea of racial superiority spread fast
and was given a new meaning. The supposed ‘scientific’ proof of European
racial superiority was used to suggest that Europeans had some sort of
natural right to conquer and rule Africans. The idea of racial difference
which had earlier been used as an argument for leaving Africa to itself was
now used as an argument for excluding Africans from the government of
their own countries.
The European governments were pleased at the change in public opin¬
ion towards invading Africa because they too were favouring occupation of
the interior. African resistance to European encroachment was growing
and was threatening even the first European settlements on the coasts and
rivers. The ‘Abushiri rising’ of 1888-9 had made things difficult for the
Germans and the British. The Arabized states in the Congo had begun to
oppose King Leopold’s agents. Samori Ture blocked the path of the
French on the Upper Niger and various African rulers were opposing
British agents around Lake Malawi. Most of the African powers con¬
cerned were new states’ which possessed some fairly modern weapons
purchased from British, German, Belgian, Portuguese or French sources.

360
 The European invaders began to realize that by competing with one
i another they were enabling Africans to buy modern guns with which they
j could keep out all European forces. For example, in East Africa, those
: involved in the ‘Abushiri rising’ bought guns from the British to repel the
i Germans and guns from the Germans to push back the British.
The anti-slave trade campaign provided the governments with a means
; of halting this situation in a comprehensive fashion. In 1889-90 the
! European powers held a conference at Brussels on the slave trade and
! agreed on an arms blockade of Africa, particularly of modern arms. The
import of the old dane guns, which were ineffective against well-armed
i European forces, was permitted. Modern weapons were restricted to
' European colonial powers who were only permitted to allow guns to pass
! through their territories if they were required by another colonial power.
The blockade, although never fully effective, was gradually extended from
East Africa to other parts of the continent and it spelt the doom of
large-scale African resistance. Two major African countries, however,
avoided its effect. In particular, Ethiopia, through the skilful diplomacy of
Emperor Menelik, was still able to buy modern arms since his country was
excluded from the effect of the Brussels agreement. Huge quantities of the
latest rifles were purchased by the Emperor from French and Italian
traders and with them the Ethiopian army was able to defeat a large Italian
army at Adowa in 1896. Morocco was also unaffected since the sultan
continued to exploit European rivalries until the European powers com¬
bined against him at the Algeciras Conference of 1906. Morocco was by
then well-armed and when the French began to occupy the country in
1908 they had to send one of the largest armies ever sent to Africa in order
to occupy just one section of the country. At that stage Germany was still
opposed to the French invasion and modern arms from Germany enabled
to Moroccans to put up a powerful resistance. But Germany was bought
off by France in 1911 by a gift of land in the Cameroons and in 1912 a
French Protectorate over Morocco was proclaimed. The Moroccans were
still heavily armed and France was far from occupying the whole country
when the First World War broke out in 1914. Elsewhere in Africa the
European arms blockade was more effective and Africans were thus dep¬
rived of the means of successful resistance.
As the European governments prepared to attack the new states in
Africa they found they needed more money for their campaigns. The small
groups with direct interests — merchants, investors and so on — pressed the
governments to act but the public, the taxpayers, had to be persuaded to
provide the money. The anti-slave trade campaign, widely publicized
among sections of the public who had hardly even heard of Africa before,
offered a means of doing this. People were told that the comparatively

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small sums needed to invade Africa were to be used to put down the slave
trade and alleviate human misery. This helped to convince the German
parliament to provide money in 1890 to take over modern Tanzania from
the German East Africa Company and raise forces for conquest there. This
was largely how the British parliament was persuaded to provide money
for. building the Uganda Railway and for the occupation of Kenya and
Uganda after 1893. King Leopold used the same argument to persuade the
governments of Europe to allow the Congo Free State government to
collect large taxes on European trade in the Congo with which he could
finance his military campaigns.

The conquest of the powerful African states

By about 1890 the colonial powers were united in their determination to

conquer a then divided Africa. They agreed which parts of the continent
each should have and promised to help each other against African resis¬
ters. The African states mostly stood alone, except for some attempts at
co-operation between Muslim rulers in the Western Sudan and in East
Africa. One after another the powerful African states were defeated in
battle or forced into submission. In 1890 after a brief campaign, Segu, the
principal city in the Tukulor empire, fell to the French. Between 1891 and
1898 Samori Ture was driven back, skilfully fighting rearguard actions
and seeking to maintain his supply of the precious modern arms and
ammunition from European traders on the coast. In 1896 the European
arms blockade became fully effective against him and two years later
Samori was forced to surrender. The Mossi empire of Ouagadougou was
overthrown by the French in 1896 and a powerful British force occupied
Asante in the same year. Btween 1892 and 1894 the kingdom of Dahomey
was occupied after strong resistance. In 1892 the power of the Iiebu
kingdom was broken by the British. After the terrible effects of its new
weapons had been shown, the British colonial government at Lagos was
able to penetrate the whole of Yorubaland. In 1896 the Royal Niger
Company defeated the Nupe army and entered the city of Ilorin. In 1897
the kingdom of Benin fell. Between 1901 and 1903 a series of major battles
around Kontagora, Yola, Kano and Sokoto left the great emirates of
northern Nigeria under the control of the British. With the increased
firepower of the new weapons this Nigerian campaign cost the British
about one-tenth of what they had spent on the war against the Zulu people
twenty-five years earlier when they had no Maxim machine guns.

362
 The assault in the east and south

) While the states of the Western Sudan were thus collapsing, the British
] after careful preparation, sent a large Anglo-Egyptian force into the Sudan
i and broke the Khalifa’s power at the battle of Omdurman in 1898. Two
i years later, Rabih ibn Fadlallah, who had recently established his power in
! Borno using rifles imported across the Sahara, was killed by the French.
The new Arab states in the eastern Congo basin were destroyed between
1892 and 1895. From 1891 the British manoeuvred themselves into a
dominant position in the inter-lacustrine kingdoms and imposed their
i sovereignty over their main ally, Buganda, in 1900. On the East African
coast the leaders who had risen with Abushiri were defeated during 1889
and 1890. In 1893 Isike the Nyamwezi leader and Meli the Chagga leader
I were beaten by the Germans. Mkwakwa, the Hehe ruler, was hunted
! down in 1898 after bitter fighting. Further south the Ndebele suffered a
! heavy and bloody defeat in 1893 and in 1898 the Ngoni west of Lake
I Malawi were broken. In 1895 Gungunhana, the powerful leader in central
i Mozambique, whose predecessors had kept the Portuguese garrisons in
the coastal ports in a state of terror, was overthrown by a small Portuguese
forced armed with magazine rifles and modern cannon.

Europe seizes the commanding heights in Africa

It was the 1890s then that finally saw the rapid destruction of almost all the
most powerful states in Africa. But the small European forces were not
immediately capable of effectively occupying all parts of Africa and they
were slow to enter the more remote areas and the territory ot small
self-governing communities whose complex social and political organiza¬
tions often baffled them. Once paralyzing blows had been struck to the
major African states colonial officials went out with small escorts over a
large part of the continent ordering chiefs great and small to arrest
opponents of the new regime, to provide labour, collect taxes, change
laws, or abolish tolls; to permit European mining or settlement, to admit
missionaries, grow certain crops, give land tor railways, or protect tele¬
graph lines. In short, to become agents of colonialism. The conquest was
over. The business of actually imposing their authority throughout Africa
would take the new colonial rulers much longer.

363
 I

Index Ashmun, Jehud, 60

Axum (Ethiopia), 8, 9, 150, 163
Azande, 151
Numbers in italics refer to illustrations and
maps Badagri, 104
Bagirmi, 17, 87, 95
Abbas I, ruler of Egypt, 143 Baikie, Dr William Balfour, 65, 69
Abdel Aziz, Sultan of Morocco, 197 Baker, Samuel, 153-4
Abdel Kader, 194, 195, 196, 197; Bambara, 17, 67, 88, 89, 92, 359
resistance to French occupation by, Bantu-speaking peoples, 14-15, 19, 21,
186-91 23, 30, 211, 214, 215-16, 225, 228, 239,
Abdel Rahman, Sultan of Morocco, 194-6 240, 266, 306, 312, 313, 315; social and
Abdullahi, khalifa, 158, 159-62, 164, 173 political organization, 216-19; Mfecane,
Abiodun , alafin of Oyo, 96, 97 229-39
Abo, 56 Baqqara, 161, 162
Abomey, 18, 41, 42, 47 Bardo, treaty of (1881), 203
Abukir Bay, battle of (1798), 134 Barghash, Sayyid, Sultan of Zanzibar,
Abushiri rising (1888-9), 336, 359, 360, 335, 335-6
361,363 Barkly, Governor sir Henry, 274
Adowa, battle of (1896), 173, 173-4, 361 Barth, Dr Heinrich, 66, 67-8
Afonja, Are-Ona-Kakanfo, 97, 101, 103 Basutoland see Lesotho; Sotho
African Association, 62, 63, 66 Batedo, battle of (1844), 100
Afrikaner Bond, 287, 291, 298; see also Bechuanaland (see Botswana)
Boers Beduin Arabs, 11-12, 181-2, 206, 207-9
Ahmad Seku, 89-90, 90, 118, 126, 127-8 Beecroft, John, 69, 115
Ahmadu Lobbo, Shaikh, 87-8, 89, 91, 92 Behanzin, King of Dahomey, 105
Ahmed Bey of Tunisia, 198 Beit, Alfred, 284
Algeria, 1, 11, 12, 13, 36, 118, 176, Belgium, 162, 163, 196, 332, 333-4, 336,
184—93, 197-8; Turkish administration, 337,349
180-1; French occupation, 184-6, 194, Bemba, 21,219, 237
197, 204, 350, 356; Abdel Kader and Benin, ancient kingdom of, 17-18, 28, 40,
resistance to the French, 186-91; 42, 43,99, 127, 362
European settlement, 191-2 Benin art, 17, 349
Aliwal North, treaty of (1858), 267 Benin (formerly Dahomey), 17, 38, 40-1,
American Colonization Society, 50-1 42
Anglo-Boer Wars: 1st (1880—1), 279, 280: Berbers, 5, 10, 11, 12, 35-6, 181,203; in
2nd (1899-1902), 300-5, 354 Morocco, 176-80, 194, 195, 196-7; in
Angola, 19, 214, 291, 306, 318, 332, 339; Algeria, 185-93
Portuguese in, 28-9, 308-9, 310, 332, Berlin West African Conference (1884-5),
333, 334, 336, 337,340 120, 125-6,333-4, 350, 352
Arabi Pasha, 136, 147-8, 148, 149, 203, Bhaca, 254
207,357 Bida, 127, 353
Arabic language, 12, 25, 27, 36, 129, 133, Bisa, 21
176, 198
Bismarck, Count Otto von, 201, 343, 349,
Arabs, 23-18, 36, 359; in Egypt, 6, 9-10, 358
129, 130, 150-1; Beduin, 11-12, 181-2, Bloemfontein Convention (1854), 263,
206, 207-8, 209; traders, 19, 218, 220, 264,269,272,280
289, 317, 321-4, 328-31, 337, 340; see Blood River, battle of (1838), 249, 253
also Islam; Maghreb
Boers (Afrikaners), 238, 239-40, 242, 254,
Ariba, alafin of Oyo, 98
256-9, 260-1,266, 332, 345; Great
Aro, 54, 127, 128
Trek, 244—52, 253, 285, 291-2; laager,
ar-Rajma, treaty of (1920), 210
246; Natal, 250, 252-5, 259; Volksraad,
Asante/Akan, 18, 39, 74, 105-15, 128, 253-4, 264,267,268, 276,282;
360, 362; British expedition against
Transvaal, 261-2, 267-9, 276-7, 281-3,
(1874), 112, 350-1, 353; and annexation 285-7, 295-9; Orange Free State,
of (1901), 112-13, 121, 127
262-4, 268; Sotho wars, 266-7, 269-70,

364
 271; and Carnarvon’s confederation Cameroon(s), 3, 4, 55, 117, 121, 125, 126,
policy, 275; 1st Anglo-Boer War, 346,349,361
279-80, 280; Afrikaner Bond, 287, 291; Cape Colony, 30, 221-8, 229, 239-44, 253,
Swaziland, 292-3; 2nd Anglo-Boer 256,261,267,274,276,283,287,295,
War, 300-5 296, 298, 301; white settlement, 221,
Bonny, 55, 56, 116 221-4; Khoisan resistance, 224-6;
Boomplaats, battle of (1848), 260 Commando system, 225; Cape Coloured
Borgu, 98, 121, 126 and Griqua peoples, 226-7; Xhosa
Borno (Bornu), 17, 65, 72-3, 77, 86, 87, resistance wars, 228; frontier society
89,92, 121, 128,363 239-44; British administration, 240-5,
Botswana (formerly Bechuanaland), 15, 252-3, 255, 275; Great Trek from, 244,
282, 283, 285, 298; see also Tswana 245-50; and Natal, 252-5; Parliament,
Brand, Jan Hendrik, 269, 270, 275 264—5, 267, 274, 279; administration of
Brazil, Brazilians, 29, 30, 51, 55, 103, 115, Sotho by, 277; ‘War of the Guns’ (1880),
318 277; and 2nd Anglo-Boer War, 302
Britain, British, 38, 43, 184, 349; in West Carnarvon, Lord, 274-5, 276
Africa, 46, 62, 63-9, 70, 72-3, 93, 100, Cathcart, Governor, 262
102,104-5,115-17,118-28,345, Cetewayo, King of the Zulus, 278, 278-9,
350-1, 359, 362; Industrial Revolution, 351
48, 62, 308, 317, 342; and abolition of Chad, 95
slavery, 49-59, 62-3, 103, 108; Chagga, 337, 363
founding of Sierra Leone, 56-9; and the Chamberlain, Joseph, 114, 297, 299-300
Sudan,63,65-6,67,68-9,125,126, Chewa, 21
157, 351, 363; missionaries, 73-7; Chokwe, 317, 331-2,337
Asante wars, 106, 108-13, 114, 350-1, Christianity, Christians, 6, 8, 9 10, 11, 12,
353; and Egypt, 133-4, 141-2, 145-7, 15, 19,21, 28, 31,37, 204, 308,309,
148-9, 157, 162-3, 183, 341,351, 359; Coptic Christians, 27, 129, 139; in
356-8; and Ethiopia, 161, 167, 168, West Africa, 33-4, 38, 43, 44, 56, 73-7,
174—5, 350; Fashoda Incident, 163-4; 78-9; and abolition of slave trade, 49,
and Libya, 182, 183,204,207;and 50, 59-60, 69; in Egypt, 27, 129, 132,
Morocco, 194, 195, 196; and Tunisia, 133, 139; in Sudan, 150-1; in Ethiopia,
198, 199, 201; in South Africa, 228, 150, 161, 164, 165; in South Africa, 224;
240-5, 249-50, 252-80, 282-7, 295-9, see also missionaries
347, 350, 351; and Boer Wars, 279, 280, Church Missionary Society (CMS), 73, 74,
300-5, 354; and consolidation in 75,76,77, 105
Southern Africa, 287-305 passim; in Clapperton, Hugh, 66, 67, 72-3
Middle Africa, 327, 332, 333-3, 335-6, Clarkson, Thomas, 49
337-8, 363; in Kenya and Uganda, 336, Congo (formerly French), 19, 162, 291,
337-8, 353, 358-9,362 306,308-9,333-4,337,349,358,359,
British Kaffraria, 259, 261, 265, 267 363
British South Africa Company, 146, 288, Congo Free State, 327, 329, 334, 337, 339,
291-2, 294,297,298,299,347,349 362
Brussels Conference (1890), 336, 361 cotton production/trade, 48, 70, 116,
Buganda, 21, 311, 312, 313, 324, 326, 329, 137-8,153,330,346
330-1, 337-8, 359, 363; Kabaka of, 312, Courts of Mixed Commission, 51,53,58
322,330,330, 338 Cromer, Lord, 144, 148, 157
Bugeaud, General, 188, 189, 191 Crowther, Bishop Samuel Ajayi, 128
Bunyoro, 21,311-13, 330, 331, 337, 359 Cyrenaica, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209
Burundi, 21, 306, 311, 312, 313-14
Bushmen see San Dahomey, 18, 41,42, 47, 54, 74, 75, 98,
Busoga, 21, 337 108, 128, 362; invasions of Yorubaland
Buxton, Thomas Fowell, 69 by, 102-5; French conquest of, 118,
121, 127; see also Benin
Caillie, Rene, 70 Danish, 38, 47, 115, 116, 117, 182
Cairo, 63, 66, 89, 130, 149,357 Darfur, 17, 153, 155, 157, 161
Calabar, 55, 74, 128 De Beers Consolidated, 284, 284, 285

365
 »

Delagoa Bay, 224, 230, 275, 294, 295, 299; Ewe, 74

railway line, 295, 296, 305
Desmichels Treaty (1834), 187-8, 189 Faidherbe, Louis, 71-2
Diamond-mining, 272-4, 281, 283-4, 285, Fante, 18, 39, 47, 55, 74, 106, 107-8, 109,
344,345,347 111-12, 114, 115,351
Dingane, 239, 246, 247-50,253 Fashoda Incident (1896), 163-4
Dingiswayo, 230, 231, 233 Filali sultans of Morocco, 176, 177, 196
Dinka, 151 Fomena, treaty of (1874), 113
Dinuzulu, 282 forts and trading posts, European, 18, 28,
Disraeli, Benjamin, 146, 274 29, 46, 47,47, 69,71, 107-8, 109, 110,
Dogali, battle of (1887), 170 111, 115, 117-18
D’Urban, Governor, 244—5 France, French, 74, 75, 125, 162, 343,
Dutch (Holland), 38, 111, 112, 115, 116, 347, 351-2; slave trade, 38, 51-2, 58; in
117; in South Africa, 221-8, 240, 242; West Africa, 46, 54, 70-2, 90, 91, 95,
see also Boers 105, 114,115,116-18,120-2,125-8,
Dutch East India Company, 30, 221, 223, 346; in Senegal, 63, 70-2, 116, 117, 118,
224,225,228, 252 347, 359; Algeria, 118, 184-93, 195,
204, 350; and Egypt, 131-4, 141-2,
Edo, 17, 40 146-7, 148, 149, 183, 196, 35(^8; and
Efik, 42, 77 Ethiopia, 161, 170, 175; Fashoda
Egba, 75, 96,98-9,100,102,104-5,128, Incident, 163-4; Somaliland, 170; and
346,360 Libya, 182, 204, 207, 210; and Tunisia,
Egbado,103, 104 182, 196, 197-204, 352; and Morocco,
Egypt, Egyptians, 3, 4, 10, 15, 129-49, 194, 195, 196, 197, 341,361;
182, 206, 331, 340, 356-8; early history, assimilation policy, 204; and South
5-8, 150; and the Sudan, 7, 140, 150-1, Africa, 221-2; in Middle Africa, 332,
152-7, 161, 162-4, 351, 363; Islam in, 333, 334; in Sudan, 114, 118, 125, 353
26, 27, 35, 129, 132, 138, 145, 150-1, Frere, Sir Bartle, 276-7, 278-9
206; Mamluks, 130, 131, 135-6; under Fulani, 14, 35, 82, 100, 101, 103, 128;
Ottoman rule, 130-1, 341, 356; jihads, 82-8,89,91,93,97,98
Napoleon’s conquest of, 131-4; Funj sultanate, 8, 15, 17, 27-8, 140, 151,
Muhammad Ali, 134-43, 185; map. 152, 152-3
137; Abbas I, 143; Suez Canal, 143, Futajallon, 3, 4, 82, 89, 126, 127
145-6, 356-7; Ismail Pasha, 144—7; Futa Toro, 82, 89
international control of finances, 146-7,
148; nationalism and Arabi Pasha Gabon,306
rebellion, 147-8, 357; British Gallieni, J.S., 126, 127
occupation, 148-9, 157, 163, 341, 351, Gambia, 38, 45, 46, 67, 125
356, 357; and Ethiopia, 169-70; Gaza empire, 293, 294
European investment in, 344-7, 357-8 Gcaleka, 283
Ekiti, 100 German East Africa Company, 349, 362
Equiano, Olaudah (Gustavus Vasa), Germany, Germans, 43, 114, 162, 163,
49-50, 50 191-2, 196, 265, 299, 326, 332, 333,
Equipment treaties, 52, 53 334, 336, 342, 343, 344, 346, 358; in
Eritrea, 170, 358 West Africa, 117, 121, 125, 126; in
Ethiopia, Ethiopians, 3, 4, 5, 32, 150, Namibia (South West Africa), 281,282,
164—75, 340, 347, 361; early history, 283, 349; East Africa (Tanganyika),
8-10, 150; Christianity in, 150, 164, 334, 335-6, 337, 338, 339,347,349,
165, 166; and the Sudan, 161, 170; 360, 362; Cameroons, 349, 361
Emperor Tewodros, 165-9, 350; Napier Gezo, King of Dahomey, 103, 104
expedition (1867), 167,168, 172, 173, Ghana, ancient empire of, 16,91
350; Emperor Yohannes (John) IV, Ghana (formerly Gold Coast), 18, 28, 54,
169-70; Emperor Menelik II and the 74, 78, 118, 346; European trade and
Italians, 170—5; treaty of Wichale, 171; influence, 38, 39-40, 46-7, 115; and
Italian invasion and battle of Adowa, Asante wars, 108-14, 350-1; British
172-5, 172, 173, 361; provinces of, 174 conquest of, 112-14, 121, 125

366
Gladstone, W.E., 157, 158, 279 inter-lacustrine kingdoms, 4, 21, 311-14,
Glele, King of Dahomey, 54, 104,105 327, 331, 363
Gobir, 82, 83, 86 irrigation, 5, 6, 35, 131, 138, 143, 144,
Gold Coast see Ghana 150, 153, 358
Gold trade/mining, 11, 12, 16, 19,23,28, Isandhlwana, battle of (1879), 279
29, 35, 38, 39, 45, 54, 105, 140, 153, Islam, Muslims, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 20,
218, 219, 281,284,285-6,291,294, 35-6, 44, 328, 330, 362; influence in
296,297,344,345,347 Africa before 1800, 23-8, 30; in West
Goldie, George Taubman, 120 Africa, 16, 17, 28, 33-4, 35-7, 43, 44,
Gordon, General Charles George, 154, 71, 78-9, 80-95, 101, 106, 128; Muslim
157-8,158, 351 law {sharia), 24, 25, 26, 27, 81, 154, 158,
Graaf Reinet, Republic of, 228, 240 192-3; jihads of Western Sudan, 80-93;
Great Trek, Boer, 229, 244-52, 253, 257 in Egypt, 129-30, 132, 133, 138, 145,
Grey, Sir George, 265-7, 268, 269, 274 150-1, 154; Mahdism (Sudan), 155-62,
Griffith, Governor Brandford, 114 207; in Morocco, 176-8; haraka, 177-8,
Griqua, 227, 238, 246, 256, 258, 266, 273, 207; in Algeria, 186-7, 192-3;
274,283 Sanusiyya brotherhood, 205-10; see also
Grobler, Peter, 288, 292 jihads; Maghreb; qadis; Quran; sufi
Guinea (forest zone of West Africa), 34, brotherhoods; ulema
35, 41-2, 44, 45,55, 80 Isly, battle of, 195
Guinea (formerly French), 3, 95, 118, 127, Ismail Pasha, Khedive of Egypt, 144-7,
128 148, 154,169,199,358
Guine Bissau (formerly Portuguese), 117, Ismail, Mawlay, Sultan of Morocco, 13,
118,127 180, 196
Gungunyana, ruler of Gaza, 293, 294, 363 Italy, Italians, 162, 163, 182, 191, 358; and
Ethiopia, 161, 170-5, 347, 358, 361; and
Hamouda Bey, ruler of Tunisia, 182 Tunisia, 199, 200, 201-2, 203; invasion
Hassan III, Sultan of Morocco, 196-7 of Libya, 205,207,210
Hausa, 16, 17, 18, 39, 40, 65, 77, 81, 82, Ivory Coast, 94, 117, 118, 128, 346
93, 101, 115, 128; Usman dan Fodio’s ivory trade, 11, 17, 19, 35, 38, 48, 54, 230,
jihad, 82-6, 87, 97 268, 310, 317, 318, 322, 327, 328, 329,
Haya states, 311, 313, 329 330, 331,332, 333
Hehe, 236, 325-6, 337, 355, 363
Henga, 219, 237 Jaja, King of Opobo, 122-4, 126-7
Hewett, Consul Edward, 121, 122-7 Jameson Raid, 298, 299
Hima, 313,339 Jefferson, Thomas, 59
Hlubi, 237, 238 Jews, Judaism, 9, 139, 181, 184, 193, 284
Hodgson, Sir Frederick, 114 Jihads, jihadists, 31, 36-7, 54, 355; of the
Hottentots see Khoi Western Sudan, 80-93; Usman dan
Husayn ibn ‘Ali Agha’, 181 Fodio’s, 82-7, 91,97; Ahmadu
Hussein, dey of Algeria, 184-5 Lobbo’s, 87-8, 91; al-Hajj Umar’s,
Hutu, 313 89-92; Abdullahi’s, 161, 170; Berbers’,
186-8
Ife, 17, 97 Jihaniyya, 153
Igbo(Ibo), 18,18, 127 Johnston, Harry, 289, 291
Ijaye, 98, 100 Jukun,18,86
Ijebu, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101-2, 104, 127,
362 Kaarta, 17, 67, 81, 89, 127
Ijo, 42 Kabylie revolt (1871), 192, 193
Ilorin, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 127, 362 Kalanga, 218, 219
Imperial British East Africa Company, Kamanga, 219, 237
334, 337,349, 359 Kamba traders, 315, 323, 329, 339
Indians (in Africa), 255, 274, 321, 322, Kanem, 17, 68, 87
Katamansu, battle of (1826), 109
324,340,349
Industrial Revolution, British, 48, 62, 308, Katanga see Shaba
Kazembe, 19, 21,219, 310, 327, 331
317,342

367
 I

Kenya, 14, 306, 315, 334, 339; Arab Lunda, 19, 21, 23, 219, 309-10, 319, 327,
traders, 329-31; British in, 336, 337, 331, 332,337
358, 359, 362
Khartoum, 150, 153, 157, 158, 159, 159, Maasai, 315,316, 329, 337, 339
161, 172,331, 351 MacCarthv, Sir Charles, 109
Khoi, 15, 30, 211-12, 213, 214, 215, 223, Maclean, Captain George, 110-11
224-7, 228, 239-40, 241, 242,243,259 Macina, 72, 87, 88, 89, 91
Kikuyu,315,329,339 McQueen, James, 63, 69
Kitchener, General H.H., 163-4, 304 Mafeking, siege of (1900), 302, 304
Kok’s Grinquas, 227, 256, 266 Magdala, 167
Kololo, 238, 289, 291 Maghreb (north-west Africa), 1,3,5, 16,
Kongo kingdom, 19, 28, 308-9; see also 28, 34, 176-210, 340-1; early history,
Congo; Zaire 10-13; trans-Saharan trade, 34—5, 37;
Korana, 226, 227 Morocco (Maghreb el Aksa), 176-80,
Kordofan, 151, 157 193-7; Turkish, 180-2; Tunisia, 181,
Kruger, Paul, President of Transvaal, 279, 182, 194,197-204, 352; European
286, 286-7,292-3, 295-6, 297, 298, influence in, 182-3; Algeria, 184-93;
299-300, 301,302,305 European advance into (map), 202;
Kuba, 19,310-11 Libya, 204-10
Kush, kingdom of, 7-8, 9, 15, 150 Magongo, battle of, 250
Kwararafa, 18, 86 Mahdist movement (Mahdi), 25, 26, 95,
155-61,162,169,203,205,207,351,
Ladysmith, siege of, 304 354, 358; see also Muhammad Ahmad
Laing, Major Gordon, 65, 66, 70 Majuba, battle of (1881), 279
Laing’s Nek, battle of, 279 Makua, 21, 219
Lander, Richard & John, 66, 67,'68, 69, Malawi (formerly Nyasaland), 4, 21, 32,
73 219,281, 289,291
Leopold, King of the Belgians, 162, 291, Mali, 27, 66, 347; ancient kingdom of, 16,
332, 333-4,336,337, 347, 349, 358, 91,93
359,360,362 Mamluks, 6, 7, 26, 130, 131, 132, 133,
Lesotho (formerly Basutoland), 214, 215, 134, 135, 140, 151, 181
227, 237, 238, 262, 268, 277; wars with Mandara, 87
Orange Free State, 266-7, 269-70; and Mande-speakers, 72, 82
British annexation of, 270-2; ‘War of Mangasha (son of Yohannes IV), 170, 172
the Guns’ (1880), 277; Independence of Mansfield, Chief Justice, 50, 56, 59
(1966), 277 Marchand, Major J.B., 163-4
Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 143, 201 Maravi, 21,219
Liberia, 58, 74, 78, 118, 122; founding of, Marza, treaty of (1883), 203
56, 59-61 Mauritania, 36, 89
Libya, 17, 132, 176,181-2,204-10; Maynier, H.C.D., 228, 239
European influence in, 182, 183; under Mbanza Kongo, 309
the Turks, 204—5, 208-10; Sanusiyya Menelik II, Emperor of Ethiopia, 161,
brotherhood, 205-10; Italian invasion 169, 170-5, 361
of, 205,207,210 Meroe, 7-8, 15
Livingstone, David, 238, 282, 289 Metemma, battle of (1889), 161, 170
Lobengula, King of the Ndebele, 288, Mfecane, 229-39, 245, 256, 324, 325, 354
289, 290, 292,293,294-5 Mfengu (Fingos), 237, 239, 244
London Convention (1884), 282 Mhlatuse river, battle of (1818), 233, 235
London Missionary Society, 73, 238, 240, migrations, 11, 13, 14, 21,23, 36, 226,
242 227; Mfecane, 229-39, 325; Boer Great
London, treaty of (1840), 141-2 Trek, 244-52; Griqua, 266; Ngoni,
Lozi, 23, 219, 238 324-6
Luba, 19, 21,23, 310, 319, 327, 328-9, Milner, Sir Alfred, 144, 300, 301-2, 305
331 Mirambo, Nyamwezi leader, 326-7, 329
Luderitz, Adolph, 349, 358 missionaries, Christian, 8, 289, 291,
Lugard, Sir Frederick, 43, 121, 359 347-8; in West Africa, 37-8, 56, 73-7,

368
 128; in South Africa, 240-1, 242-4, 257, (1867), 167,168, 172, 350
271,282,288 Napoleon I Bonaparte, 182; conquest of
1 Mkwawa, Hehe chief, 337, 363 Egypt by,131-4, 182
J Moffat, Robert, 227, 238, 288 Natal, 229, 233, 234, 239, 259, 265, 267,
f Moletsane, 257 271-2, 274,275,278,279,283,295,
!j Mollien, G., 70 296, 301; Boer Great Trek, 244-50;
s' Molteno, Sir John, 274, 275, 276, 277 British annexation of, 252-5; and 2nd
£ Morocco, 1, 11, 12-13, 176-80, 182, 190, Anglo-Boer War, 302
193-7, 205, 206, 341; the monarchy and Navarino, battle of (1827), 140
baraka, 176-8; Berbers, 178-80; Ndebele, 239, 246, 249, 274, 287-8, 289,
European pressure on, 193-5; Hassan 290, 293, 294-5, 298, 353, 363;
III, 196-7; Abdel Aziz, 197; Chimurenga uprising, 299
partitioning of, 341, 361 Ndwandwe, 230, 231,233, 235
I Moroka, Rolong chief, 246, 257 Nelson, Admiral Lord, 133-4
| Moshoeshoe, King of the Sotho, 238, 246, Ngoni, 235-7, 238, 324-6, 329, 363
252, 256, 257, 258, 260-1,262,263-4, Nguni, 215, 216, 224, 228, 229, 252, 257
266-7, 268,269-70,271-2,272 Ngwane, 237, 238, 239
I Mossi, 127, 362 Niger, (formerly French), 127
j Mozambique, 19, 21,29, 32, 215, 216, Nigeria, 3, 16, 17-18, 38, 42, 49, 77, 78,
218, 235, 236, 325; Portuguese in, 79, 355; Islam in, 28, 91, 93; trade and
218-20,235,281,291,293-4,310,333, slave trade, 40, 43, 54, 55; British in,
363 93, 115, 120-1, 125, 127, 128, 359, 362;
j Mpande (Zulu king), 250, 253, 254, 282 Northern, 121, 126, 127
j Mpondo, 283 Nilotes, 14, 21,215
' Msiri, Nyamwezi leader, 326, 327, 328, Nkhumbi, 332
337,339 Nkore, 21, 311, 312, 313,337
Mthethwa, 230, 231, 233 Nubians, 7, 8, 15
Muhammad the Prophet, 24, 81, 157, 158, Nupe, 18, 65, 87, 120, 362
177,192 Nyamwezi, 235, 310, 317, 319, 323-4,
Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi, 156, 326-7,328,337,363
156-61,205,207,208
) Muhammad Ali Pasha, voali of Egypt, Oil Rivers, 47, 62, 67, 69, 72; Protectorate
134-43, 144, 145, 185, 186,194,206, proclaimed (1885), 121
354; destruction of Mamluks, 135-6; Omdurman, 161, 162; battle of (1898),
military reforms, 136; economic 164, 363
reforms, 137-9; foreign policy, 140-2; Orange Free State, 214, 237, 238, 245,
conquest of Sudan by, 140, 152-3, 154 253,255,259-60,266,267,268,273,
Muhammad al-Kanemi, Shaikh of Borno, 274, 275, 276, 277, 285, 295; Boer
65,72-3, 87, 89, 128 independence in, 263-4; Sotho wars,
Muhammad Bello, Sultan of Sokoto, 65, 266-7, 269-70, 271; 2nd Anglo-Boer
72-3, 89, 93,128 War, 302, 304-5
Muhammad es Sadek, Bey of Tunis, 197, Orange River Sovereignty, 260-3, 266
198-201,203 Orlam communities, 226-7
Munyigumba, 325-6, 327 Oromo (Galla), 10, 165, 169, 170
Mustapha Khazinda, 200 Osei Bonsu, Asantehene, 106
Mutesa, Kabaka of Buganda, 330,330 Osei Kwame, Asantehene, 106
MwataYamvo, KingofLunda, 19,21, Oshogbo, battle of (1840), 100
219,310 Ottoman Empire (Turkey), 6, 12, 13, 26,
Mwene Mutapa, 23, 29, 218, 220, 235 65; Egypt under, 130-1, 132, 133, 134,
Mzilikazi, 238-9, 24^7, 257, 287-8 135, 140-2, 145, 341, 356-7; and the
Sudan, 152-7; and Ethiopia, 169, 174;
Namibia (South-West Africa), 15, 212, Maghreb, 176, 180-2, 185, 196, 198,
214, 215, 227, 244; Germans in, 281, 200-1,204, 341; Libya under, 204-5,
282, 283, 349, 358 207, 208-10
Nandi, 315, 329, 337 Ovambo, 332
Napier, Sir Robert, expedition to Ethiopia Ovimbundu, 317, 331, 332, 333, 337

369
 *

Owu war (1820), 97, 103, 104 Samori Ture, 92, 93-5, 118, 128, 354, 359,
Oyo empire, 17, 18, 39, 40, 41, 75, 87, 360,362
96-8,100-1,102,103 San (Bushmen), 13, 15, 21, 30, 211-12,
212, 214,215, 225-7, 239
palm oil/palm produce, 54, 103-4, 310, Sand River Convention (1852), 262, 263,
317,318, 331, 333,345 264,268,280
Park, Mungo, 66, 66-7, 72 Sandile, Xhosa chief, 259
Pedi, 230, 268, 276 Sanhaja, 36, 178
Peters, Carl, 347, 358 Sanusiyya brotherhood, 205-10
Philip, John, 242, 244, 245, 256 Segu, 17, 67, 72, 81,88-90,126,127, 362
Portugal, Portuguese, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, Sekhukhuni, Pedi chief, 276
21, 23, 45-6, 73, 165,182, 289,291, Senegal, 38, 45, 46, 66, 89, 345; French
293, 295, 332; in Angola, 28-9, 308-9, in, 63, 70-2, 116, 117, 118, 347, 359
310, 332,333,334, 336,337, 340; Shaba (formerly Katanga), 4, 219, 291,
influence on Africa before 1800, 28-30; 310, 319, 323, 327, 328, 339
in West Africa, 37-8, 39-40, 43, 45, 66, Shaiqiya, 151, 153
73, 117, 118, 125; and slave trade, 51-2, Shaka, Zulu, 231-5, 238, 239, 257
55, 58; in Mozambique, 218-20, 235, Shangane, 235, 237
281, 293-4, 310, 333; in Kongo, 308-9 shana (Islamic law), 24, 25, 26, 27, 158,
Potgieter, Andris, 246, 268 192-3
Prempe I, Asantehene, 112,113, 114 Sharp, Granville, 49, 50, 57
Pretoria Convention (1881), 280, 281,286 Shepstone, Sir Theophilus, 255, 276, 288,
Pretorius, Andries, 249, 260, 262, 268 292
Pretorius, Martinus Wessels, 268-9, 275 Shi’ites, 25-6
Pyramids, battle of the (1798), 131, 132 Shoa, 166, 169, 170
Shona/Mashonaland, 216, 220, 288,
qadis (Islamic judges), 24, 25, 26, 94, 138, 291-2,293,294,299
186-7,192 Sidi Mohammed IV, Sultan of Morocco,
Qadiriyya brotherhood, 92, 205, 206 195
Quran (Koran), 24, 33, 36, 81, 82, 83, Sierra Leone, 51, 53, 58, 60, 61,73, 93,
156,158,186,206 109, 111, 127; founding of, 56-9;
missionaries in, 74, 76, 77; African
Rabih ibn Fadlallah, 95, 354, 363 educated elite, 78; British colonization
Ras Makonnen, 174 of, 78, 115, 121, 125, 126
Reciprocal Search treaties, 51-2, 53 Sikonyela, Tlokwa chief, 247, 257
Red Sea, 8, 143, 145, 153, 162,169,170 slave trade, slavery, 7, 13, 17, 18, 19, 28,
Retief, Piet, 246, 247-8, 249 31, 35, 38,50,54,69,73,83,99, 101,
Rhodes, Cecil, 162, 283-5, 287, 288-95, 224, 341; Atlantic, 29-30, 33, 38, 41-4,
297-8,299-300,301,347 66, 105, 331-2, 340, 341; abolition of,
Robinson, Sir Hercules, 297-8 48-63, 106, 243, 244, 245; campaign
Rolong, 246, 257, 260-1 against, 48-53, 69, 115, 361-2; African
Royal African Company, 57 attitudes to abolition, 53-5; anti-slavery
Royal Niger Company (RNC), 120-1, 146, treaties, 55-6; founding of Sierra Leone,
349,353, 359,362 56-9; and founding of Liberia, 59-61;
Rozvi, 23,29,219, 235 economic consequences of abolition,
rubber, 48, 317, 318, 331, 332 61-2; Dahomean, 102-3, 104; chikunda,
Rudd Concession, 288, 290, 292, 293 220; Middle African, 310, 317, 318,
Russia, 141, 174, 207 322, 328, 331, 332
Rwanda, 21, 306, 311, 312, 313-14, 325 Smith, Governor Sir Harry, 259-62
Sobhuza, 230, 231, 237
Said, ruler of Egypt, 143-4 Sokoto caliphate, 65, 72-3, 84, 87, 89, 91,
Said, Sayyid, Sultan of Zanzibar, 21, 92, 101, 355, 362
321-2,322, 324 Somaliland, Somalis, 10, 165, 170
Sahara desert, 1-3, 4, 10, 12, 13, 16, 64, Somalia, 4, 19, 132,339, 358
65, 194, 207; caravan trade across, 3, 11, Songhai empire, 12, 16-17, 31, 82, 86, 91
12, 16, 28, 33, 34-5, 36, 37, 43-4, 66, 93 Sotho, 215, 217, 230, 231, 237-8, 246,

370
 252, 256-7, 260-1,262, 263-4, 26^7,
Tabora, 316, 322, 324, 326, 328, 329, 337
269-72, 277
Tafna, treaty of (1836), 189, 190
: South Africa, 23, 30, 31, 32, 162, 214,
Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika and
215, 218, 239-80, 281-7, 350; Malay
Zanzibar), 19, 219, 229, 235, 306,
community, 224; Boer Great Trek, 229,
314—15, 316,319, 322, 323-4, 325, 326,
244-52; racial discrimination, 239, 243,
328, 334; Germans in, 334, 335-6, 337,
251, 264—5, 285; unification of (1910),
338, 339, 347,349,360,362
243; Indian labour, 255, 274; creation of Temne, 57
Republic of, 268-9; diamond-mining, Tetela, 328-9
272-4,281,283-4,344,345,347;
Tewodros (Theodore), Emperor of
Carnarvon’s confederation policy, Ethiopia, 165-9, 350, 360
274-5; railways, 275, 295, 296, 300;
Thaba Bosiu, 238, 262, 266, 270; treaty of
‘War of the Guns’, 277; Zulu War (1866), 270, 271
(1879), 278-9, 280, 351; Angk^Boer Thembu, 237, 283
wars, 279-80, 280, 300-5, 354; Thonga, 216, 283, 292, 293
goldfields, 281,284, 285-6, 291,296, Tijaniyya brotherhood, 89, 90, 92, 190,
296-7, 344, 345, 347; European 205.206
investment in, 345, 347; see also Boers; Tippu Tip, 326, 328, 328-9, 337, 359
Cape Colony; Natal; Orange Free State; Tlokwa, 237, 238, 247, 257, 260
Transvaal Togo, 117, 125
i Southern Rhodesia see Zimbabwe Tonga, 219, 237
i South-West Africa see Namibia Toro, 21, 311, 312
j Spain, Spanish, 10, 60, 182, 191; Muslim,
Transkei, 214, 277
11, 12, 16; and slave trade, 51-2, 55, 58; Transvaal, 214, 215, 230, 239, 244, 252,
and Morocco, 194, 195, 196 253,255,260,262,273,275,278,
I Sprigg, Sir Gordon, 277, 279 285-7, 295-305; Boer independence in,
I Stanley, H.M., 336 262, 280, 281; creation of South African
! Stockenstroom, Andries, 243, 245, 256, Republic in, 267-9; British annexation
258-9 of (1877), 276-7, 295; 1st Anglo-Boer
Sudan, 7, 28,95,125,132,140,150-64, War, 279; Pretoria Convention (1881),
170; Funj Sultanate, 27-8, 140, 151, 280; expansion of, 281-3; ‘London
152; Islam in, 151,207; British in, 63, Convention’ (1884), 282; goldfields,
65-6, 67, 68-9, 125, 126, 157, 161, 285-6,291,296, 296-7,345,347;
162-4, 173, 174, 351, 363; Mahdist Lobengula’s treaties with, 288, 290;
movement, 95, 155-61, 358; Swaziland occupied by, 292-3; the
Turco-Egyptian administration, 140, struggle for the, 295-9; Uitlanders, 296,
152-7; and Egypt, 150-1, 152-7, 161, 297-8, 301, 302; Jameson Raid, 298;
164; under the Khalifa (Abdullahi), 2nd Anglo-Boer War, 300-5
159-62; Anglo-Egyptian Traza, 70, 71
Condominium, 164, 363 Tripartite treaty (1906: Britain, France
Sudanic belt, 13-14, 306; see also Western and Italy), 173-4
Sudan Tripoli, 17, 63, 65, 66, 67, 182, 183, 185,
Suez Canal, 143,144, 145-6, 356-7 204.206
sufi brotherhoods, 12, 26-7, 160-1, 176, Tswana, 215, 226, 230, 238, 257
194; Tijaniyya, 89, 92, 190, 205, 206; Tuareg, 14, 16, 82, 86, 87
Qadiriyya, 92, 205, 206; Sammaniya, Tukolor empire, 89, 355, 359, 362
156; Taibiya, 194; Mirqhaniyya, 205; Tumbuka, 219, 237
Sanusiyya, 205-10; zawaya (lodges), Tunisia, 1, 11, 12, 176, 190, 197-204, 346;
205, 206,208,209 Turkish administration, 181; French in,
Suleiman, Mawlay, Sultan of Morocco, 182, 196, 197-204, 352; Ahmed Bey’s
178-80 reign, 198; Muhammad es Sadek and
Sunni Muslims, 25 growth of European influence, 198-201;
Swahili, 19, 218, 220, 310, 317, 321, 322, and Italy, 199,200,201-2,203
328,334,337 Turkey see Ottoman empire
Swazi, Swaziland, 230, 231,237, 250, 254, Tutsi, 313,313
283,292-3

371
Uganda, 4, 154, 306, 347; Arab traders in, Wichale (Ucciali), treaty of (1889), 171
329-31; British in, 337-8, 353, 359, Wilberforce, William, 49
362; see also Buganda Wolseley, Sir Garnett, 112, 149, 158
Uitlanders, 296, 297-8, 301, 302 Woodhouse, Governor, 270, 271-2
ulema (Islamic learned men), 25, 187, 206
Ulundi, battle of, 279
Umar, al-Hajj (Umar b. Said Tall), 71-2, Xesibe, 283
Xhosa, 228, 241-5, 247, 259, 265, 283
88, 89-92, 92, 93, 94, 118, 126, 355
United States, 13, 53, 73, 74, 182, 333,
334, 342; and Liberia, 59-61
Yao, 21, 219, 289, 323
Unkiar-Skelessi, treaty of (1833), 141
Yohannes (John) IV, Emperor of Ethiopia,
Usman dan Fodio, 73, 82-6, 87, 88, 89,
161, 169-70
90-1,93, 97, 156,205, 354
Yoruba, Yorubaland, 17, 18, 39, 40, 54,
128, 355; and missionaries, 74, 75, 77;
Van Plettenberg, Governor, 228
educated elite, 78; collapse of Oyo
Van Riebeeck, Jan, 221
empire, 96-8, 100-1; wars, 98-102;
Vegkop, battle of (1836), 246
British in, 100, 102, 104-5, 115, 121,
Venda, 268
359, 362; Islamic expansion in, 101;
Vereeniging, treaty of (1902), 303-305
Dahomey invasions of, 102-5
Victoria, Queen, 167, 279, 292, 299
Yusuf Karamanli of Libya, 65, 181-2,
Viervoet, battle of (1851), 261
183, 204
Wadai, 17, 87
Wahhabi sect, 132, 140,205 Zaire (formerlv Belgian Congo), 3, 13, 19,
Walo, 70, 71 21,25,219, 306,317, 318, 327,328,
War of the Axe (1846), 259 329,331-2, 336
‘War of the Guns’(1880), 277 Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia), 19,
Warden, Henry (Warden line), 260-1, 21, 32, 219, 237, 238, 281, 287, 291, 347
263,264,269 Zanzibar, 21, 321-2, 327, 328, 329, 331,
Warri, 43, 73 334, 335-6, 345 , 358; see also Tanzania
Warrington, Hanmer, 183, 204 Zimbabwe (formerlv Southern Rhodesia),
Waterboer (Griqua chief), 227, 256, 258, 23, 32, 215, 216, 218, 220, 239, 246,
273, 274 281,287, 288, 299, 347, 353
weapons: modern firearms, 71, 73, 94, Zimbabwe, Great, 22, 23, 218
101-2, 103, 105-6, 127, 187,310,317, Zinza kingdom, 329
319-20, 320, 330, 331, 332,336,352-4, Zubair Pasha, 95, 354
355-6, 359, 360-1; traditional, 85; arms Zulu, Zululand, 31,229-35, 247-50, 253,
blockade (Brussels Conference, 1890), 254, 261,276, 282-3, 292, 362; rise of
336,361,362 Shaka’s kingdom, 231—5; migrations,
Western Sudan, 3, 15-16, 17, 28, 34, 42, 235-9; dancing, 241; War (1879),
63, 118, 125, 132, 354,362, 363; 278-9,351
trans-Saharan trade, 34—5, 37; Islam in, Zuurveld, 215, 224, 228, 240, 241-2
36, 44, 54, 78, 80-93, 128; jihads of, Zwangendaba, 235, 236, 324
80-93, 97; French in, 113,118, 125, 353 Zwide, 230,231,233

372
the making OF modern AFRICA is a stimulating two-
volume history of the African continent over the last two
centuries.
This very popular text has been thoroughly revised to
include the most up-to-date developments in research and
historiography. Five distinguished historians of Africa
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the making OF modern AFRICA has already proved

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Volume 1 looks at Africa in the nineteenth century. Taking

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Menelik il, the migrations of the Mfecane in southern
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Longman ISBN 0 582 58508 2