1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20036

Anthony H. Cordesman
Phone: 1.202.775.3270

Email: [email protected]

Web version:
www.csis.org/burke/reports

Stability in the MENA Region:

The Range of Forces
Shaping Stability
Anthony H. Cordesman
March 22, 2018
Burke Chair
In Strategy
acordesman@
gmail.com
 Introduction
The Middle East has long been one of the most unstable regions in the world, and there are no
present prospects for change in the near future. This instability is the result of ongoing conflicts and
tensions, and a variety of political tensions and divisions. It also, however, is the result of a wide
variety of long-term pressures growing out of poor governance, corruption, economic failures,
demographic pressures and other forces within the civil sector.

The Short and Long Term Forces Shaping Stability and Instability
The immediate sources of instability are clear. Most of the region has some form of internal conflict,
faces rising external threats, or is dealing with violent extremism. The violence and wars that have
resulted from the political upheavals in 2011 will at best leave lasting challenges for unity and
development even if the fighting ends. All of the major cause of violent extremism remain, and there
are few prospects that the fight against ISIS will eliminate the extremist threat in even one MENA
country. Tensions between Israel and the Palestinian  each side has seen rising internal political
barriers to a compromise peace and the tensions between Israel, Iran and Hezbollah are creating
new military threats.

The longer term pressures are less clear, although a wide range of international organizations like
the UN, World Bank, and IMF have warned about the individual forces involved for decades. Arab
experts have documented the level of such pressures in the UN's Arab Development Reports since
2002, and many of the forces involved have consistent trends lines and can be quantified by country.
These reports reveal radical differences between the countries in the region, but highlight the fact
that given countries have mix of poor and abusive governance, ethnic and sectarian differences,
corruption and self-seeking elites, poor or failed economic development, employment and career
problems, and population pressures that challenge national unity and stability, and help lead to
violent extremism.
4/8/2018 2
Taken together, it is clear that there is no simple way to model or predict the level of stability in any
given country, much less the region. There are too many variables involved, and the variables differ
so much between neighboring countries that focusing on one set of variables can at best describe
the current situation in a single country  not the situation in the Arab world or MENA region.

History has also made it all too clear that stability or instability can also change almost instantly
because of the actions of a given figure or leader, personal tensions or ability to cooperate, ill-judged
actions or interactions between given actors, outside intervention, success or failure in crisis
management or warfare, and catalytic events that capture popular attention. The origins of the
political upheavals and wars that began in 2011 are a key case in point.

Report on The Range of Forces Shaping Stability in the MENA Region

There are, however, a wide range of short and longer-term trends that can be analyzed, and many
can be at least partially quantified. They provide a clear warning in many cases of the actions that
governments must take to reduce the threat posed by given causes, and affect the society of each
Arab and MENA country.

This analysis presents a summary presentation on the forces shaping stability and instability in the
MENA region, and was prepared for the annual conference of the Arab Thought Foundation in Dubai
on April 10-12, 2018. It addresses both the short-term causes of instability and the longer-term
trends, and provides updated summary data on each Arab and Middle Eastern state where available.

3
 Table of Contents
Key Factors Shaping the Analysis, 7 The Civil Side of Instability, 37
▪ The “Band of Instability”: Morocco to Iran, 8 ▪ Key Civil Causes of Instability, 38
▪ Estimating Stability and Instability, 9 ▪ Civil Challenges to Stability, 39
▪ Key Causes of Instability, 10 ▪ Some Uncertain Polling Indicators, 40
▪ Major Impacts to Date, 11 ▪ Perceptions of National Challenges, 41
▪ Arab Youth: Negative Views of ISIS: 2015, 42
The Security Side of Instability, 12
▪ Lack of Youth Employment Opportunities,43
▪ The Cost of Conflict and Violent Extremism, 13
▪ Lack of Youth Employment Opportunities Pt 2, 44
▪ Wars with Lasting Stability and Development Impacts, 14
▪ Secularism vs. Religion vs. “Justice” vs.
▪ The Impact of War on Development: Syria, 15
Other Ideological Issues, 45
▪ The Impact of War on Development: Iraq, 16
▪ Support for Making Sharia the Official law by Country, 46
▪ Terrorism and Violent Islamic Extremism, 17
▪ The Growing Global Impact of Islam: 2010-2050, 18 Governance and Corruption, 47
▪ ODNI Map of Sunni Violent Extremist Operating Areas in 2017, 19 ▪ Governance, Corruption, Rule of Law, Repression, 48
▪ MENA and Nearby Areas Where U.S. Forces Have CT Mission, 20 ▪ UN HDI Index: Rankings by Country, 2016, 49
▪ Arab World Terrorist Attacks vs. Rest of World, 21 ▪ World Bank Rating of Governance in Entire MENA Region,
▪ Terrorist Attacks in MENA 2001-2016, 22 50
▪ High Lethality in Arab Terrorism, 23 ▪ Government Effectiveness and Failed Secularism, 51
▪ Four of Ten Leading Countries are Arab, Eight are “Islamic”, 24 ▪ Government Effectiveness and Failed Secularism Pt 2, 52
▪ Four of Five Leading Perpetrators are Arab, 25 ▪ Uncertain Governance, 53
▪ Costly Wars and Arms Races, 26 ▪ Corruption Perceptions Ranking in 2016, 54
▪ IISS Estimate of 2017 Global Military Spending, 27 ▪ Rigid and/or Repressive Regimes; Lack of
▪ Comparative Military and Security Spending in 2017, 28 Peaceful Civil and Political Alternatives, 55
▪ Excessively Large National Security Forces, 29 ▪ Political Stability/ Less Violence in 2016, 56
▪ IISS Estimate of Real Change in MENA ▪ Rule of Law MENA Region, 2016, 57
Military Spending 2016-2017, 30
Economics and Unemployment, 58
▪ Ethnic, Sectarian, Tribal, and Regional Differences, 31
▪ Key Economic Causes of Instability, 59
▪ Sectarian/Ethnic/Tribal/Regional Divisions, 32
▪ GDP by Country, MENA Region in 2017, 60
▪ Key Analytic Issues, 33
▪ GDP Per Capita Estimates: MENA Region, 61
▪ Sectarian Divisions in MENA, 34
▪ GNI per Capita PPP terms, MENA Region, 62
▪ Ethnic Divisions in MENA, 35
▪ Key Economic Pressures, 63
▪ Broader “Kurdish Problem”, 36
4/8/2018 4
 Table of Contents
▪ Key Missing Index: Gini Index, 64 Over-Dependence on Petroleum Exports, 91
▪ Percentage of Population Dissatisfied with Standard of Living, 65 ▪ The OPEC Disease and the Illusion of Oil Wealth, 92
▪ Excessive Public Sector Employment, 66 ▪ Total Petroleum Export Revenues Sub section, 93
▪ Lag in Employment and Cause, 67 ▪ The Real World Limits to Oil Wealth, 94
▪ Rankings: Ease of Doing Business MENA Region, 2017, 68 ▪ The Oil Shock in 2012-2016, 95
▪ The Expatriate Challenge, 69 ▪ The Limits to “Oil Wealth:” Per Capita Net Oil Export Income
and the Oil Shock in 2012-2016 , 96
Population Pressure and the “Youth Bulge”, 70 ▪ Non-Petroleum GDP Per Capita Income, 97
▪ Demographic Pressures, 71
▪ The Global Impact of Islam: 2010-2050, 72 Other Slides, 98
▪ MENA Population (Thousands) 1950 – 2050, 73 ▪ GDP per Capita MENA Region in 2017, 99
▪ Demographic Pressure in North Africa 1950-2015, 74 ▪ Public Sector Bias in Seeking Employment, 100
▪ Demographic Pressure in Arab-Israeli Countries: 1950-2050, 75 ▪ Perceptions of Quality of Life and Governance, 101
▪ Demographic Pressure in Gulf Countries: 1950-2050, 76 ▪ Detailed Population Trends, 102
▪ Youth Bulge and Employment, 77
▪ Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region Before 2011, 78
▪ Comparative Arab Youth Unemployment, 79
▪ The “Youth Bulge”, 80
▪ The Shape of Things to Come – for the Next Decade, 81
▪ Dependency Ratio, by country, MENA region, 2015, 82
▪ Potential Support Ratio, by country, MENA region, 2015, 83

Major Pressures for Social Change, 84

▪ Social Change, Hyperurbanization, Media, Education, 85
▪ Key Drivers, 86
▪ Growing Hyper Urbanization: 1950-2030, 87
▪ Percentages of Urbanization in MENA Region, 2017, 88
▪ Internet Users in Middle East, by Country, 2017, 89
▪ Digital Penetration in the MENA Region: 2012, 90

4/8/2018 5
 Additional Reports and References
The reader should be aware that The Burke Chair at CSIS, working with Dr. Abdullah Toucan, has
addressed these causes of instability in more depth in a number of prior reports. Two have examined
the ability to model and quantify key trends in depth:

• Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Volume One: Regional Trends April
2016, a comparative survey of the key quantitative civil factors and trends shaping
stability and instability in the region. This volume is available on the CSIS website at
http://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/160419_MENA_Stability_II_Country_01.pdf.

• Stability in the MENA Region: Beyond ISIS and War, Volume Two: Country-by-Country
Trends, April2016: a country-by-country risk assessment and survey of the key
quantitative civil factors and trends shaping stability and instability in the region. This
volume is available on the CSIS website at http://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/160419_MENA_Stability_I_Regional_0.pdf.

A third report provides a set of comparisons of each MENA country flagging both key areas of risk
and major gaps or problems in international and national reporting:

• Instability in the MENA Region, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Key Conflict States: A
Comparative Score Card, 2017: Seven tables that compare a range of key measures of
stability in all MENA states, and nearby conflict states. This volume is available on the CSIS
website at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/instability-mena-region-afghanistan-pakistan-
and-key-conflict-states-comparative-score-card

4/8/2018 6
Key Factors Shaping
the Analysis

7
 The “Band of Instability”: Morocco to Iran

Note that some experts include

Turkey, Somalia, and the Sudan

Source:
https://www.google.com/search?q=Map+of+MENA+region&tbm=isch&imgil=znXk0x3W7G3aHM%253A%253BoqWD05Q7VHfgOM%253Bhttp%25253A%25252F
%25252Fwww.slideshare.net%25252FPresentationsat24point0%25252Fmap-of-mena-
14114848&source=iu&pf=m&fir=znXk0x3W7G3aHM%253A%252CoqWD05Q7VHfgOM%252C_&usg=__5ll59zZ6D6o1QcBGWeSGl21ElKc%3D&biw=1267&bih=986
&ved=0ahUKEwjSyNj-7rjLAhXKej4KHStICX4QyjcIJg&ei=RtniVtKNB8r1-
QGrkKXwBw#imgdii=HnVYveGk_iZYSM%3A%3BHnVYveGk_iZYSM%3A%3BIJsQZYoHG_igAM%3A&imgrc=HnVYveGk_iZYSM%3A.
8
 Estimating Stability and Instability
• Largely an “Arab” and Muslim Region. But, national
differences outweigh common cultural and religious
identity.
• No clear path to predicting shape of future unrest and
conflict.
• Long list of underlying causes in terms of population
pressures, governance, weak economic developments
outlined in Arab Development reports from 2002 onwards.
• Experts differ sharply on impact and ways to weight
importance of given problems.
• Sharp gaps and differences in the data.
• Cannot easily quantify politics, leadership, extremism,
ideology.
• Poll’s help, but limited.
• Instability probably shaped as much by perceptions and
expectations as quantifiable forces. 9
 Key Causes of Instability,
But Vary Sharply by Nation
• Recent wars and their cumulative cost, impact of 2011
upheavals, tensions between Iran and Arab states.
• Internal security issues: Violent extremism plus Sectarian,
ethnic, tribal, other internal divisions.
• Local conflicts, arms races, use of proxies, struggles for
regional influence.
• Impact of outside powers.
• Poor governance, corruption, cronyism, repression
• Failure of Arab socialism, rise of religious extremism,
• High population growth, “youth bulge and
unemployment,” inadequate infrastructure, housing and
services.
• Long history of inadequate development and economic
growth, state-driven barriers.
10
 “Post 1991/2003/2011:” Major Impacts to Date
• Boom and Bust in Petroleum Export Revenues: Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar(?), Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen
• High Levels of Islamic Extremist Violence/Threat: Algeria (?), Libya, Egypt, Syria,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
• Political Instability/War Critically Impact or Cripple Economy, Governance,
National Development: Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestinians, Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan (?) Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, Yemen
• Continued/Worsened Failure to Create, Fund, and Implement an Effective
Development Plan for Economy and Governance, and Meet Job Creation
needs: All regional states, but Kuwait, Qatar and UAE partially exempt.
• Iran vs. Divided Arab World and/or Unaffordable Arms Races: Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Jordan (?), Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar
(?) Yemen
• Illusory Arab Alliances, Collapse of GCC: Egypt looks inward, Iraq & Syria civils
wars, Saudis/UAE/Bahrain vs Qatar, marginalize Oman and Kuwait.
• Sectarian, Ethnic, Tribal Crisis Worsens: Libya, Egypt, Israel/Palestinians,
Lebanon (?), Syria, Jordan (?), Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
11
The Security Side of
Instability

12
 The Cost of Conflict and Violent Extremism

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 177 13

 Wars with Lasting Stability and Development Impacts
• Morocco: Polisario, impact on South and Budget
• Algeria: residual impacts of 1991-1997 (present) civil war, Polisario
• Libya: Ongoing civil war, residual ISIS, major development barriers since 2011
• Egypt: Sinai war. Impact of tourism, military spending, development.
• Palestinian-Israel: Gaza development crippled, West Bank insecure, limited growth,
violence in Israel; Impact on Israeli-Arab military spending
• Lebanon: Residual investment and development impacts. Hezbollah vs. Army, border
clashes
• Syria: Crippled development since 2011, 500,000 dead. 40% of population IDPs and
refugees at some point. Lasting tensions and divisions. $88.5+ billion in recovery in
2016, decade or more to restore development track.
• Iraq: Crippled development since at least 1984. 15% of population IDPs and refugees at
some point. Lasting tensions and divisions. $100+ billion in recovery in 2017, decade or
more to restore development track.
• Bahrain: Steadily growing development and unity problems with Sunni vs. Shi’ite
divisions
• Yemen: Failed development before war. Crippled since 2015. All of population affected
by fighting, embargos, bombings. No clear recovery options.
14
 The Impact of War on Development: Syria
(GDP growth rate 2005–2013 in crisis and continuing scenarios (constant prices
2000)

500,000 dead
5.4 million refugees
13.1 million in need inside
6.1 million internally displaced
2.98 million in displaced, hard to reach
areas.
Key medical, education, food security
issues

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 175; UNHCR, as of 17.12.17; http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html, 17.3.18 15

 The Impact of War on Development: Iraq
(Total accumulated losses in GDP because of terrorism, Iraq, 2005–2014 )

180,00-203,000 dead as of 2.17

280,000 refugees
685,000 in need inside
2.1 million internally displaced
2.98 million in displaced, hard to reach areas.
Key medical, education, food security issues

16
Arab Development Report 2016, p. 175; UNHCR, as of 17.12.17; http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/syria-emergency.html , Iraq Body Count
 Terrorism and Violent Islamic Extremism
• Every country in region still faces some form of threat.
• Most countries have seen deterioration in internal conditions
and potential causes since 2011. Cuts in petroleum export
revenues have affected even “wealthy exporting states.
• Violence/threat particularly high in Algeria Libya, Egypt, Israel,
Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
• Break up of Caliphate does not remove many fighters, affiliates,
or address causes.
• Every country in region still faces some form of threat.
• Violence/threat particularly high in Algeria Libya, Egypt, Israel,
Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
• Break up of Caliphate does not remove many fighters, affiliates,
or address causes.
• Growing global impact of active Islam ensures growth of
extremist minority 17
The Growing Global Impact of Islam: 2010-2050

Source: the Pew Research Center, The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, April 2, 2015,
4/8/2018
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/. 18
 ODNI Map of Sunni Violent Extremist Operating
Areas in 2017

U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),

https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf 19
 MENA and Nearby Areas Where U.S. Forces Have
Counterterrorism Mission

Costs of War Project at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs
http://www.tomdispatch.com/images/managed/costofwar_projectmap_large1.jpg 20
 Arab World Terrorist Attacks vs. Rest of World
Well over 60% of those killed
worldwide are the result of
Muslims killing Muslims. Over 85%
in Arab world.

21
Arab Development Report 2016, p. 172
 Terrorist Attacks in MENA 2001-2016

Total of 36,857 incidents

• 37% of global total of 98,773.
• 45% of total of 81,234 in largely
Islamic regions in MENA, Sub-
Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and
South Asia, Africa
• Numbers so low only because do
not count most war casualties

22
START Data Base, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/; accessed 18.3.18
 High Lethality in Arab Terrorism
(Terrorist attacks and their victims in the Arab region versus the rest of the world,
2000–2014 )

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 38 23

 Four of Ten Leading Countries are Arab, Eight are
“Islamic”

State Department Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, April 30, 2017, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/index.htm, p. 14; 24
START data base, accessed 2.18.18
 Four of Five Leading Perpetrators are Arab

State Department Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, April 30, 2017, 25

https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/index.htm, p. 14; START data base, accessed 2.18.18
 Costly Wars and Arms Races
• Morocco-Algeria over Polisario?
• Residual impact of Arab-Israeli arms races.
• Egypt in Sinai/Gaza (Israel?)
• Syria: Internal, Iran, Hezbollah, U.S./allies, Turkey,
Russia, Arab states
• Iraq: Internal, Iran, U.S., Turkey
• Divided Arab world vs. Iran: Nuclear, conventional
missile, asymmetric naval/missile/air, regional
influence
• Qatar vs. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain
• Yemen: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran
• “Glitter Factor,” Toys for the Boys”
26
 IISS Estimate of 2017 Global Military Spending

4/8/2018
Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2018, p. 19
27
 Comparative Military and Security Spending in 2017:
(ISIS Estimate in Current $US Billions)
90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Mauritania Tunisia Bahrain Jordan Lebanon Egypt Morocco Kuwait Oman Algeria Iran Israel Iraq Saudi Arabia
* 0.142 0.826 1.48 1.63 1.87 2.67 3.49 5.71 8.69 10 16 18.5 19.3 76.7

.
Source: Adapted by the author from IISS, Military Balance 2017, Chapter Seven, “The Middle East and North Africa.”. 28
No data available for Qatar, Libya, UAE, and Syria
 Excessively Large National Security Forces:
(Military Spending As % of GDP)

14
• NATO goal is 2%
12
• U.S. is 3.26%,
10
• Russia is 3.68%,
• China is 1.27%.
8

0
Saudi
Egypt Tunisia Mauritania Morocco Lebanon Iran Jordan Bahrain Kuwait Israel Algeria Iraq Oman
Arabia
% GDP 1.36 2.46 2.86 3.15 3.54 3.75 4.04 4.37 4.83 5.33 5.71 10 11.3 12.08

Note: Syria, and Yemen are at war and no estimate is possible, but must exceed 8%. NATO goals is 2%. U.S. is
3.26%, Russia is 3.68%, Chia is 1.27%. 29
Source: Adapted by the author from IISS, Military Balance 2018, Chapter Seven, “The Middle East and North Africa.”.
 IISS Estimate of Real Change in MENA
Military Spending 2016-2017

Note: IISS warns that country reporting is often partial or inaccurate, generally sharply under
reporting
Source: IISS, Military Balance, 2018, p. 319-320
4/8/2018 30
 Ethnic, Sectarian, Tribal, and Regional Differences
• Deep and growing divisions at sectarian extremes,
Sunni and Shi’ite.
• Mixed national records in both correcting historical
problems and offering clear path of hope for the
future.
• Tensions made worse by resource and demographic
pressures.
• Tribal, sectarian, ethnic, and linguistic differences
tend to cluster, and reflect government favoritism
and wealth/income differences.
• Hyperurbanization interacts with major economic
modernization problems in agricultural and rural
sectors
• Violent extremism feeds on these differences.
31
 Sectarian/Ethnic/Tribal/Regional Divisions
• Berbers? Algeria, Libya
• Egypt: Copts
• Lebanon: Maronite, Sunni, Shi’ite, other Confessions
• Syria: Alawite, Shi’ite, Sunnis, Kurds, minorities
• Jordan: Jordanians, Palestinians, Refugees
• Iraq: Sunni, Shiite, Arab, Kurds, minorities
• Iran: Persian, Arab, Baluchi, Kurds, Shiite, Sunni
• Bahrain: Sunni, Shi’ite
• Saudi Arabia: Sunni, Shi’ite
• UAE, Kuwait: Iranians/Persians
• Yemen: Shi’ite divisions, Sunnis; North vs. South
• Foreign Workers? Refugees?
32
 Key Analytic Issues
• Maps and data generally badly outdated, often guesstimates
made without a meaningful census or sampling.
• Urbanization, rising population density, recent civil conflicts and
wars combined to break up traditional patterns, increase tension
and conflict.
• Most states conceal or deny to a major extent.
• Few efforts to measure levels of discrimination, poll attitudes of
affected groups.
• Key aspects of discrimination: Political power, role in governance
and security forces, economics, de facto segregation and security
barriers, career opportunities and wages rarely measured.
• Little analysis of broad patterns of crime, violence,
demonstrations, “incidents”.
• “Terrorism” rarely tied to identify of perpetrators and target.
33
 Sectarian Divisions in MENA

4/8/2018 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/sunni-shiite-map-middle-east-iran-saudi-arabia.html?_r=0 34
 Source: gulf2000.columbia.edu;
Ethnic Divisions in MENA
https://www.google.com/searc
h?q=Population+density+map+o
f+MENA+region&tbm=isch&imgi
l=pl5o89pRKnk_hM%253A%253
B5YCjfhMj-
iyu8M%253Bhttp%25253A%252
52F%25252Fgulf2000.columbia.e
du%25252Fmaps.shtml&source=
iu&pf=m&fir=pl5o89pRKnk_hM
%253A%252C5YCjfhMj-
iyu8M%252C_&biw=1430&bih=9
53&usg=__gzSbz4AA_tCEor43fQ
K7UMeybaE%3D&ved=0ahUKEw
jhyMi0it7KAhXIth4KHfi8DrYQyjc
IKQ&ei=NkCzVuHVKMjtevj5urAL
#imgrc=pl5o89pRKnk_hM%3A&
usg=__gzSbz4AA_tCEor43fQK7U
Ethnic Divisions MeybaE%3D

in MENA
4/8/2018 35
 Broader “Kurdish Problem”

Source: Source: Atlas-Syria: Federal Ministry of the interior, Republic of Austria,

2015, http://www.ecoi.net/atlas_syria.pdf, p. 16
36
The Civil Side of
Instability

37
 Key Civil Causes of Instability
• Authoritarianism, repression, discrimination
• Poor governance and corruption
• Religion, ideology
• Lack of effective development, excessive state and
governance sectors.
• Poor income distribution, low incomes, poverty.
• Population pressure, urbanization, youth bulge,
dependency ratio burdens.
• Lack of real career opportunities, equity, cronyism and
nepotism.
• Catalytic incident or crisis. Impact of conflict or political
crisis.
38
 Civil Challenges to Stability
• Rigid and/or Repressive Regimes; Lack of Peaceful
Civil and Political Alternatives.
• Problems with Security Forces Police and Rule of
Law.
• Ethnic, Sectarian, Tribal, and Regional Differences.
• Major Demographic Pressures – Youth Bulge.
• Social Change, Hyperurbanization, Media,
Education
• Economic Pressures.
• Uncertain Governance: Services, Education, Health,
Utilities (power, water, sewers/garbage)
• Secularism vs. Religion vs. “Justice” vs. Other
Ideological Issues
39
 Some Uncertain Polling Indicators
• Limited sampling of countries sharply distorts results of
many surveys. Worst rated or more unstable countries
often are not polled.
• Employment, career opportunities, merit based hires and
promotion are primary concern in many polls.
• Corruption a key popular concern, but involves “dignity,”
“justice” in moral as well as legal sense, belief
governments have failed to pursue Islamic values.
• Governance only one of many concerns, but lack of
warning of a sudden wave of unrest reflects government’s
failure to listen and respond far more than a lack of
warning indicators.
• Some surveys show fear of physical security varies far
more sharply over time than broad concerns with
governance and economy.
• Violent, armed, extremists, demagogues, ideologues,
charismatic hard to poll.
40
 Perceptions of National Challenges
(What are the most important challenges your country is facing today (%)?)

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 26 41

 Arab Youth: Negative Views of ISIS: 2015

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 38 42

 Lack of Youth Employment
Opportunities is Key Base for Extremist
Recruiting - I

Source: adapted from: INSIDE THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF ARAB YOUTH 8TH ANNUAL ASDA'A BURSON-MARSTELLER
ARAB YOUTH SURVEY, “White Paper,”
http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/uploads/whitepaper/2016-AYS-White-Paper-EN_12042016100316.pdf, p. 13.
Conducted by PSB to explore attitudes among Arab youth in 16 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. PSB conducted 3,500 face-to-face interviews from
January 11 to February 22, 2016 with Arab men and women in the age group of 18 to 24. The interviews were completed in
Arabic and English. The aim of this annual Survey is to present evidence-based insights into the attitudes of Arab youth, providing public and private sector
organizations with data and analysis to inform their decision-making and policy formation.
The Survey covered the six Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 43
Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Yemen. The Survey did not include Syria due to the civil unrest in the country.
 Lack of Youth Employment Opportunities is
Key Base for Extremist Recruiting - II
A quarter (24 per cent) of Arab youth believe that lack of
jobs and opportunities for young people is one of the
primary reasons why some are attracted to Daesh.
Interestingly, one in four (25 per cent) do not understand
why anyone would want to join the militant group.
Other specific reasons as to why some young people are
attracted to Daesh included “the belief that their
interpretation of Islam is superior to others” (18 per cent),
“religious tensions between Sunnis and Shias” (17 per
cent) and “the rise of secular Western values
in the region” (15 per cent).

Concern about lack of job opportunities remains an issue

across the 16 countries polled with fewer than half (44 per
cent) agreeing with the statement that there are good job
opportunities in the areas they live in.
Job opportunities remain a major issue That concern is particularly high in those countries where
across the Arab world with one in four 15- Daesh has actively recruited young people. Just 2 per cent
of young Yemenis,
24 year olds unemployed, the highest
youth unemployment rate in the world, 7 per cent of Libyans, 20 per cent of Palestinians, 21 per
cent Lebanese, 28 percent of Tunisians, and 39 per cent of
according young Iraqis believe they have good job opportunities
to the World Bank. available to them in their country.
Source: adapted from: INSIDE THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF ARAB YOUTH 8TH ANNUAL ASDA'A BURSON-MARSTELLER
ARAB YOUTH SURVEY, “White Paper,”
http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/uploads/whitepaper/2016-AYS-White-Paper-EN_12042016100316.pdf, p. 13.
Conducted by PSB to explore attitudes among Arab youth in 16 countries in the Middle East and North Africa. PSB conducted 3,500 face-to-face interviews from
January 11 to February 22, 2016 with Arab men and women in the age group of 18 to 24. The interviews were completed in
Arabic and English. The aim of this annual Survey is to present evidence-based insights into the attitudes of Arab youth, providing public and private sector
organizations with data and analysis to inform their decision-making and policy formation.
The Survey covered the six Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE), Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 44
Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Yemen. The Survey did not include Syria due to the civil unrest in the country.
 Secularism vs. Religion vs. “Justice” vs.
Other Ideological Issues
 Turn to religion in activist faith where legitimacy of
given belief structures often emerges as key issue.
 Failure of secular options: practical and ideological.
 Reinforced by combination of repression, economic
pressure, youth bulge.
 Religious extremism at some level affects all faiths, as
does issue of historical legitimacy.
 Building on other sources of violence: Arab-Israeli
issue, local conflicts, Iraq, counterterrorism.
 Uncertain role of education and clergy.
 “Justice” issue.
45
 The Broader Impact of Islam: Support for
Making Sharia the Official law by Country

Recent surveys show that most people in several countries with significant Muslim populations have an unfavorable view of ISIS, including virtually all respondents in
Lebanon and 94% in Jordan.
Relatively small shares say they see ISIS favorably. In some countries, considerable portions of the population do not offer an opinion about ISIS, including a majority (62%)
of Pakistanis. Favorable views of ISIS are somewhat higher in Nigeria (14%) than most other nations. Among Nigerian Muslims, 20% say they see ISIS favorably (compared
with 7% of Nigerian Christians). The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram, which has been conducting a terrorist campaign in the country for years, has sworn allegiance to
ISIS...
More generell, Muslims mostly say that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilians in the name of Islam are rarely or never justified ...,including 92% in
Indonesia and 91% in Iraq. An additional 7% say suicide bombings are sometimes justified and 1% say they are often justified in these circumstances.
In a few countries, a quarter or more of Muslims say that these acts of violence are at least sometimes justified, including 40% in the Palestinian territories, 39% in
Afghanistan, 29% in Egypt and 26% in Bangladesh.
In many cases, people in countries with large Muslim populations are as concerned as Western about the threat of Islamic extremism, and have become increasingly
concerned in recent years. About two-thirds of people in Nigeria (68%) and Lebanon (67%) said earlier this year they are very concerned about Islamic extremism in their
country, both up significantly since 2013.
4/8/2018 (http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslimpopulations- much-disdain-for-isis/); http://www.pewresearch.org/fact- 46
tank/2015/12/07/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/.
Governance and
Corruption

47
 Governance, Corruption, Rule of Law, Repression
• Many MENA countries set low standards.
• Polls show that employment and “corruption” are the
greatest single causes of popular discontent.
• “Corruption” often broadly seen as any form of abuse
of power and privilege.
• Sudden rises in instability, however, are often triggered
by incidents that catalyze broad popular action and/or
by violent and highly motivation minorities.
• Security force abuses tend to be relatively narrowly
based and targeted. Do not poll realistically.
• True poverty is forced to work. Discontented middle
class/ideologues often lead initially. Replaced by mass,
extremists, demagogues.
48
 UN Human Development Index:
Rankings by Country, 2016
1

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
Saudi Morocc Afghani
Israel Qatar UAE Bahrain Kuwait Oman Iran Lebanon Algeria Jordan Tunisia Libya Egypt Iraq Syria Yemen
Arabia o stan
* 0.899 0.856 0.847 0.84 0.824 0.8 0.796 0.774 0.763 0.745 0.741 0.725 0.716 0.691 0.649 0.647 0.536 0.482 0.479

Data Source: UN Human Development Report 2017 (provides 2016 rankings) 49

http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries
 World Bank Rating of Governance in Entire
MENA Region
Violence

Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at: www.govindicators.org
Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey
respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and
private4/8/2018
sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate 50
resources.
World Bank, World Wide Governance Indicators, Syria: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports.
 Government Effectiveness and Failed
Secularism (Pre- “Arab Winter” 2011)
100

90
Lower ranking
80 = less effective
government
70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Morocc Lebano Saudi Afghani
Israel UAE Qatar Bahrain Oman Jordan Tunisia Kuwait Iran Syria Egypt Algeria Yemen Iraq Libya
o n Arabia stan
Gov Effectiveness 87.20 81.99 75.36 68.72 63.03 58.77 55.92 55.45 48.34 45.97 44.08 41.23 38.39 35.55 35.07 12.32 10.43 7.11 4.74

(Data Source: World Bank Governance Indicators 2014)

51
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators
 Government Effectiveness and
Failed Secularism: 2016
100

90
Lower ranking = less
80
effective government
70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Saudi Morocc
UAE Israel Qatar Bahrain Oman Jordan Kuwait Iran Tunisia Lebanon Algeria Egypt Iraq Yemen Syria Libya
Arabia o
* 90.87 88.94 74.52 65.87 63.46 61.45 58.65 50.96 46.63 45.67 45.19 35.58 35.1 27.88 9.13 2.4 1.92 1.44
(Data Source: World Bank Governance Indicators 2016) 52
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators
 Uncertain Governance: Education, Health,
Utilities, Housing, Infrastructure, etc.
• State sector lacks efficiency, integrity.
• Government services do not keep up with either
rising population or expectations.
• Key infrastructure failings, particularly in urban
periphery and slums and rural areas.
• Oil wealth is relative and often poorly allocated.
• Broad perception that governments are corrupt,
unjust, and driven by selfish elites.
• Gap between intentions and execution.
• Perceived favoritism by crony, ethnicity, sect, tribe,
faction, and area.
53
 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Ranking in 2016 (Out of 177 Countries)
200

180
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 2015

160
(Ranked 0-177, from least to most corrupt)

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0
Saudi Afghanis
Qatar UAE Israel Jordan Oman Bahrain Kuwait Tunisia Morocco Egypt Algeria Iran Lebanon Iraq Yemen Libya Syria
Arabia tan
* 22 23 28 57 62 64 70 75 75 90 108 108 131 136 166 169 170 170 173

Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index “The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how
corrupt their public sector is perceived to be.”
54
Transparency International, Global Corruption Index 2016, http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/, Accessed March 19, 2018
 Rigid and/or Repressive Regimes; Lack of
Peaceful Civil and Political Alternatives
• Democracy and freedom of expression are only one
set of issues.
• Elitism, corruption, concentration of wealth, failures
personal security, government services are critical.
• So are:
• Lack of proper training and equipment at all levels of police and
justice system, grossly inadequate pay.
• Favoritism, cronyism, oligarchy, age.
• Misuse of courts, police, and security services.
• Misuse of detention, confessions-based justice, extreme interrogation.
• Restrictions on freedom of expression and travel.
• Failure to fund key governance: Services, Education, Health, Utilities
(power, water, sewers/garbage)
55
 Political Stability/ Less Violence in 2016
(by world percentile)
80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Lebano Saudi Morocc
Syria Yemen Iraq Libya Egypt Algeria Tunisia Bahrain Iran Jordan Kuwait UAE Oman Qatar
n Arabia o
* 0 0.48 3.33 3.81 8.1 9.05 11.43 13.33 18.1 20.48 26.67 28.57 35.71 41.43 60.95 71.9 76.19

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, 2016

http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators 56
 Rule of Law MENA Region, 2016
(by World Percentile)
90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Saudi
UAE Qatar Bahrain Oman Jordan Kuwait Tunisia Morocco Egypt Iran Algeria Lebanon Yemen Iraq Libya Syria
Arabia
* 79.81 79.33 67.79 66.35 65.38 62.02 56.73 55.77 49.04 35.58 25.96 19.23 18.75 4.81 2.4 1.44 0.96

Source: World Bank Governance Indicators, 2016

http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-indicators
57
Economics and
Employment

58
 Key Economic Causes of Instability
• Impact of poor governance and corruption
• State barriers to economic progress, doing business.
• Lack of effective development, excessive state and
governance sectors with gross overemployment
• Poor income distribution, low incomes, poverty.
• Population pressure, urbanization, youth bulge,
dependency ratio burdens.
• Unemployment and disguised (non-productive, low
paid) unemployment.
• Lack of real career opportunities, equity, cronyism
and nepotism.
• Catalytic incident or crisis. Impact of conflict or
political crisis.
59
 GDP by Country, MENA Region in 2017
(PPP purchasing power parity, $US millions )

2,000,000

1,800,000

1,600,000

1,400,000

1,200,000
$US Millions

1,000,000

800,000

600,000

400,000

200,000

0
Saudi
Iran Egypt UAE Iraq Algeria Qatar Kuwait Morocco Oman Tunisia Jordan Lebanon Bahrain Yemen Libya Syria
Arabia
CIA 1,789, 1,631, 1,199, 691,90 660,70 629,30 341,70 302500 300,10 187,90 135,90 89,050 87,890 69,770 68,950 63,140 50,280
WB 1,756, 1,601, 1,064, 671,11 645,42 609,63 327,55 300,96 281,42 0
N/D 132,22 85,553 85,947 0
N/D 69,166 0
N/D 0
N/D

CIA WB
Various data estimates unavailable for Bahrain, Libya, Oman, and Syria
CIA World Factbook 2017: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html
World Bank Indicator 2017: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 60
 GDP Per Capita Estimates: MENA Region
( PPP in $US using Multiple Indicators)
140000

120000

100000
US Dollars

80000

60000

40000

20000

0
Saudi Lebano Moroc
Qatar Kuwait UAE Bahrain Oman Iran Iraq Algeria Egypt Tunisia Jordan Libya Yemen Syria
Arabia n co
CIA GDPPC 124900 69700 68200 55300 51800 45000 20000 19500 17000 15100 13000 12000 12500 8600 9800 2300 2900
World Bank GDPPC 127480 72264 72399 54416 N/D0 0
N/D 19948 14308 17348 15013 11129 11595 9047 7857 N/D 0 2507 0
N/D
IMF GDPPC 129360 71930 69900 55850 52720 46630 20940 20000 17390 15270 13530 12460 12760 8950 12960 2480 0
N/D

Various data estimates unavailable for Bahrain, Libya, Oman, and Syria
CIA World Factbook 2017
World Bank Indicator 2017 61
IMF 2018
 GNI per Capita PPP terms, MENA Region
140,000

120,000
PPP GNI is gross national income (GNI)
100,000
converted to international dollars using
purchasing power parity rates.

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0
Saudi
Qatar Kuwait UAE Oman Bahrain Libya Lebanon Iraq Iran Algeria Jordan Tunisia Egypt Morocco Syria Yemen
Arabia
GNI/Capita 119,029 85,820 58,068 52,109 42,191 32,072 21,666 16,263 14,007 13,451 12,555 11,337 10,440 10,400 6,905 5,771 3,945

Source: United Nations Development Program- Human Developments Report, 2013

http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gni-capita-ppp-terms-constant-2011-ppp
62
 Key Economic Pressures
• Per Capita income is not rising to meet expectations;
government blamed.
• Low comparative rates of development.
• Poverty Issues. Limited oil income – “wealth” – per capita.
• Major income disparities. Loss of status, exclusion from
Middle Class.
• Price and inflationary shock at all levels of income. Recent
spikes in food and energy prices.
• Mismanagement of excessive state sector and government
interference and favoritism.
• Failed industrial base development and diversification;
• Inefficient and overstressed agricultural sector. Water.
• Uncertain subsidy affordability and impact.
• Significant numbers at or below a poverty line of $1-2 a day
in family income
63
 Key Missing Index: Gini Index
100

90

80

70
Gini Index Values (%)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Lebano Morocc Saudia
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Jordan Kuwait Libya Oman Qatar Syria Tunisia UAE Yemen
n o Arabia
Gini Index 65.6 59.1 80.4 66.9 0 65.9 73.7 85.7 77.7 79.6 70.8 70.6 79.2 66.1 68.3 89.2 66.9

The GINI Index is a measure of statistical dispersion that measures income inequality. The index is measured
between 0% and 100%. 0% indicates a society in which all individuals have the same income, 100% indicates that
all national wealth is concentrated into one individual

Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse Research Institute, Global Wealth Databook 2012. p. 93-96. Accessed August 8, 2013 64
https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index.cfm?fileid=88EE9D2B-83E8-EB92-9D5E0AB7A9A266A9
 Percentage of Population Dissatisfied
with Standard of Living

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 260 65

 Excessive Public Sector Employment
(Average employment shares in the public sector in selected Arab countries and selected
comparator countries in the 2000s )

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 29 66

 Lag in Employment and Cause

Arab Development Re[ort 2016, p. 263 67

 Rankings: Ease of Doing Business MENA Region, 2017
200

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0
Morocc Saudi Lebano Afghani
Kuwait Bahrain UAE Oman Qatar Tunisia Jordan Iran Egypt Algeria Iraq Syria Libya Yemen
o Arabia n stan
Rank 3.5 4.5 21 69 71 83 88 92 103 124 128 133 166 168 174 183 185 186

Source: World Bank Group 68

http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
 The Expatriate Challenge
(Distribution of employment by sector and nationality in the GCC )_

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 79 69

Population Pressure
and the “Youth
Bulge”

70
 Demographic Pressures
• Massive population growth since 1950, and will continue
through at least 2030.
• Matched by dislocation, hyperurbanization, and DP/IDP
issues.
• Major “youth bulge” and pressure on employment,
education, services, governance, and infrastructure.
• Need to focus on jobs and income for native labor, restrict
expatriates, immigration,
• Changes in sectarian, demographic mix, and presence.
• Broad pressure on agriculture at time need economies of
scale and capital – not more farmers.
• Strain on all government services and infrastructure.
• Cannot afford to increase government and state sector jobs.
• Challenge of expectations, status as important as classic
economic pressures.
71
 The Global Impact of Islam: 2010-2050

Source: the Pew Research Center, The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, April 2, 2015,
4/8/2018
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050/. 72
 MENA Population (Thousands) 1950 - 2050
700,000
644,364
From 1950 to 1980 = Population Increase X2.23
600,000 From 1950 to 2015 = Population Increase X5
From 1950 to 2050 = Population Increase X7.96
500,000 482,825
Population (Thousands)

403,604
400,000 366,938

300,000 269,733

200,000 180,448

118,950
100,000 80,879

0
1950 1965 1980 1995 2010 2015 2025 2050

Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, Accessed March 2018. 73
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
 Demographic Pressure in North Africa 1950-2015
in 1,000s
Multiplication factors = Change in population from 1950 to 2015
60,000
Algeria
50,000
X4.45
Morocco
Population (Thousands)

40,000 X3.57
30,000 Libya Tunisia
X6.67 X3.14
20,000

10,000

0
Algeria Libya Morocco Tunisia
1950 8,893 961 9,343 3,517
1965 11,963 1,624 14,066 4,566
1975 16,140 2,568 17,687 5,704
1985 22,008 3,660 21,644 7,368
1995 28,322 4,584 26,148 8,999
2005 32,918 5,570 29,901 10,030
2015 39,542 6,412 33,323 11,162
2025 45,841 7,375 36,484 12,115
2035 50,118 8,138 39,148 12,496
2045 53,894 8,747 41,230 12,671
2050 55,445 8,971 42,026 12,679

Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, Accessed March 2018. 74
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
 Demographic Pressure in Arab-Israeli Countries: 1950-2050
(in Thousands)
160,000

140,000 Multiplication factors represent the change in population from 1950 to 2015
120,000
Egypt
Population (in Thousands)

100,000 X4.17
80,000
Syria
60,000
X4.88
40,000
Gaza Strip Israel Jordan Lebanon West Bank
X7.63 X6.26 X14.47 X4.53 X3.61
20,000

-
Gaza Strip Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria West Bank Egypt
1950 245 1,286 561 1,364 3,495 771 21,198
1965 350 2,572 1,068 2,058 5,322 861 30,265
1975 395 3,341 1,822 2,692 7,398 806 36,952
1985 532 4,049 2,669 3,177 10,479 1,044 50,052
1995 886 5,335 4,249 3,672 14,487 1,621 58,945
2005 1,350 6,726 5,363 4,139 18,614 2,247 72,544
2015 1,869 8,049 8,118 6,185 17,065 2,785 88,487
2025 2,350 9,305 8,320 5,397 24,538 3,328 103,742
2035 2,778 10,588 9,638 5,624 27,563 3,827 118,256
2045 3,201 11,818 10,857 5,674 30,173 4,225 131,822
2050 3,393 12,365 11,411 5,621 31,226 4,376 137,873

Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, Accessed April 2015. 75
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
 Demographic Pressure in Gulf Countries: 1950-2050
(in Thousands)
120,000

Multiplication factors represent the change in population from 1950 to 2015

Iran
100,000 X5.0
Iraq
Population (in Thousands)

80,000
X7.18 Yemen
Saudi Arabia
60,000 X5.6
X7.19
40,000
Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar UAE
20,000 X11.71 X19.23 X6.72 X87.8 X80.28

-
Bahrain Iraq Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE Yemen Iran
1950 115 5,163 145 489 25 3,860 72 4,777 16,357
1965 191 7,971 476 682 70 5,327 144 6,510 25,040
1975 259 11,118 1,007 920 165 7,208 523 7,934 33,467
1985 423 15,694 1,733 1,497 342 13,330 1,363 10,540 48,619
1995 582 19,658 1,664 2,139 510 18,755 2,458 14,832 64,217
2005 916 27,538 2,257 2,697 973 23,642 4,087 20,003 72,283
2015 1,347 37,056 2,789 3,287 2,195 27,752 5,780 26,737 81,824
2025 1,580 47,657 3,169 3,981 2,563 31,877 7,063 32,822 90,481
2035 1,700 59,262 3,482 4,601 2,574 35,614 7,773 38,437 95,772
2045 1,806 70,923 3,751 5,147 2,548 38,781 8,024 43,709 99,181
2050 1,847 76,519 3,863 5,402 2,559 40,251 8,019 46,081 100,045

Source: United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, Accessed April 2015. 76
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php
 Youth Bulge and Employment

• Number of men and women entering and in labor force

exceeds demand.
• Regional youth unemployment ratios some of worst in the
world: Average 30% by UNDP estimate.
• Extensive additional disguised (non-productive
unemployment
• Long lags in employment regardless of education.
• Tension with expatriate labor
• Adds to gender, sectarian, ethnic tensions.
• Poor promotion and career prospects.
• Resent privilege, cronyismism, nepotism, corruption.
• Turn away from secular society to religion?
77
Figure 2
Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region1,2
(20083)Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region
Before 2011 (2008): The Threat From POAYMs
23
Youth unemployment (Percent)

MENA6
21
19 Central and
South-East Asia Latin America South-Eastern
17 and the and the Europe(non- EU)
Pacific Carribean and CIS
15
13 Sub-Saharan
World Developed
Economies and Africa
11
South Asia EU
9 East Asia
7
5
4 6 8 10
Total unemployment rate (Percent)
Sources: National authorities; IMF, World Economic Outlook; staf f
Source: IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook, 78
estimates; and
Middle East and International
Central Labor
Asia, October 2010, p. 38 Organization.
 Comparative Arab Youth Unemployment
(Youth unemployment rate (% of total labor force ages 15–24, modelled ILO
estimate), 1991– 2013 )_

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 79 79

 The “Youth Bulge”
(Percentage of Native Population Below 25 years in 2017)
70

60

50
Percentage of Total Population

40

30

20

10

0
Morocc Saudi Afghanis
Qatar UAE Bahrain Iran Tunisia Kuwait Lebanon Libya Algeria Oman Syria Egypt Jordan Iraq Yemen
o Arabia tan
Ages 15-24 12.35 13.51 15.65 14.69 13.88 15.1 16.42 17.04 17.09 15.3 18.57 18.69 19.54 18.94 20.07 19.25 21.21 22.22
Ages 0-14 12.63 21.01 19.08 24.19 25.15 25.02 24.09 25.77 25.84 29.31 26.1 30.1 31.62 33.29 34.68 39.46 39.83 40.92

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed March 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 80

 The Shape of Things to Come – for the Next Decade
(Percentage of Population Ages 0-14 in MENA Region)
4500.00%

4000.00%

3500.00%

3000.00%

2500.00%

2000.00%

1500.00%

1000.00%

500.00%

0.00%
Lebano Morocc Saudi Afghani
Qatar Bahrain UAE Iran Kuwait Tunisia Libya Algeria Oman Syria Egypt Jordan Iraq Yemen
n o Arabia stan
Ages 0-14 12.63 19.08 21.01 24.09 24.19 25.02 25.15 25.77 25.84 26.1 29.31 30.1 31.62 33.29 34.68 39.46 39.83 40.92
Ages 0-14

CIA World Factbook, 2016. Accessed March 2018

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 81
 Dependency Ratio, by country, MENA region, 2015
100
Total Dependency Ratio = the number of
90 dependents, aged 0-14 and over the age of
65, to the total population aged 15-64.
80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Saudi Morocc Afghani
UAE Qatar Kuwait Bahrain Oman Iran Tunisia Lebanon Libya Algeria Egypt Jordan Syria Yemen Iraq
Arabia o stan
Ratio 17.4 17.5 29.8 30.2 32.4 40.2 40.9 45.6 47.3 49.1 51.6 52.7 61.8 66.1 72.8 76.8 77.7 88.8

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2015

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2261.html 82
Potential Support Ratio, by country, MENA region, 2015
90
Potential Support Ratio describes the
80 burden placed on the working population
by the non-working (0-14, 65+) population
70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
Saudi Afghanist
UAE Qatar Kuwait Bahrain Oman Yemen Iraq Jordan Libya Syria Iran Egypt Algeria Morocco Tunisia Lebanon
Arabia an
Ratio 83.4 78.1 37.3 33.1 32.6 23.2 21.2 19.8 18.3 16 15.5 14.3 14.2 12.2 11.2 10.3 9 8.3

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2015 83

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2261.html
Major Pressures for
Social Change

84
 Social Change, Hyperurbanization, Media,
Education
• Hyperurbanization and relocation changes values,
patterns of stability and security – infrastructure,
dislocation, housing, and community stresses,
• Exposure to global and regional media is beyond
government control and steadily raises expectations
while criticizing regimes.
• Educational standards may not keep up, but more
and more of population has secondary or university
education.
• Economic and governance failures challenge
secularism, modernization at the popular level.
• Major questions about the role of women, marriage,
family stability and security.
85
 Key Drivers
• Changing education and role of women,
• Impact of global competition, technology, demand
for skills.
• Gross over-saturation of government jobs and state
owned enterprises. Poor productivity.
• Failure of “Arab socialism,” Weak industrial
sectors.
• Disconnect between neo-Salafi goals, modernization,
and development.
• Agriculture too small, labor intensive, lacking in
capital, and marketing/distribution.
• Economics, extremism, urbanization break up past
social order.
86
 Growing Hyper Urbanization: 1950-2030

Source: http://www.citymetric.com/skylines/amazing-map-shows-how-urbanisation-has-accelerated-1950-1709. 87
 Percentages of Urbanization in MENA Region, 2017
100.00%

90.00%

80.00%

70.00%

60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00%

20.00%

10.00%

0.00%
Saudi Morocc
Qatar Kuwait Israel Bahrain Lebanon UAE Jordan Libya Oman Iran Algeria Iraq Tunisia Syria Egypt Yemen
Arabia o
* 99.40% 98.40% 92.30% 88.90% 88.00% 86.10% 84.10% 83.50% 79.00% 78.50% 74.40% 71.90% 69.70% 67.30% 61.20% 58.50% 43.30% 35.80%

Source: CIA, Accessed March 2020. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html 88

 Internet Users in Middle East, by Country, 2017
60
(millions)

50

40

30

20

10

0
Saudi
Iran Iraq UAE Yemen Israel Jordan Syria Lebanon Oman Kuwait Qatar Bahrain
Arabia
* 56.7 24.15 14 8.52 6.91 6.64 6.3 6.03 4.6 3.31 3.21 2.2 1.39

https://www.statista.com/statistics/603061/number-of-internet-users-in-middle-east-countries/ 89
 Digital Penetration in the MENA Region: 2012

Source: World Bank, Broadband Networks in the Middle East and North Africa 90
http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0112-9, p. 24
, p. ,
Over-Dependence
On Petroleum
Exports

91
 The OPEC Disease and the Illusion of Oil Wealth
• Oil income differs radically by exporting state, and even
more so in terms of net per capita income – the real
measure of wealth.
• Most states concentrate income in their elite, consume
large amounts rather than invest, and expand the state
sector to create low productivity jobs.
• Distribution often varies sharply by region, ethnicity, and
sect. Concentration at the top feeds corruption.
• Population increases and waste consume steadily larger
portions of production domestically.
• Development, production and transport cost rise faster in
real terms
• Many petroleum exporting countries end up as rentier
states with distort economies, limited job creation, and
limited per capita income
92
 Total Petroleum Export Revenues
(in Current $U.S. Millions)

Where applicable, petroleum product exports are included. Data for some countries may include condensates, as well as other NGLs;

Source: OPEC, https://asb.opec.org/index.php/data-download

93
 The Real World Limits to Oil Wealth
(Net Oil Export Revenues in Current $U.S. Billions)

Source: US Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency,

https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31292 94
 The Oil Shock in 2012-2016
(Total Petroleum Export Revenues in Current $U.S. Millions)

Where applicable, petroleum product exports are included. Data for some countries may include condensates, as well as other NGLs;

Source: OPEC, https://asb.opec.org/index.php/data-download

95
 The Limits to “Oil Wealth:” Per Capita Net Oil Export
Income and the Oil Shock in 2012-2016
(In Constant $US 2016)

Source: EIA, OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet, May 15, 2017,

https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.cfm?RegionTopicID=OPEC. 96
 Non-Petroleum GDP Per Capita Income
(In t $US 2015)

Source: McKinsey, Digital Middle East: Transforming the region into a leading digital economy, October 2016,
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/global%20themes/middle%20east%20and%20africa/digital%20middle%20east%20transforming%
20the%20region%20into%20a%20leading%20digital%20economy/digital-middle-east-final-updated.ashx
97
 Other Slides

4/8/2018 98
 GDP per Capita MENA Region in 2017
(PPP purchasing power parity, $US )
140000

120000

100000

80000

60000

40000

20000

0
Morocc Saudi
Yemen Syria Libya Tunisia Jordan Egypt Algeria Iraq Lebanon Iran Oman Bahrain UAE Kuwait Qatar
o Arabia
* 2300 2900 8600 9800 12000 12500 13000 15100 17000 19500 20000 45500 51800 55300 68200 69700 124900

CIA World Factbook, 2018 99

 Public Sector Bias in Seeking Employment

Arab Development Re[ort 2016, p. 262

100
 Perceptions of Quality of Life and Governance

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 245 101

 Detailed Population Trends

Arab Development Report 2016, p. 245

102