20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services

ted Services Institute

COMMENTARY

The Attritional Art of War:

Lessons from the Russian War
on Ukraine
Alex Vershinin
18 March 2024
Long Read

If the West is serious about the

possibility of a great power conflict, it
needs to take a hard look at its capacity
to wage a protracted war and to pursue a
strategy focused on attrition rather than
manoeuvre.

Attritional wars require their own ‘Art of War’ and

are fought with a ‘force-centric’ approach, unlike
wars of manoeuvre which are ‘terrain-focused’.
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 1/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to

enable the replacement of losses, geographical
depth to absorb a series of defeats, and
technological conditions that prevent rapid
ground movement. In attritional wars, military
operations are shaped by a state’s ability to
replace losses and generate new formations, not
tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side
that accepts the attritional nature of war and
focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than
gaining terrain is most likely to win.

The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To

most Western experts, attritional strategy is
counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred
the short ‘winner takes all’ clash of professional
armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over
Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The
possibility that the war would go on never entered
the discussion. This is a reflection of a common
Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as
exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 2/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude.

Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers
are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of
resources available to replace initial losses. The
attritional nature of combat, including the erosion
of professionalism due to casualties, levels the
battlefield no matter which army started with
better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war
is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp
this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy
aimed at exhausting enemy resources while
preserving their own are more likely to win. The
fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on
manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on
near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that
wars of attrition have their own art is vital to
winning them without sustaining crippling losses.

The Economic Dimension

Wars of attrition are won by economies enabling
mass mobilisation of militaries via their industrial
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 3/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

sectors. Armies expand rapidly during such a

conflict, requiring massive quantities of armoured
vehicles, drones, electronic products, and other
combat equipment. Because high-end weaponry
is very complex to manufacture and consumes
vast resources, a high-low mixture of forces and
weapons is imperative in order to win.

High-end weapons have exceptional performance

but are difficult to manufacture, especially when
needed to arm a rapidly mobilised army subjected
to a high rate of attrition. For example, during the
Second World War German Panzers were superb
tanks, but using approximately the same production
resources, the Soviets rolled out eight T-34s for every
German Panzer. The difference in performance
did not justify the numerical disparity in
production. High-end weapons also require high-
end troops. These take significant time to train –
time which is unavailable in a war with high
attrition rates.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 4/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

It is easier and faster to produce large numbers of

cheap weapons and munitions, especially if their
subcomponents are interchangeable with civilian
goods, ensuring mass quantity without the
expansion of production lines. New recruits also
absorb simpler weapons faster, allowing rapid
generation of new formations or the
reconstitution of existing ones.

Achieving mass is difficult for higher-end Western

economies. To achieve hyper-efficiency, they shed
excess capacity and struggle to rapidly expand,
especially since lower-tier industries have been
transferred abroad for economic reasons. During
war, global supply chains are disrupted and
subcomponents can no longer be secured. Added
to this conundrum is the lack of a skilled
workforce with experience in a particular
industry. These skills are acquired over decades,
and once an industry is shuttered it takes decades
to rebuild. The 2018 US government interagency
report on US industrial capacity highlighted these
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 5/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

problems. The bottom line is that the West must

take a hard look at ensuring peacetime excess
capacity in its military industrial complex, or risk
losing the next war.

Force Generation
Industrial output exists so it can be channelled
into replacing losses and generating new
formations. This requires appropriate doctrine
and command and control structures. There are
two main models; NATO (most Western armies)
and the old Soviet model, with most states fielding
something in between.

NATO armies are highly professional, backed by a

strong non-commissioned officer (NCO) Corps,
with extensive peacetime military education and
experience. They build upon this professionalism
for their military doctrine (fundamentals, tactics
and techniques) to stress individual initiative,
delegating a great deal of leeway to junior officers

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 6/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

and NCOs. NATO formations enjoy tremendous

agility and flexibility to exploit opportunities on a
dynamic battlefield.

In attritional war, this method has a downside.

The officers and NCOs required to execute this
doctrine require extensive training and, above all,
experience. A US Army NCO takes years to develop. A
squad leader generally has at least three years in
service and a platoon sergeant has at least seven.
In an attritional war characterised by heavy
casualties, there simply isn’t time to replace lost
NCOs or generate them for new units. The idea
that civilians can be given three-month training
courses, sergeant’s chevrons and then expected to
perform in the same manner as a seven-year
veteran is a recipe for disaster. Only time can
generate leaders capable of executing NATO
doctrine, and time is one thing that the massive
demands of attritional war do not give.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 7/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

The Soviet Union built its army for large-scale

conflict with NATO. It was intended to be able to
rapidly expand by calling up massed reserves.
Every male in the Soviet Union underwent two
years of basic training right out of high school.
The constant turnover of enlisted personnel
precluded creation of a Western-style NCO corps
but generated a massive pool of semi-trained
reserves available in times of war. The absence of
reliable NCOs created an officer-centric command
model, less flexible than NATO’s but more
adaptable to the large-scale expansion required by
attritional warfare.

However, as a war progresses past a one-year

mark, front-line units will gain experience and an
improved NCO corps is likely to emerge, giving
the Soviet model greater flexibility. By 1943, the
Red Army had developed a robust NCO corps, which
then disappeared after the Second World War as
combat formations were demobilised. A key
difference between the models is that NATO
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 8/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

doctrine cannot function without high-

performing NCOs. The Soviet doctrine was
enhanced by experienced NCOs but did not
require them.

Instead of a decisive battle

achieved through rapid
manoeuvre, attritional war
focuses on destroying enemy
forces and their ability to
regenerate combat power, while
preserving one’s own

The most effective model is a mixture of the two,

in which a state maintains a medium-sized
professional army, together with a mass of
draftees available for mobilisation. This leads
directly to a high/low mixture. Professional pre-
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 9/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

war forces form the high end of this army,

becoming fire brigades – moving from sector to
sector in battle to stabilise the situation and
conduct decisive attacks. Low-end formations
hold the line and gain experience slowly,
increasing their quality until they gain the
capability to conduct offensive operations. Victory
is attained by creating the highest quality low-end
formations possible.

Forging new units into combat-capable soldiers

instead of civilian mobs is done through training
and combat experience. A new formation should
train for at least six months, and only if manned by
reservists with previous individual training.
Conscripts take longer. These units should also
have professional soldiers and NCOs brought in
from the pre-war army to add professionalism.
Once initial training is complete, they should only
be fed into the battle in secondary sectors. No
formation should be allowed to fall below 70%
strength. Withdrawing formations early allows
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 10/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

experience to proliferate among the new

replacements as veterans pass on their skills.
Otherwise, valuable experience is lost, causing
the process to start all over. Another implication
is that resources should prioritise replacements
over new formations, preserving combat edge in
both the pre-war army (high) and newly raised
(low) formations. It’s advisable to disband several
pre-war (high-end) formations to spread
professional soldiers among newly created low-
end formations in order to raise initial quality.

The Military Dimension

Military operations in an attritional conflict are
very distinct from those in a war of manoeuvre.
Instead of a decisive battle achieved through rapid
manoeuvre, attritional war focuses on destroying
enemy forces and their ability to regenerate
combat power, while preserving one’s own. In this
context, a successful strategy accepts that the war
will last at least two years and be broken into two
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 11/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

distinct phases. The first phase ranges from

initiation of hostilities to the point where
sufficient combat power has been mobilised to
allow decisive action. It will see little positional
shifting on the ground, focusing on favourable
exchange of losses and building up combat power
in the rear. The dominant form of combat is fires
rather than manoeuvre, complemented by
extensive fortifications and camouflage. The
peacetime army starts the war and conducts
holding actions, providing time to mobilise
resources and train the new army.

The second phase can commence after one side

has met the following conditions.

Newly mobilised forces have completed their

training and gained sufficient experience to
make them combat-effective formations,
capable of rapidly integrating all their assets in
a cohesive manner.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 12/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

The enemy’s strategic reserve is exhausted,

leaving it unable to reinforce the threatened
sector.
Fires and reconnaissance superiority are
achieved, allowing the attacker to effectively
mass fires on a key sector while denying the
enemy the same.
The enemy’s industrial sector is degraded to
the point where it is unable to replace
battlefield losses. In the case of fighting against
a coalition of countries, their industrial
resources must also be exhausted or at least
accounted for.

Only after meeting these criteria should offensive

operations commence. They should be launched
across a broad front, seeking to overwhelm the
enemy at multiple points with shallow attacks.
The intent is to remain inside a layered bubble of
friendly protective systems, while stretching
depleted enemy reserves until the front collapses.
Only then should the offensive extend towards
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 13/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

objectives deeper in the enemy rear.

Concentration of forces on one main effort should
be avoided as this gives an indication of the
offensive’s location and an opportunity for the
enemy to concentrate their reserves against this
key point. The Brusilov Offensive of 1916, which
resulted in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian
army, is a good example of a successful attritional
offensive at the tactical and operational level. By
attacking along a broad front, the Russian army
prevented the Austro-Hungarians from
concentrating their reserves, resulting in a
collapse all along the front. At the strategic level,
however, the Brusilov Offensive is an example of
failure. Russian forces failed to set conditions
against the whole enemy coalition, focusing only
on the Austro-Hungarian Empire and neglecting
German capacity. The Russians expended crucial
resources which they could not replace, without
defeating the strongest coalition member. To
reemphasise the key point, an offensive will only

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 14/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

succeed once key criteria are met. Attempting to

launch an offensive earlier will result in losses
without any strategic gains, playing directly into
enemy hands.

Modern War
The modern battlefield is an integrated system of
systems which includes various types of
electronic warfare (EW), three basic types of air
defences, four different types of artillery,
countless aircraft types, strike and
reconnaissance drones, construction and sapper
engineers, traditional infantry, armour
formations and, above all, logistics. Artillery has
become more dangerous thanks to increased
ranges and advanced targeting, stretching the
depth of the battlefield.

In practice, this means it is easier to mass fires

than forces. Deep manoeuvre, which requires the
massing of combat power, is no longer possible

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 15/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

because any massed force will be destroyed by

indirect fires before it can achieve success in
depth. Instead, a ground offensive requires a tight
protective bubble to ward off enemy strike
systems. This bubble is generated through
layering friendly counter-fire, air defence and EW
assets. Moving numerous interdependent systems
is highly complicated and unlikely to be
successful. Shallow attacks along the forward line
of troops are most likely to be successful at an
acceptable cost ratio; attempts at deep
penetration will be exposed to massed fires the
moment they exit the protection of the defensive
bubble.

Integration of these overlapping assets requires

centralised planning and exceptionally well-
trained staff officers, capable of integrating
multiple capabilities on the fly. It takes years to
train such officers, and even combat experience
does not generate such skills in a short time.
Checklists and mandatory procedures can
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 16/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

alleviate these deficiencies, but only on a less-

complicated, static front. Dynamic offensive
operations require fast reaction times, which
semi-trained officers are incapable of performing.

An example of this complexity is an attack by a

platoon of 30 soldiers. This would require EW
systems to jam enemy drones; another EW system
to jam enemy communications preventing
adjustment of enemy fires; and a third EW system
to jam space navigation systems denying use of
precision guided munitions. In addition, fires
require counterbattery radars to defeat enemy
artillery. Further complicating planning is the fact
that enemy EW will locate and destroy any
friendly radar or EW emitter that is emitting for
too long. Engineers will have to clear paths
through minefields, while friendly drones provide
time-sensitive ISR and fire support if needed.
(This task requires a great deal of training with
the supporting units to avoid dropping munitions
on friendly attacking troops.) Finally, artillery
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 17/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

needs to provide support both on the objective

and enemy rear, targeting reserves and
suppressing artillery. All these systems need to
work as an integrated team just to support 30 men
in several vehicles attacking another 30 men or
less. A lack of coordination between these assets
will result in failed attacks and horrific losses
without ever seeing the enemy. As the size of
formation conducting operations increases, so do
the number and complexity of assets that need to
be integrated.

Implications for Combat

Operations
Deep fires – further than 100–150 km (the average
range of tactical rockets) behind the front line –
target an enemy’s ability to generate combat
power. This includes production facilities,
munitions dumps, repair depots, and energy and
transportation infrastructure. Of particular
importance are targets that require significant
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 18/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

production capabilities and that are difficult to

replace/repair, as their destruction will inflict long
term damage. As with all aspects of attritional
war, such strikes will take significant time to have
an effect, with timelines running into years. The
low global production volumes of long-range
precision-guided munitions, effective deception
and concealment actions, large stockpiles of anti-
aircraft missiles and the sheer repair capacities of
strong, determined states all combine to prolong
conflicts. Effective layering of air defences must
include high-end systems at all altitudes coupled
with cheaper systems to counter the enemy’s
massed low-end attack platforms. Combined with
mass-scale manufacturing and effective EW, this
is the only way to defeat enemy deep fires.

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 19/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

Victory in an attritional war is

assured by careful planning,
industrial base development
and development of
mobilisation infrastructure in
times of peace, and even more
careful management of
resources in wartime

Successful attritional war focuses on the

preservation of one’s own combat power. This
usually translates into a relatively static front
interrupted by limited local attacks to improve
positions, using artillery for most of the fighting.
Fortification and concealment of all forces
including logistics is the key to minimising losses.
The long time required to construct fortifications
prevents significant ground movement. An
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 20/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

attacking force which cannot rapidly entrench

will suffer significant losses from enemy artillery
fires.

Defensive operations buy time to develop low-end

combat formations, allowing newly mobilised
troops to gain combat experience without
suffering heavy losses in large-scale attacks.
Building up experienced low-tier combat
formations generates the capability for future
offensive operations.

The early stages of attritional war range from

initiation of hostilities to the point where
mobilised resources are available in large
numbers and are ready for combat operations. In
the case of a surprise attack, a rapid offensive by
one side may be possible until the defender can
form a solid front. After that, combat solidifies.
This period lasts at least a year-and-a-half to two
years. During this period, major offensive
operations should be avoided. Even if large

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 21/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

attacks are successful, they will result in

significant casualties, often for meaningless
territorial gains. An army should never accept a
battle on unfavourable terms. In attritional war,
any terrain that does not have a vital industrial
centre is irrelevant. It is always better to retreat
and preserve forces, regardless of the political
consequences. Fighting on disadvantageous
terrain burns up units, losing experienced
soldiers who are key to victory. The German
obsession with Stalingrad in 1942 is a prime
example of fighting on unfavourable terrain for
political reasons. Germany burned up vital units
that it could not afford to lose, simply to capture a
city bearing Stalin’s name. It is also wise to push
the enemy into fighting on disadvantageous
terrain through information operations,
exploiting politically sensitive enemy objectives.
The goal is to force the enemy to expend vital
material and strategic reserves on strategically
meaningless operations. A key pitfall to avoid is

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 22/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

being dragged into the very same trap that has

been set for the enemy. In the First World War,
Germans did just that at Verdun, where it planned
to use surprise to capture key, politically sensitive
terrain, provoking costly French counterattacks.
Unfortunately for the Germans, they fell into their
own trap. They failed to gain key, defendable
terrain early on, and the battle devolved instead
into a series of costly infantry assaults by both
sides, with artillery fires devastating attacking
infantry.

When the second phase begins, the offensive

should be launched across a broad front, seeking
to overwhelm the enemy at multiple points using
shallow attacks. The intent is to remain inside the
layered bubble of friendly protective systems,
while stretching depleted enemy reserves until
the front collapses. There is a cascading effect in
which a crisis in one sector forces the defenders
to shift reserves from a second sector, only to
generate a crisis there in turn. As forces start
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 23/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

falling back and leaving prepared fortifications,

morale plummets, with the obvious question: ‘If
we can’t hold the mega-fortress, how can we hold
these new trenches?’ Retreat then turns into rout.
Only then should the offensive extend towards
objectives deeper in the enemy rear. The Allies’
Offensive in 1918 is an example. The Allies attacked
along a broad front, while the Germans lacked
sufficient resources to defend the entire line.
Once the German Army began to retreat it proved
impossible to stop.

The attritional strategy, centred on defence, is

counterintuitive to most Western military officers.
Western military thought views the offensive as
the only means of achieving the decisive strategic
goal of forcing the enemy to come to the
negotiating table on unfavourable terms. The
strategic patience required to set the conditions
for an offensive runs against their combat
experience acquired in overseas
counterinsurgency operations.
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 24/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

Conclusion
The conduct of attritional wars is vastly different
from wars of manoeuvre. They last longer and
end up testing a country’s industrial capacity.
Victory is assured by careful planning, industrial
base development and development of
mobilisation infrastructure in times of peace, and
even more careful management of resources in
wartime.

Victory is attainable by carefully analysing one’s

own and the enemy’s political objectives. The key
is recognising the strengths and weaknesses of
competing economic models and identifying the
economic strategies that are most likely to
generate maximum resources. These resources
can then be utilised to build a massive army using
the high/low force and weapons mixture. The
military conduct of war is driven by overall
political strategic objectives, military realities and
economic limitations. Combat operations are
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 25/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

shallow and focus on destroying enemy

resources, not on gaining terrain. Propaganda is
used to support military operations, not the other
way around. With patience and careful planning,
a war can be won.

Unfortunately, many in the West have a very

cavalier attitude that future conflicts will be short
and decisive. This is not true for the very reasons
outlined above. Even middling global powers have
both the geography and the population and
industrial resources needed to conduct an
attritional war. The thought that any major power
would back down in the case of an initial military
defeat is wishful thinking at its best. Any conflict
between great powers would be viewed by
adversary elites as existential and pursued with
the full resources available to the state. The
resulting war will become attritional and will
favour the state which has the economy, doctrine
and military structure that is better suited towards
this form of conflict.
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 26/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

If the West is serious about a possible great power

conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its
industrial capacity, mobilisation doctrine and
means of waging a protracted war, rather than
conducting wargames covering a single month of
conflict and hoping that the war will end
afterwards. As the Iraq War taught us, hope is not
a method.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the

author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or
any other institution.

Have an idea for a Commentary you’d like to write

for us? Send a short pitch to
[email protected] and we’ll get back to you if
it fits into our research interests. Full guidelines
for contributors can be found here.

WRITTEN BY

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 27/28
20/03/2024, 05:45 The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute

Alex Vershinin

MEDIA ENQUIRIES

Jack Bell
Media Relations Manager
+44 (0)7917 373 069
[email protected]

Footnotes

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/attritional-art-war-lessons-russian-war-ukraine 28/28