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VOLUME I

OFFICIAL TEXT
I N TH E

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —

HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM

VON RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL,
ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, HANS
FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER
FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP VON
BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL DÖNITZ, ERICH RAEDER,
BALDUR VON SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED
JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN, ARTHUR
SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON
NEURATH, and HANS FRITZSCHE, Individually and as
Members of Any of the Following Groups or Organizations to
which They Respectively Belonged, Namely: DIE REICHS-
REGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER PO-
LITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN
DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS
OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITER-
PARTEI (commonly known as the "SS") and including DER
SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the "SD"); DIE
GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, com-
monly known as the "GESTAPO"); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN
DER NSDAP (commonly known as the "SA"); and the
GENERAL STAFF andHIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN
ARMED FORCES, all as defined in Appendix B of the Indictment,
Defendants.
 PREFACE

Recognizing the importance of establishing for history an

authentic text of the Trial of major German war criminals, the
International Military Tribunal directed the publication of the
Record of the Trial. The proceedings are published in English,
French, Russian, and German, the four languages used throughout
the hearings. The documents admitted in evidence are printed only
in their original language.
The first volume contains basic, official, pre-trial documents
together with the Tribunal's judgment and sentence of the defend-
ants. In subsequent volumes the Trial proceedings are published in

full from the preliminary session of 14 November 1945 to the closing

session of 1 October 1946. They are followed by an index volume.
Documents admitted in evidence conclude the publication.
The proceedings of the International Military Tribunal were
recorded in full by stenographic notes, and an electric sound record-
ing of all oral proceedings was maintained.
Reviewing sections have verified in the four languages citations,
and other data, and have eliminated obvious grammatical
statistics,

errors and verbal irrelevancies. Finally, corrected texts have been

certified for publication by Colonel Ray for the United States,
Mr. Mercer for the United Kingdom, Mr. Fuster for France, and
Major Poltorak for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

vii
 CONTENTS

Members and alternate members of the Tribunal 1

Officials of the General Secretariat 2

Prosecution Counsel 3

Individual defendants and Defense Counsel 6

Establishment of the Tribunal

London Agreement of 8 August 1945 8
Charter of the International Military Tribunal 10
Protocol rectifying discrepancy in text of the Charter 17

Rules of Procedure 19

Minutes of the opening session of the Tribunal, at Berlin,

18 October 1945 24

Indictment
Text of Indictment 27
Motion of the Prosecution for correcting discrepancies in the

Indictment 93
Pleas of individual defendants 94
Letter of reservation by the United States Prosecutor in regard to
wording of the Indictment 95

Notice
Order of the Tribunal regarding notice to individual defendants . . 96
Order of the Tribunal regarding notice to members of groups and
organizations 97
Order of the Tribunal regarding notice to Defendant Bormann . . 102

Service
Certificates of compliance with orders of the Tribunal regarding
notice to members of groups and organizations and to Defendant
Bormann 104

Certificates of service on individual defendants 117

Certificate of service on Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen and

medical certificates attached thereto 118

Acknowledgment of service by Defendant Fritzsche and Defendant

Raeder 123

ix
Motion on behalf of Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen for post-
ponement of the Trial as to him, and action taken thereon
Motion, and medical certificates attached thereto 124
Report of medical commission appointed to examine Defendant
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen 127
Answer of the United States Prosecution to the motion 134
Memorandum of the British Prosecution on the motion 139
Memorandum French Prosecution on the motion
of the 141
Supplemental memorandum of the French Prosecution 142
Order of the Tribunal granting postponement of proceedings
against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen 143
Supplementary statement of the United States Prosecution .... 144
Motion of the Committee of Chief Prosecutors to amend the In-
dictment by adding the name of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen as a
defendant 145
Order of the Tribunal rejecting the motion to amend the Indictment 146
Memorandum of the French Prosecution on the order of the
Tribunal rejecting the motion to amend the Indictment .... 147

Motion on behalf of Defendant Streicher for postponement of the Trial

as to him, and action taken thereon
Motion on behalf of Defendant Streicher 148
Memorandum of the United States Prosecution on the motion . . . 149
Memorandum of the British Prosecution on the motion 150
Motion of the Soviet Prosecution for a psychiatric examination of
Defendant Streicher 152
Order of the Tribunal regarding a psychiatric examination of De-
fendant Streicher 153
Report of examination of Defendant Streicher 154

Medical examination of Defendant Hess

Motion on behalf of Defendant Hess for an examination by a
neutral expert 155
Order of the Tribunal rejecting the motion, and designating a
commission to examine Defendant Hess 157
Report of commission to examine Defendant Hess 159
Report of prison psychologist 166

Motion adopted by all Defense Counsel, 19 November 1945 168

Judgment 171

Dissenting opinion of the Soviet Judge 342

Sentences 365

x
MEMBERS AND ALTERNATE MEMBERS
OF THE TRIBUNAL

LORD JUSTICE LAWRENCE, Member for the United Kingdom

of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, President

MR. JUSTICE BIRKETT, Alternate Member

MR. FRANCIS BIDDLE, Member for the United States of

America

JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER, Alternate Member

M. LE PROFESSEUR DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, Member for

the French Republic

M. LE CONSEILLER R. FALCO, Alternate Member

MAJOR GENERAL I. T. NIKITCHENKO, Member for the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

LIEUTENANT COLONEL A. F. VOLCHKOV, Alternate Member

1
 OFFICIALS OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT

BRIGADIER GENERAL
WM. L. MITCHELL General Secretary (from 6 November
1945 to 24 June 1946)

COLONEL JOHN E. RAY General Secretary (from 24 June 1946)

MR. HAROLD B. WILLEY General Secretary (to 6 November 1945)

American Secretary (to 11 July 1946)

MR. WALTER GILKYSON American Secretary (from 16 July 1946)

MR. IAN D. McILWRAITH British Secretary

MAJOR A. POLTORAK Soviet Secretary

MR. A. MARTIN-HAVARD French Secretary

COLONEL CHARLES W. MAYS Marshal (to 26 June 1946)

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES

R. GIFFORD Marshal (from 26 June 1946)

COLONEL LEON DOSTERT Chief of Interpreters

(From the Office of U.S. Chief (to 17 April 1946)
of Counsel)

COMMANDER ALFRED STEER,

U,S.N.R Chief of Interpreters
(From the Office of U.S. Chief (from 18 April 1946)
of Counsel)

MAJOR JACK L. BAILEY Administrative Section

CAPTAIN D. P. SULLIVAN Witness Notification

and Procurement

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
A. M. S. NEAVE, B.A.O.R Applications and Motions Section

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER
ALBERT E. SCHRÄDER, U.S.N.R. Defendants' Information Center

MR. BERNARD REYMON Custodian of Documents and Records

LIEUTENANT COLONEL
LAWRENCE D. EGBERT Editor of the Record

CAPTAIN SIGMUND ROTH Director of Printing

2
 PROSECUTION COUNSEL*
United States of America

CHIEF OF COUNSEL:
Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson

EXECUTIVE TRIAL COUNSEL:

Colonel Robert G. Storey
Mr. Thomas J. Dodd

ASSOCIATE TRIAL COUNSEL:

Mr. Sidney S. Alderman
Brigadier General Telford Taylor
Colonel John Harlan Amen
Mr. Ralph G. Albrecht

ASSISTANT TRIAL COUNSEL:

Colonel Leonard Wheeler, Jr.

Lieutenant Colonel William H. Baldwin

Lieutenant Colonel Smith W. Brockhart, Jr.

Commander James Britt Donovan, U.S.N. R.

Major Frank B. Wallis
Major William F. Walsh
Major Warren F. Farr
Captain Samuel Harris
Captain Drexel A. Sprecher
Lieutenant Commander Whitney R. Harris, U.S.N.R.

Lieutenant Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., U.S.N.R.

Lieutenant Henry K. Atherton

Lieutenant Brady O. Bryson, U.S.N.R.
Lieutenant (j. g.) Bernard D. Meitzer, U.S.N.R.
Dr. Robert M. Kempner
Mr. Walter W. Brudno

* Only those members of the Prosecution Counsel who spoke before the Tribunal are listed.

3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland

CHIEF PROSECUTOR:
H. M. Attorney-General, Sir Hartley
Shawcross, K.C., M P.

DEPUTY CHIEF PROSECUTOR:

The Rt. Hon. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe,
P.C.. K.C.. M.P.

LEADING COUNSEL:
Mr. G. D. Roberts, K.C., O.B.E.

JUNIOR COUNSEL:
Lieutenant Colonel J. If, G. Griffith-Jones. M.C..
Barrister-at-Law
Colonel H. J. Phillimore, O.B.E.,
Barrister-at-Law
Major F. Elwyn Jones, M.P.,
Barrister-at-Law
Major J. Harcourt ßarrington,
Barrister-at-Law

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHIEF PROSECUTOR:
General R. A. Rudenko

DEPUTY CHIEF PROSECUTOR:

Colonel Y. V. Pokrovsky

ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS:
State Counsellor of Justice of the 2nd Class,

L. R. Shenin
State Counsellor of Justice of the 2nd Class,

ML Y. Raginsky
State Counsellor of Justice of the 3rd Class,

N. D. Zorya
Chief Counsellor of Justice, L. N. Smirnov
Colonel D. S. Karev
Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Ozol
Captain V. V. Kuchin

4
 French Republic

CHIEF PROSECUTOR:
M. François de Menthon
M. Auguste Champetier de Ribes

DEPUTY CHIEF PROSECUTORS:

M. Charles Dubost
M. Edgar Faure

ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS (Chiefs of Sections):

M. Pierre Mounier
M. Charles Gerthoffer
M. Delphin Debenest

ASSISTANT PROSECUTORS:
M. Jacques B. Herzog
M. Henry Delpech
M. Serge Fuster
M. Constant Quatre
M. Henri Monneray

5
 DEFENDANTS AND DEFENSE COUNSEL
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS: COUNSEL:
GÖRING, HERMANN WILHELM Dr. Otto Stahmer
HESS, RUDOLF Dr. Günther von Rohrscheidt
(to 5 February 1946)
Dr. Alfred Seidl
(from 5 February 1946)
VON RIBBENTROP, JOACHIM Dr. Fritz Sauter
(to 5 January 1946)
Dr. Martin Horn
(from 5 January 1946)
LEY, ROBERT*
HEITEL, WILHELM Dr. Otto Nelte
KALTENBRUNNER, ERNST Dr. Kurt Kauffmann
ROSENBERG, ALFRED Dr. Alfred Thoma
FRANK, HANS Dr. Alfred Seidl
FRICK, WILHELM Dr. Otto Pannenbecker
STREICHER, JULIUS Dr. Hanns Marx
FUNK, WALTER Dr. Fritz Sauter
SCHACHT, HJALMAR Dr. Rudolf Dix
Professor Dr. Herbert Kraus,
**
Associate
DÖNITZ, KARL Flottenrichter Otto Kranzbuehler
RAEDER, ERICH Dr. Walter Siemers
VON SCHIRACH, BALDUR Dr. Fritz Sauter
SAUCKEL, FRITZ Dr. Robert Servatius
JODL, ALFRED Professor Dr. Franz Exner
Professor Dr. Hermann Jahreiss,
**
Associate
BORMANN, MARTIN* Dr. Friedrich Bergold
VON PAPEN, FRANZ Dr. Egon Kubuschok
SEYSS-INQUART, ARTHUR Dr. Gustav Steinbauer
SPEER, ALBERT Dr. Hans Flächsner
VON NEURATH, CONSTANTIN Dr. Otto Freiherr von Lüding-
hausen
FRITZSCHE, HANS Dr. Heinz Fritz
**
Dr. Alfred Schilf, Associate
KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND Dr. Theodor Klefisch
HALBACH, GUSTAV* (to 15 November 1945)
**
Dr. Walter Ballas, Associate
(to 15 November 1945)

* All individual defendants named in the Indictment appeared before the Tribunal except:
Robert Ley, who committed suicide 25 October 1945; Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach,
owing to serious illness ; and Martin Bormann, who was not in custody and whom the Tribunal
decided to try in absentia.
** Only Associates who spoke before the Tribunal are listed.

6
GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS: COUNSEL:

REICH CABINET Dr. Egon Kubu^ehok

LEADERSHIP CORPS OF
NAZI PARTY Dr. Robert Servatius

SS and SD Ludwig Babel, Counsel for SS

and SD (to 18 March 1946),

Counsel for SS (to 1 June

1946),

Co-counsel for SS (to 27 Au-

gust 1946)
Horst Pelckmann, Co-counsel for
SS (from 2 March 1946),
Counsel for SS (from 1 June
1946)
**
Dr. Carl Haensel, Associate

to Dr. H. Pelckmann
(from 1 April 1946)

Dr. Hans Gawlik, Counsel for SD

(from 18 March 1946)

SA Georg Boehm
Dr. Martin Loeffler

GESTAPO Dr. Rudolf Merkel

GENERAL STAFF and Professor Dr. Franz Exner

HIGH COMMAND of the (to 27 January 1946)
GERMAN ARMED FORCES Dr. Hans Laternser
(from 27 January 1946)

Only Associates who spoke before the Tribunal are listed.

7
 LONDON AGREEMENT OF 8 AUGUST 1945

Agreement by the Government of the United States of

America, the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis.
WHEREAS the United Nations have from time to time made
declarations of their intention that war criminals shall be brought
to justice;
AND WHEREAS Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 on
the
German Occupied Europe stated that those German
atrocities in
officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been
responsible for or have taken a consenting part in atrocities and
crimes will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable
deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished
according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free
Governments that will be created therein;
AND WHEREAS this Declaration was stated to be without prej-
udice to the case of major criminals whose offenses have no par-
ticular geographic location and who will be punished by the joint
decision of the Governments of the Allies;
NOW
THEREFORE the Government of the United States of
America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics (hereinafter called "the Signatories") acting in the interests of
all the United Nations and by their representatives duly authorized
thereto have concluded this Agreement.

Article 1. There shall be established after consultation with the

Control Council for Germany an International Military Tribunal for
the trial of war criminals whose offenses have no particular geo-
graphical location whether they be accused individually or in their
capacity as members of organizations or groups or in both capacities.

Article 2. The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the Inter-

national Military Tribunal shall be those set out in the Charter
annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral
part of this Agreement.

Article 3 Each of the Signatories shall take the necessary steps to

make available for the investigation of the charges and trial the
major war criminals detained by them who are to be tried by the

8
International Military Tribunal. The Signatories shall also use their
best endeavors to make available for investigation of the charges
against and the trial before the International Military Tribunal such
of the major war criminals as are not in the territories of any of
the Signatories.
Article 4. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the provisions
established by the Moscow Declaration concerning the return of war
criminals to the countries where they committed their crimes.
Article 5. Any Government of the United Nations may adhere to
this Agreement by notice given through the diplomatic channel to
the Government of the United Kingdom, who shall inform the other
signatory and adhering Governments of each such adherence.*/
Article 6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the jurisdic-
tion or the powers of any national or occupation court established
or to be established in any Allied territory or in Germany for the
trial of war criminals.

Article 7. This Agreement shall come into force on the day of sig-
nature and shall remain in force for the period of one year and
shall continue thereafter, subject to the right of any Signatory
to give, through the diplomatic channel, one month's notice of inten-
tion to terminate it. Such termination shall not prejudice any pro-
ceedings already taken or any findings already made in pursuance
of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the pres-

ent Agreement.
DONE in quadruplicate in London this 8th day of August 1945
each in English, French, and Russian, and each text to have equal
authenticity.

For the Government of the United States of America

s ROBERT H. JACKSON
For the Provisional Government of the French Republic
s ROBERT FALCO
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
/ s t JOWITT
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
s '
I. NIKITCHENKO
s A. TRAININ
* In accordance with .Article 5, the followirg Governments of the United Nations have expressed
their adherence to the Agreement: Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czecho-
slovakia. Poland. Belgium. Fthiopia. Australia, Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg,
Haiti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

9
 CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL
CONSTITUTION OF THE
I.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

Article 1. In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of
August 1945 by the Government of the United States of America,
the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
there shall be established an International Military Tribunal
(hereinafter called "the Tribunal") for the just and prompt trial and
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.
Article 2. The Tribunal shall consist of four members, each with
an alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed by
each of the Signatories. The alternates shall, so far as they are
able, be present at all sessions of the Tribunal. In case of illness
* of any member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some other
reason to fulfill his functions, his alternate shall take his place.

Article 3. Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates

can be challenged by the Prosecution, or by the defendants or their
counsel. Each Signatory may replace its member of the Tribunal
or his alternate for reasons of health or for other good reasons,
except that no replacement may take place during a Trial, other
than by an alternate.
Article 4.

(a) The presence of all four members of the Tribunal or the

alternate for any absent member shall be necessary to con-
stitute the quorum.
(b) The members of the Tribunal shall, before any trial begins,
agree among themselves upon the selection from their num-
ber of a President, and the President shall hold office during
that trial, or as may otherwise be agreed by a vote of not
less than three members. The principle of rotation of presi-
dency for successive trials is agreed. If, however, a session
of the Tribunal takes place on the territory of one of the
four Signatories, the representative of that Signatory on the
Tribunal shall preside.
(c) Save as aforesaid the Tribunal shall take decisions by a
majority vote and in case the votes are evenly divided, the
vote of the President shall be decisive: provided always that
convictions and sentences shall only be imposed by affirm-
ative votes of at least three members of the Tribunal.

10
Article 5. In case of need and depending on the number of the
matters to be tried, other Tribunals may be set up; and the estab-
lishment, functions, and procedure of each Tribunal shall be iden-
tical, and shall be governed by this Charter.

IL JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Article The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to
6.

in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to
try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European
Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organiza-
tions, committed any of the following crimes.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility:

(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation,

initiation or waging of a of aggression, or a war in
war
violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances,
or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of

war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to,
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied terri-
tory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;

(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermina-

enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
tion,
mitted against any civilian population, before or during the
war,* or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy
to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan.

* Comma substituted in place of semicolon by Protocol of 6 October 1945.

11
Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of
State or responsible officials in Government departments, shall not
be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment.

Article S. The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of

his Government or of a superior shall not free him from respon-
sibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the
Tribunal determine that justice so requires.

Article 9. At the trial of any individual member of any group or

organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act
of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organi-
zation of which the individual was a member was a criminal organ-
ization.

After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such

notice as it thinks fit that the Prosecution intends to ask the Tri-

bunal to make such declaration and any member of the organization

will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave tor be heard by
the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the
organization. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the
application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct
in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard.

Article 10. In cases where a group or organization is declared

criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any
Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for
membership therein before national, military, or occupation courts.
In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization
is considered proved and shall not be questioned.

Article .11. Any person convicted by the Tribunal ma v be charged

before a national, military, or occupation court, referred to in
Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime other than of membership
in a criminal group or organization and such court may, after
convicting him, impose upon him punishment independent of and
additional to the punishment imposed by the Tribunal for partic-
ipation in the criminal activities of such group or organization.

Article 12. The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings
against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this
Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal,
for any reason, finds it- necessary, in the interests of justice, to
conduct the hearing in his absence.

Article 13. The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure.
These rules shall not be inconsistent with '
the provisions of this
Charter.

12
 HI. COMMITTEE FOR THE INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
Article 14. Each Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor for the
investigation of the charges against and the prosecution of major
war criminals.
The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following
purposes:
(a) to agree upon a plan of the individual work of each of the
Chief Prosecutors and his staff,
(b) to settle the final designation of major war criminals to be
tried by the Tribunal,
(c) to approve the Indictment and the documents to be submitted

therewith,
(d) to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying documents
with the Tribunal,
(e) to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its approval
draft rules of procedure, contemplated by Article 13 of this
Charter. The Tribunal shall have power to accept, with or
without amendments, or to reject, the rules so recommended.
The Committee shall act in all the above matters by a majority
vote and shall appoint a Chairman as may be convenient and in
accordance with the principle of rotation: provided that if there
is an equal division of vote concerning the designation of a defend-

ant to be tried by the Tribunal, or the crimes with which he shall

be charged, that proposal will be adopted which was made by the
party which proposed that the particular defendant be tried, or
the particular charges be preferred against him.

Article 15. The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting in

collaboration with one another, also undertake the following duties:
(a) investigation, collection, and production before or at the Trial
of all necessary evidence,
(b) the preparation of the Indictment for approval by the Com-
mittee in accordance with paragraph (c) of Article 14 hereof.
(c) the preliminary examination of all . necessary witnesses and
of the defendants,
(d) to act as prosecutor at the Trial,
(e) to appoint representatives to carry out such duties as may be
assigned to them,
(f) to undertake such other matters as may appear necessary to
them for the purposes of the preparation for and conduct of
the Trial.
It isunderstood that no witness or defendant detained by any
Signatory shall be taken out of the possession of that Signatory
without its assent.

13
 IV. FAIR TRIAL FOR DEFENDANTS
Article 16. In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the
following procedure shall be followed:
(a) The Indictment include full particulars specifying in
shall
detail the charges against the defendants. A copy of the In-
dictment and of all the documents lodged with the Indict-
ment, translated into a language which he understands,
shall be furnished to the defendant at a reasonable time
before the Trial.
(b) During any preliminary examination or trial of a defendant
he shall have the right to give any explanation relevant to
the charges made against him.
(c) A preliminary examination of a defendant and his trial shall
be conducted in, or translated into, a language which the
defendant understands.
(d) A defendant shall have the right to conduct his own defense
before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of counsel.
(e) A defendant shall have the right through himself or through
his counsel to present evidence at the Trial in support of his
defense, and to cross-examine any witness called by the Pros-
ecution.

V. POWERS OF THE TRIBUNAL AND CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL

Article 17. The Tribunal shall have the power:
(a) to summon witnesses to the Trial and to require their attend-
ance and testimony and to put questions to them,
(b) to interrogate any defendant,
(c) to require the production of documents and other eviden-
tiary material,
(d) to administer oaths to witnesses,
(e) to appoint officers for the carrying out of any task desig-
nated by the Tribunal including the power to have evidence
taken on commission.
Article IS. The Tribunal shall:
(a) confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the
issues raised by the charges,
(b) take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause
unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and state-
ments of any kind whatsoever,
(c) deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate
punishment, including exclusion of any defendant or his
counsel from some or all further proceedings, but without
prejudice to the determination of the charges.

14
Article 19. The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of
evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent
expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any
evidence which it deems to have probative value.
Article 20. The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature
of any evidence before it is offered so that it may rule upon the
relevance thereof.

Article 21. The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also take
judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of
the United Nations, including the acts and documents of the com-
mittees set up in the various Allied countries for the investigation
of war crimes, and the records and findings of military or other
Tribunals of any of the United Nations.
Article 22.The permanent seat of the Tribunal shall be in Berlin.
The meetings of the members of the Tribunal and of the Chief
first
Prosecutors shall be held at Berlin in a place to be designated by
the Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall be held at
Nuremberg, and any subsequent trials shall be held at such places
as the Tribunal may decide.

Article 23. One or more of the Chief Prosecutors may take part in
the prosecution at each trial. The function of any Chief Prosecutor
may be discharged by him personally, or by any person or persons
authorized by him.
The function of counsel for a defendant may be discharged at
the defendant's request by any counsel professionally qualified to
conduct cases before the Courts of his own country, or by any other
person who may be specially authorized thereto by the Tribunal.
Article 24. The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following
course:
(a) The Indictment shall be read in court.
(b) The Tribunal shall ask each defendant whether he pleads
"guilty" or "not guilty".
(c) The Prosecution shall make an opening statement.
(d) The Tribunal shall ask the Prosecution and the Defense what
evidence (if any) they wish to submit to the Tribunal, and
the Tribunal shall rule upon the admissibility of any such
evidence.
(e) The witnesses for the Prosecution shall be examined and
after that the witnesses for the Defense. Thereafter such
rebutting evidence as may be held by the Tribunal to be
admissible shall be called by either the Prosecution or the
Defense.

15
 (f) The Tribunal may put any question to any witness and to
any defendant, at any time.
(g) The Prosecution and the Defense shall interrogate and may
cross-examine any witnesses and any defendant who gives
testimony.
(h) The Defense shall address the Court.
(i) The Prosecution shall address the Court.
(j) Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal.
(k) The Tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce sentence.
Article 25. All official documents shall be produced, and all court
proceedings conducted, in English, French, and Russian, and in the
language of the defendant. So much of the record and of the proceed-
ings may also be translated into the language of any country in
which the Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers desirable
in the interests of justice and public opinion.

VI. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

Article 26. The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the
innocence of any defendant shall give the reasons on which it is
based, and shall be final and not subject to review.

Article 27. The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon
a defendant on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall
be determined by it to be just.

Article 28. In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the

Tribunal shall have the right to deprive the convicted person of
any stolen property and order its delivery to the Control Council
for Germany.
Article 29. In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out in accord-
ance with the orders of the Control Council for Germany, which
may at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentences, but may
not increase the severity thereof. If the Control Council for Ger-
many, after any defendant has been convicted and sentenced, dis-
covers fresh evidence which, in its opinion, would found a fresh
charge against him, the Council shall report accordingly to the
Committee established under Article 14 hereof, for such action as
they may consider proper, having regard to the interests of justice.

VII. EXPENSES
Article 30. The expenses of the Tribunal and of the trials, shall be
charged by the Signatories against the funds allotted for main-
tenance of the Control Council for Germany.

16
 PROTOCOL RECTIFYING DISCREPANCY
IN TEXT OF CHARTER

Whereas an Agreement and Charter regarding the Prosecution of

War Criminals was signed in London on the 8th August 1945, in the
English, French, and Russian languages;

And whereas been found to exist between the

a discrepancy has
originals of Article 6, paragraph (c), of the Charter in the Russian

language, on the one hand, and the originals in the English and
French languages, on the other, to wit, the semicolon in Article 6,
paragraph (c), of the Charter between the words "war" and "or", as
carried in the English and French texts, is a comma in the Russian
text;

And whereas it is desired to rectify this discrepancy:

NOW, THEREFORE, the undersigned, signatories of the said

Agreement on behalf of their respective Governments, duly author-
ized thereto, have agreed that Article 6, paragraph (c), of the
Charter in the Russian text is correct, and that the meaning and
intention of the Agreement and Charter require that the said semi-
colon in the English text should be changed to a comma, and that
the French text should be amended to read as follows:

c) LES CRIMES CONTRE L'HUMANITE: c'est à dire l'assassinat,

l'extermination, la réduction en esclavage, la déportation, et
tout autre acte inhumain commis contre toutes populations
civiles, avant ou pendant la guerre, ou bien les persécutions
pour des motifs politiques, raciaux, ou réligieux, lorsque ces
actes ou persécutions, qu'ils aient constitué ou non une viola-
tion du droit interne du pays ou ils ont été perpétrés, ont
été commis à la suite de tout crime rentrant dans la compe-
tence du Tribunal, ou en liaison avec ce crime.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned have signed the

present Protocol.

DONE in quadruplicate in Berlin this 6th day of October, 1945,

each in English, French, and Russian, and each text to have equal
authenticity.

17
 For the Government of the United States of America

Isl ROBERT H. JACKSO::

For the Provisional Government of the French Republic

Isl FRANÇOIS de MENTHON

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland
Isl HARTLEY SHAWCROSS

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Isl R. RUDENKO

13
 RULES OF PROCEDURE
(Adopted 29 October 1945)
Rule 1. Authority to Promulgate Rules.
The present Rules Procedure of the International Military
of
Tribunal for the the major war criminals (hereinafter
trial of
called "the Tribunal") as established by the Charter of the Tribunal
dated 8 August 1945 (hereinafter called "the Charter") are hereby
promulgated by the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of
Article 13 of the Charter.
Rule 2. Notice to Defendants and Right to Assistance of Counsel.
(a) Each individual defendant in custody shall receive not less
than 30 days before trial a copy, translated into a language which he
understands, (1) of the Indictment, (2) of the Charter, (3) of any
other documents lodged with the Indictment, and (4) of a statement
of his right to the assistance of counsel as set forth in sub-para-
graph (d) of this Rule, together with a list of counsel. He shall also
receive copies of such rules of procedure as may be adopted by the
Tribunal from time to time.
(b) Any individual defendant not in custody shall be informed
of the indictment against him and of his right to receive the docu-
ments specified in sub-paragraph (a) above, by notice in such form
and manner as the Tribunal may prescribe.
(c) With respect to any group or organization as to which the

Prosecution indicates its intention to request a finding of criminality

by the Tribunal, notice shall be given by publication in such form
and manner as the Tribunal may prescribe and such publication
shall include a declaration by the Tribunal that all members of the
named groups or organizations are entitled to apply to the Tribunal
for leave to be heard in accordance with the provisions of Article 9
of the Charter. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to confer
immunity any kind upon such members of said groups or organiza-
of
tions as may appear in answer to the said declaration.
(d) Each defendant has the right to conduct his own defense or to
have the assistance of counsel. Application for particular counsel
shall be filed at once with the General Secretary of the Tribunal at
the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, Germany. The Tribunal will
designate counsel for any defendant who fails to apply for particu-
lar counsel or, where particular counsel requested is not within
ten (10) days to be found or available, unless the defendant elects
in writing to conduct his own defense. If a defendant has requested
particular counsel who is not immediately to be found or available,
such counsel or a counsel of substitute choice may, if found and
available before trial, be associated with or substituted for counsel

19
designated by the Tribunal, provided that (1) only one counsel shall
be permitted to appear at the trial for any defendant, unless by
special permission of the Tribunal, and (2) no delay of trial will be
allowed for making such substitution or association.
Rule Service of Additional Documents.
3.

before the trial, the Chief Prosecutors offer amendments or

If,

additions to the Indictment, such amendments or additions, including

any accompanying documents shall be lodged with the Tribunal and
copies of the same, translated into a language which they each
understand, shall be furnished to the defendants in custody as soon
as practicable and notice given in accordance with Rule 2 (b) to those
not in custody. .

Rule Production of Evidence for the Defense.

4.

(a) The Defense may apply to the Tribunal for the production of
witnesses or of documents by written application to the General
Secretary of the Tribunal. The application shall state where the
witness or document is thought to be located, together with a state-
ment of their last known location. It shall also state the facts pro-
posed to be proved by the witness or the document and the reasons
why such facts are relevant to the Defense.
(b) If the witness or the document is not within the area
controlled by the occupation authorities, the Tribunal may request
the Signatory and adhering Governments to arrange for the pro-
duction, if possible, of any such witnesses and any such documents
as the Tribunal may deem necessary to proper presentation of the
Defense.
(c)the witness or the document is within the area controlled
If
by the occupation authorities, the General Secretary shall, if the
Tribunal is not in session, communicate the application to the Chief
Prosecutors and, if they make no objection, the General Secretary
shall issue a summons for the attendance of such witness or the
production of such documents, informing the Tribunal of the action
taken. If any Chief Prosecutor objects to the issuance of a sum-
mons, or if the Tribunal is in session, the General Secretary shall
submit the application to the Tribunal, which shall decide whether
or not the summons shall issue.
(d) A summons shall be served in such manner as may be pro-
vided by the appropriate occupation authority to ensure its enforce-
ment and the General Secretary shall inform the Tribunal of the
steps taken.
(e) Upon application to the General Secretary of the Tribunal,

a defendant shall be furnished with a copy, translated into a

language which he understands, of all documents referred to in the
Indictment so far as they may be made available by the Chief

20
Prosecutors and shall be allowed to inspect copies of any such docu-
ments as are not so available.
Rule 5. Order at the Trial.
In conformity with the provisions of Article 18 of the Charter,
and the disciplinary powers therein set out, the Tribunal, acting
through its President, shall provide for the maintenance of order at
the Trial. Any defendant or any other person may be excluded
from open sessions of the Tribunal for failure to observe and
respect the directives and dignity of the Tribunal.
Rule Oaths; Witnesses.
6.

(a) Before testifying before the Tribunal, each witness shall

make such oath or declaration as is customary in his own country.
(b) Witnesses while not giving evidence shall not be present in
court. The President of the Tribunal shall direct, as circumstances
demand, that witnesses shall not confer among themselves before
giving evidence.
Rule 7. Applications and Motions before Trial and Rulings during
the Trial.
(a) All motions, applications or other requests addressed to the
Tribunal prior to the commencement of trial shall be made in
writing and filed with the General Secretary of the Tribunal at
the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, Germany.
(b) Any such motion, application or other request shall be com-
municated by the General Secretary of the Tribunal to the Chief
Prosecutors and, if they make no objection, the President of the
Tribunal may make the appropriate order on behalf of the Tri-
bunal. If any Chief Prosecutor objects, the President may call a
special session of the Tribunal for the determination of the question
raised.
(c) The Tribunal, acting through
its President, will rule in court
upon questions arising during the trial, such as questions as to
all
admissibility of evidence offered during the trial, recesses, and
motions; and before so ruling the Tribunal may, when necessary,
order the closing or clearing of the Tribunal or take any other
steps which to the Tribunal seem just.
Rule Secretariat of the Tribunal.
8.

(a) The Secretariat

of the Tribunal shall be composed of a Gen-
eral Secretary, four Secretaries and their Assistants. The Tribunal
shall appoint the General Secretary and each Member shall appoint
one Secretary. The General Secretary shall appoint such clerks,
interpreters, stenographers, ushers, and all such other persons as
may be authorized by the Tribunal and each Secretary may appoint
such assistants as may be authorized by the Member of the Tribunal
by whom he was appointed.

21
 .

(b)The General Secretary, in consultation with the Secretaries,

shall organizeand direct the work of the Secretariat, subject to the
approval of the Tribunal in the event of a disagreement by any
Secretary.
(c) The Secretariat shall receive all documents addressed to the

Tribunal, maintain the records of the Tribunal, provide necessary

clerical services to the Tribunal and its Members, and perform such
other duties as may be designated by the Tribunal.
(d) Communications addressed to the Tribunal shall be delivered
to the General Secretary.
Rule 9. Record, Exhibits, and Documents.
(a) A
stenographic record shall be maintained of all oral pro-
ceedings. Exhibits will be suitably identified and marked with
consecutive numbers. All exhibits and transcripts of the proceedings
and all documents lodged with and produced to the Tribunal will
be filed with the General Secretary of the Tribunal and will consti-
tute part of the Record.
(b) The term "official documents" as used in Article 25 of the
Charter includes the Indictment, rules, written motions, orders that
are reduced to writing, findings, and judgments of the Tribunal.
These shall be in the English, French, Russian, and German
languages. Documentary evidence or exhibits may be received in
the language of the document, but a translation thereof into Ger-
man shall be made available to the defendants.
(c) All exhibits and transcripts of proceedings, all documents

lodged with and produced to the Tribunal and all official acts and
documents of the Tribunal may be certified by the General Secretary
of the Tribunal to any Government or to any other tribunal or
wherever it is appropriate that copies of such documents or represen-
tations as to such acts should be supplied upon a proper request.

Rule 10. Withdrawal of Exhibits and Documents.

In cases where original documents are submitted by the Prosecu-
tion or the Defense as evidence, and upon a showing (a) that because
of historical interest or for any other reason one of the Governments
signatory to the Four Power Agreement of 8 August 1945, or any
other Government having received the consent of said four signa-
tory Powers, desires to withdraw from the records of the Tribunal
and preserve any particular original documents and (b) that no
substantial injustice will result, the Tribunal shall permit photo-
static copies of said original documents, certified by the General
Secretary of the Tribunal, to be substituted for the originals in the
records of the Court and shall deliver said original documents to
the applicants.

22
Rule 11. Effective Date and Powers of Amendment and Addition.
These Rules shall take effect upon their approval by the Tri-
bunal. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the
Tribunal from, at any time, in the interest of fair and expeditious
trials, departing from, amending, or adding to these Rules, either by
general rules or special orders for particular cases, in such form
and upon such notice as may appear just to the Tribunal.

23
 MINUTES OF THE OPENING SESSION
OF THE TRIBUNAL, AT BERLIN, 18 OCTOBER 1945

GENERAL NIKITCHENKO, President *

Present: All of the Members of the Tribunal and their Alternates.

The International Military Tribunal held its first public session
in Berlin, as required by Article 22 of the Charter, in the Grand
Conference Room of the Allied Control Authority Building at 10:30
a. m.
The President, General Nikitchenko, said:
"In pursuance of the Agreement by the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Provisional Government of the
French Republic, the Government of the United States of America,
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland for the prosecution and punishment of the major
war criminals of the European Axia dated at London, 8 August 1945,
and of Article 22 of the Charter annexed thereto constituting this
International Military Tribunal, this meeting is held at Berlin for
the reception of the Indictment under the Agreement and Charter."
This statement was translated orally in French, English, and
German.
The Members of the Tribunal and their Alternates then made
the following declaration, each in his own language:
"I solemnly declare that I will exercise all my powers
and duties as a Member of the International Military
Tribunal honorably, impartially, and conscientiously."
The President then declared the session opened.
The Chief British Prosecutor, Mr. Shawcross, introduced in
succession the Soviet Chief Prosecutor, General Rudenko; the
French Deputy Chief Prosecutor, M. Dubost; and a representative
of the American Prosecutor, Mr. Shea. Each on being introduced
made a brief statement, which was translated orally into the other
languages, and lodged a copy of the Indictment, in his own lan-
guage, with the President of the Tribunal.
The President said:
"An Indictment has now been lodged with the Tribunal by the
Committee of the Chief Prosecutors setting out the charges made
against the following defendants:
Hermann Wilhelm Göring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribben-
trop, Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred
Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter

* General Nikitchenko was selected as President for the session at Berlin, and Lord Justice
Lawrence was elected President of the Tribunal for the Trial in Nuremberg, in accordance
with Article 4 (b) of the Charter.

24
 Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach T

Karl Dönitz, Erich Raeder, Baidur von Schirach, Fritz SauckeL

Alfred Jodl, Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Arthur Seyss-
Inquart, Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath, and Hans
Fritzsche.
"Copies of the Charter and of the Indictment and of its accom-
panying documents will be served upon the defendants in the Ger-
man language immediately.
"Notices will also be served upon them in writing drawing their
attention to Articles 16 and 23 of the Charter which provide that
they may either conduct their own defense or be defended by any
counsel professionally qualified to conduct cases before the courts
of his own country or by any other person who may be specially
authorized thereto by the Tribunal; and a special clerk of the
Tribunal has been appointed to advise the defendants of their right
and to take instructions from them personally as to their choice of
counsel, and generally to see that their rights of defense are made
known to them.
"If any defendant who desires to be represented by counsel is
unable to secure the services of counsel the Tribunal will appokit
counsel to defend him.
"The Tribunal has formulated Rules of Procedure, shortly to
be published, relating to the production of witnesses and documents
in order to see 1?hat the defendants have a fair trial with full oppor-
tunity to present their defense.
"The individual defendants in custody will be notified that they
must be ready for Trial within 30 days after the service of the
Indictment upon them. Promptly thereafter the Tribunal shall fix
and announce the date of the Trial in Nuremberg to take place not
less than 30 days after the service of the Indictment and the defend-
ants shall be advised of such date as soon as it is fixed.

"It must be understood that the Tribunal which is directed by

the Charter to secure an expeditious hearing of the issues raised
by the charges will not permit any delay either in the preparation
of the defense or of the Trial.
"Lord Justice Lawrence will preside at the Trial at Nuremberg.
"Notice will also be given under Article 9 of the Charter that
the Prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal to declare that the
following organizations or groups of which the defendants or some
of them were members are criminal organizations, and any member
of any such group or organization will be entitled to apply to the
Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question
of the criminal character of such group or organization. These organ-
izations referred to are the following:

25
 Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das Korps der Politischen
Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei
(Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party); Die Schutzstaffeln der
Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (commonly
known as the "SS") and including Der Sicherheitsdienst (com-
monly known as the "SD"); Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret
State Police, commonly known as the "Gestapo"); Die Sturm-
abteilungen der NSDAP (commonly known as the "SA"); and
the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces.
"The Indictment having been duly lodged by the Prosecutors in
conformity with the provisions of the Charter, it becomes the duty
of the Tribunal to give the necessary directions for the publication
of the text.
"The Tribunal would like to order its immediate publication but
inasmuch as the Indictment must be published
this is not possible
simultaneously in Moscow, London, Washington, and Paris.
"This result may be achieved, as the Tribunal is informed, by
permitting publication in the press of the Indictment not earlier
than 8 p.m., G.M.T., i. e. 2000 hours today, Thursday, October 18th."
This statement was translated orally in French, English, and
German.
The meeting adjourned at 11:25 a.m.

26
 INDICTMENT *
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH
REPUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM
VON RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL,
ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, HANS
FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER
FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP VON
BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL DÖNITZ, ERICH RAEDER,
BALDUR VON SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED
JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN, ARTHUR
SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON
NEURATH, and HANS FRITZSCHE, Individually and as
Members of Any of the Following Groups or Organizations
to which They Respectively Belonged, Namely: DIE REICHS-
REGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER PO-
LITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN
DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF
THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIO-
NALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
(commonly known as the "SS") and including DER SICHER-
HEITSDIENST (commonly known as the "SD"); DIE
GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE,
commonly known as the "GESTAPO"); DIE STURM-
ABTEILUNGEN DER NSDAP (commonly known as the
"SA"); and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of
the GERMAN ARMED FORCES, all as denned in Appendix B,

Defendants.

* This text of the Indictment has been corrected in accordance with the Prosecution's motion
of 4 June 1946 which was accepted by the Court 7 June 1946 to rectify certain discrepancies
between the German text and the text in other languages.

27
 I. The United States of America, the French Republic, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the undersigned, Robert
H. Jackson, Francois de Menthon, Hartley Shawcross, and R. A.
Rudenko, duly appointed to represent their respective Governments
in the investigation of the charges against and the prosecution of
the major war criminals, pursuant to the Agreement of London
dated 8 August 1945, and the Charter of this Tribunal annexed
thereto, hereby accuse as guilty, in the respects hereinafter set
forth, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against
of
Humanity, and of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those
Crimes, all as defined in the Charter of the Tribunal, and
accordingly name as defendants in this cause and as indicted on the
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, RU-
counts hereinafter set out:
DOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, WIL-
HELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSEN-
BERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER,
WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP VON
BOHLEN UND HALBACH, KARL DÖNITZ, ERICH RAEDER,
BALDUR VON SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL,
MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ VON PAPEN, ARTHUR SEYSS-
INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH and
HANS FRITZSCHE, individually and as members of any of the
groups or organizations next hereinafter named.

II.The following are named as groups or organizations (since

dissolved)which should be declared criminal by reason of their
aims and the means used for the accomplishment thereof and in
connection with the conviction of such named defend-
of the
ants as were members thereof: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH
CABINET); DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
(LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZ-
STAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN
ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the "SS") and including
DER SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the "SD"); DIE
GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, com-
monly known "GESTAPO"); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN
as the
DER NSDAP (commonly known as the "SA"); and the GENERAL
STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

28
The identity and membership of the groups or organizations referred
to in the foregoing titles are hereinafter in Appendix B more partic-
ularly defined.

COUNT ONE— THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY

(Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (a) )

III. Statement of the Offense

All the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period

of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated as leaders, organizers,
instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a
common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the com-
mission Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against
of,

Humanity, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal, and, in accord-

ance with the provisions of the Charter, are individually respon-
sible for their own acts and for all acts committed by any persons
in the execution of such plan or conspiracy. The common plan or
conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes against Peace, in
that the defendants planned, prepared, initiated, and waged wars of
aggression, which were also wars in violation of international
treaties,agreements, or assurances. In the development and course
of the common plan or conspiracy it came to embrace the commis-
sion of War Crimes, in that it contemplated, and the defendants
determined upon and carried out, ruthless wars against countries
and populations, in violation of the rules and customs of war, in-
cluding as typical and systematic means by which the wars were
prosecuted, murder, ill-treatment, deportation for slave labor and
for other purposes of civilian populations of occupied territories,
murder and ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of persons on the
high seas, the taking and killing of hostages, the plunder of public
and private property, the indiscriminate destruction of cities, towns,
and villages, and devastation not justified by military necessity. The
common plan or conspiracy contemplated and came to embrace as
typical and systematic means, and the defendants determined upon
and committed, Crimes against Humanity, both within Germany and
within occupied territories, including murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against civilian populations before and during the war, and persecu-
tions on political, racial, or religious grounds, in execution of the
plan for preparing and prosecuting aggressive or illegal wars, many
of such acts and persecutions being violations of the domestic laws
of the countries where perpetrated.

29
 IV. Particulars of the Nature aud Development
of the Common Plan or Conspiracy

(A) NAZI PARTY AS THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE

COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY
In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or Führer
of the
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche
Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist
German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had
been founded in Germany in 1920. He continued as such throughout
the period covered by this Indictment. The Nazi Party, together
with certain of its subsidiary organizations, became the instrument
of cohesion among the defendants and their co-conspirators and
an instrument for the carrying out of the aims and purposes of
their conspiracy. Each defendant became a member of the Nazi
Party and of the conspiracy, with knowledge of their aims and pur-
poses, or, with such knowledge, became an accessory to their aims
and purposes at some stage of the development of the conspiracy.

(B) COMMON OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF

CONSPIRACY
The aims and purposes of the Nazi Party and of the defendants
and divers other persons from time to time associated as leaders,
members, supporters, or adherents of the Nazi Party (hereinafter
called collectively the "Nazi conspirators") were, or came to be, to
accomplish the following by any means deemed oppbrtune, includ-
ing unlawful means, and contemplating ultimate resort to threat
of force, force, and aggressive war: (i) to abrogate and overthrow
the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the military
armament and activity of Germany; (ii) to acquire the territories
lost by Germany as the result of the World War of 1914-18 and
other territories in Europe asserted by the Nazi conspirators to be
occupied principally by so-called "racial Germans"; (iii) to acquire
still further territories in continental Europe and elsewhere claimed
I?y the Nazi conspirators to be required by the "racial Germans"
as "Lebensraum," or living space, all at the expense of neighboring
and other countries. The aims and purposes of the Nazi conspirators
were not fixed or static but evolved and expanded as they acquired
progressively greater power and became able to make more effec-
tive application of threats of -force and threats of aggressive war.
When their expanding aims and purposes became finally so great
as to provoke such strength of resistance as could be overthrown only
by armed force and aggressive war, and not simply by the oppor-
tunistic methods theretofore used, such as fraud, deceit, threats,
intimidation, fifth column activities, and propaganda, the Nazi

30
conspirators deliberately planned, determined upon, and launched
their aggressive wars and wars in violation of international treaties,
agreements, and assurances by the phases and steps hereinafter
more particularly described.

(C) DOCTRINAL TECHNIQUES OF THE COMMON PLAN OR

CONSPIRACY
To incite others to join in the common plan or conspiracy, and
as a means of securing for the Nazi conspirators the highest degree
of control over the German community, they put forth, disseminated,
and exploited certain doctrines, among others, as follows:
1. That persons of so-called "German blood" (as specified by the
Nazi conspirators) were a "master race" and were accordingly
entitled to subjugate, dominate, or exterminate other "races"
and peoples;
2. That the German people should be ruled under the Führer-
prinzip (Leadership Principle) according to which power was
to reside in a Führer from whom sub-leaders were to derive
authority in a hierarchical order, each sub-leader to owe un-
conditional obedience to his immediate superior but to be
absolute in his own sphere of jurisdiction; and the power
of the leadership was to be unlimited, extending to all phases
of public and private life;

3. That war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans;

4. That the leadership of the Nazi Party, as the sole bearer of
the foregoing and other doctrines of the Nazi Party, was en-
titled to shape the structure, policies, and practices of the
German State and all related institutions, to direct and super-
vise the activities of all individuals within the State, and to
destroy all opponents.

(D) THE ACQUIRING OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL OF

GERMANY: POLITICAL
1. First steps in acquisition of control of State machinery.
In order to accomplish their aims and purposes, the Nazi con-
spirators prepared to seize totalitarian control over Germany to
assure that no effective resistance against them could arise within
Germany itself. After the failure of the Munich Putsch of 1923
aimed at the overthrow of the Weimar Republic by direct action,
the Nazi conspirators set out through the Nazi Party to undermine
and overthrow the German Government by "legal" forms sup-
ported by terrorism. They created and utilized, as a Party formation,
Die Sturmabteilungen (SA), a semi-military, voluntary organization

31
of young men trained for and committed to the use of violence,
whose mission was to make the Party the master of the streets.
2. Control acquired.
On 30 January 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of the German
Republic. After the Reichstag fire of 28 February 1933, clauses
of the Weimar constitution guaranteeing personal liberty, freedom
of speech, of the press, of association and assembly were suspended.
The Nazi conspirators secured the passage by the Reichstag of a
"Law for the Protection of the People and the Reich" giving Hitler
and the members of his then cabinet plenary powers of legislation.
The Nazi conspirators retained such powers after having changed
the members of the cabinet. The conspirators caused all political
parties except the Nazi Party to be prohibited. They caused the
Nazi Party to be established as a paragovernmental organization
with extensive and extraordinary privileges.
3. Consolidation of control.
Thus possessed of the machinery of the German State, the Nazi
conspirators set about the consolidation of their position of power
within Germany, the extermination of potential internal resistance,
and the placing of the German Nation on a military footing.
(a) The Nazi conspirators reduced the Reichstag to a body of
their own nominees and curtailed the freedom of popular
elections throughout the country. They transformed the
several states, provinces, and municipalities, which had for-
merly exercised semi-autonomous powers, into hardly more
than administrative organs of the central Government. They
united the offices of the President and the Chancellor in the
person of Hitler; instituted a widespread purge of civil serv-
ants; and severely restricted the independence of the judi-
ciary and rendered it subservient to Nazi ends. The con-
spirators greatly enlarged existing State and Party organi-
zations; established a network of new State and Party
organizations; and "co-ordinated" State agencies with the
Nazi Party and its branches and affiliates, with the result that
German life was dominated by Nazi doctrine and practice
and progressively mobilized for the accomplishment of their
aims.
(b) In order to make their rule secure from attack and to instil
fear in the hearts of the German people, the Nazi conspirators
established and extended a system of terror against oppo-
nents and supposed or suspected opponents of the regime.
They imprisoned such persons without judicial process, holding
them in "protective custody" and concentration camps, and
subjected them to persecution, degradation, despoilment,
enslavement, torture, and murder. These concentration camps

32
 were established early in 1933 under the direction of the
Defendant GORING and expanded as a fixed part of the
terroristic policy and method of the conspirators and used by
them for the commission of the Crimes against Humanity
hereinafter alleged. Among the principal agencies utilized
in the perpetration of these crimes were the SS and the
GESTAPO, which, together with other favored branches or
agencies of the State and Party, were permitted to operate
without restraint of law.
(c) The Nazi conspirators conceived that, in addition to the
suppression of distinctively political opposition, it was neces-
sary to suppress or exterminate certain other movements or
groups which they regarded as obstacles to their retention
of total control in Germany and to the aggressive aims of
the conspiracy abroad. Accordingly:

(1) The Nazi conspirators destroyed the free trade unions in

Germany by confiscating their funds and properties, per-
secuting their leaders, prohibiting their activities, and
supplanting them by an affiliated Party organization. The
Leadership Principle was introduced into industrial rela-
tions, the entrepreneur becoming the leader and the work-
ers becoming his followers. Thus any potential resistance
of the workers was frustrated and the productive labor
capacity of the German Nation was brought under the
effective control of the conspirators.
(2) The Nazi conspirators, by promoting beliefs and practices
incompatible with Christian teaching, sought to subvert
the influence of the churches over the people and in par-
ticular over the youth of Germany. They avowed their
aim to eliminate the Christian churches in Germany and
sought to substitute therefor Nazi institutions and Nazi
beliefs, and pursued a program of persecution of priests,
clergy, and members of monastic orders whom they
deemed opposed to their purposes, and confiscated church
property.
(3) The persecution by the Nazi conspirators of pacifist
groups, including religious movements dedicated to pa-
cifism,, was particularly relentless and cruel.

(d) Implementing their "master race" policy, the conspirators

joined in a program of relentless persecution of the Jews,
designed to exterminate them. Annihilation of the Jews be-
came an official State policy, carried out both by official
action and by incitements to mob and individual violence.
The conspirators openly avowed their purpose. For example,
the Defendant ROSENBERG stated: "Anti-Semitism is the

33
 unifying element of the reconstruction of Germany." On
another occasion he also stated: "Germany will regard the
Jewish question as solved only after the very last Jew has
left the greater German living space . Europe will have
. .

its Jewish question solved only after the very last Jew has
left the Continent." The Defendant LEY declared: "We swear
we are not going to abandon the struggle until the last Jew
in Europe has been exterminated and is actually dead. It is not
—
enough to isolate the Jewish enemy of mankind the Jew has
got to be exterminated." On another occasion he also declared:
"The second German secret weapon is anti-Semitism because
if it is consistently pursued by Germany, it will become a
universal problem which all nations will be forced to con-
sider." The Defendant STREICHER declared: "The sun will
not shine on the nations of the earth until the last Jew is
dead." These avowals and incitements were typical of the
declarations of the Nazi conspirators throughout the course
of their conspiracy. The program of action against the Jews
included disfranchisement, stigmatization, denial of civil
rights, subjecting their persons and property to violence, de-
portation, enslavement, enforced labor, starvation, murder,
and mass extermination. The extent to which the conspirators
succeeded in their purpose can only be estimated, but the
annihilation was substantially complete in many localities
of Europe. Of the 9,600,000 Jews who lived in the parts of
Europe under Nazi domination, it is conservatively estimated
that 5,700,000 have disappeared, most of them deliberately
put to death by the Nazi conspirators. Only remnants of
the Jewish population of Europe remain.
(e) In order to make the German people amenable to their will,
and to prepare them psychologically for war, the Nazi con-
spirators reshaped the educational system and particularly
the education and training of the German youth. The Leader-
ship Principle was introduced into the schools and the Party
and affiliated organizations were given wide supervisory
powers over education. The Nazi conspirators imposed a
supervision of all cultural activities, controlled the dissemina-
tion of information and the expression of opinion within Ger-
many as well as the movement of intelligence of all kinds
from and into Germany, and created vast propaganda machines.
(f) The Nazi conspirators placed a considerable number of their
dominated organizations on a progressively militarized foot-
ing with a view to the rapid transformation and use of such
organizations whenever necessary as instruments of war.

34
 (E)THE ACQUIRING OF TOTALITARIAN CONTROL IN
GERMANY: ECONOMIC; AND THE ECONOMIC PLAN-
NING AND MOBILIZATION FOR AGGRESSIVE WAR
Having gained political power the conspirators organized Ger-
many's economy to give effect to their political aims.
1. In order to eliminate the possibility of resistance in the economic

sphere, they deprived labor of its rights of free industrial and

political association as particularized in paragraph (D) 3 (c) (1) herein.
2. They used organizations of German business as instruments

of economic mobilization for war.

3. They directed Germany's economy towards preparation and

equipment of the military machine. To this end they directed

finance, capital investment, and foreign trade.
The Nazi conspirators, and in particular the industrialists
4.

among them, embarked upon a huge re-armament program and

set out to produce and develop huge quantities of materials of war
and to create a powerful military potential.
5. of carrying through the preparation for war
With the object
the Nazi conspirators set up a series of administrative agencies and
authorities. For example, in 1936 they established for this purpose
the office of the Four Year Plan with the Defendant GÖRING as
Plenipotentiary, vesting it with overriding control over Germany's
economy. Furthermore, on 28 August 1939, immediately before
launching their aggression against Poland, they appointed the
Defendant FUNK Plenipotentiary for Economics; and on 30 August
1939, they set up the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the
Reich to act as a War Cabinet.

(F) UTILIZATION OF NAZI CONTROL FOR FOREIGN

AGGRESSION
1. Status of the conspiracy by the middle of 1933 and projected plans.
By the middle of the year 1933 the Nazi conspirators, having
acquired governmental control over Germany, were in a position
to enter upon further and more detailed planning with particular
relationship to foreign policy. Their plan was to re-arm and to
re-occupy and fortify the Rhineland, in violation of the Treaty of
Versailles and other treaties, in order to acquire military strength
and political bargaining power to be used against other nations.
2. The Nazi conspirators decided that for their purpose the
Treaty of Versailles must definitely be abrogated and specific plans
were made by them and put into operation by 7 March 1936, all
of which opened the way for the major aggressive steps to follow,

35
as hereinafter set forth. In the e*xecution of this phase of the con-
spiracy the Nazi conspirators did the following acts:
(a) They led Germany to enter upon a course of secret re-
armament from 1933 to March 1935, including the training
of military personnel and the production of munitions of
war, and the building of an air force.
(b) On 14 October 1933, they led Germany to leave the Inter-
national Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations.
(c) On 10 March 1935, the Defendant GORING announced that
Germany was building a military air force.
(d) On 16 March promulgated a
1935, the Nazi conspirators
law for universal military which they stated
service, in
the peace-time strength of the German Army would be
fixed at 500,000 men.
(e) On 21 May 1935, they falsely announced to the world,
with intent to deceive and allay fears of aggressive inten-
tions, that they would respect the territorial limitations
of the Versailles Treaty and comply with the Locarno
Pacts.

(f) On 7 March 1936, they reoccupied and fortified the Rhine-

land, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Rhine
Pact of Locarno of 16 October 1925, and falsely announced
to the world that "we have no territorial demands to make
in Europe."

3. Aggressive action against Austria and Czechoslovakia.

(a) —
The 1936 1938 phase of the plan: planning for the assault
on Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The Nazi conspirators next entered upon the specific planning
for the acquisition of Austriaand Czechoslovakia, realizing it would
be necessary, for military reasons, Austria before as-
first to seize
saulting Czechoslovakia. On 21 May 1935, in a speech to the Reichs-
tag, Hitler stated that: "Germany neither intends nor wishes to in-
terfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to
conclude an Anschluss." On 1 May 1936, within two months after
the reoccupation of the Rhineland, Hitler stated: "The lie goes forth
again that Germany tomorrow or the day after will fall upon
Austria or Czechoslovakia." Thereafter, the Nazi conspirators caused
a treaty to be entered into between Austria and Germany on
11 July 1936, Article 1 of which stated that "The German Govern-
ment recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federated State of
Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements of the German Führer
and Chancellor of 21 May 1935." Meanwhile, plans for aggression

36
 were being made. By the autumn of 1937,
in violation of that treaty
all noteworthy opposition within the Reich had been crushed. Mili-
tary preparation for the Austrian action was virtually concluded.
An influential group of the Nazi conspirators met with Hitler on
5 November 1937, to review the situation. It was reaffirmed that
Nazi Germany must have "Lebensraum" in central Europe. It was
recognized that such conquest would probably meet resistance which
would have to be crushed by force and that their decision might
lead to a general war, but this prospect was discounted as a risk
worth taking. There emerged from this meeting three possible plans
for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Which of the three
was to be used was to depend upon the developments in the polit-
ical and military situation in Europe. It was contemplated that
the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia would, through com-
pulsory emigration of 2,000,000 persons from Czechoslovakia and
1,000,000 persons fr^m Austria, provide additional food to the Reich
for 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 people, strengthen it militarily by provi-
ding shorter and better frontiers, and make possible the constitu-
ting of new armies up to about twelve divisions. Thus, the aim
of the plan against Austria and Czechoslovakia was conceived of
not as an end in itself but as a preparatory measure toward the next
aggressive steps in the Nazi conspiracy.

(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria: November 1937

toMarch 1938.
Hitler, on 8 February 1938, called Chancellor Schuschnigg to a
conference at Berchtesgaden. At the meeting of 12 February 1938,
under threat of invasion, Schuschnigg yielded a promise of amnestv
to imprisoned Nazis and appointment of Nazis to ministerial posts.
He agreed to remain silent until Hitler's 20 Februarv speech in
which Austria's independence was to be reaffirmed, but Hitler in his
speech, instead of affirming Austrian independence, declared him-
self protector of all Germans.
Meanwhile, underground activities
of Nazis in Austria increased. Schuschnigg, on 9 March 1938, an-
nounced a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence. On
11 March Hitler sent an ultimatum, demanding that the plebiscite
be called off or that Germany would invade Austria. Later the
same day a second ultimatum threatened invasion unless Schusch-
nigg should resign in three hours. Schuschnigg resigned. The Defen-
dant SEYSS-INQUART, who was appointed Chancellor, immediately
invited Hitler to send German troops into Austria to "preserve
order". The invasion began on 12 March 1938. On 13 March, Hitler
by proclamation assumed office as Chief of State of Austria and
took command of its armed forces. By a law of the same date
Austria was annexed to Germany.

37
 (c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia:
April 1938 to March 1939.
1. Simultaneously with their annexation of Austria the Nazi
conspirators gave false assurances to the Czechoslovak Government
that they would not attack that country. But within a month they
met to plan specific ways and means of attacking Czechoslovakia,
and to revise, in the light of the acquisition of Austria, the previous
plans for aggression against Czechoslovakia.
2. On 21 April 1938, the Nazi conspirators met and prepared to

launch an attack on Czechoslovakia not later than 1 October 1938.

They planned specifically to create an ''incident" to "justify" the
attack. They decided to launch a military attack only after a period
of diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious, would lead
to the excuse for war, or, in the alternative, to unleash a lightning
attack as a result of an "incident" of their own creation. Con-
sideration was given to assassinating the German Ambassador at
Prague to create the requisite incident. From and after 21 April
1938, the Nazi conspirators caused to be prepared detailed and
precise military plans designed to carry out such an attack at any
opportune moment and calculated to overcome all Czechoslovak
resistance within four days, thus presenting the world with a fait
accompli, and so forestalling outside resistance. Throughout the
months of May, June, July, August, and September, these plans
were made more specific and detailed, and by 3 September 1938,
it was decided that all troops were to be ready for action on
28 September 1938.
3. Throughout this same period, the Nazi conspirators were agita-

ting the minorities question in Czechoslovakia, and particularlv in

the Sudetenland, leading to a diplomatic crisis in August and Sep-
tember 1938. After the Nazi conspirators threatened war. the United
Kingdom and France concluded a pact with Germany and Italy at
Munich on 29 September 1938. involving the cession of the Sudeten-
land by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required
to acquiesce. On 1 October 1938. German troops occupied the
Sudetenland.
4. On 15 March 1939, contrary to the provisions of the Munich

Pact itself, the Nazi conspirators caused the completion of their

plan by seizing and occupying the major part of Czechoslovakia not
ceded to Germany by the Munich Pact.

4. Formulation of the plan to attack Poland: preparation and ini-

tiation of aggressive war: March 1939 to September 1939.

With these aggressions successfully consummated, the con-

(a)
spiratorshad obtained much desired resources and bases and were
ready to undertake further aggressions by means of war. Following

38
 assurances to the world of peaceful intentions, an influential group
of the conspirators met on 23 May 1939, to consider the further
implementation of their plan. The situation was reviewed and it
was observed that "the past six years have been put to good use
and all measures have been taken in correct sequence and in accord-
ance with our aims"; that the national-political unity of the Ger-
'

mans had been substantially achieved; and that further successes

could not be achieved without war and bloodshed. It was decided
nevertheless next to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
It was admitted that the questions concerning Danzig which they
had agitated with Poland were not true questions, but rather that
the question was one of aggressive expansion for food and "Lebens-
raum". It was recognized that Poland would fight if attacked and
that a repetition of the Nazi success against Czechoslovakia without
war could not be expected. Accordingly, it was determined that the
problem was to isolate Poland and, if possible, prevent a simul-
taneous conflict with the Western Powers. Nevertheless, it was
agreed that England was an enemy to their aspirations, and that
war with England and her ally France must eventually result, and
therefore that in that war every attempt must be made to over-
whelm England with a "Blitzkrieg". It was thereupon determined
immediately to prepare detailed plans for an attack on Poland at
the first suitable opportunity and thereafter for an attack on Eng-
land and France, together with plans for the simultaneous occu-
pation by armed force of air bases in the Netherlands and Belgium.
Accordingly, after having denounced the German-Polish Pact
(b)
of 1934 on false grounds, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to stir
up the Danzig issue, to prepare frontier "incidents" to "justify" the
attack, and to make demands for the cession of Polish territory.
Upon refusal by Poland to yield, they caused German armed forces
to invade Poland on 1 September 1939, thus precipitating war
also with the United Kingdom and France.

5. Expansion of the war into a general war of aggression: planning

and execution of attacks on Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, and Greece: 1939 to
April 1941.
Thus the aggressive war prepared for by the Nazi conspirators
through their attacks on Austria and Czechoslovakia was actively
launched by their attack on Poland. After the total defeat of Poland,
in order to facilitate the carrying out of their military operations
against France and the United Kingdom, the Nazi conspirators made
active preparations for an extension of the war in Europe. In
accordance with those plans, they caused the German armed forces
to invade Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940; Belgium, the

39
Netherlands, and Luxembourg on 10 May 1940; Yugoslavia and
Greece on 6 April 1941. All these invasions had been specifically
planned in advance, in violation of the terms of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 1928.

6. German invasion on 22 June 1941, of the U.S.S.R. territory in

violation of Non- Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939.
On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced
the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R. and
without any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory thereby
beginning a War of Aggression against the U.S.S.R.
From the first day of launching their attack on Soviet territory
the Nazi conspirators, in accordance with their detailed plans, began
to carry out the destruction of cities, towns, and villages, the demo-
lition of factories, collective farms, electric stations, and railroads,
the robbery and barbaric devastation of the natural cultural insti-
tutions of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., the devastation of museums,
schools, hospitals, churches, and historic monuments, the mass depor-
tation of the Soviet citizens for slave labor to Germany, as well
as the annihilation of adults, old people, women and children,
especially Beilorussians and Ukrainians, and the extermination of
Jews committed throughout the occupied territory of the Soviet
Union.
The above mentioned criminal offenses were perpetrated by the
German troops in accordance with the orders of the Nazi Govern-
ment and the General Staff and High Command of the German
armed forces.

7. Collaboration with Italy and Japan and aggressive war against

the United States:November 1936 to December 1941.
After the initiation of the Nazi wars of aggression the Nazi con-
spirators brought about a German-Italian- Japanese 10-year mili-
tary-economic alliance signed at Berlin on 27 September 1940. This
agreement, representing a strengthening of the bonds among those
three nations established by the earlier but more limited pact
of 25 November 1936, stated: "The Governments of Germany, Italy,
and Japan, considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting
peace that nations of the world be given each its own proper
all
place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another
in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and regions of Europe
respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and
maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual
prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned." The Nazi con-
spirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken and

40
handicap those nations with whom they were at war, and those
with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi con-
spirators exhorted Japan to seek "a new order of things." Taking
advantage of the wars of aggression then being waged by the Nazi
conspirators, Japan commenced an attack on 7 December 1941,
against the United States of America at Pearl Harbor and the
Philippines, and against the British Commonwealth of Nations,
French Indo-China, and the Netherlands in the southwest Pacific.
Germany declared war against the United States on 11 Decem-
ber 1941.

(G) WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COM-

MITTED IN THE COURSE OF EXECUTING THE CONSPIRACY
FOR WHICH THE CONSPIRATORS ARE RESPONSIBLE.
1. Beginning with the initiation of the aggressive war on 1 Sep-

tember 1939, and throughout its extension into wars involving

almost the entire world, the Nazi conspirators carried out their
common plan or conspiracy to wage war in ruthless and complete
disregard and violation of the laws and customs of war. In the
course of executing the common plan or conspiracy there were
committed the War Crimes detailed hereinafter in Count Three
of this Indictment.
2. Beginning with the initiation of their plan to seize and retain

total control of the German State, and thereafter throughout their

utilization of that control for foreign aggression, the Nazi conspira-
tors carried out their common plan or conspiracy in ruthless and
complete disregard and violation of the laws of humanity. In the
course of executing the common plan or conspiracy there were
committed the Crimes against Humanity detailed hereinafter in
Count Four of this Indictment.
3. By reason of all the foregoing, the defendants with divers

other persons are guilty of a common plan or conspiracy for the

accomplishment of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy to com-
mit Crimes against Humanity in the course of preparation for war
and in the course of prosecution of war; and of a conspiracy to
commit War Crimes not only against the armed forces of their
enemies but also against non-belligerent civilian populations.

(H) INDIVIDUAL, GROUP AND ORGANIZATION RESPON-

SIBILITY FOR THE OFFENSE STATED IN COUNT ONE
Reference is hereby made to Appendix A
of this Indictment for
a statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for
the offense set forth in this Count One of the Indictment. Reference
is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement

of the responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein

41
as criminal groups and organizations for the offense set forth in
this Count One of the Indictment.

COUNT TWO— CRIMES AGAINST PEACE

(Charter, Article 6 (a) )

V. Statement of the Offense

All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period
of years preceding 8 May 1945, participated in the planning, prep-
aration, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were
also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and
assurances.
VI. Particulars of the wars planned, prepared, initiated, and waged
(A) The wars referred in the Statement of Offense in this
to
Count Two of the Indictment and the dates of their initiation were
the following: against Poland, 1 September 1939; against the United
Kingdom and France, 3 September 1939; against Denmark and
Norway, 9 April 1940; against Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg, 10 May 1940; against Yugoslavia and Greece, 6 April
1941; against the Ù.S.S.R., 22 June 1941; and against the United
States of America, 11 December 1941.
(B) Reference is hereby made to Count One of the Indictment
for the allegations charging that these wars were wars of aggres-
sion on the part of the defendants.
(C) Reference is hereby made to Appendix C annexed to this
Indictment for a statement of particulars of the charges of viola-
tions of international treaties, agreements, and assurances caused
by the defendants in the course of planning, preparing, and ini-
tiating these wars.

VII. Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the Offense Stated
in Count Two
Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for
a statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for
the offense set forth in this Count Two of the Indictment. Reference
is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of

the responsibility of the groups and organizations named herein as

criminal groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this
Count Two of the Indictment.

COUNT THREE—WAR CRIMES

(Charter, Article 6, especially 6 (b) )

VIII. Statement of the Offense

All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1 September
1939 and 8 May 1945, in Germany and in all those countries and

42
 by the German Armed Forces since 1 Septem-
territories occupied
ber 1939, and in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the
High Seas.
All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and
executed a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit War Crimes as
defined in Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among
other things, the practice of "total war" including methods of com-
bat and of military occupation in direct conflict with the laws and
customs of war, and the commission of crimes perpetrated on the
field of battle during encounters with enemy armies, and against
prisoners of war, and in occupied territories against the civilian
population of such territories.
The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by
other persons for whose acts the defendants are responsible (under
Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons when committing
the said War Crimes performed their acts in execution of a common
plan and conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in the formu-
lation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defend-
ants participated as leaders, organizers, instigators, and accom-
plices.
These methods and crimes constituted violations of international
conventions, of internal penal laws and of the general principles of
criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized
nations, and were involved in and part of a systematic course of
conduct.

(A) MURDER AND TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN POPULA-

ILL -

TIONS OF OR IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY AND ON THE HIGH

SEAS
Throughout the period of their occupation of territories overrun
by their armed
forces the defendants, for the purpose of systemat-
ically terrorizing the inhabitants, murdered and tortured civilians,
and ill-treated them, and imprisoned them without legal process.
The murders and ill-treatment were carried out by divers
means, including shooting, hanging, gassing, starvation, gross over-
crowding, systematic under-nutrition, systematic imposition of labor
tasks beyond the strength of those ordered to carry them out,
inadequate provision of surgical and medical services, kickings,
beatings, brutality and torture of all kinds, including the use of
hot irons and pulling out of fingernails and the performance of
experiments by means of operations and otherwise on living human
subjects. In some occupied territories the defendants interfered
in religious matters, persecuted members of the clergy and monastic
orders, and expropriated church property. They conducted delib-
erate and systematic genocide, viz., the extermination of racial

43
and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain
occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes
of people and national, racial, or religious groups, particularly
Jews, Poles, and Gypsies and others.
Civilians were systematically subjected to tortures of all kinds,
with the object of obtaining information.
Civilians of occupied countries were subjected systematically
to "protective arrests" whereby they were arrested and imprisoned
without any trial and any of the ordinary protections of the law,
and they were imprisoned under the most unhealthy and inhumane
conditions.
In the concentration camps were many prisoners who were
"Nacht und Nebel". These were entirely cut off from the
classified
world and were allowed neither to receive nor to send letters. They
disappeared without trace and no announcement of their fate was
ever made by the German authorities.
Such murders and ill-treatment were contrary to international
conventions, in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations,
1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of crim-
inal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations,
the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were
committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
The following particulars and all the particulars appearing later
in this count are set out herein by way of example only, are not
exclusive of other particular cases, and are stated without prejudice
to the right of the Prosecution to adduce evidence of other cases
of murder and ill-treatment of civilians.

1. In France, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Luxembourg,

Italy, and the Channel Islands (hereinafter called the "Western
Countries") and in that part of Germany which lies west of a
line drawn due north and south through the center of Berlin
(hereinafter called "Western Germany").

Such murder and ill-treatment took place in concentration camps

and similar establishments set up by the defendants, and particu-
larly in the concentration camps set up at Belsen, Buchenwald,
Dachau. Breendonck, Grini, Natzweiler. Ravensbruck, Vught, and
Amersfoort, and in numerous cities, towns, and villages, including
Oradour-sur-Glane, Trondheim, and Oslo.
Crimes committed in France or against French citizens took the
following forms:
Arbitrary arrests were carried out under political or racial
pretexts: they were both individual and collective; notablv in
Paris (round-up of the 18th Arrondissement by the Field Gen-
darmerie, round-up of the Jewish population of the 11th Arron-
dissement in August 1941, round-up of Jewish intellectuals in

44
 December 1941 round-up in July 1942); at Clermont-Ferrand
,

(round-up of professors and students of the University of Stras-

bourg, who were taken to Clermont-Ferrand on 25 November
1943); at Lyons; at Marseilles (round-up of 40,000 persons in
January 1943); at Grenoble (round-up on 24 December 1943);
at Cluny (round-up on 24 December 1944); at Figeac (round-up
in May 1944); at Saint Pol de Léon (round-up in July 1944); at
Locminé (round-up on 3 July 1944); at Eysieux (round-up in
May 1944) and at Moussey (round-up in September 1944). These
arrests were followed by brutal treatment and tortures carried
out by the most diverse methods, such as immersion in icy water,
asphyxiation, torture of the limbs, and the use of instruments of
torture, such as the iron helmet and electric current, and practiced
in all the prisons of France, notably in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles,
Rennes, Metz, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse, Nice, Grenoble,
Annecy, Arras, Béthune, Lille, Loos, Valenciennes, Nancy, Troyes,
and Caen, and in the torture chambers fitted up at the Gestapo
centers.

In the concentration camps, the health regime and the labor

regime were such that the rate of mortality (alleged to be from
natural causes) attained enormous proportions, for instance:
1. Out of a convoy of 230 French women deported from Com-
piègne to Auschwitz in January 1943, 180 died of exhaustion
by the end of four months.
2. 143 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 23 March and
6 May 1943, in Block 8 at Dachau.
3. 1,797 Frenchmen died of exhaustion between 21 November
1943, and 15 March 1945, in the Block at Dora.
4. 465 Frenchmen died of general debility in November 1944, at
Dora.
5. 22,761 deportees died of exhaustion at Buchenwald between
1 January 1943, and 15 April 1945.
6. 11,560 detainees died of exhaustion at Dachau Camp (most of
them in Block 30 reserved for the sick and the infirm) be-
tween 1 January and 15 April 1945.
7. 780 priests died of exhaustion at Mauthausen.
8. Out of 2,200 Frenchmen registered at Flossenburg Camp, 1,600
died from supposedly natural causes.
Methods used for the work of extermination in concentration
camps were:
Bad treatment, pseudo-scientific experiments (sterilization of wom-
en at Auschwitz and at Ravensbrück, study of the evolution of

45
cancer of the womb at Auschwitz, of typhus at Buchenwald, anatom-
ical research at Natzweiller, heart injections at Buchenwald, bone
grafting and muscular excisions at Ravensbrück, etc.), gas cham-
bers, gas wagons, and crematory ovens. Of 228,000 French political
and racial deportees in concentration camps, only 28,000 survived.
In France systematic extermination was practiced also, notably
at Asq on
1 April 1944, at Colpo on 22 July 1944, at Buzet-sur-Tarn

on 6 July 1944 and on 17 August 1944, at Pluvignier on 8 July 1944,

at Rennes on 8 June 1944, at Grenoble on 8 July 1944, at Saint
Flour on 10 June 1944, at Ruisnes on 10 July 1944, at Nimes, at
Tulle, and at Nice, where, in July 1944, the victims of torture were
exposed to the population, and at Oradour-sur-Glane where the
entire village population was shot or burned alive in the church.

The many charnel pits give proof of anonymous massacres. Most

notable of these are the charnel pits of Paris (Cascade du Bois de
Boulogne), Lyons, Saint-Genis-Laval, Besançon, Petit-Saint-Ber-
nard, Aulnat, Caen, Port-Louis, Charleval, Fontainebleau, Bouconne,
Gabaudet, Lhermitage Lorges, Morlaas, Bordelongue, Signe.
In the course of a premeditated campaign of terrorism, initiated
in Denmark by the Germans in the latter part of 1943, 600 Danish
subjects were murdered and, in addition, throughout the German
occupation of Denmark', large numbers of Danish subjects were
subjected to torture and ill-treatment of all sorts. In addition, approx-
imately 500 Danish subjects were murdered, by torture and other-
wise, in German prisons and concentration camps.
In Belgium between 1940 and 1944 tortures by various means,
but identical in each place, were carried out at Brussels, Liège,
Möns, Ghent, Namur, Antwerp, Tournai, Arlon, Charleroi, and
Dinant.
At Vught, in Holland, when the camp was evacuated about 400
persons were murdered by shooting.
In Luxembourg, during the German occupation, 500 persons
were murdered and, in addition, another 521 were illegally execu-
ted, by order of such special tribunals as the so-called "Sonder-
gericht". Many more persons in Luxembourg were subjected to
torture and mistreatment by the Gestapo. Not less than 4,000
Luxembourg nationals were imprisoned during the period of Ger-
man occupation, and of these at least 400 were murdered.
Between March 1944 and April 1945, in Italy, at least 7,500 men,
women, and children, ranging in years from infancy to extreme old
age were murdered by the German soldiery at Civitella, in the
Ardeatine Caves in Rome, and at other places.

46
2. In the U.S.S.R., i. e., in the Bielorussian, Ukrainian, Estonian,
Latvian, Lithuanian, Kar elo- Finnish, and Moldavian Soviet So-
cialist Republics, in 19 regions of the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic, and in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Greece, and the Balkans (hereinafter called "the Eastern Coun-
tries") and in that part of Germany which lies east of a line
drawn north and south through the center of Berlin (herein-
after called "Eastern Germany").

From 1 September 1939, when the German Armed Forces in-

vaded Poland, and from 22 June 1941, when they invaded the
U.S.S.R., the German Government and the German High Command
adopted a systematic policy of murder and ill-treatment of the civil-
ian populations of and in the Eastern Countries as they were suc-
cessively occupied by the German Armed Forces. These murders
and ill-treatments were carried on continuously until the German
Armed Forces were driven out of the said countries.
Such murders and ill-treatments included:
Murders and ill-treatments at concentration camps and simi-
(a)
up by the Germans in the Eastern Countries
lar establishments set
and in Eastern Germany including those set up at Maidanek and
Auschwitz.
The said murders and ill-treatments were carried out by divers
means including all those set out above, as follows:
About 1,500,000 persons were exterminated in Maidanek and
about 4,000,000 persons were exterminated in Auschwitz, among
whom were citizens of Poland, the U.S.S.R., the United States of
America, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, and other countries.
In the Lwow region and in the city of Lwow the Germans exter-
minated about 700,000 Soviet people, including 70 persons in the
field of the arts, science, and technology, and also citizens of the
United States of America, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
and Holland, brought to this region from other concentration camps.
In the Jewish ghetto from 7 September 1941 to 6 July 1943,
over 133,000 persons were tortured and shot.
Mass shooting of the population occurred in the suburbs of the
city and in the Livenitz forest.
In the Ganov camp 200,000 peaceful citizens were exterminated.
The most refined methods of cruelty were employed in this exter-
mination, such as disembowelling and the freezing of human beings
in tubs of water. Mass shootings took place to the accompaniment
of the music of an orchestra recruited from the persons interned.
Beginning with June 1943, the Germans carried out measures to
hide the evidence of their crimes. They exhumed and burned corpses,
and they crushed the bones with machines and used them for
fertilizer.

47
 At the beginning of 1944 in the Ozarichi region of the Bielorus-
sian S.S.R., before liberation by the Red Army, the Germans estab-
lished three concentration camps without shelters, to which they
committed tens of thousands of persons from the neighboring ter-
ritories. They brought many people to these camps from typhus
hospitals intentionally, for the purpose of infecting the other per-
sons interned and for spreading the disease in territories from
which the Germans were being driven by the Red Army. In these
camps there were many murders and crimes.
In the Estonian S.S.R. they shot tens of thousands of persons
and in one day alone, 19 September 1944, in Camp Kloga, the
Germans shot 2,000 peaceful citizens. They burned the bodies on
bonfires.
In the Lithuanian S.S.R. there were mass killings of Soviet citi-
zens, namely: in Panerai at least 100,000; in Kaunas more than
70,000; in Alitus about 60,000; at Prenai more than 3,000; in Vil-
liampol about 8,000; in Mariampol about 7,000; in Trakai and neigh-
boring towns 37,640.
In the Latvian S.S.R. 577,000 persons were murdered.
As a result of the whole system of internal order maintained in
all camps, the interned persons were doomed to die.
In a secret instruction entitled "the internal regime in concen-
tration camps", signed personally by Himmler in 1941 severe
measures of punishment were set forth for the internees. Masses
of prisoners of war were shot, or died from the cold and torture.

(b) Murders and ill-treatments

at places in the Eastern Countries
and in the Soviet Union, otherthan in the camps referred to in (a)
above, included, on various dates during the occupation by the Ger-
man Armed Forces:
The destruction in the Smolensk region of over 135,000 Soviet
citizens.
Among these, near the village of Kholmetz of the Sychev region,
when the military authorities were required to remove the mines
from an area, on the order of the Commander of the 101st German
Infantry Division, Major-General Fisler, the German soldiers
gathered the inhabitants of the village of Kholmetz and forced them
to remove mines from the road. All of these people lost their lives
as a result of exploding mines.
In the Leningrad region there were shot and tortured over
172,000 persons, including over 20,000 persons who were killed in
the city of Leningrad by the barbarous artillery barrage and the
bombings.
In the Stavropol region in an anti-tank trench close to the station
of Mineralny Vody, and in other cities, tens of thousands of persons
were exterminated.

48
 In Pyatigorsk many were subjected to torture and criminal
treatment, including suspension from the ceiling and other methods.
Many of the victims of these tortures were then shot.

In Krasnodar some 6,700 civilians were murdered by poison gas

in gas vans, or were tortured and shot.
In the Stalingrad region more than 40,000 persons were tortured
and killed. After the Germans were expelled from Stalingrad, more
than a thousand mutilated bodies of local inhabitants were found
with marks of torture. One hundred and thirty-nine women had
their arms painfully bent backward and held by wires. From some
their breasts had been cut off and their ears, fingers, and toes had
been amputated. The bodies bore the marks of burns. On the bodies
of the men the five pointed star was burned with an iron or cut
with a knife. Some were disembowelled.
In Orel over 5,000 persons were murdered.
In Novgorod and in the Novgorod region many thousands of
Soviet citizens were killed by shooting, starvation, and torture. In
Minsk tens of thousands of citizens were similarly killed.

In the Crimea peaceful citizens were gathered on barges, taken

out to sea and drowned, over 144,000 persons being exterminated in
this manner.
In the Soviet Ukraine there were monstrous criminal acts of the
Nazi conspirators. In Babi Yar, near Kiev, they shot over 100,000
men, women, children, and old people. In this city in January 1942,
after the explosion in German Headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Street
—
the Germans arrested as hostages 1,250 persons old men, minors,
women with nursing infants. In Kiev they killed over 195,000
persons.
In Rovno and the Rovno region they killed and tortured over
100,000 peaceful citizens.
In Dnepropetrovsk, near the Transport Institute, they shot or
threw alive into a great ravine 11,000 women, old men, and
children.
In Kamenetz-Podolsk Region 31,000 Jews were shot and exter-
minated, including 13,000 persons brought there from Hungary.
In the Odessa Region at least 200,000 Soviet citizens were killed.
In Kharkov about 195,000 persons were either tortured to death,
shot, or gassed in gas vans.

In Gomel the Germans rounded up the population in prison, and

tortured and tormented them, and then took them to the center of
the city and shot them in public.

49
 In the city of Lyda in the Grodnen region on 8 May 1942, 5,670
persons were completely undressed, driven into pens in groups of
100, and then shot by machine guns. Many were thrown in the
graves while they were still alive.
Along with adults the Nazi conspirators mercilessly destroyed
even children. They killed them with their parents, in groups, and
alone. They killed them in children's homes and hospitals, burying
the living in the graves, throwing them into flames, stabbing them
with bayonets, poisoning them, conducting experiments upon them,
extracting their blood for the use of the German Army, throwing
them into prison and Gestapo torture chambers and concentration
camps, where the children died from hunger, torture, and epidemic
diseases.
From 6 September to 24 November 1942, in the region of Brest,
Pinsk, Kobren, Dyvina, Malority, and Berezy-Kartuzsky about 400
children were shot by German punitive units.

In the Yanov camp in the city of Lwow the Germans killed 8,000
children in two months.
In the resort of Tiberda the Germans annihilated 500 children
suffering from tuberculosis of the bone, who were in the sanatorium
for the cure.
On the territory of the Latvian S.S.R. the German usurpers killed
thousands of children, whom they had brought there with their
parents from the Bielorussian S.S.R., and from the Kalinin, Kaluga,
and other regions of the R.S.F.S.R.

In Czechoslovakia as a result of torture, beating, hanging, and

shootings, there were annihilated in Gestapo prisons in Brno, Seim,
and other places over 20,000 persons. Moreover, many thousands of
internees were subjected to criminal treatment, beatings, and
torture.

Both before the war, as well as during the war, thousands of

Czech patriots, in particular Catholics and Protestants, lawyers,
doctors, teachers, etc., were arrested as hostages and imprisoned.
A large number of these hostages were killed by the Germans.
In Greece in October 1941, the male populations between 16 and
60 years of age of the Greek villages Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia
Mesovunos, Selli, Ano-Kerzilion and Kato-Kerzilion were shot in —
all 416 persons.
many thousands of civilians were murdered. Other
In Yugoslavia
examples are given under paragraph (D), "Killing of Hostages",
below.

50
 (B) DEPORTATION FOR SLAVE LABOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATIONS OF AND IN
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
During the whole period of the occupation by Germany of both
the Western and the Eastern Countries it was the policy of the Ger-
man Government and of the German High Command to deport
able-bodied citizens from such occupied countries to Germany and
to other occupied countries for the purpose of slave labor upon
defense works, in factories, and in other tasks connected with the
German war effort.
In pursuance of such policy there were mass deportations from
all the Western and Eastern Countries for such purposes during the
whole period of the occupation.
Such deportations were contrary to international conventions, in
particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws
and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as de-
rived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal
penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed,
and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
Particulars of deportations, by way of example only and without
prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases are as
follows:
1. From the Western Countries:

From France the following deportations of persons for political

and racial reasons took place — each of which consisted of from 1,500
to 2,500 deportees:

1940 3 Transports
1941 14 Transports
1942 104 Transports
1943 257 Transports
1944 326 Transports

Such deportees were subjected to the most barbarous conditions

of overcrowding; they were provided with wholly insufficient
clothing and were given little or no food for several days.
The conditions of transport were such that many deportees died
in the course of the journey, for example:
In one of the wagons of the train which left Compiègne for
Buchenwald, on 17 September 1943, 80 men died out of 130;
On 4 June 1944, 484 bodies were taken out of the train at Sarre-
bourg;
In a train which left Compiègne on 2 July 1944 for Dachau, more
than 600 dead were found on arrival, i.e. one-third of the total
number;

51
 In a train which left Compiègne on 16 January 1944 for Buchen-
wald, more than 100 men were confined in each wagon, the dead
and the wounded being heaped in the last wagon during the journey;
In April 1945, of 12,000 internees evacuated from Buchenwald,
4,000 only were still alive when the marching column arrived near
Regensburg.
During the German occupation of Denmark, 5,200 Danish subjects
were deported to Germany and there imprisoned in concentration
camps and other places.
In 1942 and thereafter 6,000 nationals of Luxembourg were de-
ported from their country under deplorable conditions as a result of
which many of them perished.
From Belgium between 1940 and 1944 at least 190,000 civilians
were deported to Germany and used as slave labor. Such deportees
were subjected to ill-treatment and many of them were compelled
to work in armament factories.
From Holland, between 1940 and 1944, nearly half a million
civilians were deported to Germany and to other occupied countries.

2. From the Eastern Countries:

The German occupying authorities deported from the Soviet
Union to slavery about 4,978,000 Soviet citizens.
Seven hundred and fifty thousand Czechoslovakian citizens were
taken away from Czechoslovakia and forced to work in the German
war machine in the interior of Germany.
On 4 June 1941, in the city of Zagreb (Yugoslavia) a meeting of
German representatives was called with the Councillor Von Troll
presiding. The purpose was to set up the means of deporting the
Yugoslav population from Slovenia. Tens of thousands of persons
were deported in carrying out this plan.

(C) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR,

AND OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
COUNTRIES WITH WHOM GERMANY WAS AT WAR. AND OF
PERSONS ON THE HIGH SEAS
The defendants murdered and ill-treated prisoners of war by
denying them adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care and
attention; by forcing them to labor in inhumane conditions; by
torturing them and subjecting them to inhuman indignities and by
killing them. The German Government and the German High Com-
mand imprisoned prisoners of war in various concentration camps,
where they were killed and subjected to inhuman treatment by the
various methods set forth in paragraph VIII (A). Members of the
armed forces of the countries with whom Germany was at war were

52
frequently murdered while in the act of surrendering. These mur-
ders and ill-treatment were contrary to International Conventions,
particularly Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Hague Regulations, 1907,
and to Articles 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the Prisoners of War Convention
(Geneva 1929), the laws and customs of war, the general principles
of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized
nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such
crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the
production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:
1. In the Western Countries:

French officers who escaped from Oflag X C were handed over

to the Gestapo and disappeared; others were murdered by their
guards; others sent to concentration camps and exterminated. Among
others, the men of Stalag VI C were sent to Buchenwald.
Frequently prisoners captured on the Western Front were
obliged to march to the camps until they completely collapsed. Some
of them walked more than 600 kilometers with hardly any food;
they marched on for 48 hours running, without being fed; among
them a certain number died of exhaustion or of hunger; stragglers
were systematically murdered.
The same crimes have been committed in 1943, 1944, and 1945
when the occupants of the camps were withdrawn before the Allied
advance; particularly during the withdrawal of the prisoners of
Sagan on 8 February 1945.
Bodily punishments were inflicted upon non-commissioned offi-
cers and cadets who refused to work. On 24 December 1943, three
French non-commissioned officers were murdered for that motive in
Stalag IV A. Many ill-treatments were inflicted without motive on
other ranks: stabbing with bayonets, striking with riflebutts, and
whipping; in Stalag XX B the sick themselves were beaten many
times by sentries; in Stalag III B and Stalag III C, worn-out prisoners
were murdered or grievously wounded. In military jails in Grau-
denz* for instance, in reprisal camps as in Rava-Ruska, the food
was so insufficient that the men lost more than 15 kilograms in a
few weeks. In May 1942, one loaf of bread only was distributed
in Rava-Ruska to each group of 35 men.
Orders were given to transfer French officers in chains to the
camp of Mauthausen after they had tried to escape. At their arri-
val in camp they were murdered, either by shooting or by gas, and
their bodies destroyed in the crematorium.
American and men, were murdered in Nor-
prisoners, officers
mandy during the summer and in the Ardennes in Decem-
of 1944
ber 1944. American prisoners were starved, beaten, and otherwise

53
mistreated in numerous Stalags in Germany and in the occupied
countries, particularly in 1943, 1944, and 1945.

2. In the Eastern Countries:

At Orel prisoners of war were exterminated by starvation,
shooting, exposure, and poisoning.

Soviet prisoners of war were murdered en masse on orders from

the High Command and the Headquarters of the SIPO and SD.
Tens of thousands of Soviet prisoners of war were tortured and
murdered at the "Gross Lazaret" at Slavuta.
In addition, many thousands of the persons referred to in para-
graph VIII (A) 2, above, were Soviet prisoners of war.

Prisoners of war who escaped and were recaptured were handed

over to SIPO and SD for shooting.

Frenchmen fighting with the Soviet Army who were captured

were handed'over to the Vichy Government for "proceedings".
In March 1944, 50 R.A.F. officers who escaped from Stalag
Luft III at Sagan, when recaptured, were murdered.
In September 1941, 11,000 Polish officers who were prisoners of
war were killed in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk.

In Yugoslavia the German Command and the occupying author-

ities inthe person of the chief officials of the Police, the SS troops
(Police Lieutenant General Rosener) and the Divisional Group Com-
mand (General Kubier and others) in the period 1941-43 ordered
the shooting of prisoners of war.

(D) KILLING OF HOSTAGES

Throughout the territories occupied by the German Armed Forces
in the course of waging aggressive wars, the defendants adopted
and put into effect on a wide scale the practice of taking, and of
killing, hostages from the civilian population. These acts were
contrary to international conventions, particularly Article 50 of the
Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all
civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which
such crimes were committed, and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the
production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:
1. In the Western Countries:
In France hostages were executed either individually or col-
lectively; these executions took place in all the big cities of France,

54
among others in Paris, Bordeaux, and Nantes, as well as at Château-
briant.
In Holland many hundreds of hostages were shot at the follow-
ing among other places —Rotterdam, Apeldoorn, Amsterdam,
Benschop, and Haarlem.
In Belgium many hundreds of hostages were shot during the
period 1940 to 1944.
2. In the Eastern Countries:
At Kragnevatz in Yugoslavia 2,300 hostages were shot in Octo-
ber 1941.
At Kralevo in Yugoslavia 5,000 hostages were shot.

(E) PLUNDER OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

The defendants ruthlessly exploited the people and the material
resources of the countries they occupied, in order to strengthen the
Nazi war machine, to depopulate and impoverish the rest of Europe,
to enrich themselves and their adherents, and to promote German
economic supremacy over Europe.
The defendants engaged in the following acts and practices,
among others:

1. They degraded the standard of life of the people of occupied

countries and caused starvation, by stripping occupied
countries of foodstuffs for removal to Germany.

2. They seized raw materials and industrial machinery in all of

the occupied countries, removed them to Germany and used
them in the interest of the German war effort and the Ger-
man economy.
3. In all the occupied countries, in varying degrees, they confis-
cated businesses, plants, and other property.
4. In an attempt to give color of legality to illegal acquisitions
of property, they forced owners of property to go through
the forms of "voluntary" and "legal" transfers.

5. They established comprehensive controls over the economies

of all of the occupied countriesand directed their resources,
their production and their labor in the interests of the Ger-
man war economy, depriving the local populations of the
products of essential industries.
6. By a variety of financial mechanisms, they despoiled all of
the occupied countries of essential commodities and accumu-
lated wealth, debased the local currency systems and disrupted

55
 the local economies. They financed extensive purchases in
occupied countries through clearing arrangements by which
they exacted loans from the occupied countries. They imposed
occupation levies, exacted financial contributions, and issued
occupation currency, far in excess of occupation costs. They
used these excess funds to finance the purchase of business
properties and supplies in the occupied countries.

7. They abrogated the rights of the local populations in the

occupied portions of the U.S.S.R. and in Poland and in other
countries to develop or manage agricultural and industrial
properties, and reserved this area for exclusive settlement,
development, and ownership by Germans and their so-called
racial brethren.

8. In further development of their plan of criminal exploita-

tion, they destroyed industrial cities, cultural monuments,
scientific institutions, and property of all types in the occu-
pied territories to eliminate the possibility of competition
with Germany.
9. From their program and organ-
of terror, slavery, spoliation,
an instrument for
ized outrage, the Nazi conspirators created
the personal profit and aggrandizement of themselves and
their adherents. They secured for themselves and their
adherents:

(a) Positions in administration of business involving power,

influence, and lucrative perquisites.
(b) The use of cheap forced labor.
(c) The acquisition on advantageous terms of foreign proper-
ties, business interests, and raw materials.

(d) The basis for the industrial supremacy of Germany.

These acts were contrary to international conventions, particu-
larly Articles 46 to 56 inclusive of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the
laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as
derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal
penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed
and to Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

Particulars (by way of example and without prejudice to the

production of evidence of other cases) are as follows:
1. Western Countries:
There was plundered from the Western Countries, from 1940 to
1944, works of art, artistic objects, pictures, plastics, furniture,
textiles, antique pieces, and similar articles of enormous value to
the number of 21,903.

56
 In France statistics show the following:

Removal of Raw Materials.

Coal 63,000,000 tons

Electric energy 20,976 Mkwh
Petrol and fuel 1,943,750 tons
Iron ore 74,848,000
Siderurgical products 3,822,000
Bauxite : 1,211,800
Cement 5,984,000
Lime 1,888,000
Quarry products 25,872,000

and various other products to a total value of 79,961,423,000 francs.

Removal of Industrial Equipment.

Total: 9,759,861,000 francs, of which 2,626,479,000 francs of
machine tools.

Removal of Agricultural Produce.

Total: 126,655,852,000 francs, i. e., for the principal products.

Wheat 2,947,337 tons

"
Oats 2,354,080
Milk 790,000 hectolitres
" (concentrated and in
powder) 460,000
Butter 76,000 tons
"
Cheese 49,000
"
Potatoes 725,975
"
Various vegetables 575,000
Wine 7,647,000 hectolitres
Champagne 87.000,000 bottles
Beer 3,821,520 hectolitres
Various kinds of alcohol 1,830.000

Removal of Manufactured Products.

To a total of 184,640,000,000 francs.

Plundering.
Francs: 257,020,024,000 from private enterprise.
Francs: 55,000,100,000 from the State.

Financial Exploitation.
From June 1940 to September 1944 the French Treasury was
compelled to pay to Germany 631,866,000,000 francs.

57
 Looting and Destruction of Works of Art.
The museums of Nantes, Nancy, Old-Marseilles were looted.
Private collections of great value were stolen. In this way
Raphaels, Vermeers, Van Dycks, and works of Rubens, Holbein,
Rembrandt, Watteau, Boucher disappeared. Germany compelled
France to deliver up ''The Mystic Lamb" by Van Eyck, which
Belgium had entrusted to her.
In Norway and other occupied countries decrees were made by
which the property of many civilians, societies, etc., was confiscated.
An immense amount of property of every kind was plundered from
France, Belgium, Norway, Holland, and Luxembourg.
As a result of the economic plundering of Belgium between 1940
and 1944 the damage suffered amounted to 175 billions of Belgian
francs.
2. Eastern Countries:
During the occupation of the Eastern Countries the German
Government and the German High Command carried out, as a
systematic policy, a continuous course of plunder and destruction
including:
On the territory of the Soviet Union the Nazi conspirators
destroyed or severely damaged 1,710 cities and more than 70,000
villages and hamlets, more than 6,000,000 buildings and made home-
less about 25,000,000 persons.
Among the cities which suffered most destruction are Stalingrad,
Sevastopol, Kiev, Minsk, Odessa, Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov, Orel,
Kharkov, Voronezh, Rostov-on-Don, Stalino, and Leningrad.
As is evident from an official memorandum of the German com-
mand, the Nazi conspirators planned the complete annihilation of
entire Soviet cities. In a completely secret order of the Chief of the
Naval Staff (Staff la No. 1601/41, dated 29. IX. 1941) addressed only
to Staff officers, it was said:

"The Führer has decided to erase from the face of the earth
St. Petersburg. The existence of this large city willhave no further
interest after Soviet Russia is destroyed. Finland has also said that
the existence of this city on her new border is not desirable from
her point of view. The original request of the Navy that docks,
—
harbor, etc. necessary for the fleet be preserved is known to the
Supreme Commander of the Military Forces, but the basic prin-
ciples of carrying out operations against St. Petersburg do not make
it possible to satisfy this request.
"It is proposed to approach near to the city and to destroy it with
the aid of an artillery barrage from weapons of different calibers
and with long air attacks ....
"The problem of the life of the population and the provisioning
of them is a problem which cannot and must not be decided by us.

58
 "In this war . . . we are not interested in preserving even a part
of the population of this large city."
The Germans destroyed 427 museums, among them the wealthy
museums of Leningrad, Smolensk, Stalingrad, Novgorod, Poltava,
and others.
In Pyatigorsk the art objects brought there from the Rostov
museum were seized.
The losses suffered by the coal mining industry alone in the
Stalin region amount to 2,000,000,000rubles. There was colossal
destruction of industrialestablishments in Makerevka, Carlovka,
Yenakievo, Konstantinovka, Mariupol, from which most of the
machinery and factories were removed.
Stealing of huge dimensions and the destruction of industrial,
cultural, and other property was typified in Kiev. More than
4,000,000 books, magazines, and manuscripts (many of which were
very valuable and even unique) and a large number of artistic pro-
ductions and valuables of different kinds were stolen and carried
away.
Many valuable art productions were taken away from Riga.
The extent of the plunder of cultural valuables is evidenced by
the fact that 100,000 valuable volumes and 70 cases of ancient
periodicals and precious monographs were carried away by ROSEN-
BERG'S staff alone.

Among further examples of these crimes are:

Wanton devastation of the city of Novgorod and of many histori-
cal and artistic monuments there. Wanton devastation and plunder
of the city of Rovno and of its province. The destruction of the
industrial, cultural, and other property in Odessa. The destruction
of cities and villages in Soviet Karelia. The destruction in Estonia
of cultural, industrial, and other buildings.
The destruction and prophylactic institutes, the
of medical
destruction of agriculture and industry in Lithuania, the destruction
of cities in Latvia.
The Germans approached monuments of culture, dear to the
Soviet people, with special hatred. They broke up the estate of the
poet Pushkin in Mikhailovskoye, desecrating his grave, and destroy-
ing the neighboring villages and the Svyatogor monastery.
They destroyed the estate and museum of Leo Tolstoy, "Yasnaya
Polyana," and desecrated the grave of the great writer. They de-
stroyed in Klin the museum of Tchaikovsky and in Penaty, the
museum of the painter Repin and many others.
The Nazi conspirators destroyed 1,670 Greek Orthodox churches,
237 Roman Catholic churches, 67 chapels, 532 synagogues, etc. They

59
broke up, desecrated, and senselessly destroyed also the most val-
uable monuments of the Christian Church, such as Kievo-Pechers-
kaya Lavra. Nbvy Jerusalem in the Istrin region, and the most an-
cient monasteries and churches.

Destruction in Estonia of cultural, industrial, and other premises:

burning down of many thousands
of residential buildings; removal
of 10.000 works destruction of medical and prophylactic
of art;
institutions: plunder and removal to Germany of immense quantities
of agricultural stock including horses, cows, pigs, poultry, beehives,
and agricultural machines of all kinds.
Destruction of agriculture, enslavement of peasants, and looting
of stock and produce in Lithuania.
In the Latvian Republic destruction of the agriculture by the
looting of all stock, machinery,and produce.
The result of this policy of plunder and destruction was to lay
waste the land and cause utter desolation.
The overall value of the material loss which the U.S.S.R. has
borne, is computed to be 679.000.000.000 rubles, in state prices
of 1941.
Following the occupation of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939
the defendants seized and stole large stocks of raw materials, cop-
per, tin. iron, cotton, and food; caused to be taken to Germany
large amounts of railway rolling stock, and many engines, carriages,
steam vessels, and trolley buses; plundered libraries, laboratories,
and art museums of books, pictures, objects of art, scientific appa-
ratus, and furniture; stole all gold reserves and foreign exchange
of Czechoslovakia, including 23.000 kilograms of gold of a nominal
value of - 5.265.000; fraudulently acquired control and thereafter
looted the Czech banks and many Czech industrial enterprises; and
otherwise stole, looted, and misappropriated Czechoslovak public
and private property. The total sum of defendants' economic spo-
liation of Czechoslovakia from 1938 to 1945 is estimated at
200.000.000.000 Czechoslovak crowns.

(F) THE EXACTION OF COLLECTIVE PENALTIES

The Germans pursued a systematic policy of inflicting, in all the
occupied countries, collective penalties, pecuniary and otherwise,
upon the population for acts of individuals for which it could not
be regarded as collectively responsible; this was done at many
places, including Oslo, Stavanger, Trondheim. and Rogaland.

Similar instances occurred in France, among others in Dijon,

Nantes, and as regards the Jewish population in the occupied ter-

60
ritories. The total amount of fines imposed on French communities
add up to 1,157,179,484 francs made up as follows:

A fine on the Jewish population 1,000,000,000

Various fines 157,179,484

These acts violated Article 50, Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws
and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as
derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal
penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed,
and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

(G)WANTON DESTRUCTION OF CITIES, TOWNS, AND

.
VILLAGES AND DEVASTATION NOT JUSTIFIED BY
MILITARY NECESSITY
The defendants wantonly destroyed cities, towns, and villages
and committed other acts of devastation without military justifi-
cation or necessity. These acts violated Articles 46 and 50 of the
Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general
principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all
civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in
which such crimes were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
Particulars by way of example only and without prejudice to
the production of evidence of other cases are as follows:
1. Western Countries:
In March Norway was destroyed.
1941, part of Lofoten in
In April 1942, the town of Telerag in Norway was destroyed.
Entire villages were destroyed in France, among others Oradour-
sur-Glane, Saint-Nizier and, in the Vercors, La Mure, Vassieux, La
Chapelle en Vercors. The town of Saint Dié was burnt down and
destroyed. The Old Port District of Marseilles was dynamited in
the beginning of 1943 and resorts along the Atlantic and the Medi-
terranean coasts, particularly the town of Sanary, were demolished.
In Holland there was most widespread and extensive destruction,
not justified by military necessity, including the destruction of har-
bors, locks, dikes, and bridges: immense devastation was also caused
by inundations which equally were not justified by military ne-
cessity.

2. Eastern Countries:
In the Eastern Countries the defendants pursued a policy of
wanton destruction and devastation: some particulars of this (with-
out prejudice to the production of evidence of other cases) are set
out above under the heading "Plunder of Public and Private Prop-
erty".

61
 In Greece the villages of Amelofito, Kliston, Kizonia, Messovunos,
Selli,Ano-Kerzilion, and Kato-Kerzilion were utterly destroyed.
In Yugoslavia on 15 August 1941, the German military com-
mand officially announced that the village of Skela was burned to
the ground and the inhabitants killed on the order of the command.
On the order of the Field Commander Hoersterberg a punitive
expedition from the SS troops and the field police destroyed the
villages of Machkovats, and Kriva Reka in Serbia and all the in-
habitants were killed.
General Fritz Neidhold (369 Infantry Division) on 11 September
1944,gave an order to destroy the villages of Zagniezde and Udora,
hanging all the men and driving away all the women and children.
In Czechoslovakia the Nazi conspirators also practiced the sense-
less destruction of populated places. Lezaky and Lidice were
burned to the ground and the inhabitants killed.

(H) CONSCRIPTION OF CIVILIAN LABOR

Throughout the occupied territories the defendants conscripted
and forced the inhabitants to labor and requisitioned their services
for purposes other than meeting the needs of the armies of occu-
pation and to an extent far out of proportion to the resources of the
countries involved. All the civilians so conscripted were forced to
work for the German war effort. Civilians were required to register
and many of those who registered were forced to join the Todt
Organization and the Speer Legion, both of which were semi-mili-
tary organizations involving some military training. These acts
violated Articles 46 and 52 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws
and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as de-
rived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal
penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed,
and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

Particulars, by way of example only and without prejudice to

the production of evidence of other cases, are as follows:

1. Western Countries:
In France, from 1942 to 1944, 963,813 persons were compelled to
work in Germany and 737,000 to work in France for the German
Army.
In Luxembourg in 1944 alone, 2,500 men and 500 girls were con-
scripted for forced labor.

2. Eastern Countries:
Of the large number of citizens of the Soviet Union and of Czech-
oslovakia referred to under Count Three VIII (B) 2 above many
were so conscripted for forced labor.

62
 (I) FORCING CIVILIANS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO
SWEAR ALLEGIANCE TO A HOSTILE POWER
who joined the Speer Legion, as set forth in paragraph
Civilians
(H) above, were required, under threat of depriving them of food,
money, and identity papers, to swear a solemn oath acknowledging
unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Führer of Germany,
which was to them a hostile power.
In Lorraine, civil servants were obliged, in order to retain their
positions, to sign a declaration by which they acknowledged the
"return of their country to the Reich", pledged themselves to obey
without reservation the orders of their chiefs and put themselves
"at the active service of the Führer and the Great National Socialist
Germany".
A similar pledge was imposed on Alsatian civil servants by *

threat of deportation or internment.

These acts violated Article 45 of the Hague Regulations, 1907,
the laws and customs of war, the general principles of international
law, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.

(J) GERMANIZATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

In certain occupied territories purportedly annexed to Germany
the defendants methodically and pursuant to plan endeavored to
assimilate those territories politically, culturally, socially, and
economically into the German Reich. The defendants endeavored
to obliterate the former national character of these territories. In
pursuance of these plans and endeavors, the defendants forcibly
deported inhabitants who were predominantly non-German and
introduced thousands of German colonists.
This plan included economic domination, physical conquest, in-
stallation of puppet governments, purported de jure annexation and
enforced conscription into the German Armed Forces.
This was carried out in most of the occupied countries including:
Norway, France (particularly in the Departments of Upper Rhine,
Lower Rhine, Moselle, Ardennes, Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Mo-
selle), Luxembourg, the Soviet Union, Denmark, Belgium, and
Holland.
In France in the Departments of Aisne, Nord, Meurthe and Mo-
selle, and especially in that of Ardennes, rural properties were
seized by a German state organization which tried to have them
exploited under German direction; the landowners of these exploi-
tations were dispossessed and turned into agricultural laborers.
In the Department of Upper Rhine, Lower Rhine, and Moselle,
the methods of Germanization were those of annexation followed
by conscription.

63
 1. From the month of August 1940, officials who refused
to take
the oath of allegiance to the Reich were expelled. On 21 Septem-
ber expulsions and deportation of populations began and on 22 No-
vember 1940, more than 70,000 Lorrainers or Alsatians were driven
into the south zone of France. From 31 July 1941 onwards, more
than 100,000 persons were deported into the eastern regions of the
Reich or to Poland. All the property of the deportees or expelled
persons was confiscated. At the same time, 80,000 Germans coming
from the Saar or from Westphalia were installed in Lorraine and
2,000 farms belonging to French people were transferred to Ger-
mans.
2. From 2 January 1942, all the young people of the Departments
of Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine, aged from 10 to 18 years, were
incorporated in the Hitler Youth. The same thing was done in
Moselle from 4 August 1942. From 1940 all the French schools were
closed, their staffs expelled, and the German school system was
introduced in the three Departments.
3. On the 28 September 1940, an order applicable to the Depart-

ment of Moselle ordained the Germanization of all the surnames

and Christian names which were French in form. The same thing
was done from 15 January 1943, in the Departments of Upper Rhine
and Lower Rhine.
4. Two orders from 23 to 24 August 1942 imposed by force Ger-

man nationality on French citizens.

5. On 8 May Upper Rhine and Lower Rhine, 23 April
1941, for
1941, for Moselle, orders were promulgated enforcing compulsory
labor service on all French citizens of either sex aged from 17 to
25 years. From 1 January 1942 for young men and from 26 January
1942 for young girls, national labor service was effectively organized
in Moselle. It was from 27 August 1942 in Upper Rhine and in
Lower Rhine for young men only. The classes 1940, 1941, 1942 were
called up.
These classes were retained in the Wehrmacht on the expira-
6.

tion of their time and labor service. On 19 August 1942, an order

instituted compulsory military service in Moselle. On 25 August
1942, the classes 1940-44 were called up in three departments.
Conscription was enforced by the German authorities in conformity
with the provisions of German legislation. The first revision boards
took place from 3 September 1942. Later in Upper Rhine and
Lower Rhine new levies were effected everywhere on classes 1928
to 1939 inclusive. The French people who refused to obey these
laws were considered as deserters and their families were deported,
while their property was confiscated.
These acts violated Articles 43, 46, 55, and 56 of the Hague Regu-
lations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles

64
of criminallaw as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized
nations,the internal penal laws of the countries in which such
crimes were committed, and Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
IX. Individual, group and organization responsibility for the offense stated
in Count Three

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for

a statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for
the offense set forth in this Count Three of the Indictment. Refer-
ence is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a state-
ment of the responsibility of the groups and organizations named
herein as criminal groups and organizations for the offense set forth
in this Count Three of the Indictment.

COUNT FOUR— CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

(Charter, Article 6, especially 6(c) )

X. Statement of the Offense

All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during

a period of years preceding 8 May 1945 in Germany and in all those
countries and territories occupied by the German armed forces
since 1 September 1939 and in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in
Italy and on the High Seas.
All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and
executed a common plan or conspiracy to commit Crimes against
Humanity as denned in Article 6 (c) of the Charter. This plan in-
volved, among other things, the murder and persecution of all who
were or who were suspected of being hostile to the Nazi Party
and all who were or who were suspected of being opposed to the
common plan alleged in Count One.
The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the
defendants and by other persons for whose acts the defendants are
responsible (under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons,
when committing the said War Crimes, performed their acts in
execution of a common plan and conspiracy to commit the said
War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which plan and
conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, organizers,
instigators,and accomplices.
These methods and crimes constituted violations of international
conventions, of internal penal laws, of the general principles of
criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized
nations and were involved in and part of a systematic course of
conduct. The said acts were contrary to Article 6 of the Charter.
The Prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count
Three as also constituting Crimes against Humanity.

65
 (A) MURDER, EXTERMINATION, ENSLAVEMENT, DEPOR-
TATION, AND OTHER INHUMANE ACTS COMMITTED
AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATIONS BEFORE AND DURING
THE WAR
For the purposes set out above, the defendants adopted a policy
of persecution, and extermination of all civilians in
repression,
Germany who were, or who were believed to be, or who were be-
lieved likely to become, hostile to the Nazi Government and the
common plan or conspiracy described in Count One. They impris-
oned such persons- without judicial process, holding them in "pro-
tective custody" and concentration camps, and subjected them to
persecution, degradation, despoilment, enslavement, torture, and
murder.
Special courts were established to carry out the will of the con-
spirators; favored branches or agencies of the State and Party were
permitted to operate outside the range even of nazified law and to
crush all tendencies and elements which were considered "un-
desirable". The various concentration camps included Buchenwald,
which was established in 1933, and Dachau, which was established
in 1934. At these and other camps the civilians were put to slave
labor, and murdered and ill-treated by divers means, including
those set out in Count Three above, and these acts and policies were
continued and extended to the occupied countries after 1 Septem-
ber 1939, and until 8 May 1945.

(B)PERSECUTION ON POLITICAL, RACIAL, AND RELIGIOUS

GROUNDS IN EXECUTION OF AND IN CONNECTION WITH THE
COMMON PLAN MENTIONED IN COUNT ONE
As abovestated, in execution of and in connection with the com-
mon plan mentioned in Count One, opponents of the German Gov-
ernment were exterminated and persecuted. These persecutions
were directed against Jews. They were also directed against per-
sons whose political belief or spiritual aspirations were deemed to
be in conflict with the aims of the Nazis. ,

Jews were systematically persecuted since 1933; they were de-

prived of their liberty, thrown into concentration camps where
they were murdered and ill-treated. Their property was confiscated.
Hundreds of thousands of Jews were so treated before 1 Septem-
ber 1939.
Since 1 September 1939, the persecution of the Jews was re-
doubled: millions of Jews from Germany and from the occupied

66
Western Countries were sent to the Eastern Countries for exter-
mination.
Particulars by way of example and without prejudice to the
production of evidence of other cases are as follows:
The Nazis murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss, the
Social Democrat Breitscheid, and the Communist Thälmann. They
imprisoned in concentration camps numerous political and religious
personages, for example Chancellor Schuschnigg and Pastor Nie-
möller.
In November 1938, by orders of the Chief of the Gestapo, anti-
Jewish demonstrations all over Germany took place. Jewish prop-
erty was destroyed, 30,000 Jews were arrested and sent to con-
centration camps and their property confiscated.
Under paragraph VIII (A), above, millions of the persons there
mentioned as having been murdered and ill-treated were Jews.
Among other mass murders of Jews were the following:
At Kislovdosk all Jews were made to give up their property:
2,000were shot in an anti-tank ditch at Mineraliye Vodi: 4,300 other
Jews were shot in the same ditch.
60,000 Jews were shot on an island on the Dvina near Riga.
20,000 Jews were shot at Lutsk.
32,000 Jews were shot at Sarny.
60,000 Jews were shot at Kiev and Dniepropetrovsk.

Thousands of Jews were gassed weekly by means of gas-wagons

which broke down from overwork.
As the Germans retreated before the Soviet Army they exter-
minated Jews rather than allow them to be liberated. Many con-
centration camps and ghettos were set up in which Jews were
incarcerated and tortured, starved, subjected to merciless atrocities,
and finally exterminated.
About 70,000 Jews were exterminated in Yugoslavia.

XI. Individual, Group and Organization Responsibility for the Offense Stated

in Count Four

Reference is hereby made to Appendix A of this Indictment for

a statement of the responsibility of the individual defendants for
the offense set forth in this Count Four of the Indictment. Reference
is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of
the responsibility of the groups and organizationsnamed herein as
criminal groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this
Count Four of the Indictment.

67
 Wherefore, this Indictment is lodged with the Tribunal in
English, French,and Russian, each text having equal authenticity,
and the charges herein made against the above named defendants
are hereby presented to the Tribunal.

/ s / ROBERT H. JACKSON.
Acting on Behalf of the United States of
America.

i s / FRANÇOIS DE MENTHON.
Acting on Behalf of the French Republic.

I s / HARTLEY SHAWCROSS.
Acting on Behalf of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

1*1 R. RUDENKO.
Acting on Behalf of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics.

Berlin, 6 October 1945.

APPENDIX A
Statement of Individual Responsibility for Crimes Set Out in
Counts One, Two, Three, and Four
The statements .hereinafter set forth following the name of
each individual defendant constitute matters upon which the pros-
ecution will rely inter alia as establishing the individual respon-
sibility of the defendant according to Article 6 of the Charter of the
Tribunal.

GÖRING:
The Defendant GÖRING between 1932 and 1945 was: A member
of the Nazi Party, Supreme Leader of the SA, General
in the SS,
a member and President of the Reichstag, Minister of the Interior
of Prussia, Chief of the Prussian Police and Prussian Secret State
Police, Chief of the Prussian State Council, Trustee of the Four
Year Plan, Reich Minister for Air, Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force, President of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
Reich, member of the Secret Cabinet Council, head of the Her-
mann Goring Industrial Combine, and Successor Designate to
Hitler. The Defendant GÖRING used the foregoing positions, his
personal influence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in
such a manner that: He promoted the accession to power of the

68
Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control over Ger-
many set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the
military and economic preparation for war set forth in Count One
of the Indictment; he participated in the planning and preparation
of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Viola-
tion of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth
in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized,
directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count
Three of theIndictment, and the Crimes against Humanity set
forth in Count Four ©f the Indictment, including a wide variety of
crimes against persons and property.

RIBBENTROP:
The Defendant RIBBENTROP between 1932 and 1945 was:
A member of the Nazi Party, a member
the Nazi Reichstag,
of
Advisor to the Führer on matters of foreign policy, representative
of the Nazi Party for matters of foreign policy, special German
delegate for disarmament questions, Ambassador Extraordinary,
Ambassador in London, organizer and director of Dienststelle
Ribbentrop, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs, member of the
Secret Cabinet Council, member of the Führer's political staff at
general headquarters, and General in the SS. The Defendant
RIBBENTROP used the foregoing positions, his personal influence,
and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner
that: He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators
as set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the
preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
participated in the political planning and preparation of the Nazi
conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances as set forth in
Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in accordance with the
Führer Principle he executed and assumed responsibility for the
execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set
forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed,
and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of
the Indictment, and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in
Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly the
crimes against persons and property in occupied territories.

HESS:
The Defendant HESS between 1921 and 1941 was: A member of
the Nazi Party, Deputy to the Führer, Reich Minister without Port-
folio, member of the Reichstag,member
of the Council of Ministers
for the Defense of the Reich, member of
the Secret Cabinet Council,
Successor Designate to the Führer after the Defendant Goring, a

69
General in the SS and a General in the SA. The Defendant HESS
used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate
connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted
the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolida-
tion of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; he promoted the military, economic, and psychological
preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
participated in the political planning and preparation for Wars of
Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agree-
ments, and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the
Indictment; he participated in the preparation and planning of
foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; he authorized, directed and participated in
the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the
Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment,
including a wide variety of crimes against persons and property.

KALTENBRUNNER:
The Defendant KALTENBRUNNER between 1932 and 1945 was:
A member of the Nazi Party, a General in the SS, a member of
the Reichstag, a General of the Police, State Secretary for Security
in Austria in charge of the Austrian Police, Police Leader of
Vienna, Lower and Upper Austria, Head of the Reich Main Secu-
rity Office, and Chief of the Security Police and Security Service.
The Defendant KALTENBRUNNER used the foregoing positions
and his personal influence in such a manner that: He promoted the
consolidation of control over Austria seized by the Nazi conspirators
as set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he authorized,
directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count
Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the Crimes
against Humanity involved in the system of concentration camps.

ROSENBERG:
The Defendant ROSENBERG between 1920 and 1945 was:
A member of the Nazi Party, Nazi member of the Reichstag,
Reichsleiter in the Nazi Party for Ideology and Foreign Policy, the
editor of the Nazi newspaper Völkischer Beobachter and of the
NS Monatshefte, head of the Foreign Political Office of the Nazi
Party, Special Delegate for the entire Spiritual and Ideological
Training of the Nazi Party, Reich Minister for the Eastern Occu-
pied Territories, organizer of the "Einsatzstab Rosenberg", a Gen-
eral in the SS and a General in the SA. The Defendant ROSEN-
BERG used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his
intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He

70
developed, disseminated, and exploited the doctrinal techniques of
the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One
of the Indictment; he promoted the psychological preparations for
war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in
the political planning and preparation for Wars of Aggression and
Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assur-
ances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth
in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity
set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety
of crimes against persons and property.

FRANK:
The Defendant between 1932 and 1945 was: A member
FRANK
General in the SS, a member of the Reichstag,
of the Nazi Party, a
Reich Minister without Portfolio, Reich Commissar for the Co-
ordination of Justice, President of the International Chamber of
Law and Academy of German Law, Chief of the Civil Administra-
tion of Lodz, Supreme Administrative Chief of the military district
of West Lodz and Krakow, and Governor General
Prussia, Poznan,
of the occupied Polish territories. The Defendant FRANK used the
foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connec-
tion with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the
accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation
of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indict-
ment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes
set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including
particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
involved in the administration of occupied territories.

BORMANN:
The Defendant BORMANN between 1925 and 1945 was: A mem-
ber of the Nazi Party, member of the Reichstag, a member of the
Staff of the Supreme Command of the SA, founder and head of
"Hilfskasse der NSDAP", Reichsleiter, Chief of Staff Office of the
Führer's Deputy, head of the Party Chancery, Secretary of the
Führer, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the
Reich, organizer and head of the Volkssturm, a General in the SS
and a General in the SA. The Defendant BORMANN used the
foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connec-
tion with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the
accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation

71
of their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indict-
ment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count
One of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and partici-
pated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indict-
ment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of
the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against persons
and property.

FRICK:
The Defendant FRICK between 1932 and 1945 was: A member
of the Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, General in the SS, member of the
Reichstag, Reich Minister of the Interior, Prussian Minister of the
Interior, Reich Director of Elections, General Plenipotentiary for
the Administration of the Reich, head of the Central Office for the
Reunification of Austria and the German Reich, Director of the
Central Office for the Incorporation of Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig,
the eastern incorporated territories, Eupen, Malmedy, and Mo-
resnet, Director of the Central Office for the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia, the Governor General of Lower Styria,
Upper Carinthia, Norway, Alsace, Lorraine and all other occupied
territories and Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. The
Defendant FRICK used the foregoing positions, his personal in-
fluence, and his intimate connection with the Führer in such a
manner that: He promoted the accession to power of the Nazi
conspirators and the consolidation of their control over Germany set
forth in Count One of the Indictment; he participated in the plan-
ning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggres-
sion and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements,
and Assurances set forth in Count One and Two of the Indictment;
and he authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes
set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including
more particularly the crimes against persons and property in occu-
pied territories.

LEY:
The Defendant LEY between 1932 and 1945 was: A member of
the Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, Nazi Party Organization Manager,
member German Labor Front, a Gen-
of the Reichstag, leader of the
eral in the SA, and Joint Organizer of the Central Inspection for
the Care of Foreign Workers. The Defendant LEY used the forego-
ing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate connection
with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the accession
to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their
control over Germany as set forth in Count One of the Indictment;

72
he promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated in the War
Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, and in the
Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indict-
ment, including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity relating to the abuse of human beings for labor in the
conduct of the aggressive wars.

SAUCKEL:
The Defendant SAUCKEL between 1921 and 1945 was: A mem-
ber of the Nazi Party, Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Thuringia,
a member of the Reichstag, General Plenipotentiary for the Employ-
ment of Labor under the Four Year Plan, Joint Organizer with the
Defendant Ley of the Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign
Workers, a General in the SS and a General in the SA. The Defend-
ant SAUCKEL used the foregoing positions and his personal
influence in such a manner that: He promoted the accession to
power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indict-
ment; he participated in the economic preparations for Wars of
Aggression and Wars in Violation of Treaties, Agreements, and
Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment;- he
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth
in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Human-
ity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including partic-
ularly the War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity involved in
forcing the inhabitants of occupied countries to work as slave
laborers in occupied countries and in Germany.

SPEER:
The Defendant SPEER between 1932 and 1945 was: A member
of the Nazi Party, Reichsleiter, member of the Reichstag, Reich
Minister for Armament and Munitions, Chief of the Organization
Todt, General Plenipotentiary for Armaments in the Office of the
Four Year Plan, and Chairman of the Armaments Council. The
Defendant SPEER used the foregoing positions and his personal
influence in such a manner that: He participated in the military
and economic planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for
Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties,
Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of
the Indictment; and he authorized, directed, and participated in
the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the
Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indict-
ment, including more particularly the abuse and exploitation of
human beings for forced labor in the conduct of aggressive war.

l'A
FUNK:
The Defendant FUNK between 1932 and 1945 was: A member
of the Nazi Party, Economic Adviser of Hitler, National Socialist
Deputy to the Reichstag, Press Chief of the Reich Government,
State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and
Propaganda, Reich Minister of Economics, Prussian Minister of
Economics, President of the German Reichsbank, Plenipotentiary
for Economy, and member of the Ministerial Council for the De-
fense of the Reich. The Defendant FUNK used the foregoing posi-
tions, his personal influence, and his close connection with the
Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the accession to power
of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control over
Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted
the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment;
he participated in the military and economic planning and prepara-
tion of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set
forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized,
directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count
Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including more particularly
crimes against persons and property in connection with the economic
exploitation of occupied territories.

SCHACHT:
The Defendant SCHACHT between 1932 and 1945 was: A mem-
ber of the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Minister
of Economics, Reich Minister without Portfolio and President of the
German Reichsbank. The Defendant SCHACHT used the foregoing
positions, his personal influence, and his connection with the Führer
in such a manner that: He promoted the accession to power of the
Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control over Ger-
many set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the
preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and
he participated in the military and economic plans and preparation
of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression, and Wars in Viola-
tion of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set
forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment.

PAPEN:
The Defendant PAPEN between 1932 and 1945 was: A member
of the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, Reich Chancellor.
Vice Chancellor under Hitler, special Plenipotentiary for the Saar,
negotiator of the Concordat with the Vatican, Ambassador in
Vienna and Ambassador in Turkey. The Defendant PAPEN used the

74
foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his close connection
with the Führer in such manner that: He promoted the accession
to power of the Nazi conspirators and participated in the con-
solidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One
of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for war set forth
in Count One of the Indictment; and he participated in the political
planning and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of
Aggression and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agree-
ments, and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the
Indictment.

KRUPP:
The Defendant KRUPP was between 1932 and 1945: Head of
Friedrich KRUPP A.G., a member of the General Economic Council,
President of the Reich Union of German Industry, and head of the
Group for Mining and Production of Iron and Metals under the
Reich Ministry of Economics. The Defendant KRUPP used the
foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his connection with
the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the accession to
power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their con-
trol over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he
promoted the preparation for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; he participated in the military and economic planning
and preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression
and Wars in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and
Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and
he authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes set
forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including more
particularly the exploitation and abuse of human beings for labor
in the conduct of aggressive wars.

NEURATH:
The Defendant NEURATH between 1932 and 1945 was: A mem-
ber of the Nazi Party, a General in the SS, a member of the
Reichstag, Reich Minister, Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, Presi-
dent of the Secret Cabinet Council, and Reich Protector for Bohemia
and Moravia. The Defendant NEURATH used the foregoing posi-
tions, his personal influence, and his close connection with the
Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the accession to power
of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment;
he promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; he participated in the political planning and prepara-
tion of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances

75
set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; in accordance
with the Führer Principle he executed, and assumed responsibility
for the execution of the foreign policy plans of the Nazi conspira-
tors set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he authorized,
directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count
Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the crimes
against persons and property in the occupied territories.

SCHIRACH:
The Defendant SCHIRACH between 1924 and 1945 was: A mem-
-ber of the Nazi Party, a member Youth
of the Reichstag, Reich
Leader on the Staff of the SA Supreme Command, Reichsleiter in
the Nazi Party for Youth Education, Leader of Youth of the Ger-
man Reich, head of the Hitler Jugend, Reich Defense Commissioner
and Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter of Vienna. The Defendant
SCHIRACH used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and
his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He
promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the
consolidation of their control over Germany set forth in Count One
of the Indictment; he promoted the psychological and educational
preparations for war and the militarization of Nazi dominated
organizations set forth in .Count One of the Indictment; and he
authorized, directed, and participated in the Crimes against
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including,
particularly, anti-Jewish measures.

SE YSS-INQUART :

The Defendant SEYSS-1NQUART between 1932 and 1945 was:

A member of the Nazi Party, a General in the SS, State Councillor
of Austria, Minister of the Interior and Security of Austria, Chan-
cellor of Austria, a member of the Reichstag, a member of the
Reich Cabinet, Reich Minister without Portfolio, Chief of the Civil
Administration in South Poland, Deputy Governor-General of the
Polish Occupied Territory, and Reich Commissar for the Occupied
Netherlands. The Defendant SEYSS-INQUART used the foregoing
positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: He
promoted the seizure and the consolidation of control over Austria
by the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the Indictment;
he participated in the political planning and preparation of the
Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation
of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in
Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed,
and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the

76
Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count
Four of the Indictment, including a wide variety of crimes against
persons and property.

STREICHER:
The Defendant STREICHER between 1932 and 1945 was: A mem-
ber of the Nazi Party, a member of the Reichstag, a General in the
SA, Gauleiter of Franconia, editor-in-chief of the anti-Semitic news-
paper Der Stürmer. The Defendant STREICHER used the fore-
going positions, his personal influence, and his close connection
with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the accession
to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their
control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment:
he authorized, directed, and participated in the Crimes against Hu-
manity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including par-
ticularly the incitement of the persecution of the Jews set forth in
Count One and Count Four of the Indictment.

KEITEL:
The Defendant KEITEL between 1938 and 1945 was: Chief of the
High Command of the German Armed Forces, member of the Secret
Cabinet Council, member of the Council of Ministers for the Defense
of the Reich, and Field Marshal. The Defendant KEITEL used the
foregoing positions, his personal influence, and his intimate con-
nection with the Führer in such a manner that: He promoted the
military preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indict-
ment; he participated in the political planning and preparation of
the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation
of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in
Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he executed and assumed
responsibility for the execution of the plans of the Nazi conspirators
for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of International
Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in Counts One and
Two of the Indictment; he authorized, directed, and participated
in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and
the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indict-
ment, including particularly the War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity involved in the ill-treatment of prisoners of war and of
the civilian population of occupied territories.

JODL :

The Defendant JODL between 1932 and 1945 was: Lt. Colonel,
Army Operations Department of the Wehrmacht, Colonel, Chief of
OKW Operations Department, Major-General, Chief of Staff OKW
and Colonel-General. The Defendant JODL used the foregoing posi-
tions, his personal influence, and his close connection with the Führer

7?
 :

in such a manner that: He promoted the accession to power of the

Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control over Ger-
many set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the
preparations for war set forth in Count One of the Indictment;
he participated in the military planning and preparation of the
Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in
Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed,
and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of
the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count
Four of the Indictment, including a wide, variety of crimes against
persons and property.

RAEDER
The Defendant RAEDER
between 1928 and 1945 was: Command-
er-in-Chief ofGerman Navy, Generaladmiral, Grossadmiral,
the
Admiralinspekteur of the German Navy, and a member of the
Secret Cabinet Council. The Defendant RAEDER used the fore-
going positions and his personal influence in such a manner that:
He promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of
the Indictment; he participated in the political planning and prep-
aration of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars
in Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances
set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; he executed,
and assumed responsibility for the execution of the plans of the
Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of
International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in
Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized, directed,
and participated in the war crimes set forth in Count Three of the
Indictment, including particularly war crimes arising out of sea
warfare.

DÖN1TZ :

The Defendant DÖNITZ between 1932 and 1945 was: Command-

ing Officer of the Weddigen U-boat flotilla, Commander-in-Chief
of the U-boat arm, Vice-Admiral, Admiral, Grossadmiral and Com-
mander-in-Chief of the German Navy, Advisor to Hitler, and Suc-
cessor to Hitler as head of the German Government. The Defendant
DÖN1TZ used the foregoing positions, his personal influence, and
his intimate connection with the Führer in such a manner that: He
promoted the preparations for war set forth in Count One of the
Indictment; he participated in the military planning and prepara-
tion of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in
Violation of International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set
forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he authorized,

73
directed, and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count
Three of the Indictment, including particularly the crimes against
persons and property on the High Seas.

FRITZSCHE :

The Defendant FRITZSCHE between 1933 and 1945 was: A mem-

ber of the Nazi Party, editor-in-chief of the official German news
agency, ''Deutsche Nachrichten Büro", head of the Wireless News
Service and of the Home Press Division of the Reich Ministry oL
Propaganda, Ministerialdirektor of the Reich Ministry of Propa-
ganda, head of the Radio Division of the Propaganda Department
of the Nazi Party, and Plenipotentiary for the Political Organi-
zation of the Greater German Radio. The Defendant FRITZSCHE
used the foregoing positions and his personal influence to dissem-
inate and exploit the principal doctrines of the Nazi conspirators
set forth in Count One of the Indictment, and to advocate, encourage
and incite the commission of the War Crimes set forth in Count
Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth
in Count Four of the Indictment including, particularly, anti-Jewish
measures and the ruthless exploitation of occupied territories.

79
 APPENDIX B
Statement of Criminality of Groups and Organizations

The statements hereinafter set forth, following the name of

each group or organization named in the Indictment as one which
should be declared criminal, constitute matters upon which the
prosecution will rely inter alia as establishing the criminality of the
group or organization :

DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET)

•'Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet)" referred to in the Indict-
ment who were:
consists of persons
(i) Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933, the
date on which Hitler became Chancellor of the German Re-
public. The term "ordinary cabinet" as used herein means
the Reich Ministers, i.e.. heads of departments of the central
Government; Reich Ministers without portfolio; State Min-
isters acting as Reich Ministers; and other officials entitled
to take part in meetings of this cabinet.

(ii) .Members of der Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung (Coun-

cil of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich).
(iii) Members of der Geheimer Kabinettsrat (Secret Cabinet
Council).
Under the Führer, these persons functioning in the foregoing capac-
ities and in association as a group, possessed and exercised legis-
lative, executive, administrative, and political powers and functions
of a very high order in the system of German Government. Accord-
ingly, they are charged with responsibility for the policies adopted
and put into effect by the Government including those which com-
prehended and involved the commission of the crimes referred to
in Counts One. Two. Three, and Four of the Indictment.

DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONAL-

SOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
(LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY)
"Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen
Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party)"
referred to in the Indictment consists of persons who were at any
time, according to common Nazi terminology, "Politischen Leiter"
(Political Leaders) of any grade or rank.
The Politischen Leiter comprised the leaders of the various
functional offices of the Party (for example, the Reichsleitung, or

80
Party Reich Directorate, and the Gauleitung, or Party Gau Direc-
torate), as well as the territorial leaders of the Party (for example,
the Gauleiter).
The Politischen Leiter were a distinctive and elite group within
the Nazi Party proper and as such were vested with special prerog-
atives. They were organized according to the Leadership Principle
and were charged with planning, developing and imposing upon
their followers the policies of the Nazi Party. Thus the terri-
torial leaders among them were called Hoheitsträger, or bearers
of sovereignty, and were entitled to call upon and utilize the
various Party formations when necessary for the execution of Party
policies.
Reference is hereby made to the allegations in Count One of the
Indictment showing that the Nazi Party was the central core of the
common plan or conspiracy therein set forth. The Politischen Leiter,
as a major power within the Nazi Party proper, and functioning in
the capacities above described and in association as a group, joined
in the common plan or conspiracy, and accordingly share respon-
sibility for the crimes set forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and
Four of the Indictment.
The prosecution expressly reserves the right to request, at any
time before sentence is pronounced, that Politische Leiter of subor-
dinate grades or ranks or of other types or classes, to be specified
by the Prosecution, be excepted from further proceedings in this
Case No. 1, but without prejudice to other proceedings or actions
against them.

DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN

DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (COMMONLY KNOWN AS
THÇ SS) INCLUDING DER SICHERHEITSDIENST (COM-
MONLY KNOWN AS THE SD)
"Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbei-
terpartei (commonly known as the SS) including Der Sicherheits-
dienst (commonly known as the SD)" referred to in the Indictment
consists of the entire corps of the SS and all offices, departments,
services, agencies, branches, formations, organizations, and groups
of which it was at any time comprised or which were at any time
integrated in it, including but not limited to, the Allgemeine SS,
the Waffen SS, the SS Totenkopf Verbände, SS Polizei Regimente,
and the Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS (commonly known as
the SD).
The SS, originally established by Hitler
in 1925 as an elite
section of the SA guard for the Führer and
to furnish a protective
Nazi Party leaders, became an independent formation of the Nazi
Party in 1934 under the leadership of the Reichsführer-SS, Heinrich

81
Himmler. It was composed members, selected in accord-
of voluntary
ance with Nazi biological, and political theories, completely
racial,
indoctrinated in Nazi ideology and pledged to uncompromising obe-
dience to the Führer. After the accession of the Nazi conspirators
to power, it developed many departments, agencies, formations,
and branches and extended its influence and control over numerous
fields of Governmental and Party activity. Through Heinrich Himm-
ler, as Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police, agencies
and units of the SS and of the Reich were joined in operation to
form a unified repressive police force. The Sicherheitsdienst des
Reichsführers-SS (commonly known as the SD), a department of the
SS, was developed into a vast espionage and counter-intelligence
system w hich operated in conjunction with the Gestapo and crim-
T

inal police in detecting, suppressing and eliminating tendencies,

groups and individuals deemed hostile or potentially hostile to the
Nazi Party, its leaders, principles and objectives, and eventually
was combined with the Gestapo and criminal police in a single
security police department, the Reich Main Security Office.
Other branches of the SS developed into an armed force and
served in the wars of aggression referred to in Counts One and
Two of the Indictment. Through other departments and branches
the SS controlled the administration of concentration camps and the
execution of Nazi racial, biological, and resettlement policies.
Through its numerous functions and activities it served as the in-
strument for insuring the domination of Nazi ideology and pro-
tecting and extending the Nazi regime over Germany and occupied
territories.It thus participated in and is responsible for the crimes
referred to in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment.

DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE,

COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE GESTAPO)
"Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police, commonly known
as the Gestapo)" referred to in the Indictment consists of the head-
and all the forces and per-
quarters, departments, offices, branches,
sonnel of the Geheime Staatspolizei organized or existing at any
time after 30 January 1933, including the Geheime Staatspolizei
of Prussia and equivalent secret or political police forces of the
Reich and the components thereof.
The Gestapo was created by the Nazi conspirators immediately
after their accession to power, first in Prussia by the Defendant
GORING and shortly thereafter in all other states in the Reich.
These separate secret and political police forces were developed into
a centralized, uniform organization operating through a central
headquarters and through a network of regional offices in Germany

82
and in occupied territories. Its officials and operatives were selec-
ted on the basis of unconditional acceptance of Nazi ideology, were
largely drawn from members of the SS, and were trained in SS
and SD schools. It acted to suppress and eliminate tendencies,
groups, and individuals deemed hostile or potentially hostile to the
Nazi Party, its leaders, principles, and objectives, and to repress
resistance and potential resistance to German control in occupied
territories. In performing these functions it operated free from legal
control, taking any measures it deemed necessary for the accom-
plishment of its missions.
Through its purposes, activities, and the means it used, it par-
ticipated in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes
set forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment.

DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN

DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
(COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE SA)
;

Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Ar-

'Die
beiterpartei (commonly known as the SA)" referred to in the Indict-
ment was a formation of the Nazi Party under the immediate juris-
diction of the Führer, organized on military lines, whose member-
ship was composed of volunteers serving as political soldiers of the
Party. It was one of the earliest formations of the Nazi Party and
the original guardian of the National Socialist movement. Founded
in 1921 as a voluntary militant formation, it was developed by the
Nazi conspirators before their accession to power into a vast private
army and utilized for the purpose of creating disorder, and ter-
rorizing and eliminating political opponents. It continued to serve
as an instrument for the physical, ideological, and military training
of Party members and as a reserve for the German Armed Forces.
After the launching of the wars of aggression, referred to in Counts
One and Two of the Indictment, the SA not only operated as an
organization for military training but provided auxiliary police and
security forces in occupied territories, guarded prisoner-of-war
camps and concentration camps and supervised and controlled per-
sons forced to labor in Germany and occupied territories.
Through its purposes and activities and the means it used, it
participated in and is responsible for the commission of the crimes
set forth in Counts One, Two, Three, and Four of the Indictment.

GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE GERMAN

ARMED FORCES
The "General Staff Command of the German Armed
and High
Forces" referred to in the Indictment consist of those individuals
who between February 1938 and May 1945 were the highest com-

83
manders of the Wehrmacht, the Army, the Navy, and the Air
Forces.The individuals comprising this group are the persons who
held the following appointments:
Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander in Chief
of the Navy);
Chef (and, formerly, Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung
(Chief of Naval War Staff);
Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander in Chief of the
Army);
Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres (Chief of the General Staff
of the Army);
Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander in Chief of
the Air Force);
Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe (Chief of the General
Staff of the Air Force);
Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High
Command of the Armed Forces);
Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehr-
macht (Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Com-
mand of the Armed Forces);
Stellvertretender Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkomman-
dos der Wehrmacht (Deputy Chief of the Operations
Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces);
Commanders-in-Chief in the field, with the status of Ober-
befehlshaber, of the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air Force.

Functioning in such capacities and in association as a group at

a highest level in the German Armed Forces Organization, these
persons had a major responsibility for the planning, preparation,
initiation, and waging of illegalwars as set forth in Counts One
and Two of the Indictment and for the War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity involved in the execution of the common plan or
conspiracy set forth in Counts Three and Four of the Indictment.

APPENDIX C
Charges and Particulars of Violations of International Treaties,
Agreements, and Assurances Caused' by the Defendants in the
Course of Planning, Preparing, and Initiating the Wars

CHARGE: Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement

of International Disputes, signed at The Hague, 29 July 1899.

84
 PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, by force and arms, on
the dates specified in Column 1, invade the territory of the
Sovereigns specified in Column 2, respectively, without first having
attempted to settle its disputes with said Sovereigns by pacific

means.
Column 1 Column 2
6 April 1941 Kingdom of Greece
6 April 1941 Kingdom of Yugoslavia

II

CHARGE: Violation of the Convention for the Pacific Settlement

of International Disputes, signed at The Hague, 18 October 1907.

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates

specified in Column 1, by force of arms invade the territory of the
Sovereigns specified in Column 2, respectively, without having
attempted to
first settle its dispute with said Sovereigns by pacific
means.
Column 1 Column 2
1 September 1939 Republic of Poland
9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway
9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark
10 May
1940 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
10 May
1940 Kingdom of Belgium
iO May
1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands
22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

III

CHARGE: Violation of Hague Convention III Relative to the

Opening of Hostilities, Signed 18 October 1907.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates
specified in Column 1, commence hostilities against the Countries
specified in Column 2, respectively, without previous warning in the
form of a reasoned declaration of war or an ultimatum with condi-
tional declaration of war.

Column 1 Column 2
1 September 1939 Republic of Poland
9April 1940 Kingdom of Norway
9April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark
10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium
10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands
10 May 1940 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

85
 IV
CHARGE: Violation of Hague Convention V Respecting the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War
on Land, signed 18 October 1907.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates
specified in Column 1, by force and arms of its military forces,
'

cross into, invade, and occupy the territories of the Sovereigns

specified in Column 2, respectively, then and thereby violating the
neutrality of said Sovereigns.

Column 1 Column 2
9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway
9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark
10 May1940 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
10 May1940 Kingdom of Belgium
10 May1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands
22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

V
vv CHARGE: Violation of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied
and Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles, 28 June
1919, known as the Versailles Treaty.

PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on and after 7 March

1936, maintain and assemble armed forces and maintain and con-
struct military fortifications in the demilitarized zone of the
Rhineland in violation of the provisions of Articles 42 to 44 of the
Treaty of Versailles.
(2) In that Germany did, on or about 13 March 1938, annex
Austria into the German Reich in violation of the provisions of
Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles.
(3) In that Germany did, on or about 22 March 1939, incorporate
the district of Memel into the German Reich in violation of the
provisions of Article 99 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(4) In that Germany did, on or about 1 September 1939, incor-

porate the Free City of Danzig into the German Reich in violation
of the provisions of Article 100 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(5) In that Germany did, on or about 16 March 1939, incorporate

the Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, formerly part of Czecho-
slovakia, into the German Reich in violation of the provisions of
Article 81 of the Treaty of Versailles.
(6) In that Germany did, at various times in March 1935 and
thereafter, repudiate various parts of Part V, Military, Naval, and
Air Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, by creating an air force,

an
by use of compulsory military service, by increasing the size of the
army beyond treaty limits, and by increasing the size of the navy
beyond treaty limits.

VI
CHARGE: Violation of the Treaty between the United States
and Germany Restoring Friendly Relations, signed at Berlin,
25 August 1921.

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, at various times in

March 1935 and thereafter, repudiate various parts of Part V,
Military, Naval, and Air Clauses of the Treaty between the United
States and Germany Restoring Friendly Relations by creating an
air force, by use of compulsory military service, by increasing the
size of the army beyond treaty limits, and by increasing the size
of the navy beyond treaty limits.

VII
CHARGE: Violation of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between
Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, done at
Locarno, 16 October 1925.
PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March
1936,unlawfully send armed forces into the Rhineland demilitarized
zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee.
(2) In that Germany did, in or about March 1936, and thereafter,
unlawfully maintain armed forces in the Rhineland demilitarized
zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1 of the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee.
(3) In that Germany did, on or about 7 March 1936, and there-
after, unlawfully construct and maintain fortifications in the
Rhineland demilitarized zone of Germany, in violation of Article 1
of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

(4) In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully

attackand invade Belgium, in violation of Article 2 of the Treaty of
Mutual Guarantee.
(5) Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940, unlawfully
In that
attack and invade Belgium, without first having attempted to settle
its dispute with Belgium by peaceful means, in violation of Article 3
of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

VIII
CHARGE: Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany
and Czechoslovakia, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925.

87
 PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 15 March
1939, unlawfully by duress and threats of military might force
Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of Czechoslovakia and its
inhabitants into the hands of the Führer and Reichschancellor of
Germany without having attempted to settle its dispute with
Czechoslovakia by peaceful means.

IX
CHARGE: Violation of the Arbitration Convention between
Germany and Belgium, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925.

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 10 May 1940,

unlawfully attack and invade Belgium without first having attemp-
ted to settle its dispute with Belgium by peaceful means.

X
CHARGE: Violation of the Arbitration Treaty between Germany
and Poland, done at Locarno, 16 October 1925.

PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 1 September

1939, unlawfully attack and invade Poland without first having
attempted to settle its dispute with Poland by peaceful means.

XI
CHARGE: Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Con-
ciliation entered into between Germany and the Netherlands on
20 May 1926.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and not-
withstanding its solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all dis-
putes of any nature whatever which might arise between it and the
Netherlands which were not capable of settlement by diplomacy and
which had not been referred by mutual agreement to the Permanent
Court of International Justice, did, on or about 10 May 1940, with
a military force, attack, invade, and occupy the Netherlands, thereby
violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and destroying its
sovereign independence.

XII
CHARGE: Violation of Convention of Arbitration and Con-
ciliation entered into between Germany and Denmark on 2 June 1926.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and not-
withstanding solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all
its
disputes of any nature whatever which might arise between it and
Denmark which were not capable of settlement by diplomacy and

88
which had not been referred by mutual agreement to the Per-
manent Court of International Justice, did, on or about 9 April 1940.
with a military force, attack, invade, and occupy Denmark, thereby
violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and destroying its
sovereign independence.

XIII
CHARGE: Violation of Treaty between Germany and other
Powers providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy, signed at Paris 27 August 1928, known as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about the dates
specified in Column 1, with a military force, attack the Sovereigns
specified in Column 2, respectively, and resort to war against such

Sovereigns, in violation of its solemn declaration condemning re-

course to war for the solution of international controversies, its
solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy
in its relations with such Sovereigns, and its solemn covenant that
settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature
or origin arising between it and such Sovereigns should never be
sought except by pacific means.

Column 1 Column 2
1 September 1939 Republic of Poland
9 April 1940 Kingdom of Norway
9 April 1940 Kingdom of Denmark
10 May 1940 Kingdom of Belgium
10 May 1940 Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
10 May 1940 Kingdom of the Netherlands
6 April 1941 Kingdom of Greece
6 April 1941 Kingdom of Yugoslavia
22 June 1941 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
11 December 1941 United States of America

XIV
CHARGE: Violation of Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation
entered into between Germany and Luxembourg on 11 September
1929.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and not-
withstanding its solemn covenant to settle by peaceful means all
disputes which might arise between it and Luxembourg which were
not capable of settlement by diplomacy, did, on or about 10 May
1940, with a military force, attack, invade, and occupy Luxem-
bourg, thereby violating its neutrality and territorial integrity and
destroying its sovereign independence.

89
 CHARGE: Violation of the Declaration of Non- Aggression en-
tered into between Germany and Poland on 26 January 1934.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany proceeding to the application
of force for the purpose of reaching a decision did, on or about
1 September 1939, at various places along the German-Polish fron-
tier employ military forces to attack, invade, and commit other
acts of aggression against Poland.

XVI
CHARGE: Violation of German Assurance given on 21 May 1935
that the Inviolability and Integrity of the Federal State of Austria
Would Be Recognized.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany did, on or about 11 March
1938, at various points and places along the German-Austria fron-
tier, with a military force and in violation of its solemn declaration
and assurance, invade and annex to Germany the territory of the
Federal State of Austria.
XVII
CHARGE: Violation of Austro-German Agreement of 11 July
1936.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany during
the period from
12 February 1938 to 13 March 1938
did by duress and various
aggressive acts, including the use of military force, cause the
Federal State of Austria to yield up its sovereignty to the German
State in violation of Germany's agreement to recognize the full
sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.

XVIII
CHARGE: Violation of German Assurances given on 30 Jan-
uary 1937, 28 April 1939, 26 August 1939, and 6 October 1939 To
Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Inviolability of the Nether-
lands.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and with-
out recourse to peaceful means of settling any considered differen-
ces did, on or about 10 May 1940, with a military force and in
violation of its solemn assurances, invade, occupy, and attempt to
subjugate the sovereign territory of the Netherlands.

XIX
CHARGE: Violation of German Assurances given on 30 January
1937, 13 October 1937, 28 April 1939, 26 August 1939, and 6 October
1939 To Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Integrity and In-
violability of Belgium,.

90
 PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, did on or
about 10 May 1940, with a military force and in violation of its
solemn assurances and declarations, attack, invade, and occupy the
sovereign territory of Belgium.

XX
CHARGE:Violation of Assurances given on 11 March 1938 and
26 September 1938 to Czechoslovakia.

PARTICULARS: In that Germany, on or about 15 March 1939

did, by establishing a Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia under
duress and by the threat of force, violate the assurance given on
11 March 1938 to respect the territorial integrity of the Czecho-
slovak Republic and the assurance given on 26 September 1938 that,
if the so-called Sudeten territories were ceded to Germany, no
further German territorial claims on Czechoslovakia would be made.

XXI
CHARGE: Violation oj the Munich Agreement and Annexes of
29 September 1938.
PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany on or about 15 March 1939,
did by duress and the threat of military intervention force the
Republic of Czechoslovakia to deliver the destiny of the Czech
people and country into the hands of the Führer of the German
Reich.
(2) In that Germany refused and failed to join in an international
guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovakia state as
provided for in Annex No. 1 to the Munich Agreement.

XXII
CHARGE : Violation oj the Solemn Assurances of Germany
given on September 1939, 28 April 1939, and 6 October 1939 Not
3
To Violate the Independence or Sovereignty of the Kingdom of
Norway.
PARTICULARS In that Germany, without warning did, on or
:

about 9 April 1940, with its military and naval forces attack, invade,
and commit other acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Norway.

XXIII
CHARGE: Violation of German Assurances given on 28 April
1939 and 26 August 1939 To Respect the Neutrality and Territorial
Inviolability ofLuxembourg.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany, without warning, and with-
out recourse to peaceful means of settling any considered differen-
ces, did, on or about 10 May 1940, with a military force and in

91
violation of the solemn assurances, invade, occupy, and absorb into
Germany the sovereign territory of Luxembourg.

XXIV
CHARGE: Violation of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between
Germany and Denmark, signed at Berlin, 31 May 1939.
PARTICULARS: In that Germany without prior warning, did,
on or about 9 April 1940, with its military forces, attack, invade,
and commit other acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Den-
mark.

XXV
CHARGE: Violation of Treaty of Non-Aggression entered into
between Germany and U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939.
PARTICULARS: (1) In that Germany did, on or about 22 June
1941, employ military forces to attack and commit acts of aggression
against the U.S.S.R.
(2) In that Germany without warning or recourse to a friendly
exchange of views or arbitration did, on or about 22 June 1941,
employ military forces to attack and commit acts of aggression
against the U.S.S.R.

XXVI
CHARGE: Violation of German Assurance given on 6 October
1939 To Respect the Neutrality and Territorial Integrity of Yugo-
slavia.

PARTICULARS: In that Germany without prior warning did,

on or about 6 April 1941, with its military forces attack, invade,
and commit other acts of aggression against the Kingdom of Yugo-
slavia.

92
 MOTION OF THE PROSECUTION
FOR CORRECTING DISCREPANCIES
IN THE INDICTMENT*

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GORING, et al. 5

Defendants.
Motion as to Amendment of the Indictment
To The Honorable Tribunal:
WHEREAS
(1) Certain discrepancies (as set out in the attached schedule)
have been discovered in the Indictment, as between the English,
French, Russian, and German texts thereof;
(2) The Indictment was lodged with the Tribunal in English,
French, and Russian, each text having equal authenticity.
(3) The Indictment was served on the defendants in the Ger-
man language only;
respectfully submits the following MOTION:
The Prosecution
That the Tribunal direct that the discrepancies in the Indict-
ment specified in the attached schedule be rectified as between the
respective texts of the Indictment by making the English, French,
and Russian texts conform to the German text in each of the specified
cases so far as the sense of the context permits.

/ s / ROBERT H. JACKSON
For the Government of the United States of America.
/ s / CHAMPETIER DE RIBES
Per CH. DUBOST
For the Provisional Government of France.
/ s / DAVID MAXWELL FYFE
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland.
/ s / R. RUDENKO
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.
4th June, 1946.
* This motion was accepted by the Court at a meeting of the International Military Tribunal,
7 June 1946.

93
 PLEAS OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
All individual defendants, with the exception of MARTIN BOR-
MANN who could not be located, in effect pleaded not guilty to
the Indictment. The plea of ERNST KALTENBRUNNER was entered
10 December 1945; the pleas of the other defendants, 21 November
1945.

94
 LETTER OF RESERVATION
BY THE UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR
IN REGARD TO WORDING OF THE INDICTMENT

6 October 1945
M. François de Menthon,
Sir Hartley Shawcross.
General R. A. Rudenko.
Dear Sirs:
In the Indictment of German War Criminals signed today, ref-
erence is made to Estonia, Latvia. Lithuania, and certain other
territories as being within the area of the U.S.S.R. This language
is proposed by Russia and is accepted to avoid the delay which

would be occasioned by insistence on an alteration in the text. The

Indictment is signed subject to this reservation and understanding:
I have no authority either to admit or to challenge on behalf

of the United States of America, Soviet claims to sovereignty over

such territories. Nothing, therefore, in this Indictment is to be
construed as a recognition by the United States of such sovereignty
or as indicating any attitude, either on the part of the United
States or on the part of the undersigned, toward any claim to re-
cognition of such sovereignty.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON,
Chief of Counsel for the
United States.

To the Clerk or Recording Officer,

International Military Tribunal:
The representative of the United States has found it necessary
to make certain reservations as to the possible bearing of certain
language in the Indictment upon political questions which are con-
sidered to be irrelevant to the proceedings before this Tribunal.
However, it is considered appropriate to disclose such reservations
that they may not be unknown to the Tribunal in the event they
should at any time be considered relevant. For that purpose, the
foregoing copy is filed.

/s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON

95
 ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL
REGARDING NOTICE
TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al.
Defendants.

The International Military Tribunal for the trial of the major

war criminals having been duly constituted and an indictment
having been lodged with the Tribunal by the Chief Prosecutors,
in order to make fair provision for notice to* defendants:
IT IS ORDERED that each individual defendant in custody shall
receive, not less than 30 days before trial, a copy, translated into
a language which he understands, of the documents set out in para-
graph (a) of Rule 2 of the Rules of the Tribunal, in accordance
with the terms of that paragraph.
Form of Notice to Individual Defendants
To the Defendants above named:
You and each of you is hereby notified that an indictment has
been filed against you in the International Military Tribunal. A
copy of this indictment and of the Charter constituting the Inter-
national Military Tribunal are attached hereto. Your trial will
take place at the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, Germany, not less
than 30 days from the service of the indictment upon you. The
exact date will be made known to you later. Your attention is
specifically directed to your right to counsel under Article 23 and
Article 16 of the Charter and Rule 2 (d) of the Tribunal, a copy of
which and a list of counsel are attached hereto for your infor-
mation.
An officer has been designated by the Tribunal to deliver this
Notice and accompanying documents to you and to confer with
you with respect to the employment and designation of counsel.

For the International Military Tribunal

(no signature)
General Secretary

96
 ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL
REGARDING NOTICE TO MEMBERS
OF GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GORING, et al.,

Defendants.

WHEREAS an indictment has been lodged with this Tribunal

against the above named defendants:
AND WHEREAS such indictment shows that the Chief Prosecu-
tors intend to ask this Tribunal:

(1) to find that certain of the defendants were members of DIE

REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS KORPS DER
POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN
DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF
THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONAL-
SOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly
known as the "SS"), and including DER SICHERHEITSDIENST
(commonly known as the "SD"); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI
(SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the "GESTAPO");
DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NSDAP (commonly known
as the "SA"); and the GENERAL STAFF and the HIGH COM-
MAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES, and
(2) to declare that said groups and organizations were criminal
organizations

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that notice shall be given to the

members of such groups and organizations in the following form
and manner:

97
 (a) Form of Notice

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GORING. RUDOLF HESS. JOACHIM
VON RIBBENTROP. ROBERT LEY. WILHELM KEITEL. ERNST
KALTENBRUNNER. ALFRED ROSENBERG. HANS FRANK.
WILHELM FRICK. JULIUS STREICHER. WALTER FUNK.
HJALMAR SCHACHT. GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND
HALBACH. KARL DÖNITZ. ERICH RAEDER. BALDUR VON
SCHIRACH. FRITZ SAUCKEL. ALFRED JODL. MARTIN BOR-
MANN. FRANZ VON PAPEN. ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART.
ALBERT SPEER. CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH, and HANS
FRITZSCHE. Individually and as Members of Any of the Follow-
ing Groups or Organizations to Which They Respectively Belong.
Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET): DAS
~

KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIA-

LISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP
CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY): DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
(commonly known as the "'SS") and including DER SICHERHEITS-
DIENST (commonly known as the "SD"); DIE GEHEIME STAATS-
POLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the
-GESTAPO"): DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NSDAP (com-
monly known as the SA"): and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH
COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES.
Defendants.

Notice is hereby given to all members of the following groups

and organizations:
1. Die Reichsregierung, consisting of persons who were:
a) Members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 January 1933.
The term "ordinary cabinet" as used herein means the
Reich Ministers; i. e.. heads of departments of the central
government; Reich Ministers without portfolio; State
ministers acting as Reich Ministers: and other officials
entitled to take part in meetings of this cabinet.
b) Members of Der Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung.
c) Members of Der Geheime Kabinettsrat.

93
2. Das Korps der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen
Deutschen Arbeiterpartei, consisting of persons who were' at
any time, according to common Nazi terminology, Politische
Leiter of any grade or rank.
3. Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SS) and consisting
of the entire corps of the SS and all offices, departments,
services, agencies, branches, formations, organizations and
groups of which it was at any time comprised or which at
any time integrated in it, including but not limited to, the
Allgemeine SS, the Waffen SS, the SS Totenkopf Verbände,
SS Polizei Regimenter and the Sicherheitsdienst des Reichs-
führers-SS (commonly known as the SD).
4. Die Geheime Staatspolizei (commonly known as the Gestapo)
consisting of the headquarters, departments, offices, branches,
and all the forces and personnel of the Geheime Staats-
polizei Prussia and equivalent secret or political police
of
forces of the Reich and the components thereof.
5. Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiterpartei (commonly known as the SA).
6. The General Staff and High Command of the German Armed
Forces, consisting of those individuals who between
February 1938 and May 1945 were the highest commanders
of the Wehrmacht, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces.
The individuals comprising this group are the persons who
held the following appointments:
Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander-in-Chief of
the Navy)
Chef (and, formerly, Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung
(Chief of Naval War Staff)

Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres (Commander-in-Chief of the

Army)
Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe (Chief of the Generai
Staff of the Air Force)
Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Commander-in-Chief of the
Air Force)
Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Chief of the High
Command of the Armed Forces)
Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
(Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the
Armed Forces)
Commanders-in-Chief in the field, with the status of Ober-
befehlshaber of the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air Force.

99
 THAT such groups and organizations are accused by the Chief
Prosecutors for the prosecution of major war criminals of being
criminal organizations and this Tribunal has been asked by the
Chief Prosecutors to declare said groups and organizations criminal
THAT if any of such groups and organizations are found by

this Tribunal to have been criminal in character members will be

subject to trial and punishment on account of their membership
in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of this Tribunal
and upon any such trial the criminal character of the group or
organization shall be considered proved and shall not be questioned.
THAT the issue of the criminal character of these groups and
organizations will be tried commencing the 20th day of November
1945 at the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, Germany.
THAT any person who acknowledges membership in any of the
said groups or organizations may
be entitled to apply to the Tri-
bunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of
the criminal character of the group or organization. Such ap-
plication shall be made without delay, in writing, and addressed
to the General Secretary. International Military Tribunal, Nurem-
berg, Germany.
THAT in the case of members of any of the said groups or
organizations who
(i) may be in the custody of the prosecuting powers, such appli-
cations shall be handed to the Commanding Officer of the
place where the said members are detained;
(ii) may not be in custody, such applications shall be handed to
the nearest military unit.
THAT the Tribunal has powerto allow or reject any such
application. If the application allowed, the Tribunal will direct
is
in what manner the applicant shall be represented and heard.
THAT nothing contained in this notice shall be construed to
confer immunity of any kind upon such applicants.

For the International Military Tribunal

(no signature)
General Secretary

(b) Manner of Notice

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED:
THAT publication in the German language be made throughout
the zones of occupation in Germany over the radio, in newspapers
and, if practicable, by the form of postings ordinarily employed by
the military authorities in conveying information to the civilian
population. Such radio and newspaper publications shall be made

100
once a week for four weeks and over a sufficient number of radio
stations, in a sufficient number of newspapers or by posting in a
sufficient number places to give the widest possible dissemi-
of
nation throughout the occupied territory of the notice set forth in
paragraph (a) above.
THAT publication in the German language be made wherever
practicable in the prisoner of war camps in which Germans are
imprisoned, in such manner as the officers commanding such camps
may decide.
The appropriate occupation authorities are requested to
cooperate with the General Secretary of the International Military
Tribunal in making this publication and the General Secretary
shall make written report to the Tribunal of the action taken.

101
 ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL
REGARDING NOTICE TO DEFENDANT BORMANN
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GORING, et al.,

Defendants.

The International Military Tribunal having been duly constituted

and an indictment having been lodged with the Tribunal by the
Chief Prosecutors
AND one of the defendants, Martin Bormann, not having been
found
IT IS ORDERED that notice be given said Martin Bormann in
the following form and manner:

(a) Form of Notice

Take Notice:
Martin Bormann is charged with having committed Crimes
against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity all as
particularly set forth in an indictment which has been lodged with
this Tribunal.
The indictment is available at the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg,
Germany.
If Martin Bormann appears, he is entitled to be heard in person
or by counsel.
If he fails to appear, he may be tried in his absence, commenc-
ing November 20, 1945 at the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, Ger-
many, and if found guilty the sentence pronounced upon him will,
without further hearing, and subject to the orders of the Control
Council for Germany, be executed whenever he is found.

By order of
The International Military Tribunal
(no signature)
General Secretary

102
 (b) Manner of Notice

This notice shall be read in full once a week for four weeks
over the radio, the first reading to be during the week of October
22, 1945. It shall also be published in four separate issues of a
newspaper circulated in the home city of Martin Bormann.
The Orders and Forms of Notice above set forth have been
adopted by the International Military Tribunal.

1st GEOFFREY LAWRENCE

President
October 18, 1945

Attest: Is/ HAROLD B. WILLEY

General Secretary

103
 CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE
WITH ORDERS OF THE TRIBUNAL
REGARDING NOTICE TO MEMBERS OF GROUPS
AND ORGANIZATIONS AND TO DEFENDANT
BORMANN
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GORING, et al.,

Defendants.

Declaration
I, Richard William Huristone Hortin, a Major in H. M. Army
serving with the Control Commission for Germany (British Element)
at Berlin, solemnly *and sincerely declare as follows —
1. I make this Declaration in my capacity of Berlin Secretary

of the International Military Tribunal.

2. Pursuant to the order of the International Military Tribunal
as to publication of Notice No. 1 as to Nazi Organisations, I served
a copy of the said notice on each of the four Allied Secretariats; at
the same time I served on the four Allied Secretariats a copy of
the said order and. a copy of the order of the International Military
Tribunal as to Martin Bormann. Service was effected by delivery
by me personally of the said notice and orders to duly authorised
persons of the said Allied Secretariats.
The order as to Martin Bormann states that publication must
be made in four separate issues of a newspaper circulated in the
home city of Martin Bormann. After full enquiries I ascertained
that the last known place of residence of Martin Bormann was
Berlin. A former place of residence was Mecklenburg. It was also
believed that the birthplace was Halberstadt. I gave these details
to the Soviet Secretariat. I also arranged for publication in Berlin
newspapers and on the radio. Newspaper circulation in the Russian
Zone normally extends to both Halberstadt and Mecklenburg.
3. As a result of careful enquiries I ascertained that a reasonable

number of notices for the whole of the four Zones would be 200,000

104
and, in consultation with the Legal Division of the Office of the
Military Government for Germany (United States) and with the
French and Soviet Allied Secretariats, I arranged for the printing
of this number of notices. At the same time I arranged for the
printing of a similar number of notices to Martin Bormann. These
two notices were both printed on the same sheet of paper and a
copy is annexed hereto and marked "Exhibit I".
9,000 of these notices were distributed by me to the appropriate
and American Sectors, namely
officers in the French, Soviet, British
2,500 each for the American and Soviet Sectors and 2,000 each for
the French and British Sectors. I am informed, and verily believe,
that these notices were posted and exhibited in public places before
midnight of the 27th October, 1945. 1,000 copies were retained by
me as a reserve to be handed to Military authorities in the four
Zones for reading and posting in P.O.W. Camps.
4. As to the remaining 190,000 of the said notices, 50,000 were

handed personally by me to the Bureau of Information of the

Soviet Military Administration in Germany. I arranged for the
delivery of 50,000 to the Public Relations Branch of Control Com-
mission for Germany (British Element) at Lübeck, Germany. I have
made full and continuous enquiries and I am informed and verily
believe that these notices were immediately distributed throughout
the British Zone and through the channels which ensure the widest
possible distribution.
I am informed by the Legal Division of the Office of Military
Government for Germany (United States) that as previously
arranged with me, they delivered 40,000 copies to the French
Authorities at Baden-Baden. I am also informed by them and verily
believe that the remaining 50,000 notices were handed by them to
the appropriate United States Authorities for distribution through
their Zone.
5. During the period October 20th to November 17th 1945 there

have been four weekly publications in each of the four Zones of

Germany of the said two notices in newspapers and over radio
stations. The American, Soviet and British newspapers in Berlin
have also carried the notices. Furthermore, in pursuance of the
order of the International Military Tribunal, the said notices were
handed to the appropriate Military Authorities of each of the four
Zones for reading in Prisoner-of-War Camps and for such other
form of publication as local Commanders might think proper within
their own discretion.
6. Exhibits II, III and IV which are attached hereto, and marked
by me, are certificates by the appropriate American, French and
Soviet Authorities that the requirements of the said two orders
of the International Military Tribunal have been fulfilled.

105
 As to the British Zone, I have ascertained by enquiries from
the said Public Relations Branch of the Control Commission for
Germany (British Element) that the two notices have been widely
distributed and publicised through the channels most appropriate
for the purpose as stated in paragraph 4 of this my declaration.
Furthermore I have similarly ascertained that appropriate action
has been taken by British Military Authorities for reading and
posting in Prisoner-of-War Camps wherever practicable.
"Exhibit V" attached hereto and marked by me is a certificate
as to publication of thetwo notices in newspapers and on the radio
in Berlin and in the British Zone of occupation.
7. I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the

same to be true, and I declare that the information which I give

therein has been obtained by me through official sources and from
those persons whose duty it is to give such official information.

/ s / R. W. H. HORTIN
Major"

Declared by the above-named

Richard William Huristone Hortin
This 17th day of November 1945
In my presence:

/ s / R. O. WILBERFORCE
Brigadier,
Deputy Chief,
Legal Division,
C. C. G. (B. E.).

106
 BEKANNTMACHUNGEN
INTERNATIONALER MILITÄR-GERICHTSHOF 99
(TQ >ö

Nr.l
DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA, DIE FRANZÖSISCHE von Preußen und aus gleichen geheimen und politischen Polizeikräf-
REPUBLIK, DAS VEREINIGTE KÖNIGREICH VON GROSSBRITANNIEN ten des Reiches und seiner einzelnen Teile zusammensetzte.

UND NORD-IRLAND UND DIE UNION DER SOZIALISTISCHEN SOWJET- 5.Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-
partei (allgemein als die „SA" bekannt).
REPUBLIKEN
GEGEN 6 Der Generalstab und das Oberkommando der deutschen Wehrmacht,
die sich aus jenen Personen zusammensetzte, die zwischen Februar
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM von RIBBEN-
1938 und Mai 1945 die obersten Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, des
TROP, ROBERT LEY,WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, AL- Heeres, der Kriegsmarine und der Luftwaffe waren. Die Personen, aus
FRED ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREI- denen" diese Gruppe bestand, sind diejenigen Personen, die folgende
CHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP von Befehle innehatten:
BOHLEN und HALBACH, KARL DÖNITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR von Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine,
SCHIRACH, FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, Chef (früher Chef des Stabes) der Seekriegsleitung,
FRANZ von PAPEN, AJRTUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER, CON- Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres,
STANTIN von NEURATH und HANS FRITZSCHE, als Einzelpersonen so- Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe,
wie als Mitglieder irgendwelcher der folgenden Gruppen oder Organisa- Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe,
tionen, denen sie etwa angehören, nämlich: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG, DAS Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht,
KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht,
DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI, DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN' DER NATIO- Oberbefehlshaber im Felde mit dem Rang eines Oberbefehlshabers der
NALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (allgemein als Wehrmacht, der Kriegsmarine, des Heeres, der Luftwaffe.
die „SS" bekannt) und einschließlich des SICHERHEITSDIENSTES (all- DASS solche Gruppen und Organisationen von den Hauptanklägern
für die Verfolgung von Hauptkriegsverbrechern angeklagt werden, ver-
gemein als der „SD" bekannt), der GEHEIMEN STAATSPOLIZEI (allge- brecherische Organisationen zu sein, und daß dieser Gerichtshof von den
mein als „GESTAPO" bekannt), der STURMABTEILUNGEN DER N.S.D.A.P. Hauptanklägern beauftragt worden ist, die genannten Gruppen und Orga-
(allgemein als die „SA" bekannt) und des GENERALSTABES und des nisationen als verbrecherische zu erklären.
OBERKOMMANDOS DER DEUTSCHEN WEHRMACHT, und zwar alle DASS, falls irgendwelche solcher Gruppen und Organisationen vor
laut näheren Angaben in Anhang B. diesem Gerichtshof als verbrecherisch im Charakter befunden werden
sollten, die Mitglieder auf Grund ihrer Zugehörigkeit gemäß den Be-
DIE ANGEKLAGTEN. stimmungen des Charters dieses Gerichtshofs gerichtlicher Verfolgung und
Allen Mitgliedern der folgenden Gruppen und Organisationen wird hier- Bestrafung unterliegen, und bei jedwedem Gerichtsverfahren der ver-
mit bekanntgegeben:
brecherische Charakter der Gruppe oder Organisation als erwiesen an-
1. Die Reichsregierung, die sich aus Personen zusammensetzte, die gesehen und nicht in Frage gestellt werden soll.
a) Mitglieder des ordentlichen Kabinetts, nach dem 30. Januar 1933 DASS die Frage des verbrecherischen Charakters dieser Gruppen und
waren'; Die Bezeichnung „ordentliches Kabinett", wie hier ge- Organisationen im Gerichtsverfahren, das am 20. Tage des Novembers
braucht, umschließt die Reichsminister, d. h. die Abteilungsvorstände 1945 im Jusüzpalast zu Nürnberg in Deutschland beginnt, untersucht
der Zentralregierung. Reichsminister ohne Portefeuille, Staatsmini- werden wird.
ster als stellvertretende Reichsminister, und andere Beamte, die zur DASS jede Person, die sich als Mitglied irgendeiner der genannten
Teilnahme an Kabinettsitzungen berechtigt sind. Gruppen oder Organisationen bekennt, berechtigt ist, den Gerichtshof um
b) Mitglieder des Ministerrates für die Reichsverteidigung Erlaubnis zu ersuchen, von dem Gerichtshof in bezug auf die Frage des
waren.
verbrecherischen Charakters der betreffenden Gruppe oder Organisation
c)Mitglieder des Geheimen Kabinettsrates waren.
gehört zu werden. Derartige Gesuche müssen unverzüglich schriftlich ein-
2. Das Korps 'der Politischen Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen gereicht und an den Generalsekretär des Internationalen MUitärgerichts-
Arbeiterpartei, welches sich aus Personen zusammensetzte, die zu hofes in Nürnberg, Deutschland, gerichtet werden.
irgendeinem Zeitpunkte im Sinne der üblichen nazistischen Termino-
DASS im Falle von Mitgliedern irgendwelcher der genannten Gruppen
logie politische Leiter irgendwelchen Ranges oder Grades
waren. oder Organisationen, die
3. Die Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen
Arbeiter- i) sich in der Haft der verfolgenden Mächte befinden sollten, solche
partei (allgemein als die „SS" bekannt), die sich
aus dem gesamten Gesuche dem befehlshabenden Offizier des Ortes, wo die genann-
Korps der SS und allen Stellen, Abteilungen, Dienststellen, ten Mitglieder sich in Haft befinden, übergeben werden sollen:
Vertretun-
gen, Zweigstellen, Verbänden, Organisationen
und Gruppen zu- ii) sich nicht in Haft befinden sollten, solche Gesuche der nächsten
sammensetzten, aus denen es zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkte bestand, oder
Militärstelle übergeben werden sollen.
die zu irgendeinem Zeitpunkte in ihr verkörpert
waren, einschließlich DASS der Gerichtshof ermächtigt ist, jedem derartigen Gesuch stattzu-
der Allgemeinen SS, der Waffen-SS, der SS Totenkopf-
Verbände, der geben oder es abzuweisen. Falls dem Gesuch stattgegeben wird, wird der
SS Polizeiregimenter und des Sicherheitsdienstes des Reichsführers
SS Gerichtshof anordnen, in welcher Weise der Gesuchsteller vertreten und
(allgemein als der „SD" bekannt), aber nicht nur auf diese beschränkt.
gehört werden soll.
4. Die Geheime Staatspolizei (allgemein als die „Gestapo" bekannt), DASS diese Bekanntmachung unter keinen Umständen so ausgelegt
die
sich aus den Hauptquartieren, Abteilungen, Büros, Zweigstellen werden darf, daß sie einem derartigen Gesuchsteller Straflosigkeit irgend-
und
allen Mannschaften und allem Personal der Geheimen welcher Art verleiht.
Staatspolizei

FÜR DEN INTERNATIONALEN MILITÄR-GERICHTSHOF

HAROLD B. WILLEY, GENERALSEKRETÄR

INTERNATIONALER MILITÄR-GERICHTSHOF
BEKANNTMACHUNG
Martin BORMANN ist angeklagt, Verbrechen gegen den Frieden, Kriegs- Martin BORMANN, sollte er auftauchen, hat das Recht, selbst gehört
verbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschheit begangen zu haben, oder von seinem Rechtsvertreter verteidigt zu werden.
Sollte er nicht erscheinen, so kann sein Fall vom 20. November 1945 an
wie sie in der Anklageschrift, die bei diesem Gerichtshof niedergelegt ist,
in seiner Abwesenheit im Justizpalast in Nürnberg, Deutschland, ver-
aufgezählt sind. handelt werden. Sollte er als schuldig befunden werden, so wird das
Die Anklageschrift kann im Justizpalast in Nürnberg, Deutschland, ein- Urteil gemäß den Befehlen der Kontroll-Kommission für Deutschland ohne
weitere Verhandlung an ihm vollstreckt werden, nachdem er gefunden
gesehen werden
worden ist.

AUF BEFEHL DES INTERNATIONALEN MILITÄR-GERICHTSHOFES

DER GENERALSEKRETÄR HAROLD B. WILLEY
 Exhibit II. Dissemination in the American Zone

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al.,

Defendants.

Certificate

I hereby certify that at the request of the above entitled tri-

bunal, through Harold B. Willey, General Secretary, I have per-

formed the following services in connection with publication, broad-
cast and posting of notices in the above entitled cause under order
of the above entitled tribunal issued at Nuremberg. Germany, on
or about 18 October 1945:
1. In cooperation with Major R. W. H. Hortin, Legal Division,

Advance Headquarters, Control Commission for Germany (British

Element), Berlin, on or about 23 October 1945, I arranged for the
initial printing of 10,000 copies of the attached notice by the
Ullstein Press, Berlin (Exhibit "F). On 26 October 1945 I personally
took delivery of 2,500 of the said notices and delivered them to
Major E. K. Neumann, Chief Public Safety Officer, U. S. Head-
quarters, Berlin District, for posting in the U.S. Zone of Berlin.
Major Neumann's indorsement to basic letter dated 27 October 1945
is attached as Exhibit 'TIA". From my personal knowledge the
posters were posted throughout the U.S. Zone, Berlin, as stated
by Major Neumann. The remaining 7,500 posters of the original
10,000 were delivered to Major Hortin for posting in the British,
Soviet, and French sectors of Berlin. To my personal knowledge
they were so posted.
2. On or about 26 October 1945
I arranged for the publication

of 190,000 additional posters. Ninety thousand of these were per-

sonally delivered to me on 31 October 1945, and by me shipped to
the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone, Frankfurt, Germany,
for posting in the U.S. Zone and the delivery of 40,000 to Headquar-
ters, French Military Government at Baden-Baden, Germany, for
posting in the French Zone. A copy of the cable of instruction sent
to Headquarters, Office of Military Government, U. S. Zone, is
attached and marked Exhibit 'TIB".

107
 3. To my personal knowledge the Office of Information Control

Service, Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.), (Lt. Col.
R. K. Fried, Executive Officer), relayed the attached notice to all
German language newspapers and radio stations operating in the
U. S. Zone with instructions
and broadcast same as directed
to print
in the Tribunal's order. A
further certificate of compliance with
this provision of the Tribunal's order will be made by the Office
of Information Control upon expiration of the fourth week on
17 November 1945.

Dated at Berlin, Germany, this 15th day of November 1945.

/ s / ALEXANDER G. BROWN, 0-912504,

Lt. Colonel, AUS-AC,
Legal Division, Office of Military
Government for Germany (U. S.)

/ s / R. W. H. HORTIN
Major

Exhibit II A. Dissemination in the American Zone

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U. S.)

Legal Division
APO 742
27 October 1945

SUBJECT: Posting of International Military Tribunal Posters.

TO : Public Safety Division, U.S. Headquarters, Berlin District
(Major Neumann).
requested that necessary action be taken to post 2,500
1. It is

copies of the two orders of the International Military Tribunal in

the case of Hermann Wilhelm Göring et al. in the U.S. Sector of
Berlin on or before 1800 hours, 27 October 1945.
2. The Legal Division, Office of Military Government for Ger-
many (U.S.) requests that a report be made at your earliest con-
venience advising as to the posting as requested in par. 1.

3. This request is in confirmation of arrangements previously

made by Major Neumann and Lt. Col. Alexander G. Brown
(76 X6110), this headquarters.

/ s / Charles Fahy
Director

108
 1st Ind.

U.S.Hq.B.D. & OMG, P.S., APO 755, U.S. Army,

Hq. F.A.A., 31 Oct 45.
TO : Legal Division, OMGGUS, APO 742.
1. Pursuant to request 2,500 copies of the two orders of the

International Military Tribunal in the case of Hermann Wilhelm

Göring et al. were posted in the U.S. Sector of Berlin before 1800
hrs, 27 October 1945.

2. Said orders were on said date and before said hour posted

upon bulletin boards and in other conspicuous places, to the

approximate number of 435, in each of the six VBKs, namely
Steglitz,Zehlendorf, Kreuzberg, Tempelhof, Schöneberg, Neukölln,
which constitute the U.S. Sector of Berlin.

I si E. K. NEUMANN
Major, A. C.
Chief Public Safety Officer

Exhibit II B. Dissemination in the American Zone

HQ. U.S. GROUP C.C.

A.G. CABLES
OUTGOING MESSAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
PRIORITY
TO : LEGAL BRANCH, OMGUS ZONE
FROM : OMGGUS FROM FAHY SIGNED CLAY
INFO : INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
NUREMBERG

REFNO : CC-18221 TOO: 291200 B Oct 45 em

Legal Division, OMGGUS, at request of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal, Nuremberg, has arranged for the printing of 100,000
copies of official notice to defendants. Shipment of approximately
this number by air priority will be made to OMGGUS
Zone as
soon as they are printed, probably Thursday. It is desired that
one half of the shipment be relayed by OMGGUS Zone, to Head-
quarters, French Military Government, Baden-Baden. Court has
directed that the notices be posted on official bulletin boards
throughout US Zone and read and posted in all prisoner of war

109
camps. Similar distribution has been ordered in other zones in Ger-
many. Request Legal Branch, OMGGUS Zone, take necessary action
to insure immediate relay of posters to the French and immediate
distribution to military detachments throughout US Zone with
instruction that they shall be posted within 24 hours of receipt.
Distribution by OMGGUS Zone, to include Bremen Enclave, but
not Berlin District. Distribution in Berlin District made direct by
Legal Division, OMGGUS. Request that regional military govern-
ment detachments report through Legal Branch, OMGGUS Zone,
to Harold B. Willey, General Secretary, International Military
Tribunal, Nuremberg, upon compliance with posting of notices as
directed, and that a copy of such report be forwarded to Legal
Division, OMGGUS.

ORIGINATOR: Legal AUTH: F. H. GORDON

Major
INFORMATION: O/SS, Pub Relations, AG Records.
CC 18221 30 Oct 45 JAK/tb 0444B

UNCLASSIFIED

Exhibit II C. Dissemination in the American Zone

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,

THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al.,
Defendants.

Certificate

I hereby certify that acting on instruction from Lieut. Colonel

Raymond K. Fried I have performed the following services or have
been informed of the following facts in connection with the publica-
tion and broadcast of notices in the above entitled cause under order
of the above titled tribunal issued at Nuremberg, Germany, on or
about 18 October. 1945:

110
 1. caused to be transmitted to the DANA news service in Bad
I

Nauheim copies of the attached notices to Martin Bormann and to

members of certain organizations (Exhibit I) with instructions that
these notices were to be published in German language news-
papers in the United States Zone of Germany and the United
States Sector of Berlin, and broadcast over radio stations in the
United States Zone.
2. Through the Radio Section of Information Control Division,
European Theater, I have been informed that the above
U.S. Forces,
mentioned notices were broadcast three times each between Octo-
ber 26 and November 8, 1945 (Exhibit II D).
3. Through the DANA news service and through personal
observation I have learned that copies of the above mentioned

notices were printed in German language newspapers in the United

States Zone and the United States sector of Berlin between
18 October and 17 November 1945.

Dated at Berlin, Germany, this 23rd day of November 1945.

I si HOWARD DENBY
Press Control News Unit (Berlin)
Information Control Division
United States Forces, European
Theater

Exhibit II D. Dissemination in the American Zone

SUBJECT: War Crimes Indictments.
TO : Colonel Murphy.

The general indictment of the 24 defendants and the Nazi

1.

was broadcast at 2015 on October 26, November 3

organizations
and November 8.
2. The Bormann to the effect that he would be
notification to
tried in absentia he did not appear personally for trial was
if

broadcast at 2000 hours October 26, November 2 and November 8.

3. All of these broadcasts originated at Luxembourg and were
relayed by Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart.

I si GERALD F. MAULSBY
Chief, Radio Section

111
 Exhibit III A. Dissemination in the French Zone

COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF FRANÇAIS EN ALLEMAGNE-

GOUVERNEMENT MILITAIRE Baden-Baden, 23 November 1945

DE LA
ZONE FRANÇAISE Counsellor Furby
D'OCCUPATION Director General of Justice
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE Representative in Germany for
de la the Search of War Criminals
JUSTICE to
Le Directeur Général
The Delegate of the
Provisional Government of the
French Republic of the
Prosecution of the
International Military Tribunal
of the Major War Criminals

I certify that at the date of the 21st November 1945 the notice

concerning the trial by the International Military Tribunal of the

issue of the criminal character of certain organizations had been
published in the German language in the French Zone of Occupa-
tion over the radio and newspapers at least once a week for two
weeks, and that this publication will be continued for another two
weeks over the one radio station of the French Zone (Koblenz)
and in twelve German papers to give the widest possible dissemina-
tion throughout the French Zone.

I was also published by the form

further certify that this notice
of postings ordinarily employed by the military authorities in con-
veying information to the civilian population.
I further certify that this notice has been delivered to the
appropriate French authorities in charge of prisoners of war for
publication in the German language wherever practicable in pris-
oner of war camps in which Germans are imprisoned, in such manner
as the officers commanding such camps may decide.

The Director General of Justice

Representative in Germany for the
Search of War Criminals,
(Seal) s FURBY

112
 Exhibit III B. Dissemination in the French Zone
COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF FRANÇAIS EN ALLEMAGNE
GOUVERNEMENT MILITAIRE Baden-Baden, 23 November 1945
DE LA
ZONE FRANÇAISE Counsellor Furby
D'OCCUPATION Director General of Justice
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE Representative in Germany for
de la the Search of War Criminals
JUSTICE to
Le Directeur Général
The Delegate of the
Provisional Government of the
French Republic of the
Prosecution of the
International Military Tribunal
of the Major War Criminals

Certificate to General Secretary

I certify that at the date of the 21st November 1945 the notice
to Martin Bormann that he is charged with having committed
Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as
set forth in an indictment which has been lodged with this Tribunal,
had been published in the German language in the French Zone of
Occupation over the radio and newspapers at least once a week for
two weeks, the first publication having been made during the week
beginning October the 12th, and that this publication will be con-
tinued for another two weeks over the one radio station of the
French Zone (Koblenz) and in twelve German papers to give the
widest possible dissemination throughout the French Zone.
The Director General of Justice
Representative in Germany for the
Search of War Criminals,
(Seal) / s / FURBY

Exhibit IV A. Dissemination in the Russian Zone

General Secretary,
The International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg.
Certificate

I hereby certify that announcement of the trial, by the Inter-

national Military Tribunal of the criminal case of certain organi-

113
zations was duly published in German in the Soviet Zone of occu-
pation in Germany in all the newspapers under our control namely:
"Tägliche Rundschau", "Berliner Zeitung", "Deutsche Volkszeitung",
"Neue Zeit", "Der Morgen", "Das Volk", (all published in Berlin),
"Volksstimme", "Volkszeitung", "Thüringer Volkszeitung", "Volks-
blatt" and "Sächsische Volksstimme" (all published in the provinces).
The publication was repeated weekly beginning 22nd October
1945. In addition it was broadcast weekly over the Berlin radio.
Furthermore I certify that this announcement was posted in bill
form.

Chief of Information Bureau,

Soviet Military Administration in Germany

/s/ I. TUGARINOV
14 November 1945
17/11/45 A. KUDROV / s /

Exhibit IV B. Dissemination in the Russian Zone

General Secretary,
The International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg.

Certificate
Ihereby certify that the complete text of the statement of
Martin Bormann to the effect that he is guilty in full measure of
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as
set forth in the Indictment presented to this Tribunal, has been read
in German over the radio in the Soviet zone of occupation in
Germany once a week starting with Oct. 22, that is, Oct. 24, Nov. 3,
Nov. 10, and Nov. 17, 1945.
Concurrently on these same dates it was published in Berlin in
the following papers: "Tägliche Rundschau", "Berliner Zeitung",
"Deutsche Volkszeitung", "Neue Zeit", "Der Morgen", "Das Volk".
Moreover, each week it was published in the following provincial
newspapers: "Volksblatt", "Sächsische Volkszeitung", "Volkszeitung",
"Thüringer Volkszeitung".
»
Chief of Information Bureau,
Soviet Military Administration in Germany

/s/ I. TUGARINOV
17 November 1945

114
 Exhibit V A. Dissemination in the British Zone
PR/ISC Group,
Advance Headquarters,
Control Commission for Germany
(British Element),
BERLIN, B.A.O.R.
The General Secretary,
International Military Tribunal.

I certify that the notice concerning the trial by the International

Military Tribunal of the issue of the criminal character of certain

organizations has been published in the German language in the
British Zone of occupation in the following newspapers, at least
once a week for four weeks:
Circulation for
\i/pplrpnHincf 97 Ort 4.^

f\(\t\ f\C\C\
Neue Westtaliscne Zeitung 1
1,000,000
C O A f\C\f\
Neue Rheinische Zeitung 520,000
Kölnischer Kurier 370,000
Ruhr Zeitung 500,000
Aachener Nachrichten 110,000
Neue Hamburger Presse 402,500
Lübecker Post 156,000
Kieler Kurier 210,000
Hamburger Nachrichtenblatt 108,100
Lübecker Nachrichtenblatt 47,600
Kieler Nachrichtenblatt 17,500
Flensburger Nachrichtenblatt 12,500
Neuer Hannoverscher Kurier 433,000
Nordwest Nachrichten 301,000
Hannoversches Nachrichtenblatt 22,500
Neues Oldenburger Tageblatt 40,100
Lüneburger Post 178,900
Braunschweiger Neue Presse 150,500
Der Berliner 300,000

It has also been broadcast over the transmitters at Hamburg and

Cologne (Langenberg).
I certify that it has thereby received the widest possible dissem-

ination throughout the British Zone.

/ s / W. H. A. BISHOP
Major-General,
Chief, PR/ISC Group,
Control Commission for Germany (BE).
BERLIN, 15 Nov 45.

115
 Exhibit V B. Dissemination in the British Zone

PR ISC Group.
Advance Headquarters.
Control Commission for Germany
(British Element).
BERLIN. B.A.O.R.

The General Secretary.

International Military Tribunal.

I certify that the notice to Martin Bormann that he is charged

with having committed Crimes against Peace. War Crimes and

Crimes against Humanity as set forth in an indictment which has
been lodged with this Tribunal has been read in full in the German
language once a week for four weeks over the radio in the British
Zone, the first reading having been during the week of October 22.
1945. and that it has also been published in four separate issues
of "Der Berliner"', the newspaper published in the British sector
of Berlin.

s W. H. A. BISHOP
Major General.
Chief. PR ISC Group.
Control Commission for Germany (B. E.]

BERLIN. 15 Nov 45
s R.W. H. HORTIN

116
 CERTIFICATES OF SERVICE ON INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

24 October 1945

Certificate to General Secretary

I certify that I have served the following documents: (1) Indict-

ment, (2) Notice, (3) Charter of International Military Tribunal,

(4) Rule 2 (d) of the Rules of the International Military Tribunal,

and (5) list of German lawyers, on the following named defendants
at the time and place stated, by personally delivering to each of
them a copy in the German language of each of the above-named
documents:

HESS, Rudolf 19 October 45 Nuremberg

GÖRING, Hermann 19 October 45 Nuremberg
JODL, Alfred 19 October 45 Nuremberg
VON RIBBENTROP, Joachim 19 October 49 Nuremberg
KEITEL, Wilhelm 19 October 45 Nuremberg
LEY, Robert 19 October 45 Nuremberg
VON NEURATH, Constantin 19 October 45 Nuremberg
SAUCKEL, Fritz 19 October 45 Nuremberg
VON PAPEN, Franz 19 October 45 Nuremberg
DÖNITZ, Karl 19 October 45 Nuremberg
SEYSS-INQUART, Arthur 19 October 45 Nuremberg
FRANK, Hans 19 October 45 Nuremberg
ROSENBERG, Alfred 19 October 45 Nuremberg
FUNK, Walter 19 October 45 Nuremberg
FRICK, Wilhelm 19 October 45 Nuremberg
SPEER, Albert 19 October 45 Nuremberg
VON SCHIRACH, Baldur 19 October 45 Nuremberg
SCHACHT, Hjalmar 19 October 45 Nuremberg
STREICHER, Julius 19 October 45 Nuremberg
KALTENBRUNNER, Ernst 19 October 45 Nuremberg

I further certify that I have apprised each of the above-named

defendants of his right to the employment and designation of

counsel.
/ s / A. M. S. NEAVE,
Major.

117
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ON DEFENDANT
GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

23 October 1945

Certificate to General Secretary

I certify that I have served the following documents: (1) Indict-

ment, (2) Notice,Charter of International Military Tribunal,
(3)

(4) Rule 2(d) of the Rules of the International Military Tribunal,

and (5) List of German Lawyers, on the following named defend-
ant at the time and place stated, by personally delivering to him
a copy in the German language of each of the above-named docu-
ments:
HERR GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN, 19 October 1945, Blüh-
bach near Werfen, Austria.
I further certify that I have apprised the above-named defend-
ant of his right to the employment and designation of counsel to
the extent that this was possible in view of his mental condition.
At the direction of the Tribunal I have made an investigation
into the state of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen's health and have
obtained medical reports on this subject which are attached hereto.
(Attachments I, II, and III).
As a result of the conclusions in these reports and my own
observation, I suggest that the General Secretary recommend to
the Tribunal that a committee medical officers, representing
of
each nation, be appointed by the Tribunal to proceed to Blühbach
for the purpose of giving Krupp von Bohlen a thorough exam-
ination and reporting their findings to the Tribunal.

/s/ JAMES H. ROWE, JR.

118
 Medical Certificates Attached to
Certificate of Service on Defendant
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen

(Attachment I)

3d Battalion, Medical Section

232d Infantry Regiment

Schloss Blühbach
Bezirk Bischofshofen, Austria
6 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Capt. Norman A. Stoll, JAGD, Office U.S.

Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of
Axis Criminality

SUBJECT : Condition of Health of Mr. Gustav Krupp

von Bohlen

1. Mr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen was examined by me today,

and the following findings are noticed.
2. Subject has suffered from progressive arteriosclerosis and
He suffered an attack of cerebral thrombosis in
senility since 1939.
1942, which resulted in a temporary facial paralysis. About a year
ago he lost bladder and sphincter control.
3. At the present time he is bedridden, has to be fed and to
be cared for by nurses. He has no insight into his condition or
situation whatsoever and is unable to follow or keep up any con-
versation.
4. I do not believe that subject can be moved without serious

detriment to his health or that interrogation would be of any

value due to his loss of speech and complete lack of any under-
standing. His course will be progressively down-hill.
5. In my judgment subject is not mentally competent to stand
trial in a court of justice.

/s/ WALTER PICK

Capt., MC, 232d Infantry

119
 (Attachment II)

Blühbach, 13 September 1945

Otto Gerke, M. D.
Professor
Bad Gastein

Medical Certificate
Dr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, born 7 August 1870,
has been treated by me for many years; he was examined by me
today. Since 1930 there has existed an arthrosis of the spine, as
well as a hypotony which as far back as 1932 caused fainting fits.
Since 1937 a rapidly increasing sclerosis of the vessels was to be
noted which occurred in particular in the vessels of the brain.
In 1939 a fleeting paralysis of the eye muscles made its appear-
ance and passing disturbances of speech occured. In the spring of
1942, the patient suffered an apoplectic stroke on the left side,
with facialisparosis and a distinct increase of reflexes on the entire
right side. The cerebral disturbances of circulation have gradually
grown worse despite treatments with medicaments. They mani-
fested themselves first in the form of impaired memory and will
power, indecision and general deterioration of intellectual faculties
and increased to the point of definite depressions accompanied by
apoplectic numbness and involuntary crying. There developed an
acute arteriosclerotic dementia.
In an automobile accident in December, 1944, the patient suf-
fered a fracture of the nose bone and the skull basis and had to be
treated for eight days in the Schwarzach Hospital at St. Veith.
Since that time, his physical condition has also deteriorated, and
several apoplectic fits have occurred as a consequence of multiple
softenings of the brain with heart symptoms and striary syndroms.
The patient is by now completely apathetic and disorientated.
There éxists a motoric aphasy. Owing to rigor of the muscles, he
can neither walk nor stand up. For approximately the last six
months he has not been able to hold urine and stool. He is com-
pletely helpless even in the simplest matters. There can be traced
an advanced emphysen in the lungs and a distinct myocardic
impairment on the basis of a coronary sclerosis of the heart. An
enlargement of the prostate gland has existed for years.
The prognosis of the condition is definitely unfavorable, an
improvement is not to be expected. Herr Von Bohlen is in no way
competent or capable of being interrogated.

/s/ DR. GERKE

120
 (Attachment III)
HEADQUARTERS
42d DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO 411 US ARMY

20 October 1945

SUBJECT: Physical Examination of GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOH-

LEN UND HALBACH
TO : General Secretary, International Military Tribunal,
APO 403

1. The following history and physical examination of Herr

Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach is submitted in compliance
with a request from Mr. James Rowe. The history was obtained
from Frau Von Bohlen and from the valet. The information was
obtained on the 19th and 20th of October 1945 when the patient
was examined at his home at Blühbach, Austria.
2. HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: Herr Von Bohlen has

been developing arteriosclerosis since 1932 according to his physi-

cian's reports. It is believed that he first had a very light apoplectic
stroke in 1937. This was very transitory in nature and cleared
without noticeable aftereffects except for some loss of the acuteness
of his thought processes and memory which his family noticed.
In the latter part of November 1944 he had a spell of unconscious-
ness, fell and fractured a finger and was unable to walk alone for
about 24 hours. On 15 December 1944, he was in an automobile
accident and received a severe blow and laceration of the forehead.
He was hospitalized as a result of this accident until the first week
of February which time he returned home. Following this
1945, at
he was able to walk only with assistance and he was unable to
make coherent statements. He continued to have light strokes and
since March has been unable to walk even with help, and his
ability to speak has gradually decreased until at the present time
he is able only to speak an occasional single word. Also since
leaving the hospital he has had no control of the bowels or bladder
and during the past three months has given no evidence of recogniz-
ing various members of his family or close acquaintances.
3.PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
GENERAL: The patient is an emaciated white male of 76 years
of age who unable to speak or to cooperate in his own examina-
is
tion, and appears to have no realization of what is going on
about him.

121
 SKIN: Scar 2 inches long extending across the forehead and
downward between the eyes and across the bridge of the nose.
The skin of the groin is -macerated bilaterally as a result of
being constantly moistened with urine.

EYES, EARS, NOSE AND THROAT: No marked abnormalities.

LUNGS: Hyper-resonant throughout with moderate enlargement
of the chest cage suggesting the presence of mild emphysema.

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM: Apex palpable at aof heart

point 1 cm medial to the left mid-clavicular line.
evidence of No
right heart enlargement could be detected. Pulse 80. Blood pressure
130/75. Pulse full and regular except for an occasional skipped
beat. The distal palpable arteries in the wrist and ankles were
markedly sclerotic.

MUSCULO-SKELETAL SYSTEM: legs and arms were

Both
slowly moved by movements of the extremi-
the patient although all
ties were associated with moderate spasticity. The patient was
unable to stand alone or walk when he was held upright.
NEUROLOGICAL SYSTEM: Pupillary reaction to light normal.
Deep tendon reflexes in arms and legs were normal. Normal reaction
to plantar stimulation.

GENITO-URINARY SYSTEM: Incontinence of urine was noted

at thetime of examination. Genitalia appeared normal. A prostatic
examination was not made.
GASTRO-INTESTINAL SYSTEM: Abdominal examination was
normal. Incontinence of the bowels was noted at the time of the
examination.

4. IMPRESSION AND PROGNOSIS:

It is the impression of the undersigned that this man is suffering
from far advanced generalized arteriosclerosis which is progressive
and that he has already suffered from repeated small apoplectic
strokes. It is believed that this condition has already developed to
the point where this man has lost all capacity for memory, reason-
ing or understanding of statements made to him and that trans-
porting or doing anything which might excite him might endanger
his life.

s PAUL F. CHESNUT
Capt., MC
Surgeon.

122
 ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE
The following declarations were received in writing from Hans
Fritzscheand from Erich Raeder on 18 October 1945:

I, Hans Fritzsche, have received today, on 18 October 1945, at

1950 Berlin time, the Indictment of the Chief of Counsel of the

International Military Tribunal, a statement regarding my right to
defense, a list of German lawyers, the Rules of the International
Military Tribunal in the German language. Above documents have
been handed to me by the Red Army Officer Grishajeff, acting on
orders of the International Military Tribunal and who advised me
in the German language on the contents of the documents and on
my right to defense.
Berlin, 18 October 1945.
/s/ HANS FRITZSCHE

I, Erich Raeder, have received today, on 18 October 1945, at

1850 Berlin time, the Indictment of the Chief of Counsel of the
International Military Tribunal, a statement regarding my right to,
defense, a list of German lawyers, the Rules of the International
Military Tribunal in the German language. Above documents have
been handed to me by the Red Army Officer Grishajeff, acting on
orders of the International Military Tribunal and who advised me
in the German language on the contents of the documents and on
my right to defense.

Berlin, 18 October 1945.

fsl ERICH RAEDER

123
 MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT
GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN
FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE TRIAL AS TO HIM
Nuremberg, 4 November 1945
Theodor Klefisch
Lawyer
Cologne, 43, Blumenthalstrasse
To: The International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg.

As defending counsel to the accused Dr. Gustav Krupp von

Bohlen und Halbach I request that the proceedings against this
accused be deferred until he is again fit for trial.
At any rate I request that the accused be not tried in his absence.

Reasons
By Article 12 of the Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal this Court has the right to try an accused in his absence
if he cannot be found, or if the Court deem this necessary for other

reasons in the interest of justice.

The 75-year-old accused Krupp von Bohlen has for a long time
been incapable of trial or examination owing to his severe physical
and mental infirmities. He is not in a position to be in contact
with the outside world nor to make or receive statements. The
Indictment was served on him on 19 October 1945 by a represen-
tative of the International Military Tribunal by placing the docu-
ment on his bed. The accused had no knowledge of this event.
Consequently he is not aware of the existence of an Indictment.
Naturally therefore he is not capable of communicating either with
his defense counsel nor with other persons on the subject of his
defense.
To prove the above two medical certificates are enclosed — that
of the court medical expert Doctor Karl Gersdorf of Werfen, Salz-
burg of 9 September 1945, and that of the Professor Doctor Otto
Gerke of Badgastein of 13 September.
Lately Herr Krupp von Bohlen has been examined several times
by American military doctors. As far as it is possible I should like
to request another complete medical examination. If the accused
is unable to appear before the Court, then according to Article 12
of the Charter he could be tried only if the Court deemed it nec-
essary in the interests of justice.
Whatever may be understood by the phrase "in the interests of
justice"it would hardly be objective justice to try a defendant

accused of such serious crimes, if he were not informed of the con-

124
tents of the accusations or if he were not given the chance to con-

duct his own defense or instruct a defense counsel. Particularly is

he in no condition to comprehend the following rights of an accused
set out in the Charter:
1. By Article 16, Section (a) of the Charter a copy of the Indict-

ment in a language which he understands will be served on the

accused at a suitably appointed time. The assurance given hereby
for a sufficient preparation of the proceedings can not be guaran-
teed to Defendant Krupp von Bohlen on account of his state of
disease. According to Section (c) of the same Article 16 a prelim-
inary interrogation of the defendant shall take place in a language
intelligible to him. That is likewise impossible here. According to
Section (d) of Article 16 the defendant moreover can not exercise
his right of decision as to whether he will conduct his own defense
or whether he would like to be defended by counsel. Also the right
of the defendant as provided in Section (c) of producing evidence
and of cross examining witnesses himself or by his counsel in his
behalf can not be exercised by the defendant in view of his condition.
2. In the same manner as the Defendant Gustav Krupp von
Bohlen und Halbach is not able to exercise the confirmed rights
stated above in the preliminary proceedings he will also not be
able to exercise in the Trial those rights guaranteed to him by
Article 24 of the Charter. In the first place this concerns the state-
ment which the accused has to render on inquiry as to whether he
admits his guilt or not, a statement which is of particular impor-
tance for the course of the Trial and for the decision of the
Tribunal. This is all the more important as this statement regard-
ing guilt or innocence can be made exclusively by the accused
himself according to his own judgment and after examining his
conscience. So far as the procedure is admissible at all, the defense
counsel could not at the request of the Court express himself on
the question of guilt, as such a declaration presupposes the possi-
bility of communication and understanding with the accused.
Also the defendant could not exercise the right to the last word
to which he is entitled according to Article 24, Section (j).
The legislators who set up these guarantees for the defense
cannot wish to deny them undeservedly to an accused who can
not make use of them owing to illness. If by Article 12 of the
Charter the Trial of an absent defendant is allowed, then this ex-
ception to the rule can be applied only to a defendant who is
unwilling to appear though able to do so. As is the case with the
criminal procedure rules of nearly all countries, it is on this
principle that the rules and regulations concerning the trial of
absent defendants are based.
/ s / KLEFISCH
Lawyer

125
 Medical Certificates Attached to Motion
on Behalf of Defendant
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen

(Attachment I)

Doctor's Certificate

Dr. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, born 7 August

1870, presently residing at Posthaus Blühbach, Werfen, Salzburg,
suffers from progressive arteriosclerotic softening of the brain
(Paralysis celebri) and as a consequence of this illness he requires
constant care and treatment. He is incapable of standing, trial or
of being subjected to interrogation. An improvement of his con-
dition is not to be expected. Owing to his bad general physical
condition (Myodegeneratio cordis and Ataxis) he is not capable of
traveling either.

/s/ KARL GERSDORF, M. D.

.DistrictDoctor
Werfen, Salzburg
Certified Court Expert

Werfen, 8 September 1945

(Attachment II)

Attachment II is a medical certificate by Dr. Otto Gerke,

printed on page 120 ante.

126
 REPORT OF MEDICAL COMMISSION
APPOINTED TO EXAMINE DEFENDANT
GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN*
7 November 1945
We, the undersigned, during the morning of 6 November 1945,
examined the patient, identified as Gustav Krupp von Bohlen by
the military authorities in charge, in the presence of his wife and
nurse.
We unanimously agree that the patient was suffering from:
Senile softening of the brain, selectively affecting the frontal lobes
of the cerebral cortex and the corpus striatum, due to vascular
degeneration.
It is our unanimous, considered, professional opinion that the
mental condition of the patient, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, is such
that he is incapable of understanding court procedure, and of
understanding or cooperating in interrogation.
The physical state of the patient is such that he cannot be
moved without endangering his life.
We are of the considered opinion that his condition is unlikely
to improve, but rather to deteriorate even further.
Therefore, we unanimously believe that he will never be fit,
mentally or physically, to appear before the International Military
Tribunal.
fst R. E. TUNBRIDGE
Brigadier, O.B.E.. M.D., M.Sc, F.R.C.P.
Consulting Physician, British Army of the Rhine
/s/ RENE PIEDELIEVRE
M.D., Professor of the Paris Faculty of Medicine;
Expert of the Tribunal
/ s / NICOLAS KURSHAKOV
Professor of Medicine, Medical Institute of Moscow
Chief Internist, Commissariat of Public Health, U.S.S.R.
Is/ EUGENE SEPP
Emeritus Professor of Neurology, Medical Institute of Moscow
Member, Academy of Medical Sciences, U.S.S.R.
I si EUGENE KRASNUSHKIN
M. D., Professor of Psychiatry, Medical Institute of Moscow
I si BERTRAM SCHAFFNER
Major, Medical Corps
Neuropsychiatrist, Army of the United States
*At a meeting of the International Military Tribunal on 30 Oetober 1945 "it was agreed that
a committee of four medical officers, one appointed by each Member of the Tribunal, be
sent, if the Committee of Prosecutors made no objection, to examine Krupp and that they
he empowered to employ specialists if necessary-*' The report of this Medical Commission
was presented 7 November 1945.

127
 Report of the Medical Examination of
Herr Gustav Krupp von Bohlen

1. History: The following information was obtained by questioning

Frau Krupp von Bohlen, wife of the patient, Herr Krupp's
valet, and Frl. Krone, private secretary of the patient.
The patient had been physically a very active man. He
hunted, rode and played tennis. With the aid of guides, he
was hunting deer as recently as 1943. He was abstemious in his
personal habits, did not smoke or partake of alcohol. He
retired to bed early, rarely remaining up after 2200 hours.
He had eight children, six sons and two daughters. There
is no family history
of mental disorder or of drug addiction.
Previous There
Illness:is no history of any major illness.

Since 1930, he has taken spa treatment each year for arthritis
of the spine and for hypotension. No radiographs were
available to indicate the true pathology of the spinal con-
dition. The valet stated that the patient, on the recommen-
dation of his physicians, had been very careful with his diet
during the past ten years.
Present Illness: For several years, the patient had been
subject to giddy attacks. In consequence, his wife was always
anxious when he went hunting, lest he should have an attack
whilst on the edge of a cliff, and fall and kill himself. Two
reliable guides always accompanied him on his hunting
excursions, and in 1942 Frau Krupp also joined in expedi-
tions in order towatch him.
Four years ago, the patient had a disturbance of vision
primarily due to dysfunction of the eye muscles. For a period
he had double vision. From this illness, he made an apparent
complete recovery.
Two years ago he had a stroke, with weakness of the left
side of the face, and impaired function of the right side of
the body. Following the latter incident, impairment of gait,
general weakness, and impairment of mental functions
became increasingly apparent. From the middle of 1944
onwards, the patient became more and more dependent upon
his wife; she was the only person who seemed to understand
fully his speech and his needs.
On November 25th, 1944, he was proceeding from the
garden towards the house, and suddenly seemed to run (pro-
pulsion gait). Just before reaching the house, he fell and
.

injured his arm. As a result of this accident, he attended the

local hospital for treatment, traveling by motor-car. On

128
December 4th, whilst traveling to the hospital at Schwar-
zach-St. Veith, and asleep in the back of the car, the driver
was compelled to swerve to avoid another vehicle, and to
brake suddenly. Herr Krupp von Bohlen was thrown for-
ward, and hit his forehead and the bridge of the nose against
a metal rail behind the driver's seat. He did not lose con-
sciousness, but his condition was such that he was detained
in the hospital for approximately eight weeks. During his
stay in the hospital, he recognized his wife, his relatives and
the members of his staff, and spoke to them, albeit haltingly.
Since the accident mentioned above, the general condition
of the patient has deteriorated rapidly. The members of his
staff had increasing difficulty in understanding him. At first,
with the aid of two people, he was able to walk a few steps;
until two months ago he sat for short periods in a chair. The
assistance of men-servants was necessary for this task. He
has been incontinent of feces and urine since returning from
the hospital in February 1945. Since this date he has only
spoken an occasional single word, the words being simple
ones and without any rational association, apart from
sporadic expletives, such as- "Ach, Gott" and "Donner Wet-
ter", when disturbed. At times he has been exceedingly
irritable and on occasions has had inexplicable bouts of
weeping. During the past two months, he has become
increasingly apathetic, and no longer recognized relatives or
friends. Frau Von Bohlen thinks he may still recognize her
as a familiar face, but he exhibits no emotional reaction to
her presence. She thinks he realizes occasionally that stran-
gers are in the room; e. g., members of the Allied services,
and responds by being very tense.

Frl. Krone, secretary to the patient, stated that on

returning to Blühbach in September 1944, after an absence
since May 1944, she could no longer take down letters as
dictated by Krupp von Bohlen. Normally he was a very
punctilious man, and his diction and writing were correct
and very precise. She stated that after September 1944 there
were frequent interruptions in his flow of ideas, his syntax
was faulty, and he occasionally did not appear to appreciate
the meaning of certain words. She would get an idea of
what he wanted to say, and then wrote the letter herself in
accordance with what she understood to be his wishes. His
hand-writing also became increasingly illegible, and he had
difficulty in signing his name when giving power of attorney
to his relatives in January 1945.

129
 The valet had been personal valet to Krupp for 20 years,
and traveled all over the world with him. He described his
master as a very active man, physically and mentally,
extremely punctilious in all personal details. He took a great
interest in his clothes, and was very observant of any slight
defect. In his personal habits he was abstemious, never
taking alcohol, and was also a non-smoker. Although a very
excellent sportsman and physically capable of considerable
feats of endurance when hunting, playing tennis or climbing,
he never overdid things and took care of himself without in
any way being overanxious about his health. The valet first
began to notice serious changes in the patient's personal
habits two years ago, although in the valet's opinion, he had
been failing slightly for about four to five years. The degree
of change, however, prior to two years ago, was so slight
and his master was in his opinion such a "superman", that
the changes would not have been apparent to the casual
observer. Two years ago he began to lose interest in the
details of his personal clothing and to become careless with
his table manners. For instance, when soup was served to
him one day, he took his soup-spoon and used it to take
water from his wine-glass. Latterly, he would sit at table
and ask who was present, although the only people in the
room were intimate members of his family. He would
complain that the telephone bell was ringing, and of people
speaking to him; these hallucinations became more frequent
during the latter part of 1944. The valet was employed as
caretaker of the main house by the American Military
Government after the cessation of hostilities in Europe, and
did not see his employer regularly after June 1945. On
August 7, 1945, the occasion of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen's
birthday, he called to pay his respects, and for the first time
he was not recognized, and his master showed no appreciation
of his presence or his conversation.

2. General Appearance: The patient was lying rigidly in bed in a

Parkinsonian position with fine tremors of the jaw and hands.
The skin was atrophic and dry, and there was pigmentation
of the dorsum of the hands. The temporal arteries were prom-
inent and tortuous. The face was masklike, with dilated
venules over the cheeks. There was evidence of considerable
wasting of the body tissues, especially in the extremities,
which also showed evidence of trophic and acrocyanotic
changes.
3. Neuropsychiatrie Examination: The patient lay in bed with a
masklike face and in a fixed position on his back. The legs

130
were partially flexed, and similarly the elbows, the latter
being pressed firmly against the trunk. There was generalized
muscular rigidity, due to hypertenus of an extra-pyramidal
tract lesion.
On the physicians' entering the room, the patient fixed
his gaze on them, and replied to their greeting with "Guten
Tag," and gave his hand when they offered theirs to him. He
shook hands normally, but he could not relax his hold or
remove his hand, and continued to squeeze the physician's
hand this was due to the presence of a forced grasp-reflex,
;

which was more marked in the left than in the right hand.
When asked how he felt, he replied "Gut," but to all further
questions he gave no reply at all. He was silent and showed
no reaction to, or comprehension of, other questions, and
simple commands, such as "Open your mouth," "Put out
your tongue," "Look this way." Only painful and disagree-
able stimuli produced any reaction, and then it was merely
a facial expression of discontent, sometimes accompanied by
grunts of disapproval.
The disturbance of verbal response was not due to
dysarthria, because the patient was able
pronounce such
to
words as he did use, quite distinctly. Neither was it due to
motor aphasia, because the few words he used were used
correctly, and he never exhibited the jargon responses of the
true aphasie when attempting to answer questions.
The patient was indifferent, apathetic, and was not in
good rapport with the external world, lacked initiative,
exhibited paucity of emotion. He uttered no spontaneous
speech, and his reaction to painful stimuli was primitive.
Neurological examination showed the following additional
abnormal findings: There was a right facial weakness of a
supranuclear origin. The pupils reacted promptly to light,
and appeared normal, save that the left was slightly larger
than the right. Ophthalmoscopic examination of the fundi,
limited by lack of cooperation from the patient, showed clear
media and normal retina and retinal vessels. The right disc,
the only one visualized, appeared normal. Extra-ocular
movements could not be tested; there was no obvious strabis-
mus. All deep reflexes in the arms and legs were present and
very brisk. Clonus was not elicited. The plantar reflexes
were flexor. Abdominal reflexes were absent, except for the
right upper. There was incontinence of urine and feces, of
the type associated with senile dementia. There was an asso-
ciated minimal degree of intertrigo. Owing to lack of cooper-
ation of the patient a full sensory examination could not

131
 be made, but the patient responded to pin-prick, deep pres-
sure and muscular movement throughout the body.
4. Cardio-vascular Examination:
Pulse: Rate 100, rhythm irregular. The irregularity was
due to extra-systoles. The radial arteries were just palpable,
without evidence of pathological thickening or tortuosity.
Blood pressure: systolic 130 mm. of mercury, diastolic 80 mm.
of mercury.
Heart: The heart was clinically not enlarged. The cardiac
sounds were feeble, there was no accentuation of the second
sound in the aortic area, nor were any cardiac murmurs
audible. There were no vascular changes observable in the
vessels of the fundi. There was no evidence of cedema or
of congestive heart failure.
5. Respiratory Examination: Chest movement satisfactory. There
was no impairment of percussion noted. Auscultation revealed
no impairment of air entry, no alteration in the breath
sounds, and the absence of any adventitious sounds.
6. Alimentary-renal Examination: There was slight distention of
the abdomen, due to increase in the gaseous content of the
intestines. There was no evidence of ascites. The spleen was
not palpable, nor was there any evidence of glandular enlarge-
ment. The liver was just palpable, one finger's breadth
below the right costal margin, but there was no evidence of
enlargement upwards. Urinalysis: no sugar or albumen
present.
7. Skeletal Examination: The patient's rigidity limited the exami-
nation of joints. There was limitation of movement of the
neck due to muscular hypertonus. The hypertonus was so
marked in the lower dorsal and lumbar region as to produce
rigidity of the spine. Attempts to move the joints passively
stimulated involuntary contractures of the muscles. There
was evidence of crepitus in both knee-joints.

DISCUSSION:
The clinical record presented by this patient is that of an
organic cerebral disorder, with predominant involvement of
the frontal lobes and basal ganglia. The mental disintegration
of the patient renders him incapable of comprehending his
environment, and of reacting normally to it. He remains
uniformly apathetic and disinterested, intellectually retarded
to a very marked degree, and shows no evidence of spon-
taneous activity.

132
 The above findings are such as are found in the degener-
ative changes associated with senility. The findings in the
visceral organs are likewise compatible with the diagnosis
of senile degeneration.
The clinical course, from the evidence obtained, has been
that of a gradual decline over a period of years, with more
rapid deterioration during the past year. Such deterioration
will continue, and would be rapidly accelerated, with imme-
diate danger to the patient's life, were he to be moved from
his present location.

DIAGNOSIS:
Senile degeneration of the brain tissues, selectively affect-
ing the frontal lobes of the cerebral cortex and the basal
ganglia, with associated senile degeneration of the visceral
organs.

/ s / R. E. TUNBRIDGE
Brigadier, O.B.E., M.D., M.Sc, F.R.C.P., Con-
sulting Physician, British Army of the Rhine

s RENE PIEDELIEVRE
M.D., Professor of the Paris Faculty of Medi-
cine, Expert of the Tribunal

s NICOLAS KURSHAKOV
M.D., Professor of Medicine, Medical Institute
of Moscow, Chief Internist, Commissariat of
Public Health U.S.S.R.
s
1
EUGENE SEPP
M.D., Emeritus Professor of Neurology, Medi-
cal Inst, of Moscow; Member, Academy of
Medical Sciences, U.S.S.R.
s/ EUGENE KRASNUSHKIN
M.D., Professor of Psychiatry. Medical Insti-
tute of Moscow.
/ s / BERTRAM SCHAFFNER
Major, Medical Corps, Neuropsychiatrist,
Army of the United States

133
ANSWER OF THE UNITED STATES PROSECUTION
TO THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT
GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GORING, et al.,

Defendants.

ANSWER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO THE MOTION FILED

IN BEHALF OF KRUPP VON BOHLEN
The United States respectfully opposes the application on behalf
of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach that his trial be "deferred
until he is again fit for trial."
If the Tribunal should grant this application, the practical effect
would be to quash all proceedings, for all time, against Krupp
von Bohlen.
It appears that Krupp should not be arrested and brought to
the court room for trial. But the plea is that the Tribunal also
excuse him from being tried in absentia. This form of trial ad-
mittedly is authorized by Article 12 of the Charter of the Tribunal.
Of course, trial in absentia in circumstance of the case is an un-
satisfactory proceeding either for prosecution or for defense. But
the request that Krupp von Bohlen be neither brought to court
nor tried in his absence is based on the contention that "the in-
terests of justice" require that he be thus excused from any form
of trial. Public interests, which transcend all private considerations,
require that Krupp von Bohlen shall not be dismissed unless some
other representative of the Krupp armament and munitions in-
terests be substituted. These public interests are. as follows:
Four generations of the Krupp family have owned and operated
the great armament and munitions plants which have been the
chief source of Germany's war supplies. For over 130 years this
family has been the focus, the symbol, and the beneficiary of the
most sinister forces engaged in menacing the peace of Europe.
During the period between the two World Wars, the management
of these enterprises was chiefly in Defendant Krupp von Bohlen.

134
It was at all times however a Krupp family enterprise. Only a
nominal owner himself, Von Bohlen's wife, Bertha Krupp, owned
the bulk of the stock. About 1937 their son, Alfried Krupp, became
plant manager and was actively associated in the policy making and
executive management thereafter. In 1940 Krupp von Bohlen,
getting on in years, became chairman of the board of the concern,
thus making way for Alfried who became president. In 1943
Alfried became sole owner of the Krupp enterprises by agreement
between the family and the Nazi Government, for the purpose of
perpetuating this business in Krupp family control. It is evident
that the future menace of this concern lies in continuance of the
tradition under Alfried, now reported to be an internee of the
British Army of the Rhine.
To drop Krupp von Bohlen from this case without substitution
from the case the entire Krupp family, and defeats
of Alfried, drops
any effective judgment against the German armament makers.
Whether this would be "in the interests of justice" will appear
from the following recital of only the most significant items of
evidence now in possession of the United States as to the activities
of Krupp von Bohlen in which his son, Alfried, at all times aided
as did other associates in the vast armament enterprises, all plot-
ting to bring about the second World War, and to aid in its ruthless
and illegal conduct.
After the World War, the Krupp family and their asso-
first
ciates failed to comply with Germany's disarmament agreements
but all secretly and knowingly conspired to evade them.
In the 1 March 1940 issue of the Krupp Magazine, the Defendant
Krupp stated:
wanted and had to maintain Krupp in spite of all opposition,
"I
as an armament plant for the later future, even if in camou-
flaged form. I could only speak in the smallest, most intimate
circles, about the real reasons which made me undertake the
changeover of the plants for certain lines of production ....
Even the Allied snoop commissioners were duped .... After
the accession to power of Adolf Hitler, I had the satisfaction of
reporting to the Führer that Krupp stood ready, after a short
warming-up period, to begin rearmament of the German
people without any gaps of experience .". . .

Krupp von Bohlen (and Alfried Krupp as well) lent his name,
prestige and financial support to bring the Nazi Party, with an
avowed program of renewing the war, into power over the German
State. On 25 April 1931 Von Bohlen acted as chairman of the Asso-
ciation of German Industry to bring it into line with Nazi policies.
On 30 May 1933 he wrote to Schacht that:
"It is proposed to initiate a collection in the most far-

135
 reaching circles of German industry, including agriculture
and the banking world, which is to be put at the disposal of
the Führer of the NSDAP in the name of 'The Hitler Fund'
I have accepted the chairmanship of the management council."

Krupp contributed from the treasury of the main Krupp

company 4,738,446 marks to the Nazi Party fund. In June 1935 he
contributed 100,000 marks to the Nazi Party out of his personal
account.
The Nazi Party did not succeed in obtaining control of Ger-
many until it obtained support of the industrial interests, largely
through the influence of Krupp. Alfried first became a Nazi Party
member and later Von Bohlen did also. The Krupp influence was
powerful in promoting the Nazi plan to incite aggressive warfare
in Europe.
Krupp von Bohlen strongly advocated and supported Germany's
withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and from the
League of Nations. He personally made repeated public speeches
approving and inciting Hitler's program of aggression: On 6 and
7 April 1938 two speeches approved annexation of Austria;
on 13 October 1938 approving Nazi occupation of the Sudetenland;
on 4 September 1939 approving the invasion of Poland; on 6 May
1941 commemorating success of Nazi arms in the West.
Alfried Krupp also made speeches to the same general effect.
Krupps were thus one of the most persistent and influential forces
that made this war.
Krupps also were the chief factor in getting ready for the war.
In January 1944, in a speech at the University of Berlin, Von Bohlen
boasted, 'Through years of secret work, scientific and basic ground-
'

work was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German
Armed Forces at the appointed hour without loss of time or exper-
ience." In 1937, before Germany went to war, Krupps booked orders
to equip satellite governments on approval of the German High
Command. Krupp contributed 20,000 marks to the Defendant Rosen-
berg for the purpose of spreading Nazi propaganda abroad. In a
memorandum of 12 October 1939 a Krupp official wrote offering
to mail propaganda pamphlets abroad at Krupp expense.
Once the war was on, Krupps, both Von Bohlen and Alfried
being directly responsible therefor, led German industry in vio-
lating treaties and international law by employing enslaved laborers,
impressed and imported from nearly every country occupied by
Germany, and by compelling prisoners of war to make arms and
munitions for use against their own countries. There is ample evi-
dence that in Krupp's custody and service they were underfed and
overworked, misused, and inhumanly treated. Captured records
show that in September 1944 Krupp concerns were working 54,990
foreign workers and 18,902 prisoners of war.

136
 Moreover, the Krupp companies profited greatly from destroy-
ing the peace of the world through support of the Nazi program.
The rearmament of Germany gave Krupp huge orders and corre-
sponding profits. Before this Nazi menace to the peace began, the
Krupps were operating at a substantial loss. But the net profits
after taxes, gifts, and reserves steadily rose with rise of Nazi re-
armament, being as follows:
For year ending 30 September 1935 —
57,216,392 marks
For year ending 30 September 1938 —
97,071,632 marks
For year ending 30 September 1941 —
111,555,216 marks
The book value of the Krupp concerns mounted from 75,962,000
marks on 1 October 1933, to 237,316,093 marks on 1 October 1943.
Even this included many going concerns in occupied countries at
a book value of only 1 mark each. These figures are subject to
the adjustments and controversies usual with financial statements
of each vast enterprise but approximately reflect the facts about
property and operations.
The services of Alfried Krupp and of Von Bohlen and their
family to the war aims of the Nazi Party were so outstanding that
the Krupp enterprises were made a special exception to the policy
of nationalization of industries. Hitler said that he would be "pre-
pared to arrange for any possible safeguarding for the continued
existence of the works as a family enterprise; it would be simplest
to issue 'lex Krupp' to start with". After short negotiations, this
was done. A decree of 12 November 1943 preserves the Krupp
works as a family enterprise in Alfried Krupp's control and recites
that it is done in recognition of the fact that "for 132 years the
firm of Fried. Krupp, as a family enterprise has achieved out-
standing and unique merits for the armed strength of the German
people."
It has at times been the position of the United States that
all
the Germany were guilty of the crimes
great industrialists of
charged in this Indictment quite as much as its politicians, dip-
lomats, and soldiers. Its chief of counsel, on 7 June 1945, in a report
to President Truman, released by him and with his approval, stated
that the accusations of crimes include individuals in authority in
the financial, industrial, and economic life of Germany as well as
others.
Pursuant thereto, the United States, with approval of the Secre-
tary of State, proposed to indict Alfried Krupp, son of Krupp von
Bohlen, and president and owner of the Krupp concern. The Prose-
cutors representing the Soviet Union, the French Republic, and the
United Kingdom unanimously opposed inclusion of Alfried Krupp.
This is not said in criticism of them or their judgment. The neces-
sity of limiting the number of defendants was considered by repre-
sentatives of the other three nations to preclude the addition of

137
Alfried Krupp. Immediately upon service of the Indictment, learn-
ing the serious condition of Krupp von Bohlen, the United States
again called a meeting of Prosecutors and proposed an amendment
to include Alfried Krupp. Again the proposal of the United States
was defeated by a vote of 3 to 1. If now the Tribunal shall
exercise its discretion to excuse from trial the one indicted member
of the Krupp family, one of the chief purposes of the United States
will be defeated and it is submitted that such a result is not "in
the interests of justice."
The United States respectfully submits that no greater disser-
vice to the future peace of the world could be done than to excuse
the entire Krupp family and the armament enterprise from this
Trial in which aggresive war making is sought to be condemned.
The "interests of justice" cannot be determined without taking into
account justice to the men of four generations whose lives have
been taken or menaced by Krupp munitions and Krupp armament,
and those of the future who can feel no safety if such persons as
this escape all condemnation in proceedings such as this.
While of course the United States cannot, without the con-
currence of one other Power indict a new defendant, it can under
the Charter alone oppose this motion. The United States respect-
fully urges that if the favor now sought by Krupp von Bohlen is
to be granted, it be upon the condition that Alfried Krupp be sub-
stituted or added as a defendant so that there may be a represen-
tative of the Krupp interests before the Tribunal.
It may be suggested that bringing in a new defendant would
result in delay. Admitting, however, that a delay which cannot
exceed a few days may be occasioned, it is respectfully suggested
that the precise day that this Trial will start is a less important
consideration than whether it is to fail of one of its principal pur-
poses. The American Prosecution staff has been by long odds the
longest and farthest away from home in this endeavor. On per-
sonal as well as public interest consideration it deplores delay.
But we think the future as well as the contemporary world cannot
fail to be shocked if, in a trial in which it is sought to condemn
aggressive war making, the Krupp industrial empire is completely
saved from condemnation.
The complete trial brief of the United States on Krupp von Boh-
len with copies of the documents on which his culpability is asser-
ted will be made available to the Tribunal if it is desired as evi-
dence concerning him and Alfried Krupp and the Krupp concerns.
Respectfully submitted:
/ s / ROBERT H. JACKSON
Chief of Counsel for the
United States of America
12 November 1945

138
MEMORANDUM OF THE BRITISH PROSECUTION
ON THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT
GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN
British War Crimes Executive (E.S.)

12 November 1945

To: The International Military Tribunal.

The British Chief Prosecutor has had the opportunity of con-
sidering the application of the Defending Counsel to the accused
GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND H ALB ACH:
1) that the proceedings against this accused be deferred until
he is again fit for trial;
2) at any rate, that the accused be not tried in his absence.
The British Chief Prosecutor opposes this application for the
following reasons:
i) The medical position that as far as can be foreseen the
is

said defendant will never again be fit for trial, and therefore
if he is not tried in his absence, he will not be tried at all.
ii) Although in an ordinary case it is undesirable that a defend-
ant should be tried when he is unable to comprehend the
charges made against him, or to give instruction for his
defence, there are special considerations which apply to this
case and make it essential for the Defendant Gustav Krupp
von Bohlen und Halbach to be tried in his absence.
iii) As this is a case of conspiracy, the British Prosecutor sub-
mits that all the evidence directly concerned with the actions
and speeches of the said defendant and the operations of
Fried. Krupp A. G. would be evidence against the remaining
defendants, if the Prosecution establishes a prima facie case:
a) that the conspiracy existed;
b) that the said defendant was a party to the conspiracy.
Such prima facie case is clearly indicated in the Indictment
lodged with the Tribunal and the evidence against the present
defendant set out in the American Answer to this Application.
iv) If this submission of the British Chief Prosecutor is
correct and this evidence can and will be given in Court, then
it is at least arguable that it is preferable for the said
defendant to be represented so that his lawyer can deal with
such evidence to the best of his ability.
v) It is a matter of common knowledge of which the Court
may take cognisance that the business of Fried. Krupp A.G. is

139
 a vast organisation. There are, therefore, many sources within
the Krupp firm from which the defending Advocate can obtain
information which will enable him to deal with the allegations
contained in the American Answer. If the Defendant Gustav
Krupp is not retained in the list of defendants, there will be
no advocate so well qualified to deal with those allegations
on behalf of the other defendants, against whom they will
still be preferred.
vi) In the circumstances of this trial the kernel of the case for
the prosecution is that a number of conspirators have agreed
and worked together for the purpose of waging aggressive
war and causing untold misery to the World. The public
interest, that the defendant who is responsible for the
preparation of armaments on the one hand, and the utilisation
on arms production, of prisoners of war and forced labour,
including detainees from Concentration Camps on the other,
is one of "the interests of justice" within Article 12 of the
Charter.
vii) Finally, it is earnestly desired that the wishes of the
Tribunal as publicly announced at Berlin on the 18th October
that the trial should open on the appointed day, namely, 20th
November be realised and carried into execution. The British
Delegation is strongly opposed to any postponement.

/s7 HARTLEY SHAWCROSS

British Chief Prosecutor

140
MEMORANDUM OF THE FRENCH PROSECUTION
ON THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT
GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN
Nuremberg, 13 November 1945

MEMORANDUM
by the French Delegation concerning the matter of Krupp
which was discussed at the meeting of 12 November 1945
France is formally opposed to dropping the firm of Krupp from
the Trial since the other prosecutors do not contemplate the possi-
bility of preparing at this time a second trial directed against the
big German industrialists.
France objects therefore to a simple severance.
The remaining possibilities are either the trial of Krupp Sr.
in absentia or the substitution of Krupp Jr. in his father's place
and stead.
The trial of an old man who is about to die and who is not
before the Court is difficult in itself.
France would prefer to substitute his son against whom there
are serious charges.
For simple reasons of expediency, France requests that there be
no delay in excess of the delay that will result in all probability
from the motions of the Defense.
If the Tribunal denies these motions of the Defense, the Trial
of Krupp Sr. should take place in his absence.
However, this is in our opinion the lesser of two evils.

/ s / DUBOST

141
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF THE FRENCH
PROSECUTION
Nuremberg, 14 November 1945

ADDITIONAL MEMORANDUM
We consider the trial of KRUPP, the father, as impossible under
the circumstances. The trial of an old, dying man, absent from the
dock, cannot take place.
We wish that the son be prosecuted. There are serious charges
against him.
We had requested, so far, that he be prosecuted without any
delay arising in the Trial therefrom.
The reasons of opportunity which had induced us to adopt this
attitude are no longer so imperative since the Soviet Delegation has
concurred in Mr. Jackson's thesis.
Consequently we no longer raise any objection and we concur
ourselves in this thesis.

The Deputy-Delegate of
The French Government
in the Prosecution of
The International Military Tribunal
/s/ CH. DUBOST

142
 ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL GRANTING
POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
ON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel for the
defendant, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, for a postponement of the
proceedings against him;
IT IS ORDERED that the application for postponement be, and
the same hereby is, granted;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the charges in the indictment
against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall be retained upon the docket
of the Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the physical and mental
condition of the defendant should permit.

BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

/s/ GEOFFREY LAWRENCE
President.

Dated this 15th day

of November, 1945.

ATTEST:
/ s / WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary.

143
 SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES PROSECUTION
MEMORANDUM FILED BY THE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF
COUNSEL TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
4

The United States, by its Chief of Counsel, respectfully shows:

The order of the Tribunal, that "The charges in the Indictment
against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall be retained upon the docket
of the Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the physical and mental con-
dition of the defendant should permit," requires the United States
to make clear its attitude toward subsequent trials, which may have
been misapprehended by the Tribunal, in order that no inference
be drawn from its silence.
The United States never has committed itself to participate in
any Four Power trial except the one now pending. The purpose of
accusing organizations and groups as criminal was to reach, through
subsequent and more expeditious trials before Military Government
or military courts, a large number of persons. According to esti-
mates of the United States Army, a finding that the organizations
presently accused are criminal organizations would result in the
trial of approximately 130,000 persons now held in the custody of
the United States Army; and I am uninformed as to those held by
others. It has been the great purpose of the United States from the
beginning to bring into this one trial all that is necessary by way
of defendants and evidence to reach the large number of persons
responsible for the crimes charged without going over the entire
evidence again. We, therefore, desire that it be a matter of record
that the United States has not been, and is not by this order, com-
mitted to participate in any subsequent Four Power trial. It reserves
freedom to determine that question after the capacity to handle
one trial under difficult conditions has been tested.

Respectfully submitted:
fsf ROBERT H. JACKSON
Chief of Counsel for the United States
Certified a true copy:
/ s / R. L. MORGAN
Major, GSC

144
 MOTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF CHIEF
PROSECUTORS TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT
BY ADDING THE NAME OF
ALFRIED KRUPP VON BOHLEN AS A DEFENDANT
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al.
Defendants.
TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL:
Upon the Indictment and motion of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen
und Halbach, the answers thereto and all proceedings had therein,
the Committee of Prosecutors created under the Charter hereby
designates Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach as a defendant
and respectfully moves that the Indictment be amended by adding
the name of Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach as a defendant
and by the addition of appropriate allegations in reference to him
in the Appendix A thereof. It also moves that the time of Alfried
Krupp be shortened from thirty days to 2 December 1945. For this
purpose, the Committee of Prosecutors adopts and ratifies the An-
swer filed on behalf of the United States on 12 November 1945 in
response to the Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach motion, and
the motion made by Robert H. Jackson in open Court on behalf of
the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the Provisional
Government of France. This motion is authorized by a resolution
adopted at a meeting of the Committee of Prosecutors held 16 No-
vember 1945.
/ s / POKROVSKY
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
/s/ F. DE MENTHON
For the Provisional Government of France
/ s / ROBERT H. JACKSON
For the United States of America
16 November 1945

145
 ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL REJECTING THE
MOTION TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT BY
ADDING THE NAME OF ALFRIED KRUPP
VON BOHLEN AS A DEFENDANT
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al.,

Defendants.
ORDER
ON CONSIDERATION of the motion to amend the indictment by
adding the name of Alfried Krupp;
IT IS ORDERED that the motion be, and the same hereby is,
rejected.

BY THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

si GEOFFREY LAWRENCE
I

President.

Dated this 17th day

of November, 1945.

ATTEST-
/ s / WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary

146
MEMORANDUM OF THE FRENCH PROSECUTION
ON THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL
REJECTING THE MOTION TO AMEND THE
INDICTMENT
Prosecution
International Military Tribunal
FRENCH DELEGATION
Annex 13
The Delegate of the Provisional
Government of the French Republic
of the Prosecution to the
International Military Tribunal
to
The Members of the
International
Military Tribunal
Nuremberg, 20 November 1945
I have the honor to inform you that the decision rendered by

you on 17 November at 1500 hours, to reject the motion signed

the 16th by Mr. Justice JACKSON, Colonel POKROVSKY and
M. de MENTHON cannot reject the declaration contained, according
to which "The Committee of the Prosecutors created according to
the Charter, designates Alfried KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HAL-
BACH as a defendant" because this declaration has been made as
the last resort, under Article 14 b of the Charter.
Accordingly, Alfried KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH is
specifically designated as a major war criminal.
Consequently, I have the honor to inform you that the following
declaration has been published by the Chief Prosecutors represent-
ing Great Britain and the Government of the French Republic:
"The Prosecutors representing the United States of America, the
Provisional Government of the French Republic, and the Union of
Socialist Soviet Republics having agreed in the designation of
Alfried KRUPP as a major war criminal under Article 14 b of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, the French and
British Delegations are now engaged in the examination of the cases
of other leading German industrialists, as well as certain other
major war criminals, with a view to their attachment with Alfried
KRUPP, in an indictment to be presented at a subsequent trial."
We will let you know of this new indictment as soon as it is
established.
For the Delegate
/ s / CHARLES DUBOST
to: 4-The Members of the I.M.T.
1- General Secretary of the I.M.T.
3-The Members of the Prosecution (for information)
2- Files

147
MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT STREICHER
FOR POSTPONEMENT OF THE TRIAL AS TO HIM *

Schwaig, 5 November 1945

TO: The International Military Tribunal.

As defense counsel for the accused Julius Streicher I should

like to request that it be considered whether the time of commence-
ment of the Trial of the major war criminals fixed for 20 Novem-
ber could not be postponed to a later date. My reasons for this
request are as follows:
It is not possible for* me properly to prepare the defense of the
accused Streicher by 20 November 1945, nor especially to work
through all the relevant papers and documents which are in the
possession of the Court nor to produce the evidence which the
accused proposes to submit nor to discover or cause to be discovered
the witnesses named by him. Therefore I propose a postponement
of the commencement of the Trial for three or four weeks.

II

Furthermore I request that these documents, books, and other

records in which reference is made by the Prosecution in support
of the Indictment and which have been lodged with the Court, be
put at my disposal for the purpose of inspection and thorough
examination.

Ill
Lastly I take the liberty of suggesting that the films which have
been taken of the atrocities in concentration camps and other crim-
inal acts be shown to all the defense counsel of the persons
accused as this seems necessary for the instruction of counsel for
the defense.
/ s / Dr. MARX

* Part I of this motion was withdrawn by Dr. Marx, 15 November 1945, with permission
of the Tribunal.

148
 MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES
PROSECUTION ON THE MOTION ON BEHALF
OF DEFENDANT STREICHER
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et al.,

Defendants.
The United States America, acting through
of its Chief Prose-
cutor, opposes the Motion of Counsel for Defendant STREICHER for
the following reasons:
(1)
Since Counsel accepted the assignment to represent said defend-
ant on 27 October 1945, he has been provided with a list of docu-
ments relied upon by the Prosecutor, and has been permitted to
examine the documents and decrees referred to in such list; that
such documents and exhibits will remain available to said Counsel
throughout the Trial in the Defendant's Information Center in
Room No. 54 of the Court House in Nuremberg where German-
speaking custodians are available for assistance in expediting such
examination.
(2)
Said defendant will have additional time to examine documen-
tary evidence and further prepare his defense until the Prosecution
presents its Case in Chief.
(3)
Defendant STREICHER is the only defendant who has requested
postponement, and his application does not show any facts of hard-
ship that would follow which would be limited to his particular de-
fense. Further he does not show any specific injury to his defense if
the Motion should be denied.
(4)
No objection is made to request in Section II of the Motion.
(5)
agreed that the film on Concentration Camps may be showm
It is
to Defense Counsel prior to the Trial.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Motion be
overruled.
ROBERT H. JACKSON
U. S. Chief of Counsel
by
I si ROBERT G. STOREY
Asst. U. S. Chief of Counsel
14 November 1945

149
MEMORANDUM OF THE BRITISH PROSECUTION
ON THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT
STREICHER
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, et aï.,

Defendants.

The Chief Prosecutor of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Northern Ireland respectfully opposes the application for an
adjournment of Counsel for the Defendant STREICHER for the
following reasons:
I.

1) Counsel for the Defendant Streicher accepted that position

on 27 October 1945.
2) The Indictment against the said defendant and others was
published on 18 October 1945 and served on the Defendant
Streicher shortly thereafter.
3) The said Counsel has therefore had a considerable time to
familiarise himself with the contents of the Indictment and
especially these which, as appears in the part of the Appen-
dix A, page 33 relating to the said defendant, are particularly
relevant to him. In this connection the Chief Prosecutor
respectfully refers to Page 5, Section IV(D)(3)(d) and page
26 Section X(A) and (B) of the Indictment.
4) This Chief Prosecutor further respectfully reminds the Court
that the said Counsel has got a week from the filing of this
answer until the commencement of the Trial, and in addi-
tion any time which may be occupied by the opening of the
case and any matters preliminary to evidence being produced
requiring cross-examination by Counsel for the Defendant
Streicher.
5) If oral evidence is called relating to the part alleged to have
been played by the said defendant and the said Counsel is
not ready to cross-examine, he will be able to ask for a
postponement of his cross-examination.

150
 6) It is therefore respectfully submitted that this Application
ispremature, and that the time for applying for an adjourn-
ment to assist Counsel for the said defendant is when a diffi-
culty actually arises at the Trial.
7) This Chief Prosecutor respectfully reminds the Tribunal of
the words of General Nikitchenko, then its President, uttered
at Berlin on 18 October 1945: "It must be understood that
the Tribunal which is directed by the Charter to secure an
expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges will
not permit any delay either in the preparation of the defense
or of the Trial."

IL
This Chief Prosecutor has no objection to the request made in
Section II of the said application.

in.

This Chief Prosecutor has also no objection to the suggestion

contained in Section III thereof.

/ s / HARTLEY SHAWCROSS
14 November 1945

151
 MOTION OF THE SOVIET PROSECUTION
FOR A PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
OF DEFENDANT STREICHER
CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE U.S.S.R.
TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
As shown by the Indictment of the major war criminals. Julius
Streicher is to be tried in common with the other major war crimi-
nals and also for acts committed by himself, including, in particular,
the incitement of the persecution of the Jews set forth in Count One
and Count Four of the Indictment.
Thus, Streicher must bear the personal responsibility in the first
place, for deriding the Jews, for their being tortured and murdered
as a direct result of his propaganda and of that of his followers.
Pursuant to this Indictment the interrogations of Streicher were
carried on.
At the interrogation of 10 November 1945 by representatives of
the Delegation of the Soviet Union. Streicher declared quite un-
expectedly that he ''had been holding the viewpoint of Zionism."
If. in addition to this, we remember the motion of Streicher's
Defense Counsel at the session of the Military Tribunal of 15 No-
vember 1945 of the irresponsibility (psychical) of his client, it seems

to me evident that there is every reason for appointing psychiatric

experts.
This measure should not encounter any difficulties, as right at
this moment there are in Nuremberg a sufficient number of highly
qualified specialists, who have just solved a similar problem in con-
nection with the Defendant Hess.
An immediate examination would give the Tribunal, before even
the beginning of the session, exact information as to whether the
Defendant Streicher is responsible or irresponsible. There is still
amply sufficient time to do so.
To resort to experts when the Trial had already begun, would
undoubtedly delay the normal procedure of the Tribunal.
Given consideration to the above. I request that the Defendant
Streicher be submitted to a psychiatric examination before the be-
ginning of the Trial.

s / POKROVSKY
Deputy Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R.
16 November 1945

152
 ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL REGARDING
A PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION
OF DEFENDANT STREICHER
17 November 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: DR. JEAN DELAY, Professor of Psychiatry at

the Faculty of Medicine in Paris.

PROFESSOR EUGENE KRASNUSHKIN, Pro-

fessor of the Scientific Research Institute in
Moscow.
COLONEL PAUL L. SCHROEDER, U.S. Army.
The Tribunal desires that you examine the Defendant JULIUS
STREICHER to determine:
1. Is he sane or insane?
2. Is he fit to appear before the Tribunal and present his defense?
3. If he is was he for that reason incapable of under-
insane,
standing the nature and quality of his acts during the period
of time covered by the Indictment?

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL:

s WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
/ /

Brig. General, GSC

General Secretary

153
 REPORT OF EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT
STREICHER
18 November 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brig. Gen. William L. Mitchell,

General Secretary.
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL.
In response to the Tribunal's request that the Defendant Julius
Streicher be examined, the undersigned psychiatrists did examine
the Defendant Julius Streicher on 17 November 1945. The following
examinations were made: Physical, neurological and psychiatric
examinations.
In addition, the following documents were studied: All available
interrogations, biographical data, inspection of examples of his
written works, all psychological investigations and observations of
the prison psychiatrist.
The following results of the examination and unanimous con-
clusions are submitted:
1) Defendant Julius Streicher is sane.
2) Defendant Julius Streicher is fit to appear before the Tribunal
and to present his defense.
3) It being the unanimous conclusion of the examiners that
Julius Streicher is sane, he is for that reason capable of under-
standing the nature and quality of his acts during the period
of time covered by the Indictment.

/ s / DR. JEAN DELAY,

Professor of Psychiatry, at the Faculty of
Medicine in Paris.

/s/ EUGENE KRASNUSHKIN,

Professor of the Scientific Research Insti-
tute in Moscow.

/s/ COLONEL PAUL L. SCHROEDER, AUS,

Neuropsychiatrie Consultant.

154
MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT HESS FOR
AN EXAMINATION BY A NEUTRAL EXPERT WITH
REFERENCE TO HIS MENTAL COMPETENCE AND
CAPACITY TO STAND TRIAL
TO: The General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg.
On behalf of the Defendant Hess I hereby make the following
application in my capacity of counsel:
I

A. That a medical expert be asked by the Court to make a

thorough examination of the Defendant Hess and to report in an
exhaustive manner as to whether the said defendant is
a) mentally competent,
b) capable of being tried,
and to summon the medical expert as a witness at the Trial.
The expert should be named to the Tribunal by the medical
faculty of the University of Zürich or, if a competent expert should
not be available there, by the medical faculty of Lausanne.
B. If the Court has already appointed an expert, that the expert
applied for and appointed as in I A. be appointed and summoned to
act together with the Court's own expert at the examination, and
to testify in Court.
C. In the event of the Court's having already in the meantime
ordered a report by a board of experts, that this panel be completed
by the appointment, as well as the expert mentioned in I A., of
.another expert also to be named by the medical faculty of Zürich
or Lausanne.
II

Reasons:
Re The undersigned Counsel has grave doubts as to the mental
I.

responsibility and the fitness for Trial of the Defendant Hess owing
to defendant's behavior during his numerous talks with him, and
owing to the numerous publications, past and present, in the German
and foreign press about the "Hess Case". The defendant is not in a
position to give his Counsel any information whatsoever regarding
the crimes imputed to him in the Indictment. The expression of his
face is lifeless and his attitude towards his Counsel and in view of
the impending Trial is the reverse of every natural reaction of any
other defendant.

155
 The defendant declares that he has completely lost his memory
since a long period of time, the period of which he can no longer
determine.
The official Party declaration issued by the German Propaganda
Ministry of 12 May 1941 even mentions "a disease which had been
increasing over a period of years" and of "signs of mental derange-
ment". English press reports also state that defendant's conduct
1

after his landing in Scotland showed an absence of "mental clarity' .

Those facts are important for the allegation of Defendant's irre-

sponsibility as a result of morbid disorder of his mental capacity,
and sufficient grounds for application numbered I.
Those facts at the same time justify the examination of defend-
ant's ability to plead. In the event of the Court's having already,
on its own authority, entrusted a panel of experts with the prepara-
tion of a report, it would be fair to the defendant to concede the
addition of several experts to be appointed by the Defense.

1st VON ROHRSCHEIDT

Attorney
Nuremberg. 7 November 1945

156
 ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL REJECTING
THE MOTION ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANT HESS,
AND DESIGNATING A COMMISSION TO
EXAMINE DEFENDANT HESS WITH REFERENCE
TO HIS MENTAL COMPETENCE AND CAPACITY
TO STAND TRIAL
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
— against —
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING. et al..

Defendants.
ORDER
1. Counsel for the Defendant Hess has made application to the

Tribunal to appoint an expert designated by the medical faculty of

the University of Zürich or of Lausanne to examine the Defendant
Hess with reference to his mental competence and capacity to stand
trial. This application is denied.
2. The Tribunal has designated a commission composed of the

following members:

Eugene Krasnushkin. M.D.. Professor of Psychiatry.

Medical Institute of Moscow, assisted by
Eugene Sepp. M.D.. Professor of Neurology.
Medical Institute of Moscow
Member, Academy of Medical Sciences, U.S.S.R., and
Nicolas Kurshakov, M.D., Professor of Medicine
Medical Institute of Moscow
Chief Internist. Commissariat of Public Health, U.S.S.R.
Lord Moran, M.D. F.R.C.P.
President of the Royal College of Physicians, assisted by
Dr. T. Rees. M.D. F.R.C.P.
Chief Consultant Psychiatrist to the War Office, and
Dr. George Riddoch, M.D. F.R.C.P.
Director of Neurology at the London Hospital and
Chief Consultant Neurologist to the War Office
Dr. Nolan D. C. Lewis, assisted by
Dr. D. Ewen Cameron and
Colonel Paul Schroeder. M.D.
Professor Jean Delay.

157
 The Tribunal has requested the commission to examine the
Defendant Hess and furnish a report on the mental state of the
defendant with particular reference to the question whether he is
able to take his part in the Trial, specifically:
1. Is the defendant able to plead to the Indictment?
2. Is the defendant sane or not, and on this last issue the Tri-

bunal wishes to be advised whether the defendant is of sufficient

intellect to comprehend the course
of the proceedings of the Trial
so as to a proper defense, to challenge a witness to whom he
make
might wish to object and to understand the details of the evidence.
3. The examiners have presented their reports to the Tribunal in

the form which commends itself to them. It is directed that copies

of the reports be furnished to each of the Chief Prosecutors and to
Defense Counsel. The Tribunal will hear argument by the Prose-
cution and by Defense Counsel on the issues presented by the reports
on Friday, 30 November at 4 P.M.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

/s/ GEOFFREY LAWRENCE
President

Dated at Nuremberg, Germany, this

24th day of November 1945.

158
 REPORT OF COMMISSION TO EXAMINE
DEFENDANT HESS *

A
To the International Military Tribunal:
In pursuance of the assignment by the Tribunal, we, the medical
experts of the Soviet Delegation, together with the physicians of the
English Delegation and in the presence of one representative of the
American Medical Delegation, have examined Rudolf Hess and made
a report on our examination of Mr. Hess together with our conclu-
sions and interpretation of the behavior of Mr. Hess.
The statement of the general conclusions has been signed only by
the physicians of the Soviet Delegation and by Professor Delay, the
medical expert of the French Delegation.
Attachments: I. Conclusions, and
H. Report on the examination of Mr. Hess.
/ s / KRASNUSHKIN
Doctor of Medicine
/s/ E. SEPP
Honorary Scientist, Regular Member
of the Academy of Medicine
/si KURSHAKOV
Doctor of Medicine, Chief Therapeutist of
the Commissariat of Health of the
U.S.S.R.
17 November 1945

Attachment I. Conclusions
After observation and an examination of Rudolf Hess the under-
signed have reached the following conclusions:
1. No essential physical deviations from normality were observed.

2. His mental conditions are of a mixed type. He is an unstable

person, which in technical terms is called a psychopathic personality.

The data concerning his illness during the period of the last four
years submitted by one of us who had him under observation in
England, show that he had a delusion of being poisoned and other
similar paranoic notions.
Partly as a reaction to the failure of his mission there, the
abnormal manifestations increased and led to attempts at suicide.

* On the basis of this report and in view of the oral statement by the defendant during the
Proceedings of 30 November 1945, the Court ruled 1 December 1945 that "Defendant Hess
is capable of standing his trial at the present time, and the motion of Counsel for the Defense
(requesting postponement) is, therefore, denied, and the Trial will proceed."

159
In addition to the above mentioned manifestations he has noticeable
hysterical tendencies which caused a development of various
symptoms, primarily, of amnesia that lasted from November 1943
to June of 1944 and resisted all attempts to be cured.
The amnesia symptom may disappear with changing circum-
stances.
The second period of amnesia started in February of 1945 and
has lasted up through the present.
3. At present, he is not insane in the strict sense of the word.

His amnesia does not prevent him completely from understanding

what is going on around him but it will interfere with his ability
to conduct his defense and to understand details of the past which
would appear as factual data.
4. To clarify the situation we recommend that a narco-analysis

be performed on him and, if the Court decides to submit him to

trial, the problem should be subsequently re-examined from a
psychiatric point of view.
The conclusion reached on November 14 by the physicians of the
British Delegation, Lord Moran, Dr. T. Rees and Dr. G. Riddoch, and
the physicians of the Soviet Delegation, Professors Krasnushkin,
Sepp, and Kurshakov, was also arrived at on 15 November by the
representative of the French Delegation, Professor Jean Delay.
After an examination of Mr. Hess which took place on 15 Novem-
ber 1945, the undersigned Professors and experts of the Soviet Dele-
gation, Krasnushkin, Sepp and Kurshakov, and Professor Jean Delay,
the expert from the French Delegation, have agreed on the follow-
ing statement:
Mr. Hess categorically refused to be submitted to narco-analysis
and resisted all other procedures intended to effect a cure of his
amnesia, and stated that he would agree to undergo treatment only
after the trial. The behavior of Mr. Hess makes it impossible to
apply the methods suggested in Paragraph 4 of the report of 14 No-
vember and to follow the suggestion of that Paragraph in present
form.
/s/ KRASNUSHKIN
Doctor of Medicine
/s/ E. SEPP
Honorary Scientist, Regular Member
of the Academy of Medicine
/s/ KURSHAKOV
Doctor of Medicine, Chief Therapeutist of
the Commissariat of Health of theU.S.S.R.
/s/ JEAN DELAY
Professor, School of Medicine in Paris.
16 November 1945

160
 Attachment II. Report

According to the information obtained on 16 November 1945,

during the interrogation of Rosenberg who had seen Hess imme-
diately before the latter's flight to England, Hess gave no evidence of
any abnormality either in appearance or conversation. He was, as
usual, quiet and composed. Nor was it apparent that he might have
been nervous. Prior to this, he was a calm person, habitually suffer-
ing pains in the region of the stomach.
As can be judged on the basis the report of the English
of
psychiatrist, Doctor Rees, who had Hess underobservation from the
first days of his flight to England, Hess, after the airplane crash,
disclosed no evidence of a brain injury, but, upon arrest and incar-
ceration, he began to give expression to ideas of persecution, he
feared that he would be poisoned, or killed, and his death represented
as a suicide, and that all this would be done by the English under
the hypnotic influence of the Jews. Furthermore, these delusions of
persecution were maintained up to the news of the catastrophe
suffered by the German Army at Stalingrad when the manifestations
were replaced by amnesia. According to Doctor Rees, the delusions
of persecution and the amnesia were observed not to take place
simultaneously. Furthermore, there were two attempts at suicide.
A knife wound, inflicted during the second attempt, in the skin near
the heart gave evidence of a clearly hysterico-demonstrative
character. After this there was again observed a change from
amnesia to delusions of persecution, and during this period he wrote
that he was simulating his amnesia, and, finally, again entered into
a state of amnesia which has been prolonged up to the present.
According to the examination of Rudolf Hess on 14 November
1945, the following was disclosed:
Hess complains of frequent cramping pains in the region of the
stomach which appear independent of the taking of food, and
headaches in the frontal lobes during mental strain, and, finally, of
loss of memory.
In general his condition is marked by a pallor of the skin and a
noticeable reduction in food intake.
Regarding the internal organs of Hess, the pulse is 92, and a
weakening of the heart tone is noticeable. There has been no change
in the condition of the other internal organs.
Concerning the neurological aspect, there are no symptoms of
organic impairment of the nervous system.
Psychologically, Hess is in a state of clear consciousness; knows
that he is in prison at Nuremberg under indictment as a war
criminal; has read, and, according to his own words, is acquainted

161
with the charges against him. He answers questions rapidly and to
the point. His speech is coherent, his thoughts formed with precision
and correctness and they are accompanied by sufficient emotionally
expressive movements. Also, there is no kind of evidence of para-
logism. It should also be noted here, that the present psychological
examination, which was conducted by Lieutenant Gilbert, Ph. D.,
bears out the testimony that the intelligence of Hess is normal and
in some instances above the average. His movements are natural
and not forced.
He has expressed no delirious fancies nor does he give any
delirious explanation for the painful sensation in his stomach or
the loss of memory, as was previously attested to by Doctor Rees,
namely, when Hess ascribed them to poisoning. At the present time,
to the question about the reason for his painful sensations and the
loss of memory, Hess answers that this is for the doctors to know.
According to his own assertions, he can remember almost nothing
of his former life. The gaps in Hess' memory are ascertained only
on the basis of the subjective changing of his testimony about his
inability to remember this or that person or event given at different
times. What he knows at the present time is, in his own words,
what he allegedly learned only recently from the information of
those around him and the films which have been shown him.
On 14 November Hess refused the injection of narcotics which
were offered for the purpose of making an analysis of his psycho-
logical condition. On 15 November, in answer to Professor Delay's
offer, he definitely and firmly refused narcosis and explained to him
that, in general, he would take all measures to cure his amnesia
only upon completion of the Trial.
All that has been exposed above, we are convinced, permits of
the interpretation that the deviation from the norm in the behavior
of Hess takes the following forms:
1. In the psychological personality of Hess there are no changes
typical of the progressive schizophrenic disease, and therefore the
delusions, from which he suffered periodically while in England,
cannot be considered as manifestations of a schizophrenic paranoia,
and must be recognized as the expression of a psychogenic paranoic
reaction, that is, the psychologically comprehensible reaction of an
unstable (psychologically) personality to the situation (the failure
of his mission, arrest, and incarceration). Such an interpretation of
the delirious statements of Hess in England is bespoken by their
disappearance, appearance, and repeated disappearance depending
on external circumstances which affected the mental state of Hess.
2. The loss of memory by Hess is not the result of some kind of

mental disease but represents hysterical amnesia, the basis of which

is a subconscious inclination toward self-defense as well as a delib-

162
erate conscious tendency toward it. Such behavior often
and
terminates when
the hysterical person is faced with an unavoidable
necessity of conducting himself correctly. Therefore, the amnesia of
Hess may end upon his being brought to Trial.
3. Rudolf Hess, prior to his flight to England, did not suffer from

any kind of insanity, nor is he now suffering from it. At the present
time he exhibits hysterical behavior with signs of a conscious-inten-
tional (simulated) character, which does not exonerate him from his
responsibility under the Indictment.

/ s / KRASNUSHKIN
Doctor of Medicine
/s/ E. SEPP
Honorary Scientist, Regular Member
of the Academy of Medicine
/ s / KURSHAKOV
Doctor of Medicine, Chief Therapeutist of
the Commissariat of Health of the U.S.S.R.
17 November 1945

To: The International Military Tribunal.

The undersigned, having seen and examined Rudolf Hess, have
come to the following conclusions:
1. There are no relevant physical abnormalities.
2. His mental state is of a mixed type. He is an unstable man
and what is technically psychopathic personality. The
called a
evidence of his illness in the past four years, as presented by one of
us who has had him under his care in England, indicates that he
has had delusions of poisoning and other similar paranoid ideas.
Partly as a reaction to the failure of his mission these abnormal
ideas got worse and led to a suicidal attempt.
In addition, he has a marked hysterical tendency, as shown by
various symptoms, notably a loss of memory which lasted from
November 1943 to June 1944, and which resisted all efforts at treat-
ment. A second loss of memory began in February 1945 and has
lasted till the present. This amnesic symptom will eventually clear
when circumstances change.
3. At the moment heis not insane in the strict sense. His loss
of memory will not entirely interfere with his comprehension of
the proceedings, but it will interfere with his ability to make his
defense and to understand details of the past which arise in evidence.

163
 4. We recommend that further evidence should be obtained by

narco-analysis, and that if the Court decide to proceed with the

Trial, the question should afterwards be reviewed on psychiatric
grounds.

/ s / J. R REES / s GEORGE RIDDOCH

M.D.. F.R.C.P. M.D., F.R.C.P.
s MORAN
M.D.. F.R.C.P.
19 November 1945.

C
20 November 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Brigadier General Wm. L. Mitchell,

General Secretary for the International
Military Tribunal.

In response to request of the Tribunal that the Defendant Rudolf

Hess be examined, the undersigned psychiatrists examined Rudolf
Hess on 15 and 19 November 1945 in his cell in the Military Prison
in Nuremberg.
The following examinations were made: physical, neurological,
and psychological.
In addition, documents were studied bearing information con-
cerning his personal development and career. Reports concerning
the period of his stay in England were scrutinized. The results of
all psychological, special psychometric examinations, and obser-
vations carried out by the prison psychiatrist and his staff were
studied. Information was also derived from the official interrogation
of the defendant on 14 and 16 November 1945.

(1) We find, as a result of our examinations and investigations,

that Rudolf Hess is suffering from hysteria characterized in part
by loss of memory. The nature of this loss of memory is such that
it will not interfere with his comprehension of the proceedings, but
it will interfere with his response to questions relating to his past
and will interfere with his undertaking his defense.
Inaddition there is a conscious exaggeration of his loss of
memory and a tendency to exploit it to protect himself against
examination.
(2) We consider that the existing hysterical behavior which the
defendant reveals, was initiated as a defense against the circum-
stances in which he found himself while in England; that it has
now become in part habitual and that it will continue as long as

164
he remains under the threat of imminent punishment, even though
it may interfere with his undertaking a more normal form of
defense.
(3) It is the unanimous conclusion of the undersigned that
Rudolf Hess isnot insane at the present time in the strict sense
of the word.

/ s / DR. JEAN DELAY

Professor of Psychiatry at the Faculty
of Medicine in Paris

/ s / DR. NOLAN D. C. LEWIS

Professor of Psychiatry, Columbia University

/ s / DR. D. EWEN CAMERON

Professor of Psychiatry, McGill University

I si COL. PAUL L. SCHROEDER

A. U.S. Neuropsychiatrie Consultant

165
 REPORT OF PRISON PSYCHOLOGIST ON
MENTAL COMPETENCE OF DEFENDANT HESS *

17 August 1946

SUBJECT: Competence of Defendant Rudolf Hess

TO General Secretary, International Military Tribunal.
:

1. In compliance with the Tribunal's request, the following facts

and studied opinions are submitted with respect to the competence

of Rudolf Hess, based on my continual tests and observations from
October 1945 to the present time, in the capacity of prison psycholo-
gist:
2. Amnesia at beginning of trial. There can be no doubt that

Hess was in a state of virtually complete amnesia at the beginning

of the trial. The opinions of the psychiatric commissions in this
regard and with respect to his sanity have only been substantiated
by prolonged subsequent observation.
Recovery. On the day of the special hearing in his case, 30 No-
3.

vember 1945, Rudolf Hess did, in fact, recover his memory. The
cause of his sudden recovery is an academic question, but the
following event probably played a part: Just before the hearing I
told Hess (as a challenge) that he might be considered incompetent
at that time and excluded from the proceedings, but I would some^
times see him in his cell. Hess seemed startled and said he thought
he was competent. Then he gave his declaration of malingering in
court, apparently as a face-saving device. In later conversations he
admitted to me that he had not been malingering, and that he knew
he had lost his memory twice in England. During the months of
December 1945,and January 1946, his memory was quite in order.
4. Relapse. At the end of January I began to notice the begin-
nings of memory failure. This increased progressively during
February, until he returned to a state of virtually complete amnesia
again about the beginning of March, and he has remained in that
state ever since. (At the beginning of relapse, Hess expressed
anxiety over it, saying that no one would believe him this time
after he had said he had faked his amnesia the first time.) The
amnesia is progressive, each day's events being quickly forgotten.
At present his memory span is about one-half day, and his
apprehension span has dropped from 7 to 4 digits repeated correctly
immediately after hearing.

* This report was referred to Counsel for Defendant Hess by order of the Tribunal, 20 August 1946,
in reference to the motion of 2 August 1946 on behalf of the defendant. This motion, which
reviewed at length the previous examinations and psychiatric history of Defendant Hess, was
a request "to subject the Defendant Hess once more . . to an examination by psychiatric
.

experts with regard to his ability to stand trial and his soundness of mind."

166
 Competence and
5. sanity. I have read the application of Dr. Seidl
both inGerman and in English, and wish to make the following
comment:
a. discussion of psychiatric concepts does not help throw any
Lay
light on this case, because psychiatrists themselves are not in
agreement on the definition of terms like "psychopathic constitution",
"hysterical reaction", etc., and these terms have entirely different
meanings in English and German usage.
b. The psychiatric commissions have agreed, and my further
observations have confirmed, that Hess is not insane (in the legal
sense of being incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or
realizing the consequences of his acts).
Hess did recover his memory for a sufficient period of time
c.

(2 —3
months) to give his counsel ample cooperation in the prepar-
ation of his defense. If he failed to do so, it was the result of a
negativistic personality peculiarity, which I have also observed, and
not incompetence.
d. There has been no indication in his case history or present
behavior that he was insane at the time of the activities for which
he has been indicted. His behavior throughout the trial has also
shown sufficient insight and reason 'to dispel any doubts about his
sanity. (He may have gone through a psychotic episode in England,
but that in no way destroys the validity of the previous two state-
ments. He has exhibited signs of a "persecution complex" here too,
but these have not been of psychotic proportions.)
e. In my by a psychiatric commis-
opinion, another examination
sion at this time would not throw any further light on the case,
because the clinical picture is the same and the conclusions would
necessarily be the same as those of the original psychiatric commis-
sions, to wit: Hess is not insane but suffering from hysterical
amnesia. I have discussed this case with the present prison psychia-
trist, Lt. Col. Dunn, who has recently examined Hess, and he is also

of the opinion that Hess's present mental state is apparently the

same as that indicated in the original psychiatric reports, which he
has read.
/ s / G. M. GILBERT, Ph.D.
Prison Psychologist

167
MOTION ADOPTED BY ALL DEFENSE COUNSEL
19 November 1945

Two frightful world wars and the violent collisions by which

peace among the States was violated during the period between
these enormous and world embracing conflicts caused the tortured
peoples to realize that a true order among the States is not possible
as long as such State, by virtue of its sovereignty, has the right to
wage war at any time and for any purpose. During the last decades
public opinion in the world challenged with ever increasing emphasis
the thesis that the decision ofwaging war is beyond good and evil.
A distinction ismade between just and unjust wars and it is
being
asked that the Community of States call to account the State which
wages an unjust war and deny it. should it be victorious, the fruits
of its outrage. More than that, it is demanded that not only should
the guilty State be condemned and its liability be established, but
that furthermore those men who are responsible for unleashing the
unjust war be tried and sentenced by an International Tribunal. In
that respect one goes now-a-days further than even the strictest
jurists since the early middle ages. This thought is at the basis
of the first three counts of the Indictment which have been put
forward in this Trial, to wit. the Indictment for Crimes against
Peace. Humanity insists that this idea should in the future be more
than a demand, that it should be valid international law.
However, today not as yet valid international law. Neither
it is

in the statute of the League

of Nations, world organization against
war. nor in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, nor in any other of the treaties
which were concluded after 1918 in that first upsurge of attempts
to ban aggressive warfare, has this idea been realized. But above all
the practice of the League of Nations has, up to the very recent
past, been quite unambiguous in that regard. On several occasions
the League had to decide upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of
action by force of one member against another member, but it
always condemned such action by force merely as a violation of
international law by the State, and never thought of bringing up for
trial the statesmen, generals, and industrialists of the state which
recurred to force. And when the new organization for world peace
was set up last summer in San Francisco, no new legal maxim was
created under which an international tribunal would inflict punish-
ment upon those who unleased an unjust war. The present Trial
can. therefore, as far as Crimes against Peace shall be avenged, not

* The Tribunal rejected this motion 21 November 1945. ruling that insofar as it was a plea to
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal it was in conflict with Article 3 of the Charter.

168
invoke existing international law, it is rather a proceeding pursuant
to a new penal law, a penal law enacted only after the crime. This
is repugnant to a principle of jurisprudence sacred to the civilized
world, the partial violation of which by Hitler's Germany has been
vehemently discountenanced outside and inside the Reich. This
principle is to the effect that only he can be punished who offended
against a law in existence at the time of the commission of the act
and imposing a penalty. This maxim is one of the great fundamental
principles of the political systems of the Signatories of the Charter
for this Tribunal themselves, to wit, of England since the Middle
Ages, of the United States since their creation, of France since its
great revolution, and the Soviet Union. And recently when the
Control Council for Germany enacted a law to assure the return
to a just administration of penal law in Germany, it decreed in the
first place the restoration of the maxim, "No punishment without a
penal law in force at the time of the commission of the act". This
maxim is precisely not a rule of expediency but it derives from
the recognition of the fact that any defendant must needs consider
himself unjustly treated if he is punished under an ex post facto law
The Defense of all defendants would be neglectful of their duty
if they acquiesced silently in a deviation from existing international

law and in disregard of a commonly recognized principle of modern

penal jurisprudence and if they suppressed doubts which are openly
expressed today outside Germany, all the more so as it is the
unanimous conviction of the Defense that this Trial could serve in
a high degree the progress of world order even if, nay in the very
instance where it did not depart from existing international law.
Wherever the Indictment charges acts which were not punishable at
the time the Tribunal would have to confine itself to a thorough
examination and findings as to what acts were committed, for which
purposes the Defense would cooperate to the best of their ability
as true assistants of the Court. Under the impact of these findings
of the Tribunal the States of the international legal community
would then create a new law under which those who in the future
would be guilty of starting an unjust war would be threatened with
punishment by an International Tribunal.
The Defense are also of the opinion that other principles of a
penal character contained in the Charter are in contradiction with
the maxim, "Nulla Poena Sine Lege".
Finally, the Defense consider it their duty to point out at this
juncture another peculiarity of this Trial which departs from the
commonly recognized principles of modern jurisprudence. The
Judges have been appointed exclusively by States which were the
one party in this war. This one party to the proceeding is all in
one: creator of the statute of the Tribunal and of the rules of law,

169
prosecutor and judge. It used to be until now the common legal
conception that this should not be so; just as the United States of
America, as the champion for the institution of international
arbitration and jurisdiction, always demanded that neutrals, or
neutrals and representatives of all parties, should be called to the
Bench. This principle has been realized in an exemplary manner in
the case of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The
Hague.
In view of the variety and difficulty of these questions of law .

the Defense hereby pray:

That the Tribunal direct that an opinion be submitted by inter-
nationally recognized authorities on international law on the legal
elements of this Trial under the Charter of the Tribunal.
On behalf of the attorneys for all defendants who are present.

/s/ DR. STAHMER

170
 JUDGMENT
On 8 August 1945, the Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United
States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Repub-
lic, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

entered into an Agreement establishing this Tribunal for the Trial

of War Criminals whose offenses have no particular geographical
location. In accordance with Article 5, the following Governments
of the United Nations have expressed their adherence to the
Agreement :

Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands. Czechoslovakia,

Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia. Australia. Honduras. Norway, Panama.
Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand, India. Venezuela, Uruguay, and
Paraguay.
By the Charter annexed to the Agreement, the constitution,
jurisdiction, and functions of the Tribunal were defined.
The Tribunal was invested with power to try and punish per-
sons who had committed Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and
Crimes against Humanity as defined in the Charter.
The Charter also provided that at the Trial of any individual
member of any group or organization the Tribunal may declare
(in connection with any act of which the individual may be con-
victed) that the group or organization of which the individual was
a member was a criminal organization.
In Berlin, on 18 October 1945, in accordance with Article 14
of the Charter, an Indictment was lodged against the defendants
named in the caption above, who had been designated by the Com-
mittee of the Chief Prosecutors of the signatory Powers as major
war criminals.
A copy of the Indictment in the German language was served
upon each defendant in custody, at least 30 days before the Trial
opened.
This Indictment charges the defendants with Crimes against
Peace by the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars
of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international
treaties, agreements, and assurances; with War Crimes; and with
Crimes against Humanity. The defendants are also charged with
participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan
or conspiracy to commit all these crimes. The Tribunal was further
asked by the Prosecution to declare all the named groups or organi-
zations to be criminal within the meaning of the Charter.
The Defendant Robert Ley committed suicide in prison on
25 October 1945. On 15 November 1945 the Tribunal decided that
the Defendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach could not

171
then be tried because of his physical and mental condition, but
that the charges against him in the Indictment should be retained
for trial thereafter, if the physical and mental condition of the
defendant should permit. On 17 November 1945 the Tribunal decided
to try the Defendant Bormann in his absence under the provisions
of Article 12 of the Charter. After argument, and consideration of
full medical reports, and a statement from the defendant himself,
the Tribunal decided on 1 December 1945 that no grounds existed

for a postponement of the Trial against the Defendant Hess be-

cause of his mental condition. A similar decision was made in the
case of the Defendant Streicher.
In accordance with Articles 16 and 23 of the Charter, Counsel
were either chosen by the defendants in custody themselves, or at
their request were appointed by the Tribunal. In his absence the
Tribunal appointed Counsel for the Defendant Bormann, and also
assigned Counsel to represent the named groups or organizations.
The Trial, which was conducted in four languages —
English.
Russian, French, and German — began on 20 November 1945, and
pleas of "Not Guilty" were made by all the defendants except
Bormann.
The hearing of evidence and the speeches of Counsel concluded
on 31 August 1946.
Four hundred and three open sessions of the Tribunal have been
held. Thirty-three witnesses gave evidence orally for the Prose-
cution against the individual defendants and 61 witnesses, in
addition to 19 of the defendants, gave evidence for the Defense.
. A
further 143 witnesses gave evidence for the Defense by
means of written answers to interrogatories.
The Tribunal appointed Commissioners to hear evidence relating
to the organizations, and 101 witnesses were heard for the Defense
before the Commissioners, and 1,809 affidavits from other witnesses
were submitted. Six reports were also submitted, summarizing the
contents of a great number of further affidavits.
Thirty-eight thousand affidavits, signed by 155,000 people, were
submitted on behalf of the Political Leaders, 136,213 on behalf of
the SS, 10,000 on behalf of the SA. 7,000 on behalf of the SD,
3,000 on behalf of the General Staff and OKW, and 2,000 on behalf
of the Gestapo.
The Tribunal itself heard 22 witnesses for the organizations. The
documents tendered in evidence for the Prosecution of the indi-
vidual defendants and the organizations numbered several thou-
sands. A complete stenographic record of everything said in Court
has been made, as well as an electrical recording of all the proceed-
ings.
Copies of all the documents put in evidence by the Prosecution
have been supplied to the Defense in the German language. The

172
applications made by the defendants for the production of wit-
nesses and documents raised serious problems in some instances,
on account of the unsettled state of the Country. It was also nec-
essary to limit the number of witnesses to be called, in order to
have an expeditious hearing, in accordance with Article 18 (c) of
the Charter. The Tribunal, after examination, granted all those
applications which in its opinion were relevant to the defense of
any defendant or named group or organization, and were not
cumulative. Facilities were provided for obtaining those witnesses
and documents granted through the office of the General Secretary
established by the Tribunal.
Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal on behalf of
the Prosecution was documentary evidence, captured by the Allied
armies in German army headquarters, Government buildings, and
elsewhere. Some of the documents were found in salt mines, buried
in the ground, hidden behind false walls and in other places thought
to be secure from discovery. The case, therefore, against the defend-
ants rests in a large measure on documents of their own making,
the authenticity of which has not been challenged except in one
or two cases.
The Charter Provisions
The individual defendants are indicted under Article 6 of the
Charter, which is as follows: •

"Article 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement refer-

red to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the

major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall
have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the
interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individ-
uals or as members of organizations, committed any of the
following crimes:
"The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be in-
dividual responsibility:
"(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation,
initiation orwaging of a war of aggression, or a war in vio-
lation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accom-
plishment of any of the foregoing:
"(b) War
Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs
g
of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to.
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied terri-
tory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private

173
 property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity:
"(c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during the
war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of
the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
"Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices, participat-
ing in the formulation or execution of a common plan or con-
spiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such
plan."
These provisions are binding upon the Tribunal as the law to
be applied to the case. The Tribunal will later discuss them in
more detail; but, before doing so, it is necessary to review the
facts. For the purpose of showing the background of the aggressive
war and war crimes charged in the Indictment, the Tribunal will
begin by reviewing some of the events that followed the first World
War, and in particular, by tracing the growth of the Nazi Party
under Hitler's leadership to a position of supreme power from
which i\ controlled the destiny of the whole German People, and
paved the way for the alleged commission of all the crimes charged
against the defendants.

The Nazi Regime in Germany

the Origin and Aims of the Nazi Party
On 5 January 1919, not two months after the conclusion of the
Armistice which ended the first World War, and six months before
the signing of the peace treaties at Versailles, there came into
being in Germany a small political party called the German Labor
Party. On 12 September 1919 Adolf Hitler became a member of
this Party, and at the first public meeting held in Munich, on
24 February 1920, he announced the Party's program. That pro-
gram, which remained unaltered until the Party was dissolved in
1945, consisted of 25 points, of which the following five are of par-
ticular interest on account of the light they throw on the matters
with which the Tribunal is concerned:
"Point 1. We demand the unification of all Germans in the
Greater Germany, on the basis of the right of self-deter-
mination of peoples.
Point 2. We demand equality of rights for the German People
in respect to the other nations; abrogation of the peace treat-
ies of Versailles and Saint Germain.

174
 Point 3. We demand land and territory for the sustenance of
our people, and the colonization of our surplus population.
Point 4. Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member
of the race can only be one who is of German blood, without
consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member
of the race ....

Point 22. We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and

formation of a national army."
Of these aims, the one which seems to have been regarded as
the most important, and which figured in almost every public
speech, was the removal of the "disgrace" of the Armistice, and the
restrictions of the peace treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain.
In a typical speech at Munich on 13 April 1923, for example, Hitler
said with regard to the Treaty of Versailles:
"The Treaty was made in order to bring 20 million Germans
and to ruin the German Nation .... At its
to their deaths,
foundation our movement formulated three demands:
1. Setting aside of the Peace Treaty.
2. Unification of all Germans.
3. Land and soil to feed our Nation."
The demand for the unification of all Germans in the Greater
Germany was to play a large part in the events preceding the
seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; the abrogation of the Treaty
of Versailles was to become a decisive motive in attempting to
justify the policy of the German Government; the demand for land
was be the justification for the acquisition of "living space" at
to
the expense of other nations; the expulsion of the Jews from mem-
bership of the race of German blood was to lead to the atrocities
against the Jewish people; and the demand for a national army was
to result in measures of rearmament on the largest possible scale,
and ultimately to war.
On 29 July 1921, the Party which had changed its name to
National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP) was reor-
ganized, Hitler becoming the first "Chairman". It was in this year
that the Sturmabteilung or SA was founded, with Hitler at its
head, as a private para-military force, which allegedly was to be
used for the purpose of protecting NSDAP leaders from attack by
rival political parties, and preserving order at NSDAP meetings,
but in reality was used for fighting political opponents on the
streets. In March 1923 the Defendant Goring was appointed head
of the SA.
The procedure within the Party was governed in the most
way by the "Leadership Principle" (Führerprinzip).
absolute

175
 According to the principle, each Führer has the right to govern,
administer, or decree, subject to no control of any kind and at his
complete discretion, subject only to the orders he received from
above.
This principle applied in the first instance to Hitler himself as
the leader of the Party, and in a lesser degree to all other Party
officials. All members of the Party swore an oath of eternal
'

allegiance" to the leader.

There were only two ways in which Germany could achieve the
three main aims above-mentioned, by negotiation, or by force. The
25 points of the NSDAP program do not specifically mention the
methods on which the leaders of the Party proposed to rely, but
the history of the Nazi regime shows that Hitler and his followers
were only prepared to negotiate on the terms that their demands
were conceded, and that force wouid be used if they were not.
On the night of 8 November 1923. an abortive putsch took place
in Munich. Hitler and some of his followers burst into a meeting
in the Bürgerbräu Cellar, which was being addressed by the
Bavarian Prime Minister 'Kahr. with the intention of obtaining
from him a decision to march forthwith on Berlin. On the morn-
ing of 9 November, however, no Bavarian support was forth-
coming, and Hitler's demonstration was met by the armed forces
of the Reichswehr and the police. Only a few volleys were fired:
and after a dozen of his followers had been killed. Hitler fled for
his life, and the demonstration was over. The Defendants Streicher.
Frick. and Hess all took part in the attempted rising. Hitler was
later tried for high treason, and was convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment. The SA was outlawed. Hitler was released from
prison in 1924 and in 1925 the Schutzstaffeln, or SS. was created,
nominally to act as his personal bodyguard, but in reality to terror-
ize political opDonents. This was also the year of the publication
of Mein Kampf, containing the political views and aims of Hitler,
which came to be regarded as the authentic source of Nazi doctrine.

The Seizure of Power

In the eight years that followed the publication of Mein Kampf,
the NSDAP greatly extended its activities throughout Germany,
paying particular attention to the training of youth in the ideas
of National Socialism. The first Nazi youth organization had come
into existence in 1922, but it was in 1925 that the Hitler Jugend
was officially recognized by the NSDAP. In 1931 Baldur von Schi-
rach. who had joined the NSDAP in 1925. became Reich Youth
Leader of the NSDAP.
The Party exerted every effort to win political support from the
German People. Elections were contested both for the Reichstag
and the Landtage. The NSDAP leaders did not make any serious

176
attempt to hide the fact that their only purpose in entering German
political lifewas in order to destroy the democratic structure of
the Weimar Republic, and to substitute for it a National Socialist
totalitarian regime which would enable them to carry out their
avowed policies without opposition. In preparation for the day
when he would obtain power in Germany, Hitler in January 1929,
appointed Heinrich Himmler as Reichsführer SS with the special
task of building the SS into a strong but elite group which would
be dependable in all circumstances.
On 30 January 1933 Hitler succeeded in being appointed Chan-
cellor of the Reich by President Von Hindenburg. The Defendants
Göring, Schacht, and Von Papen were active in enlisting support
to bring this about. Von Papen had been appointed Reich Chan-
cellor on 1 June 1932. On 14 June he rescinded the decree of the
Brüning Cabinet of 13 April 1932, which had dissolved the Nazi
para-military organizations, including the SA and the SS. This
was done by agreement between Hitler and Von Papen, although
Von Papen denies that it was agreed as early as 28 May, as Dr.
Hans Volz asserts in "Dates from the History of the NSDAP"; but
that it was the result of an agreement was admitted in evidence
by Von Papen.
The Reichstag elections of 31 July 1932 resulted in a great
accession of strength to the NSDAP, and Von Papen offered Hitler
the post of Vice Chancellor, which he refused, insisting upon the
Chancellorship itself. In November 1932 a petition signed by leading
industrialists and financiers was presented to President Hindenburg,
calling upon him to entrust the Chancellorship to Hitler; and in
the collection of signatures to the petition Schacht took a prominent
part.
The election of 6 November, which followed the defeat of the
Government, reduced the number of NSDAP members, but
Von Papen made further efforts to gain Hitler's participation, with-
out success. On 12 November Schacht wrote to Hitler:
"I have no doubt that the present development of things can
only lead to your becoming Chancellor. It seems as if our
attempt to collect a number of signatures from business circles
for this purpose was not altogether in vain .
.". .

After Hitler's refusal of 16 November, Von Papen resigned, and

was succeeded by General Von Schleicher; but Von Papen still con-
tinued his activities. He met Hitler at the house of the Cologne
banker Von Schröder on 4 January 1933, and attended a meeting
at the Defendant Von Ribbentrop's house on 22 January, with the
Defendant Göring and others. He also had an interview with Presi-
dent Hindenburg on 9 January, and from 22 January onwards he
discussed officially with Hindenburg the formation of a Hitler
Cabinet.

177
 Hitler held his first Cabinet meeting on the day of his appoint-
ment as Chancellor, at which the Defendants Goring, Frick, Funk,
Von Neurath, and Von Papen were present in their official capacities.
On 28 February 1933 the Reichstag building in Berlin was set on
fire. This fire was used by Hitler and his Cabinet as a pretext for
passing on the same day a decree suspending the constitutional
guarantees of freedom. The decree was signed by President Hinden-
burg and countersigned by Hitler and the Defendant Frick, who
then occupied the post of Reich Minister of the Interior. On 5 March
elections were held, in which the NSDAP obtained 288 seats of the
total of 647. The Hitler Cabinet was anxious to pass an "Enabling Act"
that would give them full legislative powers, including the power
to deviate from the Constitution. They were without the necessary
majority in the Reichstag to be able to do this constitutionally. They
therefore made use of the decree suspending the guarantees of free-
dom and took into so-called "protective custody" a large number
of Communist deputies and Party officials. Having done this, Hitler
introduced the "Enabling Act" into the Reichstag, and after he
had made it clear that if it was not passed, further forceful meas-
ures would be taken, the act was passed on 24 March 1933.

The Consolidation of Power

The NSDAP ,
having achieved power in this way, now proceeded
to extend its hold on every phase of German life. Other political
parties were persecuted, their property and assets confiscated, and
many of their members placed in concentration camps. 26 AprilOn
1933 the Defendant Goring founded in Prussia the Geheime Staats-
polizei, or Gestapo, as a secret police, and confided to the deputy
leader of the Gestapo that its main task was to eliminate political
opponents of National Socialism and Hitler. On 14 July 1933 a law
was passed declaring the NSDAP to be the only political party, and
making it criminal to maintain or form any other political party.
In order to place the complete control of the machinery of
Government in the hands of the Nazi leaders, a series of laws and
decrees were passed which reduced the powers of regional and local
governments throughout Germany, transforming them into subor-
dinate divisions of the Government of the Reich. Representative
assemblies in the Laender were abolished, and with them all local
elections. The Government then proceeded to secure control of the
Civil Service. This was achieved by a process of centralization, and
by a careful sifting of the whole Civil Service administration. By
a law of 7 April it was provided that officials "who were of non-
Aryan descent" should be retired; and it was also decreed that
"officials who because political activity do not
of their previous
offer security that they will exertthemselves for the national state
without reservation shall be discharged." The law of 11 April 1933

178
provided for the discharge of "all civil servants who belong to the
Communist Party." Similarly, the judiciary was subjected to con-
trol. Judges were removed from the bench for political or racial
reasons. They were spied upon and made subject to the strongest
pressure to join the Nazi Party as an alternative to being dis-
missed. When the Supreme Court acquitted three of the four defen-
dants charged with complicity in the Reichstag fire, its jurisdiction
in cases of treason was thereafter taken away and given to a newly
established '"People's Court" consisting of two judges and five
officials of the Party. Special courts were set up to try political
crimes and only party members were appointed as judges. Persons
were arrested by the SS for political reasons, and detained in
prisons and concentration camps; and the judges were without
power to intervene in any way. Pardons were granted to members
of the Party who had been sentenced by the judges for proved
offenses. In 1935 several officials of the Hohenstein concentration
camp were convicted of inflicting brutal treatment upon the in-
mates. High Nazi officials tried to influence the Court, and after
the officials had been convicted. Hitler pardoned them all. In 1942
'
judges' letters" were sent to all German judges by the Govern-
ment, instructing them as to the '"general lines" that they must
follow.
In their determination to remove sources of opposition, the
ail
NSDAP leaders turned their attention
the trade unions, the
to
churches, and the Jews. In April 1933 Hitler ordered the late Defend-
ant Ley, who was then staff director of the political organization
of the NSDAP, ""to take over the trade unions." Most of the trade
unions of Germany were joined together in two large federations,
the "Free Trade Unions" and the '"Christian Trade Unions." Unions
outside these two large federations contained only 15 percent of the
total union membership. On 21 April 1933 Ley issued an NSDAP
directive announcing a coordination action" to be carried out on
'

2 May against the Free Trade Unions. The directive ordered that
SA and SS men were to be employed in the planned "occupation of
trade union properties and for the taking into protective custody of
personalities who come into question." At the conclusion of the
action the official NSDAP press service reported that the National
Socialist Factory Cells Organization had "eliminated the old leader-
ship of Free Trade Unions" and taken over the leadership them-
on 3 May 1933 the NSDAP press service announced
selves. Similarly,
that the Christian trade unions "have unconditionally subordinated
themselves to the leadership of Adolf Hitler." In place of the trade
unions the Nazi Government set up a Deutsche Arbeits Front (DAF),
controlled by the NSDAP, and which, in practice, all workers in Ger-

179
many were compelled to join. The chairmen of the unions were
taken into custody and were subjected to ill-treatment, ranging
from assault and battery to murder.
In their effort to combat the influence of the Christian churches,
whose doctrines were fundamentally at variance with National
Socialist philosophy and practice, the Nazi Government proceeded
more slowly. The extreme step of banning the practice of the
Christian religion was not taken, but year by year efforts were made
to limit the influence of Christianityon the German people, since, in
the words used by. the Defendant Bormann to the Defendant Rosen-
berg in an official letter, "the Christian religion and National So-
cialist doctrines are not compatible." In the month of June 1941 the
Defendant Bormann issued a secret decree on the relation of
Christianity and National Socialism. The decree stated that:
"For the first time in German history the Führer consciously
and completely has the leadership in his own hand. With the
Party, its components and attached units, the Führer has
created for himself and thereby the German Reich Leadership,
an instrument which makes him independent of the Treaty ....
More and more the people must be separated from the churches
and their organs, the pastor .... Never again must an influence
on leadership of the people be yielded to the churches. This
influence must be broken completely and finally. Only the
Reich Government and by its direction the Party, its
components and attached units, have a right to leadership of
the people."
From the. earliest days of the NSDAP, anti-Semitism had occu-
pied a prominent place in National Socialist thought and prop-
aganda. The Jews, who were considered to have no right to Ger-
man citizenship, were held to have been largely responsible for the
troubles with which the Nation was afflicted following on the war
of 1914-18. Furthermore, the antipathy to the Jews was intensified
by the insistence which was laid upon the superiority of the Ger-
manic race and blood. The second chapter of "Book 1 of Mein
Kampf is dedicated to what may be called the "Master Race" theory,
the doctrine of Aryan superiority over all other races, and the right
of Germans in virtue of this superiority to dominate and use other
peoples for their own ends. With the coming of the Nazis into
power in 1933, persecution of the Jews became official state policy.
On 1 April 1933, a boycott of Jewish enterprises was approved by
the Nazi Reich Cabinet, and during the following years a series of
anti-Semitic laws was passed, restricting the activities of Jews in
the civil service, in the legal profession, in journalism and in the
armed forces. In September 1935, the so-called Nuremberg Laws
were passed, the most important effect of which was to deprive Jews

180
of German way the influence of Jewish elements
citizenship. In this
on the affairs of Germany was extinguished, and one more poten-
tial source of opposition to Nazi policy was rendered powerless.
In any consideration of the crushing of opposition, the massacre
of 30 June 1934 must not be forgotten. It has become known as the
"Röhm Purge" or "the blood bath", and revealed the methods which
Hitler and his immediate associates, including the Defendant
Goring, were ready to employ to strike down all opposition and
consolidate their power. On that day Röhm, the Chief of Staff of
the SA since 1931, was murdered by Hitler's orders, and the "Old
Guard" of the SA was massacred without trial and without warn-
ing. The opportunity was taken to murder a large number of
people who at one time or another had opposed Hitler.
The ostensible ground for the murder of Röhm was that he was
plotting to overthrow Hitler, and the Defendant Goring gave
evidence that knowledge of such a plot had come to his ears.
Whether thiswas so or not it is not necessary to determine.
On 3 July the Cabinet approved Hitler's action and described it

as "legitimate self-defense by the State."

Shortly afterwards Hindenburg died, and Hitler became both
Reich President and Chancellor. At the Nazi-dominated plebiscite,
which followed, 38 million Germans expressed their approval, and
with the Reichswehr taking the oath of allegiance to the Führer, full
power was now in Hitler's hands.
Germany had accepted the dictatorship with all its methods of
terror, and its cynical and open denial of the rule of law.
Apart from the policy of crushing the potential opponents of
their regime, the Nazi Government took active steps to increase
its power over the German population. In the field of education,
everything was done to ensure that the youth of Germany was
brought up in the atmosphere of National Socialism and accepted
National Socialist teachings. As early as 7 April 1933 the law
reorganizing the civil service had made it possible for the Nazi
Government to remove all "subversive and unreliable teachers";
and this was followed by numerous other measures to make sure
that the schools were staffed by teachers who could be trusted to
teach their pupils the full meaning of the National Socialist creed.
Apart from the influence of National Socialist teaching in the schools,
the Hitler Youth Organization was also relied upon by the Nazi
Leaders for obtaining fanatical support from the younger generation.
The Defendant Von Schirach, who had been Reich Youth Leader
of the NSDAP since 1931, was appointed Youth Leader of the Ger-
man Reich in June 1933. Soon all the youth organizations had been
either dissolved or absorbed by the Hitler Youth, with the excep-
tion of the "Catholic Youth. The Hitler Youth was organized on

181
strict military lines,and as early as 1933 the Wehrmacht was
cooperating in providing pre-military training for the Reich Youth.
The Nazi Government endeavored to unite the Nation in support
of their policiesthrough the extensive use of propaganda. A num-
ber of agencies was set up, whose duty was to control and influence
the press, the radio, films, publishing firms, etc., in Germany, and
to supervise entertainment and cultural and artistic activities. All
these agencies came under Goebbels' Ministry of the People's
Enlightenment and Propaganda, which together with a corresponding
organization in the NSDAP and the Reich Chamber of Culture,
was ultimately responsible for exercising this supervision. The
Defendant Rosenberg played a leading part in disseminating the
National Socialist doctrines on behalf of the Party, and the Defend-
ant Fritzsche, in conjunction with Goebbels, performed the same
task for the State.
The greatest emphasis was laid on the supreme mission of the
German People to lead and dominate by virtue of their Nordic
blood and racial purity; and the ground was thus being prepared
for the acceptance of the idea of German world supremacy.
Through the effective control of the radio and the press, the
German People, during the years which followed 1933, were sub-
jected to the most intensive propaganda in furtherance of the
regime. Hostile criticism, indeed criticism of any kind, was for-
bidden, and the severest penalties were imposed on those who in-
dulged in it.
Independent judgment, based on freedom of thought, was ren-
dered quite impossible.

Measures of Rearmament
During the years immediately following Hitler's appointment as
Chancellor, the Nazi Government set about re-organizing the econo-
mic life of Germany, and in particular the armament industry.
This was done on a vast scale and with extreme thoroughness.
It was necessary to lay a secure financial foundation for the
building of armaments, and in April 1936 the Defendant Goring was
appointed coordinator for raw materials and foreign exchange, and
empowered to supervise all State and Party activities in these fields.
In this capacity he brought together the War Minister, the Minister
of Economics, the Reich Finance Minister, the President of the
Reichsbank and the Prussian Finance Minister to discuss problems
connected with war mobilization, and on 27 May 1936, in address-
ing these men, Goring opposed any financial limitation of war
production and added that "all measures are to be considered from
the standpoint of an assured waging of war." At the Party Rally
in Nuremberg in 1936, Hitler announced the establishment of the

182
Four Year Plan and the appointment of Goring as the Plenipo-
tentiary in charge. Goring was already engaged in building a strong
air force and on 8 July 1938 he announced to a number of
leading German aircraft manufacturers that the German Air Force
was already superior in quality and quantity to the English. On
14 October 1938, at another conference. Goring announced that
Hitler had instructed him to organize a gigantic armament program,
which would make insignificant all previous achievements. He said
that he had been ordered to build as rapidly as possible an air
force five times as large as originally planned, to increase the speed
of the rearmament of the navy and army, and to concentrate on
offensive weapons, principally heavy artillery and heavy tanks. He
then laid down a specific program designed to accomplish these ends.
The extent to which rearmament had been accomplished was stated
by Hitler in his memorandum of 9 October 1939, after the campaign
in Poland. He said:
"The military application of our people's strength has been
carried through to such an extent that within a short time at
any rate it cannot be markedly improved upon by any
manner of effort ....
"The warlike equipment of the German people is at present
larger in quantity and better in quality for a greater number
of German divisions than in the year 1914. The weapons
themselves, taking a substantial cross-section, are more
modern than is the case of any other country in the world at
this time. They have just proved their supreme war worthiness
in their victorious campaign .... There is no evidence
available to show that any country in the world disposes of a
better total ammunition stock than the Reich .... The A. A.
artillery is not equalled by any country in the world."
In this reorganization of the economic life of Germany for mili-
tary purposes, the Nazi Government found the German armament
industry quite willing to cooperate, and to play its part in the rearma-
ment program. In April 1933 Gustav Krupp von Bohlen sub-
mitted to Hitler on behalf of the Reich Association of German In-
dustry a plan for the reorganization of German industry, which he
stated was characterized by the desire to coordinate economic
measures and political necessity. In the plan itself Krupp stated that
"the turn of political events is in line with the wishes which I mvself
and the board of directors have cherished for a long time." What
Krupp meant by this statement is fully shown by the draft text
of a speech which he planned to deliver in the University of Berlin
in January 1944, though the speech was in fact never delivered.
Referring to the years 1919 to 1933, Krupp wrote:
"It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy
that it did not remain idle during those bad years, even

183
 though its activity could not be brought to light, for obvious
reasons. Through years of secret work, scientific and basic
groundwork was laid in order to be ready again to work for
the German armed forces at the appointed hour, without loss
of time or experience .... Only through the secret activity
of German enterprise together with the experience gained
meanwhile through the production of peace time goods was it
possible after 1933 to fall into step with the new tasks arrived
at. restoring Germany's military power.*'
In October 1933 Germany withdrew from the International Dis-
armament Conference and the League of Nations. In 1935 the Nazi
Government decided to take the first open steps to free itself from
its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. On 10 March 1935
the Defendant Goring announced that Germany was building a
military air force. Six days later, on 16 March 1935. a law was
passed bearing the signatures, among others, of the Defendants
Goring. Hess, Frank. Prick, Schacht, and Von Neurath, instituting
compulsory military service and fixing the establishment of the
German Army at a peace time strength of 500,000 men. In an
endeavor to reassure public opinion in other countries, the Govern-
ment announced on 21 May 1935 that Germany would, though
renouncing the disarmament clauses, still respect the territorial
limitations of the Versailles Treaty, and would comply with the
Locarno Pacts. Nevertheless, on the very day of this announcement,
the secret Reich Defense Law was passed and its publication for-
bidden by Hitler. In this law. the powers and duties of the Chancellor
and other Ministers were defined, should Germany become involved
in war. It is clear from this law that by May of 1935 Hitler and his
Government had arrived at the stage in the carrying out of their
policies w hen it was necessary for them to have in existence the
T

requisite machinery for the administration and government of Ger-

many in the event of their policy leading to war.
At the same time that this preparation of the German economy
for war was being carried out, the German armed forces themselves
were preparing for a rebuilding of Germany's armed strength.
The German Navy was particularly active in this regard The
official German Naval historians. Assmann and Gladisch. admit that
the Treaty of Versailles had only been in force for a few months
before it was violated, particularly in the construction of a new
submarine arm.
The publications of Captain Schuessler and Colonel Scherff, both
of which were sponsored by the Defendant Raeder, were designed
to show the German People the nature of the Navy's effort to rearm
in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles.
The full details of these publications have been given in evidence.
On 12 May 1934 the Defendant Raeder issued the Top Secret

184
armament plan for what was called the 'Third Armament Phase".
This contained the sentence:
"All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn
up with a primary view to readiness for a war without any
alert period."
One month later, in June 1934, the Defendant Raeder had a conver-
sation with Hitler in which Hitler instructed him to keep secret the
construction of U-boats and of warships over the limit of 10,000 tons
which was then being undertaken.
And on 2 November 1934, the Defendant Raeder had another
conversation with Hitler and the Defendant Goring, in which Hitler
said that he considered it vital that the German Navy "should be
increased as planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy
was not able to safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia".
The large orders for building given in 1933 and 1934 are sought
to be excused by the Defendant Raeder on the ground that negotia-
tions were in progress for an agreement between Germany and Great
Britain permitting Germany to build ships in excess of the provi-
sions of the Treaty of Versailles. This agreement, which was signed
in 1935, restricted the German Navy to a tonnage equal to one-third
of that of the British, except in respect of U-boats where 45 percent
was agreed, subject always to the right to exceed this proportion
after first informing the British Government and giving them an
opportunity of discussion.
The Anglo-German Treaty followed in 1937, under which both
Powers bound themselves to notify full details of their building
program at least four months before any action was taken.
It is admitted that these clauses were not adhered to by Germany.

In capital vessels, for example, the displacement details were

falsifiedby 20 percent, whilst in the case of U-boats, the German
historians Assmann and Gladisch say:
"It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction
that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the
German-British Treaty."
The importance of these breaches of the Treaty is seen when the
motive for this rearmament is considered. In the year ,1940 the
Defendant Raeder himself wrote:
"The Führer hoped until the last moment to be able to put
off the threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At
that time, the Navy would have had available a fleet with a
powerful U-boat superiority, and a much more favorable
ratio as regards strength in all other types of ships, particu-
larly those designed for warfare on the High Seas."
The Nazi Government as already stated, announced on 21 May
1935 their intention to respect the territorial limitations of the

185
Treaty of Versailles. On 7 March 1936, in defiance of that Treaty,
the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was entered by German
troops. In announcing this action to the German Reichstag, Hitler
endeavored to justify the re-entry by references to the recently
concluded alliances between France and the Soviet Union, and
between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. He also tried to meet
the hostile reaction which he no doubt expected to follow this
violation of the Treaty by saying:
"We have no territorial claims to make in Europe."

The Common Plan of Conspiracy and Aggressive War

The Tribunal now turns to the consideration of the Crimes
against Peace charged in the Indictment. Count One of the Indict-
ment charges the defendants with conspiring or having a common
plan to commit crimes against peace. Count Two of the Indictment
charges the defendants with committing specific crimes against
peace by planning, preparing, initiating, and waging wars of
aggression against a number of other States. It will be convenient
to consider the question of the existence of a common plan and the
question of aggressive war together, and to deal later in this Judg-
ment with the question of the individual responsibility of the
defendants.
The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and
waged aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is
essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the
belligerent States alone, but affect the whole world.
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an inter-
national crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only
from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumu-
lated evil of the whole.
The first acts of aggression referred to in the Indictment are the
seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; and the first war of aggres-
sion charged in the Indictment is the war against Poland begun on
1 September 1939.
Before examining that charge it is necessary to look more closely
at some of the events which preceded these acts of aggression. The
war against Poland did not come suddenly out of an otherwise clear
sky; the evidence has made it plain that this war of aggression,
as well as the seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia, was pre-
meditated and carefully prepared, and was not undertaken until the
moment was thought opportune for it to be carried through as a
definite part of the pre-ordained scheme and plan. For the aggressive
designs of the Nazi Government were not accidents arising out of
the immediate political situation in Europe and the world; they
were a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign policy.

186
 From the beginning, the National Socialist movement claimed
that its was to unite the German People in the consciousness
object
of their mission and destiny, based on inherent qualities of race,
and under the guidance of the Führer.
For its achievement, two things were deemed to be essential: the
disruption of the European order as it had existed since the Treaty
of Versailles, and the creation of a Greater Germany beyond the
frontiers of 1914. This necessarily involved the seizure of foreign
territories.
War was seen to be inevitable, or at the very least, highly prob-
able, these purposes were to be accomplished. The German People,
if

therefore, with all their resources, were to be organized as a great

political-military army, schooled to obey without question any policy
decreed by the State.

Preparation for Aggression

In Mein Kampf had made this view quite plain. It must
Hitler
be remembered that Mein Kampf was no mere private diary in
which the secret thoughts of Hitler were set down. Its contents were
rather proclaimed from the house-tops. It was used in the schools
and Universities and among the Hitler Youth, in the SS and the SA,
and among the German People generally, even down to the presen-
tation of an official copy to all newly-married people. By the year
1945 over 6V2 million copies had been circulated. The general
contents are well known. Over and over again Hitler asserted his
belief in the necessity of force as the means of solving international
problems, as in the following quotation:
"The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by
Heaven on our forefathers. They had to conquer it by risking
their lives.So also in the future, our people will not obtain
territory,and therewith the means of existence, as a favor
from any other people, but will have to win it by the power
of a triumphant sword."
Mein Kampf contains many such passages, and the extolling of force
as an instrument of foreign policy is openly proclaimed.
The precise objectives of this policy of force are also set forth in
detail. The very first page of the book asserts that "German- Austria
must be restored to the great German Motherland," not on economic
grounds, but because "people of the same blood should be in the
same Reich."
The restoration of the German frontiers of 1914 is declared to be
wholly insufficient, and if Germany is to exist at all, it must be as
a world power with the necessary territorial magnitude.
Mein Kampf is quite explicit in stating where the increased
territory is to be found:

187
 "Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line
through the line of conduct followed by pre-war Germany in
foreign policy. We put an end to the perpetual Germanic
march towards the South and West of Europe, and turn our
eyes towards the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to
the colonial and trade policy of the pre-war times, and pass
over to the territorial policy of the future.
"But when we speak of new territory in Europe today, we
must think principally of Russia and the border states subject
to her."
Mein Kampf is not to be regarded as a mere literary exercise,
nor as an inflexible policy or plan incapable of modification.
Its importance lies in the unmistakable attitude of aggression
revealed throughout its pages.

The Planning of Aggression

Evidence from captured documents has revealed that Hitler held
four secret meetings to which the Tribunal proposes to make special
reference because of the light they shed upon the question of the
common plan and aggressive war.
These meetings took place on 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939,
22 August 1939, and 23 November 1939.
At these meetings important declarations were made by Hitler
as to his purposes, which are quite unmistakable in their terms.
The documents which record what took place at these meetings
have been subject to some criticism at the hands of defending
Counsel.
Their essential authenticity is not denied, but it is said, for
example, that they do not purpose to be verbatim transcripts of the
speeches they record, that the document dealing with the meeting
on 5 November 1937, was dated five days after the meeting had
taken place, and that the two documents dealing with the meeting
of 22 August 1939 differ from one another, and are unsigned.
Making the fullest allowance for criticism of this kind, the Tri-
bunal is of opinion that the documents are documents of the highest
value, and that their authenticity and substantial truth are
established.
They are obviously careful records of the events they describe,
and they have been preserved as such in the archives of the German
Government, from whose custody they were captured. Such docu-
ments could never be dismissed as inventions, nor even as inaccurate
or distorted; they plainly record events which actually took place.

Conferences of 23 November 1939 and 5 November 1937

It will perhaps be useful to deal first of all with the meeting of
23 November 1939, when Hitler called his Supreme Commanders

188
together. A record was made of what was said, by one of those
present. At the dateof the meeting, Austria and Czechoslovakia had
been incorporated into the German Reich, Poland had been con-
quered by the German Armies, and the war with Great Britain and
France was still in its static phase. The moment was opportune for
a review of past events. Hitler informed the Commanders that the
purpose of the Conference was to give them an idea of the world
of his thoughts, and to tell them his decision. He thereupon reviewed
his political task since 1919, and referred to the secession of Ger-
many from the League of Nations, the denunciation of the Disarma-
ment Conference, the order for re-armament, the introduction of
compulsory armed service, the occupation of the Rhineland, the
seizure of Austria, and the action against Czechoslovakia. He stated:
"One year Austria came; this step also was considered
later,
doubtful. Itbrought about a considerable reinforcement of the
Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This
step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign.
First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was
not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me
from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the
Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution.
The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed
the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for
the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at
that time whether I should start first against the East and
then in the West or vice versa .... Basically I did not organize
the Armed
Forces in order not to strike. The decision to
strikewas always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve
the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the East
was to be attacked first."
This address, reviewing past events and re-affirming the aggres-
from the beginning, puts beyond any question
sive intentions present
of doubt the character of the actions against Austria and Czecho-
slovakia, and the war against Poland.
For they had all been accomplished according to plan; and the
nature of that plan must now be examined in a little more detail.
At the meeting of 23 November 1939 Hitler was looking back to
things accomplished; at the earlier meetings now to be considered,
he was looking forward, and revealing his plans to his confederates.
The comparison is instructive.
The meeting held at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 No-
vember 1937 was attended by Lieutenant Colonel Hossbach, Hitler's
personal adjutant, who compiled a long note of the proceedings,
which he dated 10 November 1937 and signed.

189
 The persons present were and the Defendants Goring,
Hitler,
Von Neurath, and Raeder, Commander-in-Chief
in their capacities as
of the Luftwaffe, Reich Foreign Minister, and Commander-in-Chief
of the Navy respectively, General Von Blomberg, Minister of War,
and General Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Hitler began by saying that the subject of the conference was of
such high importance that in other States it would have taken place
before the Cabinet. He went on to say that the subject matter of
his speech was the result of his detailed deliberations, and of his
experiences during his four and a half years of Government. He
requested that the statements he was about to make should be
looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.
Hitler's main theme was the problem of living space, and he dis-
cussed various possible solutions, only to set them aside. He then
said that the seizure of living space on the continent of Europe was
therefore necessary, expressing himself in these words:
"It isnot a case of conquering people but of conquering agri-
culturally useful space. Itwould also be more to the purpose
to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly
adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would
have to be brought into effect for one or two generations ....
The history of times — Roman Empire, British Empire
all
— has proved that every space expansion can only be effected
by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable: neither formerly nor today has space been found
without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the
proprietor."
He concluded with this observation:
"The question for Germany is where the greatest possible
conquest could be made at the lowest cost."
Nothing could indicate more plainly the aggressive intentions of
Hitler, and the events which soon followed showed the reality of
his purpose. It impossible to accept the contention that Hitler did
is

not actually mean war; for after pointing out that Germany might
expect the opposition of England and France, and analyzing the
strength and the weakness of those powers in particular situations,
he continued:
"The German question can be solved only by way of force,
and this is never without risk .... If we place the decision
to apply force with risk at the head of the following exposi-
tions, then we are left to reply to the questions 'when' and
'how'. In this regard we have to decide upon three different
cases."

190
The first of these three cases set forth a hypothetical international
situation, in which he would take action not later than 1943 to 1945,
saying:
"If the Führer is still living then it will be his irrevocable
decision to solve the German space problem not later than
1943 to 1945. The necessity for action before 1943 to 1945 will
come under consideration in Cases 2 and 3."
The second and third cases to which Hitler referred show the plain
intention to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in this connection
Hitler said:
"For the improvement of our military-political position, it
must be our first aim in every case of entanglement by war
to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in
order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a
possible advance westwards."
He further added:
"The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and
politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to
shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel
for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new
armies up to a strength of about twelve divisions."
This decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was discussed in
some detail; the action was to be taken as soon as a favorable oppor-
tunity presented itself.
The military strength which Germany had been building up since
1933 was now to be directed at the two specific countries, Austria
and Czechoslovakia.
The Defendant Goring testified that he did not believe at that
time that Hitler actually meant to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia,
and that the purpose of the conference was only to put pressure
on Von Fritsch to speed up the re-armament of the Army.
The Defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor Von Fritsch,
nor Von Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually meant war, a con-
viction which the Defendant Raeder claims that he held up to
22 August 1939. The basis of this conviction was his hope that Hitler
would obtain a "political solution" of Germany's problems. But
all that this means, when examined, is the belief that Ger-
many's position would be so good, and Germany's armed might
so overwhelming that the territory desired could be obtained
without fighting for it. It must be remembered too that Hitler s
declared intention with regard to Austria was actually carried out
within a little over four months from the date of the meeting, and
within less than a year the first portion of Czechoslovakia was absorb-
ed, and Bohemia and Moravia a few months later. If any doubts

191
had existed in the minds of any of his hearers in November 1937,
afterMarch 1939 there could no longer be any question that Hitler
was in deadly earnest in his decision to resort to war. The Tribunal
is Lieutenant Colonel Hossbach's account of the meeting
satisfied that
is and that those present knew that Austria
substantially correct,
and Czechoslovakia would be annexed by Germany at the first
possible opportunity.

The Seizure of Austria

The invasion was a pre-meditated aggressive step in
of Austria
furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries.
As a result Germany's flank was protected, that of Czechoslovakia
being greatly weakened. The first step had been taken in the seizure
of "Lebensraum"; many new divisions of trained fighting men had
been acquired; and with the seizure of foreign exchange reserves,
the re-armament program had been greatly strengthened.
On 21 May 1935 Hitler announced in the Reichstag that Germany
did not intend either to attack Austria or to interfere in her internal
affairs.On 1 May 1936 he publicly coupled Czechoslovakia with
Austria in his avowal of peaceful intentions; and so late as 11 July
1936 he recognized by treaty the full sovereignty of Austria.
Austria was in fact seized by Germany in the month of March
1938. For a number of years before that date, the National Socialists
in Germany had been cooperating with the National Socialists of
Austria with the ultimate object of incorporating Austria into the
German Reich. The Putsch of 25 July 1934, which resulted in the
assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, had the seizure of Austria as
its object; but the Putsch failed, with the consequence that the
National Socialist Party was outlawed in Austria. On 11 July 1936
an agreement was entered into between the two countries, Article 1
of which stated: "The German Government recognizes the full
sovereignty of the Federated State of Austria in the spirit of the
pronouncements of the German Führer and Chancellor of 21 May
1935."
Article 2 declared: "Each of the two Governments regards the
inner political order (including the question of Austrian National
Socialism) obtaining in the other country as an internal affair of
the other country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor
indirect influence."
The National Socialist movement in Austria however continued
its illegal under cover of secrecy; and the National
activities
Socialists of Germany gave the Party active support. The resulting
"incidents" were seized upon by the German National Socialists as
an excuse for interfering in Austrian affairs. After the conference
of 5 November 1937, these "incidents" rapidly multiplied. The

192
relationship between the two countries steadily worsened, and finally
the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg was persuaded by the Defend-
ant Von Papen and others to seek a conference with Hitler, which
took place at Berchtesgaden on 12 February 1938. The Defendant
Keitel was present at the conference, and Dr. Schuschnigg was
threatened by Hitler with an immediate invasion of Austria.
Schuschnigg finally agreed to grant a political amnesty to various
Nazis convicted of crime, and to appoint the Nazi Seyss-Inquart as
Minister of the Interior and Security with control of the Police. On
9 March 1938, in an attempt to preserve the independence of his
country, Dr. Schuschnigg decided to hold a plebiscite on the question
of Austrian independence, which was fixed for 13 March 1938. Hitler,
two days later, sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg that the plebiscite
must be withdrawn. In the afternoon and evening of 11 March 1938
the Defendant Goring made a series of demands upon the Austrian
Government, each backed up by the threat of invasion. After
Schuschnigg had agreed to the cancellation of the plebiscite, another
demand was put forward that Schuschnigg must resign, and that the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart should be appointed Chancellor. In conse-
quence, Schuschnigg resigned, and President Miklas, after at first
refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, gave way and
appointed him.
Meanwhile Hitler had given the final order for the German troops
border at dawn on 12 March and instructed Seyss-Inquart
to cross the
to use formations of Austrian National Socialists to depose Miklas
and to seize control of the Austrian Government. After the order to
march had been given to the German troops, Goring telephoned the
German Embassy in Vienna and dictated a telegram which he
wished Seyss-Inquart to send to Hitler to justify the military action
which had already been ordered.
It was:
"The provisional Austrian Government, which, after the dis-
missal of the Schuschnigg Government, considers its task to
establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German
Government the urgent request to support it in its task and
to help it to prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the
German Government to send German troops as soon as
possible."
Keppler, an official of the German Embassy, replied: "Well, SA
and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet."
After some further discussion, Goring stated: "Please show him
(Seyss-Inquart) the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are
asking him —well, he doesn't even have to send the telegram. All
he needs to do is to say 'Agreed'."

193
 Seyss-Inquart never sent the telegram; he never even telegraphed
"Agreed".
It appears that as soon as he was appointed Chancellor, some time
after 10 p.m., he called Keppler and told him to call up Hitler and
transmit his protests against the occupation. This action outraged
the Defendant Goring, because "it would disturb the rest of the
Führer, who wanted to go to Austria the next day". At 11:15 p.m.
an official in the Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin telephoned the
German Embassy in Vienna and was told by Keppler: "Tell the
General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees".
At daybreak on 12 March 1938 German troops marched into
Austria, and met with no resistance. It was announced in the German
press that Seyss-Inquart had been appointed the successor to Schusch-
nigg,and the telegram which Goring had suggested, but which was
never sent, was quoted to show that Seyss-Inquart had requested the
presence of German troops to prevent disorder. On 13 March 1938
a law was passed for the reunion of Austria in the German Reich.
Seyss-Inquart demanded that President Miklas should sign this law,
but he refused to do so, and resigned his office. He was succeeded
by Seyss-Inquart, who signed the law in the name of Austria. This
law was then adopted as a law of the Reich by a Reich Cabinet
decree issued the same day, and signed by Hitler and the Defend-
ants Göring, Frick, Von Ribbentrop, and Hess.
It was contended before the Tribunal that the annexation of
Austria was justified by the strong desire expressed in many
quarters for the union of Austria and Germany; that there were
many matters in common between the two peoples that made this
union desirable; and that in the result the object was achieved
without bloodshed.
These matters, even if true, are really immaterial, for the facts
plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve the object were
those of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of
Germany ready to be used if any resistance was encountered.
Moreover, none of these considerations appear from the Hossbach
account of the meetings of 5 November 1937 to have been the
motives which actuated Hitler; on the contrary, all the emphasis is
there laid on the advantage to be gained by Germany in her mili-
tary strength by the annexation of Austria.

The Seizure of Czechoslovakia

The conference November 1937 made it quite plain that the

of 5
seizure of Czechoslovakiaby Germany had been definitely decided
upon. The only question remaining was the selection of the suitable
moment to do it. On 4 March 1938 the Defendant Von Ribbentrop

194
wrote to the Defendant Keitel with regard to a suggestion made to
Von Ribbentrop by the Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin, that
possible war aims against Czechoslovakia should be discussed be-
tween the German and Hungarian Armies. In the course of this ietter
Von Ribbentrop said:
"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we
should discuss with Hungary possible war aims against
Czechoslovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well
would be informed about this."
On 11 March 1938 Goring made two separate statements to
M. Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that
the developments then taking place in Austria would in no way
have any detrimental influence on the relations between the German
Reich and Czechoslovakia, and emphasized the continued earnest
endeavor on the part of the Germans to improve those mutual
relations. On 12 March Goring asked M. Mastny to call on him, and
repeated these assurances.
This design to keep Czechoslovakia quiet whilst Austria was
absorbed was a typical maneuver on the part of the Defendant
Goring, which he was to repeat later in the case of Poland, when
he made the most strenuous efforts to isolate Poland in the impend-
ing struggle. On the same day, 12 March, the Defendant Von Neurath
spoke with M. Mastny, and assured him on behalf of Hitler that
Germany still considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak
Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in October 1925.
that after the occupation of Austria by the
The evidence shows
German Army on March and the annexation of Austria on
12
13 March, Conrad Henlein, who was the leader of the Sudeten
German Party in Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin on 28 March.
On the following day, at a conference in Berlin, when Von Ribben-
trop was present with Henlein, the general situation was discussed,
and later the Defendant Jodl recorded in his diary:
"After the annexation of Austria the Führer mentions that
there is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria
has to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case
Grün (that is, the plan against Czechoslovakia) will have to
be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly
prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because
of the annexation of Austria."
On 21 April 1938 a discussion took place between Hitler and the
Defendant Keitel with regard "Case Grün", showing quite clearly
to
that the preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were being
fully considered. On 28 May 1938 Hitler ordered that preparations
should be made for military action against Czechoslovakia by the

195
2nd October, and from then onwards the plan to invade Czecho-
slovakia was constantly under review. On 30 May 1938 a directive
signed by Hitler declared his "unalterable decision to smash Czecho-
slovakia by military action in the near future".
In June 1938 as appears from a captured document taken from
the files of the SD in Berlin, an elaborate plan for the employment
of the SD in Czechoslovakia had been proposed. This plan provided
that "the SD follow, if possible, immediately after the leading troops,
and take upon themselves the duties similar to their tasks in Ger-
many . . .
."

Gestapo were assigned to co-operate with the SD in

officials
certain operations. Special agents were to be trained beforehand to
prevent sabotage, and these agents were to be notified "before the
attack in due time ... in order to give them the possibility to hide
themselves, avoid arrest and deportation ... At the beginning,
guerrilla or partisan warfare is to be expected, therefore weapons
are necessary . . .
."

Files of information were to be compiled with notations as

follows: "To arrest." "To liquidate." "To confiscate." "To deprive
of passport." etc.
The plan provided for the temporary division of the country into
larger and smaller territorial units, and considered various "sug-
gestions", as they were termed, for the incorporation into the
German Reich of the inhabitants and districts of Czechoslovakia.
The final "suggestion" included the whole country, together with
Slovakia and Carpathian Russia, with a population of nearly
15 millions.
The plan was modified in some respects in September after the
Munich Conference, but the fact the plan existed in such exact
detail and was couched in such war-like language indicated a
calculated design to resort to force.
On 31 August 1938 Hitler approved a memorandum by Jodl dated
24 August 1938, concerning the timing of the order for the invasion
of Czechoslovakia and the question of defense measures. This memo-
randum contained the following:
"Operation Grün will be set in motion by means of an
'incident' in Czechoslovakia, which will give Germany provo-
cation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time
for this incident is of the utmost importance."
These facts demonstrate that the occupation of Czechoslovakia had
been planned in detail long before the Munich Conference.
In the month of September 1938 the conferences and talks with
military leaders continued. In view of the extraordinarily critical
situation which had arisen, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Cham-

196
berlain, flew to Munich and then went to Berchtesgaden to see
Hitler. On
22 September Mr. Chamberlain met Hitler for further
discussions at Bad Godesberg. On 26 September 1938 Hitler said in
a speech in Berlin, with reference to his conversation:
"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems

for Germany in Europe; and I further assured him that from

the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems,
that is to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement
with their other minorities, peacefully and without oppression,
I will be no longer interested in the Czech State, and that as
far as I am concerned I will guarantee it. We don't want any
Czechs."
On 29 September 1938, after a conference between Hitler and
Mussolini and the British and French Prime Ministers in Munich, the
Munich Pact was signed, by which Czechoslovakia was required to
acquiesce in the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The "piece
of paper" which the British Prime Minister brought back to London,
signed by himself and Hitler, expressed the hope that for the future
Britain and Germany might live without war. That Hitler never
intended to adhere to the Munich Agreement is shown by the fact
that a little later he asked the Defendant Keitel for information
with regard to the military force which in his opinion would be
required to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and Moravia.
Keitel gave his reply on 11 October 1938. On 21 October 1938 a
directive was issued by Hitler, and countersigned by the Defendant
Keitel, to the Armed Forces on their future tasks, which stated:
"Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. It must be
possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia
if her policy should become hostile towards Germany."

On 14 March 1939 the Czech President Hacha and his Foreign

Minister Chvalkovsky came to Berlin at the suggestion of Hitler, and
attended a meeting at which the Defendants Von Ribbentrop, Goring,
and Keitel were present, with others. The proposal was made to
Hacha that if he would sign an agreement consenting to the incor-

poration of the Czech people in the German Reich at once, Bohemia

and Moravia would be saved from destruction. He was informed
that German troops had already received orders to march and that
any resistance would be broken with physical force. The Defendant
Goring added the threat that he would destroy Prague completely
from the air. Faced by this dreadful alternative, Hacha and his
Foreign Minister put their signatures to the necessary agreement at
4:30 in the morning, and Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on behalf of
Germany.

197
 On 15 March German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia, and
on 16 March the German decree was issued incorporating Bohemia
and Moravia into the Reich as a protectorate, and this decree was
signed by the Defendants Von Ribbentrop and Frick.

The Aggression against Poland

By March 1939 the plan to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia,
which had been discussed by Hitler at the meeting of 5 November
1937, had been accomplished. The time had now come for the
German leaders to consider further acts of aggression, made more
possible of attainment because of that accomplishment.
On 23 May 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler's study in the new
Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler announced his decision to attack
Poland and gave his reasons, and discussed the effect the decision
might have on other countries. In point of time, this was the second
of the important meetings to which reference has already been
made, and in order to appreciate the full significance of what was
said and done, it is necessary to state shortly some of the main
events in the history of German-Polish relations.
As long ago as the year 1925 an Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Poland had been made at Locarno, providing for the
settlement of all disputes between the two countries. On 26 January
1934, a German-Polish declaration of non-aggression was made,
signed on behalf of the German Government by the Defendant
Von Neurath. On 30 January 1934, and again on 30 January 1937
Hitler made speeches in the Reichstag in which he expressed his
view that Poland and Germany could work together in harmony
and peace. On 20 February 1938 Hitler made a third speech in the
Reichstag in the course of which he said with regard to Poland:
"And so the way to a friendly understanding has been success-
fully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Danzig,
has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief makers,
succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations be-
tween Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sin-
cere, friendly cooperation .... Relying on her friendships,
Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal
which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead
of us — peace."
On 26 September 1938, in the middle of the crisis over the Sude-
tenland, Hitler made the speech in Berlin which has already been
quoted, and announced that he had informed the British Prime
Minister that when the Czechoslovakian problem was solved there
would be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe.
Nevertheless, on 24 November same year, an OKW directive
of the

198
was issued to the German Armed Forces to make preparations for
an attack upon Danzig; it stated:
"The Führer has ordered:
(1) . .Preparations are also to be made to enable the Free
.

State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise."

In spite of having ordered military preparations for the occupation
of Danzig, Hitler on 30 January 1939 said in a speech in the Reichs-
tag: "During the troubled months of the past year, the friendship
between Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors
in the political life of Europe."
Five days previously, on 25 January 1939, Von Ribbentrop said
in the course of a speech in Warsaw: "Thus Poland and Germany
can look forward to the future with full confidence in the solid basis
of their mutual relations."
Following on the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Ger-
many on 15 March 1939, which was a flagrant breach of the Munich
Agreement, Great Britain gave an assurance to Poland on 31 March
1939 that in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish
independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly con-
sidered it vital to resist with their National Forces, Great Britain
would feel itself bound at once to lend Poland all the support in its
power. The French Government took the same stand. It is interesting
to note in this connection, that one of the arguments frequently
presented by the Defense in the present case is that the Defendants
were induced to think that their conduct was not in breach of inter-
national law by the acquiescence of other Powers. The declarations
of Great Britain and France showed, at least, that this view could
be held no longer.
On 3 April 1939 a revised OKW directive was issued to the
Armed Forces, which after referring to the question of Danzig made
reference to Fall Weiss (the military code name for the German
invasion of Poland) and stated:
"The Führer has added the following directions to Fall Weiss.
(1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the
operation can be carried out at any time from 1 September
1939 onwards. (2) The High Command of the Armed Forces
has been directed to draw up a precise timetable for Fall
Weiss and to arrange by conferences the synchronized timings
between the three branches of the Armed Forces."
On 11 April 1939 a further directive was signed by Hitler and
issued to the Armed Forces, and in one of the annexes to that docu-
ment the words occur:
"Quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland how-
ever adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, 'a final
settlement' will be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with

199
 Poland. The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength,
and to create in the East a situation which satisfies the require-
ments of defense. The Free State of Danzig will be incor-
porated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the
latest. Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland, and this
is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France,

and British restraint as a result of this."

In spite of the contents of those two directives, Hitler made a
speech in the Reichstag on 28 April 1939 in which, after describing
the Polish Government's alleged rejection of an offer he had made
with regard to Danzig and the Polish Corridor, he stated:

"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the

Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the
worst is that now Poland like Czechoslovakia a year ago
believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign,
that it must call up its troops, although Germany on her part
has not called up a single man, and had not thought of pro -

ceeding in any way against Poland . . The intention to

.

attack on the part of Germany which was merely invented

by the international press ."
. .

It was four weeks after making this speech that Hitler, on 23 May
1939, held the important military conference to which reference has
already been made. Among the persons present were the Defendants
Goring, Raeder, and Keitel. The adjutant on duty that day was
Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt, and he made a record of what hap-
pened, certifying it with his signature as a correct record.
The purpose of the meeting was to enable Hitler to inform the
heads of the Armed Forces and their staffs of his views on the poli-
tical situation and his future aims. After analyzing the political
situation and reviewing the course of events since 1933, Hitler
announced his decision to attack Poland. He admitted that the
quarrel with Poland over Danzig was not the reason for this attack,
but the necessity for Germany to enlarge her living space and secure
her food supplies. He said:
"The solution of the problem demands courage. The principle
by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself
to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather
be adapted to needs. This is impossible without invasion of
foreign States or attacks upon foreign property."
Later in his address he added:
"There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are
left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech
affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The

200
 success of the isolation will be decisive .... The isolation of
Poland is a matter of skillful politics."
Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt's record of the meeting reveals that
Hitler fully realized the possibility of Great Britain and France
coming to Poland's assistance. If, therefore, the isolation of Poland
could not be achieved, Hitler was of the opinion that Germany should
attack Great Britain and France first, or at any rate should concen-
trate primarily on the war in the West, in order to defeat Great
Britain and France quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness.
Nevertheless, Hitler stressed that war with England and France
would be a life and death struggle, which might last a long time,
and that preparations must be made accordingly.
During the weeks which followed this conference, other meetings
were held and directives were issued in preparation for the war.
The Defendant Von Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to negotiate a
non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.
On 22 August 1939 there took place the important meeting of
that day, to which reference has already been made. The Prosecution
have put in evidence two unsigned captured documents which appear
to be records made of this meeting by persons who were present.
The first document is headed: "The Führer's Speech to the Com-
manders-in-Chief on 22 August 1939." The purpose of the speech
was to announce the decision to make war on Poland at once, and
Hitler began by saying:
"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come
sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring,
but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few
years, and only afterwards against the East ... I wanted to
establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to
fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable
to me, could not be executed since essential points have
changed. It became clear to me that Poland would attack us
in case of a conflict with the West."
Hitler then went on to explain why he had decided that the most
favorable moment had arrived for starting the war:
"Now", said Hitler, "Poland is in the position in which I
wanted her .... I am only afraid that at the last moment
some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation ....
A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's
hegemony."
This document closely resembles one of the documents put in
evidence on behalf of the Defendant Raeder. This latter document
consists of a summary of the same speech, compiled on the day it
was made, by one Admiral Boehm, from notes he had taken during

201
the meeting. In substance it says that the moment had arrived to
settle the dispute with Poland by military invasion, that although
a conflict between Germany and the West was unavoidable in the
long run, the likelihood of Great Britain and France coming to
Poland's assistance was not great, and that even if a war in the
West should come about, the first aim should be the crushing of the
Polish military strength. It also contains a statement by Hitler that
an appropriate propaganda reason for invading Poland would be
given, the truth or falsehood of which was unimportant, since "the
Right lies in Victory".
The second unsigned document put in evidence by the Prose-
cution is headed: "Second Speech by the Führer on 22 Äugust 1939",
and is in the form of notes of the main points made by Hitler. Some
of these are as follows:
"Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were
determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.
Struggle for life or death destruction of Poland in the
. . .

foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the

arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the
West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objec-
tive. I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war —
never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall
not be asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In
starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters,
but Victory .... The start will be ordered probably by Satur-
day morning." (That is to say, 26 August.)
In spite of being described as a second speech, there are suffi-
it

cient points of similarity with the two previously mentioned docu-

ments to make it appear very probable that this is an account of
the same speech, not as detailed as the other two, but in substance
the same.
These three documents establish that the final decision as to the
date of Poland's destruction, which had been agreed upon and
planned earlier in the year, was reached by Hitler shortly before
22 August 1939. They also show that although he hoped to be able
to avoid having to fight Great Britain and France as well, he fully
realized there was a risk of this happening, but it was a risk which
he was determined to take.
The events of the last days of August confirm this determination.
On 22 August 1939, the same day as the speech just referred to, the
British Prime Minister wrote a letter to Hitler, in which he said:
"Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to
you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the
greatest calamity that could occur."
On 23 August Hitler replied:

202
 "The question of the treatment of European problems on a
peaceful basis is not a decision which rests with Germany, but
primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Ver-
sailles Diktat have stubbornly and consistently opposed any
peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of
the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the
relationship between England and Germany."
There followed a number of appeals to Hitler to refrain from fore- .

ing the Polish issue to the point of war. These were from President
Roosevelt on 24 and 25 August; from his Holiness the Pope on 24
and 31 August; and from M. Daladier, the Prime Minister of France,
on 26 August. All these appeals fell on deaf ears.
On 25 August, Great Britain signed a pact of mutual assistance
with Poland, which reinforced the undertaking she had given to
Poland earlier in the year. This, coupled with the news of Mussolini's
unwillingness to enter the war on Germany's side, made Hitler
hesitate for a moment. The invasion of Poland, which was timed
to start on 26 August, was postponed until a further attempt had
been made to persuade Great Britain not to intervene. Hitler offered
to enter into a comprehensive agreement with Great Britain, once
the Polish question had been settled. In reply to this, Great Britain
made a counter-suggestion for the settlement of the Polish dispute
by negotiation. On 29 August Hitler informed the British Ambassador
that the German Government, though skeptical as to the result,
would be prepared to enter into direct negotiations with a Polish
emissary, provided he arrived in Berlin with plenipotentiary powers
by midnight for the following day, 30 August. The Polish Govern-
ment were informed of this, but with the example of Schuschnigg
and Hacha before them, they decided not to send such an emissary.
At midnight on 30 August the Defendant Von Ribbentrop read to
the British Ambassador at top speed a document containing the first
precise formulation of the German demands against Poland. He
refused, however, to give the Ambassador a copy of this, and stated
that in any case it was too late now, since no Polish plenipotentiary
had arrived.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the manner in which these
negotiations were conducted by Hitler and Von Ribbentrop showed
that they were not entered into in good faith or with any desire
to maintain peace, but solely in the attempt to prevent Great Brit-
ain and France from honoring their obligations to Poland.
Parallel with these negotiations were the unsuccessful attempts
made by Goring to effect the isolation of Poland by persuading Great
Britain not to stand by her pledged word, through the services of
one Birger Dahlerus, a Swede. Dahlerus, who was called as a witness
by Goring, had a considerable knowledge of England and things

203
English, and in July 1939 was anxious to bring about a better under-
standing between England and Germany, in the hope of preventing
a war between the two countries. He got into contact with Goring
as well as with official circles in London, and during the latter part
of August, Goring used him as an unofficial intermediary to try
and deter the British Government from their opposition to Ger-
many's intentions towards Poland. Dahlerus, of course, had no
knowledge at the time of the decision which Hitler had secretly
announced on 22 August, nor of the German military directives for
the attack on Poland which were already in existence. As he
admitted in his evidence, it was not until 26 September, after the
conquest of Poland was virtually complete, that he first realized that
Göring's aim all along had been to get Great Britain's consent to
Germany's seizure of Poland.
After attempts to persuade Germany to agree to a settlement
all
of her dispute with Poland on a reasonable basis had failed, Hitler,
on 31 August, issued his final directive, in which he announced that
the attack on Poland would start in the early morning of 1 Sep-
tember, and gave instructions as to what action would be taken if
Great Britain and France should enter the war in defense of Poland.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the events of the days immediately
preceding 1 September 1939 demonstrate the determination of Hitler

and his associates to carry out the declared intention of invading

Poland at all costs, despite appeals from every quarter. With the
ever increasing evidence before him that this intention would lead
to war with Great Britain and France as well, Hitler was resolved
not to depart from the course he had set for himself. The Tribunal
is fully satisfied by the evidence that the war initiated by Germany
against Poland on 1 September 1939 was most plainly an aggressive
war, which was to develop in due course into a war which embraced
almost the whole world, and resulted in the commission of countless
crimes, both against the laws and customs of war, and against
humanity.

The Invasion of Denmark and Norway

The aggressive war against Poland was but the beginning. The
aggression of Nazi Germany quickly spread from country to country.
In point of time the first two countries to suffer were Denmark and
Norway.
On 31 May 1939 a Treaty of Non- Agression was made between
Germany and Denmark, and signed by the Defendant Von Ribben-
trop. It was there solemnly stated that the parties to the Treaty
were "firmly resolved to maintain peace between Denmark and Ger-
many under all circumstances." Nevertheless, Germany invaded
Denmark on 9 April 1940.

204
 On 2 September 1939, after the outbreak of war with Poland,
Germany sent a solemn assurance to Norway in these terms:
"The German Reich Government is determined in view of the
friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany
under no circumstance to prejudice the inviolability and in-
tegrity of Norway, and to respect the territory of the Nor-
wegian State. In making this declaration the Reich Govern-
ment naturally expects, on its side, that Norway will observe
an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and will not
tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any third
party which might occur. Should the attitude of the Royal
Norwegian Government differ from this so that any such
breach of neutrality by a third party occurs, the Reich Govern-
ment would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the
interests of the Reich in such a way as the resulting situation
might dictate."
On 9 April 1940, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, Norway was
invaded by Germany.
The idea of attacking Norway originated, it appears, with the
Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. On 3 October 1939 Raeder
prepared a memorandum on the subject of "gaining bases in Nor-
way", and amongst the questions discussed was the question: "Can
bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is
impossible to carry this out without fighting?" Despite this fact, three
days later, further assurances were given to Norway by Germany,
which stated: "Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or
even points of controversy with the Northern States and neither
has she any today." #
Three days later again, the Defendant Dönitz prepared a memo-
randum on the same subject of bases in Norway, and suggested the
establishment of a base in Trondheim with an alternative of supply-
ing fuel in Narvik. At the same time the Defendant Raeder was in
correspondence with Admiral Karls, who pointed out to him the
importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany.
On 10 October Raeder reported to Hitler the disadvantages to Ger-
many which an occupation by the British would have. In the months
of October and November Raeder continued to work on the possible
occupation of Norway, in conjunction with the "Rosenberg Organi-
zation." The "Rosenberg Organization" was the Foreign Affairs
Bureau of the NSDAP, and Rosenberg as Reichsleiter was in charge
of it. Early in December, Quisling, the notorious Norwegian traitor,
visited Berlin and was seen by the Defendants Rosenberg and
Raeder. He put forward a plan for a coup d'état in Norway. On
12 December the Defendant Raeder and the naval staff, together
with the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, had a conference with Hitler,

205
when Raeder reported on his interview with Quisling, and set out
Quisling's views. On 16 December Hitler himself interviewed Quis-
ling on all these matters. In the report of the activities of the
Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP for the years 1933-43, under
the heading of "Political Preparations for the Military Occupation
of Norway", it is stated that at the interview with Quisling Hitler
said that he would prefer a neutral attitude on the part of Norway
as well as the whole of Scandinavia, as he did not desire to extend
the theater of war, or to draw other nations into the conflict. If the
enemy attempted to extend the war he would be compelled to guard
himself against that undertaking. He promised Quisling financial
support, and assigned to a special military staff the examination of
the military questions involved.
On 27 January 1940 a memorandum was prepared by the Defend-
ant Keitel regarding the plans for the invasion of Norway. On
28 February 1940 the Defendant Jodl entered in his diary: "I pro-
posed first to the Chief of OKW
and then to the Führer that Case
Yellow (that is the operation against the Netherlands) and Weser
Exercise (that is the operation against Norway and Denmark) must
be prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one
another as regards both time and forces employed."
On 1 March Hitler issued a directive regarding the Weser Exercise
which contained the words:
"The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the
making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark
and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces. This
operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia
>and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in
Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line
against Britain .... The crossing of the Danish border and
the landings in Norway must take place simultaneously ....
It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as
the Western opponents should be taken by surprise by our
measures."
On 24 March the naval operation orders for the Weser Exercise were
issued, and on 30 March the Defendant Dönitz as Commander-in-
Chief of U-boats issued his operational order for the occupation of
Denmark and Norway. On 9 April 1940 the German forces invaded
Norway and Denmark.
From this narrative it is clear that as early as October 1939 the
question of invading Norway was under consideration. The defense
that has been made here is that Germany was compelled to attack
Norway to forestall an Allied invasion, and her action was therefore
preventive.

206
 It must be remembered that preventive action in foreign terri-
tory is justified only in case of "an instant and overwhelming neces-
sity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of
deliberation" (The Caroline Case, Moore's Digest of International
Law, II, 412). How widely the view was held in influential German
circles that the Allies intended to occupy Norway cannot be deter-
mined with exactitude. Quisling asserted that the Allies would
intervene in Norway with the tacit consent of the Norwegian Govern-
ment. The German Legation at Oslo disagreed with this view,
although the Naval Attaché at that Legation shared it.
The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for
13 January 1940 stated that the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff
thought that the most favorable solution would be the maintenance
of the neutrality of Norway, but he harbored the firm conviction
that England intended to occupy Norway in the near future relying
on the tacit agreement of the Norwegian Government.
The directive of Hitler issued on 1 March 1940 for the attack on
Denmark and Norway stated that the operation "should prevent
British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic."
It is, however, to be remembered that the Defendant Raeder's
memorandum of 3 October 1939 makes no reference to forestalling
the Allies, but is based upon "the aim of improving our strategical
and operational position."
The memorandum itself is headed "Gaining of Bases in Norway".
The same observation applies mutatis mutandis to the memorandum
of the Defendant Dönitz of 9 October 1939.
Furthermore, on 13 March the Defendant Jodl recorded in his
diary:
"Führer does not give order yet for 'W (Weser Exercise). He
still looking for an excuse." (Justification?)
is

On 14 March 1940 he again wrote: "Führer has not yet decided what
reason to give for 'Weser Exercise' ". On 21 March 1940 he recorded
the misgivings of Task Force XXI about the long interval between
taking up readiness positions and the close of the diplomatic nego-
tiations, and added:
"Führer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for
help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up
it must be ruthlessly broken."

On 2 April he records that all the preparations are completed; on

4 April the Naval Operational Order was issued; and on 9 April, the
invasion was begun.
From all this it is clear that when the plans for an attack on
Norway were being made, they were not made for the purpose of
an imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they
forestalling
might prevent an Allied occupation at some future date.

207
 When the final orders for the German invasion of Norway were
given, the diary of the Naval Operations Staff for 23 March 1940
records: "A mass encroachment by the English into Norwegian terri-
torial waters ... isnot to be expected at the present time."
And Admiral Assmann's entry for 26 March says: "British land-
ing in Norway not considered serious."
Documents which were subsequently captured by the Germans
are relied on to show that the Allied plan to occupy harbors and air-
ports in Western Norway was a definite plan, although in all points
considerably behind the German plans under which the invasion
was actually carried out. These documents indicate that an altered
plan had been finally agreed upon on 20 March 1940, that a convoy
should leave England on 5 April, and that mining in Norwegian
waters would begin the same day; and that on 5 April the sailing
time had been postponed until 8 April. But these plans were not the
cause of the German invasion of Norway. Norway was occupied by
Germany to afford her bases from which a more effective attack
on England and France might be made, pursuant to plans prepared
long in advance of the Allied plans which are now relied on to sup-
port the argument of self-defense.
It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in
accordance with the reservations made by many of the Signatory
Powers at the time of the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
whether preventive action was a necessity, and that in making her
decision her judgment was conclusive. But whether action taken
under the claim of self-defense was in fact aggressive or defensive
must ultimately be subject to investigation and adjudication if inter-
national law is ever to be enforced.
No suggestion is made by the defendants that there was any
plan by any belligerent, other than Germany, to occupy Denmark.
No excuse for that aggression has ever been offered.
As the German Armies entered Norway and Denmark, German
memoranda were handed to the Norwegian and Danish Govern-
ments which gave the assurance that the German troops did not
come as enemies, that they did not intend to make use of the
points occupied by German troops as bases for operations against
England, as long as they were not forced to do so by measures taken
by England and France, and that they had come to protect the North
against the proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by
English-French forces.
The memoranda added that Germany had no intention of infring-
ing upon the territorial integrity and political independence of the
Kingdom of Norway then or in the future. Nevertheless, on 3 June
1940, a German naval memorandum discussed the use to be made
of Norway and Denmark, and put forward one solution for con-

208
sideration, that the territories ofDenmark and Norway acquired
during the course of the war should continue to be occupied and
organized so that they could in the future be considered as German
possessions.
In the light of all the available evidence it is impossible to ac-
cept the contention that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were
defensive, and in the opinion of the Tribunal they were acts of
aggressive war.
The Invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
The plan to seize Belgium and the Netherlands was considered
in August 1938, when the attack on Czechoslovakia was being for-
mulated, and the possibility of war with France and England was
contemplated. The advantage to Germany of being able to use these
countries for their own purposes, particularly as air bases in the
war against England and France, was emphasized. In May of 1939,
when Hitler made his irrevocable decision to attack Poland, and
foresaw the possibility at least of a war with England and France
in consequence, he told his military commanders:
"Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied .... Decla-
rations of neutrality must be ignored."
On 22 August in the same year, he told his military commanders
that England and France, in his opinion, would not "violate the
neutrality of these countries." At the same time he assured Belgium
and Holland and Luxembourg that he would respect their neutrality;
and on 6 October 1939, after the Polish campaign, he repeated this
assurance. On 7 October General Von Brauchitsch directed Army
Group B to prepare "for the immediate invasion of Dutch and
Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands." In a series
of orders, which were signed by the Defendants Keitel and Jodl,
the attack was fixed for 10 November 1939, but it was postponed
from time to time until May of 1940 on account of weather con-
ditions and transport problems.
At the conference on 23 November 1939 Hitler said:
"We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the
war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and
France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we
shall be in the greatest danger .... Certainly England and
France will assume the offensive against Germany when they
are armed. England and France have means of pressure to
bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French
help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for
France and England .... If the French Army marches into
Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We
must anticipate them .... We shall sow the English coast
with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with

209
 the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England
cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The
permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring
England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we
have occupied Belgium and Holland .... My decision is
unchangeable; I shall attack France and England at the most
favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of
Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question
that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach
of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not
break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without
attack, the war is not to be ended victoriously."
On 10 May 1940 the German forces invaded the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Luxembourg. On the same day the German Ambassa-
dors handed to the Netherlands and Belgian Governments a memo-
randum alleging that the British and French Armies, with the con-
sent of Belgium and Holland, were planning to march through
those countries to attack the Ruhr, and justifying the invasion on
these grounds. Germany, however, assured the Netherlands and
Belgium that their integrity and their possessions would be
respected. A similar memorandum was delivered to Luxembourg on
the same date.
Thereno evidence before the Tribunal to justify the conten-
is
and Luxembourg were invaded
tion that the Netherlands, Belgium,
by Germany because their occupation had been planned by England
and France. British and French staffs had been cooperating in
making certain plans for military operations in the Low Countries,
but the purpose of this planning was to defend these countries in
the event of a German attack.
The invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg was entirely
without justification.
It was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and
prepared, and was plainly an act of aggressive war. The resolve to
invade was made without any other consideration than the advance-
ment of the aggressive policies of Germany.

The Aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece

On August 1939 Hitler had a conversation with Ciano and the
12
Defendant Von Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg. He said then:
"Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for
the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process
could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one
partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing
with the uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugo-
slavia as a neutral of this kind."

210
 This observation was made only two months after Hitler had
given assurances to Yugoslavia that he would regard her frontier
as final and inviolable. On the occasion of the visit to Germany of
the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler had said in
a public speech:
"The firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to
Yugoslavia now that owing to historical events we have be-
come neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time,
will not only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples
and countries, but can also represent an element of calm to
our nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who
are disposed to perform really constructive work."
On October 1939 Germany repeated these assurances to Yugo-
6
slavia, after Hitlerand Von Ribbentrop had unsuccessfully tried to
persuade Italy to enter the war on the side of Germany by attack-
ing Yugoslavia. On 28 October 1940 Italy invaded Greece, but the
military operations met with no success. In November Hitler wrote
to Mussolini with regard to the invasion of Greece, and the exten-
sion of the war in the Balkans, and pointed out that no military
operations could take place in the Balkans before the following
March, and therefore Yugoslavia must if at all possible be won
over by other means, and in other ways. But on 12 November 1940
Hitler issued a directive for the prosecution of the war, and it in-
cluded the words: "The Balkans: The Commander-in-Chief of the
Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland
north of the Aegean Sea, in case of need entering through Bulgaria."
On 13 December he issued a directive concerning the operation
"Marita," the code name for the invasion of Greece, in which he
stated:
"1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive.

Because of a dangerous situation in Albania, it is doubly

necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create air
bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be
dangerous above all to Italy as to the Rumanian oilfields.
2. My
plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task
force in Southern Rumania within the next month, (b) after
the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to
send a task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast
by way of Bulgaria and if necessary to occupy the entire
Greek mainland."
On 20 January 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini,
at which the Defendants Von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl, and others
were present, Hitler stated:
"The massing of troops in Rumania serves a threefold purpose:

211
 (a) An operation against Greece;
(o) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;
(c) Safeguarding the guarantee to Rumania ....
It is desirable that this deployment be completed without

interference from the enemy. Therefore, disclose the game as

late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at
the last possible moment, and to line up for attack at the
earliest possible moment."
On 19 February 1941 an OKW
directive regarding the operation
"Marita" stated: "On 18 February the Führer made the following
decision regarding the carrying out of Operation Marita: The
following dates are envisaged: Commencement of building bridge,
28 February; crossing of the Danube, 2 March."
On 3 March landed in Greece to assist the
1941, British troops
Greeks and on 18 March, at a meeting between
to resist the Italians;
Hitler and the Defendant .Raeder, at which the Defendants Keitel
and Jodl were also present, the Defendant Raeder asked for confir-
mation that the "whole of Greece will have to be occupied, even in
the event of a peaceful settlement," to which Hitler replied, "The
complete occupation is a prerequisite of any settlement."
On 25 March, on the occasion of the adherence of Yugoslavia to
the Tripartite Pact at a meeting in Vienna, the Defendant Von Rib-
bentrop, on behalf of the German Government, confirmed the deter-
mination of Germany to respect the sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity of Yugoslavia at all times. On 26 March the Yugoslav Ministers,
who had adhered to the Tripartite Pact, were removed from office
,by a coup d'état in Belgrade on their return from Vienna, and
! the new Government repudiated the Pact. Thereupon on 27 March,
at a conference in Berlin with the High Command at which the
Defendants Goring, Keitel, and Jodl were present, and the De-
fendant Von Ribbentrop part of the time, Hitler stated that Yugo-
slavia was an uncertain factor in regard to the contemplated attack
on Greece, and even more so with regard to the attack upon Russia
which was to be conducted later on. Hitler announced that he was
determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the
new Government, to make all preparations in order to destroy
Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. He stated that he
would act with "unmerciful harshness."
On 6 April German forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia with-
out warning, and Belgrade was bombed by the Luftwaffe. So swift
was this particular invasion that there had not been time to estab-
lish any "incidents" as a usual preliminary, or to find and publish
any adequate "political" explanations. As the attack was starting on
6 April, Hitler proclaimed to the German people that this attack
was necessary because the British forces in Greece (who were heip-

212
ing the Greeks to defend themselves against the Italians) rep-
resented a British attempt to extend the war to the Balkans.
It is clear from this narrative that aggressive war against Greece
and Yugoslavia had long been in contemplation, certainly as early
as August of 1939. The fact that Great Britain had come to the
assistance of the Greeks, and might thereafter be in a position to
inflict great damage upon German interests was made the occasion
for the occupation of both countries.

The Aggressive War against the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics
On 23 August 1939 Germany signed the non-aggression pact with
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The evidence has shown unmistakably that the Soviet Union on
their part conformed to the terms of this pact; indeed the German
Government itself had been assured of this by the highest German
sources. Thus, the German Ambassador in Moscow informed his
Government that the Soviet Union would go to war only if attacked
by Germany, and this statement is recorded in the German War
Diary under the date of 6 June 1941.
Nevertheless, as early as the late summer of 1940, Germany
began to make preparations for an attack on the U.S.S.R., in spite
of the non-aggression pact. This operation was secretly planned
under the code name "Case Barbarossa", and the former Field
Marshal Paulus testified that on 3 September 1940, when he joined
the German General Staff, he continued developing "Case Barba-
rossa", which was finally completed at the beginning of November
1940; and that even then, the German General Staff had no infor-
mation that the Soviet Union was preparing for war.
On 18 December 1940 Hitler issued Directive No. 21, initialed
by Keitel and Jodl, which called for the completion of all prepa-
rations connected with the realization of "Case Barbarossa" by
15 May 1941. This directive stated:
"The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet
Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against
England .... Great caution has to be exercised that the
intention of an attack will not be recognized."
Before the directive of 18 December had been made, the Defend-
ant Goring had informed General Thomas, chief of the Office of War
Economy of the OKW, of the plan, and General Thomas made sur-
veys of the economic possibilities of the U.S.S.R., including its raw
materials, its power and transport system, and its capacity to pro-
duce arms.
In accordance with these surveys, an economic staff for the
Eastern territories with many military-economic units (inspectorates,

213
commandos, groups) was created under the supervision of the De-
fendant Goring. In conjunction with the military command, these
units were to achieve the most complete and efficient economic ex-
ploitation of the occupied territories in the interest of Germany.
The framework of the future political and economic organization
of the occupied territories was designed by the Defendant Rosen-
berg over a period of three months, after conferences with and
assistance by the Defendants Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Goring,
Von Ribbentrop, and Frick, or their representatives. It was made the
subject of a most detailed report immediately after the invasion.
These plans outlined the destruction of the Soviet Union as an
independent State, and its partition, the creation of so-called Reich
Commissariats, and the conversion of Estonia, Latvia, Bielorussia,
and other territories into German colonies.
At the same time Germany drew Hungary, Rumania, and Fin-
land into the war against the U.S.S.R. In December 1940 Hungary
agreed to participate on the promise of Germany that she should
have certain territories at the expense of Yugoslavia.
In May 1941 a final agreement was concluded with Antonescu,
the Prime Minister of Rumania, regarding the attack on the
U.S.S.R., in which Germany promised to Rumania, Bessarabia, North-
ern Bukovina, and the right to occupy Soviet territory up to the
Dnieper.
On 22 June 1941, without any declaration of war, Germany in-
vaded Soviet territory in accordance with the plans so long made.
The evidence which has been given before this Tribunal proves
that Germany had the design carefully thought out, to crush the
U.S.S.R. as a political and military power, so that Germany might
expand to the east according to her own desire. In Mein Kampf,
Hitler had written: "If new territory were to be acquired in Europe,
it must have been mainly at Russia's cost, and once again the new

German Empire should have set out on its march along the same
road as was formerly trodden by the Teutonic Knights, this time
to acquire soil for the German plough by means of the German
sword and thus provide the Nation with its daily bread." But there
was a more immediate purpose, and in one of the memoranda of
the OKW, that immediate purpose was stated to be to feed the
German Armies from Soviet territory in the third year of the war,
even if "as a result many millions of people will be starved to death
if we take out of the country the things necessary for us."

The final aims of the attack on the Soviet Union were formulated
at a conference with Hitler on 16 July 1941, in which the Defend-
ants Goring, Keitel, Rosenberg, and Bormann participated:
"There can be no talk of the creation of a military power west
of the Urals, even if we should have to fight 100 years to

214
 achieve this .... All the Baltic regions must become part of
the Reich. The Crimea and adjoining regions (north of the
Crimea) must likewise be incorporated into the Reich. The
region of the Volga as well as the Baku district must likewise
be incorporated into the Reich. The Finns want Eastern Ka-
relia. However, in view of the large deposits of nickel, the
Kola peninsula must be ceded to Germany."
It was contended for the defendants that the attack upon the
U.S.S.R. was justified because the Soviet Union was contemplating
an attack upon Germany, and making preparations to that end. It
is impossible to believe that this view was ever honestly entertained.

The plans for the economic exploitation of the U.S.S.R., for the
removal of masses of the population, for the murder of Commissars
and political leaders, were all part of the carefully prepared scheme
launched on 22 June without warning of any kind, and without the
shadow of legal excuse. It was plain aggression.

War against the United States

Four days after the attack launched by the Japanese on the United
States fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Germany declared
war on the United States.
The Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, had
been signed on 27 September 1940, and from that date until the
attack upon the U.S.S.R. the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, with other
defendants, was endeavoring to induce Japan to attack British
possessions in the Far East. This, it was thought, would hasten Eng-
land's defeat, and keep the United States out of the war.
The possibility of a direct attack on the United States was
considered and discussed as a matter for the future. Major Von Fal-
kenstein, the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of
the OKW, summarizing military problems which needed discussion
in Berlin in October of 1940, spoke of the possibility "of the prose-
cution of the war against America at a later date." It is clear, too,
that the German policy of keeping America out of the war, if
possible, did not prevent Germany promising support to Japan even
against the United States. On 4 April 1941 Hitler told Matsuoka, the
Japanese Foreign Minister, in the presence of the Defendant Von Rib-
bentrop, that Germany would "strike without delay" if a Japanese
attack on Singapore should lead to war between Japan and the
United States. The next day Von Ribbentrop himself urged Matsuoka
to bring Japan into the war.
On 28 November 1941, 10 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor,
Von Ribbentrop encouraged Japan, through her Ambassador in Ber-
lin, to attack Great Britain and the United States, and stated that
should Japan become engaged in a war with the United States, Ger-

215
many would join the war immediately. A
few days later, Japanese
representatives told Germany and Italy that Japan was preparing
to attack the United States, and asked for their support. Germany
and Italy agreed to do this, although in the Tripartite Pact, Italy and
Germany had undertaken to assist Japan only if she were attacked.
When the assault on Pearl Harbor did take place, the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop is reported to have been "overjoyed", and later, at
a ceremony in Berlin, when a German medal was awarded lo
Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador, Hitler indicated his approval of
the tactics which the Japanese had adopted of negotiating with the
United States as long as possible, and then striking hard without
any declaration of war.
Although it is true that Hitler and his colleagues originally did
not consider that a war with the United States would be beneficial
to their interest, it is apparent that in the course of 1941 that view
was and Japan was given every encouragement to adopt
revised,
a policy which would almost certainly bring the United States into
the war. And when Japan attacked the United States fleet in Pearl
Harbor and thus made aggressive war against the United States, the
Nazi Government caused Germany to enter that war at once on the
side of Japan by declaring war themselves on the United States.

Violations of International Treaties

The Charter defines as a crime the planning or waging of war
that is war of aggression or a war in violation of international
a
treaties. The Tribunal has decided that certain of the defendants
planned and waged aggressive wars against 12 nations, and were
therefore guilty of this series of crimes. This makes it unnecessary
to discuss the subject in further detail, or even to consider at any
length the extent to which these aggressive wars were also "wars
in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances."
These treaties are set out in Appendix C of the Indictment. Those
of principal importance are the following.

Hague Conventions
In the 1899 Convention the signatory powers agreed: "before an
appeal to arms ... to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow,
to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers."
A similar clause was inserted in the Convention for Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes of 1907. In the accompanying Con-
vention Relative to Opening of Hostilities, Article I contains this far
more specific language: "The Contracting Powers recognize that
hostilities between them must not commence without a previous and
explicit warning, in the form of either a declaration of war, giving

216
reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war."
Germany was a party to these conventions.

Versailles Treaty
Breaches of certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty are also
—
relied on by the Prosecution Not to fortify the left bank of the
Rhine (Articles 42-44); to "respect strictly the independence of
Austria" (Article 80); renunciation of any rights in Memel (Article 99)
and the Free City of Danzig (Article 100); the recognition of the
independence of the Czechoslovak State and the military, naval, and
;

air clauses against German rearmament found in Part V. There is

no doubt that action was taken by the German Government contrary
which are set out in Appendix C.
to all these provisions, the details of
With regard to the Treaty of Versailles, the matters relied on are:
1. The violation of Articles 42 to 44 in respect of the demilitarized

zone of the Rhineland;

2. The annexation of Austria on 13 March 1938, in violation of

Article 80;
3. The incorporation of the district of Memel on 22 March 1939,
in violation of Article 99;
4. The incorporation of the Free City of Danzig on 1 September
1939, in violation of Article 100;
5. The incorporation of the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia
on 16 March 1939, in violation of Article 81;
6. The repudiation of the military, naval, and air clauses of the
Treaty, in or about March of 1935.
On 21 May 1935 Germany announced that, whilst renouncing the
disarmament clauses of the Treaty, she would still respect the terri-
torial limitations, and would comply with the Locarno Pact. (With
regard to the first five breaches alleged, therefore, the Tribunal finds
the allegation proved.)

Treaties of Mutual Guarantee, Arbitration, and Non-Aggression

It is unnecessary to discuss in any detail the various treaties
entered into by Germany with other Powers. Treaties of mutual
guarantee were signed by Germany at Locarno in 1925, with Bel-
gium, France, Great Britain, and Italy, assuring the maintenance of
the territorial status quo. Arbitration treaties were also executed by
Germany at Locarno with Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Poland.
Article I of the latter treaty is typical, providing: "All disputes
of every kind between Germany and Poland which it may not
. . .

be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy,

shall be submitted for decision to an arbitral tribunal ." . . .

217
 Conventions of Arbitration and Conciliation were entered into
between Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark in 1926; and
between Germany and Luxembourg in 1929. Non-aggression treaties
were executed by Germany with Denmark and Russia in 1939.

Kellogg -Br iand Pact

The Pact of Paris was signed on 27 August 1928 by Germany,
the United States, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan.
Poland, and other countries; and subsequently by other Powers. The
Tribunal has made full reference to the nature of this Pact and its
legal effect in another part of this judgment. It is therefore not
necessary to discuss the matter further here, save to state that in
the opinion of the Tribunal this Pact was violated by Germany in
all the cases of aggressive war charged in the Indictment. It is to
be noted that on 26 January 1934 Germany signed a Declaration for
the Maintenance of Permanent Peace with Poland, which was
explicitly based on the Pact of Paris, and in which the use of force
was outlawed for a period of 10 years.
The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider any of the
other treaties referred to in the Appendix, or the repeated agree-
ments and assurances of her peaceful intentions entered into by
Germany.
The Law of the Charter
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal defined in the Agreement and
is

Charter, and the crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the

Tribunal, for which there shall be individual responsibility, are set
out in Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding
upon the Tribunal.
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign
power by the countries to which the German Reich uncon-
legislative
ditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries
to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the
civilized world. The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power
on the part of the victorious Nations, but in the view of the Tribunal,
as will be shown, it is the expression of international law existing
at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution
to international law.
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it
was to administer, and made regulations for the proper conduct of
the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one of
them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any
nation has the right thus to set up special courts to administer law.
With regard to the constitution of the Court, all that the defendants
are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on the facts and law.

218
 The Charter makes the planning or waging of a war of aggression
or a war in violation of international treaties a crime; and it is
therefore not strictly necessary to consider whether and to what
extent aggressive war was a crime before the execution of the Lon-
don Agreement. But in view of the great importance of the questions
of law involved, the Tribunal has heard full argument from the
Prosecution and the Defense, and will express its view on the matter.
It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a fundamental
—
principle of all law international and domestic is that there —
can be no punishment of crime without a pre-existing law. "Nullum
crirmn sine lege, nulla poena sine lege." It was submitted that
ex post facto punishment is abhorrent to the law of all civilized
nations, that no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime
at the time that the alleged criminal acts were committed, that no
statute had denned aggressive war. that no penalty had been fixed
for its commission, and no court had been created to try and punish
offenders.
In the first it is to be observed that the maxim nullum
place,
crimen sine lege not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general
is

a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who

in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighboring
states without warning is obviouslv untrue, for in such circumstances
the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it
being unjust to punish him. it would be unjust if his wrong were
allowed to go unpunished. Occupving the positions they did in the
Government of Germany, the defendants, or at least some of them
must have known of the treaties signed by Germany, outlawing
recourse to war for the settlement of international disputes; they
must have known that they were acting in defiance of all inter-
national law when in complete deliberation they carried out their
designs of invasion and aggression. On this view of the case alone,
it would appear that the maxim has no application to the present

facts.
This view is stronglv reinforced by a consideration of the state
of international law in 1939. so far as aggressivewar is concerned.
The General Treatv for the Renunciation of War of 27 August 1928,
more generally known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, was binding on 63 nations, including Germanv, Italy, and
Japan outbreak of war in 1939. In the preamble, the signatories
at the
declared that they were:
"Deeplv sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare
of mankind; persuaded that the time has come when a frank
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should
be made to the end that the peaceful and friendlv relations
now existing between their peoples should be perpetuated ....

219
 all changes in their relations with one another should be sought
only by pacific means * thus uniting civilised nations of the
. .

world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of

their national policy . . .

The first two articles are as follows:

L The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in

'"Article
the names of their respective peoples that they condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies
and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their
relations to one another.*'
"Article H. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settle-
ment or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever na-
ture or whatever origin they may be. which may arise among
them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."
The question is. what was the legal effect of this Pact? The nations

who signed the Pact or adhered to it unconditionally condemned

recourse to war for the future as an instrument of policy, and
expressly renounced it. After the signing of the Pact, any nation
resorting to war as an instrument of national policy breaks the Pact.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as
an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition
that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who
p]an and wage such a war. with its inevitable and terrible conse-
quences, are committing a crime in so doing. War for the solution
of international controversies undertaken as an instrument of
national policy certainly includes a war of aggression, and such a
war is therefore outlawed by the Pact. As Mr. Henry L. Stimson,
then Secretary of State of the United States, said in 1932:
"War between nations was renounced by the signatories of
the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. This means that it has become
throughout practically the entire world ... an illegal thing.
Hereafter, when nations engage in armed conflict, either one
or both of them must be termed violators of this general
treaty law .... We denounce them as law breakers."
But it is argued that the Pact does not expressly enact that such
wars are crimes, or set up courts to try those who make such wars.
To that extent the same is true with regard to the laws of war
contained in the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention of 1997
prohibited resort to certain methods of waging war. These included
the inhumane treatment of prisoners, the employment of poisoned
weapons, the improDer use of flags of truce, and similar matters.
Many of these prohibitions had been enforced long before the date
of the Convention: but since 1907 they have certainly been crimes,
punishable as offenses against the laws of war: yet the Hague Con-

220
vention nowhere designates such practices as criminal, nor is any
sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a court to try and
punish offenders. For many years past, however, military tribunals
have tried and punished individuals guilty of violating the rules of
land warfare laid down by this Convention. In the opinion of the
Tribunal, those w ho wage aggressive war are doing that which is
T

equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of one

of the rules of the Hague Convention. In interpreting the words of
the Pact, it must be remembered that international law is not the
product of an international legislature, and that such international
agreements as the Pact of Paris have to deal with general principles
of law, and not with administrative matters of procedure. The law
of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and
practices of states which gradually obtained universal recognition,
and from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and
practised by military courts. This law is not static, but by continual
adaptation follows the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many
cases treaties do no more than express and define for more accurate
reference the principles of law already existing.
The view which the Tribunal takes of the true interpretation of
the Pact is supported by the international history which preceded
it. In the year 1923 the draft of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance was

sponsored by the League of Nations. In Article I the Treaty declared

"that aggressive war is an international crime"', and that the parties
would ''undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commis-
sion". The draft treaty was submitted to 29 states, about half of
whom were in favor of accepting the text. The principal objection
appeared to be in the difficulty of defining the acts which would
constitute "aggression", rather than any doubt as to the criminality
of aggressive war. The preamble to the League of Nations 1924
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
(•'Geneva Protocol"'), after "recognising the solidarity of the members
of the international community", declared that "a war of aggression
constitutes a violation of this solidarityand is an international
crime." It went on to declare that the contracting parties were
"desirous of facilitating the complete application of the system
provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations for the pacific
settlement of disputes between the States and of ensuring the repres-
The Protocol was recommended to the
sion of international crimes."
members of the League by a unanimous resolution in the
of Nations
assembly of the 48 members of the League. These members included
Italy and Japan, but Germany was not then a members of the
League.
Although the Protocol was never ratified, it was signed by the
leading statesmen of the world, representing the vast majority of

221
the civilized states and peoples, and may be regarded as strong
evidence of the intention to brand aggressive war as an international
crime.
At the meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations on
24 September 1927, all the delegations then present (including the
German, the Italian, and the Japanese), unanimously adopted a
declaration concerning wars of aggression. The preamble to the
declaration stated:
"The Assembly:
Recognizing the solidarity which unites the community of
nations;
Being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of general
peace;
Being convinced that a war of aggression can never serve as a
means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence
an international crime ." . .

The unanimous resolution of 18 February 1928 of 21 American

republics at the Sixth (Havana) Pan-American Conference, declared
that "war of aggression constitutes an international crime against
the human species".
All these expressions of opinion, and others that could be cited,
so solemnly made, reinforce the construction which the Tribunal
placed upon the Pact of Paris, that resort to a war of aggression is
not merely illegal, but is criminal. The prohibition of aggressive
war demanded by the conscience of the world, finds its expression
in the series of pacts and treaties to which the Tribunal has just
referred.
It is also important to remember that Article 227 of the Treaty
of Versailles provided for the constitution of a special Tribunal,
composed of representatives of five of the Allied and Associated
Powers which had been belligerents in the first World War opposed
to Germany, to try the former German Emperor "for a supreme
offense against international morality and the sanctity of treaties."
The purpose of this trial was expressed to be "to vindicate the
solemn obligations of international undertakings, and the validity
of international morality". In Article 228 of the Treaty, the German
Government expressly recognized the Powers "to
right of the Allied
bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed
acts in violation of the laws and customs of war".
It was submitted law is concerned with the
that international
actions of sovereign States,and provides no punishment for indivi-
duals; and further, that where the act in question is an act of State,
those who carry it out are not personally responsible, but are pro-
tected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. In the opinion

222
of the Tribunal, both these submissions must be rejected. That inter-
national law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as well
as upon States has long been recognized. In the recent case of Ex
Parte Quirin (1942 317 U.S. 1), before the Supreme Court of the
United States, persons were charged during the war with landing in
the United States for purposes of spying and sabotage. The late
Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, said:
"From the very beginning of its history this Court has applied
the law of war as including that part of the law of nations
which prescribes for the conduct of war, the status, rights, and
duties of enemy nations as well as enemy individuals."
He went on to give a list of cases tried by the Courts, where indi-
vidual offenders were charged with offenses against the laws of
nations, and particularly the laws of war. Many other authorities
could be cited, but enough has been said to show that individuals
can be punished for violations of international law. Crimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities,
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced.
The provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles already
referred to illustrate and enforce this view of individual respon-
sibility.

The principle of international law, which under certain circum-

be applied to
stances, protects the representatives of a state, cannot
acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The
authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official
position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate pro-
ceedings. Article 7 of the Charter expressly declares:
'The official position of Defendants, whether as heads of
State, or responsible officials Government departments,
in
shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility,
or mitigating punishment."
On the other hand the very essence of the Charter is that individuals
have international duties which transcend the national obligations
of obedience imposed by the individual state. He who violates the
laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of
the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves
outside its competence under international law.
was also submitted on behalf of most of these defendants that
It
in doing what they did they were acting under the orders of Hitler,
and therefore cannot be held responsible for the acts comitted by
them in carrying out these orders. The Charter specifically provides
in Article 8:

223
 "The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from respon-
sibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment."
The provisions law of all
of this article are in conformity with the
nations. That a soldier was ordered to kill or torture in violation
of the international law of war has never been recognized as a
defense to such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here pro-
vides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the punishment. The
true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of
most nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral
choice was in fact possible.

The Law as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy

In the previous recitaJL of the facts relating to aggressive war, it
is clear that planning and preparation had been carried out in the
most systematic way at every stage of the history.
Planning and preparation are essential to the making of war. In
the opinion of the Tribunal aggressive war is a crime under inter-
national law. The Charter defines this offense as planning, prepar-
ation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression "or participation
in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment ... of
the foregoing". The Indictment follows this distinction. Count One
charges the Common Plan or Conspiracy. Count Two charges the
planning and waging of war. The same evidence has been introduced
to support both Counts. We shall therefore discuss both Counts
together, as they are in substance the same. The defendants have
been charged under both Counts, and their guilt under each Count
must be determined.
The "Common Plan or Conspiracy" charged in the Indictment
covers 25 years, from the formation of the Nazi Party in 1919 to
the end of the war in 1945. The Party is spoken of as "the
instrument of cohesion among the Defendants" for carrying out the
purposes of the conspiracy —
the overthrowing of the Treaty of
Versailles, acquiring territory lost by Germany in the last war and
"Lebeftsraum" in Europe, by the use, if necessary, of armed force,
of aggressive war. The "seizure of power" by the Nazis, the use
of terror, the destruction of trade unions, the attack on Christian
teaching and on churches, the persecution of Jews, the regimenta-
tion of youth —
all these are said to be steps deliberately
taken to carry out the common plan. It found expression, so it is
alleged, in secret rearmament, the withdrawal by Germany from the
Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations, universal
military service, and seizure of the Rhineland. Finally, according to
the Indictment, aggressive action was planned and carried out
against Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1936-1938, followed by the

224
planning and waging of war against Poland; and, successively,
against 10 other countries.
The Prosecution says, in effect, that any significant participation
in the affairs of the Nazi Party or Government is evidence of a
participation in a conspiracy that is in itself criminal. Conspiracy

is not denned in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal

the conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It
must not be too far removed from the time of decision and of action.
The planning, to be criminal, must not rest merely on the decla-
rations of a party program, such as are found in the 25 points of the
Nazi Party, announced in 1920, or the political affirmations expressed
in Mein Kampf in later years. The Tribunal must examine whether
a concrete plan to wage war existed, and determine the participants
in that concrete plan.
It is not necessary to decide whether a single master conspiracy
between the defendants has been established by the evidence. The
seizure of power by the Nazi Party, and the subsequent domination
by the Nazi State of all spheres of economic and social life must of
course be remembered when the later plans for waging war are
examined. That plans were made to wage war, as early as 5 Novem-
ber 1937, and probably before that, is apparent. And thereafter, such
preparations continued in many directions, and against the oeace of
many countries. Indeed the threat of war —
and war itself if neces-
sary — was an integral part of the Nazi policy. But the evidence
establishes with certainty the existence of many separate plans
rather than a single conspiracy embracing them all. That Germany
was rapidly moving to complete dictatorship from the moment that
the Nazis seized power, and progressively in the direction of war,
has been overwhelminglv shown in the ordered sequence of aggres-
sive acts and wars already set out in this Judgment.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the evidence establishes the
common planning to prepare and wage war by certain of the
defendants. It is immaterial to consider whether a single conspiracy
to the extent and over the time set out in the Indictment has been
conclusivelv proved. Continued planning, with aggressive war as the
objective, has been established bevond doubt. The truth of the
situation was well stated by Paul Schmidt, official interpreter of the
German Foreign Office, as follows:
"The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent
from the start, namely the domination of the European Con-
tinent, to be achieved first by the incorporation of all German
speaking groups in the Reich, and secondly, by territorial
expansion under the slogan "Lebensraum". The execution of
these basic objectives, however, seemed to be characterized

225
 by improvisation. Each succeeding step was apparently car-
ried out as each new
situation arose, but all consistent with
the ultimate objectives mentioned above."
The argument that such common planning cannot exist where there
is complete dictatorship is unsound. A plan in the execution of which
a number of persons participate is still a plan, even though con-
ceived by only one of them; and those who execute the plan do not
avoid responsibility by showing that they acted under the direction
of the man who conceived it. Hitler could not make aggressive war
by himself. He had to have the co-operation of statesmen, military
leaders, diplomats, and business men. When they, with knowledge
of his aims, gave him their co-operation, they made themselves
parties to the plan he had initiated. They are not to be deemed
innocent because Hitler made use of them, if they knew what they
were doing. That they were assigned to their tasks by a dictator
does not absolve them from responsibility for their acts. The relation
of leader and follower does not preclude responsibility here any
more than it does in the comparable tyranny of organized domestic
crime.
Count One, however, charges not only the conspiracy to commit
aggressive war, but also to commit War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity. But the Charter does not define as a separate crime any
conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive war. Article 6
of the Charter provides:
"Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Con-
spiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are respon-
sible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of
such plan."
In the opinion of the Tribunal these words do not add a new and
separate crime to those already listed. The words are designed to
establish the responsibility of persons participating in a common
plan. The Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges in Count
One that the defendants conspired to commit War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity, and will consider only the common plan
to prepare, initiate, and wage aggressive war.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

The evidence relating to War Crimes has been overwhelming, in
its volume and its detail. It is imposible for this Judgment ade-
quately to review it, or to record the mass of documentary and oral
evidence that has been presented. The truth remains that War
Crimes were committed on a vast scale, never before seen in the
history of war. They were perpetrated in all the countries occupied

226
by Germany, and on the High Seas, and were attended by every
conceivable circumstance of cruelty and horror. There can be no
doubt that the majority of them arose from the Nazi conception
of "total war", with which the aggressive wars were waged. For in
this conception of "total war", the moral ideas underlying the con-
ventions which seek to make war more humane are no longer
regarded as having force or validity. Everything is made sub-
ordinate to the overmastering dictates of war. Rules, regulations,
assurances, and treaties all alike are of no moment; and so, freed
from the restraining influence of international law, the aggressive
war conducted by the Nazi leaders in the most
is barbaric way.
Accordingly, War Crimes were committed when and wherever the
Führer and his close associates thought them to be advantageous.
They were for the most part the result of cold and criminal
calculation.
On some War Crimes were deliberately planned long
occasions,
in advance. In the case of the Soviet Union, the plunder of the
territories to be occupied, and the ill-treatment of the civilian
population, were settled in minute detail before the attack was
begun. As early as the autumn of 1940, the invasion of the
Union was being considered. From that date
territories of the Soviet
onwards, the methods to be employed in destroying all possible
opposition were continuously under discussion.
Similarly, when planning to exploit the inhabitants of the
occupied countries for slave labor on the very greatest scale, the
German Government conceived it as an integral part of the war
economy, and planned and organized this particular War Crime
down to the last elaborate detail.
Other War Crimes, such as the murder of prisoners of war who
had escaped and been recaptured, or the murder of Commandos or
captured airmen, or the destruction of the Soviet Commissars, were
the result of direct orders circulated through the highest official
channels.
The Tribunal
proposes, therefore, to deal quite generally with
the question of War Crimes, and to refer to them later when
examining the responsibility of the individual defendants in relation
to them. Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and
murdered, not only in defiance of the well-established rules of inter-
national law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of
humanity. Civilian populations in occupied territories suffered the
same fate. Whole populations were deported to Germany for the
purposes of slave labor upon defense works, armament production,
and similar tasks connected with the war effort. Hostages were
taken in very large numbers from the civilian populations in all the

227
occupied countries, and were shot as suited the German purposes.
Public and private property was systematically plundered and
pillaged in order to enlarge the resources of Germany at the expense
of the rest of Europe. Cities and towns and villages were wantonly
destroyed without military justification or necessity.

Murder and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners of War

Article 6 (b) of the Charter defines War Crimes in these words:
"War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, mur-
der, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property,
wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity."
In the course of the war, many Allied soldiers who had sur-
rendered to the Germans were shot immediately, often as a matter
of deliberate, calculated policy. On 18 October 1942, the Defendant
Keitel circulated a directive authorized by Hitler, which ordered that
all members of Allied "Commando" units, often when in uniform
and whether armed or not, were to be "slaughtered to the last man",
even if they attempted to surrender. It was further provided that if
such Allied troops came into the hands of the military authorities
after being first captured by the local police, or in any other way,
they should be handed over immediately to the SD. This order was
supplemented from time to time, and was effective throughout the
remainder of the war, although after the Allied landings in Normandy
in 1944 it was made clear that the order did not apply to "Comman-
dos" captured within the immediate battle area. Under the provi-
sions of this order, Allied "Commando" troops, and other military
units operating independently, lost their lives in Norway, France,
Czechoslovakia, and Italy. Many of them were killed on the spot,
and in no case were those who were executed later in concentration
camps ever given a trial of any kind. For example, an American
military mission which landed behind the German front in the
Balkans in January 1945, numbering about twelve to fifteen men
and wearing uniform, were taken to Mauthausen under the authority
of this order, and according to the affidavit of Adolf Zutte, the
adjutant of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp, all of them
were shot.
In March 1944 the OKH issued the "Kugel" or "Bullet" decree,
which directed that every escaped officer and NCO prisoner of war
who had not been put to work, with the exception of British and

228
American prisoners of war, should on recapture be handed over to
the SIPO and SD. This order was distributed by the SIPO and SD
to their regional offices. These escaped officers and NCO's were to
be sent to the concentration camp at Mauthausen, to be executed
upon arrival, by means of a bullet shot in the neck.
In March 1944 fifty officers of the British Royal Air Force, who
escaped from the camp at Sagan where they were confined as
prisoners, were shot on recapture, on the direct orders of Hitler.
Their bodies were immediately cremated, and the urns containing
their ashes were returned to the camp. It was not contended by the
defendants that this was other than plain murder, in complete viola-
tion of international law.
When Allied airmen were forced to land in Germany, they were
sometimes killed at once by the civilian population. The police were
instructed not to interfere with these killings, and the Ministry of
Justice was informed that no one should be prosecuted for taking
part in them.
The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war was characterized by
particular inhumanity. The death of so many of them was not due
merely to the action of individual guards, or to the exigencies of
life in the camps. It was the result of systematic plans to murder.
More than a month before the German invasion of the Soviet Union,
the OKW were making special plans for dealing with political
representatives serving with the Soviet Armed Forces who might
be captured. One proposal was that "political Commissars of the
Army are not recognized as Prisoners of War, and are to be
liquidated at the latest in the transient prisoner of war camps." The
Defendant Keitel gave evidence that instructions incorporating this
proposal were issued to the German Army.
On 8 September 1941 regulations for the treatment of Soviet
prisoners of war in all prisoner of war camps were issued, signed by
General Reinecke, the head of the prisoner of war department of
the High Command. Those orders stated:
"The Bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim to treat-
ment as an honorable opponent, in accordance with the Geneva
Convention .... The order for ruthless and energetic action
must be given at the slightest indication of insubordination,
especially in the case of Bolshevist fanatics. Insubordination,
active or passive resistance, must be broken immediately by
force of arms (bayonets, butts, and firearms) .... Anyone
carrying out the order who does not use his weapons, or does
so with insufficient energy, is punishable .... Prisoners of
war attempting escape are to be fired on without previous
challenge. No warning shot must ever be fired .... The use
of arms against prisoners of war is as a rule legal."

229
The Soviet prisoners of war were left without suitable clothing;
the wounded without medical care; they were starved, and in many
cases left to die.
On 17 July 1941, the Gestapo issued
an order providing for the
killing Soviet prisoners of war who were or might be
of all
dangerous to National Socialism. The order recited:
''The mission of the Commanders of the SIPO and SD sta-
tioned in Stalags is the political investigation of all camp
inmates, the elimination and further 'treatment' (a) of all
political, criminal, or in some other way unbearable elements
among them, (b) of those persons who could be used for the
reconstruction of the occupied territories .... Further, the
commanders must make efforts from the beginning to seek out
among the prisoners elements which appear reliable, regardless
of whether there are Communists concerned or not, in order to
use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp, and if
advisable, later in the occupied territories also. By use of such
informers, and by use of all other existing possibilities, the dis-
covery of all elements to be eliminated among the prisoners
must proceed step by step at once ." . . .

"Above all, the following must be discovered: all impor-

tant functionaries of State and Party, especially professional
revolutionaries ... all People's Commissars in the Red Army,
leading personalities of the State leading personalities
. . .

of the business world, members of the Soviet Russian Intelli-

gence, all Jews, all persons who are found to be agitators or
fanatical Communists. Executions are not to be held in the
camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp .... The
prisoners are to be taken for special treatment if possible
into the former Soviet Russian territory."
The affidavit of Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht,
and the testimony of Ohlendorf, former Chief of Amt III of the
RSHA, and of Lahousen, the head of one of the sections of the
Abwehr, the Wehrmacht's Intelligence Service, all indicate the
thoroughness with which this order was carried out.
The affidavit of Kurt Lindown, a former Gestapo official, states:
" . .There existed in the prisoner of
. . war camps on
the Eastern Front small screening teams (Einsatz commandos),
headed by lower ranking members of the Secret Police (Ge-
stapo). These teams were assigned to the camp commanders
and had the job of segregating the prisoners of war who were
candidates for execution according to the orders that had been
given, and to report them to the office of the Secret Police."

230
On 23 October 1941 the camp commander of the Gross Rosen
concentration camp reported to Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, a list
of the Soviet prisoners of war who had been executed there on the
previous day.
An account of the general conditions and treatment of Soviet
prisoners of war during the first eight months after the German
attack upon Russia was given in a letter which the Defendant Rosen-
berg sent to the Defendant Keitel on 28 February 1942:
"The fate of the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on
the contrary a tragedy of the greatest extent .... A large
part of them has starved, or died because of the hazards of
the weather. Thousands also died from spotted fever.
"The camp commanders have forbidden the civilian popu-
lation to put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they
have rather let them starve to death.
"In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer
keep up on the march because of hunger and exhaustion,
they were shot before the eyes of the horrified population, and
the corpses were left.
"In numerous camps, no shelter for the prisoners of war
was provided at all. They lay under the open sky during
rain or snow. Even tools were not made available to dig holes
or caves."
In some cases Soviet prisoners of war were branded with a
specialpermanent mark. There was put in evidence the OKW order
dated 20 July 1942 which laid down that:
"The brand is to take the shape of an acute angle of about
45 degrees, with the long side to be 1 cm. in length, pointing
upwards and burnt on the left buttock .... This brand is
made with the aid of a lancet available in any military unit.
The coloring used is Chinese ink."
The carrying out of this order was the responsibility of the
military authorities, though it was widely circulated by the Chief
of the SIPO and the SD to German police officials for information.
Soviet prisoners of war were also made the subject of medical
experiments of the most cruel and inhuman kind. In July 1943
experimental work was begun in preparation for a campaign of
bacteriological warfare; Soviet prisoners of war were used in these
medical experiments, which more often than not proved fatal. In
connection with this campaign for bacteriological warfare, prepara-
tions were also made for the spreading of bacterial emulsions from
planes, with the object of producing widespread failures of crops
and consequent starvation. These measures were never applied,
possibly because of the rapid deterioration of Germany's military
position.

231
 The argument in defense of the charge with regard to the
murder and ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, that the
U.S.S.R. was not a party to the Geneva Convention, is quite without
foundation. On 15 September 1941 Admiral Canaris protested
against the regulations for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war,
signed by General Reinecke on 8 September 1941. He then stated:
'The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war
is not binding in the relationship between Germany and the

U.S.S.R. Therefore only the principles of general international

law on the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since the
18th century these have gradually been established along the
lines that war captivity is neither revenge nor punishment, but
solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to pre-
vent the prisoners of war from further participation in the
war. This principle was developed in accordance with the
view held by all armies that it is contrary to military tra-
dition to kill or injure helpless people .... The decrees for
the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war enclosed are based
on a fundamentally different view-point."
This protest, which correctly stated the legal position, was ignored.
The Defendant Keitel made a note on this memorandum:
"The objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous
warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore
I approve and back the measures."

Murder and Ill-treatment of Civilian Population

Article 6 Charter provides that "ill-treatment ... of

(b) of the
civilian population or in occupied territory
of killing of
. . .

hostages . wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages" shall be

. .

a war crime. In the main, these provisions are merely declaratory

of the existing laws of war as expressed by the Hague Convention,
Article 46, which stated: "Family honor and rights, the lives of
persons and private property, as well as religious convictions and
practice must be respected."
The territories occupied by Germany were administered in
violation of the laws of war. The evidence is quite overwhelming
of a systematic rule of violence, brutality, and terror. On 7 Decem-
ber 1941 Hitler issued the directive since known as the "Nacht und
Nebel Erlass" (Night and Fog Decree), under which persons who
committed offenses against the Reich or the German forces in
occupied territories, except where the death sentence was certain,
were to be taken secretly to Germany and handed over to the SIPO
and SD for trial or punishment in Germany. This decree was signed
by the Defendant Keitel. After these civilians arrived in Germany,

232
no word of them was permitted to reach the country from which
they came, or their relatives; even in cases when they died awaiting
trial the families were not informed, the purpose being to create
anxiety in the minds of the family of the arrested person. Hitler's
purpose in issuing this decree was stated by the Defendant Keitel
in a covering letter, dated 12 December 1941, to be as follows:
'Efficient and enduring intimidation can only be achieved
1

either by punishment or by measures by which the

capital
relatives of the criminal and the population do not know the
fate of the criminal. This aim is achieved when the criminal
is transferred to Germany."
Even persons who were only suspected of opposing any of the
policies of the German occupation authorities were arrested, and
on arrest were interrogated by the Gestapo and the SD in the most
shameful manner. On 12 June 1942 the Chief of the SIPO and SD
published, through Müller, the Gestapo Chief, an order authorizing
the use of "third degree" methods of interrogation, where
preliminary investigation had indicated that the person could give
information on important matters, such as subversive activities,
though not for the purpose of extorting confessions of the prisoner's
own crimes. This order provided:
. . .Third degree may, under this supposition, only be em-
ployed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah's Witnesses,
saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, para-
chute agents, anti-social elements, Polish or Soviet Russian
loafers or tramps; in all other cases my permission must first
be obtained .... Third degree can, according to circumstan-
ces, consist amongst other methods of very simple diet (bread
and water), hard bunk, dark cell, deprivation of sleep, ex-
haustive drilling, also in flogging (for more than twenty strokes
a doctor must be consulted)."
The brutal suppression of all opposition to the German occupa-
tion was not confined to severe measures against suspected members
of resistance movements themselves, but was also extended to their
families. On 19 July 1944 the Commander of the SIPO and SD in
the district of Radom, in Poland, published an order, transmitted
through the Higher SS and Police Leaders, to the effect that in all
cases of assassination or attempted assassination of Germans, or
where saboteurs had destroyed vital installations, not only the
guilty person, but also all his, or her male relatives should be shot,
and female relatives over 16 years of age put into a concentration
camp.
In the summer of 1944 the Einsatz Commando of the SIPO and
SD at Luxembourg caused persons to be confined at Sachsenhausen
concentration camp because they were relatives of deserters, and

233
were therefore "expected to endanger the interest of the German
Reich allowed to go free."
if

The practice of keeping hostages to prevent and to punish any

form of civil disorder was resorted to by the Germans; an order
issued by the Defendant Keitel on 16 September 1941 spoke in
terms of fifty or a hundred lives from the occupied areas of the
Soviet Union for one German life taken. The order stated that
"it should be remembered that a human life in unsettled countries
frequently counts for nothing, and a deterrent effect can be obtained
only by unusual severity." The exact number of persons killed as
a result of this policy is not known, but large numbers were killed
in France and the other occupied territories in the West, while in
the East the slaughter was on an even more extensive scale. In
addition to the killing of hostages, entire towns were destroyed in
some cases; such massacres as those of Oradour-sur-Glane in France
and Lidice in Czechoslovakia, both of which were described to the
Tribunal in detail, are examples of the organized use of terror by
the occupying forces to beat down and destroy all opposition to
their rule.
One of the most notorious means of terrorizing the people in
occupied territories was the use of concentration camps. They were
first established in Germany at the moment of the seizure of power
by the Nazi Government. Their original purpose was to imprison
without trial all those persons who were opposed to the Govern-
ment, or who were in any way obnoxious to German authority.
With the aid of a secret police force, this practice was widely
extended, and in course of time concentration camps became places
of organized and systematic murder, where millions of people were
destroyed.
In the administration of the occupied territories the concentra-
tion camps were used to destroy all opposition groups. The persons
arrested by the Gestapo were as a rule sent to concentration camps.
They were conveyed to the camps in many cases without any care
whatever being taken for them, and great numbers died on the
way. Those who arrived at the camp were subject to systematic
cruelty. They were given hard physical labor, inadequate food,
clothes and shelter, and were subject at all times to the rigors of a
soulless regime, and the private whims of individual guards. In the
report of the War Crimes Branch of the Judge Advocate's Section
of the Third U.S. Army, under date 21 June 1945, the conditions at
the Flossenburg concentration camp were investigated, and one
passage may be quoted:
"Flossenburg concentration camp can best be described as a
factory dealing in death. Although this camp had in view
the primary object of putting to work the mass slave labor,

234
 another of its primary objects was the elimination of human
lives by the methods employed in handling the prisoners.
Hunger and starvation rations, sadism, inadequate clothing,
medical neglect, disease, beatings, hangings, freezing, forced
suicides, shooting, etc. all played a major role in obtaining
their object. Prisoners were murdered at random; spite
killings againstJews were common, injections of poison and
shooting in the neck were everyday occurrences; epidemics of
typhus and spotted fever were permitted to run rampant as
a means of eliminating prisoners; life in this camp meant
nothing. Killing became a common thing, so common that a
quick death was welcomed by the unfortunate ones."
A certain number of the concentration camps were equipped
with gas chambers for the wholesale destruction of the inmates,
and with furnaces for the burning of the bodies. Some of them were
in fact used for the extermination of Jews as part of the "final
solution" of the Jewish problem. Most of the non-Jewish inmates
were used for labor, although the conditions under which they
worked made labor and death almost synonymous terms. Those
inmates who became ill and were unable to work were either
destroyed in the gas chambers or sent to special infirmaries, where
they were given entirely inadequate medical treatment, worse food
if possible than the working inmates, and left to die.

The murder and ill-treatment of civilian populations reached its

height in the treatment of the citizens of the Soviet Union and
Poland. Some four weeks before the invasion of Russia began,
special task forces of the SIPO and SD, called Einsatz Groups, were
formed on the orders of Himmler for the purpose of following the
German Armies into Russia, combating partisans and members of
Resistance Groups, and exterminating the Jews and communist
leaders and other sections of the population. In the beginning, four
such Einsatz Groups were formed, one operating in the Baltic
States, one towards Moscow, one towards Kiev, and one operating
in the south of Russia. Ohlendorf, former Chief of Amt III of the
RSHA, who led the fourth group, stated in his affidavit:
"When the German army invaded Russia, I was leader of
Einsatzgruppe D, in the southern sector, and in the course of
the year during which I was leader of the Einsatzgruppe D
it liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women, and children.

The majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were

also among them some communist functionaries."
In an order issued by the Defendant Keitel on 23 July 1941, and
drafted by the Defendant Jodl, it was stated that:
"In view of the vast size of the occupied areas in the East,
the forces available for establishing security in these areas

235
 will be sufficient only if all resistance is punished, not by-
legal prosecution of the guilty, but by the spreading of such
terror by the Armed Forces as is alone appropriate to eradi-
cate every inclination to resist among the population ....
Commanders must find the means of keeping order by apply-
ing suitable Draconian measures."
The evidence has shown that was ruthlessly carried out
this order
in the territory of the Soviet Union and in Poland. A significant
illustration of the measures actually applied occurs in the document
which was sent in 1943 to the Defendant Rosenberg by the Reich
Commissar for Eastern Territories, who wrote:
"It should be possible to avoid atrocities and to bury those
who have been liquidated. To lock men, women, and children
into barns and set fire to them does not appear to be a
suitable method of combating bands, even if it is desired to
exterminate the population. This method is not worthy of
the German cause, and hurts our reputation severely."
The Tribunal has before it an affidavit of one Hermann Graebe,
dated 10 November 1945, describing the immense mass murders
which he witnessed. He was the manager and engineer in charge of
the branch of the Solingen firm of Josef Jung in Spolbunow,
Ukraine, from September 1941 to January 1944. He first of all
described the attack upon the Jewish ghetto at Rowno:
".
. Then the electric floodlights which had been erected all
.

around the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details of

four to six members entered or at least tried to enter the
houses. Where the doors and windows were closed, and the
inhabitants did not open upon the knocking, the SS men and
militia broke the windows, forced the doors with beams and
crowbars, and entered the dwelling. The owners were driven
on to the street just as they were, regardless of whether they
were dressed or whether they had been in bed. . Car after
. .

car was filled. Over it hung the screaming of women and

children, the cracking of whips and rifle shots."
Graebe then described how a mass execution at Dubno, which
he witnessed on 5 October 1942, was carried out:
". . Now we heard shots in quick succession from behind
. .

one of the earth mounds. The people who had got off the
trucks, men, women, and children of all ages, had to undress
upon the orders of an SS man, who carried a riding or dog
whip .... Without screaming or crying, these peo.ple un-
dressed, stood around by families, kissed each other, said
farewells, and waited for the command of another SS man,
who stood near the excavation, also with a whip in his hand.
... At that moment the SS man at the excavation called

236
 something to his comrade. The latter counted off about
20 persons, and instructed themwalk behind the earth
to
mound I walked around the mound and stood in front of
a tremendous grave; closely pressed together, the people
were lying. on top of each other so that only their heads were
visible. The excavation was already two-thirds full; I esti-
mated that it contained about a thousand people. . . . Now
already the next group approached, descended into the exca-
vation, lined themselvesup against the previous victims and
were shot."
The foregoing crimes against the civilian population are
and yet the evidence shows that at any rate
sufficiently appalling,
in the East, the mass murders and cruelties were not committed
solely for the purpose of stamping out opposition or resistance to
the German occupying forces. In Poland and the Soviet Union these
crimes were part of a plan to get rid of whole native populations
by expulsion and annihilation, in order that their territory could
be used for colonization by Germans. Hitler had written in Mein
Kampf on these lines, and the plan was clearly stated by Himmler
in July 1942, when he wrote: "It is not our task to Germanize the
East in the old sense, that is to teach the people there the German
language and the German law, but to see to it that only people of
purely Germanic blood live in the East."
In August 1942 the policy for the Eastern Territories as laid
down by Bormann was summarized by a subordinate of Rosenberg
as follows:
"The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we do not need
them, they may die. Therefore, compulsory vaccination and
Germanic health services are superfluous. The fertility of the
Slavs is undesirable."
It was Himmler again who stated in October 1943:
"What happens to a Russian, a Czech, does not interest me in
the slightest. What the nations can offer in the way of good
blood of our type, we will take. If necessary, by kidnapping
their children and raising them here with us. Whether
nations live in prosperity or starve to death interests me only
in so far as we need them as slaves for our Kultur, otherwise
it is of no interest to me."
In Poland the intelligentsia had been marked down for extermina-
tion as early as September 1939, and in May 1940 the Defendant
Frank wrote in his diary of "taking advantage of the focussing of
world interest on the Western Front, by wholesale liquidation of
thousands of Poles, first leading representatives of the Polish
intelligentsia." Earlier, Frank had been directed to reduce the
"entire Polish economy to an absolute minimum necessary for bare

237
existence. The Poles shall be the slaves of the Greater German
World Empire." In January 1940 he recorded in his diary that
"cheap labor must be removed from the General Government by
hundreds of thousands. This will hamper the native biological
propagation." So successfully did the Germans carry out this policy
in Poland that by the end of the war one third of the population
had been killed, and the whole of the country devastated.
It was the same story in the occupied area of the Soviet Union.
At the time of the launching of the German attack in June 1941
Rosenberg told his collaborators:
"The object of feeding the German People stands this year
without a doubt at the top of the list of Germany's claims on
the East, and there the southern territories and the northern
Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of
the German People .... A very extensive evacuation will be
necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future
will hold very hard years in store for the Russians."
Three or four weeks later Hitler discussed with Rosenberg, Goring,
Keitel, and others his plan for the exploitation of the Soviet popula"
tion and territory, which included among other things the evacua-
tion of the inhabitants of the Crimea and its settlement by
Germans.
A somewhat similar fate was planned for Czechoslovakia by the
Defendant Von Neurath, in August 1940; the intelligentsia were to
be "expelled", but the rest of the population was to be Germanized
rather than expelled or exterminated, since there was a shortage of
Germans to replace them.
In the West the population of Alsace were the victims of a
German "expulsion action." Between July and December 1940,
105,000 Alsatians were either deported from their homes or preven-
ted from returning to them. A captured German report dated
7 August 1942 with regard to Alsace states that: "The problem of
race will be given first consideration, and this in such a manner
that persons of racial value will be deported to Germany proper,
and racially inferior persons to France."

Pillage of Public and Private Property

Article 49 of the Hague Convention provides that an occupying
Fower may levy a contribution of money from the occupied terri-
tory to pay for the needs of the army of occupation, and for the
administration of the territory in quesfeon. Article 52 of the Hague
Convention provides that an occupying Power may make requisi-
tions in kind only for the needs of the army of occupation, and
that these requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources of

238
the country. These articles, together with Article 48, dealing with
the expenditure of money collected in taxes, and Articles 53, 55,
and 56, dealing with public property, make it clear that under the
rules of war, the economy of an occupied country can only be
required to bear the expense of the occupation, and these should
not be greater than the economy of the country can reasonably be
expected to bear. Article 56 reads as follows:
"The property of municipalities, of religious, charitable, edu-
cational, artistic,and scientific institutions, although belong-
ing to the State, is to be accorded the same standing as pri-
vate property. All pre-meditated seizure, destruction, or
damage of such institutions, historical monuments, works of
art and science, is prohibited and should be prosecuted."
The evidence in this case has established, however, that the
territories occupied by Germany were exploited for the German
war most ruthless way, without consideration of the
effort in the
localeconomy, and in consequence of a deliberate design and policy.
There was in truth a systematic "plunder of public or private
property", which was criminal under Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
The German occupation policy was clearly stated in a speech made
by the Defendant Goring on 6 August 1942 to the various German
authorities in charge of occupied territories:
"God knows, you are not sent out there to work for the wel-
fare of the people in your charge, but to get the utmost out
of them, so that the German People can live. That is what
I expect of your exertions. This everlasting concern about
foreign people must cease now, once and for all. I have here
before me reports on what you are expected to deliver. It is
nothing at all, when I consider your territories. It makes no
difference to me in this connection if you say that your
people will starve."
The methods employed to exploit the resources of the occupied
territories to the full varied from country to country. In some of
the occupied countries in the East and the West, this exploitation
was carried out within the framework of the existing economic
structure. The local industries were put under German supervision,
and the distribution of war materials was rigidly controlled. The
industries thought to be of value to the German war effort were
compelled to continue, and most of the rest were closed down alto-
gether. Raw materials and the finnished products alike were confis-
cated for the needs of the German industry. As early as 19 October
1939 the Defendant Goring had issued a directive giving detailed
instructions for the administration of the occupied territories; it

provided:

239
 .

"The task for the economic treatment of the various admini-

strative regions is different, depending on whether the country-
is involved which will be incorporated politically into the
German Reich, or whether we will deal with the Govern-
ment-General, which in all probability will not be made a
part of Germany. In the first mentioned territories, the . .

safeguarding of all their productive facilities and supplies

must be aimed at, as well as a complete incorporation into
the Greater German economic system, at the earliest possible
time. On the other hand, there must be removed from the
territories of the Government-General all raw materials,
scrap materials, machines, etc., which are of use for the Ger-
man war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely
necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked exist-
ence of the population must be transferred to Germany,
unless such transfer would require an unreasonably long
period of time, and would make it more practicable to ex-
ploit those enterprises by giving them German orders, to be
executed at their present location."
As a consequence of this order, agricultural products, raw materials
needed by German machine tools, transportation equip-
factories,
ment, other finished products, and even foreign securities and
holdings of foreign exchange were all requisitioned and sent to
Germany. These resources were requisitioned in a manner out of all
proportion to the economic resources of those countries, and resulted
in famine, inflation, and an active black market. At first the German
occupation authorities attempted to suppress the black market,
because it was a channel
of distribution keeping local products out
of German hands. When
attempts at suppression failed, a German
purchasing agency was organized to make purchases for Germany
on the black market, thus carrying out the assurance made by the
Defendant Goring that it was "necessary that all should know that
if there is to be famine anywhere, it shall in no case be in Ger-

many."
In many of the occupied countries of the East and the West, the
authorities maintained the pretense of paying for all the property
which they seized. This elaborate pretense of payment merely dis-
guised the fact that the goods sent to Germany from these occupied
countries were paid for by the occupied countries themselves, either
by the device of excessive occupation costs or by forced loans in
return for a credit balance on a "clearing account" which was an
account merely in name.
In most of the occupied countries of the East even this pretense
of legality was not maintained; economic exploitation became
deliberate plunder. This policy was first put into effect in the

240
administration of the Government General in Poland. The main
exploitation of the raw materials in the East was centered on agri-
cultural products and very large amounts of food were shipped from
the Government General to Germany.
The evidence of the widespread starvation among the Polish
People in the Government General indicates the ruthlessness and
the severity with which the policy of exploitation was carried out.
The occupation of the territories of the U.S.S.R. was characterized
by premeditated and systematic looting. Before the attack on the
U.S.S.R. an economic staff —
Oldenburg —
was organized to ensure
the most efficient exploitation of Soviet territories. The German
Armies were to be fed out of Soviet territory, even if "many
millions of people will be starved to death." An OKW
directive
issued before the attack said: "To obtain the greatest possible quan-
tity of food and crude oil for Germany —
that is the main economic
purpose of the campaign."
Similarly, a declaration by the Defendant Rosenberg of 20 June
1941 had advocated the use of the produce from Southern Russia
and of the Northern Caucasus to feed the German People, saying:
"We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part
to feed also the Russian People with the products of that
surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity,
bare of any feelings."
When the Soviet territory was occupied, this policy was put into
effect; there was a large scale confiscation of agricultural supplies,
with complete disregard of the needs of the inhabitants of the
occupied territory.
In addition to the seizure of raw materials and manufactured
articles, a wholesale seizure was made of art treasures, furniture,
textiles, and similar articles in all the invaded countries.
The Defendant Rosenberg was designated by Hitler on 29 January
1940 Head of the Center for National Socialist Ideological and
Educational Research, and thereafter the organization known as the
"Einsatzstab Rosenberg" conducted its operations on a very great
scale. Originally designed for the establishment of a research library,
it developed into a project for the seizure of cultural treasures. On

1 March 1942 Hitler issued a further decree, authorizing Rosenberg

to search libraries, lodges, and cultural establishments, to seize

material from these establishments, as well as cultural treasures
owned by Jews. Similar directions were given where the ownership
could not be clearly established. The decree directed the co-operation
of the Wehrmacht High Command, and indicated that Rosenberg's
activities in the West were to be conducted in his capacity as Reichs-
leiter, and in the East in his capacity as Reichsminister. Thereafter,
Rosenberg's activities were extended to the occupied countries. The

241
report of Robert Scholz, Chief of the special staff for Pictorial Art,
stated: "During the period from March 1941 to July 1944 the special
staff for Pictorial Art brought into the Reich 29 large shipments,
including 137 freight cars with 4,174 cases of art works."
The report of Scholz refers to 25 portfolios of pictures of the
most valuable works of the art collection seized in the West, which
portfolios were presented to the Führer. Thirty-nine volumes, pre-
pared by the Einsatzstab, contained photographs of paintings, textiles,
furniture, candelabra, and numerous other objects of art, and illus-
trated the value and magnitude of the collection which had been
made. In many of the occupied countries private collections were
robbed, libraries were plundered, and private houses were pillaged.
Museums, palaces, and libraries in the occupied territories of the
U.S.S.R. were systematically looted. Rosenberg's Einsatzstab, Von
Ribbentrop's special ''Battalion", the Reichscommissars and repre-
sentatives of the Military Command seized objects of cultural and
historical value belonging to the People of the Soviet Union, which
were sent to Germany. Thus the Reichscommissar of the Ukraine
removed paintings and objects of art from Kiev and Kharkov and
sent them to East Prussia. Rare volumes and objects of art from
the palaces of Peterhof, Tsarskoye Selo, and Pavlovsk were shipped
to Germany. In his letter to Rosenberg of 3 October 1941 Reichs-
commissar Kube stated that the value of the objects of art taken
from Bielorussia ran into millions of rubles. The scale of this
plundering can also be seen in the letter sent from Rosenberg's
department to Von Milde-Schreden in which it is stated that during
the month of October 1943 alone, about 40 box-cars loaded with
objects of cultural value were transported to the Reich.
With regard to the suggestion that the purpose of the seizure of
art treasures was protective and meant for their preservation, it is
necessary to say a few words. On 1 December 1939 Himmler, as the
Reich Commissioner for the "strengthening of Germanism", issued
a decree to the regional officers of the secret police in the annexed
eastern territories, and to the commanders of the security service in
Radom, Warsaw, and Lublin. This decree contained administrative
directions for carrying out the art seizure program, and in Clause 1
it is stated:
To strengthen Germanism in the defense of the Reich, all
articles mentioned in Section 2 of this decree are hereby con-
fiscated .... They are confiscated for the benefit of the Ger-
man Reich, and are at the disposal of the Reich Commissioner
for the strengthening of Germanism."
The intention to enrich Germany by the seizures, rather than to
protect the seized objects, is indicated in an undated report by
Dr. Hans Posse, director of the Dresden State Picture Gallery:

242
 "I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and pri-
vate collections, as well as clerical property, in Cracow and
Warsaw. It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich
ourselves from the acquisition of great art works of paintings
and sculptures, with the exception of the Veit-Stoß altar,
and the plates of Hans von Kulnback in the Church of Maria
in Cracow and several other works from the National
. . .

Museum in Warsaw."
Slave Labor Policy
Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides that the "ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose, of civilian
population of or in occupied territory" shall be a War Crime. The
laws relating to forced labor by the inhabitants of occupied terri-
tories are found in Article 52 of the Hague Convention, which
provides:
"Requisition in kind and services shall not be demanded from
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the
army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the re-
sources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve
the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military
operations against their own country."
The policy of the German occupation authorities was in flagrant
violation of the terms of this convention. Some idea of this policy
may be gathered from the statement made by Hitler in a speech on
9 November 1941:
"The territory which now works for us contains more than
250,000,000 men, but the territory which works indirectly for
us includes now more than 350,000,000. In the measure in
which it concerns German territory, the domain which we
have taken under our administration, it is not doubtful that
we shall succeed in harnessing the very last man to this
work."
The actual results achieved were not so complete as this, but the
German occupation many of the
authorities did succeed in .forcing
inhabitants of the occupied territories to work for the German war
effort, and in deporting at least 5,000,000 persons to Germany to
serve German industry and agriculture.
In the early stages of the war, manpower in the occupied terri-
tories was under the control of various occupation authorities, and
the procedure varied from country to country. In all the occupied
territories compulsory labor service was promptly instituted. Inhab-
itants of the occupied countries were conscripted and compelled to
work in local occupations, to assist the German war economy. In
many cases they were forced to work on German fortifications and
military installations. As local supplies of raw materials and local

243
industrial capacity became inadequate to meet the German require-
ments, the system of deporting laborers to Germany was put into
force. By the middle of April 1940 compulsory deportation of laborers
to Germany had been ordered in the Government General; and a
similar procedure was followed in other eastern territories as they
were occupied. A description of this compulsory deportation from
Poland was given by Himmler. In an address to SS officers he
recalled how in weather 40 degrees below zero they had to "haul
away thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands". On a
later occasion Himmler stated:
"Whether ten thousand Russian females fall down from
exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only
insofar as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished ....
We must realize that we have 6-7 million foreigners in
Germany .... They are none of them dangerous so long as
we take severe measures at the merest trifles."
During the first two years of the German occupation of France,
Belgium, Holland, and Norway, however, an attempt was made to
obtain the necessary workers on a voluntary basis. How unsuccessful
this was may be seen from the report of the meeting of the Central
Planning Board on 1 March 1944. The representative of the Defend-
ant Speer, one Koehrl, speaking of the situation in France, said:
"During all this time a great number of Frenchmen was recruited,
and voluntarily went to Germany."
He was interrupted by the Defendant Sauckel: "Not only volun-
tary, some were recruited forcibly."
To which Koehrl replied: "The calling up started after the re-
cruitment no longer yielded enough results."
To which the Defendant Sauckel replied: "Out of the five million
workers who arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily",
and Koehrl rejoined: "Let us forget for the moment whether or not
some slight pressure was used. Formally, at least, they were volun-
teers."
Committees were set up to encourage recruiting, and a vigorous
propaganda campaign was begun to induce workers to volunteer for
service in Germany. This propaganda campaign included, for
example, the promise that a prisoner of war would be returned for
every laborer who volunteered to go to Germany. In some cases it
was supplemented by withdrawing the ration cards of laborers who
refused to go to Germany, or by discharging them from their jobs
and denying them unemployment benefit or an opportunity to work
elsewhere. In some cases workers and their families were threatened
with reprisals by the police if they refused to go to Germany. It was
on 21 March 1942 that the Defendant Sauckel was appointed Pleni-
potentiary-General for the Utilization of Labor, with authority over

244
"all available manpower, including that of workers recruited abroad,
and of prisoners of war".
The Defendant Sauckel was directly under the Defendant Goring
as Commissioner of the Four Year Plan, and a Goring decree of
27 March 1942 transferred all his authority over manpower to
Sauckel. Sauckel's instructions, too, were that foreign labor should
be recruited on a voluntary basis, but also provided that "where,
however, in the occupied territories, the appeal for volunteers does
not suffice, obligatory service and drafting must under all circum-
stances be resorted to." Rules requiring labor service in Germany
were published in all the occupied territories. The number of labor-
ers to be supplied was fixed by Sauckel, and the local authorities
were instructed to meet these requirements by conscription if neces-
sary. That conscription was the rule rather than the exception is
shown by the statement of Sauckel already quoted, on 1 March 1944.
The Defendant Sauckel frequently asserted that the workers
belonging to foreign nations were treated humanely, and that the
conditions in which they lived were good. But whatever the intention
of Sauckel may have been, and however much he may have desired
that foreign laborers should be treated humanely, the evidence
before the Tribunal establishes the fact that the conscription of
labor was accomplished in many cases by drastic and violent
methods. The "mistakes and blunders" were on a very great scale.
Man-hunts took place in the streets, at motion picture houses,
even at churches and at night in private houses. Houses were
sometimes burnt down, and the families taken as hostages, practices
which were described by the Defendant Rosenberg as having their
origin "in the blackest periods of the slave trade". The methods used
in obtaining forced labor from the Ukraine appear from an order
issued to SD officers which stated:
"It will not be possible always
to refrain from using force
When searching villages, especially when it has been neces-
sary to burn down a village, the whole population will be
put at the disposal of the Commissioner by force .... As a
rule no more children will be shot .... If we limit harsh
measures through the above orders for the time being, it is
only done for the following reason .... The most important
thing is the recruitment of workers."
The resources and needs of the occupied countries were completely
disregarded in carrying out this policy. The treatment of the laborers
was governed by Sauckel's instructions of 20 April 1942 to the effect
that: "All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way
as to exploit them to the highest possible extent, at the lowest
conceivable degree of expenditure."

245
 The evidence showed that workers destined for the Reich were
sent under guard to Germany, often packed in trainswithout
adequate heat, food, clothing, or sanitary facilities. The evidence
further showed that the treatment of the laborers in Germany in
many cases was brutal and degrading. The evidence relating to the
Krupp Works at Essen showed that punishments of the most cruel
kind were inflicted on the workers. Theoretically at least the
workers were paid, housed, and fed by the DAF, and even permitted
to transfer their savings and to send mail and parcels back to their
native country; but restrictive regulations took a proportion of the
pay. the camps in which they were housed were unsanitary; and
the food was very often less than the minimum necessary to give
the workers strength to do their jobs. In the case of Poles employed
on farms in Germany, the employers were given authority to inflict
corporal punishment and were ordered, if possible, to house them
in stables, not in their own homes. They were subject to constant
supervision by the Gestapo and the SS, and if they attempted to
leave their jobs they were sent to correction camps or concentration
camps. The concentration camps were also used to increase the
supply of labor. Concentration camp commanders were ordered to
work their prisoners to the limits of their physical power. During
the latter stages of the war the concentration camps were so produc-
tive in certain types of work that the Gestapo was actually
instructed to arrest certain classes of laborers so that they could
be used in this way. Allied prisoners of war were also regarded as
a possible source of labor. Pressure was exercised on non-commis-
sioned officers to force them to consent to work, by transferring
to disciplinary camps those who did not consent. Many of the
prisoners of war were assigned to work directly related to military
operations, in violation of Article 31 of the Geneva Convention.
They were put to work in munition factories and even made to load
bombers, to carry ammunition and to dig trenches, often under the
most hazardous conditions. This condition applied particularly to
the Soviet prisoners of war. On 16 February 1943, at a meeting of
the Central Planning Board, at which the Defendants Sauckel and
Speer were present, Milch said:
"We have made a request for an order that a certain percen-
tage of men in the Ack-Ack artillery must be Russians; 50,000
will be taken altogether. Thirty thousand are already em-
ployed as gunners. This is an amusing thing, that Russians
must work the guns."
And on 4 October 1943, at Posen, Himmler, speaking of the Russian
prisoners, captured in the early days of the war, said:
"As that time we did not value the mass of humanity as we
value it today, as raw material, as labor. What, after all,

246
 thinking in terms of generations, is not to be regretted, but
is now deplorable by reason of the loss of labor, is that the
prisoners died in tens and hundreds of thousands of exhaus-
tion and hunger."
The general policy underlying the mobilization of slave labor
was stated by Sauckel on 20 April 1942. He said:
"The aim of this new gigantic labor mobilization is to use all
the rich and tremendous sources conquered and secured for
us by our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of
Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the Armed Forces, and also
for the nutrition of the Homeland. The raw materials, as
well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their
human labor power, are to be used completely and conscien-
tiously to the profit of Germany and her allies .... All pris-
oners of war from the territories of the West, as well as the
East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated
into the German armament and nutrition industries ...
Consequently it is an immediate necessity to use the human
reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest
extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary
amount of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately
institute conscription or forced labor. . The complete
. .

employment of all prisoners of war, as well as the use of a

gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and
women, has become an indisputable necessity for the solution
of the mobilization of the labor program in this war."
Reference should also be made to the policy which was in existence
in Germany by the summer of 1940, under which all aged, insane,
and incurable people, "useless eaters," were transferred to special
institutions where they were killed, and their relatives informed
that they had died from natural causes. The victims were not con-
fined to German citizens, but included foreign laborers, who were no
longer able to work, and were therefore useless to the German war
machine. It has been estimated that at least some 275,000 people
were killed in this manner in nursing homes, hospitals and asylums,
which were under the jurisdiction of the Defendant Frick, in his
capacity as Minister of the Interior. How many foreign workers
were included in this total it has been quite impossible to determine.

Persecution of the Jews

The persecution Jews at the hands of the Nazi Government
of the
has been proved in the greatest detail before the Tribunal. It is a
record of consistent and systematic inhumanity on the greatest scale.
Ohlendorf, Chief of Amt III in the RSHA from 1939 to 1943, and
who was in command of one of the Einsatz groups in the campaign

247
against the Soviet Union testified as to the methods employed in the
extermination of the Jews. He said that he employed firing squads to
shoot the victims in order to lessen the sense of individual guilt on
the part of his men; and the 90,000 men, women, and children who
were murdered in one year by his particular group were mostly
Jews.
When the witness Bach Zelewski was asked how Ohlendorf could
admit the murder of 90,000 people, he replied: "I am of the opinion
that when, for years, for decades, the doctrine is preached that the
Slav race is an inferior race, and Jews not even human, then such
an outcome is inevitable."
But the Defendant Frank spoke the final words of this chapter of
Nazi history when he testified in this Court:
"We have fought against Jewry: we have fought against it
for years: and we have allowed ourselves to make utterances
and my own diary has become a witness against me in this
connection —
utterances which are terrible .... A thousand
years will pass and this guilt of Germany will still not be
erased."
The anti-Jewish policy was formulated in Point 4 of the Party
Program which declared "Only a member of the race can be a
citizen. A member of the race can only be one who is of German
blood, without consideration of creed. Consequently, no Jew can be
a member of the race."Other points of the program declared that
Jews should be treated as foreigners, that they should not be
permitted to hold public office, that they should be expelled from
the Reich if it were impossible to nourish the entire population of
the State, that they should be denied any further immigration into
Germany, and that they should be prohibited from publishing
German newspapers. The Nazi Party preached these doctrines
throughout its history. Der Stürmer and other publications were
allowed to disseminate hatred of the Jews, and in the speeches and
public declarations of the Nazi leaders, the Jews were held up to
public ridicule and contempt.
With the seizure of power, the persecution of the Jews was
intensified. A series of discriminatory laws was passed, which
limited the offices and professions permitted to Jews; and restric-
tions were placed on their family life and their rights of citizen-
ship. By the autumn of 1938, the Nazi policy towards the
Jews had reached the stage where it was directed towards the
complete exclusion of Jews from German life. Pogroms were
organized, which included the burning and demolishing of syna-
gogues, the looting of Jewish businesses, and the arrest of prominent
Jewish business men. A collective fine of 1 billion marks was
imposed on the Jews, the seizure of Jewish assets was authorized,

248
and the movement of Jews was restricted by regulations to certain
specified districts and hours. The creation of ghettos was carried out
on an extensive scale, and by an order of the Security Police Jews
were compelled to wear a yellow star to be worn on the breast
and back.
It was contended for the Prosecution that certain aspects of this
anti-Semitic policy were connected with the plans for aggressive
war. The violent measures taken against the Jews in November 1938
were nominally in retaliation for the killing of an official of the
German Embassy in Paris. But the decision to seize Austria and
Czechoslovakia had been made a year before. The imposition of a
fine of one billion marks was made, and the confiscation of the
Jews was decreed, at a time when German
financial holdings of the
armament expenditure had put the German treasury in difficulties,
and when the reduction of expenditure on armaments was being
considered. These steps were taken, moreover, with the approval of
the Defendant Goring, who had been given responsibility for
economic matters of this kind, and who was the strongest advocate
of an extensive rearmament program notwithstanding the financial
difficulties.
It was further said that the connection of the anti-Semitic policy
with aggressive war was not limited to economic matters. The
German Foreign Office circular, in an article of 25 January 1939,
entitled "Jewish Question as a Factor in German Foreign Policy in
the Year 1938", described the new phase in the Nazi anti-Semitic
policy in these words:
"It is certainly no coincidence that the fateful year 1938 has
brought nearer the solution of the Jewish question simul-
taneously with the realization of the idea of Greater Ger-
many, since the Jewish policy was both the basis and conse-
quence of the year 1938. The advance made by Jewish in-
fluence and the destructive Jewish spirit in politics, economy,
and culture, paralyzed the power and the will of the German
People to rise again, more perhaps even than the power
policy opposition of the former enemy Allied Powers of the
first World War. The healing of this sickness among the
people was therefore certainly one of the most important
requirements for exerting the force which, in the year 1938,
resulted in the joining together of Greater Germany in de-
fiance of the world."
The Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany before the war, severe
and repressive as it was, cannot compare, however, with the policy
pursued during the war in the occupied territories. Originally the
policy was similar to that which had been in force inside Germany.
Jews were required to register, were forced to live in ghettos, to

249
wear the yellow star, and were used as slave laborers. In the
summer of 1941,however, plans were made for the ''final solution"
of the Jewish question in Europe. This "final solution'' meant the
extermination of the Jews, which early in 1939 Hitler had threat-
ened would be one of the consequences of an outbreak of war, and
a special section in the Gestapo under Adolf Eichmann, as head of
Section B 4 of the Gestapo, was formed to carry out the policy.
The plan for exterminating the Jews was developed shortly after
the attack on the Soviet Union. Einsatzgruppen of the Security
Police and SD, formed for the purpose of breaking the resistance
of the population of the areas lying behind the German armies
in the East, were given the duty of exterminating the Jews in
those areas. The effectiveness of the work of the Einsatzgruppen
is shown by the fact that in February 1942 Heydrich was able to

report that Estonia had already been cleared of Jews and that
in Riga the number of Jews had been reduced from 29.500 to 2.500
Altogether the Einsatzgruppen operating in the occupied Baltic
States killed over 135,000 Jews in three months.
Nor did these special units operate completely independently of
the German Armed Forces. There is clear evidence that leaders of
the Einsatzgruppen obtained the co-operation of Army commanders.
In one case the relations between an Einsatzgruppe and the military
authorities was described at the time as being "very close, almost
cordial"; in another case the smoothness of an Einsatzcommando's
operation was attributed to the "understanding for this procedure"
shown by the Army authorities.
Units of the Security Police and SD in the occupied territories
of the East, which were under civil administration, were given a
similar task. The planned and systematic character of the Jewish
persecutions is best illustrated by the original -report of the SS
Brigadier-General Stroop, who was in charge of the destruction of
the ghetto in Warsaw, which took place in 1943. The Tribunal
received in evidence that report, illustrated with photographs,
bearing on its title page: "The Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw No Longer
Exists." The volume records a series of reports sent by Stroop to
the Higher SS and Police Führer East. In April and May of 1943,
in one report, Stroop wrote:
"The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could only
be supnressed bv energetic actions of our troops day and
night. The Reichsführer SS ordered therefore on 23 April
1943 the cleaning out of the ghetto with utter ruthlessness
and merciless tenacity. I therefore decided to destroy and
burn down the entire ghetto, without regard to* the arma-
ment factories. These factories were systematically disman-
tled and then burnt. Jews usually left their hideouts, but

250
 frequently remained in the burning buildings, and jumped
out of the windows only when the heat became unbearable.
They then tried to crawl with broken bones across the street
into buildings which were not afire Life in the sewers
. . .

was not pleasant after the first week. Many times we could
hear loud voices in the sewers . Tear gas bombs were
. .

thrown into the manholes, and. the Jews driven out of the
sewers and captured. Countless numbers of Jews were liqui-
dated in sewers and bunkers through blasting. The longer
the resistance continued, the tougher became the members of
the Waffen SS, Poüce and Wehrmacht, who always dischar-
ged their duties in an exemplary manner.
Stroop recorded that his action at Warsaw ehminated "a proved
total of 56,065 people. To that we have to add the number of those
killed through blasting, fire, etc., which cannot be counted." Grim
evidence of mass murders of Jews was also presented to the
Tribunal in cinematograph films depicting the communal graves of
hundreds of victims which were subsequently discovered by the
Allies.
These atrocities were
all part and parcel of the policy inaugur-
ated in 1941, and not surprising that there should be evidence
it is
that one or two German officials entered vain protests against the
brutal manner in which the killings were carried out. But the
methods employed never conformed to a single pattern. The mas-
sacres of Rowno and Dubno, of which the German engineer Graebe
spoke, were examples of one method; the systematic extermination
of Jews in concentration camps, was another. Part of the '
final
solution" was the gathering of Jews from all German-occupied
Europe in concentration camps. Their physical condition was the test
of life or death. All who were fit to work were used as slave
laborers in the concentration camps; all who were not fit to work
were destroyed in gas chambers and their bodies burnt. Certain
concentration camps such as Treblinka and Auschwitz were set aside
for this main purpose. With regard to Auschwitz, the Tribunal heard
the evidence of Höss, the commandant of the camp from 1 May 1940
to 1 December 1943. He estimated that in the camp of Auschwitz
alone in that time 2.500,000 persons were exterminated, and that
a further 500,000 died from disease and starvation. Höss described
the screening for extermination by stating in evidence:
"We had two SS doctors on duty at Auschwitz to examine
the incoming transports of prisoners. The prisoners would
be marched by one of the doctors who would make spot
decisions as they walked by. Those who were fit for work
were sent into the camp. Others were sent immediately to
the extermination plants. Children of tender years were
invariably exterminated since by reason of their youth they

251
 were unable to work. Still another improvement we made over
Treblinka was that at Treblinka the victims almost always
knew that they were to be exterminated and at Auschwitz
we endeavored to fool the victims into thinking that they
were t: go through a delousir.g process. Of course, frequently
they realized our true intentions and we sometimes had riots
and difficulties due to that fact. Very frequently women
would hide their children under their clothes, but of course
when we found them we would send the children in to be
exteirninated."
He described the actual killing by stating:
"Ittook from three to fifteen minutes to kill the people in
the death chamber, depending upon climatic conditions. We
knew when the people were dead because their screaming
stopped. We usually waited about one half-hour before we
opened the doors and removed the bodies. After the bodies
were removed our special commandos took off the rings and
extracted the gold from the teeth of the corpses."
Beating starvation, torture, and killing were general. The inmates
were subjected to cruel experiments at Dachau in August 1942.
victims were immersed in cold water until their body temperature
was reduced to 28 Centigrade, when they died immediately. Other
:

experiments included high altitude experiments in pressure cham-

bers, experiments to determine how long human beings could sur-
vive in freezing water, experiments with poison bullets, experiments
with contagious diseases, and experiments dealing with sterilization
of men and women by X-rays and other methods.
Evidence was given of the treatment of the inmates before and
after their extermination. There was testimony that the hair of
women victims was cut off before they were killed, and shipped to
Germany, there to be used in the manufacture of mattresses. The
clothes, money, and valuables of the inmates were also salvaged
and sent to the appropriate agencies for disposition. After the exter-
mination the gold teeth and fillings were taken from the heads of
the corpses and sent to the Reichsbank.
After cremation the ashes were used for fertilizer, and in some
instances attempts were made to utilize the fat from the bodies of
the victims in the commercial manufacture of soap. Special groups
traveled through Europe to find Jews and subject them to the
'
final solution". German missions were sent to such satellite coun-
tries as Hungary and Bulgaria, to arrange for the shipment of
Jews to extermination camps and it is known that by the end of
1944. 400.000 Jews from Hungary had been murdered at Auschwitz.
Evidence has also been given of the evacuation of 110.000* Jews from
part of Rumania for "liquidation". Adolf Eichmann, who had been
put in charge of this program by Hitler, has estimated that the
policy pursued resulted in the killing of 6 million Jews, of which
4 million were killed in the extermination institutions.

The Law Relating to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

Article 6 of the Charter provides:
"(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, kill-
ing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity;
"(c) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war; or
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law
of the country where perpetrated."
As heretofore stated, the Charter does not define as a separate
crime any conspiracy except the one set out in Article 6 (a), dealing
with Crimes .against Peace.
The Tribunal is of course bound by the Charter, in the definition
which it gives both of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.
With respect to War Crimes, however, as has already been pointed
out, the crimes defined by Article 6, Section (b), of the Charter were
already recognized as War Crimes under international law. They
were covered by Articles 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention
of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46, and 51 of the Geneva Convention
of 1929. That violation of these provisions constituted crimes for
which the guilty individuals were punishable is too well settled
to admit of argument.
But it is argued that the Hague Convention does not apply in
this case, because of the "general participation" clause in Article 2
of the Hague Convention of 1907. That clause provided:
"The provisions contained in the regulations (Rules of Land
Warfare) referred to in Article I as well as in the present Con-
vention do not apply except between contracting powers, and
then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention."
Several of the belligerents in the recent war were not parties to this
Convention.
In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not necessary to decide this
question. The rules of land warfare expressed in the Convention
undoubtedly represented an advance over existing international

253
law at the time of their adoption. But the convention expressly
stated mat it was an attempt ''to revise the general laws and cus-
toms of war", which it thus recognized to be then existing, but
by 1939 these rules laid down in the Convention were recognized
by all civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of
the laws and customs of war which are referred to in Article 6 (b)
of the Charter.
A was made that Germany was no longer
further submission
bound by the rules of land warfare in many of the territories
occupied during the war, because Germany had completely sub-
jugated those countries and incorporated them into the German
Reich, a fact which gave Germany authority to deal with the occu-
pied countries as though they were part of *Germany. In the view
of the Tribunal it is unnecessary in this case to decide whether
this doctrine of subjugation, dependent as it is upon military con-
quest, has any application where the subjugation is the result of
the crime of aggressive war. The doctrine was never considered to
be applicable so long as there was an army in the field attempting
to restore the occupied countries to their true owners, and in this
case, therefore, the doctrine could not apply to any territories occu-
pied after 1 September 1939. As to the War Crimes committed in
Bohemia and Moravia, it is a sufficient answer that these territories
were never added to the Reich, but a mere protectorate was estab-
lished over them.
With regard to Crimes against Humanity there is no doubt what-
ever that political opponents were murdered in Germany before the
war, and that many of them were kept in concentration camps in
circumstances of great horror and cruelty. The policy of terror was
certainly carried out on a vast scale, and in many cases was organ-
ized and systematic. The policy of persecution, repression, and
murder of civilians in Germany before the war of 1939, who were
likely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried
out. The persecution of Jews during the same period is established
beyond all doubt. To constitute Crimes against Humanity, the acts
relied on before the outbreak of war must have been in execution
of, or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible
as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved
that they were done in execution of, or in connection with, any such
crime. The Tribunal therefore cannot make a general declaration
that the acts before 1939 were Crimes against Humanity within the
meaning of the Charter, but from the beginning of the war in 1939
War Crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also Crimes
against Humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the
Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, did not
constitute War Crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or

254
in connection with, the aggressive war, and therefore constituted
Crimes against Humanity.

The Accused Organizations

Article 9 of the Charter provides:
"At the trial of any individual member of any group or organ-
ization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of
which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organ-
ization of which the individual was a member was a criminal
organization."
"After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such
notice as it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to ask the
Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of the organ-
ization will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to
be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal
character of the organization. The Tribunal shall have power to
allow or reject the application. If the application is allowed, the
Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be
represented and heard."
Article 10 of the Charter makes clear that the declaration of crimi-
nality against an accused organization is final, and cannot be chal-

lenged in any subsequent criminal proceeding against a member of

the organization. Article 10 is as follows:
"In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by
the Tribunal, the competent national authority of any Signatory
shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for membership
therein before national, military or occupation courts. In any
such case the criminal nature of the group or organization is
considered proved and shall not be questioned."
The effect of the declaration of criminality by the Tribunal is
well illustrated by Law Number 10 of the Control Council of Ger-
many passed on 20 December 1945, which provides:
"Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:

" (d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organ-

ization declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.

" (3) Any person found guilty of any of the crimes above men-

tioned may upon conviction be punished as shall be determined

b / the Tribunal to be just. Such punishment may consist of one
or more of the following:
(a) Death.
(b) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or without
hard labor.

255
 (c) Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labor, in lieu
thereof."
In effect, therefore, a member of an organization which the
Tribunal has declared to be criminal may be subsequently con-
victed of the crime of membership and be punished for that crime
by death. This is not to assume that international or military courts
which will try these individuals will not exercise appropriate stan-
dards of justice. This is a far reaching and novel procedure. Its
application, unless properly safeguarded, may produce great in-
justice.
Article should be noted, uses the words "The Tribunal may
9, it

declare", so that the Tribunal is vested with discretion as to whether

it wiil declare any organization criminal. This discretion is a judi-

cial one and does not permit arbitrary action, but should be exer-
cised in accordance with well-settled legal principles, one of the
most important of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that
mass punishments should be avoided. If satisfied of the criminal
guilt of any organization or group, this Tribunal should not hesitate
to declare it to be criminal because the theory of "group criminal-
ity" is new, or because it might be unjustly applied bv some sub-
sequent tribunals. On the other hand, the Tribunal should make
such declaration of criminality so far as possible in a manner to
insure that innocent persons will not be punished.
A criminal organizationis analogous to a criminal conspiracy in

that the essence of both cooperation for criminal purposes. There

is

must be a group bound together and organized for a common pur-

pose. The group must be formed or used in connection with the
commission of crimes denounced by the Charter. Since the declar-
ation with respect to the organizations and groups will, as has been
pointed out, fix the criminality of its members, that definition should
exclude persons who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or
acts of the organization and those who were drafted by the State
for membership, unless they were personally implicated in the com-
mission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as
members of the organization. Membership alone is not enough to
come within the scope of these declarations.
Since declarations of criminality which the Tribunal makes will
be used by other courts in the trial of persons on account of their
membership in the organizations found to be criminal, the Tribunal
feels it appropriate to make the following recommendations:
1. That so far as possible throughout the four zones of occupation

in Germany the classifications, sanctions, and penalties be stand-

ardized. Uniformity of treatment so far as practical should be a
basic principle. This does not, of course, mean that discretion in

256
sentencing should not be vested in the court; but the discretion
should be within fixed limits appropriate to the nature of the crime.
2. Law No. 10, to which reference has already been made, leaves

punishment entirely in the discretion of the trial court even to

the extent of inflicting the death penalty.
The De-Nazification Law of 5 March 1946, however, passed for
Bavaria, Greater-Hesse, and Württemberg-Baden, provides definite
sentences for punishment in each type of offense. The Tribunal
recommends that in no case should punishment imposed under
Law No. 10 upon any members of an organization or group declared
by the Tribunal to be criminal exceed the punishment fixed by
the De-Nazification Law. No person should be punished under both
laws.
3. The Tribunal recommends to the Control Council that Law

No. 10 be amended to prescribe limitations on the punishment which

may be imposed for membership in a criminal group or organization
so that such punishment shall not exceed the punishment prescribed
by the De-Nazification Law.
The Indictment asks that the Tribunal declare to be criminal the
following organizations: The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party;
the Gestapo; the SD; the SS; the SA; the Reich Cabinet, and the
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.

THE LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY

Structure and Component Parts: The Indictment has named the
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party as a group or organization which
should be declared criminal. The Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party
consisted, in effect, of the official organization of the Nazi Party,
with Hitler as Führer at its head. The actual work of running the
Leadership Corps was carried out by the Chief of the Party Chan-
cellery (Hess, succeeded by Bormann) assisted by the Party Reich
Directorate, or Reichsleitung, which was composed of the Reichs-
leiters, the heads of the functional organizations of the Party, as well
as of the heads of the various main departments and offices which
were attached to the Party Reich Directorate. Under the Chief of
the Party Chancellery were the Gauleiters, with territorial juris-
diction over the major administrative regions of the Party, the Gaue.
The Gauleiters were assisted by a Party Gau Directorate or Gau-
leitung, similar in composition and in function to the Party Reich
Directorate. Under the Gauleiters in the Party hierarchy were the
Kreisleiters with territorial jurisdiction over a Kreis, usually con-
sisting of a single county, and assisted by a Party Kreis Directorate,
or Kreisleitung. The Kreisleiters were the lowest members of the
Party hierarchy who were full-time paid employees. Directly under
the Kreisleiters were the Ortsgruppenleiters, then the Zellenleiters

257
and then the Blockleiters. Directives and instructions were received
from the Party Reich Directorate. The Gauleiters had the function
of interpreting such orders and issuing them to lower formations.
The Kreisleiters had a certain discretion in interpreting orders, but
the Ortsgruppenleiters had not, but acted under definite instructions.
Instructions were only issued in writing down as far as the Orts-
gruppenleiters. The Block and Zellenleiters usually received instruc-
tions orally. Membership in the Leadership Corps at all levels was
voluntary.
On 28 February 1946 the Prosecution excluded from the declar-
ation asked for, all members of the staffs of the Ortsgruppenleiters
and all assistants of the Zellenleiters and Blockleiters. The declar-
ation sought against the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party thus
includes the Führer, the Reichsleitung, the Gauleiters and their staff
officers,the Kreisleiters and their staff officers, the Ortsgruppen-
leiters,the Zellenleiters and the Blockleiters, a group estimated to
contain at least 600.000 people.
Aims and Activities: The primary purpose of the Leadership
Corps from its beginning was to assist the Nazis in obtaining and,
after 30 January 1933, in retaining, control of the German State.
The machinery of the Leadership Corps was used for the wide-
spread dissemination of Nazi propaganda and to keep a detailed check
on the political attitudes of the German People. In this activity the
lower Political Leaders played a particularly important role. The
Blockleiters were instructed by the Party Manual to report to the
Ortsgruppenleiters all persons circulating damaging rumors or
criticism of the regime. The Ortsgruppenleiters, on the basis of
information supplied them by the Blockleiters and Zellenleiters, kept
a card index of the people within their Ortsgruppe which recorded
the factors which would be used in forming a judgment as to their
political reliability.
The Leadership Corps was particularly active during plebiscites.
All members of the Leadership Corps were active in getting out the
vote and insuring the highest possible proportion of "yes'' votes.
Ortsgruppenleiters and Political Leaders of higher ranks often collab-
orated with the Gestapo and SD in taking steps to determine those
who refused to vote or who voted "no", and in taking steps against
them which went as far as arrest and detention in a concentration
camp.
Criminal Activity: These steps, which relate merely to the con-
solidation of control of the Nazi Party, are not criminal under the
view of the conspiracy towage aggressive war which has previously
been But the
set forth. Leadership Corps was also used for similar
steps in Austriaand those parts of Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Poland.
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Yugoslavia which were incorp-

258
orated into the Reich and within the Gaue of the Nazi Party. In
those territories the machinery of the Leadership Corps was used
for their Germanization through the elimination of local customs
and the detection and arrest of persons who opposed German occu-
pation. This was criminal under Article 6 (b) of the Charter in those
areas governed by the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and criminal
under Article 6 (c) of the Charter as to the remainder.
The Leadership Corps played its part in the persecution of the
Jews. It was involved in the economic and political discrimination
against the Jews which was put into effect shortly after the Nazis
came into power. The Gestapo and SD were instructed to coordinate
with the Gauleiters and Kreisleiters the measures taken in the
pogroms of 9 and 10 November 1938. The Leadership Corps was also
used to prevent German public opinion from reacting against the
measures taken against the Jews in the East. On 9 October 1942, a
confidential information bulletin was sent to all Gauleiters and
Kreisleiters entitled "Preparatory Measures for the Final Solution
of the Jewish Question in Europe. Rumors concerning the Conditions
of the Jews in the East." This bulletin stated that rumors were being
started by returning soldiers concerning the conditions of Jews in
the East which some Germans might not understand, and outlined
in detail the official explanation to be given. This bulletin contained
no explicit statement that the Jews were being exterminated, but it
did indicate they were going to labor camps, and spoke of their
complete segregation and elimination and the necessity of ruthless
severity. Thus, even at its face value, it indicated the utilization of
the machinery of the Leadership Corps to keep German public
opinion from rebelling at a program which was stated to involve
condemning the Jews of Europe to a lifetime of slavery. This
information continued to be available to the Leadership Corps. The
August 1944 edition of Die Lage, a publication which was circulated
among the Political Leaders, described the deportation of 430.000
Jews from Hungary.
The Leadership Corps played an important part in the adminis-
tration of the Slave Labor Program. A Sauckel decree dated 6 April
1942 appointed the Gauleiters as Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobili-
zation for their Gaue with authority to coordinate all agencies
dealing with labor questions in their Gaue, with specific authority
over the employment of foreign workers, including their conditions
of work, feeding, and housing. Under this authority the Gauleiters
assumed control over the allocation of labor in their Gaue, including
the forced laborers from foreign countries. In carrying out this task
the Gauleiters used many Party offices within their Gaue, including
subordinate Political Leaders. For example, Sauckel's decree of
8 September 1942. relating to the allocation for household labor of

259
400,000 women laborers brought in from the East, established a
procedure under which applications filed for such workers should be
passed on by the Kreisleiters, whose judgment was final.
Under Sauckel's directive the Leadership Corps was directly
concerned with the treatment given foreign workers, and the Gau-
leiters were specifically instructed to prevent "politically inept fac-
tory heads" from giving "too much consideration to the care of
Eastern workers." The type of question which was considered in
their treatment included reports by the Kreisleiters on pregnancies
among the female slave laborers, which would result in an abortion
if the child's parentage would not meet the racial standards laid

down by the SS and usually detention in a concentration camp for

the female slave laborer. The evidence has established that under
the supervision of the Leadership Corps, the industrial workers were
housed in camps under atrocious sanitary conditions, worked long
hours and were inadequately fed. Under similar supervision, the
agricultural workers, who were somewhat better treated, were
prohibited transportation, entertainment, and religious worship, and
were worked without any time limit on their working hours and
under regulations which gave the employer the right to inflict corporal
punishment. The Political Leaders, at least down to the Ortsgruppen-
leiters, were responsible for this supervision. On 5 May 1943 a
memorandum of Bormann instructing that mistreatment of slave
laborers cease was distributed down to the Ortsgruppenleiters. Simi-
larly on 10 November 1944 a Speer circular transmitted a Himmler
directive which provided that all members of the Nazi Party, in
accordance with instructions from the Kreisleiter, would be warned
by the Ortsgruppenleiters of their duty to keep foreign workers
under careful observation.
The Leadership Corps was directly concerned with the treatment
of prisoners of war. On 5 November 1941 Bormann transmitted a
directive down to the level of Kreisleiter instructing them to insure
compliance by the Army with the recent directives of the Depart-
ment of the Interior ordering that dead Russian prisoners of war
should be buried wrapped in tar paper in a remote place without
any ceremony or any decorations of their graves. On 25 November
1943 Bormann sent a circular instructing the Gauleiters to report
any lenient treatment of prisoners of war. On 13 September 1944,
Bormann sent a directive down to the level of Kreisleiter ordering
that liaison be established between the Kreisleiters and the guards
of the prisoners of war in order "better to assimilate the commitment
of the prisoners of war to the political and economic demands". On
17 October 1944 an OKW directive instructed the officer in charge
of the prisoners of war to confer with the Kreisleiters on questions
of the productivity of labor. The use of prisoners of war, particularly

260
those from the East, was accompanied by a widespread violation of
rules of land warfare. This evidence establishes that the Leadership
Corps down to the level of Kreisleiter was a participant in this
illegal treatment.

The machinery of the Leadership Corps was also utilized in

attempts made to deprive Allied airmen of the protection to which
they were entitled under the Geneva Convention. On 13 March 1940
a directive of Hess transmitted instructions through the Leadership
Corps down to the Blockleiter for the guidance of the civilian
population in case of the landing of enemy planes or parachutists,
which stated that enemy parachutists were to be immediately
arrested or "made harmless". On 30 May 1944 Bormann sent a
circular letter to all Gau- and Kreisleiters reporting instances of
lynchings of Allied low-level fliers in which no police action was
taken. It was requested that Ortsgruppenleiters be informed orally
of the contents of this letter. This letter accompanied a propaganda
drive which had been instituted by Goebbels to induce such lynch-
ings, and clearly amounted to instructions to induce such lynchings
or at least to violate the Geneva Convention by withdrawing any
police protection. Some lynchings were carried out pursuant to this
program, but it does not appear that they were carried out through-
out all of Germany. Nevertheless, the existence of this circular letter
shows that the heads of the Leadership Corps were utilizing it for
a purpose which was patently illegal and which involved the use
of the machinery of the Leadership Corps at least through the Orts-
gruppenleiter.

Conclusion
The Leadership Corps was used for purposes which were criminal
under the Charter and involved the Germanization of incorporated
territory, the persecution of the Jews, the administration of the slave
labor program, and the mistreatment of prisoners of war. The
Defendants Bormann and Sauckel, who were members of this
organization, were among those who used it for these purposes. The
Gauleiters, the Kreisleiters, and the Ortsgruppenleiters participated,
to one degree or another, in these criminal programs. The Reichs-
leitung as the staff organization of the Party is also responsible for
these criminal programs as well as the heads of the various staff
organizations of the Gauleiters and Kreisleiters. The decision of the
Tribunal on these staff organizations includes only the Amtsleiters
who were heads of offices on the staffs of the Reichsleitung, Gau-
leitung, and Kreisleitung. With respect to other staff officers and
Party organizations attached to the Leadership Corps other than the
Amtsleiters referred to above, the Tribunal will follow the suggestion
of the Prosecution in excluding them from the declaration.

261
 The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the
Charter the group composed of those members of the Leadership
Corps holding the positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph
who became or remained members of the organization with know-
ledge that it was being used for the commission of acts declared
criminal by Article 6 of the Charter, or who were personally impli-
cated as members of the organization in the commission of such
crimes. The basis of this finding is the participation of the organ-
ization in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity connected
with the war; the group declared criminal cannot include, therefore,
persons who had ceased to hold the positions enumerated in the
preceding paragraph prior to 1 September 1939.

GESTAPO AND SD
Structure and Component Parts: The Prosecution has mamed Die
Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) and Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichs-
führer SS (SD) as groups or organizations which should be declared
criminal. The Prosecution presented the cases against the Gestapo
and SD together, stating that this was necessary because of the close
working relationship between them. The Tribunal permitted the SD
to present its defense separately because of a claim of conflicting
interests, but after examining the evidence has decided to consider
the case of the Gestapo and SD together.
The Gestapo and the SD were first linked together on 26 June
1936 by the appointment of Heydrich, who was the Chief of the SD,
to the position of Chief of the Security Police, which was defined to
include both the Gestapo and the Criminal Police. Prior to that time
the SD had been the intelligence agency, first of the SS, and, after
4 June 1934, of the entire Nazi Party. The Gestapo had been com-
posed of the various political police forces of the several German
Federal states which had been unified under the personal leadership
of Himmler, with the assistance of Göring. Himmler had been
appointed Chief of the German Police in the Ministry of the Interior
on 17 June 1936, and in his capacity as Reichsführer SS and Chief
of the German Police issued his decree of 26 June 1936, which placed
both the Criminal Police, or Kripo, and the Gestapo in the Security
Police, and placed both the Security Police and the SD under the
command of Heydrich.
This consolidation under the leadership of Heydrich of the
Security Police, a State organization, and the SD, a Party organ-
ization, was formalized by the decree of 27 September 1939, which
united the various State and Party offices which were under
Heydrich as Chief of the Security Police and SD into one adminis-
trative unit, the Reichs Security Head Office (RSHA) which was at
the same time both one of the principal offices (Hauptamter) of the

262
SS under Himmler as Reichsführer SS and an office in the Ministry
of the Interior under Himmler as Chief of the German Police. The
internal structure of the RSHA shows the manner in which it
consolidated the offices of the Security Police with those of the SD.
The RSHA was divided into seven offices (Ämter), two of which
(Amt I and Amt II) dealt with administrative matters. The Security
Police were represented by Amt IV, the head office of the Gestapo,
and by Amt V, the head office of the Criminal Police. The SD were
represented by Amt III, the head office for SD activities inside
Germany, by Amt VI, the head office for SD activities outside of
Germany and by Amt VII, the office for ideological research. Shortly
after the creation of the RSHA, in November 1939, the Security
Police was "coordinated" with the SS by taking all officials of the
Gestapo and Criminal Police into the SS at ranks equivalent to their
positions.
The creation of the RSHA represented the formalization, at the
top level, of the relationship under which the SD served as the
intelligence agency for the Security Police. A similar coordination
existed in the local offices. Within Germany and areas which were
incorporated within the Reich for the purpose of civil administration,
local offices of the Gestapo, Criminal Police, and SD were formally
separate. They were subject to coordination by Inspectors of the
Security Police and SD on the staffs of the local Higher SS and
Police Leaders, however, and one of the principal functions of the
local SD units was to serve as the intelligence agency for the local
Gestapo units. In the occupied territories, the formal relationship
between and SD was
local units of the Gestapo, Criminal Police,
They were organized into local units of the Security
slightly closer.
Police and SD and were under the control of both the RSHA and
of the Higher SS and Police Leader who was appointed by Himmler
to serve on the staff of the occupying authority. The offices of the
Security Police and SD in occupied territory were composed of
departments corresponding to the various Amts of the RSHA. In
occupied territories which were still considered to be operational
military areas or where German control had not been formally
established, the organization of the Security Police and SD was only
slightly changed. Members of the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD were
joined together into military type organizations known as Einsatz
Kommandos and Einsatzgruppen in which the key positions were
held by members the Gestapo, Kripo, and SD and in which
of
members of the Order Police, the Waffen SS and even the Wehr-
macht were used as auxiliaries. These organizations were under the
over-all control of the RSHA, but in front line areas were under the
operational control of the appropriate Army Commander.

263
 It can thus be seen that from a functional point of view both
the Gestapo and the SD were important and closely related groups
within the organization of the Security Police and the SD. The
Security Police and SD was under a single command, that of Heydrich
and later Kaltenbrunner, as Chief of the Security Police and SD;
it had a single headquarters, the RSHA; it had its own command

channels and worked as one organization both in Germany, in occu-

pied territories, and in the areas immediately behind the front lines.
During the period with which the Tribunal is primarily concerned,
applicants for positions in the Security Police and SD received
training in all its components, the Gestapo, Criminal Police, and SD.
Some confusion has been caused by the fact that part of the organ-
ization was technically a formation of the Nazi Party while another
part of the organization was an office in the Government, but this
is of no particular significance in view of the law of 1 December

1933, declaring the unity of the Nazi Party and the German State.
The Security Police and SD was a voluntary organization. It is
true that many civil servants and administrative officials were
transferred into the Security Police. The claim that this transfer
was compulsory amounts to nothing more than the claim that they
had to accept the transfer or resign their positions, with a possibility
of having incurred official disfavor. During the war a member of
the Security Police and SD did not have a free choice of assignments
within that organization and the refusal to accept a particular
when serving in occupied territory, might have
position, especially
led to punishment. The fact remains, however, that all
serious
members of the Security Police and SD joined the organization
voluntarily under no other sanction than the desire to retain their
positions as officials.
The organization of the Security Police and SD also included
three special units which must be dealt with separately. The first
of these was the Frontier Police or Grenzpolizei which came under
the control of the Gestapo in 1937. Their duties consisted in the
control of passage over the borders of Germany. They arrested
persons who crossed illegally. It is also clear from the evidence
presented that they received directives from the Gestapo to transfer
foreign workers whom they apprehended to concentration camps.
They could also request the local office of the Gestapo for permission
to commit persons arrested to concentration camps. The Tribunal
is of the opinion that the Frontier Police must be included in the

charge of criminality against the Gestapo.

The border and customs protection or Zollgrenzschutz became
part of the Gestapo in the summer of 1.944. The functions of this
organization were similar to the Frontier Police in enforcing border
regulations with particular respect to the prevention of smuggling.

264
It does not appear, however, that their transfer was complete but
that about half of their personnel of 54,000 remained under the Reich
Finance Administration or the Order Police. A few days before the
end of the war the whole organization was transferred back to the
Reich Finance Administration. The transfer of the organization to
the Gestapo was so late and it participated so little in the over-all
activities of the organization that the Tribunal does not feel that it
should be dealt with in considering the criminality of the Gestapo.
The third organization was the so-called Secret Field Police
which was originally under the Army but which in 1942 was trans-
ferred by military order to the Security Police. The Secret Field
police was concerned with security matters within the Army in
occupied territory, and also with the prevention of attacks by
civilians on military installations or units, and committed War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity on a wide scale. It has not
been proved, however, that it was a part of the Gestapo and the
Tribunal does not consider it as coming within the charge of crimi-
nality contained in the Indictment, except such members as may
have been transferred to Amt IV of the RS HA or were members of
organizations declared criminal by this Judgment.
Criminal Activity: Originally, one of the primary functions of
the Gestapo was the prevention of any political opposition to the
Nazi regime, a function which it performed with the assistance of
the SD. The principal weapon used in performing this function was
the concentration camp. The Gestapo did not have administrative
control over the concentration camps, but, acting through the RSHA,
was responsible for the detention of political prisoners in those
camps. Gestapo officials were usually responsible for the inter-
rogation of political prisoners at the camps.
The Gestapo and the SD also dealt with charges of treason and
with questions relating to the press, the churches and the Jews. As
the Nazi program of anti-Semitic persecution increased in intensity
the role played by these groups became increasingly important. In
the early morning of 10 November 1938, Heydrich sent a telegram
to all offices of the Gestapo and SD giving instructions for the
organization of the pogroms of that date and instructing them to
arrest as many Jews as the prisons could hold "especially rich ones",
but to be careful that those arrested were healthy and not too old.
By 11 November Jews had been arrested and many
1938, 20,000
were sent to concentration On 24 January 1939 Heydrich, the
camps.
Chief of the Security Police and SD, was charged with furthering
the emigration and evacuation of Jews from Germany, and on
31 July 1941, with bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish
problem in German-dominated Europe. A special section of the
Gestapo office of the RSHA under Standartenführer Eichmann was

265
Set up with responsibility for Jewish matters which employed its
own agents to investigate the Jewish problem in occupied territory.
Local offices of the Gestapo were used first to supervise the emigra-
tion of Jews and later to deport them to the East both from Germany
and from the territories occupied during the war. Einsatzgruppen of
the Security Police and SD operating behind the lines of the Eastern
Front engaged in the wholesale massacre of Jews. A special detach-
ment from Gestapo headquarters in the RSHA was used to arrange
for the deportation of Jews from Axis satellites to Germany for the
"final solution*'.
Local offices of the Security Police and SD played an important
role in the German administration of occupied territories. The
nature of their participation is shown by measures taken in the
summer of 1938 in preparation for the attack on Czechoslovakia
which was then in contemplation. Einsatzgruppen of the Gestapo and
SD were organized to follow the Army into Czechoslovakia to
provide for the security of political life in the occupied territories.
Plans were made for the infiltration of SD men into the area in
advance, and for the building up of a system of files to indicate what
inhabitants should be placed under surveillance, deprived of pass-
ports, or liquidated. These plans were considerably altered due to
the cancellation of the attack on Czechoslovakia, but in the military
operations which actually occurred, particularly in the war against
U.S.S.R., Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and SD went into
operation, and combined brutal measures for the pacification of the
civilian population with the wholesale slaughter of Jews. Heydrich
gave orders to fabricate incidents on the Polish-German frontier in
1939 which would give Hitler sufficient provocation to attack Poland.
Both Gestapo and SD personnel were involved in these operations.
The local units of the Security Police and SD continued their
work in the occupied territories after they had ceased to be an area
of operations. The Security Police and SD engaged in widespread
arrests of the civilian population of these occupied countries, impris-
oned many of them under inhumane conditions, subjected them to
brutal third degree methods, and sent many of them to concentration
camps. Local units of the Security Police and SD were also involved
in the shooting of hostages, the imprisonment of relatives, the
execution of persons charged as terrorists and saboteurs without a
trial, and the enforcement of the "Nacht und Nebel" decrees under
which persons charged with a type of offense believed to endanger
the security of the occupying forces were either executed within a
week or secretly removed to Germany without being permitted to
communicate with their family and friends.
Offices of the Security Police and SD were involved in the
administration of the Slave Labor Program. In some occupied terri-

266
tories they helped local labor authorities to meet the quotas imposed
by Sauckel. Gestapo offices inside of Germany were given surveil-
lance over slave laborers and responsibility for apprehending those
who were absent from their place of work. The Gestapo also had
charge of the so-called work training camps. Although both German
and foreign workers could be committed to these camps, they played
a significant role in forcing foreign laborers to work for the German
war effort. In the latter stages of the war as the SS embarked on
a slave labor program of its own, the Gestapo was used to arrest
workers for the purpose of insuring an adequate supply in the con-
centration camps.
The and SD were also involved
local offices of the Security Police
in the commission of War Crimes involving the mistreatment and
murder of prisoners of war. Soviet prisoners of war in prisoner-of-
war camps in Germany were screened by Einsatz Kommandos acting
under the directions of the local Gestapo offices. Commissars, Jews,
members of the intelligentsia, "fanatical Communists" and even
those who were considered incurably sick were classified as "intoler-
able", and exterminated. The local offices of the Security Police and
SD were involved in the enforcement of the "Bullet" decree, put
into on 4 March 1944, under which certain categories of
effect
prisoners of war,who were recaptured, were not treated as prisoners
of war but taken to Mauthausen in secret and shot. Members of the
Security Police and SD were charged with the enforcement of the
decree for the shooting of parachutists and commandos.

Conclusion
The Gestapo and SD were used for purposes which were criminal
under the Charter involving the persecution and extermination of
the Jews, brutalities, and killings in concentration camps, excesses
in the administration of occupied territories, the administration of
the slave labor program, and the mistreatment and murder of pris-
oners of war. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner, who was a member
of this organization,was among those who used it for these purposes.
In dealing with the Gestapo the Tribunal includes all executive and
administrative officials of Amt IV of the RSHA or concerned with
Gestapo administration in other departments of the RSHA and all
local Gestapo officials serving both inside and outside of Germany,
including the members of the Frontier Police, but not including the
members of the Border and Customs Protection or the Secret Field
Police, except such members as have been specified above. At the
suggestion of the Prosecution the Tribunal does not include persons
employed by the Gestapo for purely clerical, stenographic, janitorial,
or similar unofficial routine tasks. In dealing with the SD the Tri-
bunal includes Ämter III, VI, and VII of the RSHA and all other

267
members of the SD, including all local representatives and agents,
honorary or otherwise, whether they were technically members of the
SS or not, but not including honorary informers who were not
members of the SS, and members of the Abwehr who were trans-
ferred to the SD.
The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the
Charter the group composed of those members of the Gestapo and
SD holding the positions enumerated in the preceding paragraph
who became or remained members of the organization with knowl-
edge that it was being used for the commission of acts declared
criminal by Article 6 of the Charter, or who were personally impli-
cated as members of the organization in the commission of such
crimes. The basis for this finding is the participation of the organi-
zation in War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity connected with
the war; this group declared criminal cannot include, therefore, per-
sons who had ceased to hold the positions enumerated in the preced-
ing paragraph prior to 1 September 1939.

SS
Structure and Component Parts: The Prosecution has named Die
Schutzstaffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei
(commonly known as the SS) as an organization which should be
declared criminal. The portion of the Indictment dealing with the
SS also includes Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer-SS (com-
monly known as the SD). This latter organization, which was ori-
ginally an intelligence branch of the SS, later became an important
part of the organization of Security Police and SD and is dealt
with in the Tribunal's Judgment on the Gestapo.
The SS was originally established by Hitler in 1925 as an elite
section of the SA for political purposes under the pretext of pro-
tecting speakers at public meetings of the Nazi Party. After the
Nazis had obtained power the SS was used to maintain order and
control audiences at mass demonstrations and was given the addi-
tional duty of "internal security" by a decree of the Führer. The
SS played an important role at the time of the Röhm purge of
30 June 1934, and, as a reward for its services, was made an in-
dependent unit of the Nazi Party shortly thereafter.
In 1929when Himmler was first appointed as Reichs Führer the
SS consisted of 280 men who were regarded as especially trust-
worthy. In 1933 it was composed of 52.000 men drawn from all
walks of life. The original formation of the SS was the Allgemeine
SS, which by 1939 had grown men, organized
to a corps of 240,000
on military lines into divisions and regiments. During the war its
strength declined to well under 40,000.

268
 The SS originally contained two other formations, the SS Ver-
fügungstruppe, a force consisting of SS members who volunteered
for four years' armed service in lieu of compulsory service with
the Army, and the SS Totenkopf Verbände, special troops employed
to guard concentration camps, which came under the control of
the SS in 1934. The SS Verfügungstruppe was organized as an
armed unit to be employed with the Army in the event of mobili-
zation. In the summer of 1939, the Verfügungstruppe was equipped
as a motorized division to form the nucleus of the forces which
came to be known in 1940 as the Waffen SS. In that year the
Waffen SS comprised 100,000 men, 56,000 coming from the Ver-
fügungstruppe and the rest from the Allgemeine SS and the Toten-
kopf Verbände. At the end of the war it is estimated to have con-
sisted of about 580,000 men and 40 divisions. The Waffen SS was
under the tactical command of the Army, but was equipped and
supplied through the administrative branches of the SS and under
SS disciplinary control.
The SS Central Organization had 12 main offices. The most
important of these were the RSHA, which has already been dis-
cussed, the WVHA or Economic Administration Main Office which
administered concentration camps along with its other duties, a Race
and Settlement Office together with auxiliary offices for repatriation
of racial Germans The SS Central Organ-
(Volksdeutschemittelstelle).
ization also had and the SS possessed its own legal
a legal office
system; and its personnel were under the jurisdiction of special
courts. Also attached to the SS main offices was a research foun-
dation known as the Experiments Ahnenerbe. The scientists attached
to this organization are stated to have been mainly honorary mem-
bers of the SS. During the war an institute for military scientific
research became attached to the Ahnenerbe which conducted exten-
sive experiments involving the use of living human beings. An
employee of this institute was a certain Dr. Rascher, who conducted
these experiments with the full knowledge of the Ahnenerbe, which
were subsidized and under the patronage of the Reichsführer SS
who was a trustee of the foundation.
Beginning in 1933 there was a gradual but thorough amal-
gamation of the police and SS. In 1936 Himmler, the Reichsführer
SS, became Chief of the German Police with authority over the
regular uniformed police as well as the Security Police. Himmler
established a system under which Higher SS and Police Leaders,
appointed for each Wehrkreis, served as his personal representatives
in coordinating the activities of the Order Police, Security Police
and SD and Allgemeine SS within their jurisdictions. In 1939 the
SS and police systems were coordinated by taking into the SS all

269
officials of the Security and Order Police, at SS ranks equivalent
to their rank in the police.
^
Until 1940 the SS was an entirely voluntary organization. After
the formation of the Waffen SS in 1940 there was a gradually in-
creasing number of conscripts into the Waffen SS. It appears that
about a third of the total number of people joining the Waffen SS
were conscripts, that the proportion of conscripts was higher at
the end of the war than at the beginning, but that there con-
tinued to be a high proportion of volunteers until the end of the
war.
Criminal Activities: SS were active participants in the
units
steps leading up The Verfügungstruppe was used
to aggressive war.
in the occupation of the Sudetenland, of Bohemia and Moravia, and
of Memel. The Henlein Free Corps was under the jurisdiction of
the Reichsführer SS for operations in the Sudetenland in 1938, and
the Volksdeutschemittelstelle financed fifth-column activities there.
The SS was even a more general participant in the commission
of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. Through its control
over the organization of the Police, particularly the Security Police
and SD, the SS was involved in all the crimes which have been
outlined in the section of this Judgment dealing with the Gestapo
and SD. Other branches of the SS were equally involved in these
criminal programs. There is evidence that the shooting of unarmed
prisoners of war was the general practice in some Waffen SS divi-
sions. On 1 October 1944 the custody of prisoners of war and
interned persons was transferred to Himmler, who in turn trans-
ferred prisoner-of-war affairs to SS Obergruppenführer Berger and
to SS Obergruppenführer Pohl. The Race and Settlement Office of
the SS together with the Volksdeutschemittelstelle were active in
carrying out schemes for Germanization of occupied territories
according to the racial principles of the Nazi Party and were in-
volved in the deportation of Jews and other foreign nationals. Units
of the Waffen SS and Einsatzgruppen operating directly under the
SS main office were used to carry out these plans. These units
were also involved in the widespread murder and ill-treatment of
the civilian population of occupied territories. Under the guise of
combatting partisan units, units of the SS exterminated Jews and
people deemed politically undesirable by the SS, and their reports
record the execution of enormous numbers of persons. Waffen SS
divisions were responsible for many massacres and atrocities in
occupied territories such as the massacres at Oradour and Lidice.
From 1934 onwards the SS was responsible for the guarding and
administration of concentration camps. The evidence leaves no
doubt that the consistently brutal treatment of the inmates of con-
centration camps was carried out as a result of the general policy

270
of the SS, which was that the inmates were racial inferiors to be
treated only with contempt. There is evidence that where manpow-
er considerations permitted, Himmler wanted to rotate guard bat-
talions so that all members of the SS would be instructed as to the
proper attitude to take to inferior races. After 1942 when the con-
centration camps were placed under the control of the WVHA they
were used as a source of slave labor. An agreement made with
the Ministry of Justice on 18 September 1942 provided that anti-
social elements who had finished prison sentences were to be deliv-
ered to the SS to be worked to death. Steps were continually
taken, involving the use of the Security Police and SD and even
the Waffen SS, to insure that the SS had an adequate supply of
concentration camp labor for its projects. In connection with the
administration of the concentration camps, the SS embarked on a
series of experiments on human beings which were performed on
prisoners of war or concentration camp inmates. These experiments
included freezing to death, and killing by poison bullets. The SS
was able to obtain an allocation of Government funds for this kind
of research on the grounds that they had access to human material
not available to other agencies.
The SS played a particularly significant role in the persecution
of the Jews. The SS was directly involved in the demonstrations of
10 November 1938. The evacuation of the Jews from occupied ter-
ritories was carried out under the directions of the SS with the
assistance of SS Police units. The extermination of the Jews was
carried out under the direction of the SS Central Organizations.
It was actually put into effect by SS formations. The Einstzgrup-
pen engaged in wholesale massacres of the Jews. SS Police units
were also involved. For example, the massacre of Jews in the
Warsaw ghetto was carried out under the directions of SS Brigade-
führer and Major General of the Police Stroop. A special group
from the SS Central Organization arranged for the deportation of
Jews from various Axis satellites and their extermination was car-
ried out in the concentration camps run by the WVHA.
It is impossible to single out any one portion of the SS which
was not involved in these criminal activities. The Allgemeine SS
was an active participant in the persecution of the Jews and was
used as a source of concentration camp guards. Units of the Waf-
fen SS were directly involved in the killing of prisoners of war and
the atrocities in occupied countries. It supplied personnel for the
Einsatzgruppen, and had command over the concentration camp
guards after its absorption of the Totenkopf SS, which originally
controlled the system. Various SS Police units were also widely
used in the atrocities in occupied countries and the extermination
of the Jews there. The SS Central Organization supervised the

271
activities of these various formations and was responsible for such
special projects as the human experiments and "final solution"' of
the Jewish question.
The Tribunal finds that knowledge of these criminal activities
was sufficiently general to justify declaring that the SS was a
criminal organization to the extent hereinafter described. It does
appear that an attempt was made to keep secret some phases of
its activities, but its criminal programs were so widespread, and
involved slaughter on such a gigantic scale, that its criminal activi-
ties must have been widely known. It must be recognized, moreover,
that the criminal activities of the SS followed quite logically from
the principles on which it was organized. Every effort had been
made to make the SS a highly disciplined organization composed
of the elite of National Socialism. Himmler had stated that there
were people in Germany "who become sick when they see these
black coats" and that he did not expect that "they should be loved
by too many. Himmler also indicated his view that the SS was
;
'

concerned with perpetuating the elite racial stock with the object
of making Europe a Germanic continent and the SS was instructed
that it was designed to assist the Nazi Government in the ultimate

domination of Europe and the elimination of all inferior races. This

mystic and fanatical belief in the superiority of the Nordic German
developed into the studied contempt and even hatred of other races
which led to criminal activities of the type outlined above being
considered as a matter of course if not a matter of pride. The
actions of a the Waffen SS who in September 1939,
soldier in
acting on his own initiative, killed 50 Jewish laborers
entirely
whom he had been guarding, were described by the statement that
as an SS man, he w as "particularly sensitive to the sight of Jews,"
T

and had acted "quite thoughtlessly in a youthful spirit of adven-

ture" and a sentence of three-years imprisonment imposed on him
was dropped under an amnesty. Hess wrote with truth that the
Waffen SS were more suitable for the specific tasks to be solved in
occupied territory owing to their extensive training in questions of
race and nationality. Himmler, in a series of speeches made in
1943, indicated his pride in the ability of the SS to carry out these
criminal acts. He encouraged his men
be "tough and ruthless*',
to
he spoke of shooting "thousands of leading Poles", and thanked
them for their cooperation and lack of squeamishness at the sight
of hundreds and thousands of corpses of their victims. He extolled
ruthlessness in exterminating the Jewish race and later described
this process as "delousing." These speeches show that the general
attitude prevailing in the SS was consistent with these criminal
acts.

272
 Conclusions: The SS was utilized for purposes which were crim-
inal under the Charter involving the persecution and extermina-
tion of the Jews, brutalities and killings in concentration camps,
excesses in the administration of occupied territories, the adminis-
tration of the slave labor program and the mistreatment and
murder of prisoners of war. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner was a
member of the SS implicated in these activities. In dealing with
the SS the Tribunal includes all persons who had been officially
accepted as members of the SS including the members of the All-
gemeine SS, members of the Waffen SS, members of the SS Toten-
kopf Verbände, and the members of any of the different police forces
who were members of the SS. The Tribunal does not include the
so-called SS riding units. Der Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführer
SS (commonly known as the SD) is dealt with in the Tribunal's
Judgment on the Gestapo and SD.
The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the meaning of the
Charter the group composed of those persons who had been offi-
cially accepted as members of the SS as enumerated in the preced-
ing paragraph who became or remained members of the organi-
zation with knowledge that it was being used for the commission
of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter, or who were
personally implicated as members of the organization in the com-
mission of such crimes, excluding, however, those who were drafted
into membership by the State in such a way as to give them no
choice in the matter, and who had committed no such crimes. The
basis of this finding is the participation of the organization in War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity connected with the war; this
group declared criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who had
ceased to belong to the organizations enumerated in the preceding
paragraph prior to 1 September 1939.

THE SA
Structure and Component Parts: The Prosecution has named Die
Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiter-
partei (commonly known as the SA) as an organization which should
be declared criminal. The SA was founded in 1921 for political
purposes. It was organized on military lines. Its members wore
their own uniforms and had their own discipline and regulations.
After the Nazis had obtained power the SA greatly increased
in membership due incorporation within it of certain
to the
veterans organizations. In April 1933 the Stahlhelm, an organiza-
tion of l 2 million members, was transferred into the SA. with the
1

exception of its members over 45 years of age and some others,

pursuant to an agreement between their leader Seldte and Hitler.
Another veterans organization, the so-called Kyffhauserbund, was

273
 \

transferred in the same manner, together with a number of rural

riding organizations.
Until 1933, there is no question but that membership in the SA
was voluntary. After 1933 civil servants were under certain polit-
ical and economic pressure to join the SA. Members of the Stahl-
helm, the Kyffhauserbund, and the rural riding associations were
transferred into the SA without their knowledge, but the Tribunal
is not satisfied that the members in general endeavored to protest

against this transfer or that there was any evidence, except in iso-
lated cases, of the consequences of refusal. The Tribunal therefore
finds that membership in the SA was generally voluntary.
By the end of 1933 the SA was composed of 4V* million men.
As a result of changes made after 1934, in 1939 the SA numbered
l
1
2 million men.
movement the storm
Activities: In the early days of the Nazi
troopers of the SA acted as the "strong arm of the Party". They
took part in the beer hall feuds and were used for street fighting
in battles against political opponents. The SA wT as also used to
disseminate Nazi ideology and propaganda and placed particular
emphasis on anti-Semitic propaganda, the doctrine of ''Lebensraum'
the revision of the Versailles Treaty, and the return of Germany's
colonies.
After the Nazi advent to power, and particularly after the elec-
tions of 5 March 1933. the SA played an important role in establish-
ing a Nazi reign of terror over Germany. The SA was involved in
outbreaks of violence against the Jews and was used to arrest
political opponents and to guard concentration camps, where they
subjected their prisoners to brutal mistreatment.
On 1 and 2 July 1934 a purge of SA leaders oc-
30 June and
curred. The pretext which was given for this purge, which involved
the killing of Rohm, the Chief of Staff of the SA, and many other
SA leaders, was the existence of a plot against Hitler. This purge
resulted in a great reduction in the influence and power of the SA.
After 1934, it rapidly declined in political significance.
After 1934 the SA engaged
in certain forms of military or para-
military training. The SA
continued to engage in the dissemination
of Nazi propaganda. Isolated units of the SA were even involved
in the steps leading up to aggressive war and in the commission
of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. SA were among
units
the first in the occupation of Austria in March 1938.The SA
supplied many of the men and a large part of the equipment which
composed the Sudeten Free Corps of Henlein, although it appears
that the corps was under the jurisdiction of SS during its operation
in Czechoslovakia.

274
 After the occupation of Poland, the SA group Sudeten was used
for transporting prisoners of war. Units of the SA were employed
in the guarding of prisoners in Danzig, Posen, Silesia, and the Baltic
States.
Some SA units were used blow up synagogues in the Jewish
to
pogrom of 10 and 11 November
1938. Groups of the SA were
concerned in the ill-treatment of Jews in the ghettos of Vilna and
Kaunas.
Conclusion
Until the purge beginning on 30 June 1934, the SA was a group
composed in large part of ruffians and bullies who participated in
the Nazi outrages of that period. It has not been shown, however,
that these atrocities were part of a specific plan to wage aggressive
war, and the Tribunal therefore cannot hold that these activities
were criminal under the Charter. After the purge, the SA was
reduced to the status of a group of unimportant Nazi hangers-on.
Although in specific instances some units of the SA were used for
the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, it
cannot be said that its members generally participated in or even
knew of the criminal acts. For these reasons the Tribunal does
not declare the SA to be a criminal organization within the mean-
ing of Article 9 of the Charter.

THE REICH CABINET

The Prosecution has named as a criminal organization the Reich
Cabinet (Die Reichsregierung) consisting of members of the ordinary
cabinet after 30 January 1933, members of the Council of Ministers
for the Defense of the Reich and members of the Secret Cabinet
Council. The Tribunal is of opinion that no declaration of criminal-
ity should be made with respect to the Reich Cabinet for two
reasons: (1) because it is not shown that after 1937 it ever really
acted as a group or organization; (2) because the group of persons
here charged is so small that members could be conveniently tried
in proper cases without resort to a declaration that the Cabinet of
which they were members was criminal.
As to the first reason for our decision, it is to be observed that
from the time that it can be said that a conspiracy to make aggres-
sive war existed the Reich Cabinet did not constitute a governing
body, but was merely an aggregation of administrative officers
subject to the absolute control of Hitler. Not a single meeting of
the Reich Cabinet was held after 1937, but laws were promulgated
in the name of one or more of the cabinet members. The Secret
Cabinet Council never met at all. A number of the cabinet mem-
bers were undoubtedly involved in the conspiracy to make aggres-
sive war; but they were involved as individuals and there is no

275
evidence that the Cabinet as a group or organization took any part
in these crimes. It will be remembered that when Hitler disclosed
his aims of criminal aggression at the Hossbach Conference, the
disclosure was not made before the Cabinet and that the Cabinet
was not consulted with regard to it, but, on the contrary, that it
was made secretly to a small group upon whom Hitler would
necessarily rely in carrying on the war. Likewise no cabinet order
authorized the invasion of Poland. On the contrary, the Defendant
Schacht testifies that he sought to stop the invasion by a plea to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army that Hitler's order was in
violation of the Constitution because not authorized by the Cabinet.
It does appear, however, that various laws authorizing acts
which were criminal under the Charter were circulated among the
members of the Reich Cabinet and issued under its authority signed
by the members whose departments were concerned. This does
not, however, prove that the Reich Cabinet, after 1937, ever really
acted as an organization.
As to the second reason, it is clear that those members of the
Reich Cabinet who have been guilty of crimes should be brought
to trial; and a number of them are now on trial before the Tribunal.
It is estimated that there are 48 members of the group, that eight
of these are dead and 17 are now on trial, leaving only 23 at the
most, as to whom the declaration could have any importance. Any
others who are guilty should also be brought to trial; but nothing
would be accomplished to expedite or facilitate their trials by
declaring the Reich Cabinet to be a criminal organization. Where
an organization with a large membership is used for such purposes,
a declaration obviates the necessity of inquiring as to its criminal
character in the later trial of members who are accused of partici-
pating through membership in its criminal purposes and thus saves
much time and trouble. There is no such advantage in the case of
a small group like the Reich Cabinet.

GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND

The Prosecution has also asked that the General Staff and High
Command of the German Armed Forces be declared a criminal
organization. The Tribunal believes that no declaration of criminal-
ity should be made with respect to the General Staff and High
Command. The number of persons charged, while larger than that
of the Reich Cabinet, is still so small that individual trials of these
officers would accomplish the purpose here sought better than a
declaration such as requested. But a more compelling reason is that
in the opinion of the Tribunal the General Staff and High Com-
mand is neither an "organization" nor a "group" within the mean-
ing of those terms as used in Article 9 of the Charter.

276
 Some comment on the nature of this alleged group is requisite.
According to the Indictment and evidence before the Tribunal, it
consists of approximately 130 officers, living and dead, who at any
time during the period from February 1938, when Hitler reorgan-
ized theArmed Forces, and May 1945, when Germany surrendered,
held certain positions in the military hierarchy. These men were
high-ranking officers in the three armed services: OKH —Army,
OKM —
Navy, and OKL — Air Force. Above them was the over-
all Armed Forces authority, OKW — High Command of the German
Armed Forces with Hitler as the Supreme Commander. The offi-
cers in OKW, including Defendant Keitel as Chief of the High
Command, were in a sense Hitler's personal staff. In the larger
sense they coordinated and directed the three services, with parti-
cular emphasis on the functions of planning and operations.
The individual officers in this alleged group were, at one time
or another, in one of four categories; 1) Commanders-in-Chief of
one of the three services; 2) Chief of Staff of one of the three
services; 3) "Oberbefehlshabers", the field Commanders-in-Chief of
one of the three services, which of course comprised by far the lar-
gest number of these persons; or 4) an OKW officer, of which there
were* three, Defendants Keitel and Jodl, and the latter's Deputy
Chief, Warlimont. This is the meaning of the Indictment in its use
of the term "General Staff and High Command".
The Prosecution has here drawn the line. The Prosecution does
not indict the next level of the military hierarchy consisting of
commanders of army corps, and equivalent ranks in the Navy and
Air Force, nor the level below, the division commanders or their
equivalent in the other branches. And the staff officers of the four
staff commands of OKW, OKH, OKM, and OKL are not included,
nor are the trained specialists who were customarily called General
Staff officers.
In effect, then, those indicted as members are military leaders
of the Reich of the highest rank. No serious effort was made to
assert they composed an "organization" in the sense of
that
Article The assertion is rather that they were a "group", which
9.

is a wider and more embracing term than "organization."

The Tribunal does not so find. According to the evidence, their

planning at staff level, the constant conferences between staff offi-
cers and field commanders, their operational technique in the field
and at headquarters was much the same as that of the armies,
navies, and air forces of all other countries. The over-all effort
of OKW at coordination and direction could be matched by a simi-
lar, though not identical form of organization in other military
forces, such as the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff.

277
 To derive from this pattern of their activities the existence of
an association or group does not, in the opinion of the Tribunal,
logically follow. On such a theory the top commanders of every
other nation are just such an association rather than what they
actually are, an aggregation of military men, a number of individ-
uals who happen at a given period of time to hold the high-
ranking military positions.
Much of the evidence and the argument has centered around
the question of whether membership in these organizations was or
was not voluntary; in this case, it seems to the Tribunal to be quite
beside the point. For this alleged criminal organization has one
characteristic, a controlling one, which sharply distinguishes it
from the other five indicted. When an individual became a mem-
ber of the SS for instance, he did so, voluntarily or otherwise,
but certainly with the knowledge that he was joining something.
In the case of the General Staff and High Command, however, he
could not know he was joining a group or organization for such
organization did not exist except in the charge of the Indictment.
He knew only that he had achieved a certain high rank in one of
the three services, and could not be conscious of the fact that he
was becoming a member of anything so tangible as a ''group", as
that word is commonly used. His relations with his brother officers
in his own branch of the service and his association with those of
the other two branches were, in general, like those of other services
all over the world.
The Tribunal therefore does not declare the General Staff and
High Command to be a criminal organization.
Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the term "group"
in Article 9 must mean something more than this collection of
military officers, it has heard much evidence as to the participation
of the officers in planning and waging aggressive war, and in
committing War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. This evi-
dence is, as to many of them, clear and convincing.
They have been responsible in large measure for the miseries
and suffering that have fallen on millions of men, women, and
children. They have been a disgrace to the honorable profession of
arms. Without their military guidance the aggressive ambitions of
Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic and sterile.
Although they were not a group falling within the words of the
Charter, they were certainly a ruthless military caste. The contem-
porary German militarism flourished briefly with its recent ally,
National Socialism, as well as or better than it had in the genera-
tions of the past.
Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's oath
of obedience to military orders. When it suits their defense they

278
say they had to obey; when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes,
which are shown to have been within their general knowledge, they
say they disobeyed. The truth is they actively participated in all
these crimes, or sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the commis-
sion of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking than the world
has ever had the misfortune to know. This must be said.
Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to
trial so that those among them who are guilty of these crimes
should not escape punishment.
Article 26 of the Charter provides that the Judgment of the
Tribunal as to the guilt or innocence of any Defendant shall give
the reasons on which it is based.
The Tribunal will now state those reasons in declaring its Judg-
ment on such guilt or innocence.

GORING
Goring isindicted on all four Counts. The evidence shows that
after Hitler he was the most prominent man in the Nazi regime. He
was Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, Plenipotentiary for the
Four Year Plan, and had tremendous influence with Hitler, at least
until 1943 when their relationship deteriorated, ending in his arrest
in 1945. He testified that Hitler kept him informed of all important
military and political problems.

Crimes against Peace

From the joined the Party in 1922 and took command
moment he
SA, Göring was the adviser,
of the street-fighting organization, the
the active agent of Hitler, and one of the prime leaders of the
Nazi movement. As Hitler's political deputy he was largely in-
strumental in bringing the National Socialists to power in 1933,
and was charged with consolidating this power and expanding Ger-
man armed might. He developed the Gestapo, and created the first
concentration camps, relinquishing them to Himmler in 1934, con-
ducted the Röhm purge in that year, and engineered the sordid
proceedings which resulted in the removal of Von Blomberg and
Von Fritsch from the Army. In 1936 he became Plenipotentiary for
the Four Year Plan, and in theory and in practice was the economic
dictator of the Reich. Shortly after the Pact of Munich, he an-
nounced that he would embark on a five-fold expansion of the Luft-
waffe, and speed rearmament with emphasis on offensive weapons.
Goring was one of the five important leaders present at the
Hossbach Conference of 5 November 1937, and he attended the other
important conferences already discussed in this Judgment. In the
Austrian Anschluss, he was indeed the central figure, the ringleader.

279
He said in Court: "I must take 100 per cent responsibility .... I even
overruled objections by the Führer and brought everything to its
final development." In the seizure of the Sudetenland, he played
his role as Luftwaffe chief by planning an air offensive which
proved unnecessary, and his role as politician by lulling the Czechs
with false promises of friendship. The night before the invasion
of Czechoslovakia and the absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, at
a conference with Hitler and President Hacha he threatened to bomb
Prague if Hacha did not submit. This threat he admitted in his
testimony.
Goring attended the Reich Chancellery meeting of 23 May 1939
when Hitler told his military leaders ''there is, therefore, no question
of sparing Poland," and was present at the Obersalzberg briefing
of 22 August 1939. And the evidence shows he was active in the
diplomatic maneuvers w hich followed. With Hitler's connivance,
T

he used the Swedish businessman. Dahlerus. as a go-between to the

British, as described by Dahlerus to this Tribunal, to try to pre-
vent the British Government from keeping its guarantee to the
Poles.
He commanded the Luftwaffe in the attack on Poland and
throughout the aggressive wars which followed.
Even if he opposed Hitler's plans against Norway and the Soviet
Union, as he alleged, it is clear that he did so only for strategic
reasons; once Hitler had decided the issue, he followed him without
hesitation. He made it clear in his testimony that these differences
were never ideological or legal. He was "in a rage" about the in-
vasion of Norway, but only because he had not received sufficient
warning to prepare the Luftwaffe offensive. He admitted he ap-
proved of the attack: "My attitude was perfectly positive." He was
active in preparing and executing the Yugoslavian and Greek cam-
paigns, and testified that "Plan Marita," the attack on Greece, had
been prepared long beforehand. The Soviet Union he regarded as
the "most threatening menace to Germany," but said there was no
immediate military necessity for the attack. Indeed, his only objec-
tion to the war of aggression against the U.S.S.R. was its timing;
he wished for strategic reasons to delay until Britain was con-
quered. He testified: "My point of view was decided by political
and military reasons only."
After his own admissions to this Tribunal, from the positions
which he held, the conferences he attended, and the public words he
uttered, there can remain no doubt that Goring was the moving
force for aggressive war, second only to Hitler. He was the planner
and prime mover in the military and diplomatic preparation for
war which Germany pursued.

280
 War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
The record is filled with Göring's admissions of his complicity
in the use of slave labor.
"We did use this labor for security reasons so that they
would not be active in their own
country and would not work
against us. On the other hand, they served to help in the
economic war."
And again:
"Workers were forced to come to the Reich. That is some-
thing I have not denied."

The man who spoke these words was Plenipotentiary for the Four
Year Plan charged with the recruitment and allocation of man-
power. As Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief he demanded from
Himmler more slave laborers for his underground aircraft factories:
"That I requested inmates of concentration camps for the armament
of the Luftwaffe is correct and it is to be taken as a matter of
course."
As Plenipotentiary, Goring signed a directive concerning the
treatment of Polish workers in Germany and implemented it by
regulations of the SD, including "special treatment." He issued
directives to use Soviet and French prisoners of war in the arma-
ment industry; he spoke of seizing Poles and Dutch and making
them prisoners of war if necessary, and using them for work. He
agrees Russian prisoners of war were used to man anti-aircraft
batteries.
As Plenipotentiary, Goring was the active authority in the spo-
liation of conquered territory. He made plans for the spoliation of
Soviet territory long before the war on the Soviet Union. Two
months prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler gave Goring
the over-all direction for the economic administration in the terri-
tory. Goring set up an economic staff for this function. As Reichs-
marshal of the Greater German Reich, "the orders of the Reich Mar-
shal cover all economic fields, including nutrition and agriculture."
His so-called "Green" folder, printed by the Wehrmacht, set up an
"Economic Executive Staff, East." This directive contemplated plun-
dering and abandonment of all industry in the food deficit regions
and, from the food surplus regions, a diversion of food to German
needs. Goring claims its purposes have been misunderstood but
admits "that as a matter of course and a matter of duty we would
have used Russia for our purposes," when conquered.
And he participated in the conference of 16 July 1941 when
Hitler said the National Socialists had no intention of ever leaving
the occupied countries, and that "all necessary measures shooting, —
desettling, etc." should be taken.

281
 Göring persecuted the Jews, particularly after the November
1938 riots, and not only in Germany where he raised the billion-
mark fine as stated elsewhere, but in the conquered territories as
well. His own utterances then and his testimony now shows this
interest was primarily economic —
how to get their property and
how to force them out of the economic life of Europe. As these
countries fell before the German Army, he extended the Reich's
anti-Jewish laws to them; the Reichsgesetzblatt for 1939, 1940, and
1941 contains several anti- Jewish decrees signed by Göring. Al-
though their extermination was in Himmler's hands, Göring was far
from disinterested or inactive, despite his protestations in the wit-
ness box. By decree of 31 July 1941 he directed Himmler and Hey-
drich to "bring about a complete solution of the Jewish question in
the German sphere of influence in Europe."
There is nothing to be said in mitigation. For Göring was often,
indeed almost always, the moving force, second only to his leader.
He was the leading war aggressor, both as political and as military
leader; he was the director of the slave labor program and the
creator of the oppressive program against the Jews and other races,
at home and abroad. All of these crimes he has frankly admitted.
On some specific cases there may be conflict of testimony but in
terms of the broad outline, his own admissions are more than suf-
ficiently wide to be conclusive of his guilt. His guilt is unique in
its enormity. The record discloses no excuses for this man.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds the Defendant Göring guilty on all four
Counts of the Indictment.

HESS
Hess indicted under all four Counts. He joined the Nazi Party
is
in 1920 and participated in the Munich Putsch on 9 November 1923.
He was imprisoned with Hitler in the Landsberg fortress in 1924
and became Hitler's closest personal confidant, a relationship which
lasted until Hess' flight to the British Isles. On 21 April 1933 he
was appointed Deputy to the Führer, and on 1 December 1933 was
made Reichsminister without Portfolio. He was appointed member
of the Secret Cabinet Council on 4 February 1938. and a member
of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich on 30 August
1939. In September 1939 Hess was officially announced by Hitler as
successor designate to the Führer after Göring. On 10 May 1941
he flew from Germany to Scotland.

Crimes against Peace

As deputy Hess was the top man in the Nazi Party
to the Führer,
with responsibility for handling all Party matters, and authority

282
to make decisions in Hitler's name on all questions of Party leader-
ship. As Reichs Minister without Portfolio he had the authority
to approveall legislation suggested by the different Reichs Ministers
before could be enacted as law. In these positions, Hess was an
it

active supporter of preparations for war. His signature appears on

the law of 16 March 1935 establishing compulsory military service.
Throughout the years he supported Hitler's policy of vigorous rear-
mament in many speeches. He told the people that they must sacri-
fice for armaments, repeating the phrase, "Guns instead of butter."
It is true that between 1933 and 1937 Hess made speeches in which
he expressed a desire for peace and advocated international econom-
ic cooperation. But nothing which they contained can alter the
fact that of all the defendants none knew better than Hess how
determined Hitler was to realize his ambitions, how fanatical and
violent a man he was, and how little likely he was to refrain from
resort to force, if this was the only way in which he could achieve
his aims.
Hess was an informed and willing participant in German aggres-
sion against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. He was in touch
with the illegal Nazi Party in Austria throughout the entire period
between the murder of Dollf uss, and the Anschluss, and gave instruc-
tions to during that period. Hess was in Vienna on 12 March 1938
it

when the German troops moved in; and on 13 March 1938 he signed
the law for the reunion of Austria within the German Reich.
A law of 10 June 1939 provided for his participation in the adminis-
tration of Austria. On 24 July 1938 he made a speech in commem-
oration of the unsuccessful putsch by Austrian National Socialists
which had been attempted four years before, praising the steps
leading up to Anschluss and defending the occupation of Austria
by Germany.
In the summer of 1938 Hess was in active touch with Henlein,
Chief of the Sudeten German Party in Czechoslovakia. On 27 Sep-
tember 1938, at the time of the Munich crisis, he arranged with
Keitel to carry out the instructions of Hitler to make the machinery
of the Nazi Party available for a secret mobilization. On 14 April
1939 Hess signed a decree setting up the Government of the Sudeten-
land as an integral part of the Reich; and an ordinance of 10 June
1939 provided for his participation in the administration of the
Sudetenland. On 7 November 1938 Hess absorbed Henlein's Sudeten
German Party into the Nazi Party, and made a speech in which he
emphasized that Hitler had been prepared to resort to war if this
had been necessary to acquire the Sudetenland.
On 27 August 1939 when the attack on Poland had been tem-
porarily postponed in an attempt to induce Great Britain to aban-
don its guarantee to Poland, Hess publicly praised Hitler's "mag-

283
nanimous offer" to Poland, and attacked Poland for agitating for
war and England for being responsible for Poland's attitude. After
the invasion of Poland Hess signed decrees incorporating Danzig
and certain Polish territories into the Reich, and setting up the
General Government (Poland).
These specific steps which this defendant took in support of
Hitler's plans for aggressive action do not indicate the full extent
of his responsibility. Until his flight to England, Hess was Hitler's
closest personal confidant. Their relationship was such that Hess
must have been informed of Hitler's aggressive plans when they
came into existence. And he took action to carry out these plans
whenever action was necessary.
With him on his flight to England, Hess carried certain peace
proposals which he alleged Hitler was prepared to accept. It is
significant to note that this flight took place only 10 days after the
date on which Hitler fixed, 22 June 1941, as the time for attacking
the Soviet Union. In conversations carried on after his arrival in
England Hess wholeheartedly supported all Germany's aggressive
actions up to that time, and attempted to justify Germany's action
in connection with Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway. Den-
mark, Belgium, and the Netherlands. He blamed England and France
for the war.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

There is evidence showing the participation of the Party Chancel-
lery, under Hess, in the distribution of orders connected with the
commission of War Crimes; that Hess may have had knowledge of,
even if he did not participate in, the crimes that were being com-
mitted in the East, and proposed laws discriminating against Jews
and Poles; and that he signed decrees forcing certain groups of Poles
to accept German citizenship. The Tribunal, however, does not find
that the evidence sufficiently connects Hess with those crimes to
sustain a finding of guilt.
As previously indicated the Tribunal found, after a full medical
examination of and report on the condition of this defendant, that
he should be tried, without any postponement of his case. Since that
time further motions have been made that he should again be
examined. These the Tribunal denied, after having had a report from
the prison psychologist. That Hess acts in an abnormal manner,
suffers from loss of memory, and has mentally deteriorated during
this Trial, may be true. But there is nothing to show that he does
not realize the nature of the charges against him, or is incapable of
defending himself. He was ably represented at the Trial by counsel,
appointed for that purpose by the Tribunal. There is no suggestion
that Hess was not completely sane when the acts charged against
him were committed.

284
 Conclusion
The Tribunal finds the Defendant Hess guilty on Counts One and
Two; and not guilty on Counts Three and Four.

VON R1BBENTROP
Von Ribbentrop indicted under all four Counts. He joined the
is

Nazi Party in 1932. By 1933 he had been made Foreign Policy

Adviser to Hitler, and in the same year the representative of the
Nazi Party on foreign policy. In 1934 he was appointed Delegate for
Disarmament Questions, and in 1935 Minister Plenipotentiary at
Large, a capacity in which he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement in 1935 and the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. On 11 Au-
gust 1936 he was appointed Ambassador to England. On 4 February
1938 he succeeded Von Neurath as Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs
as part of the general reshuffle which accompanied the dismissal of
Von Fritsch and Von Blomberg.

Crimes against Peace

Von Ribbentrop was not present at the Hossbach Conference held
on 5 November 1937, but on 2 January 1938, while still Ambassador
to England, he sent a memorandum to Hitler indicating his opinion
that a change in the status quo in the East in the German sense
could only be carried out by force and suggesting methods to prevent
England and France from intervening in a European war fought to
bring about such a change. When Von Ribbentrop became Foreign
Minister Hitler told him that Germany still had four problems to
solve, Austria, Sudetenland, Memel, and Danzig, and mentioned the
possibility of "some sort of a show-down" or "military settlement"
for their solution.
On 12 February 1938 Von Ribbentrop attended the conference
between Hitler and Schuschnigg at which Hitler, by threats of
invasion, forced Schuschnigg to grant a series of concessions designed
to strengthen the Nazis in Austria, including theappointment of Seyss-
Inquart as Minister of Security and Interior, with control over the
police. Von Ribbentrop was in London when the occupation of
Austria was actually carried out and, on the basis of information
supplied him by Goring, informed the British Government that
Germany had not presented Austria with an ultimatum, but had
intervened in Austria only to prevent civil war. On 13 March 1938
Von Ribbentrop signed the law incorporating Austria into the Ger-
man Reich.
Von Ribbentrop
participated in the aggressive plans against Czecho-
slovakia. Beginning in March 1938, he was in close touch with the
Sudeten German Party and gave them instructions which had the
keeping the Sudeten German question a live issue which
effect of

285
might serve as an excuse for the attack which Germany was planning
against Czechoslovakia. In August 1938 he participated in a confer-
ence for the purpose of obtaining Hungarian support in the event
of a war with Czechoslovakia. After the Munich Pact he continued
to bring diplomatic pressure with the object of occupying the
remainder of Czechoslovakia. He was instrumental in inducing the
Slovaks to proclaim their independence. He was present at the
conference of 14-15 March 1939 at which Hitler, by threats of
invasion, compelled President Hacha to consent to the German
occupation of Czechoslovakia. After the German troops had marched
in, Von Ribbentrop signed the law establishing a protectorate over
Bohemia and Moravia.
Von Ribbentrop played a particularly significant role in the
diplomatic activity which led up to the attack on Poland. He partic-
ipated in a conference held on 12 August 1939, for the purpose of
obtaining Italian support if the attack should lead to a general
European war. Von Ribbentrop discussed the German demands with
respect to Danzig and the Polish Corridor with the British Ambas-
sador in the period from 25 August to 30 August 1939, when he knew
that the German plans to attack Poland had merely been temporarily
postponed in an attempt to induce the British to abandon their
guarantee to the Poles. The way in which he carried out these dis-
cussions makes it clear that he did not enter them in good faith in
an attempt to reach a settlement of the difficulties between Germany
and Poland.
Von Ribbentrop was advised in advance of the attack on Norway
and Denmark and of the attack on the Low Countries, and prepared
the official Foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify these
aggressive actions.
Von Ribbentrop attended the conference on 20 January 1941, at
which Hitler and Mussolini discussed the proposed attack on Greece,
and the conference in January 1941, at which Hitler obtained from
Antonescu permission for German troops to go through Rumania for
this attack. On 25 March 1941, when Yugoslavia adhered to the Axis
Tri-partite Pact, Von Ribbentrop had assured Yugoslavia that Ger-
many would respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. On
27 March 1941 he attended the meeting, held after the coup d'état
in Yugoslavia, at which plans were made to carry out Hitler's
announced intention to destroy Yugoslavia.
Von Ribbentrop attended a conference in May 1941 with Hitler
and Antonescu relating to Rumanian participation in the attack on
the U.S.S.R. He also consulted with Rosenberg in the preliminary
planning for the political exploitation of Soviet territories and in
July 1941, after the outbreak of war, urged Japan to attack the
Soviet Union.

286
 War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
Von Ribbentrop participated in a meeting of 6 June 1944, at
which it was agreed program under which Allied aviators
to start a
carrying out machine gun attacks on the civilian population should
be lynched. In December 1944 Von Ribbentrop was informed of the
plans to murder one of the French generals held as a prisoner of
war and directed his subordinates to see that the details were
worked out in such a way as to prevent its detection by the protect-
ing powers. Von Ribbentrop is also responsible for War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity because of his activities with respect to
occupied countries and Axis satellites. The top German official in
both Denmark and Vichy France was a Foreign Office representative,
and Von Ribbentrop is therefore responsible for the general economic
and political policies put into effect in the occupation of those
countries. He urged the Italians to adopt a ruthless occupation policy
in Yugoslavia and Greece.
He played an important part in Hitler's "final solution" of the
Jewish question. In September 1942 he ordered the German diplo-
matic representatives accredited to various Axis satellites to hasten
the deportation of Jews to the East. In June 1942 the German Ambas-
sador to Vichy requested Laval to turn over 50,000 Jews for depor-
tation to the East. On 25 February 1943 Von Ribbentrop protested
to Mussolini against Italian slowness in deporting Jews from the
Italian occupation zone of France. On 17 April 1943 he took part in
a conference between Hitler and Horthy on the deportation of Jews
from Hungary and informed Horthy that the "Jews must either be
exterminated or taken to concentration camps." At the same confer-
ence Hitler had likened the Jews to "tuberculosis bacilli" and said
if they did not work they were to be shot.

Von Ribbentrop's defense to the charges made against him is that

Hitler made all the important decisions and that he was such a
great admirer and faithful follower of Hitler that he never ques-
tioned Hitler's repeated assertions that he wanted peace or the
truth of the reasons that Hitler gave in explaining aggressive action.
The Tribunal does not consider this explanation to be true. Von Rib-
bentrop participated in all of the Nazi aggressions from the occu-
pation of Austria to the invasion of the Soviet Union. Although he
was personally concerned with the diplomatic rather than the mili-
tary aspect of these actions, his diplomatic efforts were so closely
connected with war that he could not have remained unaware of
the aggressive nature of Hitler's actions. In the administration of
territories over which Germany acquired control by illegal invasion
Von Ribbentrop also assisted in carrying out criminal policies, partic-
ularly those involving the extermination of the Jews. There is
abundant evidence, moreover, that Von Ribbentrop was in complete

287
sympathy with all the main tenets of the National Socialist creed,
and that his collaboration with Hitler and with other defendants in
the commission of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes
against Humanity was whole-hearted. It was because Hitler's policy
and plans coincided with his own ideas that Von Ribbentrop served
him so willingly to the end.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Von Ribbentrop is guilty on all four
Counts.

KE1TEL
Keitel is He was Chief of Staff to
indicted on all four Counts.
the then Minister of War Von Blomberg from 1935 to 4 February
1938; on that day Hitler took command of the Armed Forces, making
Keitel Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Keitel did
not have command authority over the three Wehrmacht branches
which enjoyed direct access to the Supreme Commander. was OKW
in effect Hitler's military staff.

Crimes against Peace

Keitel attended the Schuschnigg conference in February 1938
with two other generals. Their presence, he admitted, was a "military
demonstration," but since he had been appointed OKW
Chief just
one week before he had not known why he had been summoned.
Hitler and Keitel then continued to put pressure on Austria with
false rumors, broadcasts, and troop maneuvers. Keitel made the
military and other arrangements, and Jodl's diary noted "the effect
is quick and strong." When Schuschnigg called his plebiscite, Keitel
that night briefed Hitler and his generals, and Hitler issued "Case
Otto" which Keitel initialed.
On 21 April 1938 Hitler and Keitel considered making use of a
possible ''incident," such as the assassination of the German Minister
at Prague, to preface the attack on Czechoslovakia. Keitel signed
many directives and memoranda on "Fall Gruen", including the
directive of 30 May containing Hitler's statement: "It is my unalter-
able decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action near in the
future." After Munich, Keitel initialed Hitler's directive for the
attack on Czechoslovakia, and issued two supplements. The second
supplement said the attack should appear to the outside world as
"merely an act of pacification and not a warlike undertaking." The
OKW Chief attended Hitler's negotiations with Hacha when the
latter surrendered.
Keitel was present on 23 May 1939 when Hitler announced his
decision "to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity". Already

288
he had signed the directive requiring the Wehrmacht to submit its
"Fall Weiss" timetable to OKW by 1 May.
The invasion of Norway and Denmark he discussed on 12 Decem-
ber 1939 with Hitler, Jodl, and Raeder. By directive of 27 January
1940 the Norway plans were placed under Keitel's "direct and per-
sonal guidance." Hitler had said on 23 May 1939 he would ignore
the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands, and Keitei signed
orders for these attacks on 15 October, 20 November, and 28 Novem-
ber 1939. Orders postponing this attack 17 times until spring all
were signed by Keitei or Jodl.
Formal planning for attacking Greece and Yugoslavia had begun
in November 1940. On 18 March 1941 Keitei heard Hitler tell Raeder
complete occupation of Greece was a prerequisite to settlement, and
also heard Hitler decree on 27 March that the destruction of Yugo-
slavia should take place with "unmerciful harshness."
Keitei testified that he opposed the invasion of the Soviet Union
for military reasons, and also because it would constitute a violation
of the Non-aggression Pact. Nevertheless he initialed "Case Bar-
barossa," signed by Hitler on 18 December 1940, and attended the
OKW discussion with Hitler on 3 February 1941. Keitel's supplement
of 13 March established the relationship between the military and
political officers. He issued his timetable for the invasion on 6 June
1941, and was present at the briefing of 14 June when the generals
gave their final reports before attack. He appointed Jodl and War-
limont as OKW representatives to Rosenberg on matters concerning
the Eastern Territories. On 16 June he directed all army units to
carry out the economic directives issued by Goring in the so-called
"Green Folder," for the exploitation of Russian territory, food, and
raw materials.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

On 4August 1942 Keitei issued a directive that paratroopers
were to be turned over to the SD. On 18 October Hitler issued the
Commando Order which was carried out in several instances. After
the landing in Normandy, Keitei reaffirmed the order, and later
extended it to Allied missions fighting with partisans. He admits
he did not believe the order was legal but claims he could not stop
Hitler from decreeing it.
When, on 8 September 1941, OKW issued its ruthless regulations
for the treatment of Soviet POW's, Canaris wrote to Keitei that
under international law the SD should have nothing to do with this
matter. On this memorandum in Keitel's handwriting, dated 23 Sep-
tember and initialed by him, is the statement:
"The objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous
warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I
approve and back the measures."

289
Keiîel testified that he really agreed with Canaris and argued with
Hitler,but lost. The OKW Chief directed the military authorities to
cooperate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in looting cultural
property in occupied territories.
Lahousen testified that Keitel told him on 12 September 1939,
while aboard Hitler's headquarters train, that the Polish intelligent-
sia, nobility, and Jews were to be liquidated. On 20 October. Hitler
told Keitel the intelligentsia would be prevented from forming a
ruling class, the standard of living would remain low. and Poland
would be used only for labor forces. Keitel does not remember the
Lahousen conversation, but admits there was such a policy and
that he had protested without effect to Hitler about it.
On 16 September 1941 Keitel ordered that attacks on soldiers in
the East should be met by putting to death 50 to 100 Communists
for one German soldier, with the comment that human life was less
than nothing in the East. On 1 October he ordered military com-
manders always to have hostages to execute when soldiers were
attacked. When Terboven. the Reich Commissioner in Norway, wrote
Hitler that Keitel's suggestion that workmen's relatives be held
responsible for sabotage, could work only if firing squads were
authorized, Keitel wrote on this memorandum: "Yes, that is the
best."
On 12 May
1941. five weeks before the invasion of the Soviet
Union. OKW urged upon Hitler a directive of OKH that political
commissars be liquidated by the Army. Keitel admitted the directive
was passed on to field commanders. And on 13 May Keitel signed
an order that civilians suspected of offenses against troops should be
shot without trial and that prosecution of German soldiers for
offenses against civilians was unnecessary. On 27 July all copies of
this directive were ordered destroyed without affecting its validity.
Four days previously he had signed another order that legal punish-
ment was inadequate and troops should use terrorism.
On 7 December 1941. as already discussed in this opinion, the
so-called "Nacht und Nebel" Decree, over Keitel's signature, provided
that in occupied territories civilians who had been accused of crimes
of resistance against the army of occupation would be tried only if
a death sentence was likely: otherwise they would be handed to the
Gestapo for transportation to Germany.
Keitel directed that Russian POW's be used in German war
industry. On 8 September 1942 he ordered French, Dutch, and Belgian
citizens to work on the construction of the Atlantic WalL He was
present on 4 January 1944 when Hitler directed Sauckel to obtain
4 million new workers from occupied territories.
In the face of these documents Keitel does not deny his connec-
tion with these acts. Rather, his defense relies on the fact that he is

290
a soldier, and on the doctrine of "superior orders", prohibited by
Article 8 of the Charter as a defense.
There is nothing in mitigation. Superior orders, even to a soldier,
cannot be considered in mitigation where crimes as shocking and
extensive have been committed consciously, ruthlessly, and without
military excuse or justification.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds Keitel guilty on all four Counts.

KALTENBRUNNER
Kaltenbrunner is indicted under Counts One, Three, and Four.
He joined the Austrian Nazi Party and the SS in 1932. In 1935 he
became leader of the SS in Austria. After the Anschluss he was
appointed Austrian State Secretary for Security and when this
position was abolished in 1941 he was made Higher SS and Police
Leader. On 30 January 1943 he was appointed Chief of the Security
Police and SD and Head of the Reich Security Head Office (RSHA),
a position which had been held by Heydrich until his assassination
in June 1942. He held the rank of Obergruppenführer in the SS.

Crimes against Peace

As leader of the SS in Austria Kaltenbrunner was active in the
Nazi intrigue against the Schuschnigg Government. On the night of
11 March 1938, after Goring had ordered Austrian National Socialists
to seize control of the Austrian Government, 500 Austrian SS men
under Kaltenbrunner's command surrounded the Federal Chancel-
lery and a special detachment under the command of his adjutant
entered the Federal Chancellery while Seyss-Inquart was negotiating
with President Miklas. But there is no evidence connecting Kalten-
brunner with plans to wage aggressive war on any other front. The
Anschluss, although it was an aggressive act, is not charged as an
aggressive war, and the evidence against Kaltenbrunner under Count
One does not, in the opinion of the Tribunal, show his direct partic-
ipation in any plan to wage such a war.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

When he became Chief of the Security Police and SD and Head
of the RSHA on 30 January 1943, Kaltenbrunner took charge of an
organization which included the main offices of the Gestapo, the SD,
and the Criminal Police. As Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner had
authority to order protective custody to and release from concen-
tration camps. Orders to this effect were normally sent over his sig-
nature. Kaltenbrunner was aware of conditions in concentration

291
camps. He had undoubtedly visited Mauthausen and witnesses testi-
fied that he had seen prisoners killed by the various methods of
execution, hanging, shooting in the back of the neck, and gassing,
as part of a demonstration. Kaltenbrunner himself ordered the
execution of prisoners in those camps and his office was used to
transmit to the camps execution orders which originated in
Himmler's office. At the end of the war Kaltenbrunner participated
in the arrangements for the evacuation of inmates of concentration
camps, and the liquidation of many of them, to prevent them from
being liberated by the Allied armies.
During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was Head of the
RSHA, it was engaged in a widespread program of War Crimes and
Crimes against Humanity. These crimes included the mistreatment
and murder of prisoners of war. Einsatz Kommandos operating under
the control of the Gestapo were engaged in the screening of Soviet
prisoners of war. Jews, commissars, and others who were thought
to be ideologically hostile to the Nazi system were reported to the
RSHA, which had them transferred to a concentration camp and
murdered. An RSHA order issued during Kaltenbrunner's regime
established the "Bullet Decree," under which certain escaped
prisoners of war who were recaptured were taken to Mauthausen
and shot. The order for the execution of commando troops was
extended by the Gestapo to include parachutists while Kalten-
brunner was Chief of the RSHA. An order signed by Kaltenbrunner
instructed the police not to interfere with attacks on bailed-out
Allied fliers. In December 1944 Kaltenbrunner participated in the
murder of one of the French generals held as a prisoner of war.
During the period in which Kaltenbrunner was head of the
RSHA, the Gestapo and SD in occupied territories continued the
murder and ill-treatment of the population, using methods which
included torture and confinement in concentration camps, usually
under orders to which Kaltenbrunner's name was signed.
The Gestapo was responsible for enforcing a rigid labor dis-
cipline on the slave laborers and Kaltenbrunner established a series
of labor reformatory camps for this purpose. When the SS em-
barked on a slave labor program of its own, the Gestapo was used to
obtain the needed workers by sending laborers to concentration
camps.
The RSHA played a leading part in the "final solution" of the
Jewish question by the extermination of the Jews. A special section
under the Amt IV of the RSHA was established to supervise this
program. Under its direction approximately 6 million Jews were
murdered, of which 2 million were killed by Einsatzgruppen and
other units of the Security Police. Kaltenbrunner had been informed
of the activities of these Einsatzgruppen when he was a Higher SS

292
and Police Leader, and they continued to function after he had
become Chief of the RSHA.
The murder of approximately 4 million Jews in concentration
camps has heretofore been described. This part of the program was
also under the supervision of the RSHA when Kaltenbrunner was
head of that organization, and special missions of the RSHA scoured
the occupied territories and the various Axis satellites arranging for
the deportation of Jews to these extermination institutions. Kalten-
brunner was informed of these activities. A letter which he wrote
on 30 June 1944 described the shipment to Vienna of 12,000 Jews
for that purpose, and directed that all who could not work would
have to be kept in readiness for "special action," which meant
murder. Kaltenbrunner denied his signature to this letter, as he
did on a very large number of orders on which his name was stamped
or typed, and, in a few instances, written. It is inconceivable that
in matters of such importance his signature could have appeared so
many times without his authority.
Kaltenbrunner has claimed that when he took office as Chief of
the Security Police and SD and as Head of the RSHA he did so
pursuant to an understanding with Himmler under which he was
to confine his activities to matters involving foreign intelligence,
and not to assume over-all control over the activities of the RSHA.
He claims that the criminal program had been started before his
assumption of office; that he seldom knew what was going on;
and that when he was informed he did what he could to stop them.
It is true that he showed a special interest in matters involving
foreign intelligence. But he exercised control over the activities of
the RSHA, was aware of the crimes it was committing, and was
an active participant in many of them.

Conclusion.
The Tribunal finds that Kaltenbrunner is not guilty on Count
One. He is guilty under Counts Three and Four.

ROSENBERG
Rosenberg is indicted on all four Counts. He joined the Nazi
Party in 1919, participated in the Munich Putsch of 9 November 1923,
and tried to keep the illegal Nazi Party together while Hitler was
in jail. Recognized as the Party's ideologist, he developed and
spread Nazi doctrines in the newspapers Völkischer Beobachter and
NS Monatshefte, which he edited, and in the numerous books he
wrote. His book, Myth of the Twentieth Century, had a circulation
of over a million copies.
In 1930 Rosenberg was elected to the Reichstag and he became
the Party's representative for Foreign Affairs. In April 1933 he

293
was made and head of the Office of Foreign Affairs
Reichsleiter
of the NSDAP APA). Hitler, in January 1934, appointed Rosen-
(the
berg his deputy for the supervision of the entire spiritual and
ideological training of the NSDAP. In January 1940, he was desig-
nated to set up the "Hohe Schule," the Center of National So-
cialistic Ideological and Educational Research, and he organized the
"Einsatzstab Rosenberg" in connection with this task. He was ap-
pointed Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories on
17 July 1941.
Crimes Against Peace.
As head of the APA, Rosenberg was in charge of an organization
whose agents were active in Nazi intrigue in all parts of the world.
His own reports, for example, claim that the APA was largely
responsible for Rumania's joining the Axis. As head of the APA,
he played an important role in the preparation and planning of the
attack on Norway.
Rosenberg, together with Raeder, was one of the originators
of the plan for attacking Norway. Rosenberg had become interested
in Norway as early as June 1939, when he conferred with Quisling.
Quisling had pointed out the importance of the Norwegian coast
in the event of a conflict between Germany and Great Britain, and
stated his fears that Great Britain might be able to obtain Nor-
wegian assistance. As a result of this conference Rosenberg arranged
for Quisling to collaborate closely with the National Socialists and
to receive political assistance by the Nazis.
When the war broke
out Quisling began to express fear of
Norway. Rosenberg supported this view, and
British intervention in
transmitted to Raeder a plan to use Quisling for a coup in Norway.
Rosenberg was instrumental in arranging the conferences in Decem-
ber 1939 between Hitler and Quisling which led to the preparation
of the attack on Norway, and at which Hitler promised Quisling
financial assistance. After these conferences Hitler assigned to Rosen-
berg the political exploitation of Norway. Two weeks after Norway
was occupied, Hitler told Rosenberg that he had based his decision
to attack Norway "on the continuous warnings of Quisling as report-
ed to him by Reichsleiter Rosenberg."
Rosenberg bears a major responsibility for the formulation and
execution of occupation policies in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
He was informed by Hitler on 2 April 1941 of the coming attack
against the Soviet Union, and he agreed to help in the capacity
of a "Political Adviser." On 20 April 1941 he was appointed Com-
missioner for the Central Control of Questions Connected with the
East-European Region. In preparing the plans for the occupation,
he had numerous conferences with Keitel, Raeder, Goring, Funk,
Von Ribbentrop, and other high Reich authorities. In April and

294
May 1941 he prepared several drafts of instructions concerning the
setting up of the administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories.
On 20 June 19 il, two days before the attack on the U.S.S.R., he
made a speech to his assistants about the problems and policies of
occupation. Rosenberg attended Hitler's conference of 16 July 1941,
in which policies of administration and occupation were discussed.
On 17 July 1941 Hitler appointed Rosenberg Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, and publicly charged him with respon-
sibility for civil administration.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

Rosenberg is responsible for a system of organized plunder of
both public and private property throughout the invaded countries
of Europe. Acting under Hitler's orders of January 1940 to set up
the "Hohe Schule", he organized and directed the "Einsatzstab
Rosenberg", which plundered museums and libraries, confiscated art
treasures and collections, and pillaged private houses. His own
reports show the extent of the confiscations. In "Action-M" (Möbel),
instituted in December 1941 at Rosenberg's suggestion, 69,619 Jewish
homes were plundered in the West, 38,000 of them in Paris alone,
and it took 26,984 railroad cars to transport the confiscated furnish-
ings to Germany. As of 14 July 1944, more than 21,903 art objects
including famous paintings and museum pieces, had been seized by
the Einsatzstab in the West.
With his appointment as Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern
Territories on 17 July 1941, Rosenberg became the supreme authority
for those areas. He helped to formulate the policies of Germani-
zation, exploitation, forced labor, extermination of Jews and oppo-
nents of Nazi rule, and he set up the administration which carried
them out. He took part in the conference of 16 July 1941, in which
Hitler stated that they were faced with the task of "cutting up the
giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able: first, to
dominate it; second, to administer it; and third, to exploit it", and
indicated that ruthless action was contemplated. Rosenberg accepted
his appointment on the following day.
Rosenberg had knowledge of the brutal treatment and terror to
which the Eastern people were subjected. He directed that the
Hague Rules of Land Warfare were not applicable in the Occupied
Eastern Territories. He had knowledge of and took an active part
in stripping the Eastern Territories of raw materials and food-
stuffs, which were all sent to Germany. He stated that feeding the
German People was first on the list of claims on the East, and that
the Soviet People would surfer thereby. His directives provided for
the segregation of Jews, ultimately in ghettos. His subordinates
engaged in mass and
his civil administrators in the
killings of Jews,
East considered that cleansing the Eastern Occupied Territories of

295
Jews was necessary. In December 1941 he made the suggestion to
Hitler that in a case of shooting 100 hostages, Jews only be used.
Rosenberg had knowledge of the deportation of laborers from the
East, of the methods of "recruiting"' and the transportation horrors,
and of the treatment Eastern laborers received in the Reich. He
gave his civil administrators quotas of laborers to be sent to the
Reich, which had to be met by whatever means necessary. His
signature of approval appears on the order of 14 June 1944 for the
"Heu Aktion", the apprehension of 40,000 to 50,000 youths, aged
10-14, for shipment to the Reich.
Upon occasion Rosenberg objected to the excesses and atrocities
committed by his subordinates, notably in the case of Koch, but
these excesses continued and he stayed in office until the end.

Conclusion.
The Tribunal finds that Rosenberg is guilty on all four Counts.

FRANK
Frank indicted under Counts One, Three, and Four. Frank
is
joined the Nazi Party in 1927. He became a member of the Reichs-
tag in 1930, the Bavarian State Minister of Justice in March 1933,
and when this position was incorporated into the Reich Government
in 1934, Reich Minister without Portfolio. He was made a Reichs-
leiter of the Nazi Party in charge of Legal Affairs in 1933, and in
the same year President of the Academy of German Law. Frank
was also given the honorary rank of Obergruppenführer in the SA.
In 1942 Frank became involved in a temporary dispute with Himm-
ler as to the type of legal system which should be in effect in Ger-
many. During the same year he was dismissed as Reichsleiter of
the Nazi Party and as President of the Academy of German Law.

Crimes against Peace

The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal that Frank was
sufficientlyconnected with the common plan to wage aggressive
war to allow the Tribunal to convict him on Count One.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

Frank was appointed Chief Civil Administration Officer for
occupied Polish territory and, on 12 October 1939, was made Gover-
nor General of the occupied Polish territory. On 3 October 1939 he
described the policy which he intended to put into effect by stating:
"Poland shall be treated like a colony; the Poles will become the
slaves of the Greater German World Empire." The evidence estab-
lishes that this occupation policy was based on the complete
destruction of Poland as a national entity, and a ruthless exploita-
tion of its human and economic resources for the German war effort.

296
All opposition was crushed with the utmost harshness. A reign of
terror was instituted, backed by summary police courts which
ordered such actions as the public shootings of groups of 20 to 200
Poles, and the widespread shootings of hostages. The concentration
camp system was introduced in the General Government by the
establishment of the notorious Treblinka and Maidaneck camps.
As early as 6 February 1940, Frank gave an indication of the extent
of this reign of terror by his cynical comment to a newspaper
reporter on Von Neurath's poster announcing the execution of the
Czech students: "If I wished to order that one should hang up posters
about every seven Poles shot, there would not be enough forests in
Poland with which to make the paper for these posters." On 30 May
1940 Frank told a police conference that he was taking advantage
of the offensive in the West which diverted the attention of the
world from Poland to liquidate thousands of Poles who would be
likely to resist German domination of Poland, including "the leading
representatives of the Polish intelligentsia." Pursuant to these in-
structions the brutal A.B. action was begun under which the Secu-
rity Police and SD carried out these exterminations which were only
partially subjected to the restraints of legal procedure. On 2 Oc-
tober 1943 Frank issued a decree under which any non-Germans
hindering German construction in the General Government were
to be tried by summary courts of the Security Police and SD and
sentenced to death.
The economic demands made on the General Government were
far in excess of the needs of the army of occupation, and were out
of all proportion to the resources of the country. The food raised
in Poland was shipped to Germany on such a wide scale that the
rations of the population of the occupied territories were reduced
to the starvation level, and epidemics were widespread. Some steps
were taken to provide for the feeding of the agricultural workers
who were used to raise the crops, but the requirements of the rest
of the population were disregarded. It is undoubtedly true, as
argued by counsel for the Defense, that some suffering in the Gen-
eral Government was inevitable as a result of the ravages of war
and the economic confusion resulting therefrom. But the suffering
was increased by a planned policy of enonomic exploitation.
Frank introduced the deportation of slave laborers to Germany
in the very early stages of his administration. On 25 January 1940
he indicated his intention of deporting 1 million laborers to Ger-
many, suggesting on 10 May 1940 the use of police raids to meet
this quota. On 18 August 1942 Frank reported that he had already
supplied 800,000 workers for the Reich, and expected to be able
to supply 140,000 more before the end of the year.
The persecution of the Jews was immediately begun in the
General Government. The area originally contained from 2V2 mil-

297
lion to 3V2 million Jews. They were forced into ghettos, subjected
to discriminatory laws, deprived of the food necessary to avoid
starvation, and finally systematically and brutally exterminated.
On 16 December 1941 Frank told the Cabinet of the Governor
General: "We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them
and wherever it is possible, in order to maintain there the structure
of the Reich as a whole." By 25 January 1944, Frank estimated that
there were only 100,000 Jews left.

At the beginning Frank stated that he had a

of his testimony,
feeling of "terrible guilt" for the atrocities committed in the occu-
pied territories. But his defense was largely devoted to an attempt
to prove that he was not in fact responsible; that he ordered only
the necessary pacification measures; that the excesses were due to
the activities of the police which were not under his control; and
that he never even knew of the activities of the concentration camps.
It had also been argued that the starvation was due to the after-
math of the war and policies carried out under the Four Year Plan;
that the forced labor program was under the direction of Sauckel;
and that the extermination of the Jews was by the police and SS
under direct orders from Himmler.
undoubtedly true that most of the criminal program charged
It is
against Frank was put into effect through the police, that Frank
had jurisdictional difficulties with Himmler over the control of the
police, and that Hitler resolved many of these disputes in favor
of Himmler. It therefore may well be true that some of the crimes
committed in the General Government were committed without the
knowledge of Frank, and even occasionally despite his opposition.
It may also be true that some of the criminal policies put into effect
in the General Government did not vriginale with Frank but were
carried out pursuant to orders from Germany. But it is also true
that Frank was a willing and knowing participant in the use of
terrorism in Poland; in the economic exploitation of Poland in a
way which led to the death by starvation of a large number of
people; in the deportation to Germany as slave laborers of over a
million Poles; and in a program involving the murder of at least
3 million Jews.
Conclusion
The Tribunal Frank is not guilty on Count One but
finds that
guilty under Counts Three and Four.

FRICK
Frick is indicted on all four Counts. Recognized as the chief Nazi
administrative specialist and bureaucrat, he was appointed Reichs-
minister of the Interior in Hitler's first Cabinet. He retained this
important position until August 1943, when he was appointed Reich

298
Protector of Bohemia and Moravia. In connection with his duties at
the center of all internal and domestic administration, he became
the Prussian Minister of the Interior, Reich Director of Elections,
General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich, and a
member of the Reich Defense Council, the Ministerial Council for
Defense of the Reich, and the "Three Man College". As the several
countries incorporated into the Reich were overrun, he was placed
at the head of the central offices for their incorporation.
Though Frick did not officially join the Nazi Party until 1925,
he had previously allied himself with Hitler and the National
Socialist cause during the Munich Putsch, while he was an official
in the Munich Police Department. Elected to the Reichstag in 1924,
he became a Reichsleiter as leader of the National Socialist faction
in that body.
Crimes against Peace
An avid Nazi, Frick was largely responsible for bringing the
German Nation under the complete control of the NSDAP. After
Hitler became Reich Chancellor, the new Minister of the Interior
immediately began to incorporate local governments under the
sovereignty of the Reich. The numerous laws he drafted, signed, and
administered abolished all opposition parties and prepared the way
for the Gestapo and their concentration camps to extinguish all
individual opposition. He was largely responsible for the legislation
which suppressed the trade unions, the church, the Jews. He per-
formed this task with ruthless efficiency.
Before the date of the Austrian aggression Frick was concerned
only with domestic administration within the Reich. The evidence
does not show that he participated in any of the conferences at
which Hitler outlined his aggressive intentions. Consequently the
Tribunal takes the view that Frick was not a member of the common
plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive war as defined in this Judg-
ment.
Six months after the seizure of Austria, under the provisions of
the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938, Frick became General
Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich. He was made
responsible for war administration, except the military and economic,
in the event of Hitler's proclaiming a state of defense. The Reich
Ministries of Justice, Education, Religion, and the Office of Spatial
Planning were made subordinate to him. Performing his allotted
duties, Frick devised an administrative organization in accordance
with wartime standards. According to his own statement, this was
actually put into operation after Germany decided to adopt a policy
of war.
Frick signed the law of 13 March 1938 which united Austria with
the Reich, and he was made responsible for its accomplishment. In

299
setting up German administration in Austria, he issued decrees
which introduced German law, the Nuremberg decrees, the Military
Service Law, and he provided for police security by Himmler.
He also signed the laws incorporating into the Reich the Sudeten-
land, Memel, Danzig, the Eastern territories (West Prussia and
Posen), and Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnot. He was placed in charge
of the actual incorporation, and of the establishment of German
administration over these territories. He signed the law establishing
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.
As the head of the Central Offices for Bohemia and Moravia, the
Government General, and Norway, he was charged with obtaining
close cooperation between the German officials in these occupied
countries and the supreme authorities of the Reich. He supplied
German civil servants for the administrations in all occupied terri-
tories,advising Rosenberg as to their assignment in the Occupied
Eastern Territories. He signed the laws appointing Terboven Reich
Commissioner to Norway and Seyss-Inquart to Holland.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

Always rabidly anti-Semitic, Frick drafted, signed, and admin-
istered many laws designed to eliminate Jews from German life and
economy. His work formed the basis of the Nuremberg Decrees, and
he was active in enforcing them. Responsible for prohibiting Jews
from following various professions, and for confiscating their
property, he signed a final decree in 1943, after the mass destruction
of Jews in the East, which placed them "outside the law" and handed
them over to the Gestapo. These laws paved the way for the "final
solution", and were extended by Frick to the incorporated territories
and to certain of the occupied territories. While he was Reich Pro-
tector of Bohemia and Moravia, thousands of Jews were transferred
from the Terezin Ghetto in Czechoslovakia to Auschwitz, where they
were killed. He issued a decree providing for special penal laws
against Jews and Poles in the Government General.
The police officially fell under the jurisdiction of the Reichsmin-
ister of the Interior. But Frick actually exercised little control over
Himmler and police matters. However, he signed the law appointing
Himmler Chief of the German Police, as well as the decrees estab-
lishing Gestapo jurisdiction over concentration camps and regulating
the execution of orders for protective custody. From the many
complaints he received, and from the testimony of witnesses, the
Tribunal concludes that he knew of atrocities committed in these
camps. With knowledge of Himmler's methods, Frick signed decrees
authorizing him to take necessary security measures in certain of
the incorporated territories. What these "security measures" turned
out to be has already been dealt with.

300
 As the Supreme Reich Authority in Bohemia and Moravia, Frick
bears general responsibility for the acts of oppression in that terri-
tory after 20 August 1943, such as terrorism of the population, slave
labor, and the deportation of Jews to the concentration camps for
extermination. It is true that Frick's duties as Reich Protector were
considerably more limited than those of his predecessor, and that he
had no legislative and limited personal executive authority in the
Protectorate. Nevertheless, Frick knew full well what the Nazi
policies of occupation were in Europe, particularly with respect to
Jews, at that time, and by accepting the office of Reich Protector he
assumed responsibility for carrying out those policies in Bohemia
and Moravia.
German citizenship in the occupied countries as well as in the
Reich came under his jurisdiction while he was Minister of the
Interior. Having created a racial register of persons of German
extraction, Frick conferred German citizenship on certain groups of
citizens of foreign countries. He is responsible for Germanization in
Austria, Sudetenland, Memel, Danzig, Eastern territories (West Prus-
sia and Posen), and Eupen, Malmedy, and Moresnot. He forced on
the citizens of these territories, German law, German courts, German
education, German police security, and compulsory military service.
During the war nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums in which
euthanasia was practiced as described elsewhere in this Judgment,
came under Frick's jurisdiction. He had knowledge that insane, sick,
and aged people, "useless eaters", were being systematically put to
death. Complaints of these murders reached him, but he did nothing
to stop them. A report of the Czechoslovak War Crimes Commission
estimated that 275,000 mentally deficient and aged people, for whose
welfare he was responsible, fell victim to it.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Frick is not guilty on Count One. He is
guilty on Counts Two, Three, and Four.

STREICHER
Streicher is indicted on Counts One and Four. One of the earliest
members of the Nazi Party, joining in 1921, he took part in the
Munich Putsch. From 1925 to 1940 he was Gauleiter of Franconia.
Elected to the Reichstag in 1933, he was an honorary general in
the SA. His persecution of the Jews was notorious. He was the
publisher of Der Stürmer, an anti-Semitic weekly newspaper, from
1923 to 1945 and was its editor until 1933.

301
 Crimes against Peace
Streicher was a staunch Nazi and supporter of Hitler's main
policies. There is no evidence to show that he was ever within
Hitler's inner circle of advisers; nor during his career was he closely
connected with the formulation of the policies which led to war. He
was never present, for example, at any of the important conferences
when Hitler explained his decisions to his leaders. Although he was
a Gauleiter there is no evidence to prove that he had knowledge of
those policies. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the evidence fails to
establish his connection with the conspiracy or common plan to wage
aggressive war as that conspiracy has been elsewhere defined in this
Judgment.
Crimes against Humanity
For his 25 years of speaking, writing,and preaching hatred of
the Jews, Streicher was widely known as "Jew-Baiter Number One".
In his speeches and articles, week after week, month after month,
he infected the German mind with the virus of anti-Semitism, and
incited the German People to active persecution. Each issue of Der
Stürmer, which reached a circulation of 600,000 in 1935, was filled
with such articles, often lewd and disgusting.
Streicher had charge of the Jewish boycott of 1 April 1933. He
advocated the Nuremberg Decrees of 1935. He was responsible for
the demolition on 10 August 1938, of the synagogue in Nuremberg.
And on 10 November 1938 he spoke publicly in support of the Jewish
pogrom which was taking place at that time.
But was not only in Germany that this defendant advocated
it

his doctrines.As early as 1938 he began to call for the annihilation

of the Jewish race. Twenty-three different articles of Der Stürmer
between 1938 and 1941 were produced in evidence, in which extermi-
nation "root and branch" was preached. Typical of his teachings was
a leading article in September 1938 which termed the Jew a germ
and a pest, not a human being, but "a parasite, an enemy, an evil-
doer, a disseminator of diseases who must be destroyed in the
interest of mankind". Other articles urged that only when world
Jewry had been annihilated would the Jewish problem have been
solved, and predicted that 50 years hence the Jewish graves "will
proclaim that this people of murderers and criminals has after all
met its deserved fate". Streicher, in February 1940, published a letter
from one of Der Stürmer's readers which compared Jews with
swarms of locusts which must be exterminated completely. Such was
the poison Streicher injected into the minds of thousands of Germans
which caused them to follow the National Socialist policy of Jewish
persecution and extermination. A leading article of Der Stürmer in
May 1939 shows clearly his aim:

302
 "A punitive expedition must come against the Jews in Russia.
A punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for
them that every murderer and criminal must expect: Death
sentence and execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed.
They must be exterminated root and branch."
As the war in the early stages proved successful in acquiring more
and more territory for the Reich, Streicher even intensified his
efforts to incite the Germans against the Jews. In the record are
26 articles from Der Stürmer, published between August 1941 and
September 1944, 12 by Streicher's own hand, which demanded anni-
hilation and extermination in unequivocal terms.
He wrote and published on 25 December 1941:
"If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the
Jewish blood is finally to come to an end, then there is only
—
one way the extermination of that people whose father is
the devil."
And in February 1944 his own article stated:
"Whoever does what a Jew does is a scoundrel, a criminal.
And he who repeats and wishes to copy him deserves the
same fate, annihilation, death."
With knowledge of the extermination of the Jews in the Occu-
pied Eastern Territory, this defendant continued to write and publish
his propaganda of death. Testifying in this trial, he vehemently
denied any knowledge of mass executions of Jews. But the evidence
makes it clear that he continually received current information on
the progress of the "final solution". His press photographer was sent
to visit the ghettos of the East in the spring of 1943, the time of the
destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. The Jewish newspaper, Israeliti-
sches Wochenblatt, which Streicher received and read, carried in
each issue accounts of Jewish atrocities in the East, and gave figures
on the number of Jews who had been deported and killed. For
example, issues appearing in the summer and fall of 1942 reported
the death of 72,729 Jews in Warsaw, 17,542 in Lodz, 18.000 in Croatia,
125,000 in Rumania, 14,000 in Latvia, 85,000 in Yugoslavia, 700,000 in
all of Poland. In November 1943 Streicher quoted verbatim an article
from the Israelitisches Wochenblatt which stated that the Jews had
virtually disappeared from Europe, and commented "This is not a
Jewish lie." In December 1942, referring to an article in the London
Times about the atrocities, aiming at extermination, Streicher said
that Hitler had given warning that the second World War would
lead to the destruction of Jewry. In January 1943 he wrote and
published an article which said that Hitler's prophecy was being
fulfilled, that world Jewry was being extirpated, and that it was
wonderful to know that Hitler was freeing the world of its Jewish
tormentors.

303
 In the face of the evidence before the Tribunal it is idle for
Streicher to suggest that the solution of the Jewish problem which
he favored was strictly limited to the classification of Jews as aliens,
and the passing of discriminatory legislation such as the Nuremberg
Laws, supplemented if possible by international agreement on the
creation of a Jewish State somewhere in the world, to which all
Jews should emigrate.
Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination at the time
when Jews in the East were being killed under the most horrible
conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial
grounds in connection with War Crimes, as defined by the Charter,
and constitutes a Crime against Humanity.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Streicher is not guilty on Count One, but
that he is guilty on Count Four.

FUNK
Funk indicted under all four Counts. Funk, who had previously
is
been a financialjournalist, joined the Nazi Party in 1931, and shortly
thereafter became one of Hitler's personal economic advisers. On
30 January 1933 Funk was made Press Chief in the Reich Govern-
ment, and on 11 March 1933 became Under Secretary in the Ministry
of Propaganda and shortly thereafter a leading figure in the various
Nazi organizations which were used to control the press, films, music,
and publishing houses. He took office as Minister of Economics and
Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in early 1938 and as
President of the Reichsbank in January 1939. He succeeded Schacht
in all three of these positions. He was made a member of the Minis-
terial Council for the Defense of the Reich in August 1939, and a
member of the Central Planning Board in September 1943.

Crimes against Peace

Funk became active in the economic field after the Nazi plans to
wage aggressive war had been clearly defined. One of his represent-
atives attended a conference on 14 October 1938, at which Goring
announced a gigantic increase in armaments and instructed the
Ministry of Economics to increase exports to obtain the necessary
exchange. On 28 January 1939 one of Funk's subordinates sent a
memorandum to the OKW on the use of prisoners of war to make
up labor deficiencies which would arise in case of mobilization. On
30 May 1939 the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Economics
attended a meeting at which detailed plans were made for the
financing of the war.

304
 On 25 August 1939 Funk wrote a letter to Hitler expressing his
gratitude that he was able to participate in such world-shaking
events; that his plans for the "financing of the war", for the control
of wage and price conditions and for the strengthening of the Reichs-
bank had been completed; and that he had inconspicuously trans-
ferred into gold all foreign exchange resources available to Germany.
On 14 October 1939, after the war had begun, he made a speech in
which he stated that the economic and financial departments of Ger-
many working under the Four Year Plan had been engaged in the
secret economic preparation for war for over a year.
Funk participated in the economic planning which preceded the
attack on the U.S.S.R. His deputy held daily conferences with Rosen-
berg on the economic problems which would arise in the occupation
of Soviet territory. Funk himself participated in planning for the
printing of ruble notes in Germany prior to the attack to serve as
occupation currency in the U.S.S.R. After the attack he made a
speech in which he described plans he had made for the economic
exploitation of the "vast territories of the Soviet Union" which were
to be used as a source of raw material for Europe.
Funk was not one of the leading figures in originating the Nazi
plans for aggressive war. His activity in the economic sphere was
under the supervision of Goring as Plenipotentiary General of the
Four Year Plan. He did, however, participate in the economic prep-
aration for certain of the aggressive wars, notably those against
Poland and the Soviet Union, but his guilt can be adequately dealt
with under Count Two of the Indictment.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

Under Secretary in the Ministry of Propaganda
In his capacity as •

and Vice-Chairman Chamber of Culture, Funk had

of the Reichs
participated in the early Nazi program of economic discrimination
against the Jews. On 12 November 1938 after the pogroms of No-
vember, he attended a meeting held under the chairmanship of Goring
to discuss the solution of the Jewish problem and proposed a decree
providing for the banning of Jews from all business activities, which
Goring issued the same day under the authority of the Four Year
Plan. Funk has testified that he was shocked at the outbreaks of
10 November, but on 15 November he made a speech describing these
outbreaks as a "violent explosion of the disgust of the German
People, because of a criminal Jewish attack against the German
People", and saying that the elimination of the Jews from economic
life followed logically their elimination from political life.

In 1942 Funk entered into an agreement with Himmler under

which the Reichsbank was to receive certain gold and jewels and
currency from the SS and instructed his subordinates, who were

305
to work out the details, not to ask too many questions. As a result
of this agreement the SS sent to the Reichsbank the personal belong-
ings taken from the victims who had been exterminated in the
concentration camps. The Reichsbank kept the coins and bank notes
and sent the jewels, watches, and personal belongings to Berlin
municipal pawn shops. The gold from the eyeglasses, and gold teeth
and fillings was stored in the Reichsbank vaults. Funk has protested
that he did not know that the Reichsbank was receiving articles of
this kind. The Tribunal is of the opinion that he either knew what
was being received or was deliberately closing his eyes to what was
being done.
As Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, Funk
participated in the economic exploitation of occupied territories. He
was president of the Continental Oil Company which was charged
with the exploitation of the oil resources of occupied territories in
the East. He was responsible for the seizure of the gold reserves of
the Czechoslovakian National Bank and for the liquidation of the
Yugoslavian National Bank. On 6 June 1942 his deputy sent a letter
to the OKW requesting that funds from the French Occupation Cost
Fund be made available for black market purchases. Funk's knowl-
edge of German occupation policies is shown by his presence at the
meeting of 8 August 1942, at which Goring addressed the various
German occupation chiefs, told them of the products required from
their territories, and added: "It makes no difference to me in this
connection if you say that your people will starve."
In the fall of 1943 Funk was a member of the Central Planning
Board which determined the total number of laborers needed for
German industry, and required Sauckel to produce them, usually by
deportation from occupied territories. Funk did not appear to be
particularly interested in this aspect of the forced labor program,
and usually sent a deputy to attend the meetings, often SS General
Ohlendorf, the former Chief of the SD inside of Germany and the
former Commander of Einsatzgruppe D. But Funk was aware that
the Board of which he was a member was demanding the impor-
tation of slave laborers, and allocating them to the various industries
under its control.
As President of the Reichsbank, Funk was also indirectly involved
in the utilization of concentration camp labor. Under his direction
the Reichsbank set up a revolving fund of 12,000,000 Reichsmarks to
the credit of the SS for the construction of factories to use concen-
tration camp laborers.
In spite of the fact that he occupied important official positions,
Funk was never a dominant figure in the various programs in which
he participated. This is a mitigating fact of which the Tribunal takes
notice.

306
 Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Funk
is not guilty on Count One but is
guilty under Counts Two, Three, and Four.

SCHACHT
Schacht is indicted under Counts One and Two of the Indict-
ment. Schacht served as Commissioner of Currency and President
of the Reichsbank from 1923 to 1930, was reappointed President of
the Bank on 17 March 1933, Minister of Economics in August 1934,
and Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in May 1935. He
resigned from these two positions in November 1937, and was
appointed Minister without Portfolio. He was reappointed as Presi-
dent of the Reichsbank for a 1-year term on 16 March 1937, and
for a 4-year term on 9 March 1938, but was dismissed on 20 January
1939. He was dismissed as Minister without Portfolio on 22 Jan-
uary 1943.
Crimes against Peace
Schacht was an active supporter of the Nazi Party before its
accession to power on 30 January 1933, and supported the appoint-
ment of Hitler to the post of Chancellor. After that date he played
an important role in the vigorous rearmament program which was
adopted, using the facilities of the Reichsbank to the fullest extent
in the German rearmament effort. The Reichsbank, in its traditional
capacity as financial agent for the German Government, floated
long-term Government loans, the proceeds of which were used for
rearmament. He devised a system under which 5-year notes, known
as Mefo bills, guaranteed by the Reichsbank and backed, in
effect, by nothing more than its position as a bank of issue, were
used to obtain large sums for rearmament from the short-term
money market. As Minister of Economics and as Plenipotentiary
General for War Economy he was active in organizing the German
economy for war. He made detailed plans for industrial mobilization
and the coordination of the Army with industry in the event of war.
He was particularly concerned with shortages of raw materials and
started a scheme of stock-piling, and a system of exchange control
designed to prevent Germany's weak foreign exchange position from
hindering the acquisition abroad of raw materials needed for rearma-
ment. On 3 Mav 1935 he sent a memorandum to Hitler stating
that "the accomplishment of the armament program with speed
and in quantity is the problem of German politics, that everything
else therefore should be subordinated to this purpose."
Schacht, by April 1936, began to lose his influence as the central
figure in the German rearmament effort when Goring was appointed
Coordinator for Raw Materials and Foreign Exchange. Goring ad-
vocated a greatly expanded program for the production of synthetic
raw materials which was opposed by Schacht on the ground that

307
the resulting financial strain might involve inflation. The influence
of Schacht suffered further when, on 16 October 1936, Goring was
appointed Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan with the task of
putting "the entire economy in a state of readiness for war" within
four years. Schacht had opposed the announcement of this plan
and the appointment of Goring to head it, and it is clear that
Hitler's action represented a decision that Schacht's economic poli-
cies were too conservative for the drastic rearmament policy which
Hitler wanted to put into effect.
After Göring's appointment, Schacht and Goring promptly became
embroiled in a series of disputes. Although there was an element
of personal controversy running through these disputes, Schacht
disagreed with Goring on certain basic policy issues. Schacht, on
financial grounds, advocated a retrenchment in the rearmament
program, opposed as uneconomical much of the proposed expansion
of production facilities, particularly for synthetics, urged a drastic
tightening on Government credit and a cautious policy in dealing
with Germany's foreign exchange reserves. As a result of this
dispute and of a bitter argument in which Hitler accused Schacht of
upsetting his plans by his financial methods, Schacht went on leave
of absence from the Ministry of Economics on 5 September 1937,
and resigned as Minister of Economics and as Plenipotentiary
General for War Economy on 16 November 1937.
As President of the Reichsbank Schacht was still involved in
disputes. Throughout 1938 the Reichsbank continued to function as
the financial agent for the German Government in floating long-term
loans to finance armaments. But on 32 March 1938 Schacht discon-
tinued the practice of floating short-term notes guaranteed by the
Reichsbank for armament expenditures. At the end of 1938, in an
attempt to regain control of fiscal policy through the Reichsbank,
Schacht refused an urgent request of the Reichsminister of Finance
for a special credit to pay the salaries of civil servants which were
not covered by existing funds. On 2 January 1939 Schacht held a
conference with Hitler at which he urged him to reduce expend-
itures for armaments. On 7 January 1939 Schacht submitted to
Hitler a report signed by the Directors of the Reichsbank which
urged a drastic curtailment of armament expenditures and a bal-
anced budget as the only method of preventing inflation. On 19 Jan-
uary Hitler dismissed Schacht as President of the Reichsbank. On
22 January 1943 Hitler dismissed Schacht as Reichsminister with-
out Portfolio, because of his "whole attitude during the present
fateful fight of the German Nation." On 23 July 1944 Schacht was
arrested by the Gestapo and confined in a concentration camp until
the end of the war.
It is clear that Schacht was a central figure in Germany's rear-
mament program, and the steps which he took, particularly in the

308
early days of the Nazi regime, were responsible for Nazi Ger-
many's rapid rise as a military power. But rearmament of itself is
not criminal under the Charter. To be a Crime against Peace under
Article 6 of the Charter it must be shown that Schacht carried out
this rearmament as part of the Nazi plans to wage aggressive wars.
Schacht has contended that he participated in the rearmament
program only because he wanted to build up a strong and independ-
ent Germany which would carry out a foreign policy which would
command respect on an equal basis with other European countries;
that when he discovered that the Nazis were rearming for aggres-
sive purposes he attempted to slow down the speed of rearmament;
and that after the dismissal of Von Fritsch and Von Blomberg he
participated in plans to get rid of Hitler, first by deposing him and
later by assassination.
Schacht, as early as 1936, began to advocate a limitation of the
rearmament program for financial reasons. Had the policies ad-
vocated by him been put into effect, Germany would not have been
prepared for a general European war. Insistence on his policies led
to his eventual dismissal from all positions of economic significance
in Germany. On the other hand, Schacht, with his intimate knowl-
edge of German finance, was in a peculiarly good position to un-
derstand the true significance of Hitler's frantic rearmament, and
to realize that the economic policy adopted was consistent only with
war as its object.
Moreover Schacht continued to participate in German economic
life and even, in a minor way, in some of the early Nazi aggressions.
Prior to the occupation of Austria he set a rate of exchange be-
tween the mark and the schilling. After the occupation of Austria
he arranged for the incorporation of the Austrian National Bank
into the Reichsbank and made a violently pro-Nazi speech in which
he stated that the Reichsbank would always be Nazi as long as he
was connected with it, praised Hitler, defended the occupation of
Austria, scoffed at objections to the way it was carried out, and
ended with "to our Führer a triple 'Sieg Heil'." He has not conten-
ded that this speech did not represent his state of mind at the time.
After the occupation of the Sudetenland, he arranged for currency
conversion and for the incorporation into the Reichsbank of local
Czech banks of issue. On 29 November 1938 he made a speech in
which he pointed with pride to his economic policy which had
created the high degree of German armament, and added that this
armament had made Germany's foreign policy possible.
Schacht was not involved in the planning of any of the specific
wars of aggression charged in Count Two. His participation in the
occupation of Austria and the Sudetenland (neither of which are
charged as aggressive wars) was on such a limited basis that it does
not amount to participation in the common plan charged in Count

309
One. He was clearly not one of the inner circle around Hitler which
was most closely involved with this common plan. He was regarded
by this group with undisguised hostility. The testimony of Speer
shows that Schacht's arrest on 23 July 1944 was based as much on
Hitler'senmity towards Schacht growing out of his attitude before
the waras it was on suspicion of his complicity in the bomb plot.
The case against Schacht therefore depends on the inference that
Schacht did in fact know of the Nazi aggressive plans.
On this all-important question evidence has been given for the
Prosecution, and a considerable volume of evidence for the Defense.
The Tribunal has considered the whole of this evidence with great
care, and comes to the conclusion that this necessary inference has
not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion.
The Tribunal finds that Schacht is not guilty on this Indictment,
and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal when the
Tribunal presently adjourns.

DÖNITZ
Dönitz is indicted on Counts One, Two, and Three. In 1935 he
took command of the first U-boat flotilla commissioned since 1918,
became in 1936 commander of the submarine arm, was made Vice-
Admiral in 1940, Admiral in 1942, and on 30 January 1943 Com-
mander-in-Chief of the German Navy. On 1 May 1945 he became
the Head of State, succeeding Hitler.

Crimes against Peace

Although Dönitz built and trained the German U-boat arm, the
evidence does not show he was privy to the conspiracy to wage
aggressive wars or that he prepared and initiated such wars. He
was a line officer performing strictly tactical duties. He was not
present at the important conferences when plans for aggressive wars
were announced, and there is no evidence he was informed about
the decisions reached there. Dönitz did, however, wage aggressive
war within the meaning of that word as used by the Charter. Sub-
marine warfare which began immediately upon the outbreak of war,
was fully coordinated with the other branches of the Wehrmacht.
It is clear that his U-boats, few in number at the time, were fully
prepared to wage war.
It is true that until his appointment in January 1943 as Com-
mander-in-Chief he was not an "Oberbefehlshaber". But this state-
ment underestimates the importance of Dönitz' position. He was no
mere army or division commander. The U-boat arm was the prin-
cipal part of the German fleet and Dönitz was its leader. The High

310
Seas fleet made a few minor, if spectacular, raids during the early
years of the war, but the real damage to the enemy was done almost
exclusively by his submarines as the millions of tons of Allied and
neutral shipping sunk will testify. Dönitz was solely in charge of
this warfare. The Naval War Command reserved for itself only the
decision as to the number of submarines in each area. In the in-
vasion of Norway, for example, Dönitz made recommendations in
October 1939 as to submarine bases, which he claims were no more
than a staff study, and in March 1940 he made out the operational
orders for the supporting U-boats, as discussed elsewhere in this
Judgment.
That his importance to the German war effort was so regarded
is eloquently proved by Raeder's recommendation of Dönitz as his
successor and his appointment by Hitler on 30 January 1943 as
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Hitler, too, knew that submarine
warfare was the essential part of Germany's naval warfare.
From January 1943, Dönitz was consulted almost continuously
by Hitler. The evidence was that they conferred on naval problems
about 120 times during the course of the war.
As late as April 1945, when he admits he knew the struggle
was hopeless, Dönitz as its Commander-in-Chief urged the Navy to
continue its fight. On 1 May 1945 he became the Head of State and
as such ordered the Wehrmacht to continue its war in the East,
until capitulation on 9 May 1945. Dönitz explained that his reason
for these orders was to insure that the German civilian population
might be evacuated and the Army might make an orderly retreat
from the East.
In the view of the Tribunal, the evidence shows that Dönitz was
active in waging aggressive war.

War Crimes
Dönitz is charged with waging unrestricted submarine warfare
contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936, to which Germany acceded,
and which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid down in
the London Naval Agreement of 1930.
The Prosecution has submitted that on 3 September 1939 the
German U-boat arm began to wage unrestricted submarine warfare
upon all merchant ships, whether enemy or neutral, cynically dis-
regarding the Protocol; and that a calculated effort was made
throughout the war to disguise this practice by making hypocritical
references to international law and supposed violations by the Allies.
Dönitz insists that at all times the Navy remained within the
confines of international law and of the Protocol. He testified that
when the war began, the guide to submarine warfare was the Ger-
man Prize Ordinance taken almost literally from the Protocol, that

311
pursuant to the German view, he ordered submarines to attack all
merchant ships in convoy, and all that refused to stop or used their
radio upon sighting a submarine. When his reports indicated that
British merchant ships were being used to give information by
wireless, were being armed, and were attacking submarines on sight,
he ordered his submarines on 17 October 1939 to attack all enemy
merchant ships without warning on the ground that resistance was
to be expected. Orders already had been issued on 21 September
1939 to attack all ships, including neutrals, sailing at night without
lights in the English Channel.
On 24 November German Government issued a warning
1939 the
to neutral shipping that, owing to the frequent engagements taking
place in the waters around the British Isles and the French Coast
between U-boats and Allied merchant ships which were armed and
had instructions to use those arms as well as to ram U-boats, the
safety of neutral ships in those waters could no longer be taken for
granted. On 1 January 1940 the German U-boat Command, acting
on the instructions of Hitler, ordered U-boats to attack all Greek
merchant ships in the zone surrounding the British Isles which was
banned by the United States to its own ships and also merchant
ships of every nationality in the limited area of the Bristol Channel.
Five days later a further order was given to U-boats to "make
immediately unrestricted use of weapons against all ships" in an
area of the North Sea, the limits of which were defined. Finally on
18 January 1940, U-boats were authorized to sink, without warning,
all ships "in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use
of mines can be pretended". Exceptions were to be made in the cases
of United States, Italian, Japanese, and Soviet ships.
Shortly after the outbreak of war the British Admiralty, in
accordance with its Handbook of Instructions of 1938 to the Merchant
Navy, armed its merchant vessels, in many cases convoyed them
with armed escort, gave orders to send position reports upon
sighting submarines, thus integrating merchant vessels into the
warning network of naval intelligence. On 1 October 1939 the Brit-
ish Admiralty announced that British merchant ships had been
ordered to ram U-boats if possible.
In the actual circumstances of this case, the Tribunal is not prep-
pared to hold Dönitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare
against British armed merchant ships.
However, the proclamation of operational zones and the sinking
of neutral merchant vessels which enter those zones presents a
different question. This practice was employed in the war of 1914-18
by Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great Britain. The Wash-
ington Conference of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 1930,
and the Protocol of 1936 were entered into with full knowledge that

312
such zones had been employed in the first World War. Yet the Pro-
tocol made no exception for operational zones. The order of Dönitz
to sink neutral ships without warning when found within these
zones was therefore, in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of
the Protocol.
It is also asserted that the German U-boat arm not only did not
carry out the warning and rescue provisions of the Protocol but that
Dönitz deliberately ordered the killing of survivors of shipwrecked
vessels, whether enemy or neutraL The Prosecution has introduced
—
much evidence surrounding two orders of Dönitz War Order
Number 154, issued in 1939, and the so-called "Laconia" Order of
1942. The Defense argues that these orders and the evidence sup-
porting them do not show such a policy and introduced much
evidence to the contrary. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the
evidence does not establish with the certainty required that Dönitz
deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors. The orders
were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the strongest censure.
The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions were not
carried out and that the Defendant ordered that they should not
be carried out. The argument of the Defense is that the security of
the submarine is, as the first rule of the sea, paramount to rescue,
and that the development of aircraft made rescue impossible. This
may be so, but the Protocol is explicit. If the commander cannot
rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and
should allow it to pass harmless before his periscope. These orders,
then, prove Dönitz is guilty of a violation of the Protocol.
In view of all of the facts proved and in particular of an order
of the British Admiralty announced on 8 May 1940, according to
which all vessels should be sunk at night in the Skagerrak, and the
answers to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating that unre-
stricted submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by
the United States from the first day that Nation entered the war,
the sentence of Dönitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches
of the international law of submarine warfare.
Dönitz was also charged with responsibility for Hitler's Com-
mando Order of 18 October 1942. Dönitz admitted he received and
knew of the order when he was Flag Officer of U-boats, but dis-
claimed responsibility. He points out that the order by its express
terms excluded men captured in naval warfare, that the Navy had
no territorial commands on land, and that submarine commanders
would never encounter commandos.
In one instance, when he was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy,
in 1943, the members of the crew of an Allied motor torpedo boat
were captured by German Naval Forces. They were interrogated for
intelligence purposes on behalf of the local Admiral, and then turned

313
over by his order to the SD and shot. Dönitz said that if they were
captured by the Navy their execution was a violation of the Com-
mando Order, that the execution was not announced in the Wehr-
macht communiqué, and that he was never informed' of the incident.
He pointed out that the Admiral in question was not in his chain of
command, but was subordinate to the Army general in command of
the Norway occupation. But Dönitz permitted the order to remain in
full force when he became Commander-in-Chief, and to that extent
he is responsible.
Dönitz, in a conference of 11 December 1944, said "12,000 con-
centration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as
additional labor". At this time Dönitz had no jurisdiction over
shipyard construction, and claims that this was merely a suggestion
at the meeting that the responsible officials do something about the
production of ships, that he took no steps to get these workers since
it was not a matter for his jurisdiction and that he does not know

whether they ever were procured. He admits he knew of concen-

tration camps. A man in his position must necessarily have known
that citizens of occupied countries in large numbers were confined
in the concentration camps.
In 1945 Hitler requested the opinion of Jodl and Dönitz whether
the Geneva Convention should be denounced. The notes of the
meeting between the two military leaders on 20 February 1945 show
that Dönitz expressed his view that the disadvantages of such an
action outweighed the advantages. The summary of Dönitz' attitude
shown in the notes taken by an officer, included the following
sentence: "It would be better to carry out the measures considered
necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with the
outer world."
The Prosecution insisted that "the measures" referred to meant
the Convention should not be denounced, but should be broken at
will. The Defense explanation is that Hitler wanted to break the
Convention for two reasons: to take away from German troops the
protection of the Convention, thus preventing them from continuing
to surrender in large groups to the British and Americans, and also
to permit reprisals against Allied prisoners of war because of
Allied bombing raids. Dönitz claims that what he meant by
"measures" were disciplinary measures against German troops to
prevent them from surrendering, and that his words had no reference
to measures against the Allies; moreover that this was merely a
suggestion, and that in any event no such measures were ever taken,
either against Allies or Germans. The Tribunal, however, does not
believe this explanation. The Geneva Convention was not, however,
denounced by Germany. The Defense has introduced several affi-
davits to prove that British naval prisoners of war in camps under

314
Dönitz' jurisdiction were treated strictly according to the Convention,
and the Tribunal takes this fact into consideration, regarding it as
a mitigating circumstance.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds Dönitz is not guilty on Count One of the
Indictment, and is guilty on Counts Two and There.

RAEDER
Raeder indicted on Counts One, Two, and Three. In 1928 he
is
became Chief of Naval Command and in 1935 Oberbefehlshaber der
Kriegsmarine (OKM); in 1939 Hitler made him Gross-Admiral. He
was a member of the Reich Defense Council. On 30 January 1943
Dönitz replaced him at his own request, and he became Admiral
Inspector of the Navy, a nominal title.

Crimes against Peace

In the 15 years he commanded it, Raeder built and directed the
German Navy; he accepts full responsibility until retirement in 1943.
He admits the Navy violated the Versailles Treaty, insisting it was
"a matter of honor for every man" to do so, and alleges that the
violations were for the most part minor, and Germany built less
than her allowable strength. These violations, as well as those of
the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, have already been
discussed elsewhere in this Judgment.
Raeder received the directive of 24 June 1937 from Von Blom-
berg requiring special preparations for war against Austria. He was
one of the five leaders present at the Hossbach Conference of
5 November 1937. He claims Hitler merely wished by this conference
to spur the Army to faster rearmament, insists he believed the
questions of Austria and Czechoslovakia would be settled peace-
fully, as they were, and points to the new naval treaty with England
which had just been signed. He received no orders to speed
construction of U-boats, indicating that Hitler was not planning war.
Raeder received directives on "Fall Grün" and the directives on
"Fall Weiss" beginning with that of 3 April 1939; the latter directed
the Navy to support the Army by intervention from the sea. He was
also one of the few chief leaders present at the meeting of 23 May
1939. Heattended the Obersalzberg briefing of 22 August 1939.
The conception of the invasion of Norway first arose in the mind
of Raeder and not that of Hitler. Despite Hitler's desire, as shown by
his directive of October 1939 to keep Scandinavia neutral, the Navy
examined the advantages of naval bases there as early as October.
Admiral Karls originally suggested to Raeder the desirable aspects
of bases in Norway. A questionnaire, dated 3 October 1939, which

315
sought comments on the desirability of such bases, was circulated
within SKL. On 10 October Raeder discussed the matter with Hitler;
his War Diary entry for that day says Hitler intended to give the
matter consideration. A few months later Hitler talked to Raeder,
Quisling, Keitel, and Jodl; OKW began its planning and the Naval
War Staff worked with OKW staff officers. Raeder received Keitel's
directive for Norway on 27 January 1940 and the subsequent direc-
tive of 1 March, signed by Hitler.
Raeder defends his actions on the ground it was a move to
forestall the British. It is not necessary again to discuss this defense,
which has heretofore been treated in some detail, concluding that
Germany's invasion of Norway and Denmark was aggressive war.
In a letter to the Navy, Raeder said: "The operations of the Navy
in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the great
contribution of the Navy to this war."
Raeder received the directives, including the innumerable post-
ponements, for the attack in the West. In a meeting of 18 March 1941
with Hitler he urged the occupation of all Greece. He claims this
was only after the British had landed and Hitler had ordered the
attack, and points out the Navy had no interest in Greece. He
received Hitler's directive on Yugoslavia.
Raeder endeavored to dissuade Hitler from embarking upon the
invasion of the U.S.S.R. In September 1940 he urged on Hitler an
aggressive Mediterranean policy as an alternative to an attack on
Russia. On 14 November 1940 he urged the war against England "as
our main enemy" and that submarine and naval air force con-
struction be continued. He voiced "serious objections against the
Russian campaign before the defeat of England", according to notes
of the German Naval War Staff. He claims his objections were based
on the violation of the Non-Aggression Pact as well as strategy. But
once the decision had been made, he gave permission 6 days before
the invasion of the Soviet Union to attack Russian submarines in
the Baltic Sea within a specified warning area and defends this
action because these submarines were "snooping" on German
activities.
It is clear from this evidence that Raeder participated in the
planning and waging of aggressive war.

War Crimes
Raeder is charged with War Crimes on The
the High Seas.
Athenia, an unarmed British passenger liner,was sunk on 3 Sep-
tember 1939, while outward bound to America. The Germans
2 months later charged that Mr. Churchill deliberately sank the
Athenia to encourage American hostility to Germany. In fact, it was
sunk by the German U-boat 30. Raeder claims that an inexperienced

316
U-boat commander sank it mistake for an armed merchant
in
cruiser, that this was not knownuntil the U-30 returned several
weeks after the German denial and that Hitler then directed the
Navy and Foreign Office to continue denying it. Raeder denied
knowledge of the propaganda campaign attacking Mr. Churchill.
The most serious charge against Raeder is that he carried out
unrestricted submarine warfare, including sinking of unarmed
merchant ships, of neutrals, non-rescue and machine-gunning of
survivors, contrary to the London Protocol of 1936. The Tribunal
makes the same finding on Raeder on this charge as it did as to
Dönitz, which has already been announced, up until 30 January 1943
when Raeder retired.
The Commando Order of 18 October 1942, which expressly did
not apply to naval warfare, was transmitted by the Naval War Staff
to the lower naval commanders with the direction it should be
distributed orally by flotilla leaders and section commanders to
their subordinates. Two commandos were put to death by the Navy,
and not the SD, at Bordeaux on 10 December 1942. The comment of
the Naval War Staff was that this was "in accordance with the
Fiihrer's special order, but is nevertheless something new in inter-
national law, since the soldiers were in uniform." Raeder admits
he passed the order down through the chain of command, and he
did not object to Hitler.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Raeder is guilty on Counts One, Two,
and Three.

VON SCH1RACH
Von Schirach is indicted under Counts One and Four. He joined
the Nazi Party and the SA in 1925. In 1929 he became the leader of
the National Socialist Students Union. In 1931 he was made Reichs
Youth Leader of the Nazi Party with control over all Nazi youth
organizations, including the Hitler Jugend. In 1933, after the Nazis
had obtained control of the Government, Von Schirach was made
Leader of Youth in the German Reich, originally a position within
the Ministry of the Interior, but, after 1 December 1936, an office
in the Reich Cabinet. In 1940 Von Schirach resigned as head of the
Hitler Jugend and Leader of Youth in the German Reich, but
retained his position as Reichsleiter with control over Youth Edu-
cation. In 1940 he was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna, Reichs Governor
of Vienna, and Reichs Defense Commissioner for that territory.

Crimes against Peace

After the Nazis had come to power Von Schirach, utilizing both
physical violence and official pressure, either drove out of existence

317
•r took over all youth groups which competed with the Hitler
Jugend. A Hitler decree of 1 December 1936 incorporated all German
youth within the Hitler Jugend. By the time formal conscription
was introduced in 1940, 97 percent of those eligible were already
members.
Von Schirach used the Hitler Jugend to educate German Youth
"in the spirit of National Socialism" and subjected them to an inten-
sive program of Nazi propaganda. He established the Hitler Jugend
as a source of replacements for the Nazi Party formations. In
October 1938 he entered into an agreement with Himmler under
which members of the Hitler Jugend who met SS standards would
be considered as the primary source of replacements for the SS.
Von Schirach also used the Hitler Jugend for pre-military train-
ing. Special units were set up whose primary purpose was training
specialists for the various branches of the service. On 11 August
1939 he entered into an agreement with Keitel under which the
Hitler Jugend agreed to carry out its pre-military activities under
standards laid down by the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht agreed
to train 30,000 Hitler Jugend instructors each year. The Hitler Jugend
placed particular emphasis on the military spirit and its training
program stressed the importance of return of the colonies, the neces-
sity for Lebensraum, and the noble destiny of German youth to die
for Hitler.
Despite the warlike nature of the activities of the Hitler Jugend,
however, it does not appear that Von Schirach was involved in the
development of Hitler's plan for territorial expansion by means of
aggressive war, or that he participated in the planning or prepa-
ration of any of the wars of aggression.

Crimes against Humanity

In July 1940 Von Schirach was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna.
At the same time he was appointed Reichs Governor for Vienna and
Reichs Defense Commissioner, originally for Military District 17,
including the Gaue of Vienna, Upper Danube, and Lower Danube
and, after 17 November 1942, for the Gaue of Vienna alone. As Reichs
Defense Commissioner, he had control of the civilian war economy.
As Reichs Governor he was head of the municipal administration of
the City of Vienna, and, under the supervision of the Minister of
the Interior, in charge of the governmental administration of the
Reich in Vienna.
Von Schirach is not charged with the commission of War Crimes
in Vienna, only with the commission of Crimes against Humanity.
As has already been seen, Austria was occupied pursuant to a
common plan of aggression. Its occupation is, therefore, a "crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal", as that term is used in

318
Article 6 (c) of the Charter. As a result, "murder, extermination,

enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts" and "perse-

cutions on political, racial, or religious grounds" in connection with
this occupation constitute a Crime against Humanity under that
Article.
As Gauleiter of Vienna, Von Schirach came under the Sauckel
decree, dated 6 April 1942, making the Gauleiters Sauckel's pleni-
potentiaries for manpower with authority to supervise the utilization
and treatment of manpower within their Gaue. Sauckel's directives
provided that the forced laborers were to be fed, sheltered, and
treated so as to exploit them to the highest possible degree at the
lowest possible expense.
When Von Schirach became Gauleiter of Vienna the deportation
of the Jews had already been begun, and only 60,000 out of
Vienna's original 190,000 Jews remained. On 2 October 1940 he
attended a conference at Hitler's office and told Frank that he had
50,000 Jews in Vienna which the General Government would have
to take over from him. On 3 December 1940 Von Schirach received a
letter from Lammers stating that after the receipt of the reports
made by Von Schirach, Hitler had decided to deport the 60,000 Jews
still remaining in Vienna to the General Government because of

the housing shortage in Vienna. The deportation of the Jews from

Vienna was then begun and continued until the early fall of 1942.
On 15 Seotember 1942 Von Schirach made a speech in which he
defended his action in having driven "tens of thousands upon tens
of thousands of Jews into the ghetto of the East" as " contributing
to European culture".
While the Jews were being deported from Vienna, reports,
addressed to him in his official capacity, were received in Von Schi-
rach's office from the office of the Chief of the Security Police and
SD which contained a description of the activities of Einsatzgruppen
in exterminating Jews. Many of these reports were initialed by one
of Von Schirach's principal deputies. On 30 June 1944 Von Schirach's
office also received a letter from Kaltenbrunner informing him that
a shipment of 12,000 Jews was on its way to Vienna for essential
war work and that all those who were incapable of work would
have to be kept in readiness for "special action".
The Tribunal finds that Von Schirach, while he did not originate
the policy of deporting Jews from Vienna, participated in this
deportation after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that
the best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the
ghettos of the East. Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination
were in his office.
While Gauleiter of Vienna Von Schirach continued to function as
Reichsleiter for Youth Education and in this capacity he was

319
informed of the Hitler Jugend's participation in the plan put into
effect in the fall of 1944 under which 50,000 young people between
the ages of 10 and 20 were evacuated into Germany from areas
recaptured by the Soviet forces and used as apprentices in German
industry and as auxiliaries in units of the German Armed Forces,
In the summer of 1942 Von Schirach telegraphed Bormann urging
that a bombing attack on an English cultural town be carried out in
retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich which, he claimed, had
been planned by the British.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Von Schirach is not guilty on Count
One. He is guilty under Count Four.

SAUCKEL
Sauekel indicted under all four Counts. Sauckel joined the Nazi
is
Party in. 1923, and became Gauleiter of Thuringia in 1927. He was
a member of the Thuringian legislature from 1927 to 1933, was
appointed Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia in 1932, and Thuringian
Minister of the Interior and head of the Thuringian State Ministry
in May 1933. He became a member of the Reichstag in 1933. He held
the formal rank of Obergruppenführer in both the SA and the SS.

Crimes against Peace

The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal that Sauckel was
sufficiently connectedwith the common plan to wage aggressive war
or sufficiently involved in the planning or waging of the aggressive
wars to allow the Tribunal to convict him on Counts One or Two.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

On 21 March 1942
Hitler appointed Sauckel Plenipotentiary
Gener: for the Utilization of Labor, with authority to put under
I

uniform control "the utilization of all available manpower, including

that Of workers recruited abroad and of prisoners of war". Sauckel
was instructed to operate within the fabric of the Four Year Plan,
and on 27 March 1942 Goring issued a decree as Commissioner for
the Four Year Plan transferring his manpower sections to SauckeL
On 30 September 1942 Hitler gave Sauckel authority to appoint
Commissioners in the various occupied territories, and "to take all
necessary measures for the enforcement" of the Decree of 21 March
1942.
Under the authority which he obtained by these decrees, Sauckel
set up a program for the mobilization of the labor resources available
to the Reich. One of the important parts of this mobilization was the
systematic exploitation, by force, of the labor resources of the

320
occupied territories. Shortly after Sauckel had taken office, he had
the governing authorities in the various occupied territories issue
decrees, establishing compulsory labor service in Germany. Under
the authority of these decrees Sauckel's commissioners, backed up
by the police authorities of the occupied territories, obtained ana
sent to Germany the laborers which were necessary to fill the
quotas given them by Sauckel. He described so-called "voluntary"
recruiting by a whole batch of male and female agents just as was done
in the olden times for shanghaiing". That real voluntary recruiting
was the exception rather than the rule is shown by Sauckel's state-
ment on 1 March 1944, that "out of five million foreign workers who
arrived in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily". Although
he now claims that the statement is not true, the circumstances
under which it was made, as well as the evidence presented before
the Tribunal, leave no doubt that it was substantially accurate.
The manner in which the unfortunate slave laborers were col-
lected and transported to Germany, and what happened to them
after they arrived, has already been described. Sauckel argues that
he is not responsible for these excesses in the administration of the
program. He says that the total number of workers to be obtained
was set by the demands from agriculture and from industry; that
obtaining the workers was the responsibility of the occupation
authorities, transporting them toGermany that of the German rail-
ways, and taking care of them in Germany that of the Ministries
of Labor and Agriculture, the German Labor Front, and the various
industries involved. He testifies that insofar as he had any authority
he was constantly urging humane treatment.
There is no doubt, however, that Sauckel had over-all respon-
sibility for the slave labor program. At the time of the events in
question he did not fail to assert control over the fields which he
now claims were the sole responsibility of others. His regulations
provided that his commissioners should have authority for obtaining
labor, and he was constantly in the field supervising the steps which
were being taken. He was aware of ruthless methods being taken
to obtain laborers, and vigorously supported them on the ground
that they were necessary to fill the quotas.
Sauckel's regulations also provided that he had responsibility for
transporting the laborers to Germany, allocating them to employers
and taking care of them, and that the other agencies involved in
these processes were subordinate to him. He was informed of the
bad conditions which existed. It does not appear that he advocated
brutality for its own sake, or was an advocate of any program such
as Himmler's plan for extermination through work. His attitude was
thus expressed in a regulation:

321
 "All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a
way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the
lowest conceivable degree of expenditure."
The evidence shows that Sauckel was in charge of a program which
involved deportation for slave labor of more than 5,000,000 human
beings, many of them under terrible conditions of cruelty and
suffering.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Sauckel is not guilty on Counts One and
Two. He is guilty under Counts Three and Four.

JODL
Jodl is indicted on all four Counts. From 1935 to 1938 he was
Chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command. After
a year in command of troops, in August 1939 he returned to become
Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed
Forces. Although his immediate superior was Defendant Keitel,
he reported directly to Hitler on operational matters. In the strict
military sense, Jodl was the actual planner of the war and respon-
sible in large measure for the strategy and conduct of operations.
Jodl defends himself on the ground he was a soldier sworn to
obedience, and not a politician; and that his staff and planning work
left him no time for other matters. He said that when he signed
or initialed orders, memoranda, and letters, he did so for Hitler and
often in the absence of Keitel. Though he claims that as a soldier
he had to obey Hitler, he says that he often tried to obstruct certain
measures by delay, which occasionally proved successful as when
he resisted Hitler's demand that a directive be issued to lynch
Allied "terror fliers".
Crimes against Peace
Entries in Jodl's diary of 13 and 14 February 1938 show Hitler
instructed both him and Keitel to keep up military pressure against
Austria begun at the Schuschnigg conference by simulating military
measures, and that these achieved their purpose. When Hitler decided
"not to tolerate" Schuschnigg's plebiscite, Jodl brought to the conf-
erence the "old draft", the existing staff plan. His diary for 10 March
shows Hitler then ordered the preparation of "Case Otto", and the
directive wasinitialed by Jodl. Jodl issued supplementary instruct-
ions on 11 March, and initialed Hitler's order for the invasion on the
same date.
In planning the attack on Czechoslovakia, Jodl was very active,
according to the Schmundt Notes. He initialed items 14, 17, 24, 36,
and 37 in the Notes. Jodl admits he agreed with OKH that the
"incident" to provide German intervention must occur at the latest

322
by 1400 on X-l Day, the day before the attack, and said it must
occur at a fixed time in good flying weather. Jodl conferred with the
propaganda experts on "imminent common tasks" such as German
violations of international law, exploitation of them by the enemy
and refutations by the Germans, which "task" Jodl considered "par-
ticularly important".
After Munich, Jodl wrote:
"Czechoslovakia as a power is out .... The genius of the
Führer and his determination not to shun even a World War
have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope
remains that the incredulous, the weak, and the doubtful
people have been converted and will remain that way,"
Shortly after the Sudeten occupation, Jodl went to a post com-
mand and did not become Chief of the Operations Staff in OKW
until the end of August 1939.
Jodl discussed the Norway invasion with Hitler, Keitel, and
Raeder on 12 December 1939; his diary is replete with late entries
on his activities in preparing this attack. Jodl explains his comment
that Hitler was still looking for an "excuse" to move meant he was
waiting for reliable intelligence on the British plans, and defends
the invasion as a necessary move to forestall them. His testimony
shows that from October 1939 Hitler planned to attack the West
through Belgium, but was doubtful about invading Holland until
the middle of November. On 8 February 1940, Jodl, his deputy War-
limont, and Jeschonnek, the Air Forces planner, discussed among
themselves the "new idea" of attacking Norway, Denmark, and Hol-
land, but guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Many of the 17
orders postponing the attack in the West for various reasons
including weather conditions, until May 1940, were signed by Jodl.
He was active in the planning against Greece and Yugoslavia.
The Hitler order of 11 January 1941 to intervene in Albania was
initialed by Jodl. On 20 January, 4 months before the, attack, Hitler
told a conference of German and Italian generals in Jodl's presence
that German troop concentrations in Rumania were to be used
against Greece. Jodl was present on 18 March when Hitler told
Raeder all Greece must be occupied before any settlement could be
reached. On 27 March, when Hitler told the German High Command
that the destruction of Yugoslavia should be accomplished with
"unmerciful harshness", and the decision was taken to bomb Bel-
grade without a declaration of war, Jodl was also there.
Jodl testified that Hitler feared an attack by Russia and so
attacked first. This preparation began almost a year before the
invasion. Jodl told Warlimont as early as 29 July 1940 to prepare
the plans since Hitler had decided to attack; and Hitler later told
Warlimont he had planned to attack in August 1940 but postponed

323
itfor military reasons. He initialed Hitler's directive of 12 November
1940 that preparations verbally ordered should be continued and
also initialed "Case Barbarossa" on 18 December. On 3 February
1941 Hitler, Jodl, and Keitel discussed the invasion, and he was
present on 14 June when final reports on "Case Barbarossa" were
made.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

On 18 October 1942 Hitler issued the Commando Order and a
day later a supplementary explanationcommanding officers only.
to
The covering memorandum was signed by Jodl. Early drafts of the
order were made by Jodl's staff, with his knowledge. Jodl testified
he was strongly opposed on moral and legal grounds, but could not
refuse to pass it on. He insists he tried to mitigate its harshness in
practice by not informing Hitler when it was not carried out. He
initialed the OKW memorandum of 25 June 1944 reaffirming the
Order after the Normandy landings.
A plan to eliminate Soviet commissars was in the directive for
"Case Barbarossa". The decision whether they should be killed
without trial was to be made by an officer. A
draft contains Jodl's
handwriting suggesting this should be handled as retaliation, and
he testified this was his attempt to get around it.
When in 1945 Hitler considered denouncing the Geneva Conven-
tion, Jodl argued the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. On
21 February he told Hitler adherence to the Convention would not
interfere with the conduct of the war, giving as an example the
sinking of a British hospital ship as a reprisal and calling it a
mistake. He said he did so because it was the only attitude Hitler
would consider, that moral or legal arguments had no effect and
argues he thus prevented Hitler from denouncing the Convention.
There is little evidence that Jodl was actively connected with the
slave labor program, and he must have concentrated on his strategic
planning function. But in his speech of 7 November 1943 to the
Gauleiters he said it was necessary to act "with remorseless vigor
and resolution" in Denmark, France, and the Low Countries to
compel work on the Atlantic Wall.
By teletype of 28 October 1944 Jodl ordered the evacuation of all
persons in northern Norway and burning of their houses so they
could not help the Russians. Jodl says he was against this, but Hitler
ordered it and it was not fully carried out. A
document of the Nor-
wegian Government says such an evacuation did take place in
northern Norway and 30,000 houses were damaged. On 7 October
1941, Jodl signed an order that Hitler would not accept an offer of
surrender of Leningrad or Moscow, but on the contrary he insisted
that they be completely destroyed. He says this was done because

324
the Germans were afraid those cities would be mined by the Rus-
sians as was Kiev. No surrender was ever offered.
His defense, in brief, is the doctrine of "superior orders", prohi-
bited by Article 8 of the Charter as a defense. There is nothing in
mitigation. Participation in such crimes as these has never been
required of any soldier and he cannot now shield himself behind a
mythical requirement of soldierly obedience at all costs as his excuse
for commission of these crimes.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Jodl is guilty on all four counts.

VON PAPEN
Von Papen indicted under Counts One and Two. He was
is
appointed Chancellor of the Reich on 1 June 1932, and was succeeded
by Von Schleicher on 2 December 1932. He was made Vice Chancellor
in the Hitler Cabinet on 30 January 1933, and on 13 November 1933
Plenipotentiary for the Saar. On 26 July 1934 he was appointed
Minister to Vienna, and was recalled on 4 February 1938. On 29 April
1939 he was appointed Ambassador to Turkey. He returned to
Germany when Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with îermany (

in August 1944.
Crimes against Peace
Von Papen was and 1933 in helping Hitler to form
active in 1932
the Coalition Cabinet and aided in his appointment as C ric
11
or on
30 January 1933. As Vice Chancellor in that Cabinet he participated
in the Nazi consolidation of control in 1933. On 16 Juno 1934,
however, Von Papen made a speech at Marburg which contained a
denunciation of the Nazi attempts to suppress the free press and the
church, of the existence of a reign of terror, and of "150 percent
Nazis" who were mistaking "brutality for vitality". On 30 June 1934,
in the wave of violence which accompanied the so-called Höhrn
Purge, Von Papen was taken into custody by the SS, hi office force
was arrested, and two of his associates, including the man who had
helped him work on the Marburg speech, were murdered. Von Papen
was released on 3 July 1934.
Notwithstanding the murder of his associates, Von Pap< n accepted
the position of Minister to Austria on 26 July 1934, the day after
Dollfuss had been assassinated. His appointment was announced in
a letter from Hitler which instructed him to direct relations between
the two countries "into normal ard friendly channels" and assured
him of Hitler's "complete and unlimited confidence". As Minister to
Austria, Von Papen was active in trying to strengthen the position
•f the Nazi Party in Austria for the purpose of bringing about An-

325
schluss. In early 1935 he attended a meeting in Berlin at which the
policy was laiddown to avoid everything which would give the
appearance of German intervention in the internal affairs of Austria.
Yet he arranged for 200,000 marks a month to be transmitted to "the
persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria". On 17 May 1935
he reported to Hitler the results of a conference with Captain Leo-
pold, the leader of the Austrian Nazis, and urged Hitler to make a
statement recognizing the national independence of Austria, and
predicting that the result might be to help the formation of a
coalition between Schuschnigg's Christian Socialists and the Austrian
Nazis against Starhemberg. On 27 July 1935 Von Papen reported to
Hitler that the union of Austria and Germany could not be brought
about by external pressure but only by the strength of the National
Socialist movement. He urged that the Austrian Nazi Party change
its character as a centralized Reich German party and become a
rallying point for all National Germans.
Von Papen was involved in occasional Nazi political demonstra-
tions, supported Nazi propaganda activities and submitted detailed
reports on the activities of the Nazi Party, and routine reports
relating to Austrian military defenses. His Austrian policy resulted
in the agreement of 11 July 1936, which nominally restored relations
between Germany and Austria to "normal and friendly form", but
which had a secret supplement providing for an amnesty for
Austrian Nazis, the lifting of censorship on Nazi papers, the resump-
tion of political activities by Nazis and the appointment of men
friendly to the Nazis in the Schuschnigg Cabinet.
After the signing of this agreement Von Papen offered to resign,
but his resignation was not accepted. Thereafter he proceeded to
bring continued pressure on the Austrian Government to bring Nazis
into the Schuschnigg Cabinet and to get them important positions
in the Fatherland Front, Austria's single legal party. On 1 September
1936 Von Papen wrote Hitler advising him that anti-Nazis in the
Austrian Ministry of Security were holding up the infiltration of
the Nazis into the Austrian Government and recommended bringing
"slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime".
On 4 February 1938 Von Papen was notified of his recall as
Minister to Austria, at the same time that Von Fritsch, Von Blom-
berg, and Von Neurath were removed from their positions. He
informed Hitler that he regretted his recall because he had been
trying since November 1937 to induce Schuschnigg to hold a con-
ference with Hitler and Schuschnigg had indicated his willingness
to do so. Acting under Hitler's instructions, Von Papen then returned
to Austria and arranged the conference which was held at Berchtes-
gaden on 12 February 1938. Von Papen accompanied Schuschnigg to
that conference, and at its conclusion advised Schuschnigg to comply

326
with Hitler's demands.On 10 March 1938 Hitler ordered Von Papen
Von Papen was in the Chancellery on 11 March
to return to Berlin.
when the occupation of Austria was ordered. No evidence has been
offered showing that Von Papen was in favor of the decision to
occupy Austria by force, and he has testified that he urged Hitler
not to take this step.
After the annexation of Austria Von Papen retired into private
lifeand there is no evidence that he took any part in politics. He
accepted the position of Ambassador to Turkey in April 1939, but
no evidence has been offered concerning his activities in that position
implicating him in crimes.
The evidence leaves no doubt that Von Papen's primary purpose
as Minister to Austria was to undermine the Schuschnigg regime
and strengthen the Austrian Nazis for the purpose of bringing about
Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue
and bullying. But the Charter does not make criminal such offenses
against political morality, however bad these may be. Under the
Charter Von Papen can be held guilty only if he was a party to the
planning of aggressive war. There is no evidence that he was a party
to the plans under which the occupation of Austria was a step in
the direction of further aggressive action, or even that he partici-
pated in plans to occupy Austria by aggressive war if necessary. But
it is not established beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the

purpose of his activity, and therefore the Tribunal cannot hold that
he was a party to the common plan charged in Count One or parti-
cipated in the planning of the aggressive wars charged under
Count Two.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Von Paoen is not guilty under this Indict-
ment, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal, when
the Tribunal presently adjourns.

SEYSS-INQUART
Seyss-Inquart is indicted under all Four Counts. Seyss-Inquart,
an Austrian attorney, was appointed State Councillor in Austria in
May 1937 as a result of German pressure. He had been associated with
the Austrian Nazi Party since 1931, but had often had difficulties
with that Party and did not actually join the Nazi Party until
13 March 1938. He was appointed Austrian Minister of Security and
Interior with control over the police, pursuant to one of the con-
ditions which Hitler had imposed on Schuschnigg in the Berchtes-
gaden Conference of 12 February 1938.

327
 Activities in Austria

Seyss-Inquart participated in the last stages of the Nazi intrigue

which preceded the German occupation of Austria, and was made
Chancellor of Austria as a result of German threats of invasion.
On March 1938 Seyss-Inquart met Hitler at Linz and made
12
a speech welcoming the German forces and advocating the reunion
of Germany and Austria. On 13 March he obtained the passage of
a law providing that Austria should become a province of Germany
and succeeded Miklas as President of Austria when Miklas resigned
rather than sign the law. Seyss-Inquart's title was changed to Reich
Governor of Austria on 15 March 1938, and on the same day he was
given the title of a general in the SS. He was made a Reich
Minister without Portfolio on 1 May 1939.
On 11 March 1939 he visited the Slovakian Cabinet in Bratislava
and induced them to declare their independence in a way which
fitted in closely with Hitler's offensive against the independence of
Czechoslovakia.
As Reich Governor of Austria, Seyss-Inquart instituted a pro-
gram of confiscating Jewish property. Under his regime Jews were
forced to emigrate, were sent to concentration camps, and were
subject to pogroms. At the end of his regime he cooperated with the
Security Police and SD in the deportation of Jews from Austria to
the East. While he was Governor of Austria, political opponents of
the Nazis were sent to concentration camps by the Gestapo, mis-
treated, and often killed.

Criminal Activities in Poland and the Netherlands

In September 1939 Se /ss- Inquart was appointed Chief of Civil
Administration of South Poland. On 12 October 1939 Seyss-Inquart
was made Deputy Governor General of the General Government of
Poland under Frank. On 18 May 1940 Seyss-Inquart was appointed
Reich Commissioner for Occupied Netherlands. In these positions he
assumed responsibility for governing territory which had been
occupied by aggressive wars and the administration of which was of
vital importance in the aggressive war being waged by Germany.
As Deputy Governor General of the General Government of
Poland, Seyss-Inquart was a supporter of the harsh occupation
policies which were put in effect. In November 1939, while on an
inspection tour through the General Government, Seyss-Inquart
stated that Poland was to be so administered as to exploit its
economic resources for the benefit of Germany. Seyss-Inquart also
advocated the persecution of Jews and was informed of the begin-
ning of the AB action which involved the murder of many Polish
intellectuals.

328
 As Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands, Seyss-
Inquart was ruthless in applying terrorism to suppress all oppo-
sition to the German occupation, a program which he described as
"annihilating" his opponents. In collaboration with the local Higher
SS and Police Leaders he was involved in the shooting of hostages
for offenses against the occupation authorities and sending to con-
centration camps all suspected opponents of occupation policies
including priests and educators. Many of the Dutch police were
forced to participate in these programs by threats of reprisal against
their families. Dutch courts were also forced to participate in this
program, but when they indicated their reluctance to give sentences
of imprisonment because so many prisoners were in fact killed, a
greater emphasis was placed on the use of summary police courts.
Seyss-Inquart carried out the economic administration of the
Netherlands without regard for rules of the Hague Convention,
which he described as obsolete. Instead, a policy was adopted for
the maximum utilization of economic potential of the Netherlands,
and executed with small regard for its effect on the inhabitants.
There was widespread pillage of public and private property which'
was given color of legality by Seyss-Inquart's regulations, and
assisted by manipulations of the financial institutions of the Nether-
lands under his control.
As Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart
immediately began sending forced laborers to Germany. Until 1942
labor service in Germany was theoretically voluntary, but was
actually coerced by strong economic and governmental pressure. In
1942 Seyss-Inquart formally decreed compulsory labor service, and
utilized the services of the Security Police and SD to prevent evasion
of his order. During the occupation over 500,000 people were sent
from the Netherlands to the Reich as laborers and only a very small
proportion were actually volunteers.
One of Seyss-Inquart's first steps as Reich Commissioner of the
Netherlands was to put into effect a series of laws imposing economic
discriminations against the Jews. This was followed by decrees
requiring their registration, decrees compelling them to reside in
ghettos and to wear the Star of David, sporadic arrests and detention
In concentration camps, and finally, at the suggestion of Heydrich,
the mass deportation of almost 120,000 of Holland's 140,000 Jews to
Auschwitz and the "final solution". Seyss-Inquart admits knowing
that they were going to Auschwitz, but claims that he heard from
people who had been to Auschwitz that the Jews were comparatively
well off there, and that he thought that they were being held there
for resettlement after the war. In light of the evidence and on
account of his official position it is impossible to believe this claim.

329
 Seyss-Inquart contends that he was not responsible for many of
the crimes committed in the occupation of the Netherlands because
they were either ordered from the Reich, committed bv the Arm v.
over which he had no control, or by the German Higher SS and
Police Leader, who, he claims, reported directly to Himmler. It is
true that some of the excesses were the responsibility of the Army,
and that the Higher SS and Police Leader, although he was at the
disposal of Seyss-Inquart. could always report directly to Himmler.
It is also true that in certain cases Seyss-Inquart opposed the extreme
measures used by these other agencies, as when he was largely
successful in preventing the Army from carrying out a scorched earth
policy, and urged the Higher SS and Police Leaders to reduce the
number of hostages to be shot. But the fact remains that Seyss-
Inquart was a knowing and voluntary participant in War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity which were committed in the occupa-
tion of the Netherlands.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Seyss-Inquart is guilty under Counts
Two, Three, and Four. Seyss-Inquart is not guilty on Count One.

SPEER
Speer is indicted under all four Counts. Speer joined the Nazi
Party in 1932. In 1934 he was made Hitler's architect and became a
close personal confidant. Shortly thereafter he was made a depart-
ment head in the German Labor Front and the official in charge of
capital construction on the staff of the deputy to the Führer, positions
which he held through 1941. On 15 February 1942, after the death of
Fritz Todt, Speer was appointed Chief of the Organization Todt and
Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions (after 2 September
1943, for Armaments and War Production). The positions were
supplemented by his appointments in March and April 1942 as
General Plenipotentiary for Armaments and as a member of the
Central Planning Board, both within the Four Year Plan. Speer was
a member of the Reichstag from 1941 until the end of the war.

Crimes against Peace

The Tribunal is of opinion that Speer's activities do not amount
to initiating,planning, or preparing wars of aggression, or of
conspiring to that end. He became the head of the armament industry
well after all of the wars had been commenced and were under way.
His activities in charge of German armament production were in aid
of the war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises
aid in the waging of war; but the Tribunal is not prepared to find
that such activities involve engaging in the common plan to wage

330
aggressive war as charged under Count One or waging aggressive
war as charged under Count Two.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

The evidence introduced against Speer under Counts Three and
Four relates entirely to his participation in the slave labor program.
Speer himself had no direct administrative responsibility for this
program. Although he had advocated the appointment of a General
Plenipotentiary for the Utilization of Labor because he wanted one
central authority with whom he could deal on labor matters, he did
not obtain administrative control over Sauckel. Sauckel was appoint-
ed directly by Hitler, under the decree of 21 March 1942, which
provided that he should be directly responsible to Goring, as Pleni-
potentiary of the Four Year Plan.
As Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions and General
Plenipotentiary for Armaments under the Four Year Plan, Speer had
extensive authority over production. His original authority was over
construction and production of arms for the OKW. This was progres-
sively expanded to include naval armaments, civilian production and
finally, on 1 August 1944, air armament. As the dominant member
of the Central Planning Board, which had supreme authority for the
scheduling of German production and the allocation and development
of raw materials, Speer took the position that the Board had
authority to instruct Sauckel to provide laborers for industries under
its control and succeeded in sustaining this position over the objec-
tion of Sauckel. The practice was developed under which Speer
transmitted to Sauckel an estimate of the total number of workers
needed. Sauckel obtained the labor and allocated it to the various
industries in accordance with instructions supplied by Speer.
Speer knew when he made his demands on Sauckel that they
would be supplied by foreign laborers serving under compulsion. He
participated in conferences involving the extension of the slave labor
program for the purpose of satisfying his demands. He was present
at a conference held during 10 and 12 August 1942 with Hitler and
Sauckel, at which it was agreed that Sauckel should bring laborers
by force from occupied territories where this was necessary to satisfy
the labor needs of the industries under Speer's control. Speer also
attended a conference in Hitler's headquarters on 4 January 1944,
at which the decision was made that Sauckel should obtain "at least
4 million new workers from occupied territories" in order to satisfy
the demands for labor made by Speer, although Sauckel indicated
that he could do this only with help from Himmler.
Sauckel continually informed Speer and his representatives that
foreign laborers were being obtained by force. At a meeting of
1 March 1944 Speer's deputy questioned Sauckel very closely about

331
his failure to live up to the obligation to supply 4 million workers
from occupied territories. In some cases Speer demanded laborers
from specific foreign countries. Thus, at the conference of 10-12 August
1942 Sauckel was instructed to supply Speer with "a further million
Russian laborers for the German armament industry up to and
including October 1942". At a meeting of the Central Planning Board
on 22 April 1943 Speer discussed plans to obtain Russian laborers
for use in the coal mines, and flatly vetoed the suggestion that this
labor deficit should be made up by German labor.
Speer has argued that he advocated the reorganization of the
labor program to place a greater emphasis on utilization of German
labor in war production in Germany and on the use of labor in
occupied countries in local production of consumer goods formerly
produced in Germany. Speer took steps in this direction by estab-
lishing the so-called "blocked industries" in the occupied territories
which were used to produce goods to be shipped to Germany.
Employees of these industries were immune from deportation to
Germany as slave laborers and any worker who had been ordered
to go to Germany could avoid deportation if he went to work for
a blocked industry. This system, although somewhat less inhumane
than deportation to Germany, was still illegal. The system of blocked
industries played only a small part in the over-all slave labor pro-
gram, although Speer urged its cooperation with the slave labor
program, knowing the way in which it was actually being admin-
istered. In an official sense, he was its principal beneficiary and he
constantly urged its extension.
Speer was also directly involved in the utilization of forced labor,
as Chief of the Organization Todt. The Organization Todt functioned
principally in the occupied areas on such projects as the Atlantic
Wall and the construction of military highways, and Speer has
admitted that he relied on compulsory service to keep it adequately
staffed. He also used concentration camp labor in the industries
under his control. He originally arranged to tap this source of labor
for use in small out-of-the-way factories; and later, fearful of
Himmler's jurisdictional ambitions, attempted to use as few con-
centration camp workers as possible.
Speer was also involved in the use of prisoners of war in arma-
ment industries but contends that he utilized Soviet prisoners of
war only in industries covered by the Geneva Convention.
Speer's position was such that he was not directly concerned with
the cruelty in the administration of the slave labor program, although
he was aware of its existence. For example, at meetings of the Cen-
tral Planning Board he was informed that his demands for labor
were so large as to necessitate violent methods in recruiting. At a
meeting of the Central Planning Board on 30 October 1942, Speer

332
voiced his opinion that many slave laborers who claimed to be sick
were malingerers and stated: "There is nothing to be said against
SS and police taking drastic steps and putting those known as
slackers into concentration camps." Speer, however, insisted that the
slave laborers be given adequate food and working conditions so
that they could work efficiently.
In mitigation it must be recognized that Speer's establishment of
blocked industries did keep many laborers in their homes and that
in the closing stages of the war he was one of the few men who
had the courage to tell Hitler that the war was lost and to take steps
to prevent the senseless destruction of production facilities, both in
occupied territories and in Germany. He carried out his opposition
to Hitler's scorched earth program in some of the Western countries
and in Germany by deliberately sabotaging it at considerable per-
sonal risk.
Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Speer is not guilty on Counts One and
Two, but is guilty under Counts Three and Four.

VON NEURATH
Von Neurath is indicted under all four Counts. He is a profes-
sional diplomat who served as German Ambassador to Great Britain
from 1930 to 1932. On 2 June 1932 he was appointed Minister of
Foreign Affairs in the Von Papen Cabinet, a position which he held
under the Cabinets of Von Schleicher and Hitler. Von Neurath
resigned as Minister of Foreign Affairs on 4 February 1938, and was
made Reich Minister without Portfolio, President of the Secret
Cabinet Council, and a member of the Reich Defense Council. On
18 March 1939 he was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and
Moravia, and served in this capacity until 27 September 1941. He
held the formal rank of Obergruppenführer in the SS.

Crimes against Peace

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Neurath advised Hitler in
connection with the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference
and the League of Nations on 14 October 1933, the institution of
rearmament, the passage on 16 March 1935 of the law for universal
military service, and the passage on 21 May 1935 of the secret Reich
Defense Law. He was a key figure in the negotiation of the Naval
Accord entered into between Germany and England on 18 June 1935.
He played an important part in Hitler's decision to reoccupy the
Rhineland on 7 March 1936, and predicted that the occupation could
be carried through without any reprisals from the French. On
18 May 1936 he told the American Ambassador to France that it

333
was the policy German Government to do nothing in foreign
of the
affairs until "the Rhineland had been digested", and that as soon
as the fortifications in the Rhineland had been constructed and the
countries of central Europe realized that France could not enter
Germany at will, "all those countries will begin to feel very differ-
ently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will
develop".
Von Neurath took part in the Hossbach conference of 5 November
1937.He has testified that he was so shocked by Hitler's statements
that he had a heart attack. Shortly thereafter he offered to resign,
and his resignationwas accepted on 4 February 1938, at the same
time that Von Fritsch and Von Blomberg were dismissed. Yet with
knowledge of Hitler's aggressive plans he retained a formal relation-
ship with the Nazi regime as Reich Minister without Portfolio, Pres-
ident of the Secret Cabinet Council and a member of the Reich
Defense Council. He took charge of the Foreign Office at the time of
the occupation of Austria, assured the British Ambassador that this
had not been caused by a German ultimatum, and informed the
Czechoslovakian Minister that Germany intended to abide by its
arbitration convention with Czechoslovakia. Von Neurath partic-
ipated in the last phase of the negotiations preceding the Munich
Pact, but contends that he entered these discussions only to urge
Hitler to make every effort to settle the issues by peaceful means.

Criminal Activities in Czechoslovakia

Von Neurath was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and
Moravia on 18 March 1939. Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by
military force. Hacha's consent, obtained as it was by duress, cannot
be considered as justifying the occupation. Hitler's decree of
16 March 1939, establishing the Protectorate, stated that this new
territory should "belong henceforth to the territory of the German
Reich", an assumption that the Republic of Czechoslovakia no longer
existed. But it also went on the theory that Bohemia and Moravia
retained their sovereignty subject only to the interests of Germany
as expressed by the Protectorate. Therefore even if the doctrine of
subjugation should be considered to be applicable to territory occu-
pied by aggressive action, the Tribunal does not believe that this
Proclamation amounted to an incorporation which was sufficient to
bring the doctrine into effect. The occupation of Bohemia and
Moravia must therefore be considered a military occupation covered
by the rules of warfare. Although Czechoslovakia was not a party
to the Hague Convention of 1907, the rules of land warfare expressed
in this Convention are declaratory of existing international law and
hence are applicable.

334
 As Reich Protector, Von Neurath instituted an administration in
Bohemia and Moravia similar to that in effect in Germany. The free
press, political parties, and trade unions were abolished. All groups
which might serve as opposition were outlawed. Czechoslovakian
industry was worked into the structure of German war production,
and exploited for the German war effort. Nazi anti-Semitic policies
and laws were also introduced. Jews were barred from leading
positions in Government and business.
In August 1939 Von Neurath issued a proclamation warning
against any acts of sabotage and stating that "the responsibility for
all acts of sabotage is attributed not only to individual perpetrators
but to the entire Czech population." When the war broke out on
1 September 1939, 8,000 prominent Czechs were arrested by the

Security Police in Bohemia and Moravia and put into protective

custody. Many of this group died in concentration camps as a result
of mistreatment.
In October and November 1939 Czechoslovakian students held a
series of demonstrations. As a result, on Hitler's orders, all univer-
sities were closed, 1,200 students imprisoned, and the nine leaders
of the demonstration shot by Security Police and SD. Von Neurath
he was not informed of this action in advance, but it
testified that
was announced by proclamation over his signature posted on
placards throughout the Protectorate, which he claims, however, was
done without his authority.
On 31 August 1940 Von Neurath transmitted to Lammers a
memorandum which he had prepared dealing with the future of the
Protectorate, and a memorandum with his approval prepared by
Carl Herman Frank on the same subject. Both dealt with the
question of Germanization and proposed that the majority of the
Czechs might be assimilated racially into the German Nation. Both
advocated the elimination of the Czechoslovakian intelligentsia and
other groups which might resist Germanization, Von Neurath's by
expulsion, Frank's by expulsion or "special treatment."
Von Neurath has argued that the actual enforcement of the
repressive measures was carried out by the Security Police and SD
who were under the control of his State Secretary, Carl Herman
Frank,who was appointed at the suggestion of Himmler and who,
as a Higher SS and Police Leader, reported directly to Himmler.
Von Neurath further argues that anti-Semitic measures and those
resulting in economic exploitation were put into effect in the Protec-
torate as the result of policies decided upon in the Reich. However
this may be, he served as the chief German official in the Protec-
torate when the administration of this territory played an important
role in the wars of aggression which Germany was waging in the

335
East knowing that War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity were
being committed under his authority.
In mitigation it must be remembered that Von Neurath did inter-
vene with the Security Police and SD for the release of many of the
Czechoslovaks who were arrested on 1 September 1939, and for the
release of students arrested later in the fall. On 23 September 1941
he was summoned before Hitler and told that he was not being
harsh enough and that Heydrich was being sent to the Protectorate
to combat the Czechoslovakian resistance groups. Von Neurath
attempted to dissuade Hitler from sending Heydrich, but in vain,
and when he was not successful, offered to resign. When his resig-
nation was not accepted he went on leave, on 27 September 1941,
and refused to act as Protector after that date. His resignation was
formally accepted in August 1943.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Von Neurath is guilty under all four
Counts.

FRITZSCHE
Fritzsche indicted on Counts One, Three, and Four. He was
is
best known as a radio commentator, discussing once a week the
events of the day on his own program, "Hans Fritzsche Speaks." He
began broadcasting in September 1932; in the same year he was
made the head of the Wireless News Service, a Reich Government
agency. When, on 1 May 1933, this agency was incorporated by the
National Socialists into their Reich Ministry of Popular Enlighten-
ment and Propaganda, Fritzsche became a member of the Nazi Party
and went to that Ministry. In December 1938 he became head of the
Home Press Division of the Ministry; in October 1942 he was pro-
moted to the rank of Ministerial Director. After serving briefly on
the Eastern Front in a propaganda company, he was, in November
1942, made head of the Radio Division of the Propaganda Ministry
and Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater
German Radio.
Crimes against Peace
As head of the Home Press Division Fritzsche supervised the
German press of 2,300 daily newspapers. In pursuance of this func-
tion he held daily press conferences to deliver the directives of the
Propaganda Ministry to these papers. He was, however, subordinate
to Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief, who was in turn a subordinate
of Goebbels. It was Dietrich who received the directives to the press
of Goebbels and other Reich Ministers, and prepared them as
instructions, which he then handed to Fritzsche for the press.

336
 From time to time, the "Daily Paroles of the Reich Press Chief",
as these instructions were labeled, directed the press to present to
the people certain themes, such as the Leadership Principle, the
Jewish problem, the problem of living space, or other standard Nazi
ideas.A vigorous propaganda campaign was carried out before each
major act of aggression. While Fritzsche headed the Home Press
Division, he instructed the press how the actions or wars against
Bohemia and Moravia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union
should be dealt with. Fritzsche had no control of the formulation of
these propaganda policies. He was merely a conduit to the press of
the instructions handed him by Dietrich. In February 1939 and
before the absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, for instance, he
received Dietrich's order to bring to the attention of the press
Slovakia's efforts for independence, and the anti-Germanic policies
and politics of the existing Prague Government. This order to Diet-
rich originated in the Foreign Office.
The Radio Division, of which Fritzsche became the head in No-
vember 1942, was one of the 12 divisions of the Propaganda Ministry.
In the beginning Dietrich and other heads of divisions exerted
influence over the policies to be followed by radio. Towards the end
of the war, however, Fritzsche became the sole authority within the
Ministry for radio activities. In this capacity he formulated and
issued daily radio "paroles" to all Reich propaganda offices, accord-
ing to the general political policies of the Nazi regime, subject to
the directives of the Radio-Political Division of the Foreign Office,
and the personal supervision of Goebbels.
Fritzsche, with other officials of the Propaganda Ministry, was
present at Goebbels' daily staff conferences. Here they were instruct-
ed in the news and propaganda policies of the day. After 1943
Fritzsche himself occasionally held these conferences, but only when
Goebbels and his State Secretaries were absent. And even then his
only function was to transmit the Goebbels' directives relayed to
him by telephone.
This is the summary of Fritzsche's positions and influence in the
Third Reich. Never did he achieve sufficient stature to attend the
planning conferences which led to aggressive war; indeed according
to his own uncontradicted testimony he never even had a conver-
sation with Hitler. Nor is there any showing that he was informed
of the decisions taken at these conferences. His activities cannot be
said to be those which fall within the definition of the common plan
to wage aggressive war as already set forth in this Judgment.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

The Prosecution has asserted that Fritzsche incited and encour-
aged the commission of War Crimes by deliberately falsifying news

337
to arouse in the German People those passions which led them to
the commission of atrocities under Counts Three and Four. His
position and official duties were not sufficiently important, however,
to .nier that he took par: in originating or formulating propaganda
campaigns.
Excerpts in evidence from his speeches show definite anti-Semit-
ism on his part. He broadcast, for example, that the war had been
caused by Jews and said their fate had turned out "as unpleasant
as the Führer predicted." But these speeches did not urge persecu-
tion or exterrnination of Jews. There is no evidence that he was
aware of their extermination in the East. The evidence moreover
shows that he twice attempted to have publication of the anti-Semitic
Der Stürmer suppressed, though unsuccessfully.
In these broadcasts Fritzsche sometimes spread false news, but it

was not proved he knew it to be false. For example, he reported

that no German U-boat was in the vicinity of the Athenia when it
was sunk. This information was untrue: but Fritzsche. having received
it from the German Navy, had no reason to believe it was untrue.

It appears that Fritzsche sometimes made strong statements of

a prooagandistic nature in his broadcasts. But the Tribunal is not

prepared to hold that they were intended to incite the German
Peoole to commit atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be
held to have been a participant in the crimes charged. His aim was
rather to arouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the Ger-
man war effort.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Fritzsche is not guilty under this Indict-
ment, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal when
the Tribunal presently adjourns.

BORYiAXX
Bormann is He joined
indicted on Counts One, Three, and Four.
the National Socialist Party in 1925. was a member of the Staff of
the Supreme Command of the SA from 1928 to 1930, was in charge
of the Aid Fund of the Party, and was Reichsleiter from 1933 to
1945. From 1933 to 1941 he was Chief of Staff in the Office of the
Fuhrer's Deputy and. after the flight of Hess to England, became
Head of the Party Chancellery on 12 May 1941. On 12 April 1943 he
became Secretary to the Führer. He was political and organizational
head of the Volkssturm and a general in the SS.

Crimes against Peace

Bormann inthe beginning a minor Nazi, steadily rose to a
position of power and, particularly in the closing days, of great

338
 influence over Hitler. He was active in the Party's rise to power and
even more so in the consolidation of that power. He devoted much
of his time to the persecution of the churches and of the Jews within
Germany.
The evidence does not show that Bormann knew of Hitler's plans
to prepare, or wage aggressive wars. He attended none
initiate,
of the important conferences when Hitler revealed piece by piece
these plans for aggression. Nor can knowledge be conclusively
inferred from the positions he held. It was only when he became
head of the Party Chancellery in 1941, and later in 1943 Secretary to
the Führer when he attended many of Hitler's conferences, that his
positions gave him the necessary access. Under the view stated else-
where which the Tribunal has taken of the conspiracy to wage
aggressive war, there is not sufficient evidence to bring Bormann
within the scope of Count One.

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity

By decree of 29 May 1941 Bormann took over the offices and
powers held by Hess; by the decree of 24 January 1942 these powers
were extended to give him control over all laws and directives
issued by Hitler. He was thus responsible for laws and orders issued
thereafter. On 1 December 1942 all Gaue became Reich defense
districts, and the Party Gauleiters responsible to Bormann were
appointed Reich Defense Commissioners. In effect, this made them
the administrators of the entire civilian war effort. This was so not
only in Germany, but also in those territories which were incorpo-
rated into the Reich from the absorbed and conquered territories.
Through this mechanism Bormann controlled the ruthless exploi-
tations of the subjected populace. His order of 12 August 1942 placed
all Party agencies at the disposal of Himmler's program for forced
resettlement and denationalization of persons in the occupied coun-
tries. Three weeks after the invasion of Russia, he attended the
conference of 16 July 1941 at Hitler's field quarters with Goring,
Rosenberg, and Keitel; Bormann's reports show that there were
discussed and developed detailed plans of enslavement and annihi-
lation of the population of these territories. And on 8 May 1942 he
conferred with Hitler and Rosenberg on the forced resettlement of
Dutch personnel in Latvia, the extermination program in Russia, and
the economic exploitation of the Eastern territories. He was inter-
ested in the confiscation of art and other properties in the East.
His letter of 11 January 1944 called for the creation of a large scale
organization to withdraw commodities from the occupied territories
for the bombed-out German populace.
Bormann was extremely active in the persecution of the Jews,
not only in Germany but also in the absorbed and conquered coun-

339
tries. Hetook part in the discussions which led to the removal of
60,000 Jews from Vienna to Poland in cooperation with the SS and
the Gestapo. He signed the decree of 31 May 1941 extending the
Nuremberg Laws to the annexed Eastern territories. In an order of
9 October 1942 he declared that the permanent elimination of Jews
in Greater German territory could no longer be solved by emigra-
tion, but only by applying "ruthless force" in the special camps in
the East. On 1 July 1943 he signed an ordinance withdrawing Jews
from the protection of the law courts and placing them under the
exclusive jurisdiction of Himmler's Gestapo.
Bormann was prominent in the slave labor program. The Party
leaders supervised slave labor matters in the respective Gaue,
including employment, conditions of work, feeding, and housing. By
his circular of 5 May 1943 to the Leadership Corps, distributed down
to the level of Ortsgruppenleiter, he issued directions regulating the
treatment of foreign workers, pointing out they were subject to SS
control on security problems, and ordered the previous mistreatment
to cease. A
report of 4 September 1942 relating to the transfer of
500.000 female domestic workers from the East to Germany showed
that control was to be exercised by Sauckel, Himmler, and Bormann.
Sauckel by decree of 8 September directed the Kreisleiter to super-
vise the distribution and assignment of these female laborers.
Bormann also issued a series of orders to the Party leaders
dealing with the treatment of prisoners of war. On 5 November 1941
he prohibited decent burials for Russian prisoners of war. On
25 November 1943 he directed Gauleiter to report cases of lenient
treatment of prisoners of war. And on 13 September 1944 he ordered
liaison between the Kreisleiter with the camp commandants in deter-
mining the use to be made of prisoners of war for forced labor. On
29 January 1943 he transmitted to his leaders OKW
instructions
allowing the use of firearms, and corporal punishment on recalcitrant
prisoners of war, contrary to the Rules of Land Warfare. On 30 Sep-
tember 1944 he signed a decree taking from the OKW
jurisdiction
over prisoners of war and handing them over to Himmler and the SS.
Bormann is responsible for the lynching of Allied airmen. On
30 May 1944 he prohibited any police action or criminal proceedings
against persons who had taken part in the lynching of Allied fliers.
This was accompanied by a Goebbels' propaganda campaign inciting
the German people to take action of this nature, and the conference
of 6 June 1944, where regulations for the application of lynching
were discussed.
His Counsel, who has labored under difficulties, was unable to
refute this evidence. In the face of these documents, which bear
Bormann's signature, it is difficult to see how he could do so even
were the defendant present. Counsel has argued that Bormann is

340
dead and that the Tribunal should not avail itself of Article 12 of
the Charter, which gives it the right to take proceedings in absentia.
But the evidence of death is not conclusive, and the Tribunal, as
previously stated, is determined to try him in absentia. If Bormann
is not dead and is later apprehended, the Control Council for Ger-
many may, under Article 29 of the Charter, consider any facts in
mitigation, and alter or reduce his sentence, if deemed proper.

Conclusion
The Tribunal finds that Bormann is not guilty on Count One, but
is guilty on Counts Three and Four.

1 October 1946

/ s / GEOFFREY LAWRENCE /s/ NORMAN BIRKETT

President
/si FRANCIS BIDDLE /s/ JOHN J. PARKER
/ s / H.DONNEDIEU DE VABRES /s/ R. FALCO

/ s / NIKITCHENKO /s/ A. VOLCHKOV

341
DISSENTING OPINION OF THE SOVIET MEMBER
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
The Tribunal decided:
To acquit the Defendants Hjalmar Schacht, Franz von Papen,
a)
and Hans Fritzsche;
b) To sentence the Defendant Rudolf Hess to life imprisonment;
c) Not to declare criminal the following organizations: the Reichs-
cabinet, General Staff, and OKW.
In this respect I can not agree with the decision adopted by the
Tribunal as it does not correspond to the facts of the case and is
based on incorrect conclusions.

I. The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Schacht

The evidence, submitted to the Tribunal in the case of Schacht,

confirms the following facts:
a) Schacht established contact with Goring in December 1930 and
with Hitler at the beginning of 1931. He subsequently established
contact between the leadership of the Nazi Party and the foremost
representatives of the German industrial and financial circles. This,
in particular, confirmed by the testimony of Witness Severing
is

(Transcript, Afternoon Session, 23 May 1946; USA-615).

b) In July 1932 Schacht demanded that Von Papen resign his post
as Reich Chancellor in favor of Hitler. This fact is confirmed by
Von Papen's testimony at the preliminary interrogation and by
Schacht's own testimony in Court (Transcript, Afternoon Session,
2 May 1946).
c) November 1932 Schacht collected signatures of German indus-
In
urging them to come out for Hitler's appointment as Reich
trialists,
Chancellor. On 12 November 1932 Schacht wrote to Hitler:
"I have no doubt that the way we are directing the course of
events can only lead to your appointment as Reich Chancellor.
We are trying to secure a large number of signatures among
the industrial circles to ensure your appointment to this post."
(EC-456, USA-773; PS-3901, USA-837)
d) In February 1933 Schacht organized the financing of the pre-
election campaign conducted by the Nazi Party, and demanded at
the conference of Hitler and Goring with the industrialists that the
latter provide three million marks (D-203). Schacht admitted in
Court that he had pointed out the necessity for providing the Nazi
leaders with this sum (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946),
while the Defendant Funk and the former member of the manage-
ment of "I. G. Farbenindustrie" Schnitzler, who were present at this

342
conférence, both confirmed that it was Schacht who was the initiator
of the financing of the pre-election campaign (Transcript, 4 July 1946;
EC-439, USA-618).
e) Utilizing his prestige, Schacht also repeatedly admitted in his
public statements that he asked for the support in the elections of
both the Nazi Party and of Hitler (USA-615; USA-616; Transcript,
Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).
On 29 August 1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler: "No matter where
my activities lead me in the near future, even if some day you see
me imprisoned in a fortress, you can always depend on me as your
loyal aide" (EC-457, USA-619).
Thus, Schacht consciously and deliberately supported the Nazi
Party and actively aided in the seizure of power in Germany by the
Fascists. Even prior to his appointment as Plenipotentiary for War
Economy, and immediately after the seizure of power by the Nazis,
Schacht led in planning and developing the German armaments, as
follows:
a) On 17 March 1933, Schacht was appointed President of the
Reichsbank (PS-3021, USA-11), and as he himself stated in a speech
before his Reichsbank colleagues on 21 March 1938, the Reichsbank
under his management was "none other than a National Socialist
institution" (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946).
b) In August 1934, Schacht was appointed Reich Minister of
Economy (PS-3021, USA-11). His Ministry "was given the task of
carrying out the economic preparation for war" (EC-128, USA-623).
A special decree granted Schacht, in his capacity of Reich Minister
of Economy, unlimited authority in the field of economy (Reichs-
gesetzblatt, 1934, Part 1, p. 565).
c) Making use powers in 1934 Schacht launched upon the
of these
execution of the "new program" developed by him (Reichsgesetz-
blatt, 1934, Part 1, p. 826), and, as Schacht himself noted in his
speech of 29 November 1938, this organization played a tremendous
part in the course of Germany's rearmament (EC-611, USA-662).
d) For the purpose of the most effective execution of this "new
program" Schacht used the property and means of those political
enemies of the Nazi regime, who either became the victims of terror
or were forced to emigrate (Schacht's note to Hitler of 3 May 1939;
PS-1168, USA-37).
Schacht used swindler's tactics and coercion in an effort to acquire
raw material and foreign currency for armaments (Affidavit of
Vice-President of the Reichsbank, Puhl; EC-437, USA-624).
e) During the first days of his association with the Reichsbank,
Schacht issued a series of decrees (27 October 1933, 23 March 1934,

343
19 February 1935), which in the long run helped realize the broad
program of the financing of armaments, developed by him, and with
the aid of which, as he testified, he "had found the way to finance
the rearmament program."
In his speech in Leipzig on 4 March 1935, Schacht, while summing
up his preceding economic and financial activities, announced
"... everything that I say and do has the Fiihrer's full agreement
and I shall not do or say anything which is not approved by the
Führer" (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946).
Having become the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy,
Schacht unified under himself the leadership of the entire German
economy and through his efforts the establishment of the Hitlerite
war machine was accomplished.
a) The secret law of 21 May 1935, which appointed Schacht the
Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, states as follows:
"The task of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy
is to place all the economic resources in the service of war-
fare. The Plenipotentiary General for War Economy within
the framework of his functions is given the right to issue legal
orders, deviating from the existing laws. He is the responsible
head for financing wars through the Reich Ministry and the
Reichsbank" (PS-2261, USA-24).
b) Schacht financed German armaments through the Mefo
system of promissory notes, which was a swindling venture on a
national scale that has no precedent, and the success of which was
dependent upon the realization of the aggressive plans of, the
Hitlerites. It was because of this that Schacht set 1942 as the date
when the Mefo notes were to mature, and he pointed out in his
speech of 29 November 1938 the relation between "the daring credit
policy" of the Reichsbank and the aims of the Hitlerite foreign policy
(EC-611, USA-622).
c) Having made full use of his plenary powers, Schacht carefully

developed and carried out a broad program of economic mobilization

which allowed the Hitlerite leaders to wage war at any time
considered most favorable. In particular, from the report of Schacht's
deputy, Wohltat, "the preparation for mobilization carried out by
the Plenipotentiary for War Economy" shows that Schacht provided
to the last detail for the system of exploitation of the German
economy in war time, all the way from the utilization of industrial
enterprises, of raw material resources and manpower down to the
distribution of 80,000,000 ration cards (EC-258, USA-625). It is signif-
icant that this report was drawn up a month after Hitler's statement
at the conference of 5 November 1937, at which Hitler set forth this
concrete plan of aggression (PS-386, USA-25).

344
 Summarizing his past activity, Schacht wrote in January 1937:
"I worked out the preparation for war in accordance with the prin-
ciple that the plan of our war economy must be built in peace time
in such a way that there will be no necessity for any reorganization
in case of war". Schacht confirmed his statement in court (Transcript,
Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).
Schacht consciously and deliberately prepared Germany for war.
The former Minister of War Von Blomberg testified that:
d)
"Schacht was fully cognizant of the plans for development and
increase of the German Armed Forces, since he was constantly
informed ... of all the financing necessary for the development of
the German armed forces" (USA-838).
On 31 August 1936, Von Blomberg informed Schacht that: "The
establishment of all the Air Force units must be completed by
1 April 1937, and therefore large expenditures must be entailed in

1936 ." (PS-1301, USA-123).

. .

In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated in the military exer-

cises in Godesberg (EC-174).
e) In his memorandum to Hitler on 3 May 1935, entitled the
"Financing of Rearmament", Schacht wrote: "A speedy fulfillment
of the program for rearmament on a mass scale is the basis of
German policy, and, therefore, everything else must be subordinate
to this task; the completion of this task, the achievement of this
purpose must meet no obstacles ." (PS-1168, USA-37).
. .

In his speech on 29 November 1938, Schacht announced that

Reichsbank's credit policy made it possible for Germany to create
an "unsurpassed machine, and, in turn, this war machine made
possible the realization of the aims of our policy" (EC-611, USA-622).
One must exclude the supposition that Schacht was not informed
as to what purposes these weapons were to serve since he could not
but take into consideration their unprecedented scale and an obvious
preference for offensive types of weapons (heavy tanks, bombers,
and so on). Besides, Schacht knew perfectly well that not a single
country intended to wage war on Germany nor had it any reasons
to do so.
a) Schacht utilized the military might growing under his direction
to back Germany's territorial demands which grew in proportion to
the increase in armaments.
Schacht testified in Court that "at first he confined himself (in
his demands) to the colonies which had once belonged to Germany" \

(Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).

In September 1934, during his talk with the American Ambas-
sador Dodd, Schacht pointed out that he desired annexation if pos-

345
sible without war, but through war, if the United States would stay
out of it (EC-461, USA-58).
In 1935, Schacht announced to the American Consul Fuller:
"Colonies are essential to Germany. If it is possible, we shall
acquire them through negotiations; if not, we shall seize
them." (EC-450, USA-629)
Schacht admitted in Court that military pressure put upon
Czechoslovakia was "in some measure the result and the fruit of his
labor" (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).
b) Schacht personally participated in the plunder of private and
State property of the countries which became victims of Hitlerite
aggressions.
The minutes of the conference of the Military-Economic Staff
on 11 March 1938, in which Schacht participated, state that those
present were given Hitler's latest directives about the invasion of
Austria. Further, the minutes state: "After this, at the suggestion
of Schacht, it was decided that ... all the financial accounting will
be made in Reichsmarks at the rate of exchange: two schillings for
one Reichsmark" (EC-421, USA-645).
Schacht admitted in Court that he personally was in charge of
the seizure of the Czechoslovak National Bank after the occupation
of Czechoslovakia (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).
c) At the beginning of 1940, Schacht offered Hitler his services
for negotiations with the United States in regard to the discontin-
uance of aid to England and he informed Goring of his offer
(PS-3700; USA-780).
d) Schacht considered it his duty to greet and congratulate Hitler
publicly after the signing of armistice with France, although Schacht,
better than anyone else, understood the usurpatory nature of the
armistice (German Documentary Film, USA-635).
e) In his letter to Funk on 17 October 1941, Schacht suggested a
more effective exploitation of occupied territory. In this case, too,
Schacht acted on his own initiative (EC-504; USA-830).
Schacht also participated in the persecution of the Jews:
a) He Court that he "agreed to the policy of the per-
testified in
secution of the Jews
as a matter of principle (Transcript, Afternoon
Session, 2 May 1946) although, he stated, "to a certain extent" it was
a matter of conscience which, however, "was not serious enough to
bring about a break" between him and the Nazis (Transcript, After-
noon Session, 2 May 1946; USA-616).
b) In his capacity of Minister of Economy, Schacht signed a series
of decrees, in accordance with which the property of the Jews in
Germany was subject to plunder with impunity (USA-832; USA-616).

346
Schacht confirmed in Court the fact that he had signed a series of
anti-Semitic decrees (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).
As to the reasons for Schacht's resignation from the post of the
Minister of Economy and the Plenipotentiary General for War Econ-
omy in November 1937, and also from the post of the President of
the Reichsbank on 20 November 1939, and finally from the post of
the Minister without Portfolio in January 1943, the evidence sub-
mitted establishes the following:
a) The reason is not Schacht's disagreement with the economic
preparation for aggressive wars.
Three weeks before leaving the Ministry of Economy and the
post of Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht wrote to
Goring: "... I also don't consider that my opinion can differ from
yours on economic policy .
." (EC-497, USA-775).
.

In his reply Goring states:

. You promised me your support and collaboration .... You
.

have repeated this promise many times, even after differences

of opinion began to creep up between us." (EC-493, USA-642).
Schacht testified in Court that Goring and he only "differed in
matters of procedure" (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).
In the preliminary examination Goring testified that Schacht's
leaving the Reichsbank "had no relation to the program of rearma-
ment" (USA-648).
The vice-president of the Reichsbank, Puhl, confirmed that
Schacht's resignation from the Reichsbank can be explained by "his
desire to extricate himself from a dangerous situation" which devel-
oped as the result of Schacht's own crooked financial operations
(EC-438, USA-646).
b) The reason is not Schacht's disapproval of mass terror con-
ducted by the Hitlerites.
The witness for the Defense, Gisevius, testified that he constantly
informed Schacht of the criminal actions of the Gestapo, created by
Goring, and that nevertheless, right up to the end of 1936, Schacht
looked for "Göring's support" (Transcript, Morning Session, 24 April
1946).
In his letter to Von Blomberg on 24 December 1935, Schacht sug-
gested that the Gestapo apply "more cautious methods" since the
open terror of the Gestapo "hinders the objectives of the armament"
(Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).
On 30 January 1937, Schacht was awarded a golden Party insignia
by Hitler (EC-500; Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946). As
stated in an official German publication, "he was able to be of
greater help to the Party than if he were actually a member of
the Party" (EC-460, USA-617).

347
 Only in 1943, having understood earlier than many other Ger-
mans, the inevitability of the failure of the Hitlerite regime, did
Schacht establish contact with the opposition circles, however, doing
nothing to help depose this regime. Therefore, it was not by chance
that having found out these connections of Schacht, Hitler still
spared Schacht's life.
It is thus indisputably established that:
a) Schacht actively assisted in the seizure of power by the Nazis;
b) During a period of 12 years Schacht closely collaborated with
Hitler;
c) Schacht provided the economic and financial basis for the
creation of the Hitlerite military machine;
d) Schacht prepared Germany's economy for the waging of
aggressive wars;
e) Schacht participated in the persecution of Jews and in the
plunder of territories occupied by the Germans.
Therefore, Schacht's leading part in the preparation and execution
of the common criminal plan is proved.
The decision to acquit Schacht is in obvious contradiction with
existing evidence.

II. The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Von Papen.

The verdict does not dispute the fact that Von Papen prepared
the way for Hitler's appointment to the post of the Reich Chancellor
and that he actively helped the Nazis in their seizure of power.
In a speech of November 1933, Von Papen said the following on
the subject:
"... just as I at the time of taking over the Chancellorship
(thiswas in 1932) have advocated to pave the way to power
for the young fighting liberation movement, just as I on
30 January was selected by a gracious fate to put the hands
of our Chancellor and Führer into the hands of our beloved
Field Marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say
to the German People and all those who have kept confidence
me:
in
"The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving it in times
of deep distress a leader ." (PS-3375).
. .

It was Von Papen who revoked Bruning's order dissolving the SS

and the SA, thus allowing the Nazis to realize their program of mass
terror (D-631).
Again it was the defendant who, by the application of brute

force, did away with the Social Democrat Government of Braun and

348
 Severing (Severing's Testimony, Transcript, Afternoon Session,
14 June 1946).
On 4 January 1933,Von Papen had a conference with Hitler,
Hess, and Himmler (D-632).
Von Papen participated in the purge of the State machinery of
all personnel considered unreliable from the Nazi point of view;
on 21 March 1933, he signed a decree creating special political
tribunals; he had also signed an order granting amnesty to criminals
whose crimes were committed in the course of the "national revo-
lution"; he participated in drafting the text of the order "insuring
Party and State unity"; and so on.
Subsequently Von Papen faithfully served the Hitler regime.
After the Putsch of 1934, Von Papen ordered his subordinate
Tschirschky to appear in the Gestapo, knowing full well what
awaited him there (D-684).
Von Papen helped to keep the bloody murder secret from public
opinion (D-717; D-718).
The defendant played a tremendous role in helping Nazis to take
possession of Austria.
Three weeks after the assassination of Dollfuss, on 26 July 1934,
Hitler told Von Papen that he was being appointed Minister to
Vienna, especially noting in a letter: "You have been and continue
to be in possession of my fullest and most unlimited trust . .
."

(PS-2799).
In this connection it is impossible to ignore the testimony of the
American Ambassador Messersmith who quoted Von Papen as saying
that "the seizure of Austria is only the first step" and that he,
Von Papen, was in Austria for the purpose of "further weakening
the Austrian Government" (USA-57).
The defendant was Hitler's chief advisor in effecting plans for
the seizure of Austria. It was he who proposed several tactical
maneuvers to quiet the vigilance of world opinion on the one hand,
and allow Germany to conclude her war preparations, on the other.
This follows indisputably from Von Papen's statement to the
Austrian Minister Berger- Waideneck (PS-1760), from the report of
Gauleiter Reuner of 6 July 1939 (USA-61), from Von Papen's report
to Hitler of 21 August 1936 (D-706), from Von Papen's report to
Hitler of 1 September 1936 (PS-2246, USA-67), and from a series
of other documents which had been submitted in evidence.
Von Papen played this game until the issuance of the order for
alerting the German Armed Forces for moving into Austria. He
participated in arranging the conference between Hitler and Schusch-
nigg of 12 February 1938 (USA-69).
It was Von Papen who in a letter to Hitler emphatically recom-
mended that financial aid be given the Nazi organization in Austria

349
known as the "Freedom Union", specifically for "its fight against
the Jewry" (PS-2830).
Indisputable appears the fact of the Nazi seizure of Austria and
of Von Papen's participation in this act of aggression. After the
occupation of Austria, Hitler rewarded Von Papen with the golden
insignia of the Nazi Party (D-632).
Neither is it possible to ignore Von Papen's role as agent provo-
cateur when in his capacity of diplomat he was the German Ambas-
sador to Turkey —
whenever evaluation of his activity there is made.
The post of Ambassador to Turkey was at the time of consider-
able importance in helping the Nazis realize their aggressive plans.
The official Nazi biographer wrote about Von Papen as follows:
"Shortly (after the occupation of Austria) the Führer had need of
Von Papen's services again and on 18 April 1939, he therefore
appointed him German Ambassador in Ankara" (D-632).
It should also be noted that for his Turkish activities, Hitler
rewarded Von Papen with the Knight's Cross of the War Merit
Order with Swords (D-632).
Thus, evidence submitted establishes beyond doubt that:
a) Von Papen actively aided the Nazis in their seizure of power.
b) Von Papen used both his efforts and his connections to solidify
and strengthen the Hitlerian terroristic regime in Germany.
c) Von Papen actively participated in the Nazi aggression against
Austria culminating in its occupation.
d) Von Papen up to the very end, aiding
faithfully served Hitler
the Nazi plans of aggression both with his ability and his diplomatic
skill.
It therefore follows that Defendant Von Papen bears considerable
responsibility for the crimes of the Hitlerite regime.
For these reasons I cannot consent to the acquittal of Defendant
Von Papen.

III. The Unfounded Acquittal of Defendant Fritzsche

The acquittal of Defendant Hans Fritzsche follows from the
reasoning that Fritzsche, allegedly, had not reached in Germany the
official position making him responsible for the criminal actions of
the Hitler regime and that his own personal activity in this respect
cannot be considered criminal. The verdict characterizes him as a
secondary figure carrying out the directives of Goebbels and
Von Ribbentrop, and of the Reich Press Director Dietrich.
The
verdict does not take into consideration or mention the fact
that it was Fritzsche who
until 1942 was the director de facto of the
Reich press and that, according to himself, subsequent to 1942 he

350
became the "commander-in-chief of the German radio" (Transcript,
Morning Session, 23 January 1946).
For the correct definition of the role of Defendant Hans Fritzsche
it is necessary, firstly, to keep clearly in mind the importance
attached by Hitler and his closest associates (as Goring, for example)
to propaganda in general and to radio propaganda in particular. This
was considered one of the most important and essential factors in
the success of conducting an aggressive war.
In the Germany of Hitler, propaganda was invariably a factor
in preparing and conducting acts of aggressionand in training the
German populace to accept obediently the criminal enterprises of
German fascism.
The aims of these enterprises were served by a huge and well
centralized propaganda machinery. With the help of the police
controls and of a system of censorship it was possible to do away
altogether with the freedom of press and of speech.
The basic method of the Nazi propagandistic activity lay in the
false presentation of facts. This is stated quite frankly in Hitler's
Mein Kampf: "With the help of a skilful and continuous application
of propaganda it is possible to make the people conceive even of
heaven as hell and also make them consider heavenly the most
miserly existence" (USA-276).
The dissemination of provocative lies and the systematic decep-
tion of public opinion were as necessary to the Hitlerites for the
realization of their plans as were the production of armaments and
the drafting of military plans. Without propaganda, founded on the
total eclipse of the freedom of press and of speech, it would not have
been possible for German fascism to realize its aggressive inten-
tions, to lay the groundwork and then to put to practice the War
Crimes and the Crimes against Humanity.
In the propaganda system of the Hitler State it was the daily
press and the radio that were the most important weapons.
In his court testimony, Defendant Goring named three factors
as essential in the successful conduct of modern war according to
the Nazi concept, namely, (1) the military operations of the armed
forces, (2) economic warfare, (3) propaganda. With reference to the
latter he said:
"For what great importance the war of propaganda had,
enemy propaganda which extended by way of radio far into
the hinterland, no one has experienced more strongly than
Germany" (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 15 March 1946).
With such concepts in ascendance it is impossible to suppose that
the supreme rulers of the Reich would appoint to the post of the
Director of Radio Propaganda who supervised radio activity of all

351
the broadcasting companies and directed their propagandistic con-
—
tent a man they considered a secondary figure.
The point of view of the verdict contradicts both the evidence
submitted and the actual state of affairs.
Beginning with 1942 and into 1945 Fritzsche was not only Chief
of the Radio Department of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda but
also "Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of Radio in
Greater Germany". This circumstance is fully proven by the sworn
affidavit of Fritzsche himself (PS-3469, USA-721). It thus follows
that not at all was Fritzsche merely "one of the 12 departmental
chiefs in the Ministry of Propaganda" who acquired responsibility
for all radio propaganda only toward the end of the war, as the
verdict asserts.
Fritzsche was the political director of the German radio up and
into 1945, i. up to the moment of German defeat and capitulation.
e.,

For this reason it is Fritzsche who bears responsibility for the false
and provocative broadcasts of the German radio during the years
of the war.
As Chief of the Press Section inside Germany it was also Fritzsche
who was responsible for the activity of the German daily press
consisting of 2,300 newspapers. It was Fritzsche who created and
perfected the Information Section winning from the Reich Govern-
ment for the purpose an increase in the subsidy granted the news-
papers from 400,000 to 4,000,000 marks. Subsequently Fritzsche
participated energetically in the development of the propaganda
campaigns preparatory to the acts of aggression against Czecho-
slovakia and Poland. (Transcript, Morning Session, 23 January 1946).
A similar active propaganda campaign was conducted by the defend-
ant prior to the attack on Yugoslavia as he himself admitted on oath
in Court (Transcript, Morning Session, 23 January 1946).
Fritzsche was informed of the plan to attack the Soviet Union and
was made au courant of the military intentions at a conference with
Rosenberg (PS-1039, USA-146, "Rosenberg's Written Report to Hitler
on the Subject of Preliminary Work in Eastern European Questions").
Fritzsche headed the German press campaign falsifying reports
of Germany's aggressive war against France, England, Norway, the
Soviet Union, the United States, and the other States.
The assertion that Fritzsche was not informed of the War Crimes
and the Crimes against Humanity then being perpetrated by the
Hitlerites in the occupied regions does not agree with the facts. From
Fritzsche's testimony in Court it is obvious that already in May 1942,
while in the Propaganda Section of the 6th Army, he was aware of
Hitler's decree ordering execution for all Soviet political workers
and Soviet intellectuals, the so-called "Commissar Decree" (Trans-
cript, Afternoon Session, 27 June 1946). It is also established that

352
already at the beginning of hostilities Fritzsche was fully aware of
the fact that the Nazis were carrying out their decision to do away
with all Jews in Europe. For instance, when commenting on Hitler s
statement that "among results of the war there will be the annihi-
lation of the Jewish race in Europe" (Transcript, Afternoon Session,
22 November 1945), Fritzsche stated that: "As the Führer predicted
it would occur in the event of war in Europe, the fate of the Euro-

pean Jewry turned out to be quite sad" (Transcript, Morning Session,

23 January 1946). It is further established that the defendant
systematically preached the anti-social theory of race hatred and
characterized peoples inhabiting countries victimized by aggression
as "sub-humans" (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 27 June 1946;
Transcript, Morning Session, 28 June 1946).
When the fate of Nazi Germany became clear, Fritzsche came
out with energetic support of the Defendant Martin Bormann and of
other fanatical Hitler adherents who organized the undercover fascist
association, the so-called "Werewolf".
On 7 April 1945, for example, in his last radio address, Fritzsche
agitated for all the civilian population of Germany to take active
part in the activities of this terroristic Nazi underground organi-
zation.
He said:
"Let no one be surprised to find the civilian population,
wearing civilian clothes, still continuing the fight in the
regions already occupied and even after occupation has taken
place. We shall call this phenomenon "Werewolf" since it will
have arisen without any preliminary planning and without
a definite organization, out of the very instinct of life."
(USSR-496)
In his radio addresses Fritzsche welcomed the German use of the
new terror weapons in conducting the war, specifically the use of
the "V" rockets. On receiving a plan for the introduction of bacterial
warfare he immediately forwarded it to the OKW for acceptance.
(USSR-484; Evidence submitted during the Afternoon Session,
28 June 1946)
I consider Fritzsche's responsibility fully proven. His activity had

a most basic relation to the ^preparation and the conduct of aggres-

sive warfare as well as to the other crimes of the Hitler regime.

IV. Concerning the Sentence of the Defendant Rudolf Hess

The Judgment of the Tribunal correctly and adequately portrays
the outstanding position which Rudolf Hess occupied in the leader-
ship of the Nazi Party and State. He was indeed Hitler's closest

353
personal confidant and his authority was exceedingly great: In this
connection it is sufficient to quote Hitler's decree appointing Hess as
his deputy: "I hereby appoint Hess as my deputy and give him full
power to make decisions in my name on all questions of Party
leadership" (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 7 February 1946).
But the authority of Hess was not only confined to questions of
Party leadership.
The official NSDAP publication National Socialist Year Book for
1941 states that:
"In addition to the duties of Party leadership, the deputy of
the Führer has far-reaching powers in the field of the State.
—
These are: First participation in national and state legislation,
including the preparation of the Fiihrer's order. The deputy
of the Führer in this way validates the conception of the
Party . . . —
Second approval of the deputy of the Führer of
proposed appointments for official and labor service leaders.
—
Third securing the influence of the Party over the self-
government of the municipal units." (USA-255, PS-3163)
Hess was an active supporter of Hitler's aggressive policy. The
Crimes against Peace committed by him are dealt with in sufficient
detail in the Judgment. The mission undertaken by Hess in flying
to England should be considered as the last of these crimes, as it
was undertaken in the hope of facilitating the realization of aggres-
sion against the Soviet Union by temporarily restraining England
from fighting.
The failure of this mission led to Hess's isolation and he took no
direct part in the planning and commission of subsequent crimes of
the Hitler regime. There can be no doubt, however, that Hess did
everything possible for the preparation of these crimes.
Hess, together with Himmler, occupied the role of creator of
the SS police organizations of German fascism which afterwards
committed the most ruthless Crimes against Humanity. The defend-
ant clearly pointed out the "special tasks" which faced the SS
formations in occupied territories.
When the Waffen SS was being formed Hess issued a special
order through the Party Chancellery which made aiding the conscrip-
tion of Party members into these organizations by all means com-
pulsory for Party organs. He outlined the tasks set before the
Waffen SS as follows:
"The units of the Waffen SS composed of National Socialists are
more suitable than other armed units for the specific tasks to be
solved in the occupied Eastern territories due to the intensive train-
ing in regard to questions of race and nationality" (GB-267, PS-3245).
As early as 1934 the defendant initiated a proposal that the
so-called SD under the Reichsführer SS (Security Service) be given

354
extraordinary powers and thus become the leading force in Nazi
Germany.
On 9 June 1934 Hess issued a decree in accordance with which
the "Security Service of the Reichsführer SS" was declared to be
the "sole political news and defense service of the Party" (GB-257).
Thus the defendant played a direct part in the creation and
consolidation of the system of special police organs which were being
prepared for the commission of crimes in occupied territories.

We find Hesshave always been an advocate of the man-hating

to
"master race" theory. In a speech made on 16 January 1937 while
speaking of the education of the German Nation, Hess pointed out:
"Thus, they are being educated to put Germans above the subjects
of a foreign nation, regardless of their positions or their origin"
(GB-253, PS-3124).
Hess signed the so-called "Law for the Protection of Blood and
Honor" on 15 September 1935 (USA-200, PS-3179). The body of this
law states that "the Führer's deputy is authorized to issue all neces-
sary decrees and directives" for the practical realization of the
"Nuremberg decrees".
On 14 November 1935, Hess issued an ordinance under the Reich
citizenship law in accordance with which the Jews were denied the
right to vote at elections or hold public office (GB-258, PS-1417).
On 20 May 1938 a decree signed by Hess extended the Nurem-
berg laws to Austria (GB-259, PS-2124).
On 12 October 1939 Hess signed a decree creating the adminis-
tration of Polish occupied territories (Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 210,
1939, p. 2077). Article 2 of this decree gave the Defendant Frank the
power of dictator.
There is sufficiently convincing evidence showing that this
defendant did not limit himself to this general directive which intro-
duced into the occupied Polish territories a regime of unbridled
terror. As is shown in the letter of the Reichsminister of Justice to
the Chief of the Reich Chancellery dated 17 April 1941, Hess was
the initiator in the formation of special "penal laws" for Poles and
Jews in occupied Eastern territories. The role of this defendant in
the drawing up of these "laws" is characterized by the Minister of
Justice in the following words:
"In accordance with the opinion of the Führer's deputy I
started from the point of view that the Pole is less susceptible
to the infliction of ordinary punishment .... Under these new
kinds of punishment, prisoners are to be lodged outside prisons
in camps and are to be forced to do heavy and heaviest
labor ....The introduction of corporal punishment which the
deputy of the Führer has brought up for discussion has not

355
 been included in the draft. I can not agree to this type of
punishment The procedure for enforcing prosecution has
been abrogated, for it seemed intolerable that Poles or Jews
should be able to instigate a public indictment. Poles and Jews
have also been deprived of the right to prosecute in their own
names or join the public prosecution in an action .... From
the very beginning it was intended to intensify special treat-
ment in case of need: When this necessity became actual a
supplementary decree was issued to which the Führer' s deputy
refers to in his letter , ." (GB-268, R-96)
. .

Thus, there can be no doubt that Hess together with the other
major war criminals is guilty of Crimes against Humanity.
Taking into consideration that among political leaders of Hitlerite
Germany Hess was third in significance and played a decisive role
in the crimes of the Nazi regime, I consider the only justified sen-
tence in his case can be death.

V. Incorrect Judgment with regard to the Reich Cabinet

The# Prosecution has posed before the Tribunal the question of
declaring the Reich Cabinet a criminal organization. The verdict
rejects the claim of the Prosecution, unfoundedly refusing to declare
the Hitler Government a criminal organization.
With such a decision I cannot agree.
The Tribunal considers it proven that the Hitlerites have com-
mitted innumerable and monstrous crimes.
The Tribunal also considers it proven that these crimes were as
a rule committed intentionally and on an organized scale, according
to previously prepared plans and directives ("Plan Barbarossa",
"Night and Fog", "Bullet", etc.).
The Tribunal has declared criminal several of the Nazi mass
organizations founded for the realization and putting into practice
the plans of the Hitler Government.
In view of this it appears particularly untenable and rationally
incorrect to refuse to declare the Reich Cabinet the directing organ
of the State with a direct and active role in the working out of the
criminal enterprises, a criminal organization. The members of this
directing staff had great power, each headed an appropriate Govern-
ment agency, each participated in preparing and realizing the Nazi
program.
In confirmationit is deemed proper to cite several facts:

1.Immediately after the Nazi accession to power —

on 24 March
1933 —
there was a law passed entitled "The Law of Defense of the

356
People and the State" whereby the Reich Cabinet, besides the Reichs-
tag, was empowered to enact new laws.
On 26 May 1933 the Reich Government issued a decree ordering
the confiscation of the property of all Communist organizations and
on 14 June, the same year, it also confiscated the property of the
Social Democrat organizations. On 1 December 1933 the Reich
Government issued the law "Ensuring Party and State Unity".
Following through its program of liquidating democratic institu-
tions, in 1934 the Government passed a law of the "Reconstruction
of the Reich" whereby democratic elections were abolished for both
central and local representative bodies. The Reichstag thereby
became an institution without functional meaning. (Transcript, After-
noon Session, 22 November 1945)
By the law of 7 April 1933 and others, all Reich Government
employees, including judges, ever noted for any anti-Nazi tendencies
or ever having belonged to leftist organizations, as well as all Jews,
were to be removed from the Government service and replaced by
Nazis. In accordance with the "Basic Positions of the German Law
on Government Employees" of 26 January 1937, "the inner harmony
of the official and the Nazi Party is a necessary presupposition of his
appointment to his post Government employees must be the
. . .

executors of the will of the National Socialist State, directed by the

NSDAP." (Defense Document Number 28)
On 1 May 1934 there was created the Ministry of Education
instructed to train students in the spirit of militarism, of racial
hatred, and in terms of reality thoroughly falsified by Nazi ideology
(PS-2078).
Free trade unions were abolished, their property confiscated, and
the majority of the leaders jailed.
To suppress even a semblance of resistance the Government
created the Gestapo and the concentration camps. Without any trial
or even a concrete charge hundreds of thousands of persons were
arrested and then done away with merely on a suspicion of an anti-
Nazi tendency.
There were issued the so-called "Nuremberg Laws" against the
Jews. Hess and Frick, both members of the Reich Government,
implemented these by additional decrees.
It was the activity of the Reich Cabinet that brought on the war
which took millions of human lives and caused inestimable damage
in property and in suffering borne by the many Nations.
On 4 February 1938, Hitler organized the Secret Council of
Ministers defining its activity as follows: "To aid me byadvice on
problems of foreign policies I am creating this Secret Council"
(Reichsgesetzblatt, 1938, Part I, p. 112, PS-2031). The foreign policy

357
of the Hitler Government was the policy of aggression. For this
reason the members of the Secret Council should be held responsible
for this policy. There were attempts in Court to represent the Secret
Council as a fictitious organization, never actually functioning. This
however is an inadmissible position. It is sufficient to recall Rosen-
berg's letter to Hitler where the former insistently tried to be
appointed member of the Secret Council of Ministers — to appreciate
fully the significance of the Council.
Even more important practically in conducting aggressive warfare
was the Reich Defense Council headed by Hitler and Goring. The
following were members of the Defense Council, as is well known:
Hess, Frick, Funk, Keitel, Raeder, Lammers (PS-2194; PS-2018).
Goring characterized the function of the Defense Council and its
role in war preparations as follows, during the Court session of
23 June 1939: "The Defense Council of the Reich was the deciding
Reich organ on all questions concerning preparation for war'*
(PS-3787, USA-782).
At the same time Goring emphasized the fact that "the meeting
of the Defense Council always took place for the purpose of making
the most important decisions". From the minutes of these meetings,
submitted as evidence by the Prosecution, it is quite clear that the
Council made very important decisions indeed. The minutes also
show that other Cabinet Ministers sometimes took part in the
meetings of the Defense Council alongside the members of the Coun-
cil when war enterprises and war preparedness were discussed.

For example, the following Cabinet Ministers took part in the

meeting of 23 June 1939: of Labor, of Food and Agriculture, of
Finance, of Communication, and a number of others, while the
minutes of the meeting were sent to all the members of the Cabinet
(US-782).
The verdict of the Tribunal justly points out certain peculiarities
Government as the directing organ of the State, namely:
of the Hitler
the absence of regular cabinet meetings, the occasional issuance of
laws by the individual Ministers having unusual independence of
action, the tremendous personal power of Hitler himself. These
peculiarities do not refute but on the contrary further confirm the
conclusion that the Hitler Government is not an ordinary rank and
file cabinet but a criminal organization.

Certainly Hitler had an unusual measure of personal power but

this in no way frees of responsibility the members of his Cabinet
who were his convinced followers and the actual executors of his
program until and when the day of reckoning arrived.
I consider that there is every reason to declare the Hitler Govern-

ment a criminal organization.

358
 VI. Incorrect Judgment with regard to the General Staff
and the OKW
The verdict incorrectly rejects the accusation of criminal activity-
directed against the General Staff and the OKW.
The rejection of the accusation of criminal activity of the General
Staff and of the OKW
contradicts both the actual situation and the
evidence submitted in the course of the Trial.
It has been established beyond doubt that the Leadership Corps

of the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany, together with the SS-Party

machine, represented the most important agency in preparing
and realizing the Nazi aggressive and man-hating program. This was
constantly and forcefully reiterated by the Hitlerites themselves in
their official bulletins meant for the officer personnel of the armed
forces. In the Nazi Party bulletin called "Politics and the Officer in
the III Reich" it is quite clearly stated that the Nazi regime is
founded on
". . two pillars: the Party and the Armed Forces. Both are
.

forms of expression of the same philosophy of life the . . .

tasks before the Party and the Armed Forces are in an organic
relationship to each other and each bears the same respon-
sibility both these agencies depend on each other's success
. . .

or failure." (PS-4060, USA-928)

This organic inter-relationship between the Nazi Party and the SS
on the one hand and the Nazi Armed Forces on the other hand, was
particularly evident among the upper circles of military hierarchy
which the Indictment groups together under the concept of criminal
—
organization that is, among the members of the General Staff and
the OKW.
The very selection of members of the Supreme Command of the
Army in Nazi Germany was based on the criteria of their loyalty to
the regime and their readiness not to pursue aggressive mili-
taristic policiesbut also to fulfill such special directives as related
to treatment meted out to prisoners of war and to the civilian popu-
lations of occupied territories.
The leaders of the German Armed Forces were not merely
officers who reached certain levels of the military hierarchy. They
represented, first of all, a closely-knit group which was entrusted
with the most secret plans of the Nazi leadership. Evidence submitted
to the Tribunal has fully confirmed the contention that the military
leaders of Germany justified this trust completely and that they
were the convinced followers and ardent executors of Hitler's plans.
It is not accidental that at the head of the Air Force stood the

"second man" of the Nazi Reich, namely Goring; that the Command-
er-in-Chief of the Navy was Dönitz, subsequently designated by
Hitler to be the latter's successor; that the command of the Ground

359
Forces was concentrated in the hands of Keitel who signed the major
part of the decrees concerning the execution of the prisoners of war
and of the civilians in occupied territories.
Thus the comparisons made with the organization supreme
of the
commands in Allied countries cannot be considered demo-
valid. In a
cratic country, not one self-respecting military expert would agree
to prepare plans for mass reprisals and merciless killings of prisoners
of war side by side with plans of a purely military and strategic
character.
Meanwhile precisely such matters that occupied the supreme
it is

command General Staff and of the

of the OKW
in Nazi Germany.
The commission by them of the heaviest Crimes against Peace, of
the War Crimes, and of the Crimes against Humanity is not denied
but is particularly emphasized in the verdict of the Tribunal. And
yet the commission of these crimes has not brought the logical
conclusion.
The verdict states: "They have been a disgrace to the honorable
profession of arms. Without their military guidance the aggressive
ambitions of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been academic
and sterile
And subsequently:
"Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier's
oath of obedience to military orders. When it suits their
defense they say they had to obey; when confronted with
Hitler's brutal crimes, which are shown to have been within
their general knowledge, they say they disobeyed. The truth
is they actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent

and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes on a

scale larger and more shocking than the world ever had the
misfortune to know. This must be said."
All these assertions in the verdict are correct and are based on
numerous and reliable depositions. It remains only incomprehensible
why "these hundred or so higher officers" who have caused the
world and their own country so much suffering should not be
acknowledged a criminal organization.
The verdict advances the following reasons for the decision,
reasons quite contradictory to the facts:
a) That the crimes were committed by representatives of the
General Staff and of the OKW
as private individuals and not as
members of a criminal conspiracy.
b) That the General Staff and the OKW were merely weapons
in the hands of the conspirators and interpreters or executors of the
conspirators' will.
Considerable evidence disputes such conclusions.

360
 1. The leading representatives of the General Staff and of the
OKW, along with a small circle of the higher Hitlerite officials, were
called upon by the conspirators to participate in the development
and the realization of the plans of aggression, not as passive func-
tionaries, but as active participants in the conspiracy against peace
and humanity.
Without their advice and active cooperation, Hitler could not
have solved these problems.
In the majority of cases their opinion was decisive. It is impos-
sible to imagine how the aggressive plans of Hitler's Germany could
have been realized had it not been for the full support given him
by the leading staff members of the armed forces.
Least of all did Hitler conceal his criminal plans and motivations
from the leaders of the High Command.
For instance, while preparing for the attack on Poland, as early
as 29 May 1939, at a conference with the high military commanders
of the new Reich Chancellery, he stated:
"For us the matter consists of the expansion of 'Lebensraum'
to the East. Thus the question of sparing Poland cannot be
considered, and, instead, we have to consider the decision to
attack Poland at the first opportunity." (L-79)
Long before the Czechoslovakia, in a directive of
seizure of
30 May 1938, addressing the representatives of the High
Hitler,
Command, cynically stated: "From the military and political point
of view, the most favorable time is a lightning attack on the basis
of some incident, by which Germany will have been strongly pro-
voked and which will morally justify the military measures to at
least part of the world opinion" (PS-388).
Prior to the invasion of Yugoslavia, in a directive dated 27 Maren
1941, addressing the representatives of the High Command, Hitler
wrote: "Even if Yugoslavia declares its loyalty, it must be considered
an enemy and must, therefore, be smashed as soon as possible"
(PS-1746).
While preparing for the invasion of the U.S.S.R., Hitler invited the
representatives of the General Staff and the OKW to help him work
out the related plans and directives not at all as simply the military
experts.
In the instructions to apply propaganda in the region "Barba-
rossa", issuedby the OKW
in June 1941, it is pointed out that: "For
the time we should not have propaganda directed at the dismember-
ment of the Soviet Union" (USSR-477).
As early as 13 May 1941, OKW ordered the troops to use any
terrorist measures against the civilian populations of the temporarily
occupied regions of the Soviet Union.

361
 And the same order read: "To confirm only such sentences as are
in accordance with the political intentions of the High Command."
(G-50.)
2. OKW and the General Staff issued the most brutal decrees and
orders for relentless measures against the unarmed peaceful popu-
lation and the prisoners of war.
In the decree of special liability to punishment in the region
"Barbarossa" while preparing for the attack upon the Soviet Union,
the OKW abolished beforehand the jurisdiction of the military
courts, granting the right of repressions over the peaceful population
to individual officers and soldiers.
It isparticularly stated there that:
"Crimes of hostile civilians are excluded from the jurisdiction
of the courts martial, Suspected elements must be imme-
. . .

diately delivered to the officer. The latter will decide whether

they should be shot ... it is absolutely forbidden to hold
suspects for the purpose of bringing them to trial."
There are also provisions for "the most extreme measures, and,
mass violence', if circumstances do not
in particular, 'measures for
permit the rapid detection of the guilty."
In the same decree of the OKW
the guarantee of impunity was
assured in advance to the military criminals from the service per-
sonnel of the German Army. It states there as follows: "The bringing
of suits of actions, committed by officials of the Army and by the
service personnel against hostile civilians is not obligatory even in
cases where such actions at the same time constitute military crimes
."
or offenses . . .

In the course of the war the High Command consistently followed

this policy, increasing its terroristic actions with regard to prisoners
of war and the peaceful populations of occupied countries.
The OKW directive of 16 September 1941, states: "At the same
time, it must be borne in mind
the countries
that a human life in
in question frequently held to be of no account and that a warning
is
example can be made only by measures of exceptional severity"
(PS-389).
Addressing the commanders of the army groups on 23 July 1941,
the OKW simply briefed them as follows: "It is not in the demand
for additional security detachments, but in the application of appro-
priate draconic measures that the commanding officers must use to
keep order in the regions under their jurisdiction" (PS-459).
The OKW directive of 16 December 1941, states: "The troops . . .

have the right and are obliged to apply . . . any measures what-
soever also against women and children if this contributes to suc-
cess . .
." (USSR-16).

362
 Among the most brutal OKW directives concerning the treat-
ment of prisoners of war one must consider the order entitled "Kugel
(bullet)". The reasons for resorting to capital punishment for pris-
oners of war were offenses, which according to international con-
ventions, generally should not carry any punishment (for example,
escape from the camp).
Another order, "Nacht und Nebel", states:
"Penalty for such offenses, consisting of loss of freedom and
even a life sentence is a sign of weakness. Only death sentence
or measures which entail ignorance of the fate of the guilty
by local population will achieve real effectiveness." (L-90,
USA-224; Transcript, Afternoon Session, 25 January 1946)
In the course of the present Trial a great deal of evidence of
application of the "Kugel" order has been submitted. One of the
examples of this kind of crime is the murder of 50 officer-pilots.
The fact that this crime was inspired by the High Command cannot
be doubted.
OKW an order for the destruction of the "com-
also distributed
mando" units. The was submitted to the Court (PS-498,
original order
USA-501). According to this order officers and soldiers of the "com-
mando" units had to be shot, except in cases when they were to be
questioned, after which they were shot in any case.
These orders were unswervingly carried out by the commanding
officers of Army units. In June 1944 Rundstedt, the Commander-in-
Chief of the German troops in the West, reported that Hitler's order
in regard to "the treatment of the 'commando' groups of the enemy
is still being carried out" (PS-531, USA-550).
3. The High Command, along with the SS and the Police, is guilty
of the most brutal police actions in the occupied regions.
The instructions relating to special regions, issued by OKW on
13 March 1941, contemplated the necessity of synchronizing the
activities in occupied territories between the army command and the
Reichsführer of the SS. As is seen from the testimony of the chief
of the 3d Department of RSHA and who was concurrently chief of
the Einsatzgruppe Otto Ohlendorf, and of the chief of the
"D",
VI Department of RSHA, Walter
Schellenberg, in accordance with
OKW instructions there was an agreement made between the General
Staff and the RSHA about the organization of special "operational
groups" of the Security Police and SD - "Einsatzgruppen", assigned
to the appropriate army detachments.

Crimes committed by the Einsatzgruppen on the territory of the

temporarily occupied regions are countless. The Einsatzgruppen
were acting in close contact with the commanding officers of the
appropriate army groups.

363
 The following excerpt from the report of Einsatzgruppe "A" is
extremely characteristic as evidence:
"... among our functions as the establishment of personal
liaison with the commanding officer both at the front and in
the rear. It must be pointed out that the relations with the
army were of the best, in some cases very close, almost hearty,
as, for instance, the commander of the tank group, Colonel-
General Hoppner" (L-180).
4. The representatives of the High Command acted in all the

echelons of the army as members of a criminal group.

The directives of the OKW
and the General Staff, in spite of the
manifest violations of international law and customs of warfare, not
only did not provoke any protest on the part of the higher staff
officers of the command of the various groups of the armies but
were inflexibly applied and supplemented by still more cruel orders
in the development of such directives.
In this connection it is characteristic to note the directive of Field-
marshal Von Reichenau, army group commander, addressed to his
soldiers: "The soldier in the eastern territories is not only a warrior
skilled in the art of warfare but a bearer of a merciless national
ideology." Andelsewhere, calling for the extermination of the Jews,
Von Reichenau wrote: "Thus the soldier must be in full cognizance
of the necessity for harsh and just revenge on those sub-humans,
the Jews" (USA-556).
As another example the order of Fieldmarshal Von Mannstein
addressed to his soldiers can be referred to. On the basis of the
"political aims of the war" the Fieldmarshal cynically appealed to
his soldiers to wage the war in violation of the "recognized laws
of warfare in Europe" (USA-927).
Thus, in the course of the hearing of evidence it has been proven
beyond all doubt that the General Staff and the High Command of
the Hitlerite Army comprised a highly dangerous criminal
organization.
* * * *

I consider it my duty as a Judge to draw up my dissenting

opinion concerning those important questions on which I disagree

with the decision adopted by the members of the Tribunal.

Soviet Member, International Military Tribunal,

Major General Jurisprudence
/ s / LT. Nikitchenko
1 October 1946

364
 SENTENCES
In accordance with Article 27 of the Charter, the President of the
International Military Tribunal, at its concluding session of 1 October
1946, pronounced the sentence on the defendants convicted on the
Indictment:
"Defendant Hermann Wilhelm Göring, on the Counts of the
Indictment on which you have been convicted, the International
Military Tribunal sentences you to death by hanging.
"Defendant Rudolf Hess, on the Counts of the Indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to
imprisonment for life.
"Defendant Joachim von Ribbentrop, on the Counts of the Indict-
ment on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you
to death by hanging.
"Defendant Wilhelm Keitel, on the Counts of the Indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
by hanging.
"Defendant Ernst Kaltenbrunner, on the Counts of the Indict-
ment on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you
to death by hanging.
"Defendant Alfred Rosenberg, on the Counts of the Indictment
on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to
death by hanging.
"Defendant Hans Frank, on the Counts of the Indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
by hanging.
"Defendant Wilhelm Frick, on the Counts of the Indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
by hanging.
"Defendant Julius Streicher, on the Count of the Indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
by hanging.
"Defendant Walter Funk, on the Counts of the Indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to impris-
onment for life.

"Defendant Karl Dönitz, on the Counts of the Indictment on

which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to
10 years' imprisonment.
"Defendant Erich Raeder, on the Counts of the Indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to
imprisonment for life.
 "Defendant Baidur Von Schirach, on the Count of the Indictment
on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to
20 years' imprisonment.
"Defendant Fritz Sauckel, on the Counts of the Indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
by hanging.
"Defendant Alfred Jodl, on the Counts of the Indictment on
which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to death
by hanging.
"Defendant Arthur Seyss-Inquart, on the Counts of the Indict-
ment on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you
to death by hanging.

"Defendant Albert Speer, on the Counts of the Indictment on

which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to
20 years' imprisonment.
"Defendant Constantin von Neurath, on the Counts of the Indict-
ment on which you have been convicted, the Tribunal sentences you
to 15 years' imprisonment.
"The Tribunal sentences the Defendant Martin Bormann, on the
Counts of the Indictment on which he has been convicted, to death
by hanging."

Tabulation of Sentences
30th September 1946*

Defendant ' Counts on which Sentence

convicted
HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging
RUDOLF HESS 1, 2 Imprisonment
for life
JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging
WILHELM KEITEL 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging
ERNST KALTENBRUNNER 3, 4 Death by hanging
ALFRED ROSENBERG 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging
HANS FRANK 3, 4 Death by hanging
WILHELM FRICK 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging
JULIUS STREICHER 4 Death by hanging
WALTER FUNK 2, 3, 4 Imprisonment
for life

* These sentences were read in open court by the President on 1 October 1946.

366
 Defendant Counts on which Sentence
convicted

HJALMAR SCHACHT Not guilty

KARL DÖNITZ 2, 3 Ten years'
imprisonment
ERICH RAEDER 1, 2, 3 Imprisonment
for life
BALDUR VON SCHIRACH 4 Twenty years'
imprisonment
FRITZ SAUCKEL 3, 4 Death by hanging
ALFRED JODL 1, 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging
FRANZ VON PAPEN Not guilty
ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART 2, 3, 4 Death by hanging
ALBERT SPEER 3, 4 Twenty years'
imprisonment
CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH 1, 2, 3, 4 Fifteen years'
imprisonment
HANS FRITZSCHE Not guilty
MARTIN BORMANN 3, 4 Death by hanging

/ s / GEOFFREY LAWRENCE, President

/ s / FRANCIS BIDDLE A TRUE COPY
s H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES
/ /
, g j JOH N E RAY
/ s / NIKITCHENKO Colonel, FA

367
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