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 TRIAL
OF

THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE

THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL

NUREMBERG
14 NOVEMBER 1945 — 1 OCTOBER 1946

PUBLISHED AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY

19 4 7
This volume is published in accordance with the
direction of the International Military Tribunal by
the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the juris-
diction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.

U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

NOV 17 1Ö47
 VOLUME III

OFFICIAL TEXT
I N THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

PROCEEDINGS
1 December 1945 — 14 December 1945
 CONTENTS

Tenth Day, Saturday, 1 December 1945,

Morning Session 1

Eleventh Day, Monday, 3 December 1945,

Morning Session 35
Afternoon Session 64

Twelfth Day, Tuesday, 4 December 1945,

Morning Session 91
Afternoon Session 120

Thirteenth Day, Wednesday, 5 December 1945,

Morning Session ^ . . . . 152
Afternoon Session 178

Fourteenth Day, Thursday, 6 December 1945,

Morning Session 209
Afternoon Session 241

Fifteenth Day, Friday, 7December 1945,

Morning Session 272
Afternoon Session 303

Sixteenth Day, Monday, 10 December 1945,

Morning Session 335
Afternoon Session 367

Seventeenth Day, Tuesday, 11 December 1945,

Morning Session 400
Afternoon Session 402

Eighteenth Day, Wednesday, 12 December 1945,

Morning Session 415
Afternoon Session 447

Nineteenth Day, Thursday, 13 December 1945,

Morning Session 477
Afternoon Session 512

Twentieth Day, Friday, 14 December 1945,

Morning Session 542
Afternoon Session 571
 TENTH DAY
Saturday, 1 December 1945

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): I will

begin the session by reading the judgment of the Tribunal upon
the application made by counsel for the Defendant Hess.
The Tribunal has given careful consideration to the motion of
counsel for the defense of the Defendant Hess, and it had the
advantage of hearing full argument upon it both from the Defense
and the Prosecution. The Tribunal has also considered the very full
medical reports, which have been made on the condition of the
Defendant Hess, and has come to the conclusion that no grounds
whatever exist for a further examination to be ordered.
After hearing the statement of the Defendant Hess in Court
yesterday, and in view of all the evidence, the Tribunal is of the
opinion that the Defendant Hess is capable of standing his trial at
the present time, and the motion of the Counsel for the Defense is,
therefore, denied, and the Trial will proceed.
Now the witness under examination should come back to the
witness box.
[Erwin Lahousen resumed the stand.]
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom):
May itplease the Tribunal, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe yesterday said
he had no questions to ask this witness. He has now requested me
very shortly to cross-examine this witness on one incident men-
tioned in the Indictment, namely, the murder of 50 R.A.F. officers
who escaped from Stalag Luft 3 in March of 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: You said to "cross-examine"?
MR. ROBERTS: I realize that this is a matter which falls in

the part of the Indictment which is being dealt with by the

prosecutors for the U.S.S.R. My Lord, I have mentioned that matter
to General Rudenko, who with his usual courtesy and kindness, has
said that he has no objection to my asking some questions on that
matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Roberts.
MR. ROBERTS: Much obliged.
[Turning to the witness.] Might I ask you this? Do you know
anything of the circumstances of the death of 50 R.A.F. officers in

1
1 Dec. 45

March 1944, who had escaped from Stalag Luft 3 at Sagan and
were recaptured?
ERWIN LAHOUSEN (Witness): No, I have nothing to say because
at that was on the Eastern front, as commander of my regi-
time I

ment, and no longer had any contact with my former duties.

MR. ROBERTS: Did you hear of the matter from any of your
fellow officers?
LAHOUSEN: No, I heard nothing about it whatsoever.
MR. ROBERTS: You can't assist the Court at all with the matter?
LAHOUSEN: No, not at all.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen):

Witness, you stated yesterday that you were the intimate friend
and collaborator of Admiral Canaris. Since I can no longer address
my question directly to Admiral Canaris, I ask you to answer the
following questions for me: Did Admiral Canaris know of Defendant
Von Papen's attitude toward Hitler's war policies, and how did
Admiral Canaris express himself to you on this point?
LAHOUSEN: First, I should like to make a slight correction on
the question addressed to me. I never asserted that I was the
intimate friend of Canaris. Pieckenbrock was a friend of Canaris,
whereas I was merely one of his confidants. From this relationship,
however, I recall that Von Papen's and Canaris' attitude toward
the matter which the Counsel has just brought up, was a negative one.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was this negative attitude only toward the /

war policy, or was it also toward all the violent methods used in
the execution of such a policy?
LAHOUSEN: According to my recollection I have to answer this
question in the affirmative, judging from a conversation between
Admiral Canaris and Von Papen, during the visit of the latter in
Berlin at which I was present.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you know that Von Papen told Canaris
that there could be no resistance against Hitler's aggressive policies
from political quarters, but that such resistance would have to be
sought among the ranks of the military?
LAHOUSEN: In this connection, that is to say, in the direct
connection as it is now being presented, I personally cannot say
anything. In other words, I personally was not an ear witness at
any conversation between Canaris and Von Papen during which
this matter was brought up, and I cannot recall today whether
Canaris ever told me anything regarding such conversations with
Von Papen. It is quite possible, however, but I cannot recall it and
consequently my oath as witness does not permit me to make any
statement other than the one I have made.

2
 1 Dec. 45

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, do you conclude from this that

Canaris believed that Von Papen purposely continued to hold an
exposed political office in order to exercise a mitigating influence?
LAHOUSEN: I believe so, though I have no tangible proof from
any of his statements. But that is my impression, from what I still
recollect today.

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): My client

has requested me to ask you the following questions: How long
have you known Canaris and Pieckenbrock?
LAHOUSEN: I have known Canaris and Pieckenbrock since 1937
throughmy previous activity in the Austrian Intelligence Depart-
ment.
DR. NELTE: At that time were there any relations of a military
nature between yourself and the Abwehr, which was being run by
Admiral Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: Not only did such connections exist with the
Austrian intelligence, but the Austrian Federal Army and the Ger-
man Wehrmacht maintained at that time an absolutely legal and
—
purely military exchange of information legal in the sense that
this exchange and collaboration of military intelligence was carried
on with the knowledge of the Austrian authorities. To state it
clearly, this was a purely military collaboration for exchanging
intelligence on countries bordering upon Austria.
DR. NELTE: May I ask if this contact between you and Canaris
was also of a personal nature, in other words I want to determine
how the Austrian Army felt about the question of the Anschluss?
LAHOUSEN: This and similar questions, that is to say, all
questions of a political nature, particularly the question of the An-
schluss or the very intense illegal Nazi activities, at that time, had
to be and were completely ignored. It was generally agreed between
—
Count Marogna, the official liaison man he also was executed
—
after the 20th of July and Canaris and Generaloberst Beck that this
line should be taken.

DR. NELTE: Do understand you wish to impfy that this per-

I
sonal contact did not mean
that the Austrian General Staff officers
gave information on everything regarding their attitude to the
idea of the Anschluss, or that they were willing or able to give
this information?

LAHOUSEN: This personal contact started on the day when I

saw Canaris for the first time, while I was still an Austrian officer.
It was in the offices of the Federal Ministry of Defense, where
Canaris was with the Chief of the Austrian General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you please repeat the question?

3
 —

1 Dec. 45

DR. NELTE: I asked the witness to what extent a personal

contact existed between the officers of the German General Staff or
the Abwehr and the officers of the Intelligence Section or the
Austrian General Staff for the purpose of determining the feelings
about the Anschluss.
LAHOUSEN: First of all, there was no such personal contact in
the sense that the word is used here. The contact which actually
—
did take place and there are witnesses in this room who can confirm
this statement: Von Papen must be informed thoroughly of this
took place on a single day, during which I never spoke with Canaris
alone, but always in the presence of my superior officers. In any
case, no questions relating to the Anschluss and no political ques-
tions on Austrian internal problems were discussed there. Naturally
I myself did not raise any, and Canaris expressly refrained from
doing so.
DR. NELTE What was your job in the Abwehr Office II?
:

LAHOUSEN: In the Abwehr Section II, which I took over at the

beginning of 1939 —
I described it yesterday, and I am willing to
—
repeat it, if you wish this particular job had no special name.
Actually my task was to carry out various undertakings and actions,
which I can define very precisely: Nuisance activity, acts of sabotage,
or prevention of sabotage and nuisance activity, or in general those
types of activities that are carried out by Kommandos. All these
activities were carried out in agreement with, and conformed to, the
military demands of the Armed Forces Operations Staff or the
General Staff.
DR. NELTE: Who generally gave you your orders regarding co-,
ordinating these activities with the military activities?
LAHOUSEN: My immediate chief. Canaris, usually gave me
orders concerning the whole of my activity.
DR. NELTE: I was referring to the office, whether they came
from the OKH or the OKW?
LAHOUSEN: They did not come from the OKW as a rule.
Usually they came by way of the OKW
represented by the Chief
of the OKW, Keitel, or the chief of the Wehrmacht Operations
Staff; and when the General Staff or the Air Force Operations
Staff were interested in any undertaking, the orders, as far as I
can remember, were also transmitted by way of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, and the representatives of the three Armed Forces,
that is, the Army, Air Force, and Navy, appointed to it. All these
orders came through the same channels to the Canaris Foreign In-
telligence Department (Ausland Abwehr) which transmitted those
concerning my activities to me for necessary action.
DR. NELTE Are you now describing the official channels
:

through which you received the orders? Were the orders issued by

4
 1 Dec. 45

the Army or the Armed Forces Operations Staff? Or did the Army-
give the orders for transmission by way of the High Command of
the Armed Forces?
LAHOUSEN: Actually, speaking of myself, in questions of this
kind, regarding matters which concerned my department, I had
dealings only with my immediate superior, Canaris; and the su-
perior of Canaris at that time was the OKW
under Keitel, and he
was in touch with the gentlemen of the Armed Forces Operational
Staff, and now and then with the members of the General Staff
of the Army. I could mention specific cases from memory. But in
general the procedure was such as I described it.
DR. NELTE: Is it true that Keitel, as the Chief of the OKW,
at first every year,and then from 1943 on, at regular and shorter
intervals, spoke to the office and department chiefs of the OKW;
and on such occasions made a point of telling them that anyone
who believed that something was being asked of him which his con-
science would not allow him to carry out should tell him, Keitel,
about it personally?
LAHOUSEN: It is true that the Chief of the OKW
did several
times address the circle just mentioned. I cannot recall any exact
words of his which could be interpreted in such a way as to mean
that one could take the risk, in cases about which I testified yester-
day, of speaking with him so openly and frankly as myself and
others, that is, witnesses still alive, could speak to Canaris at any
time. I definitely did not have that impression, whatever the
meaning might have been which was given to his words at that time.
DR. NELTE: Do I understand you correctly to mean that in
principle you do not wish to challenge the fact that Keitel actually
said these words?
LAHOUSEN: I can neither challenge it, nor can I add anything
to it, because I have no exact recollection of it. I do recall that
these addresses or conferences took place, and it is quite possible
that the Chief of the OKW at that time might have used those
words. I can only add what I have already said.
DR. NELTE: Is it true that on several occasions, you, in the
company of Admiral Canaris, as well as alone, had audience with
the Chief of the OKW, in order to discuss with him plans or under-
takings of a delicate nature, which were in the purview of your
official duties?

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I said a great deal about that yesterday; and

I do not feel I have the right to talk about such things ünless I
was there personally,
DR. NELTE: I had the impression yesterday that in many
respects you were acting as a mouthpiece for Admiral Canaris, who

5
1 Dec. 45

used you as a mentor for the entries in his diary. Was that your
testimony?
LAHOUSEN: The impression is completely fallacious. I am not
a mouthpiece, and am now, as I was then, completely independent
inwardly in what I say. I have never allowed myself, nor shall I
ever allow myself^ to become the mouthpiece for any conception,
or to make any statements that are contrary to my inner convic-
tions and to my conscience.
DR. NELTE: You misunderstood me if you believe that I used
the word "mouthpiece" derogatorily. I simply wanted to bring out
the fact that yesterday you made frequent references to the remarks
in Canaris' diary, that is to the remarks of Canaris quoted by you.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I did so in those cases where the matter dis-
cussed affected Canaris. He himself cannot testify, since he is dead.
Just because I know a great deal about this, and because my infor-
mation is exact, I felt it my duty to say what I know.
DR. NELTE: Did Keitel ever ask questions or order any in-
quiries to be made about the political views of the officers in the
Intelligence Department? Did he ever ask whether there were any
National Socialists in the departments of the intelligence service?
LAHOUSEN: At the afore-mentioned periodical meetings he
asked this question and others of this nature in an unmistakable
way, and he left no doubt that in an office such as the he OKW
could not tolerate any officers who did not believe in the idea of
final victory, or who did not give proof of unswerving loyalty to
the Führer and much more besides.
DR. NELTE: Could these statements be taken to mean that he
demanded obedience in the military sense, or do you thinjc he was
speaking from a political point of view?
LAHOUSEN: Of was speaking from a military point
course, he
of view, but no less clearly political aspect, for it was not
from the
admissible to make any distinction between the two. The Wehr-
—
macht was to form a single whole the National Socialistic Wehr-
macht. Here he touched upon the root problem.
DR. NELTE: You believe, therefore, that the basic attitude was
really the military one, also in the OKW?
LAHOUSEN: The basic attitude was, or should have been.
National Socialistic, and not military. In other words, first and
foremost National Socialistic, and everything else afterwards.
DR. NELTE: You said "should have been."
LAHOUSEN: Yes, because it actually was not the case.
DR. NELTE: Quite so. You mean, therefore, that in the first
place it was military and not National Socialistic.

6
 1 Dec. 45

LAHOUSEN: It should have been a purely military one, accord-

ing to our conception, but according to the point of view put for-
ward by the Chief of the OKW —
at that time whether he received
an order in this sense I am not in a position to say, as I was not
—
there the basic attitude should be one of absolute obedience in a
National Socialistic sense.
DR. NELTE: Do you know anything about the attitude of the
generals to this problem?
LAHOUSEN: Of course, I do, because immediately after such
conferences, as have been mentioned here, a lively exchange of
opinions took place on this subject and a large number of those
—
who were present I could name them and some of them are
—
present resented that fact that the words addressed to them had
this strong political flavor,and were couched in this "higher level
language" (Sprachregelung von oben) as we used to call it, and
contained so little that was relevant and purely military, let alone
anything else.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday, when discussing the meeting that took
place in the Führer's train, on the 12th September of 1939, you said,
regarding the communication of the Chief of the OKW
to you, that
the Defendant Keitel addressed himself to you, or rather to the
gentlemen present; and said that these measures had been
determined between the Führer and Goring. He, Keitel, had no in-
fluence on them. The Führer and Goring telephoned frequently to
one another. Sometimes he knew something about it; sometimes he
knew nothing. Is that what you said?
LAHOUSEN: That is correct. I made a record of everything that
was said in my presence; and I repeated it here because it is true.
DR. NELTE: May ask whether the remark, "Sometimes I
I
find out something about it, sometimes I do not," relates to a
concrete, specific case, or was that a general rule?
LAHOUSEN: That was to be understood as a general statement,
to the best of my recollection.
DR. NELTE: At this conference in the Führer's train on the 12th
of September 1939, did you first of speak about the transmission
all
of the political aims which, according to you, came from Ribbentrop.
Did I understand you correctly?
LAHOUSEN: That is correct.
DR. NELTE: And you said that the Defendant Keitel transmitted
these aims to those who were present. Now, what I am not clear
about is whether this referred to the order regarding the bombard-
ment of Warsaw from the air. Did I understand rightly?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, as regards the air bombardment of Warsaw,
to the best of my recollection and from what is recorded in the
• notes, I can only say in this connection, the same as when the

7
 . .

1 Dec. 45

question of shootings in Poland came up, that Canaris took the

initiative by provoking a discussion on —
this subject I no longer
remember how he —
did this and then pointing out the terrible
political repercussions that this would have, especially abroad.
DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel is anxious that I should put
the question to you, whether, when this order for the bombing of
Warsaw was made known he did not stress the fact that this was to
be put into effect only if the fortress of Warsaw did not surrender
after the demand made by the bearer of the flag of truce, and even
then only after an opportunity to evacuate the city had been given
to the civilian population and the diplomats.
LAHOUSEN: I cannot recall the precise words he used but
according to my knowledge of the situation at that time it is quite
possible, indeed probable, that the Chief of the OKW, Keitel, did
make this remark.
DR. NELTE: Do you know that the Commander-in-Chief of the
army at that time. Von Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the OKW,
Keitel, before the Polish War
began, categorically objected to the
use of Gestapo and SD Kommandos, maintaining that these were
unbearable in the Wehrmacht, and in this connection asked for
Hitler's concurrence and received it?
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not know that, and could not have known
it because of my subordinate position at that time. Please do not

overrate the importance of my position at that time.

DR. NELTE: As we are also concerned here with taking
cognizance of a document, which, I take it, was transmitted to all
departments and sections of the OKW, I thought you might
remember. They were the so-called directives, were they not? And
these directives, mentioned in connection with the campaign against
Poland, in contrast to what happened later . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think you were going a little bit too fast.
DR. NELTE: I said that in connection with these military
actions, the decrees and directives were always transmitted to the
various offices of the OKW in the form of carbon copies I mean —
the offices which were in any way concerned. I thought, therefore . .

LAHOUSEN: Yes, but these were things which did not concern
my particular department, I stress the word "particular," I did not
even see them.
DR. NELTE: As later on in the conversation you were drawn
—
into the discussion on these questions it is true you did stress
that you did not know the actual wording of the orders . . .

LAHOUSEN: Orders which I did not see and read. Of course,

I knew a great many things, because I came to hear of them.

DR. NELTE: For that reason, I want to ask you whether you
recall that the Gestapo and SD had interfered behind the advance

8
 1 Dec. 45

in connection with Poland, contrary to the intentions expressed in

the orders of the military leaders?
LAHOUSEN: cannot recall that today. I can only refer to what
I
I heard and what is recorded in the files on this matter, namely,
the remark of Hitler's, which was passed down by Keitel, who was
chief at that time, and which was to the effect, that if the armed
forces objected to these measures, the armed forces as well as the
—
high command ^that is apparently what you mean would have —
to put up with it if the Gestapo and the SS went ahead with these
things. That is all I can tell you. I know that because I was present
at these discussions.
DR. NELTE: During this conversation, were you not told that
—
General Blaskowitz in other words, the Army had made a —
complaint about the methods of the SS and the SD?
LAHOUSEN: Whether or not this question was brought up at
this conference, I cannot recall. I can hardly assume that it was
brought up, because otherwise this question would have been re-
corded in the notes of that conference, particularly since the com-
plaint came from General Blaskowitz, whose attitude in such
matters was quite clear and well known. But apart from this
conversation in the Fiihrer's train, I do recall something about the
matter just mentioned, that is, the objections raised by Blaskowitz.
I cannot say today how these objections were made, whether in
writing or by word of mouth, neither do I know the occasion on
which they were made. While I do remember the substance of the
matter, I cannot recall whether it came up for discussion at the
meeting where I was present.
DR. NELTE: What appears to me to be important in this matter,
is the fact that the Wehrmacht, the troops, really did protest, or at
least refused . . .

LAHOUSEN: That the Armed Forces did object, is, of course,

quite evident.
DR. NELTE: That is what I wanted to know. Who gave the
order . . .

LAHOUSEN: One moment, please. When I say "the Armed

Forces," I mean
the masses of common soldiers, the ordinary simple
men. Of course, there were in these Armed Forces other men whom
I wish to exclude. I do not wish to be misunderstood. The concept
"Armed Forces" does not include everybody, but it does include the
mass of simple men with natural feelings.
DR. NELTE: When using the term "Wehrmacht" I only wanted
to bring out the contrast between the broad masses of the soldiers
and the SS and SD, and I think we are agreed on this.
LAHOUSEN: I think we have ample and fairly conclusive proof
of this contrast in the conditions prevailing and the methods used

9
1 Dec. 45

at that time, which in that form and scope were then for the first
time shown openly enough to become apparent to the broad masses
of the Wehrmacht —
quite apart from anything I can say about it in
this short, extremely short exposition.

DR. NELTE: Who gave the order regarding the collaboration

with the Ukrainian group? You spoke yesterday . . .

LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have to go back somewhat farther. First of

all I must say that this group was composed of citizens from various
countries, that is, Hungarians, Czechs, and afterwards Polish
citizens, who because of their attitude of opposition, had emigrated
or gone to Germany. I cannot say who gave the order for the
collaboration, because at the time when these things happened it —
was some time back, I remember quite clearly it was in 1938 or
—
even earlier I was not even working in the Amt Ausland Abwehr
and was not in touch with the Department, which I did not take
over until the beginning of 1939. It was already on a firm footing
when I took it over.
In this connection I must add, since it was also touched upon
yesterday, that these Ukrainians, at least the majority of them, had
no ties whatsoever with Germany. I can say definitely that a large
proportion of these people with whom the Amt Ausland Abwehr
had contact at that time were in German concentration camps, and
that some of these people were fighting for their country in Soviet
partisan groups. That is a fact.
DR. NELTE: Did Admiral Canaris not tell you that the Chief of
theOKW, Keitel, when informed by the SS of the demand for Polish
uniforms and military equipment, had given the clear order that the
Abteilung Abwehr should have nothing to do with this game?
LAHOUSEN: As I stated yesterday, this matter was handled very
mysteriously and secretly also in our circle. Not only myself, but
the others also, knew absolutely nothing about the game which was
being played until after it actually happened. The War Diary of the
Department makes this very clear. It records that one day, quite
suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, a demand was received, by order
of Canaris, for so and so many uniforms for an undertaking known
as "Himmler". My amazement and my enquiry as to how Himmler
came to have anything to do with an undertaking which required
Polish uniforms is also recorded in the War Diary, not by me, but by
the officer who kept this diary. In reply I was merely told that these
articles of equipment would be picked up by a certain person on a
certain day, and no further explanation was given. And there the
matter ended. Of course, when the name of Himmler was mentioned,
besides being mysterious, the thing immediately began to appear
suspicious to us. By us, I mean everybody who had to do with it
in the course of his duty, right down to the ordinary sergeant, who,

10
 1 Dec. 45

of course,had to procure these uniforms by some means or other

and deliver them to a certain Hauptsturmführer SS the name is —
recorded in the War Diary. These people had their misgivings.
That was a thing which could not be forbidden.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday you also made statements about the
treatment of prisoners of war. In what way was Abwehr II con-
cerned with prisoner-of-war questions?
LAHOUSEN: That is quite simple. Abwehr II was naturally very
interested in an objective way that prisoners of war should be
treated as well and as decently as possible, and the same applies to
any intelligence service in the world. That was all.
DR. NELTE: Do I understand you to mean that Abwehr II, as a
department, was not concerned with prisoner-of-war questions?
LAHOUSEN: It had absolutely nothing to do with prisoner-of-
war questions.
DR. NELTE: Yesterday you spoke about the problem of the treat-
ment of prisoners of war in connection with a conference that took
place, if I remember rightly, at the end of July 1941?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, at this conference did not represent only my
I
section, but the whole Amt Ausland Abwehr,
that is to say for —
general questions of international law and military political ques-
tions, that is, those questions which to the greatest extent generally
concerned foreign countries, and the intelligence sections. Depart-
ment III which dealt with espionage was practically interested be- —
cause after all, the officers affiliated with it were in the prisoner-
of-war camps. Naturally, from the point of view of my section it
was important to be informed about those matters and that my —
section was only interested within the frame of the entire problem,
that people should not be killed off, but treated decently, quite
apart from any of the other considerations which were mentioned.
DR. NELTE: You said yesterday that the prisoner-of-war camps
in the operations zone of the Eastern sectorwere under the OKW.
Is that correct?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I said about prisoner-of-war camps
what
yesterday I the conference with Reinecke, and not from
knew from
any knowledge of the orders themselves, which I had neither seen
nor read. At this conference I was able to obtain a clear idea of the
prisoner-of-war question owing to the presence of Reinecke, the chief
of the prisoner-of-war department, who represented his own depart-
ment and the OKW, and I repeated everything I remembered about
this.
DR. NELTE: What I was really asking was about the limitation
of the jurisdictions.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.

11
1 Dec. 45

DR. NELTE: Do you know that in the Army Operational Zone the
army on operations was responsible for the care of prisoners of war?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. NELTE: And that the OKW became responsible for their care
only when the prisoners of war arrived in Germany?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I I knew about the matter at
repeated what
the time from what I had heard. This was that the General Staff
of the Army had made all preparations to bring these people back,
and Hitler then authorized the OKW
to hold this up, and the OKW
was then held responsible by the General Staff for the consequences.
What happened after that I do not know and have no right to judge.
I can only repeat what I saw and heard.

DR. NELTE: I thought that yesterday you expressed the conjec-

ture that the prisoners were not brought back owing to an order
from Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: I did not express a conjecture. I simply repeated
what heard at the time and what
I I know. It might, of course, have
been wrong.
DR. NELTE: Heard from whom?
LAHOUSEN: I heard this from the people with whom I was in
daily contact, that is, at the daily situation conferences, at which
Canaris, the department chiefs, and other people who came there to
report were present. I heard it there, and a great deal was said about
this matter. I have always made this clear since my first interroga-
tion. I told Reinecke to his face that what he himself said about this
question at the time . . .

DR. NELTE: That has nothing to do with my question.

LAHOUSEN: I understand your question perfectly. I only want
to make it quite clear how I came yesterday to say what I did to —
examine how far this applies according to the actual, organizational
and other divisions . . .

DR. NELTE: But you know that in principle the OKW had charge
of prisoners of war only in Germany?
LAHOUSEN: There is no question about that.

DR. NELTE: How could it Abwehr office adopted

happen that the
the attitude you defined yesterday regarding the question of enemy
commando activities? You were supposed to deal with these things
—
from the German side, but you that is, your department were not —
officially concerned with the handling of these things?

LAHOUSEN: No, not immediately concerned. The Amt Ausland

had something do with these things because somehow it received
to
intelligence of any order that was under consideration, even before
it was put into shape, and certainly as soon as it was drawn up. The

12
 1 Dec. 45

order in question had, of course, a bearing on an essential point of

international law, and the Ausland section of the Abwehr depart-
—
ment or rather the "Sachbearbeiter" (expert) as he was called was —
naturally concerned with it. As a matter of fact, my department was
directly concerned with these things for reasons which I have
already explained, because it might turn out that persons for whom
Iwas responsible might be directly affected.
DR. NELTE: Did the department which dealt with international
law in the Amt Ausland Abwehr ever put its official attitude in
writing?
LAHOUSEN: As I pointed out yesterday, I wrote a contribution on
the subject, from the point of view of my section, which was trans-
mitted to Canaris and was to be part of the long document. I only
learned what use was made of it from what Bürckner said at the
time, and which was that his department passed the thing on in this
manner, either in writing or verbally, as a protest or counter re-
monstrance, at any rate pointing out the dangers. This happened a
second time, and again I cannot say in what form, whether verbally
—
or in writing or vice versa the first time in writing and then ver-
—
bally after executions had already taken place, and because I had
again started to make myself heard because of the executions that
had already taken place. That was the logical development.
DR. NELTE: You also said something yesterday about putting a
distinguishing mark on Russian prisoners by branding. Did it become
known to you that such a scheme, as brought out in this question,
was cancelled by a telephoned order from the Chief of the OKW,
who had gone to the Führer's headquarters for this purpose, and
that it was only because of a regrettable, a terrible misunderstand-
ing, that a few copies of this order were issued.

LAHOUSEN: No, I do not know about this, because, generally

speaking, I only heard of the things which happened in the Amt
Ausland Abwehr, that is, from Canaris' section downwards, if I was
directly concerned with them. What happened on the higher levels,
that is, from Canaris upwards, was and could only be known to me
if I was in some way connected with it.
DR. NELTE: You yourself did not see the order?
LAHOUSEN: Which order are you referring to?
DR. NELTE: The one concerning the branding of Russian pris-
oners.
LAHOUSEN: No. As in the case of the Commando Order and
others, attended only the very lively discussion of this question,
I

and with regard to the branding of Russian prisoners I remember

Canaris mentioning that a doctor had furnished a written report on
how this could be done most efficiently.

13
1 Dec. 45

DR. NELTE: You stated yesterday that Admiral Canaris had said
that the Defendant Keitel had given the order to do away with
General Weygand?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. NELTE: The Defendant Keitel denies that. He now asks
whether you ever saw any document or written proof of this order.
He wants to know the origin of any statement which concerned
General Weygand.
LAHOUSEN: This order was not given in writing, but it came
to me because I was supposed to put it into execution, that is, not I,
but my department. It came up through Canaris, in that circle which
I have so often described, and which means that it was known
only to a few. I was brought into the matter through a talk which
Canaris gave at Keitel's office in the OKW and at which I was
present. Keitel had already addressed me on the matter. I recorded
this in my personal notes and I mentioned the date. After all, such
a thing was not an everyday occurrence, at least not to me. It was
23 December 1940.
DR. NELTE: Do you not remember the actual wording of the
question that Defendant Keitel was supposed to have asked?
LAHOUSEN: Of course I cannot remember the precise wording;
the incident happened too long ago. I remember the gist very well.
What he meant was, "What has been done in this matter? How do
things stand?"
DR. NELTE: You said yesterday that you gave an evasive
answer.
LAHOUSEN: said yesterday that I could not remember exactly
I
how I worded my
answer but I certainly did not say what I had
said in the presence of Canaris, namely, "I would not think of exe-
cuting such a murderous order; my section and my officers are not
an organization of murderers. Anything but that." What I prob-
ably said to Keitel was something about how difficult the matter
was, or any evasive answer that I may have thought of.
DR. NELTE: If the Chief of the OKW had ordered such an action
on his own initiative or on higher orders, this would, because of the
high rank of General Weygand, have amounted to an act of state.
You did not tell us yesterday whether after December 23, 1940
anything transpired in this matter, that is to say, whether the Chief
of the OKW took up this question again.
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not say anything about that yesterday, but
I frequently mentioned during the interrogations that after that the
Chief of the OKW
did nothing more about it. Canaris' attitude made
it obvious that nothing further had been heard of it, for in the hier-
archy of commands which for me was authoritative, he would have

14
 1 Dec. 45

had to transmit orders to me. On the other hand, the information

which I received in the Giraud matter was authoritative.
DR. NELTE: We shall come to that presently. It is extraordinary
thatif an act of state, such as the murder of General Weygand, had

been ordered, nothing more should have been heard of it. Can you
explain this?
LAHOUSEN: can only explain it in the light of the construc-
I
tion which not onlyI myself, but also the others, put on the matter
at that time. The situation at that time was very agitated; events
followed each other very rapidly and something happened all the time;
—
and we assumed I shall come back to why we assumed it that this —
matter and the importance attached to it had been superseded by
some more important military or political event, and that it had
receded into the background.
DR. NELTE: Do you wish to say anything else?
LAHOUSEN: Yes. I wish to state that what I am saying now
has a certain bearing on the inner development of the Giraud
affair. We—that is, Canaris, myself, and the others —who knew
about this when the matter started, had hoped that it would take
the same course as the Weygand affair; that is, that the matter
would be dropped. Whether the order had been given by Keitel, or
Hitler or Himmler, it would have been shelved when it came to
Canaris and to me. In our circles it would have been relatively
easy to intercept it or to divert it. That was what we hoped when
the Giraud affair came up, as we had seen what actually had hap-
pened in the Weygand affair. Whether that was right or wrong
I cannot judge. This is the explanation.
DR. NELTE: For a important matter your argument might
less
be plausible, but in such an important matter as the Weygand case
it does not seem to me to hold water. But even if it had been so,

had the intention to do away with Weygand existed in any quar-

ters and for any reason, how do you explain the fact that Wey-
gand, who later was taken to Germany and housed in a villa, lived
undisturbed and honored and met with no harm? It would have
been understandable if the order to eliminate him had been seri-
ously expressed in any quarters, that it should have been carried
out on this occasion.
LAHOUSEN: I can only answer to this that the attitude towards
personalities in publiclife, whether at home or abroad, varied a
great deal. There were high personalities who at one moment were
in great favor and thought of very highly, and at the next moment
were to be found in a concentration camp.
DR. NELTE: Now regarding the Giraud case, you stated that Ad-
miral Canaris said in your presence and the presence of others that

15
1 Dec. 45

General Giraud was to be done away with on orders from higher

quarters.
LAHOUSEN: Yes. That it is so is borne out by the remark that
Pieckenbrock made, and which I remember very well, that Herr
Keitel should tell these things to Herr Hitler once and for all.
DR. NELTE: So according to the communication made to you by
Admiral Canaris, it was not an order of Keitel's but an order of
Hitler's.
LAHOUSEN: As far as we knew in the Abwehr office, it was
Keitel who gave
the order to Canaris. I can only assume this in
view of an order Hitler made to this effect. I do not know who
actually gave this order, because I had no insight into the hierarchy
of command beyond Canaris. It was, as far as I was concerned, an
—
order from Canaris an order which I could discuss immediately
with him, in the same way as I can discuss it here.
DR. NELTE: You yourself did not hear this order?
LAHOUSEN: No, I personally did not hear it. I never said I did.

DR. NELTE: But you mentioned that later Keitel spoke to you
about this matter?
LAHOUSEN: The procedure was the same as in the case of
Weygand.
DR. NELTE: Do you remember whether any precise or positive
expression such as "killing," "elimination," or something similar
was used on this occasion?
LAHOUSEN: The word generally used was "elimination" (um-
legen).
DR. NELTE: What I mean is whether in this connection such a
word was used by the Defendant Keitel in addressing you?
LAHOUSEN: —
Yes, of course when I gave my report, the notes
of which I have, together with the date, just as in the Weygand
case. For reasons unknown to me, the Giraud affair was apparently
carried further than the Weygand affair, for Canaris and I could
determine the different stages in its development.
DR. NELTE: You did not answer my question. What did the
Defendant Keitel say to you in this instance, when you were pres-
ent at the occasion of a report by Canaris and the question of Gi-
raud was brought up? What did he say?
LAHOUSEN: The same thing: "How does the matter stand?"
And by "matter" he clearly meant Giraud's elimination, and that
was the very subject we discussed under similar conditions in the
Weygand affair.
DR. NELTE: That is your opinion, but that is not the fact on
which you have to give evidence. I wish to find out from you what

16
 1 Dec. 45

Keitel actually said to you. When speaking to you or in your

presence, did he use the expression "dispose of" or "eliminate"?
LAHOUSEN: I cannot remember the expression he used, but it
was perfectly clear what it was all about. Whatever it was, it was
not a question of sparing Giraud's life or imprisoning him. They
had had the opportunity to do that while he was in occupied terri-
tory.
DR. NELTE: That is what I want to speak about now. You are
familiar with the fact that after Giraud's flight and his return to
Unoccupied France, a conference took place in Occupied France.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I heard of that.
DR. NELTE: Ambassador Abetz had a talk with General Giraud
which dealt with the question of his voluntary return to confine-
ment. You know that?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I heard of that.
DR. NELTE: Then you probably also know that at that time the
commander immediately called up the Fiihrer's head-
local military
quarters by way of Paris. It was believed that an important com-
munication was to be made; namely, that Giraud was in Occupied
France and could be taken prisoner?
LAHOUSEN: I know about this in its broad outline.
DR. NELTE: Then you know also that the OKW—that is to say
in this case, Keitel —then decided that this should not happen.
LAHOUSEN: No, that I do not know.
DR. NELTE: But you do know that General Giraud returned to
Unoccupied France without having been harmed?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I do know that.

DR. NELTE: Well, in that case, the answer to my previous

question is self-apparent.
LAHOUSEN: I speak the truth when I say I do not know. I
could not have known unless they had talked about it in my
presence.
DR. NELTE: Well, it is so, and the facts prove it to be so. Did
you know that General Giraud's family lived in Occupied France?
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not know that.
DR. NELTE: I thought the Abwehr division was entrusted with
surveillance of this region?
LAHOUSEN: —
No, you are mistaken certainly not my depart-
ment. I do not know whether another department was in charge
of that.
DR. NELTE: The question was asked simply to prove that the
family did not suffer because General Giraud escaped and later

17
1 Dec. 45

refused to return to captivity. I have one more question which you

may be able to answer.
LAHOUSEN: I beg your pardon. May I return, please, to the
question of Giraud?
DR. NELTE: This question also has to do with General Giraud.
LAHOUSEN: Very well.
DR. NELTE: Do you know that one day your chief, Canaris, re-
ceived by special courier a letter from Giraud in which Giraud
asked whether he might return to France? Do you know that?
LAHOUSEN: No. No, I do not know about it. Perhaps I was
not in Berlin at the time. I was not always in Berlin.
DR. NELTE: I am aware of that. I thought it might be men-
tioned in the diary.
LAHOUSEN: No, I did not keep the diary. I simply made ad-
ditions to itso far as my particular department was concerned, but
I was not familiar with the diary in its entirety.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now for 10 min-
utes.

[A recess was taken.]

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for De-

fendant Dönitz): I would like to make a motion in connection with
the technical side of the proceedings. In the course of the proceed-
ings, many German witnesses will be heard. It is important that
the Tribunal should know exactly what the witnesses say. During
the hearing of this witness I have tried to compare what the wit-
ness actually said with the English translation. I think I can state
that in many essential points the translation did not entirely cor-
respond to the statement of the witness. I would, therefore, like
to suggest that German stenographers take down directly the state-
ments of the witness in German so that Defense Counsel will have
an opportunity of comparing what the witness actually says with
the English translation and, if necessary, of making an application
for the correction of the translation. That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Justice Jackson.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the
United States): I just want to inform the Court and Counsel, in
connection with the observation that has just been made, that that
has been anticipated and that every statement of the witness is
recorded in German, so that if any question arises, if Counsel ad-
dresses a motion to it, the testimony can be verified.

18
 1 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Is that German record available to Defend-

ants' Counsel?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don't think it is. It is not, so far
as I know. It would not be available unless there were some occa-
sion for it.

THE PRESIDENT: It is transcribed, I suppose?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: don't know how far that process is
I

carried. I will consult the technicians and advise about it, but I
know that it is preserved. The extent of my knowledge now is that
it is preserved in such a form that, if a question does arise, it can

be accurately determined by the Tribunal, so that if they call at-

tention to some particular thing, either the witness can correct it
or we can have the record produced. It would not be practicable
to make the recording available without making reproducing ma-
chines available. While I am not a technician in that field, I would
not think it would be practicable to place that at their disposal.
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't it be practicable to have a tran-
scription made German and, within the
of the shorthand notes in
course of one or two days after the evidence has been given, place
that transcription in the Defendants' Counsel room?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is being done. I think
perhaps Colonel Dostert can explain just what is being done better
than I can, because he is the technician in this field. I am sure that
no difficulty need arise over this matter of correct translations.
COLONEL LEON DOSTERT (Chief of Interpreters): Your
Honors, the reports of the proceedings are taken down in all four
languages and every word spoken in German is taken down in
German by German court stenographers. The notes are then
transcribed and can be made available to Defense Counsel. More-
over, there is a mechanical recording device which registers every
single word spoken in any language in the courtroom, and in case
of doubt about the authenticity of the reporters' notes, we have the
further verification of the mechanical recording, so that Defense
Counsel should have every opportunity to check the authenticity
of the translation.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am advised further by Colonel
German transcript are being delivered
Dostert that 25 copies of the
to the defendants each day.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I was

not informed that the German testimony is being taken down in
shorthand in German. I assumed that the records handed over to
us were translations. If German shorthand notes are being taken
in the court, I withdraw my motion.

19
1 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: I think we shall get on faster if the Defend-

ants' Counsel, before making motions, inquire into the matters
about which they are making the motions.
DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Ribbentrop):
I would like to ask a few questions of the witness.
Witness, you previously stated that at some time an order was
given, according to which, Russian prisoners of war were to be
marked in a certain manner and that this order had been with-
drawn by the Defendant Keitel. You did say that, did you not?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I said that I have knowledge that there was
this purpose,

DR. SAUTER: This is interesting from the point of view of

the Defendant Ribbentrop, and I would like to hear from you
whether you know about this matter. Ribbentrop maintains that
when he heard about the order to brand Russian prisoners of war,
he, in his capacity as Reich Foreign Minister, went immediately to
the Fiihrer's headquarters to inform General Field Marshal Keitel
of this order, and pointed out to him that he, Ribbentrop, in his
capacity as Foreign Minister, as well as in his capacity as the
guarantor of international law, objected to such treatment of Rus-
sian prisoners of war.
I would be interested to know. Witness, whether in your circle

something was said as to who drew Keitel's attention to this order

and asked him to retract it?
LAHOUSEN: I was not informed of that and I only knew, as
I said yesterday, that there had been this intention, but it was not
carried out.
DR. SAUTER: Then I have another question.
Witness, you spoke yesterday about some remarks of the
Defendant Ribbentrop, especially one statement to the effect that
—
an uprising should be staged in Poland not in Russia and that —
all Polish farm houses should go up in flames and all Jews should
be killed. That, roughly, was how the statement ran.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: Now, believe, in answering a question
later on, I

you amplified your statement by

of one of the Russian prosecutors,
mentioning an order of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I would now
like to know whether you really meant to say that it was an order
from Ribbentrop to a military department?
LAHOUSEN: No.
DR. SAUTER: Just a minute please, so that you can answer
both questions together.

20
 1 Dec. 45

I would also like to remind you that yesterday, when this

matter was first discussed, you spoke of a directive which, I believe,
your superior officer had, as you said, received from Ribbentrop?
LAHOUSEN: No, the Chief of the OKW
received it, not my
superior officer, who was Canaris. I would like to repeat it, in
order to clarify this matter. It was a matter that came up for
discussion on the 12th of September 1939 in the Fiihrer's train.
These meetings took place in the following sequence with respect
to time and locality: At first a short meeting took place between
the Reich Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Canaris in his coach.
DR. SAUTER: Were you present?
LAHOUSEN: I was present at that meeting. General political
questions regarding Poland and the Ukrainians in Poland were
discussed. I do not know anything more about this meeting, which
was the first.
After that there was another meeting in the coach of Keitel,
who was then Chief of the OKW, and in the course of this meeting
Keitel summarized and commented on the general political
directives issued by Ribbentrop. He then mentioned several possible
solutions for the handling of the Polish problem from the point of
—
view of foreign policy this can happen, or something else can
happen; it is quite possible. In this connection he said:
"You, Canaris, have to promote an uprising with the aid of
the Ukrainian organizations which are working with you
and which have the same objectives, namely, the Poles and
the Jews."
And then a third discussion, or rather, a very brief remark at
the end of a very short conversation between the Foreign Minister
Ribbentrop and Canaris was made in connection with this subject,
after the intention had been made quite clear. It was about how
the uprising was to be carried out and what was to happen.
I remember this so well, because he demanded that the farm
houses must bum. Canaris discussed the matter with me in detail
later on and referred to this remark.
That is what happened, as I have described it. This was the
sequence: Directives from the High Command to Keitel; then
passed on by Keitel to Canaris at this meeting; then repeated to
Canaris in the form of a remark which I remember so well because
it contained the words about farm houses in flames, which is rather

an unusual thing to say.

THE PRESIDENT: It assist the Tribunal if one question
would
at a time were asked and the witnesses would answer "yes" or
if

"no" to the question asked, and explain, if they must, afterwards.

21
 —

1 Dec. 45

But questions and answers should be put as shortly as possible

and only one question should be asked at a time.
DR. SAUTER: Now, witness, something else has struck me.
THE PRESIDENT: You heard what I said did you? Do you
understand it?

DR. SAUTER: [Continuing.] Yesterday you said that these

remarks of Ribbentrop are not in the diary, if I understood you
correctly.
LAHOUSEN: No, this is not from the diary but has a connection
with Canaris' diary, by means of which I can make this remark.
DR. SAUTER: You said yesterday that this remark struck you
as being rather surprising.
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. SAUTER: And today you said that General Blaskowitz also
made some striking statements. You also mentioned, however, that
these statements of Blaskowitz were not entered in the diary.
LAHOUSEN: No.
—
DR. SAUTER: Now, it occurs to me and I would like you to
answer this question: Why, if this remark of the Defendant Rib-
bentrop surprised you, was it not entered in the diary?
LAHOUSEN: Regarding Blaskowitz, I have to say or rather —
repeat the following:
I said that I did not hear the Blaskowitz matter mentioned in
this connection during the meeting, and I cannot assume that this
subject came up concurrently, otherwise it would have been
entered in these notes. It may be, of course, that the Blaskowitz
matter was discussed at a time when I was not there. I have only
put down what I heard or what Canaris told me to enter in the
record.
DR. SAUTER: But did you yourself hear that from Ribbentrop?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, but the substance was not altered. Whether
one speaks of extermination, elimination, or the burning of farms,
they all amount to terroristic measures.
DR. SAUTER: Did Von Ribbentrop really talk of killing Jews?
Are you sure you remember that?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I remember that, because Canaris
definitely
talked not only to me, but also to others in Vienna about this
matter and called me time and again as a witness.
DR. SAUTER: You heard that too?
LAHOUSEN: That did not settle the matter, but these words of
Ribbentrop's were frequently discussed.
DR. SAUTER: Witness, something else. You have told us about
murderous designs on which you or your department or other

22
 .

1 Dec. 45

officers were employed or which you were charged to carry out.

Did you report these to any police station as the law required? May
I point out that according to German law failure to report intended
crimes is punishable with imprisonment or in serious cases with
death.
LAHOUSEN: Well, when you talk about German law, I cannot
I am not a lawyer, but just an ordinary man.
follow you.
DR. SAUTER; As far as I know, that is also punishable accord-
ing to Austrian law.
LAHOUSEN: At that time Austrian law, as far as I know, was
no longer valid.

DR. SAUTER: In other words, you never reported the intended

crime, either as a private person or as an official?
LAHOUSEN: I should have had to make a greatmany reports
—about 100,000 projected murders, of which I knew and could not
help but know. You can read about them in the records and —
—
about shootings and the like of which of necessity I had knowl-
edge, whether I wanted to know or not, because, unfortunately, I
was in the midst of it.
DR. SAUTER: It is not a matter of shootings which had taken
place and could no longer be prevented, but rather a matter of
intended murder at a time when perhaps it could have been
prevented.
LAHOUSEN: I can only answer: Why did the person who
received this order at first hand not do the same thing? Why did
he not denounce Hitler for instance?
DR. SAUTER: You, as a general of the German Wehrmacht,
should have asked Hitler . .

LAHOUSEN: I am sorry, you overestimate my rank, I had

only been a general in the German Wehrmacht since the first of
January 1945, that is, only for 4 months. At that time I was
lieutenant colonel and later colonel of the General Staff, not in the
General Staff.

DR. SAUTER: But in 1938, immediately after Hitler's attack

on Austria, you at once made a request to be taken into the Ger-
man Wehrmacht by Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: I did not make a request, and I did not have to
do this. Wherever I was in the service, I was known for my
special services. I was not a stranger. With the knowledge of the
Austrian Government and also, in a restricted sense, with the
knowledge of the German authorities (that is, of certain persons)
I was working for the Austrian Government in a matter which

exclusively concerned things outside the scope of Austrian internal

23
1 Dec. 45

policy. I co-operated with the Wehrmacht, as well as with the

Italianand Hungarian Governments with the knowledge of the
Austrian Government and the competent authorities. There were
matters of politics which were not my domain.
DR. SAUTER: But I believe, Witness, your memory deceives
you, because immediately after Hitler's attack on Austria, you
called on the General Staff in Berlin and there you tried to get a
commission in the German Wehrmacht, and you now deny this.
You also filled in and signed a questionnaire, in which you declared
your complete allegiance to the Greater German Reich and to
Adolf Hitler; and shortly afterwards you took the oath of allegiance
to Adolf Hitler.
LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, I did it just as everybody else who
was in the position of being transferred from one office and
capacity to another.
DR. SAUTER: Before, you said you did not apply for this
appointment, and I have information to the contrary: That you, in
the company of two or three other officers were the first to go to
Berlin with the sole purpose of asking the Chief of the German
General Staff Beck to take you into the German Army.
LAHOUSEN: I am very glad that you mention this subject,
because it allows me to make my position perfectly clear. It was
not necessary for me to make an application for my future posi-
tion in the German Wehrmacht. I was known because of my
military activities, just as any military attaché is known in the
country where he is accredited.
Moreover, I can easily explain why my rise in office was so
rapid. I have said that my activities and my co-operation with
the Austrian Military Intelligence Service, which were not
determined by me but by my superior Austrian office, were at
that time directed against the neighboring country of Czecho-
slovakia. Czechoslovakia was the country that was next on the list
after Austria. Therefore, it was natural that my later chief, Canaris,
who knew me from my former position, was very interested in
having me promoted put in a word for me,
in his department. He
and so did Colonel General Beck, whom I was visiting. Other people
also know this; and I have now told everything that General Beck
told me at that time.
DR. SAUTER: Then it is true, you did go to BerUn and apply

to be transferred into the German Wehrmacht, which you at first

denied?
LAHOUSEN: No, that is not true, I did not apply. Others made
the request. I can even say that I did not go there: I flew there.
Canaris, who knew me not only in my military capacity but also in

24
 .

1 Dec. 45

regard to my personal attitude (just as Marogna had known me and

just as Colonel General Beck, who was informed about me by
Canaris), made the request for me. I myself did not apply, but
others applied for me, for reasons which only later became clear
to me, because they knew my personal attitude, just as my Austrian
— —
comrades they were necessarily few knew about this and about
me. That is how things stood.
DR. SAUTER: I have no other questions to ask this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Before the cross-examination I wish to an-
nounce that there will be no public session of the Tribunal this
afternoon.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goring): I am
counsel for the Defendant Goring, and I would like to address a
few questions to the witness.
Witness, if I understood you correctly, you said yesterday that
it was
Canaris' personal conviction that his failure to prevent the
attack on Poland would mean the end of Germany and a great
misfortune for us. A
triumph of the system would mean an even
greater disaster, and it was the purpose of General Canaris to
prevent this. Did I understand you correctly?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, except for one point: Not that he had not
been successful in preventing it, but that it was not possible to
prevent it. Canaris had no way of knowing this . .

DR. STAHMER: Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, in

the first years of the war, had very active sabotage organizations
behind the enemy front and that he personally worked very hard
for these organizations?
LAHOUSEN: Naturally I knew about that, and I have fully
informed the American authorities who were interested in this
subject.
DR. STAHMER: But how is that possible? This would not be in
conformity with his inner political beliefs.
LAHOUSEN: This is explained by the fact that in the circle in
which he was active he could never say what he really thought,
and thousands of others could not do so either what I said is a —
truth without saying. The essential thing is not what he said,
or what he had to say in order to follow a purpose; but what he
did and how he did it. This I know and others know it, too.
DR. STAHMER: This is not a question of what he said, but of
what he actually did. He not only proposed such measures, but also
applied himself to their execution — is that true?
LAHOUSEN: Ostensibly he had, of course, to remain within the
limits of his office, in order to keep his position. That was the
important thing, that he should remain in this position, to prevent

25
1 Dec. 45

in 1939 the thing that actually happened in 1944: that Himmler

should take things in hand. I place before you these two men,
—
one against the other: Canaris and Himmler and I think I need
hardly tell you what Canaris was striving for when he (Canaris)
—
took part ostensibly took part in these activities.
DR. STAHMER: You
mentioned the name of Himmler, in this
connection, would like to ask the following question:
I

Is it known to you that Admiral Canaris, during the first years

of the war, laid great stress on his good relations with the SS
and the necessity for close co-operation with the SS, so much so,
that the Defendant Goring had to advise him to be more independent
of the SS in his military functions?
THE PRESIDENT: You are going too quickly and I do not think
you are observing what I said just now, that it will help the
Tribunal if you will ask one question at a time.
DR. STAHMER: I will put my question briefly; did the witness
know that Admiral Canaris, during the first years of the war, had
good connections with the SS and recognized the necessity for close
co-operation with the formation, and never failed to stress this?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, this is known to me. I also know why.
DR. STAHMER: And why?
LAHOUSEN: So that he might be in a position to see and
to know and keep himself informed of everything these people were
doing, and be able to intervene wherever and whenever possible.
DR. STAHMER: Was it the duty of your organization, or the duty
of Canaris' department to pass on important enemy intelligence to
the military leadership in good time?
LAHOUSEN: I do not understand what the office of Canaris
has to do with this?
DR. STAHMER: Your section of the office of Canaris?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, of course, the Department I.
DR. STAHMER: Now, according to my information, your office
did not pass on to the military departments concerned information
of the Anglo-American landing in North Africa. Is that true?
LAHOUSEN: I do not know. Please do not make me responsible
for the department. This is a question which could easily be
answered by Colonel Pieckenbrock, but not by me.
DR. STAHMER: Regarding the Case "Rowehl," you said yester-
day that a colonel of the Air Force, Rowehl, had formed a special
squadron, which had the tasks of making reconnaissance flights
over Poland, England, and the southeast sector prior to the Polish
campaign. Is that true?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.

26
 1 Dec. 45

DR. STAHMER: You also said that Colonel Rowehl went to

see Admiral Canaris to report on the results of these flights and
to submit photographs. Is that true?
LAHOUSEN: Yes. How should I have known about it otherwise?
I did not invent it.

DR. STAHMER: I did not say that. How did Colonel Rowehl
come to report to Admiral Canaris about this?
LAHOUSEN: I believe I mentioned yesterday, that this was a
function of the Amt Ausland Abwehr, Abteilung I.
DR. STAHMER: Have you yourself seen the photographs that
were taken over England?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, I have seen them.
DR. STAHMER: When and where were these pictures shown
to you?
LAHOUSEN: In the office of Canaris they were shown to me.
I had nothing do with them in an official way. I happened to
to
be present at the time. I was interested in seeing what was going on.
DR. STAHMER: What did these photographs show?
LAHOUSEN: I have forgotten the details. They were photographs
taken from airplanes.
DR. STAHMER: The photographs were not shown to you
officially?
LAHOUSEN: No, the photographs were not shown to me
officially, I was merely an interested spectator on this occasion, as
I have just told you.
DR. STAHMER: Did Rowehl give any written reports about
these flights to the Amt?
LAHOUSEN: I do not know.
DR. STAHMER: You do not know? You also said that Rowehl's
squadron made flights from Budapest?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: Do you know that from your own experience
or from some other information?
LAHOUSEN: I know it through personal investigation. The
date entered in the War Diary kept by the section. At that time
is
I was in Budapest, and I was asked to attend the conferring of a
citation in Budapest.
DR. STAHMER: That was before the Polish campaign?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: And why were these flights carried out from
Budapest?
LAHOUSEN: I do not know. I said that yesterday. A gentleman
of the Air Force would have to answer that.

27
1 Dec. 45

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Witness,

do you know Captain Strünck from the Abwehr?
LAHOUSEN: I would like you to tell me something more
than the name. The name alone does not mean anything to me.
Give me a few points that will refresh my memory.
DR. DIX: He is a lawyer who was a reserve officer with the
Abwehr. I do not know in which department, but I would say it
was in the department of Pieckenbrock. However, if you do not
know him I will not question you any further.
LAHOUSEN: If he was with Pieckenbrock I do not know him.
I knew a few. Is Strünck still alive?
DR. DIX: No, he isno longer living.
LAHOUSEN: Was he executed?
DR. DIX: He suffered the same death as Canaris and Oster. For
the information of the Court, I should like to add that I asked
this question because I named Strünck as a witness and the Court
has admitted him as such. I wish to take this opportunity ^but —
if you do not know him I will not continue questioning you.

LAHOUSEN: When I asked whether he is still alive, I seemed

to recall that this man, together with others whom I knew very
well, might have been killed, but I cannot be more definite on
this point.
DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): I would
like to ask the witness a few questions.
Witness, do you know that the Defendant Fritzsche, when in
May 1942 he was transferred to the 6th Army as a soldier and
there heard for the first time of the existence of an order for
executions, recommended to the Commander-in-Chief of the
6th Army, Paulus, that he should have this order suspended
within the jurisdiction of his army and have this decision made
known by leaflets to be dropped over the Russian front?
THE PRESIDENT: Be careful only to ask one question at a
time. You have just asked three or four questions at once.
DR. FRITZ: Yes, Sir. Is it known to you that Fritzsche gave
Paulus the advice to rescind the order for his army sector?
LAHOUSEN: That order had already been given to his army.
Will you kindly give me the approximate date?
DR. FRITZ: That was during the Russian campaign, as I
mentioned yesterday. Most of these things occurred in May 1942.
LAHOUSEN: No. I do not know anything about this in con-
nection with Fritzsche. In connection with the name Reichenau,
which was mentioned before, I do remember a conversation between
Reichenau and Canaris at which I was present. It made a great

28
 1 Dec. 45

impression on me. During this conversation, and in this circle,

where there were several other gentlemen present, Reichenau held
quite different ideas and judged things quite differently from what
I had expected of him. Apart from that, I do not know anything
about this particular question.
DR. FRITZ: Also nothing concerning the fact that Paulus had
rescinded the order within the sector of his army?
LAHOUSEN: No, not in connection with the name Paulus, but
in general I believe, as I also stated yesterday, that several army
commanders, whose names are no longer in my memory today, or
whose names have been recorded, were mentioned by me.
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kalten-
brunner): Do you know Mr. Kaltenbrunner?
LAHOUSEN: Kaltenbrunner? I met Kaltenbrunner only once
in my life, and that was on a day that will always remain in my
memory. It was also the first meeting between Canaris and Kalten-
brunner. It took place in Munich in the Regina Hotel, and it was
on the day when two young people, a student and his sister, were
arrested and executed. They had distributed leaflets in the audi-
torium of the University of Munich. I read the contents of the
leaflets, and I remember, among other things, that they contained
an appeal to the Wehrmacht.
I can easily reconstruct that day. It was the first and last time
that I saw Kaltenbrunner, with whose name I was familiar. Of
course. Kaltenbrunner mentioned this subject to Canaris, who was
completely shattered because of what had happened that day and
—
was still under the painful impression and thank God there are
still witnesses available who can When discussing
testify to this.
the matter Kaltenbrunner was very much to the point, but at the
same time he was quite cynical about it. That is the only thing
I can tell you about this matter.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner claims that Himmler retained

full executive powers for himself, while he was only in charge of
tlie intelligence service. Is this borne out by the conversation that
you just mentioned?
LAHOUSEN: I would like you to know what bearing that has

—
on the Kaltenbrunner-Himmler matter the struggle for power
which was taking place in the SS. I have merely described this
event. I can give you the names of the people present, who like
myself were very much impressed for the reasons which I have
mentioned.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for the SA): You were asked
yesterday whether the orders regarding the treatment of Soviet
prisoners of war were known to the leaders of the SA and other
organizations, and your answer was that these orders must have

29
1 Dec. 45

been known to them. I would now like to ask you who these leaders
were at the time and what were their names?
LAHOUSEN: Who they were and what their names were, I do
not know. I also stated explicitly yesterday why I said so. They
must have been known to them and to a large circle through the
execution of these orders, and, of course, through the return of the
wounded. The German people must have learned about them.
HERR BÖHM: In other words, it was only an opinion of yours,
but in no way a fact based on personal observation?
LAHOUSEN: No, it was not. I personally never had anything to
do with any SA leader. I never had anything to do with them, and
I do not think any one of them knows me well.

HERR BÖHM: Could you make a statement on this, that is,

whether the orders which were mentioned yesterday were given
to the formations of the SA?
LAHOUSEN: Would you kindly formulate that question again?
HERR BÖHM: Could you make another statement as to whether
the contents of these orders, which were discussed yesterday, were
sent to the formations of the SA through official channels?
LAHOUSEN: No, not through official channels, but in the way I
.

have previously indicated; in other words, members of the SA who

were also in the Wehrmacht could see actually what happened out
there, and when they came back they spoke about it, the same as
anyone else. It was only in this connection . . .

HERR BÖHM: Is it known to you whether members of the SA

had anything at all to do with the handling of prisoners of war?
LAHOUSEN: When members of the SA were in the Wehrmacht,
yes.
HERR BÖHM: Did you make any personal observations in this
connection?
LAHOUSEN: No, I never said that. I said I had already talked
about the SA.
HERR BÖHM: I asked you which leaders of the SA formations
knew about them, and you answered that they should have known
about them.
LAHOUSEN: I said the leaders of these organizations came to
know about them in this way.
HERR BÖHM: And today I ask you whether the individual for-
mations of the SA had received these orders.
LAHOUSEN: I can only repeat what I said yesterday, and I think
I was very clear on the subject, in other words, how these orders
were issued. I myself did not read these orders, but I know the
effects they had.

30
 1 Dec. 45

HERR BÖHM: I can imagine myself how this happened, but I

asked you whether you know anything about how these orders
reached the SA?
LAHOUSEN: No.
HERR BÖHM: You do not know? Do you know anything from
your own personal observations about members of the SA being
employed for the supervision of prisoner-of-war camps?
LAHOUSEN: Yes, because from my personal observations, once
when I was on my way to the Army Group North, I caught an SA
man who was kicking a Russian prisoner of war and I pulled him
up about it. I think that is mentioned somewhere in my records,
and also an episode about an Arbeitsdienst man.
HERR BÖHM: Did you report any of these incidents through the
proper channels? Did you see to it that the leaders of this organiza-
tion were informed about them?
LAHOUSEN: I reported it to my superior officer, or it was men-
tioned in my report on my visit either orally or in writing. There
were discussions on this and similar incidents.
HERR BÖHM: Have you got anything in your records?
LAHOUSEN: Yes.
HERR BÖHM: Will you please submit it?

LAHOUSEN: I am looking it up. This is about the Arbeitsdienst

man, this document.
HERR BÖHM: It is not about the SA man?
LAHOUSEN: No.
HERR BÖHM: Then you cannot submit anything in answer to
my question?
LAHOUSEN: I do not have it here. I would have to look it up.
HERR BÖHM: Do you think you might find some records?
LAHOUSEN: I would have to have an opportunity of going
through the whole of the material which is in the hands of the
American authorities to find this one.
HERR BÖHM: I will ask the Court that you be given this op-
portunity.
I would also like to inquire whether you were ever able to ob-
serve that members of the SA whom you ascertained were employed
on supervisory duties, ever took any measures which were in line
with the orders against Soviet soldiers.
LAHOUSEN: No, not personally.
HERR BÖHM: Thank you.
DR. STAHMER: I would like to ask the Court for a fundamental
ruling on whether the defendant also has the right personally to ask

31
1 Dec. 45

the witness questions. According to the German text of the Charter,

Paragraph 16, I believe this is permissible.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the point you

have raised and will let you know later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The United States Prosecution would

desire to be heard, I am sure, there were any probability of that
if

view being taken by the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better hear you now, Mr.
Justice Jackson.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I think it is very clear that
these provisions are mutually exclusive. Each defendant has the
right to conduct his own defense or to have the assistance of
counsel. Certainly this would become a performance rather than a
trial if we go into that sort of thing. In framing this Charter, we
anticipated the possibility that some of these defendants, being
lawyers themselves, might conduct their own defenses. If they
do so, of course they have all the privileges of counsel. If they
avail themselves of the privileges of counsel, they are not, we
submit, entitled to be heard in person.
DR. STAHMER: I would like to point out once more that
Paragraph 16 (e), according to my opinion, speaks very clearly for
my point of view. It says that the defendant has the right, either
personally or through his counsel, to present evidence, and accord-
ing to the German text it is clear that the defendant has the right
to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution. According
to the German text there reference can be made only to the
—
defendant with respect to terms as well as to the contents. In my
opinion it is made clear that the defendant has the right to cross-
examine any witness called by the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other German counsel, defendant's
counsel, wish to cross-examine the witness?
DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): I
would only like to point out that in the written forms given to us
by the Court, the defendant, as well as his counsel can make a
motion. A place is left for two signatures on the questionnaire.
I conclude, therefore, that the defendant himself has the right to
speak on the floor.

THE PRESIDENT: What I asked was whether any other

defendant's counsel wished to cross-examine the witness.
[Herr Böhm approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: What is it? Wouldyou put the earphones on,
you understand English. What is it you want to ask
please, unless
now? You have already cross-examined the witness.

32
 1 Dec. 45

HERR BÖHM: Yes, I have cross-examined him, but he has given

me understand that he made a report about an incident which
to
occurred during one of his visits of inspection, and that he has
some written notes. As I am not yet able to release the witness, I
should like to move that the Prosecution allow to be placed at the
disposal of the witness any available notes or reports on the
observations made by him at the time, so that he may find the
evidence he wants.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you must conclude your cross-
examination now.
HERR BÖHM: Certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court thinks it would be better if you
want to make any further application with reference to this witness,
that you should make it in writing later.
HERR BÖHM: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, as no other defendant's counsel wishes
to cross-examine the witness, theTribunal will now retire for the
purpose of considering the question raised by Dr. Stahmer as to
whether a defendant has the right to cross-examine as well as his
own counsel.
[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has carefully considered the

question raised by Dr. Stahmer, and it holds that defendants who
are represented by counsel have not the right to cross-examine
witnesses. They have the right to be called as witnesses themselves
and to make a statement at the end of the Trial.
Do the Prosecutors wish to ask any questions of this witness in
re-examination?
COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for
the United States): Just one question, your Lordship.
THE PRESIDENT: Let the witness come back here.
THE MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): He was taken away.
THE PRESIDENT: Taken away?
THE MARSHAL: That's right. He was taken away by some
captain who brought him here for the Trial. They have sent after
him now.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know how far he has been taken
away?
THE MARSHAL: No, Sir, I do not. I will find out immediately.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are the questions that you
wish to ask of sufficient importance for the Tribunal to wait for
this witness or for him to be recalled on Monday?

33
1 Dec. 45

COL. AMEN: I don't believe so, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well then. The Tribunal will adjourn,
and it will be understood that in the future no witness will be
removed whilst he is under examination, from the precincts of this
Court except on the orders of the Tribunal.
COL. AMEN: I do not know how that happened Your Lordship,
I understood he was still here.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 3 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

34
 ELEVENTH DAY
Monday, 3 December 1945

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: I call on the prosecutor for the United States.

SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United

States) May it please the Tribunal, it occurs
: to me that perhaps the
Tribunal might be interested in a very brief outline of what might
be expected to occur within the next week or two weeks in this
Trial.
I shall immediately proceed with the aggressive war case, to
present the story of the rape of Czechoslovakia. I shall not perhaps
be able to conclude that today.
Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British chief prosecutor, has asked
that he be allowed to proceed tomorrow morning with his opening
statement on Count Two and I shall be glad to yield for that pur-
pose, with the understanding that we shall resume on Czecho-
slovakia after that.
Thereafter, the British prosecutor will proceed to present the
aggressive warfare case as to Poland, which brought France and
England into the war. Thereupon the British prosecutor will proceed
with the expansion of aggressive war in Europe, the aggression
against Norway and Denmark, against Holland, Belgium, and
Luxembourg, against Yugoslavia and Greece. And in connection
with those aggressions the British prosecutor will present to the
Tribunal the various treaties involved and the various breaches of
treaties involved in those aggressions.
That, as I understand it, will complete the British case under
Count Two and will probably take the rest of this week.
Then it will be necessary for the American prosecuting staff to
come back to Count One to cover certain portions which have not
been covered, specifically, persecution of the Jews, concentration
camps, spoliation in occupied territories, the High Command, and
other alleged criminal organizations, particularly evidence dealing
with individual responsibility of individual defendants.
Roughly, I would anticipate that that would carry through the
—
following week two weeks. However, that is a very rough
estimate.
Thereupon, the French chief prosecutor will make his opening
statement and will present the evidence as to Crimes against
'

35
3 Dec. 45

Humanity and War Crimes under Counts Three and Four as to

Western Occupied countries.
Following that, the Russian chief prosecutor will make his open-
ing statement and will present corresponding evidence regarding
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Eastern countries.
That, in very rough outline, is what we have in mind to present.
turn now to the third section in the detailed chronological
I
presentation of the aggressive war case: Aggression against Czecho-
slovakia. The relevant portions of the Indictment are set forth in
Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing at Pages 7 and 8 of
the printed English text of the Indictment.
This portion of the Indictment is divided into three parts:
(a) The 1936-38 phase of the plan; that is, the planning for the
assault both on Austria and Czechoslovakia.
(b) The execution of the plan to invade Austria; November 1937
to March 1938.
(c) The execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia; April

1938 to March 1939.

On Thursday, last, I completed the presentation of the documents
on the execution of the plan to invade Austria. Those documents
are gathered together in a document book which was handed to the
Tribunal at the beginning of the Austrian presentation.
The materials relating to the aggression against Czechoslovakia
have been gathered in a separate document book, which I now
submit to the Tribunal and which is marked "Document Book 0."

The Tribunal will recall that in the period 1933 to 1936 the
defendants had initiated a program of rearmament, designed to give
the Third Reich military strength and political bargaining power to
be used against other nations. You will recall also that beginning
in the year 1936 they had embarked on a preliminary program of
expansion which, as it turned out, was to last until March 1939.
This was intended to shorten their frontiers, to increase their
industrial and food reserve, and to place them in a position, both
industrially and strategically, from which they could launch a more
ambitious and more devastating campaign of aggression.
—
At the moment in the early spring of 1938 when the Nazi —
conspirators began to lay concrete plans for the conquest of Czecho-
slovakia, they had reached approximately the half-way point in this
preliminary program.
The preceding autumn, at the conference in the Reich Chancel-
lery on November 5, 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes, Hitler
had set forth the program which Germany was to follow. Those
Hossbach minutes, you will recall, are contained in Document 386-PS

36
 3 Dec. 45

as United States Exhibit Number 25, which I read to the Tribunal

in my introductory statement a week ago today.
"The question for Germany," the Führer had informed his mili-
tary commanders at that meeting, **is where the greatest possible
conquest can be made at the lowest cost."
At the top of his agenda stood two countries, Austria and Czecho-
slovakia.
On March 12, 1938 Austria was occupied by the German Army,
and on the following day it was annexed to the Reich. The time
had come for a redefinition of German intentions regarding Czecho-
slovakia. A little more than a month later two of the conspirators,
Hitler and Keitel, met to discuss plans for the envelopment and
conquest of the Czechoslovak State.
Among the selected handful of documents which I read to the
Tribunal in my introduction a week ago to establish the corpus of
the crime of aggressive war was the account of this meeting on
21 April 1938. This account is Item 2 in our Document Number
388-PS, as United States Exhibit Number 26.
The Tribunal will recall that Hitler and Keitel discussed the
pretext whichGermany might develop to serve as an excuse for a
sudden and overwhelming attack. They considered the provocation
of a period of diplomatic squabbling which, growing more serious,
would lead an excuse for war. In the alternative and this alter-
to —
—
native they found to be preferable they planned to unleash a
lightning attack as the result of an incident of their own creation.
Consideration, as we alleged in the Indictment and as the docu-
ment proved, was given German Minister
to the assassination of the
at Prague to create the requisite incident.
The necessity propaganda to guide the conduct of Germans
of
in Czechoslovakia and to intimidate the Czechs was recognized.
Problems of transport and tactics were discussed, with a view to
overcoming all Czechoslovak resistance within 4 days, thus present-
ing the world with a fait accompli and forestalling outside inter-
ventions.
Thus, in mid-April 1938, the designs of the Nazi conspirators to
conquer Czechoslovakia had already reached the stage of practical
planning.
Now all of that occurred, if the Tribunal please, against a back-
ground of friendly diplomatic relations. This conspiracy must be
viewed against that background. Although they had, in the fall of
1937, determined to destroy the Czechoslovak State, the leaders of
the German Government were bound by a treaty of arbitration and
assurances freely given, to observe the sovereignty of Czecho-
slovakia. By a formal treaty signed at Locarno on 16 October 1925

37
3 Dec. 45

—Document TC-14, which will be introduced by the British pros-

—Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed, with certain excep-
ecutor
tions, to refer to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court
of Internationäl Justice matters of dispute. I quote,they would
so refer:
"All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czecho-
slovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to
their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to
settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy."

And the preamble to this treaty stated:

"The President of the German Reich and the President of the
Czechoslovak Republic equally resolved to maintain peace
between Germany and Czechoslovakia by assuring the peace-
ful settlement of differences, which might arise between the
two countries; declaring that respect for the rights established
by treaty or resulting from the law of nations, is obligatory
for international tribunals; agreeing to recognize that the
rights of a state cannot be modified save with its consent, and
considering that sincere observance of the methods of peace-
ful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving,
without recourse to force, questions which may become the
cause of divisions between states, have decided to embody in
a treaty their common intention in this respect."
That ends the quotation.
Formal and categoric assurances of their good will towards
Czechoslovakia were both coming from the Nazi conspirators as
late as March 1938. On March 11 and 12, 1938, at the time of the
annexation of Austria, Germany had a considerable interest in
inducing Czechoslovakia not to mobilize. At this time the Defendant
Goring assured Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, on
behalf of the German Government that German-Czech relations
were not adversely affected by the development in Austria and that
Germany had no hostile intentions towards Czechoslovakia. As a
token of his sincerity. Defendant Goring accompanied his assurance
with the statement, "Ich gebe Ihnen mein Ehrenwort (I give you
my word of honor)."
At the same time, the Defendant Von Neurath, who was handling
German foreign affairs during Ribbentrop's stay in London, assured
Masaryk, on behalf of Hitler and the German Government, that
Germany still considered herself bound by the Arbitration Con-
vention of 1925.
These assurances are contained in Document TC-27, another of
the series of documents which will be presented to the Tribunal
by the British prosecutor under Count Two of the Indictment.

38
 3 Dec. 45

Behind the screen of these assurances the Nazi conspirators pro-

ceeded with their miUtary and political plans for aggression. Ever
since the preceding fall it had been established that the immediate
aim of German policy was the elimination both of Austria and of
Czechoslovakia. In both countries the conspirators planned to under-
mine the will to resist by propaganda and by Fifth Column
activities, while the actual military preparations were being devel-
oped.
The Austrian operation, which received priority for political and
strategic reasons, was carried out in February and March 1938.
Thenceforth the Wehrmacht planning was devoted to "Fall Grün"
(Case Green), the designation given to the proposed operation
against Czechoslovakia.
The military plans for Case Green had been drafted in outline
from as early as June 1937.The OKW top-secret directive for the
unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war signed by Von—
Blomberg on June 24, 1937, and promulgated to the Army, Navy,
and Luftwaffe for the year beginning July 1, 1937 included, as a —
probable war-like eventuality for which a concentrated plan was
to be drafted. Case Green, "War on two fronts, with the main
struggle in the southeast."
—
This document our Number C-175, Exhibit USA-69 was intro- —
duced in evidence as part of the Austrian presentation and is an
original carbon copy, signed in ink by Von Blomberg. The original
section of this directive dealing with the probable war against
— —
Czechoslovakia it was later revised opens with this supposition.
I read from the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation of this
directive, following the heading II, and Subparagraph (1) headed
"Suppositions":
"The war in the East can begin with a surprise German
operation against Czechoslovakia in order to parry the im-
minent attack of a superior enemy coalition. The necessary
conditions to justify such an action politically, and in the
eyes of international law must be created beforehand."
After detailing possible enemies and neutrals in the event of such
action, the directive continues as follows:

"(2) The task of the German Armed Forces" and that much
— —
isunderscored "is to make their preparations in such a way
that the bulk of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia
quickly, by surprise, and with the greatest force, while in the
West the minimum strength is provided as rear-cover for this
attack.
"The aim and object of this surprise attack by the German
Armed Forces should be to eliminate from the very beginning

39
3 Dec. 45

and for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia

to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from
the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its
operational base in Czechoslovakia. This must be done by
the defeat of the enemy armed forces and the occupation of
Bohemia and Moravia."
The introduction to this directive sets forth as one of its guiding
—
principles the following statement and I now read from Page 1
of the English translation, that is, the third paragraph following
Figure 1:

"Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situation, which does

not preclude surprising incidents, demands constant prepar-
edness for war on the part of the German Armed Forces:"
— —
and then "(a) to counterattack at any time; (b) to make
possible the military exploitation of politically favorable
opportunities should they occur."
This directive ordered further work on the plan for "mobiliza-
tion without public announcement." I quote:
Armed Forces in a position to be able
"... in order to put the
to begin asudden war which will take the enemy by surprise,
in regard to both strength and time of attack."
This is, of course, a directive for staff planning, but the nature
of the planning and the very tangible and ominous developments
which resulted from it, give it a significance that it would not have
in another setting.
Planning along the lines of this directive was carried forward
during the fall of 1937 and the winter of 1937-38. On the political
level, this planning for the conquest of Czechoslovakia received the
approval and support of Hitler in the conference with his military
commanders on 5 November 1937, reported in the Hossbach minutes,
to which I have frequently heretofore referred.

In early March 1938, before the march into Austria, we find the
Defendants Ribbentrop and Keitel concerned over the extent of the
information about war aims against Czechoslovakia to be furnished to
Hungary. On 4 March 1938, Ribbentrop wrote to Keitel, enclosing for
General Keitel's confidential cognizance the minutes of a con-
ference with Sztojay, the local Hungarian Ambassador, who had
suggested an interchange of views. This is Document 2786-PS, a
photostat of the original captured letter, which I now offer in
evidence as Exhibit USA-81. In his letter to Keitel, Ribbentrop said:
"I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should
discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czecho-
slovakia, the danger exists that other parties as well would
be informed about this. I would greatly appreciate it if you

40
 3 Dec. 45

would notify me briefly whether any commitments were made

here in any respect. With best regards and Heil Hitler."
At the meeting between Hitler and Keitel, the account
21 April
of which read last week and alluded to earlier this morning (Docu-
I
ment 388-PS, Item 2), specific plans for the attack on Czechoslovakia
were discussed for the first time. This meeting was followed, in
the late spring and summer of 1938, by a series of memoranda and
telegrams advancing Case Green (Fall Grün). Those notes and com-
munications were carefully filed at Hitler's headquarters by the
very efficient Colonel Schmundt, the Führer's military adjutant, and
were captured by American troops in a cellar at Obersalzberg, near
Berchtesgaden. This file, which is preserved intact, bears out
Number 388-PS, and is United States Exhibit Number 26. We affec-
—
tionately refer to it as "Big Schmundt" a large file. The individual
items in this file tell more graphically than any narrative the
progress of the Nazi conspirators' planning to launch an unprovoked
and brutal war against Czechoslovakia. From the start the Nazi
leaders displayed a lively interest in intelligence data concerning
Czechoslovakian armament and defense. With the leave of the
Tribunal I shall refer to some of these items in the Big Schmundt
file without reading them. The documents to which I refer are Item

4 of the Schmundt file, a telegram from Colonel Zeitzler, in General

Jodl's office of the OKW, to Schmundt at Hitler's headquarters.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you proposing not to read them?
MR. ALDERMAN: I hadn't intended to read them in full, unless
that may be necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid we must adhere to our decision.
MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should simply wish
to refer to the title or heading of Item 12, which is headed, "Short
Survey of Armament of the Czech Army," dated Berlin, 9 June
1938, and initialed "Z" for Zeitzler, and Item 13, "Questions of the
Führer," dated Berlin, 9 June 1938, and classified "Most Secret."
I should like to read four of the questions which Hitler wanted

authoritative information about, as shown by that document, and I

read indicated questions on Pages 23, 24, 25, and 26 of Item 13 of
Document 388-PS.
Question 1: armament of the Czech Army.
Hitler asked about
I necessary to read the answers. They are detailed
don't think it
answers giving information in response to these questions posed
by Hitler.
"Question 2: How many battalions, et cetera, are employed in
the West for the construction of emplacements?
"Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still
occupied in unreduced strength?

41
3 Dec. 45

"Question 4: Frontier protection in the West."

As those questions were answered in detail by the
I say, OKW
and initialed by Colonel Zeitzler of Jodl's staff.
As a precaution against French and British action during the
attack on Czechoslovakia, it was necessary for the Nazi conspirators
to rush the preparation of fortification measures along the western
frontier in Germany. I refer you to Item 8, at Page 12 of the Big
Schmimdt file, a telegram presumably sent from Schmundt in Berch-
tesgaden to Berlin, and I quote from this telegram. It is, as I say.
Item 8 of the Schmundt file, Page 12 of Document 388-PS: "Inform
Colonel General Von Brauchitsch and General Keitel." And then,
skipping a paragraph: "The Führer repeatedly emphasized the
necessity of pressing forward greatly the fortification work in the
West."
In May, June, July, and August of 1938 conferences between
Hitler and his political and military advisors resulted in the issu-
ance of a series of constantly revised directives for the attack on
Czechoslovakia. It was decided that preparations for X-Day, the
day of the attack, should be completed no later than 1 October. I
now invite the attention of the Tribunal to the more important of
these conferences and directives.
On 28 May
1938 Hitler called a conference of his principal ad-
visors. At meeting he gave the necessary instructions to his
this
fellow conspirators to prepare the attack on Czechoslovakia. This
fact Hitler later publicly admitted. I now refer and invite the no-
tice of the Tribunal to Document 2360-PS, a copy of the Völkischer
Beobachter of 31 January 1939. In a speech before the Reichstag
the preceding day, reported in this newspaper, reading now from
Document 2360-PS, Hitler spoke as follows:
"On account of this intolerable provocation which had been
aggravated by a truly infamous persecution and terrorization
of our Germans there, I have determined to solve once and
for all, and this time radically, the Sudeten-German question.
On 28 May I ordered first: That preparation should be made
for military action against this state by 2 October. I ordered
second: The immense and accelerated expansion of our. de-
fensive front in the West."
Two days after this conference, on 30 May 1938, Hitler issued
the revised military directive for Case Green. This directive is Item
11 in the Big Schmundt file. Document 388-PS. It is entitled, "Two-
front War, with Main Effort in the Southeast," and this directive
replaced the corresponding section, Part 2, Section II, of the pre-
vious quote, "Directive for Unified Preparation for War," which had
been promulgated by Von Blomberg on 26 June 1937, which I have
already introduced in evidence as our Document C-175, United

42
 3 Dec. 45

States Exji^ibit Number 69. This revised directive represented a fur-

ther development of the ideas for political and military action dis-
cussed by Hitler and Keitel in their conference on 21 April. It is
an expansion of the rough draft submitted by the Defendant Keitel
to Hitler on 20 May, which may be found as Item 5 in the Schmundt
file. It was signed by Hitler. Only five copies were made. Three
copies were forwarded with a covering letter from Defendant Keitel
to General Von Brauchitsch for the Army, to Defendant Raeder for
the Navy, and to Defendant Goring for the Luftwaffe. In his cov-
ering memorandum Keitel noted that its execution must be assured
— I quote: "As from 1 October 1938 at the latest." I now read from

this document, which is the basic directive under which the Wehr-
macht carried out its planning for Case Green, a rather lengthy
quotation from the first page of Item 11, Page 16 of the English
version:
"1. Political prerequisites. It is my unalterable decision to
smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.
It is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about
the politically and militarily suitable moment.
"An inevitable development of conditions inside Czecho-
slovakia or other political events in Europe, creating a sur-
prisingly favorable opportunity and one which may never
come again, may cause me to take early action.
"The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a
favorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accord-
ingly the preparations are to be made at once.
"2. Political possibilities for the commencement of the action.
The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended
invasion:

"a. Suitable obvious cause and with it, b. sufficient political

c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will
justification,
find him prepared in the least possible degree.

"From a military as well as a political standpoint the most

favorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an
incident through which Germany is provoked in an unbear-
able way for which at least part of world opinion will grant
the moral justification of military action.
"But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war,
must terminate in sudden action on our part, which must
have the elements of surprise as regards time and extent, be-
fore the enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that
he cannot be surpassed.
"3. Conclusions for the preparation of Fall Grün.

43
3 Dec. 45

"a. For the 'armed war' it is essential that the surprise ele-
ment, as the most important factor contributing to success,
be made full use of by appropriate preparatory measures, al-
ready in peacetime and by an unexpectedly rapid course of
the action. Thus it is essential to create a situation within
the first 2 or 3 days which plainly demonstrates to hostile
nations, eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czecho-
slovakian military situation and which, at the same time, will
give nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an in-
centive to intervene immediately against Czechoslovakia. In
such a case, intervention by Poland and Hungary against
Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France due to —
—
the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy fears, or at least
hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against
Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to
Czechoslovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected.
If concrete successes are not achieved by the land operations
within the first few days, a European crisis will certainly
result. This knowledge must give commanders of all ranks
the impetus to decided and bold action.
"b. The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate
Czechoslovakia by threats and wear down her power of re-
sistance; on the other hand issue directions to national groups
for support in the 'armed war' and influence the neutrals into
our way of thinking. I reserve further directions and deter-
mination of the date.
"4. Tasks of theArmed Forces. Armed Forces preparations
are to be made on the following basis:
"a. The mass of all forces must be employed against Czecho-
slovakia.

"b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as

rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the
East against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected,
the southern frontiers to be watched.
"c. The sections of the Army which can be rapidly employed
must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision
and must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring
in the certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow
them with the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be
made and timed in such a way that the sections of the army
which can be rapidly employed cross the frontier at the ap-
pointed time, at the same time as the penetration by the Air
Force, before the enemy can become aware of our mobili-
zation. For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is

44
 —

3 Dec. 45

to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to

me for approval.
"5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces,
"a. Army. The basic principle of the surprise attack against
Czechoslovakia must not be endangered nor the initiative of
the Air Force be wasted by the inevitable time required for
transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail. Therefore it
is first of all essential to the Army that as many assault col-,
umns as possible be employed at the same time as the sur-
prise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns the —
composition of each, according to their tasks at that time
must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly
owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization
and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose
of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification
lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable di-
rection, to achieve a break-through, or to break them down
from the rear. For the success of this operation, co-operation
with the Sudeten-German frontier population, with deserters
from the Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or air-
borne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be
of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of frustrat-
ing the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the
Czechoslovakian army from escaping . .
."

THE PRESIDENT: I-s it necessary to read all this detail?

MR. ALDERMAN: I was just worried about not getting it into
the transcript.
THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that this is all detail, that
before you pass from the document you ought to read the document
on Page 15, which introduces it and which gives the date of it.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. It is a letter dated:
"Berlin, 30 May 1938; copy of the fourth copy; Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces; most secret; access only
through officer; written by an officer. Signed Keitel; distrib-
uted to C-in-C Army, C-in-C Navy, C-in-C Air Force.
"By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces,
Part Section II, of the directive on the unified preparations
2,
for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937, (Ob. d. W)"
— with some symbols, including "Chef sache" (top secret)
"(two-front war with main effort on the Southeast strategic —
concentration Green) is to be replaced by the attached ver-
sion. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 1938
at the latest. Alterations in other parts of the directives must
be expected during the next week.

45
3 Dec. 45

"By order of Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed

Forces, signed, Keitel.
"Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General
Staff."
In line with the suggestion of the presiding Justice, I shall omit
the detailed instructions which are set out for action by the Luft-
waffe and by the Navy, and I turn next to the last paragraph of
the directive, which will be found on Page 19 of the English version:
"In war economy it is essential that in the field of the arma-
ment industry a maximum deployment of forces is made pos-
sible through increased supplies. In the course of operations,
it is of value to contribute to the reinforcement of the total

— —
war economic strength by rapidly reconnoitering and re-
starting important factories. For this reason the sparing of
Czechoslovakian industrial and factory installations, insofar
as military operations permit, can be of decisive importance
to us."
In other words, the Nazi conspirators, 4 months before the date
of their planned attack, were already looking forward to the con-
tribution which the Czech industrial plant would make to further
Nazi war efforts and economy.
And the final paragraph of this directive, Paragraph 7, on Page 19:

"All preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made

by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with, and accord-
ing to, the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces,
so that their effects accord with the operations of the Army
and Air Force as to time and locality.
"Signed Adolf Hitler.
"Certified a true copy, Zeitzler, Oberstleutnant on the General
Staff."
Three weeks later, on 18 June 1938, a draft for a new directive
was prepared and initialed by the Defendant Keitel. This is Item 14
at Pages 27 to 32 of the Big Schmundt file. It did not supersede
the 30 May directive. I shall read the third and fifth paragraphs on
Page 28 of the English translation, and the last paragraph on
Page 29:
"The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by
my own free decision; this stands in the foreground of my
political intentions. I am determined as from 1 October 1938

to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to

realize this aim."
Then skipping a paragraph:
"However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia
only if I am firmly convinced, as in the case of the occupation

46
 3 Dec. 45

of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria, that

France will not march and therefore England will not inter-
vene."
And then skipping to the last paragraph on the 29th page:
"The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself
will be issued by me from time to time."
"K"—initial of Keitel, and— "Z"—initial of Zeitzler.

The second and third parts of this directive contain general

directions for the deployment of troops and for precautionary meas-
ures in view of the possibility that during the execution of the Fall
Grün (or Case Green) France or England might declare war on Ger-
many. Six pages of complicated schedules which follow this draft
in the original have not been translated into English. These sched-
ules, which constitute Item 15 in the Schmundt file, give a time-
table of specific measures for the preparation of the Army, Navy,
and Luftwaffe for the contemplated action.
Corroboration for the documents in the Schmundt file is found
in General Jodl's diary, our Document Number 1780-PS and United
States Exhibit Number 72, from which I quoted portions during the
Austrian presentation. I now quote from three entries in this diary
written in the spring of 1938. Although the first entry is not dated
it appears to have been written several months after the annexation

of Austria, and here I read under the heading on Page 3 of the Eng-
lish translation:
"Later undated entry:
"After annexation of Austria the Führer mentions that there
is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria had
to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green
will have to be carried out energetically. They will have to
be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic posi-
tion because of the annexation of Austria. State of prep-
aration, see Memorandum L-l-A of 19 April, reported to the
Führer on 21 April.
"The intention of the Führer not to touch the Czech problem
as yet will be changed because of the Czech strategic troop
concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German
threat and without the slightest cause for it. Because of Ger-
many's self-restraint the consequences lead to a loss of pres-
tige for the Führer, which he is not willing to take once
more. Therefore, the new order is issued for Green on
30 May."
And then the entry, 23 May:
"Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Führer. Further
. . .

conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of

47
3 Dec. 45

the Führer, take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces
—
High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see inclo-
sures (War Diary)."
Then the entry of 30 May:
"The Führer signs directive Green, where he states his final
decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates
military preparation all along the line. The previous inten-
tions of the Army must .be changed considerably in the direc-
tion of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right
— —
on D-Day" X-Tag "combined with aerial penetration by
the Air Force.
"Further details are derived from directive for strategic con-
centration of the Army. The whole contrast becomes acute
once more between the Führer's intuition that we must do it
this year, and the opinion of the Army that we cannot do it
as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere
and we are not as yet equal to them."
During the spring and summer of 1938 the Luftwaffe was also
engaged in planning in connection with the forthcoming Case Green
and the further expansion of the Reich.
I now offer in evidence Document R-150, as United States Ex-
hibit 82. This is a top-secret document dated 2 June 1938, issued
by Air Group Command 3, and entitled "Plan Study 1938, Instruc-
"
tion for Deployment and Combat, 'Case Red.'
"Case Red" is the code name for action against the Western
Powers if need be. Twenty-eight copies of this document were
made, of which this is number 16. This is another staff plan, this
time for mobilization and employment of the Luftwaffe in the event
of war with France. It is given significance by the considerable prog-
ress by this date of the planning for the attack on Czechoslovakia.
I quote from the second paragraph on Page 3 of the English
translation, referring to the various possibilities under which war
with France may occur. You will note that they are all predicated
on the assumption of a German-Czech conflict.
"France will either (a) interfere in the struggle between the
Reich and Czechoslovakia in the course of Case Green, or (b)
start hostilities simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, (c) It is
possible but not likely that France will begin the fight while
Czechoslovakia still remains aloof."
And then, reading down lower on the page under the heading
"Intention":
"Regardless of whether France enters the war as a result of
Case Green or whether she makes the opening move of the
war simultaneously with Czechoslovakia, in any case the mass

48
 3 Dec. 45

of the German offensive formations will, in conjunction with

the Army, first deliver the decisive blow against Czecho-
slovakia."
By mid-summer direct and detailed planning for Case Green
was being carried out by the Luftwaffe. In early August, at the
direction of the Luftwaffe General Staff, the German Air Attaché
in Prague reconnoitered the Freudenthal area of Czechoslovakia
south of Upper Silesia for suitable landing grounds.
I offer in evidence Document 1536-PS as Exhibit USA-83, a re-
port of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Intelligence Division, dated
12 August 1938. This was a top-secret document for general officers
only, of which only two copies were made.
Attached as an enclosure was the report of Major Moericke, the
German Attaché in Prague, dated 4 August 1938. I quote the first
four paragraphs of the enclosure:
"I was ordered by the General Staff of the Air Force to
reconnoiter the land in the region Freudenthal-Freihermers-
dorf .
.".

THE PRESIDENT: Page 3 of the document?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. . . for landing possibilities.
"For this purpose I obtained private lodgings in Freudenthal
with the manufacturer Macholdt, through one of my trusted
men in Prague.
"I had specifically ordered this man to give no details about
me to Macholdt, particularly about my official position.
"I used my official car (Dienst Pkw) for the journey to Freu-
denthal taking precautions against being observed."
By 25 August the imminence of the attack on Czechoslovakia
compelled the issuance by the Luftwaffe of a detailed intelligence
memorandum, entitled "Extended Case Green"; in other words, an
estimate of possible action by the Western Powers during the attack
on Czechoslovakia.
I now offer this in evidence, Number 375-PS as Ex-
document
hibit USA-84. This a top-secret memorandum of the Intelligence
is
Section of the Luftwaffe, General Staff, dated Berlin, 25 August
1938. Based on the assumption that Great Britain and France would
declare war on Germany during Case Green, this study contains
an estimate of the strategy and air strength of the Western Powers
as of 1 October 1938, the target date for Case Green. I quote the
first two sentences of the document. That is under the heading
"Initial Political Situation":
"The basic assumption is that France will declare war during
the Case Green. It is presumed that France will decide upon

49
3 Dec. 45

war only if active military assistance by Great Britain is

definitely assured."
Now, knowledge of the pending or impending action against
Czechoslovakia was not confined to a close circle of high officials of
the Reich and the Nazi Party. During the summer Germany's
allies, Italy and Hungary, were apprised by one means or another of
the plans of the Nazi conspirators. I offer in evidence Document
2800-PS as Exhibit USA-85. This is a captured document from the
German Foreign Office files, a confidential memorandum of a con-
versation with the Italian Ambassador Attolico, in Berlin on 18 July
1938. At the bottom is a handwritten note headed "For the Reichs-
minister only", and the Reichsminister was the Defendant Ribben-
trop. I now read this note. I read from the note the third and
fourth paragraphs:
"Attolico added that we had made it unmistakably clear to
the Italians what our intentions are regarding Czechoslovakia.
He also knew the appointed time well enough so that he
could take perhaps a 2 months' holiday now which he could
not do later on.
"Giving an idea of the attitude of other governments, Attolico
mentioned that the Romanian Government had refused to
grant application for leave to its Berlin Minister."
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off
for 10 minutes?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, a month later

Mussolini sent a message to Berlin asking that he be told the date
on which Case Green would take place. I offer in evidence Docu-
ment Number 2791-PS as Exhibit USA-86, a German Foreign Office
note on a conversation with Ambassador Attolico. This note is
signed "R" for Ribbentrop and dated 23 August 1938. I now read
two paragraphs from this memorandum:
"On the voyage ofPatria Ambassador Attolico ex-
the
plained to me that he had instructions to request the notifi-
cation of a contemplated time for German action against
Czechoslovakia from the German Government.
"In case the Czechs should again cause a provocation against
Germany, Germany would march. This would be tomorrow,
in 6 months, or perhaps in a year. However, I could promise
him that the German Government, in case of an increasing
gravity of the situation or as soon as the Führer made his

50
 3 Dec. 45

decision, would notify the Italian Chief of Government as rap-

idly as possible. In any case, the Italian Government will be
the who will receive such
first one a notification."
THE PRESIDENT: You did not tell us what the initial was, did
you?
MR. ALDERMAN: The initial "R" for Ribbentrop, and the date
23 August 1938.
Four days
later Attolico again asked to be notified of the date
of thepending attack. I offer Document Number 2792-PS as Exhibit
—
"USA-87 another German Foreign Office memorandum, and from
that document I read three paragraphs under the heading "R. M.
251."
"Ambassador Attolico paid me a visit today at 12 o'clock to
communicate the following:
"He had received another written instruction from Mussolini
asking that Germany communicate in time the probable date
of action against Czechoslovakia. Mussolini asked for such
notification, as Mr. Attolico assured me, in order 'to be able
to take in due time the necessary measures on the French
frontier.' Berlin, 27 August 1938; 'R' "—for Ribbentrop, and
then:
"N. B. I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former
démarche, that could not impart any date to him; that, how-
I
ever, in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be in-
formed of any decision. Berlin, 2 September 1938."

Hungary, which borders Czechoslovakia to the southeast, was

from the first considered to be a possible participant in Case Green.
You will recall that in early March 1938 Defendants Keitel and
Ribbentrop had exchanged letters on the question of bringing
Hungary into the Nazi plan. At that time the decision was in the
negative, but by mid-August 1938 the Nazi conspirators were at-
tempting to persuade Hungary to join in the attack.
From August 21 to 26 Admiral Horthy and some of his ministers
visited Germany. Inevitably there were discussions of the Czecho-
slovak question. I now offer Document 2796-PS as Exhibit USA-88.
TJiis is a captured German Foreign Office account signed by Von
Weizsäcker of the conversations between Hitler and Ribbentrop and
a Hungarian Delegation consisting of Horthy, Imredy, and Kanya
aboard the S. S. Patria on 23 August 1938. In this conference Rib-
bentrop inquired about th/e Hungarian attitude in the event of a
German attack on Czechoslovakia and suggested that such an attack
would prove to be a good opportunity for Hungary.
The Hungarians, with the exception of Horthy, who wished to put
the Hungarian intention to participate on record, proved reluctant

51
3 Dec. 45

to commit themselves. Thereupon Hitler emphasized Ribbentrop's

statement and said that whoever wanted to join the meal would
have to participate in the cooking as well. I now quote from this
document the first two paragraphs:
"While in the forenoon of the 23rd of August the Führer and
the Regent of Hungary were engaged in a political discussion,
the Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya were in confer-
ence with Von Ribbentrop. Von Weizsäcker also attended the
conference.
"Von Kanya introduced two subjects for discussion: Point 1,
the negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente;
and 2, the Czechoslovakian problem."
Then I skip two paragraphs and read the fifth paragraph:
"Von Ribbentrop inquired what Hungary's attitude would be
if the Führer would carry out his decision to answer a new

Czech provocation by forde. The reply of the Hungarians

presented two kinds of obstacles: The Yugoslavian neutrality
must be assured if Hungary marches towards the north and
perhaps the east; moreover, the Hungarian rearmament had
only been started and one to two more years time for its
development should be allowed.
"Von Ribbentrop then explained to the Hungarians that the
Yugoslavs would not dare to march while they were between
the pincers of the Axis Powers. Romania alone would there-
fore not move. England and France would also remain tran-
quil. England would not recklessly risk her empire. She
knew our newly acquired power. In reference to time, how-
ever, for the above-mentioned situation, nothing definite could
be predicted since it would depend on Czech provocation. Von
Ribbentrop repeated that, 'Whoever desires revision must ex-
ploit the good opportunity and participate.'
"The Hungarian reply thus remained a conditional one. Upon
the question of Von Ribbentrop as to what purpose the de-
sired General Staff conferences were to have, not much more
was brought forward than the Hungarian desire of a mutual
inventory of military material and preparedness for the Czech
—
conflict. The clear political basis for such a conflict the time •

—
of a Hungarian intervention was not obtained.
"In the meantime, more positive language was used by Von
Horthy in his talk with the Führer. He wished not to hide
his doubts with regard to the English attitude, but he wished
to put on record Hungary's intention to participate. The
Hungarian Ministers were, and remained even later, more
skeptical since they feel more strongly about the immediate
danger for Hungary with its unprotected flanks.

52
 3 Dec. 45

"When Von Imredy had a discussion with the Führer in the

afternoon he was very reUeved when the Führer explained
to him that in regard to the situation in question he de-
manded nothing of Hungary. He himself would not know the
time. Whoever wanted to join the meal would have to partic-
ipate in the cooking as well. Should Hungary wish con-
ferences of the General Staffs he would have no objections."
I think perhaps that sentence, "Whoever «wanted to join the meal
would have to participate in the cooking as well," is perhaps as
cynical a statement as any statesman has ever been guilty of.
By the third day of the conference the Germans were able to
note that, in the event of a German-Czech conflict, Hungary would
be sufficiently armed for participation on 1 October. I now offer
in evidence Document Number 2797-PS as Exhibit USA-89, another
captured German Foreign Office memorandum of a conversation
between Ribbentrop and Kanya on 25 August 1938. You will note
that the English mimeographed translation bears the date 29 August.
That is incorrect; it should read 25 August. I read the last para-
graph from that document, or the last two:
"Concerning Hungary's military preparedness in case of a
German-Czech conflict Von Kanya mentioned several days ago
that his country would need a period of one to two years in
order to develop adequately the armed strength of Hungary.
"During today's conversation Von Kanya corrected this re-
mark and said that Hungary's military situation was much
better. His country would be ready, as far as armaments
were concerned, to take part in the conflict by October 1 of
this year."— Signed with an illegible signature which prob-
ably is that of Weizsäcker.
The account of the German-Hungarian conference again finds its
corroboration in General Jodl's diary, Document Number 1780-PS,
from which I have already several times read. The entry in that
diary for 21 to 26 August on Page 4 of the English version of the
document reads as follows:
"Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent. Accompanied
by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
the War Minister Von Raatz.
"They arrived with the idea that in the course of a great war
after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the
old State of Hungary can be re-established. They leave with
the understanding that we have neither demands from them
nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for
a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be

53
3 Dec. 45

tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is

up to them.
"Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator
between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they
believe that when the issue arises a period of 48 hours would
be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia's attitude."
The upshot of the talks with the Hungarians proved to be a staff
conference on 6 September.
I quote again from Jodl's diary, the entry for 6 September, be-

ginning at the end of that same page:

"Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Haider, has a
conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.
Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of
the Führer, especially his order not to give any hint on the
exact moment. The same with OAI, General Von Stülpnagel."
It is somewhat interesting to find a high-ranking general giving
a briefing on such political matters.
Then we come to final actual preparations for the attack. With
a 1 October target date set for Case Green, there was a noticeable
increase in the tempo of the military preparations in late August
and September. Actual preparations for the attack on Czecho-
slovakia were well under way. The agenda of the Nazi conspirators
was devoted to technical details, the timing of "X-days," questions
of mobilization, questions of transport and supplies.
On26 August the Defendant Jodl initialed a memorandum enti-
tled, "Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance Meas-
ures." This is Item 17 at Pages 37 and 38 of the English trans-
lation of the Schmundt file on Case Green, our Number 388-PS.
I should like to invite the special attention of the Tribunal to
this memorandum. It demonstrates beyond the slightest doubt the
complicity of the OKW and of Defendant Keitel and Jodl in the
shameful fabrication of an incident as an excuse for war. It reveals
in bare outline the deceit, the barbarity, the completely criminal
character of the attack that Germany was preparing to launch.
I ask leave to read this document in full:

"Chief Section L; for chiefs only; written by General Staff

note on progress of report; Berlin, 24 August
officer; top secret;
1938; access only through officer; 1 copy.
"Timing of the X-Order and the Question of Advance
Measures.
"The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by
surprise at their peacetime airports justifiably leads them to
oppose measures taken in advance of the X-Order and to
demand that the X-Order itself be given sufficiently late on

54
 3 Dec. 45

X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization

becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.
"The Army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It
intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between
X minus 3 and X minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth
and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind
OKH also demands that the X-Order be given to the Army
not later than 1400 on X minus 1.
'To this the following must be said:
" 'Operation Green' " — —
or Aktion Grün "will be set in motion
by means of an 'incident' in Czechoslovakia which will give
Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing
of the exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance."
— I call special attention to that sentence
—
"The fixing of the
exact time for this incident is of the utmost importance.
"It must come at a time when the over-all meteorological
conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into
action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of
it" — —
news of this prepared incident "to reach us on the after-
noon of X minus 1.

"It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the

X-Order at 1400 on X minus 1.
"On X minus 2 the Navy, Army, and Air Force will merely
receive an advance warning.
"If the Führer intends to follow this plan of action, all
further discussion is superfluous.
"For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus
1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall
otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders
for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in
good time and camouflaged with the help of numerous
maneuvers and exercises.
by the Foreign Of flee as to whether all
"Also, the question raised
Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy
territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure
from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.
"Even a warning of diplomatic representatives in Prague is
impossible before the first air attack, although the con-
sequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming
victims of such an attack (that is the death of representatives
of friendly or confirmed neutral powers).
"If,for technical reasons, the evening hours should be con-
sidered desirable for the incident, then the following day can-
not be X-Day, but it must be the day after that.

55
3 Dec. 45

"In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must
be done before the incident whidi might point to mobiliza-
tion, and that the swiftest possible action must be taken after
the incident (X-Fall).
purpose of these notes to point out what a great
"It is the
interest theWehrmacht has in the incident and that it must
be informed of the Fiihrer's intentions in good time insofar —
as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organiza-
tion of the incident.
"I request that the Fiihrer's decision be obtained on these
points." —Signed— "J" — (Jodl).

In handwriting, at the bottom of the page of that document, are

the notes of the indefatigable Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant. These
reveal that the memorandum was submitted to Hitler on August 30;
that Hitler agreed to act along these lines, and that Jodl was so
notified on 31 August. There follows Jodl's initials once more.
On
3 September Keitel and Von Brauchitsch met with Hitler
at theBerghof Again Schmundt kept notes of the conference. These
.

will be found as Item 18 at Pages 39 and 40 of the Document

Number 388-PS. I shall read the first three short paragraphs of
these minutes:
"Colonel General Von Brauchitsch reports on the exact time
of the transfer of the troops to 'exercise areas' for 'Grün'.
Field units to be transferred on 28 September. From here will
then be ready for action. When X-Day becomes known field
units carry out exercises in opposite directions.
"Führer has objection. Troops assemble field units a 2-day
march away. Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere."
— —
Then there is a question mark. "OKH must know when
X-Day is by 1200 noon, 27 September."
You will note that Von Brauchitsch reported that field troops
would be transferred to the proper areas for Case Green on 28 Sep-
tember and would then be ready for action. You will also note that
the OKH must know when X-Day is by 12 noon on 27 September.
During the remainder of the conference Hitler gave his views
on the strategy the German armies should employ and the strength
of the Czech defenses they would encounter. He spoke of the pos-
sibility, and I quote, "of drawing in the Henlein people." The
situation in the West still troubled him. Schmundt further noted,
and here I read the final sentence from Page 40 of the English
transcript:
"The Führer gives orders for the development of the Western
Improvement of advance positions around
fortifications:
Aachen and Saarbrücken; construction of 300 to 400 battery

56
 3 Dec. 45

positions (1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking

action."
Five days later General Stülpnagel asked Defendant Jodl for
written assurance that the OKH
would be informed 5 days in
advance about the impending action. In the evening Jodl conferred
with Luftwaffe generals about the co-ordination of ground and air
operations at the start of the attack. I now read the 8 September
entry in General Jodl's diary, Page 5 of the English translation of
Document 1780-PS.
"General Stülpnagel, OAI, asks for written assurance that the
Army High Command will be informed 5 days in advance if
the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all
meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only
for 2 days in advance and that therefore the plans may be
—
changed up to this moment (X-Day minus 2)" or as the Ger-
man puts it— "X-2 Tag."
"General Stülpnagel mentions that for the first time he won-
ders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being
abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would
not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Führer
would stick to his decision, even though he may no longer be
of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least
moody and that . . . Italy is reserved."
Now, this is Jodl talking:
"I must admit that I am worrying, too, when comparing the
change of opinion about political and military potentialities,
according to directives of 24 June '37, 5 November '37,
7 December '37, 30 May 1938, with the last statements. In
spite of that, one must be aware of the fact that the other
nations will do everything they can to apply pressure on us.
We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few
people know the art of withstanding this pressure success-
fully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small
circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to
have it circulate through anterooms as heretofore.
"1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of High
Command of Armed Forces and Chief of General Staff of the
Air Force. (Present were General Jeschonnek, Kammhuber,
Sternburg, and myself). We agree about the promulgation of
the X-Day order"—X-Befehl—"(X-1, 4 o'clock) and pre-
announcement to the Air Force (X-Day minus 1" X minus
— —
1 day "7 o'clock). The 'Y' time has yet to be examined; some
formations have an approach flight of one hour."
Late on the evening of the following day, 9 September, Hitler
met with Defendant Keitel and Generals Von Brauchitsch and

57
 —

3 Dec. 45

Halder at Nuremberg. Dr. Todt, the construction engineer, later

joined this conference, which lasted from 10 in the evening until
3:30 the following morning. Schmundt's minutes on this conference
are Item 19 in the large Schmundt file, on Pages 41 to 43 of Docu-
ment 388-PS.
In this meeting General Haider reviewed the missions assigned
to four of the German armies being committed to the attack, the
2d, the 10th, the 12th and the 14th German Armies. With his
characteristic enthusiasm for military planning, Hitler then delivered
a soliloquy on strategic considerations, which should be taken into
account as the attack developed. I shall quote only four paragraphs,
beginning with the summary of General Von Brauchitsch's remarks,
on the bottom of Page 42:
"General Oberst Von Brauchitsch: 'Employment of motorized
divisionswas based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and
—
the difficulties in getting other divs' " that is for divisions
" 'ready to march into the area at the right time. In the
West vehicles will have to leave on the 20th of September,
if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on the 23d, by
relays. Specialist workers remain according to decision by
Army Command II.'

"The Führer: 'Does not see why workers have to return home
as early as X-11. Other workers and people are also on the
way on mobilization day. Also the railroad cars will stand
around unnecessarily later on.'
"General Keitel: 'Workers are not under the jurisdiction of
district commands in the West, Trains must be assembled.'
"Von Brauchitsch: '235,000 men RAD (Labor Service) will be
drafted, 96 construction battalions will be distributed (also in
"
the East). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West.'
From this day forward the Nazi conspirators were occupied with
the intricate planning which is required before such an attack. On
11 September Defendant Jodl conferred with a representative of
the Propaganda Ministry about methods of refuting German viola-
tions of international law and of exploiting those of the Czechs. I
read the 11 September entry in the Jodl diary at Page 5 of the
English translation of 1780-PS:
"In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Hahnke,
for the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on
imminent common tasks. These joint preparations for refuta-
tion" —Widerlegung— "of
our own violations of international
law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were
considered particularly important."
This discussion developed into a detailed study compiled by
Section L, that is, Jodl's section of the OKW.

58
 3 Dec. 45

I now offer in evidence Document C-2 as Exhibit USA-90, which

is a carbon copy of the original, signed in pencil. Seven copies of
this captured document, as it shows on its face, were prepared and
distributed on 1 October 1938 to the OKH, the OKM, the Luftwaffe,
and the Foreign Office.
In this study anticipated violations by Germany of international
law in connection with the invasion of Czechoslovakia are listed
and counterpropaganda suggested for the use of the propaganda
agencies. It is a highly interesting top-secret document and with
a glance at the original you can see the careful form in which the
study of anticipated violations of international law and propagan-
distic refutations thereof were set out.
The document is prepared in tabular form, in which the antic-
ipated instances of violation of international law are listed in the
left hand column. In the second column are given specific examples
of the incidents. In the third and fourth column the position to be
taken toward these incidents, in violation of international law and
in violation of the laws of warfare, is set forth.
The fifth column, which in this document unfortunately is blank,
was reserved for the explanations to be offered by the Propaganda
Minister. I first quote from the covering letter:
"Enclosed is a list drawn up by Section L of the OKW, of the
violations of international law which may be expected on the
part of fighting troops.
"Owing to the short time allowed for the compilation. Col-
umns c-1 and c-2 had to be filled in directly therefore, for the
time being.
"The branches of the Armed Forces are requested to send in
an opinion so that a final version may be drawn up.
"The same is requested of the Foreign Office.
"The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.
"By order" —signed— "Bürckner."
I am I perhaps cannot take the time to read ex-
sorry that
tensively from document. I shall confine myself to reading the
this
first 10 hypothetical incidents for which justification must be found
from the second column. Column b of the table:
"First: In an air raid on Prague the British Embassy is
destroyed."
"Second: Englishmen or Frenchmen are injured or killed.
"Third: The Hradschin is destroyed in an air raid on Prague.
"Fourth: On account of a report that the Czechs have used
gas, the firing of gas projectiles is ordered.
"Fifth: Czech civilians, not recognizable as soldiers, are caught
in the act of sabotage (destruction of an important bridge,

59
 . —

3 Dec. 45

destruction of foodstuffs and fodder) are discovered looting

wounded or dead soldiers and thereupon shot.
"Sixth: Captured Czech soldiers or Czech civilians are detailed
to do road work or to load munitions, and so forth.
"Seventh: For military reasons it is necessary to requisition
billets, foodstuffs,and fodder from the Czech population. As
a result, the latter suffer from want.
"Eighth: Czech population is, for military reasons, compulsorily
evacuated to the rear area.
"Ninth: Churches are used for military accommodations.
"Tenth: In the course of their duty, German aircraft fly over
Polish territory where they are involved in an air battle with
Czech aircraft."
From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an
order bringing the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service)
under the OKW. This top-secret order . .

THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the classification with
reference to gas?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps I should. Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: It is number 4.
MR. ALDERMAN: Incident number 4?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Well, number 4 was the supposed incident.
"On account of a report that the Czechs have used gas, the firing
of gas projectiles is ordered." Under the column, "Attitude of Inter-
national Law Group":
"According to the declaration agreed to in June 1925 by
40 states, including Czechoslovakia, the employment of poison
gases, chemical warfare agents, and bacteriological substances
is expressly forbidden. Quite a number of states made the
reservation to this declaration on the prohibition of gas war-
fare."
Then, under the column headed "Justification by the Laws of
War":
"If the assertion, that the opponent —in this case the Czechs
used a prohibited gas in warfare, is to be believed by the
world, it must be possible to prove it. If that is possible, the
firing of gas projectiles is justified, must be given out
and it

in public that it can be proved that the enemy was the

first to violate the prohibition. It is therefore particularly

60
 3 Dec. 45

important to furnish this proof. If the assertion is unfounded

or only partially founded, the gas attack is to be represented
only as the need for carrying out a justified reprisal, in the
same way as the Italians did in the Abyssinian war. In this
case, however, the justification for such harsh reprisals must
also be proved."
From Nuremberg on the 10th of September, Hitler issued an
order bringing the Reichsarbeitsdienst (the German Labor Service)
under the OKW
...

THE PRESIDENT: There is another short passage which seems

to be material.
MR. ALDERMAN: I was very much tempted to read the whole
document.
THE PRESIDENT: The justification of number 10.
MR. ALDERMAN: Number 10 was, "In course of their duty,
German aircraft fly over Polish territory where they are involved
in an air battle with Czech aircraft."
Under the heading, "Attitude of the International Law Group":
"According to Article 1 of the Fifth Hague Convention of
18 October 1907, the territory of neutral powers is not to be
violated. A deliberate violation by flying over this territory
is a breach of international law if the neutral powers have
declared an air barrier for combat aircraft. If German planes
fly over Polish territory this constitutes a violation of inter-
national law, provided that this action is not expressly per-
mitted."
Now, under the heading, "Justification by the Laws of War,"
is this:

"An attempt at denials should first be made; if this is un-

successful a request for pardon should be made (on the
grounds of miscalculation of position) to the Polish Govern-
ment and compensation for damage guaranteed."
I had referred to an order issued by Hitler on 10 September
1938 from Nuremberg, bringing the German Labor Service under
the OKW. This top-secret order, of which 25 copies were made, is
Item 20 in the Schmundt file. Page 44. I will read that order:
"1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command
of the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September.
"2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of
this organization in conjunction with the Reich Labor Leader
(Reichsarbeitsführer) and on assignments from time to time to
the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army, and Air Force.
Where questions arise with regard to competency he will
make a final decision in accordance with my instructions.

61
3 Dec. 45

"3. For the time being this order is to be made known only
to the departments and personnel immediately concerned.
"Signed, Adolf Hitler."
Four days later, on 14 September, Defendant Keitel issued
detailed instructions for the employment of specific units. RAD
This order is Item 21 in the Schmundt file, at Page 45 in the English
translation. I do not think I need read the order.
'There is another order issued by the Defendant Jodl on 16 Sep-
tember, Item 24, at Page 48 in the Schmundt file. I think I need
only read the heading or title of that:
"Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service for maneuvers
with Wehrmacht. Effective 15 September the following units
will be trained militarily under direction of the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army."
Two further entries in the Defendant Jodl's diary give further
indications of the problems of the OKW
in this period of mid-Sep-
tember, just 2 weeks before the anticipated X-Day.
I now read the answers for the 15th and 16th September, at
Pages 5 and6 of the English translation of the Jodl diary.
"15 September: In the morning, conference with Chief of
Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army
and Air Force, the question was discussed as to what could
be done if the Führer insists on advancement of the date, due
to the rapid development of the situation.
"16 September: General Keitel returns from the Berghof at
1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the con-
ference between Chamberlain and the Führer. The next con-
ference will take place on the 20th or 21st in Godesberg.
"With consent of the Führer, the order is given in the evening
by the Armed Forces High Command, to the Army High
Command, and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the
v.G.a.D. along the —
Czech border." That I understand to
have reference to the reinforced border guard.
"In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have
empty rolling stock kept in readiness, clandestinely, for the
strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be trans-
ported starting 28 September."
The order to the railroads to make rolling stock available, to
which General Jodl referred, appears as Item 22, at Page 47 of the
Schmundt file. In this order the Defendant Keitel told the railroads
to be ready by 28 September but to continue work on the Western
fortifications even after 20 September in the interest of camouflage.
I quote the first four paragraphs of this order:

62
 3 Dec. 45

"The Reichsbahn (the railroads) must provide trains of empty

trucks in great numbers by September 28 for the carrying
out of mobilization exercises. This task now takes precedence
over all others.
—
"Therefore the trainloads for the limes job" I understand the
"limes job" to have reference to defense fortification in the
West — "will
have to be cut down after September 17 and
those goods loaded previous to this date unloaded by Sep-
tember 20.
"The Supreme Command of the Army (Fifth Division of the
Army General Staff) must issue further orders after con-
sultation with the authorities concerned.
"However, in accordance with the Führer's directive, every
effort should be made to continue to supply the materials in
as large quantities as feasible, even after 20 September 1938,
and this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to con-
tinue the important work on the limes."
The penultimate stage of the aggression begins on 18 September.
From that date until the 28th a series of orders was issued advanc-
ing preparations for the attack. These orders are included in the
Schmundt file and I shall not take the time of the Tribunal by
attempting to read all of it.
On the 18th the commitment scheduled for the five participating
Armies, the 2d, 8th, 10th, 12th, and 14th, was set forth. That is
Item 26 in the Schmundt file at Page 50 of the English translation.
Hitler approved the secret mobilization of five divisions in the West
to protect thé German rear during Case Green, and I refer to Item
—
31 in the Schmundt file at Page 13 I beg your pardon, it is Page 55,
I had a misprint. I might refer to that. It is a "most-secret" order,
Berlin, 27 September 1938, 1920 hours; 45 copies of which this is
the 16th:
"The Führer has approved the mobilization, without warning,
of the five regular West divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 33d, and
35th). The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces has expressly reserved the right to issue the order
for employment in the fortification zone and the evacuation
of this zone by the workers of the Todt organization.
"It is left to the OKH
to assemble as far as possible, first of
allthe sections ready to march and, subsequently, the remain-
ing sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the
Western fortifications."— Signed— "Jodl."
THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good tim.e to adjourn.
We will meet again at 2 o'clock.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

63
3 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, my attention has

been called to the fact that I misread a signature on one of the
documents to which I adverted this morning. It is Item 31 of the
Schmundt minutes. I read the name "Jodl" as being the signature
on that item. should have read Keitel.
I
In the course of presenting details of the documents which are
being offered in evidence, I think it would be well to pause for a
moment, and recall the setting in which these facts took place. The
world will never forget the Munich Pact, and the international
crisis which led to it. As this crisis was developing in August and
September of 1938, and frantic efforts were being made by the
statesmen of the world to preserve the peace of the world, little
did they know of the evil plans and designs in the hearts and the
minds of these conspirators.
What is being presented to the Tribunal today is the inside story,
in their own words, underlying the Pact of Munich. We are now
able to spread upon the pages of history the truth concerning the
fraud and deceit practiced by the Nazi conspirators in achieving
for their own ends, the Pact of Munich as a stepping stone towards
further aggression. One cannot think back without living again
through the dread of war, the fear of war, the fear of world
disaster, which seized all peace-loving persons. The hope for peace
which came with the Munich Pact was, we now see, a snare and a
—
deceit a trap, carefully set by the defendants on trial. The evil
character of these men who were fabricating this scheme for aggres-
sion and war is demonstrated by their own documents.
Further discussions were held between the Army and the Luft-
waffe about the time of day at which the attack should be launched.
Conference notes initialed by the Defendant Jodl, dated 27 Sep-
tember, reveal the difference in views. These notes are Item 54,
at Page 90 in the translation of Document 388-PS. I shall read these
first three paragraphs as follows: The heading is:
"Most secret; for chiefs only; only through officers.
"Conference notes; Berlin, 27 September 1938; 4 copies, first
copy. To be filed Grün.
"Co-ordinated Time of Attack by Army and Air Force on
X-Day.
"As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a
co-ordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on 1. X-Day.
"The Army wishes to attack at dawn, that is, about 0615. It
also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous
night, which however, would not alarm the entire Czech
front.

64
 3 Dec. 45

"Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions.

These could change the time of attack and also limit the area
of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance,
would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100
due to low ceiling in Bavaria."
Then I'll skip to the last two paragraphs on Page 91:
."Thus it is proposed:
—
"Attack by the Army independent of the attack by the Air
—
Force at the time desired by the Army (0615), and per-
mission for limited operations to take place before then;
however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire
Czech front.
"The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them."
*

The initial at the end of that order is "J" meaning, I think

clearly, Jodl.
On the same date, 27 September, the Defendant Keitel sent
a most-secret memorandum to the Defendant Hess, and the Reichs-
führer SS, Himmler, for the guidance of Nazi Party officials. This
memorandum is Item 32 in the Schmundt files at Page 56 of the
English translation. I read the first four paragraphs of this message.
"As a result of the political situation the Führer and Chan-
cellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed
Forces, without the political situation being aggravated by
issuing the mobilization (X) order, or corresponding code
words.
"Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is
necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands
to the various Party authorities and their organizations, which
are connected with the previous issuing of the mobilization
order, the advance measures or special code names.
"The special situation makes it necessary that these demands
be met (even if the code word has not been previously issued)
immediately and without being referred to higher authority^
"OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate
instructions to this effect, so that the mobilization of the
Armed Forces can be carried out according to plan."
Then I skip to the last paragraph:
"The Command of the Armed Forces further
Supreme
requests that all measures not provided for in the plans which
are undertaken by Party organizations or Police units, as a
result of the political situation, be reported in every case and
in plenty of time to the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces. Only then can it be guaranteed that these measures
can be carried out in practice.

65
 .

3 Dec. 45

"The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,

Keitel."
Two additional entries from the Defendant Jodl's diary reveal
the extent to which the Nazi conspirators carried out all of their
preparations for an attack, even during the period of negotiations
which culminated in the Munich Agreement. I quote the answers
in the Jodl diary for 26 and 27 September, from Page 7 of the
translation of Document 1780-PS. 26 September . .

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got in mind the dates of the visits
ofMr. Chamberlain to Germany, and of the actual agreement? Per-
haps you can give it later on.
MR. ALDERMAN: I think it will be covered later, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: The agreement of the Munich Pact was the
29th of September, and this answer then was 3 days before the
Pact, the 26th of September:
"Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through
the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach
march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is
not yet necessary and because the Führer does not intend to
march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach to-
wards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.
"Fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put
at the disposal of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlighten-
ment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech
propaganda transmissions.
"Question by Ausland whether Czechs are to be allowed to
leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed
Forces High Command: 'Yes.'
"1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command
informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg
conversations and about the Führer's opinion. In no case will
X-Day be before the 30th.
"It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn
into military engagements because of false reports, before
Prague replies.
"A question of Stumpf about Y-Hour results in the reply that
on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous inter-
vention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The
Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on
account of frequent early fogs.
"The Führer has to make a decision as to which of the Com-
manders-in-Chief is to have priority.

66
 3 Dec. 45

"The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army-

has to proceed. The Führer has not made any decision as yet
about commitment against Prague.
"2000 hours:The Führer addresses the people and the world
inan important speech at the Sportpalast."
Then the entry on 27 September:
"1320 hours: The Führer consents to the first wave of attack
being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the
assembly area by 30 September."
The order referred to by General Jodl was also recorded by the
faithful Schmundt, which appears as Item 33 at Page 57 of the file.
I'll read it in its entirety. It is the order which brought the Nazi
Army to a jumping-ofï point for the unprovoked and brutal aggres-
sion:
"28. 9. 38.; most secret; memorandum.

"At 1300 hours 27 September the Führer and Supreme Com-

mander of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the
assault units from their exercise areas to their jumping-off
points.
"The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or seven
divisions)must be ready to begin the action against Grün on
30 September, the decision having been made 1 day previ-
ously by 1200 noon.
"This order was conveyed to General Keitel at 1320 through
—
Major Schmundt" pencil note by Schmundt.
At with the Nazi Army poised in a strategic position
this point,
around the borders of Czechoslovakia, we shall turn back for a mo-
ment to examine another phase of the Czech aggression. The mili-
tary preparations for action against Czechoslovakia had not been
carried out in vacuo.
They had been preceded by a skillfully conceived campaign de-
signed to promote civil disobedience in the Czechoslovak State. Using
the techniques they had already developed in other uncontested ven-
tures underhandedly, the Nazi conspirators over a period of years
used money, propaganda, and force to undermine Czechoslovakia.
In this program the Nazis focused their attention on the persons of
German descent living in the Sudetenland, a mountainous area
bounding Bohemia and Moravia on the northwest and south. I now
invite the attention of the Tribunal to Document Number 998-PS
and offer it in evidence as an exhibit.
This exhibit is entitled, "German Crimes Against Czechoslovakia"
and is the Czechoslovak Government's official report for the prose-
cution and trial of the German major war criminals. I believe that
this report is clearly included within the provisions of Article 21,

67
3 Dec. 45

of the Charter, as a document of which the Court will take judicial

notice. Article 21 provides:
"The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also
take judicial notice of official governmental documents and
reports of the United Nations, including the accounts and
documents of the committees set up in the various Allied
countries for the investigation of war crimes and the records
and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United
Nations."
under that provision, the Court will take judicial notice
Since,
of thisgovernmental report by the Czech Government, I shall, with
the leave of the Tribunal, merely summarize Pages 9 to 12 of this
report to show the background of the subsequent Nazi intrigue
within Czechoslovakia.
Nazi agitation in Czechoslovakia dated from the earliest days of
the Nazi Party. In the years following the first World War, a Ger-
man National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), which maintained
close contact with Hitler's NSDAP, was activated in the Sudeten-
land. In 1932, ringleaders of the Sudeten Volkssport, an organi-
zation corresponding to the Nazi SA or Sturmabteilung, openly
endorsed the 21 points of Hitler's program, the first of which de-
manded the union of all Germans in a greater Germany. Soon
thereafter, they were charged with planning armed rebellion on
behalf of a foreign power and were sentenced for conspiracy against
the Czech Republic.
Late in 1933, the National Socialist Party of Czechoslovakia
forestalled its dissolution by voluntary liquidation and several of
its chiefs escaped across the border into Germany. For a year there-
after, Nazi activity in Czechoslovakia continued underground.
On 1 October 1934, with the approval and at the urging of the
Nazi conspirators, an instructor of gymnastics, Konrad Henlein,
established the German Home Front or Deutsche Heimatfront,
which, the following spring became the Sudeten German Party
(SDP). Profiting from the experiences of the Czech National Social-
ist Party, Henlein denied any connection with the German Nazis.
He pan-Germanism and professed his respect for individual
rejected
liberties his loyalty to honest democracy and to the Czech State.
and
His party, nonetheless, was built on the basis of the Nazi Führer-
prinzip, and he became its Führer.
By 1937, when the powers of Hitler's Germany had become
manifest, Henlein and his followers were striking a more aggressive
note, demanding without definition, "complete Sudeten autonomy".
The SDP laid proposals before the Czech Parliament which would
in substance, have created a state within a state.

68
 3 Dec. 45

After the annexation of Austria by Germany in March 1938, the

Henleinists, who were now openly organized after the Nazi model,
intensified their activities. Undisguised anti-Semitic propaganda
started in the Henlein press.
The campaign against Bolshevism was intensified. Terrorism in
the Henlein-dominated communities increased. A storm-troop or-
ganization, patterned and trained on the principles of the Nazi SS
was established, known as the FS, Freiwilliger Selbstschutz (or
Voluntary Vigilantes).
On 24 April 1938, in a speech to the Party Congress in Karlovy
Vary, Henlein came into the open with what he called his Karlsbad
Program. In this speech, which echoed Hitler in tone and substance,
Henlein asserted the right of the Sudeten Germans to profess Ger-
man political philosophy which, it was clear, meant National So-
cialism.
As the summer of 1938 wore on, the Henleinists used every tech-
nique of the Nazi Fifth Column. As summarized in Pages 12 to 16
of the Czech Government official report, these techniques included:
(a) Espionage. Military espionage was conducted by the SDP,
the FS, and by other members of the German minority on behalf
of Germany. Czech defenses were mapped and information on Czech
troop movements was furnished to the German authorities.
(b) Nazification of German organizations in Czechoslovakia. The
Henleinists systematically penetrated the whole life of the German
population of Czechoslovakia. Associations and social cultural cen-
ters regularly underwent "Gleichschaltung", that is purification, by
the SDP. Among the organizations conquered by the Henleinists
were sports societies, rowing clubs, associations of ex-service men,
and choral societies. The Henleinists were particularly interested
in penetrating as many business institutions as possible and bring-
ing over to their side the directors of banks, the owners or direc-
tors of factories, and the managers of commercial firms. In the case
of Jewish ownership or direction, they attempted to secure the co-
operation of the clerical and technical staffs of the institutions.
(c) German direction and leadership. The Henleinists main-
tained permanent contact with the Nazi officials designated to direct
operations within Czechoslovakia. Meetings in Germany, at which
Henleinists were exhorted and instructed in Fifth Column activity,
were camouflaged by being held in conjunction with "Sänger Feste"
(or choral festivals), gymnastic shows, and assemblies, and commer-
cial gatherings such as the Leipzig Fair. Whenever the Nazi con-
spirators needed incidents for their war of nerves, it was the duty
of the Henleinists to supply them.
(d) Propaganda. Disruptive and subversive propaganda was
beamed at Czechoslovakia in German broadcasts and was echoed

69
3 Dec. 45

in the German press. Goebbels called Czechoslovakia a "nest of

Bolshevism" and spread the false report of Russian troops and air-
planes centered in Prague. Under direction from the Reich, the
Henleinists maintained whispering propaganda in the Sudetenland
which contributed to the mounting tension and to the creation of
incidents. Illegal Nazi literature was smuggled from Germany and
widely distributed in the border regions. The Henlein press, more
or less openly, espoused Nazi ideology before the German popu-
lation in the Sudetenland.
(e) Murder and
terrorism. Nazi conspirators provided the Hen-
and particularly the FS, with money and arms with which
leinists,
to provoke incidents and to maintain a state of permanent unrest.
Gendarmes, customs officers, and other Czech officials were attacked.
A boycott was established against Jewish lawyers, doctors, and
tradesmen.
The Henleinists terrorized the non-Henlein population and the
Nazi Gestapo crossed into the border districts to carry Czechoslovak
citizens across the border into Germany. In several cases, political
foes of the Nazis were murdered on Czech soil. Nazi agents mur-
dered Professor Theodor Lessing in 1933, and engineer Formis in
1935. Both men were anti-Nazis who had escaped from Germany
after Hitler came to power and had sought refuge in Czechoslovakia.
Sometime afterwards, when there was no longer need for pre-
tense and deception, Konrad Henlein made a clear and frank state-
ment of the mission assigned to him by the Nazi conspirators. I
offer in evidence Document Number 2863-PS, an excerpt from a lec-
ture by Konrad Henlein quoted in the book Four Fighting Years,
a publication of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and
I quote from Page 2Ö. This book has been marked for identification

Exhibit USA-92, but without offering it in evidence, I ask the

Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. I shall read from Page 29.
This lecture was delivered by Henlein on 4 March 1941, in the audi-
torium of the University of Vienna, under the auspices of the Wie-
ner Verwaltungsakademie. During a thorough search of libraries
in Vienna and elsewhere, we have been unable to find a copy of the
German This text, this volume that I have here, is an English
text.
version. The Vienna newspapers the following day carried only
summaries of the lecture. This English version, however, is an offi-
cial publication of the Czech Government and is, under the circum-
stances, the best evidence that we can produce of the Henlein
speech.
In this lecture on "The Fight for the Liberation of the Sudetens"
Henlein said:
"National Socialism soon swept over us Sudeten Germans.
Our struggle was of a different character from that in

70
 3 Dec. 45

Germany. Although we had to behave differently in public we

were, of course, secretly in touch with the National Socialist
revolution in Germany so that we might be a part of it. The
struggle for Greater Germany was waged on Sudeten soil,
too. This struggle could be waged only by those inspired by
the spirit of National Socialism, persons who were true fol-
lowers of our Führer, whatever their outward appearance.
Fate sought me out to be the leader of the national group in
its final struggle. When in the autumn of 1933, the leader of
the NSDAP asked me to take over the political leadership of
the Sudeten Germans, I had a difficult problem to solve.
Should the National Socialist Party continue to be carried on
illegally or should the movement, in the interest of the self-
preservation of the Sudeten Germans and in order to prepare
their return to the Reich, wage its struggle under camouflage
and by methods which appeared quite legal to the outside
world? For us Sudeten Germans only the second alternative
seemed possible, for the preservation of our national group
was at stake. It would certainly have been easier to exchange
this hard and mentally exhausting struggle for the heroic
gesture of confessing allegiance to National Socialism and
entering a Czechoslovak prison. But it seemed more than
doubtful whether, by this means, we could have fulfilled the
political task of destroying Czechoslovakia as a bastion in the
alliance against the German Reich."

The account of Nazi intrigue in Czechoslovakia which I have just

presented to the Tribunal is the outline of this conspiracy as it had
been pieced together by the Czechoslovak Government early this
summer. Since then, captured documents and other information
made available to us since the defeat of Germany have clearly and
conclusively demonstrated the implication, which hitherto could
only be deduced, of the Nazi conspirators in the agitation in the
Sudetenland.
I offer in evidenceDocument Number 3060-PS, Exhibit USA-93.
This the original, handwritten draft of a telegram sent from the
is
German Legation in Prague on 16 March 1938 to the Foreign Min-
ister in Berlin. It is presumably written by the German Minister
Eisenlohr. It proves conclusively that the Henlein movement was
an instrument, a puppet of the Nazi conspirators. The Henlein
party, it appears from this document, was directed from Berlin and
from the German Legation in Prague. It could have no policy of
its own. Even the speeches of its leaders had to be co-ordinated
with the German authorities.

71
3 Dec. 45

I will read this telegram:

"Prague, 16 March 1938.
"Foreign (Office), Berlin; (cipher cable — secret); No. 57 of
16 March.
"With reference to cable order No. 30 of 14 March.
"Rebuff to Frank has had a salutary effect. Have thrashed out
matters with Henlein, who recently had ^shunned me, and
with Frank separately and received following promises:
"1. The line of German foreign policy as transmitted by the
German Legation is exclusively decisive for policy and tac-
tics of the Sudeten German Party. My directives are to be
complied with implicitly.
"2. Public speeches and the press will be co-ordinated uni-
formly with my approval. The editorial staff of Zeit" —
—
Time "is to be improved.
"3. Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line,
which in the end might lead to political complications, and
adopts a line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German inter-
ests. The objectives are to be set in every case with my par-
ticipation and to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action.
Laws for the protection of nationalities (Volksschutzgesetze)
and territorial "autonomy are no longer to be stressed.
"4. consultations with Berlin agencies are required or
If
desired before Henlein issues important statements on his
program, they are to be applied for and prepared through
the Legation.
"5. All information of the Sudeten German Party for German
agencies is to be transmitted through the Legation.
"6. Henlein will establish contact with me every week, and
will come to Prague at any time if requested.
"I now hope to have the Sudeten German Party under firm
control, as this is more than ever necessary for coming devel-
opments in the interest of foreign policy. Please inform
Ministries concerned and Mittelstelle (Central Office for Ra-
cial Germans) and request them to support this uniform direc-
tion of the Sudeten German Party."
The initials are illegible.
The dressing down administered by Eisenlohr to Henlein had
the desired effect. The day after the telegram was dispatched from
Prague, Henlein addressed a humble letter to Ribbentrop, asking
an early personal conversation.
I offer in evidence Document Number 2789-PS as Exhibit USA-94.

This is the letter from Konrad Henlein to Defendant Ribbentrop,

captured in the German Foreign Office files, dated 17 March 1938.

72
 3 Dec. 45

"Most honored Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"In our deeply felt joy over the fortunate turn of events in
Austria we feel it our duty to express our gratitude to all
those who had a share in this new grand achievement of our
Führer.
"I beg you, most honored Minister, to accept accordingly the
sincere thanks of the Sudeten Germans herewith.
"We shall show our appreciation to the Führer by doubled
efforts in the service of the Greater German policy.
"The new situation requires a re-examination of the Sudeten
German policy. For this purpose I beg to ask you for the
opportunity of a very early personal talk.
"In view of the necessity of such a clarification I have post-
poned the nation-wide Party Congress, originally scheduled
for 26th and 27th of March 1938, for 4 weeks.
"I would appreciate it if the Ambassador, Dr. Eisenlohr, and
two of my closest associates would be allowed to participate
in the requested talks.
"Heil Hitler. Loyally yours" —signed— "Konrad Henlein."
You will note that Henlein was
quite aware that the seizure of
Austria made possible the adoption of a new policy towards Czecho-
slovakia. You will also note that he was already in close enough
contact with Ribbentrop and the German Minister in Prague to feel
free to suggest early personal talks.
Ribbentrop was not unreceptive to Henlein's suggestion. The
conversations Henlein had proposed took place in the Foreign Office
in Berlin on the 29th of March 1938. The previous day Henlein had
conferred with Hitler himself.
I offer in evidence Document Number 2788-PS as Exhibit USA-95,
captured German Foreign Office notes of the conference on the
29th of March. I read the first two paragraphs:
"In this conference the gentlemen enumerated in the enclosed
list participated.
"The Reich Minister started out by emphasizing the necessity
to keep the conference which had been scheduled strictly a
secret. He then explained, in view of the directives which
the Führer himself had given to Konrad Henlein personally
yesterday afternoon, that there were two questions which
were of outstanding importance for the conduct of policy of
the Sudeten German Party."
I will omit the discussion of the claims of the Sudeten Germans
and resume the minutes of this meeting in the middle of the last
paragraph of the first page of the English translation, with the
sentence beginning, "The aim of the negotiations."

73
3 Dec. 45

"The aim be carried out by the Sudeten

of the negotiations to
German Party with the Czechoslovakian Government is fi-
nally this: To avoid entry into the Government by the exten-
sion and gradual specification of the demands to be made. It
must be emphasized clearly in the negotiations that the
Sudeten German Party alone is the party to the negotiations
with the Czechoslovakian Government, not the Reich Cabinet.
The Reich Cabinet itself must refuse to appear toward the
government in Prague or toward London and Paris as the
advocate or pacemaker of the Sudeten German demands. It
is a self-evident prerequisite that during the impending dis-
cussion with the Czechoslovak Government the Sudeten Ger-
mans should be firmly controlled by Konrad Henlein, should
maintain quiet and discipline, and should avoid indiscretions.
.The assurances already given by Konrad Henlein in this con-
nection were satisfactory.
"Following these general explanations of the Reichsminister,
the demands of the Sudeten German Party from the Czecho-
slovak Government, as contained in the enclosure, were dis-
cussed and approved in principle. For further co-operation,
Konrad Henlein was instructed to keep in the closest possible
touch with the Reichsminister and the head of the Central
Office for Racial Germans, as well as the German Minister in
Prague, as the local representative of the Foreign Minister.
The task of the German Minister in Prague would be to
support the demand of the Sudeten German Party as reason-
—
able not officially, but in more private talks with the Czecho-
slovak politicians, without exerting any direct influence on
the extent of the demands of the Party.
"In conclusion, there was a discussion whether it would be
useful if the Sudeten German Party would co-operate with
other minorities in Czechoslovakia, especially with the Slo-
vaks. The Foreign Minister decided that the Party should •

have the discretion to keep a loose contact with other minor-

ity groups if the adoption of a parallel course by them might
appear appropriate.
"Berlin, 29 March 1938,
"R"—for Ribbentrop.
Not the least interesting aspect of this secret meeting is the list

who attended: Konrad Henlein; his principal deputy, Karl

of those
Hermann Frank; and two others represented the Sudeten German
Party. Professor Haushofer, the geopolitician, and SS Obergruppen-
führer Lorenz represented the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (the Cen-
tral Office for Racial Germans). The Foreign Office was repre-
sented by a delegation of eight. These eight included Ribbentrop,

74
 3 Dec. 45

who presided at the meeting and did most of the talking; Von
Mackensen; Weizsäcker and Minister Eisenlohr from the German
Legation at Prague.
In May, Henlein came to Berlin for more conversations with the
Nazi conspirators. At this time the plans for Case Green, for the
attack on the Czechs, were already on paper, and it may be assumed
that Henlein was briefed on the role he was to play during the
summer months.
I again quote from General Jodl's diary, Document 1780-PS, the
entry for 22 May 1938: "Fundamental conference between the Führer
and K. Henlein (see enclosure)." The enclosure unfortunately is
missing from Jodl's diary.
The Tribimal will recall that in his speech in Vienna Henlein
had admitted that he had been selected by the Nazi conspirators in
the fall of 1933 to take over the political leadership of the Sudeten
Germans. The documents I have just read show conclusively the
nature of Henlein's mission. They demonstrate that Henlein's policy,
his propaganda, even his speeches, were controlled by Berlin.
I will now show that from the year 1935 the Sudeten German
Party was secretly subsidized by the German Foreign Office. I offer
in evidence Document 3059-PS as Exhibit TJSA-96, another secret
memorandum captured in the German Foreign Office file.
This memorandum, signed by Woermann and dated Berlin,
19 August 1938, was occasioned by the request of the Henlein Party
for additional funds. I read from that document:
"The Sudeten German Party has been subsidized by the For-
eign Office regularly since 1935 with certain amounts, con-
sisting of a monthly payment of 15,000 marks; .12,000 marks
of this are transmitted to the Prague Legation for disburse-
ment and 3,000 marks are paid out to the Berlin represen-
tation of the Party (Bureau Bürger). In the course of the
last few months the tasks assigned to the Bureau Bürger have
increased considerably due to the current negotiations with
the Czech Government. The number of pamphlets and maps
which are produced and disseminated has risen; the propa-
ganda activity in the press has grown immensely; the expense
accounts have increased especially because due to the neces-
sity for continuous good information, the expenses for trips to
Prague, London, and Paris (including the financing of travels
of Sudeten German deputies and agents) have grown con-
siderably heavier. Under these conditions the Bureau Bürger
is no longer able to get along with the monthly allowance
of 3,000 marks if it is to do everything required. Therefore
Herr Bürger has applied to this office for an increase of this
amount from 3,000 marks to 5,500 marks monthly. In view

75
 —

3 Dec. 45

of the considerable increase in the business transacted by the

bureau, and of the importance which marks the activity of
the bureau in regard to the co-operation with the Foreign
Office, this desire deserves the strongest support.

"Herewith submitted to the personnel department with a re-

quest for approval. Increase of payments with retroactive
effect from 1 August is requested." — —
signed "Woermann."
Under this signature is a footnote:

"Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle"— Central Office for Racial Ger-

—
mans "will be informed by the Political Department"
handwritten marginal note.
We may only conjecture what financial support the Henlein
movement received from other agencies of the German Government.
As the military preparations to attack Czechoslovakia moved
forward in the late summer and early fall, the Nazi command made
good use of Henlein and his followers. About the 1st of August,
the Air Attaché in the German Legation in Prague, Major Moericke,
acting on instructions from Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin, visited
the Sudeten German leader in Freudenthal. With his assistance
and in the company of the local leader of the FS, the Henlein
equivalent of the SS, he reconnoitered the surrounding countryside
to select possible airfield sites for German use. The FS leader, a
Czech reservist then on leave, was in the uniform of the Czech
Army, a fact which, as the Attaché noted, served as excellent
camouflage.
I now read from the enclosure to Document 1536-PS, which I
offered in evidence earlier and which bears United States Exhibit
Number 83. I have already read the first four paragraphs of the
enclosure:
"The manufacturer M. is the head of the Sudeten German
Glider Pilots in Fr."— that's Freudenthal— "and said to be
absolutely reliable by my trusted man. My personal impres-
sion fully confirmed this judgment. No hint of my identity
was made to him, although I had the impression that M.
knew who I was.
"At my request, with which he complied without any question,
M. travelled with me over the country in question. We used
M.'s private car for the trip.
"As M. did not know the country around Beneschau suffi-
ciently well, he took with him the local leader of the FS, a
Czech reservist of the Sudeten German Racial Group, at the
time on leave. He was in uniform. For reasons of camouflage,
I was entirely in —
agreement with this without actually
saying so.

76
 —

3 Dec. 45

"As M., during the course of the drive, observed that I photo-
graphed large open spaces out of the car, he said. 'Aha, so
you're looking for airfields!' I answered that we supposed
that in the case of any serious trouble, the Czechs would put
their airfields immediately behind the line of fortifications.
I had the intention of looking over the country from that
point of view."
In the latter part of the Air Attaché's report, reference is made
to the presence of reliable agents and informers, which he called
"V-Leute" (V-people), apparently drawn from the ranks of the
Henlein party in this area. It was indicated that these agents were
in touch with the "Abwehr Stelle" (the Intelligence Office) in
Breslau.
In September, when the Nazi propaganda campaign was reach-
ing its height, the Nazis were not satisfied with playing merely on
the Sudeten demands for autonomy. They attempted to use the
Slovaks as well. On the 19th of September the Foreign Office in
Berlin sent a telegram to the German Legation in Prague. I offer
the document in evidence. Number 2858-PS, Exhibit USA-97,
—
another captured German Foreign Office document a telegram:
"Please inform Deputy Kundt that Konrad Henlein requests
to get in touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to
start their demands for autonomy tomorrow." signed—
"Altenburg."
Kundt was Henlein's representative in Prague.
As the harassed Czech Government sought to stem the disorders
in the Sudetenland, the German Foreign Office turned to threaten-
ing diplomatic tactics in a deliberate effort to increase the tension
between the two countries. I offer in evidence Documents 2855-PS,
2854-PS, 2853-PS, and 2856-PS, as United States Exhibits respectively
98, 99, 100, and 101. Four telegrams from the Foreign Office in
Berlin to the Legation in Prague were dispatched between the 16th
and 24th of September 1938. They are self-explanatory. The first

is dated 16 September.
"Tonight 150 subjects of Czechoslovakia of Czech blood were
arrested in Germany. This measure is an answer to the arrest
of Sudeten Germans since the Fiihrer's speech of 12 September.
I request you to ascertain as soon as possible the number of
Sudeten Germans arrested since 12 September as far as
possible. The number of those arrested there is estimated
conservatively at 400 by the Gestapo. Cable report."
A handwritten note follows:
"Impossible for me to ascertain these facts as already com-
municated to the chargé d'affaires."

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3 Dec. 45

The second telegram is dated September 17:

*'Most urgent.
"I. Request to inform the local government immediately of
the following:
"The Reich Government has decided that:
"(a) Immediately as many Czech subjects of Czech descent,
Czech-speaking Jews included, will be arrested in Germany
as Sudeten Germans have been in Czechoslovakia since the
beginning of the week; (b) If any Sudeten Germans should
be executed pursuant to a death sentence on the basis of
martial law, an equal number of Czechs will be shot in Ger-
many."
The third telegram was sent on 24 September. I read it:
"According to information received here, Czechs have arrested
two German frontier policemen, seven customs officials, and
30 railway officials. As counter measure all the Czech staff
in Marschegg were arrested. We are prepared to exchange
the arrested Czech officials for the German officials. Please
approach Government there and wire result."
On the same day the fourth telegram was dispatched, and I read
the last paragraph:
" 'Confidential'. Yielding of Czech hostages arrested here for

the prevention of the execution of any sentences passed by

military courts against Sudeten Germans is, of course, out
of question."
In the latter half of September, Henlein devoted himself and
his followers wholeheartedly to the preparations for the coming
German attack. About 15 September, after Hitler's provocative
Nuremberg speech in which he accused Benes of torturing and
planning the extermination of the Sudeten Germans, Henlein and
Karl Hermann Frank, one of his principal deputies, fied to Ger-
many to avoid arrest by the Czech Government. In Germany
Henlein broadcast over the powerful Reichsender radio station his
determination to lead the Sudeten Germans home to the Reich and
denounced what he called the Hussites-Bolshevist criminals of
Prague. From his headquarters in a castle at Donndorf, outside
Bayreuth, he kept in close touch with the leading Nazi conspirators,
including Hitler and Himmler. He directed activities along the
border and began the organization of the Sudeten German Free
Corps, an auxiliary military organization. You will find these events
set forth in the Czechoslovak official government report, 998-PS,
which has already been offered as Exhibit USA-91.
Henlein's activities were carried on with the advice and assist-
ance of the German Nazi leaders. Lieutenant Colonel Röchling was

78
 3 Dec. 45

assigned to Henlein in an advisory capacity to assist with the

Sudeten German Free Corps. In a conference with Hitler on the
night of September 17, Köchling received far-reaching military
powers.
At purpose of the Free Corps was frankly
this conference, the
stated —the maintenance of disorder and clashes.
I read from Item 25,
a handwritten note labelled "most secret," on Page 49 of the
Schmundt file, Document 388-PS:
''Most secret. Last night took place between
conference
Führer and Lieutenant Colonel Köchling. Duration of con-
ference 7 minutes. Lieutenant Colonel Köchling remains
directly responsible to OKW. He will be assigned to Konrad
Henlein in an advisory capacity. He received far-reaching
military plenary powers from the Führer. The Sudeten Ger-
man Free Corps remains responsible to Konrad Henlein alone.
Purpose: Protection of the Sudeten Germans and maintenance
of disturbances and clashes. The Free Corps will be established
in Germany. Armament only with Austrian weapons. Activ-
ities of Free Corps to begin as soon as possible."

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good place to break off for

10 minutes?

[A recess was taken.]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, General Jodl's

diary again gives a further insight into the position of the Henlein
Free Corps. At this time, the Free Corps was engaged in active
skirmishing along the Czech border, furnishing incidents and prov-
ocation in the desired manner. I quote from the entries in the
Jodl diary, for the 19th and 20th September 1938, at Page 6 of the
Document 1780-PS, which is Exhibit USA-72.
"19 September: Order is given to the Army High Command
to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.
"20 September: England and France have handed over their
demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown.
The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent
that they may bring about, and already have brought about,
consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Trans-
ferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity
of the border.) By checking with Lieutenant Colonel Köch-
ling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

"Toward the evening the Führer also takes a hand and gives
permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after
the approval of the corps headquarters."

79
3 Dec. 45

A
report from Henlein's staff, which was found in Hitler's head-
quarters, boasted of the offensive operations of the Free Corps. It
is Item 30 of the Schmundt file, Page 54 of Document 388-PS. I read
the last two paragraphs:
''Since 19 September, in more than 300 missions, the Free
Corps has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack,"
— now, that word "attack" was changed by superimposition
—
to ''defense" "and with a willingness often reaching a degree
of unqualified self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of
its activities: More than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG's"
— — which I
suppose means machine guns "and a large amount of other
weapons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead
—
and wounded suffered by the enemy." And there was super-
imposed in place of "enemy", "the Czech terrorists."
In his headquarters in the castle at Donndorf, Henlein was in
close touch with Admiral Canaris of the Intelligence Division of
the OKW and with the SS and the SA. The liaison officer between
the SS and Henlein was Oberführer Gottlob Berger (SS).
I now offer in evidence Document 3036-PS as Exhibit USA-102,
which is an affidavit executed by Gottlob Berger; and in connection
with that affidavit, I wish to submit to the Tribunal that it presents,
we think, quite a different question of proof from the Schuschnigg
affidavits which were not admitted in evidence by the Court.
Schuschnigg, of course, was a neutral and non-Nazi Austrian. He
was not a member of this conspiracy, and I can well understand
that the Court rejected his affidavit for these reasons.
This man was a Nazi. serving in this conspiracy. He
He was
has made We
think the affidavit has probative value
this affidavit.
and should be admitted by the Tribunal under the pertinent pro-
vision of the Charter, which says that you will accept in evidence
any evidence having probative value. We think it would be unfair
to require us to bring here as a witness a man who would certainly
be a hostile witness, who is to us a member of this conspiracy, and
it seems to us that the affidavit should be admitted with leave to
the defendants, if they wish, to call the author of the affidavit as
their witness. I should have added that this man was a prominent
member of the SS which is charged before you as being a criminal
organization, and we think the document is perfectly competent in
evidence as an admission against interest by a prominent member
of the SS organization.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, the Defense objects to the
use of this document. This document was drawn up as late as
22 November 1945, here in Nuremberg, and the witness Berger
could, therefore, be brought to Court without any difficulty. We
must insist that he be heard here on the subjects on which the

80
 3 Dec. 45

Prosecution wishes to introduce his testimony. That would be the

only way in which the Defense could have an opportunity of cross-
examining the witness and thereby contribute to obtaining objective
truth.

[Pause in the proceedings while the Tribunal consulted.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection and will

not hear this affidavit. It is open to either the Prosecution or the
defendants, of course, to call the man who made the affidavit. That
is all I have We have upheld your objection.
to say.

MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I had another affidavit

by one Alfred Helmut Nau jocks which, I take it, will be excluded
under this same ruling, and which, therefore, I shall not offer.
THE PRESIDENT: If the circumstances are the same.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, I might merely refer to it for identifica-
tion because it is in your document books.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is Document 3029-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That also will be rejected as
evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. Offensive operations along the Czecho-
slovakian border were not confined to skirmishes carried out by the
Free Corps. Two SS-Totenkopf (Deathhead) battalions were operat-
ing across the border in Czech territory near Asch.
I quote now from Item 36 in the Schmundt file, an OKW most-
secret order, signed by Jodl, and dated 28 September. This appears
at Page 61 of the Schmundt file:
"Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Berlin, 28 Sep-
tember 1938; 45 copies, 16th copy; most secret.
"Subject: Four SS-Totenkopf battalions subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief Army.
"To: Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police (SS
Central Office) (36th copy).
"By order of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
the following battalions of the SS Deathhead organization
will be under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of
the Army with immediate effect.
"Second and Third Battalions of the 2d SS-Totenkopf Regi-
ment Brandenburg at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia).
"First and Second Battalions of the 3d SS-Totenkopf Regi-
ment Thuringia, at present in Radebeul and Kötzschenbroda
near Dresden.

81
3 Dec. 45

"Commander-in-Chief of the Army is requested to deploy

these battalions for the West, (Upper Rhine) according to the
Fiihrer's instructions.
"These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch prom-
ontory (I and II Battalions of the SS-Totenkopf Regiment
Oberbayern) will come under the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army only when they return to German Reich territory, or
when the Army crosses the German-Czech frontier.
"It is requested that all further arrangements be made be-
tween Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Reichsführer SS
(SS Central Office).
"For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces, Jodl."

According to the 25 September entry in General Jodl's diary,

these SS-Totenkopf battalions were operating in this area on direct
orders from Hitler. As the time X-Day approached, the disposition
of the Free Corps became a matter of dispute.
On Himmler issued an order to the Chief of Staff
26 September
of the Sudeten German Free Corps, directing that the Free Corps
come under control of the Reichsführer SS in the event of German
invasion of Czechoslovakia. This document is Item 37 in the
Schmundt file, on Page 62.
On28 September Defendant Keitel directed that as soon as the
German Army crosses the Czech border, the Free Corps will take
orders from the OKH. In this most-secret order of the OKW, Keitel
discloses that Henlein's men are already operating in Czechoslovak
territory.
I read now from Item 34 of the Schmundt file on Page 58, the
last three paragraphs of this most-secret order:
"For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to it the
principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct
from the Führer and that they carry out their operations
only in conjunction with the competent corps headquarters.
The advance units of the Free Corps will have to report to
the local commander of the frontier guard immediately before
crossing the frontier.
"Those units remaining forward of the frontier should, in
their own interests, get into communication with the frontier
guard as often as possible.
"As soon as the Army crosses the Czechoslovak border the
Henlein Free Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus
it will be expedient to assign a sector to the Free Corps, even

now, which can be fitted into the scheme of army boundaries

later."

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 3 Dec. 45

On30 September, when it became clear that the Munich Settle-

ment would result in a peaceful occupation of the Sudetenland,
the Defendant Keitel ordered that the Free Corps Henlein, in its
present composition, be placed under the command of Himmler.
I read from Item 38, at Page 63, of the Schmundt file:

"1. Attachment ofthe Henlein Free Corps. The Supreme

Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered that the
Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed under
command of Reichsführer SS and the Chief of German Police.
It is therefore not at the immediate disposal of OKH as field
imit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in, like the
rest of the police forces, for police duties in agreement with
the Reichsführer SS."
I have been able, if the Tribunal please, to ascertain the dates
the Tribunal asked about before the recess.
Thefirst visit of Chamberlain to Germany in connection with
this matter was 15 September 1938. Chamberlain flew to Munich
and arrived at 12:30 o'clock on 15 September. He went by train
from Munich to Berchtesgaden, arriving at 1600 hours, by car to
Berghof, arriving about at 1650, for three talks with Hitler. On
16 September Chamberlain returned by air to London.
The second visit was on 22 September. Chamberlain met with
Hitler at Bad Godesberg at 1700 hours for a 3-hour discussion, and
it was a deadlock. On 23 September discussions were resumed at
2230 hours. On 24 September Chamberlain returned to London.
The third visit was on 29 September. Chamberlain flew to
Munich and the meeting of Chamberlain, Mussolini, Daladier, and
Hitler took place at the Brown House at 1330 and continued until
0230 hours on 30 September 1938, a Friday, when the Munich Agree-
ment was signed. Under the threat of war by the Nazi conspirators,
and with war in fact about to be launched, the United Kingdom
and France concluded the Munich Pact with Germany and Italy at
that early morning hour of 30 September 1938. This Treaty will
be presented by the British prosecutor. It is sufficient for me to
say of it at this point that it was the cession of the Sudetenland
by Czechoslovakia to Germany. Czechoslovakia was required to
acquiesce.
The Munich Pact will be TC-23 of the British documents.
On 1 October 1938 German troops began the occupation of the
Sudetenland. During the conclusion of the Munich Pact the Wehr-
macht had been fully deployed for the attack, awaiting only the
word of Hitler to begin the assault.
With the cession of the Sudetenland new orders were issued.
On 30 September the Defendant Keitel promulgated Directive

83
 —
3 Dec. 45

Number 1 on occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia.

This is Item 39 at Page 64 of the Schmundt file. This directive
contained a timetable for the occupation of sectors of former Czech
territory between 1 and 10 October and specified the tasks of the
German Armed Forces.
I read now the fourth and fifth paragraphs of that document:
"2. The present degree be
of rnobilized preparedness is to
maintained completely, for the present also in the West.
Order for the rescinding of measures taken, is held over.
"The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily
be converted into operation Grün."
It contains one other important provision about the Henlein
forces, and I quote from the list under the heading "a. Army":
"Henlein Free Corps. All combat action on the part of the
Volunteer Corps must cease as from 1st October."
The Schmundt file contains a number of additional secret OKW
directives giving instructions for the occupation of the Sudeten-
land. I think I need not read them, as they are not essential to the
proof of our case. They merely indicate the scope of the prepa-
rations of the OKW.
Directives specifying the occupational area of the Army, the
units under its command, arranging for communication facilities,
supply, and propaganda, and giving instructions to the various
departments of the Government were issued over Defendant Keitel's
signature on 30 September. These are Items 40, 41, and 42 in the
Schmundt file. I think it is sufficient to read the caption and the
signature.
THE PRESIDENT: What page?
MR. ALDERMAN: Page 66 of the EngUsh version. This is the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, most secret:
"Special Orders Number 1 to Directive Number 1. Subject:
Occupation of Territory Ceded by Czechoslovakia." — Sig-
nature— "Keitel."
Item 41 is on Page 70 of the Schmundt file.
"Supreme Command of the Armed Forces; most secret IV a.
Most secret; subject: Occupation of Sudeten-German Ter-
ritory."— Signed— "Keitel."
Item 42 in the Schmundt file is on Page 75, again most secret.
"Subject: Occupation of the Sudeten-German Area." Signed —
"Keitel."
By 10 October Von Brauchitsch was able to report to Hitler that
German troops had reached the demarcation line and that the order
for the occupation of the Sudetenland had been fulfilled. The

84
 3 Dec. 45

OKW requested Hitler's permission to rescind Case Green, to with-

draw troops from the occupied area, and to relieve the OKH of
executive powers in the Sudeten-German area as of 15 October.
These are Items 46, 47, and 48 in the Schmundt file.
Item 46, which appears at Page 77, is a letter from Berlin, dated
October 10, 1938, signed by Von Brauchitsch:
"My Führer:
"I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation
line as ordered,by this evening. Insofar as further military
operations are not required, the order for the occupation of
the country which was given to me will thus have been ful-
filled. The guarding of the new frontier line will be taken
over by the reinforced frontier supervision service in the
next few days.
"It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the
administration of the Sudetenland with the command of the
troops of the Army under the control of one person.
"I therefore ask you, my
Führer, to relieve me, with effect
from 15 October 1938, of the charge assigned to me: That of
exercising executive powers in Sudeten-German Territory.
"Heil, my Führer, Von Brauchitsch."
Item 47 of the Schmundt file, appearing on Page 78, is a secret
telegram from the OKW
to the Führer's train. Lieutenant Colonel
Schmundt:
"If evening report shows that occupation of Zone 5 has been
completed without incident, OKW
intends to order further
demobilization.
"Principle: 1) To suspend operation Grün but maintain a
sufficient state of preparedness on part of Army and Luft-
waffe to make intervention possible if necessary. 2) All units
not needed to be withdrawn from the occupied area and
reduced to peacetime status, as population of occupied area is
heavily burdened by the massing of troops."
Skipping to below the OKW signature, this appears, at the left:
"Führer's decision:
"1. Agreed.
"2. Suggestion to be made on the 13 October in Essen by
General Keitel. Decision will then be reached."
On the same date additional demobilization of the forces in the
Sudetenland was ordered by Hitler and Defendant Keitel. Three
days later the OKW
requested Hitler's consent to the reversion of
the RAD (Labor Corps) from the control of the Armed Forces. These
are Items 52 and 53 in the Schmundt file.

85
3 Dec. 45

As the German forces entered the Sudetenland, Henlein's

Sudetendeutsche Partei was merged with the NSDAP of Hitler. The
two men who had fled to Hitler's protection in mid-September, Hen-
lein and Karl Hermann Frank, were appointed Gauleiter and
Deputy Gauleiter, respectively, of the Sudetengau. In the parts of
the Czechoslovak Republic that were still free the Sudetendeutsche
Partei constituted itself as the National Socialistic German Worker
Party in Czechoslovakia, NSDAP in Czechoslovakia, under the
direction of Kundt, another of Henlein's deputies.
The Tribunal will find these events set forth in the Czecho-
slovak official report. Document 998-PS.
The stage was now prepared for the next
of the Nazi con- move
spirators, the plan for the conquest of the remainder of Czecho-
slovakia. With the occupation of the Sudetenland and the inclusion
of German-speaking Czechs within the Greater Reich, it might have
been expected that the Nazi conspirators would be satisfied. Thus
far in their program of aggression the defendants had used as a
pretext for their conquests the union of the Volksdeutsche, the
people of German descent, with the Reich. Now, after Munich, the
Volksdeutsche in Czechoslovakia have been substantially all
returned to German rule.
On 26 September, at the Sportpalast in Berlin, Hitler spoke to
the world. I now refer and invite the notice of the Tribunal to the
Völkischer Beobachter, Munich edition, special edition for 27 Sep-
tember 1938, in which this speech is quoted. I read from Page 2,
Column 1, quoting from Hitler:
"And now we are confronted with the last problem which
must be solved and will be solved. It is the last territorial
claim" . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Is this document in our documents?

MR. ALDERMAN: No. I am asking the Court to take judicial
notice of that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. ALDERMAN: It is a well-known German publication.
"It the last territorial claim which I have to make in
is
Europe, but it is a claim from which I will not swerve and
which I will satisfy, God wilUng." (Document Number 2358-PS.)
And further:
"I have I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain
little to explain.
for all his efforts, have assured him that the German
and I

people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that
I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience."

86
 —

3 Dec. 45

This is Page 2, Column 1.

"I assured him, I repeat it here, that when this

moreover, and
problem solved there will be no more territorial problems
is
for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from
the moment, when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems
that is to say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement
with their other minorities peacefully and without oppres-
—
sion I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And
that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don't
want any Czechs!"
The major portion of the passage I have quoted will be con-
tained in Document TC-28, which I think, will be offered by the
British prosecutor.
Yet two weeks later Hitler and Defendant Keitel were preparing
estimates of the military forces required to break Czechoslovak
resistance in Bohemia and Moravia.
I now read from Item 48, at Page 82, of the Schmundt file. This
is a top-secret telegram sent by Keitel to Hitler's headquarters on
11 October 1938 in answer to four questions which Hitler had
propounded to the OKW. I think it is sufficient merely to read the
questions which Hitler had propounded:
''Question 1. What reinforcements are necessary in *^the
situation to break all Czech resistance in Bohemia and
Moravia?
"Question 2. How much time is requested for the regrouping
or moving up of new forces?
"Question 3. How much time
will be required for the same
purpose if it is executed after the intended demobilization
and return measures?
"Question 4. How much time would be required to achieve
the state of readiness of 1 October?"
On 21 October, the same day on which the administration of the
Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian authorities, a directive
outlining plans for the conquest of the remainder of Czechoslovakia
was signed by Hitler and initialed by the Defendant Keitel.
I now offer in evidence Document C-136 as Exhibit USA-104,
a top-secret order of which 10 copies were made, this being the first
copy, signed in ink by Keitel.
In this order, issued only 3 weeks after the winning of the
Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators are already looking forward to
new conquests. I quote the first part of the body of the document:
"The future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparations
for the conduct of war resulting from these tasks will be laid
down by me in a later directive. Until this directive comes

87
3 Dec. 45

into force the Armed Forces must be prepared at all times

for the following eventualities:
"1) The securing of the frontiers of Germany and the protec-
tion against surprise air attacks.
"2) The liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia.
"3) The occupation of the Memel."
And then proceeding, the statement following Number 2:
'Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia: It must be
*

possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia

if her policy should become hostile towards Germany.

"The preparations to be made by the Armed Forces for this

contingency will be considerably smaller in extent than those
for Grün; they must, however, guarantee a continuous and
considerably higher state of preparedness, since planned
mobilization measures have been dispensed with. The or-
ganization, order of battle, and state of readiness of the units
earmarked for that purpose are in peacetime to be so ar-
ranged for a surprise assault that Czechoslovakia herself will
be deprived of all possibility of organized resistance. The
object is the swift occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and
the cutting off of Slovakia. The preparations should be such
—
that at the same time 'Grenzsicherung West' " the measures
—
of frontier defense in the West "can be carried out.
"The detailed mission of Army and Air Force is as follows:
"a. Army: The
units stationed in the vicinity of Bohemia-
Moravia and several motorized divisions are to be earmarked
for a surprise type of attack. Their number will be deter-
mined by the forces remaining in Czechoslovakia; a quick and
decisive success must be assured. The assembly and prepa-
rations for the attack must be worked out. Forces not needed
will be kept in readiness in such a manner that they may be
either committed in securing the frontiers or sent after the
attack army.
"b. Air Force: The quick advance of the German Army is to
be assured by early elimination of the Czech Air Force. For
this purpose the commitment in a surprise attack from peace-
time bases has to be prepared. Whether for this purpose still
stronger forces may be required can be determined from the
development of the military-political situation in Czecho-
slovakia only. At the same time a simultaneous assembly of
the remainder of the offensive forces against the West must
be prepared."
And then Part 3 goes on under the heading, "Annexation of the
Memel District."

88
 3 Dec. 45

It signed by Adolf Hitler and authenticated by Defendant

is
Keitel. was distributed to the OKH, to Defendant Göring's Luft-
It
waffe, and to Defendant Raeder at Navy headquarters.
Two months later, on 17 December 1938, Defendant Keitel issued
an appendix to the original order, stating that by command of the
Führer preparations for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia are to
continue.
I offer in evidence Document C-138 as Exhibit USA-105, and
other captured OKW
documents classified top secret.
Distribution of this order was the same as for the 21 October
order. I shall read the body of this order.
"Corollary to Directive of 21. 10. 38.

"Reference: 'Liquidation of the Rest of Czechoslovakia.' The

Führer has given the following additional order:
"The preparations for this eventuality are to continue on the
assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be ex-
pected.
"To the outside world too it must clearly appear that it is
merely an action of pacification, and not a warlike under-
taking.
"The action must therefore be carried out by the peacetime
Armed Forces only, without reinforcements from mobilization.
The necessary readiness for action, especially the ensuring
that the most necessary supplies are brought up, must be
effected by adjustment within the units.
"Similarly the units of the Army detailed for the march in
must, as a general rule, leave their stations only during the
night prior to the crossing of the frontier, and will not pre-
viously form up systematically on the frontier. The transport
necessary for previous organization should be limited to the
minimum and will be camouflaged as much as possible. Neces-
sary movements, if any, of single units and particularly of
motorized forces, to the troop training areas situated near the
frontier, must have the approval of the Führer.

"The Air Force should take action in accordance with the

similar general directives.
"For the same reasons the exercise of executive power by
the Supreme Command of the Army is laid down only for
the newly occupied territory and only for a short period."
—Signed— "Keitel."
I invite the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this par-
ticular copy of this order, an original carbon signed in ink by Keitel,
was the one sent to the OKM, the German Naval headquarters. It

89
3 Dec. 45

bears the initials of Fricke, head of the Operation Division of the

naval war staff; Schniewind, Chief of Staff; and of Defendant Raeder.
As the Wehrmacht moved forward, with plans for what it clearly
considered would be an easy victory, the Foreign Office played its
part. In a discussion of means of improving German-Czech relations
with the Czech Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky in Berlin on 31 Jan-
uary 1939, Defendant Ribbentrop urged upon the Czech Government
a quick reduction in the size of the Czech Army. I offer in evidence
Document 2795-PS as Exhibit USA-106, captured German Foreign
Office notes of this discussion. I will read only the footnote, which
is in Ribbentrop's handwriting:

"Imentioned to Chvalkovsky especially that a quick reduction

in the Czech Army would be decisive in our judgment."
Does the Court propose sitting beyond 4:30?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I think not. The Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 4 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

90
 TWELFTH DAY
Tuesday, 4 December 1945

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: I will call on the Chief Prosecutor for Great

Britain and Northern Ireland.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (Chief Prosecutor for the United
Kingdom): May please the Tribunal, on an occasion to which
it

reference has and will be made, Hitler, the leader of the Nazi con-
spirators who are now on trial before you, is reported as having
said, in reference to their warlike plans:

"I shall give apropagandist cause for starting the war, never
mind whether be true or not. The victor shall not be asked
it

later on whether he told the truth or not. 'In starting and

—
making a war, not the right is what matters, but victory the
strongest has the right."
The British Empire with its Allies has twice, within the space
of 25 years, been victorious in wars which have been forced upon
it, but it is precisely because we realize that victory is not enough,

that might is not necessarily right, that lasting peace and the rule
of international law is not to be secured by the strong arm alone,
that the British nation is taking part in this Trial. There are those
who would perhaps say that these wretched men should have been
dealt with summarily withouttrial by "executive action"; that their
power for evil broken, they should have been swept aside into
oblivion without this elaborate and careful investigation into the
part which they played in bringing this war about: Vae Victis! Let
them pay the penalty of defeat. But that was not the view of the
British Government. Not so would the rule of law be raised and
strengthened on the international as well as upon the municipal
plane; not so would future generations realize that right is not
always on the side of the big battalions; not so would the world
be made aware that the waging of aggressive war is not only a
dangerous venture but a criminal one.
Human memory is very short. Apologists for defeated nations
are sometimes able to play upon the sympathy and magnanimity of
their victors, so that the true facts, never authoritatively recorded,
become obscured and forgotten. One has only to recall the circum-
stances following upon the last World War to see the dangers to

91
4 Dec. 45

which, in the absence of any authoritative judicial pronouncement,

a tolerant or a credulous people is exposed. With the passage of
time the former tend to discount, perhaps because of their very
horror, the stories of aggression and atrocity that may be handed
down; and the latter, ^the credulous, misled by perhaps fanatical
and perhaps dishonest propagandists, come to believe that it was
not they but their opponents who were guilty of that which they
would themselves condemn. And so we believe that this Tribunal,
acting, as we know it will act notwithstanding its appointment
by the victorious powers, with complete and judicial objectivity,
will provide a contemporary touchstone and an authoritative and
impartial record to which future historians may turn for truth, and
future politicians for warning. From this record shall future
generations know not only what our generation suffered, but also
that our suffering was the result of crimes, crimes against the laws
of peoples which the peoples of the world upheld and will continue
—
in the future to uphold to uphold by international co-operation, not
based merely on military alliances, but grounded, and firmly
grounded, in the rule of law.
Nor, though thi.s procedure and this Indictment of individuals
may be novel, is there anything new in the principles which by this
prosecution we seek to enforce. Ineffective though, alas, the sanc-
tions proved and showed to be, the nations of the world had, as it
will be my purpose in addressing the Tribunal to show, sought
to make aggressive war an international crime, and although
previous tradition has sought to punish states rather than indi-
viduals, it is both logical and right that, if the act of waging war
is itself an offense against international law, those individuals who
shared personal responsibility for bringing such wars about should
answer personally for the course into which they led their states.
Again, individual war crimes have long been recognized by inter-
national law as triable by the courts of those states whose nationals
have been outraged, at least so long as a state of war persists. It
would be illogical in the extreme if those who, although théy may
not with their own hands have committed individual crimes, were
responsible for systematic breaches of the laws of war affecting
the nationals of many states should escape for that reason. So also
in regard to Crimes against Humanity. The rights of humanitarian
intervention on behalf of the rights of man, trampled upon by a
state in a manner shocking the sense of mankind, has long been
considered to form part of the recognized law of nations. Here too,
the Charter merely develops a pre-existing principle. If murder,
rapine, and robbery are indictable under the ordinary municipal
laws of our countries, shall those who differ from the common
criminal only by the extent and systematic nature of their offenses
escape accusation?

92
 4 Dec. 45

It is, as I shall show, the view of the British Government that

in these matters, this Tribunal will be applying to individuals, not
the law of the victor, but the accepted principles of international
usage in a way which will, if anything can, promote and fortify the
rule of international law and safeguard the future peace and security
of this war-stricken world.
By agreement between the chief prosecutors, it is my task, on
behalf of the British Government and of the other states associated
in this Prosecution, to present the case on Count Two of the In-
dictment and to show how these defendants, in conspiracy with
each other, and with persons not now before this Tribunal, planned
and waged a war of aggression in breach of the treaty obligations
by which, under international law, Germany, as other states, has
thought to make such wars impossible.
The task falls into two parts. The first is to demonstrate the
nature and the basis of the Crime against Peace, which is constituted
under the Charter of this Tribunal, by waging wars of aggression
and in violation of treaties; and the second is to establish beyond all
possibility of doubt that such wars were waged by these defendants.

Asto the first, it would no doubt be sufficient just to say this.

It not incumbent upon the Prosecution to prove that wars of
is
aggression and wars in violation of international treaties are, or
ought to be, international crimes. The Charter of this Tribunal has
prescribed that they are crimes and that the Charter is the statute
and the law of this Court. Yet, though that is the clear and man-
datory law governing the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, we feel that
we should not be discharging our task in the abiding interest of
international justice and morality unless we showed to the Tribunal,
and indeed to the world, the position of this provision of the
Charter against the general perspective of international law. For,
just as in the experience of our country, some old English statutes
were merely declaratory of the common law, so today this Charter
merely declares and creates a jurisdiction in respect of what was
already the law of nations.
Nor unimportant to emphasize that aspect of the matter,
is it
lest there may be some, now or hereafter, who might allow their
judgment to be warped by plausible catchwords or by an uninformed
and distorted sense of justice towards these defendants. It is not
difficult to be misled by such criticisms as that resort to war in the
past has not been a crime; that the power to resort to war is one
of the prerogatives of the sovereign state; even that this Charter,
in constituting wars of aggression a crime, has imitated one of the
most obnoxious doctrines of National Socialist jurisprudence,
—
namely post factum legislation that the Charter is in this respect
—
reminiscent of bills of attainder and that these proceedings are no

93
 —

4 Dec. 45

more than measure of vengeance, subtly concealed in the garb of

a
judicial proceedings which the victor wreaks upon the vanquished.
—
These things may sound plausible yet they are not true. It is,
indeed, not necessary to doubt that some aspects of the Charter bear
upon them the imprint of significant and salutary novelty. But it is
our submission and our conviction, which we affirm before this
Tribunal and the world, that fundamentally the provision of the
Charter which constitutes wars, such wars as these defendants
joined in waging and in planning a crime, is not in any way an
innovation. This provision of the Charter does no more than con-
stitute a competent jurisdiction for the punishment of what not only
the enlightened conscience of mankind but the law of nations itself
had constituted an international crime before this Tribunal was
established and this Charter became part of the public law of the
world.
So first let this be said:
Whilst it may be
quite true that there is no body of international
rules amounting to law in the Austinian sense of a rule imposed
by a sovereign upon a subject obliged to obey it under some definite
sanction, yet for 50 years or more the people of the world, striving
perhaps after that ideal of which the poet speaks:
"When the war drums throb no longer
And the battle flags are furled,
In the parliament of man.
The federation of the world"
sought to create an operative system of rules based upon the con-
sent of nations to stabilize international relations, to avoid war
taking place at all and to mitigate the results of such wars as took
place. The first treaty was of course the Hague Convention of 1899
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. That Con-
vention was, indeed, of no more than precatory effect, and we attach
no weight to it for the purposes of this case, but it did establish
agreement that, in the event of serious disputes arising between
the signatory powers, they would as far as possible submit to
mediation. That Convention was followed in 1907 by another con-
vention reaffirming and slightly strengthening what had previously
been agreed. These early conventions fell, indeed, very far short
of outlawing war, or of creating any binding obligation to arbitrate.
I shall certainly not ask the Tribunal to say any crime was com-

mitted by disregarding those conventions.

But at least they established that the contracting powers accepted
the general principle that, if at all possible, war should be resorted
to only if mediation failed.
Although these conventions are mentioned in this Indictment,
I am not relying on them save to show the historical development

94
 —
4 Dec. 45

of the law, and it is unnecessary, therefore, to argue about their

precise effect, for the place which they once occupied has been taken
by far more effective instruments. I mention them now merely for
this,that they were the first steps towards that body of rules of law
which we are seeking here to enforce.
There were, of course, other individual agreements between
particular states, agreements which sought to preserve the neutrality
of individual countries, as, for instance, that of Belgium, but those
agreements were inadequate, in the absence of any real will to
comply with them, to prevent the first World War in 1914.
Shocked by the occurrence of that catastrophe, the nations of
Europe, not excluding Germany, and of other parts of the world,
came to the conclusion that, in the interests of all alike, a per-
manent organization of the nations should be established to main-
tain the peace. And so the Treaty of Versailles was prefaced by the
Covenant of the League of Nations.
Now, I say nothing at this moment of the general merits of the
various provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. They have been
criticized, some of them perhaps justly criticized, and they were
certainly made the subject of much bellicose propaganda in Ger-
m.any. But it is unnecessary to inquire into the merits of the matter,
for, however unjust one might for this purpose assume the provi-
sions of the Treaty of Versailles to have been, they contained no
kind of excuse for the waging of war to secure an alteration in
their terms. Not only was that treaty a settlement, by agreement,
of all the difficult territorial questions which had been left out-
standing by the war itself, but it established the League of Nations
which, if it had been loyally supported, could so well have resolved
those international differences which might otherwise have led, as
indeed they eventually did lead, to war. It set up in the Council
of the League, in the Assembly and in the Permanent Court of
International Justice, a machine not only for the peaceful settlement
of international disputes, but also for the frank ventilation of all
international questions by open and free discussion. At that time,
in those years after the last war, the hopes of the world stood high.
—
Millions of men in all countries perhaps even in Germany itself
had laid down what they hoped and believed was a
their lives in
war to end war. Germany herself entered the League of Nations
and was given a permanent seat on the Council; and on that
Council, as in the assembly of the League, German governments
which preceded that of the Defendant Von Papen in 1932 played
their full part. In the years from 1919 to that time in 1932, despite
some comparatively minor incidents in the heated atmosphere which
followed the end of the war, the peaceful operation of the League

95
4 Dec. 45

continued. Nor was it only the operation of the League which gave
ground, and good ground, for hope that at long last the rule of law
would replace anarchy in the international field.
The statesmen of the world deliberately set out to make wars
of aggression an international crime. These are no new terms
invented by the victors to embody in this Charter. They have
figured, and they have figured prominently, in numerous treaties,
in governmental pronouncements, and in the declarations of states-
men in the period preceding the second World War. In treaties
concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other
states, such as Persia in 1927, France in 1935, China in 1937, the
contracting parties undertook to refrain from any act of aggression
whatever against the other party. In 1933 the Soviet Union became
a party to a large number of treaties containing a detailed definition
of aggression, and the same definition appeared in the same year in
the authoritative report of the Committee on Questions of Security
set up in connection with the Conference for the Reduction and
Limitation of Armaments. But at this time states were going beyond
commitments to refrain from wars of aggression and to assist states
which were victims of aggression. They were condemning aggres-
sion in unmistakable terms. Thus in the Anti-War Treaty of Non-
Aggression and Conciliation, which was signed on the 10th of
October 1933, by a number of American states, subsequently joined
by practically all the states of the American continents and a
number of European countries as well, the contracting parties
solemnly declared that "they condemn wars of aggression in their
mutual relations or in those of other states." And that treaty was
fully incorporated into the Buenos Aires convention of December
1936, signed and ratified by a large number of American countries,
including, of course, the United States. And previously, in 1928, the
6th Pan-American Conference had adopted a resolution declaring
that, as "war of aggression constitutes a crime against the human
species ... all aggression is illicit and as such is declared prohibited."
A year earlier, as long ago as September 1927, the Assembly of
the League of Nations adopted a resolution affirming the conviction
that "a war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling
international disputes and is, in consequence, an international crime"
and going on to declare that "all wars of aggression are, and shall
always be prohibited."
The first article of the draft Treaty for Mutual Assistance of
1923 read in these terms:
"The High Contracting Parties, affirming that aggressive war
isan international crime, undertake the solemn engagement .

not to make themselves guilty of this crime against any other

nation."

96
 4 Dec. 45

In the Preamble to the Geneva Protocol of 1924, it was stated

that "offensive warfare constitutes an infraction of solidarity and
an international crime." These instruments that I have just last
mentioned remained, it is true, unratified for various reasons, but
they are not without significance or value.
These repeated declarations, these repeated condemnations of
wars of aggression testified to the fact that with the establishment
of the League of Nations, with the legal developments which fol-
lowed it, the place of war in international law had undergone a
profound change. War was ceasing to be the unrestricted prerog-
ative of sovereign states. The Covenant of the League of Nations
did not totally abolish the right of war. It left, perhaps, certain
gaps which were possibly larger in theory than in practice. But in
effect it surrounded the right of war by procedural and substantive
checks and delays, which, if the Covenant had been faithfully ob-
served, would have amounted to an elimination of war, not only
between members of the League, but also, by reason of certain
provisions of the Covenant, in the relations of non-members as well.
And thus the Covenant of the League restored the position as it
existed at the dawn of international law, at the time when Grotius
was laying down the foundations of the modern law of nations and
established the distinction, a distinction accompanied by profound
legal consequences in the sphere, for instance, of neutrality, between
a just war and an unjust war.
Nor was that development arrested with the adoption of the
Covenant of the League. The right of war was further circum-
—
scribed by a series of treaties, numbering it is an astonishing
—
figure but it is right nearly a thousand, of arbitration and con-
ciliation embracing practically all the nations of the world. The
so-called Optional Clause of Article 36 of the Statute of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice, the clause which conferred upon
the Court compulsory jurisdiction in regard to the most comprehen-
sive categories of disputes, and which constituted in effect by far
the most important compulsory treaty of arbitration in the postwar
period, was widely signed and ratified. Germany herself signed it
in 1927 and her signature was renewed, and renewed for a period
of 5 years by the Nazi government in July of 1933. (Significantly,
that ratification was not again renewed on the expiration of its
5 years' validity in March of 1938 by Germany). Since 1928 a con-
siderable number of states signed and ratified the General Act for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which was designed
to fill the gaps left by the Optional Clause and by the existing
treaties of arbitration and conciliation.
And all this vast network of instruments of pacific settlement
testified to the growing conviction throughout the civilized world

97
4 Dec. 45

that war was ceasing to be the normal or the legitimate means of

settling international disputes. The express condemnation of wars
of aggression, which I have already mentioned, supplies the same
testimony. But there was, of course, more direct evidence pointing
in the same direction. The Treaty of Locarno of the 16th October
1925, to which I shall have occasion to refer presently, and to which
Germany was a party, was more than a treaty of arbitration and
conciliation in which the parties undertook definite obligations with
regard to the pacific settlement of disputes which might arise be-
tween them. It was, subject to clearly specified exceptions of self-
defense in certain contingencies, a more general undertaking in
which the parties to it agreed that "they would in no case attack
or invade each other or resort to war against each other." And that
constituted a general renunciation of war, and it was so considered
to be in the eyes of international jurists and in the public opinion
of the world. The Locarno Treaty was not just another of the great
number of arbitration treaties which were being concluded at this
time. It was regarded as a kind of cornerstone in the European
settlement and in the new legal order in Europe in partial, just, and
indeed, generous substitution for the rigors of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. And with that treaty, the term "outlawry of war" left the
province of mere pacifist propaganda. It became current in the
writings on international law and in the official pronouncements of
governments. No one could any longer say, after the Locarno Treaty
— no one could any longer associate himself with the plausible asser-
tion that at all events, as between the parties to that treaty, war
remained an unrestricted right of sovereign states.
But, although the effect of the Locarno Treaty was limited to the
parties to it, it had wider influence in paving the way towards that

most fundamental, that truly revolutionary enactment in modern

international law, namely, the General Treaty for the Renunciation
of War of 27 August 1928, the Pact of Paris, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact. That treaty, a most deliberate and carefully prepared piece
of international legislation, was binding in 1939 on more than
60 nations, including Germany. It was, and it has remained, the
most widely signed and ratified international instrument. It con-
tained no provision for its termination, and it was conceived, as
I said, as the cornerstone of any future international order worthy
of the name. It is fully part of international law as it stands today,
and it has in no way been modified or replaced by the Charter of
the United Nations. It is right, in this solemn hour in the history
of the world, when the responsible leaders of a state stand accused
of a premeditated breach of this great treaty which was, which
remains, a source of hope and of faith for mankind, to set out in
detail its two operative articles and its Preamble. Let me read them
to the Tribunal — first the Preamble, and it starts like this:

98
 4 Dec. 45

"The President of the German Reich" —and the other states

associated . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Shall we find it among the documents?

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: It will be put in. I don't think
you have it at the moment.
"The President of the German Reich deeply sensitive of
. . .

their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind; per-

suaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of
war as an instrument of international policy should be made
to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now
existing between their peoples may be perpetuated; convinced
that all changes in their relations with one another should be
sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful
and orderly progress, and that any signatory power which
shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort
to war, should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;
hopeful that, encouraged by their example, all the other
nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and
by adhering to the present treaty as soon as it comes into
force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficent
provisions, thus uniting civilized nations of the world in a
common renunciation of war as an instrument of their na-
tional policy .". . .

Then, Article I:

"The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names

of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war
for the solution of international controversies and renounce
it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with

one another."
And Article II:

"The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or

solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them,
shall never be sought except by pacific means."
In that treaty, that General Treaty for the Renunciation of War,
practically the whole civilized world abolished war as a legally per-
missible means of enforcing the law or of changing it. The right
of war was no longer of the essence of sovereignty. Whatever the
position may have been at the time of the Hague Convention, what-
ever the position may have been in 1914, whatever it may have
been in 1918 and— not necessary to discuss it— no international
it is
lawyer of repute, no responsible statesman, no soldier concerned
with the legal use of armed forces, no economist or industrialist
concerned in his country's war economy could doubt that with the

99
 4 Dec. 45

Pact of Paris on the statute book a war of aggression was contrary

to international law. Nor have the repeated violations of the Pact
by the Axis Powers in any way affected its validity. Let this be
firmly and clearly stated. Those very breaches, except perhaps to
the cynic and the malevolent, have added to the strength of the
treaty; they provoked the sustained wrath of peoples angered by the
contemptuous disregard of this great statute and determined to vin-
dicate its provisions. The Pact of Paris is the law of nations. This
Tribunal will declare it. The world must enforce it.
Let this also be said, that the Pact of Paris was not a clumsy
instrument likely to become a kind of signpost for the guilty. It
did not enable Germany to go to war against Poland and yet rely,
as against Great Britain and France, on any immunity from warlike
action because of the very provisions of the pact. For the pact laid
down its preamble that no state guilty of a violation
expressly in
of its provisions might invoke its benefits. And when, on the out-
break of the second World War, Great Britain and France com-
municated to the League of Nations that a state of war existed
between them and Germany as from the 3rd of September 1939,
they declared that by committing an act of aggression against Poland,
Germany had violated her obligations assumed not only towards
Poland but also towards the other signatories of the pact. A vio-
lation of the pact in relation to one signatory was an attack upon
all the other signatories and they were entitled to treat it as such.
I emphasize that point lest any of these defendants should seize
upon the letter of the particulars of Count Two of the Indictment
and seek to suggest that it was not Germany who initiated war
with the United Kingdom and France on 3 September 1939. The
declaration of war came from the United Kingdom and from France;
the act of war and its commencement came from Germany in vio-
lation of the fundamental enactment to which she was a party.
The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, this great con-
stitutional instrument of an international society awakened to the
deadly dangers of another Armageddon, did not remain an isolated
efl'ort soon to be forgotten in the turmoil of recurrent international
crises. It became, in conjunction with the Covenant of the League
of Nations or independently of it, the starting point for a new orien-
tation of governments in matters of peace, war, and neutrality. It
is of importance, I think, to quote just one or two of the statements
which were being made by governments at that time in relation
to the effect of the pact. In 1929 His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom said, in connection with the question of conferring
upon the Permanent Court of International Justice jurisdiction with
regard to the exercise of belligerent rights in relation to neutral
—
states and. it illustrates the profound change which was being

100
 4 Dec. 45

accepted as having taken place as a result of the Pact of Paris in

international law:
"But the whole situation .... rests, and international law on
the subject hàs been entirely built up, on the assumption that
there is nothing illegitimate in the use of war as an instru-
ment of national policy, and, as a necessary corollary, that
the position and rights of neutrals are entirely independent
of the circumstances of any war which may be in progress.
Before the acceptance of the Covenant, the basis of the law
of neutrality was that the rights and obligations of neutrals
were identical as regards both belligerents, and were entirely
independent of the rights and wrongs of the dispute which
had led to the war, or the respective position of the belliger-
ents at the bar of world opinion."
Then the Government went on:
"Now precisely this assumption which is no longer valid
it is

as regards states which are members of the League of Nations

and parties to the Peace Pact. The effect of those instruments,
taken together, is to deprive nations of the right to employ
war as an instrument of national policy, and to forbid the
states which have signed them to give aid or comfort to an
offender."
This was being said in 1929, when there was no war upon the
horizon.
"As between such states, there has been in consequence a
fundamental change in the whole question of belligerent and
neutral rights. The whole policy of His Majesty's present
Government (and, it would appear, of any alternative govern-
ment) is based upon a determination to comply with their
obligations under the Covenant of the League and the Peace
Pact. This being so, the situation which we have to envisage
in the event of a war in which we were engaged is not one in
which the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals will
depend upon the old rules of war and neutrality, but one in
which the position of the members of the League will be
determined by the Covenant and by the Pact."
The Chief Prosecutor for the United States of America referred
in his opening speech before this Tribunal to the weighty pro-
nouncement of Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of War, in which, in 1932,
he gave expression to the drastic change brought about in inter-
national law by the Pact of Paris, and it is perhaps convenient
to quote the relevant passage in full:
"War between was renounced by the signatories of
nations
the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This means that it has become
illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no

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longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to

be the principle around which the duties, the conduct, and
the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing. Hereafter,
when two nations engage in armed conflict, either one or
—
both of them must be wrongdoers violators of this general
treaty law. We no longer draw a circle about them and treat
them with the punctilios of the duelist's code. Instead we
denounce them as law-breakers."
And nearly 10 years later, when numerous independent states
lay prostrate, shattered or menaced in their very existence before
the impact of the war machine of the Nazi State, the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States, subsequently a distinguished member of
the highest Tribunal of that great country, gave significant expres-
sion to the change which had been effected in the law as the result
of the Pact of Paris in a speech for which the freedom-loving peoples
of the world will always be grateful. On the 27th of March 1941
— and I mention it now not as merely being the speech of a states-
man, although it was certainly that, but as being the considered
—
opinion of a distinguished lawyer, he said this:
"The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, in which Germany, Italy
and Japan covenanted with us, as well as with other nations,
to renounce war as an instrument of policy, made definite the
outlawry of war and of necessity altered the dependent con-
cept of neutral obligations.
"The Treaty for the Renunciation of War and the Argentine
Anti-War Treaty deprived their signatories of the right of
war as an instrument of national policy or aggression and
rendered unlawful wars undertaken in violation of these pro-
visions. In consequence these treaties destroyed the historical
and juridical foundations of the doctrine of neutrality con-
ceived as an attitude of absolute impartiality in relation to
aggressive wars ....
"It follows that the state which has gone to war in violation
of its obligations acquires no right to equality of treatment
from other states, unless treaty obligations require different
handling of affairs. It derives no rights from its illegality.
"In flagrant cases- of aggression where the facts speak so un-
ambiguously that world opinion takes what may be the equiv-
alent of judicial notice, we may not stymie international law
and allow these great treaties to become dead letters. The
intelligent public opinion of the world which is not afraid to
be vocal, and the action of the American States, has made
a determination that the Axis Powers are the aggressors in
the wars today, which is an appropriate basis in the present
state of international organizations for our policy."

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Thus, there is no doubt that by the time the National Socialist

State of Germany had embarked upon the preparation of the war
of aggression against the civilized world and by the time it had
accomplished that design, aggressive war had become, in virtue of
the Pact of Paris and the other treaties and declarations to which
I have referred, illegal and a crime beyond all uncertainty and
doubt. And it is on that proposition, and fundamentally on that
universal treaty, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, that Count Two of this
Indictment is principally based.
—
The Prosecution has deemed it necessary indeed, imperative to —
establish beyond all possibility of question, at what I am afraid may
appear to be excessive length, that only superficial learning or cul-
pable sentimentality can assert that there is any significant element
of retroactivity in the determination of the authors of this Charter
to treat aggressive war as conduct which international law has pro-
hibited and stigmatized as criminal. We have traced the progressive
limitation of the rights of war, the renunciation and condemnation
of wars of aggression, and above all, the total prohibition and con-
demnation of all wars conceived as an instrument of national policy.
What statesman or politician in charge of the affairs of nations could
doubt, from 1928 onwards, that aggressive war, or that all war,
except in self-defense or for the collective enforcement of the law,
or against a state which had itself violated the Pact of Paris, was
unlawful and outlawed? What statesman or politician embarking
upon such a war could reasonably and justifiably count upon an
immunity other than that of a successful outcome of the criminal
venture? What more decisive evidence of a prohibition laid down
by positive international law could any lawyer desire than that
which has been adduced before this Tribunal?
There are, it is true, some small town lawyers who deny the
very existence of any international law; and indeed, as I have said,
the rules of the law of nations may not satisfy the Austinian test
of being imposed by a sovereign. But the legal regulation of inter-
national relations rests upon quite different juridical foundations. It
depends upon consent, but upon a consent which, once given, cannot
be withdrawn by unilateral action. In the international field the
source of law is not the command of a sovereign but the treaty
agreement binding upon every state which has adhered to it. And
it is indeed true, and the recognition of its truth today by all the
—
great powers of the world is vital to our future peace it is indeed
true that, as M. Litvinov once said, and as Great Britain fully
accepts:
"Absolute sovereignty and entire liberty of action only belong
to such states as have not undertaken international obli-
gations. Immediately a state accepts international obligations
it limits its sovereignty."

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4 Dec. 45

In that way and that way alone lies the future peace of the
world. Yet it may be argued that although war itself was outlawed
and forbidden, it was not criminally outlawed and criminally for-
bidden. International law, it may be said, does not attribute crimi-
nality to states and still less to individuals. But can it really be said
on behalf of these defendants that the offense of these aggressive
wars, which plunged millions of people to their death, which by dint
of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity brought about the
torture and extermination of countless thousands of innocent civil-
ians, which devastated cities, which destroyed the amenities — nay,
the most rudimentary necessities of civilization in many countries
— which has brought the world to the brink of ruin from which it
—
will take generations to recover will it seriously be said by these
defendants that such a war is only an offense, only an illegality,
only a matter of condemnation perhaps sounding in damages, but
not a crime justiciable by any Tribunal? No law worthy of the
name can allow itself to be reduced to an absurdity in that way,
and certainly the great powers responsible for this Charter were
not prepared to admit it. They draw the inescapable conclusion
from the renunciation, the prohibition, the condemnation of war
which had become part of the law of nations, and they refuse to
reduce justice to impotence by subscribing to the outworn doctrines
that a sovereign state can commit no crime and that no crime can
be committed on behalf of the sovereign state by individuals acting
in its behalf. They refuse to stultify themselves, and their refusal
and their decision has decisively shaped the law for this Tribunal.
If this be an innovation, it is an innovation long overdue —
desirable and beneficent innovation fully consistent with justice,
fully consistent with common sense and with the abiding purposes
of the law of nations. But is it indeed an innovation? Or is it no
more than the logical development of the law? There was indeed
a time when international lawyers used to maintain that the lia-
bility of the state, because of its sovereignty, was limited to a con-
tractual responsibility. International tribunals have not accepted
that view. They have repeatedly affirmed that a state can commit
a tort; that it may be guilty of trespass, of nuisance, and of negli-
gence. And they have gone further. They have held that a state
may be bound to pay what are in effect penal damages. In a recent
case decided in 1935 between the United States and Canada, an
arbitral tribunal, with the concurrence of its American member,
decided that the United States were bound to pay what amounted
to penal damages for an affront to Canadian sovereignty. And on
a wider plane, the Covenant of the League of Nations, in providing
for sanctions, recognized the principle of enforcement of the law
against collective units, such enforcement to be, if necessary, of a
penal character. And so there is not anything startlingly new in the

104
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adoption of the principle that the state as such is responsible for

its criminal acts. In fact, save for reliance on the unconvincing
argument of sovereignty, there is in law no reason why a state
should not be answerable for crimes committed on its behalf. A
hundred years ago Dr. Lushington, a great English Admiralty judge,
refused to admit that a state could not be a pirate. History very —
—
recent history does not warrant the view that a state cannot be
a criminal. On the other hand, the immeasurable potentialities for
evil, inherent in the state in this age of science and organization
would seem to demand, quite imperatively, means of repression of
criminal conduct even more drastic and more effective than in the
case of individuals. And insofar, therefore, as this Charter has put
on record the principle of the criminal responsibility of the state,
it must be applauded as a wise and far-seeing measure of inter-

national legislation.

[A recess was taken.]

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: [Continuing.] I was saying be-

fore the recess that there could be no doubt about the principle of
criminal responsibility on the part of the state which engaged in
aggressive war.
Admittedly, the conscience shrinks from the rigors of collective
punishment, which may fall upon the guilty and the innocent alike,
although, it may be noted, most of these innocent victims would
not have hesitated to reap the fruits of the criminal act if it had
been successful. Humanity and justice will find means of mitigating
any injustice in collective punishment. Above all, much hardship
can be obviated by making the punishment fall upon the individ-
uals who were themselves directly responsible for the criminal con-
duct of their state. It is here that the powers who framed this
Charter took a step which justice, sound legal sense, and an enlight-
ened appreciation of the good of mankind must acclaim without
cavil or reserve. The Charter lays down expressly that there shall
be individual responsibility for the crimes, including the crimes
against the peace, committed on behalf of the state. The state is
not an abstract entity. Its rights and duties are the rights and
duties of men. Its actions are the actions of men. a salutary
It is
principle, a principle of law, that politicians who embark upon
a
— —
particular policy as here of aggressive war should not be able to
seek immunity behind the intangible personality of the state. It is
a salutary legal rule that persons who, in violation of the law,
plunge their own and other countries into an aggressive war should
do so with a halter around their necks.
To say that those who aid and abet, who counsel and procure
a crime are themselves criminals, is a commonplace in our own

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4 Dec. 45

municipal law. Nor is the principle of individual international

responsibility for offenses against the law of nations altogether new.
It has been applied not only to pirates. The entire law relating to
war crimes, as distinct from the crime of war, is based upon the
principle of individual responsibility. The future of international
law, and indeed, of the world itself, depends on its application in
a much wider sphere, in particular, in that of safeguarding the
peace of the world. There must be acknowledged not only, as in
the Charter of the United Nations, fundamental human rights, but
also, as in the Charter of this Tribunal, fundamental human duties,
and none is more vital, none is more fundamental, than the
of these
duty not vex the peace of nations in violation of the clearest legal
to
prohibitions and undertakings. If this be an innovation, it is an
innovation which we are prepared to defend and to justify, but it
is not an innovation which creates a new crime. International law
had already, before the Charter was adopted, constituted aggressive
war a criminal act.
There is thus no substantial retroactivity in the provisions of
the Charter. It merely fixes the responsibility for a crime already
clearly established as such by positive law upon its actual perpetra-
tors. It fills a gap in international criminal procedure. There is all
the difference between saying to a man, "You will now be punished
for what was not a crime at all at the time you committed it," and
in saying to him, "You will now pay the penalty for conduct which
was contrary to law and a crime when you executed it, although,
owing to the imperfection of the international machinery, there was
at that time no court competent to pronounce judgment against you."
It is that latter course which we adopt, and if that be retroactivity, we
proclaim it to be most fully consistent with that higher justice which,
in the practice of civilized states, has set a definite limit to the retro-
active operation of laws. Let the defendants and their protagonists
complain that the Charter is in this matter an ex parte fiat of the vic-
tors. These victors, composing, as they do, the overwhelming major-
ity of the nations of the world, represent also the world's sense of
justice, which would be outraged if the crime of war, after this
second world conflict, were to remain unpunished. In thus inter-
preting, declaring, and supplementing the existing law, these states
are content to be judged by the verdict of history. Securus judicat
orhis terrarum. Insofar as the Charter of this Tribunal introduces
new law, its authors have established a precedent for the future —
precedent operative against all, including themselves, but in essence
that law, rendering recourse to aggressive war an international
crime, had been well established when the Charter was adopted.
It is only by way of corruption of language that it can be described
as a retroactive law.

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There remains the question, with which I shall nof detain the
Tribunal for long, whether these wars which were launched by Ger-
many and her leaders in violation of treaties or agreements or
assurances were also wars of aggression. A war of aggression is a
war which is resorted to in violation of the international obligation
not to have recourse to war, or, in cases in which war is not totally
renounced, which is resorted to in disregard of the duty to utilize
the procedure of pacific settlement which a state has bound itself
to observe. There was, as a matter of fact, in the period between
the two world wars, a divergence of opinion among jurists and
statesmen whether it was preferable to attempt in advance a legal
definition of aggression, or to leave to the states concerned and to
the collective organs of the international community freedom of
appreciation of the facts in any particular situation that might arise.
Those holding the latter view argued that a rigid definition might
be abused by an unscrupulous state to fit in with its aggressive
design; they feared, and the British Government was for a time
among those who took this view, that an automatic definition of
aggression might become "a trap for the innocent and a signpost
for the guilty." Others held that in the interest of certainty and
security a definition of aggression, like a definition of any crime in
municipal law, was proper and useful. They urged that the compe-
tent international organs, political and judicial, could be trusted to
avoid in any particular case a definition of aggression which might
lead to obstruction or to an absurdity. In May of 1933 the Com-
mittee on Security Questions of the Disarmament Conference pro-
posed a definition of aggression on these lines:
"The aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to
the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute,
be considered to be that state which is the first to commit
any of the following actions:
"(1) Declaration of war upon another state;
"(2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declara-
tion of war, of the territory of another state;
"(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air forces, with or without
a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels, or aircraft of
another state;
"(4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another state;
"(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its terri-
tory which have invaded the territory of another state, or
refusal, notwithstanding the request of the invaded state, to
take in its own territory all the measures in its power to
deprive those bands of all assistance or protection."
The various treaties concluded in 1933 by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and other states followed closely that definition.

107
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4 Dec. 45

So did the draft convention submitted in 1933 by His Majesty's

Government to the Disarmament Conference.
However, it is unprofitable to elaborate here the details of the
problem or of the definition of aggression. This Tribunal will not
allow itself to be deflected from its purpose by attempts to venti-
late in this Court what is an academic and, in the circumstances,
an utterly unreal controversy as to what is the nature of a war of
aggression, for there is no definition of aggression, general or par-
ticular, which does not cover and cover abundantly and irresistibly
in every detail, the premeditated onslaught by Germany on the
territorial integrity and political independence of so many sovereign
states.
This, then, being the law as we submit it to be to this Tribunal
that the peoples of the world by the Pact of Paris had finally out-
—
lawed war and made it criminal I turn now to the facts to see how
these defendants under their leader and with their associates
destroyed the high hopes of mankind and sought to revert to inter-
national anarchy. First, lét this be said, for it will be established
beyond doubt by the documents which you will see, from the mo-
ment Hitler became Chancellor in 1933, with the Defendant Von
Papen as Reich Chancellor, and with the Defendant Von Neurath as
his Foreign Minister, the whole atmosphere of the world darkened.
The hopes of the people began to recede. Treaties seemed no longer
matters of solemn obligation but were entered into with complete
cynicism as a means for deceiving other states of Germany's war-
like intentions. International conferences were no longer to be used
as a means for securing pacific settlements but as occasions for
obtaining by blackmail demands which were eventually to be
enlarged by war. The world came to know the "war of nerves",
the diplomacy of the fait accompli, of blackmail and bullying.
In October 1933 Hitler told his Cabinet that as the proposed
Disarmament Convention did not concede full equality to Germany,
"It would be necessary to torpedo the Disarmament Conference. It
was out of the question to negotiate: Germany would leave the
Conference and the League". On the 21st of October 1933 Germany
did so, and by so doing struck a deadly blow at the fabric of security
which had been built up on the basis of the League Covenant. From
that time on the record of their foreign policy became one of com-
plete disregard of international obligations, and indeed not least of
those solemnly concluded by themselves. Hitler himself expressly
avowed to his confederates, "Agreements are kept only so long as
they serve a certain purpose." He might have added that again and
again that purpose was only to lull an intended victim into a false
sense of security. So patent, indeed, did this eventually become
that to be invited by the Defendant Ribbentrop to enter a non-
aggression pact with Germany was almost a sign that Germany

108
 4 Dec. 45

intended to attack the state concerned. Nor was it only the formal
treaty which they used and violated as circumstances seemed to
make expedient. These defendants are charged, too, with breaches
of the less formal assurances which, in accordance with diplomatic
usage, Germany gave to neighboring states. You will hear the im-
portance which Hitler himself publicly attached to assurances of that
kind. Today, with the advance of science, the world has been
afforded means of communication and intercourse hitherto un-
known, and as Hitler himself expressly recognized in his public
utterances, international relations no longer depend upon treaties
alone. The methods of diplomacy change. The leader of one nation
can speak directly to the government and peoples of another, and
that course was not infrequently adopted by the Nazi conspirators.
But, although the methods change, the principles of good faith and
honesty, established as the fundamentals of civilized society, both
in the national and international spheres, remain unaltered. It is
a long time since it was said that we are part one of another, and
if today the different states are more closely connected and thus

form part of a world society more than ever before, so also, more
than before, is there that need for good faith and honesty between
them.
Let us see how these defendants, ministers and high officers
of the Nazi Government, individually and collectively comported
themselves in these matters.
On the 1st of September 1939 in the early hours of the morning
under manufactured and, in any event, inadequate pretexts, the
Armed Forces of the German Reich invaded Poland along the whole
length of her frontiers and thus launched the war which was to
bring down so many of the pillars of our civilization.

It was. a breach of the Hague Conventions. It was a breach of

the Treaty of Versailles which had established the frontiers between
Germany and Poland. And however much Germany disliked that
—
treaty although Hitler had expressly stated that he would respect
its territorial provisions —
however much she disliked it, she was not
free to break it by unilateral action. It was a breach of the Arbitra-
tion Treaty between Germany and Poland concluded at Locarno on
the 16th of October 1925. By that treaty Germany and Poland ex-
pressly agreed to refer any matters of dispute not capable of set-
tlement by ordinary diplomatic machinery to the decision of an
arbitral tribunal or of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
It was a breach of the Pact of Paris. But that is not all. It was also
'
a breach of a more recent and, in view of the repeated emphasis laid
upon it by Hitler himself, in some ways a more important engage-
ment into which Nazi Germany had entered with Poland. After
the Nazi Government came into power, on the 26th of January 1934

109
4 Dec. 45

the German and Polish Governments had signed a 10 year pact of

non-aggression. It was, as the signatories themselves stated, to
introduce a new era into the political relations between Poland and
Germany. It was said in the text of the pact itself that "the
maintenance and guarantee of lasting peace between the two
countries is an essential prerequisite for the general peace of
Europe." The two governments therefore agreed to base their
mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris,
and they solemnly declared that:
"In no circumstances will they proceed to the application
. . .

of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such

disputes."
That declaration and agreement was to remain in force for at
least 10 years and thereafter.it was to remain valid unless it was
denounced by either Government 6 months before the expiration of
the 10 years, or subsequently by 6 months' notice. Both at the time
of its signature and during the following 4 years Hitler spoke of
the German-Polish agreement publicly as though it were a corner-
stone of his foreign policy. By entering into it, he persuaded many
people that his intentions were genuinely pacific, for the re-emer-
gence of a new Poland and an independent Poland after the war
had cost Germany much territory and had separated East Prussia
from the Reich. And that Hitler should, of his own accord, enter
—
into friendly relations with Poland that in his speeches on foreign
policy he should proclaim his recognition of Poland and of her right
to an exit to the sea, and the necessity for Germans and Poles to
—
live side by side in amity these facts seemed to the world to be
convincing proof that Hitler had no "revisionist" aims which would
threaten the peace of Europe; that he was even genuinely anxious
to put an end to the age-old hostility between the Teuton and the
Slav. If his professions were, as embodied in the treaty and as con-
tained in these declarations, genuine, his policy excluded a renewal
of the "Drang nach Osten", as it had been called, and was thereby
going to contribute to the peace and stability of Europe. That was
what the people were led to think. We shall have occasion enough
to see how little truth these pacific professions in fact contained.

The history of the fateful years from 1934 to 1939 shows quite
clearly that the Germans used this treaty, as they used other
treaties,merely as an instrument of policy for furthering their
aggressive aims. It is clear from the documents which will be
presented to the Tribunal that these 5 years fall into two distinct
phases in the realization of the aggressive aims which always under-
lay the Nazi policy. There was first the period from the Nazi
assumption of power in 1933 until the autumn of 1937. That was the
preparatory period. During that time there occurred the breaches

110
 4 Dec. 45

of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, the feverish rearmament of

Germany, the reintroduction of conscription, the reoccupation and
remilitarization of the Rhineland, and all those other necessary
preparatory measures for future aggression which my American
colleagues have already so admirably put before the Tribunal.
—
During that period the preparatory period Germany was —
lulling Poland into a false sense of security. Not only Hitler, but
the Defendant Goring and the Defendant Ribbentrop made state-
ments approbating the non-aggression pact. In 1935 Goring was
saying that, "The pact was not planned for a period of 10 years
but forever; there need not be the slightest fear that it would not
be continued." Even though Germany was steadily building up the
greatest war machine that Europe had ever known, and although,
by January 1937, the German military position was so strong and
so secure that, in spite of the treaty breaches which it involved.
Hitler could openly refer to his strong Army, he took pains, at the
—
same time, to say and again I quote that: —
"By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing ten-
sionsand thereby contributed considerably to an improve-
•

ment in the European atmosphere. I merely recall the agree-

ment with Poland which has worked out to the advantage
of both sides."
And so it went on: abroad, protestations of pacific intentions;
at home, "guns before butter."
In 1937 this preparatory period drew to a close and Nazi policy
moved from general preparation for future aggression to specific
planning for the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. And
there are two documents in particular which mark that change.
The first of these was called "Directive for Unified Preparation
for War", issued in June 1937— June 29, 1937—by the Reich Minister
for War, who was then Von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces. That document is important, not only for its mili-
tary directions, but for the appreciation it contained of the European
situation and for the revelation of the Nazi attitude towards it.

am ——
"The general political position" Von Blomberg stated, and I
quoting from the document "justifies the supposition that
Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Grounds
for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost
all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies
in the preparedness for war of a number of states, and of
Russia in particular."
he added, "The intention of unleashing a European
It is true,
war held just as little by Germany." And it may be that that
is
phrase was carefully chosen because, as the documents will show,

111
4 Dec. 45

Germany hoped to conquer Europe, perhaps to conquer the

world
on one front at a time, against one power at a
in detail; to fight
time, and not to unleash a general European conflict.

But Von Blomberg went on:

"The politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude
surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for
war of the German Armed Forces (a) to counter attack at any
—
time" yet he had just said that there was no fear of any
— — —
attack and "(b)" and I invite the Tribunal again to notice
this phrase "to enable the military exploitation of politically
favorable opportunities, should they occur."
That phrase is no more than a euphemistic description of aggres-
sive war. It reveals the continued adherence of the German mili-
tary leaders to the doctrine that military might, and if necessary
—
war, should be an instrument of policy the doctrine which had
been explicitly condemned by the Kellogg Pact, which was re-
nounced by the pact with Poland, and by innumerable other
treaties.

The document goes on to set out the general preparations

necessary for a possible war in the mobilization period of 1937-1938.
It is evidence at least for this, that the leaders of the German
Armed Forces had it in mind to use the military strength which
they were building up for aggressive purposes. No reason, they
—
say, to anticipate attack from any side there is a lack of desire
for war. Yet they prepare to exploit militarily favorable op-
portunities.

Still more important as evidence of the transition to planned

aggression is the record of the important conference which Hitler
held at the Reich Chancellery on the 5th of November 1937, at
which Von Blomberg, Reich Minister for War; Von Fritsch, the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Army; Goring, Commander-in-Chief of the
Luftwaffe; Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; and Von
Neurath, then the Foreign Minister, were present. The minutes of
that conference have already been put in evidence. I refer to them
now only to emphasize those passages which make apparent the
ultimate intention to wage an aggressive war. You will remember
that the burden of Hitler's argument at that conference was that
Germany required more territory in Europe. Austria and Czecho-
slovakia were specifically envisaged. But Hitler realized that the
process of conquering those two countries might well bring into
operation the treaty obligations of Great Britain and of France. He
was prepared to take the risk. You remember the passage:
"The history of all times: Roman Empire, British Empire has
proved that every space expansion can be effected only by

112
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4 Dec. 45

breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are una-

voidable: Neither formerly nor today has space been found
without an owner. The attacker always comes up against
the proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest
possible conquest can be made at the lowest possible cost."

In the course of that conference Hitler had foreseen and discussed

the likelihood that Poland would be involved if the aggressive
expansionist aims which he put forward brought about a general
European war by the Nazi State.
in the course of their realization
And when, therefore, on that veryday on which that conference was
taking place, Hitler assured the Polish Ambassador of the great
value of the 1934 Pact with Poland, it can only be concluded that
its real value in Hitler's eyes was that of keeping Poland quiet until

Germany had acquired such a territorial and strategic position

that Poland was no longer a danger.

That view is confirmed by the events which followed. At the

beginning of February of 1938 the change from Nazi preparation
for aggression to active aggression itself took place. It was marked
by the substitution of Ribbentrop for Neurath as Foreign Minister,
and of Keitel for Blomberg as head of the OKW. Its first fruits
were the bullying of Schuschnigg at Berchtesgaden on February 12,
1938 and the forcible absorption of Austria in March. Thereafter
the Green Plan for the destruction of Czechoslovakia was steadily
—
developed in the way which you heard yesterday the plan partially
foiled, or final consummation at least delayed, by the Munich Agree-
ment.
With those aspects, those developments of Nazi aggression, my
American colleagues have already dealt. But it is obvious that
the acquisition of these two countries, their resources in man-
power, their resources in the production of munitions of war, im-
mensely strengthened the position of Germany as against Poland.
And it is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that, just as the De-
fendant Goring assured the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, at the
time of the Nazi invasion of Austria, that Hitler recognized the
validity of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty of 1925,
and that Germany had no designs against Czechoslovakia herself
you remember, "I give you my word of honor," the Defendant
—
Goring said just as that is not surprising, so also it is not perhaps
surprising that continued assurances should have been given during
1938 to Poland in order to keep that country from interfering with
the Nazi aggression on Poland's neighbors.
Thus, on the 20th of February of 1938, on the eve of his invasion
of Austria, Hitler, referring to the fourth anniversary of the Polish
Pact, permitted himself to say this to the Reichstag —and I quote:

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4 Dec. 45

"... and so a way

to a friendly understanding has been suc-
cessfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Dan-
zig, has today in spite of the attempt of some mischief makers,
succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations
between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a
sincere friendly co-operation Relying on her friendships,
. . .

Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal

which provides the foundation for the task ahead of us
peace."
Still more striking, perhaps, are the cordial references toPoland
in Hitler's speech in the Sportpalast at Berlin on the 26th of Sep-
tember 1938. He then said:

"The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was

that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that
Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary
enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know well enough that I
should not have been successful if Poland had had a democratic
constitution. For these democracies which indulge in phrases
about peace are the most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Po-
land there ruled no democracy, but a man. And with him I
succeeded, in precisely 12 months, in coming to an agreement
which, for 10 years in the first instance, removed in principle
the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced that this agree-
ment will bring lasting pacification. We realize that here are
two peoples which must live together and neither of which
can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions will
always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way for understand-
ing, then,had to be found, and it will be further extended.
But the main fact is that the two governments, and all reason-
able and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples within
the two countries, possess the firm will and determination to
improve their relations. It was a real work of peace, of more
worth than all the chattering in the League of Nations palace
at .Geneva."
And Poland preceded the annexation of Austria and
so flattery of
renewed Poland preceded the projected annexation
flattery of
of Czechoslovakia. The realities behind these outward expres-
sions of good will are clearly revealed in the documents relating
to the Fall Grün, which are already before the Tribunal. They show
Hitler as fully aware that there was a risk of Poland, England, and
France being involved in war to prevent the German annexation of
Czechoslovakia and that this risk, although it was realized, was also
accepted. On 25 August of 1938 top-secret orders to the Ger-
man Air Force in regard to the operations to be conducted against
England and France, if they intervened, pointed out that, as the

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 4 Dec. 45

French-Czechoslovak Treaty provided for assistance only in the

event of an "unprovoked" attack, it would take a day or two for
France and England, and I suppose for their legal advisors to decide
whether legally the attack had been unprovoked or not, and con-
sequently a Blitzkrieg, accomplishing its aims before there could be
any effective intervention by France or England, was the object
to be aimed at.

On the same day an Air Force memorandum on future organi-

zation was issued, and to it there was attached a map on which the
Baltic States, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were all shown
as part of Germany, and preparations for expanding the Air Force,
and I quote, "as the Reich grows in area," as well as dispositions for
a two-front war against France and Russia, were discussed. And
on the following day Von Ribbentrop was being minuted about the
reaction of Poland towards the Czechoslovak problem. I quote: "The
fact that after the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian question it will
be generally assumed that Poland will be next in turn is not to be
denied," is recognized, but it is stated, "The later this assumption
sinks in, the better."
I will pause for a moment
at the date of the Munich Agreement
and ask the Tribunal remind itself of what the evidence of docu-
to
ments and historical facts shows up to that day. It has made un-
deniable both the fact of Nazi aggressiveness and of active and
actual aggression. Not only does that conference of 1937 show
Hitler and his associates deliberately considering the acquisition of
Austria and Czechoslovakia, if necessary by war, but the first of the
operations had been carried through in March of 1938; and a large
—
part of the second, under threat of war a threat which as we now
—
see was much more than a bluff a threat of actual and real war,
although without the actual need for its initiation, secured, as I
said, a large part of the second objective in September of 1938.
And, more ominous still, Hitler had revealed his adherence to the
—
old doctrines of Mein Kampf those essentially aggressive doctrines
to the exposition of which in Mein Kampf, long regarded as the
Bible of the Nazi Party, we shall draw attention in certain partic-
ular passages. Hitler is indicating quite clearly not only to his
associates, but indeed to the world at this time, that he is in pursuit
of Lebensraum and that he means to secure it by threat of force, or
if threat of force fails, by actual force —
by aggressive war.
So far actual warfare had been avoided because of the love of
peace, the lack of preparedness, the patience, the cowardice call it—
—
what you will of the democratic powers; but after Munich the
question which filled the minds of all thinking people with acute
anxiety was "where will this thing end? Is Hitler now satisfied as
he declared himself to be? Or is his pursuit of Lebensraum going

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4 Dec. 45

to lead to future aggressions, even if he has to embark on open,

aggressive war to secure it?"
It was in relation to the remainder of Czechoslovakia and to
Poland that the answer to these questions was to be given. So far,
up to the time of the Munich Agreement, no direct and immediate
threat to Poland had been made. The two documents from which
I have just quoted, show of course, that high officers of the Defend-
ant Göring's air staff already regarded the expansion of the Reich
and, it would seem, the destruction and absorption of Poland, as
a foregone conclusion. They were already anticipating, indeed, the
last stage of Hitler's policy as expounded in Mein Kampf — war to
destroy France and to secure Lebensraum in Russia. And the writer
of the minute to Ribbentrop already took it for granted that, after
Czechoslovakia, Poland would be attacked. But more impressive
than those two documents is the fact that, as I have said, at the
conference of 5 November 1937, war with Poland, if she should
dare to prevent German aggression against Czechoslovakia, had
been quite coolly and calmly contemplated, and the Nazi leaders
were ready to take the risk. So also had the risk of war with Eng-
land and France under the same circumstances been considered and
accepted. As I indicated, such a war would, of course, have been
aggressive war on Germany's part, and they were contemplating
aggressive warfare. For to force one state to take up arms to defend
another state against aggression, in other words, to fulfill its treaty
obligations is undoubtedly to initiate aggressive warfare against the
first state. But in spite of those plans, in spite of these intentions
behind the scenes, it remains true that until Munich the decision for
direct attack upon Poland and her destruction by aggressive war
had apparently not as yet been taken by Hitler and his associates.
It is to the transition from the intention and preparation of initiat-
ing aggressive war, evident in regard to Czechoslovakia, to the
actual initiation and waging of aggressive war against Poland that
I now pass. That transition occupies the 11 months from the 1st of
October 1938 to the actual attack on Poland on the 1st of Sep-
tember 1939.
Within 6 months of the signature of the Munich Agreement the
Nazi leaders had occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, which by
that Agreement they had indicated their willingness to guarantee.
On the 14th of March 1939 the aged and infirm president of the
"rump" of Czechoslovakia, Hacha and his Foreign Minister were
summoned to Berlin. At a meeting held between 1 o'clock and 2:15
in the small hours of the 15th of March in the presence of Hitler,
of the Defendants Ribbentrop, Goring, and Keitel, they were bullied
and threatened and even bluntly told that Hitler "had issued the
orders for the German troops to move into Czechoslovakia and
for the incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the German Reich."

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 4 Dec. 45

It was made quite clear to them that resistance would be useless

and would be crushed "by force of arms with all available means,"
and it was thus that the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was
set up and that Slovakia was turned into a German satellite, though
nominally independent state. By their own unilateral action, on
pretexts which had no shadow of validity, without discussion with
the governments of any other country, without mediation, and in
direct contradiction of the sense and spirit of the Munich Agreement,
the Germans acquired for themselves that for which they had been
planning in September of the previous year, and indeed much
earlier, but which at that time they had felt themselves unable
completely to secure without too patent an exhibition of their ag-
gressive intentions. Aggression achieved whetted the appetite for
aggression to come. There were protests. England and France sent
diplomatic notes. Of course, there were protests. The Nazis had
clearly shown their hand. Hitherto they had concealed from the
outside world that their claims went beyond incorporating into
the Reich persons of German race living in bordering territory. Now
for the first time, in defiance of their solemn assurances to the con-
trary, non-German territory and non-German people had been seized.
This acquisition of the whole' of Czechoslovakia, together with the
equally illegal occupation of Memel on the 22d of March 1939,
resulted in an immense strengthening of the German positions, both
politically and strategically, as Hitler had anticipated it would,
when he discussed the matter at that conference in November of
1937.
But long before the consummation by the Nazi leaders of their
aggression against Czechoslovakia, they had begun to make
demands upon Poland. The Munich settlement achieved on the
25th of October 1938, that is to say within less than a month of
Hitler's reassuring speech about Poland to which I have already
referred, and within, of course, a month of the Munich Agreement,
M. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, reported to M. Beck,
the Polish Foreign Minister, that at a luncheon at Berchtesgaden the
day before, namely, on the 24th of October 1938, the Defendant
Ribbentrop had put forward demands for the reunion of Danzig
with the Reich and for the building of an extra-territorial motor
road and railway line across Pomorze, the province which the Ger-
mans called "The Corridor". From that moment onwards until the
Polish Government had made it plain, as they did during a visit of
the Defendant Ribbentrop to Warsaw in January 1939, that they
would not consent to hand over Danzig to German sovereignty,
negotiations on these German demands continued. And even after
Ribbentrop's return from the visit to Warsaw, Hitler thought it
worthwhile, in his Reichstag speech on the 30th of January 1939,
to say:

117
4 Dec. 45

"We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclu-

sion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can
scarcely be any difference of opinion today among the true
friends of peace as to the value of this agreement. One only
needs to ask oneself what might have happened to Europe if
this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been
entered into 5 years ago. In signing it, the great Polish
marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great a ser-
vice as the leaders of the National Socialist State rendered
^
the German people. During the troubled months of the past
year, the friendship between Germany and Poland has been
one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."
But that utterance was the last friendly word from Germany
to Poland, and the last occasion on which the Nazi Leaders
mentioned the German-Polish Agreement with approbation. During
February 1939 silence fell upon German demands in relation to
Poland. But as soon as the final absorption of Czechoslovakia had
taken place and Germany had also occupied Memel, Nazi pressure
upon Poland was at once renewed. In two conversations which he
and the Defendant Ribbentrop held on the 21st of March and the
26th of March, respectively, with the Polish Ambassador, German
demands upon Poland were renewed and were further pressed. And
in view of the fate which had overtaken Czechoslovakia, in view of
the grave deterioration in her strategical position towards Germany,
it is not surprising that the Polish Government took alarm at the

developments. Nor were they alone. The events of March 1939 had
at last convinced both the English and the French Governments that
the Nazi designs of aggression were not limited to men of German
race, and that the specter of European war resulting from further
aggressions by Nazi Germany had not, after all, been exorcised by
the Munich Agreement.
As a result, therefore, of the concern of Poland and of England
and of France at the events in Czechoslovakia, and at the newly
applied pressure on Poland, conversations between the English and
Polish Governments had been taking place, and, on the 31st of
March 1939, Mr. Neville Chamberlain, speaking in the House of
Commons, stated that His Majesty's Government had given an
assurance to help Poland in the event of any action which clearly
threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government
accordingly considered it vital to resist. On the 6th of April 1939 an
Anglo-Polish communique stated that the two countries were
prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal
character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance
given by His Majesty's Government.
The justification for that concern on the part of the democratic
powers is not difficult to find. With the evidence which we now

118
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4 Dec. 45

have of what was happening within the councils of the German

Reich and its Armed Forces during these months, it is manifest that
the German Government were intent on seizing Poland as a whole,
—
that Danzig as Hitler himself was to say in time, a month later
"was not the subject of the dispute at all." The Nazi Government
was intent upon aggression and the demands and negotiations in
respect to Danzig were merely a cover and excuse for further
domination.
Would that be a convenient point to stop?
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

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4 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

THE PRESIDENT: Before the Attorney General continues his

opening statement, the Tribunal wishes me to state what they
propose to do as to time of sitting for the immediate future. We
think it will be more convenient that the Tribunal shall sit from
10:00 o'clock in the morning until 1:00 o'clock, with a break for
10 minutes in the middle of the morning; and that the Tribunal
shall sit in the afternoon from 2:00 o'clock until 5:00 o'clock with a
break for 10 minutes in the middle of the afternoon; and that there
shall be no open sitting of the Tribunal on Saturday morning, as
the Tribunal has a very large number of applications by the
defendants' counsel for witnesses and documents and other matters
of that sort which it has to consider.

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: May it please the Tribunal, when

we broke had been saying that the Nazi Government was
off I
intent upon aggression, and all that had been taking place in regard
to Danzig —
the negotiations, the demands that were being made
were really no more than a cover, a pretext and excuse for further
domination.
As far back as September 1938 plans for aggressive war against
Poland, England, and France were well in hand. While Hitler, at
Munich, was telling the world that the German people wanted
peace, and that having solved the Czechoslovakian problem, Ger-
many had no more territorial problems in Europe, the staffs of his
Armed Forces were already preparing their plans. On the 26th of
September 1938 he had stated:
"We have given guarantees to the states in the West. We
have assured all our immediate neighbors of the integrity of
their territory as far as Germany is concerned. That is no
mere phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest
whatever in a breach of the peace. We want nothing from
these peoples."
Andthe world was entitled to rely on those assurances. Inter-
national co-operation is utterly impossible unless one can assume
good faith in the leaders of the various states and honesty in the
public utterances that they make. But, in fact, within 2 months
of that solemn and apparently considered undertaking. Hitler and
his confederates were preparing for the seizure of Danzig. To
recognize those assurances, those pledges, those diplomatic moves
as the empty frauds that they were, one must go back to inquire
what was happening within the inner councils of the Reich from
the time of the Munich Agreement.
Written some time in September 1938 is an extract from a file
on the reconstruction of the German Navy. Under the heading

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 4 Dec. 45

"Opinion on the Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England,"

this is stated:
"1. If,according to the Führer's decision, Germany is to
acquire a position as a world power, she needs not only
sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval com-
munications and secure access to the ocean.
"2. Both requirements can be fulfilled only in opposition to
Anglo-French interests and would limit their position as
world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by
peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power,
therefore, forcesupon us the necessity of making the cor-
responding preparations for war.
"3. War against England means at the same time war against
the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well,
and a large number of countries overseas, in fact, against
one-third to one-half of the world.
"It can only be justified and have a chance of success" — and
was not moral justification which was being looked for in
it

this document
—
"It can only be justified and have a chance
of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically
and militarily, and waged with the aim of conquering for
Germany an outlet to the ocean."
THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal would like to know at
what stage you propose to put thedocuments, which you are citing,
in evidence.

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, Sir, my colleagues, my

American and my British colleagues, were proposing to follow up
my own address by putting these documents in. The first series of
documents, which will be put in by my noted colleague, Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe, will be the treaties.

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that what you quote will have to

be read again.
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: Well, I am limiting my quotations
as far as possibly can. I apprehend that technically you may wish
I
it to be quoted again, so as to get it on the record when the docu-

ment is actually put into evidence. But I think it will appear, when
the documents themselves are produced, that there will be a good
deal more in most of them than I am actually citing now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Very well.

SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: This document on naval warfare

against England is something which is both significant and new.
Until this date the documents in our possession disclose preparations
for war against Poland, England, and France, purporting on the

121
4 Dec. 43

face ofthem at least to be defensive measures to ward off attacks

which might result from the intervention of those states in the
preparatory German aggressions in Central Europe. Hitherto
aggressive war against Poland, England, and France has been con-
templated only as a distant objective. Now, in this document for
the first time, we find a war of conquest by Germany against France
and England openly recognized as the future aim, at least of the
German Navy.
On 24 November 1938 an appendix was issued by Keitel to a
previous order of the Führer. In that appendix were set out the
future tasks for the Armed Forces and the preparation for the
conduct of the war which would result from those tasks.
— —
"The Führer has ordered" I quote "that besides the three
eventualities mentioned in the previous directive . prepara-
. .

tions are also to be made for the surprise occupation by Ger-

man troops of the Free State of Danzig.
"For the preparation the following principles are to be borne
in mind." —
This is the common pattern of aggression "The
—
primary assumption is the lightning seizure of Danzig by
exploiting a favorable political situation, and not war with
Poland. Troops which are going to be used for this purpose
must not be held at the same time for the seizure of Memel,
so that both operations can take place simultaneously, should
such necessity arise."
Thereafter, as the evidence which is already before the Tribunal
has shown, final preparations were taking place for the invasion of
Poland. On the 3rd of April 1939, 3 days before the issue of the
Anglo-Polish communiqué, the Defendant Keitel issued to the High
Command of the Armed Forces a directive in which it was stated
that the directive for the uniform preparation of war by the Armed
Forces in 1939-40, was being re-issued and that part relating to
Danzig would be out in April. The basic principles were to remain
the same as in the previous directive. Attached to this document
were the orders Fall Weiss, the code name for the proposed invasion
of Poland. Preparation for that invasion was to be made, it was
stated, so that the operation could be carried out at any time from
the 1st of September 1939 onwards.
On the 11th of April Hitler issued his directive for the uniform
preparation of the war by the Armed Forces, 1939-40, and in it
he said:
"I shall lay down in a later directive future tasks of the
Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance
with these for the conduct of war. Until that directive comes
into force the Armed Forces must be prepared for the fol-
lowing eventualities:

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 4 Dec. 45

"1. Safeguarding of the frontiers ... ;

"2. Fall Weiss,

"3. The annexation of Danzig."
Then, in an annex to that document which bore the heading
"Political Hypotheses and Aims," it was stated that quarrels with
Poland should be avoided. But should Poland change her policy
and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settle-
ment would be necessary, notwithstanding the Polish Pact. The
Free City of Danzig was to be incorporated in the Reich at the
outbreak of the conflict at the latest. The policy aimed at limiting
the war to Poland, and this was considered possible at that time
with the internal crises in France and resulting British restraint.
—
The wording of that document and the Tribunal will study the
whole of it —does
not directly involve the intention of immediate
aggression. It is a plan of attack "if Poland changes her policy and
adopts a threatening attitude." But the picture of Poland, with
her wholly inadequate armaments, threatening Germany, now armed
to the teeth, is ludicrous enough, and the real aim of the document
—
emerges in the sentence and I quote: "The aim is then to destroy
Polish military strength and to create, in the East, a situation which
satisfies the requirements of defense" —
a sufficiently vague phrase
to cover designs of any magnitude. But even at that stage, the
evidence does not suffice to prove that the actual decision to attack
Poland on any given date had yet been taken. All the preparations
were being set in train. All the necessary action was being pro-
ceeded with, in case that decision should be reached.
It was within 3 weeks of the issue of that last document that
Hitler addressed the Reichstag on the 28th of April 1939. In that
speech he repeated the demands which had already been made
upon Poland, and proceeded to denounce the German-Polish Agree-
ment of 1934. Leaving aside, for the moment, the warlike prepara-
tions for aggression, which Hitler had set in motion behind the
scenes, I will ask the Tribunal to consider the nature of this
denunciation of an agreement to which, in the past. Hitler had
attached such importance.
In the first place, of course. Hitler's denunciation was per se
ineffectual. The text of the agreement made no provision for its
denunciation by either party until a period of 10 years had come
to an end. No denunciation could be legally effective until June or
July of 1943, and here was Hitler speaking in April of 1939, rather
more than 5 years too soon.
In the second place, Hitler's actual attack upon Poland, when it
came on 1 September was made before the expiration of the
6 months' period after denunciation required by the agreement
before any denunciation could be operative. And in the third place,

123
4 Dec. 45

the grounds for the denunciation stated by Hitler in his speech to

the Reichstag were entirely specious. However one reads its terms,
it is impossible to take the view that the Anglo-Polish guarantee

of mutual assistance against aggression could render the German-

Polish Pact null and void, as Hitler sought to suggest. If that had
been the effect of the Anglo-Polish assurances, then certainly the
pacts which had already been entered into by Hitler himself with
Italy and with Japan had already invalidated the treaty with
Poland. Hitler might have spared his breath. The truth is, of
course, that the text of the English-PoUsh communiqué, the text of
the assurances, contains nothing whatever to support the contention
that the German-Polish Pact was in any way interfered with.
One asks: Why then did Hitler make this trebly invalid attempt
to denounce his own pet diplomatic child? Is there any other
possible answer but this:
That the agreement having served its purpose, the grounds which
he chose for its denunciation were chosen merely in an effort to
—
provide Germany with some kind of justification at least for the
—
German people for the aggression on which the German leaders
were intent.
And, of course. Hitler sorely needed some kind of justification,
some apparently decent excuse, since nothing had happened, and
nothing seemed likely to happen, from the Polish side, to provide
him with any kind of pretext for invading Poland. So far he had
made demands upon his treaty partner which Poland, as a sovereign
state, had every right to refuse. If dissatisfied with that refusal,
Hitler was bound, under the terms of the agreement itself, *To seek
—
a settlement" I am reading the words of the pact:
"To seek a settlement through other peaceful means, without
prejudice to the possibility of applying those methods of
procedure, in case of necessity, which are provided for such
a case in the other agreements between them that are in
force."
And that presumably was a reference to the German-Polish
Arbitration Treaty, signed at Locarno in 1925.
The very facts, therefore, that as soon as the Nazi leaders cannot
get what they want but are not entitled to from Poland by merely
asking for it and that, on their side, they made no further attempt
to settle the dispute "by peaceful means" — in accordance with the
terms of the agreement and of the Kellogg Pact, to which the
—
agreement pledged both parties in themselves constitute a strong
presumption of aggressive intentions against Hitler and his
associates. That presumption becomes a certainty when the docu-
ments to which I am about to call the attention of the Tribunal
are studied.

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 4 Dec. 45

On the 10th of May Hitler issued an order for the capture of

economic installations in Poland. On the 16th of May the Defendant
Raeder, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, issued a memorandum
setting out the Führer's instructions to prepare for the operation
Fall Weiss at any time from the 1st of September.
But the decisive document is the record of the conference held
by Hitler on the 23rd of May 1939, in conference with many high-
ranking officers, including the Defendants Goring, Raeder, and
Keitel. The details of the whole document will have to be read to
the Tribunal later and I am merely summarizing the substantial
effect of this part of it now. Hitler stated that the solution of the
economic problems with which Germany was beset at first, could
not be found without invasion of foreign states and attacks on
—
foreign property. "Danzig" and I am quoting:
''Danzig not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question
is

of expanding our living space in the East. There is, therefore,

no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the
decision to attack Poland at the earliest opportunity. We
cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be
fighting. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of this
isolation will be decisive. The isolation of Poland is a matter
of skillful politics."
So he explained to his confederates. He anticipated the possibility
that war with England and France might result, but a two-front
war was to be avoided if possible. Yet England was recognized
— —
and I say it with pride as the most dangerous enemy which
Germany had. "England", he said, I quote, "England is the driving
force against Germany the aim will always be to force England
. . .

to her knees." More than once he repeated that the war with Eng-
land and France would be a life and death struggle. "But all the
same," he concluded, "Germany will not be forced into war but she
would not be able to avoid it."
On the 14th of June 1939 General Blaskowitz, then Commander-
in-Chief of the 3rd Army group, issued a detailed battle plan for
the Fall Weiss. The following day Von Brauchitsch issued a memo-
randum in which it was stated that the object of the impending
operation was to destroy the Polish Armed Forces. "High policy
demands," he said, "High policy demands that the war should be
begun by heavy surprise blows in order to achieve quick results."
The preparations proceeded apace. On the 22d of June the Defend-
ant Keitel submitted a preliminary timetable for the opçration,
which Hitler seems to have approved, and suggested that the
scheduled maneuver must be camouflaged, "in order not to disquiet
the population." On the 3rd of July, Brauchitsch wrote to the
Defendant Raeder urging that certain preliminary naval moves

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should be abandoned, in order not to prejudice the surprise of the

attack. On the 12th and 13th of August Hitler and Ribbentrop had
a conference with Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister.
It was a conference to which the Tribunal will have to have
regard from several points of view. I summarize now only one
aspect of the matter: At the beginning of the conversation Hitler
emphasized the strength of the German position, of Germany's
Western and Eastern Fortifications, and of the strategic and other
advantages they held in comparison with those of England, France,
and Poland. Now I quote from the captured document itself. Hitler
said this:
"Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it
any case, in the event of a conflict, they would
clear, that, in
stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy,
a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of
advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western
Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's
eastern frontier, not only would the 11 East Prussian
divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would
be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be neces-
sary in the event of a previous liquidation."
Then this:
''Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be to
This process
liquidate the false neutrals one after the other.
could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one
partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing
with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugo-
slavia as a neutral of that kind."
Ciano was for postponing the operation. Italy was not ready.
She believed that a conflict with Poland would develop into a
general European war. Mussolini was convinced that conflict with
the Western Democracies was inevitable, but he was making plans
for a period 2 or 3 years ahead. But the Führer said that the
Danzig question must be disposed of, one way or the other, by the
end of August. I quote: "He had, therefore, decided to use the
occasion of the next political provocation which has the form of an
ultimatum . . .
."

On the 22d of August Hitler called his Supreme Commanders

together and gave the order for the attack. In the course of what
he said he made it clear that the decision to attack had, in fact, been
made çot later than the previous spring. He would give a spurious
cause for starting the war. And at that time the attack was timed
to take place in the early hours of the 26th of August. On the day
before, on the 25th of August, the British Government, in the hope
that Hitler might still be reluctant to plunge the world into war.

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 4 Dec. 45

and in the belief that a formal treaty would impress him more than
the informal assurances which had been given previously, entered
into an agreement, an express agreement for mutual assistance with
Poland, embodying the previous assurances that had been given
earlier in the year. It was known to Hitler that France was bound
by the Franco-Polish Treaty of 1921, and by the Guarantee Pact
signed at Locarno in 1925 to intervene in Poland's favor in case
of aggression. And for a moment Hitler hesitated. The Defendants
Goring and Ribbentrop, in the interrogations which you will see,
have agreed that it was the Anglo-Polish Treaty which led him to
call off, or rather postpone, the attack which was timed for the
26th. Perhaps he hoped that after all there was still some chance of
repeating what he had called the Czech affair. If so, his hopes were
short-lived. On the 27th of August Hitler accepted Mussolini's
decision not at once to come into the war; but he asked for propa-
ganda support and for a display of military activity on the part of
Italy, so as to create uncertainty in the minds of the Allies. Ribben-
trop on the same day said that the armies were marching.
In the meantime, and, of course, particularly during the last
month, desperate attempts were being made by the Western Powers
to avert war. You will have details of them in evidence, of the
intervention of the Pope, of President Roosevelt's message, of the
offer by the British Prime Minister to do our utmost to create the
conditions in which all matters in issue could be the subject of free
negotiations, and to guarantee the resultant decisions. But this and
all the other efforts of honest men to avoid the horror of a European
conflict were predestined to failure. The Germans were determined
that the day for war had come. On the 31st of August Hitler issued
a top-secret order for the attack to commence in the early hours of
the 1st of September.
The necessary frontier incidents duly occurred. Was it, perhaps,
for that, that the Defendant Keitel had been instructed by Hitler
to supply Heydrich with Polish uniforms? And so without a decla-
ration of war, without even giving the Polish Government an
—
opportunity of seeing Germany's final demands and you will hear
the evidence of the extraordinary diplomatic negotiations, if one
—
can call them such, that took place in Berlin without giving the
Poles any opportunity at all of negotiating or arbitrating on the
demands which Nazi Germany was making, the Nazi troops invaded
Poland.
On the 3rd of September Hitler sent a telegram to Mussolini
thanking him for his intervention but pointing out that the war
was inevitable and that the most promising moment had to be
picked after cold deliberation. And so Hitler and his confederates
now before this Tribunal began the first of their wars of aggression

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4 Dec. 45

for which they had prepared so long and so thoroughly. They waged
it so fiercely that within a few weeks Poland was overrun.^

On the 23rd ofNovember 1939 Hitler reviewed the situation to

his military commanders and in the course of what he said he made
this observation:
"One year later Austria came; this step was also considered
doubtful. It brought about an essential reinforcement of the
Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland.
This step also was not possible to accomplish in one move.
First of all the Western Fortifications had to be finished
Then followed the creation of the Protectorate, and with that
the basis for action against Poland was laid. But I was not
quite clear at the time whether I should start first against the
East and then in the West, or vice versa .... The compulsion
to fight with Poland came first. One might accuse me of
wanting to fight again and again. In struggle, I see the fate
of all beings."
He was not sure where to attack first. But that sooner or later
he would attack, whether it were in the East or in the West, was
never in doubt. And he had been warned, not only by the British
and French Prime Ministers but even by his confederate Mussolini,
that an attack on Poland would bring England and France into the
w^ar. He chose what he thought was the opportune moment, and he
struck.
Under these circumstances the intent to wage war against Eng-
land and France, and to precipitate it by an attack on Poland, is not
to be denied. Here was defiance of the most solemn treaty obliga-
tions. Here was neglect of the most pacific assurances. Here was
aggression, naked and unashamed, which was indeed to arouse the
horrified and heroic resistance of all civilized peoples, but which,
before it was finished, was to tear down much of the structure of
our civilization.

Once started upon the active achievement of their plan to secure

the domination of Europe, if not of the world, the Nazi Government
proceeded to attack other countries, as occasion offered. The first
actually to be attacked, actually to be invaded, after the attack upon
Poland, were Denmark and Norway.
On the 9th of April 1940 the German Armed Forces invaded
Norway and Denmark without any warning, without any declara-
tion of war. It was a breach of the Hague Convention of 1907. It
was a breach of the Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation
signed between Germany and Denmark on 2 June 1926. It was, of
course, a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. It was a
violation of the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and

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 4 Dec. 45

Denmark made on the 31st of May 1939. And it was a breach of the
most explicit assurances which had been given. After his annexation
of Czechoslovakia had shaken the confidence of the world, Hitler
attempted to reassure the Scandinavian states. On the 28th of April
1939 he affirmed that he had never made any request to any of
them which was incompatible with their sovereignty and independ-
ence. On the 31st of May 1939 he signed a non-aggression pact with
Denmark.
On the 2d of September 1939, the day after he had invaded
Poland and occupied Danzig, he again expressed his determination,
so he said, to observe the inviolability and integrity of Norway
in an aide-mémoire which was handed to the Norwegian Foreign
Minister by the German Minister in Oslo on that day.
A month later, in a public speech on the 6th of October 1939,
he said:
"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even
points of controversy with the northern states, neither has
she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered
non-aggression pacts by Germany, and have both refused
them, solely because they do not feel themselves threatened
in any way."
When Denmark and Norway was already begun
the invasion of
in the earlymorning of 9 April 1940, a German memorandum was
handed to the governments of those countries attempting to justify
the German action. Various allegations against the governments of
the invaded countries were made. It was said that Norway had
been guilty of breaches of neutrality. It was said that she had
allowed and tolerated the use of her territorial waters by Great
Britain. It was said that Britain and France were themselves
making plans to invade and occupy Norway and that the Govern-
ment of Norway was prepared to acquiesce in such an event.
I do not propose to argue the question whether or not these
allegations were true or false. That question is irrelevant to the
issues before this Court. Even if the allegations were true and —
they were patently false — they would afford no conceivable justifi-
cation for the action of invading without warning, without declara-
tion of war, without any attempt at mediation or conciliation.

Aggressive war none the less aggressive war because the

is
state which wages believes that other states might, in the future,
it
take similar action. The rape of a nation is not justified because
it is thought she may be raped by another. Nor even in self-defense

are warlike measures justified except after all means of mediation

have been tried and failed and force is actually being exercised
against the state concerned.

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4 Dec. 45

But the matter is irrelevant because, in actual fact, with the

evidence which we now possess, it is abundantly clear that the
invasion of these two countries was undertaken for quite different
purposes. It had been planned long before any question of breach
of neutrality or occupation of Norway by England could ever have
occurred. And it is equally clear that the assurances repeated again
and again throughout 1939 were made for no other purpose than
to lull suspicion in these countries and to prevent them taking steps
to resist the attack against them which was all along in active
preparation. .

For some years the Defendant Rosenberg, in his capacity as

Chief of the Foreign Affairs Bureau—APA— of the NSDAP, had
interested himself in the promotion of Fifth Column activities in
Norway and he had established close relationship with the Nasjonal
Sämling, a political group headed by the now notorious traitor,
Vidkun Quisling. During the winter of 1938-39, APA was in contact
with Quisling, and later Quisling conferred with Hitler and with
the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg. In August 1939 a special
14-day course was held at the school of the Office of Foreign Relations
in Berlin for 25 followers whom Quisling had selected to attend.
The plan was to send a number and "reliable"
of selected men to
Germany These
for a brief military training in an isolated camp.
"reliable men" were to be the area and language specialists to Ger-
man special troops who were taken to Oslo on coal barges to under-
take political action in Norway. The object was a coup in which
Quisling would seize his leading opponents in Norway, including
the King, and prevent all military resistance from the beginning.
Simultaneously with those Fifth Column activities Germany was
making her military preparations. On the 2d of September 1939,
as I said. Hitler had assured Norway of his intention to respect her
neutrality. On 6 October he said that the Scandinavian states were
not menaced in any way. Yet on the 3rd October the Defendant
Raeder was pointing out that the occupation of bases, if necessary
by force, would greatly improve the German strategic position. On
the 9th of October Dönitz was recommending Trondheim as the
main base, with Narvik as an alternative base for fuel supplies. The
Defendant Rosenberg was reporting shortly afterwards on the
possibility of a coup d'état by Quisling, immediately supported by
German military and naval forces. On the 12th of* December 1939
the Defendant Raeder advised Hitler, in the presence of the
Defendants Keitel and Jodl, that if Hitler was favorably impressed
by Quisling, the OKW should prepare for the occupation of Norway,
if possible with Quisling's assistance, but if necessary entirely by

force. Hitler agreed, but there was a doubt whether action should
be taken against the Low Countries or against Scandinavia first.

130
 4 Dec. 45

Weather conditions delayed the march on the Low Countries. In

January 1940 instructions were given to the German Navy for the
attack on Norway. On the 1st of March a directive for the occu-
pation was issued by Hitler. The general object was not said to be to
prevent occupation by English forces but, in vague and general
terms, to prevent British encroachment in Scandinavia and the
Baltic and "to guarantee our ore bases in Sweden and to give our
Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain." But the
directive went on (and here is the common pattern):
"... on principle we will do our utmost to make the operation
appear as a peaceful occupation, the object of which is the
military protection of the Scandinavian states .... It is
important that the Scandinavian states as well as the western
opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures ....
In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be
kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with
fictitious ob j ecti ves.
'
'

The form and success of the invasion are well known. In the
early hours of the 9th of April, seven cruisers, 14 destroyers, and
a number of torpedo boats and other small craft carried advance
elements of six divisions, totalling about 10,000 men, forced an
entry and landed troops in the outer Oslo Fjord, Kristiansand,
Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. A small force of
troops was also landed at Arendal and Egersund on the southern
coast. In addition, airborne troops were landed near Oslo and
Stavanger in airplanes. The German attack came as a complete
surprise. All the invaded towns along the coast were captured
according to plan and with only slight losses. Only the plan to
capture the King and Parliament failed. But brave as was the
resistance, which was hurriedly organized throughout the country
— nothing could be done in the face of the long-planned surprise
—
attack and on the 10th of June military resistance ceased. So
another act of aggression was brought to completion.
Almost exactly a month after the attack on Norway, on the
10th of May 1940, the German Armed Forces, repeating what had
been done 25 years before, streamed into Belgium, the Netherlands,
—
and Luxembourg according to plan a plan that is, of invading
without warning and without any declaration of war.
What was done was, of course, a breach of the Hague Convention,
and is so charged. It was a violation of the Locarno Agreement of
1925, which the Nazi Government affirmed in 1935, only illegally to
repudiate it a couple of years later. By that agreement all questions
incapable of settlement by ordinary diplomatic means were to be
referred to arbitration. You will see the comprehensive terms of all
those treaties. It was a breach of the Treaty of Arbitration and

131
4 Dec. 45

Conciliation signed between Germany and the Netherlands on the

20th of May 1926. It was a breach of a similar treaty with Luxem-
bourg of 11 September 1929. It was a breach of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact. But those treaties, perhaps, had not derived in the minds of
the Nazi rulers of Germany any added sanctity from the fact that
they had been solemnly concluded by the governments of pre-Nazi
Germany. Let us then consider the specific assurances and under-
takings which the Nazi rulers themselves gave to these states which
lay in the way of their plans against France and England and
which they had always intended to attack. Not once, not twice, but
11 times the clearest possible assurances were given to Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. On those assurances, solemnly
given and formally expressed, these countries were entitled to rely
and did rely. In respect of the breach of those assurances these
defendants are charged. On the 30th of January 1937, for instance,
Hitler had said:
"As for the rest, I have more than once expressed the desire
and the hope of entering into similar good and cordial
relations with our neighbors. Germany has, and here I repeat
this solemnly, given the assurance time and time again that,
for instance, between her and France there cannot be any
humanly conceivable points of controversy. The German
Government has further given the assurance to Belgium and
Holland that it is prepared to recognize and to guarantee the
inviolability and neutrality of these territories."
After Hitler had remilitarized the Rhineland and had repudiated
the Locarno Pact, England and France sought to re-establish the
position of security for Belgium which Hitler's action had threatened.
And they, therefore, gave to Belgium on the 24th of April 1937
a specific guarantee that they would maintain, in respect of Belgium,
the undertakings of assistance which they had entered into with
her both under the Locarno Pact and under the Covenant of the
League. On the 13th of October 1937 the German Government also
made a declaration assuring Belgium of its intention to recognize
the integrity of that country.
It is,perhaps, convenient to deal with the remaining assurances
as we review the evidence which is available as to the preparations
and intentions of the German Government prior to their actual
invasion of Belgium on the 10th of May 1940.
As in the case of Poland, as in the case of Norway and Denmark,
so also here the dates speak for themselves.
As
early as August of 1938 steps were being taken to utilize the
Low Countries as bases for decisive action in the West in the event
of France and England opposing Germany in the aggressive plan
which was on foot at that time against Czechoslovakia.

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 4 Dec. 45

In an Air Force letter dated the 25th of August 1938 which deals
with the action to be taken if England and France should interfere
in the operation against Czechoslovakia, it is stated:
"It is not expected for the moment that other states will
intervene against Germany. The Dutch and the Belgian area
assumes in this connection much more importance for the
conduct of war in Western Europe than during the World
War, mainly as advance base for the air war."
In the last paragraph of that order it is stated:

"Belgium and the Netherlands, when in German hands,

represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution
of the air war against Great Britain as well as against
France ..."
That was in August 1938. Eight months later, on the 28th of
April 1939, Hitler is declaring again:
"I was pleased that a number of European states availed
themselves of this declaration by the German Government
to express and emphasize their desire to have absolute neu-
traUty."
A month later, on the 23rd of May 1939, Hitler held that con-
ference in the Reich Chancellery, to which I already referred. The
minutes of that meeting report Hitler as saying:
"The Dutch and Belgian must be occupied by armed
air bases
forces. Declarations of neutralitycannot be considered of any
value. If England and France want a general conflict on the
occasion of the war between Germany and Poland they will
support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality .... There-
fore, if England intends to intervene at the occasion of the
Polish war, we must attack Holland with lightning speed. It
is desirable to secure a defense line on Dutch soil up to the
Zuider Zee."
Even after that he was to give his solemn declarations that he
would observe the neutrality of these countries-. On the 26th of
August 1939, when the crisis in regard to Danzig and Poland was
reaching its climax, on the very day he had picked for the invasion
of Poland, declarations assuring the governments concerned of the
intention to respect their neutrality were kanded by the German
Ambassadors to the King of the Belgians, the Queen of the Nether-
lands, and to the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
in the most solemn form. But to the Army Hitler was saying:
"If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held,
a successful war against England will be secured."
On the 1st of September Poland was invaded, and 2 days later
England and France came into the war against Germany, in

133
4 Dec. 45

pursuance of the treaty obligations already referred to. On the 6th of

October Hitler renewed his assurances of friendship to Belgium and
Holland, but on the 9th of October, before any kind of accusation
had been made by the German Government of breaches of neu-
trality, Hitler issued a directive for the conduct of the war. And
he said this:
"1) If it becomes evident in the near future that England and
France, acting under her leadership, are not disposed to end
the war, I am determined to take firm and offensive action
without letting much time elapse.
"2) A long waiting period results not only in the ending of
Belgian and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality to the advantage
of the Western Powers, but also strengthens the military
power of our enemies to an increasing degree, causes con- -

fidence of the neutrals in final German victory to wane, and

does not help to bring Italy to our aid as brothers-in-arms.
"3) I therefore issue the following orders for the further con-
duct of military operations:
"(a) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of
Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be
carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible.
"(b) The object of this attack is to defeat as many strong
sections of the French fighting army as possible, and her ally
and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire
as great an area of Holland, Belgium, and northern France as
possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging
aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample
coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr."
Nothing could state more clearly or more definitely the object
behind the invasion of these three countries than that document
expresses it.

On the 15th of October 1939 the Defendant Keitel wrote a most-

secret letter concerning "Fall Gelb" which was the name given to
the operation against the Low Countries. In it he said that:
"The protection of tl»e Ruhr area by moving aircraft reporting
service and the forward as possible in the
air defense as far
area of Holland is significant for the whole conduct of the
war. The more Dutch territory we occupy, the more effective
can the defense of the Ruhr area be made. This point of view
must determine the choice of objectives of the Army, even if
the Army and Navy are not directly interested in such terri-
torial gain. It must be the object of the Army's preparations,

134
 4 Dec. 45

therefore, to occupy, on receipt of a special order, the terri-

tory of Holland, in the first instance in the area of the
Grebbe-Maas line. It depend on the military and polit-
will
ical attitude of the Dutch, as well as on the effectiveness of
their flooding, whether objectives can and must be further
extended."
The Fall Gelb operation had apparently been planned to take
place at the beginning of November 1939. We have in our possession
a series of 17 letters, dated from 7th November until the 9th May
postponing almost from day to day the D-Day of the operation, so
that by the beginning of November all the major plans and prepa-
rations had in fact been made.
On the 10th of January 1940 a German airplane force-landed in
Belgium. In it was found the remains of an operation order which
the pilot had attempted to burn; setting out considerable details of
the Belgian landing grounds that were to be captured by the Air
Force. Many other documents have been found which illustrate the
planning and preparation for this invasion in the latter half of 1939
and early 1940, but they carry the matter no further, and they show
no more clearly than the evidence to which I have already referred,
the plans and intention of the German Government and its Armed
Forces.
On the 10th of May 1940 at about 0500 hours in the morning,
the German invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg began.
And so once more the forces of aggression moved on. Treaties,
assurances, the rights of sovereign states meant nothing. Brutal
force, covered by as great an element of surprise as the Nazis
could secure, was to seize that which was deemed necessary for
striking the mortal blow against England, the main enemy. The
only fault of these three unhappy countries was that they stood
in the path of the German invader, in his designs against England
and France. That was enough, and they were invaded.

[A recess was taken.]

HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: On the 6th of April 1941 German

SIR
Armed Forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia. Again the blow was
struck without warning and with the cowardice and deceit which
the world now fully expected from the self-styled "Herrenvolk". It
was a breach of the Hague Convention. It was a breach of the
Pact of Paris. It was a breach of a specific assurance given by
Hitler on the 6th of October 1939.
He had then said this:
"Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss, I informed
Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country

135
4 Dec. 45

will also be an unalterable one and that we desire only to

live in peace and friendship with her."
But the plan for aggression against Yugoslavia had, of course,
been in hand well before that. In the aggressive action eastward
towards the Ukraine and the Soviet territories, security of the
southern flank and the lines of communication had already been
considered by the Germans.
The history of the events leading up to the invasion of Yugo-
slavia by Germany is well known. At 3 o'clock in the morning
of the 28th of October 1940 a 3-hour ultimatum had been presented
by the Italian Government
the Greek Government, and the
to
presentation of that ultimatum was immediately followed by the
aerial bombardment of Greek provincial towns and the advance
of Italian troops into Greek territory. The Greeks were not prepared.
They were at first forced to withdraw. But later the Italian advance
was at first checked, then driven towards the Albanian frontier,
and by the end of 1940 the Italian Army had suffered severe
reverses at Greek hands.
Of the German position in the matter there is, of course, the
evidence of what occurred when, on the 12th of August 1939, Hitler
had this meeting with Ciano.
You will remember that Hitler said then:
"Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be to
liquidate false neutrals one after the other. This process
could be carried out more easily if, on every occasion, one
partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing
with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia
as a neutral of this kind."
Then the conference went on and it met again on the 13th of
August, and in the course of lengthy discussions, Hitler said this:
"In general, however, on success by one of the Axis partners,
not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of
the other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue.
Italy carried through a number of successful operations in
Abyssinia, Spain, and Albania, and each time against the
wishes of the democratic entente. These individual actions
have not only strengthened Italian local interests, but have
also reinforced her general position. The same was the
. . .

case with German action in Austria and Czechoslovakia ....

The strengthening of the Axis by these individual operations
was of the greatest importance for the unavoidable clash
with the Western Powers."
And so once again we see the same procedure being followed.
That meeting had taken place on the 12th and the 13th of August

136
 .

4 Dec. 45

of 1939. Less than 2 months later, Hitler was giving his assurance
to Yugoslavia that Germany only desired to live in peace and
friendship with her, with the state, the liquidation of which by
his Axis partner, he had himself so recently suggested.
Then came the Italian ultimatum to Greece and war against
Greece and the Italian reverse.
We have found, amongst the captured documents, an undated
letter from Hitler to Mussolini which must have been written about
the time of the Italian aggression against Greece:
"Permit me"' —Hitler said
— "at the beginning of this letter
to assure you that within the last 14 days my heart and my
thoughts have been more than ever with you. Moreover,
Duce, be assured of my determination to do everything on
your behalf which might ease the present situation for you.
When I asked you to receive me in Florence, I undertook the
trip in the hope of being able to -express my views prior to
the beginning of the threatening conflict with Greece, about
which I had received only general information. First, I wanted
to request you to postpone the action, if at all possible, until
a more favorable time of the year, at all events until after
the American presidential election. But in any case, however,
I wanted to request you, Duce, not to undertake this action
without a previous lightning-like occupation of Crete and,
for this purpose, I also wanted to submit to you some practical
suggestions in regard to the employment of a German
parachute division and a further airborne division Yugo- . . .

slavia must become disinterested, if possible, however, from

our point of view, interested in co-operating in the liquidation
of the Greek question. Without assurances from Yugoslavia,
it is useless to risk any successful operation in the Balkans . .

Unfortunately, I must stress the fact that waging a war in

the Balkans before March is impossible. Hence it would also
serve to make any threatening influence upon Yugoslavia of
no purpose, since the Serbian General Stafî is well aware
of the fact that no practical action could follow such a threat
before March. Hence, Yugoslavia must, if at all possible, be
won over by other means and in other ways."
On the 12th of November 1939, in his top-secret order, Hitler
ordered the OKH to make preparations to occupy Greece and
Bulgaria, if necessary. Apparently 10 divisions were to be used
in order to prevent Turkish intervention. I think I said 1939; it
should, of course, have been the 12th of November 1940. And to
shorten the time, the German divisions in Romania were to be
increased.

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4 Dec. 45

On the 13th of December Hitler issued an order to OKW, OKL,

OKH, OKM, and the General Staff on the operation Marita, as the
invasion of Greece was to be called. In that order was stated
it
that the invasion of Greece was planned and was tocommence as
soon as the weather was advantageous. A further order was issued
on the 11th of January of 1941.
On the 28th of January of 1941 Hitler saw Mussolini. The
Defendants Jodl, and Ribbentrop were present at the
Keitel,
meeting. We know about it from Jodl's notes of what took place.
We know that Hitler stated that one of the purposes of German
troop concentrations in Romania was for use in the plan Marita
against Greece.
On the 1st of March 1941 German troops entered Bulgaria and
moved towards the Greek frontier. In the face of this threat of
an attack on Greece by German as well as Italian forces, British
troops were landed in Greece on the 3rd of March, in accordance
with the declaration which had been given by the British Govern-
ment on the 13th of April 1939; that Britain would feel bound to
give Greece and Romania, respectively, all the support in her
power in the event of either country becoming the victim of
aggression and resisting such aggression. Already, of course, the
Italian operations had made that pledge operative.

On the 25th of March of 1941, Yugoslavia, partly won over

by the "other means and ways" to which Hitler had
in other
referred, joined the Three Power Pact which had already been
signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. The preamble of the pact
stated that the three powers would stand side by side and work
together.
On the same day the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote two notes to
the Yugoslav Prime Minister assuring him of Germany's full
intention to respect the sovereignty and independence of his country.
That declaration was just another example of the treachery employed
by German diplomacy. We have already seen the preparations that
had been made. We have seen Hitler's attempts to tempt the
Italians into an aggression against Yugoslavia. We have seen, in
January, his own orders for preparations to invade Yugoslavia
and then Greece. And now, on the 25th of March, he is signing
a pact with that country and his Foreign Minister is writing assur-
ances of respect for her sovereignty and territorial integrity.
As a result of the signing of that pact, the anti-Nazi element in
Yugoslavia immediately accomplished a coup d'état and established
a new government. And thereupon, no longer prepared to respect
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of her ally, Germany
immediately took the decision to invade. On the 27th of March,

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2 days after the Three Power Pact had been signed, Hitler issued
instructions that Yugoslavia was to be invaded and used as a base
for the continuance of the combined German and Itahan operation
against Greece.
Following that, further deployment and instructions for the
action Marita were issued by Von Brauchitsch on the 30th of
March 1941.
It was said— and I quote:

"The orders issued with regard to the operation against

Greece remain valid so far as not affected by this order ....
On the 5th April, weather permitting, the Air Forces are to
attack troops in Yugoslavia, while simultaneously the attack
of the 12th Army begins against both Yugoslavia and Greece."
And as we now know, the invasion actually commenced in the
early hours of the 6th of April.
Treaties, pacts, assurances, obligations of any kind, are brushed
aside and ignored wherever the aggressive interests of Germany
are concerned.
I turn now to the last act of aggression in Europe my American —
colleagues will deal with the position in relation to Japan I turn —
now to the last act of aggression in Europe with which these Nazi
conspirators are charged, the attack upon Russia.
In August of 1939 Germany, although undoubtedly intending to
attack Russia at some convenient opportunity, concluded a treaty
of non-aggression with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
When Belgium and the Low Countries were occupied and France
—
collapsed in June of 1940, England although with the inestimably
valuable moral and economic support of the United States of
—
America was left alone in the field as the sole representative of
democracy in the face of the forces of aggression. At that moment
only the British Empire stood between Germany and the achieve-
ment of her aim to dominate the Western World. Only the British
—
Empire and England as its citadel. But it was enough. The first,
and possibly the decisive, military defeat which the enemy sustained
was in the campaign against England; and that defeat had a
profound infiuence on the future course of the war.
On the 16th of July of 1940 Hitler issued tô the Defendants
—
Keitel and Jodl a directive which they found themselves unable
—
to obey for the invasion of England. It started off and Englishmen —
—
will forever be proud of it by saying that:
"Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation,
shows no signs of willingness to come have decided
to terms, I

to prepare a landing operation against England and if neces-

sary to carry it out. The aim is to eliminate the English
. . .

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4 Dec. 45

homeland as a base for the carrying on of the war against

Germany .... Preparations for the entire operation must be
completed by mid-August."
But the first essential condition for that plan was, I quote:
. the British Air Force must morally and actually be so
.

far overcome that it does not any longer show any consider-
able aggressive force against the German attack."
The Defendant Goring and Air Force, no doubt, made the
his
most strenuous efforts to realize that condition, but, in one of the
most Splendid pages of our history, it was decisively defeated. And
although the bombardment of England's towns and villages w^as
continued throughout that dark winter of 1940-41, the enemy
decided in the end that England was not to be subjugated by these
means, and, accordingly, Germany turned back to the East, the
first major aim unachieved.

On the 22d of June 1941 German Armed Forces invaded Russia,

without warning, without declaration of war. It was, of course,
a breach of the usual series of treaties; they meant no more in this
case than they had meant in the other cases. It was a violation of
the Pact of Paris; it was a flagrant contradiction of the Treaty of
Non-Aggression which Germany and Russia had signed on the
23rd of August a year before.
Hitler himself said, in referring to that agreement, that "agree-
ments were only to be kept as long as they served a purpose."
The Defendant Ribbentrop was more explicit. In an interview
with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on the 23rd of February
1941, he made it clear that the object of the agreement had merely
been, so far as Germany was concerned, to avoid a two-front war.
In contrast to what Hitler and Ribbentrop and the rest of them
were planning within the secret councils of Germany, we know what
they were saying to the rest of the world.
On the 19th of July, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag:
— —
"In these circumstances" he said "I considered it proper to
negotiate as a first priority a sober definition of interest with
Russia. It would be made clear once and for all what Germany
believes she must regard as her sphere of interest to safeguard
her future and, on the other hand, what Russia considers
important for her existence. From this clear delineation of
the sphere of interest there followed the new regulation of
Russian-German relations. Any hope that now, at the end
of the term of the agreement, a new Russo-German tension
could arise is childish. Germany has taken no step which
v/ould lead her outside her sphere of interest, nor has Russia.
But England's hope to achieve an amelioration of her own

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 4 Dec. 45

position through the engineering of some new European crisis,

is, insofar as it is concerned with Russo-German relations, an
illusion.
"English statesmen perceive everything somewhat slowly, but
they too will learn to understand this in the course of time."
The whole statement was, of course, a tissue of lies. It was not
many months after it had been made that the arrangements for
attacking Russia were put into hand. And the Defendant Raeder
gives us the probable reason for the decision in a note which he sent
to Admiral Assmann:
"The fear that control of the air over the Channel in the
Autumn of 1940 could no longer be attained, a realization which
the Führer no doubt gained earlier than the Naval War Staff,
who were not so fully informed of the true results of air
raids on England (our own losses), surely caused the Führer,
as far back as August and September"
— —
this was August and
September of 1940 "to consider whether, even prior to
victory in the West, an Eastern campaign would be feasible,
with the object of first eliminating our last serious opponent
on the Continent .... The Führer did not openly express this
fear, however, until well into September."
He maynot have spoken to the Navy of his intentions until
later inSeptember, but by the beginning of that month he had
undoubtedly told the Defendant Jodl about them.
Dated the 6th of September 1940, we have a directive of the
OKW signed by the Defendant Jodl, and I quote:
"Directions are given for the occupation forces in the East to
be increased in the following weeks. For security reasons"
— —
and I quote "this should not create the impression in Russia
that Germany is preparing for an Eastern offensive."
Directives are given to the German Intelligence Service pertain-
ing to the answering of questions by the Russian Intelligence Service,
and I quote:
"The respective strength of the German troops in the East is
to be camouflaged by frequent changes in this area ....
. . .

The impression is to be created that the bulk of the troops

is in the south of the Government General and that the
occupation in the North is relatively small."
And so we see the beginning of the operations.
On the 12th of November 1940 Hitler issued a directive, signed
by the Defendant Jodl, in was stated that the political task
which it
to determine the attitude of Russia had begun, but that without
reference to the result of preparations against the East, which had
been ordered orally.

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4 Dec. 45

It is not to be supposed that the U.S.S.R. would have taken part

in any conversations at that time if it had been reaUzed that on the
very day orders were being given for preparations to be made for
the invasion of Russia, and that the order for the operation, which
was called "Plan Barbarossa", was in active preparation. On the
18th of December the order was issued, and I quote:
"The German Armed Forces have to be ready to defeat Soviet
Russia in a swift campaign before the end of the war against
Great Britain."
And later, in the same instruction —and I quote again:
"All orders which shall be issued by the High Commanders in
accordance with this instruction have to be clothed in such
terms that they may be taken as measures of precaution in
case Russia should change her present attitude towards our-
selves."
Germany kept up the pretense of friendliness and, on the 10th
of January Ï941, well after the Plan Barbarossa for the invasion of
Russia had been decided upon, Germany signed the German-Russian
Frontier Treaty. Less than a month later, on the 3rd of February
of 1941, Hitler held a conference, attended by the Defendants Keitel
and Jodl, at which it was provided that the whole operation against
Russia was to be camouflaged as if it was part of the preparation for
the "Plan Seelöwe", as the plan for the invasion of England was
described.
By March of 1941 plans were sufficiently advanced to include pro-
vision for dividing the Russian territory into nine separate states
to be administered under Reich Commissars, under the general
control of the Defendant Rosenberg; and at the same time detailed
plans for the economic exploitation of the country were made under
the supervision of the Defendant Goring, to whom the responsibility
in this matter —and it is a serious one —had been delegated by Hitler.
You will hear something of the details of these plans. I remind
you of one document which has already been referred to in this
connection.
It is significant that on the 2d of May of 1941 a conference of
State Secretaries took place in regard to the Plan Barbarossa, and in
the course of that it was noted:
"1. The war can be continued only if all Armed Forces are fed

out of Russia in the third year of the war.

"2. There is no doubt that, as a resült, many millions of people
will be starved to death if we take out of the country the
things necessary for us."
But that apparently caused no concern. The "Plan Oldenbourg",
as the scheme for the economic organization and exploitation of

142
 4 Dec. 45

Russia was called, went on. By the 1st of May 1941, the D-Day of the
operation had been fixed. By the 1st of June preparations were
virtually complete and an elaborate timetable was issued. It was
estimated that, although there would be heavy frontier battles,
lasting perhaps 4 weeks, after that no serious opposition was to be
expected.
On the 22d of June, at 3:30 in the morning, the German armies
marched again. As Hitler said in his proclamation to them, "I have
decided to give the fate of the German people and of the Reich and
of Europe again into the hands of our soldiers."
The usual false pretexts were, of course, given. Ribbentrop
stated on the 28th of June that the step was taken because of the
threatening of the German frontiers by the Red Army. It was a
lie,and the Defendant Ribbentrop knew it was a lie.
On the 7th of June 1941 Ribbentrop's own Ambassador in Moscow
was reporting to him, and I quote, that, "All observations show that
Stalin and Molotov, who are alone responsible for Russian foreign
policy, are doing everything to avoid a conflict with Germany."
The staff records which you will see make it clear that the Russians
were making no military preparations and that they were continu-
ing their deliveries under the Trade Agreement to the very last day.
The truth is, of course, that the elimination of Russia as a political
opponent and the incorporation of the Soviet territory in the German
Lebensraum had been one of the cardinal features of Nazi policy
for a very long time, subordinated latterly for what the Defendant
Jodl called diplomatic reasons.
And
so, on the 22d of June, the Nazi armies were flung against
the power with which Hitler had so recently sworn friendship,
and Germany embarked upon that last act of aggression in Europe,
which, after long and bitter fighting, was eventually to result in
Germany's own collapse.
That, then, is the case against these defendants, as amongst the
rulers of Germany, under Count Two of this Indictment.
It may be said that many of the documents which have been
referred to were in Hitler's name, and that the orders were
Hitler's orders, and that these men were mere instruments of
Hitler's will. But they were the instruments without which Hitler's
will could not be carried out; and they were more than that. These
men were no mere willing tools, although they would be guilty
enough if that had been their role. They are the men whose support
had built Hitler up into the position of power he occupied; these
are the men whose initiative and planning often conceived and
certainly made possible the acts of aggression done in Hitler's name;
and these are the men who enabled Hitler to build up the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force, the war economy, the political philosophy, by

143
4 Dec. 45

which these treacherous attacks were carried out, and by which he

was able to lead his fanatical followers into peaceful countries to
murder, to loot, and to destroy. They are the men whose coopera-
tion and support made the Nazi Government of Germany possible.
The government of a totalitarian country may be carried on
without representatives of the people, but it cannot be carried on
without any assistance at all. It is no use having a leader unless
there are also people willing and ready to serve their personal greed
and ambition by helping and following him. The dictator who is set
up in control of the destinies of his country does not depend on himself
alone either in acquiring power or in maintaining it. He depends
upon the support and the backing which lesser men, themselves
lusting to share in dictatorial power, anxious to bask in the
adulation of their leader, are prepared to give.
In the criminal courts of our countries, when men
are put on
their trial for breaches of the municipal laws, not infrequently
it

happens that of a gang indicted together in the dock, one has the
master mind, the leading personality. But it is no excuse for the
common thief to say, "I stole because I was told to steal", for the
murderer to plead, "I killed because I was asked to kill." And these
men are in no different position, for all that it was nations they
sought to rob, and whole peoples which they tried to kill. "The
warrant of no man excuseth the doing of an illegal act." Political
loyalty, military obedience are excellent things, but they neither
require nor do they justify the commission of patently wicked acts.
There comes a point where a man must refuse to answer to his
leader if he is also to answer to his conscience. Even the common
soldier, serving in the ranks of his army, is not called upon to obey
illegal orders. But these men were no common soldiers: They were
the men whose skill and cunning, whose labor and activity made
it possible for the German Reich to tear up existing treaties, to enter

into new ones and to flout them, to reduce international negotiations

and diplomacy to a hollow mockery, to destroy all respect for and
effect in international law and, finally, to march against the peoples
of the world to secure that domination in which, as arrogant mem-
bers of their self-styled master race, they professed to believe.
If these crimes were in one sense the crimes of Nazi Germany,
they also are guilty as the individuals who aided, abetted, counsel-
led, procured, and made possible the commission of what was done.

The total sum of the crime these men have committed—so awful
in its comprehension —has many aspects. Their lust and sadism,
their deliberate slaughter of so many millions
and degradation
of their fellow creatures that the imagination reels, are but
one side of this matter. Now that an end has been put to this
nightmare, and we come to consider how the future is to be lived,

144
 4 Dec. 45

perhaps their guilt as murderers and robbers is of less importance

and of less effect to future generations of mankind than their crime
of fraud —thefraud by which they placed themselves in a position
to do their murder and their robbery. That is the other aspect of
their guilt. The story of their "diplomacy", founded upon cunning,
hypocrisy, and bad faith, is a story less gruesome no doubt, but no
less evil and deliberate. And should it be taken as a precedent of
behavior in the conduct of international relations, its consequences
to mankind will no less certainly lead to the end of civilized society.
Without trust and confidence between nations, without the faith
that what is said is meant and that what is undertaken will be
observed, all hope of peace and security is dead. The Governments
of the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, of the
United States of America, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
and of France, backed by and on behalf of every other peace-loving
nation of the world, have therefore joined to bring the inventors
and perpetrators of this Nazi conception of international relationship
before the bar of this Tribunal. They do so, so that these defendants
may be punished for their crimes. They do so, also, that their
conduct maybe exposed in all its naked wickedness and they do
so in the hope that the conscience and good sense of all the world
will see the consequences of such conduct and the end to which
inevitably it must always lead. Let us once again restore sanity
and with it also the sanctity of our obligations towards each other.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Attorney, would it be convenient to the
prosecutors from Great Britain to continue?
SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS: The proposal was that my friend,
Mr. Sidney Alderman, should continue with the presentation of the
case with regard to the final acts of aggression against Czechoslovakia
and that that being done, my British colleagues would continue
with the presentation of the British case. As the Tribunal will
appreciate. Counts One and Two are in many respects complementary,
and my American colleagues and ourselves are working in closest
cooperation in presenting the evidence affecting those counts.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, would it be convenient for
you to go on until 5 o'clock?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. May it please the Tribunal, it is quite
convenient for me can but feel that it will be quite
to proceed. I
anticlimactic after the address which you just heard.
When the Tribunal rose yesterday afternoon, I had just
completed an outline of the plans laid by the Nazi conspirators in
the weeks immediately following the Munich Agreement. These
plans called for what the German officials called "the hquidation
of the remainder of Czechoslovakia." You will recall that 3 weeks
after Munich, on 21 October, the same day on which the

146
4 Dec. 45

administration of the Sudetenland was handed over to the civilian

authorities,Hitler and Keitel had issued an order to the Armed
Forces. This document is C-136, Exhibit USA-104.
In this order Hitler and Keitel ordered the beginning of prepara-
tions by the Armed Forces for the conquest of the remainder of
Czechoslovakia. You will also recall that 2 months later, on
17 December, the Defendant Keitel issued an appendix to the
original order directing the continuation of these preparations. This
document is C-138, Exhibit USA-105, and both these documents
have already been introduced.
Proceeding on the assumption that no resistance worth men-
tioning was to be expected, this order emphasized that the attack
on Czechoslovakia was to be well camouflaged so that it would not
appear to be a warlike action. "To the outside world," it said, and
I quote, *'it must appear obvious that it is merely an action of
pacification and not a warlike undertaking."
Thus, in the beginning of 1939 the basic planning for military
action against the mutilated Czechoslovak Republic had already
been carried out by the German High Command.
I turn now to the underhand and criminal methods used by the
Nazi conspirators to ensure that no resistance worth mentioning
would, in fact, be met by the German Army. As in the case of
Austria and the Sudetenland, the Nazi conspirators did not intend
to rely on the Wehrmacht alone to accomplish their calculated
objective of liquidating Czechoslovakia. With the German minority
separated from Czechoslovakia, they could no longer use the cry,
"Home to the Reich." One sizable minority, the Slovaks, still
remained within the Czechoslovak state.

I should mention at this point that the Czechoslovak Government

had made every effort to conciliateSlovak extremists in the months
after the cession of the Sudetenland. Autonomy had been granted
to Slovakia, with an autonomous Cabinet and Parliament at
Bratislava. Nevertheless, despite these concessions, it was in
Slovakia that the Nazi conspirators found fertile ground for their
tactics. The picture which I shall now draw of Nazi operations
in Slovakia is based on the Czechoslovak official Government
Report, Document Number 998-PS, already admitted in evidence
as Exhibit USA-91, and of which the Court has already taken
judicial notice.
Nazi propaganda and research groups had long been interested
in maintaining close connection with the Slovak autonomist
opposition. When Bela Tuka, who later became Prime Minister of
the puppet state of Slovakia, was tried for espionage and treason
in 1929, the evidence estabUshed that he had already established
connections with Nazi groups within Germany. Prior to 1938 Nazi

146
 —

4 Dec. 45

aides were in close contact with the Slovak traitors living in exile
and were attempting to establish more profitable contacts in the
semi-fascist Slovak Catholic People's Party of Monsignor Andrew
Hlinka. In February and July 1938 the leaders of the Henlein
movement conferred with top men of Father Hlinka's party and
agreed to furnish one another with mutual assistance in pressing
their respective claims to autonomy. This understanding proved
useful in the September agitation when at the proper moment the
Foreign Office in Berlin wired the Henlein leader, Kundt, in Prague
to tell the Slovaks to start their demands for autonomy.

This telegram, our Document Number 2858-PS, Exhibit USA-97,

has already been introduced in evidence and read.
— —
By this time midsummer 1938 the Nazis were in direct contact
with figures in the Slovak autonomist movement and had paid agents
among the higher staff of Father Hlinka's party. These agents
undertook to render impossible any understanding between the
Slovak autonomists and the Slovak parties in the government at
Prague.
Hans Karmasin, later to become Volksgruppenführer, had been
appointed Nazi leader in Slovakia and professed to be serving the
cause of Slovak autonomy while actually on the Nazi payroll. On
22 November the Nazis indiscreetly wired Karmasin to collect his
money at the German Legation in Prague, and I offer in evidence
Document 2859-PS as Exhibit USA-107, captured from the German
Foreign Office files. I read this telegram which was sent from the
German Legation at Prague to Pressburg:
"Delegate Kundt asks to notify State Secretary Karmasin he
would appreciate it if he could personally draw the sum
which is being kept for him at the treasury of the Embassy."
—signed— 'Hencke'
*
'

Karmasin proved to be extremely useful to the Nazi cause.

Although it is out of its chronological place in my discussion,
Ishould like now to offer in evidence Document 2794-PS, a captured
memorandum of the German Foreign Office which I offer as Exhibit
USA-108, dated Berlin, 29 November 1939.
This document, dated 8 months after the conquest of Czecho-
slovakia, throws a revealing light both on Karmasin and on the
German Foreign Office, and I now read from this memorandum:
"On the question of payments to Karmasin.
"Karmasin receives 30,000 marks monthly from the VDA"
Peoples' League for Germans Abroad— "until 1 April 1940;
from then on 15,000 marks monthly.
—
"Furthermore, the Central Office for Racial Germans" Volks-
deutsche Mittelstelle— "has deposited 300,000 marks for

147
 —

4 Dec. 45

Karmasin with the German Mission

— "on in Bratislava" —Press-
burg which he could fall back in an emergency.
"Furthermore, Karmasin has received money from Reich
Minister Seyss-Inquart; for the present it has been impos-
sible to determine what amounts had been involved, and
whether the payments still continue.
"Therefore, appears that Karmasin has been provided with
it
sufficient money; thus one could wait to determine whether
he would put up new demands himself.
"Herewith presented to the Reich Foreign Minister." —signed
"Woermann."
This document shows the complicity of the German Foreign
Office in the subsidization of illegal organizations abroad. More
important, it shows that the Germans still considered it necessary
to supply their undercover representatives in Pressburg with sub-
stantial funds, even after the declaration of the so-called Independent
State of Slovakia.
Sometime in the winter of 1938-39, the Defendant Goring con-
ferred with Durkansky and Mach, two leaders in the Slovak extrem-
ist group, who were accompanied by Karmasin. The Slovaks told
Goring of their desire for what they called independence, with
strong political, economic, and military ties to Germany. They
promised that the Jewish problem would be solved as it had been
solved in Germany; that the Communist Party would be prohibited.
The notes of the meeting report that Goring considered that the
Slovak efforts towards independence were to be supported, but as
the document will show, his motives were scarcely altruistic.
I now offer in evidence Document 2801-PS as Exhibit USA-109,
undated minutes of a conversation between Goring and Durkansky.
This document was captured among the files of the German Foreign
Office.
I now read these minutes, which are jotted down in somewhat
telegraphic style. To begin with:
"Durkansky (Deputy Prime Minister) reads out declaration.
Contents: 'Friendship for the Führer; gratitude, that through
the Führer, autonomy has become possible for the Slovaks:
The Slovaks never want to belong to Hungary. The Slovaks
want full independence with strongest political, economic,
and military ties to Germany. Bratislava to be the capital.
The execution of the plan only possible if the army and
police are Slovak.
"An independent Slovakia be proclaimed at the meeting
to
of the first In the case of a plebiscite the
Slovak Diet.
majority would favor a separation from Prague. Jews will

148
 4 Dec. 45

vote for Hungary. The area of the plebiscite to be up to the

March, where a large Slovak population lives.
"The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in
Germany. The Communist Party to be prohibited.
"The Germans in Slovakia do not want to belong to Hungary
but wish to stay in Slovakia.
"The German influence with the Slovak Government con-
siderable; the appointment of a German Minister (member
of the Cabinet) has been promised.
"At present negotiations with Hungary are being conducted
by the Slovaks. The Czechs are more yielding towards the
Hungarians than the Slovaks.
"The Field Marshal"—that is Field Marshal Goring— "con-
siders that the Slovak negotiations towards independence are
to be supported in a suitable manner. Czechoslovakia without
Slovakia is still more at our mercy.
**Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German
Air Force for use against the East."
On 12 February a Slovak delegation journeyed to Berlin. It
consisted of Tuka, one of the Slovaks with whom the Germans
had been in contact, and Karmasin, the paid representative of the
Nazi conspirators in Slovakia. They conferred with Hitler and the
Defendant Ribbentrop in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on Sunday,
12 February 1939.
I now Document 2790-PS as Exhibit USA-110,
offer in evidence
the captured German Foreign Office minutes of that meeting:
"After a brief welcome Tuka thanks the Führer for granting
this meeting. He addresses the Führer with 'My Führer' and
he voices the opinion that he, though only a modest man
himself, might well claim to speak for the Slovak nation.
The Czech courts and prison gave him the right to make such
a statement. He states that the Führer had not only opened
the Slovak question but that he had been also the first one
to acknowledge the dignity of the Slovak nation. The
Slovakian people will gladly fight under the leadership of
the Führer for the maintenance of European civilization.
Obviously future association with the Czechs had become an
impossibility for the Slovaks from a moral as well as an
economic point of view."
Then skipping to the last sentence: " T entrust the fate of my
—
people to your care.' " addressing that to the Führer!
During the meeting the Nazi conspirators apparently were
successful in planting the idea of insurrection with the Slovak
delegation. I refer to the final sentence of the document, which I

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4 Dec. 45

have just read, the sentence spoken by Tuka, "I entrust the fate of
my people to your care."
It is apparent from these documents that in mid-February 1939
the Nazis had a well-disciplined group of Slovaks at their service,
many of them drawn from the ranks of Father Hlinka's party.
Flattered by the personal attention of such men as Hitler and the
Defendant Ribbentrop and subsidized by German representatives,
these Slovaks proved willing tools in the hands of the Nazi
conspirators.
In addition to Slovaks, the conspirators made use of the few
Germans still remaining within the mutilated Czechoslovak Repub-
lic. Kundt, Henlein's deputy who had been appointed leader oi
this German minority, created as many artificial "focal points of
German culture" as possible. Germans from the districts handed
over to Germany were ordered from Berlin to continue their studies
at the German University in Prague and to make it a center of
aggressive Nazism.
With the assistance of German civil servants, a deliberate
campaign of Nazi infiltration into Czech public and private
institutions was carried out, and the Henleinists gave full co-opera-
tion to Gestapo agents from the Reich who appeared on Czech soil.
The Nazi political activity was designed to undermine and to
weaken Czech resistance to the commands from Germany.
In the face of continued threats and duress on both diplomatic
and propaganda levels, the Czech Government was unable to take
adequate measures against these trespassers upon its sovereignty.
I am using as the basis of my remarks the Czechoslovak official
Government report. Document Number 998-PS.
In early March, with the date for the final march into Czecho-
slovakia already close at hand. Fifth Column activity moved into
its final phase. In Bohemia and Moravia the FS, Henlein's equiv-
alent of the SS, were in touch with the Nazi conspirators in the
Reich and laid the groundwork of the events of 14 and 15 March.
I now offer in evidence Document 2826-PS as Exhibit USA-Ill.
This is an article by SS Group Leader Karl Hermann Frank,
published in the publication Böhmen and Mähren, the official
periodical of the Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, edition
May Page 179.
1941,
This is an article written by one of the Nazi leaders in Czecho-
slovakia at the moment of Germany's greatest military successes.
It is a boastful article and reveals with a frankness rarely found
in the Nazi press both the functions which the FS and the SS served
and the pride the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these
organizations. It is a long quotation.

150
 4 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going on with this tomorrow, Mr.

Alderman?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you take the whole day?
MR. ALDERMAN: No, not more than an hour and a half.
THE PRESIDENT: And after that the British prosecutors will
go on?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 5 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

151
 —

THIRTEENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 December 1945

Morning Session

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the

Tribunal rose yesterday afternoon, I had just offered in evidence
Document 2826-PS, Exhibit USA-Ill. This was an article by SS
Group Leader Karl Hermann Frank, published in Böhmen und
Mähren (or Bohemia and Moravia), the official periodical of the
Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, the issue of March 1941,
at Page 79. It is an article which reveals with considerable
frankness the functions which the FS and SS had, and shows the
pride which the Nazi conspirators took in the activities of these
organizations. I read from that article, under the heading "The SS
on March 15, 1939":

"A modern people and a modern state are today unthinkable

without political troops. To these are allotted the special task
of being the advance guard of the political will and the
guarantor of its unity. This is especially true of the German
folk-groups, which have their home in some other people's
state. Accordingly the Sudeten German Party had formerly
also organized its political troop, the Voluntary Vigilantes"
or, in German, "Freiwilliger Selbstschutz", called FS for
short.
— "This troop was trained especially in accordance with
the principles of the SS, so far as these could be used in
this region at that time. The troop was likewise assigned
here the special task of protecting the homeland actively, if
necessary. It stood up well in its first test in this connection,
wherever in the fall crisis of 1938 it had to assume the
protection of the homeland, arms in hand.
"After the annexation of the Sudeten Gau the tasks of the
FS were transferred essentially to the German student
organizations as compact troop formations in Prague and
Brünn, aside from the isolated German communities which
remained in the Second RepubHc. This was also natural
because many active students from the Sudeten Gau were
already members of the SS. The student organizations then
had to endure this test, in common with other Germans,
during the crisis of March 1939

152
 5 Dec. 45

"In the early morning hours of 15 March, after the announce-

ment of the planned entry of German troops, German men
had to act in some localities in order to assure a quiet course
of events, either by assumption of the police authority, as
for instance in Brünn, or by corresponding instructions of the
police president. In some Czech offices men had likewise,
in the early hours of the morning, begun to burn valuable
archives and the material of political files. It was also
necessary to take measures here in order to prevent foolish
destruction .... How significant the many-sided and com-
prehensive measures were considered by the competent
German agencies follows from the fact that many of the
men either on March 15 itself or on the following days were
admitted into the SS with fitting acknowledgment, in part
even through the Reich leader of the SS himself or through
SS Group Leader Heydrich. The activities and deeds of these
men were thereby designated as accomplished in the interest
of the SS
"Immediately after the corresponding divisions of the SS had
marched in with the first columns of the German Army and
had assumed responsibility in the appropriate sectors, the
men here placed themselves at once at their further disposition
and became valuable auxiliaries and collaborators."
I nowask the Court to take judicial notice under Article 21
of the Charter of three official documents. These are identified
by us as Documents D-571, D-572, and 2943-PS. I offer them in
evidence, respectively, D-571 as Exhibit USA-112; D-572, Exhibit
USA-113; and 2943-PS, which is the French Official Yellow- Book,
at Pages 66 and 67, as Exhibit USA-114.

The first two documents are British diplomatic dispatches,

properly certified to by the British Government, which gave the
—
background of intrigue in Slovakia German intrigue in Slovakia.
The third document, 2943-PS or Exhibit USA-114, consists of
excerpts from the French Yellow Book, principally excerpts from
dispatches signed by M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador in
Berlin, to the French Foreign Office between 13 and 18 March 1939.
I expect to draw on these three dispatches rather freely in the
further course of my presentation, since the Tribunal will take
judicial notice of each of these documents, I think; and therefore,
it may not be necessary to read them at length into the transcript.

In Slovakia the long-anticipated crisis came on 10 March. On that

day the Czechoslovakian Government dismissed those members
of the Slovak Cabinet who refused to continue negotiations with
Prague, among them Foreign Minister Tiso and Durcansky. Within
24 hours the Nazis seized upon this act of the Czechoslovak

153
 5 Dec. 45

Government as an excuse for intervention. On the following day,

March 11, a strange scene was enacted in Bratislava, the Slovak
capital. I quote from Document D-571; which is USA-112. That is
the report of the British Minister in Prague to the British
Government.
"Herr Bürckel, Herr Seyss-Inquart, and five German generals
came at about 10 o'clock in the evening of Saturday, the 11th
of March, into a Cabinet meeting in progress in Bratislava
and told the Slovak Government that they should proclaim
the independence of Slovakia. When M. Sidor, the Prime
Minister, showed hesitation, Herr Bürckel took him on one
side and explained that Herr Hitler had decided to settle
the question of Czechoslovakia definitely. Slovakia ought,
therefore, to proclaim her independence, because Herr Hitler
would otherwise disinterest himself in her fate. M. Sidor
thanked Herr Bürckel for this information, but said that he
must discuss the situation with the Government at Prague."

A
very strange situation that he should have to discuss such
a matter with his own Government, before obeying instructions
of Herr Hitler (delivered by five German generals and Herr Bürckel
and Herr Seyss-Inquart.
Events went on moving rapidly, but Durcansky, one of the
dismissed ministers, escaped with Nazi assistance to Vienna, where
the facilities of the German broadcasting station were placed at
his disposal. Arms and ammunition were brought from German
offices Engerau across the Danube into Slovakia, where they
in
were used by the FS and the Hlinka Guards to create incidents
and disorder of the type required by the Nazis as an excuse for
military action. The German press and radio launched a violent
campaign against the Czechoslovak Government; and, significantly,
an invitation from Berlin was delivered in Bratislava. Tiso, the
dismissed Prime Minister, was summoned by Hitler to an audience
in the German capital. A plane was awaiting him in Vienna.
At this point, in the second week of March 1939, preparations
for what the Nazi leaders like to call the liquidation of Czecho-
slovakia were progressing with what to them must have been very
satisfying smoothness. The military, diplomatic, and propaganda
machinery of the Nazi conspirators was moving in close co-
ordination. All during the process of the Fall Grün (or Case
Green) of the preceding summer, the Nazi conspirators had invited
Hungary to participate in this new attack. Admiral Horthy, the
Hungarian Regent, was again greatly fiattered by this invitation.
I offer in evidence Document 2816-PS as Exhibit USA-115. This
is a letter the distinguished Admiral of Hungary, a country which,

154
 . .

5 Dec. 45

incidentally, had no navy, wrote to Hitler on 13 March 1939, and

which we captured in the German Foreign Office files.
"Your Excellency, my sincere thanks.
"I can hardly tell you how happy I am because this headwater
—
region I dislike using big words is of vital importance to —
—
the life of Hungary." I suppose he needed some headwaters
for the non-existent navy of which he was admiral.
"In spite of the fact that our recruits have been serving for
only 5 weeks we are going into this affair with eager
enthusiasm. The dispositions have already been made. On
Thursday, the 16th of this month, a frontier incident will
take place which will be followed by the big blow on Satur-
—
day." He doesn't like to use big words; "big blow" is suffi-
cient.

"I shall never forget this proof of friendship, and Your

Excellency may rely on my unshakeable gratitude at all
times. Your devoted friend, Horthy."
From this cynical and callous letter from the distinguished
Admiral . .

THE PRESIDENT: Was that letter addressed to the Hungarian

Ambassador at Berlin?

MR. ALDERMAN: I thought it was addressed to Hitler, if the

President please.
THE PRESIDENT: There are some words at the top which look
like a Hungarian name.
MR. ALDERMAN: That is the letter heading. As I understand
it, the letter was addressed to Adolf Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: All right.
MR. ALDERMAN: And I should have said it was — it ended
with the . .

THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything on the letter which indi-

cates that?

MR. ALDERMAN: Only the fact that it was found in the BerUn
Foreign Office, and the wording of the letter and the address "Your
Excellency." We may be drawing a conclusion as to whom it was
addressed; but it was found in the Berlin Foreign Office.
From that cynical and callous letter it may be inferred that the
Nazi conspirators had already informed the Hungarian Government
of their plans for further military action against Czechoslovakia.
As it turned out the timetable was advanced somewhat. I would
draw the inference that His Excellency, Adolf Hitler, informed his
devoted friend Horthy of this change in good time.

155
 —

5 Dec 45

On the diplomatic level the Defendant Ribbentrop was quite

active. On 13 March, the same day on which Horthy wrote his
letter, Ribbentrop sent a cautionary telegram to the German
Minister in Prague outlining the course of conduct he should pursue
during the coming diplomatic pressure. I offer in evidence Document
2815-PS as Exhibit USA-116. This is the telegram sent by Ribben-
trop to the German Legation in Prague on 13 March.
"Berlin, 13 March 1939.
"Prague. Telegram in secret code.
"With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt
today. In case you should get any written communication
from President Hacha, please do not make any written or
verbal comments or take any other action on them, but pass
them on here by cipher telegram. Moreover, I must ask you
and the other members of the legation to make a point of
not being available if the Czech Government wants to
—
communicate with you during the next few days." Signed
"Ribbentrop."
On the afternoon of 13 March Monsignor Tiso, accompanied by
Durcansky and Herr Meissner and the local Nazi leader, arrived
in Berlin in response to the summons from Hitler to which I have
heretofore referred. Late that afternoon Tiso was received by
Hitler in his study in the Reich Chancellery and presented with an
ultimatum. Two alternatives were given him: Either declare the
independence of Slovakia, or be left without German assistance to
what were referred to as the emergence of Poland and Hungary.
This decision Hitler said was not a question of days, but of hours.
I now offer in evidence Document 2802-PS as Exhibit USA-117~
—
again a document captured in the German Foreign Office German
Foreign Office minutes of the meeting between Hitler and Tiso on
13 March. I read the bottom paragraph on Page 2 and the top
paragraph on Page 3 of the English translation. The first paragraph
I shall read is a summary of Hitler's remark. You will note that

in the inducements he held out to the Slovaks Hitler displayed his

customary disregard for the truth. I quote:
"Now he had permitted Minister Tiso to come here in order
tomake this question clear in a very short time. Germany
had no interest east of the Carpathian mountains. It was
indifferent to him what happened there. The question was
whether Slovakia wished to conduct her own affairs or not.
He did not wish for anything from Slovakia. He would not
pledge his people, or even a single soldier, to something
which was not in any way desired by the Slovak people. He
would like to secure final confirmation as to what Slovakia

156
 5 Dec. 45

really wished. He did not wish that reproaches should come

from Hungary that he was preserving something which did
not wish to be preserved at all. He took a liberal view of
unrest and demonstration in general, but in this connection
unrest was only an outward indication of interior instability.
He would not tolerate it and he had for that reason permitted
Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a
question of days, but of hours. He had stated at that time
that if Slovakia wished to make herself independent he would
support this endeavor and even guarantee it. He would stand
by his word so long as Slovakia would make it clear that
she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not
wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave
the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events for which
he was no longer responsible. In that case he would only
intercede for German interests, and those did not lie east
of the Carpathians. Germany had nothing to do with Slo-
vakia. She had never belonged to Germany.
"The Führer asked the Reich Foreign Minister" the
— —
Defendant Ribbentrop "if he had any remarks to. add. The
Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the
conception that in this case a decision was a question of hours
not of days. He showed the Führer a message he had just
received which reported Hungarian troop movements on the
Slovak frontiers. The Führer read this report, mentioned it
to Tiso, and expressed the hope that Slovakia would soon
decide clearly for herself."
Amost extraordinary interview. Germany had no interest in
Slovakia; Slovakia had never belonged to Germany; Tiso was
invited there. And this is what happened: Those present at that
meeting included the Defendant Ribbentrop, the Defendant Keitel,
State Secretary Dietrich, State Secretary Keppler, the German
Minister of State Meissner. I invite the attention of the Tribunal
to the presence of the Defendant Keitel on this occasion, as on so
many other occasions, where purely political measures in furtherance
of Nazi aggression were under discussion, and where apparently
there was no need for technical military advice.
While in Berlin the Slovaks also conferred separately with the
Defendant Ribbentrop and with other high Nazi officials, Ribbentrop
very soUcitously handed Tiso a copy, already drafted in Slovak
language, of the law proclaiming the independence of Slovakia.
On the night of the 13th a German plane was conveniently placed
at Tiso's disposal to carry him home. On 14 March, pursuant to
the wishes of the Nazi conspirators, the Diet of Bratislava
proclaimed the independence of Slovakia. With Slovak extremeness.

157
5 Dec. 45

acting at the Nazi bidding in open revolt against the Czechoslovak

Government, the Nazi leaders were now in a position to move
against Prague. On the evening of the 14th, at the suggestion of
the German Legation in Prague, M. Hacha, the President of the
Czechoslovak Republic, and M. Chvalkowsky, his Foreign Minister,
arrived in Berlin. The atmosphere in which they found themselves
might be described as somewhat hostile. Since the preceding
weekend, the Nazi press had accused the Czechs of using violence
against the Slovaks, and especially agaiinst the members of the
German minority and citizens of the Reich. Both press and radio
proclaimed that the lives of Germans were in danger. Such a
situation was intolerable. It was necessary to smother as quickly
as possible the focus of trouble, which Prague had become, in the
—
heart of Europe. These peacemakers!
After midnight on the 15th, at 1:15 in the morning, Hacha and
Chvalkowsky were ushered into the Reich Chancellery. They found
there Adolf Hitler, the Defendants Ribbentrop, Goring, and Keitel
and other high Nazi officials. I now offer in evidence Document
2798-PS as Exhibit USA-118. This document is the captured German
Foreign Office account of this infamous meeting. It is a long
document. Parts of it are so revealing and give so clear a picture
of Nazi behavior and tactics that I should like to read them in full.

It must be remembered that this account of the fateful conference

on the night of March 14-15 comes from German sources, and of
course it must be read as an account biased by its source, or as
counsel for the defendants said last week "a tendentious account".
Nevertheless, even without too much discounting of the report on
account of its source, it constitutes a complete condemnation of the
Nazis, who by pure and simple international banditry forced the
dissolution of Czechoslovakia. And I interpolate to suggest that
international banditry has been a crime against international law
for centuries.
I will first read the headings to the minutes. In the English
mimeographed version in the document books the time given is an
incorrect translation of the original. It should read 0115 to 0215:
"Conversation between the Führer and Reich Chancellor and
the President of Czechoslovakia, Hacha, in the presence of the
Reich Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, and of the Czecho-
slovakian Foreign Minister, Chvalkowsky, in the Reich Chan-
cellery on 15 March 1939, 0115 to 0215 hours."
Others present were General Field Marshal Goring, General
Keitel, Secretary of the StateVon Weizsäcker, Minister of the State
Meissner, Secretary of the State Dietrich, Counselor of the Legation
Hewel. Hacha opened the conference. He was conciliatory even —

158
 5 Dec. 45

humble, though the President of a sovereign state. He thanked

Hitler for receiving him and he said he knew that the fate of
Czechoslovakia rested in the Fiihrer's hands. Hitler replied that he
regretted that he had been forced to ask Hacha to come to Berlin,
particularly because of the great age of the President. Hacha was
then, I believe, in his seventies. But this journey, Hitler told the
President, could be of great advantage to his country because, and
I quote, "It was only a matter of hours until Germany would
intervene." I quote now from the top of Page 3 of the English
translation. You will bear in mind that what I am reading are
rough notes or minutes of what Adolf Hitler said:
"Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him. If Slovakia
had kept closer to Germany it would have been an obligation
to Germany, but he was glad that he did not have this
obligation now. He had no interests whatsoever in the
territory east of the Little Carpathian Mountains. He did not
."
want to draw the final consequences in the autumn . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, don't you think you ought

to read the last sentence on Page 2?
MR. ALDERMAN: Perhaps so; yes. The last sentence from
the preceding page was:
"For the other countries Czechoslovakia was nothing but a
means to an end. London and Paris were not in a position
to really stand up for Czechoslovakia.

"Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him."

Then I had read down to:

"But even at that time and also later in his conversations

with Chvalkowsky he made it clear that he would ruthlessly
smash this State if Benes' tendencies were not completely
revised. Chvalkowsky understood this and asked the Führer
to have patience." —
He often bragged of his patience. "The —
Führer saw this point of view, but the months went by
without any change. The new regime did not succeed in
eliminating the old one psychologically. He observed this
from the press, mouth-to-mouth propaganda, dismissals of
Germans, and many other things which, to him, were a
symbol of the total perspective.
"At first this but when it became
he had not understood
clear to him he drewconsequences because, had the
his
development continued in this way, the relations with
Czechoslovakia would in a few years have become the same
as 6 months ago. Why did Czechoslovakia not immediately
reduce its Army to a reasonable size? Such an army was a

159
5 Dec. 45

tremendous burden for such a state, because it only makes

sense if it supports the foreign political mission of the state.
Since Czechoslovakia no longer has a foreign political
mission such an army is meaningless. He enumerated several
examples which proved to him that the spirit in the Army
had not changed. This symptom convinced him that the
Army also would be a source of a severe political burden in
the future. Added to this were the inevitable development
of economic necessities, and, further, the protests of national
groups which could no longer endure life as it was."
I now interpolate, if the Tribunal please, to note the significance
of that language of Adolf Hitler to the President of a supposed
sovereign state and its Prime Minister, having in his presence
General Field Marshal Goring, the Commander of the Air Force,
and General Keitel. And continuing to quote:
"Thus that the die was cast on the past Sunday." This
it is
— —
is the language of Hitler. "I sent for the Hungarian
still
minister and told him that I am withdrawing my hands from
this country. We were now confronted with this fact. He
had given the order to the German troops to march into
Czechoslovakia and to incorporate Czechoslovakia into the
German Reich. He wanted to give Czechoslovakia fullest
autonomy and a life of her own to a larger extent than she
had ever enjoyed during Austrian rule. Germany's attitude
towards Czechoslovakia will be determined tomorrow, and
the day after tomorrow, and depends on the attitude of the
Czechoslovakian people and the Czechoslovakian military
towards the German troops. He no longer trusts the Govern-
ment. He believes in the honesty and straightforwardness of
Hacha and Chvalkowsky, but doubts that the Government
will be able to assert itself in the entire nation. The German
Army had already started out today, and at one barracks
where resistance was offered, it was ruthlessly broken;
another barracks had given in at the deployment of heavy
artillery.

"At 6 o'clock in the morning the German Army would invade

Czechoslovakia from all sides and the German Air Force
would occupy the Czech airfields. There existed two
possibilities. The first one would be that the invasion of the
German troops would lead to a battle. In this case the
resistance will be broken by all means with physical force.
The other possibility is that the invasion of the German troops
occurs in bearable form. In that case, it would be easy for
the Führer to give Czechoslovakia in the new organization of

160
 5 Dec. 45

Czech life a generous life of her own, autonomy, and a certain

national liberty.
"We witnessed at the moment a great historical turning-point.
He would not like to torture and denationalize the Czechs. He
also did not do all that because of hatred, but in order to
protect Germany. If Czechoslovakia in the fall of last year

for "had not yielded"

——
would not have yielded" I suppose that is a bad translation
"the Czech people would have been
exterminated. Nobody could have prevented him from doing
that. It was Czech people should live a full
his will that the
national life and he believed firmly that a way could be found
which would make far-reaching concessions to the Czech
desires. If fighting should break out tomorrow, the pressure
would result in counter pressure. One would annihilate
another and it would then not be possible any more for him
to give the promised alleviations. Within 2 days the Czech
Army would not exist any more. Of course, Germans would
also be killed and this would result in a hatred which would
— —
force him" that is. Hitler "because of his instinct of self-
preservation, not to grant autonomy any more. The world
would not move a muscle. He felt pity for the Czech people
when he was reading the foreign press. It would leave the
impression on him which could be summarized in a German
proverb: The Moor has done his duty, the Moor may go.'
"That was the state of affairs. There existed two trends in
Germany, a harder one which did not want any concessions
and wished, in memory to the past, that Czechoslovakia would
be conquered with blood, and another one, the attitude of
which corresponded with his just-mentioned suggestions.
"That was the reason why he had asked Hacha to come here.
This invitation was the last good deed which he could offer
to the Czech people. If it should come to a fight, the bloodshed
would also force us to hate. But the visit of Hacha could
perhaps prevent the extreme. Perhaps it would contribute to
finding a form of construction which would be so far-reaching
for Czechoslovakia as she could never have hoped for in the
old Austria. His aim was only to create the necessary security
for the German people.
"The hours went past. At would march in.
6 o'clock the troops
He was almost ashamed was one German
to say that there
division to each Czech battalion. The military action was no
small one, but planned with all generosity. He would advise
—
him" that is, Adolf Hitler advised poor old Hacha "now —
to retire with Chvalkowsky in order to discuss what should
be done."

161
5 Dec. 45

In his reply to this long harangue, Hacha, according to the Ger-

man minutes, said that he agreed that resistance would be useless.
He expressed doubt that he would be able to issue the necessary
orders to the Czech Army, in the 4 hours left to him, before the
German Army crossed the Czech border. He asked if the object
of the invasion was to disarm the Czech Army. If so, he indicated
that might possibly be arranged. Hitler replied that his decision
was final; that it was well known what a decision of the Führer
meant. He turned to the circle of Nazi conspirators surrounding
him, -for their support, and you will remember that the Defendants
Goring, Ribbentrop, and Keitel were all present. The only possibility
of disarming the Czech Army, Hitler said, was by the intervention
of the German Army.
I read now one paragraph from Page 4 of the English version of
the German minutes of this infamous meeting. It is the next to the
last paragraph on Page 4.

"The Führer states that his decision was irrevocable. It was

well known what a decision of the Führer meant. He did
not see any other possibility for disarmament and asked the
—
other gentlemen" that is, including Goring, Ribbentrop,
— and
Keitel "whether they shared his opinion, which was an-
swered in the affirmative. The only possibility to disarm the
Czech Army was by the German Army."
At this sad point, Hacha and Chvalkowsky retired from the room.
I now offer in evidence Document 2861-PS, an excerpt from the
official British War Blue Book, at Page 24, and I offer it as Exhibit
USA-119. This is an official document of the British Government,
of which the Tribunal will take judicial notice under the provisions
of Article 21 of the Charter. The part from which I read is a
dispatch from the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson,
describing a conversation with the Defendant Goring, in which the
events of this early morning meeting are set forth.
"Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax, Berlin, May 28, 1939.

"My paid a short visit to Field Marshal Goring at

Lord: I

Kcurinhall yesterday."
Then I skip two paragraphs and begin reading with Paragraph 4.
I am sorry, I think I better read all of those paragraphs:

"Field Marshal Goring,who had obviously just been talking

to someone
on the subject, began by inveighing against
else
the attitude which was being adopted in England towards
everything German and, particularly, in respect of the gold
held there on behalf of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia.
Before, however, I had time to reply, he was called to the

162
 5 Dec. 45

telephone and on his return did not revert to this specific

question. He complained, instead, of British hostility in
general, of our political and economic encirclement of Ger-
many and the activities of what he described as the war
party in England
*1 told the Field Marshal that before speaking of British
hostility, he must understand why the undoubted change of
feeling towards Germany in England had taken place. As
he knew quite well, the basis of all the discussions between
Mr. Chamberlain and Herr Hitler last year had been to the
effect that, once the Sudeten were allowed to enter the Reich,
Germany would leave the Czechs alone and would do nothing
to interfere with their independence. Herr Hitler had given
a definite assurance to that effect in his letter to the Prime
Minister of the 27th September. By yielding to the advice of
his *wild men' and deliberately annexing Bohemia and
Moravia, Herr Hitler had not only broken his word to Mr.
Chamberlain but had infringed the whole principle of self-
determination on which the Munich Agreement rested.
"At this point, the Field Marshal interrupted me with a
description of President Hacha's visit to Berlin. I told Field
Marshal Goring that it was not possible to talk of free will
when I understood that he himself had threatened to bombard
Prague with his airplanes, if Doctor Hacha refused to sign.
The Field Marshal did not deny the fact but explained how
the point had arisen. According to him. Doctor Hacha had
from the first been prepared to sign everything but had said
that constitutionally he could not do so without reference first
to Prague. After considerable difficulty, telephonic com-
munication with Prague was obtained and the Czech Govern-
ment had agreed, while adding that they could not guarantee
that one Czech battalion at least would not fire on German
troops. It was, he said, only at that stage that he had warned
Doctor Hacha that, if German lives were lost, he would
bombard Prague. The Field Marshal also repeated, in reply
to some comment of mine, the story that the advance
occupation of Vitkovice had been effected solely in order to
forestall the Poles who, he said, were known to have the
intention of seizing this valuable area at the first oppor-
tunity."
I and the judicial notice
also invite the attention of the Tribunal
of the Tribunal, to Dispatch Number the French Official Yellow
77, in
Book, at Page 96 of the book, identified as our Document 2943-PS,
appearing in the Document Book under that number, and I ask
that it be given an identifying number, Exhibit USA-114. This is

163
5 Dec. 45

a dispatch from M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, and it gives

another well-informed version of this same midnight meeting. The
account, which I shall present to the Court, of the remainder of this
meeting is drawn from these two sources, the British Blue Book and
the French Yellow Book. I think the Court may be interested to
read somewhat further at large, in those two books, which furnish
a great deal of the background of all of these matters.

When President Hacha left the conference room in the Reich

Chancellery, he was in such a state of exhaustion that he needed
medical attention from a physician who was conveniently on hand
for that purpose, a German physician. When the two Czechs
returned to the room, the Nazi conspirators again told them of the
power and invincibility of the Wehrmacht. They reminded them
that in 3 hours, at 6 in the morning . . .

THE PRESIDENT: You are not reading? I beg your pardon!

MR. ALDERMAN: I am not reading, I am summarizing.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
MR. ALDERMAN: They reminded them that in 3 hours, at 6 in
the morning, the German Army would cross the border. The
Defendant Goring boasted of what the Wehrmacht would do if the
Czech forces dared to resist the invading Germans. If German lives
were lost, Defendant Goring said, his Luftwaffe would blaze half
of Prague into ruins in 2 hours and that, Goring said, would be
only the beginning.
this threat of imminent and merciless attack by land and
Under
air, the aged President of Czechoslovakia at 4:30 o'clock in the
m.oming, signed the document with which the Nazi conspirators
confronted him and which they had already had prepared. This
Document is TC-49, the declaration of 15 March 1939, one of the
series of documents which will be presented by the British pros-
ecutor, and from it I quote this, on the assumption that it will
subsequently be introduced.
"The President of the Czechoslovakian State entrusts with
. . .

entireconfidence the destiny of the Czech people and the

Czech country to the hands of the Führer of the German
—
Reich" really a rendezvous with destiny.
While the Nazi officials were threatening and intimidating the
representatives of the Czech Government, the Wehrmacht had in
some areas already crossed the Czech border.
I offer in evidence Document 2860-PS, another excerpt from the
British Blue Book, of which Iask the Court to take judicial notice.
This is a speech by Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, from which I quote one passage:

164
 5 Dec. 45

"It is to
— —
be observed" and the fact is surely not without
significance "that the towns of Mährisch-Ostrau and Vitkovice
were actually occupied by German SS detachments on the
evening of the 14th March, while the President and the
Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia were still on their way
to Berlin and before any discussion had taken place."

At dawn on March 15, German troops poured into Czechoslovakia

from all sides. Hitler issued an order of the day to the Armed
Forces and a proclamation to the German people, which stated
distinctly, "Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist."
On the following day, in contravention of Article 81 of the
Treaty of Versailles, Czechoslovakia was formally incorporated into
the German Reich under the name of "The Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia." The decree is Document TC-51, another of the
documents which the British Delegation will present to the Tribunal
later in this week. It was signed in Prague on 16 March 1939, by
Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendants Frick and Von Ribbentrop.
I should like to quote the first sentence of this decree, "The
Bohemian and Moravian countries belonged for a millennium to
— —
the Lebensraum" living space "of the German people." The
remainder of the decree sets forth in bleak detail the extent to which
Czechoslovakia henceforth was subjected to Germany. A
German
Protector was to be appointed by the German Führer for the so-
—
called "Protectorate" the Defendant Von Neurath. God deliver us
from such protectors! The German Government assumed charge of
their foreign affairs and of their customs and of their excises. It
was specified that German garrisons and military establishments
would be maintained in the Protectorate. At the same time the
extremist leaders in Slovakia who, at German Nazi insistence, had
done so much to undermine the Czech State, found that the
independence of their week-old state was itself, in effect, qualified.
I offer in evidence as Exhibit USA I need
Document 1439-PS —
not offer that. I think it is a decree in the Reichsgesetzhlatt,
of which I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice, and it is
identified as our Document 1439-PS. It appears at Page 606, 1939,
Reichsgesetzhlatt, Part IL
The covering declaration is signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and then there is a heading:
"Treaty of Protection to be extended by the German Reich
to the State of Slovakia."
"The German Government and the Slovakian Government
have agreed, after the Slovakian State has placed itself under
the protection of the German Reich, to regulate by treaty the
consequences resulting from this fact. For this purpose, the

165
 —

5 Dec. 45

undersigned representatives of the two governments have

agreed ön the following provisions:
"Article 1. The German Reich undertakes to protect the
political independence of the State of Slovakia and integrity
of its territory.
"Article 2. For the purpose of making effective the protection
undertaken by the German Reich, the German Armed Forces
shall have the right, at all times, to construct military
installations and to keep them garrisoned in the strength they
deem necessary, in an area delimited on its western side by
the frontiers of the State of Slovakia, and on its eastern side
by a line formed by the eastern rims of the Lower
Carpathians, the White Carpathians, and the Javornik
—
Mountains." Then I skip
"The Government of Slovakia will organize its military
forces in close agreement with the German Armed Forces."
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn't that be a convenient time to break
off? I understand, too, that it would be for the convenience of the
Defense Counsel if the Tribunal adjourn for an hour and a quarter
rather than for an hour at midday, and accordingly, the Tribunal
will retire at 12:45 and sit again at 2:00.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, this secret

protocol between Germany and Slovakia provided for close
economic and financial collaboration between Germany and
Slovakia. Mineral resources and subsoil rights were placed at the
disposal of the German Government.
I offer in evidence Document 2793-PS, Exhibit USA-120, and
from it I read Paragraph 3:
"Investigation, development, and utilization of the Slovak
natural resources. In this respect the basic principle is that,
insofar as they are not needed to meet Slovakia's own
requirements, they should be placed in first line at Ger-
—
many's disposal. The entire soil research" "Bodenforschung"
is the German word
—"will be placed under the Reich Agency
—
for soil research." that is the Reichsstelle für Boden-
—
forschung "The Government of the Slovak State will soon
start an investigation to determine whether the present
owners of concessions and privileges have fulfilled the
industrial obligations prescribed by law and it will cancel
concessions and privileges in cases where these duties have
been neglected."

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 5 Dec. 45

In their private conversations the Nazi conspirators gave

abundant evidence that they considered Slovakia a mere puppet
state —in effect a German possession.
I offer in evidence Document R-lOO as Exhibit USA-121. This
document is a memorandum of information given by Hitler to Von
Brauchitsch on 25 March 1939. Much of it deals with problems
arising from recently occupied Bohemia and Moravia and Slovakia.
I quote, beginning at the sixth paragraph:

"Colonel General Keitel shall inform Slovak Government via

Foreign Office that it would not be allowed to keep or
garrison armed Slovak units (HUnka Guards) on this side of
the border formed by the river Waag. They shall be trans-
ferred to the new Slovak territory. Hlinka Guards should
be disarmed.
"Slovakia shall be requested via Foreign Office to deliver to
us, against payment, any arms we want and which are still
kept in Slovakia. This request is to be based upon agreement
made between Army and Czech troops. For this payment
those millions should be used which we will pour anyhow
into Slovakia.
"Czech Protectorate:
"H. Gr." —the translator's note indicates that that probably
— "shall be
means army groups, but I can't vouch for it asked
again whether the request shall be repeated again for the
delivery of all arms within^ a stated time limit and under the
threat of severe penalties.
"We take all war material of former Czechoslovakia without
paying for it. The guns bought by contract before 15 February,
though, shall be paid for .... Bohemia and Moravia have to
make annual contributions to the German Treasury. Their
amount shall be fixed on the basis of the expenses earmarked
formerly for the Czech Army."
The German conquest of Czechoslovakia, in direct contravention
of the Munich Agreement, was the occasion for the formal protest
by the British and French Governments. These documents. Numbers
TC-52 and TC-53, dated 17 March 1939, will be presented to the
Tribunal by the British prosecutor.
On the same day, 17 March 1939, the Acting Secretary of State
of the United States Government issued a statement, which I will
offer in evidence and I invite the Court to take judicial notice of
the entire volume. Document 2862-PS as Exhibit USA-122, which is
an excerpt from the official volume entitled Peace and War: United
States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 issued under the seal of 'the
Department of State of the United States of America. Incidentally,
this volume which happens to be my own copy —
and I hope I can

167
5 Dec. 45

—
get another one I am placing in evidence, because I am quite
certain that in its study of the background of this whole case, the
Court will be very much interested in this volume, which is a
detailed chronological history of all the diplomatic events leading
up to and through the second World War of 1941. But what I am
actually offering in evidence at the moment appears on Pages 454
and 455 of the volume, a statement by the Acting Secretary of State
Welles, dated 17 March 1939:
"The Government of the United States has on frequent
occasions stated its conviction that only through international
support of a program of order based upon law can world
peace be assured.
"This Government, founded upon and dedicated to the
human liberty and of democracy, cannot refrain
principles of
from making known this country's condemnation of the acts
which have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the
and independent people with whom, from
liberties of a free
the day when the Republic of Czechoslovakia attained its
independence, the people of the United States have
maintained specially close and friendly relations.
"The position of the Government of the United States has
been made consistently has emphasized the need for
clear. It
respect for the sanctity of treaties and of the pledged word,
and for non-intervention by any nation in the domestic affairs
of other nations; and it has on repeated occasions expressed
its condemnation of a policy of military aggression.
"It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of
arbitrary force are threatening the world peace and the very
structure of modern civilization. The imperative need for the
observance of the principles advocated by this Government
has been clearly demonstrated by the developments which
have taken place during the past 3 days."
With Czechoslovakia in German hands, the Nazi conspirators
had accomplished the program they had set themselves in the
meeting in Betlin on 5 November 1937. You will recall that this
program of conquest was intended to shorten their frontiers, to
increase their industrial and food reserves, and to place them in
a position, both industrially and strategically, from which they
could launch more ambitious and more devastating campaigns of
aggression. In less than a year and a half this program had been
carried through to the satisfaction of the Nazi leaders, and at that
point I would again invite the Court's attention to the large chart
on the wall. I think it is no mere figure of speech to make reference
to the wolf's head, what is known in Anglo-American law as caput
lupinum.

168
 5 Dec. 45

—
The lower jaw formed near Austria was taken the red part
on the first chart —
12 March 1938. Czechoslovakia thereby was
encircled, and the next step was the absorption of the mountainous
part, the Sudetenland, indicated on the second chart in red. On
1 October 1938 Czechoslovakia was further encircled and its
defenses weakened, and then the jaws clamped in, or the pincers,
—
as I believe General Keitel or General Jodl called them I believe
it —
was General Jodl's diary and you see what they did to
Czechoslovakia. On 15 March 1939 the borders were shortened, new
bases were acquired, and then Czechoslovakia was destroyed.
Bohemia and Moravia are in black and Slovakia in what might be
called light tan. But I have read to you the documents which
showed in what condition Slovakia was left; and with the German
military installations in Slovakia, you see how completely the
southern border of Poland was flanked, as well as the western
border, the stage being set for the next aggression, which the
British prosecutor will describe to you.
Of all was the most
the Nazi conspirators the Defendant Goring
aware of the and strategic advantages which would
economic
accrue from the possession by Germany of Czechoslovakia.
I now offer in evidence Document 1301-PS, which is a rather
large file, and we offer particularly Item 10 of the document, at
Page 25 of the EngUsh translation. I offer it as Exhibit USA-123;
Page 25 of the English translation contained the top-secret minutes
of a conference with Goring in the Luftwaffe Ministry (the Air
Ministry). The meeting which was held on 14 October 1938, just
2 weeks after the occupation of the Sudetenland, was devoted to
the discussion of economic problems. As of that date, the Defend-
ant Göring's remarks were somewhat prophetic* I quote from
the third paragraph, from the bottom of Page 26 of the English
translation:
"The Sudetenland has to be exploited by every means. Gen-
eral Field Marshal Goring counts upon a complete industrial
assimilation of Slovakia. Czech and Slovakia would become
German dominions. Everything possible must be taken out.
The Oder-Danube Canal has to be speeded up. Searches
for oil and ore have to be conducted in Slovakia, notably by
State Secretary Keppler."
In the summer of 1939, after the incorporation of Bohemia and
Moravia into the German Reich, Defendant Goring again revealed
the great interest of the Nazi leaders in the Czech economic potential.
I offer in evidenceDocument R-133 as Exhibit USA-124. This
document the minutes, dated Berlin, 27 July 1939, signed by
is
Müller, of a conference between Goring and a group of officials
from the OKWand from other agencies of the German Government

169
 —

5 Dec. 45

concerned with war production. This meeting had been held 2 days
previously, on 25 July. I read the first part of the account of this
meeting.
"In a rather long statement the Field Marshal explained
that the incorporation of Bohemia and Moravia into the
German economy had taken place, among other reasons, to
increase the German war potential, by exploitation of the
industry there. Directives, such as the decree of the Reich
Minister for Economics (S 10 402/39 of 10 July 1939) as well
as a letter with similar meaning to the Junkers firm, which
might possibly lower the kind and extent of the armament
measures in the Protectorate are contrary to this principle.
If it is necessary to issue such directives, this should be
—
done only with his consent. In any case, he insists," that
—
is Defendant Goring insists "in agreement with the directive
by Hitler, that the war potential of the Protectorate is defi-
nitely to be exploited in part or in full and is to be directed
towards mobilization as soon as possible."
In addition to strengthening the Nazi economic potential for
the following wars of aggression, the conquest of Czechoslovakia
provided the Nazis with new bases from which to wage their next
war of aggression, the attack on Poland.
You will recall the minutes of the conference between Goring
and a pro-Nazi Slovak delegation in the winter of 1938-1939. Those
minutes are Document 2801-PS, which I introduced into evidence
earlier, as Exhibit USA-109. You will recall the last sentence of
those minutes, a statement of Defendant Göring's conclusions.
I quote this sentence again, "Air bases in Slovakia are of great
importance for the German Air Force for use against the East."
I now offer in evidence Document 1874-PS, as Exhibit USA-125.
This document is the German minutes of a conference which De-
fendant Goring held with Mussolini and Ciano on 15 April 1939,
one month after the conquest of Czechoslovakia.
In this conference. Goring told his junior partners in the Axis
of the progress of German preparations for war. He compared the
strength of Germany with the strength of England and France.
Not unnaturally, he mentioned the German occupation of Czecho-
slovakia in this connection. I read two paragraphs of these thoughts,
on Page 4, Paragraph 2, of the German minutes.
"However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in
any case, how dangerous this could have been, even after
Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of German
action, the situation of both Axis countries was ameliorated
—
among other reasons because of the economic possibilities
which resulted from the transfer to Germany of the great

170
 5 Dec. 45

production capacity of Czechoslovakia. That contributes

toward a considerable strengthening of the Axis against the
Western Powers.
"Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single
division for protection against that country in case of bigger
conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both Axis
countries will, in the last analysis, benefit."
Then on Page 5, Paragraph 2, of the German version:
"The action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be
viewed as an advantage for the Axis in case Poland should
finally join the enemies of the Axis powers. Germany could
then attack this country from two flanks and would be within
only 25 minutes flying distance from the new Polish industrial
center, which had been moved further into the interior of
the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial districts
because of its proximity to the border. Now, by the turn of
events, it is located again in the proximity of the border."
And that flanking on two fronts is illustrated on the four-segment
chart.
I think the chart itself demonstrates, better than any oral argu-
ment, the logic and cold calculation, the deliberation of each step
to this point of the German aggression. More than that, it demon-
strates what I might call the master fight of the aggressive war
case, that is, that each conquest of the Nazi conspirators was
deliberately planned, as a stepping stone to new and more ambitious
aggression.
You will recall the words of Hitler, at the conference in the
Reich Chancellery on 23 May 1939, when he was planning the
Polish campaign. Document L-79, Exhibit Number USA-27. I quote
from it:
"The period which lies behind us has, indeed, been put to
good use. All measures have been taken in the correct
sequence and in harmony with our aims."
It appropriate to refer to two other speeches of the Nazi
is
Munich on 7 November 1943, the Defend-
leaders. In his lecture in
ant Jodl spoke as follows, and I quote from Page 5 of Document
L-172, already received in evidence as Exhibit USA-34 on Page 8 —
of the German text:
"The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn
of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia
rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way
that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem
on the basis of more or less favorable strategic premises."

171
5 Dec. 45

In the speech to his miUtary commanders on 23 November 1939,

Hitler described the process by which he had rebuilt the military
power of the Reich. This is our Document 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23.
I quote one passage from the second paragraph:

"The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step
also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First
of the Western fortifications had to be finished. It was
all,

not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to

me from the first moment, that I could not be satisfied with
the Sudeten Germxan territory. That was only a partial solu-
tion. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then
followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the
"
basis for the action against Poland was laid
Before leave the subject of the aggression against Czecho-
I
slovakia, should like to submit to the Court a document which
I
became available to us too late to be included in our document
book. It reached me Saturday, late in the afternoon or late at night.
This is an official document, again from the Czechoslovakian
Government, a supplement to the Czechoslovakian report, which
I had previously offered in evidence. I now offer it, identified as
Document 3061-PS, as Exhibit USA-126.
The document was furnished us, if the Court please, in the
German text with an English translation, which didn't seem to us
quite adequate and we have had it re-translated into English and
the translation has just been passed up, I believe, to the Tribunal.
That mimeographed translation should be appended to our Docu-
ment Book O.
I it is about 12 pages long. The Court
shall not read the report;
will take judicial notice ofunder the provisions of the Charter.
it,

I merely summarize. This document gives confirmation and

corroboration to the other evidence which I presented to the
Tribunal. In particular, it offers support to the following allegations:
First, the close working relationship between Henlein and the
SDP, on the one hand, and Hitler and Defendants Hess and
Ribbentrop, on the other;
Second, the use of the German Legation in Prague to direct
the German Fifth Column activities;

Third, the financing of the Henlein movement by agencies of

the German Government, including the German diplomatic
representatives at Prague;
Fourth, the use of the Henlein movement to conduct espionage
on direct orders from the Reich.
In addition, this document gives further details of the
circumstances of the visit of President Hacha to Berlin on the

172
 5 Dec. 45

night of 14 March. It substantiates the fact that President Hacha

required the medical attention of Hitler's physician and it supports
the threat which the Defendant Goring made to the Czech
Delegation.
Now, if it please the Tribunal, that concludes my presentation
of what, to me, has always seemed one of the saddest chapters
in human history, the rape and destruction of the frail little
nation of Czechoslovakia.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for
the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, before I tender
the evidence which I desire to place before the Tribunal, it might
be convenient if I explained how the British case is to be divided
up and who will present the different parts.
I After that, my learned
shall deal with the general treaties.
friend. Colonel Griffith-Jones, will deal with Poland. Thirdly,
Major Elwyn Jones will deal with Norway and Denmark. Fourthly,
Mr. Roberts will deal with Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg.
Fifthly, Colonel Phillimore will deal with Greece and Yugoslavia.
After that, my friend, Mr. Alderman, of the American Delegation,
will deal on behalf of both delegations with the aggression against
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.
May I also, with the Tribunal's permission, say one word about
the arrangements that we have made as to documents. Each of
the defendants' counsel will have a copy of the document book of —
—
the different document books in English. In fact, 30 copies of the
first four of our document books have already been placed in the
defendants' Information Center. We hope that the last document
book, dealing with Greece and Yugoslavia, will have the 30 copies
placed there today.
In addition, the defendants' counsel have at least six copies in
German of every document.
With regard to my own part of the case, the first section on
general treaties, all the documents on this phase are in the Reichs-
gesetzhlatt or Die Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, of which
10 copies have been made available to the defendants' counsel, so
that with regard to the portion with which the Tribunal is
immediately concerned, the defendants' counsel will have at least
16 copies in German of every document referred to.
Finally, there is a the Reichsgesetzhlatt and Die
copy of
Dokumente available Tribunal, other copies if they so
for the
desire, but one is placed ready for the Tribunal if any member
wishes to refer to a German text.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you propose to call any oral witnesses?

173
5 Dec. 45

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, My Lord, no oral witnesses.

If the Tribunal please, before I come to the first treaty I want
to make three quotations to deal with a point which was mentioned
in the speech of my learned friend, the Attorney General, yesterday.
Itmight be thought from the melancholy story of broken treaties
and violated assurances, which the Tribunal has already heard,
that Hitler and the Nazi Government did not even profess it
necessary or desirable to keep the pledged word. Outwardly,
however, the professions were very different. With regard to
treaties, on the 18th of October 1933, Hitler said, "Whatever we
have signed we will fulfill to the best of our ability."
The Tribunal will note the reservation, "Whatever we have
signed."
But on the 21st of May 1935 Hitler said, "The German Govern-
ment will scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily signed,
even though it was concluded before their accession to power and
office."
Onassurances Hitler was even more emphatic. In the same
speech, the Reichstag Speech on May 21, 1935, Hitler accepted
assurances as being of equal obligation, and the world at that time
could not know that that meant of no obligation at all. What
he actually said was:
"And when I now hear from the lips of a British statesman
that such assurances are nothing and that the only proof of
sincerity is the signature appended to collective pacts, I must
ask Mr. Eden to be good enough to remember that it is a
question of an assurance in any case. It is sometimes much
easier to sign treaties with the mental reservations that one
will reconsider one's attitude at the decisive hour than to
declare before an entire nation and with full opportunity
one's adherence to a policy which serves the course of peace
because it rejects anything which leads to war."
And then he proceeds with the illustration of his assurance to
France.
Never having seen the importance which Hitler wished the
world to believe he attached to treaties, I shall ask the Tribunal
in my part of the case to look at 15 only of the treaties which
he and the Nazis broke. The remainder of the 69 broken treaties
shown on the chart and occurring between 1933 and 1941 will be
dealt with by my learned friends.
There is one final point as to the position of a treaty in German
law, as I understand it. The appearance of a treaty in the Reichs-
gesetzhlatt makes it part of the statute law of Germany, and that

174
 5 Dec. 45

is by no means an uninteresting aspect of the breaches which I

shall put before the Tribunal.

The first treaty to be dealt with is the Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at The Hague
on the 29th ask that the Tribunal take judicial
of July 1899. I

notice of the Convention, and for convenience I hand in as Exhibit

GB-1 the British Document TC-1. The German reference is to the
Reichsgesetzhlatt for 1901, Number 44, Sections 401 to 404, and
482 and 483. The Tribunal will find the relevant charge in
Appendix C as Charge 1.

As the Attorney General said yesterday, these Hague Con-

ventions are only the first gropings towards the rejection of the
inevitability of war. They do not render the making of aggressive
war a crime, but their milder terms were as readily broken as
the more severe agreements.
On 19 July 1899, Germany, Greece, Serbia, and 25 other nations
signed a convention. Germany ratified the convention on 4 Sep-
tember 1900, Serbia on 11 May 1901, and Greece on 4 April 1901.
By Article 12 of the treaty between the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, signed at the
St. Germaine-en-Laye on 10 September 1919, the new Kingdom
succeeded to all the old Serbian treaties, and later, as the Tribunal
knows, changed its name to Yugoslavia.
I think it is sufficient, unless the Tribunal wish otherwise, for
me to read the first two articles only:

"Article 1 : With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse

to force in the relationsbetween states, the signatory powers
agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement
of international differences.
"Article 2: In case of serious disagreement or conflict, before
an appeal to arms the signatory powers agree to have recourse,
as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation
of one or more friendly powers."
After that the Convention deals with machinery, and I don't
think, subject to any wish of the Tribunal, that it is necessary
for me to deal with it in detail.
The second treaty is the Convention for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes, signed at The Hague on the 18th of
October 1907. Again I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
this, and for convenience I hand in as Exhibit GB-2 the Final Act
of the Conference at The Hague, which contains British Documents
TC-2, 3, and 4. The reference to this Convention in German is to
the Reichsgesetzhlatt for 1910, Number 52, Sections 22 to 25; and
the relevant charge is Charge 2.

175
5 Dec. 45

This Convention was signed at The Hague by 44 nations, and

it isin effect as to 31 nations, 28 signatories, and 3 adherents. For
our purposes it is in force as to the United States, Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Russia.
By the provisions of Article 91 it replaces the 1899 Convention
as between the contracting powers. As Greece and Yugoslavia are
parties to the 1899 Convention and not to the 1907, the 1899 Con-
vention is in effect with regard to them, and that explains the
division of countries in Appendix C.
Again I only desire that the Tribunal should look at the first two
articles:
"1. With a view to obviating as far as possible recourse to
force in the relations between states, the contracting powers
agree to use their best efforts to insure the pacific settlement
of international differences."
Then I don't think I need trouble to read 2. It is the same article
as to mediation, and again, there are a number of machinery pro-
visions.
The Hague Convention relative to the opening
third treaty is the
of hostilities, signed at the same time. It is contained in the exhibit
which I put in. Again I ask that judicial notice be taken of it. The
British Document is TC-3. The German reference is the Reichs-
gesetzhlatt for 1910, Number 2, Sections 82 to 102, and the reference
in Appendix C to Charge 3.
This Convention applies to Germany, Poland, Norway, Denmark,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Russia. It relates to
a procedural step in notifying one's protective opponent before
opening hostilities against him. It appears to have had its immediate
origin in the Russo-Japanese war, 1904, when Japan attacked Russia
without any previous warning. It will be noted that it does not fix
any particular lapse of time between the giving of notice and the
commencement of hostilities, but it does seek to maintain an abso-
lutely minimum standard of international decency before the out-
break of war.
Again, if I might refer the Tribunal to the first article:
"The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between
them must not commence without a previous and expHcit
warning in the form of either a declaration of war, giving
reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of
war."
Then there are a number again of machinery provisions, with
which I shall not trouble the Tribunal.

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 5 Dec. 45

The fourth treaty is the Hague Convention 5, respecting the

rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on
land, signed at the same time. That is British Document TC-4, and
the German reference is Reichsgesetzblatt 1910, Number 2, Sections
168 and 176. Reference in Appendix C is to Charge 4.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to give the German reference?
If it is necessary for defendants' counsel, all right, but if not it need
not be done.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If I may omit them it will save
some time.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If any of the defendants' counsel
want any specific reference perhaps they will be good enough to
ask me.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was an original signa-
tory to the Convention, and the Treaty is in force as a result of
ratification or adherence between Germany and Norway, Denmark,
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the U.S.S.R., and the United
States.
I call the attention of the Tribunal to the short contents of
Article 1, "The territory of neutral powers is inviolable."
A point does arise, however, on this Convention. I want to make
this clear at once. Under Article 20, the provisions of the present
Convention do not apply except between the contracting powers,
and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.
As Great Britain and France entered the war within 2 days of
the outbreak of the war between Germany and Poland, and one of
these powers had not ratified the Convention, it is arguable that its
provisions did not apply to the second World War.
I do not want the time of the Tribunal to be occupied by an
argument on that point when there are so many more important
treaties to be considered. Therefore, I do not press that as a charge
of a breach of treaty. I merely call the attention of the Tribunal
to the terms of Article 1 as showing the state of international
opinion at that time and as an element in the aggressive character
of the war which we are considering.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this would be a good time to

break off.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

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5 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As the Tribunal adjourned I had

come to the fifth treaty, the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Germany, signed at Versailles the 28th of
June 1919.again ask the Tribunal to take judicial cognizance of
I
this treaty, and
I again hand in for convenience Exhibit GB-3, which
is a copy of the treaty, including the British documents TC-5 to TC-10
inclusive. The reference in Appendix C is to Charge 5.
Before I deal with the relevant portions, may I explain very
briefly the layout of the treaty.
Part I contains the Covenant of the League of Nations, and
Part II sets the boundaries of Germany in Europe. These bound-
aries are described in detail but Part II makes no provision for
guaranteeing these boundaries.
Part III, Articles 31 to 117, with which the Tribunal is concerned,
contains the political clauses for Europe. In it, Germany guarantees
certain territorial boundaries in Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria,
Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, Memel, Danzig, and so forth.
It might be convenient for the Tribunal to note, at the moment,
the interweaving of this treaty with the next, which is the Treaty
for the Restoration of Friendly Relations between the United States
and Germany.
Parts I, II, and III of the Versailles Treaty are not included in
the United States treaty. Parts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII,
XIV, and XV are all repeated verbatim in the United States treaty
from the Treaty of Versailles.
—
The Tribunal is concerned with Part V the military, naval, and
air clauses. Parts VII and XIII are not included in the United
States treaty.
I don't think there is any reason to explain what the parts are,
but if the Tribunal wishes to know about any specific part, I shall
be very happy to explain it.
The first part that the Tribunal is concerned with is that con-
tained in the British Document TC-5, and consists of Articles 42
to 44 dealing with the Rhineland. These are very short, and as they
are repeated in the Locarno Treaty, perhaps I had better read them
once, just so that the Tribunal will have them in mind.
"Article 42: Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct
any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on
the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to
the east of the Rhine.
"Article 43: In the area defined above, the maintenance and
the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or tempo-
rarily, and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the

178
 5 Dec. 45

upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the

same way forbidden.
"Article 44: In case Germany violates in any manner what-
ever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded
as committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of
the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of
the world."
I am not going to put in evidence, but I simply draw the Tri-
bunal's attention to a document of which they can take judicial
notice, as it has been published by the German State, the memoran-
dum of March 7, 1936, giving their account of the breach. The
matters regarding the breach have been dealt with by my friend,
Mr. Alderman, and I don't propose to go over the ground again.
The next part of the treaty is in the British Document TC-6,
dealing with Austria:
"Article 80: Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly
the independence of Austria within the frontiers which may
be fixed in a treaty between that state and the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this indepen-
dence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the
Council of the League of Nations."
Again in the same way, the proclamation of Hitler dealing with
Austria, the background of which has been dealt with by my friend,
Mr. Alderman, is attached as TC-47. I do not intend to read it
because the Tribunal can again take judicial notice of the public
proclamation.
Next Document TC-8, dealing with Memel:
is

"Germany renounces, in favor of the Principal Allied and

Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territories
included between the Baltic, the northeastern frontier of East
Prussia as defined in Article 28 of Part II, (Boundaries of Ger-
many) of the present treaty, and the former frontier between
Germany and Russia.
"Germany undertakes to accept the settlement made by the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to these
territories, particularly insofar as concerns the nationality of
inhabitants."
I don't think that the Tribunal has had any reference to the
formal document of incorporation of Memel, of which again the
Tribunal can take judicial notice; and I put in, for convenience,
a copy as GB-4. It is British Document TC-53A, and it appears in
our book. It is very short, so perhaps the Tribunal will bear with
me while I read it:

179
5 Dec. 45

"The Transfer Commissioner for the Memel territory, Gau-

leiterund Oberpräsident Erich Koch, effected on 3 April
during a conference at Memel, the final incorporation of the
Memel territory into the National Socialist Party Gau of East
Prussia and into the state administration of the East Prussian
Regierungsbezirk of Gumbinnen . . .
."

Then, next we come to TC-9, which is the article relating to

Danzig, Article 100, and I shall read only the first sentence, because
the remainder consists of geographical boundaries:
"Germany renounces, in favor of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, all rights and title over the territory com-
."
prised within the following limits . . .

—And then the limits are set out and are described in a German
map attached to the treaty.
Lieutenant Colonel Griffith-Jones, who will deal with this part
of the case, will formally prove the documents relating to the
occupation of Danzig, and I shall not trouble the Tribunal with
them now.
So if the Tribunal would go on to British Document TC-7 —that
is Article 81, dealing with the Czechoslovak State:
"Germany, in conformity with the action already taken by
the Allied and Associated Powers, recognizes the complete
independence of the Czechoslovak State, which will include
the autonomous territory of the Ruthenians to the south of
the Carpathians. Germany hereby recognizes the frontiers of
this state as determined by the Principal Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers and other interested states."
Mr. Alderman has dealt with this matter only this morning, and
he has already put in an exhibit giving in detail the conference
between Hitler and President Hacha, and the Foreign Minister
Chvalkowsky, at which the Defendants Goring and Keitel were
present. Therefore, I am not going to put in to the Tribunal the
British translation of the captured Foreign Office minutes, which
occurs in TC-48; but I put in formally, as Mr. Alderman asked me
to this morning, as GB-6, the Document TC-49, which is the agree-
ment signed by Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop for Germany
and Dr. Hacha and Dr. Chvalkowsky for Czechoslovakia. It is an
agreement of which the Tribunal will take judicial notice. I am
afraid I can't quite remember whether Mr. Alderman read it this
morning; it is Document TC-49. He certainly referred to it.
THE PRESIDENT: No, he did not read it.
SIRDAVIDMAXWELL-FYFE: Then perhaps I might read it.

Text of the:

180
 5 Dec. 45

"Agreement between the Führer and Reich Chancellor Adolf

Hitler and the President of the Czechoslovak State Dr.
Hacha ....
"The Führer and Reich Chancellor today received in Berlin,
at their own request, the President of the Czechoslovak State,
Dr. Hacha, and the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Dr. Chval-
kowsky, in the presence of Herr von Ribbentrop, the Foreign
Minister of the Reich. At this meeting the serious situation
which had arisen within the previous territory of Czecho-
slovakia, owing to the events of recent weeks, was subjected
to a completely open examination. The conviction was unani-
mously expressed on both sides that the object of all their
efforts must be to assure quiet, order, and peace in this part
of Central Europe. The President of the Czechoslovak State
declared that, in order to serve this end and to reach a final
pacification, he confidently placed the fate of the Czech people
and of their country in the hands of the Führer of the
German Reich. The Führer accepted this declaration and
expressed his decision to assure to the Czech people, under
the protection of the German Reich, the autonomous develop-
ment of their national life, in accordance with their special
characteristics. In witness whereof this document is signed
in duplicate."
The signatures I mentioned appear.
The Tribunal will understand that it is not my province to make
any comment; that has been done by Mr. Alderman. And I am
not putting forward any of the documents I read as having my
support; they are merely put forward factually as part of the case.
The next document, which I put in as GB-7, is the British
Document TC-50. That is Hitler's proclamation to the German
people, dated the 15th of March 1939. Again, I don't think that Mr.
Alderman read that document.
THE PRESIDENT: No, he did not read it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I shall read it:

"Proclamation of the Führer to the German people, 15 March

1939.
"To the German People:
"Only a few months ago Germany was compelled to protect
her fellow countrymen, living in well-defined settlements,
against the unbearable Czechoslovakian terror regime; and
during the last weeks the same thing has happened on an
ever-increasing scale. This is bound to create an intolerable
state of affairs within an area inhabited by citizens of so
many nationalities.

181
 5 Dec. 45

"These national groups, to counteract the renewed attacks

against their freedom and life, have now broken away from
the Prague Government. Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist.
"Since Sunday at many places wild excesses have broken
out, amongst the victims of which are again many Germans.
Hourly the number of oppressed and persecuted people crying
for help is increasing. From areas thickly populated by Ger-
man-speaking inhabitants, which last autumn Czechoslovakia
was allowed by German generosity to retain, refugees robbed
of their personal belongings are streaming into the Reich.
"Continuation of such a state of affairs would lead to the
destruction of every vestige of order in an area in which Ger-
many is vitally interested particularly as for over 1,000 years
it formed a part of the German Reich.

"In order definitely to remove this menace to peace and to

create the conditions for a necessary new order in this living
space, I have today resolved to allow German troops to march
into Bohemia and Moravia. They will disarm the terror gangs
and the Czechoslovakian forces supporting them, and protect
the lives of all who are menaced. Thus they will lay the
foundations for introducing a fundamental re-ordering of
affairs which will be in accordance with the 1,000-year-old
history and will satisfy the practical needs of the German and
Czech peoples."— Signed— "Adolf Hitler, Berlin, 15 March 1939."
is a footnote, an order of the Führer to the German
Then there
Armed Forces of the same date, in which the substance is that they
are told to march in, to safeguard lives and property of all
inhabitants, and not to conduct themselves as enemies, but as an
instrument for carrying out the German Reich Government's
decision.
I put in, as GB-8, the decrees establishing the Protectorate, which
is TC-51.
think again, as these are public decrees, the Tribunal can take
I

judicial knowledge of them. Their substance has been fully

explained by Mr. Alderman. With the permission of the Tribunal,
I won't read them in full now.

Then again, as Mr. Alderman requested, I put in, as GB-9, British

Document TC-52, the British protest. If I might just read that to
the Tribunal — it is from Lord Halifax to Sir Nevile Henderson, our
Ambassador in Berlin:
"Foreign Office, March 17, 1939.

"Please inform the German Government that His Majesty's

Government desire to make it plain to them that they cannot
but regard the events of the past few days as a complete

182
]
 5 Dec. 45

repudiation of the Munich Agreement and a denial of the

spirit in which the negotiators of that Agreement bound
themselves to co-operate for a peaceful settlement.
*'His Majesty's Government must also take this occasion to
protest against the changes effected in Czechoslovakia by Ger-
man military action, which are in their view, devoid of any
basis of legality."
And again at Mr. Alderman's request, I put in as GB-10 the
Document TC-53, which is the French protest of the same date, and
if I might read the third paragraph:
"The French Ambassador has the honor to inform the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, of the formal protest made
by the Government of the French Republic against the
measures which the communication of Count de Welczeck
records.
"The Government of the Republic consider, in fact, that in
face of the action directed by the German Government against
Czechoslovakia, they are confronted with a flagrant violation
of the letter and the spirit of the agreement signed at Munich
on September 29, 1938.
"The circumstances in which the agreement of March 15 has
been imposed on the leaders of the Czechoslovak Republic
do not, in the eyes of the Government of the Republic, legalize
the situation registered in that agreement.
"The French Ambassador has the honor to inform His Excel-
lency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich, that the
Government of the Republic cannot recognize under these
conditions the legality of the new situation created in Czecho-
slovakia by the action of the German Reich."
I now come to Part 5 of the Versailles Treaty, and the relevant
matters are contained in the British Document TC-10. As con-
siderable discussion is centered around them, I read the introductory
words:
"Part V, Military, Naval, and Air Clauses: In order to render
possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments
of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the
military, naval, and air clauses which follow.
"Section 1. Military Clauses. Chapter I. Effectives and Cadres
of the German Army.
"Article 159, The German military forces shall be demobilized
and reduced as prescribed hereinafter.
"Article 160. (1) By a date which must not be later than
March 31, 1920, the German Army must not comprise more
than seven divisions of infantry and three divisions of cavalry.

183
 d

5 Dec. 45

"After that date, the total number of effectives in the Army

of the states constituting Germany must not exceed 100,000
men, including officers and establishments of depots. The
Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order
within the territory and to the control of the frontiers.
"The total effective strength of officers, including the per-
sonnel of staffs, whatever their composition, must not exceed
4,000.
"(2) Divisions and Army Corps headquarters staffs, shall be
organized in accordance with Table Number 1 annexed to
this Section. The number and strength of the units of infantry,
artillery, engineers, technical services and troops laid down
in the aforesaid table constitute maxima which must not be
exceeded."
Then there is a description of units that can have their own
depots and the grouping of divisions under corps headquarters, and
then the next two provisions are of some importance:
"The maintenance or formation of forces differently grouped
or of other organizations for the command of troops or for
preparation for war is forbidden.
"The great German General Staff and all similar organizations
shallbe dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form."
I don't think I need trouble the Tribunal with Article 161, which
deals with administrative services.
Article 163 provides the stepsby which the reduction will take
place, and then we come to Chapter 2, dealing with armament, and
that provides that up till the time at which Germany is admitted as
a member of the League of Nations, armaments shall not be greater
than the amounts fixed in Table Number 11.
the Tribunal will note the second part, Germany agrees that
If
after she has become a member of the League of Nations, the arma-
ments fixed in the said table shall remain in force until they are
modified by the Council of the League. Furthermore, she hereby
agrees strictly to observe the decisions of the Council of the League
on this subject.
Then, 165 deals with guns and machine guns, and so forth, and
167 deals with notification of guns, and 168, the first part, says:
"The manufacture of arms, munitions, or any war material
shall only be carried out in factories or works, the location
of which shall be communicated to and approved by the gov-
ernments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and
the number of which they retain the right to restrict."
Article 169 deals with the surrender of material. Number 170
prohibits importation; 171 prohibits gas, and 172 provides for

184
 5 Dec. 45

disclosure. Then 173, under the heading, "Recruiting and Military

Training" deals with one matter, the breach of which is of great
importance:
"Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in
Germany. The German Army may only be constituted and
recruited by means of voluntary enlistment."
Then the succeeding articles deal with the method of enlistment
in order to prevent a quick rush through the army of men enlisted
for a short time.
think that all I need do is to draw the attention of the Tribunal
I
to the completeness and detail with which all these points are
covered in Articles 174 to 179.
Then, passing to TC-10, Article 180. That contains the prohibi-
tion of fortressworks beyond a certain limit and in the Rhineland.
The first sentence is:
''All works, fortresses, and field works situated in
fortified
German territory to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers
to the east of the Rhine shall be disarmed and dismantled."
I shall not trouble the Tribunal with the tables which show the
amounts.
Then we come to the naval clauses. If the Tribunal will be good
enough on four pages, they will come to Article 181, and I will
to go
just read that to show the way in which the naval limitations are
imposed and refer briefly to the others.
Article 181 says:
"After the expiration of a period of 2 months from the coming
into force of the present treaty the German naval forces in
commission must not exceed:
"Six battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen type, six
light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, or an equal
number of ships constructed to replace them as provided in
Article 190.
"No submarines are to be included.
"All other warships, except where there is provision to the
contrary in the present treaty, must be placed in reserve or
devoted to commercial purposes."
Then 182 simply deals with the mine sweeping necessary to clear
up the mines, and 183 limits the personnel to 15,000, including
officers and men of all grades and corps, and 184 deals with surface
ships not in German ports, and the succeeding clauses deal with
various details, and I pass at once to Article 191, which says:
"The construction or acquisition of any submarines, even for
commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Germany."

185
5 Dec. 45

Article 194 makes corresponding obligations of voluntary engage-

ments for longer service, and 196 and 197 deal with naval fortifica-
tions and wireless stations.
Then, if the Tribunal please, would they pass to Article 198, the

first of the air clauses. The essential and important sentence is the
first:

"The Armed Forces of Germany must not include any military

or naval air forces."
I don't think that I need trouble the Tribunal with the detailed
provisions which occur in the next four clauses, which are all con-
sequential.
Then, the next document, which for convenience is put next to
that, is the British Document TC-44. For convenience I put in a
copy as GB-11, but this again is merely ancillary to Mr. Alderman's
argument. It is the report of the formal statement made at the
German Air Ministry about the restarting of the Air Corps, and I
respectfully submit that the Tribunal can take judicial notice of that.
Similarly, without proving formally the long Document, TC-45,
the Tribunal can again take judicial notice of the public proclama-
tion, which is a well-known public document in Germany, the
proclamation of compulsory military service. Mr. Alderman has
again dealt with this fully in his address.
I now come to the sixth treaty, which is the treaty between the
United States and Germany restoring friendly relations, and I put
in a copy as Exhibit GB-12. It is Document TC-11, and the Tribunal
will find it as the second last document in the document book. The
purpose of this treaty was to complete official cessation of hostilities
between the United States of America and Germany, and I have
already explained to the Tribunal that it incorporated certain parts
of the Treaty of Versailles. The relevant portion for the con-
sideration of the Tribunal is Part V, and I have just concluded going*
through the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which are repeated
verbatim in this treaty. I therefore, with the approval of the
Tribunal, will not read them again, but at Page 11 of my copy, they
will see the clauses are repeated in exactly the same way.
Then I pass to the seventh treaty, v/hich is the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and
Italy, negotiated at Locarno, October 16, 1925. I ask the Tribunal to
take judicial notice of that, and I put in as Exhibit GB-13, the
British Document TC-12.
I was dealing with the Treaty of Locarno, and might be con-
it

venient if I just reminded the Tribunal of the treaties that were

negotiated at Locarno, because they do all go together and are to a
certain extent mutually dependent.

186
 5 Dec. 45

At Locarno, Germany negotiated five treaties:

(A) The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium,
France, Great Britain, and Italy; (B) the Arbitration Convention
between Germany and France; (C) the Arbitration Convention
between Germany and Belgium; (D) the Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Poland; and (E) an Arbitration Treaty between Ger-
many and Czechoslovakia.
Article 10 of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee provided that it
should come into force as soon as ratifications were deposited at
Geneva, in the archives of the League of Nations, and as soon as
Germany became a member of the League of Nations. The ratifi-
cations were deposited on the 14th September 1926 and Germany
became a member of the League of Nations on the 10th of Sep-
tember 1926.
The two arbitration conventions and the two arbitration treaties
which I mentioned provide that they shall enter into force under the
same conditions as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. That is Article 21
of the Arbitration Conventions and Article 22 of the Arbitration
Treaties.
The most important of the five agreements is the Treaty of
Mutual Guarantee. One of its purposes was to establish in perpetuity
the borders between Germany and Belgium, and Germany and
France. It contains no provision for denunciation or withdrawal
therefrom and provides that it shall remain in force until the
Council of the League of Nations decides that the League of Nations
—
ensures sufficient protection to the parties to the treaty an event
—
which never happened in which case the Treaty of Mutual
Guarantee shall expire 1 year later.
The general scheme of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee is that
Article 1 provides that the parties guarantee three things:
The border between Germany and France, the border between
Germany and Belgium, and the demilitarization of the Rhineland.
Article 2 provides that Germany and France, and Germany and
Belgium, agree that they will not attack or invade each other with
certain inapplicable exceptions, and Article 3 provides that Ger-
many and France, and Germany and Belgium, agree to settle all
disputes between them by peaceful means.
The Tribunal will remember, because this point was made by
my friend,Mr. Alderman, that the first important violation of the
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee appears to have been the entry of
German troops into the Rhineland on 7 March 1936. The day after,
France and Belgium asked the League of Nations Council to consider
the question of the German re-occupation of the Rhineland and the
purported repudiation of the treaty, and on the 12th of March, after
a protest from the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Belgium,

187
 5 Dec. 45

France, Great Britain, and Italy recognized unanimously that the

re-occupation was a violation of this treaty, and on the 14th of
March, the League Council duly and properly decided that it was
not permissible and that the Rhineland clauses of the pact were not
voidable by Germany because of the alleged violation by France
in the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact.
That is the background to the treaty with the international
organizations that were then in force, and if I might suggest them
to the Tribunal without adding to the summary which I have given,
the relevant articles are 1, 2, and 3, which I have mentioned, and 4,
which provides for the bringing of violations before the Council of
the League, as was done, and 5 I ask the Tribunal to note, because
it deals with the clauses of the Versailles Treaty which I have

already mentioned. It says:

"The provisions of Article 3 of the present treaty are placed
under the guarantee of the High Contracting Parties as
provided by the following stipulations:
"If one of the powers referred to in Article 3 refuses to submit
a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral
or judicial decision and commits a violation of Article 2 of
the present treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the
Treaty of Versailles, the provisions of Article 4 of the present
treaty shall apply."
That is the procedure of going to the League or in the case of a
flagrant breach, of taking more stringent action.
I remind the Tribunal of this provision because of the quotations
from Hitler which I mentioned earlier, when he said that the Ger-
man Government will scrupulously maintain every treaty voluntarily
signed, even though they were concluded before their accession to
power and office. Whatever may be said of the Treaty of Versailles,
whatever may be argued and has been argued, no one has ever
argued for a moment, to the best of my knowledge, that Herr
Stresemann was in any way acting involuntarily when he signed,
along with the other representatives, the Locarno pact on behalf of
Germany. It was signed not only by Herr Stresemann, but by Herr
Hans Luther, so that there you have a treaty freely entered into,
which repeats the Rhineland provisions of Versailles and binds
Germany I simply call the attention of the Tribunal
in that regard.
to Article which deals with the remaining in force of the treaty.
8,
I might perhaps read it because as I told the Tribunal all the other

treaties have the same lasting qualities, the same provisions as to

the time they will last, as the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. It says:
"Article 8. The present treaty shall be registered at the
League of Nations in accordance with the Covenant of the
League. It shall remain in force until the Council, acting on

188
 5 Dec. 45

a request by one or other of the High Contracting Parties

notified to the other signatory powers 3 months in advance,
and voting at least by a two-thirds majority, decides that the
League of Nations ensures sufficient protection to the High
Contracting Parties; the treaty shall cease to have effect on
the expiration of a period of 1 year from such decision."
That is, that in signing this treaty, the German representatives
clearly placed the question of repudiation or avoidance of the treaty
in hands other than their own. They were at the time, of course,
a member of the League, and a member of the Council of the
League, but they left the repudiation and avoidance to the decision
of the League.
Then the next treaty on my list is the Arbitration Treaty between
Germany and Czechoslovakia, which was one of the Locarno group
^nd to which I have already referred, but for convenience I have
put in Exhibit GB-14, which is British Document TC-14. As a breach
of this treaty, as charged in Charge 8, of Appendix C, I mentioned
the background of the treaty, and I shall not go into it again but I
think the only clauses that the Tribunal need look at, are Article 1,
which is the governing clause, and says as follows (Document TC-14):
"All disputes of every kind between Germany and Czecho-
slovakia with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to
their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to
settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be
submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal, or to the
Permanent Court of International Justice as laid down here-
after. It is agreed that the disputes referred to above include,
in particular, those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations.
"This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events
prior to the present treaty and belonging to the past.
"Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is
laid down in other conventions in force between the High
Contracting Parties, shall be settled in conformity with the
provisions of these conventions."
Articles 2 to 21 of the machinery. In Article 22 the second
— —
sentence says it that's the present treaty shall enter into and
remain in force under the same conditions as the said treaty, which
is the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee.

Now that, I think, need mention about that treaty. I think

is all I
I am right that my Mr. Alderman, referred to it. It is
friend,
certainly the treaty to which President Benes unsuccessfully appealed
during the crisis in the autumn of 1938. Now the ninth treaty which
I should deal with is not in this document book, and I merely am

putting it in formally, because my friend, Mr. Roberts, will deal

189
5 Dec. 45

with —
and read the appropriate parts if the Tribunal will be good
it
enough to note it because it is mentioned in Charge 9 of Appendix C.
It is the Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium
also done at Locarno, of which I hand in a copy for convenience as
GB-15. In fact, I can
the Tribunal all these arbitration conven-
tell
tions are in the I am not going to deal with it
same form, and
because it is essentially part of the case concerned with Belgium,
the Low Countries, and Luxembourg, which my friend, Mr. Roberts,
will present. Therefore, I only ask the Tribunal to accept the formal
document for the moment. And the same applies to the tenth treaty,
which is mentioned in Charge 10 of Appendix C. That is the Arbi-
tration Treaty between Germany and Poland, of which I ask the
Tribunal to take notice, and I hand in as GB-16. That again will be
dealt with by my friend, Colonel Griffith-Jones, when he is dealing
with the Polish case.
I therefore can take the Tribunal straight to a matter which is
not a treaty, but is a solemn declaration, and that is TC-18, which
I now put in as Exhibit GB-17, and ask the Tribunal to take judicial
notice of, as a Declaration of the Assembly of the League of Nations.
The importance is the date which was the 24th of September 1927.
The Tribunal may remember that I asked them to take judicial
notice of the fact that Germany had become a member of the
League of Nations on 10 September 1926, a year before.
The importance of this Declaration is not only its effect in inter-
national law, to which my learned friend, the Attorney General,
referred, but the fact that it was unanimously adopted by the Assembly
of the League, of which Germany was a free, and let me say at once,
an active member at the time. I think that all I need read of TC-18
is, if the Tribunal would be good enough to look at it, the speech

which begins *'M. Sokal of Poland (Rapporteur)," and then the trans-
lation after the Rapporteur had dealt with the formalities, that this
had gone to the third committee and been unanimously adopted, and
he had been asked to act as Rapporteur, he says the second —
paragraph:
"The committee was of opinion that, at the present juncture,
a solemn resolution passed by the Assembly, declaring that
wars of aggressionmust never be employed as a means of
settling disputes between states, and that such wars constitute
an international crime, would have a salutary effect on public
opinion, and would help to create an atmosphere favorable to
the League's future work in the matter of security and dis-
armament.
"While recognizing that the draft resolution does not con-
which would be adequate
stitute a regular legal instrument,
in itself and represent a concrete contribution towards

190
 5 Dec. 45

security, the Third Committee unanimously agreed as to its

great moral and educative value."
Then he asked the Assembly and
to adopt the draft resolution,
I which shows what so
will read simply the terms of the resolution,
many nations, including Germany, put forward at that time:
"The Assembly, recognizing the solidarity which unites the
community of nations, being inspired by a firm desire for the
maintenance of general peace, being convinced that a war of
aggression can never serve as a means of settling international
disputes, and is in consequence an international crime;
considering that a solemn renunciation of all wars of
aggression would tend to create an atmosphere of general
confidence calculated to facilitate the progress of the work
undertaken . with a view to disarmament:
. .

"Declares: 1. That all wars of aggression are and shall always

be prohibited: 2. That every pacific means must be employed
to settle disputes of every description, which may arise be-
tween states.
"The Assembly declares that the states, members of the
League, are under an obligation to conform to these principles."
After a solemn vote taken in the form of roll call the President
—
announced which you will see at the end of the extract:
"All the delegations having pronounced in favor of the decla-
ration submitted by the Third Committee, I declare it unani-
mously adopted."
The last general treaty which I have to place before the Tribunal
is the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Pact of Paris of 1928, which my
learned friend, the Attorney General, in opening this part of the
case read in extenso and commented on fully, I hand in as Exhibit
—
GB-18 the British Document TC-19, which is a copy of that pact.
I did not intend, unless the Tribunal desired otherwise, that I

should read it again, as the Attorney General yesterday read it in

full, but of course I am at the service of the Tribunal and therefore
I leave that document before the Tribunal in that way.

Now all that remains for me to do is to place before the Tribunal

certain documents which Mr. Alderman mentioned in the course of
his address, and left to me. I am afraid that I haven't placed them
in a special order, because they don't really relate to the treaties
I have dealt with, but to Mr. Alderman's argument. The first of
these I hand in as Exhibit GB-19. It is British Document TC-26, and
comes just after that resolution of the League of Nations to which
—
the Tribunal had just been giving attention TC-26. It is the
assurance contained in Hitler's speech on 21 May 1935, and it is
very short, and unless the Tribunal has it in mind from Mr. Alder-
man's speech, I will read it again; I am not sure of his reading it:

191
5 Dec. 45

"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the

domestic affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to attach that
country to her. The German people and the German Govern-
ment have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising
out of the simple feeling of solidarity due to a common
national descent, that the right to self-determination should
be guaranteed not only to foreign nations, but to the German
people everywhere. I myself believe that no regime which is
not anchored in the people, supported by the people, and
desired by the people, can exist permanently."
The next document which is TC-22, and which is on the next
page, I now hand in as Exhibit GB-20. It is the copy of the official

proclamation of the agreement between the German Government

and the Government of the Federal State of Austria on 11 July 1936,
and I am almost certain that Mr. Alderman did read this document,
but I refer the Tribunal to Paragraph 1 of the agreement to remind
them of the essential content:
"The German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of
the Federal State of Austria in the sense of the pronounce-
ments of the German Leader and Chancellor of the 21st of
May 1935."
I now have three documents which Mr. Alderman asked me to
hand in with regard to Czechoslovakia. The first is TC-27, which
the Tribunal will find two documents further on from the one of
Austria, to which I have just been referring. That is the German
assurance to Czechoslovakia, and what I am handing in as GB-21 is
the letter from M. Masaryk, Jan Masaryk's son, to Lord Halifax,
dated the 12th of March 1938. Again I think that if Mr. Alderman
did not read this, he certainly quoted the statement made by the
Defendant Goring, which appears in the third paragraph. In the
first statement the Field Marshal used the expression, "ich gebe
Ihnen mein Ehrenwort," which I understand means, "I give you my
word of honor," and if you will look down three paragraphs, after
the Defendant Goring had asked that there would not be a mobili-
zation of the Czechoslovak Army, the communication continues:
"M. Mastny was in a position to give him definite and binding
assurances on this subject, and today spoke with Baron Von
—
Neurath that is the Defendant Von Neurath who, among —
other things assured him on behalf of Herr Hitler that Ger-
many still considers herself bound by the German-Czecho-
slovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in
October 1925."
So there remind the Tribunal that in 1925 Herr Stresemann
I
was speaking on behalf of Germany in an agreement voluntarily
concluded. Had there been the slightest doubt of that, here is the

192
 . —

5 Dec. 45

Defendant Von Neurath giving the assurance on behalf of Hitler

that Germany still considers herself bound by the German-Czecho-
slovak Arbitration Convention on 12 March 1938, 6 months before
Dr. Benes made a hopeless appeal to it, before the crisis in the
autumn of 1938. Of course the difficult position of the Czechoslovak
Government is set out in the last paragraph, but M. Masaryk says
—
and the Tribunal may think with great force in his last sentence:
"They cannot however view with great apprehension
fail to
the sequel of events in Austria between the date of the
bilateral agreement between Germany and Austria, 11 July
1936, and yesterday, 11 March 1938."

I refrain from comment, but I venture to say that is one of the

most pregnant sentences relating to this period.
Now the next document which is on the next page is the British
Document TC-28, which I hand in as Exhibit GB-22. And that is an
assurance of the 26th of September 1938, which Hitler gave to
—
Czechoslovakia, and again the Tribunal will check my memory
I don't think that Mr. Alderman read this but . .

THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I think if he did not, the

Tribunal ought to have it before them, because it gives very impor-

tant point as to the alleged governing principle of getting Germans
back to the Reich, which the Nazi conspirators purported to ask for
a considerable time, while it suited them. It says:
"I have little to am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain
explain. I
for all his efforts, have assured him that the German
and I
people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that
I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience."

The Tribunal will remember this is between the Godesberg visit

and the Munich Pact:
"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem solved there will be no more territorial problems
is
for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from
the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that
is to say, when the Czechs have come to an agreement with

their other minorities peacefully, and without oppression, I

will no longer be interested in the Czech State, and that, as
far as I am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don't want any
Czechs. But I must also declare before the German people
that in the Sudeten-German problem my patience is now at
an end. I made an offer to Herr Benes which was no more
than the realization of what he had already promised. He has
now peace or war in his hands. Either he will accept this

193
5 Dec. 45

offer and at length give the Germans their freedom, or we

shall get this freedom for ourselves."
Less than 6 months before the 15th of March Hitler was saying
in the most violent terms that "he didn't want any Czechs." The
Tribunal has heard the sequel from my friend, Mr. Alderman, this
morning. The last document which I have been asked to put in, and
which I now ask the Tribunal to take notice of, and hand in, is
Exhibit GB-23, which is the British Document TC-23 and a copy of
the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938. That was signed by
Hitler, the late Mr. Neville Chamberlain, M. Daladier, and Mussolini,
and it is largely a procedural agreement by which the entry of
German troops into the Sudeten-Deutsche territory is regulated. That
is shown by the preliminary clause:

''Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, taking into

consideration the agreement which has been already reached
in principle, for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten-
German territory, have agreed on the following terms and
conditions governing the said cession and the measures con-
sequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold them-
selves responsible for the steps necessary to secure fulfill-
ment."
Then I don't think, unless the Tribunal want me, I need go
through the steps. said that "The occupation by
In Article 4, it

stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops

will begin on 1 October." The four territories are marked on a map.
And by Article 6, "The final determination of the frontiers will be
carried out by the international commission." And it provides also
for rights of option —
and release from the forces the Czech forces
of Sudeten Germans.
That is what Hitler was asking for in the somewhat rhetorical
passage which I have just read out, and it will be observed that
there is an annex to the agreement which is most significant.
"Annex to the Agreement:
"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the
French Government have entered into the above agreement
on the basis that they stand by the offer contained in
Paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French Proposals of the 19th Sep-
tember, relating to an international guarantee of the new
boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked
aggression.
"When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities
in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy, for
their part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia."
The Polish and Hungarian minorities, not the question of Slovakia
which the Tribunal heard this morning. That is why Mr. Alderman

194
 5 Dec. 45

submitted —
and I respectfully joined him in his submission that —
the action of the 15th of March was a flagrant violation of the
letter and spirit of that agreement.
That, My Lord, is the part of the case which I desired to
present.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases.

Thank you.

[A recess was taken.]

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior

Counsel for the United Kingdom): May please the Tribunal,
it

Count Two of the Indictment charges these defendants with

participating in the planning, the preparation, the initiation, and
waging of various wars of aggression, and it charges that those
wars are also in breach of international treaty. It is our purpose
now to present to the Tribunal the evidence in respect of those
aggressive wars against Poland and against the United Kingdom
and France.
Under Paragraph (B) of the particulars to Count Two, reference
is made Count One in the Indictment for the allegations
to
charging that those wars were wars of aggression, and Count One
also sets out the particulars of the preparations and planning for
those wars, and in particular those allegations will be found in
Paragraph (F) 4. But, My Lord, with the Tribunal's approval
I would propose first to deal with the allegations of breach of
,

treaties which are mentioned in Paragraph (C) of the particulars,

and of which the details are set out in Appendix C. My Lord, those
sections of Appendix C which relate to the war against Poland are
Section 2, which charges a violation of the Hague Convention in
respect of the pacific settlement of international disputes, on which
Sir David has already addressed the Court, and I do not propose,
with the Court's approval, to say more than that.
Section 3 of Appendix C and Section 4 charge breaches of the
other Hague Conventions of 1907. Section 5, Sub-section 4, charges
a breach of the Versailles Treaty in respect of the Free City of
Danzig, and Section 13, a breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
All those have already been dealt with by Sir David Maxwell-
Fyfe, and it remains, therefore, only for me to deal with two other
sections of Appendix C: Section 10, which charges a breach of the
Arbitration Treaty between Germany and Poland, signed at
Locarno on the 16th of October 1925; and Section 15 of Appendix C
which charges a violation of the Declaration of Non-Aggression

195
 .

5 Dec. 45

which was entered into between Germany and Poland on the

26th of January 1934.
the Tribunal would take Part I of the British Document Book
If
Number 2, I will describe in a moment how the remaining parts
are divided. The document book is divided into six parts. If the
—
Tribunal will look at Part I for the moment the document books
which have been handed to the Counsel for the Defense are in
exactly the same order, except that they are bound in one and not
in six separate covers, in which the Tribunal's documents are
bound for convenience.
The German-Polish Arbitration Treaty, the subject matter of
Section 10 of Appendix C, is Document TC-15 and appears the one
but end document in the book. It has already been put in under
the Number GB-16.
My Lord, I would quote the preamble and Articles 1 and 2 from
that treaty:
"The President of the German Empire and the President of
the Polish Republic:
"Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and
Poland by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences
which might arise between the two countries;
"Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty
or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for inter-
national tribunals;
"Agreeing to recognize that the rights of a state cannot be
modified save with its consent;
"And considering that sincere observance of the methods of
peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of
resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may
become the .cause of division between states;
"Have decided. .

Then, go on to Article 1:

"All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland

with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their
respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle
amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be
submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal or to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, as laid down
hereafter."
I go straight to Article 2:

"Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure before the

Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may,
by agreement between the parties, be submitted, with a

196
 5 Dec. 45

view to amicable settlement, to a permanent international

commission, styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission,
constituted in accordance with the present treaty."
My Lord, thereafter the treaty goes on to lay down the
procedure for arbitration and for conciliation.
THE PRESIDENT: It is in the same terms, is it not, as the
arbitration between
treaty Germany and Czechoslovakia, and
Germany and Belgium?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: Well—yes, it is. My Lord, both
signed at Locarno.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: The words of the charge in
Section 10, will be noted particularly in that Germany did, on or
about the 1st of September 1939, unlawfully attack and invade
Poland without first having attempted to settle its dispute with
Poland by peaceful means.
The only other treaty to which I refer, the German-Polish
Declaration of the 26th of January 1934, will be found as the last
document in Part I of the Tribunal's document book, which is the
subject of Section 10 of Appendix C:
'The German Government and the Polish Government
consider that the time has come to introduce a new era in
the political relations between Germany and Poland by a
direct understanding between the states. They have therefore
decided to establish by the present declaration a basis for
the future shaping of those relations.
"The two Governments assume that the maintenance and
assurance of a permanent peace between their countries is
an essential condition for general peace in Europe."
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary to read all this?
We are taking judicial notice of it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: I am very much obliged; I am
only too anxious to shorten this, if I can.

In view of what is later alleged by the Nazi Government,

I would particularly draw attention to the last paragraph in that
declaration.
'The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of 10 years
counting from the day of exchange of instruments of ratifica-
tion. In case it is not denounced by one of the two govern-
ments 6 months before the expiration of that period of time,
it shall continue in effect but can then be denounced by either

Government at any time 6 months in advance."

197
5 Dec. 45

My Lord, I pass then from the breach of treaties to present to

the Court the evidence upon the planning and preparation of these
wars and in support of the allegations that they were wars of aggres-
sion. For convenience, as I say, the documents have been divided
into separate parts and if the Tribunal would look at the index, the
total index to their document, which is a separate book, on the front
page it will be seen how these documents have been divided. Part I is
the "Treaties"; Part II is entitled "Evidence of German Intentions
prior to March 1939." It might perhaps be more accurately described
as "pre-March 1939 evidence," and it will be with that part that I
would now deal.
MyLord, it has been put to the Tribunal that the actions against
Austria and Czechoslovakia were in themselves part of the prepara-
—
tion for further aggression, and I now dealing with the early
—
history of this matter wish to draw the Court's particular attention
only to those parts of the evidence which show that even at that
time, before the Germans had seized the whole of Czechoslovakia,
they were perfectly prepared to fight England, Poland, and France,
if necessary, to achieve those preliminary aims; that they appreciated
the whole time that they might well have to do so. And, what is
more, although not until after March 1939 did they commence upon
their immediate and specific preparations for war against Poland,
nevertheless, they had for a considerable time before had it in mind
specifically to attack Poland once Czechoslovakia was completely
theirs.

—
During this period also and this happens throughout the whole
—
story of the Nazi regime in Germany during this period, as after-
wards, while they are making their preparations and carrying out
their plans, they are giving to the outside worlc^ assurance after
assurance so as to lull them out of any suspicion of their real object.
—
The dates, I think as the learned Attorney General said in
—
addressing you yesterday the dates in this case, almost more than
the documents, speak for themselves. The documents in this book
are arranged in the order in which I will refer to them, and the first
that I would refer to is Document TC-70, which will go in as GB-25.
It is only interesting to see what Hitler said of the agreement
with Poland when it was signed in January 1934:
"When I took over the Government on the 30th of January,
the relations between the two countries seemed to me more
than unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing
differences, which were due to the territorial clauses of the
Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting there-
from, would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility
which, if persisted in, might only too easily acquire the
character of a dangerous traditional enmity."

198
 5 Dec. 45

I go down to the one but last paragraph.

"In the spirit of this treaty the German Government is willing
and prepared also to cultivate economic-political relations with
Poland in such a way that here, too, the state of unprofitable
suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful co-operation.
It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this same
year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been
enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with its
Polish neighbor."
That was in 1934. Three years later, again on the 30th of January,
—
speaking in the Reichstag, Hitler said this is Document PS-2368,
which will be GB-26. I will, if I may, avoid so far as possible
repeating passages which the Attorney General quoted in his speech
the other day. The first paragraph, in fact, he quoted to the
Tribunal. It is a short paragraph but perhaps I might read it now,
— —
but I will dealing with this evidence so far as possible avoid
repetition:
"By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing
tension and thereby contributed considerably to an improve-
ment in the European atmosphere. I merely recall an agree-
ment with Poland which has worked out to the advantage of
both sides .... True statesmanship will not overlook realities,
but consider them. The Italian nation and the new Italian
State are realities. The German nation and the German Reich
are equally realities. And to my own fellow citizens I would
say that the Polish nation and the Polish State have also
become a reality."
That was on the 30th of January 1937.
On the 24th of June 1937 we have a top-secret order, C-175,
which has already been put in as USA-69. It is a top-secret order
issued by the Reich Minister for War and Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces, signed "Von Blomberg." It has at the top,
"Written by an officer .... Outgoing documents in connection with
this matter and dealing with it are to be written by an officer."
. . .

So it is obviously highly secret. And with it is enclosed a directive

for the unified preparation for war of the Armed Forces to come
into force on the 1st of August 1937. The directive enclosed with it

is "General Guiding Principles"; Part

divided into Part 1, 2, "Likely
WarUke Eventualities"; Part 3, "Special Preparations."
The Tribunal will remember that the Attorney General quoted
the opening passages:
"The general political position justifies the supposition that
Germany need not consider an attack from any side."

199
5 Dec. 45

It goes on —the second paragraph:

"The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little
by Germany. Nevertheless, the politically fluid world situa-
tion, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands
a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed
Forces to counter attacks at any time, and to enable the
military exploitation of politically favorable opportunities,
should they occur."
It then goes on to set out the preparations which are to be made,
and I would particularly draw the Tribunal's attention to Para-
graph 2b:
"The further working on mobilization without public announce-
ment in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin
a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and
time."
On the next page, under Paragraph 4:

"Special preparations are to be made for the following even-

tualities: Armed intervention against Austria; warlike entan-
glements with Red Spain."
And thirdly, and this shows so clearly how they appreciated at that
time that their actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia might
well involve them in war:
"England, Poland, and Lithuania take part in a war against us."
If the Tribunal would turn over to Part 2 of that directive,
Page 5 of that document:
"For the treatment of probable warlike eventualities (concen-
trations) the following suppositions, tasks, and orders are to
be considered as basic:
"1. War on two fronts with focal point in the West.
"Suppositions. In the West, France is the opponent. Belgium
may side with Framce, either at once or later, or not at all.
It is also possible that France may violate Belgium's neu-
trality if the latter is neutral. She will certainly violate that
of Luxembourg."
pass to Part 3, which will be found on Page 9 of that Exhibit,
I

and I particularly refer to the last paragraph on that page under the
—
heading "Special Case Extension Red-Green". It will be remem-
bered that Red was Spain and Green was Czechoslovakia.
"The military political starting point used as a basis for con-
centration plans Red and Green can be aggravated if either
England, Poland, or Lithuania .join the side of our oppo-
. .

nents. Thereupon our military position would deteriorate to

an unbearable, even hopeless extent. The political leadership

200
 5 Dec. 45

will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral,

above all England and Poland."
Thereafter, it sets out the conditions which are to be the basis
for the discussion. Before I leave that document, the date will be
noted: June 1937; and it shows clearly that at that date anyway, the
Nazi Government appreciated the likelihood, if not the probability,
of fighting England, and Poland, and France, and were perfectly
prepared to do so, if they had to. On the 5th of November 1937 the —
—
Tribunal will remember Hitler held his conference in the Reich
Chancellery, the minutes of which have been referred to as the
Hossbach notes. I refer to only one or two lines of that document
to draw the attention of the Tribunal to what Hitler said in respect
to England, Poland, and France. On Page 1 of that Exhibit, the
middle of the page:
"The Führer then stated: 'The aim of German policy is the
security and preservation of the nation and its propagation.
This is consequently a problem of space.'"
He then went on, you will remember, to discuss what he described
"participation in world economy," and at the bottom of Page 2
he said:
"The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is
the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all
times has been the cause of the formation of states and move-
ments of nations."
And at the end of that first paragraph on Page 3:
"The history of all times, Roman Empire, British Empire, has
proved that every space expansion can be effected only by
breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are
unavoidable. Neither formerly, nor today, has space been
found without an owner. The attacker always comes up
against the proprietor."
My Lord, it is clear that that reference was not only . . .

THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing.] It has been read already.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: My object was only to try to
England and Poland were concerned, the evidence
collect, so far as
that had been given. I would welcome in actual fact if the Tribunal
thought that it was unnecessary, I would welcome the oppor-
tunity to . . .

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would wish you not to read

anything that has been read already.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: I would pass then to the next
document in that part of your document book. I put that document in.
It was referred to by the Attorney General in his address yesterday,

201
5 Dec. 45

and it shows that on the same date the Hossbach meeting was taking
place, acommuniqué was being issued as a result of the Polish
Ambassador's audience with Hitler, in which it was said in the
course of the conversation that it was confirmed that Polish-Ger-
man relations should not meet with difficulties because of the Danzig
question. That Document is TC-73. I put it in as GB-27. On the
2d of January ...
THE PRESIDENT: That hasn't been read before, has it?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: It was read by the Attorney Gen-

eral in his opening.

THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: On the 2d of January 1938 some

unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Führer. This docu-
ment was one of the German Foreign Office documents of which
a microfilm was captured by Allied troops when they came into
—
Germany. It is headed, "Very confidential personal only," and
is called, "Deductions on the Report, German Embassy, London,
regarding the Future Form of Anglo-German Relations":
"With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a
status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a mili-
tary conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement
will slowly disappear among Germanophile British politicians,
insofar as they are not merely playing a part that has been
given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany
and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps
and will they march once more against each other one day?
To answer this question, one must realize the following:
"A change of the status quo in the East in the German sense
can only be carried out by force. As long as France knows
that England, which so to speak, has taken on a guarantee to
aid France against Germany, is on her side, France's fighting
for her eastern allies is probable, in any case, always possible,
and thus with it war between Germany and England. This
applies then even if England does not want war. England,
believing she must defend her borders on the Rhine, would
be dragged in automatically by France. In other words, peace
or war between England and Germany rests solely in the
hands of France, who could bring about such a war between
Germany and England by way of a conflict between Germany
and France. It follows, therefore, that war between Germany
and England on account of France can be prevented only if
France knows from the start that England's forces would not
be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situ-
ation might force England, and thereby France, to accept a

202
 5 Dec. 45

lot of things that a strong Anglo-French coalition would never

tolerate.
"This position would arise for instance if England, through
insufficientarmament or as a result of threats to her empire
by a superior coalition of powers, for example, Germany,
Italy, Japan, thereby tying down her military forces in other
places, would not be able to assure France of sufficient support
in Europe."
The next page goes on to discuss the possibilities of a strong
partnership between Italy and Japan, and I would pass from my
quotation to the next page where the writer is summarizing his
ideas.
Paragraph 5:

"Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us.

"1. Outwardly, further understanding with England in regard
to the protection of the interests of our friends.
"2. Formation under great secrecy, but with whole-hearted
tenacity of a coalition against England, that is to say, a
tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the
winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours
directly or indirectly.
"Close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats of the
three great powers towards this purpose. Only in this way
can we confront England, be it in a settlement or in war.
England is going to to be a hard and astute opponent in this
game of diplomacy.
"The particular question whether, in the event of a war by
Germany in Central Europe ."
— , . —
I am afraid the translation
of this is not very good "The particular question whether, in
the event of a war by Germany in Central Europe, France,
and thereby England, would interfere, depends on the
circumstances and the time at which such a war commences
and ceases, and on military considerations which cannot be
gone into here."
And whoever it was that wrote that document appears to be on
a fairly high level, because he concludes by saying:
"I should like to give the Führer some of these points of view
verbally."
That document is GB-28.
Well, I am afraid that the next two documents have gotten into
your books in the wrong order. If you would refer to 2357-PS which
is the one following our L-43 —
it will be remembered that document
to the Führer which I have just read was dated the 2d of January
1938.

203
5 Bec. 45

On the 20th of January 1938 Hitler spoke in the Reichstag.

THE PRESIDENT: February, the document said.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: I beg your pardon— February 1938.
That is 2357-PS, and will be GB-30. In that speech he said:
"In the fifth year following the first great foreign political
agreement with the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification
to be able to state that in our relations with the state, with
which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only
has there been a détente, but in the course of these years
there has been a constant improvement in relations. This
good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many
at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that since the
League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to
unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attain-
ments as the new commissioner, the most dangerous spot from
this point of view of European peace has entirely lost its
menacing character. The Polish State respects the national
conditions in this state, and both the City of Danzig and
Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to friendly
understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding
which beginning with Danzig has today, in spite of the
attempts of certain mischief makers, succeeded in finally
taking the poison out of the relations between Germany
and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly
co-operation.
"To rely on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone
unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for
—
the task which is ahead of us peace."
—
turn back to the next to the document which was in your
I
document books, the one before that, L-43, which will be GB-29.
This is a document to which the Attorney General referred yesterday.
It is dated the 2d of May 1938, and is entitled "Organizational Study
of 1950." It comes from the office of the Chief of the Organizational
Staff of the General Staff of the Air Force, and its purpose is said
to be:
"The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly
conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organi-
zation of the Air Force. The result gained is termed 'Distant
Objective.' From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached
in the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942. This
will be called 'Final Objective 1942.' This in turn yields what
is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization

of the staffs of the Air Force group commands, air Gaue, air
divisions, et cetera."

204
 5 Dec. -45

The table of contents, the Tribunal will see, is divided into various
sections, and Section I is entitled "Assumptions." If the Tribunal
will turn over to th^next page one finds the assumption under the
heading "Assumptions I, frontier of Germany, see map, Enclosure 1."
The Tribunal sees a reproduction of that map on the wall and it
will May 1938, the Air Force were envis-
be seen that on the 2d of
aging Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and
Hungary, all coming within the bounds of the Reich. The original
map is file and if the Tribunal will look at the
here attached to this
original exhibit, be seen that this organizational study has
it will
been prepared with the greatest care and thoroughness, with a mass
of charts attached as appendices.
I would refer also to the bottom of the second page, to the
Tribunal's copy of the translation:
"Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis
of the assumptions for war and peace made in Section 1:
1) Attack forces: Principal adversaries: England, France,
Russia."
And it then goes on to say if all the 144 Geschwader are employed

against England, they must be concentrated in the western half of

the Reich; that is to say, they must be deployed in such a way that
by making full use of their range they can reach all English terri-
tory down to the last corner.
THE PRESIDENT: It is perhaps involved in the map. I think
perhaps you should refer to the organization of the Air Force, with
group commands at Warsaw and Königsberg.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: I am much obliged. Under the
paragraph "Assumptions," Sub-heading 2, "Organization of the Air
Force in Peacetime," seven group commands:
1-Berlin, 2-Brunswick, 3-Munich, 4- Vienna, 5-Budapest, 6-Warsaw,
and 7-Königsberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: I am very much obUged. And

lastly, inconnection with that document, on Page 4 of the Tribunal's
translation, the last paragraph:
"The more the Reich grows in area, and the more the Air
Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to
have locally bound commands . . .
."

I emphasize only the opening, "The more the Reich grows in

area, and the more the Air Force grows in strength ." Now I
. .

would say one word on that document. The original, I understand,

is signed by an officer who is not at the top rank in the Air Force

and I, therefore, don't want to overemphasize the inferences that

205
5 Dec. 45

can be drawn from it, but it is submitted that it at least shows the
linesupon which the General Staff of the Air Force were thinking
at that date.
The Tribunal will remember that in February 1938 the Defendant
Ribbentrop succeeded Von Neurath as Foreign Minister. We have
another document from that captured microfilm, which is dated the
26th of August 1938, when Ribbentrop had become Foreign Minister,
and it is addressed to him as "the Reich Minister via the State
Secretary." It is a comparatively short document and one that I will
read in whole:
"The most pressing problem of Gem>an policy, the Czech
problem, might easily, but must not, lead to a conflict with
the Entente."— TC-76 becomes GB-31— "Neither France nor
England is looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia.
Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she
should, without direct foreign interference and through
internal signs of disintegration due to her own faults, suffer
the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have to
take place step by step, and would have to lead to a loss of
power in the remaining territory, by means of a plebiscite
and an annexation of territory.
"The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any
immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively,
and not even if this action should come quickly and surpris-
ingly. Germany cannot fix any definite time when this fruit
could be plucked without too great a risk. She can only
prepare the desired developments."
I pass to the last paragraph on that page. I think I can leave
out the intervening lines. Paragraph 5.
THE PRESIDENT: Should you not read the next paragraph,
"For this purpose . .
."?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: "For this purpose the slogan

emanating from England at present of the right for autonomy
of the Sudeten Germans, which we have intentionally not
used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. The international
conviction that the choice of nationality is being withheld
from these Germans will do useful spadework, notwith-
standing the fact that the chemical process of dissolution of
the Czech form of states may or may not be finally speeded
up by mechanical means as well. The fate of the actual body
of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be clearly
decided by this, but would nevertheless be definitely sealed.
"This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be
recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is

206
 —
5 Dec. 45

unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of

, boundaries in the southeast and their transfer to the east and
northeast must make the Poles sit up. The fact is" I put in —
an "is" because I think it is obviously left out of the copy-
that I have in front of me.
"The fact is that after the liquidation of the Czech question,
it will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next
in turn.
"But the laterthis assumption sinks in in international politics
as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however, it is
important for the time being, to carry on the German policy,
under the well-known and proved slogans of *the right to
autonomy' and 'racial unity.' Anything else might be inter-
preted as pure imperialism on our part, and provoke resistance
by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically than
our forces could stand up to."
That was on the 26th of August 1938, just as the Czech crisis was
leading up to a Munich settlement. While at Munich, or rather a
day or two before the Munich Agreement was signed, Herr Hitler
made a speech. On the 26th of September he said I think Sir David —
Maxwell-Fyfe has just read this document to the Tribunal. I'll refer
to only two lines of it:

"I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this
problem is solved, there will be no more territorial problems
for Germany in Europe."
And document in your book, which is another
again, the last
extract from that same speech, I will not read to the Tribimal unless
the Tribunal desire, because the Attorney General did quote it in
full in his address yesterday. These two documents are already
in, TC-28 as GB-2, and TC-29, which is the second extraction of
that same speech, as GB-32.
My would refer the Tribunal to one more document
Lord, I
under which has already been put in by my American
this part
colleagues. It is C-23, now USA-49, and which appears before
TC-28 in your document book. The particular passage of that
exhibit, to which I would refer, is a letter from Admiral Carls, which
appears at the bottom of the second page. It is dated some time in
September, with no precise date, and is entitled, "Opinion on the
'Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England.' There is full
agreement with the main theme of the study." Again, the Attorney
General quoted the remainder of that letter yesterday, which the
Tribunal will remember.
"If,according to the Führer's decision, Germany is to acquire
a position of security as a world power she needs not only

207
5 Dec. 45

sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communi-

cations and secure access to the ocean."
That, then, was the position at the time of the Munich Agreement
in September 1938.
The gains of Munich were not, of course, so great as the Nazi
Government had hoped and had intended, and as a result, they
were not prepared straight away to start any further aggressive
action against Poland or elsewhere, but Your Lordships heard this
morning, when Mr. Alderman dealt in his closing remarks with the
advantages that were gained by the seizure of Czechoslovakia, what
Jodl and Hitler said on subsequent occasions, that Czechoslovakia
was only setting the stage for the attack on Poland. It is, of course,
obvious now that they intended and indeed had taken the decision
to proceed against Poland as soon as Czechoslovakia had been
entirely occupied. We know now, from what Hitler said in talking
to his military commanders at a later date. The Tribunal will
remember the speech where he said that from the first, he never
intended to abide by the Munich Agreement but that he had to
have the whole of Czechoslovakia. As a result, although not ready
to proceed in full force against Poland after September 1938, they
did at once begin to approach the Poles on the question of Danzig.
— —
Until as the Tribunal will see until the whole of Czechoslovakia
had been taken in March, no pressure was put on; but immediately
after the Sudetenland had been occupied, preliminary steps were
taken to stir up trouble with Poland, which would and was to
lead eventually to their excuse, or so-called justification for their
attack on that country.
If the Tribunal would turn to Part 3. . .
•

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is time to adjourn now until

10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 6 December at 1000 hours.]

208
 FOURTEENTH DAY
Thursday, 6 December 1945

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received an urgent request

from the defendants' counsel that the Trial should be adjourned at
Christmas for a period of 3 weeks. The Tribunal is aware of the
many interests which must be considered in a trial of this complexity
and magnitude, and, as the Trial must inevitably last for a consider-
able time, the Tribunal considers that it is not only in the interest
of the defendants and their counsel but of every one concerned in
the Trial that there should be a recess. On the whole it seems best
to take that recess at Christmas rather than at a later date when
the Prosecution's case has been completed. The Tribunal will there-
fore rise for the Christmas week and over the 1st of January, and
will not sit after the session on Thursday, the 20th of December,
and will sit again on Wednesday, the 2d of January.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like, in justice to my staff, to
note the American objection to the adjournment for the benefit of
the defendants.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: May it please the Tribunal, the
Tribunal will return to Part III of that document book in which
I included the documents relating to the earlier discussions between
the German and Polish Governments on the question of Danzig.
Those discussions, the Tribunal will remember, started almost
immediately after the Munich crisis in September 1938, and started,
in the first place, as cautious and friendly discussions until the
remainder of Czechoslovakia had finally been seized in March of
the following year.
I would refer the Tribunal to the first document in that part,
TC-73, Number 44. That is a document taken from the official
Polish White Book, which I put in as Exhibit GB-27 (a). It gives an
account of a luncheon which took place at the Grand Hotel, Berchtes-
gaden, on the 24th of October, where Ribbentrop saw Mr. Lipski,
the Polish Ambassador to Germany:
"In a conversation of the 24th of October, over a luncheon at
the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was
present, Von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general
settlement of issues between Poland and Germany. This
included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland

209
6 Dec. 45

would be assured the retention of railway and economic facili-

ties there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra-
territorial motor road and a railway line across Pomorze
(northern part of the corridor). In exchange Von Ribbentrop
mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German
Agreement to 25 years and a guarantee of Polish-German
frontiers."
I do not think I need read the following lines, I go to the last
but one paragraph:
"Finally, I said to Von Ribbentrop that I could see no possi-
bility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City
with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the
substance of this conversation to you."
I would emphasize the submission of the Prosecution as to this
part of the case and that is that the whole question of Danzig was,
indeed, as Hitler has himself said, no question at all. Danzig was
raised simply as an excuse, a so-called justification, not for the
seizure of Danzig, but for the invasion and seizure of the whole
of Poland, and we see it starting now. As we progress with the
story it will become ever more apparent that that is what the Nazi
—
Government were really aiming at only providing themselves with
some kind of crisis which would provide some kind of justification
for walking into the rest of Poland.
I turn to the next document. It is again a document taken from
the Polish White Book, TC-73, Number 45, which will be GB-27 (b).
TC-73 will be the Polish White Book, which I shall put in later.
That document sets out the instructions that Mr. Beck, the Polish
Foreign Minister, gave to Mr. Lipski to hand to the German Govern-
ment in reply to the suggestion put forward by Ribbentrop at
Berchtesgaden on the 24th of October. I need not read the first
page. The history of Polish-German relationship is set out, and the
needs of Poland in respect of Danzig are emphasized. I turn to the
second page of that exhibit, to Paragraph 6:
"In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish
Government, the Danzig question is governed by two factors:
The right of the German population of the city and the
surrounding villages to freedom of life and development, and
the fact that in all matters appertaining to the Free City as
a port it is connected with Poland. Apart from the national
character of the majority of the population, everything in
Danzig is definitely bound up with Poland."
It then sets out the guarantees to Poland under the existing
statute, and I pass to Paragraph 7:
"Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and
desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of

210
 6 Dec. 45

a friendly understanding with the Government of the German

Reich, the Polish Government proposes the replacement of
the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a
bilateral Polish-German agreement. This agreement should
guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to
assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German
majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Not-
withstanding the complications involved in such a system, the
Polish Government must state that any other solution, and in
particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the
Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only
take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all
possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects."
And then finally in Paragraph 8:
"In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am
ready to have final conversations personally with the governing
circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you
should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that
my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which
would be dangerous for the future."
The stage in those negotiations had been entirely successful
first
from the German point of view. They had put forward a proposal,
the return of the City of Danzig to the Reich, which they might well
have known would have been unacceptable. It was unacceptable,
and the Polish Government had warned the Nazi Government that
it would be. They had offered to enter into negotiations, but they
had not agreed, which is exactly what the German Government had
hoped. They had not agreed to the return of Danzig to the Reich.
The first stage in producing the crisis had been accomplished.
Shortly afterward, within a week or so of that taking place,
after the Polish Government had offered to enter into discussions
with the German Government, we find another top-secret order,
issued by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed by
the Defendant Keitel. It goes to the OKH, OKM, and OKW
and
it is headed, "The First Supplement to the Instruction Dated the

21st of October 1938":

"The Führer has ordered: Apart from the three contingencies
mentioned in the instructions of that date of 21 October 1938,
preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of
Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise ....
"The preparations will be made on the following basis: Condi-
tion is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting
a politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland."
We remember, of course, that at that moment the remainder of
Czechoslovakia had not been seized and therefore they were not

211
6 Dec. 45

ready to go to war with Poland. That document does show how the
German Government answered the proposal to enter into discus-
sions. That is C-137 and will become GB-33.
On
the 5th of January 1939 Mr. Beck had a conversation with
Hitler. It is unnecessary to read the first part of that document,
which is the next in the Tribunal's book, TC-73, Number 48, which
will become GB-34. In the first part of that conversation, of which
that document is an account, Hitler offers to answer any questions.
He says he has always followed the policy laid down by the 1934
agreement. He discusses the Danzig question and emphasizes that
in the German view it must sooner or later return to Germany.
I quote the last but one paragraph of that page:

"Mr. Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very diffi-
cult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's suggestion
he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole
of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but
the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensi-
tive on this matter.
"In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this
problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite
new, some new form, for which he used the term Körper-
schaft, which on the one hand would safeguard the interests
of the German population, and on the other the Polish inter-
ests. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister
could be quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in
Danzig, and nothing would be done to render difficult the
situation of the Polish Government."
The Tribunal will remember that in the very last document we
looked on the 24th of November, orders had already been
at,
received, or issued, for preparations to be made for the occupation
of Danzig by surprise; yet here he is assuring the Polish Foreign
Minister that there is to be no fait accompli and he can be quite
at his ease.

I turn to the next step, Document TC-73, Number 49, which will .

become GB-35, conversation between Mr. Beck and Ribbentrop, on

the day after the one to which I have just referred between Beck
and Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw attention to the fact that the
last conversation took place in the presence of the Defendant Ribben-
trop?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: I am very obHged to you. No, I

did not. As I say, it was on the next day, the 6th of January. The
date in actual fact does not appear on the copy I have got in my
book. It does appear in the White Book itself.

212
 6 Dec. 45

"Mr. Beck asked Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that

whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts
with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today,
for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly
in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the
Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement."
I emphasize this last paragraph:

"In answer Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany

was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy
towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up
of friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method
of clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights
and interests of the two parties concerned."
The Defendant Ribbentrop apparently was not satisfied with
that one expression of good faith. On the 25th of the same month,
January 1939, some fortnight or three weeks later, he was in Warsaw
and made another speech, of which an extract is set out in PS-2530,
which will become GB-36:
"In accordance with the resolute will of the German national
leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly
relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the
existing agreement between us, constitute an essential element
in German foreign policy. The political foresight and the
principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both
sides to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a
guarantee that all other problems arising in the course of the
future evolution of events will also be solved in the same
spirit, with due regard to the respect and understanding of
the rightful interests of both sides. Thus Poland and Germany
can look forward to the future with full confidence in the
solid basis of their mutual relations."
And even so, the Nazi Government must have been still
—
anxious that the Poles were beginning to sit up Your Lordship
will remember the expression "sit up" used in the note to the
—
Führer and to assume they would be the next in turn, because
on the 30th of January Hitler again spoke in the Reichstag, 30th of
January 1939, and gave further assurances of their good faith.
That document, that extract, was read by the Attorney General
in his address, and therefore, I only put it in now as an exhibit.
That is TC-73, Number 57, which will become GB-37.
That, then, brings us up to the March 1939 seizure of the
remainder of Czechoslovakia and the setting up of the Protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravia.
If the Tribunal will now pass to the next part, Part IV, of that
document book, I had intended to refer to three documents where

213
6 Dec. 45

Hitler and Jodl were setting out the advantage gained through the
seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. But the Tribunal will
remember that Mr. Alderman, in his closing remarks yesterday
morning, dealt very fully with that matter showing what advantages
they did gain by that seizure and showing on the chart that he had
on the wall the immense strengthening of the German position
against Poland. Therefore, I leave that matter. The documents are
already in evidence, and if the Tribunal should wish to refer to
them, they are found in their correct order in the story in that
document book.
As soon as that occupation had been completed, within a week
of marching into the rest of Czechoslovakia, the heat was beginning
to be turned on against Poland.
If the Tribunal would pass to Document TC-73, which is about
—
half way through that document book it follows after Jodl's lecture,
—
which is a long document TC-73, Number 61. It is headed: "Official
Documents concerning Polish-German Relations." This will be GB-38.
On the 21st of March Mr. Lipski again saw Ribbentrop and the
nature of the conversation was generally very much sharper than
that that had been held a little time back at the Grand Hotel,
Berchtesgaden:
"I saw Ribbentrop today. He began by saying he had asked
me to call in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their
entirety.
"He complained about our press, and the Warsaw students'
demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit."
I think I can go straight on to the larger paragraph, which
commences with "further":
"Further, Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Berchtes-
gaden between you and the Chancellor, in which Hitler put
forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland's frontiers in
exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig
into the Reich. He said that there had been further conver-
—
sations between you and him in Warsaw" that is, between
—
him, of course, and Mr. Beck "He said that there had been
further conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the
subject, and that you had pointed out the great difficulties
in the way of accepting these suggestions. He gave me to
understand that all this had made an unfavorable impression
on the Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive
reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. Ribbentrop
had talked to the Chancellor, only yesterday. He stated that
the Chancellor was still in favor of good relations with Poland,
and had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation
with you on the subject of our mutual relations. Ribbentrop

214
 6 Dec. 45

indicated that he was under the impression that difficulties

arising between us were also due to some misunderstanding
of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be considered
on a higher plane. In his opinion, our two States were
dependent on each other."
I think it unnecessary that I should read the next page. Briefly,
Ribbentrop emphasizes the German argument as to why Danzig
should return to the Reich, and I turn to the first paragraph on the
following page:
"I stated" —that —
Mr. Lipski "I stated that now, during the
is
settlement of the Czechoslovakian question, there was no
understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was
already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for,
despite our disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a
Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia, the position was far
worse. I emphasized our community of race, language, and
religion, and mentioned the help we had given in their
achievement of independence. I pointed out our long frontier
with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the street
could not understand why the Reich had assumed the protec-
tion of Slovakia, that protection being directed against Poland.
I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to
our relations.
"Ribbentrop reflected for a moment, and then answered that
this could be discussed.
"I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation
between you and the Chancellor. Ribbentrop remarked that
I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk the
matter over. He advised that the talk should not be delayed,
lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland
was rejecting all his offers.
"Finally, asked whether he could tell me anything about
I
his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.
Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen Mr. Urbszys
on the latter's return from Rome, and that they had discussed
the Memel question, which called for a solution."
That conversation took place on the 21st of March. It was not
very long before the world knew what the solution to Memel was.
On the next day German Armed Forces marched in.
If the Tribunal would turn over —
I think the next document is
—
unnecessary turn over to TC-72, Number 17, which becomes GB-39.
As a result of these events, not unnaturally, considerable
anxiety was growing both in the government of Great Britain and
the Polish Government, and the two governments therefore had
been undertaking conversations with each other.

215
6 Dec. 45

On the 31st of March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain,

spoke in the House of Commons, and he explained that as a result
of the conversations that had been taking place between the British
—
and Polish Governments I quote from the last but one paragraph
of his statement:
"As the House aware, certain consultations are now
is
proceeding other governments. In order to make
with
perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in
the meantime, before those consultations are concluded,
I now have to inform the House that during that period, in
the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish
independence and which the Polish Government accordingly
considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His
Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once
to lend the Polish Government all support in their power.
They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this
effect.

"I may add that the French Government have authorized

me to make
plain that they stand in the same position in
it

this matter as do His Majesty's Government."

On
the 6th of April, a week later, a formal communiqué was
issued by the Anglo-Polish Governments which repeated the
assurance the Prime Minister had given a week before and in
which Poland assured Great Britain of her support should she,
Great Britain, be attacked. I need not read it all. In fact, I need
not read any of it. I put it in. It is TC-72, Number 18. I put it
in as GB-40.

The anxiety and concern that the governments of Poland and

Great Britain were feeling at that time appear to have been well
justified. During the same week, on the 3rd of April, the Tribunal
will see in the next document an order signed by Keitel. It
emanates from the High Command of the Armed Forces. It is dated
Berlin, 3rd of April 1939. Its subject is: "Directive for the Armed
Forces 1939-40":
" 'Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the
Armed Forces for 1939-40' is being reissued.
"Part I (Frontier Defense) and Part III (Danzig) will be
issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain
unchanged.

——
"Part II, Case White" which is the code name for the oper-
ation against Poland "Part II, Case White, is attached here-
with. The signature of the Führer will be appended later.
"The Führer has added the following directives to Case
White:

216
 6 Dec. 45

"1. Preparations must be made in such a way that the

operation can be carried out at any time from 1st of September

—
1939 onwards." This is in April, the beginning of April.
, "2. The High Command of the Armed Forces has been
directed to draw up a precise timetable for Case White and
to arrange by conferences the synchronized timings among
the three branches of the Armed Forces.
"3. The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the
details for the timetable must be submitted to the OKW by
the 1st of May."
That document, as the Tribunal will see on the following page
under the heading "Distribution", went to the OKH, OKM, OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Are those words at the top part of the
document, or are they just notes?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: They are part of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: Directives from Hitler and Keitel, preparing
for war.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon; no, they are

not. The document starts from under the words "Translation of a
document signed by Keitel."

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: The first words being "top-secret."

the Tribunal will look at the second page, following after
If
"Distribution", it will be seen that there follows a translation of
another document, dated the 11th of April, and that document is
signed by Hitler:
"I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the
Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance
with these for the conduct of the war."
— —No question about
war "conduct of the war."
"Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must
be prepared for the following eventualities:
"I. Safeguarding the frontiers of the German Reich, and
protection against surprise air attacks;
"II. Case White;
The Annexation of Danzig.
"III.

"Annex IV contains regulations for the exercise of military

authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike develop-
ment." Again that document goes to the OKH, OKM, OKW.
On the next page of the copy the Tribunal have, the translation
of Annex I is set out, which is the safeguarding of the frontiers of

217
6 Dec. 45

the German Reich, and I would quote from Paragraph (2) under
"Special Orders":
"Legal Basis. It should.be anticipated that a state of defense
or a state of war, as defined in the Reich defense law of the
4th of September 1938, will not be declared. All measures
and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilization are
to be based on the laws valid in peacetime."
My Lord, that document is C-120. It becomes GB-41. It contains
some other later documents to which I shall refer in chronological
order.
The statement of the Prime Minister in the House of Commons,
followed by the Anglo-Polish communiqué of the 6th of April, was
seized upon by the Nazi Government to urge on, as it were, the
crisis which they were developing in Danzig between themselves
and Poland.
On the 28th the German Government issued a
of April
memorandum in they alleged that the Anglo-Polish
which
Declaration was incompatible with the 1934 agreement between
Poland and Germany, and that as a result of entering into or by
reason of entering into that agreement, Poland had unilaterally
renounced the 1934 agreement.
I would only quote three short passages, or four short passages,
from that document. It is TC-72, Number 14. It becomes GB-42.
Some of these passages are worth quoting, if only to show the
complete dishonesty of the whole document on the face of it:
"The German Government have taken note of the Polish-
British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the
negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great
Britain. Ascording to this declaration there has been
concluded between the Polish Government and the British
Government a temporary understanding, to be replaced
shortly by a permanent agreement, which will provide for the
giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in
the event of the independence of one of the two states
being directly or indirectly thréatened."
Thereafter, the document sets out in the next three paragraphs
the history of German friendship towards Poland. I quote from the
last paragraph. Paragraph 5, on that page:

"The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish

Government with the British Government is in such obvious
contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months
ago that the German Government can take note only with
surprise and astonishment of such a violent and fundamental
reversal of Polish policy.

218
 6 Dec. 45

"Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation

may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British
agreement is intended as a regular pact of alliance which,
by reason of its general sense and of the present state of
against Germany.
political relations, is directed exclusively
From the obligation now accepted by the Polish Government,
it appears that Poland intends, in certain circumstances, to

take an active part in any possible German-British conflict,

in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this
conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct
and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force
contained in the 1934 declaration."
I think I can omit Paragraph 6. Paragraph 7:

"The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision

to accede toan alliance directed against Germany, have given
it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a

third power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German

Government. In view of this, the German Government are
obliged to conclude that the Polish Government do not at
present attach any importance to seeking a solution of
German-Polish problems by means of direct, friendly discus-
sion with the German Government. The Polish Government
have thus abandoned the path, traced out in 1934, to the
shaping of German-Polish relations."
All this would sound very well, if it had not been for the fact
that orders for the invasion of Poland had already been issued and
the Armed Forces had been told to draw up a precise timetable.
The document goes on to set out the history of the last negotia-
tions and discussions. It sets out the demands
of the 21st, which
the German Government had made; return of Danzig, the
the
Autobahn, the railway, the promise by Germany of the 25 years'
guarantee, and I go down to the last but one paragraph on Page 3
of the Exhibit, under the heading (1):

"The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the

opportunity offered to them by the German Government for
a just settlement of the Danzig question; for the final safe-
guarding of Poland's frontiers with the Reich and thereby
for permanent strengthening of the friendly, neighborly
relations between the two countries. The Polish Government
even rejected German proposals made with this object.
"At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with
regard to another state, political obligations which are not
compatible either with the spirit, the meaning, or the text
of the German-Polish declaration of the 26th of January 1934.

219
6 Dec. 45

Thereby, the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally

'

rendered this declaration null and void."

In the last paragraph the German Government says that, never-
theless, they are prepared to continue friendly relations with
Poland.
On the same day as that memorandum was issued Hitler made
a speech in the Reichstag, 28 April, in which he repeated, in effect,
the terms of the memorandum. This is Document TC-72, Number 13,
which becomes GB-43. I would only refer the Tribunal to the latter
part of the second page of the translation. He has again repeated
the demands and offers that Germany made in March, and he goes
on to say that the Polish Government have rejected his offer and
lastly:
"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of
the Polish Government. But that alone is not the decisive
fact. The worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a
year ago, believes under the pressure of a lying international
campaign, that it must call up troops although Germany, on
her part, has not called up a single man and had not thought
of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said,
this is, in itself, very regrettable and posterity will one day
decide whether it was really right to refuse the suggestion
made once by me. This, as I have said, was an endeavor
this
on mypart to solve a question which intimately affects the
German people by a truly unique compromise and to solve
it to the advantage of both countries. According to my con-
viction, Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all,
but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all
doubt that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention
to attack, on the part of Germany, which was merely invented
by the international press, led, as you know, to the so-called
guarantee offer and to an obligation on the part of the Polish
."
Government for mutual assistance . . .

unnecessary. My Lord, to read more of that. It shows us,

It is
as I say, how completely dishonest was everything that the German
Government was saying at that time. There was Hitler, probably
with a copy of the orders for Fall Weiss in his pocket as he spoke,
saying that the intention to attack, by Germany, was an invention
of the international press.
In answer to that memorandum and that speech the Polish
Government issued a memorandum on the 28th of April. It is set
out in the next exhibit, TC-72, Number 16, which becomes GB-44.
It is unnecessary to read more than . . .

THE PRESIDENT: It is stated as the 5th of May, not the

28th of April.

220
 6 Dec. 45

LT. GOL. GRIFFITH- JONES: I beg your pardon, yes, on the

5th of May.
It is unnecessary to read more than two short paragraphs from
that reply. I can summarize the document in a word. It sets out
the objects of the 1934 agreement: to renounce the use of force and
to carry on friendly relationship between the two countries, to solve
difficulties by arbitration and other friendly means. The Polish
Government appreciate that there are about Danzig and
difficulties
have long been ready to carry out discussions. They set out again
their part in the recent discussions, and I turn to the second page
of the document, the one but last paragraph or, perhaps, I should go
back a little to the top of that page, the first half of that page. The
Polish Government allege that they wrote, as indeed they did, to
the German Government on the 26th of March giving their point of
view, that they then proposed joint guarantees by the Polish and
German Governments of the City of Danzig based on the principles
of freedom for the local population in internal affairs. They said
they were prepared to examine the possibilities of a motor road and
railway facilities and that they received no reply to those proposals:
"It is clear that negotiations in which one state formulates
demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those
demands unaltered, are not negotiations in the spirit of the
declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital
interests and dignity of Poland."

Which, of course, in a word summarizes the whole position of the

Polish point of view. And thereafter they reject the German
accusation that the Anglo-Polish agreement is incompatible with the
1934 German-Polish agreement. They state that Germany herself
has entered into similar agreements with other nations and lastly,
on the next page, they too say that they are still willing to entertain
a new pact with Germany, should Germany wish to do so.
Ifthe Tribunal would türn back to the Document C-120, to the
first two letters, to which I referred only a few minutes ago, it
becoming GB-41. On the bottom of the page there is a figure 614,
on the first page of that exhibit, "Directives from Hitler and Keitel
Preparing for War and the Invasion of Poland". I would refer to
Page 6 of that particular exhibit. The page number will be found
at the bottom of the page, in the center. It is a letter from the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, signed by Hitler and
dated the 10th of May. It goes to OKW, OKH, OKM, various
branches of the OKW and with it apparently were enclosed
"Instructions for the Economic War and the Protection of Our Own
Economy." I only mention it now to show better that throughout
this time preparations for the immediate aggression were continuing.
That document will still be part of the same exhibit.

221
6 Dec. 45

Again on the next page, which is headed Number C-120(l),

I am
afraid this is a précis only, not a full translation and therefore,
perhaps, I will not read it. But it is the annex, showing the
"Directives for the War against the Enemy Economy and Measures
of Protection for Our Own Economy."
As we were the military preparations
will see later, not only
being carried out throughout these months and weeks, but economic
and every other kind of preparation was being made for war at
the earliest moment.
Ithink this period of preparation, translated up to May 1939,
finishes really with that famous meeting or conference in the Reich
Chancellery on the 23rd of May about which the Tribunal has
already heard. It was L-79 and is now Exhibit USA-27; and it was
referred to, I think, and has been known as the "Schmundt minutes."
It is the last document which is in the Tribunal's document book
of this part and I do not propose to read anything of it. It has been
read already and the Tribunal will remember that it was the
speech in which Hitler was crying out for Lebensraum and said that
Danzig was not the dispute at all. It was a question of expanding
their living space in the East, where he said that the decision had
been taken to attack Poland.
THE PRESIDENT: Would you remind me of the date of it?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: The 23rd of May 1939. Your

Lordship will remember that Goring, Raeder, and Keitel, among
many others, were present. It has three particular lines of which
I want to remind the Tribunal, where he said:

"If there were an alliance of France, England, and Russia

against Germany, Italy, and Japan, I would be constrained
to attack England and France with a few annihilating blows.
The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement
with England."
So that, not only has the decision been taken definitely to attack
Poland, but almost equally definitely to attack England and France,
also.
I pass to the next period, which I have described as the final
preparations taken from June up to the beginning of the war, at
—
the beginning of September Part V of the Tribunal's document
book. If the Tribunal will glance at the index to the document
book, they will find I have, for convenience, divided the evidence
up under four subheadings:
Final preparations of the Armed Forces; economic preparation;
the famous Obersalzberg speeches; and the political or diplomatic
preparations urging on the crisis and the justification for the
invasion of Poland.

222
 6 Dec. 45

I refer the Tribunal to the first document in that book, deaUng

with the final preparations of the Armed Forces. It again is an
exhibit containing various documents, and I refer particularly to

the second document, dated the 22d of June 1939. This is Document
C-126, which will become GB-45.
It will be remembered that a precise timetable had been called
for. Now, here it is:
"The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted
to the Führer and Supreme Commander, a 'preliminary time-
table' for Case White based on the particulars so far available
from the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Details concerning the
days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were
not included in this timetable.
"The Führer and Supreme Commander is, in the main, in
agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army, and Air
Force and made the following comments on individual points:
"1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up
reserves on a larger scale than usual for the maneuvers
scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments,
employers or other private persons who make inquiries
should be told that men are being called up for the autumn
maneuvers and for the exercise units it is intended to form
for these maneuvers.
"It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to
subordinate establishments."
All this became relevant, particularly relevant, later when we
find the German Government making allegations of mobilization on
the part of the Poles. Here we have it in May, or rather June they —
are mobilizing, only doing so secretly:
"2. For reasons of security, the clearing of hospitals in the
area of the frontier must not be carried out."
the Tribunal will turn to the top of the following page, it
If
will be seen that that order is signed by the Defendant Keitel.
I think it is unnecessary to read any further from that document.

—
There is which perhaps will save turning back, if I might take it
—
rather out of date now the first document on that front page of
that exhibit, a short letter dated the 2d of August. It is only an
extract, I am afraid, as it appears in the translation:
"Attached are operational directions for the employment of
U-boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of
precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out Case
White remaining unchanged. Commander, U-boats is handing
in his operation orders by the 12th of August to the operations
staff of the Navy."

223
6 Dec. 45

One must assume that the Defendant Dönitz knew that his
U-boats were to go out into the Atlantic "by way of precaution in
the event of the intention to carry out Case White remaining
unchanged."
I turn to the next document in the Tribunal's book, C-30, which
becomes GB-46. That is a letter dated the 27th of July. It contains
orders for the air and sea forces for the occupation of the German
Free City of Danzig:
"The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
has ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig
with the Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must
occupy Danzig Free State immediately in order to protect
the German population. There will be no hostile intention on
the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place
without the force of arms."
It then sets out how the occupation is to be effected. All this
again becomes more relevant when we discuss the diplomatic action
of the last few days before the war, when Germany was purporting
to make specious offers for the settlement of the question by
peaceful means. I would like to offer this as evidence that the
decision had been taken and nothing was going to move him from
that decision. That document, as set out, says that, "There will be
no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation
takes place without the force of arms." Nevertheless, that was
not the only condition upon which the occupation was to take place
and we find that during July, right up to the time of the war, steps
were being taken to arm the population of Danzig and to prepare
them to take part in the coming occupation.
I refer the Tribunal to the next Document, TC-71, which becomes
GB-47, where there are set out a few only of the reports which
were coming back almost daily during this period from Mr. Shepherd,
the Consul-General in Danzig, to the British Foreign Minister. The
sum total of those reports can be found in the British Blue Book.
I now would refer to only two of them as examples of the kind
of thing that was happening.
I refer to the first that appears on that exhibit, dated the 1st of
July 1939.
"Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti
arrived here by night express from Berlin to organize Danzig
Heimwehr. AU approaches to hills and dismantled forts,
which constitute a popular public promenade on the western
fringe of the city, have been closed with barbed wire and
'verboten' notices. The walls surrounding the shipyards bear
placards: 'Comrades keep your mouths shut lest you regret
consequence.'

224
 6 Dec. 45

"Master of British steamer High Commissioner Wood, while

he was roving Königsberg from the 28th of June to 30th of
June, observed considerable military activity, including
•
extensive shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar
material, by small coasting vessels. On the 28th of June four
medium-sized steamers, loaded with troops, lorries, field
kitchens, and so forth, left Königsberg ostensibly returning
to Hamburg after maneuvers, but actually proceeding to
"
Stettin. Names of steamers
And again, as another example, the report Number 11, on the
next page of the exhibit, dated the 10th of July, states:
"The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises
methat on the 8th of July, he personally saw about 30 mili-
tary lorries with East Prussian license numbers on the Bischofs-
berg, where numerous field kitchens had been placed along
the hedges. There were also eight large antiaircraft guns in
position, which he estimated as being of over 3-inch caliber,
and three six-barreled light antiaircraft machine guns. There
were about 500 men, drilling with rifles, and the whole place
is extensively fortified with barbed wire."

I do not think it is necessary to occupy the Tribunal's time in

reading more. Those, as I say, are two reports only, of a number
of others that can be found in the British Blue Book, which sets out
the arming and preparation of the Free City of Danzig.
On the 12th of August and the 13th of August, when preparations
—
were practically complete and it will be remembered that they had
to be complete for an invasion of Poland on the 1st of September
— we find Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop at last disclosing
their intentions to their allies, the Italians.
One of the passages in Hitler's speech of the 23rd of May, it will
—
be remembered I will not quote it now because the document has
been read before. However, in a passage in that speech Hitler, in
regard to his proposed attack on Poland, had said, "Our object must
be kept secret even from the Italians and the Japanese."
Now, when his preparations are complete, he discloses his inten-
tions to his Italian comrades, and does so in hope that they will
join him.
The minutes of that meeting are long, and it is not proposed to
read more than a few passages. The meeting can be summarized
generally by saying, as I have, that Hitler is trying to persuade the
Italians to come into the war with him. The Italians, or Ciano,
rather, is most surprised. He had no idea, as he says, of the urgency
of the matter; and they are not prepared. He, therefore, is trying
to dissuade Hitler from starting off so soon until the Duce can have
had a little more time to prepare himself.

225
6 Dec. 45

— —
The value perhaps the greatest value of the minutes of that
meeting is that they show quite clearly the German intention to
attack England and France ultimately, anyway, if not at the same
time as Poland.
I refer the Tribunal to the second page of the exhibit. Hitler is
trying to show the strength of Germany, the certainty of winning
the war; and, therefore, he hopes to persuade the Italians to come in:
"At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforce-
—
ments in prospect." I quote from the top of the second page.
— "Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under
construction could be taken into service. As far as the land
army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription
60,000 men had been called to the colors."
I quote this passage particularly to show the intention to attack
England. We have been concentrating rather on Poland, but here
his thoughts are turned entirely towards England:
"If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she
could send to France, at the most, two infantry divisions and
one armored division. For the rest she could supply a few
bomber squadrons, but hardly any fighters, since, at the out-
break of war, the German Air Force would at once attack
England and the English fighters would be urgently needed
for the defense of their own country.
"With regard to the position of France, the Führer said that
in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland
— —
which would not take long Germany would be in a position
to assemble a hundred divisions along the West Wall and
France would then be compelled to concentrate all her avail-
able forces from the colonies, from the Italian frontier and
elsewhere, on her own Maginot Line for the life and death
struggle which would then ensue. The Führer also thought
that the French would find it no easier to overrun the Italian
fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count
—
Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt." Doubts which, per-
haps, in view of the subsequent performances, were well
justified.
"The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with
a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops
of less value. Poland was very weak in antitank and anti-
aircraft defense and at the moment neither France nor Eng-
land could help her in this respect."
What this Tribunal will appreciate, of course, is that Poland
formed such a threat to Germany on Germany's eastern frontier.
"If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western

Powers over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons

226
 6 Dec. 45

and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In

contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Krakow, the popu-
lation of their areas is indifferent. Furthermore, it was neces-
sary to consider the position of the Polish State. Out of
34 million inhabitants, one and one-half million were German,
about four million were Jews, and approximately nine million
Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number
than the total population and, as already said, their striking
power was to be valued variably. In these circumstances
Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the
shortest time.
"Since the Poles, through their whole attitude, had made it
clear that in any case, in the event of a conflict, they would
stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a
quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of
advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western
Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's
eastern frontier, not only would the 11 East Prussian divi-
sions be tied down; but also further contingents would be
kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary
in the event of a previous liquidation."
The argument goes on on those lines.

I pass on to the next page, at the top of the page:

"Coming back to the Danzig question, the Führer said to
Count Ciano that it was impossible for him to go back now.
He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of
the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must
take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this
Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other
areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by
pointing to a general easterly and northeasterly direction of
a German policy. The east and northeast, that is to say the
Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of
influence since time immemorial, as the Mediterranean had
been the appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons
also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these
eastern regions."
Now we get the truth of this matter. It is not the persecution of
German minorities on the Polish frontiers, but the economic reasons,
the need for foodstuffs and timber from Poland:
"In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only
material, although the city had the greatest harbor in the
—
Baltic the transshipment by tonnage was 40 percent of that
—
of Hamburg but Danzig was a Nuremberg of the north, an
ancient German city awaking sentimental feelings for every

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6 Dec. 45

German, and the Führer was bound to take account of this

psychological element in public opinion. To make a com-
parison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste
was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority was
being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult
to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything
of this kind.
"Count Ciano, in replying to the Führer's statement, first
expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the
completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in
the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place
during his Berlin visit had there been any sign, from the
German side, that the position with regard to Poland was so
serious. On the contrary, the Minister of Foreign Affairs had
said that in his opinion the Danzig question would be settled
in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce, in view
of his conviction that a conflict with the Western Powers was
unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his prepara-
tions for this event; he had made plans for a period of 2 or
3 years. If immediate conflict was unavoidable, the Duce, as
he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side;
but for various reasons he would welcome the postponement
of a general conflict until a later time."
No question of welcoming the cancellation of a general conflict;
the only concern of anybody is as to time.
"Ciano then showed, with the aid of a map, the position of
Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a
with Poland would not be limited to that country but
conflict
would develop into a general European war."
Thereafter, during the meeting, Ciano goes on to try to dissuade
Hitler from any immediate action. I quote two lines from the argu-
ment at the top of Page 5 of the exhibit:
•
"For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers
should make a gesture which would reassure people of the
peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany."
Then we get the Führer's answer to those arguments, half-way
down Page 5:
"The Führer answered that for a solution of the Polish
problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until
the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in
eastern Europe become. From the middle of September
weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in
these areas, while the conditions of the roads, which were
quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be
such as to make them impossible for motorized forces. From

228
 6 Dec. 45

September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely

unsuited for any kind of military operations. Poland could,
however, occupy Danzig in October and Germany would
. . .

not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could

not bombard or destroy the place."
They couldn't possibly bombard or destroy any place where there
happened to be Germans living. Warsaw, Rotterdam, England,
—
London I wonder whether any sentiments of that kind were held
in consideration in regard to those places.
"Ciano asked how soon, according to the Führer's view, the
Danzig question must be settled. The Führer answered that
this settlement must be made one way or another by the end
of August. To the question of Ciano as to what solution the
Führer proposed. Hitler answered that Poland must give up
political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests
would obviously be reserved and that Polish general behavior
must contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He
doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution
since, up to the present, the German proposals had been
refused. The Führer had made this proposal personally to
Beck, at his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely
favorable to Poland. In return for the political surrender of
Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests, and
the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and
the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee,
a 25-year pact of friendship, and the participation of Poland
in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal
with the remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain
refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention.
The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the press.
They wanted the whole of East Prussia, and even proposed
to advance to Berlin ."
. . . —
That was something quite
different.
The meeting was held over that night, and it continued on the
following day.
On Page 7, in the middle of the page,
it will be seen:

"The Führer had therefore come to two definite conclusions:

(1) in the event of any further provocation, he would im-
mediately attack; (2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly
state her political intention, she must be forced to do so."
I go to the last line on that page:
"As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not
exist further in the world through the lack of space; not only
was there no more space, but existing space was completely
blockaded by its present possessors; they sat like misers with

229
6 Dec. 45

their heaps of gold and deluded themselves about their

riches .... The Western Democracies were dominated by the
desire to rule the world and would not regard Germany and
Italy as in their class. This psychological element of contempt
was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It
could only be settled by a life and death struggle which the
two Axis partners could meet more easily because their
interests did not clash on any point.
"The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain
had a claim to predominance. The Duce him-
for which Italy
self had summed up the position to him in the words that
. . .

Italy, because of its geographic location, was already the

dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand,
the Führer said that Germany must take the old German
road eastwards and that this road was also desirable for
economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and histori-
cal claims to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck . . .

had recognized it and had said as much in his well-known

letter to Mazzini. The interests of Germany and Italy went
in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict
between them.
"The Minister of Foreign Affairs added that if the two prob-
lems mentioned in yesterday's conversations were settled,
Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work
against the West. The Führer said that Poland must be struck
——
down so that for 10 years" there appears to have been a
query raised in the translation "for so many years long she
would have been incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters
in the west could be settled.
"Ciano thanked the Führer for his extremely clear explanation
of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and
would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite
information on one point, in order that the Duce might have
all the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make
no decision because the Führer believed that the conflict with
Poland could be localized. On the basis of long experience
— —
he" Ciano "quite saw that so far the Führer had always
been right in his judgment of the position. If, however,
Mussolini had no decision to make, he had to take certain
measures of precaution, and therefore Ciano would put the
following question:
"The Führer had mentioned two conditions under which he
would take Poland: (1) if Poland were guilty of serious provo-
cation, and (2) if Poland did not make her political position
clear. The first of these conditions did not depend on the

230
 6 Dec. 45

decision of the Führer, and German reaction would follow in

a moment. The second condition required certain decisions
as to time. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which
Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political con-
dition. He realized that this date depended upon climatic
conditions.
"The Führer answered that the decision of Poland must be
made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, how-
ever, the decisive part of military operations against Poland
could be carried out within a period of 14 days, and the final
liquidation would need another ... 4 weeks, it could be
finished at the end of September or the beginning of October.
These could be regarded as the dates. It followed, therefore,
that the last date on which he could begin to take action was
the end of August.
"Finally, the Führer reassured Ciano that since his youth he
had favored German-Italian co-operation, and that no other
view was expressed in his publications. He had always
thought that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for
collaboration, since there were no conflicts of interest between
them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which,
apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would
stand out great and unique in history; that he could be this
man's friend was for him a matter of great personal satis-
faction, and if the hour of common battle struck, he would
always be found on the side of the Duce for better or for
worse."
THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: If the Tribunal please, I never

actually put that last document that I was referring to in as an
exhibit. It is Document TC-77, which becomes GB-48.
Having referred the Tribunal to those documents showing that
the military preparations were throughout the whole period in hand
and nearing their completion, I would refer to one letter from the
Defendant Funk, showing that at the same time the economists had
not been idle. It is a letter dated the 26th of August 1939, in which
Funk is writing to his Führer. He says:
"My thank you sincerely and heartily for your most
Führer! I
friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How
happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being
granted the favor of experiencing these overwhelmingly great

231
6 Dec. 45

and world-changing times and taking part in the mighty

events of these days.
"The information given to me by Field Marshal Goring, that
you, my
Führer, yesterday evening approved in principle the
measures prepared by me for financing the war and for
shaping the relationship between wages and prices and for
carrying through emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy.
I hereby report to you, with all respect, that I have succeeded
by means of precautions taken during the last few months in
making the Reich Bank internally so strong and externally so
unassailable that even the most serious shocks in the inter-
national money and credit market cannot affect us in the
least. In the meantime, I have quite inconspicuously changed
into gold all the assets of the Reich Bank and of the whole of
the German economy abroad on which it was possible to lay
hands. Under the proposals I have prepared for a ruthless
elimination of all consumption which is not of vital impor-
tance and of all public expenditure and public works which
are not of importance for the war effort, we will be in a posi-
tion to cope with all demands on finance and economy without
any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the
general plenipotentiary for economy, appointed by you, to
make this report and solemn promise to you, my Führer. Heil
— —
my Führer" signed "Walter Funk."
That document is PS-699, and it goes in as GB-49.
view of that letter to see how the Defendant
It is difficult in
Funk can say that he did not know of the preparations and of
the intentions of the German Government to wage war.
I come now to the speech which Hitler made on the 22d of August
at Obersalzberg to his commanders-in-chief. By the end of the third
week of August, preparations were complete. That speech has
already been read to the Tribunal. I would, perhaps, ask the
Tribunal's patience if I quoted literally half a dozen lines so as to
carry the story on in sequence.
On the first page of PS-1014, which is already USA-30, the fourth
line:
"Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were
determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers."
The second paragraph:
"Destruction of Poland is in the foreground. The aim is the
elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line.
Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of
Poland shall be the primary objective."
Again, the famous sentence in the third paragraph:

232
 6 Dec. 45

cause for starting the war, never

"I shall give a propagandistic
mind whether be plausible or not. The victor shall not bé
it

asked later on whether he told the truth or not. In starting

and making a war, not the right is what matters but victory."
We are going to see only too clearly how that propagandistic cause,
which already had been put in hand, was brought to its climax.
I turn to the next page (798-PS, USA-29), the third paragraph:

"It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come

sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring,
but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a
few years, and only afterwards against the East."
I refer to these passages again particularly to emphasize the
intention of the Nazi Government, not only to conquer Poland, but
ultimately, in any event, to wage aggressive war against the
Western Democracies.
I refer lastly to the last page, a passage which becomes more and
more significant as we continue the story of the last few days:
I quote from the fourth paragraph:
"We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply
us with grain, cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a big aim,
which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the
last minute some 'Schweinehund' will make a proposal for
mediation.
"The political aim is set farther. A beginning has been made
for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open
for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations."
And, again,, the very last line becomes significant later:
"Goring answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance
that the Armed Forces will do their duty."
We pass from the military-economic preparations and his exhor-
tations to his generals to see how he was developing the position in
the diplomatic and political field.
On the 23rd of August 1939 the Danzig Senate passed a decree
whereby Gauleiter Forster was appointed head of the State of the
Free City of Danzig, a position which did not exist under the statute
setting up the constitution of the Free City. I put in the next docu-
ment, which is taken from the British Blue Book, only as evidence
of that event, an event that was, of course, aimed at stirring up the
feeling in the Free City at that time. That is TC-72, Number 62,
which becomes GB-50.
At the same time, frontier incidents were being manufactured
by the Nazi Government with the aid of the SS. The Tribunal has
already heard the evidence of General Lahousen the other day in
which he referred to the provision of Polish uniforms to the SS

233
6 Dec. 45

forces for these purposes, so that dead Poles could be found lying
about the German side of the frontier. I refer the Tribunal now to
three short reports which corroborate the evidence that that gentle-
man came and gave before you, and they are found in the British
Blue Book. They are reports from the British Ambassador in
Warsaw.
The first of them, TC-72, Number 53, which becomes GB-51, is
dated 26th of August.
"A series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German
frontier.
"Polish patrol met a party of Germans one kilometer from
the East Prussian frontier near Pelta. Germans opened fire.
Polish patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being
returned.
"German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo,
twice near Rybnik, and twice elsewhere, firing shots and
attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns
and hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin.
"Gazeta Polska, in an inspired lead article today, says these
are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of
aggression of para-military disciplined detachments, supplied
with regular army's arms, and in one case it was a regular
army detachment. Attacks more or less continuous.
"These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and
strong attitude of defense. Facts spoke for themselves and
acts of aggression came from German side. This was the best
answer to the ravings of German press.
"Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detach-
ment has since shot a Pole across frontier and wounded
another."
I pass to the next report, TC-72, Number 54, which becomes
GB-52. It is dated the same date, the 26th of August.

"Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted

by Hitler to the French Ambassador that 24 Germans were
recently killed at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. The story is
without any foundation whatever."
And lastly, TC-72, Number 55, which becomes GB-53, the report
of the next day, the 27th of August.
"So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treat-
ment of German minority by Polish authorities are gross
exaggeration, if not complete falsification.
"2. There is of any loss of control of situation by
no sign
Polish civil authorities. Warsaw, and so far as I can ascer-
tain, the rest of Poland is still completely calm.

234
 6 Dec. 45

"3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda

methods regarding Czechoslovakia last year.
"4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German

provocation in accordance v^ith fixed policy that has since

—
March" since the date when the rest of Czechoslovakia was
—
seized and they were ready to go against Poland "that has
since March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities.
I suppose this has been done with the object:

"(a) Creating war spirit in Germany, (b) impressing public

opinion abroad, (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent
aggression in Poland.
"5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter
objects.
"6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by
Herr Hitler.
"7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is
apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings
of Germans in Poland where, be it noted, they do not amount
to more than 10 per cent of the population in any commune.
"8. In the face of these facts it can hardly be doubted that,
if Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of
destroying Polish independence.
"9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for

Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to

prove that Hitler's allegations regarding German minority are
false."
And yet, again, we have further corroboration of General
Lahousen's evidence in a memorandum, which has been captured,
of a conversation between the writer and Keitel. It is 795-PS, and it
becomes GB-54. That conversation with Keitel took place on the 17th
of August, and from the memorandum I quote the first paragraph:
"I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that
he would not pay any attention to this action, as the Führer
had not informed him, and had only let him know that we
were to furnish Heydrich with Polish uniforms. He agrees
that I instruct the General Staff. He says he does not think
much of actions of this kind. However, there is nothing else
to be done if they have been ordered by the Führer; that he
could not ask the Führer how he had planned the execution
of this special action. In regard to Dirschau, he has decided
that this action would be executed only by the Army."
That then. My Lord, was the position at the end of the first week
in August —
I mean at the end of the third week in August. On the
22d of August the Russian-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed

235
6 Dec 45

in Moscow, and we have heard in Hitler's speech of that date to his

commanders-in-chief how it had gone down as a shock to the rest
of the world. In fact, the orders to invade Poland were given imme-
diately after the signing of that treaty, and the H-hour was actually
to be in the early morning of the 25th of August. Orders were
given to invade Poland in the early hours of the 25th of August,
and that I shall prove in a moment.
— —
On the same day the 23rd of August that the German-Russian
agreement was signed in Moscow, news reached England that it was
being signed. And of course the significance of it from a military
point of view as to Germany, particularly in the present circum-
stances, was obvious; and the British Government immediately made
—
their position clear in one last hope and that one last hope was
that if they did so the German Government might possibly think
better of it. And I refer to Document TC-72, Number 56; it is the
firstdocument in the next to the last part of the Tribunal document
book, in which the Prime Minister wrote to Hitler. That document
becomes GB-55:
"Your Excellency:
"Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures
taken by His Majesty's Government, and announced in the
press and on the wireless this evening.
"These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Govern-
ment, been rendered necessary by the military movements
which have been reported from Germany and by the fact that
apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet agreement
is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that inter-
vention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer
a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake
could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the
German-Soviet agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's
obligation to Poland, which His Majesty's Government have
stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are
determined to fulfill.
"It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had
made their position more
clear in 1914, the great catastrophe
would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force
in that allegation. His Majesty's Government are resolved that
on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.
"If the case should arise, they are resolved and prepared to
employ without delay all the forces at their command; and it
is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged.

It would be a dangerous delusion to think that, if war once

starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any

236
 6 Dec. 45

one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should

have been secured."
Thereafter the Prime Minister urged the German Government
to try and resolve the difficulty without recourse to the use of force;
and he suggested that a truce should be declared while direct dis-
cussions between the two Governments, the Polish and German
Governments, might take place. I quote in Prime Minister Chamber-
lain's language:
"At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a
catastrophe that will involve Europe in war. In view of the
grave consequences to humanity which may follow from the
action of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh
with the utmost deliberation the considerations whidi I have
put before you."
On the following day, the 23rd of August, Hitler replied to Prime
Minister Chamberlain, and that document is TC-72, Number 60, and
it becomes GB-56. He starts off by saying that Germany has always

wanted England's friendship, and has always done everything to

get it; on the other hand, she has some essential interests which it is
impossible for Germany to renounce. I quote the third paragraph:
"Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig and
of the corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of
a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegation
which is disseminated by England regarding a German mobili-
zation against Poland" —
—we see here the complete dishonesty
of the whole business "the assertion of aggressive designs
towards Romania, Hungary, and so forth as well as the
so-called guarantee declarations, which were subsequently
given, had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate
on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for
Germany also.
"The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland,
that she would render assistance to that country in all circum-
stances regardless of the causes from which a conflict might
spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an
encouragement thenceforward to unloosen, under cover of
such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one
and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland."
Again I cannot help remembering the report by the British
Ambassador, to which I just referred:
"The atrocities which since then have been taking place in
that country are terrible for the victims but intolerable for
a great power such as the German Reich, which is expected
to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland
has been guilty of numerous breaches of her obligations

237
6 Dec. 45

towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the

character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic
strangulation."
It goes on to say that "Germany will not tolerate a continuance
of the persecution" and the fact that there is a British guarantee
to Poland makes no difference to her determination to end this
state of affairs. I quote from Paragraph 7:

"The German Reich Government has received information to

the effect that the British Government has the intention to
carry out measures of mobilization which, according to the
statements contained in your own letter, are clearly directed
against Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as
well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking
military measures other than those of a defensive character
against England or France and, as has already been emphasized,
has never intended, and does not in the future intend, to attack
England or France, it follows that this announcement as con-
firmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can
only refer to a contemplated act of menace directed against
the Reich. I, therefore, inform your Excellency that in the
event of these military announcements being carried into
effect, I shall order immediate mobilization of the German
forces."
If the intention of the German Government had been peaceful,
if they really wanted peace and not war, what was the purpose of
these lies; these lies saying that they had never intended to attack
England or France, carried out no mobilization, statements which,
in view of what we now have, we know to be lies? What can have
been their object if their intention had always been for a peaceful
settlement of the Danzig question only? Then I quote again from
the last paragraph:
"The question of the treatment of European problems on a
peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany, but
primarily on those who since the crime committed by the
Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed
any peaceful revision. Only after a change of the spirit on the
part of the responsible powers can there be any real change
in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all
my life fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude
—
adopted by British diplomacy at any rate up to the present
— has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an
attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the
future, nobody could be happier than I."
On the 25th of August the formal Anglo-Polish Agreement of
mutual assistance was signed in London. It is unnecessary to read

238
 6 Dec. 45

the document. The Tribunal will be well aware of its contents

where both Governments undertake to give assistance to the other
in the event of aggression against either by any third power. I point
to Document TC-73; it is Number 91 and it becomes GB-57. I shall
refer to the fact of its signing again in a moment but perhaps it
is convenient while we are dealing with a letter between the British
Prime Minister and Hitler to refer also to a similar correspondence
which took place a few days later between the French Prime
Minister M. Daladier and Hitler. I emphasize these because it is
desired to show how deliberately the German Government was set
about their pattern of aggression. "The French Ambassador in
Berlin has informed me of your personal communication," written
on the 26th of August:
"In the hours in which you speak of the greatest responsibility
which two heads of the Governments can possibly take upon
themselves, namely, that of shedding the blood of two great
nations who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to
you, personally, and to both our peoples to say that the fate
of peace still rests in your hands alone.

"You cannot doubt but what are my own feelings towards

Germany, nor France's peaceful feelings towards your nation.
No Frenchman has done more than myself to strengthen
between our two nations not only peace but also sincere
co-operation in their own interests as well as in those of
Europe and of the whole world. Unless you credit the French
people with a lower sense of honor than I credit to the Ger-
man nation, you cannot doubt that France loyally fulfills her
obligations toward other powers, such as Poland* which, as
I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany.
These two convictions are fully compatible.
"Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solu-
tion of the international crisis with all honor and dignity for
all nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.

"Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all

her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Poland's readiness,
which she has always shown, to submit to the mutual appli-
cation of a method of open settlement as it can be imagined
between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the
clearest conscience I can assure you that, among the differ-
ences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over
the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be
submitted to such a method with a purpose of reaching a
peaceful and just solution.
"Moreover, I can declare on my honor that there is nothing
in France's clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her

239
6 Dec. 45

which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude

allies,
of mycountry. This solidarity has never prevented us, and
does not prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same
friendly state of mind.
"In so serious an hour I sincerely believe that no high-minded
human being could understand it if a war of destruction were
started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful
settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for
peace could, in all certainty, work for this aim without any
prejudice to German honor. I, who desire good harmony
between the French and the German people, and who am, on
the other hand, bound to Poland by bonds of friendship and
by a promise, am prepared, as head of the French Govern-
ment, to do everything an upright man can do to bring this
attempt to a successful conclusion.
"You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know,
as I do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of
that war have left in the conscience of the people without any
regard to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind's
eye of your outstanding role as the leader of the German
people on the road of peace, toward the fulfillment of its
task in the common work of civilization, leads me to ask for
a reply to this suggestion.
"If French and German blood should be shed again as it was
shed 25 years ago in a still longer and more murderous war,
then each of the two nations will fight believing in its own
victory. But the most certain victors will be destruction and
barbarity."
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will adjourn now until 2 o'clock.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

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 6 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

COLONEL ROBERT G. STOREY (Executive Trial Counsel for

the United States): If it please the Tribunal, with the consent of
Lieutenant Colonel Griffith-Jones, may I make an announcement
to the Defense Counsel.
At 7:30 in the courtroom this evening, the remainder of the
motion pictures which the United States will offer in evidence will
be shown for the Defense Counsel. We urge that all of them come
at 7:30.

DR. DIX: I believe I can say on behalf of all members of the

Defense that they do not consider it necessary that the films be
shown to them before the proceedings, that is, shown to them twice.
We fully and with gratitude appreciate the courtesy and readiness
to facilitate our work; but our evenings are very much taken up
by the preparation of our cases and by the necessary consultations
with our clients.
The question of films is on a level different from that of docu-
ments. Documents one likes to read in advance or simultaneously
or later; but since we can hear and take note of the testimony of
witnesses only during the main proceedings, we are, of course, to an
even greater degree in a position and prepared to become acquainted
with the films submitted as evidence only during the proceedings.
We believe the Prosecution need not take the trouble of showing
every film to us on some evening before it is shown again in the
proceedings. We hope this will not be construed as, shall I say,
a sort of demonstration in some respect, for the reason really is
that our time is so fully taken up by our preparations that all
superfiuous work might well be spared both the Prosecution and us.
I repeat and emphasize that we fully and gratefully appreciate the
Prosecution's manifest readiness to facilitate our work, and I ask
that my words be understood in this light.
THE PRESIDENT: Do I understand that you think it will be
unnecessary for the defendants' counsel to have a preview of the
films, to see them before they are produced in evidence? Is that
what you are saying?
DR. DIX: Yes, that is what I said.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Storey, I am not sure that you were

here when Dr. Dix began his observation; but I understand that what
he says is that in view of the amount of preparation which the
defendants' counsel have to undertake, they do not consider it neces-
sary to have a view of these films before they are produced in evi-
dence, but at the same time he wishes to express his gratification at
the co-operation of the Counsel for the Prosecution.

241
6 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: Very agreeable. It's all right with us. We were
doing it for their benefit.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: When the Tribunal rose for the
adjournment, I had just read the letter from M. Daladier to Hitler,
of the 26th of August. On the 27th of August Hitler rephed to that
letter, and I think it unnecessary to read the reply. The sense of
it was very much the same as that which he wrote to the British
Prime Minister in answer to the letter that he had received earlier
in the week.
Those two letters are taken from the German White Book which
I put in evidence as GB-58, so perhaps the Tribunal would treat
both those letters as of the same number. After that, nobody could
say that the German Government could be in any doubt as to the
position that was to be taken up by both the British and French
Governments in the event of a German aggression against Poland.
But the pleas for peace did not end there. On the 24th of August
President Roosevelt wrote to both Hitler and the President of the
Polish Republic. I quote only the first few paragraphs of his letter:
"In the message which I sent you on April the 14th, I stated

that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had

it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster

that impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately

made, with goodwill on all sides, to find a peaceful and con-
structive solution to existing controversies, the crisis which
the world was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today
that catastrophe appears to be very near at hand indeed.
"To the message which I sent you last April I have received
no reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of
—
world peace which is the cause of humanity itself rises —
above all other considerations, I am again addressing myself
to you, with the hope that the war which impends, and the
consequent disaster to all peoples, may yet be averted.
"I therefore urge with all earnestness —
and I am likewise
urging the President of the Republic of Poland that the —
Governments of Germany and Poland agree by common
accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a
reasonable, stipulated period; and that they agree, likewise
by common accord, to solve the controversies which have
arisen between them by one of the three following methods:
"First, by direct negotiation; second, by the submission of these
controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can
both have confidence; third, that they agree to the solution of
these controversies through the procedure of conciliation."

242
 6 Dec. 45

I think it is unnecessary to read any more of that letter. As

I have already indicated to the Tribunal, the answer to that was
the order to his armed forces to invade Poland on the following
morning.
That document is Exhibit TC-72, Number 124, which becomes
GB-59.
I put in evidence also the next document, TC-72, Number 126,
GB-60, which is the reply to that letter from the President of the
Polish Republic, in which he accepts the offer to settle the differences
by any of the peaceful methods suggested.
On
the 25th of August, no reply having been received from the
German Government, President Roosevelt wrote again:
"I have this hour received from the President of Poland a
reply to the message which I addressed to Your Excellency
and to him last night."
The text of the Polish reply is then set out.
"Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims
and objects sought by the German Reich were just and
reasonable.
"In his reply to my message the President of Poland has
made it plain that the Polish Government are willing, upon
the basis set forth in my message, to agree to solve the
controversy which has arisen between the Republic of Poland
and the German Reich by direct negotiation or the process
of conciliation.
"Countless human lives can yet be saved, and hope may still
be restored that the nations of the modern world may even
now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier
relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich
will agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the
Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany,
too, will accept."
But, My Lord, Germany would not accept, nor would she accept
the appeals by the Pope which appear in the next document.
I am sorry —the President of Poland's reply, TC-72 becomes
Number 127, GB-61.
They would not agree to those proposals, nor would they pay
heed which is TC-72, Number 139 on the same
to the Pope's appeal,
date, the 24th of August, which becomes GB-62. I do not think it
is necessary to read that. It is an appeal in similar terms. And
there is yet a further appeal from the Pope on the 31st of August,
TC-72, Number 14, which becomes GB-63. It is 141; I beg your
pardon. It is TC-72, Number 141. I think the printing is wrong in
the Tribunal's translation:

243
6 Dec. 45

"The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotia-

tions may
lead to a just pacific solution, such as the whole
world continues to pray for."
I think it is unnecessary to read the remainder of that. If the
Pope had realized that those negotiations which he referred as
to
the "pending negotiations" in the last days of August, which we
are about to deal with now, were completely bogus negotiations,
bogus insofar as Germany was concerned, and put forward, as
—
indeed they were and as I hope to illustrate to the Tribunal in
—
a moment simply as an endeavor to dissuade England either by
threat or by bribe from meeting her obligations to Poland, then
perhaps he would have saved himself the trouble in ever addressing
that last appeal.
It will be seen quite clearly that those final German offers, to
which I now turn, were no offers in the accepted sense of the word
at all; that there was never any intention behind them of entering
into discussions, negotiation, arbitration, or any other form of
peaceful settlement with Poland. They were just an attempt to
make it rather easier to seize and conquer Poland than appeared
likely if England and France observed the obligations that they had
undertaken.
Perhaps I might, before dealing with the documents, summarize
in a word those last negotiations.
On
the 22d of August, as we have seen, the German-Soviet Pact
was signed. On the 24th of August, orders were given to his armies
to march the following morning. After those orders had been given,
the news apparently reached the German Government that the
British and Polish Governments had actually signed a formal pact
of non-aggression and of mutual assistance. Until that time, it will
be remembered, the position was that the Prime Minister had made
a statement in the House and a joint communiqué had been issued
— I think on the 6th of April —
that they would in fact assist one
another if either were attacked, but no formal agreement had been
signed.
Now, on the 24th of August after those orders had been given
by him, the news came that such a formal document had been
signed; and the invasion was postponed for the sole purpose of
making one last effort to keep England and France out of the war
— not to end the war, not to cancel the war, but to keep them out.
And to do that, on the 25th of August, having postponed the
invasion. Hitler issued a verbal communiqué to Sir Nevile Hender-
son which, as the Tribunal will see, was a mixture of bribe and
threat with which he hoped to persuade England to keep out.
On the 28th of August Sir Nevile Henderson handed the British
Government's reply to that communiqué to Hitler. That reply

244
 6 Dec. 45

stressed that the difference ought to be settled by agreement. The

British Government put forward the view that Danzig should be
guaranteed and, indeed, any agreement come to should be guaran-
teed by other powers, which, of course, in ^ny event would have
been quite unacceptable to the German Reich.
As I say, one really need not consider what would have been
acceptable and not acceptable because once it had been made
—
clear as indeed it was in that British Government's reply of the
—
28th of August that England would not be put off assisting Poland
in the event of German aggression, the German Government really
had no concern with further negotiation but were concerned only
to afford themselvessome kind of justification and to prevent them-
selves appearing too blatantly to turn down all the appeals to
reason that were being put forward.
On the 29th of August, in the evening at 7:15, Hitler handed to
Sir Nevile Henderson the German Government's answer to the
British Government's reply of the 28th. And here again in this
document it is quite clear that the whole object of it was to put
forward something which was quite unacceptable. He agrees to
enter into direct conversations as suggested by the British Govern-
ment, but he demands that those conversations must be based upon
the return of Danzig to the Reich and also of the whole of the
Corridor.
It will be remembered that hitherto, even when he alleged that
Poland had renounced the 1934 agreement, even then he had put
forward as his demands the return of Danzig alone and the arrange-
ment for an extra-territorial Autobahn and railroad running through
the Corridor to East Prussia. That was unacceptable then. To make
quite certain, he now demands the whole of the Corridor; no question
of an Autobahn or railway. The whole thing must become German.

Even so, even to make doubly certain that the offer would not
be accepted, he says:
"... on those terms I am prepared to enter into discussion;
but to do so, as the matter is urgent, I expect a plenipotentiary
with full powers from the Polish Government to be here in
Berlin by Wednesday, the 30th of August 1939."

This offer was made at 7:15 p.m. on the evening of the 29th.
That had to be transmitted first to London, and from London
offer
to Warsaw; and from Warsaw the Polish Government had to give
authority to their Ambassador in Berlin. So that the timing made
it quite impossible to get authority to their Ambassador in Berlin

by midnight the following night. It allowed them no kind of oppor-

tunity for discussing the matters at all. As Sir Nevile Henderson
described it, the offer amounted to an ultimatum.

245
6 Dec. 45

At midnight on the 30th of August at the time by which the

Pohsh Plenipotentiary was expected to arrive, Sir Nevile Henderson
saw Ribbentrop; and I shall read to you the account of that inter-
view, in whicli Sir Nevile Henderson handed a further message to
Ribbentrop in reply to the message that had been handed to him
the previous evening, and at which Ribbentrop read out in German
a two- or three-page document which purported to be the German
proposal to be discussed at the discussions between them and the
Polish Government. He read it out quickly in German. He refused
to hand a copy of it to the British Ambassador. He passed no copy
of it at all to the Polish Ambassador. So that there was no kind
of possible chance of the Poles ever having before them the propo-
sals which Germany was so graciously and magnanimously offering
to discuss.

On the following day, the 31st of August, Mr. Lipski saw

Ribbentrop and could get no further than to be asked whether
—
he came with full powers. When he did not when he said he
did not come with full powers, Ribbentrop said that he would
put the position before the Führer. But, in actual fact, it was
much too late to put any position to the Führer by that time,
—
because on the 31st of August I am afraid I am unable to give
—
you the exact time ^but on the 31st of August, Hitler had already
issued his Directive Number 1 for the conduct of the war, in
which he laid down H-Hour as being a quarter to five the
following morning, the 1st of September. And on the evening of
the 31st of August at 9 o'clock the German radio broadcast the
proposals which Ribbentrop had read out to Sir Nevile Henderson
the night before, saying that these were the proposals which had
been made for discussion but that, as no Polish Plenipotentiary had
arrived to discuss them, the German Government assumed that they
were turned down. That broadcast at 9 o'clock on the evening of
the 31st of August was the first that the Poles had ever heard of
the proposals, and the first, in fact, that the British Government or
their representatives in Berlin knew about them, other than what
had been heard when Ribbentrop had read them out and refused
to give a written copy, on the evening of the 30th.
After that broadcast at 9:15, perhaps when the broadcast was
in its course, acopy of those proposals was handed to Sir Nevile
Henderson, for the first time.
Having thus summarized for the convenience, I hope, of the
Tribunal, the timing of events during that last week, I would ask
the Tribunal to refer briefly to the remaining documents in that
document book. I first put in evidence an extract from the inter-
rogation of the Defendant Goring, which was taken on the 29th of
August 1945.

246
 6 Dec. 45

DR. STAHMER: As defense counsel for the Defendant Goring,

I object to the use of this document which is an extract from testi-
mony given by the Defendant Goring. Since the defendant is present
here in court, he can at any time be called to the stand and give
direct evidence on this subject before the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that your objection?

DR.STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand the ground
of your objection, in view of Article 15 (c) and Article 16 (b)
and (c) of the Charter. Article 15 (c) provides that the Chief Prose-
cutors shall undertake, among others, the duty of "the preliminary
examination of all necessary witnesses and of the defendants"; and
Article 16 provides that:
"In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the follow-
ing procedure shall be followed: . (b) During any prelim-
. .

inary examination ... of a defendant he shall have the

right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made
against him; (c) A
preliminary examination of a defendant
. shall be conducted in, or translated into, a language which
. .

the defendant understands."

Those provisions of the Charter, in the opinion of the Tribunal,
show that the defendants may be interrogated and that their inter-
rogations may be put in evidence.

DR. STAHMER: I was prompted by the idea that when it is

possible to call a witness, direct examination in court is preferable,
since the evidence thus obtained is more concrete.

THE PRESIDENT: You certainly have the opportunity of sum-

moning the defendant for whom you appear to give evidence
himself, but that has nothing to do with the admissibility of his
—
interrogation his preliminary examination.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: This extract is TC-90, which I put

in as GB-64. I quote from the middle of the first answer. It is

at the end of the 7th line. The Defendant Goring says there:

"On the day when England gave her official guarantee to

Poland, the Führer called me on the telephone and told me
that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked
him then whether this was just temporary or for good. He
said 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British
"
intervention.'

THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not read the question before the
answer?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: I go back to the question:

247
 —

6 Dec. 45

"When the negotiations of the PoHsh Foreign Minister in

London brought about the Anglo-Polish Treaty, at the end
of March or the beginning of April 1939, was it not fairly-
obvious that a peaceful solution was impossible?" answer —
"Yes, it seemed impossible after my conviction" I think that
— —
must be a bad translation "according to my conviction."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [Continuing.] but not . .

according to the convictions of the Führer. When it was

mentioned to the Führer that England had given her
guarantee to Poland, he said that England was also guarantee-
ing Romania, but then when the Russians took Bessarabia,
nothing happened; and this made a big impression on him.
I made a mistake here. At this time Poland only had the .

promise of a guarantee. The guarantee itself was only given

shortly before the beginning of the war. On the day when
England gave her official guarantee to Poland, the Führer
called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped
the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether
this was just temporary, or for good. He said, *No, I will
have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention.'
So, then I asked him, *Do you think that it will be any
different within 4 or 5 days?' At this same time I do not —
know whether you know about that. Colonel I was in —
communication with Lord Halifax by a special courier,
outside the regular diplomatic channels, to do everything to
stop war with England. After the guarantee, I held an
English declaration of war inevitable. I already told him in
the spring of 1939, after occupying Czechoslovakia, I told
him that from now on, if he tried to solve the Polish
question, he would have to count on the enmity of
—
England 1939, that is, after the Protectorate.
"Question: Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign
against Poland were originally supposed to have been com-
pleted by the end of August 1939?'
"Answer: *Yes.'

"Question: 'And that the final issuance of the order for

the campaign against Poland came sometime between the
15th and 20th of August 1939, after the signing of the treaty
—
with Soviet Russia?' " The dates obviously are wrong there.
"Answer: 'Yes, that is true.'

"Question: Is it not also a fact that the start of the

campaign was ordered for the 25th of August but on the
24th of August in the afternoon it was postponed until

248
 6 Dec. 45

September the 1st in order to await the results of new

diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador?'
"Answer: 'Yes.' "
My only comment upon that document is in respect to the
second paragraph where Goring is purporting not to want war
with England. The Court will remember how it was Goring, after
the famous speech of the 22d of August to his commanders-in-chief,
who got up and thanked the Führer for his exhortation and assured
him that the Armed Forces would play their part.
I omit the next document in the document book, which carries
the matter a little further, and we go on to Hitler's verbal
communiqué, as it is called in the British Blue Book, that he handed
to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th of August, after he had heard
of the signing of the Anglo-Polish agreement, in an endeavor to
keep England from meeting her obligations. He states in the first
paragraph, after hearing the British Ambassador, that he is anxious
to make one more effort to save war. In the second paragraph,
he asserts again that Poland's provocations were unbearable; and
I quote Paragraph 2:

"Germany was determined to abolish

in all circumstances
these Macedonian conditions on her eastern frontier and,
what is more, to do so in the interests of quiet and order
and also in the interests of European peace.
"The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved.
The British Prime Minister had made a speech which was
not in the least calculated to induce any change in the
German attitude. At the most, the result of this speech could
be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany and
England. Such a war would be bloodier than that of 1914
to 1918. In contrast to the last war, Germany would no
—
longer have to fight on two fronts." One sees the threats,
—
veiled threats, appearing in this paragraph "Agreement
with Russia was unconditional and signified a change in
foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long
time. Russia and Germany would never again take up arms
against each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached
with Russia would also render Germany secure economically
for the longest possible period of war.
"The Führer had always wanted Anglo-German under-
standing. War between England and Germany could at best
bring some profit to Germany, but none at all to England."
Then we come to the bribe:
"The Führer delared the German-Polish problem must be
solved and will be solved. He is, however, prepared and
determined, after the solution of this problem, to approach

249
6 Dec. 45

England once more with a large, comprehensive offer. He

is a man of great decisions; and in this case also,
he will be capable of being great in his action." and then,
— —
magnanimously "He accepts the British Empire and is ready-
to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and
to place the power of the German Reich at its disposal on
condition that his colonial demands, which are limited, should
be negotiated by peaceful means .... His obligations to
Italy remain untouched."
Again he stresses irrevocable determination never to enter into
war with Russia. I quote the last two paragraphs:
"If the British Government would consider these ideas, a
."
blessing for Germany . .

THE PRESIDENT: Why do you not read the first few lines of
Paragraph 3?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: Yes; I did summarize it—Para-
graph 3:
"He also desired to express the irrevocable determination
of Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia."

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: I quote the last two paragraphs:
"If the British Government would consider these ideas,
a blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire
might result. If they reject these ideas, there will be war.
In no case will Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war
proved it. The Führer repeats that he himself is a man of
far-reaching decisions by which he is bound, and that this is
."
his last offer . . .

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn and then the

matter can be investigated.

[A recess was taken.]

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I had just finished reading the

from Hitler to the British Government, which was TC-72,
offer
Number 68, and which becomes GB-65.
The British Government were not, of course, aware of the real
object that lay behind that message; and, taking it at its face value
and desirous to enter into discussions, they wrote back on the 28th
of August saying that they were prepared to enter into discussions.
They agreed with Hitler that the differences must be settled, and
I quote from Paragraph 4:

*'Inthe opinion of His Majesty's Government, a reasonable

solution of the differences between Germany and Poland

250
 6 Dec. 45

could and should be effected by agreement between the two

countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of
Poland's essential interests; and they recall that in his speech
of the 28th of April, the German Chancellor recognized the
importance of these interests to Poland.
"But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in. his letter to
the German Chancellor of the 22d of August, His Majesty's
Government consider it essential for the success of the
discussions, which would precede the agreement, that it
should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived
at would be guaranteed by other powers. His Majesty's
Government would be ready, if desired, to make their
contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee."
I go to the last paragraph on that page. Paragraph 6:

"His Majesty's Government have said enough to make their

own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between
Germany and Poland. They trust that the German Chancellor
will not think that, because His Majesty's Government are
scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland, they are
not anxious to use all their influence to assist the achievement
of a solution which may commend itself both to Germany
and to Poland."
That, of course, knocked the German hopes on the head. They
had failed by their tricks and their bribes to dissuade England
from observing her obligations to Poland, and it was now only
a matter of getting out of their embarrassment as quickly as
possible and saving their face as much as possible. The last
document becomes GB-66. And I put in also Sir Nevile Henderson's
account of that interview, TC-72, Number 75, which becomes GB-67.
During that interview, the only importance of it is that Sir
Nevile Henderson again emphasized the British attitude and that
they were determined in any event to meet their obligations to
Poland. One paragraph I would quote, which is interesting in view
of the letters that were to follow, paragraph 10:
"In the end I asked him two straight questions: 'Was he
willing to negotiate directly with the Poles?' and 'Was he
ready to discuss the question of an exchange of population?'
He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter, although
there I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same
time of a rectification of frontiers. As regards the first, he
said he could not give me an answer until after he had
given the reply of His Majesty's Government the careful
consideration which such a document deserved. In this
connection he turned to Ribbentrop and said, 'We must
summon Field Marshal Goring to discuss it with him.' "

251
6 Dec. 45

Then in the next paragraph, again Sir Nevile Henderson finaHy

repeated to him very solemnly the main note of the whole
conversation, so far as he was concerned.
I pass to the next document, which is TC-72, Number 78, which
becomes GB-68.
The German reply, as I outlined before, was handed to Sir
Nevile Henderson at 7:15 p.m. on the 29th of August. The reply
sets out the suggestion submitted by the British Government in
their previous note; and it goes on to say that the German
Government are prepared to enter into discussion on the basis
that the whole of the Corridor, as well as Danzig, are returned to
the Reich. I quote particularly the next to the last paragraph on
the first page of that document:
"The demands of the German Government are in conformity
with the revision of the Versailles Treaty, which has always
been recognized as being necessary, in regard to this terri-
tory, namely: return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany,
the safeguarding of the existence of the German national
group in the territories remaining to Poland."
It is only just now, as I emphasized before, that that right has
been recognized for so long. On the 28th of April his demands
consisted only of Danzig, of an Autobahn, and of the railway.
will remember the position which he is trying
The Tribunal
to get out of now. He is trying to manufacture justification by
putting forth proposals which under no possible circumstances
could either Poland .or Great Britain accept. But, as I said before,
he wanted to make doubly certain.
I go to the second page, and start with the third paragraph:
"The British Government attach importance to two consider-
That the existing danger of àn imminent explosion
ations: (1)
should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotia-
tion; and (2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the
form in which it would then continue to exist, should be
adequately safeguarded in the economic and political sphere
by means of international guarantees.

"On this subject the German Government make the following

declaration:
"Though skeptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome,
they are, nevertheless, prepared to accept the English proposal
and to enter into direct discussion. They do so, as has already
been emphasized, solely as the result of the impression made
upon them by the written statement received from the British
Government that they, too, desire a pact of friendship in

252
 6 Dec. 45

accordance with the general lines indicated to the British

Ambassador."
And then, to the last but one paragraph:
"For the rest, in making these proposals, the German
Government have never had any intention of touching
Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an
independent Polish State."
These letters really sound like the letters of some common
swindler rather than of the government of a great nation.
"The German Government, accordingly, in these circum-
stances agree to accept the British Government's offer of
their good offices in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish
Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this
Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August 1939.
"The German Government will immediately draw up pro-
posals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if
possible, place these at the disposal of the British Govern-
ment before the arrival of the Polish negotiator."
That was at 7:15 in the evening of the 29th of August and
as I have explained, it allowed little time in order to get the Polish
Emissary there by midnight the following night. That document was
GB-68.
The next document, Sir Nevile Henderson's account of the
summarizes what had taken place; and I quote particularly
interval,
Paragraph 4:

"I —
remarked that this phrase" that is the passage about
the Polish Emissary being there by midnight the following
—
night "sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated
remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr Von Ribbentrop assured
me that it was only intended to stress the urgency of the
moment when the two fully mobilized armies were standing
face to face."
That was the interview on the evening of the 29th of August. The
last document becomes GB-69.

Again the British Government replied, and Sir Nevile Henderson

handed this reply to Ribbentrop at the famous meeting on midnight
of the 30th of August at the time the Polish Emissary had been
expected. I need not read at length. The British Government
reciprocate the desire for improved relations. They stress again
that they cannot sacrifice the interest of other friends in order to
obtain an improvement in the situation. They understand, they
say, that the German Government accept the condition that the
settlement should be subject to international guarantee. They make
a reservation as to the demands that the Germans put forward in

253
6 Dec. 45

their last letterand they are informing the Polish Government

immediately; and lastly, they understand that the German Govern-
ment are drawing up the proposals. That Document TC-72,
Number 89, will be GB-70. For the account of the interview, we
go to the next document in the Tribunal's book, TC-72, Number 92,
which becomes GB-71. It is not a very long document. It is perhaps
worth reading in full:
"I told Herr Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty's
Government found it difficult to advise the Polish Govern-
ment to accept the procedure adumbrated in the German
reply and suggested that he should adopt the normal contact,
i.e. that when German proposals were ready, to invite the

Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for

transmission to his Government with a view to immediate
opening of negotiations. I added that if this basis afforded
prospect of settlement. His Majesty's Government could be
counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize negoti-
ations.

"Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy document which

he read out in German, aloud, at top speed. Imagining that
he would eventually hand it to me, I did not attempt to follow
too closely the 16 or more articles which it contained. Though
I cannot, therefore, guarantee the accuracy, the main points
were .
."
. . —
and I need not read out the main points.
I go to Paragraph 3:

"When I asked Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in

accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yester-
day, he asserted that was now too late as Polish representa-
it

tive had not arrived by midnight.

in Berlin
"I observed that to treat the matter in this way meant that
the request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on
the 30th of August constituted in fact an ultimatum, in spite
of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This
he denied, saying that the idea of an ultimatum was a figment
of my imagination. Why then, I asked, could he not adopt the
normal procedure and give me a copy of the proposals, and
ask the Polish Ambassador to call on him just as Hitler had
summoned me a few days ago, and har^d them to him for
communication to the Polish Government? In the most violent
terms Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassa-
dor to visit him. He hinted that if the Polish Ambassador
asked him for interview it might be different. I said that I
would, naturally, inform my Government so at once. Where-
upon he said, while those were his personal views, he would

254
 6 Dec. 45

bring all that I had said to Hitler's notice. It was for the
Chancellor to decide.
"We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Von Ribben-
trop's demeanor during an unpleasant interview was aping
Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against the
Polish mobilization, but I retorted that it was hardly sur-
prising since Germany had also mobilized as Herr Hitler
himself had admitted to me yesterday."
Nevertheless, Sir Nevile Henderson did not know at that time
that Germany had also already given the orders to attack Poland
some days before. The following day, the 31st of August at 6:30
in the evening, Mr. Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, had an inter-
view with Ribbentrop., This document, the next Document TC-73,
Number 112, becomes GB-72, and is a short account in a report to
Mr. Beck:
"I carried out my instructions. Ribbentrop asked if I had
special plenipotentiary powers undertake negotiations.
to
I said, 'No'. He then asked whether I had been informed
that on London's suggestion the German Government had
expressed their readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate
of the Polish Government, furnished with the requisite full
powers, who was to have arrived on the preceding day, the
30th of August. I replied that I had no direct information on
the subject. In conclusion, Ribbentrop repeated that he had
thought I would be empowered to negotiate. He would com-
municate my démarche to the Chancellor."
As I have indicated already, it was too late. The orders had
already been given on that day to the German Army to invade.
I It is already in as GB-45. Other portions of it
turn to C-126.
were put in, refer now to the letter on the second page, for
and I
the order (most-secret order). It is signed by Hitler and is described
as his "Directive Number 1 for the Conduct of the War," dated
31st of August 1939. Paragraph 1:
"(1) Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by
peaceful means
of a situation on the eastern frontier, which
is intolerable for Germany, are exhausted, I have determined
on a solution by force.
"(2) The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance
with the preparations made for Case White with the alter-
ations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the
fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispo-
sitions.

"Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain un-

changed.

255
6 Dec. 45

"The date of attack: September

1939; time of attack:
1st of
4:45" —inserted — "this
time also applies to the
in red pencil
operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.
"(3) In the West it is important that the responsibility for the
opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England
and France. At first, purely local action should be taken
against insignificant frontier violations."
There it sets out the details of the order which, for the
purpose of
this Court, unnecessary to read. That evening at 9 o'clock the
it is

German radio broadcast the terms of the German proposals about

which they were so willing to enter into discussions with the Polish
Government. It sets out the proposals at length. It will be remem-
bered that by this time neither Sir Nevile Henderson nor the Polish
Government nor their Ambassador had yet been given their written
copy of them, and it is indeed a document which is tempting to
—
read or to read extracts of it simply as an exhibition or an
example of pure hypocrisy. I refer to the second paragraph Docu-
ment TC-72, Number 98, exhibit GB-39:
"Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt
able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an under-
standing available to the British Government by the time the
Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin."
Now, we have heard the manner in which they did that. They then
say that:
"Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of authorized
Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the
Reich received of their readiness for an understanding was
the news of the Polish mobilization; and only toward 12 o'clock
on the night of the 30th of August 1939, did they receive a
somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help
towards the commencement of negotiations.
"Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the
Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary
conditions for informing His Majesty's Government of the
views of the German Government as regards a possible basis
for negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves
had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and
Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop
gave the British Ambassador, on the occasion of the presen-
tation of the last British note, precise information as to the
text of the German proposals which will be regarded as a
basis of negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish
Plenipotentiary."
And, thereafter, they go on to set out the story, or rather their
version of the story, of the negotiations over the last few days.

256
 6 Dec. 45

I pass to the next but one document in the Tribunal's book,

TC-54, which becomes GB-73. On the 1st of September when his
armies were already crossing the frontier and the whole of the
frontier, he issued this proclamation to his Armed Forces:

"The Polish Government, unwilling to establish good neigh-

borly relations as aimed at by me, want to force the issue by
way of arms.
"The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody
terror and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier
violation, which cannot be tolerated by a great power, show
that Poland is no longer prepared to respect the Reich's fron-
tiers. To put an end to these mad acts, I can see no other
way but from now onwards to meet force with force.
"The German Armed Forces will with firm determination
take up the struggle for the honor and the vital rights of the
resuscitated German people.
"I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition
of the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty
to the last.
"Remember always and in any circumstances that you are
the representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.
"Long live our people and the Reich."
And so we see that at last Hitler had kept his word to his
generals. He had afforded them their propagandistic justification;
and at that time, anyway, it did not matter what people said about
it afterwards. "The victor shall not be asked later on, whether he
—
told the truth or not." Might is what counts or victory is what
counts and not right.
On that day, the 1st of September, when news came of this
violation of Polish ground, the British Government in accordance
with their treaty obligations sent an ultimatum to the German
—
Government in which they stated I quote from the last paragraph:
"I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the
German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's
Government satisfactory assurances that the German Govern-
ment have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and
are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish
territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland."
By the 3rd of September no withdrawal had taken place, and
so at 9 —
o'clock the document, TC-72, Number 110, I have just
—
referred to will be GB-74 at 9 o'clock on the 3rd of September,
a final ultimatum was handed to the German Minister of Foreign
Affairs. I quote from the third paragraph:

257
6 Dec. 45

"Although this communication was made more than 24 hours

ago, no reply has been received but German attacks upon
Poland have been continued and intensified. I have accord-
ingly the honor to inform you that, unless not later than
11 o'clock British summer time today, the 3rd of September,
satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given
by the German Government and have reached His Majesty's
Government in London, a state of war will exist between
the two countries as from that hour."
And it was that at 11 o'clock on the 3rd of September a state
so
of existed between Germany and England and between Germany
war
and France. All the appeals to peace, all the appeals to reason we
now see completely stillborn; stillborn when they were made. Plans,
preparations, intentions, determination to carry out this assault
upon Poland, had been going on for months, for years before. It
mattered not what anybody but the German Government had in
mind or whatever rights anybody else but the German nation
thought they had; and, if there is any doubt left at all after what
we have seen, I would ask you to look at two more documents.
If you would look at the last document first of all, in your
—
document book 1831-PS, which becomes GB-75. Even now on the
3rd of September, Mussolini offers some chance of peace.
We have here a telegram. It is timed 6:30 hours, and I am
afraid I am unable to say whether that is 6:30 in the morning or
evening; but it is dated the 3rd of September, and I quote:
"The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at
the Duce's order the following copy for the Führer and Reich
Chancellor and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:
" 'Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every deci-

sion to the Führer, that it still has a chance to call a confer-

ence with France, England, and Poland on the following basis:
An armistice which would leave the army corps where
" *1.

—
they are at present' " and it will be remembered that on the
3rd of September they had advanced a considerable way over
—
the frontier " '2. calling a conference within 2 or 3 days;
3. solution of the Polish-German controversy would be cer-
tainly favorable for Germany as matters stand today.
" 'This idea, which originated from the Duce, has its foremost
exponent in France.
" 'Danzig already German and Germany is holding already
is
securitieswhich guarantee most of her demands. Besides,
Germany has had already her "moral satisfaction." If she
would accept the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her
aims and at the same time prevent a war which already today

258
 6 Dec. 45

has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long

"
duration.'
My Lord, perhaps even Mussolini did not appreciate what
But,
all Germany's aims were; and, of course, the offer was turned down
in the illuminating letter which Hitler was to write in reply. I refer
you back to the document before that. It is still part of the same
Exhibit GB-75.
THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, the "GB" references you
give are not on the documents at all; they are the exhibit numbers
themselves, which are to be put on the document after they have
been put in.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. That is correct. They will
be put in by the Court, of course.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you try to make clear the references
which are on the document so that the Tribunal could find the
document itself?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. The last document was
1831-PS, and it is the very last one in the document book. That
is the one I have just referred to —
the telegram from Mussolini.
The document to which I am about to refer is the one but last
in the Tribunal's book but it has the same number on it as the last
because it forms part of the same exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: I think if you would just explain the system
in which the exhibits are numbered, it would help us.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: The exhibits are numbered at the
present moment before they are put in evidence with a variety of
serial numbers, such as "PS", "TC", "L" and other letters. There
is no significance attached to that at all. It depends on whom they

have been found by and what files they have come from. When the
documents are put in as exhibits, they are marked by the Court
with a court number. The documents put in by the United States
representatives were all prefixed with the letters "USA." The docu-
ments which have been put in by the British prosecutors have all
been prefixed with the letters "GB." If it would be of any assistance
to members of the Tribunal, I will have their document books
marked up this evening with the new court numbers that have been
put upon them by the Court officials, during the course of the day.
THE PRESIDENT: We will talk about that later.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: If there is any document missing

from any of these books, I have a copy.
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read 1831-PS?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH- JONES: Yes, that is GB-75.

259
 6 Dec. 45

"Duce:
"I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a
mediation. I would have been ready to accept, but only
under condition that there would be a possibility to give me
certain guarantees that the conference would be successful.
Because for the last 2 days the German troops are engaged in
an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland, it would have been
impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby
by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way
could have been found if England would not have been
determined to wage war under all circumstances. I have not
given in to the English because, Duce, I do not believe
that peace could have been maintained for more than one-half
a year or a year. Under these circumstances I thought
that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better
for resistance. At present the superiority of the German
Armed Forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all the fields
that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time.
I doubt whether this fast success could have been achieved
in 1 or 2 years. England and France would have armed their
allies to such an extent that the crushing technical superiority
of the German Armed Forces could not have become so
apparent any more. I am aware, Duce, that the fight which
I enter is one for life and death. My own fate does not play
any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one cannot
avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose,
after cold deliberation, the ^moment for resistance in such a
way that the probability of success is guaranteed; and I
believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a rock.
Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you
think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I
acknowledge this in advance, with sincere thanks. But I
— —
believe also even if we march now over different roads that
fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany
were destroyed by the Western Democracies, the Fascist
Italy would also have to face a grave future. I was personally
always aware of this community of the future of our two
governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same
way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the
brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant
things, that we do not waste any man on unimportant
tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational
considerations. The northern Polish Army, which is in the
Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our
action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. Other-
wise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily

260

I
 6 Dec. 45

achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations.

The superiority of our Air Force is complete, although
scarcely one-third of it is in Poland. In the West, I will be
. on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first.
Then the moment will come when we can confront the enemy
also there with the full power of the nation. Accept my
thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have given
to me in the past; and I ask you not to deny it to me in the
future."
That completes the evidence which I propose to offer upon this
part of the case in respect of the war of aggression against Poland,
England, and France, which is charged in Count Two.
MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United
Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, in the early hours of the
morning of the 9th of April 1940 Nazi Germany invaded Norway
and Denmark. It is my duty to present to the Tribunal the
Prosecution's evidence which has been prepared in collaboration
with my American colleague. Major Hinely, with regard to these
brutal wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, and assurances. With the Court's
permission I would like, first of all, to deal with the treaties and
agreements and assurances that were in fact violated by these
two invasions of Norway and Denmark.
The invasions were, of course, in the first instance violations
of the Hague Convention and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. My
learned friend. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, has already dealt with
those matters in the course of his presentation of the evidence. In
addition to these general treaties, there were specific agreements
between Germany and Norway and Denmark. In the first instance
there was the Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between
Germany and Denmark, which was signed at Berlin on 2 June 1926.
The Court will find that treaty, TC-17, on the first page of British
Document Book Number 3; and to that exhibit it may be convenient
to give the Number GB-76. I am proposing to read only the first
article of that treaty, which is in these terms:
"The contracting parties undertake to submit to the procedure
of arbitration or conciliation, in conformity with the present
treaty, all disputes of any nature whatsoever which may arise
between Germany and Denmark, and which it has not been
possible to settle within a reasonable period by diplomacy
or to bring with the consent of both parties, before the
Permanent Court of International Justice.
"Disputes for the solution of which a special procedure has
been laid down in other conventions in force between the

261
6 Dec. 45

contracting parties shall be settled in accordance with the

provisions of such conventions."
Then there follows in the remaining articles the establishment
of the machinery for arbitration.
I would next refer to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between
Germany and Denmark, which was signed by the Defendant
Ribbentrop on the 31st of May 1939 which, as the Tribunal will
recollect, was 10 weeks after the Nazi seizure of Czechoslovakia.
The Court will find that as Document TC-24 in the document book
and it will now bear the Exhibit Number GB-77.
With the Court's permission, in view of the identity of the signa-
tory of that treaty, I would like to read the Preamble and Articles 1
and 2.
"The Chancellor of the German Reich and His Majesty, the
King of Denmark and Iceland, being firmly resolved to main-
tain peace between Denmark and Germany in all circum-
stances, have agreed to confirm this resolve by means of a
treaty and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: The
Chancellor of the German Reich and His Majesty, the
. . .

King of Denmark and Iceland ."

. . .

Article 1 reads as follows:

"The German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark shall in no
case resort to war or to any other use of force, one against
the other.
"Should action of the kind referred to in Paragraph 1 be
taken by a third power against one of the contracting parties,
the other contracting party shall not support such action in
any way."
Then Article 2 deals with the ratification of the treaty, and the
second paragraph states:
"The treaty shall come into force on the exchange of the
instruments of ratification and shall remain in force for a
"
period of 10 years from that date . . . .

As the Tribunal will observe, the treaty is dated the 31st of May
1939. At the bottom of the page there appears the signature of the
Defendant Ribbentrop. The Tribunal will shortly see that less than
a year after the signature of this treaty the invasion of Denmark
by the Nazi forces was to show the utter worthlessness of treaties
to which the Defendant Ribbentrop put his signature.
With regard to Norway, the Defendant Ribbentrop and the Nazi
conspirators were party to a similar perfidy. In the first instance
I would refer to Document TC-30, which is the next document in

the British Document Book 3 and which will bear the Exhibit Number
GB-78. The Tribunal will observe that that is an assurance given

262
 6 Dec. 45

to Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands on the 28th of

April 1939. That, of course, was after the annexation of Czecho-
slovakia had shaken the confidence of the world; and this was
presumably an attempt, now submitted by the Prosecution to be
a dishonest attempt, to try to reassure the Scandinavian States.
The assurance is in a speech by Hitler and reads:
.1 have given binding declarations to a large number of
.

states.None of these states can complain that even a trace

of a demand contrary thereto has ever been made to them by
Germany. None of the Scandinavian statesmen, for example,
can contend that a request has ever been put to them by the
German Government or by German public opinion which
was incompatible with the sovereignty and integrity of their
state.

"I was pleased that a number of European states availed

themselves of these declarations by the German Government
to express and emphasize their desire too for absolute neu-
trality. This applies to the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzer-
land, Denmark, et cetera.''

A further assurance was given by the Nazi Government on the

2d of September 1939 which, as the Tribunal will recollect, was the
day after the Nazi invasion of Poland. The Court will observe the
next document in British Document Book 3 is the Document TC-31,
which will be Exhibit GB-79. That is an aide-memoire that was
handed to the Norwegian Foreign Minister by the German Minister
in Oslo on the 2d of September 1939. It reads:
"The German Reich Government are determined, in view of
the friendly relations which exist between Norway and Ger-
many, under no circumstances to prejudice the inviolability
and integrity of Norway and to respect the territory of the
Norwegian State. In making this declaration, the Reich
Government naturally expect on their side that Norway will
observe an unimpeachable neutrality towards the Reich and
will not tolerate any breaches of Norwegian neutrality by any
third party. Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian
Government differ from this so that any such breach of neu-
trality by a third party occurs, the Reich Government would
then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interest of the
Reich in such a way as the resulting situation might dictate."
There follows, finally, the further German assurance to Norway,
which appears as the next document in the book, TC-32, which will
be Exhibit GB-80. That is a speech by Hitler on the 6th of October
1939; and if the Court will observe Paragraph 2 at the top of the
page, the extract from the speech reads as follows:

263
6 Dec. 45

"Germany has never had any conflicts of interest or even

points of controversy with the Northern States; neither has
she any today. Sweden and Norway have both been offered
non-aggression pacts by Germany and have both refused
them solely because they did not feel themselves threatened
any way."
in
Those are clear and positive assurances which Germany gave.
The Court will see that violation of those assurances is charged in
Paragraph XXII of Appendix C of the Indictment at Page 43. The
Court will notice that there is a minor typographical error in the
date of the first assurance which is alleged in the Indictment to have
been given on the 3rd of September 1939. The Court will see from
Document TC-31, which is Exhibit GB-79, that the assurance was
in fact given on the 2d of September 1939.
Now those treaties and assurances were the diplomatic back-
ground to the brutal Nazi aggression on Norway and Denmark, and
the evidence which the Prosecution will now place before the Court
will in my submission establish beyond reasonable doubt that these
assurances were simply given to lull suspicion and cause the intended
victims of Nazi aggression to be unprepared to meet the Nazi attack.
For we now know that as early as October 1939 these conspirators
and their confederates were plotting the invasion of Norway, and
the evidence will indicate that the most active conspirators in that
plot were the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg.
The Norwegian invasion is, in one respect, not a typical Nazi
aggression in that Hitler had to be persuaded to embark upon it.
The chief instruments of persuasion were Raeder and Rosenberg;
Raeder because he thought Norway strategically important and
because he coveted glory for his Navy, Rosenberg because of his
political connections in Norway which he sought to develop.
As the Tribunal will shortly see, in the Norwegian Vidkun Quis-
ling the Defendant Rosenberg found a very model of the Fifth
Column agent, the very personification of perfidy.
The evidence as to the early stages of the Nazi conspiracy to
invade Norway is found in a letter which the Defendant Raeder
wrote on the 10th of January 1944 to Admiral Assmann, the official
German naval historian.
I put in this letter, the document C-66, which will be Exhibit
GB-81, and which the Court will find further on in this book of
documents. I should explain that in this book of documents the
documents are inserted in the numerical order of the series to which
they belong and not in the order of their submission to the Court.
I am trusting that that will be a more convenient form of bundling

them together than to set them down in the order of presentation.

THE PRESIDENT: 66?

264
 6 Dec. 45

MAJOR JONES: C-66. It is headed, "Memorandum to Admiral

Assmann; for his own information; not to be used for pubUcation."
The Court will observe that the first page deals with Barbarossa.
If the Tribunal turns to the next page headed "(b) Weserübung,"
the Tribunal will find from documents which I shall shortly be
submitting to the Court that Weserübung was the code name for
the invasion of Norway and Denmark.
I will omit the first sentence. The document which, as I have
said, a communication
is from the Defendant Raeder to Assmann
reads as follows:
"During the weeks preceding the report on the 10th of October
1939, I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a
detailed letter to me, first pointed out the importance of an
occupation of the Norwegian coast by Germany. I passed this
letter on to C/SKL"— which is the Chief of Staff of the Naval
—
War Staff "for their information and prepared some notes
based on this letter .for my report to the Führer, which
. .

I made on the 10th of October 1939, since my opinion was

absolutely identical with that of Admiral Carls, while at that
time SKL was more dubious about the matter. In these notes I
stressed the disadvantages which an occupation of Norway by
the British would have for us: Control of the approaches to
the Baltic, outflanking of our naval operations and of our air
attacks on Britain, pressure on Sweden. I also stressed the
advantages for us of the occupation of the Norwegian coast:
Outlet to the North Atlantic, no possibility of a British mine
barrier, as in the years 1917-18. Naturally, at the time, only
the coast and bases were considered; I included Narvik, though
Admiral Carls, in* the course of our correspondence, thought
that Narvik could be excluded .... The Führer saw at once
the significance of the Norwegian problem; he asked me to
leave the notes and stated that he wished to consider the
question himself."
I will pause in the reading of that document at that point and
return to it later so that the story may be revealed to the Court
in a chronological order.

That report of Raeder, in my submission, shows that the whole

evolution of this Nazi campaign against Norway affords a good
example of the participation of the German High Command in the
Nazi conspiracy to attack inoffensive neighbors.
This letter, an extract from which I have just read, has revealed
that Raeder reported to Hitler on the 10th of October 1939 .. .

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When was that report?

265
6 Dec. 45

MAJOR JONES: The report, C-66, was made in January 1944

by the Defendant Raeder to Assmann, who was the German naval
historian, and so, presumably, was for the purposes of history.
Before Raeder's report of 10 October 1939 was made to the
Führer, Raeder got a second opinion on the Norwegian invasion.
On the 3rd of October Raeder made out the questionnaire to which
I now invite the Court's attention. It is Document C-122 and the
Court will find it next but one to C-66 in the document book. That
will now be Exhibit GB-82.
That, as the Tribunal will observe, is headed "Gaining of Bases
in Norway (extract from War Diary)" and bears the date of the
3rd of October 1939. It reads:
"The Chief of the Naval Operations Staff" who was the
— —
Defendant Raeder "considers it necessary that the Führer
be informed as soon as possible of the opinions of the Naval
Operations Staff on the possibilities of extending the opera-
tional base to the north. It must be ascertained whether it is
possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure
of Russia and Germany, with the basic aim of improving our
strategic and operational position. The following questions
must be given consideration:
"(a) What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
"(b) Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's
will if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?
"(c) What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?
"(d) Will the harbors have to be developed completely as
bases or have they already decisive advantages suitable for
supply position?"
Then there follows in parenthesis:
"The Commander of the U-boat Fleet" —
which is a reference,
—
of course,the Defendant Dönitz ".
to considers such
. .

harbors already extremely useful as equipment and supply

bases at which Atlantic U-boats can call temporarily."
And then Question (e):

"What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the

war at sea in gaining bases in north Denmark, e.g. Skagen?"
There is, in our possession, a document C-5, to find which it will
be necessary for the Court to go back in the document book to the
first of the C exhibits. This will be Exhibit GB-83.

This is a memorandum written by the Defendant Dönitz on

Norwegian bases. It presumably relates to the questionnaire of the
Defendant Raeder which, as I have indicated, was in circulation at
about that time. The document is headed, "Commander of the

266
 —

6 Dec. 45

U-boat Fleet; Operations Division," and is marked "most secret."

The subject is "Base in Norway."
Then there are set out "suppositions," "advantages and dis-
advantages," and, over one page, "conclusions". I am proposing to
read the last paragraph. III:
"The following is therefore proposed:
"(1) Establishment of a base in Trondheim, including:
"a) Possibilityof supplying fuel, compressed air, oxygen,
provisions;
"b) Repair opportunities for normal overhaul work after an
encounter;
"c) Good opportunities for accommodating U-boat crews;
"d) Flak protection, L.A. antiaircraft armament, patrol and
M/S units.
"(2) Establishment of the possibility of supplying fuel in
Narvik as an alternative."
That is a Dönitz memorandum.
Now, as the Tribunal saw in the report of Raeder to Assmann,
in October 1939, Hitler was merely considering the Norwegian
aggression and had not yet committed himself to it, although, as
the Tribunal will see very shortly, Hitler was most susceptible to
any suggestions of aggression against the territory of another
country.
The documents will show that the Defendant Raeder persevered
in pressing his point of view with regard to Norway, and at this
stage he found a powerful ally in the Defendant Rosenberg.
The Nazi employment of traitors and the stimulation of treachery
as a political weapon are now unhappily proven historical facts, but
should proof be required of that statement it is found in the
remarkable document which I now invite the Court to consider.
I refer to Document 007-PS, which is after the TC and D series in
the document book. That will be Exhibit GB-84.
That is headed on Page 1, "Brief Report on Activities of the
—
Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Party" Aussenpolitisches Amt der
NSDAP— "from 1933 to 1943." It reads:
"When the Foreign Affairs Bureau" —Aussenpolitisches Amt
"was established on the 1st of April 1933, the Führer directed
thatit should not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency;

but should rather develop its effectiveness through initiative

and suggestions.
"Corresponding to the extraordinarily hostile attitude adopted
by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning, the
newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to

267
6 Dec. 45

internal conditions in the Soviet Union as well as to the

effects ofworld Bolshevism, primarily in other European
countries. It entered into contact with the most variegated
groups inclining towards National SociaUsm in combatting
Bolshevism, focussing its main attentions on nations and
states bordering on the Soviet Union.' On the one hand those
nations and states constituted an insulating ring encircling
the Bolshevist neighbor; on the other hand they were the
laterals of German living space and took up a flanking posi-
tion towards the Western Powers, especially Great Britain.
In order to wield the desired influence by one means or
——
another" and the Court will shortly see the significance of
that phrase "the bureau was compelled to use the most
varying methods, taking into consideration the completely
and intellect, and
different living conditions, the ties of blood
historical dependence of the movements observed by the
bureau in those countries.
"In Scandinavia a progressively more outspoken pro- Anglo-
Saxon attitude based on economic considerations had become
more dominant after the World War of 1914-18. There the
bureau put the entire emphasis on influencing general cultural
relations with the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took
the Nordic Society in Lübeck under its protection. The Reich
conventions of this society were attended by many outstanding
personalities, especially from Finland. While there were no
openings for purely political co-operation in Sweden and
Denmark, an association based on Greater Germaijic ideology
was found in Norway. Very close relations, which led to
further consequences, were established with its founder."
the Court will turn to the end of the main part of the state-
If
—
ment which is 4 pages forward in the intervening pages, I may
say, there is an account of the activity of Rosenberg's bureau in
various parts of Europe, and indeed of the world, which I am not
proposing to call the Tribunal's attention to at this stage but if the —
Tribunal will look at the last paragraph of the main body of the
report which bears the signature of the Defendant Rosenberg, the
last two sentences read:

"With the outbreak of war it was entitled to corfsider its task

as terminated. The exploitation of the many personal connec-
tions in many lands can be resumed under a different guise."
If the Tribunal will turn to the annex to the document, which is
on the next page, the Tribunal will appreciate what "exploitation
of personal connections" involved.
Annex I to the document is headed, "Brief Report on Activities
*
of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943."

268
 6 Dec. 45

It is headed, "The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation

of Norway during the War Years 1939-40," and it reads:
"As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scan-
dinavia only Nasjonal Sämling, led in Norway by the former
Minister of War and retired major, Vidkun Quisling, deserved
serious political attention. This was a fighting political group
possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic community.
Naturally all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to
prevent by any means its success among the population. The
bureau maintained constant relation with Quisling and atten-
,

tively observed the attacks he conducted with tenacious

energy on the middle class, which had been taken in tow
by the English. From the beginning it appeared probable
that without revolutionary events which would stir the popu-
lation from their former attitude no successful progress of
Nasjonal Sämling was to be expected. During the winter
1938-39 Quisling was privately visited by a member of the
bureau. When the political situation in Europe came to a
head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the convention
of the Nordic Society in Lübeck in June. He expounded his
conception of the situation and his apprehensions concerning
Norway. He emphatically drew attention to the geopolitically
decisive importance of Norway in the Scandinavian area and
to the advantages that would accrue to the power dominating
the Norwegian coast in case of a conflict between the Greater
German Reich and Great Britain.
"Assuming that his statements would be of special interest to
the Marshal of the Reich, Goring, for aero-strategical reasons,
Quisling was referred to State Secretary Körner by the
bureau. The Staff Director of the bureau handed the Chief
of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission to
the Führer .
."
. .

In a later part of the document, which I shall read at a later

stage of my presentation of the evidence, if I may, the Court will
see how Quisling came into contact with Raeder. The Prosecution's
submission with regard to this document is that it is another illus-
tration of the close interweaving between the political and the
military leadership of the Nazi State, of the close link between the
professional soldiers and the professional thugs.
The Defendant Raeder, in his report to Admiral Assmann,
admitted his collaboration with Rosenberg; and I will invite the
Court's attention once more to Document C-66, which is Exhibit
GB-81. In the page headed "Weserübung," the second paragraph
of the Raeder report reads as follows:

269
6 Dec. 45

"In the further developments, I was supported by Commander

Schreiber, Naval Attaché in Oslo,and the M-Chief per-
sonally —in
conjunction with the Rosenberg organization.
Thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who came to
Berlin in the beginning of December and were taken to the
—
Führer by me with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosen-
berg . . .

I will later draw the attention of the Tribunal to the develop-

ments in December.
The details of the manner in which the Defendant Raeder did
make contact personally with Quisling are not very clear. But I
would draw the Court's attention to the Document C-65, which
precedes . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Would you read the end of that paragraph?

MAJOR JONES: With your Lordship's permission, I would like
to revert to that in a later stage in my unfolding of the evidence.
In the Document C-65, which will be Exhibit GB-85, we have a
report of Rosenberg to Raeder in which the full extent of Quisling's
preparedness for treachery and his potential usefulness to the
Nazi aggressors was reported and disclosed to the Defendant Raeder.
Paragraph 1 of that report deals with matters which I have
already dealt with in reading Rosenberg's statement, 007-PS. But
if the Court will look at the second paragraph of Exhibit GB-85,

C-65, it reads as follows:

"The reasons for a coup, on which Quisling made a report,
would be provided by the fact that the Storthing" that is to
— —
say the Norwegian parliament "had, in defiance of the
constitution, passed a resolution prolonging its own life which
is to become operative on January 12th. Quisling still retains
in his capacity as a long-standing officer and a former
Minister of War the closest relations with the Norwegian
Army. He showed me the original of a letter which he had
received only a short time previously from the commanding
officer in Narvik, Colonel Sunlo. In this letter Colonel Sunlo
frankly lays emphasis on the fact that if things went on
as they were going at present, Norway was finished."
If the Court will turn to the next page of that document, the
lasttwo paragraphs, the details of a treacherous plot to overthrow
the government of his own country, by the traitor Quisling in
collaboration with the Defendant Rosenberg, will be indicated to
the Court.
"A plan has been put forward whichdeals with the possibility
of a coup and which provides for a number of selected
Norwegians to be trained in Germany with all possible speed

270
 I

6 Dec. 45

for such a purpose, being allotted their exact tasks and

provided with experienced and die-hard National Socialists
who are practiced in such operations. These trained men
should then proceed with all speed to Norway where details
would then require to be further discussed. Some important
centers in Oslo would have to be taken over forthwith, and
at the same time, the German Fleet together with suitable
contingents of the German Army would go into operation
when summoned specially by the new Norwegian Government
in a specified bay at the approaches to Oslo. Quisling has
no doubts that such a coup, having been carried out with
instantaneous success, would immediately bring him the
approval of those sections of the army with which he at
present has connections; and thus it goes without saying that
he has never discussed a political fight with them. As far
as the King is concerned, he believes that he would respect
it as an accomplished fact."

How wrong Quisling was in that anticipation was shown, of

course,by subsequent developments. The last sentence reads:
"Quisling gives figures of the number of German troops
required which accord with German calculations."
The Tribunal may think that there are no words in the whole
vocabulary of abuse sufficiently strong to describe that degree of
treachery.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that document dated?
MAJOR JONES: That document does not bear a date.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 7 December 1945 at 1000 o'clock.]

271
 FIFTEENTH DAY
Friday, 7 December 1945

Morning Session

MAJOR JONES: May please the Tribunal, yesterday after-

it

noon when the Tribunal adjourned I was dealing with the stage of
the Nazi conspiracy against Norway at which the activities of the
Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg converged. And the Court will
remember that I submitted in evidence Document C-65, which was
a report from the Defendant Rosenberg to Raeder regarding Quis-
ling and ending with the infamous words, "Quisling gives figures
of the number of German troops required which accord with Ger-
man calculations."
The Court has already received in evidence and has heard read
material parts of Document C-66, which was the report of Raeder
to Admiral Assmann which disclosed how, in December of 1939, the
Defendant Raeder did in fact meet Quisling and Hagelin.
I now invite the Court to look at Document C-64 which, for
the purpose of the record, will be Exhibit GB-86. The Court will
observe that that is a report by Raeder of a meeting of the Naval
Staff with Hitler on the 12th of December 1939, at 1200 hours, in
the presence of the Defendants Keitel and Jodl, and Puttkammer,
who at this time was adjutant to Hitler.
The report is headed "Norwegian Question," and the first sentence
reads:
—
"Commander-in-Chief, Navy" who of course was the
—
Defendant Raeder "has received Quisling and Hagelin.
Quisling creates the impression of being reliable."
And then there follows, in the next two paragraphs, a statement
of Quisling's views,views with which the Court is by now familiar
because of my reading of extracts from the Document 007-PS; but
I draw the Court's attention to the fourth paragraph in Document

C-64, beginning:
"The Führer thought of speaking to Quisling personally so
that he might form an impression of him. He wanted to see
Rosenberg once more beforehand, as the latter has known
—
Quisling for a long while. Commander-in-Chief, Navy" that
—
is, of course, Raeder "suggests that if the Führer forms a
favorable impression, the OKW
should obtain permission to
make plans with Quisling for the preparation and carrying

272
 7 Dec. 45

out of the occupation: (a) By peaceful means —that is to say,

German forces summoned by Norway; (b) to agree to do so
by force."
That was the 12th of December, the meeting at which Raeder
made this report to Hitler.
If the Court will now look at Document C-66, which is Raeder's
record of these transactions for the purpose of history, the Court
will observe, in the last sentence of the second paragraph of the
section of C-66 headed "(b) Weserübung," these words:
"... thus we got in touch with Quisling and Hagelin, who
came to Berlin at the beginning of December, and were taken
to the Führer by me with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosen-
berg."
And then the Court will observe a note at the end of the page:
"At the crucial moment R" —presumably
Rosenberg "hurt —
his foot, so that I visited him in his house on the morning
of the 14th December."
That is, of course, Raeder's note; and it indicates the extent of
his contact in this conspiracy. The report continues:
"On the grounds of the Führer's discussion with Quisling and
Hagelin on the afternoon of the 14th of December 1939, the
Führer gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian
operation were to be made by the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces.
"Until that moment the naval operations staff had taken no
part in the development of the Norwegian question and con-
tinued to be somewhat skeptical about it. The preparations
which were undertaken by Captain Krancke in the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces were founded, however, on
a memorandum of the naval war staff."
The Court may well think that the note of the Defendant Raeder
referring to the crucial moment was an appropriate one because
the Court will see that on that day, the 14th of December, Hitler
gave the order that preparations for the Norwegian operation were
to be begun by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

If the Court will now turn to Document 007-PS, which is further

on in the document book and which the Court will remember is
Rosenberg's report on the activities of his organization it is after —
the "D" documents—if the Court will turn to about 10 lines from
the bottom of the first page of Annex I dealing with Norway, the
Court will see that there were further meetings between Quisling
and the Nazi chiefs in December; and I am going to read now the
section beginning:

273
 ——

7 Dec. 45

"As a result of these steps Quisling was granted a personal

audience with the Führer on the 16th of December, and once
more on the 18th of December. In the course of this audience
the Führer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would
prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of
the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the
theater of war and to draw still other nations into the con-
flict."

As
I have said in opening the presentation of this part of the

case,here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear

on Hitler to induce him to take part in these operations.
The report continues:
"Should the enemy attempt" —there a mis-translation
is here
— "to extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving
further throttling and intimidation of the Greater German
Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself against such an
undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy
propaganda activity, the Führer promised Quisling financial
support of this movement, which is based on Greater Ger-
manic ideology. Military exploitation of the question now
raised was assigned to the special military staff which trans-
mitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg
was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses
were to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs"
—
that is to say, by Ribbentrop's organization "the Minister for
— —
Foreign Affairs" that is to say, Ribbentrop "being kept
continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau"
which, of course, was Rosenberg's organization.
"Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison
with Quisling. In the course of further developments he was
assigned to the Naval Attaché in Oslo .... Orders were given
that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy."
Here again the Court will note the close link between the Nazi
politiciansand the Nazi service chiefs.
The information that is available to the Prosecution as to the
events of January 1940 is not full, but the Court will see that the
agitation of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit,
and I now invite the Court to consider a letter of Keitel's, Docu-
ment C-63, which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit
—
GB-87. The Court will observe that that is an order a memoran-
—
dum signed by the Defendant Keitel dated the 27th of January
1940. It is marked "Most secret, five copies; reference. Study 'N';"
—
which was another code name for the Weserübung preparations
"access only through an officer." It is indicated that "C-in-C of the

274
 7 Dec. 45

— —
Navy" that is to say, the Defendant Raeder "has a report on this."
The document reads:
"The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
wishes that Study 'N' should be further worked on under my
direct and personal guidance, and in the closest conjunction
with the general war policy. For these reasons the Führer
has commissioned me to take over the direction of further
preparations.
"A working staff has been formed at the Supreme Command
of theArmed Forces headquarters for this purpose, and this
represents at the same time the nucleus of a future operational
staff."

Then, at the end of the memorandum:

"All further plans will be made under the cover name Weser-
übung."
I should like respectfully to draw the Tribunal's attention to the
importance of that document, to the signature of Keitel upon it, and
to the date of this important, decision.
Prior to this date, the 27th of January 1940, the planning of the
various aspects of the invasion of Norway and Denmark had been
confined to a relatively small group, whose aim had been to persuade
Hitler of the desirability of undertaking this Norwegian operation.
The issuance of this directive of Keitel's on the 27th January 1940
was the signal that the Supreme Command of the German Armed
Forces, the OKW, had accepted the proposition of the group that
was pressing for this Norwegian adventure, and turned the com-
bined resources of the German military machine to the task of
producing practical and co-ordinated plans for the Norwegian
operation.
The Court will observe that from January onward the operational
planning for the invasion of Norway and Denmark was started
through the normal channels.
And now I would refer the Court
to some entries in the diary
of the Defendant Jodl, how
the preparations progressed. That
to see
is Document Number 1809-PS, which will be for the purposes of the

record Exhibit GB-88. That, the Court will observe, is the last
document in the document book.
There
is a slight confusion in the order in which the entries are
setout in the diary because the first three pages relate to entries
which will be dealt with in another part of the case.
I invite the Court's attention to Page 3 of these extracts from
beginning at the bottom February the 6th.
Jodl's diary The entry
under the date line of February the 6th 1940 starts, "New idea:

275
7 Dec. 45

Carry out 'H' and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee Belgium's
neutrality for the duration of the war."
I would like to repeat that entry if I may be permitted to do so.
"New idea: Carry out *H' and Weser Exercise only, and guarantee
Belgium's neutrality for the duration of the war."
The next entry to which I invite the Court's attention is the
entry of the 21st of February.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What does that mean, to "carry
out 'H' "?
MAJOR JONES: That is a reference to another codeword, "Hart-
mut," which the Court will see disclosed in a subsequent document.
That is another code word for this Norwegian and Danish operation.
The entry of February 21st in Jodl's diary reads:
"Führer has talked with General Von Falkenhorst and charges
him with preparation of Weser Exercise. Falkenhorst accepts
gladly. Instructions issued to the three branches of the Armed
Forces."
Then the next entry, on the next page . . .

THE PRESIDENT: "Weser Exercise"—is that Norway too?

MAJOR JONES: That is Norway too, My Lord, yes. That is a
translation of "Weserübung."
The entry on the next page, under the date February the 28th: of
"I propose first to the Chief of OKW and then to the Führer
—
that Case Yellow" which as the Court knows is the code
—
name for the invasion of the Netherlands "and Weser Exer-
cise" —
the invasion of Norway and Denmark "must be
—
•prepared in such a way that they will be independent of one
another as regards both time and forces employed. The
Führer completely agrees, if this is in any way possible."
So that the Court will observe that the new idea of February
the 6th that the neutrality of Belgium might be preserved had been
abandoned by February the 28th.
—
The next entry is of February the 29th I am not troubling the
Court with further entries of the 28th of February, which relate to
the forces to be employed in the invasion of Norway and Denmark.
February 29th, the second paragraph:
"Führer also wishes to have a strong task force in Copen-
hagen and a plan elaborated in detail showing how individual
coastal batteries are to be captured by shock troops. Warli-
mont, Chief of Land Defense, instructed to make out imme-
diately the order of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; and Chief
*WZ' to make out a similar order regarding the strengthening
of the staff."

276
 7 Dec. 45

And there for the moment, I will leave the entries in JodFs
diary and refer the Court to the vital Document C-174, which for
the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-89. The Court will
see from that document that it is Hitler's operation order to complete
the preparations for the invasion of Norway and Denmark. It bears
the date of the 1st of March 1940, and it is headed, "The Führer
and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; most secret." Then,
"Directive for Case Weserübung":
"The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires
the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark
and Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces Weser —
Exercise. This operation should prevent British encroachment
on Scandinavia and the Baltic; further, it should guarantee
our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and Air Force a
wider start line against Britain."
The second part of Paragraph 1 reads:
"In view of our military and poUtical power in comparison
with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be employed
in the Weser Exercise will be kept as small as possible. The
numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and
surprise execution. On principle we will do our utmost to
make the operation appear as a peaceful occupation, the object
of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the
Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be trans-
mitted to the governments at the beginning of the occu-
pation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and the Air
Force will provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this,
resistance should be met with, all military means will be
used to crush it."
There follows, in Paragraph 2 on the next page:
"I put in charge of the preparations and the conduct of the
operation against Denmark and Norway the commanding
general of the 21st Army Corps, General Von Falkenhorst."
Paragraph 3:
"The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in Nor-
way must take place simultaneously. I emphasize that the
operations must be prepared as quickly as possible. In case
the enemy seizes the initiative against Norway, we must be
able to apply immediately our own coimter measures.
"It is most important that the Scandinavian States as well as
the western opponents should be taken by surprise by our
measures. All preparations, particularly those of transport
and of readiness, drafting, and embarkation of the troops,
must be made with this factor in mind.

277
7 Dec. 45

"In case the preparations for embarkation can no longer be

kept secret, the leaders and the troops will be deceived with
fictitious objectives."

Then Paragraph 4 on the next page, "The Occupation of Den-

mark," which is given the code name of "Weserübung Süd":
"The task of Group XXI: Occupation by surprise of Jutland
and of Fünen immediately after occupation of Zealand.
"Added to this, having secured the most important places, the
group will break through as quickly as possible from Fünen
to Skagen and to the east coast."

Then there follow other instructions with regard to the operation.

Paragraph 5:
"Occupation of Norway, 'Weserübung Nord' ":

"The task of the Group XXI: Capture by surprise of the most

important places on the coast by sea and airborne operations.
"The Navy will take over the preparation and carrying out
of the transport by sea of the landing troops."
Andthere follows a reference to the part of the Air Force, and
I wouldlike particularly to draw the Court's attention to that
reference. This is Paragraph 5 on Page 3 of Hitler's directive:
"The Air Force, after the occupation has been completed, will
ensure air defense and will make use of Norwegian bases for
air warfare against Britain."
I am underlining that entry at this stage because I shall be
referring to it in connection with a later document.

Whilst these preparations were being made and just prior to the
final decision of Hitler ...
THE PRESIDENT: Did you draw our attention to the defendant
by whom it was initialed, Frick, on the first page of that document.
MAJOR JONES: That is an initial by Fricke. That is a different
^

person altogether. That is a high functionary in the German

Admiralty and has no connection with the defendant who is before
the Tribunal.
As I was My Lord, while these decisions were being
saying.
made reports were coming in through Rosenberg's organization
from Quisling; and if the Court will again turn for the last time
to Document 007-PS, which is Rosenberg's report, the Tribunal will
observe the kind of information which Rosenberg's organization was
supplying at this time. The third paragraph, "Quisling's reports"
—that is in Annex I in Rosenberg's report, the section dealing with
Norway, Page 6 on my copy referring — to the second page of the
annex, the paragraph beginning with:

278
 7 Dec. 45

"Quisling's reports transmitted to his representative in Ger-

many, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of inter-
vention by the Western Powers in Norway, with tacit consent
of the Norwegian Government, became more urgent by
January. These increasingly better substantiated communi-
cations were in sharpest contrast to the view of the German
Legation in Oslo which relied on the desire for neutrality of
the then Norwegian Nygardsvold Cabinet and was convinced
of that government's intention and readiness to defend Nor-
way's neutrality. No one in Norway knew that Quisling's
representative for Germany maintained closest relations with
him; he therefore succeeded in gaining a foothold within
governmental circles of the Nygardsvold Cabinet and in
listening to the Cabinet members' true views. Hagelin trans-
mitted what he had heard to the bureau" Rosenberg's
— —
bureau "which conveyed the news to the Führer through
Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the night of the 16th to
17th February English destroyers attacked the German
steamer Altmark in Jössingfjord."
The Tribunal will remember that that is a reference to the action
by the British destroyer Cossack against the German naval auxiliary
vessel Altmark which was carrying 300 British prisoners captured
on the high seas to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters.
The position of the British Delegation with regard to that episode
is that the use that was being made by the Altmark of Norwegian
territorial waters was in fact a flagrant abuse in itself of Norwegian
neutrality and the action taken by H. M. S. Cossack which was
—
restricted to rescuing the 300 British prisoners on board no attempt
being made to destroy the Altmark or to capture the armed guards
—
on board of her was fully justified under international law.
Now the Rosenberg report which I interrupted to give that state-
—
ment of the British view on the Altmark episode the Rosenberg
report continues:
"The Norwegian Government's reaction to this question per-
mitted the conclusion that certain agreements had been
covertly arrived at between the Norwegian Government and
the Allies. Such assumption was confirmed by reports of
Chief of Section Scheidt, who in turn derived his information
from Hagelin and Quisling. But even after this incident the
German Legation in Oslo championed the opposite view and
went on record as believing in the good intentions of the
Norwegians."
And so the Tribunal will see that the Nazi Government preferred
the reports of the traitor Quisling to the considered judgment of
German diplomatic representatives in Norway. The result of the

279
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7 Dec. 45

receipt of reports of that kind was the Hitler decision to invade

Norway and Denmark. The culminating details in the preparations
for the invasion are again found in Jodl's diary, which is the last
document in the document book. I will refer the Court to the entry
of the 3rd of March.
"The Führer expressed himself very sharply on the necessity
of a —
swift entry into N" which is Norway "with strong
—
forces.
"No delay by any branch of the Armed Forces. Very rapid
acceleration of the attack necessary."
Then the last entry on March the 3rd:
"Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case
Yellow with a few days interval."
So that the important issue of strategy which had been concern-
ing the German High Command for some time had been decided by
this date, and the fate of Scandinavia was to be sealed before the
fate of the Low Countries; and the Court will observe from those
entries of March 3 that by that date Hitler had become an enthusi-
astic convert to the idea of a Norwegian aggression.

The next entry in Jodl's diary of the 5th of March:

"Big conference with the three commanders-in-chief about
Weser Exercise; Field Marshal in a rage because not con-
sulted till now. Won't listen to anyone and wants to show
that all preparations so far made are worthless.
"Result:
"(a) Stronger forces to Narvik; (b) Navy to leave ships in the
ports (Hipper or Liitzow in Trondheim); Christiansand can
(c)

be left out at first; (d) six divisions envisaged for Norway;

(e) a foothold to be gained immediately in Copenhagen also."
Then the next entry to which I desire to draw the Court's atten-
tion the entry of the 13th of March, which the Court may think
is
is one of the most remarkable in the whole documentation of this
case:
"Führer does not give order yet for Weser Exercise*W.' " —
"He is still looking for justification."
The entry of the next day, the 14th of March, shows a similar
pre-occupation on the part of Hitler with seeking justification for
this flagrant aggression. It reads:
"English keep vigil in the North Sea with 15 to 16 sub-
marines; doubtful whether reason to safeguard own opera-
tions or prevent operations by Germans. Führer has not yet
decided what reason to give for Weser Exercise."

280
 7 Dec. 45

And would like the Court to look at the entry for the
then I

21st of March,which by inadvertence has been included in the next

page at the bottom of Page 6:
"Misgivings of Task Force 21 . .
."

The Court has seen from documents that I have put in already
that Task Force 21 was Falkenhorst's force, which was detailed to
conduct this invasion.
"Misgivings of Task Force 21 about the long interval between
taking up readiness positions at 0530 hours and closing of
diplomatic negotiations. Führer rejects any earlier negoti-
ations as otherwise calls for help go out to England and
America. If resistance is put up it must be ruthlessly broken.
The political plenipotentiaries must emphasize the military
measures taken and even exaggerate them."
Comment upon that entry is, I think, unnecessary. The next
entry, the Court will turn to Page 5, of the 28th of March, the
if
third sentence:
"Individual naval officers seem to be lukewarm concerning
• the Weser Exercise and need a stimulus. Also Falkenhorst
and the other three commanders are worrying about matters
which are none of their business. Krancke sees more disad-
vantages than advantages.
"In the evening the Führer visits the map room and roundly
declares that he won't stand for the Navy clearing out of the
Norwegian ports right away. Narvik, Trondheim, and Oslo
will have to remain occupied by naval forces."
There the Court will observe that Jodl, as ever, is the faithful
collaborator of Hitler.
Then April the 2d:
"1530 hours. Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force,t Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Navy, and General Von Falkenhorst
with the Führer. AU confirm preparations completed. Führer
orders carrying out of the Weser Exercise for April the 9th."
Then the last entry in the next page, the 4th of April:
"Führer drafts the proclamations. Pieckenbrock, Chief of
Military Intelligence I, returns with good result from the
talks with Quisling in Copenhagen."
Until the very last the treachery of Quisling continued most
active.
The Prosecution has in its possession a large number of operation
orders that were issued in connection with the aggression against
Norway and Denmark, but I propose only to draw the Court's
attention to two of them to illustrate the extent of the secrecy and

281
7 Dec. 45

the deception that was used by the defendants and their con-
federates in the course of that aggression. I would now draw the
Court's attention to Document C-115, which for the purpose of
the record will be Exhibit GB-90. First of all I will draw the
Court's attention to the second paragraph, "General Orders," with
a date, "4th of April 1940":
"The —
barrage-breaking vessels" Sperrbrecher "will pen- —
etrate inconspicuously and with lights on into Oslo Fjord
disguised as merchant steamers.
"Challenge from coastal signal stations and look-outs are to
be answered by the deceptive use of the names of English
steamers. I lay particular stress on the importance of not
giving away the operation before zero hour."
Then the next entry is an order for reconnaissance forces dated
the 24th of March 1940, "Behavior during entrance into the harbor."
The third paragraph is the part to which I wish to draw the Court's
attention:
"The disguise as British craft must be kept up as long as
possible.All challenges in Morse by Norwegian ships will
be answered in English. In answer to questions a text with
something like the following content will be chosen:
" 'Calling at Bergen for a short visit; no hostile intent.'
"Challenges to be answered with names of British warships:
— —
"Köln H. M. S. Cairo; Königsberg H. M. S. Calcutta; Bremse —
—
H.M.S. Faulkner; Karl Peters H.M.S. Halcyon; Leopard —
—
British destroyer; Wolf British destroyer; S-boats British —
motor torpedo boats.
"Arrangements are to be made enabling British war flags to
be illuminated. Continual readiness for making smoke screen."
Andthen finally the next order dated the 24th of March 1940,
Annex "From Flag Officer, Reconnaissance Forces; most secret."
3,
Next page, page two:
"Following is laid down as guiding principle should one
ofour own units find itself compelled to answer the challenge
of passing craft. case of the Köln *H.M.S.
To challenge —
Cairo'; then to order to stop
— in
Please repeat last signal,
'(1)

(2) Impossible to understand your signal'; in case of a warning

—
shot 'Stop firing, British ship, good friend'; in case of an
—
inquiry as to destination and purpose 'Going Bergen, chasing
German steamers.' "
Then I would draw the Court's attention to Document C-151,
which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB-91, which
is a Dönitz order in connection with this operation. If the Court
will observe, it is headed:

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 7 Dec. 45

"Top secret, Operation Order — 'Hartmut.' Occupation of Den-

mark and Norway.
"This order comes into force on the code word Hartmut.
With its coming into force the orders hitherto valid for the
boats taking part lose their validity.
"The day and hour are designated as Weser-Day and Weser-
Hour, and the whole operation is known as Weser Exercise.
"The operation ordered by the code word has as its objective
the rapid surprise landing of troops in Norway. Simultaneously
Denmark will be occupied from the Baltic and from the land
side."
And there is at the end of that paragraph another contribution
by Dönitz to this process of deception:
"The naval force will, as they enter the harbor, fiy the British
flag until the troops have landed except, presumably, at
Narvik."
The Tribunal now knows as a matter of history that on the
9th of April 1940 the Nazi onslaught on the unsuspecting and
almost unarmed people of Norway and Denmark was launched.
When the invasions had already begun a German memorandum was
handed to the Governments of Norway and Denmark attempting to
justify the German action; and I would like to draw the Court's
attention to Document TC-55, Exhibit GB-92. That is at the
—
beginning of the book of documents the sixth document of the
book. I am not proposing to read the whole of that memorandum;
I have no doubt the defending counsel will deal with any parts

which they consider relevant to the defense. The Court will observe
that it is alleged that England and France were guilty in their
maritime warfare of breaches of international law and that Britain
and France were making plans themselves to invade and occupy
Norway and that the Government of Norway was prepared to
acquiesce in such a situation.
—
The memorandum states and I would now draw the Court's
attention to Page 3 of the memorandum to the paragraph just
below the middle of the page beginning "The German Troops":
"The German troops, therefore, do not set foot on Norwegian
soil as enemies. The German High Command does not intend
to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases
for operations against England as long as it is not forced to
do so by measures taken by England and France; German
military operations aim much more exclusively at protecting
the north against proposed occupation of Norwegian strong
points by English-French forces."
In connection with that statement I would remind the Court
that in his operation order of the 1st of March Hitler had then

283
7 Dec. 45

given orders to the Air Force to make use of Norwegian bases for
air warfare against Britain. That is the 1st of March. And this is
the memorandum which was produced as an excuse on the 9th of
April. The last two paragraphs of the German memorandum to
Norway and Denmark, the Court may think, are a classic Nazi
combination of diplomatic hypocrisy and military threat. They read:
"The Reich Government thus expect that the Royal Norwegian
Government and the Norwegian people will respond with
understanding to the German measures and offer no resistance
to them. Any resistance would have to be and would be
broken by all possible means by the German forces employed,
and would therefore lead only to absolutely useless bloodshed.
The Royal Norwegian Government are therefore requested
to take all measures with the greatest speed to ensure that
the advance of the German troops can take place without
friction and difficulty. In the spirit of the good German-
Norwegian relations that have always existed, the Reich
Government declare to the Royal Norwegian Government
that Germany has no intention of infringing by her measures
the territorial integrity and political independence of the
Kingdom of Norway now or in the future."
What the Nazis meant by the protection of the Kingdom of
Norway was shown by their conduct on the 9th of April. I now
refer the Court to Document TC-56, which will be Exhibit GB-93,
which is a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal
Norwegian Forces. It is at the beginning of the document book,
the last of the TC documents.
I will not trouble the Court with the first page of the report.
If the Tribunal will turn to the second page:
"The Germans, considering the long lines of communications
and the threat of the British Navy, clearly understood the
necessity of complete surprise and speed in the attack. In
order to paralyze the will of the Norwegian people to defend
their country and at the same time to prevent Allied inter-
vention, it was planned to capture all the more important
towns along the coast simultaneously. Members of the
Government and Parliament and other military and civilian
people occupying important positions were to be arrested
before organized resistance could be put into effect and the
King was to be forced to form a new government with ,

Quisling as its head."

The next paragraph was read by the learned British Attorney
General in his speech and I will only refer to the last paragraph
but one:

284
 7 Dec. 45

"The German attack came as a surprise and all the invaded

towns along the coast were captured according to plan with
only slight losses. In the Oslofjord, however, the cruiser
Blücher, carrying General Engelbrecht and parts of his
division, technical staffs, and specialists who were to take
over the control of Oslo, was sunk. The plan to capture
the King and members of the Government and Parliament
failed. In spite of the surprise of the attack resistance was
organized throughout the country."
That is a brief picture of what occurred in Norway.
What happened in Denmarkdescribed in a memorandum
is
prepared by the Royal Danish Government, a copy of which I hand
in as Exhibit GB-94 and an extract from which is in Document
D-628, which follows the C documents.
"Extracts from the memorandum concerning Germany's
attitude —
towards Denmark" ^before and during the occu-
pation — "prepared by the Royal Danish Government.
"On the 9th of April 1940 at 0420 hours"—in the morning
that
— "the German Minister appeared at the private
is
residence of the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs accom-
panied by the Air Attaché of the Legation. The appointment
had been made by a telephone call from the German Legation
to the Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
at 4 o'clock the same morning. The Minister said at once that
Germany had positive proof that Great Britain intended to
occupy bases in Denmark and Norway. Germany had to
safeguard Denmark against this. For this reason German
soldiers were now crossing the frontier and landing at various
points in Zealand, including the port of Copenhagen; in a
short time German bombers would be over Copenhagen;
their orders were not to bomb until further notice. It was
now up to the Danes to prevent resistance, as any resistance
would have the most terrible consequences. Germany would
guarantee Denmark territorial integrity and political
independence. Germany would not interfere with the internal
government of Denmark but wanted only to make sure of the
neutrality of the country. For this purpose the presence of
the German Wehrmacht in Denmark was required during the
war
"The Minister for Foreign Affairs declared in reply that the
allegation concerning British plans to occupy Denmark was
completely without foundation; there was no possibility of
anything like that. The Minister for Foreign Affairs protested
against the violation of Denmark's neutrality which, according
to the German Minister's statement, was in progress. The

285
7 Dec. 45

Minister for Foreign Affairs declared further that he could

not give a reply to the demands, which had to be submitted
to the King and the Prime Minister, and further observed
that the German Minister knew as everybody else that the
Danish Armed Forces had orders to oppose violations of
Denmark's neutrality so that fighting presumably had already
taken place. In reply the German Minister expressed that the
matter was very urgent, not least to avoid air bombardment."
What happened thereafter is described in a dispatch from the
British Minister in Copenhagen to the British Foreign Secretary,
which the Tribunal will find in D-627, the document preceding
the one which I have just read. That document, for the purposes
of the record, will be GB-95. That dispatch reads:
"The actual events of the 9th April have been pieced
together by members of my staff from actual eye-witnesses
or from reliable information subsequently received and are
given below. Early in the morning towards 5 o'clock three
small German transports steamed into the approach to
Copenhagen harbor while a number of airplanes circled
overhead. The northern battery guarding the harbor
approach fired a warning shot at these planes when it was
seen that they carried German markings. Apart from this
the Danes offered no further resistance, and the German
vessels fastened alongside the quays in the Free Harbor.
Some of these airplanes proceeded to drop leaflets over the
town urging the population to keep calm and co-operate
with the Germans. I enclose a specimen of this leaflet, which
is written in a bastard Norwegian-Danish, a curiously un-
German disregard of detail, together with a translation.
Approximately 800 soldiers landed with full equipment and
marched to Kastellet, the old fortress of Copenhagen
and now barracks. The door was locked so the Germans
promptly burst it open with explosives and rounded up all
the Danish soldiers within together with the womenfolk
employed in the mess. The garrison offered no resistance, and
it appears that they were taken completely by surprise.
One officer tried to escape in a motor car, but his chauffeur
was shot before they could get away. He died in hospital
2 days later. After seizing the barracks a detachment was
sent to Amalienborg, the King's palace, where they engaged
'
the Danish sentries on guard wounding three, one of them
fatally .... Meanwhile a large fieet of bombers flew over the
city at low altitude."
Then, the last paragraph of the dispatch reads:

^ 286
 7 Dec. 45

"It has been difficult to ascertain exactly what occurred in

Jutland .... It is clear, however, that the enemy invaded
Jutland from the south at dawn on the 9th of April and
were at first resisted by the Danish forces, who suffered
casualties The chances of resistance were weakened by
the extent to which the forces appear to have been taken by
surprise. The chief permanent official of the Ministry of
War, for instance, motored into Copenhagen on the morning
of the 9th of April and drove blithely past a sentry who
challenged him in blissful ignorance that this was not one of
his own men. It took a bullet, which passed through the
lapels of his coat, to disillusion him."
The German memorandum to the Norwegian and Danish
Governments spoke of the German desire to maintain the territorial
integrity and political independence of those two small countries.
I will close by drawing the Court's attention to two documents

which indicate the kind of territorial integrity and political

independence the Nazi conspirators contemplated for the victims
of their aggression. I will first draw the Court's attention to an
entry in Jodl's diary, which is the last document in the book, on
the last page of the book, the entry dated 19th April:
"Renewed crisis.
— Envoy Brauer" —that is the German Minister
to Norway "is recalled. Since Norway is at war with us,
the task of the Foreign Office is finished. In the Führer's
opinion force has to be used. It is said that Gauleiter
Terboven will be given a post. Field Marshal" which, as —
the Court will see from the other entries, is presumably a
—
reference to the Defendant Goring "is mpving in the same
direction. He criticizes as defect that we did not take
sufficiently energetic measures against the civilian population,
that we could have seized electrical plant, that the Navy did
not supply enough troops. The Air Force cannot do every-
thing."
The Court will see from that entry and the reference to Gau-
leiter Terboven that already by the 19th of April rule by Gau-
leiter had replaced rule by Norwegians.

The final document is Document C-41, which will be Exhibit

GB-96, which is a memorandum dated the 3rd of June 1940 signed
by Fricke, who, of course, has no connection with the Defendant
Frick. Fricke was at that date the head of the operations division
of the German naval war staff, a key appointment in the very
nerve center of German naval operations. That is why, as the
Tribunal noticed, he came to be initialing the important naval
documents.

287
7 Dec. 45

That memorandum is as I have said, dated 3rd June 1940 and

relates to questions of territorial expansion and bases:
"These problems are pre-eminently of a political character
and comprise an abundance of questions of a political type,
which it is not the Navy's province to answer, but they also
materially affect the strategic possibilities open according —
to the way in which this question is answered for the —
subsequent use and operation of the Navy.
"It is too well known to need further mention that Germany's
present position in the narrows of the Heligoland Bight and
—
in the Baltic ^bordered as it is by a whole series of states
—
and under their influence is an impossible one for the
future of Greater Germany. If over and above this one
extends these strategic possibilities to the point that Germany
shall not continue to be cut off for all time from overseas
by natural geographical facts, the demand is raised that
somehow or other an end shall be put to this state of affairs
at the end of the war.
"The solution could perhaps be found among the following
possibilities:

"1) The territories of Denmark, Norway, and northern France

acquired during the course of the war continue to be so
occupied and organized that they can in the future be con-
sidered as German possessions.
"This solution will recommend itself for areas where the
severity of the decision tells, and should tell, on the enemy
and where a gradual germanizing of the territory appears
practicable.
"2) The taking over and holding of areas which have no
direct connection with Germany's main body and which, like
the Russian solution in Hangö, remain permanently as an
enclave in the hostile state. Such areas might be considered
possible around Brest and Trondheim ....
"3) The power of Greater Germany in the strategic areas
acquired in this war should result in the existing population
of these areas feeling themselves and being politically,
economically, and militarily completely dependent on
Germany. If the following results are achieved that —
expansion is undertaken (on a scale I shall describe later)
by means of the military measures for occupation taken
during the war, that French powers of resistance (popular
unity, mineral resources, industry, armed forces) are so
broken that a revival must be considered out of the question,
that the smaller states such as the Netherlands, Denmark,

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 7 Dec. 45

and Norway are forced into a dependence on us which will

enable us in any circumstances and at any time easily to
—
occupy these countries again then in practice the same,
but psychologically much more, will be achieved."
Then Fricke recommends:
"The solution given in 3), therefore, appears to be the proper
—
one that is, to crush France, to occupy Belgium and part of
northern and eastern France, to allow the Netherlands, Den-
mark, and Norway to exist on the basis indicated above."
Then, the culminating paragraph of this report of Fricke reads
as follows:
"Time will show how far the outcome of the war with Eng-
land will make an extension of these demands possible."
The submission of the Prosecution is that that and other docu-
ments which have been submitted to the Court tear apart the veil
of the Nazi pretenses. These documents reveal the menace behind
the good- will of Goring; they expose as fraudulent the diplomacy
of Ribbentrop; they show the reality behind the ostensible political
ideology of tradesmen in treason like Rosenberg; and finally and
above all, they render sordid the professional status of Keitel and
of Raeder.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, it is my duty to

present that part of Count Two which relates to the allegations
with regard to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In
Charges II, III, IV, IX, XI, XIII, XIV, XVIII, XIX, and XXIII there
are charges of violating certain treaties and conventions and yiolating
certain assurances. So far as the treaties are concerned, some of
them have been put in evidence already, and I will indicate that
when I come to them. May I, before I come to the detail, remind
the Tribunal of the history of these unfortunate countries, the
Netherlands and Belgium; especially Belgium, which for so many
centuries was the cockpit of Europe.
The independence of Belgium was guaranteed as the Tribunal
will remember, in 1839 by the great European powers. That guaran-
tee was observed for 75 years until it was shamelessly broken in
1914 by the Germans, who brought all the horrors of war to Bel-
gium and all the even greater horrors of a German occupation of
Belgium. History was to repeat itself in a still more shocking fashion
some 25 years after in 1940 as the Tribunal already knows.

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7 Dec. 45

The first treaty which was mentioned in these charges is the

Hague Convention of 1907. That has been put in by my learned
friend, Sir David,and I think I need say nothing about it.
The second treaty is the Locarno Convention, the Arbitration
and ConciUation Convention of 1925. My Lord, that was between
Gerniany and Belgium. That was put in by Sir David. It is GB-15,
and I think I need say nothing more about that.
Belgium's independence and neutrality was guaranteed by Ger-
many in that document.
My
Lords, the next treaty is the Hague Arbitration Convention
of May
1926 between Germany and the Netherlands. That Docu-
ment I ought formally to put in. It is in the Reichsgesetzhlatt,
which perhaps I may call RGB in the future for brevity; and it,
no doubt, will be treated as a public document. But in my bundle
of documents, which goes in the order in which I propose to refer
to them, I think it is more convenient for the presentation of my
case. That is the second or third document, TC-16.

THE PRESIDENT: It is Book 4, is it?

MR. ROBERTS: It is Book 4, My Lord. This is the Convention

of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and the Nether-
lands signed at The Hague in May 1926. Your Lordships have the
document; perhaps I need read only Article I:
—
"The contracting parties" those are the Netherlands and the
—
German Reich "undertake to submit all disputes of any
nature whatever which may arise between them which it has
not been possible to settle by diplomacy and which have not
been referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice
to be dealt with by arbitration or conciliation as provided."
And then. My Lords, there follow all the clauses which deal
merely with the machinery of conciliation, which are unnecessary
for me to read. May I just draw attention to the last article.
Article 21, which provides that the Convention shall be valid for
10 years, and then shall remain in force for successive periods of
5 years until denounced by either party. And this treaty never was
denounced by Germany at all.
I put that document in as Document TC-16, which will be Exhibit
GB-97; and a certified copy is put in and a translation for the Court.
As the Tribunal already knows, in 1928 the Kellogg-Briand Pact
was made at Paris, by which all the powers renounced recourse to
war. That is put in as GB-18, and I need not, I think, put it in or
refer to it again.
Then the last treaty — all of which, of course, belong to the days
of theWeimar Republic is the — Arbitration Treaty between Ger-
many and Luxembourg executed in 1929. That is Document TC-20

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 7 Dec. 45

in the bundle. two documents further on than the one the

It is
Tribunal has last referredto. That is the Treaty of Arbitration and
Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg signed at Geneva
in 1929. May I just read the first few words of Article 1, which are
familiar:
"The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful
means in accordance with the present treaty all disputes of
any nature whatever which may arise between them and
which it may not be possible to settle by diplomacy."
And then there follow the clauses dealing with the machinery for
peaceful settlement of disputes, which follow the common form.
My Lord, those were the treaty obligations. May I put in that
last treaty, TC-20, which will be Exhibit GB-98.
My Lord, those were the treaty obligations between Germany
and Belgium at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in
1933; and as you have heard from my learned friend, Hitler adopted
and ratified the obligations of Germany under the Weimar Republic
with regard to the treaties which had been entered into. My Lord,
nothing more occurred to alter the position of Belgium until in
March 1936. Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, announced, of
course, the resumption of conscription, and so on. And Hitler on
the 7th of March 1936 purported in a speech to repudiate the obli-
gations of the German Government under the Locarno Pact; the
reason given being the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935.
Sir David has dealt with that and has pointed out that there was
no legal foundation for this claim to be entitled to renounce obli-
gations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was, of course, left
in the air in the sense that it had entered itself into various obli-
gations under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which
other nations acknowledged; and now one of those liabilities,
namely, the liability of Germany to observe the pact, had been
renounced.
And so MyLord, on the 30th of January 1937, perhaps because
Hitler realized the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler,
in the next document in the bundle, TC-33 and 35, which I hand in
and which will be Exhibit GB-99, gave the solemn assurance he —
—
used the word "solemn" to Belgium and to the Netherlands. That
has already been read by the Attorney General and so I don't want to
read it again. But the Tribunal will see that it is a full guarantee. In
April of 1937 in a document which is not before the Court, France
and England released Belgium from her obligations under the
Locarno Pact. It is a matter of history and it does occur in an
exhibit, but it hasn't been copied. Belgium, of course, gave guaran-
tees of strict independence and neutrality; and France and England
gave guarantees of assistance should Belgium be attacked. And it

291
 7 Dec. 45

was because of that that Germany on the 13th of October 1937 in —

—
the next document gave a very clear and unconditional guarantee
—
to Belgium Document TC-34, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit
GB-100—the German declaration of the 13th of October 1937, which
shows the minutes:
"I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to
make the following communication to Your Excellency:
"The German Government have taken cognizance with par-
which the Belgian
ticular interest of the public declaration in
Government define the international position of Belgium. For
their part they have repeatedly given expression, especially
through the declaration of the Chancellor of the German
Reich in his speech of the 30th of January 1937, to their own
point of view. The German Government have also taken
cognizance of the declaration made by the British and French
Governments on the 24th of April 1937."
That is a document to which I have previously referred.
"Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of
Locarno may still take some time and being desirous of
strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries,
the German Government regard it as appropriate to define
now their own attitude towards Belgium. To this end they
make the following declaration:
"First: The German Government have taken note of the views
which the Belgian Government have thought fit to express.
That is to say, (a) of the policy of independence which they
intend to exercise in full sovereignty; (b) of their deter-
mination to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all their
« forcesagainst any aggression or invasion and to prevent
Belgian territory from being used for purposes of aggression
against another state as a passage or as a base of operation
by land, by sea, or in the air, and to organize the defense of
Belgium in an efficient manner to this purpose.
"Second: The German Government consider that the inviola-
bilityand integrity of Belgium are common interests of the
Western Powers. They confirm their determination that in no
circumstances will they impair this inviolability and integrity,
and that they will at all times respect Belgian territory
except, of course, in the event of Belgium's taking part in
a military action directed against Germany in an armed
conflict in which Germany is involved.

"Third: The German Government, like the British and French

Governments, are prepared to assist Belgium should she be
subjected to an attack or to invasion."

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 7 Dec. 45

And then, on the following page:

"The Belgian Government have taken note with great satis-
faction of the declaration communicated to them this day by
the German Government. They thank the German Govern-
ment warmly for this communication."
My Lord, may pause there to emphasize that document. There
I
in October of 1937 is Germany giving a solemn guarantee to this
small nation of its peaceful aspiration towards her and its assertion
that the integrity of the Belgian frontier was a common interest
between her and Belgium and the other Western Powers.
You have before you to try the leaders of the German Govern-
ment and the leaders of the German Armed Forces. One doesn't
have to prove, does one, that every one of those accused must have
known perfectly well of that solemn undertaking given by his
government? Every one of these accused in their various spheres
—
of activity some more actively than the others —
were party to the
shameless breaking of that treaty two and a half years afterwards,
and I submit that on the ordinary laws of inference and justice all
those men must be fixed as active participators in that disgraceful
breach of faith which brought misery and death to so many millions.
Presumably it will be contended on the part, for instance, of
Keitel and Jodl that they were merely honorable soldiers carrying
out their duty. This Tribunal, no doubt, will inquire what code of
honor they observe which permits them to violate the pledged word
of their country.

That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the

leaders and to the High Command of Germany can be seen by the next
document, which is Document PS-375 in the bundle. It is already
an exhibit, USA-84, and has been referred to many times already.
— —
May I just refer or remind the Tribunal to one sentence or two.
The document comes into existence on the 25th of August 1938 at
the time when the Czechoslovakian drama was unfolding, and
it was uncertain at that time whether there would be war with the

Western Powers. It is top secret, prepared by the 5th section of the

General Staff of the German Air Force. The subject: "Extended
—
Case Green Estimate of the Situation." Probably the more correct
words. would be: "Appreciation of the Situation with Special Con-
sideration of the Enemy." Apparently some staff officer had been
asked to prepare this appreciation. In view of the fact that it has
been read before, I think I need only read the last paragraph which
is Paragraph H and it comes at the bottom of Page 6, the last page

but one of the document. Now H, "Requests to Armed Forces

Supreme Command, Army and Navy". This, you see, was an appre-
ciation addressed by an Air Force staff officer. So these are requests

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7 Dec. 45

to the Army and Navy. And then if one turns over the page,
Number 4:

"Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands,

represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of
the air war against Great Britain as well as against France.
Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of
the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of
this area could be carried out and how long it would take.
And in this case it would be necessary to reassess the commit-
ment against Great Britain."
that the Prosecution desires to make on that document
The point
is that apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared
it is
this, and assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German
nation and the High Command would not pay the smallest attention
to the fact that Germany had given her word not to invade Holland
or Belgium. They are recommending it as a militarily advantageous
thing to do, strong in the knowledge that if the commanders and the
Führer agree with that view treaties are to be completely ignored.
Such, I repeat, was the honor of the German Government and of
their leaders.
Now in March of 1939 as has been proved, the remainder of
Czechoslovakia was peacefully annexed; and then came the time for
further guarantees in the next document, the assurances TC-35 —
—
and 39 which were given to Belgium and the Netherlands on the
28th of April 1939.
Those have been read by my learned friend. Major Elwyn Jones.
They bear the number GB-78. I need not read them again.
There is also a guarantee to Luxembourg, which is on the next
page, TC-42 (a). That was given in the same speech by Hitler in
the Reichstag where Hitler was dealing with a communication from
Mr. Roosevelt who was feeling a little uneasy on the other side of
the Atlantic as to Hitler's intentions. May I, before I read this
document, say that I believe the Tribunal will be seeing a film of
the delivery by Hitler of this part of this speech; and you will have
the privilege of seeing Hitler in one of his jocular moods, because
this was greeted and was delivered in a jocular vein. And you
will see in the film that the Defendant Goring who sits above Hitler
in the Reichstag appreciates very much the joke, the joke being
this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany could
—
possibly go to war with any of its neighbors and that was the point
of the joke that everybody appears to have appreciated very much.

Now, if I may read this document:

"Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an
assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack

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 7 Dec. 45

the territory or possessions of the following independent

nations and above all that they will not march into them.
And he goes on to name the following as the countries in
question:
"Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Norway, Sweden, Den-
mark, Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portu-
gal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland,
Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey,
Iraq, Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.
"Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in
the case of the countries listed firstly, whether they feel
themselves threatened and secondly, and particularly, whether
this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result
of a demarche by them or at least with their consent.
"The answer was a general negative, which in some cases
took the form of a blunt rejection. Actually this counter-
question of mine could not be conveyed to some of the
states and nations listed, since they are not at present in
possession of their liberty (as for instance Syria) but are
occupied by the military forces of democratic states and there-
fore deprived of all their rights.
"Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Ger-
many have received much more binding assurances and above
all much more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of
me in his peculiar telegram."
You will see that although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it
is suggesting in the presence, certainly, of the accused Goring as
being quite absurd that Germany should nurture any warlike feeling
against her neighbors. But the hollow falsity of that and the pre-
ceding guarantee is shown by the next document. May I put this
document, TC-42 (a) in as Exhibit GB-101.
The next document (L-79) which is Hitler's conference of the
23rd of May has been referred to many times and is Exhibit USA-27.
Therefore I need only very shortly remind the Tribunal of two
passages. First of all, on the first page it is interesting to see who
was present: The Führer, Goring, Admiral Raeder, Brauchitsch,
Colonel General Keitel, and various others who are not accused.
Colonel Warlimont was there. He, I understand, was Jodl's deputy.
Well now, the purpose of the conference was an analysis of the
situation. Then may I refer to the third page down at the bottom.
The stencil number is 819:
"What will this struggle be like?"
And then these words:
"The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed
force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored."

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7 Dec. 45

Then, at the bottom:

"Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war,
we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim
at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuyder
Zee."
There is that decision made, "Declarations of neutrality must
be ignored," and there is the Grand Admiral present, and there is
the Air Minister and Chief of the German Air Force, and there is
General Keitel present. They all appear, and all their subsequent
actions show that they acquiesced in that: Give your word and then
break it. That is their code of honor. And you will see that at
—
the end of the meeting, the very last page the stencil number is
—
823 Field Marshal Goring asked one or two questions.
There was the decision of the 23rd of May. Is it overstating the
matter to submit that any syllable of guarantee, any assurance given
—
after that is just purely hypocrisy, is just the action apart from
—
the multiplicity of the crimes here of the common criminal?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, I think we would like you so
far as possible to confine yourself to the document.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord, then we go to the 22d of August,

798-PS. That has already been put in and is Exhibit USA-29. My
Lord, that was Hitler's speech of the 22d of August. It has been
read and re-read. I, My Lord, refer only to one passage, and that
is at the bottom of the second page:

"Attack from the west from the Maginot Line: I consider this
impossible.
"Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and
Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as
well as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all avail-
able means."
My Lord, I desire to emphasize the next sentence:
"England and France will not violate the neutrality of these
countries."
ThenI desire to comment: I ask Your Lordship to bear that
sentence in mind, that correct prophecy, when remembering the
excuses given for the subsequent invasion of Belgium and the
Netherlands.
My Lord, the next documents are TC-36, 40, and 42. Those are
three assurahces. Number 36 is by the Ambassador of Germany to
the Belgian Government:
"In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am
expressly instructed by the head of the German Reich to
transmit to Your Majesty the following communication:

296
 7 Dec. 45

"Though the German Government are at present doing every-

thing in their power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the
questions at issue between the Reich and Poland, they never-
theless desire to define clearly here and now the attitude
which they propose to adopt towards Belgium should a con-
flict in Europe become inevitable.
"The German Government are firmly determined to abide by
the terms of the declaration contained in the German note of
October 13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will
in no circumstances impair the inviolability and integrity of
Belgium and will at all times respect Belgian territory. The
German Government renew this undertaking, however, in the
expectation that the Belgian Government for their part will
observe an attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium will
tolerate no violations on the part of a third power, but that
on the contrary, she will oppose it with all the forces at her
disposal. It goes without saying that if the Belgian Govern-
ment were to adopt a different attitude the German Govern-
ment would naturally be compelled to defend their interests
in conformity with the new situation thus created."
My Lord, may I make one short comment on the last part of that
document? I submitclear that the decision having been made
it is
to violate the neutrality, as we know, those last words were put
in to afford some excuse in the future.
That document will be Exhibit GB-102.
My Lord, TC-40, the next document, is a similar document com-
municated to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands on the
same day, the 26th of August 1939. Subject to the Tribunal's direc-
tion, I don't think I need read it. It is a public document in the
German document book, and it has exactly the same features.
That will be Exhibit GB-103.
Then My Lords, TC-42, the next document (Exhibit GB-104) is
a similar document relating to Luxembourg. That is dated the
26th of August, the same day. I am not certain; it has two dates.
I think it is the 26th of August. My Lords, that is in the same terms
a complete guarantee with the sting in the tail as in the other two
documents. Perhaps I need not read it.
My Lords, as the Tribunal knows, Poland was occupied by
means the lightning victory; and in October German Armed
of
Forces were free for other tasks. The first step that was taken so
far as the Netherlands and Belgium are concerned is shown by the
next document, which is, I think, in as GB-80; but the two central
portions refer to Belgium and the Netherlands. It is the next docu-
ment in Your Lordships' bundle: Number 4.

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7 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: TC-32?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. It begins with TC-32, and then if you go
to the next one, My Lords will see TC-37 on the same page and —
then TC-41; both 37 and 41 refer to this matter. Now, this is a Ger-
man assurance on the 6th, of October 1939:
"Belgium.
"Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state
I tried tocreate friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced
any revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not
made any demands which would in any way be likely to be
considered in Belgium as a threat."
My Lord, there is a similar assurance to the Netherlands —the
next part of the document:
"The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional
friendship with the Netherlands. It has not taken over any
existing differences between the two countries and has not
created any new ones."
I submit it is impossible to overemphasize the importance of
those assurances of Germany's good faith.
My Lord, the value of that good faith is shown by the next
document which is of the very next day, the 7th of October. Those
two guarantees were the 6th of October. Now we come to Docu-
ment 2329-PS dated the 7th of October. It is from the Commander-
in-Chief of the Army, Von Brauchitsch, and it is addressed to his
Army groups. He said, third paragraph:
"The Dutch border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed
only.
"At the same time Army Group B has to make all prepara-
tions according to special orders for immediate invasion of
Dutch and Belgian territory if the political situation so
demands."
"If the poUtical situation so demands" —the day after the guarantee!
It quite clear from the next document.
is I put in the last
document; that bears an original typewritten signature of Von
Brauchitsch, and it will be Exhibit GB-105.
My
Lord, the next document is in two parts. Both are numbered
C-62. The first part is dated the 9th of October 1939, 2 days after
the document I have read. My Lord, that was all read by the
Attorney General in opening down to the bottom of Paragraph (b).
Therefore, I won't read it again. May I remind the Tribunal just
of one sentence.
"Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of

298
 —

7 Dec. 45

Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands. This attack must

be carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible."
In the next paragraph, may I just read six words:
"The object ... to acquire as great an area
of this attack is
of Holland, Belgium, and northern France as possible."
That document is signed by Hitler himself. It is addressed to
the three accused: The Supreme Commander of the Army, Keitel;
Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister, Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Force, Goring. That appears from the distribution.
I will hold that document over and will put that other one in
with it.

My Lord, the next document is the 15th of October 1939. It is

from the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. It is signed by
Keitel in what is to some of us his familiar red pencil signature,
and it is again addressed to Raeder and Goring and to the General
Staff of the Army.
Now that also has been read by the Attorney General; may
I just remind the Tribunal that at the bottom of the page:

"It must be the object of the Army's preparations to occupy

—on —
receipt of a special order the territory of Holland in
the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Maas" or Meuse —
"line".

The second paragraph deals with taking possession of the West

Frisian Islands.
my submission, beyond discussion that from that
It is clear, in
moment the decision to violate the neutrality of these three coun-
tries had been made. All that remained was to work out the details,
to wait until the weather became favorable, and in the meantime,
to give no hint that Germany's word was about to be broken again.
Otherwise these small countries might have had some chance of
combining among themselves and with their neighbors.
It will be Exhibit GB-106.
Well, the next document is a Keitel directive. It is Document
440-PS (Exhibit GB-107). It, again, is sent to the Supreme Com-
mand of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and it gives details
of how the attack is to be carried out. I want to read only a very
few selected passages. Paragraph 2) on the first page:
"Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended
against Holland may be carried out without a special order
when the general attack will start.
"The attitude of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be antic-
ipated ahead of time."

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7 Dec. 45

And then may I comment here: Would Your Lordship note this as
a German concession?
"Wherever there is no resistance the entry should carry the
character of a peaceful occupation."
Then Paragraph (b) of the next paragraph:
"At first the Dutch area including the West Frisian Islands
... is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Maas line."
The next two paragraphs, I need not read them, deal with action
against the Belgian harbor; and in Paragraph 5):
"The 7th Airborne Division" they were parachutists "will— —
be committed for the airborne operation after the possession
of bridges across the Albert Canal" which is in Belgium
— —
as the Court knows "is assured."
And then in Paragraph 6) (b) Luxembourg is mentioned. It
is mentioned in Paragraph 5) as well. The signature is "Keitel,"
but that is typed. It is authenticated by a staff officer.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that document in?

MR. ROBERTS: GB-107, My Lord.

Then the next document is C-10 (Exhibit GB-108) and it is
dated the 28th of November 1939. That is a signature of Keitel in
his red pencil and it is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Air
Force. It deals with the fact that if a quick break-through should
fail —
north of Liège I think. My Lord, only machinery for carrying
out the attack.
Paragraph 2) shows clearly
that the Netherlands is to be
violated. It occupation of Walcheren Island and
speaks of "the
thereby Flushing," and the "taking of one or more of the Meuse
crossings between Namur and Dinant."
That will be 108.
My
Lord, the documents show that from November until March
of 1940 the High Command and the Führer were waiting for
favorable weather before A-Day, as they called it. That was the
attack on Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands.
My Lord, the next document, C-72, consists of 18 documents
.

which range in date from the 7th of November until the 9th of
May 1940. They are certified photostats I put in and they are all
signed either by Keitel personally or by Jodl personally, and I
don't think necessary for me to read them. The Defense, I
it is
think, have of them, but they show that successively
all had copies
A-Day is being postponed for about a week, having regard to the
weather reports. That will be Exhibit GB-109.
My Lord, on the 10th of January 1940, as the Attorney General
informed the Tribunal, a German airplane made a forced landing

300
 .

7 Dec. 45

in Belgium. The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which

they were in possession, but they were only partially successful.
And the next document I offer is Document TC-58 (a); it will be
Exhibit GB-110. The original is a photostat certified by the Belgian
Government which, of course, came into possession of the original.
My
Lord, I can summarize it. They are orders to the Com-
mander of the 2d Air Force Fleet (Luftflotte) clearly for offensive
action against France, Holland, and Belgium. One looks at the
bottom of the first page. It deals with the disposition of the Belgian
Army. The Belgian Army covers the Liége-Antwerp Line with its
main force, its lighter forces in front of the Meuse-Schelde Canal.
Then it deals with the disposition of the Dutch Army; and then
if you turn over the page Number 3, you see that the German

western army directs its attack between the North Sea and the
Moselle with the strongest possible airforce support through the
Belgian-Luxembourg region.
My Lord, I think I need read no more. The rest are operational
details as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and
in Holland.
My Lord, the next document I think is rather out of place
for my purpose. My learned friend, Major Elwyn Jones, put in
Jodl's which is GB-88, and I desire to
diary, refer very, very
briefly to some extracts which are printed first in bundle Number 4.
If one looks at the entry for the 1st of February 1940 and then
some lines down . .

THE PRESIDENT: 1809-PS?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, that's right. My Lord, and GB-88.
THE PRESIDENT: We haven't got the GB numbers on the
documents.
MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry, My Lord, it's my mistak-e.
If Your Lordship will look about eight lines down it says,
"1700 hours General Jeschonnek" — and then:
"1) Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they
have to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer
brute force. The 7th Division intends to drop units near the
town.
*'2) Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent
action against the Dutch Air Force."
My Lord, I think the rest I need not read; it is operational detail.
—
"2d February" I refer again to Jodl's entry under ''a" as to
"landings can be made in the center of The Hague."
If Your Lordship will turn over the page I omit February the —
—
5th you come to 26th February:

301
7 Dec. 45

"Führer raises the question whetherit is better to undertake

the Weser Exercise before or after Case Yellow."

And then on the 3rd of March, the last sentence:
"Führer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before Case
Yellow with a few days' interval."
And then My Lord, there is an entry to which I desire to call
Your Lordship's attention, on May the 8th, that is, 2 days before
the invasion —the top of the page:
"Alarming news
from Holland, cancelling of furloughs,
evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures.
According to reports of the intelligence service the British
have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have
refused."
My Lord, may I make two short comments on that? The first is
that the Germans are rather objecting because the Dutch are
actually making some preparations to resist their invasion:
"Alarming news" as they wrote. The second point is that Jodl is
there recording that the Dutch according to their intelligence reports
are still adhering properly to their neutrality. But I need not read
any more of the diary extracts.
My Lord, that is the story except for the documents which were
presented to Holland and to Belgium and to Luxembourg after the
invasion was a fait accompli, because as history now knows at
4:30 a. m. on the 10th of May th^e three small countries were
violently invaded with all the fury of modern warfare. No warning
was given to them by Germany and no complaint was made by
Germany of any breaches of any neutrality before this action
was taken.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a convenient place to

break off until 2 o'clock.

MR. ROBERTS: If Your Lordship pleases.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

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 7 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, when the Court

adjourned I had come to the point at 4:30 a.m. on the 10th of
just
May 1940 when the Germans invaded these three small countries
—
without any warning a violation which, the Prosecution submits, it
is clear from the documents had been planned and decided upon
months before.
My Lord, before I close this part of the case, may I refer to three
documents in conclusion. My Lord, the invasion having taken place
at 4:30 in the morning in each of the three countries, the German
Ambassadors called upon representatives of the three governments
some hours later and handed in a document which was similar in
each case and which is described as a memorandum or an ultimatum.
My Lord, an account of what happened in Belgium is set out in our
Document TC-58, which is about five documents from the end of the
—
bundle. It is headed, "Extract from Belgium The Official Account
of What Happened 1939-1940," and I hand in an original copy,
certified by the Belgian Government, which is Exhibit GB-111.
My Lord, might I read short extracts? I read the third para-
graph:
"From 4:30 a.m. information was received which left no
shadow doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first
of
reported in the east. At 5 o'clock came news of the bombing
of two Netherlands' airdromes, the violation of the Belgian
frontier, the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael
Fort, the bombing of the Jemelle station."
My Lord, then I think I can go to two paragraphs lower down:
"At 8:30 a.m. the German Ambassador came to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister's room, he
began to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak" that is
— —
the Belgian Minister "stopped him: 1 beg your pardon,
Mr. Ambassador. I will speak first.' And in an indignant
voice, he read the Belgian Government's protest: 'Mr. Ambas-
sador, the German Army has just attacked our country. This
is the second time in 25 years that Germany has committed
a criminal aggression against a neutral and loyal Belgium.
What has just happened is perhaps even more odious than
the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no note, no protest of
any kind has ever been placed before the Belgian Govern-
ment. It is through the attack itself that Belgium has learned
that Germany has violated the undertakings given by her on
October 13th 1937 and renewed spontaneously at the begin-
ning of the war. The act of aggression committed by Germany
for which there is no justification whatever will deeply shock

303
7 Dec. 45

the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held

responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself.
Her cause, which is the cause of Right, cannot be van-
quished.' "
Then I think I shall omit the next paragraph: "The Ambassador
read the note . . . And in the last paragraph:
"In the middle of this communication M. Spaak, who had by
his side the Secretary-General, interrupted the Ambassador:
'Hand me 1 should like to spare you
the document,' he said.
M. Spaak confined
so painful a task.' After studying the note,
himself to pointing out that he had already replied by the
protest he had just made."
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to read what
the Ambassador read.

MR. ROBERTS: I am sorry. I was thinking of the next document

I was going to read. I read the last paragraph on the first page:
"The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had
brought:
" 'I am instructed by the Government of the Reich,' he said,
*to make the following declaration:
" 'In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and

Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been

making preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Govern-
ment of the Reich are compelled to ensure the neutrality of the
three countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose
the Government of the Reich will bring up an armed force
of the greatest size so that resistance of any kind will be
useless. The Government of the Reich guarantee Belgium's
European and colonial territory as well as her dynasty on
condition that no resistance is offered. Should there be any
resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of her country
and the loss of her independence. It is, therefore, in the inter-
ests of Belgium that the population be called upon to cease all
resistance and that the authorities be given the necessary
instructions to make contact with the German Military Com-
"
mand.'
My Lord, the so-called ultimatum handed in some hours after
the invasion had started is Document TC-57, which is the last docu-
ment but three in the bundle. It is the document I handed in and
it becomes Exhibit GB-112. My Lord, it is a long document and

I will read to the Tribunal such parts as the Tribunal thinks advis-
able:
—
"The Reich Government" it begins "have for a long time —
had no doubts as to what was the chief aim of British and

304
 7 Dec. 45

French war policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to

other countries and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary
and mercenary troops for England and France.
"The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy Scandi-
navia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new
front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany's
last minute action which upset this project. Germany has
furnished documentary evidence of this before the eyes of
the world.
"Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia
miscarried, England and France took up their policy of wa-r
expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the
retreat .from Norway was still going on, the English Prime
. .

Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation

in Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go
ahead with the transfer of the full weight of her Navy to
the Mediterranean, and that English and French units were
already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now
became the center, of English-French war propaganda. This
was partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the big
loss of prestige before their own people and before the world,
and partly to make it appear that the Balkans had been
chosen for the next theater of war against Germany.
"In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the Mediter-
ranean of English-French war policy had quite another pur-
pose. It was nothing but a diversion maneuver in grand style
to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next English-
French attack. For, as the Reich Government have long been
avv'are, the true aim of England and France is the carefully
prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany
in the West, so as to advance through Belgium and Holland
to the region of the Ruhr.
"Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of
Belgium and Holland, it being, of course, understood that these
two countries in the event of a war of Germany against Eng-
land and France would maintain the strictest neutrality.
"Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this con-
dition."

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, do you think it is necessary to

read this in full?
MR. ROBERTS: No, I don't. I was going to summarize these
charges. your Lordship would be good enough to look at the
If
bottom of the first page, you will see the so-called ultimatum com-
plaining of the hostile expressions in the Belgian and Netherlands

305
7 Dec. 45

press; and then, My Lord, in the second paragraph over the page
there is an allegation of the attempts of the British Intelligence to
bring a revolution in Germany with the assistance of Belgium and
the Netherlands.
Then, My Lord, in Paragraph 3 reference is made to military
preparation of the two countries; and in Paragraph 4 it is pointed
out that Belgium has fortified the Belgian-German frontier.
A
complaint is made in regard to Holland in Paragraph 5 that
British aircraft have flown over the Netherlands' country.
There are. My Lord, other charges made against the neutrality
of these two countries although no instances are given. I don't think
I need refer to anything on Page 3 of the document.
—
Page 4, My Lord I would like, if I might, to read the middle
paragraph:
"In this struggle for existence, forced upon the German people
by England and France, the Reich Government are not dis-
posed to await submissively the attack by England and France
and to allow them to carry the war over Belgium and the
other Netherlands into German territory."
And, My Lord, I this sentence and then I read
just emphasize
no further:
"They have, therefore, now issued the command to German
troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the
military means at the disposal of the Reich."
My Lord, it is unnecessary, in my submission, to emphasize the
The world now knows that for months
falsity of that statement.
preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three
countries. This document is saying the orders to do so have now
been issued.
My
Lord, a similar document, similar in terms altogether was
handed to the representatives of the Netherlands Government; My
Lord, TC-60— that will be GB-113, which is the last document but
one in the bundle. My Lord, that is a memorandum to the Luxem-
bourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the document
handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands.
My Lord, I only desire to emphasize the second paragraph of
TC-60:
"In defense against the imminent attack the German troops
have now received the order to safeguard the neutraUty of
these two countries ." . . .

My Lord, the last document, TC-59, which I formerly put in,

that is GB-111.
My Lord, that is the dignified protest of the Belgian Government
against the crime which was committed against her. My Lord, those

306
 7 Dec. 45

are the facts supporting the charges of the violation of treaties and
assurances against these three countries and supporting the alle-
gation of the making of an aggressive war against them. My Lord,
in the respectful submission of the Prosecution here the story is a
very plain, a very simple one, a story of perfidy, dishonor, and
shame.
COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United
Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, it is my task to present the
evidence on the wars of aggression and wars in breach of treaties
against Greece and Yugoslavia. The evidence which I shall put
in to the Tribunal has been prepared in collaboration with my
American colleague, Lieutenant Colonel Krucker.

The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia by the Germans, which

took place in the early hours of the morning of the 6th of April
1941, constituted direct breaches of the Hague Convention of 1899
on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928. Those breaches are charged, respec-
tively, at Paragraphs I and XIII of Appendix C of the Indictment.
Both have already been put in by my learned friend, Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe, who also explained the obligation of the German
Government to the Governments of Yugoslavia and Greece under
those pacts.
In the case of Yugoslavia the invasion further constituted a
breach of an express assurance by the Nazis, which is charged at
Paragraph XXVI of Appendix C. This assurance was originally
given in a German Foreign Office release made in Berlin on the
28th of April 1938 but was subsequently repeated by Hitler himself
on the 6th of October 1939 in a speech he made in the Reichstag, and
it is in respect of this last occasion that the assurance is specifically

pleaded in the Indictm.ent.

May I ask the Tribunal to turn now to the first document in the
document book, which is Book Number 5. The first document is
2719-PS, which is part of the document which has already been put
in as Exhibit GB-58. This is the text of the German Foreign Office
release on the 28th of April 1938, and I would read the beginning
and then the last paragraph but one on the page:
"Berlin, the 28th of April 1938. The State Secretary of the
German Foreign Office to the German Diplomatic Repre-
sentatives.

"As a consequence of the reunion of Austria with the Reich

we have now new frontiers with Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzer-
land, Liechtenstein and Hungary. These frontiers are regarded
by us as finaland inviolable. On this point the following
special declarations have been made ." . . .

307
7 Dec. 45

And then to the last paragraph:

"3.Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government have been informed
by authoritative German quarters that German policy has no
aims beyond Austria, and that the Yugoslav frontier would in
any case remain untouched. In his speech made at Graz on
the 3rd of April of that year the Führer and Chancellor
stated that in regard to the reunion of Austria, Yugoslavia
and Hungary had adopted the same attitude as Italy. We
were happy to have frontiers there which relieved us of all
anxiety about providing military protection for them."
Then, if I may, I will pass to the second document in the book,
TC-92, and offer that as Exhibit GB-114. This is an extract from a
speech made by Hitler on the occasion of the dinner in honor of
the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia on June 1, 1939. I will read the
extract in full:
"The German friendship for the Yugoslav nation is not only a
spontaneous one. It gained depth and durability in the midst
of the tragic confusion of the World War. The German soldier
then learned to appreciate and respect his extremely brave
opponent. I believe that this feeling was reciprocated. This
mutual respect finds confirmation in common political, cul-
tural, and economic interests. We therefore look upon your
Royal Highness' present visit as a living proof of the accuracy
of our view, and at the same time, on that account we derive
from it the hope that German-Yugoslav friendship may con-

tinue further to develop in the future and to grow ever closer.

"In the presence of your Royal Highness, however, we also
perceive a happy opportunity for a frank and friendly
exchange of views which —and of this I am convinced —in this
sense can only be fruitful to our two peoples and States.
I believe this all the more because a firmly established reli-

able relationship of Germany and Yugoslavia, now that owing

to historical events we have become neighbors with common
boundaries fixed for all time, will not only guarantee lasting
peace between our two peoples and countries but can also
represent an element of calm to our nerve-racked continent.
This peace is the goal of all who are disposed to perform
really constructive work."
As we now know this speech was made at the time when Hitler
had already decided upon the European war. I think I am right in
saying it was a week after the Reich Chancellery conference, known
as the Schmundt note, to which the Tribunal has been referred more
than once. The reference to "nerve-racked continent" might perhaps
be attributed to the war of nerves which Hitler had himself been
conducting for many months.

308
 7 Dec. 45

Now I pass to a document which is specifically pleaded at Para-

graphXXVI as the assurance breached; it is the next document in
—
the bundle, TC-43 German assurance to Yugoslavia of the 6th of
October 1939. It is part of the document which has already been
put in as Exhibit GB-80. This is an extract from the Dokumente
der Deutschen Politik:
"Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed
Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country
would also be an unalterable one and that we only desire to
live in peace and friendship with her."
Despite the obligation of Germany under the Convention of 1899
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and^ under the assurances which I have
read, the fate of both Greece and Yugoslavia had, as we now know,
been sealed ever since the meeting between Hitler and the Defendant
Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg, on the 12th and 13th of
August 1939.
We will pass to the next document in the bundle, which is TC-77.
That document has already been put in as GB-48; and the passages
to which I would draw Your Lordship's attention already have been
quoted, I think, by my learned friend, the Attorney General. Those
passages are on Page 2 in the last paragraph from "Generally
speaking ..." until "... neutral of this kind," and then again on
Pages 7 and 8, the part quoted by the Attorney General and
emphasized particularly by Colonel Griffith-Jones at the foot of
Page 7 on the second day of the meeting, the words beginning "In
general, however, success by one of the Axis partners .
." to
.

". . Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work
.

against the West."

Both of those passages have been quoted before; and if I might
sum up the effect of the meeting as revealed by the document as
a whole, it shows Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop, only
2 months after the dinner to the Prince Regent, seeking to persuade
the Italians to make war on Yugoslavia at the same time that Ger-
many commences hostilities against Poland, as Hitler had decided
to do in the very near future. Ciano, while evidently in entire
agreement with Hitler and Ribbentrop as to the desirability of
liquidating Yugoslavia and himself anxious to secure Salonika,
stated that Italy was not yet ready for a general European war.
Despite all the persuasion which Hitler and the Defendant
Ribbentrop exerted at the meeting, it became necessary for the
Nazi conspirators to reassure their intended victim, Yugoslavia,
since in fact Italy maintained her position and did not enter the
war when the Germans invaded Poland, while the Germans them-
selves were not yet ready to strike in the Balkans. It was just for
this reason that on the 6th of October through Hitler's speech they

309
7 Dec. 45

repeated the assurance they had given in April 1938. It is, of course,
a matter of history that after the defeat of the Allied armies in May
and June 1940 the Italian Government declared war on France and
that subsequently at 3 o'clock in the morning of the 28th October
1940 the Italian Minister at Athens presented the Greek Government
with a 3 hours' ultimatum upon the expiry of which Italian troops
were already invading the soil of Greece.
If I may quote to the Tribunal the words in which His Majesty's
Minister reported that event, "The President of the Council has
assured himself an outstanding ." . .

THE PRESIDENT: You have referred to a document?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not* in any of my documents. It is
merely carrying the story to the next document:
"The President of the Council has assured himself an out-
standing place in Greek history, and whatever the future may
bring, his foresight in quietly preparing his country for war,
and his courage in resisting without demur the Italian ulti-
matum when delivered in the small hours of that October
morning will surely obtain an honorable mention in the story
of European statecraft. He means to fight until Italy is com-
pletely defeated, and this reflects the purpose of the whole
Greek nation."
I turn now to the next document in the bundle. That is 2762-PS,
a letter from Hitler to Mussolini, which I put in as GB-115. Although
not dated, I think it is clear from the contents that it was written
shortly after the Italian invasion of Greece. It has been quoted in
full by the Attorney General, but I think it would assist the Tribunal
if I read just the last two paragraphs of the extract:-
"Yugoslavia must become disinterested if possible, however,
from our point of view interested in co-operating in the liqui-
dation of the Greek question. Without assurances from Yugo-
slavia, it is useless to risk any successful operation in the
Balkans.
"Unfortunatelymust stress the fact that waging a war in
I

March is impossible. Therefore any threat-

the Balkans before
ening move towards Yugoslavia would be useless since the
impossibility of a materialization of such threats before March
is well known to the Serbian General Staff. Therefore Yugo-
slavia must, if at all possible, be won over by other means
and other ways."
You may think the reference in the first two lines to his thoughts
— having been with Mussolini for the last 14 days probably indi- —
cates that it was written in about the middle of November, shortly
after the Italian attack.

310
 7 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Could you give us the date of the Itahan

attack?
COL. PHILLIMORE: 28th October 1940.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

COL. PHILLIMORE: As the Tribunal will see from the succeed-
ing document, it was at this time that Hitler was making his plans
for the offensive in the spring of 1941, which included the invasion
of Greece from the north. This letter shows that it was an integral
part of those plans that Yugoslavia should be induced to co-operate
in them or at least to maintain a disinterested attitude toward the
liquidation of the other Balkan states.
I pass now to the next document
in the bundle, 444-PS, which
becomes Exhibit GB-116. a top-secret directive issued from
It is
the Führer's headquarters, signed by Hitler, initialed by the Defend-
ant Jodl, and dated the 12th of November 1940. I will read the first
two lines and then pass to Paragraph 4 on the third page:
"Directive Number 18. The preparatory measures of Supreme
Headquarters for the prosecution of the war in the near
future are to be made along the following lines ." . .

Omitting the serious dealings with operations against Gibraltar

and an offensive against Egypt, I will read Paragraph 4 on the
third page:
"Balkans The Commander-in-Chief of the Army will make
. . .

preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the

Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and
thus make possible the use of German Air Force units against
targets in the eastern Mediterranean, in particular against
those English air bases which are threatening the Romanian
oil area.

"In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Tur-

key in check, the use of an army group of an approximate
strength of 10 divisions is to be the basis for the planning and
the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to
count on the railway leading through Yugoslavia for moving
these forces into position.
"So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, prepa-
rations will be made for an early increase in the German
Army mission in Romania, the extent of which must be sub-
mitted to me.
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force will make prepa-
rations for, the use of German Air Force units in the southeast
Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border
of Bulgaria in accordance with the intended ground oper-
ations."

311
7 Dec. 45

I don't think I need trouble the Tribunal with the rest. The next
document in the bundle, 1541-PS, which I offer in evidence as
Exhibit GB-117, is the directive issued for the actual attack on
Greece. Before reading it, it might be convenient if I summarized
the position of the Italian invading forces at that time as this is
one of the factors mentioned by Hitler in the directive. I can put
it very shortly. I again use the words in which His Majesty's
Minister reported:
"The morale of the Greek Army throughout has been of the
highest,and our own naval and land successes at Taranto
and in the western desert have done much to maintain it.
"With relatively poor armaments and the minimum of equip-
ment and modern facilities they have driven back or captured
superior Italian forces more frequently than not at the point
of the bayonet. The modern Greeks have thus shown that
they are not unworthy of the ancient traditions of their
country and that they, like their distant forefathers, are
prepared to fight against odds to maintain their freedom."
In fact the Italians were getting the worst of it, and it was time
that Hitler came to the rescue. Accordingly this directive was issued
on 13 December 1940; it is top-secret Directive Number 20 for the
Operation Marita. The distribution included, of course, the Com-
mander of the Navy, that would, of course, be the Defendant Raeder;
one to the Commander of the Air Force, which would be the Defend-
ant Goring; one to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
Keitel; and one to the Command Staff, which I take it, would be
the Defendant Jodl. I shall read the first two paragraphs and then
summarize the next two, if I may:
"The result in the battles of Albania is not yet decisive.
Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly
necessary that the British endeavor to create air bases under
—
the protection of a Balkan front which would be dangerous
above all to Italy as well as to the Romanian oil fields be —
foiled.

"My is (a) to form a slowly increasing .task

plan, therefore,
force in southern Romania within the next months (b) after
—
the setting in of favorable weather probably in March to —
send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean north
coast by way of Bulgaria and, if necessary, to occupy the
entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita). The support of
Bulgaria is to be expected."
The next paragraph gives the forces for the operation, and
Paragraph 4 deals with the Operation Marita itself. Paragraph 5
states:

312
 7 Dec. 45

"The military preparations which will produce exceptional

political results in theBalkans demand the exact control of
all the necessary measures by the High Command. The trans-
port through Hungary and the arrival in Romania will be
reported step by step by the High Command of the Armed
Forces and are to be explained at first as a strengthening of
the German Army mission in Romania. Consultations with
the Romanians or the Bulgarians whidi may point to our
intentions as well as notification of the Italians àre each sub-
ject to my consent, also the sending of scouting missions and
advanced parties."
I thinkneed not trouble the Tribunal with the
I The next rest.
document, 448-PS, which I put in as Exhibit GB-118, again a top- is
secret directive carrying the plan a little further; it deals with
decidedly different aspects, the direct support of the Italian forces
in Albania. I read, if I may, the first short paragraph and then the
paragraph at the foot of the page.
"The situation in the Mediterranean theater of operations
demands German assistance for strategical, political, and
psychological reasons due to employment of superior forces
by England against our allies."
And in Paragraph 3 after dealing with the forces to be trans-
ferred to Albania the directive sets out what the duties of the
German forces will be:
"a) To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for
an emergency case should new crises arise there.
"b) To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later
attacking with the aim:
"To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for
a far-reaching operation.
"To open up the straits west of Salonika from the back in
order to support thereby the frontal attack of List's army."
That directive was signed by Hitler and, as can be seen on the
original which I have put in, it was initialed by both the Defendant
Keitel and the Defendant Jodl. Here again, of course, a copy went
to the Defendant Raeder, and I take it that the copy sent to foreign
intelligence would probably reach the Defendant Ribbentrop.
I pass to C-134, the next document in the bundle, which becomes
Exhibit GB-119. This records a conference which took place on the
19th and 20th of January between the Defendant Keitel and the
Italian General Guzzoni and which was followed by a meeting
between Hitler and Mussolini at which the Defendants Ribbentrop,
Keitel, and Jodl were present.
I need not trouble the Tribunal with the meeting with the Ital-
ians, but if you would pass to Page 3 of the document, there is

313
7 Dec. 45

a paragraph there in the speech which the Führer made, which is

—
perhaps just worth reading the speech by the Führer on the
20th of January 1941, in the middle of Page 3. It sets out that the
speech was made after the conference with the Italians and then
shows who was present.
On the German side I would call your attention to the presence
of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the Supreme Com-
mand of the Armed Forces, and the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operational That is, of course, the Defendants Ribbentrop,
Staîf.
Keitel and Jodl; and on the Italian side, the Duce, Ciano, and then
three generals. It is the last paragraph that I would wish to read:
"The massing of troops in Romania serves a threefold pur-
pose:
"a. An operation against Greece;
"b. Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;
"c. Safeguarding the guarantee to Romania.
"Each of these tasks requires its own group of forces; alto-
gether, therefore, very strong forces whose deployment far
from our base requires a long time.
"Desirable that this deployment is completed without inter-
ference from the enemy. Therefore disclose the game as late
as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at the
last possible moment and to line up for attack at the earliest
possible moment."
I document, 1746-PS, which I offer as GB-120.
pass to the next
That document is in three parts. It consists, in the first place, of a
conference between Field Marshal List and the Bulgarians on the
8th of February. The second part and the third part deal with later
events, and I will, if I may, come back to them at an appropriate
time. I would read the first and the last paragraphs on the first
page of this document:
"Minutes of questions discussed between the representatives
of the Royal Bulgarian General Staff and the German High
—
Command General Field Marshal List in connection with —
the possible movement of German troops through Bulgaria
and their commitment against Greece and possibly against
Turkey, if she should involve herself in the war."
And then the last paragraph on the page shows the plan being
concerted with the Bulgarians Paragraph 3: —
"The Bulgarian and the German General Staffs will take all
measures in order to camouflage the preparation of the opera-
tions and to assure in this way the most favorable conditions
for the execution of the German operations as planned.

314
 7 Dec. 45

"The representatives of the two general staffs consider it suit-

able to inform their governments that it will be advisable of
necessity to take secrecy and surprise into consideration when
the Three Power Treaty is signed by Bulgaria, in order to
assure the success of the military operations."
pass then to the next document, C-59, I offer that as Exhibit
I
GB-121. It is a further top-secret directive of the 19th of February.
I need not, I think, read it. All that is set out of importance is the

date for the Operation Marita. It sets out that the bridge across the
Danube is to be begun on the 28th of February, the river crossed
on the 2d of March, and the final orders to be issued on the 26th of
February at the latest.
It isperhaps worth noting that on the original which I have put
in, the actual dates are filled in in the handwriting of the Defendant
Keitel.
perhaps just worth setting out the position of Bulgaria at
It is
this moment. Bulgaria adhered to the Three Power Pact on the
1st of March . . .

THE PRESIDENT: What year?

COL. PHILLIMORE: In 1941, and on the same day the entry of
German troops into Bulgaria began in accordance with the Plan
Marita and the directives to which I have referred the Tribunal.
The landing of British troops in Greece on the 3rd of March in
accordance with the guarantee given in the spring of 1939 by His
Majesty's Government may have accelerated the movement of the
German forces; but, as the Tribunal will have seen, the invasion of
Greece had been planned long beforehand and was already in prog-
ress at this time.
I pass now to the next document in the bundle, C-167, which
I put in as GB-122. I am afraid it is not a very satisfactory copy,
but the original which I have put in shows that both the Defendants
Keitel and Jodl were present at the interview with Hitler which
this extract records. It is a short extract from a report by the
Defendant Raeder on an interview with Hitler in the presence of
the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. It is perhaps interesting as showing
the ruthless nature of the German intention.
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy asks for confirmation
that the whole of Greece will have to be occupied even in the
• event of a peaceful settlement.
"Führer: The complete occupation is a prerequisite of any
settlement."
The above document . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Is it dated?

315
7 Dec. 45

COL. PHILLIMORE: It took place on the 18th of March at

1600 hours.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that on the original document?
COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes, on the original document.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: The document I have referred to shows,
it issubmitted, that the Nazi conspirators in accordance with their
principle of liquidating any neutral who did not remain disinter-
ested had made every preparation by the end of January and were
at this date in the process of moving the necessary troops to ensure
the final liquidation of Greece, which was already at war with and
getting the better of their Italian allies.
They were not, however, yet ready to deal with Yugoslavia
towards which their policy accordingly remained one of lulling the
unsuspecting victim. On the 25th of March 1941 in accordance with
this policy, the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three Power Pact
was secured. This adherence followed a visit on the 15th of February
1941 by the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic and the Foreign Minister
Cinkar-Markovic to the Defendant Ribbentrop at Salzburg and
subsequently to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, after which these ministers
were induced to sign the Pact at Vienna on the 25th of March. On
this occasion the Defendant Ribbentrop wrote the two letters of
assurance, which are set out in the next document in the bundle,
2450-PS, which I put in as GB-123- If I might read from half-way
down the page:
"Notes of the Axis Governments to Belgrade.
"At the same time when the protocol on the entry of Yugo-
was signed, the Governments of
slavia to the Tri-Partite Pact
the Axis Powers sent to the Yugoslavian Government the
following identical notes:
" 'Mr. Prime Minister:
" 'In the name of the German Government and at their behest
I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:
" 'On the occasion of the Yugoslavian entry today into the

Tri-Partite Pact the German Government confirm their deter-

mination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
"
Yugoslavia at all times.'

That letter was signed by the Defendant Ribbentrop, who you

will remember, was present at the meeting in August of 1939 when
he and Hitler tried to persuade the Italians to invade Yugoslavia.
In fact it was 11 days after this letter was written that the Germans
did invade Yugoslavia and 2 days after the letter was written that
they issued the necessary order.

316
 7 Dec. 45

If I might read the second letter:

"Mr. Prime Minister:

"With reference to the conversations that occurred in connec-
tion with the entry of Yugoslavia into the Tri-Partite Pact,
I have the honor to confirm to Your Excellency herewith in
—
the name of the Reich Cabinet" Reichsregierung "that in
—
the agreement between the Axis Powers and the Royal Yugo-
slavian Government the Governments of the Axis Powers
during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to
permit the march or transportation of troops through Yugo-
slavian national territory."
The position at this stage, the 25th of March 1941, was therefore,
that German troops weré already in Bulgaria moving towards the
Greek frontier, while Yugoslavia had, to use Hitler's own term in
his letter to Mussolini, "become disinterested" in the cleaning-up of
the Greek question.
The importance of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the Three
Power Pact appears very clearly from the next document in the
bundle, 2765-PS, which I put in as GB-124. It is an extract from
the minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Ciano, and if I might
just read the first paragraph:
"The Führer first expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's
joining the Tri-Partite Pact and the resulting definition of
her position. This is of special importance in view of the pro-
posed military action against Greece, for if one considers that
for 350 to 400 kilometers the important line of communication
through Bulgaria runs within 20 kilometers of the Yugoslav
border, one can judge that with a dubious attitude of Yugo-
slavia an undertaking against Greece would have been mili-
tarily an extremely foolhardy venture."
Again it is a matter of history that on the night of the 26th of
March, when the two Yugoslav Ministers returned to Belgrade,
General Simovic and his colleagues effected their removal by a coup
d'état; and Yugoslavia emerged on the morning of the 27th of March
ready to defend, if need be, her independence. The Yugoslav people
had found themselves.
The Nazis reacted to this altered situation with lightning rapid-
ity, and the immediate liquidation of Yugoslavia was decided on.
ask the Tribunal to turn back to 1746-PS, which I put in as
I
GB-120, to the second part on Page 3 of the document consisting
of a record of a conference of Hitler and the German High Com-
mand on the situation in Yugoslavia dated 27th of March 1941.
It shows that those present included the Führer; the Reich Mar-
shal, that is of course, the Defendant Goring; Chief, OKW, that is

317
7 Dec. 45

the Defendant Keitel; Chief of the Wehrmacht Führungsstab, that

is the Defendant Jodl. Then over the page
—
"later on the following
persons were added." I call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that
those who came in later included the Defendant Ribbentrop.
If I might read the part of Hitler's statement set out on Page 4:

"The Führer describes Yugoslavia's situation after the coup

d'état. Statement that Yugoslavia was an uncertain factor in
regard to the coming Marita action and even more in regard
to the Barbarossa undertaking later on. Serbs and Slovenes
were never pro-Germans."
I think I can pass on to the second paragraph:
"The present moment is for political and military reasons
favorable for us to ascertain the actual situation in the country
and the country's attitude towards us. For if the overthrow
of the government would have happened during the Barba-
rossa action, the consequences for us probably would have
been considerably more serious."
And then the next paragraph to which I would particularly draw
the Tribunal's attention:
"The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible
loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all prep-
arations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a
national unit. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ulti-
matums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav Government
which cannot be trusted anyhow in the future will be taken
note of. The attack will start as soon as the means and troops
suitable for it are ready.
"It is important that actions will be taken as fast as possible.
An attempt will be made to let the bordering states partic-
ipate in a suitable way. An actual military support against
Yugoslavia is to be requested of Italy, Hungary, and in certain
respects of Bulgaria too. Romania's main task is the protec-
tion against Russia. The Hungarian and the Bulgarian Minis-
ters have already been notified. During the day a message
will still be addressed to the Duce.
"Politically it is especially important that the blow against
Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that
the military destruction is done in a lightning-like under-
taking. In this way Turkey would become sufficiently fright-
ened and the campaign against Greece later on would be
influenced in a favorable way. It can be assumed that the
Croats will come to our side when we attack. A corresponding
political treatment (autonomy later on) will be assured to
them. The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in

318
 7 Dec. 45

Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as territorial acquisitions are

to be promised to these states; the Adriatic coast for Italy, the
Banat for Hungary, and Macedonia for Bulgaria.
"This plan assumes that we speed up the schedule of all prep-
arations and use such strong forces that the Yugoslav collapse
will take place within the shortest time."
Well, of course, the Tribunal will have noted that in that third
—
paragraph 2 days after the pact had been signed and the assurances
—
given because there has been a coup d'état and it is just possible
that the operations against Greece may be affected, the destruction
of Yugoslavia is decided upon without any question of taking the
trouble to ascertain the views of the new government.
Then there is one short passage on Page 5, the next page of the
document, which I would like to read:
"5) The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as
possible with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force
ground installations and to destroy the capital Belgrade in
attacks by waves . . .

I pause there to comment; we now know, of course, how ruth-

lessly this bombing was done when the residential areas of Belgrade
were bombed at 7 o'clock on the following Sunday morning, the
morning of the 6th.
THE PRESIDENT: The 6th of April?
COL. PHILLIMORE: The 6th of April.
Then again still in the same document, the last part of it, Part V
at Page 5; a tentative plan is set out, drawn up by the Defendant
Jodl and I would read one small paragraph at the top of the follow-
ing page. Page 6:
"In the event that the political development requires an
armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German
intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon
as possible, to destroy her armed forces, and to dissolve her
national territory."
I read that because the plan is issued from the office of the
Defendant Jodl.
Now passing to the next document in the bundle, C-127, I put
that in as Exhibit GB-125. It is an extract from the order issued
after the meeting from the minutes of which I have just read, that
is the meeting of the 27th of March recorded in 1746-PS, Part IL
It is worth reading the first paragraph:

"The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the poUtical

situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her
protestations of loyalty, for the time being be considered as
an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible."

319
7 Dec. 45

pass to the next document, 1835-PS, which I put in evidence

I
as GB-126. It is an original telegram containing a letter from Hitler
to Mussolini forwarded through the German Ambassador in Rome
by Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is written to advise
Mussolini of the course decided on and under the guise of somewhat
fulsome language the Duce is given his orders. If I might read the
first five paragraphs:

"Duce, events force me to give you, Duce, by this the quickest

means, my estimation of the situation and the consequences
which may result from it.
"(1) From the beginning I have regarded Yugoslavia as the
most dangerous factor in the controversy with Greece. Con-
sidered from the purely military point of view, German inter-
vention in the war in Thrace would not be at all justified as
long as the attitude of Yugoslavia remains ambiguous, and
she could threaten the left flank of the advancing columns on
our enormous front.
"(2) For this reason I have done everything and honestly
|:iave endeavored to bring Yugoslavia into our community
bound together by mutual interests. Unfortunately these
endeavors did not meet with success, or they were begun too
late to produce any definite result. Today's reports leave no
doubt as to the imminent turn in the foreign policy of Yugo-
slavia.
"(3) I do not consider this situation as being catastrophic, but
nevertheless a difficult one, and we on our part must avoid
any mistake if we do not want in the end to endanger our
whole position.
"(4)Therefore I have already arranged for all necessary meas-
ures in order to meet a critical development with necessary
military means. The change in the deployment of our troops
has been ordered also in Bulgaria. Now I would cordially
request you, Duce, not to undertake any further operations in
Albania in the course of the next few days. I consider it
necessary that you should cover and screen the most impor-
tant passes from Yugoslavia into Albania with all available
forces.
"These measures should not be considered as designed for a
long period of time, but as auxiliary measures designed to
prevent for at least 14 days to 3 weeks a crisis arising.
"I also consider it necessary, Duce, that you should reinforce
your forces on the Italian-Yugoslav front with all available
means and with utmost speed.
"(5) I also consider it necessary, Duce, that everything which
we do and order be shrouded in absolute secrecy and that

320
 7 Dec. 45

only personalities who necessarily must be notified know any-

thing about them. These measures will completely lose their
value should they become known . . .
."

Then he goes on to emphasize further the importance of secrecy.

I pass to R-95; the next document in the bundle, which I put in
as Exhibit GB-127. It was referred to by my learned friend, the
Attorney General. It is an operational order signed by General
Von Brauchitsch which is merely passing to the armies the orders
contained in Directive Number 25, which was the Document C-127,
an extract of which I put in as Exhibit GB-125. I won't trouble the
Tribunal with reading it.

I pass to TC-93, which has already been put in with TC-92 as

GB-114. The invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia took place on this
morning, the 6th of April, on which Hitler issued the proclamation
from which this passage is an extract:
"From the beginning of the struggle it has been England's
steadfast endeavor to make
the Balkans a theater of war. Brit-
ish diplomacy did, in fact, using the model of the World War,
succeed in first ensnaring Greece by a guarantee offered to
her and then finally in misusing her for Britain's purposes.
"The documents published today afford" —that refers to the
German White Book which they published of all the docu-
ments leading up to the invasion
— "The documents published
today afford a glimpse of a practice which in accordance with
very old British recipes is a constant attempt to induce others
to fight and bleed for British interests.

"In the face of this I have always emphasized that: (1) The
German people have no antagonism to the Greek people but
that (2) we shall never as in the World War tolerate a power
establishing itself on Greek territory with the object, at a
given time, of being able to advance thence from the south-
east into German living space. We have swept the northern
flank free of the English; we are resolved not to tolerate such
a threat in the south."
Then the paragraph to which I would draw the Tribunal's par-
ticular attention:

"In the interests of a genuine consolidation of Europe it has

been my endeavor since the day of my assumption of power
above all to establish a friendly relationship with Yugo-
slavia. I have consciously put out of mind everything that
once took place between Germany and Serbia. I have not
only offered the Serbian people the hand of the German
people, but in addition have made efforts as an honest broker

321
7 Dec. 45

which existed between the

to assist in bridging all difficulties
Yugoslav State and various nations allied to Germany."
One can only think that when he issued that proclamation Hitler
must momentarily have forgotten the meeting with Ciano in August
of 1939 and the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop and the
others on 27th March a few days earlier.
I pass to the last document in the bundle. It is a document which
has already been put in, L-172, and it was put in as Exhibit USA-34.
It is a record of a lecture delivered by the Defendant Jodl on
7th November 1943. At Page 4 there is a short passage which sets
out his views two and a half years later on the action taken in April
1941. I refer to Paragraph 11 on Page 4:

"What was, however, less acceptable was the necessity of

affording our assistance as an ally in the Balkans in conse-
quence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against Greece. The
attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from
Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all
agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which
— —
taking a long view of the matter would have become
necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on
Greece from the north was not executed merely as an opera-
tion in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the
British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing
our Romanian oil area from that country."
might summarize the story:
If I

The invasion of Greece was decided on at least as early as

December or November 1940 and planned for the end of March or
the beginning of April 1941. No consideration was at any time
given to any obligations under treaties or conventions which might
make such invasion a breach of international law. Care was taken
to conceal the preparations so that the German forces might have
an unsuspecting victim.
In the meanwhile Yugoslavia, although to be liquidated in due
course, was clearly better left for a later stage. Every effort was
made to secure her co-operation for the offensive against Greece or
at least to ensure that she would abstain from any interference.

The coup d'état of General Simovic upset this plan and it was
then decided that irrespective of whether or not his government had
any hostile intentions towards Germany, or even of supporting the
Greeks, Yugoslavia must be liquidated.
It*was not worth while to take any steps to ascertain Yugo-
when it' would be so little trouble now that the
slavia's intentions
German troops were deployed to destroy her militarily and as a
national unit. Accordingly in the early hours of Sunday morning,

322
 7 Dec. 45

the 6th of April, German troops marched into Yugoslavia without

warning and into Greece simultaneously with the formality of
handing a note to the Greek Minister in Berlin informing him that
the German forces were entering Greece to drive out the British.
M. Koryzis, the Greek Minister, in replying to information of the
invasion from the German Embassy, replied that history was
repeating itself and that Greece was being attacked by Germany
in the same way as by Italy. Greece returned, he said, the same
reply as in the preceding October.
That concludes the evidence in respect of Greece and Yugoslavia.
But as I have the honor to conclude the British case I would like,
if the Tribunal would allow me, to draw their attention, very shortly
indeed, to one common factor which runs through the whole of this
aggression. I can do it, I think, in 5 minutes.
It is an element in the diplomatic technique of aggression which
was used with singular consistency not only by the Nazis them-
selves but also by their Italian friends. Their technique was essen-
tially based upon securing the maximum advantage from surprise
even though only a few hours of unopposed military advance into
the country of the unsuspecting victim could thus be secured. Thus
there was, of course, no declaration of war in the case of Poland.
The invasion of Norway and of Denmark began in the small
hours of the night of April 8-9 and was well under way as a mili-
tary operation before the diplomatic explanations and excuses were
presented to the Danish Foreign Minister at 4:20 a.m. on the
morning of the 9th and to the Norwegian Minister between half
past 4 and 5 on that morning.
The invasion Luxembourg, and Holland began not
of Belgium,
most cases earlier in the small hours of the
later than 5 o'clock, in
10th of May, while the formal ultimatum delivered in each case
with the diplomatic excuses and explanations was not presented
until afterwards.
In the case of Holland the invasion began between 3 and 4 in the
morning. It was not until about 6 when The Hague had already
been bombed that the German Minister asked to see M. Van Klef-
fens. In the case of Belgium where the bombing began at 5, the
German Minister did not see M. Spaak until 8.
The invasion of Luxembourg began at 4 and it was at 7 when
the German Minister asked to see M. Beck.
Mussolini copied this technique. It was 3 o'clock on the morning
of the 28th ofOctober in 1940 when his Minister in Athens presented
a 3-hour ultimatum to General Metaxas.
The invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia, as I have said, both
began in the small hours ot April 6, 1941. In the case of Yugoslavia

323
7 Dec. 45

no diplomatic exchange took place even after the event, but a

—
proclamation was issued by Hitler a proclamation from which
I read an extract —
at 5 o'clock that Sunday morning some 2 hours
before Belgrade was bombed.
In the case of Greece, once again, it was at 20 minutes past 5
that M. Koryzis was informed that German troops were entering
Greek territory.
The manner in which this long series of aggressions was carried
out is in itself further evidence of the essentially aggressive and
treacherous character of the Nazi regime. Attack without warning
at night to secure an initial advantage and proffer excuses or reasons
afterwards. Their method of procedure is clearly the method of the
barbarian, of the state which has no respect for its own pledged
word nor for the rights of any people but its own.
One is tempted to speculate whether this technique was evolved
by the honest broker himself or by his honest clerk, the Defendant
Ribbentrop.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you be ready to go on
after a short adjournment? That's what you were intending to do?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: We'll adjourn for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, before proceeding

with the presentation of the evidence relating to the aggression
against the Soviet Union, I shall take about 15 minutes to offer two
further documents relating to the aggression against Austria.
These two documents are stapled in a supplementary book,
supplement to Document Book N. Both documents are correspond-
ence of the British Foreign Office. They have been made available
to us through the courtesy of our British colleagues.
First I offer in evidence Document 3045-PS as Exhibit USA-127.
This is in two parts. The first is a letter dated 12 March 1938, from
Ambassador Nevile Henderson at the British Embassy, Berlin, to
Lord Halifax. It reads:
"My Lord:
"With reference to your telegram Number 79 of March 11th,
I have the honor to transmit to Your Lordship herewith a
copy of a letter which I addressed to Baron Von Neurath in
accordance with the instructions contained therein and which
was delivered on the same evening..

324
 7 Dec. 45

"The French Ambassador addressed a similar letter to Baron

Von Neurath at the same time."
The enclosure is the note of March 11th from the British Em-
bassy to Defendant Von Neurath and it reads as follows:
"Dear Reich Minister:
"My Government are informed that a German ultimatum
was delivered Vienna demanding, inter alia,
this afternoon at
the resignation of the Chancellor and his replacement by the
Minister of the Interior, a new Cabinet of which two-thirds
of the members were to be National Socialists and the
readmission of the Austrian Legion to the country with the
duty of keeping order in Vienna.
"I am instructed by my Government to represent immediately
to the German Government that if this report is correct His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom feel bound to
register a protest in the strongest terms against such use of
coercion backed by force against an independent state in order
to create a situation incompatible with its national independ-
ence.
"As the German Minister for Foreign Affairs has already been
informed in London, such action is found to produce the
greatest reactions of which it is impossible to foretell the
issues."
I now offer Document 3287-PS, as Exhibit Number USA-128.
This consists of a transmittal from the British Embassy, Berlin, to
the British Foreign Office of Defendant Von Neurath's letter of
response dated 12 March 1938. The letter is identified in the docu-
ment with the letter "L".
First the Defendant Von Neurath objected to the fact that the
British Government were undertaking the role of protector of
Austria's independence. I quote from the second paragraph of his
letter:
"In the name of the German Government I must point out
here that the Royal British Government have no right to
assume the role of a protector of Austria's independence. In
the course of diplomatic consultations on the Austrian ques-
tion, the German Government never left any doubt with the
Royal British Government that the formation of relations
between Germany and Austria could not be considered any-
thing but the inner concern of the German people and that
it did not affect a third power."

Then in response to the assertions regarding Germany's ulti-

matum, Von Neurath set out what he stated to be the true version
of events. I quote the last two long paragraphs of the letter; in the
English translation I start at the bottom of Page 1 of the letter:

325
7 Dec. 45

"Instead, the former Austrian Chancellor announced on the

evening of the 9th of March the surprising and arbitrary reso-
lution decided on by himself to hold an election within a few
days which, under the prevailing circumstances and especially
according to the details provided for the execution of the
election, could and was to have the sole purpose of oppressing
politically the predominant majority of the population of
Austria. As could have been foreseen, this procedure, being
a flagrant violation of the agreement of Berchtesgaden, led to
a very critical point in Austria's internal situation. It was
only natural that the members of the then Austrian Cabinet
who had not taken part in the decision for an election pro-
tested very strongly against it. Therefore a crisis of the
Cabinet occurred in Vienna which, on the 11th of March,
resulted in the resignation of the former Chancellor and in
the formation of a new Cabinet. It is untrue that the Reich
used forceful pressure to bring about this development. Espe-
cially the assertion which was spread later by the former
Chancellor that the German Government had presented the
Federal President with a conditional ultimatum, is a pure
invention; according to the ultimatum he had to appoint a
proposed candidate as Chancellor and to form a Cabinet con-
forming to the proposals of the German Government other-
wise the invasion of Austria by German troops was held in
prospect. The truth of the matter is that the question of
sending military or police forces from the Reich was only
brought up when the newly formed Austrian Cabinet addressed
a telegram, already published by the press, to the German
Government urgently asking for the dispatch of German
troops as soon as possible in order to restore peace and in
order to avoid bloodshed. Faced with the immediately
threatening danger of a bloody civil war in Austria, the
German Government then decided to comply with the appeal
addressed to it.
"This being the state of affairs, it is impossible that the atti-
tude of the German Government as asserted in your letter
could lead to some unforseeable reactions. A complete picture
of the political situation is given in the proclamation which,
at noon today, the German Reich Chancellor has addressed to
the German people. Dangerous reactions to this situation can
take place only if eventually a third party should try to exer-
cise its influence contrary to the peaceful intentions and
legitimate aims of the German Government on the shaping
of events in Austria, which would be incompatible with the
right of self-government of the German people."

326
 7 Dec. 45

That ends the quotation.

Now in the light of the evidence which has already been pre-
sented to the Tribunal, this version of the events given by the
Defendant Von Neurath is a hollow mockery of the truth.
We have learned, from the portions quoted from Document
1780-PS, Exhibit Number USA-72, Jodl's diary, the entry for March
10, 1938, the fact that Von Neurath was taking over the duties of
the Foreign Office while Ribbentrop was detained in London, that
the Führer wished to send an ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet,
that he had dispatched a letter to Mussolini of his reasons for
taking action, and that army mobilization orders were given.
We have seen the true facts about the ultimatum from two
different documents. refer to 812-PS, Exhibit Number USA-61,
I
report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reichskommissar Bürckel, dated 6 July
1939, which was transmitted to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart on
22 August 1939. The portions reporting on the events of March 11
have already been read to the Tribunal.
I also refer to Document 2949-PS, Exhibit USA-76, the transcripts
of Göring's telephone conversations, relevant portions of which I
have already read to the Tribunal.
These documents emphatically show and with unmistakable
clarity, that the German Nazis did present an ultimatum to the
Austrian Government that they would send troops across the border
if Schuschnigg did not resign and if Defendant Seyss-Inquart were

not appointed Chancellor.

These documents also show that the impetus of the famous tele-
gram came from Berlin and not from Vienna, that Goring composed
the telegram and Seyss-Inquart did not even have to send it, but
merely said "agreed."
The transcript of Göring's telephone call to Ribbentrop is indi-
cated as Part W
of that document. In it the formula was developed
and recited for English consumption that there ha^ been no ulti-
matum and that the German troops crossed the border in response
only to the telegram.
And now in this document from which I have just read we find
the same bogus formula coming from the pen of the Defendant
Von Neurath. He was at the meeting of November 5, 1937, of whidi
we have the Hossbach minutes. Exhibit USA-25. And so he knew
very well the firmly held Nazi ideas with respect to Austria and
Czechoslovakia. And yet in the period after March 10, 1938 when
he was handling the foreign affairs for this conspiracy and partic-
ularly after the invasion of Austria, he played out his part in
making false representations. He gave an assurance to Mr. Mastny
regarding the continued independence of Austria. I refer to the

327
7 Dec. 45

document introduced by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, Document TC-27,

Exhibit GB-21.
And we see him here still handling foreign affairs, although
using the letterhead of the Secret Cabinet Council as the exhibit
shows, reciting this diplomatic fable with respect to the Austrian
situation, a story also encountered by us in the transcript of the
Göring-Ribbentrop telephone call, all in furtherance of the aims
of what we call the conspiracy.

Now, if the Tribunal please, it might have been fitting and

appropriate for me to present the case on collaboration with Japan
and the attack on the United States on this December 7, 1945, the
fourth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, our
plan was to proceed chronologically so that part of the case must
wait its turn for the presentation next week.
Wenow come to the climax of this amazing story of wars of
aggression, perhaps one of the most colossal mis-estimates in history,
when Hitler's intuition led him and his associates to launch an
aggressive war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In my last appearance before the Tribunal I presented an account
of the aggression against Czechoslovakia. In the meantime our
British colleagues have given you the evidence covering the formu-
lation of the plan to attack Poland and the preparations and initi-
ation of actual aggressive war. In addition they have laid before
the Tribunal the story of the expansion of the war into a general
war of aggression involving the planning and execution of attacks
on Denmark, Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Yugoslavia, Greece; and in doing so the British Prosecution has
marshalled and presented to the Court various international treaties,
agreements, and assurances, and the evidence establishing the
breaching of those treaties and assurances.
should like to present to the Tribunal now the account of the
I
last but one of the defendants' acts of aggression, the invasion of
the U.S.S.R. TÏie section of the Indictment in which this crime is
charged is Count One, Section IV (F), Paragraph 6, German invasion
on 22 June 1941 of the U.S.S.R. territory in violation of the Non-
Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939. The first sentence of this para-
graph is the one with which we shall bb concerned today. It reads:
"On 22 June 1941 the Nazi conspirators deceitfully denounced
the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the U.S.S.R.
and without any declaration of war invaded Soviet territory
thereby beginning a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R."
The documents having a bearing on this phase of the case are
contained in document book marked "P," which we now hand to
the Court.

328
 7 Dec. 45

First, if the Tribunal please, the inception of the plan. As a

point of departure for the story of aggression against the Soviet
Union, I should like to take the date 23 August 1939. On that date
just a week before the invasion of Poland, the Nazi conspirators
caused Germany to enter into the Treaty of Non-Aggression with
the U.S.S.R. which is referred to in this section of the Indictment
which I have just quoted. This treaty. Document Number TC-25,
will be introduced in evidence by our British colleagues, but it con-
tains two articles which I should like to bring to the attention of
the Tribunal. Article I provides as follows:
"The two contracting parties undertake to refrain from any
act of violence, any aggressive action, »or any attack against
one another, whether individually or jointly with other
powers."
Article V provides that, should disputes or conflicts arise between
the contracting parties regarding questions of any kind whatsoever,
the two parties would clear away these disputes or conflicts solely
by friendly exchanges of view or, if necessary, by arbitration com-
missions.
well to keep these solemn pledges in mind during the course
It is
of the story which is to follow. This treaty was signed for the
German Government by the Defendant Ribbentrop. Its announce-
ment came as somewhat of a surprise to the world since it appeared
to constitute a reversal of the previous trend of Nazi foreign policy.
The explanation for this about-face has been provided, however, by
no less eminent a witness than the Defendant Ribbentrop himself
in a discussion which he had with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima
in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. A
report of that conference was
forwarded by Ribbentrop to certain German diplomats in the field
for their strictly confidential and purely personal information. This
report we now have. It is Number 1834-PS. I offer it in evidence
as Exhibit USA-129, the original German document.
On Page 2 of the English translation, Ribbentrop tells Oshima
the reason for the pact with the U.S.S.R. That is Page 2 of the
German:
"Then when it came to war the Führer decided on a compro-
mise with Russia — as a necessity for avoiding a two-front
war."
In view of the spirit of opportunism which motivated the Nazis
in entering into this solemn pledge of arbitration and non-aggres-
sion, it is not very surprising to find that they regarded it as they
did all treaties and pledges, as binding on them only so long as it
was expedient for them to be bound. That they did so regard it is
evidenced by the fact that even while the campaign in the West was

329
7 Dec. 45

still in progress they began to consider the possibility of launching

a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.
In a speech to Reich- and Gauleiter at Munich in November 1943,
which is set forth in our Document L-172 already in evidence as
Exhibit Number USA-34, the Defendant Jodl admitted— and I shall
read from Page 7 of the English translation, which is at Page 15
of the original German text:
"Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily
growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the
—
Bolshevik East that danger which has been only too little
perceived in Germany and of late, for diplomatic reasons, had
deliberately to be ignored. However, the Führer himself has
always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back
as during the Western campaign had informed me of his
fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the
moment our military position made it at all possible."
At the time this decision was made, however, the Western cam-
paign was still in progress, and so any action in the East necessarily
had to be postponed for the time being. On 22 June 1940, however,
the Franco-German armistice was signed at Compiègne, and the
campaign in the West with the exception of the war against Britain
came to an end. The view that Germany's key to political and
economic domination lay in the elimination of the U.S.S.R. as a
political factor and in the acquisition of Lebensraum at her expense
had long been, basic in Nazi ideology. As we have seen, this idea
had never been completely forgotten even while the war in the
West was in progress. Now flushed with the recent success of their
arms and yet keenly conscious of both their failure to defeat
Britain and the needs of their armies for food and raw materials,
the Nazis began serious consideration of the means for achieving
their traditional ambition by conquering the Soviet Union.
The situation in which Germany now found herself made such
action appear both desirable and practical. As early as August of
1940 General Thomas received a hint from the Defendant Goring
that planning for a campaign against the Soviet Union was already
under way. Thomas at that time was the Chief of the "Wirtschafts-
rüstungsamt" of the OKW.
I should, perhaps, mention that this office is generally referred
to in the German documents by the abbreviation Wi Rü.
General Thomas tells of receiving this information from Goring
in his draft of a work entitled Basic Facts for a History of German
War and Armament Economy, which he prepared during the summer
of 1944. This book is our Document 2353-PS and has already been
admitted into evidence as Exhibit USA-35. I am sorry, it was

330
 7 Dec. 45

marked that for identification purposes. I now offer it in evidence

as Exhibit Number USA-35.
On Pages 313 to 315 of this work Thomas discusses the Russo-
German Trade Agreement of 1939 and relates how, since the Soviets
were delivering quickly and well under this agreement and were
requesting war materials in return, there was much pressure in
Germany until early in 1940 for increased delivery on the part of
the Germans. However, at Page 315 he has the following to say
about the change of heart expressed by the German leaders in
August of 1940. I read from Page 9 of the English translation:
"On August 14 the Chief of the Wirtschaf tsrüstungsamt during
a conference with Reich Marshal Goring, was informed that
the Führer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only
until spring 1941. Later on we were to have no further
interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. This
allusion moved the Chief of the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt to
give priority to matters concerning Russian war economy."
I shall refer to this statement again later when I discuss the
preparation for the economic exploitation of Soviet territory expected
to be captured. At that time, too, I shall introduce evidence which
will show that in November of 1940 Goring informed Thomas that
a campaign was planned against the U.S.S.R.
Preparations for so large an undertaking as an invasion of
the Soviet Union necessarily entailed even these many months in
advance of the date of execution, certain activity in the East in the
way of construction projects and strengthening of forces. Such
activity could not be expected to pass unnoticed by the Soviet
Intelligence Service. Counter-intelligence measures were obviously
called for.
In an OKW directive signed by the Defendant Jodl and issued
abroad on 6 September 1940, such
to the counter-intelligence service
measures were ordered. This directive is our Number 1229-PS and
I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-130, a photostat of the cap-
tured German document. This directive pointed out that the activity
in the East must not be permitted to create the impression in the
Soviet Union that an offensive was being prepared, and outlined the
line for the counter-intelligence people to take to disguise this fact.
The text of the directive indicates by implication the extent of the
preparations already under way, and I should like to read it to the
Tribunal:
"The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks
to come. By the end of October the status shown on the
enclosed map is supposed to be reached.
"These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia
that we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other

331
7 Dec. 45

hand, Russia will realize that strong and highly trained Ger-
man troops are stationed in the Government General, in the
Eastern Provinces and in the Protectorate; she should draw
the conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests
— —
especially in the Balkans with strong forces against Rus-
sian seizure.
"For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for
the answer to questions of the Russian Intelligence Service,
the following directives apply:
"1) The respective total strength of the German troops in the
East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about
a frequent change of the army units there. This change is to
be explained by movements into training camps, regroupings,
et cetera.
"2) The impression be created that the center of the
is to
massing of troops is Government,
in the southern part of the
in the Protectorate, and in Austria, and that the massing in
the north is relatively unimportant.
"3) Whencomes to the equipment situation of the units,
it

especially of the armored divisions, things are to be exagger-

ated, if necessary.
"4) By suitable news the impression
be created that the
is to
antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased con-
siderably after the end of the campaign in the West and that
it continues to be increased with captured French material on
all important targets.

"5)Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes,

et it is to be stated that the work is kept within
cetera,
normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly
won eastern territories, and serves primarily economical
traffic.

"The Supreme Command of the Army (OKH) what

decides to
extent correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of
garrisons, et cetera, will be made available to the defense
for purposes of counter espionage.
"The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces,
by order of" —signed— "Jodl."
Early in November of 1940 Hitler reiterated his previous orders
and called for a continuation of preparations, promising further and
more definite instructions as soon as this preliminary work produced
a general outline of the Army's operational plan. This order was
contained in a top-secret directive from the Führer's headquarters.
Number 18, dated 12 November 1940, signed by Hitler and initialed

332
 7 Dec. 45

by Jodl. It is Number 444-PS in our numbered series and is already

in evidence as Exhibit Number GB-116.
The directive begins by saying:
"The preparatory measures of supreme headquarters for the
prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made
along the following lines . . .
."

then outlines plans for the various theaters and the policy
It
regarding relations with other countries and says regarding the
—
U.S.S.R. and I read now from Page 3, Paragraph Number 5 of the
English translation:
"Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of
clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective
of the results of these discussions all preparations for the East
which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.
"Instructions on this will follow as soon as the general outline
of the Army's operational plans have been submitted to, and
approved by me."
On the 5th of December 1940 the Chief of the General Staff of
the Army, at that time General Haider, reported to the Führer con-
cerning the progress of the plans for the coming operation against
the U.S.S.R. A report of this conference with Hitler is contained
in captured Document Number 1799-PS. This is a folder containing
many documents labeled annexes and all bearing on Fall Barba-
all
rossa, the plan against the U.S.S.R. This folder was discovered in
the War Diary of the Wehrmachtführungsstab and was apparently
an enclosure to that diary.
The report I am here referring to is Annex Number 1 and is
dated December 1940.
I now offer in evidence Document Number 1799-PS as United
States Exhibit Number 131. I should also like to read into the record
a few sentences from the report of 5 December 1940 as they indicate
the state of the planning for this act of aggression six and a half
months before it occurred.
"Report to the Führer on 5 December 1940.
"The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reported
about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at
first on the geographical fundamentals. The main war indus-
trial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Lenin-
grad."
Then skipping:
"The Führer declares that he has agreed with the discussed
operational plans and adds the following:
"The most important goal is to prevent the Russians from
withdrawing on a closed front. The eastward advance should

333
7 Dec. 45

be combined until the Russian Air Force will be unable to

attack the territory of the German Reich and on the other
hand the German Air Force will be enabled to conduct raids
to destroy Russian war industrial territory. In this way we
should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian
Army and to prevent its regeneration. The first commitment
of the forces should take place in such a way as to make the
annihilation of strong enemy units possible."
Then, skipping again:
"It, is essential that the Russians should not take up positions
in the rear again. The number of 130 to 140 divisions as
planned for the entire operation is sufficient."
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?

MR. ALDERMAN: Very convenient, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Then we shall not sit in open session tomor-
row. We will sit again on Monday at 10 o'clock.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 10 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

334
 SIXTEENTH DAY
Monday, 10 December 1945

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has received a letter from

Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht. In answer to that
the Tribunal wishes the defendants' counsel to know that they will
be permitted to make one speech only in accordance with Article
24 (h) of the Charter, and this speech will be at the conclusion of
all the evidence.

At the conclusion of the case for the Prosecution, the defendants'

counsel will be invited to submit to the Tribunal the evidence they
propose to call; but they will be strictly confined to the names of
the witnesses and the matters to which their evidence will be rele-
vant, and this submission must not be in the nature of a speech. Is
that clear? In case there should be any misunderstanding, what
I have just said will be posted up on the board in the defendants'
Counsel Room so that you can study it there.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, when the Tribunal
rose Friday, I had just reached the point in my discussion of aggres-
sion against the U.S.S.R. where, with the campaign in the West at
an end, the Nazi conspirators had begun the development of their
plans to attack the Soviet Union. Preliminary high level planning
and action was in progress. Hitler had indicated earlier in November
that more detailed and definite instructions would be issued. These
would be issued as soon as the general outline of the Army's
operational plans had been submitted to him and approved by him.
We had thus reached the point in the story indicated on the outline
submitted last Friday as Part 3 of the Plan Barbarossa.
By the 18th of December 1940, the general outline of the Army's
operational plan having been submitted to Hitler, the basic strate-
gical directive to the High Command of the Army, Navy, and the
— —
Air Force for Barbarossa Directive Number 21 was issued. This
directive, which for the first time marks the plan to invade the
Soviet Union, was specifically referred to in an order although the
order was classified top secret. It also marked the first use of the
code word Barbarossa to denote this operation.
The directive is Number 446-PS, and was offered in evidence in
the course of my opening statement as Exhibit USA-31. Since it
was fully discussed at that time, it is, I believe, sufficient now

335
10 Dec. 45

merely to recall to the Tribunal two or three of the most significant

sentences in that document. Most of these sentences appear on
Page 1 of the English translation. One of the most significant,
I believe, is this sentence with which the order begins:

"The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet

Russia in a quick campaign even before the end of the war
with England."
On the same page it is stated:
"Preparations requiring more time to start are, if this has not
yet been done, to begin presently and are to be completed by
15 May 1941. Great caution has to be exercised that the
intention of the attack will not be recognized."
The directive then outlines the broad strategy on which the
intended invasion was to proceed and the parts that the various
services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) were to play therein, and
calls for oral reports to Hitler by the commanders-in-chief, closing
as follows:
— —
"V." that is on Page 2 "I am expecting the reports of
the commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this
letter of instructions.
"The preparations planned by all branches of the Armed
Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command,
also in regard to their time."
Signed by Hitler, and initialed by Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont, and one
illegible name.

It is from the contents of the order itself as

perfectly clear both
well as from its which I have outlined, that this directive
history,
was no mere planning exercise by the staff. It was an order to
prepare for an act of aggression, which was intended to occur and
which actually did occur.
The various services which received the order certainly under-
stood it as an order to prepare for action, and did not view it as
a hypothetical staff problem. This is plain from the detailed plan-
ning and preparation which they immediately undertook in order to
implement the general scheme set forth in this basic directive.
So we come to the military planning and preparation for the
implementation of Plan Barbarossa. The Naval War Diary for
13 January 1941 indicates the early compliance of the OKM with
that part of Directive Number 21 which ordered progress in prep-
aration to be reported to Hitler through the High Command of the
Armed Forces. This entry in the War Diary is Document C-35 in
our numbered series, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-132.
This document contains a substantial amount of technical infor-
mation concerning the Navy's part in the coming campaign and the

336
 10 Dec. 45

manner in which it was preparing itself to play the part. I feel,

however, that it will be sufficient for the establishment of our point
that the Navy was actively preparing for the attack at this early
date, to read only a small portion of the entry into the record,
beginning on Page 1 of the English translation, which is Page 401
of the Diary itself. The entry reads:
"30 January 1941.
"7. Talk by la about the plans and preparations for the Bar-
barossa Case to be submitted to the High Command of Armed
Forces."
I should note that "la" is in this case the abbreviation for a
deputy chief of naval operations. Then follows a list of the Navy's
objectives in the war against Russia. Under the latter many tasks
for the Navy are listed, but I think one is sufficiently typical to
give the Tribunal an idea of all. I quote from the top of Page 2
of the English translation:

"II. Objectives of War Against Russia ....

"d) To harass the Russian fleet by
surprise blows as: 1) Light-
ning-like actions at the outbreak of the war by air force units
against strong points and combat vessels in the Baltic, Black
Sea, and Polar Sea."
The purpose of the offer of this document is merely that it
indicates the detailed thinking and planning which was being car-
ried out to implement Barbarossa almost six months before the
operation actually got under way. It is but another piece in the
mosaic of evidence which demonstrates beyond question of doubt
that the invasion of the Soviet Union was one of the most cold-
bloodedly premeditated attacks on a neighboring power in the history
of the world. Similarly the Naval War Diary for the month of
February contains at least several references to the planning and
preparation for the coming campaign. Extracts of such references
are contained in Document C-33, which I am now offering in evi-
dence as Exhibit USA-133.
I think it will be sufficient to quote for the record as typical
the entry for 19 February 1941, which appears at Page 3 of the
English translation and at Page 248 of the Diary itself.
"In regard to the impending operation Barbarossa for which
allS-boats in the Baltic will be needed, a transfer can only
be considered after conclusion of the Barbarossa operations."
On the 3rd of February 1941 the Führer held a conference to
assess the progress thus far made in the planning for Barbarossa.
The conference also discussed the plans for "Sonnenblume," which
—
was the code name for the North African operation "Sunflower."
Attending this conference were, in addition to Hitler: The Chief

337
 —

10 Dec. 45

of the Supreme Command the Armed Forces, the Defendant

of
Keitel; the Chief of the Armed
Forces Operations Staff, the Defend-
ant Jodl; the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch; the
Chief of the Army General Staff, Haider; as well as several others,
including Colonel Schmundt, Hitler's Adjutant.
A report of this conference is contained in our Document Num-
ber 872-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-134.
During the course of this conference the Chief of the Army
General Staff gave a long report about enemy strength as com-
pared with their own strength and the general overall operational
plans for the invasion. This report was punctuated at various inter-
valsby comments from the Führer.
At Page 4 of the English translation of the conference plan,
which is at Page 5 of the German original, there is an interesting
extract, which, although written in a semi-shorthand, is at least
sufficiently clear toinform us that elaborate timetables had already
been set out for the deployment of troops as well as for industrial
operations. I quote:
"The proposed time schedule is charted on the map. First
—
Deployment Echelon" Aufmarschstaffel "now being trans- —
ferred, Front-Interior-East. Second Deployment Echelon from
the middle of March gives 3 divisions for reinforcement in the
West, but Army groups and Army High Commands are with-
drawn from the West. In the East there are already con-
siderable reinforcements though still in the rear area. From
—
now on, 'Attila' " I might state here parenthetically that
this was the code word for the operation for the occupation
of unoccupied France
—
"Attila can be carried out only with
difficulty. Economic traffic is hampered by transport move-
ments. From the beginning of April, Hungary will be ap-
proached about the march-through. Third Deployment Echelon,
from the middle of April. 'Felix' is now no longer possible,
as the main part of the artillery has been shipped." Felix —
was the name for the proposed operation against Gibraltar.
"In industry the full capacity timetable is in force. No more
camouflage. Fourth Deployment Echelon, from 25. IV to 15. V,
withdraws considerable forces from the West ('Seelöwe' can
—
no longer be carried out)." "Seelöwe" (or Sea Lion) was a
code word for the planned operation against England, and
"Marita," which we shall see a little later in the quotation, was
the code word for the action against Greece. "The concen- —
tration of troops in the East is clearly apparent. The full
capacity timetable is maintained. The complete picture of
the disposition of forces on the map shows 8 Marita divisions.

338

)
 10 Dec. 45

"Commander-in-Chief, Army, requests that he no longer have

to assign 5 control divisions for this; but might hold them
ready as reserves for commander in the West.
"Führer: 'When Barbarossa commences the world will hold
"
itsbreath and make no comment.'
This much, I believe, when read with
the conference conclusions,
which I shall read in a moment, show that the Army
is sufficient to
as well as the Navy regarded Barbarossa as an action directive and
were far along with their preparations even as early as February
—
1941 almost 5 months prior to 22 June, the date the attack was
actually launched. The conference report summarized the con-
clusions of the conference, insofar as they affected Barbarossa, as
follows; I am now reading from Page 6 of the English translation,
which is on Page 7 of the German:
"Conclusions:
"1. Barbarossa.
"a. The Führer on the whole
is in agreement with the
operational plan. When it is being carried out it must be
remembered that the main aim is to gain possession of the
Baltic States and Leningrad.
"b. The Führer desires that the operation map and the plan
of the deployment of forces be sent to him as soon as
possible.
"c. Agreements with neighboring states who are taking part
may not be concluded until there isno longer any necessity
for camouflage. The exception is Romania with regard to
reinforcing the Moldau.
• "d. It must, in any case, be possible to carry out Attila.
(With the means available.)
"e. The concentration for Barbarossa will be carried out as
a feint for Sea Lion and the subsidiary measure Marita'."
On 13th March 1941 the Defendant Keitel signed an operational
directive to Führer Order Number 21, which was issued in the form
of "Directives for Special Areas." This detailed operational order
is Number 447-PS in our numbered series, and I now offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-135.
This order which was issued more than 3 months in advance of
the attack indicates how complete were the plans on practically
every phase of the operation. Section I of the directive is headed,
"Area of Operations and Executive Power," and outlines who was
to be in control of what and where. It states that while the cam-
paign is in progress in territory through which the Army is advan-
cing, the Supreme Commander of the Army has the executive
power. During this period, however, the Reichsführer SS is

339
 10 Dec. 45

entrusted with "special tasks." This assignment is discussed in

Paragraph 2b, which appears on Page 1 of the English translation
and reads as follows:
"b) In the area of operations of the Army the Reichsführer
SS is, on behalf of the Führer, entrusted with special tasks
for the preparation of the political administration —tasks
which result from the struggle which has to be carried out
between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of
these tasks the Reichsführer SS shall act independently and
/ under his own responsibility. The executive power invested
in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agen-
cies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is
the responsibility of the Reichsführer SS that through the
execution of his tasks military operations shall not be dis-
turbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH
with the Reichsführer SS."
The order then states that in time political administration will
be set up under Conmiissioners of the Reich, and discusses the
relationship of these officials to the Army. This is contained in
Paragraph 2c. and Paragraph 3, parts of which I should like to read:
"c) As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient
depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied
territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given
its own political administration. For the present it is to be
divided on the basis of nationality and according to the posi-
tions of the Army groups into North (Baltic countries), Center
(White Russia), and South (Ukraine). In these territories the
political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of
the Reich who receive their orders from the Führer.
"3) For the execution of all military tasks within the areas
under the political administration in the rear of the area
of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in
command.
"The commanding officer is the supreme representative of
the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of
the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a territorial
commander and the rights of a supreme Army commander
or a commanding general. In this capacity he is responsible
primarily for the following tasks:
"a) Close co-operation with the Commissioner of the Reich
in order to support him in his political tasks; b) exploitation
of the country and securing its economic values for use by
German industry."

340
 10 Dec. 45

The directive also outlines the responsibility for the administra-

tion of economy
in the conquered territory, a subject I will develop
more fully later in my presentation. This provision is also in
Section I, Paragraph 4, which I shall read:
"4) The Führer has entrusted the uniform direction of the
administration of economy in the area of operations and in
the territories of- political administration to the Reich Mar-
shal, who has delegated the Chief of the 'Wi Rü Amt' with
the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come
from the OKW/Wi Rü Amt."
The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply,
and . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you tell us at some time

who these people are? Who is the Reich Marshal?
MR. ALDERMAN: The Reich Marshal is the Defendant Goring.
THE PRESIDENT: And who was the Reichsführer of the SS
at that time?

MR. ALDERMAN: Himmler.

THE PRESIDENT: Himmler?
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.
The second section deals with matters of personnel, supply, and
communication traffic, and I shall not read it here.

Section III of the order deals with the relations with certain
other countries, and states in part as follows I am reading from —
Page 3 of the English translation:
"III. Regulations regarding Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and
Finland.
"9) The necessary arrangements with these countries shall
be made by the OKW
together with the Foreign Office and
according to the wish of the respective high commands. In
case it should become necessary during the course of the
operations to grant special rights, applications for this pur-
pose are to be submitted to the OKW."
The document closes with a section regarding Sweden, which is

also on Page 3 of the English Translation:

"tV. Directives regarding Sweden.
"12) Since Sweden can only become a transient area for
troops, no be granted to the com-
special authority is to
mander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and
compelled to secure the immediate protection of railroad
transports against sabotage and attacks.

\
341
 — —

10 Dec. 45

"The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,"

signed
"Keitel."
As was hinted in the original Barbarossa order, Directive Num-
ber 21, which
discussed earlier, the plan originally contemplated
I
that the attack would take place about the 15th of May 1941. In
the meantime, however, the Nazi conspirators found themselves
involved in a campaign in the Balkans, and were forced to delay
Barbarossa for a few weeks. Evidence of this postponement is found
in a document, which bears our Number C-170. This document has
been identified by the Defendant Raeder as a compilation of official
extracts from the Naval War Staff War Diary. It was prepared by
naval archivists who had access to the Admiralty files, and contains
file references to the papers which were the basis for each entry.

I offer that document in evidence as Exhibit USA-136.

Although I document again later, I should
shall refer to this
like at present to read only an item which appears in the second
paragraph of Item 142 on Page 19 of the English translation and
which is in the text in a footnote on Page 26 in the German original.
This item is dated 3 April 1941, and reads as follows:
"Balkan operation delay; Barbarossa now in about 5 weeks.
All measures which can be construed as offensive actions are
to be stopped according to the Führer's order."

By the end of April, however, things were sufficiently straight-

ened out to permit the Führer to definitely set D-Day as the 22d of
—
June more than 7 weeks away. Document Number 873-PS in our
series is a top-secret report of a conference with the Chief of the
Section "Landesverteidigung" of the "Wehrmacht Führungsstab" on
April 30, 1941. I now offer that document in evidence as Exhibit
USA-137.
I think it will be sufficient to read the first two paragraphs of
this report:
"1) Timetable Barbarossa. The Führer has decided:
"Action Barbarossa begins on 22 June. 23 May maximal
From
troop movements performance schedule. At the beginning of
operations the OKH reserves will have not yet reached the
appointed areas.
"2) Proportion of actual strength in the Plan Barbarossa:
"Sector North, German and Russian forces approximately of
the same strength; Sector Middle, great German superiority;
Sector South, Russian superiority."
Early in June, practically 3 weeks before D-Day, preparations
for the attack were so complete that it was possible for the High

342
 —

10 Dec. 45

Command to issue an elaborate timetable showing in great detail

the disposition and missions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
This timetable is Document Number C-39 in our series, and
I offerit in evidence now as Exhibit USA-138.

This document was prepared in 21 copies, and the one offered

here was the third copy which was given to the High Command
of the Navy; Page 1 is in the form of a transmittal, and reads as
follows:
"Top secret; Supreme Command of the Armed Forces;
Nr. 44842/41 top miUtary secret WFSt/Abt. L (I Op.); Führer's
headquarters; for chiefs only, only through officer; 21 copies;
I Op. 00845/41; received 6 June; no enclosures.

"The Führer has authorized the appended timetable as a

foundation for further preparations for Plan Barbarossa. If
alterations should be necessary during execution, the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces must be informed.
"Chief of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces" —signed
"Keitel."

I shall not bother to read to you the distribution list which

indicates where the 21 copies went.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, the Tribimal does not think

it necessary that you should read all those preliminary matters at
the head of these documents, "top secret," "only through officer,"
and then the various reference numbers and file information when
you give identification of a document.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.
The next two pages of the document are in the form of a text
outlining the state of preparations as of the 1st of June 1941. The
outline is in six paragraphs covering the status on that date under
six headings: General, Negotiations with friendly states, Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Camoufiage.
I thinkunnecessary to read into the record any of this textual
it

material. The remainder

of the paper is in tabular form with seven
columns headed from left to right at the top of each page: Date,
Serial number. Army, Air Force, Navy, OKW, Remarks. Most
interesting among the items appearing on this chart . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, will you read the first para-
graph, for that seems to be important. There are two lines there.
MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The heading "General" on Page 2.

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, Sir.

343
10 Dec. 45

"1. General. The timetable for the maximum massing of

troops in the East will be put into operation on the 22d of
May."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. ALDERMAN: Most interesting among the items appearing
on this chart, in my opinion,
are those appearing on Pages 9 and 10.
These are at Page 8 of the German version. At the bottom of
Page 9 it is provided in the columns for Army, Navy, and Air
—
Force and I quote:
"Up to 1300 hours is latest time at which operation can be
cancelled."
Under the column headed OKW appears the note that —and again
I quote:
"Cancelled by code word 'Altona' or further confirmation of
start of attackby code word 'Dortmund'."
In the Remarks column appears the statement that:
"Complete absence of camouflage of formation of Army point
of main effort, concentration of armor and artillery must be
reckoned with."
The second entry on Page 10 of the chart for the 22d of June,
under Serial number 31, gives a notation which cuts across the
columns for the Army, Air Force, Navy, and OKW, and provides
as follows, under the heading:
"Invasion Day. H-Hour for the start of the invasion by the
Army and crossing of the frontier by the Air Forces: 0330
hours."
In the Remarks column, it states that:
"Army assembly independent of any lateness in starting on
the part of the Air Force owing to weather.
The other parts of the chart are similar in nature to those quoted
and give, as I have said, great detail concerning the disposition and
missions of the various components of the Armed Forces.
On 9 June 1941 the order of the Führer went out for final reports
on Barbarossa to be made in Berlin on 14 June 1941, which was just
8 days before D-Day. This order is signed by Hitler's Adjutant,
Schmundt, and is C-78 in our numbered series of documents. I offer
it in evidence now as Exhibit USA-139.

I read from Page 1 the matter under the heading "Conference

Barbarossa":
"1. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
has ordered reports on Barbarossa by the commanders of
Army groups, armies, and naval and air commanders of equal
rank.

344
 10 Dec. 45

"2. The reports will be made on Saturday, 14 June 1941, at

the Reich Chancellery, Berlin.
"3. Timetable:
"a) 1100 hours, ''SilverFox"; b) 1200 hours-1400 hours, Army
Group South; 1400 hours-1530 hours, lunch party for all
c)
participants in conference; d) from 1530 hours, Baltic, Army
Group North, Army Group Center, in this order."
It is signed by Schmundt.
There is attached a list of participants and the order in which
they will report which I shall not read. The list includes, however,
a large number of the members of the Defendant High Command
and General Staff group as of that date. Among those to participate
were, of course, the Defendants Goring, Keitel, Jodl, and Raeder.
I believe that the documents which I have introduced and quoted
from are more than sufficient to establish conclusively the premed-
itation and cold-blooded calculation which marked the military
preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Starting almost
a full year before the commission of the crime, the Nazi conspirators
planned and prepared every military detail of their aggression
against the Soviet Union with all of that thoroughness and metic-
ulousness which has come to be associated with the German char-
acter. Although several of these defendants played specific parts
in this military phase of the planning and preparation for the attack,
it is natural enough that the leading roles were performed, as we

have seen, by the military figures: the Defendants Goring, Keitel,

Jodl, and Raeder.

—
Next, preparation for plunder plans for the economic exploi-
tation and spoliation of the Soviet Union.
Not only was there detailed preparation for the invasion from
a purely military standpoint, but equally elaborate and detailed
planning and preparation was undertaken by the Nazi conspirators
to ensure that their aggression would prove economically profitable.
Alittle later in my presentation I shall discuss with the Tribunal
the motives which led these conspirators to attack, without provo-
cation, a neighboring power. I shall at that time show that the
crime was motivated by both political and economic considerations.
The economic basis, however, may be simply summarized at this
point as the greed of the Nazi conspirators for the raw material,
food, and other supplies which their neighbor possessed and which
they conceived of themselves as needing for the maintenance of
their war machine. To these defendants such a need was translated
indubitably as a right, and they early began planning and preparing
with typical care and detail to ensure that every bit of the plunder
which it would be possible to reap in the course of their aggression
would be exploited to their utmost benefit.

345
10 Dec. 45

I have already put into the record evidence showing that as

early as August of 1940 General Thomas, the chief of the B Group
Army, received a hint from the Defendant Goring about a possible
attadî on the U.S.S.R. which prompted him to begin considering
the Soviet war economy. I also said at that time that I would later
introduce evidence that in November 1940 8 months before the —
—
attack Thomas was categorically informed by Goring of the planned
operation in the East and preliminary preparations were commenced
for the economic plundering of the territories to be occupied in the
course of such operation. Goring, of course, played the overall
leading role in this activity by virtue of his position at the head
of the Four Year Plan.
Thomas describes his receipt of the knowledge and this early
planning at Page 369 of his draft, which is our Document 2353-PS
introduced earlier as Exhibit USA-35; the part I shall read is at
Pages 10 and 11 of the English translation:
"In November 1940 the Chief of Wi Rü together with Secre-
Kömer, Neumann, Backe, and General Von
taries of State
Hanneken were informed by the Reich Marshal of the action
planned in the East.
"By reason of these directives the preliminary preparations
for the action in the East were commenced by the office of
Wi RÜ at the end of 1940.
"The preliminary preparations for the action in the East
included first of all the following tasks:
"1. Obtaining of a detailed survey of the Russian armament
industry, its location, its capacity, and its associate industries.
"2.Investigation of the capacities of the different big arma-
ment centers and their dependency one on the other.
"3. Determining the power and transport system for the indus-
try of the Soviet Union.
"4. Investigation of sources of raw materials and petroleum
(crude oil).
"5. Preparation of a survey of industries other than arma-
ment industries in the Soviet Union.
"These points were concentrated in one big compilation, *War
Economy of the Soviet Union,' and illustrated with detailed
— —
maps." I am still quoting. "Furthermore a card index was
made containing all the important factories in Soviet Russia
and a lexicon of economy in the German-Russian language for
the use of the German war economy organization.
"For the processing of these problems a task staff, 'Russia,*
was created, first in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Luther and
later on in charge of Major General Schubert. The work was

346
 10 Dec. 45

carried out according to the directives from the chief of the

office, respectively" —
I suppose
—
"by the group of depart-
— —
ments for foreign territories" Ausland "with the co-oper-
ation of all departments, economy offices, and any other per-
sons possessing information on Russia. Through these inten-
sive preparative activities an excellent collection of material
was made which proved of the utmost value later on for
carrying out the operations and for administering the terri-
tories."
That ends the quotation.
By the end of February 1941 this preliminary planning had
proceeded to a point where a broader plan of organization was
needed, and so General Thomas held a conference with his sub-
ordinates on 28 February 1941 to call for such a plan. A memoran-
dum of this conference, classified top secret and dated 1 March 1941,
was captured, and is our Document 1317-PS. I now offer it in
evidence as Exhibit USA-140. The text of this memorandum reads
as follows:
"The general ordered that a broader plan of organization be
drafted for the Reich Marshal.
"Essential Points:
"1. The whole organization to be subordinate to the Reich
Marshal. Purpose: Support and extension of the measures of
the Four Year Plan.
"2. The organization must include everything, concerning war
economy, excepting only food which is said to be made
already a special mission of State Secretary Backe.
"3. Clear statement that the organization is to be independent
of the military or civil administration. Close co-ordination,
but instructions direct from the central office in Berlin.
"4.Scope of activities to be divided into two steps: a) Accom-
panying the advancing troops directly behind the front lines
in order to avoid the destruction of supplies and to secure the
removal of important goods; b) Administration of the occupied
industrial districts and exploitation of economically comple-
mentary districts."

And on the bottom of Page 1:

then,
"5.In view of the extended field of activity the term 'war
economy inspection' is to be used in preference to armament
inspection.
"6. In view of the great field of activity the organization
must be generously equipped and personnel must be cor-
respondingly numerous. The main mission of the organization
will consist of seizing raw materials and taking over all

347
 —

10 Dec. 45

important exploitations. For the latter mission reliable per-

sons from German concerns will be interposed suitably from
the beginning, since successful operation from the beginning
can only be performed by the aid of their experience. (For
example: lignite, ore, chemistry, petroleum).
"After the discussion of further details Lieutenant Colonel
Luther was instructed to make an initial draft of such an
organization within a week.
"Close co-operation with the individual sections in the build-
ing is essential. An officer must still be appointed for the Wi
and RÜ with whom the operational staff can remain in con-
stant contact. Wi is to give each section chief and Lieutenant
Colonel Luther a copy of the new plan regarding Russia.
"Lieutenant General Schubert is to be asked to be in Berlin
the second half of next week. Also, the four officers who are
ordered to draw up the individual armament inspections are
—
to report to the office chief at the end of the week. Signed
Hamann."
Hamann, who signed the report, is listed among those attending
as a captain and apparently the junior officer present, so presum-
ably it fell naturally enough to Hamann to prepare the notes on the
conference.
The authority and mission of this organization which Thomas
was organizing at the direction of Goring was clearly recognized
by Keitel in his operational order of 13 March 1941. This order is
Number 447-PS, and I have already offered it in evidence earlier
as Exhibit USA-135. At that time I quoted the paragraph in the
order in which it was stated that the Führer had entrusted the uni-
form direction of the administration of economy in the areas of
operation and political administration to the Reich Marshal who
in turn had delegated his authority to the Chief of the Wi Rü Amt.
The organizational work called for by General Thomas at the
meeting on 28 February apparently proceeded apace, and on 29 April
1941 a conference was held with various branches of the Armed
Forces to explain the organizational set-up of the Economic Staff
"Oldenburg." Oldenburg was the code name given to this economic
counterpart of Plan Barbarossa. A report of this conference is cap-
tured Document Number 1157-PS, and I now offer it in evidence
as Exhibit USA-141. Section 1 of this memorandum deals with the
general organization of Economic Staff Oldenburg as it had devel-
oped by this time, and I should like to read most of that section
into the record. The report begins:

"Conference with the Branches of the Armed Forces at 1000

hours on Tuesday, 29th April 1941.

348
 —

10 Dec. 45

"1. Welcome. Purpose of the meeting: Introduction to the

organizational structure of the economic section of the under-
taking Barbarossa-Oldenburg,
"As already known, the Führer, contrary to previous proce-
dure, has ordered for this drive the uniform concentration in
one hand of all economic operations and has entrusted the
Reich Marshal with the overall direction of the economic
administration in the area of operations and in the areas
under political administration.
"The Reich Marshal has delegated this function to an Eco-
nomic General Staff working under the director of the Eco-
nomic Armament Office (Chief, Wi Rii Amt).
"Under the Reich Marshal and the Economic General Staff
the supreme central authority in the area of the drive itself
is the" — —
and then a heading "Economic Staff Oldenburg for
special duties under the command of Lieutenant General
Schubert. His subordinate authorities, geographically sub-
divided, are: 5 economic inspectorates, 23 economic com-
mands, and 12 district offices which are distributed among
important places within the area of the economic command.
"These offices are used in the military rear area. The idea
is that in the territory of each army group an economic
inspectorate is to be established at the seat of the commander
of the military rear area, and that this inspectorate will
supervise the economic exploitation of the territory.
"A distinction must be made between the military rear area
and the battle area proper on the one hand, and the rear area
of the army on the other hand. In the latter, economic
matters are dealt with by the Group IV Economy" IV Wi—
"of the Army Headquarters Command, that is, the liaison
officer of the Economic Armament Office within the Supreme
Command of the Forces assigned to the Army Head-
Armed
quarters Command. Forthe battle area he has attached to
him technical battalions, reconnaissance and recovery troops
for raw materials, mineral oil, agricultural machinery, in par-
ticular, tractors and means of production.

"In the rear area of the Army situated between the battle
and the military rear area. Group IV Economy with the various
field commands are placed at the disposal of the liaison officer
of the Economic Armament Office for the support of the
specialists of the Army Headquarters Command, who are
responsible for supplying the troops from the country's
resources and for preparing the subsequent general economic
exploitation.

349
10 Dec. 45

"While these units move with the troops, economic inspec-

torates,economic commands and their sub-offices remain
established in the locality.
"The new feature inherent in the organization under the com-
mand of the Economic Staff Oldenburg is that it does not only-
deal with military industry but comprises the entire economic
field. Consequently all offices are no longer to be designated
as offices of the military industries or armaments but quite
generally as economic inspectorates, economic commands,
et cetera.
"This also corresponds with the internal organization of the
individual offices which, from the Economic Staff Oldenburg
down to the economic commands, requires a standard sub-
division into three large groups, i. e. Group M, dealing with
troop requirements, armaments, industrial transport organi-
zation; Group L, which concerns itself with all questions of
feeding and agriculture, and Group W, which is in charge of
the entire field of trade and industry, including raw materials
and supplies; further, questions of forestry, finance and bank-
ing, enemy property, commerce and exchange of commodities,
and manpower allocation.
"Secretary of State Backe is appointed Commissioner for Food
and Agriculture in the General Staff; the problems falling
within the field of activities of Group W
are dealt with by
General Von Hanneken."
The remainder of the document deals with local subdivisions, per-
sonnel and planning problems, and similar details, which I think
it unnecessary to put into the record.

These documents portray vividly the coldly calculated method

with which those Nazis prepared months in advance to rob and loot
their intended victim. They show that the conspirators not only
planned to stage a wanton attack on a neighbor to whom they had
pledged security, but they also intended to strip that neighbor of
his food, his factories, and all his means of livelihood.
As I shall point out more fully later when I discuss the question
of motivation, these men made
their plans for plunder being fully
aware that to carry them out would necessarily involve ruin and
starvation for millions of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union.
THE PRESIDENT: This would be a good time to adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. ALDERMAN: May the Tribunal please, I have been in-

formed by the interpreters that I have been speaking at a great

speed this morning, so I shall try to temper the speed.

350
 10 Dec. 45

Next, the politics of destruction; preparation for the political

phase of the aggression. As I have already indicated and as I shall
develop more fully later in this discussion, there were both economic
and political reasons motivating the action of the conspirators in
invading the Soviet Union. I have already discussed the extent of
the planning and preparations for the economic side of the aggres-
sion. Equally elaborate planning and preparation were engaged in
by the conspirators to ensure the effectuation of the political aims
of their aggression. It is, I believe, sufficient at this point to describe

that political aim as the elimination of the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics as a powerful political factor in Europe and the acquisition
of Lebensraum.
For the accomplishment of this purpose the Nazi conspirators
selected as their agent the Defendant Rosenberg. As early as the
2d of April 1941 Rosenberg or a member of his staff prepared a
memorandum on memorandum speculates on the
the U.S.S.R. This
possibility of a disagreementwith the U.S.S.R. which would result
in a quick occupation of an important part of that country. This
memorandum then considers what the political goal of such occu-
pation should be and suggests ways for reaching such a goal.
The memorandum is Number 1017-PS in our series, and I offer
it in evidence now as Exhibit USA-142.
Beginning with the second paragraph it reads, under the subject
"U.S.S.R.":
"A military conflict with the U.S.S.R. will result in an extra-
ordinarily rapid occupation of an important and large section
of the U.S.S.R. It is very probable that military action on our
part will very soon be followed by the military collapse of
the U.S.S.R. The occupation of these areas would then present
not so many military as administrative and economic diffi-
culties. Thus arises the first question:

"Is the occupation to be determined by purely military or

economic needs respectively, or is the laying of political
foundations for a future organization of the area also a factor
in determining how far the occupation shall be extended? If
so, it is a matter of urgency to fix the political goal which is
to be attained, for it will without doubt also have an effect
on military operations.
"If the political overthrow of the eastern empire, in the weak
condition it would be at the time, is set as the goal of military
operations, one may conclude that:
"1) The occupation must comprise areas of vast proportions.
"2) From the very beginning the treatment of individual sec-
tions of territory should, in regard to administration as well

351
10 Dec. 45

as economics and ideology, be adapted to the political ends

we are striving to attain.
"3) Again, extraordinary questions concerning these vast
areas such as, in particular, the ensuring of essential supplies
for the continuation of war against England, the maintenance
of production which this necessitates, and the great directives
for the completely separate areas, should best be dealt with
all together in one place.

"It should again be stressed here that, in addition, all the

arguments which follow only hold good, of course, once the
supplies from the area to be occupied, which are essential to
Greater Germany for the continuance of the war, have been
assured.
"Anyone who knows the East sees in a map of Russia's popu-
lation the following national or geographical units:
"(a) Greater Russia, with Moscow as its center; (b) White
Russia, with Minsk or Smolensk as its capital; (c) Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania; (d) The Ukraine and the Crimea, with
Kiev as its center; (e) The Don area, with Rostov as its
capital;(f) The area of the Caucasus; (g) Russian Central Asia
or Russian Turkestan."
The memorandum then proceeds to discuss each of the areas or
geographical units in some detail, and I shall not read those pages.
At the end of the paper, however, the writer sums up his thoughts
and briefly outlines his plan. I should like to read that portion into
the record. It is at the bottom of Page 4 of the English translation
under the heading "Summary":
"The following systematic constructional plan is evolved from
the points briefly outlined here:
"(1) The creation of a central department for the occupied
areas of the U.S.S.R. to be confined more or less to war time.
Working in agreement with the higher and supreme Reich
authorities, it would be the task of this department:
"(a) To issue binding political instructions to the separate
administration areas, having in mind the situation existing at
the time and the goal which is to be achieved;
"(b) To secure for the Reich supplies essential to the war from
all the occupied areas;
"(c) To make preparations for, and to supervise the carrying
out in main outline of, the primarily important questions for
all areas, as for instance, those of finance and funds, transport,
and the production of oil, coal, and food.
"(2) The carrying out of sharply defined decentralization in
the separate administration areas, grouped together by race

352
 10 Dec. 45

or by reason of political economy for the carrying out of the

totally dissimilar tasks assigned to them.
"As against this, an administrative department regulating
matters in principle and to be set up on a purely economic
basis, as is at present envisaged, might very soon prove to be
inadequate and fail in its purpose. Such a central office would
be compelled to carry out a common policy for all areas, dic-
tated only by economic considerations, and this might impede
the carrying out of the political task and, in view of its
being run on purely bureaucratic lines, might possibly even
prevent it.
"The question therefore arises whether the opinions which
have been set forth should not, purely for reasons of ex-
pediency, be taken into consideration from the very beginning
when organizing the administration of the territory on a basis
of war economy. In view of the vast spaces and the difficulties
of administration which arise from that alone, and also in
view of the living conditions created by Bolshevism, which
are totally different from those of Western Europe, the whole
question of the U.S.S.R. would require different treatment
from that which has been applied in the individual countries
of Western Europe."

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is that signed?

MR. ALDERMAN: It is not signed. No, Sir.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is it in the Defendant Rosen-
berg's handwriting?
MR. ALDERMAN: It was in the Rosenberg file.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Is there anything to indicate

that he wrote it?

MR. ALDERMAN: No. I said it was evidently prepared by

Rosenberg or under his authority. We captured the whole set of
Rosenberg files, which constitutes really a large library.
It is evident that the "presently envisaged administration
operating on a purely economic basis" to which this memorandum
objects was the Economic Staff Oldenburg, which I have already
described as having been set up under Goring and General Thomas.
— —
Rosenberg's statement if this be his statement of the political
purpose of the invasion and his analysis of the achieving of it
apparently did not fall on deaf ears. By a Führer order, dated
20 April 1941, Rosenberg was named commissioner for the central
control of questions connected with the east European region. This
order is part of the correspondence regarding Rosenberg's appoint-
ment, which has been given the Number 865-PS in our series. I ask

353
10 Dec. 45

that this file, all relating to the same subject and consisting of four
which I shall read or refer
letters, all of to, be admitted in evidence
as Exhibit USA-143.
The order itself reads as follows — it is the first item on the Eng-
lish translation of 865-PS:
"I name Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as my commissioner
for the central control of questions connected with the east
European region. An office, which is to be furnished in
accordance with his orders, is at the disposal of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg for the carrying out of the duties thereby entrusted
to him. The necessary money for this office is to be taken
out of the Reich Chancellery Treasury in a lump sum.
"Führer's headquarters, 20th April 1941. The Führer, signed,
Adolf Hitler; Reich Minister and Head of Reich Chancellery,
signed, Dr. Lammers."
This particular copy of the Führer's order was enclosed in a
letterwhich Dr. Lammers wrote to the Defendant Keitel requesting
his co-operation for Rosenberg and asking that Keitel appoint a
deputy to work with Rosenberg. This letter reads as follows it is —
on the stationery of the Reich Minister and the Head of the Reich
Chancellery, Berlin, 21 April 1941. I omit the salutation:
"Herewith I am sending you a copy of the Führer's decree of
the 20th of this month by which the Führer appointed Reichs-
leiter Alfred Rosenberg as his commissioner for the central
control connected with the east European region. In this
capacity Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make the necessary
preparations for the probable emergency with all speed. The
Führer wishes that Rosenberg shall be authorized for this
purpose to obtain the closest co-operation of the highest Reich
authorities, receive information from them, and summon the
representatives of the highest Reich authorities to conferences.
In order to guarantee the necessary secrecy of the commission
and the measures to be undertaken, for the time being, only
those of the highest Reich authorities should be informed on
whose co-operation Reichsleiter Rosenberg will primarily
depend. They are: The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan"
— —
that is Goring "the Reich Minister of Economics, and you
— —
yourself" that is Keitel "Therefore, may I ask you in
accordance with the Führer's wishes to place your co-operation
at the disposal of Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the carrying out
of the task imposed upon him. It is recommended in the
interests of secrecy that you name a representative in your
office with whom the office of the Reichsleiter can communi-
cate and who, in addition to your usual deputy, should be the

354
 10 Dec. 45

only one to whom you should communicate the contents of

this letter.
"I should be obliged if you would acknowledge the receipt of
this letter.
"Heil Hitler, Yours very sincerely, signed, Dr. Lammers."
In the next letter Keitel writes Lammers acknowledging receipt
of his letter and telling of his compliance with the request. Keitel
also writes Rosenberg telling him of the action he has taken. Now,
the letter to Dr. Lammers— I shall read the text:
"Dear Reich Minister:
"I acknowledge receipt of the copy of the Führer's decree in
which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg as
his commissioner for the central control of questions connected
with the east European region. I have named General of the
Artillery Jodl, head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff,
as my permanent deputy, and Major General Warlimont as
his deputy to Reichsleiter Rosenberg."
And the letter to Reichsleiter Rosenberg on the same date:
"The head of the Reich Chancellery has sent me a copy of the
Führer's decree, by which he has appointed you his commis-
sioner tor the central control of questions connected with the
east European region. I have charged General of the Artillery
Jodl, head of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, and his
deputy. Major General Warlimont, with the solving of these
questions as far as they concern the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces. Now I ask you, as far as your office is
concerned, to deal with them only."
Immediately upon receipt of the order from Hitler Rosenberg
began building his organization, conferring with the various minis-
tries, issuing his instructions, and generally making the detailed
plans and preparations necessary to carry out his assigned mission.
Although Rosenberg's files, which were captured intact, were
crowded with documents evidencing both the extent of the prep-
aration and its purpose, I believe that the citation of a small num-
ber which are typical should be sufficient for the Tribunal and the
record. All of those I shall now discuss were found in the Defendant
Rosenberg's files.

Our document numbered 1030-PS is a memorandum, dated 8 May

1941, entitled, "General Instructions for all Reich Commissioners
in the Occupied Eastern Territories." I offer that in evidence as
Exhibit USA-144.
In these instructions to his chief henchmen Rosenberg outlines
the political aims and purposes of the attack. In the second and third
paragraphs of the English translation, which appear on Page 2 of
the German, the following remarks appear:

355
10 Dec. 45

"The only possible political goal of war can be the aim to

free the German Reich from the 'grossrussisch' pressure for
centuries to come: This does not only correspond with Ger-
man interests but also with historical justice, for Russian
imperialism was in a position to accomplish its policy of con-
quest and oppression almost unopposed, whilst it threatened
Germany again and again. Therefore, the German Reich has
to beware of starting a campaign against Russia with a
historical injustice, meaning the reconstruction of a great
Russian empire, no matter of what kind. On the contrary,
all historical struggles of the various nationalities against
Moscow and Leningrad have to be scrutinized for their
bearing on the situation today. This has been done on the
part of the National Socialist movement to correspond to the
Leader's political testament as laid down in his book, that
now the military and political threat in the East shall be
eliminated forever.
"Therefore this huge area must be divided according to its
historicaland racial conditions into Reich commissions each
of which bears within itself a different political aim. The
— —
Reich Commission Eastland" Ostland "including White
Ruthenia, will have the task to prepare, by way of cfevelop-
ment Germanized protectorate, a progressively closer
into a
cohesion with Germany. The Ukraine shall become an inde-
pendent state in alliance with Germany, and Caucasia with
the contiguous northern territories a federal state with a
German plenipotentiary. Russia proper must put her own
house in order for the future. These general viewpoints are
explained in the following instructions for each Reich com-
missioner. Beyond that there are still a few general con-
siderations which possess validity for all Reich commis-
sioners."

The fifth paragraph of the English translation, Page 7 of the

German, presents a fascinating rationalization of a contemplated
robbery. It reads:
"The German people have achieved, in the course of cen-
turies, tremendous accomplishments in the eastern European
area. Nearly all its land and houses were confiscated without
indemnification; hundreds of thousands (in the south on the
Volga) starved or were deported or, as in the Baltic terri-
tories, deprived of the fruits of their cultural work during
the past 700 years. The German Reich must proclaim the
principle that after the occupation of the Eastern Territories
the former German assets are the property of the people of
Greater Germany, irrespective of the consent of the former

356
 —

10 Dec. 45

individual proprietors, where the German Reich may reserve

the right (assuming that it has not already been done during
resettlement) to arrange a just settlement. The manner of
compensation and restitution of this national property will be
subject to different treatment by each Reich commission."
Document Number 1029-PS in our series is an "Instruction for
a Reich Commissioner Ostland." It is typical of the type of instruc-
tion which was issued to each of the appointed commissioners (or
Kommissars), and is amazingly frank in outlining intentions of the
Nazi conspirators toward the country they intended to occupy in
the course of their aggression. I offer this document in evidence as
Exhibit USA-145. I should like to read into the record the first
three paragraphs. It begins:
"All the regions between Narva and Tilsit have constantly
been in close relationship with the German people. A 700-
year-old history has moulded the inner sympathies of the
majority of the races living there in a European direction
and has in spite of all Russian threats added this region to
the living space of Greater Germany.
"The aim of a Reich commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, —
and White Ruthenia" last words added in pencil
"must be to strive to achieve the form of a German Pro-
tectorate and then transform the region into part of the
Greater German Reich by germanizing racially possible ele-
ments, colonizing Germanic races, and banishing undesirable
elements. The Baltic Sea must become a Germanic inland sea
under the guardianship of Greater Germany.
"For certain cattle-raising products the Baltic region was a
land of surplus; and the Reich commissioner must endeavor
to make this surplus once more available to the German
people and, if possible, to increase it. With regard to the
process of germanizing or resettling, the Estonian people are
strongly germanized to the extent of 50 percent by Danish,
German, and Swedish blood, and can be considered as a
kindred nation. In Latvia the section capable of being assim-
ilated is considerably smaller than in Estonia. In this
country stronger resistance will have to be reckoned with
and banishment on a larger scale will have to be envisaged.
A similar development may have to be reckoned with in
Lithuania, for here too the immigration of racial Germans is
called for in order to promote very extensive germanization
(on the East Prussian border)."
Skipping a paragraph, the next paragraph is also interesting
and reads as follows:

357
 —

10 Dec. 45

"The task of a Reich commissioner with his seat of office in

Riga will therefore largely be an extraordinarily positive one.
A country which 700 years ago was captured by German
Knights, built up by the Hanseatic League, and by reason of
a constant influx of German blood together with Swedish
elements was a predominantly germanized land, is to be
established as a mighty German borderland. The preliminary
cultural conditions are available everywhere; and the Ger-"
man Reich will be able to guarantee the right to a later settle-
ment to all those who have distinguished themselves in this
war, to the descendants of those who gave their lives during
the war, and also to all who fought in the Baltic campaign,
never once lost courage, fought on in the hour of despair,
and delivered Baltic civilization from Bolshevism. For the
rest the solution of the colonization problem is not a Baltic
question but one which concerns Greater Germany, and it
must be settled on these lines."
These two directives are, I think, sufficiently typical of the lot
to show the Tribunal the extent of the planning and preparation
for this phase of the aggression as well as the political purpose it
was hoped would be achieved thereby. However, on 28 June 1941,
less than a week after the invasion, Rosenberg himself prepared
a full report of his activities since his appointment on the 20th of
April. One might almost think he had so meticulously recorded his
activities in order to be of assistance to this prosecution.
This report is numbered 1039-PS, and I now offer it in evidence
as Exhibit USA-146. To me the most interesting things about this
report are its disclosures concerning the number of these defend-
ants who worked with and assisted Rosenberg in the planning and
preparation for this phase of the aggression and the extent to which
practically all of the ministries and offices of both state and Party
are shown to have been involved in this operation. The report was
found in the Defendant Rosenberg's files; and although it is rather
long, it is of sufficient importance in implicating persons, groups,
and organizations, that it must, I believe, be read in full in order
that it may be made part of the record. It is headed, "Report on
the Preparatory Work in Eastern European Territories":
"Immediately after the notification of individual supreme
Reich offices regarding the Führer's Decree of 20. 4. 41 a con-
—
ference with the Chief of the OKW" ^Armed Forces High
— —
Command "took place" That is the Defendant Keitel
"After presentation of the various political aims in the pro-
posed Reich commissions and presentation of personal require-
ments for the East, the chief of the OKW explained that
— —
reservation" UK-Stellung "would be too complicated in

358
 10 Dec. 45

this case and that this matter could be carried out best by
direct — —
assignment" Abkommandierung "by command of
the Chief of the OKW. General Field Marshal Keitel then
issued an appropriate command which established the basis
for the coming requirements. He named as deputy and liai-
son officer General Jodl and Major General Warlimont. The
negotiations which then commenced relative in all questions
of the Eastern territory including personal needs"
— —
relative
to, I suppose it is "were carried on by the gentlemen of the
OKW in collaboration with officials of my office.
"A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect
that under the given confidential circumstances my office
could in no way deal with any representatives of the people
of the east European area. I asked him to do this insofar as
the military intelligence required it and then to name persons
to me who could count as political personalities, over and
above the military intelligence, in order to arrange for their
eventual commitment later. Admiral Canaris said that natu-
rally also my wish not to recognize any political groups among
the emigrants would be considered by him and that he was
planning to proceed in accordance with my indications.
"Later on I informed General Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch
and Grossadmiral Raeder about the historical and political
conceptions of the Eastern problem. In further conferences
we agreed to appoint a representative of my office to the
Supreme Commander of the Army, respectively to the Chief
Quartermaster, and to the Army groups for questions relative
to political configuration and requests of the OKW. In the
meantime this has been done.
"Already at the outset there was a discussion with Minister
—
of Economics"
——
Reichswirtschaftsminister "Funk" the De-
fendant Funk "who appointed as his permanent deputy
—
Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer. Almost daily confer-
ences were then held with Dr. Schlotterer with reference to
the war economic intentions of the Economic Operational
Staff East. In this connection I had conferences with General
Thomas, State Secretary Körner, State Secretary Backe,
Ministerial Director Riecke, General Schubert, and others.
"Far-reaching agreement was reached in the eastern questions
as regards direct technical work now and in the future. A
few problems regarding the general relationship of the pro-
posed Reich ministry toward the Four Year Plan are still open
and will be subject, after submission, to the decision of the
Führer. In principle I declared that I in no way intended to
found an economic department in my office; economics would

339
10 Dec. 45

rather be handled substantially and practically by the Reich

— —
Marshal" that is the Defendant Goring "and the persons
appointed by him. However, the two responsible department
heads, namely. Ministerial Director Dr. Schlotterer for indus-
trial economy and Ministerial Director Riecke for food econ-
omy, would be placed in my office as permanent liaison men
to co-ordinate here political aims with the economic necessi-
ties in a department which would still have to unite with
other persons for such co-ordinating work, depending on
labor conditions as they may arise later on (political leader-
ship of labor unions, construction, et cetera).
"After notification of the Reich Foreign Minister, the latter
appointed Geheimrat Grosskopf as permanent liaison man to
my office. For the requested representation in the political
department of my office (headed by Reichsamtsleiter Dr. Leib-
brandt), the Foreign Ministry released Consul General
Dr. Bräutigam, who is known to me for many years, speaks
Russian, and worked for years in Russia. Negotiations, which
if necessary will be placed before the Führer, are under way

with the Foreign Office regarding its wishes for the assign-
ment of its representatives to the future Reich commissioners
(or Kommissars).

"The Propaganda Ministry" —that is Goebbels — "appointed

State Secretary Gutterer as permanent liaison man, and a
complete agreement was reached to the effect that the deci-
sions on all political and other essays, speeches, proclamations,
et cetera, would be made in my office; a great number of
substantial works for propaganda would be delivered and the
papers prepared by the Propaganda Ministry would be modi-
fied here, if necessary. The whole practical employment of
propaganda will undisputedly be subject to the Reich Ministry
of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. For the sake of
closer co-operation the Propaganda Ministry assigns yet
another person directly under my department, 'Enlighten-
ment and Press,' and in addition appoints a permanent press
liaison man. All these activities have been going on for some
time, and without attracting attention to my office in any
way this co-ordination on contents and terminology takes
place continually every day.
"Thorough discussions took place with Reich Minister Ohne-
sorge concerning future transmission of communication and
setting up of all technical necessities in future occupied terri-
tories; with Reich Minister Seldte on the supply of labor
forces, with Reich Minister Frick"
— — that is the Defendant
Frick "(State Secretary Stuckart) in detailed form on the

360
 —
10 Dec. 45

assignment of numerous necessary officials for the commis-

sions. According to the present estimate there will be four
Reich commissions as approved by the Führer. I shall pro-
pose to the Führer for political and other reasons to set up
a suitable number of general commissions (24), main commis-
sions (about 80), and regional commissions (over 900). A
general commission would correspond to a former general
government; a main commission to a main government.
"A regional commission contains three or four districts"
—
Kreise "In view of the huge spaces that is the minimum
number which appears necessary for a future civil govern-
ment or administration. A
portion of the officials has already
been requested on the basis of the above-named command of
the Chief of the OKW."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, speaking for myself I don't
understand why it is necessary to read this document in full. You
have already shown that there was a plan for dividing Russia up
into a number of commissions.

MR. ALDERMAN: Quite true. I should like merely to point out

two of three other individual defendants who are referred to in
this document and as to whom the document shows that they were
in immediate complicity with this whole scheme. The first of those,
about three paragraphs further down, the Reich Youth Leader that —
is the Defendant Baldur Von Schirach. Then of course Gruppen-

führerSS Heydrich, about the next paragraph . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he is not a defendant.

MR. ALDERMAN: No, Sir. His organization is, however, if the
Tribunal please, charged as a criminal organization.
In the next paragraph, the Defendant Ministerial Director
Fritzsche, who worked under Goebbels.
Without a long discussion of further evidence I might summarize
the individual implication in this fashion. Those of the individual
defendants now on trial which this report personally involves are
Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Goring, Ribbentrop, Frick, Schirach, and
Fritzsche. The organizations involved by this report include the
following:
OKW, OKH, OKM, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Eco-
nomics, Reich Foreign Ministry, Propaganda Ministry, Ministry of
Labor, Ministry of Communications, the Reich Physicians' Union,
Ministry of Munitions and Armaments, Reich Youth Leadership,
Reich Organization Leadership, German Labor Front, the SS, the
SA, and the Reich Press Chief.
At a later stage in the Trial, and in other connections, I should
like to ask the Tribunal to consider that that document with which

361
10 Dec. 45

I have just been dealing be considered a part of the record to the

extent that it involves these individuals.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you can treat it as all being in
evidence.

MR. ALDERMAN: At a later stage in the Trial and in other

connections, evidence will be introduced concerning the manner in
which all of this planning and preparation for the elimination of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a political factor was
actually carried out. The planned execution of intelligentsia and
other Russian leaders was, for example, but a part of the actual
operation of the program to destroy the Soviet Union politically
and make impossible its early resurrection as a European power.
Having thus elaborately prepared on every side for the invasion
of the Soviet Union, the Nazi conspirators proceeded to carry out
their plans; and on 22 June 1941 hurled their armies across the
borders of the U.S.S.R. In announcing this act of perfidy to the
world Hitler issued a proclamation on the day of the attack. The
text of this statement has already been brought to the Tribunal's
attention by my British colleagues, and I should like merely to refer
to it in passing here by quoting therefrom this one sentence, "I
have therefore today decided to give the fate of Europe again into
the hands of our soldiers."
This announcement told the world that the die had been cast
—the plans darkly conceived almost a full year before and secretly
and continuously developed since then, had now been brought to
fruition. These conspirators, having carefully and completely
planned and prepared this war of aggression, now proceeded to
initiate and wage it.

That brings usto the consideration of the motives for the attack.
Before going into the positive reasons I should like first to point
out that not only was Germany bound by a solemn covenant not
to attack the U.S.S.R., but throughout the entire period from August
1939 to the invasion in 1941 the Soviet Union was faithful to its
agreements with Germany and displayed no aggressive intentions
toward territories of the German Reich. General Thomas, for
example, points out in his draft of "Basic Facts for a History of
the German War and Armaments Economy," which is our Document
Number 2353-PS and which I put in evidence earlier as Exhibit
USA-35, that insofar as the German-Soviet Trade Agreement of
II August 1939 was concerned, the Soviets carried out their deliv-
eries thereunder up to the very end.
Thomas points out that deliveries by the Soviets were usually
made quickly and well; and since the food and raw materials being
thus delivered were considered essential to the German economy,

362
 10 Dec. 45

effortswere made to keep up their side too. However, as prepara-

tions for thecampaign proceeded, the Nazis cared less about com-
plying with their obUgations under that agreement. At Page 315
of his book Thomas says, and I read from Page 9 of the English
translation:
"Later on the urgency of the Russian deliveries diminished,
as preparations for thecampaign in the East were already
under way."
By that, clearly he speaks of German deliveries to Russia, not as
to what the Russians delivered.
"The Russians carried out their deliveries as planned right
up to the start of the attack; even during the last few days
transports of india-rubber from the Far East were completed
by express transit trains."
Again at Page 404 this author brings this point out even more
—
forcefully when he states and I shall read the first paragraph on
Page 14 of the English translation:
"In addition to the Italian negotiations until June 1941, the
negotiations with Russia were accorded a great deal of atten-
tion.
"The Führer issued the directive that, in order to camouflage
German troop movements, the orders Russia has placed in
Germany must be filled as promptly as possible. Since the
Russians only made grain deliveries when the Germans deliv-
ered orders placed by the Russians and since, in the case of
the individual firms, these deliveries to Russia made it im-
possible for them to fill orders for the German Armed Forces,
it was necessary for the Wi Rii office to enter into numerous
individual negotiations with German firms in order to co-
ordinate Russian orders with those of the Germans from the
standpoint of priority. In accordance with the wishes of the
Foreign Office German industry was instructed to accept all
Russian orders even if it were impossible to fill them within
the limits of the time set for manufacture and delivery. Since,
in May especially, large deliveries had to be made to the
Navy, the firms were instructed to allow the equipment to
go through the Russian Acceptance Commission, then how-
ever, to make such a detour during its transportation as to
make it impossible for it to be delivered over the frontier
prior to the beginning of the German attack."
Not only was the Soviet Union faithful to the treaty obligations
with Germany but the evidence shows that she had no aggressive
intentions toward any German territory. Our Document Number
C-170, which is in evidence as Exhibit USA-136, is as I have previ-
ously stated, a file on Russo-German relations found in the files

363
 —

10 Dec. 45

of the Naval High Command covering the entire period from the
treaty to the attack. The entries in this file demonstrate conclusively
the point I have just stated. It will, I think, be sufficient to read
to the Tribunal a few entries which include reports from the Ger-
man Ambassador in Moscow as late as June 1941. I shall read the
first entry, 165 on Page 21 of the English translation; that is 4 June:

"Outwardly, no change in the relationship Germany-Russia;

Russian deliveries continue to full satisfaction. Russian
Government is endeavoring to do everything to prevent a
conflict with Germany."
In entry 167 on Page 22 of the English translation, it says:
"6 June. Ambassador in Moscow reports . .Russia will
.

only fight if attacked by Germany. Situation is considered in

Moscow much more serious than up to now. All military
—
preparations have been made quietly as far as can be
recognized, only defensive. Russian policy still strives as
before to produce the best possible relationship to Germany."
The next one is entry 169, also on Page 22; the date, 7 June:
"From the report of the Ambassador in Moscow ... all obser-
vations show that Stalin and Molotov, who alone are respon-
sible for Russian foreign policy, are doing everything to avoid
a conflict with Germany. The entire behavior of the Govern-
ment as well as the attitude of the press, which reports all
events concerning Germany in a factual, indisputable manner,
support this view. The loyal fulfillment of the economic
treaty with Germany proves the same thing."
Now, that is the German Ambassador talking to you.
The reasons, therefore, which led to the attack on the Soviet
Union could not have been self-defense or treaty breaches. In truth,
no doubt, as has been necessarily implied from the materials pre-
sented on planning and preparation, more than one motive entered
into the decision of the Nazi conspirators to launch their aggression
against the U.S.S.R. All of them, however, appear to blend into
one grand motive of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these
various reasons impelling the decision to attack may^be said to fall
is the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the
expense of the U.S.S.R. This Nazi version of an earlier imperial
—
imperative the "Drang nach Osten" (or the drive to the East)
had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost since its
birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and eco-
nomic aggrandizement. Politically such action meant the elimination
of the powerful country to the east, which might constitute a threat
to German ambitions, and acquisition of Lebensraum; while on the
economic side, it offered magnificent opportunities for the plunder
of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going

364
 10 Dec. 45

far beyond any legitimate exploitation under the Geneva Conven-

tion principles for military purpose. Undoubtedly the demands of
the German war economy for food and raw material served to
revive the attractiveness on the economic side of this theory while
the difficulties Germany was experiencing in defeating England
reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators the temporarily forgotten Nazi
political imperative of eliminating, as a political factor, their one
formidable opponent on the continent.
As early as 1923 Hitler outlined this theory in some detail in
Mein Kampf where he stated, and I quote from Page 641 of the
Houghton Mifflin English edition, as follows:
"There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a spe-
cial examination the relation of Germany to Russia: (1) Here
perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern of
all Germanforeign affairs; and (2) this question is also the
touchstone for the political capacity of the young National
Socialist movement to think clearly and to act correctly."
And again at Page 654 of the same edition:
"And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line
beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period.
We take up where we broke off 600 years ago. We stop the
endless German movement to the south and west, and turn
our gaze toward the land in the East. At long last we break
off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-war period
and shift to the soil policy of the future.
"If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have
inmind only Russia and her vassal border states."
The political portion of this economy or purpose is clearly
reflected in purposes of the organization which the
the stated
Defendant Rosenberg set up to administer the Occupied Eastern
Territories. I have already discussed this material and need not
repeat it now. In a speech, however, which he delivered 2 days
before the attack to the people most interested in the problem of
the East, Rosenberg re-stated in his usual somewhat mystic fashion
the political basis for the campaign and its inter-relationship with
the economic goal. I should like to read a short extract from that
speech, which is Document Number 1058-PS and which I now offer
in evidence as Exhibit USA-147. The part I read is from Page 9
of the German text:
"The job of feedingthe German people stands this year,
without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims
in the East; and here the southern territories and the northern
Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of
the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obli-
gation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the

365
10 Dec. 45

products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a

harsh necessity, bare of any feehngs. A very extensive
evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is
sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for
the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to what
extent industries can still be maintained there (wagon fac-
tories, et cetera). The consideration and execution of this
policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich
and its future a tremendous and by no means negative task,
as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the
evacuation into consideration. The conversion of Russian
dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the
strongest characters. Perhaps this decision will also be
approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but in a
100 years."
As
I have indicated, the failure of the Nazi conspirators to defeat

Great Britain had served to strengthen them further in their belief

of the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a
European factor before Germany could completely achieve her role
as the master of Europe.
The economic motive was brought out clearly
for the aggression
in our discussion organization set up under Goring and
of the
General Thomas to carry out the economic exploitation of the
territories they occupied. The purely materialistic basis for the
attack was unmistakable; and if any doubt existed that at least
one of the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and
raw material needed for the Nazi war machine regardless of the
horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that doubt is
dispelled by a memorandum, which bears our Number 2718-PS and
which I introduced earlier during my opening statement as Exhibit
ÜSA-32, showing clear and conscious recognition that these Nazi
plans would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people
by robbing them of their food.
Along the similar line, on June 20, 1941 General Thomas wrote
a memorandum in which he stated that General Keitel had con-
firmed to him Hitler's present conception of the German economic
policy concerning raw material. This policy expressed the almost
unbelievably heartless theory that less manpower would be used
in the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be neces-
sary to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This is
our Document Number 1456-PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit
USA-148. I should like to read the first two paragraphs.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjourn-
ment.
[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

366
 10 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the Defendant Kalten-

brunner is now in court. Will you stand up, please?

[The Defendant Kaltenhrunner rose in the dock.]

THE PRESIDENT: In accordance with Article 24 of the Charter,
you must now plead either guilty or not guilty.

ERNST KALTENBRUNNER: I plead not guilty. I do not believe

that I have made myself guilty.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just put

Document 1456-PS as Exhibit USA-148. I now read
in evidence our
from that document on Page 17:

"The following is a new conception of the Führer, which

Minister Todt has explained to me and which has been con-
firmed later on by Field Marshal Keitel:
"I. The course of the war shows that we went too far in our
autarkical endeavors. It is impossible to try to manufacture
everything we lack by synthetic procedures or other measures.
For instance, it is impossible to develop our motor fuel econ-
omy to a point where we can entirely depend on it. All
these autarkical endeavors demand a tremendous amount of
manpower, and it is simply impossible to provide it. One has
to choose another way. What one does not have but needs,
one must conquer. The commitment of men which is neces-
sary for one single action will not be as great as the one that
is currently needed for the running of the synthetic factories

in question. The aim must therefore be to secure all terri-

tories which are of special interest to us for the war economy
by conquering them.
"At the time the Four Year Plan was established I issued a
statement in which I made it clear that a completely autarki-
cal economy is impossible for us because the need of men will
be too great. My solution, however, has always been directed
by con-
to securing the necessary reserves for missing stocks
cluding economic agreements which would guarantee deliv-
ery even in wartime."
On macabre note I come to the end of the story of this
this
aggression. We have seen these conspirators as they planned, pre-
pared, and finally initiated their wanton attack upon the Soviet
Union. Others will carry on the tale and describe the horrible
manner in which they waged this war of aggression and the count-
less crimes they committed in its wake. When I consider the solemn
pledge of non-aggression, the base and sinister motives involved,

367
 —

10 Dec. 45

the months of secret planning and preparation, and the unbelievable

—
suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought when I consider
all of this, I never before and,
feel fully justified in saying that —
—
God help us, never again in the history of relations between sover-
eign nations has a blacker chapter been written than the one which
tells of this unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet
—
Union. For those responsible and they are here before you, the
—
defendants in this case it might be just to let the punishment fit
the crime.
I now turn to the final phase of the detailed presentation of the
aggressive- war part of the case: German collaboration with Italy
and Japan, and aggressive war against the United States. The rele-
vant portions of the Indictment are set forth in Subsection 7 under
Section IV (F) of Count One, appearing at Pages 9 and 10 of the
printed English text of the Indictment. The materials relating to
this unholy alliance of the three fascist powers and to the aggressive
war against the United States have been gathered together in a
document book, marked with the letter "Q," which I now submit
to the Tribunal.
Before moving on to the subject matter of this tripartite col-
laboration, I should like to invite the attention of the Tribunal to
the significance of this phase. In the course of the joint presentation
by the British and American Prosecution in the past several days,
we have seen the swastika carried forward by force of arms from
a tightly controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners
of Europe. The elements of a conspiracy that I am now about to
discuss project the Nazi plan upon a universal screen, involving the
older world of Asia and the new world of the United States of
America. As a result, the wars of aggression that were planned in
Berlin and launched across the frontiers of Poland ended some six
years later, almost to the day, in surrender ceremonies upon a
United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay of Tokyo.
The first formal alliance between Hitler's Germany and the
Japanese Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin
on 25 November 1936. This agreement, on its face, was directed
against the activities of the Communist International. It was subse-
quently adhered to by Italy on 6 November 1937.
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of these official state
I
documents in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The Ger-
—
man text of these treaties the original German-Japanese Anti-
Comintern Pact and the subsequent Protocol of Adherence by Italy
is to be found in Volumes 4 and 5 of the Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik, respectively. The English translation of the German-
Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 25 November 1936 is contained
in our Document 2508-PS; the English translation of the Protocol

368
 10 Dec. 45

of Adherence by Italy of 6 November 1937 is contained in our

Document 2506-PS. Both of these documents are included in the
document books which have just been handed up to the Tribunal.
It an interesting fact, especially in the light of the evidence
is
I shallsubmit regarding the Defendant Ribbentrop's active par-
ticipation in collaboration with the Japanese, that Ribbentrop signed
the Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany at Berlin even though at
that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign
Minister but simply Hitler's special Ambassador Plenipotentiary.
On 27 September 1940 some four years after the Anti-Comintern
Pact was signed and one year after the initiation of war in Europe,
the German, Italian, and Japanese Governments signed another pact
at Berlin, a 10-year military-economic alliance. Again I note that
the Defendant Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his
capacity as Foreign Minister. The official German text of this pact,
as well as the Japanese and Italian texts together with an English
translation, is contained in our Document 2643-PS, which has been
certified by the signature and seal of the United States Secretary
of State. I now offer in evidence Document 2643-PS as Exhibit
USA-149.
The
Tripartite Pact pledged Germany, Italy, and Japan to
support and collaboration with, one another in the establish-
of,
ment of a New Order in Europe and East Asia. I should like to
read into the record parts of this far-reaching agreement:
"The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan consider it

as a condition precedent of a lasting peace, that each nation

of the world be given its own proper place. They have,
therefore, decided to stand together and to co-operate with
one another in their efforts in Greater East Asia and in the
regions of Europe, wherein it is their prime purpose to
establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to
promote the prosperity and welfare of the peoples there.
Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to
extend this co-operation to such nations in other parts of the
world as are inclined to give to their endeavors a direction
similar to their own, in order that their aspirations towards
world peace as the ultimate goal may thus be realized.
Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan
have agreed as follows:
"Article 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of
Germany and Italy in the establishment of a New Order in
Europe.
"Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the
leadership of Japan in the establishment of a New Order in
Greater East Asia.

369
10 Dec. 45

"Article 3. Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to co-operate in

their efforts on the aforesaid basis. They further undertake
to assist one another with all political, economic, and military
means, if one of the three contracting parties is attacked by
a power at present not involved in the European war or in
the Chinese- Japanese conflict."
I now skip to the first sentence of Article 6.

"The present pact shall come into force immediately upon

signature and remain in force for 10 years from the date of
its coming into force."

The Tripartite Pact of 27 September 1940 thus was a bold

announcement to the world that the fascist leaders of Germany,
Japan, and Italy had cemented a full military alliance to achieve
world domination and to establish a New Order presaged by the
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the ruthless Italian con-
quest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria early
in 1938. I might also comment that this fact introduces the Führer-
prinzip into world politics.
I should like to read in this connection a statement by Cordell
Hull, Secretary of State of the United States, at the time of the
signing of this Tripartite Pact. This statement appears in the official
United States publication, Peace and War, United States Foreign
Policy, 1931-1941, which has already been put in evidence as Exhibit
USA-122. Mr. Hull's statement is Number 184 therein. It is also
our Document Number 2944-PS, and both the English text and a
German translation thereof are included in the document books.
Inow quote a statement by the Secretary of State, 27 September
1940:
"The reported agreement of alliance does not, in view of the
Government of the United States, substantially alter a situ-
ation which has existed for several years. Announcement of
the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which
has long existed in effect, and to which this Government have
repeatedly called attention. That such àn agreement has been
in process of conclusion has been well known for some time,
and that fact has been fully taken into account by the
Government of the United States, in the determining of this
country's policies."
That ends the quotation.
I shall not attempt here to trace the relationships and negoti-
ations leading up Pact of 27 September 1940. I
to the Tripartite
shall note, however, one example of the type of German-Japanese
relationship existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact.
This is the record of the conversation of 31 January 1939 between
Himmler and General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, which

370
 10 Dec. 45

was referred to by the United States Chief of Counsel in his open-

ing address.This document, which is signed by Himmler in crayon,
is our Document Number 2195-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit
USA-150. I now quote the file memorandum:
"Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged
over the following subjects:
"1) The Führer speech, which pleased him very much, espe-
cially because it has been spiritually well founded in every
respect.
"2) Wediscussed the conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the
triangle Germany-Italy-Japan into an even firmer mold. He
also told me with German counter-espionage"
that, together
—Abwehr— "he projects aimed
was undertaking long-range
at the disintegration of Russia and emanating from the Cau-
casus and the Ukraine. However, this organization was to
become effective only in case of war.
"3) Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now in sending
10 Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These
Russians had the mission to kill Stalin. A number of addi-
tional Russians whom he had also sent across had been shot
at the frontier."
Whatever the beginning and the course of development of the
Nazi conspirators, once their military and eco-
fascist triplice, the
nomic alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the
Japanese to aggression against those nations with whom they were
at war and those with whom they contemplated war. In this the
conspirators pursued a course strikingly parallel to that followed in
their relationship with the other member of the European Axis.
On 10 June 1940 in fulfillment of her alliance with Germany, Italy
had carried out her "stab in the back" by declaring war against
France and Great Britain. These Nazi conspirators set about to
induce similar action by Japan on the other side of the world.
As I whom the German-Japanese
shall show, the nations against
collaboration was aimed at various times were the British Common-
wealth of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the
United States of America. I shall deal with each of these nations
in the order named.
—
At least as early as 23 February 1941 on the basis of documents
—
available to us these conspirators undertook to exploit their alH-
ance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the
British Commonwealth. Again the figure of the Defendant Ribben-
trop appears. On that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference
with General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which
he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the British in
the Far East as soon as possible.

371
10 Dec. 45

The report of that conference, our Document 1834-PS, has already

been offered in connection with the presentation of the case on
aggression against the Soviet Union as Exhibit USA-129. A part of
it has already been read into the record and I now intend to read

other portions. I shall again come back to this document when

dealing with the German-Japanese collaboration as regards the
United States.
As can be seen on the cover page of the English translation,
Ribbentrop on 2 March sent copies of an extract of the record of
this conference to his various ambassadors and ministers for their
strictly confidential and purely personal information with the
—
further note that and I quote:
"These statements are of fundamental significance for orien-
tation in the general political situation facing Germany in
early spring 1941."
I shall now quote from the top of Page 2 of the English trans-
lation of 1834-PS, to the end paragraph on that page,
of the first
and then skip to the last three sentences of the second paragraph:
"Extract from the report of the conference of the Reich
Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on
13 February 1941.
"After particularly cordial mutual greetings the RAM
(Reich
Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been
proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany
in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory
in the West these policies had been fully vindicated. He (the
— —
RAM)" that is Ribbentrop "regretted that the alliance
between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working
with the ambassador for many years already, had come into
being only after various detours; but public opinion in Japan
had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, how-
ever, that they are together now."
Then, skipping:
"Now that the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded,
Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from
the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the ques-
tion of its further development now stands in the foreground.
How is the situation in this respect?"
Ribbentrop, thereafter in the conference, proceeded to shape the
argument for Japanese intervention against the British. First out-
lining the intended air and U-boat warfare by Germany against
—
England, he said and I now quote the last two sentences in Para-
graph 4, on Page 2, of the English translation:
"Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape
overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution,

372
 —

10 Dec. 45

however, depends on various factors, above all on weather

conditions."
And then skipping and picking up at the first full paragraph
on Page 3 of the English translation, I quote the Defendant Ribben-
trop again:
"The Führer will beat England wherever he encounters her.
Besides, our strength is not only equal but superior to a com-
bined English-American air force at any time. The number
of pilots at our disposal is unlimited. The same is true of our
airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned,
—
ours always has been superior to the English to say nothing
—
about the American and we are on the way to enlarge even
this lead. Upon order of the Führer the antiaircraft defense,
too, will be greatly reinforced. Since the Army has been
supplied far beyond its requirements and enormous reserves
—
have been piled up the ammunitions plants have been
slowed down because of the immense stock of material
production now will be concentrated on submarines, air-
planes, and antiaircraft guns.
"Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been
won today, militarily, economically, and politically. We have
the desire to end the war quickly, and to force England to
sue for peace soon. The Führer is vigorous and healthy, fully
convinced of victory, and determined to bring the war as
quickly as possible to a victorious close. To this end the co-
operation with Japan is of importance. However, Japan, in
her own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This
would destroy England's key position in the Far East. Japan,
on the other hand, would thus secure her position in the Far
East, a position which she could acquire only through war.
There were three reasons for quick action:
"1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against
the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser war-
fare, et cetera). The effect upon the morale of the British
people would be very serious and this would contribute
toward a quick ending of the war.
"2) A surprise intervention by Japan is bound to keep
America out of the war. America, which at present is not
yet armed and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to
any risks west of Hawaii, could then less likely do this. If
Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there
would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the
argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the
Americans. It is very unlikely that America would declare
war if she then would have to stand by helplessly while

373
10 Dec. 45

Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to

do anything about it.

"3) In view of the coming New World Order

seems to be
it

in the interest of Japan even during

also to secure for herself,
the war, the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the
time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed entirely
with this line of thought and said that he would do every-
thing to carry through this policy."
I should like to note at this point the subtlety of Ribbentrop's
argument. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany
had already practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless he
suggested that the war could be successfully terminated more
quickly with Japan's aid and that the moment was propitious for
Japan's entry. Then referring to the spoils of the conquest, he
indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself
during the war the positions she wanted, implying that she would
have to earn her share of the booty, which is reminiscent of that
statement I read to you earlier from the Führer, that "those who
wished to be in on the meal must take a part in the cooking."
Continuing Ribbentrop's argument to show the real nature of the
German-Japanese alliance, I shall now read the top two paragraphs
on Page 5 of the English translation of 1834-PS:
"The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was
Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after
the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand,
Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English
sphere of influence in China. Germany's victory on the con-
tinent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three
Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power,
was eliminated in the Far East (Indo-China). England, too,
was considerably weakened; Japan had been able to close
in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already con-
tributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the
two nations. Due to our geographical situation, we should
have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future,
too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise, we
should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If
Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find herself con-
fronted by a world coalition within a short time. We would
all be in the same boat. The fate of both nations would be
determined for centuries to come. The same was true for
Italy. The interests of the three countries would never inter-
sect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the
Japanese imperialistic idea.

374
 10 Dec. 45

"Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements

and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep
her imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then dis-
cussed the great problems which would arise after the war
for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of
a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising
then would require a bold solution. Thereby no over-cen-
tralization should take place; but a solution should be found
on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In
regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the prin-
ciple that a free exchange of trade should take place between
the two spheres of influence on a liberal basis. The European-
African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and
Italy, and the East Asian sphere of interest under the leader-
ship of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would
conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the
independent states in the European hemisphere as heretofore,
while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make
trade agreements with the independent countries within the
Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China,
et cetera. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres,
each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with
regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agree-
ment with this thought."
In the document I have just quoted from we have seen the
instigation war by the Defendant Ribbentrop, the German
to
Foreign Minister. I shall return to him again in this connection.
I now wish to show, however, the participation of the so-called
military representatives in the encouragement and provocation of
further wars of aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our Docu-
ment Number C-75 as Exhibit USA-151.
This document is a top-secret order signed by the Defendant
Keitel as Chief of the OKWand entitled, "Basic Order Number 24
regarding Collaboration with Japan." It is dated 5 March 1941,
about a week and a half after Ribbentrop's conference with Oshima
that I have just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the
highest commands of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as
to the Foreign Office. We have turned up two copies of this order,
identical except for handwritten notations, presumably made by the
recipients.C-75, the document I have introduced, is copy Number 2
of the order distributed to the naval war staff of the Commander-
in-Chief of the Navy, the OKM. We also have Copy number 4,
designed for the Wehrmacht Führungsstab (the Operations Staff of
the High Command of the Armed Forces). The head of this
Operations Staff was the Defendant Jodl. Copy Number 4 was

375
10 Dec. 45

found in the OKW files at Flensburg. It is our Document Number

384-PS, and was referred to by the United States Chief of Counsel
in his opening address. I shall not burden the Tribunal and the
record by introducing two identical copies of the same order.
Basic Order Number 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on
collaboration with Japan. I shall, therefore, propose to read it in
its entirety, some two pages of English translation:

^
"The Führer has issued the following order regarding collab-
oration with Japan:
"1. It must be the aim
of the collaboration based on the Three
Power Pact induce Japan, as soon as possible, to take active
to
—
measures in the Far East" The underscoring is in the original
—
document "Strong British forces will thereby be tied down,
and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States
of America will be diverted to the Pacific. The sooner she
intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for
Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war
on the part of her adversaries. The Barbarossa operation will
create particularly favorable political and military prereq-
uisites for this."
Then there is a marginal note, "Slightly exaggerated."

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any idea when that marginal

notation was put in?

MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient

of this copy of the order.

THE PRESIDENT: By whom?
MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of
the order, which was the naval war staff.

"2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to

strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means
available. For this purpose the High Commands of the
branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehen-
sive and generous manner with Japanese desires for infor-
mation regarding German war and combat experience, and
for assistance in military economics and in tedinical matters.
Reciprocity is desirable, but this factor should not stand in
the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given
to those Japanese requests which would have the most imme-
diate application in waging war. In special cases the Führer
reserves the decisions for himself.
"3. of the operational plans of the two par-
The harmonizing
ties isthe responsibility of the Naval High Command. This
will be subject to the following guiding principles:

376
 10 Dec. 45

"a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed

as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping
the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has .

no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East

which would give occasion for any reservations with regard
to Japanese intentions.
"b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile
warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong
Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection
every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare
must be exploited.
"c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands
that Japan should acquire possession of those territories
which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if
the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be
carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since
they are of vital importance to Germany.
"d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in
the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire
conduct of war of the three powers.
"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British
—
naval power extending to those of American naval power
only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot
—
be prevented will result in weakening the enemy's
system of power in that region and also, just like the attack
on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of
all kinds (Austraha). A date for the beginning of operational
discussions cannot yet be fixed.
"4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance
with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be
dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers.
These will include primarily the problems of economic war-
fare. The working out of the details is the responsibility of
the main commission with the co-operation of the Armed
Forces High Command.
"5.The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the
Barbarossa operations."
It is signed by Keitel as Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.
Ifthe Tribunal will glance at the distribution list, you will see
that it went to the heads of all the Armed Forces, Armed Forces
High Command: Joint Operation Staff, Intelligence divisions, and
to the chief of foreign affairs, simultaneously for the Foreign Office.
It appears from what I have just read that the Nazis' cardinal
operational principle in collaboration with Japan was, as early as

377
10 Dec. 45

March 1941, the inducement of Japan to aggression against Singa-

pore and other British far eastern bases. I shall pass over, for the
moment, other references to the United States in Basic Order
Number 24 and take up that point later.
I now wish to refer to our Document Number C-152, which
has already been introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit
GB-122. This document is the top-secret record of a meeting on
18 March 1941, about 2 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order
Number 24; a meeting attended by Hitler, the Defendant Raeder,
the Defendant Keitel, and the Defendant Jodl. We are concerned
only with Paragraph 11 in this phase, where Raeder, then Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Navy, is speaking. I quote:
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (tie-up
of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for
war against Japan; inferiority of the United States Fleet
in comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making
preparations for this action; but according to all declarations
made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if
Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must,
therefore, concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to
act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East
Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are
thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
''Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A.
She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon
as possible."
The fact clearly appears from these minutes that military staff
conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss
the activation of Japanese military support against the British
and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote agaia
the second sentence in that paragraph:
"Japan is indeed making preparations for this action; but
according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she
will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in Eng-
land."
Apparently the Nazis were subsequently able to persuade the
Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their performance
under the contract.
I now turn to further efforts by the Defendant Ribbentrop to

induce the Japanese to aggression against the British Common-

wealth. On the 29th of March 1941 he met with the Japanese
Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. A report
of their conversations found in the German Foreign Office archives

378
 10 Dec. 45

is contained in our Document 1877-PS, which I now offer in

evidence as Exhibit USA-152.
Relevant portions of this document have been translated into
English. I shall now read from the top of Page 1 of the English
translation:
"The RAM" —that is Ribbentrop — "resumed, where they had
the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the
left off,
latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow. He
expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in
view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with
the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation
would develop. One thing was certain, however, namely
that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever
attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive
assurance so that Japan could push forward to the south
on Singapore without fear of possible complications with
Russia. The largest part of the German Army was on the
Eastern frontiers of the Reich anyway and fully prepared
to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM), however,
believed that Russia would try to avoid developments
leading to war. Should Germany, however, enter into a
conflict with Russia, the U.S.S.R. would be finished off
within a few months. In this case Japan would have, of
course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wants
to advance on Singapore. Consequently, she need not refrain
from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.
"He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia
would develop. It was uncertain whether or not Stalin
would intensify his present unfriendly policy against
Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka
in any case that a conflict with Russia was at least within
the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not
report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return, that a
conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On
the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict,
even if it were not probable, would have to be considered
possible."
I now skip five pages of the German text and continue directly
with the English translation:
"Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In
view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible
attacks by submarines based on the Philippines, and of the
intervention of the British Mediterranean and home fleets,
he had again discussed the situation with Grossadmiral
Raeder. The latter had stated that the British Navy during

379
10 Dec. 45

this year would have its hands so full in the English home
waters and in the Mediterranean that it would not be able
to send even a single ship to the Far East. Grossadmiral
Raeder had described the United States submarines as so poor
that Japan need not bother about them at all.
"Matsuoka replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had
a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy.
It also held the view that, in case of a clash with the
American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without
trouble. However, it was afraid that the Americans would
not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with
the United States might perhaps be dragged out to 5 years.
This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.
"The RAM
replied that America could not do anything
against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore.
Perhaps for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice
before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while
on the one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan,
on the other hand there was the probability of losing the
Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course,
this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because
of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to
offset such a loss.

"In this connection Matsuoka pointed out that he was doing

everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted
as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key
position of England in the East. Therefore it might be
possible that his attitude toward the British would appear
to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany
should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude
not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order
to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements in Japan
just so long, until one day he would suddenly open the
attack on Singapore.
"In this connection Matsuoka stated that his tactics were
based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack
against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation
with one blow. ('Nothing succeeds like success,' the RAM
remarked.) He followed here the example expressed in the
words of a famous Japanese statesman addressed to the
Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war:
'You open fire, then the nation will be united.' The
Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as
an Oriental, he believed in the fate which would come,
whether you wanted it or not."

380
 10 Dec. 45

I then skip again in the German text, and continue with

what appears in the English translation:
"Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance
in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been
broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of
a German written promise of assistance.
"The RAM replied that he had already discussed these
questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to
procure maps of Singapore in order that the Führer who —
probably must be considered the greatest expert on military
—
questions at the present time could advise Japan on the
best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on
aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could
draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for
the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in
the vicinity against the British Fleet in Singapore. Thus,
the British Fleet would be forced to disappear from
Singapore immediately.
"Matsuoka remarked that Japan was less concerned with the
British Fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.
"The RAM replied that here, too, the Führer had developed
new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified
positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben-Emael,
which he could make available to the Japanese.
"Matsuoka replied in this connection that some of the younger
expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of
his, were of the opinion that the Japanese Naval forces
would need 3 months until they could capture Singapore.
As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate.
He believed he could stave off any danger which threatened
from America for 6 months. If, however, the capture of
Singapore required still more time and if the operations
would perhaps even drag out for a year, the situation with
America would become extremely critical; and he did not
know as yet how to meet it.
"If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands
East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese
attack on this area, the oil fields would be set afire. They
could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.
"The RAM added that Japan would gain decisive influence
over the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the
capture of Singapore."
On the 5th of April, about a week after the conference from
whose minutes I have just quoted, Ribbentrop again met with
Matsuoka and again pushed the Japanese another step along the

381
10 Dec. 45

road to aggressive war. The notes of this conference, which were

also found in the German Foreign Office archives, are contained
in our Document 1882-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-153.
I shall read a few brief extracts from these notes, starting with
the third paragraph on Page 1 of the English translation:
"In answer a remark by Matsuoka that Japan was
to
now awakened and, according to the Japanese temperament,
would take action quickly after the previous lengthy
deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was
necessary, of course, to accept a risk in this connection just
as the Führer had done successfully with the occupation of
the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of
armament and with the resignation from the League of
Nations."
I now skip several pages of the German text and continue
on with the English translation.
"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German
Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient
traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation,
which in its time was the only dominant power on the
European continent.
"In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again
summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to
Japan with him from his trips:
"1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of
this year, the world would realize this. Even England would
have to concede it, if she had not collapsed before then, and
America would also have to resign herself to this fact.
"2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and
Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated
for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate
in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.
"3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war.
But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war.
Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the
interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a
unique opportunity, which would hardly ever return, for the
—
fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan a chance which
would make it possible for her to play a really leading role
in East Asia."
Here again, in the portion just quoted, we see Ribbentrop pur-
suing the same track I have previously noted. Germany has already
won the war for all practical purposes. Japan's entry will hasten
the inevitable end. But Japan had better get the positions she
wants during the war.

382
 10 Dec. 45

I also invite the Tribunal's attention to Ribbentrop's assurances,

expressed in the quotation I read from 1877-PS previously, that
Japan likewise had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union if Japan
entered the conflict. The references to the weaknesses of the United
States, scattered throughout the quotations I have read, were also
an ingredient in this brew which was being so carefully prepared
and brought to a boil.
I should like to introduce one more document on the part of the
case dealing particularly with exhortation of the Japanese to aggres-
sion against the British Commonwealth. This is our Document
1538-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA-154. This document is
a top-secret report, dated 24 May 1941, from the German Military
Attaché in Tokyo to the Intelligence Division of the OKW. I wish
merely to call attention, at this point, to the last sentence in the
—
paragraph numbered 1, wherein it is stated I quote: *'The prep-
arations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand."
I shall return to this document later. I point out here, however,
the fact which appears from the sentence I have just read, that the
German military were keeping in close touch with the Japanese
operational plans against Singapore, which the Nazi conspirators
had fostered.
Next, exhortations by the Nazis to Japanese aggression against
the U.S.S.R.
I invitethe Tribunal's attention, at this point, to the language
of the Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition. I quote,
beginning with the eighth line from the top of the page:
"The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression
would weaken and handicap those nations with whom they
were at war and those with whom they contemplated war.
Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a
'new order of things'."
The evidence have just adduced showed the Nazi exhortations
I
with particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations.
We now turn to their efforts to induce the Japanese to commit a
"stab in the back" on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here
again the Defendant Ribbentrop appears as the central figure.
For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order Number 24
regarding collaboration with Japan, the conspirators had been pre-
paring Fall Barbarossa, the plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic
Order Number 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese "must not
be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation."
In his conference with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka,
on 29 March 1941, almost 3 weeks after the issuance of Basic Order
Number 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. The

383
10 Dec. 45

report of this conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already been

introduced as Exhibit USA-152 and read into the record. I wish to
invite the Tribunal's attention again to the first two paragraphs
of the English translation of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured
Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the
eastern frontiers of the Reich fully prepared to open the attack at
any time. Ribbentrop then added that although he believed that the
U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, never-
theless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would
have to be considered possible.
Whatever conclusion the Japanese Ambassador drew from these
remarks in April of 1941 can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis
had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941,
the tenor of Ribbentrop's remarks left no room for doubt. On
10 July 1941 Ribbentrop dispatched a coded telegram to Ott, the
German Ambassador The telegram is our Document
in Tokyo.
I now
2896-PS, which introduce as Exhibit USA-155. I quote from
numbered Paragraph 4 of that telegram, which is the first para-
graph of the English translation:
"Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Foreign
Minister for conveying the cable report of the Japanese Am-
bassador in Moscow. It would be convenient if we could keep
on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up,
I should like to say I have now, as in the past, full confidence
in the Japanese policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister;
first of all because .the present Japanese Government would
really act inexcusably toward the future of their nation if
they would not take this unique opportunity to solve the
Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expan-
sion to the south and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia,
as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in
effect close to collapse —
a report which coincides with our
own observations as far as we are able to judge the present
—
war situation it is simply impossible that Japan should not
settle the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area as soon
as her military preparations are completed."
Skipping now to the middle of the second paragraph on Page 1
of the English translation — the sentence beginning "However .
.":
.

"However, Iask you to employ all available means in further

insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at
the earliest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my
note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better.
The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join
hands on the trans-Siberian railroad before winter starts.
After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the

384
 10 Dec. 45

Three-Power-Pact States in the world will be so gigantic that

the question of England's collapse or the total destruction of
the British Isles will be only a matter of time. An America
totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be
faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions
of the British Empire which are important for the Three-
Power-Pact countries. I have the unshakeable conviction that
a carrying through of the New Order as desired by us will
be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable
difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand
close together and encounter every action of the Americans
with the same weapons. I ask you to report in the near
future, as often as possible and in detail, on the political
situation there."
Wehave Ott's reply to this telegram, dated 13 July 1941. This
is our Document Number 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as
Exhibit USA-156. After reading the heading, I shall skip to the
last paragraph on Page 3 of the German text, which is the para-
graph appearing in the English translation:
—
"Telegram; secret cipher system" Sent 14 July from Tokyo;
—
arrived 14 July 1941 '*As fast as possible.
"I am trying with all means to work toward Japan's entry
into the war against Russia as soon as possible, especially
using arguments of personal message of Foreign Minister and
telegram cited above to convince Matsuoka personally, as
well as the Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists,
and friendly businessmen. I believe that according to military
preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The
greatest obstacle to this against which one has to fight is the
disunity within the activist group which, without unified com-
mand, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to
the changed situation."
Onsubsequent occasions Ribbentrop repeated his exhortations
to induce the Japanese to aggression against the U.S.S.R. I shall
present three documents covering July of 1942 and March and April
of 1943. The first is our Document 2911-PS which contains notes
of a discussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambas-
sador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. As a matter of background I note
that at this time German armies were sweeping forward in the
U.S.S.R. and the fall of Sevastopol had just been announced.
I now offer our Document 2911-PS as Exhibit USA-157, and
I quote the relevant extracts appearing in the English translation
thereof:
"He, the German Minister, had asked to see the Ambassador
at this time, when the situation was as described, because

385
10 Dec. 45

now a question of fateful importance had arisen concerning

the joint conduct of the war. If Japan felt herself sufficiently
strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was
probably now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked
Russia at this time, it would lead to her (Russia) final moral
collapse; at least it would hasten the collapse of her present
system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an
opportunity as existed at present to eliminate once and for
all the Russian colossus in eastern Asia.
"He had discussed this question with the Führer, and the
Führer was of the same opinion; but he wanted to emphasize
one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she
felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no
circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be
allowed to bog down at the half-way mark, and we do not
want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profit-
able."

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in

evidence our Document Number 2954-PS as Exhibit USA-158. This
is a record of a conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador
Oshima on 6 March 1943.
note again for background that the strategic military situation
I
in the broad expanses of the U.S.S.R. had changed somewhat.
In the previous month, February 1943, the Soviet armies had
completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted
very severe losses. Further north and west their winter offensive had
removed large areas from the hands of the invader. Combined
United States and British forces had already landed in North Africa.
You will remark as
read that the tone of Ribbentrop's argu-
I
ment at this time changed military situation. The fami-
reflects the
liar Japanese refrain of "So sorry, please," likewise appears to have
crept in.

note in this record that the month of February 1943 had also
I

seen the end of the organized Japanese resistance on the Island of

Guadalcanal.
I now quote the relevant extracts from the minutes of the dis-

cussion between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6 March 1943, which

appear in the English translation in the document book:
"Ambassador Oshima declared that he received a telegram
from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his Government
to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The

386
 10 Dec. 45

suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was

the subject of a common conference between the Japanese
Government and the Imperial headquarters during which the
question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The
result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely
recognize the danger which threatens from Russia and com-
pletely understand the desire of their German ally that Japan
on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However,
not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the
it is

present war situation, to enter into the war. They are rather
of the conviction that it would be in the common interest not
to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the
Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian
question.
"The Japanese Government have the intention to become
aggressive again in the future on other fronts.
"The RAM brought up the question, after the explanation by
the Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is
envisaged in Tokyo. At present Germany wages the war
against the common enemies, England and America, mostly
alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. How-
ever, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the
Three Power Pact would combine their forces not only to
defeat England and America, but also Russia. It is not good
when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the
German national strength. He was inwardly concerned about
certain forces at work in Tokyo, who were of the opinion, and
propagated the same, that doubtless, Germany could emerge
from the battle victoriously and that Japan should proceed
to consolidate her forces before she should further exert her-
self to the fullest extent."
I now skip several pages in the German text and resume the
quotation:
"Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack
on Russia by Japan and he declared that, after all, the fight
on the Burma front as well as in the south is actually more
of a maritime problem; and on all fronts except those in
China at best very few ground forces are stationed. There-
fore the attack on Russia is primarily an Army affair, and
he asked himself if the necessary forces for that would be
available."
Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with
Oshima about 3 weeks later on 18 April 1943. The top-secret notes
of this conference are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which
I now offer as Exhibit USA-159. I shall quote only one sentence:

387
10 Dec. 45

"The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again

that, without any doubt, this year presented the most favor-
able opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had
sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal, to attack Russia,
which certainly would never again be as weak as she was at
the moment."
I now wish
to come to that aspect of this conspiracy which is
in a large measure responsible for the appearance of millions of
Americans in uniform all over the world.
The Nazi preparations and collaboration with the Japanese
against the United States, as noted by the United States Chief of
Counsel in his opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one
of preparations by the Nazis themselves for an attack from across
the Atlantic, and the other of fomenting war in the Pacific.
In the course of my presentation of the Nazi exhortations to the
Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R.,
I have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences
relating to the United States. I shall take those documents up again
in their relevant passages to show their particular application. I
have also, in the treatment of Ribbentrop's urging the Japanese to
war against the U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of 7 December and
II December 1941, when the Japanese and German Governments
respectively initiated and declared aggressive war against the United
States.
Apart from the advantage and convenience of presentation, these
documents have indicated the Nazi awareness and acceptance of the
direction in which their actions were leading, as well as the uni-
versal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the
Japanese. Their intentions against the United States must be viewed
in the focus of both their over-all plan and their immediate commit-
ments elsewhere. That their over-all plan involved ultimate aggres-
sive war against the United States was intimated by the Defendant
Goring in a speech on 8 July 1938, when these conspirators had
already forcibly annexed Austria and were perfecting their plans
against Czechoslovakia.
This speech was delivered to representatives of the aircraft
industry, and the copy that we have was transmitted as the enclo-
sure to a secret memorandum from Göring's adjutant to General
Udet, who was then in charge of experimental research for the
Luftwaffe. It is contained in our Document R-140, which I now
offer as Exhibit USA-160.
invite the Tribunal's attention to the statement in the covering
I
memorandum that the enclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes
of the conference. I shall not go through the long speech in which
Goring called for increased aircraft production and pointed to the

388
 10 Dec. 45

necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. I wish

to quote just two sentences, which appear on Page 33 of the German
text and Page 11 of the English translation. Quoting from the second
full paragraph on Page 11 of the English translation, starting with
the third sentence from the end of the paragraph:
rocket-motors which could make such flights
"I still lack these
possible. completely lack the bombers capable of round-trip
I
flights to New York with a 5-ton bomb load. I would be
extremely happy to possess such a bomber which would at
last stuff the mouth of arrogance across the sea."
Göring's fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization
at that time, either tedinically or in the fact of the Nazi conspira-
tors' schedule of aggression that has been outlined here in the past
several days.
During the period of their preparation for and the waging of
aggressive war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign
against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that these con-
spirators were not disposed to involve the United States in war at
that time. Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940 the prosecution of
war against the United States of America at a later date was on
the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document which we
have found in the files of the OKL, the German Air Force files.
It is Document 376-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit Number
USA-161. This document is a memorandum marked "Chefsache,"
the German designation for top secret, from a Major Von Falken-
stein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe general.
Falkenstein, who was a major of the General Staff, was at that
time the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the
OKW, which was the staff headed by the Defendant Jodl. His memo-
randum, which he characterizes as a "brief résumé on the military
questions current here," is dated the 29th of October 1940. It covers
several questions. I shall quote to you numbered Paragraph 5,
which appears at the bottom of the first page of the EngUsh trans-
lation and carries over to the reverse side of the one-sheet docu-
ment:
"5) The Führer is at present occupied with the question of the
occupation of the Atlantic islands with a view to the prose-
cution of a war against America at a later date. Deliberations
on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential con-
ditions are at the present:
"(a) No other operational commitment; (b) Portuguese neu-
trality; (c) support of France and Spain.
"A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding
air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the
GAF." — or the German Air Force.

389
10 Dec, 45

The Nazis' military interest in the United States is further

indicated by Paragraph 7 which I read:
"General Bötticher has made repeated reference, especially
in his telegram 2314, dated 26th of October, to the fact that
in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American
aircraft industry are being published in the German press.
The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme
Command. pointed out that the matter was specifically a
I
GAF one but have taken the liberty of referring the matter
to you on its own merits."
Again, in July 1941, in his first flush of confidence resulting from
early gains in the aggression against the U.S.S.R., the Führer signed
an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the
United States. This top-secret order, found in the files of the Ger-
man Navy, is our Document C-74, which I now offer as Exhibit
USA-162. I read from the first paragraph of that text just preceding
the paragraph numbered (1):
"By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive Num-
ber 32, for the further conduct of the war, I lay down the
following principles to govern the strength of personnel and
of material supplies:
"(1) In general:
"The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia
will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably
reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength
of the Army will allow, the armored units will be greatly
increased.
"Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which
have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against
England and, should the case arise, against America.
"The main armament will be shifted to the Air
effort in
must be greatly increased in strength."
Force, which
From these documents it appears that the Nazi conspirators were
making at least preliminary plans of their own against the United
States. The Nazis' over-all plan with regard to the United States
was, however, a complex one involving, in addition, collaboration
with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations
to the Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions
in the Pacific Far East, they again considered war against the United
States.
I now refer again to Basic Order Number 24, regarding collab-
oration with Japan. This is our Document C-75, which I have put
in as Exhibit USA-151. I have read it in its entirety into the record.
The Tribunal will recall that in that basic order, which was issued

390
 10 Dec. 45

on 5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was stated in Subparagraph (3) (a)
as "forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the
United States out of the war."
Nevertheless, the Nazi conspirators clearly contemplated, within
the framework of that policy, the possibility of the United States'
entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were then
instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on posses-
sions of the United States practically simultaneously with the assault
on the British Empire, as actually happened. Other possibilities
of involvement of the United States were also discussed. This Basic
—
Order Number 24 stated and I am referring to Subparagraph (3) (c),
on the top of Page 2 of the Document C-75:
"(c) The raw material situation of the pact powers demands
that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which
it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the

United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried

out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are
of vital importance to Germany."
The order continues in an unnumbered paragraph, immediately
below Subparagraph (3) (d):
"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British
—
naval power extending to those of American naval power
only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be
—
prevented will result in weakening the enemy's system of
power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea
communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds
(Australia)."
In these passages there is a clear envisagement of United States
involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to
United States interests, if Japan were to capture Singapore, was
also envisaged by the Defendant Raeder in his meeting of 18 March
1941 with Hitler and the Defendants Keitel and Jodl. These minutes
are contained in our Document C-152, which has already been put
in as Exhibit GB-122. I wish now to repeat the four sentences of
Item 11 of the minutes of that conference, contained on Page 1 of
the English translation. I am quoting the Defendant Raeder:
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible,
since the opportunity will never again be so favorable (tie-up
of the whole English Fleet; unpreparedness of the U.S.A. for
war against Japan, inferiority of the United States Fleet in
comparison with the Japanese). Japan is indeed making
preparations for this action, but according to all declarations
made by Japanese officers, she will carry it out only if Ger-
many proceeds to land in England. Germany must, there-
fore, concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act

391
10 Dec. 45

immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic

questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby-
solved (Guam, the Philippines, Borneo, and the Dutch East
Indies).

"Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A.

She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon
as possible."
The Defendant Ribbentrop also recognized the possibility of
United States involvement as a result of the course of aggression that
he was urging on the Japanese. I refer again to his meeting of
23 February 1941 with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima, the notes
of which are contained in our Document 1834-PS, which is in evi-
dence as Exhibit USA-129.
The Tribunal I have already read,
will recall that in a passage
Subparagraph near the bottom of Page 3 of the English trans-
(2)
lation, Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that a surprise by Japan was
bound to keep the United States out of the war since she was
unarmed and could not risk either her fleet or the possibility of
losing the Philippines as the result of a declaration of war. Two
paragraphs later Ribbentrop practically dropped the pretense that
the United States would not be involved. I quote here from the
last paragraph at the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation:

"The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that if

America should declare war because of Japan's entry into the
war, this would mean that America had the intention to
enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would
be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as
explained above, be by no means decisive and would not
endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three
Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief
that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by Amer-
ica's entry into the war would be canceled by Japan's entry
into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the
Americans should be careless enough to send their navy, in
spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would
represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three
Power Pact to bring the war to an end with the greatest
rapidity. He — —
the Foreign Minister is convinced that the
Japanese Fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador
Oshima replied to this that unfortunately he does not think
the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a vic-
tory of his fleet in Japanese waters."
In the paragraphs that follow, some of which have already
been read into the record, Ribbentrop again stressed the mutual

392
 10 Dec. 45

inter-dependence of the Tripartite Pact powers and suggested co-

ordinated action.
I want to quotenow only the last paragraph on Page 5, a diffi-
cult bit of Nazi cynicism which by now is quite familiar.
"The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question,
explicitly designated as theoretical, that the contracting
powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by
the U.S.A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and
Italy were fundamentally determined on this. After signing
of the Three Power Pact, we should proceed, if the occasion
arises, also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open
the eyes of the people in the United States, and under certain
conditions swing public opinion towards isolation. Naturally
a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself
entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory
powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda.
The question, however, was in no way acute at the time."
Again, on 29 March 1941, Ribbentrop, this time in a conference
with the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, discussed the possible
involvement of the United States. Notes of this conference are con-
tained in our Document 1877-PS, which I have already introduced
as Exhibit USA-152; and I have read it into the record. The rele-
vant statements appear in the bottom two paragraphs of Page 1
and the first full paragraph on Page 2 of the English translation.
I shall not take the Tribunal's time to read them again.

I should like to refer to one more document to show that the

Nazi conspirators knew that the aggressive war they were urging
the Japanese to undertake both threatened the vital interests of the
United States and could lead to the United States' involvement in
the contemplated Far Eastern confiict. This document is our 1881 -PS,
report of the conference between Hitler and the Japanese Foreign
Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 4 April 1941. I have already offered,
in my opening statement to the Tribunal 2 weeks ago, Document
1881-PS as Exhibit USA-33; and I read at that time a considerable
portion of it into the record. Unless the Court prefers that I do not
do so, it seems to me desirable at this point to re-read a few brief
passages.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we might treat it as being in evi-

dence.

MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to emphasize, however, that the pas-

sages which I read 2 weeks ago and which I had expected to re-read
at this point show not only a realization of the probable involve-
ment of the United States in the Far Eastern confiict that the Nazis
were urging, but also a knowledge on their part that the Japanese

393
 10 Dec. 45

Army and Navy were actually preparing war plans against the
United States. Furthermore, we have a document that shows the
Nazis knew at least a part of what those war plans were.
I now refer again to Document Number 1538-PS, which has been
offered in evidence as Exhibit USA-154, the secret telegram from
the German Military Attaché in Tokyo, dated 24 May 1941. He talks
about the conferences he has had regarding Japan's entry in the
war in the event Germany should become involved in war with
the United States.
—
In the paragraph numbered 1 this sentence also appears I quote
the last sentence in numbered Paragraph Number 1, "Preparations
for attack on Singapore and Manila stand."
May I at this point review the Nazi position with regard to the
United States at this time, the spring of 1941. In view of their
pressing commitments elsewhere and their aggressive plans against
the U.S.S.R. set for execution in June of 1941, their temporary
strategy was naturally a preference that the United States not be
involved in the war at that time. Nevertheless, they had been
considering their own preliminary plan against the United States,
as seen in the Atlantic island document which I offered.
They were repeatedly urging the Japanese to aggression against
the British Commonwealth just as they would urge them to attack
the U.S.S.R. soon after the launching of the Nazi invasion of the
Soviet Union. They were aware that the course along which they
were pushing the Japanese in the Far East would probably lead to
involvement of the United States. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign
Minister had told Hitler this in so many words, and their own
military men had fully realized the implications of the move against
Singapore. They also knew that the Japanese Army and Navy were
preparing operation plans against the U.S. They knew at least part
of those plans.
The Nazi conspirators not only knew all these things; they
accepted the risk of the aggressive course they were urging on
the Japanese and pushed their eastern allies still further along
that course.
In April 1941 Hitler told the Japanese Foreign Minister that
in the eventJapan would have become involved in the war with
the United States, Germany would immediately take the conse-
quences and strike without delay.
I refer our Document 1881-PS, the notes of the Hitler-
to
Matsuoka conference in Berlin on 4 April 1941, which has already
been introduced as Exhibit Number USA-33. I refer particularly
to the first four paragraphs on Page 2 of the English translation.
I think that has been read to you at least twice, and I perhaps
need not repeat it.

394
 10 Dec. 45

Then, skipping two paragraphs, we see Hitler then encouraging

Matsuoka in his decision to strike against the United States; and
I invite your attention to the fourth paragraph on Page 2, which
you have heard several times and which I shall not re-read.
Here in those passages were assurance, encouragement, and
abetment by the head of the German State, the leading Nazi co-
conspirator, in April 1941. But the Nazi encouragement and promise
of support did not end there.

I now offer our Document 2898-PS as Exhibit Number USA-163.

This is another telegram from the German Ambassador in Tokyo
regarding his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister. It
is dated the 30th of November 1941, exactly 1 week before Pearl
Harbor. I will read from the first four paragraphs on Page 2 of
the German text, which is the first paragraph of the English
translation; and this passage, I am sure, has not been read to the
Tribunal. No part of this document has been read.
"The progress of the negotiations so far confirms his view-
point that the difference of opinion between Japan and the
U.S. is very great. The Japanese Government, since they
sent Ambassador Kurusu, have taken a firm stand as he
told me. He is convinced that this position is in our favor,
and makes the United States think that her entry into the
European war would be risky business. The new American
proposal of 25 November showed great divergencies in the
viewpoints of the two nations. These differences of opinion
concern, for example, the further treatment of the Chinese
—
question. The biggest" and then the German text has the
legend "one group missing," indicating that one group of
the secret code was garbled on transmission. It would
appear from the text that the missing words are "difference
of opinion"
— "The biggest (one group missing), however,
resulted from the United States attempt to make the three-
power agreement ineffective. The United States suggested to
Japan that she conclude treaties of non-aggression with the
United States, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and
other countries in order to prevent Japan's entry into the
war on the side of the Axis Powers. Japan, however, insisted
upon maintaining her treaty obligations, and for this reason
American demands are the greatest obstacles for adjusting
Japanese-American relations. He avoided discussing con-
cessions promised by the Uliited States and merely mentioned
that grave decisions were at stake.
"The United States is seriously preparing for war and is
about to operate a considerable part of its navy from southern
Pacific bases. The Japanese Government are busy working

395
10 Dec. 45

out an answer in order to clarify their viewpoint. But he

has no particulars at that moment. He thinks the American
proposals as a whole unacceptable.
"Japan is not afraid of a breakdown of negotiations, and she
hopes that if occasion arises Germany and Italy, according
to the Three Power Pact, would stand at her side. I answered
that there could be no doubt about Germany's future position.
The Japanese Foreign Minister thereupon stated that he
understood from my words that Germany, in such a case,
would consider her relationship to Japan as that of a union
by fate. I answered, according to my opinion, Germany was
certainly ready to have mutual agreement between the two
countries over this situation.
"The Minister of Foreign Affairs answered that it was
possible that he would come back to this point soon. The
conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed
the impression that the United States note, in fact, is very
unsatisfactory even for the compromise-seeking politicians
here. For these circles America's position, especially in the
China question, is very disappointing. The emphasis upon
the Three Power Pact as being the main obstacle between
successful Japanese-United States negotiations seems to point
to the fact that the Japanese Government are becoming
aware of the necessity of close co-operation with the Axis
Powers."
The time is now fast approaching for that day of infamy.
I our Document 2987-PS as Exihibit USA-166. This document
offer
consists of extracts from the handwritten diary of Count Galeazzo
Ciano during the period 3 December to 8 December 1941. It consists
of notes he jotted down in the course of his daily business as
Foreign Minister of Italy. The Italian has been translated into both
English and German, and copies of both the English and the
German are in the document books.
I now quote from the beginning of the entry of 3 December,
Wednesday:
"Sensational move by Japan. The Ambassador asks for an
audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on
the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding
with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then
invoking the appropriate clause^ in the Tripartite Pact, he
asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after
the outbreak of hostilities and proposes the signing of an
agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter
translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce
gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with

396
 10 Dec. 45

Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with

the communication and said, *We are now on the brink of
the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as
September 1939.' What does this new event mean? In any
case it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver.
Since he could not enter the war immediately and directly,
he entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by
Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every
prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed
— —
and that it is now easy muCh too easy to predict a long
war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this
basis that the problem must be considered. BerUn's answer
will be somewhat delayed because Hitler has gone to the
southern Front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue
to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet
offensive."
And then December 4, Thursday —that is 3 days before Pearl
Harbor:
"Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely
cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get
out of it, but the idea of provoking America's intervention
pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other
hand, is pleased about it."
And December 5, Friday:
"A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After
delaying 2 days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the
Japanese; and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen
to my house to submit a plan for a triple agreement relative
to Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a
separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did
not do so, and the latter was very glad I had not."
It appears from the last entry I have read, that of December 5,
that some sort of an agreement was reached.
On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japan, without previous warning
or declaration of war, commenced an attack against the United
States at Pearl Harbor and against the British Commonwealth
of Nations in the Southwest Pacific. On the morning of 11 De-
cember, 4 days after the Japanese assault in the Pacific, the German
Government declared war on the United States, committing the
last act of aggression which was to seal their doom. This declaration
of war is contained in Volume IX of the Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik, of which I now ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice
as Exhibit USA-164. An English translation is contained in our
document book, and for the convenience of the Tribunal is Number
2507-PS.

397
10 Dec. 45

The same day, 11 December, the fourth anniversary of which

is tomorrow, the Congress of the United States resolved:
"That the state of war between the United States and the
Government of Germany which has thus been thrust upon
the United States, is hereby formally declared."
This declaration is contained as Document 272 in the official
publication Peace and War, of which the Tribunal has already
taken judicial notice as Exhibit USA-122. The declaration itself
has been reproduced for the document books as our Document
2945-PS.
thus appears that, apart from their own aggressive intentions
It
and declaration of war against the United States, the Nazi con-
spirators in their collaboration with Japan incited and kept in
motion a force reasonably calculated to result in an attack on the
United States. While maintaining their preference that the United
States not be involved in war at the time, they nevertheless
foresaw the distinct possibility, even probability, of such involve-
ment as a result of the action they were encouraging. They were
aware that the Japanese had prepared plans for attack against the
United States, and they accepted the consequences by assuring
the Japanese that they would ^declare war on the United States
should a United States-Japanese conflict result.
In dealing with captured documents of the enemy the
completeness of the plan is necessarily obscured, but those docu-
ments which have been discovered and offered in evidence before
this Tribunal show that the Japanese attack was the proximate
and foreseeable consequence of their collaboration policy and that
their exhortations and encouragement of the Japanese as surely
led to Pearl Harbor as though Pearl Harbor itself had been
mentioned.
I should like to read the Ciano diary entry for 8 December,

the day after Pearl Harbor:

"A night telephone call from Ribbentrop. He is overjoyed
about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about
it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about

the final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now

certain, thatAmerica will enter the conflict and that the con-
flictwill be so long that she will be able to realize all her
potential forces. This morning I told this to the King who
had been pleased about the event. He ended by admitting
that, in the long run, I may be right. Mussolini was happy,
For a long time he has favored a definite clarification of
too.
between America and the Axis."
relations
The final document consists of the top-secret notes of a conference
between Hitler and Japanese Ambassador Oshima on 14 December

398
 10 Dec. 45

1941, from 1300 to 1400 hours, in the presence of the Reich Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop. It is our Document 2932-PS, which I now
offer as Exhibit USA-165. The immediate subject matter is the Pearl
Harbor attack, but the expressions therein typify Nazi technique.
I quote from the second paragraph of the English translation which
has not been previously read:
"First the Führer presents Ambassador Oshima with the
Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in
gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the
achievement of German-Japanese co-operation, which has
now obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.
"General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor
and emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms
has now come about between Germany and Japan.
"The Führer continues: 'You gave the right declaration of
war.' This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it
formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to
negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees the other is
interested only in putting one off, in shaAming and humili-
ating one, and is not willing to come to an agreement, then
one should strike as hard as possible, indeed, and not waste
time declaring war. It was heart-warming to him to hear of
the first operations of the Japanese. He himself negotiated
with infinite patience at times, for example, with Poland and
also with Russia. When he then realized that the other did
not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and
without formality. He would continue to go on this way in
the future."
If the Tribunal please, that ends my presentation of the various
phases of aggressive warfare charged as Crimes against Peace in
Count One of the Indictment. As I conclude this phase I hope the
Tribunal will allow me to express my deep sense of obligation to
Commander Sidney J. Kaplan, section chief, and to the members of
his staff, who did the yeoman work necessary to assemble and
prepare these materials that I have presented. These members of
that staff, in the order in which the materials were presented, are:
Major Joseph Dainow, Lieutenant Commander Harold Leventhal,
Lieutenant John M. Woolsey, Lieutenant James A. Gorrell, Lieu-
tenant Roy H. Steyer.
Commander Kaplan and his staff have fully measured up to the
famous motto branch of the armed services, the United States
of his
Coast Guard, "Semper Paratus" (Always Prepared).
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 11 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

399
 SEVENTEENTH DAY
Tuesday, 11 December 1945

Morning Session

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the United States next

evidence some captured moving pictures through Com-
offers in
mander Donovan, who had charge of taking them.
COMMANDER JAMES BRITT DONOVAN (Assistant Trial
Counsel for the United States): May it please the Tribunal, the
United States now offers in evidence Document Number 3054-PS,
United States Exhibit Number 167, the motion picture entitled The
Nazi Plan. This document contains several affidavits with exhibits,
copies of which have jDeen furnished to Defense Counsel. I ask the
Tribunal whether it believes it to be necessary that I formally read
the affidavits at this time. Since the motion pictures themselves wiîl
be presented to the Tribunal and thereafter be in its permanent
record, I respectfully submit that the reading be waived.
In the past 3 weeks the Prosecution has presented to this Tribunal
a vast amount of evidence concerning the nature of the Nazi con-
spiracy and what we contend to be its deliberate planning, launching,
and waging of wars of aggression. That evidence has consisted of
documentary and some oral proof, but the Nazi conspirators did
more than leave behind such normal types of evidence. German
proficiency in photography has been traditional. Its use as a propa-
ganda instrument was especially well known to these defendants,
and as a result the United States in 1945 captured an almost com-
plete chronicle of the rise and fall of National Socialism as docu-
mented in films made by the Nazis themselves. It is from excerpts
of this chronicle that we have compiled the motion picture now
presented, entitled The Nazi Plan, which in broad outline sums up
the case thus far presented under Counts One and Two of the
Indictment.
The motion picture has been divided into four parts. This
morning we first offer to the Tribunal Parts 1 and 2, respectively
entitled "The Rise of the NSDAP, 1921 to 1933," and "Acquiring
TotaUtarian Control of Germany, 1933 to 1935." These will be con-
cluded by 11:20, at which time we assume the Tribunal will order
its customary morning adjournment. At 11 30 we shall present Part 3,
:

entitled "Preparation for Wars of Aggression, 1935 to 1939." This

will be concluded shortly before 1 o'clock. At 2 p. m. we will offer

400
 11 Dec. 45

Part 4, "Wars of Aggression, 1939 to 1944," and this will be con-

cluded by 3 p.m.
Parts 1 and 2 now to be presented, enable us to re-live those
years in which the Nazis fought for and obtained the power to rule
all life in Germany. We see the early days of terrorism and propa-
ganda bearing final fruit in Hitler's accession to the Chancellery in
1933, then the consolidation of power within Germany, climaxed
by the Parteitag of 1934, in which the Nazis proclaimed to the
nation their plans for totalitarian control. It is in simple and
dramatic form the story of how a nation forsook its liberty.
I wish again to emphasize that all film now presented to the
Tribunal, including, for example, pictures of early Nazi newspapers,
is the original German film, to which we have added only the title

in English. And now, if it please the Tribunal, we shall present

Parts 1 and 2 of The Nazi Plan.
THE PRESIDENT: It may be convenient for the United States
Prosecutor to know that the Tribunal propose to rise this afternoon
at 4 o'clock instead of 5.

[The film, The Nazi Plan, was then shown in the court room
until 1125 hours, at which time a recess was 'taken.]

COMMANDER DONOVAN: May it please the Tribunal, in the

films which have just been shown to the Tribunal we. have watched
the Nazi rise to power. In Part 3 of our documentary motion picture
now to be presented, we see the use they made of that power and
how the German nation was led by militaristic regimentation to
preparation for aggressive war as an instrument of national policy.
Part 3, "Preparation for Wars of Aggression, 1935-1939; 1935—Von
Schirach urges Hitler Youth to follow principles of Mein Kampf."

[The showing of the film then continued and at the end a recess
was taken until 1400 hours.]

401
11 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

COMMANDER DONOVAN: This morning we presented photo-

graphic evidence of the history of National Socialism from 1921 to
September 1939. We saw the dignity of the individual in Germany
destroyed by men dedicated to perverted nationalism, men who set
forth certain objectives and then preached to a regimented people
the accomplishment of those objectives by any necessary means,
including aggressive war.
In September 1939 the Nazis launched the first of a series of
catastrophic wars, terminated only by the military collapse of Ger-
many. It is this final chapter in the history of National Socialism
that the Prosecution now presents.
May I again remind the Tribunal that all film presented and all
German narration heard is in the original form as filmed by the
Nazis.
[The showing of the film, part 4, then continued.]
COMMANDER DONOVAN: The Prosecution has concluded its
presentation of the photographic summation entitled The Nazi Plan.
We shall deliver for the permanent records of the Tribunal, as soon
as possible, the original films projected today.

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, just a brief announce-

ment about the presentation that shall follow. The rest of the week
will be consumed in the presentation of War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity, starting with exploitation of forced labor, con-
centration camps, persecution of the Jews, and Germanization and
spoliation in occupied countries. We should like to call the Tri-
bunal's attention to the fact that many of these crimes will be
crimes attributed to the criminal organizations which will follow.
The program following will be the criminal organizations, beginning
with the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Reich Cabinet,
the SA, the SS, and finally, the SD and Gestapo.
Mr. Dodd will now present "Exploitation of Forced Labor."
MR. THOMAS
J. DODD
(Executive Trial Counsel for the United
States): May
please the Tribunal, we propose to submit during
it

the next several days, as Colonel Storey has said a moment ago,
evidence concerning the conspirators' criminal deportation and
enslavement of foreign labor, their illegal use of prisoners of war,
their infamous concentration camps, and their relentless persecution
of the Jews. We shall present evidence regarding the general aspects
of these programs, and our French and Soviet colleagues will present
evidence of the specific application of these programs in the West
and the East respectively.

402
 11 Dec. 45

These crimes were committed both before and after Nazi Ger-
many had launched her series of aggressions. They were committed
within Germany and in foreign countries as well. Although separated
in time and space, these crimes had, of course, an inter-relationship
which resulted from their having a common source in Nazi ideology;
for we shall show that within Germany the conspirators had made
hatred and destruction of the Jews an official philosophy and a
public duty, that they had preached the concept of the master race
with its corollary of slavery for others, that they had denied and
destroyed the dignity and the rights of the individual human being.
They had organized force, brutahty, and terror into instruments of
political power and had made them commonplaces of daily existence.
We propose to prove that they had placed the concentration camp
and a vast apparatus of force behind their racial and political
myths, their laws, and their policies. As every German Cabinet
minister or high official knew, behind the laws and decrees in the
Reichsgesetzhlatt was not the agreement of the people or their
representatives but the terror of the concentration camps and the
police state. The conspirators had preached that war was a noble
activity and that force was the appropriate means of resolving
international differences; and having mobilized all aspects of Ger-
man life for war, they plunged Germany and the world into war.
We say this system of hatred, savagery, and denial of individual
rights, which the conspirators erected into a philosophy of govern-
ment within Germany or into what we may call the Nazi constitu-
tion, followed the Nazi armies as they swept over Europe. For the
Jews of the occupied countries suffered the same fate as the Jews
of Germany, and foreign laborers became the serfs of the "master
race," and they were deported and enslaved by the million. Many
of the deported and enslaved laborers joined the victims of the
concentration camps, where they were literally worked to death in
the course of the Nazi program of extermination through work. We
propose to show that this Nazi combination of the assembly line,
the torture chamber, and the executioner's rack in a single insti-
tution has a horrible repugnance to the twentieth century mind.
We say that it is plain that the program of the concentration
camp, the anti-Jewish program, and the forced labor program are
all parts of a larger pattern, and this will become even more plain
as we examine the evidence regarding these programs, and then
test their legality by applying the relevant principles of inter-
national law.
The evidence relating to the Nazi slave labor program has been
assembled in a document book bearing the letter "R"; and in addi-
tion, there is an appendix to the document book consisting of cer-
tain photographs contained in a manila folder. Your Honors will
observe that on some of the books we have placed some tabs, so

403
11 Dec. 45

that it would be easier for the Tribunal to locate the documents.

Unfortunately, we did not have a sufficient number of tabs to do
the work completely, and that would account for tabs which are
missing on some of the document books.
It may illuminate the specific items of evidence which will be
offered later if we first describe in rather general terms the ele-
ments of the Nazi foreign labor policy. It was a policy of mass
deportation and mass enslavement, as I said a minute ago, and it
was also carried out by force, by fraud, by terror, by arson, by
means unrestrained by the laws of war and laws of humanity, or
the considerations of mercy. This labor policy was a policy as well
of underfeeding and overworking foreign laborers, of subjecting
them to every form of degradation, brutality, and inhumanity. It
was a policy which compelled foreign workers and prisoners of war
to manufacture armaments and to engage in other operations of
war directed against their own countries. It was a policy, as we
propose to establish, which constituted a flagrant violation of the
laws of war and of the laws of humanity.
We shall show that the Defendants Sauckel and Speer are prin-
cipally responsible for the formulation of the policy and for its
execution: that the Defendant Sauckel, the Nazis' Plenipotentiary
General for Manpower, directed the recruitment, deportation, and
the allocation of foreign civilian labor, that he sanctioned and
directed the use of force as the instrument of recruitment, and that
he was responsible for the care and the treatment of the enslaved
millions; that the Defendant Speer, as Reich Minister for Armament
and Munitions, Director of the Organization Todt, and member of
the Central Planning Board, bears responsibility for the deter-
mination of the numbers of foreign slaves required by the German
war machine, was responsible for the decision to recruit by force
and for the use under brutal, inhumane, and degrading conditions
of foreign civilians and prisoners of war in the manufacture of
armaments and munitions, the construction of fortifications, and in
active military operations.
We shall also show in this presentation that the Defendant
Goring, as Plenipotentiary General for the Four Year Plan, is
responsible for all of the crimes involved in the Nazi slave labor
program. Finally, we propose to show that the Defendant Rosen-
berg, as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and
the Defendant Frank, as Governor of the Government General of
Poland, and the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, as Reich Commissar for
the occupied Netherlands, and the Defendant Keitel, as Chief of
the OKW, share responsibility for the recruitment by force and
terror and for the deportation to Germany of the citizens of the
areas overrun or subjugated by the Wehrmacht.

404
 11 Dec. 45

The use numbers of foreign workers was planned before

of vast
Germany went war and was an integral part of the conspiracy
to
for waging aggressive war. On May 23, 1939 a meeting was held
in Hitler's study at the Reich Chancellery. Present were the De-
fendants Goring, Raeder, and Keitel.
I now refer to Document L-79, which has already been entered
in evidence as Exhibit USA-27. The document presents the minutes
of this meeting at Which Hitler stated, as Your Honors will recall,
that he intended to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity;
but I wish to quote from Page 2 of the English text starting with
the 13th paragraph as follows. In the German text, by the way,
the passage appears at Page 4, Paragraphs 6 and 7. Quoting directly
from the English text:
"If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession
of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall
be able to rely upon record harvests even less in time of war
than in peace.
"The population of non-German areas will perform no mili-
tary service and will be available as a source of labor."
We say the slave labor program of the Nazi conspirators was
designed to achieve two purposes, both of which were criminal.
The primary purpose, of course, was to satisfy the labor require-
ments of the Nazi war machine by compelling these foreign workers,
in effect, tomake war against their own countries and their allies.
The secondary purpose was to destroy or weaken peoples deemed
inferior by the Nazi racialists or deemed potentially hostile by the
Nazi planners of world supremacy.
These purposes were expressed by the conspirators themselves.
I wish to refer at this point and to offer in evidence Document
016-PS, which is Exhibit USA-168. This document was sent by the
Defendant Sauckel to the Defendant Rosenberg on the 20th of April
1942, and it describes Sauckel's labor mobilization program. I wish
to quote now from Page 2 of the English text, starting with the
sixth paragraph; and in the German text, again, it appears at Page 2
of the second paragraph. Quoting from the text directly:
"The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use
all the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured
for us by our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of
Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the Armed Forces and also
for the nutrition of the homeland. The raw materials as well
as the fertility of the conquered territories and their human
labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to
the profit of Germany and her allies."
The theory of the master race underlay the conspirators' labor
policy in the East as well.

405
11 Dec. 45

I now refer to Document Number 1130-PS, which is marked

Exhibit USA-169. This document consists of a statement made by
one Erich Koch, Reich Commissar for the Ukraine, on the 5th day
of March 1943 at a meeting of the National Socialist Party in Kiev.
I quote from the first page of the EngUsh text, starting with the first
—
paragraph and in the German text it appears at Page 2, Para-
graph 1. Quoting directly again from the English text Koch said:
"1. We are the master race and must govern hard but just ....
"2. I will draw the very
last out of this country. I did not
come spread bliss. I have come to help the Führer. The
to
population must work, work, and work again for some
. . .

people are getting excited that the population may not get
enough to eat. The population cannot demand that. One has
only to remember what our heroes were deprived of in
Stalingrad .... We definitely did not come here to give out
manna. We have come here to create the basis for victory.
"3. We are a master race, which must remember that the
lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thou-
sand times more valuable than the population here."
At this point I should like to offer in evidence Document Num-
ber 1919-PS, which is Exhibit USA-170. This is a document which
contains a speech delivered by Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, to a
group of SS Generals on the 4th day of October 1943 at Posen;
and I am referring to the first page of the English text, starting
with the third paragraph. For the benefit of the interpreters, in the
German text it appears at Page 23 in the first paragraph. Quoting
directly again from this document on the first page, starting with
the third paragraph:
"What happens to the Russians, to the Czechs, does not
interest me in the slightest. What the nations can offer in
the way of good blood of our type we will take, if necessary,
by kidnapping their children and raising them here with us.
Whether the other nations live in prosperity or starve to
death interests me only insofar as we need them as slaves
for our culture; otherwise, it is of no interest to me. Whether
10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while
digging an anti-tank ditch or not interests me only insofar
as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished."

THE PRESIDENT: Who is the author of that document?

MR. DODD: The author of that quotation is the Reichsführer SS,
Heinrich Himmler.
The next document to which I make reference is Number 031-PS,
which is Exhibit USA-71. This document is a top-secret memoran-
dum prepared for the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories
on the 12th of June 1944 and approved by the Defendant Rosenberg;

406
 11 Dec. 45

and from it I wish to quote, from the Enghsh text starting with the
first paragraph, and in the German
text it appears at the first para-
graph of Page 2. Quoting directly:
"The Army group center has the intention to apprehend
40,000-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the
Army territory and to transport them to the Reich."
1 wish to pass now to line 21 of Paragraph 1. Quoting directly
I read as follows:
"It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to the Ger-
man trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers after
2 years' training. This is to be arranged through the Organi-
zation Todt which is especially equipped for such a task by
means of its technical and other set-ups. This action is being
greatly welcomed by the German trade since it represents
a decisive measure for the alleviation of the shortage of
apprentices."
little further on in that document, I wish to call to
Passing a
the attention of the Tribunal Paragraph 1 on Page 2, and to quote
it directly:
"This action is aimed not only at preventing a direct rein-
forcement of the enemy's military strength but also at a
reduction of his biological potentialities as viewed from the
perspective of the future. These ideas have been voiced not
only by the Reichsführer SS but also by the Führer. Cor-
responding orders were given during last year's withdrawals
."
in the southern sector . . .

I call to Your Honor's attention particularly that the approval

of the Defendant Rosenberg is noted on Page 3 of the document.
It is a note in ink on the original. I quote it:

"Obergruppenführer Berger has received another memoran-

dum on June 14, according to which the Reich Minister now
has approved the action."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, did you mean to leave out the
sentence at the bottom of Page 1?
MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, I did not, but I did not want to
refer to it at this time. I will refer to it a little later on.

THE PRESIDENT: Isn't it really a part of what follows at the

top of Page 2, which you did read, "Following are the argu-
."
ments . .

MR. DODD: Yes, I did omit that. I thought you were referring
to the sentence above. I'm sorry.
"Following are the arguments against this decision of the
minister." — —
and then quoting "This action is not only aimed
."
at preventing direct reinforcement of any military . .

407
11 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Yes and you were telling us how you showed
that the Defendant Rosenberg was implicated.
MR. DODD: Yes. On the last page of that document, the original
bears a note in ink, and in the mimeographed copy it is typewritten:
"Obergruppenführer Berger has received another memoran-
dum on June 14, according to which the Reich Minister now
has approved the action."
One page back on that same document, from the first paragraph,
four sentences down, the sentence begins:
"The Minister has approved the execution of the 'Hay Action'
in the Army territories under the conditions and provisions
arrived at in talks with Army group center."
The purposes of the slave labor program which we have just
been describing, namely the strengthening of the Nazi war machine
and the destruction or the weakening of peoples deemed inferior by
the Nazi conspirators, were achieved, we repeat, by the impress-
ment and the deportation of millions of persons into Germany for
forced labor. It involved the separation of husbands from their
wives, and children from their parents, and the imposition of con-
ditions unfit for human existence, with the result that countless
numbers were killed.
Poland was the first victim. The Defendant Frank, as Governor
of the Government General of Poland, announced that under his
program 1 million workers were to be sent to Germany; and he
recommended that police surround Polish villages and seize the
inhabitants for deportation.
I wish to refer to Document Number 1375-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-172. This document is a letter from the Defendant Frank to
the Defendant Goring and it is dated the 25th day of January 1940;
and I wish to quote from the first page of the English text, starting
with the first paragraph, and in the German text, again, it appears
at Page 1 of the first paragraph. Quoting directly:
"1. In view of the present requirements of the Reich for the

defense industry, it is at present fundamentally impossible to

carry on a long-term economic policy in the Government
General. Rather, it is necessary so to steer the economy of
the Government General that it will, in the shortest possible
time, accomplish results representing the maximum that can
be secured out of the economic strength of the Government
General for the immediate strengthening of our capacity for
defense.
"2. In particular the following performances are expected of
"
the total economy of the Government General

408
 —

11 Dec. 45

I wish to pass on a little bit in this text to the second page and
particularly to Paragraph g in the English text. In the German
text, the same passage appears on Page 3 in Paragraph g. I am
quoting directly again:
"Supply and transportation of at least 1 million male and
female agricultural and industrial workers to the Reich
among them at least 750,000 agricultural workers of which
—
at least 50 percent must be women in order to guarantee
agricultural production in the Reich and as a replacement
for industrial workers lacking in the Reich."
The methods by which these workers were to be supplied were
considered by the Defendant Frank, as revealed in another docu-
ment to which we now refer.

It is an entry in the Defendant Frank's own diary, to which

we have assigned our Document Number 2233(a)-PS and which we
offer as Exhibit USA-173. The portion which I shall read is the
entry for Friday, the 10th of May 1940. It appears in the document
book as 2233(a)-PS, on the third page in the center of the page.
Just above it are the words "Page 23, Paragraph 1" to the left:
"Then the Governor General deals with the problem of the
compulsory labor service of the Poles. Upon the pressure
from the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion
may be exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower
was not voluntarily available for service inside the German
Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of
male and female Poles. Because of these measures a certain
disquietude had developed which, according to individual
reports, was spreading very much and might produce
difficulties everywhere. General Field Marshal Goring some
time ago pointed out, in his long speech, the necessity to
deport into the Reich a million workers. The supply so far
was 160,000. However, great difficulties had to be overcome
here. Therefore it would be advisable to co-operate with the
district and town chiefs in the execution of the compulsion,
so that one could be sure from the start that this action
would be reasonably expedient. The arrest of young Poles
when leaving church service or the cinema would bring
about an ever increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally
speaking, he had no objections at all to the rubbish, capable
of work yet often loitering about, being snatched from the
streets. The best method for this, however, would be the
organization of a raid; and it would be absolutely justifiable
to stop a Pole in the street and to question him as to what
he was doing, where he was working, et cetera."

409
11 Dec. 45

I should like to refer to another entry in the diary of the

Defendant Frank, and I offer in evidence an extract from the
entry made on the 16th day of March 1940, which appears in the
document book as 2233(b)-PS, and it is Exhibit USA-174. I wish
particularly to quote from the third page of the English text:
"The Governor General remarks that he had long negotiations
in Berlin with the representatives of the Reich Ministry
for Finance and the Reich Ministry for Food. Urgent demands
have been made there that Polish farm workers should be
sent to the Reich in greater numbers. He has made the
statement in Berlin that he, if it is demanded from him,
could of course exercise force in some such manner: he
could have the police surround a village and get the men
and women in question out by force, and then send them to
Germany. But one can also work differently, besides these
police measures, by retaining the unemployment compensation
of these workers in question."
The instruments of force and terror used to carry out this
program reached into many phases of Polish life. German labor
authorities raided churches and theaters, seized those present, and
shipped them back to Germany. And this appears in a memo-
randum to Himmler, which we offer in evidence as Document
Number 2220-PS, and bears Exhibit Number USA-175. This
it
memorandum is dated the 17th day of April 1943; and it was
written by Dr. Lammers, the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, and
deals with the situation in the Government General of Poland.
DR. SERVATIUS: I should like to call the attention of the
Tribunal to the fact that the last three documents, which have
just been read, were not made available to me beforehand. They
do not appear on the original list of documents, nor have I been
able to find them on the later list.

therefore request that the reading of these documents be held

I
in abeyance until I have had an opportunity to read them and
to discuss them with my client.
Perhaps I may, at the same time, lodge an additional complaint.
I received some interrogation records in English the day before
yesterday. I consulted my client about them and he told me that
they are not the actual transcripts of his words in the interrogation,
because he was interrogated in German; an interpreter translated
his statements into English, and then they were taken down.
These documents cannot have any evidential value since they
were not presented to the defendant for certification; he did not
sign them, nor were they read to him. They are transcripts in
English, a language of which the defendant understands little or
nothing.

410
 11 Dec. 45

I also discovered that another interrogation record on the

Defendant Speer contains statements which incriminate my client
but which are apparently -also incorrect, as I established in con-
sultation with the Defendant Speer.
I should like to have an opportunity of discussing the matter
with the representative of the Prosecution and of clearing up
—
these differences to decide to what extent I can agree to the
use of these documents. They were to be presented by the
Prosecution today or tomorrow at the latest, but for the time
being I must object to their use.
THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, you said to us that the
lastthree documents were not available to you and that they
were not in the original list. Is that right?
DR. SERVATIUS: Not up to now. I want to have an opportu-
nity of reading these documents in advance. They are being read
my having seen them.
here without
THE PRESIDENT: And then you went on to deal with the
interrogations which have not been put into evidence.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I wanted to take the opportunity of
saying that I wished to discuss these documents with the Prose-
cution before they are submitted to the Tribunal tomorrow, or
probably even today. Meanwhile I must object to their being
used as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you know what the circum-
stances are about these three documents which have not been
supplied?
MR. DODD: I do not, Your Honor. They have been placed in
the defendants' Information Center and they partly have been
in the information list. It may be that through some oversight
these entries of this diary were neglected.
DR. SERVATIUS: I have these documents before me now; they
are not numbered; the document concerning Sauckel begins on
—
Page 10 question and answer on Pages 11 and 12. The record
is not continuous; it consists of fragments of a transcript, which
I want to trace to its origin.

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for the Prosecution will supply you

with these documents at the adjournment this afternoon. With
reference to the interrogation, if they propose to use any inter-
rogation in the Trial tomorrow, they can also supply you with
any documents which are material to that interrogation.
DR. SERVATIUS: Thank you.
MR. DODD: I believe I was referring to Document Number
2220-PS.

411
11 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: That is right. You have not begun to read

it yet.
MR. DODD: I propose to read frofn the fourth page of the
English text, Paragraph 2 at the top of the page, particularly
the last two sentences of the paragraph; and in the German text
the passage is found in Page 10, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly, it
is as follows:
"As things were, the recruiting of manpower had to be
accomplished by means of more or less forceful methods,
such as the instances when certain groups appointed by the
labor offices caught church and movie-goers indiscriminately
and transported them into the Reich. That such methods
only undermine the people's willingness to work and the
people's confidence to such a degree that it cannot be checked
even with terror, is just as clear as the consequences brought
about by a strengthening of the political resistance move-
ment."
That is the end of the quotation. We say that Polish farmland
was confiscated with the aid of the SS and was distributed to
German inhabitants or held in trust for the German community,
and the farm owners were employed as laborers or transported
to Germany against their will. We refer to Document Number
1352-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-176. This document
is a report of the SS, and it bears the title "Achievement of
Confiscations of Polish Agricultural Enterprises with the Purpose
of Transferring the Poles to the Old Reich and Employing them as
Agricultural Workers."
I wish to read from the first page of the English text beginning
with the fifth paragraph; and in the German text it appears on
Page 9, Paragraph 1 on that page. Quoting:
"It is possible without difficulty to accomplish the confis-
cation of small agricultural enterprises in the villages in
which larger agricultural enterprises have been already
confiscated and are under the management of the East
German Corporation for Agricultural Development."
And then passing down three sentences, there is this statement
which I quote:
"The former owners of Polish farms together with their fami-
lies will be transferred to the Old Reich by the employment
offices for employment as farm workers. In this way many
hundreds of Polish agricultural workers can be placed at the
disposal of agriculture in the Old Reich in the shortest and
simplest manner. In this way, to begin with, the most
pressing shortage now felt in a very disagreeable manner,
especially in the root-crop districts, will be quickly removed."

412
 11 Dec. 45

Pursuant to the directions of the Defendant Sauckel, his agents

and the SS men deported PoUsh men to Germany without their
families, thereby accomplishing one of the basic purposes of the
program, the supplying of labor for the German war effort, and
at the same time, weakening the reproductive potential of the
Polish people.
I wish to refer directly to Document L-61, which bears Exhibit
Number USA-177. This document is a letter from the Defendant
Sauckel to the presidents of the land labor offices. It is dated
the 26th day of November 1942, and I want to read from the
first paragraph of that letter which states as follows:

"In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the
SD, these Jews who are still in employment are also, from
now on, to be evacuated from the territory of the Reich and
are to be replaced by Poles, who are being evacuated from
the Government General."
And passing to the third paragraph of that same letter, we
find this statement. Quoting:
"The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this
measure will' be put into concentration camps and put to
work, insofar as they are criminal or asocial elements. The
remaining Poles, so far as they are suitable for labor, will
— —
be transported without family into the Reich, particularly
to Berlin, where they will be put at the disposal of the
labor allocation offices to work in armament factories instead
of the Jews who are to be replaced."

THE PRESIDENT: Who is the Chief of the Security Police,

mentioned in the second paragraph?
MR. DODD: The Chief of the Security PoUce was Heinrich
Himmler. He was also the Reichsführer of the SS.
DR. SERVATIUS: May I say something with regard to this
document. The Defendant Sauckel denies knowledge of it and says
that the place of dispatch, not mentioned during the reading of
this document, is of importance. The document, according to its
letterhead, was written at 96 Saarland Strasse, which was not the
office of the Defendant Sauckel. The second point is that this
document, contrary to the statement in the document list clas-
sifying it as an original letter of Sauckel, was not signed by him.
Moreover the certification of the signature, customary on all
documents, is missing. May I ask the prosecutor to read this into
the record, so that I can come back to it later.
THE PRESIDENT: If the procedure which the Tribunal has laid
down has been carried out, either the original document or a
photostat copy will be in your Information Center; and you can

413
11 Dec. 45

then compare or show to your client either the photostat or the

original.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have done that and only object now to

the fact that from the reading of this document parts which I
consider important are being omitted. If this letter is being read
here it must be read in its entirety, including the parts which I
consider important, namely, the letterhead and the type of
signature.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat that.
DR. SERVATIUS: am asking that if it is to be used as
I
evidence, the letter should be read in its entirety, including its
complete heading and the signature as it appears, namely, "signed
Sauckel." The certification of the signature is missing, a fact from
which my client draws certain conclusions in his favor.
THE PRESIDENT: You have an opportunity after adjourn-
will
ment of and you have been told already
seeing this document;
that you can refer, when your turn comes to present your defense,
to the whole of any document. It is inconvenient to the Tribunal
to have many interruptions of this sort; and if you wish to refer
to the whole document, you will be able to do so at a later stage.

DR. SERVATIUS: I must assume then, Mr. President, that it

is admissible to read parts of a document instead of the whole.
Did I understand correctly?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, You can put in a part or
certainly.
the whole of the document turn comes. We will adjourn
when your
now; but, Mr. Dodd, you will satisfy this counsel for the Defense
as to the reason why he had not got these documents.
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I understand, Mr. President.
MR. DODD: Yes, I will.
THE PRESIDENT: And you will make them available to him
and insure that he has an opportunity of seeing the original of this
document so that he can check the signature.
MR. DODD: We will, and I will see that the original is available
to him.

THE PRESIDENT: All right, we will adjourn now.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 12 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

414
 EIGHTEENTH DAY
Wednesday, 12 December 1945

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn this morning at

12:30 for a closed session and sit again at 2:00 o'clock.

MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to report

to the Tribunal this morning with reference to the questions which

arose yesterday afternoon concerning three documents.
After adjournment we found that Document 2220-PS was in the
defendants' Information Center in photostatic form, and that the
two other documents, being respectively two entries from the Frank
diary, were also there but in a different form. The Frank diary
consists of some 40-odd volumes which we, of course, were not able
to photostat, so we had placed instead in the defendants' room the
excerpts. As a matter of fact, we had placed the entire document
book there.

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for the Defendant Frank): Yester-

day the Prosecution submitted documents concerning the Defendant
Frank; the numbers are 2233(a)-PS and 2233(b)-PS, which were
presented as Exhibits USA-173 and USA-174. These are not ordi-
nary documents, but excerpts from the diary of Frank. Six weeks
ago I applied in writing to have this diary, which consists of
42 heavy, thick volumes, submitted to me. I made this request for
the first time on the 2d of September, the second time on the 16th of
November, the third time on the 18th of November, and the fourth
time on the 3rd of December.
Unfortunately, I have not so far received this diary, and I should
like to ask the Tribunal that it be submitted to me as soon as
possible, not least because this material was surrendered by the
Defendant Frank himself to the officers who arrested him and was
to be used as evidence for his defense.
I am of course not in a position to work through all this material
in a few days, and should like to ask the Tribunal that this diary
I
be put at my disposal without delay.
In this connectionI should like to call the attention of the
Tribunal to another matter. The Tribunal has already approved
that the four long speeches which the Defendant Frank delivered
in Germany in 1942 and which led to his dismissal by Hitler from

415
12 Dec. 45

should be put at
all his offices my
disposal as evidence. The Gen-
eral Secretary of the Tribunal informed me of this on the 4th of
December, but unfortunately I have not so far received copies of
these speeches. I should be very grateful, therefore, if the Tribunal
will ensure that its decisions are carried out and that the documents
are submitted to me without delay.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will look into these matters
with the General Secretary of the Tribunal, and doubtless it will
be able to arrange that you should have these documents submitted
to you 'in the defendants' counsel Information Center.

DR. SEIDL: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Dodd.
MR. DODD: May I refer briefly to the discussion that we were
engaged in yesterday in order to take up the train of thought.
I wish to remind the Tribunal that we were discussing or had
just completed a discussion of Document L-61, which had to do
with a letter written by the Defendant Sauckel to the presidents
of the "Länder" labor offices. I had read two excerpts from that
letter.

Referring to the letter, we say that the Nazi campaign of force

and terror and abduction was described in another letter to the
Defendant Frank, which we wish to refer to as Document Num-
ber 1526-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from that, Mr. Dodd, has
either the original or the photostatic copy been shown to Sauckel's
counsel?
MR. DODD: Oh, yes. Sir. A photostatic copy was in the defend-
ants' Information Center, and after adjournment yesterday we got
the original and handed it to him here in this room.
THE PRESIDENT: And he saw it?
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: This document. Number 1526-PS, USA-178, is a
letter written by the chairman Ukrainian Main Committee
of the
at Krakow in February 1943. I wish to read from the third page of
the English text, beginning with the second paragraph; the same
passage in the German text at Page 2, Paragraph 5. I quote:
"The general nervousness is still further increased by the
wrong methods of labor mobilization which have been used
more and more frequently in recent months.
"The wild and ruthless manhunt as practiced everywhere in
towns and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in

416
 12 Dec. 45

churches, as well as at night in homes, has shaken the feeling

of security of the inhabitants. Every man is exposed to the
danger of being seized suddenly and unexpectedly, anywhere
and at any time, by the police, and brought into an assembly
camp. None of his relatives knows what has happened to him,
and only weeks or months later one or another gives news of
his fate by a postcard."
I wish to turn to Enclosure 5 on Page 8 of this document, which
I quote:
"In November of last year an inspection of all males of the
age-classes bom 1910 to 1920 was ordered in the area of
Zaleszczyti (district of Czortkow). After the men had ap-
peared for inspection, all those who were selected were
arrested at once, loaded into trains, and sent to the Reich.
Similar recruitment of laborers for the Reich also took place
in other areas of this district. Following some interventions,
the action was then stopped."
The resistance of the Polish people to this enslavement pro-
gram and the necessity for increased force Were described by the
Defendant Sauckel's deputy, one Timm, at a meeting of the Central
Planning Board, which was, by the way. Hitler's wartime planning
agency. It was made up of the Defendant Speer, Field Marshal
Milch, and State Secretary Körner. The Central Planning Board was
the highest level economic planning agency, exercising production
controls by allocating raw materials and labor to industrial users.
Now, Document R-124, Exhibit USA-179. This document consists
of excerpts from minutes of the meetings of this Central Planning
Board and minutes of conferences between the Defendant Speer and
Hitler. Only the excerpts, of course, from these minutes upon which
we rely are being offered in evidence. I would say to the Tribunal,
however, that the balance of the minutes are available —can be
—
made available if the Tribunal so desires.
This deputy of Sauckel, his name being Timm, made a state-
ment at the 36th conference of the Central Planning Board; and it
appears on Page 14, Paragraph 2 of the English text of Document
R-124, and on Page 10, Paragraph 2 of the German text:
"Especially in Poland the situation at the moment is extra-
ordinarily serious. It is known that violent battles have
occurred just because of these actions. The resistance against
the administration established by us is very strong. Quite a
number of our men have been exposed to increased dangers;
and just in the last 2 or 3 weeks some of them have been
shot dead, for example, the head of the Labor Office of War-
saw, who was shot in his office 14 days ago, and yesterday
another man again. This is how matters stand at present; and

417
12 Dec. 45

the recruiting itself even if done with the best will, remains
extremely difficult unless police reinforcements are at hand."
Deportation and enslavement of civilians reached unprecedented
levels in the so-called Eastern Occupied Territories. These whole-
sale deportations resulted directly from labor demands made by the
Defendant Sauckel on the Defendant Rosenberg, who was the Reich
Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories, and his subordinates,
—
and also on the Armed Forces a demand made directly on the
Armed Forces by the Defendant Sauckel.
On the 5th of Octob^ 1942, for example, the Defendant Sauckel
wrote to the Defendant Rosenberg, stating that 2 million foreign
laborers were required and that the majority of these would have
to be drafted from the recently occupied Eastern territories and
especially from the Ukraine.
I wish to refer at this point to Document 017-PS, which bears
Exhibit Number USA-180. This letter from the Defendant Sauckel
to the Defendant Rosenberg I wish to quote in full. It begins by
saying:
"The Führer has^vorked out new and most urgent plans for
armament which require the quick mobilization of two mil-
lion more foreign workers. The Führer therefore has granted
me, for the execution of his decree of 21 March 1942, new
powers for my new duties, and has especially authorized me-
to take whatever measures I think are necessary in the Reich,
the Protectorate, the Government General, as well as in the
occupied territories, in order to assure, at all costs, an orderly
mobilization of labor for the German armament industry.
"The additional required labor forces will have to be drafted,
for the most part, from the recently occupied Eastern Terri-
tories, especially from the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. There-
fore, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine must furnish 225,000
workers by 31 December 1942 and 225,000 more by 1 May 1942.
"I ask you to inform Reich Commissioner, Gauleiter, Party
Member Koch at once about the new situation and require-
ments and especially to see that he supports personally in
every possible way the execution of this new order.
"I intend to visit Party Member Koch shortly and I would be
grateful if he could inform me as to where and when I could
meet him for a personal discussion. Just now though, I ask
that the recruiting be taken up at once with all energy and
the use of every factor, especially the experts of the labor
offices. All directives which temporarily limited the procure-
ment of Eastern Workers are annulled. The Reich procure-
ment for the next months must be given priority over all
other measures ....

418
 12 Dec. 45

"I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution
of this new order, but I am convinced that with the ruthless
use of all resources and with the full co-operation of all
concerned the execution of the new demands can be accom-
plished by the date fixed. I have already communicated the
new demands directly to the Reich Commissioner for the
Ukraine by teletype. In reference to our phone-call of today,
I will send you the text of the Führer's decree at the begin-
ning of next week."
I should Hke to remind the Tribunal that we have referred
previously, yesterday afternoon, to this Reichskommissar, Gau-
leiter, Party Member Koch; and we quoted him as stating, the
Tribunal will recall, "We are the master race. We must be hard,"
and so forth.
On the 17th day of March 1943, the Defendant Sauckel wrote
again to the Defendant Rosenberg; and on this occasion he demanded
the importation of another 1 million men and women from the
Eastern Territories within the following 4 months. I wish to refer
at this point to Document Number 019-PS, which bears Exhibit
Number USA-181. Quoting that letter in full:
"After a protracted illness, my deputy for labor allocation in
the Occupied Eastern Territories, State Councillor Peuckert,
is going there to regulate the allocation of labor both for Ger-
many and the territories themselves.
"I ask you sincerely, dear Party Member Rosenberg, to assist
him to your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of
Peuckert's mission. I may thank you already at this moment
for the good reception accorded to Peuckert up to this time.
He himself has been charged by me to co-operate fully and
unreservedly with all bureaus of the Eastern Territories.
"Especially the labor allocation for German agriculture and
likewise the most urgent armament production programs
ordered by the Führer, make the fastest importation of
approximately 1 million men and women from the Eastern
Territories within the next 4 months, a necessity. Starting
15 March the daily shipment must reach 5,000 female or male
workers, while from the beginning of April this number has
to be stepped up to 10,000, if the most urgent programs and
the spring tillage and other agricultural tasks are not to
suffer to the detriment of food and of the Armed Forces.
"I have provided for the allotment of the draft quotas for the
individual territories, in agreement with your experts for
labor supply, as follows:
"Daily quota starting 15 March 1943: From General kommis-
sariat. White Ruthenia —500 people; Economic Inspection,

419
12 Dec. 45

Center —500 people; Reichskommissariat, Ukraine— 3,000

people; Economic Inspection, South — 1,000 people; total—5,000
people.
"Starting 1 April 1943, the daily quota is to be doubled cor-
responding to the doubling of the entire quota. I hope to
visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the end of
the month, and ask you once more for your kind support."
The Defendant Sauckel did travel to the East. He travelled to
Kovno in Lithuania to press his demands. We offer in evidence
Document Number 204-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-182.
This document is a synopsis of a report of the City Commissioner
of Kovno and minutes of a meeting in which the Defendant Sauckel
participated. I wish to read from the second page of the English
text, beginning with the first paragraph. The same passage appears
in the German text at Page 5, Paragraph 2. Quoting directly as
follows:
"In a lecture which the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, gave on 18 July 1943
in Kovno, and in an official conference following it between
Gauleiter Sauckel and the General Commissioner, the precari-
ous labor situation in the Reich was again urgently presented
for discussion. Gauleiter Sauckel again demanded that Lithu-
anian labor be furnished in greater volume for the purposes
of the Reich."

THE PRESIDENT: Who was the General Commissar? Rosen-

berg?
MR. DODD: The Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz?
THE PRESIDENT: No, the General Commissar.
MR. DODD: His name is not known to us. He was apparently
a local functionary in the Party.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: The Defendant Sauckel also visited Riga, in Latvia,

to assert his demands; and the purpose of this visit is described in
Document Number 2280-PS, bearing Exhibit Number USA-183. This
document is a letter from the Reich Commissar for the Ostland to
the Commissioner General in Riga, and it is dated the 3rd of May
1943. I wish to read from Page 1 of the English text, beginning
with the first paragraph:
"Following the basic statements of the Plenipotentiary Gen-
eral for Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, on the occa-
sion of his visit to Riga on the 21st of April 1943, it was
decided, in view of the critical situation and in disregard of
all adverse considerations, that a total of 183,000 workers
would have to be supplied from the Ostland to the Reich

420
 12 Dec. 45

territory.This task absolutely must be accomplished within

the next 4 months and at the latest must be completed by
the end of August."
Here again we are not informed as to the name and identity
of the Reich Commissar for the Ostland.
Sauckel asked the German Army for assistance in the recruit-
ment and deportation of civilian labor from the Eastern Territories.
We refer now to Document Number 3010-PS, which bears Exhibit
Number USA-184.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you saying that it was not
known from whom that document emanated?
MR. DODD: No, Sir. We say it is a letter from the Reichskom-
missar for the Ostland to the Commissioner General in Riga, but
we don't know their names specifically at the time of the writing
of the letter.

THE PRESIDENT: You don't know who the Reichskommissar of

the Eastern Territories was?
MR. DODD: We don't know him by that title, "The Reichskom-
missar for the Ostland."
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. DODD: Lohse, I am now informed, was his name. I under-
stood that we did not know it.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

MR. DODD: Referring to this Document 3010-PS, this document
is a secret operational order of the Army Group South dated the
17th day of August 1943. I wish to read from the first page of the
Enghsh text, the first two paragraphs, as follows:
"The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, in
Decree Az. VI A 5780.28, a copy of which is enclosed (Enclo-
sure 1), has ordered the mustering and calling-up of two
complete age classes for the whole newly occupied Eastern
Territory. The Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions
has approved this order.
"According to this order by the Plenipotentiary General for
— —
Allocation of Labor" GBA "you have to recruit and to
transport to the Reich immediately all labor forces in your
territory born during 1926 and 1927. The decree of 6 Febru-
ary 1943 relative to labor duty and labor employment in the
theater of operations of the newly occupied Eastern Terri-
tory and the executive orders issued on this subject are the
authority for the execution of this measure. Enlistment must
be completed by 30 September 43 at the latest."

421
12 Dec. 45

We say it is clear that the demands made by the Defendant

Sauckel resulted in the deportation of civilians from the Occupied
Eastern Territories. The Defendant Speer has recorded conferences
with Hitler on 10, 11, and 12 August 1942; and this record is con-
tained in Document R-124, which is already in as Exhibit USA-179.
I now wish to quote from Page 34 of that same document in Para-
graph 1 of the English text. In the German text it appears at
Page 23, Paragraph 2. Quoting directly:
"Gauleiter Sauckel promises to make Russian labor available
for the fulfillment of the iron and coal program and reports
that, if required, he will supply a further million Russian
laborers for the German armament industry up to and includ-
ing October 1942. So far he has already supplied 1,000,000
for industry and 700,000 for agriculture. In this connection
the Führer states that the problem of providing labor can be
solved in all cases and to any extent. He authorizes Gauleiter
Sauckel to take ail necessary measures. He would agree to
any compulsory measures in the East as well as in the Occu-
pied Western Territories if this question could not be solved
on a voluntary basis."
—
In order to meet these demands of 1,700,000 100,000 here and
—
there the Nazi conspirators made terror and violence and arson,
as we said yesterday, fundamental instruments of their labor
enslavement policy. Twenty days after the Defendant Sauckel's
demands of the 5th of October 1942, a top official in the Defendant
Rosenberg's Ministry described the measures taken to meet these
demands. I wish to refer now to Document Number 294-PS, which
is Exhibit Number USA- 185. This document is a top-secret memo-
randum, dated the 25th of October 1942, signed by one Bräutigam.
I wish to quote from Page 4 of the English text starting with the
last paragraph, as follows —
in the German text it appears at Page 8,
—
Paragraph 2 quoting directly:
"We now experienced the grotesque picture of having to
recruit, precipitately, millions of laborersfrom the Occupied
Eastern Territories, after prisoners of war had died of hunger
like flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within
Germany. Now suddenly the food question no longer existed.
In the customary limitless disregard for the Slavic people,
'recruiting' methods were used which probably have their
precedent only in the blackest periods of the slave trade.
A regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration
of health or age, the people were shipped to Germany where
it turned out immediately that more than 100,000 had to be

sent back because of serious illness and other incapability for

work."

422
 12 Dec. 45

The Defendant Rosenberg wrote, himself, concerning these bru-

talities, to the instigator of them, the Defendant Sauckel; and we
refer now to Document Number 018-PS, which bears Exhibit Num-
ber USA-186.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, from where did that top-secret
document come?
MR. DODD: It came from the files of the Defendant Rosenberg.
This document, 018-PS, is a letter from the Defendant Rosen-
berg to the Defendant Sauckel; and it is dated the 21st day of
December 1942, with attachments. I wish to quote from Page 1 of
the English text, starting at the middle of the second paragraph
which reads as follows:
"The reports I have received show that the increase of the
guerilla bands in the Occupied Eastern Territories is largely-
due to the fact that the methods used for procuring laborers
in these regions are felt to be forced measures of mass
deportations, so that the endangered persons prefer to escape
their fate by withdrawing into the woods or going to the
guerilla bands."
Passing now to Page 4 of the same English text, there is an
attachment to Rosenberg's letter consisting of parts excerpted from
letters of residents of the Occupied Eastern Territories excerpted —
by Nazi censors apparently. In the German text it appears at
Page 6, Paragraphs 1 and 2. Starting the quotation:
"At our place, new things have happened. People are being
taken to Germany. On October 5 some people from the
Kowkuski district were scheduled to go, but they did not
want to and the village was set on fire. They threatened to
do the same thing in Borowytschi, as not all who were
scheduled to depart wanted to go. Thereupon three truck-
loads of Germans arrived and set fire to their houses. In
Wrasnytschi 12 houses and in Borowytschi 3 houses were
burned.
"On October 1 new
conscription of labor forces took place.
a
Of what happened, I most important to you.
will describe the
You cannot imagine the bestiality. You probably remember
what we were told about the Soviets during the rule of the
Poles. At that time we did not believe it and now it seems
just as incredible. The order came to supply 25 workers, but
no one reported. All had fled. Then the German police came
and began to ignite the houses of those who had fled. The
fire burned furiously, since it had not rained for 2 months.
In addition the grain stacks were in the farm yards. You can
imagine what took place. The people who had hurried to the

423
12 Dec. 45

scene were forbidden to extinguish the flames, were beaten

and arrested, so that six homesteads were burned down. The
policemen meanwhile ignited other houses. The people fall
on their knees and kiss their hands, but the policemen beat
them with rubber truncheons and threaten to burn down the
whole village. I do not know how this would have ended if
Sapurkany had not intervened. He promised that there would
be laborers by the next morning. During the fire the police
went through the adjoining villages, seized the laborers, and
brought them under arrest. Wherever they did not find any
laborers, they detained the parents until the children
appeared. That is how they raged throughout the night in
Bielosersk ....
"The workers who had not yet appeared by then were to be
All schools were closed and the married teachers were
shot.
sent to work here, while the unmarried ones go to work in
Germany. They are now catching humans as the dogcatchers
used to catch dogs. They are already hunting for 1 week and
have not yet enough. The imprisoned workers are locked in
the schoolhouse. They cannot even go to perform their natural
functions, but have to do it like pigs in the same room.
People from many villages went on a certain day to a pil-
grimage to the Poczajow Monastery. They were all arrested,
locked in, and will be sent to work. Among them there are
lame, blind, and aged people."
Despite the fact that the Defendant Rosenberg wrote this letter
with this attachment, we say he nevertheless countenanced the use
of force in order to furnish slave labor to Germany and admitted
his responsibility for the "unusual and hard measures" that were
employed. I refer to excerpts from the transcript of an inter-
rogation under oath of the Defendant Rosenberg on the 6th of
October 1945, which is Exhibit USA-187, and I wish to quote from
Page 1 of the English text starting with the ninth paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: You haven't given us the PS number.
MR. DODD: It has no PS number.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. Has a copy of it been
given to Rosenberg's counsel?
MR. DODD: Yes, it has been. It is at the end of the document
book, if Your Honors please, the document book the Tribunal has.
DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for the Defendant Rosenberg):
In the name of my client, I object to the reading of this document
for the following reasons:
In the preliminary hearings my client was questioned several
times on the subject of employment of labor from the eastern
European nations. He stated: that the Defendant Sauckel, by virtue

424
 12 Dec. 45

of the authority he received from the Führer and by order of the

Delegate for the Four Year Plan, had the right to give him instruc-
tions; that he (the Defendant Rosenberg) nevertheless demanded
that recruiting of labor be conducted on a voluntary basis; that this
was in fact carried out; and that Sauckel agreed, provided that the
quota could be met. Rosenberg further stated that on several
occasions in the course of joint discussions his Ministry demanded
that the quota be reduced and that in part it was, in fact, reduced.
This document which is now going to be presented does not
mention all these statements, it only contains fragments of them.
In order to make it possible both for the Tribunal and the Defense
to obtain a complete picture, I ask the Tribunal that the Prose-
cution be requested to present the entire records of the statements
and, before submitting the document officially, to discuss the re-
translation with the Defense so as to avoid misunderstandings.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that I understand your objec-
tion. You say, as I understood it, that Sauckel had authority from
Hitler. Is that right?

DR.THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And that Rosenberg was carrying out that
authority.
DR.THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: But all that counsel for the Prosecution is
attempting to do at the moment is to put in evidence an inter-
rogation of Rosenberg. With reference to that, you ask that he
should put in the whole interrogation?
DR.THOMA: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we don't know yet whether he intends
to put in the whole interrogation or a part of it.

DR. THOMA: I know only one thing: I already have in my hand

the document which the Prosecution wishes to submit and I can
see from it that it contains only fragments of the whole interroga-
tion. What in particular it does not contain is the fact that Rosen-
berg always insisted on voluntary recruiting only and that he
continually demanded a reduction of the quota. That is not con-
tained in the document to be submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: counsel for the Prosecution reads a part
If
of the interrogation, and you wish
to refer to another part of the
interrogation in order that the part he has read should not be mis-
leading, you will be at liberty to do so when he has read his part
of the interrogation. Is that clear?
DR. THOMA: Yes. But then I request the Tribunal to ask
counsel for the Prosecution if the document which he intends to
submit contains the whole* of Rosenberg's statement.

425
12 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you going to put in the

whole of Rosenberg's interrogation?
MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, I was not prepared to put in
the whole of Rosenberg's interrogation, but only certain parts
of it. These parts are available, and have been for some time, to
counsel. The whole of the Rosenberg interrogation in English was
given to Sauckel's counsel, however, and he has the entire text of
it, the only available copy that we have.

THE PRESIDENT: Has counsel for Rosenberg not got the entire
document?
MR. DODD: He has only the excerpt that we propose to read
into the record here at this time.

DR.THOMA: May I say something?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal considers that if you
propose to put in a part of the interrogation, the whole interrogation
ought to be submitted to the defendant's counsel, that then you may
read what part you like of the interrogation, and then defendant's
counsel may refer to any other part of the interrogation directly if it
is necessary for the purpose of explaining the part which has been

read by counsel for the Prosecution. So before you use this inter-
rogation, Rosenberg's counsel must have a copy of the whole inter-
rogation.
MR. DODD: I might say, Your Honor, that we turned over the
whole interrogation to counsel for the Defendant Sauckel; and we
understood that he would make it available to all other counsel for
the Defense. Apparently, that did not happen.
DR. THOMA: Thank you, Mr. President.
DR. SERVATIUS: I received these documents from the Prose-
cution last night. They were in English; that is sufficient for me,
but counsel for the other defendants are not all in a position to
follow the English text, so that certain difficulties arise, and I must
find time to interpret the document to my colleagues. But it would
be desirable if the Prosecution could give us the German text, for
the interrogation took place in German and was translated into
English, so that the original German text should be available.
Those are the difficulties, and I would like to suggest that the

German text be also handed to us as soon as possible.

MR. DODD: With reference to the so-called German text, the
original an English text. These interrogations were made through
is
an interpreter and they were transcribed in English so that the
original text is an English text, and that is what was turned over
to the attorney for the Defendant Sauckel with the understanding
that it would be made available to all other counsel.

426
 12 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: But of course that doesn't quite meet their

difficultiesbecause they don't all of them speak English, or are not
all able to read English, so I am afraid you must wait until Rosen-
berg's counsel has got a copy of the entire interrogation in his own
language.
MR. DODD: Very well.
Passing on beyond the document to which we have just referred
— which we now withdraw in view of the ruling and which we —
will offer at a later date after we have complied with the ruling
of the Court, we have a letter dated the 21st of December 1942,
which is Document 018-PS, and which bears Exhibit Number USA-
—
186 which, by the way, is a letter from the Defendant Rosenberg
—
to the Defendant Sauckel and I wish to quote from Page 1, Para-
graph 3 of the English text. In the German text it appears at
Page 3, Paragraph 1. Quoting directly:
"Even if I in no way deny that the numbers demanded by the
Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions as well as by
the agricultural economy justify unusual and severe meas-
ures, I must, because I am answerable for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, emphatically request that, in filling the
quota demanded, measures be excluded the consequences and
our toleration of which will some day be held against me and
my collaborators."
In the Ukraine area, arson was indeed used as a terror instru-
ment to enforce these conscription measures; and we refer now to
Document Number 254-PS, which is Exhibit USA-188. This docu-
ment is from an official of the Rosenberg Ministry and was also
found in the Rosenberg file. It is dated June 29, 1944 and encloses
a copy of a letter from one Paul Raab, a district commissioner in
the territory of Wassilkov, to the Defendant Rosenberg. I wish to
quote from Raab's letter. Page 1, starting with Paragraph 1 of the
English text which reads as follows:
"According to a charge by the Supreme Command of the
Army, I burned down several houses ... in the territory of
"Wassilkov, Ukraine, belonging to insubordinate people ordered
to labor service —this accusation is true."
Passing now to the third paragraph:
"During the year of 1942 the conscription of workers was
accomplished nearly exclusively by way of propaganda. Only
rarely was force necessary. But in August 1942, measures
had to be taken against two families in the villages of Gle-
venka and Soliony-Shatior, each of which were to supply one
person for labor. Both had been requested in June for the
first time but had not obeyed, although requested repeatedly.
They had to be brought in by force, but succeeded twice in

427
12 Dec. 45

escaping from the collecting camp in Kiev or while in transit.

Before the second arrest, the fathers of both of the workers
were taken into custody as hostages to be released only when
their sons appeared. When, after the second escape, the
re-arrest of both the young men and the fathers was ordered,
the police patrols detailed to do this, found the houses empty."
Passing to Paragraph 4, it is stated, and I quote directly:
"At that time I decided at last to take measures to show the
increasingly rebellious Ukrainian youth that our orders have
to be followed. I ordered the burning of the houses of the two
fugitives."

Would Your Honor like to have the rest of that paragraph?

THE PRESIDENT: I think you should read the next few lines.
MR. DODD: "The was
that in the future people obeyed,
result
willingly, orders concerning labor obligations. However, the
practice of burning houses has not become known for the first
time by my actions, but was suggested in a secret letter from
the Reich Commissioner for Allocation of Labor specifically
as a coercivemeasure in case other measures should fail.
This harsh punishment was acceptable to the local popu-
."
lation . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle):The Commissioner for Labor,

—
Mr. Dodd you just said, "an order from the Commissioner of
Labor." Who was that?
MR. DODD: Well, we have discussed this matter previously to
our appearance here today. The document does not identify him by
name. We are not sure. The Defendant Sauckel was called Pleni-
potentiary General for Labor, and we think we can't go much
further, and say we don't know. It just does not appear.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Thank you.

MR. DODD: Reading that last sentence again:
"This harsh punishment was acceptable to the local popu-
lation because previous to this step both families had ridi-
culed on every hand the duty-conscious people who sent their
children partly voluntarily to the labor allocation."
Turning to Paragraph 2 on Page 2, beginning about two-thirds
way through the paragraph, I wish to read
of the as follows —in the
German text it appears at Page 3, Paragraph 1:
"After initial successes, a passive resistance of the population
started, which finally forced me to turn again to arrests,
confiscations, and transfers to labor camps. After a whole
transport of conscripted laborers overcame the police at the

428
 12 Dec. 45

railroad station in Wassilkov and escaped, I saw again the

necessity for strict measures. A
few ring-leaders, who of
course had long since escaped, were located in Plissezkoje
and in Mitnitza. After repeated attempts to get hold of them,
their houses were burned down."
And finally, I wish to pass to the last paragraph on Page 3 of
that same document. In the German text it appears at Page 5,
Paragraph 7. Quoting from that last paragraph on the third page:
"My actions toward fugitive labor draftees were always
reported to District Commissioner Döhrer, of the Wassilkov
office, and to the Commissioner General in Kiev. Both of
them knew the circumstances and agreed with my measures
because of their success."
That is the end of that part of the quotation.

That Generalkommissar in Kiev, as we indicated yesterday and

again this morning, was the man Koch—we quoted his statement
about the master race.
Another document confirms arson as an instrument of enforcing
this labor program in the village of Bielosersk in the Ukraine in
cases of resistance to forced labor recruitment. Atrocities committed
in this village are related in Document Number 018-PS, which is
already in evidence as Exhibit USA-186. But in addition there is
Document Number 290-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-189.
This document consists of correspondence originating within the
Rosenberg ministry, which was, of course, the office headquarters of
the Defendant Rosenberg; and it is dated the 12th day of November
1943. I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text, starting with
the last line, as follows:
"But even if Müller had been present at the burning of houses
in connection with the Reich conscription in Bielosersk, this
should by no means lead to the removal of Müller from
office. It is mentioned specifically in a directive of the Com-
missioner General in Luck, of 21 September 1942, referring to
the extreme urgency of national conscription, that farms of
those who refuse to work are to be burned and their relatives
are to be arrested as hostages and brought to forced labor
camps."
The SS troops were directed to participate in the abduction of
these forced laborers and also in the raids on villages, burning of
villages, and were directed to turn the entire population over for
slave labor in Germany.
We refer to Document Number 3012-PS, which bears Exhibit
Number USA-190. This document is a secret SS order and it is
dated the 19th day of March 1943. I wish to quote from Page 3 of

429
12 Dec. 45

the English text starting with the third paragraph. In the German
text it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 3. It says, and I quote it:
"The activity of the labor offices, that is, of recruiting com-
missions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible.
It will not be possible always to refrain from using force.
During a conference with the chief of the labor allocation
staffs, it was agreed that whatever prisoners could be released
should be put at the disposal of the commissioner of the labor
office. When searching villages or when it becomes necessary
to burn down villages, the whole population will be put at
the disposal of the commissioner by force."
THE PRESIDENT: Shouldn't you read Number 4 which fol-
lows it?

MR. DODD: Number 4 says:

"As a rule, no more childrenwill be shot."
might say to Your Honor that parts of these documents are
I
going to be relied on for other purposes later and it sometimes may
appear to the Tribunal that we are overlooking some of these
excerpts, but nevertheless I am grateful to have them called to our
attention because they are most pertinent to these allegations as
well.
From the community of Zhitomir where the Defendant Sauckel
appealed for more workers for the Reich, the Commissioner General
reported on the brutality of the conspirator's program, which he
described as a program of coercion and slavery. And I now refer
to Document Number 265-PS, which is Exhibit USA-191. This
document is a secret report of a conference between the Commis-
sioner General of Zhitomir and the Defendant Rosenberg in the
community of Vinnitza on the 17th of June 1943. The report itself
is dated the 30th of June 1943 and is signed by Leyser. I wish to
quote from Page 1 of the English text, beginning with the last
paragraph; and in the German text it appears at Page 2, Para-
graph 3. Quoting it directly:
"The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are,
no doubt, well known to the Reich Minister through reports
and his own observations. Therefore I shall not repeat them.
It certain that a recruitment of labor in the true sense
is
of the word can hardly be spoken of. In most cases it is
nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force."
Passing now to Page 2 of that same document, and to Para-
graph 1, line 11 —in the German text it appears at Page 3, Para-
graph 2 — it says; and I quote it directly:
"But as the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor explained to us the gravity of the situation, we had

430
 .

12 Dec. 45

no alternative. I consequently have authorized the commis-

sioners of the areas to apply the severest measures in order
to achieve the imposed quota. That a lowering of morale is
coupled with this needs no further proof. It is nevertheless
essential to win the war on this front too. The problem of
labor mobilization cannot be handled with gloves."
The recruitment measures which we have been discussing
enslaved so many citizens of occupied countries that whole areas
were depopulated.
I now wish to refer to our Document Number 3000-PS, which is

Exhibit USA-192. This document is a partial translation of a report

from the chief of Main Office III with the High Command in Minsk,
and it is dated the 28th day of June 1943. It was sent to Ministerial-
direktor Riecke, who 'was a top official in the Rosenberg Ministry.
I wish to read from Page 1 of the English text, starting with the
second paragraph, as follows:
"Thus recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary,
had disastrous effects, for the recruitment measures in the
last months and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have
an irreparable political and economic effect .... From . .

White Ruthenia approximately 50,000 people have been ob-

tained for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to be taken.
Considering the 2;400,000 total population the fulfillment of
. . .

these quotas is impossible. Owing to the sweeping drives

. . .

of the SS and police in November 1942, about 115,000 hectares

of farmland. .are not used, as the population is not there
.

."
and the villages have been razed. . .

•
We have already referred to the conspirators' objective of perma-
nently weakening the enemy through the enslavement of labor
and the breaking up of families; and we invite the Tribunal's
attention to Document 031-PS, which is in evidence as Exhibit
USA-171, for we desire to emphasize that the policy was applied
in the Eastern Occupied Territories with the Defendant Rosenberg's
approval of a plan for the apprehension and deportation of 40,000
to 50,000 youths of the ages of 10 to 14. Now the stated purpose
of this plan was to prevent a reinforcement of the enemy's military
strength and to reduce the enemy's biological potentialities. We
have already quoted from Page 3 of the English text of that docu-
ment to establish that the Defendant Rosenberg approved that
plan, the so-called Hay Action plan. We referred to it yesterdqiy
afternoon.
Further evidence of the conspirators' plan to weaken their
enemies, in utter disregard of the rules of international law, is
contained in Document Number 1702-PS, which bears Exhibit
Number USA-193. This document is a secret order, issued by a

431
12 Dec. 45

rear area military commandant to the district commissar at

Kasatin, dated the 25th of December 1943. I quote from Page 3
of the EngUsh text at Paragraph 1. In the German text it appears
at Page 12, Paragraph 1.
"The able-bodied male population between 15 and 65 years
of age and the live stock are to be shipped back from the
districteast of the line Belilovka-Berditchev-Zhitomir (ex-
clusive of these places)."
This program, which we have been describing, and the brutal
measures that it employed were not hmited to Poland and the
Occupied Eastern Territories but covered and cursed Western
Europe as well. Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Belgians, Italians, all came
to know the yoke of slavery and the brutality of their slave-
masters.
In France these slavemasters intensified their program in the
early part of 1943, pursuant to instructions which the Defendant
Speer telephoned to the Defendant Sauckel at 8 o'clock in the
evening on the 4th day of January 1943 from Hitler's headquarters.
I now refer to Document Number 556(13)-PS, which is Exhibit
USA-194. This document, incidentally, is a note for his own files,
signed by the Defendant Sauckel, dated the 5th of January 1943.
I wish to quote from Page 1 of the English text, Paragraph 1 as
follows:
"On 4 January 1943 at 8 p. m. Minister Speer telephones
from the Fiihrer's headquarters and communicates that on
the basis of the Fiihrer's decision, it is no longer necessary
to give special consideration to Frenchmen in the further
recruiting of specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting .

can proceed with vigor and with sharpened measures."

To overcome resistance to his slave labor program, the Defendant
Sauckel improvised new impressment measures which were applied
to both France and Italy by his own agents and which he himself
labelled as grotesque. I now refer to Document Number R-124,
which Exhibit USA-179, and particularly Page 2 and Paragraph 2
is

of the English text; in the German text it appears at Page 8,

Paragraph Quoting directly from that page and that paragraph
1.

a statement 1 March
made by Sauckel on 1944 at a meeting of
the Central Planning Board:
"The most abominable point against which I have to fight
is the claim that there is no organization in these districts
properly to recruit Frenchmen, Belgians, and Italians and to
dispatch them to work. So I have even proceeded to employ
and train a whole staff of French and Italian agents of both
sexes who for good pay, just as was done in olden times
for 'shanghaiing,' go hunting for men and dupe them, usmg

432
 12 Dec. 45

liquor as well as persuasion in order to dispatch them to

Germany.
"Moreover, I have charged several capable men with found-
ing a special labor allocation organization of our own, and
this by training and arming, under the aegis of the Higher
SS and PoUce Führer, a number of indigenous units; but I
still have to ask the munitions ministry for arms for these
•

men. For during the last year alone several dozens of high-
ranking labor allocation officials of great ability have been
shot. All these means must be used, grotesque as it may
'sound, to refute the allegation that there is no organization
to bring labor to Germany from these countries."
This same slave labor hunt proceeded in Holland, as it did in
France, with terror and abduction. I now refer to Document Num-
ber 1726-PS, which is Exhibit USA-195. This document is entitled,
"Statement of the Netherlands Government in View of the Prose-
cution and Punishment of the German Major War Criminals."
I wish to quote from enclosure "h," entitled "Central Bureau for

—
Statistics The Deportation of Netherlands' Workmen to Germany."
It is Page 1 of the English text, starting with the first paragraph;
and in the German text it appears at Page 1, also Paragraph 1.
Quoting it directly, it reads as follows:
"Many big and medium-size large business concerns, especially
in the metal industry, were visited by German commissions
who selected workmen for deportation. This combing-out
was called the 'Sauckel action,' so named after its leader,
who was charged with the procurement of foreign workmen
for Germany.
"The employers had to cancel the contracts with the selected
workmen; and the latter were forced to register at the
labor offices, which then took charge of the deportation
under supervision of German 'Fachberater.'
— —
"Workmen who refused relatively few were prosecuted by
—
the Sicherheitsdienst the SD. If captured by this service,
they were mostly lodged for some time in one of the infamous
prisoners' camps in the Netherlands and eventually put to
work in Germany.
"In these prosecutions the Sicherheitsdienst was supported
by the German police service, which was connected with the
labor offices and was composed of members of the NSB
and the like.
"At the end of April 1942 the deportation of workers started
on a grand scale. Consequently, in the months of May and
June, the number of deportees amounted to not less than

433
12 Dec. 45

22,000 and 24,000 respectively, of which many were metal

workers.
"After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October
1942 another peak was reached (2,600). After the big con-
cerns, the smaller ones had, in their turn, to give up their
personnel. . . .

"This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started

a ruthless campaign for manpower, passing by the labor
offices. Without warning they lined off whole quarters of
the towns, seized people in the streets or in the houses and
deported them.
"In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids took place
on 10 and 11 November, the number of people thus deported
was estimated at 50,000 and 5,000, respectively.
"In other places where the raids were held later, the num-
bers were much lower, because one was forewarned by the
events. The exact figures are not known as they have
never been published by the occupants.
"The people thus seized were put to work partly in the
Netherlands, partly in Germany."
A document found in the OKH files furnishes further evidence
of the seizure of workers in Holland; and I refer to Document
Number 3003-PS, which is Exhibit USA-196. This document is a
partial translation of the text of a lecture, delivered by one Lieu-
tenant Haupt of the German Wehrmacht, concerning the situation
of the war economy in the Netherlands. I wish to quote from Page 1
of the English text, starting with the fourth line of Paragraph
1
—
quoting that directly, which reads as follows:
"There had been some difficulties with the Arbeitseinsatz,
that is, during the man-catching action, which became very
noticeable because it was unorganized and unprepared.
People were arrested in the streets and taken out of their
homes. It has been impossible to carry out a uniform ex-
emption procedure in advance, because for security reasons
the time for the action had not been previously announced.
Certificates of exemption, furthermore, were to some extent
not recognized by the officials who carried out the action.
Not only workers who had become available through the
stoppage of industry, but also those who were employed
in our installations producing things for our immediate need
were apprehended or did not dare to go into the streets. In
any case it proved to be a great loss to us."
I might say to the Tribunal, that the hordes of people displaced

in Germany today indicate, to a very considerable extent, the

length to which the conspirators' labor program succeeded. The

434
 12 Dec. 45

best available Allied and German data reveal that, as of January

1945, approximately 4,795,000 foreign civilian workers had been
put to work for the German war effort in the Old Reich; and
among them were forced laborers of more than 14 different
nationalities. I now refer to Document Number 2520-PS, Exhibit
USA-197, which is an affidavit executed by Edward L. Deuss, an
economic analyst.
At the top of the first page there are tables setting forth the
nationality and then the numbers of the various nationals and
other groupings or prisoners of war and politicals, so-called. The
workers alone total, according to Mr. Deuss who is an expert in
the field, the 4,795,000 figure to which I have just referred. In
the second paragraph of this statement of Deuss, I should like
to read for the record and quote directly:

"I, Edward L. Deuss, for 3 years employed by the Foreign

Economic Administration, Washington, as an economic analyst
in London, Paris, and Germany, specializing in labor and
population problems of Germany during the war, do hereby
certify that the figures of foreign labor employed in the
Old Reich have been compiled on the basis of the best
available German and Allied sources of material. The
accompanying table represents a combination of German
official estimates of foreigners working in Germany in
January 1945, and of American, British, and French figures
of the number of foreigners actually discovered in the Old
Reich since 10 May 1945."

Only a very small proportion imported laborers came

of these
to Germany on a voluntary basis. At the March
1, 1944 meeting of

this same Central Planning Board, to which we have made reference

before, the Defendant Sauckel himself made clear the vast scale on
which free men had been forced into this labor slavery. He made
the statement, and I quote from Document Number R-124, w^hich
is in evidence as Exhibit USA-179 and from which I have quoted

earlier this morning. I wish to refer to Page 11 of that document,

the middle paragraph, Paragraph 3. In the German text it appears
at Page 4, Paragraph 2 —
the Defendant Sauckel speaking and I —
quote directly from that document:
"Out of 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Germany,
not even 200,000 came voluntarily."
The Nazi conspirators were not satisfied just to tear 5 million
odd persons from their children, from their homes, from their
native land. But in addition, these defendants, who sit today in
this courtroom, insisted that this vast number of wretched human
beings who were in the so-called Old Reich as forced laborers must

435
12 Dec. 45

be starved, given less than sufficient to eat, often beaten and mal-
treated, and permitted to die wholesale for want of food, for want
of even the fundamental requirements of decent clothing, for the
want of adequate shelter or indeed sometimes just because they
produced too little.
Now
these conditions of deportation are vividly described in
Document Number 054-PS, which is a report made to the Defendant
Rosenberg concerning the treatment of Ukrainian labor. I wish to
refer to Document Number 054-PS, which bears the Exhibit Num-
ber USA-198. Before quoting from it directly —according to this
report the plight of these hapless victims was aggravated because
many were dragged off without opportunity to collect their posses-
sions. Indeed, men and women were snatched from bed and lodged
in cellars pending deportation. Some arrived in night clothing.
Brutal guards beat them. They were locked in railroad cars for
long periods without any toilet facilities at all, without food,
without water, without heat. The women were subjected to phys-
ical and moral indignities and indecencies during medical exami-
nations.
I refer now specifically to this Document Number 054-PS, which
consists of a covering letter to the Defendant Rosenberg, first of
all, signed by one Theurer, a 1st lieutenant in the Wehr-
and is
macht, to which is attached a copy of a report by the commandant
of the collecting center for Ukrainian specialists at Kharkov; and
it also consists of a letter written by one of the specialists in the

—
Rosenberg office no, by one of the workers, not in the Rosenberg
office, but one of the specialists they were recruiting, by the name
of Grigori. I wish to quote from the report at Page 2, starting at
—
Paragraph 4 of the English text and in the German text it appears
at Page 3, Paragraph 4. Quoting directly from that page of the
English text:
"The starosts, that is village elders, are frequently corrupt-
ible; they continue to have the skilled workers, whom they
drafted, dragged from their beds at night to be locked up in
cellars until they are shipped. Since the male and female
workers often are not given any time to pick up their luggage
and so forth, many skilled workers arrive at the collecting
center for skilled workers with equipment entirely insufficient
(without shoes or change of clothing, no eating and drinking
utensils, no blankets, et cetera). In particularly extreme cases,
therefore, new arrivals have to be sent back again imme-
diately to get the things most necessary for them. If people
do not come along at once, threatening and beating of skilled
workers by the above-mentioned local militia become a daily
occurrence and are reported from most of the communities.
In some cases women were beaten until they could no longer

436
 12 Dec. 45

march. One bad case in particular was reported by me to the

commander of the civil police here (Colonel Samek) for severe
punishment (village of Sozolinkov, district of Dergatchi). The
encroadiments of the starosts and the militia are of a par-
ticularly grave nature because they usually justify themselves
by claiming that all that is done in the name of the German
Armed Forces. In reality, the latter have conducted them-
selves throughout in a highly understanding manner toward
the skilled workers and the Ukrainian population. The same,
however, cannot be said of some of the administrative agen-
cies. To illustrate this, be it mentioned that a woman once
arrived dressed with barely more than a shirt."
Passing now to Page 4 of this same document, starting with the
10th line of the third paragraph, and in the German text it appears
at Page 5, Paragraph 2. Quoting directly again:

"On the basis of reported incidents, attention must be called

to the fact that inexcusable to keep workers locked in the
it is
cars for many hours, so that they cannot even take care of
the calls of nature. It is evident that the people of a trans-
port must be given an opportunity from time to time, to get
drinking water, to wash, and to relieve themselves. Cars have
been shown in which people had made holes so that they
could attend to the calls of nature. When nearing bigger
stations, persons should, if possible, relieve themselves far
from these stations."
Turning to Page 5 of the same document, Paragraph 12 in the —
German text it appears at Page 6, Paragraph 1:
"The following abuses were reported from the delousing
stations:
"In the women's and girls' shower rooms, services were partly
performed by men, or men would mingle around or even help
with the soaping, and vice versa there were female per-
sonnel in the men's shower rooms. Men also for some time
were taking photographs in the women's shower rooms. Since
mainly Ukrainian peasants were transported in the last
months, as far as the female portion of these are concerned,
they were mostly of a high moral standard and used to strict
modesty; they must have considered such a treatment as a
national degradation. The above-mentioned abuses have been,
according to our knowledge, settled by the intervention of
the transport commanders. The reports of the photographing
were made from Halle; the reports about the former were
made from Kiwerce. Such incidents, altogether unworthy of
the dignity and prestige of the Greater German Reich may
still occur here or there."

437
12 Dec. 45

Sick and infirm people of the occupied countries were taken

indiscriminately with the rest. Those who managed to survive the
trip into Germany but who
arrived too sick to work were returned
like cattle togetherwith those who fell ill at work, because they
were of no further use to the Germans. The return trip took place
under the same terrible conditions as the initial journey, and with-
out any kind of medical supervision. Death came to many and their
corpses were unceremoniously dumped out of the cars, with no
provision for burial.
I quote from Page 3, Paragraph 3 of Document Number 054-PS.

In the German text it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 3. Quoting

directly:
"Very depressing for the morale of the skilled workers and
the population is the effect of those persons shipped back
from Germany who had become disabled or had been
unfit for employment from the very beginning.

"Several times already transports of skilled workers on their

way to Germany have crossed returning transports of such
disabled persons and have stood on the tracks alongside
of each other for a long period of time. These returning
transports are insufficiently cared for. Nothing but sick,
injured, or weak people, mostly 50 to 60 in a car usually
escorted by 3 to 4 men. There is neither sufficient care nor
—
food. The returnees made frequently unfavorable! if also
—
surely exaggerated statements relative to their treatment in
Germany and on the way. As a result of all this and of what
the people could see with their own eyes, a psychosis of fear
was evoked among the skilled workers, that is, the whole
transport to Germany. Several transport leaders, of the 62d
and 63rd transports, in particular, reported on it in detail.
In one case the leader of the transport of skilled workers
observed with his own eyes how a person who had died of
hunger was unloaded from a returning transport on the side
track (1st Lieutenant Hofmann of the 63rd Transport Station,
Darniza). Another time it was reported that three dead had
to be deposited by the side of the tracks on the way and had
to be left behind unburied by the escort. It is also regrettable
that these disabled persons arrive here without any identifi-
cation. From the reports of the transport commanders, one
gets the impression that these unemployable persons are
assembled, penned into the wagons, and sent off provided
only by a few men escorts and without special care for food
and medical or other attendance. The labor office at the place
of arrival as well as the transport commanders confirm this
impression."

438
 12 Dec. 45

Incredible as it may seem, mothers in the throes of childbirth

shared cars with those infected with tuberculosis or venereal
diseases. Babies, when bom, were hurled out of these car windows;
and dying persons lay on the bare floors of freight cars without
even the small comfort of straw.
I refer to Document Number 084-PS, which is Exhibit USA-199.

This document is an interdepartmental report, prepared by Dr. Gut-

kelch, in the Defendant Rosenberg's Ministry, and it is dated the
30th of September 1942. I wish to quote from Page 10 of the Eng-
lish text, starting with the fourth line from the top of the page.
In the German text it appears at Page 22, Paragraph 1. Quoting
directly from that paragraph:
"How necessary this interference was is shown by the fact
that this train with returning laborers had stopped at the
same place where a train with newly recruited Eastern Wor-
kers had stopped. Because of the corpses in the trainload of
returning laborers, a catastrophe might have been precipitated
had it not been for the mediation of Mrs. Miller. In this
train women gave birth to babies who were thrown out of the
windows during the journey, people having tuberculosis and
venereal diseases rode in the same car, dying people lay in
freight cars without straw, and one of the dead was thrown
on the railway embankment. The same must have occurred
in other returning transports."
Some aspects of the Nazi transport were described by the
Defendant Sauckel himself in a decree which he issued on the
20th of. July 1942; and I refer specifically to Document Number
2241(2)-PS, which is Exhibit USA-200. I ask that the Tribunal take
judicial notice of the original decree, which is pubUshed in Section
Bla, at Page 48e of a book entitled Die Beschäftigung von aus-
ländischen Arbeitskräften in Deutschland. I quote from Page 1,
Paragraph 2, of the EngUsh text; and I am quoting directly:
—
"According to reports of transportation commanders" Trans-
—
portleiter "presented to me, the special trains provided by
the German railway have frequently been in a really broken-
down condition. Numerous window panes have been missing
in the coaches. Old French coaches without lavatories have
been partly employed so that the workers had to fit up an
emptied compartment as a lavatory. In other cases, the
coaches were not heated in winter so that the lavatories
quickly became unusable because the water system was
frozen and the flushing apparatus was therefore without
water."
The Tribunal will unquestionably have noticed or observed that
a —
number of the documents which we have referred to and which

439
12 Dec. 45

—
we have offered consist of complaints by functionaries of the
Defendant Rosenberg's Ministry, or by others, concerning the con-
ditions under which foreign workers were recruited and lived. I
think it is appropriate to say that these documents have been
presented by the Prosecution really for two purposes, or for a dual
purpose; to establish, first, the facts recited therein, of course, but
also to show that these conspirators had knowledge of these con-
ditions and that notwithstanding their knowledge of these con-
ditions, these conspirators continued to countenance and assist in
this enslavement program of a vast number of citizens of occupied
countries.
Once within Germany, slave laborers were subjected to almost
unbelievable brutality and degradation by their captors; and the
character of this treatment was in part made plain by the conspira-
tors* own statements, as in Document Number 016-PS, which is in
evidence as Exhibit USA-168; and I refer to Page 12, Paragraph 2
of the English text. In the German text it appears at Page 17,
Paragraph 4. Quoting directly:
"All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a
way that they produce to the highest possible extent at the
lowest conceivable degree of expenditure."
Force and brutality as instruments of production found a ready
adherent in the Defendant Speer who, in the presence of the
Defendant Sauckel, said at a meeting of the Central Planning
—
Board and I refer to Document Number R-124, which is already
in evidence and which has been referred to previously. It bears
the Exhibit Number USA-179. I j-efer particularly to Page 42 of
that Document R-124, and Paragraph 2 of that Page 42. The
Defendant Speer, speaking at that meeting, stated:
"We must Ley has ascertained that
also discuss the slackers.
the sick decreased at once to one-fourth or one-fifth in
list
factories where doctors are on the staff who examine the sick
men. There is nothing to be said against SS and police taking
drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into con-
centration camps. There is no alternative. Let it happen
several times and the news will soon go around."
At a later meeting of the Central Planning Board, Field Mar-
shal Milch agreed that so far as workers were concerned and again —
I refer to Document Number R-124 and to Page 26, Paragraph 2, in

the English text, and in the German text at Page 17, Paragraph 1.
Field Marshal Milch, speaking at a meeting of the Central Planning
Board when the Defendant Speer was present, stated; and I am
quoting directly:
"
"The list of the shirkers should be entrusted to Himmler

440
 12 Dec. 45

Milch made particular reference to foreign workers again in this

Document Number R-124 at Page 26, Paragraph 3 —
in the German
—
text it appears at Page 18, Paragraph 3 when he said; and I am
quoting him directly:
"It is therefore not possible to exploit fully all the foreigners
unless we compel them by piece-work wages and have the
possibility of taking measures against foreigners who are not
doing their bit."

The policy as actually executed was even more fearful than the
policy as expressed by the conspirators. Indeed, these impressed
workers were underfed and overworked; and they were forced to
live in grossly overcrowded camps where they were held as virtual
prisoners, and were otherwise denied adequate shelter, adequate
clothing, adequate medical care and treatment. As a consequence,
they suffered from many diseases and ailments. They were gen-
erally forced to work long hours, up to and beyond the point of
exhaustion. They were beaten and subjected to all manner of
inhuman indignities.

An example of this maltreatment is found in the conditions

which prevailed in the Krupp factories. Foreign laborers at the
Krupp works were given insufficient food to enable them to per-
form the work required of them.
1 refer to Document Number D-316, which is Exhibit USA-201.

This document was found in the Krupp files. It is a memorandum

upon the Krupp stationery to a Herr Hupe, a director of the Krupp
locomotive factory in Essen, Germany, dated the 14th of March
1942. I wish to refer to Page 1 of the English text, starting with
Paragraph 1, as follows; and I am quoting directly:
"During the last few days we established that the food for
the Russians employed here is so miserable that the people
are getting weaker from day to day.
"Investigations showed that single Russians are not able to
place a piece of metal for turning into position, for instance,
because of lack of physical strength. The same conditions exist
in all other places of work where Russians are employed."
The condition of foreign workers in Krupp workers' camps is
described in detail in an affidavit executed in Essen, Germany, by
Dr. Wilhelm Jäger, who was the senior camp doctor. It is Docu-
ment Number D-288, which is Exhibit USA-202.
"I, Dr. Wilhelm Jäger, am a general practitioner in Essen,
Germany, and its surroundings. I was born in Germany on
2 December 1888 and now live at Kettwig, Sengenholz 6,
Germany.

441
12 Dec. 45

"I make the following statement of my own free will. I have

not been threatened in any way and I have not been promised
any sort of reward.
"On the 1st of October 1942, I became senior camp doctor in
the Krupp's workers' camps for foreigners and was generally
charged with the medical supervision of all Krupp's workers'
camps in Essen. In the course of my duties it was my respon-
sibility to report upon the sanitary and health conditions of
the workers' camps to my superiors in the Krupp works.
"It was a part of my task to visit every Krupp camp which
housed foreign civilian workers, and I am therefore able to
make this statement on the basis of my personal knowledge.
"My first official act as senior camp doctor was to make a
thorough inspection of the various camps. At that time, in
October 1942, I found the following conditions:
"The Eastern Workers and Poles who worked in the Krupp
works at Essen were kept at camps at Seumannstrasse, Grie-
perstrasse, Spenlestrasse, Heegstrasse, Germaniastrasse, Kapi-
tän-Lehmannstrasse, Dechenschule, and Krämerplatz." When —
the term "Eastern Workers" is hereinafter used, it is to be
—
taken as including Poles. "All of the camps were surrounded
by barbed wire and were closely guarded. .

"Conditions in all of these camps were extremely bad. The

camps were greatly overcrowded. In some camps there were
twice as many people in a barrack as health conditions per-
mitted.
"At Krämerplatz the inhabitants slept in treble-tiered bunks,
and in the other camps they slept in double-tiered bunks.
The health authorities prescribed a minimum space between
beds of 50 centimeters, but the bunks in these camps were
separated by a maximum of 20 to 30 centimeters.
"The Workers was altogether
diet prescribed for the Eastern
insufficient. They were given day less than
1,000 calories a
the minimum prescribed for any German. Moreover, while
German workers engaged in the heaviest work received 5,000
calories a day, the Eastern Workers with comparable jobs
received only 2,Q00 calories. The Eastern Workers were given
only two meals a day and their bread ration. One of these
two meals consisted of a thin, watery soup. I had no assur-
ance that the Eastern Workers, in fact, received the mini-
mum which was prescribed. Subsequently, in 1943, I under-
took to inspect the food prepared by the cooks; I discovered
a number of instances in which food was withheld from the
workers.

442
 12 Dec. 45

"The plan for food distribution called for a small quantity of

meat per week. Only inferior meats rejected by the veter-
inary, such as horse meat or tuberculin-infested, was per-
mitted for this purpose. This meat was usually cooked into
a soup ....
"The percentageof Eastern Workers who were ill was twice
among the Germans. Tuberculosis was particularly
as great as
widespread among the Eastern Workers. The tuberculosis
rate among them was four times the normal rate (Eastern
Workers, 2 percent; German, 0.5 percent). At Dechenschule
approximately 2.5 percent of the workers suffered from open
tuberculosis. The Tartars and Kirghises suffered most; as soon
as they were overcome by this disease they collapsed hke
flies. The cause was bad housing, the poor quality and insuf-

ficient quantity of food, overwork, and insufficient rest.

"These workers were likewise afflicted with spotted fever.

Lice, the carrier of this disease, together with countless fleas,
bugs, and other vermin, tortured the inhabitants of these
camps. As a result of the filthy conditions of the camps
nearly all Eastern Workers were afflicted with skin disease.
The shortage of food also caused many cases of Hunger-
Oedema, Nephritis and Shiga-Kruse.
"It was the general rule that workers were compelled to go
to work unless a camp doctor had certifled that they were
unfit for work. At Seumannstrasse, Grieperstrasse, Germania-
strasse, Kapitän-Lehmannstrasse, and Dechenschule there
was no daily sick At these camps the doctors did not
call.
appear for 2 or 3 days. As a consequence workers were
forced to go to work despite illness.
"I undertook to improve conditions as much as I could. I
insisted upon the erection of some new barracks in order to
relieve the overcrowded conditions of the camps. Despite this,
the camps were still greatly overcrowded but not as much
as before. I tried to alleviate the poor sanitary conditions in
Krämerplatz and Dechenschule by having some emergency
toilets installed; but the number was insufficient, and the
situation was not materially altered ....
"With the onset of heavy air raids in March 1943, conditions
in the camps greatly deteriorated. The problem of housing,
feeding, and medical attention became more acute than ever.
The workers lived in the ruins of their former barracks.
Medical supplies which were used up, lost, or destroyed were
difficult to replace. At times the water supply at the camps
was completely shut off for periods of 8 to 14 days. We

443
12 Dec. 45

installed a few emergency toilets in the camps, but there

were far too few of them to cope with the situation.
"During the period immediately following the March 1943
raids many foreign workers were made to sleep at the Krupp
factories in the same rooms in which they worked. The day
workers slept there at night, and the night workers slept
there during the day, despite the noise which constantly
prevailed. I believe that this condition continued until the
entrance of American troops into Essen.
"As the pace of air raids was stepped up, conditions became
progressively worse. On 28 July 1944 I reported to my
superiors that:
" The sick barracks in camp Rabenhorst are in such a bad

condition one cannot speak of a sick barracks any more. The

rain leaks through in every corner. The housing of the sick
is therefore impossible. The necessary labor for production
is in danger because those persons who are ill cannot recover.'

"At the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944 I am not —

—
completely sure of the exact date I obtained permission for
the first time to visit the prisoner-of-war camps. My inspec-
tion revealed that conditions at these camps were worse than
those I had found at the camps of the Eastern Workers in
1942. Medical supplies at such camps were virtually non-
existent. In an effort to cure this intolerable situation, I con-
tacted the Wehrmacht authorities whose duty it was to
provide medical care for the prisoners of war. My persistent
efforts came to nothing. After remonstrating with them over
a period of 2 weeks, I was given a total of 100 aspirin tablets
for over 3,000 prisoners of war.
"The French prisoner-of-war camp in Nöggerathstrasse had
been destroyed in an air raid attack and its inhabitants were
kept for nearly half a year in dog kennels, urinals, and in
old bakehouses. The dog kennels were 3 feet high, 9 feet
long, and 6 feet wide. Five men slept in each of them. The
prisoners had to crawl into these kennels on all fours. The
camp contained no tables, chairs, or cupboards. The supply
of blankets was inadequate. There was no water in the camp.
Such medical treatment as there was, was given in the open.
Many of these conditions were reported to me in a report by
Dr. Stinnesbeck, dated 12 June 1944, in which he said:
" '
There are still 315 prisoners in the camp. One hundred
. . .

seventy of these are no longer in barracks but in the tunnel

in Grunertstrasse under the Essen-Mülheim railway line.
This tunnel is damp and is not suitable for continued accom-
modation of human beings. The rest of the prisoners are

444
 12 Dec. 45

accommodated in 10 different factories in the Krupp works.

The medical attention is given by a French military doctor
who takes great pains with his fellow countrymen. Sick
people from Krupp factories must be brought to sick call.
This inspection is held in the lavatory of a bumed-out public
house outside the camp. The sleeping accommodation of the
four French orderlies is in what was the men's room. In the
sick bay there is a double-tier wooden bed. In general the
treatment takes place in the open. In rainy weather it is held
in the above-mentioned small room. These are insufferable
conditions. There are no chairs, tables, cupboards, or water.
The keeping of a register of sick people is impossible. Ban-
dages and medical supplies are very scarce, although the
badly wounded from the factory are very often brought here
for first aid and have to be bandaged here before being trans-
ported to the hospital. There are many loud and lively com-
plaints about food which the guard personnel confirms as
being justified. Illness and loss of manpower must be reck-
.'
oned with under these conditions . . .

"In my report to my superiors at Krupps, dated 2 September

1944, I stated

"Camp Humboldtstrasse has been inhabited by Italian mili-

tary internees. After it had been destroyed by an air raid,
the Italians were removed and 600 Jewish females from
Buchenwald concentration camp were brought to work at the
Krupp factories. Upon my first visit at Camp Humboldt-
found these persons suffering from open festering
strasse, I
wounds and other ailments.
"I was the first doctor they had seen for at least a fortnight.
There was no doctor in attendance at the camp. There were
no medical supplies in the camp. They had no shoes and
went about in their bare feet. The sole clothing of each con-
sisted of a sack with holes for their arms and head. Their
hair was shorn. The camp was surrounded by barbed wire
and closely guarded by SS guards.
"The amount camp was extremely meager and
of food in the
of very poor quality. The houses in which they lived con-
sisted of the ruins of former barracks and they afforded no
shelter against rain and other weather conditions. I reported
to my superiors that the guards lived and slept outside their
barracks as one could not enter them without being attacked
by 10, 20, and up to 50 fleas. One camp doctor employed by
me refused to enter the camp again after he had been bitten
very badly. I visited this camp with Mr. Grone on two occa-
sions and both times we left the camp badly bitten. We had

445
12 Dec. 45

great difficulty in getting rid of the fleas and insects which

had attacked us. As a result of this attack by insects of this
camp I got large boils on my arms and the rest of my body.
I asked my superiors at the Krupp works to undertake the
necessary steps to delouse the camp so as to put an end
to this unbearable vermin-infested condition. Despite this
report, I did not find any improvement in sanitary conditions
at the camp on my second visit a fortnight later.
"When became too sick to work or
foreign workers finally
were completely disabled, theywere returned to the labor
exchange in Essen and from there they were sent to a camp
at Friedrichsfeld. Among persons who were returned to
the labor exchange were aggravated cases of tuberculosis,
malaria, neurosis, cancer which could not be treated by
operation, old age, and general feebleness. I know nothing
about conditions at this camp because I have never visited
it. I only know that it was a place to which workers were

sent who were no longer of any use to Krupp.

"My colleagues and I reported all of the foregoing matters
to Mr. Ihn, director of Friedrich Krupp AG.; Dr. Wiele, per-
sonal physician of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach;
senior camp leader Kupke; and sometimes to the Essen
health department. Moreover, I know that these gentlemen
— —
personally visited the camps." signed "Dr. Wilhelm Jäger."
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

446
 ^ 12 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, we had just completed

the reading of the affidavit executed by Dr. Wilhelm Jäger at the
noon recess. The conditions which were described in this affidavit
were not confined to the Krupp factories alone but existed through-
out Germany; and we turn to a report of the Polish Main Committee
made to the Administration of the General Government of Poland,
Document Number R-103, Exhibit Number USA-204. This document
is dated the 17th of May 1944 and describes the situation of the
Polish workers in Germany, and I wish to refer particularly to
Page 2 of the English translation, starting with Paragraph 2; in the
German text it appears at Page 2, Paragraph 2 also. In quoting
from the document, it reads:

"The state of cleanliness of many overcrowded camp rooms

is contrary to the most elementary requirements. Often there
is no opportunity to obtain warm water for washing; there-
fore, the cleanest parents are unable to maintain even the
most primitive standard of hygiene for their children or often
even to wash their only set of underclothing. A consequence
of this is the spreading of scabies which cannot be eradi-
cated ....
"We receive imploring letters from the camps of Eastern
Workers and their prolific families beseeching us for food.
The quantity and quality of camp rations mentioned therein
— —
the so-called class 4 is absolutely insufficient to compen-
sate the energy spent in heavy work. Three and one half kilo-
grams of bread weekly and a thin soup at lunch time, cooked
with kohlrabi or other vegetables without any meat or fat,
with a meager addition of potatoes now and then, is a star-
vation ration for a heavy worker.
"When, on top of that, starvation is sometimes inflicted as
—
punishment for refusal to wear the badge 'East', for
—
example the result is that workers faint at their work
(Klosterteich Camp, Grünheim, Saxony). The consequence
is complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health, and tuber-

culosis. The spreading of tuberculosis among the Polish

factory workers is due to the deficient food rations meted
out in the community camps which are insufficient to restore
the energy spent in heavy work ....
"The call for help which reaches us brings to light privation
and hunger, severe stomach and intestinal trouble, especially
in the case of children, resulting from the insufficiency of
food which does not take into consideration the needs of

447
12 Dec. 45

children. Proper medical treatment or care for the sick is

not available in the mass camps."
We now refer to Page 3 of this same document and particularly
to the first paragraph. In the German text it appears at Page 5,
Paragraph 1:

"In addition to these bad conditions, there is lack of system-

atic occupation for and supervision of these hosts of children
which affects the life of prolific families in the camps. The
children, left to themselves without schooling or religious
care, must run wild and grow up illiterate. Idleness in rough
surroundings may and will create undesirable results in these
children .... An indication of what these awful conditions
may lead to is given by the fact that in the camps for Eastern
Workers ('Waldlust,' Lauf, post office, Pegnitz) there are cases
of 8-year-old, delicate, and undernourished children put to
forced labor and perishing from such treatment ....
"The bad conditions dangerously affect the
fact that these
state of healthand the vitality of the workers is proved by
the many cases of tuberculosis found in very young people
returning from the Reich to the General Government as unfit
for work. Their state of health is usually so bad that recov-
ery is out of the question. The reason is that a state of
exhaustion resulting from overwork and a starvation diet is
not recognized as an ailment until the illness betrays itself
by high fever and fainting spells.
"Although some hostels for unfit workers have been provided
as a precautionary measure, one can only go there when
recovery may no longer be expected (Neumarkt in Bavaria).
Even there the incurables waste away slowly, and nothing is
done even to alleviate the state of the sick by suitable food
and medicines. There are children there with tuberculosis
whose cure would not be hopeless and men in their prime
who, if sent home in time to their families in rural districts,
might still be able to recover .... No less suffering is caused
by the separation of families when wives and mothers of
small children are away from their families and sent to the
Reich for forced labor."
And from Page 4 of the same document, starting with
finally,
the first —
paragraph in the German text it appears at Page 7, Para-
graph 4:

"If, under these conditions, there is no moral support such

as normally based on regular family life, then at least such
is
moral support which the religious feelings of the Polish popu-
lation require should be maintained and increased. The elim-
ination of religious services, religious practices, and religious

448
 12 Dec. 45

care from the life of the Polish workers, the prohibition of

church attendance when there is a religious service for other
people, and other measures show a certain contempt for the
influence of religion on the feeUngs and opinions of the
workers."
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us who the Polish Central Com-
mittee were— or, I mean, how they were founded?
MR. DQDD: Well, insofar as we are aware, it was a commit-
tee apparently setup by the Nazi State when it occupied Poland
to work in some sort of co-operation with it during the days of the
occupation. We don't know the names of the members, and we
haven't any more specific information.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it a captured document?
MR. DODD: It a captured document, yes. Sir. All of the
is
documents that I am
presenting in connection with this case are,
excepting the Netherlands Government's report and one or two
other official reports, the Deuss affidavit and such other matters,
are captured documents. That particular document, it has just been
called to my attention, was captured by the United States 3rd Army.
Particularly harsh and brutal treatment was reserved for work-
ers imported from the conquered Eastern territories. As we have
illustrated, they did indeed live in bondage, and they were sub-
jected to almost every form of degradation, quartered in stables
with animals, denied the right of free worship and the ordinary
pleasures of human society.
is Document EC-68, bearing Exhibit
Illustrative of this treatment
Number USA-205. This document, EC-68, bears the title, "Direc-
tives on the Treatment of Foreign Farm Workers of Polish National-
ity," issued by the Minister for Finance and Economy of Baden,
Germany, on the 6th of March 1941. And we don't know his name,
nor have we been able to ascertain it.
Quoting from the English text of this document from the begin-
ning:
"The agencies of the Baden State Peasant Association of the
Reich Food Administration, have received the result of the
negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Führer in Stutt-
gart on 14 February 1941 with great satisfaction. Appropriate
memoranda have already been turned over to the District
Peasants Associations. Below I promulgate the individual
regulations as they have been laid down during the con-
ference and the manner in which they are now to be applied:
"1. On principle, farm workers of Polish nationality are no

longer granted the right to complain, and thus no complaints

may be accepted by any official agency.

449
12 Dec. 45

"2. The farm workers of Polish nationality may no longer

leave the localities in which they are employed, and have a
curfew from 1 October to 31 March from 2000 hours to
0600 hours and from 1 April to 30 September from 2100 hours
to 0500 hours.
"3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are
possible for riding to the place of work in the field if a rela-
tive of the employer or the employer himself is present.
"4. The visit to churches, regardless of faith, is strictly pro-
hibited, even when there is no service in progress. Individual
spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is permitted.
"5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures, or other cultural enter-
tainment are strictly prohibited for farm workers of Polish
nationality.
"6. The visit to strictly prohibited to farm
restaurants is
workers except for one restaurant in
of Polish nationality,
the village, which will be selected by the Regional Commis-
sioner's Office" — —
Landratsamt "and then only 1 day per
week. The day which is allowed for visiting the restaurant
will also be determined by the Landratsamt. This regulation
does not change the curfew regulation mentioned above
under '2'.

"7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly pro-

hibited; and wherever it is discovered, it must be reported.
"8. Gatherings of farm workers of Polish nationality after
work is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the
stables, or in the living quarters of the Poles.
"9. The use of railroads, buses, or other public conveyances

by farm workers of Polish nationality is prohibited.

"10. Permits to leave the v»illage may be granted only in very
exceptional cases by the local poüce authority (mayor's office).
However, in no case may it be granted if a Pole wishes to
visit a public agency on his own authority, whether it is a
labor office or the District Peasants Association, or if he wants
to change his place of employment.
"11. Unauthorized change of employment is strictly prohib-
ited. The farm workers of Polish nationality have to work
daily as long as it is to the interests of the enterprise and is
demanded by the employer. There are no limits to the work-
ing hours.
"12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punish-
ment to farm workers of Polish nationality if persuasion and
reprimand fail. The employer may not be held accountable
in any such case by an official agency.

450
 12 Dec. 45

"13. Farm workers of Polish nationality should, if possible,

be removed from the household; and they can be quartered
in stables et cetera. No consideration whatever should restrict
such action.
"14. Report to the authorities of all crimes committed by
farm workers of Polish nationahty which sabotage industry
—
or slow down work for instance, unwillingness to work,
—
impertinent behavior is compulsory even in minor cases.
An employer who loses a Pole sentenced to a long prison
sentence because of such a compulsory report will upon
request, have preference for the assignment of another Pole
from the competent labor office.
"15. In all other cases, only the State Police is still compe-
tent. For the employer himself, severe punishment is pro-
vided if itestablished that the necessary distance has not
is
been kept from farm workers of Polish nationality. The same
applies to women and girls. Extra rations are strictly pro-
hibited. Noncompliance with the Reich tariffs for farm work-
ers of Polish nationality will be punished by the competent
labor office by the taking away of the workers."
The women conquered territories were led away against
of the
and the Defendant Sauckel described
their will to serve as domestics,
this program in his own words, which appear in Document Num-
ber 016-PS, already offered in evidence as Exhibit USA-168, 016-PS,
and particularly Page 7, fourth paragraph of the English text. In
the German text it appears on Page 10, Paragraph 1, and I quote
directly:
"In order to relieve considerably the German housewife,
especially the mother with many children and the extremely
busy farmwoman, and in order to avoid any further danger
to their health, the Führer also has charged me with the
procurement of 400,000 to 500,000 selected, healthy, and strong
girls from the territories of the East for Germany."
Once captured, once forced to become laborers in Germany, or
workers in Germany, these Eastern women, by order of the slave-
master, Defendant Sauckel, were bound to the household to which
they were assigned, permitted at the most 3 hours of freedom a
week, and denied the right to return to their homes.
I now refer to Document Number 3044(b)-PS. That is Exhibit
Number USA-206. The document is a decree issued by the Defend-
ant Sauckel containing instructions for housewives concerning
Eastern household workers; and I ask that the Court take judicial
notice of the original decree which appears on Pages 592 and 593
of the second volume of a publication of the Zentralverlag of the
NSDAP, entitled Verfügungen, Anordnungen und Bekanntgaben,

451
12 Dec. 45

and I quote from the first paragraph of the English translation of

a portion of the decree as follows:
"There is no claim for free time. Female domestic workers
from the East may, on principle, leave the household only to
take care of domestic tasks. As a reward for good work,
however, they may be given the opportunity to stay outside
thehome without work for 3 hours once a week. This leave
must end with the onset of darkness, at the latest at 2000
hours. It isprohibited to enter restaurants, movies or other
theaters, and similar establishments provided for German or
foreign workers. Attending church is also prohibited. Special
events may be arranged for Eastern domestics in urban homes
by the German Workers' Front, for Eastern domestics in rural
homes by the Reich Food Administration in cooperation with
the German Women's League. Outside the home, the Eastern
domestic must always carry her work card as a personal pass.
"Vacations and return to homes are not granted as yet. The
recruiting of Eastern domestics is for an indefinite period."
Always over these enslaved workers was the shadow of the
Gestapo and the concentration camps. Like other major programs
of the Nazi conspirators, the guards of the SS and Himmler's
methods of dealing with people were the instruments employed for
enforcement.
On the subject of the slave laborers, a secret order dated
20 February 1942 issued by Reichsführer SS Himmler to SD and
Security Police officers concerning Eastern Workers spells out the
violence which was applied against them. It is our Document
3040-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-207, and I ask this Court
to take judicial notice of the original order, which is published in
the Allgemeine Erlass-Sammlung Part II, Section 2-A, III, f Pages 15 ,

to 24. I wish to quote from Page 3 of the English text, starting with
—
Paragraph III in the German text it appears in Section 2-A, III, f,
—
at Page 19 of the publication as follows:
"III. Combatting violations against
discipline. (1) In keeping
with the equal status of laborers from the original Soviet
Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline
must be maintained in quarters and in workshops. Violations
against discipline, including refusal to work and loafing at
work, will be dealt with exclusively by the secret state police.
The less serious cases will be settled by the leader of the
guard according to instructions from the state police head-
quarters with measures as provided for in the appendix. To
break acute resistance, the guards shall be permitted to use
also physical compulsion against the laborers. But this may
be done only for a cogent reason. The laborers should always

452
 12 Dec. 45

be informed that they will be treated decently when con-

ducting themselves with discipline and accomplishing good
work. In serious cases, that is, in such cases where the meas-
ures at the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice,
the state police is to step in. In such instances, as a rule,
severe measures will be taken, that is, transfer to a concen-
tration camp or special treatment. The transfer to a concen-
tration camp is made in the usual manner. In especially
serious cases special treatment is to be recommended at the
Reich Security Main Office; personal data and the exact facts
must be given. Special treatment is hanging. It should not
take place in the immediate vicinity of the camp. certain A
number of laborers from the original Soviet Russian territory
should attend the special treatment; at that time they are to
be advised of the circumstances which lead to this special
treatment. Should special treatment be required within the
camp for exceptional reasons of camp discipline, this must
be applied for."
And I turn now to Page 4 of the text. Paragraph VI; in the Ger-
man text it appears at Section 2-A, III, f, on Page 20:

"VI. Sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse is forbidden to

laborers of the original Soviet Russian territory. Owing to
their closely confined quarters they have no opportunity for
it . For every case of sexual intercourse with German men
. .

or women application for special treatment is to be made for

male labor from the original Soviet Russian territory, trans-
fer to a concentration camp for female labor."
And finally from Page 5 of thesame document. Paragraph VIII;
and in the German text it appears at Section 2-A, III, f, at Page 21:
"VIII. Search. Fugitive workers from the original Soviet
Russian territory are to be announced on principle in the
German search book. Furthermore, search measures are to
be decreed locally. When caught the fugitive must in prin-
ciple be proposed for special treatment."
We have said to this Tribunal more than once that the primary
purpose of the entire slave labor program was, of course, to compel
the people of the occupied countries to work for the German war
economy. The decree by which Defendant Sauckel was appointed
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor reveals that the
purpose of the appointment was to facilitate acquisition of the man-
power required for German war industries, and in particular the
armaments industry, by centralizing under Sauckel responsibility
for the recruitment and allocation of foreign labor and prisoners
of war in these industries. I refer to the document bearing our
Number 1666-PS—Exhibit USA-208. This document is a decree

453
12 Dec. 45

signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendant Keitel and it is —

—
dated 21 March 1942 appointing the Defendant Sauckel the Pleni-
potentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. I ask that the Court
take judicial notice of the original decree, which is published at
Page 179, Part I, of the 1942 Reichsgesetzhlatt; referring to the
English text starting at Paragraph 1, as follows, and quoting
directly:
"In order to secure the manpower requisite for war industries
as a whole and particularly for armaments, it is necessary
that the utilization of all available manpower, including that
of workers recruited abroad and of prisoners of war, should
be subject to a uniform control directed in a manner appro-
priate to the requirements of war industry, and further that
all still incompletely utilized manpower in the Greater Ger-
man including the Protectorate as well as in the
Reich,
Government General and in the Occupied Territories, should
be mobilized. Reichsstatthalter and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel
will carry out this task within the framework of the Four
Year Plan, as Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor. In that capacity he will be directly responsible to the
Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Section III (Wages) and
Section V (Utilization of Labor) of the Reich Labor Ministry
together with their subordinate authorities, will be placed at
the disposal of the Plenipotentiary General for the accom-
plishment of his task."
Sauckel's success can be measured from a letter which he him-
selfwrote to Hitler on 15 April 1943 and which contained his report
on 1 year of his activities. We refer to the Document as Number
407(VI)-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-209. I wish to quote
from Paragraphs 6 and 9 on Page 1 of the English text; in the
German text it appears at Page 2, Paragraphs 1 and 2:
"After 1 year's activity as Plenipotentiary for the Allocation
of Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers
were given to the German war economy from 1 April of last
year to 31 March of this year ....
"The 3,638,056 are distributed amongst the following branches
of the German war economy: Armament, 1,568,801 . . .
."

Still further evidence of this steady use of enslaved foreign

labor found again in a report of the Central Planning Board, to
is
which we have referred so many times this morning and yesterday.
Another meeting of this Central Planning Board was held on the
16th day of February 1944; and I refer to our Document Number
R-124, which contains the minutes of this meeting of the Central
Planning Board and which has been offered in evidence already as
Exhibit Number USA-179. And I want to refer particularly to

454
 12 Dec. 45

Page 26, Paragraph 1 of the English text of Document Number

R-124. It is at Page 16, in Paragraph 2, of theGerman text:
"The armament industry employs foreign workmen to a large
—
extent; according to the latest figures 40 percent."

Moreover, our Document Number 2520-PS, which is in evidence

as Exhibit Number USA-197, records that, according to Speer Minis-
try tabulations, as of 31 December 1944, approximately 2 million
civilian foreign workers were employed directly in the manufacture
of armaments and munitions (finished products or parts). That the
bulk of these workers had been forced to come to Germany against
their will is made clear by Sauckel's statement, which I previously
quoted from Paragraph 3 of Page 11 of Document Number R-124.
We quoted it this morning, the statement being that of 5 million
foreign workers only 200,000, or less than 200,000, came voluntarily.
The Defendants Sauckel, Speer, and Keitel succeeded in forcing
foreign labor to construct military fortifications. Thus, citizens of
France, Holland, and Belgium were compelled against their will
to engage in the construction of the "Atlantic Wall"; and we refer
to our Document Number 556(2)-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-
194. This is a Hitler order dated the 8th of September 1942, and
it is initialled by the Defendant Keitel. Quoting the order directly:

"The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to

be erected in the area of Army Group West make it neces-
sary that in the occupied territory all available workers be
assigned and give the fullest extent of their productive capac-
ities to this task. The previous allotment of workers origi-
nating from these countries is insufficient. In order to in-
crease it I order the introduction of compulsory labor and the
prohibition of changing the place of employment without per-
mission of the authorities in the occupied territories. Further-
more, the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to
those subject to labor draft should in the future depend on
the possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to
accept an assigned job, as well as leaving the place of work
without the consent of the authorities in charge, will result
in the withdrawal of the food and clothing ration cards. The
—
GBA" Deputy General for Arbeitseinsatz "in agreement —
with the military commander, as well as the Reich Commis-
sioner, will issue the appropriate decrees."

Indeed, the Defendant Sauckel boasted to Hitler concerning the

contribution of the forced labor program to the construction of the
Atlantic Wall by the Defendant Speer's Organization Todt. And we
refer to Document 407(VIII)-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-210.
This document is a letter from the Defendant Sauckel to Hitler,

455
12 Dec. 45

dated the 17th day of May 1943. And I refer to the second and last
paragraph:
"In addition to the labor allotted to the total German econ-
omy by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organi-
zation Todt was supplied with new labor continually ....
Thus the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make
possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall."

Russian civilians were forced into labor battalions

Similarly,
and compelled to build fortifications to be used against their own
countrymen. In Document 031-PS, in evidence as Exhibit Number
USA-171, which is a memorandum of the Rosenberg Ministry, it
is stated in Paragraph 1 at Page 1 of that document:

"The men and women in the theaters of operations have been

and will be conscripted into labor battalions to be used in the
construction of fortifications."
In addition, the conspirators compelled prisoners of war to
engage in operations of war against their own country and its
allies. At a meeting of the Central Planning Board, again held on
February 19, 1943, attended by the Defendant Speer and the
Defendant Sauckel and Field Marshal Milch, the following conver-
sation occurred and is recorded in our Document R-124, at Page 32,
Paragraph 5, of the English text. It is Page 20, the last paragraph,
of the German text. And I quote it, the Defendant Sauckel speaking:
"Sauckel: 'If any prisoners are taken, they will be needed
there.'

"Milch: 'We have made a request for an order that a cer-

tain percentage of men in the antiaircraft artillery must be
Russians. Fifty thousand will be taken altogether, thirty
thousand are already employed as gunners. It is an amusing
thing that Russians must work the guns.' "
We refer now to Documents Numbers 3027-PS and 3028-PS.
They are, respectively, Exhibit USA-211 for 3027 and USA-212 for
3028. They will be found at the very back,
I believe, of the docu-
ment book, manila folder. They are official German
in a separate
Army photographs; and, if Your Honors will examine Document
3027-PS, the caption states that Russian prisoners of war are acting
as ammunition bearers during the attack upon Tschedowo. Docu-
ment 3028-PS consists of a series of official German Army photo-
graphs taken in July and August 1941 showing Russian prisoners
of war in Latvia and the Ukraine being compelled to load and
unload ammunition trains and trucks and being required to stack
ammunition, all, we say, in flagrant disregard of the rules of inter-
national law, particularly Article 6 of the regulations annexed to
the Hague Convention Number IV of 1907, which provides that the

456
 12 Dec. 45

tasks of prisoners of war shall have no connection with the opera-

tions of war. The use of prisoners of war in the German armament
industry was as widespread and as extensive almost as the use of
the forced foreign civilian labor. We
refer to Document Number
3005-PS, which is Exhibit USA-213. This document is a secret
letter from the Reich Minister of Labor to the presidents of the
regional labor exchange offices, which refers to an order of the
Defendant Goring to the effect that-^I quote now from Paragraph 1
of that document —
I am quoting it directly:

"Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal, 100,000 men are

to be taken from among the French prisoners of war not yet
employed in armament industry and are to be assigned to the
armament industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower
supply resulting therefrom will be filled by Soviet prisoners
of war. The transfer of the above-named French prisoners
of war is to be accomplished by 1 October."
The Reich Marshal referred to in that quotation is of course the
Defendant Goring.
A was followed with respect to Russian prisoners
similar policy
of war. The Defendant Keitel directed the execution of Hitler's
order to use prisoners of war in the German war economy. And
I now make reference to our Document EC-194, which has Exhibit
Number USA-214. This document is also a secret memorandum,
according to its label, issued from Hitler's headquarters on the
31st of October 1941; and I read from Page 1, Paragraphs 1 and 2,
quoting it directly as follows:
"The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous
hindrance for the future German war and armament industry.
The expected relief through releases from the Armed Forces
is uncertain as to the extent and date; its probable extent will
by no means correspond to expectations and requirements in
view of the great demand.
"The Führer has now ordered that even the manpower of the
Russian prisoners of war should be utilized to a large extent
by large-scale assignments for the requirements of the war
industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate nourish-
ment. Also very small wages to provide a few every-day
necessities must be offered with additional premiums for spe-
cial effort, as the case may be."
And quoting now from the same document, Paragraph 2, H and
in — I am quoting directly:
"II. Construction and armament industry,
"(a) Work units for construction of all kinds, particularly for
the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unload-
ing units for essential war plants).

457
12 Dec. 45

"(b) Suitable armament factories which are to be selected in

such a way that their personnel will consist in the majority
of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (upon
withdrawal and other employment of the German workers).
"III. Other war industries.
"(a) Mining as under II (b).

"(b) Railroad construction units for building tracks, et cetera.

"(c)Agriculture and forestry in closed units. The utilization
of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis
of the above examples:

"To I. The Armed Forces.

"To II. The Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions and
the Inspector General for the German Road System in agree-
ment with the Reich Minister for Labor and Supreme Com-
mander of the Armed Forces (Economic Armament Office).
Deputies of the Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions
are to be admitted to the prisoner-of-war camps to assist in
the selection of skilled workers."
The Defendant Goring, at a conference at the Air Ministry on
the 7th day of November 1941, also discussed the use of prisoners
of war in the armament industry. And we refer now to our Docu-
ment Number 1206-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-215. This
document consists of top-secret notes on Göring's instructions as
to the employment and treatment of prisoners of war in many
phases of the German war industry. And I wish to quote from
Paragraph 1 of Page 1 and Paragraph 4 of Page 2 of the English
text and from Paragraph 1, Page 1, and Paragraph 1, Page 3 of the
German text, as follows:
"The view as to employment of prisoners of
Fiihrer's point of
war war
industries has changed basically. So far a total of
in
5 million prisoners of war —
employed so far 2 million."
And on Page 2:

"In the interior and the Protectorate it would be ideal if

entire factories could be manned by Russian prisoners of war
except the employees necessary for directing. For employ-
ment in the interior and the Protectorate the following are to
have priority:
"(a) At the top, the coal mining industry. Order by the
Führer to investigate all mines as employ-
to suitability for
ment of Russians, in some instances manning the entire plant
with Russian laborers.
"(b) Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars,
repair shops, et cetera). Railroad-repair and factory workers

458
 12 Dec. 45

are to be sought out from the prisoners of war. Rail is the

most important means of transportation in the East.
"(c) Armament industries. Preferably factories of armor and
guns. Possibly also construction of parts for aircraft engines.
Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclu-
sively by Russians if possible. For the remainder, employment
in groups. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of
farm tractors, generators, et cetera. In emergency, erect in
some places barracks for casual workers who are used in
unloading units and for similar purposes. (Reich Minister of
the Interior through communal authorities.)
"OKW/AWA is competent for procuring Russian prisoners of
war. Employment through Planning Board for employment
of all prisoners of war. If necessary, offices of Reich com-
missariats.
"No employment where danger to men or supply exists, that
is, factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks,
et cetera. No contact with German population, especially no
'solidarity.' German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians.
"Food is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Procurement of
special food (cats, horses, et cetera).
"Clothes, billeting, messing somewhat better than at home
where part of the people live in caves.
"Supply of shoes for Russians; as a rule wooden shoes, if
necessary install Russian shoe repair shops.
"Examination of physical fitness in order to avoid importation
of diseases.
"Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians; if possible by
selected Russian engineer troops."
The Defendant Goring was not the only one of these defendants
who sponsored and applied the policy of using prisoners of war in
the armament industry. The Defendant Speer also sponsored and
applied this same policy of using prisoners of war in the armament
industry. And we refer to the document bearing our Number 1435-
PS, which also carries Exhibit Number USA-216. This document is
a speech to the Nazi Gauleiter delivered by the Defendant Speer
on the 24th day of February of 1942, and I wish to read from Para-
graph 2 of that document, and I quote as follows:
"I therefore proposed to the Führer at the end of December
that all my labor force, including specialists, be released for
mass employment in the East. Subsequently the remaining
prisoners of war, about 10,000, were put at the disposal of
the armament industry by me."
He also reported at the 36th meeting of the Central Planning
Board, held on the 22d day of April 1943, that only 30 percent of

459
12 Dec. 45

the Russian prisoners of war were engaged in the armament indus-

try. This the Defendant Speer found unsatisfactory. And referring
again to Document R-124, the minutes of the Central Planning
Board, and particularly to Page 17 of that document, Paragraph 10
of the English text, and Page 14, Paragraph 7 of the German text,
we find this statement by the Defendant Speer, quoting directly:
"There is a detailed statement showing in what sectors the
Russian prisoners of war have been distributed. This state-
ment is quite interesting. It shows that the armaments indus-
try received only 30 percent. I constantly complained about
this."

And at Page 20 of the —

same document, R-124 Paragraph 1 on
Page 20 of the English text and Page 14, the last paragraph of the
German text — the Defendant Speer stated, and I quote from the
paragraph directly:
"The 90,000 Russian prisoners of war employed in the whole
of the armament industry are for the greatest part skilled
men."
The Defendant Sauckel, who was appointed Plenipotentiary Gen-
eral for the utilization of labor for the express purpose, among
war into the German war indus-
others, of integrating prisoners of
try, made it plain that prisoners of war were to be compelled to
serve the German armament industry. His labor mobilization pro-
gram, which is Document 016-PS, already marked Exhibit USA-168,
contains this statement on Page 6, Paragraph 10 of the English
text and Page 9, Paragraph 1, of the German text:
"All prisoners of war now in Germany, from the territories
of the West as well as of the East, must be completely incor-
porated into the German armament and food industries.
Their production must be brought to the highest possible
level."

I wish to turn now from the exploitation of foreign labor in

general to a rather special point of the Nazi program which appears
to us to have combined the brutality and the purposes of the slave
labor program with those of the concentration camp. The Nazis
placed all Allied nationals in concentration camps and forced them,
along with the other inmates of the concentration camps, to work
under conditions which were set actually to exterminate them. This
was what we call the Nazi program of extermination through work.
In the spring of 1942 these conspirators turned to the concen-
tration camps as a further source of slave labor for the armament
industry. I refer to a new Document Number R-129, bearing Exhibit
Number USA-217. This document is a letter to Himmler, the Reichs-
führer SS— and it is dated the 30th day of April 1942— from one

460
 12 Dec. 45

of his subordinates, an individual named Pohl, SS Obergruppen-

führer and General of the Wafïen-SS; and I wish to quote from
the first page of that document. Quoting directly:
"Today I report about the present situation of the concen-
trationcamps and about measures I have taken to carry out
your order of the 3rd of March 1942."
Then moving on from paragraphs numbered 1, 2, and 3 on Page 2
and at Page 1 of the German text, I quote as
of the English text
follows:
"1. The war has brought about a marked change in the struc-
ture of the concentrationcamps and has changed their duties
fundamentally with regard to the employment of the pris-
oners. The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of secur-
ity, education, or as a preventive measure is no longer the
main consideration. The importance now lies in the economic
side. The mobilization of all prisoner labor for purposes of
the war (increase of armament) now, and for purposes of con-
struction in the forthcoming peace, is coming more and more
to the foreground.
"2. From this knowledge necessary measures result which
require a gradual transformation of the concentration camps
from their former one-sided political character into an organi-
zation adapted to economic tasks.
"3. For this reason I called together all the leaders of the
former inspectorate of concentration camps, all camp com-
manders, and all managers and supervisors of work, on the
23rd and 24th of April 1942 and explained personally to them
this new development. I have compiled, in the order attached,
the essential points which have to be brought into effect with
the utmost urgency if the commencement of work for the
purposes of the armament industry is not to be delayed."
Now the order referred to in that third paragraph set the frame-
work for a program of relentless exploitation, providing in part as
—
follows and I now refer to the enclosure appended to the quoted
letterwhich is also a part of Document R-129, found at Page 3,
Paragraphs numbered 4, 5, and 6 of the English text, and Page 3
of the German text:
"4. The camp commander alone is responsible for the utili-
zation of the manpower available. This utilization must be,
in the true meaning of the word, complete, in order to obtain
the greatest measure of performance. Work is allotted only
centrally and by the Chief of the Department D. The camp
commanders themselves may not accept on their own initiative
work offered by third parties and may not negotiate about it.

461
12 Dec. 45

"5. There is no limit to working hours. Their duration depends

on the kind of working establishments in the camps and the
kind of work to be done. They are fixed by the camp com-
manders alone.
"6. Any circumstances which may result in a shortening of
working hours (for example, meals, roll-calls, et cetera), have
therefore to be restricted to an irreducible minimum. Time-
wasting walks and noon intervals, only for the purpose of
taking meals, are forbidden."
The armament production program we have just described was
not merely a scheme for mobilizing the manpower potential of the
camps. It actually was integrated directly into the larger Nazi pro-
gram of extermination; and I wish to refer, at this point, to our
document bearing Number 654-PS and Exhibit Number USA-218.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it will be convenient to break
off now for a few minutes?
MR. DODD: Very well.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. DODD: At the recess time I had made reference to Docu-

ment Number 654-PS, whidi has the Exhibit Number USA-218. This
document is a memorandum of an agreement between Himmler,
Reichsführer SS, and the Minister of Justice, Thierack. It is dated
the 18th of September 1942. The concept of extermination to which
I referred shortly before the recess was embodied in this document

and I wish to quote from Page 1, Paragraph 2:

"2. Transfer of asocial elements from prison to the Reichsführer
SS for extermination through work. To be transferred with-
out exception are persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gyp-
sies, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year
sentences, Czechs, and Germans with more than 8-year sen-
tences, according to the decision of the Reich Minister for
Justice. First of all the worst asocial elements amongst those
just mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the
Führer of this through Reichsleiter Bormann."
Now this agreement further provided, in Paragraph 12 on Page 2
of the English text and Page 3, Paragraph 14, of the German text,
as follows:
"14. It isagreed that, in consideration of the intended aims
of the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern
problems, in the future, Jews, Poles, Gypsies, Russians, and
Ukrainians are no longer to be tried by the ordinary courts,
so far as punishable offenses are concerned; but are to be

462
 12 Dec. 45

dealt with by the Reichsführer SS. This does not apply to

civil lawsuits, nor to Poles whose names are reported or
entered in the German racial lists."
Now, in September of 1942, the Defendant Speer made arrange-
ments to bring this new source of labor within his jurisdiction.
Speer convinced Hitler that significant production could be obtained
only if the concentration camp prisoners were employed in factories
under the technical control of the Speer Ministry instead of the
control in the camps. In fact, without Defendant Speer' s cooperation,
we say it would have been most difficult to utilize the prisoners on
any large scale for war production, since he would not allocate to
Himmler the machine tools and other necessary equipment. Accord-
ingly, it was agreed that the prisoners were to be exploited in fac-
tories under the Defendant Speer's control. To compensate Himmler
for surrendering this jurisdiction to Speer, the Defendant Speer
proposed and Hitler agreed, that Himmler would receive a share of
the armaments output, fixed in relation to the man-hours contrib-
uted by his prisoners. In the minutes of the Defendant Speer's
conference with Hitler on the 20th, 21st, and the 22d September
1942—Document Number R-124, which is Exhibit Number USA-179
— I wish to refer particularly to Page 34 of the English text. These
are the Defendant Speer's minutes on this conference. I am quoting
from Page 34, Paragraph 36, beginning at the middle of the page;
and it is at the top of Page 26 in the German text:
"I pointed out to the Führer that, apart from an insignifi-
cant amount of work, no possibility exists of organizing arma-
ment production in the concentration camps, because: (1) the
machine tools required are missing; (2) there are no suitable
premises. Both these assets would be available in the arma-
ment industry, if use could be made of them by a second
shift.

"The Führer agrees to my proposal that the numerous fac-

tories set up outside towns for reasons of air raid protection
should release their workers to supplement the second shift
in town factories and should in return be supplied with labor
—
from the concentration camps also two shifts.
"I pointed out to the Führer the difficulties which I expect
to encounter if Reichsführer SS Himmler should be able, as

he requests, to exercise authoritative influence over these fac-

tories. The Führer, too, does not consider such an influence
necessary.
"The Führer, however, agrees that Reichsführer SS Himmler
should derive advantage from making his prisoners available;
he should get equipment for his division.

463
12 Dec. 45

"I suggest giving him a share in kind (war equipment) in

ratio to the man-hours contributed by his prisoners. A 3 to
5 percent share is being discussed, the equipment also being
calculated according to man-hours. The Führer would agree
to such a solution.
"The Führer is prepared to order the additional allocation of
thisequipment and weapons to the SS, upon submission of
a list."

After a demand for concentration-camp labor had been created

and after a mechanism had been set up by the Defendant Speer for
exploiting this labor in armament factories, measures were evolved
for increasing the supply of victims for extermination through work.
A steady flow was assured by an agreement between Himmler and
the Minister of Justice mentioned above, which was implemented
—
by such programs as the following and I refer to Document L-61,
Exhibit Number USA-177; and I wish to quote from Paragraph 3.
That document, the Tribunal will recall, is the Defendant Sauckel's
letter, dated the 26th of November 1942, to the presidents of the
Länder employment offices; and I wish to quote from Paragraph 3
of that letter:
"The Poles who are to be evacuated as a result of this measure
will be put into concentration camps and put to work insofar
as they are criminal or asocial elements."
General measures were supplemented by special drives for per-
sons who would not otherwise have been sent to concentration
camps.
THE PRESIDENT: Didn't you read that this morning?
MR. DODD: Yes, I did, Your Honor. I was reading it again with
particular reference to this feature of the proof.
For example, for "reasons of war necessity" Himmler ordered
that at least 35,000 prisoners qualified for work should be trans-
ferred to concentration camps. I now offer in evidence Document
Number 1063(d)-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-219. This docu-
ment is a Himmler order dated the 17th of December 1942. The
order provides, and I quote in part, beginning with the first para-
graph of that document:
"For reasons of war necessity not to be discussed further here,
the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police, on the
14th of December 1942, has ordered that by the end of
January 1943 at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be
sent to the concentration camps. In order to reach this num-
ber, the following measures are required:
"(1) As of now, to begin with, until 1 February 1943, all
Eastern Workers or foreign workers who have been fugitives

464
 12 Dec. 45

or who have broken

contracts and who do not belong to allied,
friendly, neutral states
or are to be brought by the
. . .

quickest means to the nearest concentration camps ....

"(2) The commanders and the commandants of the Security
Police and the Security Service, and the chiefs of the state
police headquarters will check immediately on the basis of
a close and strict rule: (a) the prisons, and (b) the labor
reformatory camps.
"All prisoners fit for work, if it is practically and humanly

possible, will be committed at once to the nearest concen-

tration camp, according to the following instructions, even
for example, those who are about to be brought to trial.
Only such prisoners can be left there who, in the interest
of further investigations, are to remain absolutely in solitary
confinement.
"Every single laborer counts!"
Measures were also adopted to insure that this extermination
through work was practiced with maximum efficiency. Subsidiary
concentration camps were established near important war plants.
The Defendant Speer has admitted that he personally toured Upper
Austria and selected sites for concentration camps near various
munitions factories in the area. I am about to refer to the transcript
of an interrogation under oath of the Defendant Albert Speer.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, do you understand the last docu-
ment you read, 1063-PS, to refer to prisoners of war, or prisoners
in ordinary prisons, or what?
MR. DODD: We understood it to refer to prisoners in ordinary
prisons.
In view of the Tribunal's ruling this morning, I think I should
state that,with respect to this interrogation of Defendant Speer,
we had provided the defendants' counsel with the entire text in
German. It happens to be a brief interrogation, and so we were
able to complete that translation, and it has been placed in their
Information Center.
DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER (Counsel for Defendant Speer): In
reference to the transcript of the interrogation, the reading of which
the prosecutor has just announced, I should like to say the follow-
ing:
It is true that we have received the German transcript of the
English protocol, if one may call it a protocol. A comparison of
the English text with the German transcript shows that there are,
both in the English text and in the German transcript, mistakes
which change the meaning and which I believe are to be attributed
to misunderstandings on the part of the certifying interpreter. I

465
12 Doc. 45

believe, therefore, that the so-called protocol and the English text
do not actually give the contents of what Defendant Speer tried
to express during the interrogation. It would, therefore, not further
the establishment of the truth should this protocol ever be used.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, when was the German translation
given to counsel for the defendant?
MR. DODD: About 4 days ago. Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: there any certification
Mr. Dodd, is by the
interrogator as to the English translation?
MR. DODD: There is, Your Honor. There is a certification at
the end of the interrogation by the interrogator and by the inter-
preter and by the reporter as well. There are three certifications.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the best course will be, in these cir-
cumstances, to receive the interrogation now. You will have an
opportunity, by calling the defendant, to show in what way he
alleges, or you allege, that the interrogation is inaccurately trans-
lated.
DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you, Sir.

MR. DODD: May respectfully refer.

I Your Honor, to the last
document in the document book, 4 pages from the end?
THE PRESIDENT: Which page do you refer to?
MR. DODD: I refer to the page bearing the Number 16 of the
English text of the transcript of the interrogation and Page 21 of
the German text. The answer quoted is:
"The fact was that we were anxious to use workers from con-
centration camps in factories and to establish small concen-
tration camps near factories, in order to use the manpower
that was then available there. But it did not come up only
."
in connection with this trip . . .

That is, Speer's trip to Austria. (Exhibit USA-220)

THE PRESIDENT:I think I ought to say to defendant's counsel

that he had waited until he heard that piece of evidence read,

if

he would have seen that it was quite unnecessary to make any

objection.
MR. DODD: Defendant Goring endorsed this use of concentra-
tion camp labor and asked for more. We refer to our Document
1584-PS, Part 1, which is Exhibit Number USA-221. This document
is a teletype message from Goring to Himmler, dated 14th of
February 1944. I quote from the document beginning with the
second sentence:
"At the same time,
a number of
I ask you to put. at
KZ" — concen-tration-camp —my disposal as great
"convicts as possible

466
 12 Dec. 45

for air armament, as this kind of manpower proved to be

very useful according to previous experience. The situation
of the air war makes subterranean transfer of industry
necessary. For work of this kind KZ convicts can be
especially well concentrated at work and in the camp."

Defendant Speer subsequently assumed responsibility for this

program; and Hitler promised Speer that if the necessary labor for
the program could not be obtained, a hundred thousand Hungarian
Jews would be brought in by the SS.
Speer recorded his conferences with Hitler on April 6 and
April 7, 1944 in Document R-124, which is Exhibit Number USA-179,
already in evidence. I quote from Page 36 of the English text,
Page 29 of the German text as follows:
"Suggested to the Führer that, due to lack of builders and
equipment, the second big building project should not be set
up in German territory but in close vicinity to the border
on a suitable site (preferably on gravel base and with trans-
port facilities) in French, Belgian, or Dutch territory. The
Führer agrees to this suggestion if the works could be set
up behind a fortified zone. The strongest argument for setting
up this plant in French territory is the fact that it would be
much easier to procure the necessary workers. Nevertheless,
the Führer asks that an attempt be made to set up the second
factory in a safer area, namely the Protectorate. If it should
prove impossible there, too, to get hold of the necessary
workers, the Führer himself will contact the Reichsführer SS
and will give an order that the required 100,000 men are to
be made available by bringing in Jews from Hungary.
Stressing the fact that in the case of the Industriegemein-
schaft Schlesien the building organization was a failure, the
Führer demands that these works must be built by the OT
exclusively, and that the workers should be made available
by the Reichsführer SS. He wants to hold a meeting shortly
in order to discuss details with all the men concerned."
The unspeakably brutal, inhumane, and degrading treatment
inflicted on Allied nationals and other victims of concentration
camps, while they were indeed being literally worked to death, is
described in Document L-159, which is not in the document book.
It is an official report prepared by a U.S. Congressional committee,
U.S. Senate Document Number 47. This Congressional committee
had inspected the liberated camps at the request of General Eisen-
hower. It bears Exhibit Number USA-222. I would like to quote
from the document briefly, first from Page 14, the last paragraph,
and from Page 15, the first two paragraphs, of the English text:

467
12 Dec. 45

"The treatment accorded to these prisoners in the con-

centration camps was generally as follows: They were herded
together in some wooden barracks not large enough for one-
tenth of their number. They were forced to sleep on wooden
frames covered with wooden boards in tiers of two, three,
and even four, sometimes with no covering, sometimes with
a bundle of dirty rags serving both as pallet and coverlet.
"Their food consisted generally of about one-half of a pound
of black bread per day and a bowl of watery soup for noon
and night, and not always that. Owing to the great numbers
crowded into a small space and to the lack of adequate
sustenance, lice and vermin multiplied, disease became
rampant, and those who did not soon die of disease or torture
began the long, slow process of starvation. Notwithstanding
the deliberate starvation program inflicted upon these
prisoners by lack of adequate food, we found no evidence
that the people of Germany, as a whole, were suffering from
any lack of sufficient food or clothing. The contrast was so
striking that the only conclusion which we could reach was
that the starvation of the inmates of these camps was
deliberate.
"Upon entrance into these camps, newcomers were forced to
work either at an adjoining war factory or were placed 'in
commando' on various jobs in the vicinity, being returned
each night to their stall in the barracks. Generally a German
criminal was placed in charge of each 'block' or shed in which
the prisoners slept. Periodically he would choose the one
prisoner of his block who seemed the most alert or intelligent
or showed most leadership qualities. These would report to
the guards' room and would never be heard from again. The
generally accepted belief of the prisoners was that these were
shot or gassed or hanged and then cremated. A refusal to
work or an infraction of the rules usually meant flogging and
other types of torture, such as having the fingernails pulled
out, and in each case usually ended in death after extensive
suffering. The policies herein described constituted a cal-
culated and diabolical program of planned torture and exter-
mination on the part of those who were in control of the
."
German Government . . .

I quote next from Page 11 of the English text beginning with

the second sentence of Paragraph 2, a description of Camp Dora at

Nordhausen, Page 12, Paragraph 1 of the German text, quoting as
follows:
"On the whole, we found this camp to have been operated
and administered much in the same manner as Buchenwald

468
 12 Dec. 45

had been operated and managed. When the efficiency of the

workers decreased as a result of the conditions under which
they were required to live, their rations were decreased as
punishment. This brought about a vicious circle in which the
weak became weaker and were ultimately exterminated."
Such was the cycle of work, torture, starvation, and death for
—
concentration-camp labor labor which the Defendant Goring, while
requesting that more of it be placed at his disposal, said had proved
very useful; labor which the Defendant Speer was "anxious" to use
in the factories under his control.
The policy underlying this program, the manner in which it was
executed, and the responsibility of the conspirators in connection
with it has been dwelt upon at length. Therefore, we should like,
at this point, to discuss the special responsibility of the Defendant
Sauckel.
The Defendant Sauckel's appointment as Plenipotentiary General
for manpower is explained probably first of allby his having been
an old and trusted Nazi. He certified in Document 2974-PS, dated
17 November 1945, which is already in evidence before this Tribunal
as Exhibit Number USA-15, that he held the following positions:
Starting with his membership in the NSDAP, he was thereafter
a member of the Reichstag; he was Gauleiter of Thuringia; he was
a member of the Thuringian legislature; he was Minister of Interior
and head of the Thuringian State Ministry; he was Reichsstatthalter
for Thuringia; he was an SA Obergruppenführer; he was SS Ober-
gruppenführer; he was administrator for the Berlin-Suhler Waffen
and Fahrzeugwerke in 1935; he was head of the Gustloff Werke
Nationalsozialistische Industrie-Stiftung, 1936, and the honorary
head of the Foundation. And from the 21st of March 1942 until
1945, he was the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation.
Sauckel's official responsibilities are borne out by evidence. His
appointment as Plenipotentiary General for manpower was effected
by a decree of the 21st of March 1942, which we have read and
which was signed by Hitler, Lammers, and the Defendant Keitel.
And by that decree Sauckel was given authority, as well as respon-
sibility, subordinate only to that of Hitler and Goring, who was the
—
head of the Four Year Plan subordinate only to those two for all
matters relating to recruitment, allocation, and handling of foreign
and domestic manpower.
The Defendant Goring, to whom Sauckel was directly respon-
sible,abolished the recruitment and allocation agencies of his Four
Year Plan and delegated their powers to the Defendant Sauckel and
placed his far-reaching authority as deputy for the Four Year Plan
at Sauckel's disposal.

469
12 Dec. 45

In Document 1666-PS, a second 1666-PS but of another date, the

27th of March 1942—1 ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
this original decree, which is published in the 1942 Reichsgesetz-
hlatt, Part I, at Page 180:

"In pursuance of the Führer's decree of 21st of March 1942,

I decree as follows:
"1. My manpower are hereby abolished (circular
sections
letter of 22d of October Their duties (recruitment and
1936).
allocation of manpower, regulation of labor conditions) are
taken over by the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of
Labor, who is directly under me.
"2. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor will
be responsible for regulating the conditions of labor (wage
policy) employed in the Reich territory, having regard to the
requirements of labor allocation.
"3. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor is
part of the Four Year Plan. In cases where new legislation
is required or. existing laws need to be modified, he will sub-
mit appropriate proposals to me.
"4. The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor wiU
have performance of his task the right
at his disposal for the
delegated to me by the Führer for issuing instructions to the
highest Reich authorities and their subordinate offices, as well
as the Party offices and their sections and their affiliated
organizations, also to the Reich Protector, the Governor
General, the military commanders, and heads of the civil
administrations. In the case of ordinances and instructions
of fundamental importance, a report is to be submitted to me
in advance."
Document Number 1903-PS is a Hitler decree of the 30th of Sep-
tember 1942 giving the Defendant Sauckel extraordinary powers
over the civil and military authority of the territories occupied by
Germany. We ask that judicial notice be taken by this Tribunal
of the original decree, which is published in Volume II, Page 510,
of the Verfügungen, Anordnungen, und Bekanntgaben, published by
the Party Chancellery. This decree states as follows:
"I herewith authorize the Plenipotentiary General for Allo-
cation of Labor, Reich Governor and Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel
to take all necessary measures for the enforcement of my
decree of 21 March 1942, concerning a Plenipotentiary General
for Allocation of Labor (Reichsgesetzhlatt I, Page 179), accord-
ing to his own judgment, in the Greater German Reich, in the
Protectorate, and in the Government General, as well as in
—
the Occupied Territories measures which will safeguard
under all circumstances the regulated deployment of labor

470
 —

12 Dec. 45

for the German war economy. For this purpose he may

appoint commissioners to the bureaus of the military and
civilian administration. These are responsible directly to the
Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor. In order to
carry out their tasks, they are entitled to issue directives to
the competent military and civilian authorities in charge of
labor allocation and of wage policy.
"More detailed directives will be issued by the Plenipotenti-
ary General for Allocation of Labor.
"Führer headquarters, 30 September 1942. The Führer,"
signed— "Adolf Hitler."
Within 1 month after his appointment, the Defendant Sauckel
sent Defendant Rosenberg his "Labor Mobilization Program". This
program. Document Number 016-PS, already in evidence as Exhibit
USA-168, envisaged a recruitment by force and the maximum
exploitation of the entire labor resources of the conquered areas
and of prisoners of war in, the interests of the Nazi war machine
at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure to the German
State. •

—
The Defendant Sauckel states and I refer now to the bottom
of Page 6 of the English text of that document. It is Page 9, Para-
graph 2, of the. German text, and I quote as follows:
"It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremen-
dous number of foreign laborers has to be found for the
Reich. The greatest pool for that purpose is the occupied
territories of the East. Consequently, it is an imperative
necessity to use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet
territory to the fullest extent. Should we not succeed in ob-
taining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis,
we must immediately institute conscription of forced labor.
"Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied terri-
tories, we must, therefore, requisition skilled or unskilled
male and female labor from the Soviet territory from the age
of 15 up, for the German allocation of labor."
Passing to Page 11 of the English text, first paragraph and
Page 17, Paragraph 4, of the German text, I quote as follows
directly:
"The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as
number of new foreign
the use of a gigantic civilian workers,
men and women, has become an indisputable necessity for the
solution of the problem of the allocation of labor in this war."
The Defendant Sauckel proceeded to implement this plan, which
he submitted, with certain basic directives. He provided that if
voluntary recruitment of foreign workers was unsuccessful compul-
sory service should be instituted.

471
 —

12 Dec. 45

Document Number 3044-PS the Defendant Sauckel's Regulation

is
Number 4, May
1942. And we ask that the Tri-
dated the 7th of
bunal take judicial notice of the original regulation published in
Volume II, Pages 516 to 527 of the Verfügungen, Anordnungen, und
Bekanntgaben, to which I have previously referred; Reading from
Page 1, Paragraph 3, of the English text:
"The recruitment of foreign labor will be done on principle
on a volunteer basis. Where, however, in the occupied terri-
tories the appeal for volunteers does not suffice, obhgatory ser-
vice and drafting must, under all circumstances, be resorted
to. This is an indisputable requirement of our labor situ-
ation."
Sauckel provided also for the allocation of foreign labor in the
order of its importance to the Nazi war machine. We refer to Docu-
ment Number 3044(a)-PS, which is the Defendant Sauckel's Regula-
tion Number 10, and ask that the Court take judicial notice of the
original regulation, published in Volume II, Verfügungen, Anord-
nungen, und Bekanntgaben, at Pages 531 to 533. Paragraph 3 of
this regulation I quote as follows:
"The resources of manpower that are available in the occupied
be employed primarily to satisfy the require-
territories are to
ments of importance for the war in Germany itself. In allo-
cating the said labor resources in the Occupied Territories,
the following order of priority will be observed:
"(a) Labor required for the troops, the occupation authorities,
and the civil authorities;
"(b) Labor required for German armament;
"(c) Labor required for food and agriculture;

"(d) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of

Germany, other than armaments;
"(e) Labor required for industrial work in the interests of
the population of the territory in question."
The Defendant Sauckel, and agencies subordinate to him, exer-
cised exclusive authority over the recruitment of workers from
every area in Europe occupied by, controlled by, or friendly to, the
—
German nation. He affirmed, himself the Defendant Sauckel did
this authority in a decree. Document Number 3044-PS, already
in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-206. I refer to Paragraph 5
on Page 1 of the English text of that document, and I am quoting
it directly:
"The recruitment of labor in the areas occupied by Germany
will be carried out exclusively by the labor allocation offices
of the German military or civil administration in these areas."

THE PRESIDENT: Haven't you read that already?

472
 12 Dec. 45

MR. DODD: No, I have not, if Your Honor pleases. We have

referred to that decree before, but we have not referred to this
portion of it.
I am passing to Paragraph II, 1-a on Page 2, and quoting again
directly:
"For the carrying out of recruitment in allied, friendly, or
neutral foreign countries, my commissioners are solely respon-
sible."
In addition, the following defendants, who were informed by
Sauckel of the quotas of foreign laborers which he required, collab-
orated with Sauckel and his agents in filling these quotas: The
Defendant Keitel, Chief of the OKW—
which was the Supreme
—
Command who collaborated with Sauckel.
We refer to Document Number 3012(1)-PS, which is Exhibit
Number USA-190. This document is the record of a telephone con-
versation of the Chief of the Economic Staff East of the German
Army, and it is dated March 11, 1943. I wish to quote from the
first two paragraphs of the document as follows:

"The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Gau-

leiter Sauckel, points out to me in an urgent teletype that
the allocation of labor in German agriculture, as well as all
the most urgent armament programs ordered by the Führer,
make the most rapid procurement of approximately 1 million
women and men from the newly occupied Eastern Territories
within the next 4 months an imperative necessity. For this
purpose, Gauleiter Sauckel demands the shipment of 5,000
workers daily beginning 15 March; 10,000 workers, male and
female, beginning 1 April, from the newly occupied Eastern
Territories."
I am passing down to the next paragraph:
"In consideration of the extraordinary losses of workers which
occurred in German war industry because of the develop-
ments of the past months, it is now necessary that the recruit-
ing of workers be taken up again everywhere with all vigor.
The tendency momentarily noticeable in that territory, to
limit and/or entirely stop the Reich recruiting program, is
absolutely not bearable in view of this state of affairs. Gau-
leiter Sauckel, who is informed about these events, because
of this applied directly to General Field Marshal Keitel on
10 March 1943, in a teletype, and emphasized on this occasion
that, as in all other occupied territories, where all other
methods fail, a certain pressure must be used, by order of the
Führer." •
At this point we were prepared to offer a transcript of an inter-
rogation under oath of the Defendant Sauckel. Only the English

473
 12 Dec. 45

of the transcript of the interrogation has been seen by the Counsel

for the Defendant Sauckel. He has had it, however, for some time;
and the excerpts on which we intended to rely were furnished to
him as well in German.
If I understood the ruling of the Tribunal correctly, it would
be necessary for us to have furnished the entire record in German.
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might use this interrogation, as
the excerpts have been submitted in German.
MR. DODD: Yes, they have. Your Honor, and the entire English
text as well.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: I refer to a transcript of an interrogation under

oath of the Defendant Sauckel, held on the morning of the 5th of
October 1945 (Exhibit USA-224). That is the very last document in
the document book. I wish to quote from the bottom of Page 1 of
the English text and Page 1, Paragraph 11, of the German text, as
follows:
"Q: 'Was it necessary, in order to accomplish the completion
of the quotas given, to have liaison with the OKW?'
"A: 'I remember that the Führer had given directives to Mar-
shal Keitel, telling him that my task was a very important
one; and I, too, have often conferred with Keitel after such
discussions with the Führer, when I asked him for his
support.'
"Q: 'It was his task to supervise the proper performance of
the military commanders in the occupied countries in carry-
ing out their assigned mission, was it not?'
"A: 'Yes, the Führer had told me that he would inform the
Chief of the OKW
and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery as to
"
these matters. The same applies to the Foreign Minister.'
We
are also prepared to offer the transcript of an interrogation
of the Defendant Alfred Rosenberg. There is this distinction insofar
as this record is concerned. While we have supplied the counsel
with the German translation of those parts of it which we propose
to use, we have not had an opportunity to supply the whole text
to counsel. However, they have been supplied with the German of
the parts which we propose to use and to offer to this Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you are prepared to do it hereafter,
I suppose?
MR. DODD: Yes, we will, Your Honor,«as soon as we can get
these papers down to the Information Center.
THE PRESIDENT: Good.

474
 12 Dec. 45

MR. DODD: The next document is rather lengthy, and I wonder

what the Tribunal's pleasure is. Do I understand that I may proceed
with the interrogation?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. DODD: I wish to refer to the Defendant Alfred Rosenberg,

the Reich Minister for Eastern Occupied Territories, as one who
also collaborated with the Defendant Sauckel, and specifically, to
refer to a transcript of an interrogation under oath of the Defend-
ant Rosenberg, on the afternoon of the 6th of October 1945 (Exhibit
USA-187). That record may be found about the third from the last
of the interrogation records in the document book, and I wish to
read from Page 1 of the transcript:
"Q: Isn't it a fact that Sauckel would allocate to the various
areas under your jurisdiction the number of persons to be
obtained for labor purposes?'
"A: 'Yes.'
"Q: 'And that thereafter your agents would obtain that labor
in order to meet the quota which had been given. Is that
right?'
"A: 'Sauckel, normally, had very far-reaching desires, which
one could not fulfil unless one looked very closely into the
matter.'
"Q: 'Never mind about Sauckel's desires being far-reaching
or not being far-reaching. That has nothing to do with it.
You were given quotas for the areas over which you had
jurisdiction, and it was up to you to meet that quota?'

"A: 'Yes. It was the responsibility of the administrative offi-

cials to receive quota and to distribute the allotments
this
over the districts in such a way, according to number and
according to the age groups, that they would be most reason-
ably met.'
"Q: 'These administrative officials were part of your organi-
zation, isn't that right?'

"A: 'They were functionaries or officials of the Reich Com-

missioner for the Ukraine; but, as such, they were placed in
their office by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Terri-
tories.'

"Q: 'You recognized, did you not, that the quotas set by
Sauckel could not be filled by voluntary labor; and you did
not disapprove of the impressment of forced labor. Isn't that
right?'
"A: 'I regretted that the demands of Sauckel were so urgent

that they could not be met by a continuation of voluntary

475
12 Dec. 45

recruitments, and thus I submitted to the necessity of forced

impressment.' "
Then, passing a Httle further down on that page:
"Q: 'The letters that we have already seen between you and
Sauckel do not indicate, do they, any disagreement on your
part with the principle of recruiting workers against their
will? They indicate, as I remember, that you were opposed
to the treatment that was later accorded these workers, but
you did not oppose their initial impressment. " '

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think you ought to read the next
two answers in fairness to the Defendant Rosenberg, after the one
where he said he submitted to the necessity of forced impressment.
MR. DODD: Very well, I shall read those, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: " 'Did you ever argue with Sauckel . . .

MR. DODD: Yes.

"Q: 'Did you ever argue with Sauckel that perhaps in view
of the fact that the quotas could not be met by voluntary
labor, the labor recruiting program be abandoned, except for
what recruits could be voluntarily enrolled?'
"A: 'I could not do that because the numbers or allotments

that Sauckel had received from the Führer to meet were

absolutely binding for him, and I couldn't do anything about
"
that.'

And then, referring again to the question which I had just read,
the answer is as follows:
" 'That In those matters I mostly discussed the pos-
is right.
sibility offinding the least harsh methods of handling the
matter, whereas in no way did I place myself in opposition
"
to the orders that he was carrying out for the Führer.'

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal might adjourn now.

MR. DODD: Very weU, Your Honor.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 13 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

476
 NINETEENTH DAY
Thursday, 13 December 1945

Morning Session

MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, at the close of yester-

day's session we were discussing and had just completed reading
the excerpts from the interrogation of 6 October 1945, wherein the
Defendant Alfred Rosenberg was questioned.
There have already been introduced Documents 017-PS and
019-PS and I have read excerpts from them. The Tribunal will
recall that they are letters written by the Defendant Sauckel to
the Defendant Rosenberg requesting the assistance of the Defendant
Rosenberg in the recruitment of additional foreign laborers. I refer
to them in passing, by way of recapitulation, with respect to the
Defendant Sauckel's participation in this slave-labor program and
also the assistance of the Defendant Rosenberg. Also the Defendant
Sauckel received help from the Defendant Seyss-Inquart who was
the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands.
I refer again to the transcript of the interrogation under oath of
the Defendant Sauckel, which was read from yesterday; and I now
refer to another part of it. The transcript of this interrogation will
be found in the rear of the document book. It is the very last
document and I wish to quote particularly from it. It is the first
question:
'
"Q: For a moment, I want to turn our attention to Holland.
It is my
understanding that the quotas for the workers from
Holland were agreed upon, and then the numbers given to
the Reich Commissioner Seyss-Inquart to fulfill, is that cor-
rect?
"A: Yes, that is correct.

"Q: After the quota was given to Seyss-Inquart, it was his

mission to fulfill it with the aid of your representatives; was
it not?

"A: Yes. This was the only possible thing for me to do and
the same appUed to other countries."
And the Defendant Hans Frank, who was the Governor General
of the Government General of Poland, also participated in the fill-
ing of Defendant Sauckel's quota requirements.

477
13 Dec. 45

I refer again to the interrogation of the Defendant Sauckel and

to Page 1 of the excerpts from the transcript of this interrogation
as it appears in the document book:
"Q: Was the same procedure substantially followed of allo-
cating quotas in the Government General of Poland?
"A: Yes. I have principally to repeat that the only possibility
I had in carrying through these missions was to get in touch
with the highest German military authority in the respective
country and to transfer to them the orders of the Führer and
ask them very urgently, as I have always done, to fulfill these
orders.
"Q: Such discussions in Poland, of course, were with the
Governor General Frank?
"A: Yes. I spent a morning and an afternoon in Krakow
twice or three times and I personally spoke to Governor
General Frank. Naturally, there was also present Secretary
Dr. Goebbels."
The SS, as in most matters involving the use of force and bru-
tality, also extended its assistance. We refer to Document Number
1292-PS, which is Exhibit USA-225. This Document, 1292-PS, is the
report of the chief of the Reich Chancellery, Lammers, of a con-
ference with Hitler, which was attended by, among others, the
Defendant Sauckel, the Defendant Speer, and Himmler, the Reichs-
führer SS. I tum to Page 2 of the document, beginning with the
third line from the top of the page of the English text; and it is
Page 4, Paragraph 2 of the German text. The quotation reads as
follows:
"The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor, Sauckel,
declared that he will attempt with fanatical determination to
obtain these workers. Until now he has always kept his
promises as to the number of workers to be furnished. With
the best of intentions, however, he is unable to make a defi-
nite promise for 1944. He will do everything in his power to
furnish the requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will
succeed depends primarily on what German executive agents
will be made available. His project cannot be carried out
with indigenous executive agents."
There are additional quotations, as the Tribunal may observe,
in this very part from which I have been reading, but I intend to
refer to them again a little further on.
The Defendant Sauckel participated in the formulation of the
over-all labor requirements for Germany and passed out quotas to
be filled by and with the assistance of the individuals and agencies
referred to, in the certain knowledge that force and brutality were

478
 13 Dec. 45

the only means whereby his demands could be met. Turning to

Document 1292-PS again, and quoting from Page 1:
"1. A conference took place with the Führer today which was
attended by:
"The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor,
Gauleiter Sauckel; the Secretary for Armament and War
Production, Speer; the Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Army, General Field Marshal Keitel; General Field Mar-
shal Milch; the acting Reich Minister for Food and Agricul-
ture, State Secretary Backe; the Minister of the Interior,
Reichsführer of the SS, Himmler; and myself. (The Minister
for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy had
repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate prior to the
conference, but the Führer did not wish their attendance.)"

Continuing the quotation:

"The Führer declared in his introductory remarks:
" 'I want a clear picture:
" '(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of
German war economy?
" '(a) For the maintenance of present output?
" '(b) To increase its output?
" *(2) How many workers can be obtained from occupied coun-
tries,or how many can still be gained in the Reich by suitable
means (increased output)? For one thing, it is a matter of
making up for losses of labor by death, infirmity, the constant
fluctuation of workers, and so forth; and further it is a matter
of procuring additional workers.'
"The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor,
Sauckel, declared that, in order to maintain the present
amount of workers he would have to add at least 2V2 but
probably 3 million new workers in 1944. Otherwise produc-
tion would fall off.

"Reich Minister Speer declared that he needed an additional

1,300,000 laborers. However, this would depend on whether
it will be possible to increase production of iron ore. Should
this not be possible, he would need no additional workers.
Procurement of additional workers from occupied territory
would, however, be subject to the condition that these work-
ers will not be withdrawn from armament and auxiliary
industries already working there. For this would mean a
decrease of production of these industries which he could not
tolerate. Those, for instance, who are already working in
France in industries mentioned above must be protected.

479
13 Dec. 45

against being sent to work in Germany by the Plenipotenti-

ary General for the Allocation of Labor.
"The Führer agreed with the opinions of Reich Minister Speer
and emphasized that the measures taken by the Plenipoten-
tiary General for the Allocation of Labor should create no
circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of work-
ers from armament and auxiliary industries working in occu-
pied territories, because such a shifting of workers would
only cause disturbance of production in occupied countries.
"The Führer further called attention to the fact that at least
250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air
attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna
alone 2,000-2,500 are required immediately. The Plenipotenti-
ary General for the Allocation of Labor will need at least
4 million workers considering that he requires 2V2 million
workers for maintenance of the present level, that Reich
Minister Speer needs 1,300,000 additional workers, and that
the above-mentioned preparations for security measures
against air attacks call for 250,000 laborers."
Referring again to Page 2, the first fullparagraph of the English
text of this document, and Page 5, Paragraph 1, of the German text:
"The Reichsführer SS explained that the executive agents
put at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try
helping the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them
and working them harder. The Reichsführer SS made imme-
diately available 2,000 to 2,500 men from concentration camps
for air raid preparations in Vienna."
Passing the next paragraph of this document and continuing
with the paragraph entitled "Results of the Conference" and quoting
it directly after the small figure 1:

"The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor shall

procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied terri-
tories."
Moreover, as Document 3012-PS, which has already been offered
as Exhibit USA-190, revealed, the Defendant Sauckel, in requesting
the assistance of the Army for the recruitment of 1 million men and
women from the Occupied Eastern Territories, informed the Defend-
ant Keitel that prompt action was required and that, as in all other
occupied countries, pressure had to be used if other measures were
not successful. Again, as revealed by Document 018-PS, which has
been offered and from which excerpts have been read, the Defendant
Sauckel was informed by the Defendant Rosenberg that the enslave-
ment of foreign labor was achieved by force and brutality. Not-
withstanding his knowledge of these conditions, the Defendant
Sauckel continued to request greater supplies of manpower from

480
 13 Dec. 45

the areas in which the most ruthless methods had been applied.
Indeed, when German field commanders on the Eastern Front
attempted to resist or restrain the Defendant Sauckel's demands,
because forced recruitment was swelling the ranks of the partisans
and making the Army's task more difficult, Sauckel sent a telegram
to Hitler, in which he implored him, Hitler, to intervene.
I make reference to Document Number 407(II)-PS, which bears
Exhibit Number USA-226. This document a telegram from the
is
Defendant Sauckel to Hitler dated 10 March 1943. It is a rather
long message, but I wish to call particularly to the attention of the
Tribunal the last paragraph on Page 1 of the English text. It is
Page 2, Paragraph 5 of the German text. Quoting the last para-
graph of the English text:
"Therefore, my Führer, I ask you to abolish all orders which
oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and kindly
to report to me whether my conception of the mission pre-
sented here is still right."
Turning to Paragraph 5 on the first page of this English text,
we find these words, quotingthem directly:
"If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of work-
ers in the East is not possible any more, then the German
war industries and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the
full extent."

The next paragraph:

"I myself have the opinion that our Army leaders should not
give credence, under any circumstances, to the atrocity and
defamatory propaganda campaign of the partisans. The gen-
erals themselves are greatly interested that the support for
the troops is made possible in time. I should Uke to point out
that hundreds of thousands of excellent workers going into
the field as soldiers now cannot possibly be replaced by Ger-
man women not used to work, even if they are trying to do
their best. Therefore, I have to use the people of the Eastern
Territories."

THE PRESIDENT: I think you should read the next paragraph.

MR. DODD: myself report to you that the workers belong-
"I
ing to all foreign nations are treated humanely, and correctly, .

and cleanly; are fed and housed well and are even clothed.
On the basis of my own services with foreign nations I go as
far as to state that never before in the world were foreign
workers treated as correctly as they are now, in the hardest
of all wars, by the German people."
In addition to being responsible for the recruitment of foreign
civilian labor by force, Defendant Sauckel was responsible for the

481
13 Dec. 45

conditions under which foreign workers were deported to Germany

and for the treatment to which they were subjected within Ger-
many.
We have already referred to the conditions under which these
imported persons were transported to Germany and we have read
from Document 2241(3)-PS to show that Sauckel knew of these con-
ditions. Yesterday we referred at length to the brutal, degrading,
and inhumane conditions under which these laborers worked and
lived within Germany. We again invite the attention of the Tri-
bunal to Document 3044-PS, already offered as Exhibit USA-206. It
is Regulation Number 4 of 7 May 1942, issued by Sauckel as the
Plenipotentiary General for the mobilization of labor, concerning
recruitment, care, lodging, feeding, and treatment of foreign work-
ers of both sexes. By this decree Defendant Sauckel expressly
directed that the assembly and operation of rail transports and the
supplying of food therefor was the responsibility of his agents
until the transports arrived in Germany. By the same regulation
Defendant Sauckel directed that within Germany the care of foreign
industrial workers was to be carried out by the German Labor
Front and that the care of foreign agricultural workers was to be
carried out by the Reich Food Administration. By the terms of the
regulation, Sauckel reserved for himself ultimate responsibility for
all aspects of care, treatment, lodging, and feeding of foreign work-
ers while in transit to and within Germany.
refer particularly to the English text of this Document 3044-PS,
I

Exhibit USA-206; and the part of it that I make reference to is at

the bottom of Page 1 in the English text, and it appears at Page 518
of the volume in the German text. Quoting directly from the Eng-
lish text:
"The care of foreign labor will be carried out:
"(a) Up
to the Reich border by my commissioners or, in the
occupied areas, by competent military or civil labor allocation
agencies; care of the workers will be carried out in co-opera-
tion with the respective competent foreign organization;
"(b) Within the area of the Reich (1) by the German Labor

^ Front in the cases of non-agricultural workers, (2) by the

Reich Food Administration in the case of agricultural workers.
"The German Labor Front and the German Food Administra-
tion are bound by my directives in the carrying out of their
tasks of caring for the workers.
"The administrative agencies for the Allocation of Labor are
to give far-reaching support to the German Labor Front and
the German Food Administration in the fulfillment of their
assigned tasks.

482
 13 Dec. 45

"My competence for the execution of the care for foreign

labor is not prejudiced by the assignment of these tasks to
the German Labor Front and the Reich Food Administration."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, don't you think that that sort of
passage is the sort of passage which might be summarized and not
read, because all that it is really stating is that Sauckel, his depart-
ment and commissioners, were responsible and that is what he is
saying.

MR. DODD: Yes, indeed, Your Honor, we spelled it out, thinking

that perhaps under the rule of getting it into the record it must be
read fully. I quite agree.
THE PRESIDENT: A summary will be quite sufficient, I think.

MR. DODD: In the same document, I should like to make

reference to the data on Page 3, Paragraph III, of the English text,
which indicate, under the title of "Composition and Operation of
the Transports" that this function is the obligation of the repre-
sentatives of the Defendant Sauckel; and in Paragraph "c," on
Page 5 of the English text, under the title of "Supply for the
Transport," after setting out some responsibility for the Office of
the German Workers Front, the Defendant Sauckel states that for
the rest his offices effect the supply for the transport.
The Defendant Sauckel had an agreement with the head of the
German Labor Front, Dr. Robert Ley, and in this agreement the
Defendant Sauckel emphasized his ultimate responsibility by creat-
ing a central inspectorate charged with examining the working and
living conditions of foreign workers. We
refer to Document 1913-PS,
Exhibit USA-227. This agreement between the Defendant Sauckel
and the then Chief of the German Labor Front is published in the
1943 edition of the Reichsarheitshlatt, Part I, at Page 588. It is a
rather lengthy agreement; and I shall not read it all or any great
part of it except such part as will indicate the basic agreements
between the Defendant Sauckel and Ley with respect to the foreign
workers and their living conditions and working conditions.
On the first page of the English text:
"The Reichsleiter of the German Labor Front, Dr. Ley, in
collaboration with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allo-
cation of Labor, Qauleiter Sauckel, will establish a 'Central
Inspection' for the continuous supervision of all measures
concerning the care of the foreign workers mentioned under 1.
This will have the designation: Central Inspection for Care
of Foreign Workers."
Paragraph 4 marked with the Roman numeral IV, in the same
text, states:

483
13 Dec. 45

"The offices for the administration of the Allocation of Labor

willbe constantly informed by the 'Central Inspection for the
Care of Foreign Workers' of its observations, in particular,
immediately in each case in which action of state organizations
seems to be necessary."
I should also like to call the attention of the Tribunal to this
paragraph, which is quoted on the same page. It is the fourth para-
graph down after the small number 2 and it begins with the words:
"The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allo-
cation of Labor to empower the members of his staff and the
presidents of the state employment offices to get direct infor-
mation on the conditions regarding the employment of for-
eigners in the factories and camps will remain untouched."
We have already offered to the Court proof that the Defendant
Sauckel was responsible for compelling citizens of the occupied
countries, against their will, to manufacture arms and munitions
and to construct military fortifications for use in war operations
against their own country and its allies. He was, moreover, respon-
sible for having compelled prisoners of war to produce arms and
munitions for use against their own countries and their actively
resisting allies.
The decree appointing Sauckel indicates that he was appointed
Plenipotentiary General for manpower for the express purpose,
among others, of integrating prisoners of war into the German war
industry; and in a series of reports to Hitler, Sauckel described how
successful he had been in carrying out that program. One such
report states that in a single year the Defendant Sauckel had
incorporated 1,622,829 prisoners of war into the German economy.
I Document Number 407(V)-PS, which is Exhibit USA-
refer to
228. Ita letter from the Defendant Sauckel to Hitler on the
is
14th of April 1943. Although the figures in the document have been
contained in another document, this is the first introduction of this
particular document. Quoting from Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Eng-
lish text, it begins:

"My Führer:
"... afterhaving been active as Plenipotentiary for the Allo-
cation of Labor for one year, I have the honor to report to
you that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added to
the German war economy between April 1st of the last year
and March 31st of this year."
Passing on a little bit, with particular reference to the prisoners
of war, we find this statement:
"Besides the foreign civilian workers another 1,622,829 pris-
oners of war are employed in the German economy."

484
 .

13 Dec. 45

A later report states that 846,511 additional foreign laborers and

prisoners of war were incorporated into the German war industry;
and quoting from Document 407(IX)-PS, Exhibit USA-229, which is
also a letter from the Defendant Sauckel to Hitler, I read in part
from Page 1, Paragraphs 1 and 2:

"My Führer:
"I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of
the Arbeitseinsatz for the first 5 months of 1943. For the first
time the following number of new foreign laborers and pris-
oners of war were employed in the German war industry . .

Total: 846,511."

This use of prisoners of war in the manufacture of armaments

allocated by the Defendant Sauckel was confirmed by the Defend-
ant Speer, who stated that 40 percent of all prisoners of war were
employed in the production of weapons and munitions and in sub-
sidiary industries.I wish to refer briefly to Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8
on Page 15 of the English text of an interrogation of the Defendant
Speer, on the 18th of October 1945, which was offered and referred
to yesterday and has the Exhibit Number USA-220. Quoting from
—
Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 on Page 15 Paragraph 1 on Page 19 of the
—
German text there are two questions which will establish the
background for this answer:
"Q: Let me understand; when you wanted labor from pris-
oners of war did you requisition prisoners of war separately,
or did you ask for a total number of workers?
"A: Only Schmelter can answer that directly. As far as the
commitment of prisoners of war for labor goes, it was effected
through employment officers of the Stalags. I tried several
times to increase the total number of prisoners of war that
were occupied in production, at the expense of the other
demands.
"Q: Will you explain that a little more?
"A: In the last phase of production, that is, in the year 1944
when everything collapsed, I had 40 percent of all prisoners
of war employed in production. I wanted to have this per-
centage increased.
"Q: And when you say 'employed in production', you mean
in these subsidiary industries that you have discussed and
also in the production of weapons and munitions, is that
right?
"A: Yes. That was the total extent of my task."

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What do you mean by "subsidiary

industries," Mr. Dodd? Is that war industries?

485
13 Dec. 45

MR. DODD: Yes, Sir; war industries, as we understand it. It

was referred to many times by these defendants as the component
parts of the plans.
I also would like to call the attention of the Tribunal again to
the "Minutes of the 36th Meeting of the Central Planning Board,"
Document R-124, from which we read a number of excerpts yester-
day, and remind the Tribunal that in the report of the minutes of
that meeting the Defendant Speer stated that, "Ninety thousand
Russian prisoners of war employed in the whole of the armament
industry are for the greater part skilled men."
We should like, at this point, to turn to the special respon-
sibility of the Defendant Speer and to discuss the evidence of the
various crimes committed by Defendant Speer in planning and
participating in the vast program of forcible deportation of the
citizens of occupied countries. He was the Reich Minister of Arma-
ments and Munitions and Chief of the Organization Todt, both of
which positions he acquired on the 15th of February 1942; and by
•virtue of his later acquisition of control ovêr the armament offices
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the production offices of the
Ministry of Economics, the Defendant Speer was responsible for the
entire war production of the Reich as well as for the construction
of fortifications and installations for the Wehrmacht. Proof of the
positions held by the Defendant Speer is supplied in his own state-
ment as contained in Document 2980-PS, which has already been
offered to the Tribunal and which bears Exhibit Number USA-18.
The industries under the Defendant Speer's control were really
the most important users of manpower in Germany; and thus,
according to the Defendant Sauckel, Speer's labor requirements
received unconditional priority over all other demands for labor.
We refer to the transcript of the interrogation of the Defendant
Sauckel on the 22d of September 1945. It is Exhibit USA-230. It
is next to the last document in the document book. I wish to refer
to Page 1 of that document. Paragraph 4. It is a brief reference,
the last answer on the page. The question was asked of the Defend-
ant Sauckel:
"Q: Except for Speer, they would give the requirements in
general for the whole field; but in Speer's work you would
get them allocated by industry, and so on — is that right?
"A: The others only got whatever was left. Because Speer
told me once in the presence of the Führer that I am here to
work for Speer and that, mainly, I am his man."
The Defendant Speer has admitted under oath that he partici-
pated in the discussions during which the decision to use foreign
forced labor was made. He has also said that he concurred in the
decision and that it was the basis for the program of bringing for-
eign workers into Germany by compulsion. I make reference to the

486
 13 Dec. 45

interrogation of the Defendant Speer of the 18th of October 1945.

It bears the Exhibit Number USA-220. We have already read from
it; and I particularly refer to the bottom of Page 12 and the top of
'
Page 13 of the EngUsh text:
"Q: But is it clear to yo«i, Mr. Speer, that in 1942 when the
decisions were being made concerning the use of forced for-
eign labor, that you participated in the discussions yourself?
"A: Yes.
"Q: So that I take it that the execution of the program of
bringing foreign workers into Germany by compulsion under
Sauckel was based on earlier decisions that had been made
with your agreement?
"A: Yes, but I must point out that only a very small part of
the manpower that Sauckel brought into Germany was made
available to me; a far larger part of it was allocated to other
departments that demanded them."
This admission is confirmed by the minutes of Speer's confer-
ences with Hitler on 10, 11, and 12 August 1942 in Document R-124,
which has been offered here and from which excerpts have been
read. Page 34 of that document, Paragraph 1 of the English text,
has already been quoted, and those excerpts have been read before
the Tribunal yesterday. The Tribunal wiU recall that the Defend-
ant Speer related the outcome of his negotiations concerning the
forcible recruitment of 1 million Russian laborers for the German
armaments industry; and this use of force was again discussed by
Hitler and Defendant Speer on the 4th of January 1943 as shown
by the excerpts read from the Document 556(13)-PS, where it was
decided that stronger measures were to be used to accelerate the
conscription of French civilian workers.
Wesay the Defendant Speer demanded foreign workers for the
industries under his control and used those workers with the knowl-
edge that they had been deported by force and were being com-
pelled to work. Speer has stated under oath in his interrogation of
18 October 1945, Page 5, Paragraph 9, of the English text, quoting
it directly:

"I do not wish to give the impression that I want to deny

the fact that I demanded manpower and foreign labor from
Sauckel very energetically."
He has admitted that he knew he was obtaining foreign labor,
a large part of which was forced labor; and referring again to that
same interrogation of the 18th of October 1945, and to Pages 8 and
9 of the English text and Page 10 of the German text:
"Q: So that during the period when you were asking for
labor,it seems clear, does it not, that you knew you were

487
13 Dec. 45

obtaining foreign labor as well as domestic labor in response

to your requests and that a large part of the foreign labor
was forced labor?
"A: Yes.
"Q: So that, simply by way of illustration, suppose that on
January 1, 1944 you require 50,000 workers for a given pur-
pose; would you put in a requisition for 50,000 workers, know-
ing that in that 50,000 there would be forced foreign workers?
"A: Yes."
The Defendant Speer has under oath that he knew
also stated
at least as early as September workers from the Ukraine
of 1942 that
were being forcibly deported for labor into Germany. Likewise he
knew that the great majority of the workers of the western occupied
countries were slave laborers forced against their will to come to
Germany; and again referring to his interrogation of this 18th day
of October 1945, and beginning with the fourth Paragraph from the
bottom of Page 5 of the English text. Paragraph 10 on Page 6 of
the German text, we find this series of questions and answers:
"Q: When did you first find out then that some of the man-
power from the Ukraine was not coming voluntarily?
"A: It is rather difficult to answer this here, that is, to name
a certain date to you. However, it is certain that I knew that
at some particular point of time the manpower from the
Ukraine did not come voluntarily.
"Q: And does that apply also to the manpower from other
occupied countries; that is, did there come a time when you
knew that they were not coming voluntarily?
"A: Yes.
"Q: When, in general, would you say. that time was without
placing a particular month of the year?
"A: As far as the Ukraine situation goes, I believe that they
come voluntarily any more after a few months, because
did not
immense mistakes were made in their treatment by us. I
should say offhand that this time was either in July, August,
or September of 1942."
Turning to Paragraph 11 on Page 6 of the English text of this
same interrogation and Page 7 and Paragraph 8 of the German
text, we find this series of questions —
and answers quoting:
"Q: But many workers actually did come from the west to
Germany, did they not?
"A: Yes.
"Q: That means then, that the great majority of the workers
—
that came from the western countries the western occupied
—
countries came against their will to Germany?

488
 13 Dec. 45

"A: Yes."
These admissions are borne out, of course, by other evidence,
for as Document R-124 shows and as we have shown by the readings
from it, in all countries conscription for work in Germany could
be carried out only with the active assistance of the poHce; and the
prevailing methods of recruitment had provoked such violence that
many German recruiting agents had been killed.
And again, at a meeting with Hitler to discuss the manpower
requirements for 1944, which is reported in Document 1292-PS,
Speer was informed by the Defendant Sauckel that the require-
—
ments including Speer's requirement for 1,300,000 additional labor-
—
ers could be met only if German enforcement agents were furnished
to carry out the enslavement program in the occupied countries.
Now we say that notwithstanding this knowledge that these
workers were conscripted and deported to Germany against their
will, Speer nevertheless continued to formulate requirements for
the foreign workers and requested their allocation to these indus-
tries which were subject to his control. This is borne out by the
minutes of the Central Planning Board as contained in Document
R-124, and particularly Page 13, Paragraph 4 of the English text;
and that is Page 6 and Paragraph 4 of the German text. Speer
speaking:
"Now the labor problem in Germany. I believe it is still
possible to transfer some from the western territories. Only
recently the Führer stated he wishes to dissolve these foreign
volunteers as he had the impression that the army groups
were carting around with them a lot of ballast. Therefore, if
we cannot settle this matter ourselves, we shall have to call
a meeting with the Führer to clear up the whole coal situ-
ation. Keitel and Zeitzler will be invited to attend in order
to determine the number of Russians from the rear army
territories who must be sent to us. However, I see another
possibility: We might organize another drive to pick out
workers for the mines from the Russian prisoners of war in
the Reich. But this possibility is none too promising."
At another meeting of the Central Planning Board the Defendant
Speer rejected a suggestion that labor for industries under his
control be furnished from German sources instead of from foreign
sources. And again in this Document R-124, on Page 16, Para-
graphs 3, 4, and 5 of the English text, and Page 12, Paragraphs 6
—
and 7 of the German text I quote the Defendant Speer:
"We do that way: Kehrl collects the demands for labor
it

necessary to complete the coal-and-iron plan and communi-

* cates the numbers to Sauckel. Probably there will be a con-
ference at the Reich Marshal's in the next week, and an

489
13 Dec. 45

answer from Sauckel should have arrived by then. The ques-

armaments industry will be solved
tion of recruitment for the
together with Weger."
Kehrl speaking:
"I wish to urge that the allotments to the mines should not
be made dependent on the possibility of recruitment of men
abroad. We were completely frustrated these last 3 months
because this principle had been applied. We ended December
with a deficit of 25,000 and we never get replacements. The
number must be made up by men from Germany.
"Speer: 'No, nothing doing.' "
Wesay also that the Defendant Speer is guilty of advocating
terror and brutality as a means of maximizing production by slave
laborers. And again I refer to this Document R-124. At Page 42
there is a discussion concerning the supply and exploitation of labor.
That excerpt has been read to the Tribunal before, and I simply
refer to it in passing. It is the excerpt wherein Speer said it would
be a good thing; the effect of it was that nothing could be said
against the SS and the police taking a hand and making these men
work and produce more.
We say he is also guilty of compelling allied nationals and pris-
oners of war to engage in the production of armaments and muni-
tions and in direct military operations against their own country.
Wesay that as Chief of the Organization Todt he is accountable
for which were in direct conflict with the laws of war;
its policies,
for the Organization Todt, in violation of the laws of war, impressed
allied nationals into its service.
Document L-191, Exhibit USA-231, is an International Labor
Office study of the exploitation of foreign labor by Germany. We
have only one copy of this document, this International Labor Office
study, printed at Montreal, Canada, in 1945. We
ask that the Tri-
bunal take judicial notice of it as an official publication of the Inter-
national Labor Office.
I might say with some apology, that this arrived
to the Tribunal,
at a time able even to have the excerpt mimeo-
when we were not
graphed and printed to place in your document book, so this is the
one document which is missing from the document book which is in
your hands. However, I should like to quote from Page 73, Para-
graph 2, of this study by the International Labor Office. It is not
long; it is very brief. I am quoting directly. It says:

"The methods used for the recruitment of foreign workers

who were destined for employment in the Organization did
not greatly differ from the methods used for the recruitment
of foreigners for deportation to Germany."

490
 .

13 Dec. 45

"The Organization," by the way, is the Organization Todt. Going

on with the quotation:
"The main difference was that, since the principal activities
of the Organization lay outside the frontiers of Germany, for-
eigners were not transported to Germany but had either to
work in their own country or in some other occupied country.
"In the recruitment drives for foreign workers for the Organi-
zation, methods of compulsion as well as methods of persua-
sion were used, the latter usually with very little result."
Moreover, conscripted allied nationals were compelled by this
same Organization Todt actually to engage in operations of war
against their country.
Document 407(Vin)-PS discloses that the foreign workers who
were impressed into the Organization Todt through the efforts of
the Defendant Sauckel did participate in the building of the Atlantic
Wall fortifications.
As chief of German war production, this Defendant Speer spon-
sored and approved the use of these prisoners of war in the pro-
duction of armaments and munitions. This has been made plain
by the evidence already discussed.
To sum it up briefly finally we say that it shows first that after
Speer assumed the responsibility for the armament production, his
concern, in his discussions with his co-conspirators, was to secure
a larger allocation of prisoners of war for his armament factories.
That has been shown by the quotations from the excerpts of Docu-
ment R-124, the minutes of the meeting of the Central Planning
Board; and in this same meeting the Tribunal will recall that Speer
complained because only 30 percent of the Russian prisoners of war
were engaged in the armaments industry.
We referred to a speech of Speer, Document 1435-PS we —
—
quoted from it in which he said that 10,000 prisoners of war
were put at the disposal of the armaments industry upon his orders.
And finally, Speer advocated the returning of escaped prisoners
of war to factories as convicts. That is shown again by Document
R-124, Page 13, Paragraph 5, of the English text, where the
Defendant Speer says that he has come to an arrangement . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, don't you think that we have

now?
really got this sufficiently
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir; I just ...
THE PRESIDENT: We have Speer's own admission and any
number of documents which prove the way in which these prisoners
of war and other laborers were brought into Germany.
MR. DODD: Well I just wanted to refer briefly to that passage
in that document, R-124, as showing that this defendant advocated
having escaped prisoners of war returned to the munitions factories.

491
13 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: What page?

MR. DODD: Thirteen. I don't want to labor this responsibility
of the Defendant Speer. I was anxious or perhaps I should say —
we —
are all overanxious to have the documents in the record and
before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Which is the passage you want to refer to
on Page 13?
MR. DODD: I just referred in passing to the statement which
begins with the words, "We have to come to an arrangement with
the Reichsführer SS." And in the next to the last sentence it says:
"The men should be put into the factories as convicts."
Finally, with reference to the
Defendant Speer, I should like
to say to theTribunal that he visited the concentration camp at
Mauthausen and he also visited factories such as those conducted
by the Krupp industries, where concentration camp labor was
exploited under degrading conditions. Despite this first-hand
knowledge of these conditions, both in Mauthausen and in the
places where these forced laborers were at work in factories, he
continued to direct the use of this type of labor in factories under
his own jurisdiction.

THE PRESIDENT: How do you intend to prove it as to these

concentration camps?
MR. DODD: I was going to refer the Tribunal to Page 9 of
the interrogation of the 18th of October 1945; and I refer to Page 11,
Paragraph 5, of the German text and Page 9, beginning with
Paragraph 9, of the English text:
"Q: But, in general, the use of concentration camp labor was
known to you and approved by you as a source of labor?
"A: Yes.
"Q: And you knew also, I take it, that among the inmates
of the concentration camps there were both Germans and
foreigners?
"A: I didn't think about it at that time.
"Q: As a matter of fact, you visited the Austrian concentra-
tion camp personally, did you not?
"A: I —
did not well, I was in Mauthausen once, but at that
time was not told just to what categories the inmates of
I

the concentration camps belonged.

"Q: But in general everybody knew, did they not, that
foreigners who were taken away by the Gestapo or arrested
by the Gestapo, as well as Germans, found their way into the
concentration camps?

492
 13 Dec. 45

"A: Of course, yes. I didn't mean to imply anything like

that."
And on Page 15 of this same interrogation, beginning with the
13th Paragraph of the English text and Page 20 in the German
text, we find this question:
"Q: Did you ever discuss, by the way, the requirements of
Krupp for foreign labor?
"A:' It is certain that it was reported to me what lack Krupp
had in foreign workers.
"Q: Did you ever discuss it with any of the members of the
Krupp firm?
"A: I cannot say that exactly; but during the time of my
activities I visited the Krupp factory more than once and
it is certain that this was discussed, that is, the lack of
manpower."
Before closing I should like to take 2 minutes of the time of
the Tribunal to refer to what we consider to be some of the
applicable laws of the case for the assistance of the Tribunal in
considering these documents which we have offered.
We refer, of course, first of àll, to Sections 6 (b) and 6 (c) of
the Charter of this Tribunal. We also say that the acts of the
conspirators constituted a flagrant violation of Articles 46 and 52
of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention Number IV
of 1907.
Article 46 seeks to safeguard the family honor, the rights and
the lives of persons in areas under belligerent occupation.
Article 52 provides in part that:
"Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded
from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of
the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the
resources of the country."
We say that these conspirators violated this article because the
labor which they conscripted was not used to satisfy the needs
of the army of occupation, but on the contrary, was forcibly
removed from the occupied areas and exploited in the interest
of the German war effort.
—
Finally, we say that these conspirators and particularly the
—
Defendants Sauckel and Speer by virtue of their planning, of
their execution, and of their approval of this program, which we
have been describing yesterday and today, the enslavement and
the misuse of the forced labor of prisoners of war that for this —
they bear a special responsibility for their Crimes against Humanity
and their War Crimes.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you finishing, Mr. Dodd?

493
13 Dec. 45

MR. DODD: Yes, I have concluded.

THE PRESIDENT: I should like to ask you why you have not
read Document 3057-PS, which is Sauckel's statement.
MR. DODD: Yes. We had intended to offer that document.
Counsel for the Defendant Sauckel informed me a day or two
ago that his client maintained that he had been coerced into making
the statement. Because we had not ample time to ascertain the
facts of the matter, we preferred to withhold it, rather than to
offer it to the Tribunal under any question of doubt.

THE PRESIDENT: He objects to it, and therefore you have not

put it in?

MR. DODD: No, we did not offer it while there was any
question about it.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: Might I suggest to the Tribunal that a recess be
taken at this time? I am sorry to have to say that I am due to
—
be before the Tribunal for a little while that is, I am sorry for
—
the Tribunal with the matters on the concentration camps.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean *a recess now?
MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, yes; 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, we propose to offer

additional evidence at this time concerning the use of Nazi
concentration camps against the people of Germany and allied
nationals. We
propose to examine the purposes and the role of
the concentration camp in the larger Nazi scheme of things. We
propose to show that the concentration camp was one of the
fundamental institutions of the Nazi regime, that it was a pillar
of the system of terror by which the Nazis consolidated their power
over Germany and imposed their ideology upon the German people,
that it was really a primary weapon in the battle against the
Jews, against the Christian church, against labor, against those
who wanted peace, against opposition or non-conformity of any
kind. We
say it involved the systematic use of terror to achieve
the cohesion within Germany which was necessary for the
execution of the conspirators' plans for aggression.
We propose to show that a concentration camp was one of the
principal instruments used by the conspirators for the commission,
on an enormous scale, of Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes;

494
 13 Dec. 45

that it was the final link in a chain of terror and repression which

involved the SS and the Gestapo and which resulted in the

apprehension of victims and their confinement without trial, often
without charges, generally with no indication of the length of their
detention.
My colleagues will present full evidence concerning the criminal
role of the SS and the Gestapo in this phase of Nazi terrorism,
the concentration camp; but at this point I wish simply to point
out that the SS, through its espionage system, tracked down the
victims, that the criminal pohce and the Gestapo seized them and
brought them to the camps, and that the concentration camps were
administered by the SS.
This Tribunal, we feel, is already aware of the sickening
evidence of the brutality of the concentration camp from the
showing of the moving picture. More than that, individual
prosecutions are going on, going forward before other courts which
will record these outrages in detail. Therefore, we do not propose
to present a catalogue of individual brutalities but, rather, to
submit evidence showing the fundamental purposes for which the
camps were used, the techniques of terror which were employed,
the large number of victims, and the death and the anguish which
they caused.
The evidence relating to concentration camps has been assembled
in a document book bearing the letter "S." I might say that the
documents in this book have been arranged in the order of
presentation, rather than, as we have been doing, numerically. In
this book we have put them in as they occur in the presentation.^
One document in this book, 2309-PS, is cited several times, so we
have marked it with a tab with a view to facilitating reference
back to it. It will be referred to more than once.
The Nazis realized early that without the most drastic repression
of actual and potential opposition they could not consolidate their
power over the German people. We have seen that, immediately
after Hitler became Chancellor, the conspirators promptly destroyed
civil liberties by issuing the Presidential Emergency Decree of
February 28, 1933. It is Document 1390-PS of the document book;
and it sets forth that decree which has already been introduced
in evidence before the Tribunal and is included in USA Exhibit B.
It was this decree which was the basis for the so-called "Schutz-
—
haft," that is, protective custody the terrible power to imprison
people without judicial proceedings. This is made clear by Docu-
ment Number 2499-PS, which is a typical order for protective
custody. We offer it for that purpose, as a typical order for
protective custody which has come into the possession of the
Prosecution. It bears Exhibit Number USA-232. I should like to
quote from the body of that order:

495
13 Dec. 45

"Order of Protective Custody.

"Based on Article 1 of the Decree of the Reich President for
the Protection of People and State of 28 February 1933
(Reichsgesetzhlatt I, Page 83), you are taken into protective
custody in the interest of public security and order.
"Reason: Suspicion of activities inimical toward the State."
The Defendant Goring in a book entitled Aufbau einer Nation,
published in 1934, sought to give the impression, it appears, that
the camps were originally directed at those whom the Nazis
considered Communists and Social Democrats. We refer to Docu-
ment 2324-PS, Exhibit USA-233. This document is an excerpt from
Page 89 of the German book. We refer to the third and fourth
paragraphs of the document, which I read as follows:
"We had to deal ruthlessly with these enemies of the State.
It must not be forgotten that at the moment of our seizure
of power, over 6 million people officially voted for com-
munism and about 8 million for Marxism in the Reichstag
elections in March.
"Thus the concentration camps were created to which we
had to send first thousands of functionaries of the Com-
munist and Social Democratic Parties."
In practical operation the power to order confinement in these
camps was almost without limit. The Defendant Frick, in an
order which he issued on the 25th day of January 1938 as Minister
of the Interior, made this quite clear. An extract from this order
is set forth in Document 1723-PS, to which we make reference.
It bears Exhibit Number USA-206. I wish to read Article 1,
beginning at the bottom of Page 5 of the English translation of
this order:
"Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of
the Secret State Police to counter all hostile efforts of
persons who endanger the existence and security of the
people and the State through their attitude."
I wish also to read into the record the two paragraphs of
first
that order, which are found at the top of Page 1 of the English
translation:
"In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the
co-operation between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to
the following and ordain:
"1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the
Führer to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the
Party and the National State, as well as all disintegrating
forces of all kinds directed against both. The successful solu-
tion of this mission forms one of the most essential prereq-
uisites for the unhampered and frictionless work of the

496
 13 Dec. 45

Party. The Gestapo, in its extremely difficult task, is to be

granted support and assistance in every possible way by the
NSDAP."
The conspirators then were directing their apparatus of terror
against the "enemies of the State," against "disintegrating forces,"
against those people who endangered the State "through their
attitude." Whom did they consider as belonging in these broad
categories? Well, first, there were the men in Germany who wanted
peace. We refer to Document L-83 (Exhibit USA-234).
THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of that document that you
have been referring to, Number 1723-PS?
MR. DODD: January 25, 1938. Ithas already been introduced
and is included in USA Exhibit B. This document consists of an
affidavit of Gerhart H. Seger, and I wish only to read from Page 1,
Paragraph 2 of that affidavit:
"2. During the period after World War I, until I was com-
mitted to the Leipzig jail and Oranienburg Concentration
Camp, in the spring of 1933 following the Nazi accession to
power in January of that year, my business and political
affiliations exposed me to the full impact of the Nazi theories
and practice of violent regimentation and terroristic tactics.
My conflict with the Nazis by virtue of my identification with
the peace movement and as duly elected member of the
Reichstag representing a political faith (Social Democratic
Party) hostile to National Socialism, clearly demonstrated that
even in the period prior to 1933 the Nazis considered crimes
and terrorism a necessary and desirable weapon in over-
coming democratic opposition."
Passing to Page 5 of the same document and the paragraph
marked "(e)":
"That the Nazis had already conceived the device of the con-
centration camp as a means of suppressing and regimenting
opposition elements was forcefully brought to my attention
during the course of a conversation which I had with Dr. Wil-
helm Frick in December 1932. Frick at that time was chair-
man of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag of
which I was a member. When I gave an emphatic answer to
Frick concerning the particular matter discussed, he replied,
'Don't worry, when we are in power we shall put all of you
guys into concentration camps.' When the Nazis came into
power, Frick was appointed Reich Minister of Interior and
promptly carried out his threat in collaboration with Goring,
as Chief of the Prussian State Police, and Hirmnler."
This paragraph shows that even before the Nazis had seized
power in Germany they had conceived the plan to repress any

497
13 Dec. 45

potential oppositions by terror, and Frick's statement to Seger is

completely consistent with an earlier statement which he made on
the 18th of October 1929. We refer to Document Number 2513-PS
(Exhibit USA-235), which has also been received in evidence and
has been included in USA Exhibit B. We refer to the first page of
the English translation, Page 48 of the German text. On Page 1
the quotation begins:
"This fateful struggle will first be taken up with the ballot;
but this cannot continue indefinitely, for history has taught
us that in a battle blood must be shed and iron broken. The
ballot is the beginning of the fateful struggle. We are deter-
mined to promulgate by force that which we preach. Just as
Mussolini exterminated the Marxists in Italy, so must we also
succeed in accomplishing the same through dictatorship and
terror."

THE PRESIDENT: This is the defendant, is it?

MR. DODD: Yes, the Defendant Frick.
There are many additional cases of the use of the concentration
camp against the men who wanted peace. There was, for example,
a group called the Bibelforscher, that is, Bible research workers,
most of whom were known as Jehovah's Witnesses. They were
pacifists, and so the conspirators provided not only for their prose-
cution in the regular courts but also for their confinement in con-
centration camps after they had served the judicial sentences; and
we refer to Document Number D-84, Exhibit USA-236.
This document is dated the 5th day of August 1937; and it is
an order by the Secret State Police at Berlin, and I refer partic-
ularly to the first and last paragraphs of this order, as follows:
"The Reich Minister of Justice had informed me that he does
not share the opinion voiced by subordinate departn^ents on
various occasions according to which the arrest of the Bibel-
forscher after they have served a sentence is supposed to
jeopardize the authority of the law courts. He is fully aware
of the necessity for measures by the State Police after the
sentence has been served. He asks, however, not to bring the
Bibelforscher into protective custody under circumstances
detrimental to the respect of the law courts."
And then, the Paragraph numbered "(2)":

"If information regarding the impending release of a Bibel-

forscher from arrest is received from the authorities carrying
out the sentence, my decision regarding the ordering of meas-
ures by the State Police will be asked for without delay in
accordance with my circular decree dated 22. 4. 37, so that
transfer to a concentration camp can take place immediately

498
 13 Dec. 45

after the sentence has been served. Should a transfer into

concentration camp immediately after the serving of the sen-
tence not be possible, Bibelforscher will be detained in police
prisons."
The labor unions, of which I think it is safe to say the majority
are traditionally opposed to wars of aggression, also felt the full
force of Nazi terror. A member of the American staff, Major Wallis,
has already submitted evidence before this Tribunal concerning the
conspirators' campaign against the trade unions. But the concen-
tration camp was an important weapon in this campaign; and the
Tribunal will recall that in Document Number 2324-PS, to which
I made reference this morning, the Defendant Goring made it plain
that members of the Social Democratic Party were to be confined
in concentration camps. Now labor leaders were very largely mem-
bers of that party, and they soon learned the horrors of protective
custody. We refer to Document Number 2330-PS (Exhibit USA-237),
which has already been received as part of USA Exhibit G, which
consists of an order that one Joseph Simon should be placed in
protective custody. We refer to the middle of the first page of the
English translation of that order, beginning with the material under
the word "reasons."
THE PRESIDENT: think you should read the sentence before
I
that —the two The words are, "The arrestee has no
lines before
it.

right to appeal against the decree of protective custody."

MR. DODD: "The arrestee has no right to appeal against the

application of protective custody." Then comes a title: "Reasons":
"Simon was for many years a member of the Socialist Party
and temporarily a member of the Union Socialiste Populaire.
From 1907 to 1918 he was Landtag deputy of the Socialist
Party; from 1908 to 1930 Social Democratic City Counsellor
(Stadtrat) in Nuremberg. In view of the decisive role which
Simon played in the international trade unions and in regard
to his connection with international Marxist leaders and cen-
tral agencies, which he continued after the national recovery,
he was placed under protective custody on the 3rd day of
May 1933 and was kept, until 25 January 1934, in the Dachau
Concentration Camp. Simon is under the grave suspicion
that even after this date he played an active part in the illegal
continuation of the Socialist Party. He took part in meetings
which aimed at the illegal continuation of the Socialist Party
and propagation of illegal Marxist printed matter in Ger-
many. Through this radical attitude, which is hostile to the
State, Simon directly endangers pubUc security and order."
We do not wish to burden these proceedings with a multipli-
cation of such instances, but we refer the Tribunal to documents

499
13 Dec. 45

which have already been offered in connection with the presentation

of the evidence concerning the destruction of the trade unions. In
we wish to refer to Document Number
particular, 2334-PS and
Document Number 2928-PS, (Exhibits USA-238 and 239) both of
which are included within USA Exhibit G.
Thousands of Jews, as the world so well knows, were, of course,
confined in these concentration camps. The evidence on this point
will be developed in a later presentation by another member of the
prosecuting staff of the United States. But among the wealth of
evidence available on this point showing the confmement of Ger-
mans only because they were Jews, we wish to offer a document.
Number 3051-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-240. This is a
copy of a teletype from SS Gruppenführer Heydrich, and it is dated
the 10th of November 1938. It was sent to all headquarters of the
State Police and all districts and subdistricts of the SD. We refer
to Paragraph 5 of this teletype. Paragraph 5 is found on Page 3 of
the English translation. It begins at the bottom of Page 2 and runs
over to Page 3. Quoting from Paragraph 5:

"As soon as the course of events of this night allows the use
of the officials employed for this purpose, as many Jews,
especially rich ones, as can be accommodated in the existing
prisons are to be arrested in all districts. For the time being
only healthy men, not too old, are to be arrested. Upon their
arrest, the appropriate concentration camps should be con-
tacted immediately, in order to confine them in these camps
as fast as possible.
"Special care should be taken that the Jews arrested in
accordance with these instructions are not ill-treated."
Himmler in 1943 indicated that use of the concentration camp
against the Jews had been motivated not simply by Nazi racialism.
Himmler indicated that this policy had been motivated by a fear
that the Jews might have been an obstacle to aggression. There is
no necessity to consider whether this fear was justified. The im-
portant consideration is that the fear existed; and with reference to
it we refer to Document 1919-PS, which bears Exhibit Number
USA-170. The document is a speech delivered by Himmler at the
meeting of the SS major generals at Posen on 4 October 1943, in
the course of which he sought to justify the Nazi anti- Je wish policy.
We refer to a portion of this document or this speech, which is
found on Page 4, Paragraph 3, of the English translation, starting
with the words, "I mean the clearing out of the Jews":
"I mean the clearing out of the Jews, the extermination of the
Jewish race. It's one of those things it is easy to talk about.
'The Jewish race is being exterminated', says one Party mem-
ber, 'that's quite clear; it's in our program; elimination of the

500
 13 Dec. 45

Jews, and we're doing it, exterminating them.' And then

there come 80 million worthy Germans and each one has his
decent Jew. Of course, the others are vermin, but this one is
an A-1 Jew. Not one of all those who talk this way has wit-
nessed it, not one of them has been through it. Most of you
must know what it means when 100 corpses are lying side by
side, or 500 or 1,000. To have stuck it out and at the same
—
time apart from exceptions caused by human weakness to —
have remained decent fellows, that is what has made us hard.
This is a page of glory in our history which has never been
written and is never to be written, for we know how difficult
—
we should have made it for ourselves, if with bombing raids,
—
the burden and deprivations of war we still had Jews today
in every town as secret saboteurs, agitators, and trouble-
mongers."
It is clear, we from the foregoing that prior to the launching
say,
of the aggression, the concentrationcamp had been one of the prin-
cipal weapons by which the conspirators achieved the social cohesion
which was needed for the execution of their plans for aggression.
After they launched their aggression and their armies swept over
Europe, they brought the concentration camp to occupied countries;
and they also brought the citizens of the occupied countries to Ger-
many and subjected them to the*whole apparatus of Nazi brutality.
Document Number R-91 is Exhibit USA-241. This document
consists of a conununication dated the 16th day of December 1942
sentby Müller to Himmler, for the Chief of the Security Police and
SD, and deals with the seizure of Polish Jews for deportation to
concentration camps in Germany. I am beginning with the first
paragraph. It says, quoting directly:
"In connection with the increase in the transfer of labor to
the concentration camps ordered to be completed by 30 Jan-
uary 1943, the following procedure may be applied in the
Jewish section:
"1. Total number: 45,000 Jews.
"2. Start of transportation: 11 January 1943. End of trans-
portation: 31 January 1943. (The Reidi railroads are unable
to provide special trains for the evacuation during the period
from 15 December 1942 to 10 January 1943 because of the
increased traffic of Armed forces leave trains.)
"3. Composition: The 45,000 Jews are to consist of 30,000 Jews
from the district of Bialystok; 10,000 Jews from the Ghetto
of Theresienstadt, 5,000 of whom are Jews fit for work who
heretofore had been used for smaller jobs required for the
ghetto and 5,000 Jews who are generally incapable of work-
ing, also Jews over 60-years old."

501
13 Dec. 45

And passing the next sentence:

"As heretofore only such Jews would be taken for the evacu-
ation who do not have any particular connections and who
are not in possession of any high decorations. Three thousand
Jews from the occupied Dutch territories, 2,000 Jews from
—
Berlin 45,000. The figure of 45,000 includes those unfit for
work (old Jews and children). By use of a practical standard,
the screening of the arriving Jews in Auschwitz should yield
at least 10,000 to 15,000 people fit for work."
The Jews of Hungary suffered the same tragic fate. Between
19 March 1944 and the 1st of August 1944, more than 400,000 Hun-
garian Jews were rounded up. Many of these were put in wagons
and sent to extermination camps, and we refer to Document Num-
ber 2605-PS, Exhibit USA-242. This document is an affidavit made
in London by Dr. Rudolph Kastner, a former official of the Hun-
garian Zionist Organization. We refer to Page 3 of the document,
the third full paragraph. In March 1944, quoting:
"Together with the German military occupation, there arrived
in Budapest a 'Special Section Commando' of the German
Secret Police with the sole object of liquidating the Hun-
garian Jews. It was headed by Adolf Aichmann, SS Ober-
sturmbannführer, Chief of Section IV B of the Reich Security
Head Office. His immediate collaborators were: SS Ober-
sturmbannführer Hermann Krumey, Hauptsturmführer Wisli-
czeny, Hunsche, Novak, Dr. Seidl, and later Danegger, Wrtok.
They arrested and later deported to Mauthausen all the
leaders of Jewish political and business life and journalists,
together with the Hungarian democratic and anti-fascist
politicians; taking .advantage of the 'interregnum' following
upon the German occupation lasting 4 days, they have placed
their Quislings in the Ministry of the Interior."
On Page 7 of that same document, the 8th paragraph, beginning
with the words "Commanders of the death camps" and quoting:
"Commanders camps gassed only on direct or
of the death
Aichmann. The particular officer of
indirect instructions of
IV B who directed the deportations from some particular
country had the authority to indicate whether the train should
go to a death camp or not and what should happen to the
passengers. The instructions were usually carried by the
SS non-commissioned officers escorting the train. The letters
'A' or 'M' "—capital letters "A" or "M"— "on the escorting
instruction documents indicated Auschwitz (Oswieczim) or
Majdanek; it meant that the passengers were to be gassed."
And passing over the next sentence, we come to these words:

502
 . —
13 Dec. 45

"Regarding Hungarian Jews the following general ruling was

laid down in Auschwitz: Children up to the age of 12 or 14,
older people over 50, as well as the sick, or people with
criminal records (who were transported in specially marked
wagons) were taken immediately on their arrival to the gas
chambers.
"The others passed before an SS doctor who, on sight, indi-
cated who was fit for work and who was not. Those unfit
were sent to the gas chambers, while the others were distrib-
uted in various labor camps."
In the so-called "Eastern Territories" these victims were appre-
hended for extermination . .

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, don't you want Page 5 for the
numbers which you have stated "up June 1944"? You
to the 27th of
haven't yet given us any authority for the numbers that you have
stated.
MR. DODD: Oh, yes. On Page 5 of that same document, 2605-PS,
quoting:"Up to the 27th of June 1944, 475,000 Jews were deported."
In the so-called "Eastern Territories" these victims were appre-
hended for extermination in concentration camps without any
charges having been made against them. In the western occupied
territories charges seemed to have been made against some of the
victims. Some of the charges which the Nazi conspirators con-
sidered sufficient basis for confinement to the concentration camps
are shown by reference to Document Number L-215, which bears
Exhibit Number USA-243. This document is the summary of the
file, the dossier, of 25 persons arrested in Luxembourg for commit-

ment to various concentration camps and sets forth the charges

made against each person. Beginning with the paragraph after the
name "Henricy," at the bottom of the first page, and quoting:
"Name: Henricy; charge: ... by associating with members of
illegal resistance movements and making money for them,
violating legal foreign exchange rates, by harming the inter-
ests of the Reich and being expected in the future to disobey
official administrative regulations and act as an enemy of the
Reich; place of confinement —Natzweiler."
Next comes the name of "Krier" and the charge:
"... by being responsible for continuous sabotage of labor and
causing fear because of his political and criminal past
freedom would only further his anti-social urge; place of con-
—
finement Buchenwald."
Passing to the middle of Page 2, after the name "Monti":
"Charge: ... by being strongly suspected of aiding desertion;
place of confinement —Sachsenhausen."
503
13 Dec. 45

Next, after the name "Junker":

"Charge: because as a relative of a deserter he is expected
. . .

to endanger the interests of the Greater German Reich if

allowed to go free; place of confinement Sachsenhausen." —
"Jaeger" is the next name and the charge against Jaeger, quoting:
". .because as a relative of a deserter he is expected to take
.

advantage of every occasion to harm the Greater German

Reich if allowed to go free; place of confinement Sachsen- —
hausen."
And down to the name "Ludwig" and the charge against Ludwig:
being strongly suspected of aiding desertion; place of
"... for
confinement Dachau." —
Not only civilians of the occupied countries but also prisoners
of war were subjected to the horrors and the brutality of the con-
centration camps; and we refer to Document Number 1165-PS,
which bears Exhibit Number USA-244. This document is a memo-
randum to all officers of the State Police signed by Müller, the
Chief of the Gestapo, dated the 9th of November 1941. The memo-
—
randum has the revealing title of and I quote "Transportation of —
Russian Prisoners of War, destined for Execution, into the Con-
centration Camps."
I wish to quote also from the body of this memorandum, which
is found on Page 2 of the English translation, and I quote directly:

"The commandants of the concentration camps are complain-

ing that 5 to 10 percent of the Soviet Russians destined for
execution are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. There-
fore the impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting
rid of such prisoners in this way.
"It particularly noted that when marching, for example,
was
from the railroad station to the camp a rather large number
of PW's collapsed on the way from exhaustion, either dead
or half dead, and had to be picked up by a truck following
the convoy.
"It cannot be prevented that the German people take notice
of these occurrences.
"Even ifthe transportation to the camps is generally taken
care of by the Wehrmacht, the population will attribute this
situation to the SS.
"In order to prevent, if possible, similar occurrences in the
future, I therefore order that, effective from today on, Soviet
Russians declared definitely suspect and obviously marked by
death (for example with hunger-typhus) and therefore not
able to withstand the exertions of even a short march on foot
shall in the future, ais a matter of basic principle, be excluded

504
 13 Dec. 45

from the transport into the concentration camps for exe-

cution."
More evidence of the confinement of Russian prisoners of war
in concentration camps is found in an
report of the investi-
official
gation of the Flossenbürg Concentration Camp by the Headquarters
of the United States Third Army, the Judge Advocate Section, and
particularly the War Crimes Branch, under the date of the 21st day
of June 1945. It is our Document Number 2309-PS and bears
Exhibit Number USA-245. At the bottom of Page 2 of the Enghsh
text the last two sentences of that last paragraph say, and I quote:
"In 1941 an additional stockade was added at the Flossenbürg
camp to hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. Of these 2,000 prisoners
only 102 survived."
Soviet prisoners of war found their allies in the concentration
camps too; and at Page same Document Number 2309-PS,
4 of this
it will show, particularly Paragraph 5 on Page 4, and I quote it:
"The victims of Flossenbürg included among them: Russian
civilians and prisoners of war, German nationals, Italians,
Belgians, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, British, and American
prisoners of war. No practical means was available to com-
plete alist of victims of this camp; however, since the foun-
dation of the camp in 1938 until the day of liberation, it is
estimated that more than 29,000 inmates died."
Escaped prisoners of war were sent to concentration camps by
the conspirators, and these camps were specially set up as exter-
mination centers; and we refer to Document Number 1650-PS,
bearing Exhibit Number USA-246. This document is a communi-
cation from the Secret State PoHce of Cologne and it is dated the
4th day of March 1944. At the very top of the English text it says,
—
"To be transmitted in secret to be handled as a secret Government
matter."
In the third paragraph, quoting:
"Concerns: Measures to be taken against captured escaped
prisoners of war who are officers or non-working non-
commissioned officers, except British and American prisoners
of war. The Supreme Command of the Army has ordered
as follows:
"1. Every captured escaped prisoner of war who is an officer

or a non-working noncommissioned officer, except British and

American prisoners of war, is to be turned over to the Chief
of the Security Police and of the Security Service under the
classificationStep III regardless of whether the escape
occurred during a transport, whether it was a mass escape,
or an individual one.

505
13 Dec. 45

"2. Since the transfer of the prisoners of war to the Security-

Police and Security Service may not become officially known
to the outside under any circumstances, other prisoners of
war may by no means be informed of the capture. The
captured prisoners are to be reported to the Army Information
Bureau as 'escaped and not captured.' Their mail is to be
handled accordingly. Inquiries of representatives of the
protective power, of the International Red Cross, and of other
aid societies will be given the same answer."
The same communication carried a copy of an order of SS
General Müller, acting for the Chief of the Security Pohce and
SD, directing the Gestapo to transport escaped prisoners directly to
Mauthausen; and I quote the first two paragraphs of MüUer's order,
which begins on the bottom of Page 1 and runs over to Page 2
of the English text. Quoting:
"The State Pohce directorates
will accept the captured
escaped officer prisoners of war from the prisoner-of-war
camp commandants and will transport them to the Con-
centration Camp Mauthausen following the procedure
previously used, unless the circumstances render a special
transport imperative. The prisoners of war are to be put in
—
irons on the transport not on the way to the station if it
is subject to view by the public. The camp commandant at
Mauthausen is to be notified that the transfer occurs within
the scope of the action 'Kugel.' The State Police directorates
will submit semi-yearly reports on these transfers giving
merely the figures, the first report being due on 5 July 1944."
Passing the next three sentences, we come to this Une:
"For the sake of secrecy the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces has been requested to inform the prisoner-of-war
camps to turn the captured prisoners over to the local State
Police office concerned and not to send them directly to Maut-
hausen."
It is no coincidence that the literal translation for the German
word "Kugel" is the English word "bullet," since Mauthausen,
where the escaped prisoners were sent, was an extermination
center.
Nazi conquest was marked by the estabhshment of concentra-
tion camps over all of Europe. In this connection we refer to
Document Number R-129. It is a report on the location of con-
centration camps signed by Pohl, who was an SS generalwho was
in ciiarge of concentration camp labor poUcies. Document Number
R-129 bears our Exhibit Number USA-217.
I wish to refer particularly to Section 1, Paragraphs numbered 1
and 2 of this document, which are found on Page 1 of the English

506
 13 Dec. 45

translation. It is addressed to the Reichsführer SS and bears the

stamp "secret":
"Reichsführer:
"Today I report about the present situation of the con-
centration camps and about measures I have taken in order
to carry out your order of 3 March 1942:
"1. At the outbreak of war there existed the following con-
centration camps:
"a. Dachau— 1939, 4,000 prisoners; today, 8,000.
"b. Sachsenhausen— 1939, 6,500 prisoners; today, 10,000.
"c. Buchenwald— 1939, 5,300 prisoners; today, 9,000.
"d. Mauthausen — 1939, 1,500 prisoners; today, 5,500.
"e. Flossenbürg — 1939, 1,600 prisoners; today, 4,700.
"f. Ravensbrück— 1939, 2,500 prisoners; today, 7,500."
And then it goes on to say in Paragraph Number 2, quoting:
"In the years 1940 and 1942 nine additional camps were
erected:
"a. Auschwitz, b. Neuengamme, c. Gusen, d. Natzweiler,
e. Gross-Rosen, f. Lublin, g. Niederhagen, h. Stutthof, i. Ar-
beitsdorf."
In addition to the camps in the occupied territory mentioned
in thisDocument R-129, from which I have just read these names
and figures, there were many, many others. I refer to the official
report by the United States Third Army Headquarters, to which
we have already made reference. Document Number 2309-PS, on
Page 2 in the English text. Section IV, Paragraph 4, quoting:
"Concentration Camp
Flossenbürg was founded in 1938 as a
camp Construction was commenced
for political prisoners.
on the camp in 1938 and it was not until April 1940 that the
first transport of prisoners was received. From this time on
prisoners began to flow steadily into the camp. (Exhibit B-1.)
Flossenbürg was the mother camp and under its direct control
and jurisdiction were 47 satellite camps or outer-commandos
formale prisoners and 27 camps for female workers. To these
outer-commandos were supplied the necessary prisoners for
the various work projects undertaken.
"Of these outer-commandos, Hersbruck and Leitmeritz (in
all
Czechoslovakia), Oberstaubling, Mulsen and Sail, located on
the Danube, were considered to be the worst."
I do not wish to take the time of the Tribunal to discuss each
of the Nazi concentration camps which dotted the map of Europe.
We feel that the widespread use of these camps is commonly known
and notorious. We do, however, wish to invite the Tribunal's
attention to a chart which we have had prepared. The solid black

507
13 Dec. 45

line marks the boundary of Germany after the Anschluss, and we

call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that the majority of the
camps shown on the chart are located within the territorial limits
of Germany itself. They are the red spots, of course, on the map.
In the center of Germany there is the Buchenwald camp located
near the city of Weimar, and at the extreme bottom of the chart
there is Dachau, several miles outside of Munich. At the top of
the chart are Neuengamme and Bergen-Belsen, located near Ham-
burg. To the left is the Niederhagen camp in the Ruhr Valley.
In the upper right there are a number of camps near Berlin, one
named Sachsenhausen (formerly Oranienburg, which was one of the
first camps established after the Nazis came into power). Near
to that is the camp of Ravensbrück which was used exclusively
for women. Some of the most notorious camps were located indeed
outside of Germany. Mauthausen was in Austria. In Poland was
the infamous Ausdiwitz; and to the left of the diart is a camp
called Hertogenbosch and this one was located in Holland, as the
chart shows; and below it is Natzweiler, located in France.
The camps were estabUshed in networks; and it may be observed
—
that surrounding each of the major camps the larger red dots is —
a group of satellite camps; and the names of the principal camps,
the most notorious camps, at least, are above the map and below
it on the chart; and those names, for most people, symbolize the
Nazi system of concentration camps as they have become known
to the w^orld since May or a Uttle later in 1945.
I should hke to direct your attention briefly to the treatment

which was meted out in these camps. The motion picture to which
I have made reference a short time ago and which was shown to
the members of this High Tribunal has disclosed the terrible and
savage treatment which was inflicted upon these Alhed nationals,
prisoners of war, and other victims of Nazi terror. Because the
moving picture has so well shown the situation, as of the time of
its taking at least, I shall confine myself to a very brief discussion
of the subject.
The conditions which existed inside these camps were, of course,
we say, directly related to the objectives which these Nazi
conspirators sought to achieve outside of the camps through their
employment of terror.
Ittruly remarkable, it seems to us, how easily the words
is
"concentration camps" rolled off the lips of these men. How simple
all problems became when they could turn to the terror institution
of the concentration camps. I refer to Document Number R-124,
which is already before the Tribunal as Exhibit USA-179. It is
again that document covering the minutes of the Central Planning
Committee on which the Defendant Speer sat and where the high
strategy of the high Nazi armament production was formulated.

508
 13 Dec. 46

I do not intend to read from the document again, because I read

from it this morning to illustrate another point; but the Tribunal
will recall that it was at this meeting that the Defendant Speer
and others were discussing the so-called slackers, and the con-
versation had to do with having drastic steps taken against these
workers who were not putting out sufficient work to please their
masters. Speer suggested that, "There is nothing to be said against
the SS and Police taking steps and putting those known as slackers
into concentration camp industries," and he used the words "con-
centration camp industries." And he said, "Let it happen several
times and the news will soon get around."
Words spoken we say, sealed the fate of many
in this fashion,
victims. As for the news around as suggested by the
getting
Defendant Speer, this was not left to chance, as we shall presently
show.
The deterrent effect of the concentration camps upon the public
was a carefully planned thing. To heighten the atmosphere of terror,
these camps were shrouded in secrecy. What went on in the barbed
wire enclosures was a matter of fearful conjecture in Germany and
countries under Nazi control; and this was the policy from the
very beginning, when the Nazis first came into power and set up
this system of concentration camps. We refer now to Document
Number 778-PS, which bears Exhibit Number USA-247. This
document is an order issued on the 1st of October 1933 by the
camp comm^ander of Dachau. The document prescribed a program
of floggings, solitary confinement, and executions for the inmates
for infractions of the rules.
Among the rules were those prescribing a rigid censorship
concerning conditions within the camp; and I refer to the first
page of the English text, paragraph numbered Article 11, and
quoting:
"By virtue of the law on revolutionaries, the following
offenders considered as agitators, will be hanged:
"Anyone who, for the purpose of agitating, does the following
in the camp, at work, in the quarters, in the kitchens and
workshops, toilets and places of rest: holds political or incit-
ing speeches and meetings, forms cliques, loiters around with
others; who, for the purpose of supplying the propaganda of
the opposition with atrocity stories, collects true or false
information about the concentration camp and its institution,
receives such information, buries it, talks about it to others,
smuggles it out of the camp into the hands of foreign visitors
or others by means of clandestine or other methods, passes
it on in writing or orally to released prisoners or prisoners

who are placed above them, conceals it in clothing or other

509
13 Dec. 45

articles, throws stones and other objects over the camp wall
containing such information, or produces secret documents;
who, for tiie purpose of agitating, climbs on barracks roofs
and trees, seeks contact with the outside by giving light or
other signals, or induces others to escape or commit a crime,
gives them advice to that effect or supports such under-
takings in any way whatsoever."
The censorship about the camps themselves was complemented
by an officially inspired rumor campaign outside the camps. Con-
centration camps were spoken of in whispers, and the whispers
were spread by agents of the Secret Police. When the Defendant
Speer said that if the threat of the concentration camp were used,
the news would get around soon enough, he knew whereof he spoke.
We refer to Document 1531-PS. With reference to this document,
I wish to submit a word of explanation. The original German text,
the original German document, the captured document, was here
in the document room and was translated into English as our
translation shows. Yesterday we were advised that it has either
been lost or misplaced, the original German text; and unfortunately
no photostatic copy was available here in Nuremberg. A certified
copy is, however, being sent to the office here from Frankfurt, and
it is on its way today; and I ask the Tribunal's permission to offer

the English translation of the German original, which is certified

to be accurate by the translator, into evidence, subject to a motion
to strike it if the certified copy of the original German document
does not arrive.
I now refer to the Document Number 1531-PS. It bears our
Exhibit Number USA-248. This document is marked "top secret"
and it is addressed to all State Police district offices and
to the
Gestapo office and for the information of the Inspectors of the
Security Police and the SD. It is an order relating to concentration
camps, issued by the head of the Gestapo; and I read from the
English text, beginning with the second paragraph, and quoting
directly:
"In order to achieve a further deterrent effect, the following
must, in the future, be observed in each individual case:
"3. The length of the period of custody must in no case be
made known, even if the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the
German Police or the Chief of the Security Police and the
SD has already fixed it.

"The term of commitment to a concentration camp is to be

openly announced as 'until further notice.'
"In most serious cases there is no objection to increasing
the deterrent effect by the spreading of cleverly carried
out rumor propaganda, more or less to the effect that,

510
 13 Dec. 45

according to hearsay, in view of the seriousness of his case,

the arrested man will not be released for 2 or 3 years.
"4.In certain cases the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the
German Police will order flogging in addition to detention
in a concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in the
future, also be transmitted to the State Police district office
concerned. In this case, too, there is no objection to spreading
the rumor of this increased punishment as laid down in
Section 3, Paragraph 3, insofar as this appears suitable to
add to the deterrent effect.
"5. Naturally, particularly suitable and reliable people are
to be chosen for the spreading of such news."
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal think that they will
take judicial notice of that United States Document, Number
2309-PS; and for the convenience of the Defense Counsel, the
Tribunal having sat until 1 will not sit again until 2:15.
MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor.

[A recess was taken until 1415 hours.]

511
13 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

MR. DODD: May it please the Tribunal, the deterrent effect

of the concentration camps was based on the promise of brutal
treatment. Once in the custody of the SS guards, the victim was
beaten, tortured, starved, and often murdered through the so-called
"extermination through work" program which I described the other
day or through the mass execution gas chambers and furnaces of
the camps, which were shown several days ago on the moving
picture screen in this courtroom.
The reports of official government investigations furnish addi-
tional evidence of the conditions within the concentration camps.
Document 2309-PS, which has already been referred to and of
which the Tribunal has taken judicial notice, I now refer to again,
particularly to the second page of the English text, beginning wiith
the second sentence of the second paragraph:
"The work at these camps mainly consisted of underground
labor,the purpose being the construction of large under-
ground factories, storage rooms, et cetera. This labor was per-
formed completely underground and as a result of the brutal
treatment, working and living conditions, a daily average of
100 prisoners died. To the one camp Oberstaubling 700 pris-
oners were transported in February 1945, and on the 15th of
April 1945 only 405 of these men were living. During the
12 months preceding the liberation, Flossenbürg and the
branch camps under its control accounted for the death of
14,739 male inmates and 1,300 women. These figures represent
the deaths as obtained from the available records in the
camp. However, they are in no way complete, as many
secret mass executions and deaths took place. In 1941 an
additional stockade was added at the Flossenbürg camp to
hold 2,000 Russian prisoners. From these 2,000 prisoners only
102 survived.
"Flossenbürg Concentration Camp can best be described as
a factory dealing in death. Although this camp had in view
the primary object of putting to work the mass slave labor,
another of its primary objectives was the elimination of
human lives by the methods employed in handUng the
prisoners.
"Hunger and starvation rations, sadism, housing faciUties,
inadequate clothing, medical neglect, disease, beatings,
hangings, freezing, forced hand hanging, forced suicides,
major role in obtaining their objective.
shooting, all played a
Prisoners were murdered at random; spite killings against
Jews were common. Injections of poison and shooting in

512
 . .

13 Dec. 45

the neck were everyday occurrences. Epidemics of typhus and

spotted fever were permitted to run rampant as a means
of eliminating prisoners. Life, in this camp meant nothing.
Killing became a common thing, so common that a quick
death was welcomed by the unfortunate ones."
Passing to the next to the last sentence of this same paragraph,
quoting directly . .

THE PRESIDENT: What are those exhibits that are referred to?
MR. DODD: They are in evidence with the affidavit. They are
attached to it.

THE PRESIDENT: They are not, I suppose, mimeographed in

our copy?
MR. DODD: No, we have not had an opportunity to* mimeograph
each one of them.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they documents or photographs or what?
MR. DODD: They are principally documents. There are some
few plans and photographs, and so on.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they affidavits or what? There seem to
be instances of . .

MR. DODD: Well, some of them are in the form of affidavits

taken at the time of the liberation of the camp from persons who
were there, and others are pictures of writings that were found
there and of the plans and so on such sort of thing. —
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well the Tribunal will take judicial
notice of those exhibits as well.
MR. DODD: Very well, Your Honor.
Reading from the last sentence of this same paragraph on the
same page and quoting:
"On Christmas, 1944, a number of prisoners were hanged at
one time. The prisoners were forced to view this hanging.
By the side of the gallows was a decorated Christmas tree;
and as expressed by one prisoner, *It was a terrible sight,
that combination of prisoners hanging in the air and the
glistening Christmas tree.'"
"In March or April, 13 American or British parachutists were
hanged. They had been delivered to this camp some time
before and had been captured while trying to blow up
bridges."
We burden the Tribunal with a recital of all of these
will not
reports. We
wish, however, to make reference to the Concentration
Camp Mauthausen, one of the most notorious extermination
centers; and I refer particularly to Document Number 2176-PS,

513
 —

13 Dec. 45

which I have already placed in evidence as Exhibit Number

USA-249. This is also an official report of the office of the Judge
Advocate General of the United States 3rd Army, dated 17 June
1945. I wish to refer to the conclusions on Page 3 of the English
text, at paragraph numbered Roman V, beginning with the second
sentence as follows:
"V. Conclusions. There is no doubt that Mauthausen was the
basis for long-term planning. It was constructed as a gigantic
stone fortress on top of a mountain flanked by small barracks.
Mauthausen, in addition to its permanency of construction,
had facilities for a large garrison of officers and men and had
large dining rooms and toilet facilities for the staff. It was
conducted with the sole purpose in mind of exterminating
any so-called prisoner v/ho entered within its walls. The
so-called branches of Mauthausen were under direct command
of the SS officials located there. All records, orders, and
administrative facilities were handled for these branches
through Mauthausen. The other camps, including Gusen and
Ebensee, its two most notorious and largest branches, were
not exclusively used for extermination; but prisoners were
used as tools in construction and production until they were
beaten or starved into uselessness, whereupon they were
customarily sent to Mauthausen for final disposal."
Both from the showing of the moving picture and from these
careful reports, which were made by the 3rd Army of the United
States on their arrival at those centers, we say it is clear that
the conditions in those concentration camps over Germany and in —
a few instances outside of the actual borders of the Old Reich
followed the same general pattern. The wide-spread incidence of
these conditions makes it clear that they were not the result
of sporadic excesses on the part of individual jailers, but were the
result of policies deliberately imposed from above. The crimes
committed in these camps were on so vast a scale that individual
atrocities pale into insignificance.

We have had turned over to us two exhibits which we are

prepared to show to this Tribunal only because they illustrate the
depths to which the administration of these camps had sunk shortly
before, at least, the time that they were liberated by the Allied
Army. The Tribunal will recall that in the showing of the moving
picture, with respect to one of the camps, there was a showing of
sections of human skin taken from human bodies in the Buchen-
wald Concentration Camp and preserved as ornaments. They were
selected, these particular hapless victims, because of the tattooing
which appeared on the skin. This exhibit, which we have here,
is Exhibit Number USA-252. Attached to the exhibit is an extract

514
 13 Dec. 45

of an official United States Army report describing the circum-

stances under which this exhibit was obtained; and that extract is
set forth in Document 3420-PS, which I refer to in part. It is
entitled:
"Mobile Field Interrogation Unit Number 2; PW Intelligence
Bulletin; 13. Concentration Camp, Buchenwald.
"Preamble. The author of this account is PW Andreas
Pfafïenberger, 1 Coy, 9 Landesschützen Bn., 43 years old and
of limited education. He is a butcher by trade. The substan-
tial agreement of the details of his story with those found in
PWIB (H) /LF/36 establishes the validity of his testimony.
PW has not been questioned on statements which, in the light
of what is known, are apparently erroneous in certain details,
nor has any effort been made to alter the subjective
character of the PW's account, which he wrote without being
told anything of the intelligence already known. The results
of interrogation on personalities at Buchenwald have already
been published (PWIB Number 2/12, item 31.).
" Tn 1939 prisoners with tattooing on
all them were ordered
"
to report to the dispensary.'

THE PRESIDENT: Is this what Pfafïenberger said?

MR. DODD: Yes, Sir.

" 'No one knew what the purpose was; but after the tattooed
prisoners had been examined, the ones with the best and
most artistic specimens were kept in the dispensary and then
killed by injections administered by Karl Beigs, a criminal
prisoner. The corpses were then turned over to the patho-
logical department where the desired pieces of tattooed skin
were detached from the bodies and treated. The finished
products were turned over to SS Standartenführer Koch's
wife, who had them fashioned into lamp shades and other
ornamental household articles. I myself saw such tattooed
skins with various designs and legends on them, such as
"Hänsel and Gretel," which one prisoner had on his knee,
and designs of ships from prisoners' chests. This work was
done by a prisoner named Wernerbach."
I also refer to Document 3421-PS, which bears Exhibit Number
USA-253.
"I, George C. Demas, Lieutenant, USNR, associated with the
United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis
Criminality, hereby certify that the attached exhibit, consist-
ing of parchment, was delivered by the War Crimes Section,
Judge Advocate General, United States Army, to me in my
above capacity, in the usual course of business, as an exhibit

515
13 Dec. 45

found in Buchenwald Camp and captured by military forces

under the. command of the Supreme Commander, Allied
Expeditionary Forces."
And the last paragraph of Document 3423-PS (Exhibit USA-252)
is a conclusion reached in a United States Army report, and
I quote it:

"Based on the findings in Paragraph 2, all three specimens

are tattooed human skin."
This document is also attached to this exhibit on the board. We
do not wish to dwell on this pathological phase of the Nazi culture;
but we do feel compelled to offer one additional exhibit, which we
offer as Exhibit Number USA-254. This exhibit, which is on the
table, is a human head with the skull bone removed, shrunken,
stuffed, and preserved. The Nazis had one of their many victims
decapitated, after having had him hanged, apparently for fraterniz-
ing with a German woman, and fashioned this terrible ornament
from his head.
The last paragraph of the official United States Army report
from which Ihave just read deals with the manner in which this
exhibit was acquired. It reads as follows:
"There I also saw the shrunken heads of two young Poles
who had been hanged for having relations with German girls.
The heads were the size of a fist, and the hair and the marks
of the rope were still there."
Another certificate by Lieutenant Demas is set forth in Docu-
ment 3422-PS (Exhibit USA-254) and is similar to the one which I
have read a few minutes ago with relation to the human skin,
excepting that it applies to this second exhibit. We have no accurate
estimate of how many persons died in these concentration camps
and perhaps none will ever be made; but as the evidence already
introduced before this Tribunal indicates, the Nazi conspirators
were generally meticulous record keepers. But the records which
they kept about concentration camps appear to have been quite
incomplete. Perhaps the character of the records resulted from the
indifference which the Nazis felt for the lives of their victims. But
occasionally we find a death book or a set of index cards. For the
most part, nevertheless, the victims apparently faded into an
unrecorded death. Reference to a set of death books suggests at
once the scale of the concentration camp operations, and we refer
now and offer Document Number 493-PS as Exhibit Number
USA-251. This exhibit is a set of seven books, the death ledger of
the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Each book has on its cover
the word "Totenbuch" (or Death Book) Mauthausen. —
In these books were recorded the names of some of the inmates
who died or were murdered in this camp, and the books cover the

516
 13 Dec. 45

period from January of 1939 to April of 1945. They give the name,
the place of birth, the assigned cause of death, and time of death
of each individual recorded. In addition each corpse is assigned a
serial number, and adding up the total serial numbers for the
5-year period one arrives at the figure of 35,318.
An examination of the books is very revealing insofar as the
camp's routine of death is concerned; and I invite the attention of
the Tribunal to Volume 5 from Pages 568 to 582, a photostatic copy
of which has been passed to the Tribunal. These pages cover death
entries made for the 19th day of March 1945 between 15 minutes
past 1 in the morning until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. In this space
of 12 and three-quarter hours, on tliese records, 203 persons are
reported as having died. They were assigned serial numbers
running from 8390 to 8593. The names of the dead are listed. And
interestingly enough the victims are all recorded as having died of
—
the same ailment heart trouble. They died at brief intervals.
They died in alphabetical order. The first who died was a man
named Ackermann, who died at 1:15 a.m., and the last was a man
named Zynger, who died at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.
At 20 minutes past same afternoon, according
2 o'clock of that
to these records, on the 19th of March began
1945, the fatal roll call
again and continued until 4:30 p.m. In a space of 2 hours 75 more
persons died, and once again they died all from heart failure and in
alphabetical order. We find the entries recorded in the same
volume, from Pages 582 through 586.
There was another death book found at Camp Mauthausen. It
is our Document Number 495-PS and bears Exhibit Number
USA-250. This is a single volume, and again has on its cover the
—
words "Death Book Prisoners of War." And I invite the attention
of the Tribunal in particular to Pages 234 through 246. Here the
entries record the names of 208 prisoners of war, apparently
Russians, who at 15 minutes past midnight on the 10th day of
May 1942 were executed at the same time. The book notes that the
execution was directed by the chief of the SD and the Sipo, at
that time Heydrich.
It was called to my attention as late as this morning — a publica-
tion of a New York newspaper published in the United States, part
of which is made up of three or more pages consisting of advertise-
ments from the families, the relatives of people who once resided in
Germany or in Europe, asking for some advice about them. Most of
the advertisements refer to one of these concentration camps or
another. The paper is called Dsr Aufbau. It is a German-language
newspaper in New York City, published on the 23rd day this —
—
particular issue on the 23rd day of November 1945. I do not
propose to burden the record of this Tribunal with the list of the

517
13 Dec. 45

names of all of these unfortunate individuals; but we refer to it as

a publication in the City of New York, a German-language news-
paper of recent date which illustrates the horrible extent of this
terrible tragedy which has affected so many people as a result of
this concentration-camp institution. We
feel that no argument, no
particular argument, is necessary to support our statement that
the Nazi conspirators used these concentration camps and the
related instruments of terror in them to commit Crimes against
Humanity and to commit War Crimes.
More about concentration campswill of necessity be involved in
the presentation concerning the persecution of the Jews, but this
concludes our presentation with respect to the concentration camps
as a specific entity of proof.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, speaking for myself, I should like

to know what these headings mean.
MR. DODD: Yes, I have them here.
THE PRESIDENT: Document 495-PS?
MR. DODD: Yes, Document 495-PS. Column 1 is the serial
number assigned to the prisoners in the order of their deaths.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. DODD: Column 2, prisoners-of -war serial number. Column 3
is Column
the last name, 4 is the first name.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. DODD: Column 5 is the date Column 6, the place

of birth.
of birth. Column 7, cause of death.
In these cases their cause of
death is stated as follows: "Execution pursuant to order of the
Chief of the Sipo and SD dated 30th April 1942," and the ditto
marks beneath indicate that the same cause of death was assigned
to the names which come beneath it. In the eighth column is the
date of death and the hour of death. The first one being 9. 5. 42
at 2335 hours. In the ninth column there is a space which says it
is reserved for comments.

THE PRESIDENT: There are numbers there too— M 1681 is the

first one.

MR. DODD: Well, the German word, I am told, means that it

confirms the death with that number. Apparently the number
of the . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I think you said the number of the corpse.

MR. DODD: The number of the corpse, I think that is what it is

as distinguished from the number of the prisoner. Each corpse Vv^as

given a number as well after the individual died.

518
 13 Dec. 45

COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next phase of War

Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, the Persecution of the Jews,
will be presented by Major Walsh.

THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh.

MAJOR WILLIAM F. WALSH (Assistant Trial Counsel for the
United States): the Tribunal please, on behalf of the United
If
States Counsel, I now present to this august Tribunal the evidence
to establish certain phases of the Indictment alleged in Count One
under War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, and by agree-
ment between the prosecutors the allegations in Count Four,
Paragraph X(B), Crimes against Humanity. The topical title of this
presentation is "The Persecution of the Jews."
At this time I offer in evidence a Document Book of translations,
lettered "T." These documents contained in the books are arranged
according to the D-, L-, PS-, and R-series; and under the series the
translations are listed numerically. This title, "The Persecution of
the Jews," is singularly inappropriate when weighed in the light of
the evidence to follow. Academically, I am told, to persecute is to
afflict, harass, and annoy. The term used does not convey, and
indeed I cannot conjure a term that does convey the ultimate aim,
the avowed purpose to obliterate the Jewish race.
This presentation is not intended to be a complete recital of all
the crimes committed against the Jews. The extent and the scope of
the crimes was so great that it permeated the entire German nation,
its people and its organizations.

I am informed that others to follow me will offer additional

evidence under other phases of the Prosecution's case. Evidence
relating to the Party organizations and state organizations, whose
criminality the Prosecution will seek to establish, will disclose
and emphasize the part that these organizations played in the
pattern and plan for annihilation.
The French and the Soviet Prosecutors, too, have a volume of
evidence all related to this subject, which will be submitted in the
course -of the Trial.
Before I begin a recital of the overt acts leading to the
elimination of the Jews, I am prepared to show that these acts and
policies within Germany from the year 1933 to the end of the war
related to the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of
aggressive wars, thus falling within the definition of Crimes
against Humanity as defined in Article 6(c) of the Charter.
It had long been a German theory that the first World War
ended in Germany's defeat because of a collapse in the zone of the
interior. In planning for future wars it was determined that the
home front must be secure to prevent a repetition of this 1918

519
13 Dec. 45

debacle. Unification of the German people was essential to

successful planning and waging of war, and the Nazi political
—
premise must be established "One race, one state, one Führer."
Free trade unions must be abolished, political parties (other than
the National Socialist Party) must be outlawed, civil liberties must
be suspended, and opposition of every kind must be swept away.
Loyalty to God, church, and scientific truth was declared to be
incompatible with the Nazi regime. The anti-Jewish policy was
part of this plan for unification because it was the conviction of the
Nazis that the Jews would not contribute to Germany's military
program, but on the contrary would hamper it. The Jew must
therefore be eliminated.
This view is clearly borne out by a statement contained in Docu-
ment 1919-PS, Exhibit USA-170. This document is a transcript of
a Himmler speech at a meeting of the SS major generals on
4 October 1943, and from Page 4, Paragraph 3, of the translation
before the Court, I read a very short passage:
"We know how we should have made it for ourselves
difficult
if with the bombing raids, the burdens and deprivations of
war, we still had Jews today in every town as secret sabo-
teurs, agitators, and trouble mongers; we would now probably
have reached the 1916-17 stage when the Jews were still in
the German national body."
The treatment Jews within Germany was therefore as
of the
much war as was the building of armaments
of a plan for aggressive
and the conscription of manpower. It falls within the jurisdiction of
this Tribunal as an integral part of the planning and preparation
to wage a war of aggression.
It is obvious that the persecution and murder of Jews throughout
the conquered territories of Europe following 1939 are War Crimes
as defined by Article 6(b) of the Charter. It further violates
Article 46 of the Regulations of the Hague Convention of 1907, to
which Germany was a signatory. I quote Article 46 and ask the
Court to take judicial notice thereof:
"Family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practices, must
be respected."
I know of no crime in the history of mankind more horrible in

its details than the treatment of the Jews. It is intended to establish

that the Nazi Party precepts, later incorporated within the policies
of the German by the defendants at bar,
State, often expressed
were the Jewish people. I shall seek to avoid the
to annihilate
temptation to editorialize or to draw inferences from the documents,
however great the provocation; rather I shall let the documentary
—
evidence speak for itself its stark realism will be unvarnished.

520
 13 Dec. 45

Blood lust may have played some part in these savage crimes, but
the underlying purpose and objective to annihilate the Jewish race
was one of the fundamental principles of the Nazi plan to prepare
for and to wage aggressive war. I shall from this point limit my
proof to the overt acts committed; but I dare to request the Court's
indulgence, if it is necessary in weaving the pattern of evidence,
to make reference to certain documents and evidence previously
submitted.
Now this ultimate objective^ that is, the elimination and
extermination of the Jews, could not be accomplished without
preliminary steps and measures. The German State must first be
seized by the Nazi Party, the force of world opinion must be faced,
and even the regimented German people must be indoctrinated
with hatred against the Jews.
The first clear-cut evidence of the Party policies concerning the
Jews was expressed in the Party program in February 1920.
I offer in evidence Document 1708-PS, "Program of the National
Socialist Party," Exhibit USA-255. With the Court's permission,
I would like to quote the relevant part of that program. Para-

graph (4):

"Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of

the race can only be one who is of German blood without
."
consideration of confession. . .

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): May I interrupt a minute. It is

a little hard to know where these exhibits are or what volume you
are now quoting from.
MAJOR WALSH: This, Sir, is 1708-PS.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Volume 2?
MAJOR WALSH: Volume 2.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And what page of that exhibit?
MAJOR WALSH: That is Paragraph (4) and Paragraph (6), Sir,
on the first page.
Paragraph {4):
"Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of
the race can only be one who is of German blood, without
consideration of confession. Consequently, no Jew can be a
member of the race."
And again, Paragraph (6):
in
"The right to determine matters concerning administration
and law belongs only to the citizen; therefore, we demand
that every public office of any sort whatsoever, whether in
the Reich, the county, or municipality, be filled only by
citizens."

521
13 Dec. 45

I now offer Document 2662-PS, Mein Kampf, Exhibit Number

USA-256. On Pages 724-725, Hitler, in this book, speaking of the
Jew, said that if the National Socialist movement was to fulfill its
task —and I quote:
"Itmust open the eyes of the people with regard to foreign
nations and must remind them again and again of the true
enemy our present-day world. In the place of hate against
of
Aryans —from
whom we may be separated by almost
everything but to whom, however, we are tied by common
—
blood or the great tie of a common culture it must dedicate
to the general anger the evil enemy of mankind as the true
cause of all suffering.
"It must see to it, however, that at least in our country he
be recognized as the most mortal enemy and that the struggle
against him may show, like a flaming beacon of a better era,
to other nations, too, the road to salvation for a struggling
Aryan mankind."
A and for all age groups
flood of abusive literature of all types
was published and circulated throughout Germany. Illustrative of
this type of publication is the book entitled Der Giftpilz. I offer in
evidence Document 1778-PS, Exhibit Number USA-257. This book
brands the Jew as a persecutor of the labor class, as a race défiler,
devil in human form, a poisonous mushroom, and a murderer. This
particular book instructed school children to recognize the Jew
by caricature of his physical features, shown on Pages 6 and 7;
taught them that the Jew abuses little boys and girls, on Page 30;
and that the Jewish Bible permits all crimes, Pages 13-17. The
Defendant Streicher's periodical Der Stürmer, Number 14, April
1937, in particular, went to such extremes as to publish the
statement that Jews at the ritual celebration of their Passover
slaughtered Christians. /

I offer Document 2699-PS, Exhibit Number USA-258. On Page 2,

Column 1, Paragraphs 6 to 9, I quote:

"Also the numerous confessions made by the Jews show that

the execution of ritual murders is a law of the Talmud Jew.
The former chief Rabbi (and later monk) Teofiti declares that
the ritual murders take place especially on the Jewish Purim
(in memory of the Persian murders) and Passover (in memory
of the murder of Christ). The rules are as follows:

"The blood of the victims is to be tapped by force. On

Passover it is to be used in wine and matzos. Thus a small
part of the blood is to be poured into the dough of the matzos
and into the wine. The mixing is done by the head of the
Jewish family.

522
 13 Dec. 45

"The procedure is as follows: The family head empties a few

drops of the fresh and powdered blood into a glass, wets the
fingers of the left hand with it and sprays (blesses) with it
everything on the table. The head of the family then says,
'Thus we ask God to send the 10 plagues to all enemies of
the Jewish faith.' Then they eat, and at the end the head of
the family exclaims, 'May all Gentiles perish, as the child
whose blood is contained in the bread and wine.'
"The fresh (or dried and powdered) blood of the slaughtered
is further used by young married Jewish couples, by
pregnant Jewesses, for circumcision and so on. Ritual murder
is recognized by all Talmud Jews. The Jew believes he
absolves himself thus of his sins."
It is difficult for our minds to grasp that falsehoods such as these
could fall on fertile soil, that a literate nation could read, digest, or
believe these doctrines. We must realize, however, that with a
rigidly controlled press which precluded an exposé of such lying
propaganda, some of the ignorant and gullible would be led to
believe.
I now offer in evidence Document 2697-PS, a copy of Der
Stürmer, Exhibit Number USA-259. This publication. Der Stürmer,
was published by the Defendant Streicher's publishing firm. In this
publication, Streicher, speaking of the Jewish faith, said, "The Holy
Scripture is a horrible criminal romance abounding with murder,
incest, fraud, and indecency."
And again he said, "The Talmud is the great Jewish book of
criminal instructions that the Jew practices in his daily Hfe." This
is contained in Document 2698-PS, Der Stürmer, which I now offer
in evidence. Exhibit Number USA-260.
This propaganda campaign of hate was too widespread and
notorious to require further elaboration. Within the documents
offered in evidence in this and in other phases of the case will be
found similar and even more scurrilous statements, many by the
defendants themselves and others by their accomplices.
When the Nazi Party gained control of the German State, a
new and weapon against the Jews was placed within their
terrible
grasp, the power to apply the force of the state against them. This
was done by the issuance of decrees.
Jewish immigrants were denaturalized: 1933 Reichsgesetzhlatt,
Part I, Page 480, signed by Defendants Frick and Neurath.

Native Jews were precluded from citizenship: 1935 Reichsgesetz-

hlatt, Part I, Page 1146, signed by Defendant Frick.
Jews were forbidden to live in marriage or to have extra-
marital relations "with persons of German blood: 1935 Reichsgesetz-
hlatt, Part I, Page 1146, signed by Frick and Hess.

523
13 Dec. 45

Jews were denied the right to vote: 1936 Reichsgesetzhlatt,

Part I, Page 133, signed by Defendant Frick.

Jews were denied the right to hold public office or civil service
positions: Reichsgesetzhlatt 1933, Part I, Page 277, signed by
Defendant Frick.
It was determined to relegate the Jews to an inferior status by
denying them common privileges and freedoms. Thus, they were
denied access to certain city areas, sidewalks, transportation, places
of amusement, restaurants: 1938 Reichsgesetzhlatt, Part I, Page 1676.
Progressively more and still more stringent measures were
applied, even to the denial of private pursuits. They were excluded
from the practice of dentistry: 1939 Reichsgesetzhlatt, Part I,

Page 47, signed by Defendant Hess.

The practice of law was denied: 1938 Reichsgesetzhlatt, Part I,

Page 1403, signed by Defendants Frick and Hess.

Thepractice of medicine was denied: 1938 Reichsgesetzhlatt,
Part Page 969, signed by Defendants Frick and Hess.
I,

They were denied employment by press and radio: 1933 Reichs-

gesetzhlatt, Part I, Page 661.
From stock exchanges and stock brokerage: 1934 Reichsgesetz-
hlatt, Part I, Page 169.

And even from farming: 1933 Reichsgesetzhlatt, Part I, Page 685.

In 1938 they were excluded from business in general and from
the economic lifé of Germany: 1938 Reichsgesetzhlatt, Part I,
Page 1580, signed by the Defendant Goring.
The Jews were forced to pay discriminatory taxes and huge
atonement fines. Their homes, bank accounts, real estate, and
intangibles were expropriated.
To digress for a moment from a recital of decrees and to refer
specifically to the atonement fines, I wish to offer Document
1816-PS, Exhibit Number USA-261. This exhibit is a stenographic
report of a conference under the chairmanship of the Defendant
Goring, attended by the Defendant Funk among others, held at
11 o'clock on 12 November 1938 at the Reich Ministry for Air. From
Pages and 9 of Section 7, I quote the Defendant Goring:
8
"One more question, gentlemen, what would you think the
situation would be if I announced today that Jewry shall
have to contribute this 1,000,000,000 as a punishment."
And then the last paragraph on Page 22 of the translation before
the Court — I quote:
"I shall choose the —
wording this way that German Jewry
shall, as punishment for their abominable crimes, et cetera,
et cetera, have to make a contribution of 1,000,000,000. That
will work. The pigs won't commit another murder in a hurry.

524
 .

13 Dec. 45

I should like to say again that I would not like to be a Jew-

in Germany."
It was whimsical remarks such as these that originated decrees,
for following this meeting was issued placing upon the
a decree
German Jews the burden of 1,000,000,000 Reichsmark fine: 1938
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 1579, date 12 November 1938, signed
by the Defendant Goring.
Similar decrees are contained in 1939 Reichsgesetzhlatt, Part I,
Page 282, signed by Defendant Goring, and 1941 Reichsgesetzhlatt,
Part I, Page 722, signed by Defendants Frick and Bormann.
Finally, in the year the Jews were placed beyond the
1943,
protection of any process by a decree signed by the
judicial
Defendants Bormann and Frick and others; and the police became
the sole arbiters of punishment and death: 1943 Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, Page 372, signed by Frick and Bormann.
I ask the Court to take judicial notice of the Reichsgesetzblatt
decrees cited.
Side by side with the passage of these decrees and their execu-
tion went still another weapon, wielded by the Party and the
Party-controlled state. These were the openly sponsored and official
anti-Jewish boycotts against Jews. I now offer Document 2409-PS,
the published diary of Joseph Goebbels, Exhibit Number USA-262,
and I invite the Court's attention to Page 290 where, under date
of 29 March 1933 —
the Court will find the quotation on the top
of Page 1 of the translation of 2409-PS— "The boycott appeal is
approved by the entire Cabinet." And again on the 31st of March
1933 he wrote, on Page 1, first sentence of Paragraph 2, "We are
having a last discussion among a very small circle and decide that
the boycott is to start tomorrow with all severity."
The Defendant Streicher and the Defendant Frank, together with
Himmler, Ley, and others, were members of a central committee
who conducted the 1933 boycott against the Jews. Their names are
listed in Document 2156-PS, National Socialist Party Correspondence,
29 March 1933, Exhibit Number USA-263.
As early as 1933 violence against the Jews was undertaken.
Raids were conducted, by uniformed Nazis, on services within
synagogues. Attending members of the synagogues were assaulted
and religious insignia and emblems were desecrated. A report of
such an occurrence iis contained in the official dispatch from the
American Consul General in Leipzig, dated 5 April 1933.
I offer in evidence Document 2709-PS . .

THE PRESIDENT: What do you refer to 2156 for?

MAJOR WALSH: Only, Sir, to show the names of the Defend-
ants Streicher and Frank as members of the boycott committee.

525
13 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: I see.

MAJOR WALSH: Document 2709 has been given Exhibit Number
USA-265. From Paragraph 1 of Page 1, I quote:
"In Dresden, several weeks ago, uniformed Nazis raided the
Jewish prayer house, interrupted the evening rehgious
service, arrested 25 worshippers, and tore the holy insignia
or emblems from their headcovering worn while praying."
At Nuremberg, before the representatives of
a meeting here in
the German Defendant Streicher and Mayor Liebel of
press, the
Nuremberg revealed in advance to the gathered members of the
press that the Nuremberg synagogue was to be destroyed.
I offer in evidence Document 1724-PS, Exhibit Number USA-266,
which is minutes of this meeting, dated 4 August 1938. From
Page 1, Paragraph 4 of the original, I quote the translation before
the Court:
"The breaking up of the synagogue (information must still be
On August 10, 1938, at 10 o'clock a.m., the breakup
secret).
of the synagogue will commence. Gauleiter Julius Streicher
will personally set the crane into motion with which the
Jewish symbols. Star of David, et cetera, will be torn down.
This should be arranged in a big way. Closer details are still
unknown."
The Defendant Streicher himself supervised the demolition.
In support of this, I offer Document 2711-PS, a newspaper
account of 11 August 1938, Exhibit Number USA-267, Paragraph 1
of the translation before the Court:
"In Nuremberg the synagogue is being demolished; Juhus
Streicher himself inaugurates the work by a speech lasting
—
more than an hour and a half. By his order then so to speak
—
as a prelude of the demolition the tremendous Star of David
came off the cupola."
These accounts of violence were not localized anti-Semitic
demonstrations but were directed and ordered from a centralized
headquarters in Berlin. This is established by a series of teletype
messages sent by the Berlin Secret State Police headquarters to
chiefs of police throughout Germany on 10 November 1938, which
contained instructions pertaining to the pre-arranged demonstration.
I now refer to Document 3051-PS, previously offered in evidence

as Exhibit Number USA-240. I shall quote the relevant part of one

of these confidential orders signed by Heydrich, the translation
before the Court, the last half on Page 2:
"Because of the attempt on the life of the Secretary of the
Legation, VomRath, in Paris tonight, 9-10 November 1938,
demonstrations against Jews are to be expected throughout

526
 13 Dec. 45

the Reich. The following instructions are given on how to

treat these events:
"1) The Chiefs of the State Police or their deputies must get
in telephonic contact with the political leaders who have
jurisdiction over their districts and must arrange a joint
meeting with the appropriate inspector or commander of the
Order Police to discuss the organization of the demonstrations.
At these discussions the political leaders have to be informed
that the German Police has received from the Reichsführer SS
and Chief of the German Police the following instructions, in
accordance with which the political leaders should adjust
their own measures.
"a) Only such measures should be taken which do not involve
danger to German life or property. (For instance synagogues
are to be burned down only when there is no danger of fire
to the surroundings.)
"b) Business and private apartments of Jews may be
destroyed but not looted. The poHce is instructed to supervise
the execution of this order and to arrest looters."
To we have found a gradual and a mounting emphasis
this point
in the campaign against the Jews, one of the basic tenets of the
Nazi Party and of the state. The flame of prejudice has now been
lighted and fanned. The German people have been to a large
degree indoctrinated, and the seeds of hatred have been sown. The
German State is now armed and is prepared for conquest and the
force of world opinion can now safely be ignored. Already they
have forced out of Germany 200,000 of its original 500,000 Jews.
The Nazi-controlled German State is therefore emboldened; and
Hitler, in anticipation of the aggressive wars already planned, casts
about for a "whipping boy" upon whose shoulders can be placed
the blame for the world catastrophe yet to come. The speech before
the Reichstag on 30 January 1939 is set forth in Document Number
2663-PS, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-268.
I quote:
"If the international Jewish financiers within and without
Europe succeed in plunging the nations once more into a
world war, the result will not be the Bolshevization of the
"
world and the victory of Jewry, but the obliteration of the
Jewish race in Europe."
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, it would, I think, assist the

Tribunal if you were careful to state the PS number which we

527
13 Dec. 45

have rather more clearly and slowly. You see, the United States
Exhibit number we do not have and I do not know whether it
would be better to state the United States Exhibit number first
and then give us the PS number; I am not sure it would. Anyhow,
if you would go a little more slowly and make certain we get the

PS number, it would be helpful.

MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Your Honor.
The Chief Editor organ of the SS, the Schwarze
of the official
Korps, expressed similar sentiments on August 8, 1940.
I offer in evidence Document 2668-PS; this is Exhibit Number
USA-269, Page 2 of the original and the full excerpt before the
Court in translation, as follows:
"Just as the Jewish question will be solved for Germany only
when the last Jew has been deported, so the rest of Europe
should also realize that the German peace which awaits it
must be a peace without Jews."
These were not the onlyofficials of the Party and of the State
to voice the same views. The Defendant Rosenberg wrote for
the publication World Struggle. I offer in evidence Document
2665-PS, Exhibit Number USA-270. This publication. Volumes 1
and 2, April and September 1941, Page 71 of the original, reads,
"The Jewish question will be solved only when the last Jew has
left the European continent."

The Court will recall Mr. Justice Jackson's reference to the

apologetic note contained in the diary of Hans Frank when he
wrote, and I quote from Document 2233(c)-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-271, bottom of Page 1 of the translation:
"Of course, I could neither ehminate all lice nor all Jews in
only 1 year's time. But in the course of time and, above all,
if you will help me, this end will be attained."

THE PRESIDENT: I forgot to say, Major Walsh, it would help

us too, when you do

not begin at the beginning of a paragraph,
if you would indicate about where it is.
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; I shall do that.
While presentation is not necessarily intended to be a
this
chronological narrative of events in the treatment of the Jewish
people, it would appear at this point that we should pause to
examine the record to date. We find that the Nazi Party and the
Nazi-dominated State have, by writings and by utterances, by
decrees and by official acts, clearly expressed their intent: the Jew
must be eliminated.
How do they now progress to the accompUshment of this
purpose? The first requirement was a complete registration of all
Jews; and inasmuch as the policy relating to the Jews followed

528
 , 13 Dec. 45

on the heels of German aggression, such registration was required

not only within the Reich but successively within the conquered
territories. For example, within Germany registration was required
by decree {Reichsgesetzhlatt, Part I, 1938, Page 922, 23 July, signed
by the Defendant Frick); within Austria {Reichsgesetzhlatt, Volume 1,
1940, Page 694, 29 April); within Poland (Kurjer Krakowski,
5 October 1939); in France {Journal Ojficiel Number 9, Page 92,
30 September 1940); in Holland (Verordnungsblatt, Number 6,
10 January 1941, signed by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart).

The second step was to segregate and concentrate the Jews

within restricted areas called ghettos. This policy was carefully
worked out, and perhaps the confidential statement taken from the
files of the Defendant Rosenberg will best serve as an illustration.

I offer in evidence a copy of a memorandum from Defendant

Rosenberg's file"Directions for Handling of the Jewish
entitled,
Question," Document 212-PS, Exhibit Number USA-272. I quote
from the top of Page 2 of the translation before the Court:
"The first main goal of the German measures must be strict
segregation of Jewry from the rest of the population. The
presupposition of this is, first of all, the registration of the
Jewish population by the introduction of a compulsory
registration order and similar appropriate measures. ..."
And then, in the second sentence, in the second paragraph, on
Page 2, I continue:
"... all rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn.
They are to be placed in ghettos and at the same time are to
be separated according to sexes. The presence of many more
or less closed Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in
the Ukraine makes this mission easier. Moreover, places are
to be chosen which make possible the full use of the Jewish
manpower as a consequence of present labor programs. These
ghettos can be placed under the supervision of a Jewish self-
government with Jewish officials. The guarding of the
boundaries between the ghettos and the outer world is,
however, the duty of the police.

"Also, the case in which a ghetto could not yet be

in
estabhshed, care is to be taken through strict prohibition and
similar suitable measures that a further intermingling of
blood of the Jews and the rest of the populace does not
continue."
In May 1941 Rosenberg, as the Reich Minister for the Eastern
regions, issued directions confining the Jews to ghettos in the
Ukraine.

529
13 Dec. 45

I offer in evidence Document 1028-PS, Exhibit Number USA-273,

and from the first sentence of the translation before the Court,
I read:
"After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices,
the Jewish question will have to be solved conclusively
through the institution of ghettos."
The policies expressed in the quoted Rosenberg memoranda were
not isolated instances nor the acts of one individual. It was the
expressed state policy. Defendant Von Schirach played his part in
the program of "ghettoization." I offer in evidence Document
3048-PS, Exhibit Number USA-274. Before the Court is a full
translation of that which I wish to quote. The Defendant Von
Schirach spoke before the European Youth Congress held in Vienna
on 14 September 1942, and from Page 2, Column 2, of the Vienna
edition of the Völkischer Beobachter of 15 September, I quote:
"Every Jew who exerts influence in Europe is a danger to
European culture. If anyone reproaches me with having driven
from this city, which was once the European metropolis of
Jewry, tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into
the ghetto of the East, I feel myself compelled to reply, *I

see in this an action contributing to European culture.' "

One of the largest ghettos was within the City of Warsaw. The
original report made by SS Major General S troop concerning this
ghetto is "The Warsaw Ghetto -is no more." I now offer
entitled,
if the Court please, and request leave
this in evidence at this time,
to refer to it later on in this presentation—Exhibit Number
USA-275, 1061-PS, top of Page 3 of the translation. Document
1061-PS:
"The Ghetto thus established in Warsaw was inhabited by
about 400,000 Jews.
"Itcontained 27,000 apartments with an average of two and
a half rooms each. It was separated from the rest of the city
by partitions and other walls and by walling-up of thorough-
fares, windows, doors, open spaces, et cetera.''

Some idea of the conditions within this ghetto can be gathered

from the fact that an average of six persons lived in every room.
Himmler received a report from the SS Brigadeführer Group A,
dated 15 October 1941 which further illustrates the establishment
and operation of the ghettos. I offer Document L-180 in evidence
as Exhibit Number USA-276. The translation, if the Tribunal
please, is from the second paragraph from the bottom of Page 9:
"Apart from organizing and carrying out measures of execu-
tion, the creation of ghettos was begun in the larger towns
at once during the first days of operations. This was especially

530
 13 Dec. 45

urgent in Kovno because there were 30,000 Jews in a total

population of 152,400."
And from the last paragraph on Page 9 continuing to page 10
I quote:
"In Riga the so-called 'Moscow suburb' was designated as
a ghetto. This is the worst dwelling district of Riga, already
now mostly inhabited by Jews. The transfer of the Jews into
the ghetto district proved rather difficult because the Latvian
dwellings in that district had to be evacuated and residential
space in Riga is very crowded. Of the 28,000 Jews living in
Riga 24,000 have been transferred into the ghetto so far. In
creating the ghetto the Security Police restricted themselves
to mere policing duties, while the establishment and ad-
ministration of the ghetto as well as the regulation of the
food supply for the inmates of the ghetto was left to civil
administration; the Labor Offices were left in charge of labor
allocation. In the other towns with a larger Jewish population
ghettos shall be estabhshed likewise."
Jews were also forced into ghettos in the Polish Province of
Galicia. No words in my vocabulary could describe quite so
adequately the conditions as those contained in the report from
Katzmann, Lieutenant General of Police, to Krüger, General of
the PoUce East, dated 3 June 1943, entitled "Solution of Jewish
Question in Galicia." I offer Document L-18 in evidence as Exhibit
Number USA-277. From the translation, if the Court please, we
will begin with the last three sentences on Page 11, that is, the last
three sentences prior to the word "nothing" which is there on that
page: "Nothing but catastrophical conditions were found in the
ghettos of Rawa-Ruska and Rohatyn."
"The Jews Rawa-Ruska, fearing the evacuation, had con-
of
cealed those who
suffered from spotted fever in underground
holes. When evacuation was to start it was found that 3,000
Jews suffering from spotted fever lay about in this ghetto.
In order to destroy this center of pestilence at once, every
police officer inoculated against spotted fever was called into
action. Thus we succeeded in destroying this plague-boil,
losing thereby only one officer. Almost the same conditions
were found in Rohatyn."
On Page 19 of this same document, L-18, the last paragraph, 1

wish to quote further.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MAJOR WALSH: "Since we received more and more
alarming reports on the Jews becoming armed in an ever-
increasing manner, we started, during the last fortnight in

531
13 Dec. 45

June 1943, an action throughout the whole of the District of

Galicia with the intent to use strongest measures to destroy
the Jewish gangsterdom. Special measures were found neces-
sary during the action to dissolve the living quarters in Lvov
where the dug-out mentioned above had been established.
Here we had to act brutally from the beginning in order to
avoid losses on our side; we had to blow up or to burn down
several houses. On this occasion the surprising fact arose that
we were able to catch about 20,000 Jews instead of 12,000
Jews who had registered. We
had to pull at least 3,000 Jewish
corpses out of every kind of hiding place; they had committed
suicide by taking poison."
On Page 20 of this document, the third paragraph I read:
"Despite the extraordinary burden heaped upon every single
SS and Police member during these actions, the mood and
spirit of the men were extraordinarily good and praisewo-rthy
from the first to the last day."
These acts and actions of removal and slaughter were not
entirely without profit. The author of this report, on the ninth
page of this translated copy stated, and I quote the last paragraph:
"Together with the evacuation action we executed the confis-
cation of Jewish property. Very high values were confiscated
and handed over to the Special Staff 'Reinhard.' Apart from
furniture and many textile goods, the following amounts were
"
confiscated and turned over to Special Staff 'Reinhard.'
I would like to read a few of the many and assorted items listed
under this confiscation:
"20.952 kilograms of golden wedding rings; 7 stamp collec-
tions,complete; 1 suitcase with pocket knives; 1 basket of
fountain pens and propelling pencils; 3 bags filled with rings
— not genuine; 35 wagons of furs."
I will hot burden the Court with the detailed lists of objects
of value and of the money confiscated; but the foregoing is citefd to
illustrate thethoroughness of the looting of a defenseless people,
even to the 11.73 kilograms of gold teeth and inlays.
By the end of 1942 Jews in the Government General of Poland
had been crowded into 55 localities whereas before the German
invasion there had been approximately 1,000 Jewish settlements
within this same area. This is reported in the 1942 official gazette
for the Government General, Number 94, Page 665, 1 November
1942.
The Jews having been registered and confined within the
ghettos, they now
furnished a reservoir for slave labor. It is •

believed pertinent at this time to point out the difference between

the slave labor and labor duty. The latter group were entitled

532
»
 13 Dec. 45

to reasonable compensation, stated work hours, medical care and

attention, and other social security measures, while the former
were granted none of these advantages, being in fact on a level
below a slave.
Defendant Rosenberg, as Reich Minister for the Eastern Occupied
Territories, set up within his organization a department which,
among other things, was to seek a solution for the Jewish problem
by means of forced labor. His plans are contained in another
document, 1024-PS, which I now offer in evidence, Exhibit Number
USA-278.
I quote the first part of Paragraph 3 of Page 1 of the document
entitled, "General Organization and Tasks of Our Office for the
General Handhng of Problems in the Eastern Territory." This is
dated 29 April 1941. This brief excerpt reads as follows:
"A general treatment is required for the Jewish problem for
which a temporary solution will have to be determined
(forced labor for the Jews, creation of ghettos, et cetera),"
Thereafter he issued instructions that Jewish forced labor should
be effected and utilized for every manual labor; and I refer to
Document 212-PS, already in evidence, Exhibit Number USA-272.
From Page 3 of this document, Paragraph 5 and Paragraph 7, I
quote Paragraph 5:
"The standing rule for the Jewish labor employment is the
complete and unyielding use of Jewish manpower regardless
of age in the reconstruction of the Eastern Occupied Terri-
tories."
And from Paragraph 7 of the same page I read:
"Violations of German measures, especially evasions of the
forced labor regulations, are to be punished by death in the
case of the Jews."
From the ghettos Jewish labor was selected and sent to a con-
centration area. Here the usable Jews were screened from those
considered worthless. For example, a contingent of 45,000 Jews
would be expected to yield 10,000 to 15,000 usable laborers. My
authority for this statement is contained in a RSHA telegram to
Himmler, marked "urgent" and "secret," dated 16 December 1942.
I offer this document, 1472-PS, in evidence. Exhibit Number
USA-279; and from the translation before the Court I read the last
four lines:
"In the total of 45,000 are included physically handicapped
and others (old Jews and children). In making a distribution
for this purpose, at least 10,000 to 15,000 laborers will be
available when the Jews arriving at Auschwitz are assigned."
From Document L-18, a report from the Lieutenant General of
the Police, Katzmann, to General of the Police East, Krüger, already

533
 .

13 Dec. 45

in evidence, Exhibit Number USA-277, we find the clearly outlined

nature of the forced labor situation for the Jews. On Page 2 of the
translation, starting with Paragraph 6, I read:
"The best remedy consisted in the formation of forced labor
camps by the SS and Police Leader. The best opportunity
for labor was offered by the necessity to complete the *Dg. 4'
road which was extremely important and necessary for the
whole of the southern part of the front and which was in a
catastrophically bad condition. On October 15, 1941, the
establishment of camps along the road was commenced; and
despite considerable difficulties there existed, after a few
weeks only, seven camps containing 4,000 Jews."
From Page 2, Paragraph 7, I read:
"Soon more camps followed these first ones, so that after a
very short time the completion of 15 camps of this kind could
be reported to the superior leader of SS and police. In the
course of time about 20,000 Jewish laborers passed through
these camps. Despite the hardly imaginable difficulties arising
from this problem I can report today that about 160 kilo-
meters of the road are completed."
And from Page 2, Paragraph 8, I read:
"At the same time other Jews fit for work were registered
all
and distributed for useful work by the labor agencies."
And on Page 5, last part of Paragraph 1 . .

THE PRESIDENT: Don't you want the remainder of that para-

graph on Page 2?
MAJOR WALSH: It is such a lengthy document, I hesitated to
burden the record with so much of it, and had extracted certain
portions therefrom, but I shall be very glad to read it into the
record.
THE PRESIDENT: "Then, for instance, the Municipal Ad-
ministration at Lvov had no success in their attempts to house
the Jews within a closed district which would be inhabited
only by Jews. This question, too, was solved quickly by the
SS and Police Leader through his subordinate officials."
MAJOR WALSH: With the Court's permission, I add. that to the
record.
Reading the last paragraph of Page 2:

"When the Jews were marked by the Star of David, as well

as when they were registered by the labor agencies, the first
symptoms appeared in their attempts to dodge the order of
the authorities. The measures which were introduced there-
upon led to thousands of arrests. It became more and more
apparent that the civil administration was not in a position

534
 13 Dec. 45

to solve the Jewish problem in an approximately satisfactory

manner. Then, for instance, the municipal administration at
Lvov had no success in their attempts to house the Jews
within a closed district which would be inhabited only by
Jews. This question, too, was solved quickly by the SS and
Police Leader through his subordinate officials. This measure
became the more urgent as in the winter of 1941 big centers
."
of spotted fever were noted in many parts of the town . . .

And on Page 5 of this document, L-18, last half of Paragraph 1,

I read:
"During the removal of the Jews into a certain quarter of the
town several sluices were erected at which all the work-shy
and asocial Jewish rabble were caught during the screening
and treated in a special way. Owing to the peculiar fact that
almost 90 percent of artisans working in Galicia were Jews,
the task to be solved could be fulfilled only step by step, since
an immediate evacuation would not have served the interest
of war economy."
And again, on Page 5, Paragraph 2, the latter part, beginning
with "cases were discovered":
"Cases were discovered where Jews, in order to acquire any
certificate of labor, not only renounced all wages but even
paid money themselves. Moreover, the organizing of Jews
for the benefit of their employers grew to such catastrophical
extent that it was deemed necessary to interfere in the most
energetic manner for the benefit of the German name.
"Since the administration was not in a position and showed
itself too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police leader
simply took over the entire disposition of labor for Jews. The
Jewish labor agencies, which were manned by hundreds of
Jews, were dissolved. All certificates of labor given by firms
or administrative offices were declared invalid, and the cards
given to the Jews by the labor agencies were validated by
the police offices by stamping them. In the course of this
action, again, thousands of Jews were caught who were in
possession of forged certificates or who had obtained, surrep-
titiously, certificates of labor by all kinds of pretexts. These
Jews also were exposed to special treatment."
If the Court please, at fhis time I would like to arrange for the
showing of a very short motion picture, perhaps one of the most
unusual exhibits that will be presented during the Trial. With the
Court's permission I would like to call upon Commander Donovan
to assist.

THE PRESIDENT: Need we adjourn for it or not?

535
13 Dec. 45

MAJOR WALSH: No, Sir. The movie itself is very, very short,
Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COMMANDER DONOVAN: May it please the Tribunal, the
United States now offers in evidence Document Number 3052-PS,
Exhibit Number USA-280, entitled "Original German 8-millimeter
Film of Atrocities against Jews."
is a strip of motion pictures taken, we believe, by a member
This
of theSS and captured by the United States military forces in an
SS barracks near Augsburg, Germany, as described in the affidavits
now before the Tribunal.
We have not been able to establish beyond doubt in which area
these films were made, bu^t we believe that to be immaterial.
The film offers undeniable evidence, made by Germans them-
selves, of almost incredible brutality to Jewish people in the custody
of the Nazis, including German military units.
believed by the Prosecution that the scene is the exter-
It is
mination of a ghetto by Gestapo agents, assisted by military units.
And, as the other evidence to be presented by the Prosecution will
indicate, the scene presented to the Tribunal is probably one which
occurred a thousand times all over Europe under the Nazi rule of
terror. •

This film was made on an 8-millimeter home camera. We have

not wished even to reprint it, and so shall present the* original,
untouched film captured by our troops. The pictures obviously were
taken by an amateur photographer. Because of this, because of the
fact that part of it is burned, because of the fact that it runs for only
1^/2 minutes, and because of the confusion on every hand shown on

this film, we do not believe that the Tribunal can properly view the
evidence if it is shown only once. We therefore ask the Tribunal's
permission to project the film twice as we did before the Defense
Counsel.
This is a silent film. The film has been made available to all
Defense Counsel, and they have a copy of the supporting affidavits,
duly translated.
[The film was shown.]
COMMANDER DONOVAN: [Continuing.] May it please the Tri-
bunal, while the film is being rewound Î wish to say that attached
to the affidavits offered in evidence is a description of every picture
shown in this film. And, with the Tribunal's permission, I wish
to read a few selections from that at this time, before again pro-
jecting the film, in order to direct the Tribunal's attention to certain
of the scenes:

536
 13 Dec. 45

Scene —A naked girl running across the courtyard.

2

Scene —An older woman being pushed past the camera, and
3 '

a man in SS uniform standing at the right of the scene.

Scene 5 —A man with a skullcap and a woman are manhandled.
Number 14— half-naked woman runs through the crowd.
^A
Number 15 —Another haK-naked woman runs out of the house.
Number 16 —Two men drag an old man out.
Number 18 —A man in German military uniform, with his back
to the camera, watches.
Number 24—A general shot of the showing fallen bodies
street,
and naked women running.
Number 32 —A shot of the showing five fallen bodies.
street,
Number 37—A man with a bleeding head hit again. is

Number —A soldier in German military uniform, with a

39 rifle,
stands by as a crowd centers on a man coming out of the house.
Number 44—A soldier with a in German military uniform,
rifle,
walks past a woman clinging to a torn blouse.
Number 45 —A woman dragged by her hair across the
is street.

[The film was shown again.]

COMMANDER DONOVAN: [Continuing.] We submit to the Tri-
bunal for its permanent records this strip of 8-millimeter fllm.
MAJOR WALSH: It is difficult from this point to follow the
thread of chronological order or a topical outline. So numerous are
the documents and so appalUng the contents that in this brief recital
the Prosecution will make no effort to itemize the criminal acts.
Selected documents, however, will unfold the crimes in full detail.
Before launching a discussion of the means utilized to accomplish
the ulcimate aim, that is the extermination of the Jewish people,
I now turn to that fertile source of evidence, the diary of Hans
Frank, then Governor General of occupied Poland. In a cabinet
session on Tuesday, 16 December 1941, in the government building
at Krakow, the Defendant Frank made a closing address to the ses-
sion. I offer now in evidence that part of the document. Number
2233(d)-PS, Exhibit Number USA-281, identified CV 1941, October
to December, and from Page 76, line 10, to Page 77, line 33, of the
original and of the entire translation before the Court. I quote:
"As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell yeu quite
frankly that they must be done away with in one way o»r
another. The Führer said once: 'Should united Jewry again
succeed in provoking a world war, the blood of not only the
nations which have been forced into the war by them will
be shed, but the Jew will have found his end in Europe.'
I know that many of the measures carried out against the

537
13 Dec. 45

Jews in the Reich at present are being criticized. It is being

tried intentionally, as is obvious from the reports on the
morale, to talk about cruelty, harshness, et cetera. Before I
continue, I would beg you to agree with me on the following
formula: We will principally have pity on the German people
only and nobody else in the whole world. The others, too,
had no pity on us. As an old National Socialist I must also
say: This war would be only a partial success if the whole lot
of Jewry would survive it, while we would have shed our best
blood in order to save Europe. My attitude towards the Jews
will, therefore, be based only on the expectation that they
must disappear. They must be done away with. I have
entered negotiations to have them deported to the East. A
large conference concerning that question, to which I am
going to delegate the State Secretary Dr. Bühler, will take
place in Berlin in January. That discussion is to take place
in the Reich Security Main Office with SS Lieutenant General
Heydrich. A great Jewish migration will begin, in any case.
"But what should be done with the Jews? Do you think they
willbe settled down in the 'Ostland' in villages? This is what
we were told in Berlin: Why all this bother? We can do
nothing with them either in the 'Ostland' or in the 'Reichs-
kommissariat.' So liquidate them yourselves.
"Gentlemen, I must ask you to arm yourselves against all
feeling of pity. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we
find them and wherever it is possible, in order to maintain
there the structure of the Reich as a whole. This will, natu-
rally, be achieved by other methods than those pointed out
by Bureau Chief Dr. Hummel. Nor can the judges of the
Special Courts be made responsible for it because of the limi-
tations of the frame work of the legal procedure. Such out-
dated views cannot be applied to such gigantic and unique
events. We must find at any rate a way which leads to the
goal, and my thoughts are working in that direction.
"The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant
gluttons.We have now approximately, 2,500,000 of them in
the Government General, perhaps with the Jewish mixtures
and everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews. We cannot
shoot or poison those 3,500,000 Jews; but we shall never-
theless be able to take measures which will lead, somehow,
to their annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic
measures to be determined in discussions with the Reich. The
Government General must become free of Jews, the same as
the Reich. Where and how this is to be achieved is a matter
for the offices which we must appoint and create here. Their
activities will be brought to your attention in due course."

538
 13 Dec. 45

This, the Tribunal please, is not the planning and scheming

if

of is the expression of the official of the German

an individual, but
State, the appointed Governor General of occupied Poland. The
methods used to accomplish the annihilation of the Jewish people
were varied and, although not subtle, were highly successful.
I have from time to time made reference to certain utterances
and actions of the Defendant Rosenberg as one of the leaders and
policy makers of the Nazi Party and German State. It is perhaps
reasonable to assume that the Defendant Rosenberg will claim for
many of his actions that he pursued them pursuant to superior
orders. I have before me, however, a captured document, Number
001-PS, marked "secret," dated 18 December 1941, entitled "Docu-
—
mentary Memorandum for the Führer Concerning Jewish Posses-
sions in France," Exhibit Number USA-282. I dare say that no
document before this Tribunal will more clearly evidence the
Defendant Rosenberg's personal attitude, his temperament, and con-
victions toward the Jews more strongly than this memorandum,
wherein he, in his own initiative, urges plundering and death. I
offer in evidence Document Number 001-PS. The body of the memo-
randum reads as follows:
"In compliance with the order of the Führer for protection of
Jewish cultural possessions, a great number of Jewish dwell-
ings remained unguarded. Consequently, many furnishings
have disappeared because a guard could, naturally, not be
posted. In the whole East the administration has found ter-
rible conditions of living quarters, and the chances of procure-
ment are so limited that it is not possible to procure any
more. Therefore, I beg the Führer to permit the seizure of
all Jewish home furnishings of Jews in Paris who have fled
or will leave shortly and those of Jews living in all parts of
the occupied West to relieve the shortage of furnishings in
the administration in the East.
"2. A great number of leading Jews were, after a short
examination in Paris, again released. The attempts on the
lives of members of the Forces have not stopped; on the
contrary they continue. This reveals an unmistakable plan
to disrupt the German-French co-operation, to force Ger-
many to retaliate and, with this, evoke a new defense on the
part of the French against Germany. I suggest to the Führer
that, instead of executing 100 Frenchmen, we shoot in their
place 100 Jewish bankers, lawyers, et cetera. It is the Jews
in London and New York who incite the French Communists
to commit acts of violence, and it seems only fair that the
members of this race should pay for this. It is not the little
Jews but the leading Jews in France who should be held

539
 . .

13 Dec. 45

responsible. That would tend to awaken the anti-Jewish

sentiment." —Signed— "A. Rosenberg."
[Dr. Thoma approached the lectern.]
THE PRESIDENT: May I ask you to speak slowly so that your
application will come to me through the earphones correctly.
DR. THOMA: Since the Prosecutor is now dealing with the case
against my client, Rosenberg, may I be permitted to voice an objec-
tion to Document 212-PS, Exhibit Number USA-272. The Prose-
cutor claims that this document was a directive issued by the
Minister for the East. It begins with the words . .

THE PRESIDENT: None of that has come through on the ear-

phones. I don't understand you. You had better begin again.
DR. THOMA: The
Prosecutor presented earlier today Document
Number 212-PS, Exhibit Number USA-272, claiming that its content
was a directive issued by the Minister for the East on the treatment
of Jews. In this document he is said to have given instructions that
violations of German regulations by Jews, especially violations of
the compulsory labor laws, could only be punished by death. This
document does not originate with the Defendant Rosenberg; nor did
it by mistake . .

THE PRESIDENT: More slowly, please.

DR. THOMA: This document does not originate with the Defend-
ant Rosenberg. bears neither a date nor an address, nor his
It
signature. I, therefore, object to the assertion that this document
originated with the Defendant Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I don't think that Counsel
for the Prosecution said that, that Document 212-PS emanated from
Rosenberg. I didn't so understand him.

DR. THOMA: I understood him to say that it was a directive

issued by the Minister for the East; and if I am not mistaken, he
also said it was dated April 1941. At that time there was no
Ministry for the East. Rosenberg was only named Minister for the
East in July 1941.
THE PRESIDENT: I will ask the Counsel for the Prosecution.

MAJOR WALSH: It is my understanding. Sir, that that docu-

ment, 212-PS, was taken from the captured files of Rosenberg.

DR. THOMA: That is true, it was found among the papers of the
Defendant Rosenberg; the Defendant Rosenberg claims, however,
that he has never seen this document, that he knows nothing about
it, and that it has never passed through his hands.

THE PRESIDENT: Rosenberg, when he is called as a witness

or when you appear to speak for him, will be able to say that he

540
 13 Dec. 45

has never seen the document before. All that Counsel for the Prose-
— —
cution has said and it appears to be true is that the document
was found in Rosenberg's file. You can say or prove by Rosenberg's
—
evidence when you call Rosenberg if you do call him that he—
never saw the document. Do you understand?
DR.THOMA: Yes, thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o'clock now, so we will adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 14 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

541
 TWENTIETH DAY
Friday, 14 December 1945

Morning Session

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I bring up two points with regard to

yesterday's and all future presentation of evidence on the section
dealing with Crimes against Humanity.
Firstly, I request that the affidavit of the witness Pfaffenberger,
which was submitted yesterday, be stricken from the record. The
witness himself will later have to be cross-examined, since his
affidavit is fragmentary in most important points. In many cases
it does not appear whether his statements are based on personal
observations or on hearsay, and therefore it is too easy to draw
false conclusions. The witness did not mention that the Camp Com-
mander Koch and his inhuman wife were condemned to death by
an SS court, among other things, on account of these occurrences.
It is, of course, possible to ascertain the complete facts by ques-
tioning the witness at a later stage of the Trial. But until then the
Tribunal and all members of the Prosecution and the Defense must
be continually influenced by such dreadful testimony.
The contents of this testimony are so horrifying and so degrading
to the human mind that one would like to avert one's eyes and ears.
In the meantime such statements make their way into the press of
the whole world, and civilization is justly indignant. The conse-
quences of such prejudiced statements are incalculable. The Prose-
cutor clearly recognized the significance of this testimony and
exposed the sorry documents in yesterday's proceedings.
If weeks or months pass before such testimony is rectified, its
can never be wholly eliminated; but truth suffers and
initial effect
justice is endangered thereby. Surely, Article 19 of the Charter
does not envisage bringing about such a state of affairs.
Secondly, I should, therefore, like to suggest that at the present
stage of the Trial the testimony of witnesses who live in Germany
and whose appearance here in court is possible should not be read
in the proceedings. For at this stage of the Trial the charges being
made are even more terrible than those referring to wars of aggres-
sion, since the tortured lives and deaths of human beings are
involved.
At the beginning of the Trial the Tribunal refused to admit
testimony of the witness Schuschnigg, and it is my opinion that

542
 —

14 Dec. 45

what was valid then should be all the more valid at this stage of
the Trial.
I my suggestion particularly with regard
should like to emphasize
to the Defendant Dr. Kaltenbrunner himself, since it was not until
the spring of 1943 that he became Chief of the Reich Security Main
Office and since, in the opinion of the Defense, many, if not all, of
his signatures were forged and the entire executive function attached
to the concentration camps and the things connected with them lay
exclusively in Himmler's hands. That I hope to prove at a later
date. I mentioned it now in order to justify my suggestion.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear counsel for

the Chief Prosecutor of the United States.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, Mr. Dodd,
who had charge of the matter which is under discussion, left for the
United States yesterday; and I shall have to substitute for him
best I can.
This Tribunal sits under a Charter which recognized the impos-
sibility ofcovering a decade of time, a continent of space, a million
acts, by ordinary rules of proof, and at the same time finishing this
case within the lives of living men. We do not want to have a trial
here that, like the trial of Warren Hastings, lasted 7 years. There-
fore the Charter sets up only two standards by which any evidence,
I submit, may be rejected. The first is that evidence must be rele-

vant to the issue. The second is it must have some probative value.
That was made mandatory upon this Tribunal in Article 19 because
of the difficulty of ever trying this case if we used the technical
rules of Common Law proof.
One of the reasons this was a military tribunal, instead of an
ordinary court of law, was in order to avoid the precedent-creating
effect of what is done here on our own law and the precedent
control which would exist if this were an ordinary judicial body.
Article 19 provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by
technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest
possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure and shall
admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. That
was made mandatory, that it shall admit any evidence which it
deems to have probative value. The purpose of that provision. Your
Honors, I may say, was this: That the whole controversy in this
—
case and we have no doubt that there is room for controversy
should be centered upon the value of evidence and not on its admis-
sibility.

We have no jury. There is no occasion for applying jury rules.

Therefore, when a piece of evidence is offered, there are two ques-
tions which arise: Does it have probative value? If it has no pro-

bative value, then it should not encumber the records, of course.

543
14 Dec. 45

The second is, does it have relevancy? If it has not, of course it

should not come in.
The evidence in question has relevance; no one questions that.
No one can say that an affidavit, duly sworn, does not have some
probative value. What probative value it has, the weight of it,
should be determined on the submission of the case. That is to say,
if a witness has made a statement in an affidavit, and it is denied

by Mr. Kaltenbrunner, and you believe that the denial has weight
and credibility, of course, the affidavit should not be considered in
the final consideration of the case. But we are dealing here with
events that took place over great periods of time and great distances.
We are dealing with witnesses widely scattered and a situation
where communications are almost at a standstill.
If this affidavit stands at the end of this case undenied, unchal-
lenged, it is not, then, beyond belief that you would give it value
and weight. An affidavit might bear internal evidence that it lacked
credibility, such as evidence where the witness was talking of some-
thing of which he had no personal knowledge. I do not say that
every affidavit that comes along has probative value just because it
is sworn to. But it seems to me that if we are to make progress
w^ith this case, this simple system envisioned by this Charter, which
was the subject of long consideration, must be followed; that if,
when a piece of evidence is presented, even though it does not
comply with technical rules governing judicial procedures, it is
something which has probative value in the ordinary daily concerns
of life, it should be admitted. If it stands undenied at the close
of the case, as many of these things will, then, of course, there is
no issue about it; and it saves the calling of witnesses, which will
take an indefinite period of time as we have already seen. I may
say that the testimony of the witness Lahousen, which took nearly
2 days, could have been put in, in this Court, in 15 minutes in
affidavit form, and all that was essential to it could have been
placed before us; and if it were to be denied you could then have
determined its weight.
We want to adhere to this Charter. I submit it is no reason for
deviating from the Charter that an affidavit recites horrors. I should
have thought that the world could not be more shocked by recitals
of horrors in affidavits than it has been in the documents that have
proceeded from sources of the enemy itself. There is no reason in
that for departing from the plain principles of the Charter.
I think the question of orderly procedure and the question of
time are both involved in this. I think that the Tribunal should
—
receive affidavits, and we have prepared them we hope carefully,
—
we hope fairly to present a great many things that would take
days and days of proof. I may say that this ruling is more important

544
 14 Dec. 45

in subsequent stages of this case than it is on this particular

affidavit.
There is another reason, perhaps. We have some situations in
which a member of an accused organization, who is directly hostile
to our position because the accusation would reach him within the
accused class, has made an affidavit or affidavits which constitute
admissions against interest; but on some other issue he makes state-
ments which we believe are untrue and incredible; and we do not
wish to vouch for his general credibility by calling him as a witness,
but we wish to avail ourselves of his admission. Those things we
think since we have to make our proof largely from enemy sources.
All this proof and every witness 8 months ago were in the hands
of the enemy. We have to make our proof from them. God alone
knows how much proof there is in this world that we have not been
able to reach. We submit that the orderly procedure here is to abide
by this Charter and admit these affidavits. If they stand unques-
tioned at the end of the case, there is no issue about them. If they
are questioned, then the weight is a matter which you would deter-
mine on final submission.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I have three questions
I should like to ask you. The first is: Where is Pfaffenberger?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That cannot answer at the moment,
I

but I will get an answer as quickly as I can. It is unknown to us^

at the moment. If we are able to ascertain, I will inform you at

the conclusion of the noon recess.
THE PRESIDENT: The second point to which I wish to draw
your attention Article 16(e) of the Charter, which contemplates
is
cross-examination of witnesses by the defendants. The only reason
why it is thought that witnesses who are available should not give
evidence by affidavit is because it denies to the Defense the oppor-
tunity of cross-examining them.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that this provision means just
exactly what it says. If we call a witness, they have the right of
cross-examination. If he is not called, they have the right to call
him, if he is available, as their witness; but not, of course, the right
of cross-examination. The provision itself, if Your Honor notices,
reads that they have the right to cross-examine any witness called
by the Prosecution; but that does not abrogate or affect Article 19,
that we may obtain and produce any probative evidence in such
manner as will expedite the Trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I wish to draw
the next point to which
your attention is As I understood it, you were
Article 17(a).
arguing that it was mandatory upon the Tribunal to consider any
evidence which was relevant. Therefore, I draw your attention to

545
14 Dec. 45

Article 17(a) which gives the Tribunal power to summon witnesses

to the Trial.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. I think there is no con-

flict in that whatever. The power of the Tribunal wit- to summon
nesses and to put questions to them was introduced
into this Charter
through the continental systems of jurisprudence. Usually there are
not Tribunal witnesses in our procedure in the States. Witnesses
are called only by one of the parties; but it was suggested by the
continental scholars that in this kind of case, since we were uti-
lizing a mixture of the two procedures, the Tribunal itself should
have the right to do several things. One is to summon witnesses,
to require their attendance, and to put questions to them. I submit
that this witness, whose affidavit has been received, can be called,
if we can find him, by the Tribunal and questioned.

The next provision —

and it bears on the spirit of this of —
Article 17 that the Tribunal has the right to interrogate any
is
defendant. Of course, under our system of jurisprudence the Tri-
bunal would have no such right, because the defendant has the
unqualified right to refrain from being a witness; but in deference
again to the continental system, the Tribunal was given the right
to interrogate any defendant, and his immunities, which he would
have under the Constitution of the United States, if he were being
tried under our system, were taken away.
I submit that the perfect consistency in those provisions
empowers the Tribunal on its own motion (Article 17) to summon
witnesses, to supplement anything that is offered, to put any ques-
tions to witnesses and to any defendant.
If any witness
is called, the right of cross-examination cannot
be denied; but that does not abrogate Article 19, which was intended
to enable us to put our case before the Tribunal so that the issue
would then be drawn by the defendants and the weight of what
we offer determined on final submission.
THE PRESIDENT: Lastly, there is Article 17(e), which
I sup-
pose, in your submission, would they thought
entitle the Tribunal, if

right, after receiving the affidavit, to take the evidence of Pfaffen-

berger on commission.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: think it would. Your Honor. I
Yes, I
may —
what, perhaps, may be sur-
say, in reference to that section
prising to those accustomed to our system of jurisprudence that it —
was one of the most controversial issues we had in the framing of
this Charter. We had in mind the authorization of what we call
"masters" to go into various localities, perhaps, and take testimony,
not knowing what might be necessary. Our practice, however, of
sending "masters in equity" to take testimony and make recom-
mendations was not acceptable to the continental system, and we

546
 14 Dec. 45

finally compromised on this provision which authorizes the taking

of testimony by commissions.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.):
Your Honors, have come forward after my colleague, Mr. Jackson,
I

to make my own statement, inasmuch as I think that the petition

of the Defense is fundamentally wrong and should not be
complied with.
We are submitting our objections for the Tribunal's con-
sideration. I fully share the viewpoint held by the Chief Prosecutor
of the U.S.A., Mr. Jackson, and in addition should like to point
out the following: The Defense Counsel, in his petition, raises the
question of whether the Prosecution should refer to, or make public,
documents containing affidavits of persons residing in Germany. A
statement of this sort is completely out of order since, as is known,
the defendants committed the greater part of their atrocities in
all countries of Europe and it will be readily understood that the
witnesses of these atrocities live in different parts of these countries;
it is essential that the Prosecution have recourse to the testimony

of such persons, whether it be written or oral. Your Honors, we

have entered a phase of the Trial in which we have to set forth
the atrocities connected with so-called War Crimes and Crimes
against Humanity, atrocities which were committed by the
defendants over extensive areas. We shall submit as evidence
documents originating from the defendants themselves or from
persons who suffered at the hands of the war criminals; it would
be impossible to summon all these witnesses to the Trial so that
they could give their evidence orally. It is absolutely necessary to
have affidavits and written testimonies from these witnesses.
As His Honor the President has already remarked. Article 17
provides for the right of summoning witnesses to the Trial. That
is correct; but it is impossible to summon all the witnesses who

could depose affidavits on the crimes committed by the defendants.

I therefore refer to Article 19 of the Charter which reads:

"The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of

evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible
—
extent expeditious" and I emphasize. Your Honor, expeditious
— "and non- technical procedure and shall admit any evidence
which it deems to have probative value."
I would ask the Tribunal to proceed according to this article
which, definitely admits written affidavits of witnesses as evidence.
That is what I wished to say by way of a supplement to the state-
ment of Mr. Jackson.
MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, as far as the British

Delegation is concerned, they desire to support what the American

547
14 Dec. 45

Chief Prosecutor has said, and we do not feel we can usefully add
anything.
THE PRESIDENT: [To M, Faure of the French Delegation.] Do
you wish to add anything?
M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French
Republic): Mr. President, I wish simply to inform the Court that
the French Prosecution is entirely in accord with the remarks of
the American and Soviet Prosecutors.
I think, as the representative of the American Prosecution said,
it impossible to settle the question of evidence in this Trial
is
solely by hearing oral testimony in the courtroom, for under those
circumstances it might be opportune to call to the witness stand
all the inhabitants of the territories involved, which is obviously
impossible. The Defense will have every opportunity of discussing
the documents which have been presented by the Prosecution,
including the written testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that Counsel for Kalten-
brunner was suggesting that every witness must be called but
that witnesses who were in Germany and available should be called
and that their evidence should not be given by affidavit.
M. FAURE: The Defense has the right of calling them as wit-
nesses if it so desires.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add a few more words to this
important question? The replies which have just been given
illustrate that one of the main principles of the proceedings is that
the Trial should proceed speedily. That is also expressed in
Article 19 of the Charter, and no one can hope more than we
that this principle be followed; but it is nevertheless my opinion
that another principle, the highest known to mankind, the principle
of truth, should not thereby suffer. If there is a fear that truth
will suffer through an over-hasty trial, then formal methods of
procedure must take a secondary place. There are human principles
which remain unspoken, which need not be spoken.
This spirit of truth is certainly contained in and governs
Article 19; and the objections I raised to the testimony of this
witness seem to me justified to such a degree that the important
principle of speeding up the Trial should give way to the principle
of truth. Humanity itself is in question here. We want to establish
the truth for our own generation and for that of our children. But
if such testimony remains untold for months, then a part of
mankind might well despair of all humanity and the German
people, in particular, would suffer.
DR. FRIEDRICH BERGOLD (Counsel for the Defendant Bor-
mann): May it please the Tribunal, I should like to bringup one
other point, which appears to me important, because it was

548
 . .

14 Dec. 45

apparently the real source of this discussion. According to our

legal system it is the duty of the Prosecution to produce not only
the incriminating evidence but also evidence for the defense of the
accused. I can well understand that my colleague, Dr. Kauffmann,
protests the Prosecution's failure to mention a very important point,
namely, that the German authorities indicted this inhuman. SS
leader and his wife and condemned them to death. It is highly
probable that the Prosecution knew of this and that these horrible
exhibits of perverted human nature, which were presented to us,
were found in the files of the German Court.
I believe the whole discussion would not have arisen if the

Prosecution had mentioned, as part of the ghastly evidence, the fact

that the German authorities themselves passed judgment on this
inhuman man and condemned him to death. •

We find ourselves in difficulties because, in contrast to our own

procedure, the Prosecution for the most part simply presents
incriminating evidence but omits to present the exculpating
evidence which may form part of any document or part of the
testimony of a witness. If the German procedure had been followed
in the present case and if the Prosecution had stated that this man
was condemned to death, then in the first place, the evidence
against the Defendant Kaltenbrunner would not have appeared so
weighty and secondly, public opinion would, on the whole, have
been left with a different impression. My colleague Kauffmann
could then have limited himself to proving at a later stage of the
Trial that Kaltenbrunner had, in fact, nothing at all to do with this
affair; and the inhuman character of the proceedings and the
dreadful impression which it made on us would have been avoided.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you explain the part of the German
law towhich you were referring, where you say it is the duty
of the Prosecution not only to produce evidence for the Prosecution
but also to produce evidence for the Defense.
DR. BERGOLD: That is a general principle of German juris-
prudence, established in Paragraph 160 of the Reich Code of Penal
Procedure. It is one of the basic principles of law in Germany to . .

THE PRESIDENT: Give me that reference again.

DR.BERGOLD: Paragraph 160. German law incorporates this
principle in order to enable an accused person to . .

THE PRESIDENT: 160 of what?

DR. BERGOLD: Of the Reich Code of Penal Procedure. The
same is true of Austria. In the Austrian Code of Penal Procedure there
is a similar paragraph with which, however, I am not quite familiar.
This principle is established to permit the whole truth of a case
to be brought to light, since a defendant in custody is frequently

549
14 Dec. 45

not in a position to produce all the evidence in his favor. Therefore,

under German law it is the Prosecution's duty to present the
exculpating as well as the incriminating evidence in a particular
case.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The question arising out of Pfaffenberger's

evidence does not specifically concern the Defendant Von Papen,
because that part of the Indictment does not apply to his case.
I am therefore speaking only of the principle behind it. I believe
that in practice the effect of the different opinions expressed by
the Prosecution and the Defense cannot be of very great importance.
Justice Jackson agrees with us that every witness whose affidavit
is presented can, if available, be called to the stand by the Defense.
Thus, in all cases in which the Defense holds that an affidavit is
evidence of secondary value and as such insufficient and that direct
—
examination of the witness is necessary in all such cases there
w-ould be duplication of evidence, namely, the reading of the
affidavit and then the examination and cross-examination of the
witness. This would undoubtedly delay the proceedings of the Trial;
and to prevent that the Tribunal would, in all such cases, rule
against the reading of the affidavit. Consequently, it is futile for
the Prosecution to present affidavits of witnesses who can be
expected to appear in person later in the proceedings.
do not think that the Prosecution should be worried about
I
this. It is a matter of course that we —and we assume the same
is true of the Prosecution —that we, the members of the Defense,
want the Trial to be as speedy as possible but also want it to
proceed cautiously to establish the full truth. But, it is obvious,
if evidence is introduced which is a potential cause of completely

unjust findings, that such evidence will have to be clarified in a

more complicated and time-consuming way when the witness is
called in person.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the objection that

has been raisedwhen the Court adjourns.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I have one word?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, it is unusual to hear
counsel who opposes an objection a second time.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I merely want to give you the answer
to the question which you asked me as to the whereabouts of
Pfaffenberger. Myinformation is that these affidavits were taken
by the American Army at the time it liberated the people in these
concentration camps, at the same time the films were taken and
the whole evidence that was available gathered. This witness was
.

present at the concentration camp, and at that time his statements

were taken. We do not know his present whereabouts, and I see

550
 14 Dec. 45

no reasonable likelihood that we will be able to locate him within

any short time. We will make an effort.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MR. ROBERTS: May it please the Tribunal, might I endeavor to
assist? think I have now obtained the German order to which
I

the Defense Counsel referred, Paragraph 160. It is. My Lord, of

course, in German. Perhaps I might hand it up, and the court
translators will no doubt deal with the paragraph.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think one bit of additional informa-
tion should be furnished in view of the statements made here that
we have information that we are withholding. Kaltenbrunner has
been interrogated. At no time has he made such a claim, so I am
advised by our interrogators; and under the Charter our duty is
to present the case for the Prosecution. I do not, in any instance,
serve two masters.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, I call upon Major Walsh. Major Walsh,
did you give a lettering to the document book with which you
are dealing?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes. If Your Honor please, it is the letter
"T." May please the Tribunal, during the last session the
it

Prosecution presented briefly the preliminary steps leading to the

ultimate objective of the Nazi Party and the Nazi-controlled State,
that is, the extermination of the Jews. Propaganda, decrees, the
infamous Nuremberg Laws, boycotts, registration, and "ghetto-
ization" were the initial measures in the program. I shall, with
the Court's permission, continue with a discussion of the methods
utilized for the annihilation of the Jewish people.
I would hke first to discuss starvation. Policies were designed
and adopted to deprive the Jews of the most elemental necessities
of life. Again the Defendant Hans Frank, then Governor General
of Poland, wrote in his diary that hunger rations were introduced
in the Warsaw ghetto; and referring to the new food regulations
in August 1942, he callously, and perhaps casually, noted that by
these food regulations he virtually condemned more than 1 million
Jews to death. I offer in evidence that part of Document 2233(e)-PS,
diary of Hans Frank, "Conference Volume," 24 August 1942, Exhibit
USA-283. And I quote:
"That we sentence 1,200,000 Jews to die of hunger should
be noted only marginally. It is a matter of course that
should the Jews not starve to death it would, we hope, result
in a speeding up of the anti-Jewish measures."
Frank's diary was not the only guide to the deUberate policy
of starvation of the Jews. They were prohibited from pursuing
agricultural activities in order to cut them oft" from access to the

551
 .

14 Dec. 45

source of food. I offer Document 1138-PS in evidence, Exhibit

tJSA-284. I refer the Court to Page 4 of the translation, marked
with the Roman numeral V, Paragraphs a and b. The document
is entitled "Provisional Directive on the Treatment of Jews .

and it was issued by the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland.

I read:

"Jews must be cleaned out from the countryside. The Jews

are to be removed from all trades, especially from trade
with agricultural products and other foodstuffs."
Jews were excluded from the purchase of basic food, such as wheat
products, meat, eggs, and milk.
I offer in evidence Document 1347-PS, Exhibit USA-285, and

I quote from Paragraph 2 on the first page of the translation before

the Court. This is an original decree, dated 18 September 1942,

from the Ministry of Agriculture. I quote:
"Jews will no longer receive the following foods, beginning
with the 42d distribution period (19 October 1942): meat, meat
products, eggs, wheat products (cake, white bread, wheat
rolls, wheat flour, et cetera), whole milk, fresh skimmed milk,
as well as such food distributed not on food ration cards
issued uniformly throughout the Reich but on local supply
certificates or by special announcement of the nutrition office
on extra coupons Jewish children and young
of the food cards.
people over 10 years of age will receive the bread ration
of the normal consumer."
The sick, the old, and the pregnant mothers were excluded from
the special food concessions allotted to non-Jews. Seizure by the
State Police of food shipments to Jews from abroad was authorized,
and the Jewish ration cards were distinctly marked with "Jew,"
in color, across the face of the cards, so that the storekeepers could
readily identify and discriminate against Jewish purchasers.
The Czechoslovakian Government published in 1943 an official
document entitled "Czechoslovakia Fights Back." I offer this book
in evidence, Document 1689-PS, Exhibit USA-286. To summarize
the contents of Page 110, it states that the Jewish food purchases
were confined to certain areas and to certain days and hours. As
might be expected, the period permitted for the purchases was
during the time when food stocks were likely to be exhausted.
By Special Order Number 44 for the Eastern Occupied
Territories, dated 4 November 1941, the Jews were limited to
rations as low as only one-half of the lowest basic category of
other people; and the Ministry of Agriculture was empowered to
exclude Jews entirely or partially from obtaining food, thus
exposing the Jewish community to death by starvation.
I now offer in evidence Document L-165.

552
 .

14 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Did you réad anything from 1689-PS?

MAJOR WALSH: Just to summarize, Sir, the contents of
Page 110.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. Now you are offering L. .

MAJOR WALSH: L-165, Your Honor, Exhibit USA-287. I refer

the Court to the last half of the first paragraph of the translation.
This is a press bulletin issued by the Polish Ministry of Information,
dated 15 November 1942. The Polish Ministry concludes that, upon
the basis of the nature of the separate rationing and the amount
of food available to Jews in the Warsaw and Krakow ghettos, the
system was designed to bring about starvation; and from the
quotation I read:
"In regard to food supplies they are brought under a
completely separate system, which is obviously aimed at
depriving them of the most elemental necessities of life."
I would now like to discuss annihilation within the ghettos.
Justice Jackson in address to the Tribunal made
his opening
reference to Document 1061-PS, "The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More,"
marked Exhibit USA-275.
This finest example of ornate German craftsmanship, leather
bound, profusely illustrated, typed on heavy bond paper, is the
almost unbelievable recital of a proud accomplishment by Major
General of the Police Stroop, who signed the report with a bold
hand. General Stroop in this report first pays tribute to the bravery
and heroism of the German forces who participated in the ruthless
and merciless action against a helpless, defenseless group of Jews,
numbering, to be exact, 56,065, including, of course, the infants and
the women. In this document he proceeds to relate the day-by-day
account of the ultimate accomplishment of his mission to destroy —
and to obliterate the Warsaw ghetto.
According to this report, the ghetto, which was established in
Warsaw in November 1940, was inhabited by about 400,000 Jews;
and prior to the action for the destruction of this ghetto, some
316,000 had already been deported. The Court will note that this
report is approximately 75 pages in length, and the Prosecution
believes that the contents are of such striking evidentiary value
that no part should be omitted from the permanent records of the
Tribunal and that the Tribunal should consider the entire report
in judging the guilt of these defendants.
The defendants were furnished with several photostatic copies
of the entiredocument at least 20 days ago and have had ample
time, I am to scrutinize it in detail. If the Court, in the
sure,
exercise of judgment, determines that the entire report may
its
be accepted in toto, the Prosecution believes that the reading of a

553
 .

14 Dec. 45

portion of the summary, together with brief excerpts from the

daily teletype reports, will suffice for the oral record. I would
like the Court to examine it; and I present it to the Court, together
with the duplicate original thereof, and ask that the Court rule
that the entire document may be accepted.
THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, the Court will take that course,
provided that the Prosecution supplies as soon as possible, both to
the Soviet and to the French members of the Tribunal, copies in
Russian and French of the whole document.
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; may I consult with . .

THE PRESIDENT: I do not say present immediately, but present

as soon as possible.
MAJOR WALSH: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You are going to read the passages that you
think necessary?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes. From Page 6 of the translation before
the Court of Document 1061-PS I would like to read the boastful
but nonetheless vivid account of some of this ruthless action w'ithin
the Warsaw ghetto. I quote, second paragraph, Page 6:
"The resistance put up by the Jews and bandits could be
broken only by the relentless and energetic use of our shock-
troops by day and night. On 23 April 1943 the Reichsführer
SS issued through the Higher SS and Police Leader East at
Krakow his order to complete the combing out of the Warsaw
ghetto with the greatest severity and relentless tenacity. I
therefore decided to destroy the entire Jewish residential area
by setting every block on fire, including the blocks of
residential buildings near the armament works. One building
after the other was systematically evacuated and subsequently
destroyed by fire. The Jews then emerged from their hiding
places and dugouts in almost every case. Not infrequently
the Jews stayed in the burning buildings until, because of
the heat and the fear of being burned alive, they preferred
to jump down from the upper stories after having thrown
mattresses and other upholstered articles into the street from
the burning buildings. With their bones broken they still
tried to crawl across the street into blocks of buildings which
had not yet been set on fire or were only partially in
flames. Often the Jews changed their hiding places during
the night by moving into the ruins of burnt-out buildings,
taking refuge there until they were found by our patrols.
Their stay in the sewers also ceased to be pleasant after the
first week. Frequently from the street we could hear loud
voices coming through the sewer shafts. Then the men of

554
 14 Dec. 45

the Waffen-SS, the Police, or the Wehrmacht Engineers

courageously climbed down the shafts to bring out the Jews
and not infrequently they then stumbled over Jews already
dead or were shot at. It was always necessary to use smoke
candles to drive out the Jews. Thus one day we opened 183
sewer entrance holes and at a fixed time lowered smoke
candles into them, with the result that the bandits fled from
what they believed to be gas into the center of the former
ghetto, where they could then be pulled out of the sewer
holes there. A great number of Jews who could not be
counted were exterminated by blowing up sewers and
dugouts.
"The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the men of the
Waffen-SS, Police, and Wehrmacht became. They fulfilled
their duty Indefatigably in faithful comradeship and stood
together as models and examples of soldiers. Their duty hours
often lasted from early morning until late at night. At night
search patrols, with rags wound around their feet, remained
at the heels of the Jews and gave them no respite. Not
infrequently they caught and killed Jews who used the night
hours for supplementing their stores from abandoned dugouts
and for contacting neighboring groups or exchanging news
with them.
"Considering that the greater part of the men of the Waffen-
SS had only been trained for 3 to 4 weeks before being
assigned to this action, high credit should be given to the
pluck, courage, and devotion to duty which they showed. It
must be stated that the Wehrmacht Engineers, too, executed
the blowing up of dugouts, sewers, and concrete buildings
with indefatigability and great devotion to duty. Officers
and men of the Police, a large part of whom had already
been at the front, again excelled by their dashing spirit.
"Only through the continuous and untiring work of all
^involved did we
succeed in catching a total of 56,065 Jews
whose extermination can be proved. To this should be added
the number of Jews who lost their lives in explosions or
fires but whose number could not be ascertained."

THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, in the section that you are just
upon now, ought you not to read the opening paragraphs of this
document, which set out the amount of the losses of the German
troops?
MAJOR WALSH: I v^U do so, Sir. On Page 1 of the translation,
I quote. The "The Warsaw Ghetto is no more."
title:

"For the Führer and their country the following fell in the
battle for the destruction of Jews and bandits in the former

555
14 Dec. 45

Jewish residential area of Warsaw." —Fifteen names are

thereafter listed.
"Furthermore, the Polish Police Sergeant Julian Zielenski,
born 13 November 1891, 8th Commissariat, fell on 19 April
1943 while fulfilling his duty. They gave their utmost, their
life. We shall never forget them.
."
"The following were wounded. . .

Then follow the names of 60 Waffen-SS personnel, 11 watchmen

from training camps (probably Lithuanians), 12 Security Police
officers in SS units, 5 men of the Polish Police, and 2 soldiers of
the Wehrmacht Engineers.
Permit me to read some brief excerpts of the daily teletype
reports. Page 13 of the translation, from the teletype message of
22 April 1943, I read:

"Our setting the block on fire achieved the result in the

course of the night that those Jews whom we had not been
able to find despite all our search operations left their hide-
outs under the roofs, in the cellars, and elsewhere and
appeared on the outside of the building, trying to escape the
flames anyhow. Masses of them entire families were — —
already aflame and jumped from the windows or endeavored
to let themselves down by means of sheets tied together or
the like. Steps had been taken so that these Jews as well as
the remaining ones were liquidated at once."

And from Page 28 of the translation, the last part of the first
paragraph, I read:
"When the blocks of buildings mentioned above were
destroyed, 120 Jews were caught and numerous Jews were
destroyed when they jumped from the attics to the inner
courtyards, trying to escape the flames. Many more Jews
perished in the flames or were destroyed when the dugouts
•
and sewer entrances were blown up."
And on Page 30, second half of the second paragraph, I read:

"Not until the blocks of buildings were well aflame and were
about to collapse did a considerable number of Jews emerge,
forced to do so by the flames and the smoke. Time and again
the Jews tried to escape even through burning buildings.
Innumerable Jews whom we saw on the roofs during the
conflagration perished in the flames. Others emerged from
the upper stories in the last possible moment and were only
able to escape death from the flames by jumping down.
Today we caught a total of 2,283 Jews of whom 204 were

556
 14 Dec. 45

shot; and innumerable Jews were destroyed in dugouts and

in the flames."
And from Page 34, the second paragraph, I read, beginning the
second Hne:
"The Jews testify that they emerge at night to get fresh air,
since unbearable to stay permanently within the dugouts
it is

owing to the long duration of the operation. On the average

the raiding parties shoot 30 to 50 Jews each night. From
these statements it was to be inferred that a considerable
number of Jews are
still underground in the ghetto. Today
we blew up a concrete building which we had not been able
to destroy by fire. In this operation we learned that the
blowing up of a building is a very lengthy process and
takes an enormous amount of explosives. The best and only
method for destroying the Jews therefore still remains the
setting of fires."
And from Page 35, the last part of the second paragraph, I read:
"Some depositions speak of three to four thousand Jews still
remaining in underground holes, sewers, and dugouts. The
undersigned is resolved not to terminate the large-scale
operation until the last Jew has been destroyed."
And from the teletype message of 15 May 1943 on Page 44, we
gather that the operation is in its last stage. I read the end of
the first paragraph on Page 44:
"A special unit once more searched the last block of buildings,
which was still intact, in and subsequently
the ghetto
destroyed it. In the evening the chapel, mortuary, and all
other buildings in the Jewish cemetery were blown up or
destroyed by fire."
On 24 May 1943 the final figures have been compiled by Major
General Stroop. He reports on Page 45, last paragraph:
"Of the total of 56,065 caught, about 7,000 were destroyed
in the former Jewish residential area during large-scale
operations; 6,929 Jews were destroyed by transporting them
to T. II" —
which we believe to be Trebhnka, Camp Number 2,
—
which will later be referred to "the sum total of Jews
destroyed is therefore 13,929. Beyond the number of 56,065
an estimated number of 5,000 to 6,000 Jews were destroyed
by being blown up or by perishing in the fiâmes."
The Court has noted within the report 1061-PS a number of
photographs; and with the Court's permission I should like to show
a few of these photographs, still pictures, on the screen, unless
the Court believes that reference to the original text will be
sufficient for the Court's purpose.

557
14 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: No; if you want to put them on the screen,

you may do so. Perhaps it would be convenient to adjourn now
and you can put them on the screen afterwards.

[A recess was taken.]

[Still pictures were projected on the screen in the courtroom.]

MAJOR WALSH: This
picture [pointing to a picture on the
first
screen] is shown on Page
of the photographs in Document
27
1061-PS. It is entitled "The Destruction of a Block of Buildings."
The Court will recall those portions of the teletype messages that
referred to the setting of fires for the purpose of driving out the
Jews. This picture, taken from the record, portrays such a scene.
This picture [pointing to a picture on the screen] is from
Page 21 of the photographs contained in the exhibit, and the
caption is "Smoking out of the Jews and Bandits." Excerpts from
the teletype messages read in the record relate to the use of smoke
as a means of forcing Jews out of the hiding places.
This picture [pointing to a picture on the screen] is from Page 36
of the photographs in the exhibit and it is called "Fighting a Nest
of Resistance." It is obviously a picture of an explosive blast
being used to destroy one of the buildings, and the Court may
recall the message of 7 May 1943 that related to the blowing up
of buildings as a lengthy process requiring an enormous amount
of explosive. The same message reported that the best method
for destro>ang the Jews was the setting of fires.
This picture [pointing to a picture on the screen] is taken from
Page 36 of the photographs. The Court's attention is invited to
the figure of a man in mid-air who appears in the picture about
halfway between the center and the upper right-hand comer. He
has jumped from one of the upper floors of the burning building.
A close examination of this picture by the Court in the original
photograph will disclose other figures, in the upper floor windows,
who apparently are about to follow him. The teletype message of
22 April reported that entire families jumped from burning
buildings and were liquidated at once.
This picture [pointing to a picture on the screen] is from Page 39
of the photographs. It is entitled "The Leader of the Large-
scale Action." The Nazi-appointed commander of this action was
S S Major General Stroop, who probably is the central figure in
this picture. I cannot refrain from commenting at this pK)int on
the smiling faces of the group shown there, in the midst of the
violence and destruction.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that document now?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir.

558
 14 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell the Tribunal where the docu-
ment was found?
MAJOR WALSH: It is a captured document, Sir. I do not have
the history, but I shall be very pleased to submit the background
and history to the Court at the beginning of the afternoon session.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, I think, would like to know
where it was found and to whom it was submitted.
MAJOR WALSH: I have that. I believe that is contained in the
document. The teletype messages. Sir, that are contained in this
exhibit were all addressed to the Higher SS and Police Führer,
SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Krüger or his
deputy.
It was not always necessary, or perhaps desirable, first to place
the Jews within the ghettos to effect the elimination. In the Baltic
States a more direct course of action was followed. I refer to
Document L-180, now in evidence, which is Exhibit USA-276. This
is a report by SS Brigade Führer Stahlecker to Himmler, dated
15 October 1941, entitled "Action Group A," found in Himmler's
private files. He reported that 135,567 persons, nearly all Jews,
were murdered in accordance with basic orders directing the
•

complete annihilation of the Jews. This voluminous document

provides me with the following statement by the same SS Brigade
Führer, and from the translation at the bottom of Page 6, the
second sentence of the last paragraph, I read:
"To our surprise it was not easy, at first, to set in motion an
extensive pogrom against the Jews. KUmatis, the leader of
the partisan unit mentioned above, who was used for this
purpose primarily, succeeded in starting a pogrom on the
basis of advice given to him by a small advanced detach-
ment acting in Kovno and in such a way that no German
order or German instigation was noticed from the outside.
During the first pogrom in the night from 25 to 26 June the
Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews,
setting fire to several synagogues or destroying them by other
means and burning down a Jewish dwelling district consisting
of about 60 houses. During the following nights 2,300 Jews
were eliminated in a similar way."
From the last part of Paragraph 3, Page 7, I read:
"It was possible, though, through similar influences on the
Latvian auxiliary to set in motion a pogrom against the Jews
also in Riga. During this pogrom all synagogues were
destroyed and about 400 Jews were killed."
Nazi ingenuity reached a new high mark with the construction
and operation of the gas van as a means of mass annihilation of

559
14 Dec. 45

the Jews. A description of these vehicles of horror and death and

the operation of them is fully set forth in a captured top-secret
document, dated 16 May 1942, addressed to SS Obersturmbann-
führer Rauff, 8 Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, Berlin, from Dr. Becker,
SS Untersturmführer. I offer this document, 501 -PS, Exhibit
USA-288. I quote:
"The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished.
While the vans in the first series can also be put into action
if the weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series
(Saurer) stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained
for instance for only one-half hour, the van cannot be used
because it simply skids away. It can only be used in
absolutely dry weather. It is a question now of whether the
van can be used only when it stands at the place of execution.
First the van has to be brought to that place, which is
possible only in good weather. The place of execution is
usually 10 to 15 kilometers away from the highway and
is difficultaccess because of its location; in damp or
of
wet weather not accessible at all. If the persons to be
it is

executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize

immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be
avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left: to
load them at the collecting point and to drive them to
the spot.
"I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house-
trailersby putting one set of window shutters on each side
of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans,
such as one often sees on farm houses in the country. The
vans became so well-known that not only the authorities but
also the civilian population called the van 'death van' as
soon as one of the vehicles appeared. It is my opinion the
van cannot be kept secret for any length of time, not even
camouflaged."
And then I read the fourth paragraph on this page:
"Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and
highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the
course of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should
not be brought to Berlin for repairs. Transportation to Berlin
would be much too expensive and would demand too much
fuel. In order to save these expenses I ordered them to have
smaller leaks soldered and, if that should no longer be
possible, to notify Berlin immediately by radio, that License
Number ... is out of order. Besides that I ordered that during
application of gas all the men were to be kept as far away
from the vans as possible, so that they should not suffer

560
 14 Dec. 45

damage to their health by the gas which eventually would

escape. Ishould like to take this opportunity to bring the
following to your attention: Several commands have had the
unloading, after the application of gas, done by their own men.
I brought to the attention of the commanders of these special
detachments concerned the immense psychological injury
and damage to their health which that work can have for
those men, even if not immediately, at least later on. The
men complained to me about headaches which appeared after
each unloading. Nevertheless they don't want to change the
orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for that work
could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the men
from such damage, I request orders be issued accordingly.
The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly.
In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver
presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that
the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation and
not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now
have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death
comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully.
Distorted faces and excretions, such as could be seen before,
are no longer noticed.
"Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can
be reached with further news. Signed, Doctor Becker,
S S Untersturmführer."
On Page 3 in Document 501-PS we find a letter signed by
Hauptsturmführer Trühess on the subject of S-Vans, addressed to
the Reich Security Main Office, Room II-D-3-A, Berlin, marked
"top secret." This letter establishes that the vans were used for
the annihilation of the Jews. I read this top-secret message; subject,
"S-Vans":
"A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special
way, arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the
Security Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.
"The three S-vans which are there are not sufficient for that
purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5 tons). At
the same time I request the shipment of 20 gas hoses for the
three S-vans on hand (two Diamond, one Saurer), since the
— —
ones on hand are leaky already." Signed "the Commandant
of the Security Police and the Security Service, Ostland."
It would appear from the documentary evidence that a certain
amount of discord existed between the officials of the German
Government as to the proper means and methods used in connection
with the program of extermination. A secret report dated 18 June
1943, addressed to Defendant Rosenberg, complained that 5,000 Jews

561
14 Dec. 45

killedby the police and SS might have been used for forced labor
and chided them for failing to bury the bodies of those liquidated.
I offer in evidence this file, Document Number R-135, Exhibit
USA-289.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in these volumes, Major Walsh?
MAJOR WALSH: I think, Sir, that will be found in the assembly
of the document book in our case; that has been placed in front
of R-124. I quote from the letter referred to, addressed to the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, the first
paragraph of the translation:
"The fact that Jews receive special treatment requires no
further discussion. However, it appears hardly believable
that this was done in the way described in the report of the
General Commissioner of 1 June 1943. What is Katyn against
that? Imagine only that these occurrences might become
known to the other side and be exploited by them! Most
likely such propaganda would have no effect, only because
people who hear and read about it simply would not be ready
to believe it."
The last part of Paragraph 3 on this page reads:
"To lock men, women, and children into bams and to set fire
to them does not appear to be a suitable method for combat-
ting bands, even if it is desired to exterminate the population.
This method is not worthy of the German cause and hurts
our reputation severely."
Günther, the prison warden at Minsk, in a letter dated 31 May
1943, addressed to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia,
subject: "Action against Jews," was critical by implication. With
the Court's permission I would like to read this entire letter, part
of Document R-135, Page 5, subject: "Action Against Jews":
"On 13 April 1943 the former German dentist Ernst Israel
Tichauer and his wife, Elisa Sara Tichauer, née Rosenthal,
were committed to the court prison by the Security Ser-
vice .... Since that time all German and Russian Jews who
were turned over to us had their gold bridgework, crowns,
and fillings pulled or broken out. This happens always 1 to
2 hours before the respective action.
"Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews have
been finished off. On the basis of a definite investigation gold
—
was taken only in two actions on 14 April 1943, from 172,
and on 27 April 1943, from 164 Jews. About 50 percent of the
Jews had gold teeth, bridgework, or fillings. Hauptschar-
führer Rübe of the Security Service was always personally
present, and he took the gold along, too.

562
 14 Dec. A5

"Before 13 April 1943 this was not done. Signed, Günther,

Prison Warden."
This letter was forwarded to the Defendant Rosenberg as Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories on 1 June 1943. I will
read the covering letter, part of Document R-135, Page 4, to the
Reich Minister of the Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin, through
the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland, Riga; Subject, "Actions
against Jews in the Prison of Minsk":
"The enclosed official report from the warden of the prison
in Minsk is submitted to the Reich Minister and the Reich
—
Commissioner for Information." Signed— "the General Com-
missioner in Minsk."
THE PRESIDENT: Does "respective action," as indicated in the
letter dated the 31st of May 1943, mean execution?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; we
so interpret it. The Court will
recall that the ridding of the Jews
via gas vans ties in very closely
with the second letter of the transport of Jews arriving for that
purpose.
THE PRESIDENT: Was this document found in Rosenberg's file?
MAJOR WALSH: I am so informed, Sir. A further complaint
iscontained in a secret letter addressed to General of the Infantry
Thomas, chief of the industrial armament department, dated
2 December 1941. It might be noted with interest that the
apprehensive writer of this letter stated that he did not forward
the communication through official channels. I offer in evidence
captured Document 3257-PS; and I quote from the first paragraph.
This is Exhibit USA-290:
"For the personal information of the chief of the industrial
armament department, I am forwarding a total account of
the present situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in
which the difficulties and tensions encountered so far and the
problems which give rise to serious anxiety are stated with
unmistakable clarity.
"Intentionally I have desisted from submitting such a report
through official channels or from making it known to other
departments interested in it because I do not expect any
results that way, but on the contrary am apprehensive that
the difficulties and tensions and also the divergent opinions
might only be increased due to the peculiarity of the situ-
ation."
—
"Jewish problem" Paragraph c. Page 1:
"Regulation of the Jewish question in the Ukraine was a diffi-
cult problem because the Jews constituted a large part of the
—
urban population. We therefore have to deal just as in the

563
14 Dec. 45

—
Government General with a mass problem of policy con-
cerning the population. Many cities had a percentage of
Jews exceeding 50 percent. Only the rich Jews had fled from
the German troops. The majority of Jews remained under
German administration. The latter found the problem more
complicated through the fact that these Jews represented
almost entire trade and even a part of the manpower in small
and medium industries, besides business, which had in part
become superfluous as a direct or indirect result of the war.
The elimination therefore necessarily had far-reaching eco-
nomic consequences and even direct consequences for the
armament industry (production for supplying the troops)."
Paragraph 1 on Page 2:

—
"The attitude of the Jewish population was anxious obliging
from the beginning. They tried to avoid everything that
might displease the German administration. That they hated
the German administration and army inwardly goes without
saying and cannot be surprising. However, there is no proof
that Jewry as a whole or even to a greater part was impli-
cated in acts of sabotage .... Surely there were some ter-
rorists or saboteurs among them, just as among the Ukrain-
ians. But it cannot be said that the Jews as such represented
a danger to the German Armed Forces. The output produced
by Jews who, of course, were prompted by nothing but the
feeling of fear, was satisfactory to the troops and the German
administration.
"The Jewish population remained temporarily unmolested
shortly after the fighting. Only weeks, sometimes months
later, specially detached formations of police executed a
planned shooting of Jews. This action as a rule proceeded
from east to west. It was done entirely in public with the
use of the Ukrainian militia; and unfortunately, in many
instances also with members of the Armed Forces taking part
voluntarily. The way these actions, which included men and
old men, women, and children of all ages, were carried out
was horrible. The great masses executed make this action
more gigantic than any similar measure taken so far in the
Soviet Union. So far about 150,000 to 200,000 Jews may have
been executed in the part of the Ukraine belonging to the
Reichskommissariat; no consideration was given to the inter-
ests of economy.
"Summarizing, it can be said that the kind of solution of the
Jewish problem applied to the Ukraine, which obviously was
based on the ideological theories as a matter of principle, had
the following results:

564
 14 Dec. 45

"(a) Elimination of a part of partly superfluous eaters in the

cities;

"(b)Elimination of a part of the population which undoubt-

edly hated us;
"(c) Elimination of badly needed tradesmen who were in
many instances indispensable even in the interests of the
Armed Forces;
"(d) Consequences as to foreign policy propaganda which are
obvious;
"(e) Bad effects on the troops which in any case get indirect
contact with the execution;
"(f) Brutalizing effect on the formations which carry out the
—
execution regular police."
Lest the Court be persuaded to the belief that these conditions
related, existed only in the East, I invite attention to the official
Netherlands Government report by the Commissioner for Repatri-
ation as indicative of the treatment of the Jews in the West.
This document is a recital of the German measures taken in the
Netherlands against the Dutch Jews. The decrees, the anti-Semitic
demonstrations, the burning of synagogues, the purging of Jews
from the economic life of their country, the food restrictions against
them, forced labor, concentration camp confinement, deportation,
—
and death all follow the same pattern that was effected through-
out Nazi-occupied Europe.
I now Document 1726-PS, Exhibit USA-195, already in
refer to
evidence. not intended to read this document in evidence, but
It is
it is deemed important to invite the Court's attention to that portion

of the report relating to the deportation of Dutch Jews shown on

Page 5 of the translation. There the Court will note that full Jews
being liable to deportation number 140,000. The Court will also
note that the total number of deportees was 117,000, representing
more than 83 percent of all the Jews in the Netherlands. Of these
115,000 were deported to Poland for slave labor, according to the
Netherlands report, and after departure all trace of them was lost.
Regardless of victory or defeat to Germany, the Jew was doomed.
It was the expressed intent of the Nazi State that, whatever the
German fate might be, the Jew would not survive.
I offer in evidence Document
L-53, stamped "top secret," Exhibit
USA-291. This message from the Commandant of the Sipo and
is
SD for the Radom District, addressed to SS Hauptsturmführer Thiel
on the subject, "Clearance ot Prisons." I read the body of this
message:
"I again stress the fact that the number of inmates of the Sipo
and SD prisons must be kept as low as possible. In the present

565
14 Dec. 45

handed over by the civil

situation, particularly, those suspects
police need only be subjected to a short formal interrogation
provided there are no serious grounds for suspicion. They are
then to be sent by the quickest route to a concentration camp
should no court-martial proceeding be necessary or should
there be no question of discharge. Please keep the number of
discharges very low. Should the situation at the front neces-
sitate it, early preparations are to be made for the total
clearance of prisons. Should the situation develop suddenly
in such a way that it is impossible to evacuate the prisoners,
the prison inmates are to be eliminated and their bodies dis-
posed of as far as possible (burning, blowing up the building,
et cetera). If necessary, Jews still employed in the armament
industry or on other work are to be dealt with in the same
way.
"The liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy be it the —
WB —
or the Red Army must be avoided under all circum-
stances, nor may they fall into their hands aUve."

THE PRESIDENT: What is the WB?

MAJOR WALSH: I have inquired about the WB, Your Honor,
from several sources and have not found an understanding or a
statement of it. Perhaps before the afternoon session I may be able
to enlighten the Court. I have not yet been able to find out.

THE PRESIDENT: Where was the document found?

MAJOR WALSH: It is a captured document, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Does it relate to prisoners of war, did you say?
MAJOR WALSH: No, Sir; including therein, of course, prisoners
of war as well as all Jews. The history of the document. Sir, I will
try to gather for the Court's information.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Did you tell us what the Sipo were?
MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir; I furnished the Court with that; that
is the Security Poüce, Sir.

This presentation, if the Court please, would be incomplete

without incorporating herein reference to the concentration camps
insofar as they relate to the hundreds of thousands millions of — —
Jews who died by mass shooting, gas, poison, starvation, and other
means. The subject of concentration camps and all its horrors was
shown to this Tribunal not only in the motion picture film but by
the most able presentation of Mr. Dodd yesterday; and it is not
—
intended, at this time, to refer to the camps only insofar as they
relate to the part they played in the annihilation of the Jewish
people. For example, in the camp at Auschwitz during July 1944
Jews were killed at the rate of 12,000 daily. This information is

566
 14 Dec. 45

contained in Document L-161, Exhibit USA-292. The Document

L-161 is an official Polish report on Auschwitz Concentration Camp.
It is dated 31 May 1945. I have taken a short excerpt from this
report on the original marked . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Ithink you made a mistake, did you not?

It is not a Polish report; it is a British report.
MAJOR WALSH: I understand, Sir, it was compiled originally
by the Polish Government and perhaps distributed from London.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Very well.
MAJOR WALSH: I quote:
"During July 1944 Hungarian Jews were being liquidated at
the raté of 12,000 daily; and as the crematoria could not deal
with such numbers, many bodies were thrown into large pits
and covered with quicklime."
I offer in evidence Document 3311-PS, Exhibit USA-293. This is
an official Polish Government Commission report on the investiga-
tion of German crimes in Poland. The document describes the con-
centration camp at Treblinka; and from Page 1, Paragraph 3 and 4,
I read as follows:

"In March 1942 the Germans began to erect another camp,

Treblinka B, in the neighborhood of Treblinka A, intended to
become a place of torment for Jews.
"The erection of this camp was closely connected with the
German plans aimed at a complete destruction of the Jewish
population in Poland, which necessitated the creation of a
machinery by means of which the Polish Jews could be killed
in large numbers. Late in April 1942 erection was completed
of the first chambers in which these general massacres were
to be performed by means of steam. Somewhat later the
erection of the real death building, which contains 10 death
chambers, was finished. It was opened for wholesale murders
early in autumn 1942."
And on Page 3 of this report, beginning with the second para-
graph, the Polish Commission describes graphically the procedure
for the extermination within the camp:
"The average number of Jews dealt with at the camp in the
summer of 1942 was about two railway transports daily, but
there were days of much higher efficiency. From autumn 1942
this number was falling.
"After unloading in the siding, all victims were assembled in
one place, where men were separated from women and chil-
dren. In the first days of the existence of the camp the vic-
tims were made to believe that after a short stay in the camp,
necessary for bathing and disinfection, they would be sent

567
14 Dec. 45

farther east for work. Explanations of this sort were given

by SS men who assisted at the unloading of the transports,
and further explanations could be read in notices studc up on
the walls of the barracks. But later, when more transports
had to be dealt with, the Germans dropped all pretenses and
only tried to accelerate the procedure.
"All victims had to strip off their clothes and shoes, which
were collected afterwards, whereupon all victims, women and
children first, were driven into the death chambers. Those too
slow or too weak to move quickly were driven in by rifle
butts, by whipping and kicking, often by Sauer himself.
Many slipped and fell; the next victims pressed forward and
stumbled over them. Small children were simply thrown
inside. After being filled up to capacity, the chambers were
hermetically closed and steam was let in. In a few minutes
all was over. The Jewish menial workers had to remove the
bodies from the platform and to bury them in mass graves.
By and by, as new transports arrived, the cemetery grew,
extending in an easternly direction.
"From reports received it may be assumed that several hun-
dred thousands of Jews have been exterminated in Treb-
linka."

I now offer in evidence the document identified by Number L-22,

Exhibit USA-294. This is an official United States Government

report issued by the Executive Office of the President of the United
States, War Refugee Board, on the German camps at Auschwitz and
Birkenau, dated 1944. On Page 33 of this report is set forth the
number of Jews gassed in Birkenau in the 2-year period between
April 1942 and April 1944. I have been assured that the figure
printed in this report is not a typographical error. The number
shown is 1,765,000.

I would now
like to turn to the German bookkeeping and statis-
tics enlightenment on the extermination of Jews in Poland.
for
Referring again to the diary of Hans Frank already in evidence,
Document 2233-PS, Exhibit USA-281, I read briefly from the begin-
ning of the fourth paragraph on Page 1:
"For us the Jews also represent extraordinarily malignant
gluttons.
"We have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the Govern-
."
ment General . .

THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, you have read this already

yourself.

MAJOR WALSH: Yes, Sir, that is true. I just want to make

reference to it again, Sir, for comparison with other figures.

568
 —

14 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MAJOR WALSH: perhaps with the Jewish mixtures, and
"...
everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews."
Now this figure, if the Court please, was as of 16 December 1941.
I now wish to turn to 25 January 1944, 3 years and 1 month later,

and make reference to another excerpt from Frank's diary, 2233-PS,

loose-leaf volume Exhibit USA-295. This volume covers the period
from 1 January 1944 to 28 February 1944, and Page 5 of the original
reads:
"At the present time we still have in the Government Gen-
eral perhaps 100,000 Jews."
In this period of 3 years, according to the records of the then
Governor General of Occupied Poland, between 2,400,000 and
3,400,000 Jews had been eliminated.
The Prosecution could offer this Tribunal a wealth of evidence
on the total number of Jews who died by Nazi hands, but it is
believed that cumulative evidence would not vary the guilt of these
,

defendants.
I do wish, however,
to offer one document, a statement, to estab-
lish the deaths of 4 million Jews in camps and deaths of 2 million
Jews by the State Police in the East, making a total of 6 million
Document 2738-PS, Exhibit USA-296. This is a statement— of Adolf
Eichmann, Chief of the Jewish Section of the Gestapo, and the
—
source of the figures quoted made by Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, Deputy
Group Leader of the foreign section of the Security Service, Amt VI
of the RSHA. Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, in affidavit form, made the fol-
lowing statement; and I quote from Page 2:
"Approximately 4 million Jews had been killed in the various
concentration camps, while an additional 2 million met death
in other ways, the major part of which were shot by opera-
tional squads of the Security Police during the campaign
against Russia."
May I, in conclusion, emphasize that the captured documents in
evidence are, almost without exception, from the official sources of
the Nazi Party.
THE PRESIDENT: You only read that one statement, but where
does the person who made the affidavit get his information from?
MAJOR WALSH: I shall be pleased to read that in there, Sir.
I made
a statement that Eichmann has been the source of the infor-
mation given to Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, one of his assistants, and on
Page 1 it says:
"According to my knowledge Eichmann was at that time
a section leader in the Amt IV (Gestapo) of RSHA; and in
addition he had been ordered by Himmler to get hold of the

569
14 Dec. 45

Jews in all the European countries and to transport them to

Germany. Eichmann was then very much impressed with the
fact that Romania had withdrawn from the war in those
days. Therefore, he had come to me to get information about
the military situation, which I received daily from the Hun-
garian .Ministry of War and from the Commander of the
. .

Waffen-SS in Hungary. He expressed his cbnviction that

Germany had lost the war and that he personally had no
further chance. He knew that he would be considered one of
the main war criminals by the United Nations, since he had
millions of Jewish lives on his conscience. I asked him how
many that was, to which he answered that although the num-
ber was a great Reich secret, he would tell me since I, as a
historian too, would be interested and that probably he would
not return anyhow from his command in Romania. He had,
shortly before that, made a report to Himmler, as the latter
wanted to know the exact number of Jews who had been
killed."
It was on that basis of this information, Sir, that I read the
following quotation.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

[A recess was taken until 1400 hours.]

570
 . .

14 Dec. 45

Afternoon Session

THE PRESIDENT: The motion that was made this morning on

behalf of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner is denied, and the affidavit
is admitted and will not be stricken from the record. But the
Tribunal wished me to say that it is open to the Defendants' Counsel,
in accordance with the Charter and the Rules, to make a motion,
in writing, if they wish to do so, for the attendance of Pfaffen-
berger for cross-examination and to state in that motion the reasons
therefor.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I now bring up a question similar,
though in some respects different, from that of Pfaffenberger? I
request that the evidence of Dr. Hoettl, which was read into the
record this morning be stricken out again for the following two
reasons. As far as I know. Dr. Hoettl is here in Nuremberg . .

THE PRESIDENT: One minute. Do you understand that the

Tribunal has just denied the motion that you made this morning?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I understood that perfectly.
THE PRESIDENT: What is your motion now?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I should like to ask that the evidence of
Dr. Hoettl be stricken from the record. My reasons for this request
are rather different from those given this morning in the Pfaffen-
berger case.
As can be seen from the affidavit. Dr. Hoettl was interrogated
on the 26th of November hardly 3 weeks ago. Moreover I gather
that Dr. Hoettl is kept in custody here in Nuremberg. No delay
would therefore be involved if this witness were called to the stand.
This man held a significant position in the SS and for that reason
I have already applied in writing that he be called as a witness.
I am convinced that there is a large amount of important evidence
which he can reveal to the Court. Dr. Hoettl's deposition is infi-
nitely important. The death of millions of people is involved here.
His affidavit is based largely on inferences, on hearsay; I believe
that the facts are very different, and I would not like to apply later,
after weeks or months, for the witness to be brought into Court.
MAJOR WALSH: If the Court please, excerpts from the affidavit
of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl were read into the record this morning for
the purpose . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wait—what was the number?

MAJOR WALSH: Document 2738-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
MAJOR WALSH: Dr. Hoettl's affidavit 2738 was in part read
into the record this morning for the sole purpose of showing the

571
 —

14 Dec. 45

approximate number of Jews, according to his estimates, that had

met death at the hands of the German State. No other portion of
his testimony was referred to and the evidence offered was
only for the sole purpose of establishing his estimate of the
number. His position in the Party and in the state, as well as the
position of Adolf Eichmann, the source of his information, was also
stated into the record.
I believe that Dr. Hoettl, if he is desired for any other purpose
by the Defense, may be called by the Defense, but the Prosecution
had no other purpose in utilizing his evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to add anything more?
MAJOR WALSH: That is all. Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal makes the same ruling in this
case as in the case of Pfaffenberger, namely, that the affidavit is
admitted in evidence but that it is open to Defendants' Counsel to
make a motion, in writing, for the attendance of the witness for
cross-examination and to state in that motion the reasons for it.
MAJOR WALSH: During the morning session the Court requested
certain information concerning documents that had been offered and
accepted in evidence. I refer to Document 1061-PS, the report "The
Warsaw Ghetto Is No More." This report, I am told, was prepared
for presentation at a meeting of the SS Police leaders to be held
on 18 May 1943. That is indicated on Page 45 of the translation
before the Court.
This document was captured by the 7th United States Army and
delivered by them to the G-2 of the United States Forces in the
European Theater. In turn they were delivered to Colonel Storey
of the United States prosecutors' staff, some months ago. The Court
also ignored . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Major Walsh, I think the Tribunal also

wished to know whether you could tell us to whom the report had
been made?
MAJOR WALSH: The report, Sir, according to the teletypes
—
the daily teletypes. Sir was addressed to the Higher SS and
Police Leader East, SS Obergruppenführer and General of the Police
Krüger, or his deputy.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MAJOR WALSH: The Court further inquired about Document
L-53 and I have obtained some information concerning this docu-
ment. This document was captured by T-Force of the Counter
Intelligence Corps Detachment Number 220, found among the Ger-
man records at Weimar, Germany, sometime prior to 10 May 1945.
The Court further inquired, concerning this document, the
meaning of the letters "WB." I regret that I have been unable to

572
 14 Dec. 45

obtain definite information as to the meaning of "WB" but it has

been suggested to me that it might mean Westbund or Western Ally
—
because it is used in connection with the capture the destruction
of all prisoners before capture by either the WB or the Red Armies,
and I presume that it may mean Westbund.
The slaughter of the Jews
Europe cannot be expressed in
in
figures alone, for the impact of this slaughter is even more tragic

to the future of the Jewish people and mankind. Ancient Jewish

communities with their own rich spiritual, cultural, and economic
life, bound up for centuries with the life of the nations in which

they flourished, have been completely obliterated. The contribution

of the Jewish people to civilization, the arts, the sciences, industry,
and culture, need not, I am sure, be elaborated upon before this
Tribunal. Their destruction, carried out continuously, deliberately,
intentionally, and methodically by the Nazis, represents a loss to
civilization of special qualities and abilities that cannot possibly be
recouped.
I have not attempted to recount the multitudinous and diabolical

crimes committed against the Jewish people by the state which

these defendants ruled, because, with sober regard for contemporary
and historical truth, a detailed description of some of these crimes
would transcend the utmost reaches of the human faculty of
expression. The mind already recoils and shrinks from the
acceptance of the incredible facts already related. Rather, it is my
purpose to elucidate the pattern, the successful and successive
stages, the sequence and concurrence of the crimes committed, the
pre-determined means to a pre-ordained end.
Yet, these cold, stark, brutal facts and figures, drawn largely
from the defendants' own sources and submitted in evidence before
this Tribunal, defy rebuttal.

From conception to execution, from the Party program of 1920

to the gloating declarations of Himmler and the Defendant Frank
in 1943 and 1944, the annihilation of the Jewish people in Europe
—
was man-made made by the very men, sitting in the defendants'
box, brought to judgment before this Tribunal.
Before closing may I acknowledge with appreciation the
untiring services of the group of the staff of the United States'
Prosecution, through whose painstaking search, analysis, and study,
this presentation of evidence was made possible: Captain Seymour
Krieger, Lieutenant Brady Bryson, Lieutenant Frederick Felton,
Sergeant Isaac Stone, and Mr. Hans Nathan.
COL. STOREY: If the Tribunal please, the next presentation,
concerning Germanization and spoliation in occupied countries, will
be presented by Captain Sam Harris.

573
14 Dec. 45

CAPTAIN SAMUEL HARRIS (Assistant Trial Counsel for the

United States): May the Tribunal please, documents relating to the
Nazi program of Germanization and spoliation have been assembled
in a document book bearing the letter "U." These document books
are now being distributed for the use of the members of the
Tribunal. I ask Your Honors to note that the tabs on the side of
the document book are numbered 1 to 30. The index sheet at the
front of the book keys these numbers to the EC, PS, and R numbers
of our exhibits.
For Your Honors' convenience we have also numbered the pages
of each exhibit in pencil at the upper right-hand corner of each
exhibit.
The documents which we shall introduce were collected by
Lieutenant Kenyon, who sits at my right, and by Doctors Derenberg
and Jacoby. Without their untiring efforts, this presentation would
not have been possible.
Evidence has already been introduced by Mr. Alderman to prove
that the defendants conspired to wage aggressive war. It has also
been proved that the desire for Lebensraum was one of the chief
forces motivating the conspirators to plan, launch, and wage their
wars of aggression. We propose at this time to present evideace
disclosing what the conspirators intended to do with conquered
territories, called by them Lebensraum, after they had succeeded
in overpowering the victims of their aggressions.
We have broadly divided this subject into two categories: Ger-
manization and spoliation. When we speak of plans to germanize, we
mean plans to assimilate conquered territories politically, culturally,
socially, and economically into the German Reich. Germanization,
we shall demonstrate, meant the obliteration of the former national
character of the conquered territories and the extermination of all
elements which could not be reconciled with the Nazi ideology. By
spoliation, we mean the plunder of public and private property
and, in general, the exploitation of the people and the natural
resources of occupied countries.
We propose, with the permission of Your Honors, to introduce
at this time 30 documents in all. These documents lay bare some
of the secret plans of the conspirators to germanize, to plunder, to
despoil, and to destroy. They do not, of course, tell the whole story
In some instances proof
of all the conspirators' plans in this field.
of the plan is derived from the acts committed by the conspirators.
But these few documents are particularly illuminating with respect
to the conspirators' plans for Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia;
and they indicate the outUnes of carefully conceived plans for
the rest of Europe. Others who follow will fill in this outline by
showing a series of outrages committed on so vast a scale that no
doubts will exist that they were committed according to plan.

574
 14 Dec. 45

Poland was, in a sense, the testing ground for the conspirators'

theories upon Lebensraum; and I turn to that country first.
The four western provinces of Poland were purportedly incor-
porated into Germany by an order of 8 October 1939. This order,
which was signed by Hitler, Lammers, and Defendants Goring,
Frick, and Hess, is set forth in Reichsgesetzhlatt, 1939, Part I,
Page 2042; and we ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice thereof.
These areas of Poland are frequently referred to in correspondence
among the conspirators as "incorporated Eastern Territories." The
remainder of Poland, which was seized by the Nazi invaders, was
established as the Government General of Poland by an order of
Hitler dated 12 October 1939. By that same order Defendant Hans
Frank was named Governor General of the newly created Govern-
ment General; and Defendant Seyss-Inquart was named Deputy
Governor General. This order is set forth in Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939,
Part I, Page 2077; and we ask the Tribunal also to take judicial
notice of it.

The plans with respect to Poland were rather complicated; and

I believe that the significance of specific items of proof may be
more readily apparent if, in advance of the introduction of the
documents, I am permitted briefly to indicate the broad pattern
of these plans.
We submit that the documents we are about to introduce on
Poland show the following:
First: The conspirators specifically planned to exploit the people
and material resources Gk)vemment General of Poland in
of the
order to strengthen the Nazi war machine, to impoverish the
Government General, and to reduce it to a vassal state. At a later
stage plans were formulated for creating islands of German settle-
ments in the more fertile regions of the Government General in
order to engulf the native Polish population and accelerate the
process of Germanization.
Second: The incorporated area of Poland, which was deemed to
be a part of the German Reich, was to be ruthlessly germanized.
To that end, the conspirators planned:
(a) To permit the retention
of the productive facilities in the
incorporated area, all of which, of course, would be dedicated to
the Nazi war machine.
(b) They planned to deport to the Government General many
hundreds of thousands of Jews, members of the Polish intelligentsia,
and other non-compliant elements. We shall show that the Jews
who were deported to the Government General were doomed to
speedy annihilation. Moreover, since the conspirators felt that
members of the Polish intelligentsia could not be germanized and

575
14 Dec. 45

might serve as a center of resistance against their New Order,

they too were to be eliminated.
(c) They planned to deport all able-bodied Polish workers to

Germany for work in the Nazi war machine. This served the two-
fold purpose of helping to satisfy the labor requirements of the
Nazi war machine and preventing the propagation of a new
generation of Poles. Mr. Dodd has already produced abundant
proof on this topic, and I shall do no more than refer to it.
(d) They planned to mould all persons in the incorporated area
who were deemed to possess German blood into German subjects
who would religiously adhere to the principles of National
Socialism. To that end the conspirators set up an elaborate racial
register. Those who resisted or refused to co-operate in this
program were sent to concentration camps.
(e) They planned to bring thousands of German subjects into
the incorporated area for purposes of settlement.
(f) And finally, they planned to confiscate the property partic- —
—
ularly the farms of the Poles, the Jews, and all dissident elements.
The confiscation of the property of Jews was part of the
conspirators' larger program of extermination of the Jews. Confis-
cation likewise served three additional purposes: (1) It provided
land for the new German settlers and enabled the conspirators to
reward their adherents; (2) dispossessed Polish property owners could
be shipped to Germany for work in the production of implements
of war; and (3) the separation of Polish farmers from their wives
furthered the plan to prevent the growth of a new generation
of Poles.
We turn now to the specific items of proof.
I first offer in evidence Document Number EC-344 (16), which
is Exhibit Number USA-297. This document is a report of an
interview with Defendant Frank on 3 October 1939 and was found
among the files of the OKW, which were assembled in bulk at
the Fechenheim document center. This particular document was
included in a large report prepared in the OKW
by one Captain
Varain at the direction of General Thomas, then chief of the
military economic staff of the OKW. I quote from the first 19 lines
of Page 3 of the English text. The German text appears on Page 29,
lines 25-36, and Page 30, lines 1-6. The report states, and I quote:
"In the first interview which the chief of the Central Division
and the liaison officer between the Armament Department
Upper East and the Chief Administrative Officer (subsequently
Governor General) had with Reich Minister Frank on
3 October 1939 in Posen, Frank explained the instruction
which had been entrusted to him by the Führer and the
economic political directives according to which he intended

576
 14 Dec. 45

to administer Poland. According to these directives, Poland

could be administered only by utilizing the country by means
of ruthless exploitation; removal of all supplies —raw
materials, machines, factory installations, et cetera which are—
important for the German war economy; availability of all
workers for work within Germany; reduction of the entire
Polish economy to the absolute minimum necessary for the
bare existence of the population; closing of all institutions,
especially technical schools and colleges in order to prevent
the growth of a new Polish intelUgentsia. Poland" Defendant
—
Frank stated and this is an exact quotation "Poland shall ——
be treated as a colony; the Poles shall be the slaves of the
Greater German World Empire."
I should like also to quote from the last six lines of the EngHsh
text of this Exhibit. In the German text it is lines 18 to 23 of
Page 30. Defendant Frank further stated, and I quote:
"By destroying Polish industry its subsequent reconstruction
after the war would become more difficult, if not impossible,
so that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as
an agrarian country which would have to depend upon
Germany for importation of industrial products."
As further proof of the defendant's plan to plunder and despK)il
the Government General of Poland, I next offer in evidence Docu-
ment Number EC-410, which is Exhibit Number USA-298. In
addition to the proof of the defendant's plans to plunder and
despoil the Government General, this document demonstrates the
difference in treatment which the conspirators planned for the
incorporated area of Poland and the Government General. It is
a cop 5^ of a directive issued and signed by Defendant G<)ring on
19 October 1939 and was likewise found among the captured OKW
files. I quote from lines 1 to 19 on Page 1 of the English text.

In the German text it is all of Page 1 and the first line of Page 2.
Defendant Göring's directive states, and I quote:
"In the meeting of October 13th I have given detailed instruc-
tions for the economical administration of the occupied
territories. I will repeat them here in short:
"1. The task for the economic treatment of the various
administrative regions is different, depending on whether
a country which will be incorporated politically into the
German Reich is involved or whether we deal with the
Government General, which in all probability, will not be
made a part of Germany.
"In the first-mentioned territories the reconstruction and
expansion of the economy, the safeguarding of all their
production facilities and supplies must be aimed at, as well

577
14 Dec. 45

as a complete incorporation into the Greater German

economic system at the earliest possible time. On the other
hand, there must be removed from the territories of the
Government General all raw materials, scrap materials,
machines, et cetera which are of use for the German war
economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely necessary for
the meager maintenance of the naked existence of the
population must be transferred to Germany, unless such
transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time
and would make it more practical to exploit those enterprises
by giving them German orders to be executed at their
present location."
Once the Government General had been stripped of its industrial
potential, the defendants planned to leave the country desolate.
Not even the war damage was to be repaired. This is the clear
import of the documents previously introduced and is likewise
made clear by Document Number EC-411, which is Exhibit Number
USA-299. I offer this document in evidence. This document is a
copy of an order dated 20 November 1939, by Defendant Hess,
in his capacity as Deputy Führer. This document was also found
in the captured OKWfiles. I quote the English and German texts

in their entirety. Defendant Hess stated, and I quote:

"I hear from Party members who came from the Government
General that various agencies, as for instance, the MiUtary
Economic Staff, the Rdch Ministry for Labor, et cetera,
intend to reconstruct certain industrial enterprises in Warsaw.
However, in accordance with a decision by Minister Dr. Frank
approved by the Führer, Warsaw shall not be rebuilt nor
is it the intention of the Führer to rebuild or reconstruct

any industry in the Gk)vemment General."

Turning from the defendants' program of economic spoliation in
the Government General to their program of deportation and
resettlement, I next offer in evidence Document Number 661-PS,
which is Exhibit Number USA-300. This is a secret report, prepared
by the Academy of German Law in January 1940, upon plans for
the mass migration of Poles and Jews from incorporated areas of
Poland to the Government General and for the forcible deportation of
able-bodied Poles to Germany. This document was obtained from
the ministerial collecting center at Kassel, Germany. The date
does not appear in the English translation, but it is clearly set
forth on the cover page of the original document as January 1940.
Before quoting from this document, I ask first that the Tribunal
take judicial notice of the decree of 11 July 1934, embodied in the
Reichsgesetzhlatt, Part I, Page 605, 11 July 1934, which provided
that the Academy of German Law would be a public corporation

578
 14 Dec. 45

of the Reich under the supervision of the Reich Ministers of Justice

and the Interior, and that its task would be:
"To promote the reconstruction of German legal life and to
in constant close collaboration with the competent
realize,
legislative organizations, the National Socialist program in
the entire sphere of the law."
Second, before quoting from the afore-mentioned report of the
Academy of German Law, I should like to offer in evidence Docu-
ment Number 2749-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-301. This
is the title page of the publication of the Academy of German Law
for 1940. for the purpose of showing that Defendant
It is offered
Frank was the President of the Academy of German Law during
the period that the above-mentioned secret report of the Academy
was made. The document specifically states, and I quote:
"Reich Minister Dr. Hans Frank, President of the Academy
for German Law, 7th year 1940."
Now, if I may ask Your Honors to turn to Document Number
661-PS, I should first hke to quote Page 1, lines 6 to 24, of the
English text. In the German text these extracts appear at Page 6,
lines 6 to 10; and line 22, Page 6, to Une 4, Page 7. I quote:

"In the carrying out of costly and long-term measures for

the increase of agricultural production, the Government
General can, at the most, absorb 1 to 1.5 million resettlers,
as it is already over-populated in many cases. By further . . .

absorption of 1.6 million resettlers the 1925 Reidi census

figure of 133 inhabitants per square kilometer would be
reached, which practically, because of already existing rural
over-population and lack of industry, would result in a double
over-pressure.
"This figure of 1.6 million will barely suffice for deportations
from the Reich:
"The Jews from the liberated East (over 600,000); groups of
the remaining Jews, preferably the younger age groups from
Germany proper, Austria, Sudetengau and the Protectorate
(altogether over 1 million)."
Continuing the quotation, the report goes on with respect to
transfers from the Reich,, and I continue to quote:
"The Polish intelligentsia, who have been branded as
politicians, and potential the leading
political leaders;
economic personalities, comprising owners of large estates,
industrialists and businessmen, et cetera; the peasant
population, so far as it has to be removed in order to carry
out, by strips of German settlements, the encirclement of
Polish territories in the East."

579
14 Dec. 45

Next I quote the last paragraph on Page 1 of the English text.

The German text is at Page 8, lines 3-10:
"In order to relieve the living space of the Poles in the
Government General as well as in the liberated East, one
should temporarily remove cheap labor by the hundreds of
thousands, employ them for a few years in the Old Reich,
and thereby hamper their native biological propagation.
(Their assimilation into the Old Reich must be prevented.)"
Finally, I quote from the last paragraph of Page 2 of the English
text. In the German text it is the last 5 lines on Page 40:

"Strictest care is to be taken that secret documents, memo-

randa, and official correspondence which contain instructions
detrimental to the Poles are kept steadily under lock and
key, so that they will not some day fill the White Books
printed in Paris or the U.S.A."
Your Honors will recall, from your own experiences, the vicious
propaganda campaigns conducted by Nazi Germany to discredit the
Polish books when they made their appearance in countries friendly
to Poland. The last paragraph of this document which I have just
read gives the lie to that whole Nazi propaganda campaign.
The plans for the deportation of thousands of innocent people,
which are set forth in the document from which I have just quoted,
were not mere theories spun by lawyers. They represented, as the
next three documents to be offered in ev'idence will show, a
program which was, in fact, ruthlessly executed.
next offer in evidence Document Number 2233(g)-PS, the Frank
I
diaries, 1939, from 25 October to 15 December, which is Exhibit
Number USA-302. This document was obtained from the 7th Army
document center at Heidelberg. I quote from the last paragraph
of Page 1, carrying over to the first two lines of Page 2 of the
English text. In the German text the statements appear at Page 19,
lines 19 to 28. Defendant Frank stated, and I quote:

— —
"The Reichsführer SS" meaning Himmler "wishes that all
Jews be evacuated from the newly gained Reich territories.
Up to February approximately 1 milHon people are to be
brought in this way into the Government General. The
famines of good racial extraction present in the occupied
Polish territory (approximately 4 million people) should be
transferred into the Reich and individually housed, thereby
being uprooted as a people."
I next offer in evidence Document Number EC-305, which is

Exhibit Number USA-303. This exhibit is the top-secret minutes

of a meeting held on 12 February 1940, under the chairmanship
of Defendant Goring, on "Questions Concerning the East." The

580
 . — .

14 Dec. 45

document was found in the captured OKW files. Himmler and

Defendant Frank likewise were present at this meeting.
I initially quote from Page 1, lines 15 to 17, of the English text.

These extracts are found in the front page, lines 1 to 8, of the

German text. The minutes state, and I quote:
"By way of introduction the General Field Marshal"
—
meaning Defendant Goring "explained that the strength-
ening of the war potential of the Reich must be the chief
aim of all measures to be taken in the East."
I next quote the first two lines of the last paragraph on Page 1

of the English text. The German text appears at Page 2, lines 2 to 4.

"Agriculture: The task consists of obtaining the greatest
possible agricultural production from the new eastern Gaue,
disregarding questions of ownership."
I next quote from the second paragraph of Page 2 of the EngUsh
text. This is at Page 3, lines 22-24, of the German text:
"Special questions concerning the Government General. . .

The Government General will have to receive the Jews who

are ordered to emigrate from Germany and the new eastern
Gaue."
Finally, I quote the paragraph numbered 2 under Roman
numeral II of Page 2 ofthe English text. These statements appear
in the German text at Page 4, lines 3-19:
"The following reported on the situation in the Eastern
territories. . .

"2. Reichsstatthalter Gauleiter Forster" —

who said " 'The —
population of the Danzig- West Prussia Gau (newly acquired
territories) is 1.5 million, of whom 240,000 are Germans,
850,000 well-established Poles, and 300,000 immigrant Poles,
Jews, and asocials (1,800 Jews). There have been evacuated
87,000 persons, 40,000 of these from Gdynia. From there also
the numerous shirkers, who are now looked after by welfare,
will have to be deported to the Government General. There-
fore an evacuation of 20,000 additional persons can be counted
on for the current year.' "
Comparable reports were made by other Gauleiter at the
meeting. The figures that were quoted, it may be noted, were only
as of February 1940. The forcible deportations, which are reported
in the exhibits from which I have just read, did not involve merely
ordering the unfortunate victims to leave their homes and to take
up new residences elsewhere. These deportations were accomplished
according to plan in an utterly brutal and inhuman manner. Docu-
ment Number 1918-PS, which is Exhibit Number USA-304, affords
striking proof of this fact; and I offer it in evidence. This is a

581
14 Dec. 45

speech delivered by Himmler to officers of the SS on a day-

commemorating the presentation of the Nazi flag. It is contained
in a compilation of speeches delivered by Himmler, and was
captured by the Counter-intelligence branch of the United States
Army. The exact date of the speech does not appear in the exhibit,
but its contents plainly show that it was delivered sometime after
Poland had been overrun. I quote from the second to the eighth
lines of Page 1 of the English text. In the German text this
quotation appears on Page 52, lines 2 to 10. In this speech Himmler
said, and I quote:
"Very frequently the member of the Waffen-SS thinks about
the deportation of these people here. These thoughts came
to me today when watching the very difficult work out there
performed by the Security Police, supported by your men,
who help them a great deal. Exactly the same thing
happened in Poland in weather 40 degrees below zero, where
we had to haul away thousands, ten thousands, a hundred
thousand; where we had to have the toughness you should —
—
hear this but also forget it again to shoot thousands of
leading Poles."
I repeat the latter statement:
"Where we had to have the toughness ... to shoot thousands
of leading Poles."
Such Poles from the incorporated area as managed to survive
the journey to the Government General could look forward, at
best, to extreme hardship and exposure to every form of degra-
dation and brutality. Your Honors will recall Defendant Frank's
statement contained in Document Number EC-344(16), now Exhibit
Number USA-297, which was introduced a short while ago, that
the Polish economy would be reduced to the absolute minimum
necessary for the bare existence of the population.
Your Honors will also recall Defendant Göring's directive in
Document Number EC-410, now Exhibit Number USA-298, also
introduced a few moments ago, that all industrial enterprises in
the Government General not absolutely necessary for the main-
tenance of the naked existence of the Polish population must be
removed to Germany. A bare and naked existence, by the precepts
of the conspirators, meant virtual starvation.
For the Jews who were forcibly deported to the Government
General there was, of course, absolutely no hope. They were, in
effect, deported to their graves. The Defendant Frank, by his own
admissions, had dedicated himself to their complete annihilation.
I refer Your Honors to the Frank diaries, conference volume, 1941,
October to December, which is Document Number 2233(d)-PS, which
was introduced by Major Walsh earlier as Exhibit Number USA-281.

582
 14 Dec. 45

The particular statement that I want to quote appears on Page 4,

Your Honor, of Document Number 2233-PS. I believe it appears at
Page 77, lines 9 and 10 of the German text. I quote this is what —
Defendant Frank stated, "We must annihilate the Jews, wherever
we find them, and wherever it is possible. ..."
I turn next to that aspect of the conspirators' program which
involved the forcible Germanization of persons in the incorporated
area who were deemed to possess German blood. I refer you now,
Your Honors, to the incorporated area, to persons who were deemed
to possess German blood. Such persons, the evidence will show,
were given the choice of the concentration camp or submission to
Germanization. Himmler was the chief executioner of this program;
and initially I should like to introduce a few documents which
disclose the powers bestowed upon him and his conception of
his task.
First, I evidence Document Number 686-PS. This is
offer in
Exhibit Number USA-305.
This is a copy of a secret decree signed
by Hitler and Defendants Goring and Keitel, dated 7 October 1939,
entrusting Himmler with the task of executing the conspirators'
Germanization program. This particular document came from the
ministerial collection center at Kassel, Germany. I quote from
Page 1, lines 9 to 21 of the English text. In the German text
these extracts appear at Page 1, lines 13 to 25:
"The Reichsführer SS" —that was Himmler— "has the obliga-
tion in accordance with my directives:
"1. To bring back for final return into the Reich all German
nationals and racial Germans in the foreign countries.
"2. To eliminate the harmful influence of such alien parts of
the population which represent a danger to the Reich and
the German folk community.
"3. The forming of new German settlements by resettling and,
in particular,by settling the returning German citizens and
racial Germans from abroad.
"The Reidisführer SS is authorized to take all necessary
general and administrative measures for the execution of
his obligation."
Himmler's conception of his task under this decree is plainly
stated in the foreword which he wrote for the Deutsche Arbeit
issue of June- July 1942. The foreword is contained in Document
Number 2915-PS, now Exhibit Number USA-306. I quote from the
first four lines of the English text. The German text appears at
Page 157:
"It is our task" —Himmler wrote — "to germanize the East,
not in the old sense— that is, to teach the people there the

583
14 Dec. 45

German language and German law —but to see to it that

only people of purely German, Germanic blood live in the
East. Signed, Himmler."
I next offer in evidence Document Number 2916-PS, which is

Exhibit Number USA-307. This document contains various

materials taken out of Der Menscheneinsatz of 1940, a confidential
publication issued by Himmler's office for the consolidation of
German nationhood. I quote initially from Page 1, lines 7 to 11.
In the German text these extracts appear at Page 51, first four
lines under the letter "D." I quote:

"The removal of foreign races from the incorporated Eastern

Territories is one of the most essential goals to be
accomplished in the German
East. This is the chief national
has to be executed in the incorporated
political task, w^hich
Eastern Territories by the Reichsführer SS, Reich Commis-
sioner for the Preservation of German Nationality."
I next quote from lines 33 to 39 of Page 1 of the English text.

In the German text these extracts appear on Page 52, lines 14 to 20.
I quote:

"There are the following two primary reasons which make

the regaining of this lost German blood an urgent necessity:
"1. Prevention of a further increase of the Polish intelligentsia
through families of German descent, even if they are
Polonized.
"2. Increase of the population by racial elements desirable
for the German nation and the acquisition of ethno-
biologically unobjectionable forces for the German recon-
struction of agriculture and industry."
Further light thrown upon the goals which the conspirators
is

had set Germanization program in conquered Eastern

for their
areas by a speech delivered by Himmler on 14 October 1943. This
speech was published by the National Socialist leadership staff of
the OKW. The document came to us through the Document
Section, 3rd U.S. Infantry Division. Excerpts from this speech are
set forth in L-70, which is Exhibit Number USA-308. I quote
all of the English text; and in the German text these excerpts
appear at Page 23, lines 6 to 11, 12 to 15, 20 to 23, and Page 30,
lines 7 to 16. Himmler said, and I quote:
"Therefore, I consider that in dealing with members of a
foreign country, especially some Slav nationality, we must
not start from German points of view, we must not endow
these people with decent German thoughts and logical
conclusions of which they are not capable, but we must take
them as they really are*

584
 —

14 Dec. 45

"Obviously in such a mixture of peoples there will always

be some racially good types. Therefore I think that it is our
duty to take their children with us, to remove them from
their environment, if necessary, by robbing or stealing them.
Either we win over the good blood that we can use for
ourselves and give it a place in our people or we destroy
. . .

that blood."
Continuing the German text on Page 30, lines 7 to 16, which
is continuation of the English text,
a I believe. Your Honor
Himmler stated and I quote:
"For us the end of this war will mean an open road to the
East, the creation of the Germanic Reich in this way or
that . the fetching home of 30 million human beings of our
. .

blood, so that still during our lifetime we shall be a people

of 120 milUon Germanic souls. That means that we shall be
the sole and decisive power in Europe. That means that we
shall then be able to tackle the peace, during which we shall
be willing for the first 20 years to rebuild and spread out our
villages and towns, and that we shall push the borders of our
German race 500 kilometers farther to the East."
In furtherance of the unlawful plans disclosed by the last four
exhibits, which have been offered in evidence, the conspirators con-
trived a racial register in the incorporated area of Poland. The
racial register was, in effect, an elaborate classification of persons
deemed to be of German blood, and contained provisions setting
forth some of the rights, privileges, and duties of the persons in
each classification. Persons were classified into four groups:
(1) Germans who had actively promoted the Nazi cause;

(2) Germans who had been more or less passive in the Nazi
struggle, but had retained their German nationahty;
(3) Persons of German extraction who, although previously
connected with the Polish nation, were willing to submit to
Germanization;
(4) Persons of German descent, who had been "poUtically ab-
sorbed by the Polish nation," and who would be resistant to
Germanization.
The racial register was inaugurated under a decree of 12 Sep-
tember 1940 issued by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the
consolidation of German nationhood, and this is contained in Docu-
ment Number 2916-PS, previously introduced in evidence. That is
Exhibit Number USA-307. I quote from Page 4 of the English text,
lines 14 to 46. In the German text these extracts appear at Page 92,
lines 29 to the end of the page, and lines 1 to 9 of Page 93. I
quote:

585
 .

14 Dec. 45

"For inter-office use the list of racial Germans will be divided

into four groups:
"1. Racial Germans who fought actively in the ethnic struggle.
Besides the membership of a German organization, every other
deliberated activity in favor of the Germans against a foreign
nationality will be considered an active manifestation.
"2. Racial Germans who did not actively intervene in favor

of the German nationality but had preserved their traceable

German nationality,
"3.Persons of German descent who became connected with
the Pölish nation in the course of the years but have, on
account of their attitude, the pre-requisites to become full-
fledged members of the German national community. To this
group belong also persons of non-German descent who live in
a people's mixed marriage with an ethnic German in which
the German spouse has prevailed. Persons of Masurian,
Kushubian, Slonzak, or Upper Silesian descent, who are to be
recognized as racial Germans usually belong to this group 3.
"4. Persons of German descent politically absorbed by the
Polish nation (renegades). Persons not included on the list
of racial Germans are Poles or other foreign nationals. Their
treatment is regulated by B II ...
"Members of groups 3 and 4 have to be educated as full
Germans, that is, they have to be re-germanized in the
course of time through an intensive educational training in
Old Germany.
"The establishment of members of group 4 has to be based
on the doctrine that German blood must not be utilized in the
interest of a foreign nation. Against those who refuse re-Ger-
."
manization. Security Police measures are to be taken . . .

The basic idea of creating a racial register for persons of Ger-

man extraction was later incorporated in a decree of 4 March 1941
signed by Himmler and the Defendants Frick and Hess. This decree
is dated 4 March 1941; and is set forth in the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1941,
Part 1, Page 118. We ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice thereof.
The entire apparatus of the SS was thrown behind the vigorous
execution of these decrees. Proof of this fact is contained in Docu-
ment Number R-112, which is Exhibit Number USA-309, and I now
offer it in evidence. This exhibit contains directives issued by
Himmler as the Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of Ger-
man nationhood. I quote first from the last two paragraphs of the
English text of the directives, 16 February 1942, which is on Page 3
of this exhibit. In the German text this provision appears on Page 1
of the first decree, dated 16 February 1942, Paragraph 1 and 2. The
directive provided, and I now quote:

586
 —

14 Dec. 45

"I. Where racial Germans have not applied for entry in the
German ethnical list you will instruct the subordinate agen-
cies to turn over their names to the local State Police
(superior) Office. Subsequently, you will report to me.

"II. The local State Police (superior^ Office will charge the
persons whose names are turned over to it to prove within
8 days that they have applied for entry in the German eth-
nical list.

"Ifsuch proof is not submitted, the person in question is to

be taken into protective custody for transfer to a concentra-
tion camp."
The measures taken against persons in the fourth category
—
"Polonized Germans" as the conspirators called them were partic-
ularly harsh. These persons were resistant to Germanization, and
ruthless measures calculated to break their resistance were pre-
scribed. Where the individual's past history indicated that he could
not be effectively germanized, he was thrown into a concentration
camp.
Some of these measures are set forth in Subparagraph A of
Paragraph II on Page 5 of Document R-112, and I quote in full from
the English text of that particular paragraph. This passage is set
forth in the German text at Pages 2 and 3 of the second decree
dated 16 February 1942 under II. This is what the directive
provides:
"II. The re-Germanization of the Polonized Germans presup-
poses their complete separation from Polish surroundings.
For that reason the persons entered in Division 4 of the Ger-
man ethnical list are to be dealt with in the following manjier:
"A. They are to be resettled in Old Reich territory.
"1.The Higher SS and Police Leaders are charged with
evacuating and resettling them in Old Reich territory accord-
ing to instructions which will follow later.
"2. Asocial persons and others who are of inferior hereditary
quality will not be included in the resettlement. Their names
will be turned over at once by the Higher SS and Police
Leaders (Inspectors of Security Police and Security Service)
to the competent State Police (superior) Offtce. The latter
will arrange for their transfer to a concentration camp.
"3.Persons with a particularly bad political record will not
be included in the resettlement action. Their names will also
be given by the Higher SS and Police Leaders (Inspectors
of Security Police and Security Service) to the competent
State Police (superior) Office for transfer to a concentration
camp.

587
14 Dec. 45

"The wives and children of such persons are to be resettled

in Old Reich territory and to be included in the Germani-
zation measures. Where the wife also has a particularly bad
political rècord and cannot be included in the resettlement
action, her name, too, is to be turned over to the competent
State Police (superior) Office with a view to transferring her
to a concentration camp. In such cases the children are to be
separated from their parents and dealt with according to III,
Paragraph 2 of this decree.
"Persons are to be considered as having a particularly bad
political record who have offended the German nation to a
very great degree (for example, those who participated in
persecutions of Germans, or boycotts of Germans, et cetera.)"
Coincident with the program of germanizing persons of German
extraction in the incorporated areas, the conspirators, as previously
indicated, undertook to settle large numbers of Germans of proven
Nazi convictions in that area. This aspect of their program is clearly
shown by an article by SS Obergruppenführer and General of the
Police Wilhelm Koppe, who was one of Himmler's trusted agents.
Excerpts from this article are contained in Document Number
2915-PS, which was earlier introduced as Exhibit Number USA-306.
I quote from the second paragraph of the English text of this
exhibit. The German text appears at the third line from the bottom
of Page 170 and continues to the first full paragraph of Page 171.
I now quote Koppe's statement:

"The victory of German weapons in the East must, therefore,

be followed by the victory of the German race over the Polish
race, if the regained Eastern sphere —
according to the Füh-
rer's will —shall henceforth remain for all time an essential
constituent part of the Greater German Reich. It is therefore
of decisive importance to infiltrate German farmers, laborers,
civil servants, merchants, and artisans into the regained
German region so that a living and deep-rooted bastion of
German people can be formed as a protective wall against
foreign penetration and possibly as a starting point for the
racial infusion of the territories farther east."

THE PRESIDiy^T: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

CAPT. HARRIS: Up to this point we have been speaking of the

Germanization measures in the incorporated areas. I should like
now briefly to turn to the Germanization program in the Govern-
ment General.

588
 H Dec. 45

In the Government General there were relatively few persons,

at the outset, who qualified as Germans according to the conspira-
tors' standards. Hence little would be served by the introduction
of a racial register categorizing persons of German extraction on
the model of the one instituted in the incorporated area; and to our
knowledge, no such racial register was prescribed in the Govern-
ment General. Rather, the plan seems to have been (a) to make the
—
Government General a colony of Germany, which as Your Honors
will recall from Document EC-344(16), which has been introduced
as Exhibit Number USA-297 — was the objective expressed by the
Defendant Frank; and (b) to create so-called "German island settle-
ments" in the productive farming areas. These island settlements
were to be created by an influx of German persons who faithfully
adhered to the principles of National Socialism.
In this connection I offer in evidence Document Number 910-PS.
This is Exhibit Number USA-310. These are secret notes bearing
the date line, "Department of the Interior, Krakow, 30 March 1942,"
and they concerned Himmler's statements upon the planned Ger-
manization of the Government General. This document was obtained
from the 3rd Army intelligence center at Freising, Germany; and
I now quote from Page 2 of the English text, from line 3 to the end

of the report. This appears in the German text at Page 2, line 21,
continuing to the end of the report. The document states, and I
quote:
"The Reichsführer — —
SS" Himmler "developed additional
trains of ideas to the effect that, in the first 5-year plan for
resettlement after the war, the new German Eastern terri-
tories should first be filled; it is intended afterwards to
provide the Crimea and the Baltic countries with a German
upper class at least. Into the Government General, perhaps,
further German island settlements should be newly trans-
planted from European nations. An exact decision in this
respect, however, has not been issued. In any case, it is
wished that at first a heavy colonization along the San and
the Bug be achieved so that the parts of Poland with alien
populations are encircled. Hitherto, it has been always proved
that this kind of encircling leads most quickly to the desired
nationalization."

In this same connection, I offer in evidence Document Number

2233(h)-PS. This Defendant Frank's diary, 1941, Volume II, Page
is
317. This is Exhibit Number USA-311. I quote from the last sen-
tence at the bottom of our Page 3 of the English text of this exhibit.
In the German text this passage appears on Page 317, lines 25 to
28. Defendant Frank stated in this diary, and I quote:

589
14 Dec. 45

"Thanks to the heroic courage of our soldiers this territory-

has become German; and the time will come when the valley
of the Vistula, from its source to its mouth at the sea, will
be as German as the valley of the Rhine."
I now
turn to another phase of the program that I mentioned
plan to confiscate the property of
earlier, that is the -conspirators'
Poles, Jews, and dissident elements. As I previously mentioned,
the evidence will show that these plans were designed to accomplish
a number of objectives. Insofar as the Jews were concerned, they
were part and parcel of the conspirators' overall program of exter-
mination. Confiscation was also a means of providing property for
German settlers and of rewarding those who had rendered faithful
service to the Nazi State. This phase of their program likewise
made available dispossessed Polish farmers for slave labor in Ger-
many and operated to further the conspirators* objective of pre-
venting the growth of another generation of Poles.
Proof of the fact that the conspirators confiscated the property
of Poles in furtherance of their Germanization and slave labor pro-
gram is contained in Document Number 1352-PS, previously intro-
duced by Mr. Dodd as Exhibit Number USA-176. This exhibit
contains a number of reports by one Kusche, who appears to have
been one of Himmler's diief deputies in Poland. Mr. Dodd quoted
from one of Kusche's confidential reports, dated 22 May 1940, at our
Page 4, Paragraph 5 of the English text. In the German text it is
at Page 9, lines 16 to 18. In this statement Kusche pointed out that
it was possible, without difficulty, to confiscate small farms and
that —
and I now quote:
"The former owners of Polish farms together with their fami-
lies will be transferred to the Old Reich by the labor offices
for employment as farm workers."
I now desire to quote from another report by Kusche contained
in the same exhibit and bearing the same date, 22 May 1940. I
think the upper right-hand comer numbers might simplify it. The
report from which I now quote is marked "secret" and is entitled,
"... Details of the Confiscation in the Bielsko Region." Initially, I
should like to quote from the last paragraph at the bottom of
Page 1 of this exhibit. This exhibit, you will recall, is 1352-PS, last
paragraph at the bottom of Page 1. The German text is at Page 11,
Paragraphs 1 and 2. Kusche stated, and I quote:
"Some days ago the commandant of the concentration camp
being built at Auschwitz called on Staff Leader Müller and
requested suppert for the carrying out of his assignments. He
said that it was absolutely necessary to confiscate the agri-
cultural enterprises within a certain area around the concen-
tration camp, since not onl.y the fields but also in some cases

590

I
 14 Dec. 45

the farm houses of these border directly on the concentration

camp. A
local inspection held on the 21st of this month
revealed the following:
"There is no room for doubt that agricultural enterprises
bordering on the concentration camp must be confiscated at
once. In addition, the camp commandant requests that further
plots of farm land be placed at his disposal, so that he can
keep the prisoners busy. This, too, can be done without diffi-
culty since enough land can be made available for the pur-
pose. The owners of the plots are all Poles."
I next quote from Page 2, lines 22 to 31, of the English text of

this same exhibit. The German text is at Page 12, Paragraph 2,

continuing through to line 22 from the top of the page. I quote:
"I had the following discussion with the chief of the labor
office in Bielsko:
"The lack of agricultural laborers still exists in the Old Reich.
The transfer of the previous owners of the confiscated agri-
cultural enterprises to the Reich as farm workers, together
with their entire families, is possible without any difficulty.
It is only necessary for the labor office to receive the lists of
the persons in time, in order to enable it to take the neces-
sary steps (collection of transportation; distribution over the
various regions in need of such labor)."
Finally, I quote from Page 3 of this same exhibit, lines 6 to 13
of the English text. The German text appears at Page 13, the last
three lines, continuing through to Page 14, line 9:
"The confiscation of these Polish enterprises in Alzen will also
be carried out within the next few days. The commandant of
the concentration camp will furnish SS men and a truck for
the execution of the action. Should it not yet be possible to
take the Poles from i^.lzen to Auschwitz" and Auschwitz, —
Your Honors will recall, is wher« the concentration camp
—
was "they should be transferred to the empty castle at
Zator. The liberated Polish property is to be given to the
needy racial German farmers for their use."
In order to regularize the program of confiscation, Defendant
Goring issued a decree on September 17, 1940. This decree appears
in the Reichsgesetzhlatt, 1940, Part I, Page 1270; and I ask the Tri-
bunal to take judicial notice of it. Under Section 2 of this decree
sequestration of movable and immovable property, stores, and other
intangible property, interests of Jews and "persons who have fled
or are not merely temporarily absent", was made mandatory. In
addition, sequestration was authorized under Section 2, Subsection 2,
if the property was required "for the public welfare, particularly
in the interests of Reich defense or the strengthening of German

591
14 Dec. 45

folkdom." By Section 9 of this decree, issued by Defendant Goring,

confiscation of sequestrated property was authorized "if the pubUc
welfare, particularly the defense of the Reich, or the strengthening
of German folkdom, so requires." However, Section 1, Subsection 2,
of the decree provided that property of German nationals was not
subject to sequestration and confiscation; and Section 13 provided
that sequestration would be suspended if the owner of the property
asserted that he was a German. The decree, on its face, indicates
very clearly a purpose to strip Poles, Jews, and dissident elements
of their property. It was, moreover, avowedly designed to promote
Germanism.
We ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. It is in the Reichs-
gesetzhlatt.
Apparently some question arose at one point as to whether the
decree required that a determination be made in each case, involv-
ing the property of a Pole, that the property was required "for
the public welfare, particularly in the interests of Reich defense or
the strengthening of German folkdom." The answer supplied by the
conspirators was firm and clear. In any case in which the property
of a Pole is involved, the "strengthening of German folkdom"
required its seizure. In this connection I offer in evidence document
Number R-92, which is Exhibit Number USA-312. This document,
which is dated 15 April 1941, bears the letterhead of the Reich
Leader SS, commissioner for the consolidation of German nation-
hood, and is entitled, "Instruction for Internal Use on the Appli-
cation of the Law Concerning Property of the Poles, of 17 Sep-
tember 1940." This document was captured by the U.S. CouAter-
Intelligence Corps. I quote from Page 2, lines 11 to 14 of the Eng-
lish text. In the German text this statement appears at Page 3,
Paragraph 2, Subparagraph 2. I quote:
"The objective conditions permitting seizure according to
Section II, Subsection 2(a), are to be assumed whenever, for
example, the property belongs to a Pole, for the Polish real
estate will beneeded without exception for the preservation
of the German folkdom."

In the Government General Defendant Frank promulgated a

decree on 24 January 1940 authorizing sequestration for the "per-
formance of tasks serving the public interest" and liquidation of
"anti-social or financially unremunerative concerns." The decree is
embodied in the Verordnungsblatt of the Government General,
Number 6, 27 January 1940, Page 23; and we ask the Tribunal to
take judicial notice of it. The undefined criteria in this decree
obviously empowered Nazi officials in the Government General to
engage in wholesale seizure of property.

592
 14 Dec. 45

The magnitude of the conspirators' confiscation program in

Poland was staggering. I ask Your Honors to turn to the chart on
the sixth page of Document Number R-92, which was introduced
into evidence a moment ago as Exhibit Number USA-312.
This chart shows that as of 31 May 1943 the staggering total of
693,252 estates, comprising 6,097,525 hectares, had been seized and
9,508 estates, comprising 270,446 hectares, had been confiscated by
the Estate Offices Danzig-West Prussia, Posen, Ciechanôw, and
Silesia. This, it will be noted, represented the seizure and confis-
cation of only four offices.
That, Your Honors, concludes our discussion on Poland; and I
now turn to Czechoslovakia. At this point of the proceedings we
shall introduce only one document upon Czechoslovakia. This one
document, however, contains a startling revelation of the conspira-
tors' plans to germanize Bohemia and Moravia. It relates how three
plans, each characterized by its severity, were discussed; and finally
how the Führer decided on plan (c), which involved the assimila-
tion of about one-half of the Czech population by the Germans and
the extermination of the other half. Moreover, the plan envisaged
a large influx into Czechoslovakia of Germans whose loyalty to the
Führer was unquestioned. I offer this document in evidence. It
is Document Number 862-PS, and it is Exhibit Number USA-313.
This is a top-secret report, dated 15 October 1940, which was .

written by General Friderici, Deputy General of the Wehrmacht

in Bohemia and Moravia. On the face of the document, it appears
that only four copies were made. The document we offer in evi-
dence is the original document, which was found among the captured
files of the OKW. This document bears the handwritten letters "K"
and "J" on the first page on the left-hand side, and I am advised
that the handwriting is unquestionably that of Defendants Keitel
and Jodl. I quote the document in its entirety:
"On 9 October of this year the office of the Reich Protector
held an official conference in which State Secretary SS
Gruppenführer K. H. Frank spoke about the following .
."
. .

SS Gruppenführer K. H. Frank, it may be noted, was Secretary

of State under Defendant Von Neurath, who at the date of this
report was the Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.
THE PRESIDENT: Who did you say Frank was?
CAPT. HARRIS: Frank was an SS Gruppenführer, and Secre-
tary of State under Defendant Von Neurath. He is not the Defend-
ant Hans Frank. At the date of this particular report Von Neurath,
under whom K. H. Frank served, was the Protector of Bohemia and
Moravia. Continuing the quotation:
"Since creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
Party agencies, industrial circles, as well as agencies of the

593
14 Dec. 45

central authorities of Berlin, have considered a solution for

the Czech problem.
"After ample deliberation, the Reich Protector expressed his
views about the various plans in a memorandum. In this
three ways of solution were indicated:
"a) German infiltration of Moravia and confinement of the
Czech nationals to a residual Bohemia. This solution is con-
sidered unsatisfactory, because the Czech problem, even if in
diminished form, will continue to exist.
"b) Many arguments can be brought up against the most
radical solution, namely, the deportation of all Czechs. There-
fore, in the memorandum it is concluded that it cannot be
carried out within a reasonable period of time,
"c) Assimilation of the Czechs, that is, absorption of about
half of the Czech nationals by the Germans insofar as these
are of racial or otherwise valuable importance. This will also
be caused, among other things, by increased employment of
Czechs in the Reich territory (with the exception of the
Sudeten German border districts), in other words, by dis-
persing the concentrations of Czech nationals.
"The other half of the Czech nationals must be deprived of
their power, eliminated, and shipped out of the country by
methods. This applies particularly to the racially
all sorts of
mongoloid part and to the major part of the intellectual class.
The latter can scarcely be converted and would become a
burden by constantly making claims for the leadership over
the other Czech classes and thus interfering with a possible
rapid assimilation.
"Elements which counteract the planned Germanization ought
to be handled roughly and eliminated.
"The above development naturally pre-supposes an increased
influx of Germans from the Reich territory into the Pro-
tectorate.
"Having been reported, the Führer has chosen solution (c)
(assimilation)as a directive for the solution of the Czech
problem and decided that, while keeping up the autonomy of
the Protectorate on the surface, the Germanization will have
to be carried out in a centralized way by the office of the
Reich Protector for years to come.
"From the above no particular conclusions are to be drawn
by the Armed Forces. This is the line which has always been
taken here. In this connection I refer to my memorandum
submitted to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed
Forces, dated 12 July 1939, file number 6/39, top secret,
entitled 'The Czech Problem' (attached as annex).

594
 14 Dec. 45

"The Representative of the Armed Forces with the Reich Pro-

tector in Bohemia — —
and Moravia." Signed "Friderici, Gen-
eral of Infantry."
With the permission of Your Honors, I should like to comment
further upon some parts of this memorandum. First, I invite your
attention to solution (a). This solution would have called for Ger-
man infiltration into Moravia and the forcible removal of the Czechs
from that area to Bohemia. As Your Honors know, Moravia lies
between Bohemia and Slovakia. Thus solution (a) would have
involved the erection of a German State between Bohemia and
Slovakia, and would have prevented effective inter-communications
between the Czechs and the Slovaks. In this manner, the historic
desire for unity of these two groups of peace-loving people and the
continued existence of their Czechoslovakian State would have been
frustrated. Solution (a), it may be noted, was rejected because the
surviving Czechs, even though compressed into a "residual Bohemia",
would have remained to plague the conspirators.
Solution (b) which involved the forcible deportation of all Czechs
was rejected, not because its terms were deemed too drastic, but
rather because a more speedy resolution of the problem was desired.
Solution (c), as shown in the exhibit, was regarded as the most
desirable and was adopted. This solution first provided for the
assimilation of about one-half of the Czechs. This meant two things:
a. Enforced Germanization for those who were deemed racially
qualified and b. deportation to slave labor in Germany for others.
"Increased employment of Czechs in the Reich territory" as stated
in the exhibit meant, in reality, slave labor in Germany.
Solution (c) further provided for the elimination and deportation
"by all sorts of methods" of the other half of the Czech population,
particularly the intellectuals and those who did not meet the racial
standards of the conspirators. Intellectuals everywhere were an
anathema to the Nazi conspirators, and the Czech intellectuals were
no exception. Indeed, the Czech intellectuals, as the conspirators
well knew, had a conspicuous record of gallantry, self-sacrifice, and
resistance to the Nazi ideology. They were, therefore, to be exter-
minated. As will be shown in other connections, that section of the
top-secret report which stated "elements* which counteract the
planned Germanization are to be handled roughly and eliminated"
meant that intellectuals and other dissident elements were either
to be thrown in concentration camps or immediately exterminated.
In short, the provisions of solution (c) were simply a practical
application of the conspirators' philosophy as expressed in Himm-
ler's speech, part of which we have quoted in L-70, already pre-
sented in evidence as Exhibit Number USA-308. Himmler said that
"either we win over any good blood that we can use for our-
selves ... or we destroy this blood."

595
14 Dec. 45

I now turn briefly to the conspirators' program of spoliation and

Germanization in the western occupied countries. Evidence which
will be presented at a later stage of this proceeding will show how
the conspirators sought to germanize the western occupied coun-
tries; how they stripped the conquered countries in the West of
food and raw materials, leaving to them scarcely enough to main-
tain a bare existence; how they compelled local industry and agri-
culture to satisfy the insatiable wants of the German civilian
population and the Wehrmacht; and finally how the spoliation in
the western occupied countries was aided and abetted by excessive
occupation charges, compulsory and fraudulent clearing arrange-
ments, and confiscation of their gold and foreign exchange. The
evidence concerning these matters which will be presented in great
detail by the Prosecutor for the Republic of France is so overwhelm-
ing that the inference is inescapable that the conspirators' acts
were committed according to plan.
However, it will not be until after the Christmas recess that the
evidence concerning the execution of the conspirators' plans in the
West will be presented to this Tribunal. Accordingly, by way of
illustration, and for the purpose of show«:ng in this presentation
that the conspirators' plans embraced the occupied Western coun-
tries as well as the East, we now offer in evidence a single exhibit
on this aspect of the case, R-114, which is Exhibit Number USA-314.
This document was obtained from the U.S. Counter-intelligence
branch. This exhibit consists of a memorandum dated 7 August 1942
and a memorandum dated 29 August 1942 from Himmler's personal
files. The former memorandum deals with a conference of SS offi-
cers and bears the title, "Directions for the Treatment of Deported
Alsatians." The latter memorandum is marked secret and is entitled,
"Shifting of Alsatians into the Reich." The memoranda comprising
this exhibit show that plans were made and partially executed to
remove all elements from Alsace which were hostile to the con-
spirators and to germanize the province. I quote from Page 1,
lines 21 to 31, of the English text entitled, "Directions for the
Treatment of Deported Alsatians." These extracts contained in the
German text at Page 1, the last 8 lines, and Page 2, lines 1 to 5.

Inow quote:
"The first expulsion action was carried out in Alsace in the
period from July to December 1940; in the course of it 105,000
persons were either expelled or prevented from returning.
They were in the main Jews, gypsies and other foreign racial
elements, criminals, asocial and incurably insane persons, and
in addition Frenchmen and Francophiles. The patois-speaking
population was combed out by this series of deportations in
the same way as the other Alsatians.

596
 —
14 Dec. 45

"Referring to the permission the Führer had given him to

cleanse Alsace of all foreign, sick, or unreliable elements,
Gauleiter Wagner has recently pointed out the political
—
necessity of a new deportation" zweite Aussiedlungsaktion
"which is to be prepared as soon as possible."
I should like Your Honors to permit me to defer the remainder
of this presentation until Monday. Mr. Justice Jackson would like
to make a few remarks to the Tribunal.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please I wish
the Tribunal,
to bring to the attention of the Tribunal and Defense Counsel
of the
some matters concerning the case as it will take its course next
week, in the belief that it will result in expediting our procedure
if, over the weekend, our program can be considered.

Captain Harris' presentation will take a short time longer on

Monday; and when it has concluded, the presentation by the United
States will have reached that part of the Indictment which seeks
a declaratory judgment of this Tribunal that six of the organizations
named therein are criminal organizations. They effect such a find-
ing only that they may constitute such a basis for prosecution
against individual members in other courts than this, proceedings in
which every defense will be open to an accused individual, except
that he may not deny the findings made by this Tribunal as to the
character of the organization of which he was a member.
The United States desires to offer this evidence under conditions
which will save the time of the Tribunal and advance the prose-
cution as rapidly as possible so that United States personnel can
he released.
We also desire defendants' counsel to have before them as much
as possible of our evidence against organizations before the Christ-
mas recess so that they may use that recess time to examine it and
to prepare their defenses and that we may be spared any further
applications for delay for that purpose.
The substance of our proposal is that all of the ultimate ques-
tions on this branch of the case be reserved for consideration after
the evidence is before the Tribunal. The real question, we submit,
is not whether to admit the evidence. The real quéstion is its value
and its legal consequences under the provisions of this Charter. All
of the evidence which we will tender will be tendered in the belief
that it cannot be denied to have some probative value and that it
is relevant to the charges made in the Indictment. And those are
the grounds upon which the Charter authorizes a rejection of evi-
dence.
At the time we seek no advantage from this suggestion except
the advantage of saving time to the Tribunal and to ourselves to
get as much of the case as possible in the hands of the defendants

597
14 Dec. 45

before the Christmas recess and to urge the ultimate issues only
when they can be intelligibly argued and understood on the basis
of a real record instead of on assumptions and hypothetical state-
ments of fact.
In offering this evidence as to the organizations, therefore, we-
propose to stipulate as follows:
Every objection of any character to any item of the evidence
offered by the United States, as against these organizations, may
be deemed to be reserved and fully available to Defense Counsel
at any time before the close of the United States case with the same
effect as if the objection had been made when the evidence was
offered.All evidence on this subject shall remain subject to a con-
tinuing power of the Tribunal, on motion of any counsel or on its
own motion, to strike, unprejudiced by the absence of objection.
Every question as to the effect of the evidence shall be considered
open and unprejudiced by the fact it has been received without
objection.
Now we recognize the adherent controversial character of the
issues may be raised concerning this branch of the case.
which
What this evidence proves, what organizations it is sufficient to
condemn, and how the Charter applies to it are questions capable
of debate, which we are quite ready to argue when it can be done
in orderly and intelligible fashion. We had expected to do it in
final summation, but we will do it at any time suggested by the
Tribunal, after there is a record on which to found the argument;
and we are willing to do it either before or after the defendants
take up the case. But we do suggest that, if it is done step by step
as the evidence is produced and on questions of admissibility, it
will be disorderly and time-consuming. Piecemeal argument will
consume time by requiring counsel on both sides to recite evidence
that is either in the case, or to speculate as to evidence that is not
yet in, to resort to hypothetical cases, and to do it over and over
again to each separate objection. It will also be disorderly because
of our plan of presentation.
Questions which relate to these organizations go to the very
basis of the proposal made by President Roosevelt to the Yalta Con-
ference, agreement upon which was the basis for this proceeding.
The United States would not have participated in this kind of deter-
mination of question of guilt but for this or some equivalent plan
of reaching thousands of others, who, if less conspicuous, are just
as guilty of these crimes as the men in the dock. Because of partic-
ipation in the framing of the Charter and knowledge of the problem
it was designed to reach, I shall expect to reach the legal issues

involved in these questions.

The evidence, however, will be presented by the lawyers who
have specialized in the search for the arrangement of evidence on

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 14 Dec. 45

a particular and limited charge or indi-ctment. Piecemeal argument,

therefore, would not be orderly, but would be repetitious, incom-
plete, poorly organized, and of little help to the Tribunal. The
issues deserve caref»ul, prepared presentation of the contentions on
both sides.

We will ask, therefore, upon these conditions, which we think

protect everybody's rights and enable the Defense as well as our-
selves to make a better presentation of their questions because they
will have time to prepare them, to lay before the Tribunal, as
rapidly as possible next week and as uninterruptedly as possible,
the evidence which bears upon the accusations against the organi-
zations.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, have you yet communi-

cated that to the defendants' counsel in writing or not?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have not communicated it, unless
it has been sent to the Information Center since noon.
THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, it might be convenient that

you should state what you have stated to us as to objections to the

may thoroughly understand it.
evidence in writing so they
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have prepared to do that and to
supply sufficient copies for members of the Tribunal and for all
defense counsel.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
HERR BÖHM: I represent the members of the S.A. who have
volunteered to be questioned before the Tribunal. I understood the
statement of Justice Jackson only partially. As Defense Counsel
I have no one who can supply me with information and I cannot,
under any circumstances, agree to give my views on statements
which I do not know or which are made known to me in such a way
that I am not in a position to get information.
Ishould like to ask first that I be supplied with a German trans-
lation of the statement which the Prosecution has made on the
future course of the Trial, so that I can express my views on it.
I do not represent here just one person but millions of people who
will, after the Trial, come forward with all sorts of accusations
against me, possibly even justified accusations. My own respon-
sibility, as well as that of my colleagues who represent the organi-
zations, is immense. I should therefore like to request, as a matter
of principle, that anything which is presented in this Trial at all
be submitted to me in the German language, because I am not in
a position to have whole volumes of documents translated into Ger-
—
man from one day to the next documents which could quite easily
be given to me in the German original. This is a circumstance

599
14 Dec. 45

which makes it dreadfully bard for me, as well as for a number

of my colleagues, to follow the Trial at all.
Of the incriminatory evidence against the organizations, I have
previously gathered little in the proceedings up to now. Since,
according to today's statements, however, the evidence against the
organizations is to be presented shortly, I should like to ask emphat-
ically that, if we are to continue to represent the organizations,
the proceedings be conducted in such a way that, in a technical
respect, too, we shall be in a position to carry on the defense in a
responsible manner.
THE PRESIDENT: As you know or have been told, only those
parts of documents which are read before the Tribunal are treated
as being in evidence and therefore you hear through your earphones
everything that is in evidence read to you in German. You know
also that there are two copies of the documents in your Information
Center which are in German. So much for that. That has been the
procedure up to now.
In order to meet the legitimate wishes of German counsel, the
proposal which Mr. Justice Jackson has just made is perfectly
simple, as I understand it, and it is this:

That the question of the criminality of these organizations should

not be argued before the evidence is put in; that the United States
counsel should put in their evidence first,, and that they hope to put
the majority of it in evidence before the Christmas recess, but that
the German counsel (defendants' counsel) shall be at liberty at any
time, up to the time the United States case is finished, to make
objection to any part of the evidence on these criminal organi-
zations. Is that not clear?
HERR BÖHM: Yes, that is clear.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any objection to that procedure?
HERR BÖHM: Yes. The procedure as suggested is clear, but I

think it is highly inadequate. I have as yet had no opportunity to

get into my hands either of the two copies, which are said to be
downstairs in Room 54, maybe because two copies are not sufficient
for the purposes of 25 lawyers, especially if these copies are placed
in Room 54 at 10:30 in the morning, when the session starts at
10:00 o'clock. It would not even suffice if these two copies for 25
of us were placed into our room on the day before, since it is not
possible for all of us to make satisfactory use of these two copies
in so short a time. Arrangements should therefore be made just —
how the Prosecution will make them, I cannot say to enable us to —
—
know at the proper time and I emphasize again, in the German
—
language what the Prosecution expects of us, so that our work
may be of avail to the Tribunal.

600
 14 Dec. 45

THE PRESIDENT: What you have just stated is a general objec-

tion to the procedure which has been adopted up to now and has
nothing to do with the procedure which has been suggested by
Mr. Justice Jackson with reference to these criminal organizations.
His suggestion was that argument on the law of the criminal issue
or the criminal nature of these organizations should be postponed
until the evidence was put in and that the right of Counsel for the
Defense should be to make objection at any stage or, rather, to
defer their objections until the evidence had been put in; and it was
hoped that the evidence would be completed or nearly completed
by the Christmas recess. What you say about the general procedure
may be considered by the Tribunal.
So far as the piarticular question is concerned, namely, the
question of the procedure suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson, have
you any objection to that?
HERR BÖHM: I have objections to this procedure only —
and in
this respect reserve for myself all rights, for the sake of the great
I

—
number of people I represent if it handicaps or hinders me in any
way in representing the interests of my many clients.
THE PRESIDENT: We are aware of that fact, but that does not
seem to be material to the question whether the legal argument
should be deferred until after the evidence is presented. The fact
that you have millions of people to represent has nothing to do with
the question whether the legal argument shall take place before,
or in the middle of, or at the end of the presentation of the evidence.
What I am asking you is: Have you any objection to the legal
argument taking place at the end of the presentation of the evidence?
HERR BÖHM: I have no objection to these suggestions if they
do not impair my defense in any way.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 17 December 1945 at 1000 hours.]

601